T. F. Torrance’s Christological Anthropology (Routledge New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies) 9781032201344, 9781032209029, 9781003265832, 1032201347

Citation preview

T. F. Torrance’s Christological Anthropology

This book demonstrates the promise of Christology for developing Scottish theologian T. F. Torrance’s theological anthropology. T. F. Torrance’s Christological Anthropology: Discerning Humanity in Christ engages with several key themes in Torrance’s theological anthropology and considers how each one of these topics—anthropological method, the metaphysics of human nature, the imago Dei, personhood, vocation, human destiny—can be further developed in light of Christ. Christopher Woznicki argues that Christology not only holds promise for the task of developing Torrance’s insights on humanity but also for developing a constructive account of humanity. The volume is valuable reading for scholars of T. F. Torrance’s theology and for those who are interested in the role of Christology in theological anthropology. Christopher G. Woznicki is an Affiliate Assistant Professor in Theology at Fuller Theological Seminary, USA. He has published various articles in theology and philosophy of religion. His research has appeared in journals such as Calvin Theological Journal, Journal of Reformed Theology, Neue Zeitschrift fur Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, and Philosophia Christi, among others. His research interests include the doctrine of atonement, theological anthropology, prayer, analytic theology, and the Reformed tradition.

Routledge New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies

The Routledge New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies series brings high quality research monograph publishing back into focus for authors, international libraries, and student, academic and research readers. This open-ended monograph series presents cutting-edge research from both established and new authors in the field. With specialist focus yet clear contextual presentation of contemporary research, books in the series take research into important new directions and open the field to new critical debate within the discipline, in areas of related study, and in key areas for contemporary society. Phenomenology and the Horizon of Experience Spiritual Themes in Henry, Marion, and Lacoste Joseph Rivera Evil, Sin, and Christian Theism Andrew Ter Ern Loke Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand of God Brendan Long T. F. Torrance’s Christological Anthropology Discerning Humanity in Christ Christopher G. Woznicki Religion in Reason Metaphysics, Ethics, and Politics in Hent de Vries Edited by Tarek Dika and Martin Shuster Augustine and Contemporary Social Issues Edited by Paul L. Allen For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge. com/religion/series/RCRITREL

T. F. Torrance’s Christological Anthropology Discerning Humanity in Christ

Christopher G. Woznicki

First published 2022 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2022 Christopher G. Woznicki The right of Christopher G. Woznicki to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-032-20134-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-20902-9 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-26583-2 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003265832 Typeset in Sabon by Taylor & Francis Books

To Amelia, Proverbs 31:20

Contents

Foreword Acknowledgments 1 2

Introduction: Approaching T. F. Torrance’s Theological Anthropology

viii x

1

Method: Torrance’s Christological Anthropology and Christ’s Fallen Human Nature

17

3

Nature: The Metaphysics of Human Beings

39

4

Image: The Relational, Dynamic, Ecstatic, and Christological Imago Dei

63

5

Personhood: Onto-Relational Christological Anthropology

90

6

Vocation: Called as Priests to Know and Care for Creation

115

7

Destiny: Christ’s Deification of Human Nature

142

8

Conclusion: A Torrancian Christological Anthropology

167

Index

184

Foreword

For a small country on the edge of Europe, Scotland punches well above its theological weight. In fact, some of the greatest divines in the Christian Church have been Scottish. Think of Richard of St Victor, or Duns Scotus, or John Mair, or John Knox, or John Cameron, or Samuel Rutherford, or Thomas Reid (a philosopher, yes, but also a minister of the Kirk), or Thomas Chalmers, or John McLeod Campbell, or P. T. Forsyth, or John and Donald Baillie, or John Macmurray. These thinkers have made signal contributions to the study of divinity, and in particular to systematic theology. Their literary remains endure, in some cases long after the physical demise of their authors. By any estimate, Thomas Torrance is a divine whose stature places him among this constellation of Scotland’s finest theologians. He is arguably the most influential British theologian of the twentieth century, and one of the most important theologians in the Anglophone world. His intellectual legacy is considerable, spanning the massive translation projects of Barth’s Church Dogmatics and Calvin’s New Testament Commentaries, the founding of a major theological organ in the Scottish Journal of Theology, churchmanship as a minister of the Church of Scotland, chaplain in the Armed Forces, and Moderator of the General Assembly, as well as being a contributor to ecumenical dialogue across theological divisions. In addition to this is the significant body of work he bequeathed his successors, much of which was written or edited in his retirement from the Chair of Christian Dogmatics at New College, University of Edinburgh, where he spent most of his career. Torrance was deeply indebted to the Reformed tradition of theology, and his contribution is very much that of a Scottish Reformed theologian. But he was not narrowly Reformed in his intellectual sensibilities. In fact, he drew deeply from earlier theological resources, particularly those of the Greek Fathers like Athanasius and Irenaeus. And he was well-versed in medieval theology as well as the work of the Magisterial Reformation. John Calvin’s influence upon him is clear, but so too is the work of the nineteenth-century minister, John McLeod Campbell, whose work T. F. Torrance, and his brother J. B. Torrance, did so much to make known to a wider audience in the middle of the twentieth century. No doubt the towering work of his doktorvater, Karl Barth, was a major source for his thinking as well. Yet, for all his affinity with Barth’s project, and

Foreword

ix

his personal involvement with the dissemination of Barth’s theology in English, it has become clear as the secondary literature on his work has matured that Torrance was no mere mouthpiece for Continental theological ideas. He was an important and original theologian in his own right who was not afraid to diverge from Barth’s thinking in a number of significant respects such as on the role of natural theology, and the sacraments. Although he did not write a comprehensive theological anthropology, what can be gleaned of Torrance’s views on this topic from his various writings continues to be of significant interest to theologians today. If we were to summarize his views on the matter, we might, with Dr Woznicki, speak of Torrance’s Christological account of human beings. For Torrance thinks that it is only by means of a right understanding of the centrality and transformative power of the incarnation that we will come to a correct comprehension of the nature and place of humanity in God’s cosmic purposes. Christ is literally the key to ascertaining who we are and what our role as bearers of the divine image should be. Thus, Torrance writes of the vicarious humanity of Christ, according to which in becoming incarnate God the Son assumes and heals human nature as such, in and through the particular human nature of Jesus of Nazareth. He also maintains that Christ bears a fallen but not sinful human nature as part-and-parcel of this process. But Christ not only restores human nature, he deifies it. Torrance is clear that Christ’s mediatorial role doesn’t just yield reconciliation for estranged human creatures. Christ also enables fallen humans to partake of the divine nature by means of his incarnation so that we might become what we were created to be, namely, priests and vice-regents of creation. Previous authors have discussed aspects of Torrance’s theological anthropology at length. But this is the first comprehensive treatment of his theological anthropology. Christopher Woznicki’s careful, critical, and yet sympathetic reading of this Christological theological anthropology represents an important contribution to the growing literature on Torrance’s thought. In each chapter, Woznicki is at pains to give a plausible and charitable account of Torrance’s views, even when he is unable to completely endorse the conclusions that Torrance reaches. At the same time, he has managed to bring to life the ideas with which Torrance wrestled, treating them with the same excitement and fascination that are evident in Torrance’s own reflections on the matter. The result is a philosophically and theologically sophisticated and irenic engagement with the thought of one of Scotland’s finest divines that repays careful study. Oliver D. Crisp University of St Andrews

Acknowledgments

It is often said that writing a book is lonely work; thankfully I have been blessed with having a wonderful community throughout this entire process. Oliver Crisp has been a true model of Christian scholarship. Not only is he an exemplar in terms of quality (and quantity) of his research, he embodies the character and virtues of a Christian scholar. Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen’s encyclopedic knowledge and his consistent encouragement have enriched my theological development. John Thompson—whom I jokingly call my “doktoronkel”—has helped me become a better writer and a better historian. He also introduced me to the em dash; this is a gift for which I will remain forever grateful! I would be remiss if I failed to thank my friends and colleagues. The members of the Analytic Theology for Theological Formation Project—James Arcadi, Oliver Crisp, Jesse Gentile, Steven Nemes, J. T. Turner, Jordan Wessling, and Allison Wiltshire—were a source of encouragement and laughter. I value their friendship and sense of humor even more now since the project has come to an end. I would like to thank those whom I have met along the way that ended up contributing to this dissertation either by reading portions of it or by having conversations about it: Nick Barrett, Rafael Bello, Emily Buck, Marc Cortez, Myk Habets, Scott Harrower, Andrew Hollingsworth, Tom McCall, Sean McGever, Martine Oldhoff, Gavin Ortlund, Jonathan Rutledge, Jason Sexton, Jordan Steffaniak, Jake Stone, Christy Thornton, and Adonis Vidu. My aunt Edna, my in-laws, Brian and Lori Morehead, and my church have been a source of support during the writing process. My daughters, Shiloh and Abigail, have provided me with so much joy; I always looked forward to coming home to them after long days of writing and researching in the library. They truly are a gift from God. My mother, Ingrid, has always pushed me forward in my education, making countless sacrifices for my good. I likely would not be where I am at today if she didn’t make me do educational workbooks, write book reports, and attend creative writing classes during the summers of my childhood. Finally, I want to acknowledge my wife, Amelia. She has been such a strong support over the last several years. Without her companionship, prayers, words of encouragement, and her willingness to put up with me going to countless conferences and workshops, I would have not finished this book.

Acknowledgments

xi

Most importantly, I would like to acknowledge the person whom this dissertation is ultimately about: Jesus Christ. Writing about my Lord and Savior is a fearful task. Nevertheless, it is a privilege to be able to write about him and how he informs our understanding of what it means to be human. May God be glorified through this work. Several of these chapters have appeared elsewhere in slightly different form. Chapter 2 is a lightly revised version of “‘Begin at the Beginning’: Method in Christological Anthropology and T. F. Torrance’s Fallen Human Nature View,” Perichoresis 19 (2021): 21–41. A version of Chapter 3 appeared as “The One and the Many: The Metaphysics of Human Nature in T. F. Torrance’s Doctrine of Atonement,” Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018): 103–26.

1

Introduction Approaching T. F. Torrance’s Theological Anthropology

Theological doctrine deals not only with the God who is known, but also— implicitly and necessarily—with the human subject who seeks to know. John Calvin famously began his Institutes by asserting that “nearly all wisdom we possess … consists of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves.”1 It would be surprising, therefore, if a serious dogmatic theologian—especially one who so identifies with Calvin’s theological project—should fail to address theological anthropology, a standard topic of systematic theology, in a substantive way. Yet precisely such an omission seems to mark the work of Thomas Forsyth Torrance (1913–2007), the eminent Scottish theologian. In his well-received intellectual biography of T. F. Torrance, Alister McGrath writes that Torrance is “widely regarded, particularly outside of Great Britain, as the most significant British academic theologian of the twentieth century.”2 Torrance’s reputation stands not only on a stack of significant works on the relationship between theology and science as well as the doctrine of the Trinity, but also on the accolades he received during his lifetime, including the 1978 Templeton Foundation Prize for Progress in Religion.3 His work on the doctrine of the Trinity led to an important role in the joint statement of agreement about the Trinity between the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and the Orthodox Church. These honors alone are impressive. Torrance, however, is well known not only for these achievements; he, along with Geoffrey Bromiley, was responsible for the large-scale task of editing Barth’s Church Dogmatics—making Barth accessible to the English-speaking theological world—and along with his brother, David Torrance, he edited Calvin’s New Testament commentaries. Nonetheless, despite being hailed as a “leading Reformed theologian,” “one of the most brilliant and seminal thinkers of our time,” as being among “the premier theologians in the second half of the twentieth century,” as the “most consistent evangelical theologian in our times,” Torrance’s lack of sustained focus on theological anthropology is conspicuous.4 Although Torrance’s corpus includes over 600 works on variegated topics such as theological exegesis, theological epistemology, theological science, and dogmatic theology, he has comparatively little to say about what it means to be a human from a DOI: 10.4324/9781003265832-1

2

Introduction

theological perspective. In fact, only eight of his published works are dedicated specifically to theological anthropology.5 Torrance’s lack of production in the area of theological anthropology might not be so surprising. After all, he was of the opinion that Reformed theology has always been shy about erecting an anthropology, not because it lacked a view of man, but because such a view cannot be enunciated as an independent article of faith as if it could of itself condition or contribute to our knowledge of God.6 Perhaps the absence of a fully developed theological anthropology can be attributed to his belief that theological anthropology—in the Reformed tradition—does not stand alone as an article of faith. This rationale, however, would seem to be an odd explanation of why he did not produce more works on theological anthropology given that on the same page of the same essay he claimed that no point in theology is “more relevant today than the issues it [theological anthropology] raises about our knowledge of man.”7 Those who would agree with Torrance’s observation regarding the relevance of theological anthropology for our day and those who see the prospects and promise of Torrance’s theology in general are left wondering: what might Torrance have said about humanity had he devoted more attention to the topic? How might he have further developed his sparse writing on the theology of the metaphysics of human nature, human constitution, the imago Dei, knowledge of God, sin, the will, race, gender, humanity’s place in creation, or a number of other topics of theological anthropology?

Relevant Studies of Torrance’s Theological Anthropology Few theologians have attempted to analyze Torrance’s theological anthropology in a systematic manner. For the most part, Torrance’s theological anthropology has received attention as smaller components of larger projects. Elmer Colyer, for example, briefly addresses Torrance’s writings on the doctrine of humanity. In his almost 400-page introduction to Torrancian theology, How to Read T. F. Torrance, Colyer devotes a mere ten pages to theological anthropology. In a short section titled, “The Human Creature,” he summarizes Torrance’s understanding of the body-soul relationship, the dignity and depravity of humans, the imago Dei, and humanity’s role as priest of creation.8 While Colyer’s brief introduction is helpful for orienting readers to Torrance’s theological anthropology, Colyer is content with merely re-narrating several key elements of theological anthropology. Besides Colyer, and his brief description of Torrance’s theological anthropology as a small part of his introduction to Torrance’s thought, Eric Flett has also provided a brief treatment of Torrance’s theological anthropology as part of a larger project. Flett’s monograph, Persons, Powers, and Principalities: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Culture, develops Torrance’s understanding of God as triune, creation as contingent,

Introduction 3 and human persons as stewards of creation in order to develop a trinitarian theology of culture. More specifically, Chapter 4 of his monograph is devoted to Torrance’s theologically anthropology, including Torrance’s understanding of human persons as “priests of creation” and “mediators of order,” created in continuity with the contingent order but also in distinction from it, as creatures given a unique constitution and identity and entrusted with a cultural task that is doxologically motivated.9 Additionally, Dick Eugenio, in Communion with the Triune God, a work devoted to developing Torrance’s explicitly Trinitarian soteriology, makes the curious statement that, “Statements about Christ’s humanity are also statements about our humanity.”10 Eugenio uses this principle to elaborate upon why Torrance is committed to the view that Christ assumes a fallen human nature upon the incarnation, yet like Colyer and Flett, he does not further develop his discussion of Torrance’s theological anthropology beyond a portion of his larger project. Finally, Geordie Zeigler devotes one chapter of a book to Torrance’s theological anthropology. Zeigler’s Trinitarian Grace and Participation is his attempt to describe Torrance’s doctrine of grace and to demonstrate that grace is “Torrance’s basic theological centrum.”11 Zeigler demonstrates that grace provides a vantage point for understanding the entirety of Torrance’s theology.12 As part of his demonstration of the adequacy of grace for interpreting the whole of Torrance’s theology Zeigler examines theological anthropology through the lens of grace. To be a human creature, he argues, is to be caught up in grace. Humans are constituted as “creatures of Grace, created as the image of God for fellowship with God.”13 Humans are also fallen creatures, experiencing God’s loving judgment against sin. Yet even under judgment, God’s grace towards them is restorative, seeking fellowship with them.14 Through his treatment of the doctrine of the image of God (including humanity’s failure to live as the image of God), Zeigler makes a significant, though limited, contribution to the small field of studies on Torrancian theological anthropology. Although most of the attention that Torrance’s theological anthropology has received has been smaller components of larger projects, one work stands out because it is a full-length project focusing on one aspect of Torrance’s theological anthropology. Myk Habets’s monograph, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, is a full-length treatment of one aspect of Torrance’s theological anthropology, namely human destiny. Habets argues that Torrance’s doctrine of theosis, i.e., the doctrine of humanity’s telos, finds its grounding in Christology.15 He states, In the person of Jesus Christ we see true humanity partaking of true Divinity by nature in such a way that by union, communion, and theosis with Christ by the Spirit we too, by grace, can participate in the divine nature.16

4

Introduction

Although the monograph is devoted to one aspect of theological anthropology, namely humanity’s telos, Habets devotes half a chapter to an overview of Torrance’s theological anthropology, treating topics like the imago Dei, human constitution, personhood, and vocation, through the lens of theosis. Although short in length—which, coming in at a mere twenty pages, is still double the length of Colyer’s introductory section—this section holds significantly more promise than Colyer’s introduction to Torrance’s theological anthropology because it does not merely restate Torrance’s doctrine of humanity; it provides an interpretation of Torrance’s doctrine of humanity. While interesting, Habets’s interpretation rests on the contentious claim that theosis, as opposed to another topic like grace or Christology, is the best interpretative lens for approaching all of Torrance’s theology.17 A second full-length treatment of one aspect of Torrance’s theological anthropology of note is Hakbong Kim’s Person, Personhood, and the Humanity of Christ. This monograph, as the title implies, focuses on the concept of personhood. Kim’s aim in the book is to develop a Christian ethic which comes out of Torrance’s understanding of Christ’s role in personalizing humanity. Kim himself explains that “Torrance does in fact involve and display horizontal concerns and practical implications in his theological system and reasoning,” despite those who would argue that Torrance’s theology has no clear ethical implications.18 While the focus is on Torrancian ethics, it is grounded in Torrance’s understanding of persons, as such, Kim devotes three-quarters of the book to the concept of Trinitarian, as well as human, onto-relational personhood. According to Kim, Christ in his humanity not only reveals that we are “personalized or humanized as persons” when we are “in true relations with God and others” but that Christ is the one who makes the reconciliation necessary for personalization.19 Because of Christ’s revelatory and reconciliatory work, humans are free to “live out a new moral life and order before God and others.”20 Like the others who have examined Torrance’s theological anthropology before him, Kim recognizes that “for Torrance, it is Christ who must be regarded as the absolute epistemic and ontological hinge of the biblical/ Christian anthropology.”21 Kim’s monograph makes a significant contribution to discussions of personhood in Torrance’s theology—and in systematic theology more generally—yet it still represents an examination of only one key aspect of Torrance’s theological anthropology. While Colyer, Flett, Eugenio, and Zeigler each examine aspects of Torrance’s theological anthropology as minor parts of larger projects, and Habets and Kim examine one aspect of Torrance’s theological anthropology in a comprehensive manner, Jing Wei provides the first—and to date, only—full-length, comprehensive, treatment of Torrance’s doctrine of humanity in his dissertation: “The Theological Anthropology of Thomas F. Torrance: A Critical and Comparative Exploration.” In Wei’s Ph.D. dissertation undertaken at the University of Edinburgh, Wei explores Torrance’s doctrine of humanity by examining Torrance’s earliest works, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, and three theological loci. Wei argues that Torrance’s approach to theological anthropology is conditioned by the

Introduction 5 Barth-Brunner debate and that Torrance’s Christology, Trinitarian theology, and doctrine of creation all provide insight into Torrance’s theological anthropology. Wei’s dissertation is helpful for understanding some of the central themes in Torrance’s anthropology, yet the dissertation suffers from lack of cohesion. The structure of the dissertation reflects Torrance’s scientific theology, beginning with God’s self-revelation in Christ; the dissertation ought to be commended for this approach. Yet, despite reflecting the structure of Torrance’s theological epistemology, the dissertation fails to show the centrality of Christology in Torrance’s theological anthropology. At one point Wei states that it is in “Torrance’s Christology and soteriology in which his most insightful arguments about humanity can be discerned … To a significant degree, the substance of his anthropology emerges from his Christology and soteriology.”22 Despite making this strong claim, which I take to be largely correct, Wei loses track of the significance of Christology for theological anthropology as he examines the Trinitarian and Creation-based foundations of Torrance’s doctrine of humanity.23 As this brief survey demonstrates, there is a dearth of studies examining the entirety of Torrance’s theological anthropology. The several studies that address his theological anthropology do so in a cursory manner or focus only on one topic related to the subject; and the one full-length study, Jing Wei’s dissertation, loses focus on the Christological elements that underlie Torrance’s doctrine of humanity. Thus, there is a gap in this area of Torrance scholarship, and a need for a thoroughly Christological reading of Torrance’s theological anthropology.

Method and Thesis This project seeks to argue for the promise of Christology for developing Torrance’s underdeveloped theological anthropology. The fact that I am arguing in favor of a need to develop Torrance’s theological anthropology should not be taken to imply that Torrance did not have a theological anthropology. We should not downplay the fact that Torrance did devote some attention to the topic that he considered the most relevant topic of our day. Combing through Torrance’s works, one notices that he has one major work on theological anthropology and several—more occasional works—on the doctrine. Consider for instance his book, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man. 24 In this monograph, which is one of the most significant historical studies of Calvin’s theological anthropology, Torrance deals primarily with Calvin’s doctrine of the imago Dei, humanity’s knowledge of itself and of God, humanity’s place in creation, total depravity, and natural theology.25 Eric Flett opines that this work is “more a compendium of Calvin’s thought on the subject than a presentation of Torrance’s views.”26 In addition to this monograph, Torrance penned two booklets on theological anthropology: The Soul and Person of the Unborn Child and The Being and Nature of the Unborn Child. Most of Torrance’s writings on theological anthropology, however, have appeared as essays in fetschriften or anthologies, chapters in books, or journal articles. These works include, “Goodness and

6

Introduction

Dignity of Man,” “Soul and Person in Theological Perspective,” “Man, Priest of Creation,” “Immortality and Light,” and “The Word of God and the Nature of Man.” Flett observes that Torrance’s material on the subject of theological anthropology is small and spans a long period (1947–2000). He maintains that the corpus is sparse “because Torrance’s creative powers were never turned fully upon the subject matter as a whole.”27 We can agree with Flett’s assessment, indeed, Torrance occasionally wrote about the topics of the imago Dei, human depravity, the body-soul relation, and humanity’s calling but Torrance does not address these topics with the level of depth characteristic of his other dogmatic interests. Given Torrance’s sparse writings on the doctrine of humanity, how shall we develop his theological anthropology? Flett, Colyer, and Eugenio make several suggestions. Flett, for instance, claims that additional material for developing Torrance’s theological anthropology “may be gleaned from his workings on the person and work of Christ, [although] this material does not add substantially to his specifically anthropological work.”28 Colyer, on the other hand, believes that despite the lack of “sustained attention to this subject,” i.e., theological anthropology, a Christocentric treatment of anthropology would be proper to the subject. Colyer explains: Torrance argues that a Christian anthropology is properly “formed in light of the humanity of Christ and in accordance with his redemptive purpose in the regeneration of mankind.” The incarnation entails the Son of God assuming our actual human being and nature in order to heal, restore and fulfill it in accordance with the divine telos for humanity of union and communion with God. Thus Torrance views the humanity that the Son of God assumed from us in the incarnation, healed in body and soul and restored to proper relation with God and others as of archetypal significance for all human beings. In Jesus Christ we “discern what the basic structure of humanity is and ought to be.”29 Despite thinking that Christology is the key to discerning what humanity is and ought to be, Colyer does not put this principle into service for developing Torrance’s theological anthropology; rather, Colyer is content with merely summarizing what Torrance says in his explicitly anthropological works. Eugenio explains: “What constitutes humanity can only be known in the light of who Christ is and what he has done, not the other way around.”30 Because Torrance’s general modus operandi begins with revelation and redemption in Christ, and then develops other doctrines from there, Eugenio concludes, for example, from the fact that “Christ assumed fallen humanity, that we can infer that humanity is fallen.”31 Torrance’s method for discerning the fallen nature of Christ is then generalized by Eugenio into the principle that “theological anthropology is grounded in Christology.”32 Despite this claim, Eugenio does not attempt to further develop this principle because his interests lie primarily in soteriology and not theological anthropology.

Introduction 7 In this project I build upon the suggestions of Flett, Colyer, and Eugenio that Christology is a potential key for further developing Torrance’s theological anthropology. I demonstrate the promise of Christology for developing Torrance’s theological anthropology by applying the insights of Christological anthropology—roughly the approach to theological anthropology in which Christology warrants important claims about what it means to be human.33 This project makes an argument for the following claim: Christology holds promise for developing Thomas F. Torrance’s theological anthropology. There are various ways I could argue for this claim. One approach would be to make an argument for why Torrance’s theological anthropology should read as being informed by Christology. This approach would have argued for a particular reading of Torrance’s theological epistemology, one which starts with Christ as the starting point for all theological reflection. From there I could have made an argument for the appropriateness of starting our anthropology with Christology. In other words, if Christ is the beginning of all theological doctrines, theological anthropology—being a theological doctrine—should also begin with Christ. Such an argument would have demonstrated that Christology is the right starting point for developing what Torrance would have said about theological anthropology had he devoted his creative energies to the topic. To take such an approach, while methodologically interesting, would have still left Torrance’s theological anthropology underdeveloped. Instead of taking this approach I have decided to make a cumulative argument for the claim that Christology holds promise for developing Torrance’s theological anthropology. In making my cumulative argument I am drawing upon Richard Swinburne’s work on various types of inductive arguments. According to Swinburne, a deductive argument is one in which the premises make the conclusion certain; deductive arguments, however, are not the only type of arguments that could be used towards establishing a particular conclusion. There are arguments in which premises do not guarantee a conclusion, rather the premises are used to support, give strength to, or confirm a conclusion. These arguments—inductive arguments—says Swinburne, come in two varieties. He calls the first type of inductive argument a “P-inductive argument.”34 This type of inductive argument is one in which the premises make the conclusion probable. Swinburne calls the second type of inductive argument a “C-inductive argument.”35 This type of argument is one in which the premises add to the probability of the conclusion. Swinburne draws attention to these types of inductive arguments in The Existence of God because he is interested in avoiding the tendency of treating arguments for the existence of God in isolation from one another. Instead of treating a number of deductive arguments for the existence of God separately, Swinburne is interested in the cumulative effects of individual arguments. With the various individual arguments for the existence of God in place

8

Introduction

he then considers whether the cumulative arguments make a good P-inductive argument. Although arguments for the existence of God may be interesting in their own right, my interest in Swinburne’s distinctions are because of his description of cumulative arguments. In a cumulative argument, “each separate piece of evidence does not make the theory very probable,” but “the cumulative force of the evidence taken together gives great probability to the wide theory.”36 As an example of a cumulative argument Swinburne demonstrates how various pieces of evidence are cited as evidence for the General Theory of Relativity. On their own these pieces of evidence—e.g., the movement of Mercury’s perihelion—do not make the General Theory of Relativity very probable; but when these arguments are put together their cumulative force makes the theory probable. For a cumulative argument to be forceful—i.e., make the conclusion more probable than not—each piece of evidence need not prove the conclusion, rather it simply needs to increase the probability of the conclusion.37 In making a cumulative argument for the promise of Christology for developing Torrance’s theological anthropology I select several key topics in Torrance’s theological anthropology and demonstrate that each one of these topics can be further developed in light of Christ. The force of each chapter is a cumulative argument for the promise of Christology for developing Torrance’s theological anthropology. Each separate piece of evidence—i.e., each chapter that shows that Torrance’s theological anthropology can be developed Christologically—does not necessarily make my conclusion probable, but the cumulative force of the evidence taken together makes my claim regarding the promise of Christology more probable than not. The result of my cumulative argument is a version of what I am calling “Broad Christological Anthropology”; that is, a theological anthropology in which Christology warrants important claims across a broad range of anthropological topics.38 My approach in this monograph proves the promise of Christology for developing Torrance’s theological anthropology because it makes a cumulative case that such an approach bears theological fruit across a wide range of anthropological topics. This result of this study is not only the demonstration of the promise of Christology for developing Torrance’s Christological anthropology, it is also an example of a theological anthropology which presses beyond what has been typical of much Christological theological anthropology, namely, taking Christ as the starting point but limiting itself to applying Christological data only to a small set of issues like the imago Dei and ethics.39 To develop Torrance’s Christological anthropology I will focus on two kinds of sources: his explicit works on the topic of theological anthropology and his Christological-soteriological works. The first type of work includes, for example, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, The Soul and Person of the Unborn Child, The Being and Nature of the Unborn Child, “Goodness and Dignity of Man,” “Soul and Person, in Theological Perspective,” “Man, The Priest of Creation,” and “The Word of God and the Nature of Man.” By focusing on his explicit works

Introduction 9 on theological anthropology, I will be able to develop a starting point for a Torrancian anthropology. Not only that, I will also be able to establish the guide and guardrails for the development of Torrancian anthropology. If, for example, Torrance explicitly states X in his theological works, then I take it that the anthropology that is derived from his Christology should not contradict X; his explicit anthropological statements hold hermeneutical primacy of implicit anthropological ideas. It may be the case that there are places where Torrance’s explicit anthropology might be inconsistent with his implicit anthropology, but given Torrance’s intellectual prowess we ought to approach such potential inconsistencies with caution. The second type of work is represented by various books, including for example: Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ, Atonement: The Person and Work of Christ, The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons, Theology in Reconstruction, Space Time and Resurrection, and Space, Time, and Incarnation. This second type of work also includes numerous chapters and journal essays, as well as unpublished materials like his Auburn Lectures and sermons.

Outline of Subsequent Chapters My cumulative argument for the promise of Christology for developing Torrance’s theological anthropology proceeds in two parts. In the first (Chapter 2) I home in on Torrance’s anthropological method. In the second (Chapters 3–7) I turn my attention to five topics in theological anthropology—the metaphysics of human nature, the imago Dei, personhood, human vocation, and human destiny—developing Torrance’s writings on these topics, thus demonstrating the promise of Christology for developing his theological anthropology. Chapter 2, “Method: Torrance’s Christological Anthropology and Christ’s Fallen Human Nature,” places Torrance’s theological anthropology in the context of other theologians who have written on the relationship between Christology and anthropology. I argue that unlike other recent Christological anthropologies that begin with protology or eschatology, Torrance’s anthropology begins with the incarnate Christ as he confronts us in the midst of God’s act of redemption. I label Torrance’s approach Soteriological-Christological Anthropology. This approach is grounded in Torrance’s kata physic approach to theology. The fact that Torrance’s Christology includes the belief that Christ has a fallen human nature creates a potential problem for moving from Christology to anthropology. I conclude this chapter by attempting to show that Christ’s fallen human nature need not undermine the Soteriological-Christological approach to anthropology. Chapter 3, “Nature: The Metaphysics of Human Beings,” marks the transition from the first part to the second. In this chapter I raise the question, “What metaphysical account of human nature best makes sense of T. F. Torrance’s doctrine of atonement?” I argue that in order for Torrance’s doctrine of atonement to work, Christ’s human nature must be an abstract universal. Specifically, Christ instantiates an abstract universal human nature and the rest of

10

Introduction

humanity participates in an abstract universal human nature.40 In the process of making this claim I exposit Torrance’s doctrine of atonement and Torrance’s use of the enhypostasia-anhypostasia distinction. One upshot of my conclusion in this chapter is that, contra Oliver Crisp, the enhypostsia-anhypostasia distinction remains significant for abstract universal theories of Christ’s human nature. Chapter 4, “Image: The Relational, Dynamic, Ecstatic, and Christological Imago Dei,” shows that Torrance’s doctrine of the image of God ought to be characterized primarily as dynamic, relational, and ecstatic. By considering Torrance’s writings on the imago Dei through the several stages of redemption history—creation, fall, and redemption—I respond to three questions: (1) What did the image of God originally consist in? (2) What has the fall done to the image of God in humanity? (3) What does it mean to say that the image of God in humans is renewed? I show that Torrance’s answers to these questions are best understood through the Christological lens of instantiation (a term defined in Chapter 3)—and the vicarious humanity of Christ. Thus, I demonstrate that Christology holds promise for developing Torrance’s explicit theology of the imago Dei in more robust ways than he himself did. I conclude by addressing a puzzle that instantiation and the vicarious humanity of Christ creates for understanding how Christ restores the imago Dei in humans, namely why Torrance’s notion of subjective imaging does not become redundant if Christ vicariously images God for all of humanity. Chapter 5, “Personhood: Onto-Relational Christological Anthropology,” attempts to clarify the notion of a relational ontology of persons and considers whether Torrance’s claim that “‘Person’ is an onto-relational concept” amounts to a relational ontology.41 By putting Torrance’s concept of personhood alongside John Zizioulas’s concept of personhood, I argue that Torrance indeed presents a highly relational view of personhood but that his view does not amount to a “relational ontology.” After examining Torrance’s understanding of personhood, I then turn to his provocative claim that Christ is the “personalizing person.” I interpret this Torrancian claim as meaning that because of the vicarious humanity of Christ, human beings enter into the kind of personal relation necessary for a personal life. This view, I suggest, does not suffer from objections that could be leveled against Zizioulas’s relational ontology of persons. Chapter 6, “Vocation: Called as Priests to Know and Care for Creation,” addresses the increasingly discussed topic of human vocation, i.e., the general office of all human beings in creation. I argue that Torrance’s doctrine of creation and Christology lead to a theological anthropology in which the human vocation is framed in terms of being “priests of creation.” My discussion of Torrance’s understanding of human vocation is carried out in conversation with his understanding of creation as contingent and orderly. Human beings, in a Torrancian framework, fulfill their vocation when they act as mediators between God and creation, leading creation in the worship of God, through discerning the order and contingency of creation, mediating God’s intention to advance order in creation, and rectifying disorder in creation. These three

Introduction

11

aspects of humanity’s calling as priests of creation cannot be understood apart from Christ’s vicarious humanity and his work of atonement. Thus, Torrance’s theology of human vocation is Christologically informed. The final topic that I turn my attention to in order to demonstrate the promise of Christology for developing his theological anthropology is humanity’s telos. In Chapter 7, “Destiny: Christ’s Deification of Human Nature,” I set out to defend the claim that for Torrance, the doctrine of theosis ought to be understood in light of the vicarious humanity of Christ, thus, his theology of humanity’s end is also Christologically informed. To demonstrate this claim, I begin by describing the doctrine of theosis with special reference to two figures who were especially influential upon Torrance, namely, Athanasius and John Calvin. I then describe Torrance’s understanding of theosis, suggesting that for Torrance there are four things that a human being gains by being deified: (1) immortality, (2) knowledge of God, (3) participation in the life of the Triune God, and (4) humanization/personalization. I conclude by explaining how we ought to understand the difference between Christ’s objective deification of human nature via the vicarious humanity of Christ and the subjective deification of human nature via the Holy Spirit. My project concludes, in Chapter 8, “Conclusion: A Torrancian Christological Anthropology,” by tying together the previous chapters, demonstrating that approaching anthropological topics through the lens of Christology bears fruit, and therefore, Christology holds promise for developing T. F. Torrance’s theological anthropology. I suggest other areas where Torrance’s anthropology might be further developed in light of Christology, bring attention to the strengths of Torrance’s theological anthropology, and highlight some of its weaknesses. I conclude by making the claim that Christology not only holds promise for the narrow task of developing Torrance’s insights on humanity but that it might also hold promise for developing a constructive theological account of humanity.

Discerning Humanity in Christ T. F. Torrance once wrote that in Christ we “discern what the basic structure of humanity is and ought to be.”42 This project is an attempt to take Torrance’s claim seriously by attempting to discern Torrance’s doctrine of humanity by drawing from his doctrine of his Christ. My hope is that readers would not only see the promise of Christology for developing his theological anthropology, nor that they would only see what the basic structure of Torrance’s doctrine of humanity is, but that they would see the prospects—and potential perils—of Torrance’s Christologically informed theological anthropology.

Notes 1 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vols., Library of Christian Classics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), 1.1.1.

12

Introduction

2 Alister McGrath, T. F. Torrance: An Intellectual Biography (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2006), xi. 3 Some of Torrance’s key works on theological science include: T. F. Torrance, Christian Theology and Scientific Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); Divine and Contingent Order (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998); Preaching Christ Today: The Gospel and Scientific Thinking (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994); Reality and Evangelical Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1982); Theological Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Transformation and Convergence in the Framework of Knowledge: Explorations in the Interrelations of Scientific and Theological Enterprise (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984). Some of Torrance’s key works on the Trinity include: T. F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (London: T&T Clark, 1996); Space, Time, and Incarnation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997); Theology in Reconciliation: Essays Towards Evangelical and Catholic Unity in the East and West (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976); The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995). 4 Stanley Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), 201; Elmer Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian and Scientific Theology (Downers Grove: Intervarsity, 2001), 11; Kye Won Lee, Living in Union with Christ: The Practical Theology of Thomas F. Torrance (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2003), 1. 5 See: A chapter titled, “The Word of God and the Nature of Man” in Theology in Reconstruction (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1965), 99–116 [This essay first appeared as “The Word of God and the Nature of Man” in Reformation Old and New, ed. F. W. Camfield (London: Lutterworth Press, 1947), 121–141]; Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1997); “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition,” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 309–22; a chapter titled “Man, Mediator of Order,” in The Christian Frame of Mind: Reason, Order, and Openness in Theology and Natural Science (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2015), 35–64; “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective” in Religion, Reason, and the Self: Essays in Honour of Hywel D. Lewis, eds. Steward Sutherland and T. A. Roberts (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1989), 103–18; The Soul and Person of the Unborn Child (Edinburgh: Handsel Press for the Scottish Order of Christian Unity, 1999); The Being and Nature of the Unborn Child (Edinburgh: Handsel Press for the Scottish Order of Christian Unity, 2000); a chapter titled “Man, Priest of Creation” in The Ground and Grammar of Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 1–14. 6 Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 99. 7 Ibid. 8 Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance, 173–82. 9 Eric Flett, Persons, Powers, and Pluralities: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Culture (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2011), 4. 10 Dick Eugenio, Communion with the Triune God: The Trinitarian Soteriology of T. F. Torrance (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2014), 43. Eugenio defines “Trinitarian soteriology” such that “(1) salvation is the work of the Persons of the Triune God, and that (2) because in addition to (1), salvation is grounded in the being of the Triune God, (3) the ultimate telos of salvation is relationship with the Triune God.” Eugenio, Communion with the Triune God, xx. 11 Geordie Zeigler, Trinitarian Grace and Participation: An Entry into the Theology of T. F. Torrance (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017), xvi. 12 Zeigler attempts to follow the lead of Torrance himself, who stated: “Christology must always be the centrum of a Christian dogmatic. If therefore it can be said that a systematic treatment of theology will be one in which all the doctrines cohere and dovetail together … then we may look for certain material dogmatic norms within the body of theology which may act as a kind of interior logic throughout the whole,

Introduction

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26

27 28 29

30 31 32 33

34 35

13

characterizing as well the single doctrines themselves. Without doubt we find that in Christology, or viewed from another angle one might well say it was the doctrine of Grace. How God deals with us in Jesus Christ, that must be the norm for all our theologizing.” T. F. Torrance, “Predestination in Christ,” Evangelical Quarterly 13 (1941): 127–8. Zeigler, Trinitarian Grace and Participation, 147. Ibid., 182. Habets frames theosis as an aspect of soteriology. This may be correct, yet it seems to me that it could rightly be understood as an aspect of theological anthropology. Myk Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 62. Recall Torrance’s words, “Christology must always be the centrum of a Christian dogmatic.” T. F. Torrance, “Predestination in Christ,” 127. Hakbong Kim, Person, Personhood, and the Humanity of Christ: Christocentric Anthropology and Ethics in Thomas F. Torrance (Eugene: Pickwick, 2021), xvii. Kim, Person, Personhood, and the Humanity of Christ, 87. Ibid. Ibid., 25. Jing Wei, “The Theological Anthropology of Thomas F. Torrance: A Critical and Comparative Exploration” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Edinburgh, 2013), 14. Why is it problematic that Wei loses sight of the Christological foundation of theological anthropology? Why shouldn’t the Trinity be the focus of our theological anthropology? The answer is that even Christology undergirds Torrance’s Trinitarian theology. The being and work of Christ reveal the nature and relation of the triune God to us and thus, Christology is foundational even for Trinitarian thought. Torrance’s concept of a three-fold structure of knowledge and how this structure corresponds to our understanding of the Trinity is especially helpful here. [Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (New York: T&T Clark, 1996), 84.] T. F. Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2001). It is likely Torrance’s most influential work of theological anthropology because it remained the only full-length treatment of Calvin’s doctrine of humanity for several decades after its publication. Flett, Persons, Powers, and Pluralities, 116. Although, as with most interpretations, this is also disputed. Others have argued that Calvin’s Doctrine of Man is in fact Barthian distortion of Calvin’s theological anthropology. This opinion will be discussed in Chapter 4. Flett, Persons, Powers, and Pluralities, 117. Ibid. Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance, 173–4. Italics in the original. Here he quotes (in order): Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition,” 309; Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 315; Torrance, “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective,” 115. Eugenio, Communion with the Triune God, 43. Ibid. Ibid. This is merely a working definition of “Christological Anthropology.” The term will be further developed as this project proceeds, especially in Chapter 2. See Marc Cortez, Christological Anthropology in Historical Perspective: Ancient and Contemporary Approaches to Theological Anthropology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2016), 20–22. Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 7. Swinburne, The Existence of God, 7.

14

Introduction

36 Ibid., 18. 37 My use of Swinburne’s cumulative arguments for the existence of God should not be taken as suggesting that Torrance’s theology is commensurate with Swinburne’s proofs for the existence of God. I am not necessarily interested in whether Swinburne’s arguments actually establish the existence of God—that is a topic beyond the scope of this work. I am merely using Swinburne’s work on arguments for the existence of God to illustrate the nature of a cumulative argument. Swinburne’s arguments for the existence of God provide a good example of the structure of a cumulative argument. Swinburne’s prior work on the nature of inductive arguments is helpful for establishing the strength of these types of arguments. 38 “Broad Christological Anthropology” is similar to “Comprehensively Christological Anthropology” in Marc Cortez’s distinction between “Minimally Christological Anthropology” and “Comprehensively Christological Anthropology.” Cortez defines “minimal Christological anthropology” as one “in which (a) Christology warrants important claims about what it means to be human and (b) the scope of those claims goes beyond issues like the image of God and ethics.” He defines “comprehensive Christological anthropology” as one “in which (a) Christology warrants ultimate claims about true humanity such that (b) the scope of those claims applies to all anthropological data.” “Broad Christological Anthropology” differs from Cortez’s categories in that it goes beyond the claim that Christology warrants important claims about limited issues like the imago Dei and ethics (i.e., minimal Christological anthropology) but it does not go as far as claiming that Christology warrants claims about all anthropological data (i.e., comprehensive Christological anthropology). Broad Christological anthropology stands somewhere between Cortez’s two proposals. See Marc Cortez, ReSourcing Theological Anthropology: A Constructive Account of Humanity in Light of Christ (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018), 21. 39 As examples of the trend in theological anthropology which limits Christological data to the imago Dei and ethics, see: Paul Jewett and Margueritte Shuster, Who We Are: Our Dignity as Human: A Neo-Evangelical Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996); Charles Sherlock, The Doctrine of Humanity (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1997); Hans Schwarz, The Human Being (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013). 40 For my definitions of “instantiate” and “participate,” see the section titled, “The One and The Many: Participation and Instantiation,” in Chapter 3. 41 T. F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons, 157. 42 T. F. Torrance, “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective,” 115.

References Calvin, John. Institutes of Christian Religion. Edited by John T. McNeill, translated by Ford Lewis Battles. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1960. Colyer, Elmer M. How to Read T. F. Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian and Scientific Theology. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2001. Cortez, Marc. Christological Anthropology in Historical Perspective: Ancient and Contemporary Approaches to Theological Anthropology. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2016. Cortez, Marc. ReSourcing Theological Anthropology: A Constructive Account of Humanity in Light of Christ. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018. Eugenio, Dick. Communion with the Triune God: The Trinitarian Soteriology of T. F. Torrance. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2014. Flett, Eric. Persons, Powers, and Pluralities: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Culture. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2011.

Introduction

15

Grenz, Stanley. Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004. Habets, Myk. Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009. Jewett, Paul and Margueritte Shuster. Who We Are: Our Dignity as Human: A NeoEvangelical Theology. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996. Kim, Hakbong. Person, Personhood, and the Humanity of Christ: Christocentric Anthropology and Ethics in Thomas F. Torrance. Eugene: Pickwick, 2021. Lee, Kye Won. Living in Union with Christ: The Practical Theology of Thomas F. Torrance. New York: Peter Lang, 2003. McGrath, Alister. T. F. Torrance: An Intellectual Biography. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2006. Schwarz, Hans. The Human Being: A Theological Anthropology. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013. Sherlock, Charles. The Doctrine of Humanity. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1997. Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979. Torrance, Thomas F. Atonement: The Person and Work of Christ. Edited by Robert T. Walker. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009. Torrance, Thomas F. The Being and Nature of the Unborn Child. Edinburgh: Handsel Press for the Scottish Order of Christian Unity, 2000. Torrance, Thomas F. Calvin’s Doctrine of Man. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2001. Torrance, Thomas F. The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons. London: T&T Clark, 1996. Torrance, Thomas F. The Christian Frame of Mind: Reason, Order, and Openness in Theology and Natural Science. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2015. Torrance, Thomas F. Christian Theology and Scientific Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. Torrance, Thomas F. Divine and Contingent Order. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition.” In Christ in our Place: The Humanity of God in Christ for the Reconciliation of the World: Essays Presented to Professor James Torrance, edited by Trevor Hart and Daniel Thimell, 369–387. Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1989. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition.” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 309–322. Torrance, Thomas F. The Ground and Grammar of Theology: Consonance between Theology and Science. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001. Torrance, Thomas F. Preaching Christ Today: The Gospel and Scientific Thinking. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994. Torrance, Thomas F. “Predestination in Christ.” Evangelical Quarterly 13 (1941): 108– 141. Torrance, Thomas F. Reality and Evangelical Theology: A Fresh and Challenging Approach to Christian Revelation. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective.” In Religion, Reason, and the Self: Essays in Honour of Hywel D. Lewis, edited by Steward Sutherland and T. A. Roberts. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1989. Torrance, Thomas F. The Soul and Person of the Unborn Child. Edinburgh: Handsel Press for the Scottish Order of Christian Unity, 1999. Torrance, Thomas F. Space, Time and Incarnation. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996. Torrance, Thomas F. Theological Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.

16

Introduction

Torrance, Thomas F. Theology in Reconciliation: Essays Towards Evangelical and Catholic Unity in East and West. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976. Torrance, Thomas F. Theology in Reconstruction. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Torrance, Thomas F. Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge: Explorations in the Interrelations of Scientific and Theological Enterprise. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984. Torrance, Thomas F. The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Word of God and the Nature of Man.” In Reformation Old and New, edited by F. W. Camfield, 121–141. London: Lutterworth Press, 1947. Wei, Jing. “The Theological Anthropology of Thomas F. Torrance: A Critical and Comparative Exploration.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of Edinburgh, 2013. Zeigler, Geordie. Trinitarian Grace and Participation: An Entry into the Theology of T. F. Torrance. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017.

2

Method Torrance’s Christological Anthropology and Christ’s Fallen Human Nature

The White Rabbit put on his spectacles. “Where shall I begin, please your Majesty?” he asked. “Begin at the beginning,” the King said, very gravely, “and go on till you come to the end: then stop.” (Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 1)

Introduction The King of Hearts’ famous instructions to “begin at the beginning” in Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland is humorous because it is so blatantly obvious. What exactly constitutes “the beginning,” however, is not always so obvious. This is especially the case when doing theological anthropology, where the question arises: “Where do we begin our theological reflection on what it means to be human?” Generally contemporary theologians offer three types of answers to that question: (1) begin with the Genesis creation narratives, (2) reflect upon our experiences of being human, and (3) reflect upon God himself.2 This third approach is typified by theologians who begin their reflections on human nature by starting with the doctrine of the Trinity or Christology.3 If one chooses to begin with the latter doctrine—Christology— one still must ask, “What aspect of Christology constitutes the proper starting place for Christological anthropology?” In this chapter, I argue that unlike many contemporary Christological anthropologies that begin with protology or eschatology, T. F. Torrance’s anthropology begins with the incarnate Christ as he confronts us in the midst of God’s act of redemption. Let us call this approach to theological anthropology, Soteriological-Christological Anthropology. By adopting this approach, I argue, Torrance makes a unique contribution to the method of Christological anthropology. This chapter proceeds as follows. In part one I distinguish between Protological Christological Anthropologies and Eschatological Christological Anthropologies. I then draw attention to representative examples of each. In parts two and three, I turn to Torrance’s doctrine of Christ’s fallen human nature as a way of exploring his Christological anthropology. By focusing on this aspect of Torrance’s Christology, we will see that for him theological DOI: 10.4324/9781003265832-2

18

Method

anthropology begins in the midst of the incarnate Christ’s salvific actions. In part four, I raise one puzzle that Torrance’s fallen nature Christology creates for the task of Christological anthropology. I conclude by commenting on the promise that Torrance’s Soteriological-Christological approach holds for theological anthropology.

Christological Anthropology Most Christian theologians want to claim that our understanding of human nature is “shaped in some way by their beliefs about Jesus Christ and God’s relation to him.”4 This conviction, however, does not warrant calling a particular anthropology “Christological” because this conviction is consistent with the belief that there might be something more essential to understanding human nature than Christology. Thus, I suggest the following definition of Christological anthropology: Christological Anthropology: The approach to theological anthropology according to which Christology warrants important claims about what it means to be human. Based on this definition, we can draw a number of distinctions within Christological anthropology. For example, we might draw a distinction between the potential scope of Christological anthropology: Narrow Christological Anthropology: Christological anthropologies that claim that Christology warrants important claims about what it means to be human across a narrow range of areas. Broad Christological Anthropology: Christological anthropologies that claim that Christology warrants important claims across a broad range of anthropological topics.5 Narrow Christological Anthropology typically limits itself to making claims about the image of God and/or ethics, whereas Broad Christological Anthropology expands beyond these two subjects to discuss how Christology can inform areas like the significance of the human body, human constitution, gender, sexuality, freedom of the will, race, ethnicity, etc. Broad Christological Anthropology claims that Christology may even shed light on many aspects of human existence that have not been traditionally associated with Christian spirituality.6 We can draw another distinction based on the question: “What makes it the case that Christology warrants important claims about anthropology?” Marc Cortez correctly suggests that the incarnation alone cannot be the ground for such claims. The reason being that “simply affirming Christ’s full humanity would not explain the uniqueness of his anthropological centrality since presumably all humans are fully human.”7 Therefore, something else is needed to

Method

19

explain why Christ’s humanity is the epistemological key to understanding our humanity. Typically, two kinds of answers have been given as to what explains the epistemological significance of Christ’s humanity for understanding our humanity. The first is based on protology and the second on eschatology. Thus, Protological Christological Anthropology: Christological anthropologies which claim that Christology warrants important claims about what it means to be human because Jesus’ humanity is the eternal paradigm of humanity. Eschatological Christological Anthropology: Christological anthropologies which claim that Christology warrants important claims about what it means to be human because Jesus fulfills the eschatological destiny of humanity. Although these distinctions, Protological/Eschatological, are not explicitly named in recent Christological anthropologies, they are helpful categories for understanding contemporary approaches to Christological anthropology. In what follows I illustrate the distinction by surveying four representative works of Christological anthropology and classify them according to these two categories.8 Eschatological Christological Anthropologies Two important examples of Eschatological Christological Anthropology —that also happen to be Narrow Christological Anthropology —can be found in the works of Wolfhart Pannenberg and his student Stanley Grenz. Pannenberg, for example, explains that in Christ “we see our destiny as individuals and as species.”9 According to Pannenberg, humanity’s destiny is fellowship with God. This fellowship is definitively realized in the incarnation of the Son. Furthermore, this destiny of fellowship “confers inviolability on human life in the person of each individual. It is the basis of the inalienable dignity of each person.”10 The subject of the dignity of humanity, grounded in its destiny is the subject of the imago Dei. Addressing his approach to the imago Dei, Pannenberg explains that the subject deserves to be addressed in connection with “the doctrine of creation on the one side, and Christology on the other.”11 Pannenberg addresses Old Testament creation passages that characterize humans as creatures created to be “God’s vicars preparing the way for his own dominion in the world.”12 Moving past Old Testament claims that address our divine likeness, Pannenberg turns his attention to Pauline statements that call Jesus the image of God. He explains that “the idea of Jesus Christ as the image of God in which believers have a share through the Spirit (2 Cor. 3:18) has a general anthropological significance that the NT statements develop.”13 How does Pannenberg develop his understanding this significance? He does this in two ways. First, Old Testament claims about the image of God are now read in the light of the claim that

20

Method

Christ is the image of God. Second, New Testament claims about the future of humanity are now read in light of Christological claims. These Old Testament and New Testament claims lead Pannenberg to think that “in the story of the human race, then, the image of God was not achieved fully at the outset. It was still in process.”14 How can we come to understand the goal of this process? By looking to Jesus. In Jesus we see how humanity’s destiny is proleptically fulfilled. Or as Pannenberg himself says, because Christ who is the image of God proleptically fulfills humanity’s destiny of fellowship with God, “our creation in God’s image was related from the very outset to his fulfillment that has come, or broken in, in the history of Jesus of Nazareth.”15 Thus, for Pannenberg, Jesus of Nazareth, who proleptically fulfills the eschatological destiny of humanity as the divine image, is the key to reflection upon what it means to be the imago Dei. This conviction places Pannenberg’s anthropology in the Eschatological Christological Anthropology category. Much like his Doktorvater, Pannenberg, Stanley Grenz’s Christological anthropology is both narrow and eschatological. This is especially clear towards the end of The Social God and the Relational Self. For instance, in a section titled, “The Imago Dei and the True Human,” Grenz highlights the point that the New Testament writers elevate Christ as the image of God and, by extension, declare that “the believing community shares in this new Christocentric anthropology.”16 While agreeing that the Genesis narrative sets forth the idea that humankind is created in the image of God, he believes that Genesis 1:26–27 does not define the imago Dei in detail, rather it “opens up the door to the possibility of the answer emerging from the broader biblical narrative in which the creation story is in place.”17 The broader biblical narrative, according to Grenz, actually points to Jesus Christ who is not only the divine image but also the “head of a new humanity destined to be formed according to that image in fulfillment of God’s intent for humankind from the beginning.”18 As such, reflecting on how Christ is the fulfillment of humanity’s eschatological destiny is the key to understanding what it means to be made in the image of God. Protological Christological Anthropologies If Pannenberg and Grenz are representative of Eschatological Christological Anthropology then Karl Barth and Marc Cortez are representative of Protological Christological Anthropology. Barth’s Christological method of theological anthropology can be found in Church Dogmatics 3.2 Section 43, “Man as a Problem of Dogmatics.” There Barth asserts that theological anthropology asks, what kind of beings are we who stand in a covenantal relationship before God?19 Barth explains that there are other ways to answer the kind of question that takes into account “man as a phenomenon.”20 Barth, however, believes that a “phenomenal” approach that attempts to answer the question of theological anthropology via speculation or the sciences is a dead end. The reason speculative and purely scientific approaches do not contribute to theological anthropology can be encapsulated in the following argument:

Method 1 2

21

Theological anthropology is the study of humanity in its relationship to God. Humanity’s relationship to God can only be known by the Word of God.

