Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo 2503601006, 9782503601007

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Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo

ACTA SCANDINAVICA

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN THE SCANDINAVIAN WORLD

VOLUME 14 General Editor Stefan Brink, University of Cambridge/Uppsala universitet Editorial Advisory Board (under the auspices of the Department of Anglo-Saxon, Norse, and Celtic, University of Cambridge) Maria Ågren (History), Uppsala universitet Pernille Hermann (Literature), Aarhus Universitet Terry Gunnell (Folklore), Haskoli Islands (University of Iceland) Judith Jesch (Old Norse/Runology), University of Nottingham Judy Quinn (Old Norse/Literature), University of Cambridge Jens Peter Schjødt (History of Religions), Aarhus Universitet Dagfinn Skre (Archaeology), Universitetet i Oslo Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde (Law), Universitetet i Bergen A series devoted to early Scandinavian culture, history, language, and literature, between the fall of Rome and the emergence of the modern states (seventeenth century) — that is, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Early Modern period (c. 400–1600). Previously published volumes in this series are listed at the back of the book.

Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo

Edited by arne jönsson and arsenii vetushko‑kalevich

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

© 2023, Brepols Publishers n.v., Turnhout, Belgium. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. D/2023/0095/49 ISBN 978-2-503-60100-7 eISBN 978-2-503-60101-4 DOI 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.130234 ISSN 2466-586X eISSN 2565-9170 Printed in the EU on acid-free paper.

Table of Contents

List of Illustrations

7

Preface Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich

13

Introduction Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich

15

Stolbovo in Perspective. Jacobean Diplomacy in the Baltic Region, 1589–1618 Steve Murdoch

47

The Dutch Republic, Sweden, and Moscow. The Dream of the Russian Market Kristian Gerner

67

Cartographic Knowledge and Geographic Ignorance. Karelia and the Cap of the North in the Swedish Imagination around 1600 Stefan Troebst

87

The Stolbovo Treaty and Tracing the Border in Ingria in 1617–1618 Adrian Selin

99

The Symbolic Uses of the Early Modern Russo-Swedish Border Alexander Tolstikov

119

Ryssgården. The Russian Factory in Stockholm in the Seventeenth Century Elisabeth Löfstrand

143

The Treaty of Stolbovo and Tallinn’s Customs Rental Agreement (1623–1629) Enn Küng

161

Influence of the Peace of Stolbovo on Estonia and Livonia Ülle Tarkiainen

189

6

Table of ConTenTs

Ingria as a Swedish Province in the Seventeenth Century Kasper Kepsu

205

The Treaty of Stolbovo and Its Impact on Narva’s Urban Development Stefan Herfurth

219

Petitions, Letters, Wills, and Receipts. A First Road Map to The King’s Russian-Writing Subjects in Swedish Ingria, 1617–1656 Alexander I. Pereswetoff-Morath

235

The Mosaic of Knowledge about Muscovy in Sweden in the Great Power Era Kari Tarkiainen

287

Superstitious Christians. Lutheran Views on the Russian Orthodox Church in the Swedish Great Power Era David Gudmundsson

301

The Peace of Stolbovo as Reflected in the De la Gardie Archives. Some Manuscript Examples Per Stobaeus

313

Historia Vladislai by Stanisław Kobierzycki as a Source of Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici by Johannes Widekindi Arsenii Vetushko-Kalevich

337

The Treaty of Stolbovo. A Failure or Success of Russian Diplomacy? Gennady Kovalenko

359

Index of Persons

375

Index of Places

382

Index rerum

389

Contributors

393

List of Illustrations

Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich Map 1.1.

Figure 1.1. Figure 1.2.

Figure 1.3.

The Eastern part of the Swedish realm (Finland, Kexholm County, Ingermanland (Ingria), Estland (Estonia), Livland (Livonia)) after the Peace of Stolbovo in 1617 and the Truce of Altmark in 1629. Count Jacob De la Gardie (1583–1652). Dederino (where the peace preliminaries took place) in the travelogue of Anthonis Goeteeris, Iournael Der Legatie ghedaen inde jaren 1615 ende 1616, published in 1619. The first page of Gustavus Adolphus’s ratification of the Stolbovo Peace Treaty, signed on 1 May 1617.

16 18

20 26

Steve Murdoch Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.2. Figure 2.3.

James VI and I, King of Scotland and England, his consort Queen Anna, sister of the King of Denmark, Christian IV, and their eldest son Henry Frederick, Prince of Wales (d. 1612; his younger brother Charles succeeded him as heir apparent). The Coat of Arms of Baron James ( Jacob) Spens. The Old English Court, erected in the early sixteenth century in Varvarka street on the east side of the Kremlin, was the seat of the English Muscovy Company in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

49 50

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Kristian Gerner Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.2.

The Grote Hollandse Waard. Outer right wing of an altarpiece with the St Elizabeth’s Day flood, 18–19 November 1421, with the broken dike at Wieldrecht. Painted by the Master of the St Elizabeth Panels between c. 1490 and c. 1495. The Dutch town plan for Gothenburg with canals for trade and transports. Plan drawn in 1624 by Heinrich Thome, a military engineer and cartographer in Swedish service in 1624–1635.

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Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.4. Figure 3.5.

A mid-seventeenth-century fluyt. Probably first developed in Hoorn in about 1590, this economical purpose-built cargo vessel gave the Dutch a significant trading advantage. Engraving by Wenceslaus Hollar (1607–1677). The German Church in Stockholm. Engraving by Eric Åkerland. From Fant and Lüdeke, Dissertatio Historica de Ecclesia Teutonica. The Bronze Horseman, an equestrian statue of Peter the Great.

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Stefan Troebst Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.2. Figure 4.3. Figure 4.4. Figure 4.5.

Chart of northern Europe by Cornelis Doedszoon. Second edition, engraved by Johannes a Dotecum and published by Claes Jansz. Visscher in 1610. Simon van Salingen’s map of Scandinavia, 1601. ‘Karte über Nord-Finnland (v. J. 1595)’. In: Grotenfelt, ‘Kaksi PohjoisSuomen ja Kuolanniemen karttaa 1500-luvun lopulta’, annex. Engraved copy of Andreas Bureus’s 1611 ‘Lapponia’. Bureus, Orbis Arctoi nova et accurata delineatio.

92 93 95 96 96

Adrian Selin Map 5.1. Map 5.2. Map 5.3. Map 5.4. Map 5.5. Map 5.6.

Map of seven Lopp pogosts based on information supplied by Hans Brakil. The area south of Lake Ladoga. The disputed seven pogosts of the Kopor´e county claimed by the Muscovite state. The deserted Konduia village. Expedition to Jama. Osinovaia Gorka

101 103 105 108 111 114

Alexander Tolstikov Figure 6.1. Figure 6.2.

The Lavuia river, a small tributary of lake Ladoga, in Adam Olearius’s travel description. Olaus Magnus’s map (Carta Marina, 1539, fragment). Woodcut.

126 135

Elisabeth Löfstrand Figure 7.1.

Panoramic view of Stockholm, seen from Kastellholmen, in 1650. An engraving by Wolfgang Hartmann.

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Figure 7.2. Figure 7.3. Figure 7.4.

Figure 7.5.

The Russian Merchants’ Market. Detail from the preceding engraving. Södra stadshuset in Suecia antiqua et hodierna. A unique portrait of a seventeenth-century merchant, Gavrila Martynovič Fetiev, d. c. 1684, a wealthy and well-connected merchant from Vologda. An 8-daler piece of plate money from 1658.

146 149

150 152

Enn Küng Figure 8.1. Table 8.1. Table 8.2. Table 8.3.

View of Tallinn in Anthonis Goeteeris’s travel journal under the title Iournael Der Legatie ghedaen inde Jahren 1615 ende 1616… (1619). Volume and balance of Russian trade in Tallinn according to portorium tolls (in (riks)dalers). Amounts received by Tallinn’s portorium chamber in 1617–1632 (in riksdalers). Tallinn’s shipping traffic based on portorium duties.

165 169 181 182

Ülle Tarkiainen Figure 9.1. Figure 9.2. Figure 9.3.

Kunda manor in Estonia. From Adam Olearius, Offt begehrte Beschreibung der newen Orientalischen Reise, Schleswig 1647. 191 Johan Skytte (1577–1645). Engraving by Crisp. van den Queboren (1604–1653?). 193 The building of the University of Tartu, where the studies took place in the years 1642–1656 and 1690–1699. 200

Kasper Kepsu Map 10.1.

Figure 10.1. Figure 10.2. Figure 10.3.

Ingria in the seventeenth century. The basic administrative unit in Ingria as well as in Karelia was pogost, parallel to the Swedish socken (parish). Fortress plan for Jama from 1645 (today Kingisepp), north is to the right of the plan. Coat of arms of Ingria, embroidered to the funeral of Gustavus Adolphus. Coat of arms of the bayor family Pereswetoff-Morath.

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Stefan Herfurth Figure 11.1a. Ivangorod fortress in the travelogue of Anthonis Goeteeris, Iournael Der Legatie ghedaen inde jaren 1615 ende 1616, published in 1619. Figure 11.1b. Offensive plan to capture Ivangorod fortress in 1612. Figure 11.2. The waterfall in the River Narva south of the city of Narva. Figure 11.3. Narva (with Ivangorod) from south-west, 1696.

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Alexander I. Pereswetoff-Morath Figure 12.1. Figure 12.2.

Figure 12.3.

Figure 12.4.

Figure 12.5. Figure 12.6. Table 12.1.

Alfabetum Rutenorum, a Church Slavonic primer (pp. 1–7) and catechism (pp. 8–28) for Swedes. The Church Slavonic/Russian translation of Luther’s Catechism with comments and other texts (all in all 144 pages), published in Stockholm in 1628. Undated letter (1660s) from the Ingrian nobleman and corporal Kuz´ma Klement´ev (Clementeoff; c. 1620–1669) to the merchant Parfen(ej) Torčakov in Narva. Icon of St Nicholas of Zarajsk with Scenes from His Life (midseventeenth century). Votive gift from the Caporie burgher Petr Dmitriev syn Mazichin to the Orthodox Church of the Assumption at Caporie/Kopor´e. P. P. Bělous (?). Oplač narovesk (‘Lamentation over Narova’, c. 1665). P. P. Bělous (?). Sophia. The Wisdom of God. Petitions (or inquiries) in Russian/total number of extant petitions from (or inquiries regarding) crown peasants in the Ingrian Specialräkningar, 1635/6–1640/1.

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251 254 257

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Kari Tarkiainen Figure 13.1.

Figure 13.2.

The salt works on the river Mshaga. From an illustrated book about Russia 1674, Några observationer angående Ryssland (Some Observations Concerning Russia). The German translation of Petrus Petrejus’s main work Historien und Bericht von dem Grossfürstenthumb Muschkow (Leipzig, 1620).

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David Gudmundsson Figure 14.1. Figure 14.2.

Figure 14.3.

Baptism in Russia, an illustration in Adam Olearius’s travel description. People gathering at a cemetery in Narva on Whitsun Eve, for commemoration of their departed relatives. An illustration in Adam Olearius’s travel description. A procession leaving church to bless the water in a nearby river, thus making it into holy water for church services. An illustration in Adam Olearius’s travel description.

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Per Stobaeus Figure 16.1. Figure 16.2. Figure 16.3. Figure 16.4. Figure 16.5. Figure 16.6. Figure 16.7. Figure 16.8. Figure 16.9. Figure 16.10. Figure 16.11. Figure 16.12. Figure 16.13. Figure 16.14. Figure 16.15. Figure 16.16. Figure 16.17. Figure 16.18. Figure 16.19.

Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives, F 6 Cordt 3A, pp. 71– 73. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Hapsalsamlingen 14. Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives, A 1, fols 297–98. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Hapsalsamlingen 12. Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives, A 2, fol. 425. Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives A 1, fol. 1. Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives, A 1, fols 28–30. Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives, F 6 Cordt IV, fol. 258. Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives, A 2, fol. 848r Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives, A 2, fol. 493. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Hapsalsamlingen 11. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Historiska handlingar 3:1. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Historiska handlingar 3:1. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Topographica, Ingermanland och Kexholms län 3. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Topographica, Ingermanland och Kexholms län 5. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Topographica, Ingermanland och Kexholms län 6. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Historiska handlingar 3:1. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Historiska handlingar 4. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Hapsalsamlingen 13.

314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332

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Figure 16.20. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Topographica, Ingermanland och Kexholms län 5. Figure 16.21. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Topographica, Ingermanland och Kexholms län 6. Figure 16.22. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Pergamentsbrev 266. Figure 16.23. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Topographica, Ryssland.

333 334 335 336

Arsenii Vetushko-Kalevich Figure 17.1. Graph 17.1. Figure 17.2.

Title page of Historia Vladislai. 338 % of Widekindi's text borrowed from Kobierzycki (books 1 to 7). 341 Charles IX of Sweden. Frontispiece to Widekindi’s Historia Belli SuecoMoscovitici Decennalis. Drawing by David Klöcker Ehrenstrahl, engraving by Dionysius Padt Brugge. 347

Gennady Kovalenko Figure 18.1. Figure 18.2.

Figure 18.3. Figure 18.4.

Tsar Mikhail, the first tsar of the House of Romanov. Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden 1611–1632. Frontispiece to the Gustavus Adolphus Bible (Biblia, Thet är: All then Helgha Scrifft, På Swensko) that was published in 1618 (a revised version of the Gustavus Vasa Bible of 1541). The Theotokos of Tikhvin, one of the most celebrated icons in Russia. Boundary-mark. Boundary-marks were cut in a boulder or in the trunk of a big tree. Three crowns were used for Sweden, the cross for Muscovy.

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ARNE jöNSSON AND ARSENII VETUSHkO‑kALEVICH 

Preface

The Swedish-Russian war, which had begun in 1610, ended in February 1617 with the Peace Treaty of Stolbovo. For Sweden, it led to a considerable expansion of her territory, which was to be followed be a number of other conquests during the seventeenth century. For Russia, the Peace of Stolbovo was an important landmark in bringing the Time of Troubles to an end. The border between the Swedish Realm and Russia that was drawn as a result of the treaty remained valid for only a century, until the situation changed completely due to the Great Northern war at the start of the eighteenth century. For this reason, the Treaty of Stolbovo has largely been sidelined in the historical memory of both Sweden and Russia. The 400th anniversary of the treaty in 2017 was, however, a convenient opportunity to draw scholarly attention to this event, which had been crucial for the political and economic development of the Baltic region in the seventeenth century. On 16–17 February 2017, a conference was, therefore, held in Lund, Sweden, where a dozen speakers from Sweden, Russia, Finland, Estonia, Poland, Germany, and Great Britain discussed various aspects of the treaty and its aftermath. Papers delivered at that conference form the basis for the present volume. Another con‐ ference was organized by the Army Museum in Stockholm and the Department of Slavic Languages at Stockholm University on 13 October 2017. Its materials, as well as three further contributions, have allowed us to complement the volume and eventually cover all of the most significant aspects of the subject. We would like to express our profound gratitude to the contributors and hope that the volume will be of interest for all scholars concerned with the early modern history of Northern Europe. We would also like to thank Kungliga Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Lund and the Barbro Osher Pro Suecia Foundation, San Francisco, which shouldered the financial costs of the conference. Lund, June 2021

ARNE jöNSSON AND ARSENII VETUSHkO‑kALEVICH 

Introduction

The Swedish-Russian War, 1610–1617 1 For both Russia and Sweden, the early seventeenth century was a troubling time. Russia had its ‘Time of Troubles’, when pretenders to the Tsar’s throne and foreign powers struggled for supremacy, bringing unrest to the country. Sweden, on the other hand, was on a constant war-footing with all of its neighbours. In a letter to the Queen Mother, Queen Christina, the Chancellor of Sweden, Axel Oxenstierna writes that ‘we all know that all of our neighbours are our enemies, the Poles, the Russians, the Danes, so that no place in Sweden, Finland, or Livonia is completely safe’.2 The Time of Troubles is a conventional term used to describe the Russian political and social crisis that had commenced at the death of the last Tsar of the Rurikid dynasty, Fedor Ivanovich, in 1598; in 1601–1603 famine raged, putting stress on the social fabric of a society undergoing great tensions and discontent among almost all of its social groups. Another important factor was the geopolitical and commercial ambitions of the neighbouring states, Sweden and Poland, which both wished to control Russian trade and make it impossible for the other state to have the support of Russia in their rivalry. In 1605 a man who claimed to be Ivan the Terrible’s younger son Dmitrii, who, however, had actually died in 1591, rose to power with the help of Polish-Lithuanian troops and Russian supporters. False Dmitrii the First, as he came to be called, was killed in 1606 by a group of conspirators discontented with the growing power of the Poles in Russia

1 The war lacks an established name in historical research. Its earliest Swedish historian, Johannes Widekindi, called it ‘The ten years’ war’, although it lasted a bit more than six years (or eight years, if one includes De la Gardie’s campaign in spring 1609 – summer 1610). See Vetushko-Kalevich, Compilation and Translation, pp. 26–28. An alternative name, ‘the Ingrian war’, seems to have emerged in Swedish popular historical literature at the end of the twentieth century, but it is somewhat misleading, considering that this name takes account of the territorial result of the war, not of its whole theatre. 2 Axel Oxenstierna to Queen Christina, Stockholm, 25 March 1612, in Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brefvexling, i.2, p. 42. Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 15–46 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133596

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Map 1.1. The Eastern part of the Swedish realm (Finland, Kexholm County, Ingermanland (Ingria), Estland (Estonia), Livland (Livonia)) after the Peace of Stolbovo in 1617 and the Truce of Altmark in 1629. Detail from: Sveriges krig 1611‒1632, I: Danska och ryska krigen, appendix: Översiktskarta, Generalstabens krigshistoriska avdelning, Stockholm 1936. Photo: Gideon Horn, Lund University Library.

inTroduCTion

and an elderly and childless nobleman, Vasilii Shuiskii, was proclaimed Tsar. The Poles were driven out of Moscow, but two years later they supported a new impos‐ tor, False Dmitrii the Second, and began to threaten open war. This ‘False Dmitrii’ gained control over vast territories and partly blockaded Moscow. When, in early 1609, the position of Tsar Vasilii had become desperate, the King of Sweden, Charles IX, who was concerned about the growing influence of the Poles in Rus‐ sia, offered military aid in exchange for financial support and territorial conces‐ sions, the most important of which was the cession of the city and county of Kex‐ holm (Korela). According to the Viborg contract, which was signed on 28 Febru‐ ary 1609, the Swedes were obliged to provide five thousand men. Under the com‐ mand of Jacob De la Gardie (Fig. 1.1) and jointly with the forces of Prince Mikhail Skopin-Shuiskii, a distant relative of the Tsar, they set to work and eventually drove False Dmitrii’s troops out of north-western Russia. In the spring of 1610 De la Gardie and Skopin-Shuiskii marched into Moscow, which had now been cleared of the followers of the impostor. However, Skopin-Shuiskii died unexpectedly in April and on 24 June (N.S. 4 July) a combined Russian-Swedish army was de‐ feated by Polish forces in the Battle of Klushino. As a result of the battle, a group of Muscovite leaders deposed Tsar Vasilii on 17 July (N.S. 27 July) 1610 and on 27 August (N.S. 6 September) 1610 recognized the Polish prince Władysław, the son of Charles IX’s rival for the Swedish throne, the Polish King Sigismund III (deposed as King of Sweden in 1599), as Tsar of Russia. The Poles entered Moscow again on 11 September (N.S. 21 September) 1610. Moscow rose up, but the riots were brutally suppressed and the city was set ablaze. The Poles were, however, eventually defeated by the Russian militia, and the Polish garrison of the Kremlin, which had run out of supplies, capitulated on 26 October (N.S. 5 November) 1612. King Sigismund, who was on his way to assist the garrison, decided to halt the march and returned to Poland. The battle of Klushino in 1610 had had dramatic consequences not only for the Russians, but for the Swedes, too. Quarrels about pay led the foreign soldiers to refuse to fight and the Russian allies deserted. De la Gardie was obliged to make an agreement with the Polish commander Stanisław Żółkiewski to discontinue his support for Tsar Vasilii and, with the rest of his army, four hundred Swedes and Finns, he retreated to the border, where he received reinforcements. De la Gardie and the Swedes now started their own campaign in north-western Russia to try to derive advantage from the Russian crisis and create a buffer zone against the Poles, who soon gained further strategic advantages by taking Smolensk. In March 1611 De la Gardie stormed the fortress of Kexholm, which had been promised to the Swedes in the Viborg Treaty in return for their support, but there had been no surrender. The Russian delay may have depended on the fact that, unlike the western border (the Swedish border), which had been marked out in the 1590s, the eastern and northern borders of the county of Kexholm had not been marked

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Figure 1.1. Count Jacob De la Gardie (1583–1652). Born in Estonian Reval (today’s Tallinn) as a son of Pontus De la Gardie and Sofia Johansdotter Gyllenhielm, the illegitimate daughter of King John III of Sweden. In 1606–1608, De la Gardie served under the Dutch general Maurice of Nassau. Impressed with the Dutch way of waging war, De la Gardie began introducing Dutch methods into the Swedish army upon his return to Swedish service. In 1608–1613, De la Gardie as Sweden’s Chief Commander in Finland also commanded the Swedish war efforts in Russia. Privy Councillor from 1613 onward, Governor of Swedish Estonia in 1619–1622, GovernorGeneral of Livonia in 1622–1628. Militärhögskolan Karlberg. Photograph: bosselind.com.

inTroduCTion

out. (In the opinion of Charles IX’s brother, King John III, the county of Kexholm extended as far as the Arctic Ocean and the White Sea.)3 Now the great prize was at stake, Novgorod. De la Gardie’s order from the King was to seize the city. On the other hand, the Novgorod authorities were asked by the anti-Polish militia that was besieging Moscow to provide Swedish assistance. The negotiations dragged on and De la Gardie decided to storm the city. The seizure of Novgorod on 16 July 1611 proved to be the greatest success of the Swedish military in this war and De la Gardie gained a politically and strategically important stronghold in north-western Russia. In the treaty signed on 25 July 1611, the people of Novgorod pledged to recognize one of Charles IX’s sons (Gustavus Adolphus or Charles Philip) as the new Tsar. De la Gardie strenuously promoted the plan to summon Charles Philip, the younger son, from Sweden. The Swedish successes continued: Ladoga, Tikhvin, and Staraia Russa were captured in the autumn of 1611, followed by Nöteborg (Oreshek), Kopor´e, Jama, Gdov, and Ivangorod in 1612. During the next year, however, a Russian counter-offensive took place and the Swedes were driven out of some of these locations. The military reverses were accompanied by political ones. Gustavus Adolphus, who had succeeded his deceased father Charles IX at the end of 1611, opposed De la Gardie’s dynastic plan. The arrival of Charles Philip at Novgorod was put off time after time and, when he finally arrived in Viborg in July 1613, the political situation in Russia had changed completely. After the Poles had been driven out from Moscow, a descendant of the old Rurikid dynasty on a female line, Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, was proclaimed Tsar in February 1613, which meant that the dynastic plan of the Swedes had to be abandoned definitively. In the autumn, the Tsar sent ambassadors to the Emperor and the Kings of Denmark and Great Britain to ask them to mediate in the conflict with the Swedes and the Poles. The Swedish ambassador to Britain, Sir James Spens, promised to try to persuade James I to accept.4 The British mediator was to be the diplomat and merchant Sir John Merrick (Meyrick). In the meantime, the Swedes used their limited resources to take or at least keep Russian towns, so as to ensure a favourable position at the negotiations. The attempts to take Pskov, both the attempt led by the Swedish commander Evert Horn in 1611 and another headed by King Gustavus Adolphus himself in 1615, ended in failure. The latter siege was directly aimed at hastening peace negotiations. Both sides were also concerned about their conflicts with Poland. After several months of preliminary steps towards peace, the negotiations began in January 1616 in the village of Dederino (Fig. 1.2), between Ostashkov and Staraia Russa. The mediators of the great trading powers, the Stuart kingdoms (Great Britain) and the Dutch Republic, who were most anxious to have the Russian 3 Tarkiainen, Moskoviten, p. 88. 4 James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, Hamburg, 8 November 1613, in The Works and Correspondence of Axel Oxenstierna ii.13, pp. 26–28 with note a.

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Figure 1.2. Dederino (where the peace preliminaries took place) in the travelogue of Anthonis Goeteeris, Iournael Der Legatie ghedaen inde jaren 1615 ende 1616, published in 1619. Goeteeris draws himself with his back to the onlookers down in the middle of the picture. ‘On 13 January, when the tents were visited by the noble gentlemen Negotiators, there was quite some debate on the positioning of the tents and the table, since the Russians and the aforementioned ambassador demanded they should have two-thirds on their ground, which after the pitching even became three-quarters. In the end, everyone agreed. The tents were put up behind Dederino, all in a row: five tents for the Russians connected by curtains, the first of them directed towards their headquarters, rather small and set up like a roof. And their largest tent was number five. That one was placed close to the first tent of His Majesty the King of Sweden, which was connected to the second one by curtains, while the third one was placed a little further, not connected by curtains. And there were no other tents, except the one of the gentlemen negotiators which was put up close to the tents of both parties, with all three tents close to each other, and the negotiators’ tent facing the English quarters. And in between the two tents of the parties, right in the middle, there was a table so that each party could sit from their own side underneath their own tent, facing each other. But a curtain had been drawn in full length of the table so that the two parties could not see each other while seated. … And on the ground were some bear furs to keep the feet warm, although that did not really work in the extreme cold. … The gentlemen negotiators asked both parties if they were ready. When they answered yes, the curtain … was suddenly raised, so that these noble persons who in the name of their leaders had waged war on each other for so long as sworn enemies, now looked one another in the eyes, not without great emotions on both sides. But then they both stood up and shook hands and saluted. And then the negotiations started’ (Translation from Dutch by Frans Blom). Photo: Jens Östman, Kungliga Biblioteket.

market re-opened for commerce, found rather fertile ground and, thanks to their efforts, the negotiations muddled along. As a first step they worked out arrange‐ ments for an armistice, by the provisions of which Russia and Sweden agreed to suspend hostilities from February to May 1616. After helping to arrange the truce, the Dutch ambassadors however decided to withdraw from any further confer‐ ences and returned home after audiences with Gustavus Adolphus in June 1616,

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leaving the Stuart ambassador, Sir John Merrick, as the sole mediator. During the armistice Merrick redoubled his efforts to persuade each side to make concessions so that an agreement could be worked out when the negotiations were reopened. In December 1616 the final session began at Stolbovo, a village not far from Lake Ladoga, and on 27 February 1617 the peace negotiations were brought to a suc‐ cessful conclusion, restoring peace between Russia and Sweden. Merrick’s success in arranging the peace earned him the praise of both the Stuart and Russian gov‐ ernments. Merrick’s entrance into Moscow in June is said to have resembled a tri‐ umphal procession.5 While the Swedes had to fight the Russians in the east, they were also, as mentioned, in conflict with the Danes in the west, in the so-called Kalmar War, which was to involve not only the city of Kalmar, but most of southern Sweden. Well informed about the Swedes’ complicated relationship, to put it mildly, with the Russians and Poles, the Danish King Christian IV declared war on Sweden on 4 April 1611 and laid siege to the strongly fortified city of Kalmar on the Swedish east coast opposite the island of Öland. On 27 May they seized the city in an as‐ sault and on 3 August the castle surrendered without a struggle. When Älvsborg, too, (a fortress close to present-day Gothenburg) surrendered on 22 May 1612, Sweden lost its only harbour on the west coast and was cut off from convenient contacts with the Dutch and the British. War on two fronts is an awkward matter. There were, however, those who could help Gustavus Adolphus, the new King, out of this predicament. Both the Dutch and the British offered to mediate, but Christian IV deterred the Dutch and it was, thus, James I of Great Britain who sent mediators, namely Sir Robert Anstruther to King Christian and Anstruther’s stepbrother, the above-mentioned Spens, to Sweden. The peace was costly for the Swedes: to regain Älvsborg Castle, which the Swedes could hardly do without, they had to pay a ransom of one million thalers, a huge sum for an impoverished country, 25,000 kilo silver. The ransom was to be paid in four instalments in January of each of the years 1616, 1617, 1618, and 1619. The payment for January 1618 proved particularly difficult to raise for various reasons, one of which was undoubtedly that the Swedes had mismanaged earlier loans and one cannot help wondering what would have happened if the Stolbovo Peace Treaty had not been concluded in what seems to have been the nick of time. For the January 1619 instalment, the Dutch States General guaranteed 150,000 thalers 6 and the Swedes were able to reclaim the castle.

5 Phipps, Sir John Merrick, p. 117. 6 Jan Rutgers to Axel Oxenstierna, The Hague, 21 November 1618, in The Works and Correspondence of Axel Oxenstierna ii.13, pp. 310–12.

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The Stolbovo Peace Treaty Four Swedish delegates (among them Jacob De la Gardie and Henrik Horn) and four Russians met at Stolbovo in the presence of the British mediator, the abovementioned Sir John Merrick. The delegates had, as the treaty states, ‘discussed and reconciled the quarrels and differences’ between the King and the Tsar and their respective predecessors that in past years had led to ‘enmity, war, and bloodshed’. King James’ peace initiative and Merrick’s arbitration were recognized. The treaty consists of thirty-three articles (twenty-five pages in Rydberg’s and Hallendorff’s edition). In the peace instrument the articles are not numbered but only separated by a dagger (†). The numbering was introduced in the ratification and is used in this book. The Russian Tsar and the Swedish King agreed to the following terms: 1 Old grudges and injustices are to be forgotten to guarantee an everlasting peace and sincere friendship between the King and the Tsar and their respec‐ tive territories, countries, cities, and subjects, both those that belonged to them of old and those ceded or acquired in the present treatise. 2 The King of Sweden returns to the Tsar the Russian castles and cities taken in recent years, namely Novgorod, Staraia Russa, Porkhov, Ladoga, Gdov, together with their counties, and Sumerskaia volost, as well as crown estates and those of the metropolitan and the monasteries. 3 The King returns the ornaments of the St Sophia Church and other churches in Novgorod and in other castles and cities by agreement, as well as returning documents and books belonging to the chancelleries and the town law-courts. 4 The Swedes should not commit injustices or acts of violence when evacuating the cities mentioned above. 5 The King’s governors are to surrender to the voivodes and governors of the Tsar Novgorod, Staraia Russa, Porkhov, together with their counties, and Sumerskaia volost in the presence of Sir John Merrick or a court nobleman within a fortnight of the confirmation of the treaty by both sides. 6 (Terms for the surrender of Ladoga Castle and county and Gdov Castle, county, and People). 7 The King’s brother Duke Charles Philip renounces all claims to Russian castles and territories and the King pledges himself not to aid him. 8 The Tsar renounces from the Novgorod dominion for time eternal the castles and cities of Ivangorod, Jama, Kopor´e, and Nöteborg, together with all of their dependencies and properties, and within their right and recognized borders. Monks, nobles, sons of boyars, as well as burghers in the cities mentioned and their suburbs, have the right to leave with wives, children, servants, and all of their property for Russia within a fortnight of the treaty being made public. The delegates have, however, agreed and decided that all Russian priests and all peasants in the aforementioned cities and counties have to stay under the Swedish crown with their wives, children, and servants, as

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9 10

11

12

13

14

well as those nobles, boyar scions, and burghers who have not left within a fortnight. The King of Sweden shall receive 20,000 roubles from the Tsar to be delivered by Sir John Merrick. The King is free to take the cannons, weapons, ammunition, and other things that he has brought to fortresses he has captured and removed according to the agreement of 20 November without censure; the Russian cannons on fortresses now to be returned to the Tsar are to remain and be returned to them. Since Tsar Vasilii Ivanovich had signed over Kexholm with its county to Charles IX and the Swedish Crown in recognition of the aid he received against the Poles, Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich shall ratify and confirm this dona‐ tion, so that Kexholm with the whole of the county and all its land, people, properties, rents, and rights on land and sea, with all its right and customary borders and boundary marks, nothing excepted pass to him in all eternity. And to avoid disputes about boundary marks, commissaries shall be sent out by the King and the Tsar to meet between Nöteborg and Ladoga near the point where the River Lavuia flows into Lake Ladoga and from that place they shall mark the boundary between the King’s and the Tsar’s land, so that the counties of Nöteborg, Kopor´e, Jama, and Ivangorod are demarcated from the counties of Ladoga, Novgorod, Sumerskaia volost, and Gdov. Similarly, boundaries are to be marked between the counties of Kexholm and Novgorod. (The procedure is described in detail). The Tsar renounces for eternity all right to Livonia and gives up using ‘of Livonia’ in his title, but he is obliged to use ‘of Livonia’ and ‘of Karelia’ in the title of the Swedish King. The delegates have referred to the King and Tsar themselves the questions of the full titles, whether the King shall have ‘Ingria’ in his title and the Tsar ‘Lord and Conqueror of many other dominions’. To leave the question open, two different letters of confirmation were to be dispatched. (The rulers chose the complete titles, as can be seen in the letter of ratification). It has been agreed that there shall be free and unhindered trade between the realms of Sweden and Russia and between the subjects of the realms, so that all merchants who are subjects of Gustavus Adolphus — both those living in Sweden, Finland, and Estonia and those living in Ivangorod, Jama, Kopor´e, Nöteborg, and Kexholm, of whichever nation they are, Russians as well as other nationals, when they have paid duty in the correct custom-house — may trade in Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov, Ladoga, and other Russian cities with merchants who are subjects of Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich and travel in all Russian territories to trade. Similarly, it has been agreed that all merchant subjects of Mikhail Fedorovich, both those from Novgorod and Pskov and those from all other cities, when they have paid duty, may trade in Stockholm, Viborg, Reval, Narva, and other cities in Sweden, Finland, and Livonia with

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15

16 17

18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25

merchant subjects of the King and travel in King Gustavus Adolphus’s country and dominions to trade. Swedish merchants, who are subjects of Gustavus Adolphus, shall continue to have a trading house in Novgorod, as well as in Moscow and Pskov. And they are permitted to worship in their own houses, but no other churches may be built for their religion. Similarly, merchants who are the Tsar’s subjects are permitted to continue to have a trading house in Reval and have such houses built in Stockholm and Viborg. And they are permitted to worship in their own houses in Stockholm and Viborg, but in Reval in the church that they have had of old. No other churches may be built for their religion. Swedish and Russian merchants have a right to assistance from the authorities to settle debts. (The terms are stated in detail). Emissaries and couriers of the Swedish King are to be permitted to travel across Russia to Persia, Turkey, the Crimea, and other places in the Orient, but they must not bring with them merchants and their merchandise. Similarly, emissaries and couriers of the Tsar are to be permitted to travel freely to and from the Roman Empire, Great Britain, France, Spain, Denmark, Holland, The Netherlands, and other places, but they must not bring with them merchants and their merchandise. All prisoners on either side are to be released without ransom. Those who wish to remain are permitted to do so. The Russians who live in cities, fortresses, and counties ceded to the Swedish King are not to be enticed to emigrate to Russia and vice versa. Traitors, murderers, thieves, and other criminals who have defected to the other side are to be extradited. The King’s governors and the Tsar’s voivodes are required to pursue and eliminate all robbers and highwaymen. If there are any disputes and differences, this does not mean that the peace is broken, but the party who claims to be injured shall contact the governor or voivode of the nearest frontier fortress for inquiry and reconciliation. If the matter is of greater importance, it is to be referred to a meeting of delegates from the two rulers. The Teusina Peace Treaty signed in 1595 remains valid and is herewith con‐ firmed with the exception of stipulations that are explicitly changed. The eternal Peace Treaty signed at Viborg in 1609 between Charles IX and Vasilii Ivanovich remains in force as regards the cession of Livonia and Kex‐ holm as well as the eternal peace. Neither the King nor the Tsar shall intrigue against the other party or his dominions, country, fortresses, cities, or subjects. Nor shall the King of Sweden inflict losses on the Russian realm, in particular Novgorod, Staraia Russa, Pskov, Porkhov, Gdov, Ladoga, Tikhvin, Solovetskii Monastery, Suma, Kola with its county, Kholmogory (and the entire Dvina land), all the Lap‐ ponian pogosts that belong to the Russian realm, Kargopol with its county, Beloozero, Vologda but rather show signs of friendship, and the Tsar shall

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26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33

not inflict losses on the Swedish realm, in particular Viborg, Reval, Narva, Wit‐ tensten, Ivangorod, Jama, Kopor´e, Nöteborg, Kexholm, Nyslott, Tavastehus, Kajaneborg, Uleåborg, and the Lapponian pogosts that belong to the Swedish realm. (Decisions about the process of how the treaty and the eternal peace is to be confirmed by the two parties). Swedish emissaries are to be conveyed from the border to and from Moscow to guarantee their safety and, similarly, Russian emissaries are to be escorted to and from Stockholm. Interpreters, who are in the King’s service and have worked in Russia, are allowed to return freely to Sweden. Similarly, interpreters, who are in the Tsar’s service and have worked in Sweden, are permitted to return to Russia. It has been agreed that a new King or Tsar must first send emissaries to the other party to promise friendship and good will. If the King or the Tsar send emissaries for deliberations they should meet on the borders either between Ivangorod and Gdov or between Nöteborg and Ladoga. If the King’s subjects and merchants suffer shipwreck in the Russian part of Lake Peipus or Lake Ladoga, they have the right to leave unhindered and receive assistance from the Russian authorities. Similarly, when the Tsar’s subjects or merchants suffer shipwreck in the Baltic sea and on Lake Ladoga when they sail to Reval, Viborg, and other cities in Sweden, Finland, and Livonia or when his emissaries and couriers sail to the Emperor, the Pope, Great Britain or other kingdoms, they have the right to leave unhindered, and to receive assistance from the Swedish authorities. It has been agreed that the King shall not in any way give support to the King of Poland and Lithuania, his son Władysław, the Polish kingdom or the Lithuanian grand duchy against the Tsar and vice versa. It has been agreed that the emissaries, whom the King sends to the Tsar and the Tsar to the King, should have authorization to conclude an alliance between the King and the Tsar against King Sigismund and the Polish realm and the Lithuanian grand duchy.

To confirm what had been discussed and agreed upon, the British mediator, Merrick, is asked to sign and seal the contract together with the delegates.

The Textual History of the Treaty The Stolbovo Peace Treaty is drawn up in two versions, one in Swedish, issued by King Gustavus Adolphus, the other in Russian, issued by Tsar Mikhail Fe‐ dorovich. The introduction has, as a consequence, a Swedish or Russian perspec‐ tive and, whereas the Swedish version is dated 27 February 1617, the Russian is dated in the year after the world’s creation 7125 on 27 February. In the Swedish version, King James is referred to as King of Great Britain, in the Russian as

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Figure 1.3. The first page of Gustavus Adolphus’s ratification of the Stolbovo Peace Treaty, signed on 1 May 1617. The ratifications were exchanged in 1618 in Moscow and Stockholm respectively. The Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA).

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King of England and Scotland.7 The Swedish delegates confirmed the treaty by swearing an oath on the Holy Gospel and the Russians by kissing the cross. The textual history of the treaty has not been subject to a thorough investiga‐ tion so far and we are not going to conduct such an investigation here, but a general overview with some notes that can be useful for future editors would not be out of place. The Russian original of the treaty — i.e. the copy with an official status — has been lost. Some copies in Russian can be found at the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA), fund 96: Russia’s relations with Sweden. The Swedish original is preserved at the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federa‐ tion. In Stockholm, the Swedish National Archives contain one copy in Swedish in the 649th volume of Diplomatica Muscovitica and several Swedish copies in the 650th volume; the latter also includes a Latin translation from Swedish8 and German translations from both Swedish and Russian. The first publications of the treaty were neither in Swedish nor in Russian. In 1618, a German translation from Swedish entitled Glaubwirdige Copia, Der Ewig währenden Friedenshandlung / So zwischen dem Durchleuchtigsten Großmächtigen Hochgebohrnen Fürsten vnd Herrn Herrn Gustavum Adolphum … Vnd dem auch Großmächtigen Herrn Herrn Michael Foederwitz … Behandelt vnd geschlossen ist / den 27. Februarij / dieses 1617. Jahres / zu Stolbowa was printed in Hamburg, and two years later another one was included in Historien vnd Bericht von dem Großfürstenthumb Muschkow by Petrus Petrejus.9 Petrejus’s text is shorter, mainly due to the systematic abbreviation of royal titles,10 e.g. ‘der Großfürst’ instead of ‘der grosse Herr Zaar vnd Großfürst Michael Foederwitz/vber alle Russen/ Samodersetz’ and generally somewhat less close to the original, but it can still be called a complete translation, rather than a paraphrase. There are many striking similarities in the wording of Glaubwirdige Copia and that of Petrejus, and it is very plausible that the Swedish historian had Glaubwirdige Copia at hand when writing his own translation, but it should be stressed that it is a separate piece of work, as evidenced by a handful of differences corresponding to variations in the Swedish textual tradition.11 7 The comparison is made with the help of a reprint of the Swedish version with parallels from the Russian version, published in 1842 (‘Fredsfördrag, Gränsetraktater och Råbref ’). 8 Signed ‘Carolus Rosingius’ at the bottom of the title-page. Most probably it is Carolus Caroli Rosingius (aka Rosinger, ennobled Rosenstielke), who studied at Uppsala and Leiden and served as assessor at the Svea Court of Appeal. He is known to have delivered a funerary speech on Gustavus Adolphus in 1633. The Latin translation of the Stolbovo Treaty is thus not quite contemporary with the original, but rather made at some point between 1630 and Rosingius’s death in 1661. 9 Petrejus, Historien vnd Bericht von dem Großfürstenthumb Muschkow, pp. 489–518. The abovementioned manuscript of the German translation from Swedish at the National Archives of Sweden is identical with that published as Glaubwirdige Copia. 10 Reprinted in Treuer, Einleitung Zur Moscovitischen Historie, pp. 407–46, and abridged in Schmauss, Einleitung zu der Staatswissenschafft, ii, 55–59. 11 The three perhaps most important of them are as follows: in paragraph 10, Glaubwirdige Copia has ‘vnd alles wieder lieffern’ (cf. ‘och alt igen lefreras’ in the Swedish editions of the seventeenth

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28

The Glaubwirdige Copia was used by Sigmund Latomus, the editor of the semestral continuation of Jacobus Francus’s Relatio Historica, in the spring volume for 1618.12 The first six paragraphs are reprinted there almost without abridge‐ ments; paragraphs 7–15 are abbreviated or paraphrased and the rest of the text only summarizes paragraphs 18, 22, and 32. The resulting text,13 consisting of eighteen paragraphs, became widespread in early modern Europe: its Latin trans‐ lation appeared in 1627,14 and the French translation had already been published in 1620 in Mercure François.15 In it, there was a minor rearrangement: paragraph 6 is divided into two, one on Ladoga and one on Gdov, whereas the paragraph on trading houses (No. 15 in the original treaty) is omitted. The place of the treaty is corrupted into ‘Stokolm’. This French version was, in its turn, reprinted in diplomatic collections,16 and even translated into Russian in Vasilii Berkh’s monograph on the rule of Mikhail Fedorovich.17 Meanwhile, the original versions did not get the same circulation as this abridged French translation of a German abridgement of a German translation. The complete text in Swedish was first published in 165118 and once again in Johannes Widekindi’s Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie.19 Either the same copy or two very close copies of the treaty were used for these two editions, but Widekindi is far less accurate than the edition of 1651: there are dozens of omissions and minor corruptions in his text. In 1842, the edition of 1651 was reprinted by Matthias Akiander in the journal Suomi.20 Akiander compared it to a copy of the Russian original, but did not undertake any further investigation of textual variants. Thus, the resulting notes on ‘differences’ is an unsatisfactory mish mash of translational notes, details that indeed can be referred to textual variation, and simply orthographical matters, with hardly any attempt at comprehensiveness in any of these three components.

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

century), whereas Petrejus has ‘vnd mitgelieffert werden’ (cf. ‘och igen leffreres’ in Sverges traktater); in paragraph 26, Glaubwirdige Copia has ‘vns beyden Gesandten’ (cf. ‘Oss både Sändebuden’ in the Swedish editions of the seventeenth century) and Petrejus ‘vns beyden vollmächtigen Gesandten’ (cf. ‘oss både store sändebuden’ in Sverges traktater); in paragraph 28, Glaubwirdige Copia has ‘Die Dolmetschen / so jetzt in S. Kön. May. Dienst seyn’ (cf. ‘De tolkar, som nw i Hans Kon. May:tz tienst äre’ in Sverges traktater), while Petrejus omits ‘jetzt’ just as the Swedish editions of the seventeenth century omit ‘nw’. Latomus, Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio, pp. 3–10. Reprinted in Gottfried, Inventarium Sveciae, pp. 152–55. On pp. 30–32 of Laurea Austriaca, the Latin translation of Lundorp’s Östreichischer Lorberkrantz, where the German text of the treaty from Relatio Historica is reproduced on pp. 41–43. Cinquiesme Tome du Mercure François, part 2, pp. 21–24. Recueil des traitez de paix, vol. 3, pp. 147–48 and its numerous later versions. Берх, Царствование царя Михаила Феодоровича [Berkh, The Rule of the Tsar Mikhail Feodorovich], ii, 98–102. Fredzfördragh Emillan Swerige och Ryssland / Oprättadh åhr 1617. Widekindi, Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie, pp. 830–62. ‘Fredsfördrag, Gränsetraktater och Råbref ’.

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An edition of the Swedish ‘original’ was made in the collection Sverges traktater in 1903.21 The editors have also compared it with the Swedish ratification act, providing a list of (selected) differences. What has been published in Russian, is only a contemporary translation of the Swedish version — that is, of the version where the Swedish representatives are named in the first person and the references to the King always stand before the references to the Tsar. It was printed in the Complete Legislative Collection of the Russian Empire22 in 1830 and reprinted at least twice since then.23 The text of the Russian version has so far only been accessible in printed form as notes in the aforementioned publication by Akiander and as excerpts in a collection of documents concerning Swedish-Russian economic relations, published in 1960.24 A complete scholarly edition of the Russian version, as well as a stemmatic analysis of all the preserved copies of both versions (also taking into account the German translations), is to be desired.

Previous Research If we now turn to the research concerning the various historical aspects of the treaty,25 the first modern work to be mentioned is a monograph by Nikolai Lyzhin from 1857.26 It contains a detailed history of the negotiations preceding the treaty and is accompanied by an impressive selection of documents from both Russian and Swedish archives. Another publication of historical documents of relevance for the history of Swedish-Russian relations in the first half of the seventeenth century was undertaken by Konstantin Yakubov.27 Documents concerning the Stolbovo Treaty — both the negotiations in 1616–1617 and the ratification process in 1617–1618 — are taken from the Archive of the Foreign Ministry in Moscow and constitute the first part of the book (about ninety pages). A drawback of Yakubov’s collection is that the documents are not published in their complete form, but only in excerpts and paraphrases. The Swedish General Staff, just before its abolition in 1937, published a series of thorough accounts of the wars waged by Sweden. This enormous work has

21 Sverges traktater, v.1, 242–66. 22 Полное собрание законов Российской империи [A Complete Legal Code of the Russian Empire], i, 177–92. 23 Лыжин, Столбовский договор [Lyzhin, The Treaty of Stolbovo], pp. 142–73; Коваленко, ‘В соединенье с Московским государством’ [Kovalenko, ‘In a union with the Muscovite State’], pp. 88–107. 24 Русско-шведские экономические отношения в XVII веке [Russian-Swedish Economic Relations in the 17th Century], pp. 25–27. This publication covers paragraphs 14–17 and 31 of the treaty. 25 For a more detailed account, especially as regards research in Russian, see Селин, Столбовский мир 1617 года [Selin, The Stolbovo Treaty of 1617], pp. 24–46. 26 Лыжин, Столбовский договор [Lyzhin, The Treaty of Stolbovo]. 27 Россия и Швеция в первой половине XVII века [Russia and Sweden in the First Half of the 17th Century].

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provided researchers with the most reliable and detailed account of the war itself. Much attention is paid to the negotiations, both the preliminary ones in 1613–1614 and those in Dederino in 1616.28 At the same time, articles by the Estonian scholar Arnold Soom represent a pioneering effort in the research on the economic history of the territories acquired by the Swedes in 1617.29 In 1948, Artur Attman published an important article about the impact of the Stolbovo Treaty on Baltic trade.30 It contains a historical overview of this issue, in particular during the sixteenth century. Attman concluded that the treaty was a turning point in Swedish eastern policy, representing an abandonment of Swedish expansion plans in the east, in particular regarding the areas around the White Sea; territory which had been seriously coveted by the Swedes in the course of the war. The ideological background of Swedish policy has been dealt with in the works of Kari Tarkiainen.31 A monograph by Igor´ Shaskol´skii,32 published in 1964, is focused on the economic issues in the course of negotiations and in the treaty. It is particularly impressive as a piece of solid, thorough research drawing on innumerable archive sources. In an article published soon afterwards, Shaskol´skii demonstrated by specific examples how the paragraphs of the treaty were implemented in the first years after its conclusion.33 He also participated in the edition of documents related to the economic aspects of the treaty.34 The negotiation process has been paid a good deal of attention in two publica‐ tions on the key mediator, John Merrick, namely his biography, written by Geral‐ dine Phipps several decades ago,35 and a recent article by Yakov Rabinovich on Merrick’s role in the negotiations.36 A chapter in Stefan Troebst’s monograph on Swedish-Russian relations in 1617–1661 mainly discusses geopolitical aspects of the treaty and its evaluations in Swedish historiography, but can be recommended generally for its impressive bibliographical basis.37 A recent contribution to the research is an article by German Zamiatin, prepared around 1950 but published

28 Generalstaben, Sveriges krig 1611–1632, I: Danska och ryska krigen, pp. 481–95 and 535–48 respectively. 29 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbständige Stadt 1617–1649’; ‘De ingermanländska städerna och freden i Stolbova 1617’. 30 Attman, ‘Freden i Stolbova 1617’. See also Attman’s later monograph, The Struggle for Baltic Markets, esp. pp. 192–207. 31 Of particular importance in the present context is Tarkiainen, ‘Faran från öst’. See also Tarkiainen’s dissertation ‘Vår gamble arffiende ryssen’ and a chapter in his recent book Moskoviten, pp. 94–142. 32 Шаскольский, Столбовский мир 1617 г. [Shaskol´skii, The Peace of Stolbovo of 1617]. 33 Шаскольский, ‘Восстановление русской торговли со шведскими владениями’ [Shaskol´skii, ‘The Rehabilitation of Russian Trade with Swedish Dominions’]. 34 That is, the volume mentioned in n. 24 above as well as Экономические связи между Швецией и Россией в XVII в. [Economic Relations between Russia and Sweden in the 17th Century]. 35 Phipps, Sir John Merrick. 36 Рабинович, ‘Джон Меррик на переговорах в Ладоге 1616 года’ [Rabinovich, ‘John Merrick at the Negotiations in Ladoga in 1616]. 37 Troebst, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung, pp. 54–75.

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only in 2016.38 A specific aspect that it discusses is the relationships between the Swedes and the Russian population of those territories which were to be restored under the treaty. For the rest, the article focuses on the conditions of the treaty in terms of diplomatic successes and setbacks; a conclusion is made that the peace treaty was a victory of Russian diplomacy. A similar perspective, this time from the Swedish-Finnish point of view, has been recently tackled in an article by Nils Erik Villstrand.39 He argues that the treaty may be regarded as a success for the Swedish side, but that in the long run the Swedish empire did not care or rather did not have resources to exploit this success. Three books published in the year of the 400th anniversary of the treaty should, finally, be mentioned. Gennady Kovalenko discusses Stolbovo primarily as the point of return of Novgorod to the Muscovitic state.40 His monograph is valuable as a summary of events in Novgorod in 1613–1617, beginning with the negotiations about the election of Charles Philip as the Russian Tsar. The author underlines both the geopolitical advantages taken by Sweden and the position of Novgorod as the Western outpost of Russia as the main results of the treaty. A conference volume, edited by the same scholar and resulting from one of three anniversary conferences held in 2017 in Russia, consists of articles by Russian researchers, mostly concerned with life in Novgorod during the Swedish occupation of 1611–1617: taxation, legal regulations, relations between the citi‐ zens and the administration, and everyday life in the city.41 Finally, the book by Adrian Selin (re-edited in 2019) consists of three chapters.42 In the first, the author gives a detailed overview of the previous research and summarizes the publication history of the Stolbovo Treaty. The second chapter deals with the final stages of peace negotiations (from June 1616). The subject of the third chapter is the implementation of the treaty; in it, the author is primarily concerned with the demarcation of the border — quantitatively this issue occupies more than a quarter of the whole book — but also pays attention to the ratification process and the subsequent consequences for trade. In his concluding remarks, Selin touches upon the problem of the treaty in Russian historical memory.

38 Замятин, ‘Условия заключения Столбовского мирного договора’ [Zamiatin, ‘Conditions of the Stolbovo Peace Treaty’]. 39 Villstrand, ‘Bättre än prognosen’, pp. 106–14. 40 Коваленко, ‘В соединенье с Московским государством’ [Kovalenko, ‘In a Union with the Muscovite State’]. 41 Коваленко, ed., Столбовский мир и возвращение Новгородской земли в состав Российского государства [Kovalenko, ed., The Peace of Stolbovo and the Reintegration of Novgorod Land into the Russian State]. 42 Селин, Столбовский мир 1617 года [Selin, The Stolbovo Treaty of 1617].

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The Papers of the Volume Murdoch

In the preamble of the Stolbovo Treaty King James I of Great Britain is spoken of as first cause to the peace process by sending both a letter and a delegate, Sir John Merrick, to the King of Sweden who thereafter took a positive attitude towards the British proposals. James ( James VI of Scotland from as early as 1567) was deeply engaged in the Baltic Region as shown by his many initiatives, diplomatic and other. He had for instance helped the Danes and the Swedes to make peace in 1613, the Knäred Peace, and in 1589, as King of Scotland, he had married Anna of Denmark, Christian IV’s sister. In his chapter Steve Murdoch gives an analysis of the aims and methods of King James’ diplomacy in the Baltic Region. All the four major powers were involved: Denmark-Norway, Sweden, Russia, and Poland-Lithuania. Denmark had a privileged position because of old traditions and the recent marriage, whereas Sweden and Russia were reduced to playing second fiddle. Britain’s ties with Muscovy were primarily of a commercial nature. As regards Poland-Lithuania, James was keen on helping countries perceived to be threatened by the Turks, as the Commonwealth was in this period. A key player in British-Swedish diplomacy was Sir James Spens, ambassador of both realms, for Sweden in London and for Britain in Sweden. Spens was ‘embedded at the Stuart court’ as Murdoch puts it, a position which gave the Swedes an advantage over the Muscovites who had no equivalent representative. Gerner

Another Western power, the Dutch Republic (the United Provinces), played an important role for Sweden in her contacts with Russia. Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, the virtual leader of the Dutch Republic, was for instance a supporter of Sweden and it was natural for Swedish envoys to keep close contacts with him.43 In 1614 a treaty had been concluded, according to which the two states would exchange ambassadors, and in 1615 the Dutch took it upon themselves to mediate a peace between Sweden and Russia. The results of these efforts were the truce of Dederino in 1616. The Dutch Republic aimed at securing free trade in the Baltic Sea Region and these aims were achieved successfully. In his survey of Dutch-Swedish-Russian contacts, Kristian Gerner analyses the Dutch influence on Sweden and Russia, calling attention to the fact that the initiative came from the countries receiving benefits from the Dutch: Charles IX and Gustavus Adolphus actively recruited merchants and industrialists for the development of Swedish trade and production as Peter I would do a hundred years later.

43 Jan Rutgers to Axel Oxenstierna, London, 1 July 1616, in The Works and Correspondence of Axel Oxenstierna, ii.13, 231–36.

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A conspicuous sign of Dutch influence is that both Gothenburg and St Petersburg adopted the Amsterdam pattern of streets and canals. An important aspect in Gerner’s article is the historian Boris Porshnev’s idea that it does not make sense to write about a state as an isolated entity, for trade, warfare and culture are not contained within political boundaries, as shown by the fact that Amsterdam, Stockholm, and St Petersburg undoubtedly were parts of the joint international system. Troebst

The eleventh paragraph of the Stolbovo Treaty stipulated the cession of Kexholm county to the Swedish Realm. Before the ratification of the treaty, Gustavus Adolphus sent a letter to his commander in Kexholm, instructing him to find out whether the county by chance extended to the White Sea. Many misperceptions of that kind arose at the beginning of the seventeenth century due to deficient maps, which were inappropriate as tools of military tactics and governmental practice, and general geographical ignorance. All of this is the subject of Stefan Troebst’s article. Contemporary maps of Karelia and the Cap of the North were largely products of fantasy. Some of the maps provided reliable information on coastlines, but little on hinterlands. A frequent mistake leading to disastrous miscalculations concerned the extent of the isthmus between the Gulf of Bothnia and Kandalaksha Bay, which is considerably diminished on the maps. At the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century the Swedes failed in their attacks against the Kola peninsula and the coast of the White Sea precisely because of bad geographical planning. Somewhat later, the maps drawn by Anders Bure became a step forward, coming rather close to today’s cartographic represen‐ tation of the region. Selin

The twelfth paragraph of the treaty describes the procedures concerning the establishing of the new border. The Ingrian part of this lengthy story is thoroughly discussed in the article by Adrian Selin. As there was probably no limited border between the counties that were to be ceded and those that were to remain in Russia, a completely new one had to be established. During the negotiations in 1616 the Swedes consulted record books in Novgorod and planned to use them in the delimitation, but the Russians insisted on consulting old residents instead. The delimitation was originally planned to start on 1 March 1617, but was postponed several times and eventually started on 23 October. A series of disputes arose during the process, the first one of them concerning Zelenets Islands (as nothing had been said in the treaty about the delimitation of the Ladoga lake). The testimonies of local residents were often contradictory. Communication between the Chancellery in Moscow and the Russian commission was badly organized. Final negotiations on disputable issues were conducted in the beginning of 1618

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in Osinovaia Gorka; in the meanwhile, the border commissions were exposed to the danger of attacks from Lithuanian detachments of the Polish-Lithuanian army. Finally, the border agreement concerning Ingria was signed at the end of March, and the sides could now turn to tracing the border in Karelia. Tolstikov

Borders have many aspects in addition to the strictly political ones. Alexander Tolstikov investigates the symbolic and religious value of the border between Russia and the Swedish realm in the seventeenth century when the Peace of Stol‐ bovo meant that new borders were established with far-reaching consequences, in particular for the people in the Russian territories that were ceded to Sweden. The symbolic value can be studied in the use of rituals marking the border. Tolstikov analyses the reception of diplomats, the proving of the sincerity of witnesses, the attitudes to Russians who chose to stay in territories ceded to Sweden, and the punishment of criminals. These cases allow him to draw conclusions about how the border was understood and interpreted by the Russians. It seems that there was no division between the political and religious spheres, and ‘Russians’ can be defined in purely religious terms as those who belonged to a diocese of the Moscow Patriarchate, were subjects of the Tsar, and had been born and baptized in Holy Russia. As regards the religious symbolism of the border seen in a Swedish perspective, Tolstikov is of the opinion that the ‘Swedes’ more often defined themselves vs. ‘the Others’ in non-confessional terms. Löfstrand

The treaty meant an increase in trade between Sweden and Russia. According to the fifteenth paragraph of the treaty, factories were to be established in both coun‐ tries. Elisabeth Löfstrand’s article deals with perhaps the most famous of these factories, Ryssgården; rich documentary sources concerning it are preserved in Swedish, Russian, and Baltic archives. It took a long time before the paragraph on factories was implemented from the Swedish side: a market place for the Russian merchants was established only in 1637 and, in 1638, permanent half-timbered buildings of Ryssgården were erected on Södermalm in Stockholm. Most of the goods imported from Russia were raw materials, such as hemp and flax. The merchants themselves were mainly interested in metals. Bureaucratic hindrances often arose initially, but by the end of the century improvements were made. Language difficulties being another major obstacle to trade, many merchants acquired some knowledge of Swedish, as is perfectly witnessed by a phrase-book from the end of the seventeenth century. Another important aspect in the activity of Russian merchants in Stockholm was the freedom to exercise their religion, which made the Russian congregation in Stockholm the oldest Russian orthodox congregation outside Russia.

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Küng

The city of Tallinn prospered in the first half of the sixteenth century when it had a virtual monopoly over trade between Russia and the eastern part of the Baltic Sea, in a time when Western Europeans were not permitted to trade with other towns on the Gulf of Finland without passing through Tallinn. When transit trade with Russia was redirected to Narva and Viborg, Tallinn’s economy suffered badly, but the merchants and town council strove unceasingly to regain their trade rights, for instance its status as a storage depot (the ius emporii) for Russian trade. The Stolbovo Treaty, which deals with questions of trade and the rights of merchants in articles 14 and 15, gave rise to new expectations in Stockholm, as well as in Tallinn and Narva. How the Tallinners derived advantage from the new situation, for instance, by an ingenious plan to rent the customs duties of its competitors for a certain period, is discussed by Enn Küng in his paper on Tallinn’s Customs Rental Agreement 1623–1629. For the crown, the arrangement was a convenient way to secure means for the ongoing war with Poland. In the long perspective, to stimulate Tallinn’s economy a trade company with Russians involved would be required. Ülle Tarkiainen

The wars waged from the middle of the sixteenth century meant a division of the heritage of Old Livonia. In Stolbovo, the Russian Tsar relinquished all claims to Livonia, as stipulated by the thirteenth paragraph of the treaty. Ülle Tarkiainen’s article deals with the development of the Swedish provinces of Esto‐ nia and Livonia during the seventeenth century. As Ingria became a new Swedish buffer zone against Muscovy, the strategic importance of Estonia declined. The treaty also enabled the Swedes to achieve further success in their conflict with Poland-Lithuania. While Estonia, which belonged to Sweden from 1561, formed a separate province, the province of Livonia, initially including Ingria (a separate governorate general from 1642), covered a territory from Riga to northern Karelia and consisted of two large areas without an overland connection. The Swedish censuses of 1624 and 1627 give a notion of the population of Livonia. The Baltic provinces had suffered much from the wars and many villages had been deserted and completely resettled. Immigrants arrived from Finland, Russia and the isle of Saaremaa. A new wave of immigration came at the end of the seventeenth century due to the flight of Old Believers from Russia. At the Baltic fortresses, extensive fortification works were undertaken during the seventeenth century. The Treaty of Stolbovo also invigorated transit trade, providing the towns with outstanding incomes. The most significant cultural event in the Baltic provinces was the foundation of the University of Tartu in 1632. It was strongly connected to Ingria both by economic ties and by the influx of students.

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Kepsu

As Sweden, according to the eighth paragraph of the treaty, had acquired Ivan‐ gorod, Jama, Kopor´e, and Nöteborg counties, a completely new territorial entity was formed, Swedish Ingria. The article by Kasper Kepsu examines its position in the Swedish state. Ingria was a turbulent region, with great ethnic and cultural diversity, as well as great mobility of its population, which was problematic for the authorities. People often moved from other parts of the kingdom to Ingria or from Ingria further to Russia to avoid taxes. Neither the state nor the local elite established a commanding position in Ingria. It was governed as a province, not as a part of the actual realm; thus, it was devoid of representation in the Diet, but, on the other hand, it was free from conscription for the army. The province enjoyed stable economic development in the 1640s and the beginning of the 1650s, but this development was prevented by the Rupture War of 1655–1658. During the reign of Charles XI, attempts were made to integrate Ingria more closely into the realm, in particular as regards taxation system. These attempts, however, led to complaints and other forms of resistance. The commercial aims of the crown as regards strengthening of Narva’s and Nyen’s position in international trade were partly fulfilled at the end of the century. Herfurth

The capture of Narva by Tsar Ivan IV in 1581 gave Muscovite merchants direct access to the Gulf of Finland for the first time and opened new trade opportunities for the Western powers. The city of Tallinn feared for its traditional transit trade and placed itself under Swedish protection. Russia’s commercial plans were thwarted in 1581, when Swedish troops under Pontus De la Gardie conquered Narva. This was a momentous feat: it represented the start of Swedish rule that would last for more than 120 years at the Narva River and changed the previous shape and the legal status of the cities of Narva and Ivangorod. Ivangorod emerged from Narva’s shadow and became an independent town with staple and town privileges. (The Narva River marks the border between Estonia and Russia to the present day). The Swedish crown saw Narva as another step for its mercantilist policy in its dealings with the Russian market. Directly after the conquest, extensive construction work took place. Ivangorod, which was situated opposite the city of Narva on the eastern side of the river, had an important Russian hinterland from which the peasants came to the markets of the city. There was an important castle, a Russian church and an orthodox monastery built in stone. For the benefit of the Russian transit trade there were spacious storehouses for visiting merchants. However, the potential for further conflicts and competition was present from the beginning. In 1649 the burghers of Ivangorod were ordered to remove to a Narva suburb, and Ivangorod was to be a part of the city of Narva for the next three

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hundred years. In his article Stefan Herfurth gives an account of the consequences of the rivalry between Narva and Ivangorod in the period from the Peace of Stolbovo to the merger of the two cities in 1649. Pereswetoff-Morath

Paragraph 8 of the treaty provides a list of population categories that were free or not free to stay on the territories ceded to Sweden. Alexander Pereswetoff-Morath accordingly lists those areas where literacy in Russian retained a role between Stolbovo and the Rupture War, presenting a road-map for research on the written Ingrian Russian language. The Russian lord lieutenants were discharged soon after the treaty, but the secretaries and, especially, the scribes at the Ingrian fortresses held their positions until the 1640s. Their accounts and other books in Russian are lost, but there is, in any case, evidence betraying their existence. The service‐ men of the gentry (bayors) were gradually Lutheranized and assimilated into German/Swedish culture. There are some examples of bayors communicating in Russian (and retaining Orthodoxy) even into the late seventeenth century, but important petitions tend to be written in Swedish or German from an early stage. Estate archives of this local nobility have been destroyed. Another category, the burghers (in the town of Ivangorod in particular), remained thoroughly Russian throughout the Swedish period and their basic level of literacy appears to have been relatively high. The main bulk of the material preserved consists, as in other cases, of signatures and receipts, but apart from that, a peculiar goldmine has survived, namely the archive of the merchant Parfenii Torchakov, consisting of approximately two hundred incoming Russian letters from the 1650s and 1660s. Another interesting piece of evidence from the same period is a collection of partly poetic texts by Petr Belous. Monasteries died out within a quarter of a century of Stolbovo and the number of Orthodox parishes gradually dwindled as well, but about ten of them still had their own priests as late as in 1696. Unfor‐ tunately, there is little written material from the priests that has been preserved but a great deal of the extant documents in Ingrian Russian were penned by the representatives of the minor clergy known as d´iachki. As for the final category, the peasants, no Cyrillic writings penned personally by an Ingrian peasant in the period 1617–1656 seem to have survived, but there is still a fairly high number of petitions in Russian from the peasantry of Ingria for the years 1635–1641. An interesting detail is that these petitions reproduce in their formulas — and in the fact of turning to the crown directly — the habits that can be traced in the occupied territories of Novgorod in the 1610s. Kari Tarkiainen

Confirmation of the treaty constituted the nucleus of diplomatic relations be‐ tween Sweden and Russia in the seventeenth century. The twenty-eighth para‐ graph of the treaty touches upon the fate of translators. This small professional

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group played a key role in the increase of knowledge about Russia in Sweden and they deservedly take place as a starting point for Kari Tarkiainen’s article review‐ ing the main sources of this knowledge. Viborg and Narva were the main centres of bilingual training. In Stockholm, interpreters were a part of the chancery. The steady official interest in the Russian language caused the rise of Slavonic scholarship in Sweden by the end of the century. Another sphere, which provided knowledge about Muscovy, was religion. Attempts to convert the population of Ingria and Karelia to Lutheranism were made throughout the century, varying in intensity, and went hand in hand with the production of learned theological treaties, which provided insight into Russian beliefs. Another topic of learned investigation was trade politics, where the main ambition of the Swedish authori‐ ties was the so-called derivation (of Russian trade from the White Sea into the Baltic). Whereas, until the beginning of the eighteenth century, the main Swedish description of Russia was the book by Petrus Petrejus, an unparalleled account was also written in 1669 by the Russian refugee Grigorii Kotoshikhin. Gudmundsson

No mention of religious freedom is made in the Stolbovo Treaty; however, paragraph 8 stipulated that Russian priests were to stay on the territories acquired by Sweden. The subject of David Gudmundsson’s article is how Lutheran Swedes perceived the Russian religion. Traditionally, up to the beginning of the seven‐ teenth century, the Russians were considered to be pagans and, as thousands of Russian Orthodox became Swedish subjects, the key question was the valid‐ ity of their baptism. It was a matter of both sincere spiritual concern and of practical governance, with the result that several investigations on this issue were conducted both during and immediately after the war, in particular by Johannes Rudbeckius and Johannes Botvidi. The conclusion was that a new baptism was not necessary, but that the church customs of Russians abounded with errors. A point exposed to particularly harsh criticism was the adoration of saints. On the other hand, it was stressed that Russians, just like Lutherans, held the Scripture in highest regard. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the same question — whether the Russians were Christians — was answered in the same way in an extensive treaty by Nicolaus Bergius. His respectful views on Russian religion were not shared by some of his contemporaries, as becomes obvious when one compares them to sermons by Swedish chaplains during the Great Northern war. Although not taking up the topic of the Russian religion very often, they underlined the superiority of the Lutheran faith. Stobaeus

For research about the Peace of Stolbovo and its consequences, the De la Gardie archives in Lund University Library is of greatest interest. Jacob De la Gardie (1583–1652) not only played a principal part in the Swedish-Russian war but also

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leased the conquered territories that were to be constituted as Kexholm län and Nöteborg län. Per Stobaeus offers us a smörgåsbord of documents from 1611–1651 illustrating various aspects of this period. Vetushko-Kalevich

A most important source on the war is the history by Johannes Widekindi (c. 1620–1678) entitled Thet Swenska i Ryssland tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie (the Swedish version) and Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici Decennalis (the Latin ver‐ sion), published in 1671 and 1672 respectively. Since it is based on many archival sources that are unpublished or lost, Widekindi’s book has been seen as one of the main sources for this period, which means that the question of Widekindi’s sources for his work has come to the fore. That question is, however, difficult to answer and requires systematic analysis, as Widekindi himself is of little help, dodging references to his sources. In his paper Vetushko-Kalevich investigates a printed source, of Polish origin, namely Stanisław Kobierzycki’s Historia Vladislai Poloniae et Sueciae Principis that was published in 1655. Research has shown that there is no doubt that Widekindi owes a debt of gratitude to his Polish colleague, particularly in the third and fourth books, where he gives an account of the events of 1609–1610 when the Swedish and Polish forces came into direct contact in Russia. Widekindi does, however, not only use the historical accounts, but inspired by Kobierzycki’s stylistics and compositional technique, he appropriates for himself certain features that he transforms and uses in new contexts. The great challenge is to map the interdependence between the Swedish and Latin versions. Vetushko-Kalevich demonstrates that the relationship is compli‐ cated but can be made clear by positing an early Latin version, different from the published Latin version. Kovalenko

In a discussion with the Swedish Ambassador Spens on the progress of the peace making process, King James had advised against the inclusion by the Swedes of conditions that were so severe in the peace treaty that the Russians would be forced to breach the treaty when they had recovered their strength.44 The Swedes seem to have given heed to this advice by the Rex pacificus, for there are indica‐ tions that the Russian contemporaries of the Treaty of Stolbovo regarded it as quite advantageous to the Russians and, indeed, worth celebration. The great city of Novgorod was, for instance, returned to the Tsar, who proved conciliatory in a proclamation and declared he would forgive all inhabitants who had cooperated with the Swedes during the occupation. In the epilogue to this book, Gennady

44 James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, London, 2 February 1617, in The Works and Correspondence of Axel Oxenstierna ii.13, 26–28 with note a.

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Kovalenko analyses the peace terms and explains why a hundred years later, in the time of Peter I, some writers voiced an entirely different idea of the peace, claiming it was a diplomatic failure for Russia. *** With a few specific exceptions, spelling of Russian proper names and translitera‐ tion from Russian in this volume follow the principles of The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History. However, this does not concern the articles by Löf‐ strand and Pereswetoff-Morath, where the PI transliteration standard is applied.

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Works Cited Manuscripts and Archival Sources Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Diplomatica Muscovitica, vol. 649: Kopior av fördrag 1595–1684 ———, vol. 650: Kopior av fördrag 1617–1655 Primary Sources Cinquiesme Tome du Mercure François, ou, Suitte de l’Histoire de nostre temps, sous le regne du Tres-Chrestien Roy de France & de Nauarre, Louys XIII. Contentant ce qui s’est passé de memorable ez annees M. DC. XVII. M. DC. XVIII. et M. DC. XIX. Iusques à la Declaration de la volonté du Roy sur le depart de la Royne sa Mere du Chasteau de Blou. Publié le 20. Iuin 1619 (Villefranche: Albert, 1620) ‘Fredsfördrag, Gränsetraktater och Råbref. Fortsättning. Fredzfördragh Emillan Sverige och Ryssland, oprättadh i Stolbowa den 27 Februarii åhr 1617’, ed. by Matthias Akiander, Suomi. Tidskrift i fosterländska ämnen, 5 (1842), 34–68 Fredzfördragh Emillan Swerige och Ryssland / Oprättadh åhr 1617 (Stockholm: Keyser, [1651]) Glaubwirdige Copia, Der Ewig währenden Friedenshandlung / So zwischen dem Durchleuchtigsten Großmächtigen Hochgebohrnen Fürsten vnd Herrn Herrn Gustavum Adolphum / der Reiche Schweden / Gothen vnd Wenden Könige / GroßFürsten in Finnlandt / Hertzogen zu Esthen vnd Carelen / Herrn zu Jngermanlandt / etc. Eines Vnd dem auch Großmächtigen Herrn Herrn Michael Foederwitz / aller Reussen / Zaaren vnd GroßFürsten / Andern Theils / Behandelt vnd geschlossen ist / den 27. Februarij / dieses 1617. Jahres / zu Stolbowa. Auß dem rechten Original in vnsere Teutsche Sprache von Wort zu Wort getrewlichen vbergesetzet ([Hamburg]: [n. pub.], 1618) Goeteeris, Anthonis, Iournael Der Legatie ghedaen inde Iaren 1615. ende 1616. by de Edele, Gestrenge, Hoochgheleerde Heeren; Heer Reynhout van Brederode … Dirck Bas … ende Aelbrecht Ioachimi … Te samen by de Hooch-ghemelte Heeren Staten Generael voornoemt, afghesonden aende Grootmachtichste Coninghen van Sweden ende Denemercken; mitsgaders aenden Groot-Vorst van Moscovien, Keyser van Ruschlandt. Ende namentlick op den Vreden-handel tuschen den Hoochghemelten Coninck van Sweden ter eenre, ende den Groot-Vorst van Moschovien ter anderer sijde. Inhoudende cort ende waerachtich verhael, vande seer seltsame ende wonderbaerlicke ghesteltenisse des landts van Ruschlandt, ende de seer moeyelicke ende beswaerlicke Reyse aldaer gevallen (The Hague: Meuris, 1619) Gottfried, Johann Ludwig, Inventarium Sveciae, Das ist: Gründliche / vnd warhaffte Beschreibung deß Königreichs Schweden vnd dessen Jncorporirten Provintzien / darinnen von Natur vnd Eigenschafft deß Lands / Fruchtbarkeit / Metallen / Wassern / stehenden / fliessenden / vnd Meeren / Jnnwohnern vnd Völckern / Ordnungen / Gewonheiten vnd Gebräuchen / Regiment vnd Religionswesen / wie auch den Schwedischen vnd Gothischen Königen / die von Christi Geburt hero / so wol ausser als jnner Lands regieret / gehandelt wirdt (Frankfurt: Hofmann, 1632)

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Latomus, Sigmund, Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio. Jacobi Franci Historische Beschreibung aller denckwürdigen Historien / so sich hin vnd wider in Europa / in hoch vnd nider Teutschland / auch in Franckreich / Schott- vnnd Engeland / Hispanien / Hungarn / Polen / Siebenbürgen / Wallachey / Moldaw / Türckey / etc. hierzwischen nechstverschiener Franckfurter Fastenmessz biß auff Herbstmessz dieses 1618. Jahrs verlauffen vnd zugetragen (Frankfurt: [n. pub.], 1618) Lundorp, Michael Caspar, Laurea Austriaca, Hoc est, Commentariorum de statu reipublicae nostri temporis, sive de bello Germanico eiusque causis, inter Diuum Matthiam, et Inuictissimum Ferdinandum II. Romm. Impp. nec non Fridericum V. Palatinum, aliosque cum Imperii tum exteros Reges Principesque, gloriose vincente Aquila Caesarea, gesto libri XII. (Frankfurt: Kempffer, 1627) ———, Östreichischer Lorberkrantz Oder Kayserl: Victori. Das ist: Warhafftige vnd Außführliche Historische Beschreibung vnd offentliche Acta aller Gedenckwürdigen Sachen vnd Händel / welche sich im Geistlichen / Weltlichen / Politischen vnd KriegßSachen / bey Regierung Weilandt Keyser Matthiae Hochlöblichsten Andenckens / vnd jetzt Regierender Röm. Key. May. Ferdinando II. wie auch Chur vnd Fürsten / vnd andern Ständen deß Reichs in diesem 10. Jährigen Krieg zugetragen vnd verlauffen (Frankfurt: Kempffer, 1627) Petrejus, Petrus, Historien vnd Bericht Von dem Grossfürstenthumb Muschkow, mit dero schönen fruchtbaren Provincien vnd Herrschaften, Festungen, Schlössern, Städten, Flecken, Fischreichen Wassern, Flüssen, Strömen vnd Seen, Wie auch Von der Reussischen Grossfürsten Herkommen, Regierung, Macht, Eminentz vnd Herrligkeit, vielfältigen Kriegen, jnnerlichen Zwytrachten, bisz sie zu einer Monarchi gewachsen, Mit den newlich vorgelauffenen Auffrühren vnd Händeln von den dreyen erdichteten Demetrijs, Nebenst dem auffgerichteten Friedens Contract, zwischen dem Löblichen König in Schweden, vnd jetzt regierenden GrossFürsten, Deszgleichen Die Processe, so zwischen den Königlichen Ambassadoren in der Stadt Muschow, vnd der Groszfürstlichen Reussischen Gesandten in der Königlichen Stadt Stockholm, wegen der auffgerichteten Friedens Contracts Confirmation seyn gehalten worden, Mit der Muschowiter Gesetzen, Statuten, Sitten, Geberden, Leben, Policey, vnd Kriegswesen: wie auch, was es mit jhrer Religion vnd Ceremonien vor eine Beschaffenheit hat, kürtzlich vnd deutlich in sechs Theilen zusammen gefasset, beschrieben vnd publiciret (Leipzig: [n. pub.], 1620) Recueil des traitez de paix, de trêve, de neutralité, de suspension d’armes, de confédération, d’alliance, de commerce, de garantie, et d’autres actes publics, comme contracts de mariage, testaments, manifestes, declarations de guerre, etc. Faits entre les Empereurs, Rois, Républiques, Princes, & autres Puissances de l’Europe, & des autres Parties du Monde. Depuis la Naissance de Jesus-Christ jusqu’à présent. Servant a établir les droits des princes, et de fondement a l’histoire, 4 vols (Amsterdam: Henry, 1700) Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brefvexling, i.2: Bref 1606–1624, ed. by Carl Gustaf Styffe (Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien, 1896)

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Schmauss, Johann Jacob, Einleitung zu der Staats-Wissenschafft, und Erleuterung des von ihm herausgegebenen Corporis Juris Gentium Academici und aller andern seit mehr als zweyen Seculis her geschlossenen Bündnisse, Friedens- und Commercien-Tractaten, 2 vols (Leipzig: Gleditsch, 1741–1747) Sverges traktater med främmande magter jemte andra dit hörande handlingar, ed. by Olof Simon Rydberg and Carl Hallendorff (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1877–1934) The Works and Correspondence of Axel Oxenstierna, ii.13: Letters from Sir James Spens and Jan Rutgers, ed. by Arne Jönsson (Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien, 2007) Treuer, Gottlieb Samuel, Einleitung Zur Moscovitischen Historie Von der Zeit an Da Moscov aus vielen kleinen Staaten zu einem Grossen Reiche gediehen / Biß auf den Stolbovischen Frieden Mit Schweden Anno 1617. Dessen Instrument beygefüget ist / Mit unpartheyischer Feder Aus denen bewährtesten Scribenten gezogen (Leipzig: Freytags seel. Wittibe, 1720) Widekindi, Johannes, Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie, Hwilket vnder twänne Sweriges Stormächtige Konungars, Konung Carls IX. Och K. Gustaf Adolphs den Andres och Stoores Baneer, Storfursten Ivan Vasilivitz Suischi och Ryssland til hielp, Först emoot the Rebeller och Lithower, sedan the Påler, på sidstone emoot sielfwe Muskowiterne, ifrån åhr 1607. in til 1617. Aff Feldtherren Gref. Iacob De La Gardie vthfördt, och medh en reputerligh Fredh bijlagdt är, i lijka många Böcker fördeelt (Stockholm: Wankijff, 1671) Полное собрание законов Российской империи [A Complete Legal Code of the Russian Empire], 45 vols (St Petersburg: Tipografiia II Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1830) Россия и Швеция в первой половине XVII века. Сборник материалов, извлеченных из Московского Главного Архива Министерства Иностранных Дел и Шведского Государственного Архива и касающихся истории взаимных отношений России и Швеции в 1616–1651 годах, ed. by К. И. Якубов [Russia and Sweden in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century. Collection of the Materials Taken from the Moscow Chief Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish State Archives, and Pertaining to the History of Mutual Relations between Russia and Sweden in 1616–1651, ed. by K. I. Yakubov] (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1897) Русско-шведские экономические отношения в XVII веке. Сборник документов, ed. by М. Б. Давыдова, И. П. Шаскольский, А. И. Юхт [Russian-Swedish Economic Relations in the Seventeenth Century. A Collection of Documents, ed. by M. B. Davydova, I. P. Shaskol´skii, and A. I. Yukht] (Moscow: Izdatel´stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1960) Экономические связи между Россией и Швецией в XVII в. Документы из советских архивов, ed. by А. Аттман, Ф. И. Долгих, В. М. Карлгрен, О. Кромнов, А. Л. Нарочницкий, С. Л. Тихвинский, Л. В. Черепнин, Г. Ярринг [Economic Relations between Russia and Sweden in the Seventeenth Century. Documents from Soviet Archives, ed. by A. Attman, F. I. Dolgikh, W. M. Carlgren, Å. Kromnow, A. L. Narochnitskii, S. L. Tikhvinskii, L. V. Cherepnin, and G. Jarring] (Moscow: Nauka, 1978)

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arne Jönsson and arsenii VeTushko‑kaleViCh

Secondary Studies Attman, Artur, ‘Freden i Stolbova 1617. En aspekt’, Scandia, 19 (1948), 36–47 ———, The Struggle for Baltic Markets. Powers in Conflict 1558–1618, Acta Regiae Societatis scientiarum et litterarum Gothoburgensis. Humaniora, 14 (Gothenburg: Vetenskapsoch vitterhets-samhället, 1979) Phipps, Geraldine M., Sir John Merrick, English Merchant-Diplomat in Seventeenth Century Russia, Russian Biography Series, 13 (Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners, 1983) Soom, Arnold, ‘De ingermanländska städerna och freden i Stolbova 1617’, Svio-Estonica (1936), 34–45 ———, ‘Ivangorod als selbständige Stadt 1617–1649’, Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi Aastaraamat (1935), 215–315 Sveriges krig 1611–1632, i: Danska och ryska krigen (Stockholm: Generalstaben, 1936) Tarkiainen, Kari, ‘Faran från öst i svensk säkerhetspolitisk diskussion inför Stolbovafreden’, Scandia, 40 (1974), 34–56 ———, Moskoviten. Sverige och Ryssland 1478‒1721, Skrifter utgivna av Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 818 (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2017) ———, ‘Vår gamble arffiende ryssen’. Synen på Ryssland i Sverige 1595–1621 och andra studier kring den svenska Rysslandsbilden från tidigare stormaktstid, Studia historica Upsaliensia, 54 (Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 1974) Troebst, Stefan, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung. Schwedische Moskaupolitik 1617–1661 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997) Vetushko-Kalevich, Arsenii, Compilation and Translation. Johannes Widekindi and the Origins of His Work on a Swedish-Russian War, Studia Graeca et Latina Lundensia, 26 (Lund: Lund University, 2019) Villstrand, Nils Erik, ‘Bättre än prognosen. Året 1617 som val mellan alternativ med konsekvenser’, in Öppet fall. Finlands historia som möjligheter och alternativ 1417–2017, ed. by Nils Erik Villstrand and Petri Karonen, Skrifter utgivna av Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 813 (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2017), pp. 103–34 Берх, Василий Николаевич, Царствование царя Михаила Феодоровича и взгляд на междуцарствие [Berkh, Vasilii Nikolaevich, The Rule of the Tsar Mikhail Feodorovich and a Perspective on the Interregnum], 2 vols (St Petersburg: Gintse, 1832) Замятин, Герман Андреевич, ‘Условия заключения Столбовского мирного договора между Россией и Швецией 9 марта 1617 года’ [Zamiatin, German Andreevich, ‘Conditions of the Stolbovo Peace Treaty between Russia and Sweden concluded on 9 March 1617’], Новгородский исторический сборник [Novgorod Historical Miscellany], 16/26 (2016), 341–76

inTroduCTion

Коваленко, Геннадий Михайлович, ‘В соединенье с Московским государством’. Столбовский мир и возвращение Великого Новгорода в состав Российского государства. 1613–1617 гг. [Kovalenko, Gennadii Mikhailovich, ‘In a union with the Muscovite state’. The Peace of Stolbovo and the Reintegration of Novgorod the Great into the Russian State, 1613–1617] (Novgorod: [n. pub.], 2017) ———, ed., Столбовский мир и возвращение Новгородской земли в состав Российского государства. Материалы международной научной конференции 28 февраля – 1 марта 2017 г. [The Peace of Stolbovo and the Reintegration of Novgorod Land into the Russian State. Proceedings of an International Scholarly Conference, 28 February–1 March 2017] (St Petersburg: Liubavich, 2017) Лыжин, Николай Петрович, Столбовский договор и переговоры ему предшествовавшие [Lyzhin, Nikolai Petrovich, The Treaty of Stolbovo and the Negotiations Preceding It] (St Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk, 1857) Рабинович, Яков Николаевич, ‘Джон Меррик на переговорах в Ладоге 1616 года’ [Rabinovich, Yakov Nikolaevich, ‘John Merrick at the Negotiations in Ladoga in 1616’], Известия Саратовского университета: История, международные отношения [Saratov University Bulletin: History, International Relations], 1 (2009), 91– 103 Селин, Адриан Александрович, Столбовский мир 1617 года [Selin, Adrian Aleksandrovich, The Stolbovo Treaty of 1617] (St Petersburg: BLITs, 2019) Шаскольский, Игорь Павлович, ‘Восстановление русской торговли со шведскими владениями в первые годы после Столбовского мира’ [Shaskol´skii, Igor´ Pavlovich, ‘The Rehabilitation of Russian Trade with Swedish Dominions in the First Years after the Peace of Stolbovo’], Скандинавский сборник [Scandinavian Miscellany], 11 (1966), 61–79 ———, Столбовский мир 1617 г. и торговые отношения России со шведским государством [The Peace of Stolbovo of 1617 and Trade Relationships between Russia and the Swedish State] (Moscow: Nauka, 1964)

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Stolbovo in Perspective Jacobean Diplomacy in the Baltic Region, 1589–1618

On 27 February 1617 Sweden and Russia concluded the Treaty of Stolbovo. The details of the treaty are well known to the scholars of Russia, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Jacobean Britain. For the English-speaking world this is thanks to the detailed analysis of Stuart-Romanov relations published in a series of articles in which correspondence between London and Moscow was transcribed and analysed for the Oxford Slavonic Papers by Sergey Konovalov in the 1950s.1 This work, in turn, built upon on the earlier work of Inna Lubimenko who, in 1918, pioneered the field through the publication of the very earliest of letters between the Romanovs and the Stuarts.2 The Stolbovo Treaty had cut the Russians off from the Baltic Sea while the Swedes had been ceded the important fortresses of Kexholm and Nöteborg, as well as a list of lesser consequences for the Muscovites. Within the Konovalov corpus, and as noted by early modern contemporaries, a great deal of credit for the peace was attributed to the Englishman, Sir John Merrick, the Stuart ambassador to Russia who remained in Muscovy from 1614 until the peace was concluded. In May 1617 the English Secretary of State, Sir Ralph Winwood, sent letters to both Sweden and Muscovy discussing Merrick’s role, while observing to a friend that ‘Sir John Merrick, his Majestys Ambassador who hath worthely acquitted him self of his charge and hath done notable service by making a peace between those princes’.3 Konovalov quotes the Winwood letter as evidence that King James thanked, or gave credit to Merrick for concluding the peace, which is not what is actually stated.4 Konovalov did so, intentionally or otherwise, because he was keen to emphasize a special ‘Anglo-Russian’ dynamic without regard to the other parties involved in the process, including Sweden and her representatives. Considering this line of argument, Merrick’s role as arbiter of Stolbovo is here scrutinized in 1 ‘Anglo-Russian Relations, 1617–1618’; ‘Anglo-Russian Relations, 1620–1624’; ‘Seven Russian Royal Letters (1613–1623)’. 2 Lubimenko, ‘The Correspondence of the First Stuarts with the First Romanovs’. 3 Ralph Winwood to Thomas Lake, 22 May 1617, TNA, SP 14/92, fols 121–22; Merrick was acknowledged by Samuel Pufendorf in the same way, and he noted that that the Russians concurred. See Pufendorf, An introduction to the history of the principal kingdoms and states of Europe, p. 312. 4 ‘Anglo-Russian Relations, 1617–1618’, pp. 65 and 83 n. c. Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 47–66 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133597

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the wider milieu of Stuart diplomatic relations in Northern Europe. Within this analysis, it is imperative to understand what James, as King of Great Britain and Ireland, hoped to gain from his mediation in Stolbovo, and other similar treaty negotiations with which he became involved. To contextualize James’ aspirations, we should first briefly outline the diplo‐ matic hierarchy of Northern Europe as seen through the eyes of the House of Stuart. Only when that is understood can we properly interpret what the Stolbovo Peace actually represented to King James, and how far it advanced his agenda with regard to his prospective alliances. It is necessary to broaden the sometimes limited understanding of Stuart objectives which results when scholars only take a bi-lateral rather than a more global approach to events. Indeed, what is often presented as an individual crowning glory for Merrick in Stuart-Romanov diplomacy clearly needs closer scrutiny as it was only one part of a much larger agenda.

Diplomatic Hierarchies and Military Engagement King James certainly maintained a diplomatic hierarchy in Northern Europe, and neither Russia nor Sweden were near the top of it in 1614. However, the King of Great Britain was not the ‘first of the Stuarts’ as Inna Lubimenko exclaimed in 1918, and if one is to understand the diplomacy of King James one must look beyond the traditional Anglo-European relationships of the pre-1603 period. As James VI of Scotland, the King had married Anna of Denmark in 1589, renewing an older alliance dating back to the fifteenth century.5 This marriage ensured that in terms of Northern European politics, the Scottish House of Stuart and the Danish House of Oldenburg were locked into an alliance that held strong throughout the reigns of both King James and his son, Charles I. It was in the person of Charles, his older brother Henry, and their sister, Elizabeth of Bohemia that the Stuart-Oldenburg alliance was truly cemented, not least as they were ethnically half-Scottish and half-Danish. When King James added England and Ireland to his personal portfolio in 1603, ‘Anglo-European’ relations were significantly reshaped to take cognisance of this Scoto-Danish dynamic.6 Two main resident ambassadors served the House of Stuart in the Oldenburg kingdoms thereafter, Sir Andrew Sinclair and Sir Robert Anstruther. Both of these men were Scots, and throughout the reign of King James it was devolved to them to continually strengthen Stuart-Oldenburg relations. Other alliances were maintained, including Scotland’s oldest one which was with France. But for countries like Sweden and Russia, the Stuart’s binding blood-ties to Christian IV’s Denmark-Norway complicated the establishment of formal relations. 5 Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, pp. 22–25. 6 Murdoch, ‘Diplomacy in Transition’, pp. 93–138.

sTolboVo in PersPeCTiVe

Figure 2.1. James VI and I, King of Scotland and England, his consort Queen Anna, sister of the King of Denmark, Christian IV, and their eldest son Henry Frederick, Prince of Wales (d. 1612; his younger brother Charles succeeded him as heir apparent). The genealogical tree shows James’ descent from English and Scottish kings. Edward IV of England was his great-great-great-grandfather. National Portrait Gallery, London.

It was only in 1609 that King James initiated formal political relations with Sweden’s Charles IX, albeit he had briefly traversed parts of western Sweden nine‐ teen years previously on his journey between Oslo and Copenhagen.7 Within months of his letter to Charles, another Scot, Sir James Spens, officially took up his recruiting commission in the Swedish army as ‘General of British Soldiers’, both Scots and English, which had been negotiated as early as 1606.8 More impor‐ tantly, Spens was accredited as both a Stuart-British and a Swedish-Vasa diplomat. One of the major problems he faced lay in repairing the strained relationship between the Stuart and Swedish-Vasa dynasties caused by King James’ contin‐ ued recognition of Sigismund III Vasa (of Poland-Lithuania) as the legitimate 7 For James’ transit through Sweden in 1590 see Spottiswood, The History of the Church of Scotland, ii, 405; Calderwood, The History of the Kirk of Scotland, v, 70. For the 1609 Stuart-Vasa correspondence see James VI to Charles IX, 22 September 1609, TNA, SP 95/1, fol. 158r–v; Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, p. 27. 8 Charles IX to James Spens, April 1606, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 4, fol. 1.

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Figure 2.2. The Coat of Arms of Baron James ( Jacob) Spens. Spens (b. in the 1560s, d. 1632) served as Swedish ambassador in Britain, British ambassador in Sweden and recruiter of Scottish soldiers and officers to the Swedish army. He and Sir Robert Anstruther (British ambassador to Denmark) were stepbrothers. Spens was endowed with the barony of Orreholmen (in the province of Västergötland) in 1627. Photo: Riddarhuset.

monarch of Sweden.9 However, Stuart pragmatism and James’ successive favour‐ ing of Charles IX and Gustavus Adolphus, over Sigismund, allowed the Stuart King to tolerate a ‘sub-state’ level relationship with Stockholm which has been as‐ siduously described by Alexia Grosjean as ‘An Unofficial Alliance’.10 Crucially, Spens had both diplomatic and familial links with his opposite number in

9 See for example James VI and I, ‘A treatise about the Union of England and Scotland’, p. 39. For a full analysis of the legitimacy of the Swedish Vasas in the eyes of James VI see Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, pp. 24–28. 10 Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance.

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Denmark-Norway, Sir Robert Anstruther.11 Moreover, King James sweetened his relations with Sweden by constantly allowing the Swedes to recruit soldiers, often to the chagrin of James’ brother-in-law in Copenhagen. Indeed, the furnishing po‐ tential allies with military units was a key element in Stuart foreign policy, which served both to gain credit for the House of Stuart while sometimes ridding Britain of potentially destabilising elements in the process. Troops were also supplied to Poland-Lithuania, for the army of Sigismund Vasa, but with an important caveat that they could only be deployed against Turks and Tartars.12 Here, too, Scotsmen monopolized the diplomatic duties to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for the majority of the Jacobean and Carolinian periods.13 Patrick Gordon took up the royal appointment as merchant consul based in Danzig in 1610. Significantly, he had once been tutor to the Swedish Count, Gustav Eriksson Stenbock, the man who served alongside Johan Skytte during the Swedish embassy to King James in London that very same year.14 Spens held Gordon in high esteem and cultivated him as an informant for the Swedes on matters concerning Poland-Lithuania. Thereafter Gordon main‐ tained a correspondence not only with Axel Oxenstierna, but also his ‘loving friend and brother’, Archibald Rankin.15 Rankin was both a Gentleman of the Bedchamber to Charles, Prince of Wales (the future Charles I), and the prince’s representative in Sweden.16 Together these men would play an important role in Swedish-Polish relations for the next decade, and these formed part of the general hopes that James held for peace in Northern Europe. But nowhere was Jacobean diplomacy, with its dangerous mix of projected military power backed by strong culturally embedded negotiating teams, more evident than between Sweden and Denmark-Norway during the Kalmar War of 1611–1613.

The Kalmar War In April 1611 Christian IV of Denmark-Norway declared war on his Swedish neighbour, Charles IX. In anticipation of this move James Spens had been careful

11 Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, pp. 39–42; Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, pp. 34–36. 12 Instructions given by Robert Naughton to Captain Buik, n.d. and King James’ instructions to Captain Buik, n.d. both c. 1614, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522; Murdoch, Network North, pp. 256–57. 13 Murdoch, ‘Diplomacy in Transition’, pp. 98–100. 14 James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, 1 March 1615, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522, printed in The Works and Correspondence of Axel Oxenstierna ii.13, ed. by Jönsson, pp. 49–58; Papers Relating to the Scots in Poland, ed. by Steuart, pp. xv–xix, 37, and 103–07. 15 Patrick Gordon to Axel Oxenstierna, 6 December 1615, RA, Oxenstiernska samlingen, vol. E604; Patrick Gordon to Archibald Rankin, 18 August 1617, RA, Strödda historiska handlingar, vol. 24; Tunberg, Den svenska utrikesförvaltningens historia, pp. 74–75. 16 See Rankin’s dispatches from London (20 December 1617, 2 January 1618, 20 March 1617/18, and 3 May 1618) in RA, Oxenstiernska samlingen, vol. E692.

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to open channels to the Stuart Court via the Earl of Salisbury in March. Spens informed Salisbury that Christian’s actions would ultimately prove dangerous to Sweden, not least due to Sweden’s ongoing troubles in Russia. He carefully reported that, as one engaged presently in the employ of another monarch (Charles IX), he did not want to press the cause too far with his own ‘dread sovereign’ (King James) in London. Rather, he hoped James might intercede in the dispute due to his empathy with the ‘common cause of princes’.17 Officially, James supported his Danish brother-in-law under the terms of their alliance of 1589.18 He did not wish to be seen to be shying away from his commitments to Denmark-Norway and so allowed Christian IV to recruit several thousand men in Britain. By March 1612, some six thousand troops were reported to be mustering as an Anglo-Scottish force for Danish service under the command of Lord Willoughby and Lord Dingwall.19 At this time Sweden had limited resources available for further military ex‐ penditure given an ongoing conflict between the contesting Swedish and Polish branches of the House of Vasa.20 Anstruther informed Sir Thomas Lake in Lon‐ don that the Swedes could barely muster a serious fighting force to confront the much stronger Danish army then besieging Kalmar. Bearing this in mind, and while harbouring serious doubts over the justifications for the Danish attack, King James embarked on a precarious course of action. On the one hand, he counselled Christian IV to settle a peace with the Swedes while, on the other, he armed the protagonists on both sides. Between January and November 1611, Sir James Spens ensconced himself at the Stuart Court in London trying to raise an additional force of three thou‐ sand men for Charles IX.21 These men were raised in a covert manner, tacitly approved of by the Stuart Court, but in such a way that King James could deny responsibility for them by ensuring that they appeared to be destined for the Dutch Republic. Several thousand Scots got to Sweden in this circuitous fashion, though some three hundred others were caught and executed in Norway while trying to establish a more direct route to Sweden.22 Nevertheless, the majority of the Scottish soldiers destined for Sweden arrived safely, and before the English under Willoughby arrived in Denmark. Sir Robert Anstruther knew of the presence of General Spens’s troops and made it clear to his ‘Loving Brother’ that while British soldiers in Danish service

17 James Spens to Earl of Salisbury, 31 March 1611, TNA, SP 75/4, fol. 240. 18 Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, pp. 22–23, 39–40; Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, pp. 31–38. 19 Antonio Foscarini, correspondence, November 1611–March 1612, CSPV, xii, pp. 239–40, 252, and 298; John Chamberlain to Dudley Carlton, 25 March 1612, CSPD, ii, p. 124; Riis, Should Auld Acquaintance be Forgot, i, pp. 95–96. 20 Robert Anstruther to Thomas Lake, June 1612, TNA, SP 75/4, fols 316 & 318. 21 Charles IX to James Spens, 24 January 1611 and Gustavus Adolphus to James Spens, 16 November 1611, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 4. 22 Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, pp. 33–35.

