System Leadership: Policy and Practice in the English Schools System 9781350081055, 9781350081062, 9781350081086

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System Leadership

Also available from Bloomsbury School and System Leadership, Susan Robinson School Leadership and Education System Reform, edited by Peter Earley and Toby Greany An Intellectual History of School Leadership Practice and Research, Helen M. Gunter

System Leadership Policy and Practice in the English Schools System Susan Cousin

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2019 Paperback edition first published 2020 Copyright © Susan Cousin, 2019 Susan Cousin has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgements on p. viii constitute an extension of this copyright page. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-3500-8105-5 PB: 978-1-3501-8329-2 ePDF: 978-1-3500-8108-6 eBook: 978-1-3500-8107-9 Typeset by Newgen KnowledgeWorks Pvt. Ltd., Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

This book is dedicated to all system leaders who work with skill and commitment to bring the best education to the widest number of learners.

Contents Acknowledgements Glossary Introduction 1 System Leaders: Leaders of a Profession, or Instruments of Government? 2 The Evolution of System Leadership Policy in England 3 The System Leaders 4 Towards a Model of System Leadership Practice 5 Policy Instruments and Intermediaries 6 System Leader Training and Development 7 Partnerships and Place References Index

viii ix 1 5 31 55 97 125 169 197 221 237

Acknowledgements Thanks and admiration go to the respondents who contributed to this study – for their generosity, openness and wisdom. Acknowledgements are due to Mr Jonathan Crossley and Dr Richard Riddell for comments on early drafts of Chapter 5 and to Professor Peter Earley and Dr Trevor Male for comments on early drafts of Chapter 6. All errors or shortcomings are mine.

Glossary Academy

State-funded school in England directly funded by the Department for Education and independent of local authority control. Self-governing non-profit charitable Trust. Established under the Labour government through the Learning and Skills Act, 2000

Academy Chain

A MAT with at least three schools

ALB

Arm’s-length body

Converter Academy Post 2010, a school that chose to move to academy status. No sponsor required as they are high-performing CVA

Contextual value added. The average is 1000; 1030 places the school in the top 40 per cent of schools for students’ progress between KS2 and KS4. Measure took account of contextual factors such as gender and family circumstances. Abandoned as a measure by the Coalition in 2011

DCS

Director of Children’s Services

DCSF

Department for Children, Schools and Families

DfE

Department for Education

DfES

Department for Education and Skills

EAZ

Education Action Zone. Labour government incentivized schoolled partnerships of schools, communities and local businesses to raise standards in deprived areas

EBacc

A performance measure introduced in 2010. The ‘core’ subjects which make up the measure include English, mathematics, history or geography, the sciences and a language, all at grade C or above

ERA

Education Reform Act, 1988

ESRC

European Social Research Council

Floor targets

Threshold levels of percentage of pupil attainment in external assessments against national standards. Performance below

x

Glossary this minimum acceptable standard triggers intervention. For secondary schools, floor targets are the percentage of pupils gaining at least five GCSE equivalents at grade C or above (including English and maths)

Free School

New academies established since 2011 via the Free School Programme

HTB

Headteacher Board – four to eight members, of which four are elected academy heads who advise RSC on decisions

KS2, KS4

In England and Wales, Key Stage 2 is the legal term for the four years of primary education between ages 7 and 11, called year 3, year 4, year 5 and year 6. Key Stage 4 covers years 10 and 11, ages 14–16. National assessments at the end of each stage are used as benchmarks to ‘measure progress’. Key Stage 3 is the early years of secondary education, years 7–9; external assessment at the end of KS3 was replaced in 2009 with internal teacher assessment

LA

Local authority

LEPP

Leading Edge Partnership Programme. Labour Government Programme launched in 2003 as a successor to the Beacon Schools Programme (1998–2002), whereby high-performing schools received £60,000 per annum to support continued innovation and to work with lower-performing ‘partner’ schools to raise attainment

LLE

Local Leader of Education. Headteacher accredited to support schools in their locality

MAT

Multi-Academy Trust. A single trust is responsible for more than one academy; a single legal entity is accountable for each of the schools

NCSL, NCTL

NDPB National College for School Leadership (NSCL) 2000–12. Became an executive agency in 2012 and was renamed National College for Teaching and Leadership (NCTL). In 2017 its functions moved to the DfE

NDPB

Non-Departmental Public Body

NLE

National Leader of Education

NPM

New Public Management

NSC

National Schools Commissioner

Glossary

xi

NSS

National Support School

Ofsted

Office for Standards in Education, formed under the Education (Schools) Act, 1992. A non-ministerial department. Inspects providers of education and childcare and publishes an annual report on the quality of schools. Each school is inspected every four years (or less frequently if data indicates high performance) and a report published awarding a grade on a four-point scale: 1: Outstanding; 2: Good; 3: Satisfactory (became ‘Requires Improvement’ from 2009); 4: Inadequate. The fourth grade is further divided into ‘Serious Weaknesses’ and requiring ‘Special Measures’

PASC

Public Administration Select Committee

PD

Professional development

PLC

Professional Learning Community

PMDU

Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit. Established by the Labour government in 2001 and headed by Michael Barber; abolished in 2010

PPG

Pupil Premium Grant. A payment to schools introduced in 2010 based on number of disadvantaged pupils, aimed to close the social attainment gap

PSA

Public Service Agreement. Performance indicators for government departments. Monitored by the Treasury and PMDU 2006–10 when they were abolished

RI

Grading of school as ‘requires improvement’ by Ofsted

RSC

Regional Schools Commissioner (8). Announced 2013, appointed September 2014. Accountable since 2016 to the National Schools Commissioner. Responsible for monitoring academy performance, decisions on new academies and making recommendations to ministers on Free School applications. Meets the HTB twice-monthly. In June 2015 the role extended to tackling underperformance in maintained schools

SESI

School Effectiveness and School Improvement movement

SIP

School Improvement Partner. Introduced by the Labour Government in 2004 as part of the ‘The New Relationship with Schools’. A ‘critical friend’ allocated five days per school to provide advice and challenge. Abolished in 2010 by the Coalition government

xii SLE

Glossary Specialist Leader of Education. Introduced in the 2010 White Paper, SLEs are ‘outstanding’ senior or middle leaders with a particular area of expertise, employed in National Support Schools and TSAs, with a remit to work with other schools to build capacity

Sponsored Academy A formerly maintained school that gained academy status as a result of government intervention by converting under the aegis of a government-approved sponsor. Term retrospectively applied to city academies to distinguish them from other later types of academy. Under the Labour government it needed a private sponsor; under the Coalition a good or outstanding school can be a sponsor TSA

Teaching School Alliance (introduced in 2010)

Umbrella Trust

Charity established to offer services and support to a number of schools, not all of which must have academy status. The Umbrella Trust is not accountable for the performance of each school, each of which has its own governing body

Introduction

This book is about the activity of headteachers as ‘system leaders’, defined as ‘a headteacher working in a leadership position with schools other than their own’. It presents an account of the rise of system leadership as a global approach to both old and new challenges of governing public service delivery and the contestation around claims that system leadership evidences a change of governance towards increasing self-regulation of public services. System leadership is a practice heralded for more than a decade as a response to the global drivers of rapid economic, social and technological change and as a solution to the challenges of school improvement. It is a practice worth investigating. There has been a proliferation of and enthusiastic professional engagement with system leadership activity since the concept was introduced in the early 2000s. System leadership has maintained a high profile in education policy in several countries. It has played a major role in the radical structural diversification of the English education system and underpins claims for a ‘self-improving school system’ (SISS), a phenomenon which, it is suggested, ‘many countries are watching and some are already emulating’ (Robinson, 2017). However, despite its high profile over the past decade, system leadership is both under-theorized and open to differing interpretations. The challenge to adequately conceptualize system leadership was highlighted by Higham et  al. (2009). While governments, successful headteachers and academics endorsed system leadership activity, aligned in optimism about its potential to sustain a move from a highly centralized to a more open-networked education system, Higham et al. pointed to a ‘tension between system leadership being a national policy or a professional movement’ (148). Others (Hatcher, 2008:  25) have described system leaders as ‘a new top-level management cadre’ whose role is to ensure networks of schools align with government agendas. A number of studies have highlighted concerns, including an intensification of leadership roles (Earley, 2013); the segmentation of schools leading to an increasingly hierarchical system (Coldron et al., 2014); and a failure to resolve the persistent attainment

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gap between children of different social backgrounds (Alexander, 2011; Cousin, 2018). This book attempts to clarify the nature of system leadership by providing an account of how it works in practice. It draws on the findings of an eightyear empirical study (2009–17) conducted in England to offer both theoretical insights into the workings of policy and empirical examples of how headteachers have carried out or responded to system leadership. A range of data is discussed, including policy documents; semi-structured interviews with policy leaders, headteacher system leaders, headteachers they worked with and those ‘managing’ this activity at a mediating level; and performance data of the respondents’ schools. Chapter  1 outlines the theoretical approach taken to problematize the concept of system leadership in order to better understand its nature and practice. Delivering outcomes via others in a complex and adaptive system is not easy; governance literature attempts to theorize the mechanisms used by policymakers to achieve this. The book examines the nature of system leadership through the lens of public sector governance in order to critically examine its characteristics and impact and to generate new knowledge around the development of hybridized concepts of leadership and control in the area of school improvement. It explores the complex ways in which policy is responded to at the levels of individuals, institutions and localities, drawing on literatures on the policy process and policy-practice interactions. Chapter  2 details the policy background in England within which the system leaders have operated, tracing the evolution of system leadership across three terms of government: the Labour government (2001–10), the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government (2010–15) and the Conservative government elected in 2015. Chapter 3 presents rich narratives from the lived experience of several system leaders and those with whom they worked. It captures, in their own words, the daily realities of the challenges they faced. The system leader respondents are categorized into four ‘types’: the Protector, the Collaborator, the Hero-Head and the Auditor. From this data, a conceptual framework of the nature of system leadership interactions is detailed in Chapter  4. Tracking the journeys of system leaders and those they led, over the course of two governments and into a third, provides powerful insights into the interplay between personal philosophies and the governance environment within which they are played out, and the relative transformative powers of each. The nature of the power and trust operating within each of the four approaches is outlined, together with the type

Introduction

3

of learning each most commonly engenders. The conceptual framework raises questions on the strengths and weaknesses of evolving ‘new’ or ‘alternative’ forms of leadership, considered further in Chapter 6 in terms of implications for headteacher preparation and in-service professional development (PD). The roles of those leading the education system at the middle tier level, such as local authority (LA) CEOs or district superintendents, was not a primary focus of the empirical study, which aimed to provide a much-needed conceptualization of headteacher system leadership activity. However, any discussion of system reform would be incomplete without considering the nature and operation of the ‘middle tier’. Chapter 5 considers what can be learned from the data about different approaches to the management of education systems. This chapter is concerned with policy levers and mediating influences and draws together reflections on how the radical change to the governance of the English education system was achieved. For example, when the Thatcher government introduced grant-maintained schools in 1989, only 1,188 of the 24,500 state-maintained schools opted out of LA control despite incentives such as additional funding and freedom to create their own admissions policies (National Archives, 1999). In contrast, the Academies programme of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition government (2010–15) resulted in 3,516 schools opting for Academy status, which places them in a direct relationship with government and outside of LA control. At the start of 2018, 27 per cent of primary schools and 72 per cent of secondary schools in England were academies, giving an estimated 47 per cent of pupils taught in academies, outside of LA control (NAO, 2018: 4). The analysis offers an understanding of how such a radical shift came about. It assesses the consequences of a reduced LA role, the need for a ‘middle tier’ and the risks of not having one. The final chapter evaluates how far system leadership in England has fulfilled its early promise. It assesses the extent to which the reality of public sector leaders delivering system reform has matched the rhetoric that this heralded a new era in governance, an era where leadership of the education system is devolved to professionals. It considers how far the use of system leaders in England evidence the ‘genuine partnerships’ between policy and professionals advocated for successful public sector reform (Ringen, 2013; Cappon, 2015; OECD, 2015; Glatter, 2017). The conclusion offers eight learning points from the English experience. In presenting a detailed picture of the experiences of system leadership in England, it is hoped the book will make a useful contribution to future debates in countries considering their own approaches to this evolving leadership practice.

1

System Leaders: Leaders of a Profession, or Instruments of Government?

Introduction This chapter describes what is meant by system leadership and the global governance environment within which the concept was born and has flourished. It outlines the theoretical contestation around notions of system leadership and explains, in five propositions, the governance approach taken to problematize the concept so as to better understand its nature.

The global governance environment The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was established in 1961 and has a membership of thirty-five countries. Its mission is to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world . . . [and] to provide a forum in which governments can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to common problems. We work with governments to understand what drives economic, social and environmental change . . . We analyse and compare data to predict future trends. We set international standards on a wide range of things. (www.OECD .org, 2018)

In 2008, the OECD explained the importance of ‘system leadership’ thus: In many countries school leaders now have more autonomy, but it is coupled with greater accountability. [School leaders] must not only prepare all their students to participate successfully in the new global economy and society. They must take increasing responsibility for helping to develop other schools, their local communities and other public services. This means that school leaders must become system leaders. (Pont et al., 2008: 3)

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The OECD located ‘system leadership’ within the then common narrative of a global governance trend away from hierarchical central control towards selfregulation of a complex adaptive system (Kamarck, 2003; Kooiman, 2003; Ranson, 2003; Pollit and Bouckaert, 2004; PMSU, 2006; Lodge and Kalitowski, 2007; Hopkins, 2009). The rationale was that the growing complexity of the world made governing too difficult for traditional top-down approaches. The literatures mentioned above presented a normative view of governments searching for more effective approaches to public services delivery in response to the external drivers of globalization, new technologies and increasing societal complexity. They suggested a single global movement away from hierarchical command and control towards less bureaucratic, more open, integrated forms of governance, with greater reliance on public engagement and co-production. Such critiques offered a new model of governance suited to the challenges of the postmodern world, which signalled, they claimed, a decline in the power of the state. This concept of system leadership appears to have achieved a rare and global alignment of government, professional and academic ambitions. The OECD reported ‘significant system leadership activity’ (Pont et  al., 2008:  11) in five countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, England and Finland) and concluded that, although these approaches were at an early stage, significant emerging benefits included ‘the development of leadership capacity; rationalising of resources; increased cooperation; leadership being distributed further into schools and across education systems; improving school outcomes’. Academics offered new models of governance to theorize the trend. Kooiman (2003) summarized the shift as away from hierarchical command and control towards ‘steering’ or ‘shaping’, which was no longer solely the preserve of government but of a wide range of agencies. In Kooiman’s analysis, policy steering in this form is seen as a positive move towards ‘co-production’, indicating a lessening of state power in favour of greater democracy. Peters (2000) suggested such an interpretation may arise from the history in the Netherlands and Scandinavia of a strong tradition of dense networks and working towards a consensus. Ranson (2003) similarly described a governance journey in England from pre-Thatcher1 professionalism of legitimacy via expertise, through reduced professionalism via the new public management (NPM) of the Thatcher and post-Thatcher years, to a ‘new professionalism’ gained by informed and democratic consent. Ranson was

1

Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister (1979–90), Conservative government.

System Leaders

7

more detailed than Kooiman, particularly about NPM and its negative effects on professionals, but his presentation of post-Blair2 reforms is similarly benign. Leadership literature also claimed that system leadership was ‘a sign of the increasing professionalism with which school leadership is being regarded’ (Hopkins, 2009:  2). After a long history of teaching being treated as a ‘quasi-profession’ (Etzioni, 1969), successful headteachers and their professional associations welcomed system leadership as a legitimate extension of a headteacher’s career ladder, an acknowledgement of their expertise and evidence of a move towards professional self-regulation. Jopling et al. (2006: 1) described new opportunities for headteachers to ‘lead networks and lead the system [and] develop the strategic thinking, moral purpose and wider engagement increasingly identified as core characteristics of system leadership’. Headteachers described participation in these networks as empowering, an antidote to the isolation of the traditional role of headteacher. The Association of School and College Leaders (ASCL), the largest professional association in England for secondary headteachers, predicted that system leadership would ‘become a template for the future of school leadership, with leaders increasingly fulfilling their wider obligations by taking on one or more of these external responsibilities’ (Dunford, 2007: 7). For policy designers, the use of system leadership offered a new solution to the old challenge of ‘reforming education’, one of the ‘diffuse problems’ subject to implementation issues which often cause policies to fail (May, 2012: 281). As O’Leary and Craig (2007: 8) observed, the emergence of systems policies in the decade after 2000 was partly in recognition that ‘central prescription takes us only so far and decentralised policies don’t take us very far at all’. Policies began to be designed specifically to ‘motivate the expertise and energies of others behind clear outcomes’ (DfES, 2006: 5). Evaluations of early system leadership activity endorsed this optimism (Hopkins, 2007; Pont et  al., 2008; Hargreaves, 2010, 2011). Higham et  al. (2009:  10–14) acknowledged that this was contested terrain, with the results of their national survey showing only 11 per cent of the then current system leadership activity in England being professionally driven and the rest government-led. They nevertheless concluded that ‘the portents currently look good’ for a continued shift from national prescription to schools leading reform via system leadership.

2

Tony Blair, British Prime Minister (1997–2007), Labour government.

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System Leadership

So there existed, in 2009, a certain alignment of political, policy, professional and academic views of the world, a perspective which gave birth to system leadership as a potential means to ‘rebalance’ professional and political power. System leadership, it appeared, was a concept whose time had come.

Reconfiguring not relinquishing control For some commentators, the argument for a single trend from top-down control to the devolution of power to professionals was unconvincingly idealistic, insofar as it assumed rational rather than politically self-interested debate and action. Ranson (2003: 213) presented the potential of public participation adapted to an increasingly complex and differentiated society, describing accountability as close to Durkheim’s ‘dialogic accountability’. Such accounts failed to explore the exclusionary possibilities of ‘one consensus’. Peters (2000: 45) also suggested that they showed ‘too much faith in the self-organising capacities of people’ and questioned the basis for assuming that unguided networks would result in action, without the state as a guiding force. Several theorists (Rhodes, 1997; Jessop, 1998; Pierre and Peters, 2000) questioned the claim that state power had, in fragmenting, been weakened. They argued, rather, that other forms of control had been intensified and that state control had moved to ‘new sites of action’, but not lessened. Rhodes (1997) described how the freeing of service providers from state control, by marketization in the 1980s and 1990s, brought greater choice but also a fragmentation of service delivery and a proliferation of new forms of control such as frameworks, targets, performance indicators and increased regulation, an argument echoed by Newman (2001). Stoker (1998:  18) argued that government, while no longer having the power to command by authority, was still able to use ‘new tools and techniques to steer and guide’ to achieve what Rose (1996:  350) called ‘governing at a distance’. However, unlike Kooiman, Stoker interpreted this adaptation of the state’s capacity to direct or influence behaviour not as a relinquishment but a reconfiguration of state power. Peters (2000:  45) described the changes as ‘decentring outwards’, that is, state functions are dispersed through market and quasi-market mechanisms, outsourcing government functions to private sector companies and establishing agencies, Trusts and quangos to act as agents for government. Power is fragmented but control is maintained via strengthened performance and accountability measures, while accountability is shifted to the professionals. The emergence of ‘governance’ is evidence not of the decline of

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the state but ‘rather of the state’s ability to adapt to external challenges’ (Pierre, 2000: 3). The broad appeal of the normative narrative no doubt came from yoking together economic and social aims (Miliband, 2003; Pont et al., 2008). However, critical theorists were sceptical of the social democratic strand in the narrative, dismissed by Hall (2003: 3) as a ‘double-shuffle’ between the dominant neo-liberal3 strand and the subordinate social democratic strand, there to appease traditional Labour voters. Ball (2008: 11–12) warned that viewing education as a means of economic competitiveness was leading to a neglect of its social purposes. He argued the combined effects of market forces and managerialism were destroying the ethos of civic service, with consequent increases in inequality. Despite such warnings, the policy field has been dominated by the Global Educational Reform Movement (GERM) which, as Sahlberg (2011:  103) observed, had an explicit intention to align schools and education systems to the ‘operational logic of private corporations’. An emerging globalized education industry offered a range of services, including testing, tutoring, specialized knowledge management, new technologies and professional development (PD). Ball (2012:  112) outlined a complex interaction of networks of public and private interests in the education field: ‘The private sector now occupies a range of roles and relationships within the state and educational state in particular, as sponsors and benefactors, as well as working as contractors, consultants, advisers, researchers, service providers and so on and both sponsoring innovations (by philanthropic actions) and selling policy solutions and services to the state, sometimes in related ways’ (italics in original). So, competing conceptualizations exist of the claimed global governance trend from hierarchies, through marketization, to networks. Since the early 2000s, there has been an increasing focus in governance and policy literature on the role of networks, which, it has been argued (Rhodes, 1997), appear to be displacing both hierarchies and markets as a dominant form of governance. But all three forms continue to coexist. Ball and Junemann (2012: 5) described a ‘shift of balance’, arising from the need to address ‘wicked’ problems typically involving many stakeholders with different values and problems, which have long histories and tangled origins. Network governance, it is claimed, brings new solutions to bear.

3

Neo-liberalism:  political ideology of laissez-faire economic liberalism. Its characteristics are privatization, austerity, deregulation, free trade and reductions in government spending in order to increase the role of the private sector in the economy and society (Vincent, 2009: 339).

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Advocates claim that network governance provides a more democratic environment for consensus building, which in turn limits implementation resistance. Peters (2008:  3) described networks as a form of delegation which is not only a means to improve the efficiency of the public sector, but also ‘important for enhancing the democratic element of governing’. Critics argue that when policy processes become more dispersed and opaque, a democratic deficit is created because powerful interests are privileged in the policy process. Jessop (2011) argued that the state had achieved an enhancement of its capacity to project its influence and secure its objectives by mobilizing knowledge and power resources from influential non-governmental stakeholders. Coffield et al. (2008) claimed that unelected agencies in England, such as non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs), had an increasingly important place in steering policy and in creating a direct link between central government and schools, thereby bypassing locally elected government; they signalled a lessening of democratic governance, rather than a lessening of state control. Apple (2001: 410) described the myriad of players in the new governance environment as a ‘new alliance and new power bloc’, committed to neoliberal solutions to educational problems. Members, he suggested, include ‘neo-conservative intellectuals who want a “return” to higher standards and a “common culture”; authoritarian populist religious conservatives who are deeply worried about secularity and the preservation of their own traditions and fractions of the professionally and managerially oriented new middle classes who are committed to the ideology of accountability, measurement and managerialism’. Since 2010, England has been characterized by a rapid intensification of the trend towards multiplication of types of schools and governance structures through the acceleration of the academies programme and the growth of academy ‘chains’, federations and Trusts. There has also been an intensification of public accountability measures. This perspective calls into question Newman’s (2001) analysis of the governance environment as conflicted, by linking apparently contradictory discourses of fragmentation, markets and choice on the one hand and accountability, performance measures and standards on the other, into a mutually reinforcing environment grounded in neo-liberalism. Ball and Junemann (2012: 133) argue, following Jessop, that the new hybrid mix of networks, markets and bureaucracy is fashioned ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’. While the influence of some players is diminished – elected local government, public sector organizations, qualified practitioners and their unions – the power of the state is not. One of the clear advantages for

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‘the partnering state’ is that it can change its partners easily – programmes and initiatives can be ended, contracts reassigned, agencies closed: ‘The process of governance through networks is increasingly significant but always contingent’ (134). This impermanence, together with the ambiguous relationships and opaque accountabilities of network governance, make it an unstable means of managing state and society. The resultant instability has been noted as a major inhibitor of sustainable improvement (Robinson, 2012:  191; Cappon, 2015: 54). Advocates of system leadership welcomed it as an overdue recognition of headteachers’ expertise but Forrester and Gunter (2009:  79) claimed that the English government had used deliberate strategies to seduce headteachers, first, with symbolic capital of national recognition in speeches, honours, higher pay and a training college, and, second, by their promotion as the linchpin of school improvement (which they dismiss as a ‘doxa’). Such positive attention, they warned, ‘can mean that headteachers misrecognise how this deflects attention away from the coercive force of performance audits’. Bangs et al. (2011: 57) also record, from their policy interviews, the government’s ‘determination’ to turn headteachers into its levers for improvement. In summary, there is a body of literature which contests the claim for a single direction of travel towards state devolution of power, arguing instead that the ‘shift’ in approach from direct to more diffuse control renders a tighter government grip on action which, through a lack of transparency, becomes harder to challenge. This analysis of the implementation of system leadership in the English secondary school system was conducted within precisely this contested environment.

Conceptual approach The contestation outlined above raises several questions about the theory and practice of system leadership, which this book addresses. Are system leaders leading the education profession towards greater self-governance or operating as the instruments of government in their quest to gain tighter control of professional agency? Who leads self-governing networks? How do system leaders provide direction while maintaining democratic rule in a devolved system? To whom are they accountable? In order to answer such questions, an empirical study (2009–17) examined the nature of system leadership through the lens of public

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sector governance. Exploring system leadership roles from the contested perspectives of governance raises questions not explored in the mainly normative literatures on system leadership and brings a critical perspective to successive governments’ use of the same mechanism. This book explores how far the evidence supports the rhetoric of system leaders as autonomous professionals, guided by a cohesive moral purpose, operating leadership in an increasingly self-regulated system. It considers the contention that they are acting on behalf of government as a means of arm’s-length control and seeks to illuminate the ways policy and practice interact in a complex adaptive system of governance. The mainly normative literature on system leadership (Fullan, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007; Hopkins, 2007; Collarbone and West-Burnham, 2008; Hill and Matthews, 2008, 2010; Pont et al., 2008) promotes the contribution of successful leaders to leadership of the wider system as both positive and a moral imperative. Higham et  al. (2009:  ix) suggested system leadership represents ‘a potentially radical shift in the landscape of education’. The study arose from a concern that the concept of ‘system leadership’ presented in these literatures was not yet fully theorized in either its enactment or its purpose. In particular, the perspective of the headteachers ‘in receipt of ’ the system leader’s support and the nature of the interactions between them remained a ‘blind spot’ (after Hallinger and Heck, 1996), neglected in the literatures. This book reports the findings from an attempt to problematize the concept in order to properly debate its use by successive governments as a particular kind of policy instrument within what has been characterized variously as a ‘top-down’ governance environment (e.g. Coffield et al., 2008) and a contested governance environment (Newman, 2001).

A governance perspective As Judge et al. (2002: 3) suggest, conceptual frameworks ‘provide a language and frame of reference through which reality can be examined and lead theorists to ask questions that might not otherwise occur’. Acknowledging the contested nature of ‘governance’, this section outlines in five propositions the theoretical underpinnings of a governance framework, drawing together the above literature with literatures on the policy process and implementation: Ball (1990, 1994, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2015); Bowe et al. (1992); Spours et al. (2007). The discussion locates governance theory in attempts to understand

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a posited global trend towards new ways of governing, outlining the contested nature of modern approaches to governance. It presents a view of policy implementation as complex and dynamic, rather than rational and linear, exploring both practitioner responses and government’s attempts to steer them.

Proposition 1: ‘governance’ is a complex and contested concept It is, firstly, important to acknowledge that ‘governance’ is a concept which, although overused, is both contested and under-theorised. (Newman, 2001: 22)

Governance studies appeared in the 1990s, when the social science community, among others, became interested in what they perceived as a change in behaviour and style of governing (Stoker, 1998). Although dictionary definitions still treat the terms as synonyms, these studies distinguish ‘government’ from ‘governance’. A review of the literature uncovers a range of uses and meanings of the term ‘governance’: there is greater consensus on its eclectic nature than on a single defining approach (Rhodes, 1997; Jessop, 1998, 2011; Pierre and Peters, 2000). Newman (2001: 12) describes it as a ‘rather promiscuous concept’ because of its links to a ‘wide range of theoretical perspectives and policy approaches’. There is, however, consensus among theorists from different disciplines that there have been significant changes in approaches to governing and that ‘governance’ frameworks provide a useful way of making sense of them. They present definitions based on the need to distinguish ‘traditional’ from ‘new’ forms of governing: [G]overnance is used in a range of practitioner and academic settings in an attempt to capture a shift in thinking and ways of working. (Stoker, 1998: 17–18) [G]overnance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing. (Rhodes, 1996: 652) [Governance is] a shift in the centre of gravity around which policy cycles move. (Jessop, 1998: 32) (italics in the quotations are mine)

Kooiman’s (2000, 2003)  model to aid conceptualization of the suggested shift in governance offers the concepts of governance levels and steering instruments to provide a means of talking about the relationship between government and the system and the mechanisms by which government can influence others to deliver its objectives. He distinguishes three ‘orders’ of governance which are relatively easy to apply to the English education system (the examples given

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are mine). First-order governing aims to solve problems directly. This might apply to policies which are aimed at specific ‘problems’, such as obesity or poor literacy levels. Governing at this level alone leads to a plethora of disconnected initiatives being fed into a complex system without adequate consideration of how the elements of the ‘system’ will react; as well as issues concerning national solutions to local problems and the inability of practitioners to respond to the priorities of their own local circumstances. Kooiman’s second-order governing attempts to ‘influence the conditions under which first order problem solving . . . takes place’; it applies to the ‘structural conditions’ of first-order governing (Kooiman, 2000: 154). This might move us towards a systems or network approach to governance where, for example, rather than a national literacy strategy imposed by the centre directly upon teachers in classrooms, teaching of literacy might be improved by addressing wider system elements such as teacher training courses and qualifications within a standards framework. Third-order governing, ‘the total effort of a system to govern itself ’ (Kooiman, 2000: 160), describes a more mature system, where improvement comes about through educationalists holding each other to account in professional discourses, rather than being performance managed by audit and inspection. One weakness in the ‘single direction of travel’ model is that, as Kooiman and Van Vliet (1993) acknowledge, heterarchical (shared) forms of governance coexist with more hierarchical forms. Characteristics of all three ‘levels’ can be seen to coexist in the English education system:  a plethora of initiatives (first order); increased use of frameworks and standards (second order) and, possibly, a move towards self-regulation (third order). So, Kooiman’s analysis of a governance trend away from centralized control via systems governance towards a self-governing system is attractive in its simplicity and clarity, but remains too abstract to capture the current complexity of the English education system. Critical theorists have questioned the normative assumptions of accounts of governance which claim a lessening of state power, placing the term and studies around it within a particular style of governing. Hall (2003: 3) concurred with the above definitions that ‘governance’ is not a synonym for ‘government’ but, eschewing normative perspectives, gave a post-Gramscian view of its use as ‘the signifier of a new process of governing, a changed condition of ordered rule, specifically designed to blur the difference between state and civil society’. Calling the term ‘another shifty New Labour concept’, he placed the concept itself, regardless of ‘mode’ of governance, within neo-liberal ideology; a way of

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using language to gain public support for a relentless drive towards the aims of market fundamentalism. Ball (2007) demonstrated how education had become ‘big business’, insisting the market freedom introduced by the Labour government was more pernicious than Thatcher marketization because, in the latter, public sector managers were in control of the quasi-markets whereas the move since the early 2000s has been towards releasing control of state-funded services to corporations. He warned that corporate accountability ‘atomises the public and empowers sectional interests’ (10). At the same time, the ‘education policy field’ has expanded to become global. Ball (2012) described how space has opened up for edu-businesses and policy entrepreneurs to ‘sell’ their solutions to global and national policy problems in the academic and political marketplace. One consequence of this globalization is that international comparison has become central to governance on both national and global scales. Martens et al. (2007) trace the mutually reinforcing trends of the growing activity of international organizations in education policymaking and the increasing marketization of the field of education. They claimed the OECD and World Bank are ‘guardians of the leading position of capitalist countries’ (6) and that comparative studies have allowed the OECD to develop new governance capacities, giving an example of how data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) showing Germany was falling in OECD rankings of student performance led to a reorganization of education in Germany, without questioning how far what PISA measures matters for Germany. In England, Gunter and McGinity (2014:  4) claimed the Coalition government legitimated the drive for academy expansion with reference to ‘rigorous international evidence [of] autonomy-driven improvement’.

Proposition 2: governance refers to a set of institutions and actors that include those in formal positions of government and those acting in roles beyond government Rose (1996:  350) described ‘governing at a distance’:  ‘In a plethora of quasiautonomous units, associations and intermediate organisations, experts are allocated new responsibilities and new mechanisms are deployed for the management of professional expertise “at a distance”  – that is, outside the machinery of bureaucracy that previously bounded experts into devices for the government of “the social”.’ Stoker (1998: 19) cited this as his first principle

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of governance, explaining:  ‘the first message of governance is to challenge constitutional, formal understandings of systems of government’. There is a consensus in governance literature, supported by official records, that governance is the domain of a large number and type of agencies: there is less consensus about the nature and implications of this in terms of the relationships between government and governed and the nature of the mediating agencies and agents. The issues involved in governing at a distance are exemplified by the nature of arm’s-lengths bodies (ALBs). In England, the Cabinet Office is responsible for the classification of and reporting on public bodies and has, since 1980, published an annual report on the ‘public body sector’ giving statistical information on staffing, funding and expenditure. In 2009, it recorded that over 110,000 non– civil servants were employed in recognized NDPBs, at a cost of £46.5 billion of government funds (Cabinet Office, 2009). The classification of categories of public bodies was published in a guide for departments in 2006 and is updated following the election of new governments. These documents define the range of organizations to which government responsibilities can be devolved, which have varying degrees of closeness to ministers. The term ‘non-departmental public body’ or NDPB was coined in the Plaitsky report of 1980:  ‘[G]overnment departments in their own right  – [which] carry out their work at arm’s length from Ministers, although Ministers are ultimately responsible to Parliament for the activities of bodies sponsored by their department.’ There are four categories of NDPBs, sometimes called ‘quangos’: executive bodies carry out a wide range of operational and regulatory functions and have a regional or national remit; advisory bodies, groups of experts, advise on a specific issue; tribunals have a judicial or quasi-judicial function; and independent monitoring boards are mainly for prisons and immigration. NDPBs are distinct from executive agencies, which are part of a government department and provide services but do not decide policy, which is the role of the department that oversees them. Executive agencies, once established, can only be dissolved following a full review. As the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) commented in 1999, there are good reasons for the continued existence of NDPBs, which perform useful functions. By dividing the functional responsibilities of the state among a range of single purpose agencies, a government is able to ‘de-politicize’ service delivery and develop specialist skills, confirming Pliatsky’s earlier arguments as to why governments create NDPBs. Nevertheless, ALBs have been problematic, mainly due to confusion over definitions and blurring of responsibilities. In 1999 the PASC called for ‘greater

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clarity and consistency’ to be brought to the ‘confusing network of bodies which play a crucial role in British Government’. The Flinders report (2002: 3) found:  ‘nobody knows exactly how many quangos exist’. In January 2011 PASC was still drawing attention to ‘the complex and confusing nature of the public bodies’ landscape’, concluding: ‘simplifying this set-up is not a matter of administrative tidiness but a necessary step to ensure the accountability and effectiveness of these organisations. The current system is chaotic’. A second problem is the size and cost of the ‘quango state’, the source of perennial cross-party concern. The debate around the high cost of ALBs and the lack of democratic accountability is well-rehearsed: ‘The main bodies of central and local government are directly accountable to the people through elections and through Parliament. Quangos, despite the amount that they do and the importance of what they do, are not. Their accountability lies instead to those (who may be Ministers or other organisations) who established them’ (Cabinet Office, 1999). Labour’s 2009 ‘Smarter Government’ White Paper made an explicit commitment to reductions; the number of ALBs fell from 827 in 2007 to 766 in 2009 (Cabinet Office, 2009). However, Gash et al. (2010) argued that cutting the number of quangos would not necessarily lead to a reduction in their costs, since much of the money ‘spent’ by NDPBs consists of grants passed onto others. They advised against mergers, reporting significant costs and disruption resulting from past government reorganizations – more than £750 million in direct costs over four years from 2005 to 2009 – and that ALBs can offer a way of bringing expert advice to policymakers at lower cost than through consultancy contracts. The main issue remains one of accountability. Civil servants operate within an organization, traditionally a department, headed by a minister who is accountable to Parliament between elections and to the public at elections. NDPBs are established precisely to avoid ministerial involvement – operating at arm’s length from the ministerial department. However, this distance can also translate into a lack of direct democratic accountability for the actions, effectiveness and efficiency of ALBs. For example, in the 1960s, the Fulton Report (Fulton, 1968: 29) noted the increase in the numbers of public bodies raised ‘parliamentary and constitutional issues [possibly affecting the] answerability for sensitive matters such as social and educational services’ and recommended ‘an early and thorough review of the whole question’. Such a review failed to take place. The Coalition government in 2010 announced its intention to undertake a full review and The Public Bodies Bill 2010–11 gave ministers the power, by order, to abolish, merge and transfer functions to and from 481 public bodies. An analysis signals the nature of the changed governance relationship between the education

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sector and the government and, thus, the changes in the governance relationship of system leaders with ministers. The selection of respondents for the study included, in 2009, those who worked for NDPBs and for more independent membership bodies. The second phase of fieldwork in 2012 investigated how governance changes were affecting the choice and enactment of system leadership roles, as the NDPB accrediting system leaders (the National College for School Leadership, NCSL) became an executive agency; a non-NDPB (the Specialist Schools and Academies Trust, SSAT) who commissioned them went into administration; and local authorities (LAs), which brokered school-toschool partnerships, lost their remit to do so. The PASC (2011, para 96) concluded: The Government has not made the case that these reforms will improve accountability. We believe that its narrow definition of accountability has inhibited its ability to develop mechanisms that will actually deliver a more responsible and transparent system. We sympathise with the desire of ministers to have direct responsibility for functions for which they are likely to be held account. But we also believe that bringing functions back into sponsor departments is likely to undermine other channels of accountability, particularly with relevant stakeholder groups. This will mean less effective accountability and challenge on a day-to-day basis.

The extension of policymaking to those outside of government has not been limited over this period to realigning institutions and structures but has widened to include academic research and education professionals. The Blair government’s modernization agenda focused on a ‘concern with policy delivery as much as with policy development’ and ‘an equal concern for practice to be informed by evidence’ (Solesbury, 2001:  4). Their manifesto outlined their pragmatism:  ‘What counts is what works’ (Labour Party, 1997). Solesbury (2001: 6) claimed ‘new knowledge requirements’ led to a stance which was suspicious of many established influences on policy, particularly within the civil service and anxious to open up policy thinking to outsiders. Hence the appointment of specialist advisers. Hence, too, the creation of new outfits like the Performance and Innovation Unit under Geoff Mulgan (ex of the Demos think tank), the Centre for Management and Policy Studies under Ron Amann (formerly of the ESRC) and the Social Exclusion Unit under Moira Wallace.

In education, Standards Units were headed by practitioners (Jane Williams, ex-college principal led the post-16 standards unit) and academics (Professor Hopkins became Professor Barber’s successor for Schools Standards).

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There has also been an increasing blurring of boundaries between state- and non-state-funded agencies involved in ‘steering and guiding’. Ball (2008, 2013) illuminates the role of edu-businesses and philanthropic trusts which have joined supranational, multilateral agencies and non-governmental organizations, including the OECD, the World Bank and UNESCO, as key players in the expanded global field. This ‘policy ensemble’ creates a global consciousness or mode of cultural reproduction which leads to a convergence of policy pressures on national schooling systems. Ball and Junemann (2012) applied network ethnography, a method of mapping the form and content of policy relations in a particular field, to the English education system. The resulting picture is a complex range of ‘policy communities’ (9) on a continuum from integrated, stable and exclusive policy networks to loosely connected communities with members who are often in conflict. These new networks ‘expand the territory of influence [so that] . . . the topology of policy is changed’ (78). Wealth and particular social and moral capital (e.g. philanthropists) have privileged access to influence and control. The mapping drew on network theory’s concept of ‘nodal’ actors, adept at networking, spanning boundaries and accumulating valuable information, to show how interests are often connected by key actors who are influential across several ‘policy communities’. These new ‘policy lions’ include sponsors of multischool organizations, such as Ark; leaders of new social enterprises, such as Teach First; and charities, such as the New Schools Network, established in 2009 by a former adviser to Conservative ministers, funded from a mix of individual donors, charitable trusts and public grants. The concept of nodal actors was used by Hargreaves (2010) with reference to strong ‘alliance competences’ required of system leaders, and by Hill (2011: 6) in his description of some system leaders who have a large share of influence at the centre of a network. An early analysis of requirements of system leaders (Collarbone and West-Burnham, 2008:  88) also referred to Gladwell’s (2000) concept of ‘connectors’, people who have large personal and professional networks. It is possible to view headteacher system leaders as part of the increasingly networked, complex governance system of education.

Proposition 3: governance depends upon new tools and techniques to steer and guide The second proposition considered the range of influences and actors involved in governing at a distance. This proposition considers how government maintains

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control of what they do. Kooiman (1993) suggested that in shifting from a command/control relationship with the public sector, government depends upon ‘governance steering instruments’ to guide action in the system to deliver desired outcomes. The term ‘instrument’ is sometimes used synonymously with ‘lever’ (e.g. Steer et al., 2007: 4); sometimes ‘lever’ is used to refer more narrowly to those mechanisms associated with accountability, for example, funding, audit and inspection (Coffield et  al., 2008). These studies raise questions about the appropriateness of an engineering metaphor when there is little evidence to suggest that professionals react to policy in simple and predictable ways. In this book, the term ‘instrument’ is used, after Kooiman, to include the whole range of mechanisms at the disposal of government to ‘steer’ the system. One way of placing available instruments within a conceptual framework might be to ‘rank’ them on a continuum which ranges from the ‘hard’ or ‘strong’ instruments to those with ‘weak’ power (after Mulgan, 1994). Such a list would start with:  legislation and funding; continue through a range of performance management tools such as targets, audit, inspection and the publication of measures (e.g. league tables and examination results); move onto capabilitybuilding instruments such as in-service training; to instruments of the ‘market’, which work on increasing demand such as financial incentives, user choice, ‘free’ resources and advertising campaigns to ‘steer’ public opinion. A second possibility might be to use ‘typologies’, as in the model produced by the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (PMSU) (2006), which can be seen as an explicit attempt to experiment with a wider range of approaches to governing the delivery of public services. It signals, if not a shift from Kooiman’s first- to third-order governance, a shift from centralized to more diffuse control. Written to encourage departments across Whitehall to take a different approach to policymaking and system management, it claimed to move in the same ‘direction of travel’, acknowledging that the state is only one player in a system in which others operate with varying degrees of formal and informal autonomy. Since the state is dependent upon these others to deliver public services, working with them in ‘heterarchical’ governance (sharing power) is likely to achieve more than working in hierarchical relationships. A range of ‘steering’ actions, including ‘co-production, co-regulation, co-steering, cooperative management’, as well as public-private partnerships appear in the PMSU publication, offering some evidence to support claims of a ‘trend’ in governance approaches towards increased partnership. The PMSU model mapped four directions from which public services can be influenced, alongside the types of ‘leverage’ which are seen as operating in each

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of the four dimensions. The first is ‘top-down performance management’, which depends upon targets; regulation and standard setting; performance assessment, including inspection and direct intervention (in cases of failure to deliver). The report acknowledges that ‘top down performance management has limitations [including] increased bureaucracy, the creation of perverse incentives and the stifling of innovation . . . the Government has taken steps to design the system in a way that maximises performance improvements’ (PMSU, 2006:  6). Three additional directions of influence are intended to counter the limitations of a purely top-down model. Market incentives offer:  ‘improved efficiency, higher quality of service and incentives to innovate and share best practice’. Competition, contestability and the commissioning of services are the instruments to be used in influencing from this direction. The dangers of purely market-driven incentives are listed:  undermining the public services ethos and the ability of the better-off to maximize advantages of the market in ways not accessible to the socially less advantaged, thus running counter to the government’s agenda for increased equity. The third approach is via ‘users shaping services from below’. This is achieved through user choice and personalization; funding following users’ choices and engaging users through voice and co-production. Summarized as ‘bottom up pressure through choice and voice’ (8), the aim is to encourage more responsive services; but the report describes the benefits using language which suggests, rather than active participation on the part of users, a ‘done-to’ activity:  ‘choice-based mechanisms can lead to better matching of users to services’. The fourth direction of influence on public service deliverers is ‘capability and capacity building’, through steering instruments such as: leadership development; workforce development and reform – a suite of reforms similar to Kooiman’s second-order governing. The use of successful headteachers to work with less successful schools and the incentivization of schools to collaborate to achieve higher performance and innovation are key instruments under capacity-building. Consideration of the language and presentation of the arguments by the PMSU suggests an unintended irony in the presentation of a public sector reform model which claims to address the limitations of a top-down performance management approach in a language and perspective which is directive and where concepts such as ‘co-production’ are defined as ‘a more active role for the citizen either in directly delivering a public service or in changing their behaviour in ways that contribute to the ultimate outcomes the service exists to deliver e.g. changes in diet that lead to better health’ (PMSU, 2006: 8). Nevertheless, the report was an attempt to address the realization that the Labour government had in its first

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term focused its power on strengthening performance management and market incentives and that insufficient attention had so far (in 2006) been given to the ‘capability’ and ‘users’ dimensions. The PMSU (2006:  3) model offers the four directions of influence for simultaneous consideration by policymakers as they attempt to shape the system to deliver government objectives:  ‘[T]he UK Government’s current approach to public service reform combines pressure from government; pressure from citizens (choice and voice); competitive provision; and measures to build the capability and capacity of civil and public servants and central and local government.’ It concludes that benefits can be maximized and risks minimized if ‘careful attention is paid to getting the detailed design conditions right . . . different element of the model will have differing weight depending on the service it is being applied to’. There is no guidance on how to get the detailed design conditions right:  the range of choices are presented as a ‘toolbox’ (a common metaphor for Labour’s approach to the modernization of public services) (Newman, 2001). Barber’s (2007) post-hoc summary of the Labour government’s attempts to modernize public services presented a tripartite model for large-scale system reform which, unlike the eclectic approach of the PMSU model, attempted to match governance approach to the ‘maturity’ of the system. He rationalized the Labour government’s early ‘command-and-control’ as necessitated by the urgency of the requirement to shift the service rapidly from ‘awful’ to ‘adequate’. On the next stage of the improvement journey, because ‘you cannot mandate greatness [you] unleash frontline managers and hold them to account’ (performance management) and enable ‘users’ to drive the improvement through operating choice (quasi-markets). Once schools become good, funding is devolved to school level, headteachers are given extensive operational authority and results are published (devolution and transparency). Barber was unapologetic about the necessary role of the state as interventionist, whereas the PMSU document suggests reliance on this approach alone has serious weaknesses. Despite attempts to move from policy levers to less centralist policy frameworks (e.g. Every Child Matters, Cabinet Office, 2003), policy ‘levers’ remained dominant. Pollit (2006) found the United Kingdom distinctive in the importance attributed to performance indicators. For example, Public Service Agreement targets from 1998  ‘arguably took the target approach at the top level of government to a point hardly seen since the demise of the USSR’ (96). The United Kingdom was also a pioneer in developing from the late 1980s’ government-mandated leagues of secondary and primary school examination

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performance originating in the Education Reform Act (ERA), 1988, first published for secondary schools in 1992 and primary schools in 1997. Official publication of such ranking tables was abandoned in the 2000s in Wales and Northern Ireland, reduced in Scotland but maintained in England. Pollit (2006:  97) linked these findings to the degree of centralization  – England is the most centralized country in Europe in the sense of having no elected levels of government between parliament and LAs, which creates conditions in which central government has both the motive and opportunity to develop elaborate target and league tables systems in a way less likely to apply in less centralized countries, and the conditions for a more developed managerial transfer market for players such as health trust chief executives or school ‘superheads’. He suggested a degree of relational distance between those heading delivery agencies and the central establishment allows for the use of ‘terror’ in measured performance systems in a way that is harder in smaller societies with more tightly linked and overlapping political and social elites. The Economic and Social Research Council’s (ESRC) five-year research programme into public service performance (Hood, 2007:  100–101) offers a categorization of types of public service management, all found in the English education system. ‘Management by numbers’ comes in three forms:  targets systems (measure actual performance against one or more specified aspirational standards); ranking systems (measure performance of comparable units against one another – as information to inform user choice or for action by government); and intelligence systems (provide background detail to develop learning capacity and diagnostic power). Hood and Pollit both referenced Goodhart’s Law:  ‘any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed on it for control purposes’ (1984: 94, cited in Pollit, 2006). So we might expect that, when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a valid measure. Performance measures are also subject to ‘gaming’, in the sense of hitting the target but missing the point or reducing performance where targets do not apply. An example is the neglect of students at each end of the performance spectrum in favour of those around the GCSE C/D borderline, as the ‘main metric’ (Burgess et al., 2005). To counter this, a succession of measures has been introduced to take account of rates of progress of all students, such as the ‘Progress 8’ measure introduced in 2016 which ‘measures the achievement of a pupil across 8 qualifications including mathematics (double weighted) and English (double weighted), 3 further qualifications that count in the English Baccalaureate (EBacc) measure and 3 further qualifications that can be GCSE qualifications (including EBacc subjects) or any other non-GCSE qualifications on the DfE approved list’ (DfE, 2016b: 2).