Therefore, 3

Any approach to theological anthropology that does not begin with the Word of God will not yield answers concerning humanity’s relationship to God.21

Premise 1, however, is problematic because “the revelation of God does not show us man as we wish to see him, in the wholeness of his created being but in his perversion and corruption.”22 In other words, the picture of humanity we see in Scripture is a picture of humanity as sinful; therefore we have access to humanity’s relation to God only in a fallen or corrupt state; we do not see humanity in its true relation to God. Barth poses the problem in this way: “If we know man only in corruption and distortion of his being how can we even begin to answer the question about his creaturely nature?”23 Barth’s solution to this problem is to point out the notion that sin presupposes a covenant, and thus that the covenant of God with humanity is primary, even ultimate.24 From this Barth concludes that God “created man to be His covenant-partner.”25 If God created humanity to be his covenant-partner then we must look to the one whom God elected to be his covenant-partner. This elect-one who was elected prior to God’s decision to create is none other than Jesus himself. God has eternally elected Jesus to be his covenant-partner, and in Jesus God has elected the rest of humanity to be covenant-partners.26 Because Jesus is the eternally elected covenant-partner, we ought to look to Jesus alone as the key to theological anthropology.27 Jesus alone reveals what our nature as covenant-partners was eternally elected to be. Building on the notion that Jesus alone reveals our human nature, Barth explains that in our exposition of the doctrine of man we must always look in the first instance at the nature of man as it confronts us in the person of Jesus, and only secondarily—asking and answering from this place of light—at the nature of man as that of every man and all other men.28 Thus, because Jesus alone reveals human nature as God created it, any topic in anthropology which is properly theological must be grounded in Christology. This principle necessarily places Barth in the Broad Christological Anthropology camp. That is, if we will reflect theologically on topics like sexuality, race, gender, embodiment, freedom of the will, or the mind-body debate, we must begin by looking to Jesus.29 Another theologian who follows the protological approach—and ends up with a Broad Christological Anthropology—is Marc Cortez. Cortez’s work on

22

Method

anthropological method can be found across a number of works but his own constructive proposal is found in his most recent work, ReSourcing Theological Anthropology: A Constructive Account of Humanity in the Life of Christ. 30 There he proposes a “comprehensive Christological anthropology,” that is, “one in which (a) Christology warrants ultimate claims about true humanity such that (b) the scope of those claims applies to all anthropological data.”31 One part of Cortez’s project is to ground the epistemological centrality of Jesus by arguing that his humanity is ontologically fundamental for the existence of all other humans. He proposes three ways that one could go about doing this. First one could argue that the eternal Son just is the paradigm of humanity. Thus, “it is really the eternal Son who is the true imago Dei.”32 The incarnation then becomes the epistemological key to theological anthropology because the ontological ground for humanity has become flesh. Cortez finds this option problematic because it is difficult to reconcile this view with the inherently embodied language of the imago Dei. A second way to ground Christ’s ontological fundamentality for other humans is to argue that “the son himself is God’s eternal idea of what a true human should be.”33 Under this account— which finds precedent in Schleiermacher and support in James Dunn—the Son is God’s paradigm for a true human, and this paradigm has existed eternally in the mind of God.34 Cortez rightly points out that such a view creates large difficulties for maintaining historical Trinitarian theology. The final view, and the one that Cortez affirms, is one in which the eternal significance of the Son’s humanity is found in identifying it as that which grounds the eternal identity of the Son.35 Such an account bears obvious similarities to Karl Barth’s theology of the Son’s identity. Under Barth’s account, the Son is personally existent from all of eternity, but somehow the identity of the Son is determined by his historic existence. How that identity is understood has been a hotly contested issue in Barth studies. In the literature addressing the topic one can find a range of interpretations; stronger versions emphasize the strict identity between the incarnate Son and the eternal son and hence find no use for the logos asarkos while weaker versions affirm the conceptual value of the logos asarkos because it enables us to say that the incarnation was a free gift of God’s grace.36 Ultimately Cortez does not double down on any of the range of options made available by Barthians, rather, Cortez lands on a version which draws on the substance of Barth’s protological anthropology, saying that, Jesus just is God’s eternal determination of what it means to be human. His humanity has ontological significance for that of all other humans simply because Jesus is the one in whom God establishes what it means to be human.37 Building on the ontological and epistemological significance of Jesus, Cortez concludes that any reflection on what it means to be human—including reflection on gender, embodiment, race, and death—must be grounded in Jesus Christ.

Method

23

Summary By means of examples we have seen that a number of Christological anthropologies can be classified as Protological or Eschatological. In what follows, I argue that Torrance develops a version of Christological anthropology that does not fit either category: Soteriological-Christological Anthropology. In order to see how this is so we will examine his account of Christ’s fallen human nature.

T. F. Torrance and Christ’s Fallen Human Nature In recent decades a number of theologians have begun to ask whether Jesus assumed a fallen or an unfallen human nature upon the incarnation. Those who advocate for the fallen view include Karl Barth, Colin Gunton, and Wolfhart Pannenberg.38 Yet in recent literature the theologian who has received the most attention for his fallen human nature view is T. F. Torrance.39 Jerome van Kuiken, among others, has argued that Torrance’s understanding of Christ’s fallen human nature develops over the course of his theological career. In his 1938–1939 Auburn lectures Torrance taught that Christ assumed a fallen flesh which was sanctified in the moment of assumption. When Christ became a part of the human race he entered into solidarity with sinners, thus falling under the curse of God’s wrath. On this view, “Christ’s flesh, while holy, is ‘fallen’ in the sense of suffering divine judgement upon the sin of which Christ himself is innocent.”40 What does this suffering consist of? It consists of the enmity of God against sin as well as the enmity of Satan and sinners against him. In this way he represents sinful humanity before God, yet unlike the rest of humanity he offers perfect obedience to God despite having a fallen nature. Daniel Cameron summarizes Torrance’s early view, saying, In the incarnation, God comes “near to sinful man, inasmuch as he was made in the likeness of sinful flesh,” and in doing so he assumed the suffering of infirmity and temptation, the enmity of God against sin, and the enmity of Satan against sinners.41 Torrance’s view, however, evolved. In his Edinburgh lectures he argued that the Son assumed a fallen nature and sanctifies it. Jesus experiences the agony of obedience and identification with sinners, opposition from sinners and Satan, as well as opposition from God against his vicarious sinfulness. In these areas the earlier and latter doctrines are continuous. The discontinuity, however, arises concerning Torrance’s understanding of original sin. Van Kuiken explains, At Auburn he [Torrance] had followed Brunner in locating original sin in one’s personhood and so denied original sin to Christ on the basis that the Logos had assumed human nature but not a human person—the person of Christ was the divine Logos. In later writings, however, Torrance relocates

24

Method original sin to the human nature. This move allows him to affirm that in assuming a fallen nature, Christ assumed original sin, only to annihilate it upon assumption.42

How Torrance develops his doctrine of Christ’s fallen nature leaves us with two versions of the fallenness doctrine: the early view and the late view.43 Given that the latter view represents his more mature thought, we will focus on this second view. In light of his mature view we can ask two questions: what motivates Torrance’s adoption of this doctrine? What “work” does it do for his doctrine of redemption? Motivations for Adopting the Fallen Human Nature View In what condition do human beings find themselves as they stand before God? And what needs to change? According to one strand of Christian tradition, humanity’s condition is marked by sinfulness. Because of this condition, humans deserve the judgment and wrath of God. In the Reformed tradition this has typically been understood in terms of a “penalty.” Thus, Christ dies on the cross, fulfilling justice for the penalty that would have befallen those who have transgressed God’s laws.44 This understanding of humanity’s predicament and its solution leads Torrance to say that “in Western Christianity the atonement tends to be interpreted almost exclusively in terms of external forensic relations as a judicial transaction in the transference of the penalty for sin form the sinner to the sin-bearer.”45 Torrance sees this way of understanding humanity’s predicament and the solution as overly juridical. Furthermore, he sees them as operating with an external rather than internal solution. Torrance deems this “gospel of external relations,” where Christ’s passion is understood in juridical terms as a transaction between Christ and the rest of humanity, the “Latin heresy.”46 In the “Latin heresy” the incarnation becomes instrumental. It is a means rather than an end. Not only this, the external understanding of the gospel cannot address what Torrance thinks is humanity’s major predicament: alienation before God in terms of mind and will. According to Torrance, the human mind is perverse. It is ignorant and requires labor to learn truth in a sin-darkened world.47 It is subject to temptation.48 It is diseased and stands in enmity and violence against God’s reconciling love, it turns God’s truth into lies.49 Not only is the mind in need of healing, the will stands in opposition to God’s will and needs to be healed as well. This, Torrance believes, is illustrated in the history of Israel. As God moves closer towards Israel, Israel’s will resists God more vigorously. Torrance explains, The closer God drew near the more the human self-will of Israel asserted itself in resistance … the more fully God gave himself to this people, the more he forced it to be what it actually was, what we all are, in the selfwilled isolation of fallen humanity from God.50

Method

25

For Torrance, Israel is a microcosm of humanity; in its resistance to God’s will and its alienation from him despite his love for it, Israel embodies the human predicament before God.51 If the human predicament were merely juridical it could be dealt with a merely extrinsic solution; however, Torrance is convinced that the human predicament is also internal and thus an external gospel is inadequate. If the fallen minds and wills of humans are to be dealt with, God will have to take it and deal with it from the “inside-out,” so to speak. Christ will have to assume human nature as it stands after the fall—with its fallen and depraved mind and will—because that which is not assumed is not healed, i.e., “that what God has not taken up in Christ is not saved.”52 This internal solution will need to address the problems of the mind and the will, problems that are ontological rather than forensic. Thus concerning the mind Torrance says: “It is the alienated mind of man that God had laid hold of in Jesus Christ in order to redeem it and effect reconciliation deep within the rational center of human being.”53 Concerning the will, Torrance explains: “From within our alienation and in battle against our self will,” Christ casts himself “in utter reliance upon God the Father.”54 Christ prays, “Not my will (that is, not the will of the alienated humanity which Jesus has made his own), but they will be done.”55 From our own humanity, Christ offers “perfect filial obedience … from within man’s alienated life.”56 In order to accomplish this kind of redemption, Torrance argues, Christ needs to assume our fallen humanity. Thus, we can say that his understanding of the human predicament, paired with the non-assumptus principle, drives his adoption of the fallen nature view of Christ’s humanity. Before proceeding with an explanation of how Christ accomplishes redemption from within a fallen human nature, we ought to say something about Torrance’s use of the non-assumptus principle. Ian McFarland has argued that to appeal to the non-assumptus principle as the grounds for claiming that Christ had a fallen human nature is to misunderstand Gregory Nazianzen’s famous maxim: “the unassumed is the unhealed.”57 Gregory was concerned with the assumption of a whole human nature. If Christ did not have a human mind then he had not assumed humanity in its fullness. McFarland argues that having a mind is an essential part of being human but having a fallen mind is merely a contingent part of being human. Thus, Gregory was concerned with the completeness (the essential parts) rather than the quality (the contingent aspects) of Jesus’ humanity. This may be true but it does not invalidate Torrance’s use of the principle. Torrance appeals to the fallen nature view because he repudiates a gospel of external relations. Salvation has to be worked out from within Christ. In the case of the mind and will, the healing of both features will have to occur from within Christ or else they cannot truly be healed. To use a medical analogy, someone with malaria can only be healed of malaria if that person has malaria. Similarly, the fallen mind and will can only be healed if the person being healed actually has a fallen human mind and will. Therefore, if fallen human nature will be healed, the one in whom the healing occurs must have a fallen human nature. Without Christ’s assumption of a

26

Method

fallen human nature, human nature remains unhealed. Thus, “the whole man [in its essential and contingent properties] had to be assumed by Christ if the whole man is to be saved … the unassumed is the unhealed … what God has not taken up in Christ is not saved.”58 The Assumption and the Sanctification of Human Nature Orthodox Christology holds that Christ assumed a fully human nature. Torrance is in line with orthodoxy but adds that the human nature that Christ assumes is the “concrete form of our human nature marked by Adam’s fall.”59 Just as we stand before God in our sin-laden, corruptible, mortal humanity, the Son entered into this same state of humanity. Christ, Torrance says, “entered into complete solidarity with us in our sinful existence in order to save us, without becoming himself a sinner.”60 What redemptive action does assuming a fallen human nature accomplish? The answer comes in two parts: (1) what the initial assumption of a fallen nature does to human nature and (2) what the assumption of a fallen nature allows Christ to accomplish over the course of his life. Immediately upon assuming fallen a human nature, Christ sanctifies it. Thus, Torrance says, “In the very act of assuming our flesh the Word sanctified and hallowed it, for the assumption of our sinful flesh is itself atoning and sanctifying action. How could it be otherwise when he, the Holy One took on himself our unholy flesh.”61 When Son’s divine nature is united to a fallen human nature, the divine nature is not defiled by the fallen human nature.62 Rather, it sanctifies what has been marred and unites it again to the purity of God.63 In Theology in Reconstruction he explains, “in his holy assumption of our unholy humanity, his purity wipes away our impurity, his holiness covers our corruption, his nature heals our nature.”64 How is the initial act of union of between divine and human natures sanctifying and salvific? Answering this question has generated controversy partly because Torrance does not carefully spell out exactly what aspect of human nature is being sanctified upon assumption. One way to understand this initial act of sanctification is that upon assumption of a human nature Christ deals with the problem of original sin. This, as we have noted above, seems to be the hallmark of his mature view of the fallen nature. Yet we might still ask, what does it mean to say that Christ “dealt with” original sin upon assuming fallen human nature? To make sense of this question we might distinguish between original sin as corruption and guilt. Let us define original sin as “corruption” as the part of original sin that “involves a propensity or proneness to actual sin, but it is not the same as actual sin.”65 Let us define original sin as “guilt” as the “culpability aspect of guilt that accrues to Adam’s first sin.”66 Although (in traditional Western theology) these two aspects of original sin go hand in hand, they are (at least) logically separable. What does Torrance mean when he argues that the assumption of our fallen nature deals with original sin? We can rule out original corruption being dealt with at the assumption of human

Method

27

nature, because, as we will see below, Christ needs to bear a corrupt humanity for redemption to occur. This leaves us with original guilt. We can summarize this interpretation of Torrance’s account as follows: at the moment of assumption, Christ cleanses his fallen nature of guilt, but retains the corruption of human flesh. Therefore, Christ is not culpable for original sin but he bears the kind of corrupt nature necessary to accomplish the redemption of human nature.67 Christ’s Life and the Sanctification of Human Nature In Theology and Reconstruction, Torrance writes that Christ sanctifies our fallen human nature both “in the very act of assumption and all through his holy life he lived in it from beginning to end.”68 Torrance, it seems, is suggesting that the corruption that comes from having a fallen human nature is precisely what is redeemed over the whole course of Christ’s life. What does this corruption consist of? This corruption consists of a mind and will that are hostile to God. Christ, deals with the corruption of our mind by “converting it” and by living in “holiness and purity.” He deals with our corruption of will by beating “his way forward by blows” and “bending” back the wayward will of humanity into submission to the will of God.69 He overcomes the temptations that arise due to a corrupt will and “resists its downward drag in alienation from God” and converts “it back in himself to obedience toward God, thus sanctifying it.”70 He overcomes the opposition and enmity of our fallen nature to God “and restored it to peace with God first in glad and willing submission to God’s judgement.”71 He offers “the amen of truth from within our humanity to the word and will of God’s eternal truth.”72 He stands “in the place of Adam and all mankind,” standing in the gap “created by man’s rebellion and reconciled men and women to God by living the very life he lived in the perfection of obedience.”73 Christ’s whole life—his baptism, repentance, confession, struggle with temptation, obedience, prayer, death and resurrection—serves the purpose of healing the corruption of the fallen nature that he assumed. The corruption of human nature due to original sin is dealt with over the whole course of Christ’s life, which is lived in perfect conformity to God’s will for humanity.

Torrance’s Christological Anthropology Like others who are inclined towards Christological anthropology, Torrance expresses interest in approaching theological anthropology in light of the person of Christ. However, an in-depth examination of Torrance’s theological anthropology is difficult because he rarely addresses questions of theological anthropology—let alone anthropological method—in a sustained manner. Thus, Eric Flett notes that Torrance’s writings on theological anthropology are sparse “because Torrance’s creative powers were never fully turned upon the subject matter as a whole.”74 Yes, Torrance occasionally wrote about the imago Dei, human depravity, and the body-soul relation, but he did not address these

28

Method

topics with the depth of engagement given to his other dogmatic interests. His lack of in-depth engagement with theological anthropology is not surprising given his observation that, Reformed theology has always been shy about erecting an anthropology, not because it lacked a view of man, but because such a view cannot be enunciated as an independent article of faith as if it could of itself condition or contribute to our knowledge of God.75 Given the sparsity of Torrance’s writings on the doctrine of humanity, how might he have developed his theological anthropology? Flett suggests that additional material for developing Torrance’s theological anthropology “may be gleaned from his workings on the person and work of Christ.”76 Colyer concurs, saying, Torrance argues that a Christian anthropology is properly “formed in light of the humanity of Christ and in accordance with his redemptive purpose in the regeneration of mankind.” The incarnation entails the Son of God assuming our actual human being and nature in order to heal, restore, and fulfill it in accordance with the divine telos for humanity of union and communion with God. Thus Torrance views the humanity that the Son of God assumed from us in the incarnation, healed in body and soul and restored to proper relation with God and others as of archetypal significance for all human beings. In Jesus Christ we “discern what the basic structure of humanity is and ought to be.”77 Dick Eugenio makes this same claim more pointedly, explaining that for Torrance, “what constitutes humanity can only be known in light of who Christ is and what he has done, not the other way around.”78 The claim that the proper starting place for theological anthropology is Christology is not unique. As we have seen, Barth, Cortez, Grenz, Pannenberg, and countless others would agree that theological anthropology is grounded in Christology. However, what is unique about Torrance’s theological anthropology is that theological anthropology begins with Christ’s human nature as we are confronted by it in Christ’s saving act, which according to Torrance is a fallen human nature. Thus, unlike Christological anthropologies that begin with protology or eschatology, Torrancian Christological anthropology begins by discerning what it means to be human by first looking at the actual human nature of Christ—which happens to be a fallen and sanctified nature—rather than some putative human nature. That Christological anthropology would begin with who Christ is and what he has done—especially in his fallen human nature—instead of protology or eschatology should not be surprising given Torrance’s epistemology. The idea that we know Christ’s human nature only through the reality that we have access to, namely the fallen and sanctified human nature he assumes for the sake of salvation, bears much similarity to how Torrance believes we know God as Trinity.

Method

29

According to Torrance, “we know things in accordance with their natures, or what they are in themselves; and so we let the nature of what we know determine for us the content and form of our knowledge.”79 That is, we know things, kata physin. This epistemological principle applies to all realms of knowledge ranging from the natural sciences all the way to theological science. That knowledge is kata physin is the unifying methodological principle for all scientific investigation, theology included. Furthermore, the kata physin principle entails that knowledge of objects begins with being confronted by that object. Because of this conviction, Habets explains, Torrance is critical of the use of a priori notions in both science and theology.80 A priori modes of investigation do not take seriously the fact that the knower has been confronted with the object of knowledge. When the science of theology functions in an a priori manner, it operates as “a system of ideas laid down on the ground of external preconceptions and authorities” and it no longer operates out of “the actual knowledge of the living God as he is disclosed to us through his interaction with us in our world of space and time.”81 And once theology moves away from interaction with God as he has disclosed himself to us in space and time, it loses its kata physic and thus scientific manner of investigation. This means that theology as a science is necessarily an a posteriori activity; knowing begins with the givenness of the object being studied. This concept is important for Torrance’s Trinitarian theology. In accordance with the kata physin principle, Torrance claims that knowledge of God must be revealed by God, and so our theology is also a posteriori. Knowledge of God cannot be arrived at by means of a priori reflection; rather it can only be arrived at by being confronted by God himself. For Christians, being confronted by God occurs in Scripture and Tradition, but ultimately occurs in the person of Jesus Christ. In Jesus Christ, God reveals himself as he is. This is why the concept of homoousion is so important for Torrance. If Christ were not homoousios with God we would not have genuine knowledge of God. The homoousion guarantees that there is no other God behind Christ’s back. When Torrance applies the kata physic to Trinitarian theology it results in a multi-leveled approach to theology. The first, and the most basic level for thinking about the Triune God, is dubbed the “evangelical and doxological level.” This is the level of experience and worship, “in which we encounter God’s revealing and reconciling activity in the gospel.”82 All other reflection upon the Triune God is developed from this foundational level.83 If, as Torrance claims, things are only known in accordance with their natures, or what they are in themselves, then humanity is only known kata physin as well. This, Torrance would say, entails that we cannot know what human beings are by means of a priori reflection; scientific knowledge of what it means to be human is a posteriori. Much like our knowledge of God rests on the fact that Christ is hommousios with the Father, knowledge of humanity rests on the fact Christ is homoousios with us. As the Chalcedonian symbol says, Christ is “consubstantial with the Father according to the Godhead, and consubstantial with us according to the manhood.” Thus Christ, as he confronts us forms the

30

Method

basis for knowing what it means to be human. We could very well apply Torrance’s stratification of knowledge to our knowledge of humanity as well. The first, and most foundational level for theological reflection about humanity occurs at the “evangelical” level. It is the encounter of the God-man in his reconciling activity of the gospel that forms the “sine qua non of other levels of doctrinal formulation developed from it.”84 The claim that Christ forms the basis for knowing humanity is consistent with Protological and Eschatological Christological Anthropology, so why would Torrance reject both of these approaches? The reason is simply that we have not been confronted with the protological or eschatological Christ in the gospel. The only Christ that we have access to is Christ as he confronts us in salvation history, i.e., the one who was born of Mary. Let us call this approach Soteriological-Christological Anthropology. Under this approach, we might infer protological or eschatological claims about Christ, but we cannot ultimately ground claims of who Christ is apart from the reality we currently have access to, namely as he has confronted us in salvation history. This means that for Torrance we might be able to infer God’s protological and eschatological purposes for humanity from Christ’s humanity only as he confronts us in the midst of salvation history. However, we cannot ultimately ground our knowledge of what it means to be human apart from Christ’s human nature which, prior to the resurrection and ascension, is a fallen human nature because we do not have access to any other humanity.

A Puzzle Concerning the Movement from Christology to Anthropology That Christ is the basis for theological anthropology is simple enough, but how does one move from Christology to theological anthropology?85 Moreover, how does one move from Christology to theological anthropology while maintaining a Soteriological-Christological Anthropology approach? This is not an easy task, especially because Torrance’s fallen human nature Christology raises a significant puzzle for Soteriological-Christological Anthropology. Under the interpretation of Torrance provided by Kevin Chiarot it seems as though the kind of will that Christ has in his fallen nature is significantly different than the will of our fallen nature. If Chariot’s interpretation is correct then Christ’s own humanity does not tell us anything significant about our humanity, at least when it comes to our wills. If this is correct, then Soteriological-Christological Anthropology is undercut because Christ as he confronts us in the midst of salvation history does not actually inform our theological anthropology. If Soteriological-Christological Anthropology is correct then the fallen nature, including the fallen will, that Christ assumes at the incarnation must be the same as ours. So what kind of will does Christ’s fallen human nature have? Considering this issue Chiarot lists three options for how we might describe Christ’s human will within his fallen nature: (1) Christ’s human will is healed so that it is no longer fallen, (2) Christ’s human will is regenerated so that it is equivalent to our redeemed but sub-eschatological will, (3) Christ’s will is

Method

31

enabled so that it is equivalent to our pre-fallen humanity in its ability to deliberate without the constraints of a corrupt nature.86 Chiarot concludes that Torrance is working with something like the third option, since this option allows the humanity of Jesus to “bend back” the fallen will of humanity to conformity with the divine will. Chiarot, however, finds this problematic. The main reason this view is problematic is that a will that has the ability to freely deliberate without the constraints of a corrupt nature is not the will of our concrete human experience. Christ, in other words, has a human will that is radically different from ours. This radically different will is at best a pre-fallen humanity or at worst a semi-Pelagian will. Because of this conclusion, Chiarot concludes that Torrance’s fallen nature view is simply wrong. I agree with Chiarot that options one and two do not fit with Torrance’s theology. But unlike Chiarot I want to reject option three for an additional reason, namely that, if Torrance’s view leads us to say that Christ’s will really is like option three, then we would be undercutting the Soteriological-Christological approach. Why? Because we would be saying that humanity is best revealed by a pre-fallen humanity that we do not actually have access to, moreover Christ’s human will does not reveal what our will is actually like. Contra Chiarot, I do not think that these are the only three options for understanding the features of Christ’s will in his fallen nature. A fourth option is that Christ still has a fallen (i.e., corrupt will) after the initial act of assumption. The grounds for this are a reading of Torrance in which to say that human nature is sanctified in the act of assumption is to say that original guilt is removed, rather than original corruption. Under this reading, which I defended above, we can maintain that Christ’s will is like ours, that is, corrupted. Christ does not have the equivalent of a pre-fall will or a semi-pelagian will. This is highly significant otherwise Soteriological-Christological Anthropology is undercut. The reason being that Christ’s humanity that confronts us in salvation history would be significantly different than our humanity. Under Chiarot’s reading of Torrance, Christ has a human will that looks like X while everyone has a human will that looks like Y. Christ, in this reading does not reveal anything significant to us about the nature of our fallen nature. Under the reading of Torrance I have proposed in this chapter, however, Christ has a human will that looks like X and all other humans have a human will that look like X. Thus, the idea that Christ as he confronts us in salvation history accurately reveals something about our nature is salvaged. Additionally, this understanding of fallenness makes sense of the apparent contradiction that arises from the conjunction of Torrance’s beliefs that Christ has a fully sanctified human nature but somehow simultaneously “bends back” the fallen will of humanity to conformity with the divine will, thus effecting the healing of the human will.87 If my reading of Torrance regarding the removal of original guilt, but not original corruption is correct, then the supposed puzzle raised by Chiarot’s reading of Torrance slips away and one challenge to Torrance’s SoteriologicalChristological Anthropology is avoided.

32

Method

Coda Before concluding, we ought to ask a question that might be on the mind of some readers: must we adopt the fallen nature view to reap the benefits of Soteriological-Christological Anthropology? We must not. What I have called the Soteriological-Christological approach need not include a fallen nature. One could reject a fallen-nature view and still choose to begin reflection on what it means to be human based on whatever account of salvation one holds. To hold Soteriological-Christological Anthropology one only need to agree with Torrance regarding the kata physic and a posteriori nature of the sciences, specifically the theological science of humanity. This latter conviction, not the presence of a fallen-human-nature-Christology is what sets SoteriologicalChristological Anthropology from other approaches to theological anthropology. Thus, the insights of Torrancian theological anthropology might be applied towards the developing other versions of Soteriological-Christological Anthropology. Engaging in this project might prove to be a helpful alternative to the commonly employed protological and eschatological approaches.

Conclusion Over the course of this chapter, I have argued that unlike a number of recent prominent Christological anthropologies Torrance’s Christological anthropology does not begin with protology or eschatology, rather, it begins with who Christ is as he confronts us in his saving act. This for Torrance implies that Torrance’s Christological anthropology begins with the notion that Christ bears a fallen human nature because that is how Christ confronts us in salvation history. Thus, Torrance’s view stands apart from other views because it is a Soteriological-Christological Anthropology. In the chapters that follow, I will build upon the notion that Torrance’s approach to theological anthropology is a Soteriological-Christological Anthropology. The first aspect of Torrance’s theology of humanity that I will address concerns the question, “What are the metaphysics of human nature?”

Notes 1 Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (Chicago: VolumeOne Publishing, 1998), 182. 2 Jason Matson asks a similar question, though instead of the three options presented here he limits his answer to options one and three. See, Jason Matson, “Christ or Adam: The Ground for Understanding Humanity.” Journal of Theological Interpretation 1 (2017): 277–93. 3 For Trinitarian approaches, see for example: Christoph Schwöbel and Colin Gunton, Persons, Divine and Human: King’s College Essays in Theological Anthropology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991). 4 David Kelsey, Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology, 2 vols. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2009), 8–9.

Method

33

5 Marc Cortez uses different terminology to describe a similar distinction, he uses the terms “Minimal Christological Anthropology” and “Comprehensive Christological Anthropology.” The key difference between the latter term and my “Broad Christological Anthropology” lies in the distinction between “important”/“ultimate” and “broad”/“all.” He defines a “Comprehensive Christological Anthropology” as one “in which (a) Christology warrants ultimate claims about true humanity such that (b) the scope of those claims applies to all anthropological data.” See Marc Cortez, ReSourcing Theological Anthropology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018), 21. 6 Marc Cortez, Christological Anthropology in Historical Perspective: Ancient and Contemporary Approaches to Theological Anthropology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2016), 3. 7 Cortez, ReSourcing Theological Anthropology, 171. Italics in the original. 8 There is logical space for another possibility, one in which Christ is the paradigm of all human beings (protology) and the “blueprint” for how all human beings will be in the eschaton. See for example: Thomas Flint, “Molinism and Incarnation” in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. Ken Perszyk (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 187– 207. 9 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology: Volume 2, trans. Geoffrey Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 176. 10 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology: Volume 2, 176. 11 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology: Volume 2, 180. 12 Ibid., 203. 13 Ibid., 208. 14 Ibid., 217. 15 Ibid., 225. 16 Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 204. 17 Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self, 223. 18 Ibid., 224. 19 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, eds. G.W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, vol. III.2 (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1960), 19. 20 Barth, CD III.2, 25. 21 Barth, CD III.2, 26. Barth does not explicitly present his point in this form. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., 27. 24 Ibid., 32. 25 Ibid., 40 26 Ibid., 42. 27 Ibid., 43. 28 Ibid. 29 Barth applies the principle that theological anthropology begins with Christology in his discussion of the mind-body problem in CD III.2 section 46 and the topic of the beginning-end of life in CD III.2 section 47. 30 See, Marc Cortez, Embodied Souls, Ensouled Bodies: An Exercise in Christological Anthropology and its Significance for the Mind/Body Debate (London: T&T Clark, 2008); “The Madness in Our Method: Christology as the Necessary Starting Point for Theological Anthropology” in The Ashgate Research Companion to Theological Anthropology, ed. Joshua Farris and Charles Taliaferro (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015), 15–26. 31 Cortez, Resourcing, 21. The key difference between this view and my proposed Broad Christological Anthropology lies in the distinction between “important”/ “ultimate” and “broad”/“all.” 32 Ibid., 124. 33 Ibid.

34

Method

34 See Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and J. R. Steward (Berkeley: Apocryphile, 2011), Section 89.3 and James Dunn, Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980), 54–6. 35 Cortez, Resourcing, 125. 36 For the range of interpretation see, for example, Bruce McCormack, “Grace and Being: The Role of God’s Gracious Election in Karl Barth’s Theological Ontology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 92–110 and George Hunsinger, “Election and the Trinity: Twenty-Five Theses on the Theology of Karl Barth,” Modern Theology 24 (2008): 179–98. 37 Cortez, Resourcing, 172. 38 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, vol. II.1 (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1957), 153; Colin Gunton, The Christian Faith: An Introduction to Christian Doctrine (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 99, 101–2; Colin Gunton, Christ and Creation (Bletchley: Paternoster: 2005), 50–52; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, trans. L. L. Wilkins and D. A. Priebe, 2nd ed (Philadelphia: Westminster John Knox, 1977), 354–65. 39 For secondary literature on fallen nature Christology see, for example, Thomas G. Weinandy, In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh: An Essay on the Humanity of Christ (New York: T&T Clark, 2000), Kelly M. Kapic, “The Son’s Assumption of a Human Nature: A Call for Clarity,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 3 (2001): 154–66; Stephen Wellum, God the Son Incarnate: The Doctrine of Christ (Wheaton: Crossway, 2016), 230–35; Oliver Crisp, Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 90–117; Myk Habets, “The Fallen Humanity of Christ: A Pneumatological Clarification of the Theology of T. F. Torrance,” Participatio 5 (2015), 18–44; Darren Sumner, “Fallenness and Anhypostasis: A Way Forward in the Debate over Christ’s Humanity,” Scottish Journal of Theology 67 (2014), 195–212; Rafael Nogueira Bello, Sinless Flesh: A Critique of Karl Barth’s Fallen Christ (Bellingham: Lexham Press, 2020). 40 Jerome van Kuiken, Christ’s Humanity in Current and Ancient Controversy: Fallen or Not? (London: T&T Clark, 2017), 35. 41 Daniel J. Cameron, Flesh and Blood (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2016), 16. Cameron quotes Torrance, “Predestination in Christ,” The Evangelical Quarterly 13 (1941): 133. 42 Van Kuiken, Christ’s Humanity, 38. 43 One might also choose to call the early view a “weak” view and the latter view a “strong” view since the latter view includes original sin. 44 T. F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ (Colorado Springs: Helmers and Howard, 1992), 40. 45 Torrance, Mediation of Christ, 40. Torrance argues that this forensic understanding of humanity’s predicament takes a different form in Roman Catholic theology. There original sin is dealt with through the transfer of grace merited by Christ and dispensed by the church through the sacraments. T. F. Torrance, Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 203. See also, T. F. Torrance, Preaching Christ Today: The Gospel and Scientific Thinking (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 59. There he says that the forensic approach to purely forensic approach to atonement is “one of the most disastrous things that has happened in the history of the church.” 46 See T. F. Torrance, “Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy,” Scottish Journal of Theology 39 (1986): 461–82. 47 T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965), 132; The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 166–7.

Method

35

48 T. F. Torrance, Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ, ed. Robert T. Walker (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 112. 49 Torrance, Mediation of Christ, 39–40. 50 Ibid., 28. 51 The notion that Israel is a “microcosm” of humanity is especially evident in Thomas F. Torrance, “The Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel in World History,” in The Witness of the Jews to God, ed. David W. Torrance (Edinburgh: Handsel Press for the Scottish Order of Christian Unity, 1982), 85–104. 52 Torrance, Mediation of Christ, 39. 53 Ibid. 54 Torrance, Incarnation, 117. 55 Ibid., 118. 56 Ibid. 57 Ian A. McFarland, “Fallen or Unfallen? Christ’s Human Nature and the Ontology of Human Sinfulness,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 10 (2008): 406. 58 Torrance, Mediation of Christ, 39. 59 Torrance, Incarnation, 61. 60 Ibid., 62. 61 Ibid., 63. 62 One could argue that the joining of a fallen nature to the Word is impossible on moral grounds. See Oliver D. Crisp, Divinity and Humanity, 112. 63 Torrance, Incarnation, 100. 64 Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 155–6. 65 Crisp, Divinity and Humanity, 97. 66 Oliver D. Crisp, “Original Sin and Atonement,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, eds. Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea (Oxford: Oxford, 2009), 437. 67 Oliver Crisp raises the worry that even if Christ was not culpable for original guilt but was only afflicted by original corruption then Christ’s humanity would still be morally vitiated. Therefore, it would be “loathsome in the sight of his heavenly Father, even if, strictly speaking, he is not culpable for having this property.” Crisp, Divinity and Humanity, 112. The idea behind Crisp’s objection is that in his holiness God loathes that which is evil, corrupt, or unclean and cannot look upon such things (Habakkuk 1:13). In order to address this type of objection Torrance would need to provide an account for why a non-culpable but corrupt nature would not be excluded from the divine presence. There are several ways in which this might be done. For example, it could be argued that Old Testament laws—e.g., those found in Leviticus 12–15—which restrict unclean but morally inculpable persons from engaging God’s presence are actually meant to illustrate the fact that God cannot allow sinful beings into his presence. In other words, restricting unclean people from entering God’s presence through worship rituals is an “object lesson” for how sin restricts our access to God. If one adopts this reading of purity laws then the force of the objection is diminished. 68 Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 155. Italics added for emphasis. 69 Ibid., 132. 70 Torrance, Incarnation, 205. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid., 123. 73 Ibid. 74 Eric Flett, Persons, Powers, and Pluralities: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Culture (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2011), 117. 75 Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 99. 76 Flett, Persons, Powers, and Pluralities, 117.

36

Method

77 Elmer Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian and Scientific Theology (Downers Grove: Intervarsity, 2001), 173–4. Italics in the original. The quotations are from: T. F. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition,” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 309, 315; T. F. Torrance, “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective,” in Religion, Reason, and the Self: Essays in Honour of Hywel D. Lewis, ed. Stewart Sutherland and T. A. Roberts (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1989), 115. 78 Dick Eugenio, Communion with the Triune God: The Trinitarian Soteriology of T. F. Torrance (Cascade: Wipf and Stock, 2014), 43. 79 T. F. Torrance, The Ground and Grammar of Theology: Consonance between Theology and Science (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 8. 80 Myk Habets, Theology in Transposition: A Constructive Appraisal of T. F. Torrance (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013), 47. 81 Torrance, Ground and Grammar of Theology, 15–16. 82 Habets, Theology in Transposition, 31. 83 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, One Being Three Persons (London: T&T Clark, 1996), 90. 84 Elmer M. Colyer, The Nature of Doctrine in T. F. Torrance’s Theology (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2001), 182. 85 Marc Cortez notes the difficulty of moving directly from Christology to anthropology. He is especially concerned about universalizing the particularities of Christ, e.g., because Christ is male then maleness is the norm for being fully human. Cortez, ReSourcing Theological Anthropology, 184–6. 86 Kevin Chiarot, The Unassumed is the Unhealed: The Humanity of Christ in the Christology of T. F. Torrance (Eugene: Pickwick Books, 2013), 100–1. 87 One could appeal to Pneumatology to help explain how Christ’s corrupt will does not in fact sin. See Myk Habets, Theology in Transposition, 194.

References Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word of God. Vol. 2, 1. Edited by G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, translated by T. H. L. Parker, W. B. Johnston, H. Knight, and J. L. M. Harie. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1957. Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Creation: The Work of Creation. Vol 3, 2. Edited by G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, translated by H. Knight, G. W. Bromiley, J. K. S. Reid, and R. H. Fuller. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1960. Bello, Rafael Nogueira. Sinless Flesh: A Critique of Karl Barth’s Fallen Christ. Bellingham: Lexham Press, 2020. Cameron, Daniel J. Flesh and Blood: A Dogmatic Sketch Concerning the Fallen Nature View of Christ’s Human Nature. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2016. Carroll, Lewis. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. Chicago: Volume One Publishing, 1998. Chiarot, Kevin. The Unassumed is the Unhealed: The Humanity of Christ in the Christology of T. F. Torrance. Eugene: Pickwick, 2013. Colyer, Elmer M. How to Read T. F. Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian and Scientific Theology. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2001. Colyer, Elmer M. The Nature of Doctrine in T. F. Torrance’s Theology. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2001. Cortez, Marc. Christological Anthropology in Historical Perspective: Ancient and Contemporary Approaches to Theological Anthropology. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2016.

Method

37

Cortez, Marc. Embodied Souls, Ensouled Bodies: An Exercise in Christological Anthropology and its Significance for the Mind/Body Debate. London: T&T Clark, 2008. Cortez, Marc. “The Madness in Our Method: Christology as the Necessary Starting Point for Theological Anthropology.” In The Ashgate Research Companion to Theological Anthropology, edited by Joshua Farris and Charles Taliaferro, 15–26. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015. Cortez, Marc. ReSourcing Theological Anthropology: A Constructive Account of Humanity in Light of Christ. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018. Crisp, Oliver. Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Crisp, Oliver. “Original Sin and Atonement.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, edited by Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea, 430–447. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Dunn, James. Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980. Eugenio, Dick. Communion with the Triune God: The Trinitarian Soteriology of T. F. Torrance. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2014. Flett, Eric. Persons, Powers, and Pluralities: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Culture. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2011. Flint, Thomas. “Molinism and Incarnation.” In Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, edited by Ken Perszyk, 187–207. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Grenz, Stanley. The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001. Gunton, Colin. Christ and Creation. Bletchley: Paternoster, 2005. Gunton, Colin. The Christian Faith: An Introduction to Christian Doctrine. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. Habets, Myk. “The Fallen Humanity of Christ: A Pneumatological Clarification of the Theology of T. F. Torrance.” Participatio 5 (2015): 18–44. Habets, Myk. Theology in Transposition: A Constructive Appraisal of T. F. Torrance. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013. Hunsinger, George. “Election and the Trinity: Twenty-Five Theses on the Theology of Karl Barth.” Modern Theology 24 (2008): 179–198. Kapic, Kelly M. “The Son’s Assumption of a Human Nature: A Call for Clarity.” International Journal of Systematic Theology 3 (2001): 154–166. Kelsey, David. An Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2009. Matson, Jason. “Christ or Adam: The Ground for Understanding Humanity.” Journal of Theological Interpretation 1 (2017): 277–293. McCormack, Bruce. “Grace and Being: The Role of God’s Gracious Election in Karl Barth’s Theological Ontology.” In The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, edited by John Webster, 92–110. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. McFarland, Ian A. “Fallen or Unfallen? Christ’s Human Nature and the Ontology of Human Sinfulness.” International Journal of Systematic Theology 10 (2008): 399–415. Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Jesus – God and Man. 2nd ed. Translated by L. L. Wilkins and D. A. Priebe. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977. Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Systematic Theology, vol. 2, translated by Geoffrey Bromiley. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991. Schleiermacher, Friedrich. The Christian Faith. Edited by H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart. Berkeley: Apocryphile, 2011.

38

Method

Schwöbel, Christoph and Colin Gunton. Persons, Divine and Human: King’s College Essays in Theological Anthropology. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991. Sumner, Darren. “Fallenness and Anhypostasis: A Way Forward in the Debate over Christ’s Humanity.” Scottish Journal of Theology 67 (2014): 195–212. Torrance, Thomas F. The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons. London: T&T Clark, 1996. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel in World History.” In The Witness of the Jews to God, edited by David W. Torrance, 85–104. Edinburgh: Handsel Press for the Scottish Order of Christian Unity, 1982. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition.” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 309–322. Torrance, Thomas F. The Ground and Grammar of Theology: Consonance between Theology and Science. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001. Torrance, Thomas F. Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ. Edited by Robert T. Walker. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008. Torrance, Thomas F. “Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy.” Scottish Journal of Theology 39 (1986): 461–482. Torrance, Thomas F. Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990. Torrance, Thomas F. The Mediation of Christ. Colorado Springs: Helmers and Howard, 1992. Torrance, Thomas F. Preaching Christ Today: The Gospel and Scientific Thinking. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective.” In Religion, Reason, and the Self: Essays in Honour of Hywel D. Lewis, edited by Steward Sutherland and T. A. Roberts. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1989. Torrance, Thomas F. Theology in Reconciliation: Essays Towards Evangelical and Catholic Unity in East and West. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976. Torrance, Thomas F. Theology in Reconstruction. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Torrance, Thomas F. The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995. van Kuiken, Jerome. Christ’s Humanity and Ancient Controversy: Fallen or Not? London: T&T Clark, 2017. Weinandy, Thomas G. In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh: An Essay on the Humanity of Christ. New York: T&T Clark, 2000. Wellum, Stephen. God the Son Incarnate: The Doctrine of Christ. Wheaton: Crossway, 2016.

3

Nature The Metaphysics of Human Beings

I have made the case that when the rare theologian has explicitly attempted to address T. F. Torrance’s theological anthropology, they have primarily done so a part of a larger project. Eric Flett, for instance, examines Torrance’s notion of humans as “priests of creation,” for the sake of developing a Trinitarian theology of culture.1 Elmer Colyer dedicates seven pages, of an almost 400-page introduction to Torrance’s theology, to a summary of Torrance’s theological anthropology.2 Geordie Zeigler explores the logic of grace in Torrance’s theology and devotes one chapter to establishing the view that humans are creatures of grace created for fellowship with God but falling under God’s loving judgment because they have rejected God’s grace towards them.3 Myk Habets stands apart from these other treatments of Torrance’s theological anthropology because he focuses entirely on one aspect of Torrance’s theological anthropology, namely, the doctrine of theosis.4 To date, Jing Wei’s dissertation undertaken at the University of Edinburgh—“The Theological Anthropology of Thomas F. Torrance: A Critical and Comparative Exploration,” constitutes the only full-length treatment of Torrance’s theological anthropology.5 Despite the fact that these, largely occasional, works explore a number of elements in Torrance’s theological anthropology, one aspect remains underexplored: the metaphysics of Christ’s human nature that undergirds his doctrine of atonement.6 Theologians have, by and large, failed to ask the question: “What metaphysical account of human nature best makes sense of T. F. Torrance’s doctrine of atonement?”7 This is likely due, in part, to Torrance’s “mysterian” approach to the doctrine of atonement, i.e., Torrance’s belief that the doctrine of atonement is ultimately a mystery more to be adored than expressed.8 In this chapter I proceed to an answer this question by examining Torrance’s doctrine of atonement and his use of the anhypostasia–enhypostasia distinction.9 I argue that in order for Torrance’s doctrine of atonement to work, Christ’s human nature must be an abstract universal. Specifically, Christ instantiates an abstract universal human nature and the rest of humanity participates in an abstract universal human nature.10 By establishing this thesis, I hope to demonstrate that Christology holds promise for developing an understanding of the metaphysics of human nature. Additionally, I hope to contribute DOI: 10.4324/9781003265832-3

40

Nature

to ongoing discussions regarding Torrance’s doctrine of atonement and defend the significance of the an-enhypostasia distinction for abstract universal theories of Christ’s human nature.11 The plan of this chapter is as follows. First, I shall briefly exposit Torrance’s doctrine of atonement and his use of the an-enhypostasia distinction. Following this exposition, I provide three categories for understanding the metaphysics of Christ’s human nature. With these categories in place, I defend the thesis that according to Torrance, Christ instantiates an abstract universal human nature but the rest of humanity participates in an abstract universal human nature. I conclude with a few comments regarding the fittingness of this analytic-theological project despite Torrance’s aversion to subjecting “the great mystery of atonement … to the rationalism of human thought.”12

Torrance on the Union of Natures and Atonement “Christ Jesus IS the atonement.”13 For Torrance, it is apt to describe Christ as the atonement himself, because Christ does not just make atonement, rather atonement is made in Christ’s person not just his work. Hence, Torrance says, Atonement is something done … within the ontological depths of the Incarnation, for the assumption of the flesh by God in Jesus Christ is itself a redemptive act and of the very essence of God’s saving work. This takes place, not just in some impersonal physical way, but in an intensely personal and intimate way within the incarnate Lord and his coexistence with us in our fallen suffering condition as sinners. Incarnation is thus intrinsically atoning, and atonement is intrinsically incarnational. 14 His conviction that incarnation and atonement constitute one saving act is especially apparent in his Edinburgh lectures, which were published as Atonement. In those lectures the hypostatic union between divine and human nature serves as the linchpin of his doctrine of atonement. The significance of the hypostatic union for his doctrine of atonement becomes clear in the way he considers three aspects of atonement: (1) justification, (2) reconciliation, and (3) redemption. Concerning justification as atonement, Torrance argues that justification is two-fold.15 On God’s side it means to judge and to deem right. On humanity’s side there are two actions that must be performed. There must be confession of God’s righteousness and there must be obedience to it. Torrance suggest that these four requirements are fulfilled in Christ because of the hypostatic union. In Christ, humanity, by virtue of Christ’s human nature, acknowledges its sinfulness. In Christ, God judges humanity as sinful and puts humanity in the right, thereby revealing his own righteousness. Simultaneously, in Christ, humanity offers up perfect obedience and faithfulness to God. Finally, in Christ, God deems humanity as being in the right. Thus, Jesus is the judge and judged in one person.16

Nature

41

For Torrance, however, atonement cannot be considered solely in judicial terms. Atonement is the recreation of the bond of union between God and humanity. He calls this aspect of atonement “reconciliation.” By reconciliation here Torrance is referring to the “at-one-ment” between human and divine natures that occurs both ontologically and relationally.17 How does this at-onement happen? It occurs in virtue of the hypostatic union. Because Torrance makes the at-one-ment of natures the conceptual core of his doctrine of atonement, we shall focus on this aspect. Focusing on this union as the “once and for all union”18 and the “continuous union”19 of the human and divine natures will help us to answer the question, “What metaphysical account of human nature must be given in order to make sense of T. F. Torrance’s doctrine of atonement?”

At-one-ment: The Once and For All Union of God and Man Throughout a number of Torrance’s writings, one finds the idea that the Word takes on a fallen human nature for the sake of redeeming, healing, and sanctifying humanity. According to Torrance, the incarnational union is atoning because in the union of human and divine natures our lost and damned humanity is sanctified.20 In Torrance’s mind the notion that a fallen human nature is assumed is the logical entailment of the non-assumptus principle. In a section of Incarnation in which he discusses the hypostatic union, Torrance is adamant that “there is no doubt at all that by ‘human nature’ the fathers wanted to stress the actuality of Christ’s union with us in our true humanity, that Christ was human in all points exactly like us, yet without sin.”21 However, in order to affirm that “Christ was human in all points exactly like us,” Torrance believes that we must say that Christ assumed our fallen humanity in order to heal and sanctify it “through the act of assumption.”22 When the divine nature is united to a fallen human nature, the divine nature is not defiled by the fallen human nature, rather it “resists it [sin], sanctifying what sin had corrupted, and unites it again to the purity of God.”23 Again, Torrance is clear that the sanctification of fallen human nature occurs in the union of the divine and human nature, i.e., the hypostatic union. In Theology in Reconstruction he says, “In his holy assumption of our unholy humanity, his purity wipes way our impurity, his holiness covers our corruption, his nature heals our nature.”24 From what we have said above, it is apparent that the Son’s assumption of a fallen human nature has salvific effects, it is a reconciling and sanctifying union. How the union of the divine and human natures is sanctifying and salvific is a matter of discussion among Torrance scholars.25 For the purposes of this chapter, we do not need to decide how exactly this union of the human and divine natures is salvific, it is sufficient to say that according to Torrance, this initial act of incarnation is inherently redemptive. Finally, we should also note that the healing union affected by the incarnation does not simply open up the possibility for the sanctifying of individual’s

42

Nature

human natures. There is an objective sanctification of all of humanity in virtue of the Son’s assumption of human nature. Kye Won Lee notes that Torrance objectivizes this salvific action, whereas traditionally this action has been reserved for subjective appropriation by the Holy Spirit. Lee refers to the fact that “Torrance does not view our regeneration … as what happens in our heart.”26 Rather Torrance views regeneration occurring in Christ’s birth. James Cassidy elaborates upon this and says that “our humanity (and in fact, humanity as such) is born and born again in the birth and rebirth of Jesus Christ.”27 We can now summarize Torrance’s understanding of the role that the initial act of incarnation plays in atonement. First, Torrance believes that in assuming a fallen human nature, the divine nature of the Son heals and sanctifies human nature. Second, Torrance believes that the salvific effects of the incarnation objectively apply to humanity. The regeneration of human nature is not a subjective act, rather it has occurred objectively in Christ at the moment of incarnation. In light of these two observations, especially the latter, we might wonder, “Metaphysically, what must human nature be in order for the healing, sanctifying, and regenerating union between divine nature and human nature to affect human nature?” Before answering that question we ought to consider the role that the continuous union between human and divine natures plays in atonement. At-one-ment: The Continuous Union in the Life of Jesus (The Vicarious Humanity of Christ) The incarnation is a once and for all atoning act of assumption of our flesh; however, it is also continuous union “carried all the way through our estranged state under bondage into freedom and triumph of the resurrection.”28 In treating the topic of reconciliation, Torrance stresses that for reconciliation to occur, the union of God and humanity must take place over the whole course of Christ’s life from birth to death.29 The union of God and humanity, however, cannot simply end at death, it must be carried through to its completion in the resurrection, so that after the resurrection human nature and the divine nature are united for eternity. In treating the continuous union, which takes place over the whole course of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection, Torrance stresses the notion that there are certain key moments that have special atoning significance for the rest of humanity. These key moments are typically grouped together under Torrance’s notion of the “vicarious humanity of Christ.” The “vicarious humanity of Christ” is one of several distinctive aspects of Torrance’s doctrine of the person and work of Christ. Andrew Purves describes this doctrine by saying that Torrance “saw Christ’s humanity not merely as exemplary but rather as through and through substitutionary, in which the covenant between God and humankind was entirely completed in and by him for us.”30 Similarly, Christian Kettler explains that according to the doctrine of

Nature

43

vicarious humanity, “Christ’s humanity is not simply that which we imitate but is vicarious, on our behalf and in our place.”31 He elaborates upon this definition by explaining that, Jesus Christ is both the representative and substitute for my humanity. He represents my humanity before God the Father, having taken my humanity upon himself, bringing it back to God from the depths of sin and death. He is the High Priest, representing the people before God. (The Epistle to the Hebrews) But he is also the sacrifice himself. He is the substitute doing in my place, in my stead, what I am unable to do: live a life of perfect faithfulness to, obedience to, and trust in God. “Vicarious” at its heart means doing something for another in their stead, doing something that they are unable to do.32 When Torrance appeals to this notion, it is almost always in the context of how Christ is our substitute and representative across all aspects of the human and Christian experience, thus accomplishing atonement.33 Torrance himself states, That Jesus Christ really took our place in the human responses of knowing, believing and worshipping God, of repenting, obeying, laying hold of eternal life or bearing testimony, is something that many people find extremely hard to accept, ready as they may be to accept that God acts on their behalf in Jesus Christ.34 In other words, the vicarious humanity of Christ should not be thought of as merely “substitution,” “representation,” or “solidarity with.”35 The doctrine of the vicarious humanity of Christ considers the entirety of Christ’s human life is lived as our substitute and representative.36 Yet Christ’s vicarious action on our behalf can be divided into various key moments. The key moments that Torrance believes are accomplished by the vicarious humanity of Christ include (among others): baptism, repentance, adoration, praise, joy, suffering, confession, struggle with temptation, faith, obedience, faith, ministry, prayer, sanctification, death, and resurrection. To treat the atoning significance of each of these moments in detail is beyond the scope of this chapter; however, a few things should be said about the atoning significance of several of these moments.37 First, we might consider Christ’s baptism. Torrance says that Christ’s baptism belongs “to the great redemptive events of the gospel.”38 He states that “the truth of our baptism is lodged in Jesus Christ himself and all that he has done for us within the humanity he took from us and made his own, sharing to the full what we are that we may share to the full what he is.”39 Chiarot argues that “this understanding of baptism of Jesus and, by implication Christian baptism rests on the ontological foundation of the assumption of our fallen nature.”40 Given Torrance’s own statements and Chiarot’s interpretation, we

44

Nature

can say that Christ’s baptism is our own baptism because in Christ’s baptism as an individual, humanity as a whole has been baptized.41 Second, we might consider Christ’s repentance and confession together. Torrance states that Christ must be recognized “as acting in our place in all the basic acts of man’s response to God: in faith and repentance, confession, penitence, sorrow, chastisement, and submission to divine judgment.”42 Elsewhere Torrance says that Christ “confesses our sin and submits perfectly to God, restoring mankind to oneness with God, both in regard to life and in regard to mind.”43 Christ, as an individual, turns away from sin, bending back the wayward will of man into submission to the will of God. Christ also confesses humanity’s propensity to sin, though Christ himself is not guilty of sin. Because Christ has performed these actions, even as an individual, humanity is said to have vicariously repented and confessed in Christ. Third, we might consider Christ’s faith and obedience. Torrance is explicit in stating that Christ takes “our place at every point where human beings act as human beings and are called to have faith in the Father.”44 Furthermore, Christ is said to offer “the amen of truth from within our humanity to the word and will of God’s eternal truth.”45 If there is any ambiguity as to whom Christ’s faith and obedience counts for, Torrance clarifies this by saying that Christ stands “in the place of Adam and all mankind,” that is he “stood in the gap created by man’s rebellion and reconciled men and women to God by living the very life he lived in the perfection of obedience.”46 Another significant aspect of Christ’s vicarious obedience is Christ’s prayer on our behalf. Torrance says that when Christ prays, he stands “where we stand in our rebellion and alienation,”47 but that out of disobedience, he “offers a prayer of obedience.”48 Because Christ has had faith and obedience, as an individual, humanity is said to have had faith and obedience vicariously in Christ. Finally, we might consider Christ’s death and resurrection. Concerning these two moments of Christ’s work, Torrance says that Christ’s death and resurrection are corporate acts. Thus, he can say that “Christ’s death for all mankind means that all men and women are already involved … Christ died for them when they were yet sinners, and in that he died, all died.” Christ’s vicarious action on humanity’s behalf also applies to resurrection. According to Torrance, the resurrection is the sign that the union between the human and the divine nature has held. At the cross the union is attacked and almost destroyed, but at the resurrection this union is permanently forged together. Thus, after the death of Christ, human and divine natures are forever united in him. This union of natures applies to all of humanity. Torrance is clear about this when he says, Since in Jesus Christ the Creator Word of God has become man, in such a way that in him Divine Nature and human nature are indivisibly united in his own Person, the humanity of every man, whether he knows it or not, whether he believes it or not, is ontologically bound up with the humanity of Jesus.49

Nature

45

In this section we have briefly considered Torrance’s understanding of Christ’s baptism, his repentance and confession, his faith and obedience, and his death and resurrection. Under each of these moments in Christ’s life we have noted that, according to Torrance, it is Christ’s actions as an individual that count vicariously for the rest of humanity.50 Christ was baptized, repented, confessed, had faith, obeyed, died, and rose from the dead as an individual. However, his individual actions had an effect on all of humanity.51 Summary Let us take stock. In this section we have examined two topics within Torrance’s doctrine of atonement: (1) the once and for all union of human and divine natures and (2) the continuous union of human and divine natures. We have briefly examined each of these topics with an eye towards asking “What metaphysical account of human nature must be given in order to make sense of T. F. Torrance’s doctrine of atonement?” Our survey above should lead us to believe that our answer must account for at least two features of Christ’s human nature. We can call the first feature the generality of Christ’s human nature: Whatever happens to Christ’s human nature happens to human nature in general. We can call the second feature the particularity of Christ’s human nature: Christ must be able to act as a person with an individual human nature. The aspect of Torrance’s theology that helps make sense of these two features is his use of the anhypostasis–enhypostasis distinction. We shall now address this topic.