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could be employed anywhere by Christian IV, those destined for Sweden could not be deployed against the Danish King’s forces and were only for use against Poles and Muscovites.23 Hoping to avoid bloodletting by his subjects in either Scandinavian army, King James sent instructions to Anstruther and Spens detail‐ ing how he would like the Stuart position to be represented in Copenhagen and Stockholm.24 From April the step-brothers worked together to find a solution to the war. Anstruther crafted a detailed letter to King James in which he outlined the terms by which Christian IV might consider negotiations, the main point be‐ ing that the Swedes had to make the first move in such a direction, not least due to their perceived military weakness. Indeed, Christian had apparently felt snubbed by the Swedes as they had not written to him already.25 With encouragement from Spens, Gustavus Adolphus made the required move and wrote directly to Christian on 8 July 1612.26 Thereafter Anstruther was able to send transcripts of Christian’s response to Gustavus Adolphus to allow Spens to be fully appraised of the official Danish position.27 Another letter from Anstruther to Spens noted the safe receipt of a copy of the letter from Gustavus Adolphus to Christian IV, thus exposing the trade in royal letters as a two-way affair.28 By September Anstruther noted that there was general agreement that four Swedish commissioners and four Danes could meet at the Swedish-Danish Fron‐ tier on the 28 October to discuss all extant points of grievance.29 The conference at Knäred continued throughout the following months until a formalized peace was concluded in January 1613. Within six months of their joint mission to Scandinavia, Anstruther and Spens had navigated the political deadlock, got the two monarchs talking directly to each other and actually helped to negotiate a treaty which they were able to guarantee by the word of King James himself. Both Scandinavian monarchs formally thanked James for his mediation and particularly the good offices of his diligent ambassadors.30 The event was widely celebrated,

23 Robert Anstruther to James Spens, 18 July 1612, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522. 24 Copy of Instructions, James VI to James Spens, 20 April 1612, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 517. 25 Anstruther to King James, 5 July 1612, TNA, SP 75/4, fol. 322. Although this is technically true, the Council of Sweden (Riksråd) had actually written to their counterparts in Denmark (Rigsraad) in January 1612. See the States of Sweden to those of Denmark, 1 January 1612, TNA, SP 75/4, fol. 295. 26 Gustavus Adolphus to Christian IV, 8 July 1612, TNA, SP 95/1, fol. 191. 27 Robert Anstruther to James Spens, 17 July 1612, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522. 28 Robert Anstruther to James Spens, 18 July 1612, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522. 29 Robert Anstruther to James Spens, 26 September 1612, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522. 30 ‘A copy of the contract of peace procured by the King’s most Excellent Majestie of Greate Brittaine and betwixt the Kings of Denmark and Sweden’, 26 January 1613, TNA, SP 75/5, fols 63 & 73; ‘Kong Jakob I:s af Storbritannien garanti af den mellan Sverge och Danmark slutna traktaten. Westminster, 2 April 1613’, in Sverges traktater med främmande magter, ed. by Rydberg & Hallendorff, v.1, 223–24; Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus, i, p. 70.

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even in English-language broadsheets,31 and the full extent of James’ successes here had implications for his role as mediator in a number of European conflicts thereafter, including Stolbovo.

The Road to Stolbovo As with Sweden, Muscovy did not have the kind of relationship which the House of Stuart enjoyed with the royal houses of Denmark-Norway or France. Instead, a commercial relationship with the London-based Muscovy Company was maintained. The political situation was not improved any by Russia’s ‘Times of Troubles’ which followed the death of Tsar Boris Godunov in 1606. During the free-for-all contest for Muscovy between rival Polish, Swedish, and Russian factions, King James is also alleged to have pondered annexing part of northern Russia as a protectorate.32 Given his ongoing plantations in Ireland, support for the East India Company in Asia, and the settlement of Jamestown in Virginia (1609), this is not as far-fetched a project as it may seem. Yet, despite the potential for commercial growth as a result of the Archangel scheme, it has been argued that James opted to decline the proposal in order not to upset his existing relationships with his brother-in-law Christian IV of Denmark-Norway — nor his improving relations with Sweden.33 He therefore determined to keep diplomatic ties with Muscovy ‘loose’ and focussed on commerce. As was typical of Jacobean diplomacy, there was a martial element to the House of Stuart’s relationship with both Sweden and Russia from the outset: Colonel Samuel Cockburn’s regiment of 1200 Scots served in the Russian cam‐ paign with Jacob De la Gardie, albeit with mixed success. Some companies of Sir James Spens’s regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Calvine were also dispatched from Sweden to assist the Russians, as were companies of Englishmen under captains Crail (probably a Scot), Chamberlain, Benson, and York.34 Many English and some Scots transferred into Polish service after the Russian-Swedish defeat at Klushino, but Cockburn’s service to Sweden remained steadfast.35 The loyalty

31 The Joyful Peace, concluded between the King of Denmarke and the King of Sweden, by the means of our most worthy Soveraigne, James, by the Grace of God, King of Great Britaine, France and Ireland. 32 Lubimenko, ‘A Project for the Acquisition of Russia by James I’, pp. 246–56; TNA, SP 91/2, fols 196– 99 quoted in ‘Thomas Chamberlayne’s Description of Russia, 1631’, pp. 107 and 112–16; Fedorowicz, England’s Baltic Trade, p. 10; Jansson and Bushkovitch, ‘Introduction’, pp. 64–68. 33 Jansson and Bushkovitch, ‘Introduction’, p. 68. 34 Brereton, Newes of the present Miseries of Rushia, p. 44; Frost, ‘Scottish Soldiers, Poland-Lithuania and the Thirty Years’ War’, p. 199; Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, pp. 28, 30. 35 James Spens to the Earl of Salisbury, 30 September 1610, TNA, SP 95/1, fol. 170. Spens only mentions that these troops were British. That they were Cockburn’s is recorded in Frost, ‘Scottish Soldiers, Poland-Lithuania and the Thirty Years’ War’, pp. 199–200.

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Figure 2.3. The Old English Court, erected in the early sixteenth century in Varvarka street on the east side of the Kremlin, was the seat of the English Muscovy Company in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In addition to trade, the building also served diplomatic contacts between the two countries. It was the first official residence of a Western power in the Russian capital. Sir John Merrick, agent of the Muscovy Company and Stuart ambassador to Russia, resided there at times. (In comparison it was not until in 1618 that a Swedish court — a timbered main building and storehouses — was opened in Tverskaia street in the city centre; the first resident, who arrived in 1630, lived in the trade court). Wikimedia Commons.

of Spens’s and Cockburn’s troops led to further recruitment drives in Scotland be‐ tween 1610 and 1615 on behalf of the Swedes.36 In this period the Muscovites also sought direct British military intervention to help in their renewed campaigns against the Swedes and Poles after 1613. These requests increased once Mikhail Romanov became Tsar, as did the desire for closer diplomatic relations. There followed eleven years of embassies between London and Moscow, beginning with that of Aleksei Ziuzin and Aleksei Vitovtov which arrived in London in October 1613 bringing rich gifts of sable and fox fur

36 Gustavus Adolphus to James Spens, 17 December 1614, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 4; Gustavus Adolphus to King James, 5 February 1615, TNA, SP 95/2, fol. 14; Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, pp. 30–31.

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for King James.37 The Muscovites not only wished to announce the succession of Tsar Mikhail, but also to propose a full military alliance between the Stuart and Romanov monarchs. According to General Spens, King James knew that such a treaty would restrict the possibility of any future for his vision of a grand league linking Sweden, Denmark-Norway, Venice, the United Provinces, the Duke of Savoy, and any German cities or Swiss cantons of the reformed religion.38 Never‐ theless, the proposed military alliance, or variations of it, formed a key-point in all Stuart-Romanov negotiations for the following decade. Some historical emphasis has been placed on the importance of the 1613 embassy and the implications of a Stuart-Romanov alliance should it have reached fruition.39 That King James did not immediately reject the Russian proposal did not, however, mean that Muscovy suddenly became the key player in Stuart for‐ eign policy. The new Stuart-British agenda entailed finding a balance that would allow for positive contact with all the Northern European powers, at least from King James’ perspective. Fortuitously for the Swedes, Sir James Spens arrived in London in the midst of the Muscovite embassy. Hearing that the Russians were pressing King James to try to extract both a firmer alliance and recruit more troops into their service, Spens unilaterally intervened. According to his own account, Spens managed to both stall the new levy of troops for Russia, and, crucially, urged James to volunteer as arbiter in the proposed Vasa-Romanov peace negotiations.40 He added that he had, on his own initiative, suggested that Gustavus Adolphus wanted this arbitration, having heard that the Muscovites had already asked for Stuart intervention. This fact shines new light into the origin of the Stuart intervention in the Swedish-Muscovite conflict. Spens’s direct letter to the Swedish Chancellor, with a shorter missive to Gustavus Adolphus on the same day, certainly lends veracity to Spens’s claim to be the originator of the idea of Stuart intervention between Stockholm and Moscow, at least from the Swedish side. Not wishing to reject all of the Russian proposals out of hand, King James sent Sir John Merrick to Moscow as his ambassador in June 1614, with William Beecher as his secretary.41 The Englishman was armed with two commissions: one

37 Tsar Mikhail to King James, June 1613, in ‘Seven Russian Royal Letters (1613–1623)’, pp. 118–19 and 122; England and the North, ed. by Jansson and Bushkovitch, trans. by Rogozhin. This volume includes a discussion of the embassy based on the ambassadors’ own accounts. These have been translated and reproduced in full in the book. 38 James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, 1 March 1615, see n. 14 above. 39 Jansson and Bushkovitch, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1–10. 40 James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, 10 January 1614, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522, printed in The Works and Correspondence of Axel Oxenstierna, ii.13, 28–32; Spens to Gustavus Adolphus, same date, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 517, fol. 3. 41 ‘A passe for Sir John Merrick, knight, ambassador from his Majestye unto the Emperour of Russia’, 21 June 1614, TNA, PC 2/27, fol. 174. Merrick’s various embassies to Muscovy are discussed in Fedorowicz, England’s Baltic Trade, pp. 150–57; ‘Anglo-Russian Relations, 1617–1618’, pp. 67 and 95–99; ‘Anglo-Russian Relations, 1620–1624’, pp. 74, 85–87.

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from the King for Stuart business and the other from the Muscovy Company to deal with trade.42 Spens contacted Oxenstierna in both June and July 1614 alerting him to Merrick’s mission.43 At the same juncture, he also corresponded directly with Gustavus Adolphus, pointing out the aspirations of the Muscovites, includ‐ ing their desire to obtain both finances and soldiers from Britain. The latter, the Russians claimed, were to be directed against Poland and not Sweden.44 Despite this caveat, Spens reported that he was able to block all Stuart support other than the sending of the Merrick embassy. In his correspondence of 24 June he specifically noted a digression from the Knäred-style negotiations in that Merrick was to serve as the sole intermediary for both sides. Spens hinted — although he did not specify — that if Gustavus Adolphus was unhappy about there being only a sole arbiter, particularly one with such blatantly pro-Russian credentials, King James would send one more suited to Stockholm to serve as a balance.45 Over the coming year Spens was able to keep both the Swedes and King James informed of Merrick’s progress, or rather lack of it. In March 1615 this stagnation was attributed to ongoing unrest within Muscovy caused by Swedish military victories; King James congratulated Gustavus Adolphus on his battlefield successes — hardly an endorsement of Stuart monarch’s neutrality. Spens also discussed what he believed to be an improving situation on the Swedish-Polish front, adding his hopes that a recently agreed truce might lead to a permanent peace and hinting at further Stuart mediation in this direction.46 Sigismund III Vasa certainly desired Stuart intervention in the Polish dispute with the Elector of Brandenburg via Patrick Gordon.47 It seems perfectly reasonable that he might also hope for intervention with Sweden. Problematically, though, Gordon’s, or at least the House of Stuart’s, position in this affair was compromised. Christian IV of Denmark-Norway allegedly encouraged King James to lend military support to the Duke of Brandenburg in his ongoing dispute against the Duchy of Cleves. Christian personally rallied James during his visit to London in July and August of 1614; during this period James Spens also obtained an audience with the Danish King.48 Christian’s protracted stay in England clearly gave the Danes something of an advantage with regard to diplomatic negotiations with King James, but Spens’s concurrent presence at the Stuart Court created an unexpected avenue

42 Jansson and Bushkovitch, ‘Introduction’, p. 68. 43 James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, 24 June & 25 July 1614, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522, printed in The Works and Correspondence of Axel Oxenstierna ii.13, 40–48. 44 James Spens to Gustavus Adolphus, 4 June 1614, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 517, fol. 7. 45 James Spens to Gustavus Adolphus, 24 June 1614, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 517, fol. 9; James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, 24 June 1614 (see n. 43 above). 46 James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, 1 March 1615, see n. 14 above. 47 James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, 1 July 1615, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522, printed in The Works and Correspondence of Axel Oxenstierna, ii.13, 63–67. 48 James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, 25 July & 3 August 1614, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522, printed in The Works and Correspondence of Axel Oxenstierna, ii.13, 41–49; James Spens to Gustavus Adolphus, 25 July 1614, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 517.

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for Swedish-Danish dialogue. Whether influenced by Danish considerations or otherwise, Patrick Gordon found himself kept at arms-length from Sigismund. This was a consequence of problems bubbling under the surface with Lutherans in Brandenburg who were in dispute with the Elector over their religious rights. On‐ going Polish disputes with the city of Elbing over trade only further complicated Gordon’s position.49 Nevertheless, Gordon’s remit from the House of Stuart also extended to trying to settle a Russian-Polish truce in a mirror to the Merrick mission. In a move typical for the Stuart monarch James sought more than a bilateral treaty, and he hoped that Spens and Gordon might work together to negotiate a Swedish-Polish truce, in addition to resolving the myriad of ancillary conflicts.50 The secretive nature of the Spens-Gordon connection, conducted by word of mouth via agents, makes tracking down the details of their negotiations difficult to say the least. From what we can piece together, James was determined to help any part of Christendom in their fight against the perceived threat from Islam to the south of Europe. But more importantly, it is evident that any Stuart-brokered peace with Poland-Lithuania was always going to play second fiddle to that between Sweden and Muscovy. Spens reported that Merrick had arrived in Novgorod and had sent a repre‐ sentative to Gustavus Adolphus to advance the negotiations for peace. For his own part, Spens vowed to continue to work for the same ends and the Swedish interest at the Stuart court in London.51 Merrick himself had already initiated a correspondence directly with Gustavus Adolphus in January 1615.52 Nevertheless, King James went through the formality of writing to Gustavus Adolphus to introduce Merrick as his man in Muscovy and his chosen arbiter for peace, even though Spens had done this over a year earlier and Merrick was already in direct contact with the Swedish King.53 These various letters clarify that no formal second Stuart negotiator was to act in the Russian-Swedish negotiations. That said, with James Spens embedded at the Stuart Court, the Swedish case was being constantly reinforced in London in a more immediate way than the Muscovites could manage. Thus, when Gustavus Adolphus wrote to Merrick from Narva in November 1615, he did so from an informed position, having already been briefed by James Spens with regard to King James’s intentions.54 Merrick

49 Patrick Gordon to Ralph Winwood, 30 June 1616, TNA, SP 88/3, fol. 127. 50 Fedorowicz, England’s Baltic Trade, pp. 18 and 152; Jansson and Bushkovitch, ‘Introduction’, pp. 70– 71. 51 James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, 26 May 1615, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522, printed in The Works and Correspondence of Axel Oxenstierna ii.13, 61–63. 52 John Merrick to Gustavus Adolphus, 29 January 1614 Old Style (19 January 1615), RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522. I thank Dr Peter Maxwell-Stuart for his detailed translations of John Merrick’s often convoluted Latin. 53 King James to Gustavus Adolphus, 2 October 1615, TNA, SP 95/2, fol. 20. 54 Receipt of the letter from Gustavus Adolphus is recorded in: John Merrick to Gustavus Adolphus, 8 February 1615 Old Style (29 January 1616), RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522.

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resolutely maintained his correspondence with the Swedish King, met him in person in Ladoga, and outlined the detailed financial and territorial exchanges required to establish a peace.55 Once again a Northern European peace settlement was being shaped by the arbitration of two, not one, Stuart ambassadors albeit this time, unlike Knäred in 1612, they were not seated in the same room together. Spens informed Gustavus Adolphus and Axel Oxenstierna in February 1617 of his discussion of Merrick’s mission with King James and noted the Stuart monarch’s advice to the Swedes not to demand such harsh terms from the Mus‐ covites that they would be unable to comply with them.56 This point was given great importance if King James was to be able to both arrange and stand guarantor for a binding peace. Spens further emphasized it by including it as a sub-clause to a letter which opened with the need for the Swedes to complete their still outstanding reparation payments to the Danes after the Kalmar War. Although sound advice, it arrived too late to play a direct role in the negotiations. However, the various couriers who left London carrying messages of similar sentiment throughout 1616 ensured that James’ advice must have resonated once the terms for the ensuing treaty became known.57 John Merrick also wrote to Gustavus Adolphus the day after the Treaty of Stolbovo had been signed, thanking the King for the kindness shown to him throughout the treaty, and for the praise which he had bestowed upon the ambassador for his services.58 He concluded his letter with an observation that the role of King James of Great Britain in settling the affair was to be made clear to both the Muscovite and Swedish delegations alike, and on the direct instruction of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. Many Englishmen were quick to spin John Merrick’s success and his name appeared in a number of publications thereafter, each seeking to bolster the role of England and Englishmen in settling the affairs of the northern world. In Thomas Gainford’s 1618 publication, The Glory of England, he declared: ‘Wee haue made peace betweene Denmark and Sweden, and pacified those troubles long agoe […] We returned the Polish Ambassadour, with admiration at our Princes greatnesse and magnanimity. We haue setled the good opinion of the Muscouite’.59 Gainsford’s audacious aggrandisement of England (and appropriation of all British achievements as English ones) is exemplified in his ‘forgetting’ that not

55 See for example John Merrick to Gustavus Adolphus, 20 April, 9 May, 22 June, 14 September and 10 December 1616 (all Old Style), RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522. 56 James Spens to Gustavus Adolphus, 2 February 1617, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 517; James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, 2 February 1617, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522, printed in The Works and Correspondence of Axel Oxenstierna, ii.13, 72–74. 57 Through various letters written by Spens held in Riksarkivet and The National Archives at Kew, we know of a number of messengers used including ‘Dobkin of Hamburg’, Thomas Spens, and Andrew Shaw among others variously recorded simply as ‘the bearer’. 58 John Merrick to Gustavus Adolphus, 28 February 1616 (18 February 1617), RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522. The letter has been catalogued out of sequence due to the English dating system employed. Its importance has thus gone unnoticed despite it being dated at Stolbovo. 59 Gainsford, The glory of England, pp. 244–46.

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only was the King a Scot, but so were four out of five of the ambassadors and consuls working in the northern sphere: James Spens, Robert Anstruther, Andrew Sinclair, and Patrick Gordon — and the host of agents who worked for them. This omission signalled the complete failure of the English establishment of the day to understand King James’ desire to project himself as King of Great Britain, wherein England was but one of his three Stuart kingdoms. Despite Gainsford’s jingoism, some Englishmen were more precise in their understanding of events. In a journal of his peregrinations, Samuel Purchase recorded that ‘Sir Iohn Merike Knight, a man of great experience in those North‐ erne parts, was employed as his Majesties Embassadour to negotiate betwixt those two Great Princes, the Moscouite and the Sweden’.60 Such prudent references to Merrick simply as the conduit of the King’s will rather than the architect of peace are rare in English sources, as shown by the earlier quote from Ralph Winwood who emphatically stated that Merrick had made the peace. Fortuitously, we know how King James himself perceived the role of his ambassador. Upon the conclusion of the Stolbovo Treaty, Merrick sent a courier to London with the news of the peace.61 The agent must have been quick as King James wrote directly to Tsar Mikhail within weeks reminding him of the services of Merrick and specifically noting: ‘And wee for our part will be ever ready to cherish this peace wherin our mediation hath soe happily prevailed’.62 To King James there was no doubt that it was his mediation, and not Merrick’s, which had secured the peace, albeit he recognized Merrick’s role as the conduit of his arbitration. Some previous scholarship appears to have missed this important caveat. Indeed, Inna Lubimenko and Sergey Konovalov both conjectured that congratulations for the Stolbovo Treaty must have come in an as yet undiscovered letter dated June 1617 which allegedly arrived with a courier from England. However, the discovery of James’s letter, which by the ‘1616’ date must have been written before 25 March 1617, shows that King James was much quicker to congratulate the Tsar than previously supposed. It was for this letter, and a subsequent one, that King James was thanked by the Tsar for his mediation.63 Mikhail Romanov’s letter of thanks arrived with a new Muscovite embassy, amounting to some seventy-five persons, which was headed by Stepan Ivanovich Volynskii and accompanied by John Merrick. The purpose of the visit was to both impress the Jacobean court and cement the commercial relationship and treaties

60 Purchase, Purchas his pilgrimes In fiue bookes, p. 791. 61 John Merrick to Gustavus Adolphus, 28 February 1616 (18 February 1617), RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522. 62 King James to Grand Duke of Muscovy, ‘1616’, TNA, SP 91/2, fol. 23. NB, this letter is miscatalogued as being composed on 10 August 1616. Its contents reveal it has to have been written after the conclusion of the Treaty of Stolbovo in February 1617. There is no day or month visible on the letter, only ‘1616’. A 1616 date is correct if written according to the English Julian calendar, and before 25 March 1617. 63 Tsar Mikhail to King James, September 1617, in ‘Seven Russian Letters’, pp. 119 and 125–27.

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between the London and Moscow regimes.64 The Russians were received by the King and English Privy Council several times. During a speech just prior to their departure in May 1618 the ambassadors once again ‘thankefully acknowledged the princely offices of love and friendshippe performed by his Majestie, in medi‐ ating an honourable peace betwixt the Greate Lord Emperor and Greate Duke Michaylo Phedorowich of All Russia Selfe Uphoulder and the Kinge of Sweden’.65 Conclusively, according to King James, Gustavus Adolphus, Tsar Mikhail, and his ambassadors, James was the arbiter of the Stolbovo Treaty, and John Merrick merely channelled his instructions. This is not to understate the important role that Merrick played, and his work was clearly appreciated by all three of the potentates with whom he dealt. However, we should not overlook the role of Sir James Spens in facilitating these negotiations. By 1613 he was a proven Stuart-Vasa diplomat with one international peace treaty already under his belt. It was apparently he who was the first to suggest that Gustavus Adolphus seek Stuart intervention. Moreover, Spens was actually ensconced at the Stuart court throughout the 1614 to 1617 period and advising both sovereigns he worked for on diplomatic matters, and his proximity to King James benefited the Swedes to the cost of the Russians. To highlight Spens’s significance in this context we should consider the StuartRomanov correspondence that followed the Treaty of Stolbovo. This did not focus on the proposed alliance between Moscow and London as the Russians hoped. Rather, the second letter sent by James (following his initial congratula‐ tory missive on the peace) focussed mainly on the fate of one Captain David Gilbert. This soldier had served the Russians before deserting to the Poles during the Time of Troubles. James’ intervention resulted in Gilbert’s death sentence being commuted and the captain was allowed to leave Russia.66 Thereafter, James’ agenda was dominated by the prospect of retaining commercial advantage despite his ‘optimistic assurances’ in regard to the much vaunted military alliance and substantive loans requested by the Russians.67 He certainly concluded no alliance with the Russians, which should have been a mere formality had James really desired it. Eventually, in 1621, Merrick offered the Russians a watered down ‘League of Amity’ in place of a firm military alliance, though ultimately to little avail.68

64 Two accounts of the Russian Embassy, 8 & 9 November 1617, in Calendar of State Papers Colonial: East Indies, China and Japan, 1617–1627, pp. lxi–lxii. 65 Stephan Volinskii and colleagues, 28 May 1618, in Acts of the Privy Council of England, ad 1542–1631, vol. 36, p. 397. 66 Tsar Mikhail to King James, August 1617, in ‘Seven Russian Letters’, pp. 118–19 and 122–24; Barnhill and Dukes, ‘North-East Scots in Muscovy in the Seventeenth Century’, pp. 49–63; Frost, ‘Scottish Soldiers, Poland-Lithuania and the Thirty Years’ War’, p. 201. 67 ‘Anglo-Russian Relations, 1617–1618’, p. 69. 68 ‘Anglo-Russian Relations, 1620–1624’, p. 72. The terms of this proposed league are reprinted as appendix 3 on pp. 102–03; Lubimenko, ‘The Correspondence of the First Stuarts with the First Romanovs’, pp. 80–81.

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Post-Stolbovo further embassies, under Sir Dudley Digges in 1618 and Sir Christopher Cocks in 1623, were also sent to Moscow.69 It has been argued that King James probably never had any intention of allowing Cocks to complete the League of Military Alliance that he had been sent to discuss. As one authority on Stuart-Romanov relations put it, by Cock’s embassy ‘time was gained; and English (sic) diplomacy had once more succeeded in preserving that combination of “outward satisffaccioun” and freedom from binding political obligation’.70

Conclusion Using clever diplomacy backed, when required, by a requisite amount of mili‐ tary force, King James had established himself as the international arbitrator in Northern European politics. His ability to deploy military contingents to both Scandinavian kingdoms during the Kalmar War had not gone unheeded by his contemporaries. Similarly, the success of his ambassadors in securing the Swedish-Danish Peace Treaty at Knäred was also noticed. In consequence Swedish officials also sought official intervention from the House of Stuart in their dispute with Denmark over a proposed Danish alliance with Lübeck.71 The Muscovites also paid attention to the advantages of Jacobean arbitration, and, unquestionably, John Merrick conducted himself well both at the Romanov and Vasa courts during the Stolbovo negotiations. However, as established above, Merrick was not the only Stuart ambassador involved in the Russian-Swedish dialogue. Without undue fanfare, it is abundantly clear that the Swedes were quite delighted with their skilled ambassador James Spens, both for his accredited participation at Knäred and his more covert and historically unrecognized role in securing the Swedish-Russian peace. He would continue his services for Sweden in the military, diplomatic, and espionage spheres right through until his death in 1632. However, for the remainder of his life, Spens did not have to concern himself with Russia. In the years after 1618 a new phase of British diplomatic prioritization opened up as Europe headed for thirty years of warfare. With their ensconced positions at the courts of many of the leading protagonists, particularly Denmark-Norway and Sweden, Scottish diplomats like Spens, Sinclair, and Anstruther were ready to take a leading role in what they believed was a fight for the honour of the House of Stuart. Mobilization of troops for the Northern powers of Denmark-Norway 69 The Digges embassy is discussed in ‘John Tradescant’s diary of a voyage to Russia June–September 1618’ in ‘Two Documents Concerning Anglo-Russian Relations in the Early Seventeenth Century’, pp. 130–41. See also ‘Anglo-Russian Relations, 1620–1624’, pp. 72–73 for discussion of Merrick and pp. 85–90 for information on Cocks; Lubimenko, ‘The Correspondence of the First Stuarts with the First Romanovs’, pp. 81–84. 70 ‘Anglo-Russian Relations, 1620–1624’, p. 90. 71 Gabriel Oxenstierna to James Spens, 13 May 1615, RA, Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 522; James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, 1 March 1615 (see n. 14 above).

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and Sweden moved into a scale unprecedented prior to that date. No less than 18,700 Stuart soldiers fought for Christian IV of Denmark-Norway between 1627 and 1629; over thirty thousand would fight for Sweden before the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648. While smaller contingents were still allowed for Russia and Poland-Lithuania to fight the Turks throughout this period, the period after Stolbovo established once and for all that, for the House of Stuart, it was the Scandinavian powers that demonstrably took both military and diplomatic prece‐ dent in the European North. Russia and Poland-Lithuania thereafter remained only secondary concerns.

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Works Cited Manuscripts and Archival Sources

RA = Stockholm, Riksarkivet Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 4: Instruktioner och brev från Kungl. Maj:t samt brev från rikskanslern 1606–1629 ———, vol. 517: Engelska konungahusets originalbrev till svenska konungahuset 1561– 1685 ———, vol. 522: Engelska beskickningars memorial och noter 1591–1692 Oxenstiernska samlingen, vol. E604: Furstars, ämbetsmäns och enskilda personers brev och ansökningar Oxenstiernska samlingen, vol. E692: Furstars, ämbetsmäns och enskilda personers brev och ansökningar Strödda historiska handlingar, vol. 24: Handlingar från Gustav II Adolfs tid 1612–1632

TNA = London, The National Archives of Great Britain PC (= Privy Council), 2/27 SP (= State Papers), 14/92, 75/4 & 5, 88/3, 95/1 & 2 Primary Sources Acts of the Privy Council of England, ad 1542–1631, xxxvi: 1618–1619 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964) ‘Anglo-Russian Relations, 1617–1618’, ed. by Sergey Konovalov, Oxford Slavonic Papers, 1 (1950), 64–103 ‘Anglo-Russian Relations, 1620–1624’, ed. by Sergey Konovalov, Oxford Slavonic Papers, 4 (1953), 71–131 Brereton, Henry, Newes of the present Miseries of Rushia: Occassioned By the late Warres in that Countrey […] together with the memorable occurrences of our owne National forces, English, and Scottes, under the Pay of the now King of Swethland (London: John Bache, 1614) Calderwood, David, The History of the Kirk of Scotland, ed. by Thomas Thomson, 7 vols (Edinburgh: Wodrow Society, 1842–1849) Calendar of State Papers Colonial: East Indies, China and Japan, 5 vols (London: HMSO, 1862–1922) CSPD (= Calendar of State Papers, Domestic), ii (London: HMSO, 1858) CSPV (= Calendar of State Papers, Venetian), xii (London: HMSO, 1905)

sTolboVo in PersPeCTiVe

England and the North: The Russian Embassy of 1613–1614, ed. by Maija Jansson and Paul Bushkovitch, trans. by Nikolai Rogozhin, Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge, 210 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1994) Gainsford, Thomas, The glory of England, or A true description of many excellent prerogatiues and remarkeable blessings, whereby she triumpheth ouer all the nations of the world vvith a iustifiable comparison betweene the eminent kingdomes of the earth, and herselfe: plainely manifesting the defects of them all in regard of her sufficiencie and fulnesse of happiness (London: Griffin, 1618) James VI and I, ‘A treatise about the Union of England and Scotland’, in The Jacobean Union: Six Tracts of 1604, ed. by Bruce R. Galloway and Brian P. Levack, Scottish History Society, Series 4, 21 (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1985) Papers relating to the Scots in Poland, 1576–1793, ed. by Archibald Francis Steuart, Scottish History Society, Series 1, 59 (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1915) Pufendorf, Samuel, An introduction to the history of the principal kingdoms and states of Europe by Samuel Puffendorf, made English from the original (London: Newborough, 1695) Purchase, Samuel, Purchas his pilgrimes In fiue bookes. The first, contayning the voyages and peregrinations made by ancient kings, patriarkes, apostles, philosophers, and others, to and thorow the remoter parts of the knowne world: enquiries also of languages and religions, especially of the moderne diuersified professions of Christianitie. The second, a description of all the circum-nauigations of the globe. The third, nauigations and voyages of English-men, alongst the coasts of Africa […] The fourth, English voyages beyond the East Indies, to the ilands of Iapan, China, Cauchinchina, the Philippinae with others […] The fifth, nauigations, voyages, traffiques, discoueries, of the English nation in the easterne parts of the world (London: Featherstone, 1625) ‘Seven Russian Royal Letters (1613–1623)’, ed. by Sergey Konovalov, Oxford Slavonic Papers, 7 (1957), 118–34 Spottiswood, John, The History of the Church of Scotland: Beginning the Year of Our Lord 203, and Continued to the End of the Reign of King James VI, 3 vols (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1851) Sverges traktater med främmande magter jemte andra dit hörande handlingar, ed. by Olof Simon Rydberg and Carl Hallendorff (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1877–1934) The Joyful Peace, concluded between the King of Denmarke and the King of Sweden, by the means of our most worthy Soveraigne, James, by the Grace of God, King of Great Britaine, France and Ireland (London: Gosson, 1613) The Works and Correspondence of Axel Oxenstierna, ii.13, Letters from Sir James Spens and Jan Rutgers, ed. by Arne Jönsson (Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien, Riksarkivet, 2007) ‘Thomas Chamberlayne’s Description of Russia, 1631’, ed. by Sergey Konovalov, Oxford Slavonic Papers, 5 (1954), 107–16 ‘Two Documents concerning Anglo-Russian Relations in the Early Seventeenth Century’, ed. by Sergey Konovalov, Oxford Slavonic Papers, 2 (1951), 128–44

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Secondary Studies Barnhill, J. W., and Paul Dukes, ‘North-East Scots in Muscovy in the Seventeenth Century’, Northern Scotland, 1 (1972), 49–63 Fedorowicz, J. K., England’s Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century. A Study in AngloPolish Commercial Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press, 1980) Frost, Robert, ‘Scottish Soldiers, Poland-Lithuania and the Thirty Years’ War’, in Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War, 1618–1648, ed. by Steve Murdoch, History of Warfare, 6 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 191–214 Grosjean, Alexia, An Unofficial Alliance. Scotland and Sweden 1569–1664, The Northern World, 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2003) Jansson, Maija, and Paul Bushkovitch, ‘Introduction’, in England and the North: The Russian Embassy of 1613–1614, ed. by Maija Jansson and Paul Bushkovitch, trans. by Nikolai Rogozhin, Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge, 210 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1994), pp. 1–71 Lubimenko, Inna, ‘A Project for the Acquisition of Russia by James I’, English Historical Review, 29 (1914), 246–56 ———, ‘The Correspondence of the First Stuarts with the First Romanovs’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th ser., 1 (1918), 77–91 Murdoch, Steve, Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603–1660 (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2003) ———, ‘Diplomacy in Transition: Stuart British Diplomacy in Northern Europe, 1603– 1618’, in Ships, Guns and Bibles in the North Sea and the North Sea and the Baltic States, c. 1350–c. 1700, ed. by Allan Macinnes, Frederick Pedersen, and Thomas Riis, Proceedings of the Northern European Historical Research Network, 1 (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2000), pp. 93–138 ———, Network North. Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Associations in Northern Europe, 1603–1746, The Northern World, 18 (Leiden: Brill, 2006) Riis, Thomas, Should Auld Acquaintance be Forgot … Scottish-Danish Relations c. 1450– 1707, Odense University Studies in History and Social Sciences, 114, 2 vols (Odense: Odense University Press, 1988) Roberts, Michael, Gustavus Adolphus. A History of Sweden 1611–1632, 2 vols (London, 1953–1958) Tunberg, Sven, Carl-Fredrik Palmstierna, Arne Munthe, Arne Forssell, Torsten Gihl, and Nils G. Wollin, Den svenska utrikesförvaltningens historia (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1935)

kRISTIAN GERNER 

The Dutch Republic, Sweden, and Moscow * The Dream of the Russian Market

A Strategic Marriage of Convenience: Sweden and the United Provinces Sweden occupied a pivotal role in political, military, and economic developments in the Baltic Sea region in the era of the Livonian and Nordic wars in 1558–1721. The seventeenth century became known in the Swedish historical memory as ‘the Great Power Era’. In the same century, the United Provinces played a central role as the hegemonic naval and commercial power in the North Sea-Baltic region. In the Netherlands, the seventeenth century became known as ‘the Golden Age’. A third important role in the struggle for the Baltic market in the seventeenth century was played by the Russian lands of Novgorod and Moscow. From her nadir as a Baltic power in 1605–1612, the Time of Troubles, Russia had by 1721 reached her zenith as the military hegemon in the north-eastern Baltic region. On 18 and 19 November 1421 a major disaster occurred in south Holland. A violent storm tore a hole in the dikes at Broek and at the junction of the rivers Waal and Maas (Fig. 3.1). Five hundred square kilometres were flooded up to Heusden, several miles to the east of Dordrecht. This happened at St Elizabeth’s Day (19 November) and the flood became known under the name ‘St Elizabeth’s Day Flood’. Contemporaries viewed the flood in apocalyptic terms, comparable to the Black Death. The number of victims was estimated by contemporary sources at one hundred thousand, and some seventy-two villages were supposed to have been inundated. Although later accounts have reduced the numbers to ten thousand victims and twenty villages swamped, the event for centuries was

* The author is a retired Swedish Sovietologist who has taken an interest in Dutch history. I thank my reviewer Steve Murdoch for his attempt to update the content, for his claim that the Dutch dimension is overplayed, and for his demonstration that the story that I tell might have been told differently. I hope that my perspective will give food for thought on how one might interpret history as an ironic tale. I refer to a declaration by Hayden White: ‘It is not a matter of choosing between objectivity and distortion, but rather between different strategies of constructing “reality” in thought so as to deal with it in different ways, each of which has its own ethical implications’ (White, Tropics of Discourse, p. 22). Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 67–86 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133598

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nevertheless regarded as ‘the primal catastrophe of the Netherlandish nation’. The British historian Simon Schama adds that it ‘is sometimes forgotten by political historians that the war for national independence took place at the same time as a particularly fierce phase in the struggle against the sea’, for beginning with the 1560s the floods became particularly calamitous.1 It stands to reason that Schama, unlike contemporaries, applies a secular perspective. However, the war for independence was closely linked to the rise of the Dutch Republic as a maritime power. Dutch seamen sailed to the Baltic ports for grain and timber and to ports in western France and Portugal for salt. The inundations, of which the Elizabeth Flood was just the greatest, had caused a change in Dutch agriculture from arable to dairy farming. At the same time the Dutch full-rigged herring buss secured hegemony over the herring grounds in the North Sea. These developments furthered urbanization of the coastal areas and caused a competition between the coastal and the inland German towns with the effect that those who opposed the growing influence of The Netherlandish provinces sought outlets and allies to the north. At the close of the first half of the sixteenth century, ‘the Netherlands seemed a formidable adjunct to Habsburg primacy in Europe and the world more generally’.2 In the first half of the sixteenth century, the Seven Provinces had secured their political independence and had become the major maritime power in the Baltic area. Who were the Dutch, in their own eyes? According to Simon Schama, they were the new/old Batavians, guardians of the waare vrijheid (the true liberty). They were reborn Hebrews, children of the Covenant. […] Whither would they go? To reveal God’s design for the world through their destiny and to dwell in honor, prosperity and glory, so long as they obeyed His commandments.3 The commercial dominance and the military prominence of the Dutch were followed by Dutch cultural influence. The seventeenth century was Amsterdam’s century in the Baltic. However, there were competitors. On 8 and 9 November 1520 a major disaster had occurred in central Sweden. A hundred leading politicians, some from the aristocracy but the majority from the ranks of the gentry and the burghers were beheaded. The initiative came from the king of the Kalmar Union, i.e. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (with Finland), Christian II, and was meant to be a final blow against his opponents among the Swedish political elite. The event became known in Swedish historiography as the Stockholm Bloodbath. The Bloodbath triggered armed resistance against the king. Already in 1521, the nobleman Gustavus Vasa was recognized by the Swedes as Protector of the

1 Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches, p. 37. 2 Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 40. 3 Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches, p. 68. Similarly the Swedes considered themselves God’s chosen people. See Jönsson, ‘Lunds universitets grundande’, pp. 652–53.

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Figure 3.1. The Grote Hollandse Waard. Outer right wing of an altarpiece with the St Elizabeth’s Day flood, 18–19 November 1421, with the broken dike at Wieldrecht. Painted by the Master of the St Elizabeth Panels between c. 1490 and c. 1495. Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam.

Realm, and in 1523 he was elected King. In the course of the next hundred years, Sweden eclipsed Denmark-Norway as the major power in Scandinavia. Its politics aimed at controlling Baltic trade and getting a stronghold on the North Sea coast. It was important to break not only Denmark’s hold over the Sound but also to curb the Hanseatic League and push both the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy away from the Baltic coast in the east.

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In the early seventeenth century, Swedish ambitions were in tune with Dutch aspirations in the Baltic. There were common interests between the two. In the late sixteenth century, Amsterdam had become the leading city of the Dutch republic. After the armistice with Spain in 1609 (the Twelve Years’ Truce), it soon became the leading port in Europe and also a major financial centre. Moreover, its design with the harbour reaching downtown thanks to a system of canals was applied in the new Swedish port on the North Sea, Hisingen, i.e. Gothenburg, as envisaged by Abraham Cabiljau. It should not be conflated with the city of Gothenburg founded in 1621. The Dutch had greater influence in the former than the latter, and the former was destroyed by the Danes in the Kalmar war.4 Dutch shipbuilders, merchants, and industrialists were to play a major role in Sweden’s rise to great power status in the course of the century. The rise of Sweden as a military Great Power in the Baltic area during the seventeenth century and the emergence of the Russian Empire in the early eighteenth century are two important consequences of the Dutch Revolt in 1568 against Habsburg rule. The creation of the United East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC) in 1602 signaled a Dutch quest for preeminence in global trade. Sweden with the two Gothenburgs (founded respectively in 1607 and 1621), Indonesia with Batavia — now Jakarta (1619), North America with Nieuw Amsterdam (1625), and Russia with St Petersburg (1703, capital in 1712) were stations on the Dutch reach for global commercial power. A necessary condition for Sweden’s successful ascendance as a regional great power had been the secularization and subsequent dissolution of the Teutonic Or‐ der state in Livonia. With a keen view to the fact that a power vacuum of sorts had emerged, the Vasa monarchs grasped the opportunity and aimed at total control over a huge area east and south of the Finnish part of the Swedish state, ideally from Archangel on the White Sea in the north to the northern shores of the Black Sea in the south; the latter being the goal of the Polish wars of king Charles X Gustavus (r. 1654–1660). The principal areas of expansion were the lands around Novgorod in the north and those of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to‐ wards the south-east. In the beginning of the period, the major competitor in the struggle to take control of the Russian market was Poland-Lithuania. The conflict pattern was complex, though, because to the south of Sweden, Denmark was the main adversary in the struggle for political-cum-commercial hegemony. However, the Swedish kings recognized an asset: a rising power at the North Sea coast, the Dutch Republic. King Charles IX (r. 1599–1611) and his son and successor Gustavus Adolphus (r. 1611–1632) recognized that their ambitions were compatible with Dutch aspirations in the region. Dutch entrepreneurs, including many Walloons with whom they were associated (such as Louis De Geer), arrived in Sweden by the late sixteenth century as developers of the iron mining industry. In order to

4 See Scander, ‘Holländarnas Göteborg’.

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attract Dutch capital to the Swedish weapons industry and link Sweden to the overseas trade routes opened by the Dutch, King Charles IX founded in the early seventeenth century a ‘Dutch’ city at the mouth of the Göta River, which was Swe‐ den’s only outlet to the North Sea. The members of the city’s government, whom he appointed in 1609, were all Dutch. The judicial and administrative language in the new city was Dutch. There are many dedicated studies of both Dutch and Wal‐ loon settlement in Sweden at this time.5 Fredric Bedoire, himself of Huguenot de‐ scent, has pointed to an important ideological factor behind the establishment of this Dutch enclave and behind the settlement in Sweden of Huguenots in early seventeenth-century Sweden: During the reign of Charles IX between 1604 and 1611, Calvinism became an important factor when choosing immigrants. […] Charles IX paved the way for the largescale immigration of Walloons by opening the door, not only to Willem De Besche, but also to his father and three brothers, all of whom were industrialists and master builders.6 The original Gothenburg had been exempted from taxes for twenty years and its burghers were exempted from custom fees in the Sound. However, it was destroyed by Danish forces during the 1611–1613 Kalmar War between Sweden and Denmark. It was re-founded by Gustavus Adolphus in 1619 and bestowed city privileges in 1621. Sweden’s war with Denmark ended in the Peace of Knäred in 1613. In conse‐ quence, Sweden had to pay a huge indemnity, ‘the ransom for Älvsborg’. The enormous amount of money, one million riksdaler specie, could be raised only in the Dutch Republic. The agent who handled the credits was the Liège born, but Amsterdam-based banker and entrepreneur, Louis De Geer. By the time of the Peace of Knäred, Sweden was involved in the struggle to establish a foothold in Novgorod/Muscovy, in fierce competition with PolandLithuania. In this situation co-operation with the Dutch Republic became cru‐ cially important. In the year 1614 a treaty was concluded by Sweden and the Dutch Republic. In this treaty, which was signed on 5 April 1614 in The Hague, it was decided that the two countries would exchange resident ambassadors. The treaty was signed by the Swedish king on 28 July and by the States General on 11 December 1614. In 1615 the United Provinces took upon themselves the role as mediators in the Swedish-Russian negotiations. Another mediator was King James of Great Britain whom both Gustavus Adolphus and Tsar Mikhail accredited with success‐ ful mediation between Sweden and Muscovy in the war that had started in 1610 with the Swedish conquest of Novgorod in 1611 as an immediate effect.

5 For the Walloon migration to Sweden see especially Douhan, ‘Vallonerna i Sverige’. 6 Bedoire, ‘Religion, Entrepreneurship, and Architecture’, p. 112.

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Figure 3.2. The Dutch town plan for Gothenburg with canals for trade and transports. Plan drawn in 1624 by Heinrich Thome, a military engineer and cartographer in Swedish service in 1624–1635. Krigsarkivet, Stockholm.

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A Strategic Rivalry: Sweden and Muscovy The plight of Russia at the time of the Swedish acquisition of Novgorod in the period known as the Time of Troubles (Smuta) has made a lasting impact in Russian historical memory. In contemporary Russia there are several monuments and other reminiscences of the 1612 war with Poland-Lithuania, the Russian triumph in which heralded the end of the Smuta and paved the way for the election of Mikhail Romanov as Tsar in the following year, 1613. The Swedish-Muscovite contest had begun in earnest already in 1555, to continue in 1558 with the first Livonian War and lasted for the remaining of the sixteenth century. Ivan IV ‘the Terrible’ was the main actor on the Muscovite side until his death in 1584. The conflict concerned not only the former Teutonic province of Livonia (which included Estonia) but also Finland, the eastern part of Sweden. The designation of Grand Duchy was bestowed on Finland about 1580 because Duke John (King of Sweden as John III in 1568–1592), should appear as equal in rank to his Russian counterpart, the Grand Duke of Muscovy. Novgorod had a central role in the conflicts between Sweden, Denmark, Poland-Lithuania, and Muscovy over access to the Russian market in the wake of the disappearance of the Teutonic Order and the decline of the Hanseatic League. From a Swedish point of view, Novgorod was geographically closer than Moscow and thus of direct strategic and geopolitical importance. There were also ancient historical connections with the city-state ‘Sir Novgorod the Great’, as it was known — the Russian name was Gospodin Velikii Novgorod: there were other ‘Novgorod’ — ‘New City’ — in ancient Rus, but none of the same significance. There were also reminiscences of the Rurik dynasty, which had become extinct in 1598 with the death of Ivan IV’s son but from both sides was considered to be of Swedish origin. When it came to aspirations for political power, thinking in dynastic lineages mattered. The importance of this dimension was fairly evident in the contemporary struggle between the Vasa dynasties in Sweden and Poland-Lithuania over the right to the Swedish throne. In 1606, King Charles IX contacted Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii of Muscovy in order to gain an ally against Poland. In 1608, the Tsar reacted in a positive way and asked the king to help him defend Novgorod and Moscow. The following year, the Swedish king and the Muscovite tsar concluded a defensive alliance. A Swedish army under Jacob De la Gardie marched via Novgorod to Moscow. However, in 1610 the Polish army defeated the Swedish and Russian forces outside Moscow. Shuiskii was dethroned and the Polish prince Władysław, King Sigismund’s son, was elected Tsar. The Swedes concentrated their interest on Novgorod. In 1611, Jacob De la Gardie occupied the city and was recognized by the local leaders as its protector. The idea was that one of the sons of Charles IX should become Tsar of Novgorod and that Muscovy should be offered the opportunity to join in. In Russian and Soviet historiography it has been usual to stress that the Swedes were foreign occupiers that took advantage of Russia’s weakness in the Time of Troubles. Some Russian historians, however, draw attention to the facts

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that the Swedish troops fought on the side of Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii, and that when Jacob De la Gardie laid siege to Novgorod there existed a pro-Swedish party within the city. In the 1930s the Soviet historian Zamyatin wrote about an alliance between Novgorod and Sweden in 1611–1615. His articles were not published until the 2010s.7 The Swedish interest in controlling Novgorod concerned, among other things, trade policy. The new Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus, instructed the Swedish negotiators in 1613 to make clear that if his brother Charles Philip was elected Grand Duke of Novgorod, ‘no foreign nation, neither Germans, Danes, Poles nor subjects of the Polish Crown, Dutchmen, Englishmen, Scots nor others would be allowed thereafter to engage in any trade in Russia via the Baltic, neither with Pskov, Novgorod, or other places’.8 If Charles Philip was not elected, Pskov and Novgorod should be placed under Swedish command. Only Swedes, Finns, and Livonians should be allowed to trade with the two Russian cities. Ships from Novgorod should have to go to Viborg in the Gulf of Finland and to Åbo on the southwest coast of Finland and deliver their goods there. Those from Pskov should go to Stockholm. If all these plans came to nothing, Sweden would instead demand the right to stop merchants of other nations approaching the Russian market by way of Archangel or Baltic ports.9 Murdoch underlines that these instructions were very strange, since Merrick was one of the intermediaries on behalf of the Stuart Court and had a prominent role in the English Muscovy Company. Moreover, Murdoch adds, what would the Danish king Christian IV say, given he viewed the north route into Archangel around Finnmark as his territorial waters?10 However, whereas the Treaty of Stolbovo gave Sweden additional territories in the east, the plans to incorporate Novgorod and Pskov were not fulfilled.

Mediator and Model: The Peace of Stolbovo and the Dutch Impact on Sweden The Dutch Baltic project suited the Swedish ambitions well. The Peace of Stol‐ bovo in February 1617 was preceded by the truce in Dederino in February 1616, which can be viewed as producing the blueprint of the ensuing treaty. The Swedish historian Sune Hildebrand writes in his comment on the report on the 7 Замятин, ‘Выступление новгородцев’ [Zamiatin, ‘Rising of the People of Novgorod’]; ‘Борьба за унию Новгорода со Швецией’ [‘The Struggle for a Union of Novgorod and Sweden’]; ‘Посольство архимандрита Киприана’ [‘The Embassy of Archimandrite Kiprian’]. I thank Elisabeth Löfstrand, Stockholm University, for drawing my attention to these works. 8 Gustavus Adolphus’s instruction for Swedish negotiators, June 1613, Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Diplomatica Muscovitica, vol. 17. 9 Gustavus Adolphus’s instruction for Swedish negotiators, June 1613, Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Diplomatica Muscovitica, vol. 17. 10 Steve Murdoch, comment in personal communication.

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Figure 3.3. A mid-seventeenth-century fluyt. Probably first developed in Hoorn in about 1590, this economical purpose-built cargo vessel gave the Dutch a significant trading advantage. Engraving by Wenceslaus Hollar (1607–1677). The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto.

negotiations by the Dutch deurwaarder (bailiff) and member of the Dutch mis‐ sion to Dederino in 1615–1616, Anthonis Goeteeris, that the Dutch contributed to the Swedish success at Stolbovo because they were impartial, unlike Merrick who was pro-Russian; King Gustavus Adolphus bestowed them with tokens of his appreciation, Hildebrand adds.11 Thus the Dutch were impartial in a special man‐ ner, in a manner which certainly helped strengthening the newly formed DutchSwedish liaison.12 The United Provinces aimed at securing free trade for themselves in the Baltic Sea region. In the instruction for the Dutch envoys to the Swedish-Muscovite negotiations at Dederino in 1615–1616, the aim was spelled out, i.e. to safeguard free shipping, trade and trafficking in all kinds of goods.13 The leader of the Dutch mission, Reinoud van Brederode, could report in August 1616 — i.e. before the final peace negotiations had resulted in the Treaty of Stolbovo — that the mission

11 Hildebrand, ‘Inledning’, p. xii. 12 It may be worth noting in this context that a leading diplomat on the Swedish side was the Dutch philologist and jurist Jan Rutgers, who had been recruited by the Swedish ambassador to the States General, Dr Jacob van Dijck who was to become burggrave in Gothenburg. 13 ‘Vrye Navigatie, handelinge ende traficque van alle sorten van goederen, soo int inbrengen ende verhandelen, als oock int Innecoopen, ende uytvoeren in alle vryheyt’ (quoted after Blom and Bas-Backer, Op reis voor vrede, p. 19).

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had been successful. There was now a cease-fire in the previous theatre of war and the Seven Provinces had proved to be the ‘belangrijkste handelsmacht in de Oost‐ zee’, eclipsing Sweden.14 This must, however, be seen as an exaggeration of the Dutch role and a diminishing of England’s role. Acknowledging the importance of the Dutch influence on Sweden and Russia it is important to take cognizance of the fact that the initiative in both cases came from the receiving end. Charles IX and Gustavus Adolphus actively recruited Dutch, Germans, Walloons, Englishmen, Scots, and French merchants, bankers, and industrialists. In his first Great Embassy in 1697, Peter I visited the Nether‐ lands to study and learn about city planning and ship building. As a result of the Dutch impact, both Gothenburg and St Petersburg adopted Amsterdam’s pattern of streets and canals. The church at the Peter and Paul Fortress in St Petersburg and the Christinae church in Gothenburg had Dutch Protestant style elements: the Christinae church was even built with Dutch bricks. These two historical events, the foundation of Gothenburg in the early seven‐ teenth century and of St Petersburg in the early eighteenth century belong to one and the same history. The issue was hegemony in the Baltic Sea region and first the Swedish kings and thereafter the Russian tsar believed that to emulate Amster‐ dam would be reasonable as a means to attain this goal. There were certainly other cultural influences and other actors of consequence in the Baltic Sea region in the seventeenth century. However, it is reasonable to highlight the historical trajectory Amsterdam — Gothenburg — St Petersburg. The resemblance of the design is there for all to see. In this context, the Dutch impact on Danzig/Gdańsk, Copen‐ hagen, Potsdam and Kristianstad does not have a similar historical significance. The foundations of Gothenburg and St Petersburg were from scratch (this is true also of Kristianstad, but the town never achieved the importance of the other two). Whereas Gothenburg was the earliest visible sign of the Dutch impact on Sweden, the most significant actor was Louis De Geer (1587–1652) who moved from Amsterdam to Sweden in 1627. He came from the Calvinist brethren in the Liège region and did not establish himself in Amsterdam until 1615.15 His contribution to the modernization of Sweden was such that the Swedish historian Eli Heckscher, with a slight overstatement, argued that it was doubtful whether any other individual had exerted such an economic influence on Sweden as De Geer. It would be easier to say what he did not control than to enumerate all the enterprises under his influence.16 He owned iron mines and iron works, brass foundries and ship yards, and also engaged in large scale farming. He gave Swedes

14 ‘The main trading power in the Baltic’ (translation by editors), Blom and Bas-Backer, Op reis voor vrede, p. 79. 15 Bedoire, ‘Religion, Entrepreneurship, and Architecture’, p. 111. 16 Heckscher, Svenskt arbete och liv, p. 132.

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Figure 3.4. The German Church in Stockholm. Engraving by Eric Åkerland. From Fant and Lüdeke, Dissertatio Historica de Ecclesia Teutonica. Photo: Gideon Horn, Lund University Library.

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schooling in new technologies. He was the biggest creditor and financier of the Swedish Crown.17 In their introductory chapter to the new edition of Goeteeris’s travelogue, Frans Blom and Peter Bas-Backer observe that the Amsterdam ‘tycoons’ Louis De Geer and the Trip family, thanks to their role in granting Sweden credits, could take control of the Swedish mining and copper industry and create a mighty commercial empire in Sweden.18 In Swedish historical textbooks, the growth of a modern bourgeoisie in eighteenth-century Sweden is attributed to the entrepreneurial skills of ‘Skepps‐ broadeln’ (The Waterfront Aristocracy). The reference is to the inner harbour of Stockholm’s old city, its quays lined with the palaces of the merchants. Some sustained close family bonds with Dutch families in Amsterdam. The role of Gothenburg in Swedish economic, technological, and cultural history remained paramount. Long after the actual Dutch flavor had evaporated, Gothenburg remained a liberal and, as it were, ‘progressive’ city as Anders Ham‐ marlund makes clear in his book on Gothenburg in the nineteenth century.19 The city attracted Scots and Jews, who in the late eighteenth century were allowed to settle in Gothenburg (and three other cities).20 Murdoch underlines that Scots were there from the foundation, both as council members, and as naturalized Swedes.21 The iron works in mid-Sweden are still a visible heritage from the Dutch pe‐ riod of Swedish industrialization. Murdoch remarks that Walloons, Germans, and Scots were equally important as the Dutch. An interesting case of a fusion of the Calvinist and the Jewish contributions to Sweden’s modernization materialized in the iron works at Gysinge. The factory had been part of the Grill mining empire. In 1820 an immigrant Jew to Stockholm from Saxony, a banker and jeweler at the Swedish Royal Court, Michael Benedicks, bought Gysinge, thus confirming his position as a respected member of Swedish society. The seller, a Jean Fredric Bedoire, was a descendant of a French Huguenot family. In Sweden, Huguenots had integrated with their Calvinist brethren from the Netherlands.22 The first Calvinists to be ennobled and enter Riddarhuset (the House of the Nobility) — and establish an open Calvinist congregation — were, however, Scots in the 1620s and 1630s, indeed a whole decade before De Geer held ‘private meetings’ in his house.23 The Calvinists from the Netherlands and France, and Jews from Germany and Denmark played a paramount role in the creation of the

Utterström, ‘Nederländska köpmän’, pp. 176–79. Blom and Bas-Backer, Op reis voor vrede, p. 31. See also Muller, The Merchant Houses of Stockholm. Hammarlund, A Prayer for Modernity, pp. 7–8. On Jewish impact on architecture in Gothenburg, see Bedoire, The Jewish Contribution to Modern Architecture, pp. 454–91. 21 Grosjean and Murdoch, ‘The Scottish Community in Seventeenth-Century Gothenburg’. 22 Bedoire, Hugenotternas värld, pp. 34–36. 23 Murdoch, ‘Scottish Calvinists and Swedish Diplomacy: The Case of Sir James Spens of Wormiston’.

17 18 19 20

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material and cultural basis of modern Sweden — of course other people were important as well. The Jews and the Calvinists were a minority, particularly the Jews, but their contributions were crucial. Moreover, they were accepted as belonging to the success story of Sweden by later historians because what they accomplished was depicted as precisely that which shaped modern Swedish industry and culture. Their accomplishments were seen as so Swedish that historians did not even bother to mention that they were immigrants. ‘Walloons’ and ‘Jews’ were, at the close of the nineteenth century, merely exotic labels. While Murdoch has pointed out that the number of Jews was indeed far smaller than the number of Walloons present, neither group was singled out as such by Swedish historians when refer‐ ring to their accomplishments.24 They were merely recognized as Swedish in a way that, from personal experience, I do not believe would be so likely now, under the influence of identity politics. Thus, the long-term social impact of the contributions to the Swedish econ‐ omy by De Geer and his compatriots in Sweden was great. The Calvinist-inspired iron works, where workers and their families were taken care of from cradle to grave and generations of workers’ dynasties came to work and live, are one of the foundations of the both class-conscious and reformist Swedish workers’ movement which emerged in the late nineteenth century and was the political hegemon from the 1930s into the 1970s, the era of the establishment of the Swedish welfare society.

Passing the Baton: St Petersburg as a Swedish-Dutch Outpost The Swedish Slavicist Per-Arne Bodin has highlighted the fact that, in a letter to Charles IX in 1611, the Assembly of Novgorod draws attention to the fact that the Russian Rurik dynasty has its origins among the same Varagians as the Swedish Vasa dynasty. Bodin comments: If half-democratic Novgorod, the only Russian city in the Hanseatic League, had taken the lead, the Russian state and Russian history might have looked different. Although Novgorod’s semi-independence had been brought to an end by Moscow’s conquest in 1477, the memory of its different kind of statehood had remained. In the early seventeenth century, Sweden called on this Russian identity which was more Western, more bourgeois and more interested in trade and international contacts.25 24 Pers. comm. with Murdoch. 25 Author’s own translation from Bodin, Ryssland. Idéer och identiteter, p. 141: ‘Om det halvdemokratiska Novgorod som var ensam rysk stad i Hansan hade tagit täten, hade den ryska staten och den ryska historien kanske sett annorlunda ut. Novgorods halvt självständiga ställning hade upphört vid Moskvas erövring av staden 1477, men minnet av denna annorlunda ryska statstanke fanns kvar. Till

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The Swedish plans for Novgorod and Pskov can be interpreted as an attempt to westernize the Russian state a century before Peter I ventured upon his project. Novgorod could be said to have passed the relay baton on to Peter. When he had founded his capital, the Novgorod Prince Alexander Nevskii, who according to the Russian chronicles had defeated a Swedish invasion army on the Neva in 1240, became the patron saint of St Petersburg and his holy relics were brought there by Peter. The Finnish historian Max Engman has given the label ‘the Stockholm period’ to Baltic history in the seventeenth century. However, Engman significantly adds that viewed in a broader perspective the proper label would rather be ‘the Amster‐ dam period’. Dutch pre-eminence was reflected in the fact that the Dutch language supplanted Low German as the main commercial language.26 ‘The ‘Stockholm period’ was, in Engman’s terminology, succeeded by ‘the St Petersburg period’. From a Russian perspective it has been argued that the Dutch contribution to Swedish and Russian modernization was part of a dialectical process where Muscovy played an important role. Usually, Russia has been cast in a rather passive role when it comes to modernization and societal development in general. It is significant that the founding of St Petersburg has been considered to be the inauguration of both the ‘Westernization’ and the ‘Europeanization’ of Russia. However, if the perspective is changed it might be argued that Muscovy’s challenge to Swedish supremacy in the Baltic spurred the military, administrative and economic modernization of Sweden. Sweden had to outperform Muscovy in the competitive race for control over the eastern Baltic shore which the Swedes simply referred to as ‘the Seaside’ (Sjökanten). Moreover, it has even been argued by the Soviet Russian historian Boris Porshnev, that Muscovy’s foreign and military policies contributed to the rise of the United Provinces. In all his writings, Porshnev stressed that political, economic, and cultural history cannot be understood if the analysis is confined to separate states. Instead, it is necessary to view Europe as a historical system of states. In 1948, Porshnev published a book devoted especially to Russia’s place and role in early modern European history. He described Muscovy’s struggle against the Teutonic Order and thereafter against the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation as a crucial factor for the victory of the bourgeois revolution in Western Europe. Porshnev argued that Tsar Ivan IV certainly did not intentionally act to help the Dutch revolution against the Habsburgs. According to Porshnev, Muscovy despised the Dutch rebels and fought them diplomatically. However, Muscovy’s pressure on Europe weakened the Habsburgs and thus made the Dutch revolution possible.

denna annorlunda ryska identitet, mera västerländsk, mera borgerlig och mera inriktad på handel och internationella kontakter appellerade Sverige i början av 1600-talet’. 26 Engman, Petersburgska vägar, pp. 22–23.

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The pattern was repeated during the Thirty Years’ War.27 Without Muscovy’s support to Sweden against the Catholic forces, claims Porshnev, the German Empire would not have been defeated. Muscovy thus contributed to the triumph of ‘the progressive forces’, i.e., the Protestant powers of Sweden and The Dutch Republic.28 St Petersburg and Gothenburg have the same Amsterdam ancestry and St Petersburg owes something, if not to Gothenburg then to that Swedish mod‐ ernization project of which Gothenburg was a beginning. Seventeenth-century Sweden actually was a model for eighteenth-century Russia. In his dissertation, the Swedish legal historian Claes Peterson showed that Peter I copied the Swedish administrative system and tried to organize the Russian administration accord‐ ingly.29 It is appropriate to compare the role of Gothenburg as a powerful external fac‐ tor in Sweden’s economic and cultural development, especially if the city is viewed as an emblem for the role of integrated and assimilated foreigners in general, with the role of St Petersburg in the economic and cultural development of Russia.30 The renowned Soviet Russian literary scholar Yurii Lotman, who came from Leningrad (St Petersburg) but spent his academic career at the University of Tartu in Estonia (the university in Tartu being the successor to the Swedish Academy in Dorpat, which was founded in 1632 by Gustavus Adolphus), has written much on this topic. He has called attention to another dimension: St Petersburg was situated at the geographical periphery of Russia. The city constituted a border zone between European culture in general and the specific Russian traditional culture. In a similar manner, Gothenburg was situated at the periphery of Sweden and became a border zone between early modern European culture and the traditional Swedish culture. Thus it is possible to argue that Gothenburg’s location and its original relation to Swedish culture was similar to the role of St Petersburg in Russia. The following history became, however, somewhat different. Whereas Gothenburg remained a vanguard city in the modernization of Sweden in the nineteenth century, it did not become the capital of Sweden and was fairly well integrated into Swedish society, St Petersburg remained alien in the Russian cultural environment and in the symbolic universe of Russian thinking. According to Lotman’s analysis, the city was viewed both as embodying the victory of reason over the elements and

27 So it goes in Porshnev’s work. Steve Murdoch [personal communication] notes that ‘this is an astonishing assertion’. And that is the point! In the context of the subject of this article I think that it is informative to present the viewpoint of Soviet scholars. 28 Поршнев, ‘К вопросу о месте России’ [Porshnev, ‘On the Place of Russia’]. For Porshnev’s thesis, see also Porshnev, Muscovy and Sweden in the Thirty Years’ War. 29 Peterson, Peter the Great’s Administrative and Judicial Reforms. 30 In personal communication with the author, Murdoch has correctly argued that Stockholm was more advanced than Gothenburg at the time, but the point I am seeking to make is about the similarities between Gothenburg and St Petersburg as projects of modernization, even if that word was not used at the time.

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as constituting a break with the order of nature, in its capacity both as a rosy utopia and as an evil, even diabolical, illusion. According to the contemporaneous baroque interpretation of the message of Falconet’s Bronze statue of Peter I from 1782, the snake under the horse symbolized the hatred, the enmity, and the hindrances that Peter had to overcome in order to accomplish his modernization of Russia. According to Russian religious tradition, the snake was Anti-Christ and in the actual context with the horse and the horseman it symbolized the end of the world. This interpretation said that the Devil had helped Peter build his city against the order of Nature and thus had violated Russia.31 During the nineteenth century, St Petersburg was still perceived as the oppo‐ site to the Russian city Moscow. Yurii Lotman is keen to add that the city played a dynamic role and really functioned as the modernizing centre of Russia — much as Gothenburg did in Sweden, one may add.

Bringing Russia in — An Eternal Mission Although the meteorological and hydrological causes are different, the Russians share with the Dutch the experience of floods, as is evident from Pushkin’s poem ‘The Bronze Horseman’. It was not only the Dutch masters but also their Swedish, Danish, German, and Polish disciples who learned to live with the threat of floods — as well as Gothenburg and St Petersburg, Copenhagen, Potsdam, and Gdansk were partly rebuilt on the Dutch model. However, the Russians never really mastered this art, neither during imperial times nor Soviet times. In Pushkin’s poem, the sea is a foe, not a friend. For the Dutch it is a challenge, and also a companion. The difference in the perception of the role of water for society is borne out by the design of two major engineering projects in the post-war era. In 1953, the Netherlands were hit by a storm flood which caused immense inundation and major destruction. It was a kind of an echo from the founding period, i.e., from the Elizabeth Flood. The Dutch answer this time was to engage in a major project to protect the country from future catastrophes of this kind by building a system of dikes with locks on the delta of the Schelde estuary. Great care was taken not to let the huge dams interfere with vegetation and wildlife. It is only after warnings of a coming storm flood that the locks are closed and the natural course of the water is temporarily disturbed. At intervals, St Petersburg has been flooded by water driven in by western winds from the Gulf of Finland. In the 1970s the Soviet authorities decided to ad‐ dress the situation once and for all by constructing a huge dam across the Gulf on both sides of the island where the naval base Kronstadt is situated. Construction work dragged on for decades, but by the time the dam was half-finished it became evident that it really was a dam. The only outlet to the open sea was not enough

31 Лотман, ‘Символика Петербурга’ [Lotman, ‘The Symbolism of Petersburg’], pp. 34–37.

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Figure 3.5. The Bronze Horseman, an equestrian statue of Peter the Great. Commissioned by Catherine the Great, created by the French sculptor Étienne Maurice Falconet and opened in 1782. The snake symbolizes the enemies of Peter and his reforms, but also serves to maintain the static balance of the sculpture. Photo: Andrei Smekalov.

to ensure the circulation and exchange of water. Most of the pollution from the city remained inside the dam — or wall — thus causing great damage to wildlife and human health. The Leningrad dam, as it was called, was built by people used to regarding the sea as an enemy to be kept out. The water’s revenge was the pollu‐ tion of the city. In the 1990s, the Leningrad dam, now the St Petersburg dam, remained half-built. Construction was not completed until 2011. This may symbolize the point at which St Petersburg entered the twenty-first century as a modern city. It seemed that a new round of Westernization was reaching Russia in the northwest. The original ‘European’ city of Novgorod, so to speak, naturally born in Varangian times as a joint Slavic-Scandinavian commercial centre, and the likewise ‘Euro‐ pean’ city of St Petersburg, constructed by Peter with the aim of letting Russia join ‘Europe’, may be regarded as one historical whole, i.e., what contemporary Sweden has christened ‘northwest Russia’. This time, maybe the ancient Swedish dream of taking command of the Russian market will come true. If so, that happy

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conclusion to the age of Baltic empires will be another legacy of the Dutch influence on Sweden as well. The three Baltic empires of the Dutch, the Swedes, and the Russians belong to the past. Today, Russia is a military superpower, but in political, economic, and cultural terms it does not have hegemony in the Baltic region. The Netherlands and Sweden have been reduced to small powers in military terms, but their reputation as successful welfare states remains strong. At the time of writing, it seems as if the pattern of the seventeenth century may be repeated,32 but not as a struggle for empire. This time the challenge for the Netherlands and for Sweden is to try to contribute to the aims of some Russians to make Russia ‘European’ at last, if not as a prospective member of the European Union, then at least as part of the informal but real European community of nations. However, all this can only take place if and when the backlash of the Putin era has been happily overcome. Boris Porshnev had a point when he argued that it does not make sense to write about a state as an isolated entity. Trade, warfare, and culture cannot be contained within strict political boundaries. Once upon a time, Novgorod, Amsterdam, Gothenburg, and St Petersburg were parts of a complex, supra-state cultural and commercial system. The medieval European city of Novgorod which emerged in Varangian times as a joint Slavic-Scandinavian commercial centre, and the early modern European city of St Petersburg, constructed by Peter with the aim of letting Russia join Europe, may hopefully be succeeded by a democratic Russian state. Out of the blue, on 17 July 2014, a sudden bolt seriously injured DutchRussian relations. This occurred four months after the Russian conquest of the Crimea and the ensuing Russian insurgency in eastern Ukraine, all of which had put an end to all West European dreams of Russia becoming a civilized, democratic state. On this fateful day in July 2014, a Malaysia Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur crashed in eastern Ukraine near the Russian border. In 2016 a Dutch-led investigation concluded that the powerful surface-to-air missile system used to shoot down the plane and killing all 298 on board, half of whom were Dutch citizens, was trucked in from Russia at the request of Russian-backed separatists and returned to Russia the same night. The report largely confirmed the Russian government’s already widely documented role not only in the deployment of the missile system — called a Buk, or SA-11 — but also in the subsequent cover-up.33 In spite of this recent serious backlash in Russia’s quest for modernization, the ancient Swedish and Dutch mission may be crowned with success if the successors of Vladimir Putin recognize that it was not the Devil that helped Peter build his city against the order of Nature, violating Russia. It was civilized Europe that greeted Russia with a welcome.

32 This article was written prior to the full-scale attack on Ukraine launched by Russia in 2022. 33 Sengupta and Kramer, ‘Dutch Inquiry Links Russia to 298 Deaths’.

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Works Cited Manuscripts and Archival Sources Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Diplomatica Muscovitica, vol. 17: Handlingar ang. hertig Karl Filips val till rysk tsar 1613–1615 Secondary Studies Bedoire, Fredric, Hugenotternas värld. Från religionskrigens Frankrike till Skeppsbroadelns Stockholm (Stockholm: Bonnier, 2009) ———, ‘Religion, Entrepreneurship, and Architecture’, in The Swedes & the Dutch Were Made for Each Other. 400 Years of Swedish-Dutch Relations, ed. by Kristian Gerner (Lund: Historiska Media, 2014), pp. 111–39 ———, The Jewish Contribution to Modern Architecture, 1830–1930, trans. by Roger Tanner ( Jersey City, NJ: KTAV Publishing House, 2004) Blom, Frans R. E., and Peter W. A. Bas-Backer, Op reis voor vrede met het Journael van de Nederlandse vredesmissie naar Zweden en Rusland, 1615–1616 (Zuthpen: Walburg, 2014) Bodin, Per-Arne, Ryssland. Idéer och identiteter (Skellefteå: Norma, 2000) Douhan, Bernt, ‘Vallonerna i Sverige’, Fataburen (1981), 66–90 Engman, Max, Petersburgska vägar (Esbo: Schildts, 1995) Fant, Eric Michael, and Johan Anton August Lüdeke, Dissertatio Historica de Ecclesia Teutonica et templo S:tae Gertrudis Stockholmiensi (Uppsala: Edman, 1791) Grosjean, Alexia, and S. Murdoch, ‘The Scottish Community in Seventeenth-Century Gothenburg’, in Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period, ed. by Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions, 107 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 191–223 Hammarlund, Anders, A Prayer for Modernity. Politics and Culture in the World of Abraham Baer (1834–1894) (Stockholm: Svenskt visarkiv, 2013), online at: [accessed 11 June 2021] Heckscher, Eli, Svenskt arbete och liv: från medeltiden till nutiden (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1941) Hildebrand, Sune, ‘Inledning’, in En holländsk beskicknings resor i Ryssland, Finland och Sverige 1615–1616, Anthonis Goeteeris, trans. by Sune Hildebrand (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1917), pp. ix–xv Israel, Jonathan Irvine, The Dutch Republic. Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) Jönsson, Arne, ‘Lunds universitets grundande’, in Att dikta för livet, döden och evigheten. Tillfällesdiktning under tidigmodern tid, ed. by Arne Jönsson, Valborg Lindgärde, Daniel Möller, and Arsenii Vetushko-Kalevich (Gothenburg: Makadam, 2020), pp. 645–65

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Muller, Leo, The Merchant Houses of Stockholm, C. 1640–1800. A Comparative Study of Early-modern Entrepreneurial Behaviour, Studia historica Upsaliensia, 188 (Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 1998) Murdoch, Steve, ‘Scottish Calvinists and Swedish Diplomacy: The Case of Sir James Spens of Wormiston’, in Confessional Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe, ed. by Roberta Anderson and Charlotte Backerra, Routledge Studies in Renaissance and Early Modern Worlds of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2020) Peterson, Claes, Peter the Great’s Administrative and Judicial Reforms. Swedish Antecedents and the Process of Reception, Rättshistoriskt bibliotek, 29 (Stockholm: Institutet för rättshistorisk forskning, 1979) Porshnev, Boris F., Muscovy and Sweden in the Thirty Years’ War, 1630–1635, ed. by Paul Dukes, trans. by Brian Pearce (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) Scander, ‘Holländarnas Göteborg’, Fataburen (1981), 91–114 Schama, Simon, The Embarrassment of Riches. An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Ages (London: Fontana, 1987) Sengupta, Somini, and Andrew E. Kramer, ‘Dutch Inquiry Links Russia to 298 Deaths in Explosion of Jetliner Over Ukraine’, New York Times, 28 September 2016 [accessed 10 October 2016] Utterström, Gustaf, ‘Nederländska köpmän’, in Den svenska historien, iv: Gustav Adolfs och Kristinas tid 1611–1654, ed. by Sten Carlsson and Jerker Rosén (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1967), pp. 173–79 White, Hayden V., Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978) Замятин, Герман Андреевич, ‘Борьба за унию Новгорода со Швецией в 1614 году’ [Zamiatin, German Andreevich, ‘The Struggle for a Union of Novgorod and Sweden in 1614’], Новгородский исторический сборник [Novgorod Historical Miscellany], 14/24 (2014), 392–469 ———, ‘Выступление новгородцев против первого царя из дома Романовых в 1613 году’ [‘The Rising of the People of Novgorod against the First Tsar of the House of Romanov in 1613’], Новгородский исторический сборник [Novgorod Historical Miscellany], 13/23 (2013), 422–81 ———, ‘Посольство архимандрита Киприана, Я. Боборыкина и М. Муравьёва из Новгорода в Москву в 1615 году’ [‘The Embassy of Archimandrite Kiprian, Yakov Boborykin and Matvei Murav´ev from Novgorod to Moscow in 1615’], Новгородский исторический сборник [Novgorod Historical Miscellany], 15/25 (2015), 350–412 Лотман, Юрий Михайлович, ‘Символика Петербурга и проблемы семиотики города’ [Lotman, Yurii Mikhailovich, ‘The Symbolism of Petersburg and the Problems of Urban Semiotics’], Труды по знаковым системам [Sign System Studies], 18 (1984), 30–45 Поршнев, Борис Федорович, ‘К вопросу о месте России в системе европейских государств в XV–XVIII вв.’ [Porshnev, Boris Fedorovich, ‘On the Place of Russia in the System of European States in the 15th–17th Centuries’], Ученые записки Академии общественных наук [Transactions of the Academy of Social Sciences], 2 (1948), 5–34

STEfAN TROEBST 

Cartographic Knowledge and Geographic Ignorance Karelia and the Cap of the North in the Swedish Imagination around 1600

Before Gustavus Adolphus ratified the Peace Treaty of Stolbovo on 1 May 1617, which was concluded on 27 February the same year, he sent a letter on 16 March to Hans Jonsson, the commander of the once again Swedish fortress of Kexholm on the western shore of Lake Ladoga. In his letter, the King gave Jonsson three tasks: first, to go through all ‘old records, accounts, letters, and documents’ in the fortress archives in order to find out ‘how far the county of Kexholm extended in the past and which pogosts (i.e., Muscovite administrative districts) currently belong to it and belonged in the past, also which villages lie in which pogost’. Second, Jonsson should ask elderly people in the region about their knowledge on these matters and to take down details of their answers. And third, Jonsson should either himself embark on a field trip from Kexholm to the north-east of the county or send someone there in order ‘to collect all information on how far the län extends and whether it reaches up to the White Sea’.1 In other words, at that point in time, the Swedish side had no clear idea concerning the territorial extent of what in paragraph 11 of the Stolbovo Treaty was defined as Kexholm ‘with its whole county, land, people, belongings, rents, and rights on land and water, and, without exceptions, with all its privileges and all of its boundaries and landmarks’ and was to be handed over by the Tsar to Sweden.2 Interestingly enough, one of Gustavus Adolphus’s predecessors on the Swedish throne, his uncle John III, throughout the 1580s also gave several orders

1 ‘Till Hans Jonsson att granneligen förfahra om alla Kexholms tillydande rättigheter. Af Stockholm den 16 Martij [1617]’, in: Handlingar upplysande Finlands historia under Gustaf Adolfs tid, ii, 207–08. See also Attman, The Struggle for Baltic Markets, p. 203 n. 20. 2 ‘Fredstraktat mellan Sverge och Ryssland, genom hvilken Ryssland till Sverge afträdde Keksholms län och Ingermanland mot det att Sverge återlemnade sina andra eröfringar. Stolbova, 1617, februari 27’, in Sverges traktater, v.1, 242–69, at p. 251. Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 87–98 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133599

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to find out whether Kexholm county extended to the Barents Sea and/or to the White Sea.3 Eino Jutikkala in his Geschichte Finnlands has listed in detail Gustavus Adol‐ phus’s misperceptions concerning the actual territorial provisions of the Stolbovo Treaty due either to deficient maps or to geographic ignorance.4 Of particular interest is the fact that it was by then unclear to the King whether the treaty provided Sweden with a foothold on the White Sea — an acquisition which would have considerably contributed to the realization of the ‘derivation scheme’ developed by John III forty years earlier, i.e., the scheme to intercept Muscovy’s foreign trade with England and The Dutch Republic via the port of Archangel on the White Sea and to ‘re-route’ it through the Swedish ports on the Gulf of Finland. Behind this Swedish grand design was the hope that by bringing the Russian trade ‘back’ to its former outlet on the Gulf of Finland a steep increase in customs revenues in Narva and Reval would materialize and thus forever solve the financial problems caused by Sweden’s imperial overstretch.5 By 1613 at the latest Gustavus Adolphus had made John III’s concept his own, as his repeated demands for the acquisition of Archangel and other parts of the White Sea region as well as of the Kola Peninsula with its Barents Sea coast demonstrated. The reason why at the end of the protracted negotiations with the Muscovite side and the English and Dutch intermediaries Sweden did not insist on territorial gains in the White Sea region and/or on the Kola Peninsula was obviously a question of priority: to Gustavus Adolphus it was more important to block the Tsar’s access to the Gulf of Finland than to block his foreign trade on the Northern Sea route. There remained, however, the hope that the acquisition of Kexholm county would provide direct access to the southern or western shores of the White Sea and that thus an interception of the northern route to the Russian market would still be possible. However, the distance between the eastern border of the county of Kexholm (which then became the new border between Sweden and Muscovy) and the White Sea was more than two hundred kilometers. On the other hand, one can assume that the Swedish occupation of Novgorod in 1611 resulted in, among other things, the knowledge of the territorial extent of the medieval Republic of Novgorod (господин Великий Новгород in Russian) which indeed included, in addition to Korela, all shores of the White Sea. Yet in the sixteenth century the Votskaja pjatina with its administrative centre Korela — which in 1617 then became Kexholm and Kexholm county — did not extend to the White 3 Attman, Den ryska marknaden i 1500-talets baltiska politik, pp. 419–21, and Attman, The Struggle for Baltic Markets, pp. 168–73 and 181–207. See also Kan, Sverige och Ryssland, pp. 53–62; Szaskolskij, ‘Cele wojen szwedskich’, pp. 43–46; Roberts, The Early Vasas, pp. 267–73, 447–51; Sveriges krig 1611–1636, i, and Almquist, Sverge och Ryssland 1595–1611. 4 Jutikkala, Geschichte Finnlands, p. 125. 5 Attman, ‘Till det svenska Östersjöväldets problematik’, pp. 57–87; Attman, ‘Freden i Stolbova 1617. En aspekt’. On the historiographic controversies over Attman’s argument see Troebst, ‘Debating the Mercantile Background’.

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Sea. The only access to the White Sea via Novgorodian territory was from its Obonezhskaia piatina, i.e., the region around Lake Onega. So what we see in the case of Gustavus Adolphus is on the one hand a striking discrepancy between geopolitical thought and geographic knowledge. This is, according to my hypothe‐ sis, due to the limited cartographical knowledge concerning Karelia and the Cap of the North in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.6 It was commonplace that in the early modern period maps were first of all a medium for fixing and popularizing vested rights and territorial demands. To a much lesser degree they were tools applied in governmental and administrative practice, and even in warfare their role was basically limited to strategic planning, while their importance for military tactics and operations was low. The libraries of the Swedish Vasa kings from Gustavus Vasa to Gustavus Adolphus contained, of course, large numbers of maps, among them, however, few of medium-sized scale. We know, for instance, that the map of the German lands which Gustavus Adolphus had at hand during the battle of Breitenfeld in 1631 showed northern Germany including Mark Brandenburg but not the Electorate of Saxony to the south of it where the action took place. At least Gustavus Adolphus was able to read a map — an ability which he shared with only a few contemporaries. For example, according to a contemporary Russian source, Jacob Pontusson De la Gardie, the Swedish commander-in-chief on the Russian theater of war during the years 1609 to 1616, reportedly confessed in retrospect, regarding the year of 1610 (my translation): If I back then, when I conducted warfare against the Russian State, would have had the means of power and would have been able to read a map, I would not have started the war on this side [i.e., from Karelia — S. T.] but on the Archangel side [i.e., from the White Sea — S. T.], because that is the gate to the Russian State.7 What De la Gardie was talking about was one among many Swedish attacks against Muscovite territories in the years between 1580 and 1614. The Swedish military expeditions went in three directions: first, from Västerbotten over land 6 In the following I draw on my presentation ‘Handelsimperiale Expansion und kartographische Distorsion. Zu einem Problem der schwedischen Nordostpolitik 1553–1617’, given at the Second Symposium of German and Finnish Historians, held on 27 September 1990 in Helsinki. 7 ‘Естли бы де онъ досужъ был, и земляной бы чертежъ розумѣлъ вътѣпоры, какъ онъ воевалъ здѣ въ Русiйскомъ государствѣ, и онъ бы не съ тое стороны началъ войну, а почать было ему съ Архангелогородцкую сторону, потому что то первые ворота Росiйского государства’. See a report by the Dutchman in Muscovite service, Andries Dionysiuszoon Winius, on a conversation in 1646 with the Dutch merchant and industrialist Peter Marselis, who on his behalf reported the content of a conversation with J. P. De la Gardie in Stockholm: ‘Выписка из дела Посольского Приказа, о постройке башен и замкнутии железными цепями Берзовского устья Двины, для воспрепятствования тайному проходу иностранных кораблей’ [An Excerpt from an Act of the Ambassadorial Prikaz on the Construction of Towers and on the Closure of the Berezovoe Mouth of Dvina, to Prevent Secret Passage of Foreign Ships], in Дополнения к актам историческим [Additions to the Historical Acts], iii, 61–65, at p. 64.

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towards the wooden Russian fortress of Kola on the northern shore of the Kola Peninsula; second from Uleåborg/Oulu via the waterways of Central Finland to the Russian fortress of Kem on Onega Bay in the south-western part of the White Sea; and third, from southern Karelia again via rivers to another Russian fortress, the one of Suma, also on Onega Bay. None of these campaigns was successful. Swedish troops were either forced to turn around before they had reached their destination or failed to capture the designed targets or were unable to hold them. In all cases the main reason for these failures was poor logistics due to insufficient knowledge of geography. In some cases, troops ran out of food and/or forage because the calculation of the number of days’ marches turned out to be far too optimistic. In others, it was impossible to transport the artillery needed for shelling Russian fortresses due to difficult terrain. And sometimes the supply situation in places seized was so critical that a retreat had to be ordered. Also, the Swedish naval force assigned to support the expeditionary forces militarily and logistically once they had reached the destinations on the White Sea never succeeded in coming to their rescue since they had no experience in navigating the long way and the difficult waters around the Cap of the North and the Kola Peninsula. The fact that in the process of planning these forays the king and his military advisers seldom had reliable maps to hand contributed to the failure of all these ventures. On the one hand, contemporary maps of Karelia and the Cap of the North were partly products of fantasy, not of autopsy. For instance, cartographers tended to generously put rivers, lakes and mountains on their maps even where there were none, while on the other hand their knowledge of the location of existing rivers, lakes and mountains more often than not was poor. A classical case is the ‘Lacus Albus’ on Olaus Magnus’s famous Carta Marina of 1539, quite obviously a confusion with the White Sea. A ‘Lacus Albus’ appears also on later maps by contemporary European-wide known map-makers like Abraham Ortelius who used Carta Marina as a blueprint. The fact that maps like this had a predominantly political function and less a geographic one, is demonstrated by the fact that Olaus Magnus inserted the Swedish three crowns coat of arms on the northern shore of the Kola Peninsula as well as in the middle of his ‘Lacus Albus’. Another type of contemporary map with partly misleading features was por‐ tolan maps used for navigation, and mostly of Dutch origin. They provided reliable information on coastlines, river outfalls, coastal mountain ranges, etc. yet little or no data on hinterlands. A typical example is Cornelius Doedszoon of Amsterdam’s popular map of Northern Europe, Tabula hydrographica, tum maris Baltici (quod Orientale hodie vocant) tum septentrionalis Oceani navigationem continens … published by Cornelis Claeszoon in 1589.8 It was copied by other

8 Only one copy has survived. It is bound in a copy of Lucas Waghenaer’s Spieghel der Zeevaerdt from 1596. The book is owned by the British Library. This is the copy depicted in Günter Schilder’s article ‘Development and Achievements of Dutch Northern and Arctic Cartography in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, p. 494.

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mapmakers in the years to follow. Two copies of the edition of 1610 are known, one owned by the National Library of Norway (monochrome), the other by the Maritime Museum, Rotterdam (coloured). The two 1610 copies are identical with British Library’s 1589 copy — except for the first part of the text in the cartouche in the upper left corner.9 In Cornelius Doedszoon’s map there are not only no geographic features of the interior of Karelia and the Cap of the North outlined, but also the linear distances from coast to coast are partly misleading. This is true for the isthmus between the northern shore of the Gulf of Bothnia and Kandalaksha Bay on the White Sea. According to Doedszoon’s map its width is some one hundred kilometers while as a matter of fact it is three times that. A somewhat similar case is the map by another Dutchman and merchant active in Muscovy, Simon van Salingen of 1601. Here the interior of the Kola Peninsula is outlined in detail while Finland is misleadingly represented as a predominantly mountainous region. Again, how‐ ever, the isthmus between the Gulf of Bothnia and the White Sea is represented in a manner that makes it far too narrow. This map, too, is the result of politics, and has less to do with any genuine interest in geography. Salingen’s task allotted to him by the Danish king, Christian IV, was to prove that the Cap of the North belonged to Denmark-Norway, not to Sweden — thus the inscription ‘Pars Norvegiae’ on the upper-left corner of the map.10 Both maps, the one by Doedszoon as well as Salingen’s, were in the possession of the Swedish crown and probably used by Charles IX in his military planning of the three campaigns against the northern parts of Muscovy of 1611. Dramatic miscalculations of distances and terrain conditions were the consequence. Knut Håkansson, who commanded an expedition force to the Russian fortress of Kem on the White Sea, reported to the king with blatant criticism: ‘Had I known the region to the degree I know it now, I would have never agreed to go there’.11 The main problem he faced, according to Håkansson, was that the distances to master were much greater than calculated by him on the basis of data received from Stockholm. Accordingly, to reach Kem many more days’ marches were necessary than planned. Before even crossing the border into Russian territory, all supplies were depleted and the expeditionary force was thus compelled to turn around without any contact with the enemy. The degree of Håkansson’s frustration becomes obvious by his message to Charles IX that the one who suggested this campaign to the king must either have taken leave of his senses or was a traitor. This was not the only abortive campaign under Charles IX. In

9 See Ginsberg, Printed Maps of Scandinavia and the Arctic 1482–1601, entry 32: ‘Cornelis Doedsz’, pp. 134–37. 10 Palmén, ‘Simon van Salinghens karta öfver Norden 1601’. See also Salingen, ‘Bericht von der Landschaft Lappia, aufgesetzt 1591’. 11 Knut Håkansson Hand to Charles IX, Uleåborg, 30 April 1611, in Handlingar upplysande Finlands historia under Karl IX:s tid, iii, 151–52. See also Sveriges krig 1611–1636, i, 349–50.

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Figure 4.1. Chart of northern Europe by Cornelis Doedszoon. Second edition, engraved by Johannes a Dotecum and published by Claes Jansz. Visscher in 1610. Nasjonalbiblioteket, Oslo.

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Figure 4.2. Simon van Salingen’s map of Scandinavia, 1601. Kansalliskirjasto, Helsinki.

1609 he had ordered an expeditionary force to Altafjord in Finnmarken which should fell trees there and build two ships to protect the coastline against Danish intruders. This task proved to be impossible since the timberline ran some two hundred kilometers south of the fjord — something obviously unknown in Stock‐ holm by then. And when an expeditionary force did reach the wooden Russian fortress of Kola in 1611, they had not brought artillery for shelling due to the diffi‐ culties of traversing the terrain with it. Accordingly, commander Baltzar Bäck

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returned emptyhanded. ‘You always make a beginning to a campaign, but never a [successful] end’, the king wrote to Bäck.12 The fact that the political and military leadership of the country lacked reliable maps did, however, not mean that such maps did not exist. Tax collectors in charge of the nomadic people in the Cap of the North as well as birkarlar, i.e., merchants doing trade with reindeer herdsmen, possessed profound geographic knowledge which resulted occasionally in maps. For example, a sketch map of 1595 shows how to get on waterways from Oulu (Uleåborg) to Lake Inari and also indicates waterways to the Kola Peninsula and Kandalaksha Bay. Obviously, based on sketch maps like this one, the Swedish state servant Anders Bure compiled his famous map Lapponiae, Bothniae Cajaniaeque, Regni Sveciae Provinciarum Septentrionalium Nova Delineatio published in 1611 — now with realistic proportions and distances. This did of course not prevent Bure from the contemporary habit of putting text or pictures on those parts of the map for which the map-maker had no data. Jonathan Swift’s mock-poem of 1733 was valid also for the early seventeenth century: So geographers in Afric-maps With savage-pictures fill their gaps; And o’er unhabitable downs Place elephants for want of towns.13 Anders Bure did not turn to animals but to calligraphy as in the case of the Kola Peninsula and other territories to the east of Sweden. Still, the degree of his geographic knowledge was greater than most of his contemporaries. In 1611 a larger scale segment of his Laponia map was produced. In it the borderline between Sweden and Muscovy is marked on the terrain and clearly defined. This border was the result of the Teusina Peace Treaty of 1595,14 and that of Stolbovo in 1617 as agreed by a bilateral border commission. Moreover, it represents the first clear illustration of the border on any map produced to that date.15 Bure’s Laponia map then was the basis for his famous map of Northern Europe of 1626 Orbis Arctoi nova et accurata delineatio. While the interior of the Kola Peninsula still had calligraphy instead of geo‐ graphic features, as well as animals and chimeras here and there, this map comes

12 Charles IX to Baltzar Bäck, 27 April and 9 June 1611, in Handlingar upplysande Finlands historia under Karl IX:s tid, iii, 152–53. See also Sveriges krig 1611–1636, i, 349. 13 Swift, On Poetry, p. 12. 14 ‘Fredstraktat mellan Sverge och Ryssland. Vid Narova nedanför Ivangorod vid Teusina, 1595, maj 18’, in Sverges traktater, v.1, 79–91. 15 On the delineation of the Muscovite-Swedish border in the wake of the Stolbovo Treaty see Korhonen, Suomen itärajan syntyhistoria, Селин, Русско-шведская граница [Selin, The RussianSwedish Border], and Ellersieck, ‘The Swedish-Russian Frontier in the Seventeenth Century’. Cf. also Kujala, ‘Sweden’s Russian Lands, Ingria and Kexholm Province’.

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Figure 4.3. ‘Karte über Nord-Finnland (v. J. 1595)’. In: Grotenfelt, ‘Kaksi Pohjois-Suomen ja Kuolanniemen karttaa 1500-luvun lopulta’, annex. See also ‘Karte über die Halbinsel Kola (c. 1600)’ in the same article. Photo: Gideon Horn, Lund University Library.

rather close to today’s cartographic representation of the region. If Gustavus Adol‐ phus would have had this map during the protracted negotiations with the Rus‐ sians and the intermediaries of the Stolbovo Treaty he would have been in a much better bargaining position. With regard to the question of the territorial extent of the county of Kexholm, however, Bure’s Orbis arctoi nova et accurata delineatio would have been of no help since it did not show administrative divisions required to advance the Swedish understanding of the region.

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Figure 4.4. Engraved copy of Andreas Bureus’s 1611 ‘Lapponia’. Photo: Jens Östman, Kungliga Biblioteket.

Figure 4.5. Bureus, Orbis Arctoi nova et accurata delineatio. Kungliga Biblioteket.

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Works Cited Primary Sources Bureus, Andreas, Orbis Arctoi nova et accurata delineatio (Stockholmiae: Reusner, 1626) Handlingar upplysande Finlands historia under Gustaf II Adolfs tid, ii: 1615–1618, ed. by Johan Esaias Waaranen (Helsingfors, 1878) Handlingar upplysande Finlands historia under Karl IX:s tid, vol. 3: 1609–1611, ed. by Johan Esaias Waaranen (Helsingfors: Finska litteratur-sällskapet, 1866) Sverges traktater med främmande magter jämte andra dit hörande handlingar, v.1: 1572–1632, ed. by Olof Simon Rydberg and Carl Hallendorff (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1903) Swift, Jonathan, On Poetry: A Rhapsody (Dublin: [n. pub.], 1733) Дополнения к актам историческим, собранные и изданные Археографическою комиссиею [Additions to the Historical Acts, Collected and Published by the Archaeographical Commission], iii (St Petersburg: Tipografiia II Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1848) Secondary Studies Almquist, Helge, Sverge och Ryssland 1595–1611. Tvisten om Estland, förbundet mot Polen, de ryska gränslandens eröfring och den stora dynastiska planen (Uppsala: [n. pub.], 1907) Attman, Artur, Den ryska marknaden i 1500-talets baltiska politik 1558–1595 (Lund: [n. pub.], 1944) ———, ‘Freden i Stolbova 1617. En aspekt’, Scandia, 19 (1948–1949), 36–47 ———, The Struggle for Baltic Markets. Powers in Conflict 1558–1618, Acta Regiae Societatis scientiarum et litterarum Gothoburgensis. Humaniora, 14 (Gothenburg: Vetenskapsoch vitterhets-samhället, 1979) ———, ‘Till det svenska Östersjöväldets problematik’, in Studier tillägnade Curt Weibull den 19 augusti 1946, ed. by Åke Holmberg, Hans Lennart Lundh, Erik Lönnroth, and Gunnar Olsson (Gothenburg: [n. pub.], 1946), pp. 57–87 Bagrow, Leo, A History of the Cartography of Russia up to 1600, ed. by Henry W. Castner (Wolfe Island, Ont.: Walker, 1975) Ehrensvärd, Ulla, ‘Cartographic Representation of the Scandinavian Arctic Regions’, Arctic, 37 (1984), 552–61 Ellersieck, Heinz, ‘The Swedish-Russian Frontier in the Seventeenth Century. A Commentary’, Journal of Baltic Studies, 5 (1984), 188–97 Ginsberg, William B., Printed Maps of Scandinavia and the Arctic 1482–1601 (New York: Septentrionalium Press, 2006) Grotenfelt, Kustavi, ‘Kaksi Pohjois-Suomen ja Kuolanniemen karttaa 1500-luvun lopulta’, Fennia, 5.9 (1892), 1–12 Jutikkala, Eino, Geschichte Finnlands (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1976) Kan, Aleksander, Sverige och Ryssland. Ett 1200-årigt förhållande (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1996)

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Korhonen, Arvi, Suomen itärajan syntyhistoriaa, Puolustusministeriön sotahistoriallisen toimiston julkaisuja, 3 (Porvoo: WSOY, 1938) Kujala, Antti, ‘Sweden’s Russian Lands, Ingria and Kexholm Province, 1617–c. 1670: The Interaction of the Crown with Its New Subjects’, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 64 (2016), 545–74 Palmén, Ernst Gustaf, ‘Simon van Salinghens karta öfver Norden 1601’, Fennia, 31.6 (1909–1911), 3–10 Roberts, Michael, The Early Vasas. A History of Sweden, 1523–1611 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968) Salingen, Simon van, ‘Bericht von der Landschaft Lappia, aufgesetzt 1591’, Magazin für die neue Historie und Geographie, 7 (1773), 337–46 Schilder, Günter, ‘Development and Achievements of Dutch Northern and Arctic Cartography in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, Arctic, 37 (1984), 493–514 Sveriges krig 1611–1632, i: Danska och ryska krigen (Stockholm: Generalstaben, 1936) Szaskolskij, Igor P., ‘Cele wojen szwedskich przeciwko Rosji w XVI i początkach XVII w.’, Zapiski Historyczne, 40.2 (1975), 37–54 Troebst, Stefan, ‘Debating the Mercantile Background to Early Modern Swedish EmpireBuilding: Michael Roberts versus Artur Attman’, European History Quarterly, 24 (1994), 485–509 Селин, Адриан Александрович, Русско-шведская граница (1617–1700 гг.). Формирование, функционирование, наследие. Исторические очерки [Selin, Adrian Aleksandrovich, The Russian-Swedish Border (1617–1700). Formation, Functioning, and Legacy. Historical Essays] (St Petersburg: BLITs, 2016)

ADRIAN SELIN 

The Stolbovo Treaty and Tracing the Border in Ingria in 1617–1618 *

The political crisis in Muscovy in the beginning of the seventeenth century can be explained through two productive research frames. Firstly, as Chester Dunning showed, it can be studied in the context of numerous rebellions and political crises in Europe in the late sixteenth–early seventeenth centuries.1 Secondly, it can be seen as a failure of Ivan the Terrible’s Muscovy project that occurred quickly and badly in the 1550–1580s, and even started moving towards its final collapse after the death of the last ‘genuine Tsar’, Fedor, in 1598. However, the total collapse did not come. Something common appeared in the minds of Muscovite inhabitants leading up to the 1610s: the growing political subjectivity of different parts of Muscovy could lead to collaboration, not to disintegration. The case of Novgorod the Great and its failed alliance with Sweden is a good example of this. After negotiations in Viborg in 1613, when both the ideas of Tsar Charles Philip and of Novgorod having autonomy in the body of the Swedish kingdom failed, it became clear everywhere — in Stockholm, Novgorod, and Moscow — that peace was the common aim and new borders ought to appear in this region of Europe. After late 1615, Moscow and Stockholm tried to find the concrete conditions for a peace treaty, which was finally achieved on 27 February 1617 (O.S.) in the village of Stolbovo on the Sias river.