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Proposition 4: governance recognizes power in the Foucauldian sense of ‘circulating’ between mutually dependent actors Foucault (1980) challenged the concept of power as located in structures or roles, suggesting instead that power is dispersed, embodied in discourse, knowledge and ‘regimes of truth’ which produce boundaries that enable or constrain possibilities for action. Power is not repressive, wielded by certain individuals over others or by a coercive state; but power produces reality, resides in a state of flux and can be challenged and negotiated. One way of considering the increased number of actors and the use of an increasing range of governance instruments is as an acknowledgement by government of weaknesses in the traditional policy processes which envisage ‘power’ as residing in the state. Political and government reform studies have struggled with the awareness of the persistent tension between the wish for authoritative action and dependence upon the compliance and actions of others (Rhodes, 1996); policy implementation studies have attempted analyses of why the system is ‘littered’ with failed attempts to take reform to scale (Coburn, 2003), and researchers have analysed the response strategies of teachers and managers to government initiatives (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Hoyle and Wallace, 2005; Hodgson and Spours, 2006). Governance studies acknowledge attempts by the state to regulate social activity:  ‘Government concerns not only practices of government but also practices of the self. To analyse government is to analyse those processes that try to shape, sculpt, mobilise and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups’ (Dean, 1999: 12). These studies present a mainly reactive perspective and there remains insufficient attention to the concept of professional agency: ‘Much of the work on governance tends to dissolve notions of power and agency’ (Newman, 2001: 20). Ball’s (2012, 2013, 2015) later work, influenced by his readings of Foucault, returns to this question. The traditional process by which governments translate their political vision into programmes to deliver ‘outcomes’ – desired changes – in the real world has been policymaking and implementation via the ‘hard’ levers of legislation and funding (see, e.g., the ‘Modernising Government’ White Paper, Cabinet Office, 1999). However, Ball’s (1990, 1994) post-structural critiques of policy describe the policy process as dynamic, irrational and non-sequential:  ‘there is ad hocery, negotiation and serendipity within the policy formulation process’ (Ball, 1994: 16). Ball’s 1990s trilogy (Ball, 1990, 1994; Bowe et al., 1992) sets what has

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been termed the ‘foundational canon of policy sociology in education’ (Lingard and Sellar, 2013:  267). This rejected the unidirectional account of policy as linear, rational and normative, and reconceptualized it as multidirectional and interactive across three contexts: influence, text production and practice (which in later works he termed ‘policy enactment’). The context of influence describes how ‘key policy concepts are established (e.g. National Curriculum, opting-out), acquire currency and credence and provide a discourse and lexicon for policy initiation’ (Bowe et al., 1992: 20). In other words, an important part of the policy process is trialling a policy idea among the key opinion formers upon whose backing it depends before it is formally encapsulated into written policy. This challenged assumptions that policy formation is a separate activity from policy implementation: ‘the policy process is one of complexity . . . of policy making and remaking’ (23), stressing the iterative nature of the three contexts. In effect, they presented a challenge to the notion of a state-enforced approach to policy which predates debates about ‘governance’. The concept of policy ‘translation’ or ‘mediation’ attempts to take account of the ‘power’ residing in the agency of actors in a multilevel system. Policy documents issued by government departments are often rewritten by agencies of government into statements of guidance and again by institutional managements into internal policy documents. This chain of translations means the concerns and contextual constraints of those ‘reinterpreting’ the text can result in both slippages in meaning throughout the policy cycle and in space for professionals within which to manoeuvre. In terms of power and influence, this representation of the policy process illuminates how practitioners at different levels of the system might have a privileged position at different points in the policy cycle and how space can open up at the point of enactment for practitioner agency to resist, accommodate or subvert government intent. The approach to policy as constituted of possibilities allows for a discussion of how value dispute and material influence work in a complex multilevel system, although writers give little empirical evidence of how professionals use that influence. Elmore (2004) summarizes decades of research into policy implementation, describing the difficulties in sustaining change in a multilevel system characterized by multiple and shifting priorities. His research offers ideas to flesh out Ball’s concept of ‘space’. He points to the value-driven nature of teaching and suggests the need for ‘normative coherence’, the collective acceptance of new approaches, across school, district and the broader system, for reform to be

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sustained. Coburn (2003) suggests a key mechanism for developing normative coherence is the spread of norms and beliefs, particularly important for reforms that challenge conventional or institutionalized behaviour. Her contention is teachers resist reforms which are contrary to the values and beliefs about their role and their relationship with students. Spillane’s (2000: 163) empirical work supports this, describing how teachers draw on their prior knowledge, beliefs and experiences to interpret and enact reforms, so they gravitate towards approaches that are congruent with their prior practices or focus on surface manifestations (discrete activities, classroom organization) rather than deeper pedagogical principles Thus, reaching the classroom cannot be taken for granted by policymakers, despite attempts to do so in highly prescriptive initiatives such as Labour’s National Strategies Programme. The issue of reform ownership features frequently in studies of why policy reform fails to have the desired impact on professional behaviour. Hargreaves and Fullan (2008) distinguish ‘outside-in’ reform, from ‘inside-out’ reform, which stems from the profession. Such reform is more than ‘buy-in’ or acceptance of externally imposed change; longer-term sustainability requires compatibility between the normative base of the reform and that of the classroom, school or locality in which it is implemented, including the capability of those implementing it. In this sense, it acknowledges the challenge for leaders attempting to bring change in sites which do not share the norms of the changed behaviours. It is possible that ‘system leadership’ gained traction partly because the headteachers delivering it have authority within the system. Fullan (2005) called system thinkers a ‘new breed of leader’. After a period where greater performance management and public accountability led to incremental improvements which have proved too little and often temporary, he added his voice to those arguing the moral imperative of successful headteachers to take on system leadership by claiming this as the answer to ‘sustainable’ improvement. Hoyle and Wallace (2005) pointed to the reducing scope for leaders to live with the ironies of organizational life as educational reforms have increasingly sought to eliminate ambiguity by tight specification, tight surveillance and punitive consequences for failure – a description of the governance environment in line with Newman’s (2001). They characterized headteachers as ‘sceptical’ towards government policy, but pragmatic in implementation and cited examples of heads using government strictures to improve pockets of poor performance in their school. Their study offers a useful taxonomy of modes of adaptation, citing

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three overarching strategies. The first is ‘compliance’, whereby headteachers accept both the aims and the means of government policy; ‘willing compliers’ are typically ambitious, recently promoted or aspiring to promotion; ‘strategic’ or ‘unwilling’ compliers apply a type of ‘artful pragmatism’. The second ‘mediation’ is where professionals make positive attempts to transform aims and means within the constraints of policy and school structures. These are Hoyle and Wallace’s (2005: 157) ‘heroines and heroes’ who neither opt out nor rebel but seek to work around policy for the benefit of their school and students. Hoyle and Wallace describe education as essentially an adaptive social institution; those involved have only limited agency in relation to the much more powerful constituents of their environment which delimit their room for manoeuvre:  politics, the economy, culture, the media and technological development. The third response is ‘non-compliance’, which ranges from defiant rejection to passive optingout, or ‘retreatism’, where teachers submit to the imposed changes without any change in their own ideology, leading eventually to resentment, demoralization and alienation. The taxonomy is useful; however, it is somewhat dated in its conclusion that no headteachers and few teachers are leaving the profession. It takes no account, for example, of potential ‘disengagement from leadership’ described by Earley et  al. (2002) as a serious sustainability issue as teachers abstain from taking on leadership posts in the current accountability climate. A  guide to school governors was published in response to the ‘national shortage of candidates for headship’ (NCSL, 2006: 9). Dunford (2007: 8) recorded that school leaders in England ‘have a very high degree of delegated responsibility [where] expectations have outgrown resources. Demands have outgrown energy . . . The system is crushing some good heads . . . they are resigning’. Higham et al. (2009) also cited a shortage of headteachers as one of the policy drivers for the growth of system leadership, enabling successful leaders to lead more than one school. Newman’s (2001:  32–3) analysis links response, not to individual policy initiatives, but to the overall governance regime: ‘effects of change programmes do not flow directly from the intentions of those designing modernisation programmes or specific policy initiatives, but from the way in which competing pressures are resolved on the ground. Tensions and dilemmas are not of mere academic interest but provide the key to understanding the lived experience of public sector staff ’. There is a need to conceptualize power and agency in discussions of policy/practice interactions. This book raises questions about the scope of professionals to respond to policy; introduces system leaders as

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a potential solution to policy challenges of managing those responses; and considers how policy discourses ‘recreate’ professionals’ group and self-identity.

Proposition 5: in modern Western democracies, models of governance are overlaid upon each other It has been argued that the description of a single linear global governance trend away from central control towards self-regulation fails to capture the complexities of current and recent governance environments. A conceptual framework to aid an understanding of system leadership needs to provide a means of explaining the complexity. Newman (2001) used organizational theory to illustrate how opposing approaches to governance, each with distinctive norms, values and expectations, coexist along a synchronic dimension, with resulting tensions. Her model of quadrants (33), based on Quinn’s (1988) framework for mapping the contradictions of organizational life, maps across two dimensions of difference – degree of centralization of power and degree of stability or innovation. She suggested tensions arise when governance approaches from diagonally opposite quadrants of the model are in play at the same time, for example, between governance arrangements oriented towards the creation of continuity, stability and sustainability and those intended to encourage innovation to respond to new economic pressures. Newman (2001:  36) acknowledged that decentralization of some forms of power (e.g. the management of schools) can coexist with the recentralization of others (e.g. control over the curriculum), claiming that ‘[g]overnments in liberal democracies tend to operate in all four quadrants. . . . however, each is based on distinctive values and assumptions, definitions of “effectiveness”. . . and institutional norms and expectations’. Since each model offers different definitions of the problems to be addressed and different assumptions about the nature of change and power, they are not readily compatible; the logics of appropriate action generated by one may well undermine the requirements of the other. A strength of this approach is the ability to capture the complexity and explain apparent tensions in governments’ attempt to modernize public services, offering a more powerful framework for analysis than those which present a single narrative of a linear trend from central control towards self-regulation. As successive governments seek ways of delivering similar or conflicting goals, they layer additional governance approaches onto existing ones, so that different models become overlaid.

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The conceptual model The conceptual and analytical framework, therefore, needed to have the capacity to capture the complexity of England’s educational governance system, to illuminate tensions arising from overlaid environments and to address the contested area of how far government has relinquished power. It needed not only to capture respondents’ perspectives on the governance environment but also how they negotiate their daily lives in interactions with each other, with those they lead and with national and regional policy and practice. It needed to be able to capture how professionals respond to changing dominant and subordinate government narratives across governments and allow an assessment of how far system leaders are ‘steering’ or ‘steered’ as they operate their agency. A framework was developed (Figure  1.1) consisting of two axes, adapting Newman’s use of Quinn’s model. The vertical axis, in line with the main theme of the study and arising from governance and policy literatures, allows the positioning of respondents’ comments on a continuum according to the degree to which power over the roles is perceived as centralized or devolved. The horizontal axis is intended to capture the degree of distributed leadership found in system leaders’ interactions with other leaders. Leadership literature offers a continuum of models, from those focused on the individual to those arguing for a ‘distributed’ perspective. A distributed approach was recommended: ‘system leadership will exert an influence only to the extent that it focuses on teaching

Decentralizaon

Direcve Leadership

Distributed Leadership

Centralizaon

Figure 1.1 Conceptual framework.

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and learning [and] shares its authority with others’ (Higham et al., 2009: 27), but it was also acknowledged (Day et al., 2010) that approaches may be contingent upon a school’s ‘phase’ of development, as well as a leader’s personal style, and that directive styles may deliver quicker results. The wealth of available literature on educational leadership reveals a degree of contestation around governmentsponsored conceptions of leadership as well as a ‘double-shuffle’ whereby a transformational style is promoted but a transmission style is sought (Hoyle and Wallace, 2005: 130–50). Governance and leadership literatures both point to the need for an analytical model with the capacity to capture possible tensions arising from the contradictions of competing demands in a conflicted environment. The embryonic model drawn from governance and leadership literatures was developed inductively over the course of the study to accommodate new insights from the detail of the case studies (see Figure 4.1).

Summary This chapter has demonstrated how a conceptual framework based on a governance approach can throw new light on the concept of system leadership. This is necessary because academic and policy literatures have presented a mainly normative view of system leadership as an effective means of school improvement; a moral imperative for successful school leaders; and evidence of a relinquishing of control by the centre to professionals. System leadership activity continues to gain momentum but remains under-theorized. Governance and leadership literatures identify recurring themes to inform the empirical analysis including issues of power and agency; moral purpose; trust; and a leadership focus on pedagogy and professional learning. Literatures on policy implementation and leadership stress the importance of interaction effects, highlighting the need for reform ownership and values alignment. The empirical study included, as well as headteachers acting as system leaders, headteachers they supported and policymakers, to add perspectives which deepen our insights into the interactions of system leadership in practice. The longitudinal design of the study (2009–17) captured a profound change in system leadership activity as it has developed across changing governance environments.

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The Evolution of System Leadership Policy in England

This chapter details the policy contexts within which system leaders have operated, illuminating the notion of policy upcycling, a borrowing to describe how elements of one political ideology are adapted for different political purposes by successive governments. It first outlines the main governance approaches of recent governments in England:  the Labour government of 2001–10; the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government of 2010–15; and the Conservative government elected in 2015 – the administrations within which system leadership has flourished in England. It moves on to detail a chronology of policies which adopted system leadership as a delivery mechanism, before concluding with a discussion of definitional issues.

The policy background Policy studies (Whitty, 2002) have recognized the necessity of providing an historical and wider contextual analysis for interpreting policymaking trends. This section summarizes findings from an operational mapping exercise (after Raffe et  al., 1998) carried out using published literature. It attempts to explain the origins and evolution of system leadership by first outlining the dominant governance approach of each government since the 1990s and then summarizing system leadership policies. By tracing elements of policy that have been ‘upcycled’ across parliaments, it aids our understanding of how system leadership has evolved. The term ‘upcycling’ describes the tendency to take up ideas used by previous governments, adapt them for different political purposes and present them with a new gloss.

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The pre-Thatcher era: the age of professionalism There appears to be a consensus (Newman, 2001; Ranson, 2003) that nothing was the same after Thatcher’s Conservative government (1979–90). The literature is relatively consistent in describing the existence of two ‘Ages’: the pre-Thatcher era or ‘age of professionalism’ and the post-Thatcher ‘neo-liberal age’. The first is characterized by the ‘state’ as a direct service provider governing by hierarchy and professionals enjoying a broad hegemonic basis for authority. (Hegemonic is used in the Gramscian sense of ‘the combination of force and consent which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent’ [Gramsci, 1971:  80]). The weaknesses of the hierarchy approach to governance were over-bureaucratic processes which consumed large amounts of public money and a lack of responsiveness to public needs or wants. The public were omitted from any part in a service exclusively the domain of ‘experts’. Solesbury (2001) called the loss of unquestioning public faith in professionals a ‘retreat from priesthood’ and suggested that, as informed consent has taken the place of trust in professional judgement, demand has grown for evidence to support practice. Whitty (2000) summarized attempts by sociologists in the 1950s and 1960s to identify characteristics of ‘professionals’, modelled on high-status professions such as medicine and law:  skills and theoretical knowledge; qualifications; a code of conduct; concern for the public good, not self-interest; and powerful organization including the ability to recruit. An important characteristic was the self-governing nature of professions. Assessments of teaching against such criteria found it wanting:  Etzioni (1969) concluded teaching was a ‘quasi’ or ‘semi’ profession. The ‘professionalization project’ was born (defined by Whitty as the attempt to gain those characteristics).

The Thatcher, or ‘neo-liberal’ era Many commentators (e.g. Rhodes, 1997; Newman, 2001; Ranson, 2003) describe how, during the Thatcher governments of the 1980s and 1990s, a profound transformation took place in the relationship between ‘state’ and ‘society’, as NPM fragmented the public sphere, devolving more power to public sector organizations. Much of the effort towards public sector reform was targeted at weakening the autonomy of professionals as experts and introducing a culture of customer service via marketization and choice. This is an example of government using mechanisms other than legislation and funding to alter behaviours: ‘one

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of the points that is most interesting about this type of approach is the way it provides a language and a framework for thinking about the linkages between questions of government, authority and politics and questions of identity, self and person’ (Dean, 1999:  13). In education, Ball (2003) called this age ‘postprofessionalism’, because teachers’ success is redefined as complying with others’ definitions of their work. Helsby and McCulloch (1996) linked teacher autonomy with control over the curriculum and contrasted the growth of this expertise in the 1960s with its loss as the ERA of 1988 introduced a National Curriculum and tests at 7, 11, 14 and 16. Newman (2001) described how educators became recast as managers or service providers; children and parents became the ‘consumers’ of a service. Ranson (2003) portrayed the early 1980s, the beginning of this period, as characterized by ‘marketization’. The early 1990s saw the growing domination of NPM, with principles modelled on private sector contract management: the privatization of state facilities; the separation of policy and delivery functions in the civil service, with delivery becoming the responsibility of a large number of NDPBs; and increasing power devolved, not to professionals, but to a rising class of public-sector managers. At the same time, legal regulation was increased, strengthened by audit systems which became dominant in governing how and what professionals delivered, so that the period has been described as ‘The Audit Society’ (Power, 1997). Power, writing with the insights of an auditor, demonstrated the self limiting nature of audit which eventually led to disillusion with it as a control mechanism, with examples of how the requirements of an audit can be satisfied without any impact on delivery. Nevertheless, trust in professional expertise was replaced with trust in auditing and inspection. The 1990s also saw the introduction of what Ranson (2003:  205) described as ‘partnerships and privatisation’, where public accountability was eroded by a strengthening of corporate power from a growing private sector involvement in the public sector. Hall (2003) gave a convincing account of why, when the Labour government gained power in 1997, a return to the old ideological territory of traditional labour was not an option. His post-Gramscian critique explained that Thatcherism ‘had evolved not just an effective occupancy of power, but a broad hegemonic basis for its authority’ (1). In other words, the philosophical foundations of Thatcherism had gained populist acceptance and become the cultural and ideological norm. By 1997 the electorate might have become disillusioned with the Conservative government; but elements of the Thatcherite ideology (the rise of individualism and the hegemony of free-market ideas) had irreversibly reconstructed the political terrain. There seems little doubt, as Hall claims, that the effects of this

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revolution were ‘epochal’ in that they defined a new political stage. What is more contested is how far the Labour government, in coming to power in 1997, marked a further new stage or merely adapted the neo-liberal terrain.

‘New Labour’ – new era? Despite the rhetoric of ‘The Third Way’, commentators are split about how far the Labour government of 1997 heralded a new era. When Blair gained power after three consecutive Conservative terms of government, he was elected on a platform which criticized a growing range of social problems and the weakened capacity of the state to respond. While there appears to be broad consensus about the nature of governance and the existence of periods marked out by observable characteristics pre-1997, the literature is more divided about how to describe the governance frameworks post-Blair. Hall claimed the Thatcher revolution was more than a popular strategy or long term of government; it was an approach to governing with deep philosophical foundations which changed the relationship between the state and the public. The debate in 1997 was how far the Labour government would bring about a change as deep in its philosophy and impact. ‘New’ Labour promised to repair the damage created by market individualism without returning to the collectivist state-centred ‘old Labour’, to reinstate the ‘social’ and deliver manifesto pledges to increase social inclusion. The distinguishing difference between modernization (New Labour’s mission) and NPM is the former’s link to social democratic attempts to construct a new (third) way between the first (Old Left) and the second (New Right). However, the rhetoric of community and citizenship, reciprocity and fairness has been dismissed (Hall, 2003) as a linguistic sleight of hand. Hall conceded that New Labour is difficult to characterize – but suggested this was deliberately so. He described a hybrid approach of two strands:  the dominant neo-liberal one which opens the door to privatization and the subordinate social democratic strand that pours more funding into education and health. Labour’s success with the electorate, he claimed, arose from their ability to perform a ‘double shuffle’ between these two strands. Thus, there is, in the research literature and policy documents, a mixed picture of the governance environment during the three terms of the Labour government (1997–2010). On the one hand, there is evidence to suggest that decentralization was a feature of the Blair reforms. The Children Act of 2004, for example, with its radical reform agenda to reconfigure services around the needs of the child, has widely been seen as both transformational and successful as

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an attempt to reform children’s services from the ground up: ‘education reform is always politically controversial. But . . . the changes brought by Every Child Matters have been exceptional. The professionals responsible for delivering the new services have embraced the overarching aims’ (Lownsbrough and O’Leary, 2005). This mainly positive review, however, warned of a trend towards a ‘decline in the convention of ministerial responsibility [which has] serious implications for the enduring climate in which professionals are then asked to operate’ (25). Citing the demonization of social workers and court cases where teachers are placed on trial, it suggested that such localization of responsibility to professionals on the ground created a major disincentive for innovation. Newman (2001) contended the Labour government continued NPM by devolving power to public sector organizations using NPM techniques for regulating activity with coercive additions, for example, an intensification of the discourse of failure, with harsher measures introduced by government to deal with ‘failing providers’; the proliferation of standards and quality regimes, with Standards Units established in the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) to regulate the delivery of education; the introduction of Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets; multiplication of centrally set performance indicators; incentives-based funding; framework documents and a continuation of the hierarchical accountability through audit and inspection which was a feature of the NPM of the early 1990s. To continued marketization, claimed Newman, was added an iron design type of neo-liberal corporate regulation. The Labour government experimented with a range of policy instruments to reshape its relationship with the public sector. The model produced by the PMSU (2006) can be seen as an explicit attempt to use a wider range of approaches to governing the delivery of public services, including ‘capacity and capability’ building and incentivizing collaboration to do so. It is within this approach that policies using system leaders flourished.

The Conservative-Liberal/Democratic coalition The Coalition government lost little time in making new policy. ‘Every Child Matters’ was abandoned and there was a decoupling of education from wider children’s services in LAs, signalling a return to the standards agenda discussed in Chapter 1. The first education White Paper of this Parliament (DfE, 2010) shows a preference for policy instruments at the ‘harder’ end of the continuum, with a proliferation of targets, standards and regulation. Performance assessment was strengthened by increased ‘floor’ targets (minimum acceptable

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standards below which government intervention is triggered) for primary and secondary schools and stronger penalties for not meeting these: ‘we will use the powers in the Academies Act to require conversion [to an academy] if need be’ (56). League tables were extended:  in addition to examination results at age 16 in the key measure of five GCSEs at grades A*–C including English and maths (5A*–C (EM)), added subjects included science, history or geography and a foreign language. This suite of qualifications gained the name the English Baccalaureate (EBacc), thus intensifying government control of the curriculum. Also added to league tables were the academic performance of excluded children and those entitled to the pupil premium grant (PPG), a payment supporting additional intervention for pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds. A new financial management standard was introduced. As part of the drive to increase literacy levels, phonics was dictated as a teaching method, reinforced by centrally provided resources and a test inspected by the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted), the national inspection service. The Coalition government thus reversed the trend towards self-regulation by retreating into the arena of Kooiman’s first-order governance  – dictating not only the outcomes required from the system but also how they were to be achieved. The analysis of instruments gives a sense of the direction of influence intended by the Coalition, away from arm’s-length steering towards stronger top-down accountability, with an increased focus on standards and structural reform. The powers of the secretary of state (SOS) were extended: ‘we will legislate to extend the Secretary of State’s closure powers to schools subject to a ‘notice to improve’ (DfE, 2010: 56). This category replaced the previous Ofsted category of ‘Satisfactory’ and was accompanied by direct intervention from the Department for Education (DfE). The increase in central control was enhanced by the restructuring of education agencies:  ALBs were culled or turned into executive agencies. Of seventeen NDPBs then sponsored by the Department, only three were retained: Ofsted; Ofqual, the awarding body for qualifications; and the School Teachers Review Board. The outcomes of the Coalition’s reorganization signalled their wish to take on direct responsibility for inspection, qualifications and pay – the most powerful instruments to steer professional behaviour within an outcomes-based accountability framework. The choice of those to be abolished (e.g. School Food Agency, Teenage Pregnancy Advisory Group, Children’s Workforce Development Council, an executive NDPB with the aim of improving the lives of children, young people, their families and carers) evidenced the Coalition’s intention

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to reduce the social welfare role of the state. The General Teaching Council, the School Support staff negotiating body, the Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency and the Young Persons Learning Agency were abolished. Two new executive agencies, the Standards and Testing Agency and the Education Funding Agency, were established to manage £54 billion of education funding. The Teacher Development Agency was merged with the NCSL to create the National College for Teaching and Leadership (NCTL), an executive agency responsible for ‘Teaching and Leadership’, the two areas the White Paper claims are the major drivers of raising standards. Thus, responsibility for teacher recruitment, initial teacher training (ITT), teacher development and leadership moved within closer government control. The role of Ofsted was placed under review:  twenty-seven headings in the inspection framework (many reflecting the previous government’s initiatives) were reduced to four core functions: pupil achievement; the quality of teaching; leadership and management; and pupil behaviour and safety. The chief inspector was replaced and the DfE approached high-profile system leaders to take on the role. Schools and parents could now request and pay for an inspection (DfE, 2010: 70), giving Ofsted a commercial aspect for the first time. There were claims to deregulate, mainly in recognition that the current approach was not working, or leading to perverse outcomes: ‘legislating in these areas is in our view ineffective:  at most it reinforces a compliance culture in schools; at worst it brings the law into disrepute as some schools feel able to ignore such duties, while other schools change perfectly good practice because they think that they must’ (DfE, 2010: 29). The meta-comment on why some instruments were chosen over others suggests recent approaches to public sector reform have been designed to take account of the anticipated responses of professionals. Numerous references to the behaviour of professionals in response to certain instruments show an increased understanding of government steering. Examples include: the ‘compliance culture’ brought about by too many statutory duties which cannot be policed (29); teaching to the test (48); the use of vocational courses because of the advantages they confer in the accountability system (49); and the ‘perverse incentives’ which ‘distort behaviour’ (68). The proposed reforms, therefore, were partly to address the recognition that ‘schools have become skilled at meeting government targets’ (8). On the one hand, it appears that the trend away from centralization towards greater self-regulation was reversed by a government who pulled back delivery functions into the Department and whose officials could now be contacted directly should sponsors for new academies be hard to find or for Free School

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proposers who wanted ‘a named DfE contact’. The greatest proliferation of instruments was in the top-down quadrant of the PMSU model. On the other hand, the White Paper continued the rhetoric of reduced centralization and increased freedom (mentioned forty-one times) for successful headteachers. The defining feature of the Coalition’s approach, it is claimed (Greany, 2015: 7), was the vision for ‘a self-improving, school-led system’ (SISS). It is a vision that professionals were encouraged to ‘take up with enthusiasm’ (Hargreaves, 2011: 4): For England’s school leaders, the coalition government’s White Paper, The Importance of Teaching (2010) strikes a startling new note. The improvement of schools, they are now told, rests primarily with them – not with government, local or central. The aim should be to create a self-improving system, built on the premise that teachers learn best from one another and should be more in control of the professional and institutional development than they have been in recent years. To this end, a self-improving system is to be led by newly designated teaching schools and the strategic alliances they establish with partners. (Ibid.)

Greany (2015:  7) pointed out that a word search of the White Paper shows the phrase ‘self-improving’ appears twice, compared with 147 mentions for ‘academy/ies’ and 36 for ‘free schools’. ‘Self-improving’ does not appear in either of the two forewords or the 2010 Conservative manifesto. Nevertheless, the concept caught the imagination of successful school leaders, particularly the mission of a ‘teaching school’, which was to work collaboratively with other schools to share practice and research, support school improvement and deliver ITT, PD and leadership training. In the run-up to the General Election in 2015, the ASCL published a ‘blueprint’ on how to achieve a SISS: The direction of travel over three decades has been towards greater school autonomy . . . Coalition policies have centred on delivering a self-improving system through the concept of system leadership . . . it is now time for the profession of school leaders to step forward and grasp this leadership challenge . . . The next phase in system leadership is to define what a world-class, selfimproving system looks like and then move steadily and determinedly towards it. (Cruddas, 2015)

The Conservative government (2015–) The White Paper ‘Educational Excellence Everywhere’ (DfE, 2016a) presented a continuation of the mixed governance approach which combined structural

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reform, marketization, strengthened accountability and potential autonomy. These strands have been consistent across administrations. Labour’s Learning and Skills Act (2000) had introduced the academies programme to turn around poorly performing city secondary schools by giving them independence from the LA and support from a sponsor. The 2002 Education Act extended the academies programme to include non-city secondary schools. The main theme of the Labour government’s 2005 White Paper was to ‘create a system of independent non-fee-paying state schools, where schools can decide whether they wish to acquire a self-governing Trust or become a self-governing Foundation school’ (DfES, 2005:  8). Measures included increased parental choice and encouragement for the growth of federations and other partnership arrangements. The Coalition’s Academies Act (2010) enabled successful schools (rated as Outstanding or Good by Ofsted) to become academies without a sponsor and gave the secretary of state the power to compel schools eligible for intervention (because of poor performance) to become academies. The Conservative government both attempted to consolidate structural reform via academization – ‘we will move to a system where every school is an academy’ (DfE, 2016a:  4)  – and continued the rhetoric of the ‘devolution agenda’ to promote it – ‘most schools will form or join MATs [Multi-Academy Trusts] so proven educational models can spread and grow and the best leaders can extend their influence by running multiple schools’ (16). In this 2016 White Paper, LAs were mentioned 102 times, confirming government intentions to reduce their role by moving the maintenance and funding of schools to the Department and shifting school improvement to schools and system leaders (19). A  National Commissioner for Schools was appointed in 2016 to coordinate the work of eight Regional Schools Commissioners established by the Coalition in 2014. Other signs of a progressive renationalization of the system include further reformation of ALBs. The NCTL was subsumed into the Department. A single executive agency, the Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA), was created on 1 April 2017 by the merger of two funding agencies, the Education Funding Agency (EFA) and the Skills Funding Agency (SFA). Chapter  8 of the White Paper described plans for a new national funding formula for schools, intended to be fairer and end local funding disparities. The rhetoric of failure (mentioned twenty-five times) continued as a rationale for the segregation of schools:  ‘our most successful leaders extending their influence and weaker ones doing the opposite’ (DfE, 2016a: 4). The trend towards targeted rather than universal policy intensified, with the acknowledgement that ‘school-led’ reforms of the previous administration had, as yet, failed to

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deliver a SISS (73–84). Rather than a failure of policy approach, the White Paper described areas where school performance was ‘weak’ and the school-led system ‘not yet mature enough to address it’, specifically in the under-representation in areas of social deprivation, of academy sponsors, National Leaders of Education (NLEs) and teaching schools, by now the major instruments of school improvement. Recruitment of system leaders became targeted on these areas. ‘Education Opportunity Areas’ were identified, six in 2016 and a further six in 2017, with funds (£72  million) and support to address social mobility. A  new £3.5  million programme (£1.5  million from DfE and £2  million from the Education Endowment Foundation) was allocated to create a ‘research school’ for each opportunity area, to lead the development and dissemination of evidence-led practice in local schools. In 2017, following a review by the Social Mobility Commission (2017), the government announced their determination to tackle the perennial challenge of social mobility, in what they described as ‘a different way of approaching policy’ through a core focus on ‘place’ . . . Our national reforms to date have been fundamental to raising standards, but we now need to reflect that their impact has as yet been unevenly felt. And, due in part to their demand-led nature, they have meant that at times, resource and capacity has tended to flow to areas that are already ahead and able to push for more. We will continue these reforms, building on their success. But we must now also look at how they can be effectively targeted to have maximum impact in the areas that have yet to feel their full benefit. (DfE, 2017a: 6)

The rationale remains a blend of social justice and, particularly post Brexit, economic necessity. The use of system leaders has continued and their influence grown as they take positions in the emerging new infrastructure. The next section tracks the evolution of system leadership by detailing the policies within which the concept has been developed across governments.

System leadership policies Specialist schools: a whole-system approach, 1997–2010 The dominant approach to school improvement in the Labour era was a whole-system approach known as the ‘Specialist Schools Programme’. The first Labour Green Paper on education (DfEE, 1997) announced the intention to adopt the embryonic programme initiated by the previous, Conservative

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government, adding a requirement for schools gaining specialist schools status on the basis of their good track record to share their expertise with other schools and provide benefits to the local community. The emphasis thus shifted from the Conservative’s ‘centre of excellence in a subject specialism’ model to a whole-system school improvement model (House of Commons, 2003: paragraph 36) which partly addressed criticisms of its anticomprehensive drive for diversity. The criticism of enhancing social class segregation, arising from the requirement to raise sponsorship funding which schools in poorer areas found difficult (Schagen and Goldstein, 2002), was addressed by halving the sponsorship requirement to £50,000 (less for smaller schools) and the extension of possible specialisms. The aim for a totally specialist system was almost realized, with 88 per cent of the 3,000 statefunded secondaries attaining specialist status by the close of the programme in 2010 (DCSF, 2010). Substantial funding was allocated and rose annually, with an estimated annual recurrent cost of £358  million were all schools to become specialist (House of Commons, 2003: 25). Individual schools received, in addition to the private sponsorship money (which could be ‘gifts in kind’ of resources or time), £100,000 from the DfES in capital funding and £126 (in 2003) per pupil for four years, or longer if redesignated as specialist (Jenkins and Levacic, 2004: 2–4). The two key design principles of ‘specialization’ and ‘collaboration’ to support diversity, though not uncontroversial, were evaluated positively. Specialist school status was found to be ‘a powerful mode of school improvement’ because it generated internal conditions resulting in a positive school ethos and raised the status of the school in the eyes of staff, parents and the community (University of Warwick, 2004: 10). The delivery mechanism was through the SSAT, a body established in the 1980s by the then Conservative government. The SSAT received a government grant until 2010 to run the specialist schools programme, government contracts to deliver other programmes until 2011 and became subject to a management buy-out in 2012. The programme supported extensive local and regional networks for subject teachers, subject leaders and headteachers as part of specialist status. The SSAT was also allocated additional grant funding to offer places to schools where performance ‘flat-lined’ on the Raising Achievement Transforming Learning (RATL) Programme and to those where performance became a cause for concern a place on the Specialist Schools Achievement Programme (SSAP). Both programmes used ‘consultant headteachers’ and their SSAT-accredited

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‘mentor schools’, identified on the basis of high performance in the subject of the specialism. Chapman and Allen (2006) evaluated the SSAP between 2003 and 2005, conducting over 100 interviews with stakeholders in 10 collaborative partnerships involving 20 schools. They identified three sets of prevalent conditions in successful collaborations:  ‘emotional conditions’ such as ‘mutual trust and confidentiality framed within shared values and strong interpersonal skills’; ‘practical conditions’ including ‘geographical accessibility of partnership schools and strong support from senior leaders in partner schools’; and ‘external support’ of a manager (297; italics in original). Hargreaves and Shirley (2007) conducted a mixed-methods study into the early years of RATL, which supported up to 400 schools between 2004 and 2010. The researchers triangulated data from focus group meetings with consultant heads; interviews with supported headteachers and their staff; observations and site visits; and archival and web-based data. They concluded the RATL programme represented an innovative and often extremely effective model of educational change, characterized by collaborative engagement (79). They recommended, however, more intensive forms of intervention and support, along with targeted leadership development or replacement of key leaders, for ‘struggling and sinking’ schools (21).

The London challenge: a regional approach, 2003–11 This high-profile programme was led directly by a team based in the Department, who worked with education leaders to establish a strategy consisting of several strands. Of an annual budget of £40 million (Kidson and Norris, 2014), 22 per cent was dedicated to the London Leadership Strategy (Earley and Weindling, 2006). This early evaluation found consultant leaders to be a ‘new breed’ of ‘portfolio heads’. Despite the perceptions by some supported headteachers of a ‘deficit model’, consultant leaders were required to be collaborative and the process was mainly perceived by interviewed recipient heads as a form of peer coaching or mentoring. The evaluation distinguished the consultant leader role from that of both external consultants, who quickly become outdated once they have left headship, and executive headteachers who take over the running of the school. They identified three development needs:  covering consultant headteachers’ absence from their own school; the slow process of building trust; and the need for an appropriate balance between challenge and support. A review by Ofsted (2010: 4) praised the use of teaching schools and the way staff from both supported and supporting schools learned by experience beyond

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their own contexts. A  regional infrastructure was established to coordinate activity including the ‘matching’ of successful schools with supported schools. Successful evaluations resulted in the programme being extended in 2008 to primary schools and to Greater Manchester and the Black Country in what became the City Challenge programme. System leadership elements of the programme, including consultant headteachers and teaching schools, became national elements of the SISS. The programme was unusual in England, at that time, for being a regional rather than a universal school improvement initiative.

School improvement partner, 2004–10 ‘The New Relationship with Schools’ (2004) attempted to respond to pressures on schools by replacing excessive central regulation with more streamlined selfand peer-regulation. The government’s aim was a single conversation [to] reduce the multiple accountabilities and reporting requirements that too many schools face [with] a credible and experienced practitioner  – a school improvement partner, in many cases someone with current or recent secondary headship experience – to act as a critical friend to the school and be authorised to approve – on behalf of the LEA and DfES – the performance targets set by the head and governing body of the school. (DfES, 2004a: 19–20)

School improvement partners (SIPs) are an example of system leadership promoted by the centre, a mechanism in a universal and centrally driven governance approach. After a pilot phase, the policy was implemented nationally in 2008 and each primary and secondary state school allocated a SIP. In 2009 there were 3,000 serving SIPs and 1,200 additional accredited SIPs not at that point active in the role. The third-party National Strategies were contracted to manage the programme and SIPS were engaged by the LA, at that time the main ‘mediating’ layer between government and schools. They became part of the accountability structure:  ‘SIPs carry out the LA’s statutory duties to challenge, support and monitor their schools . . . they will:  interrogate the school’s performance and other data; challenge and support the school on its self-evaluation . . . ensure the school adopts high-impact strategies to improve its priorities; broker support to assist its improvement’ (National Strategies, 2009). The role was revisited in the Schools White Paper (DCSF, 2009a), emerging as higher profile, part of a more explicit drive by Labour to use successful headteachers as part of the

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management of the school system, with SIPs taking over additional monitoring roles such as redesignation for specialist school status. Introduced as part of New Labour’s drive towards self-regulation and sharing of ‘what works’, they became an early casualty of the Coalition who dismissed them as part of the previous government’s ‘centralising compliance system’ (DfE, 2010: 66). This judgement was in direct opposition to the stated intent of the policy at its inception, which described the SIP programme as ‘designed to reduce bureaucracy, challenge schools in a more direct and useful way and make sure they get the right kind and quality of support’ (DfES, 2006: 9). All the headteacher respondents in this study experienced SIP interactions in their own school; several also operated as SIPs for other schools. It is the only system leadership role which was a universal rather than a targeted policy. The SIP role is considered in this study as a system leadership role; however, not everyone would define it as such: in their taxonomy of system leadership roles, Higham et al. (2009: 119) place SIP at the bottom of the hierarchy as ‘other agent’. Although the target in 2006 was for 75 per cent of SIPs to be experienced headteachers, in 2009 only 25 per cent were practising headteachers. Chapter 5 considers the policy learning from the London Challenge and the SIP programmes and identifies success factors which were adapted by successive governments.

National accreditation: leaders of education National Leaders of Education The 2005 White Paper contained several strategies to address teacher and leader shortages, such as bursaries and golden hellos; different routes into teaching such as Teach First; and workforce reform including the recruitment of staff without teaching qualifications, for example, school business managers and teaching assistants. Moves to address workload were welcomed but there were also concerns (Bangs et  al., 2011; Robinson, 2012) that such strategies would lead to a ‘de-professionalization’ of teaching. A relatively low-profile announcement (DfES, 2005: 93) was the intention to ‘recognise our best headteachers as “National Leaders of Education”’. The NCSL was asked to identify and accredit headteachers with successful experience of challenging schools to become NLEs, who would advise ministers and work for LAs to support less successful schools. NLEs were ‘outstanding school leaders who, together with the staff in their schools, use their knowledge and experience

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of teaching to provide additional leadership capacity to schools in difficulty’ (NCSL, 2009). The designation of an NLE’s school as a ‘National Support School’ (NSS) recognized the need to provide lateral support at different levels in other schools. The NCSL-commissioned impact studies of NLEs and Local Leaders of Education (LLEs) (Hill and Matthews, 2008, 2010) emphasized the importance of swift and careful brokerage of the relationship between the supporting and the supported school and cautioned the need for sufficient capacity in the NSS to undertake outreach commitment, particularly in core subjects. They found nearly a third of NLEs were acting as executive headteachers for another school; others provided non-executive support in roles including consultant leaders and associate headteachers; or wider system leadership such as leading a group or chain of schools, area-wide support teams or regional initiatives. Robinson (2012: 162) reported a continuation of this range of NLE activity, with system leaders also adopting roles previously carried out by the LA as the latter’s capacity diminished, such as brokerage or external advising. In this sense, the NLE designation is more accurately seen as a ‘badge’ that leads to the offer of a range of roles which have extended as the strategy has evolved. The first tranche of sixty NLEs was designated in October 2006, with a further sixty-eight designated in July 2007 and a third cohort in September 2008. The long-term aim was a critical mass across the country. NLEs and NSSs were positively evaluated as ‘making a strong contribution to school improvement’ (Hill and Matthews, 2010: 73). The Coalition stated their intention to ‘double the number of National and Local Leaders of Education by 2015’ (DfE, 2010: 28). By 2016 there were over 1,000 NLEs. The Conservative government introduced ‘target areas’ to ensure schools in the most challenging areas have access to NLE support.

The Local Leaders of Education LLEs are headteachers accredited to support local schools:  ‘As we understand more about the potential of school-to-school improvement and as the need to raise standards becomes more pressing, NCSL is developing Local Leaders of Education. The LLE model builds on the successful role of consultant leaders in London Challenge’ (Hill and Matthews, 2008: 16). The main purpose of the LLE role is providing ‘peer-to-peer support to headteachers, enabling focus on improvement priorities and to build capacity’ (Hill, 2011: 4). It differs from the NLE role, which is to ‘provide intensive support to schools facing challenging

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circumstances, e.g. in an Ofsted category or facing closure’, requiring different skills, including leading and managing change and whole-school responsibilities (14). Thus, at the start of the study there existed a range of system leadership roles. The SIP role was system-wide, whereas NLEs are targeted at ‘schools in difficulty’; the SIP and LLE were individual roles, whereas the NLE brings the whole school to the support role. Not all SIPs were practising headteachers, whereas NLEs and LLEs are. The 2010 White Paper discontinued SIPs but extended the suite of system leadership roles to include National Leaders of Governance (NLGs) and Specialist Leaders of Education (SLEs), as part of the plan for schools to take a central role in developing the SISS. SLEs are outstanding senior or middle leaders with a particular area of expertise (curriculum subjects, special needs, behaviour) employed in National Support Schools.

Incentivized collaboration Numerous programmes were introduced by the Labour government to promote school collaborations, based on the premise of identifying ‘good’ practice in one school and sharing it with other schools so that they improve. The Primary Leadership Programme, run by the NCSL, trained over 1,700 heads as strategy consultant leaders who worked with over one-third of primary schools (7,000 schools) in the first two years of the programme, successfully improving Key Stage 2 (KS2) results in English and mathematics (Fullan, 2004: 8–9). The Leading Edge Partnership Programme (LEPP), also launched in 2003 as a successor to the Beacon Schools Programme (1998–2002), was managed until 2006 by the Innovation Unit based within the Department; in 2006 the SSAT were given grant funding to project-manage partnerships of 200 ‘lead’ (high-performing) schools, each with four to six ‘partner’ schools in local hubs. Lead schools received £60,000 per annum to support innovation and work with partner schools to raise attainment (Higham et al., 2009: 51–2). Education Action Zones (EAZs), Excellence Clusters and Excellence in Cities Action Zones, in various iterations from 1998, incentivized school-led partnerships of schools, communities and local businesses to raise standards in deprived areas. In 2005 there were 134 Excellence in Cities Action Zones receiving up to £350,000 each per year and 80 Excellence Clusters receiving £650,000 per year (DfE, 2009). There was also the Leadership Incentive Grant, the NCSL’s Networked Learning Communities and the Increased Flexibility

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Programme launched by the DfES in 2002 to encourage collaboration between further education colleges and schools, a forerunner to the 14–19 Partnerships (Hopkins, 2009: 2). These programmes all followed the model of the government making available funding to a third-party organization to implement policy. The trend towards collaboration was intensified with the publication of ‘Every Child Matters’ (Cabinet Office, 2003), which placed a duty on schools to work closely with other children’s services, to take responsibility for five outcomes for children (including, in addition to enjoying learning and achieving, safety, health, making a positive contribution and the achievement of economic well-being). These responsibilities included ‘extended schools’, which required headteachers to build partnerships with parents and the community by opening the school site and resources for use by other services and the community. Robinson (2012) expressed headteachers’ concerns that these additional duties made the job of the school ‘undoable’. Bangs et  al. (2011:  42) reported how some government advisers, such as Barber, worried that the extended welfare role would ‘take the eye off the hard-won standards ball’. So, while this Labour period was defined by their vision for children of combined education and social services, affirmed in the five-year Strategy for Children and Learners (DfES, 2004b) and reconfirmed in the Children’s Plan (DCSF, 2007), Conservatives believed their amalgamation was a ‘disaster’ (Bangs et  al., 2011:  41). The Coalition deconstructed the framework in 2010. The Labour government, under pressure to reduce ‘initiative overload’ and philosophically driven to manage the whole system, was conscious that the sheer number of policies meant they were often overlapping or even inconsistent with one another. A joint publication by the NCSL and Demos argued that ‘the defining characteristic of each initiative has been to recognise the interconnections between issues and institutions and to try to build productive relationships between them . . . they have given rise to elements of system leadership without creating a genuinely systematic approach, due to their own fragmentation’ (O’Leary and Craig, 2007: 11). A more coherent approach to system leadership was needed.

The ‘system’ in system leader In ‘The Education Debate’, Ball (2008: 104–107) listed intellectuals and thinktanks who advised ministers during the Labour terms in office (1997–2010). These included:  Fullan, a ‘change guru and policy entrepreneur’; Hargreaves, a Demos author and Associate Director for Development and Research with

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the SSAT; and other Demos authors including Bentley. Publications between 2005 and 2007 by these authors drew on Senge’s (1990) systems thinking to offer new approaches to the governance of the English education system. Senge popularized systems thinking as the ‘fifth discipline’. The first four – personal mastery, mental models, shared vision and team learning  – needed ‘systems thinking’ to integrate them, requiring a change of mind, from seeing ourselves as separate from the world to understanding how we are connected to it. Fullan is credited with coining the term ‘system leader’. His pamphlet (Fullan, 2004) applied systems thinking to the English education system, explaining the nature of the challenge to which system leadership was the answer: the national whole-system reform of Labour’s first term saw primary schools move forward on average from 62 per cent proficiency in literacy for 11-year-olds in 1997 to 75 per cent in 2000, with similar results for numeracy, but results plateaued after 2000. The inability to go beyond 75 per cent was due, he said, to a lack of engagement from heads and teachers. To move beyond the ‘standards plateau’ required the creativity of practitioners and a collective commitment to the system as a whole. In addition, the complexity, unpredictability and pace of events in a changing world required freedom to innovate. Fullan’s pamphlet was used to stimulate debate in workshops across government departments and the NCSL subsequently commissioned Demos to produce a practical tool to inform policy and practice (Craig and Bentley, 2005; O’Leary and Craig, 2007). Drawing on these publications, the philosophy of systems thinking can be explained in terms of five ‘core elements’: 1. A ‘tri-level reform’ perspective: school and community, district or local education authority and state or national policy. Systems thinkers experience and take into account all three levels because they know they impact on each other and are aware that in order to change the larger system you have to engage in it, using frames (individuals frame issues through their perspectives, so all perspectives should be taken into account in attempts to identify and solve problems). 2. Subsidiarity and autonomy with accountability: vertical relationships are co-dependent, with strong accountability, in a system where those at different levels take account of others’ views. Limits on the ability of leaders to prescribe and control complex systems means allowing those closest to delivery the autonomy to address problems (subsidiarity). 3. Building capacity: support learning over time, particularly through feedback loops, which depend upon an open culture. Build lateral capacity

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via deliberate strategies where peers learn from each other across schools, across LAs or districts; systems thinkers create opportunities for people to interact beyond their own situation in order to change the climate or context for getting things done. 4. A collaborative ethos underpinned by a shared moral purpose: moral purpose ‘must transcend the individual to become a quality of organisations and the system itself ’ (Fullan, 2004: 10). 5. A focus on ‘the system’: system leaders see and act on the system as a whole, aware of connections (how individual people relate to one another in a system which is more than the sum of its parts) and unintended consequences (arising from a lack of attention to the connections, so that action in one part of a system has unforeseen consequences in another). The influence of systems thinking is pervasive in Labour’s policies, for example, the tri-level structure of the London Challenge, and self-evaluation strategies as a valuable potential tool for transversing levels informing the ‘New Relationship with Schools’. Fullan set several questions for assessing how far we meet the challenge of system leadership, which usefully frame the questions this book sets out to answer. Do system leaders care about all students in their locality? Do they have a strong moral purpose? Do headteachers redefine their existence as being part of the larger system? Are they judged on how many good leaders they develop? Does the accountability framework reflect the broader responsibility taken on by system leaders?

Defining system leadership The concept of ‘system leader’, or leading beyond the individual school, has had advocates in policy, academic and professional circles, maintained across changing policy and governance environments. As with many concepts that achieve hegemonic status, it is in danger of meaning all things to all people. This section outlines definitional issues, which highlight its conflicted nature. The earliest suggestions in England that headteachers should take responsibility for schools other than their own came from the then Minister of State for School Standards: ‘in the interests of raising productivity, effecting greater social justice and ensuring sustainable improvement’ (Miliband, 2003). At the same time, academics were inspired by systems thinking. Educational reformists argued passionately for a view of education as a dynamic system

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where what happens in one part affects the whole; and for the use of successful headteachers to influence interactions in this wider system (Fullan, 2004; Hargreaves, 2007). Higham et al. (2009: 26) reference Senge (1990: 3) in what they term the ‘loud and clear-read across from system theory to the key areas of system leadership activity’. Riddell (2016:  58) describes the NCSL as ‘a key mechanism for the implementation of Government policy’ through the development of a dominant narrative, codified through research and evaluations, largely commissioned by itself and government. The evolving nature of system leadership can be seen from the NCSL’s frequent publications on the subject. Early studies presented the concept as a professionally led collaborative form of network leadership (Jopling et al., 2006). In the Coalition era, Hargreaves’ four think-pieces (2010, 2011, 2012a and 2012b) advise on the development of a SISS. Collarbone and West-Burnham (2008:  94) locate system leadership in the need for new ways of working required by the government agenda: It has almost certainly arisen as a result of schools moving toward greater interdependency and partnership as a result of a number of initiatives from the DCSF, starting with the Excellence in Cities agenda . . . More recently, the Every Child Matters agenda and the accompanying extended schools programme has added to a sense of urgency in developing a new form of leadership within the schooling system. The Networked Learning Community programme managed by NCSL and the work being undertaken by the TDA (2007) on remodelling have helped leverage this agenda.

O’Leary and Craig (2007) identified three types of ‘systems policies’, all requiring new leadership models. The first was ‘building relationships between schools’ premised on the identification of ‘good’ or ‘best’ practice in some ‘leading’ schools which were incentivized to share their practice with less wellperforming schools. Examples include Labour policies such as Beacon Schools, LEPPs, Networked Learning Communities and Specialist Schools, Federations and Foundation Trusts. The second was a holistic approach to the whole system, placing a duty on schools to take responsibility for the five outcomes for children in the ‘Every Child Matters’ policy (Cabinet Office, 2003), an ambitious attempt to develop a ‘policy framework’ (after Spours et al., 2007: 7) rather than individual policies and thus avoid ‘silo’ working which resulted in vulnerable children falling between the lines of accountability. The third was incentivizing links between schools, parents and the wider community, in Labour policies such as EAZs.

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Empirical studies (Robinson, 2012) have found that school leaders in this era were motivated behind these policy aims, expressing a strong sense of their moral purpose to care about outcomes for all children, not just those in their own school. Courtney (2015:  808) notes the resonance of current forms of system leadership work with ‘a collective professional memory of inter-school collaboration’. A  study from this period (Hill, 2006) found that in England, most headteachers were involved in some form of collaborative activity or networking. Later studies, however (Higham et  al., 2009), attempted to distinguish collaboration between schools from ‘system leadership’ which was seen as implying a more substantive engagement and a degree of accountability for their outcomes. There is little doubt, then, that the drive for system leadership came from the Department; nor that professional engagement with it was more than mere compliance. However, contestation remains about its nature.

Taxonomies At the start of the study it was ‘not actually clear what or how many system leadership roles are being undertaken’ (Higham et  al., 2009:  21). Several taxonomies were drawn up, illustrating, through their differences, the lack of clarity and consensus around the concept. Dunford (2007) suggested three separate areas of system leadership activity:  ‘extended leadership’, ‘advice’ and ‘challenge and support’. Within the first he included leadership of a federation or trust; consortium leader; trainingschool leader and executive head; along with ‘co-head’ and ‘associate-head’, thus widening his definition to include succession planning – leaders who have not yet attained headship. The roles of NLEs and SIPs were placed within ‘support and challenge’ whereas SSAT consultant heads were with LA consultants, under ‘advice’. Published in Australia, this map appears to have gained little traction in England, despite its usefulness in attempting precise definition of the range of system leadership roles. O’Leary and Craig (2007) included executive heads, co-leadership and leaders of extended schools and NCSL’s community leaders but did not mention SIPs or NLEs. Collarbone and West-Burnham (2008) included consultant leaders, SIPs and NLEs as system leaders, in roles ranging from policy advice; advising the NCSL on the NLE/NSS initiative; working with LAs; leading a cluster of schools or a federation; executive headship; to providing additional leadership to schools in difficulty.

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In the first systematic attempt to map system leadership activity, Higham et  al. (2009:  22) produced a ‘taxonomy’ of seven roles (including executive headship, consultant leaders, mentor heads, leading multi-agency partnerships or LEPPs, SIPs and NLEs) and a tabulation of activities undertaken by NLEs (119). From a national e-questionnaire with 1,317 responses they found two groupings. For the first, ‘the impetus and agency behind the roles are located at a national level, often within the DfES, NCSL or National Strategies . . . [where] the focus is on deploying the knowledge and skills of experienced heads (and other leaders) as part of a broader school improvement programme’. This work came with a ‘funding schedule . . . for PD, salary payment, supply cover and/ or travel expenses’; the roles themselves were ‘relatively standardized through entry requirements and selection procedures, clear protocols for action set out in guidance and an evaluative system to monitor progress’ (153). The second group, accounting for only 11 per cent of the system leadership activity, operated in less formalized local partnerships characterized as ‘flexible, organic, often ad hoc’ with the benefit of local responsiveness. While less numerous, these roles were judged to be ‘as significant’, demonstrating the ‘enabling state’ and providing an important step towards ‘rebalancing agency by making it more possible for headteachers to lead technical and adaptive solutions in a widening professional domain’ (161). System leadership was an emerging practice and Higham et al. predicted that ‘for the foreseeable future, it is probable that school leaders will continue to work between these contradictions between government-led reform and locally-led renewal’ (14).