Torrance’s Use of the Anhypostasis–Enhypostasis in his Doctrine of Atonement In recent years the an-enhypostasia distinction has received some pushback.52 Regardless of whether we find this distinction useful or coherent, it is a basic element of Torrance’s Christology and a crucial element of his doctrine of atonement. Let us briefly exposit his use of the distinction. Anhypostasis and Enhypostasis Torrance accounts for what we have called the generality of Christ’s human nature and the particularity of Christ’s human nature by means of anhypostasia and enhypostasia. Torrance writes,

46

Nature The anhypostasia stresses the general humanity of Jesus, the human nature assumed by the Son with its hypostasis in the Son, but enhypostasia stresses particular humanity of the one man Jesus, whose person is not other than the person of the divine Son.53

This quotation explains what anhypostasia and enhypostasia stress, but what do anhypostasia and enhypostasia mean? According to Torrance, anhypostasis means that the humanity of Jesus has no independent personal existence apart from the incarnation. Enhypostasis means that in the incarnation the human nature of Christ is personalized.54 This distinction allows Torrance to guard against the heresy of adoptionism. He notes that “if there was a human person to whom the divine person was added, there would have been an independent center of personal being in Jesus over against the person of the Son.”55 We cannot emphasize enough the fact that for Torrance one of the main functions of anhypostasis and enhypostasis is to stress the general and particular humanity of Christ. He goes on to say that The anhypostasia and enyhypostasia taken together tell us that the incarnation was the union of the Word of God with mankind in solidarity with all men and women [the general humanity of Christ’s human nature]; yet it was union with one man or rather such a union with all humanity that it was achieved and wrought out in and through this one man [the particular humanity of Christ’s human nature], Jesus of Bethlehem and Nazareth for all men and women.56 In other words, Christ has a universal ontological solidarity with all humans, and at the same time Jesus is an individual human being, with individual personhood. Helpfully, Torrance further elaborates upon the work that the an-enhypostasia distinction does for his Christology. First, Anhypostasia explains to the solidarity of Christ with all humanity and enhypostasia explains Christ’s encounter with other people in personal relationship. Torrance reiterates the fact that the doctrine of anhypostasis means that the Son did not join himself “to an independent personality existing on its own as an individual,” rather it means that the Son assumes “that which unites us with one another, the possession of the same or common human nature.”57 He says that on its own anhypostasis would mean that the solidarity between Christ and all mankind would be “only ontological and therefore physical and mechanical—a causal necessitarian solidarity.”58 However, anhypostasia does not stand on its own, it is complemented by enhypostasia. He states that The doctrine of enhypsotasia insists here that within that anhypostatic solidarity of Christ with our common human nature, he came also as an individual human being in our humanity, seeking in addition a solidarity in terms of the interaction of persons within our human social life, in personal relations of love, commitment, responsibility, decision, etc.59

Nature

47

In addition to grounding Christ’s solidarity with all of humanity and his encounter with people in personal relationship, the an-enhypostasia distinction grounds the assumption of fallen humanity and the purity of Jesus. This distinction helps us make sense of how “God the Son was made in the likeness of our flesh of sin, and yet was not himself a sinner; how he became one with us in the continuity of our Adamic and fallen existence in such a way as to make contact with us in the very roots of our sinning being, and yet did not himself repeat our ‘original sin’ but vanquished it, and broke its continuity within our human nature.”60 Anhypostasis speaks of the Son’s act of assuming humanity in its fallen nature, but enhypostasis speaks of the fact that Christ was the person who was obedient to the Father and was sinless, and therefore holy. Torrance summarizes this, saying that the enhypostatic Son of man, lived out a life of perfect and sinless obedience to the Father in the midst of the fallen human nature which he had anhypostatically assumed, and in virtue of which he entered into solidarity with all mankind.61 Summary In this section we have noted that in Torrance’s theology, anhypostasia and enhypostasia refer to the generality of Christ’s human nature and the particularity of Christ’s human nature respectively. Anhypostasia refers to the fact that Jesus Christ took possession of a shared or “common human nature.”62 This means that there is metaphysical solidarity between Jesus and all humanity. Enhypostasia refers to the fact that Jesus came as an individual human being, having a personal mode of existence.63 Both of these features are necessary to make sense of Torrance’s doctrine of atonement. Having done the work of clarifying the work that the an-enhypostasia distinction does for his doctrine of atonement, we are finally in a position to answer the question: “Which account of the metaphysics of human nature undergirds his doctrine of atonement and his use of the an-enhypostasia distinction?” In what follows, I provide three options for making sense of the metaphysics of Christ’s human nature.

What is Christ’s Human Nature? Three Options When Torrance speaks of Christ’s human nature, what are the metaphysics he has in mind? He is not explicit and thus his metaphysics of Christ’s human nature remains ambiguous and underdetermined.64 However, this problem is not unique to Torrance’s theology. Many contemporary theologians have failed to inquire into the metaphysics of human nature. Nevertheless, a few analytic philosophers and theologians have decided to take this task upon their shoulders.65 One such theologian is Oliver Crisp. In Divinity and Humanity, Crisp offers three categories by which we might understand the metaphysics of Christ’s human nature. First, we might conceive

48

Nature

of Christ’s human nature as a concrete particular. By this, Crisp means that Christ’s human nature is a concrete object assumed by the Word and not a property of the Word.66 This concrete object might be a human body or a human body and human soul rightly configured. We might also conceive of Christ’s human nature as being an abstract property. Crisp distinguishes between two types of abstract properties: abstract universals and tropes (abstract particulars).67 By “abstract universals” we can take him to mean the sort of entities that exist abstractly (that is, non-spatial, non-temporal) and singularly. Consider, for example, the property of being purple. If the color purple were an abstract universal, we might say that the purple drink, a purple Kobe Bryant Los Angeles Lakers jersey, and the purple McDonald’s character Grimace all exemplify or participate in the sole abstract universal called purpleness. Thus, in application to humanity, each human person necessarily exemplifies or participates in one abstract universal human nature. Crisp also speaks of “tropes,” also called “abstract particulars.” He says that “According to this view (or family of views), particulars are abstract objects, in fact properties; they are not universals. Instead, they are properties possessed by individual concrete things.”68 Consider once again the purple drink, a purple Kobe Bryant Laker jersey, and the purple McDonald’s character Grimace. Under one understanding of tropes, the purpleness of the drink, the jersey, and Grimace is just the purpleness that this drink, this Kobe Bryant Laker jersey, and this Grimace have. Each of these three objects do not exemplify or participate in some universal “purpleness,” rather each exemplifies or participates in a particular abstract object called purple. Thus, in application to humanity, it can be said that each human person necessarily exemplifies or participates in a particular human nature. In thinking about the metaphysics of Christ’s human nature we shall use the following definitions: Concrete Nature Christology (CNC): The Second Person of the Trinity assumes a concrete human nature. Abstract Universal Nature Christology (AUC): The Second Person of the Trinity assumes a common abstract universal human nature which is exemplified by or participated in by all humans. Abstract Particular Nature Christology (APC): The Second Person of the Trinity assumes a particular abstract particular human nature which is solely exemplified by or participated in by the person of Jesus Christ. With these definitions in place, we shall now turn answer the question, “What metaphysical account of human nature must be given in order to make sense of T. F. Torrance’s doctrine of atonement?”

The One and the Many: Torrance’s Metaphysics of Human Nature A Torrancian account of Christ’s human nature, whether described as CNC, AUC, or APC, must be able to give an account of Christ’s metaphysical

Nature

49

solidarity with all of humanity and his individual, personal mode of existence as a human person. As CNC and APC are both particularist Christologies, let us begin by attempting to articulate a particularist account of Torrance’s doctrine of atonement. If such an account does not cohere with Torrance’s doctrine of atonement then we shall attempt to articulate a Torrancian abstract universal account. The Particularist Option: Concrete Nature Christology and Abstract Particular Nature Christology Oliver Crisp has recently defended a union account of atonement in which Christ’s human nature is a concrete particular. Central to his defense is a version of Augustinian realism. Maintaining Augustinian realism allows Crisp to say that Adam and his posterity are one metaphysical entity, thus original sin can justly be transmitted from Adam to his posterity.69 Helpfully, he notes that Augustinian realism is not a thesis which commits one to a particular mechanism of how such an arrangement occurs between Adam and his posterity. What is important is the “idea that Adam and his progeny are (somehow) one metaphysical entity.”70 Having established the possibility of Augustinian realism, he proceeds to consider the possibility that “Christ and the elect together compose one metaphysical entity that persists through time just as, on the Augustinian realist way of thinking, Adam and his progeny do.”71 Crisp’s Augustinian realist notion that Christ and the elect together compose one metaphysical entity fits well with Torrance’s generality of Christ’s human nature criteria. However, we might wonder whether an Augustinian realist metaphysics can account for Torrance’s particularity of Christ’s human nature criteria? Although he is not addressing Torrance’s theology, Crisp believes Augustinian realism modified by stage theory can account for the moral properties of individuals, including Christ and other human beings.72 Hence, Crisp in his own words: According to the stage theorist, what we have been calling the temporal parts of four-dimensional wholes—but they call “stages” of four dimensional entities—do have moral properties, and it does make sense to say “this state of four dimensional agent is guilty of sinning at such-and-such time.”73 If Crisp’s stage theory account is right, then prima facie, it seems like there may be a way of constructing a particularist (i.e., CNC or APC) account of human nature which considers Christ and humanity to be one metaphysical entity (seemingly fulfilling Torrance’s generality of Christ’s human nature criteria) and which accounts for the individuality of Christ and other human beings (seemingly fulfilling Torrance’s particularity of Christ’s human nature criteria). However, there is at least one reason to believe particularist accounts of human nature do not fit Torrance’s Christological requirements.74

50

Nature

One reason that CNC and APC are not live options for Torrancian Christology is that throughout his doctrine of atonement, Torrance does more than merely emphasize that Christ is one part of the metaphysical entity we call humanity. Torrance wants to be able to say that what happens in Christ happens to all of humanity. Thus, Torrance would be unsatisfied with an account that says that changes that occur to that one metaphysical entity come in virtue of certain parts affecting others. This is a feature of the Augustinian realist picture described above. Why would Torrance be unhappy with an account in which Christ’s “part” affects the rest of the “parts” of the one metaphysical entity we call human nature? Because that would lead to a denial of Torrance’s view that atonement occurs in the ontological depths of humanity. Torrance wants to affirm the fact that the sanctification of humanity occurs in Christ’s human nature, not just that Christ’s sanctification of human nature affects other parts of humanity. Torrance also wants to affirm that what Christ does as an individual in the continuous union of humanity and divinity just is what humanity does, it is not something that just affects the rest of humanity. Torrance wants to say that what happens to Christ’s human nature happens to the rest of humanity as a whole; but stage theory can only say that what happens to the stage designated as Christ’s human nature affects the rest of the “stages” of humanity. Stage theory cannot capture this fine-grained distinction that Torrance is after, thus we must say that a particularist account of human nature does not fit Torrance’s Christology. Given this conclusion, let us now turn to our final option: Abstract Universal Christology. Abstract Universal Christology Abstract Universal Christology, as we have seen, is the view in which the second person of the Trinity assumes a common abstract universal human nature which is exemplified by or participated in by all humans. Historically, this was a view held by several major patristic theologians. In an essay titled “The Patristic Atonement Model,” Ben Myers explains what work AUC does in patristic atonement models. Myers begins his essay by stating in outline form the patristic atonement model:75 1 2 3 4

5

Humanity, created in the image of God, is loved by God. (M1) There is one human nature. All individual human beings participate in this universal. But human nature has succumbed to the power of death. (M2) Death is not a positive quality but a privation of being. (Privation.) To rescue humanity from its plight, God needs to retrieve human beings from the state of death. In Christ, God becomes incarnate, the divine nature is united with human nature. (M4) Exactly how this union occurs is unknowable. (Hypostatic union.) What happens to human nature in Christ happens to humanity as a whole because of (M1). (The universal effect.)

Nature 6 7

51

Human nature is now freed from the power of death and is restored to its created position. This is a Good Thing. (The Solution.) Human nature is now united to God and receives the benefits far surpassing its created position. This is a Very Good Thing. (The Surplus.)76

Myers rightly points out that this model of atonement requires certain metaphysical assumptions about human nature, namely that “Humanity is essentially one—that there is a universal human nature in which individuals participate in.”77 He argues that this view is so widely taken for granted in early Christianity that it is seldom defended or discussed. Yet it consistently shows up in the theology of many of the church fathers. For example, Irenaeus suggests that the unfolding history of human nature is like a single book, and that Christ is the precis that encompasses the whole story in brief.78 Athanasius compares humanity to a town, which one day a king decides to visit, and the whole town is dignified by its new resident. In the same way, Athanasius says, the whole of humanity reaps the benefits when the Son of God takes up residence in our nature.79 Gregory of Nazianzus’s words are especially illustrative of this metaphysics of human nature. In one sermon he says: He bears the title “Man” … with the aim of hallowing humanity through himself, by becoming a sort of yeast for the whole lump. He has united with himself all that lay under condemnation, in order to release it from condemnation. For all our sakes he became all that we are, sin apart— body, soul, mind, all that death pervades.80 From our brief exposition of Torrance’s own doctrine of atonement, we can say there are deep affinities with the patristic model Myers presents. This should come as no surprise given Torrance’s well-known indebtedness to patristic theology, specifically the theology of the three church fathers mentioned.81 Much like the church fathers, Torrance wants to affirm that Christ is “at once man, and a man.”82 That Christ is the one and the many, is the metaphysical underpinning of Torrance’s doctrine of atonement.83 Yet this concept is not without problems. First, we might worry: how come what happens to Christ’s human nature happens to humanity as a whole but what happens to my human nature does not happen to humanity as a whole? If what happens to my human nature happens to humanity as a whole, this would be a problem for Torrance’s metaphysics of human nature. Only Christ’s human nature can affect all of humanity.84 Second, we might worry that an abstract nature Christology makes the anenhypostasia distinction trivial. This is a worry that Oliver Crisp has concerning universal abstract nature Christologies. He believes that the defender of AUC can affirm the “anhypostatic element of the an-enhypostasia distinction, but it turns out to be nothing more than a trivial consequence of holding the realist explanation of abstract natures.”85 He says this because under an

52

Nature

abstract universal view of natures, “all human natures are impersonal in the sense that they are just kind essences … [human nature] exists as an abstract object irrespective of whether or not it is possessed by a person.”86 Thus it is trivial to say that Christ’s human nature is anhypostatic, since every human being’s nature is anhypostatic prior to being exemplified. Furthermore, he also says that there is “little that is theologically substantive about this [abstract nature Christology] understanding of the enhypostatic aspect of the distinction.”87 Enhypostasis lacks theological substance because the personalizing of an abstract human nature always occurs once the nature is exemplified in any human being. Thus, the personalizing of Christ’s human nature and my human nature is not in any sense different. Given the triviality of anhypostasis and the lack of substance in enhypostasis, Crisp concludes that abstract nature Christologies have the “cost of making the distinction seem theologically inconsequential.”88 If Crisp is correct, this would pose a problem for Torrance’s metaphysics of human nature, which makes much use of the an-enhypostasia distinction. In the section that follows, I explain how Torrance’s metaphysics can avoid both problems. The One and the Many: Participation and Instantiation There are several ways to construe the relationship between abstract universals and their relation to ordinary objects (e.g., dogs, goats, human beings, etc.). In section one I used the terms “exemplify” and “participate in” to capture the plurality of views which exist concerning this relation. What exactly this relation is, is a matter of much discussion especially among platonists. Many contemporary platonists want to affirm that abstract universals are unchanging and entirely causally inert. That is, “they cannot be involved in cause and effect relationships with other objects.”89 Thus, contemporary platonists avoid the use of “participation” language and opt for using the term “exemplify.” The reason they avoid “participate in” language is because this suggests a causal relationship between the objects and the universal. This, however, is not Plato’s own view. Plato believed that particulars participated in abstract universals.90 According to Plato, abstract universals are transcendent, that is they do not exist at any time or place and they are unchanging. Yet abstract universals are also causes; they cause a particular thing to be the way it is. So how does this distinction between exemplification and participation help make sense of Torrance’s metaphysics of human nature? The idea is this: if we follow the participationist scheme then we can say that the abstract universal human nature is the cause of a particular human beings existing in the way she does. If we can say this, then we can say that every human being who participates in the abstract universal human nature undergoes change because of the abstract universal. This feature allows us to make sense of how Christ’s human nature can act as a cause upon all of humanity. However, the participation relation is not enough since Platonist metaphysicians believe that abstract

Nature

53

universals are non-spatial, non-temporal, and unchanging objects. A Torrancean metaphysics of human nature needs to deny this is the case if human nature is said to change as a result of the hypostatic union and vicarious humanity of Christ. This is where we can introduce the concept of instantiation.91 By “instantiation” I mean a specific relation in which an abstract universal is related to a particular object in such a way that the abstract universal nature itself can be affected by other causes when the particular object it is instantiated in is subject to causes acting upon it.92 Thus, when the individual we call Christ has faith, is baptized, confesses, prays, or sanctifies human nature, etc., this affects the abstract universal human nature he instantiates. Let us take stock. We have mentioned two types of relations between abstract universal natures and particular objects. The first relation is participation. In this relation, a particular object relates to an abstract universal nature in such a way that the abstract universal nature affects the particular object, but the abstract universal nature remains unaffected. All human beings, barring Christ,93 are in a participation relation to the abstract universal human nature. The second relation is instantiation.94 In this relation a universal nature relates to a particular object in such a way that the abstract universal nature can be affected by external causes. This distinction explains why it is the case that what happens to Christ’s human nature happens to humanity as a whole but what happens to my human nature does not happen to humanity as a whole. Thus, our first worry is addressed. But does this distinction address Crisp’s worry that abstract universal nature Christologies make the an-enhypostasia distinction theologically inconsequential? It does. Here is how. Remember Crisp said that the an-enhypostasia distinction is trivial because it turns out to be nothing more than a consequence of holding the realist explanation of abstract natures. Specifically, it is trivial to say that Christ’s human nature is anhypostatic, because every human being’s nature is anhypostatic prior to being exemplified. Enhypostasis is insubstantial because the personalizing of an abstract human nature always occurs once the nature is exemplified in any human being. I take it that Crisp believes these two conditions taken together make the distinction inconsequential. We can grant it to Crisp that on its own the anhypostatic distinction seems trivial. However, our participation/instantiation distinction undercuts Crisp’s worry about enhypostasis. It does so because our participation/instantiation distinction means that the personalizing of an abstract human nature occurs in significantly different ways in Christ than in all other humans. In Christ, the personalizing of an abstract human nature occurs as instantiation, but in all other humans the personalizing of an abstract human nature occurs as participation. Thus the way in which the abstract universal human nature is personalized in Christ is significantly different than the way it is personalized in other human beings. Given the fact that he thinks that each critique taken together makes the an-enhypostasia distinction theologically inconsequential, showing that enhypostasia is theologically significant undercuts his critique.

54

Nature

Conclusion In this chapter, I have set about the task of describing what account of Christ’s human nature best helps to make sense of T. F. Torrance’s doctrine of atonement and his use of the an-enhypostasia distinction. I have demonstrated that the best option is an abstract universal nature Christology. Furthermore, we have shown that an abstract universal nature Christology described in terms of participation and instantiation can avoid some of the problems inherent to Torrance’s Christology specifically and abstract universal nature Christology generally. Although our findings are helpful for understanding Torrance’s doctrine of atonement, we should pause to ask ourselves, “Would Torrance be amenable to our analysis of the mechanics of his doctrine of atonement?” Torrance is more than clear that he believes the atonement is mysterious, thus he says, “The saving act of God in the blood of Christ is an unfathomable mystery before which the angels veil their faces and into which we dare not and cannot intrude, but before which our minds bow in wonder, worship, and praise.”95 Not only is atonement a mystery, it is logically unanalyzable. He states that there is “no logical relation, nor formal continuity” between the atoning work of Christ and the forgiveness of our sins.96 Torrance explains that “the innermost heart of the atonement, its most solemn and awful part, was hidden from public view. It is ineffable.”97 Being ineffable it remains a mystery, “it cannot be spelled out.”98 Not only does Torrance believe that the atonement is a wonderous mystery and logically unanalyzable, he believes that attempting to rationally explain this mystery might be a harmful project. Thus, Torrance states that “No merely theoretical understanding [of the atonement] is possible, for abstract theoretic understanding does away with the essential mystery by insisting on the continuity of merely rational explanation.”99 Yet in this chapter we have made use of the tools and resources common to analytic theology and metaphysics in order to spell out one way of construing the metaphysics undergirding Torrance’s doctrine of atonement, and by extension his doctrine of humanity. Again, we might ask ourselves, “Would Torrance be amenable to the sort of analytic-theological analysis we have subjected his work to?” It seems that the answer might likely be “no.” For, our analytic approach to understanding the metaphysics of human nature and the atonement in Torrance’s theology might be thought by some to remove the mystery from this inherently mysterious doctrine. This is an important concern, which speaks not only to the project of this particular chapter, but to analytic approaches to theology in general. Despite the importance of this concern, a full-scale defense of analytic approaches to theological doctrines that involve “mystery” in general, and Torrance’s mysterian approach to the doctrine of atonement, more specifically, is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, two things can be said in defense of our analytic approach to Torrance’s doctrine of atonement. First, it may be the case that a particular theologian might not explicitly commit herself to a particular position, yet the rest of her theology implies that

Nature

55

position anyway. In this case, it may be that Torrance did not commit himself to the theological anthropology I describe here, yet his doctrine of atonement in fact implies the theological anthropology I have described. Torrance might reply by saying that to claim that his doctrine of atonement implies a particular metaphysical account of human nature, like the one described here, is to reduce atonement to a fallacious “logico-causal” explanation. Thus, this seems like an unattractive way to respond to the claim that our analytic approach reduces the mystery of atonement. Second, one might want to understand what I have offered in this essay as a way of reading Torrance’s mysterian account of atonement that provides a metaphysical “just-so story” that makes sense of a lot of Torrance’s thinking, with some obvious costs. By understanding that the account provided here is a metaphysical “just-so story,” we can maintain with Torrance that ultimately the atonement is a mystery. Regardless of how we answer the question of how Torrance might evaluate the analytic approach, we have seen that the sort of conceptual distinctions concerning Christology typically made by analytic theologians make can help bring some clarity to Torrance’s theological anthropology. In the following chapter we turn our attention to one of the most fundamental topics in theological anthropology, the doctrine of the Imago Dei.

Notes 1 Eric Flett, Persons, Powers, and Powers and Pluralities: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Culture (Eugene: Pickwick, 2011), esp. 116–38. 2 Elmer Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian and Scientific Theology (Downers Grove: Intervarsity, 2001), 173–82. 3 Geordie W. Ziegler, Trinitarian Grace and Participation: An Entry into the Theology of T. F. Torrance (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017), 147–83. 4 Myk Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). Although theosis has often been considered in its relation to soteriology there are ample grounds for claiming that it is also an anthropological subject primarily because it deals with humanity’s telos. 5 Jing Wei, “The Theological Anthropology of Thomas F. Torrance: A Critical and Comparative Exploration” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Edinburgh, 2013). 6 For the most part discussions about the metaphysics of Christ’s human nature have been limited to discussions of Christology rather than theological anthropology. One would be very hard pressed to find a discussion of the metaphysics of human nature in most books on theological anthropology. For examples of recent discussions concerning the metaphysics of Christ’s human nature in essays or books about Christology see: Timothy Pawl, In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 22–30; James M. Arcadi, An Incarnational Model of the Eucharist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 155–70; James Arcadi, “Kryptic or Cryptic? The Divine Preconscious Model of the Incarnation as a Concrete-Nature Christology,” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 58 (2016): 229–43; Richard Cross, “Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation,” Thomist 60 (1996): 171–202; Katherin A. Rogers, “Incarnation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Philosophical Theology, eds. Charles Taliaferro and Chad V. Meister (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 95–107; J.P. Moreland and

56

7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26

Nature William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 2nd ed. (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2017), 603–10; Garret Deweese, “One Person, Two Natures: Two Metaphysical Models of the Incarnation,” in Jesus in Trinitarian Perspective, eds. Fred Sanders and Klaus Issler (Nashville: B&H Publishing, 2007); 114–53; Stephen T. Davis, “The Metaphysics of Kenosis,” in The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, eds. Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 117. There are at least two reasons why asking this metaphysical question about Torrance’s doctrine of atonement might be in tension with Torrance’s overall approach to theology. First, it seems that Torrance’s understanding of the atonement is a matter of faith, knowledge, and obedience to the Word of God active as our reconciler and revealer in and as the man Jesus. Second, it seems that Torrance might want to rule out any attempt to find a metaphysical basis for understanding the atonement by using abstract metaphysics, since doing so possibly rules out the possibility of atonement being shaped by Christ in his actual uniqueness in his divine/ human unity acting as God for us. The propriety of asking this metaphysical question is addressed below. See especially T. F. Torrance, Atonement, ed. Robert T. Walker (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009), 2–4; T. F. Torrance, Incarnation, ed. Robert T. Walker (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 83, 161–74. Hereafter I shall abbreviate this distinction by using “the an-enhypostasia distinction.” For my definitions of “instantiate” and “participate” see the section below titled “The One and The Many: Participation and Instantiation.” The substantiality of this distinction has been called into question by Oliver Crisp in Divinity and Humanity. We shall treat this claim below. T. F. Torrance, Atonement, 187. Ibid., 94. Italics and capitalization in the original. T. F. Torrance, “Dramatic Proclamation of the Gospel: Homily on the Passion of Melito of Sardis,” in Greek Orthodox Theological Review 37 (1992), 155. See Chapter 4 of Atonement. Torrance explicitly ties justification to the hypostatic union. There he says that it is only through this union of the human nature with his divine nature that Jesus Christ justifies us. See: T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965), 156. Torrance, Atonement, 137. Torrance, Incarnation, 89 Ibid., 105. Kevin Chiarot, The Unassumed is the Unhealed: The Humanity of Christ in the Theology of T. F. Torrance (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2013), 122. Torrance, Incarnation, 201. Ibid. Ibid., 100. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 155–6. Chiarot lists three options for how this might be so: (1) fallen human nature could be healed in the act of assumption, (2) the human will could be regenerated in the act of assumption, or (3) the human will could be enabled in the act of assumption. Chiarot believes that Torrance is working with something like this third option, since this option allows the humanity of Jesus to “bend back” the fallen will of humanity to conformity with the divine will. However, he finds this option problematic. The Unassumed is the Unhealed, 100–101. Kye Won Lee, Living in Union with Christ: The Practical Theology of Thomas F. Torrance (New York: Peter Lang, 2003), 210.

Nature

57

27 James J. Cassidy, “T. F. Torrance’s Realistic Soteriological Objectivism and the Elimination of Dualisms: Union with Christ in Current Perspective,” Mid-America Journal of Theology 19 (2008): 171. 28 Torrance, Incarnation, 96. 29 Torrance, Atonement, 228. 30 Andrew Purves, Exploring Christology and Atonement: Conversations with John McLeod Campbell, H.R. Mackintosh, and T. F. Torrance (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2015), 11. 31 Christian Kettler, The God Who Rejoices: Joy, Despair, and the Vicarious Humanity of Christ (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2010), xv. 32 Christian Kettler, The God Who Believes: Faith, Doubt, and the Vicarious Humanity of Christ (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2005), 6. 33 There is a fine-grained distinction between representation and substitution. Jeannine Graham, interacting with Otfried Hofius’s work, describes this distinction in terms of exclusive place-taking and inclusive-place taking. In exclusive place-taking, Jesus’ death is an offering made instead of us. Inclusive place-taking, on the other hand, sees Jesus’ life and death offered in a way that includes us. See Jeannine Graham, “Substitution and Representation” in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, ed. Adam Johnson (New York: T&T Clark, 2017), 764. 34 T. F. Torrance, Transformation and Convergence in the Framework of Knowledge: Explorations in the Interrelations of Scientific and Theological Enterprise (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), 345. 35 Donald Macleod, Jesus is Lord: Christology Yesterday and Today (Fearn: Christian Focus, 2000), 133. 36 Kye Won Lee explains Torrance’s understanding accurately, saying, “if Christ acts for us only as our representative, then this would mean that Jesus is only our leader representing our act of response to God. If Jesus simply acts as a substitute in our place in an external-formal-forensic way, then his response would be ‘an empty transaction over our heads’ with no ontological relation to us.” Lee, Living in Union with Christ, 163. 37 For pastoral uses of Torrance’s theology of the vicarious humanity of Christ see: Alexandra Radcliff, The Claim of Humanity in Christ: Salvation and Sanctification in the Theology of T. F. and J.B. Torrance (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2016); Kettler, The God Who Rejoices; Kettler, The God Who Believes; Ray S. Anderson, “Reading T. F. Torrance as a Practical Theologian,” in The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in Dialogue with T. F. Torrance, ed. Elmer M. Colyer (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 161–78. 38 T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation: Essays Toward Evangelical and Catholic Unity in East and West (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 85. 39 Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1991), 294. 40 Chiarot, The Unassumed is the Unhealed, 175. 41 This does not imply that the liturgical act of baptism is a rebaptism, rather, it is a reexpression of what has already been done for us by Christ. 42 Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation, 136. 43 Torrance, Atonement, 76. 44 T. F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ (Colorado Springs: Helmers & Howard, 1992), 82. 45 Torrance, Incarnation, 123. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., 117. 48 Ibid., 118. 49 T. F. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition,” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 317. Torrance says something similar in The Mediation of Christ: “Because in Jesus Christ human nature is perfectly and indivisibly united

58

50

51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

66 67 68 69 70 71 72

73

Nature to God the Creator, he constituted in his humanity the ontological source and ground of being of every man and woman, whether they know him or not, but to those who receive and believe in him he is the One in whom and through whom they may be born anew as sons and daughters of the heavenly Father.” Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, 72. This should not be taken to mean that humanity is automatically justified or sanctified in Christ’s vicarious humanity without some human response. Some authors have questioned whether that the vicarious humanity of Christ undermines the importance of the personal response of faith. Yet Elmer Colyer points out that Torrance believed that “Jesus Christ calls us to repent and believe the gospel, to convert and make a personal decision to follow Christ as Savior and Lord.” Accordingly, Torrance says that the human response “is something that each of us must do, for no other human being can substitute for us in that ultimate act of man in answer to God—no other, that is except Jesus.” How this holds together is ultimately ineffable. Cf. Elmer Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance, 114; T. F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, 84; T. F. Torrance, Christian Theology and Scientific Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 134–7. Torrance explains that the incarnation “has the effect of finalizing and sealing the ontological relations between every man and Jesus Christ.” Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith, 182. See Ivor Davidson, “Theologizing the Human Jesus: An Ancient (and Modern) Approach to Christology Reassessed,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 3 (2001), 136–41. There he brings up and addresses some critiques of the doctrine. Torrance, Incarnation, 230. There is some discussion as to whether he is using this distinction in accordance with its historical use. See Chiarot, The Unassumed is the Unhealed, 160–1. Torrance, Incarnation, 229. Ibid., 230. Ibid., 231. Italics added for emphasis. Ibid. Ibid. Italics added for emphasis. Ibid., 231–2. Ibid., 232. Torrance, Incarnation, 231. Ibid. Kevin Chiarot makes a similar observation when he states that, “Torrance appears to take no position on just what constitutes Christ’s human nature.” Chiarot, The Unassumed is the Unhealed, 159. See Alvin Plantinga, “On Heresy, Mind, and Truth,” Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999), 183–5; Oliver Crisp, Divinity and Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 34–71; Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 27–76. Crisp, Divinity and Humanity, 46. Ibid., 41–5. Ibid., 43. Oliver Crisp, The Word Enfleshed: Exploring the Person and Work of Christ (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016), 131–2. Crisp, The Word Enfleshed, 133. Ibid., 135. Briefly, stage theorists believe that perduring objects are four-dimensional objects composed of brief temporal parts or “stages.” See Michael Rea, “The Metaphysics of Sin,” in Persons: Human and Divine, ed. Peter Van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 335–41. Crisp, The Word Enfleshed, 142.

Nature

59

74 Given our observation that stage theory seems to meet the generality and particularity criteria of Christ’s human nature, this leads us to believe that some sort of stage theory account is the best option for constructing a particularist account of Christ’s human nature. Other non-stage theory accounts may be given, but it seems to me that stage theory is our best option. 75 I have chosen to reproduce this outline, including only the parts which are relevant to this discussion. Here “M” stands for “metaphysical assumption.” 76 Benjamin Myers, “The Patristic Atonement Model,” in Locating Atonement, eds. Oliver Crisp and Fred Sanders (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2015), 73–4. Italics in the original. 77 Myers, “The Patristic Atonement Model,” 82. 78 Ibid., 83. Referring to Irenaeus, Against Heresies, trans. Dominic J. Unger (New York: Newman Press, 1992), 3.18. 79 Ibid. Referring to Athanasius, On the Incarnation, trans. John Behr (Yonkers, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011), 9. 80 Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 30.21 in On God and Christ: The Five Theological Orations and Two Letters to Cledonius, trans. Fredrick Williams and Lionel Wickham (Yonkers, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2002). Cited in Myers, “The Patristic Atonement Model,” 83. 81 Although he is primarily addressing the topics of “soul” and “person,” Myk Habets rightly notes Torrance’s indebtedness to patristic sources for theological anthropology when he states that “Impetus for Torrance’s anthropology comes from Patristic sources which recast terms from Middle Platonism into a distinctively Christian anthropology.” Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, 38. For an in-depth treatment of Torrance’s indebtedness to Patristic theology, see Jason Robert Radcliff, Thomas F. Torrance and the Church Fathers: A Reformed, Evangelical and Ecumenical Reconstruction of the Patristic Tradition (Eugene: Pickwick, 2014). 82 Torrance, Incarnation, 231. Italics in original. 83 Maurice Wiles, although not addressing Torrance’s own doctrine makes a similar point about non assumptus theology when he says that “If there is believed to be a single reality—humanity—such that both Christ and we share (albeit in different ways) in the same reality, the principle [the unassumed is the unhealed] appears more plausible that if we do not hold such a belief.” Maurice Wiles, Working Papers in Doctrine (London: SCM, 1976), 117. 84 As Torrance himself puts it, “Jesus Christ is now the fount of all that is truly personal among us … we are not personal in virtue of some substance inherent in ourselves, but only through what we receive from Jesus Christ … to be personal therefore is to be in Christ.” T. F. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition,” 318. On the idea that “Jesus alone is the personalizing Person while we are personalized persons,” see Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, 29–44. 85 Crisp, Divinity and Humanity, 88. 86 Ibid., 77. 87 Ibid., 88. 88 Ibid. 89 Mark Balaguer, “Platonism in Metaphysics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016), ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed May 1, 2019, https://plato.sta nford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/platonism. 90 There is some discussion regarding the development of Plato’s view about this relation. See Richard Kraut, “Plato,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015), ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed May 1, 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/a rchives/spr2015/entries/plato.

60

Nature

91 I am using “instantiation” in a different way than it is normally used in philosophical discussions. 92 The idea of a universal which is capable of being acted upon is unheard of in the philosophical literature. However, such a universal is needed if we are to make sense of Torrance’s doctrine of atonement. 93 Whether Adam is in a participation or instantiation relation is beyond the scope of this chapter. But it seems to me that it is possible that Adam may be in an instantiation relation to human nature. This would fit well with biblical passages which describe Christ as the second Adam. 94 One might worry that if Christ is the only human being who instantiates a human nature (perhaps barring Adam), then his relationship to that nature is profoundly different than that of every other human being. That is, his relationship as the hypostasis he is to human nature is sui generis, making him, seemingly not simply a different human being, but a different kind of human being than everyone else. This might be thought to violate Torrance’s non assumptus principle. This worry is unfounded because what makes a person a human being is that they possess a human nature, irrespective of how they possess a human nature. Thus, even though Christ instantiates a human nature, as opposed to merely participating in human nature, he still possesses a human nature just as much as every other human person. 95 T. F. Torrance, Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1990), 239. 96 Torrance, Atonement, 4. 97 Torrance, Atonement, 2. 98 Ibid. 99 Torrance, Atonement, 4.

References Anderson, Ray. “Reading T. F. Torrance as a Practical Theologian.” In The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in Dialogue with T. F. Torrance, edited by Elmer M. Colyer, 161–178. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. Arcadi, James. An Incarnational Model of the Eucharist. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Arcadi, James. “Kryptic or Cryptic? The Divine Preconscious Model of the Incarnation as a Concrete-Nature Christology.” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 58 (2016): 229–243. Athanasius. On the Incarnation. Translated by John Behr. Yonkers: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011. Balaguer, Mark. “Platonism in Metaphysics.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016), edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed May 1, 2019, https://plato.sta nford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/platonism. Cassidy, James J. “T. F. Torrance’s Realistic Soteriological Objectivism and the Elimination of Dualisms: Union with Christ in Current Perspective.” Mid-America Journal of Theology 19 (2008): 165–194. Chiarot, Kevin. The Unassumed is the Unhealed: The Humanity of Christ in the Christology of T. F. Torrance. Eugene: Pickwick, 2013. Colyer, Elmer M. How to Read T. F. Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian and Scientific Theology. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2001. Crisp, Oliver D. Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Nature

61

Crisp, Oliver D. The Word Enfleshed: Exploring the Person and Work of Christ. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016. Cross, Richard. “Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of Incarnation.” Thomist 60 (1996): 171–202. Cross, Richard. The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Davidson, Ivor. “Theologizing the Human Jesus: An Ancient (and Modern) Approach to Christology Reassessed.” International Journal of Systematic Theology 3 (2001): 129– 153. Davis, Stephen T. “The Metaphysics of Kenosis.” In The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, edited by Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill, 114–133. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Deweese, Garret. “One Person, Two Natures: Two Metaphysical Models of the Incarnation.” In Jesus in Trinitarian Perspectives, edited by Fred Sanders and Klaus Issler, 114–153. Nashville: B&H Publishing, 2007. Flett, Eric. Persons, Powers, and Pluralities: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Culture. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2011. Graham, Jeannine. “Substitution and Representation.” In T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, edited by Adam Johnson, 763–768. New York: T&T Clark, 2017. Gregory of Nazianzus. On God and Christ: The Five Theological Orations and Two Letters to Cledonius. Translated by Fredrick Williams and Lionel Wickham. Yonkers: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2002. Habets, Myk. Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009. Irenaeus. Against Heresies. Translated by Dominic J. Unger. New York: Newman Press, 1992. Kettler, Christian. The God Who Believes: Faith, Doubt, and the Vicarious Humanity of Christ. Eugene: Cascade Books, 2005. Kettler, Christian. The God who Rejoices: Joy, Despair, and the Vicarious Humanity of Christ. Eugene: Cascade Books, 2010. Kraut, Richard. “Plato.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015) edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed May 1, 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2015/entries/plato. Lee, Kye Won. Living in Union with Christ: The Practical Theology of Thomas F. Torrance. New York: Peter Lang, 2003. Macleod, Donald. Jesus is Lord: Christology Yesterday and Today. Fearn: Christian Focus, 2000. Moreland, J. P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. 2nd ed. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2017. Myers, Benjamin. “The Patristic Atonement Model.” In Locating Atonement: Explorations in Constructive Dogmatics, edited by Oliver Crisp and Fred Sanders, 71–88. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2015. Pawl, Timothy. In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Purves, Andrew. Exploring Christology and Atonement: Conversations with John McLeod Campbell, H. R. Mackintosh, and T. F. Torrance. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2015. Radcliff, Alexandra. The Claim of Humanity in Christ: Salvation and Sanctification in the Theology of T. F. and J. B. Torrance. Eugene: Pickwick, 2016.

62

Nature

Radcliff, Jason. Thomas F. Torrance and the Church Fathers: A Reformed, Evangelical and Ecumenical Reconstruction of the Patristic Tradition. Eugene: Pickwick, 2014. Rea, Michael. “The Metaphysics of Sin.” In Persons: Human and Divine, edited by Peter Van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman, 319–356. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Rogers, Katherin A. “Incarnation.” In The Cambridge Companion to Christian Philosophical Theology, edited by Charles Taliaferro and Chad V. Meister, 95–107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Torrance, Thomas F. Atonement: The Person and Work of Christ. Edited by Robert T. Walker. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009. Torrance, Thomas F. Christian Theology and Scientific Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. Torrance, Thomas F. “Dramatic Proclamation of the Gospel: Homily on the Passion of Melito of Sardis.” Greek Orthodox Theological Review 37 (1992): 147–163. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition.” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 309–322. Torrance, Thomas F. Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ. Edited by Robert T. Walker. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008. Torrance, Thomas F. Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990. Torrance, Thomas F. The Mediation of Christ. Colorado Springs: Helmers and Howard, 1992. Torrance, Thomas F. Theology in Reconciliation: Essays Towards Evangelical and Catholic Unity in East and West. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976. Torrance, Thomas F. Theology in Reconstruction. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Torrance, Thomas F. Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge: Explorations in the Interrelations of Scientific and Theological Enterprise. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984. Torrance, Thomas F. The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995. Wei, Jing. “The Theological Anthropology of Thomas F. Torrance: A Critical and Comparative Exploration.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of Edinburgh, 2013. Wiles, Maurice. Working Papers in Doctrine. London: SCM Press, 1976. Zeigler, Geordie. Trinitarian Grace and Participation: An Entry into the Theology of T. F. Torrance. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017.

4

Image The Relational, Dynamic, Ecstatic, and Christological Imago Dei

Images play a formative role in the lives of human beings. The images we hold of ourselves and those that others hold of us can profoundly shape our sense of self. This is especially evident as Western and non-Western society increasingly projects images onto virtually every corner of existence. Pictures (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, VSCO) and videos (e.g., Youtube, TikTok, Snapchat) form the oft-unnoticed background noise for the lives of countless individuals around the globe. At times it seems as though these images proliferate and take on a life of their own; constructing, deconstructing, distorting, or bringing into focus the imaged sense of self of those whom these images (accurately or inaccurately) portray. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that in our image-driven age there is a proliferation of views concerning what the imago Dei signifies. Three diverse views may be identified. First, anecdotal evidence suggests that biblical scholars favor understandings of the imago Dei in which the concept refers to a particular vocation given to humanity. Typically, this vocation has to do with the Ancient Near Eastern practice of kings setting up images of themselves as reminders of their rule. On this view humans are imagined to be like statues or icons representing God and his rule.1 Systematic theology, on the other hand, seems to be a house divided. Some systematic theologians continue to affirm a second view—the so-called substantial or structural view of the imago Dei, according to which the image of God in humans consists of some structural aspect of humans. Other systematicians, however, affirm what seems to be the “new orthodoxy” about the image of God that takes a third tack, emphasizing relationality.2 Relational views—those that identify the imago Dei as constituted by or consisting in human relations with God and other humans—seem to have won the day among systematic theologians.3 This taxonomy of three views about the image of God can be a helpful heuristic for thinking about the imago Dei but at the end of the day it is far too reductionistic for actually capturing the nuance that marks contemporary discussion of the image of God; contemporary views about the imago Dei are simply too variegated and much more nuanced. Two examples illustrate this point. Consider first the work of Old Testament scholar Catherine McDowell. In an essay titled, “In the Image of God He Created Them,” she argues that the image of God in Genesis indeed carries the notion of functioning as a royal DOI: 10.4324/9781003265832-4

64

Image

representative in God’s “macro-temple,” but it also carries the notion of relating to God as “God’s royal ‘son.’”4 Consider also the work of systematic theologian Marc Cortez. He says that the image of God can be understood as “God manifesting his personal presence in creation through his covenantal relationships with human persons, whom he has constituted as personal beings to serve as representatives in creation and to whom he remains faithful despite their sinful rejection of him.”5 These two examples illustrate the claim that contemporary articulations of the doctrine of the imago Dei can be quite nuanced, even including elements of the three approaches. This nuance, however, is not always evidenced among contemporary and modern theologians. Here I suggest that unlike the previous examples, Torrance’s theology of the imago Dei does not draw upon the three approaches. The purpose of this chapter is to show that T. F. Torrance’s doctrine of the image of God ought to be characterized primarily as dynamic, relational, and ecstatic. Moreover, I will show that this account is characterized by a Christological emphasis. Christ, in other words, is the key to T. F. Torrance’s doctrine of the imago Dei. In order to develop T. F. Torrance’s doctrine of the image of God in a systematic manner, I have decided to examine his writings on the topic through the lens of the various acts of redemptive history. One way to organize the stages of redemptive history is through a four-act narrative: creation, fall, redemption, and consummation. My systematization of Torrance’s doctrine of the image of God will follow the structure of this narrative, except that the act corresponding to consummation will be addressed in a later chapter on human destiny. This chapter proceeds as follows. In part one, I begin by providing a systematic account of Torrance’s doctrine of the imago Dei. This section will address three questions: (1) What did the image of God originally consist in? (2) What has the fall done to the image of God in humanity? (3) What does it mean to say that the image of God in humans is renewed?6 In part two, I address a puzzle that is raised by the Christological aspects of Torrance’s conception of the image of God. In the end I will have shown that Torrance’s Christological account of the imago Dei which is dynamic, relational, and ecstatic is best understood through the Christological lens of instantiation—and the vicarious humanity of Christ—first articulated in Chapter 3.

Torrance’s Doctrine of the Image of God What is Torrance’s account of the imago Dei? One way to address this question is to examine his works that specifically address the topic. There are three works that are especially relevant. Two essays, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition,” and “The Word of God and the Nature of Man,” are especially useful because they express Torrance’s own theological anthropology.7 The third work, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, however, is significantly more difficult to glean Torrance’s theological anthropology from. This monograph is an attempt to present Calvin’s theological anthropology in a

Image

65

8

comprehensive and systematic manner. It is likely Torrance’s most influential work of theological anthropology because it remained the only full-length treatment of Calvin’s doctrine of humanity for several decades after its publication. Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, however, isn’t without its critics. A number of Calvin scholars have questioned whether—and to what extent—Torrance has imposed a Barthian lens onto his interpretation of Calvin.9 This observation, however, does not necessarily mean that Torrance’s interpretation of Calvin’s theological anthropology is distorted by a Barthian lens or that Calvin’s Doctrine of Man should actually be titled Torrance’s Doctrine of Man. What it means for us as we attempt to develop Torrance’s account of the imago Dei is that we need to recognize that Calvin’s Doctrine of Man cannot be considered a book that simply articulates Calvin’s theological anthropology, nor can it be used as a book that simply articulates Torrance’s own theological anthropology. With this caveat in place, let us turn our attention to the matter at hand: T. F. Torrance’s theology of the image of God. Developing a Theology of the Imago Dei—Torrance’s Method In Chapter 2, I argued that Torrance’s approach to theological anthropology is best labeled Soteriological-Christological Anthropology. This is because Torrance rejects protological and eschatological approaches to Christological anthropology in favor of a theological anthropology that ultimately grounds claims about humanity in Christ as he has confronted us in salvation history. Certainly, we might be able to infer God’s protological and eschatological purposes for humanity from Christ’s humanity, but even so, we can only do so from Christ’s humanity as he confronts us in the midst of salvation history. The notion that Torrance’s doctrine of the imago Dei should be developed in a soteriological-Christological manner is especially evident in his 1988 essay, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition.” There Torrance states that “Christian judgments about man are properly formed in light of the humanity of Christ and in accordance with his redemptive purpose in the regeneration of mankind.”10 By making such a statement, Torrance echoes Calvin’s approach to developing a theology of the image of God. In the Institutes, Calvin explains that “we do not have a full definition of ‘image’ if we do not see more plainly those faculties in which man excels, and in which he ought to be though the reflection of God’s glory.”11 How do we gain clear access to what those faculties are? Calvin says that they “can be nowhere better recognized than from the restoration of his corrupted nature.”12 Although Calvin does not employ a Soteriological-Christological Anthropology approach, the fact that the image of God is best recognized in restored humanity leads us to think about “the restoration which we obtain through Christ” because “the end of regeneration is that Christ should reform us to God’s image.”13 For Torrance, the theology of the image of God is properly formed in light of the humanity of Christ, yet it must also pay attention to the “Hebraic understanding” of humanity which is found in the Old Testament.14 While

66

Image

maintaining a Christological approach to theological anthropology, Torrance recognizes the necessity of the Old Testament because the concepts taught in the Old Testament permeate the entire biblical tradition. He recognizes that the New Testament contains distinctive claims about humanity, yet he also recognizes that the New Testament’s claims about humanity “cannot be properly understood without due consideration of their presuppositions and roots.”15 Because the Old Testament teachings shape our understanding of what God is doing in Christ—as well as other concepts in the New Testament—Torrance begins his development of the Christian tradition’s doctrine of humanity by first concentrating on the Old Testament, and only then turning to specifically Christian teachings.16 Does the fact that Torrance begins with the Old Testament stand in tension with what I have called Soteriological-Christological Anthropology? By no means! Torrance himself says, “the absolutely decisive factor in the Christian tradition is, of course, Jesus Christ. In him the whole Biblical tradition has its climactic fulfillment and its controlling centre.”17 Christ is the human in whom God’s goal for creation is embodied. Moreover, Christ is the one by whom and for whom all things were created. Christ is the ground and telos of creation. Thus, Torrance says, Christ “is the key to the secret of our creation and redemption.” Because of this, it is in Christ that “we may now permeate through all the distortion, depravity and degradation of humanity to the true nature of man hidden beneath it all.”18 To summarize, Torrance’s most systematic exposition of the Christian tradition’s doctrine of humanity—and thus the doctrine of the image of God as well—begins with an exposition of the Old Testament’s teachings about humanity but it is still thoroughly Christological since the Old Testament serves as the root and presupposition for understanding God’s revelation in Christ, that is the ultimate ground of our doctrine of the imago Dei. Creation—What Did the Image of God Originally Consist In? Torrance vigorously rejects substantial views of the image of God. He says “there can be no doubt” that the image of God “does not have anything to do” with humans being rational beings.19 This of course, does not mean that Torrance does not recognize the importance of rationality when thinking about the image of God; he can say that “through the image the glory and grace of God belongs to his [a human being] nature as an intelligent being.”20 These seemingly contradictory statements should be understood as claiming that intelligence or rationality plays a role in humans living as the image of God, yet the image itself does not consist in rationality or intelligence.21 If we turn our attention to functional accounts of the image of God, i.e., those that understand the meaning of the imago Dei as refer to humanity’s exercise of God’s authority of creation, we notice that Torrance does not explicitly reject such a view. In fact, Torrance believes that humanity’s vicarious authority over creation is a significant part of what it means to be a

Image 22

67

human. This, however, does not mean that Torrance believes that the imago Dei concerns humanity’s vicarious rule over creation.23 What does the imago Dei consist in? The image of God consists in humanity’s relationality. Torrance explicitly states that “it is in respect of this intrarelational structure of man as man and woman that man is said in the Biblical tradition to have been created after the image and likeness of God.”24 If we examine the way that humans have been created, male and female, we come to the conclusion that they need each other to be human.25 Torrance goes as far as to say that this male-female relationship “generates a dynamic ontological relationship within human existence.”26 In making such a claim, he echoes Barth who held to the view that the relationship between man and woman reflects the “I-Thou” relationship of differentiation within God’s self.27 The relational nature of humans, however, goes beyond “the ‘horizontal’ relation within his God given existence as man and woman.”28 Even more fundamental than this relation is the human relation with God. Humans subsist in a “being-constituting” relation with God.29 If God were to withdraw from this relation, humans would simply cease to exist, thus, humanity’s very existence is relationally grounded. The fact that humans are constituted by the “vertical” relationship with the Creator, and the “horizontal” relation between woman and man, leads Torrance to say that “man is constituted [as] a relational being.”30 Humans are not simply relational beings; they are made by God in such a way that their very ontology enables them to exist in relation. God created humans in such a way that they are both physical and non-physical. Yet humans are not a body and a mind, rather, a human is “body of his mind and mind of his body, a unitary whole.”31 This fact of human ontology enables them to exist as creatures in relation with other creatures but also as creatures who can exist in relation with God who is a transcendent Spirit.32 The unitary nature of humans allows them to be open to the Word of God in a way that is not possible for other creatures. It is clear that Torrance believes that humans are essentially relational beings, but why is relationality identified with being the image of God? After all, substantial and functional views of the imago Dei can recognize that humans are fundamentally relational yet disagree that relationality itself constitutes the image. Torrance believes that the image of God in humans is constituted by their relationality because “the horizontal relation between them [humans] grounded in their vertical relation to God is a contingent reflection of God and represents correspondence to uncreated relations within God himself.”33 The Triune God himself is relational: “no divine Person is who he is without essential relation to the other two, and yet each divine Person is other than and distinct from the other two.”34 The Father is who he is precisely because of his relation to the Son and Spirit. The Son is precisely who he is because of his relation to the Father and the Spirit. The Spirit is precisely who he is because of his relation to the Father and the Son. The relations between the divine persons belong intrinsically to who the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are. “The relations

68

Image

between the divine Persons belong to what they are as Persons—they are constitutive relations.”35 According to Torrance, humans are made in the image of God because in their horizontal relations they reflect God’s essentially relational nature. “God has created human beings in such a way that their inter-human relations are meant to be inter-personal, as such they are meant to reflect on the level of the creature the inter-personal relations of God himself.”36 Humans are also said to be made in the image of God because their vertical relation with God reflects God’s own essential relationality, but what is the nature of their vertical relation with God?37 In “The Word of God and the Nature of Man,” Torrance makes the case that “man lives truly as man only in conscious and thankful relation to the grace of God, and in the consciousness of his own creaturehood.”38 He also claims that humanity’s “manhood” depends upon the communication of God’s Word of grace. When the Word is communicated to humans and becomes engraved on the person, humans acts as a mirror to the glory of God.39 It is in this particular relation, i.e., receiving the Word of grace, depending on this Word of grace, being maintained in this Word of grace, and living in this Word of grace that humans are said to mirror or image God.40 This act of mirroring is meant to be a continuous act. To live as the image of God is to consistently life in a reflective mode. Torrance emphasizes that such a view—which he says characterizes the Reformed doctrine of humanity—makes a “decisive break” with the Aristotelian doctrine of humanity in scholastic theology. The scholastic doctrine of humanity exchanges the “dynamic relation of man to God” into “a subsantival and logical relation.”41 The relational act of reflecting God’s glory in the Word to humans is meant to be an intentional action. It is not something that occurs automatically. This relation, Torrance says, is meant to be enjoyed “in a conscious and intelligent fashion.”42 When humans consciously and intelligently meditate upon the Word of grace to them, and realize that they have nothing in themselves which is not a gift from God, they can live as mirrors of God’s Word.43 Torrance’s relational account of the image of God can be divided into two categories: the objective and subjective image. Accordingly, humans are objectively made in the image of God in the sense that the image of God is grounded in God’s will to create humans in fellowship with himself.44 The image of God can also be thought of in a subjective sense. God made humans intelligent beings “for fellowship with God in order that [they] might conform [themselves] the will and Word of God.”45 Thus, when human beings consciously mirror back God’s Word and grace in thankfulness, they act as a witness to the God who pours his grace upon them.46 It should be stressed that for Torrance both the objective and subjective senses of the image are supernatural gifts of grace and not an aspect of humanity’s own nature. God has graciously deigned to communicate the grace of his Word to humans and has enabled them, by an act of grace, to reflect the image back to him.47 At this point, one might wonder, in what sense is this relational doctrine Christological? It is Christological in two ways. First, for Torrance the image