Stolbovo Negotiations and the Decisions The negotiations in Stolbovo lasted for almost two months, from 1 January until 27 February 1617. According to the agreement, the Swedish administration and military were to leave Novgorod during the two weeks following the signing of the treaty. Then, two weeks later, Ladoga and Porkhov were to be similarly

* The results of the project ‘Governing Technologies and Regional Diversity of Russia in the 16th–20th Centuries’, carried out within the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE University) in 2023, are presented in this work. 1 Dunning, ‘The Preconditions of Modern Russia’s First Civil War’. Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 99–118 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133600

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evacuated. In summer 1617 the delimitation was planned to be done before the autumn freeze. I suppose that the aspiration for the fastest normalization of relations was held honestly by both sides; but it was hard to combine with the resolutions reached. The Russian side had agreed to pay a contribution of 20,000 rubles. The Swedes, in turn, had agreed not to take away the bells and cannons after 20 November 1616, while both sides were not to retain town settlers and servicemen on either side. Moscow and Sweden had guaranteed that all the debts would be paid by the subjects of both sides. Both sides were to return all captives without any ransom; those who wanted to stay were allowed to stay. When deciding that Ivangorod, Jama, Kopor´e, and Oreshek (Nöteborg) must be transferred to Sweden, neither side could imagine the mechanism for such a transfer and delimitation. I suppose there was no limited border between these counties on one side and the Novgorod and Ladoga counties on the other when they were in the territory of the Muscovite state. Thus, it was necessary to make a new border. Both sides were preparing to explain their own version of it. In Stolbovo, the Swedish and Russian ambassadors decided that in disputable cases while the process proceeded, they ought to use the statements of local older residents (not the documentary data) as they were best placed to provide information on such matters. Two months before the end of the Stolbovo negotiations, those Novgorodians who sympathized with the Moscow ambassadors wrote a letter to them. They re‐ ported that the Swedes had found record books in Novgorod and were preparing to use them during the demarcation process: the idea was to base some territorial complaints (especially in Karelia) on those documents of Novgorodian origin. The deserters from Novgorod informed the ambassadors that Swedish translator Hans Brakil had taken extracts from the record books of Vodskaia piatina, made in 1500, showing which districts and pogosts belonged to which fortress and county. In particular, Brakil had written out information about seven Lopp pogosts; and the Swedes wanted to take those pogosts as a part of Korela (Kexholm, Käkisalmi) län (Map 5.1). The Swedes planned to argue over those pogosts and to unite them to Korela or Oreshek, because in Moscow there were no copies of the books the Swedes used in Novgorod.2 During the negotiations in Ladoga in December 1616, the Muscovite ambas‐ sadors noted that the Swedes had transcribed the record books in Novgorod and planned to use those writings during the discussions concerning the borders. The Moscow secretaries said that since, in Moscow, those books had been lost during the ‘Lithuanian devastation’, the Swedish copies could not be used as an argument in the delimitation disputes, because there was nothing to compare them with.3 The Swedes replied that they had brought the record books to Ladoga precisely to answer the question of where the border went. 2 RGADA, fond 96, 1616, no. 6, fol. 217. 3 RGADA, fond 96, 1616, no. 6, fols 214–15.

The sTolboVo TreaTy and TraCinG The border in inGria in 1617–1618

Map 5.1. Map of seven Lopp pogosts based on information supplied by Hans Brakil. Map by author.

The issue of the Lopp pogosts was not so simple (there being, in all likelihood, not any description of them recorded in 1500). Probably according to the first ad‐ ministrative division of Novgorod land in the late fifteenth century the Lopp pogosts belonged to Korela county (so its territory ought to transfer to Sweden ac‐ cording to the Viborg Treaty of 1609).4 The rumour that the Swedes had secretly taken record books in Novgorod and had written out the texts concerning Lopp pogosts had reached the ambassadors in December 1616 when Prince Nikifor Meshcherskii and Matvei Murav´ev wrote their next newsletter to the Moscow Foreign Chancellery. The secretaries of the Chancellery were very stressed about it. In a previous account of those lands that should have been transferred to Swe‐ den, which had been made in Moscow in spring 1616, there were no Lopp pogosts

4 Селин, Историческая география Новгородской земли [Selin, Historical Geography of the Novgorod Land], p. 40, n. 36.

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mentioned but rather only seven pogosts of the Korela county and eight pogosts to the Oreshek county. The same information was on the drawing that the Novgorod gentleman Nikita Tyrkov had brought to Moscow. Ivan Fedorov, the clerk in the Foreign Chancellery, said that he succeeded in finding accounts of Karelia in the Embassy High Chamber. Nobody could find those books in the winter of 1616/1617 (and unfortunately they have not been found since then). The Foreign Chancellery instructed ambassador Prince Daniil Mezetskii that he had to prove the Lopp pogosts belonged to Novgorod county (and, thus, to the Moscow state after the treaty) with the argument that, according to the Teusina Treaty of 1595, Sweden had returned to Moscow only the seven pogosts of the Korela county, and that the Lopp pogosts were out of discussion at the end of the sixteenth century. It was unambiguously forbidden to add the Lopp pogosts to the Korela county dur‐ ing the new border configuration.5 So, with the lack of comparable documents in Moscow, there was apprehension in those quarters that the Swedes would use the documents that they had transcribed in Novgorod to their advantage. This shaped the position of the Muscovite ambassadors on the negotiations in Stolbovo: to them, the main argument in disputable cases during the process had to rely on the testimony of local older residents. In January 1617 both sides supposed the moment of signing the treaty was very close. The ambassadors optimistically proposed starting the demarcation meeting as early as 1 March (so before the spring thaw), ‘на прямом рубеже меж Ладоги и Орешка на реке на Кобоне середи мосту’ (on the genuine border between Ladoga and Oreshek on the bridge across the Kobona river).6 Those words clearly demonstrate the true knowledge of the future border by both the Russians and the Swedes. In the next stage of the treaty (proposed between 14 and 20 January) the ambassadors specified that the meeting ought to be held ‘на прямом рубеже меж Ладоги и Орешка на реке на Лавуе на Ладожской дороге’ (on the genuine border between Ladoga and Oreshek on the Lavuia river on the Ladoga road), the place where the border indeed appeared, and the time of the meeting had been more realistically scheduled to 1 May.7 The last version was that both sides would each send three gentlemen and one clerk ‘меж Орешка и Ладоги, на усть реки Лавуи и Ладожского озера июня к 1 числу’ (between Oreshek and Ladoga, in the mouth of the Lavuia near Lake Ladoga on 1 June).8 The Swedes agreed that the key argument during the delimitation would be the statements of old residents of the region and not their transcriptions (Map 5.2). After a long discussion about the debts which had appeared after 1610 (when, following the Klushino battle, the Moscow government stopped paying a salary to Swedish soldiers) the Swedes gave up those complaints. In return the Russian side agreed that there were outstanding debts owed by Russian subjects to the Swedes

5 6 7 8

RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 1, fols 12–21а. RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 3, fol. 65. RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 3, fols 139–40. RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 3, fols 72–73.

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Map 5.2. The area south of Lake Ladoga. Map by author.

and guaranteed the payment.9 Igor´ Shaskol´skii thought that this article was signed for the Baltic merchants’ interests who had previously traded intensively with Russia.10 But the scholar was not acquainted with the documents concerning the large debts of Moscow subjects to former interpreter Timofei Hahin, who had become a Swedish subject. While studying the economic aspect of the Stolbovo negotiations, Shaskol´‐ skii noted that the Swedes had insisted on including the full list of Moscow towns and places where Swedish merchants had been allowed to trade in the final text of the treaty agreement. The Russian idea was to name Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov, and ‘the other towns’. The Swedes understood that if they did not insist on including the concrete names, the local governors of Russian towns would forbid Swedes from trading in their towns, arguing that they had not been mentioned in the treaty agreement. Nevertheless the Russian side did not put the list into the text.11 There was another very important point discussed in Stolbovo in January and February 1617. It was the issue of returning captives together with their

9 Шаскольский, Столбовский мир 1617 г. [Shaskol´skii, The Peace of Stolbovo of 1617], p. 70. 10 Шаскольский, Столбовский мир 1617 г. [Shaskol´skii, The Peace of Stolbovo of 1617], p. 107. 11 Шаскольский, Столбовский мир 1617 г. [Shaskol´skii, The Peace of Stolbovo of 1617], pp. 92–93.

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families and also the future fate of Novgorod gentlemen who had served the Swedes. The Swedes were concerned that they could be somehow punished after Novgorod returned to Muscovite control. Moscow’s ambassadors answered: ‘которые руские люди иманы, хоти и на боех, а иные в подъездех, а иные на дороге, как ехали от государя вашего ис Стекольны и приведены к великому государю нашему царю и великому князю Михайлу Федоровичю всеа Русии самодержцу к его царскому величеству, и царское величество по своему милосердому нраву вины их все отдал’ (those Russians who had been captured whether in the battles, in the patrols and on the roads on the way from Stockholm, from your King were taken to our Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich of all Russia. And our Tsar His Majesty according to his charitable temper excused their guilt). They ‘служат царскому величеству с своею братьею с природными людми с радостию, а у многих жены и дети из Новагорода выведены, и живут ныне з женами и з детми’ (served His Majesty with their brothers and families with great pleasure; many of them had taken wives and children from Novgorod and they lived with their families).12 The Muscovite government promised to grant those serving in Swedish Novgorod total forgiveness. In practice, however, in late 1616–1617 both the Swedes and the Muscovites tried to retain as many people as possible using both violence and remonstrances. In later disputes the Swedish side accused the Russians of exiling Novgorodians to Siberia. That was partly correct: many Novgorod servicemen notable in 1611–1617 were appointed to Siberian towns (mostly as governors) but whether this was as a punishment or not is a contestable point. During the Stolbovo negotiations on 7 January 1617, the British legate John Merrick had delivered a proposal to the Russian delegation to be included in the text of the treaty. Both sides were to refrain from agitating people in the towns being prepared to be transferred. Then, if after the treaty some people were to commit a crime or rob and then desert to the opposite side, the other side would have to return them back with everything they had stolen. All the offenders who had committed a crime against a given state would have to be found and returned to it.13 This article of the treaty played an important role in the discussion between the Swedish and Muscovite authorities in 1617–1660 because of the great number of deserters from both sides. It was also decided in Stolbovo that for two weeks after the conditions of the Treaty were proclaimed in towns and districts, the servicemen and the town settlers had to make a decision as to which side of the border they wanted to live on, allowing them to decide to become or remain the subject of whichever state they wanted to belong to. Thus, about April 1617, the term for deciding their preference would be ended. All the servicemen and the town settlers who tried

12 RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 3, fol. 192. 13 Россия и Швеция в первой половине XVII века [Russia and Sweden in the First Half of the 17th Century], p. 7.

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Map 5.3. The disputed seven pogosts of the Kopor´e county claimed by the Muscovite state. Map by author.

to cross the border (which frankly speaking did not yet exist) after April were con‐ sidered to be deserters. The authorities of both sides were obliged to return them back to the appropriate side of the border.

Delimitation in Progress On 31 May 1617, the head of the Moscow deputation Semen Zherebtsov and his assistants, gentleman Ivan Domozhirov and secretary (d´iak) Ivan L´govskii moved to Novgorod from Moscow. According to the Chancellery order, the commissars had to retain as much territory as possible for the Tsar’s side and to describe the places and lands taken secretly.14 Moscow’s commissars were specially ordered to insist on the delivery of seven pogosts of the Kopor´e county to the Muscovite state (Map 5.3). 14 RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fols 9–77.

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That was the space, which after the war of the 1590s, the Russians took from the Swedes; after that, the land was transferred to the Novgorod gentry. Zherebtsov was allowed to refuse that delivery only if absolutely forced to do so.15 On 18 September Zherebtsov reached Novgorod. The governor, Prince Ivan Khovanskii, had reached the city only a few days before. On 25 September Russian commissars set out to Ladoga and then onto the Lavuia River. The commission did not even have a translator.16 Only after meeting Prince Fedor Boriatinskii — who was on his way home from the Stockholm Ratification Embassy — did Zherebtsov receive the Prince’s translator, Timofei Fannemin, into his company. The head of the Swedish deputation was Johan Berends of Strömsberg. The Swedes showed displeasure at the way Fannemin translated the speeches. They had an expert in Russian and Swedish, as well as Finnish, German, and Tartar languages — that was Erik Andersson.17 The first two weeks of the negotiations were spent in conversations about the titles of Tsar Mikhail and King Gustavus Adolphus and, as a result of this, about the correct use of credentials. The Swedes, desiring to make the negotiations proceed at a faster pace, offered to postpone the issues for the time when both sides would receive the appropriate new credentials and start the process of delimitation. The important impulse for this was the coming of Ambassador Gustav Stenbock to the Swedish commissars’ camp on 18 October. He went to Moscow for the Stolbovo Treaty ratification. On 23 October Zherebtsov and Berends started the delimitation process.18 The first dispute between the sides concerned the status of two small islands, the Zelenets in Lake Ladoga. Both sides suddenly understood that there was not any word about the delimitation of the lake in the text of the Stolbovo Treaty. The dispute about the islands witnessed the first contradictions in the testimonies of older residents: Russian witnesses swore that the islands belonged to the Ladoga county, the Swedish ones that it belonged to the Nöteborg county. The Swedes suggested that in future cases both sides could better test the oath of the old residents through a test of their faith. The oath was of two manners: one was the kissing of a cross and the other — bearing a piece of sod on one’s head.19 The issue of the islands and ways of swearing the oath merited something of a special discussion in the Chancellery. The secretaries in Moscow allowed for both ways of oath-taking and ordered Russian commissars to fight hard for the islands or, in extreme case — to propose the division of them.20

RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fols 100–22. RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fols 149–50. On this person, see Korhonen, Eerikki Antinpoika. RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fols 166–94. RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fols 223–30. On the latter ritual, see Alexandr Tolstikov’s article in the present volume, pp. 119–142. 20 RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fol. 238.

15 16 17 18 19

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It was impossible to maintain good communication between the Moscow Foreign Chancellery and Zherebtsov’s commission. Orders and reports were coming to Moscow and to the commissars only after great delays. In one of his first reports Zherebtsov wrote that he started the delimitation process on 25 October and drew the boundary of the Terebuzhskii pogost, Malaia Loptsa, and Sol´tsy pogost from the Lopp pogost and Yarvosol pogost with a ‘genuine border’. It can be supposed that Zherebtsov meant the genuine border between the pogosts. However, when they were at the Velikii Kamen (Great Stone) where the Tigoda pogost from the Russian side and the Kopor´e county from the Swedish side met, the Russians offered to talk about the seven pogosts of Kopor´e county that had allegedly been transferred to Novgorod county after the war of the 1590s. The Swedes flatly refused, using simple arguments: in the late sixteenth century all Novgorod land, including Kopor´e and other north-western counties, was a part of Muscovite State; the pogosts the Muscovites were talking about were the genuine pogosts of the Kopor´e county. Novgorod landowners who had estates in the area after 1617 were free to return to the Muscovite side, so the Russian commissars had no arguments to lay claim to those seven pogosts. That was not so simple according to the Muscovite perspective. The way that the Russian commissars tried to reconsider the Stolbovo agreements was based on the sequence of historical events. According to the Pliussa Treaty of 1583, the fortresses of Kopor´e, Jama, and Ivangorod were kept under Swedish rule. After the Muscovites retook these fortifications in 1590–1591, the estates in the counties were distributed to Novgorod servicemen as would happen in any other newly conquered land. These estates were governed by the Novgorod Chancellery (not by Kopor´e or other governors). That system was fixed in 1614 when nobody could have conceived of the conditions of the later Stolbovo Treaty.21 Thus, according to the unprejudiced opinion of Novgorod servicemen after 1590–1593 the seven Kopor´e pogosts were transferred to the Novgorod county. Another dispute happened around the same point: the older residents from both sides started to argue about the abandoned village of Konduia: Swedish witnesses maintained that it belonged to the Yarvosol pogost while the Muscovite residents affirmed that the ‘genuine’ border was ‘higher’ than Konduia village and that the village belonged to the Tigoda pogost. The Muscovite witness had even quoted the old record books to support their argument (Map 5.4). After passing by the disputed village the commissars moved further following ‘прошодчи то место, пошли прямою старинною межею от Лезенского мху верст с шесть до Ноугородцкой и Ореховской дороги, а от тех мест пошли новою межею по Ореховскому и по Копорскому уезду’ (the old border, passing by the Lez´e swamp about six versts up to the Orekhov road and then following the new border through the Nöteborg and Kopor´e counties). The commissions moved through these counties for 204 versts up to the abandoned village Lipovo,

21 RGADA, fond 96, 1616, no. 3, fols 181, 183, 182, 184.

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Map 5.4. The deserted Konduia village. Map by author.

according to Zherebtsov’s report taking from Nöteborg and Kopor´e counties space of about seventeen and in some areas ten, eight or fewer versts in width. ‘Russian’ old residents told the commissars that ‘Swedish’ old residents did not know this part of ‘the genuine border’. This was accepted by the Swedish commis‐ sion so both commissions followed the Russian side. The next stop was at the Posestrina Gora site, where Swedish old residents tried to testify that the villages of Bezhany and Muraveino should go to Sweden but that was not accepted by Russian ‘connoisseurs’ and both villages were left as disputed ones. After the next fifty versts along the Luga River the two com‐ missions reached the border village of Storon´e; then Zherebtsov and his team went to the camp in Lozhgolovo, and the Swedish commissars to Jama fortress (see map). That happened in mid-December (just at the time when new Russian credentials were sent from Moscow). On 15 December Erik Andersson came to the Muscovite camp and offered a new meeting at Luga. During that conference the Russian commissars described the last part of the border according to the Stolbovo Treaty: it ran along Krutoi Brook from the Luga river to the Piata river, by the Piata river to the Pliussa river, by the Pliussa river to the Narova river. However, Andersson made a secret proposal to the Russians: to align the

The sTolboVo TreaTy and TraCinG The border in inGria in 1617–1618

border along the Dolgaia river, making the Swedish Ivangorod county larger. The proposal failed: witnesses from both sides did not achieve a consensus and so after that the commissars continued the negotiations without them.22 In the end, Erik Andersson offered a compromise: if Zherebtsov agreed to sign the border agreement immediately, the Swedes would agree with the Russian version; if the Russians proposed to wait for the credentials from Moscow, the Swedes would continue to persist with their version. It is notable that the Swedes also started to hesitate and to propose the revision of the Stolbovo agreements. Zherebtsov, who could not agree to such proposals, had appealed to the earlier demarcations from 1583 and the 1590s. But Andersson rejected the idea of using data from previous negotiations and stressed what the articles of the Stolbovo Treaty clearly testified: the sides needed to specify the border according to the old residents’ testimonies; meanwhile ‘Swedish’ old residents noted that the ‘genuine’ border passed along the line of the Dolgaia river and further — to Issad. Once again the sides used the identification parade between the old residents. The intrigue of that day was not over: Erik Andersson resorted to political arguments. He appealed to the danger in Muscovy that came from ‘Lithuanian’ troops; he knew that Prince Władysław Vasa had already conquered Viazma and Dorogobuzh and started to besiege Moscow. He told them: ‘и слышим, что он идет к Москве одною дорогою, а ещо бы де нам слышети, чтоб ему от Москвы бежати тысечма дорогами, и тому де бы мы стали радоватца’ (I heard the prince is going to Moscow by one road; but I would be happy to know that he ran away by thousands of roads).23 That was subtly done: both menace and benevolence were made clear immediately. Zherebtsov, meanwhile, refused to accept the reliability of information about the events posing such a great threat to Moscow (and Andersson did not know about the terrible march of Sagaidachnyi’s Cossacks). He answered that only a few ‘Lithuanians’ had reached Moscow, and they were anyway defeated by the Tsar’s army. In January 1618 Zherebtsov’s commission, having had no contact with the Foreign Chancellery, appeared to be in a very difficult situation. They had no possibility of sending couriers to Moscow and Novgorod as often as needed; Zherebtsov had a lack of both wagons and food, all the countryside near the future border having been abandoned. The commissars were very afraid to stay in the Lozhgolovo camp without any fortifications to protect them.24 The January reports to Moscow were taking more than a month to reach their destination. The military situation in January had become very dangerous: Lithuanian detach‐ ments had appeared very close to Narva. Both Swedes and Russians supposed that the enemies knew about their mission and aimed to attack them. During meetings

22 Cf. Widekindi, Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie, pp. 924–26. 23 RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fol. 239–49. 24 RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fols 239–49.

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on 21–22 January, the two sides discussed the possibility of such an assault and the implications of it. It was in this situation that a new stage of the negotiations started. The border commissions had passed along the whole path of the border. The last task they had was to conquer all the remaining disputed issues and to sign the agreement. Meanwhile the military danger had not passed away: a raid by a large Lithuanian detachment to Novgorod or Pskov remained very possible. The frightened Swedish commissars suddenly interrupted the negotiations and moved to Jama fortress. Erik Andersson came to the Russian camp in person and offered to finish the conference at Osinovaia Gorka, the place where the Big Ivangorod road crossed the new border.25 Later on, it became apparent that there were solid grounds for concern among the commissioners: local peasants told Zherebtsov (after his separation with Swedes) that there had been a Polish-Cossack detachment specially sent to sud‐ denly attack the commissars. Only when Zherebtsov moved from the Luga River closer to Novgorod, and the Swedes had moved to Jama, did the detachment turn back. At the same time, the Swedes captured the spy in Gdov who had also told them about that detachment.26

Gossip in the Border in Winter 1617/18 While moving through territory that had been out of Muscovite control for more than six years, Zherebtsov needed to search for any information on it. This mostly came through analysis of different messages from local peasants and from spies engaged for this purpose. The spies were ordered to collect information about both the Swedes’ intentions and the movements of the ‘Lithuanians’. On 18 November 1617, Zherebtsov sent two local landowners, the brothers Faddei and Foma Grigor´ev, from the Lozhgolovo Camp to their native town Jama (Map 5.5). Five days later Faddei returned to the Russian camp, having visited Narva and Ivangorod. He told the commissars that he had stayed in Ivangorod for three days and had noted that the Narva fortress had been strengthened. At the same time, significant fortification works were ongoing in Ivangorod. In 1616 the Ivangorod wooden fortress had burnt down;27 in late 1617 the Swedes made a new one and cleared the ditch around it. Jama fortress was being repaired as well. Faddei’s relatives told him that soon after Pokrov day (1 October) there was a panic in twenty versts near Narva. People were saying that the ‘Lithuanians’ had taken the Livonian fortresses back. After numerous setbacks, Jacob De la Gardie, according

25 RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fols 291–93. 26 RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fols 294–312, 314, 318–20, 317, 315, 321–34, 336. 27 Селин, Новгородское общество в эпоху Смуты [Selin, Novgorodian Society in the Time of Troubles], pp. 600–06.

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Map 5.5. Expedition to Jama. Map by author.

to speculation, signed the armistice with ‘Lithuania’ and promised Reval and Narva to the enemy. Thereafter he went to Stockholm. Meanwhile, in Reval, the inhabitants were waiting for King Gustavus Adolphus. One thousand five hundred Lithuanian cavalry and infantry had reportedly come to Dorpat and nobody knew where they were preparing to go. Two days later Foma Grigor´ev also returned to the Russian camp. He con‐ firmed most of the events which had been reported by his brother and added some news about the Swedish king. According to his information, Gustavus Adolphus remained in Stockholm and on Christmas the King was to be prepared for his coronation. After the coronation, Gustavus Adolphus was supposed to be going to Reval. While he had been in Narva, Foma had heard that the Swedes in Stockholm did not want Gustavus Adolphus to be King and there had even been talk about Prince Charles Philip as a candidate for the throne. Such talk about confusion in Sweden and about the confrontation between Gustavus Adolphus and his brother (who had not long before been a candidate for the Muscovite throne) seemed to be very significant to the Russian commissars and, of course,

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greatly influenced them. However, all the ‘Swedish’ talk appeared to be false gossip while at the same time, the ‘Lithuanian’ danger was very close to the truth. The armistice between Swedish Narva and ‘Lithuanian’ Dorpat was a reality and numerous enemy troops in Dorpat represented a very real threat to the delimitation mission.28 But Foma Grigor´ev also passed on details about confusion in Lithuania: when in Jama he had heard about ‘был де в Ливонской земле немчин князь у литовского короля, и просил у литовского себе в Ливонской земле в удел городов, и литовской де король за то его хотел казнить смертью, и он от него отъехал к свейскому королю, а людей с ним было с тысечю человек’ (a German Prince who had asked the Lithuanian King for some fortresses in Lithuania and the King wanted to execute him; after that the Prince had deserted and gone to the Swedish King with his one thousand soldiers). Then, in November 1617, the Prince, according to reports, was besieged in Pernau. Russian commissars also tried to take any information just from their oppo‐ nents during the negotiations (sometimes of the same degree of truth). On 15 December Erik Andersson told Russian commissars that the Swedish and Danish Kings had achieved peace and the fortress of Kalmar had been ransomed from the Danes; but there had been no peace between Sweden and Lithuania, only a temporary armistice by June. Andersson also denied the talk about a further coronation of King Gustavus Adolphus; according to him, the king had been crowned in Uppsala on 12 October. Other reports were obtained from Commissar Gert von Ungern on 29 or 30 December. He confirmed the reports about the armistice in Livonia being set to last until June. He also minutely described the struggle of Swedish high-rankers for the supremacy in the southern Baltic. Carl Gyllenhielm had left Narva to check on the progress of the armistice with Lithuania. Meanwhile Jacob De la Gardie was said to be a prospect for governor over Reval, Narva, and also Viborg (that was also false: Gyllenhielm remained governor over the rest of Ingerman‐ land). Zherebtsov also repeated to the Foreign Chancellery von Ungern’s reports that King Gustavus Adolphus had hired eight thousand soldiers in the Dutch Republic and was given the towns ‘where honey burns’ as deposit. The clearest reports were taken to the Russian commissars from priest Larion from Staropol´e near Lozhgolovo. In late December Zherebtsov sent him to Gdov county to speak with local fishermen. The priest returned on 2 January. In one of the fishing villages (Kunest) he met with a peasant named Ivan Borovikov, formerly from Gdov county, and at that time a settler in Dorpat district. Borovikov told the priest about eight thousand troops of the Lithuanian army that had been holed up in Polotsk. The reason for the military concentration was the peaceful negotiations that had been started between the Swedes and 28 Аракчеев & Селин, ‘Русско-польские отношения на северо-западной границе России на исходе Смуты и перемирие 1617 г.’ [Arakcheev and Selin, ‘Russian-Polish Relations on the Northwestern Border of Russia at the End of the Time of Troubles and the Armistice of 1617’].

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Lithuanians. According to Borovikov the Lithuanians claimed fifteen Livonian fortresses, including Narva, Reval, and even Viborg. If the treaty were signed the Lithuanian army would attack Novgorod, and if not — the war between the Swedes and Lithuanian would restart. The reports gathered in other fisher villages were less fraught in nature. The fishermen told the priests that Field-Marshall Gyllenhielm had gone with the army to the Lithuanian frontier and that the inhabitants of Gdov had supplied them with food and forage. In Gdov the people believed that Gyllenhielm had gone to negotiate with the Lithuanians.29 It is significant that the most current theme of the reports was the negotiations and the armistice between the Swedes and Lithuanians; the most important hero appears to be Field-Marshal Gyllenhielm who had besieged Pskov some months before and at that time had been appointed to govern the Baltic Swedish provinces.

Final Negotiations and Assignment on Osinovaia Gorka (Map 5.6) After negotiations had been interrupted, Berends and his team had gone to Jama. They notified Zherebtsov that after spending one night in the fortress they moved to Zarech´e and then to Osinovaia Gorka.30 There the Swedes offered the Russians the opportunity to sign the delimitation agreement and finish everything within a week. Zherebtsov and his team went to Beloe on account of being afraid of Lithuanian troops in the area. On 30 January Erik Andersson came to Beloe and told the Russians that the Swedes were waiting for them, having prepared dwellings for them in Osinovaia Gorka. Zherebtsov showed he was ready to join in with the Swedish plans. But on 31 January the governor of Novgorod, Prince Khovanskii, informed the commissars that the Lithuanians’ detachments were seen some 40 versts from Novgorod. The Swedes were also afraid of reports concerning these Lithuanian troops: the Swedish commissars became worried and agreed with Russian preliminary proposals regarding the border and warning them about the Polish attacks near Narva.31 In early February 1618 the military danger became all too serious. Local peasants told Zherebtsov that separate Lithuanian detachments were asking them where the commissars were staying. Greatly frightened, Zherebtsov started to‐ wards Novgorod in haste. Near the Viazhitskii monastery, he was made aware that Prince Khovanskii had defeated the Lithuanian detachments. On 8 Febru‐ ary, the Swedes again invited Zherebtsov to Osinovaia Gorka. On 13 February, Zherebtsov started to move back to the point. Two days later the last round of 29 RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fols 266–72. 30 RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fols 291–93. 31 RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fols 294–312, 314, 318–20, 317, 315, 321–34, 336.

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Map 5.6. Osinovaia Gorka and Beloe Hillfort area. Map by author.

negotiations started. The Swedes prepared fortifications in the Osinovaia Gorka and guarded it with about three hundred soldiers with cannons.32 In Osinovaia Gorka the Swedes refused to relinquish the Zelenets Islands and the disputed villages of Konduia, Bezhany, and Muraveino. Even the old residents did not swear an oath. The Russian commissars succeeded in making a border of the Somro and Gdov counties with the Jama and Ivangorod counties according to the ‘old’ borders.33 Overall the negotiations finished on 19 February. Then Fannemin and Erik Andersson translated the credentials.34

32 RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fols 294–312, 314, 318–20, 317, 315, 321–34, 336. 33 RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fols 294–312, 314, 318–20, 317, 315, 321–34, 336. 34 RGADA, fond 96, 1617, no. 9, fols 337, 335, 338–42, 343–48.

The sTolboVo TreaTy and TraCinG The border in inGria in 1617–1618

Conclusion On 28 March 1618, the border agreement in Ingria was signed. Long and com‐ plicated negotiations about the other part of the new Russian-Swedish border continued in Karelia for almost the next three long years and Erik Andersson was a very active participant in them. After March 1618, Ingermanland became a Swedish territory, first — with a number of fortresses and countryside districts, all governed from Narva, then, after the 1630s, as a new province. The borderland ap‐ peared as a special area with transparent limits and kindred population. The new challenges concerning the repatriation of deserters appeared in the borderland discourse. It is important to stress that the persons taking part in the delimitation were veterans of the 1611–1617 military events. Sometimes they had an experience of common service (like the Novgorod gentleman, Nikita Tyrkov, a member of the commission, and Swedish commissar Berends). Sometimes the persons had changed sides during the previous events (like Erik Andersson). The heritage of the Time of Troubles followed the history of the Russian-Swedish borderland discussions for more than twenty years thereafter.

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Works Cited Manuscripts and Archival Sources Moscow, Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA), fond 96: Relations between Russia and Sweden Primary Sources Widekindi, Johannes, Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie, Hwilket vnder twänne Sweriges Stormächtige Konungars, Konung Carls IX. Och K. Gustaf Adolphs den Andres och Stoores Baneer, Storfursten Ivan Vasilivitz Suischi och Ryssland til hielp, Först emoot the Rebeller och Lithower, sedan the Påler, på sidstone emoot sielfwe Muskowiterne, ifrån åhr 1607. in til 1617. Aff Feldtherren Gref. Iacob De La Gardie vthfördt, och medh en reputerligh Fredh bijlagdt är, i lijka många Böcker fördeelt (Stockholm: Wankijff, 1671) Россия и Швеция в первой половине XVII века. Сборник материалов, извлеченных из Московского Главного Архива Министерства Иностранных Дел и Шведского Государственного Архива и касающихся истории взаимных отношений России и Швеции в 1616–1651 годах, сост. К. И. Якубов [Russia and Sweden in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century. Collection of the Materials Taken from the Moscow Chief Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish State Archives, and Pertaining to the History of Mutual Relations between Russia and Sweden in 1616–1651, ed. by K. I. Yakubov] (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1897) Secondary Studies Dunning, Chester, ‘The Preconditions of Modern Russia’s First Civil War’, Russian History/ Histoire Russe, 25.1–2 (1998), 119–31 Korhonen, Arvi, Eerikki Antinpoika (Porvoo: Söderström, 1953) Аракчеев, Владимир Анатольевич, & Адриан Александрович Селин, ‘Русско-польские отношения на северо-западной границе России на исходе Смуты и перемирие 1617 г.’ [Arakcheev, Vladimir Anatol´evich, and Adrian Aleksandrovich Selin, ‘Russian-Polish Relations on the Northwestern Border of Russia at the End of the Time of Troubles and the Armistice of 1617’], in Россия, Польша, Германия: история и современность европейского единства в идеологии, политике и культуре, сост. Б. В. Носов [Russia, Poland, Germany: The Past and the Present of European Unity in Ideology, Politics, and Culture, ed. by B. V. Nosov] (Moscow: Indrik, 2009), pp. 70–81 Селин, Адриан Александрович, Историческая география Новгородской земли XVI– XVIII вв. Новгородский и Ладожский уезды Водской пятины [Selin, Adrian Aleksandrovich, Historical Geography of the Novgorod Land of 16th–17th Centuries. The Novgorod and the Ladoga Counties of Vodskaia Piatina] (St Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2003)

The sTolboVo TreaTy and TraCinG The border in inGria in 1617–1618

———, Новгородское общество в эпоху Смуты [Novgorodian Society in the Time of Troubles] (St Petersburg: BLITs, 2008) Шаскольский, Игорь Павлович, Столбовский мир 1617 г. и торговые отношения России со шведским государством [Shaskol´skii, Igor´ Pavlovich, The Peace of Stolbovo of 1617 and Trade Relationships between Russia and the Swedish State] (Moscow: Nauka, 1964)

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ALExANDER TOLSTIkOV 

The Symbolic Uses of the Early Modern Russo-Swedish Border *

As any other complex phenomenon, political borders have many aspects not least of which is their symbolic value. Within today’s field of border studies it is trivial to say that, as Anssi Paasi put it, ‘borders are not mere lines but processes, social institutions, and symbols’.1 So, as such they do not ‘just exist’, but are constantly (re)produced and can also be (mis)used. At the same time, it seems that for most historians studying borders (and this is now a rather wide and expanding field within history writing)2 this thesis is not equally self-evident, although scholars are very interested in how borders in the past were created, conceptualized, contested, mapped, and so on. It can be argued, of course, that what is typical of current political borders cannot and should not be transferred to, say, medieval or early modern borders which were quite different. This is totally true. We know very well, for example, that the political (as we call them today) borders then were transparent, sieve-like (if we use the term coined by Stephen Rowell), that they were normally not guarded, that they began to be put on maps rather late, etc. But, on the other hand, it is worth noting that despite all these differences at least since the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries political borders in Europe have been in some respects pretty close to the current ones. It seems, for example, that by the late fifteenth–early sixteenth century in Sweden and Russia a relatively modern (i.e., early modern, which is not a coincidence) concept of the political border developed. We can trace a conceptual shift that probably happened then and that can be connected to the development of the territorial state (which in itself is a symptom of the coming early modernity). Whatever changes the Russo-Swedish border underwent later on, until the beginning of the eighteenth century, during * This article is based on my Russian-language publications: Толстиков, ‘Религиозный аспект понимания политических границ в допетровской России’ [Tolstikov, ‘The Religious Aspect of Understanding the Political Borders in Pre-Petrine Russia’] and ‘Ритуальные аспекты маркирования российско-шведской границы в раннее Новое Время’ [‘Ritual Aspects of Actualizing the Russian-Swedish Border in the Early Modern Period’]. 1 Paasi, ‘Borders and Border-Crossings’, p. 480. 2 See, for example, the publications referred to in Golubev, Tolstikov, and Räihä, ‘Language and Border between Scandinavia and Russia’. Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 119–142 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133601

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this period I do not see any major shifts in its conceptualization comparable to that of the late fifteenth century (which does not exclude, of course, other types of changes).3 Another telling aspect is an alleged difference in understanding borders by the government elites and the ‘simple’ local population living at these borders. As Jens Lerbom has shown, the Swedish people living at the border with Denmark in the seventeenth century definitely perceived both realms as political and judicial territorial units with clear-cut linear borders, and even shared the notion of Sweden as the fatherland (fäderneslandet), although the latter concept is often believed to have been elitist and inappropriate for the majority of the crown’s subjects.4 On the other hand, I think, we have good grounds to suppose that however different early modern political borders might seem compared to the current ones, they were also (re)produced through discourses and/or actions (for example, rituals) and could also be (mis)used — but simply in different ways. The aim of the present article is to show how such a research perspective, that views political borders as something symbolically usable, can help to high‐ light the early modern notion of borders between realms and, more generally, of political power’s territorial dimension. I will focus here on the history of the Russo-Swedish border, mainly in the seventeenth century. On the basis of relatively well-known cases I will touch upon only two aspects: first, the use of certain rituals for marking/actualizing this border and, second, the (allegedly asymmetrical) role of confessional membership with its implications for the notion of the Muscovite tsardom as a territorial unit.

Rituals Rituals are effective mechanisms of (re)producing borders, even today (see any passport check or the colourful spectacle of the famous flag lowering ceremony at the Indian-Pakistan Wagah border). Historians now use rather actively the concepts of ritual and symbolic communication while studying different aspects of medieval and early modern European societies.5 Although these scholars seem to be more interested in metaphorical borders (between statuses, social and/or religious groups, etc.), they very often focus on ceremonies, including diplomatic ones, and in these cases some border-crossing rituals, even those of crossing the border of Muscovy, draw their attention too. But such studies are not numerous.6 3 Tolstikov, ‘From Mezha and Rån to Rubezh and Gränsen’; Katajala, ‘Line, Zone, or Sieve?’. 4 Lerbom, ‘The Spaces and Boundaries of the Realm’. 5 See, as an introduction, Althoff, Die Macht der Rituale, and Stollberg-Rilinger, Rituale. For works in English see, for example, Althoff, Rules and Rituals in Medieval Power Game. 6 See, first of all, Garnier, ‘“Wer meinen Herrn ehrt, den ehre ich billig auch”’ and ‘Die Macht der Zeichen — die Zeichen der Macht’. See also a recent study (made within the same theoretical framework) of the Russian diplomatic ceremonial of the late seventeenth–early eighteenth centuries, Hennings, Russia and Courtly Europe. This framework of symbolic communication is also effectively applied to the study of another important aspect of medieval and early modern diplomatic practices,

The syMboliC uses of The early Modern russo-swedish border

At the same time, many important comments and observations concerning this aspect, made from other research perspectives, can be found in scholarly litera‐ ture.7 The concept of ritual might need some clarification in the current context. Here it is understood in a rather broad sense, within the frame of symbolic communication studies as developed by the German medievalist Gerd Althoff and his colleagues. As Althoff puts it: We talk about rituals when actions, or rather chains of actions, of a complex nature are repeated by actors in certain circumstances in the same or similar ways, and, if this happens deliberately, with the conscious goal of familiarity. In the minds of both actors and spectators, an ideal type of ritual exists that takes on a material form that is easily recognized in its various concrete manifestations. Actors and spectators act in the consciousness of being bound to a given pattern, which does not, however, prevent the ritual from having the desired effect.8 So, diplomatic ceremonies analyzed further on are definitely rituals from this point of view.9 And what is extremely important, different elements of rituals understood in this way were opened for manipulations and (re)interpretations on the part of participants: The actors on medieval political stages did not carry out established rituals slavishly but rather used the given rituals in a utilitarian-rational way. They varied, mixed, or updated them in keeping with the given situation or even invented new rituals if there was no suitable pre-existing ritual language at their disposal.10 This all is true not only for medieval actors, but even more so for early modern ones, including Muscovite diplomats on whose actions I will focus in this section. Probably the most spectacular ritual action mentioned in the context of the Russo-Swedish early modern border was that of proving a witness’s sincerity and righteousness in a dispute on the exact course of the borderline by placing a clod of earth on one’s head and walking with it along the alleged line. Mentions of this ritual are present, for example, in the documents pertaining to the delimitation of

7 8 9

10

gift-giving: Бойцов & Альтхоф, eds, На языке даров [Boitsov and Althoff, eds, In the Language of Gifts]. See, first of all, Юзефович, ‘Как в посольских обычаях ведется …’ [Yuzefovich, ‘According to the Ambassadorial Custom …’] and Путь посла [The Ambassador’s Path]. Althoff, Rules and Rituals in Medieval Power Game, p. 128. As Althoff stresses,‘[i]t is neither possible nor necessary to delimit ritual vis-à-vis related phenomena such as rite, custom, ceremony, or habit. To be conscious of the fluid boundaries between these notions is surely a more adequate approach to the subject’ (Althoff, Rules and Rituals in Medieval Power Game, pp. 128–29). Althoff, Rules and Rituals in Medieval Power Game, p. 130.

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the border in accordance with the Stolbovo Treaty in 1617 and 1620.11 It is well known both due to written sources (the earliest are from the eleventh century) and later ethnographic evidence. This ritual seems to have been connected to the Slavs’ cult of Mother Earth, who was believed to punish (‘press’, ‘cover for ever’) the perjurer. Later on Mother Earth began to be associated with the Mother of God,12 hence the contamination of the Christian and pagan elements in the ritual: the clod to be put on the head (also on the shoulders, back or in the bosom, sometimes in the mouth — cf. oath formulas ‘I will eat earth if I lie’ etc.) could be cut in the form of the cross and, what is more important, an icon, usually that of the Mother of God, could be used. Our sources may speak only of образное хожение (walking with an image, i.e. with an icon) but from the context it becomes clear that the same, originally pagan, ritual is meant. For example, in the Muscovite Law Code (Sobornoe ulozhenie, 1649), Chapter x, Article 236: If for some reason it is impossible to compile a decree in the matter of such disputed lands, administer an oath on such disputed lands to the plaintiff and the defendant by [having them] walk around [the boundaries] with an icon. Order that person who took the oath on his soul at trial to walk with the icon.13 And the next article 237: If on any disputed lands there are long-time residents on both sides; and a dispute arises among those long-time residents themselves, some long-time residents proceed to testify in favor of the plaintiff, and other long-time residents proceed to testify in favor of the defendant: on that disputed land the plaintiff and the defendant shall cast lots [to determine] which one of them will carry the icon around the contested land [to verify] the testimony of the long-time residents. He who is singled out by the lot shall walk the boundary of the contested land with the icon.14 Compare it to a fragment from a letter sent in 1620 from the Ambassadorial Chancery to Nikita Vysheslavtsev, the Russian representative who established the new border with Sweden in Karelia:

11 Селин, Русско-шведская граница [Selin, The Russo-Swedish Border], pp. 56, 58, 84. 12 On this cult and its connection with the cult of the Mother of God see Успенский, ‘Мифологический аспект русской экспрессивной фразеологии’ [Uspenskii, ‘The Mythological Aspect of Russian Expressive Phraseology’], pp. 83–107. 13 The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649, p. 183. Comments in square brackets here and in the quotations on pp. 124 and 130 are added in the cited publication. 14  The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649, p. 183. On this ritual see Павлов-Сильванский, ‘Символизм в древнем русском праве’ [Pavlov-Sil´vanskii, ‘Symbolism in the Ancient Russian Law’], pp. 486–92; Толстой, ‘Граница’ [Tolstoi, ‘Boundary’], p. 538; Белова, Виноградова, & Топорков, ‘Земля’ [Belova, Vinogradova, and Toporkov, ‘Earth’], p. 318; Успенский, ‘Право и религия в Московской Руси’ [Uspenskii, ‘Law and Religion in Muscovite Rus’], p. 164, n. 115.

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If a dispute arises and it is impossible to find [where the borderline goes], let the long-time residents cast lots in those places, and the long-time residents who have casted lots shall give an oath and allocate lands and acreages from our side [of the border] with an image and clod, according to the land custom; and from the side of their sovereign, if the lot is cast in their favour, the long-time residents if they are Russians [i.e. Orthodox] shall allocate land in the same manner with an image and clod, according to the land custom, but if they are foreigners [немцы, i.e. non-Orthodox] then with the Gospel and the oath; and in the most disputed lands the long-time residents from our side shall kiss the cross and from the King’s side the King’s long-time residents if they are Russians shall also kiss the cross, but if they are foreigners then [they shall kiss] the Gospel with the oath.15 As we can see, this was exactly the same ritual. I would like to make three comments on it. First, it is evident that the logic used by Russian diplomats while establishing borders between the realms was analogous to the logic used for solving disputes over private land. However banal it may seem, this gives us grounds to hope for clarifying other aspects of the Muscovites’ understanding of political borders through that analogy. Second, here another ritual is mentioned, the kissing of the cross. I am not going to discuss it now, because much has been written on this subject,16 but I want to underline that cross kissing was to be used only in the cases of the most difficult disputes, so, it was perceived as a more serious and more responsible act, which was far more dangerous for a per‐ jurer. Probably, it was for this reason that, in 1620, the Russian representatives headed by Nikita Vysheslavtsev stubbornly refused to settle the dispute over the borderline in the vicinities of Lake Unusjärvi through having their witnesses, the long-time residents, kiss the cross, although the witnesses from the Swedish side were ready to kiss the cross in order to prove their testimony.17 And, third, in this case we see a clear differentiation of the prescribed rituals according to the religious membership of the witnesses (Orthodox vs non-Orthodox, i.e. Lutherans). Despite the fact that here the expression русские люди (Russians) is easily used to denote the Orthodox who had happened to stay on the Swedish side (to become the Swedish King’s subjects), there are nevertheless grounds to believe that for the Muscovites the political (in our meaning of the term) and the confessional identities tended to merge. In other contexts the Stolbovo border

15 Cited after Селин, Русско-шведская граница [Selin, The Russo-Swedish Border], p. 56 (see also p. 84), my translation; comments in square brackets are mine. 16 Филюшкин, ‘Институт крестоцелования в Средневековой Руси’ [Filiushkin, ‘The Institution of Cross Kissing in Medieval Rus’’]; Стефанович, ‘Крестоцелование и отношение к нему церкви в Древней Руси’ [Stefanovich, ‘Cross Kissing and the Perception of it by the Church in Ancient Rus’]; Антонов, Смута в культуре средневековой Руси [Antonov, The Time of Troubles in the Culture of the Medieval Rus], pp. 174–206, 213–24; Mikhailova and Prestel, ‘Cross Kissing’. On cross kissing in diplomatic practice see Юзефович, Путь посла [Yuzefovich, The Ambassador’s Path], pp. 280–94. 17 Селин, Русско-шведская граница [Selin, The Russo-Swedish Border], pp. 104, 106–07.

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could be perceived as the border of the Orthodox land and the ‘Orthodoxness’ of the population left on the territories that had been ceded to Sweden could be questioned. An indirect indication of such an attitude is another ritual mentioned by Grigorii Kotoshikhin: And when ambassadors are sent to diplomatic congresses, and commandants [voevody] to war with their regiments, with them on such missions are sent icons of ancient authorship, covered in gold and silver, with pearls and precious stones; and the tsar and patriarch and metropolitans and all the clergy, and the boyars, and men of every rank, accompany these icons on foot, [bearing] many other icons and candles, from [the city of] Moscow to the place where foreign ambassadors are greeted. And while they accompany those icons a Te Deum is sung, and following the Te Deum the patriarch and tsar and hierarchs and boyars and men of every rank bid farewell to those icons and then kiss the hand of the painted icon; and at this time the ambassadors or regimental commandants [voevody] approach the tsar’s hand in farewell; and after making their farewells the tsar and patriarch and hierarchs and boyars return to the primatial cathedral [of the Dormition] with the other icons, and then disperse to their homes. In the same manner, when ambassadors return from their embassies, or commandants [voevody] from their regiments, the tsar and patriarch and hierarchs and boyars and other men greet those icons in the same place to which they had accompanied them upon departure, similarly with icons and with candles, and the ceremony is like the one upon departure; and upon greeting those icons, they return them to the churches where they were previously kept. And those icons, of the Savior or of the Mother of God or of some saint, are painted on wood, the size of a sheet [of paper], but sometimes an arshin or more.18 Then follows the question ‘Why are these icons sent?’ to which the answer is given: When in time of war there is a victory over the enemy, or an embassy [concludes] an eternal peace, they consider that such things happen not through God’s mercy, but through the aid and intercession and prayers of the Mother of God and the saints who are [portrayed] on those icons; and upon these considerations they revere those icons and shamelessly address an inanimate being and beg for intercession; for they are blind, the devil having darkened their eyes with the flame of the unquenchable fire.19 Leonid Yuzefovich mentions that the Russian diplomats took one and the same icon, the Tikhvin icon of the Mother of God, to the congresses at the border with their Swedish colleagues in Stolbovo and in Valiesari (1658). He underlines 18 Kotoshikhin, Russia in the Reign of Aleksei Mikhailovich, p. 75. 19 Kotoshikhin, Russia in the Reign of Aleksei Mikhailovich, p. 76.

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that ‘such commonly worshipped sacred things should not leave the territory of Russia, that is why the highly venerated icons like these were not sent with the missions travelling not to the border congresses but abroad’.20 It is worth noting that, according to Kotoshikhin, the solemn processions arranged to bid farewell to departing ambassadors and commandants, and to meet them upon their return, accompanied the icons to and from ‘the place where foreign ambassadors are greeted’.21 It seems that there existed a parallel in this case with the diplomatic ceremonial which included a special ritual of greeting foreign ambassadors at the border, in the towns en route, and directly at their entrance to Moscow. Actualizing the political border through rituals in the diplomatic ceremonial is, of course, a topic to be treated separately. The custom of sending a diplomatic representative to the border to greet arriving foreign ambassadors has been well observed in Europe, for example, in Venice since the end of the thirteenth cen‐ tury.22 But it looks like in Muscovy this first greeting was much more solemn and important. For example, according to the French ceremonial of the first half of the eighteenth century (undoubtedly reflecting here the norms developed much earlier) ordinary and extraordinary ambassadors from crowned heads should not be treated with special ceremonies in the towns they entered: ‘Un Ambassadeur Ordinaire ou Extraordinaire arrivé sur la Frontiére du Royaume, en donne avis au Ministre Sécretaire d’Etat des Affaires Etrangéres. Il est reçu sans aucune Cérémonie dans les Villes de son passage’ (An Ordinary or Extraordinary Ambas‐ sador having arrived at the border of the realm informs the Minister, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of it. He is received without any ceremony in the towns he follows through).23 The same rule had to be applied to papal nuncios, who, moreover, went incognito: ‘On ne lui fait aucune reception dans les lieux de son passage: Il arrive comme un particulier, & ne paroit qu’incognito jusqu’au jour de son Entrée publique’ (No reception ceremonies are organized for him at the places he follows through; he arrives as a private person and remains incognito until the day of his public entrance).24 But in Russia foreign diplomats were greeted at the border with Sweden by dozens of servicemen already (strel´tsy, cossacks, deti boiarskie).25 Of course, the greeting ceremonies at the entrance to Novgorod and, particularly, Moscow were more pompous and included more participants. But I would like to stress the following aspects. First, this greeting at the border was obligatory. Second, it is precisely from this ritual that foreign diplomats started to be involved in symbolic

20 21 22 23 24 25

Юзефович, Путь посла [Yuzefovich, The Ambassador’s Path], pp. 70–71, my translation. Kotoshikhin, Russia in the Reign of Aleksei Mikhailovich, p. 75. Garnier, ‘“Wer meinen Herrn ehrt, den ehre ich billig auch”’, p. 31. Rousset de Missy, Le ceremonial diplomatique, i, 2. Rousset de Missy, Le ceremonial diplomatique, i, 36. See, for example, Селин, Русско-шведская граница [Selin, The Russo-Swedish Border], pp. 292, 301, 303, 324.

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Figure 6.1. The Lavuia river, a small tributary of lake Ladoga, in Adam Olearius’s travel description. It became the eastern starting-point of the Swedish-Russian border in Ingria after the treaty of Stolbovo. The diplomatic mission which Adam Olearius was a member of entered Russia here in June 1634. Lund University Library.

communication with their Russian counterparts. Their main partners-opponents in this game (the rules of which were quite comprehensible for the foreigners) and, simultaneously, ‘masters of ceremonies’, as Claudia Garnier labelled them, were the pristavs.26 And third, the key structural elements and, evidently, the very logic of this border ritual were the same as at the further stages of the ceremonial of greeting foreign ambassadors. The foreigners, at least since Sigismund Herberstein, were struck mainly by the following detail: the Russian pristavs, both at the border and later at the entrance to Moscow, always insisted that foreign diplomats should step on the ground first. Herberstein boasted that he had outwitted the Muscovites: he pre‐ tended to start dismounting but then vaulted into the saddle again.27 In 1655 a similar game of pretending at the Russo-Swedish border resulted in the pristav’s falling down from the horse (because his saddle-girth became torn due to his

26 Garnier, ‘“Wer meinen Herrn ehrt, den ehre ich billig auch”’, p. 31. 27 Герберштейн, Записки о Московии [Herberstein, Notes on Muscovy], i, 524–27 (text in Latin, German, and Russian).

The syMboliC uses of The early Modern russo-swedish border

constant ups and downs), and later on some foreign authors took their chance to rejoice at this spectacular faux pas.28 But in the context of the present article another element of the border ritual is more interesting. It has been described by another classic author renowned for his description of Muscovy, Adam Olearius. In June 1634 he observed how a Russian pristav met a Swedish embassy at the border river Lavuia: At 4 o’clock in the afternoon the ambassadors sent word to the other shore that they now wished to be received and that the pristav should therefore come ahead. Then they and their interpreters sat down in one boat and their hofjunkers, whom I joined, in another. The pristav, with 15 well-dressed Russians, then came to meet us in a boat. To impress upon us the pristav’s rank and dignity, the Russians dipped their oars into the water very slowly, moving the boat so little that they scarcely came away from the shore. From time to time they quit completely, waiting for the Swedish ambassadors’ boat to draw near them. They extended an oar to the ambassadors’ boat so that they might be pulled along beside it. They also prompted the ambassadors’ helmsman to the same end. When the ambassadors realized what the Russians were up to, one of them called to the pristav to come more quickly: ‘What is the use of such pointless ceremony?’ The pristav would gain as little for the Grand Prince as they could lose for their sovereign. When the boats came together in the middle of the stream, the pristav spoke up and said that the Great Lord and Tsar, Mikhail Feodorovich, Autocrat of all Russia (rendering the full title), had instructed him to receive the King’s ambassadors.29 The most illuminating, however, is the pristav’s comment that he made while answering a question asked by the Holstein embassy (which Olearius was a member of): When we asked whether he would receive us on his side or on the water as he had the Swedes, he replied that we should come across; there was no need to meet on the water, since there could be no quarrel with us over borders that we did not share.30 It seems that the pristav’s aim was to make the Swedes cross the border, i.e. the mid-stream of the river, first. I would say that in this case the border was used as a symbolic resource of a kind in accordance with the same logic as in the diplomatic game of pretending to start dismounting or getting off the carriage/sledge: it was

28 See Толстиков, ‘Испытание терпения’ [Tolstikov, ‘The Trial of Patience’], p. 252. 29 Olearius, The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-Century Russia, pp. 45–46. 30 Olearius, The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-Century Russia, p. 47. On this episode as an example of actualizing border in the process of symbolic communication see Garnier, ‘“Wer meinen Herrn ehrt, den ehre ich billig auch”’, pp. 33–34. By the way, the author remarks that the diplomatic ritual of meeting at the middle of the river on boats or floats has been known in Europe since the early Middle Ages (p. 48, n. 39).

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always more ‘honourable’ to be the receiving, reacting party in the communica‐ tion, not the initiating one; to be the addressee, not the addresser. This principle was typical of Russian early modern diplomacy in general, for example, it was more ‘honourable’ to host a foreign embassy first and only then, reacting to this, send one’s own mission abroad.31 In the situation described, the Russians tried to apply this principle to the border-crossing process. It seems to be corroborated by the pristav’s comment, although the latter might have been a little bit cunning, because the Holstein embassy had to be met on the Russian bank of the river, i.e. on the Russian side of the border already. The Swedes, in their turn, aimed at meeting exactly in mid-stream, and that probably symbolized the equal status of the parties. This equality of status could be symbolically underlined by the Muscovite party in other contexts. For example, an instruction for the Russian ambassadors sent in 1636 to Karelia for exchanging deserters with the Swedes stated explicitly that the diplomats should neither enter the Swedish side of the border, nor let the Swedes enter the Russian side, but hold negotiations strictly ‘at the border’ (на рубеже). And in 1618 the Muscovite and the Swedish ambassadors met at the same river Lavuia, first on the bridge and then ‘in the middle of the river on horses’ (на середи реки на конях).32 A congress of diplomats on a bridge and building a bridge for this particular goal are, of course, also symbolic actions. In 1617 a bridge was planned to be built over the same Lavuia, at its mouth where this river flows into the Ladoga, for the coming Russian-Swedish negotiations. However strange it may seem from the practical point of view, this was probably dictated by symbolic considerations. It is worth noting that during these 1617 negotiations the parties quarrelled over where their tents should stand. Before the Tsar’s ambassadors agreed to place them in the middle of the bridge they had stubbornly insisted on placing the tents on the Russian side.33 So, in this case the Swedes were to come to the Russians and that would demonstrate the inferior status of the former. Leonid Yuzefovich gave a number of examples of such disputes during congresses between the Rus‐ sian and the Swedish ambassadors from the late sixteenth century. He commented on a possible symbolic meaning of the 1575 compromise when in the similar situation of a heated dispute over where the tents should stand, and after the Russian party had definitively refused to carry out the negotiations on the bridge, the Swedes just took their tent roof and moved it onto the other bank of the Sestra (i.e. on the Russian side of the border). By doing so, in Yuzefovich’s words, it was ‘as if they moved their own territory onto the other bank’.34 He remarks that

31 32 33 34

Юзефович, Путь посла [Yuzefovich, The Ambassador’s Path], pp. 68–69. Селин, Русско-шведская граница [Selin, The Russo-Swedish Border], pp. 241 (1636), 376–77 (1618). Селин, Русско-шведская граница [Selin, The Russo-Swedish Border], pp. 45, 50, 283. Юзефович, Путь посла [Yuzefovich, The Ambassador’s Path], pp. 72–73. See also Памятники дипломатических сношений Московского государства с Шведским государством [Monuments of the Diplomatic Relations of the Muscovite State with the Swedish State], pp. 325–29.

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a tent for diplomatic congresses is a model of the borderland between two neighbouring states, and this is not a coincidence that it consists of two tents. It was believed that the ambassadors of both parties were staying each on their own territory. The curtain is the border, the vault of the tent is the sky dome. Only on this scene a play could be staged that would be impossible in another setting.35 Some of the rituals mentioned above pertaining to crossing the border of Mus‐ covy can, in my opinion, also be considered in the context of symbolically marking the boundary of home. In Russia the sovereign was often likened to a householder and his realm to a household.36 In this case it is worth remembering that in Russia (as well as in Poland-Lithuania, but not in the countries of Western Europe) foreign embassies were to be fully supplied on the Tsar’s account as long as they stayed within his dominions.37 Receiving a foreign diplomat was an evident equivalent of receiving a guest in one’s own house. But the guest in the Slavic culture ‘in fact becomes a hostage of certain demands of the etiquette which he is obliged to obey’.38 So, the ritual helped to gain a symbolic capital from the very fact of crossing the border through marking the status of the foreigners as guests who should obey certain rules which worked in favour of the receiving party. There was also another way of ritually marking the political border and, prob‐ ably, gaining some symbolic dividends through using border sites. This was the capital punishment of criminals. In 1621/22 two robber brothers from Kexholm county, who had been caught on the Russian side, were hanged at the border. The Swedes expressed their discontent with the fact that those criminals had not been extradited, but the Novgorodian voivode Daniil Mezetskii answered to this, that ‘where these robbers had been found, there they were punished’.39 It is well known that in early modern Russia (as well as in many other countries) there existed a principle according to which, as Nancy Kollmann put it, ‘executions be done at symbolically charged sites associated with the crime’.40 In the Muscovite Law Code, for example, damaging a boundary had to be punished by knouting at this very boundary (Chapter x, Article 231): If anyone, on land belonging to the sovereign, or to an hereditary estate owner or a service landholder, destroys a cadastral surveying the boundary and clears away marking posts, or cuts down boundary markers, or levels off 35 Юзефович, Путь посла [Yuzefovich, The Ambassador’s Path], p. 74, my translation. 36 See, for example, Антонов, Смута в культуре средневековой Руси [Antonov, The Time of Troubles in the Culture of the Medieval Rus’], pp. 168–74. 37 Юзефович, Путь посла [Yuzefovich, The Ambassador’s Path], pp. 108–15. 38 Агапкина & Невская, ‘Гость’ [Agapkina & Nevskaia, ‘Guest’]. 39 Селин, Русско-шведская граница [Selin, The Russo-Swedish Border], pp. 189, 194, 212 (the cited phrase), 495. See also Жуков, Управление и самоуправление в Карелии в XVII в. [Zhukov, Administration and Self-Government in Karelia in the Seventeenth Century], pp. 81–82. 40 Kollmann, Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Russia, p. 291.

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pits in the ground, or plows the land over boundaries [and thus obliterates them], and that is established conclusively at trial and investigation: beat such people mercilessly with the knout on the disputed boundaries. After beating them with the knout, cast them in prison for a week. Order the plaintiff to collect from them 5 rubles for each boundary marker [destroyed]. Order the boundaries and boundary markers restored and the pits redug as they were previously.41 However, the episode mentioned from 1621/22 was not about destroying a boundary but about robbery. Nevertheless, the decision to punish the criminal brothers from the other side of the border exactly near this very border may have had to do with asserting the territorial limits of the Tsar’s jurisdiction. This kind of ritual could be used by the Swedish party, too: in May 1636 a Russian subject, serviceman (syn boiarskii) Ivan Neelov, who had been found guilty of murder on the Swedish side, was quartered by the Swedish authorities at a crossroad, ‘on the big Novgorodian road at the distance of three virsts from the border’ (на большой дороге новгородской от рубежа за три версты). His punishment was deliberately executed at the place where the crime had been committed, in Yarvosol´skii pogost (alias Järvisaari parish). After the execution the dead body was just left there, ‘at the border’ (на рубеже). But then it was dug out in secret, taken to the Russian side and buried there in a churchyard, i.e. in consecrated land.42 Due to the crime site’s location as well as its symbolic importance for choosing the place of punishment this execution became a ritual that actualized the Russo-Swedish border. Jens Lerbom also mentions that the Swedish-Danish border in the seven‐ teenth century served as a place for carrying out executions and, besides that, certain symbolic acts pertaining to legal practice: exchanging prisoners (who had to confess their behaviour while crossing the border) or the criminals (thieves), who had previously escaped to Denmark, reconciling with the plaintiffs.43 An‐ other type of connection between political border and punishment can be seen in the fact that in the sixteenth century a gallows was erected in the disputed land (known under its Finnish name Riitamaa) at the Russo-Swedish border in the Karelian Isthmus, right near the borderstone (which later became known as Ristikivi). In this region both parties then organized raids over the border, so the gallows here was probably a symbol of punishment for these kinds of evil deeds.44

41 The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649, p. 181. 42 Пересветов-Мурат, ‘Ингерманландский криминал’ [Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘An Ingrian Crime Story’]; Селин, Русско-шведская граница [Selin, The Russo-Swedish Border], pp. 566–69. 43 Lerbom, ‘The Spaces and Boundaries of the Realm’, pp. 39, 40. 44 Gallén, Nöteborgsfreden och Finlands medeltida östgräns, p. 72.

The syMboliC uses of The early Modern russo-swedish border

Symbolic Value of a Border as a Confessional and Cultural Division Line In any case, the symbolic value of the political border could be either enhanced through certain rituals or, conversely, invoked to enhance the power of rituals. And, of course, the symbolic meaning of the political border could be appealed to not only through rituals, i.e. actions, but also in discourse or image. Just to illustrate this here, I will shortly touch upon another issue which seems to be a rather telling example of the early modern Russo-Swedish border’s symbolic value as a confessional and cultural division line. How and when could it be referred to as such? As is well known, the border markers (stones or trees) usually had one or three crowns (i.e. the Swedish coat-of-arms) on the Swedish side and a cross on the Russian side (not, for example, the double-headed eagle). And there is a document that shows that both these signs, at least in certain contexts, could be interpreted as purely religious symbols. In 1646 a voivode of Oshta (in Olonets Karelia), Iov Nashchokin, sent a report to the Ambassadorial Chancery on an alleged incident of damaging a border-marking sign on a tree (at the border post in Kangasozero/Kangasjärvi, near Siamozero/Säämäjärvi). The voivode cited Timofei Lukin, a strelets who had inspected the site and informed his superior that on the Swedish side ‘немецкой болван высечен’ (the foreign/Swedish idol is hewed off) but on the Russian side ‘крест господень цел’ (the Lord’s cross is undamaged).45 It looks like here we have an example of interpreting the Swedish state symbol as a pagan idol as opposed to the Christian symbol of a cross which in practice only marked the Russian territory. We do not know, of course, how typical this interpretation was, but the Muscovite authorities’ attitude to the Orthodox who had become the Swedish King’s subjects after the Treaty of Stolbovo and continued to come to the Russian side, now from behind the Swedish side, leads one to believe that Muscovy’s border with Sweden (i.e. the new one, agreed upon in Stolbovo) was often perceived as the border of Russian Orthodoxy (even Christianity) in general. In 1618 the Swedish ambassadors had to protect their new subjects against the offences and discrimination they suffered during their visits to Pskov and Novgorod regions. The Tsar’s subjects called them ‘heretics, traitors, and disloyal servants’ (еретиками и отметчики и неверными слугами in the Russian transla‐ tion of the Swedes’ complaints). And some Orthodox priests from Ivangorod, Jama, and Kopor´e (that had been ceded to Sweden) when they came to the Novgorodian Metropolitan for blessing, were also cursed and scolded by him and invoked to move to the Tsar’s side of the border (what would be followed, in the

45 Cited after Жуков, Управление и самоуправление в Карелии в XVII в. [Zhukov, Administration and Self-Government in Karelia in the Seventeenth Century], p. 130.

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Metropolitan’s view, by the peasants’ migration).46 Later, in 1629, the voivodes of Novgorod got the order to check the firmness of the faith of all the Orthodox pilgrims who came from the Swedish side. The ones found ‘firm’ enough could be allowed into posad churches but never to the Hagia Sophia of Novgorod. The ‘unfirm’ and Lutherans should not be granted entrance to the churches at all, ‘in order to avoid an insult to our Orthodox faith’ (дабы нашей Православной вере поруганья не было).47 It looks like the very fact of living outside the Russian border made even an Orthodox Christian suspicious as to his or her religious loyalty. At the same time, it seems that at least for the spiritual authorities the only natural order of things was when all Orthodox Christians lived within the territory subject to the Tsar. And the question was not about refusing to recognize the newly established border or about the usual pastoral care of the flock on its other side. The examples mentioned show, in my view, that, first, the territorialization process of the Russian state had advanced far enough by the early seventeenth century and Russia’s border, although transparent, clearly defined the limits of the political community (at least in the west). Second, this territorially limited community was simultaneously considered to be confessional. There was no division between the political and the religious spheres (which is so usual for us nowadays), and, as a result, the political border became at the same time the religious one, although it went through a territory where a monoconfessional population existed. Such an understanding of the border was hardly common for all members of Russian society at its different levels. Uncovering a more nuanced picture is a possible subject for future studies. But the importance of this aspect is beyond doubt. All the aforementioned correlates well with how researchers define the seventeenth-century concept of Russianness. For example, according to Tat´iana Oparina, ‘“the Russians” were the ones who belonged to a diocese of the Moscow Patriarchate (confessionym), had the full status of the Tsar’s subject (politonym), had been born or at least baptized in Holy Rus (toponym)’.48 The spatial element of this identity, together with the political and the reli‐ gious ones, was equally important, sometimes even the determinative. Tat'iana Oparina quotes the words (said, incidentally, during the Russo-Swedish negotia‐ tions that were later ratified by the Treaty of Stolbovo) of Kiprian, the archiman‐ drite of the Khutyn monastery. He reproached Hans Brackel, who had been born in Moscow’s Foreign Quarter (Nemetskaia sloboda, alias Kukui), for entering Swedish service (note that Hans Brackel had never been Orthodox):

46 Россия и Швеция в первой половине XVII века [Russia and Sweden in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century], pp. 82–83. 47 Cited after Цветаев, Протестанты и протестантство в России до эпохи преобразований [Tsvetaev, The Protestants and Protestantism in Russia before the Time of Reforms], p. 594. 48 Опарина, ‘Предписанная идентичность православных иностранцев в России первой половины XVII века’ [Oparina, ‘The Prescribed Identity of Orthodox Foreigners in Russia during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century’], p. 174, my translation.

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You have forgotten your nature, where you were born and where your parents are, who all lie buried in Kukui; you have forgotten Moscow’s bread and salt […] But nonetheless, you are a real Russian of ours (прямой наш русак).49 In this context, Alexander Chepel´ has pointed to a similar wording in the letter to the Novogorodians (dated 25 December 1616), compiled in the Tsar’s name after the conclusion of the treaty with Sweden. It admonished Novgorod’s clergy and instructed them to induce all those who had helped the Swedes during the Time of Troubles, or had lands on the territory that would be ceded to Sweden, not to stay on the Swedish side and to move to the Russian side. The Orthodox priests had to urge their flock to ‘remember our true Christian Orthodox faith, and Us, the great inborn Christian sovereign, and their parents’ graves, and their nature’ (попомнили нашу истинную православную хрестьянскую веру, и нас великого природного государя, и родителей своих гробы, и свою природу).50 Here, too, faith, subjecthood, and living in a certain land, where one has been born and where one’s parents are buried, are united. This leads us to a more general question of an alleged specificity of the semiotics of space in pre-Petrine Russia. This problem has been posed by Yurii Lotman and Boris Uspenskii, who underlined the importance of moral and reli‐ gious categories through which the space had been described as divided between the ‘clean’ and the ‘unclean’ or the ‘just’ and the ‘sinful’, etc.51 I think the cases presented above can be seen from this perspective. Thus, the restrictions imposed on the Orthodox who had come from the Swedish side of the border can be compared to the known practice of sending those who returned to Russia after a long period abroad (in the lands of the heterodox believers) to monasteries, ‘under command’ (под начал), in order to spend a certain amount of time there and ‘be purified’. For example, Voin Nashchokin (a runaway son of the renowned diplomat Afanasii Nashchokin) had to pass such a ‘quarantine’ in late 1666–early 1667 in the Kirillo-Belozerskii monastery after he had returned home.52 Having been too long outside the ‘clean’ space was seen to have ‘tainted’ an Orthodox Christian, and required either that one tested one’s firmness in the faith and

49 Опарина, ‘Предписанная идентичность православных иностранцев в России первой половины XVII века’ [Oparina, ‘The Prescribed Identity of Orthodox Foreigners in Russia during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century], p. 168, my translation. 50 Акты исторические [Historical Acts], iii, 450 (No. 284) and Чепель, ‘Проблемы шведско-русского приграничья и пограничная политика Швеции в 1617–1661 гг.’ [Chepel´, ‘The Problems of the Swedish-Russian Borderlands and Sweden’s Border Policy in 1617–1661’], p. 181. 51 Лотман, ‘О понятии географического пространства в русских средневековых текстах’ [Lotman, ‘On the Concept of Geographical Space in Russian Medieval Texts’], Успенский, ‘Дуалистический характер русской средневековой культуры’ [Uspenskii, ‘The Dual Character of Russian Medieval Culture’]. 52 Флоря, ‘Путешествия Воина Нащокина’ [Floria, ‘The Travels of Voin Nashchokin’], pp. 1–2, 318– 19.

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restricted one’s contacts with sacred places and things, or demanded a ‘cleanup’ (and the latter also presupposed moving to the holy territory of a monastery). What about the political border’s religious symbolism from the Swedish point of view? Despite all the importance of Lutheranism as one of the pillars bearing the principle identity of the Swedish Crown’s subjects, other factors like language and ‘national’ belonging (defined mainly according to the language, too) acquired growing significance from the early seventeenth century, at least on the level of an educated elite. In the border regions of Ingria and Karelia ‘the game of identities’ (the ‘national’, political, confessional ones, etc.) became very complicated after 1617.53 But my strong impression is that Sweden’s discoursive landscape more often defined ‘the Others’ vs ‘us’ through non-confessional terms. It is worth remembering in this context, that by the sixteenth century, when the Swedes routinely referred to the Russians as pagans and non-Christians,54 Olaus Magnus in 1539 (i.e. long before a new border between Sweden and Russia was agreed upon in 1595 in Teusina) presented the Russo-Swedish border on his ‘Carta Marina’ as cultural or ‘ethnographic’ but hardly religious.55 The border itself is shown here sketchily with a double tree row.56 Its symbolic meaning is illustrated through juxtaposition of the coats-of-arms (the three crowns vs a fantastic coat-of-arms of the Grand Duke — a horseman shooting a bow) and the figures of Swedes and Russians on both sides of the border. The latter are easily recognizable due to ‘the Russian attributes’ (as Leif Tengström has labelled them): ‘Scythian’ bows, sharply sloped hats, caftans vs the Swedes’ spears and crossbows, flat hats, knightly armor.57 Later on, the role of this ‘ethnographic’ discourse of ‘the Other’ grew in Sweden. As Kari Tarkiainen remarks, from the 1610s it became more usual to call the Muscovites ‘barbarians’ rather than ‘pagans’.58 So, I am inclined to think that in certain respects the seventeenth-century Russo-Swedish border had more value as the line of religious division for the Russians rather than for the Swedes. If this is true, we can offer a new perspective for viewing the problem of the Orthodox ‘deserters’ from the Swedish side. It has often been argued that the Orthodox fled to Russia because of the religious oppression on the part of the Swedish authorities. Although a certain pressure

53 See Katajala, Suurvallan rajalla, pp. 42–54, 238–44; Nordin, Ett fattigt men fritt folk, pp. 77–80; Sivonen, ‘Me inkerikot, vatjalaiset ja karjalaiset’, pp. 41–83; Толстиков, ‘Православное население Ингерманландии глазами шведской администрации’ [Tolstikov, ‘Ingria’s Orthodox Population in the Eyes of the Swedish Administration’]. 54 Tarkiainen, Se vanha vainooja, pp. 16–54; Щеглов, ‘Олаус Магнус о России и русских’ [Shcheglov, ‘Olaus Magnus on Russia and the Russians’]. 55 Although near the figure of the Grand Duke of Moscow there is a quotation from I Corinthians, 1.10: Non sint in vobis schismata (that there be no divisions among you), which reminds us of the religious discord. 56 On the methods of showing borders on early maps see Katajala, ‘Maps, Borders, and State-Building’ (on ‘Carta Marina’ see pp. 69–71). 57 Tengström, ‘Muschoviten … Turcken icke olijk’, ii, 137–64, 194–202, 480, 482, 488–89. 58 Tarkiainen, ‘De ryska “nationalegenskaperna” enligt svensk uppfattning i början av 1600-talet’, p. 50.

The syMboliC uses of The early Modern russo-swedish border

Figure 6.2. Olaus Magnus’s map (Carta Marina, 1539, fragment). Woodcut. It marks the Russo-Swedish border with a double tree row. Sweden is symbolized with the three crowns’ emblem and Russia with a horseman shooting a bow. Uppsala University Library.

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did exist, some researchers, especially those studying mostly Swedish sources, are sure that such an explanation does not work.59 On the other hand, the Russian sources underline the religious motif. But could such a picture be a result of the abovementioned asymmetry in understanding the religious aspect of the border? And, moreover, could it be a result of using this symbolic dimension of the border by the deserters themselves, who probably knew very well what kind of arguments would become the most effective in communication with the Russian authorities? So, the early modern Russo-Swedish border had a symbolic value which could be appealed to in different ways (through rituals, discourses, or images), by different actors (for example, diplomats or, albeit hypothetically, trans-border migrants), and in different situations (like diplomatic negotiations or executing justice). To study how exactly it was done is to study how this border was (re)produced as the cultural phenomenon in the course of time. And inasmuch as borders are the instruments of mastering space, studying the symbolic uses of political borders tends in turn to become studying the spatial dimension of political power.

59 See, for example, Laasonen, Novgorodin imu.

The syMboliC uses of The early Modern russo-swedish border

Works Cited Primary Sources Kotoshikhin, Grigorii Karpovich, Russia in the Reign of Aleksei Mikhailovich, ed. by Marshall Poe, trans. by Benjamin Phillip Uroff (Berlin: De Gruyter Open, 2014) [accessed 1 February 2018] Olaus Magnus, Carta Marina et descriptio septemtrionalium terrarum ac mirabilium rerum in eis contentarum diligentissime elaborata (Venice: [n. pub.], 1539) Olearius, Adam, Auszführliche Beschreibung Der Kundbaren Reyse Nach Muscow und Persien / So durch gelegenheit einer Holsteinischen Gesandschafft von Gottorff auß an Michael Fedorowitz den grossen Zaar in Muscow / und Schah Sefi König in Persien geschehen. Worinnen die gelegenheit derer Orter und Länder / durch welche die Reyse gangen / als Liffland / Rußland / Tartarien / Meden und Persien / sampt dero Einwohner Natur / Leben / Sitten / Hauß- Welt- und Geistlichen Stand mit fleiß auffgezeichnet / und mit vielen meist nach dem Leben gestelleten Figuren gezieret / zu befinden, 3rd ed. (Schleswig: Holwein, 1663) ———, The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-Century Russia, ed. and trans. by Samuel H. Baron (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967) Rousset de Missy, Jean, Le ceremonial diplomatique des cours de l’Europe, ou collection des actes, memoires et relations qui concernent les dignites, titulatures, honneurs & prééminences; les fonctions publiques des souverains, leurs sacres, couronnemens, mariages, batêmes, & enterremens; les investitures des grands fiefs; les entrées publiques, audiences, fonctions, immunitez & franchises des ambassadeurs & autres ministres publics; leurs disputes & démêlez de préséance; et en général tout ce qui a rapport au cérémonial & à l’etiquette, 2 vols in 1 (Amsterdam: Janssons à Waesberge, Weststein & Smith, 1739) The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649, i: Text and Translation, ed. and trans. by Richard Hellie (Irvine, CA: Schlacks Jr., 1988) Акты исторические, собранные и изданные Археографическою комиссиею [Historical Acts Collected and Published by the Archaeographical Commission], 5 vols (St Petersburg: Tipografiia II Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1841–1842) Герберштейн, Сигизмунд, Записки о Московии, пер. А. И. Малеин, А. В. Назаренко, отв. ред. А. Л. Хорошкевич [Herberstein, Sigismund, Notes on Muscovy, ed. by A. I. Malein, A. V. Nazarenko, and A. L. Khoroshkevich], 2 vols (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2008)

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Памятники дипломатических сношений Московского государства с Шведским государством, i: 1556–1586, сост. В. В. Майков, Н. Д. Чечулин [Monuments of the Diplomatic Relations of the Muscovite State with the Swedish State, ed. by V. V. Maikov and N. D. Chechulin], Сборник Императорского Русского исторического общества [Collection of the Imperial Russian Historical Society], 129 (St Petersburg: Tipografiia II Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1910) Россия и Швеция в первой половине XVII века. Сборник материалов, извлеченных из Московского Главного Архива Министерства Иностранных Дел и Шведского Государственного Архива и касающихся истории взаимных отношений России и Швеции в 1616–1651 годах, сост. К. И. Якубов [Russia and Sweden in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century. Collection of the Materials Taken from the Moscow Chief Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish State Archives, and pertaining to the History of Mutual Relations between Russia and Sweden in 1616–1651, ed. by K. I. Yakubov] (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1897) Secondary Studies Althoff, Gerd, Die Macht der Rituale. Symbolik und Herrschaft im Mittelalter (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003) ———, Rules and Rituals in Medieval Power Game: A German Perspective (Leiden: Brill, 2020) Gallén, Jarl, Nöteborgsfreden och Finlands medeltida östgräns, Skrifter utgivna av Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 427.1 (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 1968) Garnier, Claudia, ‘Die Macht der Zeichen — die Zeichen der Macht. Zur Bedeutung symbolischer Kommunikation in der Politik des Großfürstentums Moskau im ausgehenden 15. und 16. Jahrhundert’, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 55 (2007), 331–56 [accessed 1 February 2018] ———, ‘“Wer meinen Herrn ehrt, den ehre ich billig auch”. Symbolische Kommunikationsformen bei Gesandtenempfängen am Moskauer Hof im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert’, Jahrbuch für Kommunikationsgeschichte, 7 (2005), 27–51 [accessed 1 February 2018] Golubev, Alexei V., Alexander V. Tolstikov, and Antti Räihä, ‘Language and Border between Scandinavia and Russia’, Revue d’Histoire Nordique, 19 (2015), 21–29 Hennings, Jan, Russia and Courtly Europe. Ritual and the Culture of Diplomacy, 1648–1725 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) Katajala, Kimmo, ‘Line, Zone, or Sieve? Conceptualizing the 1617 Russo-Swedish Border’, Nordic and Baltic Studies Review, 2 (2017), 177–90 [accessed 1 February 2018]

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———, ‘Maps, Borders, and State-Building’, in Physical and Cultural Space in Pre-Industrial Europe. Methodological Approaches to Spatiality, ed. by Marko Lamberg, Marko Hakanen, and Janne Haikari (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011) ———, Suurvallan rajalla. Ihmisiä Ruotsin ajan Karjalassa, Historiallinen arkisto, 118 (Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, 2005) Kollmann, Nancy Shields, Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) Laasonen, Pentti, Novgorodin imu. Miksi ortodoksit muuttivat Käkisalmen läänistä Venäjälle 1600-luvulla?, Historiallisia tutkimuksia, 222 (Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, 2005) Lerbom, Jens, ‘The Spaces and Boundaries of the Realm: Sweden in the Early Modern Popular Mind’, in Imagined, Negotiated, Remembered. Constructing European Borders and Borderlands, ed. by Kimmo Katajala and Maria Lähteenmäki, Mittel- und Ostmitteleuropastudien, 11 (Vienna: LIT, 2012), pp. 31–45 Mikhailova, Yulia, and David K. Prestel, ‘Cross Kissing: Keeping One’s Word in TwelfthCentury Rus’’, Slavic Review, 70 (2011), 1–22 Nordin, Jonas, Ett fattigt men fritt folk. Nationell och politisk självbild i Sverige från stormaktstid till slutet av frihetstiden (Stockholm: Symposion, 2000) Paasi, Anssi, ‘Borders and Border-Crossings’, in The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Cultural Geography, ed. by Nuala C. Johnson, Richard H. Schein, and Jamie Winders (Chichester: Wiley, 2013), pp. 478–93 Sivonen, Mika, ‘Me inkerikot, vatjalaiset ja karjalaiset’. Uuskonnollinen integrointi ja ortodoksisen vähemmistön identiteetin rakentuminen Ruotsin Inkerissä 1680–1702, Bibliotheca historica, 111 (Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, 2007) Stollberg-Rilinger, Barbara, Rituale (Frankfurt: Campus, 2013) Tarkiainen, Kari, ‘De ryska “nationalegenskaperna” enligt svensk uppfattning i början av 1600-talet’, Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier, 48 (1973), 18–61 ———, Se vanha vainooja. Käsitykset itäisestä naapurista Iivana Julmasta Pietari Suureen, Historiallisia tutkimuksia, 132 (Helsinki: Suomen historiallinen seura, 1986) Tengström, Leif, ‘Muschoviten … Turcken icke olijk’. Ryssattribut, och deras motbilder, i svensk heraldik från Gustav Vasa till freden i Stolbova, 2 vols, Jyväskylä studies in the arts, 55 ( Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 1997) Tolstikov, Alexander V., ‘From Mezha and Rån to Rubezh and Gränsen’, Revue d’Histoire Nordique, 19 (2015), 31–55 Агапкина, Татьяна Алексеевна, & Лидия Георгиевна Невская, ‘Гость’ [Agapkina, Tat’iana Alekseevna, and Lidiia Georgievna Nevskaia, ‘Guest’], in Славянские древности. Этнолингвистический словарь, i: А–Г, под ред. Н. И. Толстого [Slavic Antiquities. The Ethnolinguistic Dictionary, ed. by N. I. Tolstoi] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), pp. 531–33 Антонов, Дмитрий Игоревич, Смута в культуре средневековой Руси. Эволюция древнерусских мифологем в книжности начала XVII века [Antonov, Dmitrii Igorevich, The Time of Troubles in the Culture of the Medieval Rus’. The Evolution of Old Russian Mythologems in the Book Culture of the Early Seventeenth Century] (Moscow: RGGU, 2009)

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Белова, Ольга Владиславовна, Людмила Николаевна Виноградова, & Андрей Львович Топорков, ‘Земля’ [Belova, Ol’ga Vladislavovna, Liudmila Nikolaevna Vinogradova, & Andrei L’vovich Toporkov, ‘Earth’], in Славянские древности. Этнолингвистический словарь, ii: Д–К, под ред. Н. И. Толстого [Slavic Antiquities. The Ethnolinguistic Dictionary, ed. by N. I. Tolstoi] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1999), pp. 315–21 Бойцов, Михаил Анатольевич, & Герд Альтхоф, eds, На языке даров. Правила символической коммуникации в Европе 1000–1700 гг. [Boitsov, Mikhail Anatol’evich, and Gerd Althoff, In the Language of Gifts. The Rules of Symbolic Communication in Europe, 1000–1700] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2016) Жуков, Алексей Юрьевич, Управление и самоуправление в Карелии в XVII в. [Zhukov, Aleksei Yur´evich, Administration and Self-Government in Karelia in the Seventeenth Century] (Novgorod: Novgorodskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2003) Лотман, Юрий Михайлович, ‘О понятии географического пространства в русских средневековых текстах’ [Lotman, Yurii Mikhailovich, ‘On the Concept of Geographical Space in Russian Medieval Texts’], in his Избранные статьи [Selected Articles], 3 vols (Tallinn: Aleksandriia, 1992), iii, 407–12 Опарина, Татьяна Анатольевна, ‘Предписанная идентичность православных иностранцев в России первой половины XVII века’ [Oparina, Tat´iana Anatol´evna, ‘The Prescribed Identity of Orthodox Foreigners in Russia during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century’], Диалог со временем [Dialogue with Time], 22 (2008), 161–74 Павлов-Сильванский, Николай Павлович, ‘Символизм в древнем русском праве’ [Pavlov-Sil´vanskii, Nikolai Pavlovich, ‘Symbolism in the Ancient Russian Law’], in his Феодализм в России [Feudalism in Russia] (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), pp. 483–505 Пересветов-Мурат, Александр Иванович, ‘Ингерманландский криминал, XVII век’ [Pereswetoff-Morath, Aleksandr Ivanovich, ‘An Ingrian Crime Story of the Seventeenth Century’], Inkeri (Pietarin ja Inkerinmaan kuulumisia), 67 (2008), 8–9 [accessed 1 February 2018] Селин, Адриан Александрович, Русско-шведская граница (1617–1700 гг.). Формирование, функционирование, наследие. Исторические очерки [Selin, Adrian Aleksandrovich, The Russo-Swedish Border (1617–1700). Formation, Functioning, Legacy. Historical Essays] (St Petersburg: BLITs, 2016) Стефанович, Петр Сергеевич, ‘Крестоцелование и отношение к нему церкви в Древней Руси’ [Stefanovich, Petr Sergeevich, ‘Cross-Kissing and the Perception of it by the Church in Ancient Rus’’], Средневековая Русь [The Medieval Rus], 5 (2004), 86–113 Толстиков, Александр Владимирович, ‘Испытание терпения: поэтическое описание злоключений шведского посольства в России середины XVII в.’ [Tolstikov, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, ‘The Trial of Patience: A Poetic Description of the Swedish Embassy’s Misadventures in Mid-Seventeenth Century Russia’], Одиссей: Человек в Истории [Odysseus. A Man in History], 21 (2009), 244–66

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———, ‘Православное население Ингерманландии глазами шведской администрации: соотношение этнического и конфессионального аспектов (XVII в.)’ [‘Ingria’s Orthodox Population in the Eyes of the Swedish Administration: The Relationship between the Ethnic and the Confessional Aspects’], in XV конференция по изучению истории, экономики, языка и литературы Скандинавских стран и Финляндии. Тезисы докладов, i [The Fifteenth Conference on the Studies of History, Economy, Language and Literature of the Scandinavian Countries and Finland. The Abstracts] (Moscow: Institut vseobshchei istorii RAN, 2004), pp. 132–34 ———, ‘Религиозный аспект понимания политических границ в допетровской России’ [‘The Religious Aspect of Understanding the Political Borders in Pre-Petrine Russia’], Россия и мир глазами друг друга: из истории взаимовосприятия [Russia and the World in the Eyes of Each Other: from the History of Mutual Perception], 8 (2017), 145–63 ———, ‘Ритуальные аспекты маркирования российско-шведской границы в раннее Новое Время’ [‘Ritual Aspects of Actualizing the Russian-Swedish Border in the Early Modern Period’], Nordic and Baltic Studies Review, 2 (2017), 191–206 [accessed 1 February 2018] Толстой, Никита Ильич, ‘Граница’ [Tolstoi, Nikita Il’ich, ‘Boundary’], in Славянские древности. Этнолингвистический словарь, i: А–Г, под ред. Н. И. Толстого [Slavic Antiquities. The Ethnolinguistic Dictionary, ed. by N. I. Tolstoi] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), pp. 537–40 Успенский, Борис Андреевич, ‘Дуалистический характер русской средневековой культуры (на материале “Хожения за три моря” Афанасия Никитина)’ [Uspenskii, Boris Andreevich, ‘The Dual Character of Russian Medieval Culture (On the Material of Afanasii Nikitin’s Journey beyond the Three Seas’], in his Избранные труды [Selected Works], 3 vols (Moscow: Yazyki russkoi kul’tury, 1996), i, 381–432 ———, ‘Мифологический аспект русской экспрессивной фразеологии’ [‘The Mythological Aspect of Russian Expressive Phraseology’], in his Избранные труды [Selected Works], 3 vols (Moscow: Yazyki russkoi kul’tury, 1996), ii, 67–161 ———, ‘Право и религия в Московской Руси’ [‘Law and Religion in Muscovite Rus’’], Факты и знаки. Исследования по семиотике истории [Facts and Signs. Studies in the Semiotics of History], 1 (2008), 122–97 Филюшкин, Александр Ильич, ‘Институт крестоцелования в Средневековой Руси’ [Filiushkin, Aleksandr Il´ich, ‘The Institution of Cross-Kissing in Medieval Rus’], Клио. Журнал для ученых [Clio. A Journal for Scholars], 11 (2000), 42–48 Флоря, Борис Николаевич, ‘Путешествия Воина Нащокина’ [Floria, Boris Nikolaevich, ‘The Travels of Voin Nashchokin’], Средние века [The Middle Ages], 71.1/2 (2010), 313–20 Цветаев, Дмитрий Владимирович, Протестанты и протестантство в России до эпохи преобразований [Tsvetaev, Dmitrii Vladimirovich, The Protestants and Protestantism in Russia before the Time of Reforms] (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1890)

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Чепель, Александр Иванович, ‘Проблемы шведско-русского приграничья и пограничная политика Швеции в 1617–1661 гг.’ [Chepel´, Aleksandr Ivanovich, ‘The Problems of the Borderlands and Sweden’s Border Policy in 1617–1661’] (unpublished doctoral/candidate of sciences thesis, Herzen State Pedagogical University, St Petersburg, 2011) Щеглов, Андрей Джолинардович, ‘Олаус Магнус о России и русских (к вопросу об интерпретации образа)’ [Shcheglov, Andrei Dzholinardovich, ‘Olaus Magnus on Russia and the Russians (To the Question of Interpretation of the Image’], in Eastern and Northern Europe in the Middle Ages, ed. by G. V. Glazyrina, Древнейшие государства Восточной Европы [The Earliest States of Eastern Europe], 1999 (Мoscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 2001), pp. 230–38 Юзефович, Леонид Абрамович, ‘Как в посольских обычаях ведется …’ Русский посольский обычай конца XV – начала XVIII в. [Yuzefovich, Leonid Abramovich, ‘According to the Ambassadorial Custom …’ The Russian Diplomatic Ceremonial from the End of the Fifteenth to the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1988) ———, Путь посла. Русский посольский обычай. Обиход. Этикет. Церемониал [The Ambassador’s Path. Russian Ambassadorial Custom. Practice. Etiquette. Ceremonial] (St Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Ivana Limbakha, 2007)

ELISABETH LöfSTRAND 

Ryssgården The Russian Factory in Stockholm in the Seventeenth Century

Introduction In the seventeenth century the countries around the Baltic Sea were important suppliers of raw materials for Western Europe. They comprised a small number of highly important products: iron, copper, timber, hemp, flax, and grain. Many of these were vital for Western European powers that were engaged in major expansions of their merchant and naval fleets.1 Sweden, Denmark, and Holland competed for mastery of the Baltic. With the Peace of Stolbovo in 1617, Sweden strengthened its position, and again even more so when Riga was conquered in 1621. In March 1609, Swedish troops intervened in Russia. A central power no longer functioned and various pretenders fought for the throne. The country was devastated by war and famine and disease raged. Known as the Time of Troubles, this period well suited its name. For six years, from 1611 to 1617, Sweden occupied the northwest Russian town of Novgorod and a large part of its hinterland. Due to the weakened state of Russia, Sweden was able to make severe demands in the peace negotiations held in the small village of Stolbovo, a few miles south of Ladoga. Under the peace treaty, Sweden returned Novgorod and its surrounding region but retained, in exchange, large areas around the Gulf of Finland. Russia was now completely cut off from the Baltic Sea. Several rivers from the interior of Russia connect to the Gulf of Finland and the natural trading routes to Western Europe crossed the Baltic Sea. From 1617 onwards, this trade was only permissible through Swedish middlemen. Customs dues, which were paid in cash, made an important contribution to state finances. One of the most important goals of Swedish foreign policy to the east, to control Russia’s Baltic trade, had been achieved.2 In order to promote mutual trade between Sweden and Russia, it was decided at Stolbovo that factories would be established in several towns in both countries. This also meant that Russia also had to be allowed to have its own ships trading 1 Attman, Ryssland och Europa, p. 33. 2 Ekonomiska förbindelser mellan Sverige och Ryssland, p. iii; Attman, Ryssland och Europa, p. 20. Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 143–160 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133602

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on the Baltic Sea.3 The fourteenth paragraph of the Peace Treaty stipulates that the merchants in Tsar Michail Fedorovič’s kingdom: friitt och obehindret, när de sin toll vttlagtt haffwe på rätte tollhws, måghe handle i Stockholm, Wiiborgh, Reffle, Narfwen och andre städer i Swerigie, Finlandh och Liiffland med Hans Kon. May:tz vndersåter köpmän, såsom och friitt och obehindret reese igenom den stormechtige herres konungh Gustaff Adolphz till Swerigie landh och herschap i deris handell och ärender i Swerigis riike.4 (freely and without hinder, when they had paid their customs dues at the correct customs house, may trade in Stockholm, Viborg, Reval, Narva, and other towns in Sweden, Finland, and Livonia with merchants who were the subjects of His Majesty the King, and also freely and without hinder travel through the country and territories of the mighty King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden for trade and business in the Kingdom of Sweden). Equally, merchants from Sweden were allowed to trade in Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov, Ladoga, and other Russian towns. This resulted in an increase in trade between Sweden and Russia which persisted throughout the remainder of the seventeenth century. It was broken by a short war 1656–1658, but the Peace of Kardis 1661 which followed confirmed the conditions stipulated in the Treaty of Stolbovo. Furthermore, an easing of trade restrictions was introduced. This period of lively economic exchange has been studied by several scholars in the twentieth century. However, no major work has been done in the most recent decades. Articles in popular history magazines have been published, but they are based on previous research.5 The Russian scholar Igor´ Šaskol´skij has analysed the economic connections between Russia and Sweden in several works, among them his monograph Столбовский мир и торговые отношения России со шведским государством [The Peace of Stolbovo of 1617 and Trade Relationships between Russia and the Swedish State] (1964) and in the posthumously published (1998) Экономические отношения России и Шведского государства в XVII веке [Economic Relations between Russia and the Swedish State in the Seventeenth Century]. Šaskol´skij was also one of the editors of the major collection of documents concerning Russian-Swedish trade which was published in Moscow in 1960, Русско-шведские экономические отношения в XVII веке. Сборник документов [Russian-Swedish Economic Relations in the Seventeenth Century. A Collection of Documents]. This con‐ tains over three hundred Russian documents collected from archives in Moscow, 3 Loit, ‘Sverige och östersjöhandeln under 1600-talet’, p. 320. 4 Sverges traktater, v.1, 255. 5 Abrahamsson, ‘Ryssgården’; Лёфстранд, ‘Новгородцы Кошкины и Ryssgården в Стокгольме’ [Löfstrand, ‘The Koškins from Novgorod and the Ryssgården in Stockholm’]; Löfstrand, ‘Ryssgården i Stockholm och köpmännen Kosjkin’; Лёфстранд, Новгородские купцы в Швеции [Löfstrand, Novgorodian Merchants in Sweden].

ryssGården

Figure 7.1. Panoramic view of Stockholm, seen from Kastellholmen, in 1650. An engraving by Wolfgang Hartmann. To the left: Maria Magdalena Church and The Russian Merchants’ Market; in the middle, Skeppsbron (The Ship’s Bridge or Quay) in Gamla stan, the old town, stretching from the Royal Castle southward to Slussen (the Sluice), and slightly to the right, the Royal castle; to the right, Norrmalm with the extravagant palace Makalös (peerless) built by General Count Jacob De la Gardie. Stockholms stadsmuseum.

Leningrad, Tallinn, Riga, and Tartu. In 1978, Russian-Swedish collaboration re‐ sulted in the publication of two volumes of documents from Swedish archives in Swedish, German, and Russian, both volumes under the editorship of Artur Attman (and others), Ekonomiska förbindelser mellan Sverige och Ryssland under 1600-talet. Attman is also the author of several articles on Russia’s trade with the west and on the aims of Swedish trading policy in the east during the seventeenth century. Concerning research specifically into Ryssgården in Stockholm there are four works that should be mentioned. As early as 1910 a monograph, Из прошлого русской православной церкви в Стокгольме [From the Past of the Russian Orthodox Church in Stockholm], was published.6 Its author was Father Petr Rumjancev, Father Superior of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Transfiguration of Christ in Stockholm. He was primarily interested in the history of the congregation; however, as the early history of this church is intimately connected to Ryssgården 6 A typed German version was published in 1945: Rumjantsev, Von der Vergangenheit der Russichen orthodoxen Kirche in Stockholm.

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Figure 7.2. The Russian Merchants’ Market. Detail from the preceding engraving.

he researched this aspect as well. Father Petr was fluent in both Russian and Swedish and he used sources from both languages. His work is a thorough study to which all who have later written about Ryssgården refer. In 1966, Signe Lang published a booklet in the series Stockholms stadsmuseums småskrifter with the title Stadsgården och Ryssgården. It is the only work which focuses entirely on Ryssgården and its history from the date of its opening to when it was closed in 1874. In addition, Ture J. Arne has devoted a chapter to Ryssgården in his collec‐ tion of essays Det stora Svitjod (1917),7 and in Ture Nerman’s Svensk och ryss. Ett umgänge i krig och handel (1946) there are two short chapters about Russian trade in Stockholm.8 In a specific study, Sergej Bachrušin has examined a particular

7 Arne, Det stora Svitjod, pp. 174–201. 8 Nerman, Svensk och ryss, pp. 118–26.

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merchant’s family and its business in Stockholm across three generations, ‘Торги новгородцев Кошкиных’ [‘The Trade of the Koškins from Novgorod’]. It was published in Moscow in 1954.

Ryssgården is Inaugurated. The Settlement during the Seventeenth Century It took until twenty years after the Peace of Stolbovo before the Russians were allocated a market place in Stockholm.9 The Russians had already allocated a site to Swedish merchants in 1618. It was not until 1637, after many requests from Moscow that Stockholm City established a market place for the Russian merchants. It consisted of twenty-one wooden booths and a weighing house at Brunnsgränd in the centre of the city near the royal palace. The entire market was, however, provisional and soon had to be pulled down to make way for the new stylish street of Skeppsbron. In 1638, the Russians were allocated a permanent site barely a kilometre further south, close to the lock at Södermalm.10 The Russians were given a quay of their own with bath house and weighing house. In 1641, a number of booths were built at the city’s expense and in the same summer the factory was available for rent by the Russian merchants. The name Ryssgården appears on a map showing the street plan from 1645.11 The Russians were not at all pleased with their new site, and complained that it lay too far from town, that the land was marshy and damp and that their wares became damaged. These complaints were perhaps not intended to be taken completely seriously, but were a part of the rhetoric of their dispute with the city and its burgesses. The booths were situated a bit up the slope from the quayside and were divided into wooden booths and permanent half-timbered buildings. The latter probably acted as storage for wares while trade was carried on from the wooden booths. Ryssgården was surrounded by a wooden fence where gaps in the fence opened into the booths. The number of booths varied from year to year and reached a peak of seventy-four in 1654. Between the booths and the quayside there was a market square with a weighing house. The bath house by the water was essential to the Russians as they, like the Finns, had an old and well-established tradition of a sauna culture. When the authorities, for any reason, wished to

9 This and the following chapter are based mainly on Румянцев, Из прошлого русской православной церкви в Стокгольме [Rumjancev, From the Past of the Russian Orthodox Church in Stockholm], pp. 60–71 and Lang, Stadsgården och Ryssgården, pp. 92–104. 10 The first lock in the passage between the lakes Mälaren och Saltsjön was built here in 1634 (Ericson, Stockholms historia under 750 år, p. 183). 11 The name Ryssgården is still used: the open square in front of the underground station at Slussen bears this name. The name was reinstated in 1967 when the underground station had been covered over, creating a square.

