Sustainable Energy Development: A Comparative Policy Analysis of the EU Member States 3031280644, 9783031280641

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Environment & Policy 63

Gamze Tanil

Sustainable Energy Development A Comparative Policy Analysis of the EU Member States

Environment & Policy Volume 63

The series, Environment & Policy, aims to publish research that examines global and local environmental policies. It covers a variety of environmental topics ranging from biodiversity, ecology, pollution, climate change, agriculture, biodiversity, sustainability, resources, to water security. This long-standing series has published renowned authors for over a decade and it continues to be the home for environmentalists, policy experts, and related discipline experts who are genuinely interested in tackling the issues of our days.

Gamze Tanil

Sustainable Energy Development A Comparative Policy Analysis of the EU Member States

Gamze Tanil Istanbul, Türkiye

ISSN 1383-5130     ISSN 2215-0110 (electronic) Environment & Policy ISBN 978-3-031-28064-1    ISBN 978-3-031-28065-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28065-8 The book presents the results of research conducted at the University of West Bohemia within the E-ADAPT Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence (project No. 620971-EPP-1-2020-1-CZEPPJMO-CoE) co-funded by the European Union. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

With growing impacts of ongoing climate change, which started recently in increasing amount of extreme events to hit after “distant” parts of world also European territory including EU member states, the issue of reasons, and in particular potential solutions, is increasingly reflected in both public and political discussions within the region. This process has different dynamics in different parts of European Union. There are many reasons for this difference; among others it is obviously the level of economic development, dependence on domestic sources of energy, and consequent structure of national economics, but also trade relations and dependences as well as political and societal history of each member state. From the times, when former Prime Minister and later also President of the Czech Republic V. Klaus presented ecology and environmental measures as “cherry on the cake” of successful economic development, the understanding of environmental and climatic threats evolved dramatically. Repeated experience with ever-­ increasing costs needed to addressing of extreme climate impacts raised the awareness and interest of public, and consequently also the political actors. Evolving views on the way how to address these problems obviously impacted also Common European approaches and led to dramatic evolution of environmental and particularly climatic agenda at the EU level. First visible reflection of this process was the creation of dedicated Directorate General for climate within European Commission structure, with consequent flow of agreements on – now permanently growing and fine-tuned – legislative framework. This led EU also to overtake global position of leader in climatic agenda. There is overall understanding and agreement that in addressing climate change challenge, energy generation and consumption has a crucial role. As the sector most exploiting fossil fuels and sources of energy, contributing dominantly to greenhouse gas production, it is an obvious target for potential solutions. In this context, transformation of energy generation from fossil to sustainable energy sources is clearly one of the main elements promising long-term positive outcome. “Purely” climatic and environmental perception of this transformation gained additional geo-political, safety, and security meaning after unprecedented Russian aggression to Ukraine, v

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Foreword

and consequent use of traditional (oil, and dominantly gas) cheap fossil fuels as indirect weapon to affect and undermine economies of EU member states. All this elevated the issue of energetic transformation to the top of political agenda. Transformation of energy mix to sustainable and dominantly renewable source is no more a political exclusivity of green parts of political spectrum, but find its way into political programs of vast majority of democratic political parties across political representation. Adoption of until now globally most ambitious transition strategy, so-called “Green Deal for Europe” by EU Commission led by conservative-right President Ursula von der Leyen is a good example of this fact. However broad is understanding of necessity to transform to sustainable sources of energy, the transition itself is a major political and economic challenge. History of development of energy sources in different parts of Europe, the infrastructure build for decades, distribution networks, linked industry structure, etc. make this transition costly and difficult  – more in the parts of EU which were dominantly dependent on coal and other domestic fossil fuels, or evolving their structure on the presumption of long-time availability of cheap imports. All these factors were reflected in developing policy frameworks and societal discussions within European Union. Understanding of processes, root-causes, traditions, and development of policies at national, regional, but also EU level is a pre-­ requisite for shaping the future developments, and particularly in addressing the growing need to speed-up this process. Present analysis written by Gamze Tanil provides a very informed and detailed insight, which allows for better understanding of differences and commonalities within EU and also for identifying main elements of future progress in the area of sustainable energy development. Selection of two neighbors  – Germany and Czech Republic  – for this analysis is particularly helpful. States with different economic history and status, with very intensive trade relations and sometimes almost opposite starting points in energy transformation discussions, but at the same time member states which are both contributing to the common EU goals and EU leadership in global terms, provide excellent case studies, full of experience, solutions, and lessons learned, which may be instrumental in shaping future policy instruments and implementation solutions elsewhere. When observing objective data on ongoing climate change, trends in glass-house emissions, global developments in climatic agenda, and options, which are available for addressing the problem, the conclusion that both political will and societal support are equally important and really able to reshape the future is reassuring. Ladislav Miko Former Minister of Environment of the Czech Republic Prague, Czech Republic Former Director for Biodiversity Protection of DG Environment of European Commission and Deputy Director General of DG SANTE for Food Safety Prague, Czech Republic

Contents

1

Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 The Challenge: Sustainable Energy Development������������������������������������    1 Fossil Fuels in Europe’s Energy Structure������������������������������������������������    5 Energy Transition Policy����������������������������������������������������������������������������    7 Outline of the Book������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    8 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    9

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 Conceptual and Methodological Framework����������������������������������������   11 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   11 Energy Policy Formulation: Actors, Attitudes, and Actions����������������������   11 Research Hypotheses ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   22 Methodology����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   24 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   25

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 Policy Formulation in European Union ������������������������������������������������   29 Development of the EU Environmental Policy������������������������������������������   29 Development of the EU Renewable Energy Policy ����������������������������������   34 Policy Norms and Objectives����������������������������������������������������������������   34 Policy Legislation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   39 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   49

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 Policy Formulation in Member States���������������������������������������������������   51 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   51 Czech Republic������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   51 Policy Norms and Objectives����������������������������������������������������������������   52 Policy Legislation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   60 Germany����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   65 Policy Norms and Objectives����������������������������������������������������������������   65 Policy Legislation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   74 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   82

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Contents

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 Political and Public Perceptions ������������������������������������������������������������   85 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   85 Germany����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   85 Political Perceptions������������������������������������������������������������������������������   85 Public Perceptions����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   89 Czech Republic������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   92 Political Perceptions������������������������������������������������������������������������������   92 Public Perceptions����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   97 Expert Perceptions ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  101 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  110

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Policy Implementation����������������������������������������������������������������������������  113 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  113 Development Trajectory of the Renewable Energies in the EU����������������  114 Fulfilment of the 2020 Renewable Energy Targets in the EU��������������������  125 Future Projections for the Renewable Energies in the EU������������������������  130 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  133

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Conclusion������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  135 We Can Reshape Our Energy Systems������������������������������������������������������  135 Energy Transition Policy����������������������������������������������������������������������������  136 Research Outcomes������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  137 Pathway to 2030����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  141 Contribution of This Book ������������������������������������������������������������������������  142

About the Author

Gamze  Tanil is a researcher and lecturer in Politics and International Relations with a specialization in European Politics and Environmental Politics. She acquired Masters in European Studies in 2003 and Doctorate in International Relations in 2010. She has worked as a researcher and lecturer at several universities in United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Czech Republic, and Poland and taught various courses and seminars on European history and politics. Her current research agenda revolves around sustainability, environment, and energy policies. In 2021, she published a book on sustainable water and waste management policies in Europe to improve our understanding of the patterns and dynamics of structural change in response to current levels of urbanization and industrialization. In 2023, a new book in sustainability research comes out with an analysis of energy transitions from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. This book provides a comprehensive assessment of the energy transition process with a dedicated focus on the coordination of policies, regulations, strategies, and social learning in the European Union member states to overcome barriers to change and foster sufficient impetus toward structural transition. This broad framework integrates different phases, levels, and dimensions to provide overarching frames for understanding the political, legal, and societal contexts of sustainable energy transition.  

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List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Five key principles to accelerate energy transition���������������������������   23 Fig. 4.1 Czech Republic’s executive portfolio in renewable energy policy. (Author’s own compilation)��������������������������������������������������   53 Fig. 4.2 Czech Republic’s legislative portfolio in renewable energy policy. (Author’s own compilation)��������������������������������������������������   61 Fig. 4.3 Germany’s executive portfolio in renewable energy policy. (Author’s own compilation)��������������������������������������������������������������   67 Fig. 4.4 Germany’s legislative portfolio in renewable energy policy. (Author’s own compilation)��������������������������������������������������������������   75 Fig. 5.1 Conceptual framework of political and public support for energy transition. (Author’s own compilation)���������������������������   86 Fig. 6.1 Electricity generation from RES in the EU-27 (2004–2020). (Eurostat, 2020)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������  115 Fig. 6.2 EU member states with the highest installed renewable energy capacity (2011–2020). (IRENA, 2021)���������������������������������  115 Fig. 6.3 Comparison of the EU member states in terms of installed wind energy capacity (2020). (EurObserv’ER, 2022a)��������������������  116 Fig. 6.4 Share of wind energy in gross electricity generation in Germany (2002–2020). (Fraunhofer ISE, 2022a)�������������������������  117 Fig. 6.5 Development trajectory of onshore wind energy in Germany (2000–2020). (Bundesverband WindEnergie, 2021)������������������������  117 Fig. 6.6 Development trajectory of wind energy in the Czech Republic (2010–2020). (IRENA, 2022)��������������������������������������������  119 Fig. 6.7 EU member states with the highest hydroenergy generation (2012–2020). (IRENA, 2022)�����������������������������������������������������������  119 Fig. 6.8 EU member states with the highest installed solar energy capacity (2011–2020). (IRENA, 2022)���������������������������������������������  120 Fig. 6.9 Annual solar share of electricity production in Germany (2002–2020). (Fraunhofer ISE, 2022b)��������������������������������������������  121 xi

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List of Figures

Fig. 6.10 Development trajectory of solar PV energy in the Czech Republic (2010–2020). (IRENA, 2022)��������������������������������������������  122 Fig. 6.11 EU member states with the highest biogas generation (2015–2020). (EurObserv’ER, 2021a)����������������������������������������������  123 Fig. 6.12 Development trajectory of biogas energy in Germany (2000–2020). (German Biogas Association, 2020)���������������������������  124 Fig. 6.13 Electricity production from renewable municipal waste in EU-27 (2016–2020) (electricity only and CHP plants combined). (EurObserv’ER, 2021a)�������������������������������������������������  125 Fig. 6.14 Solid biofuels primary energy production and consumption in the EU-27 (2010–2020) (excluding charcoal). (EurObserv’ER, 2021b)��������������������������������������������������������������������  126 Fig. 6.15 Electricity production from solid biofuels in the EU-27 (2018–2020) (excluding charcoal). (EurObserv’ER, 2021b)�����������  126 Fig. 6.16 The share of renewable energy in total gross final energy consumption in the EU zone (2020). (EurObserv’ER, 2021a)���������  127 Fig. 6.17 The share of renewable energy in gross electricity consumption in EU zone (2004–2020). (EurObserv’ER, 2021a)���������������������������  128 Fig. 6.18 Distribution of additional electrical capacity connected in EU-27 (2020). (EurObserv’ER, 2021a)����������������������������������������  129 Fig. 6.19 Share of renewable energy sectors in electricity generation in the EU-27 (2020). (EurObserv’ER, 2021a)����������������������������������  131

Chapter 1

Introduction

The Challenge: Sustainable Energy Development The global environmental crisis and climate crisis are accelerating dramatically. How to ensure climate change adaptation and mitigation and environmental sustainability came to the fore as the most critical problem of our age. A major problem about the fossil fuel use is that they generate an excessive amount of CO2 emissions, and they are the main causes of problems for the climate, environment, and human health. The growth in the use of fossil-based energy sources, coupled with the environmental consequences of their extraction, processing, and waste, increases the pressure on the world’s economies and threatens the environment and human welfare. Scientists, researchers, and policy-makers work on developing new strategies, technologies, and policies to offer solutions to this problem. The global solution suggested by international organizations, agreements, common policies, and strategies is the complete avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions, i.e., the goal of climate neutrality. Energy efficiency and energy transition from fossil-based energy sources to renewable energy sources are fundamental parts of the solution. Scientific research shows that it is technically feasible to convert the world’s energy system to a clean and sustainable one; the only barrier to energy transition is related to political and economic concerns. Governments tend to regard the domestically available fossil fuel sources as cheap and secure energy sources. They usually focus on providing stable energy at low-cost to their industries and consumers. However, in an age of low-cost technological development of the renewable energies, these economic arguments are not valid anymore. Instead of focusing solely on the viability of economic competitiveness of domestic industries and keeping up the jobs in the coal sector, policy-makers need to recognize that maintaining a proper balance between economic development and environmental protection is possible. We call this concept sustainable energy development.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Tanil, Sustainable Energy Development, Environment & Policy 63, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28065-8_1

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For the policy-makers, it is time to better understand the relationships between energy consumption patterns, greenhouse gas emissions, climate change, and environmental issues. This understanding is leading ever-increasing numbers of policy-­ makers around the world to embrace the idea that economic stability, environmental sustainability, and citizens’ welfare can only be ensured by converting into renewable energies. The increasing concerns over adverse effects of fossil fuels coupled with the global efforts to meet long-term sustainability goals have accelerated energy transition across the globe, and therefore, many countries pledged to reach net-zero CO2 emissions in the coming decades. We observe that sustainable energy development concept is gaining hold in policy circles around the world. Main benefits of the construction and operation of renewable energies are that they have the capacity to provide sustainable development in environmental, economic, and social pillars. They also eliminate hazardous effects of fossil fuels on human health. In addition, they contribute to maintaining stability of energy markets and reducing energy dependence on other countries. In terms of environmental effects, a major contribution of renewable energies to environmental sustainability is a decrease in air pollution levels and CO2 levels. Air pollution has many costs for the flora and fauna. One of the pollutants in the air, nitrogen oxide emissions (NOx) impact on excessive fertilization and acidification of soils and water, and thereby, harm ecosystems such as lakes and forests, and result in biodiversity loss. Also, opening new coal mines and extending the existing ones require deforestation, so abandoning coal mining activities would protect the fauna and flora in those regions. Abandoning the extraction and use of fossil fuels can significantly contribute to environmental sustainability. In terms of socio-economic effects, energy transition boosts the employment opportunities in new industries and contributes to economic growth. New renewable energy investments, new technologies, research, development, and production facilities all have a great potential to create new jobs. This, in turn, triggers an increase in the welfare of national and regional communities. In terms of health effects, clean energy sources help mitigate the negative health impacts associated with air pollution. As mentioned before, burning of fossil fuels generates an excessive amount of CO2 emissions, and this polluted air contains high amounts of nitrogen dioxide emissions (NO2) and particulate matter (PM2.5). These substances cause aggravated respiratory illnesses (like asthma and chronic bronchitis) and cardiovascular illnesses (like high blood pressure and heart attacks). In addition, burning coal and other fossil fuels for power and heat is a major source of mercury release into the atmosphere. This airborne mercury can fall to the ground in raindrops, in dust, or simply due to gravity and then become dissolved into freshwater and seawater, condensed through the food chain, and ingested by humans. Consequently, exposure to methylmercury creates chronic effects on human health. We can eliminate all these adverse health impacts of fossil fuels by converting our energy mix into clean energy sources. Energy transition is relevant also in terms of international security because access to energy sources and import dependency can be major causes of insecurity and international conflicts. The prices of coal, gas, and oil are subject to global price

The Challenge: Sustainable Energy Development

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fluctuations, and political instability may endanger the supply. The volatility of both the prices and the supply means that the market can be highly unpredictable. Especially, with the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine earlier this year, European states recognized the urgency of energy independence, which could be only achieved via energy transition into renewable energies. For this purpose, on March 8, 2022, the European Commission proposed an outline of a plan to make Europe independent of Russian fossil fuels before the year 2030. This plan outlined the measures designed to accommodate rising gas prices in Europe and to fill the gas stocks for the winter. The impact of the war on Europe has been hard, with increased energy prices coupled with supply uncertainty. Commission president Ursula von der Leyen announced that Europe must become independent from Russian oil, coal, and gas. To be energy-independent, she called for immediate action to accelerate the clean energy transition and achieve the switch to renewables and hydrogen as quickly as possible, combined with more energy efficiency. Executive vice president for the European Green Deal Frans Timmermans also urged the transition into renewable energies at lightning speed. He underlined that the renewables are cheap, clean, and endless. They also create job opportunities in Europe instead of funding the fossil fuel industry elsewhere. This recent crisis showed globally that energy dependence on fossil fuels cannot be pursued any longer, and an immediate energy transition is necessary. Energy transition to renewable energies can provide all states sufficient, affordable, and sustainable access to clean energy sources and thereby help them eliminate their dependency on oil and gas imports. In terms of market effects, renewable energy sources have certain advantages over the fossil fuels. Especially wind and sun energies have a near zero marginal cost. They neither bear the cost of extraction of fossil fuels nor of buying CO2 certificates. From the investors’ perspective, therefore, this eliminates an important risk factor. From the macro-economic perspective, renewable energies can hedge the states against global fuel price volatility and enhance their national trade and fiscal balances. As a result of these factors, renewable energy investments can safeguard countries’ industrial competitiveness. Considering these benefits, the market opportunities of the renewable energies are clear. The challenge for the policy-makers around the world is clear. They need to recognize the urgency of energy transition to slow down the environmental damage, avoid the climate catastrophe, boost the economy, reduce energy dependence on other countries, and avoid human health problems. Indeed, numerous international organizations, NGOs, research institutions, and scholars announced the urgency and necessity of the energy transition. The United Nations recognized the close relationship between climate, energy, and sustainable development and, therefore, included climate action and clean energy among 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). With a common declaration (United Nations, 2015a) in 2015, the Heads of State and Government committed themselves to “achieve sustainable development in its three dimensions -economic, social and environmental- in a balanced and integrated manner” and pledged “common action and endeavour on the path towards sustainable development.” They established three global energy policy objectives to be accomplished by 2030 as

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“ensuring universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services; increasing substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix; and doubling the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency” (United Nations, 2015a). They conceived three objectives as an integrated whole and mutually supportive. They also addressed the threat posed by the climate change and environmental degradation and called for widest possible international cooperation aimed at reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change. To achieve this goal, they stressed the urgency of “integrating climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning”. Recognizing that climate change represents an urgent threat to the world and the people, the Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015 (United Nations, 2015b). It was a legally binding international treaty with a common cause of “strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change in the context of sustainable development”.1 The agreement set the global goal of “holding the increase in the global average temperature well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit temperature increases to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”2 The parties to the agreement recognized that an energy transition is required from the fossil fuels to renewable energy sources and committed themselves to “prepare, communicate, and maintain successive nationally determined contributions to this policy objective.”3 In pursuit of this goal, 191 countries made their mid-century pledges on low greenhouse gas emission development strategies, so-called nationally determined contributions (NDCs). This process is dynamic; the parties need to update their NDCs every 5 years in a progressive manner to reflect the highest possible ambition.4 The signatories also committed themselves to strengthening cooperation “through sharing information, good practices, and experiences, providing technical support and guidance to each other, and assisting developing countries in identifying effective adaptation practices, needs, priorities, actions, and efforts”.5 With the European Green Deal, the European Union committed itself to cut CO2 emissions by at least 55% by 2030 and achieve complete climate neutrality by 2050 (European Commission, 2019). Making the EU the first climate-neutral continent by 2050 is a significant goal, and it will obviously be a challenge for the member states to achieve this goal by their aggregated efforts. The EU heads of state and government now recognize that it is time to move away from coal, oil, and gas and to completely restructure their energy patterns in industry, agriculture, transport, and households. The International Energy Agency (IEA) published a comprehensive study of how transition to a net zero energy system by 2050 can be achieved, while at the same time ensuring stable and affordable energy supplies, universal energy access,

 Paris Agreement, Article 2.1.  Paris Agreement, Article 2.1. 3  Paris Agreement, Article 4.2. 4  Paris Agreement, Article 4.9. 5  Paris Agreement, Article 7.7. 1 2

Fossil Fuels in Europe’s Energy Structure

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and robust economic growth (IEA, 2021). The report maintained that a net zero pathway requires an immediate and massive deployment of all available clean and efficient energy technologies and a huge decline in the use of fossil fuels. The report invited the governments to set credible step-by-step plans to reach their energy and climate targets, strengthen their policies to speed up the deployment of clean and efficient energy technologies, implement fossil fuel subsidy phase-outs, carbon pricing and other market reforms, and build confidence among investors, industry, and citizens to drive the new investments (IEA, 2021). The report also stressed the importance of sustained support and participation from citizens for energy transition. The Global 100% Renewable Energy Strategy Group, composed of leading researchers on energy transition, announced that “a massive re-design of the global energy system is needed to save money, create jobs and wealth, save lives, avoid a climate catastrophe, and provide sustainable energy for future generations” (Global100REStrategyGroup, 2021). They maintained that with political will, a transformation of the global energy sector by 2030–2035 appears to be possible. The Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA) brings together a diverse range of governments, businesses, and organizations with an aim to take action to accelerate clean energy growth and rapid phase-out of unabated coal power. In its declaration in 2017, the alliance encouraged all members in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and EU to commit to phase out coal-fired power generation by 2030 and maintained that the countries moving to low-carbon and climate-resilient economies were already seeing environmental, economic, and human health benefits. All these international efforts, common policies, and a common voice show that we can only realize energy transition goal in a global context. This means establishing better mechanisms to coordinate the developed and developing economies together so that they can share the know-how, policy measures, and technologies to provide clean and sustainable energy for all their citizens. Only through a collective effort involving all sections of the society, i.e., citizens, scientists, politicians, policy-­makers, and NGOs, can we convert our energy structure into a clean and sustainable one. Only a new political vision can drive our societies, economies, and technologies forward and eliminate the risk of global warming, air pollution, and energy insecurity for all of us.

Fossil Fuels in Europe’s Energy Structure The good news is that the use of fossil fuels is on the decline across the world, and more and more countries are announcing a coal phase-out. It is obvious that the higher the number of countries that implement this strategy, the higher the number of good examples will be for the noncommitted countries to follow. In the EU-zone, statistics show that both the production and consumption of hard coal and brown coal have decreased almost continuously from the 1990s onward. In terms of hard coal, total EU production in 1990 was 277 million tons, and this amount decreased to 56.5 million tons in 2020 (Eurostat, 2021a). There are only two

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countries left in the EU which produce hard coal: Poland and the Czech Republic. In 2020, Poland produced 54.4 million tons of hard coal (96% of the total EU production) and the Czech Republic produced 2.1 million tons (4%) (Eurostat, 2021b). Germany ended its production of hard coal with the closure of the Prosper-Haniel mine in December 2018. The EU consumption of hard coal was around 300 million tons during the 1990s, and this amount decreased to 143.8 million tons in 2020 (Eurostat, 2021a). In 2020, 62.3 million tons of this hard coal (43%) was consumed in Poland and 31 million tons (21%) consumed in Germany. Therefore, Poland and Germany together accounted for almost two-thirds of the total hard coal consumption of the EU in 2020. They were followed by Italy (7.73 million tons), France (7.69 million tons), the Netherlands (6.51  million tons), and the Czech Republic (5.3  million tons) (Eurostat, 2021a). In terms of brown coal (lignite), the EU consumption was 691 million tons in 1990, and this amount decreased to 246.3 million tons in 2020 (Eurostat, 2021a). The brown coal production trend is very similar to its consumption trend because it is mostly produced in the countries of consumption, as the imports and exports are negligible. In 2020, 107.4 million tons of this brown coal (43%) was consumed in Germany and 46 million tons (18%) was consumed in Poland. They were followed by the Czech Republic, with 29.4 million tons (12%) of brown coal consumption (Eurostat, 2021a). The statistics show that Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic together accounted for more than two-thirds of the total brown coal consumption of the EU in 2020. In terms of active coal-fired power plants, three countries demonstrate the highest number of plants in the EU-zone. As of 2021, there are 258 coal-fired power plants in the EU-zone; 66 of them are located in Germany, 44 are in Poland, and 32 are in the Czech Republic (Europe Beyond Coal, 2021). Considering that the three countries together account for more than half of the EU’s coal-fired power plants, an urgent action in these countries is decisive for an effective implementation of the climate and sustainability targets in the EU-zone. Traditionally, Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic were collectively known as the Black Triangle or the coal heartlands of Europe. Significant amounts of domestic coal and lignite resources served as the backbone of industrial development in this region. However, their heavy reliance on coal became a burden over time, resulting in adverse consequences for environment, climate, and human health. Energy transition can be particularly challenging in these countries because their energy structure highly relies on domestically produced coal. Now, more discussion is needed on how to transform the energy structure of the Black Triangle and implement policies for a swift coal phase-out in the region. Among the EU member-states, there are several good examples for successful coal phase-out. Belgium became the first EU member state to have become coalpower-free in 2016. In 2020, Austria became the second EU member state that became coal-power-free, and it was closely followed by Sweden. At the end of

Energy Transition Policy

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2021, Portugal became the fourth EU country ending the use of coal for electricity generation. Over the last years, national discussions on gradual phasing out of coal have accelerated in Europe’s top three lignite countries: Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The German Coal Commission proposed to close all hard coal  – and lignite-­fired power plants by 2038 at the latest, and the German parliament adopted this plan. A Coal Commission was also set up in the Czech Republic, and it determined the same date as Germany for the Czech Republic’s coal phase-out. In January 2022, the Czech Republic rescheduled its coal phase-out date as 2033. Poland scheduled a later date for its coal phase-out as 2049. In terms of coal phase-out and energy transition, a uniform action in the EU-zone is important because the EU serves as a role model to other parts of the world in taking decisive action toward sustainable energy development. The EU policy target of climate neutrality by 2050 can only be achieved with the aggregated efforts of all member states.

Energy Transition Policy This book analyzes energy transition from fossil fuels into renewable energy sources in the EU-zone. Although the research considers the EU as a whole, a particular focus is given to energy policy design and implementation in two EU member states, i.e., Germany and the Czech Republic. This analysis includes both policy-­making and policy implementation phase, with an intention to provide a complete picture of the energy transition in these countries. We also scrutinize the EU member states’ national renewable energy targets for 2020 and compare these targets with the actual achievements. The year 2020, in this regard, is important for the researchers to test the fulfilment of renewable energy targets in the EU. We believe that purely economic, technological, or geographic explanations to the study of energy transition are not sophisticated enough to explain the differences in terms of deployment of renewable energies. With this understanding, we incorporate all relevant factors that can contribute to energy transition: the role of state regulatory framework, effective target-setting, effective policy design with financial support measures, and the role of political will and public support. We argue that this broader set of factors can better explain the success of energy transition in a country. This book addresses several questions in this context: –– How can energy transition be best supported in terms of structural policies? –– Which financial support measures can be used to give momentum to renewable energy investments?

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–– How can politics and society help promote a successful energy transition? –– How much transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources has been accomplished in the EU by 2020? This book was written in the course of 2021 and revised in 2022 in the light of recent developments in global energy politics. The policy analysis and the statistical data, therefore, mainly depend on the research carried out during this period.

Outline of the Book Chapter 2 provides a conceptual and methodological framework. This chapter provides a review and discussion of scientific theories and concepts that is necessary for understanding the key elements of energy transition. Chapter 3 includes an overview of the EU’s renewable energy policy with a particular focus on the directives and regulations on renewable energy. This chapter guides the readers to understand how supranational policy norms and objectives function as contextual drivers for the emergence of new policy objectives and legislation in the member states. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the renewable energy policy framework in Germany and the Czech Republic. This chapter sets out what needs to be done in terms of policy design and examines the financial incentives needed. In this framework, it discusses the policies in Germany and the Czech Republic that have been implemented to achieve energy transition. The chapter highlights the importance of a broad policy framework that can address social and economic challenges. Chapter 5 explores the link between policy-making and socio-political aspects of energy transition. This chapter examines the political and public acceptance of renewable energies. This analysis is supplemented with primary empirical data gathered through interviews with energy experts, energy analysts, former politicians, and representatives of research institutions and business associations. Chapter 6 analyzes policy implementation by using statistical data for renewable energies. In this context, it investigates the deployment of renewable energies in the EU member states through the prism of 2020 renewable energy targets. The essential research question here is “How much progress has been achieved on the way to meeting the 2020 targets for renewable energies?” The answers to this research question contribute to our understanding of the operationalization of renewable energy policy norms, objectives, and strategies in the EU member states. Chapter 7 presents the research conclusions. This chapter also provides recommendations for European and national policy-makers in terms of policy design and implementation.

References

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References Europe Beyond Coal. (2021). Europe beyond coal database. European Commission. (2019). COM(2019) 640 final. Eurostat. (2021a). Supply, transformation and consumption of solid fossil fuels. Retrieved July 26, 2021. Eurostat. (2021b). Statistics explained: Coal production and consumption statistics. Retrieved July 26, 2021. Global100REStrategyGroup. (2021). Joint declaration. Retrieved from https://global100restrategygroup.org/ IEA. (2021). Net zero by 2050: A roadmap for the global energy sector. United Nations. (2015a). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/70/1). United Nations. (2015b). Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement (FCCC/CP/2015/L9/Rev/1).