Image

69

of God in humans consists in receiving the Word of grace from God and mirroring it back to God in thankfulness. According to Torrance, God’s Word of grace is Christ himself.48 Thus, in some sense it is actually Christ himself who is mirrored to God in us.49 What this means for a Christological doctrine of the imago Dei is that in order to speak of the imago Dei in human beings, one must necessarily use Christological categories. Second, the image of God in humans consists in living in an appropriate vertical relation with God. The appropriate relationship with God would be one that is marked by constant thankfulness to God, mirroring God’s glory. Moreover, it would be a relationship which is not marked by any estrangement whatsoever. In other words, it would be a relation marked by perfect unity. Jesus Christ is the only human being who lives in perfect union with God, “Jesus Christ is the one true Man for he is perfectly one with God.”50 As such, he is the one Man who is properly and completely in the image of God, but he is much more than that—he is the only One who is both the Image and the Reality of God, for in his incarnate Person God and man, divine and human nature are inseparably united.51 Because Christ perfectly embodies the imaging relation, he is the epistemological key to the doctrine of the image of God. If one wants to know what it looks like to live as the image of God one ought not look to Adam—since even Adam (prior to the fall) was only the image of God by virtue of existing in an unestranged mirroring relationship with God. Rather, one ought to look to Christ who embodies the perfect vertical relationship with God—in virtue of the hypostatic union—and the perfect horizontal relationship with all other humans—in virtue of being bound up with the humanity of every human being.52 Fall—What Has the Fall Done to the Image of God in Humans? What does it mean to say that humans have “fallen?” For Torrance it means that there is a breach between God and humans that was “introduced by the inexplicable emergence of evil.”53 This breach has several implications for humanity’s “horizontal” relations: (1) man and woman are estranged from one another, (2) humans become “alien” to themselves, and (3) humans “find themselves at odds with nature.”54 Torrance describes the effects of the fall upon humanity’s horizontal relations in vivid terms, describing their existence in the world as having become “dislocated,” saying that they are “ontologically split within themselves” and that they are “so inextricably curved in upon themselves” that “no matter how much they exercise their free will they are quite unable to escape their self-will.”55 Fallenness, however, affects more than humanity’s horizontal relations with other creatures. It affects its vertical relationship with God, creating a breach within humanity’s relationship so that humans “are no longer the beings they ought to be” in relation to God.56 This breach, Torrance believes, constitutes

70

Image

the Reformed view of total depravity. According to him, “total depravity” means that “the essential relation in which true human nature is grounded has been utterly perverted and turned into the opposite.”57 Sin, for Torrance, is utterly relational. At the root of sin, he claims, is ingratitude. Ingratitude is the opposite of what it means to live as an image, mirroring God’s Word of grace.58 Ingratitude is a failure to live in the sort of relation that ought to characterize human existence before God. Given this understanding of the nature of ingratitude, we would expect Torrance to say that if the mirror is not reflecting God’s Word of grace, then the mirror is not in fact imaging God. This is precisely what he says: Instead of thankful acknowledgement of God’s grace, and of his creaturely dependence on it, wherein consists the imago dei, man has ungratefully presumed upon his relation to God, as made in God’s image, and arrogated it to his own being. Sin, as the motion contradictory to grace, perverts man’s relation to God in the exact contrary to the imago dei. 59 If indeed there is a breach in the relationship between God and humans—a breach that does not allow humans to reflect the glory of God—one might be led to wonder in what sense, if any, are humans still said to be the imago Dei? At first glance, it seems as though Torrance holds inconsistent beliefs about what happens the imago Dei at the fall. For example, in “The Dignity and Goodness of Man,” Torrance says that “In spite of all its depravity and distortion through sin, human nature is not and cannot be effaced or destroyed, for its ground and goal are lodged in God himself.”60 Although he specifically mentions “human nature” and not the image of God, the language of being “destroyed” or “effaced” is typical of discussions of the state of the image in fallen humanity.61 Moreover, teleological language dominates the discussion of the state of the image in this essay. For example, he explains that the image and likeness of God “continually stands sentinel” over humans “even in the face of everything that contradicts it.”62 Eschatological language is even more explicit. He says that “it is man’s destiny to live in covenanted relation.”63 We can say, therefore, that in “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” Torrance rejects the notion that the image is completely effaced or destroyed because the relation that constitutes the image of God in humans looms over them as their destiny. Torrance’s discussion of the state of the image of God in fallen humans, however, seems to point in a different direction in his essay on theological anthropology in Theology in Reconstruction. In “The Word of God and the Nature of Man,” Torrance uses language that is typical of Calvin to describe what happens to the image of God at the fall. For example, he says that “man has been utterly deprived of the imago Dei wherein his life consists.”64 When speaking of the nature of sin, he explains that sin is a motion contradictory to grace and thus is contradictory to the imago Dei. Because humans are totally depraved, living in contradiction to the grace that constitutes their being the imago Dei, we “cannot talk about there

Image 65

71

remaining in fallen man, as such, any portion of the imago dei.” These are not offhand remarks. He says that opposition to the grace of God “means the obliteration of the imago dei in man” and that “if the imago dei is a dynamic imago corresponding to grace, then sin which is active perversity blots out the imago dei in man.”66 Additionally, he says that “inasmuch as man possesses the imago dei only in grateful response to the Word of grace, it is impossible for him to retain it in a motion of hostility to or alienation from the Word of grace.”67 Myk Habets has noticed this tension in Torrance’s view of fallen humanity’s possession of the imago Dei. He suggests that either Torrance is inconsistent— this could easily be the case since “The Word of God and the Nature of Man” was originally written in 1947 and “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition” was originally written in 1988—or “there is a deeper explanation.”68 Habets resolves this tension by saying that “Torrance is so influenced by Calvin’s anthropology that he adopts his ‘perspectival approach,’ to use Engel’s words.”69 In Engel’s classic text on Calvin’s anthropology, she argues that there is a distinction between the perspective of God and the perspective of humankind. This distinction is the key to understanding Calvin’s apparently contradictory understanding of the state of the imago Dei. 70 Following this perspectival logic, Habets argues that “from the perspective of traditionally conceived explanations of the imago Dei in substantial terms,” Torrance concludes, more strongly than Calvin himself, that “the imago Dei has been obliterated in fallen creatures.”71 From a Christological perspective, however, the imago Dei remains since “all humans have a capacity for God because the incarnation proleptically conditions creation.”72 Although Habets is right to home in on the significance of Christology for thinking about how humans may (or may not) possess the image of God in a fallen state, Habets’s perspectival approach misses the mark because he maintains that Torrance’s view of the imago Dei can be thought of in substantial terms. Torrance clearly does not think that the imago Dei is substantial (although he does leave room for rationality and the will for explaining how the relation that makes up the image is lived out).73 Torrance’s own words would lead us to believe that we do not need to appeal to a perspectival solution. Recall Torrance’s distinction between the objective and subjective imago Dei. Objectively the imago Dei consists in God’s will “to create man in fellowship with himself.”74 So long as humans depend entirely upon God for their existence—regardless of their knowledge or obedience to God’s Word of grace—they remain in the image of God because they mirror his grace and glory to the world. Subjectively the imago Dei consists in humanity’s conscious reflection of the Word and grace of God.75 Apart from this conscious reflection, we cannot say that humans image God. This objective-subjective distinction, I believe, is the key to understanding Torrance’s view of the state of the image in fallen human beings. Objectively the imago Dei “cannot be effaced or destroyed, for its ground and goal are lodged in God himself.”76 Subjectively, however, the imago Dei is obliterated or blotted out because fallen humans do not consciously reflect God’s Word of

72

Image

grace. Moreover, they do not live in a matter that is fitting with God’s horizontal relational design for them so they do not subjectively act as the relational mirrors they were designed to be. In sum, objectively the imago Dei relation remains despite the fall but subjectively the imago Dei relation is not carried out in our fallen state. Redemption—Renewing the Image of God in Humanity So far I have argued that the Torrancian imago Dei is a relational concept. God created human beings so that through their inter-personal relations with other humans and their inter-personal relationship with God they would reflect the intra-personal relations of God himself. If this is what the image of God consists in—properly constituted horizontal and vertical relations—then the opposite side of the coin, i.e., a failure to live out these relations in a proper fashion, provides what it looks like for humans to fail to live as the image of God. Human beings in their fallen state do not have the ability to live out these relations as God intended them to be lived out. Because of this disability, Torrance can speak of the image of God in humans being obliterated or blotted out. If God is to carry out his intentions for humanity then the marred image needs to be restored. How does this restoration occur? In Chapter 3 I made the case that T. F. Torrance’s doctrine of redemption is best understood as a “vicarious humanity” doctrine of atonement. What does this mean? Typically, the word “vicarious” can refer to one of several concepts, all depending on the particular context of the word. It can track with the concepts of “substitution,” “representation” or “solidarity with.”77 Torrance’s doctrine of atonement, however, cannot be thought of as simply employing one or the other of these concepts of “vicariousness.” Torrance’s understanding of the vicarious humanity of Christ includes both representative and substitutionary ideas.78 Kye Won Lee explains Torrance’s understanding accurately: if Christ acts for us only as our representative, then this would mean that Jesus is only our leader representing our act of response to God. If Jesus simply acts as a substitute in our place in an external-formal-forensic way, then his response would be ‘an empty transaction over our heads’ with no ontological relation to us.79 What is significant about the fact that Christ acts as both a representative and a substitute? The significance is that Christ’s life, death, and resurrection are not simply Christ’s own actions, they vicariously count for all those who possess a human nature. In an essay titled “The Atonement and the Oneness of the Church,” Torrance makes the case that the distinct moments of Christ’s life—e. g., birth, baptism, the cross, resurrection, and ascension—are undertaken by Christ for our sake and on our behalf.80 Why do Christ’s actions vicariously count on humanity’s behalf? As the quotation from Lee’s Living in Union With Christ above suggests, Torrance’s logic does not have to do with Christ’s

Image

73

relation as a federal head of humanity. Torrance repudiates federal theology because of its supposed dualistic basis.81 Instead Torrance believes that Christ can vicariously act for humanity because he “instantiates” human nature. By this I mean that Christ bears a specific relation to the abstract universal human nature such that this nature can be affected by causes when these causes act upon Christ.82 In an early chapter I drew attention to Torrance’s notion that Christ is “at once man, and a man.”83 Such a statement has much in common with the metaphysical assumptions of patristic era. A number of church fathers seem to have held to the view that there is a universal human nature in which individuals participate in—a view more often assumed than defended or discussed.84 The fact that Torrance would echo the language of the church fathers should come as no surprise given his indebtedness to the patristic theology of figures like Irenaeus, Athanasius, and Gregory of Nazianzus. Because Christ is an individual human and because he instantiates universal “humanity,” it can be said that Christ’s actions as an individual also count for all those who bear a human nature. For example, Christ’s baptism is indeed Christ’s own baptism, but in virtue of Christ’s relation to the universal human nature, Christ’s baptism is also vicariously the baptism of all those who have a human nature. Christ’s temptation is Christ’s own temptation but it is also vicariously the temptation of all those who have a human nature. Christ’s death and resurrection are Christ’s own death and resurrection but they are also vicariously the death and resurrection of all those who have a human nature. What does the vicarious humanity of Christ have to do with the restoration of the marred imago Dei in humans? It is in virtue of Christ’s birth, life, death, resurrection, and ascension that Christ brings the “creaturely relations [of humans] to their destined end in unrestricted access as children to their heavenly Father.”85 Here I quote Torrance at length: Jesus Christ, the Son of God penetrated into the dark depths of our alienated, enslaved and distorted human existence, making it his own in order to heal, sanctify and renew it in himself through the whole course of his vicarious human life, death and resurrection and thus restore us to perfect filial union with the God the Father.86 In the incarnation the Son became human, assuming a fallen human nature, sanctifying it, renewing it, and restoring it—and thus also sanctifying, renewing, and restoring the human nature which all human beings participate in. This act heals the “dehumanizing breach between man and God.”87 How do Christ’s person and work heal this relational breach? Torrance’s answer assumes that as the one human being who is “wholly determined in his humanity through fellowship with God,” Christ is the “one Man who is properly and completely in the image of God.”88 Because Christ is both an individual human with a human nature and the instantiation of universal human nature, Christ’s life—which is determined by his fellowship with God—vicariously counts

74

Image

for all those who bear a human nature. Thus, Torrance says that “our actual human being and nature have been taken up in him and been perfectly united to his Divine Being and nature.”89 It is not only Christ’s own human nature which is united to the divine nature—i.e., the hypostatic union—it is also the universal human nature which Christ instantiates which is united to the divine nature. Because all human beings have their own individual human nature—which participates in the human nature which Christ instantiates—Torrance can speak of our individual human nature being united to the divine nature through Christ and also speak of our nature, which is in fact the universal human nature, being united to God in Christ. What does this mean for humanity’s relation to God? Quite simply it means that all human beings now exist in union with God. Every person who has a human nature, exists in union with the divine nature in virtue of Christ—who bears the universal human nature—whether a person knows it or not. If indeed, as Torrance has suggested, Christ is “both the image and the Reality of God” in virtue of his divine nature and human nature being inseparably united (by nature), then everyone who bears a human nature can be said to be the image of God in virtue of their nature being united to the divine nature (by grace) as well.90 Christ, in other words, makes it so that ontologically all human beings stand in the closest personal relationship to God possible, thus restoring the inter-personal vertical relationship with God that defines the imago Dei. 91 Summary Let us take stock. Up to this point I have made three claims about Torrance’s theology of the imago Dei. First, that in Torrance’s theology human beings are said to be the imago Dei because their inter-personal relations with other creatures and with God mirror God’s own intra-personal nature. Specifically, humanity’s vertical relation is said to constitute the imago Dei when humans live in a thankful fashion corresponding to the Word of grace towards them. Second, that a Torrancian conception of how the fall affects the imago Dei turns on the distinction between imaging in an objective and subjective sense. Objectively human beings always are in the imago Dei because this sense of the image is grounded in God’s own gracious relation to humans. Subjectively, the imago Dei can be said to be obliterated because humans do not consciously mirror God’s grace towards them. Third, because of the vicarious humanity of Christ, the imago Dei has been restored in all those who bear a human nature. This holds for all human beings whether they know it or not because they are “ontologically bound up with the humanity of Jesus, and determined by it.”92 With these three points in place, we are now in a position to articulate Torrance’s theology of the image of God. I suggest that the Torrancian position on the imago Dei can be efficiently described, in turn, by four key characteristics, namely that the imago is (1) relational, (2) dynamic, (3) ecstatic, and (4) Christological. According to Paul Ramsey, the relational view of the imago Dei holds that

Image

75

the image of God … is to be understood as a relationship within which man sometimes stands … The image of God according to this view consists of man’s position before God, or rather the image of God is reflected in man because of his position for him.93 Given this definition, it is uncontroversial to say that Torrance’s theology of the imago Dei neatly corresponds to the relational view. Torrance himself explains that being in the image of God has to do with the “basic inter-human relation” of being “called into existence by the Word and Spirit of God” in order to “reflect in its creaturely diffenence [sic] a transcendent relation within God, and also to exhibit the basic covenant-partnership between God and mankind.”94 In this essay I have provided ample evidence that indicates that Torrance does not fit into a structural or functional view of the image of God. In addition to holding to a relational view of the imago Dei, Torrance holds to a dynamic view. According to this view the image of God is not something that is static, rather, it is something that humans continue to progress in. Drawing on Isaac Dorner, Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen explains that the image “is to be viewed partly as original endowment, partly as destination.”95 Although human beings are said to be the imago Dei, there is a sense in which humans also grow as the imago Dei. They are the image of God and they are becoming the image of God. Torrance’s language neatly corresponds with this distinction of being and becoming. Objectively the imago Dei arises from God’s free determination to create humans who would relate to him as a mirror reflecting God’s relational nature. This aspect of the image of God can be said to be static since it is a gracious endowment that does not change or develop. There is, however, an aspect of the image of God by which we can say that it is in a constant change of activity and in some cases progress. Torrance explains that humans do not have continuity in relation to God inherent within their own nature but that the relation which constitutes the image of God is “continuously given and unceasingly sustained by the creative power of the Spirit.”96 Torrance goes as far as saying that just like all humans are bound up ontologically with Christ whether they believe it or not, whether they know it or not, they are also “ontologically dependent” upon the Holy Spirit for the relation that constitutes the image of God in humans. Since this relation is characterized by the constant activity of God, we can say that the imago Dei is dynamic. Besides being relational and dynamic, Torrance’s theology of the imago Dei can be described as ecstatic. By this I mean that the image has its center in something outside of itself.97 The ecstatic nature of the image of God can be seen in how the Holy Spirit relates to the imago. Torrance explicitly states that in the Spirit’s sustenance of humanity’s relation to God, we see that “man is not to be understood from an independent centre in himself but only from above and beyond himself in a transcendental relation to God.”98 Even apart from the Holy Spirit’s work, we can say that the imago Dei is ecstatic. Recall the relational nature of Torrance’s theology of the imago Dei; humans are said to be mirrors, but mirrors can only reflect an image if there is an external object that

76

Image

the mirror can reflect. Thus, the mirror’s imaging depends upon an object outside of itself. Similarly, as mirrors of the Word of grace, humans depend upon the external Word of grace for their act of imaging. Finally, a Torrancian theology of the imago Dei can be described as Christological. Christ, I have argued, is the epistemological key to understanding the image of God because Christ is the image and reality of God; Christ himself is the Word of grace that humans are designed to reflect; and Christ is key to the restoration of the image of God in all of humanity. Therefore, if one wished to concisely characterize the Torrancian theology of the imago Dei, one would be right to call it relational, dynamic, ecstatic, and Christological.

A Christological Puzzle Concerning the Imago Dei Despite the clearly Christological characteristic of Torrance’s doctrine of the image of God, a puzzle remains. To bring this puzzle to light, it is helpful to remember the various aspects of the image of God. Objective Imago Dei (OID): The imago Dei that consists in the divine will to create humans in fellowship with himself and that remains regardless of a human being’s response. Subjective Imago Dei (SID): The imago Dei that consists in a human being’s conscious and grateful reflection of the Word and grace of God. Both of these aspects of the imago Dei are expressed explicitly by Torrance and help to make sense of how he can simultaneously affirm that the image of God remains in humans and that it has been blotted out by sin. In addition to these two aspects, I have introduced a third, which is present in Torrance’s work but which Torrance himself does not explicitly state. Christological Imago Dei (CID): The imago Dei in humans that consists in Christ’s restoration of relationship with God and Christ’s conscious and proper response to God in virtue of the vicarious humanity of Christ. When we place these three aspects of the image of God side by side, a puzzle arises: why is the Subjective Imago Dei not superfluous given the Christological Imago Dei? Let us call this puzzle the “Superfluous Image Puzzle.” According to the SID, if a person is to live as the image of God, they must respond to the Word of God’s grace in a proper way. According to the CID, however, Christ has vicariously responded on all of humanity’s behalf. Christ’s vicarious response makes it the case that in Christ all human beings (i.e., all those who bear a human nature) have in fact responded properly to God. In his description of Torrance’s doctrine of Christ’s vicarious humanity, Christian Kettler explains that “in relation to human beings, his [Christ’s] humanity is both representative and substitutionary in all our relations with God, such as trusting and obeying, understanding and knowing, loving, and worshipping.”99

Image

77

Torrance himself explains that Christ takes our place in “all the basic acts of man’s response to God.”100 It is worthwhile to quote Torrance’s words on the extent of Christ’s vicarious actions: He acted in your place in the whole range of your human life, and activity, including your personal decisions and your responses to God’s love, and even your acts of faith. He has believed for you, fulfilled your human response to God, even made your personal decision for you, so that he acknowledges you before God as one has already responded to God in him, who has already believed in God through him, and whose personal decision is already implicated in Christ’s self-offering to the Father.101 To this rather comprehensive list of Christ’s actions, we can add his conscious and grateful response to God. Thus, the SID seems to be included automatically in the CID. If the CID includes the SID in virtue of the vicarious humanity of Christ— which is grounded in Christ’s instantiation of human nature—then it seems as though the need for individuals to respond for themselves is undercut. Thomas Smail addresses this puzzle brought up by vicarious humanity of Christ in The Giving Gift. He expresses appreciation for Torrance’s emphasis on “the fact that Christ has made an acceptable response to God on behalf of all of us.”102 Yet he also expresses dissatisfaction with this aspect of Torrance’s theology. He explains that Christ’s response on our behalf has to be appropriated for it to take effect in a person.103 Smail suggests that it is the Holy Spirit who brings about the appropriation of the response which is necessary for Christ’s response to truly become ours. Certainly, Christ has spoken “‘Yes’ on behalf of us all,” but it is “the Spirit who comes from Christ to me who lets me say ‘Yes’ to his ‘Yes.’”104 Without the Holy Spirit, Smail argues, Christ’s response does not in fact truly become our own. If we apply Smail’s logic to the Torrancian image of God, then we must say that the “Yes” of the SID which is included in the “Yes” of CID is not appropriated apart from the Holy Spirit in us. At first glance, Smail’s inclusion of the Holy Spirit seems to solve the Superfluous Image Puzzle raised by the CID. Christ offers the appropriate image constituting response on our behalf, but that response does not become our subjective response apart from the Holy Spirit’s work. Torrance seems to hint at a view like Smail’s, saying that the Holy Spirit brings human relations with God to their true and proper end.105 But on the other hand he also says that all human beings, whether they believe it or not, are dependent upon the Holy Spirit who has been poured out “upon all flesh.”106 This latter claim seems to undercut the possibility distinguishing between the “Yes” that comes in virtue of the CID and the “Yes” of the SID that only comes in virtue of the Holy Spirit. If the Holy Spirit has actually been poured out upon “all men, whether they believe it or not” then we are left wondering, why don’t all humans express the SID? Moreover, we might wonder, why should Torrance introduce

78

Image

the concept of the SID if Christ expresses it vicariously on our behalf? In other words, the SID seems superfluous given the CID. Torrance does not provide an answer to the first question—i.e., why don’t all humans express the SID if the Holy Spirit has been poured out upon all humans?—but rather he appeals to mystery. He explicitly states that “we cannot understand all that this being-constituting relation of the Spirit of God to man involves for one who is ‘without Christ.’”107 His appeal to mystery should not be surprising to those familiar with his atonement theology. While addressing why some people do not experience reconciliation with God despite the fact that in his death Christ represents all those whom he represents in his incarnation, Torrance concludes that facile responses to this question are examples of “man’s proud reason,” of insisting on logical conclusions based upon partial insight. In trying to provide logical answers to such a question, people subject “the great mystery of atonement” to “the rationalism of human thought.”108 Those who try to reason about why all people do not experience reconciliation with God have not yet “bowed their reason before the Cross of Christ.”109 For Torrance, it is enough to know that scripture holds together the claims that Christ has reconciled all humans to God and that not all humans actually experience this reconciliation. Similarly, concerning the distinction between the SID and CID, we might say that the attempt to provide a reason why not all humans express the SID despite the CID constitutes a failure to bow our reason before the Cross of Christ. Thus, on the Torrancian way of seeing things, this aspect of the Superfluous Image Puzzle is less of puzzle to be solved and more of mystery to be accepted. Regarding the second matter—why the concept of the SID is necessary if Christ expresses it vicariously on our behalf—Torrance could provide a more straightforward answer. The SID fulfills two functions. First, it reveals how we have failed to be the image of God. Second, it shows us how Christ was the image of God on our behalf. Thus, even though all human beings after Christ are in the imago Dei because of the vicarious humanity of Christ and all human beings prior to Christ are proleptically in the imago Dei because of the vicarious humanity of Christ, the SID serves as a tool for helping us to understand what Christ has done for us and why Christ has stepped into accomplish our task of being image bearers.110 The SID is a helpful conceptual tool for understanding the nature of our fallenness and the nature of Christ’s redemptive work. Accordingly, a sympathetic reading of Torrance at this point might say that the Superfluous Image Puzzle arises only if we attempt to explain why the SID would need to be appropriated if Christ fulfills it vicariously; but the puzzle does not arise if one treats the SID merely as a conceptual tool for understanding the image of God.

Conclusion God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them (Genesis 1:27). Various interpretations of how

Image

79

to understand the meaning of this verse have been offered throughout church history. Some interpretations have emphasized that there is something within humans that constitutes the image, others have argued that the image is a function, and more recently some have stressed that the image is relational. Despite these differences, most interpretations of the imago Dei have held that Christology is in some way important for understanding what the image of God is. T. F. Torrance joins the chorus of voices elevating Christology’s position in imago Dei theology. Torrance’s theology of the image of God, I have argued, is relational, dynamic, ecstatic, and Christological. The Christological aspect— especially the aspect grounded in the vicarious humanity of Christ—raises a puzzle about what Torrance has called the subjective image of God. I have shown that in one sense the puzzle is not problematic if it is merely seen as a conceptual tool. I also argued, however, that given the claim that Christ vicariously fulfills the subjective image on our behalf, it seems superfluous to speak of individuals bearing the subjective image. While Torrance’s theology of the imago Dei has this undeniably puzzling aspect, I should conclude that despite this puzzle (mystery?), his understanding of the image of God brings a novel element to theological reflection about the image of God. To my knowledge, no other theologian’s metaphysics of human nature have explicitly led to the affirmation that subjectively the image of God in humans is in fact Christological.

Notes 1 See, for example, Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1–15 (Nashville: Nelson, 1987), 5– 10; John H. Walton, The Lost World of Adam and Eve: Genesis 2–3 and the Human Origins Debate (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2015), 56–7; Peter Enns, The Evolution of Adam: What the Bible Does and Doesn’t Say about Human Origins (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2012), xv; Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2005), 27–8; Sean McDonough, Creation and New Creation: Understanding God’s Creation Project (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2017), 160. 2 For contemporary examples of the substantial/structural view, see Aku Visala, “Imago Dei, Dualism, and Evolution—a Philosophical Defense of the Structural Image of God,” Zygon 49 (2014): 101–20; Joshua Farris, “A Substantive (Soul) Model of the Imago Dei: A Rich Property View,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to Theological Anthropology, eds. Joshua Farris and Charles Taliaferro (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015), 165–78; J. P. Moreland, The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism (London: SCM Press, 2009), 4–5. 3 See, for example, Stanley Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001); Michelle Gonzalez, Created in God’s Image: An Introduction to Feminist Theological Anthropology (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2007), 108–60; Alistair McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social Relationship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Paul K. Jewett and Marguerite Shuster, Who We Are: Our Dignity as Human (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996). 4 Catherine McDowell, “In the Image of God He Created Them: How Genesis 1:26– 27 Defines the Divine-Human Relationship and Why it Matters,” in The Image of God in an Image Driven Age: Explorations in Theological Anthropology, eds. Beth Felker Jones and Jeffrey Barbeau (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2016), 42.

80

5 6

7

8 9

10 11 12

13 14 15 16

Image For an expanded account McDowell’s views, see her book, The Image of God in the Garden of Eden: The Creation of Humanity in Genesis 2:5–3:24 in Light of the mı-s pî pı-t pî and wpt-r Rituals of Mesopotamia and Ancient Egypt (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2015). Marc Cortez, Theological Anthropology: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 37. Italics added for emphasis. It is beyond the scope of this essay to provide an in-depth examination of Calvin’s and Barth’s influence on Torrance’s doctrine of the image of God, but given that Torrance’s only full-length theological anthropology is an analysis of John Calvin’s “doctrine of man” and that Karl Barth had a significant impact on Torrance, the answers to these three questions will make special reference to the theology of Calvin and Barth where such references are fitting. Thomas F. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition,” Modern Theology 4 (1988). This essay was also published in Christ in our Place: The Humanity of God in Christ for the Reconciliation of the World: Essays Presented to Professor James Torrance, eds. Trevor Hart and Daniel Thimell (Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1989), 369–87. T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965). This essay was first published as “The Word of God and the Nature of Man,” in Reformation Old and New, ed. F. W. Camfield (London: Lutterworth Press, 1947), 121–41. T. F. Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2001). Mary Potter Engel, for example, says that Torrance’s “narrow focus on God’s beholding and the neglect of what the image means in and to humankind reflect a limited reading of Calvin … I believe it is Torrance’s Barthian bias which has led him to this narrow conclusion.” Mary Potter Engel, John Calvin’s Perspectival Anthropology (Atlanta: Scholars, 1988), 52. Like Engel, Jing Wei recognizes the Barthian character of Torrance’s reading of Calvin, but tempers his conclusions about how Barthian Torrance’s work actually is. Wei states that “Despite CDOM [Calvin’s Doctrine of Man] bearing a rather Barthian character, it is not a work that Torrance did as a spokesman for Barth, otherwise he would not have emphasized the imago-relation as an active reflection of God in a humanity which God has not created to be idle.” Wei recognizes the Barthian influence on Torrance’s interpretation of Calvin but he also recognizes “Brunner’s accent on human subjectivity and responsibility” in Torrance’s reading. Thus, he concludes that “we must recognize Torrance as an independently thinking theologian who has made his own interpretation of Calvin in response to the controversy between Brunner and Barth.” Wei is correct in stating that Torrance’s interpretation of Calvin is shaped by the questions posed by Barth and Brunner. Jing Wei, “The Theological Anthropology of Thomas F. Torrance: A Critical and Comparative Exploration” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Edinburgh, 2013), 64. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 309. See also, Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 102. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vols., Library of Christian Classics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), 1.15.4. Calvin, Institutes, 1.15.4. Stanley Grenz notes that, “Like Luther, Calvin does not derive his understanding from the fallen state of humankind but from the restoration given in Christ, who is the second Adam and as the Word of God is the perfect image of God.” Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self, 169. Calvin, Institutes, 1.15.4. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 309. Ibid. In The Mediation of Christ, Torrance provides an extended argument for the importance of the Old Testament for understanding the New Testament. He

Image

17 18 19

20 21

22 23

24 25

26 27

28 29 30 31

81

argues that it is the Old Testament that provides us fitting modes of thought and speech and adequate conceptual forms and structures necessary for understanding the revelation of God in Christ. Thus, “the structures of biblical thought and speech found in the Old Testament … have permanent value, both for the New Testament and for the Christian Church.” T. F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ (Colorado Springs: Helmers and Howard, 1992), 1–23, especially page 18. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 314. Ibid., 315. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 311. Torrance’s statement directly contradicts Myk Habets’s understanding of Torrance’s theology of the imago Dei. He states, “Like many in the early church Torrance believes the imago is an inherent rationality within men and women…” Myk Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance (New York: Ashgate, 2009), 31. T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 99. In rejecting the substantial/structural view, Torrance follows Barth who refused to find the description of the being of humans in their structure, dispositions, or capacities. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III.2 (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1960), 76–7. See Chapter 6 for an exposition of Torrance’s understanding of humanity’s vocation in regards to creation. Geordie Zeigler argues otherwise. He explains that as priests of creation, “humanity’s task is to represent the creation before the Creator in a joyous and worshipping response.” Although, as we will see below, humans image God in their grateful response to God’s Word of grace, this does not mean that humanity’s task as priests of creation is what constitutes the image of God in humans. It may be an aspect of how the image is reflected, but it is not the image itself. Geordie Zeigler, Trinitarian Grace and Participation: An Entry into the Theology of T. F. Torrance (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017), 166–7. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 311. Geordie Zeigler explains, “Torrance’s concept of sexually differentiated cohumanity fittingly integrates with his holistic understanding of the human being as an onto-relational physical and rational creature designed for communion—with God and one another.” Zeigler, Trinitarian Grace and Participation, 160. Ibid. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III.1, eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1958), 198. “Could anything be more obvious than to conclude from this clear indication that the image and likeness of the being created by God signifies existence in confrontation, i.e. in this confrontation, in the juxtaposition and conjunction of man and man which is that of male and female…?” Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 311. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 310. Torrance vigorously opposes any kind of dualism throughout his corpus, he is no less opposed to dualism in human ontology. Instead, he holds to the view that the soul (or mind) and body are essentially integrated. Because there are two parts that are tightly integrated it seems proper to classify his ontology as a form of Holistic Dualism. See T. F. Torrance, “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective,” in Religion, Reason, and the Self: Essays in Honour of Hywel D. Lewis, eds. Steward Sutherland and T. A. Roberts (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1989), 103–18. On Holistic Dualism, see John Cooper, Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000).

82

Image

32 T. F. Torrance, The Christian Frame of Mind: Reason, Order, and Openness in Theology and Natural Science (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2015), 35–42. 33 Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 312. Like Barth, Torrance’s understanding of the correspondence of the created and uncreated relations is not to be thought of in terms of the analogia entis, rather it is to be thought of in terms of the analogia gratiae. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 114. 34 T. F. Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (London: T&T Clark, 1996), 157. 35 Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 157. 36 Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 320. 37 Torrance’s language of “reflection” corresponds to his understanding of Calvin’s theology of the image. For example, Torrance states that “There is no doubt that Calvin always thinks of the imago in terms of a mirror. Only while the mirror actually reflects an object does it have the image of that object. There is no such thing in Calvin’s thought as an imago dissociated from the act of reflecting.” Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, 36. Italics in original. While it is widely recognized that language of “mirror” and “reflection” plays an important role in Calvin’s theology of the imago Dei opinions about what constitutes the image in Calvin’s theology are not unanimous. Eberhard Busch and John L. Thompson, for example, think of Calvin’s theology of the imago primarily in reflective terms. Busch explains that “the imago is similar to a reflector which is illuminated only when light falls upon it.” Thompson makes the case that in Calvin describes the image “in terms of the general excellence and integrity which the first human pair possessed, an integrity which was reflective of (and responsive to) the divine glory and righteousness.” Jason Van Vliet and François Wendel on the other hand, dissent from the “mirror” view. Van Vliet argues that for Calvin the image “is an attributive similarity which the Triune God imprints on the human soul from the beginning.” Wendel claims that “the image of God consists, then, of the integrity and righteousness which were the attributes of Adam when he came fresh from his Creator’s hand…” Eberhard Busch, trans. Judith J. Guder, “God and Humanity,” in The Calvin Handbook, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 225; John L. Thompson, “Creata Ad Imaginem Dei, Licet Secundo Gradu: Woman as the Image of God According to John Calvin,” Harvard Theological Review 81 (1988): 130; Jason van Vliet, Children of God: The Imago Dei in John Calvin and His Context (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 253–4; François Wendel, Calvin: Origins and Development of His Religious Thought, trans. Philip Mairet (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1963) 176–7. See also, Christopher Woznicki and Jesse Gentile, “Refocusing the Image: Domestic Violence, Refugees, and the Imago Dei in John Calvin’s Pastoral Theology,” in McMaster Journal of Theology and Ministry 19 (2018): 81–111. 38 Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 101. 39 Ibid. 40 Torrance elaborates upon this concept when discussing the image of God in Calvin, saying the “imago dei is essentially a reflection in and by the soul of the Word of God which is itself the lively or quickening image of God.” Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, 56. For examples of Calvin’s use of “mirror”/“reflection” language see his commentary on Ephesians 4:23 and Colossians 3:10. John Calvin, Commentaries on The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Galatians and Ephesians, trans. William Pringle (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1957), 296; John Calvin, Commentaries on The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Philippians, Colossians, and Thessalonians, trans. John Pringle (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1948), 212. 41 Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 102–3. 42 Ibid., 104.

Image

83

43 Torrance appeals to Calvin to support this claim, explaining that “the imago dei, according to Calvin, consists essentially in the objective act of grace by which God sets his love upon man, communicates to him, created with intelligence, his Word accommodated to creaturely capacity.” Ibid., 105. 44 Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 105. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid., 101. Speaking of Calvin’s theology of the image, he says, “Calvin thinks of God as having made man to be the conscious correlative of his grace in a life of a thankful response, but in such a way that it is only as man reflects in thankfulness and praise the grace and glory of God that he himself becomes established as a man in the image of God.” Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, 71. 47 Torrance’s emphasis on Grace in his theology of the image of God leads him to reject substantial accounts of the image of God. For example, he states that the image of God cannot “be lodged in the being of man, as Augustine taught” because this would make humans inherently in the image of God apart from God’s movement of grace towards them. T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 114. 48 “Grace is in fact identical with Jesus Christ in person and word and deed.” T. F. Torrance, The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1996), 21. This entire monograph is dedicated to defending this claim and showing how some apostolic fathers maintained this view of grace and how others deviated from it. See also, Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science, where he says, “The Truth of God in Jesus Christ is Grace. Grace is the turning of God toward us in His mercy and love, His self-giving to us and His action for us, whereby he establishes us in union and communion with Himself and so gives us a true place in relation to the Reality of God. As such Grace is identical with Jesus Christ. He is Grace and Truth in Himself, and therefore Grace and Truth for us.” Torrance, Theological Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 155. Italics added for emphasis. For a comprehensive study of Torrance’s doctrine of grace see Zeigler’s Trinitarian Grace and Participation (2017). 49 “It is not often that Calvin uses the expression imago dei except in this intimate association with mirror and word. ‘God was never willing to be disjoined from His Word, because He is Himself invisible, and never appears otherwise than in a mirror.’” Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, 37. “It becomes apparent from the act of grace in Christ that the imago dei in the strict sense is Christ, and is not man’s own possession. It was only by means of Christ, the real image of God that Adam ‘approximated to the glory of his maker.’” Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, 86. 50 Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 317. 51 Ibid. Torrance speaks of the demonic forces attempting to separate what God has inseparably united in Christ. “The forces of evil thrust against that union, seeking to break it wide open, to divide the human life of the Son on earth from the life of the Father above, to divide the divine and human natures in Christ himself.” T. F. Torrance, Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ, ed. Robert T. Walker (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 210. 52 Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 317. 53 Ibid., 312. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 107. 58 “On the subjective side, the imago Dei may be defined as man’s humble and adoring gratitude to God for His wonderful grace, in which motion of thankfulness man most truly reflects or images the glory of the Father so as to be himself a

84

59 60 61

62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

72 73 74 75 76 77 78

79 80 81

Image true child of the Father. It is grateful sonship.” Torrance cites Institutes 3.6.3 as evidence for this claim. Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, 70. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 108. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 314. Over the course of his ministry, Calvin used a variety of terms to describe what happens to human nature at the fall. For example, he uses the following terms: lapsus, inducta, obliterata, deleta, vitiata, and mutila. For a discussion of the progression Calvin shows in using these terms, see Barry Waugh, “John Calvin on the Fall and the Imago Dei,” The Confessional Presbyterian 13 (2017): 67–80. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 314. Ibid. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 106. Ibid., 108. Ibid. Ibid., 113. Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, 33. Ibid. Habets is referring to Mary Engel’s John Calvin’s Perspectival Anthropology. Engel, Calvin’s Perspectival Anthropology, 2. Jason Van Vliet notes that although early on Calvin uses strong language to describe what happens to the imago Dei at the fall, he qualifies his language over time. Partly in response to his polemics with Roman Catholics and radical reformers he tones down strong language and prefers to speak of ruined remnants remaining. Van Vliet, Children of God, 121. Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, 33. Torrance explains that according to Calvin in order to image God there must be “a continuous relation of man’s mind and will in response to God.” Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, 64. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 105. Ibid. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 314. Donald Macleod, Jesus is Lord: Christology Yesterday and Today (Fearn: Christian Focus, 2000), 133. There is some controversy regarding whether substitution is compatible with representation. Karl Barth, James Dunn, Simon Gathercole, and N. T. Wright all believe that these concepts do not necessarily exclude one another. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV.1, trans. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956–61), 230; James Dunn, “Paul’s Understanding of the Death of Jesus,” in Sacrifice and Redemption: Durham Essays in Theology, ed. S. W. Sykes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 50–52; Simon Gathercole, Defending Substitution: An Essay on Atonement in Paul (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015), 109–13; N. T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 153. Kye Won Lee, Living in Union With Christ: The Practical Theology of Thomas F. Torrance (New York: Lang, 2003), 163. Lee cites Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, 79–98. T. F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement in the Church: Volume I Order and Disorder (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1996), 238–49. Torrance’s repudiation of Reformed federalist theology is founded upon the view that later Reformed theology abandoned its early roots when it adopted a scholastic methodology. According to Torrance, the scholastic mode represented by the Westminster tradition is at odds with the evangelical mode represented by the Scots confession. T. F. Torrance, Scottish Theology from John Knox to John McLeod Campbell (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 3. Richard Muller argues vigorously against “corruption” thesis put forth by theologians like Torrance in favor

Image

82

83 84

85 86 87 88 89 90

91

92 93

94 95 96 97

85

of a “continuity thesis,” wherein later Reformed theology (e.g., Westminster) is the elaboration, refining, and drawing out of conclusions of the positions of the early Reformed faith. Richard Muller, Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics Volume One: Prolegomena to Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 59. By “dualism” Torrance means the separation of reality into two isolated domains. This can include cosmological dualism, epistemological dualism, or ontological dualism. For a discussion of Torrance’s rejection of dualisms, see Elmer M. Colyer, “A Scientific Theological Method,” in The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in Dialogue with T. F. Torrance, ed. Elmer M. Colyer (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 201), 209–12. In Chapter 3 I defined “participation” as the relation in which a particular object relates to an abstract universal nature in such a way that the abstract universal nature affects the particular object but the abstract universal nature remains unaffected. All human beings, except for Christ and perhaps Adam, stand in a participation relation to human nature. I defined “instantiation” as a specific relation in which an abstract universal nature itself can be affected by other causes when the particular object it is instantiated in is subject to causes acting upon it. See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of these terms. Torrance, Incarnation, 231. Italics in original. Cf. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, trans. Dominic J. Unger (New York: Newman Pres, 1992), 3.18; Athanasius, On the Incarnation, trans. John Behr (Yonkers: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011), 9; Gregory of Nazianzus, “Oration 30.21,” in On God and Christ: The Five Theological Orations and Two Letters to Cledonius, trans. Fredrick Williams and Lionel Wickham (Yonkers: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2002). Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 315. Ibid, 316. Ibid., 317. Ibid. Ibid. For a similar proposal regarding how union constitutes the image of God, see Oliver Crisp, “A Christological Model of the Imago Dei: A Rich Property View,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to Theological Anthropology, eds. Joshua Farris and Charles Taliaferro (Aldershot: 2015), 217–29. It should be noted, however, that Torrance does not address how the restoration of the image through the vicarious work of Christ actually restores the inter-personal horizontal relations that also constitute the imago Dei in humans. This, it seems, is a glaring oversight on Torrance’s insofar as he places an emphasis on the male-female image constituting relationship. In the conclusion of this monograph, I revisit this shortcoming and provide a response to this potential objection to his understanding of the redemption of the imago. Ibid., 317. Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950), 255. Cited in Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self, 162. This definition, perhaps unnecessarily, imports Calvin’s “mirror” language into what the relational view signifies, A broader definition is provided by Marc Cortez. He defines the relational view as one in which the “true meaning of the imago is to be found in relations.” Marc Cortez, Theological Anthropology: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 24. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 311–12. Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Creation and Humanity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 278. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 319. I am drawing upon Pannenberg’s notion of exocentricity. His use of exocentricity is rather vague but John Macquarrie explains it by saying that “the being of

86

98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110

Image man … has a centre not only in itself but also beyond itself.” [John Macquarrie, “What is a Human Being? Review of W. Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective,” Expository Times 97 (1986): 202–3.] I prefer to use the term ecstatic instead of exocentric because, unlike Pannenberg, Torrance would not want to claim that humans have a center in themselves. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 319. Torrance also speaks of a “transcendental relation to his fellow-men,” but it is not clear in what sense the horizontal relation between humans could classify as transcendental. Christian Kettler, The Vicarious Humanity of Christ and the Reality of Salvation (Lanham: University Press of America, 1991), 139. T. F. Torrance, “Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy,” Scottish Journal of Theology 39 (1986): 479. Italics in original. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, 94. Thomas Smail, The Giving Gift: The Holy Spirit in Person (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1994), 109. Smail, The Giving Gift, 109. Ibid., 110. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 320. Ibid., 321. Ibid. Torrance, Atonement, 187. Ibid., 188. Regarding the proleptic nature of Christ’s work see Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, 35–6.

References Athanasius. On the Incarnation. Translated by John Behr. Yonkers: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011. Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Creation: The Work of Creation. Vol 3, 1. Edited by G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, translated by J. W. Edwards, O. Bussey, and H. Knight. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1958. Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Creation: The Work of Creation. Vol 3, 2. Edited by G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, translated by H. Knight, G. W. Bromiley, J. K. S. Reid, and R. H. Fuller. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1960. Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Reconciliation. Vol 4, 1. Edited by G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, translated by G. W. Bromiley. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1956. Busch, Eberhard. “God and Humanity.” Translated by Judith J. Guder. In The Calvin Handbook, edited by Herman J.Selderhuis, 224–235. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008. Calvin, John. Institutes of Christian Religion. Edited by John T. McNeill, translated by Ford Lewis Battles. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1960. Calvin, John. Commentaries on The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Galatians and Ephesians. Translated by William Pringle. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957. Calvin, John. Commentaries on The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Philippians, Colossians, and Thessalonians. Translated by John Pringle. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948. Colyer, Elmer. “A Scientific Theological Method.” In The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in Dialogue with T. F. Torrance, edited by Elmer M. Colyer, 205–237. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. Cooper, John. Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the MonismDualism Debate. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000.

Image

87

Cortez, Marc. Theological Anthropology: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: T&T Clark, 2010. Dunn, James. “Paul’s Understanding of the Death of Jesus.” In Sacrifice and Redemption: Durham Essays in Theology, edited by S. W. Sykes, 35–56. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Crisp, Oliver D. “A Christological Model of the Imago Dei: A Rich Property View.” In The Ashgate Companion to Theological Anthropology, edited by Joshua Farris and Charles Taliaferro, 217–229. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015. Engel, Mary Potter. John Calvin’s Perspectival Anthropology. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988. Enns, Peter. The Evolution of Adam: What the Bible Does and Doesn’t Say about Human Origins. Grand Rapids: Brazos: 2012. Farris, Joshua. “A Substantive (Soul) Model of the Imago Dei: A Rich Property View.” In The Ashgate Research Companion to Theological Anthropology, edited by Joshua Farris and Charles Taliaferro, 165–178. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015. Gathercole, Simon. Defending Substitution: An Essay on Atonement in Paul. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015. Gonzalez, Michelle. Created in God’s Image: An Introduction to Feminist Theological Anthropology. Maryknoll: Orbis, 2007. Gregory of Nazianzus. On God and Christ: The Five Theological Orations and Two Letters to Cledonius. Translated by Fredrick Williams and Lionel Wickham. Yonkers: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2002. Grenz, Stanley. The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001. Habets, Myk. Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009. Irenaeus. Against Heresies. Translated by Dominic J. Unger. New York: Newman Press, 1992. Jewett, Paul and Margueritte Shuster. Who We Are: Our Dignity as Human: A NeoEvangelical Theology. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996. Kärkkäinen, Veli-Matti. Creation and Humanity. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015. Kettler, Christian. The Vicarious Humanity of Christ and the Reality of Salvation. Lanham: University Press of America, 1991. Lee, Kye Won. Living in Union with Christ: The Practical Theology of Thomas F. Torrance. New York: Peter Lang, 2003. Macleod, Donald. Jesus is Lord: Christology Yesterday and Today. Fearn: Christian Focus, 2000. Macquarrie, John. “What is a Human Being? Review of W. Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective.” Expository Times 97 (1986): 202–203. McFadyen, Alistair. The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social Relationship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. McDonough, Sean. Creation and New Creation: Understanding God’s Creation Project. Peabody: Hendrickson, 2017. McDowell, Catherine. “In the Image of God He Created Them: How Genesis 1:26–27 Defines the Divine-Human Relationship and Why it Matters.” In The Image of God in an Image Driven Age: Explorations in Theological Anthropology, edited by Beth Felker Jones and Jeffrey Barbeau. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2016. McDowell, Catherine. The Image of God in the Garden of Eden: The Creation of Humanity in Genesis 2:5–3:24 in Light of the mı-s pî pı-t pî and wpt-r Rituals of Mesopotamia and Ancient Egypt. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2015.

88

Image

Middleton, J. Richard. The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1. Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2015. Moreland, J. P. The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism. London: SCM Press, 2009. Muller, Richard. Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Volume One: Prolegomena to Theology. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003. Ramsey, Paul. Basic Christian Ethics. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950. Smail, Thomas. The Giving Gift: The Holy Spirit in Person. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1994. Thompson, John L. “Creata Ad Imaginem Dei, Licet Secundo Gradu: Woman as the Image of God According to John Calvin.” Harvard Theological Review 81 (1988): 125–143. Torrance, Thomas F. Calvin’s Doctrine of Man. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2001. Torrance, Thomas F. The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons. London: T&T Clark, 1996. Torrance, Thomas F. The Christian Frame of Mind: Reason, Order, and Openness in Theology and Natural Science. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2015. Torrance, Thomas F. Conflict and Agreement in the Church, Volume I: Order and Disorder. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1996. Torrance, Thomas F. The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1996. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition.” In Christ in our Place: The Humanity of God in Christ for the Reconciliation of the World: Essays Presented to Professor James Torrance, edited by Trevor Hart and Daniel Thimell, 369–387. Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1989. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition.” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 309–322. Torrance, Thomas F. Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ. Edited by Robert T. Walker. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008. Torrance, Thomas F. “Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy.” Scottish Journal of Theology 39 (1986): 461–482. Torrance, Thomas F. The Mediation of Christ. Colorado Springs: Helmers and Howard, 1992. Torrance, Thomas F. Scottish Theology from John Knox to John McLeod Campbell. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective.” In Religion, Reason, and the Self: Essays in Honour of Hywel D. Lewis, edited by Steward Sutherland and T. A. Roberts. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1989. Torrance, Thomas F. Theological Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969. Torrance, Thomas F. Theology in Reconstruction. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Word of God and the Nature of Man.” In Reformation Old and New, edited by F. W. Camfield, 121–141. London: Lutterworth Press, 1947. van Vliet, Jason. Children of God: The Imago Dei in John Calvin and His Context. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009. Visala, Aku. “Imago Dei, Dualism and Evolution—a Philosophical Defense of the Structural Image of God.” Zygon 49 (2014): 101–120. Walton, John H. The Lost World of Adam and Eve: Genesis 2–3 and the Human Origins Debate. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2015.

Image

89

Waugh, Barry. “John Calvin on the Fall and the Imago Dei.” The Confessional Presbyterian 13 (2017): 67–80. Wei, Jing. “The Theological Anthropology of Thomas F. Torrance: A Critical and Comparative Exploration.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of Edinburgh, 2013. Wendel, François. Calvin: Origins and Development of His Religious Thought, translated by Philip Mairet. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1963. Wenham, Gordon J. Genesis 1–15. Nashville: Nelson, 1987. Woznicki, Christopher and Jesse Gentile. “Refocusing the Image: Domestic Violence, Refugees and the Imago Dei in John Calvin’s Pastoral Theology.” McMaster Journal of Theology and Ministry 19 (2018): 81–111. Wright, N. T. The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and The Law in Pauline Theology. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991. Zeigler, Geordie. Trinitarian Grace and Participation: An Entry into the Theology of T. F. Torrance. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017.