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punish the Russians, they closed the bath house, which the merchants regarded as a gross insult and major inconvenience. The construction of a monumental building was begun in 1664 on the site above Ryssgården. It was intended to house a large central factory for the needs of Sweden’s foreign trade. The original design was by the famous architect Nicode‐ mus Tessin the Elder and shows a major complex which was intended to extend down to the water’s edge. Soon, however, there were financial problems as a result of the war with Denmark and the building was delayed. It was completed in 1679, but was much smaller than in the original designs. It was never used as a central factory. The building was taken over by the city and given the name Södra stadshuset (The Southern City Hall). It still stands and now contains the Stockholm City Museum. From the open space that is the present-day Ryssgården, a set of long steps leads down to the entrance to the museum. Here we are at the seventeenth-century street level. The many wooden buildings of Ryssgården were allowed to remain and throughout the seventeenth century fires were a recurrent problem. A major fire broke out in 1680 and a large number of the booths burnt down. The newly built Södra stadshuset was also damaged. In 1694, Ryssgården was once again in flames, only this time the damage was much worse as everything was turned into ashes. The fire broke out during the Feast of Saint Nicholas and in his report the Danish envoy, Bolle Luxdorph, describes how drunk the Russians had been during the festival. One of the drunken Russians had fallen asleep and lost his life. On this occasion, the Magistrat (city council) considered it too costly to constantly re-erect the wooden booths and it was decided to invest in better half-timbered buildings. These were built close to the Södra stadshuset and were ready for use in 1697. At the time of writing major construction work is under way at Slussen, where a roundabout from the 1930s is being demolished. At the same time archaeologi‐ cal digs are being carried out and in the autumn of 2017 they reached the old Ryssgården. The foundations of the weighing house and parts of the quayside have been uncovered and in December archaeologists exposed the cellar vaulting and the walls of one of the buildings built for the Russian merchants after the fire of 1694. So far no objects have been recorded ( January 2018).12 The largest part of Ryssgården cannot be examined as it lies beneath the underground station at Slussen.

12 From a conversation with the archaeology consultants in charge of the excavations. The archaeologists report their finds on their website, Slussenportalen.

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Figure 7.3. Södra stadshuset in Suecia antiqua et hodierna. Construction began in 1663. Södra stadshuset was intended as a generalfaktorikontor, an office for international trade, but already in 1669 that period was over, and it is referred to in 1676 as Stadshusbyggnaden on Södermalm. In 1680 a fire broke out at Ryssgården which also affected the building. Under Tessin the Younger’s leadership, the house was renovated and given a new look. Kungliga Biblioteket, Stockholm (via suecia.kb.se).

Trade in Ryssgården during the Seventeenth Century The Russian merchants usually arrived in the spring and stayed in Stockholm over the summer. Their journey by sea took three to four weeks.13 They returned home in August–September before the coming of the autumn storms. A common complaint was that the Swedish customs officers delayed their departure in vari‐ ous ways, which could be fateful. Nikita Koškin, a merchant from Novgorod, complains that in August 1698 he was detained on his departure from Stockholm by a dishonest customs officer. After five days of favourable winds he was finally released, but in the Sea of Åland a major storm blew up and his ship and its entire cargo were lost. He and his crew were just able to get ashore on a skerry.14 The boats used by the Russians, karbasy, were designed as combined rowing and

13 Бахрушин, ‘Торги новгородцев Кошкиных’ [Bachrušin, ‘The Trade of the Koškins from Novgorod’], p. 183. 14 Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Diplomatica Muscovitica, vol. 112, fol. 121; see also Русско-шведские экономические отношения в XVII веке [Russian-Swedish Economic Relations in the 17th century], p. 552.

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sailing boats, but did not have a deep keel. They were intended for use in rivers and, therefore, not suited to journeys across the open sea. The merchants came from various towns in northwest Russia such as Novgorod, Tichvin, Pskov och Jaroslavl´. Their trade was often prof‐ itable and contributed to the eco‐ nomic development of their home towns. In addition, the Russian mer‐ chants became used to mixing with foreigners in a way that had not been possible previously, at least not under peace-time conditions. In general, it was difficult for Russians to leave their country to travel, with the ex‐ Figure 7.4. A unique portrait of a emption of diplomatic assignments seventeenth-century merchant, Gavrila and pilgrimages. Martynovič Fetiev, d. c. 1684, a wealthy and Among the wares the Russians well-connected merchant from Vologda. It sold in Stockholm were hemp, flax, is situated on the important waterways wood-tar, potash, wax, grain, tallow, connecting Moscow, Novgorod, and the hides, leather, furs, soap, and fibre car‐ White Sea. © Вологодский pets. Hemp and flax were purchased государственный музей-заповедник (The in large quantities by the Swedish Vologda State Museum-Preserve). Crown. They were needed for the building of the Swedish navy and merchant fleet. Most of the goods imported were raw materials. Processed goods were hides, skins, and furs, for which the Russians had a reputation for excellent craftsmanship. They produced a fine, soft leather, known as Russian leather. The Russian merchants purchased goods that were imported into Sweden, such as salt, wine, expensive fabrics, and writing paper. But above all, they were interested in metals such as iron, copper, and pewter, which they bought both as metal ingots or processed. There was a shortage of metals in Russia and it was not until the time of Peter the Great that mining became a high priority industry. Swe‐ den was an important European exporter of iron and copper. Sweden had the Falun copper mine, which was at times the largest producer of copper in Europe. The Swedish Crown considered it undesirable that large quantities of metals were taken out of the country and tried to limit exports with various restrictions which the Russian merchants sought to circumvent.

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The Koškin Family Sergej Bachrušin, the Russian scholar, has studied in particular the Koškin family from Novgorod who traded in Stockholm for three generations. Two of their ledgers, both in octavo format, have been preserved. They are unique examples and are kept in the State Historical Museum in Moscow.15 The ledgers record the transactions of the family during the last quarter of the seventeenth century and parts of the eighteenth. At Ryssgården, the Koškins traded primarily in hemp. In 1687, they sold 572 berkovets, the equivalent of 93.7 tonnes.16 Such large quantities required purchasing trips throughout the Novgorod area. They earned a good profit; in 1697 the selling price was thirty-six per cent higher than the purchasing price. All sales were wholesale as retail trade was forbidden, except for a few goods such as gloves and whips. The biggest customer for the Koškin family was the Swedish Crown. Despite the ban on retail trade, the Koškins also sold hemp in smaller units directly from their vessel or booth.17 As with their countrymen, the Koškins also sold leather, hides, woollen cloth, whips, potash, lard, and flax. They also sold furs, a traditional Russian export ware which was, however, becoming less important. In 1687, they brought in sable tails, pine marten tails, pine marten skins, bearskins, wolf skins, and also thirty-four pairs of wolf paws. Wolf paws were a lucrative business, they sold for a price that gave a more than double or triple profit.18 When the Russian merchants sold their wares they were often paid in what was known as plate money. During the first half of the seventeenth century there was a major shortage of silver in Sweden (partly because of the Älvsborg ransom which had to be paid in silver). It was then decided to mint copper coinage of which the largest measured 33 × 67 cm and weighed 19.7 kg. Payment could also be made in notes, a new and more modern system. There was also straight barter. Nikita Koškin and a Swedish merchant named Gottfrid exchanged hemp for iron and scrap copper.19 The Koškins primarily brought back metals from Sweden: iron, steel, and copper. They were also pleased to buy pewter in various shapes: mugs, plates, candlesticks, bowls, etc. Plate coinage was made of copper and could be used both as coinage and as a good. As copper was the most desirable purchase for the Russians, they had no objections to being paid in this clumsy coinage. On 15 Moscow, The State Historical Museum (Государственный исторический музей), Собрание Уварова, книга 124, 125. 16 1 berkovec = 163.8 kg. 17 Бахрушин, ‘Торги новгородцев Кошкиных’ [Bachrušin, ‘The Trade of the Koshkins from Novgorod’], p. 185. 18 Бахрушин, ‘Торги новгородцев Кошкиных’ [Bachrušin, ‘The Trade of the Koshkins from Novgorod’], p. 187. 19 Бахрушин, ‘Торги новгородцев Кошкиных’ [Bachrušin, ‘The Trade of the Koshkins from Novgorod’], p. 188.

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Figure 7.5. An 8-daler piece of plate money from 1658. Kungliga Myntkabinettet.

the contrary, in Russia the coins could be exchanged for their value by weight. However, the export of coinage was a threat to the finances of the Swedish Crown and the authorities tried, in various ways, to ban this export, but the Russians of‐ ten managed to circumvent this ban. With regard to copper, they took everything they could get hold of, including all types of scrap. In 1694 the Koškins brought back almost twenty-eight tonnes of copper from Sweden.20

Trade Regulations Immediately following the opening of Ryssgården there arose a dispute between the people of Stockholm and the Russian merchants, and many of the misun‐ derstandings were the product of language difficulties. In 1636, the Magistrat published Ordning hwar efter the Ryske Köpmän som här på Stockholm sijn Handel drifwa sitt Godz sälia och förhandla skole (Regulations for how the Russian Mer‐ chants here in Stockholm may sell and negotiate the sale of their wares). Here we can read: Effter såsom en stoor Oordning sig här hafwer yppat och tildragit ibland wår Swenske Nation och then Ryske i thet at den ene parten icke hafwer den andra redeligen förståndit uti köpande och säliande af then orsaak att then Swenske icke rätt thet Ryske Språk ey heller the Ryske wårt Swenske Språk hafwer förståndit, hwaraf utaff sigh yppat hafwer ibland Parterna stoor Klagan, Rättegångs Process, Eedgång och myckin Oreda.21

20 Бахрушин, ‘Торги новгородцев Кошкиных’ [Bachrušin, ‘The Trade of the Koškins from Novgorod’], p. 191. 21 Ordning, p. 1. Translation by author.

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(Since a great disorder has appeared here and continued between our Swedish Nation and the Russian one in that one of the parties has not properly understood the other in their buying and selling because the Swedes did not understand the Russian language, and neither the Russians our Swedish language, whereof between the parties there arose great complaints, legal proceedings, swearing of oaths and much disturbance). The solution proposed by the Magistrat was that no agreement of sale should be signed without a Russian interpreter being present. This person was to be paid by the merchants. There were reasons other than language difficulties behind the decision of the Magistrat. Trade with the Russians involved a number of restrictions. Russian merchants were not allowed to export unlimited amounts of metal, they were not allowed to engage in retail trade, and they were not allowed to display their goods in such a manner to encourage such a trade. To ensure that all the rules were followed it was important for the Swedish authorities to have a staff of interpreters who could help with trading agreements and who could also check that everything was done correctly. The Russian merchants preferred to do without the presence of an interpreter whom they considered unnecessary. Many of them returned year after year and certainly acquired some knowledge of Swedish. The problem was not just one of cost, as the Russians often complained that the interpreters were biased and capricious.22

The Koškin Phrase Book That many Russians wanted to be able to converse in Swedish is evidenced by the Russian-Swedish phrase book found in one of the Koškins’ ledgers.23 The phrase book covers ten pages and uses calligraphy typical of the period, skoropis´ (a kind of shorthand). The Swedish words and phrases are also written in Cyrillic script. The phrase book arranges the words and phrases in thematic sections, but within each section a kind of principle of association has been used. There are words and expressions which denote the seasons and time of day, the weather, etc. These are followed by a list of fifty-one verbs: ‘jag går, jag står, jag sitter, jag ber, jag dör etc’ (I am walking, I am standing, I am sitting, I am praying, I am dying, etc.). The list ends with the phrase ‘Jag kysser en jungfrus läppar’ (I kiss a maiden on her lips). There are also useful words and phrases that a merchant would need to know: ‘Gud give dig lycka i din köphandel; Säg mig huru långt bort du bor; Kom spatsera med mig’ (God bless your business; Tell me, how far away do you live? Come let’s take a walk together). In addition, we find such general words of wisdom as: ‘Tig

22 Arne, ‘Rysstolkarna och Ryssgården’, p. 190. 23 Moscow, The State Historical Museum (Государственный исторический музей), Собрание Уварова, книга 124, fols 2–8.

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stilla, tala inte mycket; Låt ligga det som dig inte kommer till’. (Hold your peace, don’t talk so much; Leave well alone that which won’t come to you). On a closer examination of the Koškins’ phrase book, we see that it is similar to many other phrase books from the period which contained phrases to and from various languages that were common in the world of the merchant. What makes the Koškins’ phrase book unique is that it was written by Russians for the use of Russians in their trade with Stockholm. This was at a time when very few Russians travelled abroad. The demand for phrase books was not great, but in Stockholm there was a need.

The Church of the Russian Merchants Throughout the seventeenth century Sweden was dominated by a fundamental Protestantism. Its greatest enemy was the Catholic Church, and there was no toleration of the practice of Catholicism. On the other hand, there was a Rus‐ sian Orthodox congregation. The fifteenth paragraph of the Treaty of Stolbovo stipulated that in their factories the Russians would be allowed to ‘hafue deris friie gudztienst efter deris religion i deris hws och stufuur vdi Stockholm och Wiiborgh’ (freely have their religious services in accordance with their religion in their homes and buildings at Stockholm and Viborg).24 The same was true for the Swedish merchants in their factories in Russia. The building of churches was however forbidden. At Ryssgården the meeting house moved from building to building. The Russians paid no rent to the city for their meeting house. The priests were appointed by the diocese in Novgorod and, like the merchants, usually arrived in the spring and stayed in Stockholm over the summer.25 Eventually, the church moved into a wing of the Södra stadshuset and from there, after one of the many periods of decline, to the main building where it remained until 1846. Thereafter, the church had an itinerant existence in the city until it received permanent premises in 1907.26 The Russian Orthodox Church of the Transfiguration of Christ at Birger Jarlsgatan 98 is the oldest Russian Orthodox congregation outside the borders of Russia. The Russian merchants’ church at Ryssgården was the only non-Lutheran congregation allowed in Sweden until Gustav III’s Tolerance Act of 1781 which made it possible for all foreigners in Sweden — not just Russians — to practise their own religion. But it was not until 1855 that Swedes were allowed to attend religious services other than the Lutheran services.

24 Sverges traktater, v.1, p. 255. 25 Румянцев, Из прошлого русской православной церкви в Стокгольме [Rumjancev, From the Past of the Russian Orthodox Church in Stockholm], p. 1. 26 Kristi Förklarings ortodoxa kyrka, pp. 4, 6–12. This fifteen-page booklet on the history of the Russian church in Stockholm is also available in Russian: Свято-Преображенский храм в Стокгольме [Transfiguration Church in Stockholm].

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The Theotokos of Stockholm The links between Swedes and Russians in Stockholm in the seventeenth century are given substance by the story of the icon of the Theotokos of Stockholm. This icon, which was richly decorated in silver-gilt, pearls, and gems was held until 1926 in the Church of the Transfiguration of Christ in the northwest Russian town of Tichvin, where it had an important place in the iconostasis. It was regarded as a source of wonders and was highly respected by the townspeople. In 1926, it was confiscated by the state and moved to the Russian Museum in Leningrad. There, all the valuable attributes were removed. The icon, which is believed to have been the work of the Novgorod school disappeared and has not been found since. It is possible it was sent abroad to be sold.27 At the State Historical Museum in Moscow the history of the icon has been recorded in a manuscript from the eighteenth century. The story is that in 1671 some merchants from Tichvin visited the home of the Swedish burgess ‘Foka’ where they saw a small, beautifully painted icon of the Theotokos of Tichvin on a shelf.28 They were dismayed that a holy image of the Theotokos should be in the home of a heretic and they took all possible opportunities to visit Foka in order to pray before the icon. Once back in Tichvin, they told people of the icon and the townspeople realized that they had to do everything to repatriate it to Russia. Money was collected. After much persuasion Foka agreed to sell it for a large sum of money, and when the merchants sailed home the following autumn they took the icon with them. When they reached Ladoga a dreadful storm arose, the ship began to take in water and large blocks of ice fell on the decks. In their fear, the merchants began to quarrel about how they could save the vessel and themselves and forgot they had a holy image on board. Suddenly, they realized that they had the icon and prayed earnestly to the Theotokos to save them. The storm then abated and they discovered that they were close to land and not far from the river Svir´ which would take them home to Tichvin. Rumour of their amazing escape went ahead of them and when the merchants reached home on 13 November all the church bells in the town were ringing and the icon was carried in procession to the Church of the Transformation of Christ, where it was put on display. A day of celebration was declared for this day, 13 November (26 November in the new calendar).29 Hereafter it was called Богоматерь Стокгольмская [The Theotokos of Stockholm].

27 Шалина & Колесникова, ‘Икона Богоматери Стокгольмской’ [Šalina & Kolesnikova, ‘The Icon of Our Lady of Stockholm’], pp. 159, 166. 28 The Theotokos of Stockholm is a Hodegetria, the guide, and belongs to the sub-group of Theotokos of Tichvin. The baby Jesus is held on Mary’s left arm and holds a scroll in his left hand. A characteristic feature is that the whole of the sole of Jesus’s right foot is visible. 29 Шалина & Колесникова, ‘Икона Богоматери Стокгольмской’ [Šalina & Kolesnikova, ‘The Icon of Our Lady of Stockholm’], p. 173.

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In recent decades icons of all kinds of Madonna have been painted in Moscow, among them the Theotokos of Stockholm. Copies are to be found in both the Russian Orthodox churches in Stockholm and new icons are painted regularly in accordance with the rules for this type of work.30 It is naturally difficult to decide how true the story of the icon is, but an interesting detail is that at this time there was a Swedish merchant called Johan Fock. He appears in two petitions of appeal, one from 1673 and one from 1680. At that time he is in Stockholm. In 1686 he is in Moscow and is questioned at the Chancellery of Foreign Affairs on the reasons for his visit to the city. He explains that he is there to purchase goods. From Moscow he wants to continue to Novgorod for the same reason and he requests, in an appeal to the Tsars Ivan and Peter, for permission to travel.31 Fock is mentioned once more in 1696 in a customs record from Narva. Here his goods are being declared — dried meat and lampreys — on a vessel captained by Sigfred Matson which is on its way to Stockholm.32 In the Russian documents he is called ‘Fok’ or ‘Foken’ but sometimes he is referred to as ‘Foka’, a word better known to the Russians as a Russian name of Greek origins.

Conclusion Documents relating to the seventeenth-century trade between Russia and Sweden are richly represented in the archives in Sweden, Russia, and the Baltic countries. Only a few have been published.33 Often they register complaints and display disbelief and displeasure on both sides. It is easy to believe that problems and difficulties dominated. But these documents do not reflect the entire situation. When everything worked normally there was no need to compose pleas and appeals. Good trade seldom leaves traces in the archives. An exemption is Koškin’s phrase book with his polite phrases of social contact. At the end of the seventeenth century the Stockholm Magistrat introduced a number of improvements for the Russian trade in Stockholm. A common cause of complaint from the Russian side was that their conflicts with the citizens were sent from institution to institution which both took time and cost money. Now, the procedures were simplified and sped up. In the event of a disagreement the merchants could turn directly to the Steward at the palace who could immediately 30 In addition to the Church of the Transfiguration of Christ, which is under the universal patriarchate of Constantinople, there is also the Church of Saint Sergius of Radonezh which is under the patriarchate of Moscow. 31 Русско-шведские экономические отношения в XVII веке [Russian-Swedish Economic Relations in the 17th Century], pp. 336, 421, 472, 473. 32 Экономические связи между Швецией и Россией в XVII в. [Economic Relations between Russia and Sweden in the 17th Century], p. 262. 33 Русско-шведские экономические отношения в XVII веке [Russian-Swedish Economic Relations in the 17th Century], p. 8.

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pass judgment on a dispute. The state thereby took over the cases from the Mag‐ istrat which the Russians had considered biased.34 In 1697, the new, well-built, half-timbered brick buildings in Ryssgården, which had been built to replace the old wooden structures, were ready and it became more common for the Russian merchants to stay in Stockholm all year. With the new regulations, trade between the Russians and the citizens of Stockholm became more efficient and rational. Conditions were optimal for greater progress, but just when the future looked most promising for Ryssgården all activity ceased with the outbreak of the Great Northern War. The market was closed and the merchants were imprisoned, as were the Russian ambassadors.35 Half of the merchants managed to escape in their boats, but the rest were detained. Some were later exchanged and others succeeded in escaping and taking themselves home. The Russian chargé d’affaires, Prince Andrej Chilkov, and other representatives of the Russian state, however, were to spend many years in imprisonment and many died in Sweden. Only after the Peace of Nystad in 1721 were the survivors allowed to return home. Ryssgården was re-opened after the war, but by then the Russians had conquered their own ports in the Baltic. Ryssgården had lost most of its importance, but survived in the same place until 1874 when it was finally closed.

34 Loit, ‘Sverige och östersjöhandeln under 1600-talet’, p. 322. 35 Румянцев, Из прошлого русской православной церкви в Стокгольме [Rumjancev, From the Past of the Russian Orthodox Church in Stockholm], p. 6.

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Works Cited Manuscripts and Archival Sources Moscow, The State Historical Museum (Государственный исторический музей), Собрание Уварова, книга 124, 125 Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Diplomatica Muscovitica, vol. 112: Ryska gränsbefolkningens klagomål Primary Sources Ekonomiska förbindelser mellan Sverige och Ryssland under 1600-talet. Dokument ur svenska arkiv, ed. by Artur Attman, Wilhelm Mauritz Carlgren, Filipp I. Dolgich, Gunnar Jarring, Åke Kromnow, Alexej L. Narotjnitskij, Sergej L. Tichvinskij, and Lev V. Tjerepnin (Stockholm: Vitterhets-, historie- och antikvitetsakademien, 1978) Ordning / hwar efter the Ryske Köpmän som här på Stockholm sijn Handel drifwa / sitt Godz sälia och förhandla skole / Så at the hwarken emoot Lagen eller Stadzens wälfångne Privilegier och elliest Ordinantier aff framfarne Konungar om köphandelen stadgade sigh på något sätt förgrijpa och brotzlige warda / til straff som wederbör (Stockholm: [n. pub.], 1636) Sverges traktater med främmande magter jämte andra dit hörande handlingar, v.1: 1572–1632, ed. by Olof Simon Rydberg and Carl Hallendorff (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1903) Русско-шведские экономические отношения в XVII веке. Сборник документов, сост. М. Б. Давыдова, И. П. Шаскольский, & А. И. Юхт [Russian-Swedish Economic Relations in the Seventeenth Century. A Collection of Documents, ed. by M. B. Davydova, I. P. Šaskol´skij, and A. I. Jucht] (Moscow: Izdatel´stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1960) Экономические связи между Россией и Швецией в XVII в. Документы из советских архивов, сост. А. Аттман, Ф. И. Долгих, В. М. Карлгрен, О. Кромнов, А. Л. Нарочницкий, С. Л. Тихвинский, Л. В. Черепнин, & Г. Ярринг [Economic Relations between Russia and Sweden in the Seventeenth Century. Documents from Soviet Archives, ed. by A. Attman, F. I. Dolgich, W. M. Carlgren, Å. Kromnow, A. L. Naročnickij, S. L. Tichvinskij, L. V. Čerepnin, and G. Jarring] (Moscow: Nauka, 1978) Secondary Studies Abrahamsson, Åke, ‘Ryssgården’, Stadsvandringar, 18 (1998), 25–28 Arne, Ture J., Det stora Svitjod. Essayer om gångna tiders svensk-ryska kulturförbindelser (Stockholm: Geber, 1917) Attman, Artur, Ryssland och Europa. En handelshistorisk översikt, Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-historiska institutionen vid Göteborgs universitet, 27 (Gothenburg: Gothenburg University, 1973) Ericson, Lars, Stockholms historia under 750 år (Lund: Historiska media, 2003) Kristi Förklarings ortodoxa kyrka (Stockholm: Kristi Förklarings ortodoxa kyrka, 1999)

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Lang, Signe, Stadsgården och Ryssgården, Stockholms stadsmuseums småskrifter, 2 (Stockholm: Stadsmuseum 1966) Loit, Aleksander, ‘Sverige och östersjöhandeln under 1600-talet’, Historisk tidskrift, 84 (1964), 302–37 Löfstrand, Elisabeth, ‘Ryssgården i Stockholm och köpmännen Kosjkin’, LiteraruS, 2011.6 (2011), 6–12 Nerman, Ture, Svensk och ryss. Ett umgänge i krig och handel (Stockholm: Saxon, 1946) Rumjantsev, Petr P., Von der Vergangenheit der Russichen orthodoxen Kirche in Stockholm. Historiche Übersicht mit Zeichnungen und Beilagen, trans. by Leonid Kaart (Stockholm: Stadsarkivet, 1945) Slussenportalen, [accessed 16 March 2023] Бахрушин, Сергей Владимирович, ‘Торги новгородцев Кошкиных’ [Bachrušin, Sergej Vladimirovič, ‘The Trade of the Koškins from Novgorod], in his Научные труды, ii: Статьи по экономической, социальной, и политической истории русского централизованного государства XV–XVII вв. [Scholarly Works, ii: Papers on Economic, Social, and Political History of the Centralized Russian State in the Fifteenth–Seventeenth Centuries] (Moscow: Izdatel´stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1954), pp. 174–223 Лёфстранд, Элизабет, Новгородские купцы в Швеции [Löfstrand, Elisabeth, Novgorodian Merchants in Sweden] (Novgorod: Novgorodskij universitet, 2012) ———, ‘Новгородцы Кошкины и Ryssgården в Стокгольме’ [‘The Koškins from Novgorod and the Ryssgården in Stockholm’], Родина [Motherland], 9 (2009), 61–64 Румянцев, Петр Павлович, Из прошлого русской православной церкви в Стокгольме. Исторический очерк с рисунками и приложениями [Rumjancev, Petr Pavlovič, From the Past of the Russian Orthodox Church in Stockholm. A Historical Overview with Illustrations and Appendices] (Berlin: Sv. Knjaz´-Vladimirskoe Bratstvo, 1910) Свято-Преображенский храм в Стокгольме [Transfiguration Church in Stockholm] (Stockholm: Kristi Förklarings ortodoxa kyrka, 1999) Шалина, Ирина Александровна, & Леся Анатольевна Колесникова, ‘Икона Богоматери Стокгольмской – святыня и покровительница Тихвина’ [Šalina, Irina Aleksandrovna, and Lesja Anatol´evna Kolesnikova, ‘The Icon of Our Lady of Stockholm, a Relic and a Patron of Tikhvin], in На рубеже культур. Тихвин в XVII столетии. Материалы научно-практической конференции [On the Cultural Border. Tichvin in the 17th Century. Proceedings of a Research-to-Practice Conference] (St Petersburg: Kalamos, 2015), pp. 159–81 Шаскольский, Игорь Павлович, Столбовский мир 1617 г. и торговые отношения России со шведским государством [Šaskol´skij, Igor´ Pavlovič, The Peace of Stolbovo of 1617 and Trade Relationships between Russia and the Swedish State] (Moscow: Nauka, 1964) ———, Экономические отношения России и шведского государства в XVII веке [Economic Relations between Russia and the Swedish State in the 17th Century] (St Petersburg: Dmitrij Bulanin, 1998)

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The Treaty of Stolbovo and Tallinn’s Customs Rental Agreement (1623–1629) *

The following article discusses this issue from Tallinn’s perspective. I will examine the diplomatic steps taken by Tallinn’s town council after the Treaty of Stolbovo aimed at regaining its position as the storage depot for transit trade with Russia and eliminating Narva as a competitor in trade. As a result of these diplomatic efforts, Sweden rented the customs duties from four trading towns on the shores of the Gulf of Finland — Tallinn, Narva, Helsinki, and Porvoo — to Tallinn in 1623–1629, and foreign merchants were obliged to trade exclusively in Tallinn. It was the conclusion of the Treaty of Stolbovo in February 1617 in particular that provided Tallinn with the theoretical opportunity to emerge from the crisis that had already plagued the city for over half a century and to restore its flourishing trade from the first half of the sixteenth century. Different aspects of the period of customs duties rental have also attracted attention previously in historical literature thus far. The development of trade in the town during the first half of the seventeenth century and Sweden’s economic policy in relation to Tallinn have been examined in works by Kurt Reinhold Melander, Ragnar Liljedahl, Arnold Soom, Artur Attman, Ernst Gierlich, Stefan Troebst, and Jarmo T. Kotilaine.1 Evald Blumfeldt, A. Attman, A. Soom, Helmut Piirimäe, Wolf-Rüdiger Rühe, J. T. Kotilaine, and Enn Küng have researched goods that have passed through Tallinn, their quantities, origin, destination ports,

* This work was supported by the Estonian Research Council grant PRG318. Translated from Estonian by Peeter Tammisto. 1 Melander, ‘Ruotsin hallituksen ja Tallinnalaisten kauppatuumat Venäjän suhteen ynnä’; Melander, ‘Die Revaler Zollarende 1623–1629’; Liljedahl, Svensk förvaltning i Livland 1617–1634; Soom, Der baltische Getreidehandel; Soom, Die Politik Schwedens; Soom, ‘Ett förslag till handelsordning i Reval år 1626’; Attman, Den ryska marknaden; Attman, The Russian and Polish Markets in International Trade; Attman, The Struggle for Baltic Markets; Gierlich, Reval 1621 bis 1645; Troebst, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung; Kotilaine, Russia’s Foreign and Economic Expansion in the Seventeenth Century. Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 161–188 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133603

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customs duties, and other such aspects.2 Materials at the Tallinn City Archives and the Swedish National Archives nevertheless make it possible to supplement a number of aspects of the history of how Tallinn’s customs duty rental came about.

Background For Tallinn, the first half-century under Swedish rule passed under the conditions of almost uninterrupted war and economic decline. Tallinn had control of trade between Russia and the eastern part of the Baltic Sea that almost amounted to a monopoly in the first half of the sixteenth century. Western Europeans, including merchants from Hanseatic towns, were not permitted to sail to other towns along the shores of the Gulf of Finland to trade without first passing through Tallinn. As a result of the peace treaty signed between Russia and Sweden on 2 April 15573 and of the Livonian War that broke out in January 1558, Tallinn had to start competing against its neighbouring towns Viborg and Narva in trade with Russia for both storage depot rights (ius emporii) as well as for goods. The redirection of transit trade with Russia to Viborg at the outset of the war already had a fatal effect on Tallinn’s economy. This became apparent in 1558, for instance, in the decline in salt imports to one third of its former volume. This decline continued in subsequent years.4 When Russia opened its foreign trade centre in Narva, however, Tallinn almost completely lost its Russian hinterland and became the export port for Estonia and northern Livonia, both of which had been ravaged by war. For example, 94.6 per cent of tallow (5998.5 ship pounds) passed through Narva to Western Europe by way of the Danish straits, while at the same time Tallinn’s share was only 0.8 per cent. According to data from 1566, 81.1 per cent of exported hides passed through Narva, with 0.8 per cent going through Tallinn. In 1567, 42.7 per cent of the flax and hemp that arrived in Öresund came from Narva (15,248 ship pounds), with 32.9 per cent from Danzig, 11.6 per cent from Riga, but only 0.3 per cent from Tallinn.5 The loss of transit trade touched off a struggle waged for more or less a century by Tallinn’s merchants and town council against trade passing through Narva. This became a key issue in Tallinn’s economic policy. When at the end of 1560,

2 Blumfeldt, ‘Statistilisi lisandeid Tallinna kaubaliikluse ja meresõidu ajaloole’; Attman, Den ryska marknaden; Soom, Der Handel Revals im 17. Jahrhundert; Пийримяэ, ‘Некоторые вопросы транзитной торговли России’ [Piirimäe, ‘Some Issues of the Russian Transit Trade’]; Rühe, ‘Revals Seehandel 1617–1624’; Kotilaine, ‘Noch mal über die Revaler Zollarrende’; Kotilaine, ‘Tallinna kaubandussidemed Moskva riigiga 17. sajandi alguses’; Küng, ‘Die staatlichen Zölle — Portorium und Lizent’. 3 Fagerlund, Jern, and Villstrand, Finlands historia, pp. 36–37, 42. 4 Mickwitz, Aus Revaler Handelsbüchern, p. 45; Attman, Den ryska marknaden, supplement 6; Attman, The Russian and Polish Markets in International Trade, p. 225; Attman, The Struggle for Baltic Markets, p. 16. 5 Attman, The Russian and Polish Markets in International Trade, p. 76.

The TreaTy of sTolboVo and Tallinn’s CusToMs renTal aGreeMenT

accession negotiations began between Tallinn and Sweden, the Narva question became an important topic6 because Tallinn’s attempts to single-handedly prevent foreigners from heading for Narva had been unsuccessful. Yet in the subsequent period until 1581, attempts to stop Western European merchants from heading for Narva and to redirect them to Tallinn still did not succeed,7 even though Tallinners were not completely cut off from the Russian market. Paradoxically, Tallinners used the mediation of foreigners, including merchants from Lübeck, to interact with the Russian market, meaning with Narva.8 On 6 September 1581, the Swedes, under the command of Pontus De la Gardie, captured Narva. Sweden’s military success, however, was not a victory for Tallinn because at the end of 1583 after signing an armistice with the Muscovite state, Sweden’s King John III decided to turn Narva into Sweden’s centre for trade with Russia. Trade nevertheless did not get off the ground in Narva — on the one hand due to the paucity and poverty of the townspeople, and on the other hand because Ivan IV redirected Russian trade with Western Europe through Pskov. Yet Tallinn’s anti-Narva rhetoric was also vigorous. Reasons why Tallinn should have been the place for transshipping transit goods were noted in a letter sent to the King in September 1583, highlighting the town’s good harbour and warehouse facilities, quality culling of goods, favourable prices, the security of the town, and the opportunity to better control the conveyance of war materials to Russia. Tallinn considered trade with Russia to be the foundation of the town’s well-being. In Tallinn’s opinion, it was sufficient for Narva, Viborg, and Helsinki to have only small shops. Tallinn was prepared to relinquish part of its income from customs duties to the state in order to regain its position as storage depot. Seeing that the majority of foreigners, with the exception of the merchants from Lübeck, were not particularly interested in trading in Narva at the outset of Swedish rule and preferred the trade routes passing through Poland, Riga, or Archangel, yet certainly bearing in mind the income from Tallinn’s customs duties that would start accumulating in the state treasury, the Swedish government gave in to Tallinn’s demands. On 25 August 1584, King John III disclosed his decision, according to which foreigners were not permitted to travel by ship any farther than Tallinn. Citizens of Narva were henceforth to receive their goods from Tallinn.9 The state treasury already received the first customs duties from Tallinn the following year in 1585.10

6 Arnell, Die Auflösung des livländischen Ordensstaates, pp. 160, 165–66, 171–73. Küng, ‘“Paludes kristlikku päästmist ja kaitset”’. 7 Concerning Western Europeans interested in sailing to Narva for trade, see further: Köhler, Die Narvafahrt, pp. 68–115. 8 The most recent instance where attention has been directed to this possibility is: Kaupmees Matheus Spielmanni arveraamatud 1568–1570, pp. xvi–xix. 9 Attman, Den ryska marknaden, pp. 297–300, 306–11, 315–18; Attman, The Struggle for Baltic Markets, pp. 125–27. 10 When Tallinn came under Swedish rule in 1561, the new regime vowed not to start introducing any new customs duties. Under difficult economic conditions in 1568, Tallinn itself decided to start

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Regardless of the King’s decision, many Western Europeans, mainly from Lübeck, continued to sail directly to Narva. Tallinn’s own share of Narva’s gross imports was also high: 6.7 per cent in 1584, 13.3 per cent in 1585, and 27.8 per cent in 1586. On 10 September 1588, the King repeated his ban on foreigners trading in Narva. Only subjects of Sweden could sail there. Regardless of the harsh wording of the resolution, again its effect remained insufficient. Besides, Tallinn did not have enough ships to haul goods between Tallinn and Narva.11 On 1 August 1590, the King once again repeated his ban on foreigners sailing to Narva,12 but now already under the conditions of the Russian-Swedish War that had broken out in January of that same year. After John III died in November 1592, a power struggle broke out between the new King Sigismund (r. 1592– 1599) and his uncle Duke Charles (r. 1599–1611), and this also affected Tallinn’s trade. While the duke preferred Narva as the storage depot, the King, who needed the support of Tallinners, found that transit trade with Russia must take place only by way of Tallinn.13 The King’s standpoints were also the point of departure for the Treaty of Teusina signed with the Russians on 18 May 1595 — foreigners were permitted to trade in Tallinn and Viborg, while only Swedish subjects were permitted to sail to Narva.14 Data on Narva’s customs duties for 1595–1598, 1605–160815 and the years 1612, 1613 and 161616 nevertheless indicates that foreigners, among whom mer‐ chants from Lübeck remained in first place, continued to come to Narva to trade without passing through Tallinn. At the outset of the seventeenth century, their shipping traffic to Narva grew from year to year. The complaints of Tallinners also corroborate this. At the same time, one way or another, Russian goods moved towards the West via Narva and that is where they went through customs. The relative proportion of Russian goods in Narva’s export was up to 98 per cent.17 Tallinn’s customs duty invoices from the end of the sixteenth century and the outset of the seventeenth century indicate that the town did not regain its former status as storage depot for Russian trade, even though efforts were made to achieve this.

11 12 13 14 15 16 17

levying a pound toll on goods passing through the town. The full extent of the income received remained entirely at the disposal of the town. When John III established a royal customs duty, so to speak, in Tallinn by his decision of 25 August 1584, the state took two thirds of the income from customs duties for itself in the years 1585–1593 and 1618–1622. In the period 1594–1617 and from the year 1622/23 until the end of the period of Swedish rule, the income from customs duties was divided in half. TLA, 230.1.Ba 16. Attman, Den ryska marknaden, pp. 319–21, 335; Attman, The Struggle for Baltic Markets, p. 127. Attman, Den ryska marknaden, p. 343. Federley, Kunglig Majestät, Svenska Kronan och Furstendömet Estland 1592–1600, pp. 247–48, 265. On the Treaty of Teusina, see: Almquist, Sverge och Ryssland, pp. 12–15; Attman, Den ryska marknaden, pp. 367–75; Attman, The Struggle for Baltic Markets, pp. 166–69, 204–07. Attman, The Russian and Polish Markets in International Trade, pp. 127–29. Пийримяэ, ‘О состоянии нарвской торговли в начале XVII века’ [Piirimäe, ‘On the Condition of Narva Trade in the early 17th Century’]. Attman, Den ryska marknaden, p. 305.

The TreaTy of sTolboVo and Tallinn’s CusToMs renTal aGreeMenT

Figure 8.1. View of Tallinn in Anthonis Goeteeris’s travel journal under the title Iournael Der Legatie ghedaen inde Jahren 1615 ende 1616… (1619). In 1615–1616, English and Dutch diplomats participated in the peace talks between Russia and Sweden. The Dutch delegates would have liked to restore the trade between the Netherlands and Russia over the Baltic Sea trade routes. The Dutch delegation included Anthonis Goeteeris who published in The Hague his travel journal. It describes vividly and emotionally their travel and stay in Tallinn, Narva, Novgorod and other places. The picture by Goeteeris depicts Tallinn, stormy sea, on the right the Toompea Castle, and on the left the tower of St Olav’s Church. It has been drawn in autumn 1615 after the arrival of the Dutch delegation by sea in Tallinn on September 14. Photo: Jens Östman, Kungliga Biblioteket.

The ‘eternal peace’ concluded between Sweden and Russia in Stolbovo on 27 February 1617 gave rise to positive expectations in Stockholm and in the over‐ seas towns of Tallinn and Narva. For Sweden as a whole, a period of peaceful diplomacy with Russia began. Article 14 of the peace treaty was important for these maritime towns since it defined the general principles of trade, guaranteeing merchants from both countries freedom to trade and travel in one another’s coun‐ tries mutually: Russian merchants were permitted to trade with Swedish subjects in Stockholm, Tallinn, Narva, and Viborg; Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov, and Ladoga were such towns in Russia for Swedish merchants. Article 15 prescribed the erec‐ tion of covered markets along with religious freedom in their territories. Thus Tallinn had to restore to the Russians their former covered market and return to them the Church of St Nikolai the Miracle-Worker. The restriction on Russian merchants, however, was that when they were in Swedish towns, they could only trade with local merchants. Direct trade with foreigners was prohibited. The pre‐ requisite for the emergence of trade between these two countries, however, was

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the fact that according to the terms of the peace treaty, Sweden gained possession of the surroundings of the entire Gulf of Finland together with Kexholm County and Ingria, this cutting Russia off from the Baltic Sea.18

Dilemma: Tallinn or Narva? Ongoing ambiguity concerning which town on the Gulf of Finland — Tallinn or Narva — should be preferred as the storage depot for transit trade with Russia characterized the trade policy of the Swedish regime following the Treaty of Stolbovo. Tallinn was quick to use the new situation and already sent a letter to Gustavus Adolphus on 17 March and again on 14 April 1617, congratulating him on the occasion of signing the peace treaty with the Muscovite state, while at the same time requesting that Tallinn’s trade, which had declined over the course of long wars, be restored and that foreign merchants be prohibited from travelling to Narva, which was detrimental to Tallinn. In view of this an earlier pledge made by the King was referred to.19 Namely, representatives of Tallinn had been in Stockholm in the autumn of 1613. Along with the affirmation of the town’s historical privileges,20 they had requested that shipping to Narva be banned and that the storage depot for transit trade with Russia should be brought to Tallinn. At that time, Gustavus Adolphus did not grant the request submitted by the Tallinners, pledging to decide in the future and to base his decision on the interests of both the state and Tallinn.21 In his reply to Tallinn dated 5 May 1617, the King once again postponed the issue of banning shipping to Narva ‘until a better opportunity emerges’.22 At the same time, eleven days earlier on 25 April, the King had already invited Tallinn’s representatives to come to Stockholm at the end of June so that they would first discuss matters important to the state with him (‘med os Rijkzens nödige saaker öfuerväga’) and thereafter travel to the King’s coronation in Uppsala.23 Essentially, this meant the invitation of Tallinners to the Riksdag preceding the coronation.24 Tallinn’s four-member delegation — the burgomaster

18 Шаскольский, Столбовский мир 1617 г. [Shaskol´skii, The Peace of Stolbovo of 1617], pp. 80–96; Troebst, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung, pp. 64–65. 19 Tallinn’s town council to Gustavus Adolphus, in Tallinn on 17 March and 14 April 1617: TLA, 230.1.BF 54. 20 Tallinn’s privileges were affirmed on 22 September 1613: Die Quellen des Revaler Stadtrechts, ii, 199–201. 21 Gustavus Adolphus to Tallinn’s town council, in Stockholm on 24 September 1613: Die Quellen des Revaler Stadtrechts, ii, 203–04. 22 Gustavus Adolphus to Tallinn’s town council, in Stockholm on 5 May 1617: TLA, 230.1.BF 55. 23 Gustavus Adolphus to Tallinn’s town council, in Stockholm on 25 April 1617: TLA, 230.1.BF 55. The King’s coronation took place in Uppsala on 12 October 1617. 24 The Riksdag convened in Stockholm and Uppsala from 26 August to 12 October 1617, see: Wetterberg, Kanslern, i, 270–73.

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and syndic Johann Derenthal, the town councillor Georg von Wangersen, and Bugislaus Rosen and Didrich Grothe as representatives of the citizenry — arrived in Stockholm on 6 September.25 Nine days later they were at an audience before his royal majesty the King for the first time. The main points that the delegates requested of the King were the prohibition of voyages by foreigners to Narva, Nyen, and other ‘secondary ports’ detrimental to Tallinn, the increase of the share of customs duty income that goes to the town from one-third to one-half, and the granting of trading conditions to Tallinners in Sweden and Finland that would be equal to those enjoyed by other subjects of the realm.26 Yet Gustavus Adolphus had already spoken about trade in the Gulf of Finland in a speech he gave at the Riksdag on 26 August 1617. Namely, the King found that as a result of the Treaty of Stolbovo, by which Sweden’s border shifted closer to the trading centres of north-western Russia, Narva was capable of seizing for itself the brokering of all of Russia’s foreign trade. This town was also suitable as a starting point for Swedish subjects in arriving at the Russian market.27 A nationwide trade ordinance issued on 12 October 1617 that increased the number of storage depot towns in the Swedish realm is associated with the King’s standpoint.28 In view of that, Narva and Ivangorod in Ingria were granted both active and passive storage rights, and Jama and Kopor´e, both of which were situated inland, were granted navigation rights.29 On 28 November 1617, the King issued a resolution to Narva and Ivangorod that expressly allowed foreigners to sail to Narva. Thus merchants arriving from Western Europe, from all parts of Sweden, but also from Tartu, which was then under Polish rule, had to stop on the Narva side and put their goods through customs, after which they could make transactions with residents of Narva and of Ivangorod, and they could also cross to the Ivangorod side to trade there. Goods bought up in Ivangorod had to be brought to the Narva side and put through customs there before departure.30 Mer‐ chants arriving from Russian towns, however, stopped in Ivangorod, where their goods were weighed and put through customs. Alongside residents of Ivangorod,

25 Instructions given to Tallinn’s representatives to take along to Stockholm on 19 August 1617: TLA, 230.1.Aa 21B and Aa 28. King Gustavus Adolphus was informed about the delegation on 29 August 1617: TLA, 230.1.BF 54. 26 Letters from Tallinn’s delegation to the town council dated 24 September, 4 October and 31 November (TLA, 230.1.BL 7). The town council mentioned secondary ports detrimental to Tallinn in a letter to the King dated 18 September 1617 (TLA, 230.1.BF 54). Tallinn’s representatives to Gustavus Adolphus, in Stockholm, not dated, but judging by its contents written after the coronation on 12 October and before the town’s privileges were affirmed on 24 November 1617: TLA, 230.1.BL 7. 27 Troebst, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung, p. 69. 28 Concerning Sweden’s trade ordinances from 1614, 1615, and especially 1617, see for instance: Sandberg, I slottets skugga, pp. 140–43, 160–61, 168–83. 29 Samling utaf Kongl. Bref, Stadgar och Förordningar, i, 655–90; Melander, ‘Die Revaler Zollarende 1623–1629’, p. 245; Soom, ‘De ingermanländska städerna och freden i Stolbova 1617’, p. 35; Soom, Die Politik Schwedens, p. 8. 30 Gustavus Adolphus’s privilege for Narva, in Stockholm on 28 November 1617: RA, EAA, 1646.1.1.

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residents of Narva could also trade directly with subjects of the Russian Tsar. Additionally, residents of Ivangorod were also granted the right to sail their barges to Tallinn, Finland, Sweden, and as far as the straits of Denmark.31 It is known that Russian merchants possessed small vessels. Whether the voyages of residents of Ivangorod extended farther than Tallinn, Viborg, and Stockholm is another matter. The only achievement of the Tallinners in Stockholm was the subsequent affirmation of the town’s historical privileges by the King on 24 November 1617.32 The town reacted to the decisions pronounced in Stockholm with new complaints concerning the decline in trade, and with requests to grant them the exclusive right to broker transit trade with Russia.33 It was understood in Tallinn that it was not possible to squeeze its neighbouring town Narva out of trade through pure competition alone, even though Russian trade manifested a slight growth tendency particularly in Tallinn after the Treaty of Stolbovo. In 1617, Russian imports into Tallinn totalled 1068 dalers. In 1618, thirty-four Russian merchants brought goods valued at 7580 dalers to Tallinn. In 1620, this figure dropped to 2069.5 dalers, but already in 1622, fourty-six Muscovites arrived again and they brought goods valued at 12,179 dalers. See also Table 8.1. It is not possible to use customs duty registers to statistically ascertain how Russian trade developed further in Tallinn because starting in the latter half of 1623, the import and export of Russian goods was no longer recorded in them. Yet as Jarmo Kotilaine has pointedly noted, Tallinn nevertheless did not have reason to celebrate at the outset of the 1620s because even as recently as 1607 and 1609, total imports from Russia had been valued at more than 73,000 dalers.34 Besides, Tallinn received very little income from customs duty on Russian goods because they mostly passed through customs in Narva, that is to say in the place where the Swedish border was crossed. If the storage depot had been located in Tallinn, the latter would have been able to collect customs duty to a greater extent. In order to achieve this, it was necessary to take vigorous diplomatic steps in relation to royal authority.

31 32 33 34

Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbständige Stadt 1617–1649’, pp. 215–17. Die Quellen des Revaler Stadtrechts, ii, 206–07. Tallinn’s town council to Gustavus Adolphus, in Tallinn 23 June 1618: TLA, 230.1.BF 54. Kotilaine, ‘Noch mal über die Revaler Zollarende’, pp. 52–53.

The TreaTy of sTolboVo and Tallinn’s CusToMs renTal aGreeMenT Table 8.1. Volume and balance of Russian trade in Tallinn according to portorium tolls (in (riks)dalers).35

Year

Import customs duty

Export customs duty

Balance

Import value of goods

Export value of goods

1605

267

6

– 261

17,770

390

1606

509

249

– 260

33,757

15,722

1607

565

648

+ 83

73,598

43,400

1608

543

386

– 157

61,822

25,679

1609

1111

410

– 701

73,996.5

27,316.5

215

– 212

33,349

14,348

46

– 23

6331

3063.5

166

– 193

23,278

11,040

1610

500

1611

69

*

*

1612

349

1613

135

94

– 41

8974 +?

6260

1614

47*

47

0

3157 +?

3124

1615

-

94

-

?

6291

19

+ 17

1068

303

92

– 22

7580

6115

11

– 20

2069.5

704

1617

*

2

1618

114

1620

31

1621 1622 1623 I

55

*

*

183

22

– 33

3642

1429

*

50

– 133

12,179

3248

*

31

– 124

?

?

155

Basis: SRA, Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper, vol. 2, 3, 4, 5; RA, EAA, 1.2.764, 765, 766, 767, 768; TLA, Ag.1, 2, 3. *Includes customs duty paid elsewhere, mostly in Narva, before arrival in Tallinn: 1610–83:24.5, 1612–31:25, 1614–47:17, 1617–13:40.5, 1618–87:06, 1621–52:29.5, 1622–183:01.5; 1623–155:15 per (riks)daler. The amount of customs duty paid elsewhere is not indicated for other years. Customs duty was collected in 1605–1613 according to the rate 1 daler = 40 öre, from 1614 onward, one riksdaler equalled 48 öre.

35 Russian trade in Tallinn during the first two decades of the seventeenth century has been examined by Evald Blumfeldt concerning 1609 (Blumfeldt, ‘Statistilisi lisandeid Tallinna kaubaliikluse ja meresõidu ajaloole’, pp. 60–61); by Artur Attman concerning 1606–1612 (Attman, Den ryska marknaden, p. 102; Attman, The Russian and Polish Markets in International Trade, p. 154) and concerning the years 1600, 1605–1618: Kotilaine, ‘Tallinna kaubandussidemed Moskva riigiga 17. sajandi alguses’, p. 32. At the same time, the data of different authors are divergent, even though they all rely on one and the same pound or portorium toll registers of Tallinn. Similarly, the authors referred to here have not indicated the customs duty income from Russian goods.

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In the spring of 1620, Tallinn’s representative Johann Derenthal, town council‐ lor Bartholomeus Rhotert, oldermann Hans Wibking, and representative of the citizenry Albrecht Lanting were once again in Stockholm. According to their instructions, they were to complain about the redirection of trade past Tallinn to Narva, Nyen, Helsinki, Porvoo, Tammisaari, and elsewhere. On top of that, Finnish barges had started sailing for Riga, which was still under Polish rule at that time, instead of Tallinn. The representatives were supposed to remind the King of the historic decisions of 1584 and 1588, according to which the storage depot for Russian transit trade had to be located exclusively in Tallinn.36 The royal authority did not make any direct changes for Tallinners as a result of this delegation’s mission.37 The voyages of Western Europeans to Narva continued, yet not in the kind of volume that would have satisfied the King’s fiscal interests. It was primarily Lübeck that was interested in reaching the Russian market by way of Narva. Lübeck even applied for an accession agreement with Sweden in 1620 and 1621 to achieve this aim. Lübeck’s wish was to renew the Treaty of Stettin that had been in effect since 1570. At the end of the Northern Seven Years War, this treaty had at least declaratively enabled residents of Lübeck to sail directly to Narva. The negotiations that were held in Stockholm in 1621, at which representatives of Tallinn were also present according to Kurt Melander, did not lead to any direct results.38 Tallinn’s categorical position was that Russian transit trade in the Gulf of Finland had to take place through Tallinn’s brokering. As evidence of the town’s losses in the first half of 1621, it was pointed out that as of 15 May, ten foreign vessels had sailed to Finnish and Ingrian harbours without unloading their goods in Tallinn. As of 9 June, twelve such ships were noted.39 On 16 July 1621, Gustavus Adolphus issued instructions to War Commissar Adam Schrapfer, who resided in Tallinn, on what kinds of proposals to make for improving the town’s economic situation in negotiations with Tallinn’s town council. First, Tallinners were to be offered the rental of an iron mine in Finland (Svarteråå?) for twenty to forty years. The production of the mine was to be marketed by way of Tallinn. Second, the export of iron was to be free of tithe and customs duty for a few years. Additionally, Gustavus Adolphus offered Tallinners landed property in Finland for rent in order to help bring Finnish trade to Tallinn. The King announced as the third and most important point that he had nothing against stopping foreigners from sailing to Narva, but Tallinners had to create a trading company for bringing Russian trade back to their city. The King vowed to grant this company privileges. Fourth, Schrapfer had to ask Tallinn’s citizenry for

36 Instructions from Tallinn’s town council to its representatives going to Stockholm dated 2 May 1620: TLA, 230.1.Aa 21B; Aa 28A. 37 Delegation’s report on their trip to Stockholm: TLA, 230.1.Aa 21B. 38 Melander, ‘Die Revaler Zollarende 1623–1629’, pp. 246–47. 39 Tallinn’s town council to Gustavus Adolphus, in Tallinn on 15 May and 9 June 1621: TLA, 230.1.BF 54.

The TreaTy of sTolboVo and Tallinn’s CusToMs renTal aGreeMenT

a loan for a couple of years. The lenders were similarly promised landed property in Finland for rent, or six to nine per cent interest on the loan. The fifth point concerned the correspondence of money minted in Tallinn to Swedish coins, and the sixth point was the exchange rate of Russian coins in relation to daler coins.40 Thus already in the summer of 1621, the King expressed his willingness in principle to halt the voyages of foreigners to Narva and offered measures for invigorating Tallinn’s economic life. Using the demand made by Gustavus Adolphus, which arrived in Tallinn at the end of December, that Tallinn give the state 1000 tonnes of grain as its contribution, the town sent its representatives Johann Derenthal and Georg von Wangersen to the King, who was in Narva at the outset of 1622.41 The representatives offered the King 3000 Swedish dalers instead of the grain, but also wanted to discuss bringing Russian trade back to Tallinn, shutting down secondary ports, and increasing the town’s share of the pound toll to half, which meant reducing the state’s share. The dispute between Tallinn’s Great Guild and the town’s artisans, who wanted to deal in commerce and trade as well, was also discussed. The King’s position, that the reorganization of trade must not impair trade, merits highlighting. For this reason, he also forthrightly recommended that Tallinners should establish a trading company. The King pointed to the experience of the Swedish realm itself in the copper trade, and to England and the Netherlands as examples. The merchants of those countries had achieved success precisely through trading companies. It would have been possible to concentrate the scant monetary resources of Tallinners, including the artisans, into such a company and to involve German towns. The Tallinners, however, confined themselves to blaming secondary ports and excessively high customs duties for the decline in trade. Swedish and Finnish towns were also criticized for treating Tallinners like strangers. After removing these obstacles, trade was supposed to return from Archangel to the Gulf of Finland and lay a new foundation for Tallinn’s economic prosperity. In his response to the Tallinners, the King asked for the presentation of additional information and recommended that the towns of Estonia and Livonia hold a joint meeting for this purpose to discuss bringing back Russian trade.42 Thus Gustavus Adolphus sent a proposal to Riga on 16 January and to Tallinn on 17 January recommending that representatives of the maritime towns Tallinn, Riga, Narva, and Pärnu meet somewhere in Livonia and confer on how to help to better organize Russian trade. The towns were supposed to convey their pro‐ posals to the King.43 Although Tallinn’s town council proposed in a letter dated 40 Gustavus Adolphus’s instructions to Adam Schrapfer, in Älvsnabben on 16 July 1621: TLA, 230.1.BF 56. 41 Instruction from Tallinn’s town council to J. Derenthal and G. von Wangersen for their trip to Narva, in Tallinn on 6 January 1622: TLA, 230.1.Aa 21B. The representatives were in Narva on 11–18 January 1622: TLA, 230.1.Ab 41. 42 Report by J. Derenthal and G. von Wangersen to Tallinn’s town council: TLA, 230.1.BF 61. 43 Gustavus Adolphus to Tallinn’s town council, in Narva on 16 January and to Riga’s town council, in Narva on 17 January 1622: TLA, 230.1.BF 56. See also Liljedahl, Svensk förvaltning i Livland, p. 105.

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8 February 1622 to Riga’s town council to meet that same winter in Pärnu,44 a conference of the above-mentioned four towns did not take place. It is also unlikely that Tallinn’s town council would have wanted to discuss the theme of Russian trade at all with Narva, which was in their opinion considered a secondary port. On 16 February 1622, the syndic Johan Ulrich and the town councillor and Untervogt (an office somewhat similar to that of a deputy bailiff) Godthardt Welling arrived in Tallinn as representatives of Riga’s city council and as new subjects of the Swedish realm on their way to Stockholm to attend the Riksdag.45 The position of the representatives of Riga tended to be negative concerning the winter meeting of maritime towns — the war continued, Riga’s city council was weak, and the necessary money was lacking. A joint discussion with Tallinn’s town council nevertheless took place on 20 February. As a result of this discussion, it was decided that the representatives of Riga would propose bringing Russian trade back to the towns of Old Livonia when discussing trade issues with the royal majesty of the realm. They had to request the shutting down of ports that were harmful for both towns — the ports of Finnish harbour towns and those of Haapsalu, Pärnu, and Narva. Additionally, the towns wanted the border toll in Vastseliina to be done away with so that Russian goods could come to Tallinn and Riga without any hindrances. Trade conducted in the countryside by the nobility and royal officials, who bought up grain and other goods, also had to be banned. Tallinn’s town council drew up a corresponding memorandum for Riga’s representatives on 22 February.46 In their reply of 13 April to a subsequent letter dated 23 March from Tallinn, Riga’s representatives confirmed that they would not leave any opportunity unused to discuss trade issues with the King or the Lord High Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna.47 The endeavours of Riga’s represen‐ tatives in Stockholm helped to prepare the way for the next steps of Tallinn’s town council.

The Idea of Renting Customs Duties At the outset of 1622, it was realized in Tallinn that criticism alone was not enough to change the situation. Something tangible had to be offered to the royal authority. This is most likely the time when the idea was arrived at to rent the customs duties of its competitors for a certain period. Tallinn’s representative

44 Tallinn’s town council to Riga’s town council, in Tallinn on 8 February 1622: TLA, 230.1.BF 47. 45 Riga’s town council to Tallinn’s town council, in Riga on 6 February 1622: TLA, 230.1.BF 47. 46 Protocol of Tallinn’s town council for 16, 18, 20 and 21 February 1622: TLA, 230.1.Ab 41, Bl. 459f, 492, 494f; the same: TLA, 230.1.BF 61; Tallinn’s town council to Stockholm to Riga’s representatives, in Tallinn on 22 February 1622: TLA, 230.1.BF 47. See also Soom, Der baltische Getreidehandel, p. 99; Gierlich, Reval 1621 bis 1645, p. 157. 47 Riga’s representatives to Tallinn’s town council, in Stockholm on 13 April 1622: TLA, 230.1.BF 47.

The TreaTy of sTolboVo and Tallinn’s CusToMs renTal aGreeMenT

Johann Derenthal set out for Stockholm again at the end of May 1622.48 In the capital, he was once again supposed to discuss the possibilities for bringing the storage depot for Russian transit trade back to Tallinn. Due to a strong headwind at sea, Derenthal arrived in the capital three weeks later than he had planned. Since the King had left Stockholm for Riga, negotiations took place with Johan Skytte and other councillors of the realm.49 The jurisdiction of the latter was only to listen to the Tallinner and to convey his thoughts to the King at his military camp in Livonia.50 As a result of Derenthal’s mission, Tallinn’s town council also sent a letter to Gustavus Adolphus on 10 August in which first the town’s former monopoly in brokering Russian trade was recalled, after which it was affirmed that in the event that Tallinn regained its status as storage depot, and other ports were closed off to the voyages of foreigners, it would be easy to keep the merchants of the Hanseatic towns, the Netherlands and England in Tallinn. The town council stressed that the town was not pursuing only its own benefit but rather was bearing the interests of the entire state in mind. When sending Derenthal to Stockholm, he was given authorization to offer 4000 Swedish dalers per year for six years for Narva’s customs duties, 1500 Swedish dalers for the customs duties of Porvoo and Helsinki, and 2000 Swedish dalers for Tallinn’s customs duties. In view of that the import of goods from Finland and Russia to Tallinn was supposed to be duty free, but in the event of their export, three per cent duty had to be paid. The same duty rate applied for imports and exports from abroad to Tallinn.51 The Tallinners noted a complication regarding Narva’s customs duties. Namely, they were rented out to Daniel Simonsson Falck,52 whose rental agreement was coming to an end. Tallinn’s town council asked that it not be extended any more.53 Derenthal’s undertaking brought a certain degree of success. First on 31 Au‐ gust 1622, a proposal was made to Tallinn’s town council to send a new dele‐ gation to Stockholm so that the King could decide once and for all how to ‘promote’ Tallinn’s ‘well-being’.54 Second, Gustavus Adolphus issued a patent on 22 November 1622 that the King justified with the fact that foreigners disregarded

48 Instructions from Tallinn’s town council to J. Derenthal for his trip to Stockholm, dated 29 May 1622: TLA, 230.1.Aa 21B; Tallinn’s town council to Lord High Councillor Axel Oxenstierna, in Tallinn on 29 May 1622: TLA, 230.1.BF 47; ibid. BL 7. 49 J. Derenthal to Tallinn’s town council, in Stockholm on 18 and 21 June 1622; Johan Skytte and other councillors of the realm to Gustavus Adolphus, in Stockholm on 27 June 1622: TLA, 230.1.BF 47, l. 143. 50 Sweden’s councillors of the realm to Gustavus Adolphus, in Stockholm on 27 June 1622: TLA, 230.1.BF 61. 51 Until the customs duty rental of 1623, customs duty at a rate of 1.5% of the value of the goods was collected in Tallinn: Küng, ‘Die staatlichen Zölle — Portorium und Lizent’, p. 127. 52 Daniel Simonsson Falck was Narva’s castle secretary in 1604 until about 1609. Starting in 1613, he was the customs duty administrator for the town and county of Narva and in 1620, he rented Narva’s customs duties for himself, which was extended in 1624 and 1629: Hildebrand and Broomé, ‘Falck, släkt’, p. 134. 53 Tallinn’s town council to Gustavus Adolphus, in Tallinn on 10 August 1622: TLA, 230.1.BF 54. 54 Axel Oxenstierna to Tallinn’s town council, in Riga on 31 August 1622: TLA, 230.1.BF 61.

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the trade regulations of 1617 and visited ‘illegal’ ports in Finland, Estonia, and Ingria (the only such port mentioned by name is Nyen). As a result of this, the realm was deprived of customs duty income and privileged ports were deprived of trade. The King’s decision was that henceforth, foreign ships were not permitted to sail east of Tallinn in the Gulf of Finland. The ships and goods of violators of this ordinance were to be confiscated.55 The royal patent was only a partial victory for Tallinners: Narva was not mentioned in it, and besides, Narva together with Ivangorod was elevated to the status of a storage and port town in the trading regulations of 1617 and thus it was a privileged port, so to speak. The King likely had in mind ports where the state did not collect customs duty. But this was done in Narva. Yet it was precisely the ban on sailing east of Tallinn that became the basis for the future rhetoric of Tallinners. Understandably, the authorities did not manage to take any specific steps at the turn of the years 1622 and 1623. Yet as of 18 February 1623, the representatives of Tallinn’s town council — once again Derenthal and von Wangersen — were in Narva, where over the course of a couple of days they introduced the royal patent. Both Narva’s town council and the Governor of Ingria Anders Eriksson Hästehufvud promised to investigate the matter with his royal majesty.56 A letter from Narva’s town council to Tallinn’s town council dated 26 April is characteristic. It stressed that even though Tallinn did not permit cargo ships to sail to Narva and forced them to stop in Tallinn, Narva permitted its citizens to continue trading with German and Dutch towns because no royal ordinance had reached them. Narva’s merchants had acquired goods over the course of the winter which had to be forwarded in the spring to their trading partners. Narva referred to their business ties in Western Europe and to the need to pay their debts. Tallinners had to compensate for the losses suffered by Narva’s merchants due to their exclusion from trade.57 Tallinners themselves were also uncertain of the extent to which the King’s decision of 22 November 1622 applied. Thus the town council drew up new comprehensive instructions on 11 February 1623, sending Derenthal and von Wangersen to Stockholm. As is known, the corresponding royal invitation had arrived in Tallinn at the end of the previous year. As has been pointed out, the journey began in Narva, from where it proceeded by way of Viborg and the Finnish coast to Stockholm. The central theme of their instructions, which comprised of numerous points, was the storage depot issue. The representatives had to once again stress that due to wars and ‘unusual and prohibited’ ports, Tallinn’s trade had declined. The town was in dearth and in debt, which it was no longer possible to get out of by ordinary means. The representatives were to

55 SRA, Riksregistraturet, vol. 143; Troebst, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung, p. 133. 56 J. Derenthal and G. von Wangersen to Tallinn’s town council, from Narva on 20 February 1623: TLA, 230.1.BF 47. Report from Tallinn’s representatives on their trip from February to May by way of Narva and Viborg to Stockholm: TLA, 230.1.BL 7. 57 Narva’s town council to Tallinn’s town council, in Narva on 26 April 1623: TLA, 191.1.161.

The TreaTy of sTolboVo and Tallinn’s CusToMs renTal aGreeMenT

further explain that if changes were not implemented now, what little income that remained would also be lost — citizens would abandon their work, start cultivating fields due to poverty, or go elsewhere to seek a livelihood. Then the representatives were to mention the royal patent, by which the King prohibited sailing to ‘unusual ports’ and required that trade be brought back to ‘privileged ports’. Derenthal and von Wangersen were instructed to thank the King for making this decision and to ask that it be implemented. The representatives were to once again repeat that Tallinn’s well-being was founded on trade and shipping, and to affirm that the town was not seeking benefit for only itself but was striving for income for the entire state. Pärnu, Haapsalu, Narva, Nyen, Kopor´e, Porvoo, and Helsinki were named as ports where shipping was henceforth to be prohibited. Narva was considered especially detrimental to Tallinn, Livonia, and also the entire Swedish realm. By competing with Tallinn, Narva was the main culprit to blame for why Russian foreign trade had shifted from the Baltic Sea to Archangel. Next the representatives were to pursue the objective that Tallinn could rent Narva’s customs duties for six years to the extent that they were rented out to Daniel Simonsson Falck, along with the customs duties of Helsinki and Porvoo for 1500 Swedish dalers, and the part of Tallinn’s customs duties allotted to the royal treasury for 3000 Swedish dalers per year. All goods arriving from Finland and Russia were to be duty free upon their arrival in Tallinn, and Tallinn’s suggested rate of customs duty was three per cent for these goods. The same rate was to apply to goods imported from abroad and exported abroad. In the event that the King was to plan to bring the storage depot to Tallinn anyway, the representatives were not supposed to hurry to bring up the rental idea. Increasing the customs duty rate to three percent was to be requested in the event that the share of the duty allocated to the town increased to half. If Narva’s merchants proved to be against bringing the storage depot to Tallinn, the representatives were to refer to the freedoms that were being given to Narva — they had to be permitted to trade freely with foreigners and Tallinners.58 In the first half of 1623, Tallinn’s representatives held negotiations in Stock‐ holm first of all with councillor of the realm Johan Skytte. On 9 April, they had the chance to meet with his royal majesty, to whom the arguments already highlighted in their instructions were presented. During the negotiations with Skytte, the King had him inform the Tallinners that the storage monopoly was possible only in the case where Tallinn compensated to the state treasury the customs duty income from the other ports that would in such a case not be collected. Skytte referred in the case of Narva to information obtained from Daniel Simonsson Falck that customs duty there yielded over 10,000 Swedish dalers per year and Russian trade in Narva was showing growth tendencies, while the Tallinners were offering the King only 6000 dalers, which was less than half of Narva’s annual customs duty income. According to Skytte, only four or five people in Tallinn 58 Instructions from Tallinn’s town council to J. Derenthal and G. von Wangersen, in Tallinn on 11 February 1623: TLA, 230.1.Aa 21B.

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would benefit from the relocation of shipping and trade, and from the rental of customs duties, not the entire citizenry. Thus the town, which ‘was already a cadaver or corpse would be ruined even further and would perish altogether’ (‘dar fern nuhn dem also, würde ferner die Statt, die doch bereitt ein Cadaver oder thottes Aaß, Ja erger alß ein Cadaver, ruiniret und zu nichtte gebracht werden’). Over the course of subsequent negotiations, the Tallinners were reminded of the necessity to create a company oriented to Russian trade, which propertied foreigners could join, first and foremost merchants from Lübeck and Hamburg. The King vowed to affirm privileges and the exclusive right to trade with Russia via Sweden for the company that was to be created. Secondly, the Tallinners were reminded of the opportunity to use iron mines in Finland and to sell iron ore in Tallinn. Alongside copper, iron was one of the commodities on the Russian market for which demand was highest. The third recommendation concerned bringing artisans to Tallinn so that the town’s economic life would not depend on trade alone. In the King’s opinion, Tallinn needed manufactories.59

The Importance of Customs Duty Rental to Tallinn As the instructions from Tallinn’s town council dated 11 February indicated, the representatives had to agree to everything in order to achieve the main objective of bringing the storage depot to their town. Success finally crowned the vigorous diplomatic activity of the Tallinners — on 26 June 1623 in Nääs, Axel Oxenstierna and Johan Skytte issued a resolution in the name of his royal majesty to Tallinn’s representatives concerning the rental of customs duties, according to which: 1) Tallinn gained the rental of the customs duties of its own town, Narva, Helsinki, and Porvoo for six years starting from St Bartholomew’s Day (24 August) of 1623 to St Bartholomew’s Day of 1629; 2) foreigners were forbidden to sail using either their own vessels or vessels chartered from Swedes farther east of Tallinn or Viborg and to visit Narva, Nyen, Kopor´e, Helsinki, and Porvoo. The same ban applied to Swedish subjects who used the ships of foreigners; 3) citizens of Narva, Helsinki, and Porvoo were permitted to put out to sea on their own ships from their home port and to return, but they had to pay Tallinn’s customs duty representative 6 per cent of the value of the goods; 4) ships arriving to and departing from Tallinn paid customs duty of 3 per cent based on previously affirmed rates; 5) Swedish subjects sailing on Swedish vessels to or from Tallinn also paid customs duty of 3 per cent and after that could freely sail onward, but if they were to sail directly to Narva, Nyen, Helsinki, and Porvoo, the customs duty rate would be 6 per cent; 6) goods on which 3 per cent customs duty had been paid in Tallinn or which had been brought there to be put through customs 59 Report from Tallinn’s representatives on the negotiations in Stockholm: TLA, 230.1.BL 7. See also: Gierlich, Reval 1621 bis 1645, p. 162; Troebst, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung, pp. 133– 36.

The TreaTy of sTolboVo and Tallinn’s CusToMs renTal aGreeMenT

were duty free in Narva, Porvoo, Nyen, and Helsinki; 7) illegal coastal trade was banned and violators of this ban were subject to the confiscation of their goods. Tallinn paid its customs duty rent to the royal rental chamber twice a year — by 2 February and by St Bartholomew’s Day. A total of 12,000 Swedish dalers in ‘good money’ was to be paid each year, provided that trade in Russia and at sea was not obstructed. If more than 12,000 Swedish dalers in customs duty were received, the town gave half of the surplus to the rental chamber, but if less than the agreed rental amount was received, the town had to add the amount of the shortfall. The town council had to draw up a detailed report on the annual customs duty income and send it to the rental chamber. All local representatives of the state authorities were informed of the rental of the customs duties, and they were responsible for ensuring that the agreement went into effect.60 The resolution included a clause stating that the resolution would be handed over to Tallinn’s representatives but that the document had to be ratified by the King. This took place over a year later — on 1 September 1624 — in terms of all the clauses of the agreement, in view of which the King added two clauses of his own. First, Tallinn was not permitted to undermine Narva’s rights, jurisdiction and privileges by using the rental of customs duties. Secondly, the wish of Tallinners to ban shipping to ‘unusual ports’, like Haapsalu for instance, still had to be studied. Until then, Tallinn had to tolerate such ports.61 Tallinn’s representatives essentially succeeded in achieving the rental condi‐ tions that they had pursued — the customs duty rental amount was admittedly larger, and Finnish and Russian ships had to pay customs duty upon their arrival in Tallinn, but voyages of foreigners beyond Tallinn to towns of the Gulf of Finland (except for Viborg), first and foremost to Narva as its main competitor, were banned for at least the next six years. At the same time, the customs duty rate in Tallinn was increased to three percent and in neighbouring towns to six percent, which was meant to make it easier to collect the amount required for renting customs duty. The customs duty rental agreement was nevertheless not fiscal for Tallinn’s town council but rather a step determined entirely in terms of trade policy under conditions of competition in order to bring Russian transit trade back to its town. Representatives of the state authorities remained sceptical concerning the objective of the customs duty rental agreement — stimulating Russian transit trade in Tallinn and on the Baltic Sea. In June 1624, Swedish diplomats informed Danish representatives that the King had relocated the storage depot to Tallinn for a certain period of time until it became apparent how this affected trade.62

60 Original document of Tallinn’s customs duty rental conditions signed by Axel Oxenstierna and Johan Skytte, in Nääs on 26 June 1623: TLA, 230.1.BF 61; the same as a copy: TLA, 230.1.Aa 28A. See also: Melander, ‘Ruotsin hallituksen ja Tallinnalaisten kauppatuumat Venäjän suhteen ynnä’, pp. 36–37; Blumfeldt, ‘Statistilisi lisandeid Tallinna kaubaliikluse ja meresõidu ajaloole’, pp. 4–5. 61 Die Quellen des Revaler Stadtrechts, ii, 207–08. 62 Kotilaine, ‘Noch mal über die Revaler Zollarende’, p. 55.

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Customs duty rental was more of a fiscal undertaking for the state in the context of the ongoing war against Poland in order to gain additional monetary means for the state treasury. The King and the councillors of the realm remained of the opinion that the only chance of actually stimulating Tallinn’s trade was to create a joint Russian trade company there with propertied foreign merchants from Lübeck and Hamburg, which would have had a monopoly on the right to trade with Russia via Sweden. Axel Oxenstierna and Johan Skytte expressed this idea on 27 June, the day after the customs duty rental agreement had been signed, in a memorandum given to Tallinn’s representatives. The document also repeated once again the opportunity to use the iron ore mine in Finland, and the processing and sale of iron via Tallinn. The reorganization of handicrafts was considered important, bringing artisans to Tallinn that would be useful to the town — tinsmiths, master armourers, makers of muskets and pistols, and other blacksmiths, weavers of linen fabric, canvas, and other fabrics — and getting them involved with trade. These measures together with bringing the storage depot for Russian trade to Tallinn were meant to contribute to the town’s economic advancement and ‘new prosperity’, but the state must not suffer any losses due to any forfeited excise duties, customs duties, and other income. Tallinners had to compensate for such losses.63 Narva’s merchants protested against Tallinn’s rental of customs duties, while Lübeck’s company of merchants trading with Novgorod was most vigorously opposed to the ban on voyages to Narva since they were unwilling to redirect their trade with Russia to Tallinn. Already in 1623, Lübeck tried to convince Tallinn’s town council and Sweden’s central authorities to abandon the rental of customs duty. They threatened in future to sail from Lübeck to Russia by way of the White Sea route. Ships from Lübeck violated the new procedure and continued to visit Narva, Nyen, Haapsalu, and Pärnu. Tallinn in turn tried to convince Lübeck to restore the trading procedures from the era of the Hanseatic League. Kurt Melander has researched in detail the attitudes of Narva’s town council, the Gov‐ ernor of Ingria Anders Eriksson Hästehufvud, and Lübeck towards Tallinn’s rental of customs duties and the steps taken by these opponents for doing away with it.64 Melander’s findings will not be recapitulated here. Danish merchants were also opposed to the prohibition of voyages to Narva.65 When Gustavus Adolphus realized that it was necessary for him to intervene in the war in Germany, he needed the support of Lübeck and the other Hanseatic towns. Tallinn’s rental of customs duties was in the King’s way. Stralsund was the first to be granted the right to sail duty free to Narva, Nyen, and the rivers of Russia. This grant was made in January 1629, that is before the end of the customs duties rental

63 Axel Oxenstierna and Johan Skytte to Tallinn’s representatives, in Nääs on 27 June 1623: TLA, 230.1.BF 61. 64 Melander, ‘Ruotsin hallituksen ja Tallinnalaisten kauppatuumat Venäjän suhteen ynnä’; Melander, ‘Die Revaler Zollarende 1623–1629’. 65 Troebst, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung, p. 135.

The TreaTy of sTolboVo and Tallinn’s CusToMs renTal aGreeMenT

agreement.66 In April of that same year, the King allowed two Englishmen, the brothers William and John Rowley, to settle in Narva, acquire ships for themselves and trade duty and tax free with goods from Russia and Western Europe.67 The end of Tallinn’s rental of customs duties raised Narva back into the sphere of interest of royal authority, but the King’s death in November 1632 halted trade reforms in the towns of the eastern part of the Baltic Sea for more than a decade. The conclusive turnaround in the attitude towards the voyages of foreigners to Narva was accomplished on 13 October 1643 when a resolution was issued in Stockholm allowing residents of Lübeck (essentially all Western Europeans) to visit the ports of Tallinn and Narva under equal conditions, and to either sell all goods wholesale (en gros) to local citizens or to use those ports for transit to Russia.68 It is clear from examining Tallinn’s portorium income that the town’s fiscal benefit from renting customs duty was insubstantial (see Table 8.2). The first years after the Treaty of Stolbovo was signed did not indicate any sharp rise in customs duty income. A larger increase took place only in 1622, and the first half of 1623 is also impressive, but the subsequent years are no longer so. At the same time, Jarmo Kotilaine has found in studying the quantities of goods that passed through Tallinn that the rental of customs duties stimulated trade in Tallinn. For instance, the export of fibrous materials, flax, and hemp temporarily recovered to its pre-war level and even rose above it. There was also some improvement in the export of tanned leather and other skins. Yet this did not mean explosive growth of either Russian or Western trade in Tallinn. Even the export level of the turn of the century was not reached.69 The number of ships that visited Tallinn’s port also did not increase significantly (see Table 8.3). In the case of this table, it should nevertheless be borne in mind that the data indicated is the minimum, since customs duty registers often did not record those ships that had already paid their customs duty at some other Swedish port and were duty free upon arrival. Ships that departed loaded with ballast were not entered in the registers. The Swedish realm used the income received from customs duties primarily to finance the army and civil service stationed in Estonia.70 At the same time,

66 Melander, ‘Die Revaler Zollarende 1623–1629’, pp. 270–71. 67 Soom, Die Politik Schwedens, pp. 10–11. 68 Melander, ‘Die Beziehungen Lübecks zu Schweden’, pp. 5–59; Soom, Die Politik Schwedens, pp. 33– 39, 90–93; Soom, ‘Die merkantilistische Wirtschaftspolitik Schwedens’, pp. 193–94; Troebst, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung, pp. 156–57, 221–29; Küng, Rootsi majanduspoliitika Narva kaubanduse küsimuses 17. sajandi teisel poolel, pp. 279–81; Küng, ‘Die narvasche Barriere’, pp. 104–06. 69 Kotilaine, ‘The Significance of Russian Transit Trade’, p. 572; Kotilaine, ‘Noch mal über die Revaler Zollarende’, pp. 56–57. The same conclusion can be arrived at on the basis of the results of Blumfeldt’s research: Blumfeldt, ‘Statistilisi lisandeid Tallinna kaubaliikluse ja meresõidu ajaloole’, pp. 52–54, 57–58. 70 See the final reports on customs duty rental: SRA, Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper, vol. 6; TLA, 230.1.Ba 25.

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the amounts received were insufficient to cover all expenses. Gustavus Adolphus’s unambiguous wish was that the province of Estonia would support itself. The King, who spent a month in Tallinn at the outset of 1626, asked for money for the defence of Estonia from both the town of Tallinn and the Knighthood of Estonia. The proposition was made to Tallinn’s town council to cover defence expenditures by establishing the so-called little toll (in Swedish den lilla tullen, an excise tax on foodstuffs imported into the town from the countryside). Tallinn was not willing to do so because it found that the little toll contradicted the town’s privileges. This was seen as a burden that the land was unable to bear since it had been devastated by war. As is known, Gustavus Adolphus lost his temper and on 9 February 1626, he threatened that he could ‘hang the bread basket [of Tallinners] up so high that they can’t get their hands on it’ and open up all ports along Estonia’s coast to free trade — Narva, Haapsalu, Toolse, and others. The King found that he ‘would rather own a little settlement from which he derives profit than a town without profit’.71 Later the King had vowed to reduce the town to ruins and turn it into a place where only a few fishermen can eke out a living. The town stuck to its guns and did not budge from its position, so the little toll was not implemented in Tallinn. Instead of that, a new harbour toll, namely the licent toll was established in 1628. Tallinners also had to pay contributions to the state, house army units, and provide ships and grain in 1621–1628.72 When Gustavus Adolphus issued a declaration to Tallinn on 5 May 1629 concerning the establishment of the licent toll, he affirmed among other things that sailing to secondary ports — Haapsalu, Toolse, Kolga, and other such ports — was admittedly prohibited for foreigners, but he no longer included Narva, Pärnu, and Finnish ports among them because these ports had to be open to all.73

71 Protocol of Tallinn’s town council from 9 February 1626: TLA, 230.1.Ab 43. 72 Liljedahl, Svensk förvaltning i Livland, pp. 182–84, 207–08, 216–18; Soom, Der baltische Getreidehandel, pp. 22–25; Gierlich, Reval 1621 bis 1645, pp. 138–41, 145–53. 73 Die Quellen des Revaler Stadtrechts, ii, 212–13. Tallinn’s representatives who were in Stockholm from 1 March to 13 May 1629 wanted foreign shipping to Pärnu, Haapsalu, Helsinki, Porvoo, Viborg, and Narva to be banned and the duties from those towns were to be collected by Tallinn’s license chamber: Liljedahl, Svensk förvaltning i Livland, p. 217.

The TreaTy of sTolboVo and Tallinn’s CusToMs renTal aGreeMenT Table 8.2. Amounts received by Tallinn’s portorium chamber in 1617–1632 (in riksdalers).74

Year

Total

State’s share

1617

2736

1463

1342

1618

2289

1526

763

1619

2780

-

927

1620

2560

1707

853

1621

2827

1885

942

1622

3954

1977

1977

January – August 1623

3240

1620

1620

August 1623– August 1624

9981

1562 + 6857

1562

August 1624– August 1625

9938

1541 + 6857

1541

August 1625– August 1626

9677

1586 + 6857

1582

August 1626– August 1627

11,028

2085 + 6857

2085

August 1627–August 1628

8457

800 + 6857

800

August 1628– August 1629

10,176

1660 + 6857

1660

August–December 1629

1884

942

942

1630

5220

2610

2610

1631

4700

2363

2350

1632

4959

2480

2479

Town’s share

Basis: RA, EAA, 1.2.765–71; SRA, Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper, vol. 5, 6; TLA, 230.1.Ag 2, Ag 3, Ag 6-Ag 9; TLA, 230.1.Ba 16, Ba 17, Ba 25; Ba 34; TLA, 230.1.Bh 10. Note: In the years 1617–1623, duty was collected according to calculations based on the rates 1 riksdaler = 48 öre and starting from the period of customs duty rental, 1 riksdaler consisted of 56 öre.

74 Concerning Tallinn’s portorium toll see further: Küng, ‘Die staatlichen Zölle — Portorium und Lizent’, pp. 126–34.

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Foreign ships

Year

Domestic ships

In

Out

Total

In

Out

Total

1600

121

148

268

-

-

-

1605

86

61

147

-

-

-

1606

97

78

175

-

-

-

1607

94

78

172

-

-

-

1608

95

71

166

-

-

-

1609

100

47

147

-

-

-

1610

103

61

164

-

-

-

1611

167

85

252

-

-

-

1612

20+?

36

56+?

13

110

123

1613

135

55

125

19

34

53

1614

78

35

73

26

48

74

1615

99

55

125

-

24

?

1617

123

40

95

30

-

?

1618

53

38

91

52

56

108

1620

112

33

145

10

14

24

1621

63

38

101

38

31

69

1622

94

53

147

14

37

51

1623 I half-year

108

42

150

13

19

32

1623 II half-year – 1624 I half-year

76

65

141

3

17

20

1626 II half-year – 1627 I half-year

46

67

113

-

5

?

1627 II half-year

15

21

36

-

2

-

1628 I half-year

26

34

60

-

15

-

1628 II half-year – 1629 I half-year

59

87

146

-

19

-

1629 II half-year

10

20

30

-

2

-

1631

43

43

86

-

29

-

1632

34

39

73

-

13

-

Basis: RA, EAA, 1.2.765–71; SRA, Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper, vol. 5, 6; TLA, 230.1.Ag 2, Ag 3, Ag 6–Ag 9; TLA, 230.1.Ba 16, Ba 17, Ba 25; Ba 34; TLA, 230.1.Bh 10.

The TreaTy of sTolboVo and Tallinn’s CusToMs renTal aGreeMenT

Summary After the Treaty of Stolbovo was signed, Tallinn undertook one last vigorous attempt to bring the storage depot for Russian trade to its town as a monopoly and to ban foreigners from sailing to Narva as their primary competitor. Lübeck was also a competitor against Tallinn. Its merchants preferred to interact with Russia by way of Narva. The merchants of Narva and Lübeck were blamed for the decline in Tallinn’s trade and for driving Russian trade from the Baltic Sea to Archangel. In Tallinn, it was thought that if the centre for Russian transit trade were to be brought back to their town, trade through Archangel would decline due to the increasing interest of Western Europeans in Tallinn. The royal authority in Sweden hoped that this was true. Nevertheless, the standpoint of the Swedish authorities wavered in regard to the storage depot question during the first quarter of the seventeenth century, for which reason Narva was preferred at times, and at other times Tallinn was preferred as the broker of Russian trade. Tallinn’s diplomatic activity directed at Stockholm was very active regarding the issue of trade, even though one and the same arguments were repeated from year to year. At the same time, only a few of Tallinn’s merchants were active in trade with Russia. This was a risky undertaking and required the possession of the necessary capital, which impoverished Tallinners did not have during the period of economic decline. Thus it was hoped that Russians would come to Tallinn with their goods, where those goods would be passed on to Western Europeans, and vice versa. Along with storage depot status, Tallinn hoped to increase customs duty income. In the summer of 1622, Tallinn realized that only anti-Narva rhetoric and requesting that the storage depot be brought to Tallinn was not enough. Something real had to be offered to the royal authority. Thus the idea was arrived at to rent the customs duties of Tallinn’s competitors for a certain period as compensation to the state. While the royal authority considered the creation of a trading company to be more profitable in advancing Tallinn’s trade, it agreed to the idea of renting customs duties in 1623 and signed the corresponding agreement with Tallinn for six years. Even though annual receipts during the period of customs duty rental exceeded the rate of 12,000 Swedish dalers, the harbour registers indicate that the town’s income remained modest and also that no substantial upturn took place in trade. In the case of customs duty data, the increase in the customs duty rate from the former 1.5 per cent to 3 per cent must also be taken into account. On the other hand, however, the number of öre in one riksdaler was increased in customs duty calculation from the former 48 to 56. One of the reasons for the meagre success of customs duty rental was the warfare that continued to be waged in Livonia. The state repeatedly implemented a ban on grain exports, thus reducing the interest of Western Europeans in trading in Tallinn. In essence, King Gustavus Adolphus realized from the beginning of the period of customs duty rental onward that it was not possible by way of

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this measure to bring Russian trade back to the Baltic Sea or to restore Tallinn’s economic prosperity from the era of the Hanseatic League. Sweden subsequently placed its stakes on the possibilities of Narva and Nyen, which was built at the mouth of the Neva River. Even though Tallinn’s trade continued to be tied to the market of north-western Russia by way of Narva and Nyen in the future as well, its primary economic hinterland was situated in Estonia and northern Livonia.

The TreaTy of sTolboVo and Tallinn’s CusToMs renTal aGreeMenT

Works Cited Manuscripts and Archival Sources

RA, EAA = Eesti Rahvusarhiivi ajalooarhiiv fund 1: Eestimaa rootsiaegse kindralkuberneri arhiiv fund 1646: Narva magistraat

SRA = Sveriges Riksarkiv Riksregistraturet, vol. 143: Tyska kansliets ingående registratur 1622 Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper, vols 2–6

TLA = Tallinna Linnaarhiiv fund 191: Tallinna Suurgildi arhiiv fund 230: Tallinna magistraadi arhiiv Primary Sources Die Quellen des Revaler Stadtrechts, ii, ed. by Friedrich Georg von Bunge (Dorpat: Kluge, 1847) Goeteeris, Anthonis, Iournael Der Legatie ghedaen inde Iaren 1615. ende 1616. by de Edele, Gestrenge, Hoochgheleerde Heeren; Heer Reynhout van Brederode … Dirck Bas … ende Aelbrecht Ioachimi … Te samen by de Hooch-ghemelte Heeren Staten Generael voornoemt, afghesonden aende Grootmachtichste Coninghen van Sweden ende Denemercken; mitsgaders aenden Groot-Vorst van Moscovien, Keyser van Ruschlandt. Ende namentlick op den Vreden-handel tuschen den Hoochghemelten Coninck van Sweden ter eenre, ende den Groot-Vorst van Moschovien ter anderer sijde. Inhoudende cort ende waerachtich verhael, vande seer seltsame ende wonderbaerlicke ghesteltenisse des landts van Ruschlandt, ende de seer moeyelicke ende beswaerlicke Reyse aldaer gevallen (The Hague: Meuris, 1619) Kaupmees Matheus Spielmanni arveraamatud 1568–1570, ed. by Ivar Leimus, Tallinna Linnaarhiivi Toimetised, 15 (Tallinn: Tallinna Linnaarhiiv, 2017) Samling utaf Kongl. Bref, Stadgar och Förordningar, etc. Angående Sweriges Rikes Commerce, Politie och Oeconomie Uti Gemen, Jfrån Åhr 1523. in til närwarande tid, ed. by Anders Anton von Stiernman, 6 vols (Stockholm: Hesselberg, 1747) Secondary Studies Almquist, Helge, Sverge och Ryssland 1595–1611. Tvisten om Estland, förbundet mot Polen, de ryska gränslandens eröfring och den stora dynastiska planen (Uppsala: [n. pub.], 1907)

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Arnell, Sture, Die Auflösung des livländischen Ordensstaates. Das schwedische Eingreifen und die Heirat Herzog Johans von Finnland 1558–1562 (Lund: [n. pub.], 1937) Attman, Artur, Den ryska marknaden i 1500-talets baltiska politik 1558–1595 (Lund: [n. pub.], 1944) ———, The Russian and Polish Markets in International Trade 1500–1650, trans. by Eva Green and Allan Green, Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-historiska institutionen vid Göteborgs universitet, 26 (Gothenburg: Gothenburg University, 1973) ———, The Struggle for Baltic Markets. Powers in Conflict 1558–1618, Acta Regiae Societatis scientiarum et litterarum Gothoburgensis Humaniora, 14 (Gothenburg: Vetenskapsoch vitterhets-samhället, 1979) Blumfeldt, Evald, ‘Statistilisi lisandeid Tallinna kaubaliikluse ja meresõidu ajaloole aa. 1609–1629’, Ajalooline Ajakiri (1935), 1–18, 49–63 Fagerlund, Rainer, Kurt Jern, and Nils Erik Villstrand, Finlands historia, ii (Esbo: Schildts, 1993) Federley, Berndt, Kunglig Majestät, Svenska Kronan och Furstendömet Estland 1592–1600, Commentationes humanarum litterarum, 14.1 (Helsingfors: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1946) Gierlich, Ernst, Reval 1621 bis 1645. Von der Eroberung Livlands durch Gustav Adolf bis zum Frieden von Brömsebro (Bonn: Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen, 1991) Hildebrand, Bengt, and Bertil Broomé, ‘Falck, släkt’, in Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon, xv (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1956), pp. 133–35 Köhler, Meike, Die Narvafahrt. Mittel- und westeuropäischer Rußlandhandel 1558–1581, Hamburger Beiträge zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, 6 (Hamburg: Kovač, 2000) Kotilaine, Jarmo T., ‘Noch mal über die Revaler Zollarrende: der fiktive Aufschwung?’, Vana Tallinn, 16 (2002), 51–72 ———, Russia’s Foreign Trade and Economic Expansion in the Seventeenth Century, The Northern World, 13 (Leiden: Brill, 2005) ———, ‘Tallinna kaubandussidemed Moskva riigiga 17. sajandi alguses’, Vana Tallinn, 14 (2000), 27–44 ———, ‘The Significance of Russian Transit Trade for the Swedish Eastern Baltic Ports in the Seventeenth Century’, Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung, 49 (2000), 556–89 Küng, Enn, ‘Die narvasche Barriere in den Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Lübeck und Russland im 17. Jahrhundert’, Zeitschrift des Vereins für Lübeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde, 88 (2008), 89–133 ———, ‘Die staatlichen Zölle — Portorium und Lizent — in den Städten der schwedischen Ostseeprovinzen’, Hansische Geschichtsblätter, 133 (2015), 115–62 ———, ‘“Paludes kristlikku päästmist ja kaitset”: Eestimaa seisuste alistumine Rootsi võimule 1561. aasta suvel’, Tuna. Ajalookultuuri Ajakiri, 3 (2011), 88–98 ———, Rootsi majanduspoliitika Narva kaubanduse küsimuses 17. sajandi teisel poolel, Scripta Archivi Historici Estoniae (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 2001) Liljedahl, Ragnar, Svensk förvaltning i Livland 1617–1634 (Uppsala: [n. pub.], 1933)

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Melander, Kurt Reinhold, ‘Die Beziehungen Lübecks zu Schweden und Verhandlungen dieser beiden Staaten wegen des russischen Handels über Reval und Narva während der Jahre 1643–53’, Historiallinen Arkisto, 18 (1903), 1–81 ———, ‘Die Revaler Zollarrende 1623–1629 und die dadurch zwischen Schweden und Lübeck hervorgerufenen Mißhelligkeiten’, Zeitschrift des Vereins für Lübeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde, 14 (1912), 237–72 ———, ‘Ruotsin hallituksen ja Tallinnalaisten kauppatuumat Venäjän suhteen ynnä niistä johtuvat riidat Lübeckin kanssa vuosina 1614–43’, Historiallinen Arkisto, 16 (1900), 22–62 Mickwitz, Gunnar, Aus Revaler Handelsbüchern. Zur Technik des Ostseehandels in der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts, Societas Scientiarum Fennica. Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, 9.8 (Helsingfors: Akademische Buchhandlung, 1938) Rühe, Wolf-Rüdiger, ‘Revals Seehandel 1617–1624’, Zeitschrift für Ostforschung, 38 (1989), 191–255 Sandberg, Robert, I slottets skugga. Stockholm och kronan 1599–1620, Stockholmsmonografier, 105 (Stockholm: Kommittén för Stockholmsforskning, 1991) Soom, Arnold, ‘De ingermanländska städerna och freden i Stolbova 1617’, Svio-Estonica, 3 (1936), 34–45 ———, Der baltische Getreidehandel im 17. Jahrhundert, Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademiens handlingar. Historiska serien, 8 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1961) ———, Der Handel Revals im 17. Jahrhundert, Marburger Ostforschungen, 29 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1969) ———, ‘Die merkantilistische Wirtschaftspolitik Schwedens und die baltischen Städte im 17. Jahrhundert’, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 11 (1963), 183–222 ———, Die Politik Schwedens bezüglich des Russischen Transithandels über die estnischen Städte in den Jahren 1636–1656, Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi toimetused, 32 (Tartu: Õpetatud Eesti Selts, 1940) ———, ‘Ett förslag till handelsordning i Reval år 1626’, Svio-Estonica, 8 (1944–1948), 130– 48 ———, ‘Ivangorod als selbständige Stadt 1617–1649’, Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi Aastaraamat (1935), 215–315 Troebst, Stefan, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung. Schwedische Moskaupolitik 1617–1661, Veröffentlichen des Osteuropa-Instituts München: Reihe Forschungen zum Ostseeraum, 2 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997) Wetterberg, Gunnar, Kanslern. Axel Oxenstierna i sin tid, 2 vols (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2002)

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Пийримяэ, Хельмут, ‘Некоторые вопросы транзитной торговли России со странами Западной Европы через Таллин в XVII в.’ [Piirimäe, Helmut, ‘Some Issues of the Russian Transit Trade with Western European Countries via Tallinn in the 17th Century’], in Экономические связи Прибалтики с Россией. Сборник статей [Economic Ties of the Baltics with Russia. A Collection of Articles] (Riga: Zinatne, 1968), pp. 95–116 ———, ‘О состоянии нарвской торговли в начале XVII века’ [‘On the Condition of Narva Trade in the Early 17th Century’], Скандинавский сборник [Scandinavian Miscellany], 11 (1966), 82–110 Шаскольский, Игорь Павлович, Столбовский мир 1617 г. и торговые отношения России со шведским государством [Shaskol’skii, Igor´ Pavlovich, The Peace of Stolbovo of 1617 and Trade Relationships between Russia and the Swedish State] (Moscow: Nauka, 1964)

üLLE TARkIAINEN 

Influence of the Peace of Stolbovo on Estonia and Livonia

This article examines the effect of the Treaty of Stolbovo signed in 1617 on Sweden’s Baltic Sea provinces, with primary attention directed at the provinces of Estonia and Livonia. It will focus on the changes that took place in their administration, population, economy, and culture.

Geopolitical Aspects In the Middle Ages, the territory that is currently Estonia and the greater portion of Latvia’s territory formed the State of the Livonian Order, or the so-called Old Livonia. To the east it bordered on Pskov and Novgorod, to which the region east of Lake Peipus belonged. Relations were varied, and an indefinite, extensive, heav‐ ily forested zone between Livonia and Pskov was the state border.1 The border ran more precisely only to the north along the Narva River. Extensive trade between East and West proceeded along waterways through this region and their primary destination was Novgorod. When Tsar Ivan III annexed Novgorod to Moscow in 1478 and shut down the Hanseatic League’s covered market located in Novgorod, more and more Russian merchants began appearing in Narva, Tallinn, Tartu, and Riga. Trade between foreigners — Gast gegen Gast, as this was referred to — was forbidden, for which reason the citizens of those cities earned handsome profits from mediating such trade.2 During the reign of Tsar Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible), Moscow intervened in dividing up the heritage of Old Livonia by capturing the eastern part of Livonia in 1558 with its centre in Tartu, and Virumaa County in Estonia, with the city of Narva at its eastern border. Russian rule ended in Livonia at the end of the sixteenth century. Under the terms of the Truce of Yam-Zapol´skii in 1582, Livonia was ceded to Poland. Sweden, in the meantime, had captured Narva in 1581 under the command of Pontus De la Gardie. Sweden and Russia made 1 Selart, Eesti idapiir keskajal, pp. 128–33. 2 Leimus, ‘Kaubandus ja rahandus’, pp. 206–10. Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 189–204 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133604

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peace with the Treaty of Teusina in 1595. While competing against each other for Livonia, Sweden and Poland worked together at that time in their policies directed eastward. This cooperation was nevertheless discontinued when their joint King Sigismund was forced to relinquish the Swedish throne. From that point onward, Sweden and Poland were at war, which spilled over into Russian territory in 1609–1617. This period of war was ended by the Treaty of Stolbovo, which was signed in 1617 — on 27 February according to the old Julian calendar or 9 March according to the new Gregorian calendar — after two years of haggling between Sweden and Russia. Peace was a kind of defeat for Sweden because it did not gain those extensive northern territories that it would have needed to control trade via Archangel. Only Ingria and Kexholm County were incorporated into Sweden, yet this cut off Russia’s access to the Gulf of Finland. The prevailing opinion in Sweden was that this peace treaty strengthened the country’s security. It would have been unforgivable for Sweden to refrain from plucking Russia’s feathers when it was weak, said Sweden’s Lord High Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna in 1615.3 As a result of the Treaty of Stolbovo, Russia relinquished all claims to Estonia (cf. article 25) and Livonia (article 13). The treaty stipulated the drawing-up of the border between Sweden and Russia (article 12). It was important for Sweden that Russia was cut off from the Baltic Sea as a result of the Treaty of Stolbovo, thus assuring Sweden a permanent overland connection to Estonia and Livonia via Finland and Ingria. Estonia’s military importance declined because Ingria became the border province as a result of the treaty. The peace achieved with Russia enabled the Swedes to turn their weapons against the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania with the aim of driving the Poles out of Livonia. The results were encouraging. Riga was captured in 1621 and Tartu in 1625. This put Sweden in control of important transport links, namely the riverway opening up along the Emajõgi River from Tartu to Pskov, and the waterway that inspired great expectations but was difficult to navigate starting from Pärnu and passing through Viljandi to Tartu, and onward from there.4 These waterways intersecting in Livonia are an important key to understanding Sweden’s trade and economic policy in its Baltic Sea provinces. It was not until 1629 that a truce was concluded at Altmark and as its result, Livonia came under Swedish rule. It must briefly be added that Swedish territories expanded further in 1645 when Saaremaa (Ösel), which had belonged to Denmark, was annexed and united with Estonia and not incorporated into the realm. Livonia’s political and administrative border with Polish Livonia also became fixed after the Truce of Altmark. A period of peace began with the second quarter of the seventeenth century in Estonia and also in the new provinces of Ingria and Livonia, for which reason the former infrastructure that corresponded to wartime requirements was no longer needed. Estonia was shortly no longer a 3 Tarkiainen, ‘Faran från öst’, p. 45. 4 Tarkiainen, ‘Geometriska kartor från Estland’, pp. 62–63.