Chapter 2

Conceptual and Methodological Framework

Introduction Following the technological advancements and declining generation costs, renewable energy technologies have become technically and economically viable. Both globally and within the EU zone, the great amount of investment and capacity increase in renewable energy projects made them the most powerful solutions for energy transition. The International Energy Agency estimated the share of renewables in total electricity generation globally will be over 60% in 2030 and nearly 90% in 2050 (IEA, 2021). To enable this expansion, governments need to define proper policy targets, design effective policy frameworks, incorporate policy goals and objectives into legislation, design adequate financial incentives, and strive for social acceptance of the renewable energies. These are the key challenges for many countries. This research aims to present a successful route to energy transition from fossil fuels into renewable energy technologies via policy-making. With this consideration, we will discuss the impact of favorable and effective governmental policy-­ making and target setting on the further deployment of renewable energies, and then, we will analyze the role of political and public actors on the pace of the energy transition. This chapter provides the conceptual framework equipped with different theories and approaches for better evaluation of policy design in renewable energies.

Energy Policy Formulation: Actors, Attitudes, and Actions The academic literature is crowded with studies that ask what action on the part of government is required to get rapid and sustainable renewable energy implementation. There are several authors who listed the key features of successful renewable © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Tanil, Sustainable Energy Development, Environment & Policy 63, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28065-8_2

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energy policy formulation. One of them explained these steps clearly (Mallon, 2006a), and we will refer to his work here. The first step of energy policy formulation is the establishment of contextual frameworks since this is the crucial step to initiate the renewable energy industry. In this context, governments must clearly define objectives for renewable energy at the onset and integrate these priorities into policies. These policy objectives both act as an incentive for new legislation and give policy-makers a reason to review the existing legislation. Unless such objectives are explicitly stated with deadlines and committed to by governments, it would be difficult to establish adequate policy framework. The second step would be controlling and amending the energy market legislation into which renewables must fit. In this step, the contextual frameworks must be checked for all legal processes that renewable energy projects will need to pass through, from their inception to decommissioning. At the highest level, the amendments should start with the transposition of international and European agreements into national energy policy framework. Afterward, local governments must assess their legal framework for its renewable energy friendliness. Certification or licensing requirements should be made appropriate for renewables; access to distribution should be provided without hindrance through power lines; connection contracts, fees, and system requirements should be made applicable to the renewable electricity. The necessity of an enabling legal framework for renewable energies is a widely shared assumption among the academics and the politicians. A former German politician, Hans-Josef Fell, confirms this necessity: “political framework conditions and state regulations are crucial to the launch and penetration of climate protection technologies in world markets. The state regulations are the decisive stimulus for climate protection” (Fell, 2012). Fell argues that the German renewable energy law (EEG) is an example of a successful state policy that stimulated a fast-growing renewables market. To test this assumption, we will investigate the legislative framework in the European Union, in Germany, and in the Czech Republic through a comparative lens to lay a solid basis for the analysis of policy implementation in energy transition. In the third step, governments’ choice of policy instruments matters in the operationalization of energy transition objectives. We analyze three different policy instruments, i.e., regulatory, market-oriented, and funding instruments, which are used to support renewable energies. Regulatory instruments enable expansion of renewable energies via feed-in tariffs (FITs) by guaranteeing specified payments for renewable energy generators per unit of electricity from renewable energies over a fixed period. Market-oriented instruments focus more on free competition. For example, electric utility quotas define minimum quotas of renewable energy for utility companies or consumers and leave it open to market competition how these targets are reached. Renewable energy certificates are used to certify the generation of a specific amount of renewable energy. Governments also use tendering (auctions) as a competitive purchasing mechanism. Funding instruments are financial support mechanisms such as reduction of taxes, loans, and direct public investments. Funding instruments are especially important to kick-start the renewable energy

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market with new players because although renewable energy sources are available at low or zero cost, the bulk of project expenditure lies in the capital cost and installation. Thus, low-cost loans, direct subsidies, or tax exemptions are attractive for the market players particularly at the beginning of renewable energy development. In the long term, as each renewable energy technology becomes more commercially mature, governments can abandon them and shift their focus to good policy design to make the industry attractive to private investment. Recent academic research provided considerable attention to the analysis of which policy instruments are more likely to lead to a successful expansion of renewable energies. Scholars agree that a mix of financial policy instruments are necessary at different stages for the successful expansion of renewable energies. In this context, current academic debate revolves around comparative effects of public policies for supporting renewable energies (Barnea et al., 2022; García-Alvarez et al., 2017; Haas et al., 2011; Marques et al., 2019; Zhao et al., 2013). The first study which we analyze in this context searched for the explanatory factors for capacity increase in renewable energies on a global scale from 2010 to 2019 (Barnea et al., 2022). This study analyzed three factors, i.e., structural factors, characteristics of the political system, and policy instruments, to explain different levels of capacity development of renewable energies. Regarding the policy instruments, this research showed that funding instruments are of limited relevance, while regulatory and market instruments have positive impact. Regulatory instruments, i.e., FITs, particularly played a crucial role in the implantation phase of renewable energies at the beginning of the 2010s. After the renewable technologies reached at their point of development and maturity that made them market competitive, market instruments, i.e., quota and renewable portfolio standards, were applied (Barnea et al., 2022). Another study analyzed the effectiveness and economic efficiency of the FIT policy in EU member states (Haas et al., 2011). This study firstly asked if the FITs led to an increase in renewable energy capacities and, then, analyzed the required level of support compared to the actual generation costs. In the former category, it was found that between 1998 and 2005, in the onshore wind energy sector, the EU countries with the highest policy effectiveness were Denmark, Germany, and Spain, all of which implemented fixed FITs. The investment security provided by this measure resulted in a continuous growth for the sector. In the latter category, absolute support levels were compared with the actual costs of renewable energy generation; and it was found that in the onshore wind sector in EU member states, support levels and generation costs are very close. There were a few deviations from this conclusion: in Finland and Netherlands, the level of support was too low to initiate a steady growth in capacity. In Germany and Spain, the level of support was higher than the actual cost, and market potentials were exploited well. The conclusion was that a well-designed FIT system can secure quick deployment of renewable energies at the lowest cost for the society (Haas et al., 2011). Another study that was carried out in 46 countries globally from 1996 until 2017 analyzed the short-term and long-term effects of different policy instruments (Marques et al., 2019). The research found that market-based instruments are ineffective in the short term. They can only be effective in maintaining renewable

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energies in the long term when the renewables are more mature and well-integrated in the market. Measuring the comparative effects of FITs and renewable portfolio standards, a study focused on capacity increase in onshore wind power in the EU-28 from 2000 until 2014 (García-Alvarez et al., 2017). The authors categorized these policies as price-­driven mechanisms and quantity-driven mechanisms, because in the former, renewable energy producers obtain remuneration based on a predetermined price per kWh, while in the latter, governments use bidding mechanisms based on predetermined capacities for each renewable energy sector. This study firstly analyzed if these policies contributed to an increase in onshore wind capacity, and then analyzed which policy led to more increase in onshore wind capacity. The research found that the FITs generated better results in terms of newly installed onshore wind capacity in the EU-28 whereas renewable portfolio standards did not have a significant impact on the development of onshore wind energy. The conclusion of this research was that policy-makers should prefer using FITs in the development of onshore wind energy since this method is more successful for achieving renewable energy targets (García-Alvarez et al., 2017). The final study which we analyze in this context assessed 122 countries over the period of 1980–2010 regarding the role of different policy instruments in promoting the renewable energy generation (Zhao et al., 2013). This research found that policy effectiveness varied by the type of energy source, but investment incentives and FITs have positive effects for all renewable energy sources for electricity. On the contrary, production quotas have a negative effect on wind energy production. They have positive effects only on the biomass and waste electricity generation (Zhao et al., 2013). This brief review of literature on the effectiveness of various supportive policies suggested the policy-makers should adopt a mix of policy instruments for the promotion of renewable energies, especially in different phases of market development. However, the research also showed that the use of more policies would not necessarily bring about better results. If there is a policy conflict or policy overlap, then the policy effect may either stagnate or even decrease (Zhao et al., 2013). Increased policy effectiveness would only be expected when the supportive policies complement each other. Therefore, policy-makers must carefully consider policy overlapping and interaction when designing supportive policy instruments. Finally, governments must abide by the crucial need for transparency, simplicity, clarity, and stability for their renewable energy policy frameworks. These are necessary preconditions for market certainty; otherwise, insiders or more influential actors may have market advantages which will deter new players. Without policy stability, industries will lose confidence in the sector. In the second part, we focus on the role of political and public actors on the pace of energy transition. The need for political and public acceptance of renewable energies is put forward widely in the academic literature. For instance, a comparative analysis of the pace of growth in renewable energy capacity in five countries (USA, Denmark, Japan, Germany, China) showed that periods of growth are followed by stagnation. These swings can be attributed to domestic political changes with the

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impact of vested interests (Moe, 2017). Traditional energy sectors are big, old, and established actors in societies, and they have strong vested interests in the status quo. Obviously, energy transformation away from fossil fuels toward renewable energy sources would imply a structural change in the energy system which would mean significant losses for the conventional energy systems. That’s why these sectors would resist change. With the media rallying behind them, they can be strong enough to constrain the deployment of renewable energy technologies (Moe, 2017). Other academic studies also confirm the role of political and public acceptance in successful energy transition. The crucial argument here is that to be legislated, the renewable energy policy must be accepted by the government, industry, and society. If any one of these groups is not ready for change, energy transition will be hard to achieve (Mallon, 2006b). There are two groups of actors in this process: the renewables industry, large environmental groups, and some parts of government on the one side and the fossil fuel industry, nuclear power industry, and other parts of government on the other side. It is certain that there would be complex interactions and conflicts of interest between these groups of actors during the energy transition process. Can different actors influence renewable energy policy differently? Yes, there is a higher chance of success for renewable energies in those countries where vested interests of conventional energy sectors are weak or political decision-makers have more autonomy from interest group politics. Where vested energy interests are stronger, they would be more likely to affect political decisions through lobbying and by using the media to shape the political agenda and public opinion. In fact, the literature is crowded with studies that examined how various actors influence the energy transition. A study investigated this question in 25 OECD countries and revealed that governmental actors and markets positively influence the transition to renewables, whereas traditional energy industries negatively affect the energy transition (Sung & Park, 2018). The government’s role in this context is to make various policies and, thereby, exert coercive pressure to the markets. These policies include a wide range of market- and nonmarket-based policy instruments that are necessary to make each economy environmentally sound and sustainable. The scholars of energy policy suggested three dimensions of stakeholder acceptance that impact on the deployment of renewable energies. These are sociopolitical acceptance (acceptance of policy-makers and key stakeholders), market acceptance (acceptance of investors and consumers), and community acceptance (acceptance of local authorities and residents) (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). In terms of sociopolitical acceptance, the key challenge is to translate national policy objectives into publicly accepted policies and to create policy frameworks that foster new project initiatives. This dimension is linked with the market acceptance because investor acceptance for renewable energy policies is crucial for effective market growth. Regarding the community acceptance, there is a widespread agreement in the literature that it has a significant impact on the development of the renewable energies and, thereby, has the potential to limit the scale of the sector and its contribution to national energy systems (Ellis & Ferraro, 2016).

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Can citizens force national or state authorities to revise their renewable energy goals, specifically regarding the expansion of the wind and solar power generation? Yes, indeed. There are several studies that investigated the actual impact of local citizens on government’s energy policies. One of them, a study conducted in the German state of Saxony, investigated the role of local anti-wind protestors on the reduction of state expansion targets for renewables (Lintz & Leibenath, 2020). In 2011, the Saxon government ambitiously expanded its renewable energies target simultaneously with Germany’s declaration of phase-out of nuclear energy. However, the adoption of the Saxon Energy and Climate Programme in 2013 saw a partial scaling back of this target, greatly reducing the planned contribution of wind power. The research showed that the local protests against the ambitious renewables and wind power targets set by the government had a major impact on the reduction of these targets by Saxony’s governing coalition committee. The complimentary factors included “the general sceptical attitude towards wind power in Saxony, spontaneous increase of the renewables targets, and the rapid breakdown of these targets into concrete areas for wind farms” (Lintz & Leibenath, 2020). As a conclusion, we can rightfully argue that political and public acceptance of renewable energies is an important precondition for their large-scale deployment. A further investigation of the issue reveals different factors that impact either positively or negatively on the public perception of renewable energies. After a revision of several academic studies, we categorized the most important factors in five points: perceived economic benefits, perceived environmental benefits, perceived environmental risks, perceived negative impacts on landscape and health, and perceived procedural and distributive fairness of the project. 1. Perceived economic benefits: A comprehensive literature on the subject maintains that large-scale wind and solar power projects have positive impact on job markets via creating new job opportunities for the local communities. Through the employment creation impact, renewable energy projects provide consistent income for the local labor force. Especially in those regions where high unemployment rates persist, this is not a negligible economic opportunity for the local citizens. For instance, a study that was carried out in Ireland analyzed the contribution of renewable energy to socio-economic objectives and showed that “the implementation of RES installations favours the productive diversification in less-developed regions, enhancing their competitiveness level and contributing to the reduction of regional income disparities” (Komor & Bazilian, 2005). Another study reviewed 15 studies in the USA on the job creation potential of renewable energy, energy efficiency, and low-carbon sources and concluded that “all non-fossil fuel technologies create more jobs per unit energy than coal and natural gas” (Wei et al., 2010). The authors argued that “cutting the annual rate of increase in electricity generation in half and targeting 30% renewable energies by 2030 each generates about 2 million job-years through 2030” (Wei et al., 2010). A similar study was carried out in the EU zone. The authors studied the net employment impacts from the transformation of the EU energy sector in the period 1995–2009 when the EU’s energy structure went through a significant shift away

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from the more carbon intensive sources toward gas and renewables. This study estimated “the net employment generated from this structural change was 530,000 jobs which corresponded to 0.24% of total employment in the EU in 2009” (Markandya et al., 2016). The authors concluded that “the countries that most benefited in terms of employment were Poland (124  k-jobs), Germany (95  k-jobs), Hungary (55  k-jobs), Italy (50  k-jobs), Spain (40  k-jobs), Slovakia (36  k-jobs), and the Netherlands (36  k-jobs). In four Eastern European countries, the change in the employment represented more than 0.8% of the total employment in 2009: Slovakia (1.6%), Latvia (1.5%), Hungary (1.4%) and Poland (0.8%). This result owes to the more energy-intensive economic structure of these countries than the average” (Markandya et al., 2016). Through new employment creation impact, renewable energy projects contribute to a desirable increase in employment diversification and mitigate the excessive concentration on declining agricultural or coal-mining activities. Besides employment creation, renewable energy projects also provide payments to local citizens via hiring the land and paying compensation to the local community by the owner of the renewable energy plant. Such economic benefits may “stop the migration of the rural population over socio-economic concerns and may even reverse this trend by encouraging immigration to the local area” (Rio & Burguillo, 2008). There is a widespread agreement in the literature on that “implementation of local renewable energy projects would lead to a substantive local sustainability impact in environmental, economic, and social dimensions of sustainability” (Rio & Burguillo, 2008). However, distribution of the socio-economic benefits might be uneven across different actors, or they might be perceived differently by different stakeholders. For this reason, studies on objective contributions of renewable energy projects to local sustainability should be complimented by an investigation of the local actors’ interests and perceptions because it is usually this latter factor that determines the public acceptance or rejection of the large renewable energy projects. 2. Perceived environmental benefits: Public attitudes toward climate change and climate change concerns positively correlate with renewable energy acceptance. Wind energy’s potential to mitigate climate change is a benefit often cited by supporters. For instance, a study carried out in the UK on 2000 respondents found that public concern about climate change positively influences respondents’ perception of small wind turbines (with a capacity up to 50 kW) in their local area (Tatchley et  al., 2016). The researchers found that the respondents with high levels of climate change concern were eight times more likely to find small wind turbines acceptable compared to those with low levels of concern, while members of environmental organizations were almost three times more likely to find small wind turbines more acceptable than nonmembers. Another study carried out in China’s Gansu Province, which possesses the largest installed capacity for wind power generation in China, revealed a similar result: “Majority of respondents agreed that environmental protection is very important to them (93.2%) and to China (92%). Moreover, 95.3% of respondents cared about global climate change” (Guo et al., 2015). These environmental perceptions reflected

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on the attitudes: “89.1% of respondents agreed that China should develop renewable energy, more than 90% of respondents agreed that wind energy technology is beneficial to the optimization of the Chinese energy mix, environmental protection and economic growth in China (93.2%, 92.7%, and 92%, respectively)” (Guo et al., 2015). A study that was carried out in the Czech Republic on 1026 respondents measured public perceptions on renewable energy by using three indicators: “country level environmental protection, individual level environmental protection, and self-­ reported level of information about the state of the environment in the Czech Republic” (Cábelková et al., 2020). Firstly, the authors found that higher level of dissatisfaction with the Czech Republic’s environmental protection level leads to higher inclination to renewable energies. Secondly, personal active care for environment is positively associated with the belief in renewable energies: the more often the respondents care for environment and save energy and water to help the environment, the more they believe that it is possible to implement energy transition. Finally, the self-claimed knowledge of environmental issues is positively associated with the belief in renewables: the more people believe their knowledge of environmental issues is sufficient, the more they think that it is possible to replace traditional electricity resources with the renewables (Cábelková et al., 2020). A survey carried out in Utah with 1411 respondents assessed how having an ecological worldview and beliefs about various opportunities and threats associated with renewable energy development were related to perceptions of renewable energy. The research revealed that “those who have positive renewable energy attitudes tend to have a stronger ecological worldview, believe renewable energy is clean and green, it produces economic benefits, it is not a danger to wildlife, and does not have negative visual effects” (Larson & Krannich, 2016). As a conclusion, there is adequate evidence in the literature that the belief in, and concern about, climate change and environmental protection is associated with higher levels of public acceptance of renewable energies. 3. Perceived environmental risks: Despite generally favorable public attitudes toward renewable energies, there are also environmental obstacles and risks perceived in the implementation of wind energy. Some people concern over the potential threats of wind energy to wildlife, particularly birds and bats. Indeed, there are studies that estimated “between 140,000 and 328,000 birds are killed annually by collisions with monopole turbines in the contiguous U.S.” (Loss et al., 2013). The research also found that bird collision mortality increased significantly with increasing hub height. While the perceived environmental benefits of the renewable energies lead to higher public acceptance, the perceived environmental risks have a negative impact on public acceptance. Research has shown that “individuals with stronger environmental attitudes may consider the wind energy development as wildlife interference, and thus, may prioritize the conservation of natural landscape over the benefits of renewable energy” (Fergen & Jacquet, 2016). In these cases, residents express a need to “preserve pristine prairie from wind energy development and scepticism

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over economic benefits they perceived to only benefit a few” (Fergen & Jacquet, 2016). The main conclusion of these studies is that residents with pro-­environmental attitudes may oppose renewable energy projects due to their concerns about wildlife. A study was carried out in a US coastal area, Cape Cod, on the public acceptance of a proposed offshore wind project with 130 turbines and about 9.5-km distance from the land. In 2005, the survey revealed that “48% of respondents believed the wind farm would cause harm to bird life and 44% thought it would harm marine life. In a repeat survey in 2009, these percentages decreased to 40% and 34% respectively” (Firestone et al., 2012a, b). Another study focused on the tourists’ and day trippers’ perceptions of wind farms in a sparsely inhabited mountain area, the Austrian Alps. This research found “a strong positive correlation with the perceived benefits and reliability of wind power for higher acceptance levels and a moderately strong negative correlation with environmental concern for the acceptance of wind farms” (Brudermann et al., 2019). 4. Perceived negative impacts on landscape and health: These arguments are mostly put forward against the large-scale wind projects. The big fields of wind energy are usually criticized as creating visual/landscape intrusions, disturbing noises, and health risks for nearby inhabitants. When residents perceive the negative impacts of wind projects to be greater than their rewards, they no longer support the project development in their neighborhood. The explanation for the visual/landscape intrusion is that wind farms typically consist of dozens of towers often exceeding 100 m in height and topped with rotating blades. A comprehensive literature review found that the aesthetic change in the landscape is one of the most obvious impacts of wind energy development (Fergen & Jacquet, 2016). As a result of the construction of massive wind turbines, “the diminution of scenic beauty may contribute to annoyance, and it is often linked to negative attitudes toward existing wind facilities or reduced support of proposed wind projects” (Rand & Hoen, 2017). It is also worth mentioning that “seeing wind turbines does not produce less-positive attitudes but perceiving that wind turbines are unattractive or fit poorly within the landscape does” (Hoen et al., 2019). Another research revealed that “respondents, who stated that turbines are an eyesore, often show conviction in their responses and displeasure at having to see them on the landscape” (Groth & Vogt, 2014). There is an interesting correlation between the perceived visual impact and economic benefit of the wind farms. A study conducted in the USA with 239 respondents revealed that “a strong majority of respondents found the turbines beautiful while in motion compared to not in motion. Persons who most valued the economic benefits of the wind farm project were the most likely to perceive a lack of beauty in motionless turbines” (Fergen & Jacquet, 2016). There is also a correlation between the public acceptance of wind turbines and the aesthetic quality of the landscapes. A photo-based survey was carried out in the Czech Republic on 337 respondents in areas with existing or planned wind turbines. The survey results revealed that “the respondents’ visual preferences were

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significantly influenced by the visual quality of the landscape in which the turbines were located” (Molnarova et al., 2012). In the most attractive landscapes, only 1% of respondents perceived the addition of wind turbines as a significant improvement, whereas 35% perceived it as a significant deterioration. In the least attractive landscapes, the addition of wind turbines was evaluated as a nearly nonsignificant change, while the supporters of wind power see the placement of wind turbines in these landscapes as slightly positive (Molnarova et al., 2012). The opponents of wind energy development are concerned not only about the sight of the wind turbines and solar energy panels but also about the transmission systems that accompany these energy projects. The main explanation for this negative perception is that while traditional electricity sources are invisible in our daily lives, the visible nature of the wind and solar energy transmission facilities has a strong impact on the visual landscapes. When aesthetically valued places and landscapes are affected, particularly in the areas that rely on tourism and outdoor recreation, the residents perceive threats to the visual and environmental qualities of local landscapes (Larson & Krannich, 2016). In terms of sound effects, a national survey with 1705 respondents in the USA found that “the respondents who hear wind turbines are less likely to have positive attitudes toward the turbines, and this effect is more pronounced among respondents who hear the turbine in their home with the windows closed” (Hoen et al., 2019). Other researchers also found that “turbine sound correlates with annoyance as it is associated with sleep disturbance or negative emotions. This annoyance experienced by people living near wind turbines correlates with negative perception of wind energy” (Rand & Hoen, 2017). Indeed, a survey with 221 respondents in the USA found “the concern regarding noise” among the top three most recurring attributes (Groth & Vogt, 2014). The research revealed that “the issue of noise generated by the rotating turbine blades was expressed by both groups of respondents -those who opposed and supported wind development. Respondents acknowledged that noise exists, and this acoustic disturbance could be of concern for some residents” (Groth & Vogt, 2014). The implication of these research findings is that sound of the wind turbines is an important factor for reduced public acceptance of the wind projects; although public in general support wind farms as providers of clean energy, residents consider it as an annoying one. Health effects of wind turbines are related to wind turbine operation (electromagnetic fields, shadow flicker, audible noise, low-frequency noise, and infrasound). A review of studies on the public responses to this noise revealed no evidence for a direct causal link between living in proximity to wind turbines and more serious physiological health effects (Knopper & Ollson, 2011). The evidence has shown that noise from wind turbines is not loud enough to cause hearing impairment and is not causally related to adverse effects, but wind turbine noise, especially at sound levels >40 dB(A), can be a source of annoyance for some people and that annoyance may be associated with certain reported health effects such as sleep disturbance (Knopper et al., 2014).

Energy Policy Formulation: Actors, Attitudes, and Actions

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5. Perceived procedural and distributive fairness: The common argument in this context is that higher perceived procedural and distributive fairness of political decisions and decision-making processes lead to higher public acceptance for the renewable energy projects. Procedural fairness relates to the decision-­making process during project planning, while distributional justice refers to the fair distribution of the costs and benefits of renewable energy developments. The subject has been widely studied in the literature. Regarding the procedural fairness, a study carried out in Germany tested how the perceived fairness of decision-making process affects both the general acceptance and local acceptance of the wind farms. Through surveys on a representative sample of 2009 respondents, the researchers found that “the perceived fairness of the energy transition increases both the sociopolitical acceptance of onshore wind farms and the local acceptance of wind farms” (Sonnberger & Ruddat, 2017). The fairness of the project planning can be so important for the public acceptance of the project that “a planning process perceived as fair can lead to greater toleration of the outcome, even if it does not fully satisfy all stakeholders” (Firestone et al., 2012a, b). In other words, local citizens may accept the projects they perceive as fair, even if they do not get exactly what they wanted. Regarding the distributional justice, the main problem is the unfair distribution of costs and benefits of large renewable energy projects. Researchers found that local citizens concern about that “the economic benefits that are produced from local wind facilities do not stay local and benefit the residents” (Groth & Vogt, 2014). In such situations, rural residents feel exploited by urban, multinational, corporate project developers who are seeking profits. Thus, they feel injustice because of experiencing the development impacts but not the economic opportunities of the projects (Rand & Hoen, 2017). In the same vein, other researchers stressed the inequitable distribution of costs and benefits of the large renewable energy projects. Their argument is that “while environmental and energy benefits of renewable energy projects mainly accrue at the national and international levels, direct impacts of these projects occur at the local level” (Mallon, 2006a). The mechanism that can solve this problem would be to equalize the community risk and cost-benefit distribution. If local communities get their fair share of the benefits of renewable energy developments, then they may consider themselves as beneficiaries of these projects and support these processes. However, there is also a word of caution that it should not be perceived as the ultimate method for increasing public acceptance of projects. Indeed, a recent academic study investigated this question among 811 German citizens (Knauf, 2022). The study tested if increasing the financial benefits for the local community (in the form of direct or indirect payments to local stakeholders) may foster public acceptance of the local renewable energy projects. This empirical study did not confirm that financial benefits can change the preference of the opponents, as only those citizens with weak preferences and project proponents appreciate these benefits. Thus, the research maintained, local governments can use fair distribution of financial benefits to win the support of group of citizens with weak preferences.

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To summarize this brief review of literature, political and public acceptance of renewable energies is widely perceived as an important precondition for their large-­ scale deployment. To test this assumption, we will investigate the political and public support for renewable energies in the European Union, in Germany, and in the Czech Republic through a comparative lens to lay a solid basis for the analysis of policy implementation in energy transition.

Research Hypotheses We synthesized the existing literature on the policy-making, the actors, attitudes, and actions in energy transition process and deducted five key principles from this analysis to enable the energy transition (Fig. 2.1): (i) Target setting for renewables, greenhouse gases, and other sectoral objectives. (ii) Creating or amending legislation with an aim to incorporate the renewables into energy infrastructure. (iii) Creating or adjusting supportive policies to stimulate the development and market penetration of renewable energies. (iv) Maintaining political will and accord for continuous policy implementation (notwithstanding changes in government). (v) Achieving public acceptance of renewable energies via public participation in the process We argue in this research that these are the key factors of an effective energy transition policy to be implemented in any country. Based on these factors, we derived the following hypotheses to test in the following chapters: H1. Policy targets are contextual drivers of change and have a positive effect on the energy transition. H2. State regulations create trust and stability in key actors and have a positive effect on the energy transition. H3. Policies supporting renewables create stimulus and encourage the market actors toward renewable energy investments and have a positive effect on the energy transition. H4. Political will and accord among the political parties have a positive effect on the energy transition. H5. Public acceptance and involvement have a positive effect on the energy transition.