5

Personhood Onto-Relational Christological Anthropology

“Few anthropological concepts are used more widely and with less clarity than that of person.”1 Except for some notable liminal cases, it seems as though most people can recognize a person when they see them.2 Despite the apparent intuitiveness of the notion there is no commonly agreed upon definition of the concept, Marc Cortez, thus, astutely observes, “person remains one of those concepts with broad intuitive appeal and little conceptual clarity.”3 To say that the definition of person remains unclear—especially in the area of theology—is slightly misleading. The situation could be likened to the difference between the doctrine of atonement and Christology. In Christology there is an agreed upon ecumenical definition, namely the Chalcedonian Definition. On the other hand, when it comes to atonement, there is no single agreed upon ecumenical statement defining the doctrine. The various articulations of the doctrine of atonement through church history can be thought of as a number of families or traditions that each have their distinct ways of describing the atoning work of Christ. There might be different articulations of Satisfaction, for example, but there is a common thread that ties these various articulations together as members of the “Satisfaction” family, in other words, despite differences there is a family resemblance. Theological definitions of persons are more like the doctrine of atonement than Christology. There is no single agreed upon ecumenical definition of what a person is, rather, there are a number of conceptual families with distinct ways of describing what it means to be a person. The most well-known—and probably the most historically significant—family of definitions of personhood finds its origin in the sixth-century Roman statesman and philosopher Boethius, who defined persons as “naturae rationalis inidividua substantia.”4 This definition of a person as an individual substance of a rational nature gets picked up by and cemented into the Christian tradition by Thomas Aquinas. Of course, there are other families of definitions of personhood that have the historical pedigree of the Boethian definition. Richard of St. Victor represents another conceptual family. Consider Richard’s definition of person: persona est rationalis naturae individua existentia. 5 He then proceeds to explain that individua existentia can also be called incommunicabilis existentia. 6 Thus a person is an incommunicable existence of a rational nature. Richard Ray Anderson points out that in this definition, DOI: 10.4324/9781003265832-5

Personhood

91

unlike the Boethian family of definitions, a person does not merely possess a nature; rather, a person is one who “stands out of himself toward the source of being.”7 One crucial feature of personhood, according to this family, is that persons are necessarily ecstatic. In recent years, however, a new conceptual family has developed: relational ontologies.8 Relational ontologies, as the term indicates, hold to the view that personhood is relational. This does not simply mean that relations are fundamental to flourishing as persons, rather, it means that in some sense persons only become persons through relations with other persons. It is not a stretch to say that among contemporary constructive theologians the relational account of personhood has become the new orthodoxy. For various historical reasons, the Boethian definition of persons is no longer en vouge. 9 Even a cursory survey of contemporary theological anthropology reveals the shift to relational ontologies.10 John Zizioulas, for example, says that personhood never occurs in an individualistic manner, it is always a gift from some other person. Thus, a person “is an ‘I’ that can exist only as long as it relates to a ‘thou’ which affirms its existence and its otherness.”11 In other words, a “person is otherness in communion and communion in otherness.”12 Alistair McFadyen states that what it means to be a person does not “refer to some internal and independent source of identity, but to the way one is and has been in relation.”13 Elaine Graham argues that gender is “suggestive of a model of human nature as profoundly relational, requiring the agency of culture to bring our personhood fully into being.”14 Vincent Brümmer makes the claim that “one can only be a person in relation to other persons.”15 T. F. Torrance, likewise, makes the claim that “‘Person’ is an onto-relational concept.”16 Yet, we ought to ask, does Torrance’s claim amount to a relational ontology? Does Torrance’s concept of personhood belong to the relational family alongside the relational ontology of theologians like Zizioulas or does it simply bear a superficial resemblance? In this chapter, I examine Torrance’s relational account of persons in light of contemporary relational ontologies. By putting Torrance in conversation with John Zizioulas—perhaps the most influential advocate of relational ontology of persons—I hope to show that the highly relational view of persons that Torrance propounds is significantly different from the relational family of views. I show that Torrance, like Zizioulas begins thinking about the meaning of “person” by thinking about the Trinity, and more specifically, Christ. Furthermore, Torrance, I argue, presents a highly relational view of personhood, but unlike Zizioulas, he does not advocate for a relational ontology. After examining Torrance’s understanding of personhood, I then turn to his provocative claim that Christ is the “personalizing person.” In many ways this claim parallels Zizioulas’s claim that Christ is the one who establishes the personhood of human beings.17 I argue that despite the apparent similarities between Torrance’s and Zizioulas’s understanding of the role that Christ plays in personalizing human beings, Torrance’s view is radically different than Zizioulas’s. When Torrance claims that human beings are personalized in virtue of the vicarious humanity of Christ, he does not mean that they become persons,

92

Personhood

rather they enter into the kind of personal relation that is necessary for life as a person. Such a view does not suffer from the objections that can be leveled against Zizioulas’s view.18

The Ontology of Persons In what follows, I compare and contrast the relational ontologies of John Zizioulas and T. F. Torrance. I argue that while both begin to think about “persons” in a Trinitarian manner, Torrance’s reflections on the topic are more Christological. Additionally, I show that Torrance does not have a true “relational ontology.” Relational Ontology: The Trinitarian Theology of John Zizioulas In Being and Communion, Zizioulas makes the bold claim that “person” as a “concept and as a living reality is purely the product of patristic thought.”19 In order to establish this claim Zizioulas narrates the history of the development of the concept of personhood. Tracing the use of words like ousia, hypostasis, and persona, in Greco-Roman philosophy and literature, Zizioulas eventually addresses how the church was forced to develop a novel expression of personhood in light of its faith in the Triune God.20 The church, he explains, eventually came to identify “hypostasis” with the “person.” This revolution in Greek thought consists of two theses: a

b

The person is no longer an adjunct to a being, a category which we add to a concrete entity once we have first verified its ontological hypostasis. It is itself the hypostasis of the being. Entities no longer trace their being to being itself—that is, being is not an absolute category in itself—but to the person, to precisely that which constitutes being, that is, enables entities to be entities.21

What led to this development in ontology? In part, it was the conviction that the being of God himself ought to be identified with the person. Unlike Western theologians—who, Zizioulas claims, argue that God begins first as his nature or being, and only then exists as Trinity, i.e., persons—the Cappadocians argue that “the being and life of God does not consist in the one substance of God but in the hypostasis, that is the person of the Father.”22 This claim turns out to be revolutionary because the basic ontological principle of all of reality is no longer thought to be “being” rather it is now understood to be “person,” specifically, it is the person of the Father. This claim is underdeveloped in Being and Communion, but is further elaborated upon in Communion and Otherness. In this book, Zizioulas engages in a close reading of the early creeds and the Cappadocians to argue that “the one ontological arche in the Trinity is the Father, who in this one sense is the One God.”23 This claim, he believes is more faithful to the biblical and creedal equation of God with the Father. Unlike Augustine and the medieval Scholastics, the Cappadocians, Zizioulas argues,

Personhood

93

believed that the origination of being in God was attached to the person of the Father.24 Zizioulas’s claim that the Father is the arche of the Trinity implies that the fundamental category of metaphysics is not being, rather, it is person. Yet this ontology does not posit a monistic God, rather it is grounded in the Triune God. The Holy Trinity, he says, “is a primordial ontological concept and not a notion which is added to the divine substance or rather which follows it.”25 The Triune God is love (1 John 4:16). He follows this claim about the relational nature of the Triune God by saying that “Love is not an emanation or ‘property’ of the ousia of God … but is constitutive of his ousia, i.e. it is that which makes God what he is.”26 Because the Trinity is the “primordial ontological concept” we can conclude that communion is a fundamental ontological category. God, he says, “has no ontological content, no true being, apart from communion,” furthermore, “it is communion which makes beings ‘be’; nothing exists without it, not even God.”27 What happens if we take Zizioulas’s doctrine of God seriously? Two claims follow. First, “There is no true being without communion. Nothing exists as an ‘individual,’ conceivable in itself. Communion is an ontological category.”28 Second, “the person cannot exist without communion; but every form of communion which denies or suppresses the person is inadmissible.”29 As he explains in Communion and Otherness, an “I” can exist only as long as it relates to a “thou.”30 Zizioulas highlights several consequences of his ontology for theological anthropology. First, if we are to speak of personhood for humans, we must “allow God’s way of being to reveal to us true personhood.”31 This means that a person is always a gift from someone, personhood never occurs in an individualistic manner. Unlike the Boethian understanding of personhood, which Zizioulas says forced individualism on to “the very foundation of our culture,” his view places communion at the center of what it means to be a person.32 Second, it means that we must affirm that our personal existence is due to a person and not a nature. This means that the primary ontological category for theological anthropology is persons, not natures. Finally, it also means that personal otherness is asymmetrical. There is always something which is ontologically prior to persons.33 Najeeb Awad further elaborates upon the anthropological claims that follow Zizioulas’s ontology. He explains that “if the human is person in the image of God ultimately, in and as the community of God, then the human is theologically a ‘person’ only when her personhood reflects the personhood of God.”34 In other words, apart from communion a human being is not truly a person. This claim however is not simply a feature of being a person, rather, it is part of the definition of being a person. Zizioulas defines personhood in terms of communion. He says that “person is otherness in communion and communion in otherness.”35 Personhood emerges through relationship and can only exists when it can relate to another. The Trinity leads us to arrive at this notion of personhood. As Zizioulas says, “It is divine personhood alone that can be the

94

Personhood

true model for true personhood.”36 The Father cannot be conceived of without the Son and Spirit, and the Son and Spirit cannot be conceived apart from the Father. This claim however is not merely about personhood and the psychological, historical, or moral conditions that shape one’s sense of self as a personal being. It is an ontological claim. This is confirmed when Zizioulas says that a person is “an ‘I’ that can exist only as long as it relates to a ‘thou’ which affirms its existence and its otherness.”37 Awad summarizes Zizioulas’ ontology of personhood accurately, saying that “the communion of the persons is their being.”38 In other words, persons are constituted by their relations, ontologically “persons do not exist as persons apart from the relationships that make them personal beings.”39 Persons and Onto-Relations: Torrance Like Zizioulas, Torrance believes that the historical development of “the concept of ‘person…’ is a direct product of Christian theology, and specifically the doctrines of Christ and the Holy Trinity.”40 Also, Like Zizioulas, Torrance establishes this claim by narrating the development of the concept in early Christianity. The narrative of the development of this concept—much like his narration of other theological concepts—follows a rise and fall storyline. An authentically Christian concept of person is developed by the Greek Fathers, the concept declines but it appears in flashes and glimpses in the writings certain Medievals and Reformers, it disappears in the Post-Reformation era, and is finally recovered in our contemporary period. Torrance’s tracing of the concept through history begins with Scripture. The Old and New Testaments, he claims, do not have an explicit concept of “person,” yet we find an emphasis on “name,” “presence,”, “the face and Glory of God” in ways that are “dynamic and quasi-hypostatic” and “correspond to what we would think of as the personal presence” of God.41 Although the concept of person was not present, God was known as being profoundly personal. Once Jesus Christ revealed God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, however, the church was forced to develop a Trinitarian understanding of the concept “person.” The Trinitarian concept of person was especially developed in light of God’s self-revelation in Christ.42 Christ is the epistemological key for formulating a doctrine of personhood. Apart from God’s self-revelation in Christ, the Christian doctrine of personhood would not have developed. Thus, Torrance says, “Jesus Christ alone is determinative of the meaning of persona.”43 The term which was used to speak of the three of the Trinity was hypostasis. This word, however, was not simply taken over from Greek thought unchanged. Torrance says that it was “stretched and transformed under the impact of God’s Trinitarian self-revelation through Christ and in the Spirit.”44 When the church fathers reflected upon the homoousial and hypostatic interrelations between the three divine persons of the Trinity, they came to realize that “the ontic relations between the divine Persons belong to what they are as Persons.”45 The idea that relations belong to what persons are is dubbed “onto-

Personhood

95

relations.” An “onto-relation,” Torrance says, “is the kind of relation subsisting between things which is an essential constituent of heir being, and without which they would not be what they are.”46 The church fathers realized that “No divine Person is who he is without essential relation to the other two, and yet each divine Person is other than and distinct from the other two.”47 The Father is who he is precisely because of his relation to the Son and Spirit. The Son is precisely who he is because of his relation to the Father and the Spirit. The Spirit is precisely who he is because of his relation to the Father and the Son. The relations between the divine persons belong intrinsically to who the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are. “The relations between the divine Persons belong to what they are as Persons—they are constitutive relations.”48 Thus Torrance concludes that “‘Person’ is an onto-relational concept.”49 True to his theological epistemology, Torrance stresses that the notion that “person” as an onto-relational concept, is not “logically derived” as other Western concepts of “person” (here Torrance has the Boethian definition, naturae rationalis inividua substantia, in mind). The Boethian definition of persons is derived “through logical analysis from Aristotelian and Neoplatonic notions of particular and general substance and rational nature.”50 The onto-relational concept of person, on the other hand, is derived from “the communion of Being in Love in God himself.”51 The onto-relational concept of person is derived a posteriori, through the self-revelation of the Triune God in Christ. This self-revelation gave rise to “the new concept of person, unknown in human thought until then.”52 The notion that person is an onto-relational concept, however, would not last long. According to Torrance, the concept of person is changed during the medieval period. This change is due to the influence of “a peculiar medieval interpretation of Aristotle” which set aside Patristic conceptions of hypostasis. 53 Under the influence of Boethius and Thomas, “person” came more and more to refer to an individualized substance of a rational nature. The trajectory away from an onto-relational concept of person climaxes in early modernity with the “Cartesian revival of the Augustinian cogito ergo sum, and the attachment of ego-consciousness to this individual personal substance.”54 Yet the concept of onto-relational personhood was not entirely absent during the medieval period. Richard of St. Victor understood that the concept of “personhood” ought to be derived from the “Communion of Being in Love in God himself.”55 Similarly, Duns Scotus and Calvin understood that personhood, especially as it pertains to the Trinity, has a dynamic and relational quality. Regrettably, in Torrance’s mind, the atomistic understanding of persons as static and non-necessarily relational individuals took hold of the modern imagination. This, Torrance notes, need not be the case. The Bantu, for example, “naturally think in relational ways.”56 Thus the concept of onto-relations comes more naturally for them than for Westerners because of how the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition has ingrained itself into their minds and speech.57 The concept of “person” would be in terrible shape, according to Torrance’s way of framing the concept’s history, had it not been for the development of

96

Personhood

particle theory and quantum theory. These scientific revolutions forced a retrieval of onto-relational notions. The “hero” in Torrance’s story is James Clerk Maxwell. Unlike Newton, who conceived of particles as atomistic, individualized, and isolated entities, Maxwell realized that particles are interrelated to one another. Maxwell articulated a relational account of how particles interact; the relations between particles were an intrinsic part of what the particles are. Thus, Torrance says, The relations he [Maxwell] referred to were not just imaginary or putative but real relations, relations that belong to reality as much as things [particles] do, for the interrelations of things, are, in part at least, constitutive of what they are. Being-constituting relations of this kind we may well speak of as “onto-relations.”58 Thanks to the work of early particle and quantum physicists like Maxwell, the notion that the relations between particles constitute what they are, the notion of relational ways of thought have reentered into the modern imagination. Once this concept had been rediscovered by scientists, it was only a matter of time before the onto-relational way of thinking about God—as well as humans— would be reintroduced. We may now ask ourselves, what is a person according to Torrance? Regrettably he does not provide an explicit definition of a person; nevertheless, we can infer a definition from two points he makes throughout his writings. First, Torrance stresses that personhood is an onto-relational concept. This means that relations constitute the very stuff of personal being. Second, Torrance speaks disparagingly against the Boethian definition of personhood but he affirms the Ricardine approach to deriving a definition of persons. Richard, recall, defined a person as a rationalis naturae incommunicabilis existentia (incommunicable existence of a rational nature). Nowhere does Torrance indicate that he disagrees with Richard’s definition of a person, rather, Torrance finds much to approve in Richard’s definition.59 Given these two observations we can provide a Torrancian definition of a person (Torrancian Person) as follows: TP: An incommunicable existence of a rational nature, whose relations belong to who that “incommunicable existence of a rational nature” is.60 If this, as I am suggesting, is the appropriate Torrancian definition of a person, then we might ask, “Does Torrance’s concept of personhood belong alongside the relational ontology of Zizioulas or is the resemblance superficial?” Torrance vs. Zizioulas on Being Persons The first step towards answering the question above is determining what a relational ontology actually is. I intimated above that a relational ontology of persons is one which holds that personhood is relational, i.e., that in some sense

Personhood

97

persons only become persons through relations with other persons. Such a definition, however, is too broad and unrefined. After all, one could adopt the above definition and hold that some person, Matt, only becomes a person in a psychological sense, when he relates properly to his friends Karen and Paul. Apart from these relations Matt is indeed a person, but Matt cannot psychologically develop a personal sense of self apart from an I-Thou relation with these companions. This is not the kind of personhood that I am interested in this chapter, I am interested in an ontological account of persons. I suggest that Peter van Inwagen’s ontology can help us narrow down a relational ontology of persons. In “Relational vs. Constituent Ontologies,” van Inwagen draws up several distinctions between types of ontologies. First, he explains that there are monocategorical and polycategorical ontologies. Monocategorical ontologies, as the name implies, hold that there is one primary ontological category. Polycategorical ontologies, on the other hand, imply multiple categories. Polycategorical ontologies can be further subdivided into relational ontologies and constituent ontologies. In order to explain the difference between these two kinds of ontologies van Inwagen introduces the concept of an ontological structure. Whether or not a thing has an “ontological structure” is determined in light of whether an ordinary particular has any objects in categories other than a concrete particular that bears a quasi-mereological relation to it, where a “quasi-mereological relation” is defined as follows: Quasi-mereological Relation: A relation is quasi-mereological if it is either the part-whole relation or is in some vague sense “analogous to” or “comparable to” the part-whole relation.61 With this concept in place, van Inwagen defines a relational ontology as one in which “the only structure that concrete particulars have is good, old fashioned everyday structure: mereological structure.”62 Van Inwagen also provides a definition of a constituent ontology. A constituent of an object is defined as “one of its parts or some object that is not, in the strict sense, one of its parts, but stands in some quasi-mereological or partlike relation to it.”63 A constituent ontology, therefore, is one which implies that concrete particulars “have constituents that do not belong to the category ‘concrete particular.’”64 Van Inwagen favors a relational ontology, but, that is neither here nor there for our purposes, since what we need is a framework to define a relational ontology of persons. Let us adopt van Inwagen’s definitions and modify them to make sense of the ontology of persons. I suggest the following definitions: Relational Ontology of Persons (ROP): X is a concrete particular of a certain kind, P, that stands in a mereological relation to other concrete particulars of the same kind, P, such that apart from this relation X would not be a P.

98

Personhood Constituent Ontology of Persons (COP): X is a concrete particular of a certain kind, P, that has constituents that do not belong to the category “concrete particular,” such that apart from these constituents X would not be a P.

Which of these two ontologies best fits what theologians like Zizioulas and Torrance might be after? COP can be easily eliminated as a live option because—as far as I am aware—nobody thinks that persons are not concrete particulars; this leaves us with ROP.65 Can Zizioulas and Torrance be classified as theologians who hold to ROP? Consider Zizioulas’s doctrine of persons once again. He believes that persons do not exist as persons apart from the relations to other persons. If there is any doubt that this is not an ontologically robust statement, but one that refers to something like a psychological sense of personhood, the doubt is dispelled when Zizioulas says, “the person cannot exist without communion.”66 This statement comports with ROP. Consider Matt once again. Zizoiulas wants to say that Matt is not a person apart from Matt’s relation to people like Karen and Paul. Matt as a person, cannot exist without communion, with other persons like Karen and Paul. Matt is a concrete particular; Karen and Paul are concrete particulars. Let us apply ROP to this situation: Matt is a concrete particular of a certain kind, Person, that stands in a mereological relation to other concrete particulars (Karen and Paul) of the same kind, P, such that apart from this relation Matt would not be a Person. This analysis captures Zizioulas’s ontology accurately, but does it capture Torrance’s? I suggest that it does not. Recall Torrance says that an onto-relation is “the kind of relation that subsists between things which is an essential constituent of their being, and without which they would not be what they are.”67 The paradigmatic case of ontorelational persons are the persons of the Trinity. He explains that the Father is the Father precisely in his relation to the Son and the Holy Spirit and that the Son is the Son precisely in his relation to the Father and Holy Spirit. These relations define who these persons are; however, there is no suggestion that the relation defines what they are. This view of personhood, Torrance says, “is applicable to inter-human relations, but in a created way reflecting the uncreated way in which it applies to the Trinitarian relations in God.”68 How then does Torrance think of the onto-relational personhood of human beings? In the introduction to Torrance’s book, The Christian Frame of Mind, Jim Neidhardt exposits Torrance’s understanding of onto-relations. Neidhardt’s interpretation is an especially authoritative interpretation because (1) it is included as the introduction to Torrance’s book and (2) Torrance himself gave feedback to Neidhardt’s interpretation of his work.69 In this introduction, Neidhardt explains that,

Personhood

99

Central to [Torrance’s] understanding of personhood is the reality of human relationships as an integral part of what persons really are. You as a person are not a cut-off, isolated individual, like the Newtonian particle, separated from other autonomous particles. Rather, you as a person are interrelated with others, your parents, your friends, even people with whom you disagree. These interrelationships constitute the very stuff of personal being.70 This interpretation—which was authorized by Torrance himself—is further reinforced when Torrance says that human beings are “personal” primarily through their relations to God and to one another.71 We ought to note the difference between being a “person” because of relations and being “personal” because of relations. It might be the case that the persons of the Trinity are persons because of their relations to one another, but for human beings, personhood is only analogous to Trinitarian personhood.72 A human beings exists as a person, i.e., incommunicable existence of a rational nature apart from its relations, yet a human being is not personal apart from relations. In this sense, relations make up what a human person is. Matt, to go back to our example, exists as an incommunicable existence of a rational nature apart from Karen and Paul, but he does not exist in a personal manner apart from these (and other) relations. This account of human personhood does not comport with ROP. One additional point confirms my interpretation that Torrance did not hold to ROP but that he thought about being personal in terms of relations. This point is the influence that the Scottish philosopher, and contemporary, John Macmurray had on Torrance.73 In a list recounting the list of persons that “I have learned much from,” Torrance includes one philosopher, namely, John Macmurray.74 In Persons in Relation, we get Macmurray’s most comprehensive account of personhood. There he sets out to prove the thesis that “the Self is constituted by its relation to the Other; that it has its being in relationship; and that this relationship is necessarily personal.”75 At first glance this seems to be a form of ROP, yet upon closer inspection Macmurray’s doctrine of personhood is more intuitive. He explains that any self is an agent, and the idea of an isolated agent is “self-contradictory.”76 He goes on to say that “Any agent is necessarily in relation to the Other. Apart from this essential relation he does not exist.”77 Selves, which are coextensive with “persons” are therefore constituted by their mutual relation to one another. In language reminiscent of Buber’s “I-Thou,” Macmurray makes the claim that “I” exist only as one element in the complex “You and I.” Once this “You and I” relation is formed, a self, or a person is formed out of this mutual relation. This claim, however, is not ontological. He states that he uses the term “personal” where the term “personality” would be used by most people.78 Personality, in Macmurray’s framework, simply refers to the characteristics which all persons share, which distinguish them from non-personal entities. So, a person is constituted by a relation with another person that is defined against non-personal

100

Personhood

characteristics. This simply means that to be a self, one must be in a “personal” relationship with another person. This is not a claim about the necessary conditions for being a person, rather, it is an observation about how the self is formed: it is formed in light of personal relationships with other selves. If the preceding observations do not establish the fact that Macmurray does not hold to ROP, then his comments on how he uses the term “person” will. Macmurray explicitly states that “the term ‘person’ fulfills the same function from the standpoint of the agent as the ‘self’ does in traditional philosophy.”79 In traditional philosophy, the “self” is simply the subject of awareness in contrast to the other. We can thus read Macmurray’s claim that persons are constituted by their relations as being equivalent to the claim that the sense of self is defined in light of the subject’s relation to other personal beings. If this reading of Macmurray is correct, and the claim that Macmurray’s philosophy influenced Torrance’s is correct as well, then we have further reason to believe that for Torrance a person is an incommunicable existence of a rational nature that becomes personal—not a person—only in relation to other persons. Summary In this section, I have argued that Torrance’s understanding of human beings as persons should not be understood as a relational ontology—in the technical sense defined above—since Torrance does not think that relations are what make humans to be persons, rather relations are what make humans personal. In other words, even apart from relations, a human being is still incommunicable existence of a rational nature. The relations simply tell us who that incommunicable existence of a rational nature is; additionally, the relations define the particular person as a personal being. Now a further question remains: how are human beings personalized? As we will see below, Torrance’s answer is Christological.

Christ’s Role in Personalizing Human Beings Both Torrance and Zizioulas agree that Christ is the personalizing person. Our person-ality is derived in some way from Christ’s person-ality. Despite this similarity, however, Torrance and Zizioulas have radically different conceptions of how Christ personalizes other human beings. Biological and Ecclesial Personhood in Zizioulas In Being and Communion, Zizioulas distinguishes between two ways of being human: “the hypostasis of biological existence” and “the hypostasis of ecclesial existence.” Every human being bears the former hypostasis in virtue of the fact that every human is the product of communion between two humans.80 Those who exist in this manner of being alone suffer from two passions which tend

Personhood

101

towards the destruction of the very thing which constitutes personhood, namely, communion. First, humans who are constituted merely according to biological existence suffer from the passion of “ontological necessity.”81 To be truly a person, one must exist in an “I-Thou” relationship. To exist in an “I-Thou” relationship in an authentic manner, there must be love between these beings. Love, Zizioulas says, requires freedom to relate to the other. Mere biological existence lacks this freedom; thus, he says the human in this state “subsists not as freedom but as necessity.”82 A human who is constituted merely by their biological existence cannot achieve the communion necessary for personhood. The second passion that such human beings suffer from is the “passion of individualism, of the separation of the hypostases.”83 The body has the potential to be an instrument for communion. It can stretch out a hand to another, create language, speak, make art, kiss, etc. Yet in actuality, the body behaves like a “fortress of an ego,” hindering the hypostasis from becoming a person, i. e., the body hinders the affirmation of love and freedom in relationship with others, two constitutive elements of personhood. The body, Zizioulas concludes, tends towards individualism not communion, and apart from redemption hinders the possibility of personhood. Zizioulas concludes that humans as mere biological beings are tragic figures. They are born as the result of an ecstatic act, i.e., an act of communion, yet even this act “is interwoven with a natural necessity and therefore lacks ontological freedom.”84 Additionally they are born “as a hypostatic fact, as a body,” yet, as humans currently find themselves, the possession of a body is interwoven with individuality and death. What human beings need if they are to overcome the problem of existing as mere biological hypostases, and enter into true personhood, is that their constitution needs to be transformed. They need to be reconstituted in such a way that they are made persons who are free to love others in freedom. Zizioulas argues that the way that humans move from the hypostasis of biological existence into the hypostasis of ecclesial existence is by means of baptism. Baptism leads to a new mode of existence, and to a new hypostasis.85 Why is this the case? it is because “there is no true human personhood which his not constituted by a union with divine persons.”86 Recall that for Zizioulas the only true personhood is divine personhood. Thus he can say, “the human being (alone) can be called a person as it is endowed with the freedom to reflect divine personhood in creation.”87 How does Zizioulas establish the concept of an “ecclesial hypostasis?” He does so in a Christological manner. Christ, in virtue of the hypostatic union, assumes the biological existence which constitutes human beings. In virtue of assuming a human nature, Christ allows human nature to subsist in true communion with God. Christ is the only human who is “authentically a person … who possesses a ‘mode of existence’ which is constituted as being in precisely the same manner in which God subsists as being.”88 Yet, if human beings are to be transformed into persons, they must share in the communion which alone

102

Personhood

belongs to the divine persons. They must enter into communion with the only being that is fully personal. They must be adopted into the divine communion. Baptism is especially significant for this purpose, for “adoption is the essence of baptism.”89 When a human is baptized in the church, she is adopted into communion with God in Christ. Being united to Christ, she shares in the freedom and love Christ possesses as Son of God with the Father. Furthermore, this adoption should also be considered to be regenerative; it is a new birth.90 Thus Zizioulas says, This “new birth,” which is the essence of baptism, is nothing but the acquisition of an identity not dependent on the qualities of nature but freely raising nature to a hypostatic existence identical with that which emerges from the Father-Son relationship.91 Being regenerated, the old biological mode of existence dies and no longer constitutes the human. The human is now constituted by an ecclesial existence. Cortez summarizes Zizioulas’s point about baptism well, explaining that “in the death and resurrection of baptism, we are reconstituted as personal beings as we are drawn into the personal life of the Son.”92 Baptism, then, is the basis for the union with Christ which constitutes the communion with God necessary for existing as a person. It is therefore because of Christ that a human being can truly subsist as a person. Christ the Personalizing Person Much like Zizioulas, Torrance claims that God alone is fully personal.93 Torrance nuances this claim, saying that God alone is Person because “he is in himself the fullness of personal Being.”94 What Torrance means by this is that God is fully personal because each person of the Trinity is a rational agent that lives in perfect and unhindered communion and love. Person-ality, you will recall, for Torrance is defined by relationality. Persons are constituted by their relations. This means that apart from relations, persons are not “personal.” The consequence of this claim for theological anthropology is that Christ is the only perfectly personal human being. As Torrance says, “Jesus Christ is Person in the full and proper sense, for in him God the creative Source of personal being and the one perfect human person are wholly and indivisibly one.”95 As the only human being who has a divine and human nature, Christ is the only human being, properly speaking, who is a divine person. As a divine person, Christ, as a human being is constituted by his personal relation to the Father and the Son. Jesus Christ, the human, exists as fully personal in virtue of his onto-relational existence as the second person of the Trinity. Torrance is adamant about the fact that Jesus Christ is personal in the full and proper sense, but how does Christ’s personality affect the rest of humanity and its personality? There are two ways in which Jesus Christ personalizes human beings: an objective manner and a subjective manner.

Personhood

103

The objective personalization of human beings occurs in virtue of the incarnation: “In the Incarnation … God himself has become one with us and one of us in such a way that Jesus Christ is now the fount of all that is truly personal among us.”96 But how does the incarnation personalize humanity? To make sense of this, we need to reintroduce the distinction between “participation” and “instantiation” that I first introduced in Chapter 3. There I argued that Torrance’s metaphysics of human nature force us to distinguish between two different ways that human beings relate to the abstract universal human nature. The first mode of relating to human nature was called “participation.” A particular object, in this case a particular human being, participates in an abstract universal when the universal is the cause of the particular existing in the way that it does. Thus, for humans, a human being exists as a human because it participates in an abstract universal human nature. The second way to relate to an abstract universal was dubbed “instantiation.” I defined “instantiation” as specific kind of relation in which is abstract universal is related to a particular object in such a way that the abstract universal nature itself can be affected by other causes when the particular object it is instantiated in is subject to causes acting upon it. With these two distinctions in place, we can understand how Christ objectively personalizes human beings. Upon the incarnation, the Son assumes the abstract universal human nature that is participated in by all human beings. Every human being, except for Christ, participates in the abstract universal human nature. Because of this, every human being who participates in the abstract universal human nature is affected by whatever is true of the abstract universal human nature. Christ, unlike the rest of humanity, does not merely participate in the abstract universal human nature. Christ instantiates the abstract universal human nature. Thus, when Jesus Christ has faith, is baptized, confesses, prays, or sanctifies human nature, this affects the abstract universal human nature he instantiates, and thus all those who participate in the abstract universal human nature are also affected. In this chapter, our focus is on “personhood,” thus, what interests us the most is the fact that Christ effects a change upon the abstract universal human nature he instantiates. When the Son becomes incarnate, a human being enters into the full and perfectly personal communion of the Trinity for the first time in history. The persons of the Trinity have eternally existed in the fullness of personal being, and once the incarnation takes place, a human being has entered into that fully personal communion. What is significant about the fact that it is Christ who is fully personalized is that Christ does not merely participate in human nature, rather Christ instantiates human nature. Because Christ instantiates human nature, what is true of his humanity—namely that it exists in fully personal manner with the Triune God—is now true of all those who participate in the abstract universal human nature. Every single human being has objectively been personalized.97 Humans are personalized persons through what they receive from Jesus, namely “communion with the fullness of personal being in the Holy Trinity.”98 All humans exist in a fully personal manner

104

Personhood

because they are in communion with the Triune God in virtue of the vicarious humanity of Christ.99 Despite the fact that all humans have been objectively personalized in Christ, not all human beings subjectively experience the personalization that is theirs in Christ. This can be explained by the subjective element of faith and union with Christ. Myk Habets explains, “what drives the human being to personality and relatedness is the Holy Spirit who is the bond of union between the Father and the Son.”100 When humans are united to Christ by the Spirit, humans are drawn into experiencing union with God. United to God, humans can experience the “relationship of the Father for the Son in or by the Holy Spirit.”101 This participation in communion with divine persons, who are personal in the full and proper sense, enables human persons to experience personality; the reason being that personality is constituted by relations. This kind of personality—i.e., personality that comes in virtue of union with Christ by the Holy Spirit—is entirely subjective. Yet, this subjective experience of personality is not had by all. Unlike the hypostatic union which unites human nature to the divine nature—and hence all those who possess a human nature to God—there is also a sort of union that is enacted by the Holy Spirit that only belongs to believers. Only believers who are united to Christ through faith by the Spirit experience personality in the subjective sense. Faith in Christ is a necessary condition for experiencing communion with the Triune God. Even though Torrance stresses that Jesus Christ has believed, trusted, and has had faith in God the Father on our behalf and our place, not everyone has the faith in God necessary for subjective union with Christ.102 Why this is the case, ultimately, “is not something that can be understood logically.”103 Taking stock, we can summarize Torrance’s claim that Christ is the personalizing person as follows: Objectively, Christ has personalized all human beings by his vicarious humanity. Subjectively, only those who are united to Christ through the Spirit experience the fullness of personality that comes through experiencing communion with the Triune God. Critical Assessment Zizioulas and Torrance are in agreement that Christ is the “personalizing person,” yet their understanding of what this means is quite different. Ultimately, I believe, Torrance’s understanding is to be preferred over Zizioulas’s understanding of personhood. This is because Zizioulas’s doctrine of personhood excludes all those who are outside of the church from the category of persons. Torrance’s distinction between objective and subjective personalization, on the other hand, presents an inclusive vision of personhood while affirming that not all persons live in fully personal ways. In Persons and Communion, Alan Torrance wonders, Does it [Zizioulas’s doctrine of personhood] allow us to describe as “persons” human beings who have not experienced salvation, who may not

Personhood

105

have been found, or been “found by”, this salvific communion who may not be said to have been “divinized” by being brought through eucharistic or ecclesial experience to participate (cognitively) in God’s personal existence?104 Furthermore, he wonders, “When Jesus refers to ‘the least of these’, may he not be referring to individual human beings who do not have this ‘capacity’ or have not had the opportunity for such cognitive communion and yet who are loved by God as persons?”105 Why does Alan Torrance bring up these questions? Recall that for Zizioulas, humans who exist in the hypostasis of biological existence are not actually persons. Those who exist in this mode of being lack the ecstatic communion necessary to make them persons. Once those who exist in the biological mode transcend beyond their biological constraints and are brought into the communion of persons participating in the triune life of God, then they become persons. Alan Torrance points out that in Zizioulas’s exposition of the distinction between biological and ecclesial hypostases, he leaves open the extent to which those who can enter into this ecstatic relation of transcendence includes those human beings who do not have the cognitive capacity necessary to have this cognitive kind of transcendence.106 This concern is especially relevant for those who are either immature, mentally handicapped, or have lost cognitive capacities for various reasons. Torrance is right to worry about the personhood of those incapable of cognitively being aware of the communion that grounds their personhood. Let us assume, however, that the kind of communion that Zizioulas requires for personhood does not involve cognition of that communion. This assumption has some grounding, for Orthodox churches baptize infants. Infants—we can assume—are not cognitively aware of the ecstatic communion that grounds their personhood, yet Zizioulas would say that baptized infants subsist in the ecclesial mode of being hypostatized. The more significant issue, therefore, is the concern raised by Alan Torrance about the personhood of those outside of the church. Zizioulas argues that “human nature in Christ recovers its ekstatic movement towards God.”107 Those who are united to Christ enter into the filial relationship between the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit. Entering into the filial relationship with the Father, through Christ, is the key to attaining personhood because personhood is achieved only in communion with other persons. Thus, “man ‘in Christ’ becomes a true person … only in and through the one filial relationship which constituted Christ’s being.”108 Those who are baptized, and thus united to Christ, are brought into communion with the Triune God and all those who are persons in virtue of belonging to the communion of the saints. Apart from Christ, and more accurately, apart from baptism human beings remain in the biological mode of existence.109 Thus, for Zizioulas, those who are not baptized are not actually persons. This Christologically based personalization of human beings is highly concerning, because it means that those who stand outside of the Christian church are not persons. Moreover, according to standard Orthodox teaching (and Zizioulas), those who are not baptized into

106

Personhood

the Orthodox church are not actually part of the church.110 Thus, it is not only non-Christians who are not persons, but Christians who are not baptized in the Orthodox (or Catholic) church are not persons as well because they have not entered into ecclesial existence. It is not hard to imagine how Zizioulas’s Christologically based account of personhood might lead to troubling effects. If Alan Torrance is right about the cognitive elements of communion, then those who lack the necessary cognitive functions will be labeled as non-persons. Without being deemed persons, such humans would be vulnerable to mistreatment. Thankfully, I think that Zizioulas can escape this worry. Anyone, whether they are cognitively capable or not, can enter into the ecclesial mode of existence through baptism, and thus anyone (in principle) could become a person. Yet, Alan Torrance’s second worry still looms large: non-Christians (and non-Orthodox Christians) are not actually persons because they don’t possess the ecclesial mode of existence. History has shown that the moment certain groups of humans are deemed “non-persons,” horrendous actions tend to be committed against those groups by those who see themselves as “persons.” I suggest that T. F. Torrance’s account of personhood—objective personalization as well as subjective personalization—provides us with a robustly Christological basis from a doctrine of personhood that avoids the problems with Zizioulas’s account mentioned above. On Torrance’s account, “personhood” is not constituted relationally, rather personality is constituted relationally. A person is defined as an incommunicable existence of a rational nature, whose relations belong to who that “incommunicable existence of a rational nature” is.111 Thus, all human beings are already persons. The role that Christ plays in Torrance’s doctrine of personhood, is that Christ alone personalizes human persons. In his vicarious humanity, Christ personalizes all human beings. Thus, objectively all human persons are “personal.” Unlike Zizioulas, this means that anyone who possesses a human nature—whether cognitively impaired, non-Christian, or non-Orthodox—are personalized. All human beings stand in a personalized relationship with the Triune God. All humans, regardless of abilities or religion, are personalized persons. This, of course, does not mean that all humans taste the benefits of being personalized through the vicarious humanity of Christ. Only those who are united to Christ by faith subjectively experience the relation that grounds their person-ality. I believe that the Torrancian distinction between objective personalization and subjective personalization better capture the intuitions that Zizioulas wants to affirm, namely: (1) relations matter for personhood, (2) human beings are “personalized” through Christ, and (3) that those who are not united to Christ do not fully live as persons. Torrance’s way of articulating these intuitions avoids the problematic entailments that come from Zizioulas’s way of capturing these intuitions.

Conclusion In this monograph, I have set out to demonstrate the promise of Christology for developing T. F. Torrance’s theological anthropology. This chapter supports

Personhood

107

this thesis, i.e., that Christ as he confronts us in salvation history is the determinative factor for thinking about anthropological topics, by arguing that personhood in general and for humans is best understood through Christ. Concerning personhood in general, I have argued that for Torrance Christ is the epistemological key to understanding the concept. Christ reveals that personhood is an onto-relational concept. According to Torrance, “no divine Person is who he is without essential relation to the other two, and yet each divine Person is other than and distinct from the other two.”112 Apart from God’s self-revelation in Christ, we would not know that divine personhood is onto-relational. Thus Torrance claims that Jesus Christ “alone is determinative of the meaning of persona.”113 Furthermore, I have shown that in distinction from John Zizioulas, Torrance’s doctrine of personhood, while highly relational, should not be considered under the category of relational ontologies. Concerning human personhood, I have established the claim that for Torrance, Christ is the one who personalizes human persons, thus, Christ is the “personalizing person.”114 Christ personalizes all those who possess a human nature in an objective and subjective manner. Apart from Christ, human beings, while still persons, would not be fully personalized, thus we are “personalized persons.”115 Taking stock, we can say that Torrance’s doctrine of personhood is thoroughly Christological. The nature of persons is revealed by Christ and humanity’s existence as personalized persons is brought into effect through Christ. In the next chapter, we will shift our attention to the anthropological topic of vocation. I will argue that humanity’s vocation as “priests of creation” is also Christologically grounded.

Notes 1 Marc Cortez, Christological Anthropology in Historical Perspective: Ancient and Contemporary Approaches to Theological Anthropology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2016), 163. 2 It should go without saying, nevertheless it bears repeating: “person” is not coextensive with human being. Consider Jenny Teichman’s observation regarding this matter: “In ordinary unthinking everyday usage, ‘person’ is co-extensive with ‘human being.’ For instance, philosophy students use the terms ‘human being’ and ‘person’ interchangeably until they are taught not to by philosophy teachers. The OED [Oxford English Dictionary] supports the man in the street, and the students, rather than philosophy teachers.” Jenny Teichman, “The Definition of Person,” Philosophy 60 (1985): 177. Throughout the rest of this chapter, we can assume that person is not co-extensive with “human being,” thus we can say that the Holy Spirit is a divine person, Nicholas Cage is a human person, the Archangel Michael is an angelic person, and Baby Yoda (Grogu) is a Yodic person. For T. F. Torrance’s understanding of angels see, “The Spiritual Relevance of Angels,” in Alive to God: Studies in Spirituality Presented to James Houston, eds. J. I. Packer and Loren Wilkinson (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1992), 122–39. 3 Cortez, Christological Anthropology, 163. 4 Boethius, Liber de Persona et Daubus Naturis, 3. 5 Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate IV.23.

108

Personhood

6 See John Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 59. 7 Ray Anderson, On Being Human: Essays in Theological Anthropology (Pasadena: Fuller Seminary Press, 1982), 6. 8 Despite some similarities it is not clear that this family’s genealogy can be traced back to the family represented by Richard of St. Victor. M. William Ury expresses appreciation for Richard in Trinitarian Personhood and argues that the relational and dynamic aspects of Richard’s ontology should be adopted, still it is not clear to me that for Ury, and other proponents of relational definitions of personhood, the definition was not developed independent of interaction with the conceptual descendants of Richard. See Ury, Trinitarian Personhood: Investigating the Implications of a Relational Definition (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2002). 9 A full-length study of why the Boethian definition of persons is not as prominent as it once was would be a worthwhile endeavor. Here I can only speculate why Boethius’s definition has declined in popularity. I offer the following suggestions: (1) A suspicion toward classical metaphysics, (2) Personalism as a philosophical trend, and (3) the influence of existentialism in theology. Martin Buber’s influence against a Boethian definition is especially palpable. Especially influential was I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1937). 10 In what follows, the focus is on systematic and philosophical theologians, but the trend can also be seen among biblical scholars. See, for example, Susan Grove Eastman, Paul and the Person: Reframing Paul’s Anthropology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017). She defines human persons as “one for whom Christ died” (14), thus defining human personhood in relation to the person of Christ. 11 John Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church (London: T&T Clark, 2006), 9. 12 Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, 9. 13 Alistair McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social Relationships (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 18. 14 Elaine Graham, Making the Difference: Gender, Personhood, and Theology (London: Mowbray, 1995), 223. It should be noted that Graham resists the notion of a “human nature.” She explains that “Whatever human nature may be, even if there are universal common elements, they remain inaccessible to our understanding beyond the medium of our own culture and interpretation.” Graham, “Gender, Personhood, and Theology,” Scottish Journal of Theology 48 (1995): 354. 15 Vincent Brümmer, The Model of Love: A Study in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 72. 16 T. F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (London: T&T Clark, 1996), 157. 17 Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, 243. 18 These objections, raised below, stem from the claim that Zizioulas’s understanding of personhood excludes certain categories of humans from full personhood. 19 John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1993), 27. Joseph Ratzinger similarly argues that the concept of person is a product of Christian theology. However, instead of emphasizing the patristic source of the concept, he says its source is rooted “especially in Scripture.” Ratzinger, “Retrieving the Tradition: Concerning the Notion of Personhood in Theology,” Communio 17 (1990): 439. 20 The faithfulness of Zizioulas’s interpretation of the patristic development of concepts like person is quite contentious. For critical readings of Zizioulas’s historical interpretation see for example, Lucian Turcesu, “‘Person’ versus ‘Individual,’ and Other Modern Misreadings of Gregory of Nyssa,” Modern Theology 18 (2002): 527–639; John Behr, The Way to Nicaea (Crestwood: Saint Valadimir’s Seminary Press, 2001); Andrew Louth, John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in

Personhood

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

109

Byzantine Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Stephen Holmes, The Quest for the Trinity: The Doctrine of God in Scripture, History and Modernity (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2012). Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 39. Italics in original. Ibid., 40. Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, 119. Ibid., 162. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 17. Ibid., 45. Ibid. Ibid, 18. Ibid. Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, 9. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 141. Ibid., 1. Except in the case of God the Father. Najeeb Awad, “Personhood as Particularity: John Zizioulas, Colin Gunton, and the Trinitarian Theology of Personhood,” Journal of Reformed Theology 4 (2010): 4. Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, 9. Ibid., 95. Ibid., 9. Awad, “Person as Particularity,” 6. Cortez, Christological Anthropology, 169. T. F. Torrance, Reality and Evangelical Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982), 43. See also, T. F. Torrance, The Soul and Person of the Unborn Child (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1999), 17–18. Hakbong Kim helpfully points to a critique made by C. J. de Vogel regarding theological narrations of the history of personhood. Kim summarizes Vogel’s argument that “there was a wide range of Greek reflections on human beings in discussion about their rational and individual character, which was prior of Boethius’s definition of a person in terms of individuality and rational nature.” Because of this “Torrance might be subjected to Vogel’s criticism for he states that the concept of person is ‘a direct product of Christian theology.’” [Hakbong Kim, Person, Personhood, and the Humanity of Christ: Christocentric Anthropology and Ethics in Thomas F. Torrance (Eugene: Pickwick, 2021), 36]. See C. J. de Vogel, “The Concept of Personality in Greek and Christian Thought,” in Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, ed. Ryan John Kenneth (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1963), 40–60. Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 155. Ibid., 102. T. F. Torrance, Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ, ed. Robert T. Walker (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 213. Ibid., 156. Ibid., 6. Torrance, Reality and Evangelical Theology, 42–3. Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 157. Ibid. Ibid. Torrance, Reality and Evangelical Theology, 43. T. F. Torrance, The Ground and Grammar of Theology: The Consonance between Theology and Science (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 174. Torrance, Ground and Grammar of Theology, 174. Torrance, Incarnation, 213.

110 54 55 56 57

58 59 60

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

70 71 72

73

74

Personhood Ibid., 214. Torrance, Ground and Grammar of Theology, 174. Ibid. Hakbong Kim highlights the fact that Torrance is concerned with how engrained the static, individualistic, and rationalistic concept of person has gotten into the western mind. The result of the influence of the non-dynamic understanding is that there has been an “epistemological and ontological separation not only of the human subject (or huma knower) from the object (or objective realities), but also of God from both the universe and humanity in proper scientific and theological ways of thinking.” The personal and onto-relational concept of person alleviates this epistemological dualism. [Kim, Person, Personhood, and the Humanity of Christ, 17.] T. F. Torrance, Transformation and Convergence in the Framework of Knowledge: Explorations in the Interrelations of Scientific and Theological Enterprise (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), 230. T. F. Torrance, Reality and Scientific Theology (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2001), 175–6. In “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective,” Torrance says, “man is constituted a rational subject and agent, i.e., a person.” His equation of “person” with a “rational subject and agent” fits well with the definition I have provided. T. F. Torrance, “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective,” in Religion, Reason, and The Self: Essays in Honour of Hywel D. Lewis (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1989), 110. Peter van Inwagen, “Relational vs. Constituent Ontologies,” Philosophical Perspectives 25 (2011): 390. van Inwagen, “Relational vs. Constituent Ontologies,” 391. Ibid., 390. Ibid., 391. Natures might not be concrete particulars, but persons most certainly are. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 18. Torrance, Reality and Evangelical Theology, 43. Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 103. Jim Neidhardt, “Key Themes in Thomas F. Torrance’s Integration of JudeoChristian Theology and Natural Science,” in The Christian Frame of Mind: Reason, Order, and Openness in Theology and Natural Science (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2015), xlii. Ibid., xxix–xxx. Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 160. Ibid., 103 and 160. On analogy and personhood see also: Torrance, Ground and Grammar of Theology, 173; T. F. Torrance, The Christian Frame of Mind: Reason, Order, and Openness in Theology and Natural Science (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2015), 38. For an in-depth examination of Macmurray’s influence on Torrance see, Marty Folsom, “John Macmurray’s Influence on Thomas F. Torrance,” Scottish Journal of Theology 71 (2018): 339–58. See also, Jing Wei, “The Theological Anthropology of Thomas F. Torrance: A Critical and Comparative Exploration” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Edinburgh, 2013), 152–62. These comments are found in a letter from Torrance addressed to Kenneth Barnes. It is reprinted in John Costello, John Macmurray: A Biography (Edinburgh: Floris, 2002), 422–3. Torrance speaks of Macmurray as, “the quiet giant of modern philosophy, the most original and creative savants and social thinkers in the English speaking world.” [Costello, John Macmurray, 422.] Torrance’s praise of Macmurray, is not limited to Macmurrary’s work as a philosopher in general, rather, he praises Macmurray’s work on personhood. He praises Macmurray for

Personhood

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

100 101 102 103

104

111

“overturning the essentially atomistic ways of regarding the human person which stem from Descartes and Locke.” Torrance applauds how Macmurray has restructured “our basic notion of personal existence” in such a way that is essentially relational. [These comments are found in a letter from Torrance addressed to Kenneth Barnes. It is reprinted in Costello, John Macmurray, 423.] John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1961), 17. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, 24. Ibid. Ibid., 25. Ibid., 27. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 50. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 51. Ibid., 52. Ibid., 53. Robert Turner, “Eschatology and Truth,” in The Theology of John Zizioulas: Personhood and the Church, ed. Douglas Knight (Aldershot: Ashgate: 2007), 20. Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, 95. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 55. Ibid., 56. Ibid., 53 Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, 109. Marc Cortez, Christological Anthropology, 185. T. F. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition,” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 318. Torrance, “Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 318. Ibid. Ibid. This is true even for those who exist before Christ because of proleptic nature of Christ’s work. Regarding the proleptic nature of Christ’s work see Myk Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), 35–6. Myk Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, 35–6. In addition to the personalization through Christ that occurs in virtue of communion with the Triune God, humans are also further personalized as they live in truly personal relations with other human persons. Developing the ethical implications of this concept is, in part, Hakbong Kim’s burden in Person, Personhood and the Humanity of Christ. The personalization of human beings that is accomplished objectively in Christ, enables “us not only to have true and inter-personal relations with fellow humans, but also to be fully responsible for moral deeds and social ethics.” Kim, Person, Personhood and the Humanity of Christ, 111. Ibid., 37. Ibid. T. F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ (Colorado Springs: Helmer & Howard, 1992), 82–3. T. F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, xii. For more on the logic of grace and human responsibility see Alexandra S. Radcliff, The Claim of Humanity in Christ: Salvation and Sanctification in the Theology of T. F. and J. B. Torrance (Eugene: Pickwick, 2016), 91–104 as well as Christopher Woznicki, “Penal Substitution, Limited Atonement, and the Problem of Universalism in T. F. Torrance’s Theology,” Criswell Theological Review 19 (2021): 3–26. Alan Torrance, Persons in Communion: Trinitarian Description and Human Participation (London: T&T Clark, 1996), 296.

112

Personhood

105 Torrance, Persons in Communion, 296. Italics in original. 106 Ibid., 301. One could respond to this objection by noting the apophatic nature of theology in the Eastern church. 107 Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, 238. 108 Ibid., 139. 109 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 53. 110 Roman Catholics are exceptions to this teaching. 111 The fact that a person is defined as the incommunicable existence of a rational nature does not necessarily mean that this definition is cognitive. One can be the type of being that has a rational nature without ever exercising any cognitive functions. 112 Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 157. 113 Torrance, Incarnation, 213. 114 Torrance, Christian Frame of Mind, 39. 115 Ibid.

References Anderson, Ray. On Being Human: Essays in Theological Anthropology. Pasadena: Fuller Seminary Press, 1982. Awad, Najeeb. “Personhood as Particularity: John Zizioulas, Colin Gunton, and the Trinitarian Theology of Personhood.” Journal of Reformed Theology 4 (2010): 1–22. Behr, John, The Way to Nicea. Crestwood: Saint Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001. Boethius. The Theological Tractates, translated by H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978. Brümmer, Vincent. The Model of Love: A Study in Philosophical Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Buber, Martin. I and Thou, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1937. Cortez, Marc. Christological Anthropology in Historical Perspective: Ancient and Contemporary Approaches to Theological Anthropology. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2016. Costello, John. John Macmurray: A Biography. Edinburgh: Floris, 2002. Crosby, John. The Selfhood of the Human Person. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996. Eastman, Susan Grove. Paul and the Person: Reframing Paul’s Anthropology. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017. Folsom, Marty. “John Macmurray’s Influence on Thomas F. Torrance.” Scottish Journal of Theology 71 (2018): 339–358. Graham, Elaine. “Gender, Personhood, and Theology.” Scottish Journal of Theology 48 (1995): 341–358. Graham, Elaine. Making the Difference: Gender: Personhood, and Theology. London: Mowbray, 1995. Habets, Myk. Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009. Holmes, Stephen. The Quest for the Trinity: The Doctrine of God in Scripture, History and Modernity. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2012. Kim, Hakbong. Person, Personhood, and the Humanity of Christ: Christocentric Anthropology and Ethics in Thomas F. Torrance. Eugene: Pickwick, 2021. Louth, Andrew. John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Personhood

113

Macmurray, John. Persons in Relation. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1961. McFadyen, Alistair. The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social Relationship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Neidhardt, Jim. “Key Themes in Thomas F. Torrance’s Integration of Judeo-Christian Theology and Natural Science.” In The Christian Frame of Mind, by T. F. Torrance. Colorado Springs: Helmers & Howard, 1989. Radcliff, Alexandra. The Claim of Humanity in Christ: Salvation and Sanctification in the Theology of T. F. and J. B. Torrance. Eugene: Pickwick, 2016. Ratzinger, Joseph. “Retrieving the Tradition: Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology.” Communio 17 (1990): 439–454. Richard of St. Victor. De Trinitate: texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables, edited by Jean Ribaillier. Paris: Vrin, 1958. Teichman, Jenny. “The Definition of Person.” Philosophy 60 (1985): 175–185. Torrance, Alan. Persons in Communion: Trinitarian Description and Human Participation. London: T&T Clark, 1996. Torrance, Thomas F. The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons. London: T&T Clark, 1996. Torrance, Thomas F. The Christian Frame of Mind: Reason, Order, and Openness in Theology and Natural Science. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2015. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition.” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 309–322. Torrance, Thomas F. The Ground and Grammar of Theology: Consonance between Theology and Science. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001. Torrance, Thomas F. Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ. Edited by Robert T. Walker. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008. Torrance, Thomas F. The Mediation of Christ. Colorado Springs: Helmers and Howard, 1992. Torrance, Thomas F. Reality and Evangelical Theology: A Fresh and Challenging Approach to Christian Revelation. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982. Torrance, Thomas F. Reality and Scientific Theology. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2001. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective.” In Religion, Reason, and the Self: Essays in Honour of Hywel D. Lewis, edited by Steward Sutherland and T. A. Roberts. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1989. Torrance, Thomas F. The Soul and Person of the Unborn Child. Edinburgh: Handsel Press for the Scottish Order of Christian Unity, 1999. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Spiritual Relevance of Angels.” In Alive to God: Studies in Spirituality Presented to James Houston, edited by J. I. Packer and Loren Wilkinson, 122–139. Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1992. Torrance, Thomas F. Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge: Explorations in the Interrelations of Scientific and Theological Enterprise. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984. Turcesu, Lucian. “‘Person’ versus “Individual,’ and Other Modern Misreadings of Gregory of Nyssa.” Modern Theology 18 (2002): 527–639. Turner, Robert. “Eschatology and Truth.” In The Theology of John Zizioulas: Personhood and the Church, edited by Douglas Knight, 15–34. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. Ury, M. William. Trinitarian Personhood: Investigating the Implications of a Relational Definition. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2002.

114

Personhood

van Inwagen, Peter. “Relational v. Constituent Ontologies.” Philosophical Perspectives 25 (2011): 389–405. de Vogel, C. J. “The Concept of Personality in Greek and Christian Thought.” In Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, edited by Ryan John Kenneth, 20– 60. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1963. Wei, Jing. “The Theological Anthropology of Thomas F. Torrance: A Critical and Comparative Exploration.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of Edinburgh, 2013. Woznicki, Christopher G. “Penal Substitution, Limited Atonement, and the Problem of Universalism in T. F. Torrance’s Theology.” Criswell Theological Review 19 (2021): 3–26. Zizioulas, John. Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church. Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1993. Zizioulas, John. Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church. London: T&T Clark. 2006.

6

Vocation Called as Priests to Know and Care for Creation

“There has been a subtle change in how vocation is understood recently.”1 Historically, the topic of vocation has primarily concerned several issues, namely, (1) the call to faith, (2) the call to ministerial duties, and in the last 500 years, (3) the theology of work. More recently, however, the topic of “human vocation”—by which I mean “the general office of all human beings in creation and of all believers in redemption”—has been a topic of increasing interest to systematic theologians.2 This chapter is primarily concerned with this broader sense of vocation. What is the human vocation? The ecumenical “Lima Document” (Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry) suggests that the vocation of the “whole of humanity [is] to become part of God’s people.”3 Specific traditions offer varied responses. From a Pentecostal perspective, Frank Macchia says that “at the very core of the human vocation is the goal of being possessed by God and, in this possession, to bear the divine Spirit.”4 Speaking from the perspective of Vatican II Roman Catholicism Gaudium et Spes describes human vocation in explicitly Christological terms. It teaches that the “ultimate vocation of man is in fact one,” and that this one vocation only comes to light “in the mystery of the incarnate Word.”5 What is this one vocation? It is to know and love the Creator by subduing creation and using it to God’s glory.6 The Lutheran Theologian Ian McFarland also writes about vocation in terms of a general call upon all human beings. Using “vocation” to relate nature and grace, McFarland conceives of vocation as the way in which open-ended human nature is summoned to share in the “infinity of the divine nature.”7 The Presbyterian theologian Michael Horton considers the human vocation in terms of four characteristics: sonship/royal dominion, representation, glory, and prophetic witness.8 Several of these characteristics, says Horton, have priestly elements, including the fact that “Human beings are that part of creation that is raised up by God to lead the earth of which they are part in common praise of the covenant Lord.”9 Finally, Karl Barth, whose influence on Torrance is immeasurable, writes that human vocation concerns “actual fellowship with Jesus Christ, namely, in the service of His prophecy, in the ministerium Verbi divini, of the Word of reconciliation, and therefore in the service of God and his fellow men.”10 What becomes apparent when one surveys a number of theologians’ reflections on DOI: 10.4324/9781003265832-6

116

Vocation

humanity’s vocation is that it is a highly significant, but often underexplored, category within theological anthropology. What is T. F. Torrance’s understanding of human vocation? Here I argue that Torrance’s doctrine of creation and Christology lead to a theological anthropology in which the human vocation is framed in terms of being “priests of creation.”11 Torrance’s understanding of “priests of creation” can be understood in light of the provocative claim that every Christian ought to become a “scientist.”12 This vocation—to be a “priest of creation”—applies to all human beings and not just professional scientists. In virtue of being “priests of creation,” all humans should engage in the scientific task of pursuing a deeper understanding of universe. Torrance, I will argue, believes that this vocation applies to all human beings but is uniquely fulfilled by those who have experienced reconciliation to God in Christ. My argument concerning Torrance’s understanding of human vocation proceeds as follows. First, I explore Torrance’s understanding of creation as contingent and orderly. Second, I detail Torrance’s argument for why natural science flourishes when it takes contingence and order seriously. Third, I propose that humans fulfill their vocation when they act as mediators between God and creation, leading creation in the worship of God through discerning the order and contingency of creation, mediating God’s intention to advance order in creation, and rectifying disorder in creation. Fourth, I argue that for Torrance fulfilling this mediatorial vocation is made possible through the person and work of Christ. I conclude by showing why Torrance’s understanding of the human vocation and the convergence of these three doctrines—creation, Christology, and theological anthropology—serves as the basis for all Christians to pursue a deeper understanding of and care for creation.