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Figure 9.1. Kunda manor in Estonia. From Adam Olearius, Offt begehrte Beschreibung der newen Orientalischen Reise, Schleswig 1647. The two-storied main building with thatched roof and projecting stair-well is typical of the Swedish period. The fence had replaced the medieval defence wall. Photo: Jens Östman, Kungliga Biblioteket.

border province. The exercise of the authority of the state was concentrated in the provincial centres (Tallinn, Narva, Tartu, and Riga), where governors (general) resided with their administrative offices. The centralization of the governing of the country, and the unification of the Swedish motherland and its provinces once again rose to the agenda during the reign of Gustavus Adolphus, yet the Instru‐ ment of Government of 1634 again clearly differentiated between the Swedish motherland and the provinces.

Administration The Estonian territory of the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea was administratively divided up into several parts during the era of Swedish rule. Estonia, which had already submitted to Swedish rule in 1561, formed a separate province. After the capture of Riga in 1621, the southern Estonian and northern Latvian territories acquired from Poland were combined to form a new province that was given the name of Livonia. The province of Livonia nevertheless covered only a part of the former Old Livonia. The Viceroyalty of Ingria established after the Treaty of

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Stolbovo was incorporated into the province of Livonia in 1629. Ingria and the part of Karelia that came under Swedish rule — Kexholm County — were under the jurisdiction of Livonia’s governor general until 1642. Thus the province of Livonia covered a very large territory extending from Riga and the banks of the Daugava River to the shore of Lake Pielisjärvi in northern Karelia, but it consisted of two parts that had no overland connection because Estonia separated Livonia and Ingria.5 Then only the waterway running along Lake Peipus and the Narva River connected the southern and northern parts of the governorate general. For a time, Tartu became the most important centre of Swedish power in the Baltic region because that is where the residence of Livonia’s governor general was located. In 1629, the King appointed State Councillor Johan Skytte to the post of governor general of the province. He quickly established a court of appeal (hovrätt), an ecclesiastical supreme consistory, a grammar school and sub‐ sequently a university in Tartu. After only a couple of years, however, the Council of State ordered Skytte to move to Riga. In Skytte’s view, Ingria’s problems were inevitably overshadowed by Livonia’s worries. Even though the province was supposed to be one complete whole financially and militarily, and in terms of the administration of justice, a clear distinction was made between the two parts of the province. The governor general was genuinely interested in the entire territory placed under his administration and travelled about during his term in office, also visiting Ingria alongside Livonia.6 The fact that Ingria was placed under the jurisdiction of Livonia is perplexing at first glance because Livonia and Ingria had no common border. One had to pass through the province of Estonia to travel from one end of the governorate general to the other. The explanation lies in the fact that these territories had formed a unified area in the 1580s due to the conquests of Ivan IV. The fact that both regions were subjugated by the Swedish state as the result of conquest and over the course of a relatively short time interval is another aspect that the two regions had in common. This clearly differentiated them from Estonia, which had voluntarily submitted to Sweden more than fifty years previously. The affiliation between Livonia and Ingria was discontinued in 1642, when Ingria was turned into an independent governorate general. Nyen (Nevanlinna) on the banks of the Neva River initially became its first centre but the governor general’s residence was transferred in 1651 to Narva due to its better infrastruc‐ ture.7 Alutaguse, which had until then been part of Ingria, was transferred to Estonia in that same year. Ingria became independent in ecclesiastical terms ten years earlier, more precisely in 1641 when the independent superintendency

5 Küng, ‘Rootsi administratiivvõim Eesti alal’, p. 233. 6 Küng, ‘Rootsi administratiivvõim Eesti alal’, pp. 241–45. 7 Küng, ‘Nyen (Nevanlinna) transiitkaubanduse keskusena Neeva jõe suudmealal’, p. 16.

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Figure 9.2. Johan Skytte (1577–1645). Engraving by Crisp. van den Queboren (1604– 1653?). Johan Skytte was a diplomat, councillor of the realm from 1617, governorgeneral of Livonia (preceded by Jacob De la Gardie), Ingria and Karelia 1629‒1634, in 1632 appointed chancellor of the Academia Gustaviana (today’s Tartu University) which he had founded that year. Skytte aimed at centralisation of the administration, uniformity with Sweden and incorporation of the Baltic provinces into the Realm (Rosén, Från Sveriges stormaktstid, pp. 133‒34). In 1624 he had been created baron and enfeoffed with the barony of Duderhof in Ingria. Wikimedia Commons.

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of Ingria was established.8 Ingria’s first superintendent was Heinrich Stahl, who published a catechism in Swedish in 1644 that was meant for orthodox people.9 The inhabitants of the conquered territories were not granted privileges, unlike Estonia, which voluntarily joined the Swedish state by way of an agreement in 1561. Ingria and Livonia were treated as territories acquired on the basis of jus belli (the law of war). The administration of the provinces was to be left to local governments. Swedish secular and ecclesiastical law immediately went into effect in Ingria along with the privileges of the Swedish nobility. The unification of Ingria with the Swedish motherland was that much easier since it had no dominant nobility. The strength of the state’s administration in Narva and Ingria derived to a great extent from the weak legal status of the local estates, including both the nobility and the town citizenry. In practice, the administration of Ingria and Kexholm County proved to be rather peculiar. Even though Swedish law was put in effect in Ingria since there were no strong local estates, the Land Act of 1622 had features more in common with Estonia and Livonia, affirming extensive liberties for recipients of fiefs. Large tracts of land were rented to Swedish aristocrats, especially to Jacob De la Gardie, and since the land had been depopulated as a result of the war, leaseholders imported Lutheran peasants from outside the territory. In this way, the population of Ingria was diversified because alongside the villages of orthodox Ingrians, Votians, and Russians, hundreds of new villages sprang up with inhabitants who had arrived there from Savonia or the Karelian Isthmus.10 Peasants were brought there even from Germany. Together with these arrivals, a network of Lutheran congregations also took shape. The organization of the justice system was adopted directly from Sweden and Finland, and was initially placed under the jurisdiction of the Tartu Court of Appeal, but was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Turku Court of Appeal in 1642. Nobles from Ingria and Kexholm County built manorial estates in the region, so called ‘hoveja’, where customs originating from Livonia prevailed. The nobles from both counties, who formed a diverse whole of representatives from different nationalities, came together to form the Knighthood of Ingria, which started demanding participation in government just like the nobilities of Estonia and Livonia. The diet (Landtag) was held in Narva and some of the members of the knighthood signed the decision in Cyrillic. These were former Russian nobles, among whom the most influential was Aminoff, whereas that family moved to Sweden and Finland after the Great Northern War.

8 Lotman, ‘Unustatud uus linn’, p. 28. 9 Lotman, Heinrich Stahli elu ja looming, pp. 134–36. 10 Saloheimo, ‘Inkerinmaan asutus ja väestö’.

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Population A very good overview of population conditions can be gained from censuses that Sweden was able to carry out in the area of Pärnu in 1624 and in the recently captured region of Tartu in 1627 in order to gain a clear understanding of the economic capacity of those areas and the possibilities for levying and collecting taxes.11 War at the outset of the seventeenth century together with the plague and famine that accompanied it caused a significant decrease in the number of in‐ habitants. Entire villages were left deserted, manorial estates were abandoned and their fields became overgrown with brushwood. Peasants fled in great numbers in areas near the borders, especially in Livonia and Ingria. The Swedish censuses of 1624 and 1627 reveal that Livonia was a desolated, nearly depopulated land due to the war. In some places, it had to be entirely resettled. New inhabitants arrived from the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland, but also from the eastern direction from Russia. Several deserted villages on the northern coast of Estonia were completely resettled by Finns, e.g. Finns accounted for twenty per cent of the population of Harju County in the 1620s. Finnish colonization accounted for a particularly large proportion of the population in Ingria. The so-called military settlement system was also used to bring Finns to Estonia. This meant that men recruited into the Swedish army were stationed in the countryside in separate communities. This kind of military settlement was established in Põltsamaa in Livonia, where there were no peasants to cultivate the land and thus also to assure the manorial estate of income on lands that had been given as fiefs to Field Marshal Herman Wrangel. In the case of many immigrants, the above-mentioned censuses as well as the census of 1638 indicate their origin as ‘reuss’ or ‘ryss’.12 Research has nevertheless verified that for the most part, these people were not Russians but rather peasants from Livonia who had crossed the border to go into hiding in Russia during the war and later returned when peace was restored. The war commissar Erik Andersson Trana had written that just a dirty look was enough to send peasants packing their things into carts to move across the border to the Russian side.13 People who arrived from Russia settled down mostly in the eastern part of Livonia in Tartu County, which was the eastern one of the two districts of Swedish Livo‐ nia’s northern part. Additionally, there were also immigrants who arrived from the south, mostly from Polish Livonia and Courland. Islanders from Saaremaa who migrated to the mainland formed a special group because Saaremaa had remained untouched by war and it was very densely populated. Since immigrants were mostly dispersed among the local population, their assimilation was rapid,

11 Das Dorpater Land 1624/27; Das Pernauer Land 1624. 12 Estnisches Siedlungsgebiet II. Die Revision Livlands 1638; Liivimaa 1638. a. maarevisjon. 13 Erik Andersson Trana to the King, 18 August 1625, Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Skrivelser till konungen, Gustav II Adolfs tid, vol. 9.

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and in the 1680s, immigrants and their descendents were no longer considered foreigners and mostly only the surnames of peasants referred to their origin. Settlements expanded and became denser as peace became more permanent, yet the flight of peasants to Russia still remained a problem that had become quite serious by the 1650s. For this reason, the Knighthood of Livonia even requested assistance from the King. While in the first half of the seventeenth century, warfare, crop failure, and also simply the poor quality of farmland and the aspiration to find more favourable conditions for running a farm were the reasons for the departure of peasants, now the primary reason was the increasing burden of duties and taxes imposed by the manorial estates. Immigration took on a new complexion at the end of the seventeenth century when the widespread flight of Old Believers or Raskolniks, who were being persecuted in Russia, began across the border from Russia into territories under Swedish rule. The greater portion of these refugees settled down on the western shore of Lake Peipus, where they formed a population group with fishing as its main livelihood that continues to populate the area to the present day. A small number of Raskolniks settled down in Alutaguse, while others settled on the shores of Lake Võrtsjärv, which is considerably smaller than Lake Peipus. The Raskolniks formed a population group that was entirely one of a kind because they did not cultivate land belonging to manorial estates and for this reason they were also not counted as serfs. The immigration of peasants corresponded in a certain sense to the relocation of former Russian nobles into the territory of Estonia. King John III had already enfeoffed large tracts of land in Finland, Sweden, and Estonia to boyars who had fled from persecution by the Russian Tsar.14 Nevertheless not all boyars put down roots in their new territories. Russians who had received small fiefs in Hiiumaa remained permanently, but Russians also resided elsewhere. The boyars became Germanized in the second or third generation already, and later on, only their name and aristocratic coat of arms differentiated them from German landowners. Their attribute was Russian weaponry — the sable or the handbow — and of course symbols deriving from their name as well, which in the case of Baranoff was a sheep, for instance.

Fortifications Border province status meant the deployment of rather large garrisons in its towns. Important strongholds were Tallinn in Estonia, Narva and all fortresses in Ingria, and Tartu, Pärnu, and Riga in Livonia. Extensive fortification work was also undertaken in many places during the seventeenth century, whereas the importance of Narva’s fortress grew especially. The fortress towns of the Baltic Sea provinces had to demonstrate their defence capacity in the mid-seventeenth

14 Kepsu, Mellan Moskva och Stockholm, pp. 43–65.

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century when the Swedish-Polish and Russian-Swedish wars broke out. The lengthy period of peace with Russia ended in 1656, when the Tsar’s army attacked Swedish territories on three fronts. The main force marched on Riga, the second army advanced from Pskov in the direction of Tartu, and the third army invaded Ingria. A five-year occupation of northern Livonia began with the fall of Tartu, with the Russians having captured extensive territory. The formal reason for war had been Ingria and Kexholm County, where inhabitants of the orthodox faith had raised a cry of distress. Even though a peace treaty was signed in Kärde in 1661, by which the Russians returned to Sweden all captured territories and affirmed the validity of the articles of the Treaty of Stolbovo, the war had caused large population losses and precipitated a downturn in economic activity. By that time, Sweden had become the strongest military-political power in the Baltic Sea region.

Economy The Treaty of Stolbovo created new opportunities for invigorating transit trade and attracting merchants from Western Europe and Russia. Since Russia was cut off from the Baltic Sea, Russian merchants had to use the mediation of towns in Estonia and Livonia for shipping their goods to Sweden or elsewhere in Europe. Russian economic policy nevertheless expressed a preference for trade via Archangel, which was under Russia’s own control, even though the climatic and navigation conditions there were poor. Lord High Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna was interested in the possibilities of international trade with the East and in the transport links with Russia provided by the Gulf of Finland’s network of rivers. For this reason, he wished to support trade via Narva and proposed in the 1640s that Narva be declared the second capital city, which the ruler was to visit every fourth year.15 This admittedly did not come to fruition but the idea of a large administrative and trading centre had been planted. The ruler of Russia brought this idea to fruition in 1703 with the establishment of St Petersburg. The transit trade that passed through the towns of Estonia and Livonia was connected primarily with the export of grain. The Baltic Sea provinces have even been called Sweden’s granary. The fact that rivers offered passage from Riga and Narva further into Russia, Poland, and Lithuania was considered to be important. Transit trade and domestic trade provided the state and also the towns with signif‐ icant incomes in the form of tolls and other taxes. Even though communication of towns in Estonia and Livonia with Western and Southern Europe had expanded in the last decades of the seventeenth century due to shipping traffic, they remained most closely tied to north-western Russia, Finland, and the local market. Narva was most closely connected with transit trade while trade between Finland and

15 Villstrand, ‘Stormaktstidens politiska kultur’, p. 22.

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the provinces of Estonia and Livonia dominated in Tallinn alongside trade with Russia.16 Typical Russian goods like flax, hemp, and leather goods passed through Narva, and in the latter half of the seventeenth century, Russian timber and forest products started being exported through Narva. On the other hand, local grain, flax, and hemp dominated export in Tallinn.17 The citizenry of the town of Narva developed into something completely one of a kind. The town of Ivangorod ( Jaanilinn in Estonian) located on the other side of the river remained an independent, completely Russian town until 1649, when it was merged with Narva. Narva formed a centre of knowledge concerning Russia for Sweden in the seventeenth century with its orthodox churches, priests and Russian language translators, who worked at the governor’s office. There was also a Russian school in the town. Narva had very close connections to Novgorod and Pskov (see Herfurth’s article on Narva below, pp. 219–234). Ingria was known as ‘Sweden’s Siberia’ because criminals were deported to that region, but it was also a testing ground for reforms and innovations by which the Swedish central government aspired to increase its influence in the provinces. Feudal relationships changed radically in the Baltic Sea provinces in the 1680s when the decision was made to implement the reduction of manorial estates in Sweden (the return of privatized estates to the crown). This was meant to include Estonia and Livonia, and later Saaremaa as well. In connection with this reduction process, extensive surveying work was also called for in the Baltic Sea provinces.18 The surveying and mapping of lands were meant to provide an overview of the condition and resources of the holdings that were returned to the crown and to regulate the procedure for taxing the manorial estates that remained the property of nobles. Ingria, where a one-fourth reduction had also been carried out at an early stage already, was selected as the testing ground for surveying the provinces. Five surveyors began work in Ingria in 1675, and the first general map of the province was completed as the result of their work by 1685. Work continued in Livonia on the basis of experiences gained in Ingria. Major Arnold Emmerling, a former land surveyor in the Governorate General of Ingria and Kexholm County, was appointed the manager of the surveying work that began in Livonia in 1681.19

The University Ingria was of special importance for financing the University of Tartu. It was precisely the income received from landed property located in Ingria that was the main source from which the amounts designated for the needs of the univer‐ sity were received. The example for this kind of system was the University of

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Küng, Rootsi majanduspoliitika Narva kaubanduse küsimuses, pp. 238–39. Küng, ‘Linnad 16. sajandi teisel poolel ja 17. sajandil’, pp. 358–59. Pauli, ‘Hetsigt gnägga svenskarnas hästar’, pp. 54–58. Tarkiainen, ‘Maamõõtjad Läänemere provintsides suure reduktsiooni ajal’, p. 322.

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Uppsala. According to a decision made in 1638, the manorial estates located in the Kopor´e county were placed under the management of the university and the incomes received from them were to go to the university in their entirety.20 The administration of the manorial estates caused serious financial problems for the university. Ingria had been devastated by wars and many peasants had fled to Russia. Sweden’s government had admittedly demanded their extradition because according to the Treaty of Stolbovo (article 8), only nobles and townspeople were allowed to leave the country (and even they were allowed to leave only during a two-week window), while peasants and village clergymen had to remain stationary. Letters from the university to the administrators of these manorial estates are filled with demands to quickly send money and grain. The administrators for their part complain about financial difficulties. Grain was usually sent to Narva, where the university’s granaries were located and where grain was sold, yet a large portion of grain went to Tartu. Professors were paid their salary and university students received their schol‐ arships in the form of barrels of grain, which large riverboats — barges — hauled from the east across Lake Peipus and along the Emajõgi River. Salaries were paid out in cash only in exceptional circumstances. The university’s quaestor took the peas, hops, and flax that arrived from Ingria into his custody to cover salaries. The advantage of the University of Tartu was that grain as well as living expenses were cheaper there than in Sweden. The university’s ties to Ingria resembled Governor General Johan Skytte’s own personal ties to that region. Namely, he had a large fief there in the form of Duderhof (Tuuter).21 The acquisition of money and its conveyance to Tartu was the task of the manorial estate administrators. Frequent crop failures, the arrears of the peasants, and their fleeing made this task difficult. The interval 1638–1653 was, in fact, the most favourable for the university because then it received the amounts allotted to it in the budget (8000 silver thalers annually) and even more in some years. Great difficulties began when Queen Christina mortgaged the manorial estates belonging to the University of Tartu to private individuals in 1652.22 The University of Tartu was connected to Ingria not only by economic ties, but also by the university students who came from that area. In addition to Livo‐ nia, the University of Tartu had been established for the benefit of another two provinces, Estonia and Ingria. Arno Cederberg has identified a total of 193 Finns and Ingrians who studied at the University of Tartu during the Academia Gusta‐ viana period, which came to an end in 1656 when Russia started a war against Sweden and set about besieging Tartu.23 There were fifty-two Finns and thirty young men from Ingria, most of whom were Swedes, among the students during

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Piirimäe, ‘Academia Gustaviana’, pp. 52–54. Tarkiainen and Tarkiainen, Provinsen bortom havet, p. 97. Piirimäe, ‘Academia Gustaviana’, pp. 59–60. Cederberg, ‘Suomaliset ja inkeriläiset ylioppilaat’, p. 13.

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Figure 9.3. The building of the University of Tartu, where the studies took place in the years 1642–1656 and 1690–1699. Facade drawing from 1688, made by lieutenant Paul von Essen, foreman of the fortification of Livonia, Estonia and Saaremaa, when the reopening of the university in Tartu was discussed. The repairs lasted from the autumn of 1688 until the summer of 1690. Riksarkivet. Photographer: Emre Olgun.

the university’s second period of operation in 1690–1710.24 Swedish and Ingrian students from Finland and Ingria belonged to a single organization (nation). Addi‐ tionally, at the end of the seventeenth century, the university persistently re‐ quested the right to take students who had studied abroad and worked as tutors in

24 Piirimäe, ‘Teine tegevusperiood Tartus’, p. 94.

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Livonia, Estonia, and Ingria under its control. Beyond ideological motives, the as‐ piration to drive out competitors was also behind this. The most famous man who had been educated at the seventeenth-century University of Tartu was Urban Hjärne, who was born in 1641 in the village of Skvoritsa in Ingria.25

Conclusion It can in summary be said that for Sweden, Ingria formed the country’s most important buffer in the east in the seventeenth century. After the Treaty of Stol‐ bovo, Estonia lost its status as a border province and although Livonia retained its border with Russia, it was considerably shorter than in the south in the direction of Courland and Poland. In this way, a relatively more peaceful time had arrived on the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland in the first half of the seventeenth century compared to the sixteenth century. Estonia and Livonia nevertheless retained their status as mediators between West and East. To a certain extent, especially in terms of population and trade relations, the amalgamation of these provinces with Ingria and Kexholm County took place after the latter territories had been won from Russia. All of these territories also fell under Russian rule as a unitary complex in 1721 as a result of the Great Northern War, yet the former hegemony of the Baltic Germans continued in Estonia and Livonia, while on the contrary, Ingria was Russianized again.

25 Lotman and Lotman, ‘Fennougristika eellugu ja Thomas Hjärne’, p. 222; Laidla, ‘Ajalookirjutuse antikvaarsest suunast’, pp. 109–16.

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Works Cited Manuscripts and Archival Sources Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Skrivelser till konungen, Gustav II Adolfs tid, ix Primary Sources Das Dorpater Land 1624/27, ed. by Oleg Roslavlev, Hefte zur Landeskunde Estlands, 1 (Munich: Roslavlev, 1965) Das Pernauer Land 1624, ed. by Oleg Roslavlev, Hefte zur Landeskunde Estlands, 2 (Munch: Roslavlev 1967) Estnisches Siedlungsgebiet II. Die Revision Livlands 1638, ed. by Oleg Roslavlev, Hefte zur Landeskunde Estlands, 4 (Munich: Roslavlev, 1969) Liivimaa 1638. a. maarevisjon. Eesti asustusala I kaguosa, ENSV Riigi Keskarhiivi Tartu osakonna Toimetused, 1/7 (Tartu: Teaduslik Kirjandus, 1941) Olearius, Adam, Offt begehrte Beschreibung Der Newen Orientalischen Reise / So durch Gelegenheit einer Holsteinischen Legation an den König in Persien geschehen. Worinnen Derer Orter vnd Länder / durch welche die Reise gangen / als fürnemblich Rußland / Tartarien vnd Persien / sampt jhrer Einwohner Natur / Leben vnd Wesen fleissig beschrieben / vnd mit vielen Kupfferstücken / so nach dem Leben gestellet / gezieret (Schleswig: Jacob zur Glocken, 1647) Secondary Studies Cederberg, Arno Rafael, ‘Suomalaiset ja inkeriläiset ylioppilaat Tarton ja Tarton-Pärnun yliopistoissa vv. 1632–1710’, Suomen Sukututkimusseuran Vuosikirja, 23 (1939), 8–132 Kepsu, Kasper, Mellan Moskva och Stockholm. De svenska ryssbajorerna i Ingermanland 1478–1722 (Helsingfors: Otava, 2015) Küng, Enn, ‘Linnad 16. sajandi teisel poolel ja 17. sajandil’, in Eesti ajalugu, iii: VeneLiivimaa sõjast Põhjasõjani, ed. by Enn Küng and Marten Seppel (Tartu: Tartu ülikooli Ajaloo ja arheoloogia instituut, 2013), pp. 338–71 ———, ‘Nyen (Nevanlinna) transiitkaubanduse keskusena Neeva jõe suudmealal 1632– 1703’, Tuna. Ajalookultuuri Ajakiri, 2 (2003), 8–26 ———, ‘Rootsi administratiivvõim Eesti alal’, in Eesti ajalugu, iii: Vene-Liivimaa sõjast Põhjasõjani, ed. by Enn Küng and Marten Seppel (Tartu: Tartu ülikooli Ajaloo ja arheoloogia instituut, 2013), pp. 219–71 ———, Rootsi majanduspoliitika Narva kaubanduse küsimuses 17. sajandi teisel poolel (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 2001) Laidla, Janet, ‘Ajalookirjutuse antikvaarsest suunast ja selle ilmingutest 17. sajandi Balti ajalookirjutuses’, in Läänemere provintside arenguperspektiivid Rootsi suurriigis 16/17. sajandil, iii, ed. by Enn Küng, Acta et Commentationes Archivi Historici Estoniae, 17/24 (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 2009), pp. 96–117

influenCe of The PeaCe of sTolboVo on esTonia and liVonia

Leimus, Ivar, ‘Kaubandus ja rahandus’, in Eesti ajalugu, ii: Eesti keskaeg, ed. by Anti Selart (Tartu: Tartu ülikooli Ajaloo ja arheoloogia instituut, 2012), pp. 203–28 Lotman, Piret, Heinrich Stahli elu ja looming, Eesti Rahvusraamatukogu Toimetised, 14 (Tallinn: Eesti Rahvusraamatukogu, 2014) ———, ‘Unustatud uus linn’, Tuna. Ajalookultuuri Ajakiri, 3 (2003), 25–34 Lotman, Piret, and Mihhail Lotman, ‘Fennougristika eellugu ja Thomas Hjärne’, in Läänemere provintside arenguperspektiivid Rootsi suurriigis 16/17. sajandil, iii, ed. by Enn Küng, Acta et Commentationes Archivi Historici Estoniae, 17/24 (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 2009), pp. 206–30 Pauli, Ulf, ‘Hetsigt gnägga svenskarnas hästar’. Sveriges Baltiska provinser 1561–1710, Svenska humanistiska förbundets skriftserie, 107 (Stockholm: Ordfront, 1995) Piirimäe, Helmut, ‘Academia Gustaviana’, in Tartu Ülikooli ajalugu, i: 1632–1798, ed. by Helmut Piirimäe (Tallinn: Valgus, 1982), pp. 46–71 ———, ‘Teine tegevusperiood Tartus’, in Tartu Ülikooli ajalugu, i: 1632–1798, ed. by Helmut Piirimäe (Tallinn: Valgus, 1982), pp. 72–119 Rosén, Jerker, Från Sveriges stormaktstid (Lund: Gleerup, 1966) Selart, Anti, Eesti idapiir keskajal (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli kirjastus, 1998) Saloheimo, Veijo, ‘Inkerinmaan asutus ja väestö 1618–1700’, in Inkeri. Historia, kansa, kulttuuri, ed. by Pekka Nevalainen and Hannes Sihvo, Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seuran toimituksia, 547 (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 1991), pp. 67–82 Tarkiainen, Kari, ‘Faran från öst i svensk säkerhetspolitisk diskussion inför Stolbovafreden’, Scandia, 40 (1974), 34–56 ———, and Ülle Tarkiainen, Provinsen bortom havet. Estlands svenska historia 1561–1710, Skrifter utgivna av Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 778 (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2013) Tarkiainen, Ülle, ‘Geometriska kartor från Estland och norra Livland som källor i bosättningshistorisk forskning’, in Nationalutgåva av de äldre geometriska kartorna. Konferens i Stockholm 27–28 november 2003, ed. by Birgitta Roeck Hansen, Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien. Konferenser, 57 (Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien, 2005), pp. 61–80 ———, ‘Maamõõtjad Läänemere provintsides suure reduktsiooni ajal’, in Läänemere provintside arenguperspektiivid Rootsi suurriigis 16/17. sajandil, iii, ed. by Enn Küng, Acta et Commentationes Archivi Historici Estoniae, 17/24 (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 2009), pp. 315–60 Villstrand, Nils Erik, ‘Stormaktstidens politiska kultur’, in Signums svenska kulturhistoria. Stormaktstiden, ed. by Jakob Christensson (Lund: Signum, 2005), pp. 17–101

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Ingria as a Swedish Province in the Seventeenth Century

Introduction The province of Ingria (Ingermanland) was ceded to Sweden in the Peace Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617. Nowadays, Ingria has largely been forgotten. Likewise, most historical research about Ingria is insufficient and outdated, even though some scientific articles concerning the province have been published during the last few years. This article examines the position of Ingria in the Swedish Kingdom. To begin with, Ingria as a border region and its cultural diversity will be discussed. After that, Sweden’s centralization and unification policy regarding Ingria during the last decades of the seventeenth century will be examined. The significance of the province is also investigated by analysing commerce and trade in Ingria. The focus is on the Swedish Crown’s aim to unify its provinces with the actual realm.

Ingria — ‘Swedish Siberia’? While under Swedish rule, Ingria was a turbulent region with great ethnic and cultural diversity. The population spoke different languages and consisted of several ethnic groups. The indigenous people, Izhorians, Votes, and Russians, professed the Orthodox faith. In addition, there were landlords, civil and manorial officials, and officers of German, Baltic-German, Russian, and Swedish descent. The burghers in the Ingrian towns of Narva and Nyen consisted at least of German, Swedish, Dutch, British, Armenian, Russian, and Karelian merchants. During the seventeenth century, a significant influx of Lutheran Finns from the Karelian Isthmus and Savonia (Savolax) changed the ethnic structure of the pop‐ ulation. Altogether, the Ingrian population was characterized by great mobility, which caused problems for the authorities. Indeed, they continuously ran up against different kinds of problems in Ingria. Hence, it was often described as a

Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 205–218 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133605

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Map 10.1. Ingria in the seventeenth century. The basic administrative unit in Ingria as well as in Karelia was pogost, parallel to the Swedish socken (parish). Map by Kasper Kepsu.

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‘troublesome’ province by the governors-general. Many officials also called the in‐ habitants in the province cunning and fierce and similar things.1 The experiences of the Ingrian governors-general are visible in earlier research in Finland and Sweden in the late-nineteenth century. It described Ingria colour‐ fully according to a kind of ‘rhetoric of the wild east’. Ingria was, for example, called the ‘Swedish Siberia’ which is a reference to social problems caused by extensive migration and even deportation to the region, just like in Siberia or the American West in the nineteenth century. In addition, the inhabitants were more or less described as ignorant barbarians or criminals.2 The English scholar Michael Roberts, called Ingria ‘a dumping-ground for undesirables’, consisting of ‘turbulent individuals’ avoiding taxes or contract labour-service.3 It is evident that a significant part of the migrants moved to Ingria illegally in an attempt to avoid paying taxes or arrears due to the Crown or to avoid conscription or local conflicts of some kind.4 On the whole, Ingrian peasants used the border in a very tactical manner, for example by moving frequently to new holdings and thus benefitting from a system that guaranteed exemption from taxes during the first three years on a new holding. It is also important to bear in mind, that the Swedish-Russian border was highly permeable, therefore it was easy to slip over the border into Russia if the tax burden became too heavy. Commissioner Erik Andersson Trana, who was a specialist on Sweden’s eastern provinces, compared the borderland peasants with birds who were sitting up in a tree, flying away as soon as the hunter [tax collector] appeared. In this way, deserting was not only a way to escape in difficult situations, but also a latent threat which the peasants used in keeping the taxes and duties to a bearable level.5 Nevertheless, most of the migrants were not criminals. The majority of mi‐ grants simply sought an easier way to make a living in a time that was character‐ ized by a heavy tax burden, a harsh climate and indirect religious discrimination. The number of deported individuals was most likely very low, although this re‐ mains an open question. However, the mobility of the Ingrian population made it very difficult for the authorities to control the region. Hence, seventeenth-century Ingria can be described as an unruly borderland, which was characterized by less coherent power structures, where neither the state nor the local elite had established a commanding position over the local population.6

1 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, pp. 50–55; Sivonen, ‘Me inkerikot, vatjalaiset ja karjalaiset’, pp. 41–47. 2 See particularly Öhlander, Bidrag till kännedom om Ingermanlands historia och förvaltning, pp. 15, 25–26, 165, 196; Bonsdorff, ‘Nyen och Nyenskans’, p. 410; Forsström, Kuvaus Inkerinmaan oloista, pp. 54–55. See also Roberts, The Swedish Imperial Experience, pp. 89–90. 3 Roberts, The Swedish Imperial Experience, p. 86. 4 Kujala, ‘Sweden’s Russian Lands’, pp. 559–62; Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, p. 75; Saloheimo, ‘Inkerinmaan asutus ja väestö 1618–1700’, pp. 73–74. 5 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, pp. 48, 83–90; Kujala, ‘Sweden’s Russian Lands’, pp. 550–51, 559–63. 6 For the concept unruly borderland, see Baud and van Schendel, ‘Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands’, pp. 219, 227–29.

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Figure 10.1. Fortress plan for Jama from 1645 (today Kingisepp), north is to the right of the plan. The fortress was situated along the Luga river and consisted during the Swedish rule also of a small town-like community (Sw. hakelvärk). Source: Utländska stad- och fästningsplaner, Swedish Military Archives, Stockholm.

Administration Before the Peace Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617, the region that became Ingria was not a well-defined territory. Most of the region belonged to the Vodskaia province (Vodskaia piatina) in the Novgorod region of the Muscovite state. In the Peace Treaty, Russia actually ceded the counties of Ivangorod, Jama, Kopor´e, and Nöteborg (Oreshek) to Sweden, not Ingria. In this way, Ingria developed into a region through the Peace of Stolbovo.7 Ingria was not part of the actual realm (riket), which comprised the core areas of Sweden and Finland, but was instead governed as a province. It was not integrated into the actual realm immediately after the Peace Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617, as previous research often claims. The objective of the Swedish central government was rather to organize the administration of Ingria as flexibly as

7 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, pp. 48–50; Eng, Det svenska väldet, pp. 150–60.

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possible.8 In fact, the embodiment of Ingria is a quite typical example of state formation. Integrative actions stemmed usually from the need for concrete actions in critical situations.9 Nonetheless, the rights of Ingria in the Swedish conglomerate state were relatively similar to those of the core areas, at least when compared to Sweden’s German and Baltic provinces. The inhabitants of Ingria were under Swedish law but, on the other hand, they were not represented in the Swedish Diet. Moreover, con‐ scriptions for the army were not im‐ posed in Ingria. Consequently, Ingria belonged to a middle category com‐ pared to the other Swedish provinces. Another special feature in Ingria, as well as in Kexholm County, was taxa‐ Figure 10.2. Coat of arms of Ingria, tion. It was based on a non-fixed rent, embroidered to the funeral of Gustavus in which the taxable property and Adolphus. Photo: Helena Bonnevier, crops of the peasants were assessed Livrustkammaren/SHM. annually. Ingria differed also confes‐ sionally. A large part of the population professed the Orthodox faith. Even though the Swedish Crown tried to convert the Orthodox population to Lutheranism throughout the seventeenth century, it did not succeed in integrating the Ortho‐ dox peasants into the realm.10

The Traumatic Rupture War When war-torn Ingria was rebuilt in the years immediately after the Treaty of Stol‐ bovo, the so-called Russian bayors (ryssbajorer) had various intermediary assign‐ ments, for example in border issues and religious matters. This group consisted of a dozen of families belonging to the Muscovite service class gentry, which entered

8 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, pp. 57–63 with references. 9 Villstrand, Sveriges historia, pp. 147–48; Gustafsson, Makt och människor, pp. 115, 146. 10 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, pp. 55–58, 104–06; Gustafsson, ‘Sverige som partner’, pp. 14–15, 22; Katajala, Suurvallan rajalla, pp. 13–20, 224–38.

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Swedish service during the Ingrian War (1610–1617) in exchange for grants of land in Ingria and incorpora‐ tion into the Swedish nobility.11 Still, the first decades of Swedish rule in Ingria were quite unstable. Large parts of the province were leased to tax farmers and the popula‐ tion number was low. However, Ingria seems to have been experiencing a rel‐ atively stable phase in the 1640s and 1650s. Trade picked up both in Narva as well as in the newly founded town of Nyen, located in the same place that Saint Petersburg is located today. Narva was the most important port for Russian transit trade in the Gulf of Finland, while Nyen became an es‐ Figure 10.3. Coat of arms of the bayor sential part for the trade between family Pereswetoff-Morath. Image: north-western Russia and Stockholm. Riddarhuset. In the countryside, the manors were quite productive. However, this minor economic boom came to an abrupt end with the Russo-Swedish War of 1656– 1658 (part of the Second Northern War). Ingria was more or less completely de‐ stroyed during the war. This war was a major setback for the whole province and entire villages were decimated. In Finland this war is called ‘the rupture war’, meaning a crack or split, referring to the consequences of the war. Thousands of Orthodox peasants fled from Ingria to Russia during the fighting, which resulted in a dramatic change in the region’s demographic structure. They were replaced by Lutheran Finns. Thus, the Orthodox population became a minority in the province.12 The ethnic structure in Ingria remained like this right through to the beginning of the twentieth century.

11 Kepsu, ‘Integrating Russian Bayors’, pp. 132–40, 148; Kepsu, Mellan Moskva och Stockholm, pp. 57– 80. See also Pereswetoff-Morath’s article in this volume. 12 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, pp. 52–55; Sivonen, ‘Me inkerikot, vatjalaiset ja karjalaiset’, pp. 46– 47; Kotilaine, ‘The Significance of Russian Transit Trade’, pp. 574–88; Troebst, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung, pp. 158–66, 499–540.

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Integration and Centralization in the Late Seventeenth Century The Swedish provincial policy towards the eastern Baltic provinces (Ingria, Kex‐ holm County, Estonia, Livonia, and Ösel) was more or less passive in the middle of the seventeenth century. In the 1640s Queen Christina donated vast areas of land as fiefs to officers and officials, and soon all the cultivated land was in noble hands. In the late seventeenth century, however, the Crown started to impose more demands and heavier burdens on the provinces. The Crown also attempted to integrate Ingria more closely into the realm.13 The reduction of the estates formed the basis for Sweden’s integration and cen‐ tralization policy.14 In Ingria, a commission began reclaiming fiefs for the Crown in 1675. In the 1680s, the reduction was extended. In addition, tax farming was initiated. The administration of the manors was privatized and the job assigned to leaseholders (arrendatorer). The Ingrian nobility resisted the reduction, but Charles XI and the central government refused to cancel it. Instead, they decided to greatly decrease the political power of the Ingrian Noble Corporation.15 Other kinds of measures were also implemented in Ingria. They consisted mainly of administrative reforms in judicial and city administration. The integra‐ tion policy also included cultural homogenization. The most apparent example of this was a conversion policy towards the Orthodox population. It affected primarily the Izhorians and the Votes who professed the Orthodox faith, but spoke Finno-Ugrian languages. It is important to stress that centralization and integration were measures taken to strengthen Ingria’s fiscal self-support and to bolster its military strength. In the Swedish provincial policy, the most important financial aim was to prevent a province from being a fiscal burden to the central government. As far as the Swedish defensive strategy was concerned, it relied on strong fortresses in the eastern Baltic provinces. Since Ingria was a border province and served as a buffer zone, the governors constantly emphasized the need to strengthen the fortresses and garrisons. Consequently, the income that the state gained from the reduction and from initiating tax farming was almost entirely invested in Ingrian fortresses, above all Narva. Nevertheless, the central‐ ization policy stabilized the financial situation in the province.16 The people of Ingria reacted quite strongly to the effects of the centralization and unification policy. During the 1680s, there were numerous quarrels between peasants and Crown leaseholders. As already mentioned, the Crown did not

13 Laidre, Segern vid Narva, p. 37. For an overview of the Swedish provincial policy, see Gustafsson, ‘Sverige som partner’, pp. 13–22. 14 Naber, Motsättningarnas Narva, p. 120. 15 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, pp. 111–42. 16 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, pp. 76–82, 92–100, 141–42, 154–55, 187–88, 292, 302–05; Sivonen, ‘Me inkerikot, vatjalaiset ja karjalaiset’; Upton, Charles XI and the Swedish Absolutism, p. 179; Laidre, Segern vid Narva, pp. 34–36.

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create a tax collection system of its own after the reduction, instead the adminis‐ tration of the manors was privatized to leaseholders. Thus, the leaseholders were responsible for the collection of taxes and, in a way, functioned as the acting authority for the Crown. Tax farmers controlled their subordinated peasants more firmly and had an interest in collecting the taxes as stringently as possible, otherwise their own economy would be at risk.17 Tax farming, the non-fixed rent, the obligation to provide statute labour and the arbitrariness of the manorial officials irritated the peasants. Moreover, the Orthodox population of Ingria protested against the conversion policy. As a consequence, a great number of complaints from Ingria were handed to the authorities in the mid-1680s. In addition, the peasants used many forms of illegal resistance ranging from collective strikes to violent assaults and even minor riots. The authorities investigated the quarrels thoroughly. The leaders of the peasants were convicted and given heavy sentences, but their contribution led to modifications of the taxation system and also affected the way in which tax farming was regulated. Moreover, the actions of the peasants moderated the Crown’s religious policy. To sum up, peasant unrest in Ingria was directly caused by the problems connected with the manorial economy. However, tax farming provided a connecting link between peasant unrest and the Crown’s centralization and unification policy, in other words the state building process.18

Commerce and Trade The position and significance of Ingria in the Swedish Kingdom can also be exam‐ ined through the development of commerce and trade. For Sweden, controlling trade in the Baltic Sea was one of the most important objectives during its ‘Age of Greatness’. A strong state protected trade, which in turn generated income to the state.19 Sweden’s central government tried to steer the transit trade between Russia and Western Europe through the Ingrian towns of Nyen and Narva, away from the trading routes from Archangel and the White Sea. The so-called Derivation policy was an economic programme planned by Gustavus Adolphus and Axel Oxenstierna. The foundation of Nyen was directly connected to the Derivation policy. Both Narva and Nyen had an excellent location for trading purposes, with

17 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, pp. 141–45, 305. Compare Katajala, Nälkäkapina, pp. 88, 121–23. 18 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen. The actions of the peasants, which were partly successful, can be regarded as state building from below. For the concept, see Dørum, Hallenberg, and Katajala, ‘Repertoires of State Building’. 19 Kepsu, ‘Stad och stat’, pp. 463, 475; Glete, ‘Cities, State Formation and the Protection of Trade’, pp. 14–15; Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce, pp. 30–31.

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broad hinterlands and navigable waterways along strategic trade routes extending all the way to north-western Russia and Karelia.20 The commercial aims of the Crown were partly fulfilled in the late seventeenth century. The central government tried to improve the conditions for trade through different kinds of tax and customs relief measures. The commercial policy was yet another way for the Crown to strengthen Ingria fiscally. Actually, the eastern part of the Baltic Sea evolved into a free trading zone as Nyen, Narva, and Reval constituted a common customs region with low custom tariffs. Political agreements with Russia and the Netherlands also paved the way for commercial development. The economic boom in Nyen, as well as in Narva, was based on timber exports. There was a great demand for timber and other shipbuilding material (naval stores) in Western Europe. Trade conditions for neutral states like Sweden improved particularly by the Nine Years’ War (1688–1697) between France on one side, and the Netherlands and England on the other side. With the help of Dutch capital and professionals new fine-blade sawmills and shipyards were established along the Narva and Neva rivers in order to increase timber shipments to the Netherlands. The economic development attracted, all in all, quite a lot of immigrants to the Ingrian towns, in particular German merchants. Their commercial experience and valuable transnational networks to Continental Europe further boosted the transit trade. Because of fiscal reasons, the Crown supported the immigration of merchants and technological specialists, as well as the founding of manufactures. Consequently, timber exports, shipping and shipbuilding greatly increased, particularly in the 1690s.21 Narva and Nyen were judicially integrated Swedish towns and followed Swedish city law. Still, the Crown did not control them as closely as the towns in the core areas and the burghers were not represented in the Swedish Diet. The elite burghers were quite powerful, in particular in Narva, but the Crown restricted their political power in the city councils to some degree.22 In both towns, however, military and economic factors were intertwined, as in many com‐ mercially important border cities. The strategic position of Narva and Nyen for trade and military purposes was equally important, as they represented different sides of the same coin. This appears clearly in a resolution made by Charles XI in 1679. The fortress of Nyenskans was to be strengthened in order to secure the

20 Kepsu, ‘Stad och stat’, pp. 462–64; Tarkiainen and Tarkiainen, Provinsen bortom havet, pp. 280–86; Küng, ‘Die Entwicklung der Stadt Nyen’, p. 92; Kotilaine, Russia’s Foreign Trade, pp. 145–78; Troebst, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung. 21 Kepsu, ‘Stad och stat’, pp. 480–86; Tarkiainen and Tarkiainen, Provinsen bortom havet, pp. 281–86; Küng, ‘Die schwedische Ostseepolitik’; Zetterberg, Viron historia, pp. 215, 225–28; Åström, From Tar to Timber, pp. 30–31, 44–46. 22 Kepsu, ‘Stad och stat’, pp. 486–92; Sandberg, ‘The State and the Integration’, pp. 22–24; Küng, ‘Die Entwicklung der Stadt Nyen’, p. 91; Naber, Motsättningarnas Narva, pp. 120–41. Restrictions included quotas regarding the members in the city council. Half of them were supposed to be ‘Swedes’, which limited the political power of foreign merchants. In addition, the Swedish language was to be used during court sessions.

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Kingdom, but also to increase trade.23 The military presence secured the precon‐ ditions for trade. At the same time, strong and wealthy burghers benefited the Crown, for example by generating customs incomes and providing possibilities to loan money in times of crisis. Indeed, some of the merchants from Nyen proved to be important creditors for the Swedish army and navy during the Great Northern War.24

Ingria under Swedish Rule Ingria had a pivotal military importance for Sweden first and foremost as a buffer zone against Russia. The Ingrian fortresses were supposed to protect Finland as well as the Baltic provinces from a Russian attack. Consequently, Sweden’s cen‐ tralization and unification policy, which peaked in the middle of the 1680s, aimed particularly at strengthening its military presence in Ingria. A strong military presence was also essential for securing the preconditions of trade and increasing revenues to the Crown through custom duties and licent tolls. However, the Swedish commercial policy in a way posed a security risk to Sweden and Ingria. As the profitable transit trade turned more and more away from the Archangel trade route to the Baltic Sea, the Ingrian towns became more lucrative for Tsar Peter I. As earlier research has pointed out, conquering Ingria became the main objective for Peter I in the Great Northern War.25 One could say that Ingria can be considered simultaneously as a Swedish, Finnish, German or Baltic (Livonian) region. In the 1670s and 1680s, the Crown attempted to integrate Ingria more closely within the realm. The Crown was nevertheless not strong enough to carry out a coherent integration process, which is clearly demonstrated by the initiation of tax farming. Thus, Ingria was still treated as a border province, situated in the crossroads of the Baltic (Livonian), Finnish-Swedish, Karelian, and Russian cultural spheres. During Swedish rule it occupied a continuously changing position between the actual realm and the provinces. The intermediary position of Ingria appears, for example, with regard to commerce and the administration of the Ingrian towns. It is evident that the Swedish state often appeared weak when it tried to enforce its sovereignty in Ingria. The first decades after the Peace Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617 were unstable. A promising development in the 1640s and 1650s came to an abrupt end with the traumatic ‘rupture war’. In the late-seventeenth century Crown officials succeeded, for example, in increasing revenues, but on

23 Charles XI’s resolution, 4 June 1679, in Bonsdorff, ‘Nyen och Nyenskans’, pp. 479–84. 24 Kepsu, ‘The Burghers of Nyen as Creditors’. 25 Scheltjens, ‘The Influence of Spatial Change’, pp. 115–17.

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the other hand the successful integration of the Orthodox peasants into the realm remained an unresolved issue. In addition, authorities faced constant difficulties in controlling the peasants, particularly because of their use of the border drawn in Stolbovo in 1617.

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Works Cited Åström, Sven-Erik, From Tar to Timber. Studies in Northeast European Forest Exploitation and Foreign Trade 1660–1860, Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, 85 (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1988) Baud, Michiel, and Willem van Schendel, ‘Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands’, Journal of World History, 8 (1997), 211–42 Bonsdorff, Carl von, ‘Nyen och Nyenskans. Historisk skildring’, in Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennicae, 18 (1891), 349–504 Dørum, Knut, Hallenberg, Mats, and Kimmo Katajala, ‘Repertoires of State Building from below in the Nordic Countries, c. 1500–1800’, in Bringing the People Back In. State Building from Below in the Nordic Countries c. 1500–1800, ed. by Knut Dørum, Mats Hallenberg, and Kimmo Katajala (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 3–22 Eng, Torbjörn, Det svenska väldet. Ett konglomerat av uttrycksformer och begrepp från Vasa till Bernadotte, Studia Historica Upsaliensia, 201 (Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2001) Forsström, Oskar Adolf, Kuvaus Inkerinmaan oloista Ruotsinvallan aikana I (Sortavala: Sortavalan Kirjapaino-yhtiö, 1890) Glete, Jan, ‘Cities, State Formation and the Protection of Trade in Northern Europe, 1200– 1700’, in The Dynamics of Economic Culture in the North Sea and Baltic Region: In the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Period, ed. by Hanno Brand and Leos Müller (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2007), pp. 13–23 Gustafsson, Harald, Makt och människor. Europeisk statsbildning från medeltiden till franska revolutionen (Gothenburg: Makadam, 2010) ———, ‘Sverige som partner 1319–1905. Ett perspektiv’, Historisk tidskrift, 136 (2016), 3– 31 Katajala, Kimmo, Nälkäkapina. Veronvuokraus ja talonpoikainen vastarinta Karjalassa 1683– 1697, Historiallisia Tutkimuksia, 185 (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1994) ———, Suurvallan rajalla. Ihmisiä Ruotsin ajan Karjalassa, Historiallinen Arkisto, 118 (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2005) Kepsu, Kasper, Den besvärliga provinsen. Reduktion, skattearrendering och bondeoroligheter i det svenska Ingermanland under slutet av 1600-talet, Bidrag till kännedom av Finlands natur och folk, 193 (Helsingfors: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 2014) ———, ‘Integrating Russian Bayors in the Swedish Nobility’, in Foreign Drums Beating. Transnational Experiences in Early Modern Europe, ed. by Björn Forsén and Mika Hakkarainen, Acta Byzantina Fennica, 5 (Helsinki: The Finnish Society for Byzantine Studies, 2017), pp. 129–51 ———, Mellan Moskva och Stockholm. De svenska ryssbajorerna i Ingermanland 1478–1722 (Helsingfors: Otava, 2015) ———, ‘Stad och stat. Nyen, migrationen och borgarna under 1600-talets andra hälft’, Historisk Tidskrift för Finland, 104 (2019), 461–92

inGria as a swedish ProVinCe in The seVenTeenTh CenTury

———, ‘The Burghers of Nyen as Creditors and Suppliers in the Great Northern War (1700–1714)’, in Civilians and military supply in early modern Finland, ed. by Petri Talvitie and Juha-Matti Granqvist (Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 2021), pp. 87– 117 Kotilaine, Jarmo T., Russia’s Foreign Trade and Economic Expansion in the Seventeenth Century, The Northern World, 13 (Leiden: Brill, 2005) ———, ‘The Significance of Russian Transit Trade for the Swedish Eastern Baltic Ports in the Seventeenth Century’, Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung, 49 (2000), 556–89 Kujala, Antti, ‘Sweden’s Russian Lands, Ingria and Kexholm Province, 1617 — c. 1670: The Interaction of the Crown with Its New Subjects’, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 64 (2016), 545–74 Küng, Enn, ‘Die Entwicklung der Stadt Nyen im zweiten Viertel des 17. Jahrhunderts’, in Forschungen zur baltischen Geschichte, i, ed. by Mati Laur and Kersten Brüggeman (Tartu: Akadeemiline Ajalooselts, 2006), pp. 82–107 ———, ‘Die schwedische Ostseepolitik, die internationale Handelskonjunktur und die Entstehung der Narvaer Handelsflotte in der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts’, in Forschungen zur baltischen Geschichte, iii, ed. by Mati Laur and Kersten Brüggeman (Tartu: Akadeemiline Ajalooselts, 2008), pp. 87–102 Laidre, Margus, Segern vid Narva. Början till en stormakts fall, trans. by Enel Melberg (Stockholm: Natur och kultur, 1996) Müller, Leos, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce. The Swedish Consular Service and Longdistance Shipping, 1720–1815, Studia Historica Upsaliensia, 213 (Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2004) Naber, Jaak, Motsättningarnas Narva. Statlig svenskhetspolitik och tyskt lokalvälde i ett statsreglerat samhälle, 1581–1704, Opuscula Historica Upsaliensa, 15 (Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 1995) Öhlander, Carl, Bidrag till kännedom om Ingermanlands historia och förvaltning, i: 1617– 1645 (Uppsala: [n. pub.], 1898) Roberts, Michael, The Swedish Imperial Experience 1560–1718 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) Saloheimo, Veijo, ‘Inkerinmaan asutus ja väestö 1618–1700’, in Inkeri. Historia, kansa, kulttuuri, ed. by Pekka Nevalainen and Hannes Sihvo, Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seuran toimituksia, 547 (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 1991), pp. 67–82 Sandberg, Robert, ‘The State and the Integration of the Towns of the Provinces of the Swedish Baltic Empire’, in Baltic Towns and Their Inhabitants. Aspects on Early Modern Towns in the Baltic Area, ed. by Kekke Stadin (Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, 2003), pp. 10–26 Scheltjens, Werner, ‘The Influence of Spatial Change on Operational Strategies in EarlyModern Dutch Maritime Shipping. A Case-Study on Dutch Maritime Shipping in the Gulf of Finland and on Archangel 1703–1740’, International Journal of Maritime History, 23.1 (2011), 115–47 Sivonen, Mika, ‘Me inkerikot, vatjalaiset ja karjalaiset’. Uskonnollinen integrointi ja ortodoksisen vähemmistön identiteetin rakentuminen Ruotsin Inkerissä 1680–1702, Bibliotheca Historica, 111 (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2007)

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Tarkiainen, Kari, and Ülle Tarkiainen, Provinsen bortom havet. Estlands svenska historia 1561–1710, Skrifter utgivna av Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 778 (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, Atlantis, 2013) Troebst, Stefan, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung. Schwedische Moskaupolitik 1617‒1661, Veröffentlichen des Osteuropa-Instituts München: Reihe Forschungen zum Ostseeraum, 2 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997) Upton, Anthony F., Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) Villstrand, Nils Erik, Sveriges historia 1600–1721 (Stockholm: Norstedts, 2011) Zetterberg, Seppo, Viron historia, Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seuran toimituksia, 1118 (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2007)

STEfAN HERfURTH 

The Treaty of Stolbovo and Its Impact on Narva’s Urban Development

Russian Rule 1558–1581 and Swedish Rule 1581–1704 In 1558 Tsar Ivan IV captured Narva from the Teutonic Order, and thus for the first time gave Moscow free access to the shore of the Baltic Sea. The consequences for the region were far-reaching. Since Reval feared the ruin of its traditional trade and the loss of its middleman’s profits, in 1560 the town offered to put itself under Swedish protection. King Eric XIV of Sweden accepted the offer and put a ban on trade with Narva, directing the merchants to do business in Reval or Viborg. The Swedish empire in the Baltic Sea region continued to increase. The conquest of Narva in 1581 by Swedish troops under Pontus De la Gardie marked the end of Ivan’s most cherished commercial ambitions on the Gulf of Finland. Swedish rule at the Narva River was to last for more than 120 years and changed the previous shape and the legal status of the towns of Narva and, just across the river, Ivangorod. Directly after the conquest spacious construction works took place. Four new bastions were constructed in Narva by building contractor Peter Hertig.1 The capture of Narva gave the Swedish crown the possibility not to accept or preserve the existing privileges of the town. The town lost its previous autonomy and had to submit to Swedish law. Simultaneously the Swedish crown saw the city as another step for its mercantilist policy in the interchange of commodities with the Russian market. The shift of trade routes, the so-called derivation, from Russian cities (e.g. Archangel and Pskov) to Swedish-controlled ports was highly favored in order to increase the tax income of the Swedish harbour cities.2 The favouring of Narva was the answer to the shift of the Russian staple market to Pskov in 1583 and the attempts to restructure commercial relations. The Treaty of Teusina in 1595 recognized the Swedish rule over all of Estonia and stabilized the territorial and commercial situation eastward to the Narva River (today the border between Estonia and Russia). 1 Karling, Narva. Eine baugeschichtliche Untersuchung, p. 76. 2 Troebst, Handelskontrolle –‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung, pp. 122–28. Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 219–234 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133606

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Figure 11.1a. Ivangorod fortress in the travelogue of Anthonis Goeteeris, Iournael Der Legatie ghedaen inde jaren 1615 ende 1616, published in 1619. The fortress, established by Ivan III in 1492, faces the Herman Castle in Narva on the other bank of the Narva river. In 1612, the Swedes conquered the fortress. Source: The Finnish Heritage Agency, Helsinki. (Goeteeris gives eye-witness reports from his visit to Narva and Ivangorod).

With the Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617 the devastating Ingrian War ended, and new as well as old Swedish ambitions made themselves felt. Russia lost the mouth of the Neva and its territorial access to the Baltic Sea by a closure of the Swedish circle around the Gulf of Finland. The Narva became merely the frontier between two Swedish provinces, Estonia and Ingria. It was hoped that the fierce competi‐ tion between Narva and Ivangorod would cease. The old trade lines with the Tsardom of Russia were reinstalled as direct trade via the Baltic Sea had to shift to alternative routes. At the same time the Swedish crown became aware that the possession of fortresses was necessary to protect the spit of land between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipus.3 The Treaty of Stolbovo made the commercial return of Novgorod more than a mere option (cf. articles 14 and 15), Reval was in the position that its medieval privileges were preserved and unchangeable, but Narva which had been taken iure belli could easily be beaten down by the Swedish crown. Narva’s hinterland was

3 Erpenbeck and Küng, Narvaer Bürger- und Einwohnerbuch 1581–1704, pp. 18–19.

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Figure 11.1b. Offensive plan to capture Ivangorod fortress in 1612. Source: Sveriges krig, Swedish Military Archives, Stockholm.

however a transit zone for trade and a pool for naval stores that were required in all of Europe.4 Reval, Narva, and Nyen sought to provide the basis for a new Swedish commercial engagement in the Gulf of Finland, because these three cities had different meteorological conditions that affected the trade mobility especially in winter. On the other side, by reaching more eastward, depopulation became a serious problem for the new Swedish provinces, and the lack of people in the moment of expansion of power became one of the major concerns for the Swedish crown.5 In article 8 of the treaty are listed those groups who had the right to move to Russia. Monks, nobles, sons of boyars, as well as burghers had the right to leave the Swedish province with wives, children, servants and all of their property within a fortnight of the treaty being made public. The priests and peasants had to stay, however — but could of course flee the country. The Swedes simply had to make offers that would persuade the inhabitants to stay and infuse new life into the plans of making Ingria a centre for the trade between Russia and Western Europe.

4 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 229. 5 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 218.

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Staple Rights of Narva and Ivangorod New trade rules were promulgated by King Gustavus Adolphus on 12 October 1617.6 The staple right (ius emporii) was given to Narva and some weeks later to Ivangorod that was recognized as a city but was allowed to keep its traditional jurisdiction. In 1618, Swedish town right was introduced in Narva as the centre of administration of the province of Ingria. In 1621 Narva became subordinated to the province of Livonia in Riga and shifted in 1629 again to the province of Estonia in Dorpat until 1642. The Swedish Governor was based in the Castle of Narva and stayed there even after the constitution of the new province of Ingria-Kexholm (1642–1681). The fact that Sweden had got Ingria as a frontier province and excluded direct Russian trade from the Baltic Sea harbour towns had an enormous impact on Narva and Ivangorod which became military bulwarks and hubs for political and commercial influence. Since the new Swedish policy required preservation of the population in the provinces, consolidation of trade and expansion of military power in the region, Ivangorod received the Swedish town right and the staple status as inland city (uppstad). Through the royal enactment of 12 October 1617 the staple right was defined, for Narva with active staple rights as staple town (stapelstad) and for Ivangorod with passive staple rights as inland city (uppstad), i.e. foreign trade had to pass Narva, a stipulation that the Novgorod merchants regarded as a way to harass them and place obstacles in their way. Also trade rules with foreign merchants were defined.7 At the same time the unimpeded worship of Greek Orthodoxy was assured to the Russian residents of Ivangorod for strategic reasons as another argument to retain the sparse population and to stop them from emigrating.8 By virtue of the stipulations of the Treaty of Stolbovo, Ivangorod had thus emerged from Narva’s shadow and became an independent town with staple and town rights. However two neighbouring cities with similar economy but no common administration meant a potential for conflicts, and the competition between the merchants of the two cities became increasingly bitter over time. The conferring of town rights to Ivangorod facilitated the implementation of Swedish legislation in both places. The Treaty of Stolbovo had raised hopes to redeploy maritime trade with Moscow via Narva and Ivangorod to new and even more comprehensive heights. For this reason the Swedish crown regarded it as a matter of prime importance to dissuade the business-minded Russian merchants from emigration towards the east. To achieve the ambitious goals Ivangorod was

6 Küng, ‘Die rechtliche Lage der Stadt Narva’, p. 355. 7 Heckscher, Sveriges ekonomiska historia från Gustav Vasa, i, 240–53; ii, 672–75. 8 Ingria nevertheless remained sparsely populated. In 1664 the population was counted as 15,000. Swedish attempts to introduce Lutheranism were opposed by the Orthodox who were obliged to attend Lutheran services, although converts were promised grants and tax reductions.

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released from taxes and grain levy over the following three years as a subsidy.9 The fact that a new storage yard was established on the opposite side of the Narva River was contrary to the basic intentions of the Swedish regional trade policy and the mercantile strategies of Gustavus Adolphus, especially since Ivangorod only held the status of an inland city by sharing the staple with Narva.10 As such trade was to be divided between the two independent towns, the Russian merchants were obliged to trade their eastern based products in Ivangorod. In return, the merchants from the West should weigh and declare their goods in Narva, which was the only harbour for shipping of export goods. The implemen‐ tation of this diametrically counter-rotational policy facilitated the potential for conflict between the competing trade networks, thus exposing the inhabitants of both cities to trade with the respective foreign merchants without arbitration. For foreign merchants purchasing goods, customs clearance and export opportunities became more difficult since all export goods had to pass Narva. Due to this fact foreign merchants tried to encourage commercial operations with Russians as agents. Thus in a decree by Queen Christina of 12 September 1642 we learn that the City of Narva had appealed against the fact that merchants from Lübeck and Holland and other foreign merchants provide the Ivangorodians with money to travel up and down the province and buy up goods.11

The Merger of Narva and Ivangorod Stimulated by economic inducements, the moving in of foreign merchants, for example from Great Britain and the Netherlands, was meant to lead to an increase of the urban population and thereby to a consolidation of the city in the face of the constant Russian doubts and threats towards the Swedish crown. Relative to this, the urban character and the urban attractiveness of the two settlements were highly different. Whereas Narva could be characterized as a medieval fortified town, Ivangorod could be described as an unfortified trading spot or rather as a Russian village, which had even been burned down during the last war, when the population had to seek shelter in the nearby fortress of Ivangorod. After its demo‐ lition in 1617 the Ivangorod settlement was rapidly reconstructed with traditional timber houses and the military protection by defence works was postponed in favor of the construction of private buildings, since trade had to be revived as fast as possible.12 The buildings were the premise for the presence of merchants on the shore of the Narva River, since the transit trade with Moscow was the principal source of income for the inhabitants of Ivangorod.

9 10 11 12

Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 217. Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 216. Quoted from Hansen, Geschichte der Stadt Narva, p. 96. Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 284.

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Figure 11.2. The waterfall in the River Narva south of the city of Narva. Goods from Pskov and Dorpat had to be reloaded and transported overland to Narva. Olearius tells us that when the water that plunges down from the cliff is thrown up again drop by drop, rainbows form in clear sunshine, ‘welches lustig anzusehen’. Lund University Library.

The emigration of the Greek Orthodox population could only be prevented by the assurance of their privileges. In the period of self-governance of Ivangorod the starost and the sotski were elected as supreme officers of the town.13 They were supported by a city council, a committee, which was also known as council court. The actual function of Ivangorod’s self-government created some difficulties, since the Swedish government first of all had to be convinced of the real existence of a council, a mayor and a city hall. In his reply to the Ivangorodians’ appeal, the Gov‐ ernor, Nils Assarsson, spoke disparagingly about a stuga, a small house, where the people assembled when need arose.14 After the issue of trade specific assurances and privileges from the Swedish crown in the starting years, religious questions had then become matters of controversy in the relation between the Protestants in Narva and the Greek Orthodox in Ivangorod. Jacob De la Gardie had entered into

13 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 295. 14 Öhlander, Bidrag till kännedom om Ingermanlands historia och förvaltning, p. 86.

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a written agreement to guarantee the liberty of Greek Orthodox worship, which was exchanged for the real letter issued by Gustavus Adolphus on 28 November 1617.15 Thus the removal of Russian merchants was prevented. In a letter to Gus‐ tavus Adolphus, Jacob De la Gardie reported in 1617 that there were 178 citizens liable to taxation, thirty widows, and a few hundred poor persons in Ivangorod. Only ten rich merchants had left the city.16

Competition between Narva and Ivangorod As mentioned, Narva and Ivangorod were highly connected in terms of trade policy and functioned as specifically defined staple towns more or less success‐ fully, although conflicts and different interpretations of the rules were everyday occurrences, and competition and rivalry characterized the relationship of the two cities, which were completely separated from each other in terms of administrative and geographical structures and the interaction lacked a mutual transparency or a comprehensive urban cooperation. Moreover, the inherent conflicts and disputes were aggravated by the competition with Reval and the shift of trading routes to the state of Moscow.17 The autonomy of both cities was thus from the beginning distinguished by different complexities, which weakened them in their economic potential. Gustavus Adolphus had had plans to reconnect the cities of Ivangorod and Narva in terms of administration and trade policy. The early death of the King rendered an administrative solution impossible.18 The permanent conflicts between the two cities were not leading to a powerful dual command at the shore of the Narva River, because both towns fell more and more back on their privileges and felt themselves inferior to or even threatened by the opposite side. The prosperous Russian market place in Ivangorod was a particular thorn in the flesh of the merchants of Narva, since they had no possibility of controlling the local trade between their neighbours and the surrounding farmers, wherefore they tried to supervise this business more strictly and wanted to put end to it by a resolution of the Swedish crown. Another thorn was the permission the Russian merchants of Ivangorod had got to trade in Jama and Kopor´e.19 A first step to hamper Ivangorod’s position was taken in 1634 when the Narva council suggested the removal of the Russian guesthouse from Ivangorod to Narva. This request had already been sent to Johan Skytte in 1631, who wanted to pass it on to the King. At the same time the Narvanese petitioned for a merger of Ivangorod and Narva. From then on the politics of Narva was dominated by

15 Soom, ‘De ingermanländska städerna och freden i Stolbova 1617’, p. 41 and Rahvusahiiv (The National Archives of Estonia), EAA, 1646–1-2, fols 133–44. 16 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 289. 17 Kotilaine, Russia’s Foreign Trade, pp. 305–12. 18 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 220. 19 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 239.

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requests to the Swedish government to transfer the Russian trade into the city of Narva proper. They also demanded that the local trade of the Ivangorodians be controlled in order to prevent the alleged constant increase in prices through the Ivangorodians’ speculative buying and selling of agricultural products. To achieve this goal, the town rights of Ivangorod had to be rescinded, and in 1640 the City council of Narva lodged complaints to the Swedish government, listing the economic damages inflicted on them through the allegedly unfair competition of Ivangorod and demanding the cessation of Russian illegal trade. They called for the transfer of the Russian guesthouse and the grain market to Narva, as well as the confirmation of the Narvanese leasehold in eel fishing.20 With the centralization of the grain market to the Narva side it would still have been possible for the Russian population to trade with grain in Narva after the year 1640. The successful transfer of the grain market to Narva was only reported after 1642. At the same time the information was amended by the fact that around Ivangorod a palisade fence had been constructed, which was guarded by Narvanese gate keepers in order to relegate farmers and their grain to Narva.21 All attempts from the Russian side to abolish the restrictions by means of complaints and objections failed before the Swedish Crown. In addition the trade with herring and salt was in general reserved for the inhabitants of Narva.22 The attempts of the Russian inhabitants to mitigate the restrictions led to even more draconian sanctions, since the Narva citizenry acted with harshness against their odious competitor and desired the entirety of trade to be centralized in Narva. To reach this goal different scenarios were drafted in a memorandum. The fundamental complaint was the accusation that the merchants of Ivangorod in fact did not only trade with them but also with foreign funds and therefore contributed to the increase in prices in the countryside. The criticism about the conditions caused by Ivangorod was reinforced in several tours by delegations from Narva to Stockholm. The old request to move the Russians to the Narva side was accepted by the Swedish government in 1642 and contained a reference that the settlement should take place in the northern suburbia, where ‘mit Wissen und auf Anordnung des Gouverneurs Bauplätze angewiesen werden würden’.23 For the Russians all trade outside the city was prohibited and Ivangorod would be enclosed by a palisade fence. In October 1642 the pros and cons of the resettlement were discussed in the Council of the Realm: ‘Rix-Cantzleren mente, det de skulle transfereras: 1. Att de göra i Narfven handelen starckare och icke turbera hvar andre. 2. Om de stödja i

20 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, pp. 228–32. 21 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 238. 22 For more information on the dispute on herring and salt: Küng, ‘Konflikte zwischen Narva und Reval im Salz- und Heringshandel’, pp. 301–38. 23 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 237.

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hakelvercket24 på dem gifne privilegia, så äre de gifna civibus ac cætui hominum, non loco, allegerade i lijka fall exemplum a Romanis. 3. Är inthet gott att hafva dem allena ob molitiones och infidum ingenium’.25 (The Chancellor of the Realm [Axel Oxenstierna] was of the opinion that they [the people of Ivangorod] should be transferred: 1. To strengthen the trade in Narva and make them stop quarrelling with one another. 2. If they in the hakelverk rely on the privileges given to them [they should know that] they are given to the citizens and the community of people, not to the place, and he took an example from the Romans of a similar case. 3. It is not good to leave them alone, because of their intrigues and treacherous nature). The Council did not, however, come to a decision on that occasion. When the deliberations were resumed on 13 October and the privileges of the Ivangorodians of 1617 and 1640 had been read the Council decided to confirm the privileges and let them stay. The expected synergetic effect mentioned was positive for the trade and a competition for other cities was excluded. Additionally, civil rights were ensured to the Russians in the hakelverk, because it was better not to leave them to their own devices. The new plots of land on the Narva side would enable the Russians to pursue their professions, whereas they, because of the spatial closeness to the old town of Narva, were kept under a stricter control. The constraints and sanctions against the Russians continued, however. In 1644 the Narva city council was divided into three committees: for the administration of justice, for trade, and for finances and building.26 The large extension of the urban territory required administrative planning. The newly es‐ tablished trade and crafts committee demanded from the beginning new restraints against the Russians from Ivangorod, because the new inhabitants were until then not subject to the Narvanese craft statutes. These measures were part of the plans to make Narva administratively and culturally more Swedish.27

The Russian Population The hopes of the Russian population were raised for a break in the tightened situation because of the impending majority of Queen Christina and a long desired restoration of their privileges, originally written by her father, but already

24 Farm or small market town close to a fortified castle or a suburb surrounded by a fence (palisade). See Grimm and Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, s.v. hackelwerk. 25 Svenska Riksrådets Protokoll, ix, 412. 26 Karling, Narva, eine baugeschichtliche Untersuchung, p. 36. 27 Tuchtenhagen, Zentralstaat und Provinz im frühneuzeitlichen Nordosteuropa, p. 342 and Naber, Motsättningarnas Narva, p. 47.

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Figure 11.3. Narva (with Ivangorod) from south-west, 1696. a. the City of Narva, b. Narva Castle, c. Herman Tower, d. Ivangorod Fortress, e. Narva River. Finnish Heritage Agency.

disposed in 1642.28 In particular, the religious discrimination of the Russian popu‐ lation, based on the prohibition to appoint Russian priests from Novgorod or Pskov, led to a significant lack of Orthodox priests in the late 1630s and the early 1640s, so that the sacraments could not be administered.29 There was the risk that with the expiration of the worship privileges from 1617, the conflict between Narva and Ivangorod would be aggravated. The religious conflict lasted through‐ out the period, since the Russian population felt inferior in terms of religious prac‐ tice and the Swedish authorities paid no attention to their wishes. In this difficult religious and mercantile situation the Stockholm government decided for a final

28 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 241. 29 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, pp. 244–47.

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unification of Ivangorod and Narva with the declaration of Queen Christina’s ma‐ jority in 1644.30 Voluntary emigration since 1642 preceded this decision, which had been enforced until now with administrative pressure.31 The governor-general Karl Mörner (governor-general 1645–1651) was or‐ dered to communicate the basic conditions to the population of both cities.32 The wealthy and influential Russians in Ivangorod had to be persuaded to move to Narva to convince the other Russian inhabitants to follow their example. If the Russians would not voluntarily accept the relocation, the argument would be brought forward that the Swedish crown planned new fortifications on the Ivan‐ gorod side and that this would require the demolition of the Russian settlement. With this decision, the Swedish administration hoped to pursue the creation of a cultural and religious assimilation of the Russian population in Narva by stages. Seen from the Swedish and German perspective, the move raised the hope that the Russians would give up their specific peculiarities and customs and, influ‐ enced by the Lutherans around them, more easily change faith.33 The inhabitants of Ivangorod reacted in 1646 with several memoranda to Governor-general Karl Mörner, who sent the requests on to the Swedish government in Stockholm. The main content was about religious liberty, since the discrimination was seen as an essential threat to the Russian community. In the course of the relocation to Narva an assurance of freedom of religious worship was asked for. Two questions raised specifically were those of a priest from the Russian territory as well as a new church building in the Narvanese hakelverk.34 The ordination of a Russian priest from Moscow was categorically refused from Stockholm.35 The request for a new church building in the Narva suburb remained more or less unsettled, since the final planning and levelling of the new suburb was not completed until the end of the year 1646 when a hakelverk was demarcated downstream of the old Narva.

30 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 261. 31 ‘The Russians get the permission to construct their houses in the hakelverk of Narva’ (‘Die Russen bekommen die Erlaubniß sich im Narvschen Hakelwerk anzubauen’), in Hansen, Geschichte der Stadt Narva, p. 96. 32 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 272. 33 Letter from Queen Christina to the inhabitants of Ivangorod, 17 December 1645, and to Karl Mörner, 31 December 1645 (Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Riksregistraturet, vol. 229). 34 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 262. 35 When the Ivangorodians because of shortage of priests as early as at the turn of the year 1624–1625 had begged Gustavus Adolphus for permission to send their trainee priests to Novgorod to be ordained by the metropolitan, the King refused, but answered that they among the Orthodox in Ingria could nominate two persons to be ordained priests and one to be ordained metropolitan by the patriarch of Constantinople and he promised to pay for the journey to Constantinople. The patriarch, Cyril Lukaris (of Alexandria as Cyril III, of Constantinople as Cyril I), was well known in most of Europe, and a respected theologian, and it must have fired the King’s imagination to try to get him involved on the Swedish side in the Ingrian conflict. The plans led nowehere, however. It has been claimed that Lukaris strove for a reform of the Eastern Orthodox Church along Calvinist lines (cf. Isberg, Svensk segregations- och konversionspolitik i Ingermanland 1617–1704, pp. 32–33). He was glorified (i.e. canonized) in 2009.

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The right of ownership of the Ivangorod stronghold-church was guaranteed to the Russians. Since April 1638 many suggestions about the cancellation of Ivangorod’s city right had been discussed as a solution to the struggle over the Narva River.36 Axel Oxenstierna had from the very beginning been against granting city rights to Ivangorod. He had toyed with grander ideas, to connect the Russians’ removal from Ivangorod with expansion of Narva. In a meeting of the Council of the Realm he said ‘att ibland annat castel han hade bygt i luften, var och thet, att Hans Excellence haffver hafft intention att bestella för Konungerne i Sverige tvenne residentier, then eena i Stocholm. Den andra i Narven’37 (that among other castles he had built in the air [i.e. dreams he had had] was his plan to build for the Kings of Sweden two seats of government, one in Stockholm and another in Narva). Another councillor, Field Marshall Wrangel, felt that Narva should be fortified and that the Russians who lived in Ivangorod should move to some other place, either into the city of Narva to coalesce with the other nations or find somewhere else to live.38

Planning for the New City In 1642 rumours spread that the inhabitants of Ivangorod had to move and that they would get plots to build on around Narva. Johan von Rodenburg, Livonian engineer-general, presented first drafts for an extension of Narva’s urban structure.39 For strategic purposes he demanded the demolition of all civilian buildings on the Ivangorod side and the resettlement of the Russian population to Jama and Kopor´e.40 Another plan, by the inspector of Livonian and Ingrian customs Peter Heltscher, included the resettlement of Ivangorod’s Russian population to Nyen.41 In 1644 the first Swedish mayor, Jacob Fougdt, arrived in Narva, and the merger process was carried through.42 The proposal that only the rich merchants should come to Narva and the others leave the town had already been discussed in the years before. The rich merchants of Narva wanted for their part to obtain a clear insight into the Russians’ circumstances and their funds and savings and the German merchants tried to find a way to control their Russian competitors, so the new citizens of Narva were to get land in the hakelverk and construct new

Svenska Riksrådets Protokoll, vii, 201. Soom, ‘Die merkantilistische Wirtschaftspolitik Schwedens’, pp. 190–92. Svenska Riksrådets Protokoll, viii, 126. Eimer, Die Stadtplanung im schwedischen Ostseereich, p. 296. Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 281. Memorandum from P. Heltscher in 1641, undated, together with a letter to B. Oxenstierna from 5 February 1641 to the Swedish Government (Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Livonica II, vol. 69). 42 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 268.

36 37 38 39 40 41

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buildings with a refund for their old houses.43 The Russians were unconvinced that the decision would stand and they procrastinated as long as possible trying to prevent any move on the offer. The fear of losing the privileges of 1617 was of prime importance. The guarantee to worship was at the core of the discussion due to the lack of trust toward the Swedish crown, for all complaints had been disregarded in Stockholm. In the time that followed another new urban plan for Narva and its new suburbs was drafted, by Georg von Schwengeln. Due to this development rumors popped up that the move to Narva would be full of disadvantages and discrimina‐ tory features for the Russians and disregard their rights. On the other side the extension of the city ground required the relinquishment and expropriation of property for the new inhabitants, as Queen Christina decided at the turn of the year 1645–1646 that the Ivangorodians had to leave their homes and move to Narva to the west of the river. In August 1646 a letter from Governor Hans Drake, dated 15 July 1646, Narva, reported that Ivangorod had been hit by ‘een heftigh vådeldh’ (a severe fire).44 The Russian side required a representative in the city council to preserve their equal rights. They got two representatives and the point of moving was set to 1 January 1648.45 The questions about the construction grounds and the location of the suburbs were still unsolved and under discussion.46 The harshest criticism was about the tiny size and poor location of the properties. For strategic reasons the buildings ought to have been constructed of stone, but due to the fact that the Russians had doubts about the force of the rules, they contented themselves with timbered buildings. The moving went on slowly and the Russians were under pressure to accelerate the development. In 1650 a letter from Governor General Karl Mörner to Queen Christina affirmed the ending of the removal process.47 In 1640 there had been about three hundred merchants and artisans in Ivangorod, all Russians. The total number of inhabitants in 1641–1642 was approximately seven hundred, to be compared with 1100 in Narva and nine hundred in Nyen. Ivangorod can thus be considered to have been a town with reasonable prospects. The consequences of the Treaty of Stolbovo affected the urban development of both towns for more than thirty years and set its traces for the next few centuries. It was to take more than three hundred years before Ivangorod got its city rights back, in 1954.

43 44 45 46 47

Soom, Die Politik Schwedens bezüglich des russischen Transithandels, p. 47. Svenska Riksrådets Protokoll, xi, 433 with n. 1. Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, pp. 273–81. Ahlberg, Svensk Stadsplanering, p. 352. Letter from Karl Mörner to Queen Christina, 10 January 1650 (Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Livonica ii, vol. 171).

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Works Cited Manuscripts and Archival Sources Rahvusarhiiv (The National Archives of Estonia), EAA, fund 1646: Narva magistraat Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Livonica II, vol. 69: Skrivelser från Bengt (Bengtsson) Oxenstierna 1641–1643 ———, Livonica II, vol. 171: Skrivelser från Karl Mörner 1645–1651 ———, Riksregistraturet, vol. 229: Oktober–december 1645 Primary Sources Goeteeris, Anthonis, Iournael Der Legatie ghedaen inde Iaren 1615. ende 1616. by de Edele, Gestrenge, Hoochgheleerde Heeren; Heer Reynhout van Brederode … Dirck Bas … ende Aelbrecht Ioachimi … Te samen by de Hooch-ghemelte Heeren Staten Generael voornoemt, afghesonden aende Grootmachtichste Coninghen van Sweden ende Denemercken; mitsgaders aenden Groot-Vorst van Moscovien, Keyser van Ruschlandt. Ende namentlick op den Vreden-handel tuschen den Hoochghemelten Coninck van Sweden ter eenre, ende den Groot-Vorst van Moschovien ter anderer sijde. Inhoudende cort ende waerachtich verhael, vande seer seltsame ende wonderbaerlicke ghesteltenisse des landts van Ruschlandt, ende de seer moeyelicke ende beswaerlicke Reyse aldaer gevallen (The Hague: Meuris, 1619) Olearius, Adam, Auszführliche Beschreibung Der Kundbaren Reyse Nach Muscow und Persien / So durch gelegenheit einer Holsteinischen Gesandschafft von Gottorff auß an Michael Fedorowitz den grossen Zaar in Muscow / und Schah Sefi König in Persien geschehen. Worinnen die gelegenheit derer Orter und Länder / durch welche die Reyse gangen / als Liffland / Rußland / Tartarien / Meden und Persien / sampt dero Einwohner Natur / Leben / Sitten / Hauß- Welt- und Geistlichen Stand mit fleiß auffgezeichnet / und mit vielen meist nach dem Leben gestelleten Figuren gezieret / zu befinden, 3rd ed. (Schleswig: Holwein, 1663) Svenska riksrådets protokoll, Handlingar rörande Sveriges historia (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1878–) Secondary Studies Ahlberg, Nils, Svensk stadsplanering. Arvet från stormaktstiden, resurs i dagens stadsutveckling (Stockholm: Forskningsrådet Formas, 2012) Eimer, Gerhard, Die Stadtplanung im schwedischen Ostseereich 1600–1715. Mit Beiträgen zur Geschichte der Idealstadt (Stockholm: Svenska Bokförlaget, 1961) Erpenbeck, Dirk-Gerd, and Enn Küng, Narvaer Bürger- und Einwohnerbuch 1581–1704, Veröffentlichungen der Forschungsstelle Ostmitteleuropa an der Universität Dortmund, B 64 (Dortmund: Forschungsstelle Ostmitteleuropa, 2000) Grimm, Jacob, and Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1854–1961) Hansen, Heinrich Johann, Geschichte der Stadt Narva (Dorpat: Laakmann, 1858)

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Heckscher, Eli Filip, Sveriges ekonomiska historia från Gustav Vasa, 2 vols (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1935–1936) Isberg, Alvin, Svensk segregations- och konversionspolitik i Ingermanland 1617–1704, Studia Historico-Ecclesiastica Upsaliensia, 23 (Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 1973) Karling, Sten, Narva, eine baugeschichtliche Untersuchung, Kungl. Vitterhets historie och antikvitets akademien. Archäologische Monografien, 25 (Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 1936) Kotilaine, Jarmo T., Russia’s Foreign Trade and Economic Expansion in the Seventeenth Century, The Northern World, 13 (Leiden: Brill, 2005) Kujala, Antti, ‘Det svenska riket och dess undersåtar i Ingermanland och i Kexholms län på 1600-talet (1617–1658). Kronans dialog med den lokala adeln och de ortodoxa bönderna och köpmännen’, Historisk Tidskrift för Finland, 96 (2011), 131–61 Küng, Enn, ‘De första postförvaltarna i Narva 1638–1656’, Postryttaren, 50 (2000), 49–63 ———, ‘Die rechtliche Lage der Stadt Narva in schwedischer Zeit (16.–17. Jahrhundert)’, in Riga und der Ostseeraum. Von der Gründung 1201 bis in die Frühe Neuzeit, ed. by Ilgvars Misāns and Horst Wernicke, Tagungen zur Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung, 22 (Marburg: Herder Institut, 2005), pp. 346–57 ———, ‘Konflikte zwischen Narva und Reval im Salz- und Heringshandel in der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts’, in Fernhandel und Handelspolitik der baltischen Städte in der Hansezeit. Beiträge zur Erforschung mittelalterlicher und frühneuzeitlicher Handelsbeziehungen und -wege im europäischen Rahmen, ed. by Norbert Angermann and Paul Kaegbein, Schriften der Baltischen Historischen Kommission, 11 (Lüneburg: Nordostdeutsches Kulturwerk, 2001), pp. 301–38 Naber, Jaak, Motsättningarnas Narva. Statlig svenskhetspolitik och tyskt lokalvälde i ett statsreglerat samhälle, 1581–1704, Opuscula Historica Upsaliensa, 15 (Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 1995) Öhlander, Carl, Bidrag till kännedom om Ingermanlands historia och förvaltning, i: 1617– 1645 (Uppsala: [n. pub.], 1898) Soom, Arnold, ‘De ingermanländska städerna och freden i Stolbova 1617’, Svio-Estonica, 3 (1936), 34–45 ———, ‘Die merkantilistische Wirtschaftspolitik Schwedens und die baltischen Städte im 17. Jahrhundert’ Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 11 (1963), 183–222 ———, Die Politik Schwedens bezüglich des russischen Transithandels über die estnischen Städte in den Jahren 1636–1656, Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi toimetused, 32 (Tartu: Õpetatud Eesti Selts, 1940) ———, ‘Ivangorod als selbstständige Stadt 1617–1649’, Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi Aastaraamat (1935), 215–315 Troebst, Stefan, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung. Schwedische Moskaupolitik 1617–1661, Veröffentlichen des Osteuropa-Instituts München: Reihe Forschungen zum Ostseeraum, 2 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997) Tuchtenhagen, Ralph, Zentralstaat und Provinz im frühneuzeitlichen Nordosteuropa, Veröffentlichungen des Nordost-Instituts, 5 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2008)

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Petitions, Letters, Wills, and Receipts * A First Road Map to The King’s Russian-Writing Subjects in Swedish Ingria, 1617–1656

Rossica sunt, non leguntur. ഠഠM. Rostovtzeff

In memoriam Ľubomír Ďurovič (1925–2022) In its eighth clause, the Treaty of Stolbovo stipulates that, within a fortnight after its promulgation, all monks and gentrymen,1 but also the burghers of the towns and boroughs near the fortresses of ‘Iwangorod, Jamo, Coporie, and Nötheborg’ should leave the province with their families and belongings or else stay forever on this new Swedish soil.2 Orthodox parish priests and peasants, on the other hand, were simply to stay on and in this they had no choice.3

* The research for this paper has been conducted within the research project Rossica Ingrica: The Paths of Native Written Russian in Swedish Ingria, 1611–1704. A Sociophilological Study with a Digital Edition, which has been generously funded at the Department of Slavic and Baltic languages, Finnish, Dutch, and German, Stockholm University, by the Marcus and Amalia Wallenberg Foundation. I am also much indebted to the Åke Wiberg Foundation, the Lars Hierta Memorial Foundation, and the Magn. Bergvall Foundation for travel and research grants which have allowed for me to work on the Torčakov papers at Tartu (see n. 55 below). Open access charges were graciously defrayed by the Department of Modern Languages, Uppsala University. 1 ‘Dweräne/Bayor Söner’ or ‘Dweräner/Dietibayorsker’, i.e. dvorjane and děti bojarskie, different classes of gentry servicemen. 2 ‘Jamo’ was a common alternative for ‘Jamgorod’/‘Jam’/‘Jama’ in seventeenth-century Swedish; Caporie/Coporie is ‘Kopor´e’ in modern transliteration from Russian; Nöteborg was known in Russian as Orešek, ‘the nut’. I shall call the four fortresses Ivangorod, Caporie, Jamgorod, and Nöteborg. The fenced boroughs outside of the fortress walls were known in Russian as posady (singular posad) and in Swedish as hakelvärk (singular hakelvärk). 3 Fredzfördragh Emillan Swerige och Ryßland, Oprättadh åhr 1617, Stockholm s.a. [1633–1663], unfoliated; Sverges traktater, v.i, 249–50. These stipulations notwithstanding, the new border would turn out to be quite porous and, during times of duress or crop failure, large numbers of Orthodox Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 235–286 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133607 This is an open access article made available under a CC By 4.0 International License.

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My aim in this paper is to identify and explore areas where literacy in Russian and Russian/Slavonic book-learning retained a role in the Swedish province of Ingria between the 1617 Treaty of Stolbovo and the Russo-Swedish ‘War of Rupture’ of 1656–1658. Practically, I shall do this by looking mainly at the above categories of pre-1617 ‘Ingrians’ — in as far as they remained in the province after 1617 — and at any written Nachlass in Russian.4 The result, I hope, will be a first road map to native or near-native written Ingrian Russian (wir) in this province of Sweden.5 No attempt has been made to provide a full survey of the archival riches consulted, and only in one case of singular importance shall I allow myself to go into some details of archival history and organization. I focus on the documented use of Russian in writing by Ingrians other than Swedish/ German administrators, militaries, and interpreters.6 Questions of ethnicity, then, are largely external to the paper even though future research on Rossica Ingrica

peasants as well as some representatives of the other categories would abscond to Muscovy (see: Селин, Русско-шведская граница [Selin, The Russian-Swedish Border], pp. 138–281, and several works by Veijo Saloheimo; cf. Kujala, ‘Sweden’s Russian Lands’, pp. 559–63). 4 I shall use the noun/adjective ‘Ingrian’ for what pertains, geographically, to Ingria (Sw. Ingermanland; Fi. Inkeri/Inkerinmaa; Ru. Ižorskaja zemlja). The indigenous Fennic people for which the word is occasionally used in English I shall call ‘Ižorians’. Ingria is understood as comprising the counties (Sw. län) of Ivangorod, Jamgorod, Caporie, and Nöteborg. Before the 1610s, the term ‘Ingermanland’ had a much more restricted denotation, which is not always appreciated (cf. Дмитриев, ‘Административно-территориальное деление Ингерманландии’ [Dmitriev, ‘The Administrative and Territorial Division of Ingria’]). The adjective ‘Russian’ is used in this paper to characterize language, linguistic identity, and (more seldom) ethnicity, while I use ‘Muscovite’ for things having to do with seventeenth–early-eighteenth-century Russia as a state. 5 A recent collection of papers on the languages of the Swedish dominions in the seventeenth century contains an excellent paper on Russian by Ulla Birgegård (Birgegård, ‘Ryska’). This is a survey of the state of the question and does not, therefore, treat Ingrian Russian, the extant specimens of which have remained largely unknown to scholarship. Instead, it focuses on Swedish interpreters, administrators, and scholars, but also on the seventeenth-century Slavonic/Russian catechisms printed at Stockholm and intended, mainly, for catechesis in Ingria. Very few translators or interpreters from Russian were ethnic Russians, and I am not aware of extant written materials in Russian from any of them. On them, see also: Tarkiainen, ‘Venäjäntulkit ja slavistiikan harrastus Ruotsin valtakunnassa vv. 1595–1661’; Tarkiainen, ‘Rysstolkarna som yrkeskår 1595–1661’. 6 The material has remained almost unknown in scholarship, even though parts of the Bělous codex, now in the Library of the Russian Academy of Sciences, St Petersburg, were edited in the nineteenth century and mid-twentieth century (Акты, собранные в библиотеках и архивах Российской Империи [Documents Collected in the Libraries and Archives of the Russian Empire], iv, 112–13, 183–85, 200; Лихачев, ‘Плач о реке Нарове 1665 г.’ [Lichačev, ‘A 1665 Lament for River Narova’]). Otherwise, except for some use made of it by the present writer, Ingrian documents in Russian have been drawn on — mainly in what concerns the 1610s — by the St Petersburg historian Adrian Selin (e.g. ‘Таможенная книга Невского устья 1616–1618 гг.’ [‘Customs Book of the Neva Estuary 1616–1618’]; ‘Балтийские писцовые книги — часть Каммар-архива в Государственном архиве Швеции’ [‘The Baltic Cadastres: A Part of the Kammararkiv at the Swedish National Archives’]; Смута на Северо-Западе [The Time of Troubles in the North-West]; but compare also, e.g., Selin’s edition of a 1636 document in Русско-шведская граница [The Russian-Swedish Border], 789–90), and, following him, Jakov Rabinovič (Рабинович, ‘Крепость Копорье и помещики Дягиленского погоста’ [‘The fortress of Kopor´e and the landowners of Djagilenskij pogost’]).

PeTiTions, leTTers, wills, and reCeiPTs

might lead to results of interest for such subjects, too.7 Likewise, I shall not dwell here on the entire process of communication. That might in these cases have included translating from Russian to Swedish/German (or, perhaps, interpreting from Ižorian/Votic to Russian) or the authorities’ producing and conveying writ‐ ten messages to users of wir. The few concrete examples of reading or writing in (near) Church Slavonic are not separately discussed; that language will be treated, pragmatically, as a highly literary Russian.8 I attempt to include a prosopographic perspective and to highlight, albeit briefly, some relevant aspects of the biography and service history of the ‘authors’ treated.

Aspects of Joint Administration: Assistant Lords Lieutenants, Secretaries, and Scribes Following the subjugation of the various Novgorodian fortresses by Swedish or Swedish-Novgorodian forces in the early 1610s, including those of future Ingria, a system of joint Russian and Swedish/German lords lieutenants (Sw. ståthållare, Ru. voevody) is introduced at most of the houses on the pattern of Novgorod itself, which was administered by Baron (from 1615 Count) Jacob De la Gardie and Prince Ivan Nikitič Bol´šoj Odoevskij. In the rank-and-file administration, similar duplications with one ‘Swede’ (in actual fact often a Baltic German nobleman) and one Russian in parallel or comparable positions were usual. No doubt, most important decisions were in the hands of the Swedish administrators, but many documents were decided on and signed jointly. Beginning in late 1615 and early 1616 a modified system is introduced at the Ingrian fortresses proper (including Gdov [Sw. Augdow]), where Russian lords lieutenants or assistant lords lieutenants (ryska ståthållare, underståthållare) are sworn in who are particularly loyal to the King and not merely to the Novgorod administration. However, until 1617 they serve alongside, or rather under, Swedish counterparts.9 At their disposal and at the disposal of the Swedish administration are Russian scribes, secretaries, and — at times — bailiffs; and although, with the exception of Ivangorod, the Russian lords lieutenants are discharged within months of the Stolbovo Treaty, the scribes and secretaries are not.10 At Ivangorod there are

7 The exception being some cases of possible assimilation into a Swedish/Baltic German identity which may be reflected in the choice of written language. 8 On Church Slavonic in this connection: Ďurovič, ‘Kyrkslaviskan — svenskt missionsspråk på 1600talet’. 9 Cf. Пересветов-Мурат, ‘Из Ростова в Ингерманландию’ [Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘From Rostov to Ingria’], pp. 368–70. On their growing discontent with the way they were treated by their Swedish peers in the King’s absence, see their undated (early 1616?) petition in German translation in: NAS. Oxenstiernska samlingen, vol. E 601: Hans Flörich. The petition was originally appended to a letter from H. Flörich to A. Oxenstierna. 10 There remained leading administrators in the province with at least a smidgen of Russian, such as Nils Assersson Mannersköld and Claes Galle, or persons who knew the language very well indeed,

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Russian chancery secretaries (ryska kantzliskriffware, usually calling themselves pod´jačie in Russian) until 1645,11 at Jamgorod until c. 1627, at Nöteborg until at least the early 1620s but possibly into the 1630s and even the 1640s. At Caporie, a Russian chancery secretary on the state payroll is known only until c. 1618. At Jamgorod we have some information from the early 1620s on the Russian chancery (Ryske Skrifuerij) at the fortress, where the chancery scribe worked and kept his books and acts under lock and key.12 The ‘Russian chancery’ (Rÿsche Cantzeliet) at Ivangorod, known throughout the 1620s,13 is always mentioned in Swedish sources in connection with sentences passed there by C. Galle, but it takes no great stretch of the imagination to assume that it was here that day to day affairs in Russian were discharged and the Russian chancery secretary sat. Russian scribes in lower positions, of which there were particularly many at Ivangorod in the 1620s and ’30s, were often employed at the Ingrian fortresses later than these dates may imply. They are, generally, not enumerated in this paper, but it should be mentioned that a Russian corn scribe has his salary at Jamgorod as late as 1639,14 while at Nöteborg — and occasionally at Nyen — a scribe is confirmed on the payroll (including as a school teacher) at least as late as 1647 and is still employed at least occasionally in 1648.15 At Caporie, a scribe does service for his homestead, until at least 1640 (see Appendix A). Adrian Selin has pointed out a tendency for clans of pod´jačie to be formed in the Novgorod lands at the begin‐ ning of the seventeenth century,16 and that is a development suggested by the In‐ grian material as well (viz. the Budynskoj and the Ryžkov families). At least the Budynskie and the scribe I. S. Věrin appear to have sprung from the local minor landowning class known as (svoe)zemcy (in Swedish: sem(t)zer or halfbaijorer; on them, see below).17

11 12 13 14 15 16 17

such as Erik Andersson (Trana), who had formerly served as an interpreter. At various times in the 1610s and ’20s, there were former translators or interpreters, part ethnic Russians, serving in minor administrative positions, too. On the specifics of the pod´jačie in Swedish Ingria 1617–1656, see Appendix A. MAS. Militieräkningar 1623, vol. 25. Appendices L, M, N. e.g. NAF. 428a, p. 239, for 1628/9. EAA.278.1.XXIV-80, fols 226, 682. There may not always have been one in the immediately preceding years. EAA.278.1.XXIV-83, fol. 363; see further: Пересветов-Мурат, ‘Урбан Йерне как нюенец и ингерманландец’ [Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Urban Hierne as a Nyener and an Ingrian’], pp. 119–20, 123–24. This is Timofej Timofeev syn Popov. Селин, Смута на Северо-Западе [Selin, The Time of Troubles in the North-West], p. 456. Ivan Věrin at Nöteborg expressly so (NAS. Livonica II, vol. 723. Krigsrätt i Nöteborg 1616). Dmitrej Fedorov (?) syn Budynskoj, is mentioned as a zemec in the 1630s (NAS. Kammararkivet. Östersjöprovinsernas räkenskaper, vol. 40, fol. 186v). Unfortunately, neither of the pod´jačie Semen and Petr Budynskoj is known by а patronymicon (but cf. Appendix A on Petr Budynskoj) and the exact degree of relationship between them and Dmitrej Budynskoj is unknown. Selin categorizes the brothers Ryžkov as Jamgorod svoezemcy (e.g. Селин, Смута на Северо-Западе [Selin, The Time of Troubles in the North-West], p. 441; Селин, ‘К изучению персонального состава землевладельцев Северо-Запада Новгородской земли’ [Selin, ‘A Contribution to the Study of Who Made Up the Landowning Class in North-West Novgorodia’], p. 127), but it should be pointed out that they had

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Figure 12.1. Alfabetum Rutenorum, a Church Slavonic primer (pp. 1–7) and catechism (pp. 8–28) for Swedes. After the acquisition of Ingria and Karelia (Kexholms län), the Swedish authorities made attempts to Lutheranize the Orthodox Russians and had educational aids produced. Printed by Peter van Selow in Stockholm, probably between 1638 and 1645 (Maier, ‘Wer war der Autor von Alfabetum Rutenorum?’, pp. 351–56). Uppsala University Library (via alvin-portal.org).

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In extant sources from the 1610s–40s, partly the 1650s, we find a great many signatures and receipts (for themselves or in lieu of others) from almost all of these minor Russian administrators. It is unfortunate that their accounts and other books in Russian have been lost almost entirely.18 They were probably deemed redundant when sums or conclusions had been entered into the Swedish balance sheets; hence, they were only exceptionally sent on to Stockholm. There are, however, anomalies which betray their existence, such as the yearly Russian extracts of fines from the court rolls (‘is sudnych knig’) at the Russian town hall (ratuša) at Ivangorod by Stepan Ryžkov. These were appended to the Swedish ac‐ counts in the 1630s and 1640s19 but are found from time to time at earlier dates, too.20 Other books are occasionally mentioned, such as the accounts that the pod´jačej Tarasej Ivanov (who could not read Swedish and thus could not have

been sent to Jamgorod from Moscow as late as the first decade of the seventeenth century, and Stepan Ryžkov calls himself a native (uroženec) of the Muscovite side of the border (RGADA. F. 141. Приказные дела старых лет. [The Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts. F. 141. Prikaz acts from older times] 1646 г. No. 113-a, fols 1–28, at fol. 3 (? unfoliated); cf. Appendix A). Linguistic note: This paper has its origin in a philological project on the Russian of Ingria, and I make no excuse for employing, on several occasions, not the modern standardized forms but ones closer to those in actual use at the time, thus ‘Dmitrej’, not ‘Dmitrij’; ‘pod´jačej’ (or, in quotations, ‘pod´jačei’), not ‘pod´jačij’; ‘Mikita’, not ‘Nikita’, etc. Full consistency is not attainable, however. I write, e.g., not Oleksandr, but Aleksandr. Furthermore, I have aimed both at some level of standardization — not mere transcription — and at ‘fuller’ names rather than hypocoristics. I use the East Slav -skoj/-skoi in the masc. nom. sg. of geographical adjectives, not the Slavonic/modern -skij. In addition, since Ingrian Russian was not used within the hierarchical system of Muscovy, it admitted a more liberal use of honorific patronymics in -ovič and -ovna. If a person is accorded either of these suffixes in Ingrian sources, I accord them, too. 18 The most important exceptions are early, namely the duty records of Nyenskans for 1616 and 1618, and of Nöteborg for 1619–1620. These records were kept in parallel in Russian and German/ Swedish. They were primarily meant for the local administration, and not, even before Stolbovo, for that in Novgorod. The duty revenues were thus entered directly to the credit in the accounts of the fortress in question. More detail will be given in a future edition of the Nöteborg rolls; the Nyenskans/Nevskoe ust´e (‘Neva estuary’) records have been edited by Selin in: ‘Таможенная книга Невского устья 1616–1618 гг.’ [Selin, ‘Customs Book of the Neva Estuary 1616–1618’]. 19 e.g. EAA.278.1.XXIV-76, fol. 39. 20 Ingrian judicature in Russian is a particularly interesting area, which awaits reconstruction. Apart from the Ivangorod town hall (see below), judiciary procedures were conducted in Russian at the Russian chancery during the first decades of Swedish rule (cf. above). In other cases as well, and in other places, witness statement and minutes could be taken down in Russian. However, such written statements have been preserved only in German or Swedish translation but for a few exceptions (such as Herder-Institut [Marburg]. DSHI 560 LHG, Bü Nr 5, pp. 559–61 [microfilm; the lost original was from 1629]).