Research Hypotheses

Fig. 2.1  Five key principles to accelerate energy transition

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Methodology This research takes the international and European energy policy rules, norms, objectives, and strategies as the drivers of domestic change. Based on this conviction, we will analyze how the EU’s renewable energy policy norms and objectives functioned as contextual drivers for the emergence of new policy objectives and legislation in the member states. In the literature, several studies seek to explain domestic policy change via the impact of Europeanization. The social constructivist scholars note that European values and policy norms are internalized at the national level, shaping discourses, perceptions, and identities and, thereby, result in a change of national policy norms, objectives, and strategies (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Börzel & Risse, 2003; Tanil, 2012). An influential social constructivist study focuses on three factors when explaining Europeanization of domestic policies: ideas, political elite, and policy output (Marcussen, 2000). The ideas are entwined with people’s identity and are embedded in culture. In this way, they define the universe of possibilities for action. However, the challenges of the contemporary world may prove the old policy norms and strategies obsolete, as they are inadequate to address these challenges. This realization leads to a search for new ideas to cope with the new situation. Political elites have an important role in this process because they select and institutionalize the ideas as the basis of policy norms and objectives. Once political elites are convinced that the new ideas match their political culture and interests, they institutionalize new policy norms, objectives, and strategies. Finally, these policy norms and objectives reflect on the actual policy output, as new, or amended, pieces of legislation appear. This mechanism functions both at the European level (within the EU institutions) and at the member-state level. Both contexts can define and determine each other. This social constructivist approach shapes our analysis throughout this book. As our main concern is energy transition, we analyze this mechanism within the renewable energy policy framework. A further explanation of these social constructivist concepts may clarify the perspectives of this book. Firstly, what do we mean by effective norm setting? Target setting, or norm setting, is crucial both at the EU level and at the national level because norms and targets are primary means of expressing commitment to a goal, i.e., energy transition, and they send a positive signal to the industries, businesses, and the citizens to follow suit. Such targets may include banning or phasing out fossil fuels, targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or zero emission commitments, and sectoral targets to achieve certain share of renewable energies. The policy targets on their own are generally insufficient to stimulate investment in renewable energies. They can only be converted into action through the adoption and implementation of complementary regulations. EU policy norms and targets define and determine the EU legislation which will have a substantial impact on the member states. The EU policy norms and targets also impact on the member-state policy norms and targets via norm internalization, or, in other words, ideational socialization.

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Secondly, what do we mean by effective policy outputs? Strengthening the EU legislation on energy and environment is crucial to make sure that national renewable energy policies are harmonized. In this context, majority of the policy-makers would accept that energy transition by regulation is more effective to achieve desired policy targets, rather than leaving it to the market forces. An effective policy framework is crucial to the renewable energy deployment because these regulations provide long-term certainty to industries, businesses, and the citizens to invest in renewable energies and to avoid undertaking new investments in fossil fuels. An effective policy framework must also include financial incentives, i.e., subsidies, tax incentives, and loan programs, to stimulate the renewable energies in the market. Finally, what do we mean by effective policy implementation? The policy outcomes in terms of renewable energies can be observed within the installed capacity increase rate of renewable energies in the EU member states. An effective policy implementation can be tested by analyzing how far the member states realized their 2020 renewable energy targets. To summarize, this book analyzes five areas of energy policy: development of energy policy norms at the EU level; development of energy policy legislation at the EU level; domestic change in energy policy norms in member states; domestic change in energy policy legislation in member states; and, finally, policy implementation in member states.

References Barnea, G., Hagemann, C., & Wurster, S. (2022). Policy instruments matter: Support schemes for renewable energy capacity in worldwide comparison. Energy Policy, 168. Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2003). Conceptualizing the domestic impact of Europe. In K. Featherstone & C. M. Radaelli (Eds.), The politics of Europeanization. Oxford University Press. Brudermann, T., Zaman, R., & Posch, A. (2019). Not in my hiking trail? Acceptance of wind farms in the Austrian Alps. Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy, 21, 1603–1616. Cábelková, I., Strielkowski, W., Firsova, I., & Korovushkina, M. (2020). Public acceptance of renewable energy sources: A case study from the Czech Republic. Energies, 13, 1742. Ellis, G., & Ferraro, G. (2016). The social acceptance of wind energy. European Atomic Energy Community. Fell, H.-J. (2012). Global cooling: Strategies for climate protection. CRC Press/Taylor & Francis Group. Fergen, J., & Jacquet, J. B. (2016). Beauty in motion: Expectations, attitudes, and values of wind energy development in the rural U.S. Energy Research & Social Science, 11, 133–141. Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization, 52, 887–917. Firestone, J., Kempton, W., Blaydes Lilley, M., & Samoteskul, K. (2012a). Public acceptance of offshore wind power across regions and through time. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 55(10), 1369–1386. Firestone, J., Kempton, W., Lilley, M. B., & Samoteskul, K. (2012b). Public acceptance of offshore wind power: Does perceived fairness of process matter? Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 55(10), 1387–1402. García-Alvarez, M., Cabeza-García, L., & Soares, I. (2017). Analysis of the promotion of onshore wind energy in the EU: Feed-in tariff or renewable portfolio standard? Renewable Energy, 111, 256–264.

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Groth, T. M., & Vogt, C. (2014). Residents’ perceptions of wind turbines: An analysis of two townships in Michigan. Energy Policy, 65, 251–260. Guo, Y., Ru, P., Su, J., & Anadon, L. D. (2015). Not in my backyard, but not far away from me: Local acceptance of wind power in China. Energy, 82, 722–733. Haas, R., Panzer, C., Resch, G., Ragwitz, M., Reece, G., & Held, A. (2011). A historical review of promotion strategies for electricity from renewable energy sources in EU countries. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 15, 1003–1034. Hoen, B., Firestone, J., Randa, J., Elliot, D., Hübnerd, G., & Pohld, J. (2019). Attitudes of U.S. wind turbine neighbors: Analysis of a nationwide survey. Energy Policy, 134. IEA. (2021). Net zero by 2050: A roadmap for the global energy sector. IEA. Knauf, J. (2022). Can’t buy me acceptance? Financial benefits for wind energy projects in Germany. Energy Policy, 165. Knopper, L. D., & Ollson, C. A. (2011). Health effects and wind turbines: A review of the literature. Environmental Health, 10(78). Knopper, L. D., et al. (2014). Wind turbines and human health. Frontiers in Public Health, 2. Komor, P., & Bazilian, M. (2005). Renewable energy policy goals, programs and technologies. Energy Policy, 33(14), 1873–1881. Larson, E. C. & Krannich, R. S., 2016. “A great idea, just not near me!” Understanding public attitudes about renewable energy facilities. Society & Natural Resources, 29(12), pp. 1436–1451. Lintz, G., & Leibenath, M. (2020). The politics of energy landscapes: The influence of local anti-­ wind initiatives on state policies in Saxony, Germany. Energy, Sustainability and Society, 10(5). Loss, S. R., Will, T., & Marra, P. P. (2013). Estimates of bird collision mortality at wind facilities in the contiguous United States. Biological Conservation, 168, 201–209. Mallon, K. (2006a). Ten features of successful renewable markets. In K. Mallon (Ed.), Renewable energy policy and politics (pp. 35–84). Earthscan. Mallon, K. (2006b). The politics of achieving legislation. In K. Mallon (Ed.), Renewable energy policy and politics (pp. 121–162). Earthscan. Marcussen, M. (2000). Ideas and elites: The social construction of Economic and Monetary Union. Aalborg University Press. Markandya, A., Arto, I., González-Eguino, M., & Román, M. V. (2016). Towards a green energy economy? Tracking the employment effects of low-carbon technologies in the European Union. Applied Energy, 179, 1342–1350. Marques, A. C., Fuinhas, J. A., & Pereira, D. S. (2019). The dynamics of the short and long-run effects of public policies supporting renewable energy: A comparative study of installed capacity and electricity generation. Econ. Anal. Pol., 63, 188–206. Moe, E. (2017). Does politics matter? Explaining swings in wind power installations. AIMS Energy, 5(3), 341–373. Molnarova, K., et al. (2012). Visual preferences for wind turbines: Location, numbers and respondent characteristics. Applied Energy, 92, 269–278. Rand, J., & Hoen, B. (2017). Thirty years of North American wind energy acceptance research: What have we learned? Energy Research & Social Science, 29, 135–148. Rio, P., & Burguillo, M. (2008). Assessing the impact of renewable energy deployment on local sustainability: Towards a theoretical framework. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 12, 1325–1344. Sonnberger, M., & Ruddat, M. (2017). Local and socio-political acceptance of wind farms in Germany. Technology in Society, 51, 56–65. Sung, B., & Park, S.-D. (2018). Who drives the transition to a renewable-energy economy? Multi-­ actor perspective on social innovation. Sustainability, 10, 448. Tanil, G. (2012). Europeanization, integration and identity. Routledge. Tatchley, C., Paton, H., Robertson, E., & Minderman, J. (2016). Drivers of public attitudes towards small wind turbines in the UK. PLoS ONE, 11(3), e0152033.

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Wei, M., Patadia, S., & Kammena, D.  M. (2010). Putting renewables and energy efficiency to work: How many jobs can the clean energy industry generate in the US? Energy Policy, 38, 919–931. Wüstenhagen, R., Wolsink, M., & Bürer, M.  J. (2007). Social acceptance of renewable energy innovation: An introduction to the concept. Energy Policy, 35, 2683–2691. Zhao, Y., Tang, K. K., & Wang, L. L. (2013). Do renewable electricity policies promote renewable electricity generation? Evidence from panel data. Energy Policy, 62, 887–897.

Chapter 3

Policy Formulation in European Union

Development of the EU Environmental Policy The European Union has developed its environmental policy since the 1970s. The Stockholm Conference in 1972 was the first major UN conference focusing on international environmental issues, and it prompted the emergence of an EU environmental policy. Since then, the EU’s Environment Action Programmes have developed by setting out the principles and priorities of the environmental policy. The First Environment Action Programme,1 which covered the period 1973–1976, was a reaction to increasingly perceptible ecological damage. The program defined the aim of EU’s environment policy as “to improve the setting and quality of life, the surroundings, and living conditions of the peoples of the Community” (Title 1). One of the primary aspects of the program was the harmonization of activities and standards across the EU in order to create coherence between the EU policy and the Member State policies: “Major aspects of environmental policy in individual countries must no longer be planned and implemented in isolation. National programmes in these fields should be coordinated and national policies should be harmonised within the Community” (Title 2). With this aim, the program delineated the principles of EU environmental policy as: Pollution shall be prevented at source; a project’s environmental impacts shall be assessed during the decision-making process; natural resources shall be used rationally; the cost of preventing and eliminating nuisances must be borne by the polluter; awareness-raising activities about the environmental problems must be promoted among all categories of the population; and the citizens shall be educated to understand their own responsibility towards the environment. (Title 2 and 3)

 Official Journal of the European Communities (1973) Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 22 November 1973 on the program of action of the European Communities on the environment, Official Journal 16/C112. 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Tanil, Sustainable Energy Development, Environment & Policy 63, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28065-8_3

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In the following years, we have seen these principles turn into environmental legislation such as polluter pays, environmental impact assessment, and the right to information. The Second Environment Action Programme,2 which covered the period 1977–1981, was the continuation of the first program. We can list its important principles as “introduction of standards and measures relating to polluting substances (Title 2 and 3); preventive action, i.e. environmental impact assessment (Title 4, Chapter 1); the polluter pays principle (Title 4, Chapter 2); provision of scientific, technical and economic information through a coordinated body of information services (Title 4, Chapter 3); increased support for scientific and technical research projects (Title 4, Chapter 4); promotion of awareness-raising and education activities about environmental problems (Title 4, Chapter 5); common solutions to environment problems with states outside the Community (Title 5).” In this period, we have seen preparation of the first pieces of legislative framework with an aim to reduce and eliminate pollution and nuisances, and to preserve the natural environment. This program provided a frame of reference for various sectors related with environment. In the 1980s, we observe growing attention to environmental issues and a more active participation of the EC in environment-related discussions. At a time when the economic situation of both the Community and the Member States worsened, a major question became whether or not the environmental policy should be modified. However, in order to protect the natural resources from depletion, the policy-­ makers should disregard the economic fluctuations. The Third Environment Action Programme3 (1982–1986) was adopted in such a political climate. The program explicitly referred to this understanding: “Deteriorating economic situation must not be used as an excuse for weakening the environmental policy” (Annex, Introduction). The policy-makers delineated the EU’s tasks for 1982–1986 period based on the same policy objectives and priorities as before. The focus was on the preventive approach. They planned to implement preventive approach by integrating environmental requirements into the planning and execution of actions in many economic and social sectors; and they stressed the environmental impact assessment as a crucial tool.4 However, the problems of environmental degradation were continuing and even growing. This situation convinced the European Commission that a step further

 Official Journal of the European Communities (1977) Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 17 May 1977 on the continuation and implementation of a European Community policy and action program on the environment, OJ 20/C139. 3  Official Journal of the European Communities (1983) Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 7 February 1983 on the continuation and implementation of a European Community policy and action program on the environment, OJ C46. 4  Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (Council Directive 85/337/EEC) was adopted on 27 June 1985. 2

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must be taken. The establishment of strict standards for environmental protection was no longer merely an option; now it became essential. So, the Fourth Environment Action Programme5 (1987–1992) was designed with a focus on the Member States’ formal legal compliance to and effective implementation of Community environmental legislation (Article 2.2.1). To achieve this goal, the EU policy-makers delineated different policy mechanisms: for instance, they designed Community environment inspectors to work with national officials to ensure effective implementation of the Community law. Also, they encouraged individuals, NGOs, and local authorities to bring instances of noncompliance or inadequate compliance cases to the attention of the Commission (Article 2.2.7). Community’s environmental policy would be publicized to raise public awareness. Therefore, the fourth EAP prioritized the complete and effective implementation of Community environment acts by all Member States (Article 2.2.8). Another important policy priority in the fourth EAP was to integrate the environmental policy into other community policies. The EU policy-makers declared that environmental policy shall be an essential component of all economic, industrial, agricultural, and social policies implemented by the Community and its Member States (Article 2.3.1). The program also provided an analysis of the impacts of strategic economic sectors on the environment (agriculture, industry, transport, energy, tourism, competition policy, regional policy, internal market, social policy, consumer protection, and development cooperation) (Article 2.3). The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) met in Rio de Janeiro between 3 and 14 June 1992, and it adopted the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. These two very important documents focused on the sustainable patterns of development worldwide. Parallel to these developments, the EU’s Fifth Action Programme6 (1993–2000) appeared with the title “Towards Sustainability.” For the EU policy-makers, the word sustainable reflected “a policy and strategy for continued economic and social development without detriment to the environment and natural resources” (Executive Summary, Article 5). The program addressed several environmental issues: climate change, acidification and air pollution, depletion of natural resources and biodiversity, depletion and pollution of water resources, deterioration of the urban environment, deterioration of coastal zones, and waste (Chapter 1). From the perspective of the EU policy-makers, these issues arose because of “mismanagement and abuse,” and the real problem was the “current patterns of human consumption and behaviour” which needs to be changed (Executive Summary, Article 17). Five target sectors were selected for special attention: industry, energy, transport, agriculture, and tourism. The justification of this  Official Journal of the European Communities (1987) Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 19 October 1987 on the continuation and implementation of a European Community policy and action program on the environment, OJ C328. 6  Official Journal of the European Communities (1993) Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 1 February 1993 on a community program of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development, OJ C138. 5

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selection was “these sectors’ significant impact on the environment and their crucial role in sustainable development” (Executive Summary, Article 18). Different from the previous programs, in the fifth EAP, the EU policy-makers did not rely solely on legislative measures, but, instead, recognized the need for a broader mix of policy instruments. They defined these instruments under four categories: legislative instruments (community-wide rules and standards); market-based instruments (avoidance of pollution and waste by internalizing external environmental costs); supporting instruments (scientific research and technological development, sectoral and spatial planning, public information, education, and training); and financial support mechanisms (LIFE, structural funds, and cohesion fund). Another change in this program was that the EU policy-makers prioritized two important principles: shared responsibility and subsidiarity. The former concept refers to responsibility sharing between public administration, public/private corporations, and the citizens, while the latter refers to decision-taking as closely as possible to the citizens. The strategy here was to achieve full integration of environmental policy to all sectors and all levels via an active participation of all actors in the society. This new approach was expected to bring the essential behavioral change. The Sixth Environment Action Programme7 appeared under the headline “Our Future, Our Choice,” and it was adopted for a period of 10 years (2002–2012). It prioritized two policy goals: the first one was environmental protection by considering the diversity of situations in various regions of the community and by using the principle of subsidiarity, and the second one was decoupling between environmental pressures and the economic growth. It delineated necessary policy mechanisms to attain these goals: ‘‘polluter-pays principle, precautionary principle, preventive action, and principle of rectification of pollution at source” (Article 2.1). The sixth EAP defined four thematic strategies: climate change, nature and biodiversity, environment and health and quality of life, and sustainable management of natural resources and waste (Articles 5–8). It recapped the previous strategic actions such as the development of new community legislation, effective implementation and enforcement of existing community legislation, integration of environmental concerns into other community policies, and the promotion of sustainable production and consumption patterns via market-based and economic instruments (Article 3). A major innovation of this program was that it introduced a cooperative approach to the environmental governance by embracing joint problem definition and policy formulation with the participation of experts from all member states and stakeholders. As opposed to a traditional top-down approach, this cooperative process was expected to ensure the commitment of all member states and stakeholders to the implementation of environmental policy.

 Official Journal of the European Communities (2002) Decision No 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2002 laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, OJ L242. 7

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The Seventh Environment Action Programme8 (2013–2020) appeared with the title “Living well, within the limits of our planet.” It introduced a vision for 2050 based on a healthy environment stemming from an innovative and circular economy where nothing is wasted and where natural resources are managed sustainably, a well-protected biodiversity, a low-carbon growth, and a safe and sustainable global society (Annex, Article 1). It announced its three policy priorities as protecting, conserving, and enhancing the Union’s natural capital; turning the Union into a resource-efficient, green, and competitive low-carbon economy; and safeguarding the Union’s citizens from environment-related pressures and risks to health and well-being (Article 2.1). Since these policy objectives were interrelated, they should be pursued in parallel. The policy mechanisms were similar as before: precautionary principle, preventive action, rectification of pollution at source, and polluter-­ pays principle (Article 2.2). A major innovation of the Seventh EAP was the creation of conditions to transform the EU into a resource-efficient and low-carbon economy. The conditions to accomplish this transformation are established through the EU’s climate and energy objectives for 20209. The EU policy-makers recognized that the market mechanisms are not adequate to yield these results, so they suggested a strong government action both at the EU level and national level. The government policies must aim to create right conditions for the renewable energy investments, development of sustainable businesses and technological solutions (eco-innovations), and a sustainable resource use (Annex, Article 30). To summarize this overview of Environmental Action Programmes, since the very beginning of the environmental awareness in the 1970s, the EU policy-makers’ major concern has been our growing consumption and production patterns that burden the environment. With this concern, they formulated these strategic action plans as a common European approach. The successive EAPs led to the development and consolidation of a European environmental legislation, which now covers almost all areas of environment.

 Official Journal of the European Communities (2013) Decision No 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020, OJ L354. 9  “The Union committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% by 2020, ensuring that 20% of energy consumption is derived from renewable sources by 2020, and attaining a 20% reduction in primary energy use by improving energy efficiency. Each member state shall contribute to these goals through national targets.” (Presidency Conclusions, European Council of 8 and 9 March 2007). 8

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Development of the EU Renewable Energy Policy EU policy-makers consistently express their ambitions through various press releases, aiming to position the EU as a global leader in renewable energy development, climate change mitigation, transition to a low-carbon economy (with carbon neutrality targeted for 2050), and high economic growth. One of President Juncker’s most notable statements regarding the European Commission’s priorities was the aspiration to “make the EU the world’s number one in renewables.”10 Achievement of these goals rests upon the EU’s capacity to establish a robust legal policy framework and ensure national adherence to it.

Policy Norms and Objectives The EU’s efforts to establish new policy norms for the renewable energy sources (RES) started in 1997 with the White Paper titled “Energy For The Future: Renewable Sources of Energy”.11 In this White Paper, the Commission put forward its energy policy objectives and policy instruments for the first time. The EU policy-­makers identified the key policy objectives as improved competitiveness, security of energy supply, and protection of environment. To achieve these goals, the key mechanism was to promote the development of renewable energy sources. Therefore, the EU policy-makers set an indicative target of 12% for the contribution by RES to the EU’s gross inland energy consumption by 2010. In this context, each Member State should define its own strategy and propose its own contribution to the overall 2010 objective. Their expectation was that it would not only create environmental benefits but would also reduce dependency on energy imports, increase security of energy supply, create new jobs, and increase the regional development. With this White Paper, the first instance of target setting with a view to energy transition appeared in the EU, and it opened the way to more sophisticated policy goals and strategies. The Commission’s Green Paper “Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply”12 revealed the EU’s structural weakness regarding the energy supply: Europe’s growing dependence on oil. The EU’s main goal was to ensure its security of energy supply and sustainable development, and this could be achieved via development of the RES.13 Thus, the EU policy-makers presented the development of the RES as a European policy priority. These first steps toward achieving a clean and sustainable energy policy continued with an ambitious “EU Sustainable Development Strategy”14 in 2006. The patterns of  European Commission (2016) 767, p. 2.  European Commission, 26.11.1997, COM(97)599 final. 12  European Commission, 29.11.2000, COM(2000) 769 final. 13  ibid., p. 47. 14  Council of the European Union, 26.06.2006, 10917/06. 10 11

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climate change and energy use in the EU zone were still unsustainable at the time; so, the European leaders recognized the need for a single and coherent EU strategy on sustainable development. Their policy objective involved promoting greater clean energy usage across the EU and increasing the percentage of renewable energy in total energy consumption to 12% by 2010, in electricity consumption to 21% by 2010, and in transportation to 5.75% by 2010. The future projection was that by 2015, the share of RES in overall energy consumption would be raised to 15%.15 The Commission Communication of 10 January 2007 entitled “Renewable Energy Roadmap -Renewable Energies in the 21st century: Building a More Sustainable Future”16 set out a long-term vision for the development of RES in the EU. This time, the EU policy-makers suggested new, and higher, RES targets for 2020, i.e., a binding 20% share of RES in the EU’s gross energy consumption and a 10% share of biofuels in the transport sector. Each member state would design its own targets based on their potential and priorities in the electricity sector, heating and cooling, and the transport sector, and notify their policy targets and strategies to the Commission via national action plans. The EU leaders, in the European Council of March 2007,17 reaffirmed the leading role of the EU in international climate protection and stressed that an international collective action is necessary to develop an effective response to climate change. They set out three objectives for the Union: security of energy supply, competitiveness of European economies, and affordable energy and environmental sustainability. To achieve these objectives, they adopted a comprehensive “Energy Action Plan”18 for the period 2007–2009. The Action Plan reaffirmed a binding target of a 20% share of RES in overall EU energy consumption by 2020, and a 10% binding target for the share of biofuels in overall EU transport sector by 2020; and left it to member states to decide on their national targets based on their different national starting points and potentials. 2008 was the year of a global economic crisis that had no precedent in our generation. European economy was severely affected: the overall GDP fell by 4% in 2009, industrial production dropped back to the levels of the 1990s, and 10% of the active population lost their jobs.19 In 2010, the immediate challenge for the EU policy-makers was to move the Union out of the crisis. To achieve this, Barroso Commission published “Europe 2020”.20 This strategy paper was designed to help the EU come out stronger from the crisis and become a smart, sustainable, and inclusive economy that is able to provide high levels of employment, productivity, and social cohesion. To achieve sustainable growth, the EU policy-makers focused on a more resource-efficient, greener, and competitive economy. This idea was the

 ibid. p. 7–8.  European Commission, 10.1.2007, COM(2006) 848 Final. 17  Presidency Conclusions of the European Council, 2.5.2007, 7224/1/07. 18  ibid., Annex I, p. 21. 19  European Commission, 3.3.2010, COM (2010) 2020, p. 5. 20  ibid. 15 16

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cornerstone of the environmental initiative “Resource Efficient Europe.” This initiative was designed by the EU policy-makers to create a resource-efficient and a low-­ carbon economy, a decoupled economic growth from resource and energy use, reduced CO2 emissions, increased use of RES, and a greater energy security. In the same policy vision, “Energy Roadmap 2050”21 reaffirmed the major prerequisites for a more sustainable and secure energy system: a higher share of RES and a shift in our energy consumption patterns. The EU policy-makers projected that by 2050, renewables will move to the center of the European energy mix. Therefore, both the EU and national governments need to develop more efficient incentives and use the full potential of the existing legislation. This would enable the energy transition to start immediately and provide necessary signals to the market to minimize the investments in carbon-intensive energies. The Commission’s Green Paper “2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies”22 invited all stakeholders to contribute to the policy-making on new climate and energy targets for 2030. Among the stakeholders, there was a broad consensus on setting a new and reduced target for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Based on this consultation, the Commission published “A Policy Framework for Climate and Energy in the Period From 2020 to 2030,”23 and proposed that the EU’s 2030 target for the share of RES should be at least 27%. This target will be binding at the EU level and will be fulfilled through member states’ contributions. Again, member states were free to set their own national targets (which can be even more ambitious) in accordance with their specific circumstances and capacities. The EU leaders meeting in the European Council in 2014 endorsed this policy proposal. They reaffirmed the new binding EU target of at least 27% share of RES in its energy mix in 2030.24 This cooperative approach to energy policy design in the EU and the involvement of all stakeholders to the EU-level target setting reaffirmed that the RES came to be recognized as the drivers of energy transition. In all policy circles, it was recognized that a sustainable economic growth, job creation in emerging sectors, air pollution reduction, and a more competitive, secure, and sustainable energy system would not be possible without achieving significantly higher shares of RES. The Juncker Commission declared that establishment of an Energy Union was one of their ten policy priorities. Thus, the first proposal to create an Energy Union was given by the then Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in April 2014. Tusk’s proposal firstly put stress on the continuing exploitation of domestic fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) and the excessive reliance on Russia as an energy provider.25 Another issue he underlined was that although there were certain rules set at the

 European Commission, 15.12.2011, COM(2011) 885 final.  European Commission, 27.3.2013, COM(2013) 169 final. 23  European Commission, 22.1.2014, COM(2014) 15 final. 24  European Council, “Conclusions on 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework,” 23.10.2014, SN 79/14. 25  European Commission, 25.2.2015, COM(2015) 80 final, p. 2. 21 22

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European level, in practice there were 28 national regulatory frameworks, and this situation was jeopardizing the energy transition in Europe. Finally, he argued, for the EU to become the world leader in renewable energy, its energy markets and grids should be fit for the renewables. Based on these considerations, his proposal suggested that the best approach would be to design an integrated EU energy market. In the following 10 months, the European Commission developed this proposal and broadened its rationale and objectives. The Commission’s Energy Union Package26 was published in February 2015 under the title of “Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a forward-­ looking climate change policy.” The Energy Union package was comprised of five closely related and mutually reinforcing dimensions: energy security, a fully integrated internal energy market, energy efficiency, a decarbonized economy, and research, innovation, and competitiveness. Its main goal was to achieve the EU’s climate goals and sustainable economic development via creating an integrated European energy market, making the EU’s energy sector more climate-friendly, and decreasing EU’s dependence on external energy suppliers. Fifteen initiatives27 were developed in a clear timetable for adequate policy implementation. The package also endorsed the EU’s 2030 target for renewables. When designing the Energy Union, the EU’s policy-makers recognized that making the heating and cooling sector more efficient and sustainable was their biggest challenge. The problem was specifically that “the heating and cooling sector was the EU’s biggest energy sector constituting 50% of final energy consumption and the fossil fuels accounted for 75% of the sector’s primary energy supply”.28 Based on these considerations, the European Commission published “An EU Strategy on Heating and Cooling”29 in February 2016. The primary goal of this strategy was to integrate more renewable energy into the EU’s heating and cooling sector. This policy goal would be achieved through several strategies such as “promoting the replacement of obsolete fossil fuel boilers with efficient renewable heating, increasing the deployment of renewable energy in district heating and CHP, and supporting local authorities’ strategies for integrating more renewables in the ­heating and cooling sector”.30 These policy strategies would be financed via “Smart Finance for Smart Buildings” initiative. In November 2016, European Commission released a new energy package titled “Clean Energy for All Europeans”31 with an aim to speed up the energy transition, economic growth, and job creation in the EU. The new energy package, also called as the “winter package,” pursued three key priorities: “putting energy efficiency first, achieving EU’s global leadership in renewables, and providing a fair deal for

 ibid.  ibid. p. 19–21. 28  ibid., p. 3. 29  European Commission, 16.2.2016, COM(2016) 51 final. 30  ibid., p. 11. 31  European Commission, 30.11.2016, COM(2016) 860 final. 26 27

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consumers.” The EU policy-makers declared that by “mobilising up to an additional 177 billion Euro of public and private investment per year from 2021, the Clean Energy package will enable to generate up to 1% increase in GDP over the next decade, create 900.000 new jobs, and reduce the carbon intensity of the EU’s economy by 43% in 2030 than now”.32 The role of RES in this process was beyond question because they could “support the EU towards a smarter and cleaner energy, fuel economic growth, spur investment and technological leadership, create new employment opportunities, and enhance citizen’s welfare”.33 The Clean Energy package also included legislative proposals for the energy efficiency, renewable energy, design of the electricity market, security of energy supply, and governance rules for the Energy Union. These proposals turned into four directives and four regulations after a trialogue between the European Commission, Council, and Parliament. With the publication of these final texts in the Official Journal in June 2019, the new EU targets for 2030 were updated as 40% cut in GHG emissions compared to 1990 levels, 32% for RES in the EU’s energy mix, and 32.5% energy efficiency target (relative to a baseline scenario established in 2007). In 2019, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the “European Green Deal”.34 Making the EU the first climate-neutral continent by 2050 was at the heart of the Green Deal. To meet this policy goal, the EU policy-­ makers recognized that they have to lead the EU away from coal, oil, and gas and completely restructure the energy patterns of the industry, agriculture, transport, and households based on a circular economy principle. The EU leaders also endorsed the objective of a climate-neutral EU by 2050 and stressed the need for an enabling policy framework to ensure a cost-effective, just, and fair transition.35 They reaffirmed that all relevant EU legislation and policy frameworks should be consistent with the fulfilment of this climate-neutrality objective and contribute to it. Instead of a top-down approach, this new policy embraced a participatory process bringing citizens, cities, and regions together in the fight against climate change and for environmental protection. In line with the European Green Deal’s objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050  in an effective and fair manner, the Commission proposed a “Just Transition Mechanism.”36 This Mechanism focuses on the coal-intensive regions in the EU with an aim to leave no one behind. It consists of three pillars: a Just Transition Fund that provides grants, a scheme for private investments under InvestEU, and a public sector loan facility with the EIB Group to mobilize additional investments to the regions concerned. The focus of the “Just Transition Fund” is on the economic diversification of the territories most affected by the climate transition and the reskilling and active inclusion of their

 ibid., p. 2.  ibid., p. 4. 34  European Commission, 11.12.2019, COM(2019) 640 final. 35  European Council, 12.12.2019, EUCO 29/19. 36  European Commission, 14.1.2020, COM(2020) 22 final. 32 33

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workers and jobseekers. In this context, the Commission provides financial support, transition plans, attractive conditions, and technical assistance to these regions. The Commission also sets up a “Just Transition Platform” to enable exchanges of experiences and best practices across the coal regions in transition. This platform ensures a multi-level participation (regions, national governments, local communities and businesses, trade unions, NGOs, and academia) and a multi-sectoral scope (energy, climate, environment, social, regional, and economic policy). Its primary goal is to promote exchange of knowledge and experience among all stakeholders in the EU’s coal regions, and to support the development of effective transition strategies and projects for structural diversification and technology transition. Conclusions The EU’s executive portfolio in renewable energy policy, i.e., norms and strategies, functioned as a contextual driver for the emergence of the EU’s environmental legislation. We embrace a social constructivist approach here and hold that policy norms, in effect, shape the legislation. To put it differently, the EU’s environmental policy content was shaped around its environmental policy norms and strategies which have developed over almost 50 years. The next section provides an analysis of the EU Directives and Regulations on renewable energy. These directives and regulations consist of more than 1000 pages of detailed legal text, making a complete legislative analysis time-consuming and complex for readers. Therefore, this study will provide a summary of the key aspects of this lengthy and intricate legislative framework, specifically focusing on their connection to the policy norms and strategies discussed in this context. This broad approach which connects the executive and legislative portfolios will surely help the readers grasp the essence of the EU energy law relatively easily without spending hours of reviewing long legal texts.