Love and Order: Creation as Contingent and Rational Creation—especially as it is considered in relation to science—ought to be understood as contingent and orderly. Torrance explains that “the universe is contingent in form and matter—it does not derive from any necessity in God and does not have intrinsic necessity in itself.”13 Furthermore, he says, “the universe has been freely endowed by the Word of God with an intelligible order of its own, that order is intrinsically open towards God, and not closed in upon itself.”14 This understanding of the universe as contingent and orderly undergirds the task of science; therefore, let us begin by turning our attention the claim that the universe is contingent. The Contingent Universe According to common parlance, when one says that a thing is “contingent” one typically means that the thing did not have to be like that, it might have been different. This common manner of speaking, says Torrance, partly latches on to what theologians mean when they say that the universe is contingent. A fuller

Vocation 117 sense of contingence refers to the claim that the universe did not necessarily come to exist and that the universe does not necessarily continue to exist; or as Torrance himself puts it, “There is no intrinsic reason in the universe why it should exist at all or why it should be what it actually is.”15 This dual-aspect concept of contingency can be described in various ways. For example, Torrance states, On the one hand it means that the universe depends entirely upon the grace and wisdom of God for its being and form, and is not a necessary emanation of the divine. On the other hand, it also means that the universe is given a distinctive reality of its own completely differentiated from the selfsufficient reality of God.16 Because the universe’s contingence has a dual-aspect nature, it is at once oriented towards God—in its derived existence—and away from God—in its relative independence. Natural science assumes that the universe is contingent, and it is upon an understanding of contingence—a non-theological understanding—that empirical inquiry rests.17 Contingence, however, according to Torrance, is not a feature of the universe that is derived from scientific inquiry, rather, contingence is an assumption with which natural science operates. This assumption is rooted in the Judeo-Christian doctrine of God. God, according to the Jewish and Christian tradition, is the one who created the orderly universe out of nothing and continues to preserve it from lapsing back into chaos and nothingness.18 The claim that the universe is contingent raises the question, why does the universe exist? Answering this question takes us to the doctrine of God. God is free and in need of nothing beyond himself, yet God chooses to bring the universe into existence. Why then, does God create? Torrance says that Although God is wholly self-sufficient in the inner fellowship of his being, God does not will to exist for himself alone, but has freely and spontaneously brought the world into existence out of non-existence to which he has given an integrity of its own and in which he has planted rational creaturely beings upon whom he may bestow his bounty and with whom he may share his divine communion of love and personal being.19 The answer, therefore, to the question of why the universe exists is that God desired to have beings that could participate in the Trinitarian life of love. In order to establish this answer to the “why” question, Torrance appeals to a number of Patristic theologians. He appeals to Irenaeus—who Torrance says appealed to Plato—in arguing that it was the “ungrudging goodness of God” that desired a world that would reflect God’s own goodness and order.20 He also, unsurprisingly, appeals to Athanasius, who says that God wished for there to be objects of “philanthropia.”21 God, out of “his sheer liberality,” brought creation into existence “in order to lavish his love upon it.”22 Creation is a free

118

Vocation

act of love.23 The love “which God eternally is as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” is the same love that God “wishes to share with his creation.”24 Torrance summarizes this concept when he states that “the whole raison d’être of the universe lies in the fact that God will not be alone … but has bound it to himself as the sphere where he may ungrudgingly pour out his love, and where we may enjoy communion with him.”25 Besides finding its source in God’s love, Torrance explains that the contingent universe finds it source in God’s grace. Creation, like redemption, “was a sheer act of God’s inexplicable grace.”26 The universe did not need to exist, rather it is a product of God’s will and love. God had no need to bring out creation, God was under no obligation to create. “The contingence of the world is itself grounded in the utterly contingent activity of God’s grace in freely giving being to and sustaining in being, all reality other than God himself.”27 The universe that was created ex nihilo, in other words, is completely contingent upon God’s love and grace. The fact that the universe was created as a free act of grace is not only established upon the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, it is also established on Christological grounds.28 Alexander Irving, for example, has recently argued that Torrance’s notion of contingence ought to be considered in relation to the conceptual structure of the hypostatic union, specifically the anhypostasia and enhypostasia couplet. Irving rightly states that for Torrance the hypostatic union is a methodological key for all theological loci. This methodological key should also be applied to the doctrine of contingence. What happens when we reflect upon the nature of creation from the vantage point of the anhypostasia-enhypostasia couplet? Creation is understood in light of three features: (1) the priority of grace, (2) its dependence upon God, and (3) its own integrity. This is because anhypostasia asserts that the human nature of Christ is entirely dependent upon the divine act of grace and enhypostasia demonstrates that the human nature of Jesus Christ retains its integrity as fully human.29 Irving explains: Just as the hypostatic union is characterized by the priority of the grace of God and the integrity of humanity in its dependence, so the entirety of the Creator-creature relation takes a corresponding structure of divine grace within which the discrete existence of creation is established.30 For Irving, the dual aspect of creation’s contingence—its dependence and distinctive reality—can be understood according to three stages. First, “the relationship between the divine nature and human nature described by the anhypostasia corresponds to the dependence of creation in relation to God, in that the existence of both comes under the priority of grace.”31 Second, “the relationship between the human nature and the divine nature described by the enhypostasia corresponds to the independence of creation in relation to God.”32 Finally, “the inseparability and complementarity of the divine nature and human nature described by the cooperation of the anhypostaia and enhypostasia corresponds to the interlocking structure of dependence and independence in

Vocation 119 33

contingence.” Irving’s interpretation of contingence in light of the anhypostasia-enhypostasia couplet provides further reason for understanding creation as being contingent upon grace. The Rationally Ordered Universe The contingent universe is “grounded in that ultimate Love which God the father is.”34 It is precisely because the universe is grounded in love that it ought to be understood as having a “rational order.” Torrance argues that it is “the Holy Lawful Divine Love that constitutes the ultimate invariant ground of all rational and moral order in the created universe, and it is under its constraint that all physical and moral laws functioning within the universe operate.”35 Elsewhere Torrance states that belief in order “has its ground in the love of God, for it is ultimately God’s love which is the power of the order in created existence.”36 Belief in an orderly universe, much like a contingent universe, is not a belief that is derived from scientific inquiry, rather it serves as a presupposition for scientific inquiry.37 This is because order is not self-explanatory or self-sufficient. Order depends “on an ultimate rational ground beyond.” The presupposition of an ordered universe, much like the presupposition of a contingent universe, is also “correlative of a distinctive doctrine of God as the Creator of the Universe.”38 The orderly nature of the universe is a product of “eternal reason.”39 The form of the universe comes from God’s rational creativity.40 Although the rational organization of the universe is rooted in the activity of the Triune God, the orderliness of the universe is particularly appropriated to the Son. Torrance explains that “as the Word and wisdom of God” it is he “who has imparted to the universe its rational order.”41 Torrance states, In Jesus Christ none other than the Creator, the ultimate Ground and Source of all being, order and rationality, the Creator Word of God who is God, has become man within our creaturely existence and operates creatively within it imparting to all things their form and order.42 Torrance supports the claim that it is especially the Son who imparts order to the universe by appealing to the prologue in John 1, Paul’s doctrine of creation in Colossians 1:16, and the author of Hebrews’ argument in 1:1. Torrance also appeals to Athanasius who argues that it is the activity of the Logos who provides the rational order that pervades all of created existence.43 The notion that the Logos provides the rational order of creation is well attested in the Christian tradition. Norman Wirzba, for example, argues that for Maximus the Confessor the fact that creation is through Christ “compels us to think about the world’s current meaning and structure in new ways.”44 According to Maximus each creature has a Logos, i.e., a principle of order unique to that creature. Furthermore, no creaturely Logos exists in isolation.45 Each Logos is

120

Vocation

related to other logoi, but most fundamentally each created thing is related to Christ, the eternal Logos. Thus, what creatures are, their very principle or order, cannot be understood apart from their relation to Christ. The fact that the universe is orderly can be seen in a number of features of the universe. For example, it can be seen in the harmony between the “laws of mind” and the “laws of nature.” By this Torrance means that there is “an inherent harmony between how we think and how nature behaves independently from our minds.”46 The clearest example of this harmony can be seen in the relationship between mathematics and physics. Torrance, for example, cites Eugene Wigner, who spoke of the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences.”47 This “unreasonable effectiveness” has been noted by many scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers.48 Torrance also believes that the orderly nature of the universe can also be seen as we observe “order spontaneously arising from states of equilibrium.”49 Drawing on the work of R. B. Lindsay, Torrance states that order is “entropy-consuming.” By this Torrance means that there is an orderly movement against the natural tendency towards an increase in entropy.50 Love, Order, and Disorder Thus far we have said that the universe is both contingent and orderly. These two features of the universe are grounded in the Judeo-Christian doctrine of God. God is loving, gracious, and rational. As such, God’s act of creation is grounded in God’s free act of love; there is no reason why the universe should exist other than God’s love and grace. The universe is created to be orderly, and this order is grounded in the Son’s role in creation. Despite the fact that the universe was created with a rational order, however, the universe currently suffers from a lack of order. Torrance argues that the very notion of “disorder” entails a breach in assumed regularity or order. Thus, to think in terms of disorder means that one assumes that there is a particular order to creation. This lack of order, or better yet, “disorder” can be equated with the notion of evil. Torrance explains that “evil” would not be problematic if we did not believe in an “objective and coherent rational order” because what constitutes evil as “evil” is “it’s contradiction of objective order on the one hand and its negation of that objective order on the other hand.”51 For Torrance, therefore, evil is a disruption of the divine order. Evil, to put it in different terms, is a disturbance of God’s ordained shalom. 52 Disorder comes in many forms, the most prominent being moral evil. Moral evil, according to Torrance, is human contradiction of the love of God. Evil is “undiluted enmity to God himself” and his ways which are “good” and “lawful.” It is an assault upon the love of God, it is “an attack upon the majesty and prerogative of the Creator, an anarchic force making for the vitiation and destruction of all that is true and good and orderly in God’s creation.”53 Evil, in a sense, acts as an alien invader, rooting itself in creation, and

Vocation 121 bringing about the disorder of God’s good creation, it “disrupts the inner equilibrium of contingent order and causes the collapse of contingent existence towards nothingness.”54 Evil, however, is not limited to the human and moral sphere. Evil affects all of nature and the entire universe. Torrance says that “it difficult not to think that somehow nature has been infiltrated by an extrinsic evil … introducing irrational kinks into their order.”55 Torrance then cites various examples of disorder in creation which might be equated with natural evil. These examples include decay, decomposition, and death. The most problematic of these according to Torrance are “the predatory-prey syndrome at the heart of the evolutionary process” and “animal pain.”56 The existence of animal pain and the seemingly arbitrary suffering and cruelty in the animal word can very well prompt us to question our belief in God’s rational order. Summary Torrance’s doctrine of creation, especially as it pertains to the natural sciences, can easily be summarized: creation is grounded in God’s nature therefore it is contingent and orderly; however, disorder has invaded God’s good creation. These three elements—contingence, order, disorder—will play a significant role in a Torrancian understanding of how humans act as “priests of creation.”

Contingence and Order in Natural Science Torrance’s claim that natural science assumes the contingence and orderliness of the universe is no mere assertion; Torrance provides several arguments for this claim. In essence, Torrance argues that if the universe was not ordered, and chaos or randomness ruled the day, then the universe would not be accessible to systematized scientific knowledge. Furthermore, if the universe were not contingent then the laws of nature could be derived from logical-deductive processes without need for experimental endeavors.57 The first claim seems intuitive, but why does he make the latter claim? The reason has to do with his epistemological commitments. According to Torrance, knowledge begins with “the intuitive apprehension of a given.”58 Travis McMaken explains that for Torrance knowledge is attained once a reality is presented to our consciousness and our minds “struggle to conform” to that reality.59 Thus knowledge operates according to a posteriori principles. McMaken understands the logic underlying Torrance’s claim that the contingent nature of the universe excludes a logico-deductive method as merely being the outworking of understanding the relation between contingence and the exclusion of a logico-deductive method on the grounds that logically necessary propositions can be deduced in an a priori manner, whereas a world full of contingency does not lend itself to discovery by means of idealized abstractions from reality.60 Therefore, Torrance can conclude that

122

Vocation it is through relying on the indissoluble bond between contingence and order in the universe that natural science has come to operate with distinctive interconnection between experiment and theory which has characterized our greatest advances I knowledge of the physical world.61

In order to further establish the claim that “our greatest advances in knowledge of the physical world” have occurred when the contingence and order of universe is taken seriously, Torrance narrates the history of science. Torrance’s narration of the history of science bears much similarity to his narration of the history of the gospel and Christology, especially as it relates to the homoousion, in the church’s theology. On the one hand, Torrance distinguishes himself from some evangelicals who are prone to understand the history of the gospel in the church as a movement from pristine gospel in the early church, a loss of the gospel after the fourth century, and a recovery in the period of the Reformation. On the other hand, Torrance also distinguishes himself from those who see straight continuity in how the gospel was understood across Patristic, Medieval, and Reformation periods. Torrance’s narration of the church’s grasp of the gospel as grounded in the homoousion can best be described as a series of “streams” which display “flashes” or “moments of clarity” when it comes to understanding the gospel.62 In the early church, the stream which displayed the gospel most clearly—the “evangelical stream”—was that of Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria. It also included Didymus the Blind and Hilary of Poitiers. On the other hand, there are Augustinian and Cappadocian streams. These latter streams “are opened to a dangerous dualism” that separates God in himself and God for us.63 The Augustinian stream in particular is faulted for perpetuating the “Latin Heresy.”64According to Torrance’s grand narrative, the Augustinian stream formed the basis for Latin scholasticism and the Cappadocian stream formed the basis for Palamism. The “faithful” stream, which Torrance describes as “evangelical” flows underground for a time, remaining hidden but never absent. It re-emerges in Calvin, runs underground with the Protestant Scholastics, and re-emerges once again with Karl Barth. Torrance’s narration of the history of science can be understood using this “stream” metaphor as well. There are times when contingence and order are clear, that is when the stream runs above ground, but there are also times when the stream is obscured, running below ground. Natural science flourishes when this stream is not obscured. Interestingly, the scientific “stream” of contingence and order in science happens to follow the same periodization as the “evangelical” stream. It is clear and visible in people like Athanasius and Cyril, it reemerges during the Reformation, only to be hidden by those who over-emphasize logico-deductive reasoning, and it is recovered by scientists working during the same period as Barth. According to Torrance’s narrative, the “Greek mind” conceived of the universe as necessary and self-explanatory; the notion of contingence was absent.65 The Greek mind also believed in a radical dualism between intelligible and

Vocation 123 sensible. The result of these two beliefs was that the sensible world played no significant role in scientific investigation. The Greeks, according to Torrance, restricted “scientific knowledge to the realm of intelligible forms and changeless essences.”66 Under the influence of Plato or Aristotle, the belief emerged that rational knowledge was only possible about things “which cannot but be what they are in their causes, i.e. where necessary (logical or causal) relations obtain.”67 This, he says “accounts for the lack of the all-important empirical factor in ancient natural science”; it also accounts for the Greek belief that regularities and laws could be discovered by “pure a priori thought.”68 This anti-empirical approach to science, however, was revolutionized as Christian ways of thinking began to get hold of the “Greek mind.” Torrance names Athanasius, for example, as the one who played the greatest role in establishing the contingent nature of creation.69 He also cites Basil and his Hexaemeron as being responsible for the “radical contingence of the universe and its rational order” into the Greek mind.70 Despite the emergence of empirical science, empirical science eventually returned to Greek forms of thinking because of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian thought which was tied to the resurgence of Augustinian and Thomist developments. This revived Greek form of thinking led Christians to believe that “contingent things and events obtain only under condition of extrinsic relation to what is necessary.”71 This, in turn, led to science emphasizing the universal over the particular, the essential over the accidental, and the necessary over the contingent. Science was therein practiced as the examination of propositions which belonged to a logico-deductive system, which may or may not have direct bearing upon objective reality. Despite the reemergence of Greek forms of thought, there were some bright lights during this period, including Duns Scotus. It was only during the Renaissance and Reformation, however, that the early Christian understanding of contingence and order was recovered. Because of a deep respect for the creaturely order of nature and the recovery of Patristic theology, Torrance claims, the Reformation “gave rise to empirical science as we know it.”72 The reemergence of the contingent and ordered stream did not last long, however; Descartes, Newton, and Lebniz, but above all Kant, pushed science towards logic-deductive forms of science which were concerned with formulating necessary scientific laws. Torrance calls this the “positivist” form of science. Torrance critiques positivist science on several grounds. For example, he argues that positivism attempts to achieve detachment from the object of study, yet in doing so it attaches itself to a way of thinking that is disengaged from the ground of the intrinsic intelligibility of the universe. This supposed detachment, Torrance says, is merely cloaking one’s belief “behind a false pretense of self-critical severity.”73 Additionally, positivism “drives deep wedges between its extensive abstractive operations and the very foundations of life and culture.”74 In other words, positivism is not integrative enough, it excludes a whole range of human knowing and living. Most critically, however, positivism relies on a form of thought which seems to be reduced to an “impersonal mechanism.”75 In principle, the human mind could

124

Vocation

be replaced by artificial intelligence and science would yield the same results. This, Torrance thinks, is problematic because it would elevate logico-deductive modes of thought.76 This is problematic because logico-deductive approaches to science fail to account for the contingent nature of the universe. Modern physics, however, has called into question the tenets of positivist science. In his historical narrative, Torrance shows that physicists like James Clerk Maxwell and Albert Einstein demonstrated that there is a “stubborn resistant contingence about nature” and that the concept of order is “forced on us by relativity and quantum physics.”77 Positivist science, which downplayed contingency and the importance of empirical investigation, was no longer useful for accounting for the revolutionary discoveries of relativity and quantum physics. Torrance goes as far as describing the “destruction” of positivist science.78 According to Torrance, it was only when science once again recognized the importance of empirical investigation—a practice rooted in the Christian idea of contingence—that science experienced the immense success of atomic physics. Summary According to Torrance, natural science flourishes when it is grounded in JudeoChristian notions of contingence and order. When science abandons these notions in favor of a “Greek” frame of mind, the result is a logico-deductive form of science which operates primarily from a priori principles. Torrance himself states, It was this Christian concept of contingent form, contingent intelligible order, that was eventually to become the ultimate foundation upon which our empirical and theoretical science was to rest. It is because nature is contingent that we cannot read off its rational order through logic-deductive operations.79 Practically speaking, what this means is that the Christian doctrine of creation encourages natural scientists to turn towards the universe, examine it using empirical science—not merely theorizing about it—in order to discern the patterns of order and the laws of nature which have freely and graciously been endowed upon the universe by God.80

Priests of Creation Up to this point, our attention has focused upon the nature of creation and the task of the natural scientist. In what follows, we shall turn our attention to humanity’s vocation. I suggest that for Torrance a key aspect of humanity’s calling is to act as the “priests of creation.”81 By this I mean that humans serve a mediating role between God and creation.82 This concept is by no means unique to Torrance. Alexander Schmemann writes, “‘Homo sapiens,’ ‘homo

Vocation 125 faber’ … yes, but, first of all, ‘homo adorans.’ The first and basic definition of man is that he is the priest.”83 James Arcadi also emphasizes the priestly role of humanity. He draws upon the Neoplatonic schema of exitus-reditus in order to argue that human beings stand at “the hinge of the cosmos, gratefully offering the creation back to the creator.”84 How does Torrance envision the priestly task of humans?85 He believes that humans fulfill this mediating role by (1) discerning order within creation, (2) instituting order where order has not fully developed, and (3) rectifying disorder in creation; all (4) for the purpose of glorifying God. Discerning Order Creation, we have said, is both contingent and orderly. As a contingent thing, creation simultaneously points towards God and away from God; it displays dependence upon some transcendent source while at the same time displaying a level of freedom. The fact that creation is contingent points to the fact that God created as a free act of love and grace. As an orderly thing, creation contains a particular sense of rationality which is gifted to it by the Logos. When the natural sciences explore creation, they are faced with the contingent and ordered nature of creation, as Torrance says, scientific theories “are formulated only under the dictates of the rational order found immanent in the universe.”86 How is the rational order discovered? More generally, this is discovered when humans open themselves up the universe, “allowing their minds to tune into” the order that is present there. When they tune in to the order that is there, the universe “divulges the secrets of its vast range of intelligibility.”87 This process of “tuning in” can take several forms. As Murray Rae helpfully points out, “multiple levels of explanation are required for any given reality.”88 Thus, in order to discern the order of creation, we need an arsenal of scientific disciplines. By this I mean disciplines which examine their subject in a kataphysic manner. Rae explains, “the sciences contribute their expertise to examine and explain how the world is ordered; poets and visual artists and musicians help us see in a different light the complex interdependence of things; economists, political theorists, and social scientists give insight into the workings of human culture and society, while historians provide further means of contemplating the realms of human action discerning the consequences of the world.”89 What holds all these disciplines together is that they examine their subject according to the nature of their subject—thus they are sciences—and in doing so operate under the assumption that, and further demonstrate that, there is an intelligible order and coherence in the universe. When the order of the universe is discerned, it becomes increasingly clear that there is a transcendent source of this contingent reality, not only that, but also—for those who have eyes to see—that the order is somehow associated with the Word.90 The one who studies creation comes to understand that God not only upholds and sustains created reality but that God has arranged creation in such a way as to “serve his supreme purpose of love in the communion

126

Vocation

of the creation with the creator.”91 Thus the task of discerning the order of God’s creation allows the inquirers to gain clarity about God’s purpose of communing with his creation. This is the end of creation, communion with God, discerning the order latent in creation allows humans to perceive God’s creative ends. In addition to providing a window into God’s creative ends, discerning the order of creation allows humans to perform the other tasks of being priests, namely instituting order and re-ordering disordered creation. It is only when God’s intended order is discerned that humans can begin to envision God’s desired order for creation, the proper ways to bring about more order, and how to rectify a disordered creation. Instituting Order Biblical scholars are almost unanimous in believing that the notion of the “image of God” in Genesis 1 and 2 is tied to a particular function. This function is best described as that of being “vice-regents” or “stewards” of creation. As stewards of creation, humans have been created for the purpose of developing and cultivating creation in such a way that it can serve as the dwelling place—i.e., cosmic temple—for God’s presence.92 Torrance himself says, “man has been called to be a kind of midwife to creation, in assisting nature out of its divinely given abundance constant only to give birth to new forms of life and richer patterns of order.”93 When humans institute these forms of order, “the marvelous rationality, symmetry, harmony, and beauty of God’s creation are being brought to light and given expression in such a way that the whole universe is found to be a glorious hymn to the Creator.”94 For Torrance, the task of instituting order in creation is not only grounded in the functional image of God. It is also grounded in his understanding of the way the universe is ordered. Torrance believes that the universe has various levels of order and that the lower levels of order derive meaning from higher levels of order. Human beings stand at the top level of this order. Thus, it is through human beings that “the universe knows and unfolds itself in developing rational order and expression.”95 This unfolding and developing of a rational order “is man’s priestly function in the universe.”96 Humans institute order in various ways, including, for example, developing culture.97 Humans also institute order by helping nature flourish according to its God given order. In our day there are at least two pressing issues related to humanity’s priestly task that deserve further consideration: (1) The specific ways that humans can help nature flourish, and (2) How the task of instituting order (especially by technological means) can quickly turn into creating more disorder in creation.98 Rectifying Disorder Despite the fact that God has made creation to be ordered, it currently suffers from disorder. As the ones who are tasked to bring order to creation, human

Vocation 127 beings have the special task of instituting order where disorder has taken a hold of creation. As Torrance explains, it is humanity’s task “to save the natural order through remedial and integrative activity, bringing back order where there is disorder and peace where there is disharmony.”99 Torrance provides two examples of how humans can re-order disorder. First, humans can help develop ways to prevent and cure disease and suffering, not only among human beings but among animals as well.100 Second, humans can work to reverse the “ecological chaos” brought about by humanity’s exploitation of the natural order.101 For the Glory of God The universe was designed by God to bear witness to himself and to “reflect the glory of his Love and Holiness,” thus it constitutes the theatrum gloriae Dei. 102 The universe itself, however, is mute. It points towards a transcendent source of being and order, but on its own it does not “speak” of the one who brought it into existence. At best the universe can “cry silently,” pointing towards a transcendent agency in its explanation and understanding.103 This silent cry, however, does not reveal the Triune God. McMaken summarizes this well when he says that although the silent cry of the created order for its Creator may alert us to the fact that the universe lacks an ultimate explanation of its basis and origin within itself, this cry does not provide any knowledge of the Triune God in whom the universe has its basis and origin.104 Thus, human beings have the unique task of being the point at which the universe “reaches knowledge of itself and divulges the secrets of its vast range of intelligibility.”105 This “secret” is not merely that there is a transcendent source of the universe, rather it is that this source is the Triune God who creates out of love and grace. Moreover, as humans discover the complex intelligibility of creation, they discern the Christological basis of creation. As they discern its contingence, they come to understand that God brought it about because of his grace and love. This, Torrance says, is creation’s “glory.”106 Only when this silent cry is given voice by human beings does creation truly glorify the one who created it. Torrance says, “Nature itself is dumb, but it is man’s part to bring it to word, to be its mouth through which the whole universe gives voice to the glory and majesty of the living God.”107 Furthermore, when creation is developed by human beings, it points to the one who inculcated within it the very possibility of being ordered in complex ways. Thus, the act of ordering creation allows it to sing “a glorious hymn to the Creator.”108 Coda—Biological Diversity What might it look like to fulfill this four-fold human vocation? Let me provide one brief illustration by looking at the issue of decreasing biodiversity.109 Let us

128

Vocation

assume that biodiversity is part of God’s good creation.110 In order to encourage and maintain biodiversity, scientists will need to engage in discerning type activities. They will need to examine how many species there are on earth, where these species are found, and what constitutes a healthy population. They will also need to discern what factors threaten biodiversity. In California, for example, scientists are currently attempting to discern the factors that have contributed to the lack of genetic diversity among the population of mountain lions in hills of Los Angeles.111 Some of the factors include habitation loss and degradation, the construction of freeways and roads, and the use of certain anticoagulant rodenticides. Once the issues have been discerned, plans for instituting order and rectifying the disorder brought about by human causes will need to be developed. There are a number of strategies for preserving biodiversity. Fred van Dyke lists five: (1) Purchasing or gaining operational control of land of conservation value, (2) regulating the use of land and water for conservation purposes, (3) influencing land and water use through non-regulatory means, (4) regulating the use of wild plants and animals, or (5) directly managing or manipulating wild or captive populations in ways that reduce or eliminate extinction threats.112 In Los Angeles, these strategies are enacted through: (1) the purchase of portions of the Santa Monica Mountains by the Santa Monica Mountains Conservation, (2) California’s Transit authority’s efforts to develop increased connectivity between regions that are divided by the 101 freeway, and (3) state legislators banning certain rodenticides that are especially lethal to mountain lions.113 The above example of discerning/instituting order and rectifying disorder in regards to mountain lion genetic diversity for the sake of God’s glory exemplifies Daniel Block’s statement that “a redeemed cosmos includes all creatures, with all their territorial and biological diversity, giving eternal praise to the Creator.”114

The Christological Basis for Acting as Priests of Creation The possibility of acting as priests of creation has a Christological basis. This Christological basis manifests itself in three ways: (1) the vicarious priesthood of Christ, (2) the epistemological changes brought about by the atonement, and (3) the defeat of evil on the cross. The Vicarious Priesthood of Christ In describing the priesthood of Christ, Torrance says that “we must think of the work of Christ in terms of a mediation which fully represents both the divine and human side.”115 Although his discussion of the vicarious priesthood of Christ is mainly carried out for the sake of elucidating Christ’s work of

Vocation 129 atonement, the concept is still significant for understanding how humanity’s role as priests of creation is grounded in Christ’s work. Christ is unique in that it is only in Christ that the divine nature and human nature are united.116 Christ is the only one who is homoousios with God and with humanity. As such, Christ’s actions are God’s own and humanity’s own actions. From the side of God, Christ deals with the sinfulness of humanity and restores humanity to himself.117 From the side of humanity, he offers himself to God and consecrates himself on our behalf.118 Because of Christ’s vicarious humanity, his obedience and faithfulness to the human vocation is the obedience and faithfulness of those who are united to him as well. As Alexandra Radcliff states, “Christ has already made this response of faith by the Spirit vicariously in our place.”119 This act of obedience and faithfulness includes all of humanity’s duties before God, including the three duties as “priests of creation.” This means that Christ has vicariously fulfilled our call to discern and institute order as well as to rectify disorder. What are Christians to do given that Christ has vicariously fulfilled their call? They are called to participate in Christ’s work. Speaking of a Torrancian understanding of ministry, Gary Deddo says that the whole Christian life is participation in the life and ministry of Christ. Deddo explains, “We can say, I pray, yet not I but Christ prays in me. I obey, yet not I but Christ in me. I hunger and thirst for righteousness and reconciliation, yet not I but Christ in me.”120 To this list, we can add, “I fulfill God’s call to discern and institute order, yet not I but Christ in me. I rectify disordered creation, yet not I but Christ in me.” Humanity’s fulfillment of the priestly vocation is vicariously fulfilled by Christ and participated in by those who have eyes to see that they are united to him. Epistemological Changes It is only when human beings are put right with God by Christ’s redemptive work that the epistemological and ethical changes necessary for truly fulfilling their priestly vocation are accomplished. Although the humans can discern the contingence and order of creation, apart from redemption, their minds do not discern the fact that it is the Triune God who has imparted being and order into the universe. Torrance, we have seen, argues that creation derives its contingent and order from the Word of God. He argues that this order may ultimately be understood by us “only as we are able to coordinate them with their source and ground in the Word of God.”121 Because of this, it is not possible for people whose minds are alienated from God to discern the universe’s true source in the Word. What is needed is for our minds to be reconciled to the mind of God. This only occurs through the birth, life, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Christ, in the atoning act of his vicarious life, sanctifies our mind and our rationality. Furthermore, Christ’s work enables the fulfillment of the epistemological criteria for knowing God. According to Torrance, knowledge requires the cognitive union of a mind with

130

Vocation

its object of knowledge, and this knowledge calls for the removal of estrangement or alienation that may distort it.122 Christ’s atoning work allows this criterion to be fulfilled, thus, enabling the reconciled mind to know the Triune God who creates.123 Knowing the Triune God not only allows the believer to see the love and grace of God in creation, but also creation’s logical ordering by the Word himself. If humans are not put right with the Word, who has instituted this order, there will not be an “adequate and truthful matching” of the order that humans want to institute and the order that God wants instituted.124 The result of the unredeemed attempt at the ordering of creation “may have the effect of compounding any disorder latent in it.”125 Thus, redemption is needed if we are to fulfill the first parts of our task as priests of creation. Torrance himself says, With minds inwardly transformed and sanctified in Christ, we may look in new light upon the whole universe of space and time, with its astonishing order and beauty daily being disclosed by our science, as the theater of God’s self-revelation and the sanctum for our worship and praise of the Creator and Redeemer.126 This is the epistemological change, brought about by Christ, that is necessary for humans to act as priests of creation.127 The Defeat of Evil Acting as priests of creation involves rectifying disordered creation, and this requires “more than a rearrangement of form like the resolving of dissonance in music,” it requires the “radical undoing and defeat of evil.”128 Thus, it is not enough to “know” what God’s desired order is; evil must be defeated. This undoing of evil—the evil that exists both as moral and natural disorder—is only accomplished as God himself enters into our fallen existence dealing with the forces of evil, bringing about the re-ordering of creation from the inside out. This re-ordering of disorder, which has affected all of creation, begins with the re-ordering of human beings and their relationships. As Torrance explains, The New Testament envisages a cosmic peace as the effect of reconciliation, for all things are involved, and Christ is made head of all things and in him all things are gathered up being reconciled to God the creator through the cross … Literally all things, visible and invisible, things animate and things inanimate, the whole of creation, heaven and earth, are involved in this reconciliation.129 Christ’s atoning work places human beings back into proper order not only with the Creator but with creation itself. Once human beings are put in the right “place,” namely, their location as a mediator between God and creation, humans can begin to fulfill their role as priests of creation. Thus, Torrance can

Vocation 131 say that it is through Christ, “the one mediator between man and God … through whom the created order is preserved and secured.”130 Although the re-ordering of creation necessarily involves the reconciliation of humans to God so that humans might fulfill their God given vocation, there is another element we ought to consider under the subject of defeating evil, namely “the powers.” Brian Curry mentions that “virtually every passage that discusses Christ’s mediation of creation has in view his supremacy to the ‘thrones and dominions, the principalities and powers’ that are said to dominate the world at present.”131 These powers are part of God’s original good creation, thus they were originally ordered and part of God’s order. Not only that, the powers had a particular role to play in the ordering of creation. John Howard Yoder writes that Society and history, even nature, would be impossible without regularity, system, and order—and God has provided for this need … It was made in an ordered form and “it was good.” The creative power worked in a mediated form by means of the Powers that regularized all visible reality.132 Despite the fact that they were originally created in such a way that they would help mediate order in creation, these powers have fallen and become disordered.133 Yoder explains that the powers are “No longer active only as mediators of the saving creative purpose of God; now we find them seeking to separate us from the love of God (Rom 8:38); we find them ruling over the lives of those who live far from the love of God.”134 These powers “continue to exercise an ordering function,” yet this order is far from God’s desired order.135 This ungodly “order” corrupts the social structures of creation, for example: morality, religious practices, administration of justice, the ordering of the state, politics, class, ethnicity, race, gender, and the use of resources.136 Some have even speculated that the powers might have a hand in the disorder of natural evil.137 So what has Christ to do with these powers? Christ has defeated the powers (Colossians 2:12) and freed human beings from bondage to them (Ephesians 2:1–3). As Curry writes, “the cross and resurrection are God’s way of subduing and reinstating Christ as the head over all creation.”138 Because he has disarmed the powers, making a public spectacle of them, triumphing over them, those who are in Christ participate in Christ’s victory over the powers by re-ordering fallen and corrupt structures in a way that corresponds to the reality of Christ’s victory over the powers.

Conclusion The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a Torrancian account of human vocation as it relates to Christology. The Torrancian view suggests that humans are called to be the “priests of creation.” By this, I argue, Torrance means that humans act as mediators between God and creation. When humans discern and institute order and when they rectify disorder, they act on God’s

132

Vocation

behalf, they act from the side of God towards creation. At the same time, when humans institute order and rectify disorder, they allow creation to “sing a glorious hymn” towards the Creator; they shape creation so that it can be a “theater of God’s glory.” This is humanity’s action on behalf of creation towards God. This two-fold task of mediation does not apply to natural scientists alone, rather, it falls to all human beings. Moreover, it is only because of Christ that humans—specifically those who are reconciled to God in Christ— can actually fulfill this task. The fact that Torrance’s theology of human vocation is properly conceived in light of Christ strengthens the cumulative case for my claim that Christology holds promise for developing T. F. Torrance’s theological anthropology. Finally, a question arises: what should we do with the provocative claim alluded to earlier that all believers ought to become “scientists?” I suggest that if Christians are going to fulfill the human vocation of being the “priests of creation” they will need to keep abreast of the latest deliverances of science. Without a sense of the world’s order how will believers be able to institute order and rectify disorder? How will they be able to encourage, support, and value the work of professional scientists who shed light upon the creation’s order? Obviously, this does not mean that all Christians must become professionally trained in STEM. What it means is that Christians must cultivate their interest in the divine and contingent order of creation if they are going to fulfill their vocation as priests of creation. In the next chapter, we will shift our attention from Torrance’s theology of vocation to the anthropological topic of humanity’s destiny. I will argue that Christology is the key to developing Torrance’s theology of humanity’s destiny, i.e., the deification of human nature.

Notes 1 K. Ellis, “Vocation,” in New Dictionary of Theology, Historical and Systematic, eds. Martin Davie, Tim Grass, Stephen Holmes, John McDowell, T.A. Noble (London: Inter-Varsity Press, 2016), 946. 2 Michael Horton, The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 405. 3 World Council of Churches, Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry, Ministry, 1.1. www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/commissions/faith-and-order/i-unitythe-church-and-its-mission/baptism-eucharist-and-ministry-faith-and-order-paperno-111-the-lima-text. 4 Frank D. Macchia, “Finitum Capax Infiniti: A Pentecostal Distinctive?” Pneuma 29 (2007): 185. Italics in the original. 5 Vatican II Council, “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World: Gaudium et Spes,” 1.22. 6 Ibid., Chapter 1.12. Leonardo De Chirico explains that Vatican II’s expression of human vocation, “is primarily understood as expressing the communitarian character of the person.” See, “The Dignity of the Human Person: Towards an Evangelical Reading of the Theology of Personhood of Vatican II,” Evangelical Quarterly 77 (2005): 256.

Vocation 133 7 Ian McFarland, “‘The Upward Call’: The Category of Vocation and the Oddness of Human Nature,” in The Christian Doctrine of Humanity, eds. Oliver Crisp and Fred Sanders (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018), 219, 223. 8 Horton, The Christian Faith, 397. 9 Ibid., 400. One cannot help but hear echoes of the Question 1 of the Westminster Shorter Catechism in this quotation. 10 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV.3, ed. and trans. Geoffrey Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1961), 482. 11 Torrance uses the language of “priests of creation” in a number of works including: T. F. Torrance, The Ground and Grammar of Theology: Consonance between Theology and Science (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 1–14 and Thomas F. Torrance, “Newton, Einstein and Scientific Theology,” Religious Studies 8 (1972): 233. 12 Recently Randall Zachman has drawn upon John Calvin’s theology to argue that Christian piety should incline all believers to become scientists, by which he means pursue a deeper understanding of creation. Randall Zachman, “Why Should Free Scientific Inquiry Matter to Faith? The Case of John Calvin,” in Knowing Creation: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, ed. Andrew Torrance and Thomas McCall (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018), 69, 86. 13 T. F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), xi. 14 Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, xi. 15 Ibid., 36. 16 Ibid., 71. 17 Ibid., 26. 18 Ibid. 19 T. F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 91. 20 Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 91. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 C.f. John Webster, who says that “Creation is a work of wholly adequate love.” John Webster, “‘Love is also a Lover of Life’: Creatio ex Nihilo and Creaturely Goodness,” Modern Theology 29 (2013): 168. 24 Ibid., 92. 25 Ibid., 94–5. 26 Ibid., 92. 27 Torrance, Divine and Contingent, 109. 28 In their first volume in their projected series of books exploring and developing the Kuyperian tradition for contemporary systematic theology, Bruce Ashford and Craig Bartholomew recognize that “the incarnation is inextricably intertwined with the doctrine of creation,” “that creation can only beknown truly in its relationship with Christ,” and that “creation is only fully understood as such in light of the Christ event.” These authors represent a strand in creation theology that acknowledges the significance of Christology for the doctrine of creation but leave the connection underdeveloped. [Bruce Riley Ashford and Craig Bartholomew, The Doctrine of Creation: A Constructive Kuyperian Approach (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2020), 3, 85, 23.] 29 T. F. Torrance, Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ, ed. Robert T. Walker (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 84, 230. 30 Alexander Irving, “The Person of Jesus Christ as the Normative Basis for the Doctrine of Creation: Re-Envisioning T. F. Torrance’s Christocentric Doctrine of Creation,” Evangelical Quarterly 88 (2016): 362. 31 Irving, “The Person of Jesus Christ as the Normative Basis for the Doctrine of Creation,” 363. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid.

134

Vocation

34 T. F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (London: T&T Clark, 1996), 212. 35 Ibid., 213. 36 T. F. Torrance, The Christian Frame of Mind: Reason, Order, and Openness in Theology and Natural Science (Eugene: Wipf and Stock 2015), 19. 37 Torrance, Divine and Contingent, 120. 38 Ibid., 27. 39 Ibid., 109. 40 Ibid. 41 Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 213. 42 Ibid. Cf. “And to all that he has made God assigns its proper order and function, thus conferring upon contingent existence an inherent intelligibility through his creative Logos, who is the fountain and source of all the rationality that pervades the created cosmos.” Theology in Reconciliation: Essays Towards Evangelical and Catholic Unity in the East and West (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), 219. 43 Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 104. 44 Norman Wirzba, “Creation Through Christ,” in Christ and the Created Order: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, eds. Andrew Torrance and Thomas McCall (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018), 40. 45 Wirzba, “Creation Through Christ,” 40. 46 Torrance, Christian Frame of Mind, 26. 47 Ibid., 26. 48 See, for example, Stewart Shapiro, “Mathematics and Reality,” Philosophy of Science 50 (1983): 523–48. 49 Ibid., 22. 50 Ibid. 51 Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, 114. 52 Other theologians have made this connection with sin or evil as being a disturbance or lack in the divine order of things. See for example: Cornelius Plantinga, Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 7–18. 53 Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, 118. 54 Ibid., 119. Evil as an “alien invader” fits well with recent apocalyptic discussions concerning the nature of Sin, Satan, Evil, and Death. See for example Matthew Croasmun, The Emergence of Sin: The Cosmic Tyrant in Romans (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). Croasmun appeals to emergence theory to explains how Sin emerges from human sins and acts as an agent working back against humans precipitating more sin and sinning. 55 Ibid., 123. 56 Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, 122. 57 Torrance, The Ground and Grammar of Theology, 56. 58 W. Travis McMaken, “The Impossibility of Natural Knowledge of God in T. F. Torrance’s Reformulated Natural Theology,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 12 (2010): 320. 59 McMaken, “The Impossibility of Natural Knowledge,” 320. 60 T. F. Torrance, Theological and Natural Science (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2002), 41. 61 Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, 26. 62 My use of the metaphor of “streams” for describing Torrance’s way of narrating history comes from Jason Radcliff, Thomas F. Torrance and the Church Fathers (Eugene: Pickwick, 2014), 114. 63 Pui Him Ip, “‘Back to the Fathers’: The Nature of Historical Understanding in 20th Century Patristic Ressourcement,” Reviews in Religion and Theology 23 (2016): 7.

Vocation 135 64 Torrance deems the “Latin Heresy” a “gospel of external relations.” This is where Christ’s passion is understood in juridical terms as a transaction between Christ and the rest of humanity. See T. F. Torrance, “Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy,” Scottish Journal of Theology 39 (1986): 461–82. 65 Although Torrance mainly focuses on the problems of the “Greek mind” he makes a similar critique, although briefer, about “Oriental thought.” He claims that the concept of contingent intelligibility is absent in “Oriental thought” and that it is only the relation between creation and incarnation that gives us the necessary framework for making advances in the natural sciences. See T. F. Torrance, “Ultimate Beliefs and the Scientific Revolution,” in CrossCurrents 30.2 (1980): 140. 66 Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, 31. 67 Ibid., 85. 68 Ibid., 31. 69 Torrance, Christian Frame of Mind, 2. 70 Ibid., 5. 71 Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, 87. 72 Ibid., 91. Torrance doesn’t actually say much about science in the Reformation period. This lack of clear evidence makes his case for a “Reformation” theologybased turning point in science puzzling. 73 Torrance, “Ultimate Beliefs and the Scientific Revolution,” 137. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid., 138. 76 Ibid., 138. 77 Ibid., 98–9. 78 Ibid., 98. 79 Torrance, Christian Frame of Mind, 29. 80 For other accounts of how empirical science finds its roots in Christian theology, see Rodney Stark, For the Glory of God (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 121–199; Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Edward Grant, Science and Religion, 400 B. C. to A. D. 1550: From Aristotle to Copernicus (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2004), and Lydia Jaeger, “The Contingency of Creation and Modern Science,” Theology and Science 16 (2018): 62–78. 81 Torrance describes the priestly role in the Old Testament as consisting of two tasks: “mediation of God’s Word and priestly witness to God’s revealed will.” In Christ these two tasks are transformed. Priestly action consists of Godward action and creature-ward action. T.F. Torrance, Royal Priesthood: A Theology of Ordained Ministry, 2nd Edition (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 3, 7. 82 For an objection to the sacerdotal role of human beings in creation see David Fergusson, Creation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 102–3. He claims that there is little support in Scripture for the idea that the material world and other creatures cannot achieve their appointed end except through being represented to God by human beings. Fergusson’s claim can be contrasted with claims made by G. K. Beale and Andrew Malone. See G. K. Beale, The Temple and the Church’s Mission: A Biblical Theology of the Dwelling Place of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 66–70 and Andrew S. Malone, God’s Mediators: A Biblical Theology of Priesthood (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2017), 47–57. 83 Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World: Sacraments and Orthodoxy (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1988), 15. For other Orthodox articulations of humans as priests of creation, see John Zizioulas, “Priests of Creation” in Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives, Past and Present, ed. R. J. Berry (London: T&T Clark, 2006), 273–90 and John Chryssavgis and Bruce Foltz, eds., Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration: Orthodox Christian Perspectives on Environment, Nature and Creation (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013).

136

Vocation

84 James M. Arcadi, “Homo Adorans: Exitus et Reditus in Theological Anthropology,” Scottish Journal of Theology 73 (2020): 2. 85 The background of the concept of “priests of creation” is found in the Old Testament priesthood. Writing about Torrance’s understanding of priestly functions in the Old Testament, Joseph Sherrard writes, “Within the framework of the centrality of the Word, the priesthood has a double character. On the one hand, the priesthood mediates God’s Word. On the other hand, the priesthood witnesses to God’s will.” [Joseph Sherrard, T. F. Torrance as Missional Theologian: The Ascended Christ and the Ministry of the Church (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2021), 70.] 86 Ibid., 72. 87 Ibid., 41. 88 Murray Rae, “Jesus Christ, the Order of Creation,” in Christ and the Created Order: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, eds. Andrew Torrance and Thomas McCall (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018), 29. 89 Rae, “Jesus Christ, the Order of Creation,” 29. 90 Precisely “how” the contingent reality is associated with the Word is a matter of theological investigation. 91 Ibid., 79. 92 Richard Middleton explains: “The imago Dei designates the royal office or calling of human beings as God’s representatives and agents in the world, granted authorized power to share in God’s rule or administration of earth’s resources and creatures.” Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2005), 27–8. See also Gregory Beale, “Eden, the Temple, and the Church’s Mission in the New Creation,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 48 (2005): 5– 31. 93 T. F. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition,” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 322. 94 Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 322. 95 Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, 130. 96 Ibid. 97 Much has been written about this idea from a Neo-Calvinistic perspective. Ashford and Bartholomew summarize the Kuyperian understanding of the “cultural mandate” explaining, “Humans would ‘work the garden’ not only by cultivating plant life but also cultivating art, architecture, music, liturgy, clothing, sport, and entertainment and by forming domestic, religious, social and political institutions. God did not merely give humanity the capacity to make culture; he in fact commanded us to use those capacities.” [Ashford and Bartholomew, The Doctrine of Creation, 254.] See also Abraham Kuyper, Wisdom and Wonder: Common Grace in Science and Art, trans. Nelson Koosterman (Grand Rapids: Christian’s Library Press, 2012); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Art in Action (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980); Robert Covolo, Fashion Theology (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2020); Andy Crouch, Culture Making: Recovering Our Creative Calling (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008). Eric Flett has provided a through argument for a Torrancian understanding of cultural development. See Eric Flett, Persons, Powers, and Pluralities: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Culture (Eugen: Wipf and Stock, 2011). 98 Torrance speaks of how “technological society” can often betray the integrity if science for “ideological and imperialistic ends.” In doing so humans find themselves sinning against the integrity of creation. He calls this use of technology, “malevolent technology.” See Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, 131. 99 Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, 130. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 213.

Vocation 137 103 T. F. Torrance, Reality and Scientific Theology (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2001), 58. 104 McMaken, “The Impossibility of Natural Knowledge,” 334. 105 Torrance, Christian Frame of Mind, 41. 106 Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, 111. 107 Torrance, “Newton, Einstein and Scientific Theology,” 233. 108 Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 322. 109 Biodiversity refers to “the variability among living organisms, including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine, and other aquatic ecosystems, and the ecological complexities of which they are a part; this includes diversity within species, between species, and of ecosystems.” Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Handbook of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 3rd Edition (Montreal: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2005), 5. 110 See Daniel Block’s biblical argument in “To Serve and to Keep: Toward a Biblical Understanding of Humanity’s Responsibility in the Face of the Biodiversity Crisis,” in Keeping God’s Earth: The Global Environment in Biblical Perspective, ed. Noah Toly and Daniel Block (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2010), 116–40. 111 Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area, “Local Mountain Lion Population Faces Precipitous Decline in Genetic Diversity Within 50 Years, Possible Extinction,” National Park Service, August 30, 2016, www.nps.gov/samo/learn/ news/local-mountain-lion-population-faces-precipitous-decline-in-genetic-diversitywithin-50-years-possible-extinction.htm. Accessed April 30, 2019. 112 Fred van Dyke, “The Diversity of Life: Its Loss and Conservation” in Keeping God’s Earth: The Global Environment in Biblical Perspective, ed. Noah Toly and Daniel Block (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2010), 103–104. 113 National Park Service, “Lions in the Santa Monica Mountains,” National Park Service,www.nps.gov/samo/learn/nature/pumapage.htm#CP_JUMP_6000545. Accessed April 30, 2019. 114 Block, “To Serve and to Keep,” 121. 115 T. F. Torrance, Atonement: The Person and Work of Christ, ed. Robert T. Walker (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009), 75. 116 Torrance, Atonement, 88. 117 Ibid., 76. 118 Ibid., 82. 119 Alexandra S. Radcliff, The Claim of Humanity in Christ: Salvation and Sanctification in the Theology of T. F. and J. B. Torrance (Eugene: Pickwick, 2016), 94. 120 Gary Deddo, “The Christian Life and our Participation in Christ’s Continuing Ministry,” in An Introduction to Torrance Theology, ed. Gerrit Scott Dawson (London: T&T Clark, 2007), 146. 121 Torrance, Christian Frame of Mind, 9. 122 T. F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ (Colorado Springs: Helmers and Howard Publishers, 1992), 25. 123 Christopher Woznicki, “Amo Ut Intelligam (I Love so that I May Understand): The Role of Love in T. F. Torrance’s Theological Epistemology” Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 35 (2017): 207–210 and Christopher Woznicki, “The Awe of the Lord is the Beginning of Knowledge: The Significance of Awe for Theological Epistemology,” Expository Times 131 (2020): 155–6. 124 Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, 133. 125 Ibid. 126 Torrance, Christian Frame of Mind, 15. 127 While Torrance’s focus is on the epistemological changes that are brought about by Christ which enable humans to fulfill their vocation, there are other ways in which Christology serves as an epistemological key for understanding creation. Consider for example the issue of God’s relation with the world, the relationship

138

128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138

Vocation between the Creator and creation, between infinite and finite. Rowan Williams has argued that the model of the God-World relation developed in Christology is the model that clarifies all we say about God’s relation to the world. Williams calls Jesus the “heart of creation” because he is the one “on whom all the patterns of finite existence converge to find their meaning.” [Rowan Williams, Christ the Heart of Creation (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), xii.] Additionally, Williams explains that “Christology is a key to the ‘logic of creation’ because Christ appears as perfectly creaturely.” By this Williams means that Jesus, by his nature, lives in and out of filial love. His life lived out of filial love is one which is aligned with the divine act of self-giving. To live as creatures involves living out of filial love as well, by nature as Christ does, but as created beings. [Williams, Christ the Heart of Creation, 226.] Ibid., 103. Torrance, Atonement, 169. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, 135. Brian Curry, “Christ, Creation, and the Powers,” in Christ and the Created Order: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, eds. Andrew Torrance and Thomas McCall (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018), 78. John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 141. See, for example, Travis Dumsday, “Origen on Demonic Ignorance and Why it Might Still Matter for the Theology of World Religions,” Philosophia Christi 20 (2018): 463–79. Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 141. Ibid, 141. Hendrikus Berkhoff, Christ and the Powers (Scottdale: Herald Press, 1977), 22. Alvin Plantinga entertains the idea that what we call “natural evil” may actually be the work of supernatural beings, namely “Satan and his cohorts.” Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 191–3. Murray, “Christ, Creation, and the Powers,” 83–4.

References Arcadi, James M. “Homo Adorans: Exitus et Reditus in Theological Anthropology.” Scottish Journal of Theology 73 (2020): 1–12. Ashford, Riley Bruce and Craig G. Bartholomew. The Doctrine of Creation: A Construtive Kuyperian Approach. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2020. Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Reconciliation. Vol 4, 3, 1. Edited by G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, translated by G. W. Bromiley. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1961. Beale, Gregory. “Eden, the Temple, and the Church’s Mission in the New Creation.” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 48 (2005): 5–31. Beale, Gregory. The Temple and the Church’s Mission: A Biblical Theology of the Dwelling Place of God. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004. Berkhoff, Hendrikus. Christ and the Powers. Scottdale: Herald Press, 1977. Block, Daniel. “To Serve and to Keep: Toward a Biblical Understanding of Humanity’s Responsibility in the Face of the Biodiversity Crisis.” In Keeping God’s Earth: The Global Environment in Biblical Perspective, edited by Noah Toly and Daniel Block, 116–140. Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2010. Chryssaygis, John and Bruce Fotlz. Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration: Orthodox Perspectives on Environment, Nature, and Creation. New York: Fordham University Press, 2013.

Vocation 139 Covolo, Robert. Fashion Theology. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2020. Croasmun, Matthew. The Emergence of Sin: The Cosmic Tyrant in Romans. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Crouch, Andy. Culture Making: Recovering our Creative Calling. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008. Curry, Brian. “Christ, Creation, and the Powers.” In Christ and the Created Order: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, edited by Andrew Torrance and Thomas McCall, 77–95. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018. de Chirico, Leonardo. “The Dignity of the Human Person: Towards an Evangelical Reading of the Theology of Personhood of Vatican II.” Evangelical Quarterly 77 (2005): 249–259. Deddo, Gary. “The Christian Life and Our Participation in Christ’s Continuing Ministry.” In An Introduction to Torrance Theology, edited by Gerrit Scott Dawson, 135– 156. London: T&T Clark, 2007. Dumsday, Travis. “Origen on Demonic Ignorance and Why it Might Still Matter for the Theology of World Religions.” Philosophia Christi 20 (2018): 463–479. Ellis, K. “Vocation.” In New Dictionary of Theology, Historical and Systematic, edited by Martin Davie, Tim Grass, Stephen Holmes, John McDowell, and T. A. Noble, 946. London: Inver-Varsity Press, 2016. Fergusson, David. Creation. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014. Flett, Eric. Persons, Powers, and Pluralities: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Culture. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2011. Grant, Edward. Science and Religion, 400 B. C. to A. D. 1550: From Aristotle to Copernicus. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2004. Harrison, Peter. The Bible: Protestantism and the Rise of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Horton, Michael. The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way. Grand Rapids: Zondervan. Ip, Pui Him. “‘Back to the Fathers’: The Nature of Historical Understanding in 20th Century Patristic Ressourcement.” Reviews in Religion and Theology 23 (2016): 4–13. Irving, Alexander. “The Person of Jesus Christ as the Normative Basis for the Doctrine of Creation: Re-Envisioning T. F. Torrance’s Christocentric Doctrine of Creation.” Evangelical Quarterly 88 (2016): 349–366. Jaeger, Lydia. “The Contingency of Creation and Modern Science.” Theology and Science 16 (2018): 62–78. Kuyper, Abraham. Wisdom and Wonder: Common Grace in Science and Art, translated by Nelson Koosterman. Grand Rapids: Christian’s Library Press, 2012. Macchia, Frank D. “Finitum Capax Infiniti: A Pentecostal Distinctive?” Pneuma 29 (2007): 185–187. Malone, Andrew. God’s Mediators: A Biblical Theology of Priesthood. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2017. McFarland, Ian A. “‘The Upward Call’: The Category of Vocation and the Oddness of Human Nature.” In The Christian Doctrine of Humanity, edited by Oliver Crisp and Fred Sanders, 217–236. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018. McMacken, W. Travis. “The Impossibility of Natural Knowledge of God in T. F. Torrance’s Reformulated Natural Theology.” International Journal of Systematic Theology 12 (2010): 319–340. Middleton, J. Richard. The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1. Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2015.