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produced accounts in that language) delivered upon leaving service some time be‐ fore 1650,21 or the Russian Jamgorod accounts of Isaak Torčakov, which Erik An‐ dersson Trana reviewed, both in draft and in revised form, in 1626/7 after serious suspicions had arisen as to their accuracy.22

Freedom of Worship The King’s Orthodox subject in Ingria enjoyed a certain freedom of worship which constitutes a surprising element in the bulwark of professed Lutheran unity that was seventeenth-century Sweden. This is generally thought to have been guaranteed by the Stolbovo Treaty, but that is true only in so far as it follows from the prohibition for Russian parish priests and their peasant congregations to leave the province, to which I referred at the beginning of this paper. However, many official statements show that this was the current understanding in the seventeenth century as well.23 As a result, any superintendent — as the head of the Lutheran diocese of Ingria and Narva was to be called — or other functionary who violated this freedom generally felt the need to show that he was not actually doing that. The burghers of Ivangorod, on the other hand, had negotiated formal freedom of worship from J. De la Gardie’s representative — and their own assistant lord lieutenant — the Russian gentryman Fedor Grigor´evič Aminev in 1617. This Russian document has been lost but it is quoted in original at some length in two Swedish petitions from the Ivangorod burghers to two of the Privy Councillours (riksråd) in the early 1630s.24 The gentry, too, appear to have received personal guarantees of freedom of worship. 21 ‘Nu sädan iagh intet meera för min ålderdom kunde tijena öfwergifwit tiensten och mijna richtige Rechningar ifron migh leffwererat (: som böckerna uthi Cammaren wäll utwijsar:)’ (NAS. Livonica II, vol. 209. Skrivelser om gods); on his language skills: ‘Contractet […] lätt Herren Generalen skrijfwa på Swenska, som hanß herligheet sielff wille, der utaff iagh icke ett ordh förstodh, och befalte migh sädan skrifwa under, der det doch hafwer bordt war på ryska skrifwit, huilcket Contract iagh då underskreff oansedt iagh det intet förstodh’ (ib.). 22 NAS. Kammararkivet. [Oordnade handlingar, vol. 213]. Act: Anlangandes fougten Jacob Pärßon ifrån Narfwen Sampt Rÿske Skrifuaren, etc. This entire collection, whose existence had been forgotten at the NAS, was located by me in 2014. There is still no new designation in the open archival database, but its physical shelf location at Riksarkivet Marieberg, Stockholm, is 2566. Cf. on the case: Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Isaak Torčakov: en ingermanländsk diak’, pp. 88–91, which was written before the original act was rediscovered. 23 Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘“Otiosorum hominum receptacula”’, pp. 106–07. 24 ‘[We] have vouchsafed the residents of the Ivangorod suburb and ordered [that they shall?] live by their old Christian faith of the Greek Law, [and] that they shall have and hold, freely and without hindrance, in all things and as previously, their faith, their churches and any church buildings, and Divine service’ (ivanegorodski(ch) posadski(ch) ljudei požalovali velěli im´´ žiti pri drevnei svoei christjansko(i) věre grečeskago zako(n)u čto im´´ věra svoja i cerkvi svoi i vsjakoe c[e]rkovnoe stroen´´e i božestven(n)aja služba volno (i) be(z) poměški po svoe(i) věre iměti i deržati vo vse(m) po prežnemu) (NAS. Livonica II, vol. 207. Ivanogorod till Kongl. M:t. Ivangorod’s burghers to J. De la Gardie (undated, early 1630s)). In this short text, požalovali velěli im is open to more than one formal

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‘Noblemen’ The military servicemen of the gentry who chose to ‘remain’ in the province after the first fortnight had passed, and who are often referred to as the Russian ‘bayors’ (ryssba(i)jorerne),25 were not quite what they have seemed in some histo‐ riography.26 It was probably only a handful of these families of servicemen — the Kalitins, the Chomutovs, the Klement´evs, and the Lugvenevs — who could lay claim to any traditional land-holding in what would become Ingria, even though others had lived for generations in the nearby Pskov and Gdov area. If we study Swedish administrative sources proper from the Ingrian counties in the 1610s, we find that all members of the local gentry that have traditionally, or even only recently, owned land there, other than these particular bayors, are more or less ignored from c. 1615, a time at which the King orders a review to be carried out in Ingria, apparently in preparation for a time when the province would be a part of Sweden.27 To a considerable degree, the Russian élite families of Swedish Ingria after 1617 are relatives and in-laws of those representative of the gentry who have recently served as assistant lords lieutenants at the Ingrian fortresses (and two of them have served as audit officers in the 1615–6 review). These servicemen are: F. G. Aminev (serving as assistant lord lieutenant at Ivangorod and Gdov) and his son I. F. Aminev (at Gdov) and son-in-law M. P. Karpovskoj (at Ivangorod); V. S. Čebotaev (at Caporie); and M. I. Kalitin (at Jamgorod). Several of the liaisons between the families were no doubt recent, but the information at our disposal does not allow us to tell whether marriages were entered among those who had

interpretation but the general meaning is clear; the infinitive with accusative is traditional northern. Here, as in other examples of continuous seventeenth-century Russian text, letters within round brackets render the superscript (vynosnye) letters of the original. Letters within square brackets have been supplemented by the editor in abbreviated words, which are usually indicated in the original by an abbreviation mark (titlo). Diacritic marks as such are not retained. 25 From a distortion of the word bojarin (‘boyar’), known in Swedish at least since the late-fifteenth century, see: Толстиков, ‘Бояре по-шведски’ [Tolstikov, ‘Boyars in Swedish’]. It should be pointed out that boyars these mainly minor gentrymen most definitely were not, even though some had seen better days. 26 On them, see: Lind, ‘De Ingermanlandske “Ryss-Bajorer”’; Пересветов-Мурат, ‘Из Ростова в Ингерманландию’ [Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘From Rostov to Ingria’]; Kepsu, Mellan Moskva och Stockholm; Селин, Русско-шведская граница [Selin, The Russian–Swedish Border], pp. 532–34; Селин, Смута на Северо-Западе [Selin, The Time of Troubles in the North-West], pp. 300–01, 344–46, 375, 533; on the Chomutovy: Селин, Новгородские судьбы Смутного времени [Selin, Novgorodian Fates in the Time of Troubles], pp. 112–14; on the Barohns: Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Straddling Cultural and Political Borders in Swedish Ingria’; on the deep genealogy of the families Aminev and Peresvětov: Кузьмин, На пути в Москву [Kuz´min, En Route to Moscow], ii, 61–82, 277–83. Swedish and Finnish traditional genealogical works on all these families are completely untrustworthy for the period before c. 1650 (with the exception of some works on the Aminoff family, and then only for the times after 1609) and often quite misinformed for the period before 1721. Even in the very latest literature old faulty notions have turned out to die very hard. 27 Cf. Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘“Otiosorum hominum receptacula”’, pp. 108–09. The administrative sources in question are NAS. Kammararkivet. Baltiska fogderäkenskaper, vols 167–69, 171, 174, 183, 187–88.

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decided to ‘stay’ in Ingria, or if those who already had become in-laws decided, as extended families, to become Swedish subjects. All in all, we are talking of twenty or so families (including some ‘newly baptized’ Tatar and some ‘Polish’ — proba‐ bly Orthodox Ruthenian — military men). Very soon and for various reasons, they are heavily decimated, and by the 1640s not even half of them survive on the male line.28 One of the reasons why the Swedish government had wished for Russian noble families to settle in Ingria was no doubt the need of an Orthodox élite with some legitimacy in the eyes of the local peasantry and some cultural un‐ derstanding of their life but with an undisputed allegiance to, and dependence on, the Crown.29 This has often been standard colonial procedure and it was unavoidable in a country such as early-seventeenth-century Sweden, where able low and middle administrators were still scarce. Much might be said about the gradual Lutheranization and assimilation of the bayors into the German/Swedish culture of their noble peers.30 This process was different in different families and different branches of families and usually needed two or three generations to be completed. (By the hearth, and especially among unmarried women, it appears to have been particularly slow). It was in many ways reminiscent, e.g., of the voluntary self-Russification of many local élites in the Russian empire or of the self-Polonization of the Lithuanian/Ruthenian nobility in Poland. Even though the decisions to make this cultural transition were made voluntarily, they were incited by the needs and expressed wishes of representatives of the state and, in the end, necessary in order for these élite families to keep and develop their position in society. As a rule, the sons of these nobles were brought to Lutheranism and German Baltic culture by private preceptors or by way of entering military service early on. Young members of the families Aminev, Kalitin, and Klement´ev were first

28 See Appendix C. 29 This allegiance was relative. Members of the Aminev and Kalitin families, who were, ostensibly, the most zealous advocates of the Swedes in the years leading up to Stolbovo and the first to be matriculated at the Swedish House of Nobility, turned to Muscovite authorities at the beginning of the 1620s and offered to inform on their new masters. At least in one case this resulted in a reward from the Tsar (Кобзарева, ‘Отсвет Смуты’ [Kobzareva, ‘A Reflection of the Time of Troubles’], p. 86). 30 Cf., eg.: Kepsu, Mellan Moskva och Stockholm, pp. 77–89. My article on the assimilation of the bayors, ‘“Chantries where no clerks sing”: On the Russianness of the bayors of Ingria, 1617–1704’, was accepted for publication by Slavistica Vilnensis in 2008 and has had some distribution in manuscript form, partly unbeknownst to me. The rich material which became available to me that same year as I had the occasion to work at the NAS on a more permanent basis, made it difficult not to wish for a thorough overhaul of the argument. This I have still not carried out and the article remains unpublished.

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sent to study the printed Stockholm catechesis in Russian at the feet of its original corrector I. S. Torčakov in Ivangorod.31 One of them, Grigorej Isaevič Aminev (Sw. Aminoff; c. 1630–1673), grandson of Fedor Aminev, would be proficient enough to take down his father’s longish last will in Russian in the early 1650s, but he used to sign his letters neatly in German and had a reasonably good military career, apparently managing to strike a middle way between old and new.32 Another, Kuz´ma Michajlovič Klement´ev (Sw. Clementeoff; c. 1620–1669), son of Michajlo Afanas´evič Klement´ev in his last marriage and almost certainly born in Swedish Ingria, signs a Swedish affidavit in Russian as late as 1668. He is at the time a corporal in the Ingrian Banner of Nobles but unable to read the Swedish text of the document he has just signed; this has to be read — and, possibly, translated — for him. More importantly, we have a Russian letter he has autographed in the 1660s in a beautiful fluent hand to the Narva merchant P. I. Torčakov, which bears all the marks of being only one item of an ongoing correspondence [Fig. 12.3].33 In 1668, his half nephew, Petr Mikitič Klement´ev († aft.1674), like his uncle a pupil of I. S. Torčakov’s and a corporal since 1662, signs his name in Russian in a less refined hand.34 It is tempting, but perhaps too facile, to juxtapose the latter, a corporal writing in Russian, and his (younger?) brother Fedor Mikitič (‘Fridrich’, c. 1633–aft. 1700), a cornet by 1658, who signs his name in German in 1663 as a member of the board of noble trustees at the Lutheran church of Moloscowitz (and who is not known to have studied at a Russian school).35 However, the

31 NAS. Oxenstiernska samlingen, vol. E787. Narva; Ryska borgerskapet och medlemmarna av grekisk-katolska kyrkan därstädes. I. S. Torčakov’s undated (1650?) petition to A. Oxenstierna; cf. Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Isaak Torčakov: en ingermanländsk diak’, pp. 104–05. 32 Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Isaak Torčakov: en ingermanländsk diak’, pp. 104–05 n. 33 Although Klement´ev was almost certainly born in Swedish Ingria in the years after Stolbovo, his only extant full letter and his known signatures under other documents are all in Russian. As a boy, he had been sent to Ivangorod or Narva to learn to read from the 1628 Lutheran Slavonic and Russian Catechism with its corrector, a former monastery scribe and Torčakov’s father, who taught at the Ivangorod/Narva school. This may explain why he turns to Torčakov as his kum; the word archetypically designates a relation through godparents or godchildren, but it might also be used for friends from different kinds of fraternities or coteries — here, perhaps, from the Ivangorod or Narva schoolroom. The handwriting is pleasantly fluent with some calligraphic qualities, and the author clearly uses his pen frequently. 34 ‘Petr Kleme(n)t´ev | kapra(l) po(d) ryde(r)fanu’, i.e. ‘corporal under the Riddarfana/Ryttarfana [here: the Banner of Nobles]’ (LVVA. 109.f., 2.apr., 921.l. Appendices B and C to the Exceptio of 3 April 1668). Cf., LVVA. 109.f., under K. M. Klement´ev’s Cyrillic signature: ‘Denne skrifts kontenta hafver jag undertecknad granneligen och noga oppläst och förhållet korporalen av Ingermanländska Adelsfanan, välborne Kuisma Klementioff; och han tillstod så alldeles sant och skett vara, betyger | Eric Gollsteen’. K. M. Klement´ev’s undated letter (1660s) to P. I. Torčakov is EAA.3287.1.206. Folder ‘Mitmesugused venekeelsed kirjad’, fol. 53. An unsigned note to the merchant Ivan Osipovič (Rochnov) in the same collection may be from Grigorej Isaevič Aminev (on whom, see above) but this is not certain (EAA.3287.1.206. Folder ‘Mitmesugused venekeelsed kirjad’, fol. 70). 35 For example: NAS. Livonica II, vol. 176. Appendix A to S. G. Helmfelt to the Crown, 15 December 1663.

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Figure 12.2. The Church Slavonic/Russian translation of Luther’s Catechism with comments and other texts (all in all 144 pages), published in Stockholm in 1628. Isak Torčakov was for a long time taken to be the translator, but Anders Sjöberg showed that the work originates from the famous translator Hans Flörich and might only have been corrected by Torčakov (Sjöberg, ‘Hans Flörich och Isak Torcakov’; cf. Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Isaak Torčakov: en ingermanländsk diak’, pp. 81–82, 91–94, 104–06). Photo: Jens Östman, Kungliga Biblioteket.

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Figure 12.3. Undated letter (1660s) from the Ingrian nobleman and corporal Kuz´ma Klement´ev (Clementeoff; c. 1620–1669) to the merchant Parfen(ej) Torčakov in Narva. (EAA.3287.1.206 (Tartu). Folder ‘Mitmesugused venekeelsed kirjad’, fol. 53r).

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difference in rank between the brothers may be unrelated to questions of language and relative assimilation. They were both married into landowning familes of Ger‐ man descent. The Finnish historian Eirik Hornborg was essentially correct in his claim that the bayors were more or less Germanized within a couple of generations,36 even though it should be mentioned that one or two families, owing to the specifics of their service conditions, were linguistically and, perhaps, culturally more Swedish than the rest. Nevertheless, in the second generation of even the most ‘de-Russianized’ families, various conversations are recorded to have taken place in the 1650s, which could only have been conducted in Russian.37 Many women in these families, who are bound to have been less often to Sweden, or even Narva, and probably left their estate much more seldom as well, appear to have kept both Orthodoxy and the Russian language longer. This concerns not only representatives of the first generations — who, in a couple of cases lived until fairly late in the seventeenth century.38 Now, a continuum of languages in an extended family, where, in times of language shift, the oldest and the youngest almost lack a common language, whereas a middle generation is variously fluent in the old and in the new, is by no means a unique situation. But an instructive incident from a 1684 court case tells us how the eldest (unnamed) daughter of the bayor Wasilij Callentin (V. P. Kalitin) — granddaughter, then, of the D. A. Chomutova mentioned in the previous footnote — is called to witness through an interpreter (‘Rätten lät igenom Tolcken förfråga’) of an occurrence at the house of the Russian priest at Gorka, where she had been a guest with her manservant. Various interpretations of this situation are possible, but the most natural one is that this great-granddaughter of the first ‘Swedish’ Kalitin was, even in the 1680s, both Orthodox and mainly Russian-speaking.39 Unfortunately, there appear to be no extant examples of written Russian from the women of the bayor families. However, as we have seen, signatures and receipts in Cyrillic are quite common from the men at least until the 1660s. Still, it is plain that, from an early stage, important petitions even from first-generation bayors to the Crown tend to be written in Swedish or German and signed with calligraphic pretentions in Latin 36 Hornborg, Karolinen Armfelt och kampen om Finland, p. 36. Sepp’s claim, in his survey of seventeenthcentury Ingria, that the bayor families were especially prone to become (linguistically?) Swedish or Finnish is hardly borne out by seventeenth-century sources (Sepp, ‘Bidrag till Ingermanlands historia under 1600-talet’, p. 86). 37 For example LVVA. 109.f., 2.apr., 458.l., fol. 12r; LVVA. 109.f., 2.apr., 921.l. Appendix B to the Exceptio of 3 April 1668. 38 See on D. A. Chomutova, widow of P. M. Kalitin and S. F. Aminev: NAS. Livonica II, vol. 203. J. Gezelius to the Crown. 4 September 1686 with appendices; on P. G. (?) Skudina, widow of I. F. Aminev, see NAS. Livonica II, vol. 203 and LVVA. 109.f., 2.apr., 1384.l., fol. 39v (from 1683). In the 1680s, both women are Orthodox and, the latter at least, to all appearances a Russian monoglot. 39 NAF. Häradsrätternas renoverade domböcker. Koporie domsaga. Vinterting på Obscowa Håff, 5 March 1684, p. 61. The interpreter is probably dispatched to her, since she is not present at the moot; it can therefore not be excluded that the task was entrusted to him by chance. To my mind, however, this is not what follows the most naturally from the wording of the document.

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letters, no doubt by scribes/secretaries and not the bayors themselves.40 Some second-generation bayors, while maintaining the old ties of their families with the Russian merchants of Ivangorod and Narva, still prefer to write to them in German or Swedish.41 This may be a way of showing social superiority or merely a sense of propriety but they may also never have learned to write longer Russian texts. A few passing remarks are known from/of younger generations of bayors referring to ‘the papers’ of their fathers,42 suggesting something like estate archives. Next to no specifics of these are known, however, and they would probably almost all have perished during the conflagrations of 1656–1657, 1700, and 1702–1704.

A Note on the zemcy/semtzer/halfbaijorer There was also in Swedish Ingria a class of very minor landowners or home‐ stead tenants much more numerous than the bayors, namely the (svoe)zemcy (in Swedish semtzer or halfbaijorer), who usually did service at or for the fortresses, mainly as couriers and minor envoys (Ru. rassyl´ščiki, pristavy, terms normally retained in contemporary local Swedish usage). They have been briefly mentioned above, since some scribes and secretaries at the fortresses were from their ranks. Adrian Selin appears to be correct when he deduces that the Jamgorod and Ivangorod zemcy tended quickly to merge with the rest of the townspeople after Stolbovo.43 In Caporie and Nöteborg counties, however, where the zemcy were the most numerous, and particularly in the country, it is difficult to make out such a process and many zemcy tend to live on their homesteads out of town for at least a couple of decades after 1617 without quite becoming either burghers or peasants. As late as 1641 the Narva governor admits that it is impossible to do quite without the day-to-day service of zemcy in Caporie county.44 After the 1640s, however, they are very rarely referred to, and I am aware of no mention of

40 Examples in NAS. Biographica. Aminoff; NAS. Biographica. Clementeoff; NAF. Biographicakokoelma I. Aminoff. 41 e.g. EAA.3287.1.190. D. Rubzoff († 1670) to P. I. Torčakov, 3 April 1663 (in German). An interesting situation is suggested by a Swedish letter to Torčakov from another second-generation nobleman, since Torčakov’s answer has been written on the reverse in Russian (EAA.3287.1.190. A Morahtt [† 1687] to P. I. Torčakov, 29 April 1665). We cannot be certain, however, that this Russian answer was not translated from Russian before being sent to his correspondent, then in Sweden, since the extant copy is still among papers of the Narva merchant. 42 LVVA. 109.f., 2.apr., 311.2., fol. 28r (on the ‘papers’ – ‘schrifften’ – of M. I. Kalitin); EAA.3287.1.190. A. Morahtt to P. I. Torčakov and P. P. Bělous, 21 October 1665 (on the ‘old documents’ of M. A. Peresvětov). 43 Селин, ‘К изучению персонального состава землевладельцев Северо-Запада Новгородской земли’ [Selin, ‘A Contribution to the Study of Who Made Up the Landowning Class in North-West Novgorodia’], p. 133. 44 NAF. 9658, fol. 252. With time, the Swedish semetz tends to be used only for those zemcy who do service.

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them as a category after the War of Rupture. A wealthy country family of zemcy origin such as that of D. F. Budynskoj, possibly after entertaining thoughts of church careers, manage to introduce themselves as Ivangorod/Narva merchants after the war.45 However, apart from them and from known professional scribes, it is uncertain whether any written material has been preserved in the hands of zemcy after the very early 1620s.46 Yet, the history of this class in Ingria remains to be written and the situation may change.

‘Burghers’ 47 The real cynosure for most Ingrian Orthodox was not the noblemen, however, and certainly not the zemcy, but the Russian town of Ivangorod and its burghers. (In 1648–1650 they and their town were displaced to a new suburb north of the Narva city wall, west of river Narova, which is why it will often be more expedient to talk of ‘Ivangorod/Narva’).48 We have seen that its burghers enjoyed 45 The vicissitudes of this branch of Budynskie cannot be treated here. 46 If the few petitions in the names of individual zemcy in the Ingrian Specialräkenskaper — cf. the section on abatement petitions below — do not, in fact, turn out to be autographs. 47 A note is called for on the word burgher. The better-off townspeople of the Ingrian suburbs, especially those of Ivangorod, are regularly called borgare in contemporary Swedish sources (when not merely hakelvärkare) and that is also the word used of them in the Stolbovo Treaty. However, no formal procedure for the granting of burghership is known until Ivangorod is incorporated with Narva in the late 1640s, no matter that it was recognized as a town (stad) as early as 1617. In Russian, the traditional term posadskie ljudi (posad people) is normally used, but with time the loanword borgary gains some currency in their own Russian idiom. 48 The inhabitants of the far less important boroughs of Caporie, Jamgorod, and Nöteborg cannot be given much space here. Even though they were not recognized as towns with full privileges, minor trades and crafts were practiced along with farming and fishing (for some general information, see: Soom, ‘De ingermanländska städerna och freden i Stolbova 1617’; cf. on Jamgorod: PereswetoffMorath, ‘Isaak Torčakov: en ingermanländsk diak’, p. 83). The boroughs of Jamgorod and Caporie will remain in place until the Great Northern War and retain their Russian character, while that of Nöteborg will never recover after the Muscovite attack of 1656; even when mentioned at a later stage, as a very small settlement, it is no longer inhabited by Russians. Soom — as well as some other scholars — is not quite correct, however, in assuming that the relative depopulation of Nöteborg in 1617 was to characterize it from that point on (Soom, ‘De ingermanländska städerna och freden i Stolbova 1617’, p. 44, cf. p. 38). In the 1640s, the Caporie and Jamgorod boroughs were enfeoffed to Swedish noblemen together with the fortresses. There are, as far as I know, no extant petitions in Russian and no correspondence in the language originating with the inhabitants of these three boroughs, and only minor examples of other writing. A possible testimony to ‘higher’ written Orthodox culture can still be cited, namely a mid-seventeenth-century St Nicholas icon with a Caporie donor’s inscription (see figure 4). The donor mentioned on the icon itself, Petr Mazichin (also Mozichin) was one of the local laymen who asked for a new church of the Assumption to be built in Kopor´e borough (posad) in 1715–1717 in lieu of the chapel standing on the place where, in 1703, an earlier church of the Assumption had burnt down (See: Историко-статистические сведения о С.-Петербургской епархии [Historico-Statistical Information on the St Peterburg Diocese], x, 106). He can be identified with some confidence with the moderately affluent merchant Petr Dmitriev known in Caporie borough in the 1680s and ’90s; even in 1698 he had close enough

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a basically unchallenged — but not unproblematic — freedom of worship, and for the period under discussion they had access to a minimum of two Orthodox churches with clergy; furthermore, they were in close contact both with Muscovy and with Sweden proper.49 After the death of Gustavus Adolphus their star was falling, even though individual merchants retained considerable wealth. The burghers, variously on the left and the right bank of the river, remain thoroughly Russian throughout the Swedish period, however. Until the late 1640s, as we have seen, they conduct court cases in Russian at their own — quite unpretentious — town hall and are governed by their own town council, even though an ethnic German mayor is designated for them, probably in 1644.50 At their disposal is, in 1619–1642 at the very least, a town scribe (zemskoj posadskoj d´jačok), but they may also have had recourse to Russian scribes/secretaries on state payroll, at least for town hall business.51 Basic literacy appears to have been comparatively high among the merchants, if we are to judge from the total number of people whose signatures are known from various documents. Beginning in 1617, or even earlier, the most influential merchants (F. F. Lebed´, A. M. Babin, Ž. Nasonov, A. N. Dokučaev, A. F. Namastyrščin/

contacts with the church of the Assumption for his manservant to leave and take service with the priest of that place of worship (cf., e.g., NAS. Ericsbergsarkivet. Bengt Oxenstiernas samling, vol. 35:2. Vpsatz uppå dett Spanmahl […] Appendix to petition from the Caporie hakelvärkare of 28 August 1686; NAF. 9790, 363v; NAF. Häradsrätternas renoverade domböcker. Koporie domsaga. 1698, pp. 685–86). It is uncertain, then, if he offered the icon to the pre-1703 church in Swedish Ingria or to the 1717 church in Petrine Ingria. 49 On Ivangorod and ‘Russian Narva’, see: Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbständige Stadt 1617–1649’; Кюнг, ‘Русские купцы и граждане Нарвы’ [Küng, ‘Russian Merchants and Citizens of Narva’]; Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Ryska köpmän och diktare i stormaktstidens Stockholm’; cf. Исаков, Путь длиною в тысячу лет [Isakov, A Journey of a Thousand Years], pp. 49–55. 50 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbständige Stadt 1617–1649’, pp. 295–97. 51 The town scribe is Stepan Matvěev (see Russian documents in his hand from 1619 and 1642: NAS. Kammararkivet. Baltiska fogderäkenskaper, vol. 167.5. Counterfoil of 30 June 7127 [1619]; NAS. Kammararkivet. Livonica II, vol. 202. Surety bond of Ivangorod burghers, 4 November 7151/1642, appended to H. Stahlius to the Crown, 5 November 1642). The chancery scribe Stepan Ryžkov signs a (translated) Ivangorod court report in 1644 as a pod´jačej (EAA.632.1.16, fol. 13v), but we do not know if he has been appointed by the Swedes or by the Russian town council (cf. above on his earlier extracts from the Ivangorod court rolls). In late 1646, after Ryžkov has moved to Muscovy with his manservant (malyj), a similar report is signed by I. S. Torčakov, characteristically designating himself ratuškoi dija(k) ivanegoro(d)ckogo posadu, ‘town hall d´jak [scribe] of the borough of Ivangorod’, using not d´jačok but the somewhat grander or more formal unsuffixed noun (EAA.632.1.19, fol. 91v; cf. 121r [from 1647]). If Soom is correct in dating some now presumably lost town hall minutes — not necessarily judiciary — to 1645, their Torčakov signature (as ivanegoro(d)ckoi ratuši dijak, ‘Ivangorod town hall d´jak’ — see photograph in: Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbständige Stadt 1617–1649’, p. 205, fig. 4) suggests that the Russian town council may have chosen to hire a scribe who was somewhat less tied up with the Swedish administration for this important municipal position even before Ryžkov was relieved from state service in January 1646 (cf. Appendix A). It is not always clear to what extent other Ivangorod scribes — mill scribes, customs scribes, etc. were maintained by the state and to what extent by the Russian community.

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Figure 12.4. Nationalmuseum (Stockholm). NMI 166. Icon of St Nicholas of Zarajsk with Scenes from His Life (mid-seventeenth century). Votive gift from the Caporie burgher Petr Dmitriev syn Mazichin to the Orthodox Church of the Assumption at Caporie/ Kopor´e. (see: Abel and Moore, Icons, pp. 90–91, illustration on p. 90). Dr Ulf Abel has confirmed his assessment of the icon as mid-seventeenth century in a personal message — with the proviso that the painter may have been elderly and painted in a somewhat conservative style at a later point in the seventeenth century (email to the author, 31 January 2016).

Monastyrščin, P. L. Bělous, and others, and in several cases their sons and grand‐ sons) tend to broaden their economic activities beyond mere trade, leasing

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important functions from the state (fishing-rights, mills, etc.) and, in two or three cases, going on to lease country estates from noblemen. They also tend to act forcefully in defence of Ingrian Orthodoxy, as we see from a long series of peti‐ tions to the crown for various ‘freedoms’ and privileges.52 They organize, or coorganize with the authorities, their own Russian school(s), and single merchants appear to protect the remaining Ingrian monasteries.53 Each one of the well-to-do merchants must have had his own archive,54 sometimes reflecting the activities of more than one generation, but from the first thirty or so years of Swedish rule what is left is mainly signatures and receipts of a mere couple of lines of Russian each. From the second and third generation, however, the comparatively rich archive of the merchant Parfenij Isaakov Torčakov has survived, no doubt because it was incorporated, at some point, into the Narva city archives, now at Tartu. Of great importance for understanding the use of wir is the fact that Torčakov was almost certainly born after 1617 and had no direct experience of pre-Stolbovo In‐ gria.55 Here, we find some two hundred incoming Russian letters from the 1650s and ’60s to him from Ingrian, and to some degree Muscovite, business associates and relatives along with a smaller collection of incoming letters in German.56 There is, however, a collection of other papers, too: accounts, contracts, other cor‐ respondence, in some rare cases going back to his father’s time — although at times quite fragmentary.57 Of considerable interest is the existence, among Torčakov’s papers, of a series of letters from his wife Fedos´ja Ivanovna. Apart 52 See, in particular: NAS. Livonica II, vol. 202. Ivanogorod till Kongl. M:t. 53 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbständige Stadt 1617–1649’, pp. 242–44; Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Ryska köpmän och diktare i stormaktstidens Stockholm’, p. 207; Пересветов-Мурат, ‘“Епископ Ингомерлянский и всего помория полунощного оцеана”’ [Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘“Bishop of Ingomerlandia and all the seaboard of the septentrional ocean”’], pp. 55, 58, 76–78; PereswetoffMorath, ‘Den siste munken i Ingermanland’, p. 151. On the school, see: Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Isaak Torčakov: en ingermanländsk diak’, pp. 95–97 (there also on a Russian school at Jamgorod in the 1630s [?]). 54 Cf., the Narva merchant Ja. P. Bělous’s cache (‘gömmor’) of letters and other papers confiscated shortly after the outbreak of war in 1656 (Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Ryska köpmän och diktare i stormaktstidens Stockholm’, pp. 207–08). The town of Ivangorod — by that time re-established as a suburb north of Narva — was burnt to the ground by Muscovite troops in 1657. The new Orthodox church of the Holy Trinity had already burnt with the town archive in 1653 (Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Ryska köpmän och diktare i stormaktstidens Stockholm’, pp. 219, 214); the Jamgorod borough had burnt in 1642, and with it the church in which the communal archive was claimed to have been kept (NAF. 9658, fol. 180r; NAS. Livonica II, vol. 207. Jamo. Undated petition). In addition, all the minor Russian boroughs were probably incinerated during the War of Rupture. 55 Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Isaak Torčakov: en ingermanländsk diak’, p. 85. 56 EAA.3287.1.190. Though properly catalogued in the archives as being to ‘Parfei Tortšakov’, in contradistinction to the papers referred to in the next footnote, these letters have remained almost unknown to scholarship. Except from my own use of them, I am aware only of the short mention in Роман Вилимович в гостях у Петра Игнатьевича, ed. by Стефанович & Морозов [Roman Vilimovič at Petr Ignat´evič’s, ed. by Stefanovich and Morozov], pp. 56, 157 (as I write this note, however, I do not have have access to Кюнг, ‘Русские купцы и граждане Нарвы’ [Küng, ‘Russian Merchants and Citizens of Narva’]). I am now editing a major portion of them. 57 EAA.3287.1.206.

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from them, no documents in wir penned by women are known, although there are some petitions written in the name of Russian women both in Russian and in German/Swedish. It is to be hoped that further analysis of them will tell us more of the scribal, intellectual, and social milieux in which they learned to write and in which they put these skills to use. As far as we know, in their dealings with one another these merchants and their descendants kept using Russian for the entire Swedish period, both orally and in writing. Not surprisingly, this Russian contained a fair amount of loan‐ words for concepts and things peculiar to their new surroundings. The letters to P. Torčakov also occasionally exhibit short doodles in a calligraphically acceptable German and Swedish, bearing witness to attempts at mastering the culturally dominant languages as well. Furthermore, the traditional right of the Ivangorod burghers to purchase commodities in the Ingrian countryside (so-called landköp), although curbed in 1643,58 as well as other kinds of dealing with peasants and merchants from the province, no doubt necessitated a working knowledge of the languages spoken, although perhaps not in their purest form. We find an illustration in a 1656 incident involving Ja. A. Babin, then a merchant of the Narva suburb. He speaks some Finnish but mixes it shamelessly with Swedish and Rus‐ sian to the mirth of the Orthodox clergy present at the house.59 I have seen few non-trivial signs of linguistic or religious assimilation among the burghers, how‐ ever, and in this the merchant élite differs significantly from the bulk of Russian gentry. No doubt, it was partly as a consequence of this that second-generation bayors enjoyed the full trust of the authorities and were engaged as officers on the Swedish side when the war of 1656 erupted, while, e.g., the leading Russian burghers were put under arrest and sent to Stockholm. The burghers retain some Russian book-culture, and there are, at Uppsala University Library, one or two Church Slavonic codices that have belonged to representatives of Ivangorod/Narva families. More noteworthy, however, is the codex of Torčakov’s in-law, the merchant P. P. Bělous (b. 1626–1630, † 1666), now in the library of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In it, Bělous has copied the Russian translations of various correspondence between the Crown and Narva’s Russian burghers but also some poetic and semipoetic texts of his own, such as Oplač narovesk, ‘A Lamentation over [River] Narova’, probably written in the 1660s at Stockholm. The sole full copy is in a 1665/6 codex penned apparently by Pëtr Pavlovič and his son Leontej Petrovič (to whom the poem has traditionally been ascribed). The codex contains, among other things, semipoetical texts celebrating the bonds of family and friendship linking the merchant families Jargin and Bělous. In the

58 Soom, ‘Ivangorod als selbständige Stadt 1617–1649’, pp. 222–23, 227, 235–39. 59 ‘tå offta be:tt Babin, hadhe på Finska vtfeht, begÿnnar han munnen bruka på Rÿska, Städße deem Swänskom och Rÿskom på tungan hafuandes. Öffuer huilkit hanß tal, hanß Egen Präst och Klåckare /: hoß honom Babin tå tijll måltidz warandeß:/ hafue leet och grinet’ (EAA.632.1.2a, fol. 3  r – v. O. M. Elgfoot to A. Möller. 1 April 1656).

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Figure 12.5. P. P. Bělous (?). Oplač narovesk (‘Lamentation over Narova’, c. 1665). BRAN (St Petersburg). Cod. 32.5.7, fol. 89v. Published by kind permission of the Library of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

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poem, which appears to be inspired by Orthodox liturgical hymns such as the Akathist(os), the author turns in solemn language with much parallellism but with no clearly discernible metre, to Naròva. This is the river that had traditionally sep‐ arated the German and Swedish Narva from the Russian Ivangorod. As men‐ tioned above, the Russian merchants of Ivangorod had recently had to abandon their town and move to a northern suburb of Narva, but following the 1656 Mus‐ covite attack on Ingria, the Narva Orthodox church council, on which the Bělouses served, was deported to Stockholm. A year later, their Narva suburb was burnt down by Muscovite troops and most of its inhabitants were carried away or fled. In 1666, by their own choice, the Bělouses still resided mainly at Stockholm and for a short spell Pëtr Pavlovič was Stockholm’s first Russian merchant enjoy‐ ing full burghership. The year the lamentation was written down or copied, Pëtr Pavlovič had asked the Crown for a lease on the profitable fishery from important sections of Narova, curiously bringing to mind the mentions of the riches of the river in the poem. There are several allusions in the lamentation to the vicissitudes of the Narva Russians, but it is not clear whether, for example, the wretched ‘residers’ should be thought of as Swedes or as the Ivangorod Russians who have had to move across the river. At times, the author’s use of Slavonic grammatical constructions and forms that are not part of his natural language leads to sole‐ cisms which make the meaning opaque. Lamentation over Narova

O most glorious Narova, revered by all our brothers here residing and greatly glorified by them, certain to be glorified withal. O most glorious Narova, from your bed,60 on the bidding of our awe-inspiring God, food has been drawn for (or: from) human flesh. O most glorious Narova, your name is ‘Awaited’ (nravlennoe), for you depart from the lake and rush into the sea, merging your bed and my race (plemja). O most glorious Narova, shall we forget you, when we have been expelled with weeping and much howling, such as to mortify our neighbours by the sight of us in great humbleness, disgrace, and mortification? O most glorious Narova, our awe-inspiring God has magnified you with the wealth of your bed and of our flesh, and you provided sustenance for wealthy kings and lords and servants all. O most glorious Narova, your glory has gone silent. In your bed residers have settled, dejectedly dejected in their wretchedness (?).

60 Here: nedro. When possible, the peculiar repetition of key words and roots has been kept in the translation. ‘Bed’ was chosen for nedro/nedra (‘bosom’; ‘depth(s)’), since in English the bosom of a river refers not to its depth, but its surface. Nravlennoe, a past passive participle in the neuter singular and, as it appears, a folk etymology of Narova, has been translated as ‘Awaited’ on the basis of northern Russian transitive use of the verb norovit´, with meanings like ‘love’; ‘await’.

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O most glorious Narova, so clear is your stream, along which mournful women stumble (or: stumbled), lamenting in great wretchedness, watching her [!] husband separated from her in disgrace! O most glorious Narova, we praise the Lord [who is] with us, for he is our maker and strength and our power and glory and greatness and delivery and counsellor and praise and guardian. Glory to Thee! O most glorious Narova, you are our witness, but [!] the Lord has taught me to understand his greatness. Praise be to Thee, God of no beginning! He shows himself dexterous at reproducing document illuminations and heraldry, and also renders — somewhat naïvely — an image of the Holy Wisdom fullcolour in a traditional Orthodox iconography. Other attempts at a loftier, heavily Slavonicized Russian are exemplified by an anonymous piece of oratory to Charles X Gustavus composed for the construc‐ tion of a second Orthodox Church of the Holy Trinity in the Narva suburb in April 1654, which survives in the Torčakov papers.61

‘Monks’ One of the most surprising exponents of Russian culture in Swedish Ingria, given the Swedish policy of religious unity and, particularly, the official aversion for religious houses, was the five or six small Orthodox monasteries that remained for the first twenty-odd years of Swedish rule. These diminished continually since they were forbidden to accept novices. Nonetheless, by order of Gustavus Adolphus, still obeyed in the late 1630s, some state support in victuals was extended to at least one of these foundations. Unfortunately, a receipt of such corn, signed by the monk Jonah, is the only known piece of extant writing by a Swedish-Ingrian monk (not counting a hieromonk of Nöteborg county). It cannot be doubted, however, that there was some reading and writing activity in the monasteries; when Jonah and possibly yet some of his brethren had died in 1642 and the property of their hermitage was finally confiscated and itemized, a list was drawn up of the thirty-five manuscript books held in its library.62 (These were to be sent on to Stockholm but it has proved impossible to trace them further

61 On the Bělous codex (BRAN [St Petersburg]. Cod. 32.5.7) — usually attributed to P. P. Bělous’s son Leontej — see: Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Ryska köpmän och diktare i stormaktstidens Stockholm’. The lamentation is edited there, p. 234, and in Лихачев, ‘Плач о реке Нарове 1665 г.’ [Lichačev, ‘A 1665 Lament over River Narova’], p. 336 (with other texts). To the Uppsala codices and the 1654 oratory I intend to return in another publication. 62 Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘“Otiosorum hominum receptacula”’; Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Den siste munken i Ingermanland’, pp. 150–52, 159–60. There was no Ivangorod convent surviving after the 1610s despite what is hypothesized in the first of these papers. On the hieromonk: Пересветов-Мурат, ‘Ингерманландский криминал, XVII век’ [Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘An Ingrian Crime Story of the Seventeenth Century’].

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Figure 12.6. P. P. Bělous (?). Sophia. The Wisdom of God. BRAN (St Petersburg). Cod. 32.5.7, fol. 80r. Published by kind permission of the Library of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

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and they may all have perished). We may, then, regard the Ingrian monasteries as local cultural centres of sorts. I have already mentioned the protection extended to the religious houses by Russian merchants. To this may be added the tendency both among merchants and gentrymen to make testamentary bequests at least to monasteries east and south of the border, and the respect in which the sites of for‐ mer religious houses were held, in one case leading to a curious layman commu‐ nity being instituted by a local prophet at the site of an abandoned Cuiwas monastery c. 1640.63

‘Parish Priests’ (and Minor Clergy) Of incomparably greater importance were the parish priests and their assistants in the various Ingrian pogosty.64 The number of Orthodox parishes gradually

63 See on bequests and on ceremonies on the site of the Elisěj skete: Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘“Otiosorum hominum receptacula”’, pp. 120, 125 (there also on the custom for some bayor widows to enter — as it has since turned out, Muscovite — convents); on the brotherhood (and sisterhood) established in or by the Cuiwas monastery: Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Den siste munken i Ingermanland’, pp. 159–63. 64 These were the traditional Novgorodian Orthodox parishes, which were retained in Swedish Ingria for certain administrative purposes. The Orthodox churches that continued to function after the first post-Stolbovo years most often stood at the traditional pogost centres and there was a tendency for only one Orthodox church to remain in each historical pogost. Full sources for this section would demand a great deal of space and I must refer to my unpublished paper ‘Cui cognitionem Elementorum Linguæ Moscoviticæ debeo: Om ryska församlingar och präster i det svenska Ingermanland och några av Bergius’ sagesmän’, read at the symposium ‘Nicolaus Bergius, Baltikum och den ryska kyrkan’, Uppsala University Library, 20 November 2014, and the monograph I am preparing on Orthodox clergy and parishes in Swedish Ingria. See also Appendix B. The scholarly literature to date has primarily treated seventeenth-century discussions regarding the clergy as reflected in memoranda of the Ingrian Lutheran superintendents, decisions made by the Government, petitions from the Ivangorod burghers and the ensuing privileges to them, etc. Only very rarely does it ‘touch the ground’ and deal with the actual priests and parishes, which are still very poorly understood. Numbers, furthermore, when given, appear almost always to be incorrect or not actually from Ingria but the county of Kexholm. A recent general outline of the vicissitudes of the Orthodox in their continuous battle for their parishes and priests, which was an important factor behind the exodus of Orthodox peasants from the province, can be found in Kujala, ‘Sweden’s Russian Lands’, which has the advantage of being informed by recent Finnish scholarship; see also: Isberg, Svensk segregations- och konversionspolitik. On the level of specific Orthodox churches, Heikki Kirkinen has extracted some of the Ingrian data for 1499/1500, mainly from archimandrite Sergij’s 1905 study of the Vodskaja pjatina in that year (Kirkinen, ‘Inkerin keskiaika ja uuden ajan alku vuoteen 1617’, pp. 59–60; cf. Сергий (архим.), Черты церковно-приходского монастырского быта [Sergij (archim.), Features of Everday Parochial and Monastic Life], esp. pp. 250–52). The situation in 1643 and 1656, although difficult for the Orthodox, was not quite as gloomy as suggested by Saloheimo’s unique — but incomplete — enumeration of Orthodox clergy for those years (Saloheimo, ‘Inkerinmaan asutus ja väestö 1618–1700’, p. 71). The growth and development of Lutheran parishes in seventeenth-century Ingria is much better served in scholarship, see in particular: Väänänen, Herdaminne för Ingermanland, i; Luther, Herdaminne för Ingermanland, ii, pp. 560–76 (containing corrigenda and addenda for Väänänen’s first volume), and the recent and well-referenced Sivonen, ‘Inkerin luterilainen kirkko’.

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dwindled during the entire Swedish period, for factors having to do both with the Orthodox being actively discouraged (or, in the case of the Ižorian and Votic faithful, prohibited) from practicing their faith, on the one hand, and with the great difficulties of finding new priests to replace deceased or disabled ones under the rules set up by Swedish authorities, on the other.65 It has been estimated, however, that the Orthodox remained a — small — majority in western Ingria even as late as the 1670s.66 Orthodox churches remained operational until the very end of the Swedish period, particularly in western Ingria, and the province was completely lacking priests only during the first years following the War of Rupture. For all their problems and relative disconnectedness from Swedes and Muscovites alike, the parish churches no doubt served, for the rural Orthodox, as important hubs of cultural life and identity as well as of Russian scribal activity. We can follow the church staff in the different parishes fairly closely in 1618–1623 and then in 1637–1696 (in 1624–1636, too, a number of sources provide us with important, but sporadic, data). And while forty-some churches had their own priests c. 1618 but only about eleven in 1696, we may still marvel at the resilience of the system as we realize that eight or so Orthodox Ingrian priests can still be identified in our sparse sources for 1701/2 — after the Swedish victory at Narva but before Ingria is again overrun by Tsar Peter’s troops in 1702/3. At that time, Orthodoxy had been regarded as a second-rate faith by the powers that be for almost ninety years.

65 Only for a few years, shortly after Stolbovo, was the Swedish Government willing to accept the arrival of new priests (from Ingria or not) ordained by, and hence dependent on, Muscovite hierarchs. The plans, sometimes entertained by the Government and the Ivangorodians — although these parties were not always synchronized — to create a separate Ingrian diocese under Constantinople or Kyiv, could not in the end be realized, and in any event the Ingrian Orthodox did not wish to sever their ties with the Moscow church (Kujala, ‘Sweden’s Russian Lands’, pp. 551–55; cf. Пересветов-Мурат, ‘“Епископ Ингомерлянский и всего помория полунощного оцеана”’ [Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘“Bishop of Ingomerlandia and all the seaboard of the septentrional ocean”’], pp. 55–58, 60–63, cf. 73–77; see Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘“Otiosorum hominum receptacula”’, pp. 110– 11, on an earlier attempt by Gustavus Adolphus at organising a separate Ingrian Orthodox church). The Ingrian Orthodox, never quite trusted by their Swedish overlords and never quite trusting them, found themselves between a rock and a hard place; in Muscovy, they were often suspected of heresy and apostasy (Жуков, ‘“Еретики и отметчики”’ [Žukov, ‘Heretics and Apostates’]). The utterly insensitive plans, developed in the 1640s, to have ‘Orthodox’ priests ordained by the Lutheran superintendent at Narva, were occasionally implemented (Isberg, Svensk segregationsoch konversionspolitik, pp. 43, 67–68; the decision temporarily suspended in 1651, Isberg, Svensk segregations- och konversionspolitik, p. 78), but only in a few cases is this firmly documented. 66 Cf. Saloheimo’s estimate for the numbers of Orthodox and Lutheran inhabitants in each Ingrian pogost in 1623, 1643, and 1675. Not including Nöteborg county, where Orthodoxy diminished rather quickly, both in absolute and in relative numbers, the ratios for the remaining three counties is 95.8 % Orthodox in 1623, 80.9 % in 1643, and 54.2 % in 1675 (cf. Saloheimo, ‘Inkerinmaan asutus ja väestö 1618–1700’, pp. 72, 81). See also: Forsström, Kuvaus Inkerinmaan oloista, pp. 47–49, where an estimate is given for 1695 as well.

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A rural Orthodox parish in those days would not work properly without a traditional triad of clergy: the priest (pop), the d´jačok, and the ponomar´.67 We might have translated the latter two as, e.g., lector and sexton respectively, but I shall retain the Russian terms here for these church officers. In contem‐ porary Swedish, the d´jačok was usually known as a diak or, more seldom, (kyr‐ cko)skriffuare, i.e. ‘(church) scribe’. The ponomar´ was almost universally known as klockare, i.e. bell-ringer.68 Their exact function in ceremonies and church life at this time is not easily established and we shall here only note the strong link between the d´jačok and reading and writing, and that of the ponomar´ and the safeguarding of church property and the lighting of candles. In some parishes these three men might be supplemented by a prosphora baker, a proskurnica or proskurnik (prosphora being the leavened bread used for Communion). There was a marked tendency for the offices of priest and d´jačok in a parish to be passed on in one family in such a way that the priest was a former d´jačok and the son or younger brother of a former priest (or d´jačok).69 At times, the ponomar´ was another junior family member, but more often that office appears to have been passed on within separate ‘dynasties’. There were, then, a dozen or so Orthodox churches working more or less throughout the Swedish period, occasionally cared for only by a d´jačok but in many such cases no doubt visited for services by priests from nearby parishes.70 Another dozen had functioned only until the 1640s/’50s (even a church of as central importance as that at Kipina/Kipen´, which was burnt down during the War of Rupture never to be re-erected). Before this, between 1618 and the early 1630s (mainly early in this period) yet another dozen churches had fallen into disuse, not counting the fortress churches.71 An important portion of the Orthodox herd in many or most parishes consisted of Ižorians or Votes, but it is difficult now to tell quite how large a portion they made up in the first half of the seventeenth century, and whether this constituted a majority or not.72 The clergy in these parishes, when they

67 I shall use the term ‘clergy’ here, even though two of the three persons in this triad were, at this time, usually unordained. In Swedish accounts all three were usually defined as kyrckotienare, literally ‘church servants’ (cf. the traditional, broad understanding of Ru. pričt). 68 Both seventeenth-century Lutheran churchmen and twentieth/twenty-first-century historians have tended to believe, mistakenly, that the d´jački (Sw. diaker) were deacons (Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Isaak Torčakov: en ingermanländsk diak’, p. 84). 69 This was no peculiarly Ingrian trait, and the system in, e.g., East Karelia on the eastern side of the border was similar in this respect. Parishes with a priest, a d´jačok, and a ponomar´ were also typical for the Muscovite side in the sixteenth–seventeenth century, cf. Суслова, Церковно-приходская система в Карелии [Suslova, The System of Parishes in Karelia], p. 21. 70 There is little documentary evidence of this, however, for the time before the War of Rupture, and at times the d´jačok was specifically tasked with somehow ministering to his flock (Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Den siste munken i Ingermanland’, pp. 157, 162). This situation was highly uncanonical. However, Ingria, with her unique plights, can hardly be spanned with the ordinary Orthodox yardstick. 71 See Appendix B. 72 Notwithstanding, e.g., Sivonen, ‘Me inkerikot, vatjalaiset ja karjalaiset’, pp. 41–43 (otherwise a good and nuanced discussion of ethnicity in Swedish Ingria as far as I can judge), and Kujala, ‘Sweden’s

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themselves were not local,73 would have found it difficult to communicate with, and effectively minister to such parishioners; services as such would have been conducted in Church Slavonic, as would scriptural readings (sermons playing no or next to no role). Partly out of genuine pastoral concern and a Protestant understanding of the absolute centrality of the ‘word of God’, but partly, no doubt, for other kinds of zeal, this situation was actively and at times ruthlessly combated by Lutheran authorities. That was particularly the case from the 1680s, when the Fennic Orthodox were forced to attend Lutheran church services.74 As a result, we have more reliable information on the actual ethnic and linguistic situation in Ingria from that time. We should, however, refrain from merely backtracking from there and assuming identical proportions within the Orthodox population before and after the War of Rupture and the preceding outflux of peasants from Ingria. The linguistic situation is further complicated by the fact that the actual Russian

Russian Lands’, p. 564 n., just to mention two recent proponents of the view that Fennic peasants were clearly in majority. Evidently, the tacit understanding of several Soviet historians and some modern Russian authors that the Ingrian population around 1617 was overwhelmingly Russianspeaking is even less convincing. There is still evidence to cull, and I prefer, at this stage, to remain noncommittal and not speak of ‘clear majorities’ in either direction. I do not, however, exclude the possibility that the Finnish scholars might, in the end, turn out to be correct. (Since this was written in 2017, I have identified and published a unique source which reveals that Ižorian/Votic was spoken, or at least well understood, in the absolute majority of villages in western and central Caporie county in the mid-1620s (Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Ulwichius’ lista och rösterna från Caporie län’). It also allows for some cautious conclusions e contrario as to villages in this area where Russian dominated, namely in much of Ratzinschoi and Samoschoi pogosty. For the purposes of this paper two things might then be noted: 1) this is where two of the most resilient Orthodox country parishes in Ingria, Gorka and Ratzina, were located, even though there were Ingrian speakers in both parish centres; 2) Samoschoi pogost — and areas even further to the east in the county — is where most of the fiefs of the Russian gentry would be situated. On churches and gentry, see Appendix B and Appendix C. The situation in Jamgorod county was probably analogous to that of Caporie county, and the overweight of speakers of Ižorian/Votic in the countryside of Ivangorod and Nöteborg county may have been even more pronounced). 73 Priest families of long standing in their parish are likely to have known the languages of their parishioners. It is open to question, e.g., whether the ‘Finsch[e] Sprache’ (i.e. Finnish language), from which Grigorej Ivanov interpreted into Russian during the Muscovite siege of Jamgorod in 1658, was not grounded in one of the local Fennic languages, even though it clearly sufficed as an effective means of communication with the lieutenant and the amtman at Jamgorod, both, no doubt, Finnish (Petition from ‘Griska Iwanoff’ appended to S. G. Helmfelt to the Government. 15 October 1661. NAS. Livonica II, vol. 175). Grigorej was the grandson, son, and brother of three consecutive priests of the Opolie church of the Exaltation of the Cross and most probably raised in the village of Opolie himself. Some mutual understanding between the local Fennic Orthodox — in Opolie probably Votes (cf. Köppen, Erklärender Text zu der ethnographischen Karte des St Petersburger Gouvernements, pp. 22–23) — and the parish clergy can perhaps be gleaned from the fact that, c. 1618, the brother of Ivan Michajlov, long-time church d´jačok and possibly father of the successor of Grigorej’s brother as Opolie priest in the 1650s, had made a ‘čutka’ (i.e. a local Fennic woman) in the village pregnant (NAS. Kammararkivet. Baltiska fogderäkenskaper, vol. 167:5. S. Ryžkov’s list of revenues from Jamgorod county for 7126/7 [1618] (in Russian)). 74 Isberg, Svensk segregations- och konversionspolitik, pp. 89–120; Sivonen, ‘Me inkerikot, vatjalaiset ja karjalaiset’.

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proficiency of Ižorians and Votes is bound to have been greater for the generations formed before and shortly after Stolbovo. Up to that time, leading villagers and pogost representatives, at the very least, probably had some working knowledge of Russian regardless of their native language.75 For younger generations, the role of Russian in Ingria would have changed fundamentally and so, arguably, would interaction between Fennic and Slav peasants. It is somewhat surprising that comparatively little written material has been preserved from the Ingrian priests. Here, too, we have at our disposal mainly signatures and receipts, at times written by the priests in lieu of their parishioners. In addition, at Ivangorod/Narva the priests often witness various deeds, but early extant examples are few. Orthodox priests in Ingria appear at least occasionally to have been tasked with examining their parishioners during the annual census but, again, there is precious little concrete evidence except from the very first Swedish years and then again in the 1680s and 1690s. In the latter period, we once more find the occasional signature of an Orthodox parish priest together with that of the Lutheran minister after the part of the census list that concerns their parish or district. It is unclear whether only the poor preservation of local sources is the reason why such signatures, so common in comparable cases in the Novgorod area before Stolbovo, should be so rare after 1617.76 In the few cases when fairly large documents produced in Russian by the ‘parish administration’ are still extant, the main text tends to be written by the parish d´jačok and then only signed by the priest with a traditional formula.77 The main documented exceptions known to me are a couple of last wills that were taken down in full — and not only authenticated, as was usual — by the confessor of the testator.78 (When considering the relative silence of the acting priests, we should remember, however, that, in the course of a life-time, many priests would have passed through

75 It would be a mistake to think of Russian as an official state language in a modern sense. Before the eighteenth century, the Muscovite state was often quite happy to communicate with its non-Slav subjects through interpreters and local élites (see, e.g.: Pavlenko, ‘Linguistic Russification in the Russian Empire’, p. 335). For some observations on possible Russian proficiency in an Ižorian (?) family in the 1610s–1630s, see: Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Den siste munken i Ingermanland’, pp. 152–53, 156. 76 For the 1610s, cf. Селин, Смута на Северо-Западе [Selin, The Time of Troubles in the North-West], p. 110; at the end of the century, see (the copies of) the priests’ Cyrillic signatures in 1696 in: NAF. 9790, fols 335v, 346v, 356r, 374v. 77 First and foremost: NAS. Kammararkivet. Strödda kamerala handlingar, vol. 40: Kameralia. Bugislaus von Rosens Ingermanländska arrenderäkningar. Fheel och Beswär …, fols 67–72. 78 None is extant in the Russian original, however. A. P. Amineva’s 1634 (?) will, written by her confessor, is preserved in a Swedish translation. The same is true for parts of F. G. Aminev’s 1628 will, which was taken down by, F. Ja. Popov, the son of a priest and a priest-to-be, but at the time an Ivangorod merchant (both at NAS. Genealogica, vol. 120. Aminoff – No. 456). We know that the 1649 will of the wealthy merchant A. Namastyrščin/Monastyrščin was written by two Orthodox priests (cf. EAA.1646.1.78, p. 43). There is some evidence of the use of last wills in Russian even among the Ingrian peasantry, but it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to how common this practice was.

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a d´jačok stage with all the chores connected with that position). A small number of books once belonging to Ingrian parish churches have been preserved at Uppsala University Library, but these have yet to be analysed from an Ingrian point of view.79

A Note on pogost Scribes — an Unsolved Problem It is at times difficult to differentiate between church scribes and secular scribes not on the government’s payroll (and thus not employed at one of the fortresses), and, consequently, between the various tasks performed by the two categories. They were all called d´jački or, in Swedish, diaker. Possibly, after the first decade of Swedish rule, there were exceedingly few exclusively secular scribes; with any reasonable certainty we know only of Stepan Matvěev at Ivangorod (on whom, see above) but we may in the end be wrong even about him. Immediately after Stol‐ bovo, each Ingrian pogost appears to have a pogost scribe, and to all appearances almost all of these are Russian, even though the extant list is not absolutely clear on this point.80 At least one is almost certainly a church d´jačok. From time to time, later sources will mention such pogostskrifware/pogos[ts]kie d´jački — the Russian term is occasionally used for self-designation, e.g., by Ja. P. Budynskoj at Caporie borough or by Vasilej Grigor´ev at Gorka — and at least in the 1630s we again get the impression that there are pogost scribes in each pogost. In Nöteborg county, the posts were at this time generally held by men with Swedish Lutheran names, i.e. probably ethnic Finns, who appear to have held homesteads for their service.81 Meanwhile, all known ‘pogost scribes’ in Caporie county are Russian and they can almost all be credibly tied to Orthodox parishes as church d´jački. Even when this is not documented, they generally belong in a village with an Orthodox parish church.82 Was there a special need, at least in Caporie county, of

79 The database of the project ‘Digitalized Descriptions of Slavic Cyrillic Manuscripts and Early Printed Books in Swedish Libraries and Archives’, produced by a group of four Swedish Slavists (including the author of this paper), is now largely available via alvin-portal.org. There, marginalia from all Uppsala codices have been registered by Prof. I. Lysén, which has allowed me to identify the volumes in question. I intend to return to this subject within the framework of the project Rossica Ingrica. 80 NAS. Carl Carlsson Gyllenhielms samling, vol. E 3767. Vorzeichnis aller Pagosten in Caporischen vnd Jammischen Lehn, Auch derienigen, so darein Reuisiren sollen. 81 For a suggestion of pogost scribes ready to assist the Crown in each Caporie pogost in the 1630s, see, e.g.: NAS. Livonica II, vol. 361, fol. 116r. N. A. Mannersköld’s memorandum for H. Rokus and J. Persson, 13 August 1636. Several letters in the same volume refers to Nöteborg scribes. Even though in Nöteborg county, the Russian factotum T. T. Popov — for all his many other functions (cf. above and Appendix A) — is referred to as a pogost scribe in a Russian counterfoil for mill duties from the peasants of Loppis (Lopskoi) and Jarosеlskoi pogosty as late as 1638 (NAF. 9647, fol. 203v, cf. fol. 212r). 82 Most of the time our information on one kind of employment is not from the same year as that on another kind. We cannot therefore, in theory, exclude the possibility that any such secular scribe becomes an ecclesiastical scribe or the other way round. For Jamgorod and Ivangorod counties, we still

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Russian scribes and intermediaries who might be given tasks both by the Narva administration and by the Orthodox peasants, and were the only candidates then parish d´jački?83 We can pose the question, but not, as yet, answer it.84 The specific sets of records sent annually from the Narva gubernatorial adminis‐ tration to the Exchequer (Kammaren) at Stockholm85 evince that, step by step, a new system of administration and accounting is introduced in Ingria in 1634– 1636, at least in relation to the Exchequer.86 This must be a direct consequence of the introduction of the Form of Government of 1634.87 Exactly how the latter was implemented in Ingria, however, and precisely what requirements the local administration now had to satisfy is far beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, what is of importance is the introduction, for the accounting year 1635/6 (1 September 1635–1 September 1636), of a more or less mandatory yearly volume of ‘Special accounts’ (Specialräkenskaper). These volumes provide us, for the years 1635–1641, with a rich stream of petitions in Russian from the peasantry of Ingria, all in all more than 150, and most abundant for the first year. They are written in the names of local peasants, especially of Caporie county, but probably never penned by the peasants themselves. (Apparent exceptions always involve people of somewhat higher standing, such as the zemcy, but even here it is not quite clear whether those petitions are autographs). An analysis is bound to uncover important aspects of Russian literacy and scribality in Swedish Ingria, but

83

84

85 86 87

know too little to say even this much of who the pogost scribes were. A full discussion of the evidence must be postponed. It was not unheard of in Muscovy that church d´jački and the secular zemskie d´jački of rural communities were the same people (Богословский, Земское самоуправление на русском севере [Bogoslovskij, Rural Self-Government in the Russian North], i, 298). We still do not know, however, even who chose or designated secular Russian d´jački in Swedish Ingria, and we must as yet be cautious not to apply a word such as zemskoj, which is quite rare in Ingrian documents after 1617. Stepan Matvěev (on whom, see above, n. 50) is one of few Ingrian scribes to use the adjective of themselves. In order not to beg the question, I have chosen not to address the question of which precise class of Ingrian d´jački were entrusted with teaching Orthodox children Luther’s catechism in Russian and Church Slavonic (on which, for example: Öhlander, Bidrag till kännedom om Ingermanlands historia och förvaltning, i, 181). While these particular d´jački can also usually be linked to an Orthodox church, several of them are also the very persons who, on other occasions, style themselves pogost scribes, including the aforementioned V. Grigor´ev and Ja. P. Budynskoj, the latter of whom was quite successful a teacher and is referred to the Caporie borough clergy in Swedish censuses from the 1650s (e.g. MAS. Militieräkningar 1655, vol. 9, fol. 1555v [from 1655]; successful teacher: NAF. 9674, fol. 724 [from 1648]). NAS. Kammararkivets ämbetsarkiv t.o.m. 1921. D II. Serie I:1. Generalregister över landskapshandl. m.m. 1628 (henceforth: GL). With very few exceptions, those full Ingrian account books known to be extant today — whether now in depositories in Sweden, Finland, or the Baltic republics — were all at some point kept at the Exchecquer. As far as I am aware, no locally kept full duplicates have been preserved. Cf. the normal setup of accounts for Finland in 1635–1808 as opposed to earlier times in Paloposki, Quellenkunde zur Geschichte Finlands, p. 53.

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to the best of my knowledge they have never even been mentioned as a discrete category in scholarship. Table 12.1. Petitions (or inquiries) in Russian/total number of extant petitions from (or inquiries regarding) crown peasants in the Ingrian Specialräkningar, 1635/6–1640/1.88

Year

Ivangorod county

Jamgorod county

1635/6

0/0

9/12 (75 %)

82/95 (86 %)

0/0

1636/7

1/1

0/0

13/15 (87 %)

0/0

1637/8

1/1

0/0

0/0

0/1

1638/9

1/1

0/0

3/5 (60 %)

0/0

Caporie county

Nöteborg county

1639/40

0/2

0/0

19/24 (79 %)

0/0

1640/1

0/0

0/0

27/32 (84 %)*

0/0

[1641/2

accounts lost]

In sum:

3/5

9/12

144/171 %)

0/1

(84

*This year, there are also two petitions from the landowner Isaj Aminev (Sw. Esaias Aminoff) on his peasants’ account, these are in German and Swedish but signed by him, as always, in Russian (NAF. 9653, fols 607–08) [ Jamgorod], 713–14 [Caporie]), and a Russian petition from the landowner Aleksandr Rubcov (Sw. Alexander Rubzoff) (NAF. 9653, fol. 704 [Caporie]). The latter may, however, have been drawn up by a d´jačok.

The petitions have been appended as verifications to the yearly abatement reg‐ ister (affkortningzlängd, at times specialaffkortningzlängd) of each Ingrian county. This register specifies which crown peasants are exempt from paying taxes owing to fire, crop failure, absconsion, or other reasons. An analysis of their wording and dates shows that abatements were sought at the häradsting (in Ingria, the 88 Ingrian Specialräkningar | for 1635/6: EAA.278.1.XXIV-76 (Tartu), at the Exchequer originally numbered (GL): Lifland 1636, no. 3; | for 1636/7: NAS. Kammararkivet. Östersjöprovinsernas räkenskaper, vol. 40 (Stockholm), at the Exchecquer (GL): Lifland 1637, no. 3; | for 1637/8: NAF. 9647 (Helsinki), at the Exchecquer (GL): Lifland 1638, no. 7; | for 1638/9: EAA.278.1.XXIV-80 (Tartu), at the Exchequer (GL): Lifland 1639, no. 5; | for 1639/40: NAF. 9651 (Helsinki), at the Exchecquer (GL): Lifland 1640, no. 6; | for 1640/41 — but parts of the volume are for the calendrical year of 1641: NAF. 9653 (Helsinki), at the Exchecquer (GL): Lifland 1641, no. 3. The ‘Special Landz Räckningar’ for 1641/2 (or only 1642?) are lost — they were (GL) Lifland 1642, no. 10, at the Exchequer. In 1642/3, in a book no longer called Specialräkningar (NAF. 9658 [Helsinki], self-designation: ‘Ingermanlandz Betalningz Zedler, quittntier […] no. 1’, at the Exchecquer [GL]: Lifland 1643, no. 4), there are only five or so petitions, two of which are in Russian — one from Caporie and one from Nöteborg county. After 1643 Russian petitions are few and far between in the consulted accounts; simultaneously, Specialräkningar, thus designated, disappear from the records and are surplanted by, or renamed as, other kinds of books, mainly the Affkortningzbook. No attempt has been made here to analyse the partial overlap between the books for 1641.

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moot at the level of the county). In the years concerned, the Russian petitioners address the monarch directly. Petitions in Swedish tend to be to the governor or governor-general, and we shall see presently that this difference may be telling. The governor, present at the Caporie county moots during the first years, then rules on the petitions, at times explicitly following an examination carried out by the body of recognitors (nämnd), the designated (or elected?) elder of the pogost peasantry (starost[a]),89 or the county bailiff. At times, we shall find only the abatement registers, signed by the county judge (häradzhöffding) in his own name and in the name of the recognitors with no verifications or petitions appended, either in Russian or in Swedish. It should probably be assumed, at least in Caporie county in the late 1630s and early 1640s, that this is a surface phenomenon having to do with the extant sources and that, locally, petitions were tendered in the same way as usual, only not sent on to Stockholm. For the period 1617–1635, almost no comparable sources are available for Ingrian tax abatements, but the sources that we do have suggest that written petitions may have been produced at this stage as well, at least in Caporie county.90 There is another continuity, however, which particularly strikes the prepared reader. In their formulas, the petitions of the 1630s and 1640s reproduce the kind of standard language and clichés which we also find, for example, in Russian petitions from peasants in the occupied territories of Novgorodia in the 1610s, addressed, in addition, to ‘Grand Duke Charles Philip’ — that is, here too, not to the Novgorod lords lieutenants who actually make the decisions.91 The Ingrian petitions are, then, not merely a reaction to the demands of Swedish administrators and judges and their insistence on verifications, but a continuation of a scribal world — and a world of words — reaching back before Swedish times but still reproducing itself and fulfilling a purpose for the local peasantry in the 1630s and 1640s. Since they are penned, as a rule, not by secretaries at the fortresses with access to fuller archives and genre models, but by local rural scribes in local centres (see below), and at least not only by particularly aged scribes who remember how it was done long ago, these scribal habits turn out to have been deeply entrenched in local society and to have been put to use often enough. 89 On the Ingrian starosty, see: Öhlander, Bidrag till kännedom om Ingermanlands historia och förvaltning, i, 159. 90 Cf., in particular, the very detailed information on the specific peasants asking abatement in the Caporie lord lieutenant B. Rosen’s long lists for 1627 (MAS. Militieräkningar 1628, vol. 13) and 1628 (NAF. 428a, pp. 398–442). A mysterious volume of Specialräkningar for 1633 is mentioned in the nineteenth century among the Ingrian accounts to be sent from Stockholm to Helsinki (NAS. Kammararkivet. Kammararkivets ämbetsarkiv – 1921. FIIb:4), but I have not been able to verify its existence. It was not included in the usual series of Landskapshandlingar at the Exchequer in the seventeenth century (GL; cf. NAS. Livländska donationskontoret, FIVa:2. No 3. Register på Ingermanlandske Böcker och Handlingar). 91 See, e.g.: NAS. Ockupationsarkivet från Novgorod. II:50, fol. 98 (from 1613); NAS. Ockupationsarkivet från Novgorod. II:63, fols 3–4 (from 1615)). I am indebted to Dr Elisabeth Löfstrand, Stockholm, for drawing my attention to the presence in the Novgorod Occupation Archives of petitions from peasants to their nominal sovereign.

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The Russian petitions are never signed by the actual scribe. However, twelve of the 1635/6 and 1636/7 documents listed above are, in fact, not petitions but inquiries (rannsakningar, obysknye pamjati) which, as I have mentioned, might be requested by the governor or bailiff in order to establish the facts in an appeal for tax abatement.92 As a rule, these documents contain a decision by the governor or bailiff on the reverse of an inquiry in Russian, carried out by the pogost starosta but written and signed by the pogost d´jačok (cf. above on pogost scribes). The hands of the latter can then often be traced in the unsigned petitions from a particular location as well. While the ruling of the governor or bailiff is generally in Swedish, there are at least five documents, all from 1635/6, where it is in Russian and not in the recognisable hand of a pogost d´jačok but rather that of a pod´jačej.93 Here, we appear to be witnessing the bureaucratic and scribal encounters between a Russian representative of sorts (cf. below) of the Ingrian peasants and a Russian representative of the Narva administration twenty or twenty-five years into Swedish rule. The clearest lines of difference in administrational practices between the Ingrian counties can usually be drawn between the three west Ingrian counties and Nöteborg county — this went back to the formative first dozen years of Swedish rule, when the latter was leased to Count Jacob De la Gardie. Yet, in this particular instance we observe a distinct difference between Caporie county and the rest. What differs is not that Russian petitions as such are missing or scarce in the other counties, but that next to no petitions are appended to their accounts, regardless of language. (Possibly, the 1635/6 figures from Jamgorod county bear witness to an earlier practice which was similar to that of Caporie county, but this is conjectural). It is too early to speculate as to the reasons for these differences. It is also too early to decide whether peasants turned to their trusted church d´jačok or to a pogost d´jačok who may have been prescribed by the Swedish authorities at the moot. We have seen that these might often be the same persons, which makes our inquiry the more difficult. With time, palaeographic and prosopographic analysis may provide answers and simultaneously provide us with better access to the world of Ingria’s peasants.94

92 EAA.278.1.XXIV-76, fols 163, 164, 165, 176, 179, 206, 232, 236, 243, 246, 254; NAS. Kammararkivet. Östersjöprovinsernas räkenskaper, vol. 40, fol. 207. 93 EAA.278.1.XXIV-76, fols 166, 175, 180, 218, 224. Some of these are written in a hand reminiscent of that of the Ivangorod/Narva pod´jačej in gubernatorial service, S. S. Ryžkov, but some palaeographic traits make me hesitant to attribute them to him. 94 A large part, possibly the majority, of these petitions will be edited within the project mentioned at the beginning of this paper.

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Concluding Remarks on Petitions As we have seen, we still have at our disposal several petitions to the Crown from the burghers of Ivangorod/Narva, and a few from other boroughs as well. These are all in Swedish, even though some traits (and in a few cases, partially parallel Russian documents) may in the future allow us to do some recontructional work on how, linguistically, they came into being. Similarly, we have petitions to the Crown from single Russian gentrymen in Ingria, which, but for the very first years, are also all in Swedish or German. We know that a couple of wealthy bayors had secretaries knowing one or both of these languages, and others may have procured the services of such secretaries or translators as they were needed. No doubt, there were, in the first decades of Swedish rule, plenty of petitions and pleas in Russian to the local administration at Narva from burghers and noblemen alike, but despite sporadic mentions of such writings we have precious little direct evidence. Petitions going back to the Orthodox peasants, on the other hand, are, for several decades, mainly in Russian and very conservative in style, but by the 1650s, at the very latest, they will be almost entirely replaced by appeals in Swedish. By that time, most Russian scribes and secretaries serving the local Swedish administration are gone, and sporadic communication in Russian with the Orthodox of Ingria is conducted by Swedish translators, when town or coun‐ try scribes or clergy are not hired to solve problems ad hoc (these, however, are all matters beyond the scope of this paper). Also by this time those administrators who had had some experiences of Sweden’s intervention in the Muscovite Time of Troubles and had a cultural understanding and, in some cases, knowledge of at least a little Russian, were dead or no longer in service. Yet, communicating in written Russian, writing Russian, was not an abandoned practice in the province; it only became gradually confined to more private — and commercial — spheres or, in the public sphere, to the mere signing of documents. In the 1650s, it was probably clear to everyone that writing appeals in Russian to the Swedes was no longer an effective means of achieving one’s goals. As early as c. 1640, this had been realized not only by noblemen and burghers — and, obviously, by Russian translators — but also by the most entrusted Russian scribes themselves. When the chancery secretary Stepan Ryžkov, whom we have met on several occasions in these pages, turns to the General Governor Bengt Oxenstierna in 1641 and asks for a salary increase, he does so in Swedish. Similarly, the Caporie scribe Vlasej Kornil´ev, usually signing receipts for Caporie workers and burghers in an idiosyncratically geometric Cyrillic hand, turning to Governor Nils Mannersköld and asking, in 1640, for an abatement, has engaged a Swedish scribe to pen his petition.95 Experience of ‘what works’ must have made him opt for that language even when addressing that veteran of the Russian wars. Swedish petitions such as these are preludes to the world of post-1658 Ingria,

95 NAF. 9653, fol. 56; NAF. 9651, fol. 148.

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where much of the Russian civil society — whether we understand ‘Russian’ as applying mainly to scribal practices or to more indiscriminately linguistic matters, or even to ‘ethnicity’ — will have been swept away or greatly diminished. The subject of written Ingrian Russian and its use and users at that later stage I hope to tackle in another work.

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Works Cited Manuscripts and Archival Sources

BRAN = Библиотека Российской академии наук (St Petersburg) cod. 32.5.7

EAA = Eesti Ajalooarhiiv (Tartu) fund 278: Liivimaa Rootsi-aegne kindralkuberner fund 632: Ingerimaa ja Käkisalmi kindralkuberner fund 1646: Narva magistraat fund 3287: Narva Ajalooselts

Herder-Institut (Marburg) DSHI 560, Livländisches Hofgericht

Lund University Library De la Gardieska arkivet, Topographica, Ingermanland och Kexholms län, vol. 3, 7

LVVA = Latvijas Valsts Vēstures arhīvs (Riga) fund 109: Vidzemes virspilstiesa (Hoftiesa)

MAS = The Military Archives of Sweden (Krigsarkivet, Stockholm) Militieräkningar 1623, vol. 25 Militieräkningar 1628, vol. 13 Militieräkningar 1655, vol. 9

NAF = National Archives of Finland (Kansallisarkisto, Helsinki) Biographica-kokoelma I, Aminoff Fogderäkenskaper, Allmänna handlingar, 428a: Räkenskaper för Ingermanland och Kexholms län 1628 Häradsrätternas renoverade domböcker, Koporie domsaga Länsräkenskaper, Allmänna handlingar, 6826: Ingermanlands kopiebok 1615–1653 Länsräkenskaper, Räkenskaper för Kexholms län och Ingermanland 9641: Jordebok för Ingermanland 1634 9647: Räkenskapsbok och mantalslängd för Ingermanland 1638 9651: Räkenskapsbok och mantalslängd för Ingermanland 1640

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9653: Räkenskapsbok och mantalslängd för Ingermanland 1641 9658: Specialräkning för Ingermanland och Kexholms län och mantalslängd för Ingermanland 1643 9674: Verifikationsbok för Ingermanland 1648 9790: Verifikationsbok och mantalslängd för Ingermanland och Kexholms län 1696

NAS = National Archives of Sweden (Riksarkivet, Stockholm) Biographica. Aminoff; Clementeoff Carl Carlsson Gyllenhielms samling, vol. E3767: Godshandlingar – Gods i Ingermanland Diplomatica Muscovitica, vol. 26: Kommissarierna till fredsfördragets konfirmation, brev till Kungl. Maj:t och rikskanslern 1617–1618 Ericsbergsarkivet. Bengt Oxenstiernas samling, vol. 35:2 Genealogica, vol. 120 Kammararkivet. Baltiska fogderäkenskaper, vol. 167–69, 171, 174, 183, 187–88 Kammararkivet. Oordnade handlingar, vol. [213] Kammararkivet. Strödda äldre räkenskaper. Ny serie. Fogdarnas förslag, vol. 29: Förslag avseende Östersjöprovinserna 1614–1627 Kammararkivet. Strödda kamerala handlingar, vol. 40: Avräkningar med kronoarrendatorer, militärer och andra Kammararkivet. Östersjöprovinsernas räkenskaper, vol. 40 Kammararkivets ämbetsarkiv t.o.m. 1921 Livländska donationskontoret, series FIVa, vol. 2 Livonica II, vol. 175: Skrivelser från Simon Grundel Helmfelt 1659–1661 ———, vol. 176: Skrivelser från Simon Grundel Helmfelt 1662–1663 ———, vol. 202: Skrivelser från konsistorium i Narva 1641–1685 ———, vol. 203: Skrivelser från konsistorium i Narva 1686–1704 ———, vol. 207: Skrivelser från Narva, Ivangorod, Jama och Nyen ———, vol. 209: Tjänstemäns och enskildas brev och suppliker från Ingermanland och Kexholms län ———, vol. 361: Ståthållarnas resp. guvernörernas i Narva registratur, januari–augusti 1636 ———, vol. 723: Strödda rättegångshandlingar och fragment 1590–1647 Ockupationsarkivet från Novgorod, series 2, vol. 50, 63 Oxenstiernska samlingen, vol. E601: Furstars, ämbetsmäns och enskilda personers brev och ansökningar Oxenstiernska samlingen, vol. E787: Städers, orters och däri varande lokala institutioners eller korporationers brev

RGADA = Российский государственный архив древних актов (Moscow) fund 141: Приказные дела старых лет [Prikaz acts from older times]

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Кобзарева, Елена Игоревна, ‘Отсвет Смуты: отношение в Новгороде к “изменникам” в первые годы после заключения Столбовского мира (1617 г.)’ [Kobzareva, Elena Igorevna, ‘A Reflection of the Time of Troubles: Novgorod Attitudes towards ‘Traitors’ in the First Years after the Conclusion of the Treaty of Stolbovo (1617)’], in Смутное время в России: Конфликт и диалог культур. Материалы научной конференции, Санкт-Петербург, 12–14 октября 2012 года, науч. ред. А. И. Филюшкин [The Time of Troubles in Russia. Conflict and dialogue of cultures. Proceedings of a scholarly conference, Saint Petersburg, 12–14 October 2012, ed. by A. I. Filjuškin] (St Petersburg: Istoričeskij fakul´tet SPbGU, 2012), pp. 84–87 Кузьмин, Андрей Валентинович, На пути в Москву. Очерки генеалогии военно-служилой знати Северо-Восточной Руси в XIII–середине XV в., ii [Kuz´min, Andrej Valentinovič, En Route to Moscow. Essays on the Genealogy of the Serving Military Aristocracy of North-Eastern Rus’ in the Thirteenth–Mid-Fifteenth Century, ii] (Moscow: Yazyki slavianskoi kul´tury, 2015) Кюнг, Энн, ‘Русские купцы и граждане Нарвы во второй половине 17 века’ [Küng, Enn, ‘Russian Merchants and Citizens of Narva in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century’], in Сборник Нарвского музея [Miscellany of the Narva Museum] (Narva: Narvskij muzej, 2002), pp. 7–44 Лихачев, Дмитрий Сергеевич, ‘Плач о реке Нарове 1665 г.’ [Lichačev, Dmitrij Sergeevič, ‘A 1665 Lament over the River Narova’], Труды Отдела древнерусской литературы [Proceedings of the Department of Old Russian Literature], 6 (1948), 333–38 Пересветов-Мурат, Александр Иванович, ‘“Епископ Ингомерлянский и всего помория полунощного оцеана”: великие комбинации Анфиногена Крыжановского’ [Pereswetoff-Morath, Aleksandr Ivanovič, ‘“Bishop of Ingomerlandia and all the seaboard of the septentrional ocean”. The Great Combinations of Athenogenes Kryžanoŭski’], Scando-Slavica, 56 (2010), 48–83 ———, ‘Из Ростова в Ингерманландию: М. А. Пересветов и другие русские baijor’ы’ [‘From Rostov to Ingria: M. A. Peresvetov and Other Russian bayors’], Новгородский исторический сборник [Novgorod Historical Miscellany], 7 (17) (1999), 366–78 ———, ‘Ингерманландский криминал, XVII век’ [‘An Ingrian Crime Story of the Seventeenth Century’], Inkeri (Pietarin ja Inkerinmaan kuulumisia), 67 (2008), 8–9 ———, ‘Урбан Йерне как нюенец и ингерманландец’ [‘Urban Hiärne as a Nyener and Ingrian’], in Археологическое наследие Санкт-Петербурга, iv: 400 лет основанию Ниеншанца, сост. П. Е. Сорокин [The Archaeological Heritage of Saint Petersburg, iv: 400 Years Since the Foundation of Nyenschantz, ed. by P. E. Sorokin] (St Petersburg: Naučno-issledovatel’skij institut kulturnogo i prirodnogo nasledija, 2014), pp. 105–39 Рабинович, Яков Николаевич, ‘Крепость Копорье и помещики Дягиленского погоста Копорского уезда в Смутное время (лето 1612 г. – весна 1617 г.)’ [Rabinovič, Jakov Nikolaevič, ‘The Fortress of Kopor´e and the Landowners of Djagilenskij pogost of the Kopor´e uezd in the Time of Troubles (Summer 1612–Spring 1617)’], Новгородский исторический сборник [Novgorod Historical Miscellany], 14 (24) (2014), 180–92

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Селин, Адриан Александрович, ‘Балтийские писцовые книги — часть Каммар-архива в Государственном архиве Швеции’ [Selin, Adrian Aleksandrovič, ‘The Baltic Cadastres: A Part of the Kammararkiv at the Swedish National Archives’], in Скандинавские чтения 2004 года. Этнографические и культурно-исторические аспекты [Scandinavian Readings for 2004. Ethnographical and Cultural-Historical Aspects] (St Petersburg: Kunstkamera, 2006), pp. 437–49 ———, ‘К изучению персонального состава землевладельцев Северо-Запада Новгородской земли конца XV века’ [‘A Contribution to the Study of Who Made Up the Landowning Class in Northwest Novgorodia at the End of the Fifteenth Century’], Rossica antiqua, 14 (2017), 122–43 ———, Новгородские судьбы Смутного времени [Novgorodian Fates in the Time of Troubles] (Novgorod: [n. pub.], 2009) ———, Русско-шведская граница (1617–1700 гг.). Формирование, функционирование, наследие. Исторические очерки [The Russian–Swedish Border (1617–1700). Formation, Functioning, and Legacy. Historical Essays] (St Petersburg: BLITs, 2016) ———, Смута на Северо-Западе в начале XVII века. Очерки из жизни новгородского общества [The Time of Trouble in the North-West at the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century. Essays on the Life of Novgorodian Society] (St Petersburg: BLITs, 2017) Сергий (архим.), Черты церковно-приходского и монастырского быта в писцовой книге Водской пятины 1500 года (в связи с общими условиями жизни) [Sergij (archim.), Features of Everyday Parochial and Monastic Life in the Cadastres of the Vodskaia Piatina for the Year 1500 (In Relation to the General Conditions of Life)] (St Peterburg: Akinfiev, 1905) Суслова, Евгения Дмитриевна, Церковно-приходская система в Карелии конца XV – начала XVIII века [Suslova, Evgenija Dmitrievna, The System of Parishes in Carelia from the End of the Fifteenth to the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century] (Petrozavodsk: Izdatel’stvo PetrGU, 2013) Толстиков, Александр Владимирович, ‘Бояре по-шведски: Понятие bajor в шведском языке XVI–XVII вв.’ [Tolstikov, Aleksandr Vladimirovič, ‘Boyars in Swedish: The Concept of bajor in Sixteenth–Seventeenth-Century Swedish’], in Финно-угорская мозаика. Сборник статей к юбилею Ирмы Ивановны Муллонен, отв. ред. О. П. Илюха [A Fenno-Ugric Mosaic. A Collection of Articles for the Anniversary of Irma Ivanovna Mullonen, ed. by O. P. Iljucha], Studia Nordica, 1 (Petrozavodsk: Federal’nyj issledovatel’skij centr Karel’skij naučnyj centr Rossijskoj akademii nauk, 2016), pp. 33– 42

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Appendix A. Russian Chancery Secretaries (pod´jačie) in Swedish Ingria, 1617–1656 ivangorod Semen Budynskoj, probably c. 1616–1627 (1616: NAS. Kammararkivet. Baltiska fogderäkenskaper 167:3, unfoliated; 1627: EAA.278.1.XXV-187, fol. 8v; numerous deeds between these dates); Fedor Larionov, 1627/8–? (1628: NAF. 428a, pp. 43, 278); Stepan Semenov syn Ryžkov, c. 1635/6(?)–46 (see, e.g.: EAA.278.1.XXIV-76, fol. 39r; his letter of discharge for old age of 30 January 1646 with leave to Muscovy in Russian translation at the Russian State Archive of Early Documents, F. 141. Приказные дела старых лет [Prikaz acts from older times]. 1646 г. No. 113-a, fols 1–28, at fol. 7 (? unfoliated)). Ryžkov had previously served as a scribe at Jamgorod (cf. below). Note: Some tasks as a Russian secretary at Ivangorod/Narva are later performed by the school teacher and former monastery d´jačok, Isa(a)k Sergeev syn Torčakov, prob. † 1653–4 (see: Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Isaak Torčakov: en ingermanländsk diak’, pp. 101–03; EAA.278.1. XXIV-83, fol. 740). jamgorod Uvar Pjatin, 1617–1621 (?). It is not clear whether Pjatin, who, unlike his colleague and relative Stepan Ryžkov, received no royal confirmation for his minor wartime fief in 1618, did actual service after that date. Absconded to Muscovy with his family during Lent 1621 (see: Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Isaak Torčakov: en ingermanländsk diak’, pp. 87–88);1 Stepan Semenov syn Ryžkov, 1617–1627. In 1627/8 apparently demoted (?) to a corn scribe at Jamgorod and later removed to Ivangorod (exact year uncertain but apparently by 1633) (Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Isaak Torčakov: en ingermanländsk diak’, pp. 87–88, 94; cf. on him: Селин, Смута на Северо-Западе [Selin, The Time of Troubles in the NorthWest], pp. 441–42; cf. above). He claims to have been sent with his father and brothers from Moscow to Jamgorod to be pod´jačie in 1606/7 (RGADA. F. 141. Приказные дела старых лет [Prikaz acts from older times]. 1646 г. No. 113-a, fols 1–28, at fol. 3 (? unfoliated); cf. Демидова, Служилая бюрократия в России XVII века [Demidova, The Service Class Bureaucracy of Seventeenth-Century Russia], p. 488). caporie (kopor´e) Petr Budynskoj, serving at least since 1613/14, see: NAS. Kammararkivet. Baltiska fogderäkenskaper, vol. 183. Specialredovisningar 1612–1615, fols 40r, 60v; last referred to

1 Onanej Pjatin, the only other known pod´jačej of that family, who served in Moscow from 1623, was a cousin of the Ryžkov brothers (Селин, ‘К изучению персонального состава землевладельцев Северо-Запада Новгородской земли’ [Selin, ‘A Contribution to the Study of Who Made Up the Landowning Class in North-West’], p. 134; Демидова, Служилая бюрократия в России XVII века [Demidova, The Serving Bureaucracy of Seventeenth-Century Russia], p. 472). The Pjatins were a Jamgorod family, and it is tempting to surmise that Onanej and U(v)ar is the same person, even though the fact that both names are calendrical speaks against such a straight-forward identification.

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when, in 1618, his peasants in Duderov pogost (Nöteborg län) are mentioned [vol. 187:4, under ‘Joutzinoua by’]). We cannot exclude the possibility that he is the anonymous Russian scribe known at Caporie in 1625, see below on Vlasej Kornil´ev, and/or the ‘minor scribe Petruška’ (Små skrifueren Petruska) mentioned in the Caporie borough in 1628–1629 (NAF. 428a, pp. 536, 539, 541), but he might also be identical with the pod´jačej Petr Ivanov doing seasonal service at Nyenskans/Nevskoe ust´e in 1616–1618 (cf. below), and may then, like Tarasej Ivanov, have been temporarily transferred from Caporie to Nöteborg. As we have seen, his son Jakov is later made use of as a pogost scribe but it is uncertain when this service begins, as it is unknown at what point he is drawn into church service. The scribe Vlas(ej) Kornil´ev may also best be mentioned here. He enjoyed a small freehold near Caporie for his services as a scribe and courier at least 1634–1640 (see, e.g.: NAF. 9641, fol. 32v; EAA.278.1.XXIV-80, fol. 778r; in 1643 he and his wife are both in extremis, see: NAF. 9658, fol. 663r). He may have been the ‘Russian scribe at Caporie’ who is mentioned as early as 1625 (NAS. Kammararkivet. Baltiska fogderäkenskaper, vol. 183:9. Afkortningen opå 1625 Åhrs Ränta vthi Caporie Lähn), but this may also have been the pod´jačej P. Budynskoj (cf. above), or a third person otherwise unknown to us. nöteborg (orešek) ? Ivan Stepanov syn Věrin, † 1639–1642, is mentioned in August 1617 as ‘a Russian scribe [schriffuare] […] in service here at the fortress [of Nöteborg]’ (NAS. Diplomatica Muscovitica, vol. 26. Letter from the Swedish legates to the King. 7 August 1617), but is is unclear for how long he served and, in fact, doubtful whether we might call him a chancery secretary. His handwriting in extant documents is somewhat crude. As a rule he is called a ‘diak’ in Swedish (e.g. Lund University Library. De la Gardieska arkivet. Topographica. Ingermanland och Kexholms län, vol. 7. 1619. Jaroselskoi Pågost. Lesia Bÿ Conitz); Taras(ej) Ivanov, † aft. 1651, previously a corn scribe at Caporie, is known as sole Rus‐ sian scribe at Nöteborg around 1620 (Lund University Library. De la Gardieska arkivet. Topographica. Ingermanland och Kexholms län, vol. 3. Förslag på Nöteborgs befästning 1619), but it is unknown for how long he may have served in this capacity. His fairly large estate near Pulkovo (see, e.g., the royal grant in: NAF. 6826, no. 190) may have been held in part for his service and he may therefore have remained invisible in official payrolls. Circa 1650 he claims — impossibly — to have served Gustavus Adolphus as a chamber scribe (cammarskriffuare) for twenty-three years (NAS. Livonica II, vol. 209. Skrivelser om gods). This is probably the title he himself (?) translates as dvorcovyi pod´jačei in 1636 (see the source publication in: Селин. Русско-шведская граница [Selin, The Russian-Swedish Border], p. 790). On him, see also Appendix C. In 1637, the Nöteborg scribe Timofej Timofeev syn Popov, who is usually known in Swedish as a ‘diak’ (see footnote 81), signs a court testimonial as ‘orechovskoi [i.e. ‘Nöteborg’] pod´jačei’ (Пересветов-Мурат, ‘Ингерманландский криминал, XVII век’ [Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘An Ingrian Crime Story of the Seventeenth Century’], p. 9). At present, this is the only known instance of him using this title, and it is difficult to say whether this was a contextual decision or if it reflects a position as a chancery scribe which

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he held at the time. We know of other, later, cases where he did judiciary service, but have no relevant documents in Russian confirming a title in that language. other There are also single mentions of the pod´jačei Petr Ivanov at the toll-station at Nyenskans/Nevskoe ust´e in the first year after Stolbovo (‘Таможенная книга Невского устья 1616–1618 гг.’ [‘Customs Book of the Neva Estuary 1616–1618’]), who cannot be identified with any certainty with other Ingrian scribes or secretaries (but see above on Petr Budynskoj), and of Petr (Semenov syn) Ryžkov as a Russian ‘barn bailiff’ at the Cattilla (Kotly/Kotel) Crown demesne (kungsladugård) in Toldoskoj pogost in 1627 (NAS. Kammararkivet. Strödda äldre räkenskaper. Ny serie. Fogdarnas förslag, vol. 29:6. Förslag på Caporie befästning, september–december 1627). Ryžkov, the brother of Stepan R., is otherwise known as a corn scribe at Ivangorod but designates himself a pod´jačei (NAF. 428a, pp. 43, 280).

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Appendix B. Orthodox Churches in Swedish Ingria, 1617– 1704 2 russian orthodox churches functioning in ingria for the better part of the period 1617–17043 Ivangorod County Ivangorod & Narva (a minimum of two functioning churches for most of the seventeenth century)4 Jamgorod County Opolie/Opol´e (1701?) See also Ragwitza below. Caporie County Caporie borough/Kopor´e (1702; still two churches in 1647 but possibly no resident priests in the 1640s and 1650s) Gorka/Gorki (1697/8, but the same priest under Muscovite rule in 1719) Soikinagåra/Sojkinо (1702; for almost the entire Swedish era served only by a d´jačok) Ratzina/Ratčino (1702) Cattilla/Kotly (1702) Ilies/Il´eši (1700) Udasalo/Udosolovo (1696; no firmly documented activity 1642–1672) Dätelitz/Djatlicy (1691) Nöteborg County Spasski [now in St Petersburg, near Smol´nyj] (1700) Cuiwas/Kujvozi (1689) the following additional churches had fallen into disuse in the 1640s– 1650s Jamgorod County Jamgorod borough/Kingisepp (d´jačok 1652, still two churches c. 1647 but no priest documented after 1629)5 Ragwitza/Ragovicy (chapel with d´jačok 1647, possibly 1656, again for some time around 1675)

2 Full references for this appendix cannot be given here. I am preparing a monograph on the Orthodox priests and parishes of Swedish Ingria where the complex source material is analysed. 3 That is, at least with a resident d´jačok. Present-day or historical Russian name after the solidus. The year after the church/parish name is the last year in which a church/priest or, if so specified, resident d´jačok is documented before the Muscovite occupation of Ingria in 1703/4. 4 It is uncertain whether any Orthodox churches survived the Russian invasion of 1700 and the burning of the Ivangorod and Narva suburbs, but in 1703 there were still two Orthodox priests in ‘Narva’. 5 The status of a Russian priest captured by the Muscovites in the Jamgorod borough in 1657 is unclear.

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Jablonitza/Jablonicy (d´jačok 1647, possibly 1648; possibly a chapel) See also Wruda below. Caporie County Kipina/Kipen´ (1656) Nöteborg County Nöteborg borough/Šeremet´evka (priest last mentioned in 1637; parish still known in 1647; church burnt in 1656) Ingris/Jam-Ižora (1656 – the last decade before that served only by a d´jačok, who, c. 1655, was ordained a priest in Muscovy) Mikola/Nikol´skoe in Loppis/Lopskoi pogost (1650/1, still a d´jačok in 1656) Poritz/Poreč´e (1646/7, still a d´jačok in 1656) Keltis/Koltuši [† Russkaja Kirka?] (1644/5, still an old d´jačok in 1656) Tråitza/Troickoe in Loppis/Lopskoi pogost (1644/5, still a d´jačok in 1654) additionally, functioning only until the 1620s or 1630s Ivangorod County Kusemkina / [Bol´šoe] Kuzemkinо (1618; later the Orthodox visit Ivangorod churches) Jamgorod County Jasterbina/Jastrebino (1623; possibly early 1630s) Wruda/[Bol´šaja] Vruda (1622; again a d´jačok 1651–5) Caporie County Worontkino/Voronkino (1626) Fzdilitzky/Zdylicy (1624) Glaschkowitza/Laškovicy (1623) Orlina/Orlino (1618?) Nöteborg County Korboselski/Korbosel´ki (1631, still an old d´jačok in 1638) Jechoritz/Egor´evskoe (priest 1620; a d´jačok in 1638 and possibly somewhat later) Duder/Dudergof (1623) Rjabino/Levduzi? (1619) Woronia/Voron´e (1618; signs of activity in the early 1630s, possibly to do with the Poritz priest) Wystawka [= Willola?] /Veleevo (possibly abandoned by 1617) I include neither the few monastery churches nor the fortress churches of Caporie, Jam‐ gorod, and Nöteborg (for security reasons, these had all been closed for the Orthodox by 1621) or the communities of Muscovite Old Believers (starověry) established in Caporie county in the last third of the seventeenth century. There is some evidence that otherwise abandoned churches, chapels, and monasteries could be visited — and, possibly, some

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kind of services performed — on the feastdays of their saints. From a Muscovite point of view, some churches that had been rebuilt after the 1650s (e.g. Spasski and Cuiwas), may have been regarded, canonically, as mere chapels, but this was probably not the local attitude.

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Appendix C. Bayors whose Families Remained in the Province c. 1630 6 1 2 3

F. G. Aminev (Aminoff, † 1628) with several adult children; M. I. Kalitin (Callentin, Kalitin, † c. 1635) with several adult children; V. S. Čebotaev (Sabotaioff, Zebotaioff, † 1652) probably with wife and adult (half‑?)sis‐ ters and with his (half-?)brother, namely: 4 G. K. Opalev (Apolloff, † c. 1654); 5 M. A. Klement´ev (Clementeoff, † 1624–1631) with several adult children; 6 Š. (A.?) I. Chomutov (Homutoff, † c. 1635?) 7 M. P. Karpovskoj (Carpofschoi, † 1640) 8 M. A. Peresvětov (Pereswetoff, † 1641); 9 F. V. Lugvenev (Lugmenoff, † 1626–1634) with adult children, and, possibly, 10 L. Šablykin (Sabluikin), who died without issue, however, shortly before or after 1630.

Nos 7, 8, and 10 (probably not no. 2 despite suggestions in the genealogical literature) married daughters of no. 1; nos 5 and 6 married sisters of no. 3; nos 6 and 7, and probably no. 10, died without male issue no later than 1640. No. 7 did not return to Muscovy, pace Lind. ‘De Ingermanlandske “Ryss-Bajorer”’, p. 54. No. 3 had a recognized natural son with issue — who is usually referred to as ‘well-born’ — but the noble family is formally continued with a new family name but an unchanged coat of arms (pace various armorials) by no. 4 and his children. To these bayors may be added the Polish/Lithuanian gentrymen: 11 J./I. Kukaszewicz (Kuckisieff, Kuckowitz, etc., † 1626–1632); 12 Ch. Konarski (Kanarski, † 1634). Both of these died without male issue; no. 11 some time before 1632. He was married to a daughter of no. 5. Furthermore, we may add the tatar servicemen: 13 I. Muralěev; 14 P. Alabardiev; 15 I. Isupov. No. 15 dies by 1634 and shortly thereafter his son will enter Muscovite service. No. 14 attempts to return to Muscovy in 1631 with his family and, when returned by the Russians, finds himself deprived of his Ingrian estates and is heard of no more. No. 13 is dead or has disappeared with no known issue by c. 1632.