Summary Since the early 2000s, there have been examples of headteachers supporting schools other than their own in relationships which ranged from the collaborative ‘consultant leader’ model to models which took over the running of another school. Some definitions of system leadership include ‘soft’ collaborative arrangements; others require full leadership of the supported school and/ or a degree of accountability for results. There remains, in 2018, a continuing conceptual elasticity around the concept of system leadership. The analysis highlights a reversal of the trend from centralized to diffuse government control of the education system but the picture is one of a continued hybridized approach to governance. An increasing trend towards segmentation of schools means the environment varies for schools with differential performance

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against the government’s measures. This potentially signals the end of a single national education system. For high-performing schools, the governance environment is more hands-off: greater trust, more freedom from inspection, more responsibility for schools beyond their boundaries, opportunities for expansion and financial reward. For schools which are vulnerable, the environment is one of increased accountability and intervention from a proliferation of standards and quality regimes, an intensification of the discourse of failure and direct government intervention for perceived underperformance. Structural reform and marketization have intensified from Labour’s introduction of academies, with the Coalition’s incentivization of new types of academy and the Conservative’s mission to reconsolidate via complete academization. The Conservative government restated the principles of accountability, competitive pressure and choice (DfE, 2016a: 15), continuing the trend towards complex, overlaid governance environments which are difficult to characterize. The evolving use of the same steering mechanism became even more conflicted with concerns that taking system leadership to scale at a time of fragmentation of the system had implications not fully understood. This book captures a record of the unprecedented change between 2009 and 2018 and offers an analysis of the dynamics of the governance environments which delivered it. Within these changes, the explanatory narrative around policies of successive governments has been to devolve responsibility to headteachers and increase their autonomy: ●

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Labour’s ‘New Relationship with Schools’ promised less government control and ‘more freedom and independence for headteachers’ (DfES, 2004a: 4). ‘The National Challenge is founded on the principle that schools must lead the changes necessary’ (DCSF, 2008: 4). In Labour’s third term, Ed Balls, Secretary of State for Education, claimed: ‘It means a system that makes more use of the best school leadership, with more heads working across more than one school and more innovative federations and clusters of schools’ (Foreword 21st Century Schools, DCSF, 2009). The Coalition government’s first White Paper: ‘The wider system should be designed so that our best schools and leaders can take on greater responsibility, leading improvement work across the system.’ (DfE, 2010: 13). The current Conservative government: ‘We believe that the fastest and most sustainable way for schools to improve is for government to trust this

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country’s most effective education leaders, giving them freedom and power and holding them to account for unapologetically high standards for every child . . . This system will respond to performance, extending the reach of the most successful leaders and acting promptly to reduce the influence of those who aren’t delivering for our children’ (DfE, 2016a: 9). At the same time, the policy focus moved from individual policy initiatives to performance-management of the whole system, via an increasingly detailed accountability framework. Headteachers in England are held to account by published league tables based on pupils’ performance in national tests at ‘key stages’ corresponding to the end of primary school (KS2) and the end of secondary school (KS4) and grades awarded by Ofsted in regular inspections (every three to four years in general, but more or less frequently on the basis of a school’s performance data). Ofsted awards a grade on a four-point scale: Grade 1, Outstanding; 2, Good; 3, Requires improvement (altered in 2009 from Satisfactory); 4, Inadequate. The next chapters consider, from the perspectives of system leaders and supported headteachers, the changing nature of autonomy and accountability, as part of the central question of how to understand the state’s relationship with education leaders, reflecting on how far this has remained one of relative power and control; has shifted to one of reassigning accountability for difficult choice and delivery within much reduced budgets; or has reconfigured the intellectual, social and physical capital of the English education system for private profit.

3

The System Leaders

Introduction This chapter records the narratives of the respondents in an empirical study into system leadership conducted during 2009–17. The concerns of this chapter are twofold: first, to present respondents’ perceptions of the governance environment in the Labour and Coalition periods and assess how far these support the contention that system leadership is a feature of increased self-regulation. Second, the chapter presents vignettes that illustrate the complexities of the lived experience of respondents and follows their histories across the years, including outcomes for their schools. The intention is to afford the reader a closeness to the data, by presenting in respondents’ own words their individual understandings of what system leaders do, the nature of the governance environment within which they work and the nature of their interactions with other leaders. The chapter explains how the interview data were mapped against the analytical framework (Figure 3.1) to show the characteristics of the governance environments described by the respondents in 2009 and then in 2012. By locating respondents’ perspectives within an analytical framework, it is possible to bring order to complex and contradictory data and to illuminate the nature of the impact of the governance environment upon behaviours. The period 2009– 17, when system leadership was established as a major feature of the educational landscape, was one of radical change in the English education system. This chapter illustrates the dynamic nature of the governance environments of the period and captures the nature and direction of change. The chapter then narrates the stories of the respondents:  system leaders, headteachers with whom they worked and policy leads responsible for the design or implementation of the policies. Care has been taken to protect the anonymity of respondents, including minor changes of detail; for example, all system leaders are referred to as ‘she’ and all headteachers and policy leads as

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Democrac co-producon System leader autonomous. Driving force but supporve. Volunteer partners. System leader mentoring head

Self-sustaining networks Power dispersed and fluid. Personal and professional networks. All heads system leaders operang in voluntary partnerships

Direcve Leadership

Distributed Leadership Command/control Central government direcon. Bureaucrac environment.

NPM Concentraon on accountability and outcomes.

System leader close to government

System leader working towards inspecon and targets

Centralizaon

Figure 3.1 Analytical framework.

‘he’. This technique aids understanding of the references but in no way carries a gender message:  the data suggested no ‘gender-influence’ on respondents’ perceptions or behaviours. Both male and female system leaders were found within each ‘type’ of system leader and within all roles.

Research aims The study aimed to track the development of system leadership practice as it evolved, in order to develop a conceptual model to aid understanding of system leadership practice. Through empirical investigation of specific ‘cases’, consisting of a system leader, headteachers she/he supported, those who mediated the relationship and the local context, the study sought to understand the nature of the governance environments within which system leadership operates; gain insights into the motivations and responses of professionals to a high-profile policy, which has been adopted by increasing numbers of headteachers; and provide an assessment of how far system leadership evidenced a trend away from governance by central control towards professional self-regulation.

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Research design Data collection Data was collected in a number of phases over the years of the study. Phase One (2009–10) consisted of interviews with five headteachers working extensively as system leaders (SL1–SL5), selected using a sampling frame to give a range of gender, context, locality and approach; and five policy leads (PL1–PL5) responsible for the design or implementation of a policy using system leaders (e.g. civil service directors; heads of school improvement in LAs). Phase Two (early 2012)  included interviews with headteachers with whom the system leaders worked, one each from an improving school (HT1A–HT5A) and one each from a school still struggling to meet expected performance against the national measures (HT1B–HT5B). Phase Three (2012) was a further interview with each system leader. Phase Four (2013–17) consisted of update telephone interviews with the system leaders and headteachers. The case study design, of the implementation of system leadership in specific localities, afforded a multiperspective account of an evolving practice.

Sample selection Lists of secondary NLEs were obtained from the NCSL website and of consultant headteachers from the SSAT. The Phase One system leaders were selected by issuing a questionnaire to gain personal details (age range, years in headship, types of system leadership role) and information about their own school and the schools they worked with. From this a sampling frame was drawn up to include headteachers who worked in two or more of the system leadership roles, so that their reflections on the similarities and differences in the roles could be explored. The sample attempted not to be representative but to include a range of characteristics, including geographical regions, gender, age and headship of schools of different sizes, types and context. The selected headteachers all worked with schools which were deemed to be ‘failing’ or below average in some measures, as well as with other successful headteachers to raise standards across the system as a whole (e.g. in a SIP role) or for innovation (e.g. LEPPs). Five system leaders were selected, using the above criteria, from returned questionnaires. The list covered five geographical regions, had two females and three males (reflecting the ratio of the lists), a small range of ages (it was difficult to find headteachers in the younger age range with the experience to match the

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criteria) but no ethnicity mix (the lists consisted of headteachers who were all white British).

Selecting the supported headteachers Each system leader was asked to provide a list of schools they supported and from each, two headteachers were selected, one on the basis of demonstrated improvement (defined by meeting government outcome measures), as a proxy for a successful partnership, and the second showing no improvement, mainly more recent partnerships. This also allowed consideration of the ‘contingency’ issue, that is, whether system leaders altered their approaches for different contexts. Cases included headteachers in tight partnerships (i.e. formal governance) and loose partnerships (informal, no governance arrangements). Unfortunately, the ‘unsuccessful’ headteachers in cases 2 and 3 both withdrew from the interviews, despite their initial agreement. In the interim, they had lost their jobs.

Selecting the policy leaders The inclusion of senior officials from the civil service and senior leaders in agencies responsible for implementing the policies (such as NDPBs or LAs) was in acknowledgement of the importance of the top and middle tiers of the system and findings of literature on policy implementation (e.g. Bowe et  al., 1992; Lingard and Ozga, 2006) that policy is mediated at different levels of the system in unpredictable ways.

Case studies At the centre of each case is a distinct manifestation of system leadership, as shown in Figure 3.2, reflecting opposing approaches at the start of the study. The case for case studies has been well made (Stake, 1995; Clandinin and Connelly, 1996). As well as their value in constructing an in-depth understanding of and engagement with complexity, case studies have the potential to explore and describe complex relationships and bring to life issues through contextualization and what Flyvbjerg (2001) called ‘the power of example’. The focus of the study was the nature of the relationships and interactions between system leaders and those they interact with, making the case study a more appropriate choice than interviews with system leaders only. The voice of supported headteachers has been neglected in system leadership literature, which tends to record only its promoters  – policy leaders and headteachers who enjoyed the roles. The

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study was interested in the experience of those ‘on the receiving end’ of system leadership. Contextualization was also important, since the study was concerned with the way factors at a regional or local level affected the enactment of the system leadership roles. The rich description inherent in an exemplifying case study enables the reader to assess the validity of claims and interpretations made by the researcher and is particularly appropriate to a context such as this, where there is a degree of theoretical contestation:  ‘an important criterion for judging the merit of a case study is the extent to which the details are sufficient and appropriate for [someone] working in a similar situation to relate decision making to that described in the case study’ (Stake, 1995:  119). As Robson (1993:  51) points out, there are dangers in using a ‘well-worn term like case study’ where there are varying understandings of what this means. This study used the definition given by Robson: ‘case study is a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context using multiple sources of evidence’ (52). The contemporary phenomenon is system leadership; the real-life context is the operation of system leadership in four local areas; the multiple sources of evidence include interviews with the system leader during the Labour period (2009) and in the first half of the Coalition term (2012), with one or more supported headteachers on the interactions with that system leader and with the policy lead where they have brokered the relationship; and contextual information including the outcome measures of the schools over the years (Table 3.1) as well as information about the LA area. The case study methodology was thus deemed likely to provide deeper insights into the research questions than a series of individual interviews at a single point in time. The longitudinal perspective over two changes of government affords insights into the interplay between policy and practice within specific contexts and the sustainability of improvements.

Mapping perspectives on the governance environment Using a heuristic adapted from Newman (2001), the data were used to situate the perceptions of the system leaders and the policy leads along the axes of centralization/decentralization and directive/distributed leadership. The multidimensional framework allowed flexibility to capture tensions or internal inconsistencies in the data rather than analysing it using a categorization

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approach which might have given a checklist of static features or characteristics. The findings show how far the respondents perceived system leadership roles as centrally directed or professionally autonomous and whether they felt system leaders worked in a directive style or distributed leadership. The framework allows for responses which varied according to the role or policy being discussed; and for comparisons between past, present and possible future governance regimes which contributed to the mood and habitus of their own and others’ performance and sense of identity. Figure 3.1 gives the analytical framework with the two axes clearly marked and the dominant characteristics of each quadrant, giving rise to different governance environments within which system leaders might operate.

Locating system leaders Interview data for each respondent was structured, following Kvale (1996), into natural units and themes; each unit was then placed in the appropriate quadrant of the framework. The data were mapped along the two axes to capture both the leadership style described and the degree of autonomy in operating in the role. Thus, a statement: ‘when we took over the academy, at the request of the Department’ (SL3) was placed to the left of the leadership axis and in the bottom half of the quadrant, showing a directive style and centralized control. The mapping of each individual’s statements was recorded with the line number of the verbatim transcriptions marked, to give a clear line between the data, the analysis and the interpretation. The quadrants are useful in reporting individual interviews, because the mapping captures an individual’s style and approach. All respondents reported features characteristic of each quadrant: but the mapping is sufficiently distinctive to suggest a dominant quadrant for each interview which gives rise to their positioning on the conceptual map (Figure  3.2). The maps allow comparison of individuals by group (e.g. local area, headteachers/policymakers, system leaders/other headteachers) and over time (system leader in 2009 and in 2012). As a whole, they also give a picture of the dominant governance environment at a single point in time as well as the location and nature of tensions in the system. In 2009, interviews were held with five system leaders and five policy leads linked to those system leaders (e.g. their LA head of school improvement, the SIP, the head of an NDPB commissioning the system leadership work or a senior government official responsible for the policy). Figure 3.2 gives a visual

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Decentralized Governance

System Leader 2

Direcve Leadership Policy Leader 5

Policy Leader 1

Policy Leader 3

System Leader 5

Distributed Leadership System Leader 1

Policy Leader 4

System Leader 4 Policy Leader 2 System Leader 3 Centralized Governance

Figure 3.2 Governance environment, 2009.

representation of their perspective of the governance environment in 2009. The dominant quadrants for each system leader and policy lead are clear. The closer to the central intersection of the two axes, the more evenly spread the statements made by respondents. Thus, SL5 described an environment which is slightly more centralized than devolved; whereas SL4 described one more heavily centralized. SL3 made very little reference to characteristics of decentralized governance or distributed leadership. The policy leads – those responsible for drawing up or implementing a policy whose stated intention was to devolve more power to the sector – all described an environment relatively directive and centralized, except for PL1 who described an environment in transition from one intended to be relatively decentralized to one becoming increasingly centralized. Two of the system leaders were similar in terms of the governance environment described and their approach to the headteachers and staff they worked with. SL3 and SL4 demonstrated characteristics of high centralization and control; both focused on restructuring and finances. SL1 and SL2 were more concerned with building relationships and distributing leadership. SL2 provided a contrast on the vertical dimension, as the only interviewee in the first phase of interviews who described an environment characterized by decentralization in which she had autonomy to choose the roles and how to deliver them. SL1, in contrast, described a ‘coercive’ local environment with an interventionist LA.

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The system leaders described in 2009 clearly distinct characteristics of the governance environment within which they worked and individual personal philosophies about supporting other schools. These characteristics, when mapped onto the conceptual framework, placed them in opposing quadrants. United in their belief in the benefits of system leadership, they expressed passionately held opposing views about its conduct. Strong arguments were expressed that ‘done to’ was a precursor to ‘done with’ in order to effect quick turnaround: equally vehement were those against imposing a particular model upon other headteachers. The main themes running through their descriptions of their work as system leaders, in all cases similar to the descriptions of the supported headteachers, allowed them to be characterized thus: SL1: the protector The NPM environment SL1 described in 2009 was similar to Newman’s (2001) account summarized in Chapter 1. She described a managerial, audit-dominated environment:  ‘New Labour carried on in 1997 where the Conservatives left off ’. Her motivation for working with other schools was empathy with other headteachers. The interview was dominated by references to ‘fear’, ‘constraints’ and ‘categorization’ of schools, high accountability and low trust. SL1 used the language of a servant leader (after Greenleaf, 1977): ‘work with; supporting in a collaborative way; it’s about trust, about distributing leadership from the word “go”; the first thing you do is reassure people’. SL2: the collaborator SL2 described an open-systems governance environment, strongly networked. She talked about other headteachers as peers. For her, the main difference between her system leadership work and headship was ‘not being the ultimate person at the top of the hierarchy . . . but part of a bigger system’. Collaboration was a recurring theme in this interview: she mentioned ‘support’ forty times; ‘negotiate’ four times; ‘professional’ seven times; and ‘trust’ nine times. SL3 and SL4:  the hero-heads These system leaders focused on restructuring, finances and systems. They took their ‘brand’ into other schools, established new leadership and imposed the curriculum, uniform and procedures of the successful school, including systems for behaviour management, lesson observation, data monitoring and progress tracking. SL3 described her approach in terms of trouble-shooting:  ‘The LA says, “sort it”; we move in, sort it, move out’. SL3 had a highly centralized approach; the language of control dominated this interview:  ‘the mistake I  made was in not forcing that on the school’; ‘I will always put someone in as head’; ‘it’s really, really hardnosed stuff ’; ‘when we first takeover a school’. Centralization featured both in the approach to supported schools and in the relationship with

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government: ‘the Department’ was mentioned forty-five times in SL3’s one-hour interview. Both operated from a clear strategy for growth, supported by the government: ‘We could take over two more schools now’ (SL3); ‘We discussed at our governing body this was not the only school we would want to take over . . . The Department have already approached us with another school they would like us to take on’ (SL4). SL5:  the auditor SL5 used similar strategies, in terms of sharing policies and procedures from the successful school, but delegated implementation: They get our teaching and learning syllabus. We agree targets and we monitor them in 6-weekly reviews. We identify at the beginning of the year the areas where the school isn’t functioning effectively, that I’m concerned about and I will just monitor that all year.

Distributing leadership and managing performance (‘we made them more accountable and they improved’) was combined with a clear philosophy of how to support others to change:  ‘you have to respect where they are, if I  want to change you I have to understand how you feel. Otherwise it isn’t going to work. And you’ve got to have equality to do it’. However, SL5 reported a tension of operating this distributed approach to school improvement in the context of a high stakes accountability system: ‘It’s important that the school drives its own improvement . . . but it needs to move quickly. I don’t want to be caught up in the Ofsted thing of being found satisfactory.’

Tracking the journeys Figure 3.3 captures the changed perceptions of the system leaders who were still in post after the election of the Coalition government (SL4 moved in 2011 to a different role; SL5 retired in 2012). The shaded boxes indicate the location of the system leaders in 2012 compared with the white boxes showing where they were placed three years earlier. The mapping indicates a governance environment in 2012 both more homogenous than that described three years earlier and which had shifted towards the left-hand bottom quadrant of directive leadership and high centralization. As summarized in Chapter  1, governance literature presents both a linear chronology of a shift in governance from hierarchy, through NPM and markets, to self-regulation; and contestation that this view is overly simplistic. The

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normative view of a shift from centralized to self-regulated governance has dominated education literatures and policy documents over successive Labour, Coalition and Conservative governments. The mapping of the interview data (Figures 3.2 and 3.3) shows that, in reality, all four governance structures have coexisted in the English education system in a policy and practice environment which is conflicted, complex and adaptive. The key question is the nature of the conflict and the impact on the behaviours and practice of school leaders. The data indicate that while Labour’s governance environment in 2009 was mixed, the predominant ‘mood’ was one of increasingly centralized control. Varying degrees of autonomy were claimed by system leaders in terms of their own style, placing them in different quadrants on the analytical framework, reflecting their different experiences. The mapping of the 2012 interviews with the same system leaders indicates a governance environment more homogenous than that described three years earlier and a convergence towards the bottom left-hand quadrant of directive leadership and high centralization. SL3 summed up the difference: The previous government wanted partnership . . . This government is forcing partnership . . . they’ve put all the levers in place . . . before you had National Challenge and that was not as harsh as this.

SL2’s move, from the top-right-hand quadrant, predominantly one of collaborative networks, to the diagonally opposed quadrant of command/ control, represents her view of the changed governance environment in the Coalition era. In 2009 her description was of an environment ‘still quite centralist but not as much as it used to be’; she was the only system leader to describe characteristics predominantly in the top half of the analytical framework, a view in line with the claimed governance trend towards greater self-regulation. In the second interview, the dominance of central control came from her concern about the increased accountability measures following the 2010 White Paper: The league tables, the sudden introduction of the E-Bacc . . . some schools were making people come in at the weekend so their status in the league tables wasn’t compromised.

Nevertheless, her focus on establishing a teaching school alliance (TSA) with her school as the lead resulted in her view of the environment being more balanced than that described by the other system leaders in 2012. Her position on the leadership axis had moved only slightly from just right of the centre to just

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Decentralized Governance

System Leader 2 2009 Direcve Leadership

Distributed Leadership System Leader 1 2009

System Leader 1 2012 System Leader 2 2012 System Leader 3 2009 System Leader 3 2012

Centralized Governance

Figure 3.3 System leaders over time.

left, showing that her personal approach had changed little, unlike SL1’s which moved to the far left (Figure 3.3). The picture over time is from a reduction in central control from New Labour’s first to second term, followed by a reinforcement of centralized control as a result of ‘the realisation of the political imperatives of what happens when schools do badly’ (PL4). System leaders were unanimous that centralization further increased during the Coalition, with pressure from a number of directions . . . The benchmark of five good passes at level 2 including English and maths . . . that will bring fear into many schools. I think there is certainly a fear amongst schools that they are going to be taken over by academies that are hell bent on adding to their family of schools (SL1). The whole notion of ‘right we’re going to go into outstanding schools and those who’ve got a 2 for teaching and learning we’re going to sort that out and probably they won’t be outstanding and schools that have been satisfactory for the second time will be required to improve’, it’s very controlling and centralist (SL2).

Despite the unanimous view of a harsher environment, each of the system leaders continued to embrace a raft of government policies designed to ‘foster a selfsustaining network of school-led improvement and development’ (DfE, 2011). Each moved away from operational leadership of their own school by becoming executive headteachers and putting in a deputy as ‘head of school’ to run the

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school on a daily basis. Each was designated as a Teaching School. SL1 and SL3 established a MAT, by which they worked more closely with schools in challenge, in a direct governance relationship. All formed a wider range of partnerships with other schools. However, the nature of these partnerships and of their own role at the heart of them were qualitatively different; these differences provide interesting data to illuminate the nature of system leadership as it evolved. Both Labour and Coalition governments promised more ‘autonomy’ for successful headteachers. As we track system leaders’ choices of which roles to undertake and the way in which they enacted them, it becomes clear that the nature of autonomy in the Labour era was qualitatively different from autonomy under the Coalition.

A diachronic view: mapping the system leaders’ journeys The opposing perceptions of the governance environment in 2009 appear to arise from three factors. The first is choice of role. All system leaders claimed to be selective about which roles they accepted, emphasizing their freedom to choose. SL1’s focus was mainly SIP and consultancy work:  ‘I chose not to be an NLE.’ SL2 found the NLE badge gave access to a range of system leadership activity: ‘I’ve been asked to do a number of things as an NLE and I’ve chosen not to do all of them.’ SL3 and SL4 chose only NLE work under a hard governance model. SL5 chose collaborative work with local schools with a view to them joining her Trust. The second is personal style: SL3, like SL4 and SL5, emphasized strategies, whereas the initial focus for SL1 and SL2 was on building relationships. The third is the local ecology, particularly as created by the middle tier:  SL1’s NPM environment was created largely by a ‘coercive’ LA, whereas SL2’s highly networked community arises from being in an area of high-performing schools and a ‘hands-off ’ LA. SL3 circumvents the LA by working directly with the Department. By 2012, all three were NLEs, by then the only means of securing school-toschool support; by 2013 two out of the three were CEOs of a MAT (in a ‘hard’ governance arrangement). From occupying three different quadrants in 2009, indicating different perspectives on the dominant governance environment within which they work, all had converged by 2012 into the quadrant where high centralization and direction were dominant characteristics. The following narratives present the changes from the perspective of each system leader in turn.

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All three described their experience of the overall environment, in the Coalition era, as more directive than in Labour’s, particularly for schools not hitting performance targets. Despite this, all three participated enthusiastically in the new initiatives which contributed towards this ‘harsh new world’ (SL3).

The case studies The case studies provide a rich picture of the activity and changing perspectives of the system leaders over the 2009–17 period, triangulated with the perspectives of headteachers in schools they supported and mediating policy leads where relevant. Each case is discussed under four headings. First, the journey captures the effects of changing governance environments on the attitudes and approaches of each system leader. Second, descriptions of the interactions allow insights into the perspectives of ‘failing’ headteachers as well as of different approaches to school-to-school support. Third, perspectives on the process of academization are captured, providing in-depth accounts of how this radical change in governance was brought about and the part system leaders played. Last, the middle tier is considered, as a main governance layer affecting the exchanges. Data from telephone interviews conducted as follow-up from 2013 to 2017, together with outcomes data, add a longitudinal perspective.

Case Study 1: ‘the protector’ The journey The system leader at the heart of Case Study 1 had at the start of the study spent eighteen years as headteacher of her current school. From being poorly performing when she was appointed, the average-sized mixed comprehensive with a higher-than-average percentage of disadvantaged students was performing consistently at the top of league tables. In 2013 the school gained its third consecutive Ofsted Outstanding grading in all categories; in 2017 progress 8 results confirmed student progress at rates ‘significantly above’ the national average. In 2009, SL1 had been an SIP for five years working with several schools; the national challenge advisor for two schools and had worked with over twenty schools as a consultant head for the SSAT. She had refused invitations to become

Table 3.1 Case study – schools’ performance data 68

Ofsted grade 5A*–C (EM) (and date) 2011

5A*–C (EM) 2012

5A*–C (EM) 2013

Ofsted 2012 dashboard Relative performance (quintiles)

5A*–C (EM) 2015

Progress 8 2017

SL1

1 (2013) 1 (2008) 1 (2018) 1 (2014) 1 (2006) 3 (2017) 2 (2012) 1 (2009) 1 (2015) 1 (2009) 2 (2014) 3 (2012) 1 (2009) 2 (2017) 2 (2013) 2 (2008) 3 (2015) 3 (2012) 3 (2008) 2 (2017) 2 (2013) 1 (2008) 2 (2015) 2 (2012) 2 (2017) 3 (2014) 3 (2011)

61

53

67

Highest

54

Well above average

64

75

78

Highest

75

Well above average

55

61

67

Highest

58

Well below average

89

90

92

Highest

80

Above average

72

51

78

Highest

65

Below average

59

54

67

Highest

50

Well above average

50

52

55

Third

56

Well below average

49

57

55

Third

45

Average

57

52

54

Fourth

53

Average

47

41

49

Third

42

Average

SL2

SL3

SL4 SL5

HT1A

HT1B

HT2

HT3A HT3B

System Leadership

School

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an NLE because ‘it’s a top-down model . . . some of the NLE work is hardnosed and can drive people out of the profession’. Her school was a lead school for an LEPP and a range of leaders from her school actively participated in these collaborations. The initial interview in 2009 was lengthy and impassioned. She aligned herself with those she appeared to identify with – the leaders who are ‘abused by Ofsted’, or ‘worried about their career – there’s a lot of fear about –’ against a punitive LA, who ‘haul people to County Hall to appear before a panel of 15 people to discuss their poor results’. She spoke strongly against such public scrutiny: ‘it’s washing your dirty linen in public’. SL1 described an environment where accountability was the dominant feature and the mechanisms by which headteachers were held to account ‘fear and coercion’. Her empathy appeared to stem from an acknowledgement that she might once have been in the same situation as those she was now supporting: ‘I’m supposed to be a reasonably successful head at this point in time, but it did take time and I don’t think that under current arrangements I would have been allowed to continue. I think that’s the frailty of the current system’. Figure  3.3 shows SL1’s concerns around accountability had reduced. Her own style had become slightly more directive as she worked with schools more reluctant to change. She described an environment where democratic co-production coexisted with increased and more direct government control. The power of the government, in particular the SOS, was evident in the second interview: ‘they allowed us to fast-track to becoming an Academy’ (my italics). Nevertheless, the ‘mood’ of the 2012 interview was more upbeat, mainly due to the status and freedoms enjoyed as a newly converted academy, freed from LA control. SL1 lamented the loss of national programmes to incentivize school-toschool support; she believed, however, such support would continue: We don’t have formal contracts any longer and I  think it’s quite sad that the initiative has been lost. However, four of the schools we’ve worked with have expressed a desire to continue working with us which I think is evidence of our collaborative approach to partnership where people are respected.

She described a fragmented system: One-third of the academy system works well:  there are three models of sponsorship. Model 1 involves really taking over the school . . . the second model is having a number of governors . . . So it’s a sort of half-way house but it’s still very much top down and the head of the receiving school is insecure in the very fact that they’re being taken over. I will only operate under model 3 (umbrella

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System Leadership trust) which is the model we’ve secured for sponsoring one of our neighbouring schools.

The partner was HT1B. Both HT1B and SL1 stressed the importance of choosing a support model with a ‘loose’ governance arrangement, whereby each school retained their identity, headteacher and governors. SL1 explained how schools, from both her own and other local authorities, had approached her for sponsorship: ‘they had a fear of being taken over and being done to rather than worked with’. Some had been ‘approached by a school with a philosophy of school improvement which is tied to a business model’. However, this was in early 2012. By 2013, SL1 had become an NLE. This turnaround, she explained, was necessary, because the LA of a school who had asked for support was unable to grant her the contract unless she held the NLE ‘badge’. A further turnaround was that she was in the process of establishing a MAT (model 1 above). She explained that, while she had been able to sponsor HT1B’s Grade 3 school under the ‘umbrella’ governance (model 3), another school asking for support was in an Ofsted Grade 4 category. The DfE would only agree to sponsorship under the hard governance model 1.  The MAT was the only mechanism of supporting the headteacher in that school, who possibly faced the end of his career if another organization took over. SL1 insisted she had remained true to her philosophy and that her decision was taken to protect a fellow headteacher.

The interactions HT1A and HT1B were from the same LA as SL1. There was overlap in their descriptions of the interactions with SL1. The interviews of all three respondents testified to a punitive local environment and to SL1’s respectful and collaborative approach to school-to-school support. In 2012 the two supported schools were positioned in different ‘segments’ of the performance continuum. HT1A’s school was now labelled a ‘Good’ school, eligible under the 2010 Academies Act for independent conversion to academy status; HT1B’s school, despite small yearon-year improvements to KS4 outcomes, remained just below the rising national average and had been reclassified from ‘Satisfactory’ to ‘Requires Improvement’ (RI) under the reformed Ofsted grading system. HT1A led an average-sized mixed comprehensive school with an above average percentage of disadvantaged students and below average KS2 results on

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entry. At the time of interview, he was enjoying delivering support to another school brokered through his SIP and was optimistic about the future benefits of academy status. HT1A had been partnered with SL1 on joining a national school improvement programme. His attitude to support was as follows: For the first time in my career I was hearing someone demonstrating practices I had never dreamt of but I immediately thought ‘I need to be doing this’ and I remember going back with 102 things to do in my school and I actually did most of them and that lead to the transformation in this place . . . we went from 40 per cent 5A*–C results at GCSE to 94 per cent last year . . . schools teaching schools about school improvement  – they have the strategies and the success records. Only a fool would not buy into that.

He was clear that much of the improvement in his own school was through the partnership with SL1, who he describes as a ‘mentor’. His own approach to leadership and the culture of his school had changed through the relationship: I walked around her school with her and I picked up things that I’ve used here, a particular example is the way that she talks to staff and her relationships with students . . . she knows details about them she can refer to in the course of conversations in the corridor and that contributes to the sort of ethos they’ve got there and we’ve got here now.

In 2012 his school was placed in the highest percentile for performance against similar schools (Ofsted data dashboard); the school was awarded a ‘Good’ by Ofsted, a grade reconfirmed in 2017. In 2017 the school was the lead school in a MAT with neighbouring schools. The progress 8 score was ‘well above’ the national average. The improvements appear, therefore, to have been sustained beyond the direct support received from SL1. HT1B led a large mixed comprehensive school with a more highly performing intake than HT1A’s and a below average percentage of disadvantaged students. HT1B had had a number of collaborations with SL1 and at the time of interview in 2012 was moving into a more formal partnership as a sponsored academy (model 3 above). He cited a range of partnerships with other local schools, often brokered by the LA and a change from the isolated nature of headship when he became a headteacher ten years previously, through a period of governmentincentivized partnerships starting around halfway into his headship, to the current pressure, as an ‘RI’ school, to join with a more successful academy. SL1 featured prominently across these periods. They had been part of the same EAZ, which was ‘imposed’ and LEPP, to which he was ‘invited’, although he

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also described being ‘summoned’ to the first meeting. He spoke positively about these programmes, which included a formal leadership training programme. At this point he mentioned SL1 as ‘one of the partners’ from whom he got ‘quite a lot of support’. It was only when asked to describe the initial LEPP meeting that it became clear SL1 was the lead: As a lead school [SL1] approached four individual schools to become partners but we didn’t know each other . . . [SL1 had] successful partnerships with each school but no-one had thought about, like friends at a party . . . the party can still go drastically wrong because people don’t know each other and don’t have anything in common . . . You could tell within the first 10 minutes that . . . this collaboration was going to take a bit of hard work really.

His description of how SL1 managed the issues of distance and money painted a picture of her style which corroborated her claims to treat others as equals: Because in some collaborations the lead school had got £60,000 and they were keeping all that money and the schools had to bid but SL1 disagreed with that and said her school would keep some administration money and we’re all going to get [equal shares] of the rest and that made us all think well if we’re all getting this amount we all have to chip in really.

In addition, SL1 ensured the partnership commitment was distributed beyond the headteachers: [One of the heads] thought ‘I’ll take the money and run’ but what we did then was appoint coordinators within each school and we were very clear that it wasn’t just about the head but about the head and coordinators so once we moved into . . . 10, 12, 13 people in a room all committed . . . The strength was in those meetings . . . that’s what kept the momentum going.

Both HT1A and HT1B emphasized SL1’s distributed leadership, whereby the school-to-school support relied on contact at different levels: [SL1] has a truly outstanding head of maths and he’s worked with our maths department. . . and has introduced some new ideas . . . that has brought about . . . some quite strong improvement in our maths results. (HT1A) If you ask people in the school [what has been the most useful part of the partnership] it will be different; my Leading Edge coordinator would probably say it’s the support we’ve had for maths and English . . . but for me, it’s . . . the idea that you can go away and spend a day with another colleague and you work through [an issue] . . . share ideas. (HT1B)

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HT1B’s positive description of the relationship, despite feeling pressured into becoming a sponsored academy, derives from two factors: first, confidence that his school had something to offer: ‘we do really well with our vulnerable groups . . . we’ve got something good to share’; second, having a proactive mindset and taking the initiative within the dominant governance environment. He contrasted his own ‘pre-emptive strike’ in seeking sponsorship to become an academy with the caution of other local heads described as ‘not having the bottle’. In addition, a major benefit from formalizing the long-standing partnership with SL1 was security: ‘we know that [SL1’s staff ] have a lot of commitments with other schools so buying into this partnership means that we will get the degree of contact we need, it won’t just be left to chance’. SL1 contributed to the sense of empowerment by ensuring collaboration and joint planning: ‘We have a leadership retreat, a residential with both sets of leadership teams mapping out areas for improvement, mapping out the ways in which we can provide support’.

Academization The Phase Two interviews were dominated by one concern exercising all the headteachers, whichever ‘segment’ of performance they fell into: whether, how and when to become an academy. SL1 was elated by the triumph of successfully converting: Academy status had great attractions for me because it offered me some of the flexibilities that are absolutely crucial to success in school improvement. Determining school teachers’ pay and conditions . . . allows me to reward individuals. It frees me from the prescription of the national curriculum . . . The ability to spend money which was previously spent on my behalf by the LA will allow me to put money exactly where I want it for the best use for the children [and] staff.

For HT1A and HT1B, their different perspectives reflected the position of their school on the performance continuum: all the ‘outstanding’ schools [in the LA] have converted, the ‘good’ are looking at it and the ‘satisfactory’ can’t convert at the moment although most of them I understand will go when they can. (HT1A)

Both HT1A and HT1B described the environment in 2012 as a ‘market’: the tone of their interviews was strikingly different. The first saw opportunity:

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System Leadership it’s all in the very earliest stages but we are surrounded by authorities with a number of failing schools . . . there is probably a market out there that we can tap into. (HT1A)

For HT1B, in contrast, the decision to become a sponsored academy was a risk . . . a calculated risk, I don’t mean risk where you just go sailing into the unknown and you’ve not weighed it up. But I looked at all the what-if scenarios and I looked at doing nothing, just waiting until Mr Gove said ‘right, satisfactory schools can go when they want’ and I  knew although we could eventually convert on our own the LA would block it because obviously we’d be an easy target, you know.

He explained how a major consideration, for schools in this position, is the choice of partner: It had to be somebody [we] felt comfortable with so that was the first hurdle and then explaining to staff no, we’re not all going to be wearing the other academy’s uniform, we’re not going to all be doing the other academy’s behaviour system or having recruitment posts in two schools.

The incentives by which he won over his staff and governors included: it’s an opportunity, we don’t have to do the National Curriculum, we’re in control of our own funding, our own priorities, we’re in charge of our destiny, in the authority we’ve already got six schools become an academy, where are we going to be if we don’t? We’re going to be the back of the queue.

A mistrust of the LA was a motivation:  HT1B cited a neighbouring headteacher: ‘she knows that the authority, because her numbers are declining, will start focusing on her more now because there are fewer schools who are non-academy’. For such headteachers, whose schools could not convert to academy status because they lack the requisite Ofsted grade, the ‘market’ was a bewildering place: They don’t want to approach someone and their governors are quite reticent, they’ve not got involved in partnership working at all so it’s like going out to the cattle market and trying to buy a prize bull and not really knowing anything about farming or cattle. (HT1B)

SL1 appears to have been influential in decisions to convert: when we had the Governors’ meeting to determine whether or not we were going to become an academy [SL1] came and spoke about their experiences of

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conversion for about forty minutes . . . and that was absolutely instrumental in convincing the governors that conversion was the right path to take. She then spoke at a meeting of all the secondary heads and had a fantastic input into that, too. (HT1A)

The middle tier The broker in school-to-school support had often been the LA. PL5, who worked for the LA, was SIP for both HT1A and HT1B and knew well all the schools in this case study. Asked to describe an example of support he had brokered, he chose a fourth school, X, in a neighbouring LA where he was also SIP: It was about identifying the best match between schools . . . the five days I could give them as SIP wasn’t enough so I identified a school similar in terms of socioeconomic profile and prior attainment. The gap with an Outstanding school is too great, so [HT1A] school, recently on the brink of an Ofsted category itself was better [than SL1’s].

PL5 described this model as: ‘not typical of school-to-school support, a more refined model’, compared with the ‘crude approach’ of national programmes such as ‘Gaining Ground, where all supporting schools were already good or outstanding’. The weakness of such programmes, in his view, was that the matching was based on data, but ‘behind the scenes they didn’t know the people and the human profile is a critical element’. He had been SIP at both school X and school HT1A, for two years: School X were appalling at nailing down the detail of data and [HT1A] was very strong at that. The key thing for me was my knowledge of the two sets of people . . . I knew they would work well together.

PL5 described the environment in the LA of school X: The headteacher’s job was under threat and other heads in the LA had been removed. The LA was pushing the school into a partnership. The DfE quite scarily was getting involved in pushing for a structural solution  – their GCSE results were below floor target and falling. The LA was under direct pressure from the DfE and the level of micromanagement is astonishing, even up to ministerial level . . . at a very senior level within the DfE direct conversations with the LA.

The sudden, unexpected change was a shock to the heads: ‘they’d had a relatively benign regime up to that point, it had been a paternal LA, more of a focus on inclusion than the standards agenda. It caught a lot of people out’ (PL5).

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HT1A explained his rationale for entering the partnership with school X: My SIP saw huge benefits for us . . . it brings income which is important in a school where we are recruiting fewer students each year, it brings opportunities for our staff to go and work in other schools and helps our staff retention.

When asked about his lack of a ‘badge’ or experience to provide the support, HT1A replied: I’ve got to do the training for LLE. But I’m going to retire soon so I’m not even sure I’ll complete the LLE. It’s training I suppose. From outside [LA] area they might think they’d like someone with the qualification but it’s odd we’d need to jump through the hoop.

In 2009, PL5 insisted that this partnership was successful and predicted it would be formalized by HT1A sponsoring school X in a Trust. However, in 2012, school X was graded a 4 by Ofsted, having delivered KS4 results below the floor target for the third consecutive year and being found inadequate on all measures. The governors of School X turned to SL1 to join her newly established MAT. SL1 shows the greatest movement in terms of both perceptions of the governance environment and her own actions in response: from declining the ‘top-down’ NLE work to embracing it; from insisting on only loose governance arrangements to building a MAT comprising several schools. Throughout, she cited her main motivation for system leadership work as protection of peer headteachers. She was, however, concerned in the Coalition era, about her capacity to continue the amount of school-to-school support work, in a climate where government grants for consultant-head work had ended, the SIP role no longer existed and short-term contracts with individual schools gave no guarantee to enable longer-term planning. Reluctant to give up the system leadership work she enjoyed and which brought benefit to her own school and others, she was concerned about her ability to continue supporting other schools without a sustainable model of financing the support. She also found the models of school-to-school support frustrating, citing one school which dropped her services on gaining a ‘Good’ status, only to quickly ‘revert to type’ and become ‘failing’ again within a year of her contract ending. The case study data triangulates SL1’s narrative with that of the supported headteachers:  both HT1A and HT1B independently described SL1’s interactions in terms of distributed leadership and reciprocal learning. The same motivations – empathy and the desire to help – led to an increasing alignment of actions with government intent as the interventions applied to ‘failing’ schools

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became harsher and the options for system leader support were both reduced and managed directly by the Department. The case study illustrates how SL1 was ‘absolutely instrumental’ (HT1A) in the decision of other local schools to convert to academy status. For ‘outstanding’ schools, she was a model to follow; for ‘satisfactory ones’, a protector from both LA coercion and predatory competitors. HT1B described how he and others were willing to take the ‘calculated risk’ to become an academy sponsored by SL1 because they trusted her to maintain their positions as headteachers and protect them from the LA pressure to convert with a less benign sponsor. SL1’s motivations were no doubt as espoused: to share what she deeply believed to be good choices and to protect her fellow headteachers where needed. Nevertheless, the case study data from ‘followers’ indicates that she has been a more powerful advocate of government policy than more traditional policy instruments. Changes in the language of SL1’s 2012 interview suggest some reproduction of policy intent: for example, in 2009, she used ‘drive’ seven times with negative connotations about the government or Ofsted (e.g. ‘driving good people out of the system’); whereas in the 2012 interview, ‘drive standards’ is a phrase used four times, each about her own work. However, her stated philosophy of school-to-school support remained unchanged and dominated almost as much of the later interview as it did in 2009: ‘our approach is very much about genuine collaboration and working with each other on a basis of mutual trust’. She was critical of system leaders who sponsored other schools for ‘financial reasons rather than anything to do with improving conditions for children’ and maintained ‘we only work with people who come to us’. It is possible to see SL1 at this point as an example of Hoyle and Wallace’s ‘principled infidelity’, using available government freedoms and incentives to continue to act in line with strongly held values. This case can, therefore, more accurately be interpreted as an example of Hodgson and Spour’s (2006) ‘shielding’ rather than of Argyris and Schön’s (1974) concept of ‘espoused theories of practice’ being out of sync with actual practice. Nevertheless, the outcome has been the realization of the Coalition’s intention to move schools away from LA control into independently managed financial concerns run by a Board of Trustees. Whereas the 2009 interviews placed SL3 and SL1 at opposing ends of the continuum of perspectives on leadership and governance, SL1’s later interviews had echoes of SL3’s. For example, SL1 became closer to the Department, describing her ‘gratitude’ to her link advisor at the Department for insisting on model 1, which gave her full financial and governance control of schools in the

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MAT. In 2014 she believed her earlier stance had been ‘naïve’, as she had placed too much faith in the willingness of supported headteachers to change, perhaps due to her experience on non-mandatory programmes (e.g. HT1A). Additionally, SL1 used the top-slice (5 per cent of each MAT school’s income) to fund a core team to work full time for the MAT, thus enabling her to place them in schools in challenge for two or more days per week, a necessary input to bring about improvement to schools in greatest need. More significantly, she had negotiated with one headteacher a compromise agreement to retire early, an action completely contrary to the stance she maintained at the start of the study. The pressure from the DfE to account for the school’s results was only one of the drivers to take this action. Having secured her sponsorship, the headteacher in question had resisted the changes to practice advised by SL1’s team. In SL1’s eyes, he had betrayed the trust placed in him when SL1 took on the school. This case study illustrates how the steering instruments in operation over this period led a highly principled, successful school leader to travel from one quadrant to another not only in practice but in belief. SL1 now believes that the MAT model offers greater certainty of sustaining good provision in previously failing ‘hard to shift’ schools. It is perhaps a powerful example of Ball’s (2015: 307) contention that, to some extent, ‘we do not do policy, policy does us’ (italics in original). The performance data indicate that SL1’s approach, in the non-mandatory partnerships, led to incremental and sustained improvements. For the schools in the MAT, progress was slower: results have shown variable improvement in most of the key measures. SL1 continues to ‘grow’ her MAT.

Case Study 2: the collaborator The journey At the centre of Case Study 2 is the headteacher of a large mixed comprehensive 11–16 school with above national average levels of performance at KS4 and average percentages of disadvantaged students. The school was graded ‘Outstanding’. She held a number of system leadership roles, including executive head, consultant head, SIP, NLE and a member of Department for Education advisory groups. In the initial mapping, SL2 was the only system leader to describe the 2009 governance environment with dominant characteristics of the top right-hand quadrant. In a reflective and measured interview, she was mainly optimistic

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about the movement from centralization five years earlier (Labour’s first term of government) to a more personalized approach to intervention: I think it’s very different from when staff would go out of school to seminars run by consultants who had all been given the same power point they hadn’t written to deliver across the country. Those days are gone, that didn’t work, there was quite a backlash against the National Strategies, which took good people out of schools and they had been out of schools a long time and they increasingly lost their credibility.

She had found this approach ‘very centralized and not appropriate for the context the school was in’ and was supportive of the move towards an approach based on segmentation: ‘I do feel now it’s bespoke support by the right kind of individuals for the situation and I think that’s much better’. The interviews described features of the locality which might explain why this case differed from the others: the LA in question devolved most of the funding to schools; the schools were mainly successful; the quality of the relationships was positive: ‘the relationship [with the SIP] is the most delightful, professional relationship’ (SL2) and: The relationship has been really positive because he has seen me as a support for him and not as a threat to him and I think part of the problem that some NLEs have encountered is that if you’re drafted in to support a head who is not doing the job as well as some people think they should be doing, the NLE could be seen as some kind of a threat, coming in, taking over.

The NLE badge gave SL2 scope to do ‘all sorts of things’ and she felt free to ‘pick and choose the things I  want to do, all the things I  think I’ve got more to contribute to’. She was a SIP for a year but chose not to continue because ‘I was reporting back both to the LA and to the governors but not involved in providing advice or support. I didn’t like that as much’. She enjoyed close links with the Department, ‘being at the heart of policy and innovation’, although she held no illusions about the impact this had: ‘they didn’t take on the messages they didn’t want to hear’. Figure  3.3 shows a shift in 2012 into the diametrically opposite quadrant, with numerous statements beginning with ‘the Government’. Like SL1, she acknowledged the contradictory tensions in the system: It’s topsy-turvy, they are saying ‘you get on with it, you decide on the curriculum, there is no national curriculum, you can organise your day how you like and so on. So in that way there’s a lot of decentralisation and a lot of autonomy being

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In 2009, there was an emphasis on collaboration: she described her consultant head role as: ‘helping people to network; putting them in touch with people who are experts in the field’. In this sense, SL2 appears to be a ‘nodal’ actor in the local education field. In 2012 she was involved in a structural intervention: I’m part of an IEB  – an Interim Executive Board . . . the Government have stepped in, have removed the governing body . . . the head had already left and there were five of us put in to help rapidly improve the school and support the acting head and also investigate the process of the school becoming an academy . . . My system role is that of governance.

She was positive about this aspect of Coalition changes: the work needs to be done very quickly and effectively and that has been fantastic I have to say the fact that we have at our disposal a certain amount of money to pay for the deployment of LLEs . . . and we can just one day say this is what we’re going to do and the next day have them working in a school . . . the fact that we can locally have a solution for this school by using who we think will work and making sure it is happening, is something very new.

She contrasted this freedom with the previous environment:  ‘I think the bureaucracy and the lack of local knowledge would have meant that would have taken longer to do but it’s just happened, literally overnight.’ Like SL1, SL2 had moved into system leadership work more in line with government intervention than support of peer headteachers; like SL1, she remained motivated by a strong moral purpose: These are some of the most vulnerable children and families who are being cared for by the school and they deserve a very good deal and they’re not getting a very good deal . . . something needed to happen and if that means bringing in an IEB who are working flat out to shift things and shift things fast, then that’s got to be good. You know, I am no fan of government generally coming in and intervening, but I think needs must in each individual case.

Her main focus post-Coalition was taking the TSA to maturity, working collaboratively with other schools from her own region and beyond:

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To draw the alliance together, a group of like-minded people who are committed to this kind of work, who have capacity in their schools . . . So my role is to sell the vision, write the bid, be successful in the bid, pull the alliance together, have a clarity in the way we’re going to work together.

The interactions In 2009, SL2 described how she worked with schools in challenge: staff will be pretty demotivated; it’s about ensuring the climate is right for staff to be able to teach as well as they can and are given as much positive feedback as they can be. It’s difficult because it’s complex. I don’t think it can be, ‘all you’ve got to do is that’ . . . it’s about all of those things, about results, about the school climate, about the behaviour and about the staff feeling positive about what they’re doing.

She described her role as ‘coaching’ although there are examples which are more directive: ‘he spent a long time on [the action plan]. I decided that actually I had to say it wasn’t fine . . . this was a document which was 45 pages long with too many targets’. This depended upon a strong relationship:  ‘we can be honest, open. I can be clear and direct if I think things aren’t as they should be’. The headteacher she mentioned was interviewed as HT2. He was appointed to his first headship in a school local to SL2’s. Within months, the school was placed in National Challenge because KS4 results were below the floor target of 30 per cent; despite the school having been labelled by Ofsted earlier that year as ‘Outstanding’ and having a CVA1 of over 1030. After one year as head, results rose to 38 per cent and at the time of the 2012 interview were 49 per cent. SL2 was mentioned early in the interview quite spontaneously, in the context of support he received via the LA as a new headteacher in a challenging school: ‘there are people you meet who are quite iconic in your life and [SL2] is one of those people’. He discussed his first steps with her; she advised: ‘in a school like that what you’re going to have to do is build up the morale of the staff ’. To support this, she addressed a meeting of their joint staff to say they would be working together and pointed to the aspects of HT2’s school that were better than her own, saying, ‘look what you’re achieving’. The effect, according 1

Contextual Value Added. The average is 1000; 1030 places the school in the top 40 per cent of schools for students’ progress between KS2 and KS4. Measure took account of contextual factors such as gender and family circumstances. Abandoned as a measure by the Coalition in 2011 (DfE, 2011).

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to HT2, was that ‘people really felt wow, something is taking place here, things are really changing’. HT2 described SL2’s approach in terms which place her in the top right-hand quadrant, in line with her own interview: She wouldn’t just say, this is the answer, this is the thing to do. Because to be quite honest, she had a wealth of experience [but] she’d never been in this situation. So she would just talk things through. She was just always there, always made the right noises.

The reciprocity continued after the NLE contract ended: I don’t speak to her as often now . . . I don’t need to have my hand held, she will ring me and ask what I would do in this situation because I’ve done so many capabilities (performance management of underperforming staff ), I’ve done all these things and I send staff out now to her school to help them out occasionally.

Academization SL2’s 2012 interview focused on the conversion of her school to an academy and the opportunities arising from being the lead school in a TSA. She acknowledged that her positive experience post-Coalition might not be typical: I’m only seeing it from the viewpoint of an outstanding school surrounded by good and outstanding schools and I think for others there may be a lot of anxiety and confusion about their future and support and the direction they’re going in and I think at the moment it is quite a divided system.

SL2 described conversion to academy status for one of her supported schools in terms predominantly characteristic of the bottom left-hand quadrant: The Department decided they thought academy status was what was right for the school and went through a range of options and have come up with an option, a chain that they think would be appropriate and my understanding is there hasn’t got to be consultation on that because the IEB has been brought in.

She cited direct experience of the 2011 legislation: Irrespective of what the IEB recommends, the Secretary of State can just make a decision and decide this is what’s happening. So it’s not the IEB’s decision, it’s the Secretary of State’s decision who comes in there and there’s already been a lot of work done at the Department a) they think it should be an academy and

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b) who they think the academy chain should be. So I think the reason for having an IEB is that the governors were resisting that and so the IEB has been brought in to smooth the way.

The headteacher, having ‘left’, was not available for interview. HT2, however, was positive about taking his school to academy status under the 2010 act, ironically, on the back of the ‘Outstanding’ Ofsted judgement in early 2008, regardless of the fact that in the interim he had been subject to structural interventions because the benchmarks in late 2008 deemed the school to be failing. HT2 satisfied the Coalition’s criterion of outreach work by quoting work in their primary feeder schools. He admitted that this had been undertaken not as outreach work, but to build reputation and improve student recruitment.

The middle tier The environment HT2 described was ‘freer’ than that described by other headteacher respondents. However, he described how he could have been in a different position, as, six weeks into post, he had been visited by the director of children’s services (DCS) who told him the government had literally named us, you know, there was a big drive to make failing schools Trusts . . . I would have had someone dictating how I was going to run the school and all the staff would be TUPE’d over . . . I didn’t want to do it. I didn’t want to have my authority undermined straight away.