Policy Legislation As noted previously, the First Environment Action Programme (1973) set out the first policy principles for the protection of environment at the community level. However, it was not until the Single European Act (1987) that these principles were incorporated into the European law (Article 130r).37 The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) also incorporated the environmental policy priorities into legislation in its section on environment (Article 174). The precautionary principle, preventive action, and polluter-pays principle were all integrated into the community legislation through this article.38 The principle of sustainable development was also incorporated into the legal text of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as one of the main objectives of the Union. In the TEU, sustainable development and a high level of 37 38

 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, OJ L 169, 29.6.1987.  Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ C 224, 31.08.1992.

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environmental protection were mentioned in Article 3 which ruled that “the Union shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment.”39 The legal basis of the EU’s environmental law was set by Articles 191–193 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)40 that confirmed and specified the EU’s competencies in environment. Article 191(1) TFEU enacted that Community policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following objectives: “preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, protecting human health, rational utilisation of natural resources, promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems.” Article 191(2) TFEU enacted that “Community’s environment policy shall aim at a high level of environmental protection. It shall be based on the precautionary principle, preventive action, and the polluter-pays principle.” Article 191(3) TFEU enacted that when preparing its environmental policy, the Community shall take account of “available scientific and technical data, environmental conditions in various regions of the Community, potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action, economic and social development of the Community as a whole and the balanced development of its regions.” Finally, Article 194(1) TFEU enacted the Union’s energy policy goals as “ensuring security of energy supply, promoting energy efficiency and energy saving, and development of new and renewable forms of energy.” All these articles established the legal basis of the EU’s competencies in adopting environmental and energy policies for the whole Community. When we analyzed the White Paper on RES41 and Green Paper on Security of Energy Supply,42 we noticed that the promotion of renewable electricity was a major policy goal. Directive 2001/77/EC43 transposed this policy goal into legislation. This Directive aimed to increase the share of renewable electricity production in the EU internal electricity market and to create a basis for a future Community framework (Article 1). It required the member states to take appropriate steps to encourage greater consumption of renewable electricity in conformity with their national indicative targets (Article 3.1). It also required the member states to adopt national indicative targets and measures for renewable electricity for the next 10 years and present them to the Commission not later than 27 October 2002 and every 5 years thereafter (Article 3.2). Regarding the existing national legislative and regulatory frameworks, the Directive enacted that the regulatory and nonregulatory barriers that may hinder the increase of renewable electricity should be reduced, and the  Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ 115, 09.05.2008.  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C326, 26.10.2012. 41  European Commission, 26.11.1997, COM(97) 599 final. 42  European Commission, 29.11.2000, COM(2000) 769 final. 43  Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from RES in the internal electricity market, OJ L 283/33. 39 40

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rules for various RES technologies should be objective, transparent, and nondiscriminatory (Article 6.1). Although this Directive is no longer in force, we briefly outlined it here to show how the policy objectives on renewable electricity were transposed into the Community legislation. In line with the policy targets set up by the Renewable Energy Roadmap,44 the Renewable Energy Sources Directive (Directive 2009/28/EC)45 was enacted. The so-called RES Directive was established with an aim to introduce a common framework for the promotion of RES and to set mandatory national targets for RES (Article 1). To achieve these goals, the Directive required the member states to establish their national action plans with their national RES targets in electricity, heating and cooling, and transport sectors for 2020 (Article 4.1). It also required the member states to submit a progress report to the Commission every 2 years (Article 22). Upon analyzing these reports, the Commission was authorized to propose corrective action (Article 26). The RES Directive is important to show the consistency of the EU’s executive and legislative portfolio. In fact, it played an important role by turning the indicative policy goals into mandatory targets. The change of status of the renewable energy policy targets from strategy into legislation has a considerable role in eliminating member states’ hesitations in adopting the EU energy policy targets. Annex I of the Directive provided different national targets based on the member states’ different starting points and potentials. For instance, the highest targets were set for Sweden (49%), Latvia (40%), Finland (38%), Austria (34%), and Denmark (30%), while the lowest targets were set for Belgium, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Cyprus (13%), Luxembourg (11%), and Malta (10%). The development and expansion of the renewable energies only make sense if they are provided favorable transmission and distribution conditions. With an aim to guarantee, and even prioritize, transmission and distribution of electricity from RES, the Directive required the member states to ensure that the transmission system operators and the distribution system operators shall “guarantee the transmission and distribution of renewable electricity, provide either priority access or guaranteed access to the grid-system for the renewable electricity, and give priority to generating installations using RES when dispatching electricity generating installations” (Article 16.2). In those days, there was an extensive international debate over the sustainability of the production of energy crops and the use of agricultural and forested land for bioenergy generation. Both the policy-makers and the public were discussing whether growing crops for biofuel, or the maizification of the farmland, was an ecologically sound practice. The EU policy-makers offered a solution to this problem. To target public concerns, they introduced the “sustainability criteria” for biofuels and bioliquids produced from agricultural, aquaculture, fisheries, and forestry  European Commission, 10.1.2007, COM(2006) 848 Final.  Directive 2009/28/EC of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, Official Journal, L 140/16. 44 45

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residues (Article 17). This criterion regulated that “the biofuels shall not be made from raw material obtained from land with high biodiversity value, such as primary forest and wooded land, nature protection zones, and highly biodiverse grassland’’ (Article 17.3). Similarly, ‘‘they cannot be obtained from the land with high carbon stock, such as wetlands and continuously forested areas’’ (Article 17.4). The Directive also established a reporting procedure about the operationalization of this rule. With this provision, the Commission was obliged to report to the European Parliament and to the Council every 2 years “on the national measures, both in the member states and in the third countries, taken to respect the sustainability criteria for biofuels” (Article 17.7). Another important provision in this context was the verification of international compliance to this rule. The Directive regulated that when the EU’s is entering into bilateral or multilateral arrangements with the third countries, “it shall endeavour to conclude agreements with those third countries that contain provisions on sustainability criteria that correspond to those of this Directive” (Article 18.4). These detailed provisions of the sustainability criteria attracted the attention of the policy-­ makers and the public alike, and they helped to calm down the public acceptance issues regarding this specific type of renewable energy. To summarize what we have seen so far, we can say that the RES Directive regulated almost every important aspect of the renewable energy policy by establishing a diverse set of policy mechanisms. In time, as parallel to the developments in the executive portfolio, i.e., changing policy goals, strategies, and update of the policy targets, the revision of the RES Directive also became a necessity. However, a significant revision did not appear until 2018. Another ongoing debate was over the necessity for the state subsidies to renewable energy projects. While some policy-makers believed that the feed-in tariffs were an absolute necessity to initiate the renewable energy investments, others argued that they lead to market distortions. The terms and conditions applied to the state aid were already defined in the EU law. Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibited the state aid within the EU with an aim to prevent it from distorting competition in the internal market. State aid can be compatible with the internal market only when it is used to facilitate the development of certain economic activities within the Union (Article 107(3c) of the TFEU). Based on this article, member states may resort to state aid to achieve their environmental protection targets which would not be achieved in the absence of such aid. Therefore, state aid with an aim to fulfil environmental protection and energy policy objectives is considered compatible within the internal market in the meaning of Article 107(3)(c) on the assumption that it would contribute to the Union’s policy objectives without adversely affecting the market conditions. The Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy46 defined the new framework for investment aid and operating aid to renewable energies for the 2014–2020 period. The Guideline stipulated that the market instruments, i.e.,

46

 Commission Communication, 2014/C 200/01.

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tenders and auctions, should be the normal procedure in the renewable energy investments. The member states should reduce the state subsidies to a minimum level in view of their complete phasing out (Article 109). Specific exceptions are provided for installations up to a certain size, for which a bidding process will not be suitable (Article 111). The Guideline underlined that the state aid for the renewable energies can only be compatible with the internal market if it has an incentive effect. An incentive effect occurs “when the aid induces the beneficiary to change its behaviour to increase the level of environmental protection or to improve the functioning of a secure, affordable, and sustainable energy market” (Article 49). This would be a behavioral change which the beneficiary would not undertake without the aid. The Guideline favored market-based mechanisms in the promotion of renewable energies with an aim to incentivize the market integration of renewable energies. It stipulated that the beneficiaries should sell their electricity directly in the market and be subject to market obligations. From 1 January 2016, installations with an installed electricity capacity of more than 500 kW should receive aid as a premium in addition to the market price whereby the generators sell their electricity directly in the market (Article 124a). In a transitional phase covering the years 2015 and 2016, aid for at least 5% of the planned new electricity capacity from renewable energy sources should be granted in a competitive bidding process; and from 1 January 2017 onward, all aid should be granted in a competitive bidding process based on clear, transparent, and nondiscriminatory criteria (Article 126). In terms of the state aids in the heating and cooling sector, the Commission stipulated that the state aid would be compatible with the internal market if granted to promote investments and upgrades to highly efficient CHPs and energy-efficient district heating and cooling (Article 139). The major goal here was to achieve the EU’s target of energy-efficient renovation of the buildings by employing state aids. Within the investment aid category, eligible costs were specified as the extra investment costs (Article 148) which would be calculated by comparing the investment with the counterfactual situation in the absence of the aid (Article 73). Operating aid for highly efficient CHPs would be granted on the same terms and conditions that apply to the state aid for renewable electricity (Article 151). The Guideline also modified the implementation of the environmental taxes. Environmental taxes are imposed in the member states with an aim to increase the cost of environmentally harmful behavior and to discourage this behavior. But the Commission recognized that a positive rewarding method was also an option; that is to say, reductions in, or exemptions from, environmental taxes can initiate behavioral change and contribute to an increased level of environmental protection. Based on this expectation, tax reductions or exemptions, as well as tax refunds for renewable electricity were stipulated in the law (Article 168). The Commission considered state aid in the form of tax reduction or tax refund “necessary and proportional” on the condition that “they are provided on objective, transparent, and non-­ discriminatory criteria to the beneficiaries who pay at least the minimum tax level” (Article 173).

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As a summary, the European Commission changed the rules of the game in 2014 for the future renewable energy investments. The EU policy-makers urged the member states to shift from the feed-in tariffs toward market-based processes such as auctions and tendering. Small installations can still be supported with feed-in tariffs or equivalent forms of state support to promote the small-scale investments. The Commission also recognized the need for positive behavioral change via environmental tax reductions or exemptions for the undertakings that make a contribution to environmental protection. These new Guidelines were in force from 1 July 2014 until 31 December 2020. The policy objectives and strategies for renewable energies have become more developed and sophisticated over time. Particularly, the Clean Energy package47 established three key priorities for the EU: energy efficiency, EU’s global leadership in renewables, and fair prices for consumers. Therefore, to reflect the global and European policy changes that had taken place in the last decade, a revision of the existing legislation became a necessity. The new policy goals and strategies were transposed into law via four new Directives48 and four new Regulations49 that came to regulate the renewable energy, energy efficiency, design of the electricity market, security of the energy supply and risk preparedness, and the governance rules for the Energy Union. The second version of the RES Directive appeared in 2018 and brought substantial amendments to the renewables’ legislation. In a general overview, the most important provisions of the RES II (Directive 2018/2001)50 can be listed as “a new and binding EU target for 2030; specification of the rules on financial support for renewable electricity; inclusion of the self-consumption of renewable electricity in the law; ruling over the guarantees of origin and administrative procedures; and introduction of the sustainability and greenhouse gas emissions saving criteria for biofuels, bioliquids and biomass fuels” (Article 1). First and foremost, the new RES Directive set a new and binding EU target for 2030: “the overall share of energy from RES in the Union’s gross final consumption of energy in 2030 shall be at least 32%” (Article 3.1). To meet this target collectively, member states shall set national targets in their national energy and climate plans (Article 3.2), and they shall specify these targets across three sectors, i.e., electricity, heating and cooling, and transport (Article 7.1). The list of the 2020 national targets was provided in the Annex where the highest targets were assigned to Sweden (49%), Latvia (40%), Finland (38%), Austria (34%), and Denmark (30%), while the Eastern European states were assigned lower targets, such as 13% for the Czech Republic and Hungary, 14% for Slovakia, and 15% for Poland.

 European Commission, 30.11.2016, COM(2016) 860 final.  Directive 2018/844, Directive 2018/2001, Directive 2018/2002, Directive 2019/944. 49  Regulation 2018/1999, Regulation 2019/941, Regulation 2019/942, Regulation 2019/943. 50  Directive 2018/2001 of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, Official Journal, L 328/82. 47 48

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As discussed before, state financial support schemes for energy from renewable sources had been under scrutiny both in the policy circles and among the public. The RES II clearly underlined that the EU member states shall apply a market-based and market-responsive approach when designing their financial support schemes for the electricity from renewable sources, and thereby avoid unnecessary distortions of electricity markets (Article 4.2). Regarding direct price support schemes, they can grant financial support only in the form of a market premium, either sliding or fixed (Article 4.3). However, small-scale installations and demonstration projects can still be exempted from this requirement (Article 4.3). Based on this article, the EU member states were required to encourage maximum integration of renewable electricity in their electricity market only by ensuring that the state support is granted in a market-based way and in an “open, transparent, competitive, non-discriminatory, and cost-effective manner” (Article 4.4). Another important provision was the inclusion of the prosumers into the law. The term “prosumers” (consumer-producers) is used for those who produce electricity from renewable sources to cover their needs. In fact, prosumers play an increasing role in the development and expansion of the renewable energies in Europe. With this understanding, the RES II obliged the member states to put in place “an enabling framework to promote and facilitate the development of renewables self-­ consumption based on an assessment of the existing barriers in their territories” (Article 21.6). It also obliged the member states to “apply non-discriminatory and proportionate charges and fees to the prosumers in relation to their self-generated renewable electricity remaining within their premises” (Article 21.3). As mentioned before, both the policy-makers and the public were previously caught in a heated debate whether growing crops for biofuel was an ecologically sound practice. On this issue, the RES II continued the same approach as the former Directive and regulated the bioenergy development by stipulating both the sustainability criteria and the greenhouse gas emissions saving criteria for energy from biofuels, bioliquids, and biomass (Article 29). Under the sustainability criteria, biofuels, bioliquids, and biomass fuels produced from agricultural biomass shall not be made from raw material obtained from land with a high biodiversity value (Article 29.3) or from wetlands and continuously forested areas (Article 29.4). Under the GHG reduction criteria, biofuels, bioliquids, and biomass fuels produced from waste and residues are required to fulfil only the greenhouse gas emissions saving criteria (Article 29.1). Based on this provision, bioenergy generation can only be classified as a renewable energy source if it fulfils more stricter criteria. Directive 2018/84451 provided amendments to the existing rules on the energy performance of buildings and on the energy efficiency measures. More specifically, it established new provisions for better and more energy-efficient buildings by updating and amending the existing legal texts. Firstly, it established a long-term renovation strategy obligation for all member states. So, each member state must

 Directive 2018/844 of 30 May 2018 amending Directive 2010/31/EU on the energy performance of buildings and Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency, Official Journal, L 156/75. 51

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establish “a long-term renovation strategy to support the renovation of the national stock of residential and non-residential buildings, both public and private, into a highly energy efficient and decarbonised building stock by 2050, facilitating the cost-effective transformation of existing buildings into nearly zero-energy buildings” (new Article 2a, Directive 2010/31/EU). In their long-term renovation strategies, member states shall set out “a roadmap with measures and domestically established measurable progress indicators” to ensure the achievement of this policy target. Additionally, to support the mobilization of investments into the renovation, they shall device policy mechanisms such as “the reduction of the perceived risk of energy efficiency operations for investors and the private sector, the use of public funding to leverage additional private-sector investment or address specific market failures, and accessible and transparent advisory tools on relevant energy efficiency renovations and financing instruments” (new Article 2a, Directive 2010/31/EU). Secondly, the new Directive established energy efficiency rules for the new buildings. It stipulated that the member states shall take the necessary measures “to ensure that the new buildings meet minimum energy performance requirements.” With this aim, before construction of new buildings starts, they must consider “the technical, environmental and economic feasibility of high-efficiency alternative systems” (amended Article 6, Directive 2010/31/EU). The member states are obliged to bring into force the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 10 March 2020. Directive 2018/200252 established a common framework of measures for energy efficiency within the Union to ensure that the Union’s 2020 energy efficiency target of 20% and its 2030 energy efficiency target of 32,5% are met (Article 1). With this goal, the Directive established an energy savings obligation for the member states (Article 7) and stipulated that the member states shall fulfil this obligation by establishing energy efficiency schemes (Article 7a). Within these schemes, member states shall designate the amount of energy savings for the obligated parties among energy distributors, retail energy sales companies and transport fuel distributors, or transport fuel retailers based on objective and nondiscriminatory criteria (Article 7a). The member states are obliged to bring into force the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 25 June 2020. Directive 2019/94453 established common rules for the generation, transmission, distribution, supply, and storage of electricity to create integrated, competitive, consumer-­centered, flexible, fair, and transparent electricity markets in the EU. It also included consumer protection provisions. By doing so, the aim of this Directive was to ensure “affordable, transparent energy prices and costs for consumers, a high degree of security of supply and a smooth transition towards a sustainable low-­ carbon energy system” (Article 1).

 Directive 2018/2002 of 11 December 2018 amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency, Official Journal, L 328/210. 53  Directive 2019/944 of of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU, Official Journal, L 158/125. 52

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Regulation 2018/199954 established the necessary legislative foundation for the Energy Union to provide reliable, inclusive, cost-efficient, transparent, and predictable governance with a view to ensure the achievement of the 2030 and long-term objectives and targets of the Energy Union. The Regulation established a new governance mechanism based on the member states’ 10-year National Energy and Climate Plans (NECP) starting from 2021 to 2030 (Article 1.1). Within the NECP, each member state shall set its objectives, targets, and contributions for the five dimensions of the Energy Union: energy security, internal energy market, energy efficiency, decarbonization, and research, innovation, and competitiveness (Article 4). They shall also include the existing and planned policies and measures to achieve these objectives (Article 7). These plans shall be submitted to the Commission by 30 June 2023 and shall be updated every 10 years thereafter (Article 14). Additionally, member states shall prepare energy and climate progress reports by 15 March 2023, and every 2 years thereafter (Article 17.1). The Commission shall assess the progress made at Union level toward meeting the objectives of the Energy Union (Article 29.1.a) and the progress made by each member state toward meeting its objectives, targets, and contributions and implementing the policies and measures set out in its NECP (Article 29.1.b). Based on this assessment, if the Commission concludes that insufficient progress is made by a member state, it will issue recommendations (Article 32). This overview shows that the EU emphasizes the importance of meeting its 2030 energy and climate targets and, with this goal, tries to stimulate regional cooperation within the EU structure. It also considers all necessary strategies for promoting long-term certainty and predictability for investors across the EU through the new governance mechanism based on NECPs and integrated reporting and monitoring processes. The transparency of the governance mechanism is ensured via wide public consultations on these plans and the publication of long-term strategies and final results in an online platform. Regulation 2019/94155 on risk preparedness in the electricity sector laid down the rules for cooperation between member states with a view to preventing, preparing for, and managing electricity crises in a spirit of solidarity and transparency (Article 1). The Regulation required the member states to prepare risk-preparedness plans on the basis of regional and national electricity crisis scenarios (Article 10.1). The plans must consist of national measures and regional and, where applicable, bilateral measures on how to deal with potential future electricity crises. These measures shall be clearly defined, transparent, proportionate, and nondiscriminatory (Article 10.2).

 Regulation 2018/1999 of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, Official Journal, L 328/1. 55  Regulation 2019/941 of 5 June 2019 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC, Official Journal, L 158/1. 54

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Regulation 2019/94256 established a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) with an aim to assist the regulatory authorities in exercising the regulatory tasks performed in the member states and, where necessary, to coordinate their action and to mediate and settle disagreements between them (Article 1.2). The Agency acts independently and objectively (Article 1.3). Regulation 2019/94357 set fundamental principles for the EU’s internal electricity market with an aim to “provide a non-discriminatory market access for both energy providers and consumers, ensure the EU’s competitiveness on the global market, ensure energy storage and energy efficiency, and enable market-based remuneration of renewable electricity” (Article 1). The Regulation is important in that it set fair rules for the internal electricity market’s operation and for the cross-­ border electricity exchanges with a view to enhance competition and cooperation. For instance, it set a new bidding zone review process to maximize economic efficiency and cross-zonal trading opportunities while maintaining security of supply in the EU (Article 14). The Regulation provided European-level and regional-level cooperation both for the transmission and distribution system operators. At the European level, it provided a network of transmission system operators (ENTSO for electricity) with an aim to promote the completion and functioning of the internal electricity market and to ensure the optimal management and coordinated operation of the European electricity transmission network (Article 28). At the regional level, it provided a regional cooperation within the ENTSO for electricity to ensure the optimum management of the network (Article 34). It also established regional coordination centers for the transmission system operators (Article 35). These centers shall have a legal form, and in performing their tasks, they shall act independently of individual national interests and independently of the interests of transmission system operators. Additionally, the Regulation also established a European entity for the distribution system operators (EU DSO) to promote optimal management and a coordinated operation of distribution and transmission systems (Article 52). The Regulation also referred to the Just Transition strategy for those EU regions that are predominantly based on coal industry. In that regard, the Regulation ruled that the Commission shall support the member states to put in place a national strategy for the progressive reduction of existing coal generation and mining capacity through all available means to enable a just transition in these regions. The Commission shall assist them in addressing the social and economic impacts of the clean energy transition via using available funds and programs and encouraging the exchange of good practices (Article 4).

 Regulation 2019/942 of 5 June 2019 establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, Official Journal, L 158/22. 57  Regulation 2019/943 of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity, Official Journal, L 158/54. 56

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Conclusion In this chapter, we have examined the ways in which the EU’s renewable energy policy norms and objectives are manifested in the policy output at the EU level. This review of the European policy structure is important from a social constructivist perspective because the EU norms, objectives, and legislation are perceived as contextual drivers of domestic policy change in member states. Upon the introduction of supranational legislation in EU energy policy, member states transpose these pieces of legislation into their national policy frameworks, fulfilling their obligation to adopt the acquis communautaire. Through the lens of a social constructivist perspective, this process is understood as Europeanization.

Chapter 4

Policy Formulation in Member States

Introduction This chapter explores the ways in which European renewable energy policy norms and objectives are internalized at the national level, which in turn influences discourses, perceptions, and identities, ultimately leading to a transformation of national policy norms, objectives, and strategies. In this context, Germany is a success story for renewable energy development with its consistent policy framework and financial support for renewables in effect for decades, while the Czech Republic is a new actor in energy transition and developing comparatively recent policies to achieve this goal. The aim of this chapter is to comparatively analyze their policy instruments as drivers of renewable energy deployment.

Czech Republic The Czech Republic experienced a strong deterioration of the environment during the 1980s as a consequence of centrally planned economic strategies and policies, underestimation of scientific knowledge, ignoring the principles of sustainability, and a lack of a legal and institutional framework for environmental protection. After decades of negligence of the environmental protection, the Czech energy sector spent the 1990s reforming itself. In the 2000s, the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU mandated the adoption and implementation of the European energy policy objectives and strategies which prioritize sustainable development and environmental protection. This move stopped the environmental deterioration to a major degree and in some respects even remedied it. In this section, we will analyze how the Czech Republic has experienced a major change of its energy policy via adopting and institutionalizing new renewable energy policy norms and strategies. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Tanil, Sustainable Energy Development, Environment & Policy 63, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28065-8_4

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Policy Norms and Objectives The National Programme to Abate Climate Change Impacts1 was formulated in the EU-accession period. Therefore, it recognized the climate change as an international issue and stressed the importance of joint implementation of the targets arising from the international policy frameworks such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Upon this recognition, it analyzed the climate change and its impacts globally and in the Czech Republic and set the national targets for the reduction of CO2 emissions as required by the international agreements. The targets were set as 30% reduction of emissions per capita by 2020 compared to 2000 and 25% reduction of total aggregate emissions by 2020 compared to 2000. Then, it defined the appropriate policies and measures to ensure these targets considering both the sustainable development principle and the existing and future social and economic conditions in the country. Among the measures, it referred to the legislative measures, systemic measures, and adaptation measures. In terms of renewable energies, it declared its new energy targets as increasing the share of RES in final energy consumption to 6% by 2010 and to 20% by 2030 and increasing the share of biofuels in transport to 5.75% by 2010 and to 20% by 2020.2 Among the measures for the support of the RES, it referred to the inclusion of the National Program on Clean Energy Management and Use of RES in the existing energy management law as well as the introduction of an environmental tax reform and advantageous purchase prices for electricity produced from RES as decisive state instruments (Fig. 4.1). In 2004, the Ministry of Industry and Trade published the State Energy Policy. The idea behind this document was to present a clear vision of energy development with an aim to provide the stakeholders with a decent amount of certainty for their investment plans and policies. The policy priorities were delineated as energy safety and independence – these concepts strongly resonated throughout the entire document. The whole document revolved around the need to build a firm basis of energy sources and securing the country against supply curtailments. Although regular updates were planned, it was not until 2015 that a new version was issued. In the same year, the Ministry of Environment prepared the State Environmental Policy3 for the 2004–2010 period. The Policy Paper was based on the recognition of the Czech Republic’s responsibilities for environmental protection resulting from its membership in the EU, in the UN, and in the OECD; so, it was heavily influenced by the European environmental policy strategies, such as the sixth Environment

 Government Resolution No. 187, 3 March 2004. This program replaced the earlier “Strategy of Protection of the Climate System of the Earth” (Government Resolution No. 480/1999). It was later replaced by the “Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change” (Government Resolution No. 861/2015). 2  ibid., p. 106. 3  Government Resolution No. 235, 17 March 2004. 1

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Fig. 4.1  Czech Republic’s executive portfolio in renewable energy policy. (Author’s own compilation)

Action Program and the EU Strategy for Sustainable Development.4 The policy paper analyzed the initial conditions and issues in environment in the Czech Republic, specified the government’s targets and priority areas in environmental protection, and, finally, listed the instruments for the implementation of these policy goals. The Environmental Policy concentrated on four priority areas: nature conservation and protection of the landscape and biological diversity; sustainable use of natural resources; material flows and waste management; protection of environment and quality of life; and protection of the climate system and prevention of air pollution. Within these priority areas, it provided a thorough SWOT analysis, i.e., an assessment of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and the threats.  ibid., p. 6.