6 Considerations of space do not allow full sources to be given for this appendix, and the interested reader must await the monograph on the bayors for which I have collected data for some twenty-five years. Cf., however, the literature given in n. 26 above, where some aspects are addressed.

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The Russian Nobleman 16 V. Buturlin (Butterlin, † 1665), who served in Sweden from an early age and died with no known issue, only received Ingrian lands in 1641 and probably never lived there. Other gentrymen entering Swedish service in Ingria c. 1617 (representatives of the families Abramov, Bulatov, Tyrtov, and others) pass away or move by the mid-1620s. In the periphery of the Russian gentry, but never referred to as a bayor, we find the landowning Nöteborg pod´jačej Tarasej Ivanov († aft. 1651), mentioned above, whose son, however, appears to have married a daughter of no. 2. Occasionally mentioned as bayors is, however, the family of the landowning translator: 17 B. Barohn († 1650–1651), an ethnic Frenchman from the Holy Roman Empire who had served in Moscow. To the bayors was added, in 1630, the Smolensk non-noble 18 A. (L.) D. Rubcov (Rubzoff, † c. 1648), who would soon marry a grand-daughter of no. 1. Russian gentrymen who had entered Swedish service in the 1580s–90s and had lost all connections with Ingria are not included in this survey. An adopted (?) member of one of those families, 19 Colonel F. P. Razladin (Rosladin, † 1628), b. c. 1600, did receive a substantial fief in Saretzschoi pogost in 1623. However, he was killed in the line of duty in 1628 with no male issue and it is doubtful whether he or his family ever took up residence in Ingria.

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The Mosaic of Knowledge about Muscovy in Sweden in the Great Power Era

The great change in European relations with Russia took place in 1478 when Muscovy replaced the trading Republic of Novgorod as a neighbour of Sweden, Livonia, and Lithuania. Since that year, Western Europe has shared a border with a bellicose great power with large resources, causing dread. The feelings of dread caused by the new Russia, with its rulers like Tsar Ivan the Terrible, became a standing theme in printed matter as well as politics, and the image of Russia became very similar to the image of Turkey, which threatened Europe from the south-east.1 Various, usually rather negative, stereotypical expressions characterized the vocabulary used to describe Russia in the sixteenth century.2 The Peace of Stolbovo in 1617 started a period of successive change. The era of Sweden as a Great Power led to growing knowledge about Russia in almost every respect, but it was still based on the established stereotypes. These stereotypes started, however, to seem more diluted and thinner with time. The image of Russia as a threat was, to a growing extent, replaced by an image of possibility. The increase of knowledge in Sweden was due to the political situation. The balance of power had been changing with the growing strength of Sweden as a major power and the Swedish realm had been enlarged with new provinces, including Ingria and the County of Kexholm, both acquired as war booty (iure belli) from Russia. Swedish military capacity and cohesion had proved themselves superior to those of the neighbouring powers. The Peace of Stolbovo in 1617 was an obvious setback for Russia, only enhanced by the Peace of Kardis in 1661. The disappearance of fear is illustrated by a story about Queen Christina and the Russian diplomats in 1633. Courtiers tried to warn the little princess, as yet only seven years old, before an audience with stories about the strange Russian appearance — Russians had beards and could seem dangerous, but there was

1 Tarkiainen, ‘Faran från öst i svensk säkerhetspolitisk diskussion’. 2 Scheidegger, Perverses Abendland — barbarisches Russland; Tarkiainen, ‘De ryska “nationalegenskaperna”’. Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 287–300 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133608

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no need to be afraid of them. ‘Why should I be afraid?’, Christina replied. The girl thought that she had seen enough beards also on the chins of her Swedish advisors.3

Interpreters How did knowledge of Russia arrive in Sweden? Interpreters or translators into Russian played a key linguistic role.4 Interpreting and translating from Russian to Swedish, and vice versa, was their profession. Their number and the level of their professionalism increased during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There were already bilingual persons in Viborg, Sweden’s most important eastern border town, in the fifteenth century. The training of interpreters into Russian in Viborg even attracted students from abroad. The need for Russian interpreters actually exploded during the war in 1609–1617, when Viborg occasionally harboured tens of Russian interpreters. Many of the most influential Russian interpreters continued to come from Viborg, such as Henrik Piper (in active service 1633– 1635) and Olof Barckhusen (in active service 1654–1659, 1664–1687). Some authors writing about Russia, for instance Lars Johan Malm (Ehrenmalm; b. 1688, d. 1774), also came from Viborg.5 Proficiency in the Russian language could also be found in the towns of Narva, Reval, Riga, and Nyen, where interpreters were mainly employed in trade.6 Very early references to dictionaries and registers have been found. The corps of interpreters later reached particularly great numbers in the town of Narva, where a Russian school operated at times. A concentration of Russian interpreters in Stockholm, the capital of the Swedish kingdom, has been noted as early as the 1540s. Every diplomatic mission going east was provided with a couple of Russian interpreters, the largest ones at the end of the seventeenth century with up to four or five interpreters. When the interpreters were back at home they gathered in the old part of the Chancery, where they worked in premises close to those of the State Archives and the historiographers of the state. The location was important because old treaties and other records were kept there. The appointment of a translator was created in the 1640s with a salary which was very competitive. The translator’s tasks included teaching Russian apprentices or ‘Ryssetolks drängar’ as they were called. It later became customary to send interpreters to Novgorod or Moscow, where they could put the finishing touches to their skills.7

3 4 5 6 7

Silfverstolpe, ‘Historisk bakgrund’, p. 29; Tarkiainen, Moskoviten, pp. 205–24. Tarkiainen, ‘Venäjäntulkit ja slavistiikan harrastus’, pp. 5–46. Tarkiainen, Se Vanha Vainooja, pp. 261–83; Anthoni, ‘Lars Johan Ehrenmalm’, p. 290. Tarkiainen, ‘Venäjäntulkit ja slavistiikan harrastus’, pp. 19–25. Tarkiainen, ‘Venäjäntulkit ja slavistiikan harrastus’, pp. 39–46.

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Official interest in the Russian language gave birth to interest in scholarly research, represented at the end of the seventeenth century by the internationally prominent Swedish Slavonic philologist, Johan Gabriel Sparfwenfeldt. He wrote a large dictionary, which covered several Slavonic languages. His diary from a stay in Russia is also important.8

Diplomatic Relations Confirmation of peace was a Russian specialty which constituted the nucleus of diplomatic relations. The peace, characterized as ‘eternal’, was regarded as a very fragile condition tied to the ruler who had confirmed it. When a change of rulers occurred it was absolutely necessary to exchange missions, travelling either to Moscow or to Stockholm in order to renew the peace under ‘the clear eyes’ of the new ruler. Russian liturgy was observed on these occasions. These visits were characterized by great reciprocal sensitivity and adherence to rigid practice. The material about the visits of Swedish missions is abundant, amounting to several hundreds of substantial hand-written volumes in the Muscovitica collection of the Swedish National Archives.9 Titles regularly constituted a problem.10 Both the Swedish King and the Russian Tsar had for ages been endowed with long and elaborate, constantly changing so-called great titles, which reflected the geographical breadth of their realm. They were lists of various parts and provinces, growing because Sweden as Russia as well were expanding. Omissions of some detail were easily made, and both parties also made intentional mistakes in order to see how the land lay. Deceased rulers’ titles constituted another problem. Was it possible to de‐ scribe a person as blessedly deceased, if he represented a foreign religion? Specific lists and guide books were finally compiled by the Chancery during the reign of King Charles XI in order to enable mastery of the Russian art of addressing. They were so skillfully compiled that they often included explanations of the etymology of the Russian words.11 Presenting of gifts was another feature of diplomatic relations. This habit originated from the tax paid by Muscovy to the Mongol rulers, a compulsory tribute forced upon those who were subjected. This dimension made the gift issue sensitive for Sweden. The Swedes always emphasized that the gifts were presented as proof of Royal benevolence towards the Tsar and should not be regarded as compulsory or as signs of a weaker position. Grand Swedish silver sets in Baroque style produced by the best Continental silver smiths, overwhelming pieces of colossal size and beakers in sophisticated, strict Carolinian style gradually filled

8 9 10 11

Birgegård, ‘Introduction’. Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Diplomatica Muscovitica, vol. 1–673. Birgegård, ‘En ständig huvudvärk’, pp. 34–36. Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Diplomatica Muscovitica, vol. 662.

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the Treasury of the Kremlin in Moscow. These remain priceless today in the eyes of scholars focusing on the history of silver and culture. These gifts in silver were matched with Russian gifts of sable fur.12 The journeys of the Swedish missions were of great value because they pro‐ vided tens of participating noble youngsters, usually called ‘Hovjunkrar’ [Court Junkers], with an opportunity to participate and get a glimpse of the large eastern country. For them these journeys were peregrinations, educational trips. Other travelers usually joined the missions, because they provided a way of getting into Russia without problems. A permanent Swedish diplomat or Resident was in addition continuously attached to Moscow, sending frequent letters to the government at home with detailed reports about what was going on in the hub of the large Russian Empire. In addition, almost every Swedish mission produced — beside these official records — an informal publication or report about Russia. Half a dozen such books are known, ranging from Bengt Skytte’s Relatio Moscovitica from 1631, to Anders Svensson Trana’s En kort berättelse om Ryssland (A Short Report on Russia) from 1657, and Nicolaus Lidell’s Ett kort och sannfärdigt Diarium (A Short and Truthful Diary) from 1699.13

The Russian Religion Besides the diplomatic contacts, the study of Russian religion was a sphere which provided additional knowledge about Muscovy. It was important, because religion was a state ideology in Sweden as well as Russia. The idea and identity of Swedishness as well as Russianness during this era was found in religion, not in the nation or the language. The question of the Greek religion was brought to the fore after the annexa‐ tion of Ingria and the County of Kexholm, both regions with a Greek Orthodox population. Several ecclesiastical debates provided insight in the main elements of Russian belief. Johannes Botvidi’s dissertation in Uppsala in 1620 was the most important contribution, underscoring that the Russians were Christians who did not have to be baptized.14 The state authorities therefore allowed the Greek Orthodox and the Karelians in the border areas to adhere to their beliefs. Forced conversion would have led to insuperable tensions in foreign politics. King Gustavus Adolphus procured in 1625 a printing press which could use Cyrillic types. It was operated by Typographer Peter van Selow. The printing press produced several religious publications in Russian and Church Slavonic, a primer and two catechisms and probably other ones that have become lost. The theological level in these publications was controlled by prominent clergymen,

12 Silvergåvor från Sveriges regenter, ed. by Silfverstolpe, Kudriavtseva, Zagorodniaja. 13 Norberg, ‘Bröderna Skyttes ryska resor’; Tarkiainen, ‘Olearius i Sverige’; Silfverstolpe, ‘Historisk bakgrund’, pp. 85–87. 14 Мокробородова [Mokroborodova], Quaestio nostro saeculo inusitata.

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Figure 13.1. The salt works on the river Mshaga. From an illustrated book about Russia 1674, Några observationer angående Ryssland (Some Observations Concerning Russia). Here and at Staraia Russa large quantities of first-class salt were produced. The author, Erik Palmquist (c. 1650–1676), was a member of Count Gustaf Oxenstierna’s embassy to Moscow in 1673–1674. Swedish National Archives, Stockholm: Kartor och ritningar utan känd proveniens 636. Kartbok. For the most recent edition see Пальмквист, Заметки о России [Palmqvist, Notes on Russia].

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also Greek Orthodox ones.15 The Russian studies in Sweden were based on the proficiency of Russian interpreters and were as such a unique phenomenon in the whole Western world. This line based on persuasion and education gave no results. The Greek Orthodox population did not adapt; the Greek Orthodox fled in great numbers from Ingria and the County of Kexholm across the border, particularly when the thumb screws were tightened in the 1640s by the superintendent in Narva, Heinrich Stahl,16 and the bishop in Viborg, Petrus Bjugg.17 In about 1649 a convert, Simon Igumnov, published a sharp anti-Russian pamphlet under Bjugg’s crosier: Om beläters tillbediande (On the Worship of Idols).18 The conditions in Ingria were further aggravated through the Lutheran Orthodox Superintendent Johannes Gezelius junior’s zealousness, which started to resemble direct terror. En trägen uppmaning (A Persistent Request), his publication aiming at conversion, was published from 1686–1687 in Finnish. The contrast was striking in comparison with the Bishopric of Viborg, where Petrus Bång, Bishop 1681–1696, had adopted a more tolerant and softer line towards the Greek Orthodox. His views are already tinged by the Pietistic, brighter conception of a brotherhood between various lines of Christianity. Nicolaus Bergius, who for a short while was Superintendent in Ingria, published works which were in line with Bång’s optimistic views. Bergius’s great informative package De Statu Ecclesiae et Religionis Muscoviticae (published in 1704–1705) gives a comprehensive and, in principle, non-biased picture of Russian religion, in detail as well as in general.19 Army Chaplain Henrik Sederberg went still further in expressing sympathy for the Greek Orthodox in his manuscript Anteckningar öfver Ryska Folkets Religion och Seder (Notes on the Religion and Habits of the Russian People) from the 1710s, which ranks the old Greek religion in some respects before Lutheranism. It would have been quite impossible to publish this one hundred years earlier.20

15 Tarkiainen, ‘Venäjäntulkit ja slavistiikan harrastus’, pp. 47–65; Sjöberg, ‘Hans Flörich och Isak Torcakov’. 16 Stahl (c. 1600–1657) is known for the first grammar of the Estonian language, Anführung zu der Esthnischen Sprach (1637). In 1641 he was appointed superintendent of Ingria and Alutaguse with his seat at Narva. He took pains to teach the catechism to the Estonians and preached in Estonian. His efforts to organize church and education on the Swedish model clashed, however, with opposition from the Narva council and the local nobility, and the Orthodox Ingrians could not be persuaded to exchange their faith for Lutheranism, fleeing instead to Russia. 17 Isberg, Svensk segregations- och konversionspolitik; Laasonen, Novgorodin imu; Sivonen, ‘Me inkerikot, vatjalaiset ja karjalaiset’. 18 SRA, Skoklostersamlingen fol. 34 (= vol. E 8160). 19 On Bergius, see also David Gudmundsson’s article in the present volume. 20 Tarkiainen, Se Vanha Vainooja, pp. 237–48, 284–92.

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Trade Another sphere of contact and an important source of information during the seventeenth century was trade politics.21 In addition to the expensive and danger‐ ous sea route around Africa, there was also an ancient land route between two continents. The caravans brought expensive products of the Orient, primarily silk, to Persia where the southern coast of the Caspian Sea was the starting point of a long and difficult route over waters and rivers via Astrakhan and the Russian river system right up to the White Sea or various harbours of the Baltic Sea. Thrifty Armenian merchants were the cement of this transit trade. Sweden’s aspiration to attaining the status of a great power was partially based on the command of all ports on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, from Reval (1561), Narva (1581), Riga (1621), and Nyen (1632), to Elbing and Danzig which, however, belonged to the Swedish realm only temporarily. This great Swedish hegemony over the Baltic Sea was labeled dominium maris Baltici. It was based on economics, on the aspiration to collect customs duties from the East-West flow of transit trade in the vicinity, while at times it involved changing routes in an irritating way.22 The Baltic Sea was not the only alternative; Russia was also in contact with Western Europe through Archangel (sea route discovered in 1553, town founded in 1584) which the English Muscovy Company had opened and the Dutch also started to use a couple of decades later. It was a harbour where the Russians met their buyers without any middlemen. Swedish dreams of extending control to include the White Sea route where crushed by the Peace Treaty of Stolbovo. Sweden strove since then for what was called derivation — transfer of the great trade volumes from Archangel to the Baltic Sea by various means.23 The concept of very low customs tariffs in the towns of Reval, Narva, and Nyen was launched in the 1640s, de facto making the eastern part of the Finnish Gulf a customs free zone. It did not help, and a number of economic authors took pains to develop ideas that would carry derivation into effect. Anton Loofeldt (in 1643), Johan De Rodes (in 1653), Philipp von Krusenstern (in 1646, 1660, and 1661), Johan Philipp Kilburger (in 1674), and Christoffer von Kochen (in 1692) — all wrote about the issue, often in mutual understanding with the recently (in 1651) founded National Board of Trade.24 In 1701 when war had already started, sending a fleet detachment to the White Sea with orders to destroy Archangel was in line with

21 In the treaty, trade is regulated in articles 14–16. Free trade is granted for Sweden and Russia and the subjects of these realms. 22 Hildebrand, ‘Ekonomiska syften i svensk expansionspolitik’; Attman, ‘Till det svenska Östersjöväldets problematik’. 23 Troebst, ‘Narva und der Außenhandel Persiens’. 24 Troebst, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung; Nyström, ‘Mercatura Ruthenica’, pp. 137–38; Ekonomiska förbindelser mellan Sverige och Ryssland, ed. by Attman et al., pp. 106–30.

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these efforts. This venture ordered by Charles XII was stopped by fire from heavy artillery at the mouth of the river Dvina. In approximately 1683–1684, when a new Tsar was taking over in Moscow, there was a miracle. Trade bent and started to flow in large scale through Narva and to some extent through Nyen. Merchants from Narva had personally started to go to the inner parts of Russia, often to Moscow, in order to do business. The dislike of Western seafaring powers of the journey to the Arctic Sea probably carried greater weight. The journey to Archangel lasted twice as long as the journey to Narva and time was money even in the 1680s and 1690s. Trade started to flourish at the furthest eastern end of the Finnish Gulf. It was not a bad place for a future new great city and such a city was founded by Tsar Peter in 1703 with substantial drive. The emergence of St Petersburg also enhanced the importance of the whole Finnish Gulf for Russia, because it was the entrance to its new capital. Alongside transit trade on a large scale, trade was also conducted on a local level with Russians in the capital of the Swedish Kingdom, Stockholm. Merchants from Olonets, Tikhvin, Novgorod, and Pskov sailed with their river boats via the river Neva, along the northern coast of the Finnish Gulf and finally across the Åland Sea to the Ryssgård (Russian Covered Market) which had been established in Stockholm in 1637–1638 and was given an advantageous location on Söder‐ malm. For sixty years, in the centre of Sweden, hundreds of bearded foreigners in kaftans offered their splendid products: furs, linen, hemp, and in particular, various qualities of leather, which the guild of shoemakers in Stockholm gradually became dependent on. The Russians had their own divine services and mingled with the local population, assisted by numerous interpreters who had their own links to the State interpreters in the Royal Castle.25 The Russian merchants contributed to the knowledge of Russia, for the most part in a positive way. They, however, conducted only wholesale trade, which limited their contact with the inhabitants of Stockholm in general.

Books A Russian refugee, Grigorii Kotoshikhin, lived among the merchants and, in the 1660s, wrote a sensationally good book about the administration of Muscovy. It was made available for experts on Russia as five handwritten copies, which differed from each other. Kotoshikhin’s book had the title Om Muschofsche Rijkets Staat (On the State of the Russian Realm) (1669, 1682). It is an objective and non-biased package of information without parallel anywhere in Western Europe.26

25 See Lang, Stadsgården och Ryssgården, and Elisabeth Löfstrand’s article in the present volume. 26 Adde, ‘Inledning’.

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I have still not mentioned perhaps the most remarkable, albeit rather unorigi‐ nal, Swedish printed description of Russia of the era, Regni Muschovitici Sciographia, published by Petrus Petrejus, a son of a Bishop, in 1615. Petrejus’s work is to a striking extent based on Western European, Livonian, and Russian sources; the majority of them have been identified by scholars. The book was translated into German and became a short-lived classic, which dominated the European conception of Russia until Adam Olearius’s Offt begehrte Beschreibung der newen Orientalischen Reyse was published in 1646. Olearius there‐ after served the purpose of principal encyclopedia on Russia for almost eighty years, until the 1720s.27 Petrus Petrejus’s work brings to the fore the problem of Western European literature and its role in the Swedish conception of Russia. Such literature flowed to Sweden either through purchase or as war booty. The European literature on Russia during the seventeenth century could roughly be divided into three categories: the Papal-Imperial publications, the Anglo-Saxon literature and the lit‐ erature which is linked to the Baltic Sea. The printed Papal-Imperial publications, amounting to some thirty, are very hostile towards Turkey, and consequently Muscovy is seen as a potential ally.28 The approximately forty English books are a separate world reflecting views of the explorers and merchants on Russia.29 Finally, the literature linked to the Baltic Sea (i.e. Livonia, northern Germany, Poland), amounting to some 100 to 120 titles including pamphlets, radiates a clear but gradually waning Russophobia.30 The mainly unprinted Swedish literature on Russia should certainly be included in the category of literature linked to the Baltic Sea, although there are traces of influence from papally and imperially inspired standard literature (Herberstein, Jovius, Possevino). At the final stage of Sweden’s era as a great power, during an already ongoing war after 1700, there was a substantial widening but also polarization of the information on Russia. The old Russophobia was revived in parts of Sweden when the Great War against Russia gradually approached the heartland of Sweden and was finally waged also in Roslagen, just a few tens of miles from Stockholm. Knowledge was now more popular and less scholarly than ever, and it was relayed by two entirely different but large groups of the Swedish population: the eastern war refugees, who were Finns, Ålanders, and Livonians, and the Carolinian pris‐ oners of war. The refugees, amounting to tens of thousands, left their mark in Swedish and Finnish oral tradition, particularly in Finland. The recollections were very hostile. They are moreover very unreliable. The distinctive character of oral tradition has made them changeable and hard to date. The recollections contain elements of

27 28 29 30

Tarkiainen, ‘Petrus Petrejus som skildrare av Ryssland’. Poe, ‘Herberstein and the Origin of the European Image of the Muscovite Government’. Ruffmann, Das Russlandbild im England Shakespeares. Spelge, ‘Das Russlandbild der livländischen Chroniken’, pp. 175–204.

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Figure 13.2. The German translation of Petrus Petrejus’s main work Historien und Bericht von dem Grossfürstenthumb Muschkow (Leipzig, 1620). Photo: Robert Bengtsson, Lund University Library.

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legend, wandering myths and additions by later generations but also stories that are entirely true.31 They should be read and used with care. The Carolinians who returned from captivity in Russia left a different legacy. The special high status of officers had many times protected them from maltreat‐ ment. They had a relatively dispassionate view of Russia.32 The comparatively positive frame of mind in part in Sweden concerning Russia during the eighteenth and nineteenth century was certainly mainly due to the Carolinians. Rather important research on Russia followed their footsteps.33 It should, however, be remembered that the influence of both refugees and Carolinians was mainly oral. The Carolinians certainly left great numbers of short diaries, but they were published very much later. Their contemporaries were not aware of them. The Russian reform process during Tsar Peter I also began to influence minds after the turn of the century in 1700. One of the principal describers of this pro‐ cess was the above-mentioned Lars Johan Malm (Ehrenmalm when later raised to nobility), whose large manuscript about the power of the Russian Empire of that time, Några Anmärkningar Angående det Ryska Rijkets Nuvarande Macht (Some Remarks on the Actual Power of the Russian State) from 1714 never reached the printers due to intervention from censors.34 The modernizing of Sweden’s eastern neighbour was, according to the writer, gratifying, but also a cause of worry. Malm minted the concept of ‘a giant on legs of clay’ in order to emphasize that Westernization was a phenomenon which perhaps would not penetrate deeply into the Empire of the Russian giant. It might in the future be possible to bring about the fall of the giant. This view became a sticky element in the later Swedish and European concept of Russia, which, however, was much more diversified than the prevailing view during Sweden’s era as a major power. Those who were Enlightenment-minded wiped out memories of the primitive feelings and focused on the grandeur of the positive developments in Russia which were viewed as one of the finest victories in the history of mankind. Those on the other hand who still nourished bitterness caused by the loss of Sweden’s status as a major power became instead advocates of revenge. That is why the eighteenth century shows us two different faces in the Russian question. This complex set of problems lies, however, outside the timeframe of this study.

31 Vilkuna, Viha. Perikato, katkeruus ja kertomus Isostavihasta. 32 Another important group of prisoners-of-war were clergymen. For a recent study of the changing fortunes of a clergyman — and his book — see Lindgärde, ‘På en nålstol i Moskva’, pp. 651–59. 33 Sjebaldina, Karolinska krigsfångar i Sibirien. 34 Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Manuskriptsamlingen, vol. 79.

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Works Cited Manuscripts and Archival Sources Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Diplomatica Muscovitica, vol. 662: Förhandlingar under Karl XI:s tid ———, Manuskriptsamlingen, vol. 79: Malm, L. J. Några anmärkningar angående det Ryska rijkets nuwarande macht och styrkio, i anseende till myckenheten af manskap, landets fruchtbarhet (etc.) … Upsatte under dess fångenskap åhr 1710, 1711, 1712 och 1713 ———, Skoklostersamlingen, vol. E8160: Per Brahe d. y., mottagna brev Primary Sources Ekonomiska förbindelser mellan Sverige och Ryssland under 1600-talet, i: Dokument ur svenska arkiv, ed. by Artur Attman, Wilhelm Mauritz Carlgren, Filipp I. Dolgich, Gunnar Jarring, Åke Kromnow, Alexej L. Narotjnitskij, Sergej L. Tichvinskij, and Lev V. Tjerepnin (Stockholm: Vitterhets-, historie- och antikvitetsakademien, 1978) Petrejus, Petrus, Historien vnd Bericht Von dem Grossfürstenthumb Muschkow, mit dero schönen fruchtbaren Provincien vnd Herrschaften, Festungen, Schlössern, Städten, Flecken, Fischreichen Wassern, Flüssen, Strömen vnd Seen, Wie auch Von der Reussischen Grossfürsten Herkommen, Regierung, Macht, Eminentz vnd Herrligkeit, vielfältigen Kriegen, jnnerlichen Zwytrachten, bisz sie zu einer Monarchi gewachsen, Mit den newlich vorgelauffenen Auffrühren vnd Händeln von den dreyen erdichteten Demetrijs, Nebenst dem auffgerichteten Friedens Contract, zwischen dem Löblichen König in Schweden, vnd jetzt regierenden GrossFürsten, Deszgleichen Die Processe, so zwischen den Königlichen Ambassadoren in der Stadt Muschow, vnd der Groszfürstlichen Reussischen Gesandten in der Königlichen Stadt Stockholm, wegen der auffgerichteten Friedens Contracts Confirmation seyn gehalten worden, Mit der Muschowiter Gesetzen, Statuten, Sitten, Geberden, Leben, Policey, vnd Kriegswesen: wie auch, was es mit jhrer Religion vnd Ceremonien vor eine Beschaffenheit hat, kürtzlich vnd deutlich in sechs Theilen zusammen gefasset, beschrieben vnd publiciret (Leipzig: [n. pub.], 1620) Пальмквист, Эрик, Заметки о России, сделанные Эриком Пальмквистом в 1674 году, подгот. Э. Лёфстранд, У. Биргегорд, & Л. Нурдквист, пер. Г. М. Коваленко [Palmqvist, Erik, Notes on Russia made by Erik Palmqvist in 1674, ed. by E. Löfstrand, U. Birgegård, and L. Nordquist, trans. by G. M. Kovalenko] (Moscow: Lomonosov, 2012) Secondary Studies Adde, Gustaf, ‘Inledning’, in Grigori Carpofsson Cotossichin [Grigory Karpovich Kotoshikhin], Beskrifning om Muschofsche Rijkets Staat. Samtida skildring af 1600-talets ryska samfundsliv, ed. by Gustaf Adde (Stockholm: Ljus, 1908), pp. iii–x

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Anthoni, Eric, ‘Lars Johan Ehrenmalm’, in Svenskt biografiskt lexikon, xii (Stockholm: Riksarkivet, 1949), 290–95 Attman, Artur, ‘Till det svenska Östersjöväldets problematik’, in Studier tillägnade Curt Weibull, ed. by Åke Holmberg, Hans Lennart Lundh, Erik Lönnroth, and Gunnar Olsson (Gothenburg: [n. pub.], 1946), pp. 57–87 Birgegård, Ulla, ‘En ständig huvudvärk i relationerna mellan Sverige och Ryssland: Tsarens och kungens titlar’, Slovo. Journal of Slavic Languages, Literatures and Cultures, 55 (2014), 34–46 ———, ‘Introduction’, in J. G. Sparwenfeld’s Diary of a Journey to Russia 1684–1687, ed. and trans. by Ulla Birgegård, Slavica Suecana, A 1 (Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien, 2002), pp. 11–33 Hildebrand, Karl-Gustaf, ‘Ekonomiska syften i svensk expansionspolitik 1700–1709’, in Historia kring Karl XII, ed. by Gustaf Jonasson (Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 1964), pp. 40–64 Isberg, Alvin, Svensk segregations- och konversionspolitik i Ingermanland 1617–1704, Studia Historico-Ecclesiastica Upsaliensia, 23 (Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 1973) Laasonen, Pentti, Novgorodin imu. Miksi ortodoksit muuttivat Käkisalmen läänistä Venäjälle 1600–luvulla?, Historiallisia Tutkimuksia, 222 (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2005) Lang, Signe, Stadsgården och Ryssgården, Stockholms stadsmuseums småskrifter, 2 (Stockholm: Stockholms stadsmuseum, 1966) Lindgärde, Valborg, ‘På en nålstol i Moskva. Om ägaranteckningar i gamla böcker, i synnerhet i ett exemplar av Olof Ekmans Siönödz-Löffte’, in Humanitas. Festskrift till Arne Jönsson, ed. by Astrid M. H. Nilsson, Aske Damtoft Poulsen, and Johanna Svensson (Gothenburg: Makadam, 2017), pp. 646–63 Norberg, Axel, ‘Bröderna Skyttes ryska resor och deras rysslandsskildringar’, Historisk tidskrift, 111 (1991), 487–502 Nyström, Per, ‘Mercatura Ruthenica’, in Die schwedischen Ostseeprovinzen Estland und Livland im 16.–18. Jahrhundert, ed. by Aleksander Loit and Helmut Piirimäe, Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia, 11 (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 1993), pp. 119–59 Poe, Marshall T., ‘Herberstein and the Origin of the European Image of Muscovite Government’, in 450 Jahre Sigismund von Herbersteins Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii 1549–1999, ed. by Frank Kämpfer and Reinhard Frötschner, Schriften zur Geistesgeschichte des östlichen Europa, 24 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002), pp. 131–71 Ruffmann, Karl-Heinz, Das Russlandbild im England Shakespeares, Göttinger Bausteine zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 6 (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1952) Scheidegger, Gabriele, Perverses Abendland — barbarisches Russland. Begegnungen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts im Schatten kultureller Missverständnisse (Zürich: Chronos, 1993) Silfverstolpe, Susann, ‘Historisk bakgrund’, in Silvergåvor från Sveriges regenter till Rysslands tsarer under 1600-talet, ed. by Susann Silfverstolpe, Angella Kudriavtseva, and Irina Zagorodniaja (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2014), pp. 15–104

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Sivonen, Mika, ‘Me inkerikot, vatjalaiset ja karjalaiset’. Uskonnollinen integrointi ja ortodoksisen vähemmistön identiteetin rakentuminen Ruotsin Inkerissä 1680–1702, Bibliotheca Historica, 111 (Helsinki: Suomen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2007) Sjebaldina, Galina, Karolinska krigsfångar i Sibirien, trans. by Bengt Eriksson (Stockholm: Svenskt militärhistoriskt bibliotek, 2010) Sjöberg, Anders, ‘Hans Flörich och Isak Torcakov, två “svenska” rusister i början av 1600talet’, in Äldre svensk slavistik. Bidrag till ett symposium hållet i Uppsala 3–4 februari 1983, ed. by Sven Gustavsson and Lennart Lönngren, Uppsala Slavic Papers, 9 (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1984), pp. 25–35 Spelge, Lutz, ‘Das Russlandbild der livländischen Chroniken des 17. Jahrhunderts’, in Deutschland — Livland — Russland. Ihre Beziehungen vom 15. bis zum 17. Jahrhundert. Beiträge aus dem Historischen Seminar der Universität Hamburg, ed. by Norbert Angermann (Lüneburg: Nordostdeutsches Kulturwerk, 1988), pp. 175–204 Tarkiainen, Kari, ‘De ryska “nationalegenskaperna” enligt svensk uppfattning i början av 1600-talet’, Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier, 48 (1973), 18–61 ———, ‘Faran från öst i svensk säkerhetspolitisk diskussion inför Stolbovafreden’, Scandia, 40 (1974), 34–56 ———, Moskoviten. Sverige och Ryssland 1478–1721, Skrifter utgivna av Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 818 (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2017) ———, ‘Olearius i Sverige’, Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok (1978), 50–69 ———, ‘Petrus Petrejus som skildrare av Ryssland. En personhistorisk och källkritisk studie’, Lychnos (1971–1972), 246–83 ———, Se Vanha Vainooja. Käsitykset itäisestä naapurista Iivana Julmasta Pietari Suureen, Historiallisia Tutkimuksia, 132 (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1986) ———, ‘Venäjäntulkit ja slavistiikan harrastus Ruotsin valtakunnassa vv. 1595–1661’, Historiallinen Arkisto, 64 (1969), 5–136 Troebst, Stefan, Handelskontrolle – ‘Derivation’ – Eindämmung. Schwedische Moskaupolitik 1617‒1661, Veröffentlichen des Osteuropa-Instituts München: Reihe Forschungen zum Ostseeraum, 2 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997) ———, ‘Narva und der Außenhandel Persiens im 17. Jahrhundert. Zum merkantilen Hintergrund schwedischer Großmachtpolitik’, in Die schwedischen Ostseeprovinzen Estland und Livland im 16.–18. Jahrhundert, ed. by Aleksander Loit and Helmut Piirimäe, Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia, 11 (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 1993), pp. 161–78 Vilkuna, Kustaa H. J., Viha. Perikato, katkeruus ja kertomus Isostavihasta, Historiallisia tutkimuksia, 229 (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2005) Мокробородова, Лариса, Quaestio nostro saeculo inusitata. Русское православие в тезисах Йоханнеса Ботвиди ‘Христиане ли Московиты?’ (1620) [Mokroborodova, Larisa, Quaestio nostro saeculo inusitata. Russian orthodoxy in Johannes Botvidi’s theses ‘Are the Muscovites Christians?’ (1620)] (Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2013)

DAVID GUDMUNDSSON 

Superstitious Christians Lutheran Views on the Russian Orthodox Church in the Swedish Great Power Era

Introduction The years preceding and following the Treaty of Stolbovo saw an intensified contact between the Evangelical-Lutheran Church in Sweden and the Russian Orthodox Church and its believers in Ingria, Estonia, and Livonia. The subject for this chapter is how different representatives for Lutheran Sweden perceived what they called den ryska religionen (the Russian religion). I will focus partly on official reports and learned dissertations, but mostly on military sermons and other testimonies from the Swedish armies which fought in Russia in the 1610s and in the Great Northern War (1700–1721). Traditionally, the Russians had been considered as unchristian or even as pagans by their Nordic neighbours. This apprehension, dating back to the Nordic crusades in the Middle Ages, still existed in Sweden in the sixteenth century and, albeit to a lesser extent, as late as the early seventeenth century. The Treaty of Teusina in 1595 brought the Swedish government into closer contact with Russia. In the correspondence between King Sigismund (r. 1592–1599) and Tsar Boris Godunov (r. 1584/98–1605), and later Charles IX (r. 1599/1604–1611) and the Tsar, the Christian faith was emphasized as a common ground of understanding between the rulers and their countries. However, it was the wars of the early seventeenth century that triggered a deeper interest in the Russian religion in Sweden. For the Swedish government it was important to strengthen Lutheranism in the new provinces. The Lutheran identity was considered a cornerstone of the Swedish realm and as the most important quality in a loyal subject to the Swedish crown. It was also, it is not to be forgotten, a matter of sincere spiritual concern. Gustavus Adolphus (r. 1611– 1632) and the men of the Church considered the Lutheran faith to provide the only secure path to salvation, and thus all subjects must know the ‘true faith’.

Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 301–312 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133609

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Figure 14.1. Baptism in Russia, an illustration in Adam Olearius’s travel description. The baptism in Russia usually occurred soon after a baby’s birth. The child was baptized in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and was immersed three times in holy water. Lutheran commentators considered it a valid Christian baptism, although surrounded with some superfluous practices. Olearius, p. 183. Lund University Library. Photographer: Gideon Horn.

This question was also a matter of practical governance. How were they to handle Orthodox Christians who (hopefully) wanted to become Lutherans? Did their Orthodox baptism suffice, or was a new baptism required?1

Early Seventeenth-Century Studies of the Russian Church In 1614, at a church council in Uppsala, Chaplain Martin Aschaneus defended the validity of the Russian Orthodox baptism. He had studied the matter himself in Russia, and found that the Orthodox baptism was in accordance with the

1 Tarkiainen, ‘Den svenska synen på den grekisk-ortodoxa religionen’, pp. 106–18. See also Tarkiainen, ‘Vår Gamble Arffiende Ryssen’. On conceptions of Russia in medieval Sweden, see Attius Sohlman, ‘Moscovitae fidem christianam sequuntur’ and Attius Sohlman, Det medeltida Ryssland. For an overview of Swedish seventeenth-century church history, see Montgomery, Sveriges kyrkohistoria.

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Bible. As we will see, baptism would remain the key issue for a long time.2 Since re-baptism was considered the worst error one could commit, you did not baptize anyone just to be sure. Important to point out is also that conversion by force never was an alternative, neither in the government’s mind nor in the eyes of the theologians. The people of the eastern Baltic area would ideally become Lutherans by choice, education being the most effective measure according to Swedish church officials. In the summer of 1614, Gustavus Adolphus ordered his court preachers Johannes Rudbeckius and Jonas Palma to investigate to what extent the Russian religion diverged from the Evangelical faith. Rudbeckius and Palma studied litera‐ ture, visited Russian churches, and talked to Russian priests in Ivangorod, close to Narva. Their conclusions were presented in a report called Een kort Berättelse och Undervisning om Vår Christeliga Troo och Gudztienst uthi Sverige. Ther uthi ock the groffveste Vilfarelser som äre uthi the Ryssars Religion varda kortelighan förlagde och tilbaka dreffne (A Statement and Instruction about our Christian Faith and Service in Sweden. In which also the worst Errors in the Russian Religion are briefly refuted). The idea was that the report would be translated into Russian and spread throughout the occupied provinces in order to win the population for the Lutheran faith. The report, however, dated 24 August 1614 in Narva, was never translated and not printed until 1640. The authors’ conclusion was that the Russians were Christians, although simple-minded and not without faults. Rudbeckius and Palma found that many basic teachings were in accordance with Lutheran beliefs while others were wrong. Their greatest grievances concerned the worship of saints, which they considered idolatry. They would prefer to abolish it entirely. To sum up: a new baptism was not necessary but a change in some church customs was desirable.3

Johannes Rudbeckius’s Sermon on Penitence, Narva 1614 On the tenth Sunday after Trinity Sunday, 28 August 1614, only four days after Rudbeckius and Palma had finished their report, Rudbeckius gave a sermon to the Swedish troops in Narva. The sermon was an admonishment to the audience to repent and do penance. In order to point at past and present misgivings within the Christian church, Rudbeckius produced a catalogue of Christian heresies from the early church up until his own time. After compiling a long series of heresies and profanations throughout the history of the Church, he sums up the whole catalogue with a reference to the Russian religion:

2 Kälvemark, ‘Petrus Petrejus’ och Johannes Botvidis skildringar av den ryska kyrkan’, p. 87; Tarkiainen, ‘Den svenska synen på den grekisk-ortodoxa religionen’, p. 122. 3 Tarkiainen, ‘Den svenska synen på den grekisk-ortodoxa religionen’, pp. 121–34.

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Så haffuer mäst hela Christenheten på sidstonne wikit ifrån then rette Gudhen, Ther medh the haffua uphäffuit the dödha heligha för Gudhar, och them bredhe widh Gudh dyrkat och tilbidhit. The haffua giordt them Beläter, upfylt theras Kyrckior medh affgudhar, och tilbidhit Stock och Steen, som hedningarna tilförena giorde, och äro them like wordne. Såsom wij på wåra grannar Ryssarna här see kunnom. (Thus, almost all of Christianity has left the true God. They have raised the holy dead to gods and worshipped and adored them next to God. They have filled their churches with idols, and, just like the heathens before them, they have worshipped logs and stones. All of which is found amongst our neighbours, the Russians).4 Again, and not to our surprise, it is the worship of saints that is highlighted and criticized by Rudbeckius, just like in the thesis he had recently written with Palma. Rudbeckius delivered this sermon again the next year, at the siege of Pskov. But besides this sermon he did not mention the Russian religion again during this campaign. Neither in his two sermons on war and peace, delivered at Pskov in 1615,5 nor in a long series of sermons held at court (basically the military headquarters) did he speak of the Russians.6 As a matter of fact, Rudbeckius’s military sermons were, with the exception of the one just mentioned — with its catalogue of ancient heretics concluding with the Russians’ idolatry — not polemical in their tone. On the contrary, one can mention his sermon on peace, delivered during the siege of Pskov in 1615, in which he stated that: ‘Ty thet är icke allenast Christeligit, uthan ock nyttighare någhon orett lidha aff sina grannar, än til at hempnas, tagha sigh krigh och örligh före’ (It is not only the Christian way, but also a useful thing, to suffer some injustices from your neighbours, rather than to avenge and to wage war).7

Johannes Botvidi’s Theses on the Russian Religion, 1620 During the campaign in Livonia in 1621, when Swedish forces captured Riga, Rudbeckius’s successor as First Court Preacher, Johannes Botvidi, delivered three sermons which were printed the same year.8 In none of these did Botvidi mention the Russian Orthodox Church. Of course, this campaign was part of the war fought between Sweden and Poland, and Riga was not a Russian town, so there was no obvious reason for Botvidi to speak of the Russian religion.

4 5 6 7 8

Rudbeckius, Een christeligh bootpredikan, p. 25. Rudbeckius, Krigz Predikan Hållin uthi Ryszland; Rudbeckius, Frids predikan hållin uthi Ryszland. Rudbeckius, Beatum regis sceptrum. Cf. Lindberg, Johannes Rudbeckius som predikant, p. 215. Rudbeckius, Frids predikan hållin uthi Ryszland, p. 10. Botvidi, Tree Predikninger, håldne uthi häärfärden ååt Lijfland.

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Figure 14.2. People gathering at a cemetery in Narva on Whitsun Eve, for commemoration of their departed relatives. An illustration in Adam Olearius’s travel description. They have put food on the tombstones and are crying out their sorrow. According to the German observer, the priest performed his duties without ‘particular solemnity’. Lund University Library. Photographer: Gideon Horn.

Still, Botvidi was one of those in Sweden who held the greatest knowledge on the Russian Orthodox Church. In 1620 he published a dissertation called Theses de quaestione, utrum Muschovitae sint Christiani (Theses on the question whether the Muscovites are Christians).9 Once again it was Gustavus Adolphus who or‐ dered his court preacher, now Botvidi, to write on this subject. Botvidi agreed somewhat reluctantly because he did not speak Russian, and his thesis is therefore based entirely on previous scholarly work. Botvidi found that Lutheran and Orthodox views basically were in accor‐ dance. Important from a Lutheran point of view was that the Russians held the Scripture in highest regard and that they considered faith to be the foundation of salvation. They were of course not to be considered as without faults. Botvidi criticized the Russian services for being much too noisy and for not including

9 For an extensive analysis of Botvidi’s Theses including a complete reprint, see Мокробородова [Mokroborodova], Quaestio nostro saeculo inusitata.

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Figure 14.3. A procession leaving church to bless the water in a nearby river, thus making it into holy water for church services. An illustration in Adam Olearius’s travel description. After the rite, people bathe their children in the sanctified river water. While the service continued in the church, some people continued bathing and shouting, the German observers remarked. Lund University Library. Photographer: Gideon Horn.

any preaching. Regarding the lack of preaching, however, Botvidi believed that the Russians were so ignorant that they probably only would be confused by it. Furthermore he found the worship of saints too dominant in the Russian religion. He would prefer if the saints were found only as models of faith and practice. Nevertheless, Botvidi held the Russians to be a God-fearing people who followed Christian morals. On the important question of baptism, Botvidi found that the Russians considered it the most important sacrament and that they bap‐ tized in the name of the Holy Trinity. From a Lutheran view the Russian baptism was valid, that is, the Russians were Christians and did not need to be baptized should they have wanted to accept the true faith. Some liturgical differences — such as the Russian tendency to surround the baptism with too many irrelevant ceremonies — were considered adiaphorous, minor differences, by Botvidi. It is, as Larisa Mokroborodova points out, a general trend in Botvidi’s theses to down‐ play any differences between the Lutheran and Orthodox churches. One possible

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reason for this was — at least rhetorically — to comprise the Orthodox Russians in a wider ‘Protestant’ Christendom led by Lutheran Sweden and directed against the ‘Papists’.10

Nicolaus Bergius’s Dissertation on the Russian Religion, 1704–1705 In the following decades the Swedish hold on its eastern provinces tightened and the ambitions regarding the religious education of the new subjects heightened. A Lutheran Catechism in Church Slavonic was printed in 1628. Dorpat University was founded in 1632. Ingria and Livonia were organized as Lutheran church provinces. A superintendent was placed in Narva from 1641 and another in Dorpat (Tartu), from 1642. The latter was made general superintendent for all of Livonia in 1674. From 1700 to 1702 Nicolaus Bergius was superintendent in Narva, and from 1702 to 1706 general superintendent in Livonia, by then seated in Pernau (Pärnu). In 1704 and 1705, with financial support from King Charles XII (r. 1697–1718), Bergius published a dissertation on the Russian church and religion in two parts comprising several hundred pages, the Exercitatio Historico-Theologica de Statu Ecclesiae et Religionis Moscoviticae (Historical-theological exercise regarding the state of the Muscovite church and religion). The main question was still, as it had been a hundred years before: ‘Are the Russians Christians?’ And just like Botvidi and others before him, Bergius found that they were. The Russians were Christians, although they identified with different kinds of heresies, he stated. The main problem was the Russians’ great ignorance. Most of them did not know the Lord’s Prayer, and they did not have a clue when it came to more diffi‐ cult things, such as the doctrine of the Trinity. They were pious but superstitious Christians. Still, Bergius had hopes for them. Their basic views on justification and other dogmas were acceptable. And ignorance could be treated with education. A great problem was that priests and monks were not allowed to debate religious matters with Protestants, and naturally the worship of saints was troublesome. Yet the tone in Bergius’s dissertation was more respectful than the somewhat disparaging tone we have met in the earlier commentators.11

10 Мокробородова [Mokroborodova], Quaestio nostro saeculo inusitata, pp. 211–14. See also Kälvemark, ‘Petrus Petrejus’ och Johannes Botvidis skildringar av den ryska kyrkan’, pp. 90–95; Tarkiainen, ‘Den svenska synen på den grekisk-ortodoxa religionen’, pp. 123–34. 11 Hedlund, ‘Är ryssarna kristna?’, pp. 215–26. Bergius’s work is now also available in English translation with a rich commentary: Bergius, A Historical-Theological Exercise on the Status of the Muscovite Church and Religion.

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The Swedish Campaign in Russia during the Great Northern War Still, not all commentators shared Bergius’s respectful tone, although they shared most of the observations previously mentioned. In 1707, during the Swedish campaign in Russia, Michael Eneman was secretary in the Field consistory (an ‘army chapter’, presided by a field superintendent).12 Eneman also visited numer‐ ous libraries and monasteries in order to purchase books for the Swedish Royal Library. In his letters to his father-in-law, Olof Rudbeck the younger, Eneman labelled the Russian priests as great idiots since they did not speak a word of Latin or Greek, only Russian and Slavonic. In the monasteries of Minsk, Eneman wrote, one could almost find nothing but poverty and barbarianism, not specifying what he meant by this.13 But what about the military chaplains? Did they mention the Russian religion in their preaching? In my dissertation on preaching and prayer in the Swedish army I have chal‐ lenged the old opinion that military sermons were particularly Old Testamentfocused, war-mongering, and aggressive in character. Based especially on a long series of sermons given by Chaplain Magnus Aurivillius during the Russian campaign, I have shown that consolation, solace, and discipline were main themes in the chaplains’ preaching; the New Testament, not the Old, providing most of the texts for the sermons. This preaching, according to me, was a more efficient way of strengthening the soldiers’ faith and morale and thus the Army’s ability.14 At first, I found it quite remarkable that Magnus Aurivillius did not once men‐ tion the Russian church in his many sermons given during the Russian campaign. His sermons cover years of campaigning and the Army was often deeply involved with the local population. But the Russian Church did not even figure as a bad example of faith or church practice. Instead, such examples were always taken from the Bible. Aurivillius’s preaching in general lacked an aggressive tone, and the sermons followed the New Testament text of the current Sunday or holy day closely.15 Aurivillius did, however, comment on the ‘Russian’ (or rather, Ukrainian) landscape. In June 1709 the Swedish army had reached Ukraine. Their situation was very difficult, with food supplies running short and the Russian army closing in. In one sermon Aurivillius compared the Swedes’ situation with that of the Israelites under the great King Hezekiah, a theme he had used in several sermons before. In the Second Book of Kings, the Israelites are besieged in Jerusalem by the mighty Assyrian army. Now, Aurivillius said that:

12 13 14 15

Gudmundsson, ‘The Consolation of soldiers’, pp. 213–14. Eneman, Michael Eneman till Olof Rudbeck, pp. 49, 52. Gudmundsson, Konfessionell krigsmakt, pp. 229–34. Uppsala, Uppsala University Library, T213, T213a–f. See Gudmundsson, Konfessionell krigsmakt, p. 132.

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Är någon åtskildnad, så består dän allenast där uti att Hiskia war stad i sitt fädernesland, men wi uti ett widt aflägset fremmande, och att han war insluten in om sin egen stads murar, men wi uppå en fremmandes öppen och wida fällt. (If there is any difference, it is that Hezekiah was in his fatherland, but we are in a far-off and foreign land. He was besieged within his own city walls, but we are upon these strange open and wide plains).16 The Swedes had come to Ukraine in search of supplies and allies but mostly met a frozen or burned country, during a campaign which only took them farther away from home and finally to defeat, death, and captivity.

Carolines in Russian Captivity The old notion of the ignorant and superstitious Russians continued. In a sermon given during captivity in Siberia in 1710, Chaplain Andreas Westerman told his audience that they should act as models for their unwise neighbours with their superstitious services. Another captive chaplain, Gabriel Laureus in Tobol´sk, spoke about the Russian religion as ‘Trä-lappars dyrkan’ (wood-worshipping). He recognized that Christian religions other than the Lutheran could lead man to the right path of salvation, but only the Lutheran path led the whole way through.17 Yet another of the captive chaplains, Henrik Sederberg, wrote a book called Anteckningar öfver ryska folkets religion och seder (Notes on the Russian people’s religion and customs). Again, the aim was to describe the Russian faith and to establish whether the Russians actually were Christians. Characteristic of the Russian religion, Sederberg wrote, was that they could not read the Lord’s Prayer or the Confession, that they worshipped the saints and Virgin Mary, and that they did not believe in the Holy Trinity. Priests and monks were uneducated and ignorant. Still, Sederberg concluded with twenty-three points in which the Russian and Evangelical faiths were in accordance, most of them concerning fundamental theological teachings. Based upon these twenty-three points the Russians could be called Christians, Sederberg wrote. Even if they were not in full accordance with the Evangelicals, they still resembled them in many cases.18 The Swedish congregations in Russia experienced a well-known Pietist revival in the 1710s. Andreas Westerman, mentioned above, later became a renowned champion of Pietist teachings in Sweden. Not that much attention has been paid to the fact that some chaplains, although a small minority, perhaps four out of a total of more than sixty, converted to the Russian Orthodox Church during cap‐ tivity. It caused great contempt among some of the Swedes when two chaplains ‘defected’ in 1719. According to Lieutenant Joachim Lyth they had taken up civil 16 Uppsala, Uppsala University Library, T213d: Magnus Aurivillius, Ukraine 11 June 1709, fol. 6r–v. 17 Lund, Lund University Library, Predikningar från Tobolsk, pp. 177–78. 18 Nyman, Resandets gränser, pp. 120–21.

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services in the Russian administration and strove to bring misery and misfortune upon their previous comrades, in this doing the deeds of Satan. The treachery of course was considered double-sided, aimed at both faith and country, allegiance to the true faith being strongly connected with allegiance to King and country.19

Conclusion To conclude, it is a rather unvaried conception of the Russian Orthodox Church and its teachings and practices, clergy and followers, which appears in learned theses, official reports, military sermons, and diaries and letters from the Swedish army from the seventeenth and early‑eighteenth centuries. The Russians were considered to be Christians, since their baptism was correct in all important aspects, although this question was investigated time and again. Specific criticism was directed at the worship of saints, which was considered idolatrous. The Swedish army chaplains mostly did not pay much attention to the ‘Russian religion’ in their sermons. But if they did, the general picture provided was that of the Russians as pious but ignorant and superstitious Christians.

19 Lyth, Löjtnant Joachim Matthiae Lyths dagbok 1703–1722, p. 105. We also know of at least two other chaplains who converted to the Russian faith in 1718 and 1720 respectively. Kagg, Leonhard Kaggs dagbok 1698–1722, pp. 251, 272.

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Works Cited Manuscripts and Archival Sources Lund, Lund University Library, Predikningar m.m. från svenskarnas fångenskap i Sibirien, staden Tobolsk Uppsala, Uppsala University Library, T213, T213a–f: Magnus P. Aurivillius, Predikningar Primary Sources Bergius, Nicolaus, A Historical-Theological Exercise on the Status of the Muscovite Church and Religion, ed. by Ulla Birgegård and Monica Hedlund, Slavica Suecana, A3 (Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien, 2019) Botvidi, Johannes, Tree Predikninger, håldne uthi häärfärden ååt Lijfland, anno 1621 (Stockholm: Reusner, 1627) Eneman, Michael, Michael Eneman till Olof Rudbeck d.y. 1707–1709, ed. by C. C. Gjörwell, Swenska biblioteket, 5 (Stockholm: Hesselberg, 1761) Kagg, Leonard, Leonhard Kaggs dagbok 1698–1722, ed. by Adam Lewenhaupt, Historiska Handlingar, 24 (Stockholm: Kungl. samfundet för utgifvande af handskrifter rörande Skandinaviens historia, 1912) Lyth, Joachim, Löjtnant Joachim Matthiae Lyths dagbok 1703–1722, ed. by Alf Åberg, Karolinska dagböcker (Stockholm: Natur och kultur, 1958) Olearius, Adam, Auszführliche Beschreibung Der Kundbaren Reyse Nach Muscow und Persien / So durch gelegenheit einer Holsteinischen Gesandschafft von Gottorff auß an Michael Fedorowitz den grossen Zaar in Muscow / und Schah Sefi König in Persien geschehen. Worinnen die gelegenheit derer Orter und Länder / durch welche die Reyse gangen / als Liffland / Rußland / Tartarien / Meden und Persien / sampt dero Einwohner Natur / Leben / Sitten / Hauß- Welt- und Geistlichen Stand mit fleiß auffgezeichnet / und mit vielen meist nach dem Leben gestelleten Figuren gezieret / zu befinden, 3rd ed. (Schleszwig: Holwein, 1663) Rudbeckius, Johannes, Beatum regis sceptrum. Vel felix populi regimen. Thet är wälsignat konunga regemente. Eller lyckeligh folksstyrelse. Afmålat och uthfördt uti XXXII predikningar öfwer Samuelis böcker och sidste konung Dawidz ord med valetz predikan (Uppsala: Curio, 1685) ———, Een christeligh bootpredikan öffuer thet evangelium som faller uppå then X. söndagh effter Trinitatis, Skriffuin och predikadt i Narffuen uthi Lijffland Anno 1614, Sedhan vprepeterat j Snethnagora kloster vthi Pletsko beläghring a. 1615. Och nu på nytt öffuerseedd och hållen j Westeråås a. 1623 (Västerås: Olof Olofsson Helsing, 1623) ———, Frids predikan hållin uthi Ryszland, i thet Swenska läghret widh Pletscho, then 1. Sept Anno Christi 1615 (Västerås: Peder Ericksson Wald, 1635)

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———, Krigz Predikan Hållin uthi Ryszland, twå mijl när Pletscho i thet Swenska läghret, Then 30. Juli Anno Christi 1615 (Stockholm: Olof Olofsson Helsing, 1626) Westerman, Andreas, The Christnas Plicht och Skyldighet till inbördes Förlåtelse eller Broderlig Försonlighet, förestälte uti En enfaldig predikan, på den Tiugonde och andra Söndagen effter H. Trefaldighetz Söndag, under wårt Fångenskap i Solivitziogda den 6 Nov. Anno 1710 (Halle: Orban, 1716) Secondary Studies Attius Sohlman, Margareta, Det medeltida Ryssland — västeuropeiska resenärers intryck, Svenska humanistiska förbundets skriftserie, 129 (Stockholm: CKM, 2013) ———, ‘Moscovitae fidem christianam sequuntur’. Om synen på det medeltida ortodoxa Ryssland genom några samtida västeuropeiska resenärer, Album religionum Umense, 3 (Umeå: Umeå universitet, 1994) Gudmundsson, David, Konfessionell krigsmakt. Predikan och bön i den svenska armén 1611– 1721, Bibliotheca historico-ecclesiastica Lundensis, 56 (Malmö: Universus Academic Press, 2014) ———, ‘The Consolation of Soldiers. Religious life in the Swedish army during the Great Northern War’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 39 (2014), 212–25 Hedlund, Monica, ‘Är ryssarna kristna? Om Nicolaus Bergius och den ryska kyrkan’, in Kyrka, kultur, historia. En festskrift till Johnny Hagberg, ed. by Markus Hagberg, Lena Maria Olsson, and Sven-Erik Pernler, Skara stiftshistoriska sällskaps skriftserie, 69 (Skara: Skara stiftshistoriska sällskap, 2012), pp. 215–26 Kälvemark, Torsten, ‘Petrus Petrejus’ och Johannes Botvidis skildringar av den ryska kyrkan’, Kyrkohistorisk årsskrift, 69 (1969), 85–96 Lindberg, Gustaf, Johannes Rudbeckius som predikant (Stockholm: Svenska kyrkans diakonistyrelses förlag, 1927) Montgomery, Ingun, Sveriges kyrkohistoria, iv: Enhetskyrkans tid (Stockholm: Verbum, 2002) Nyman, Maria, Resandets gränser. Svenska resenärers skildringar av Ryssland under 1700-talet, Södertörn doctoral dissertations, 77 (Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, 2013) Tarkiainen, Kari, ‘Den svenska synen på den grekisk-ortodoxa religionen i början av 1600talet’, Kyrkohistorisk årsskrift, 71 (1971), 106–41 ———, ‘Vår Gamble Arffiende Ryssen’. Synen på Ryssland i Sverige 1595–1621 och andra studier kring den svenska Rysslandsbilden från tidigare stormaktstid, Studia historica Upsaliensia, 54 (Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 1974) Мокробородова, Лариса, Quaestio nostro saeculo inusitata. Русское православие в тезисах Йоханнеса Ботвиди ‘Христиане ли Московиты?’ (1620) [Mokroborodova, Larisa, Quaestio nostro saeculo inusitata. Russian orthodoxy in Johannes Botvidi’s theses ‘Are the Muscovites Christians?’ (1620)] (Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2013)

pER STOBAEUS 

The Peace of Stolbovo as Reflected in the De la Gardie Archives Some Manuscript Examples

Introduction The De la Gardie archives are of great significance for research on SwedishRussian relations during the early-seventeenth century. The archives contain a large number of documents originating from the De la Gardie family. Jacob De la Gardie (1583–1652) played a key part in the events leading up to the Peace of Stolbovo in 1617 and also leased the newly conquered areas that were to become the counties of Kexholm and Nöteborg. Jakob Pontusson De la Gardie (1768–1842) of Löberöd in Scania was a descendant of Jacob De la Gardie. After his death, the archives at Löberöd castle were transferred to Lund University Library in compliance with his testamentary disposition. Other manuscripts previously belonging to the De la Gardie family can be found in the Tartu University Library, Estonia, among them several documents concerning the Peace of Stolbovo. A collection of De la Gardie manuscripts, formerly kept in Haapsalu, Estonia, was bought by Lund University Library in 1932. The following pages introduce a selection of documents concern‐ ing the Peace of Stolbovo from the university libraries of Lund and Tartu.

Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 313–336 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133610

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Figure 16.1. Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives, F 6 Cordt 3A, pp. 71–73.

A Swedish translation of a letter from Jacob De la Gardie to the voivode (gover‐ nor) and inhabitants of Novgorod, dated 28 February 1611. Jacob De la Gardie asks the recipients of the letter to state who they are choosing as their Grand Duke. Should this be a person who is friendly towards the Swedish King, he promises them and the whole Russian nation support against their enemies in order to enable them to defend their religion and their freedoms. If they are unwilling to maintain friendly relations with Sweden he will visit them with sword and fire, so that all will be smitten, even infants in their cradles.

The PeaCe of sTolboVo as refleCTed in The de la Gardie arChiVes

Figure 16.2. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Hapsalsamlingen 14.

In 1611, Jacob De la Gardie pays the wages of the soldiers who had participated in the siege of Kexholm. Wages are paid in Hungarian and Russian mints. The en‐ signs of Viborg receive special rewards for having captured a prisoner in Kexholm.

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Figure 16.3. Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives, A 1, fols 297–98.

Translation of a letter from King Gustavus Adolphus to the Metropolitan Isidor of Novgorod. The King writes that God has sent war into Russia because of the sins of the country. Narva, 28 September 1614.

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Figure 16.4. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Hapsalsamlingen 12.

A letter in Russian from the voivode of Pskov, dated 1615, to the Swedish Government, requesting in the name of Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov that the former good relations between Russia and Sweden be restored.

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Figure 16.5. Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives, A 2, fol. 425.

Letter from King Gustavus Adolphus to the Swedish peace commissioners. The King asks them, when in Novgorod, to take possession of some old documents from previous negotiations between Sweden and Russia, specifically a border treaty between King Magnus Eriksson (1319–1364) and Duke Yurii (‘Myckle Kongh Jören’). Dated from the military encampment at Pskov, 13 October 1615.

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Figure 16.6. Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives A 1, fol. 1.

The Governor of Novgorod, Hans Boije, is ordered by King Gustavus Adolphus to collect bells from destroyed churches and monasteries in Novgorod and its region and to sell them to get funds for the payment of wages to the soldiers of the garrison. However, he is not authorized to take such bells as are used by the Russians for their daily religious services and located in remaining monasteries. Helsingfors, 9 February 1616.

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Figure 16.7. Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives, A 1, fols 28–30.

Instruction from King Gustavus Adolphus to Jacob De la Gardie, issued in Åbo (Turku), 3 March 1616. The King wishes to ensure that conquered areas are defended by the erection of fortresses. In this way the Russians will be denied access to Lakes Onega and Ladoga. No Russian will be able to hide in Lake Ladoga anymore. (‘Så kunde och eij häller någon Ryß ytterligare, duka sigh i Ladoga Siöen’). The area around Pskov is to be laid waste or at least plundered. Access to trade goods from Dorpat is to be cut off.

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Figure 16.8. Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives, F 6 Cordt IV, fol. 258.

In a letter sent on 18 February 1617 to his friend Jacob De la Gardie, Carl Carlsson Gyllenhielm, the Swedish commander in Novgorod, writes that he hopes that there will soon be peace, since conditions in Novgorod are beginning to be very difficult. He also communicates the news that some witches have put a spell on Jacob De la Gardie in order to detain him. Carl Carlsson Gyllenhielm has had them thrown into water to test them and found that they float in water like witches usually do. One of them says that she has put a spell on Jacob De la Gardie in revenge because he has dismissed her from her job as a washerwoman. She has promised to make him well again if she is allowed to give him a bath and anoint him with ants. If this does not happen she will be cut to pieces. Carl Carlsson Gyllenhielm will have her taken to Jama, to be held in irons until the arrival there of Jacob De la Gardie.

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Figure 16.9. Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives, A 2, fol. 848r

Jacob De la Gardie proclaims, by order of King Gustavus Adolphus, that the inhabitants of the provinces allocated to Sweden under the peace treaty will be free to exercise their religion and that their parish priests and parsonages will be exempt from taxation. Keeping town dwellers and peasants on the side of the Swedish King is an urgent concern. Nöteborg, 7 March 1617.

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Figure 16.10. Tartu University Library, De la Gardie archives, A 2, fol. 493.

King Gustavus Adolphus has had reports from the commanders of the captured fortifications in Russia that the peasants are fleeing the area because of having so much trouble from the soldiers. He therefore orders Jacob De la Gardie, now that peace has been achieved, to make haste to transfer the soldiers to Åbo (Turku). Stockholm, 29 March 1617.

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Figure 16.11. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Hapsalsamlingen 11.

A copy in Swedish of a letter from Henrik Olofsson Stubbe, the commander in Viborg, to the voivode of Ladoga, Vasilii Zmeev (‘Smejoff’), in 1617. The voivode is accused of breaching the peace treaty that has been ratified on oath and by kissing the cross.

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Figure 16.12. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Historiska handlingar 3:1.

Accounts from 1617 of items delivered to the soldiers of the Crown by the commander of Kopor´e, Bogislaus von Rosen, by order of Jacob De la Gardie. Here is a list of uniform articles: satin, taffeta, sash, gold braid, silver buttons, velvet, silver braid, linen cloth, etc.

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Figure 16.13. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Historiska handlingar 3:1.

This memorandum from the commander of Nyenskans fortress, Nils Hansson Bagge, dated 14 May 1618, contains reports and questions for the King concern‐ ing conditions in newly conquered Ingria. Among other things, Nils Hansson reports that a Russian nobleman, who has arrived from Novgorod together with his wife, requests a decision by the Swedish King as to whether he may recover his landed estate in Ingria. Land in Ingria is difficult to cultivate, according to Nils Hansson Bagge. There are many bogs, and the roads are bad. He has confiscated the best farms, which had belonged to the nobility, and is now allowing the peasants to cultivate them instead. Peasants are moving into Ingria from Finland and from Kexholm county. Nils Hansson has issued permissions to settle sparingly, but they say that they must look for new land because their home country is overpopulated. He now wants to know how to act and asks the King’s advice. There is a need for new burghers for the Ingrian towns. However, it is not possible to attract Russian burghers as this would be contrary to the peace treaty. Then those burghers who escaped during the winter would be returning. How‐ ever, Nils Hansson Bagge declares that he will do all he can to attract Swedish, Finnish, and German burghers to Ingria.

The PeaCe of sTolboVo as refleCTed in The de la Gardie arChiVes

Figure 16.14. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Topographica, Ingerman‐ land och Kexholms län 3.

Tax regulations for the Kexholm northern deanery, 1618. The country people are to pay in e.g. hops, butter, tallow, cattle, sheep, pigs, hemp, russet and linen cloth, hay, straw, firewood, logs, birch bark, and tar.

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Figure 16.15. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Topographica, Ingerman‐ land och Kexholms län 5.

Financial documentation from Nöteborg county uses a mixture of Swedish, Ger‐ man, and Russian. Here is a customs list from 1618.

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Figure 16.16. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Topographica, Ingerman‐ land och Kexholms län 6.

From a census document for Nöteborg county, 1618. Here you find Russian, Finnish and Swedish personal names and some inhabitants are described as new settlers. Russian priests are also mentioned, e.g. ‘Jöran Rysse Prest’. The Russian names reflect religion rather than ethnicity, since not just the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Ingria but also the Orthodox Baltic Finns have Russian names. Initially the new Swedish authorities tried to appoint priests for the Orthodox parishes to prevent the Orthodox peasants fleeing the province. Literature: Kasper Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen. Reduktion, skattearrendering och bondeoroligheter i det svenska Ingermanland under slutet av 1600-talet, Bidrag till kännedom av Finlands natur och folk, 193 (Helsinki, 2014), pp. 50–52.

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Figure 16.17. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Historiska handlingar 3:1.

Accounts for Ivangorod and Jama signed by King Gustavus Adolphus, 1619, showing that grain, butter, beef and pork, oxen, and sheep are imported to Ingria from Ångermanland, Medelpad and Viborg county.

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Figure 16.18. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Historiska handlingar 4.

Company roll for Mats Olofsson’s company in Narva, Jama, Saris fortress, Ko‐ por´e, and Ivangorod, 1619. Preachers, pipers, and drummers are also included in the roll.

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Figure 16.19. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Hapsalsamlingen 13.

At a county court session in Sordavala pogost in Kexholm county, held on 3 Febru‐ ary 1621, it transpired that valuation officers had valued the property of the peasants unfairly to the benefit of their own family and friends, with the result that wealthy farmers had escaped transport and other obligations, while the poor had been forced to pay tax even on property they did not hold and had become so impoverished that they had fled the country. This was contrary to the regulations that had been confirmed on oath and by kissing the cross and had been read out in Russian at the county court. Jacob De la Gardie’s representative in Kexholm county, Christoffer von Waldeck, demanded on behalf of the peasantry and the King that these valuation officers were punished. Nevertheless the peasantry asked for clemency for them as they were not accustomed to anyone being sentenced to death. However, the commander of Kexholm, Henrik Månsson Spåra, and the legal officer for Kexholm county, Olof Olsson, responded that they had been appointed to administer law and justice and that a judge should not be more strict or more merciful than the law. If they were asking for mercy they should appeal to the King.

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Figure 16.20. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Topographica, Ingermanland och Kexholms län 5.

In 1622, Jacob De la Gardie leased Kexholm and Nöteborg county from the Crown. This made him one of the country’s principal grain merchants. This is reflected in a letter, dated Reval, 20 May 1622. Jacob De la Gardie acknowledges receipt of payment from the Amsterdam merchant, Albrecht Jansson, for 100 ‘läster’ (about 245 tons) of rye to be delivered to Nyen. On this letter see: Erik Grill, Jacob De la Gardie. Affärsmannen och politikern 1608–1636 (Gothenburg, 1949), p. 49.

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Figure 16.21. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Topographica, Ingermanland och Kexholms län 6.

Letter issued by Nils Hansson Bagge and Anders Mickelsen in Nöteborg, 21 June 1624, about foodstuffs for couriers sent from Kexholm, Viborg, and Nöteborg to Moscow and Novgorod. The list includes, inter alia, French wine, schnapps, Finnish beer, fine and coarse bread, butter, and candles.

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Figure 16.22. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Pergamentsbrev 266.

Baronetcy letters patent for Axel Lillie, 26 March 1651. Queen Christina awards villages in the north of Kexholm county to Axel Lillie as his baronetcy in recogni‐ tion of his services to the Crown during the Thirty Years War. The baronetcy coat of arms shows a one-legged warrior, an allusion to the injury suffered by Axel Lil‐ lie during the siege of Mainz in 1631, when he was hit by a cannon ball.

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Figure 16.23. Lund University Library, De la Gardie archives, Topographica, Ryssland. A south-orientated schematic plan of St Petersburg, probably from the beginning of the 1720s. The most ambitious buildings of the 1710s — the Winter Palace of Peter the Great (‘E’) and the Menshikov Palace (‘D’) — are already marked on. Another ‘home of the Tsar’ can be seen on the upper edge of the plan, to the right; this is Peterhof, where the large-scale construction works commenced in the middle of the 1710s. The painter has not aimed at any precision with regard to distance: for example, Vasil´evskii island looks just a little bigger in the image than the fortress to its left, while in reality, its area is some 30 to 40 times larger. Meanwhile, the remains of the pentagonal Swedish fortress Nyenskans, here depicted to the left edge of the plan, in reality lies far to the south-east. A variantion of this plan, less detailed, but designed in exactly the same way, is preserved in the National Archives of Sweden and dates from 1722.1

1 Caption by Arsenii Vetushko-Kalevich.

ARSENII VETUSHkO-kALEVICH 

Historia Vladislai by Stanisław Kobierzycki as a Source of Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici by Johannes Widekindi *

Nikolai Karamzin (1766–1826), a famous and influential Russian historian, when describing the appearance and the virtues of Prince Mikhail Skopin-Shuiskii (1586–1610), one of the central figures of the Russian Time of Troubles, refers to ‘a contemporary Swedish historian’.1 Using the word ‘contemporary’ here is misleading and proves to be nothing more than an attempt to make the descrip‐ tion look more trustworthy. Also, the nationality in this phrase turns out to be problematic, as the ‘Swedish historian’ is, to be sure, a Swedish historian, but nevertheless in this case he is quoting a Polish colleague. The Swedish historian Karamzin is alluding to is Johannes Widekindi (c. 1620–1678), who in 1671, long after the death of Skopin-Shuiskii, published a book entitled Thet Swenska i Ryssland tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie (A History of the Swedish ten-year-war in Russia), with a Latin version edited the following year under the title Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici Decennalis. As it is based on many archive documents that are either unpublished or lost, Widekindi’s work counts as one of the main sources on the Swedish-Russian war (1610–1617), and is to some extent valuable for the Russian Time of Troubles in general as well. In 2000, a Russian translation of Widekindi’s work was published, an honour that seldom has been experienced by a Swedish Neo-Latin author.2 Of the two versions the Swedish one is approximately twice as long as the Latin one, due to the fact that the two last (and longest) books, i.e. books 9 and 10, covering the events of 1614–1621, are lacking in the latter. However, Historia was originally written in Latin, as Widekindi explicitly mentions in a letter to his patron, Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, and then hastily translated into Swedish by

* The article is mainly based on a chapter in my dissertation (Vetushko-Kalevich, Compilation and Translation. Johannes Widekindi and the Origins of His Work on a Swedish-Russian War, pp. 49–64). 1 Карамзин, История государства российского [Karamzin, History of the Russian State], xii, 153. 2 Видекинд, История десятилетней шведско-московитской войны XVII века [Widekindi, The History of the Swedish-Muscovitic Ten Years’ War in the 17th Century]. Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 337–358 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133611

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Figure 17.1. Title page of Historia Vladislai. Johannes Widekindi possessed a copy of Kobierzycki’s work in his own book collection, according to his property inventory (Stockholm city archive, Bouppteckningar 1685, fols 89–120). Lund University Library.

Historia Vladislai by sTanisław kobierzyCki

Widekindi himself and some other persons.3 That the original was Latin is further confirmed by comparing Widekindi’s Latin text with his known printed sources, most of which were written in Latin: he follows them almost word for word, in no way allowing it to be assumed that he first used them in his Swedish text and then translated them back into Latin. However, a number of factors point to the con‐ clusion that the two versions stem independently from a lost Latin draft — namely, all the differences between the versions, the fact that, as suggested by his letter to De la Gardie, Widekindi revised his Latin text between the publications, and that he speaks of a ‘draft’ (‘concept’) in the preface to the Swedish edition — and thus indicate that the Swedish text is a slightly abridged translation of the lost draft, while the Latin one is a revised and incomplete version of it.4 I will return to the question of the status of Widekindi’s text at the end of this article, first turning again to its sources. The problem is made complicated by the author himself. The preface to the Swedish edition goes: Documenternes allegerande, aff hwilka Historien består / hafwer iagh i Trycket / så i thet Swenska som Latinska Exemplaret […] vthelyckt / effter som the i mitt Concept som i Archivo lembnas / finnas; och thet skulle synas orijmligit at hängia redskapen widh Arbetet / icke annorledes än en Handtwärckare wille knippa fijl och tång widh wärcket som han giordt hafwer […] At sättia i brädden eller Contexten alla theras nampn / aff hwilka thenne Historie är sammanhämtat / skulle både wara ett owalkat och skrubbat Arbete / samt och hinder för den gode Läsarens intention, som wil medh en hast och uno quasi spiritu inhämta och betrachta Historiens beskaffenhet / effter som thess troowärdigheet sigh nogsamt thess förvthan kan bekänna.5 (I have excluded the references to the documents, of which the History consists, both in the Swedish and in the Latin book, because they may be found in my draft which I leave in the Archive. And it would look absurd to hang the instruments on the work in the same way as if a craftsman would hang the file and the pliers on his work […] To put in the margin or in the text all the names of those of whom this History is compiled would be an awkward work and an obstacle for the ambition of a benevolent reader, who only wants to be able to capture the whole story in one breath, because its trustworthiness may be recognized without further reasons). Widekindi lives up to his threat and, apart from some letters and documents, he does not as a rule tell where one or another piece of information has come

3 For more details about the letters, see Vetushko-Kalevich, ‘Bilingual Writings’. 4 There are certain further implications; I will not dwell on them in this paper. In particular, concerning book 8 and certain chapters of book 3, the relation between the two versions may only be described as one between two totally different texts. 5 Widekindi, Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie, pp. xi–xii. All translations into English are my own.

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from. There are certain exceptions, though.6 In the tenth book, talking about the relations between Poland and Muscovy after 1613, which are almost irrelevant to his main argument, he mentions that these matters are described in the seventh and eighth books of the Polish historian Stanisław Kobierzycki.7 Kobierzycki (c. 1600–1665) was an older contemporary of Widekindi; apart from writing historical works, he was also active as a diplomat and a provincial governor.8 His writings are not very numerous — beside the one to be treated here, he also wrote a monograph De luxu Romanorum (published in Louvain in 1628) and a history of an episode from the Swedish-Polish war, Obsidio Clari Montis Częstochoviensis (1656) — but bear witness to a perfect command of Latin eloquence. In 1655 he published Historia Vladislai Poloniae et Sveciae Principis. This book is also a significant source on the Russian Time of Troubles, being to a large extent based on the Polish archive documents just like Widekindi’s is based on the Swedish ones. It also has a similar size (eleven books across 952 pages), and one can draw further parallels between it and Widekindi’s work: an annotated Polish translation of Kobierzycki was published in 2005,9 just five years after the (somewhat more richly annotated) Russian translation of Widekindi. In this way both works can be said to have received attention in recent historical research. The above-mentioned reference that Widekindi makes in the tenth book turns out to be crucial. Kobierzycki may indeed be called the main printed source of Widekindi, as he is extremely important for books 1 to 5, but also used in later books. The influence of Kobierzycki on Widekindi’s text was discovered as early as 1907, in Helge Almquist’s work Sverge och Ryssland 1595–1611. Almquist pinpoints about two dozen passages in Widekindi that originate with Kobierzycki, and the editors of the Russian translation of Widekindi repeat Almquist’s notes with certain additions and specifications. My aim is to give fuller notion of the scale and the way in which Widekindi uses Kobierzycki. As for the scale, it may be seen in the following diagram.

6 Apart from the one I treat here, references may be found in the Appendix about Novgorod in the Latin version (apparently a page of the draft included in the book in the very last moment). In the excursus about Cossacks (Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, p. 347) Widekindi forgot to strike out the words ‘vide Leuncl.’, i.e. ‘see Löwenklau’, although there are reasons to assume that he did not use the book by Johannes Löwenklau directly, but took the reference from another source. As regards Widekindi’s main Swedish predecessor in writing on the Time of Troubles, Petrus Petrejus, who is an important source, he is mentioned several times, but, apart from the Novgorod Appendix, as a diplomat in action, not as a reference. 7 Widekindi, Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie, p. 928. There are also several indirect references (‘Polish historians say’, etc.). Kobierzycki is also mentioned by Widekindi in ‘Gustaff Adolphs Historia’ (Widekindi, Then Fordom Stormächtigste …, p. 32), where he is called ‘Zoberzeski’. 8 For further details of his biography, see Kersten, ‘Kobierzycki’, and Byliński & Kaczorowski, ‘Posłowie’. 9 Kobierzycki, Historia Władysława, królewicza polskiego i szwedzkiego.

Historia Vladislai by sTanisław kobierzyCki

Graph 17.1. % of Widekindi's text borrowed from Kobierzycki (books 1 to 7).

I have marked all passages which are either borrowed from Kobierzycki (usu‐ ally with a very slight revision) or, in certain cases, are a clear paraphrase of him, and counted the number of words in them. Whenever Kobierzycki’s account is intertwined with material from another source (as, for instance, in the first book, where Widekindi, talking about the end of the first False Dmitrii, combines Kobierzycki with a historical sketch by Axel Oxenstierna,10 or in the fifth book, where the death of the second False Dmitrii is described after both Kobierzycki and Petrejus),11 the phrases taken from Kobierzycki are counted. The fact that the amount of borrowings culminates in the third and fourth books is hardly surprising: they describe the events of 1609–1610, when the Swedish forces came into direct contact with the Polish ones, and the RussianPolish affairs are also Swedish to a higher degree than both before and afterwards. Book 8 is not included in the diagram, as it only contains one short passage (pp. 429–30 of the Latin version, no correspondence in the Swedish one) based on Kobierzycki; there are some more in books 9 and 10, but they do not constitute any significant part of the text, which is huge (the two books are approximately as long as the eight preceding together) and consists mainly of Swedish-Russian affairs, accounted for in the Swedish sources of Widekindi. It should be noted, however, that Widekindi does not limit himself to bor‐ rowing information from Kobierzycki. He was apparently so impressed by his predecessor’s style, that he sometimes also exploits him when there is no need of it at all. An example is the beginning of the third book, copied from the end of Kobierzycki’s second book:

10 ‘Historica Relatio rerum anno 1625 et seqventi huc usque gestarum inter Regna Sueciae et Poloniae’, in Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brefvexling, i.1, 239–46. 11 Petrejus, Regni Muschovitici Sciographia and its German version Historien vnd Bericht Von dem Grossfürstenthumb Muschkow.

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Kobierzycki, pp. 87–88

Widekindi, p. 57

Caeterum (hactenus origines turbarum Moschoviae, et cruenta partium pro Imperio certamina) Sigismundi Regis arma lacessita, obsidionis Smolensci initia, contractiore exposita sunt stylo, veluti non ingrato praemisso lectori praeludio, facileque ex primis deducturo lineamentis, qua via ad vastum Septentrionis Imperium propitia Vladislaum duxere fata. In hac tamen rerum summa, plurima a me explicata dictaque esse scio, quae vel a nonnullis suppressa, vel certe per incuriam omissa sunt. Nunc quo propior ero in referendis Moschorum erga Vladislaum studiis, majore circuitu res prosequi consilium est, tantoque fidentius, quanto a Commentariis eorum, qui haec ipsa gesserunt, instructior sum, ita ut ex iis rariora quaedam neque divulgata hactenus promere possim. (However, up to now I have spoken of the beginnings of Muscovitic troubles and the bloody rivalries of the parties for achieving the supreme power, so the provocation of King Sigismund’s forces and the beginning of the Smolensk siege are described in a more compressed style, to first give the reader a pleasant introduction, so that the reader would be able to deduce from these first outlines, in what way the propitious fortune was leading Władysław to the power in the vast north. But I know that in this summary I have explained and related many things which had been suppressed or in any case negligently omitted by the others. Now my aim is to describe the events the more thoroughly the further I proceed in talking about the predilection of Muscovites for Władysław, and to do it in a way as reliable, as it is possible thanks to the memoirs of the acting persons themselves, so that I can take from them some pretty exclusive information, not divulged until now).

Hactenus origines turbarum Moschoviae, et cruenta partium pro imperio destinata, consilia Polonorum, Svecorum Regis auxilia implorata, foedera pacta pressiori stylo exposita sunt, non ingratis, ut spero, lectori praemissis lineamentis, ex quibus facile deducere poterit, cujus Partis studio, fideque arma nostra primum Moschoviam intravere. In hac rerum serie, plurima a me dicta esse scio, quae vel suppressa hactenus latuere, vel certe per incuriam aut studium partium omissa sunt. Nunc quo propior sim referendis Svecorum pro Moschis studiis, et Polonorum e contra molitionibus, majori circuitu circumlatorum armorum cursum, et gentium in contrarias partes ruentium obsequia, et fata exequi consilium est, tantoque confidentius, quanto a literis eorum, qui haec ipsa gesserunt instructior sum, ita ut ex iis collatis, vera neque hactenus divulgata exponere possim. (Up to now the beginnings of Muscovitic troubles and the bloody actions of the parties to achieve the supreme power, the plots of the Poles, the negotiations about the help from the Swedish King, the concluding of the alliance are described in a more compressed style, to first give the reader a pleasant introduction, so that the reader will be able to deduce from these first outlines, whose side our forces supported and trusted when they first entered Muscovy. I know that in this summary I have explained and related many things which had been until now suppressed and hidden, or in any case negligently or consciously omitted by the others. Now my aim is to describe the military operations, the shifting loyalty, and the fate of the peoples, the more thoroughly the further I proceed in talking about the Swedish efforts to help the Muscovites, and the contrary efforts of the Poles and to do it in a way as reliable, as it is possible thanks to the letters of the acting

Historia Vladislai by sTanisław kobierzyCki

Kobierzycki, pp. 87–88

Widekindi, p. 57 persons themselves, so that I can take from them some truthful information, not divulged until now).

The only actual difference is that the Poles are substituted with the Swedes, with certain necessary consequences: instead of ‘the provocation of King Sigis‐ mund’s forces’ Widekindi has described ‘the negotiations about the help from the Swedish King’, ‘the predilection of Muscovites for Władysław’ is turned into ‘the Swedish efforts to help the Muscovites’ etc. One more example of this trick may be found in another summarizing sentence: Kobierzycki, p. 91

Widekindi, p. 41

His igitur copiis, et tam praevalido armorum robore, biennio fere ante Sigismundi in Moschoviam adventum, bellatum est. (It was with these forces and this mighty power of weapons that the military actions were conducted over the course of two years before Sigismund came to Muscovy).

Hisce copiis biennio ferme ante Svecorum in Moschoviam adventum pugnatum est. (It was with these forces that the military actions were conducted over the course of two years before the Swedes came to Muscovy).

Sometimes Widekindi puts Kobierzycki’s words into a completely different con‐ text. For instance, he finds parallels between Władysław in 1610, when he was proclaimed Tsar in Moscow, and Charles Philip in 1612, when his ascent to the Russian throne was accepted in the north-west and discussed elsewhere, close enough to borrow a passage from the beginning of Kobierzycki’s fourth book into his own seventh book:12 Kobierzycki, pp. 161–62

Widekindi, pp. 339–40

STatuebat jam fortuna Vladislao initia causasque Imperii, quas per Legatos regios

PRaestruebat jam fortuna initia et causas Muschovitici Imperij CAROLO

12 Borrowing of Kobierzycki’s passages on Władysław when talking about Charles Philip occurs more than once in Widekindi’s text: cf. Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, p. 295, and Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, p. 319 (‘quo imperante aurea iterum e postliminio reditura esse Monarchiae secula, quae jam diu ferrea sub tot Dominis Moschoviam vexarunt’); Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, p. 339, and Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, p. 344 (the arrival of Charles Philip is delayed because his mother ‘immaturam filij aetatem turbidis Moschorum ingenijs non ausa credere’, just like Władysław’s father — with nearly the same wording — in Kobierzycki’s text).

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Kobierzycki, pp. 161–62

Widekindi, pp. 339–40

Ducibus Tribunisque exercitus Demetriani suggesserat, Muschorum animis jam praeparatis feliciterque in partes transeuntibus, praesertim fastidio utriusque Principis, quorum dedecus apertiore indies fama noscebatur: neque aliud in promtu inveniebant remedium, quam si unus praepotensque legeretur, in cujus sinu securius tutiusque Imperij status conquiesceret. Augebat gloriam Vladislai regia indoles, adolescentiae decor … (The fortune had already been laying the ground for Władysław to ascend the throne, which he had suggested to the officers and colonels of Dmitrii’s army through the King’s ambassadors. The minds of the Muscovites had already been prepared, and they were happily taking his side, especially because of their aversion to both leaders, whose disgrace was being divulged more and more each day. And they had no other remedy at hand but to choose just one and a powerful one, to confidently settle the condition of the state under his protection. The kingly nature of Władysław and the grace of his youth increased his glory).

PHILIPPO, quas per literas, per legatos Regi Svecorum Nougardensis Dominij cives suggesserant, Muschorum animis undique jam praeparatis et in partes transeuntibus, partim odio Polonorum, partim fastidio novi falsi Demetrij, cujus dedecus apud Plescovienses apertiore indies fama noscebatur: Neque aliud in promtu remedium suppetebat, quam si tam benevoli potentisque Regis frater legeretur, in cujus sinu securius Imperij status conquiesceret; augebat spem, gloriam, laetitiam publicam […] Principis regia indoles, aetatis flos et decor. (The fortune had already been preparing the ground for Charles Philip to ascend the Muscovite throne, which had been suggested by the citizens of Novgorod state through letters and ambassadors to the Swedish King. The minds of the Muscovites had already been prepared, and they were taking his side, partly because of their hatred of the Poles, partly because of aversion to the new False Dmitrii, whose disgrace in Pskov was being divulged more and more each day. And there was no other remedy at hand but to choose the brother of such a benevolent and powerful king, to confidently settle the condition of the state under his protection. The kingly nature of the prince, the blossom and the grace of his youth increased their hope, his glory, and the public joy).

Still, this sort of expressions is vague enough to be borrowed without obvi‐ ously distorting historical facts. Elsewhere Widekindi goes further than that. In Widekindi, the scornful question of the Poles, whether Maryna Mniszech married Tsarevich Dmitrii for the second time, is copied into the imagined answer of De la Gardie to Zborowski,13 while the sentimental tears of Muscovites during the secret negotiations with Sigismund, along with the subsequent feast, are placed by Widekindi into the scene of Vasilii Shuiskii’s meeting with De la Gardie in

13 Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, p. 111 and Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, p. 81.

Historia Vladislai by sTanisław kobierzyCki

March 1610.14 We do not know to what extent (if at all) Widekindi’s documentary sources prompted him to arrange pieces of information in this way: in both cases it must have been materials from Jacob De la Gardie’s archive, which is far from completely preserved.15 An interesting rearrangement of Kobierzycki’s words is made in book 3, as Widekindi describes the council in Poland concerning the open declaration of war against Muscovy. In Kobierzycki, there are several arguments against the war, sev‐ eral arguments in favour of the war, and finally, its official declaration.16 Widekindi faithfully copies the whole episode, but cuts out some arguments of the ‘pacifists’ and adds that such persons were very few.17 The arguments are cut, but not deleted. The next chapter is the Muscovitic answer to the Polish accusations, expressed, as Widekindi tells us, in their complaints to foreign regents, notably Charles IX. This answer consists of nothing but these very extracts.18 If we now turn to the general tendencies which may be noticed when compar‐ ing the two authors, they are in no way unexpected. For example, Kobierzycki dwells somewhat more on the treacherousness of Muscovites against Poles, com‐ mitted after the murder of False Dmitrii I.19 He also has a strongly negative attitude to Vasilii Shuiskii, whom he often calls ‘Tyrant’ etc. This attitude to a ruler who called for Swedish help against the Poles is of course missing in Widekindi; he obviously downplays it in all the passages taken from his Polish colleague. All mention of anti-Shuiskian opposition in the city of Moscow, as well as the secret negotiations of the Muscovites, repeatedly described in Kobierzycki, are dropped by the Swedish author. It goes almost without saying that all the exaggerations concerning the Poles in Kobierzycki are neutralized in Widekindi: Kobierzycki, pp. 70–71

Widekindi, p. 40

Jam et peracto bello Livonico adfuit praesto exercitus, cui Joannes Sapieha praeerat […] saepius a nobis non sine elogio memorandus. (After the end of the war in Livonia there also came an army led

Accessit etiam ex Livonia exercitus cui Johannes Sapieha praefuit […] saepius a nobis in posterum cruentis conflictibus memorandus. (After the end of the war in Livonia there also came an army led by Jan

14 Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, pp. 181–82 and Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, pp. 131– 32. 15 See Almquist, Sverge och Ryssland, p. ix. In another passage (Widekindi, Historia Belli SvecoMoscovitici, p. 224: De la Gardie is writing to the King about possible measures to make soldiers less inclined to mutiny), also borrowed from De la Gardie’s letters, we do have the text of the source and can see that the phrase ‘si larem, si focum […] habuissent’, probably inspired by Kobierzycki in a somewhat similar context (Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, p. 153: ‘quibus neque lar neque focus esset’, on mutineers in False Dmitry’s camp) is just a slight amplification of what the Swedish commander actually says. 16 Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, pp. 72–81. 17 Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, pp. 89–91. 18 Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, pp. 92–93. 19 Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, p. 77.

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Kobierzycki, pp. 70–71

Widekindi, p. 40

by Jan Sapieha, whom we will repeatedly mention not without a eulogy).

Sapieha, whom we will repeatedly mention in connection with bloody battles).

Kobierzycki, p. 245

Widekindi, p. 152

Gosievius in septingentos equites […] incidit, collatis signis fudit […] suffecisse interim ratus, hosti tam prospero primae salutationis officio animi imperterriti reverentiam incussisse, in arcem se recepit. (Gosiewski came across seven hundred cavalrymen, put them to flight in the battle and feeling it enough to inculcate a reverence for his bravery to the enemy with this first greeting, sheltered himself in the fortress).

Gosievius… in centenos aliquot equites […] incidit […] collatis signis nonnullos fundit […] et […] ultra progredi non ausus, se in arcem recipit. (Gosiewski comes across some hundreds of cavalrymen, puts some of them to flight in the battle and, not daring to proceed, shelters himself in the fortress).

Neither is it surprising that Widekindi, in his turn, does his best to glorify his homeland in general and De la Gardie in particular. The end of the third book, containing the successful march of Swedish and Russian forces towards Moscow, which they managed to rescue from False Dmitrii’s siege, is extremely rich in Widekindi’s insertions of De la Gardie into the text of Kobierzycki: Kobierzycki, p. 93

Widekindi, p. 111

Sed subito adventus Regius nihil tale opinantes exterruit. (But suddenly the arrival of the King frightened them, as they had not expected anything of this kind).

Adventus regius, et nostra vis imminens, exercitum Demetrianum vario animorum motu distrinxerant. (The arrival of the King and our threatening power pulled Dmitrii’s army in different directions).

Kobierzycki, p. 146

Widekindi, p. 116

Hinc simultates, indeque magnis expositae periculis legiones. (Hence emerged the rivalries, and therefore the troops were exposed to serious dangers.)

Hinc simultatum offensiones, et inde periculis expositae legiones, imminente jam Scopino et Jacobo De La Gardie. (Hence emerged the rivalries and the insults, and therefore the troops were exposed to dangers, while Skopin and Jacob De la Gardie were already approaching.)

Historia Vladislai by sTanisław kobierzyCki

Figure 17.2. Charles IX of Sweden. Frontispiece to Widekindi’s Historia Belli SuecoMoscovitici Decennalis. Drawing by David Klöcker Ehrenstrahl, engraving by Dionysius Padt Brugge. Lund University Library.

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Kobierzycki, p. 211

Widekindi, pp. 118–19

Nec Scopino qvispiam tunc rei militaris peritior habebatur, quippe cautus consilio providusque, castra optime firmare munitionibus palisque praefigere noverat, quos bis mille eum in usum curribus vehere solitus erat: manu impiger disciplinaeque militaris tenacissimus, suique septentrionis frigora in societatem pugnae, cum opus esset, advocans. (And nobody was considered to be more experienced in military matters at that time than Skopin, for, being cautious and provident, he perfectly knew how to establish a camp and to protect it with fortifications and piles. For this sake he usually carried with him in carts two thousand such piles. He was energetic, kept a tight hold on military discipline, and, when required, used the cold of his North as an ally in battle).

Nec utroque qvisquam tunc rei militaris peritior habebatur. Quippe hic cautus consilio, castra optime firmare et munitionibus acutisque palis praefigere noverat, quos bis mille eum in usum secum circumferebat: Ille providus et manu impiger, disciplinaeque tenacissimus exercitatos milites suique septentrionis frigora in societatem pugnae, cum opus esset, trahens. (And nobody was considered to be more experienced in military matters at that time than the two of them, for the latter (i.e. Skopin), being cautious in his decisions, perfectly knew how to establish a camp and to protect it with fortifications and sharp piles. For this sake he usually carried with him in carts two thousand such piles. The former (i.e. De la Gardie) was provident and energetic and, keeping a tight hold on military discipline, used, when required, the trained soldiers and the cold of his North as an ally in battle).

Kobierzycki, p. 155

Widekindi, pp. 123–24

Insuper Suyscii Scopinique conatibus animosi unita virtute obviam se ituros obstringunt. (Moreover, they swear to bravely and unitedly resist the plans of Shuiskii and Skopin).

Se unita virtute Jacobi, Scopinique conatibus animose obviam ituros obstringunt. (Moreover, they swear to bravely resist to the plans of Jacob and Skopin).

The account of the famous battle of Klushino, in which the united Swedish and Muscovite forces were disastrously crushed by the Poles, follows Kobierzycki in the Latin version more or less exclusively, but as it comes to the ‘disgraceful flight’ (‘turpissime profugerant’) of Jacob De la Gardie and Evert Horn into the woods, Widekindi suddenly stops repeating the words of his source and informs us that De la Gardie and Horn simply went to the woods to call back their disgracefully

Historia Vladislai by sTanisław kobierzyCki

flying soldiers.20 It is also interesting to note that the detailed account of the battle is by far the largest passage of Widekindi’s text, where borrowings from Kobierzycki have no correspondence in Widekindi’s Swedish version:21 there the account is shorter and probably based on De la Gardie’s own reports. When at the end of the chapter Widekindi makes an exception and translates some phrases from Kobierzycki into Swedish, he drops the words ‘prosterni Ducis nostri authoritatem’ (the authority of our general is ruined): the Swedish reader must apparently get a less maculated image of the great commander.22 The natural difference in the attitude can also be perceived regarding the Swedish king Charles IX (Fig. 16.2). Kobierzycki delightedly spends a page describing Charles’ fury and despair after the Klushino defeat, even assuming that he uttered something like the Augustan ‘Varus, give me back my legions!’, while Widekindi, probably having before him Kobierzycki’s text, confines himself to a short mention of the King’s righteous anger and sorrow.23 So much for the tendencies. I would like to finish with a note on textual criti‐ cism. Comparing Widekindi’s text with Kobierzycki contributes to the solution of the problem I mentioned in the beginning, the one of the relation between the two versions. 1. First of all, we are able to state that Widekindi did not use Kobierzycki in the two versions independently from each other — a fact which looks quite natural not least due to the evidence we already have (see above), but is important to confirm. In general, the numerous changes made by Widekindi to Kobierzycki’s text in his Latin version are faithfully preserved in the Swedish one — this is true

20 Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, pp. 270–76, and Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, pp. 163– 66. 21 Other such instances include the aforementioned characteristics of De la Gardie and Skopin (Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, pp. 118–19, after Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, p. 211), the description of skis (Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, p. 120, after Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, p. 212; the Swedish readers are probably supposed to know what skis look like) and the short account of Polish domestic affairs in 1612–1613 (Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, pp. 429–30, summarizing Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, pp. 461–68); the account of the seizure of the Joseph monastery (Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, pp. 147–48, after Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, pp. 234–36) and the above-mentioned passage on the Russians awaiting the new prince (Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, pp. 339–40, after Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, pp. 161–62) are drastically shortened in the Swedish version (Widekindi, Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie, pp. 180–81 and 419 respectively). 22 Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, p. 278, Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, p. 168, to compare with Widekindi, Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie, p. 201. Almquist, Sverge och Ryssland, p. 190 n. 1 also accuses Widekindi of inaccuracy in citing — from Kobierzycki – Żółkiewski’s letter, as Widekindi (Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, p. 176) puts ‘quatuor amplius horas’ where Kobierzycki (Historia Vladislai, p. 275) has ‘tres amplius horas’, but in fact it is nothing more than an attempt to be consistent: Kobierzycki has just said (Historia Vladislai, p. 273) ‘quatuor horas’ and Widekindi has followed him (Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, p. 165). 23 Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, p. 285; Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, p. 188; Widekindi, Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie, p. 230.

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for the passages quoted above as well as for less meaningful changes, due only to stylistic decoration. A couple of examples will suffice: Kobierzycki, p. 57

Widekindi-S, s. 23

Widekindi-L, pp. 21–22

In soceri Georgii Mniszek […] gratiam amicitiamque provectus, vultu accommodato ibi, genus fugae, evitataeque caedis modum disertius aperuit. (Forwarded to the benevolence and friendship of Jerzy Mniszech, [Konstanty Wiśniowiecki’s] father-in-law, he took a suitable countenance and described to him in more detail his escape and the way in which he avoided the murder).

Han bleff promoverat til Georgium Mniznek […] för hwilken han dristeligen / doch falskt […] bekiände / huru han war vndan kommen Mordet och bortflydd. (He was forwarded to Jerzy Mniszech, to whom he openly, but mendaciously described how he avoided the murder and fled).

Promotus est ad Georgium Mniznek […] cui aperta fronte, subdola mente genus fugae et modum evitatae coedis clarius exposuit. (He was forwarded to Jerzy Mniszech, to whom he openly, but mendaciously described in more detail his escape and the way in which he avoided the murder).