140

Vocation

Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans1974. Plantinga, Cornelius. Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995. Radcliff, Alexandra. The Claim of Humanity in Christ: Salvation and Sanctification in the Theology of T. F. and J. B. Torrance. Eugene: Pickwick, 2016. Radcliff, Jason. Thomas F. Torrance and the Church Fathers: A Reformed, Evangelical and Ecumenical Reconstruction of the Patristic Tradition. Eugene: Pickwick, 2014. Rae, Murray. “Jesus Christ, the Order of Creation.” In Christ and the Created Order: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, edited by Andrew Torrance and Thomas McCall, 23–34. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018. Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area. “Local Mountain Lion Population Faces Precipitous Decline in Genetic Diversity Within 50 Years, Possible Extinction.” National Park Service. Accessed April 30, 2019, www.nps.gov/samo/learn/news/loca l-mountain-lion-population-faces-precipitous-decline-in-genetic-diversity-within-50-yea rs-possible-extinction.htm. Schmemann, Alexander. For the Life of the World: Sacraments and Orthodoxy. Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1988. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Handbook of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 3rd Edition. Montreal: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2005. Shapiro, Stewart. “Mathematics and Reality.” Philosophy of Science 50 (1983): 523–548. Sherrard, Joseph H. T. F. Torrance as Missional Theologian: The Ascended Christ and the Ministry of the Church. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2021. Stark, Rodney. For the Glory of God: How Monotheism Led to Reformations, Science, Witch-hunts, and the End of Slavery. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. Torrance, Thomas F. Atonement: The Person and Work of Christ. Edited by Robert T. Walker. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009. Torrance, Thomas F. The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons. London: T&T Clark, 1996. Torrance, Thomas F. The Christian Frame of Mind: Reason, Order, and Openness in Theology and Natural Science. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2015. Torrance, Thomas F. Divine and Contingent Order. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition.” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 309–322. Torrance, Thomas F. The Ground and Grammar of Theology: Consonance between Theology and Science. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001. Torrance, Thomas F. Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ. Edited by Robert T. Walker. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008. Torrance, Thomas F. “Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy.” Scottish Journal of Theology 39 (1986): 461–482. Torrance, Thomas F. The Mediation of Christ. Colorado Springs: Helmers and Howard, 1992. Torrance, Thomas F. “Newton, Einstein and Scientific Theology.” Religious Studies 8 (1972): 233–250. Torrance, Thomas F. Reality and Scientific Theology. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2001. Torrance, Thomas F. Royal Priesthood: A Theology of Ordained Ministry, 2nd Edition. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993. Torrance, Thomas F. Theological and Natural Science. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2002.

Vocation 141 Torrance, Thomas F. Theology in Reconciliation: Essays Towards Evangelical and Catholic Unity in East and West. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976. Torrance, Thomas F. The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995. Torrance, Thomas F. “Ultimate Beliefs and the Scientific Revolution.” Crosscurrents 30 (1980): 129–149. van Dyke, Fred. “The Diversity of Life: Its Loss and Conservation.” In Keeping God’s Earth: The Global Environment in Biblical Perspective, edited by Noah Toly and Daniel Block, 93–115. Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2010. Vatican II Council. “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World: Gadium et Spes. Solemnly Promulgated by His Holiness, Pope Paul VI on December 7, 1965.” Accessed March 17, 2020. www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/ documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html. Webster, John. “‘Love is also a Lover of Life’: Creatio Ex Nihilo and Creaturely Goodness.” Modern Theology 29 (2013): 156–171. Williams, Rowan. Christ the Heart of Creation. London: Bloomsbury, 2018. Wirzba, Norman. “Creation Through Christ.” In Christ and the Created Order: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, edited by Andrew Torrance and Thomas McCall, 35–53. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018. Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Art in Action. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980. World Council of Churches. “Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry: Faith and Order Paper no. 111, the ‘Lima Text’ 15 January 1982.” Accessed March 17, 2020. www.oikoumene.org/ en/resources/documents/commissions/faith-and-order/i-unity-the-church-and-its-mission/ baptism-eucharist-and-ministry-faith-and-order-paper-no-111-the-lima-text. Woznicki, Christopher G. “The Awe of the Lord is the Beginning of Knowledge: The Significance of Awe for Theological Epistemology.” Expository Times 131 (2020): 153–159. Woznicki, Christopher G. “Amo Ut Intelligam (I Love so that I May Understand): The Role of Love in T. F. Torrance’s Theological Epistemology.” Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 35 (2017): 201–215. Yoder, John Howard. The Politics of Jesus, 2nd Edition. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994. Zachman, Randall. “Why Should Free Scientific Inquiry Matter to Faith? The Case of John Calvin.” In Knowing Creation: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, edited by Andrew Torrance and Thomas McCall, 69–86. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018. Zizioulas, John. “Priests of Creation.” In Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives, Past and Present, edited by R. J. Berry, 273–290. London: T&T Clark, 2006.

7

Destiny Christ’s Deification of Human Nature

The doctrine of theosis, write Stephen Finlan and Valdimir Kharlamov, is closely related to a number of other doctrines including: soteriology, Christology, anthropology, the sacraments, personal eschatology, the imago Dei, redemption, and sanctification.1 Despite the doctrine’s connections to a number of other theological loci, in the minds of many—especially those who find their theological bearings in the West—the doctrine of theosis (if it is actually developed) is typically located within the locus of soteriology.2 Calvin’s own words confirm the soteriological approach. He explains that “we should notice that it is the purpose of the Gospel to make us sooner or later like God; indeed it is, so to speak, a kind of deification.”3 Yet, unlike the soteriological focus on theosis that marks the works of a number of Western theologians, Slavko Eždenci notices that the Orthodox have a robust anthropological element in their doctrine of theosis. He explains that the Orthodox position is that “even before the fall, deification was the end and final fulfillment not just of humanity but of all created beings.”4 A number of contemporary Orthodox theologians demonstrate Eždenci’s point. For example, Vladimir Lossky describes the connection between theosis and creation, saying, Finally, the cosmic Adam by giving himself without return to God, would give Him back all His creation … Thus in the overcoming of the primordial separation of the created and uncreated, there would be accomplished man’s deification, and by him of the whole universe.5 G. I. Mantzaridis, similarly, writes that theosis is the ultimate goal of human existence. He states, It is that which from the beginning has constituted the innermost longing of man’s existence. Adam, in attempting to appropriated it by transgressing God’s command, failed, and in the place of deification, met with corruption and death. The love of God, however, through His Son’s incarnation, restored to man the possibility of deification.6 Finally, Panayiotis Nellas argues at length that “the real anthropological meaning of deification is Christification,” explaining that “Christ accomplishes DOI: 10.4324/9781003265832-7

Destiny

143

the salvation of man not only in a negative way, liberating him from the consequences of original sin, but also in a positive way, completing his iconic, prelapsarian ‘being.’”7 Yet the distinction between soteriological and anthropological approaches is a sense artificial. Human beings have particular telos or destiny. Considered from the perspective of their telos, theosis becomes an anthropological topic. After all, this is what human beings were created for. Christoforos Stavropoulos summarizes this goal, saying, In the Holy Scriptures, where God Himself speaks, we read of a unique calling directed to us … Do we hear that voice? Do we understand the meaning of this calling? Do we accept that we should in fact be on a journey, a road which leads to Theosis? As human beings we each have this one, unique calling, to achieve Theosis. In other words, we are each destined to become a god; to be like God Himself, to be united with Him … This is the purpose of your life; that you be a participant, a sharer in the nature of God and the life of Christ.8 Andrew Louth also considers theosis under the aspect of human destiny. He says that “deification, then, has to do with human destiny, a destiny that finds its fulfillment in a face-to-face encounter with God, an encounter in which God takes the initiative by meeting us in the Incarnation.”9 The fulfillment of this destiny, according to historic Christian doctrine, however, has been derailed or frustrated because of Adam’s sin. The fact that the possibility of achieving our God given destiny has been frustrated by sin requires divine intervention. Louth explains that within the larger arch of God’s purposes, i. e., deification of the cosmos through the deification of humanity, there is a lesser arch. The focus on this lesser arch, often at the expense of the greater arch, Louth says, has been characteristic of much of Western theology.10 This lesser arch of theosis is the soteriological element of theosis. In order for human nature in its fallen state to be deified, it needs to be redeemed. Redemption, as presented in Orthodox theology, is an effect of the incarnation. Through the incarnation, i.e., the Word becoming flesh, there is a real change in humanity. Louth explains that this change involves a kind of reconstitution of our humanity, a reshaping, a straightening out of all the distortions and corruptions that we have brought upon our humanity … by living out our lives in accordance with values and principles that fall a long way short of the values and principles inherent in creation as God intended.11 Thus, because theosis is humanity’s destiny and because redemption is now necessary for theosis, there is a need to bring together the anthropological and soteriological elements of this doctrine. The bringing together of these two elements, I suggest, is one way that T. F. Torrance’s commitment to

144

Destiny

Christological Anthropology is evident. In Torrance’s doctrine of theosis, the anthropological and soteriological elements of “destiny” are Christological. In this chapter, I set out to defend the claim that for Torrance the doctrine of theosis ought to be understood in light of the vicarious humanity of Christ. In order to demonstrate this claim, I proceed as follows: I begin by describing the doctrine theosis. I illustrate the content of this doctrine with special reference to two figures who were especially influential on Torrance, namely, Athanasius and John Calvin. Then, I describe Torrance’s own understanding of theosis. I suggest that for Torrance there are four things that a human being gains because of theosis: (1) immortality, (2) knowledge of God, (3) participation in the life of the Triune God, and (4) humanization/personalization. Thereafter, I explain the act of deification which includes which include Christ’s theopoiesis and our theosis. I then attempt to spell out the metaphysics of Torrance’s doctrine of theosis.

Describing the Doctrine of Theosis Undoubtedly, theosis holds a prominent, even central, place within Orthodox theology.12 Furthermore it is increasingly being recognized as holding a significant place in Western theology as well. Despite this prominence, it is difficult to find a clear, concise, agreed upon definition regarding what exactly this doctrine amounts to.13 Although not definitions, one can find numerous aphorisms in the writings of the church fathers describing theosis. These aphorisms have been taken by latter generations as being helpful for capturing the essence of the doctrine.14 Consider the following examples:    



Our Lord Jesus Christ, through His transcendent love, became what we are, so that He might bring us to be what He Himself is. – Irenaeus15 For he was incarnate that we might be made god. – Athanasius16 God united Himself to our nature in order that our nature might be made divine through union with God. – Gregory of Nyssa17 And finally, beyond all these, the human person unites the created nature with the uncreated through love (O the wonder of God’s love for us human beings!), showing them to be one and the same through the possession of grace, the whole wholly interpenetrated by God, and become completely whatever God is, save at the level of being, receiving to itself the whole of God himself. – Maximus the Confessor18 Divinization consists of being as much as possible like and in union with God. – Pseudo-Dionysius19

Despite the usefulness of such aphorisms, a theologian cannot live by aphorisms alone; longer descriptions are often helpful for understanding and employing doctrines within theological systems. Thankfully a number of theologians have ventured towards describing the content of this doctrine. Kenneth Leech describes theosis as “the work of divine grace by which human nature is so

Destiny

145

transformed that it ‘shines forth with a supernatural light and is transported above its own limits by a superabundance of glory.’”20 Basil Krivocheine explains what happens in theosis: The state of man’s total transformation, effected by the Holy Spirit, when man observes the commandments of God, acquires evangelical virtues and shares in the suffering of Christ. The Holy Spirit then gives man a divine intelligence and incorruptibility. Man does not receive a new soul, but the Holy Spirit unites essentially with the whole man body and soul. He makes him a son of God, a god by adoption, though man does not cease being a man, a simple creature, even when he clearly sees the Father. He may be called man and god at the same time.21 Finally, John McGuckin describes the process of theosis as follows: The concept of deification is the process of the sanctification of Christians whereby they become progressively conformed to God; a conformation that is ultimately demonstrated in the glorious transfiguration of the “just” in the heavenly kingdom, when immortality and a more perfect vision (and knowledge and experience) of God are clearly manifested in the glorification (δόξα) of the faithful.22 Despite these descriptions, the concept of theosis remains a bit intangible. Clendenin suggests that the reason this is so might be because Orthodox theology has a predilection for apophatic theology. Because theosis is “ultimately a mystery we need to use discretion when trying to define it. In some sense theosis defies analysis.”23 Clendin then cites St. Macarios, who says that theosis is “subtle and profound,” Maximus the Confessor who asserts that “in the nature of things, [theosis] cannot be perceived, conceived, or expressed,” and Palamas who says that “even when spoken of, deification remains unutterable.”24 Andrew Louth echoes the sentiments of these historic voices, saying that what it is to be divine is beyond our comprehension and indeed is revealed as precisely beyond our comprehension: deification is not becoming something we know and understand … it is to entry into a mystery, beyond anything we can understand.25 In light of the difficulty—and in the opinion of some Orthodox theologians the impossibility—of defining theosis, what is a theologian to do? I believe that adopting T. F. Torrance’s approach to mystery might be instructive. Speaking of the event of atonement, he explains that it is mystery more to be adored than expressed.26 He states that “the innermost heart of atonement, its most solemn and awful part, was hidden from public view. It is ineffable.” Being ineffable it remains a mystery, “it cannot be spelled out.”27 Despite its ineffable nature,

146

Destiny

Torrance does not hesitate to turn to scripture to find images and metaphors that are used to describe the mystery of atonement.28 In doing so, he is able to shed light on an event which ultimately remains a mysterious act of God.29 Clendenin suggests a similar approach to theosis. He suggests that we sharpen our understanding of the meaning of theosis by looking at the various synonyms, analogies, or metaphors that Orthodoxy uses to describe this mystery.30 This approach is also taken up by Finlan and Kharlamov. These two authors do not attempt to offer a definition of the doctrine, rather they offer a set of terms and concepts that are vitally related to the concept of theosis. Citing Ben Drewery, who sums up “the content or attributes of deification,” they say that teleiosis (ethical perfection), apatheia (exemption from human emotions or passions), aftharsia, athanasia (exemption from mortal corruption or death) are terms which communicate the idea of deification.31 Finlan and Kharlamov also offer their own list of conceptual equivalents for deification. These include: “union, participation, partaking, communion/partnership, divine filiation, adoption, recreation, intertwined with the divine, similitude with God, transformation, elevation, transmutation, commingling, assimilation, intermingling, rebirth, regeneration, [and] transfiguration.”32 Given Athanasius’s and John Calvin’s influence upon T. F. Torrance, it is appropriate to illustrate the content of the doctrine of theosis by referring to their understanding of the concept. Theosis in Athanasius Upon examining Athanasius’s doctrine of theosis, one notices that “for the Alexandrian doctor divinization of the Christian is not just a more or less secondary or causal element, as it was for most of the Fathers before him, but it is the central idea of his theology.”33 Despite the concept’s centrality in his thought, however, the precise meaning of the concept remains vague. According to Kharlamov, a systematic and well-balanced exposition of the concept is missing throughout Athanasius’s corpus.34 Thankfully, the lack of a systematic exposition of the concept does not prevent one from discerning key features in his doctrine. The first, and perhaps the central, feature of Athanasius’s doctrine of theosis that is shared with T. F. Torrance’s doctrine is that “deification of a human being is the other side of the incarnation.”35 Kharlamov points out that Athanasius’ famous exchange formula, “For he [the Logos] was made man that we might be made God” is “more of an affirmation of the incarnation of God than of the deification of human beings.”36 Although deification is partly in view, Athanasius’s emphasis is actually on the incarnation, and this is because it is the incarnation that makes deification possible. Kharlamov argues that the incarnation is central to Athanasius’s doctrine of theosis because “nobody can be deified by anyone lesser than God himself.” The fact that the incarnation is the grounds for theosis is made evident immediately after Athanasius’ famous dictum. There he states that two divine attributes that are given to human

Destiny

147

beings because of the incarnation of the Word. Humans “receive an idea of the invisible Father” and they “inherit incorruptibility.”37 These two attributes are not the only benefits granted to humans because of the incarnation—Athanasius himself states that “the achievements of the Savior, effected by his incarnation, are of such a kind and number that if anyone should wish to expound them he would be like those who gaze at the expanse of the sea and wish to count its waves”—yet they are the attributes that Athanasius focuses on in On the Incarnation. 38 A second feature of Athanasius’ doctrine of deification that is shared with Torrance’s is his focus on the notion that deification is, in part, humanity’s sharing of God’s immorality and incorruptibility that results due to Christ’s assumption of human nature. Athanasius writes that “God created the human being and willed that he should abide in incorruptibility” and that humans escaped their natural state of corruptibility “by the grace of participation in the Word.”39 Yet because of the fall they became corrupted and death reigned. Had humanity not fallen, Athanasius says, humans would have remained incorruptible, that is, they “would have lived thereafter like God.”40 He quotes Psalm 81:6–7 as evidence for this claim, “I said you are gods, and all sons of the Most High; but you die like human beings and fall like any prince.”41 He also cites Wisdom 2:23–24 as further evidence: “God created the human being for incorruptibility as an image of his own eternity; but by the envy of the devil, death entered into the world.”42 Because of this predicament, the Son became incarnate. As a result of the incarnation and the offering of his body as a substitute for all, “the incorruptible son of God consequently clothed all with incorruptibility in the promise concerning the resurrection.”43 Thus, the corruption of death, “which had prevailed formerly against them, perished.”44 Because of Christ’s life and work, human beings can once again attain the incorruptibility and immorality that was once theirs by participation in the Word. A third feature of Athanasius’s doctrine of theosis that is shared with Torrance is that “the process of deification also constitutes a proper knowledge of God.”45 God had originally made human beings in such a way that they shared in God’s own knowledge of himself. Athanasius explains: Being good, he bestowed on them his own image, our Lord Jesus Christ, and made them according to his own image according to the likeness, so that understanding through such grace the image, I mean the Word of the Father, they might be able to receive through him a notion of the Father.46 Yet, once again, because of the fall, human beings lost the grace of participating in one of God’s own attributes. Not only did they lose the grace of participating in God’s incorruptibility, there was an epistemic loss as well. Humans lost the grace of participating in God’s own knowledge of himself. Because God’s purpose had always been for humans to participate in Jesus Christ, knowing the Father through their imaging of the Son, God decided that he would renew humanity in the image so that human beings would be able to know him once

148

Destiny

again. This happens “by the coming of the very image of God, our Savior Jesus Christ.” The Son assumes a human nature so that “the human being ‘in the image’ might be recreated.”47 The result is that they can once again know their Creator and “live the happy and truly blessed life.” Theosis in John Calvin Even though Calvin rarely use the term theosis, the concept pervades his soteriology.48 Typically his occurs in his use of the concept of “union with Christ.”49 Calvin uses a number of different terms to describe union with Christ. In the Institutes he uses the terms, “engrafting,” “communion,” “fellowship,” “participation,” and “adoption.”50 Interestingly, these terms are shared with Finlan’s and Kharlamov’s list of conceptual equivalents of theosis. When Calvin specifically addresses theosis and its locus classicus, i.e., 2 Peter 1:3–4, he suggests that partaking in the divine nature “is shorthand for being clothed with God’s glory, endowed with God’s power, restored in God’s glorious image, God himself being possessed by the redeemed such that what is his becomes theirs by grace.”51 Despite hesitation by former generations of scholars to speak of Calvin and theosis, it is increasingly being recognized that it is appropriate to speak of Calvin’s doctrine of theosis.52 What are the some of the key features of Calvin’s doctrine of theosis that are shared with Torrance’s? Much like Athanasius’s doctrine of theosis, Calvin’s doctrine of theosis has the incarnation at its center. Habets writes that theosis is made possible “by the incarnation of the Son, which represents the divinizing of humanity through the humanizing of divinity.”53 For example, in the Institutes, Calvin writes, Having become with us the Son of Man, he has made us with himself sons of God. By his own descent to the earth he has prepared our ascent to heaven. Having received our mortality, he has bestowed on us his immortality. Having undertaken our weakness he has made us strong in his strength. Having submitted to our poverty, he has transferred us his riches.54 Habets explains that “like its classical antecedents,” Calvin’s doctrine of theosis is built around the hypostatic union.55 Furthermore, “Theosis is only possible because human nature has been deified in the theandric person of the Mediator.”56 A second feature of Calvin’s doctrine of theosis that is shared with Torrance’s doctrine is that “the final end and goal for humanity is trinitarian union of humanity with God.”57 Billings explains that for Calvin, “the oneness and unity of the Trinity extends to incorporate the believer.”58 This occurs primarily through union with Christ, which enables believers to be “participants not only in all his benefits but also in himself.”59 Moreover, as they are united to Christ, believers are “fully and firmly joined with God,” until they become one with him.60 The act of uniting believers to Christ is carried out through the

Destiny

149

Holy Spirit. It is through the Spirit that believers “become participants in God.”61 The culmination of this union is that “through Christ and the Spirit, believers are gathered ‘into participation in the Father.’”62 Thus, the end of theosis for Calvin is participation in the Triune life of God. Summary Instead of attempting to define theosis—a task which a number of Orthodox theologians believe is impossible—I have attempted to describe the content of the doctrine with special reference to Athanasisus’s and Calvin’s understanding of theosis. I have chosen to focus on features which are not only central to their understanding of theosis but also those that are shared with T. F. Torrance’s understanding of the doctrine. The features I have examined include: (1) a focus on the incarnation, (2) sharing in God’s immortality/incorruptibility, (3) knowledge of God, (4) and participation in the Triune life. In what follows, I show how features 2–4, as well one additional unique feature, appear in Torrance’s doctrine of theosis. I then turn my attention to the role that the incarnation plays in Torrance’s doctrine of theosis before examining the metaphysics of the doctrine.

Features of T. F. Torrance’s Doctrine of Theosis In the only full length study of T. F. Torrance’s doctrine of theosis to date, Myk Habets explains that “Torrance rarely uses the technical vocabulary of theosis and nowhere does he explicitly deal with the issues at any length.”63 Despite the infrequent use of the term, Habets argues that Torrance’s entire theology is “significantly influenced by the conceptuality” of theosis.64 Because Torrance rarely uses the term theosis, Habets correctly suggest, that any study of Torrance’s doctrine of theosis ought to examine his use of theosis’s conceptual equivalents, namely, “union, communion, participation, transcendental determination, reordering, humanizing, personalizing, and atoning exchange.”65 By examining how these themes show up in Torrance’s corpus, Habets develops a descriptive account of Torrancian theosis. Rather than rehearse Habets’s description of theosis, it seems proper to briefly highlight the features mentioned above—sharing in divine immortality, sharing in divine knowledge, and participating in the Triune life—as well as the additional feature of “personalization” and then proceed to discuss the metaphysics of Torrancian theosis. Theosis: An “Intimate Sharing of What is Divine” Despite his infrequent use, Torrance offers several different descriptions of theosis. In Theology in Reconstruction, Torrance says that theosis is the term used by the church fathers to emphasize that through the Spirit we have to do with God in his utter sublimity, his sheer Godness or holiness … Theosis describes man’s involvement in such a mighty act of God

150

Destiny upon him that he is raised up to find the true center of existence not in himself but in Holy God.66

In The Christian Doctrine of God, he explains that theosis was used by the church fathers to describe, in a succinct form “the evangelical promise that … through communion with him [Christ] we human beings are admitted into an intimate sharing of what is divine.”67 What is constituted by the notion of “sharing of what is divine” or “having to do with God in his utter sublimity?” In line with Athanasius and Calvin, Torrance stresses that sharing in what is divine consists of sharing in God’s own immortality, knowledge and Triune life. Torrance’s discussion of the relationship between theosis and the possession of immortality is primarily found in his discussion of resurrection and ascension in Space, Time, and Resurrection. Torrance explains that in Christ, humanity is carried “across the chasm of death and judgement into union with the divine life.”68 God’s immortality, “overflows freely through him [Christ] into mankind.”69 His clearest statement concerning the divine gift of immortality given to humanity comes in Torrance’s discussion of the New Testament’s teaching on resurrection. There he explains that it is “the incarnation and resurrection that confers immortality.”70 The Christological basis for sharing in this feature of divinity is evident in his statement that “Christ only has immortality and we receive it out of his fullness.”71 Torrance explicitly connects the gift of immortality to the vicarious life of Christ that has been carried out in “our human nature in which we are already implicated.”72 This claim is significant because it implies that the divine gift of immortality is given to all those who possess a human nature. Torrance, however, qualifies this statement by saying that “the fruit of the resurrection is enjoyed only by believers.”73 How do these two claims—that immortality is granted to all who possess a human nature and that it is only enjoyed by believers—fit together? The key to making sense of this puzzle has to do with how one experiences the gift of immortality. Torrance implies that through faith, believers discover that they have been involved in the vicarious life of Christ and that they are included in the objective reality of Christ’s immortality. The unbeliever, although objectively affected by this historic state of affairs, however, lacks this awareness.74 In discussing the gift of immortality, Torrance ventures into an area that many would consider to be speculative: the nature of bodies in new creation. He claims that this redeemed immortal body is the telos of humanity and that apart from immortality humanity lacks “fullness.”75 Our immortal bodies, according to Torrance, will be spiritual bodies. Spiritual bodies are not incorporeal in a platonic sense, they are indeed physical. The fact that we will be spiritual does not make us less human, in fact it makes us “more fully and truly man.”76 He elaborates, saying, “To be a spiritual body is not to be less body but more truly and completely body, for by the Spirit physical existence is redeemed from all that corrupts and undermines it, and from all or any privation of being.”77 By partaking in Christ’s body, which was given for us, we receive “the medicine of immortality.”78

Destiny

151

Besides a share in divine immortality, those who are deified are granted the gift of sharing in divine self-knowledge.79 Drawing upon Irenaeus, Torrance explains that “Only God can know himself so that it is only through God that God may be known.”80 Creatures can only be privy to God’s self-knowledge if God himself shares it with them. Moreover, if this knowledge is to be truly personal, there must be an intimate form of knowing that occurs between the creature and God. Torrance explains, “We can only know God if he brings us into communion with him in the inner relations of his own being as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.”81 Knowledge of Godself is something that only God has, yet God is willing to share this knowledge with us. Thus, we are granted to share in something which is truly divine. How does this sharing occur? Torrance explains that “This sharing in the knowledge that God has of himself was made possible through the incarnation of God’s son and his mediation of the Spirit of the Father and the Son.”82 In The Christian Doctrine of God, Torrance explicitly links theosis to this notion of sharing in God’s self-knowledge. He says that the Greek fathers used the term theosis to speak of “knowing of the Son by the Father and of the Father by the Son” which we are given to share through the Spirit.83 Theosis as he frames it there has to do with being able to apprehend God in the secrets of his own internal relations.84 Finally, in The Ground and Grammar of Theology, Torrance—although not using the word theosis—draws upon it as a concept explaining that Christ, God “condescends to share all that we are and makes us share in all that he is in Jesus Christ.” Torrance’s claim takes on the classic structure of the exchange formula so common to discussions of theosis. So what exactly are humans given to share in? They are “lifted up in his Spirit to share in God’s own self-knowing and self-loving until we are enabled to apprehend him in some real measure in himself.”85 The previous two benefits of theosis, namely immortality and divine knowledge, parallel Athanasius’s discussion of theosis. This should not be surprising as Torrance himself explains that the Reformed understanding of participation in the divine nature is interpreted in “precisely the same way as Athanasius.”86 The third feature of Torrancian theosis, although having precedent in Athanasius as well, finds previous expression in Calvin’s theology. Recall that it is Calvin’s view that “the final end and goal for humanity is trinitarian union of humanity with God.”87 For Calvin, “the oneness and unity of the Trinity extends to incorporate the believer,” through the believer’s union with Christ.88 Torrance adopts this Calvinian view, saying that, It is only through real and substantial union (Calvin’s expression) with him [Christ] in his human nature that we partake of all his benefits … because in him human nature is hypostatically united to divine nature so that the Godhead dwells in him bodily, in him we are really made partakers in the eternal life of God himself. This third feature, as the Calvinian quote implies, is a sharing in the Triune life of God himself. This sharing, Torrance says is the goal of the incarnation. The

152

Destiny

end of the incarnation was that humans would partake in the divine nature, that we would sit with Jesus beside God and that we would be exalted into the life of God.89 The Son became incarnate so that through our union with Christ we would “share brotherhood with him and so share with him the Fatherhood of God.”90 Because of the incarnation, “our human nature is now set within the Father-Son relationship of Christ.”91 The Holy Spirit plays a significant role in granting human beings the gift of partaking in the Triune life.92 It is by the Spirit that we are lifted up in Christ to enjoy communion within the divine life. Despite stating that the Spirit is crucial to the doctrine of theosis, Torrance emphasizes the significance of the incarnation.93 He adopts the Reformed understanding of participation in the divine nature, saying that participation is “the union and communion that we are given to have in Christ in his human nature.”94 Participation in the divine life and love occurs because of humanity’s participation in Christ’s incarnate sonship.95 Sharing in God’s own life and glory, however, is not merely the goal of the incarnation. To leave theosis as the goal of the incarnation would be to restrict theosis to Andrew Louth’s “lesser arch.” In full agreement with the Orthodox—and by extension Louth’s idea that theosis is also the “greater arch”—Torrance says that theosis is “the ultimate end of creation.”96 A fourth feature of Torrancian theosis, one that does not appear in Athanasius or Calvin, is that theosis personalizes human beings. By Torrance’s lights, God alone is personal; any person-ality is thus derived from participation in God’s personhood. In the case of human beings, humans are personalized in the person of the incarnate Son.97 Torrance is well known for his use of the term “onto-relation,” by which he means “the kind of relation subsisting between things which is an essential constituent of their being, and without which they would not be what they are. It is a being constituting relation.”98 Although he applies this concept to particle theory, his primary use of the concept is for the notion of personhood. Torrance believes that an onto-relational concept of personhood develops out of Trinitarian theology. He explains, It was in connection with this refined conception of perichoresis in its employment to speak of the intra-trinitarian relations in God, that Christian theology developed what I have long called its onto-relational concept of divine Persons, or an understanding of the three divine Persons in the one God in which the ontic relations between them belong to what they essentially are in themselves in their distinctive hypostases.99 According to Habets’s reading of Torrance, theosis is the “‘personalising’ of the human being in the Person of the Incarnate Son.”100 This, says Habets, is the meaning behind Torrance’s words: “for man to live in union with God is to become fully and perfectly human.”101 This fits well with Torrance’s affirmation that Jesus alone is the personalizing person while we are personalized persons. As Torrance himself puts it,

Destiny

153

Jesus Christ is now the fount of all that is truly personal among us … we are not personal in virtue of some substance inherent in ourselves, but only through what we receive from Jesus Christ … to be personal therefore is to be in Christ.102 Theosis is therefore, to quote Habets, the “process and means by which the human can achieve true personhood.”103 Summary So far we have seen that Torrancian theosis—undoubtedly influenced by Athanasian theosis and Calvin’s doctrine of participation—states that upon deification human beings share in divine immortality and divine knowledge, they participate in the Triune life, and they are personalized. When God created humanity, God had a particular end in mind. This end involved an intimate sharing in what is divine. The anthropological significance of this claim is that human beings were created to be immortal, to share in God’s self-knowledge, to participate in the Triune life, and to achieve full personhood. Far from being attributes which are incompatible with what it means to be a human being, God deigned to share them with human beings. Far from diminishing humanity’s “humanness,” the possession of these features, as humanity’s telos, make human beings to be what they were meant to be. Human beings who possess these features are humans that have fulfilled their end. Deification, then, as Torrance states “more than recreates our lost humanity”; deification “lifts us up in Christ to enjoy a new fullness of human life.”104 Still, a question remains. How are human beings deified? Torrance’s answer is Christological.

Christ’s Deification of Human Nature Habets claims that the incarnation thus forms the central context within which Torrance works out the concept of theosis … Jesus is central to theosis. Christology paves the way for soteriology, incarnation for reconciliation, and only in this order may Torrance’s doctrine of theosis be understood.105 This claim should not be surprising given Torrance’s debt to Athanasius and Calvin. How then does the Christology play a central role in Torrancian theosis? First, upon the act of incarnation Christ divinizes human nature, second, it is through union with Christ by the Spirit that divinization is applied to believers. Although it might seem as though these are two separate events, for Torrance, they constitute distinct aspects of one divine act, thus we will refer to these two aspects as “moments” of one act. In discussing these two aspects, Habets draws attention to the fact that “Torrance generally applies the English term ‘divinisation’ (theopoiesis) to the

154

Destiny

human nature that Jesus Christ took upon himself in his incarnate person, not to human persons in general (theosis).”106 Habets is in some ways correct in saying that Torrance draws a distinction between theopoiesis and theosis; the latter term is used to describe what happens to believers and the former term to what is done in Christ. However, Habets, as we will see below, fails to account for Christ’s unique relation to human nature. Nevertheless, Habets is right to say that “Strictly speaking there is only one ‘divinised’ person—the man Jesus Christ. In the hypostatic union Jesus divinized human nature ontologically and subsequently worked out this theopoiesis through his sinless life, death, and resurrection.”107 Human nature is objectively divinized in virtue of Christ’s “once and for all union of God and man.”108 Like Torrance’s doctrine of atonement, it is proper to say that “Christ Jesus is Theosis,” theosis occurs in the person of Christ.109 Atonement, for Torrance, is something that Christ does upon the incarnation; “the assumption of the flesh by God in Jesus Christ is itself a redemptive act.”110 The very assumption of fallen human nature by the Son has salvific effects. It sanctifies the fallen nature. Note, it does not merely open up the possibility for the sanctification of individual’s human natures; there is an objective sanctification of all of humanity in virtue of the Son’s assumption of human nature. Not only does sanctification occur upon the incarnation, regeneration occurs at that moment as well. Kye Won Lee claims that “Torrance does not view our regeneration … as what happens in our heart.”111 Rather, as James Cassidy puts it, “our humanity (and in fact humanity as such) is born and born again in the birth and rebirth of Jesus Christ.”112 What the incarnational aspect of sanctification and regeneration show is that on Torrance’s way of thinking the very act of the incarnation can have an objective effect on human nature. The incarnation, which is the once and for all union between God and humanity, does not just have a sanctifying and regenerative effect on Christ’s own human nature, rather, it has a sanctifying and regenerative effect on human nature tout court. If, like sanctification and regeneration, Christ’s human nature is sanctified-regenerated upon incarnation thereby effecting the same changes in human nature tout court, then it seems as though this relation would also hold for divinization: Christ’s human nature is divinized upon the incarnation, thereby objectively divinizing human nature tout court as well. Christ’s salvific work, however, is not limited to the initial union of the incarnation, it extends to the “continuous union” between God and humanity.113 In the continuous union Christ carries “our estranged state under bondage into freedom and triumph of the resurrection.”114 Over the whole course of his life Christ performs actions which are redemptive in nature. Christ is baptized, repents, confesses, struggles with temptation, has faith, obeys, prays, dies, is resurrected, and ascends. These actions are all carried out vicariously for humanity. As such, because Christ has done these things, the effects of these actions not only apply to Christ himself, they also apply objectively to all those who possess a human nature. The same logic applies to theosis, because Christ’s human nature is divinized over the whole course of his life, Christ’s

Destiny

155

vicarious divinization also applies objectively to humanity. In Christ, we can say, humans are objectively divinized because Christ’s human nature has been divinized. Although theosis is accomplished objectively in Christ, Torrance still speaks of the subjective actualization of deification by human persons. How is deification subjectively actualized? Lee correctly claims that it cannot be by “sacramental grace.” He says, “Torrance is strongly opposed to the notion of the deification of human nature through participation in the divine nature through sacramental grace, for this notion discloses a form of Monophysitism or Docetism.”115 If theosis is not actualized subjectively by partaking in the sacraments, how is it received? It is received by means of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. According to Torrance, “the pouring out of the Spirit belongs to atonement.”116 The pouring out of the Spirit into the believer is not a separate act of atonement, rather it is “atonement actualizing itself, really, and subjectively within the personal lives of men and women.”117 Thus, for Torrance, even the pouring out of the Spirit has a Christological basis, is part of Christ’s work. The Spirit’s role in salvation, however, is not limited to atonement. It applies to theosis as well. Torrance explains, “for to have the Spirit dwelling in us is to be made partakers of God beyond ourselves.”118 Torrance even speaks of the role of Pentecost in theosis, saying that This twofold movement of giving and receiving of the Spirit actualized within the life of the incarnate Son of God for our sakes is atonement operating within the ontological depths of human being. It constitutes the ‘deifying’ content of the atoning exchange in which through the pouring out of the same Spirit upon us we are given to participate.119 Much like his doctrine of Atonement, Torrance’s doctrine of theosis has an objective and subjective element. Theosis is accomplished objectively for all human beings because Christ has divinized human nature in his person. Yet, to paraphrase what Torrance says regarding one benefit of theosis, “the fruit of the theosis is enjoyed only by believers.”120 What accounts for this objectivesubjective distinction? It seems as though the distinction might be epistemic. The Holy Spirit makes believers aware of the fact that they have been divinized in Christ, whereas those who do not have the Spirit are unaware of this objective fact. We can speak of this awareness as being due to the perichoretic union effected between Christ and the believer which is brought about by the Spirit. Torrance explains that perichoresis is “a real sharing in the union of the incarnate Son with the Father, through a sharing not only in his human nature but in the life and love of God embodied in him.”121 There is an objective union between Christ and all those who possess a human nature in virtue of Christ’s relationship to human nature tout court, but in virtue of the Holy Spirit there is a subjective union—a perichoretic union—between Christ and all those who are believers. In what follows I will attempt to explain the metaphysics of human

156

Destiny

nature and of perichoresis that can account for objective theosis and subjective theosis. Objective Theosis and Human Nature Upon examining Christ’s deification of human nature, two things become apparent. First, the hypostatic union of divinity and humanity in Christ has a deifying effect upon the human nature that belongs to Christ. Second, this same union has a deifying effect upon human nature tout court. These two observations align well with two features of Christ’s humanity that were discussed in Chapter 3: The generality of Christ’s human nature and the particularity of Christ’s human nature. The significance of these features is that Christ has a universal ontological solidarity with all humans and at the same time Jesus is an individual human being, with an individual personhood. This distinction, I argued, fits well with Torrance’s use of anhypostasis and enhypostasis. Recall Torrance’s own words, The anhypostasia and enyhypostasia taken together tell us that the incarnation was the union of the Word of God with mankind in solidarity with all men and women [the general humanity of Christ’s human nature]; yet it was union with one man or rather such a union with all humanity that it was achieved and wrought out in and through this one man [the particular humanity of Christ’s human nature], Jesus of Bethlehem and Nazareth for all men and women.122 In Chapter 3 I argued that the metaphysics of human nature that best accounts for this feature of Christ’s human nature is one according to which human nature is an abstract universal. A Torrancian understanding of abstract universals posits two types of relations between universals and their particular objects. The first relation is participation. In this relation, a particular object relates to an abstract universal nature in such a way that the abstract universal nature affects the particular object, but the abstract universal nature remains unaffected. All human beings, except for Christ and Adam, are in a participation relation to the abstract universal human nature. The second relation is instantiation. In this relation the universal nature relates to a particular object in such a way that the abstract universal nature can be affected by external causes. The instantiation relation, I believe, explains how it is the case that the deifying actions of Christ upon his own human nature happen to human nature tout court. The fact that Christ’s actions can affect deifying changes not only upon his human nature but human nature as a whole is a feature that comports well with patristic metaphysics. Ben Myers has persuasively shown that patristic articulations of atonement make certain metaphysical assumptions. Among those assumptions are that: (1) There is one human nature. All individual human beings participate in this universal. (2) In Christ, God becomes

Destiny

157

incarnate, the divine nature is united with human nature. (3) What happens to human nature in Christ happens to humanity as a whole.123 Although Myers’s focus is on atonement, it is not hard to see these insights might also indirectly apply to theosis. Even more suggestive, however, is that the metaphysical account of human nature I am suggesting makes sense of Torrance’s doctrine of theosis is actually explicit in Gregory of Nyssa’s theology. David Balás says that “Gregory speaks of the deification of Christ’s humanity as its exaltation into divine glory by the resurrection and ascension, and he observes that as a consequence that the whole of humanity (not all traits or all elements of human nature but all the individuals partaking of human nature) is somehow codivinized.”124 This objective deification of human nature in Christ’s own human nature is well accounted by appealing to the participation/instantiation distinction. Subjective Theosis and Perichoresis If the objective aspect of theosis is accomplished through the union of divine nature and human nature in Christ, then what account of union explains the subjective aspect of theosis? I suggest that a perichoretic union can make sense of why believers experience the benefits of theosis. Torrance says that perichoresis is “a real sharing in the union of the incarnate Son with the Father.”125 Unlike the hypostatic union which unites Christ’s own human nature to the divine nature, thereby uniting human nature tout court to God, perichoretic union is a sort of union that is enacted by the Holy Spirit and that only belongs to believers. This kind of union, I believe, can explain why believers are subjectively aware of the benefits of theosis that are objectively theirs in virtue of Christ’s “once and for all” and “continuous” union of divinity and humanity. How so? According to one model, perichoresis is “the sharing of some aspect of the mental life between X and Y, such that X and Y are aware of this sharing, in such a way that preserves the identity of properties X and Y intact.”126 Let us call this model “Stumpian Perichoresis.” This model is based on the psychological phenomenon of shared pain and mind-reading. In describing the phenomena that underlie this kind of model of perichoresis, Eleonore Stump explains, In mind-reading between human beings, there is a sense in which one person has a kind of intuitive entrance to the thought, affect, and intention in the mind of another person. And so because of the intermingling of minds made possible at least in part by the mirror neuron system, one person can have direct access to the mind of that other. In such mindreading, one human person can be present with another in a way that is more powerful than mere presence at a place or in time.127 When two persons are aware that this mutual mind-reading occurs, a unique relation is born. Stump explains, “in mutual personal presence of this intimate

158

Destiny

kind, there can be a mutual ‘in-ness’ between the persons who are close to each other and sharing awareness.”128 The mutual interweaving of psyches amounts to a sort of mutual indwelling. What might it look like to apply this account of mutual indwelling to God’s relation to human persons? Perhaps the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in a human person is analogous to mutual indwelling between humans. In that case, a perichoretic relationship would mean that the Holy Spirit shares some aspect of the divine mental life with a human being and that the human being shares some aspect of her mental life with God in such a way that both are aware of this sharing. I suggest that Stumpian Perichoresis might help to make sense of the subjective actualization of theosis. Consider the following scenario. Let us assume two minds Christology, by which I mean that besides possessing a human mind in virtue of possessing a human nature, Christ also possesses the divine mind in virtue of possessing the divine nature. Thus, the person of Christ has both a divine mind and a human mind.129 When a believer, e.g., Jones, enters into a perichoretic relationship with Christ by means of the Holy Spirit, Jones gains access to the divine mind in such a way that God’s mental life is shared with Jones and Jones’s mental life is shared with God in such a way that both are mutually aware of the sharing. Furthermore, when Jones enters into a perichoretic relationship with Christ by means of the Holy Spirit, Jones also gains access to the human mind of Christ in such a way that Christ’s human mental life is shared with Jones and Jones’s mental life is shared with Christ in such a way that both are mutually aware of the sharing. Because Jones shares in both the divine and human mental life of Christ, Jones has access to the aspects of the divine and human minds of Christ that Christ decided to share with Jones. The content of Christ’s two minds contains all the subjective experiences of theosis that belong to Christ in virtue of him being the sole human person to— properly speaking—be divinized. Thus, when theosis is actualized subjectively in Jones, what is actually happening is that Jones is gaining subjective awareness of what it means to be divinized. Jones has already been objectively divinized—he is immortal, knows God, and is personalized—but now Jones subjectively experiences those realities because of Jones’s perichoretic relation to Christ.

Conclusion Although theosis has often been considered in its relation to soteriology, there are ample grounds for claiming that it is also an anthropological subject. Upon examining Torrance’s doctrine of theosis, we have discovered that it either makes or implies a number of anthropological claims. Included among these claims are: 1 2

Theosis is humanity’s telos. God intended human beings to possess immortality and knowledge of God, participate in the Triune life, and be personalized.

Destiny

159

3

Human beings that do not possess immortality and knowledge of God, do not participate in the Triune life, and are not personalized do not experience the fullness of humanity, i.e., the experience of human personhood exists on a spectrum ranging from less human to more human. 4 Human nature is an abstract universal that can either be instantiated or participated in. These claims, which I am not defending as being true—they are merely highlighted as Torrance’s explicit beliefs or implications of Torrancian theosis—are grounded in Torrance’s Christological approach to theosis. Theosis in Torrance’s thought is accomplished in Christ’s human nature. As a result, all those who possess a human nature are objectively deified. The subjective actualization of theosis, however, is limited to believers. Because of this, it is only believers who actually experience humanity’s telos. The fact that Torrance’s theology of human destiny is properly conceived only in light of Christ further strengthens the cumulative case for my claim that Christology holds promise for developing T. F. Torrance’s theological anthropology.

Notes 1 Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov, “Introduction,” in Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology, eds. Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2006), 5. Lexically, theosis means “becoming God” and theopoiesis means “making divine” or “making into a God.” Geoffrey W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 649. The terms are often used interchangeably. 2 See for example: Michael Christensen, “John Wesley: Christian Perfection as Faith Filled with the Energy of Love,” in Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, eds. Michael Christensen and Jeffery Wittung (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 219–29; Bruce D. Marshall, “Justification as Declaration and Deification,” in International Journal of Systematic Theology 4 (2004): 3–28; Bruce McCormack, Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 235–60; Carl Mosser, “The Gospel’s End and Our Highest Good: Deification in the Reformed Tradition,” in With All the Fullness of God: Deification in Christian Traditions, ed. Jared Ortiz (Lanham: Lexington Books/Fortress, Forthcoming), draft essay. 3 John Calvin, The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Hebrews and the First and Second Epistles of St. Peter, trans. William B. Johnston (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1963), 330. 4 Slavko Eždenci, Deification and Union with Christ: A Reformed Perspective on Salvation in Orthodoxy (London: Latimer Trust, 2011), 3. Todd Billings makes a convincing case that there is a strong anthropological element in Calvin’s theology of theosis. He writes that for Calvin, “humanity at its fullest is humanity united to God.” J. Todd Billings, “John Calvin: United to God through Christ,” in Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, eds. Michael Christensen and Jeffery Wittung (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 202. 5 Vladimir Lossky, Orthodox Theology: An Introduction, trans. Ian and Ihita Kesarcodi-Watson (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1978), 74. 6 G. I. Mantzaridis, The Deification of Man (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984), 12–13.

160

Destiny

7 Panayiotis Nellas, Deification in Christ: The Nature of the Human Person, trans. Norman Russell (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997), 39. 8 Cristoforos Stavropoulos, Partakers of the Divine Nature (Minneapolis: Light and Life, 1976), 17–18. 9 Andrew Louth, “The Place of Theosis in Orthodox Theology,” in Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, eds. Michael Christensen and Jeffery Wittung (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 34. 10 Louth, “The Place of Theosis in Orthodox Theology,” 35. 11 Ibid., 37. 12 D. B. Clendenin, Eastern Orthodox Christianity: A Western Perspective (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1994), 120. 13 The absence of a clear and concise definition is especially prominent among Orthodox theologians, as we will see below, there is almost a hesitancy to define the concept. This is not universally the case, however. Oliver Crisp provides a clear and concise definition of the concept. He defines theosis as “The doctrine according to which redeemed human beings are conformed to the image of Christ in his human nature. By being united to Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit, redeemed human beings begin to exemplify the qualities of the human nature of Christ and grow in their likeness to Christ (in exemplifying the requisite qualities Christ’s human nature instantiates). This process of transformation and participation goes on forevermore. It is akin to a mathematical asymptote.” Oliver Crisp, Analyzing Doctrine: Toward a Systematic Theology (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2019), 216. 14 For a list of these aphorisms see, Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, One With God: Salvation as Deification and Justification (BOOK), 26. 15 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 5 Preface. 16 Athanasius, On the Incarnation (Yonkers: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011), 107. 17 Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio Catechetica 25 in Opera quae reperiri poterunt omnia, rev. J.-P. Migne PG 45 (Paris: Migne, 1863), 65. 18 Maximus the Confessor, “Difficulty 41,” in Maximus the Confessor, ed. Andrew Louth (New York: Routledge, 1996), 158. 19 Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 198. Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 1.3. 20 Kenneth Leech, Experiencing God: Theology as Spirituality (San Francisco: Harper, 1985), 258. 21 Basil Krivocheine, St. Symeon the New Theologian (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1986), 389. 22 John McGuckin, “Deification” in The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, ed. Adrian Hastings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 156. 23 Daniel Clendenin, “Partakers of Divinity: The Orthodox Doctrine of Theosis,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, 37 (1994): 373. 24 Clendenin, “Partakers of Divinity,” 373. 25 Louth, “The Place of Theosis in Orthodox Theology,” 41. Crisp’s definition does not suffer from the incomprehensibility problem precisely because it looks to the attributes of Christ’s human nature as the place where we see the content of theosis. 26 T. F. Torrance, Atonement: The Person and Work of Christ, ed. Robert T. Walker (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009), 2–4. 27 Torrance, Atonement, 2. 28 His preferred term for describing the mystery of atonement is “reconciliation” although he doesn’t hesitate to use “redemption” and “justification” as well.

Destiny

161

29 Torrance claims that the mystery of the hypostatic union is analogous to the mystery of theosis. He says, “In the nature of the case we are unable to describe this participation in positive language any more than we can describe the hypostatic union in positive language.” T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965), 186. 30 McClendin, “Partakers of Divinity,” 374. 31 Benjamin Drewery, “Deification,” in Christian Spirituality: Essays in Honour of Gordon Rupp, ed. Peter Brooks (London: SCM Press, 1975), 38. 32 Finlan and Kharlamov, “Introduction,” 6. 33 Jules Gross, La Divinisation du Chretien d’ apres les peres grecs: Contribution historique a la doctrine de la Grace (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1938), 202, cited in Jeffrey Finch, “Athanasius on the Deifying Work of the Redeemer,” in Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology, eds. Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov (Eugene: Pickwick, 2006), 104. 34 Vladimir Kharlamov, “Rhetorical Application of Theosis in Greek Patristic Theology,” in Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, eds. Michael Christensen and Jeffery Wittung (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 120. 35 Kharlamov, “Rhetorical Application of Theosis,” 121. 36 Ibid. Kharlamov’s translation. See Athanasius, On the Incarnation, 107. 37 See Athanasius, On the Incarnation, 107. 38 Ibid., 167. 39 Athanasius, On the Incarnation, 53. 40 Ibid., 53. 41 Ibid., 54. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., 58. 44 Ibid. 45 Kharlamov, “Rhetorical Application of Theosis,” 121. 46 Athanasius, On the Incarnation, 61. 47 Ibid., 63. 48 Carl Mosser, “The Greatest Possible Blessing: Calvin and Deification,” Scottish Journal of Theology 55 (2002): 55. 49 Myk Habets writes that for Calvin, theosis is most closely related to the what the West has termed “union with Christ.” Habets, “Reforming Theosis,” Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology, eds. Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov (Eugene: Pickwick, 2006), 148. Billings, while noting that Calvin teaches deification of a particular sort prefers the language of “participation.” J. Todd Billings, “United to God through Christ: Assessing Calvin on the Question of Deification,” Harvard Theological Review 98 (2005): 315–34. See also, J. Todd Billings, Calvin, Participation, and the Gift: The Activity of Believers in Union with Christ (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 14–17. 50 Dennis Tamburello, Union with Christ: John Calvin and the Mysticism of St. Bernard (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1994), 90. 51 Carl Mosser, “The Gospel’s End and Our Highest Good: Deification in the Reformed Tradition,” 93. 52 For pushback against this idea, see Fredrick Norris, “Deification: Consensual and Cogent,” Scottish Journal of Theology 49 (1996): 420 and “Participation in God, Yes; Deification, No: Two Modern Protestant Responses to an Ancient Question,” in Bruce McCormack, Orthodox and Modern, 235–60; 53 Habets, “Reforming Theosis,” 149. 54 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vols., Library of Christian Classics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), 4.17.2.

162 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

Destiny Habets, “Reforming Theosis,” 149. Ibid. Billings, “John Calvin: United to God through Christ,” 205. Ibid., 205. Calvin, Institutes, 3.2.24. Ibid. Ibid. Billings, “John Calvin: United to God through Christ,” 205. Calvin, Institutes, 3.2.24. Myk Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance (New York: Ashgate, 2009), 2. Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, 2. Ibid., 15. T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 243. T. F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God (London: T&T Clark, 1996), 95–6. T. F. Torrance, Space, Time, and Resurrection (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), 50. Torrance, Space, Time, and Resurrection, 55. Ibid., 35. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 140. Ibid., 141. Ibid. Ibid., 142. Baxter Kruger, “The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God in the Theology of T. F. Torrance: Sharing in the Son’s Communion with the Father in the Spirit,” Scottish Journal of Theology 43 (1990): 366–89. T. F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 54. Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 54. Ibid. Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 151. Ibid. T. F. Torrance, The Ground and Grammar of Theology: Consonance between Theology and Science (Edinburg: T&T Clark, 2001), 155. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 184. Billings, “John Calvin: United to God through Christ,” 205. Ibid., 205. Torrance, Space, Time, and Resurrection, 135. Ibid., 69. Ibid. Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 189. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 184. Ibid. Ibid. Torrance, Space, Time, and Resurrection, 136. Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, 39. Recall Torrance’s theology of personhood discussed in Chapter 5. T. F. Torrance, Reality and Evangelical Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982), 42–3. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 102. Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, 39. Italics in original.

Destiny

163

101 Ibid., 39. Thomas F. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition,” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 315. 102 Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 318. 103 Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, 44. One implication of this understanding of theosis and personhood is that person-ality seems to be a spectrum; persons can be more or less fully personal. How fully realized one’s personality is will then depend on the strength of union that a person experiences with God. This Torrancian implication in line with Orthodox theology. John Meyendorff, for example, says that a person’s “true humanity is realized only when he lives ‘in God’” [John Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes (New York: Fordham University Press, 1974), 121.] And Jonathan Jacobs argues that “Being a human person, on this view is gradable. On the one extreme stands fallen human nature, not only united with God but incapable of union with him. On the other stands transformed and deified human nature, fully united with God—the exemplar of which is Jesus Christ.” Jonathan Jacobs, “An Eastern Orthodox Conception of Theosis and Human Nature,” Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009): 625. 104 Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 189. 105 Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, 49–50. 106 Ibid., 55. 107 Ibid. 108 T. F. Torrance, Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ, ed. Robert T. Walker (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009), 89. 109 Torrance says, “Christ Jesus is the atonement.” T. F. Torrance, Atonement: The Person and Work of Christ, ed. Robert T. Walker (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009), 94. 110 T. F. Torrance, “Dramatic Proclamation of the Gospel: Homily on the Passion of Melito of Sardis,” in Greek Orthodox Theological Review 37 (1992): 155. 111 Kye Won Lee, Living in Union with Christ: The Practical Theology of Thomas F. Torrance (New York: Peter Lang, 2003), 210. 112 James Cassidy, “T. F. Torrance’s Realistic Soteriological Objectivism and the Elimination of Dualisms: Union with Christ in Current Perspective,” Mid-America Journal of Theology 19 (2008): 171. 113 Torrance, Incarnation, 105. 114 Ibid., 96. 115 Lee, Living in Union with Christ, 203. 116 Torrance, Atonement, 189. 117 Ibid. 118 Torrance, Trinitarian Faith, 189. 119 Ibid., 190. 120 Torrance, Space, Time, and Resurrection, 35. 121 Ibid., 70. 122 Torrance, Incarnation, 230. 123 Benjamin Myers, “The Patristic Atonement Model,” in Locating Atonement, eds. Oliver Crisp and Fred Sanders (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2015), 73–4. 124 David Balás, “Deification,” in The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa, eds. Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco and Giulio Maspero, trans. Seth Cherney (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 212. 125 Torrance, Space, Time, and Resurrection, 35. 126 Christopher Woznicki, “Dancing Around the Theological Black Box: The Problem and Metaphysics of Perichoresis,” Philosophia Christi 22 (2020): 94. 127 Eleonore Stump, Atonement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 131. 128 Stump, Atonement, 132.