While there was no choice about becoming a Trust, SL2 made a case to the DCS that HT2 should be a director of the Trust rather than answerable to them. Because of her status in the LA, their belief in her judgement and the backing of the school governors, this solution was accepted. HT2 reflected:  ‘I’ve been quite lucky, I guess, someone once said to me it’s better to be born lucky than rich.’ Like SL2, HT2 conveyed a sense of the collaborative approach of the LA, describing how the DCS visited him personally to talk about the Department’s insistence that his school become a Trust and then subsequently supported him in an empowered rather than inferior role. We see here an example of direct government intervention imposing a structural change onto an LA-maintained school and the headteacher escaping being ‘taken over’ by trustees due to the support of a system leader and the lead person in the LA. This support contrasts with respondents’ descriptions of the LA in the first case study, which SL1 described as a ‘parent–child’ relationship. SL2 attributed some of the success in

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growing the TSA to the collaborative ethos in her locality. She believed TSAs as a coordinating structure for school improvement had advantages: Nobody had any choice about which they LA they belonged to, or how much they paid – money was taken at source. This model of school improvement is ‘everyone delivers and everyone receives’. It’s not centralist. Not all the SIPs were school based – some were retired or LA staff. The essence here is, each school gets a highly structured peer review and everything is evaluated. Our PD is evaluated at 4.8 out of 5 where 5 is outstanding.

The respondents in this case were clear that ‘schools don’t want to operate in isolation’ partly because they are ‘feeling vulnerable’. SL2 explained how the model of partnership working addressed this: It’s a framework within which schools can work together. The lead school takes responsibility and review reports are shared. All sign a members’ pledge. It’s important to have people aligned with the ethos. It’s organic growth. It’s safe. It’s up to the TSA to bring people in e.g. feeder primaries.

SL2 described the TSAs as school-led: Under Labour we would still all be going cap-in-hand to the [government], because there was money in it. The impetus to set this up came from two things: one was the change of government and two was the fear that if we don’t do something we’ll lose the momentum and all the gains we’ve built up from working together.

She distinguished the voluntary alliance from MATs and chains:  ‘networks have to be high trust. We can’t sack people; we don’t have decision-making on spend’. SL2 was the only respondent apart from policy leads who explicitly referenced ‘the system’, describing system leadership work in 2009 as ‘a conscious move towards a professionally led system . . . a cultural shift, a professional shift to get people on the ground who are doing the work to actually help transform the system’; and in 2012: ‘I think we’re only just now beginning to be able to work together to actually do stuff that will help the system’. She explained how the TSA was helping to shape the system because the ideas coming from us as a teaching school alliance and from [other] teaching school alliances are fed into the National College and they’re very responsive to what we have to say so it’s helping to shape everything from the induction of the new round of teaching

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schools, the processes we have to go through to appoint SLEs, all of the things we’ve had to do we have helped to refine ready for the next group coming on.

Across the TSA, members reported an increase in KS4 results of 2.3 per cent against a national average increase of 1.8 per cent from 2012 to 2013. It should be noted that the starting point of 60 per cent average attainment of the schools was one percentage point above the national average: the network was predominantly for high performing schools. Over 50 per cent of the partnership schools were LA-managed community schools, with a few sponsored academies and the remainder converter academies. SL2 had, with other system leaders, spent a great deal of time co-designing how the alliance would function. Schools paid into a fund which covered the salary of an administrator who arranged schoolto-school support. A  document had been drawn up to outline partnership protocols such as an annual review of all aspects of each school’s performance conducted by a team of trained leaders selected from across the group of schools on the basis of high performance. An agreed philosophy and framework for action was based on the TSA concept dedicated to ‘the advancement of system leadership’. There was a clear statement of high performance: ‘Teaching School Alliances sit within a community of outstanding individuals and practice who work collectively to improve outcomes for pupils’. A values statement mentioned ‘moral purpose’ and the expectation that all schools would share their good practice with others in the network. HT2 explained in the 2013 update why he accepted SL2’s invitation to join the alliance, without any pressure, as a now ‘Good’ school, to do so: ‘a key part of it is the annual review. It’s that peer accountability’. It also helped his staff retention: ‘my deputy is headteacher level. Thank god I  can provide her with enough stretch here’. He saw the days this deputy spent delivering support in other schools as ‘the best form of PD’. He feared that in future headteachers may find themselves more alone without the degree of support he enjoyed. SL2 has been ‘a profound influence’ on his development as a now successful headteacher, which he believed it was ‘quite exceptional’ in an otherwise competitive environment: I do genuinely think that once she built her school to where it is now she cares about the greater good for all [the LA] students and making sure that all schools are good. I think she genuinely believes that.

HT2 moved in 2015 to a less challenging school, which in 2016 became the lead school in a small MAT, of which he is CEO. In 2017, Ofsted reaffirmed the

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‘Good’ grading of HT2’s former school. Later that year progress 8 results were ‘average’.

Case Study 3: the hero-head The journey SL3 improved her underperforming school to achieve an outstanding Ofsted inspection in 2006, despite the school, like HT2’s, producing below national average outcomes at KS4. She then sought and, after a series of setbacks, gained a second school to lead. She repeated this process until she was, in 2009, the executive headteacher of three schools, in a single Trust, each with an operational headteacher she had trained ‘in the model’. In 2009 she had been an NLE for four years, supporting the schools which became part of her Trust. She had no interest in performing the SIP role and delegated SIP meetings to deputies, considering them ‘a waste of time’. She was an NLE and delegated outreach work to deputy headteachers from her Trust schools. The interviews with SL3 displayed the greatest imbalance in mapping, with comments indicating a strongly ‘done to’ model of leadership. She is the only case study system leader who showed little movement between 2009 and 2012, remaining firmly in the bottom left-hand quadrant on the analytical framework (Figure 3.3). In 2012 she described government intervention as ‘harsher’ and her own style as more distributed now that she was responsible for several schools. SL3 presented a clear vision of how groups of schools could, together, achieve greater results for learners; in 2009 she was the most forward-looking of the system leaders, arguing for a step beyond the then current system leadership models: ‘the Trust should be a national support school. Do you see what I mean? It cannot be this one school. I’ve spoken to the NCSL and I think they’ve got to change the [NLE] model’. She argued that, in each of the schools she was responsible for, there was an operational head ready for the next stage of running more than one school and therefore that the group should be given more schools to run. She supported her argument with an appeal to cost-effectiveness: ‘there are massive economies of scale across the three schools through IT’. In 2012, like SL1 and SL2, she was establishing a teaching school, describing it as ‘a complete turnaround of our thinking’. She foresaw that in a short time the funding for ITT and PD (e.g. leadership programmes delivered by the NCSL) would be ‘delegated to schools’. She was completely behind the move to bring

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ALBs back into the Department:  ‘Ministers should have direct responsibility rather than blaming quangos if there’s a problem’, commenting on arm’s-length steering – ‘it is now thought of as a bad thing. It’s now thought that Ministers should be responsible’. When asked what led to this reversal, she replied: ‘I’m sure there’s some funding savings or they wouldn’t be doing it, they just don’t want to put that much money in’. The environment she described is one of enforced action; almost every comment in both interviews lies in the bottom left-hand quadrant. However, ‘fear’ was not a word SL3 used in 2009 (unlike SL1), but in 2012 she saw it as a characteristic of the governance environment: If [schools] are satisfactory, a) they won’t be able to manage on their budget . . . and b) if they carry on flat-lining there’s nowhere to go . . . another school will be able to take them over . . . I think it could be quite threatening and quite frightening.

For SL3, there was no substantive change to her approach to system leadership; instead, a welcome intensification of the action to deal with failure and greater opportunity for successful proactive schools to extend their powers and funding, thus securing their future.

Interactions In 2009, SL3 described her ‘model’, calling what she did in the schools she took over as ‘dirty work’: Real cards on the table, I sack the head . . . we pick them really at the end, you know what I mean, when they’ve nowhere else to go and so at (name of school) out of 45 teachers, 19 left in the first year and 33 out of 90 left (name of a third school) and another 18 last year. A  blood bath, an absolute blood bath. It is really, really hard-nosed stuff.

When asked if she worried she ever made mistakes, she responded: Yeah, made odd mistakes, yeah when we’ve moved 30 new staff in, you’ve done it so quickly, yes, made the odd mistake, but they will go in the following year. New appointment, here we go again.

After a reflective pause, SL3 continued: Also the other thing is that you don’t pick everyone up in the first tranche, I mean at (school) there was a second cohort of staff who were underperforming

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The need to be ruthless about ‘letting go’ underperforming staff was an attitude echoed by other respondents in the first round of interviews: ‘someone’s got to do it’ (PL2); ‘you get used to it’ (SL4). In 2009, three of the five system leaders described the dominant environment of their work in the bottom left-hand quadrant. In 2012, SL3 had not changed ‘the model’ of how she worked:  her deputies became responsible for embedding ‘the model’ as headteachers in newly acquired schools; she concentrated on brokering more schools to join the expanding Trust. This appeared to be delegation rather than distributed leadership, since they worked within a given framework and she retained the ultimate say in funding and recruitment. In light of this, it might appear surprising that HT3A described, like all the case study headteachers, a more balanced environment than the system leaders. HT3A listed a plethora of support he was ‘subject to’ when his school went into Ofsted ‘Special Measures’, within a year of his promotion to headteacher from deputy. Support included a partner headteacher appointed by the LA; his own network of local headteachers; the SIP; the LA advisor and a consultant headteacher from the SSAT. He described it as ‘frustrating sometimes because conversations repeated themselves’. He found these system leaders ‘massively different, very idiosyncratic’. HT3A was restrained but clearly angry about the ‘two occasions when I was going to have a partner head whether I wanted one or not because my school was in Special Measures’ and described at length his own skills and training: ‘I’d done NQPH, I’d read Goleman; I knew enough about the theories of leadership; I was knowingly applying it according to the context of my school’. The first imposed partner, from the LA, was ‘not particularly helpful’. The second was SL3. HT3A described how he and his team prepared for the first meeting with SL3: Our preparation was almost as detailed as for an Ofsted monitoring visit because we felt very much under pressure to be able to demonstrate in a short space of time what we were about . . . We knew two people were coming from a very successful school to us, you know, a school on its knees in terms of outcomes.

SL3 did not attend: she sent two deputies. The meeting took place at a service station ‘down the motorway’, because the rural school was too far for SL3’s team to travel. HT3A recounted: ‘I’ve never felt more disappointed because we

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didn’t get the dialogue or the debate that we expected, what we got largely was a roadshow.’ This approach had negative effects on both HT3A: The message I was getting from the senior staff at that school was, well if it worked in our school, if you just replicate these things in your school then it’s bound to come right . . . I almost felt that I was being cajoled, pressurised, even bullied into adopting models of leadership that may well have worked somewhere else, but I wasn’t convinced they were going to work in my school;

and his senior team: It was difficult for me with my leadership team because I  think I’d wrongly created an expectation amongst my senior team that these visitors were going to come with a golden egg which would hatch and suddenly we would be initiated into this wonderfulness – of course that doesn’t happen.

HT3A refused to engage further with this element of the support programme. Nevertheless, the small, rural, 11–16 school with below average numbers of disadvantaged pupils made rapid progress to above average KS4 outcomes. In 2011 it was graded ‘Good’, a judgement reconfirmed by Ofsted in 2015. How did HT3A achieve this? ‘There was no silver bullet and no magic egg, just bloody hard work.’ What worked, for him, was ‘the informality of conversations in corridors or at the back of classrooms have given me more insights than anything that’s been more formal or structured in formally brokered arrangements’. He described a technique used by the head of an outstanding school, not one of his allocated support heads, but a ‘system leader’ he met at the termly conferences organized as part of the national support programme: He does it by suggestion . . . what he seems to do to me is just to float an idea and leave it hanging in the air and I think anyone who deserves to be a head will pick those things up and turn them over in their head and I find myself going back to him and saying, can I just talk to you a little bit more about that . . . that’s probably one of the most powerful influences on how I’ve gone about my job.

HT3A described the LA’s requests for him to share with other schools his improvement journey from a ‘category of concern’ to ‘Good’: ‘I’ve had to fight a rear-guard action because we’ve suddenly become flavour of the month’. In 2012 he refused to engage in external support work: ‘school improvement is a fragile and delicate business – I’ve been anxious not to take the eye off the ball in my own school’. HT3A remained sceptical about claims that school improvement can be controlled:

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System Leadership School improvement is a really messy business and one of the things that I’ve found most difficult is the notion that grey is OK, trying to find survivability and even comfort at times in the chaos of it all. You have to have an acceptance that things are planned out, you think you’re going to get there and quite often in the last stage they fail – but then you get some unexpected gains where you’ve had some stubborn issues and all of a sudden one of those comes good.

Additionally, his experience of system leadership left him opposed to the concept: One of the things I  resented was other people telling me what they thought I  should do. I’ve reacted so deeply and so strongly to that, that even now I wouldn’t presume to waltz into somebody else’s domain and say ‘why don’t you try that?’ It’s not a lack of confidence on my part, I’m quietly self-confident about what I’m doing . . . It’s more a moral or philosophical thing.

In 2013, however, HT3A became the executive headteacher of his own and a neighbouring school, with each having a ‘head of school’ for the operational leadership. In 2017, the school’s progress 8 score is ‘average’ but it continues to perform well above average in English and mathematics at GCSE. HT3A in 2017 is a lead partner in a TSA of local secondary schools and the LA; each contributes to a central fund to cover training and support for all schools in the area. The second headteacher in this case was, like HT1B, the head of a ‘Satisfactory’ school. He cancelled the scheduled interview a few weeks beforehand, following his resignation. In the telephone conversation to withdraw, he described how he ‘did what was best for the school. I  thought joining a MAT would bring us the resources and skills needed to move the school to good’. He had believed, as headteacher of a ‘Satisfactory’ school, his job would be safe, but found himself put under pressure to resign ‘before Ofsted come back and put the school in a category – you don’t want to end your career like that’. A deputy from another of SL3’s schools was appointed to replace HT3B.

Academization SL3’s 2012 interview occurred soon after conversion as a Coalition academy. SL3 was keen to emphasize the importance of the governance arrangements, having chosen the MAT model 1:

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Now that’s very important. We have a Board and a master funding agreement with the SOS so all the money comes to the Board and each school has a supplementary funding agreement. We’re told what schools are going to get, we top-slice and the rest goes to the schools. And that is formal.

In explaining the differences this governance arrangement made, there were two ‘biggies’. First, ‘the Trust is the employer of all staff which gives me the power to hire and fire: if the governors won’t get rid of a head and I think the head should go, then I’m involved’. The second was the national squeeze on school budgets: ‘Schools have got to cut £1 billion in back office and it’s only by working together and economies of scale and sharing staff that I  think you can really thrive in this Brave New World. And I think others will struggle.’

The middle tier HT3A’s interview had echoes of HT2’s: both in the declaration ‘I was lucky’ and in the source of some of the ‘luck’. Out of three headteachers in the LA placed in ‘Special Measures’ within six months of each other, HT3A said, ‘I was the only one who survived.’ He recounted the visit from the LA’s school improvement team immediately after the Ofsted judgement; they spent a day in school talking to staff and students and met him at the end of the day. He was told: ‘if we didn’t think you were capable of improving the school we would be having a different conversation now – you’d be on three months’ notice.’ From their perspective, the school had ‘the capacity to improve’. He was ‘crystal clear about why I survived and the others didn’t’: I had been honest with my staff and laid out a clear plan of where we were and what we needed to do. In the other schools, the LA said, there was too much of a gulf between the majority of the staff and the leadership team.

In 2009, SL3 expressed frustration that LAs allowed underperformance to continue in some schools for so long, since they ‘have the powers . . . why don’t they use them?’, answering her own question: ‘drippy, absolutely drippy . . . I don’t think as characters they are strong enough’. Unlike SL1 and SL2, the schools SL3 supported were all outside her own LA. It is interesting to note the LA appeared to be moderating this system leader’s desire to take over other schools: There’s another school they’re trying to get me involved in at the moment which I don’t think I will because they are trying to dilute the model. They want us

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An update in 2013 reported SL3’s Trust had grown in negotiations directly with the DfE. Most of these schools had not improved in terms of either Ofsted grades or student outcomes, despite having been part of the Trust for more than a year. By 2017, the majority of the schools were rated Good and the TSA had grown, offering PD only to schools in the Trust. SL3 remained in the same quadrant in 2012 as in 2009, closely aligned with central government. In 2009, SL3 saw the main incentivization of school partnerships as the funding. In 2012 she listed this as one of several, the others being negative rather than positive, including the raised floor target of 35 per cent 5A*–C(EM). The result was a rejection of her ‘model’ by the headteacher she was allocated to support on a non-mandatory contract (HT3A); and the loss from the system of a large number of professionals from the MAT schools.

Case Study 4: SL5 SL5 had been the head of a challenging school for over ten years and was proud of that school’s status as now Outstanding. In 2009, she had many years’ experience of school improvement and working on collaborations to improve schools. Her clearly articulated philosophy was against a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. At the time of the 2009 interview, she had formed a Trust of three schools and was working to support another school in a neighbouring LA. She had worked with the incumbent headteacher to replace governors who were unsupportive; shared her school’s policies and procedures, including the teaching and learning monitoring framework; and been in the school regularly to help embed a strong behaviour policy to support teachers with unruly students. By 2011, she was hands-off in implementation, seeing her role as behind the scenes, supporting the headteacher: So, we’ve been through the whole process, taking control, giving it back to the school. It has a strong governing body now and they’ve decided that they want to join (our Trust) because they can see the benefit of being part of us.

However, SL5, monitoring delivery of her teaching and learning framework via regular meetings and data, was taken by surprise when, in 2012, Ofsted found teaching and learning had not improved in line with the school’s own

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audit results, graded the leadership as weak and placed the school in ‘Special Measures’. The school was removed from SL5’s Trust. It remained in an Ofsted category for more than two years, during which time monitoring reports stated it was not making adequate progress. In 2014, it was renamed and became part of a large MAT. It gained an Ofsted Outstanding grade in 2017, with a progress 8 score well above average. SL5’s main school, in the meantime, was downgraded from a grade 1 to 3. SL5’s credibility was doubly compromised and she retired.

Themes Some of the themes identified in system leadership literature also featured regularly in interview data, including moral purpose as a driver and the importance of trust. Two aspects of school leadership prominent in the literature but scarcely mentioned in the interviews were the need to create professional learning communities and to focus on teaching and learning. Although all system leaders mentioned the latter’s importance, they appointed someone to lead it; they were more concerned with structural choices and brokering arrangements. Like SL2, SL1 and SL3 developed teaching schools, but in interviews mentioned them only briefly; both delegated the role of lead of their TS to one of their trusted headteachers. In spite of their positive views of the potential of TSAs, both SL1 and SL3 chose to concentrate their personal energies on establishing a MAT. Financial considerations influenced both. SL1 was also driven by concern to help other heads; SL3 welcomed the control and consistency afforded by the MAT. Funding was absent from the system leadership literature but mentioned more frequently by all respondents than any other theme. The governance environment, for high-performing schools, was one of an increasing number of new opportunities. For others, the main characteristic was instability within which it was difficult to navigate a clear sense of direction. HT2, for example, reflected that his school had, within the space of less than four years, been labelled as one of the best in the country by Ofsted; one of the worst, by the National Challenge; in need of new leadership provided by an imposed Trust; then worthy of gaining converter academy status which comes with the remit to support underperforming schools. Newman (2001: 170) described the relationships between actors at different points of the system as ‘sites of negotiation and tension’. However, the extremity of the struggles described by the respondents was unanticipated, particularly

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in the case of the system leaders who were successful headteachers. All respondents, including the policy leads, conveyed a sense of ‘battle’, of fighting against a hostile environment to act in accordance with their own beliefs about the right course of action. They operated their sense of personal and professional agency not only to cope in a challenging environment, but to impose their own actions upon others in the face of often quite strong resistance. For SL1, the hostile environment was internal:  ‘you learn to rise above the negativity of certain types’; and external: I admire heads who are courageous enough to stand firm in the face of governing bodies because as the lead professional you have the right not to be hamstrung by lay people who have vested interests that may be counter-productive to what’s in the interests of the children.

SL4 described battles with ‘cynics who thought it wouldn’t work’ and ‘staff who said it would never work, but it has worked’. SL3 acknowledged that the environment post-Coalition must be ‘frightening’ for heads of schools labelled ‘Satisfactory’ by Ofsted, but also talked about her battles with the Department and LAs to gain control of more schools. For SL5, the battle was between taking time to allow the supported school to make improvements themselves and the pressure from being held accountable within a shorter timescale. For headteachers, the sense of battle appears to be an endemic part of the role. Like SL4, HT2’s battles were with staff: ‘it was a school for staff – so much was just rotten to the core’. He described needing to address this, starting people ‘on capability’ and some ‘very, very difficult meetings’, including a ‘showdown’ with the deputy who had been acting head before his appointment: ‘he walked down to my room and the corridor outside was lined with all his cronies, it was like the OK Corrall’. In an underperforming school, he was also embattled from outside, forced into becoming a Trust. He described this period of early headship: ‘it just about broke me, it was just hell, it was horrible’. He found strength to survive, partly from SL2 – ‘she was just a rock, I’d ring her 10, 11 o’clock at night driving home’ – and partly from what he described as refusal to be beaten – ‘there must be a little bit in people who aspire to be a head, there must be a little bit that’s quite cussed’. HT3A described the impact on himself following the Ofsted judgement: You end up at that point with the deepest questions you can face and you either roll up your sleeves and think, ‘well I’ll give it my best shot’ or you just cave in and for me that wasn’t an option. I  accepted responsibility for what had

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happened. I was the head, those were the circumstances. You need those deep reservoirs, those deep pools of hope you can draw on.

However, it was a policy lead who conveyed the greatest sense of being bowed down, defeated, by the political environment: ‘I’ve had it [moral purpose] beaten out of me . . . for your own sanity you have to accept the basis on which you work.’

Summary This chapter has captured how the freedoms of the Labour government presented a mixed governance environment with clear distinctions between system leaders, and how the freedoms offered by the Coalition coexisted with other ‘levers’ to create an environment unanimously perceived as more centralized. All the system leaders described a harsher environment in 2012: all continued to do system leadership work. There is strong sense of fracturing, dislocation and instability. Survival is the result of ‘luck’. System leaders are guided more by personal philosophy about how schools improve, than by school context. School improvement is described as ‘a messy business’ (HT3A). By providing a conceptual framework within which to discuss the findings, Chapter 4 attempts to bring some meaning to the messiness.

4

Towards a Model of System Leadership Practice

Introduction In 2009, apart from policy evaluations, little had been published about how system leaders worked with other schools. System leadership was both undertheorized and open to differing interpretations:  ‘Interpretations vary and definition is elusive . . . system leadership is an emergent concept’ (Innovation Unit, DfES, 2007: 3); ‘there is currently no clear or systemic knowledge of how leaders undertake system leadership roles’ (Higham et al., 2009: 20). Despite its high profile over the past two decades, Armstrong (2015: 17) observed that the concept of ‘system leadership’ (defined as leaders operating across more than one interrelated organization in order to bring about change and improvement at a systemic level) is ‘underdeveloped and under researched in education’. This chapter details a conceptual model of system leadership practice drawn up inductively from the cases described in the previous chapter. Additional knowledge about the nature of system leadership includes, for each of four approaches, the nature of the power operating in each quadrant; the nature of the trust formed by the interaction of styles of leadership with contextual features; and the type of learning engendered. The chapter concludes by considering the relative influence of system leaders’ philosophies and the mediating factors of the environment within which they operate.

A conceptual model of system leadership Respondents confirmed that the government devolved how to do system leadership to successful headteachers:

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System Leadership It’s a tighter system in terms of accountability but much looser in terms of what solution you offer – in fact, they couldn’t care less about what you do and they’re not facilitating that, they don’t see that as their role. (PL4) They are happy to leave it to your own professional judgement, I haven’t had to negotiate a contract or what I’m doing on a daily basis, just how many days I’ll be in the school. (SL2)

All system leader respondents offered a similar list of strategies to address underperformance in other schools, which mirrored the messages from school improvement literature:  strengthen leadership (vision-setting, climate and ethos); tackle student behaviour through a consistent positive behaviour policy; improve student outcomes by curriculum changes and better teaching; get the finances into the black. In this sense, the data confirms rather than adds to what we already know about what to do to improve schools. In terms of how they implemented these changes, they appeared at first to fall into one of two camps: There is one group of system leaders who choose to run more of the same product  – executive-style leadership, a governance solution where they need more governance and control over the school. You’ve got a quite clear division between those [who] develop a chain of schools where people are basically doing as they are told inside a framework [and those] more about collaboration, the coaching and mentoring side, more about helping schools to develop within their own context, using knowledge of other people. (SL5)

As the study progressed, however, it became clear that the binary opposition on a single dimension of ‘done to or done with’ was too simplistic. In each case, the system leader evolved their own model. The different forms of exchange described by respondents were considered alongside their differential impact on receiving headteachers. Insights into the nature of the interactions allowed a characterization of system leadership as practice, theorized as four different approaches to system leadership. The conceptual model of quadrants allows these differences to be mapped in order to capture the characteristics of each. Figure 4.1 summarizes the types, locating them in the governance environment within which they operate and to which they contribute. The approaches are presented within a conceptual framework, without normative assumptions about the superiority of one over another. All four were common in the study. Each resulted in both successes and failures, in terms of impact on other leaders and the degree of school improvement in either the short term or the long term, as measured by national performance indicators. The purpose of the study

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ective t of approach to context, including the macro context of national accountability, the meso context of the regional or local governance environment and the micro context of the e importance of these contextual factors in shaping the interactions became clearer as the respondents were revisited over time. the system leader feels relatively autonomous in the role, one is more directive erences might be due to personal ering degrees of expertise or experience on the part of the supported erent contexts such as whether the school is in an Ofsted category to improve. Similarly, both centralized models operate within a framework; the ‘herohead’ imposes it, usually via a new leadership team; the ‘auditor’ supports the existing leadership team and monitors progress by audit. relationships of the protector; the dialogic accountability and reciprocity of the collaborator; the command and control of the hero-head; the managerial e next section draws on the case studies to performativity of the auditor ts and weaknesses of each. Decentralized Governance System leader driving force but servant leader or mentor Volunteer partners. Asymmetrical power

Self-sustaining networks System leader a peer. Personal and professional Power dispersed and fluid. Equal and

Mutual trust Reciprocal learning. Transfer of dialogue and coaching

Leadership

Distributed Leadership

Hierarchy

New Public Management

Command/control. System leader close to government Hierarchical one-way power. costs Directed learning

to targets and monitoring compliance leading to high Inspectorial power Contractual calculus-based trust Key: Learning from example and frameworks Power Trust Learning

Centralized Governance

System leadership practice.

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The protector The ‘servant-leader’ style of the protector depends on demonstrated expertise and experience, which gives rise to trust on the part of the recipient head who is keen to learn, so that the asymmetrical power relationship is non-threatening. The legitimacy of the system leader’s authority is acknowledged by the supported headteacher: ‘we were willing recipients of her expertise’ (HT1A). It is democratic because of the legitimacy afforded by the recipient (Glatter, 2017). While this is not a symmetrical relationship, there is reciprocity, in the recognition by the servant-leader of the qualities and successes of the recipient. Each headteacher supported by SL1 believed their school brought something to the partnership: if you always feel, oh our results are not as good as theirs, you will go in as a subservient partner . . . we do really well with our vulnerable groups [who] perform above the national average . . . so we might be 2 per cent below the national average in English and maths but still feel we’ve got something good to share. (HT1B)

An acceptance of this approach depends upon recognition that schools are differentially effective, rather than an approach which allocates an overall judgement of ‘failing’ on the basis of a limited set of performance measures. Practice was ‘transferred’ from the Outstanding schools to the schools in challenge by modelling the leadership behaviours of trust and positivity in ‘learning walks’ (where the system leader and headteacher walked around SL1’s school, popping into classrooms, meeting staff and students in corridors). They joined her senior team meetings and observed how SL1 dealt with conflicting views and the respectful ways of speaking to each other. Headteachers evidenced how they ‘picked up’ certain behaviours which had created the ethos in the SL1’s school, such as knowing the pupils by name and holding personal conversations with them and gradually reproduced these in their own. This is close to Lave and Wenger’s (1991) concept of ‘legitimate peripheral participation’, with supported headteachers (e.g. HT1A) becoming in their turn leaders of successful schools and future system leaders. Performance data over time shows that the ‘servant leader’ approach works well, but only if the recipient acknowledges the expertise of the leader and is willing to learn and change. HT1A, invited to join a partnership with SL1, described the wealth of learning he gained. The weakness of this model, illustrated in other relationships of the same system leader, is that it is open to passive resistance, if the necessary acceptance on the part of the recipient

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headteacher is missing and adequate balances and checks are not put in place to ensure ‘intelligent trust’ (O’Neill, 2012). This approach has limitations for system leadership work in schools with a long history of resistance to intervention. SL1 stressed the importance of ‘willingness’: ‘the onus is on the school to see what they get from it’; ‘at the end of the day sustainable success only comes from the heads taking on the initiatives and moving things forward themselves’; ‘we only work with schools who want to work with us, otherwise there is resistance and a failure to get beneath the surface to beliefs and values’. SL1 had insisted that she only operated under ‘soft’ governance arrangements, where supported schools kept their autonomy. But, as we’ve seen, post-2010, she could only gain the Department’s agreement to support a ‘failing’ school under the auspices of a MAT. SL1 was motivated by the same desire to protect headteachers, in this case from being taken over and sacked by a less benign sponsor; but the headteacher’s motivation to join the MAT was not so much willingness to enter partnership as fear of not doing so. The outcome was mutual disappointment:  SL1 felt betrayed when the headteacher failed to implement recommended changes; the headteacher eventually lost his job when the school did not improve. The question arises, therefore, about how far the current macro environment facilitates effective partnerships based on this approach.

The collaborator The ‘peer-leader’ style is perhaps the approach most closely aligned with early visions of system leadership, demonstrating both high degrees of decentralization and a distributed approach to leadership in the sense of collegiality and shared responsibility. HT2 recounted the reciprocal nature of the relationship; how the challenges discussed were new to them both (‘it was a school for staff, so much was just rotten to the core . . . [SL2] had never encountered this mentality before’) and how he has since provided support to her school in areas in which he now has more experience. The school made rapid progress against national measures, which it continues to maintain; HT2 became a system leader himself. The ‘peer leader’ approach works well, but only when the recipient gains a level of expertise to accord equal status: at the start of their relationship, SL2 reported having to take a more directive style. The required degree of challenge is not easy to achieve between peers (Earley and Weindling, 2006); SL2 acknowledged that honesty and openness depended upon mutual trust: ‘I can support him; he

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trusts me’. Gu et al. (2015) reported that TSAs, not accountable for the impact of their support, lack the degree of challenge needed to change practice. Whereas most system leader respondents focused in the Coalition era on building a MAT, SL2’s preferences (for coaching and facilitating over hard governance) and the local ecology (mainly good schools, a consultative LA and a history of successful local partnership) led her to concentrate on building an alliance formed of like-minded members. Other empirical studies have found that, without a coordinating infrastructure to ‘overcome potential hazards of school-to-school support’ (Ogden, 2014:  129), headteachers’ moral purpose may not be sufficient to maintain such a paradigm. SL2’s alliance requires a financial contribution to maintain a central coordinating team; is joined ‘by invitation only’ and on making a commitment to the values of the partnership. The practice of sharing expertise and peer judgements is underpinned by a theory of action encapsulated in a written publication. Results in the schools engaged in this model have shown a modest increase, mainly from an above average base. The alliance continues to grow, indicating an appetite from schools for partnership working. However, SL2 expressed concern about schools unable to share the benefits of increased autonomy and collaboration: ‘what happens to the schools that are not confident, who are potentially left behind – is there someone out there spotting that they’re going under and what’s the mechanism for doing that?’

The hero-head Both types of centralized approach appeared, from the schools’ performance data (2009–17), to deliver less positive outcomes in terms of improvement against national performance measures. Despite this and suggestions that system leadership depends upon a collegiate approach which distributes leadership (Collarbone and West-Burnham, 2008:  90; Higham et  al., 2009:  27), the ‘autocratic leader’ remains prevalent. Most respondents reported high levels of centralization and a ‘necessarily’ directive style, in line with Robinson’s (2012: 47) conclusion that ‘collegiate and collaborative leadership was particularly suited to system leadership, but a more directive style may be required by external accountability’. SL3 and SL4 entered only into partnerships based on hard governance, to which they brought their ‘brand’ and leadership teams. Thus, they avoided a year’s lost time and the disappointment described by SL1. The benefits are ‘quick

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wins’ and decisive action which ensure the reputation of the system leader is enhanced; the corollary is that SL5, who failed to show impact, lost credibility and with it, her substantive role. The weaknesses of this approach are that it is short term and fails to build sustainability in the wider system (Fullan, 2006; Hargreaves and Fink, 2006; Elmore, 2008). It can result in rejection: ‘I found it offensive . . . being partnered with another school that wanted to turn us into an imprint of themselves. I’m afraid my reaction to them was antagonistic’ (HT3A). The hero-head approach risks a loss of possible talent if headteachers are removed, which will do little to solve the succession crisis identified by Earley (2013). Although respondents considered the removal of leaders from failing schools a necessity, they also admitted ‘we’ve lost some heads prematurely’ (PL2). HT3A, in the pre-MAT era, refused to engage in the relationship with SL3 but went on to improve his own school by learning from other system leaders more willing to engage in dialogue; he became a system leader, accredited as an NLE. HT3B joined SL3’s MAT from his position as head of a ‘Satisfactory’ school. Three months later, he lost his job.

The auditor The ‘consultant-leader’ model, offering frameworks and strategies and operating a distributed style to allow the supported school’s staff to implement them, is perhaps suitable for good or average schools needing to improve; the data indicates SL5’s considerable previous success in these situations. However, this case also shows the danger of too much trust in audit to provide ‘informed scrutiny’ (Ogden, 2014:  13) in challenging schools where the capacity to implement different ways of working might not be not present. The managerial style falls foul of Power’s (1997) warning that auditing shows only that something is auditable. Such schools may improve by experienced leaders working alongside teachers, ‘acting as role models, building respect and trust and engaging in dialogue to build confidence and understanding’ (Collarbone and WestBurnham, 2008: 93). But Hargreaves and Shirley (2007) found the ‘light-touch’ of the consultant headteacher model was inadequate to change ‘sinking’ schools and recommended a change of leadership in these cases. There remains, therefore, a question of how far system leaders provide a solution to the improvement of complex schools; and where the resource comes

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from without compromising performance in their own school. The potential risk to quality of provision from the rapid pace of growth in some of the larger academy chains was raised by Hill et al. (2012).

Power There are multiple actors in the social field of power in which the means and ends of education are contested. It is exactly the differential relations of power that are currently moving education in particular directions. (Apple, 2001: 410)

Although there was no explicit question in the interviews on power and agency, these were dominant themes, particularly for system leaders and policy leads. Power and control featured at macro, meso and micro levels. The system leaders identified power as a motivation for the role:  however, most made a distinction between themselves, motivated by moral purpose and others: I think a lot of them are driven by power, I think there is a notion that they see themselves as knights on white chargers and I think it’s good for their ego . . . but I’m sure that there are some that are interested, as I am, in improvement and doing it in difficult circumstances. (SL4)

System leaders had differing perspectives on how much power attached to their roles. For SL3, absolute power to take autonomous action was a prerequisite: ‘I won’t go in unless it’s completely executive powers’ (2009). For others, power was more dispersed: ‘As headteacher I have the ultimate say whereas as a system leader you are no longer the ultimate decision-maker’ (SL2). Respondents made explicit links between the degree of control desired and the choice of system leadership model. SL1 explained why some system leaders feel they have to use a centralized approach: ‘they’re worried about what might be the outcome of not doing the same things in all schools to manage by control, top-down management and lack of trust’ (2009). However, she believed that imposing a ‘model’ upon another school ‘doesn’t lead to improvement: unless you establish trust, they will only let you see what they want you to see and you won’t get beyond that to the deep structures’ (2009). The empirical evidence illustrates that the type of power operating within each quadrant is different (Figure 4.2). This affects the nature of the trust in the relationships and, hence, the type of learning.

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Decentralizaon

SL1

Servant leader

Peer leader

Mentoring style

Collaborave style

Asymmetrical power

Symmetrical power

Direcve Leadership

SL2

Distributed Leadership Autocrac leader

Consultant leader

Hierarchical style

Managerial style

One-way power

Inspectorial power

SL3

SL5 Centralizaon

Figure 4.2 Power relations.

Trust Politics and policymaking is not simply about finding solutions for pressing problems, it is as much about finding formats that generate trust among mutually interdependent actors. (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003: 12)

Trust was a theme at the macro, meso and micro levels. Governance literature presents trust as essential for ‘creating the conditions in the system’ for successful public service delivery (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). Leadership literature links trust to a distributed approach: ‘the successful distribution of leadership depends on the establishment of trust’ (Day et  al., 2010:  17). Of all the ‘promoting’ factors of distributed leadership, MacBeath et al. (2004: 56) claimed ‘trust was consistently in the foreground’. The literature tends to talk of ‘trust’ as a single entity which does not require definition: Leaders should be trustworthy . . . Without trust leaders lose credibility . . . The painful alternative is to be punitive, seeking to control people through manipulation or coercion. But trust is a virtue in other ways too. The building of trust is an organizational quality. Once embedded in the culture of the school, trust works to liberate people to be their best, to give others their best and to take risks. (Sergiovanni, 2005: 90)

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The empirical data highlighted the importance of trust in partnership work: trust was frequently mentioned in all the interviews in both 2009 and 2012. However, in attempting to map the interview data onto the conceptual framework, it became clear that different types of trust operate in each quadrant, created partly by the power relations. Collarbone and West-Burnham (2008: 91) stressed both its importance: ‘Of all the qualities of a systems-leader, trust is probably the most important. It is difficult to envisage any aspect of their work that is not profoundly dependent on trust’ and the need for a model of trust suitable for system leadership, recommending ‘relationship trust’ as defined by Bryk and Schneider (2002) who found, in a longitudinal study of 400 Chicago schools over a decade, that ‘the need to improve the culture, climate and interpersonal relationships in schools has received too little attention’ (40). School improvement correlated with levels of trust between head and teacher, between teachers and between the school staff and parents. The building of trust was ‘deliberate action taken to reduce the sense of vulnerability that comes from dependence on others’. Bryk and Schneider distinguished ‘contractual trust’, which is transactional, based on something for something, from ‘relational trust’, which is the product of human relationships and characterized by rich networks and high social interdependence (41–45). They usefully detailed the ‘conditions’ for relational trust:  built in day-to-day social exchanges characterized by respect, where views are genuinely taken into account; personal regard based on openness; competence (and the tackling of incompetence) and personal integrity guided by a moral-ethical perspective which puts the interests of children first. Organizational theory also suggests trust works to build, or lose, commitment. Mishra (1996) described four dimensions of trust assigned to leaders by followers, similar to the above qualities of relational trust: competence (do they make the right decisions?); openness (do they give straightforward accounts?); concerns (do they act in our best interests?); reliability (do their actions align with their statements?). Respondents’ descriptions of the interactions in the decentralized approaches align with these descriptions: ‘she cares about the greater good for all [the LA] students’ (HT2). Reciprocity was, for those operating a decentralized approach, an essential prerequisite of system leadership work: you build trust from the outside and you offer them some hope – it’s not about being soft, it’s about being confident . . . most heads don’t need to be told where underperformance lies because colleagues are very good at pointing out league

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tables. Mine is very much about positive leadership, recognizing their strengths. (SL1, 2009)

Hargreaves (2011: 19) stressed reciprocity as essential to build the ‘social capital’ upon which school-to-school collaboration depends:  ‘Alliances in which one partner is seen as in every way superior to others, who in their turn simply have to learn from the partner in the dominant position, have a poor success rate, because this stance destroys the trust that is the seed of social capital.’ He advised that organizational trust is a prerequisite for any school embarking upon collaborative work:  ‘a school lacking a reasonably high level of internal trust cannot expect to make a success of partnership with another school’ (19). This was echoed in the case studies: ‘you’ve got to have a lot of trust in the people back at the ranch’ (SL2, 2009). Other empirical studies have found that ‘permission’ needs to be given by staff for heads to play an extended role such as system leadership ‘a lot of trust resides in the relationship’ (Robinson, 2012: 132). Time was a second critical factor. HT1B was clear that his trust in SL1 as sponsor, because of the relationship built over time, made the decision to apply for academy status more comfortable than for other headteachers in the same position: ‘I think it would be quite hard going into this sort of governance model if you didn’t have that’. Respondents identified the lack of time to build trust as a weakness of the SIP programme: You need to get to the heart of what the real problems are within the school and that takes time, experience and skill and you’re never going to get to it in five days in a school because you’re asking people to open up themselves to a remarkable degree, there’s so much trust involved. (PL5, 2009)

Many theories on trust appear based on a social exchange approach  – an assumption that trust is rationally based, so that people decide to trust others by estimating how likely it is they will reciprocate that cooperation: Hardin’s (1993) ‘encapsulated interest’ perspective, the something for something of Bryk and Schneider’s (2002) ‘contractual trust’. Coleman (1990: 91) describes trust as the ‘incorporation of risk into the decision of whether or not to engage in the action’ based on estimates of the likely future behaviour of others and points out that, while these assumptions are widespread, they are not empirically tested. Examples from the case studies include SL1’s assumption that the MAT headteacher would follow her advice and HT1B’s ‘calculated risk’ to convert to an academy. The latter is an example of Lewicki and Bunker’s (1996) ‘knowledge-based trust’,

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based on the belief that other people’s dispositions are well enough known that their behaviour can be reliably predicted. They distinguish this from ‘deterrencebased trust’, which is a willingness to trust linked to the belief that there is a credible threat of punishment for failure to cooperate. There are elements of this in several of the case studies, which show how punitive sanctions post-2010 led to decisions to adopt academy status. Both are rational choice-based descriptions of trust, unlike Lewicki and Bunker’s third category, ‘identification-based’ trust, which is qualitatively different, underpinned by an assumption that people have non-instrumental motivations. This type of trust arises when people have taken on the needs and desires of others as personal goals and are united by ‘a strong and unifying set of ethics based on public service values’ (Newman, 2001: 100). Newman claims this form of trust has been eroded, displaced by NPM forms of control via contract and performance management. O’Neill (2002) suggested loss of trust is a ‘cliché of our times’ and that steps to prevent that loss include the setting and enforcement of standards, contracts, professional codes of conduct and auditing. She explained how we manage with some success to place trust in others intelligently on the basis of evidence of their honesty, reliability and competence . . . However, difficulties arise when we have to judge complex institutions and arcane expertise, or interact with strangers. The standard contemporary remedy to these difficulties has been to construct systems of accountability that supposedly provide indirect ways of judging honesty, reliability and competence, which can serve when direct judgements of others’ honesty, reliability or competence are not feasible. (O’Neill, 2012: 3–4)

Like Newman, O’Neill believed systems of accountability have proliferated in public and professional life in the past twenty-five years, with failures of trustworthiness leading to ‘more and better’ accountability. She claimed, though, that ‘the remedy does not always work and enthusiasm for this approach is waning’, partly because it has been found to fail to either improve trustworthiness, or to help people place and refuse trust ‘intelligently’. The analytical framework (Figure 4.3) attempts to conceptualize the nature of trust in each quadrant. The data suggest that the more decentralized styles which respond to context and offer bespoke solutions based on dialogic accountability are lower in transaction costs than those based on managerial performativity which require monitoring or the enforcement of sanctions. The evidence upon which trust is based in the former includes personal relationships, which system leaders such as SL1 and SL2 take care to build if

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Decentralizaon

Knowledge-Based Trust • • •

Idenficaon-Based Trust • •

Non-instrumental Formed over me Reciprocity

Unifying set of ethics Low transacon costs due to mutual engagement and loyalty

Direcve Leadership

Distributed Leadership Deterrence-Based Trust • •

Punishment/Threat High transacon costs due to enforcement of sancons

Calculus-Based Trust • •

Exchange relaonship High transacon costs due to monitoring compliance

Centralizaon

Figure 4.3 Types of trust.

they do not already exist. However, the case of SL1 and the MAT headteacher show that, for the trust to be ‘intelligent’ (after O’Neill) there also needs to be additional evidence that the headteacher is acting in accordance with their agreement. O’Leary and Craig (2007:  15) warned systems literature often romanticizes the effects of autonomy, suggesting ‘in practice, system leaders find as ultimately inescapable the idea that with rights come responsibilities. The most successful system leaders retain mechanisms by which they can hold staff to account’. The data provides insights into the nature of the trust upon which some partnerships operate: The contractual side was very strong and it’s remained that way. You knew they were an outstanding headteacher, you knew they’d been trained in coaching and mentoring, that you could trust the way they behaved with you, that they were committed to what you were doing. (PL3)

HT3A conveyed a sense of betrayal when the psychological contract wasn’t fulfilled: They hadn’t taken the care to understand our context and that made me cantankerous and that led to its own set of difficulties because whether I liked

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it or not metaphorically I was in bed with that leadership team. But I never met that partner head, I’m sure that’s capacity issues as far as she’s concerned but when we went into that partnership I took it really seriously. (HT3A)

For her part, SL3, who it must be remembered spends an amount of time at the Department, gave an interesting take on government trust in the profession to deliver high quality. She did not see the new freedoms as necessarily leading to greater autonomy: No, what’s happened is, lots of heads in schools have said ‘we can’t deliver this, we’ve got too much paperwork, it’s all come down from the centre’. A  lot of schools have used that as an excuse. So [the SOS] has got rid of bureaucracy like the SEF. What he’s saying is ‘because I trust you, you can deliver’. But I think the sub-text is ‘a lot of you can’t deliver and now you’ve got nowhere to go and we’ll weed you out and there are no excuses now’. Because I think you’re a lot more accountable in this brave new world . . . there’s nowhere to hide at all.

This interpretation was matched by a policy lead: I am quite sure that with this greater independence in the end will come greater accountability because when the first few of these independent academies start to go wrong the blame will be laid and they’ll have to do something about it and lo and behold they’ll all get more accountability, just watch this space.

There is also the potentially negative impact on the headteacher-to-headteacher relationship of the system leaders’ need to honour the Department’s trust: If someone’s officially appointed to you there’s a business arrangement and I think probably quite often hard outcomes expected . . . I think that framework can be constricting. (HT3A)

O’Neill (2002:  4) reflected:  ‘perhaps the culture of accountability that we are relentlessly building for ourselves actually damages trust rather than supporting it’. There is evidence from the case studies that trust is not only a function of personal style of the system leader, but also affected by the dominant governance environment. An example is the difference between HT1A’s trust in SL1 because of the knowledge-based trust built over time, in a non-mandated partnership; and the headteacher in SL1’s MAT who entered the partnership for fear of the sanction of being ‘taken-over and sacked’, a deterrence-based form of trust, resulting in a compromise agreement. SL2’s partnership does not leave the ‘unifying ethics’ to chance: it is encapsulated in a formal manifesto to which all parties voluntarily sign-up.

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High Trust

• Reciprocal learning leading to improvement

• Mutual validaon • Recycling of weak pracce

e.g. SL2/HT2; SL1/HT1A

e.g. HT1A/School X

High Challenge

Low Challenge • Challenge through power • Defensiveness, denial, resistance

• No learning • Isolaon e.g. schools in some LAs

e.g. SL3/HT3

Low Trust

Figure 4.4 Trust and challenge.

It is also possible to draw from the cases studies evidence about the relationship between degree of challenge and degree of trust (Figure 4.4). Where SL3 failed to build trust, HT3A rejected the challenges. Where high levels of trust exist, high levels of challenge are viewed as motivated by good intentions, aimed to move both parties forward:  ‘It starts with the challenge . . . I’ve been challenged far more by SL2 than I’ve ever been by anyone’ (HT2). Reciprocity is implicit here: annual reviews are carried out by teams made up from the alliance, on each TSA school:  ‘It’s also that peer accountability’ (HT2). The accountability to other heads, mentioned by SL1 and SL2, is a powerful driver of improvement. However, the success of this approach depends upon a high degree of challenge and there is a danger in voluntary partnership arrangements, of ‘collaborative inertia’ (Higham et  al., 2009) or ‘collusion’ (MacBeath et al., 2004). The findings of this study show that, where partnerships are based on trust alone, no improvement results, for example, HT1A was trusted to be supportive, above others with more experience: school X did not improve. Governance literature points to the centrality of ‘trust’ at a macro level for the effective delivery of public services; leadership literature points to its centrality in allowing learning within and between organizations. System leaders need to explicitly build the type of trust needed to enable professional learning.

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The nature of learning Best practice is the English cure for everyone’s public service problems, while others see it as an English disease that they should strenuously try to avoid. (Hood, 2007: 97)

Previous chapters have illustrated how the identification and sharing of good practice has been a key strand of international educational policy since the 1990s. The ‘School Effectiveness and School Improvement’ movement (SESI) claimed to ‘represent one of the most dominant models of school improvement world-wide’ (Townsend, 2007: 93). It provides a huge body of literature about ‘what works’ (a search of ERIC produces over 18,000 entries). The history of this approach is extensively described (Reynolds and Cuttance, 1992; Sammons et al., 1995; Sammons, 2007) and well known, so it is not the intention to give an account of it here. Since 1978, when Edmonds introduced the mantra that ‘all children can learn’, research has consistently suggested common correlates of effective schools:  instructional leadership with a clear vision and focus on learning; safe and orderly environment; climate of high expectations; frequent monitoring of student progress; positive home-school relations. Literature has, therefore, provided a wealth of intertextual knowledge about what constitutes an effective school and school-leader. This raises the question of why we still have schools that are regarded as ineffective. It is in this area that the charge of inadequate theorizing around school improvement is most telling:  the assumption that identification of effective practice in some schools leads to its transfer to others is a foundational concept which remains under-theorized. The cases evidence the lack of an agreed and explicit theory of change to guide system leaders’ work. The four approaches arise from different theories of action driven by deeply held values and personal experience. Sfard (1998) analysed debates about the nature of learning as a conflict between the metaphor of acquisition (knowledge or skills) and the metaphor of participation (activities within a social context). The latter is similar to Lave and Wenger’s (1991) ‘communities of practice’, where individuals are seen as part of the social and organizational contexts where they work and learn. Sfard warned of the danger of choosing just one. Much school improvement work (encouraged by SESI literature) privileges the acquisition metaphor, as suggested by the use of the word ‘transfer’. Hargreaves (2011) recommends ‘lateral transfer’ as well as ‘joint practice development’ (JPD) which has been

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promoted by the NCSL (Sebba et al., 2012). JPD is defined as a process that is collaborative: rather than a one-way transfer, the practice of both parties is improved and innovation results. Fielding et al. (2004) distinguished ‘transfer of practice’, often in the form of pre-packaged practice or set models, from ‘co-construction’, suggesting the first often fails to bring about sustained improvement, because the ‘receiving’ school does not accept or embed the practice. ‘Co-construction’ suggests a relationship of greater reciprocity, with active problem-solving and learning by both parties. Studies of high performing school systems (Jensen et al., 2016) find professional collaboration forms an integral part of teachers’ practice. ‘Transfer of practice’ and ‘best practice’ were mentioned frequently in the policy-lead interviews, but less frequently by others. The data show a distinction between the ‘transfer’ approaches of SL3, SL4 and SL5 and the ‘joint practice’ approach of SL1 and SL2. The former concentrate on strategies and knowledge; the latter on relationships. SL4 has a ‘model’ which prioritizes structures and finances: ‘we fix the deficit budget by restructuring the senior leadership team’. She then puts in place a positive behaviour strategy and ensures it is consistently implemented; changes the ethos to one of caring and high aspiration by, for example, having senior staff at the gates welcoming and saying goodbye to pupils and asking them focused personal questions about their day. SL3 also has a clear ‘model’, the key element of which is workforce reform, ‘weeding out’ weak staff. She replaces the headteacher with her own people, ‘trained in our model, come up through our schools’ and introduces central IT, quality assurance and progress tracking across all schools in the MAT. SL5 and SL1 believed that supporting schools’ own development was paramount and had a theory of action based on willing engagement. HT1A seems to support SL1’s claim that headteachers do not need to be forced to adopt improved practices. Nevertheless, both SL5 and SL1 experienced disappointment when their approach did not lead to improvements in schools which resisted change. All system leader respondents in this study of secondary schools experienced some resistance (unlike the primary school system leaders in Robinson’s (2012) study). SL1 approached partnerships with headteachers who asked to join the MAT with the same philosophy as all her system leadership work. Her approach, validated by headteachers in the case, is one of distributed leadership and trust, building expertise by sharing and coaching. What appears different in the MAT cases, as described by HT1B, is that motivation to join the MAT is not so much a willingness to enter partnership as a fear of not doing so. It is more a ‘get out

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of jail free card’ than a ‘ticket to embark on a new journey’. The post-Coalition governance environment may not foster productive partnership working, at least not in the MAT model of hard governance, the only solution available to schools struggling to improve. Some headteachers saw themselves as victims of an unfair system rather than as needing to change practices which do not work. Others, seen in the cases of SL1, SL5 and HT2, actively resist efforts to bring about change in their schools, reluctant to relinquish the ‘vested interests’ described by Elmore (2008: 50). If, as this study suggests, a willingness to change is a prerequisite of effective professional learning, the dominant approach of ‘forcing’ partnerships may well be counterproductive. The solution of SL3, of removing headteachers and installing those willing to implement a preset model, however, runs the risk of losing headteachers such as HT2 and HT3A, who have been developed by more distributed approaches and HT3B, who might have been. The interviews with headteacher recipients of system leadership illuminated the characteristics of the exchanges which led them to change their practice and offer new learning in the problematic area of how good practice transfers from one school to another. The first is that knowledge is not just about what to do (fix the deficit budget; broaden the curriculum; establish strong behaviour systems); it is also and perhaps more importantly about how to behave as a professional with others. The effective system leaders modelled respect for and belief in others and thereby established trust, focusing on participation as well as acquisition. Respondents stressed that this requires relationships to be equal in terms of power:  the headteachers testified to the importance for them of feeling that they have something to bring to the partnership. Data on withinschool variation in these cases is critical in providing evidence on which to base these beliefs. Co-construction leads to deeper learning but demands time. In cases 1 and 2, both system leader and headteacher reported joint tackling of challenges they shared in common (e.g. HT1B/SL1) or which were new to them both (e.g. ‘she’d never encountered this mentality before’, HT2). These elements appear important means by which effective system leaders create relationships that are less asymmetrical in terms of power. Neither is compatible with a segmentation approach which creates hierarchies of schools. Examples from the case studies of how system leaders create less asymmetrical relationships include: the importance of the joint working of SL1’s senior team with HT1B’s senior team, on a shared ‘retreat’ to tackle common tasks; HT1B’s confidence that he brought outstanding practice in a particular area (special

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needs students) to the table; SL2’s address to HT2’s staff commending the areas of good practice in the school. There was, however, a difference between SL1, where the relationship was personally dependent upon her approach and the case of SL2, where partnership has been established with built-in mechanisms for operating what she calls ‘a meritocracy’ based on agreed evidence of performance and a physical sign-up to published values. This is an important consideration if system leadership is to be taken to scale or applied on a systemic basis. Equally important is the realization that outstanding headteachers who perform system leadership roles might be operating in environments in which they are inexperienced (SL2) or, in SL1’s words, ‘naïve’. Their theory of action may need to be revised in different contexts.