4

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Based on this analysis, it delineated the sectoral policies. It defined the energy policy goal as “minimizing the impact of obtaining energy, rational energy consumption, and supply of energy in the regime of sustainable development”5 and stipulated that the conditions shall be created to meet the national targets for the share of RES in electricity production (8% in 2010) and in total consumption of primary energy sources (6% in 2010).6 To attain these goals, it recognized the need for a suitable legislative, economic, and information framework that would support activities leading to sustainable energy supplies. In terms of renewable energies, the policy paper recognized the biggest renewable energy potential of the Czech Republic was in biomass energy, thermosolar systems and photovoltaic panels, small hydroelectric plants with an installed output up to 10  MW, wind energy, and biofuel. It embraced the development of these sources in order to provide a realistic potential for the energy requirements of the society in the future. It stressed that this development would also contribute to the energy independence of the country. It also recognized that the utilization of the RES would provide new working opportunities especially in the rural areas, and thus contribute to decreasing the unemployment. To facilitate the achievement of the RES targets for 2010, it defined the policy strategies as promoting investments into RES; providing financial support from public budgets of at least 0.1% GDP; ensuring approval and subsequent implementation of the Act on Promotion of Production of Electricity and Thermal Energy from RES; approving and implementing an environmental tax reform; and simplifying the permit-issuing procedure in construction of installations for the RES.7 Finally, among the instruments for the implementation of these policy goals, it listed the legal instruments, economic instruments, increasing public awareness on environmental issues, informative instruments, maintaining active public participation in the process, strategic planning, international cooperation, and research and development activities.8 In 2010, Strategic Framework for Sustainable Development in the Czech Republic9 was published. The overall aim of this renewed strategy was to ensure environmental protection, social cohesion, economic prosperity, and to meet the international responsibilities in this context. Based on this recognition, it defined the strategic vision of sustainable development in the Czech Republic in 2030 as designing a society “on a mutual balance between economic, social, and environmental areas.”10 To achieve this goal, it delineated five priority axes as “(1) society, people, and health; (2) economy and innovation; (3) spatial development; (4) landscape,

 ibid., p. 26.  ibid., p. 17. 7  ibid., p. 17. 8  ibid., p. 36–45. 9  Government Resolution No. 37, 11 January 2010. 10  ibid., p. 9. 5 6

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ecosystems and biodiversity; and (5) a stable and secure society.”11 In each of these areas, the strategy paper included a description of the main problems and the proposed priorities and objectives. Regarding the energy policy, four policy objectives were designed as “(1) achieving maximum energy independence; (2) achieving maximum energy safety; (3) promoting the sustainability of the energy sector; and (4) promoting a sustainable materials management.”12 These policy objectives would be achieved particularly by ensuring a reliable supply of all types of energy, optimizing a long-term secure energy mix while respecting the necessary requirements for operational safety, and reducing dependence on foreign energy resources. Such policy objectives require a disputable energy policy regime which dictates “an optimal use of the reserves of brown and black coal and other fuels, including RES, that are located in the territory of the Czech Republic.”13 However, based on the information that “the domestic reserves of black coal will last for 20-30 years, and the reserves of brown coal will last about 50 years at the current pace of extraction and with the current methods of use,”14 the Strategic Framework recognized a pressing need for energy transformation in the Czech Republic. The National Renewable Energy Action Plan15 was prepared in 2010 in pursuit of the Directive 2009/28/EC which set a 20% target for the share of energy from RES and required the member states to transfer this target into their national targets. Based on this requirement, the Action Plan identified the Czech Republic’s energy policy objectives, renewable energy targets and trajectories, and the measures to achieve these targets. It presented the national energy conception as “energy safety, energy independence, and sustainable development with a view to provide safe supply of energy at reasonable prices by using all available domestic energy sources in the most environmental-friendly manner.”16 It set the national target as 13.5% share of energy from RES in gross final energy consumption by 2020.17 However, this was a very low amount compared to more enthusiastic national targets in the EU zone. The Action Plan set the sectoral targets for 2020 as 14.3% share of RES in electricity, 10.8% share of RES in transport, and 14.1% share of RES in heating and cooling sector.18 It defined its policy measures to attain these targets as establishing an enabling regulative framework by amending existing legislation concerning the renewable energies and using financial support schemes to promote the renewable energies. Among the financial support measures, there were “investment support from subsidy schemes, operational support (feed-in tariffs and green bonuses), tax

 ibid., p. 10.  ibid., p. 30–31. 13  ibid., p. 30. 14  ibid., p. 27. 15  Ministry of Industry and Trade, National Renewable Energy Action Plan, July 2010. 16  ibid., p. 5. 17  ibid., p. 10. 18  ibid., p. 11. 11 12

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exemptions or reductions, tax refunds, and income tax exemptions for the promotion of renewable energies.”19 The State Environmental Policy20 for the 2012–2020 period acknowledged that the Czech Republic, as a member of the EU, put emphasis on the implementation of its environmental commitments arising from the approved environmental legislation of the EU. Upon this recognition, it defined its main objective as ensuring a healthy and good environment for all citizens, ensuring an efficient use of all resources, and minimizing the negative effects of human activities on the environment. To achieve these objectives, it primarily focused on the efficient and environmental-­friendly use of the RES with a view to increase their share for progressive elimination of dependence on fossil fuels and for strengthening energy security of the country. Therefore, it set the policy targets as 13% share of RES in gross energy consumption and 10% share of RES in transport by 2020. It also introduced several strategic assignments for the state energy policy, primarily regarding the protection and sustainable use of natural sources, climate protection and improving air quality, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, supporting the efficient and environmental-friendly use of RES and energy savings, and the protection of the nature and landscape. On 18 May 2015, the Government of the Czech Republic approved an updated State Energy Policy21 for the next 25 years. With the SEP, the government of the Czech Republic aimed to formulate a political, legislative, and administrative framework for reliable and reasonably priced supplies of energy that are also sustainable in the long term. The SEP was constructed in four sections: firstly, it presented an analysis of the existing energy system (SWOT analysis), and then defined the development strategies for the energy policy. This was followed by the future trajectories for the primary energy sources and the production of electrical energy in terms of planned corridors. Finally, it delineated the procedures and instruments designed for the implementation of this energy policy. In the first section, the policy paper recognized that “the Czech energy sector was dominated by the coal sources, which supply almost 60% of electrical energy and a large proportion of heat through district heating.”22 Although the Czech Republic was committed to ensuring that 13% of gross final energy consumption will be covered by from RES by 2020, a major restriction was the budget capacity of the Czech Republic: “To meet the RES targets, our country has found itself in a difficult situation because higher renewable energy generation needs to be partially subsidised. However, programmes for supporting energy generation and savings cannot exceed

 ibid., p. 50.  It was amended and updated by the “State Environmental Policy 2030 with a view to 2050” which was prepared by Government Resolution No.1026/2016. Here, we will refer to the original document, not to the updated one. 21  Government Resolution No. 362, 18 May 2015. 22  ibid., p. 13. 19 20

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the financial and social capacity of the state.”23 Therefore, a controversial approach was created. The SEP concluded that “despite certain ecological aspects of coal usage, this domestic raw material is not fully replaceable within the time frame of the SEP for both safety and economic reasons. So, the reduction in the proportion of coal in electricity and heat generation in the Czech Republic should be a smooth process in a long-term perspective and implemented in a way to ensure the remaining coal stocks are to be used in the most effective and environmental-friendly manner possible.”24 In the second section, it delineated three strategic goals of the energy policy as “security of supply, competitiveness, and sustainability.”25 Therefore, energy policy would be shaped around the objective of ensuring reliable, secure, and environmental-­ friendly supplies of energy to meet the needs of the population while maintaining competitive and acceptable energy prices. The long-term energy vision was to secure uninterrupted energy supplies in crisis situations to the extent necessary to ensure a smooth functioning of the economy. In the third section, we find the definition of planned corridors in 2040 for the electricity generation as “46–58% share for nuclear, 18–25% for RES, 11–21% for black and brown coal, and 5–15% for natural gas” and for the mix of primary energy sources as “25–33% share for nuclear, 18–25% for natural gas, 17–22% for RES, and 11–17% for solid fuels.”26 In the final section, instruments to enforce these policy objectives were set. These are legislative instruments, state administration instruments, and fiscal and tax instruments. In the first category, we find the proposed amendments to Energy Act, Act on Supported Energy Sources, Energy Management Act, Building Act, Environmental Impact Assessment Act, and Air Protection Act. In the second category, we find the regulation of energy sectors, establishment of a permanent multidisciplinary team of experts, performing periodical evaluations, and publishing annual report on the development of the energy sector. In the final category, we find the use of EU funds and direct support programs to achieve these policy goals. The Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change27 was prepared for the years 2015–2020 with a view to 2030, and it updated the previous document on climate change. The strategy paper is important for its recognition that adapting to climate change requires a proactive approach at local, national, and international levels, and for its cooperation-seeking effort with strategic partners to reduce the vulnerability of their countries to the effects of climate change. It aimed to mitigate the impacts of climate change by adapting to that change as much as possible, to maintain welfare of the society, and to preserve and possibly enhance the economic potential of the country for the next generations. It sought to be more resilient to future climate

 ibid., p. 20.  ibid., p. 13. 25  ibid., p. 33. 26  ibid., p. 46–47. 27  Government Resolution No. 861, 26 October 2015. 23 24

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change impacts via an effective and coordinated planning among the state administration bodies, local governments, and public organizations. The contents of this strategy paper firstly presented the climate change trends in the Czech Republic and the impacts of the climate change on selected sectors and on the environment. Based upon this analysis, it defined the adaptation measures as well as the barriers hindering the implementation of these measures and the ways to eliminate them. Finally, it presented the current state of legislation and the required legislative changes and identified the possible sources of funding. To support the implementation of the adaptation measures, it did not recommend introducing new economic instruments, but rather focused on the existing tools, such as the payments, fees, levies, and taxes. It also recommended that the national financial support programs can be complemented by the EU’s funding instruments for environment and climate action, such as LIFE program. The Strategic Framework 203028 was formulated upon the vision of how the Czech Republic should look in 2030. It was the result of more than a 1-year participative process that included hundreds of participants from various sectors of society within the Government Council for Sustainable Development. The strategy paper connected two major concepts, i.e., quality of life and sustainable development in social, economic, and environmental areas, with an effort to contribute to sustainable development principles in the EU and global sustainable development objectives adopted by the UN. In fact, a new mindset was brought into global agenda with the implementation of Agenda 2030 and the global agenda on climate change; and the Strategic Framework 2030 embraced this new global mindset and strived to work with international organizations for the attainment of these goals. Upon this recognition, the strategy paper formulated policy objectives for the Czech Republic across six key areas: people and society, economic model, resilient ecosystems, municipalities and regions, global development, and good governance. These policy objectives would serve as the basic framework for other strategic documents on national, regional, and local levels, and their fulfilment would be the responsibility of relevant bodies of the state administration. In the resource management section, policy-makers hold the existing energy policy objectives: “Any solution to energy transition in the Czech Republic must meet the conditions of resilience, competitiveness, and long-term sustainability.”29 So, they promoted reducing the fossil fuel consumption by increasing the share of renewables and nuclear energy and improving the energy efficiency. The policy-­ makers also recognized that these objectives can only be met by providing the necessary infrastructure. For instance, they provided that the emergence of small, decentralized energy sources, such as solar panels on roofs, municipal wind farms, or biogas stations, would require adaptation of the electricity network, and this could be done via state planning and investment into the necessary infrastructure.  Office of the Government of the Czech Republic -Department of Sustainable Development (2017), “Strategic Framework Czech Republic 2030,” Government Resolution No. 622, 29 July 2015. 29  ibid., p. 59. 28

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They also recognized that the use of locally available heat sources would contribute to the decentralization of energy, reduce dependence on fossil fuel imports, and strengthen the local economy. With this understanding, they promoted “transformation of the cities and municipalities from simple energy consumers to producers and local providers using locally available energy sources.”30 This could be achieved by reducing the energy intensity of the cities, creating major changes in the heating and cooling of both existing and new buildings, and integrating appropriate measures into their strategic and spatial planning procedures. As a summary, we can extract three important policy strategies from the document regarding the energy transition: firstly, natural resources shall be used as efficiently and economically as possible to minimize the external costs caused by their consumption. Secondly, a working and stable infrastructure shall be designed to create conditions for the efficient use of energy from renewable sources. Thirdly, cities shall reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the negative impacts of climate change. In this context, reducing energy intensity of the cities, using smart grids, and higher share of renewable energies shall appear in the urban environment. The National Energy and Climate Plan was prepared based on the Regulation 2018/1999/EU with the purpose of designing national policies and measures to meet the targets of the Energy Union and the EU’s 2030 targets for energy and climate. It was prepared upon consultation with other ministries and other key stakeholders in the period from 21 December 2018 to 10 January 2019; and as a result of the consultations, it presented the Czech Republic’s policy targets and strategies for the period 2021–2030 in five dimensions of the Energy Union: (1) decarbonization, (2) energy efficiency, (3) energy security, (4) internal energy market, and (5) research, innovation, and competitiveness. As its foundation, the Plan embraced the key policy objectives contained in the State Energy Policy: a reliable, affordable, and sustainable energy supply for households and economy. This vision was summarized in the SEP in three top-level objectives for the energy sector: energy security, competitiveness, and sustainability. The National Plan was established on the basis of these policy objectives. An important part of the National Plan was the setting of the Czech Republic’s contribution to the European climate and energy targets. The EU’s target for RES in gross final energy consumption was set as 32% by 2030. The Czech Republic proposed a 22% contribution to this target by the year 2030. This was an increase of 9% points compared to the national target of the Czech Republic of 13% set for the year 2020. The Czech Republic also proposed its sectoral targets for the share of RES as 16.9% in electricity, 14% in transport, and 30.7% in heating and cooling sector. The National Plan summarized existing support policies to achieve the RES targets as indirect support (reduction of administrative requirements, guarantees of origin of energy, and spatial planning), operational support (feed-in tariffs and green bonus), investment support (through various state and EU programs), and tax

30

 ibid., p. 89.

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exemption, reduction, or refunds. New forms of operational support were provided to maintain the operation of power-generating facilities in the form of hourly or annual green bonus and for the heat-generating facilities in the form of an annual green bonus. Also, support for electricity to modernize a power-generating facility was provided in the form of an hourly or yearly green bonus or auction bonus for the lifetime of the facility. The Plan also stipulated new forms of legal regulation of supported energy sources, simplifying administrative procedures, and encouraging and facilitating the development of renewable energy self-consumption and renewable energy communities. In summer 2019, the Czech society finally witnessed a decisive step toward energy transition. For the first time, a Coal Commission was established with an aim to discuss the possibilities for the coal phase-out. This Commission brought together the representatives of the Czech government, coal-mining groups, energy companies, and environmental NGOs. In December 2020, the Coal Commission announced a coal phase-out date by December 2038. This was the same date as Germany’s planned coal phase-out. In January 2022, the Czech government’s policy statement announced that they will make the coal phase-out possible by 2033.

Policy Legislation The Czech Republic’s legal framework in renewable energy consists of several acts and implementing regulations (Fig. 4.2).31

Energy Act Energy Act (2000)32 aimed to regulate the conditions of business and the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons in electricity sector (Articles 22–54), gas sector (Articles 56–74), and heating sector (Articles 76–89). The law set an obligation of equal treatment for the transmission system operators and the distribution system operators: transmission system operators were obliged to provide all participants in the electricity market with equal conditions for the connection of their equipment to the grid system (Article 24.10b) and for the transmission of electricity through the grid system (Article 24.10c); and the distribution system operators were  Since the legislative portfolio in energy policy is extensive including several laws and their amendments, for the sake of clarity, we will cover only the most prominent laws in this section with an aim to shed light on the process of how the new policy objectives and strategies were transposed into law. 32  Act No. 458/2000 of 28 November 2000 on Business Conditions and the Performance of State Administration in the Energy Sectors and on Amendments to Certain Acts. 31

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Fig. 4.2  Czech Republic’s legislative portfolio in renewable energy policy. (Author’s own compilation)

obliged to provide equal conditions to all participants (Article 25.10c and 25.10d). Thus, there was no preferential treatment, or priority, established for the connection, transmission, and distribution of the renewable electricity. An amendment was provided in 200933 with an aim to incorporate relevant regulations of the European Communities (Article 1). This amendment integrated a preferential treatment clause for the electricity from high-efficiency combined heat and power generation (CHP): “An electricity producer operating a facility for high-efficiency cogeneration of electricity and heat or a plant to produce electricity from secondary energy sources has the right to priority provision of electricity transmission through the transmission system and distribution systems. It also has the right to give priority to the connection of its generating equipment to the transmission or distribution system if it meets the conditions for connection” (Article 32). Another amendment was provided in 2015.34 It reorganized the organization and function of the Energy Regulatory Office (Article 17b) and its relations with other state institutions (Article 17c and 17f). This amendment extended the responsibilities of the transmission operators by including the duty to “ensure safe, reliable and efficient operation, renewal and development of the transmission system, ensure its interconnection with other systems to meet reasonable electricity demand, and 33 34

 Act No. 158/2009 of 7 May 2009 amending Act No. 458/2000.  Act No. 131/2015 of 13 May 2015 amending Act No. 458/2000.

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cooperate in the European internal electricity market” (Article 24.1a). It also integrated the concept of prosumer as “a customer operating electricity generation with an installed capacity of up to 10 kW if no other electricity generation is connected at the same offtake point” (Article 28.5). Energy Management Act Energy Management Act (2000)35 stipulated the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons in the management of energy, especially electricity and heat, as well as gas and other fuels. The Act established the obligation of long-term planning at all administrative levels in accordance with the principles of sustainable development, protection of environment, security of energy supply, and economic competitiveness. In this context, firstly, there is the State Energy Concept which would be prepared by the Ministry of Industry and Trade as a strategic document covering a period of 20 years, and it would serve as the basis of territorial energy concepts (Article 3). Secondly, Territorial Energy Concepts would be prepared by the regions for a period of 20 years in accordance with the same principles, and they shall contain analysis of trends in energy demand, analysis of possible sources and methods of energy management, evaluation of the usability of renewable energy sources, evaluation of economically usable savings from more economical use of energy, and environmental impact assessments (Article 4). Thirdly, the Act stipulated the preparation of a National Program for the Economical Management of Energy and the Use of Renewable and Secondary Energy Sources. The National Program would be prepared by the Ministry of Industry and Trade for a period of 4 years in agreement with the Ministry of the Environment based on the approved state energy concept (Article 5). The focus on long-term strategic planning shows the Czech government’s dedication to implement the sustainable energy strategies at all administrative levels. The Act presented the measures to increase the energy economy as energy efficiency (Article 6), combined heat and power generation (Article 7), energy labels (Article 8), and energy audit (Article 9). An amendment in 201236 introduced a new policy priority as reducing the energy intensity of the buildings. Therefore, it stipulated that in the case of the construction of a new building, it shall meet the requirement of energy performance at a cost-­ optimal level from 1 January 2013 onward (Article 7.1a). In case the new building is owned and used by a public authority, it shall fulfil the exemplary role of the public buildings. Therefore, public buildings with an area greater than 1500 m2 shall meet the requirement of almost-zero energy consumption from 1 January 2016 onward (Article 7.1b). From 1 January 2018 onward, almost-zero energy consumption requirement

35 36

 Act No. 406/2000 of 25 October 2000 on Energy Management.  Act No. 318/2012 of 19 July 2012 amending Act No. 406/2000.

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would extend to all new buildings with an area greater than 1500 m2 (Article 7.1c). The requirement of energy performance certificate was also introduced for all buildings: The builder or the owner of a building was obliged to ensure the processing of the energy performance certificate during the construction of new buildings or during major alterations to completed buildings (Article 7a.1). An amendment in 201537 provided the establishment of the State Energy Inspectorate as a new administrative authority. The Inspectorate was equipped with such responsibilities as “check whether the recipients of subsidies meet the conditions and purpose of the provided subsidy; verify energy savings from energy services and other energy efficiency improvement measures; provide market participants with information on energy efficiency improvement mechanisms and their financial and administrative frameworks; and ensure that energy-related products are placed on the market in accordance with the requirements of this Act and of applicable EU regulations” (Article 13b and 13c). Act on Renewable Energy Sources Act on Renewable Energy Sources (2005)38 aimed to “contribute to the sustainable development of society, promote the use of RES, ensure an increase in the share of RES in the consumption of primary energy sources, and create conditions for the fulfilment of the target of the share of renewable electricity in the Czech Republic to 8% by 2010” (Article 1.2). The Act listed the support measures for renewable electricity. The Act stipulated that the transmission system operator or distribution system operator preferentially transmit or distribute electricity from renewable sources if it meets the necessary conditions (Article 4.1). Regional distribution system operators and transmission system operators were also obliged to purchase all electricity from renewable sources to which the support applies and to conclude a supply contract (Article 4.4). Regarding the financial support measures, the Act designated that the Energy Regulatory Office shall set purchase prices for renewable electricity and green bonuses annually and maintain them for a period of minimum 15 years from the year of commissioning (Article 6.1). In addition, the Ministry of Industry and Trade shall provide a subsidy for the payment of additional costs (calculated as difference between expected costs and actually incurred costs associated with the electricity from RES) to the transmission system operator and regional distribution system operators on a quarterly basis on the basis of their applications (Article 6b). The Amended Act on Renewable Energy Sources (2012)39 incorporated the National Action Plan (Article 3) and the support measures for the electricity from  Act No. 131/2015 of 13 May 2015 amending Act No. 406/2000.  Act No. 180/2005 of 31 March 2005 on the support of electricity production from renewable energy sources. 39  Act No. 165/2012 of 31 January 2012 on the support of electiricty production from renewable energy sources and on amendments to certain acts. 37 38

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renewable sources (Article 4), electricity from secondary sources (Article 5), and electricity from high-efficiency CHPs (Article 6). The Act established the right of priority connection for the renewable electricity: the transmission system operator or distribution system operator is obliged to preferentially connect the electricity from a supported source if the producer meets the connection conditions (Article 7.1). Regarding the financial forms of support to electricity from renewable sources, the Act stipulated that the financial support shall be provided in the form of green bonuses or purchase prices (Article 8.1). Feed-in tariffs are provided for the producers of hydroenergy with a capacity up to 10 MW and producers of electricity from other RES with an installed capacity of up to 100 kW (Article 8.2). In other cases, the producer of electricity from RES is only entitled to the green bonuses. The purchase prices are determined by the Energy Regulatory Office separately for each type of RES according to the size of the installed capacity of electricity production plant (Article 12.1). The amount of green bonus for electricity is determined for each RES based on the difference between the purchase price and the price achieved in the market (Article 12.2). Regarding the financial forms of support to heat from renewable sources, the Act stipulated that the financial support shall be provided in the form of operational support (Article 24) and investment aid (Article 25). The operational support is provided through green bonus, while the investment support is provided through national or European funds. The operational support included the sustainability criteria for the bioliquids as a prerequisite as specified in the EU law (Article 24.3). Finally, the Act specified the conditions for issuing guarantees of origin for the electricity from renewable sources and for the electricity from high-efficiency cogeneration (Articles 44–47). A further amendment to this Act was provided in 2013.40 This amendment was introduced pursuant to the Commission Communication (2014/C 200/01) which required the gradual phasing-out of feed-in tariff support, and its replacement by market-based instruments. Although such guidelines are not as effective as EU law which requires member states’ compliance, they are still understood in practice as rules that the member states must adhere. Therefore, the new amendment abolished the feed-in tariffs with the exception of production of electricity using hydroenergy with an installed capacity of up to 10 MW (Article 4.10). Two exceptions were provided: firstly, “the holder of an authorization for the construction of electricity generation from RES issued before the date of entry into force of this Act, who puts this electricity production into operation within 6 years of the authorization, is entitled to feed-in support” (Transitional Provision 1). Secondly, “the holder of a permit for the construction of electricity generation with an output of up to 100 kW from RES issued before the date of entry into force of this Act, who shall put this electricity production into operation by 31 December 2015 inclusive, is entitled to feed-in support” (Transitional Provision 2).

40

 Act No. 310/2013 of 13 September 2013 amending Act No. 165/2012.

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Energy Regulatory Office published the most recent purchase prices and green bonuses for electricity produced from RES in 201941 to take effect on 1 January 2020. Act on Public Budgets In the policy framework for the promotion of the use of RES, a contested decision was the introduction of a tax on electricity from renewable energy sources. In 2007, the Act on Public Budgets42 established three new energy taxes: tax on natural gas (Part 45), tax on solid fuels (Part 46), and tax on electricity (Part 47). However, contrary to the expectations, the tax on electricity was imposed on “the renewable electricity originating from solar, wind or geothermal energy, produced in hydropower plants, or produced from biomassˮ (Article 2d). The only exemption was provided for the renewable electricity with an installed capacity up to 30 kW and consumed at the point of production (Article 8). For all other taxpayers, the tax rate was set as CZK 28.30/MWh (Article 6). As a result, large electricity producers using RES were burdened by this tax. This brief overview of the new energy legislation in the Czech Republic aimed to shed light on the transposition of new energy policy norms, objectives, and strategies into the law. Due to the extensive nature of the field, we covered only the most prominent acts and some of their amendments that are either contested or progressive. The next chapter will analyze and quantitatively overview the effectiveness and efficiency of these national support schemes for renewable energy.

Germany Germany’s energy transition from fossil-based fuels to renewable forms of energy is termed as Energiewende, and it represents the most ambitious climate and energy project in Germany. In this section, we analyze renewable energy policy norms and strategies within the executive and legislative portfolio of Germany.