164

Destiny

129 Thomas Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1986), 102–3.

References Athanasius. On the Incarnation. Translated by John Behr. Yonkers: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011. Balás, David. “Deification.” In The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa, edited by Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco and Giulio Maspero, translated by Seth Cherney, 210– 213. Leiden: Brill, 2010. Billings, J. Todd. Calvin, Participation, and the Gift: The Activity of Believers in Union with Christ. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Billings, J. Todd. “John Calvin: United to God through Christ.” In Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, edited by Michael Christensen and Jeffery Wittung, 200–218. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008. Billings, J. Todd. “United to God through Christ: Assessing Calvin on the Question of Deification.” Harvard Theological Review 98 (2005): 315–334. Calvin, John. Institutes of Christian Religion. Edited by John T. McNeill, translated by Ford Lewis Battles. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1960. Calvin, John. The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Hebrews and the First and Second Epistles of St. Peter. Translated by William B. Johnston. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1963. Cassidy, James J. “T. F. Torrance’s Realistic Soteriological Objectivism and the Elimination of Dualisms: Union with Christ in Current Perspective.” Mid-America Journal of Theology 19 (2008): 165–194. Christensen, Michael. “John Wesley: Christian Perfection as Faith Filled with the Energy of Love.” In Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, edited by Michael Christensen and Jeffrey Wittung, 219–229. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008. Clendenin, D. B. Eastern Orthodox Christianity: A Western Perspective. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1994. Clendenin, D. B. “Partakers of Divinity: The Orthodox Doctrine of Theosis.” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 37 (1994): 365–379. Crisp, Oliver D. Analyzing Doctrine: Toward a Systematic Theology. Waco: Baylor University Press. Drewery, Benjamin. “Deification.” In Christian Spirituality: Essays in Honour of Gordon Rupp, edited by Peter Brooks, 20–62. London: SCM Press, 1975. Eždenci, Slavko. Deification and Union with Christ: A Reformed Perspective on Salvation in Orthodoxy. London: Latimer Trust, 2011. Finch, Jeffrey. “Athanasius on the Deifying Work of the Redeemer.” In Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology, eds. Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov, 104–121. Eugene: Pickwick, 2006. Finlan, Stephen and Vladimir Kharlamov. “Introduction.” In Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology, edited by Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov, 1–15. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2006. Gregory of Nyssa. Oratio Catechetica Magna 25. In Opera quae reperiri poterunt omnia, edited by J.-P. Migne, 65–67. Patrologia Graeca 45. Paris: Migne, 1863.

Destiny

165

Gross, Jules. La Divinisation du Chrétien d’après le pères grecs: Contribution historique à la doctrine de la grâce. Paris: Libairie Lecoffre, 1938. Habets, Myk. “Reforming Theosis.” In Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology, edited by Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov, 146–167. Eugene: Pickwick, 2006. Habets, Myk. Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009. Irenaeus. Against Heresies. Translated by Dominic J. Unger. New York: Newman Press, 1992. Jacobs, Jonathan. “An Eastern Orthodox Conception of Theosis and Human Nature.” Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009): 615–627. Kärkkäinen, Veli-Matti. One With God: Salvation as Deification and Justification. Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2004. Kharlamov, Vladimir, “Rhetorical Application of Theosis in Greek Patristic Theology.” In Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, edited by Michael Christensen and Jeffery Wittung, 115–131. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008. Krivocheine, Basil. St. Symeon the New Theologian. Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1986. Kruger, Baxter. “The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God in the Theology of T. F. Torrance: Sharing in the Son’s Communion with the Father in the Spirit.” Scottish Journal of Theology 43 (1990): 366–389. Lampe, Geoffrey W. H. A Patristic Greek Lexicon. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. Leech, Kenneth. Experiencing God: Theology as Spirituality. San Francisco: Harper, 1985. Lee, Kye Won. Living in Union with Christ: The Practical Theology of Thomas F. Torrance. New York: Peter Lang, 2003. Lossky, Vladimir. Orthodox Theology: An Introduction, translated by Ian and Ihita Kesarcodi-Watson. Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1978. Louth, Andrew. “The Place of Theosis in Orthodox Theology.” In Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in Christian Traditions, edited by Michael Christensen and Jeffery Wittung. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008. Mantzaridis, G. I. The Deification of Man. Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984. Marshall, Bruce D. “Justification as Declaration and Deification.” In International Journal of Systematic Theology 4 (2004): 3–28. Maximus the Confessor. “Difficulty 41.” In Maximus the Confessor, edited by Andrew Louth, 156–162. New York: Routledge, 1996. McCormack, Bruce. Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008. McGuckin, John. “Deification.” In The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, edited by Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason, and Hugh Pyper, 156. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Morris, Thomas. The Logic of God Incarnate. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1986. Mosser, Carl. “The Gospel’s End and Our Highest Good: Deification in the Reformed Tradition.” In With All the Fullness of God: Deification in Christian Traditions, edited by Jared Ortiz, 83–108. Lanham: Lexington Books/Fortress, 2021. Mosser, Carl. “The Greatest Possible Blessing: Calvin and Deification.” Scottish Journal of Theology 55 (2002): 36–57. Myendorff, John. Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes. New York: Fordham University Press, 1974.

166

Destiny

Myers, Benjamin. “The Patristic Atonement Model.” In Locating Atonement: Explorations in Constructive Dogmatics, edited by Oliver Crisp and Fred Sanders, 71–88. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2015. Nellas, Panayiotis. Deification in Christ: The Nature of the Human Person, translated by Norman Russell. Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997. Norris, F. W. “Deification: Consensual and Cogent.” Scottish Journal of Theology 49 (1996): 411–428. Pseudo-Dionysius. Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, translated by Colm Luibheid. New York: Paulist Press, 1987. Stavropoulos, Cristoforos. Partakers of the Divine Nature. Minneapolis: Light and Life, 1976. Stump, Eleonore. Atonement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Tamburello, Dennis. Union with Christ: John Calvin and the Mysticism of St. Bernard. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1994. Torrance, Thomas F. Atonement: The Person and Work of Christ. Edited by Robert T. Walker. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009. Torrance, Thomas F. The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons. London: T&T Clark, 1996. Torrance, Thomas F. “Dramatic Proclamation of the Gospel: Homily on the Passion of Melito of Sardis.” Greek Orthodox Theological Review 37 (1992): 147–163. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition.” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 309–322. Torrance, Thomas F. The Ground and Grammar of Theology: Consonance between Theology and Science. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001. Torrance, Thomas F. Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ. Edited by Robert T. Walker. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008. Torrance, Thomas F. Reality and Evangelical Theology: A Fresh and Challenging Approach to Christian Revelation. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982. Torrance, Thomas F. Space, Time and Resurrection. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976. Torrance, Thomas F. Theology in Reconstruction. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Torrance, Thomas F. The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995. Woznicki, Christopher G. “Dancing Around the Theological Black Box: The Problem and Metaphysics of Perichoresis.” Philosophia Christi 22 (2020): 85–103.

8

Conclusion A Torrancian Christological Anthropology

My burden in this monograph has been to argue in favor of the promise of Christology for developing T. F. Torrance’s theological anthropology. Yet, one might wonder, “Why is there a need to develop Torrance’s theological anthropology?” The answer is that despite being hailed a “leading Reformed theologian,” “one of the most brilliant and seminal thinkers of our time,” one of “the premier theologians in the second half of the twentieth century,” and “the most significant British academic theologian of the twentieth century,” Torrance failed to develop a theological anthropology in a substantive manner.1 Typically, one would not fault a theologian for failing to develop a robust account of every important doctrine, after all, one woman or man can only do so much; no one can address every topic in theology! Nevertheless, the lack of development of the topic is especially glaring because Torrance once claimed that “at no point is theology more relevant today than in the issues it raises about our knowledge of man.”2 Although Torrance believed that theological anthropology was a doctrine of utmost significance for our day, he did not produce many works specifically dedicated to the topic.3 Why might this be the case? Perhaps this can be attributed to Torrance’s insistence that Reformed theology has always been shy about erecting an anthropology, not because it lacked a view of man, but because such a view cannot be enunciated as an independent article of faith as if it could of itself condition or contribute to our knowledge of God.4 Regardless of why Torrance produced few substantive works in the field of theological anthropology, the fact remains, Torrance’s theological anthropology is underdeveloped. He did not address central topics of theological anthropology in substantive ways; these topics include, among others, the metaphysics of human nature, the imago Dei, the nature of human personhood, human vocation, and humanity’s destiny in a dedicated manner. One can find sparse thoughts about these topics in a number of his works, but these thoughts are far too underdeveloped to be commensurate with his claim that at “no point is theology more relevant today” than theological anthropology.5 DOI: 10.4324/9781003265832-8

168

Conclusion

Given his own lack of sustained engagement with this theological topic of such great relevance, it is no surprise that few theologians have attempted to analyze Torrance’s theological anthropology in a sustained manner as well. Torrance scholars, like Elmer Colyer, Dick Eugenio, Eric Flett, and Geordie Zeigler for example, analyze aspects of Torrance’s theological anthropology as parts of larger projects, and Myk Habets examines one aspect of Torrance’s theological anthropology as does Hakbong Kim.6 To date, the only full length, comprehensive, treatment of Torrance’s doctrine of humanity is Jing Wei’s unpublished dissertation undertaken at the University of Edinburgh: “The Theological Anthropology of Thomas F. Torrance: A Critical and Comparative Exploration.”7 With this gap in scholarly literature and Torrance’s lack of engagement with the topic in mind, I have attempted to develop Torrance’s underdeveloped theological anthropology; I have argued that Christology is the key to undertaking such a project. My argument for the promise of Christology for developing Torrance’s theological anthropology could have taken several routes. I could have made an extended argument for why a developed version of Torrance’s theological anthropology should be informed by Christology. If I had taken this route, it would have sufficed to demonstrate that Torrance’s anthropological methodology is Christological. This would have been enough to show that Christology holds promise for further development of Torrance’s theological anthropology. Yet such an approach leaves Torrance’s anthropology underdeveloped. Instead, I opted to make a cumulative argument that Christology holds promise for developing Torrance’s theological anthropology by developing several key topics in Torrance’s theological anthropology in light of Christology. The result is a version of what I have called “Broad Christological Anthropology”—that is, a theological anthropology in which Christology warrants important claims across a broad range of anthropological topics.8 My approach in this monograph proves the promise of Christology for developing Torrance’s theological anthropology because it shows that such an approach bears theological fruit across a wide range of topics. The extended argument of my monograph proceeded in two parts. In the first, which consists of Chapter 2, I examined Torrance’s method for doing theological anthropology. I argued that, unlike other contemporary Christological anthropologies that begin with protology or eschatology, T. F. Torrance’s Christological anthropology begins with the incarnate Christ as he confronts us in the midst of God’s redemptive acts. I labeled this approach SoteriologicalChristological Anthropology. This approach is not without its challenges. For example, the fact that in Torrance’s schema Christ has a fallen human nature poses some difficulty for moving directly from Christology to theological anthropology. This difficulty, I argued, is not necessarily damning, but it can make moving from Christology to anthropology a less than straightforward task. Having established that a Torrancian theological anthropology begins with Christ as he confronts us in salvation history, I then proceeded with the second part of my extended argument.

Conclusion

169

In the second part, I selected five core topics of theological anthropology and demonstrated that Christology allows one to develop Torrance’s thoughts on these five topics in a more substantive manner than he himself did. Chapter 3 served as a foundational chapter, setting in place several key concepts that would play a recurring role in later chapters.9 I argued that the metaphysical account that best makes sense of Torrance’s doctrine of atonement is one in which Christ instantiates an abstract universal human nature and the rest of humanity participates in an abstract universal human nature. Thus, Christ, as he confronts us in salvation history, informs our understanding of the metaphysics of human nature. Chapter 4 drew our attention to the doctrine of the imago Dei. I argued that Torrance joins a chorus of voices elevating Christology’s position in imago Dei theology. His understanding of the image of God, I claimed, is relational, dynamic, ecstatic, and Christological. Torrance’s imago Dei theology is Christological in a number of ways. First, for Torrance the image of God in humans consists in receiving the Word of grace—i.e., Christ himself—from God and mirroring it back to God. Thus, in some sense, it is actually Christ himself who is mirrored to God in us. Second, because Christ alone is both the image and reality of God, he perfectly embodies the imaging relation, thus serving as the epistemological key for what it looks like for humans to live as the imago Dei. Third, in virtue of the vicarious humanity of Christ, the Subjective imago Dei, which all humans are called to embody, is fulfilled by Christ, thereby restoring the imago Dei in all human beings. These three claims further illustrate fact that Christ is the key to developing Torrance’s theology of the image of God. In the fifth chapter, I turned to the topic of personhood. Torrance is known for making the claim that “‘Person’ is an onto-relational concept.”10 This led us to wonder whether Torrance’s claim amounts to what has been called a “relational ontology.” I proceeded to examine Torrance’s relational account of persons in light of contemporary ontologies. By putting Torrance in conversation with John Zizioulas—perhaps the most influential proponent of a relational ontology of persons—I made the case that the highly relational view of persons that Torrance propounds is significantly different from contemporary relational ontologies. I drew this distinction by looking at the role that Christ plays in personalizing human beings. I argued that when Torrance claims that human beings are personalized in virtue of the vicarious humanity of Christ, he does not mean that they become persons, rather he means that they enter into the kind of personal relation that is necessary for life as a person. On this account, in virtue of the vicarious humanity of Christ and the instantiation relation Christ has with the universal human nature, every single human being has objectively been personalized. Humans are personalized persons through what they receive from Jesus, namely “communion with the fullness of personal being in the Holy Trinity.”11 All humans exist in a fully personal manner because they are in communion with the Triune God in virtue of the vicarious humanity of Christ. Thus, once again, our understanding of Christ and his salvific work informs an important aspect of our theological anthropology, i.e.,

170

Conclusion

the nature of human personhood, demonstrating the promise of Christology for theological anthropology. I examined Torrance’s understanding of human vocation in Chapter 6. I argued that Torrance’s doctrine of creation and Christology lead to a theological anthropology in which the human vocation is framed in terms of being “priests of creation.” As priests of creation, humans are called to act as mediators between God and creation, leading creation in the worship of God through discerning the order and contingency of creation, mediating God’s intention to advance order in creation, and rectifying the disorder that they encounter in creation. This mediatorial role, I argued, cannot be conceived apart from the doctrine of Christ and his work; it has a Christological basis. This Christological basis manifests itself in three ways: (1) the vicarious priesthood of Christ, (2) the epistemological changes necessary for acting as priests of creation are brought about by atonement, and (3) the defeat of evil by Christ upon the cross. Thus, for Torrance, this aspect of theological anthropology, i.e., human vocation, can only be thought of in light of Christ, his work, and his vicarious humanity. The final chapter of the second part led us to consider humanity’s destiny: the deification of human nature. In Chapter 7 I set out to defend the claim that for Torrance the doctrine of human destiny, i.e., theosis, ought to be understood in light of the vicarious humanity of Christ. To be deified, on Torrance’s account, means to become immortal, to share in God’s self-knowledge, to participate in the Triune life, and to achieve fully personalized personhood. Theosis is accomplished objectively in Christ for all those who bear a human nature. This is for two reasons: (1) Christ instantiates human nature and (2) all other human beings are objectively deified in virtue of their participation in the abstract universal human nature. Subjectively, however, theosis is limited to believers because it is only believers who have access to the mind of Christ, the sole human person—properly speaking—who has been deified. Like the previous four chapters, Chapter 7 serves further to establish the fact that Christology can be applied to Torrance’s explicit claims about theological anthropology to produce fruit beyond Torrance’s sparse writings on the topic. The theology of humanity’s destiny is properly conceived only in light of Christ’s vicarious humanity and his act of instantiating the abstract universal human nature. Over the course of Chapters 2 through 7 I have made a cumulative case that Christology holds promise for developing Torrance’s theological anthropology across a broad range of anthropological topics. Although I have limited myself to demonstrating the fruitfulness of Christology for the development of five topics, there are certainly more anthropological topics which are briefly mentioned in Torrance’s work that would benefit from the same kind of Christological treatment given to the five topics here. One topic that would benefit from more attention is the topic of human constitution. Torrance says that a human is not a body and a mind, rather, a human is “body of his mind and mind of his body, a unitary whole.”12 How might Torrance’s Christology shed

Conclusion

171

further light on the unitary nature of human beings? Or consider the doctrine of sin. In Torrance’s theology, Christ assumes a fallen human nature. Christ’s fallen nature leads to a number of questions. For example: is the will located in the nature or the person? Does fallenness apply to natures or persons? What is original sin? Can a person bear original corruption and not bear original guilt? What is the relation between original guilt and corruption? What is corruption? That such questions arise from Torrance’s theological commitments demonstrate that Torrance’s Christological anthropology is still ripe for further reflection.

The Strengths of Torrance’s Christological Anthropology One of the strengths of Torrance’s theological anthropology—especially the aspect related to the distinction between the instantiation/participation of an abstract universal human nature—is that it opens up the possibility for further reflection on issues of race and sexuality. Consider for example the problem of particularity that arises because of Christ’s maleness and his being a first-century Jew. In recent years, a number of theologians have wondered in what sense Jesus’s humanity might be normative for all of humanity since he is a firstcentury Jewish male. This query is related to another question about Christ’s humanity, namely, “How can a first century Jewish male be the savior of all of humanity, including women?”13 In response to the issues underlying this kind of question, a number of theologians—as well as artists—have decided to portray Christ as a suffering woman on the cross: “Christa figures have been created in order to emphasize the compassion of the crucified Christ with women who have suffered from beatings, rapes, or other abuse of power.”14 Some Christa portrayals, however, go beyond the purpose of expressing Christ’s compassion or solidarity with women who suffer; some Christa figures represent a reinterpretation of the role of gender in interpreting the Christ-event.15 Such reinterpretations attempt to present Christ as a savior not only for men, but for women, as well. To address the question of how a male can be the savior of all, women included, some theologians have turned to the metaphysics of human nature. Fellipe do Vale, for example, argues that “as long as Christ can assume essential properties besides the ones needed to be human, then Christ could have assumed an essentially human nature without being disqualified from his soteriological job description.”16 His argument turns on the observation that the feminist challenge is rooted in the assumption that Christ needed to assume all of our essential properties in order to save us. If Christ did not assume essential femininity as well as essential masculinity, then Christ does not meet the conditions to save humanity. Yet according to do Vale, Christ is free to assume individual essential properties that not all humans have, in this case masculinity. Why is the issue of whether Christ, as savior, is male or female salient? It is because according to Torrance’s Soteriological-Christological Anthropology, Christ—as he confronts us in the midst of God’s redemptive act—is the starting point for anthropological reflection. A benefit of Torrance’s

172

Conclusion

metaphysics of human nature is that it can help make progress towards addressing the ontology of gender and soteriological questions related to the matter. Recall from Chapter 3 that Torrance affirmed that Christ is “at once man, and a man.”17 The former sense of “man” refers to Christ’s instantiation of an abstract universal human nature (anhypostasia). The latter sense of “man” refers to Jesus Christ’s particularity, which consists of his maleness, his Jewishness, and his historical-geographical situatedness (enhypostasia). Perhaps, Christ’s humanity can be normative for all of humanity, even though Christ is particularly a Jewish male living in the first century, because he instantiates an abstract universal human nature which is not particularized apart from being instantiated or participated in.18 Another strength of Torrance’s theological anthropology is that it speaks to two pastoral concerns of our day. Of prime concern to many Christians is the relationship between science and religion. I have had numerous conversations with Christians who are scientists that say that they feel as though their work is undervalued by the churches that they belong to. I have also had conversations with ministers who feel as though younger generations are exasperated with the church’s anti-science attitude.19 Torrance’s Christologically informed theology of human vocation can speak to both of these pastoral concerns. To the frustrated scientist, Torrance might say that their work is a way not only to fulfill humanity’s vocation but it is also a way to help those who are not scientists by profession to discern and appreciate God’s creation. To the despondent pastor, Torrance might reply by encouraging the pastor to gently prod the youth in their church towards STEM professions because the scientific task is a legitimate way to fulfill the human vocation. The notion that churches would encourage young people to pursue careers in the natural sciences would dispel the stereotype that Christian churches do not care much for science. Besides addressing the concern that arises concerning the relationship between science and religion, Torrance’s theological anthropology addresses another concern often expressed about Christianity: Christianity does not care about the preservation of the natural world. Torrance’s theological anthropology, we have seen, makes precisely the opposite claim. Grounded in Christ’s own priesthood, human beings are called to be priests of creation, instituting order and rectifying disorder in creation whenever they encounter it. Addressing the dwindling genetic diversity among the population of mountain lions in hills of Los Angeles, for example, is one way that I suggested that Christian scientists might help institute order where it is lacking and rectify disorder among creation.20 Even more pressing is the cultural concern about climate change. If Christians, those who are scientists by profession and those who are informed by the deliverances of the natural sciences, were to take their calling to identify disorder in creation and work to rectify the disorder, then their actions would serve as defeaters to the objection that Christianity does not care for the environment. Thus, Torrance’s Christological anthropology might serve as the grounds for a pastoral response to some of the most pressing issues facing Christians in relation to science.

Conclusion

173

To this list of strengths of Torrance’s Christological anthropology we can add three more points. First, Torrance’s theological anthropology makes provocative claims that are bound to generate further discussion. For example, in Chapter 4 I mentioned that no other theologian’s metaphysics of human nature has explicitly led to the affirmation that the subjective image of God in humans is in fact Christological. Whether one believes Torrance’s theological judgment on this point is correct is besides the fact; the point itself, like many other of Torrance’s unique claims, is bound to generate further conversation about how Christology can generate new ideas for theological anthropology. Second, Torrance’s theological anthropology is amenable to conversation with other disciplines including analytic philosophy and neuroscience.21 For example, in Chapter 3 (“Personhood: Onto-Relational Christological Anthropology”), we saw that Peter van Inwagen’s distinction between relational and constituent ontologies can shed light on Torrance’s theology of personhood. In Chapter 7 (“Destiny: Christ’s Deification of Human Nature”) I showed that we can make use of the neuroscientific concepts of mindreading and mutual shared awareness to develop Torrance’s distinction between objective and subjective theosis. The fact that Torrancian theological anthropology is amenable to conversation with analytic philosophy and neuroscience facilitates his theology’s reach into other disciplines, preventing it from becoming an insular conversation.22 Finally, Torrance’s Christological anthropology is suffused with a deep sense of Christ’s supremacy in all things, even anthropology! All things have been created by Christ and for Christ. Christ himself is before all things and in him all things hold together. Christ has first place in everything. “All things,” being all things, includes humanity. The fact that Torrance’s theology gives preeminence to Christ in thinking about the doctrine of humanity is further evidence that Torrance gave Christ first place in all that he did.23 In my opinion, the greatest compliment that could be given to T. F. Torrance’s theological anthropology— from a Reformed perspective—is that it attempted—whether successfully or not—to make Christ great in the eyes of his readers.

The Weaknesses of Torrance’s Christological Anthropology Despite the aforementioned strengths, Torrance’s Christological anthropology is not without its weaknesses. Prior to this conclusion I have, for the most part, refrained from passing judgments on the strengths or weaknesses of Torrance’s anthropological claims. This is partly because this monograph was intended to be descriptive and analytical in nature rather than comparative. Nevertheless, I should mention some weaknesses in Torrance’s doctrine of humanity.24 The first two weaknesses concern Torrance’s doctrine of the image of God and the third concerns the metaphysics that undergirds much of Torrance’s theological anthropology. Recall that in Chapter 4 I demonstrated that for Torrance human beings are said to be the imago Dei because their inter-personal relations with other creatures and with God mirror God’s own intra-personal nature. Moreover,

174

Conclusion

humanity’s vertical relation with God is said to constitute the imago Dei when humans live in a thankful fashion corresponding to the Word of grace towards them. In virtue of his vicarious humanity, Christ makes it the case that, ontologically, all human beings stand in the closest personal relationship to God possible, thereby restoring the inter-personal vertical relationship with God that—in part—defines the imago Dei. From what I argued, it is clear that Torrance believes that the vertical aspect of the imago Dei is restored through the vicarious humanity of Christ. However, Torrance fails to address how Christ restores the inter-personal relations that also constitute the imago Dei in humans. Apart from such restoration it is difficult to say how the relationality (both horizontal and vertical) that constitutes the image is in fact restored. One could make the case for Torrance that, in virtue of receiving the Spirit, human beings can be transformed to live their inter-personal relationships in the manner that God intended for them. Yet such a solution would not be grounded upon the vicarious humanity of Christ. Certainly, Torrance believed that humans receive the Spirit because of Christ, but the kind of solution I am proposing seems asymmetrical, i.e., the subjective “vertical image” is restored through the vicarious humanity of Christ; but the subjective “horizontal” image is restored by some other divine action, namely sanctification. Such a solution might satisfy some but ultimately this kind of solution does not neatly fit within the framework provided by Torrance for the restoration of the image through the vicarious humanity of Christ. Torrance’s doctrine of the imago Dei is also the source for another potentially concerning aspect of his theological anthropology. The problem I have in mind is the lack of exegetical support for grounding the imago Dei (at least in part) in the male-female relationship. According to Torrance, It is not man or woman individually or as such that is said to be created after the image and likeness of God, but “man” as man and woman in their reciprocal complementary relationship, that is as man-and-woman in a unique analogical relation to God.25 In making this claim, Torrance follows Barth in noting the analogia relationis that is the male-female relationship among humans. This male-female relationship includes within it the elements of correspondence, co-existence, confrontation, likeness, and difference, thus mirroring the I-Thou relationship of God himself.26 This Barthian view, which Torrance adopts, has been subject to a number of criticisms. Marc Cortez, for example, points to two criticisms leveled by James Barr and Phyllis Bird respectively.27 Barr claims that for Barth, “the image of God in mankind was the relational mutuality of man and woman, and this was loosely analogical to the relational existence of the persons in the being of God.”28 While this interpretation, Barr claims, is loosely similar to Augustine’s Trinitarian interpretation of the image, he claims that Barth’s view is a case of “ill-judged and irresponsible piece of exegesis.”29 Barth, Barr says, argues that the statement “God created man in his own

Conclusion

175

image” is explained by “male and female he created them” because the latter text follows the former. Barr correctly points out that this is not necessarily the case. He explains, If phrase X is followed at once by phrase Y, it is only one among many possible functions of Y that it should be the explanation of X; it could equally well be the sequel or consequence of X or an addition of a new factor to X, or indeed a qualification or modification of X.30 In other words, Barr says, Barth has made an interesting move using the text in this way, but exegetically it is not as simple as Barth makes it out to be. A second objection to the Barthian reading comes from Phyllis Bird. She makes the case that there is nothing in the cultural background of the Old Testament that would lead to the belief that the imago Dei consists in humanity’s existence as male and female. She explains, Despite close reference to the biblical text as his primary source, he has failed to discern its anthropology—and theology—and has advanced only a novel and arresting variation of the classical trinitarian interpretation, an interpretation characterized by the distinctly modern concept of an “IThou” relationship, which is foreign to the ancient writer’s thought and intention at all three points of its application.31 Bird, in other words, accuses Barth of importing a foreign mode of thought into a biblical text, one which could not have been intended by the biblical author. A third objection—one that was briefly mentioned in Chapter 4—is that grounding the imago Dei in relationality, as opposed to humanity’s task, seems to ignore the consensus view among biblical scholars about the image of God in the Ancient Near East. As James Turner explains, the language of “image of God” is not unique to Israelite theology; rather, Israelites seemed to have borrowed the term from their surrounding environment to explain what humans do.32 Image of God, the term’s cultural background leads us to believe, “assigns or denotes a particular role, namely one that proclaims a deity’s sovereign presence in a land,” therefore the imago Dei is functional.33 This exegetical point does not necessarily mean that relationality is to be excluded from the image of God. The best definitions of the imago Dei—including those put forward by some biblical scholars and systematic theologians—recognize the multifaceted nature of the image, while grounding it in its functional nature.34 Unlike the accounts of the image of God which include structural and relational elements but are grounded in function, Torrance’s account lacks nuance in its sole focus on relationality. The final area of worry that I would like to raise concerns Torrance’s metaphysics of human nature. Throughout this monograph, I argued that much of Torrance’s theological anthropology—including the imago Dei, the nature of personhood, and theosis—is elucidated by understanding the vicarious

176

Conclusion

humanity of Christ which is grounded in a particular ontology of human nature. In Chapter 3, I argued that the account of human nature that best explains Torrance’s doctrine of atonement is one in which human nature is an abstract universal. On this account, “the human nature of Christ is the same as the human nature of other humans. It is a universal sharable thing.”35 Christ, I explained, instantiates this one universal nature, while other human beings participate in this one universal nature. It is far beyond the scope of this conclusion to argue for or against an Abstract Universal Nature Christology (AUC), yet it should be stated that AUC is a contentious metaphysical account of Christ’s human nature.36 Since I have argued that much of Torrance’s theological anthropology is founded upon this particular metaphysics of human nature, it would severely undercut the value of Torrance’s contribution to the topic if his abstract universal nature ontology turned out to be wrong.37 Moreover, there is potential worry that the Torrancian idea of a universal that is capable of being acted upon (i.e., the instantiation relation) is unheard of in philosophical literature.38 Yet, if we are to make sense of Torrance’s doctrine of atonement—and by extension his theological anthropology—we need to affirm the existence of such a metaphysical object. To some, positing the existence of such an object will seem ad hoc, but to those who follow a Torrancian mode of thought positing, such an object will seem appropriate. After all, on a Torrancian framework, even though we might not have any precedent for thinking that universals can be causally active, if we are to account for the “data” that we are confronted by in Christ we will need to posit the existence of an abstract universal nature that can be instantiated and participated in.39

Conclusion In this monograph, I made the case that Christology holds promise for developing T. F. Torrance’s theological anthropology. Before drawing this work to an end, I should note that the promise of theology for developing theological anthropology need not be limited to T. F. Torrance’s theology. In one sense, this monograph could be viewed as a case study, examining the prospects of Christology for the development of theological anthropology in conversation with one particular theologian. This approach has proved fruitful for developing multiple facets of Torrance’s theological anthropology, including the imago Dei, the metaphysics of human nature, the nature of human personhood, vocation, and destiny but the approach might prove fruitful for any number of topics or theologians. If Christology holds promise for the narrow task of developing Torrance’s insights on humanity, might it also turn out to be the case that Christology holds promise for developing a constructive theological account of humanity? If so, then perhaps we can join Torrance in affirming the broader claim that in Christ we “discern what the basic structure of humanity is and ought to be.”40

Conclusion

177

Notes 1 Stanley Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), 201; Elmer Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian and Scientific Theology (Downers Grove: Intervarsity, 2001), 11; Alister McGrath, T. F. Torrance: An Intellectual Biography (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2006), xi. 2 T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965), 99. 3 Out of over 600 publications, only eight were specifically dedicated to the topic of theological anthropology. See: a chapter titled, “The Word of God and the Nature of Man,” in Theology in Reconstruction, 99–116; Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957); a chapter titled “Man, Priest of Creation,” in The Ground and Grammar of Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 1–14; “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition,” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 309–22 [this essay was also published in Christ in our Place: The Humanity of God in Christ for the Reconciliation of the World: Essays Presented to Professor James Torrance, eds. Trevor Hart and Daniel Thimell (Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1989), 369–87]; a chapter titled “Man, Mediator of Order,” in The Christian Frame of (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2015), 35–64; “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective” in Religion, Reason, and the Self: Essays in Honour of Hywel D. Lewis, eds. Steward Sutherland and T. A. Roberts (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1989), 103–18; The Soul and Person of the Unborn Child (Edinburgh: Handsel Press for the Scottish Order of Christian Unity, 1999); The Being and Nature of the Unborn Child (Edinburgh: Handsel Press for the Scottish Order of Christian Unity, 2000). 4 Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 99. 5 Ibid. 6 Elmer Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance, 173–82; Dick Eugenio, Communion with the Triune God: The Trinitarian Soteriology of T. F. Torrance (Eugene: Pickwick, 2014), 37–46; Eric Flett, Persons, Powers, and Pluralities: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Culture (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2011), 116–38; Geordie Zeigler, Trinitarian Grace and Participation: An Entry into the Theology of T. F. Torrance (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017), 147–83; Myk Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance (New York: Routledge, 2009); Hakbong Kim, Person, Personhood, and the Humanity of Christ: Christocentric Anthropology and Ethics in Thomas F. Torrance (Eugene: Pickwick, 2021). 7 Jing Wei, “The Theological Anthropology of Thomas F. Torrance: A Critical and Comparative Exploration” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Edinburgh, 2013). 8 Although very similar to Marc Cortez’s distinction between “Minimally Christological Anthropology” and “Comprehensively Christological Anthropology,” “Broad Christological Anthropology” differs in that it goes beyond the claim that Christology warrants important claims about issue like the imago Dei and ethics but it does not go as far as claiming that Christology warrants claims about all anthropological data. See Marc Cortez, ReSourcing Theological Anthropology: A Constructive Account of Humanity in Light of Christ (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018), 21. Drawing on Cortez’s definition of Christological Anthropology, gestures towards what one might say about human constitution, personhood, work, death, ascension, and the beatific vision. See Joshua R. Farris, An Introduction to Theological Anthropology: Humans, Both Creaturely and Divine (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2020), 161–86. 9 Among these concepts are the vicarious humanity of Christ, instantiation, and participation. 10 T. F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (London: T&T Clark, 1996), 157. 11 Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 157.

178

Conclusion

12 Thomas F. Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition,” 310. Torrance has one full length essay on the topic: T. F. Torrance, “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective,” 103–18. 13 See for example, Ellen Leonard, “Women and Christ: Toward Inclusive Christologies,” Toronto Journal of Theology 6 (1990): 266–85 and Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam’s Child, Sophia’s Prophet: Critical Issues in Feminist Christology, 2nd Edition (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 35–68. 14 Arnfríður Guðmundsdóttir, “Crucified—So What? Feminist Readings of the CrossEvent,” in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, ed. Adam Johnson (London: T&T Clark, 2017), 350. 15 Theresa Berger, “A Female Christ Child in the Manger and a Woman on the Cross, Or: The Historicity of the Christ Event and the Inculturation of the Gospel,” Feminist Theology 2 (1996): 32–45. 16 Fellipe do Vale, “Can a Male Savior Save Women? The Metaphysics of Gender and Christ’s Ability to Save,” Philosophia Christi 21 (2019): 310. 17 T. F. Torrance, Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ, ed. Robert T. Walker (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009), 231. 18 Joshua Farris presents two historical Christian models of gender, the Thomistic Model and the Nyssa Model. On the latter model, “gender is not an essential property of the soul but rather is a common property of the soul and, if in fact a body has essential properties, then an essential property of the body.” Gregory’s model is shaped by Platonic influences. Likewise, Torrance’s metaphysics shares some common elements with Platonism, though it is significantly distinct from Platonism. It would be worthwhile to pursue the question of whether Torrance’s metaphysics of gender would be commensurate with the Nyssa Model, a modified Nyssa Model, or whether it represents a completely different model altogether. [Farris, An Introduction to Theological Anthropology, 225.] 19 Whether this is a correct assessment is a matter of empirical research. 20 Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area, “Local Mountain Lion Population Faces Precipitous Decline in Genetic Diversity Within 50 Years, Possible Extinction,” National Park Service, August 30, 2016, www.nps.gov/samo/learn/news/ local-mountain-lion-population-faces-precipitous-decline-in-genetic-diversity-withi n-50-years-possible-extinction.htm. Accessed April 30, 2019. 21 Regarding theology done in conversation with analytic philosophy see ongoing discussions about analytic theology. Michael C. Rea, “Introduction,” in Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, eds. Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 1–32; William Wood, Analytic Theology and the Academic Study of Religion (Oxford: OUP, 2021); Oliver D. Crisp, James Arcadi, Jordan Wessling, The Nature and Promise of Analytic Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2019); Thomas McCall, An Invitation to Analytic Christian Theology (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2015); Andrew Torrance, “The Possibility of a Scientific Approach to Analytic Theology,” Journal of Analytic Theology 7 (2019): 178–198; Martin Westerholm, “Analytic Theology and Contemporary Inquiry” International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 3 (2019): 230–54; William Wood, “Trajectories, Traditions, and Tools in Analytic Theology,” Journal of Analytic Theology 2 (2014): 254–66; Christopher Woznicki, “Analyzing Doctrine: A Précis,” Philosophia Christi 23 (2021): 7–10. 22 This should come as no surprise given that Torrance in part conceived of himself as a missionary to the modern scientific west. This self-conception is likely rooted in his early desire to become a missionary, like his parents. T. F. Torrance, “Thomas Torrance Responds,” in The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in Dialogue with T. F. Torrance, ed. Elmer M. Colyer (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 304.

Conclusion

179

23 In an interview Torrance once said that his greatest concern for the church was to help restore its sense of the crucified and risen Lord. T. F. Torrance, Gospel, Church, and Ministry, ed. Jock Stein (Eugene: Pickwick, 2012), 60. 24 I am avoiding pointing out weaknesses that are part of Torrance’s theology but are tangential to Torrance’s theological anthropology. 25 Torrance, “The Goodness and Dignity of Man,” 312. 26 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III.1, eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1958), 195–6. 27 Marc Cortez, Theological Anthropology: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 26–7. 28 James Barr, Biblical and Natural Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 159. 29 Barr, Biblical and Natural Theology, 160. 30 Ibid. 31 Phyllis A. Bird, “‘Male and Female He Created Them’: Gen 1:27b in the Context of the Priestly Account of Creation,” Harvard Theological Review 74 (1981): 132. 32 James T. Turner, “Temple Theology, Holistic Eschatology, and the Imago Dei: An Analytic Prolegomenon,” Theologica 2 (2018): 104. 33 Turner, “Temple Theology, Holistic Eschatology, and the Imago Dei,” 105. 34 See, for example, Catherine McDowell, “In the Image of God He Created Them: How Genesis 1:26–27 Defines the Divine-Human Relationship and Why it Matters,” in The Image of God in an Image Driven Age: Explorations in Theological Anthropology, eds. Beth Felker Jones and Jeffrey Barbeau (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2016), 42; Marc Cortez, Theological Anthropology, 37. 35 Timothy Pawl, In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 104. 36 For arguments against AUC on Christological grounds, see, for example, Timothy Pawl, In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology, 105; Oliver Crisp, Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 34–71. I should note, however, that Alvin Plantinga, while believing that the Chalcedonian Definition does not imply an abstract nature Christology over and against a concrete nature Christology, cites Philip Schaff who says, “The Logos assumed, not a human person (else we would have two persons, a divine and a human) but a human nature which is common to us all; and hence he redeemed not a particular man, but all men as partakers of the same nature.” Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 1 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1877), 30. [Alvin Plantinga, “On Heresy, Mind, and Truth,” Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999): 184.]. There are others besides Schaff who see Chalcedon as advocating for an abstract nature Christology, for example, Richard Cross and Gerald O’Collins. Richard Cross, “Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation,” Thomist 60 (1996): 171; Gerald O’Collins, Incarnation (London: Continuum, 2002), 70. Stephen Wellum and Pawl dissent from this view, arguing that Chalcedon advocates for a concrete nature Christology. Stephen J. Wellum, God the Son Incarnate: The Doctrine of Christ (Wheaton: Crossway, 2016), 451; Pawl, In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology, 26. 37 Torrance’s metaphysics of human nature is in a sense Platonist; this should not come as a surprise given that much of the Christian tradition, especially during the era of the church fathers, was Platonist in one way or another. Consider the point made by Andrew Louth who quotes Endre von Ivánka: “The phenomenon which characterizes the whole of the first millennium of Christian thought … is the use of Platonism as the form for [its] philosophical expression and framework of the worldpicture in terms of which the proclamation of revealed truth was made—in other words, Christian Platonism.” Andrew Louth, Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), xii, citing Endre von Ivánka, Plato Christianus: Übernahme Und Umgestaltung Des

180

Conclusion

Platonismus Durch Die Väter (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1964), 19. For extended discussion of “Christian Platonism,” see Craig Carter, Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition: Recovering the Genius of Premodern Exegesis (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2018), 66–91. See also, Alexander J. B. Hampton and John Peter Kenney, “Christianity and Platonism,” in Christian Platonism: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 3–10, along with the multitude of essays in that volume. Again, it is far beyond the scope of this conclusion to address contemporary arguments against abstract universals, but it should be noted that the existence of such objects is highly contested. For theologically informed introduction to discussions about the existence of abstract objects, see William Lane Craig, God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), especially chapters 1–4. Even if objections against the existence of abstract objects turn out to be correct, the framework underlying Torrance’s adoption of an abstract universal account of human nature might be salvaged by making use of divine conceptualism. According to Plantinga, “perhaps the most natural way to think about abstract objects … is as divine thoughts.” [Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 288.] On a modified-divine conceptualist Torrancian account of human nature, human nature would not be an abstract universal object, rather it would be a concrete divine idea which serves as the blueprint for all human beings. 38 Oliver Crisp has facetiously said that me calling this proposal a “potential problem” is “a moment of scholarly understatement.” Oliver Crisp, “T. F. Torrance on Theosis and Universal Salvation,” Scottish Journal of Theology 74 (2021): 14. 39 Perhaps an appeal to divine conceptualism might help Torrance avoid the ad hoc objection. Adopting a divine conceptualist approach, we might be able to say that the divine mind associates a different concept (i.e., redeemed human nature) with human beings after Christ has accomplished salvation. On such an account there would not be a universal nature that changed, rather what changes is the idea associated with what constitutes a human being. This suggestion needs to be worked out in greater detail. Additionally, I should note that there is no evidence for thinking that Torrance would have adopted divine conceptualism. 40 T. F. Torrance, “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective,” in Religion, Reason, and the Self: Essays in Honour of Hywel D. Lewis, eds. Steward Sutherland and T. A. Roberts (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1989), 115.

References Barr, James. Biblical and Natural Theology. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Creation: The Work of Creation. Vol 3, 1. Edited by G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, translated by J. W. Edwards, O. Bussey, and H. Knight. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1958. Berger, Theresa. “A Female Christ Child in the Manger and a Woman on the Cross, Or: The Historicity of the Christ Event and the Inculturation of the Gospel.” Feminist Theology 2 (1996): 32–45. Bird, Phyllis A. “‘Male and Female He Created Them’: Gen 1:27b in the Context of the Priestly Account of Creation.” Harvard Theological Review 74 (1981): 129–160. Carter, Craig. Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition: Recovering the Genius of Premodern Exegesis. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2018. Colyer, Elmer M. How to Read T. F. Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian and Scientific Theology. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2001.

Conclusion

181

Cortez, Marc. ReSourcing Theological Anthropology: A Constructive Account of Humanity in Light of Christ. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018. Cortez, Marc. Theological Anthropology: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: T&T Clark, 2010. Craig, William Lane. God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Crisp, Oliver D. Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Crisp, Oliver D. “T. F. Torrance on Theosis and Universal Salvation.” Scottish Journal of Theology (2021): 12–25. Crisp, Oliver and James Arcadi and Jordan Wessling. The Nature and Promise of Analytic Theology. Leiden, Brill, 2019. Cross, Richard. “Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of Incarnation.” Thomist 60 (1996): 171–202. Eugenio, Dick. Communion with the Triune God: The Trinitarian Soteriology of T. F. Torrance. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2014. Farris, Joshua R. An Introduction to Theological Anthropology: Humans, Both Creaturely and Divine. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2020. Flett, Eric. Persons, Powers, and Pluralities: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Culture. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2011. Fiorenza, Elizabeth Schüssler. Jesus: Miriam’s Child, Sophia’s Prophet: Critical Issues in Feminist Christology, 2nd Edition. New York: Bloomsbury, 2015. Grenz, Stanley. Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004. Guðmundsdóttir, Arnfríður. “Crucified—So What? Feminist Readings of the CrossEvent.” In T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, edited by Adam J. Johnson, 335– 354. London: T&T Clark, 2017. Habets, Myk. Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009. Hampton, Alexander J. B. and John Peter Kenney. “Christianity and Platonism.” In Christian Platonism: A History, edited by Alexander J. B. Hampton and John Peter Kenney, 3–10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Ivánka, Endre v. Plato Christianus: Übernahme Und Umgestaltung Des Platonisumus Durch Die Väter. Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1964. Leonard, Ellen. “Women and Christ: Toward Inclusive Christologies.” Toronto Journal of Theology 6 (1990): 266–285. Louth, Andrew. Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McCall, Thomas. An Invitation to Analytic Christian Theology. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2015. McDowell, Catherine. “In the Image of God He Created Them: How Genesis 1:26–27 Defines the Divine-Human Relationship and Why it Matters.” In The Image of God in an Image Driven Age: Explorations in Theological Anthropology, edited by Beth Felker Jones and Jeffrey Barbeau. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2016. McGrath, Alister. T. F. Torrance: An Intellectual Biography. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2006. O’Collins, Gerald. Incarnation. London: Continuum, 2002. Pawl, Timothy. In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

182

Conclusion

Plantinga, Alvin. “On Heresy, Mind, and Truth.” Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999): 182– 193. Plantinga, Alvin. Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Rea, Michael. “Introduction.” In Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, edited by Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea, 1–32. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area. “Local Mountain Lion Population Faces Precipitous Decline in Genetic Diversity Within 50 Years, Possible Extinction.” National Park Service. Accessed April 30, 2019, www.nps.gov/samo/learn/news/loca l-mountain-lion-population-faces-precipitous-decline-in-genetic-diversity-within-50-yea rs-possible-extinction.htm. Schaff, Philip. The Creeds of Christendom, Volume 1. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1877. Torrance, Andrew. “The Possibility of a Scientific Approach to Analytic Theology.” Journal of Analytic Theology 7 (2019): 178–198. Torrance, Thomas F. The Being and Nature of the Unborn Child. Edinburgh: Handsel Press for the Scottish Order of Christian Unity, 2000. Torrance, Thomas F. Calvin’s Doctrine of Man. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2001. Torrance, Thomas F. The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons. London: T&T Clark, 1996. Torrance, Thomas F. The Christian Frame of Mind: Reason, Order, and Openness in Theology and Natural Science. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2015. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition.” In Christ in our Place: The Humanity of God in Christ for the Reconciliation of the World: Essays Presented to Professor James Torrance, edited by Trevor Hart and Daniel Thimell, 369–387. Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1989. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition.” Modern Theology 4 (1988): 309–322. Torrance, Thomas F. Gospel, Church, and Ministry. Edited by Jock Stein. Eugene: Pickwick, 2012. Torrance, Thomas F. The Ground and Grammar of Theology: Consonance between Theology and Science. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001. Torrance, Thomas F. Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ. Edited by Robert T. Walker. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective.” In Religion, Reason, and the Self: Essays in Honour of Hywel D. Lewis, edited by Steward Sutherland and T. A. Roberts. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1989. Torrance, Thomas F. The Soul and Person of the Unborn Child. Edinburgh: Handsel Press for the Scottish Order of Christian Unity, 1999. Torrance, Thomas F. Theology in Reconstruction. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965. Torrance, Thomas F. “Thomas Torrance Responds.” In The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in Dialogue with T. F. Torrance, edited by Elmer M. Colyer (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 303–340. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Word of God and the Nature of Man.” In Reformation Old and New, edited by F. W. Camfield, 121–141. London: Lutterworth Press, 1947. Turner, James T. “Temple Theology, Holistic Eschatology, and the Imago Dei: An Analytic Prolegomenon.” Theologica 2 (2018): 95–114.

Conclusion

183

do Vale, Fellipe. “Can a Male Savior Save Women? The Metaphysics of Gender and Christ’s Ability to Save.” Philosophia Christi 21 (2019): 309–324. Wei, Jing. “The Theological Anthropology of Thomas F. Torrance: A Critical and Comparative Exploration.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of Edinburgh, 2013. Wellum, Stephen. God the Son Incarnate: The Doctrine of Christ. Wheaton: Crossway, 2016. Westerholm, Martin. “Analytic Theology and Contemporary Inquiry.” International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 3 (2019): 230–254. Wood, William. Analytic Theology and the Academic Study of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Wood, William. “Trajectories, Traditions, and Tools in Analytic Theology.” Journal of Analytic Theology 2 (2014): 254–266. Woznicki, Christopher G. “Analyzing Doctrine: A Précis.” Philosophia Christi 23 (2021): 7–10. Zeigler, Geordie. Trinitarian Grace and Participation: An Entry into the Theology of T. F. Torrance. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017.

Index

abstract nature 48–52, 73, 103, 156, 176 analytic theology 40, 47, 54–5, 173, 178n2 angels 54, 107n2 anhypostasia/enhypostasia 45–7, 51–3, 118, 156 a posteriori 29–32, 95, 121 a priori 29, 121, 123–4 Arcadi, James 125 Aristotle 68, 95, 123 Athanasius 51, 117, 119, 122–3, 144, 146–8, 150–3 Atonement 39, 40–5, 50, 72, 90, 129, 145, 154, 155 Auburn 23 Augustinian realism 49 Awad, Najeeb 93, 94 Balás, David 157 Baptism 27, 43, 72–3, 102, 105, 106 Barr, James 174–5 Barth, Karl 20–2, 67, 80n9, 115, 122, 174, 175 Billings, J. Todd 148 bio-diversity 127–8 Bird, Phyllis 174–5 Boethius 90, 91, 93, 95, 96 Brümmer, Vincent 91 Bryant, Kobe 48 Calvin, John 1, 65, 70, 71, 80n9, 82n37, 95, 143, 148–9, 151, 152 Cameron, Daniel 23 Carroll, Lewis 17 Chiarot, Kevin 30–1, 43, 56n25 christological anthropology 7, 14n38, 18–19, 28 christological imago Dei 76–8

Clendenin, Daniel 145 Colyer, Elmer 2, 6, 40, 58n50 cognitive 105–6, 129 concrete 48–9, 97–8, 180n37 constituent ontology 97–8 contingency 117–19, 121–4 Cortez, Marc 18, 21, 33n5, 64, 90, 102, 174 Crisp, Oliver D. 35n67, 48, 49, 53, 160n13, 180n38 cumulative argument 7, 8, 168 Cyril of Alexandria 122 Deddo, Gary 129 do Vale, Fellipe 171 dualism 81n31, 85n81, 122 dynamic 64, 65, 71, 74–6, 94 ecstatic 64, 74–6, 101, 105 Einstein, Albert 124 Engel, Mary Potter 71, 80n9 entropy 120 epistemology 28, 29, 69, 94, 129–30, 137n127 Eschatological-Christological Anthropology 19–20, 30, 65 Eugenio, Dick 3, 6, 28 evil 69, 120–1, 130–1 Eždenci, Slavko 142 fallen human nature 23–7, 30, 73, 154, 163n103 Finlan, Stephen 142, 146, 148 Flett, Eric 2, 5, 6, 27, 28, 39 freeway (101) 128 gender 21, 91, 131, 171–2, 178n18 goat 48, 52

Index God: The Father 25, 29, 43, 47, 67, 73, 92, 95, 104, 147, 151; Holy Spirit 42, 75, 77, 95, 98, 104, 145, 152, 157, 158 grace 3, 39, 68, 70–2, 118, 147, 155 Greek mind 122, 123, 135n65 Gregory of Nazianzus 25, 51, 73 Gregory of Nyssa 144, 157, 178n18 Grenz, Stanley 19–20 Grimace 48 guilt 26, 31, 35n67, 171 Gunton, Colin 23 Habets, Myk 3, 29, 39, 59n81, 71, 81n19, 104, 148, 149, 153–4 Hilary of Poitiers 122 homoousion 29, 122, 129 Horton, Michael 115 hypostasis 46, 92, 100, 101 hypostatic union 40, 41, 50, 53, 69, 74, 101, 104, 118, 148, 156, 157 imago Dei: functional 66, 75, 126, 175; objective 68, 71, 74, 76; relational 63, 74, 79, 174–5; structural 63, 75; subjective 68, 71, 74, 76, 79n2 immorality 144, 145, 148, 150–1, 158, 159 incarnation 6, 22, 28, 40–2, 73, 103, 143, 146–7, 149, 152 inductive argument 7 instantiation 52–4, 73, 77, 103, 156, 176 Instagram 63 Irenaeus 51, 73, 117 Irving, Alexander 118 Israel 24 I-Thou 67, 97, 99, 101, 174 Jones, Jessica 158 kata physin 29, 32, 125 Kärrkkäinen, Veli-Matti 75 Kharlamov, Vladimir 142, 146, 148 Kettler, Christian 42, 76 Kim, Hakbong 4, 109n40, 110n57, 111n99, 168 knowledge of God 1, 2, 11, 28, 29, 144, 147, 149, 158–9, 167 Krivocheine, Basil 145 Latin heresy 24, 122 Lee, Kye Won 42, 72, 154, 155 Leech, Kenneth 144 logico-causal 55

185

logico-deductive 121–4 logoi 120 Los Angeles 48, 128, 172 Lossky, Vladimir 142 Louth, Andrew 143, 145, 179n37 Macchia, Frank 115 Macmurray, John 99–100, 110n74 Mantzaridis, G. I. 142 Maximus the Confessor 119, 144, 145 Maxwell, James Clerk 96, 124 McDonald’s 48 McDowell, Catherine 63 McFadyen, Alister 91 McFarland, Ian 25, 115 McGuckin, John 145 McMaken, Travis 121, 127 mereology 97–8 mirror 68, 70, 71, 74–6, 82n37, 82n40, 83n49, 173 mirror neurons 157 mountain lion 128, 172 Muller, Richard 84n81 Murdock, Matt 97, 98 Myers, Benjamin 50, 51, 156 mysterian 39, 54, 55 Neidhardt, Jim 98 Nellas, Panayiotis 142 non-assumptus 25, 41, 59n83, 60n94 objective: imago Dei 68, 71, 74, 76; personalization 102, 103, 106–7; theosis 155–7, 173 onto-relations 94–6, 98, 152 order: created 127, 131; discerning 125, 128; instituting 126, 128; rectifying disorder 126, 128 original sin 23, 26, 27, 34n45, 47, 49, 143, 171 Page, Karen 97 Pannenberg, Wolfhart 19–20, 23, 28 participation: metaphysical 52–3, 85n82, 156, 170; in God see union with God Pentecost 155 perichoresis 152, 155, 157, 158 personhood: ecclesial 100–2, 105, 106; biological 100–2, 105 Plato 52, 117, 123, 179n37 Protological-Christological Anthropology 17, 19, 20–2, 30, 32, 65

186

Index

Pseudo-Dionysius 144 purple 48 Purves, Andrew 42

subjective: imago Dei 68, 71, 79, 169, 173; personalization 104, 106; theosis 156, 157, 173 Swinburne, Richard 7–8

quantum physics 96, 124 race 2, 18, 20, 131, 171 Radcliff, Alexandra 129 Radcliff, Jason 134n62 Rae, Murray 125 regeneration 6, 28, 42, 65, 146, 154 relational ontology 10, 91, 92, 96, 97, 100, 169 repentance 27, 43, 44, 58n50, 154 response 44, 57n36, 58n50, 71, 76, 77, 81n23, 129 Richard of St. Victor 90, 95, 108n8 rodenticides 128 sanctification 26, 27, 41, 42, 43, 50, 142, 145, 154, 174 Santa Monica Mountains 128 Schmemann, Alexander 124 Soteriological-Christological Anthropology 9, 17, 18, 23, 30–2, 65, 66, 168, 171 stage theory 49, 50, 58n72, 59n74 Stavropoulos, Christoforos 143 STEM 132, 172 Stump, Eleonore 157

theopoiesis 144, 153, 154 Thompson, John N. 82n37 Tiktok 63 Torrance, Alan 104–6 trope 48 Turner, James T. 175 union with God 11, 69, 74, 104, 129, 144, 152, 153, 155–7, 161n49 van Kuiken, Jerome 23 van Inwagen, Peter 97 vicarious: humanity of Christ 42–3, 72, 73, 76–8, 91, 104, 106, 129, 144, 169, 170, 174; priesthood 44, 128, 170 Wei, Jing 4–5, 39, 80n9 Wigner, Eugene 120 Wirzba, Norman 119 Yoder, John Howard 131 Yodic, Grogu 107 Zeigler, Geordie 3, 39 Zizioulas, John 91, 92–8, 100–6, 169