What factors affect the exchanges? While it is possible to allocate the system leaders in the study to a particular quadrant in terms of their main approach, it should be noted that exchanges varied according to the dominant governance environment in which the system leaders found themselves  – an environment only partly created by their own choices and personalities. Constraining and enabling factors operated at macro, meso and micro levels. It appears from the data that the ability of system leaders’ personal philosophies to ‘normalize’ the effect of policy reduced over the period of the study. For example, SL1’s motivation to shield fellow headteachers from a hostile environment led to different forms of exchange over time. Headteachers in the case confirmed that her style is distributed and reciprocal and that the trust in the relationship was knowledge-based. Case study headteachers respected her: ‘we were the grateful beneficiaries of her expertise’ (HT1A). There was evidence of impact on school improvement in the schools she supported over the Labour period (e.g. improvement on the key measure of 5A*–C(EM) from 59 to 67 per cent [HT1A] and from 50 to 55 per cent [HT1B]). These schools engaged in voluntary and funded partnerships. However, the exchanges described in the later interviews, as voluntary but motivated more by fear than willingness, formalized in ‘hard’ governance relations, were based on contractual trust and ended in mutual betrayal. SL1 maintained her stance that she will only work with schools that approach her, but the motivations for headteachers asking to join her MAT appear qualitatively different from the motivations of schools on non-mandated

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support programmes. The ‘willingness to change’ SL1 quoted as essential in the 2009 interview appeared not to be a feature of the later partnerships, which were enforced in a macro environment the mapping shows to be more directive. Case study 2 was characterized by positive relationships based on exchanges between peer professionals, in a highly networked environment. Her focus postCoalition was on building the TSA. However, over the period of the study, this system leader too described exchanges which were more interventionist, but, she believed, necessary in the circumstances for the good of the students. In the example of SL2’s IEB work, the headteacher was removed from her post and government officials directed decisions on governance of the school. SL3’s exchanges were characterized as ‘offensive’ by HT3A, who attributed his improved results to his own efforts and the learning from other sources of support. He rejected the imposition of a ‘model’ in favour of the dialogic exchanges of other system leaders. SL3 reports no change in style over the years; she demonstrates Hopkin’s (2007) characteristic of maximizing external opportunities for the benefit of her own school, Ball’s (2008:  149) entrepreneurialism. She does not adapt her approach for the circumstances of schools she supports and evidence of positive impact on those schools is only just beginning to emerge. Even allowing for the challenging nature of the schools, this case points to the limitations of an approach to macro governance of the system allowing unmoderated growth of chains using a model which is perhaps flawed by lack of a theoretical base to provide understanding of how schools improve, or by too much faith in the ‘hero-head’.

The meso level In 2009, SL3 reported LAs as a constraining factor to her ‘takeovers’; this mediating level was removed post-Coalition. Once SL3 negotiated directly with the Department, her Trust grew rapidly. The cases of SL1 and SL2 provide contrasting examples of the critical influence of the local ecology on system leadership exchanges. Ecologies appear to be constituted from three elements: (i) the degree of collaboration versus competition between schools; (ii) the degree of segmentation (most schools in SL2’s locality were good and outstanding); and (iii) the relationship of the LA with their headteachers (SL2’s was supportive but ‘hands-off ’; SL1’s interventionist and punitive). So, while HT2 and HT3A survived as headteachers of ‘failing’ schools to become ‘good’, due to the positive support of their LA, HT1B turned instead to SL1’s protective Umbrella Trust and HT3B left the profession.

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The macro level: assessment and performance regimes Jupp (2005) identifies assessment regimes as a national constraint and the data provides evidence that this is a major factor affecting the nature of the exchanges. The personal style of the system leader was dominant enough in the 2009 interviews to result in descriptions of different governance environments: in the later interviews it is overshadowed by the impact of the Coalition macro environment, in which the assessment regime played a critical role. At a micro-level, the school’s context is largely determined by their position on the continuum of performance against national benchmarks, which confers symbolic capital (Coldron et al., 2014: 390). The case study data raises questions about the reliability of judgements upon which such segmentation is based. Challenges to current ways of making these judgements come from four main directions: ● ● ●

●

measures are constantly changing; assessments against these measures are contradictory and/or unreliable; in-school variation is wider than between-school variation and schools change rapidly: therefore labelling some ‘good’ and others not is arbitrary; management by numbers (targets, ranking and intelligence systems) is subject to measurement errors, including clerical, sampling, categorization and gaming errors (Hood, 2007: 100).

In order to assess the arguments and counterarguments, publicly published performance data on the schools in the study was collated (Table 3.1). England is unusual compared with other countries in its use of number-based performance management systems (Pollit, 2006; Hood, 2007). Tracking the performance indicators used to hold schools to account over the years of the study indicates the truth of respondents’ claims of an increasingly punitive governance environment and illuminates some of the issues inherent in the use of numerically based performance management systems, which in England comprise all three types – targets, ranking and intelligence.

Targets Targets systems measure actual performance against one or more specified standards. Floor standards for secondary schools have increased year on year from 5 GCSEs at A*–C grades, then to include English and Maths; from 30 per cent to 35 per cent (2010) to 40 per cent (2012). While 407 secondary schools were below the 40 per cent benchmark in 2010, only 154 remained so in 2013

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(DfE, 2013). There was no change, however, to the rhetoric of failure. The 2010 White Paper recognized that schools are becoming ‘skilled in meeting government targets’ (8) and responded by making it harder to do so. Examples include ‘multiple entries’ (i.e. the same student enters for the same examination more than once in the same year) and ‘early entries’. In 2007 approximately 5 per cent of the English and mathematics GCSE cohorts entered the exam early, giving opportunities for retakes; by 2010, this proportion had risen to around 25 per cent of the cohorts (DfE, 2011: 3). The government responded in 2013 by declaring that only the first entry in a qualification would ‘count’ in league tables; headteacher associations responded by saying they would publish their own league tables of ‘best’ entry in 2014 to give parents ‘more accurate’ information. Another example is ‘equivalences’ (vocational qualifications), which were increasingly used to boost league table positions. In 2013, for example, one respondent reported that their performance against the floor standard would be reduced by 25 per cent without equivalences. Some argued that removing equivalent qualifications disadvantaged students more suited to a vocational route, resulting in a widening of the already growing achievement gap between students from advantaged versus disadvantaged backgrounds. Apple (2001) argued that such a return to ‘real knowledge’ equates to a legitimation and reproduction of social and economic stratification by labelling some knowledge as not legitimate. However, Schleicher (2018:  71), on the basis of years of PISA data, is adamant that of the patterns observed among the highest-performing countries is the gradual move from a system in which students were streamed into different types of secondary schools, with curricula demanding various levels of cognitive skills, to a system in which all students go to secondary schools with similarly demanding curricula . . . no education system has managed to achieve sustained high performance and equitable opportunities to learn without developing a system built on the premise that it is possible for all students to achieve at high levels – and that it is necessary for them to do so. I cannot overstate the importance of clearly articulating the expectation that all students should be taught and held to the same standards.

It would be simplistic to view these battles as government versus profession: system leaders aligned themselves more closely with the government than with their less successful headteacher peers when discussing floor targets: The arbitrariness of 30 per cent is strange but I  think there has to be targets, otherwise schools can do a disservice to the children who attend, for example

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the school I’m working with now has been bumping along at 20 per cent for years just thinking that’s all the kids can achieve and the target is just the bump up the bum they need. (SL2, 2009)

A clear motivation for system leaders was the frustration they felt about the current performance of the system as a whole: We get appalling rates, I mean it’s just tolerated and it’s a waste, it’s a huge waste. I feel that the English education service is running at about 30 per cent of its capacity of what it could do. You wouldn’t get away with it elsewhere. (SL5)

The problem with the current use of targets is not, therefore, resistance by the profession to their use in principle:  it is, rather, exasperation at their implementation. Robinson (2012: 107) made a similar point: the headteachers in her study accepted accountability, but raised concerns about fairness and consistency, criticizing Ofsted as a ‘deficit model’ and doubting the accuracy of CVA. Respondents believed that the use of performance targets was really another form of ranking because ‘pass rates’ were manipulated by the government via Ofqual, the NDPB responsible for their regulation.

Ranking Ranking systems measure performance of comparable units against one another. Measures in England include the floor standards and performance in the EBacc subjects, as well as performance of ‘key groups’ such as students with special educational needs and disabilities and those from disadvantaged backgrounds. Secondary schools are ranked not only on raw scores, but in terms of performance at KS4 compared with ‘similar’ schools, that is, those with similar student intakes based on attainment at KS2. A new value-added measure (Progress 8)  was introduced in 2016 which measures students’ performance between KS2 and KS4 across eight qualifications. Schools are also ranked by Ofsted on a scale of 1 (outstanding) to 4 (inadequate). A  judgement of ‘outstanding’ brings certain freedoms (e.g. less frequent Ofsted visits) while a judgement of ‘inadequate’ can trigger interventions, including a new governing body, new headteacher and senior team, the imposition of an academy sponsor and regular monitoring.

Intelligence systems Intelligence systems gather background information, usually as a form of further analysis or evaluation. This form of management is best for diagnosis; it

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is open, when used solely for performance management, to charges of a lack of transparency (Hood, 2007). In England, the main source of intelligence-based data comes from Ofsted. The findings (Table 3.1) show the degree of correlation between Ofsted grades and validated school performance data. The data suggests some correlation of performance at KS4 with Ofsted grading: it also raises issues. The first is a lack of coherence between two concurrent ranking systems, one based on intelligence data, the other on performance data. Anomalies can be seen by comparing two case study schools. HT1B’s and HT3A’s schools were inspected in 2012:  HT1B’s was graded 3 and HT3A’s graded 2.  Each had results against the key measure (then 5A*–C grades including in English and mathematics) at 52 per cent, just below the then national average. The Ofsted data dashboard compared relative performance of schools with similar intakes: HT3A’s performed in the fourth quintile, showing that, compared with similar schools, students were making less-than-average progress; HT1B’s was in the third quintile showing that students were making average progress. HT3A’s school showed a three-year downward trend: 59, 57, 52 per cent. HT1B’s showed a three-year upward trend: 49, 50, 52 per cent. On raw data (52 per cent), the schools performed equally well. On value-added and trend data, HT3A’s school appeared to perform less well than HT1B’s. On what grounds, therefore, was HT3A’s school judged by Ofsted to be better? An analysis of the two Ofsted reports provided possible explanations. HT3A was reported to be aware of and addressing the performance drop. Inspectors stated their confidence that the senior team (including the executive headteacher) and governors (including an NLG) were taking robust and clear action; had strong performance management linked to student outcomes; and had SLEs as part of their partnership with a TSA. In short, they were believed to have the capacity to lead the required improvements. HT1B’s team, in contrast, was reported to be ineffective in scrutinizing data, governance required improvement and performance management was not linked to improvements in student achievement and behaviour. This comparison possibly supports claims by respondents that inspectors are inconsistent in judgement; or that to persuade Ofsted that you are ‘good’ you need to demonstrate a compliance with current thinking about how schools improve (join a TSA, recruit an NLG as chair of your governors, etc.); or that Ofsted have become too powerful as arbitrators of quality. The second issue is the element of serendipity. Respondents claimed the timing of an Ofsted can affect grading, a finding also noted by Robinson (2012: 116). The data provides some support for this claim. Three out of five of the system

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leaders’ schools maintained their Grade 1 status on reinspection: performance data place all three in the highest 20 per cent in all measures against schools with similar intakes; all show an upward trajectory in performance over a three-year period. However, SL1’s school records a ‘blip’ in English results in 2012 which she attributes to the controversy that year over one examination board’s changing grade boundaries. Results in 2013 rose to 6 per cent above their 2011 figure indicating an overall upward trend, giving some support to her insistence that the 2012 results were an aberration. Ofsted in the autumn of 2013 re-awarded the Outstanding grade, but SL1 believes they would have lost this status had they been inspected a year earlier. Data for SL3’s school supports this contention. It was awarded a grade 1 in 2009 when results against the KS4 key measure were 3 per cent below national average but value added was positive. In 2012 the school was graded 2 by Ofsted on the basis of results on the key measure being only in line with national averages and inspectors finding not enough outstanding lessons. Despite this judgement, the school’s 2013 results a few months later placed the school at 10 per cent above national average and performing in the highest quintile for similar schools on all measures and confirmed a three-year upward trajectory. Such data raise several questions. The first is the reliability of Ofsted judgements. The second is the rationale for intelligence-based data to rank schools, given the wealth of performance data. However, there is also the question of how a school with weak teaching can deliver good outcomes, given the wealth of research which suggests a strong correlation between the two: and Ofsted remain the only external and national source of information about teaching quality. Furthermore, analysis of the case of SL5’s judgement cautions against the removal of the type of intelligence data gained from face-to-face in-depth inspection of a school as an important addition to the growing amount of quantitative data. The downgrading of SL5’s school from a grade 1 to a 3 in the summer of 2012 was at a time when validated results had fallen from 72 per cent to 51 per cent (i.e. from above to below the national average). Only months later, the 2013 results came in at 78 per cent, placing it in the top percentile of similar schools. The Ofsted report explains inspectors had deemed the school to be ‘requires improvement’ due to variability of teaching and the failure of the leadership team to adequately judge and act on this weakness. The report acknowledged average student results but criticized the means by which these were obtained, by targeted support for examination classes, rather than tackling the underlying problem of weak teaching. In both cases we have the anomaly of

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intelligence-based data indicating poor teaching while ranking data indicates above average examination outcomes. One explanation could be that the inspectors were wrong in their judgements. Hood (2007) noted the danger of human error in all forms of performance measures. He also warned:  ‘the gaming form of measurement error can be expected to be highest for targets and rankings, especially of the published type’ (100). The 2010 White Paper made explicit reference to ‘gaming’ behaviour (DfE, 2010: 8, 13, 29) indicating government awareness of the perverse incentives of some targets. Hood (2007: 100) suggested that we know little about ‘the extent of gaming or cheating in target or ranking systems, or indeed about where the culture draws the lines in practice between what is seen as gaming and what as cheating (a question that needs an ethnographic approach)’. Respondents were concerned about the pressure: ‘whose fault’s that, the fact is we’ve trained people to be cheats because we have a high stakes thing and then complain that people cheat’ (system leader). So, the data raises a third issue, a possible system failure, where anomalies thrown up by contradictory data sets are not investigated further. A fourth issue is constantly changing performance measures. Two of the case study schools (HT2 and HT3A) were graded ‘Good’ or ‘Outstanding’ by Ofsted at both the beginning and the end of the study; but both schools were subject in between to government-driven intervention as ‘failing’ schools for falling below floor targets. The cases illustrate the complexity of leading a school in a system where schools are held to account by targets, ranking and intelligence systems each operating independently. Hood (2007: 102) warned that, while we ‘know very little about system level and long-term effects of public service targets with harsh sanctions for failure’, consequences may include system collapse, as in the USSR, or the loss of public trust in government statistics, through the perception that for every set of statistics showing good or bad performance there is an equal and opposite set of statistics pointing in the opposite direction. The above analysis of published performance data suggests we might be close to both consequences. The cases indicate the strength of these measures as factors affecting behaviour. It is not only headteachers from ‘failing’ schools who suffer the pressure of this performance management framework:  system leaders are conscious of the need to maintain an ‘Outstanding’ grade in their own school as well as deliver results in supported schools. Robinson (2012:  168) also found system leaders undertake rigorous performance monitoring and that ‘trust is limited by

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pragmatism because their reputation is bound up with Inspection’. Respondents of this study echoed these anxieties: ‘I don’t want to be caught being satisfactory’ (SL5); ‘you’re only as good as your last Ofsted’ (SL4).

Summary This chapter has given insights into system leadership practice from a range of perspectives including the usually unheard voices of supported headteachers. It has allowed a theorization of the nature of system leadership practice: Figure 4.1 presents four approaches, each with distinct characteristics. Examples of each have been described, indicating a continuation of overlaid governance environments. System leaders operate with various degrees of distributed leadership, influenced by factors in the micro, meso and macro environments as well as personal preference. The position of the school in terms of its segmentation against the national accountability framework has increased as an influential factor over the years of the study; the mediating influence of system leaders and local ecologies has reduced. Formal, system-wide evaluation of the way system leaders conduct their work is lacking, an omission the Conservative government promised to rectify with training programmes for new CEOs of MATs. System leadership was viewed positively by respondents from all levels of the system. No respondent, except HT3A in 2011, suggested any limitation or negative impact on the educational system. However, HT3A was reacting to the way SL3 had conducted the role rather than the role itself and is now himself a system leader. The question remains, therefore, why a movement which aligns policy and professional intent to this degree has failed to deliver the hoped-for improvements to student outcomes. One suggestion was: I think we’re being set up to fail. I think the object of the exercise is for the system to show that it can’t do it. I think from the outset the continual haranguing of schools by Ofsted and by other people is deliberately designed to say at the end – that we can’t do it. They want to privatize the system. (SL5)

The next chapter considers the extent to which this objective has been realized.

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Introduction The previous chapter offered a conceptualization of system leadership, arguing that a new framework was needed to allow a critical consideration of how these roles work in practice. Using a governance perspective, it located the roles within the macro and meso environments from which they have emerged and within which they operate. This chapter considers those environments in more detail, exploring the complex interplay of governments’ use of policy instruments, professionals’ responses to them and the role of mediating layers in the education system. School reform in England has, since the early 2000s, focused mainly on governance and structural changes (Glatter, 2017; Greany, 2017:  6). However, a marketized approach has delivered the changes with the engagement of a significant number of school leaders:  the radical change in the governance landscape has been achieved by ‘pull’ rather than ‘push’ (after Ringen, 2013) policies. In 1989, when the Thatcher government introduced grant-maintained schools, only 1,199 of the 24,500 state-maintained schools opted out of LA control, despite incentives such as additional funding and freedom to create their own admissions policies (National Archives, 1999). In contrast, the Academies programmes of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition government (2010–15) and the Conservative government elected in 2015 have resulted in 27 per cent of primary schools and 72 per cent of secondary schools (with an estimated 47 per cent of pupils) operating as academies, outside of LA control (NAO, 2018: 4). This chapter illuminates how such a radical change has occurred, by reflecting upon the motivations of the school leaders who embraced it. It first outlines the types of structural diversity recently introduced. Next, it illustrates headteachers’ responses to the dominant policy instruments and the policy learning which delivered the radical changes. It discusses the evolving nature

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of the ‘middle tier’ and concludes with a summary of emerging consequences of the structural diversification of the English education system.

Background Since the Education Act (1902), the LA has been the ‘middle tier’ between the state and individual schools in England, answerable to democratically elected councillors, with responsibilities including provision of school places, admissions and funding. There are, in 2018, 152 LAs in England. In 1988, under the ERA, LAs lost responsibility for higher education, with polytechnics and colleges of higher education becoming independent corporations; to further introduce diversification and weaken the influence of LAs, this Act also created ‘grant-maintained status’, whereby schools could opt out of LA control and receive funding directly from the government. The Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition government reintroduced this possibility in the Academies Act 2010 and the Conservative Government White Paper of 2016 expressed the ambition for a fully academized system, ‘a schoolled system with every school an academy by 2022 . . . most schools will form or join MATS’ (DfE, 2016a: 15–16). Following cross-party criticism of the element of compulsion, plans to force all schools to become academies were suspended in May 2016.

How diverse are schools in England? Courtney (2015) undertook a mapping of school types in England, from a range of perspectives: legal status; curricular specialism; pupil selection; types of academy; and school groups, highlighting how the current reform agenda intersects with the historical diversity within the English school system. He concluded:  ‘current structural diversification policies enable the enactment of interests other than educational through transferring responsibility for education and related assets away from public and towards corporatized or religious actors and institutions’ (1). According to Courtney, while the thirty-year period of diversification in England is internationally unparalleled, it is premised on a neo-liberal discourse which underpins much reform internationally, that is, the ideology that school-type diversification leads to improvements.

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The new school structures which currently comprise the diverse landscape of the English education system include the following: Academies are state-funded schools directly funded by the Department for Education and independent of LA control. They have the status of self-governing non-profit charitable trusts, with freedom over the pay and conditions for staff (who they employ directly), including the freedom to hire unqualified teachers; the length and times of school terms and the school day; and, to some extent, the curriculum. They are required to teach a ‘broad and balanced curriculum’ including English, mathematics, science and religious studies. The earliest type of academy was established under the Labour government through the Learning and Skills Act 2000. Sponsors were required to contribute 10 per cent of the academy’s capital costs (up to a maximum of £2  million) towards opening new schools or ‘turning around’ failing schools, thus furthering the dual policy aim of encouraging private investment in state education and reducing inequalities in the quality of schooling. When Labour left office in 2010, there were 200 such academies in operation. The Coalition academies of 2010–15 differ from Labour’s. The Academies Act 2010 proposed a new type of academy called ‘converter academy’, whereby any school graded Outstanding by Ofsted could opt for academy status. This option was extended to ‘Good’ schools in 2012. At the start of 2018 there were 3,161 converter primary school academies and 1,540 converter secondary school academies. In addition, there were 209 converter Special Schools (schools that educate students with special educational needs). Converter academies do not need a sponsor. ‘Sponsored’ academies, in the Coalition era, included those which, like the early Labour academies, were ‘forced’ conversions, resulting from government intervention due to poor performance. They also included schools who chose to convert with the support of a sponsor because they wanted academy status but did not meet the government’s criteria to convert (e.g. their Ofsted grading was less than ‘Good’). In January 2018, there were 1,279 sponsored primary schools, 680 sponsored secondary schools and 48 sponsored special schools. Sponsors in the Coalition period, unlike Labour’s, were no longer required to contribute funding up front but to offer goods in kind, such as use of facilities, sharing of teachers or training. The new sponsors included faith (religious) communities, businesses and entrepreneurs, charities and philanthropists, universities, further education colleges, private schools and successful state schools who had become academies (https://www.gov.uk/guidance/sponsor-an-academy).

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In the Labour era, sponsors tended to be primarily philanthropic or business sponsors. Since the Coalition, however, the majority are high-performing schools who form a multi-academy trust: in 2015, 369 out of 669 sponsors were converter academies (Armstrong, 2015: 37). A multi-academy trust (MAT) is a group of academies which share a single Board, responsible for governance, funding and operations across all schools in the MAT. MATs are the only academy group option the DfE will now approve (NASBM, 2016: 6). In a MAT, the sponsoring organization is directly accountable to the Secretary of State through a contract called a ‘funding agreement’ for improving the performance of their schools. By 2016, there were 1,121 active MATs in England (DfE, 2016a). Fifty-four per cent of academies operated within a MAT comprising two or more schools (Armstrong, 2015: 7). Thirty-nine MATS had ten or more schools, 78 comprised six to ten schools and 517 had two to five schools (Armstrong, 2015). Twenty-five per cent of MATs (a total of 261) are ‘empty’ MATs comprising a single school; their legal status as a MAT comes with the expectation that they will sponsor other schools in the future (Cirin, 2017: 10). MATs are led by a CEO, usually but not always, the headteacher of the ‘lead’ school, which is graded ‘Good’ or ‘Outstanding’ by Ofsted. Academies that share a sponsor are often called ‘academy chains’ (Hutchings and Francis, 2017: 3). Further diversification arises from sub-types of academy:  7 per cent of secondary academies are categorized as Free schools, University Technical Colleges (UTCs) or Studio Schools (DfE, 2017b). These have the same legal status as academies. They are part of the quasi-market approach intended to give more power to parents and other interests and raise standards by increasing competition. Free Schools are new state schools, introduced in 2011. They can be set up on direct application to the DfE by any of the following:  teachers; parents; independent (fee-charging) schools becoming state schools for the first time; universities or community groups. They are not allowed to set admissions selection processes: they must offer places on an ‘all-ability’ basis to children of parents who apply. Initial take-up of Free Schools was low with only 81 opening by 2013 and 174 by 2014 (www.parliament.uk). By March 2015 there were 255 and by January 2018 there were 476 (NAO, 2018: 5). UTCs, first established in 2010, are university technical colleges for students aged 14–19, sponsored by universities and employers in a specific area of science, engineering or technical work. The sponsoring university appoints the majority of governors and leaders. There are forty-nine in England in 2018.

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Studio Schools provide an alternative education for up to 300 students aged 14–19 who do not respond to the academic school curriculum. They operate as workplaces, with longer days, all-year-round opening and an enterprise-based curriculum including some paid work. LA-maintained schools: The LA, while reduced in scope of activity and size (in terms of both budget and staffing), remains an important part of the ‘middle tier’. Seventy-three per cent of primary schools and 28 per cent of secondary schools continue in 2018 to be maintained by the LA. However, these statistics mask a large variation between LAs: in some, as few as 6 per cent of schools are academies, in others as many as 93 per cent (NAO, 2018: 5). LA-maintained schools include community schools, where the LA employs the staff, owns the lands and buildings and has primary responsibility for admissions; and voluntary controlled schools (mainly church schools) where the lands and buildings are owned by a charitable foundation but the LA employs the staff and has primary responsibility for admissions. Collaborative structures: In addition to the above, there continues to be a range of structures whereby schools work together in collaborations and successful headteachers have the opportunity to work as system leaders. Armstrong (2015) attempted to review the constantly evolving structural complexity of interschool partnerships. This is a rapidly changing picture and definitions of structures can be confusing. For example, Lindsay et al. (2007) identified four levels of formality in collaboration arrangements. These ranged from ‘hard’ governance federations established under statutory regulations made in the 2002 Education Act, whereby the federation operates with a single governing body; through to ‘soft’ governance federations, also statutory but with each school retaining its own governing body; to non-statutory federations and ‘loose’ collaborations. Armstrong (2015:  15) claimed the term ‘federation’ now applies more commonly to interschool collaborations in the LA maintained sector, whereas the interschool collaborations of schools that have converted to academy status would now be considered MATs. In an attempt to map the post-academization landscape of collaborative structures in English schooling, Woods and Simkins (2014: 332) distinguished between ‘national academy chains’ (academies sharing a single governance board owned by a charitable trust operating in different regions); ‘school-led chains’ (initiated and led by successful schools often operating on a regional or local basis); ‘local federations’ (groups of LA-maintained schools, joined for pragmatic purposes such as sharing an executive headteacher or resources); and ‘collaboratives’ (schools working together on shared issues such as PD, but maintaining their own governance and leadership structures).

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An example of the latter is Teaching Schools, established by the Coalition government in 2011. The designation is awarded, on application, to Ofsted-graded ‘Outstanding’ schools, who are then able to form Teaching School Alliances (TSAs) with other schools to share practice, support school improvement, deliver ITT, leadership training and PD. An as yet underdeveloped research and development role is intended to capture ‘what works’. There are in 2018 approximately 800 Teaching Schools forming a national network coordinated by the Teaching School Council (TSC). This national representative body of twenty elected members ‘directs and shapes the work of Teaching Schools through discussion with government ministers and senior officials’ (Teaching Schools Council, 2018). Armstrong (2015:  32) reports considerable variation in the size and structural arrangements of TSAs, from collaborative arrangements with unclear membership boundaries to chains of schools with clearly defined membership structures. He summarized challenges for TSAs:  issues around schools’ autonomy, trust, increased workload, capacity and funding. Similar findings were reported in a two-year mixed methods evaluation of teaching schools (Gu et al., 2015): an unsustainable workload on alliance leaders and a lack of robust peer challenge between partner schools, compounded by a lack of clarity around accountability for impact. The policy intentions of structural diversification on this scale remain contested. The Coalition government maintained the rhetoric of increasing devolution of the management of the education system to professionals: ‘Across the world, the case for the benefits of school autonomy has been established beyond doubt. In a school system with good quality teachers, flexibility in the curriculum and clearly established accountability measures, it makes sense to devolve as much day-to-day decision-making as possible to the front line’ (DfE, 2010: 11). Courtney (2015: 814) contended: ‘there is no sign that this 30-year drive for school-type diversification will cease whichever administration governs, because of the long-standing cross-party consensus regarding the appropriateness of neo-liberal solutions to the ‘problem’ of raising educational standards’. It must be remembered that system leadership activity, including the formation of MATs and applying for teaching school status, is voluntary. We turn now to the question of why, from 2010, headteachers embraced a range of government reforms which risked an unprecedented fragmentation of the system, when they had rejected the opportunity to leave their LA in 1988.

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System leaders’ motivations Apart from SL3, all system leader respondents were invited to take on the work, perhaps suggesting some central steer rather than Higham et  al.’s (2009:  17) ‘emergence of a movement’. Nevertheless, it is clear that system leaders do the work because they want to. The Phase One interviews described five motivations for system leadership: the motivations for academy conversion described in the Phase Two interviews mirrored these, with one exception.

The accolade The degree of trust awarded to system leaders is based on their track record. The public recognition of excellence, encapsulated in the NLE badge, was cited by most respondents in 2009 as a motivation for engaging in system leadership work. The 2012 interviews illustrated how the Coalition incentivized academy conversion of ‘Outstanding’ schools as the first tranche, by the accolade of being nominated as an Academy. SL1 described how the brand of ‘Academy’ became ‘diluted’ when it was extended beyond outstanding schools: ‘I felt a bit cheated because this was something special and it was prestigious, then Gove opened it out to schools who were a million miles away from us’ (SL1, 2012). The findings point to the links with ego and power. The labelling of some schools and leaders as superior to others contributes to the fragmentation of the ‘profession’.

An extended career ‘I enjoy seeing improvements’ (SL4); ‘it gives variety’ (SL5). There was consensus among policy leads and system leaders of the need for an extended career structure for successful headteachers: ‘the exercise of this wider leadership is a legitimate additional step on the leadership career ladder’ (PL2); ‘Once you’ve done all the things that you’ve set out to do to improve the school, there is a sense of well I’ve done that, now what? You look for new challenges and new interests’ (SL2). The data support the theory that successful headteachers are remaining in the system for longer: ‘it’s kept me in headship longer than I thought I would be’ (SL2). However, there was also evidence that some headteachers are being ‘lost prematurely’ (PL2). Only two of the five system leader respondents are still active in the role and only two out of six headteacher respondents.

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Autonomy Choice featured in the mixed environment described by the system leaders in 2009:  they selected, according to their personal philosophies, from available roles brokered by a range of mediating agencies (the LA, the SSAT, the NCSL). Despite the reported reduction of choice post-Coalition in the type of system leadership work available, it remained an activity which successful headteachers were willing to take on and unwilling to give up. Those initially suspicious of NLE work as ‘top-down’ now embraced it. This suggests closeness to government. However, there was autonomy for the NLEs in how they performed the roles; the previous chapter presents their distinctive approaches. For headteachers working to system leaders, the findings reveal reduced levels of autonomy. In localities where LA control had been punitive (SL1) or ineffective (SL3), freedom from their power acted as an incentive for academy conversion. For HT1B an incentive to become a sponsored academy was the changed relationship with the LA:  ‘you’re in the driving seat now, you become the customer’. The findings show how the rhetoric of ‘greater autonomy for outstanding schools’ was a real motivation for headteachers, perhaps in response to years of centralized control. In reality, the freedoms listed by the respondents were neither new nor widely adopted (Academies Commission, 2013:  44). ‘Freedom from the National Curriculum’, for example, was a freedom no school had the courage to take advantage of, since performance against the EBacc was added to the list of numerical indicators of success, to be published in league tables. Most of the freedoms ‘stem from the funding rather than educational choices . . . no ringfencing so you can spend money on what your own school needs’ (HT1B).

Moral purpose Throughout the ‘grand narrative’ of the governance and system leadership literatures runs a concern for reciprocity, fairness and community. The policy leads and system leaders interviewed in 2009 shared the language of this narrative, which featured so pervasively in their interviews that it may be considered a sign of Elmore’s ‘normative coherence’ in the system, or Fullan’s criterion of a collective commitment to the system as a whole, that is, as evidence that system leadership had reached a precondition for going to scale. It featured far less in the post-Coalition interviews, hardly at all in those with supported headteachers.

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The system leaders explicitly stated moral purpose as a reason for doing the work: ‘it’s about a moral responsibility for all students, not just those that are here’ (SL4); ‘it’s back to the kind of moral purpose . . . it’s wanting to provide as good an experience as possible for staff and for students’ (SL2); ‘to be influential, to give these youngsters a head start in life’ (SL1). ‘It’s good to feel you can contribute beyond your school’ (SL2); ‘the right of every child to have a good education’ (SL5). SL4 described a public consultation on a school joining her MAT. After a three-and-a-half hour ‘ordeal’ of being ‘harangued’ by councillors and union representatives, she was ‘sustained’ by a parent at the end of the evening: I was just about to set off home and this parent came up to me– studs everywhere, bleached blond hair, boy in tow, grandma in tow, it was the only time I  was nervous – I actually stood behind a table. ‘You’re just what we need’, she said. ‘Those councillors saying I can’t afford to buy the uniform. I’m on benefits, his dad’s on benefits, my mum here’s on benefits  – I  don’t want my son to be on benefits.’ I was frightened by her at first, but it took real courage for her to come and speak to me.

It is through narratives such as this that the interviews conveyed a sense of the powerful motivations of system leaders. ‘Moral purpose’ featured so frequently in the interviews with the policy leads it was almost a mantra. PL2 denied the main purpose of system leadership was to address failing schools: ‘part has been driven by that and part has been driven by the wider moral purpose of creating a system in which people think beyond their own school’ (2009). For two of the system leaders their sense of moral purpose extended beyond the learners to peer headteachers. SL1 conveyed a strong sense of empathy with headteachers in schools in challenge:  ‘when I  first became a head I think I would have been driven out of that school inside two years, I don’t think in today’s climate I  would have been allowed to succeed’. She gave the most pessimistic view of the governance environment in 2009: ‘there’s a load of apprehension and fear and we lose a lot of good people’ alongside the greatest degree of empathy – ‘I think it must be humiliating’. In 2012, SL1 continued to be ‘worried about some of the NLE and LLE initiatives. I think they’re pernicious in many ways. I  think we’re losing potentially good headteachers who’ve had an unfortunate throw of the dice in terms of the schools they’ve picked up’. She talks of the ‘obligation on an academy such as ours to support schools who are suffering some challenge’. For such schools, her school was a ‘bastion of support’,

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a view corroborated by the headteachers in the case. SL2 also felt ‘responsible to the head I’m supporting because I owe it to him to do as good a job as I can’. However, this sense of obligation coexisted with a sense of frustration at the failure of some professionals, including headteachers, to deliver high quality education for students. This finding was echoed by Coldron et al. (2014: 392) whose study of fifteen successful headteachers noted their ambivalence in both recognizing the more challenging job of heads in ‘failing’ schools and criticizing their lack of visionary leadership. The system leaders commonly expressed a lack of comprehension about why circumstances which fail to deliver an effective education for young people had arisen and/or been allowed to continue. ‘I just can’t understand, it’s just absolutely beyond me, why, with the choice of programmes, anyone would struggle to personalise the curriculum’ (SL4). They were on the whole clear that improving schools is straightforward and showed impatience with those who apparently ‘get in the way’ of allowing the necessary improvements to happen. HT3A criticized this approach as a ‘technicist fix’ which did not take account of the aspirations of his school and community. There was in the data a dominant view that underperforming schools accept underperformance while the system leaders have higher expectations of students and staff. The sense of entitlement of young people to a good education outweighed the sense of sympathy for leaders who ‘allow’ underperformance. SL3 criticized the ‘collusion’ of governors and senior leaders and she, PL2 and PL5 criticized the failure of LAs to act. SL5 described the issue in terms of a tension between rights and responsibilities: I do think that my generation and the generation that came after us still have a view of education as very loose and feel entitled to make their own decisions and be individuals . . . a very liberal left wing view . . . that’s poor . . . I don’t mind if you’re doing it a different way, just produce better results than the person who’s the best, if you do that, it’s fine. But if not you should learn from them, you haven’t got an excuse . . . if we’ve got best practice, you haven’t got a right not to engage in it, you’re meant to be serving these kids, what right have you got to have an independent view of it? (SL5)

Chapter 3 describes how the moral obligation to students remained a factor in system leaders’ actions later in the study that they had previously eschewed, including their sanctioning of harsher government intervention: These are some of the most vulnerable children and families . . . You know, I am no fan of government generally coming in and intervening, but I think needs must in each individual case. (SL2)

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The most evangelical statements came from the policy leads: Now, this is about the best leading the system, it’s about making use of our best schools, it’s about saying ‘don’t just be there and be good, how about helping others?’ and I think it’s terrific, I think it’s just a fantastic approach and I think we’re leading the world in this. (PL4)

Moral purpose was presented by policy leads as a major risk-mitigation factor to ensure that system leaders used their power for the greater good: I’m a big fan of federations and I think provided they are well led and sensitively led and based on moral purpose and doing what’s right for children they’re a very good thing but if they’re about empire building and income generation and increasing the bottom line then I think they’re dangerous. (PL4) The only way it will work is if the people who are doing this work do it with authenticity and integrity and moral purpose and are doing what’s right for the children in the system, otherwise I think it’s got serious dangers. (PL2)

‘Moral purpose’ was, however, replaced by ‘funding’ as the most dominant theme of the interviews in the Coalition era. With its loss, there is the danger that one of the main risk mitigations was removed.

Funding One of the ‘hardest’ levers, most widely used to incentivize policy implementation, is funding. Money was the strongest theme in all interviews, with headteachers mentioning it more than six times as frequently as any other theme; system leaders twice as often and policy leads 1.5 times as often. It featured more strongly in the second set of interviews than the first, mirroring Earley et al.’s (2012) findings of the same year that headteachers’ main concern was finances, arising from the government’s austerity measures. System leaders, while stressing their motivations as mainly altruistic, acknowledged the importance of payment for the work:  ‘it’s a mix of being interesting for me, brings in lots of money for the school which is very good with all the tight budgets’ (SL2, 2009). Post-Coalition, it was a safeguard against reducing budgets. Financial management was a common issue for system leaders:  ‘All these failing schools are the same, there are always budgetary issues, we’ll be out of deficit this year, £350,000 deficit when we took it over’ (SL5); ‘We needed to look at the budget and the staffing structure’ (SL4).

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For the policy leads, funding was seen as a key driver of policy changes: There’s the principle of the twenty first century school [but] there’s also, you have to be blunt about it, a suspicion this is to do with there being no money. So, what’s going to happen? Well we’re going to pretend that we’re going to give money to the schools that we have previously held centrally, we will say ‘your funding support is in your budget and you decide what to spend it on and we’ll create a market for you’ so it’s quite a nice game perhaps that’s being played. (PL1)

At the change of government, funding constraints were seen as a possible threat to the continuation of system leadership work: The issue for me is whether there’ll be enough resource in the system to make sure schools who perform that role are recompensed. If the resource dries up, it will be much harder to find NLEs . . . if the cost of the work they do is covered it will remain an attractive proposition, but if we start having to ask them to do it without any financial recompense to at least cover their costs, it will be a major challenge. (PL4)

Interviewees cited additional funding available to a school on conversion as a major incentive to leave their LA. This concurs with other evidence. The National Audit Office (NAO) (2018) report set the programme cost as £1.2 billion between 2010 and 2012; most of the schools were converter academies. The Academy Trust Survey (Cirin, 2017) reported 71 per cent of single academies giving the reason for conversion as more funding and more control over it. From 2010, finances were an imperative: to manage new budget stringencies and to cover absences to allow system leadership work in other schools – for themselves and, where lateral support was provided, other staff too. For those building a MAT, the top-slice funding from supported schools’ budgets (cited by respondents as 5–7 per cent) provided central services previously provided by the LA (HR; payroll; premises management); and security of employment for a core education team to provide intensive support in challenging schools.

Supported headteachers Income was described by most headteacher respondents as a major incentive for participating in school improvement partnerships: ‘it was £17,000 you got’ (HT1A); ‘The LEPP, like the EAZ, was a formal way of getting money into the school’ (HT1B). An unexpected finding was that all headteacher respondents were offered system leadership work to support other schools. This was despite or, in some cases, because of, once having been labelled ‘failing’. Unlike system

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leaders, none of them mentioned moral purpose in discussing the work. HT1A explained the benefits: It brings income which is important in a school where we are recruiting fewer pupils; it brings opportunities for our staff to go and work in other schools . . . It’s great experience but it also provides income.

He saw the move to Academy status, as a now ‘Good’ school, as an extension of the benefits of his school-to-school support:  ‘so part of converting into an academy is to help other schools and I understand there is a pot of money up to £100,000.’ The headteacher interviews also introduced a new motivation.

Fear The case studies illuminate how schools graded 3 by Ofsted were incentivized to join the growing numbers of academies as ‘sponsored’ academies. A  main motivator for these schools was fear: of the LA’s powers to enforce partnerships, of being ‘taken over’ by ‘predatory’ chains of schools, of being removed as headteachers. For HT1B, his ‘calculated risk’ rescued him from this fate. HT3B took the same action from the same position as head of a ‘Satisfactory’ school, only to find himself forced after conversion into an early and unwanted retirement.

Policy instruments The case studies demonstrate the powerful influence of successful headteachers on other headteachers. In choosing academy status, SL1, was, for neighbouring ‘outstanding’ schools, a model to follow; for ‘satisfactory’ ones, a protector from LA coercion on the one hand and predatory competitors on the other. Larger-scale research has confirmed these motivations (Coldron et  al., 2014:  391). Gu et  al. (2015:  96) describe similar motivations for building TSAs: moral purpose; a duty to share; to fill school improvement gaps left by a diminished LA; and a need to either take the initiative or be left behind. The case studies provide insights into the policy trajectories of the use of system leaders, giving a longitudinal understanding of how a Labour policy instrument has been subject to adaptation by successive governments. They evidence a growing understanding on the part of policymakers of the effects of

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policy instruments. By using a combination of levers from a range of directions, the Coalition was able to draw on the capacity generated by Labour’s system leaders, a field force with more status and drive than the SIPs had offered, a field force with an appetite for school-to-school support who sought replacements for the contract-based funding they had become used to and dependent upon to maintain capacity in their schools to enable them to be system leaders. The governance environment remained overlaid: added to this set of ‘pull’ levers, were the ‘push’ ones:  intervention by the Department in the form of named advisors brokering the conversions of sponsored academies; Ofsted regrading ‘Satisfactory’ schools as ‘Requiring Improvement’; published league tables of an increased number of measures; funding for school improvement limited to structural solutions. The rapid expansion of the academies programme under the Coalition government can be seen partly as a result of the growing sophistication of the government in wielding policy instruments, including system leadership, to promote an agenda which had changed from Labour’s system improvement to the Coalition’s concentration on structural reform. An understanding of the anamorphosis of system leadership across successive governments can be gained by considering the complete policycycle of two of its earliest manifestations, the SIP programme and the London Challenge programme.

Policy evaluations The SIP programme, 2005–10 Policy documents and respondents agree that in 2006 the introduction of the SIP policy arose from the Blair government’s concern to follow a global trend towards decentralization (DfES, 2006). PL1 compared the vision of 2006 with the reality of its implementation as lost potential: ‘I’ve been disappointed in that ambition’; ‘there was a purity about the belief in 2005 and I  think there is a bit more cynicism about it now’ (2009). The interview was permeated with the sense of tension between what the policy set out to achieve and the pressures upon its realization over different policy eras, particularly as the National Challenge was introduced in 2008 in the run-up to a General Election, when Brown’s1 government realized that the huge public spend on education had failed to deliver the hoped-for results: 1

Gordon Brown, British Prime Minister, 2007–2010, Labour government.

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as I  reflect upon it now, I  think that caused a great disruption of the whole notion of SIPs as system leaders, because they became SIPs as implementers of government policy . . . there was quite a sharp conflict really between the goals that [the] delivery team had been set up to achieve and the newly grafted on goals.

This respondent gave a strong sense of a policy cycle, reflecting on the ‘ebbs and flows’ in support for the policy within the civil service and with ministers across different administrations. He narrates us through the original intent, of greater self-regulation: ‘1,000 good leaders to form a community that would shape the whole system and provide learning about what works’; through the difficulties of implementation; the ‘grafting-on’ of other aims by later ministers: ‘the system leadership aspirations stuttered’; the ‘loss of favour’ when key officials left the Department; to the ‘real full circle moment’ of realigning the SIPs with Labour’s 2009 White Paper agenda, as SIPs became the source of a ready-made field-force of advisors to implement the National Challenge.

Implementation issues Interview data over the course of the policy cycle highlights the following implementation issues: 1. The practicalities of recruiting the intended calibre of person to the role: ‘For heads, SIPs are the bottom of the career path’ (PL1); ‘As a headteacher I don’t want a LA advisor who’s never had any experience of secondary school leadership coming and wasting my time, I’d rather have some support and challenge from someone who’s done the job’ (SL4). 2. Resistance of headteachers to engage in ‘the single conversation’: ‘heads will manage the SIP conversation’ (PL1); ‘It’s just another thing’ (SL4); ‘I delegated it to my deputy’ (SL3). System leaders found the role ‘impotent: there was never any follow-up’ (SL2). 3. Difficulty in holding people to account ‘outright subversion, people just didn’t do what they were supposed to do’ (PL1). 4. Failure to form the SIPs into a coherent community with shared values: ‘you’d need a more homogenous workforce – [SIPs include] some practising heads, some LA people, some consultants and none of them would give SIP as their identity’ (PL1). 5. Resistance to what became seen as a ‘mechanism of government’ (PL2) or agent of the LA, ‘doing the LA’s dirty work’ (SL1) as policy priorities changed.

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6. Political short-termism: ‘the policy after its initial launch wasn’t given sufficient political backing to drive it through . . . a strange kind of dichotomy in the Department of hostility versus enthusiasm’ (PL1). 7. Management of the relationship between the NDPB and the Department official: ‘a single key person: until it’s taken away from you, you don’t understand the importance of having a voice speaking for what you’re doing. That’s quite frightening that a nationally agreed and financially supported policy is dependent on a few key people’ (PL1). These can be collated into two main conceptual issues.

1. Professional resistance to policy (1–5 above) Literature presents resistance as both good (Hoyle and Wallace’s ironic heroes, 2005) and bad (Elmore’s ‘congealed residues of private interest’, 2008: 50); there is evidence of both in the data. SL1 and SL2 ‘shield’ colleagues from negative impacts of policy; but there are also examples (given by SL1, SL2, HT2 and SL5) of professionals placing their own interests before those of pupils. The data over time illuminates how these spaces to manoeuvre have been reduced. Respondents’ views on their experience of the SIP programme aid our understanding of system leaders’ engagement with the harsher regime which succeeded it. Successful headteachers saw SIPs as an irrelevance. SIPs were frustrated at the lack of impact. The Coalition, therefore, encountered no opposition to the proposal to save money spent on the SIP programme. Instead, they focused on schools deemed as underperforming against the accountability framework and used the smaller number of NLEs (all headteachers of successful schools) to work more intensively with those schools. System leadership, as sponsored by government, thus moved from a universal mandated service, to a targeted service mandated for schools at the lower end of a continuum which segments schools on the basis of numerical performance measures. The ‘system’ elements (e.g. the sharing of what works between large numbers of schools) appear to have been lost for some manifestations of the role, although they are an explicit part of TSAs. To theorize the change, we could turn to Bourdieu, who describes leaders of the organizations of civil society – party leaders, trade union leaders, intellectual leaders, religious leaders  – competing with one another in the field of power above civil society, employing their representative function to advance their own interests, more or less unaccountable to their followers (Bourdieu, 1991:  Part III). It is possible from the detail of the cases to see some system leaders in this way. Gramsci critiques Bourdieu’s universalistic defence of intellectuals as the ideology of the traditional intellectual, who through defending autonomy

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becomes all the more effective in securing the hegemony of the dominant classes. The dominant classes seek to present their interests as the interests of all and for that they require relatively autonomous intellectuals who genuinely believe in their universality. The findings suggest that the system leaders, relatively autonomous, genuinely believed they speak for the rights of professionals and children. Bourdieu believed that intellectuals represent their autonomy in opposition to bourgeois hegemony without being accountable to another class: Gramsci disputes this. Gramsci’s organic intellectual not only elaborates the good sense of the working class but attacks the claims of traditional intellectuals to represent some true universality. In the ‘Labour’ phase ‘moral purpose’ was a dominant narrative: system leaders working for the common good. The findings illustrate how this narrative was largely absent from the Coalition phase interviews. Additionally, the interviews across phases suggest the identity of some system leaders aligned more closely with government than fellow professionals, who ‘collude’ with failure and let down ‘vulnerable children and families’. Descriptions of system leadership at its conception (Fullan, 2004; O’Leary and Craig, 2007) emphasized the concept of ‘frames’, the need to see issues from all perspectives, together with the need for lateral capacity building, where peers learn from each other. The SIP programme and the London Challenge explicitly stated these characteristics as design features. However, the trajectory over the course of the study is towards a philosophy of system leadership rooted in a qualitatively different philosophy than the one that gave birth to system leadership: from professional equity to a hierarchy of professionals (Coldron et al., 2014). This fracturing of a united profession was presaged by Whitty (2000: 285): ‘some members of the profession being given more autonomy and scope for flexibility than others, but only once they have met what might be termed a “loyalty test”’. Yet the cases (SL1, SL5) and research (Bangs et al., 2011: 179) suggest that the most complex schools are not easily rescued by system leaders either and it appears the ‘loyalty’ is not reciprocal:  not all system leaders remain in the roles. While NLEs were promoted as ‘a safer model for heads taking on failing schools; they have their substantive role to go back to’ (PL4), as the MAT policy has evolved, we have seen a growing number of schools considered too high risk to take on.