That is, Widekindi inserts an antithesis where Kobierzycki has a more simple expression. The most common change (naturally not always conceivable in the Swedish text), though, is using one equivalent synonym instead of another, as e.g. ‘pressiori’ instead of ‘contractiore’ or ‘pugnatum’ instead of ‘bellatum’ in the quotations from pp. 57 and 41 above. Sometimes, albeit rarely, the attempts to vary the text of the source in this way are clearly unfortunate: Kobierzycki, p. 286

Widekindi-S, s. 217

Widekindi-L, p. 179

aliaque oppida explicandis per Moschoviam copiis opportuna (And other towns convenient to deploy the troops in Muscovy)

och någre andre emellan Moscou wälbelägne Orter (And some other towns conveniently placed between Moscow)

aliaque oppida explicandis inter Moschuam armis idonea (And other towns convenient to deploy the troops between Moscow)

The four last words in Kobierzycki’s phrase are substituted by their synonyms — but putting these synonyms mechanically, Widekindi arrives at the meaningless ‘between Moscow’ both in the Latin and in the Swedish version. Some further mistakes common for the two versions may be found. An inaccurate spelling of the original ‘cui’ destroys the syntax in the Latin text and causes a slight distortion of meaning in the Swedish translation:

Historia Vladislai by sTanisław kobierzyCki

Kobierzycki, p. 95

Widekindi-S, s. 137

Widekindi-L, pp. 111–12

Tenebantque anxios [sc. Duces ac Tribunos] liberalia promissa Demetrii, cui necdum asserto regimine, et ad quod mox asserendum nova adventantis Regis arma ponerent obicem, omnis penitus exsolvendarum pollicitationum praecidebatur facultas. (And the officers and the colonels were anxious about Dmitrii’s generous assurances, who was totally denied the opportunity to keep his promises without having asserted the throne, while the new armies of the approaching King put an obstacle to assert it soon).

Serdeles gick Öfwerstarna och Officerarne hårdt til sinne […] at the stoore Lyfften som Demetrius them giordt hafwer / vthan tuifwel lära gåå tilbaka / efftersom wij så för Konungens som för the Swenskas infall / icke läre kunne hålla wår lofwen / och honom på Stor-Förste Stoolen sättia. (In particular, the colonels and the officers were anxious that Dmitrii’s great assurances would undoubtedly go for nothing, as they were unable to keep their promises and assert for him the throne, due to the attacks of both the King and the Swedes).

Praecipue duces Tribunosque […] angebant liberalia promissa Demetrii, cum in posterum asserendo imperio, non hostium solum, sed Regis arma positura obicem: Et sic solvendarum pollicitationum praecidi facultatem. (In particular, the officers and the colonels were anxious about Dmitrii’s generous assurances, as the armies of both the enemies and the King were going to put an obstacle to asserting the throne, and thus the opportunity to keep promises would be denied).

Had the person translating the Latin draft into Swedish seen ‘cui’ instead of ‘cum’ (‘efftersom’), the False Dmitrii’s officers would have been more anxious about his promises than about their own. 2. Further, there is some specific evidence for another thing we already know — that the Swedish text is translated from the Latin. There are namely some mistakes in the Swedish text caused by the ambiguity or lack of precision in the Latin text: Kobierzycki, p. 142

Widekindi-S, s. 141

Widekindi-L, p. 115

Proposuisset, ut Rex Severia et Smolensco a Demetrio accepto, placatus discederet. (He suggested that the King would withdraw, satisfied with Severia and Smolensk, which he would get from Dmitrii).

Och begiärte at Konungen wille träda ifrån Smolensko och vthur Severien / then Demetrius hafwer them försäkrat. (And they [sc. Dmitrii’s adherents] demanded that the King would withdraw from

Petuntque, ut Rex, Severia et Smolensco a Demetrio acceptis, discedat. (And they ask that the King would withdraw, having received Severia and Smolensk from Dmitrii — or withdraw from Severia

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Kobierzycki, p. 142

Widekindi-S, s. 141

Widekindi-L, p. 115

Smolensk and Severia, promised to them by Dmitrii).

and Smolensk, received by Dmitrii).

Kobierzycki has a participial construction in ablative, depending on ‘placatus’. Widekindi strikes out ‘placatus’ from his Latin text and arrives at an ambiguous construction, to understand either correctly as absolute ablative or incorrectly as a participial construction depending on ‘discedat’. The person who translated it into Swedish was unlucky in his — indeed difficult — choice. 3. There is one more and probably the most important detail to claim: the Latin draft was not identical with the text submitted to the printers for the Latin edition, the draft had been revised. It becomes clear due to some traces of the original text in the Swedish version: Kobierzycki, p. 150

Widekindi-S, s. 144

Widekindi-L, p. 117

Illum non regionis sed religionis expugnandae, templorum non urbium hostem, eversorem rituum, expilatorem Coenobiorum in Moschoviam advenisse. (He has come to Muscovy to occupy not the region but the religion, as an enemy of the churches, not of the cities, as a destroyer of the ceremonies and a robber of the monasteries).

Nembligen honom wara infallen icke til at wäria vthan förhäria / Kyrckior / theras Religions och the Heliges Skrud / Land och Städer, etc. (He has invaded them not to defend but to plunder the churches, the attire of their religion and their saints, the land and the cities, etc.)

Illum scilicet religionis potius extirpandae, templorum hostem, rituum eversorem, caenobiorum expilatorem in Moschoviam advenisse. (He has come to Muscovy rather to eradicate their religion, as an enemy of the churches, a destroyer of the ceremonies and a robber of the monasteries).

Widekindi makes a rhyme in the Swedish text (‘wäria’ – ‘förhäria’) under the influ‐ ence of Kobierzycki’s paronomasia ‘regionis’ – ‘religionis’. Hence we may conclude that this paronomasia was still present in the draft, but was then expunged during the preparation of the Latin edition. Another instance of following Kobierzycki in the Swedish edition (and thus certainly in the Latin draft), but shortening the expression in the Latin edition: Kobierzycki, p. 376

Widekindi-S, s. 288

Widekindi-L, p. 227

Flammis ambusti aediumque suarum involuti

Månge omkommo / deels vthi sielfwe Eelden / deels

ingenti aedium ruina et hominum clade. (With a

Historia Vladislai by sTanisław kobierzyCki

Kobierzycki, p. 376

Widekindi-S, s. 288

Widekindi-L, p. 227

ruina miseri intereunt. (Burned by the fire and buried under the collapse of their houses, they perish miserably).

och aff sielfwe huusen som fölle neder / ihiälslagne. (Many died, some killed by the fire itself, some by the collapsing houses).

huge collapse of the houses and peril of the people).

From the Latin text of Widekindi (the episode is the seizure of Smolensk) we only learn about the destruction of buildings and the fatalities during the fire, while Kobierzycki and Widekindi’s Swedish text put these details into more explicit connection — so the Swedish phrase could hardly originate from Widekindi’s Latin as we have it. Having stopped by Smolensk in October 1609, the Polish King is doubtful as to whether he should go on or besiege the city. Żółkiewski pleads for the former option, Lew Sapieha and Gosiewski for the latter. Kobierzycki, p. 87

Widekindi-S, s. 115

Widekindi-L, p. 93

At Zolkevius […] suadebat ulteriorem in Moschoviam progressum armorum. (But Żółkiewski recommended to move the war further into Muscovy).

Til thet förre rådde honom öfwerste Feltherren Solkefski. (The former option was recommended to him by the commander in chief Żółkiewski).

Spretum prius consilium, dissvadente summo exercituum praefecto Zolkevio. (The first option was rejected, the commander in chief Żółkiewski pleading against it).

Thus the Swedish text is correct, while the Latin one has the opposite meaning. To be exact, the absolute ablative here may theoretically — just like the English translation — be understood in a concessive sense, ‘although Żółkiewski pled against it (i.e. against rejecting the first option)’, but it seems more likely that the construction is a result of some inaccurate revision of the draft. Otherwise we would have had to assume that Widekindi — if it was himself at all, and not one of the persons who helped him with the translation into Swedish — (1) remembered what Kobierzycki meant and understood the clumsy construction in a concessive sense; (2) did not find it clumsy and ambiguous and thus made no corrections for the Latin edition. In my opinion, that is not very likely. As regards the possibility that ‘dissuadente’ is a misreading of the printer, and the text of the manuscript actually had ‘dissentiente’ or ‘dissidente’, i.e. a form of some intransitive verb which is easier to understand in a concessive sense, Kobierzycki’s ‘suadebat’ virtually excludes this possibility.

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There are, besides that, quite a few phrases24 in the Swedish text that have no correspondence in the Latin one, although they are taken from Kobierzycki, for instance: Kobierzycki, p. 96

Widekindi-S, s. 138

Widekindi-L, p. 112

In horum utrumque peccare […] plenum opus periculi […] jusjurandum Hero praestitum convellere […] extremae amentiae est. (To offend both of them is very dangerous; to break the oath given to the master is an extreme madness).

Bägges at förtörne / synes fahrligit och icke rådsampt. (To offend both of them seems dangerous and unwise).

In utrumque peccare, rem periculosae aleae plenam esse. (To offend both of them is a very dangerous bet).

The ‘madness’ is dropped in the Latin text, but preserved (although modified) in the Swedish one. To this group also belong, e.g., the instances in the above-mentioned Polish council, where the words ‘emedan som Stilståndz Förbundet ännu intet war vthe’ and ‘igenom thet Mord the widh Bröllopz Fästen bedrefwo på Pålackarna i Muschou’ constitute a paraphrase of Kobierzycki’s text, but have no parallel in the Latin text of Widekindi.25 *** Finally, a perfect example to summarize Widekindi’s working process is provided by a passage from the sixth book, where the Polish seizure of Smolensk is described. The episode is based entirely on Kobierzycki. At the end, a huge blast in a powder magazine destroys a part of the city, and two weeks later the Poles find two people still alive under the ruins: Kobierzycki, p. 416

Widekindi-S, s. 353–54

Widekindi-L, p. 287

rudera […] amovent. Et ecce attoniti reperiunt marem et faeminam spirantes viventesque. Faemina quidem hausto

Tolff dagar ther effter funnes twå karlar vnder gruuset / som ännu wore lefwandes / doch strax sedan the wore vptagne /

duobus per duodecim dies inter rudera [quod mirum) superstitibus. (Two persons remained alive among the

24 As far as I could ascertain, this is never the case with any passages longer than one sentence. 25 Widekindi, Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie, pp. 109–10, to compare with Kobierzycki, Historia Vladislai, pp. 74, 77 and Widekindi, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici, pp. 89–90.

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Kobierzycki, p. 416

Widekindi-S, s. 353–54

Widekindi-L, p. 287

puriori aere confestim exanimis concidit: alter ad castra perductus, cum vinum adustum et balneum poposcisset, hausto vino non supervixit. Sedecim dies ruderibus coopertos […] vitam protrahere potuisse, omnibus certe admirationi fuit. (They move the ruins away and are surprised to find a male and a female breathing and alive. The woman fell dead just after she had inhaled the fresh air; the other one was lead to the camp, asked for some schnapps and bath, but did not survive drinking the schnapps. That they, having for sixteen days been covered with ruins, managed to remain alive, astonished everybody, of course).

och hade ätit / så blefwe the döde. (Twelve days later two men were found under the gravel, who were still alive, but died just after they had been taken up and had eaten).

ruins for twelve days, which is astonishing).

In this example we can assume, firstly, that Widekindi writes an inaccurate nu‐ meral symbol in his draft, something like ХИ, so that sixteen days turn into twelve in both versions. Secondly, he (or his anonymous assistant) makes a mistake in the Swedish text when translating the ambiguous Latin ‘duobus’: instead of ‘male and female’ from Kobierzycki’s text there are two males, ‘twå karlar’. Finally, when preparing the Latin edition, Widekindi decides to strike out the phrase about the further fate of these two persons, which is thus only preserved in the Swedish text. To conclude — when dealing with early modern texts in general and with Neo-Latin ones in particular, one should always bear in mind that the habit of writing historical and other works by the way of compiling was regarded as far more normal than it is now. On the other hand, this habit itself may provide us with interesting subjects of research on different aspects of the composition: comparison with the source may shed light on the literary technique of the author, on his aims and intentions as well as on the history of the text.

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Works Cited Primary Sources Kobierzycki, Stanisław, Historia Vladislai Poloniae et Sueciae Principis, ejus Natales et Infantiam, Electionem in Magnum Moscoviae Ducem, Bella Moscovitica, Turcica, caeterasque res gestas continens, usque ad excessum Sigismundi III Poloniae Sueciaeque Regis (Gdańsk: Förster, 1655) ———, Historia Władysława, królewicza polskiego i szwedzkiego, trans. by Marek Krajewski, ed. by Janusz Byliński and Włodzimierz Kaczorowski, Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis, 2837 (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2005) Petrejus, Petrus, Regni Muschovitici Sciographia. Thet är: Een wiss och egenteligh Beskriffning om Rydzland, med thes många och stora Furstendömers, Provinciers, Befestningars, Städers, Siögars och Elfwers Tilstånd, Rum och Lägenheet: Såsom och the Muskowiterske Storfursters Härkomst, Regemente, macht och myndigheet, medh theras Gudztienst och Ceremonier, Stadgar och åthäfwor, både vthi Andeliga och Politiske saker, Vthi Sex Böker korteligen författat, beskrifwin och sammandragin (Stockholm: Meurer, 1615) Petrejus, Petrus, Historien vnd Bericht Von dem Grossfürstenthumb Muschkow, mit dero schönen fruchtbaren Provincien vnd Herrschaften, Festungen, Schlössern, Städten, Flecken, Fischreichen Wassern, Flüssen, Strömen vnd Seen, Wie auch Von der Reussischen Grossfürsten Herkommen, Regierung, Macht, Eminentz vnd Herrligkeit, vielfältigen Kriegen, jnnerlichen Zwytrachten, bisz sie zu einer Monarchi gewachsen, Mit den newlich vorgelauffenen Auffrühren vnd Händeln von den dreyen erdichteten Demetrijs, Nebenst dem auffgerichteten Friedens Contract, zwischen dem Löblichen König in Schweden, vnd jetzt regierenden GrossFürsten, Deszgleichen Die Processe, so zwischen den Königlichen Ambassadoren in der Stadt Muschow, vnd der Groszfürstlichen Reussischen Gesandten in der Königlichen Stadt Stockholm, wegen der auffgerichteten Friedens Contracts Confirmation seyn gehalten worden, Mit der Muschowiter Gesetzen, Statuten, Sitten, Geberden, Leben, Policey, vnd Kriegswesen: wie auch, was es mit jhrer Religion vnd Ceremonien vor eine Beschaffenheit hat, kürtzlich vnd deutlich in sechs Theilen zusammen gefasset, beschrieben vnd publiciret (Leipzig: [n. pub.], 1620) Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brefvexling, i.i, Historiska och politiska skrifter (Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien, 1888) Widekindi, Johannes, Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie / Hwilket vnder twänne Sweriges Stormächtige Konungars / Konung Carls IX. Och K. Gustaf Adolphs den Andres och Stoores Baneer / Storfursten Ivan Vasilivitz Suischi och Ryssland til hielp / Först emoot the Rebeller och Lithower / sedan the Påler / på sidstone emoot sielfwe Muskowiterne / ifrån åhr 1607. in til 1617. Aff Feldtherren Gref. Iacob De La Gardie vthfördt / och medh en reputerligh Fredh bijlagdt är / i lijka många Böcker fördeelt och sammanfattat (Stockholm: Wankijff, 1671)

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Widekindi, Johannes, Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici Decennalis, Quod junctis armis cum Magno Moscorum Duce Johan. Basilio Svischio, Primum adversus Rebelles et Lithuanos, mox Polonos, tandem data causa contra ipsos Moscovitas, auspiciis Regum Sveciae Caroli IX, et Gustavi Adolphi Ductu Jacobi De La Gardie, Varia fortuna ab Anno seculi hujus Septimo, in decimum septimum gestum, et ardua pace compositum est, Totidem Libris distincta (Stockholm: Wankijff, 1672) Widekindi, Johannes, Then Fordom Stormächtigste / Högborne Furstes och Herres Herr Gustaff Adolphs / den Andres och Stores Sweriges / Götes och Wändes, etc. Konungs Historia, och Lefwernes Beskrifning / Then Första Deel (Stockholm: Wankijff, 1691) Видекинд, Юхан, История десятилетней шведско-московитской войны XVII века, пер. С. А. Аннинского, А. М. Александрова, & А. Ф. Костиной, под ред. В. Л. Янина & А. Л. Хорошкевич [Widekindi, Johannes, The History of the Swedish-Muscovitic Ten Years’ War in the 17th Century, trans. by S. A. Anninskii, A. M. Aleksandrov, & A. F. Kostina, ed. by V. L. Yanin & A. L. Khoroshkevich] (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2000) Карамзин, Николай Михайлович, История государства российского [Karamzin, Nikolai Mikhailovich, History of the Russian State], 12 vols (St Petersburg: Smirdin, 1833– 1835) Secondary Studies Almquist, Helge, Sverge och Ryssland 1595–1611. Tvisten om Estland, förbundet mot Polen, de ryska gränslandens eröfring och den stora dynastiska planen (Uppsala: [n. pub.], 1907) Byliński, Janusz, and Włodzimierz Kaczorowski, ‘Posłowie’, in Stanisław Kobierzycki, Historia Władysława, królewicza polskiego i szwedzkiego, trans. by Marek Krajewski, ed. by Janusz Byliński and Włodzimierz Kaczorowski, Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis, 2837 (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2005), pp. 421–38 Kersten, Adam, ‘Kobierzycki’, in Polski Słownik Biograficzny, xiii (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich, 1967–1968), pp. 151–52 Vetushko-Kalevich, Arsenii, ‘Bilingual Writings on Bilingual Writings: J. Widekindi’s letters to M. G. De la Gardie’, Philologia Classica, 11 (2016), 289–300 ———, Compilation and Translation. Johannes Widekindi and the Origins of His Work on a Swedish-Russian War, Studia Graeca et Latina Lundensia, 26 (Lund: Lund University, 2019)

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The Treaty of Stolbovo * A Failure or Success of Russian Diplomacy?

For a long time, the Treaty of Stolbovo was considered a diplomatic failure for Russia. It has been compared to the failure of the Truce of Deulino with Poland, concluded by Russian diplomats in 1618. This assessment of the treaty owes much to the works of Petr Shafirov and Ivan Golikov. The aim of A Discourse on the Causes of the Northern War, commissioned by Peter the Great and written by Vice-Chancellor Petr Pavlovich Shafirov (1669– 1739) in 1717 was to substantiate the legitimacy of the Tsar’s territorial claims. Therefore, it is quite natural that Shafirov would describe the Treaty of Stolbovo, whose conditions did not suit Peter, as ‘woeful, forced upon us’ and inflicting an ‘irrevocable loss to the Russian state and people’. According to Shafirov, Russian diplomats were forced to sign it ‘in order to deliver their Fatherland from com‐ plete devastation’.1 In his work, the Acts of Peter the Great, the Kursk merchant Ivan Ivanovich Golikov (1735–1801), a passionate admirer and the first biographer of Peter the Great, described the Treaty of Stolbovo as ‘a coercive treaty’. He wrote that the Swedes had placed ‘the quills in the hands’ of the Russian ambassadors and compelled them to sign this treaty by force, ‘holding a naked sword over their heads’. Furthermore, the ambassadors, ‘without regard for their own lives but in the interests of saving their dearest fatherland, were forced to fulfil all their demands’.2 In contrast to their descendants, those living at the time of the Treaty of Stolbovo considered it to have been a rather profitable one for Russia. In a letter sent to Velikii Novgorod, Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich wrote: ‘In accordance with our royal decree, our ambassadors […] have perpetuated friendship and love between us and the Swedish King, and peace, accord, and felicity between our states’.3 He celebrated it as a victory, and thus ordered the governors [the voevods] of * A Russian version of this article has been published in Новгородский исторический сборник [Novgorod Historical Miscellany], 17 (27) (2017), 165–72. 1 Шафиров, ‘Разсуждение о причинах Свейской войны’ [Shafirov, ‘А Discourse on the Causes of the Swedish War’], p. 493. 2 Голиков, Деяния Петра Великого [Golikov, Acts of Peter the Great], i, 150; xii, 532–33. 3 Собрание государственных грамот и договоров [Collection of State Documents and Treaties], iii, 452. Sweden, Russia, and the 1617 Peace of Stolbovo, ed. by Arne Jönsson and Arsenii Vetushko‑Kalevich, Acta Scandinavica, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), pp. 359–374 10.1484/M.AS-EB.5.133620

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various cities ‘to gather all those people serving and living in them and to read a proclamation to them in public, so that all the people should know of that good deed, hold church services, and ring the bells, and it is ordered that salutes be made from guns both large and hand-held so that this deed be proclaimed and made known’.4 One of the peculiarities of the Treaty of Stolbovo was that it marked the end of a war that had not been officially declared. During the Time of Troubles, Russia and Sweden were not formally at war. It is no coincidence that in the preamble to the treaty it was stated that: ‘The ambassadors have met […] in order to come to an agreement and settle the issue of disputes and misunderstandings that they have got during the previous several years […] and have then boiled over into open hostility, war, and bloodshed’.5 The Swedes had entered the territory of the Russian state as allies on the basis of the Treaty of Viborg, 1609, and for a certain period of time they fought alongside and not against Russia. As a matter of fact, this was a Swedish-Polish war fought on the territory of Russia. That is why the seminal work dedicated to these events by the seventeenth-century Swedish historiographer of the realm, Johannes Widekindi, is entitled in the Swedish version: History of the Ten-Year War of the Swedes in Russia.6 The nature of the Swedish military presence in Russia changed in accordance with the changes in the political situation within the country. Nevertheless, it can be said that de jure, in accordance with the norms of international law at that time, the Treaty of Viborg continued to be in force until the election of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov in 1613. It is another matter that de facto, for various reasons, it was inadvertently violated by both sides, whereby the relations between the two countries needed to be reconciled with a settlement. It was the leaders of the Riazan militia force who aspired to achieve this settlement and who like the government of Vasilii Shuiskii were interested in garnering Swedish military assistance. After the election of Mikhail Romanov to the throne, the idea of the need to resume a peace that had been violated against the will of both sides, as well as the idea of involving international mediators in the negotiation process, found supporters both in the Russian and Swedish ruling circles. Peace talks opened on 4 January 1616 in the village of Dederino, located between Ostashkov and Staraia Russa. The Moscow government was represented at the talks by Daniil Ivanovich Mezetskii, Aleksei Ivanovich Ziuzin, Nikolai Nikitich Novokshchenov, and Dobrynia Semenov. Klas Fleming, Henrik Horn, Jacob De la Gardie, and Måns Mårtensson were appointed as the Swedish repre‐ sentatives. The mediators were Dutch and English envoys interested in seeing military operations in Russia terminated and receiving trade preferences from the Moscow government. The English representatives ( John Merrick, Thomas 4 Собрание государственных грамот и договоров [Collection of State Documents and Treaties], iii, 155. 5 Sverges traktater, v.1, pp. 242–43. 6 Widekindi, Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie.

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Figure 18.1. Tsar Mikhail, the first tsar of the House of Romanov. Just like Gustavus Adolphus, he ascended the throne as a very young man in an extremely turbulent situation, with both a civil war and wars against Sweden and Poland to be brought to an end. The Latin distich under the portrait in Olearius’s book contains a Virgil-styled comparison (quo non clementior alter): ‘Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich, whom no leader surpassed in clemency, had a face that looked like this’. Lund University Library. Photographer: Gideon Horn.

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Figure 18.2. Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden 1611–1632. Frontispiece to the Gustavus Adolphus Bible (Biblia, Thet är: All then Helgha Scrifft, På Swensko) that was published in 1618 (a revised version of the Gustavus Vasa Bible of 1541). Engraving by Valentin Staffansson Trauthman, active in Stockholm 1610–1627. Lund University Library. Photographer: Gideon Horn.

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Smith) gave the most support to Russia and the Dutch (Reinoud van Brederode, Diederik Bas, Albert Joachimi) to Sweden.7 The negotiations that had commenced with disputes over Gustavus Adolphus and Mikhail Fedorovich’s entitlements and mutual reproaches and claims were rather difficult, since both sides had lodged fairly disproportionate claims. The Swedish representatives insisted that the question of the acceptance of Charles Philip to the kingdom of Muscovy be discussed and demanded that the Russians ceded all the cities occupied by Swedish forces. The Moscow ambassadors cate‐ gorically refused to discuss the question of the King’s son and insisted that the Swedes return all the territories they had occupied, and also pay reparations for the losses they had caused. In the end, the Swedes agreed to cede the cities they had occupied — except for Korela — for the mind-boggling sum of forty barrels of gold. If the Tsar failed to provide this sum of money, then he would be obliged to cede Ivangorod, Oreshek, Jama, Kopor´e, and the Sumerskaia volost. Ladoga and Gdov would remain in the hands of the Swedes as a pledge until the final settlement of all the questions under dispute. The negotiations were completed on 22 February 1616 with the conclusion of an armistice to last until 31 May. The ambassadors agreed that they would meet again after consultations with their respective governments.8 In May 1616, the Russian ambassadors, together with Merrick, left for Tikhvin ‘to make peace between the Tsar and the Swedish King’.9 They arrived in Tikhvin on 12 June and began to look for a suitable place for the negotiations. The village of Stolbovo located between Tikhvin and Ladoga was chosen. The Swedish autho‐ rized representatives did not arrive for the negotiations on the scheduled date. The summer passed with correspondence being couriered between the Russian and Swedish ambassadors by John Merrick. In the middle of August, the Swedes informed the Muscovites that unless they declared within eight days which of the three articles drafted in Dederino would be used as the basis for the negotiations, they would not be coming to the meeting. In September, the Zemskii sobor examined the conditions for concluding the peace with the Swedes: ‘On whether to order the conclusion of the peace with the Swedish ambassadors on the basis of cities or money?’ In the end, it was decided to ‘conclude the peace on the basis of cities’, in other words, to cede Ivangorod, Jama, and Kopor´e to Sweden with a small additional payment.10

7 On the English and the Dutch participation in the negotiations, see respectively Steve Murdoch’s and Kristian Gerner’s articles in the present volume. 8 Лыжин, Столбовский договор и переговоры ему предшествовавшие [Lyzhin, The Treaty of Stolbovo and the Negotiations Preceding It], pp. 56–57. 9 The Dutch intermediaries did not take part in the negotiations. Having received their reward from Gustavus Adolphus, they considered their mission to have been fulfilled, and in June 1616 left Stockholm for their native lands. Additionally, they responded with a refusal to subsequent proposals by the Russian side that they participate in the negotiations. 10 Замятин, ‘Два документа к истории Земского собора 1616 г.’ [Zamiatin, ‘Two Documents from the History of the Zemskii Sobor of 1616’], pp. 299–302.

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At the end of August, the Swedes undertook a campaign against Pskov, the aim of which was to force the Russians to seek peace on terms that were favourable to Sweden. The attempt to take the city ended in failure, and in December the Swedish army gave up the siege. The Swedes’ ‘Pskov Misadventure’ had a big influence on the course of the peace negotiations. It testified to the exhaustion of the Swedes’ strength and their need to sue for peace as much as the Russians’. Finland, in particular, was in need of peace. In January 1616, representatives of the estates at the Riksdag in Helsingfors stated that ‘the Russian war is being fought more out of considerations of greed for foreign land than of necessity’.11 The report of the Dutch ambassadors, who passed through Finland in the spring of 1616, also noted: ‘The journey through Finland was extremely difficult — the people had fled and were completely impoverished from the incessant campaigns of the Swedish army to and from Russia’.12 It was not by chance that the Finns gave Jacob De la Gardie, who had spent so long fighting in Russia, the nickname ‘lazy Jaakko’ (laiska Jaakko). In November, the text for the preliminary agreement was worked out. Under the conditions of this agreement, Gustavus Adolphus would cede Novgorod, Staraia Russa, Porkhov, Gdov, Ladoga with their counties (uezds) and the Sumerskaia volost to Mikhail Fedorovich. Sweden would get Ivangorod, Kopor´e, Jama, and Oreshek with their counties. The Tsar, in his turn, would be obliged to confirm the concession to the Swedes of Korela, with its county, and pay Sweden twenty thousand roubles. The Swedish authorized emissaries expressed their consent to continue the negotiations and declared their readiness to come to Stolbovo. Mezetskii notified the Moscow government of this, and it immedi‐ ately informed the members of the Zemskii about the agreement that had been reached. The latter were extremely pleased that ‘such a great deed is being accom‐ plished […] The state of Novgorod and its outlying towns is coming under the power of his Majesty the Tsar in union with the state of Moscow’.13 But that agreement did not ease the situation for the people of Novgorod and did not result in changes for the better. On the contrary, realising that they would not be able to hold Novgorod, the Swedes began plundering its inhabitants: ‘The taxes that have been imposed on the townspeople are much higher than before’ and ‘torture is being used to recover debts’. The people of Novgorod sent a letter to the ambassadors with a message stating that because of exorbitant extortion and the forced recovery of debt, the people of Novgorod would be compelled to go over to the side of the Swedes, who forced them to resettle into Swedish territories. They complained that the conclusion of the peace was not making progress and requested the negotiations to be completed as soon as possible: ‘And, gentlemen, no good deed will have come to pass […] and we will not have

11 Widekindi, Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie, p. 832. 12 Отчет нидерландских уполномоченных [Report of the Dutch Plenipotentiaries], p. 414. 13 Замятин, ‘Два документа к истории Земского собора 1616 г.’ [Zamiatin, ‘Two Documents from the History of the Zemskii Sobor of 1616’], p. 310.

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been liberated, and we shall have been destroyed by all these outlandish taxes and duties’.14 Thus, by the end of 1616, the situation was such that any delay to the negotia‐ tions would have threatened to ruin Novgorod once and for all and resulted in its inhabitants becoming subjects of the Swedish King. Therefore, the Russian diplomats were instructed ‘not to break with the Swedish ambassadors under any circumstances, to appeal to them, to encourage them secretly with payments from the Tsar, to promise and give them incentives so that they would do it willingly and swiftly’.15 In their turn, the Swedes were wary that the Russians might reach a settlement with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and conclude an alliance with it against Sweden. Therefore, they accepted the Russian side’s proposals and the next meeting of ambassadors was scheduled for December in the village of Stolbovo, thirty-seven versts from Tikhvin. The negotiations began on 31 December with a discussion about the cities that were being held as a pledge. The Russian ambassadors insisted that all cities occupied by the Swedes were to be returned immediately after the conclusion of the peace treaty, without waiting for its ratification and the establishment of a borderline. The Swedes did not agree to this. Eventually, the parties reached an agreement that the Swedes would leave Novgorod, Staraia Russa, Porkhov, and Ladoga fourteen days after the signing of the treaty and Gdov would remain as a pledge to the Swedes. Then the ambassadors began to discuss the procedure for the transfer of the cities and titulary questions.16 At that time, the Novgorod ‘Piatikonetskie’ elders arrived in Stolbovo.17 They complained to the ambassadors that ‘in Novgorod, the foreigners are exhausting the local people to death by their exactions for the soldiers’ quarters and carts’, and asked to borrow money from the state treasury in order to pay off the Swedes, otherwise they would have to ‘unwillingly go over to the King’s side’. The ambassadors asked the Novgorodians to wait a while and promised to ask Merrick to put in a word for them and persuade the Swedes ‘not to harass Novgorod’. After nearly two months of negotiations on 27 February 1617, the Russian and Swedish diplomats signed the first ever international treaty of perpetual peace in the history of the new dynasty. Under its terms, Sweden recognized the Romanov dynasty, relinquished its claims to the Moscow throne and its plans to seize the White Sea coast, and returned the territories occupied by Swedish troops in Novgorod, Staraia Russa, Porkhov, Ladoga, Gdov, and their associated uezds. Meanwhile, the Russian side undertook to pay the Swedish crown twenty

14 Quoted after Замятин, ‘Условия заключения Столбовского мирного договора между Россией и Швецией’ [Zamiatin, ‘Conditions of the Stolbovo Peace Treaty between Russia and Sweden’], pp. 370–71. 15 Quoted after Соловьев, Сочинения [Solov´ev, Collected Works], v, p. 80. 16 Россия и Швеция в первой половине XVII века [Russia and Sweden in the First Half of the 17th Century], pp. 4–8. 17 That is, the elected elders of the townspeople of Novgorod’s five ‘corners’ (parts).

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thousand roubles and Korela, Kopor´e, Oreshek, Jama, and Ivangorod passed into Swedish possession. Their inhabitants along with their wives, children, and all their property could freely leave ‘to join his Majesty the Tsar’s side’ within two weeks of the date of the announcement of the treaty. On 14 March, the Tsar’s ambassadors, Prince Daniil Mezetskii, okol´nichii18 Aleksei Ziuzin, and d´iaks19 Nikolai Novokshchenov and Dobrynia Semenov, solemnly entered Novgorod. They carried with them the Tikhvin icon of the Mother of God, which was one of the guarantees of the peace treaty and on which the Novgorodians would swear an oath of loyalty to the new dynasty. A verst and a half from the city they were met by a solemn Novgorodian deputation headed by Metropolitan Isidor. Mezetskii read the Tsar’s charter to the Novgorodians, under which he forgave all the Novgorodians: ‘We have liberated Novgorod from the non-believers in order to have you Orthodox Christians in our royal favour and not in order to apply our royal opprobrium on anybody […] And these people who, being in the hands of the Swedes, served them of their own free will, and were obedient to them in all things, and did the bidding of the Swedes both of their own volition and against it, and in our merciful royal disposition we wish to forgive these people, so they shall have nothing to fear from us; as when they were in the hands of the Swedes, they could not follow their own will’.20 In all probability, Mikhail Romanov, who had spent more than two years in Moscow under Polish occupation, understood the motives behind the Novgoro‐ dians’ behaviour and treated them more leniently than some modern historians, who believed the Novgorodians’ relations with the Swedes had not so much been a temporary compromise as an act of treason. In this regard, it is particularly important to mention the conclusion made by Adrian Selin that ‘the process of Novgorod’s return was politically conceived, Moscow announced a full amnesty for all those who had served under the Swedes and fought against the Muscovites between 1614–1616, and likewise a retention of their ranks and investitures. The announcement of a social truce for Novgorod was a timely and wise act on the part of Moscow’s rulers’.21 The Treaty of Stolbovo, concluded as a result of protracted and complex negotiations, to a great extent suited both sides. The Russian diplomats succeeded in keeping Novgorod. The Swedish ruling elite’s plan to establish a border along the Volkhov River had collapsed, along with its plans to seize the Russian coast of the White Sea. Now Russia could concentrate all its forces to fight against a more dangerous enemy — the Poles, who had already started their campaign towards Moscow in the spring of 1617.

18 19 20 21

Moscow court or council rank, one rank below that of a boyar. The highest chancellery rank: head of a chancellery. Акты исторические [Historical Acts], iii, 450, 454. Селин, Новгородское общество в эпоху Смуты [Selin, Novgorodian Society in the Time of Troubles], p. 695.

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Figure 18.3. The Theotokos of Tikhvin, one of the most celebrated icons in Russia.It is ascribed to St Luke the Evangelist. It was held in Tikhvin since the fourteenth century. Transferred westwards during the war, it remained in Chicago until 2004, when it was returned to the Assumption Monastery in Tikhvin. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

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The Tsar rewarded his diplomats generously: Daniil Mezetskii was made a bo‐ yar and Aleksei Ziuzin an okol´nichii. The English mediator John Merrick got a gold chain with a portrait of the Tsar, a gold chalice adorned with precious stones, a brocade caftan trimmed with sable, a black-brown fox fur hat, fifty sable and five thousand squirrel furs. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Stolbovo strengthened the Swedes’ position, whose resources were on the verge of exhaustion, on the eve of a war with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (the term of the armistice with the Common‐ wealth had expired in 1616). At the opening of the Riksdag in Stockholm in August 1617, Gustavus Adolphus made a speech about the treaty with Russia. In this speech, he talked about ‘a great and glittering victory’, which had been crowned by ‘an excellent treaty’, which was important for Sweden both in terms of its economic development and its defence. Finland was now separated from Russia by Lake Ladoga, and ‘it will be difficult for the Russians to jump over this brook’.22 The main economic result of the Treaty of Stolbovo was Russia’s relinquishing to Sweden the entirety of its Baltic trade. Igor´ Shaskol´skii considered that the treaty had a negative effect on Russia’s foreign trade and its economy as a whole. But if we treat it within the narrow framework of relations with Sweden, then, in a certain sense, its consequences turn out to be much more positive. ‘The Treaty of Stolbovo created favourable conditions for Russian trade to be rolled out on the territory of Sweden because Sweden was the only Western European country where Russian merchants officially had the right to travel via the Baltic Sea. And because these conditions came into being soon after the Treaty of Stolbovo, Russian traders actively took advantage of them and they served as the official basis for the development of Russian trade on the indigenous Swedish mainland’.23 Russian merchants were particularly active in the trading relations between Russia and Sweden in the seventeenth century and in most cases it was Russian tradespeople who travelled to Sweden.24 From this point of view, the Treaty of Stolbovo was especially important to Novgorod. In 1627, a Swedish trading court was built in Novgorod, which became the centre of trade with Western Europe through the Baltic Sea. In 1637, a Russian trading court was opened in Stockholm, which became the Russian state’s first permanent trade post in the West. Novgorod merchants played a very active role in that trade with Sweden. And it was on the basis of this trade that the famous Novgorod Shorin, Kharlamov, Mikliaev, and Koshkin merchant dynasties rose. In this regard, it is 22 Konung Gustaf II Adolfs skrifter, p. 181. 23 Шаскольский, Русская морская торговля на Балтике в XVII в. [Shaskol´skii, Russian Sea-Borne Trade in the Baltic in the 17th Century], pp. 18–19. 24 Шаскольский, Столбовский мир 1617 г. и торговые отношения России со Шведским государством [Shaskol´skii, The Peace of Stolbovo of 1617 and Trade Relationships between Russia and the Swedish State], pp. 201, 211–12; Шаскольский, Экономические отношения России и Шведского государства в XVII веке [Shaskol´skii, Economic Relations between Russia and the Swedish State in the 17th Century], pp. 7–10.

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Figure 18.4. Boundary-mark. Boundary-marks were cut in a boulder or in the trunk of a big tree. Three crowns were used for Sweden, the cross for Muscovy. Finnish Heritage Agency.

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very interesting to note that the so-called ‘Charter Document’ — a copy of the Treaty of Stolbovo — was widely used among Novgorod tradespeople. Artur Attman has noted that the Treaty of Stolbovo was a turning point in Swedish foreign policy. From that time, for almost a hundred years, the Swedish ruling elite rejected the policy of further expansion against Russia, and plans to conquer Novgorod, Pskov, and the coasts of the White and Barents Seas were abandoned.25 At about the same time German Zamiatin wrote an article, published about sixty-five years later, inferring that the Treaty of Stolbovo was a triumph of Russian diplomacy.26 Overall, it could be said that the Treaty of Stolbovo was a compromise that was mutually beneficial. According to Sergei Solov´ev, ‘Moscow and Stockholm were very satisfied with the Treaty of Stol‐ bovo; and the return of Novgorod and their release from the Swedish war during an extremely dangerous one with Poland made the loss of several cities a lot less painful: for now access to the sea would have to wait!’27 On the basis of the conditions of this treaty, Russia and Sweden built relations that would last until the next century. The borderlines established by the treaty, which stayed in place until 1721, formed a border area through which the diffusion of Muscovite and Swedish cultures became much more intense.28

25 Attman, ‘Freden i Stolbova 1617. En aspekt’, p. 47. 26 Замятин, ‘Условия заключения Столбовского мирного договора между Россией и Швецией’ [Zamiatin, ‘Conditions of the Stolbovo Peace Treaty between Russia and Sweden’]. 27 Соловьев, Сочинения [Solov´ev, Collected Works], v, 90. 28 Селин, Русско-шведская граница [Selin, The Russian-Swedish Border], p. 661.

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Works Cited Primary Sources Biblia, Thet är: All then Helgha Scrifft, På Swensko: effter förre Bibliens text, oförandrat: medh förspråk på the böker ther förr inge woro, medh summarier för capitelen, marginalier, flere concordantier, samt nyttighe förklaringar och register, etc. förmerat (Stockholm: Oloff Oloffson, 1618) Konung Gustaf II Adolfs skrifter, ed. by Carl Gustaf Styffe (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1861) Olearius, Adam, Auszführliche Beschreibung Der Kundbaren Reyse Nach Muscow und Persien / So durch gelegenheit einer Holsteinischen Gesandschafft von Gottorff auß an Michael Fedorowitz den grossen Zaar in Muscow / und Schah Sefi König in Persien geschehen. Worinnen die gelegenheit derer Orter und Länder / durch welche die Reyse gangen / als Liffland / Rußland / Tartarien / Meden und Persien / sampt dero Einwohner Natur / Leben / Sitten / Hauß- Welt- und Geistlichen Stand mit fleiß auffgezeichnet / und mit vielen meist nach dem Leben gestelleten Figuren gezieret / zu befinden, 3rd ed. (Schleswig: Holwein, 1663) Sverges traktater med främmande magter jämte andra dit hörande handlingar, v.i, ed. by Olof Simon Rydberg and Carl Hallendorff (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1903) Widekindi, Johannes, Thet Swenska i Ryssland Tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie / Hwilket vnder twänne Sweriges Stormächtige Konungars / Konung Carls IX. Och K. Gustaf Adolphs den Andres och Stoores Baneer / Storfursten Ivan Vasilivitz Suischi och Ryssland til hielp / Först emoot the Rebeller och Lithower / sedan the Påler / på sidstone emoot sielfwe Muskowiterne / ifrån åhr 1607. in til 1617. Aff Feldtherren Gref. Iacob De La Gardie vthfördt / och medh en reputerligh Fredh bijlagdt är / i lijka många Böcker fördeelt och sammanfattat (Stockholm: Wankijff, 1671) Акты исторические, собранные и изданные Археографическою комиссиею [Historical Acts Collected and Published by the Archaeographical Commission], iii (St Petersburg: Tipografiia II Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1841) Отчет нидерландских уполномоченных бывших посредниками для заключения мира между Россиею и Швециею в 1615 и 1616 годах [Report of the Dutch Plenipotentiaries who Acted as Mediators for Concluding Peace between Russia and Sweden in 1615 and 1616] (St Petersburg: Balashev, 1878)

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Россия и Швеция в первой половине XVII века. Сборник материалов, извлеченных из Московского Главного Архива Министерства Иностранных Дел и Шведского Государственного Архива и касающихся истории взаимных отношений России и Швеции в 1616–1651 годах, сост. К. И. Якубов [Russia and Sweden in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century. Collection of the Materials Taken from the Moscow Chief Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish State Archives, and Pertaining to the History of Mutual Relations between Russia and Sweden in 1616–1651, ed. by K. I. Yakubov] (Moscow:Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1897) Собрание государственных грамот и договоров, хранящихся в Государственной коллегии иностранных дел [Collection of State Documents and Treaties which are Held at the State Collegium of Foreign Affairs], iii (Moscow: Selivanovskii, 1822) Secondary Studies Attman, Artur, ‘Freden i Stolbova 1617. En aspekt’, Scandia, 19 (1948), 36–47 Голиков, Иван Иванович, Деяния Петра Великого, мудрого преобразителя России, собранные из достоверных источников и расположенные по годам [Golikov, Ivan Ivanovich, Acts of Peter the Great, the Wise Reformer of Russia, Collected from Trustworthy Sources and Arranged by the Years], 2nd ed., 15 vols (Moscow: Nikolai Stepanov, 1837–1843) Замятин, Герман Андреевич, ‘Два документа к истории Земского собора 1616 г. о русско-шведских отношениях’ [Zamiatin, German Andreevich, ‘Two Documents from the History of the Zemskii Sobor of 1616 Concerning Russian-Swedish Relations’], Труды Воронежского государственного университета [Proceedings of Voronezh State University], 1 (1925), 299–310 ———, ‘Условия заключения Столбовского мирного договора между Россией и Швецией 9 марта 1617 года’ [‘Conditions of the Stolbovo Peace Treaty between Russia and Sweden Concluded on 9 March 1617], Новгородский исторический сборник [Novgorod Historical Miscellany], 16 (26) (2016), 341–76 Лыжин, Николай Петрович, Столбовский договор и переговоры ему предшествовавшие [Lyzhin, Nikolai Petrovich, The Treaty of Stolbovo and the Negotiations Preceding It] (St Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk, 1857) Селин, Адриан Александрович, Новгородское общество в эпоху Смуты [Selin, Adrian Aleksandrovich, Novgorodian Society in the Time of Troubles] (St Petersburg: BLITs, 2008) ———, Русско-шведская граница (1617–1700 гг.). Формирование, функционирование, наследие. Исторические очерки [The Russian-Swedish Border (1617–1700). Formation, Functioning, and Legacy. Historical Essays] (St Petersburg: BLITs, 2016) Соловьев, Сергей Михайлович, Сочинения, подгот. И. Д. Ковальченко & С. С. Дмитриев [Solov´ev, Sergei Mikhailovich, Collected Works, ed. by I. D. Koval´chenko & S. S. Dmitriev], v (Moscow: Mysl´, 1990)

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Шаскольский, Игорь Павлович, Русская морская торговля на Балтике в XVII в. [Shaskol´skii, Igor´ Pavlovich, Russian Sea-Borne Trade in the Baltic in the 17th Century] (St Petersburg: Nauka, 1994) ———, Столбовский мир 1617 г. и торговые отношения России со шведским государством [The Peace of Stolbovo of 1617 and Trade Relationships between Russia and the Swedish State] (Moscow: Nauka, 1964) ———, Экономические отношения России и шведского государства в XVII веке [Economic Relations between Russia and the Swedish State in the 17th Century] (St Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 1998) Шафиров, Петр Павлович, ‘Разсуждение о причинах Свейской войны’ [Shafirov, Petr Pavlovich, ‘А Discourse on the Causes of the Swedish War’], in Россию поднял на дыбы …, подгот. Н. И. Павленко [Who reared Russia up …, ed. by N. I. Pavlenko], i (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1987), pp. 461–549

373

Index of Persons

Spelling of Russian names follows the principles of The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History. Abramov family: 285 Åkerland, Eric: 77 Akiander, Matthias: 28, 29 Alabardiev, P.: 284 Alexander Nevskii: 80 Alexei Mikhailovich, tsar: 197 Almquist, Helge: 340 Aminev (Aminoff) family: 194, 242, 243 Aminev, Fedor: 241, 242, 244, 262, 284 Aminev, Grigorii: 244 Aminev, Isai: 242, 247, 265 Aminev, Stepan: 247 Amineva, Avdot´ia: 262 Aminoff see Aminev Andersson, Eriksee Trana Anna of Denmark: 32, 48, 49 Anstruther, Robert: 21, 48, 50–53, 60, 62 Apolloff see Opalev Arne, Ture J.: 146 Aschaneus, Martin: 302 Assarsson, Nils see Mannersköld Attman, Artur: 30, 88, 145, 161, 169, 370 Augustus, emperor: 349 Aurivillius, Magnus: 308 Babin, A. M.: 250 Babin, Ya. A.: 253 Bäck, Baltzar: 93, 94 Bagge, Nils Hansson: 326, 334 Bakhrushin, Sergei: 146, 151 Bång, Petrus: 292 Baranoff family: 196

Barckhusen, Olof: 288 Barohn, Benjamin: 242, 285 Bas, Diederik: 363 Bas-Backer, Peter: 78 Bedoire, Fredric: 71 Bedoire, Jean Fredric: 78 Beecher, William: 56 Belous, Leontii: 253, 256 Belous, Pavel: 251 Belous, Petr: 37, 236, 248, 253–57 Belous, Yakov: 252 Benedicks, Michael: 78 Benson, captain: 54 Berends till Strömsberg, Johan: 106, 113, 115 Bergius, Nicolaus: 38, 258, 292, 307, 308 Bergvall, Magnus: 235 Berkh, Vasilii: 28 Birgegård, Ulla: 236 Bjugg, Petrus: 292 Blom, Frans: 20, 78 Blumfeldt, Evald: 161, 169, 179 Bodin, Per-Arne: 79 Borovikov, Ivan: 112, 113 Boriatinskii, Fedor: 106 Botvidi, Johannes: 38, 290, 304–07 Brackel, Hans: 100, 101, 132 Brandenburg, Elector of see John Sigismund Brederode, Reinoud van: 75, 363 Budynskoi family: 238, 249 Budynskoi, Dmitrii: 238, 249

376

index of Persons

Budynskoi, Petr: 238, 278–80 Budynskoi, Semen: 278 Budynskoi, Ya. P.: 263, 264 Bulatov family: 285 Bure, Anders: 33, 94–96 Buturlin (Butterlin), Vasilii: 285 Cabiljau, Abraham: 70 Callentin see Kalitin Calvine, lieutenant colonel: 54 Carpofschoi see Karpovskoi Catherine the Great: 83 Cecil, Robert (Earl of Salisbury): 52, 54 Cederberg, Arno: 199 Chamberlain, captain: 54 Charles I: 48, 49, 51 Charles IX: 17, 19, 23, 24, 32, 49–52, 70, 71, 79, 91, 94, 164, 301, 345, 347, 349 Charles Philip: 19, 22, 31, 74, 76, 99, 111, 266, 343, 344, 363 Charles X Gustavus: 70, 256 Charles XI: 36, 211, 213, 214, 289 Charles XII: 294, 307 Chebotaev (Sabotaioff, Zebotaioff), Vasilii: 242, 284 Chepel´, Aleksandr: 133 Chilkov see Khilkov Chomutov see Khomutov Christian II: 68 Christian IV: 21, 32, 48, 49, 51–54, 57, 63, 74, 91 Christina: 199, 211, 223, 227, 229, 231, 287, 288, 335 Christina of Holstein-Gottorp: 15 Claeszoon, Cornelis: 90 Clementeoff see Klement´ev Cockburn, Samuel: 54, 55 Cocks, Christopher: 62 Crail, captain: 54 De Besche, Willem: 71 De Geer, Louis: 70, 71, 76, 78, 79 De la Gardie family: 313

De la Gardie, Jacob (1583–1652): passim De la Gardie, Jakob (1768–1842): 313 De la Gardie, Magnus Gabriel: 337, 339 De la Gardie, Pontus: 18, 36, 163, 189, 219 De Rodes, Johan: 293 Derenthal, Johann: 167, 170, 171, 173– 75 Digges, Dudley: 62 Dijck, Jacob van: 75 Dingwall, Lord see Preston Dmitrii Ivanovich, tsarevich: 15 see also False Dmitrii Dobkin of Hamburg: 59 Doedszoon, Cornelius: 90–92 Dokuchaev, A. N.: 250 Domozhirov, Ivan: 105 Drake, Hans: 231 Dunning, Chester: 99 Edward IV: 49 Ehrenmalm, Lars Johan: 288, 297 Elizabeth of Bohemia: 48 Emmerling, Arnold: 198 Eneman, Michael: 308 Engman, Max: 80 Eric XIV: 219 Essen, Paul von: 200 Falck, Daniel Simonsson: 173, 175 Falconet, Étienne Maurice: 82, 83 False Dmitrii I: 15, 341, 345 False Dmitrii II: 17, 341, 344–46, 351, 352 False Dmitrii III: 344 Fannemin, Timofei: 106, 114 Fedorov, Ivan: 102 Fedor Ivanovich, tsar: 15, 99 Fetiev, Gavrila Martynovich: 150 Fleming, Klas: 360 Flörich, Hans: 237, 245 Fock, Johan: 155, 156 Foka, burgess see Fock

index of Persons

Fougdt, Jacob: 230 Francus, Jacobus: 28 Gainford, Thomas: 59 Galle, Claes: 237, 238 Garnier, Claudia: 126 Gezelius, Johannes (the Younger): 247, 292 Gierlich, Ernst: 161 Gilbert, David: 61 Giovio, Paolo: 295 Godunov, Boris: 54, 301 Goeteeris, Anthonis: 20, 75, 78, 165, 220 Golikov, Ivan: 359 Gordon, Patrick: 51, 57, 58, 60 Gosiewski, Aleksander Korwin: 346, 353 Gottfrid, merchant: 151 Grigor´ev, Faddei: 110 Grigor´ev, Foma: 110–12 Grigor´ev, Vasilii: 263, 264 Grill family: 78 Grosjean, Alexia: 50 Grothe, Didrich: 167 Gustav III: 154 Gustavus Adolphus: passim Gustavus Vasa: 68, 89, 362 Gyllenhielm, Carl: 112, 113, 321 Gyllenhielm, Sofia: 18 Habsburg dynasty: 68, 70, 80 Hahin, Timofei: 103 Håkansson, Knut: 91 Hallendorff, Carl: 22 Hartmann, Wolfgang: 145 Hästehufvud, Anders Eriksson: 174, 178 Heckscher, Eli: 76 Heltscher, Peter: 230 Henry Frederick, Prince of Wales: 48, 49 Herberstein, Sigismund: 126, 295 Hertig, Peter: 219 Hezekiah: 308, 309 Hierta, Lars: 235 Hildebrand, Sune: 74, 75

Hjärne, Urban: 201 Hollar, Wenceslaus: 75 Homutoff see Khomutov Horn, Evert: 19, 348 Horn, Henrik: 22, 360 Hornborg, Eirik: 247 Igumnov, Simon: 292 Isidor, metropolitan: 316, 366 Isupov, Ivan: 284 Ivan III: 189, 220 Ivan IV ‘the Terrible’: 15, 36, 73, 80, 99, 163, 189, 192, 219, 287 Ivan V: 156 Ivanov, Bazhen see Barohn, Benjamin Ivanov, Grigorii: 261 Ivanov, Petr: 279, 280 Ivanov, Tarasii: 240, 279, 285 James VI and I: 19, 21, 22, 25, 32, 39, 47– 54, 56–62, 71 Jansson, Albrecht: 333 Joachimi, Albert: 363 John III: 18, 19, 73, 87, 88, 163, 164, 196 John Sigismund (Elector of Brandenburg): 57, 58 Jonah, monk: 256 Jonsson, Hans: 87 Jovius see Giovio Jutikkala, Eino: 88 Kalitin (Callentin) family: 242, 243 Kalitin, Nikita: 242, 248, 284 Kalitin, Petr: 247 Kalitin, Vasilii: 247 Kanarski see Konarski Karamzin, Nikolai: 337 Karpovskoi (Carpofschoi), Maksim: 242, 284 Kharlamov family: 368 Khilkov, Andrei: 157 Khomutov (Homutoff) family: 242 Khomutov, Shum: 284

377

378

index of Persons

Khomutova, Dar´ia: 247 Khovanskii, Ivan: 106, 113 Kilburger, Johan Philipp: 293 Kiprian, archimandrite: 132 Klement´ev (Clementeoff) family: 242, 243 Klement´ev, Fedor: 244 Klement´ev, Kuz´ma: 244, 246 Klement´ev, Mikhailo: 244, 284 Klement´ev, Petr: 244 Kobierzycki, Stanisław: 39, 337–57 Kochen, Christoffer von: 293 Kollmann, Nancy: 129 Konarski (Kanarski), Khristofor: 284 Konovalov, Sergey: 47, 60 Kornil´ev, Vlasii: 268, 279 Koshkin family: 147, 151–54, 156, 368 Koshkin, Nikita: 149, 151 Kotilaine, Jarmo T.: 161, 168, 179 Kotoshikhin, Grigorii: 38, 124, 125, 294 Kovalenko, Gennady: 31 Krusenstern, Philipp von: 293 Kukaszewicz (Kuckisieff, Kuckowitz), J./I.: 284 Küng, Enn: 161 Lake, Thomas: 47, 52 Lang, Signe: 146 Lanting, Albrecht: 170 Larion, priest: 112 Larionov, Fedor: 278 Latomus, Sigmund: 28 Laureus, Gabriel: 309 Lebed´, F. F.: 250 Lerbom, Jens: 120, 130 L´govskii, Ivan: 105 Lidell, Nicolaus: 290 Liljedahl, Ragnar: 161 Lillie, Axel: 335 Löfstrand, Elisabeth: 74, 266 Loofeldt, Anton: 293 Lotman, Yurii: 81, 82, 133 Löwenklau, Johannes: 340

Lubimenko, Inna: 47, 48, 60 Lugvenev (Lugmenoff) family: 242 Lugvenev, Fedor: 284 Luke, the Evangelist: 367 Lukin, Timofei: 131 Luxdorph, Bolle: 148 Lysén, Irina: 263 Lyth, Joachim: 309 Lyzhin, Nikolai: 29 Magnus Eriksson, Swedish king: 318 Magnus, Olaus: 90, 134, 135 Malm see Ehrenmalm Mannersköld, Nils Assersson: 224, 237, 263, 268 Marselis, Peter: 89 Mårtensson, Måns: 360 Master of the St Elizabeth Panels: 69 Matson, Sigfred: 156 Matveev, Stepan: 250, 263, 264 Maurice of Nassau: 18 Maxwell-Stuart, Peter: 58 Mazikhin, Petr: 249, 251 Melander, Kurt Reinhold: 161, 170, 178 Menshikov, Aleksandr: 336 Merrick, John: 19, 21–23, 25, 30, 32, 47, 48, 55–62, 74, 75, 104, 360, 363, 365, 368 Meshcherskii, Nikifor: 101 Mezetskii, Daniil: 102, 129, 360, 364, 366, 368 Mickelsen, Anders: 334 Mikhail Fedorovich, tsar: passim Mikhailov, Ivan: 261 Mikliaev family: 368 Mniszech, Jerzy: 350 Mniszech, Maryna: 344 Mokroborodova, Larisa: 306 Monastyrshchin see Namastyrshchin Mörner, Karl: 229, 231 Mozikhin see Mazikhin Muraleev, Ivan: 284 Murav´ev, Matvei: 101

index of Persons

Namastyrshchin, A. F.: 250, 251, 262 Nashchokin, Afanasii: 133 Nashchokin, Iov: 131 Nashchokin, Voin: 133 Nasonov, Zh.: 250 Neelov, Ivan: 130 Nerman, Ture: 146 Novokshchenov, Nikolai: 360, 366 Odoevskii, Ivan: 237 Oldenbarnevelt, Johan van: 32 Oldenburg dynasty: 48 Olearius, Adam: 126, 127, 191, 224, 295, 302, 305, 306, 361 Olofsson, Mats: 331 Olsson, Olof: 332 Opalev (Apolloff), Grigorii: 284 Oparina, Tat´iana: 132 Ortelius, Abraham: 90 Osher, Barbro: 13 Oxenstierna, Axel: 15, 19, 21, 32, 39, 51, 56–59, 62, 172, 173, 176–78, 190, 197, 212, 227, 230, 237, 244, 341 Oxenstierna, Bengt: 230, 268 Oxenstierna, Gabriel: 62 Oxenstierna, Gustaf: 291 Paasi, Anssi: 119 Palm see Mårtensson Palma, Jonas: 303, 304 Palmquist, Erik: 291 Peresvetov (Pereswetoff-Morath) family: 210, 242 Peresvetov, Murat: 248, 284 Peter I: 32, 40, 76, 80–84, 133, 150, 156, 214, 250, 259, 294, 297, 336, 359 Peterson, Claes: 81 Petrejus, Petrus: 27, 28, 38, 295, 296, 340, 341 Phipps, Geraldine: 30 Piatin family: 278 Piatin, Ananii: 278 Piatin, Uvar: 278

Piirimäe, Helmut: 161 Piper, Henrik: 288 Popov, F. Ya.: 262 Popov, Timofei: 238, 263, 279 Porshnev, Boris: 33, 80, 81, 84 Possevino, Antonio: 295 Preston, Richard (Lord Dingwall): 52 Pufendorf, Samuel: 47 Purchase, Samuel: 60 Pushkin, Aleksandr: 82 Putin, Vladimir: 84 Rabinovich, Yakov: 30, 236 Rankin, Archibald: 51 Razladin (Rosladin), Fritz: 285 Rhotert, Bartholomeus: 170 Roberts, Michael: 207 Rodenburg, Johann von: 230 Rokhnov, Ivan: 244 Romanov dynasty: 47, 48, 56, 61, 62, 361, 365 Romanov, Mikhail see Mikhail Fedorovich Rosen, Bogislaus von: 167, 266, 325 Rosenstielke see Rosingius Rosingius, Carolus: 27 Rosladin see Razladin Rostovtzeff, Michael: 235 Rowell, Stephen: 119 Rowley, John: 179 Rowley, William: 179 Rubtsov (Rubzoff), Aleksandr: 265, 285 Rubtsov (Rubzoff), D.: 248 Rudbeck, Olof (the Younger): 308 Rudbeckius, Johannes: 38, 303, 304 Rühe, Wolf-Rüdiger: 161 Rumiantsev, Petr: 145 Rurik dynasty: 15, 19, 73, 79 Rutgers, Jan: 21, 32, 75 Rydberg, Olof Simon: 22 Ryzhkov family: 238 Ryzhkov, Petr: 238, 278, 280

379

380

index of Persons

Ryzhkov, Stepan: 238, 240, 250, 267, 268, 278, 280 Sabluikin see Shablykin Sabotaioff see Chebotaev Sagaidachnyi, Petr: 109 Salingen, Simon van: 91, 93 Salisbury, Earl of see Cecil, Robert Saloheimo, Veijo: 236, 258, 259 Sapieha, Jan Piotr: 345, 346 Sapieha, Lew: 353 Schama, Simon: 68 Schrapfer, Adam: 170, 171 Schwengeln, Georg von: 231 Sederberg, Henrik: 292, 309 Selin, Adrian: 31, 236, 238, 240, 248, 366 Selow, Peter van: 239, 290 Semenov, Dobrynia: 360, 366 Shablykin (Sabluikin), L.: 284 Shafirov, Petr: 359 Shaskol´skii, Igor´: 30, 103, 144, 368 Shaw, Andrew: 59 Shorin family: 368 Shuiskii, Vasilii: 17, 23, 24, 73, 74, 344, 345, 348, 360 Sigismund III: 17, 25, 49–51, 57, 58, 73, 164, 190, 301, 342–44 Sinclair, Andrew: 48, 60, 62 Sjöberg, Anders: 245 Skeppsbroadeln: 78 Skopin-Shuiskii, Mikhail: 17, 337, 346, 348, 349 Skudina, Pelageia: 247 Skytte, Bengt: 290 Skytte, Johan: 51, 173, 175–78, 192, 193, 199, 225 Smejoff see Zmeev Smith, Thomas: 360, 363 Solov´ev, Sergei: 370 Soom, Arnold: 30, 161, 249, 250 Spåra, Henrik Månsson: 332 Sparfwenfeldt, Johan Gabriel: 289 Spens, James: 19, 21, 32, 39, 49–62

Spens, Thomas: 59 Stahl, Heinrich: 194, 250, 292 Stenbock, Gustav Eriksson: 51, 106 Stuart dynasty: 19, 21, 32, 47–63, 74 Stubbe, Henrik Olofsson: 324 Swift, Jonathan: 94 Tarkiainen, Kari: 30, 134 Tengström, Leif: 134 Tessin, Nicodemus (the Elder): 148 Tessin, Nicodemus (the Younger): 149 Thome, Heinrich: 72 Torchakov, Isaak: 241, 244, 245, 250, 278 Torchakov, Parfenii: 37, 235, 244, 246, 248, 252, 253, 256 Torchakova, Fedos´ia: 252 Trana, Anders Svensson: 290 Trana, Erik Andersson: 106, 108–10, 112–15, 195, 207, 238, 241 Trip family: 78 Troebst, Stefan: 30, 161 Tyrkov, Nikita: 102, 115 Tyrtov family: 285 Ulrich, Johan: 172 Ungern, Gert von: 112 Uspenskii, Boris: 133 Varus, Publius Quintilius: 349 Vasa dynasty: 49, 50, 52, 56, 61, 62, 70, 73, 79, 89 Verin, Ivan: 238, 279 Villstrand, Nils Erik: 31 Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro): 361 Vitovtov, Aleksei: 55 Volynskii, Stepan: 60 Vysheslavtsev, Nikita: 122, 123 Waldeck, Christoffer von: 332 Wallenberg, Amalia: 235 Wallenberg, Marcus: 235 Wangersen, Georg von: 167, 171, 174, 175

index of Persons

Waterfront Aristocracy see Skeppsbroadeln Welling, Godthardt: 172 Westerman, Andreas: 309 Wiberg, Åke: 235 Wibking, Hans: 170 Widekindi, Johannes: 15, 28, 39, 337–58, 360 Willoughby, William: 52 Winius, Andries Dionysiuszoon: 89 Winwood, Ralph: 47, 58, 60 Wiśniowiecki, Konstanty: 350 Władysław IV Vasa: 17, 25, 39, 73, 109, 337, 338, 340, 342–44 Wrangel, Herman: 195, 230

Yakubov, Konstantin: 29 Yargin family: 253 York, captain: 54 Yurii Danilovich, Prince of Moscow: 318 Yuzefovich, Leonid: 124, 128

Zamiatin, German: 30, 370 Zborowski, Aleksander: 344 Zebotaioff see Chebotaev Zherebtsov, Semen: 105–10, 112, 113 Ziuzin, Aleksei: 55, 360, 366, 368 Zmeev, Vasilii: 324 Żółkiewski, Stanisław: 17, 349, 353

381

Index of Places

The index does not cover toponyms that frequently occur throughout the book and/or refer to its entire contents, namely ‘Sweden’, ‘Russia’ (‘Muscovy’), ‘Ingria’, ‘Stolbovo’, ‘Northern Europe’. Åbo see Turku Africa: 94, 293 Åland: 295 Åland Sea see Sea of Åland Altafjord: 93 Altmark: 16, 190 Alutaguse: 192, 196, 292 Älvsborg: 21, 71, 151 America: 70, 207 Amsterdam: 33, 68–71, 76, 78, 80, 81, 84, 90, 333 Archangel: 54, 70, 74, 88, 89, 163, 171, 175, 183, 190, 197, 212, 214, 219, 293, 294 Arctic Ocean: 19, 294 Armenia: 205, 293 Asia: 24, 54, 293 Assumption monastery (Tikhvin): 367 Assyria: 308 Astrakhan: 293 Baltic countries: 34, 156, 264 Baltic provinces: 35, 113, 189, 193, 196– 98, 209, 211, 214 see also Estonia, Livonia Baltic Sea, Baltic region: passim Barents Sea: 88, 370 Batavia: 70 Beloe: 113, 114 Beloozero: 24 Bezhany: 108, 114 Birger Jarlsgatan (Stockholm): 154

Black Sea: 70 Brandenburg: 57, 58, 89 Breitenfeld: 89 Broek: 67 Brunnsgränd (Stockholm): 147 Cap of the North: 33, 87, 89–91, 94 Caporie see Kopor´e Caspian Sea: 293 Cattilla/Kotly: 280, 281 Chicago: 367 Christinae Church (Gothenburg): 76 Cleves, Duchy of: 57 Constantinople: 156, 229, 259 Copenhagen: 49, 51, 53, 76, 82 Courland: 195, 201 Crimea: 24, 84 Cuiwas/Kuivozi: 258, 281, 283 Danish straits: 162, 168 see also Öresund Danzig: 51, 76, 82, 162, 293 Dätelitz/Diatlitsy: 281 Daugava: 192 Dederino: 19, 20, 30, 32, 74, 75, 360, 363 Denmark: 15, 19, 21, 24, 32, 48–54, 56– 59, 62, 63, 68–71, 73, 74, 78, 82, 91, 93, 112, 120, 130, 143, 148, 168, 177, 178, 190 Deulino: 359 Diatlitsy see Dätelitz

index of PlaCes

Diderino see Dederino Dolgaia: 109 Dordrecht: 67 Dorpat see Tartu Dorogobuzh: 109 Duder(hof): 193, 199, 279, 282 Düna see Daugava Dutch republic see Netherlands Dvina see Northern Dvina East India: 54, 70 Egor´evskoe see Jechoritz Ekenäs see Tammisaari Elbing: 58, 293 Emajõgi: 190, 199 England: 20, 27, 47–49, 57, 59–62, 76, 88, 165, 171, 173, 213, 295, 360, 363, 368 see also Great Britain English Court (Moscow): 55 Estland see Estonia Estonia: 13, 16, 18, 23, 35, 36, 73, 81, 161, 162, 171, 174, 179, 180, 184, 189–204, 211, 219, 220, 222, 301, 313 Falun: 150 Finland: passim Finnish Gulf see Gulf of Finland Finnmarken: 74, 93 France: 24, 48, 54, 68, 76, 78, 125, 213, 334 Fzdilitzky/Zdylitsy: 282 Gamla stan (Stockholm): 145 Gdańsk see Danzig Gdov: 19, 22–25, 28, 110, 113, 237, 242, 363–65 Gdov county: 22, 23, 112, 114, 364 German Church (Stockholm): 77 German provinces of Sweden: 209 Germany: 13, 56, 68, 78, 80, 81, 89, 171, 174, 178, 194, 205, 213, 295, 326

see also Holy Roman Empire Glaschkowitza/Lashkovitsy: 282 Gorka: 247, 261, 263, 281 Göta River: 71 Gothenburg: 21, 33, 70, 71, 72, 75, 76, 78, 81, 82, 84 see also Hisingen Great Britain: 13, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32, 47–52, 54–57, 59, 60, 62, 68, 71, 90, 91, 104, 205, 223 see also England, Scotland Greece: 156, 222, 224, 225, 241, 290, 292, 308 Grote Hollandse Waard: 69 Gulf of Bothnia: 33, 91 Gulf of Finland: 35, 36, 74, 82, 88, 143, 161, 162, 166, 167, 170, 171, 174, 177, 190, 195, 197, 201, 210, 219–21, 293, 294 Gysinge: 78 Haapsalu: 172, 175, 177, 178, 180, 313 Hagia Sophia (Novgorod) see St Sophia Church The Hague: 21, 71, 165 Hamburg: 19, 27, 59, 176, 178 Hanseatic League: 69, 73, 79, 162, 173, 178, 184, 189 Harju county: 195 Helsingfors see Helsinki Helsinki: 89, 93, 161, 163, 170, 173, 175– 77, 180, 220, 266, 319, 364 Herman Castle (Narva): 220, 228 Heusden: 67 Hiiumaa: 196 Hisingen: 70 see also Gothenburg Holland see Netherlands Holstein: 127, 128 Holy Roman Empire: 24, 80, 285 see also Germany Hoorn: 75 Hungary: 315

383

384

index of PlaCes

Ilies/Il´eshi: 281 Inari: 94 India: 120 see also East India Indonesia: 70 Ingris/Yam-Izhora: 282 Ireland: 48, 54 Israel: 308 Issad: 109 Ivangorod: passim Ivangorod county: 22, 23, 36, 100, 107, 109, 114, 208, 236, 259, 261, 263, 265, 267, 281, 282, 364 Ivangorod road: 110 Jablonitza/Yablonitsy: 282 Jakarta see Batavia Jama: 19, 22, 23, 25, 100, 107, 108, 110– 13, 131, 167, 208, 225, 230, 235, 238, 240–42, 248, 249, 252, 261, 278, 281, 282, 321, 330, 331, 363, 364, 366 Jama county: 22, 23, 36, 100, 107, 114, 208, 236, 259, 261, 263, 265, 267, 281, 282, 364 Jamestown: 54 Jamgorod see Jama Järvisaari see Yarvosol Jasterbina/Yastrebino: 282 Jechoritz/Egor´evskoe: 282 Jerusalem: 308 Joseph monastery: 349 Kajaneborg: 25 Käkisalmi see Kexholm Kalmar: 21, 51, 52, 59, 62, 68, 70, 71, 112 Kandalaksha Bay: 33, 91, 94 Kangasjärv see see Kangasozero Kangasozero: 131 Kärde see Kardis Kardis: 144, 197, 287 Karelia: 23, 33–35, 38, 87, 89–91, 100, 102, 115, 122, 128, 131, 134, 192,

193, 205, 206, 213, 214, 239, 260, 290 Karelian Isthmus: 130, 194, 205 Kargopol: 24 Karlberg: 18 Kastellholmen: 145 Keltis/Koltushi: 282 Kem: 90, 91 Kew: 59 Kexholm: 17, 23–25, 33, 47, 87, 88, 315, 332, 334, 363, 364, 366 Kexholm county: 16, 17, 19, 23, 33, 39, 87, 88, 95, 100–02, 129, 166, 190, 192, 194, 197, 198, 201, 209, 211, 222, 239, 258, 287, 290, 292, 313, 326, 327, 332, 333, 335, 364 Kholmogory: 24 Khutyn monastery: 132 Kingisepp see Jama Kipina/Kipen: 260, 282 Kirillo-Belozerskii monastery: 133 Klushino: 17, 54, 102, 348, 349 Knäred: 32, 53, 57, 59, 62, 71 Kobona: 102 Kola (fortress): 24, 90, 93 Kola county: 24 Kola Peninsula: 33, 88, 90, 91, 94 Kolga: 180 Koltushi see Keltis Konduia: 107, 108, 114 Kopor´e: 19, 22, 23, 25, 100, 107, 131, 167, 175, 176, 225, 230, 235, 238, 242, 249–51, 263, 264, 266, 268, 278, 279, 281, 282, 325, 331, 363, 364, 366 Kopor´e county: 22, 23, 36, 100, 105, 107, 108, 199, 208, 236, 248, 259, 261, 263–67, 281, 282, 364 Korbosel´ki: 282 Korela see Kexholm Kotly see Cattila Kremlin (Moscow): 17, 55, 290 Kristianstad: 76

index of PlaCes

Kronstadt: 82 Krutoi Brook: 108 Kuala Lumpur: 84 Kukui see Nemetskaia sloboda Kunda manor: 191 Kunest: 112 Kursk: 359 Kusemkina/Kuzemkino: 282 Kuivozi see Cuiwas Ladoga (town): 19, 22–25, 28, 59, 99, 100, 102, 106, 143, 144, 165, 324, 363–65 Ladoga (lake): 21, 23, 25, 33, 87, 102, 103, 106, 126, 128, 155, 320, 368 Ladoga county: 22, 23, 100, 106, 364 Ladoga road: 102 Lapponian pogosts see Lopp pogosts Lashkovitsy see Glaschkowitza Latvia: 189, 191 Lava see Lavuia Lavuia: 23, 102, 106, 126–28 Leningrad see St Petersburg Levduzi: 282 Lez´e swamp: 107 Liège: 71, 76 Lipovo: 107 Lithuania: 15, 25, 32, 34, 35, 49, 51, 58, 63, 69–71, 73, 100, 109–13, 129, 190, 197, 243, 284, 287, 365, 368 Livonia: 15, 16, 18, 23–25, 35, 67, 70, 73, 74, 110, 112, 113, 144, 162, 171, 173, 175, 183, 184, 189–204, 211, 214, 222, 230, 287, 295, 301, 304, 307, 345 see also Old Livonia Löberöd: 313 London: 32, 39, 47, 49, 51, 52, 54–61 Lopp pogost see Loppis pogost Lopp pogosts: 24, 25, 100–02 Loppis pogost: 107, 263, 282 Louvain: 340 Lozhgolovo: 108–10, 112

Lübeck: 62, 163, 164, 170, 176, 178, 179, 183, 223 Luga River: 108, 110, 208 Lund: 13, 38, 313 Maas: 67 Mainz: 335 Makalös Palace (Stockholm): 145 Mälaren: 147 Malaia Loptsa: 107 Malaysia: 84 Maria Magdalena Church (Stockholm): 145 Medelpad: 330 Menshikov Palace (St Petersburg): 336 Mikola/Nikol´skoe: 282 Minsk: 308 Moloscowitz: 244 Mongolia: 289 Moscow: passim Mshaga: 291 Muraveino: 108, 114 Nääs: 176–78 Narva: passim Narva county: 173 Nar(o)va River: 36, 108, 189, 192, 213, 219, 220, 223–25, 228, 230, 249, 253–56 Nemetskaia sloboda (Moscow): 132, 133 Netherlands: 18–21, 24, 32, 33, 52, 56, 67–86, 88–91, 112, 143, 165, 171, 173, 174, 205, 213, 223, 293, 360, 363, 364 Neva: 80, 184, 192, 213, 220, 240, 280, 294 Nevskoe ust´e see Nyenskans New York see Nieuw Amsterdam Nieuw Amsterdam: 70 Nikol´skoe see Mikola Norrmalm (Stockholm): 145 North Sea: 67–71 Northern Dvina: 24, 294

385

386

index of PlaCes

Norway: 32, 48, 51, 52, 54, 56, 57, 62, 63, 68, 69, 91 Nöteborg (Oreshek): 19, 22, 23, 25, 47, 100, 102, 235, 238, 240, 249, 263, 279, 282, 285, 322, 334, 363, 364, 366 Nöteborg county: 22, 23, 36, 39, 100, 102, 106–08, 208, 236, 248, 256, 259, 261, 263, 265, 267, 281, 282, 313, 328, 329, 333, 364 Novgorod: passim Novgorod county: 22, 23, 100, 102, 107, 364 Novgorodian road: 130 Nyen: 36, 167, 170, 174–78, 184, 192, 205, 210, 212, 213, 214, 221, 230, 231, 238, 288, 293, 294, 333 Nyenskans: 213, 240, 279, 280, 326, 336 Nyslott: 25 Nystad: 157 Obonezhskaia piatina: 89 Öland: 21 Old Livonia: 35, 70, 73, 172, 189, 191 Olonets: 131, 294 Onega: 89, 320 Onega Bay: 90 Opolie: 261, 281 Orekhov road: 107 Oreshek see Nöteborg Öresund: 69, 71, 162 see also Danish straits Orient see Asia Orreholmen: 50 Ösel see Saaremaa Oshta: 131 Osinovaia Gorka: 34, 110, 113, 114 Oslo: 49, 92 Ostashkov: 19, 360 Oulu see Uleåborg Paide see Wittensten Pakistan: 120

Pärnu: 112, 171, 172, 175, 178, 180, 190, 195, 196, 307 Peipus: 25, 189, 192, 196, 199, 220 Pernau see Pärnu Persia: 24, 293 Peter and Paul fortress (St Petersburg): 76, 336 Peterhof: 336 Piata: 108 Pielisjärvi: 192 Pliussa: 107, 108 Poland: passim Polotsk: 112 Põltsamaa: 195 Porech´e see Poritz Poritz/Porech´e: 282 Porkhov: 22, 24, 99, 364, 365 Portugal: 68 Porvoo: 161, 170, 173, 175–77, 180 Posestrina Gora: 108 Potsdam: 76, 82 Priozersk see Kexholm Pskov: 19, 23–25, 74, 80, 103, 110, 113, 131, 144, 150, 163, 165, 189, 190, 197, 198, 219, 224, 228, 242, 294, 304, 317, 318, 320, 344, 364, 370 Pulkovo: 279 Ragwitza/Ragovitsy: 281 Ratzina/Ratchino: 261, 281 Reval see Tallinn Riazan: 360 Riddarhuset (Stockholm): 50, 78, 210 Riga: 35, 143, 145, 162, 163, 170–73, 189–92, 196, 197, 222, 288, 293, 304 Riitamaa see Ristikivi Ristikivi: 130 Rjabino: 282 Rome: 227, 340 Roslagen: 295 Royal Castle (Stockholm): 145, 147, 294 Russian Merchants’ market (Stockholm) see Ryssgården

index of PlaCes

Ryssgården (Stockholm): 34, 143–60, 294 Säämäjärvi see Siamozero Saaremaa: 35, 190, 195, 198, 200, 211 Saltsjön: 147 Samoschoi/Zamozhskii pogost: 261 San Francisco: 13 Saris: 331 Savolax see Savonia Savonia: 194, 205 Savoy (Duchy) : 56 Saxony: 78, 89 Scandinavia: 53, 62, 63, 69, 83, 84, 93 Scania: 313 Schelde: 82 Scotland: 27, 32, 48–52, 54, 55, 62, 74, 76, 78 Scythia: 134 Sea of Åland: 149, 294 Seaside (eastern Baltic coast): 80, 303 Sestra: 128 Seven Provinces see Netherlands Severia: 351, 352 Sheremet´evka: 282 Shlissel´burg see Nöteborg Sias: 99 Siamozero: 131 Siberia: 104, 198, 205, 207, 309 Sjökanten see Seaside Skeppsbron (Stockholm): 78, 145, 147 Skvoritsa: 201 Slussen (Stockholm): 145, 147, 148 Smolensk: 17, 285, 342, 351–54 Smolnyi: 281 Södermalm (Stockholm): 34, 147, 149, 294 Södra stadshuset (Stockholm): 148, 149, 154 Soikinagåra/Soikino: 281 Solovetskii monastery: 24 Sol´tsy pogost: 107 Somro see Sumerskaia volost

Sordavala: 332 Sound see Öresund Southern City Hall (Stockholm) see Södra stadshuset Southern Europe: 197 Soikino see Soikinagåra Spain: 24, 70 Spasski: 281, 283 St Nicholas Orthodox Church (Tallinn): 24, 165 St Olav’s Church (Tallinn): 165 St Petersburg: 33, 70, 76, 79–84, 145, 155, 197, 210, 236, 254, 257, 281, 294, 336 St Sergius Church (Stockholm): 156 St Sophia Church (Novgorod): 22, 132 Staraia Russa: 19, 22, 24, 291, 360, 364, 365 Staropol´e: 112 State of the Livonian Order see Old Livonia State of the Teutonic Order see Old Livonia Stettin: 170 Stockholm: passim Storon´e: 108 Suma: 24, 90 Sumerskaia volost: 22, 23, 114, 363, 364 Svarteråå 170 Svir: 155 Switzerland: 56 Tallinn (Reval): 18, 23–25, 35, 36, 88, 111–13, 144, 145, 161–89, 191, 196, 198, 213, 219–21, 225, 288, 293, 333 Tammisaari: 170 Tartu (Dorpat): 35, 81, 111, 112, 145, 167, 189–201, 222, 224, 235, 252, 265, 307, 313, 320 Tartu county: 195 Tavastehus: 25 Terebuzhskii pogost: 107

387

388

index of PlaCes

Teusina: 24, 94, 102, 134, 164, 190, 219, 301 Tiavzino see Teusina Tigoda pogost: 107 Tikhvin: 19, 24, 124, 150, 155, 294, 363, 365–67 Tobol´sk: 309 Toolse: 180 Toompea Castle (Tallinn): 165 Tråitza/Troitskoe: 282 Transfiguration Church (Stockholm): 145, 154, 156 Trinity Church (Ivangorod): 252, 256 Troitskoe see Tråitza Turkey: 24, 32, 51, 63, 287, 295 Turku (Åbo): 74, 194, 320, 323 Tuuter see Duder Udasalo/Udosolovo: 281 Ukraine: 84, 308, 309 Uleåborg: 25, 90, 91, 94 United Provinces see Netherlands Unusjärvi: 123 Uppsala: 27, 112, 135, 166, 199, 235, 239, 253, 256, 258, 263, 290, 302 Valiesari: 124 Varvarka street (Moscow): 55 Vasil´evskii Island (St Petersburg): 336 Västerbotten: 89 Västergötland: 50 Vastseliina: 172 Veleevo see Wystawka Velikii Kamen: 107 Venice: 56, 125 Viazhitskii monastery: 113 Viazma: 109 Viborg: 17, 19, 23–25, 35, 38, 74, 99, 101, 112, 113, 144, 154, 162–65, 168, 174, 176, 177, 180, 219, 288, 292, 315, 324, 334, 360 Viborg county: 330 Viljandi: 190

Virginia: 54 Virumaa county: 189 Vodskaia piatina: 100, 208, 258 Volkhov: 366 Vologda: 24, 150 Voron´e see Woronia Voronkino see Worontkino Võrtsjärv: 196 Vruda see Wruda Vyborg see Viborg Waal: 67 Wagah: 120 Wales: 49, 51 Wallonia: 70, 71, 76, 78, 79 Western Europe: 32, 35, 36, 55, 80, 129, 143, 162–64, 167, 170, 174, 179, 183, 197, 212, 213, 221, 287, 293–95, 368 White Sea: 19, 30, 33, 38, 70, 87–91, 150, 178, 212, 293, 365, 366, 370 Wieldrecht: 69 Willola see Wystawka Winter Palace (St Petersburg): 336 Wittensten: 25 Woronia/Voron´e: 282 Worontkino/Voronkino: 282 Wruda/Vruda: 282 Wystawka/Veleevo: 282 Yablonitsy see Jablonitza Yam see Jama Yam-Izhora see Ingris Yam-Zapol´skii: 189 Yarosel´skii pogost see Yarvosol Yaroslavl: 150 Yarvosol: 107, 130 Yastrebino see Jasterbina Zamozhskii see Samoschoi Zaraisk: 251 Zarech´e: 113 Zdylitsy see Fzdilitzky Zelenets: 33, 106, 114

Index rerum

administration Estonian-Livonian: 191, 192, 193, 194 Ingrian: 208, 222, 240, 264, 266, 267 manorial: 199, 211, 212 Narvanese: 225, 227 Novgorodian: 31, 258 parochial: 262 Russian: 81, 294, 310 Swedish: 99, 134, 229, 237, 250, 264, 268 amnesty: 366 Anglo-Danish relations: 48 Anglo-Russian (Stuart-Romanov) relations: 47, 48, 54–56, 61, 62 Anglo-Swedish relations: 49, 50 archives: passim local: 87, 162, 248, 252, 266 private: 313–36 assimilation, cultural and religious: 195, 229, 237, 243, 247, 253 baptism: 38, 302, 303, 306, 310 Batavians: 68 bayors: 37, 194, 196, 209, 210, 221, 242– 48, 253, 258, 268, 284, 285 Bible: 303, 308, 362 1 Cor. 1.10: 134 2 Kings: 308 bilingual writings: 339, 394 speakers: 288 training: 38 birkarlar: 94 bishops: 90, 252, 259, 292, 295 borders, borderland: 17, 19, 23, 99–117, 119–42, 207

border rituals: 34, 120–31, 136 border symbols: 119–42 border treaty: 318 borders as confessional and cultural division: 131–35 boundary mark: 88, 131 delimitation: 105–10 boyars: 124, 242, 368 boyar scions (deti boiarskie): 22, 23, 221, 235 bridges: 102, 128 buffer zone: 35, 201, 211, 214 burghers: 22, 23, 36, 37, 71, 205, 213, 214, 221, 241, 248, 249–56, 268, 326, 392 butter: 327, 330, 334 calligraphy: 94, 153 Calvinism, Calvinists: 71, 76, 78, 79, 229 cartography see maps catechism: 194, 236, 239, 244, 245, 264, 290, 292, 307 central government, Swedish: 198, 208, 211, 212, 213 centralization: 191, 193, 205, 211, 212, 214, 226 chancellery: 33, 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 109, 112, 156, 366 chaplains: 292, 302, 308–10 Church Slavonic: 237, 239, 245, 253, 261, 264, 290, 307 coat of arms: 50, 90, 196, 209, 210, 284, 335 commerce see trade compilation: 337–58 conglomerate state: 209

390

index reruM

constructing reality: 67 conversion policy: 211, 290, 292, 303 copper: 78, 144, 150, 151, 152, 171, 176 copper coinage: 151, 152 Cossacks: 109, 110, 125, 340 courier: 24, 25, 59, 60, 109, 248, 279, 334, 363 covered markets: 165, 189, 294 crop failure: 196, 199, 235, 265 customs: 181–88 customs book: 236, 240, 280 Cyrillic script: 37, 153, 194, 244, 262, 263, 268, 290 defence: 180, 196, 223, 368 delimitation see borders derivation (of trade): 30, 38, 88, 161, 167, 174, 176, 179, 210, 212, 213, 219, 293 desertion: 17, 61, 100, 104, 105, 112, 115, 128, 134, 136 d´iachok (ecclesiastical office): 260, 263, 264, 281, 282 d´iak (secular office): 105, 250, 263, 279, 366 diplomacy, Jacobean: 47–66 diplomacy, Russian: 359–73 diplomats: 34, 123–26, 128, 136, 165, 177, 287 distich: 361 dreams (projects): 67–86, 230, 293 Dutch military organization: 18 Dutch language: 80 eel fishing: 226 embroidery: 209 engravings: 75, 77, 145, 146, 193, 347, 362 Estonian language: 292 executions: 52, 112, 129, 130 export see trade and commerce factory: 143–59

feathers, pluck Russia’s: 190 Fennic languages: 211, 236, 260, 261 fine-blade sawmills: 213 Finnish language: 106, 130, 253, 261, 292 fishing: 112, 196, 226, 249, 251 flax: 34, 162, 179, 198, 199 fortifications: 110, 114, 196, 197, 200, 229, 323, 348 flood: 67–69, 82 fortresses passim wooden fortresses: 90, 93, 110 free trade see trade freedom of worship: 24, 34, 38, 165, 229, 241, 250, 252, 314 furs: 20, 55, 150, 151, 290, 294, 368 Gast gegen Gast: 189 gentry: 37, 68, 105, 209, 235, 241, 242, 253, 258, 261, 268, 284, 285 gifts: 55, 121, 289, 290 votive gift: 251 grain: 68, 143, 171, 172, 180, 183, 197– 99, 223, 226, 330, 333 Grand League: 56 Great Northern War: 13, 157, 194, 201, 214, 249, 301, 308, 309 Greek language: 308 Greek Orthodoxy see Russian religion hakelvärk: 208, 235, 249, 250 hegemony: 29, 68, 70, 76, 84, 201 hemp: 150, 151, 162, 179, 198, 294, 327 heresies, heretics: 131, 259, 303, 304, 307 herring trade: 226 herring buss: 68 hides: 150, 151, 162 highwaymen: 24 historiography, Neo-Latin: 337–58 Huguenots: 71, 78 icons: 122, 124, 125, 155, 156, 249–51, 256, 366, 367

index reruM

identity politics: 79, 132, 134, 236, 259, 290, 301 ignorance: 33, 87, 88, 102, 307 Ingrians: 194, 199, 205–18, 235–86 inland city see uppstad integration process: 31, 211, 213–15 interpreters: 25, 38, 103, 106, 127, 153, 198, 236, 238, 247, 261, 262, 288, 292, 294 training of interpreters: 288 iron: 143, 150, 151, 170 iron works: 78, 79 mining: 70, 76, 170, 176, 178 Islam: 58 Izhorians: 205, 211, 236, 260–62 Jews: 78, 79 jingoism: 60 jus belli: 194, 220 jus emporii see staple right lamentation over Narova (poem): 253– 56 Latin: 27, 28, 39, 247, 308, 337–58, 361 letters: 235–86 literacy: 37, 235–86 Livonian Order: 189 lord lieutenants: 37, 241, 242, 266 Low German: 80 Lund University Library: 313–36 Lutheranism: 301–12 and passim making of Ingria: 208 manorial economy: 194–99, 205, 212 maps (cartography): 33, 87–98, 198 function of maps: 89–91 portolan maps: 90 products of fantasy: 90 merchants see trade mediation: 19, 21, 22, 25, 30, 48, 53, 54, 57, 60, 71, 74, 163, 197, 201, 360, 368 miracles: 155, 165, 294 miscalculations: 33, 91

mobility: 36, 205, 207 mock-poem: 94 modernization: 76, 78, 80–82, 84 monks: 221, 235, 256, 258, 307, 309 Mother Earth: 122 Muscovite Law Code: 122, 129, 130 Muscovy Company: 54, 55, 57, 74, 293 Old Believers: 196, 282 oral tradition: 106, 109, 295, 297 Orthodox see Russian religion patriarch: 34, 124, 132, 156, 229 peace: passim peace mediation see mediation peasants: 22, 36, 37, 110, 113, 132, 194– 96, 199, 207, 209–12, 215, 221, 235, 248, 253, 258–67, 279, 322, 323, 326, 329, 332 petitions: 235–86 phrase book: 34, 153, 154, 156 Pietism: 309 poems: 83, 94, 253–56 portolan maps see maps priests: 22, 37, 38, 112, 113, 131, 133, 154, 198, 221, 228, 229, 235, 241, 247, 250, 258–63, 281–82, 303, 305, 307–09, 322, 329 prisoners of war: 24, 100, 103, 295, 297, 309 Raskolniks see Old Believers receipts: 235–86 reduction of estates: 198, 211, 212 reparation payment: 59, 363 rituals: 34, 120–31, 136 Rupture War: 36, 37, 209, 210, 214, 236, 248, 252, 259–61 Russian language: 153, 198, 235–86, 288, 289 Russian religion (Greek Orthodoxy): 37, 38, 123, 222, 224, 290–92, 301–12 Russian-Dutch relations: 165

391

392

index reruM

salt: 68, 150, 162, 226 salt works: 291 scribes: 37, 237, 238, 248–50, 263, 264, 266–68, 281 sermons: 261, 301–12 shipbuilding: 213 staple rights, staple town: 35, 162, 222 storage depot: 161–88 superintendent: 194, 241, 258, 259, 292, 307, 308 Swedish-Danish relations: 15, 53, 58, 62, 130 Swedish-Dutch relations: 79 Swedish-English relations see AngloSwedish relations Swedish-Polish relations: 15, 51, 57, 58, 197, 340, 360 Swedish-Russian relations: passim symbolic use: 119–42 tallow: 150 Tartars: 51 taxation: 31, 36, 209, 212, 225, 322 exemption from: 71, 223, 265 tax farming: 211, 212, 214 taxes: 195–97, 207, 212, 364, 365 Teutonic Order: 70, 73, 80, 219 three crowns: 90, 131, 134, 135, 369 Time of Troubles: 15, 61, 67, 73, 110, 112, 115, 116, 123, 133, 139, 143, 268, 337, 340, 360 titular questions: 23, 27, 106, 289

trade and commerce: 67–86, 143–59, 161–88, 212–14 export restrictions: 150, 152, 153, 183, 223 free trade: 32, 75, 180, 293 transit trade: 35, 36, 161–88, 197, 210, 212–14, 223, 293, 294 translation: 337–58 see also interpreters

uppstad (inland city) 222, 223 urban development: 219–34 University of Dorpat (Tartu): 198–201 Tartu University Library: 252, 313– 23

Varangians: 83, 84 voivodes: 22, 24, 129, 131, 132, 314, 317, 324 Votes: 205, 211, 260–62

waterways: 90, 94, 150, 189, 190, 192, 213 welfare state: 79, 84 wild east: 207 worship of saints: 38, 303, 304, 306, 309, 310 written Ingrian Russian: 235–86

Contributors

Kristian Gerner is Professor Emeritus of history at Lund University. He was previously Professor of Eastern European History and Culture at Uppsala Univer‐ sity. His research has focused on twentieth century Central and Eastern European history and cultural history. Recent publications include Rysslands historia (Lund: Historiska media, 2017) and Mellan Solidaritet och Coca Cola. Rapporter i Sven‐ ska Dagbladet om det postmoderna Europa ([Stockholm]: Engelsbergs akademi, [2019]). David Gudmundsson is a docent in church history and a senior lecturer in the didactics of religion at the Centre for Theology and Religious Studies of Lund University. His research interests include early modern Swedish church history, particularly the relation between church and army and the meeting between orthodoxy and pietism. He has published Konfessionell krigsmakt. Predikan och bön i den svenska armén 1611‒1721 (Malmö, 2014). Stefan Herfurth has been wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter at the Centre for History and Culture in Eastern and Central Europe at the University of Leipzig. His research has had its focus on Swedish Pomerania and the concept of freedom in a comparative perspective. In 2017 he published Freiheit in Schwedisch-Pommern. Entwicklung, Verbreitung und Rezeption des Freiheitsbegriffs im südlichen Ostseeraum zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts (Göttingen: Wallstein). Arne Jönsson is Professor Emeritus in Latin at Lund University and former vice-chairman of the board of the Swedish Institute in Rome and the Villa San Michele Foundation on Capri. He has specialized in historical-philological research with editions and studies on St Birgitta of Sweden, Chancellor Axel Ox‐ enstierna, Sophia Elisabet Brenner (Sweden’s first woman poet), and the Linnaeus disciple Daniel Rolander. In 2017 he edited (with Gregor Vogt-Spira, Marburg University) a collection of articles entitled The Classical Tradition in the Baltic Region. Perceptions and Adaptations of Greece and Rome for Olms Verlag. Kasper Kepsu is a docent in Nordic history at Åbo Akademi University. His research focuses on the province of Ingria (Ingermanland) and the town of Nyen in the seventeenth century (the Swedish period), and he has published Den besvärliga provinsen: reduktion, skattearrendering och bondeoroligheter i det

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svenska Ingermanland under slutet av 1600-talet (Helsingfors: Finska VetenskapsSocieteten, 2014) and Mellan Moskva och Stockholm. De svenska ryssbajorerna i Ingermanland 1478‒1722 (Helsingfors: Otava, 2015) and several articles on the burghers in Nyen (2018–2022). Gennady Kovalenko has been a researcher at St Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences since 1983. His research interests include the history of Russia (especially Novgorod) in the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries, the history of Swedish-Russian relations and foreign views on Russia. Among his books should be mentioned Великий Новгород в иностранных сочинениях. XV — начало XX века (2002, 3rd ed. 2016) and Россия и Швеция от Рюрика до Ельцина (2018). He has also published several travel journals written by early modern foreigners who travelled to Russia. Enn Küng is an Associate Professor of Estonian History at Tartu University. His research focuses on seventeenth-century economic history in the Baltic Sea area. He is the author of the monograph Rootsi majanduspoliitika Narva kaubanduse küsimuses 17. sajandi teisel poolel (2001) and editor-in-chief of the third volume (2013) of Eesti ajalugu, the recent fundamental overview of the Estonian history. Elisabeth Löfstrand is an Associate Professor at Stockholm University. Her field of research is Slavic philology and she has specialized in editing Medieval and early modern texts. In Accounts of an Occupied City. Catalogue of the Novgorod Oc‐ cupation Archives, she gives (together with Laila Nordquist and Anatoly Turilov) a detailed description of the contents of a unique archive that mirrors the life and administration of Swedish-occupied Novgorod in 1611‒17. Steve Murdoch is Professor of Military History at the Swedish Defence Univer‐ sity. His research interests include Scottish and British relations with Scandinavia and Northern Europe 1560–1750. He has co-authored a monograph with Alexia Grosjean, Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years’ War, 1618– 1648 (2014). His present research involves a project on the translation into English of the diplomatic correspondence of Sir James Spens and Sir Robert Anstruther during the Thirty Years’ War. Alexander I. Pereswetoff-Morath is Professor and chair in Slavonic languages at Uppsala University. He specializes in Medieval Slavic philology, pre-modern Judæo-Slavic contacts, and seventeenth-century Russian. His recent project, funded by the Marcus and Amalia Wallenberg Foundation, was entitled ‘Rossica Ingrica: The Paths of Native Written Russian in Swedish Ingria, 1611–1704. A Sociophilological Study with a Digital Edition’.

ConTribuTors

Adrian Selin is a Professor of History at the Higher School of Economics in St Petersburg. The main subjects of his research are the historical geography of Novgorod and Novgorod society in the early seventeenth century. His re‐ cent publications include Русско-шведская граница 1617–1700 гг. Формирование, функционирование, наследие (2016) and Смута на Северо-Западе в начале XVII века. Очерки из жизни новгородского общества (2017). Per Stobaeus, is a docent in history and lecturer at the department for book history, Lund University, and a librarian at the section for Collections at the University Library. His main research field is fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Swedish history. He is the author of Hans Brask. En senmedeltida biskop och hans tankevärld (2008), Från biskop Brasks tid (2010), and Josef. Om Jesu far i Bibeln och den kristna traditionen (2014). Kari Tarkiainen is former Director-General of The National Archives of Finland and Professor honoris causa. He has specialized in Swedish-Russian contacts and the history of the Finns in Sweden. His most recent works are Provinsen bortom havet: Estlands svenska historia 1561–1710 (with Ülle Tarkiainen, Helsinki, 2013), and Moskoviten: Sverige och Ryssland 1478–1721 (Helsinki, 2017). Ülle Tarkiainen is a senior researcher at the Institute of History and Archeology of Tartu University. Her main subjects of research are the history of settlement, agricultural history, and the history of cartography from the seventeenth century to the end of the nineteenth century. She has written the book Provinsen bortom havet: Estlands svenska historia 1561–1710 (with Kari Tarkiainen, Helsinki, 2013) and numerous articles on Estonian cultural and economic history. Alexander Tolstikov is an Associate Professor at the Department of Foreign His‐ tory, Political Science and International Relations of Petrozavodsk State Univer‐ sity (Republic of Karelia, Russia). His research interests include Russo-Swedish relations in the Middle Ages and the early modern period as well as representa‐ tions of political power and the history of political concepts in early modern Europe. Stefan Troebst is Professor Emeritus of East European Cultural Studies at the University of Leipzig. His fields of research are international and inter-ethnic relations in modern Eastern Europe as well as the comparative cultural history of contemporary Europe. His most recent books are Zwischen Arktis, Adria und Armenien. Das östliche Europa und seine Ränder. Aufsätze, Essays und Vorträge 1983–2016 (Cologne, 2017) and West-östliche Europastudien. Rechtskultur, Kul‐ turgeschichte, Geschichtspolitik (Leipzig, 2015). Arsenii Vetushko-Kalevich is a post-doctoral scholar at Lund University. His field of research is Neo-Latin philology. In his recent book he traces the working

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process of Johannes Widekindi (c. 1620–1678), historiographer of the Realm, when writing his bilingual history of the Swedish military actions in Russia in 1609–1617, published in 1671 in Swedish as Thet Swenska i Ryssland tijo åhrs Krijgz-Historie and in 1672 in Latin as Historia Belli Sveco-Moscovitici Decennalis.

ACTA SCANDINAVICA Cambridge Studies in the Early Scandinavian World

All volumes in this series are evaluated by an Editorial Board, strictly on academic grounds, based on reports prepared by referees who have been commissioned by virtue of their specialism in the appropriate field. The Board ensures that the screening is done independently and without conflicts of interest. The definitive texts supplied by authors are also subject to review by the Board before being approved for publication. Further, the volumes are copyedited to conform to the publisher’s stylebook and to the best international academic standards in the field.

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