Policy Norms and Objectives Chancellor Angela Merkel acted as a politician advocating environment and climate protection both at the national level and EU level since 2005. In the context of German EU Presidency, Merkel pushed for an ambitious European climate and

 Energy Regulatory Office No. 3/2019 of 26 September 2019 fixing support for supported energy sources. 42  Act No. 261/2007 of 19 September 2007 on the stabilization of public budgets. 41

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energy policy. This initiative led the European Council adopt a comprehensive “Energy Action Plan” in March 2007. With this plan, European heads of state and government agreed to reduce the EU’s CO2 emissions by 20%; increase the energy efficiency by 20%; and increase the share of RES in total energy consumption to 20% by 2020 in comparison with 1990 levels.43 In domestic politics, coalition government under Angela Merkel’s leadership took an important step in August 2007 by adopting an ambitious energy and climate program. The “Integrated Energy and Climate Program,”44 which consists of 29 key elements, set the guiding principles for German energy policy as security of supply, economic efficiency, and environmental protection. The Program promoted further development of renewable energies and reduction in the consumption of coal, oil, and gas in electricity, heating, and transport sectors. The program set its 2020 targets for the renewable energies as 25–30% in electricity sector, 14% in heating and cooling sector, and 20% in transport sector.45 With these targets, Germany’s energy and climate policy even surpassed the EU-level targets (Fig. 4.3). The “National Renewable Energy Action Plan” (NREAP) was published in July 2010. The Plan presented the expected development of the renewable energies in Germany for each sector in compliance with the Directive 2009/28/EC.  While Directive 2009/28/EC established an 18% target for Germany’s share of RES in gross final energy consumption, the NREAP projected that this share would reach 19.6% by 2020. The anticipated sectoral distribution would be 38.6% in the electricity sector, 15.5% in the heating/cooling sector, and 13.2% in the transport sector by 2020. These targets were set at the national level, while federal states and municipalities were free to set their own targets. The Plan also set the measures to implement these targets. Among these measures, there were legislative instruments, financial instruments, and administrative procedures and spatial planning measures. A sophisticated set of legislative instruments were already existing at the time with the Renewable Energy Act (EEG), Renewable Energies Heat Act (EEWärmeG), Combined Heat and Power Act (KWKG), Energy Saving Ordinance (EnEv), and Biofuels Quota Act (BioKraftQuG). Financial instruments were provided within the Market Incentive Program (MAP) and KfW-funding programs. Relevant administrative procedures, national/regional/local planning measures, technical specifications, public provision of information, and responsible public bodies for these measures were all provided in detail within the Plan. In September 2010, the Federal Government adopted the “Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply”46 which set out Germany’s energy policy until 2050. Initially, the Energy Concept recognized that “the energy consumption currently causes 80% of greenhouse gas emissions. For  Presidency Conclusions of the European Council, 2.5.2007, 7224/1/07.  Integrated Energy and Climate Program, Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, December 2007, p. 2. 45  ibid., p. 4. 46  Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply, Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 28 September 2010. 43 44

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Fig. 4.3 Germany’s executive portfolio in renewable energy policy. (Author’s own compilation)

this reason, present energy supply structures have to be radically transformed in the medium to long term.”47 So, the Energy Concept stated its political objective as making Germany “one of the most energy-efficient and greenest economies in the world with a high level of energy security, effective environmental and climate protection, and economically viable energy supply.”48 The aim in the energy market was to strengthen competition and market orientation which will “secure sustainable economic prosperity, jobs for the future, and innovation and modernisation of Germany.”49 Therefore, the energy policy target was to make the RES account for the biggest share in the future energy mix, as conventional energy sources are steadily replaced by renewables and the nuclear energy act as a bridging technology

 ibid., p. 3.  ibid., p. 3. 49  ibid., p. 3. 47 48

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on this road. Based on this policy target, the Energy Concept repeated the 2020 target of 18% share of RES in gross final energy consumption and stated that this target shall be increased to 30% by 2030, 45% by 2040, and 60% by 2050. It set the 2020 target for the share of RES in electricity as 35%, which shall also be increased further to 50% by 2030, 65% by 2040, and 80% by 2050. Drawing on these policy targets, the Energy Concept set the policy measures in all major fields of action (electricity, heat, and transport) with an aim to ensure an energy supply that is “environmentally sound, economically viable and secure in the long run, and in the interests of industry and consumers alike.”50 To create this energy supply, “a cost-efficient expansion of renewables, building renovations for greater use of RES in heating and cooling, a massive expansion of onshore and offshore wind power capacity, sustainable use and generation of bioenergy, qualitative and quantitative expansion of electricity grids, and development and promotion of storage technologies”51 would be the topics of central focus. The Energy Concept recognized that the continuous expansion of renewable energies in the electricity sector (especially offshore wind) would require their integration into the grid infrastructure. To integrate more renewable energies in the electricity grid, therefore, a rapid expansion of the grid infrastructure was needed. The most urgent action in this context was to construct north-south routes which would carry electricity from the wind farms of the north to consumption centers in the west and south. This policy goal required government action to design and provide necessary regulatory framework via legislative instruments, financial incentives, and planning instruments.52 The policy measures included developing a state concept for a target grid for 2050; creating a Federal Grid Plan based on a 10-year grid update plan coordinated among grid operators; streamlining the planning and licensing procedures for grid expansion to ensure consistent and transparent planning and licensing practices in the Länder; making the modernization and expansion process financially attractive so that grid operators and other investors provide the necessary capital; and launching a public information campaign called grids for environmentally sound energy supply to strengthen public understanding and acceptance. As argued before, different forms of state financial support for the renewable energies were widely contested among the policy-makers and public alike. In this context, the Energy Concept embraced a new mentality and signaled the change of the existing policy regime. The new policy goal was introduced as “an incremental transfer of a growing proportion of renewable energies from the state support regime into the market domain.”53 To facilitate this transition, the government would consider offering an optional market premium to plant operators. These operators would then have the choice between receiving fixed EEG tariffs or selling their

 ibid., p. 6.  ibid., p. 7. 52  ibid., p. 18–19. 53  ibid., p. 20. 50 51

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electricity directly to the market, while obtaining a market premium in addition to their market revenues. As a result, it was clear by 2010 that a new financial support mechanism would be developed, aiming to integrate renewable energy sources into the market system. The Energy Concept recognized that “the buildings were responsible for 40% of final energy consumption and 1/3 of the CO2 emissions in Germany”54 at the time. Based on this fact, upgrading the building stock’s energy performance was perceived as central to achieving both the energy transition goal and the climate protection targets. So, the new policy target would be “to reduce the heating requirement of the building stock by 20% by 2020, and then, to achieve an almost climate-­ neutral building stock by 2050.”55 In terms of policy strategy to achieve this goal, the policy-makers preferred creating economic incentives for the citizens over ordering compulsory renovation. Thus, the Energy Concept established a modernization campaign for the buildings by employing several financial instruments such as tax incentives for homeowners to promote renovation, state financial support for homeowners if they meet targets ahead of time or at higher standards, use of the market incentive program with additional resources from special energy and climate funds, use of a grant program for urban rehabilitation to be operated by KfW, and a revision of the rent law that will also facilitate investment in energy upgrades. Modernization of the buildings’ energy structure through upgrading the existing stock and creating energy-efficient new buildings will not only fulfil the energy efficiency and climate change targets but also bring additional benefits such as reduced use of fossil energy sources and reduced dependence on energy imports. The Energy Concept also embraced “an improved production of electricity from biomass, greater recovery of biomass in CHPs, and greater use of biomethane”56 with an aim to promote integration of more renewable energies into the energy supply. At the same time, it adopted the EU’s sustainability criteria for all forms of bioenergy. It embraced a policy objective that prioritizes a sustainable, efficient, and nature-friendly agriculture and forest management which minimizes bioenergy use that competes with the production of food and feed. This sustainable use would be maintained via improved use of domestic bioenergy potential while avoiding conflicts of use through wider use of organic residues and wastes, agricultural coproducts, and wood from short-rotation plantations. Also, a new procedure was designed to ensure that only biomass that is produced and used sustainably can count toward quotas or benefit from tax incentives. This requirement would apply equally to biomass produced in Germany and imported from elsewhere. Finally, the Energy Concept recognized the nuclear energy as “a bridging technology until a higher share of RES would be achieved.”57 Therefore, it extended the

 ibid., p. 22.  ibid., p. 22. 56  ibid., p. 10. 57  Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply, Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 28 September 2010, p. 14. 54 55

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operating lives of nuclear power plants in Germany by an average of 12 years. In the case of nuclear power plants commissioned up to and including 1980, there will be an extension of 8 years. For plants commissioned after 1980, there will be an extension of 14 years. The policy perception was that “a limited extension of the operating lives of existing nuclear power plants makes a key contribution to achieving the three energy policy goals of climate protection, economic efficiency and supply security in Germany within a transitional period.”58 However, this perception was going to change very soon. The nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan, in March 2011 dramatically changed the policy context, and the media reaction to the disaster as well as the mass antinuclear public protests across Germany led to the reconsideration of nuclear energy policy by the German government. On 15 March 2011, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced the shut down of 7 nuclear power stations, which had started operation before 1980. In the beginning of April 2011, the Ethics Commission for Safe Energy Supply was convened with the aim of discussing the risks of using nuclear energy. The Commission submitted its recommendations on 30 May 2011 and recommended limiting the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation as far as possible and phasing out nuclear energy within a decade. It also stated that a phase-out would be possible due to the existence of lower-risk alternatives. On this basis, the German Bundestag adopted the 13th Act amending the Atomic Energy Act on 30 June 2011. The amended Act introduced fixed dates by which nuclear power plants in Germany must be shut down, and, thereby, imposed a gradual phase-out of nuclear power generation by the end of 2022 at the latest. From June 2015 to March 2016, the Länder, municipalities, associations, and citizens compiled joint proposals for strategic climate measures to be effective by 2030. In March 2016, they presented 97 proposals for measures to the Federal Environment Minister. Upon these proposals, the German Cabinet adopted the “Climate Action Plan 2050”59 in November 2016. The Action Plan outlined the guiding principles, milestones and targets, strategic measures, and a learning process via public dialogue in all related areas of action. The Plan provided the basic framework, upon which the Bundestag would transpose the necessary legislative measures. As a consequence, the Plan functioned as an essential guidance for all actors in the economy, society, and industry for implementing Germany’s long-term climate action strategy in line with the Paris Agreement. Based on the climate targets for 2050, the Action Plan provided targets, guiding principles, and policy measures in energy, buildings, transport, trade and industry, agriculture, and forestry sectors. The first area of action is the energy sector. In this area, the greenhouse gas neutrality goal requires a gradual phasing out of the use of fossil fuels to produce energy and a completely decarbonized energy supply by 2050. To attain this goal, Action  ibid., p. 15.  Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building, and Nuclear Safety, “Climate Action Plan 2050: Principles and goals of the German government’s climate policy,” November 2016. 58 59

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Plan embraced three guiding principles: “first of all, energy demand must be significantly and permanently reduced in all sectors (efficiency first); secondly, renewable energy must be directly used in all sectors whenever it is feasible; and thirdly, electricity from renewable sources must be used efficiently for heat provision, the transport sector, and industry (sector coupling).”60 The Plan provided two key actions: “increased use of RES and CHP generation, and decommissioning/standby for lignite-­fired power plants.”61 The first action would be implemented through several measures such as: 1. Developing the grid structure for the integration of renewable energy into the electricity supply system. 2. Shifting to market-based processes (tendering) to keep costs as low as possible. 3. Maintaining public understanding and support via local community energy projects. 4. Launching a comprehensive consultation process entitled Electricity 2030 to create consensus among the actors involved. 5. Funding research and development programs and initiatives in renewable energy technologies, grids, and storage systems. The second measure would be implemented through appointing “a commission for growth, structural change, and regional development.”62 The commission will be set up at the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy and will involve other government departments, the Länder, local authorities, trade unions, representatives of affected businesses and sectors, and regional actors. The aim of the Commission would be “to provide realistic prospects for the energy transition by developing a mix of instruments targeting economic development, structural change, social compatibility, and climate action.”63 The second area of action is the buildings. The overall policy goal was to make the building stock virtually climate-neutral by 2050. The Action Plan developed two key actions to attain this goal: “zero-energy building standard for new buildings and extensive refurbishment of the existing building stock.”64 Both actions would be facilitated by measures designed for increasing energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy in the buildings. Government funding programs, such as CO2 Building Rehabilitation Programme and Market Incentive Programme Promoting Renewable Energies, would support implementation of these actions. For the new buildings, zero-energy standard would be the norm from 2021 onward, and this would be facilitated by “using technology-neutral approaches that were developed through the Efficiency House Plus standard, solar house designs,

 ibid., p. 34.  ibid., p. 38. 62  ibid., p. 41. 63  ibid., p. 41. 64  ibid., p. 47. 60 61

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and pilot projects feeding solar thermal energy into heating networks.”65 For the energy-efficient refurbishment of the existing buildings, individual voluntary refurbishment timetables would be introduced as part of the Strategy on Energy Efficiency in Buildings. The government would also use the existing energy-saving legislation to classify the building stock into different energy performance categories. Decarbonization of buildings would also require avoiding the use of fossil fuels and switching to renewable energy sources to provide heating, cooling, and electricity. The government would facilitate this by “phasing out its funding for replacing heating technology based on fossil fuels by 2020, and at the same time, improving funding for renewable heating technologies.”66 This strategy would make renewable heating systems significantly more attractive than those using fossil fuels. As stipulated by the Action Plan, the Commission on Growth, Structural Change and Employment was convened in June 2018. Their final decision67 was announced in January 2019 whereby they recommended the end of 2038 as the end date for coal-fired power generation. A note was also added that “if the requirements for energy, employment, and economy are met, this date may be brought forward to 2035 in negotiation with the operators.”68 The Commission acknowledged that “abruptly phasing out coal would have massive, disproportionate consequences considering the people employed in the coal industry, security of power and heat supply, and the industrial competitiveness.”69 On this recognition, they stated that the cessation of coal-fired generation shall be founded on a reliable structural change which would be created via “a secure underlying framework for long-term investment, new jobs and prospects for companies, sufficient and long-term financing for structural development, a competitive, reliable and interruption-free supply of power and heat, and a balanced distribution of the advantages and burdens of this structural change.”70 The Commission, therefore, recommended a set of closely interlinked measures for climate protection; for energy market and electricity prices for industry and consumers; for the reliability of supply; for better use of grids, storage, sector coupling, and innovation potential; and for creation of jobs. In September 2019, a comprehensive “Climate Action Program 2030”71 was launched with an aim to make sure that Germany will reach its climate targets for 2030. The Program comprised four components for concrete CO2 emissions mitigation: support programs and incentives for cutting CO2 emissions, carbon pricing for the prevention of CO2 emissions, reinvestment of all extra revenues from carbon

 ibid., p. 47.  ibid., p. 48. 67  Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Commission on Growth, Structural Change and Employment, “Final Report,” January 2019. 68  ibid., p. 64. 69  ibid., p. 3. 70  ibid., p. 4. 71  Climate Action Programme 2030, 19 September 2019. 65 66

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pricing in measures promoting climate action, and regulatory measures. With this aim, the Program provided a varied package of sector-specific measures, targets, and incentives in six key sectors: buildings, energy, transport, agriculture and forestry, industry, and waste management. The Program also designated a permanent Climate Cabinet for a continuous review of the effectiveness and efficiency of these measures. In the energy sector, the target was to reduce the CO2 emissions to 175–183 million tons by 2030; and to this end, three key actions were recommended: expanding renewable energies, reducing the use of electricity from coal-fired power plants, and raising energy efficiency. The renewable energy target was set as 65% of gross electricity consumption by 2030. To achieve this goal, the expansion target for the offshore wind energy was raised to 20  GW by 2030. A regionalization bonus was introduced to ensure that the onshore wind farms are better distributed across different regions. To boost public acceptance of the onshore wind energy, a 1000-meter minimum distance was established between wind turbines and purely residential areas. This new minimum distance regulation would apply to all existing and future land use plans, but the Länder and the municipalities would be free to use their opt-­ out right and prescribe lower minimum distances if they require. The importance of sector coupling in renewable electricity was stressed, and the obstacles to sector coupling were recommended to be identified and removed. Future development and comprehensive modernization of CHPs was another important measure to maintain the expansion of renewable energy. It was projected that the modern CHP systems would replace coal-based CHP plants in the long term. Restructuring and expanding the heating networks was also targeted to improve energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy in the buildings. A final policy measure was to establish living labs for the energy transition as a new pillar of research support and funding. In the buildings sector, the target was to reduce the CO2 emissions to 72 million tons by 2030; and to this end, several measures were designed. Firstly, the Program proposed an attractive, simple tax incentive for the energy upgrades from 2020 onward. This tax incentive would supplement existing programs as a further pillar of support. Secondly, the Program proposed optimization of the existing funding programs in the buildings sector in a single, comprehensive, modernized support program: Federal Funding for Energy-Efficient Buildings. This would make the support considerably more user-friendly and attractive, steer funding toward more ambitious measures, and significantly simplify the application procedure. Also, the program’s allocation of funds would be increased. Thirdly, the Program proposed inclusion of an upgrade premium, which covers 40% of a new, more efficient heating system, into the Federal Funding for Energy-Efficient Buildings. The aim was to create an attractive incentive to replace all heating systems that run with fossil-­ based fuels with renewable heating systems. The government also decided to stipulate a legal provision that bans the installation of oil heaters in buildings from 2026 onward. Fourthly, the Program proposed to improve the energy auditing services for residential buildings and making them mandatory in case of change of ownership. Cost of this service would be covered by the existing support programs. Finally, the Program proposed that the federal buildings must be role models for the entire

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building stock in the areas of energy efficiency, climate action, and sustainable construction. With this aim, the existing federal building stock would be given binding upgrade targets for 2030 and 2050.

Policy Legislation In Germany, the federal government and the Länder have responsibilities in the field of energy policy. The federal government is primarily responsible for establishing legislation on energy policy, while the Länder can contribute to the shaping of energy policy via the federal council (Bundesrat). Since a detailed presentation of German federal and regional legislation in renewable energy would be too extensive,72 legislative analysis in this section is based on the federal legislation only (Fig. 4.4).73 Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG) With the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG 2000),74 the German government transposed the executive policy goals into law that would be enforced on the energy sector. If the setting of national targets and strategies is the first step of energy transition, transposition of these policy targets into law and their effective implementation would be the second important step to achieve this goal. The first EEG contained 12 articles. The law transposed the common energy policy goal of the EU and of Germany into law by stipulating that the share of renewable energies in electricity consumption shall be doubled by 2010 (Article 1). To enable this development, the law established five-step priority obligations for network operators: priority connection, purchase, transmission, distribution of renewable energies, and capacity expansion obligation. The aim was to ensure continuous transmission of electricity from RES to industry and consumers. Therefore, the EEG 2000 is important for introducing priority connection, transmission, and distribution of renewable electricity over conventionally generated electricity. The law also provided a remuneration system based on a fixed, regressive feed-in tariff for the renewable energy sources. Specific feed-in tariff rates were provided for electricity from hydropower, landfill gas, mine gas and sewage gas (Article 4),  There are a large variety of legislative and financial measures that have been taken at local/ regional level. For the sake of clarity and length of this section, these regional and local variations will not be considered in this legislative analysis. 73  Since the legislative portfolio in energy policy is extensive including several laws and their amendments, for the sake of clarity, we will cover only the most prominent laws in this section with an aim to shed light on the process of how the new policy objectives and strategies were transposed into law. 74  Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2000 Teil I Nr.13, 31 March 2000. 72

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Fig. 4.4  Germany’s legislative portfolio in renewable energy policy. (Author’s own compilation)

biomass (Article 5), geothermal energy (Article 6), wind power (Article 7), and solar PV (Article 8). The law stipulated that these minimum rates were to be paid for newly commissioned plants for a period of 20 years (Article 9). For systems that were commissioned before the law came into force, the year 2000 was considered as the year of commissioning. The law established a nationwide compensation scheme to balance out the network operators among one another (Article 11). The aim was to reduce the cost differentials paid by grid operators in different parts of the country for the purchase of renewable electricity. To enable this, the network operators shall determine by March 31 of each year, the proportion of the amount of energy that they have purchased in the previous year to the total amount of energy that they have delivered directly or indirectly via networks to end consumers. In case of a dispute, the law entitled the competent higher regional court to determine the compensation by an auditor (Article 11.5). The 2012 amendment to the Renewable Energy Act (EEG 2012)75 transposed the executive policy goals of 2010 Energy Concept76 into law. In pursuant of these  Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2011 Teil I Nr.42, 4 August 2011.  Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, “Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply,” 28 September 2010, p. 5. 75 76

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policy goals, it stipulated the goal of increasing the share of renewable energies in the electricity supply to 35% by 2020, 50% by 2030, 65% by 2040, and 80% by 2050 at the latest (Article 1.2). Furthermore, it stipulated the goal of increasing the share of renewable energies in the total gross final energy consumption to at least 18% by 2020 (Article 1.3). The law retained the five-step priority obligations for network operators for connection, purchase, transmission, and distribution of renewable energies as well as network expansion obligations. Thus, network operators were obliged to prioritize connecting and integrating renewable energy sources into their networks while also ensuring grid safety, reliability, and network expansion to accommodate these energy sources. The costs of connection of renewable energy (Article 13) and capacity expansion (Article 14) shall be borne by the network operators. A crucial change came with the reduction of remuneration to electricity generation facilities from renewable energies. EEG 2012 reduced the feed-in tariff rates between 1% and 2% for hydropower, landfill gas, sewage gas, mine gas, and biomass energy installations from 2013; 5% for geothermal energy; and 7% for offshore wind energy installations from 2018 (Article 20.2). The law also reduced the feed-in tariff rates by 9% for the solar PV installations from 2012 (Article 20a). The reason for this comparatively higher reduction was that there was a risk of overfunding due to comparatively lower investment costs for photovoltaic systems as a result of the development of new low-cost technologies and the expansion of production capacities. A variety of financial support instruments were employed to promote renewable energies. The law retained specific feed-in tariff rates for all renewable energy systems (Articles 23–32). These guaranteed feed-in payments for commercial renewable energy installations aimed to ensure investment security. The law also provided direct marketing instruments (Article 33b) in the form of market premium, flexibility premium, and EEG surcharge reduction. These instruments aimed to bring renewable energies closer to the market. We will analyze these financial instruments briefly here. The market premium was provided for direct marketing of electricity from renewable energies (Article 33 g). The premium shall be calculated every calendar month retrospectively based on the difference between the average market price and the reference tariff for that renewable energy and multiplying this sum by the amount of electricity generated in that calendar month (Annex 4). The flexibility premium was provided only for the biogas plants for the provision of additional installed capacity for electricity generation (Article 33i). It shall be calculated every calendar year and is payable for a period of 10 years. The amount was set as EUR 130 per kilowatt for the provision of the additional installed power (Annex 5). Finally, the EEG surcharge was reduced by 2 cents per kilowatt hour if the electricity supply companies provide at least 50% of renewable electricity to their consumers and at least 20% of their electricity supply comes from wind and solar PV (Article 39).

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The 2014 amendment to the Renewable Energy Act (EEG 2014)77 is sometimes known as the EEG 2.0 due to its differences from earlier legislation. The most striking change was the termination of feed-in tariffs for larger installations generating electricity from RES.  This change was introduced pursuant to the Commission Communication (2014/C 200/01) which required the gradual phasing-out of the feed-in tariff and establishment of market-based processes. Although the state aid guidelines are not EU law that mandates member states’ compliance, they are understood in practice as rules that the member states must adhere to. Therefore, EEG-2014 stipulated that the entitlement to feed-in tariff would continue only for electricity from installations commissioned before 1 January 2016 with a maximum capacity of 500 KW, and for electricity from installations commissioned after 31 December 2015 with a maximum capacity of 100 KW (Article 37.2). The limitation of the feed-in tariffs strictly to small installations was a decision in line with the European Commission guidelines. The new rates were introduced with significant reductions (Articles 40–51). The use of market-based instruments continued with the market premium for renewable electricity (Article 34) and with the flexibility premium for the biogas plants (Articles 52–54). Market premiums acquired a new role after the termination of the feed-in tariff scheme and became an instrument that compensates for the difference between the reference value (previously feed-in tariff) and the average trading price for electricity from that renewable energy. Another important amendment was the introduction of the auctions for electricity from renewable energy sources. Initially, this procedure would start only for ground-mounted solar installations, and the Federal Network Agency would determine the level of financial support based on auctions (Article 55). The amended law retained the priority obligations for network operators to connect (Article 8), to use (Article 10), and to purchase, transmit, and distribute (Article 11) the electricity generated from the renewable energy sources, as well as the network expansion obligations (Article 12) to enable these processes. Finally, the law retained the EEG surcharge (Articles 60–61). This surcharge continued pursuant to one of the basic principles of the Act that “the costs of the financial support for electricity from renewable energy sources should be distributed appropriately in view of the user-pays principleˮ (Article 2.4). The 2017 amendment to the Renewable Energy Act (EEG 2017)78 transposed the executive policy goals of Climate Action Plan 205079 which were designed on the basis of the new international frameworks, i.e., the Paris Agreement and the EU climate targets. Embracing the new policy goal of achieving almost complete greenhouse gas neutrality by 2050, EEG-2017 amended the previously established goals of EEG-2014. The amended law stipulated the new goal of increasing the

 Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2014 Teil I Nr.33, 24 July 2014.  Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2017 Teil I Nr.49, 24 July 2017. 79  Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety, “Climate Action Plan 2050,” 9 June 2015. 77 78

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proportion of electricity generated from RES in gross electricity consumption to 40–45% by 2025, 55–60% by 2035, and at least 80% by 2050 (Article 1.2). This goal would be achieved by establishing development corridors for the newly build installations of renewable energy (Article 4).80 The amended law retained the fivestep priority obligations for network operators for connection, purchase, transmission, and distribution of renewable energies, as well as the obligation of grid system capacity expansion. The EEG-2017 retained the feed-in tariff only for electricity from small installations with an installed capacity of up to 100 kilowatts (Article 21.1). The amended law introduced the landlord-to-tenant supply premium for electricity from solar installations with a total installed capacity of up to 100 kilowatts which are installed on or in a residential building and consumed within that building or in residential buildings in a direct spatial relationship with that building and not fed through a grid system (Article 21.3). The EEG-2017 retained the market premium, but there was a paradigm shift regarding the determination of its value not by the government but by the tenders on the market. The aim of the introduction of a competitive approach was to maintain renewable energy as a cost-efficient source by keeping costs as low as possible and to control the level of expansion.81 The new system was also in line with the European Commission guidelines for financial support to renewable energies to be based on market-based instruments, rather than on feed-in tariffs. The EEG-2017 widened the range of auctions to include most renewable technologies, i.e., the onshore and offshore wind energy installations, solar installations, and biomass (Article 22). As mentioned before, in the EEG-2014, this procedure was introduced only for the ground-mounted PV installations as a pilot area. The EEG-2017 exempted the onshore wind energy installations and solar installations with an installed capacity of up to and including 750 kilowatts from the auctions so that they could continue receiving feed-in tariffs. Regarding the procedure of the auctions, the law entitled the Federal Network Agency to announce the auctions on its website providing all necessary information on the bid deadline, the volume of the auction, and the maximum value (Article 29). The lowest bids would win until the capacity under auction is met. The Federal Network Agency would inform the bidders who have been awarded funding about the award and the value of the award (Article 35). Successful projects would receive the awarded funding rate for 20 years (Article 25). The EEG-2017 introduced a reduction of the EEG surcharge in the event of negative prices for six consecutive hours (Article 51). It also introduced a 40% reduction in the EEG surcharge for self-suppliers for highly efficient CHP  Article 4 stipulated that “the annual capacity increase in onshore wind energy installations shall be 2.8 GW in 2017 to 2019 and 2.9 GW from 2020; for offshore wind energy installations 6.5 GW by 2020 and 15 GW by 2030; for PV installations 2.5 GW; and for biomass energy installations 150 MW in 2017 to 2019 and 200 MW in 2020 to 2022.ˮ 81  Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety, “Climate Action Plan 2050,” 9 June 2015, p. 39. 80

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installations (Article 61b) and a 20% reduction in the EEG surcharge for the renewal or replacement of the existing installation without expansion (Article 61e). As mentioned before, there has been an ongoing debate among the policy-­makers and the public on whether growing crops for biofuel was an ecologically sound practice. On this issue, EEG-2017 stipulated that an entitlement to payment of various types of financial support to the biogas plants shall exist only if the proportion of cereal grain or maize used to produce biogas amounts to maximum 50% of the total mass annually for the installations that received an award in 2017 or 2018. This rate decreases to 47% for the installations awarded in 2019 or 2020, and further decreases to 44% for the installations awarded in 2021 or 2022 (Article 39  h Paragraph 1). This rule came to be known as the maize lid. The latest amendment to Renewable Energies Act (EEG 2021)82 came into effect on 1 January 2021. In this book, we analyze the impact and effectiveness of the executive and legislative portfolios in renewable energy on the achievement of the renewable energy targets set for 2020, so the EEG-2021 is not highly relevant for this analysis. However, considering that all new amendments shed light on the direction of the energy policy targets and strategies, we will analyze the most important amendments provided by the EEG-2021 with an aim to project their impact on the future development of the renewable energies in Germany. The EEG-2021 set the renewable energy target in electricity sector as 65% by 2030 (Article 1.2) and set the target of greenhouse gas neutrality by 2050 (Article 1.3). To attain these goals, it provided a significant increase in the renewable energy development corridors (Article 4). The new expansion paths for 2030 were set as 71 GW for onshore wind energy installations, 100 GW for solar PV installations, and 8.4 GW for biomass energy installations (Article 4). Feed-in tariffs were retained for the small renewable energy installations with an installed capacity up to 100 kilowatts (Article 21). Entitlement to market premiums continued if the electricity is marketed directly (Article 20). Tender volumes were specified for onshore wind energy installations (Article 28), for solar PV systems (Article 28a), for biomass installations (Article 28b), and for innovative systems (Article 28c). With an aim to incentivize expansion of renewable energies in the southern Germany, EEG-2021 introduced a quota for the south in the tenders from 2022 onward. Under this new incentive, Federal Network Agency would separate the admitted bids and ensure that in the calls for tenders for the years 2022 and 2023, 15% of the successful tenders would be allocated to the south, and from the year 2024 onward, 20% of the successful tenders would be allocated to the south (Article 36d). For the biomass systems, 50% of the successful tenders would be allocated to the south from 2022 onward (Article 39d). The southern quota regions correspond to Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and the southern Rhineland-Palatinate regions (Appendix 5). The aim of the southern quota was to reduce the imbalance in terms of renewable energy capacity which is tilted toward the north of the country.

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 Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2020, Teil I Nr.65, 28 December 2020.