2. Risk assessment and management (6–7) The Coalition placed faith in an approach to governance of the system based on ‘earned autonomy’, an approach unanimously supported by system leaders

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respondents and one which appears to address implementation challenges 1–3 above. In so doing, the management of schools by government became at the same time both more devolved (for successful schools) and more directive (for underperforming schools). The NLE force provided a targeted solution to failing schools; successful headteachers were more willing to take on the higher-status NLE work than they had been to become SIPs. The case studies provide portraits of how different perspectives on system leadership merged over the years to an acceptance of the NLE role, despite earlier concerns expressed by some at its ‘top-down’ nature. The cases provide insights into what happens when policy is mediated by professionals with strong personal drives and philosophies. SL3, like HT1A, saw opportunities. Leadership literature identifies one characteristic of successful headteachers as the ability to seize external opportunities for the benefit of your own school (Hopkins, 2009). It fails, however, to acknowledge that in some governance environments, this can be at the expense of others. Chapter 1 highlights the weakness of normative accounts: they neglect the possibility of self-interest. In promoting system leadership over the years, policymakers have underestimated, neglected or taken advantage of this risk. For example, SL3 described how she actively sought schools to ‘take over’ to mitigate the risk to her own from imminent budget stringencies. Both SL5 and HT2 described the cycle of admissions whereby once a school becomes ‘Good’ the nature of the intake changes, as parents from higher social classes choose the school. Greany (2015: 12) reported that ‘the dominant response [to competition] is for schools to try to control their intake by attracting the most “desirable” students’. The cases illustrate the impact of a fragmented system whereby the collective voice is replaced by competition for students more likely to deliver against the performance measures of a stringent accountability framework. A  report commissioned by the RSA and Pearson (one of Ball’s policy lions) found ‘some academies take the low road of improving admissions’ (Academies Commission, 2013:  30). LAs remain responsible for admissions, but their power to enforce a fair admissions process across a locality has weakened; Cirin (2017) reports 13 per cent of converter academies cite control over intakes as their main motivation. Coldron et al. (2014) illustrated the development of this dual trend of more successful schools gaining cumulative advantage while the LA role as arbiter reduces, thus deepening local hierarchies of schools. Governance studies have warned that governance environments characterized by competition and

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marketization are likely to increase inequality (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 18) and sociopolitical analyses have illustrated how social polarization results from the less-advantaged families being priced out of catchment areas of ‘highperforming’ schools (Power et al., 2003: 153).

The London Challenge, 2003–11 The programme has been hailed as an example of ‘excellent system leadership’ (Ofsted, 2010: 1). Ogden (2014: 127), a London headteacher and system leader, claimed: ‘The London Challenge established a new paradigm for policy-making in education. It fulfilled the ultimate goal of theories of system leadership, where system leaders lead the system and where the government’s role is to create the right conditions for this to happen.’ The strategy was launched for secondary schools in 2003 and extended in 2008, following positive evaluations, to primary schools and to two further urban areas, Greater Manchester in the north of England and the Black Country in the midlands. The Coalition government ended the challenge programmes in 2011. The intention was to address underperformance of schools in England’s capital city, which in 2001 was the worst in England with outcomes for disadvantaged students and ethnic groups below the national average (Ogden, 2014). From the start of Labour’s second term, in 2001, Prime Minister Blair and Estelle Morris, Secretary of State until 2002, were personally committed to addressing secondary school underperformance in the capital. This was a high-profile, political commitment, signalled by the appointment in 2002 of a minister for London schools. Greany (2015:  7) concluded that, while the precise combination of factors that made the London Challenge successful is still debated, it remains England’s most successful example of systematic reform. This section assesses the degree of success and how far it is due to careful application of the principles of system leadership summarized in Chapter 2.

Was the London Challenge a success? There is no doubt that education provision and outcomes for London students improved, particularly in Inner London. McAleavy and Elwick (2016) cite a range of statistics from DfES examination results releases to evidence this:  in 2001, national examination results, as measured by the key indicator of performance at age 16 against a universal target of five GCSEs at grade A*–C, placed Inner London as the worst performing area in the country, at 38 per cent against a

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national average of 50 per cent. In 2013, this measure (by then increased in stringency by the stipulation that the five GCSEs must include English and mathematics) saw London outperform the rest of the country with 64 per cent of students gaining the key measure against a national average of 61 per cent. Improvements were recorded for all cohorts of students. At 34 per cent, Inner London has a higher-than-average proportion of high-poverty students, 76 per cent of which are from ethnic minority backgrounds. The performance of all major ethnic groups in Inner London improved between 2005 and 2013 at a greater rate than those elsewhere in England:  in 2006 an ethic minority student in London would have performed worse than anywhere else in England; in 2013 all performed better (McAleavy and Elwick, 2016). Similarly, disadvantaged students in London have improved at a greater rate than those in other regions: in 2012, 54 per cent of high-poverty students in Inner London achieved five or more good grades compared with 40 per cent in the next best performing region outside of London (the West Midlands) (Greaves et  al., 2014). The performance gap between non-disadvantaged and disadvantaged students has also narrowed: a high-poverty student in Inner London is not only likely to do better than a similar pupil elsewhere in England but is also likely to achieve results which are closer to their non-disadvantaged peers (McAleavy and Elwick, 2016: 16). An outcome of the better performance at GCSE is that a greater percentage of London students progress to higher education than in the rest of the country (ibid.). As well as statistical measures, there is a wealth of evaluation evidence which suggests that London schools have become the best in England: ‘London secondary schools have continued to improve and the average attainment of pupils in London secondary schools is above the national average . . . The contextual value-added measures of the participating schools have risen significantly from below average in 2008 to above average in 2010’ (Ofsted, 2010: 2). Before 2003, the number of schools in London graded Good or Outstanding for overall effectiveness and teaching and learning was 9 per cent below the national average; in 2013, it was 17 per cent above the England average (McAleavy and Elwick, 2016). These improvements appear to have been sustained beyond the end of the programme. In 2016, London secondary schools had the highest Attainment 8 score of any region at 51.9 points compared with a national average of 50.1 (DfE, 2017c); 57 per cent of pupils in Londons’ primary schools met or exceeded the new expected standard in reading, writing and maths tests by the end of KS2, compared with a national average of 52 per cent (DfE, 2016c).

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Evaluations confirm: ‘London Challenge made school improvement a system priority and a collective responsibility’ (Hutchings et al., 2014: 102).

Policy design principles At the start of the second Labour term of government, ministers and civil servants were seeking new ways to manage the education system, in response to findings that the centralized prescription of the 1990s led to diminishing returns, that moving beyond the ‘standards plateau’ required professional ownership of reform. The London Challenge was one of the earliest policies to employ system leaders. It is possible its success is due to the careful application of the design principles of systems thinking, outlined below. Evaluations (Kidson and Norris, 2014: 7) note that Fullan’s books were well known by the lead practitioners in the London Challenge. 1. A ‘tri-level reform’ perspective of the school and community; the district or local education authority; and the state or national policy. The strategy was project-managed by a team of civil servants based in the DfE, with the director reporting to the new minister. A regional infrastructure of advisors (experienced professionals, mostly former headteachers or LA chief advisers) bypassed local boroughs who were perceived to be part of the problem. These ‘experts’ recruited heads from successful schools to support ‘Keys to Success’ schools (those facing particular difficulties) to implement agreed improvement plans. The close working of the civil servants, the regional leaders and the schools observed the need to consider issues from each level of the system, so all perspectives were taken into account in attempts to identify and solve problems. The regional advisors, as high-profile professional ‘champions’, elicited the engagement of headteachers and teachers across London by personally visiting schools to promote the vision of working together for the good of London’s children. Ogden (2014) records how the infrastructure of a pan-London leadership team helped to overcome the potential hazards of school-to-school support, such as aggressive tendering for work or empire building, avoiding the predatory behaviour in a competitive environment described by SL1 and SL3. Regional advisors brokered relationships and maintained the ethos of equity to avoid arrogance, resistance or segregation. Ofsted (2010: 3) found this created a sense of ‘mutual trust’ between schools: ‘the leaders of the schools that contributed to the survey stated positively that the support is implemented with them and not imposed on them’.

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2. ‘Subsidiarity and autonomy with accountability’ were observed in the close working of the three levels with experimentation on the ground assessed in rapid feedback loops to deliver managed innovation and improvement (Kidson and Norris, 2014). The advisors met the Department team weekly. The analysis of multilevel data to identify differential performance enabled targeted and intensive intervention to improve a group of the worst performing schools and a group of the worst performing boroughs (Tower Hamlets, Newham, Lewisham, Hackney, Westminster). Data was collated into ‘Families of schools’, so that schools with similar pupil characteristics could compare relative performance and draw up improvement plans with agreed outputs. 3. Learning and capacity building:  The London Leadership Strategy used deliberate strategies to create a learning ethos, including peer-to-peer coaching and mentoring and collaborative working of system leaders with supported schools. A report by the National Foundation for Education Research (NFER) (Rudd et al., 2011: 40) concluded the use of NLEs and NSSs, together with the Teaching School model, enabled lateral learning at all levels and were both the most innovative aspects of the London Challenge and the most successful. Teacher recruitment was a separate, important strand of the policy: extended pay scales and ‘help-to-buy’ housing schemes were introduced. Vacancy rates in London in 2001 were 3.5 per cent compared with an England average of 0.6 per cent and fell to 1 per cent in 2007. Teach First was launched in 2002 in 45 London secondary schools; in 2013 there were 1,421 teach first trainees, 6 per cent of the London teaching population. However, since 2010, the proportion of teachers leaving the state-funded school sector in England have increased in both primary and secondary phases with the highest in Inner London at 12.3 per cent (secondary) and 13 per cent primary (DfE, 2016d: 21). Almost one in three London secondary schools in 2015 had teacher vacancies (ibid., Table 3.1a). 4. Positive framing of the policy and a collaborative ethos underpinned by a shared moral purpose:  The collaborative ethos was apparent at each level ‘the people we have been working with know more than we do, are the experts and have made it their life’s work to improve urban education’ (DfES, 2006: 15). The building of a shared ‘moral purpose’ among schools was not left to chance  – it was both structural and emotional. Regional advisors engaged teachers and leaders in a common endeavour based on pride in London and shared moral purpose: ‘the staff in almost every school expressed their commitment to London children, not simply to those in their own school’ (Ofsted, 2010:  4). Ogden (2014:  136) described the complex relationship between headteachers and policy: ‘their motivations for engaging were not straightforward’, warning: ‘any

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assumption that without leadership, the moral purpose alone of headteachers in London would have been sufficient to engage their support for the policy, is not a safe one’. The collaborative, client-led nature of the support and the positive ethos were identified in a number of evaluations as critical success factors (Earley and Weindling, 2006; Hutchings et al., 2012; Kidson and Norris, 2014). Deliberate strategies to maintain equity included:  objectives were set for all schools including those graded ‘Good’ and ‘Outstanding’, so that ‘improvement’ became a common goal; the regional team publicly eschewed behaviour and attitudes not in keeping with the ethos of respect (‘we didn’t use headteachers who were more interested in promoting their own school than helping others’); the ethics were encapsulated in a code of conduct: ‘a framework of professional ethics acts effectively as a safeguard for the values and vision of system leadership’ (Ogden, 2014: 148). The advisors, NLEs and LLEs recognized and celebrated successes, which Hutchings et al. (2012: 109), in a DfE commissioned evaluation, found was important in motivating headteachers and teachers to continue. Ofsted (2010: 2) recognized as ‘a fundamental characteristic’ the sense of professionals’ pride in being part of a city-wide education service, irrespective of whether they were receiving or providing support. 5. Focus on the whole system:  A joint report from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the IFG (Kidson and Norris, 2014) concluded that, although secondary school performance in London had dramatically improved and local authorities in Inner London went from the worst performing to the best performing nationally, it was difficult to isolate the specific effect of the London Challenge in an era of multiple national and regional education initiatives. They suggested the successful embedding of strategies within the wider policy mix to ‘harness the assets in the system’ contributed to the success (10). For example, the regional advisors drew on LA resources including advisory staff or externally brokered consultants (Ofsted, 2010); some ‘Keys to Success’ schools were also part of national programmes such as the Gaining Ground or SSAP programmes (see Chapter 2), which brought additional money and support.

Funding In addition to these principles of system reform, central DfE funding was vital to the success of the London Challenge: ‘all the individual schools in trouble would not have had enough money in their budgets to go and buy the kind of help they were needing’ (policy lead). An annual budget of £40 million (Kidson and Norris, 2014) enabled a regional infrastructure and removed common barriers

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to the take-up of support: ‘the leadership has the financial clout to get things started quickly’ (Ofsted, 2010: 10). Each school was allocated £30,000–£50,000 of ‘support in kind’ according to need, mainly for cover of lessons for staff to attend training.

Attributing the success Some analysts have attributed the success of London’s schools to effects other than the London Challenge. While confirming the existence of the ‘London effect’, Burgess (2014:  1). concluded the significantly higher progress rates of London’s students on standard measures ‘is entirely accounted for by ethnic composition’. A report from the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) and the Institute of Education (Greaves et al., 2014), also based on statistical analysis, found the demographic composition of London’s schools contributed to London’s positive education outcomes, but does not explain the whole London effect; a joint report of the IFS and the London School of Economics Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (Blanden et al., 2015: 8) concluded the ethnic makeup of the capital has not changed enough over the period to account for all of the improvement. Similarly, a report from CfBT and the Centre for London (Baars et  al., 2014) investigated the extent to which London’s ethnic mix explained its educational success, concluding that, at borough level, there was no strong association between performance levels and diversity. They also pointed out that white pupils are one of the most significantly improved ethnic groups in London. The latter report suggested the improved secondary school performance largely reflects improvements in school quality over time; that improvements in primary schools appeared as early as 1995 and played a major role in explaining later improvements in secondary schools; and that secondary schools build on that. However, Hutchings et al. (2014) show that in 2008 the percentage of London primary pupils attaining expected levels in English (81 per cent) and in maths (79 per cent) were identical to the national averages and, five years later, these pupils’ attainment at GCSE was above that in other regions. Additionally, since the literacy and numeracy strategies were national, any differential effect in London’s primary schools can only be attributable to the way teachers embraced them. It is uncertain how far the previous history of collaborative working arising from a period as a single LA (the Inner London Education Authority, 1965–90) contributed; Chapter 3 suggests history and ‘place’ are critical factors influencing system leadership, a point also made by Gu et al. (2015: 89) in their evaluation of TSAs. Nevertheless, it was a culture deliberately

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cultivated by the London Challenge team, underpinned by an explicit theory of action (Berwick, 2010). Hutchings et al. (2014: 109) found interviewees in all three challenge areas reported higher morale, greater ambition and positivity; and increased energy and enthusiasm.

Systems or structures? Ofsted’s (2010: 7) recommendation was for government to ensure the expertise and knowledge of how to sustain school improvement in London be applied in future regional and national school improvement strategies. Hutchings et al. (2012:  109) suggested ‘tackling school improvement at area level (rather than national level or individual school level) has considerable benefits’. A frequent message from research (e.g. Bangs et al., 2011: 179) is that government ‘cherry picks’ from research and policy evaluation, messages which further their strategic aims. The use of similar policy instruments (NLEs, teaching schools) across governments indicates a degree of continuity. Evaluations consistently pointed to the effectiveness of the Teaching School concept: ‘providing support improves the provider as well as the received; this symbiotic effect lies behind the overall higher performance of London schools’ (Ofsted, 2010: 10); Teaching Schools provide high-quality professional development, value for money and improvements to teaching and learning and leadership development (Rudd et al., 2011). Teaching Schools became a feature of both Coalition and Conservative governments. Other factors, such as the importance of ‘place’, did not appear to be taken forward and the suitability of an urban model for whole-system reform remains in doubt, as geographically more distant schools struggle to access support from TSAs (Gu et al., 2015). While there is broad agreement that school-to-school support remains a powerful mechanism for school improvement, the effectiveness of structural reform is contested. Advocates of charter schools in the United States believe new providers force action by competitive pressure and break cultures of complacency (Hoxby, 2003). In England, however, Hutchings et  al. (2014) pointed to the wide variation between different groups of sponsored academies, with some chains performing worse than LA-maintained schools. The three best improving boroughs in London (Tower Hamlets, Hackney and Camden) had different policies on academies, so it is unlikely that structural reform featured in London’s success, although Hill’s (2012: 27) comparison of three successful regional reform programmes includes closure of the worst-performing schools as a common feature of both London and New  York’s approach

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(but not Ontario’s). Conclusions of the Academies Commission (2013:  41), ‘academisation does not guarantee improvement’, were repeated by the PASC review of academies (House of Commons, 2015: paragraph 57):  ‘taken in aggregate there is not substantial or consistent evidence for MATs being more effective than local authorities or vice versa’. Given the lack of evidence that structural reform guarantees improvements, why has it featured so largely in school reform in England?

The middle tier: misunderstood, missing or muddled? System leaders were clear about the drivers: I think what’s behind [the academy drive] is the removal of the role of the local authority. I think the current government is no big fan of having the mediating layer. . . they sense that lots of schools are impatient with some of the a) bureaucracy and b) mediocrity that you can get in some LAs . . . perhaps the government feel that the schools are wanting this. I think they certainly feel that they want direct contact with schools rather than LAs interfering with political persuasions affecting the government’s policies. So, it may be because they think it will be popular, it may be because they don’t want LAs getting in the way, maybe they think LAs don’t necessarily do a good job. But I’m sure academies are all about removing the middle tier. (SL2, 2012)

The data offer explanations of how, over the short period of the study, the middle tier was dismantled with relative ease. LAs, in their role as intermediaries, appear to have had no friends in either policy or system-leader circles: ‘LAs vary: some want the SIP to go in and do a hatchet job’ (SL1, 2009). ‘Some LAs are very good, but too many of them really aren’t and they have no vision’ (PL1, 2009). All respondents made uninvited criticisms of the LAs they come into contact with, ranging from poor relationships – ‘I don’t think a lot of heads trust the LA’ (SL1, 2009) – to incompetence – ‘appalling that the LA hasn’t picked them up years ago’ (SL3, 2009); to differences in philosophy – ‘it hadn’t occurred to the LA to ask the school whether they wanted to work with us’ (SL4, 2009). In the primary phase, schools have been far more reluctant to embrace the academies agenda (Simkins et al., 2018). The respondents of this study, however, from the secondary phase, indicated variability in the nature of LA relationships with schools and in the degree and manner of intervention and support. In the Phase 1 interviews, respondents criticized the failure of LAs to use their powers

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to intervene where schools were not performing: ‘they’ve got the powers, why don’t they use them’ (SL3) and: Where was the LA when the school was going down the pan? Who’s getting the sack in the LA? No, it’s the head that carries the can. With a bit more support from the LA a few years ago they might have rescued the situation at a much earlier stage. (PL2, 2009)

Others criticized them as a major source of ‘coercion’ (SL1). My data concurs with Robinson’s (2012: 163) finding that her primary school system leaders were unanimous LAs ‘deserved their loss of power in the system’. However, only 26 per cent of primaries are academies, 7.6 per cent of which were forced (NAO, 2018: 4). Lubienski (2014) applied the term ‘disintermediation’ (from the field of economics, defined as the removal of intermediaries from a supply chain, Oxford English Dictionary) to the diminishing of intermediate-level institutions in the United States and New Zealand. His review of specific policies suggests that, rather than devolving power to local agents, many such reforms have been more successful in creating conditions in which new, non-state actors are able to move into the space left by receding meso-level institutions. In England, there have been concerns that the ‘hollowing out’ (after Stoker, 1998) of local government, from the combined increases in power of the state over curriculum and standards and of individual schools over finances and management, has diminished the capacity of LAs to intervene in the organization, delivery and monitoring of education services, resulting in a missing middle tier (Hill, 2012). At least three potential solutions to the ‘reintermediation’ of the middle tier have been proposed:  (a) continuation of autonomous schools held to account through market forces and strengthened regulation with state intervention for failure (O’Shaunessy, 2012); (b) a streamlined LA (Academies Commission, 2013); (c)  a new middle tier (Hargreaves, 2010; Hill, 2012). All three coexist in the current overlaid governance environment in a triple-track approach to managing the school system. The need for a strong middle tier is well established. Research suggests that an effective mediating layer can add significant value to collaborative actions of school networks: ‘schools as a group cannot move forward unless the district is part of the solution. The district is a crucial part of the infrastructure with respect to leadership development, capacity-building, mobilization and use of data and intervention’ (Fullan, 2009:  155). A  growing literature reinforces the need for the middle tier to adopt a structured role, but there are different

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views on where it should sit. Hill (2012: 3) found common features in London, New York and Ontario included leadership and alignment between the state, regions and schools: ‘the impact of individual policies aimed at improving school student performance will be more effective if they are coordinated and steered at a sub-regional level’. Hargreaves (2010) cited Bunt and Harris (2010), ‘It is not enough to assume that scaling back government bureaucracy and control will allow local innovation to flourish. Policy-makers need an effective approach to “mass localism”’ (9). Fullan (2018:  1), after decades of studies, claims that ‘we have learned a great deal . . . as we examined and worked with systems around the world’. The answer, he says, is ‘Leadership from the Middle’ (LftM), first identified by Hargreaves and Braun in their evaluation of the implementation of a special education initiative in Ontario, where the government allocated $25  million to the Council of Ontario Directors of Education to lead implementation across all seventy-two districts. Top-down leadership doesn’t last due to lack of sustainable buy-in from the bottom; bottom-up change (e.g. school autonomy) doesn’t result in overall system improvement:  some schools improve, others don’t and the gap between high and low performers grows wider (as in New Zealand which abolished in 1989 regional authority and created individual school autonomy). LftM, it is claimed, achieves the strongest system coherence, capacity and commitment, resulting in sustained improvement – a deliberate strategy that increases the capacity and internal coherence of the middle. Such ‘connected’ strategies are, according to Fullan (2015), being used in several systems around the world, including New Zealand (where it is too early to evaluate impact) and another seven countries including Canada. Tri-level reform, ensuring ‘connectedness’, was one of the design features of the London Challenge; it appears not to have been taken forward as policy learning, despite Ofsted’s (2010) evaluation that the regional leadership was a key factor in its success. The need to reconfigure the LA role arose from three concerns: the role was too wide-ranging; variable performance of LAs in monitoring and addressing school performance; and a growing consensus that school improvement was more effectively delivered by accredited high-performing schools than by advisors: LAs were given an incoherent group of responsibilities when the government can’t think who to give things to: transport, SEN, school places then the school improvement role. You have 150 LAs, mixed ability group – particularly for school improvement – involves monitoring data, knowing when to intervene – most

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LAs have no one working for them with secondary expertise because it’s not part of the career ladder as it is for primary heads. (PL2, 2009)

There were several contenders for positions in the ‘new’ middle tier. Initially, it appeared that system leaders might fill the gap: In the end there’s something about the mediating layer and how the new world appears and I suppose I’m just acting as the new mediating layer in a different sort of way to the LA. (SL5, 2009)

System leaders heading chains and MATs appeared the favoured solution until recently. Early evaluations suggested MATs successfully improved the most challenging schools (Hill, 2012). Chapman and Muijis (2013) concluded ‘performance’ federations, with more centralized operating models, had quicker impact. The strong accountability lines and deep partnerships inherent in the MAT model are cited as key factors of successful school-to-school support (Greany, 2012:  14). This is the model promoted by the National Schools Commissioner (NSC): ‘as the MAT model matures, more trusts are recognising the need to align strategy and delivery across the schools . . . and move from being loose to tighter’ (DfE, 2017d). However, few chains are as large as an LA and there are too many ‘failing’ schools for the Department to directly intervene in all of them. A problem with international comparisons (e.g. Mourshed et  al.’s 2010 study for McKinsey) is a lack of clarity about where to position the middle tier. Suggestions vary. Hargreaves (2010:  5) called for ‘the creation of a new intermediary between the individual school and the LA’. Hill (2012: 10) suggested Regional Commissioners, whose ability to steer the system would come from holding funding agreements for academies, allocating capital funding for all major projects and disbursing a school improvement budget allocated by the DfE to each sub-region. In 2014, eight Regional Schools Commissioners (RSCs) were appointed with the remit to oversee academies; decide on applications to convert to academy status; and recruit and monitor sponsors. In 2015, they became responsible for academy conversion of underperforming LA schools including brokering support from a sponsor. They are supported by a team of civil servants and advised by a regional board of six to eight academy headteachers, at least four of whom are elected by academy headteachers. Hill’s (2012:  13) vision was for these new commissioners to ‘gain their legitimacy from being accountable democratically’. RSCs, however, are appointed by the DfE and not answerable, as LAs are, to elected members but,

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initially, directly to the SOS. Since 2016 they report to an NSC, described as ‘an increasingly powerful figure in the creation and expansion of MATs’ (House of Commons, 2017: paragraph 5). Peters (2008: 6) named such strategies: ‘the center strikes back’, an attempt by governments to restore control over the public sector by increasing their capacity to influence programmes for which they hold political responsibility without delivery authority. ‘One of the simplest means of attempting to gain such control is to have one’s own people managing the programs, e.g. to move toward higher levels of political appointment.’ Paradoxically, the deregulation of public employment fostered by NPM has facilitated those appointments. In addition to politicization of appointments, Peters noted, the ‘decentering’ of the state tended to engender the identification of scapegoats and denial of responsibility. He cited the increasing use of ‘Tzars’ for problem areas of public service to deflect attention and potentially accountability, away from the political leaders: ‘the Blair government in the United Kingdom was the most enthusiastic user of czars’ (6). The current Conservative government appointed, in 2017, thirty-three subregional improvement boards (SRIBs) to make recommendations to the government on how to spend the Strategic School Improvement Fund (SSIF), £140 million of annual school improvement funding (for two years) and consider challenges and needs of groups of schools in the area. Membership includes the RSC and representatives from relevant regional bodies including: the TSC; the LA(s); Diocesan Boards of Education (DfE, 2017e). MATs are noticeably absent. The Conservatives created a new DfE division of twelve regional directors of delivery: these attend SRIBs and have decision-making power over the SSIF. These roles do not cover the full remit of the LA. They do, however, further extend the role of the state. The triple-track approach has created a muddled system. The following attempt to consider in turn each of the functions previously carried out by the LA and where they now lie highlights areas where clarification is needed.

The role of the middle tier Funding and financial oversight The NAO (2018:  43) explains the role-share between LAs (for maintained schools) and trusts (for academies):

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Local authorities provide services such as human resources, finance and other support functions for maintained schools in their area. These are services that academy trusts provide for themselves. The Department withdrew, from 2017–18, the ‘general funding rate’ for local authorities and academies for school support services that it previously paid through the Education Services Grant. This general funding rate was worth £77 per pupil in 2016–17. The Education Funding Agency’s guidance recognised in February 2017 that local authorities would need to find alternative sources of revenue to fund their support and oversight of maintained schools. The Department has made provision for local authorities to retain a proportion of their maintained school budgets in order to pay for these services. The budgets available for maintained schools would be reduced as a result of this. The Department continues to fund local authorities for statutory duties in respect of all schools, such as school places, admissions and transport.

This means that government funding for universal school improvement has been replaced by the targeted funding of the SSIF. As LAs’ capacity to support maintained schools reduces, there is a question of who is responsible for prevention strategies. Funding pressures have been exacerbated by the costs to LAs of academy conversion of their schools: any accumulated financial deficit of the converting school remains with the LA and LA costs include staff time and buying-in legal support, estimated to be between, on average, £6,400 and £8,400 per school (43). The policies of market mechanisms and autonomy for successful schools have combined to cause concerns about inadequate oversight. Fullan (2006: 96) warned: ‘we don’t want the inadequacies of tightly controlled centralization being replaced with the equal flaws of school and community autonomy’. These include the ability of MATs to select what one respondent called ‘low hanging fruit’  – schools that are easy to turn around – and refuse others; excessive pay for some central staff including CEOs; weak governance and procurement procedures. Such issues have been assigned to ‘early problems’ of transition rather than a flaw in the strategy: ‘some of the earliest trusts expanded too quickly over wide geographic regions and the performance of their schools suffered as a result. We are encouraged by the development of a MAT growth check’ (House of Commons, 2017). However, they concluded: ‘There is a gap in assessing MATs which neither Ofsted nor RSCs presently fulfil . . . it is not part of the skillset of [Ofsted] to analyse the finances or governance or organization structure of a MAT’. Financial oversight of MATs remains with a funding agency within the Department; an expansion of MATs will place further pressures on their already stretched capacity.

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Monitoring quality and early intervention Policy leads were clear that the Coalition government wanted a less ‘managed’ system: The previous government was much more into system change in the sense that they looked at the whole system . . . they were concerned to make sure that they had common systems and you have SIPs and national targets, all kinds of systems in place to try to improve the system. This government is less concerned about the whole system, they’re not saying ‘I wonder what’s going to happen in Cornwall?’ They are saying ‘we’ll be hands-off unless there are problems and we’ll encourage new providers to come in and the market can gradually change the system because we’ll unleash opportunities that have not been there before’. (PL4)

He cited as an example the Teaching Schools initiative: Under the previous government you’d probably have been told which cluster you’re going to be in . . . they want a system so everyone is in a cluster with a teaching school. But that’s not what it’s going to be like under this government. You choose if you want to be in or if you don’t and if you want to be in you can choose which teaching school you want to be with. (PL4)

While the increased autonomy this brought was welcomed, concerns were also raised: There are good and bad things about autonomy: the good things are that excellent schools will get on and do it and probably do it with increased freedom and in an even more creative and hopefully impactful way. The downside is what happens to the schools that are not confident, who are potentially left behind? Is there someone out there spotting that they’re going under and what’s the mechanism for doing that? (SL2, 2012)

The Academies Commission (2013) reinforced the need for sustained local scrutiny of the quality of education. Eight RSCs cannot fulfil the role of 152 LAs in this regard. Emerging concerns are that the schools who need support do not recognize it, without LA monitoring and support and have neither the will nor the resources to seek it (Gu et  al., 2015). Ofsted remain responsible for inspecting all schools on an average four-year cycle, but Good/Outstanding schools are inspected less frequently and academies are free from regular LA monitoring. Policy leads were not unanimously in favour of removing national monitoring:

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SIPs will disappear, which I think is a big mistake, partly to save money. Because when you’ve got successful schools sometimes the SIP is the only person who properly, professionally, challenges the head. (PL2, 2009)

Academies receive visits from both Ofsted and the RSC. The 2017 PASC was the third to recommend the government align Ofsted’s nine regions with the RSCs’ eight and clarify the division of responsibilities. The report stated that both were crucial to the development of the MAT model, but ‘the overlap and lack of clarity over the roles of Ofsted and RSCs has had a detrimental effect on MAT oversight’. Additionally, they found (paragraph 27) the current situation of Ofsted conducting ‘batched inspections’ (simultaneous inspections of single schools within a MAT) was neither sustainable nor sufficient for the anticipated future expansion of MATs. It does not form part of the formal accountability process and does not necessarily lead to intervention. They recommended a new Ofsted framework for MAT inspections and that Ofsted develop the resources, skills and powers to conduct full inspections of trusts.

Democratic accountability LAs are the democratically elected middle tier in the post-war social welfare state in the United Kingdom which provided health, education and social care to all citizens. Their legitimacy is grounded in this fact. The locally elected political layer was commonly viewed as inefficient; however, there has been growing concern about the loss of accountability of new structures to the community and parents. Under the terms of the 1980 and 1986 Education Acts, accountability and thereby decision-making for state-funded schools in England lay with governing bodies which typically comprised representatives of the LA, parents and teaching staff. Headteachers were responsible for the operational management of the school under the direction of the governing body. Articles and instruments of governance allowed democratic representation of the local community and provided a framework that could allow for the monitoring of professional power, becoming ‘part of the complex system of checks and balances evident in the administration of public services; the principal purpose of [which] is to address the concern society continues to exhibit over the prevention of fraud and misuse of public resources’ (Male, 2006: 23). The Coalition’s White Paper (2010: paragraph 51) signalled a radical change by shifting governing bodies from representative membership to skills-based: ‘We will expect all governing boards to focus on seeking people with the right skills

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for governance and so we will no longer require academy trusts to reserve places for elected parents on governing boards.’ The rationale was to depoliticize school governance: ‘We all know what good governance looks like. Smaller governing bodies, where people are there because they have a skill, not because they represent some political constituency. They concentrate on the essentials such as leadership, standards, teaching and behaviour’ (Michael Gove, SOS, speech to FASNA, 5 July 2012). The NCTL advised: ‘the key is a smaller more strategic and skills-focused governing body, with less regulation and a definition of purpose more aligned to the current educational landscape’ (NCTL academies online resource, undated). Governance in the new structures aligns with this vision. MATs have a single overarching governing board for their schools; arrangements for local governing bodies (i.e. the board of each single school) vary, with some MATs having no local boards, others committees and a minority a small local board. The PASC found: There is too much emphasis on upward accountability and not enough on local engagement – MATs are not sufficiently accountable to their local community [who] feel disconnected from decision-making at trustee board level. [There is] more work to be done to ensure that MATs are accountable to the communities in which their schools are located; there must be more engagement with parents and clarity around the role of local governing boards. (House of Commons, 2017: paragraph 46)

The Academies Commission (2013) also found the complexity of the system was confusing for parents who do not understand the role of the RSC. The free-school policy strengthened the rhetoric of marketization and privatization as ‘community empowerment’ but research suggests it has contributed to the fragmentation of the state school sector: ‘free schools allow a widening range of actors, delimited by government requirements . . . to engage in the privatisation of school governance’ (Higham, 2014:  420). Higham cited three common critiques: (i) that those the policy is allegedly intended for (e.g. parents) have not been reached; (ii) the current regulatory framework is not sufficient to safeguard against risks of segregation; (iii) opportunities for self-interest (found to be the main motivation of proposers) allows public services to be moulded in particular interests. The RSC headteacher boards provide an element of accountability, as approximately half the members are elected – but only by academy headteachers. One respondent reflected in the 2017 update:

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RSCs and HTBs are no more or less accountable or efficient than the precursor LAs. Two big dangers are inexperienced or out-of-touch RSCs and too many board members with their own agendas and prejudices  – probably I  am one of them.

Mediation between state and school The LA role as mediator was sometimes seen as a source of tension, with LAs under pressure from both locally elected councillors:  ‘there’s a job of work to do to convince elected members who are worried about the loss of control and power  – it’s got nothing to do with standards’ (SL1, 2012), and from central government:  ‘government is putting pressure on the LA because the schools aren’t good enough and the LA thinks well, how can we flex our muscles and show the government we are doing our job? Nothing like sacking a couple of headteachers for the LA to show they are doing something about school improvement’ (PL2, 2009). The demise of LAs was welcomed, despite (or in some cases, because of) their positive powers of mediation. The survival of both HT2 and HT3A as headteachers (and now successful system leaders) was attributed to LA judgements of their capability to improve their failing schools. These headteachers were shielded by a supportive LA and afforded time to bring about improvement, unlike the respondents who dropped out of the study when they were forced to resign as soon as their school went into an Ofsted category. SL3 described an LA preventing her takeover of one of ‘their’ schools: ‘because of local politics you just can’t go in and take over, you have to work with others and lots more negotiation and that isn’t the way we work’ (2009); SL3 welcomed the removal of LA powers and funding: ‘If you stay with the LA you will struggle because you will not have that 8–10 per cent top slice’ (2012). This mediating space is one which currently appears empty.

Strategic planning across a locality A strategic subregional view is needed for place planning and, arguably, for school improvement. For the first, the Academies Commission (2013:  8) recommended that LAs hold the lead responsibility, embracing ‘a stronger role in education . . . as guardians and champions of all children in an area’, claiming their democratic base gives LAs this leverage. They rejected concerns about reimposing local bureaucracy, insisting ‘a lack of local oversight and planning impedes the effective operation of the system, both in terms of meeting the needs

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of individual pupils and improving system-level outcomes’. Tension remains, however, with market forces, as Free Schools open in areas of no demographic demand or school failure and academies, MATs and church schools operate different admissions policies. Two RSA-commissioned reports (Hill, 2012; Academies Commission, 2013) recommended the government clarify how LAs fulfil their statutory obligations in these contexts. As changing demographics create pressure for school places in some areas and oversupply in others, this issue is becoming more urgent. While LAs retain duties for vulnerable children and those with special needs, their capacity in some areas is reducing from the combined pressures of reduced budgets and competition for the best experts who are sometimes recruited by MATs to work across their schools.

School improvement The reducing role of LAs in school improvement was foreshadowed in evaluations of the London Challenge: ‘Over time, the impact of local authority consultancy has diminished as authorities reduce their capacity for direct support for their schools and are replaced by this pan-London network of National and Local Leaders of Education and associated teaching and training schools’ (Ofsted, 2010: 13). The Academies Commission (2013: 8) recommended LAs phase out their provision of school improvement services and devolve them to school-led partnerships. However, LAs and schools have responded in different ways and at different rates to the changes, determined mainly by historical relationships and phase of education. A DfE-commissioned study (Sandals and Bryant, 2014) tracked progress in ten LAs in three areas of responsibility previously reported by LAs to be ‘challenging’: school improvement, school place planning and support for vulnerable children. The authors categorized LAs into ‘timely adapters’, ‘slow movers’ or ‘sudden reactors’. The first were high-performing and change had been led proactively in collaboration with schools. The second were mainly lower-performing, with historically higher levels of intervention in schools; LA services were seen by schools as weak or variable in quality and change had been slow or ineffective. ‘Sudden reactors’ were LAs which moved to replace LA services, regardless of quality, with school-led partnerships, regardless of their maturity. Pace of change had outweighed precision in planning and engagement with school leaders and without creating the conditions for schools to lead a successful transition. The resulting picture was of a system in 2014 variable across different contexts and localities: overall, confidence and commitment to partnership was found to be growing among school leaders, but confidence in

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the capacity of local systems to meet the needs of vulnerable children was less strong. An update commissioned by the LGA (Bryant et  al., 2018) found in a sample of eight local systems, most continued to offer LA school improvement services but reductions were planned and the LA role was developing into one of commissioning and evaluating support and brokering partnerships. Amid uncertainty about LAs’ statutory responsibilities and funding, LAs were providing strategic cohesion in local areas, responsive to local context and the performance of schools. ‘The historical relationships between schools, academies and the LA had played an important part’ in how services were developing (22). School improvement models included: LA-employed advisors; schools buying-in a core offer from de-delegated funds; ‘blended’ offers where the LA employed fewer staff and called on TSAs to provide additional support. Some LAs maintained an overview of all schools and had a universal offer; in others, a targeted offer left good/outstanding schools with no monitoring or support from the LA. Where LAs had set up traded services, these were both complementing and competing with other school improvement offers, but overall the system was squeezed by reductions to LA funding and pressure on school budgets. The 2018 picture continues, therefore, to be one of variability, which has arisen from factors including different reactions of schools and LAs to academization. Policy intent is for school improvement to be mainly delivered by TSAs but there is considerable variation in teaching school representation across LAs, between urban and rural areas and across different levels of deprivation (Gu et  al., 2015:  64). The proportion of teaching schools in each LA area ranged from 0 per cent to 10 per cent (56) due to both the percentage of schools in an area having an Outstanding Ofsted grade (the criterion for teaching school status); and the percentage of Outstanding schools in an area choosing to apply. London, for example, had 675 Outstanding schools, 15 per cent of which were teaching schools, giving a total of 99. In Kensington and Chelsea 22/40 schools were Outstanding but none had teaching school status. The north-west had 11 per cent of their Outstanding schools as teaching schools and Yorkshire and the Humber 19 per cent, with total numbers of 76 and 65 respectively. There was also variation in ‘reach’ across an area (57–58). London had the highest proportion of both Outstanding schools and teaching schools but not of the proportion of schools participating in TSA activity. The authors concluded that ‘larger numbers of alliances do not necessarily relate to higher reach in the region’ (54). It is unclear how far this is because in such areas, schools are opting for support from a still strong LA; or how far, as mentioned elsewhere in the

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report, those schools who most need support are the ones who either do not seek it or cannot afford it. In a rapidly changing landscape, variability has led to four main consequences: in addition to the above risks relating to oversight gaps and a democratic deficit, there are increasing concerns about fragmentation and instability and an increasing social mobility gap.

The consequences of the disintermediation of the middle tier Fragmentation A number of studies have raised concerns about an increasingly fragmented system. Schools, like LAs, have responded differently to opportunities to engage in the SISS. Higham and Earley (2013: 714) categorized schools in a typology according to ‘capacity’ and ‘freedom to act’, as ‘confident, cautious, concerned or constrained’. Coldron et  al. (2014:  390) claimed ‘formally putting schools in a hierarchical relation to each other is a key practice of policy’ and illustrated the development of a dual trend of ‘well-positioned’ schools gaining cumulative advantage over those further down the league tables, while the LA role as arbiter reduced, thus deepening local hierarchies of schools. Hopkins (2007) promoted system leadership as an antidote to competition between schools, but Hargreaves (2012) identified the new threat of ‘tribalism’ associated with groups such as chains, TSAs and diocese groups, again foreshadowed by Ofsted (2010: 13): Twenty former London Challenge schools have become academies. In five of the six academies visited for this survey, the change in designation appears to have separated them from the networks of support that they once enjoyed . . . Their commitment to school improvement has become much narrower in its reach, limited, in most of the cases that inspectors encountered directly, to other academies. This risks leading to separate networks of expertise.

Tribalism continues to be a barrier to the collaborative working of some TSAs (Day et  al., 2015; Gu et  al., 2015). It appears that, in the current, as in past governance environments, competition and cooperation remain in tension. Earley (2013:  57) warned of the risk of a two-tier system of those within and those outside alliances, with the first having access to PD and support not easily accessible to the second. Gu et al. (2015: 93) pointed to a lack of clarity

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around ‘engagement’ in TSAs, which differs from alliance membership; the latter is usually restricted to other Outstanding schools due to ‘strong belief amongst all senior leaders of our case studies that TSAs are and should be where outstanding teaching and leadership practice is located’. TSAs cited barriers to access to support as geography, culture or ‘tribalism’, limited leadership capacity and limited opportunity for teacher release, particularly in primary, small and rural schools. The PASC (House of Commons, 2017) noted concern that small rural schools, largely in the primary sector, are at risk of becoming isolated. The two-tier system appears to be deepening due to increasing overlaps between TSAs, NSSs and MATs. Eighty-five per cent of teaching schools are also NSSs, led by a NLE. Eighty per cent of NSSs are part of a TSA. MATs are more likely than schools overall (46 per cent compared with 32 per cent) to be in a TSA (Gu et al., 2015: 63). This means that staff in a NSS or a MAT have greater access to PD and leadership training; and, since teaching schools now deliver ITT, that NSSs and MATs have first access to the best new teachers and fewer recruitment problems. However, the system is not stable. Between 2011 and 2015, over 850 schools left a TSA (Gu et al., 2015: 45); between 2015 and 2018 the number of TSAs grew from 600 to 800, exacerbating the challenges of duplication of provision and an increasingly competitive market in some areas, without solving the challenges of lack of provision in other areas or encouraging participation of those who don’t want to contribute or those in denial about the need. The 2015 PASC noted the uncertainty arising from recent multiple changes to academy policy. Respondents summed up resultant feelings of disorientation: ‘the infrastructure has gone’ (SL5); ‘it’s all very post-modernist, it’s dismantling all the institutions and structures’ (HT2).

Social mobility Several factors have caused concern that fragmentation has led to an increasing gap between more and less advantaged students. Teaching schools have lower than average levels of FSM and 39 per cent of Outstanding schools have one of the lowest levels of deprivation (Gu et al., 2015: 59). The implications are that those already serving the most advantaged are those gaining the most benefits from the emerging SISS, in terms of resources, training and access to best practice; and those charged with providing school-to-school support have the least experience of working in areas of greatest challenge. In addition, there is evidence of higher rates of pupil exclusion in academies than in LA-maintained

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schools (NAO, 2010:  29). Interviewees reported removing lower performing students from their published results through reallocating challenging students as ‘home-educated’, or to new types of provision, such as studio schools or UTCs, a process colloquially known as ‘off-rolling’. These are complex issues, as enforcing stronger behaviour systems is an accepted strategy for improving challenging schools and the belief that vocational provision is a better pathway for some students than the academic route of the EBacc is strongly held by some, despite PISA evidence (Schleicher, 2018: 71) that ‘the highest performing systems have moved from a system in which students were streamed into different types of secondary schools, with curricula demanding various levels of cognitive skills, to a system in which all students go to secondary schools with similarly demanding curricula’. The PASC review of MATS (House of Commons, 2017:  4) concluded a weakness of the policy was the number of ‘untouchable schools which trusts refuse to take on’. Some of these need to be ‘re-brokered’ when they are taken from or given back by struggling MATs. The NAO (2018:  11) recorded that the Department issues directive academy orders to maintained schools rated as inadequate, with the aim of opening them as sponsored academies within nine months of the rating; 59 per cent of maintained schools with such orders (91/153) had not opened as academies nine months later. The average length of time between being rated as inadequate and opening as an academy was 17.9 months. The report accepted that some support may begin before formal conversion is completed, but estimated that 37,000 children are being educated in maintained schools rated as inadequate, waiting to be converted.

Reintermediation These concerns have led to calls for a reassessment of the role of LAs. The Select Committee report on multi-academy trusts (House of Commons, 2017: paragraph 69) pointed out that 82 per cent of primaries remained (then) under LA control and insisted ‘the Government must clearly define the future role of LAs particularly in areas with high numbers of academies. The current uncertainty about their place in the school system is not sustainable and making their role clear should be a priority for the SOS’. More radically, they suggested the government should recognize the experience and expertise of the highest performing LAs and allow their education departments to create MATs.

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The place of system leadership, in the transition to the Coalition government, was questioned: I think it will survive as a concept in quite a few countries because they have a more managed system. I mean Ontario, Alberta, Singapore, they are all quite managed systems with a strong middle tier. I think it will be interesting to see how it develops in England with a much weaker middle tier as the LA role in reality becomes less and a new middle tier of chains of schools develops in an unmanaged way. (PL4)

System leaders, however, found the new system offered them a stronger professional voice: It’s new and, for me, personally, very exciting. My role is very different than it was even a year ago, certainly than it was four or five years ago . . . at this stage of my career it’s absolutely where I  would want to be . . . I’m thinking well actually perhaps I won’t retire at 60 because this is fascinating as it unfolds. I think for schools involved in the teaching schools alliance, a new lease of life, a new direction, a new focus. (SL2, 2012)

TSAs have been described as the ‘latest manifestation of system leadership’ (Gu et al., 2015: 75) and a ‘quieter but potentially no less significant revolution’ (15) than the academies programme. Teaching schools are a major policy lever to develop teachers and leaders; the government aim is for a national network. The Teaching Schools Council is gaining more influence as they become aligned with the RSCs on the SRIBs. Their website claims: ‘The TSC plays a key role in the development of a regional school-led strategy to improve outcomes in all schools, particularly those that are not yet good. Members of the Council proactively build partnerships and broker collaborative working arrangements between teaching schools in their regions and with the RSC, Ofsted, academy trusts, local authorities, Dioceses and other organizations’ (TSC, 2018). Gu et al. (2015: 179) reported that 77 per cent of their survey respondents believed TSAs play a central role in the development of an SISS but could not achieve it alone; TSAs could not become the new mediating tier because of limited capacity and resources, fluid membership and the unpredictability of demand-led support in an increasingly competitive market. The role of the TSC is to coordinate provision and address the scarcity of teaching schools in some areas and duplication in others. There is a growing awareness of the need for partnerships. TSAs self-reported (172) as collaborating with HEIs on initial teacher training (98 per cent) and research and

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development (86 per cent) and with other TSAs locally (8 per cent) and outside the locality (71 per cent) for peer reviews and health checks. Over two-thirds of LAs were strategic partners in TSAs, and Gu et al. found more coherence where the LA played a role, compared with duplication, unused capacity and missed opportunity for intervention where they did not (40). They recommended government funding and support to enable the emerging local infrastructure to take effect.

Summary RSCs and their teams were not intended as a reinvention of the middle tier. It is clear they do not redress the regulatory gap: their primary role is a commissioning one tied to finding suitable sponsors for schools requiring improvement and allocating school improvement funds. In 2015 RSCs were given a quality monitoring role. They do not provide democratic representation: the headteacher boards are not fully elected and then only by schools in the academy sector; the SRIBs have a limited remit; not all schools are engaged in a TSA. The spaces in the middle are currently populated by RSCs, Ofsted regional directors, LAs, TSAs, federations, chains, MATs, the dioceses, private companies offering a range of traded services and a new DfE group of regional directors. This reintermediation of the middle tier represents a shift away from formal local government structures and institutions as the principal locus of policy shaping and service delivery, towards new political and non-political agencies which occupy overlapping roles of deliverers, auditors, brokers, contractors, consultants and experts. It is ironic that system leadership, borne in an age of optimism about a governance trend towards greater devolvement of responsibility for the school system to professionals, appears to have resulted in greater government intervention, justified by system failures arising from structural reform which promised greater school autonomy. Nevertheless, there are positive elements of the current overlaid governance environment. School-led improvement mechanisms are likely to remain the preferred delivery mechanism for support. There is increasing realization of the need for local partnerships, including with LAs, and an acceptance of the criticality of ‘place’ as a determinant of educational improvement. Six ‘Opportunity Areas’ were identified in 2016 and a further six in 2017, on the basis of low social mobility. Each area has a delivery plan agreed by the RSC and

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RDD through the SRIBs. A national plan (DfE, 2017a) evidences government determination to address social mobility through education, supported by £800  million of funding targeted to areas of greatest need in terms of social disadvantage. The implications of this evolving system for system leadership development are the subject of the next chapter.

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System Leader Training and Development

Introduction This chapter argues that headteachers need preparation for system leadership, which requires additional skills to headship, and continuing development and support. It discusses the devolution of leadership training and development to the profession and the NPQEL, a new qualification for executive leaders. Pluralist provision has the potential for innovation, enhanced practice and local responsiveness, but a mechanism is needed for avoiding variable quality in future leaders. The current fragmentation also risks inequality of access to highquality training and development and a continuing neglect of issues of power and inclusivity. A  lack of consensus about what constitutes effective system leadership and competing theories of action result in a ‘local lottery’ of how system leadership is experienced by those supported, as well as inconsistencies in impact on schools. The chapter concludes that a focus on partnerships and place, supported by a conceptual model of the dynamics of partnership working, will help to address these concerns.

The qualities and skills needed to be a system leader The respondents in this study believed that system leadership is a ‘legitimate extension of a headteacher’s career’ (policy lead). The system leaders were successful headteachers, with extensive experience of a range of system leadership roles which they had been invited to adopt on the basis of the performance of their school. Experiences included: secondment by the LA into a ‘failing’ local school; leading ‘hubs’ of schools for government-sponsored programmes such as EAZs; coaching or mentoring new headteachers for the LA or NCSL; supporting ‘weaker’ schools on programmes brokered by the SSAT; acting as

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a SIP. Following their journeys over the years has testified to the commitment and passion of these leaders to work beyond their own school for the greater good. It has also raised a number of issues relating to system leader preparation, development and support. The first is, as consistently suggested in the literature, that the necessary skills, knowledge and competences of system leaders are different from and additional to those of headship. While there is no consensus on what effective system leadership practice looks like, there is broad agreement that not all successful headteachers will be successful system leaders. Collarbone and West-Burnham (2008: 82) recognized that it is ‘naïve’ to assume all headteachers would be able to transfer from school to system leadership, which requires additional skills or aptitudes such as the need to move from the positional authority of headship to political authority and the ability to engage others. They cited the Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2007) study which found some headteachers were more comfortable with an operational rather than a strategic role; some leaders might not have embraced the people agenda and therefore lack a talent for developing others; many were struggling with the networking and communication skills required to be outward-looking. Collarbone and West-Burnham referenced systems thinking to explain why system leaders need strong analytical skills to be able to identify the nature of the problem, since moving to a solution immediately may cause more problems than it solves, particularly if time is not taken to identify perspectives of those involved:  ‘The systems viewpoint is generally oriented toward the long-term view. That’s why delays and feedback loops are so important. In the short term, you can often ignore them; they’re inconsequential. They only come back to haunt you in the long term’ (Senge, 1990: 92 cited Collarbone and West-Burnham, 2008:  100). However, we have seen that some system leaders prefer to impose a model of what works, feeling a need to be in control, perhaps pressured by central expectations. Writing for the NCSL, Hill (2011: 13) stressed that more complex contexts place a ‘premium on being able to inspire, persuade and negotiate with other school leaders, challenge the status quo and bring about change quickly and effectively’. NLEs who fail to show improvement in another school after eighteen months risk losing their designation (DfE, 2017f ). The second is that new roles require new skills and knowledge. The increasing structural diversity has introduced roles which did not exist at the start of the study (e.g. CEO of a MAT or chain; executive headteacher of a federation; head of school). A  study of executive headship by The Future Leaders Trust, the National Governors Association and the NFER found it requires ‘a new and different mix of skills and experience’ (Lord et al., 2016: 23–42) and that

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there is no comprehensive guidance on what these are. They reported that executive heads, once in role, felt there was little formal development available and that skills needs included strategic thinking, coaching, staff development, collaboration and looking outwards. For those leading MATs or other forms of multisite leadership, new areas of expertise include finance, HR, governance and legal issues such as land transfer. The Academies Commission (2013: 51) found:  ‘Some converters had underestimated the greater financial and audit responsibilities that come with greater financial autonomy’. The third is that successful system leaders are not successful in every context. The cases describe four different approaches arising from different theories of action and examples of where the approaches did not work, despite a record of previous success. There is no national consensus on a theory of action for system leadership, although there are strongly held values driving proponents of one approach over another. Berwick and Johns (2017:  210) insist, from their years of experience on the London Challenge, that system leadership is a practice quite distinct from leadership of a single school, noting ‘the skills to lead such organizations are not to be found in all headteachers, especially those who adopt a purely directive style’. Close et  al. (2018:  3) argue that all system leaders are consultants and propose a development framework based on consultancy research. Others (e.g. Gu et  al., 2015:  178) point to the need for different skills for different roles: ‘the skills needed to be an effective leader of a TSA are perceived as being different from those required by other system leadership roles’. They suggest roles with tight accountability, such as executive headteacher or MAT CEO, can use clear management levers, whereas leading a TSA requires ‘more capacity for influencing, engaging, building relationships, working in partnership and potentially facilitating people to take risks’. This, however, presupposes a certain way of working for all MATs, which is far from the case, as seen in the contrast between SL1 and SL3. A study of leaders and staff in over thirty MATs (Menzies et al., 2018) also found differences in vision, with some emphasizing pupil attainment and others the whole child; and a range of operating models from individual school autonomy, to collegiate working, to centralized systems. In MATs which demanded alignment, approaches to achieving this differed, from central imposition to collaborative convergence. There was (14) no correlation between MATs’ decisions to standardize and the mix of converter to sponsored academies, echoing the findings reported in Chapters  3 and 4 that system leaders’ choices are guided by their personal styles and philosophy of school improvement, rather than school context, and are modified in response to practical or political considerations. They report,

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for example, how the decision to establish a heterogeneous MAT is not always vision-based but can be adopted as a strategy to recruit more schools in order to meet growth targets; that a MAT’s strategy can be affected by the RSC or DfE changing priorities about schools in need; and that decisions to opt for a standardized model might correlate with size of MAT.

The need for training, development and support The variation in approaches arising from unarticulated or strongly held theories of action, and the lack of consensus about what constitutes effective system leadership, are a cause for concern. They matter because, as shown in the study, the consequences are: a ‘local lottery’ of how system leadership is experienced by those supported; inconsistencies in impact; and high levels of stress for both system leaders and headteachers which sometimes lead to a loss of committed professionals from the system. Of the respondents in post at the start of the study, only two of the six headteachers remained in 2017 and only two of the five system leaders. A survey of practising system leaders conducted for the NCSL found that 56 per cent felt they had not been adequately prepared for the role (Hill, 2011: 15). Mourshed et al. (2010: 7) noted that theories of action are frequently absent, with few leaders of improving school systems having a mental map of how their changes fit together as a coherent whole: ‘Some even thought they had just been lucky’. Several respondents ascribed their survival as headteachers and eventual system leaders to luck: which means they are unlikely to be able to articulate a theory of action for those they go on to support. The need to do so is pressing, since the growing responsibilities of system leaders include the pre-service training and in-service development of teachers and school leaders, in a context where the traditional role of headteacher is both expanding and contracting. For example, a review of the leadership landscape commissioned by the NCSL (Earley et  al., 2012) found the complexity of school leadership continues to increase with consequential intensification of work. At the same time, leaders of a single school working to an executive headteacher or CEO are often titled ‘head of school’. Concerns about the limited autonomy of this role are cited as a disincentive to apply for headship (Cliffe et al., 2018); there is little published on the specifications of the role or the ways in which it is used to build future capacity.

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In summary, the range and fluidity of system leadership activity make definitions complex and the identification of development needs difficult. The reliance on system leaders to make a success of the SISS demands serious attention be given to their preparation, support and development. The next section considers how leadership development in England compares with that of high-performing school systems.

High-performing school systems Jensen et  al. (2016, 2017) offer detailed international comparisons of highperforming school systems in Canada, Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghai, on teacher professional learning (2016) and leadership preparation (2017). Researching for the National Centre on Education and the Economy, they define high-performing by PISA outcomes in mathematics, literacy and science in 2009 and 2012. The countries differed in their relative emphasis on pre- or in-service training. Only the Singapore Ministry of Education selects and trains an annual cohort whom they place as need arises; the others train teacher leaders who fulfil application criteria. The four systems shared six common features: (i) Defined pathways including recruitment, ITT, PD, opportunities for progression to leadership and then to system leadership. (ii) Professional standards reflecting the system’s philosophy on how schools improve, how teachers are expected to behave and how they will be held to account. The standards provide a leadership framework to underpin training programmes. Critically reflective educational leaders are common aims. (iii) A partnership of government, universities and programme providers to design a programme with a conceptual framework and theory of action. (iv) A  major distinguishing feature (2017:  60) of leadership training in high-performing systems is high-quality action research projects which focus on a collaborative approach to real-world problems, highly contextualized and often in a host school whose principal acts as a mentor. Participants experience an influencing role, in an unfamiliar setting without formal authority, to deliver a real change. (v)  Delivery is based on principles of effective adult learning (capitalize on prior experience; analyse and respond to individual need; learner takes responsibility), which includes a mix of group and peer-learning, mentoring, shadowing, access to experts, blended experience including online resources and fora. (vi) Professional development is part of the job and integrated with other system elements such as QA and accountability.

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How England compares There is no room here for a history of leadership development in England (see Simkins, 2012 or Gunter, 2016). The following gives a comparison of leadership development in England against the above characteristics, which is mainly favourable but also points to areas for consideration. The first two characteristics, defined pathways and professional standards, are well established. The Teacher Training Agency (TTA) was inaugurated in 1974 and National Standards and a linked competence-based qualification, the National Professional Qualification for Headteachers (NPQH), were introduced in 1997. Revisions to these reflect the changing policy environments within which they have evolved, for example, following the ERA (1988) which made headteachers responsible for finance and staffing previously administered by the LA, bureaucratic and rational forms of management were advocated, reflecting borrowings of perspectives from the business world (Bush, 2008). Simkins (2012) describes three eras of school leadership training and development in England since the ERA: the era of ‘Administration’; the era of ‘Management’; and the era of ‘Leadership’. It is arguable that the devolution of training and development to TSAs marks a new era, which will be shaped in part by the profession. Characteristic (iii) is partly met: the NCSL on its inception in 2000 held a period of consultation and three ‘think tanks’ led, respectively, by Professor Hopkins, Bentley from Demos and Professor Stoll, leading to revised National Standards (DfES, 2004c) together with a Framework for Leadership Development (FLD) (NCSL, 2004). The latter included five stages of leadership: emergent leadership (middle leadership); established leadership (assistant or deputy headteacher); entry to headship (aspirant headteachers); advanced leadership (established headteachers); and consultant leadership (contributing to the profession, e.g. by training others) (24). The suite of non-mandatory national leadership qualifications was extended to include the NPQML for middle leaders and the NPQSL for senior leaders. The NPQEL, a new qualification for executive leaders, was added in 2017. The NCSL was welcomed as representing a paradigm shift from transactional managerialism to transformational leadership (Bush, 2008) and the FLD as ‘the most extensive and coherent investigation undertaken into the nature and development needs for school leadership and . . . a step forward in terms of central government sponsored support for the development of school leadership, including headteachers’ (Male, 2002: 37). The NCSL had a monopoly of leadership provision during the Labour era and became subject

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to claims that, from ad hoc provision in the 1980s, development of leaders was increasingly steered to ensure implementation of government policies. With the transition of the NCSL to an executive agency in 2012, ‘more than ever, leadership development is a vehicle for ensuring compliance with national imperatives’ (Bush, 2013: 459). The Coalition government introduced a licensing system in 2012; those licensed to deliver the national leadership qualifications included outstanding schools, universities, LAs and private-sector bodies. The Conservative government, in 2017, subsumed the NCSL within the Department and issued a number of publications, including new quality standards for the NPQ suite of qualifications, detailing the content and criteria against which providers are required to assess candidates (DfE, 2017g). There are six content areas common to each NPQ, which ‘set out what a leader should know or be able to do, increasing in sophistication, depth and breadth progressively through the NPQ levels’. Providers may deliver these content areas (strategy and improvement; teaching and curriculum excellence; leading with impact; working in partnership; managing resources and risks; increasing capability) in any order, organize them by different themes, add to them and contextualize them. This is in contrast to studies (Jensen et al., 2017; Close et al., 2018) which suggest sequencing and timing of modules is critical to allow personal growth. Specified assessment tasks describe the project(s) a participant must complete and the supporting evidence they must submit at the assessment stage. All levels include a school improvement project (characteristic iv), NPQML and SL within their own school; NPQH in a placement school. NPQEL participants must design a sustainable business development strategy for their organization, analysing the benefits, costs and risks of different options and lead a project to improve progress and attainment in several schools. This suggests that the NPQEL is aimed at leaders of multisite organizations (such as MATs) rather than the whole range of system leadership roles. Behaviours, which are not assessed, include commitment, collaboration, personal drive, resilience, awareness, integrity and respect. In terms of delivery (characteristic v), the NCSL has been both criticized for an over-reliance on experiential learning and e-learning, at the expense of theory and research (Male, 2002: 42) and commended for respecting ‘craft’ knowledge and offering a range of professional learning contexts including networking, coaching and internships in other schools (Bush, 2008). System leader respondents who undertook the NCSL’s training to deliver the NPQs in 2012/13 commended the high quality and the focus on androgyny. The types of study mandated in the 2017 NPQ suite of qualifications include work-based

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learning; challenge and support through a coach and/or mentor; access to highquality resources, drawing on up-to-date research and evidence; peer learning and opportunities for structured reflection. Also specified is the requirement (except for NPQEL) that 50 per cent of deliverers are serving headteachers. QA operates by six-monthly reports to the DfE against recruitment targets and completion rates. The final characteristic is where England’s system diverges most strongly from those described by Jensen et  al. There is no entitlement to professional development or to progression along the leadership pathway. Headteachers are not held accountable for developing others and headteacher appraisals no longer routinely include a personal development objective. None of the NPQs are mandatory. England is the only country to have mandated a qualification for headship (in 2009) then subsequently removed it (in 2012). The removal was in line with the Coalition’s intention to deregulate. It was also due to conflicting perspectives of headteachers on the value of the NPQH (Cliffe et al., 2018) and the belief that ‘growing your own’ leads to more capable leaders. Additionally, Bush (2013: 458) suggested the decision was related to LA-reported difficulties in appointing new headteachers and to criticisms of the programme, including the level (pitched below that of Masters’ leadership qualifications); over-reliance on a competency system; and an underpinning normative and standardized model of leadership. Of the respondents in the study, the system leaders did not hold the NPQH whereas the supported headteachers all held the qualification. While this is a reflection of the period in which they became headteachers, it indicates that holding an NPQH is no guarantee of success. Several system leaders held master’s degrees and some had completed leadership training programmes delivered by, for example, the Hay Group, funded as part of programmes such as the EAZ or LEPP. Strongly centralized systems plan for leadership succession, whereas a devolved system, relying on self-nomination, risks the most suitable candidates not applying, overall insufficient numbers and potential lack of diversity. England operates an aspiration-led system, locally delivered, managed centrally by targets and standards. Succession planning and diversity are addressed through DfE-set leadership recruitment targets (to reflect the school population in the area in terms of percentage of schools serving disadvantaged students and non-white participants) and standards (talent-spotting and developing teachers are in the non-mandatory Headteachers’ Standards). A  major shift in these revised standards (DfE, 2015b) was to ‘aspirational standards of excellence’, rather than standards to be used as a minimum baseline. The review process

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was ‘an opportunity to create headteacher standards which contribute to the development of a self-improving school-led system’ (5). This version of the standards describes four domains (qualities and knowledge; pupils and staff; systems and processes; the self-improving school system), each with six key characteristics.

A fourth era of leadership training and development: the professional era As system leaders take forward leadership training and development in what one respondent termed ‘a new era, one that we are having to develop’, the following issues need to be addressed including revisiting some concepts of the dominant leadership paradigm of the last two decades.

A strategy for the development of the teaching profession This has long been recommended (Bangs et al., 2011: 67), but there remains no entitlement to professional development and access to the leadership pathways, nor is professional development integrated with other systemic elements such as appraisals, as it is in high-performing systems (Jensen et al., 2016). The nonmandatory nature of the NPQs devalues them and runs the risk of variable quality in future leaders. Addressing these features of the current system might go some way to improving recruitment, retention, morale and quality and to developing a more inclusive cadre of leaders.

The purpose of education NCSL-commissioned studies, many for the DCSF, contributed to a paradigm of leadership effectiveness ‘as measured by combined absolute improvement in pupil attainment levels across three years in key indicators of attainment (per cent pupils 5A*–C(EM)’ (Day et  al., 2007:  1x). Much of the leadership literature emphasized ‘leadership for improvement’, to the extent that views of successful leadership equated the two:  ‘in an institutional structure in which the governance of schools is increasingly defined by accountability for performance, leadership is the practice of improvement  – like it or not’ (Elmore, 2008: 42–5). Leadership development needs to be grounded in the recognition of methodological issues inherent in the attribution of mediated

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effects: ‘greater understanding is needed of the linkages and mediators between leadership and educational attainment and social outcomes. [There is a] lack of consensus about the contribution of different elements to the linkages, indirect effects and mediating factors for improving school leadership’ (DfES, 2004d: para 22). Data analysis and use needs to be sophisticated and balanced with acknowledgement of the whole range of purposes of education rather than a narrow focus on exam results.

The hero-head A penchant for strong, charismatic leaders means the ‘hero-head’ is a familiar figure. The FLD was welcomed as a move away from this perspective:  ‘The previous hegemony, led by the TTA, had tended to support the notion of singular leadership, posited in the role of headteacher as it is configured by legislation and practice. The NCSL propositions recognise that schools are complex entities’ (Male, 2002: 40). However, despite Hargreaves’ lament that ‘we are more reliant on charismatic heads than we ought to be’ (SSAT, 2009), the case studies testify to the continuing dominance of a ‘hero-head’ model of system leadership, linked to the dominant governance environment. PL3 described a challenge faced in recruiting system leaders:  ‘a lot of the people we got volunteering were more about projecting themselves and their school and were very keen on telling people what the solution was and we had to go and find people who would work from where people were . . . otherwise it wasn’t going to work, it would just put people off and not achieve anything’. Elmore (2008: 47) warned against the notion of ‘turnaround’ specialists for failing schools, who, in line with the taste for heroic leaders, ride in, fix the problem, ride off into the sunset. This model is ‘the antithesis’ of theories which see improvement as a developmental process. Short-term ‘turn around’ strategies necessarily involve heavy use of managerial control, whereas ‘sustainability’ is a longer-term aim:  ‘[C]urrent turnaround strategies are too little too late, work on only a small part of the problem and unwittingly establish conditions that actually guarantee unsustainability [by creating] a psychology of failure because they use external direction and increased control. They move schools from awful to adequate; and violate every change rule for sustainable reform’ (Fullan, 2006: 20). Effective system leaders are conscious that every year of underperformance equates to a cohort of students who do not achieve their potential; as well as the need to build sustainable improvement. They put in place a mix of short and longterm strategies, of which the primary one is improving teaching and learning.

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An explicit theory of action relevant to context Evaluations of system leadership cited in earlier chapters found that a small number of schools, perhaps 5 per cent, need new leadership and a fresh start but the model of complete restructure is wasteful when applied to moderately performing schools, which can improve with less intensive intervention (e.g. HT1A, HT2, HT3A). The cases provide examples both of a system leader placing too much trust in the senior team to change (SL1) and another failing to provide development for headteachers capable of improvement (SL3). The importance of context continues to be underestimated and the cases suggest that system leaders’ approaches are based primarily on theories of action, often unarticulated, expressed as personal beliefs about how school improvement happens, constrained by pragmatic considerations and the governance environment. System leaders need to promote the ability to adapt a leadership approach relative to the history and context of the school, being responsive to the school’s development phase, the confidence of staff, the behaviour and attainment of students and wider contextual constraints, including the governance environment. They will be familiar with Day et al.’s (2010) three broad phases, each with different strategies, although not all agree with the phasing of the strategies. Day et  al. reported that at the early stage successful leaders improve the physical environment and standards of behaviour, restructure the senior leadership team and implement performance management systems. At the middle or developmental stage, they distribute leadership and use data and target-setting; at the later, ‘enrichment’ stage key strategies include personalizing and enriching the curriculum and distributing leadership more widely. In reality, leaders make judgements about what is needed in a particular context, although most agree with Day et  al.’s headteachers that ‘[i]n the beginning there was a lot of telling. It was not democratic’ (15). Scheerens (2012: 147) also suggested ‘failing’ schools might need a more directive form of leadership, whereas highperforming or average schools need a ‘thinner’ degree of control, offering the image of school leaders as ‘meta-controllers’ who ‘need to have a broad overview of key areas for organizational functioning, a keen eye for self-steering and self-organisation and a detached attitude of taking matters in their own hands (diverting from meta- to direct-control)’. For system leaders, from ‘outstanding’ schools, used to leading via ‘meta-control’, their work in less successful schools might require a change in approach. If so, how this is negotiated has implications for their own identity as leaders, as seen in the cases of SL1 and SL5, who were subject to Bell’s (2011) paradox of being: ‘forced by external pressure to employ

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transactional leadership approaches that focused on immediate results and detailed supervision of staff performance [despite] knowing transformational leadership would be more effective in the longer run’ (cited Earley et  al., 2012: 26). The resistance to change in the most challenging schools came as a shock to respondents: ‘she’d never encountered this mentality before’ (HT2). In some cases, the covert nature of the resistance led to an underestimation of the degree of direction required (‘I was naïve’, SL1). Training for leaders and system leaders needs to afford the opportunity to surface and explore one’s own and others’ theories of action (following Argyris and Schön, 1974, 1978) and the circumstances in which they may or may not be most effective. As indicated in Figure 4.1, different approaches lead to different types of learning.

Distributed leadership The horizontal axis of the conceptual framework was chosen because a distributed approach was recommended:  ‘system leadership will exert an influence only to the extent that it focuses on teaching and learning [and] shares its authority with others’ (Higham et al., 2009: 27), while system leaders’ views on the efficacy of directive versus distributed approaches were polarized (SSAT, 2009). Lumby (2013) records how the concept of distributed leadership underwent a transition from a lens through which to view leadership, with no normative connotations, to a form of practice promoted as a mantra by the NCSL to improve schools. It featured in both the 2004 and 2015 National Standards for Headteachers. Distributed leadership is seen as an antidote to heroic, top-down, transactional models of leadership and therefore more effective in implementing change because it is more inclusive (Lumby, 2013). ‘Ownership and empowerment are two key words in the lexicon of distribution (MacBeath et al., 2004: 7). Hall (2012: 19) agreed that the practice of distributed leadership ‘suggests a discursive softening of the harsher edges of managerialism [in] an environment where institutional and personal attachments to those instrumentalist and performative agendas so central to NPM remain strong’. However, it has also been linked to the dominant performative culture and used to encourage compliance in middle leaders (Woods and Roberts, 2013: 9). Bolden (2011) confirmed the rapid growth in interest in the concept since 2000 but observed that this is mainly in the field of education and mainly in England, thus linking it to a specific governance environment. Forrester and Gunter (2009: 77) described distributed leadership as ‘official good practice’ promoted

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by the NCSL as part of workforce reform to address headteacher recruitment and retention issues following workload intensification arising from the combination of Labour’s policies (e.g. Every Child Matters, extended schools, devolution of funding). Dunford (2007:  12) suggested ‘it was probably the weight of work on headteachers, rather than leadership theory, that led to the development of more distributed leadership’. Harris (2009: 11–14) linked the rise of distributed leadership directly to government programmes including the Primary Strategy Learning Networks and the Federations Programme: ‘undoubtedly, as schools adopt and adapt to the new forces of structural changes more and more examples of distributed leadership will appear.’ System leaders acknowledged the importance of ‘trust in the team back at the ranch’ which enabled their headteacher role to be covered in their absence on system leadership work. The deputies promoted to ‘Head of School’ roles confirmed that they appreciated the opportunities to extend their leadership experience while retaining access to a leader they trusted ‘for difficult decisions’. In the 2009 interviews, these positions had evolved gradually, as system leadership work expanded. In this way, distributed leadership is linked to the creation of capacity within schools and across the system and offers a potentially important contribution to a conceptual framework for leadership development in a system where delivery is devolved to accredited practitioners. SL1 operated ‘shadow teams’ at each leadership level in MAT schools to ensure succession planning, offering NPQs and SLE accreditation through her TSA. Like HT1A who followed her model, she found system leadership opportunities for talented staff helped retain them. This approach is similar to Lave and Wenger’s (1991) ‘legitimate peripheral participation’, which affords increasing access to expert performances as a means of developing others. In promoting distributed leadership on development programmes, a balanced discussion needs to acknowledge practical challenges. It can appear to be a rather nebulous concept, with conflicting definitions, for example, MacBeath et  al. (2004) suggested delegation as the first of six stages of distributed leadership, whereas Harris (2009) distinguished between delegation (which is ‘handed out’) and distributed leadership (which is a product of shared activity, discussion or dialogue). The findings in this study stress the importance of creating suitable conditions before distributing leadership; it is linked to context, need and capability. While many headteachers are opposed to ‘telling other leaders what to do’, and the ideal for most is the context of the ‘Collaborator’, working in environments where mainly good schools work with other good schools, much system leadership work appears to operate in contexts of inequality, where

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capability is lacking. SL5 described how the transfer of strategies did not lead to sustainable improvement; like SL1, she underestimated the time needed for theoretical understanding and self-reflection for personal growth. Gibson (2018: 11) raised the issue of whether some models are self-improving or selfserving and pointed to the fact that leadership development reflects the value-set of the MAT: his single case study found an emphasis on functional knowledge for action with no articulated philosophy to encourage reflection. It is possible that an apprenticeship model with no explicitly discussed theory of action could lead to the replication of previous practice which at best might induce conformity rather than critical reflection and at worst might lead to the ‘toxic’ leadership described by Craig (2017). There is little empirical evidence on the role of head of school and research might usefully explore the extent to which leadership is distributed to those in this role and whether their theories of action are given, formed or remain unarticulated. MacBeath et  al.’s (2004:  56–60) typologies recognized tensions for leaders, describing ‘promotors of ’ and ‘barriers to’ distributing leadership, acknowledging the ‘continually shifting balance in relationships’. Practical issues reported in the cases include:  the reluctance of some teachers to engage with leadership responsibilities; increased burdens on teachers or leaders without increasing authority to act; and what one system leader called the tendency for ‘upwards delegation’. Respondents were positive about distributing or sharing leadership; however, they advised that doing so is dependent upon trust and reciprocity which take time to grow. The case studies illustrate how system leadership in challenging schools can be subject to betrayals of trust and the risks to system leaders of distributing leadership in such schools. Like the headteachers in Macbeath et al.’s study, they returned to coercive styles when trust was betrayed or became too risky. Distributing leadership involves sharing power, which some respondents found difficult. Lumby (2013) claimed issues of distribution of power are ignored and that the effect of distributed leadership theory is the maintenance of the status quo. She reminds us that ‘the field of educational leadership and management has a history of avoidance of issues of inclusion’ and warns that distributed leadership, a concept that is confusing, contradictory and utopian, remains profoundly political (590). It is unlikely that setting recruitment targets for training programmes will, by itself, solve the urgent need for a more inclusive leadership cadre. Talent-spotting runs the risk associated with the homophily principle  – we are drawn to people who are like ourselves. The conceptual framework presented in Figure 4.1 facilitates a discussion of the nature of power

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operating in different approaches and the importance of taking account of this in developing others.

Developing a professional learning community Another concept linked to the creation of capacity is that of a professional learning community (PLC). One of the propositions in the FLD, it was a recurring feature in NCSL literature and the headteacher standards. ‘Organizational learning’ is defined as the capacity of the school for high performance and continuous improvement through:  the development of staff by constructive pedagogical dialogues between peers, both internal and external; coaching, mentoring and self-reflection; a vision and climate for collective learning and thoughtful use of data (Fullan, 2004; Dufour et al., 2006; Stoll and Seashore-Louis, 2007; Elmore, 2008; Day et al., 2010). However, the vision of developing a culture where professionals learn together and create shared practices to promote student learning has been found to be problematic in some countries, although it is a feature of high-performing systems (Jensen et  al., 2016). Fullan (2007:  148–52) lamented the failure to realize the possibilities of PLCs, stating they need ‘lateral capacity building’, a concept expanded by Hargreaves (2011) as part of the critical ‘glue’ in his model for TSAs. Earley et al. (2012: 22) linked the ability to create such a community with Glatter’s (2004) notion of ‘deliberative leadership’, stressing the ability to listen to others rather than create conflict. These two insights suggest a level of reciprocity related to equality of power relationships. To foster true PLCs, it is suggested, teachers need to engage with teachers from other schools, which makes school-to-school support the ideal mechanism for providing professional development. The Teaching School concept arises from the benefits observed in the London Challenge, as detailed in Chapter 5. However, the ‘Challenge’ was developed as an urban model and respondents reported practical difficulties in managing such links, particularly in schools geographically distant and those small or struggling, where there is no capacity to release teachers. One aspect of the PLC literature which featured strongly in the interviews was the need for cohesion. Harris and Lambert (2003) suggested shared decision-making, shared purpose, mutual regard and integrity are the factors which assist teachers to bond in a single community, supported by strategies including projects co-led by members of different teams, to address the common issue of pockets of ‘brilliance’ coexisting alongside areas of poor performance.

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Similarly, Hargreaves and Fink (2006) suggested the ‘silos’ within a school can be broken down by building small teams and introducing linking mechanisms consisting of overlapping group membership, to allow cross-fertilization of ideas between groups. These are all strategies to allow peer learning and JPD. The way respondents in the empirical study chose to create cohesion correlated with their overall approach, some building a brand, others social capital. SL4 described taking her ‘brand’ into other schools:  ‘they had no experience of the [name] brand’; ‘we extended the [name] brand’. SL3 mentioned ‘the model’ thirty-five times in a one-hour interview, stressing consistency across the schools for which she is responsible: they all run on the same model, so you go in and they’re all running on the [name] model where, you know, we’ve got the QA, the data, the workforce reform, everything like that, decent management information systems.

Both SL3 and SL4 operate a centralized approach where leaders’ identities are as members of the MAT rather than members of a particular school or local community.

Focusing on teaching and learning System leaders agreed that:  ‘the issue’s about the quality of teaching and learning’ (SL5); ‘the teaching and learning environment is the significant issue’ (SL2). Elmore (2008: 40) recommended ‘two specific practices, adapted from other professions’ to reform classroom practice. The first is the use of protocols to observe, analyse and develop teaching by ‘depersonalising practice so that the practice can be changed through learning and further practice’. The second is ‘to work with practitioners on their theories of action [so that they] can feel free to treat their own most deeply held values and beliefs as empirical propositions that can be subject to verification through evidence on the effects of what they do’ (51). The dilemma is how to do this without evoking Ball’s (2003) criticism of the performativity culture of the 1980s and its impact on ‘teachers’ souls’. Researchers emphasize a leader’s monitoring role, which includes frequent assessment of performance data including direct observation:  ‘monitoring instructional practice more or less continuously’ (Elmore, 2008: 49). All system leaders implemented a lesson observation process. In the United Kingdom, 93 per cent of headteachers report involvement in classroom observation, compared with 50 per cent average across the OECD (Schleicher, 2012: 17).

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Nevertheless, 58 per cent of headteachers in England considered they do not spend enough time on leadership of teaching and learning (Earley et al., 2012: 10). It is unclear how far this represents a perceived need for a stronger ‘monitoring’ role, rather than a greater focus on coaching or dialogue about practice; Earley reported that the ‘most important action’ of headteachers replying to an open-ended question on actions taken to improve teaching and learning was ‘more monitoring’ (80). Jensen et  al. (2016) reported the emphasis of high performing systems on a cycle of assessing students’ learning, seeking evidence of teaching practices which will provide the next stage of learning and evaluating then refining practice, in a process similar to action-research. What appears to be different, in those systems, is that peer-leaders have responsibility for professional learning, are allocated time for it and teachers work together to ensure their professional learning programmes are improving teaching. Collaborations and frequent observations are part of a shared responsibility for professional learning, with teacher and headteacher appraisals linked to how they develop others. The OECD (2014) found that that more than 40 per cent of teachers had never taught a class jointly, observed classes or provided feedback to another teacher. Respondents described processes in which lessons were observed by leaders, feedback was given verbally at the end of the day in the form of a grade and bullet points and consequences of a low grade included being placed on an ‘improvement’ programme to relearn principles of pedagogy. This is an area where issues of power and reciprocity need to be given greater consideration. Strategies which were reported positively include pairs or groups of teachers developing solutions for particularly challenging classes or students and the joint design of schemes of work. Where system leaders introduced improvement programmes for teachers, these were dominated by generic pedagogical techniques (e.g. questioning skills and feedback), whereas evidence suggests:  ‘participating in professional development that focuses on the curriculum rather than pedagogy makes a teacher more likely to report making an effort to enhance students’ learning’ (OECD, 2014: 25).

Curriculum excellence Another feature of the NPQs, this was also an area subject to contestation in the interviews. SL4 re-timetabled the curriculum three times in the first term in one school ‘to offer courses more suited to learners’ needs’. SL1 (2009) criticized such strategies for improving outcomes:

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I think sometimes the government want short term fixes and some schools claim to have turned around on the back on inflated GNVQs . . . improved their 5A to C grades from 40 to 70 per cent and at the same time the 5As to Cs with English and maths had risen 0.3 per cent . . . Now is that turning around a school, is that improving the quality of teaching and learning? I don’t think it is.

The Coalition tackled this ‘gaming’ of the system explicitly by removing such ‘equivalences’ from key measures. They also revised the National Curriculum, emphasizing subject-based rather than skills-based curricula and returning to linear (end of course) based qualifications (from some being unitized). These moves were part of ‘the continuing attempt to raise levels of attainment in the core subjects of English, mathematics and science, reflecting the perceived need to compete internationally and move up the international league’ (Creese and Isaacs, 2016:  153). System leaders reported that attempts to implement these changes in some schools met with strong resistance from teachers and leaders committed to a more integrated curriculum and project-based learning. Poorly implemented, the latter had failed to explicitly teach core skills and students were performing below expectation. SL5 lamented the loss of headteachers’ expertise in curriculum design: at the moment we’ve got very good leadership in the UK in schools if we’re going in the right direction, if we’re teaching the right stuff. We might be wrong, the syllabuses look as if they’re wrong, fundamental stuff, but there’s been no leadership in that area given to headteachers for years. High stakes entrepreneurial, since the ERA we’ve been financial managers. Asking us to think about the curriculum, well we haven’t done that for 20 years.

Emotional support The case studies give personal accounts of the sense of embattlement experienced by respondents. In addition to the well-documented ‘greedy’ demands of headship (after Gronn, 2003:  147), now multiplied across more than one school, system leaders support other headteachers who are going through crises of identity: ‘it just about broke me, it was just hell, it was horrible’ (HT2); ‘you end up at that point with the deepest questions you can face’ (HT3A). Ironically, some of the system leaders appeared to have returned to the isolation of earlier headship, answerable to governance boards that demand quick success in a punitive accountability system and operating in a competitive local environment. Only one system leader had an external source of emotional

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support: the governors provided a two-hour session at the end of each term with a trained counsellor. Evaluations of early system leadership programmes (RATL, SSAP, London Challenge) stressed the importance of brokerage agents or boards which provided support and opportunities for headteacher steering groups to come together to agree protocols and provide a sounding board for ‘wicked’ problems. These programmes also had the advantage of being able to draw from a wide range of support schools, recognizing that few schools are outstanding in all areas and that a single school is unlikely to have the capacity to respond to all the needs of a school in challenge. Some MATs provide headteacher or subject networks and staff feel supported in the knowledge they are part of a wider team. However, some interviewees reported the mixed usefulness of school-to-school networks and access issues, particularly for geographically distant schools. ‘Resilience’ and ‘awareness’ are listed in the NPQs as required ‘behaviours’ of leaders but are not assessed. It is important that accredited providers structure programmes to develop these qualities. Only one provider of the NPQEL lists on their website a 360-degree assessment at the start and the end of the programme as a means of increasing self-awareness and allowing for personalized learning goals to be agreed. The study provides insights into the activities which enabled reflective learning. Respondents valued the SIP role where it was enacted as a ‘critical friend’ to give non-judgemental feedback on performance. HT3 was clear that self-reflection led to his ‘survival’, describing how his MA had taught him these habits more than the NPQH, as the former provided opportunities to debate with peers and tutors and thus extend his thinking, whereas the latter had focused on occupational skills for the job. Respondents had mixed views on the usefulness of reflective journals, finding them time-consuming and less valuable than face-to-face discussions. Advocates of MATs saw opportunities for on-thejob observation and instant feedback; however, recipients experienced some instances as reinforcements of power differentials, with little time for discussion or reflection. They reported greater learning where improvements were jointly planned and mutually assessed (e.g. the joint SLT awaydays of SL1; MAT headteacher awaydays; some models of peer review). This echoes research which found that feedback can become evaluative and supervisory: learning from each other leads to more powerful improvement (Joyce and Showers, 2002). SL1 had introduced peer coaching into her MAT schools and reported benefits but stressed the resource-intensive nature of training coaches and allocating time for peer coaching.

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‘Adaptability’ does not feature in the list of qualities in the new Headteacher Standards but was repeatedly stressed as a need by respondents. The most challenging situations system leaders described were ones they had not encountered before and the need to act quickly often precluded the opportunity to reflect. Scenarios and simulations in off-site situations would provide valuable learning experiences for subsequent cadres of system leaders. Finally, while high-quality development can build resilience, and networks and coaching can provide support, steps to reduce the punitive nature of the current accountability system would alleviate unnecessary stress and improve morale.

Place Promoters of system leadership drew on established leadership literature, much of which was focused on schools as single entities. There is little that considers area approaches:  an exception is the urban model of the London Challenge, discussed in Chapter 5, where evaluations emphasize the importance of systems thinking, an agreed theory of action and a collaborative approach emphasizing pride in the area and a shared endeavour to raise achievement in all schools. The theory of action underpinning the dominant school improvement paradigm of the past half century runs counter to these findings. It is based on two foundational assumptions, first, that schools can be labelled in clear categories on a continuum from ‘Outstanding’ to ‘Failing’, which gave rise to an approach to policymaking based on segmentation, thereby conferring differential degrees of power and status. Second, the belief that ‘transfer of practice’ from one school to another is unproblematic. Increasing awareness of the limitations of this paradigm has derived, in part, from its failure to address widening social attainment gaps: ‘disadvantaged children in Knowsley have no chance of going to a secondary school rated “good” or “outstanding”, while in Hackney all children on free school meals go to strong schools; the most deprived coastal rural areas have one and a half times the proportion of unqualified secondary teachers that the least deprived inland rural areas have’ (Social Mobility Commission, 2017: 39). This report emphasized the importance of ‘place’ and provided evidence that the challenges in some areas are systemic rather than a failure of leadership or teaching. The government reacted with a plan to address social mobility: ‘This core focus on “place” means a different way of approaching policy’ (DfE, 2017a:  7). Leadership development programmes need similarly to change their focus to the challenges of ‘place’, which depend upon wholelocal-system working and building partnerships. Wood and Simkins (2014: 337)

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point to the need for reflective leaders who exercise their agency in a pluralistic, marketized system: The emerging local places a premium on conscious and critical agency . . . There are implications for leadership development. As leadership contributes to shaping the local terrains, it needs support in taking a critical approach and in examining power, purpose, change and identity within an emerging context that demands leaders decide to whom and with which ends they align themselves.

This will be a challenge in areas where competition between MATs and TSAs has been added to competition between schools. However, the potential benefits for students make it a worthwhile challenge for those with the opportunity to lead leadership development in a new direction.

Unevenness of provision The devolution of training to local alliances led by professionals has the potential for increased flexibility, responsiveness to local need and a focus on practical skills. The DfE (2017h) lists forty-one accredited providers of the NPQ programmes, of which ten are recorded as ‘national’; twenty-four operate in a single region, three across two regions and four across three to five regions. Figure 6.1 summarizes the regional coverage. Providers are accredited for one or more NPQ level. Two providers offer only the NPQEL programme; 49 per cent of providers do not offer this. Thirty-three of the forty-one providers offer the NPQH and only twenty-one the NPQEL. Three

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Figure 6.1 a–c Accredited NPQ providers per region.

universities are listed as national providers. Three national providers operate with partners to provide a mix of national and local training. For example, Ambition Alliance accredits forty-seven partners (MATs, TSAs and teaching schools) with 750 schools. All NPQML levels are delivered by local teaching schools, some operating ‘closed’ provision, only available to participants from their own Trust. The ASCL delivers some training through its own specialist staff

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and some via four partner TSAs. The SSAT (now a membership organization) offers only NPQML from the national suite; its own, non-accredited, programme for executive headteachers costs about 50 per cent of the average cost of the NPQEL. The Church of England Foundation for Educational Leadership is listed as an accredited provider in five regions, offering only the headteacher qualification (NPQH). Concerns have been raised that the fragmentation of the system and consequential hierarchies of schools result in variable local provision and unequal access to professional development. Cliffe et  al. (2018) surveyed seventy-four aspiring leaders in six LA areas who reported they could choose from accredited courses, higher degrees or work-based preparation but access and, sometimes, accreditation were not transferable from school to school. Progress through academy chains was considered the most likely way a teacher could access leadership preparation and development. TSA internships in outstanding schools for middle leaders were neither an entitlement nor a coordinated programme; they were subject to a school’s finances and availability of time. The authors found teachers in struggling schools under pressure to improve results and financially constrained, had limited opportunities for PD. In addition, a SLE had received one day’s training, insufficient to develop the coaching skills recommended by some theories of change (Joyce and Showers, 2002; Close et  al., 2018). In comparison, professional learning leaders in Hong Kong have a compulsory 100 hours of training (Jensen et al., 2016: 15). In summary, the lack of either an agreed theory of action for school improvement, or a coherent strategy at a local level, means differential experiences for teachers and leaders, with subsequent issues of equity and inclusivity.

Partnership competences The most comprehensive account of development needs for system leaders is found in a series of think-pieces (Hargreaves, 2010, 2011, 2012) commissioned by the NCSL. Hargreaves (2010: 15) is clear that ‘knowing how to lead a highperforming school is a necessary but not always a sufficient condition of knowing how to help another school to succeed’. His model (2011) for a mature SISS outlines partnership and collaborative competences for use by the newly designated teaching schools, which were encouraged to modify the details to fit their own circumstances. The 2012 version was intended for any schools in partnership. The model is complex, with three dimensions and twelve strands,

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each with four stages of maturity: beginning, developing, embedding and leading. The strands of the ‘professional development’ dimension include joint practice development, mentoring and coaching, talent identification and development through distributed leadership. Those of the ‘partnership competence’ dimension are: fit governance, high social capital, collective moral purpose and evaluation which leads to robust challenge. The ‘collaborative capital’ dimension’s strands are: analytic investigation, creative entrepreneurship, disciplined innovation and ‘alliance architecture’. Hargreaves (2012:  33) claimed mature partnerships are the building blocks of the SISS. However, the optimistic model which emphasizes shared values, joint goals and a unifying moral purpose needs to be tempered with realism which acknowledges the practical challenges of making partnerships work. As Hargreaves acknowledged:  ‘Headteachers rightly approach the notion of interschool partnerships with some caution, for partnerships incur transaction costs – the time, money and energy to make them work. The larger the number of partnerships, the greater the transaction costs’ (3). He recommended a small number of deep partnerships, while noting that wider, shallower partnerships might also be fit for purpose. His model of a SISS focuses on improved teaching and learning that arises from JPD across partnerships. This is a mature model of elements discussed earlier in this chapter, such as externality and peer-to-peer, lateral, collaboration with reciprocal learning. Hargreaves admitted: ‘The greatest barrier to a widespread adoption of the JPD model of professional development is simply the lack of time for teachers to engage in it’. He cited two examples from schools he worked with on developing the model: (i) moving staff between schools, so that they work with other colleagues in JPD activities; (ii) two-hour twilight sessions sourced from a disaggregated training day. Both strategies were used by respondents of this study:  practical difficulties to overcome included financing absences; different timings of the school day; travel time, particularly for geographically distant schools; leaders being detained by student issues. It is a model more suited to urban than rural environments. Crucially, there was tension between mandating the sessions (which works against building trust) and leaving them optional (which resulted in a lack of take-up, particularly from teachers most in need). A common barrier was the reluctance of teachers to move out of their ‘home’ school and leave established relationships with colleagues and students. Hargreaves noted the need for enabling conditions, presented as ‘strands of the dimension of partnership competence’, that is, the responsibility of system leaders:

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Decentralizaon Depends on system leader as driving force Fostering parcipaon, building consensus and parcipaon, embedding networks Voluntary Inequalies of power Not suitable as people mature or challenge the system leader’s authority Democrac co-producon

Fluid and flexible Power dispersed Adaptable to changing condions Personal and professional networks Shared values, joint goals, moral purpose Voluntary Long-term planning difficult No accountability Self-sustaining networks

Direcve Leadership Hierarchy, standardizaon

New Public Management

Sustainable, long-term Accountability Emphasis on structures, roles, procedures Bureaucrac Direcve or managerial Standardized Formal, not democrac Lacks local flexibility

Distributed Leadership

Pragmasm Emphasis on geng things done, audit, meeng targets Short-term, specific purpose Joint acvity Contractual

Centralizaon

Figure 6.2 Dynamics of partnership working.

A self-improving school system based on inter-school partnerships has to push the concept and practice of system leadership to a new level. Today all school leaders are familiar with the idea and practice of distributed leadership  – the notion that leadership is not exclusively a matter of what specified leaders at the top of an organisational hierarchy do, but rather is something that all members of an organisation should have opportunities to exercise. (15)

Hargreaves extended the concept of distribution to ‘distributed system leadership’ or ‘collective moral purpose’. It is clear, however, that enabling conditions are not all within the power of system leaders but are partly created by the governance environment within which they operate, at both macro and meso levels. The conceptual framework detailed in Chapter  4 offers a means of theorizing the interaction of leadership style with a particular governance environment. Figure 6.2 for example, shows that a NPM governance environment, characterized by a contractual focus, is likely to produce a short-term, pragmatic form of partnership to achieve specific goals; whereas the self-sustaining networks characteristic of many TSAs (Gu et al., 2015), founded by like-minded leaders with shared values, have fluid membership and no accountability for partnership outcomes.

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There is no clear alignment between system leadership approaches and structures. For example, there are formalized TSAs (Armstrong, 2015) and heterogenous MATs (Menzies et al., 2018). The following questions are intended to engage system leaders in reflective consideration of how to adapt an approach to the needs of the partnership and the type of leaders they hope to develop. Consideration needs to be given to the governance environment which partly determines the type of power operating in each approach, which affects the nature of the trust in the relationships and, hence, the type of learning.

Generic questions: ●

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What is your theory of action on how schools improve? What is the evidence for this theory of action? How experienced are the leaders you are developing? Do you see learning as the acquisition of skills, knowledge and understanding, or as a process of socialization into a community of practice? How will you ensure performance management enhances the learning of your staff ? Is time allocated for dialogic exchange and reflection? What principles of adult learning are you employing? What type of trust do you want to engender and how will you build it? How will you reduce vulnerability in schools which have less social capital than yours? How will you build reciprocity in the interactions with supported staff ? What type of accountability will ensure professional respect rather than erode trust? Whose role is it to develop teaching and learning? How will you ensure the emphasis is on professional development rather than monitoring? Have you appointed a peer responsible for developing professional learning and if so, what training have they had? How will you build cohesion, morale and a positive ethos? What are your unifying set of ethics and how will they be established?

In supporting struggling schools: ●

●

Is there a long history of intervention and resistance? Is this an enforced partnership? If so, how will you build teachers’ and leaders’ morale and confidence? How keen are they to learn? How will you and your team respond to defensiveness?

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How will you build reciprocity – what do they bring to the knowledge base? Do you have data to evidence variable strengths and weaknesses? If a MAT structure, how will you minimize power inequalities? What financial model of school support will be used to ensure adequate levels of support?

In collaborations of all ‘Good’ schools: ● ● ●

● ●

How will you ensure adequate challenge which is received constructively? Are you inclusive of all schools in the area? What financial model will ensure equity and also deliver support relative to need? How will you draw up protocols enshrining your agreed theory of action? How will you build sustainability into the partnership?

Finally, it is clear that the partnerships required to deliver the SISS cannot be solely between schools. Chapter 5 detailed the need, repeated in evaluations of system leadership policies, for strategic area-planning and coherent brokerage to deliver effective school-to-school support. No other education system operates without a coherent middle tier. Existing partnerships in TSAs include with LAs and HEIs (Gu et  al., 2015) and, in Educational Opportunity Areas, with further education colleges, local businesses and community organizations. More research is needed on how to make these partnerships work for the benefit of all children and teachers in an area.

Summary There are opportunities for the profession to have greater influence over how future leadership develops but thought needs to be given to who provides an overview and QA of pre-service preparation and in-service training. The current QA framework is against targets but not theories of action and it may be beneficial to attempt an explicit national statement of the latter, in which context is given adequate consideration. Differences in leadership preparation and development currently reflect the value set and theory of action of the provider, not always explicitly stated. Alliances include those strongly bonded by faith and those loosely bonded by pragmatic considerations. It is unclear how each type will develop the level of criticality needed to produce reflective practitioners, rather than a cadre of leaders possibly unsuited to the challenges

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of dynamic future environments. Perceptions of tribalism need to be countered by inclusivity demonstrated in a concern for all children in an area. Concerns that a fragmented system will lead to unequal access to and quality of leadership development need to be addressed. In a marketized system operating an ‘aspiration’ driven approach to leadership development, potential leaders need a means of judging the quality of optional professional qualifications offered by different licencees and alternative university master’s levels qualifications, including MBAs. Pluralist provision has the potential for innovation and enhanced practice, but there also needs to be a mechanism for avoiding variable quality and unprepared future headteachers and system leaders. Much is required of system leaders. They are required to have strategic vision; strong networking and influencing skills; good judgement; a talent for developing others; and be competent in analysing complex data. In addition to professional knowledge of curriculum, timetabling and how children and adults learn, they must understand finance and audit, HR, legalities and governance. In a rapidly evolving context they need continual updating. Coaching skills will help them to develop others and to aid their personal growth. While on-site experience provides valuable learning, it should be complemented by opportunities to develop the skills of critical reflection and build resilience. Greater attention needs to be paid to the emotional health of our leaders, if we are to avoid a recruitment and retention crisis. Passion for improvement needs to be tempered with objectivity in assessing how far a particular theory of action meets the needs of a particular situation. System leadership will have been successful when leaders feel their success is due to preparation and development rather than luck.

7

Partnerships and Place

Introduction This chapter summarizes what has been learned about the nature of system leadership, a concept which continues to enjoy a rare alignment of policy and professional ambition. Accredited system leaders, school-to-school support and teaching schools are key mechanisms for school improvement in a developing self-improving school system. An assessment of the different governance and funding models in operation over the course of the study – central fieldforces; contracts managed by arm’s-length agencies; structural governance in multi-academy trusts; demand-led partnerships of teaching schools alliances – concludes that no mechanism has fully resolved issues of capacity and funding. The chapter summarizes the conflicted governance environments within which system leadership operates, explaining how the use of dominant and subordinate policy steering instruments and hybridized approaches to school and system leadership have led to increasing inequalities, to which an emerging solution is a focus on ‘place’. The chapter evaluates the success of system leadership against the vision outlined for it, concluding that reality has not matched the rhetoric that it heralded a new era in governance, but has, in fact, intensified the neoliberal trends of earlier administrations. It concludes with a summary of lessons from the English experience and some thoughts on future trends.

Evolving models of governance and funding for school improvement The governance of school improvement has evolved over the course of this study from universal, centrally determined programmes; to targeted programmes

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brokered by ALBs; to demand-driven, school-led partnerships. Issues of capacity and funding have been common to all.

Centrally led field-force At the start of the study, system-leadership was welcomed as a more devolved model of school improvement than previous centrally led support models, such as Labour’s National Strategies, which ‘took good people out of schools [and] they increasingly lost their credibility’ (SL2, 2009). System leaders focused on an individual school’s needs, whereas the centrally trained field-force ‘delivered centrally produced slides they hadn’t written themselves’ (SL2, 2009). A policy lead suggested the expense of employing a national field-force and maintaining an infrastructure to manage them was a factor in changing the model, as much as the need to address the standards plateau by ‘unleashing greatness’. Policy moved towards data-driven, targeted intervention strategies and also took account of headteachers’ agency in, for example, disregarding SIPs.

Contracts System leaders remained credible, as headteachers of outstanding schools, employed to support other schools via contracts brokered by a mediating body, usually the LA or a national agency. Central grants provided targeted funding for underperforming schools. Evaluations (Earley and Weindling, 2006; Higham et al., 2009; Robinson, 2012) identified the issue of capacity: the time out that leaders can afford from their ‘outstanding’ school without a potentially detrimental effect was insufficient to bring about the improvements needed in a school in challenging circumstances. The NLE/NSS accreditation was developed partly to address capacity issues, although Hill and Matthews (2010) state the need for sufficient capacity in the NSS to undertake outreach commitment, particularly in core subjects. The suite of central accreditations (NLE, LLE, NLG, SLE) signalled a move to Kooiman’s second-level governance, providing a framework of accreditation rather than directing actions. System leaders reported the challenges of finding a sustainable model of support once government grants for national support programmes ceased after 2010: without a guaranteed income to ‘backfill’ the time out, releasing staff to work in other schools became problematic. All system leaders identified the short-termism of supporting schools which retain the authority to resist change or revert to weak practice once the system leader moves on.

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The MAT An annual top-slice of 5–7 per cent from each school’s budget allows a planned approach to school-to-school support with guaranteed income to cover the investment of time and resources. It is seen as a more cost-effective model than investment of central funding, such as in the London Challenge, although there are questions of whether school budgets can cover the amount needed for intensive support for ‘failing’ schools and of how to fund a subregional infrastructure. The DfE (2016a: 57) claim the benefits of MATs include: improved career opportunities and support for teachers and leaders; sharing of excellent practice in teaching and curriculum; a breadth of curriculum and extracurricular activities; reduced workload; more robust governance and more efficient backoffice arrangements that free up funding for the classroom. They suggest economies of scale come with an optimum size: We know that on average MATs can begin to fully develop the centralised systems and functions that will deliver these benefits at a size of around 10–15 academies  – although the real determinant of effective size is the number of pupils. Over time we expect there to be many more MATs of this size, and we will therefore encourage and support MATs to grow, ensuring that they can access the support they will need to expand sustainably. Because of these benefits, we expect that most schools will form or join MATs. (58)

This arrangement is also second-order governance: an accountability framework establishes expectations and delivery is devolved to system leaders, who are free to choose different operating models. Some MATs employ experts in a priority field, such as mathematics or teaching and learning, to work across more than one school. The cases illustrate, however, that this changes the model from one which provides support from those doing the job in the system leader’s school, to one more similar to the ‘consultancy’ model of the Labour era. If a core team of experts work exclusively for the MAT and no longer do the ‘day-job’, the MAT needs to ensure they maintain currency in a constantly changing environment. Additionally, a central team funded from the top slice, can create budget pressures. Issues of equity also need to be resolved: sponsored academies need a greater amount of support than converters and may not have the budget to pay for support above a ‘core’ offer agreed for all MAT schools. Converter academies contribute capacity to support other MAT schools, which can be unpaid, paid into the school’s budget or go to the MAT budget. Respondents reported ethical issues in using resources allocated for one group of pupils to support those in

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less successful schools. Thus, the proportion of converter/sponsored academies in a MAT determines both the need for and the capacity available to deliver school-to-school support, as well as the type of funding arrangement. Such considerations partly explain RSCs’ problems in finding sponsors for challenging schools. Greany (2015: 137) suggests schools cannot undertake the monitoring role previously undertaken by LAs. For the schools they govern, MATs do exactly that  – monitor and intervene; arrangements are unclear for schools not in MATs, particularly those graded good or outstanding which Ofsted inspects less frequently. Chapter 3 also illuminates how the hard governance of a MAT changes the nature of the interactions between MAT staff and staff of the supported school, with imbalances of power rendering professional learning problematic. SL3’s solution results in the loss of leaders; but offers the solution to ‘grow your own’ to work within a prescribed framework.