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Regarding the maize lid, the EEG-2021 further restricted the existing requirements for the use of grain or maize to generate biogas. With the new amendment, entitlement to payment of financial support can be claimed by newly approved biogas plants only if their use of maize and cereal grain is maximum 40% of total mass per year (Article 39i). The EEG-2021 introduced a bonus for small biomass installations with an aim to strengthen the competitiveness of systems in the lower performance segment. Therefore, biomass installations with a capacity up to and including 500 kW can claim a bonus of 0.5 cents per kWh for the calendar years 2021–2025 (Article 39 g). Finally, the EEG-2021 retained the reductions of EEG surcharges for highly efficient CHPs (Article 61c) and for newer CHPs (Article 61d). In line with the green hydrogen strategy, producers of green hydrogen were exempted from paying the EEG surcharge (Article 69b).  enewable Energies Heat Act R (Erneuerbare-­Energien-Wärmegesetz, EEWärmeG) To achieve energy transition in the heating and cooling sector, Renewable Energies Heat Act (EEWärmeG)83 entered into force on 1 January 2009. The purpose of the law is to achieve sustainable development of energy supply from RES and to promote further development of technologies for the production of heating and cooling from RES (Article 1.1). With this purpose, the law intended to increase the share of renewable energies in the energy consumption for heating and cooling up to 14% by 2020 (Article 1.2). In this context, the law designated a role model function for the public buildings (Article 1a). Public buildings located abroad and owned by the public sector must also serve as role models where they are located. The law stipulated that the owners of buildings (both public and private) that are newly constructed must meet their heating and cooling energy demand through the proportional use of renewable energies (Article 3). This obligation applies to all buildings with a usable area of more than 50 square meters (Article 4). When solar radiation energy is used, at least 15% of the heating and cooling energy requirement shall be covered from this source; when solid or liquid biomass or geothermal energy is used, at least 50% of the heating and cooling energy requirement shall be covered from this source (Article 5). This obligation is deemed fulfilled if at least 50% of the heating and cooling energy requirement comes from CHP plants (Article 7). In this context, public sector must act as a role model (Article 10a). The Act stipulated that the renewable energies for the generation of heating and cooling are to be funded by the federal government with up to 500 million Euros per year from 2009 to 2012 (Article 13). The Act well reflected the changing requirements arising from changing political and social contexts. As a result of the unexpected wave of refugees and asylum

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 Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2008, Teil I No. 36, 18 August 2008.

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seekers in 2015, Germany had to use buildings owned by the public sector as reception facilities or communal accommodation for these persons. With an amendment to Heat Act84 in 2015, heating and cooling requirements of these buildings were also taken into consideration and added to the context of the Act (Article 9a). The Act introduced the obligation of proportional use of renewable energies for these buildings with a possible exemption by the competent authority up to December 31, 2018 (Article 9a.2). To summarize, EEWärmeG had a triplefold approach, i.e., target setting, regulatory obligation, and state support, to enable the desired transition. The law addressed the heating and cooling energy supply of the new buildings with the regulatory obligation to use renewable energies (Article 3). With the financial support measure designated for the use of renewable energies in the heating and cooling sector (Article 13), the law primarily aimed to transform the energy structure of the existing building stock. These measures resulted in an increase in the share of renewable energies in the heating and cooling sector. With this positive trend, it also contributed to achieve the long-­ term target of almost climate-neutral building stock by 2050. Market Incentive Program (Marktanreizprogramm, MAP) The German government recognized that to achieve its renewable energy targets, it needs to provide financial support to citizens, companies, and municipalities to change their heating and cooling systems with the new, more efficient systems that also use renewable energies. To initiate and promote this transition process, it introduced the “guidelines to promote measures for the use of renewable energies in the heating market” in 1999. These guidelines were amended in 201585 and 201986 according to the changing conditions. The Market Incentive Program (MAP)87 is a state funding program which primarily aims to increase the share of renewable energies to cover heating and cooling requirements in the existing buildings, improve competitiveness and promote innovations in the renewable energy technologies for heating and cooling sector, and, therefore, create a sustainable energy supply (Article 3). The program established two funding procedures: investment grants are provided by the Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA); low-interest loans and repayment grants are provided by the state-owned KfW-banking group (Kreditanstalt für  Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2015, Teil I No. 40, 20 October 2015.  Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, “Guidelines to promote measures for the use of renewable energies in the heating market,ˮ 11 March 2015. 86  Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, “Guidelines to promote measures for the use of renewable energies in the heating market,ˮ 30 December 2019. 87  Here, we will refer to the most recent amendment of the Guidelines: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, “Guidelines to promote measures for the use of renewable energies in the heating market,ˮ 30 December 2019. 84 85

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Wiederaufbau). Private individuals (both homeowners and tenants), municipalities, local authorities, companies, and nonprofit organizations are eligible to apply for these funds (Article 5). BAFA grants investment subsidies for the promotion of mostly small systems up to 100 kW power in the areas of solar thermal energy, biomass, and heat pumps. Funding through investment grants takes the form of project funding on an expenditure basis. This is as a shared financing in the form of a nonrepayable subsidy based on the eligible costs (Article 6.1). Eligible costs are the acquisition costs of the system, installation and commissioning expenses, expenses for the specialist planning and construction supervision, and expenses for necessary environmental measures (Article 6.1). The amount of funding is limited to a maximum of €50,000 per unit for residential buildings and a maximum of €3.5 million per unit for nonresidential buildings (Section 6.2). As part of the KfW Renewable Energies premium program, funding is provided in the form of low-interest loans and repayment grants for large solar thermal plants, biomass heating plants, biogas pipelines, deep geothermal systems, and local heating networks for heat from renewable energies. The amount of support is determined based on the type of renewable energy and the capacity of the installation. The MAP guidelines have been effective for more than 20 years now. Since the program first started in 1999, the Federal Office of Economics and Export Control has paid out grants totaling more than €3  billion, thereby generating €20  billion investment. In this context, more than 1.8 million systems were subsidized.88 This high volume of grants in two decades played an important role in the conversion of heating and cooling structures of existing buildings toward energy-efficient systems using renewable energy sources. Effective provision and use of state support, in this context, significantly contributed to the energy transition in Germany.

Conclusion This chapter analyzed the operationalization of the idea of energy transition in Germany and the Czech Republic via an analysis of the executive and legislative portfolio.89 We found that in line with EU policy targets, Germany set out its national target as 18% by 2020 and 30% by 2030 for the share of renewable energies in total energy consumption. It also set an ambitious target of complete greenhouse gas neutrality by 2050. In comparison, the Czech Republic set out its national target as 14% by 2020 and 22% by 2030 for the share of renewable energies in total energy consumption. These targets serve as contextual drivers for the policy-makers in

 Federal Office of Economics and Export Control, “20 Jahre Marktanreizprogramm Wärme aus Erneuerbaren Energien,ˮ July 2019, p. 3. 89  In this analysis, the focus is solely on the electricity and the heating and cooling sectors, and the transport sector is neglected. 88

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developing necessary state regulations; for this reason, they are important benchmarks in delivering necessary policy outcomes. We have also seen that both Germany and the Czech Republic set up a stable and transparent legislative framework for the renewable energies. In Germany, the EEG and EEWӓrmeG are good examples for effective state regulation which can trigger new renewable energy investments. In the Czech Republic, Energy Act, Energy Management Act, and Renewable Energy Sources Act are the basic elements of legislative framework in energy policy, and they include several policy measures designed to increase the share of renewables in electricity sector and heating and cooling sector. This regulatory approach by the state is important to initiate and implement the desired change in all energy sectors. In Germany, the EEG-2000 provided a fixed, regressive feed-in tariff for renewable sources, and this enabled the fast development of the renewable energies with the involvement of a wide range of public participants in the system. We found a similar framework in the Czech Republic as well. The Act on Renewable Energy Sources (2005 and 2012) promoted the use of renewable electricity by means of feed-in tariff and green bonuses (market premium). After 2014, both countries shifted to market-oriented instruments and employed tenders (auctions) for the new renewable energy investments. Therefore, both countries provided a mix of different financial support instruments to achieve the energy transition.

Chapter 5

Political and Public Perceptions

Introduction This chapter investigates how political and public actors in Germany and Czech Republic perceive energy transition and further deployment of renewable energies. Political support for energy transition is important because governments can create both guidance and coercive pressure on industry and society via policy targets and measures that promote energy transition. So, political will and accord are key factors for devising necessary policy targets and mechanisms, diverting funds, and attracting adequate investments in renewable energies. Public support for energy transition is important because public actors can induce gradual change by creating consensus on energy transition. Participation of various societal actors and stakeholders in energy transition process contributes to expansion of renewable energy investments. To understand both dimensions, we investigate the political climate by analyzing the discourses of political parties and political actors, and, then, investigate the public support for energy transition by analyzing opinion polls. We complement them with primary empirical data by carrying out interviews with energy experts, energy analysts, representatives of research institutions, and former politicians (Fig. 5.1).

Germany Political Perceptions In the early 2000s, Germany became a pioneer in climate protection policy and set the course for European cooperation on environmental issues. The energy transition policy in Germany, Energiewende, has been widely supported by major political © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Tanil, Sustainable Energy Development, Environment & Policy 63, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28065-8_5

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Fig. 5.1  Conceptual framework of political and public support for energy transition. (Author’s own compilation)

parties. Here, we will investigate the party programs of the Grand Coalition parties and major opposition parties. The party program of CDU/CSU for 2017–2021 advocated “restructuring of the financial support mechanism for the renewable energies on a market-based approach for drastically reducing the expansion costs for offshore/onshore wind and solar PV systems.”1 The party advocated this market-based approach with an aim to keep electricity affordable for all companies and private consumers. They advocated good environment and good economy together: “With the initiation of the energy transition policy and the expansion of renewable energies, Germany has made an important contribution to this goal. With an aim to succeed energy transition while maintaining the competitiveness of the economy, energy transition must be organized in a market economy.”2 The party program proposed to stick to the country’s national climate targets and implement these targets in a step-by-step approach. The SPD has traditionally been the country’s labor party; so, they consider German coal-mining regions and industrial regions as their strongholds, particularly the Ruhr region in North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, and Lower Saxony. The party program for 2017–2021 stated how the party plans to deal with the coal phase-out in these regions: “The structural change in the energy industry imposes special

 CDU/CSU. (2017). Government Program 2017–2021: For a Germany in which we live well and happily. p. 21. 2  ibid., p. 69. 1

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challenges on Lusatia, Central Germany, and Rhine district. In these regions, new economic structures must be set up and expanded with the support of federal funds. They should be built on the industrial tradition of these regions and secured by collective agreements among trade unions, companies, and citizens.”3 The SPD declared three goals of its energy policy as environmentally friendly, affordable, and reliable energy. The party considers renewable energies as “the most cost-effective form of energy generation in the long-term,” and they believe that “they will make Germany independent of oil, natural gas, and uranium from conflict regions.”4 So, party’s overarching goal was to “make Germany the most energy-­ efficient economy in the world”5 and “further develop the climate protection plan 2050.”6 To continue energy transition successfully, SPD’s proposals were “to achieve sector coupling, rapid expansion of the distribution and transmission networks, better utilization of existing power lines with the help of new technologies and ensure that everyone participates in energy transition.”7 The party program of Alliance 90/The Greens criticized the policies of CDU/ CSU and SPD: “They ignore the reality of the climate crisis and negligently risk the future of our children and the future viability of our economy. Germany’s emissions have stagnated for over seven years. We are miles away from our climate target of reducing CO2 emissions”8 argued the Greens. Instead of long-term policies on coal phase-out, the Greens proposed to initiate an irreversible phase-out of coal in the next 4 years. They advocated an immediate action and proposed to “take the twenty dirtiest coal-fired power plants off the grid immediately, cap the CO2 emissions of the remaining coal-fired power plants in line with the climate targets, and prevent opening of new lignite opencast mines and construction of new coal-fired power plants.”9 They wanted to carry out this policy through a coal exit law and an amended mining law. Regarding the structural change in mining regions, they proposed such policy measures as “making energy transition socially acceptable by working together with all people involved, setting up a new fund to remediate post-mining damage, and creating new jobs.”10 Their strategy was “to withdraw as much capital as possible from fossil fuels and flow this into where it creates sustainable prosperity and new jobs.”11

 SPD. (2017). Government Program 2017–2021: It’s Time for More Justice. p. 31.  ibid., p. 61. 5  ibid., p. 62. 6  ibid., p. 61. 7  ibid., p. 62. 8  Alliance 90/The Greens. (2017). Government Program 2017–2021: The future is made of courage. p. 34. 9  ibid., p. 35. 10  ibid., p. 39. 11  ibid., p. 43. 3 4

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Regarding renewable energies, they proposed several policy measures: “making a new, nationwide climate protection law which sets national reduction targets in a legally binding manner and defines targets for all relevant sectors; switching completely to renewables; abolishing the upper limits for the expansion of renewable energies; amending electricity market design and tax system on energy in favour of renewable energies; setting renewable energy projects free from bureaucratic obligation to tender and surcharges; promoting use of renewable heat in existing buildings, promoting energy modernization of houses and entire city districts by expanding local heating networks and waste heat utilization.”12 They recognized that the switch to climate-friendly heating is only possible if it is affordable; to this end, they proposed “fair heat funding program which will provide at least 2 billion Euros annually to energy modernization of buildings.”13 Diametrically opposite arguments came from the far-right party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), which disputed the climate change. They falsely argued that “CO2 is not a pollutant, but an indispensable prerequisite for all life. The statements of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that climate change is predominantly man-made is not correct.”14 Based on these arguments, they even called for “termination of Germany’s involvement in Paris Climate Agreement.”15 They proposed to continue using modern gas and coal power plants and the existing nuclear power plants until the end of their useful life. Regarding the renewable energies, they stressed “the costs and problems of the energy transition such as rising prices, endangered network stability, increasing risk of power outages, and a lack of large storage facilities.”16 Based on these reasons, they called for “abolishment of the EEG and EEWärmeG without replacement and stopping the expansion of wind energy.” They proposed “not to install renewable energy systems in forests and protected areas, keep minimum distance of wind turbines from residential areas by 10 times the total height of the turbines, and design wind projects only with the consent of the citizens concerned.”17 These policies found a large supporter base in the coal regions and provided 27.5% of the votes in Saxony and 23.5% in Brandenburg, making AfD the second biggest political party in both states.

 ibid., p. 50–54.  ibid., p. 54. 14  AfD. (2017). Government Program 2017–2021: Alternative Manifesto for Germany. p. 64. 15  ibid., p. 64. 16  ibid., p. 65. 17  ibid., p. 72. 12 13

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Public Perceptions In the context of public perceptions, we analyzed three areas: (a) Perceptions of environment, climate change, and energy (b) Attitudes toward energy transition (c) Actions for energy saving and energy transition We analyzed these indicators in two dimensions comparatively: at the EU level and at the country level. We used Eurobarometer public surveys carried out in 2019, 2020, 2021, and most recently in 2022 to make this comparative analysis in a reasonable time series. (a) Perception of Energy Transition The first indicator that we analyzed in this context was whether protecting the environment and mitigating climate change are perceived as policy priorities for the German public opinion. The survey results give us the percentage of the respondents who consider it as the primary political issue to be dealt with by the governments. In 2022,18 34% of the respondents at the EU average perceived the rising prices/ inflation/cost of living as the most important issue facing the EU. Energy supply came as the second issue with 28%, while the environment and climate change came at the fourth position with only 20% at the EU level. Similarly, in Germany,19 rising prices/inflation/cost of living became the major concern facing the EU (40%), and it was followed by energy supply (37%). The environment and climate change became the fourth most important issue with only 24%. In this regard, the German public perception did not deviate from the EU average. This result is similar to the earlier findings for Germany. Only in 2021,20 28% of the respondents in Germany21 considered the climate change as the most serious problem facing the world, a much higher proportion than the EU average (18%). In other years, environment and climate were in lower ranks than more immediate concerns such as economy and immigration. In 2020,22 the major concern of the public both in Germany and in the EU was economy (35%). It was followed by concerns over public finance (32%) and immigration (27%). 24% of the respondents in Germany23 perceived environment and climate change as an important issue facing the EU, which located the issue at the fifth position. This result was more or

 Standard Eurobarometer 97, Summer 2022.  1507 face-to-face interviews were carried out. 20  Special Eurobarometer 513, March-April 2021. 21  1505 face-to-face interviews were carried out. 22  Standard Eurobarometer 93, Summer 2020. 23  1514 face-to-face interviews were carried out. 18 19

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less the same at the EU average in that year. In 2019,24 38% of respondents in Germany25 perceived immigration as the most important issue facing the EU, followed by climate change with 31%. This rate was higher than the average of the EU where 24% of the EU citizens consider climate change as priority. In that year, environment was at the sixth position in Germany with only 17%. (b) Attitudes Toward Energy Transition The second indicator that we analyzed in this context was the means of the realization of energy transition objective. Here, we searched for the public attitudes over the mechanisms that can be devised by the government to attain higher deployment of renewable energies. In 2022, due to the impact of the war between Ukraine and Russia and the resulting energy crisis in Europe, 87% of the respondents at the EU level agreed that the EU should invest massively in renewable energies. This rate was even higher (91%) in Germany. 86% of the respondents at the EU level also agreed that the EU should reduce its dependency on Russian sources of energy. This rate was similar in Germany with 87% of the respondents. 85% of the EU citizens agreed that increasing energy efficiency in buildings, transports, and goods will make Europeans less dependent from energy producers. Similarly, 86% of the respondents in Germany agreed to this statement. Finally, 84% of the respondents at the EU average agreed that reducing imports of oil and gas and investing in renewable energies is important for overall security. This rate was the same in Germany. In 2021, 87% of the respondents in Germany and 76% of those in the EU average agreed that tackling climate change and environment issues should be a priority to improve public health. 91% of the respondents in Germany and 90% of those at the EU average agreed that we should reduce greenhouse gas emissions to a minimum while offsetting the remaining emissions to make the EU economy climate-neutral by 2050. In 2020, 54% of the respondents in Germany (in 2019, 59%) and 52% of those in the EU average (in 2019, 54%) agreed that developing renewable energy should be given top priority in the European Green Deal to protect the environment and fight climate change. (c) Actions for Energy Saving and Energy Transition In 2022, in Germany, 79% of the respondents agreed that they have recently taken action to reduce their own energy consumption, or they plan to do so soon. This rate is almost the same at the EU average with 78% of the respondents. In 2021, 79% of the respondents in Germany agreed that they have taken action to fight the climate change in the last 6 months. This rate was 64% at the EU average. Those who disagreed to this statement were 20% in Germany, while it was as high as 35% at the EU average. In Germany, the most popular attitude was reducing the waste and recycling it (81%), followed by cutting down the use of disposable

24 25

 Standard Eurobarometer 92, Autumn 2019.  1540 face-to-face interviews were carried out.

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items (74%). Using environmentally friendly transport came as the third most popular attitude with 51% of the respondents. Other high percentage actions were considering carbon footprint of transport for longer-distance travel (21%), switching to energy supplier which offers a greater share of renewable sources (17%), and home insulation to reduce energy consumption (16%). The EU averages for all these actions were considerably lower than the rates for Germany. Public surveys carried out by other independent agencies displayed similar results. They all confirmed that public acceptance of energy transition policy is high in Germany. For instance, a survey conducted in 2019 by YouGov and commissioned by the Renewable Energy Agency revealed that an overwhelming majority of the people in Germany supports energy transition. According to the results, 89% of those surveyed26 considered further expanding renewable energy important or extremely important. Among different renewable energy sources, 57% of the respondents supported solar power installations, 45% supported offshore wind energy installations, and 34% supported onshore wind energy installations.27 Another YouGov survey conducted in 2020 revealed that 74% of the respondents28 supported wind turbines as a supplier of renewable energies, while only 16% rejected them. The same positive public perception is noticeable regarding the construction of new wind turbines: 73% of the respondents considered new wind installations important, while 17% considered them not important.29 As can be seen from different public opinion polls, German public opinion is generally supportive of the expansion of renewable energy technologies. Previously, we discussed that negative public perceptions of renewable energies may stem from different concerns of local communities living in the close amenity of these projects. Especially regarding the large wind energy projects, these concerns circle around the perceived environmental risks on birds and wildlife, perceived negative aesthetic impacts on landscape, perceived negative impacts on human health due to disturbance by sound, and perceived procedural and distributive (un)fairness of the projects for the local communities. Not in the big, urban areas, but in the local towns of Germany, we have seen protests arising from these concerns. Notwithstanding the fact that wind energy is the country’s most important renewable energy source, some German local communities became ardent opponents of it. They usually complained about the wind turbines’ negative effects on people, wildlife, and natural scenery, and based on these convictions, campaigned against erecting new wind farms around their local communities. We give a few examples here. In February 2016, local residents in Lower Saxony,

 1000 people took part in the survey in 2019.  Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien. (2019). Acceptance of renewable energy in Germany 2019. https://www.unendlich-viel-energie.de/english/acceptance-of-renewable-energy-ingermany-2019 28  2068 people took part in survey between 17 and 20 January 2020. 29  YouGov: What the world thinks. (2020, January 23). Drei Viertel der Deutschen befürworten Windenergie. https://yougov.de/news/2020/01/23/drei-viertel-der-deutschen-befurworten-windenergie/ 26 27

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Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and Schleswig-Holstein protested the expansion of wind power. Their basic complaint was the loss of value for residential property, noise, and perceived negative effects of infrasound on human health. In December 2016, local residents in Neukalen and Jürgenstorf impacted on the decision of regional planning council and stopped the development of a new wind power project between Jürgenstorf, Krummsee, and Ritzerow. In March 2017, local residents protested the regional wind power conference in Oldesloer Stormarnhalle due to their concern over the health risks of wind turbines. In March 2020, local residents in Odenwald/Rothenberg protested the planned wind farm of 13 turbines due to a perceived threat to the quality of life in the area and local tourism in the mountains. As seen from a few examples here, local protestors generally voiced concerns over potential negative impacts on flora and fauna, particularly birds and bats, infrasound pollution, and negative impacts on landscape. Indeed, there is an academic study which investigated the influence of public protests on the reduction of state expansion targets for renewables.30 The study was carried out in Saxony between 2011 and 2013 and found that activists, working through a range of channels and at several levels of the politico-administrative system, influenced regional planners and politicians and became successful in halting the expansion of wind energy in the region. Not to retreat from the state policy of expansion of renewable energy targets, both national and regional governments should take public concerns seriously, and focus more on public information and awareness campaigns, as well as attainment of more community involvement into planning and decision-making processes.

Czech Republic Political Perceptions In this section, we will analyze political party programs and discourses of the political figures in the Czech Republic on the question of energy transition with an aim to sketch how different interests are articulated within the political system. This analysis will also help us to understand and identify the tensions in politics. During the European Council on 23–24 October 2014, negotiations on energy transition revealed a controversy between the policy positions of the Eastern European states and other EU member states. Regarding the proposed tougher climate and energy targets for 2030,31 ministers from the Czech Republic, Slovakia,

 Lintz, G. & Leibenath, M., 2020. The politics of energy landscapes: the influence of local antiwind initiatives on state policies in Saxony, Germany. Energy, Sustainability and Society, 10(5). 31  A binding EU target of an at least 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990. A binding EU-level target of at least 27% for the share of renewable energy consumed in the EU in 2030. An indicative target at the EU level of at least 27% for energy efficiency in 2030. 30

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Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania announced a joint statement32 and stated their opposition to “binding renewable energy and energy efficiency targets at the EU level or national level.”33 The Ministers of Environment maintained that “any decision on climate and energy policy must respect that it is the sovereign right of every member state to freely choose its most suitable energy mix” and that “the proposed level of CO2 reduction is too ambitious, and its implementation would be economically challenging in our regional conditions and national circumstances.”34 As a result of the negotiations, a special flexibility clause was added to the final text.35 Through this reference, member states obtained a guarantee that the two EU goals of renewable energy and energy efficiency would not be binding at the national level.36 Now we will analyze election manifestos of the Czech political parties to find out their proposals for energy transition. ANO 2011, a new political party since 2012, has taken part in coalition governments since 2013 parliamentary elections. Their party program for 2014 European election promoted “a balanced EU energy policy by taking into account the specifics of the Czech Republic” and “rejected any European energy policy concept or legislation that would disadvantage nuclear energy and the use of strategic coal reserves in the Czech Republic.”37 On 24–25 May 2014, ANO came first nationally by winning 16.13% of the votes. On 20–21 October 2017, ANO won the national legislative election with 29.6% of the votes, becoming the largest party in the Parliament. The party provided their energy policy in the Program Statement of the Government in 2018 based on the policy priorities of ensuring energy self-sufficiency, security of supply, and competitive energy prices. In terms of electricity generation, the  program promised growing share of nuclear energy and renewable energy sources and gradual decline in coal-fired power generation. Regarding coal mining, the party program declared that the limits of lignite mining would be maintained and projects to improve air quality in all regions, primarily in Moravian-Silesian and Ústí nad Labem regions, would be prepared and financially supported. The government also proposed to simplify the conditions for the small producers of electricity from renewable sources for their own consumption, and promised to carry out an analysis of

 Joint Statement of the 21st Meeting of the Ministers of Environment of the Visegrad Group of Countries, the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania, 30 September 2014, Bratislava, Slovakia. 33  ibid. 34  ibid. 35  European Council Conclusions on 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework, 23 October 2014, SN 79/14. 36  These targets will be achieved while fully respecting the member states’ freedom to determine their energy mix. Targets will not be translated into nationally binding targets. Individual member states are free to set their own higher national targets. 37  Detailní program|ANO, bude líp. (2014). [Press release]. https://www.anobudelip.cz/cs/o-nas/ eurovolby/detailni-program/ 32

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overcompensations, especially for large solar power plants, to reduce high payments for existing renewables. The Czech Social Democratic Party’s (ČSSD) 2017 election program, “Good Earth for Life,” stated their energy policy priorities as “energy stability and affordable energy prices.”38 So, they prioritized the provision of reliable energy supplies to public at affordable prices. To achieve this objective, ČSSD perceived the development of renewable energy sources as an effective tool and, thereby, supported the development of transmission and distribution networks to ensure a secure and stable supply of renewable electricity. In connection with the decline of coal-fired power plants, ČSSD supported “further development of nuclear energy, including the construction of a new unit at Dukovany nuclear power plant, and later, at Temelín.”39 In terms of energy use, ČSSD promised state support for energy-saving measures, refurbishment of buildings’ heating facilities, and domestic electricity generation. They stated that “current air quality is not ideal and may worsen due to insensitive changes in economy and energy use. This must be prevented by the state, regions, municipalities, and by the people themselves. We guarantee that the state will support those who decide to save energy and will not increase energy costs for people.”40 In this context, they proposed replacement of old non-ecological boilers and support for domestic electricity generation. However, the party program did not clarify which support mechanisms are to be used to enable these actions. TOP09 is a liberal-conservative party meaning “tradition, responsibility, prosperity,” and it was founded in 2009. The party program for 2017 elections stated their energy policy as “ensuring energy security of the Czech Republic via providing stable, safe, and cost-effective energy supply.”41 They would achieve this goal by using four strategies: “suitable energy mix with gradual decrease of coal power plants and increase of renewable energies; extension of service life of existing units and construction of new units in Dukovany nuclear power plant; energy savings; and affordable energy for businesses and households.”42 Regarding state financial support for renewable energies, they favored “a competitive and fair business in energy sector” on the conviction that “energy must remain affordable for all social groups without exception.”43 They criticized an earlier situation where “reckless support for solar energy placed a disproportionate burden on consumers and state budget”; thus, they proposed to use “state financial support mainly for research and development of new, more efficient renewable technologies.”44

 ČSSD. (2017). Party Program for 2017 Parliamentary Election.  ibid. 40  ibid. 41  TOP09. (2017). Party Program for 2017 Parliamentary Election. p. 30. 42  ibid., p. 30. 43  ibid., p. 31. 44  ibid., p. 31. 38 39

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In August 2017, TOP09 announced a “Memorandum on Environmental Protection,” which was written by three former environment ministers.45 This document is one of the most sophisticated environmental programs of the Czech political parties. On the question of coal phase-out, the memorandum stressed that “the Czech Republic has no plan for the gradual exit from coal dependence and the replacement of decommissioned capacities with clean non-fossil resources and energy savings.”46 Upon this recognition, they proposed preparing a plan for “gradual decarbonisation of the Czech energy sector.” This plan would include “a binding schedule for decommissioning of the coal-power plants and their replacement by electricity from renewable sources; energy savings; and self-production and consumption of electricity/heat by individuals and energy communities.”47 In terms of renewable energy, they supported creating more prosumers: “More consumers will be active participants in the energy system. Many citizens, municipalities, and cities will opt for energy self-sufficiency and will generate electricity from renewable energy sources for their own use.”48 The Pirate Party (Piráti) is a liberal political party focusing on political transparency, civil rights, public participation in decision-making, environmental protection, local development, and sustainability. In their 2017-election campaign, the party used the slogan “ecology without ideology.” The party’s program entitled “Black on White” stated the core of its environmental policy as “respect for nature and public participation.”49 In this context, the party advocated “the rights of residents to participate in environmental decision-making in their neighbourhood; tightening controls on large industrial polluters; reducing the Czech Republic’s dependence on fossil fuels; maintaining programs for energy saving in buildings; and supporting energy self-sufficiency.”50 In terms of energy policy, the party advocated “a balanced energy mix with a reasonable representation of all types of sources.”51 In this context, they gave priority to research, development, and deployment of new technologies that reduce energy consumption and increase energy efficiency. In pursuit of increasing the number of prosumers, they aimed to create “self-sufficient energy units with intelligent production and consumption management where distinction between producer and consumer is blurred.”52 Regarding state financial support for renewables, the Pirate Party rejected the use of state subsidies and embraced market policies: “We reject state-guaranteed purchase prices, green bonuses, and other forms of  Bedřich Moldan, Martin Bursík, and Ladislav Miko.  TOP09. (2017). Memorandum on Environmental Protection. p. 12. 47  ibid., p. 12. 48  ibid., p. 15. 49  The Pirate Party. (2017). Black on White, Party Program for 2017 Parliamentary Election. p. 18. 50  ibid., p. 18 and p. 12. 51  Program: Energetika | Pirátská Strana. (2017). [Press release] https://www.pirati.cz/program/ dlouhodoby/energetika/ 52  ibid. 45 46

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subsidies. For existing subsidies, we insist on equal conditions and easy administration. We suggest motivating operators of clean energy by tax breaks.”53 Finally, they advocated transparency of public institutions in energy to be secured by fully transparent management and administration. In December 2020, the Czech Coal Commission met to negotiate the coal phase-­ out date. Over the issue, there were different policy perceptions within the Czech cabinet. Minister of Industry and Trade, Karel Havlíček (ANO), supported a coal phase-out by 2038. Minister of Environment, Richard Brabec (ANO), commented in an interview that “it is the economic stimuli rather than the political one” that will determine the coal phase-out date: “price of renewable energies continues to fall due to lower technology prices, while price of carbon allowance continues to grow. So, exit from coal will be resolved on its own.”54 As the consequence of negotiations, the coal phase-out date was agreed as 2038. Two years after this meeting, in January 2022, the new five-party coalition government announced that the Czech Republic will exit coal by 2033. As a summary, we have seen that the Czech political scene is divided and have an ambiguous stance over energy transition policy. We have seen both inter-party and intra-party divisions, and these internal splits further hindered the parties’ clear positioning on energy transition. Associated political costs also contribute to the ambiguous stance over the issue. In terms of policy priorities, energy security and provision of energy supplies at affordable prices seem to be the common denominator for all political parties. However, given the national circumstances, it seems to be an environment vs. economy dilemma for the politicians to choose from. Most politicians struggle within the environment vs. economy dilemma when they consider the support of their voters. In terms of energy transition strategies, although all political discourses share a common position on gradual reduction of coal power and increase of renewable energies, most of them lack clear targets and strategies. We have seen that the Pirate Party and TOP09 demonstrated the most comprehensive and specific programs for renewable energies and sustainable environment, while other political parties lacked explicit policy strategies. Domestic conditions can provide some explanation for the unambitious political scene over energy transition. Firstly, the Czech Republic’s reliance on domestically produced coal is a crucial barrier for energy transition because most political parties present it as a provider of energy security at affordable prices for the businesses and consumers. Secondly, there is still a strong focus on nuclear energy; political parties perceive it as an essential element of the energy mix and consider further developing it. Thirdly, all political parties avoid dependence on energy imports, so, domestically produced coal is also perceived as the solution to energy independence. Finally, considering the social impacts of coal phase-out on regional employment in

 ibid.  Ministerstvo životního prostředí. (2019, September 16). Ministr Brabec pro LN: Snižovat uhlík je jako hubnout. Bolí to [Press release]. https://www.mzp.cz/cz/articles__20190916_LN 53 54

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North-Western Bohemia and Northern Moravia (that highly depend on coal mining), politicians avoid discourses and policies that may displease their voters.