Collaborative partnerships Not all collaborations operate under hard governance. The annual reports of SL2’s voluntary partnership outline the income, expenditure and services provided. Based on a subscription model, where each school pays a membership fee for core services (including an annual inspector-led review and a small team of administrative staff ), there are additional services on a ‘charged for’ basis for schools needing more support. Costs are low because each member contributes time and expertise. This model fulfils the promise of system leadership as locally led and professionally driven. It does not, however, offer solutions for complex ‘hard-to-shift’ schools; nor does it replace accountability measures: peer-reviews have no status in the formal framework. Respondents valued the peer-reviews. They are cost-effective compared with peer-reviews offered by national membership organizations, which range from £600 for members (Whole Education, 2018) to £4,125 for non-members (SSAT, 2018). Whole Education targeted reviews (e.g. of curriculum design) are conducted by system leaders on a consultancy basis. SSAT reviews are by senior leaders of schools who sign up, grouped in triads, to conduct one-day reviews of each other’s school, following one day’s training. Matthews and Ehren (2017: 54) claim ‘peer evaluation is emerging as the preferred means of validating self-evaluation’ but is rare internationally. They cite Challenge Partners, a cooperative group of over 300 schools clustered around 29 outstanding ‘hub’ schools as ‘the most established system for peer review in England’. Agendas in all these models are co-designed; reviews facilitated by an expert evaluator

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(e.g. an Ofsted inspector) are non-judgemental and dissemination is supported. Challenge Partners, like 71 per cent of TSAs (Gu et al., 2015: 40), use reviewers from outside the local area to ensure ‘challenge’. This is close to Kooiman’s (2000: 160) third-order governing, ‘the total effort of a system to govern itself ’ where improvement comes about through educationalists holding each other to account in professional discourses. However, peer reviews are demand-led, not yet ‘whole-system’ and have not replaced performance management by audit and inspection. Gu et  al. (2015) reported that schools most in need do not engage with TSAs; geographical supply of support doesn’t match demand; peer challenge between partner schools is not always robust and ‘financial sustainability is seen as a persistent and continuing challenge by TSAs’ (132). SLEs, the most numerous of the system leaders at 8,000 (DfE, 2018), are accredited by TSAs. Bush (2018) notes the SLE model suffers from being ‘on demand’; schools lack capacity to release them to work in other schools, especially in shortage subjects; and schools in need have to find money from decreasing budgets. Gu et al. (2015) found varied funding models, some charging membership fees, often differentiated according to partners’ level of need or size of school. Some operated a central team. For some, a standard membership allowed partners to access development opportunities and courses at a reduced (or no) cost. The authors concluded: Over time there has been sharper understanding of the ‘true cost’ of running a TSA . . . the missing link in the calculation of costs is the uncosted leadership time, especially the time that headteachers and other senior leaders have invested in building and developing their alliances. Time taken for meetings is not costed either, and this is usually substantial. Although most teaching schools have now learned to charge a percentage of income from course income, room hires and brokerage of support to the TSA, the idea of a financially self-sustaining model still does not appear viable. (132)

The conclusion drawn is that while system leadership has the potential to improve schools and develop teachers and leaders, adequate resources must be available in the system, whichever model is chosen. Resource includes capable leaders at all levels with time allocated to work with other schools.

A governance approach to understanding system leadership This section summarizes findings against the questions raised in Chapter 1, in order to provide a conceptualization of system leadership practice.

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Nature of the governance environment The conceptual framework (Figure  4.1) provides a means of representing with adequate conceptual distance, governance environments described from multiple perspectives. The governance environment in England remains overlaid and conflicted:  centralization coexists with devolution; collaboration with competition; autonomy with accountability. The conceptual maps in Chapter 3 represent a trajectory from the mixed environments of Labour to the more centralist ones of the Coalition, in which a stringent accountability framework and differential interventions for schools at the lower end of the performance continuum resulted in an environment that felt ‘harsher’ to respondents. The relative transformative powers of personal philosophy versus governance environment have been rebalanced; the ability of system leaders to normalize policy effects through mediating strategies such as shielding reduced. Similarly, the mediating influence of LAs, which led to the ‘survival’ of headteachers such as HT2 and HT3A, has been removed in some locations There has been a reduction in the range of system leadership roles and agencies commissioning them, alongside an increased congruence between policy intent and the beliefs of system leaders. Despite their closeness to government, however, their power is precarious, as evidenced by the loss of three of the five system leader respondents and also reported by Coldron et al. (2014: 393). The dominant narrative across governments has been towards a ‘selfimproving school system’. The subordinate narratives, however, capture the qualitative difference in the nature of the governance environments:  Labour emphasized the moral duty of successful leaders to improve the whole system for the greater good, whereas the Coalition and Conservative eras have been dominated by structural reform and the austerity agenda. The first appealed to the public service ethos seen as one characteristic of the ‘professions’ (Whitty, 2000); the second to headteachers’ pragmatism. Policy lead respondents at the start of the study identified the ‘dangers’ of system leadership (selfinterested pursuit of power and financial reward), claiming their mitigation by the subordinate narrative of moral purpose. Moral purpose disappeared as a narrative post-2010:  it did not feature in the later interviews and is not mentioned in the Conservatives’ White Paper (DfE, 2016a). Chapter  1 raised the risk of underestimating self-interest and Ball (2007) suggested that market forces and managerialism were combining in state education to destroy the ethos of civic service, with consequent increases in inequality. Evidence from this study and concurrent research (Higham and Earley, 2013; Coldron et al., 2014)

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demonstrate the realization of these warnings in increasing hierarchies of schools and a widening social attainment gap. Clifton (2013:  1) warned of ‘an urgent moral, social and economic imperative to address educational disadvantage – one of the UK’s most destructive and pervasive problems’. These identified risks were not managed across governments. The Conservative response has been to increase accountability: ‘A more autonomous school-led system depends even more heavily on a fair and effective accountability system’ (DfE, 2016a: 21), a statement repeated later in the same White Paper on page 104. The cases show the power of the prevailing governance environment to out-influence factors at meso or micro levels. System leaders reported a lower concern with teaching and learning than might have been expected, focused on monitoring as part of the accountability system rather than professional development. Similarly, inclinations towards distributing leadership were subjugated to pragmatic considerations of the risks involved. These findings go some way to explaining Greany’s (2014:  13) conclusion that ‘competition and markets do appear to affect the behaviour of schools, but they do not tend to encourage schools to improve the quality of teaching and learning in classrooms’. The study has shown that, despite claims of increasing devolution of power, the governance environment has been experienced as increasingly centralized, due to the predominance of top-down steering instruments, the weakening of the middle tier and a strengthening of the powers of the SOS to directly intervene in the governance of schools. Despite a wealth of research which indicates the importance of a middle tier, not least to protect the welfare of the most vulnerable children, there is confusion about what this tier might look like. A  worrying characteristic of the emerging environment is instability, arising from unmanaged fragmentation combined with the ambiguous, impermanent relationships and opaque accountabilities of networks that appear to have replaced NDPBs as a source of policy influence. The SRIBs provide a mechanism for a subregional strategic overview, with the RSC and DfE Regional Directors of Delivery meeting representatives from the TSC, LA(s) and Diocesan Boards (DfE, 2017e). Since decision-making rests with the civil servants, the SRIBs, in effect, represent a form of ‘renationalization’.

Steering instruments At the start of the study:  ‘the effects of the operation of policy levers [were] generally not well-understood, including by the policy makers who have constructed the levers in the first place’ (Raffe and Spours, 2007: 7). The study

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has found growing sophistication in the use of a range of steering instruments and in particular in the power of ‘softer’ instruments which play to professionals’ motivations; nevertheless, unintended or unforeseen consequences remain a feature. System leadership was positioned in policy documents of Labour, Coalition and Conservatives as ‘capability building’. Headteachers adopted these roles willingly and have worked to build capacity in other schools in a variety of relationships. On the one hand, this has been beneficial, removing ineffective brokerage of partnerships such as that reported in Case Study 1 between an unaccredited headteacher (HT1A) and school X, which was based mainly on personal contacts. The performance of School X deteriorated. On the other hand, system leaders became drivers for changed patterns of governance, particularly under the aegis of the academies programme. It seems to be a feature of the English political system that adaptive neo-liberal initiatives introduced by Labour governments with a subordinate dimension of social purpose are later available for Conservative governments for the advancement of a ‘purer’ neoliberal project, which loses the diluting effects of the social democratic agenda. The case studies, tracked over time, captured the motivations and beliefs of headteachers in sufficient detail to show how the radical transformation of the education governance landscape in England occurred. Targets and funding remain the strongest policy-steering instruments; but the case studies demonstrate that complex and contradictory motivations including moral purpose, a sense of duty, power and ego can be used to help deliver government intent.

Autonomy and Accountability Promises of increased autonomy were reported as a primary motivation for respondents’ decisions. A  central tenet of international policy on the reform of public services has been the twin approach of autonomy (devolution of decision-making from the state to professionals) and accountability (measuring that delivery against centrally set targets) (Pont et al., 2008; OECD, 2011, 2015). However, the nature of ‘autonomy’ in policy contexts is opaque:  the term is usually preceded with a limiting qualifier. ‘Managerial autonomy’ signifies it is limited to resources and funding; several studies have noted the restriction of educational autonomy to operational power, with governments maintaining control over both the purpose of education (Higham and Earley, 2013) and the curriculum (Helsby and McCulloch, 1996). Schleicher, deputy director of the OECD, reported to the Education Select Committee (House of Commons, 2015: paragraphs 20–21) that ‘with regard to resource management . . . there are

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a very few countries with such a high level of discretion in schools’ capacities to manage their resources, make funding decisions and so on’ and argued that this should be extended to ‘curriculum and instructional policies and practices’. Earned autonomy signifies it is allowed only to those leaders who demonstrate ‘loyalty’ or success in meeting government targets. Not only is it segmented, it is unstable: ‘Autonomy will be both earned and lost, with our most successful leaders extending their influence and weaker ones doing the opposite’ (DfE, 2016a: 4). Supported autonomy (ibid.), defined as ‘aligning funding, control, responsibility and accountability in one place, as close to the front line as possible and ensuring that institutions can collaborate and access the support they need to set them up for success’, recognizes the limits of freedom to act without access to resources and expertise. It is a response to an unforeseen consequence of segmented autonomy, which renders schools needing the most support clustered in areas where there are the fewest ‘good’ schools to provide it. As Gibton (2017) points out, autonomy is finite within a system and the increase of autonomy for one group is always at the expense of autonomy of another group. In England, the increased autonomy of academies has been achieved through granting them powers and funding previously held by LAs. It has also been at the expense of those schools deemed less successful against increasingly stringent accountability measures. The Academies Commission (2013) concluded that ‘arguments for the importance of autonomy may be overplayed . . . academy status means more autonomy for some and less for others’. The Conservative government’s separation (DfE, 2016a:  9) of ‘successful’ school leaders from their ‘unsuccessful’ peers is an explicit statement of an increasing trend towards segmentation of the system into successful and unsuccessful schools. ‘System leadership’ was premised on the notion of segmentation: ‘it is system leadership that has the power to maximize the impact of . . . the energy of segmentation’ (Pont et al., 2008: 152). The result is that ‘policymaking’ has become performance management of the system’, via an increasingly detailed accountability framework of published league tables and grades awarded by Ofsted, which reinforces the segmentation of schools. Rewards for a high grade are significant: the opportunity to convert to academy status; less frequent inspections; higher social capital in the eyes of parents and the community, leading to increased pupil recruitment and thereby funding; the option to apply for accredited status as a National Leader of Education and a National Support School, which brings the opportunity to conduct system leadership work; the option to apply for Teaching School status and lead a TSA, bringing both status and funding. The corollary is that the

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consequences of gaining a lower grade can be severe, including forced academy conversion under the auspices of a sponsor and loss of individual autonomy. Respondents did not define autonomy as equating to leadership of the system:  ‘autonomy means we define the outcomes and you determine the means. We hold you to account for the outcomes’ (policy lead). SL2 pointed out the ‘good and bad’ things about autonomy, raising the concern that less confident schools would be left to ‘go under’. Earley (2013:  58) estimated ‘up to half [of schools] may be left outside of any partnership or collaboration’ and warned of a potential ‘intensification of existing hierarchies between schools’. In summary, England is recognized as an extreme example of a high autonomy/ high accountability system (Greany, 2017: 57) linked to a globalized economy and the spread of neo-liberal practices (Ball, 2007). Certain ironies have begun to emerge. One paradox of the academy programme is that, for schools in chains, this may well mean less autonomy at the school level than that enjoyed in maintained schools. In 2017, 73 per cent of academies were run by MATs: these schools no longer exist as legal entities. The Select Committee (House of Commons, 2015: paragraph 22)  heard evidence from Schleicher in favour of autonomy (although a more accurate term might be ‘subsidiarity’): ‘the only area of decision-making that has a measurable impact on outcomes is the level of decision-making at the school’. The same paragraph continues, however: ‘decision-making within a chain is a matter for the trust and . . . is subject to how much it decides to delegate down to a local governing body.’ The new role of ‘head of school’ has emerged to signify a headteacher working as the operational head of a school answerable to an executive head or MAT CEO. A consequence of the reduced autonomy is increasing reluctance to apply for the role (Cliffe et al., 2018). A second irony is that the government-incentivized trend towards statutory governance structures, such as those of MATs, means system leaders at the head of these organizations are more easily held to account for the performance of all schools who join than system leaders working in less formal collaborative partnerships. The effectiveness of this approach is currently limited, since accountability structures focus on individual schools, with no formal mechanism to assess groups of schools. This is likely to change following a series of recommendations: a former HMI (Gilbert, 2012) made a case for extending accountability to cover partnerships, a step also recommended by the Education Select Committee (House of Commons, 2017). Matthews and Ehren (2017: 52) argued that, as the SISS matures, the national evaluation and assessment framework needs to adapt to allow greater self-regulation, by encompassing peer

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evaluation and the evaluation of system-leading organizations such as MATs, as well as the impact of RSCs and LAs. A third irony is that the policy intention, in Labour’s term of government, to increase the autonomy and leadership of good headteachers in order to move the system from good to great, might be compromised by the Coalition and Conservative governments’ focus on structures. Chapman (2015) noted the propensity of SISSs to produce federations or chains. The case study of SL1 evidenced how her extensive success in non-mandated partnerships was not replicated in her MAT, where the conditions for change (trust, reciprocity, other leaders’ willingness to change) were compromised by governance structures with hierarchical power relations. Findings indicate that accountability measures dominate others in terms of their impact on professionals’ behaviour. This is potentially counterproductive, given weaknesses in the reliability of current judgements which allocate schools to a ‘segment’ on a performance continuum within the accountability framework. These judgements (from examination/test measures and Ofsted) sometimes pervert the focus of teachers and headteachers, at the expense of a broad education for all children. As long as examination grades remain norm-referenced, gains by one child will be at the expense of others. The study highlights how such highstakes accountability leads to gaming or even cheating. Additionally, evidence of differential effectiveness questions the foundational assumption that schools can be segmented onto a single performance continuum. Acknowledging greater equality between schools is more likely to lead to the reciprocity needed for joint practice development. Doubts raised during the study about the robustness and impartiality of Ofsted’s inspection model have been raised in other research (Robinson, 2012). Greany (2015) argued that the growing number of such questions suggests that Ofsted has become too dominant a force for change and regulation. An example which raises questions about the legitimacy of the current Ofsted framework is data recording the highest number of ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ schools (78 per cent) than at any time since Ofsted began in 1992 (Ofsted, 2013), in a year where PISA results showed England’s performance continued to flatline against international benchmarks (OECD, 2013 cited Greany, 2015:  16). Such findings suggest the accuracy of warnings from O’Neill (2002) and Hood (2007) that people can become good at meeting the requirements of accountability systems without improving the quality of the service those systems are intended to measure. The ESRC describe intelligence systems as a source of diagnostic power to develop learning; Ofsted’s role could be more constructive as a catalyst for professional dialogue leading to improvement, if findings were ungraded.

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Dominant and subordinate narratives The study has illustrated the relative strong and weak power of available instruments and their combination into dominant and subordinate narratives within governance environments. For example, ‘the moral purpose of helping other schools’ as a condition of gaining academy status is clearly a subordinate narrative: ‘many of the good and outstanding schools that converted since 2010 have become standalone academies. Not all these “converter” academies are fulfilling their commitment to support other schools to improve’ (Academies Commission, 2013: 5). Changes of governance arrangements into ‘hard’ rather than ‘soft’ alliances have, however, been led by named advisors at the DfE for individual schools. The dominant narrative of the system leadership movement appealed to the desires of educationalists to be ‘professionals’. Respondents’ motivations mirror the characteristics identified in literature on teaching as a profession (Goodson and Hargreaves, 1996; Whitty, 2000; Day, 2004). Status was conferred by the NLE badge; an extended career structure offered with more pay; the ethical dimension or desire to do public good; the importance of autonomy. Explicit references were made to ‘professionalism’ by politicians (‘a new professionalism’, Miliband, 2003); academics (a ‘new era of professionalism’, Higham et al., 2009); and the Department (‘to increase professional dialogue’, DfES, 2004a). Respondents described system leadership as: ‘a conscious move towards a professionally led system’; ‘a cultural shift, a professional shift to get people on the ground who are doing the work to actually help transform the system’. This was not mere compliance, but an enthusiastic drive from the profession for the extension of school leadership to leading the system. System leadership is an example of ‘pull not push’ policy, defined by Ringen (2013: 51): ‘people obey not because they must but because they want to’. In this sense, system leadership policies appear to have fulfilled government aims (DfES, 2006) to achieve professional ownership and consent for reform. However, this form of ‘professionalism’ is only available to the minority who ‘earn it’ (as Whitty suggested, ‘by loyalty’) and elements once considered vital characteristics of ‘professionalism’ (e.g. curriculum design and planning) remain directed by government. The emphasis in the interviews on funding and governance above teaching, learning or assessment suggests that system leaders’ identities are more ‘entrepreneurial-competitive’ than ‘ethical-professional’ (Ball, 2008: 149). Some case study schools have taken an entrepreneurial route of ‘selling’ their good practice and those operating TSAs were in different

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stages of developing financially effective business models. The new National Standards for Headteachers require headteachers to ‘model entrepreneurial and innovative approaches to school improvement, leadership and governance (DfE, 2015a: 3). Empirical examples from this study combined with those of Robinson (2012) and Coldron et  al. (2014), illustrate the accuracy of Ball’s (2008: 45) judgement that the new policy paradigm constitutes ‘a new moral environment’ within which schools are being ‘inducted into a culture of selfinterest manifested in terms of survivalism’. This shift of orientation, towards the internal well-being of the institution and away from more general social issues within the community risks the neglect of the most vulnerable students, as it introduces new orientations and value systems in which social justice issues seem peripheral (149). It is also the opposite of the principles and aims of system leadership, as espoused in literature and policy documents at the start of the study. Some system leaders warned of these dangers, for example, It must be a high-risk strategy to push so much diversity into the system so early without checks for how effective the changes will be. There is no guarantee that schools won’t use the changes for self-interest rather than to collaborate in the interests of the wider system. There is a consequential danger that if the school system fragments unchecked, it may fail to save the most vulnerable with the least understanding of how to access the system. (Robinson, 2012: 191)

Despite their perceived power in the system, such voices appear not to have been heard. The conclusion of the study is that, while the environment remains mixed, contested and currently in a state of transition, there is evidence to suggest that system leaders in some areas have been aligned more closely with government than with their fellow headteachers and have been instrumental, often unintentionally, in steering the system towards government objectives.

Nature of system leadership interactions The study has confirmed rather than added to knowledge about what to do to improve schools (strengthen leadership including vision-setting, climate and ethos; improve student behaviour; raise student outcomes by curriculum changes and better teaching). It has captured how system leaders approach the work. The conceptual model (Figure 4.1) offers a theorization of the nature of system leadership interactions, including the differential nature of power and

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trust in different governance environments, which produce different types of learning. Leadership literature has, since the early 2000s, consistently suggested that a more distributed and democratic approach to the leadership of teachers correlates with building capacity and achieving cohesive schools which perform better. However, system leaders at the start of the study were polarized over whether a ‘done to’ approach was more appropriate than a ‘done with’ model for system leadership. Both approaches exist in our current system. The study tracked these, elicited headteacher reactions to each and correlated them with success in terms of long-term outcomes. Evidence suggests system leaders who operate towards the ‘distributed’ end of the spectrum build trust and reciprocity which are more conducive to changed behaviours than directive approaches which incur defensive reactions. The perceptions and willingness to change of supported leaders is a critical element of the interaction, which may be missing in forced partnerships or in schools with a long history of resistance to change. Mechanisms to minimize the inevitable asymmetry of power in a heavily segmented system include data on within-school variation. In an environment where segmentation dominates, this is more difficult. The model provides both a self-reflective tool for system leaders and a frame against which to evaluate activity. The study has identified the strengths and potential weaknesses of four styles of system leadership:  the dialogic accountability and reciprocity of the peer-leader; the expert/novice, servant leader, an approach which includes legitimate peripheral participation; the ruthlessness of the autocratic leader which avoids the potential disappointments of the previous approach; the managerial performativity of the consultantleader which risks too much trust in audit. The importance of governance environment and the need for adaptability of leadership approach in different situations are strong messages from the pioneer system leaders in this study. Professional development for prospective and current system leaders should draw on conceptual models to make explicit their theories of action about how schools improve and professionals learn, taking account of how the governance environments within which they are situated affect issues of power, trust, identity and ability to learn. There also needs to be clarity about the purpose of the particular system leadership role: the syllabus of the NPQEL appears to be focused on multisite leadership (finance, governance and leadership of groups of schools in an academy system) whereas Hargreaves’ (2012) model focuses on school-to-school partnerships in a self-improving school system.

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Factors affecting the interactions Personalities appear to have had a diminishing ability to normalize policy to any significant extent. The dominant governance environment has proved more significant and has the power to reshape professionals’ identities. The national assessment framework of examinations and Ofsted outweigh small gains in autonomy (such as choice of curriculum); austerity trumps markets as choice is constrained by reduced budgets. The mediating middle tier (consisting mainly of LAs and including ALBs) was an important broker of system leadership over the early period of the study; there is in 2018 uncertainty about the nature and political status of a replacement. In this period of transition, local democratic rule has been weakened, alongside community engagement (although many schools, particularly in the primary phase, continue to resist moves to subject local governing bodies of a single school with volunteer stakeholders to the tiered and hierarchical governance of MAT boards). Chains and MATs are not guaranteed to deliver improvements (Hutchings et al., 2014): Ofsted (2015: 33) reported they ‘share the same basic problems as maintained secondary schools’. Gunter and McGinity (2014: 303) claimed that: While research evidence (e.g. Wrigley and Kalambouka, 2013), commissioned evaluations (e.g. PwC, 2008) and Parliamentary scrutiny (e.g. NAO, 2007) have all raised serious questions and presented challenging evidence about the [Academies] Programme, not least that there is no evidence of ‘an academies effect’ (PwC, 2008), politicians of the left and right have remained resilient in their promotion of the independent school and have been able to generate a sense of normality.

The policy intention for all schools to become or join a MAT is on hold but remains in the background (DfE, 2016a) creating uncertainty about the future, particularly for primary schools, whose engagement with the academy agenda has been less widespread than in the secondary sector. The study has shown that support and challenge from a system leader, particularly when supported by talented staff recognized as SLEs, can improve schools. However, it does not necessarily lead to improvement: transfer of practice is more complex than applying the checklist of what we know works in terms of strategies, which some see as a ‘technicist fix’. In some cases, system leaders have no experience of the contexts they find in complex schools (SL1, SL2 and SL5). The training needs of system leaders have been recognized in the addition of NPQEL to the NPQ suite but, as with all NPQs, it remains non-mandatory. The

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NPQ model is geared to the single leader; some MATs are choosing to deliver the NPQML to middle leader cohorts or, less often, the NPQSL to senior leader cohorts across their schools, allowing a focus on shared leadership. However, the cohesion created by a shared value set or a religious faith has also raised concerns about tribalism. Research also reports variable access to and quality of leadership preparation and training, and issues of inclusivity.

Self-regulation or increased government steering? At the start of the study in 2009, optimism about opportunities for system leadership to change for the better the educational experience of students and teachers coexisted with scepticism that system leaders would become instruments of governments which dispersed, but did not relinquish, power. Governance literature presents a mainly normative view of a global trend away from centrally imposed governance towards self-regulation and localization. There is no doubt that successful headteachers have played a role in leading reform. The increased autonomy of some schools, however, has been at the expense of LAs and other schools, not of the government, which has increased its power of intervention in schools over the past decade. Interview data offered conflicting views about the degree of ‘steering’ from the centre during the Labour period and a consensus about greater direction in the Coalition and Conservative terms. The trajectory is of a continuous move towards greater segmentation with differentiated intervention and a renationalization of some elements. In 2009, SL3 described a government coming towards the end of its term of office, six months before a general election, feeling pressure to demonstrate impact from the increased public spending on education:  ‘the people I’m working with at the Department are now pretty hard-nosed and I think they’ve learned that. I  don’t think they used to be . . . The Department are much more interventionist now’. This perhaps explains why policies intended to facilitate a self-governing system earlier in the term became diverted towards a more directive approach. In addition, the failure of the demand-led system to provide a cohesive and complete self-improving system led the Conservative government to revert to governance approaches of the early Labour period. For example, a range of short-term funding streams are available, on a bidding basis, to be used for school improvement in priority areas. The SSIF, targeted at weaknesses, runs counter to the learning from successful system policies such as the London Challenge, which resulted from a whole-area, morale-building approach inclusive of all schools.

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The introduction raised the question of how far single headteachers working with one or two other schools could be defined as ‘system leaders’. This study shows that SIPs, though system-wide, failed to form a collective identity for the sharing of ‘what works’ across the whole system. System leadership became less focused on ‘the system’. Respondents now have closer partnerships with a smaller number of schools, the majority in a ‘hard’ governance relationship. The data suggest that this too is a progression of already established thinking rather than a new trend: ‘Government ministers sneer at soft federations’ (SL1, 2009). Current government policy is to consolidate this trend, with all schools becoming or joining a MAT (DfE, 2016a). There is little evidence of collaboration or sharing between MATs. In conclusion, the state has devolved responsibility for school improvement to schools but has taken back decision-making via the SRIBs. It has retained control of the curriculum, assessment and accountability frameworks and directly intervenes in perceived failures to act if a school falls below a rising floor target. The analysis evidences a move from first- to second-order governance, with a reliance on frameworks, standards and accountability. There is no evidence of school leaders determining and driving educational priorities, or self-regulating. The study has traced respondents’ responses to the Coalition’s approach, from the initial optimism:  ‘It’s about really excellent school leaders creating themselves a system, supported by the government’ (PL2), through a period of disorientation: ‘the infrastructure has gone’ (SL5); ‘it’s all very post-modernist, it’s dismantling all the institutions and structures’ (HT2). The fragmentation questions how far English education remains a single system. One policylead suggested: ‘I think it’s probably old government thinking rather than new government thinking to use the word “system” like that . . . you might need a better word for it.’ Several writers (e.g. Earley, 2013; Coldron et  al., 2014) warned of the development of a two-tier system of those in partnerships and those isolated. There is also a two-tier system of governance: a continuation of LA-maintained schools alongside the academy system. Additionally, different legal and funding systems exist within the academies system: ‘We must ensure that the legal framework for academies is fit for purpose for the long term. At present, the basis on which academies operate depends entirely on when they became an academy’ (DfE, 2016a:  64). The disintermediation of the middle tier has moved power away from formal locally elected government as the site of education planning and delivery, towards a range of agencies with varying degrees of closeness to central government: RSCs and DfE regional directors, Ofsted, LAs, TSAs and the TSC, federations, chains, MATs, the dioceses and

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private companies offering a range of traded services. These represent both markets and networks – but all operate in what Ball and Junemann (2012: 133) termed ‘the shadow of hierarchy’.

Evaluating the success of system leadership The stated ‘purposes’ of system leadership have changed over the course of this study, from Labour’s focus on the ‘system’ and sharing of practice, to the Coalition and Conservative governments’ increasingly confident neo-liberal agenda, characterized by structural diversity, marketization and networks, via strengthened accountability measures. Chapter  1 outlined four questions set by Fullan in 2004 for assessing the success of system leadership. The first was how far a strong moral purpose led system leaders to care about all students in their locality. The interviews record how moral purpose was a powerful driver for system leaders. Supported headteachers (e.g. HT2) insisted that system leaders genuinely care about all children in the locality and (e.g. HT1A) about peer headteachers. The overshadowing of this theme in the second round of interviews by the dominance of governance changes, suggests it is no longer a mantra for system leadership. The second, related question was how far headteachers redefine their existence as being part of the larger system. Evaluations of the London Challenge conclude that a pan-London identity was established (Ofsted, 2010). Hutchings et al. (2014: 102) found the City Challenges ‘made school improvement a system priority and a collective responsibility’. The case studies also describe the national phenomenon mentioned by Robinson (2012), of empire builders and predators competing with collaborators. Hopkins (2007) claimed system leadership was an antidote to competition between schools, but Hargreaves (2012) identified the new threat of ‘tribalism’ associated with groups such as chains, TSAs and diocese groups. In the current, as in previous governance environments, competition and cooperation remain in tension. Fullan’s third suggestion was that system leaders be judged on how many good leaders they develop and this study provides individual examples of success (HT2, HT3A). The Teaching School initiative is also a mechanism for achieving this goal, although Robinson (2012: 182) warned of a potential issue that, as training and development becomes locked into schools, those not in a TSA become second-tier and fail to recruit. The fourth suggestion, whether the accountability framework reflects the broader responsibility taken on by system

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leaders, has been partially implemented, with Ofsted batched inspections of MAT schools starting in 2014. Higham et al. (2009) identified three main drivers for what they termed the system leadership ‘movement’:  to provide a wider resource for innovation; to provide an authentic response to low attaining schools; and to address the declining source of headteachers by allowing successful heads to run more than one school.

Innovation The Labour government explicitly sought to encourage innovation as a solution to moving beyond the ‘standards plateau’, with funded initiatives and an Innovation Unit within the DfES. Subsequent governments have moved away from a concern with innovation towards floor standards, marketization and structural reform. The Academies Commission (2013: 30) reported ‘considerable evidence that the current accountability framework inhibits change and innovation’. Greany (2014) concluded that competition and marketization do not encourage innovation or higher quality teaching. There is little evidence in the data of a focus on innovation:  SL1 and SL3 were preoccupied with structural solutions and ensuring survival by growth of the MAT. For SL2, the focus was on establishing systems including QA of selfevaluation and professional development. This is not to say that innovation is not happening in our schools or teaching schools; only that, for the respondents in this study, it has not been a primary concern. Hargreaves (2012: 31), in his review of interschool partnerships established since the Coalition White Paper, suggested that ‘collaborative capital’, a necessary precondition for innovation, ‘will be hard to achieve’. Quoting Sennett (2012: 129), he explained: ‘Modern capitalism has unbalanced competition and cooperation and so made cooperation itself less open, less dialogic’. To fulfil the aim of enabling innovation, he suggested, we need to rebalance. Given its link with high-performing systems (Toh, et al., 2016), it is worth reconsidering a strategic focus on innovation.

Solution for complex problems There is mixed evidence that system leaders improve schools with a long history of failure. This study has analysed examples of complex schools remaining in challenge after years of support from a system leader as well as those that have improved. Robinson (2012:  63), while finding school-to-school support is a potentially effective lever in the system for raising standards by improving

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vulnerable schools, adds the caveat that this works best when it is welcomed, also a clear finding from the SL1 case study. Her respondent system leaders were ‘unequivocal that their support had parameters’. They would not support ‘either indefinitely or for a lost cause’, leaving the most complex schools with no solution and the phenomenon of ‘orphan’ schools or ‘schools no-one wants’ (SNOWs). The PASC review of MATs (House of Commons, 2017: 4) noted: ‘[T]he Government should ensure that schools which are under-performing are not left behind by a programme which was originally designed to support such schools.’ This model for failing schools, has, however, been applied as a solution to a wide range of schools including many that were previously deemed ‘satisfactory’.

Closing the social attainment gap At the start of the study, in the Labour era where system leadership was born, those promoting it believed ‘in the final analysis, the only moral rationale for system leadership is to secure excellence and equity across the system’ (Collarbone and West-Burnham, 2008: 87). This is a promise not yet fulfilled (Social Mobility Commission, 2017). The Conservative government’s response has been intervention, funding and a detailed plan which ‘provides a framework that everyone – whether educators, government, business or civil society – can be empowered to support . . . The government intend to manage rigorously against it, working with our partners to identify exactly how best to measure and drive progress.’ (DfE, 2017a: 36). This response to the failure of a demandled system to ensure equity signifies a return to first-order government direction and to the questions raised in Chapter 1 about the legitimate role of the state.

The succession crisis Policy leads recommended system leadership as ‘a safer model’ (PL4) of finding leadership for challenging schools – the NLE has his/her own school to return to if something goes wrong; heads of schools have the protection of a MAT or chain. Partly, this is recognition of the fallacy of the notion of the ‘hero-head’. Even so: ‘there is now considerable evidence to suggest that potential headship candidates hesitate to apply for posts due to the extensive responsibilities associated with the role, growing accountability demands, inadequate preparation, training and support and insufficient rewards or salary differentials’ (Earley, 2013: 59). Respondents believed the 2010 White Paper:

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will intensify that, I’ve had first-hand evidence of people who would have made good heads saying, ‘no, becoming a head in a school with low attainment is a price I’m not willing to pay’. (PL5)

Headteacher retention is as problematic as recruitment: the precariousness of the job was a repeated theme in the interviews. HT3A reported he is the only one of three headteachers in the LA to ‘survive’ poor results and SL5 reported that, out of fifteen heads in her LA who took on headship at the same time, ‘one of them is in prison, one nearly got locked up, one’s had a nervous breakdown, only four of them retired properly’. Only two of the six headteachers who agreed to take part in the study are still headteachers; both attribute this to ‘luck’ rather than deliberate strategies to retain them. Only two of the five system leaders have remained. Joining a MAT is no guarantee for a headteacher that they will keep their job, as evidenced by HT3B. Some system leaders have added to the shortage by ‘sacking’ heads in the schools they take over. However, others have developed inexperienced or ‘unlucky’ heads, fulfilling the intention for system leadership to build capacity in the system.

Conclusions The aim of this book to clarify the nature of system leadership has been complicated by the fluidity of the concept over changes of government, which have seen it evolve for different purposes. Headteachers over the past two decades have embraced the challenges to contribute beyond their own school to the success of other schools. Evidence is abundant of their continued commitment and increased workloads as they have developed MATs and TSAs while continuing to lead high performing schools and support improvement in others. Supported headteachers testify to the benefits, some becoming in their turn system leaders. There is no doubt that good system leaders, skilled at collaborating with others to improve schools, represent a more powerful force for improvement than previous reform efforts. However, it is difficult to separate progress towards a self-improving school system from structural reform, with which it has been inextricably interwoven. There is no conclusive evidence that structural reform is a necessary mechanism for school improvement and some evidence that it is counterproductive, through changing the nature of power and trust in relationships. Respondents expressed fears that government’s moves towards fewer top leaders, closer

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to government, running chains of schools as businesses, answerable to no democratically elected body, are laying the foundations for the privatization of education. The promotion of economies of scale from MATs can be seen as part of the neo-liberal ideology of reduced state funding for public services. Funding was one of the strongest themes in the post-Coalition interviews. The IFS reported a real-terms average growth in education spending of 5 per cent per year from 1998/99 to 2010/11 and a 14 per cent fall in real terms from 2010/11 to 2015/16. At the same time, there was a 7 per cent growth in pupil numbers (Belfield et al., 2017). There are several lessons to be drawn from the English experience. 1. An unmanaged process with over-reliance on market demands has unintended consequences, most severely in terms of equity for pupils, teachers and leaders. 2. Partnerships will not solve capacity issues without resources. England’s 21,000 schools have the choice to stand alone, buy-in services from the ‘market’ of TSAs, LAs and commercial companies and remain in local competition, at risk from a punitive accountability system should standards fall. Alternatively, they can join a partnership to gain capital advantage (SL3) or for security (HT1B), relinquishing autonomy for protection. Schools and LA responses to partnership have varied, with choices made on the basis of local histories and relationships. But even the current number of 800 TSAs leaves many schools without access to development and these are more likely to be schools serving the disadvantaged, in coastal or geographically distant areas. 3. The too-rapid growth of some MATs has seen failures of governance and an inability to support schools in need due to lack of capacity. 4. The segregation of schools into hierarchies damages the confidence of staff and parents and intensifies fragmentation, leading to some areas being poorly served in terms of access to the key mechanisms of school improvement and increased numbers of struggling schools left without support. 5. Evidence is robust that a middle tier provides a strategic overview, planning and early intervention to prevent failure; and that tri-level reform, with strong alignment between the state, middle tier and schools, delivers impact. It is unclear where the middle tier in England will eventually be positioned, locally, subregionally or regionally, or how concerns about lack of democratic accountability will be resolved. The

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result is a loss of transparency and local accountability, inadequate local strategic planning and instability. 6. Conflicted governance environments result in tensions in the system which pull professionals in opposing directions. Devolution coexists with progressive renationalization; high autonomy with high accountability; collaboration with competition. A clear message from the study is the need to understand the nature of ‘autonomy’ and the unintended consequences of segmented autonomy, which include unchecked autonomy at one extreme leading to abuses of power and limited autonomy at the other rendering headship unattractive. 7. Neo-liberal initiatives introduced by Labour governments with a subordinate dimension of social purpose are later available for Conservative governments for the advancement of a ‘purer’ neo-liberal project, which loses the diluting effects of the social democratic agenda. 8. There is no single theory of action about how system leaders support schools to improve. Figure 4.1 offers a conceptualization of four approaches (the hero-head; the collaborator; the servant-leader and the auditor). It describes, for each, the natures of the governance environment, power and trust which render different learning experiences.

The future Moves towards recentralizing the school system may not be sustained. There is growing recognition across the political spectrum in the areas of health, housing, skills and economic regeneration, especially in the large city conurbations, that progress depends upon local partners coming together under the leadership of elected mayors to exploit opportunities and solve problems particular to them. Since the Local Government Act (2000), sixteen LAs have elected mayors and six combined LAs elected a ‘metro-mayor’ in 2017 and signed devolution deals with the Government (Sandford, 2017). System leaders are likely to retain a prominent role: ‘Devolving power to individual school and system leaders sits squarely within this government’s devolution agenda’ (DfE, 2016a: 18). The Conservative’s claim of approaching policy differently, through a core focus on ‘place’, has the potential to address some of the issues outlined above. If successful, the approach can be adopted in all areas, delivering a more fully selfimproving school system. It remains to be seen how far devolving responsibility

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for training and development of the profession to the profession will reinvigorate the supply of teachers and leaders. What is clear is that powerful roles are likely to remain within one half of the current system, leaving unanswered the questions raised in this book about the place of local democracy and local communities: The knowledge and skills needed to perform the role of RSC are considerable. The RSC system therefore relies heavily on identifying the right people to take on the role, and on the future supply of such system leaders. There is a need to nurture potential future RSCs to undertake the role . . . The academies system ensures that there is a growing number of headteachers, CEOs of MATs and other system leaders with the necessary skills to become future RSCs. (House of Commons, 2018: paragraph 40)

Throughout the study contradictions and complexity were prevalent: but there has also been a single underlying direction of travel towards the next stage of neo-liberal approaches to governing education as a public service. An inability to see whole system and foresee the unintended consequences of marketization are perhaps contributory factors to the failure of educationalists to halt the relentless agenda of successive governments to privatize state education. The study captured in detail other contributory factors, including the fragmentation of the education profession via segmentation into ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ headteachers, and an increasingly sophisticated understanding of how to wield steering instruments to deliver desired outcomes. This is not to fall into the trap warned against by Ball (2015: 309), following Foucault: the story is not one of simple domination. The state can ‘steer’ and ‘guide’ professionals only with their consent. It is up to professionals to ensure that the consent is the ‘active consent’ of Gramsci, rather than the ‘misrecognition’ of Bourdieu.

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Index academy 10, 15, 36–40, 53, 60, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 77, 82, 83, 90, 93, 104, 107, 108, 119, 126–9, 131–3, 136, 137, 150, 153, 155, 158, 163–6, 197, 205, 206, 208, 210, 211, 213 academy chain 10, 83, 104, 128, 129, 191 academy sponsors 19, 37, 40, 69, 70, 73, 78, 127, 128, 153, 166, 200 accountability 5, 8, 10, 15, 17, 18, 20, 26, 27, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39, 43, 48, 49, 50, 51–6, 62, 63–9, 85, 98, 99, 102, 108, 110, 111, 119, 123, 130, 140, 142, 146, 153, 154, 157, 158, 171, 173, 177, 186, 188, 193, 199, 200, 202–7, 210, 213–16, 218, 219 action research 173, 185 adult learning principles of 173 arms-length body (ALB) 16, 17, 36, 39, 87, 198, 211 autonomy 5, 20, 32–3, 38, 48, 53, 54, 60, 61, 64, 66, 101, 109, 110, 130, 132, 140, 141, 146, 152, 155, 156, 171, 172, 202–8, 211, 212, 218–19 earned autonomy 141, 205 managerial autonomy 204 segmented autonomy 205, 219 supported autonomy 205

conditions for collaboration 41–2, 107, 113 incentivized collaboration 46–7 commissioning 21, 60, 161, 166, 202 conceptual model 29, 30, 56, 97–9, 169, 209, 210 Conservative government 2, 6, 31–4, 38– 40, 41, 45, 53, 123, 125–6, 149, 154, 175, 201–7, 214–16, 212, 219 Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition government 2, 15, 17, 32–8, 39, 44–7, 50, 53, 64–7, 80–4, 94–5, 102, 114–17, 125–32, 156–7, 175–6, 207, 212, 214, 218 contextual value-added (CVA) 81, 119, 144 converter academies 93, 127, 136, 142, 171, 199, 200, 208 curriculum 28, 33, 36, 62, 73, 79, 98, 114, 127, 129–30, 134, 151, 175, 185–6, 199–200, 204–5, 208–9, 211

best practice 21, 50, 112–13, 134, 163 see also good practice

Education Action Zone (EAZ) 46, 50, 71, 136, 169, 176 Education Opportunity Area 40 Education Reform Act (ERA) (1988) 23, 33, 126, 174 English Baccalaureate (EBacc) 23, 36, 119, 132, 164 entrepreneurship 15, 47, 116, 127, 186, 192, 208, 209 equity 21, 141, 145, 147, 191, 195, 199, 216, 218 European Social Research Council (ESRC) 18, 23, 207

case studies 56–95, 137, 186, 204 Case Study One 67 Case Study Two 78 Case Study Three 86 Case Study Four 92 coaching 42, 81, 98–9, 109, 113, 146, 169, 175, 183, 185–96 collaboration 35, 41, 51, 62, 71–3, 80, 92, 98, 102, 129, 160, 171, 175, 185, 192, 200, 206, 213

democracy 6, 11, 17, 19, 28, 34, 100, 126, 204, 219 democratic accountability 153, 157–9, 218 democratic deficit 10, 162, 166, 211, 220 disintermediation 151, 162, 213 distributed leadership 29, 56, 59–60, 72, 88, 105, 113, 123, 180–2, 192–3

238

Index

executive agency 18, 37, 39, 175 Executive Headteacher 42, 45, 65, 86, 90, 120, 129, 170–2, 191 feedback 81, 185, 187 feedback loops 48, 146, 170 floor standards 117–19 Framework for Leadership Development (FLD) 174, 178, 183 free school 37, 38, 158, 160, 188 definition 128 funding 3, 16, 20–4, 32, 34, 39, 41, 47, 52, 74, 79, 91, 93, 125–30, 135–8, 153–9, 161, 208, 212–13, 218 Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA) 39 Education Funding Agency (EFA) 37 funding models 197–208 global educational reform movement (GERM) 9 globalization 1, 5, 6, 13, 15, 19, 28, 138, 206, 212 good practice 37, 46, 112–14, 180, 208 see also best practice governance 5–6, 8–9, 12 definition 13 governance environments 28, 30, 49, 53–5, 68, 117, 123, 142, 162, 197, 202, 208–10, 219 governance models 13–14, 20–2, 28, 35, 38, 39, 69 governance propositions 12–28 governance steering instruments 13, 20–1, 78, 197, 203–4 heterarchical governance 14, 20 network governance 9–11 Headteacher Board (HTB) 158–9, 166 Head of School 65, 90, 170–2, 181–2, 206 hierarchy 6, 9, 32, 35, 44, 63, 114, 141–2, 162, 206–7, 211, 214, 218 identity 28, 33, 60, 70, 139, 141, 179, 186, 210, 213–14 inclusivity 169, 177, 180–2, 191, 196, 212 initial teacher training (ITT) 37–8, 86, 130, 163, 165, 173 innovation 9, 21, 35, 46, 57, 113, 146, 152, 192, 196, 215

joint practice development (JPD) 112–13, 184, 192 Key Stage (KS2, KS4) 46, 54, 70, 76, 78, 81, 85–6, 89, 119–21, 144 Labour government 2, 7, 9, 14–18, 21–2, 26, 31–5, 39, 40–53, 59, 64–7, 79, 84, 95, 115, 127–8, 137–45, 174, 181, 198–9, 202–4, 207, 212, 214–16, 219 leadership models 50–2, 62–3, 69 leadership qualifications see National Professional Qualifications (NPQs) leadership training and development 38, 72, 163, 169, 173–4, 176–7 local authority 3, 150, 160 London Challenge 42–3, 45, 49, 138, 141, 143–50 design principles 145 markets 8–10, 15, 20–3, 32–5, 39, 53, 63, 73–4, 125, 128, 136, 143, 151, 155–8, 160, 163–5, 189, 196, 202–3, 211, 214–15, 218, 220 mentoring 42, 56, 98, 105, 109, 146, 169, 173, 183, 192 middle tier 3, 58, 66–7, 75, 83, 91, 126, 129, 150–66, 195, 203, 211, 213, 218 models of school improvement 39, 41–3, 45, 52, 63, 70–1 75–6, 78, 84, 98–9, 102, 112, 136–8, 145, 149, 152–5, 159, 160–2, 188, 197–201, 209, 212, 217–18 models of system leadership 97–123 multi academy trust (MAT) 39, 66, 70, 84, 90, 93, 101, 109–10, 113, 123, 126, 128, 133, 136, 141, 150, 153–5, 163–4, 189, 190, 197, 199–200, 211, 213, 215–16 definition 128 empty MATs 128 MAT governance 155, 157–8, 163, 206 MAT growth 155, 218 MAT leadership 170–2, 175, 181–2, 187, 193–4, 212 National College for School Leadership (NCSL) 18, 27, 37, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 57, 86, 113, 132, 169, 170, 172, 174, 175, 177, 178, 180, 181, 183, 191

Index National College for Teaching and Leadership (NCTL) 37, 39, 158 National Leader of Education (NLE) 40, 44–6, 51–2, 66, 69, 79, 86, 131–3, 136, 140, 141–2, 146–7, 163, 198, 208 National Professional Qualifications (NPQs) 174–6, 177, 187, 189–91, 210–12 NPQ curriculum 175 National Professional Qualification for Executive Leadership (NPQEL) 169, 174–6, 187, 189, 210–11 National Professional Qualification for Headship (NPQH) 174–6, 187, 191 National Professional Qualification for Middle Leadership (NPQML) 190–1, 212 National Professional Qualification for Senior Leadership (NPQSL) 212 National Schools Commissioner (NSC) 153, 154 national standards 174, 180, 209 National Strategies 26, 43, 52, 79, 198 National Support School (NSS) 45–6, 146, 163, 198 neo-liberalism 9–10, 14, 32–5, 106, 126, 130, 197, 204, 214, 218, 219, 220 networks 6–11, 19, 41, 64, 84, 106, 151, 162, 187–8, 193, 203, 214 New Public Management (NPM) 6–7, 32–5, 63–4, 66, 99, 108, 154, 180, 193 nodal actors 19, 80 non-departmental public body (NDPB) 10, 16–18, 33, 36, 58, 119, 203 Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) 36, 37, 42, 46, 54, 63, 69, 70, 71, 74, 77, 81, 83, 90, 91–4, 99, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 127–8, 130, 137–8, 143, 147, 149, 152, 155–7, 159, 160, 162, 165–6, 200, 205, 207, 211, 213, 215 orphan schools 216 partnerships 3, 18, 20, 33, 42, 46–7, 52, 58, 66, 71, 78, 92, 101, 109, 111, 113–16, 129, 136–7, 153, 160, 165–6, 169, 188, 192, 193, 195, 197, 200, 204, 206, 207, 210, 213, 215, 218

239

peer accountability 85 peer reviews 43, 166, 200–1 personal philosophy 95, 202 policy policy ensemble 19 policy entrepreneurs 15, 47 policy evaluation, policy learning 138, 149, 152 policy frameworks 22, 50 policy instruments, policy levers 3, 11, 13, 20–24, 38, 40, 77, 125, 135, 137–8, 165, 203–4 policy lions 19 policy mediation 25–8, 43, 142, 150–1, 159, 202, 211 policy process 2, 7, 9–10, 12–13, 24–5, 30, 79, 105, 198 policy steering 6, 10, 13, 19–20, 197, 203–9, 212 policy upcycling 31 pull-push policies 125, 138, 208 risk management 22, 103–4, 135, 141, 142, 158, 162–3, 169, 175, 176–7, 182, 202, 203, 209 policy eras 31 Conservative 38 Conservative-Liberal/Democratic Coalition 35 New Labour 34 pre-Thatcher, Thatcher 32 power 8, 10, 11, 24–5, 27, 28, 35–6, 54, 87, 91, 97, 99, 100, 104–6, 114, 120, 131, 132, 135, 140, 169, 182, 185–188, 189, 193–4, 200, 202, 203–5, 207, 209–10, 212, 219 local authority power 137, 150–1, 159, 213 parent power 128, 157 primary schools 3, 22, 23, 43, 46, 48, 54, 113, 125, 127, 129, 144, 150, 151, 163, 181, 211 Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (PMSU) 6, 20–2, 35, 38 professional agency, 11, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 52, 94, 104, 189, 198 professional development (PD) 3, 9, 38, 85, 92, 130, 149, 162–3, 173, 176–7, 183, 185, 191–2, 203, 210, 212, 215 professional learning 30, 93, 111, 114, 173–5, 185, 191, 200

240

Index

professional learning community (PLC) 183 professionalism 6–7, 32, 208 progress 8 measure 23, 119 Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) 16, 17, 18, 150, 157, 158, 163, 164, 216 Public Service Agreement 22, 35 Pupil Premium Grant (PPG) 36 quangos 16, 17, 87 Regional Schools Commissioner (RSC) 39, 153–9, 165, 166, 172, 200, 203, 207, 213, 220 rural schools 88, 161, 163, 188, 192 school effectiveness and school improvement (SESI) 112 school improvement 11, 38–43, 63, 70, 84, 89, 90, 95, 98, 99, 106, 112, 138, 166, 171, 175, 179, 213, 218 see also models school improvement partner (SIP) 43 segmentation 1, 52, 79, 114, 116–17, 123, 188, 205, 210, 212, 220 self-improving school system (SISS) 1, 38, 40, 43, 46, 50, 162, 163, 165, 173, 177, 191–2, 195, 197, 206, 207, 210, 217 self-regulation 7, 14, 28, 36–7, 44, 55–6, 63–6, 139, 206, 212 servant leader 62, 99, 100, 105, 210, 219 social attainment gap 188, 203, 216 Specialist Leader of Education (SLE) 46, 85, 120, 181, 191, 198, 201, 211 specialist schools 40–1, 44, 50 strategic school improvement fund (SSIF) 154–5, 212 structural diversification 126, 130 studio school 128, 129, 164 subsidiarity 48, 146, 206 system leader types 2, 62–3, 99, 219

auditor 63, 99, 103, 210, 219 collaborator 78, 101, 181, 210, 219 hero-head 86, 102, 116, 178, 210, 216, 219 protector 67, 77, 100, 137, 210 systems thinking 7, 48–50, 109, 145–7, 149, 152, 156, 170, 172, 188 talent identification and retention 103, 176, 181, 182, 192, 196, 211, 217 teaching and learning 63–5, 92, 178, 180, 184–6, 192, 199, 203 teaching school (TS) 40, 42–3, 93, 146, 149, 156, 161, 163, 183, 190–1, 201, 214 teaching school council (TSC) 130, 154, 165, 203 teaching school mission 38, 130 teaching school alliance (TSA) 64, 80, 82, 84, 85, 90, 92, 93, 102, 111, 120, 130, 137, 140, 148, 149, 161–3, 165–6, 171, 181, 183, 189, 190, 191, 193–5, 201, 205, 214, 218 Teacher Training Agency (TTA) 174, 178 theories of action 112, 169, 171, 172, 179, 180, 182, 184, 195, 210 transfer of practice 113, 188, 211 see also ‘best practice’ and ‘good practice’ tribalism 162, 163, 196, 212, 214 trust 2, 30, 32, 33, 42, 53, 62, 74, 77, 78, 84, 93, 97, 99, 100–5, 113, 114, 122, 130, 131, 145, 150, 179, 181, 182, 192, 194, 207, 210, 217, 219 theories of trust 106–10 trust and challenge 111 types of trust 106–15 two-tier system 162, 163, 213 umbrella trust 70, 116 university technical college (UTC) 128, 164