Public Perceptions In the context of public perceptions, we analyzed three areas: (a) Perceptions of environment, climate change, and energy (b) Attitudes toward energy transition (c) Actions for energy saving and energy transition We analyzed these indicators in two dimensions comparatively: at the EU level and at the country level. We used Eurobarometer public surveys carried out in 2019, 2020, 2021, and most recently in 2022 to make this comparative analysis in a reasonable time series. (a) Perception of Energy Transition The first indicator that we analyzed in this context was whether protecting the environment and mitigating climate change are perceived as policy priorities for the Czech public opinion. The survey results give us the percentage of the respondents who consider it as the primary political issue to be dealt with by the governments. In 2022,55 the rising prices/inflation/cost of living is perceived as the primary issue for the 34% of the respondents in the EU average, while 42% of the Czech respondents56 perceived it as the primary concern. In the EU average, energy supply came as the second issue with 28%, while it is the top priority for the Czech respondents with 46%. The environment and climate change came at the last position for the Czech public (10%), only after the international situation (36%), immigration (20%), and economic situation (19%). This result is similar to the earlier findings for the Czech Republic. In 2021,57 12% of the respondents in the Czech Republic58 perceived climate change as the single most serious problem facing the world (compared with the EU average of 18%). In 2020,59 immigration (38%), public finance (28%), and economic situation (26%) came as the most important issues for the Czech public,60 followed by rising prices/cost of living (17%) and health (14%). Environment and climate change came at the bottom of this list with a marginal 11% compared to the 20% in the EU

 Standard Eurobarometer 97, Summer 2022.  1015 face-to-face interviews were carried out. 57  Special Eurobarometer 513, March-April 2021. 58  1044 face-to-face interviews were carried out. 59  Standard Eurobarometer 93, Summer 2020. 60  1009 face-to-face interviews were carried out. 55 56

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average. In 2019,61 the Czech public62 considered immigration (48%) and terrorism (31%) as the most important issues facing the EU. Environment and climate change received minor public attention with 14% and 15%, respectively. Thus, trend is clear for the Czech public opinion: they prioritize economic considerations and secure energy supply, immigration, and health over the concerns for environment and climate change. (b) Attitudes Toward Energy Transition The second indicator that we analyzed in this context was the means of the realization of energy transition objective. Here, we searched for the public attitudes over the mechanisms that can be devised by the government to attain higher deployment of renewable energies. In 2022,63 due to the impact of the war between Ukraine and Russia and the resulting energy crisis in Europe, 87% of the respondents at the EU level agreed that the EU should invest massively in renewable energies. This rate was lower (79%) in Czech Republic. 86% of the respondents at the EU level agreed that the EU should reduce its dependency on Russian sources of energy. This rate was also lower (76%) in Czech Republic. 85% of the EU citizens agreed that increasing energy efficiency in buildings, transports, and goods will make Europeans less dependent from energy producers. Only 74% of the respondents in the Czech Republic agreed to this statement. Finally, 84% of the respondents at the EU average agreed that reducing imports of oil and gas and investing in renewable energies are important for overall security. This rate was even lower (69%) in the Czech Republic. The comparatively lower rates of agreement with these statements can be explained by the fact that the Czech Republic has its abundant coal resources which provide some degree of energy security. In 2021, 86% of the respondents in the Czech Republic and 76% of those in the EU average agreed that tackling climate change and environment issues should be a priority to improve public health. 87% of the respondents in the Czech Republic and 90% of those at the EU average agreed that we should reduce greenhouse gas emissions to a minimum while offsetting the remaining emissions to make the EU economy climate-neutral by 2050. The rates of agreement with these statements are more or less similar between the Czech public and the general EU average. In 2020, 39% of the respondents in the Czech Republic (in 2019, 41%) and 52% of those in the EU average (in 2019, 54%) agreed that developing renewable energy should be given top priority in the European Green Deal to protect the environment and fight climate change. The rates of support for renewable energies are apparently lower in the Czech Republic than the EU average.

 Standard Eurobarometer 92, Autumn 2019.  1013 face-to-face interviews were carried out. 63  Standard Eurobarometer 97, Summer 2022. 61 62

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(c) Actions for Energy Saving and Energy Transition In 2022, in the Czech Republic, 73% of the respondents agreed that they have recently taken action to reduce their own energy consumption, or they plan to do so soon. This rate is almost the same at the EU average with 78% of the respondents. In 2021,64 only half of the respondents in the Czech Republic agreed that they have taken action to fight the climate change in the last 6 months. This rate was 64% at the EU average. In the Czech Republic, the most popular attitude was reducing the waste and recycling it (88%), followed by cutting down the use of disposable items (71%). Using lower energy consumption, household appliances came as the third most popular attitude with 68% of the respondents. Other high percentage actions were using environmentally friendly transport (35%) and home insulation to reduce energy consumption (29%). The EU averages for all these actions were considerably lower than the rates for the Czech Republic. As a conclusion, public opinion polls showed that the environment, climate change, and energy transition do not appear as the most critical issues for the Czech public. Indeed, a successive analysis of the period 2019–2022 revealed that the economic concerns, inflation, and cost of living dominated the Czech public agenda, followed by the social concerns such as immigration, housing, health, and social security. There are several academic papers65 that confirm these opinion polls. They also contribute to our analysis of the public support for energy transition in the Czech Republic. A survey that was carried out in 2020 among 1026 respondents revealed that “45% of the respondents believe that energy transition in the Czech Republic is possible, while 41% believe that it is not possible.”66 Regarding the use of renewable energy sources in the Czech Republic, this survey revealed that “52% of the respondents evaluate the situation rather bad or very bad, while 31% of the respondents evaluate the situation positively or rather positively.”67 Another academic research68 revealed similar findings about Czech public attitudes on energy transition. The authors of this research concluded that “general Czech public prefer renewables over both nuclear and coal, but do not necessarily think that renewables can replace these sources of electricity. The public has a positive attitude towards renewables in general, but there is little trust that a complete system transformation is possible.”69 Public Perception of Coal Mining: At this point of analysis of the Czech public perceptions on energy transition, it is relevant to discuss the public debate on the continuation and expansion of open-pit

 Special Eurobarometer 513, March-April 2021.  Čábelková, I., Strielkowski, W., Firsova, I., & Korovushkina, M. (2020). Public acceptance of renewable energy sources: A case study from the Czech Republic. Energies, 13(7), 1742. 66  ibid., p. 4. 67  ibid., p. 4. 68  Schwartzkopff, J., Schulz, S., & Goritz, A. (2017). Climate and Energy Snapshot: Czech Republic: The Political Economy of the Low-Carbon Transition. E3G. 69  ibid. 64 65

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coal mining. In this context, we can analyze a case study that concerns the expansion of coal mining limits in Northern Bohemia.70 In this region, there are vast lignite resources beneath the soil, and the major advantage for the production company is that this lucrative asset is in an area that is already equipped with the necessary infrastructure for further mining operations. However, there is a legally binding resolution from 1991 which sets territorial environmental limits of the open-pit coal mining.71 The issue came forth to the political and public agenda when Sev.en Corporation, which is the owner of the Czech Army mine (ČSA) and Vršany mine, decided to extend their territorial limits. The company used the narrative of brown coal as the most affordable energy source in the country and referred to the high cost of building a new energy infrastructure for the renewable energies. But such a move would mean increase of coal-related pollution and contribution to climate change. It would also mean the destruction of the nearby towns, Horní Jiřetín and Černice. Thus, a conflict became unavoidable both in politics and society. There was an ambiguous policy position over the issue: when we analyze state energy policies prepared by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, we find strong references to security of supply and affordable energy prices as the cornerstones of energy policy. In this context, domestically produced coal has significant advantages due to security and economic reasons. On the contrary, when we analyze state environmental policies prepared by the Ministry of Environment, we find strong commitments to decreasing the share of fossil fuels in the production of electricity and heat. The political scene was also divided over the issue: after the regional elections in 2012, the Communist Party was the largest regional party in the region. The Communist Party was a strong proponent of the rescission of the limits for the sake of maximum utilization of coal resources located in the region. The party’s regional leader Oldřich Bubeníček advocated breaching the limits on the condition that the miners reach an agreement with the local inhabitants. His main argument was to maintain regional employment. The most prominent opponent was the Mayor of Horní Jiřetín, Vladimír Buřt, who had a seat on the regional council as a member of the Green Party. Although the Green Party argued for maintaining the existing limits, it did not have political power to affect the policy. The strength of the local opposition came from the civic association Kořeny (Roots) in which the residents of two towns joined their forces with the environmental NGOs and activists to defend their homes. Ultimately, there was a decision at the end of 2015 to keep the limits on the ČSA mine in place, and this decision saved Horní Jiřetín and Černice from destruction. For the Bílina mine, limits were breached until a certain level which is at least 500 m away from the local towns. The surrounding towns agreed with the decision. After the 2018 municipal elections, Mayor of Horní Jiřetín, Vladimír Buřt, adopted  For more information on the issue, readers can refer to Černoch, F., Lehotský, L., Ocelík, P., & Osička, J. (2019). Exploring and explaining participation in local opposition: brown coal mining in Horní Jiřetín. Masaryk University Press. 71  Resolution No. 444 passed in 1991. 70

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a strategic development plan to make the town fossil-free by 2023 and to expand clean energy sources for households with the help of the regional, national, and European grants. The plan included green roofs and wind power stations to make the town self-sufficient. This case well illustrates the divisive nature of the environment vs. economy dilemma in the Czech political and public debate.

Expert Perceptions This section provides primary empirical data to the analysis of public acceptance of energy transition based on expert-level policy perceptions. In this context, we carried out seven interviews between January 2021 and August 2021. The interview questions were designed around the key principles of this research. The respondents were asked to provide their perceptions on (1) policy targets, (2) state regulations, (3) financial measures, (4) political will, and (5) patterns of conflict in society in Germany and the Czech Republic. The respondents were asked several questions on these topics to elaborate on, and the interview sessions were carried out in a semi-­ structured format. The respondents are chosen among highly competent professionals in renewable energy policies and technologies, so they have the best capacity to answer our questions. All respondents gave permission to disclose their names and institutional affiliations, so this information is provided throughout the interview analysis. The first interviewee is Hans-Josef Fell, the former spokesperson on energy for the Greens parliamentary group.72 He is one of the authors of the EEG Law in Germany and the president of the Energy Watch Group, a global network of scientists and parliamentarians. He is also the author of the book Global Cooling  – Strategies for Climate Protection. We started our interview with a discussion of the effectiveness of the energy targets at the EU level and national level. Mr. Fell argued that “These targets are far too low and inadequate. For an effective climate protection and energy transition, we need to accelerate current policy targets.” Regarding the necessity for state regulations, he maintained that “political framework conditions and state regulations are crucial to the launch and penetration of climate protection technologies in world markets. The state regulations are the decisive stimulus for climate protection.”73 We discussed the effectiveness of state policy in Germany on renewable energies and he commented that “The EEG is considered by many as the most successful legislative measure for climate protection. Firstly, it enabled the investors in renewable energy to achieve a profitable  He is a former member of the German Parliament and former spokesperson on energy for the Alliance 90/The Greens parliamentary group, Interview date: 28 January 2021. 73  Fell, H. (2012). Global Cooling: Strategies for Climate Protection (Sustainable Energy Developments). CRC Press., p. 61. 72

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investment by earning money from producing clean energy. This boosted the expansion of the investments. Secondly, it enabled the whole society to take part in the process. For both reasons, the renewable energy law in Germany not only created effective climate legislation but also created an energy democracy.” The next subject was the role of state financial support for the deployment of renewable energies. In this context, we discussed the advantages and disadvantages of different types of financial measures. He commented that: Feed-in-tariff payments provide the cheapest option of renewable energy production, so this system should continue. It should be set high enough to make investments in this sector profitable and to enable everyone in the society to take part in it. It was the feed-in-tariff system which enabled small and medium actors to invest in renewable energies, and thereby, made energy transition in Germany a democratic event because the public could take part in it, instead of only a few monopolies. Maximum targets, however, can be a hindrance for the development of renewable energy, especially if they are underestimated.

Regarding the importance of political will and accord for energy transition, he argued that: To achieve energy transition, political will is certainly the first step. The realization of this political will comes with the legislation, particularly through an effective state regulation. However, I observe that the ‘denial politicians’ support the interests of big energy lobbies, ignore the climate change problems, and thereby, avoid taking steps towards energy transition; while the ‘fake politicians’ talk about climate change as a big threat and stress that they will fight it with all means, but eventually end up doing nothing. Both types of politicians block the way forward to energy transition by maintaining the status quo.

I asked his viewpoint on the widely discussed environment versus economy dilemma in energy transition. He commented that: It is a fake discussion, not representing the reality. Energy transition into renewable energies boosts the economy, and the actual situation is that less developed countries have economic problems due to maintaining the coal sector. Firstly, coal sector creates air pollution which causes lung disease in wide sections of society, thereby creating a burden on the health system. Secondly, long-term state subsidies for coal and nuclear power prevent the states to invest in education, infrastructure, and climate protection measures. Thirdly, coal sector does not create enough employment opportunities as do the renewable energy systems. In Germany, there are around 30,000 people employed in the coal industry whereas ten times more people are employed in the renewables sector. So, welfare and prosperity for a wider section of the society comes not by maintaining the coal industry, but rather through energy transition towards renewable energy sources. In this context, transition into renewable energy sources would be a democratic shift where not only big energy actors, but also everyone in the society can take part and benefit.

The second interview respondent is a renowned scholar on renewable energies, Volker Quaschning.74 He is also the author of the book Understanding Renewable Energy Systems.

 Volker Quaschning is an expert on the modeling and simulation of renewable energy systems and energy concepts for a sustainable energy supply. He is a professor for renewable energy systems at the University of Applied Sciences in Berlin. Interview date: 10 February 2021. 74

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We started our interview with a discussion of the effectiveness of the energy targets at the EU level and national level. Mr. Quaschning argued that “If we want to fulfil the Paris Climate Agreement, we must move faster. So, Germany’s target of CO2 neutrality until 2045 is too low. In terms of climate goals, Scandinavian countries can set as a good example to follow.” Secondly, I asked him the effectiveness of state regulations in Germany to achieve energy transition goals. He commented that “There is a need for better conditions for the installations of solar PV and wind energy, establishment of a new regulation to stop the production of diesel cars and enable the switch to electric cars, and a persisting need to change the heating systems in buildings to renewable energy sources.” The next subject was the role of state financial support for the deployment of renewable energies. In this context, we discussed the advantages and disadvantages of different types of financial support. He stressed that: There are two targets here: renewable energy installation target and public involvement target. The best available technique depends on your target. For the former target, if you want to produce solar energy in low quantity at a low price, tendering is a good method. However, in Germany we need to speed up the installation rate to fulfil the targets of Paris Climate Agreement. For the latter target, fixed feed-in tariff offers opportunities for small players in the market (such as individuals or small companies), while tendering is a good idea for big market players. For the public acceptance of energy transition, we need individuals and small companies to be part of this energy transition. For instance, in Germany, we started with 3% of renewable energy; today we achieved around 46% of renewable energy. This is the success of the feed-in tariffs and the renewable energy legislation in Germany.

I asked his perception of the widely discussed environment versus economy dilemma in energy transition. He argued that: This argument is only valid when you don’t consider the external costs of energy production. Today, maintaining the coal industry is not an economic imperative. We see that the production of coal is getting more and more expensive, and coal power plants are not profitable anymore. Regarding the jobs, in Germany, there are around 20,000 jobs in lignite industry, so it is not a great amount of employment. Of course, we need alternative opportunities for the people living in the lignite regions, but the socio-economic costs of coal phase-out are not high compared to the costs we must pay due to negative climate conditions.

Finally, we talked about the public support for energy transition in Germany. Mr. Quaschning argued that “Public opinion for energy transition in Germany is positive. Most people support the energy transition and demand to speed up this transition. There are some people who do not like the wind power installations in the countryside because of the big size of the turbines, but their number is not many.” The third interview respondent is Bedrich Moldan, former Minister of Environment of the Czech Republic.75 Currently, he is the deputy director of the

 He is also a holder of many awards, including the Minister of the Environment Award and the Josef Vavroušek Award for lifetime contribution to environmental protection. Interview date: 11 February 2021. 75

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Centre for Environmental Issues at Charles University. He is also the author of the book The Conquered Planet. We started our interview with a discussion of the effectiveness of the energy targets at the EU level and national level. He argued that “Considering the Paris Climate Agreement objectives, renewable energy target of the Czech Republic is not adequate to fulfil the climate protection objectives. The coal phase-out date of the Czech Republic is not ambitious, and the implementation of the renewable energy policy in the Czech Republic is not adequate.” Secondly, I asked him the effectiveness of state regulations in the Czech Republic to achieve energy transition goals. He commented that “The development of renewable energy in the Czech Republic started with the first law on renewables in 2005. This law was shaped based on the German legislation, and it has been effective to provide the necessary framework for energy transition.” The next question was about the political will and accord for energy transition. He stressed that “In the Czech Republic, a clear political support is not existent, and this is a barrier to the promotion of energy transition.” I asked his perception of the widely discussed environment versus economy dilemma – whether coal phase-out implies negative socio-economic costs for the regions dependent on coal industry. Mr. Moldan commented that “There are not too many people employed in the coal industry today. You can’t compare the situation with 20 years ago when there were more people employed in this industry. The situation is exaggerated by certain lobbies that are against the coal phase-out. So, the employment issue is not a crucial factor in the coal phase-out. The big energy companies lobby quite well, and their power delays the coal phase-out.” Finally, we talked about the public support for energy transition in the Czech Republic: “On this issue, the rhetoric of the government is important to shape the public support. When political scene does not give explicit support for renewables, this puzzles the public perceptions. Notwithstanding that, if you look at the public support for renewables, you can see that most of the Czech population supports the energy transition,” he argued. The fourth interview respondent is Rolf Wuestenhagen.76 He held a position in the Advisory Board of the Swiss Federal Government’s Energy Strategy 2050 (2011–2015) and in the Lead Author Team of the Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation (2008–2011). He is also a co-­ author of the book Europeanization of the Swiss Energy System. We started our interview with a discussion of the effectiveness of the energy targets at the EU level and national level. Mr. Wuestenhagen commented that: Until a few years ago, renewable energy was more expensive than conventional sources of electricity, but this has changed. Now, wind and solar energy are among the cheapest sources of energy. From this point of view, higher renewable energy targets are both possible and achievable. At the European level, the current Commission is ambitious in its objectives and inspires other member states. When it comes to EU member states, most of them  Professor Rolf Wuestenhagen is the Chair for Management of Renewable Energies at University of St.Gallen. Interview date: 17 February 2021. 76

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had periods of success followed by a loss of the initial momentum. Rather than saying that one country is doing everything perfectly we should see that there are periods of time when countries do good things. However, there are also countries that are taking the opposite stance such as Poland. The countries that have high share of coal and nuclear energy may tend to be slower in accepting renewable sources of energy.

The next subject was the role of state financial support for the deployment of renewable energies. In this context, we discussed the advantages and disadvantages of different types of financial support. He argued that: The feed-in-tariff system was useful when the renewables were more expensive than conventional sources of electricity. At that time, nobody would rationally invest in renewable energies without strong government support. So, the initial investments were made thanks to the feed-in tariff system because it smoothens the revenue curve for the renewable energy generators who take the investment risk. It is pretty much a government-guaranteed and secure revenue stream, so it allowed lots of investors, farmers, and homeowners to participate in energy transition by investing in renewable energies. Therefore, it was the feed-in tariff system that enabled fast renewable energy deployment in Germany. However, these conditions have changed. Auctions may put more price pressure on investors and leave more risk to the investor, but a major advantage is that they lead to lower costs. As a conclusion, the issue is not black and white; we can make different instruments work efficiently in a country.

I asked his perception of the widely discussed environment versus economy dilemma in energy transition. He answered that: I don’t believe in economy versus environment debate that is inherent in some political discourses because you can have both cheap energy and do something good for the environment. There are 20.000 coal jobs left in Germany compared to 350.000 jobs in renewable energy, and this could increase more with the new investments. Apparently, what seems to happen in the political debate is that somehow the coal jobs are emphasized more than the equivalent number of jobs available in other sectors that may benefit from a faster coal phase-out.

The next question was about the public support for energy transition in Germany. He stressed that: In Germany, there is a lot of support for the basic idea of energy transition and for switching to higher share of renewables. However, there is the issue of social acceptance when it comes to implementing these projects on the ground. This is a bit of a challenge. People are happy about a large share of wind energy in the country’s energy mix, but not all of them are happy about a wind turbine in the vicinity of their home because they are highly visible. So, policy makers need to think about carefully how they can implement these projects for the local people to accept them.

Finally, we discussed how government policies can positively change public acceptance. He argued that: The more ambiguity the political leadership creates, the more conflicts will be on the ground. How the government communicates this issue and the conviction that the government exhibits are very important to get social acceptance on the ground. In that regard, clear communication by the government especially for the wind energy is probably something that they could do better in Germany. Also, a project’s locality contributes to its acceptance by the people. In an opposite situation, when some anonymous and far-away investor imposes a project on a local population, there is a higher chance of contestations. For this

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reason, some people perceive a positive link between broader participation of different players and greater social acceptance of the projects.

The fifth interview respondent is Markus Kahles.77 He is a policy expert at Environmental Energy Law Foundation (Stiftung Umweltenergierecht). We started our interview with a discussion of the effectiveness of the energy targets at the EU level and national level. He argued that “These targets are not very weak but not sufficient. Both the EU target and the German national target could be more ambitious. But you can set higher targets on paper, what is more important is that governments must supplement them with adequate legal framework and action.” Secondly, we discussed the effectiveness of state regulations in Germany to achieve energy transition. Mr. Kahles commented that “We have good examples in the EU in different aspects of renewable energy policy. German Renewable Energy Act of 2000 was a very good instrument for the uptake of renewables, and it functioned very well. In the UK, carbon price is a good example that encourages reduction in CO2 emissions. Spain is quite ambitious for deployment of renewable energies in local communities, which could be a role model for other EU member states.” The next subject was the role of financial measures for the deployment of renewable energies. In this context, we discussed the advantages and disadvantages of different types of financial measures. He commented that “In Germany, as a result auctions, we started to see lower prices, especially for solar PV. This has been a natural evolution. Now we can support energy transition with smarter, more intelligent, and more competitive methods. So, we don’t have to support every renewable energy installation with a feed-in tariff mechanism; rather, renewable energy installations can support themselves on the market.” I asked his perception of the widely discussed environment versus economy dilemma in energy transition. He answered that: The main problem for some states is the higher rate of coal in electricity sector. The states that have higher share of nuclear power in electricity sector may find it easier to phase-out coal because they don’t depend on it that much. How to deal with the results of the coal phase-out is an ongoing debate in Germany. The compromise is that the federal government and the EU will provide a lot of support measures to those regions for local development and develop programs intended for structural development.

The next question was about the public support for energy transition in Germany. He commented that “In Germany, we have very high public support for energy transition and renewable energies, but sometimes in some local communities there is refusal of new wind energy installations to be built. We may call it not-in-my-­ backyard (NIMBY) problem. When these projects get closer to communities, people don’t want them in their near environment.”

 Dr. Markus Kahles works as the co-head of the research field of renewable energies and energy industry law at the Environmental Energy Law Foundation (Stiftung Umweltenergierecht). His expertise is on European environmental energy law, EU state aid law, and renewable energy law. Interview date: 4 March 2021. 77

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Finally, we discussed which measures and strategies may empower policy implementation. He commented that: We don’t have enough wind installations due to lack of support from local communities. We must find new ways of gaining public acceptance to plan them. In solar PV sector, we have unused potential for rooftop installations. We need to develop strategies to use that potential. Also, we need to discuss the possibilities of increasing the self-consumption of renewable energies, in other words, how to get more prosumers in the system because prosumers are significant to evolve the energy transition.

The sixth interview respondent is Rainer Hinrichs-Rahlwes.78 He is Vice-­ President of the European Renewable Energies Federation (EREF) and Board Member of the German Renewable Energy Federation (BEE). He is also a senior policy advisor about policy developments in renewable energy and greenhouse gas reduction. We started our interview with a discussion of the effectiveness of energy targets at the EU level and national level. Mr. Hinrichs-Rahlwes argued that “I don’t think that these are high targets. Higher targets are certainly attainable. Indeed, we need higher targets to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement.” Secondly, we discussed the effectiveness of state regulations in Germany to achieve energy transition. He commented that: Germany was a good example in the early days. Thinking back the 2000s, there was a broad public involvement in the energy transition because the original version of the EEG was easy to understand and to apply, and it involved ordinary citizens, farmers, and SMEs. In the initial phase, significant renewable energy capacity was installed by citizens, communities, cooperatives, not by the utility companies. So, the EEG acted as the main driver of change, and therefore, it set a good example for other countries.

The next subject was the role of financial measures for the deployment of renewable energies. In this context, we discussed the advantages and disadvantages of different types of financial measures. He commented that: The feed-in tariffs were introduced to facilitate market penetration of renewables, and the original idea behind them was that they would not be there forever. Many countries around the world established and implemented a similar system of feed-in tariffs or premiums to foster renewable energy development. They served very well in the initial phase by bringing down the costs and developing big volumes of renewable power capacity. Then, the European Commission argued that other more market-based instruments will bring down the costs faster and will be more effective. Today, renewables are cheap, and the sector is mature, so we don’t need fixed payments for large installations anymore; but this certainly applies to big projects and big companies. What we see in Germany is that auctions have slowed down the citizen or community projects of smaller scale. Especially for rooftop solar, auctions are widely inappropriate. For these small and medium projects, we need other solutions to enable high levels of self-consumption, and to some extent, a guaranteed price for power fed into the grid.

The next question was about the political will and accord for energy transition in Germany. He argued that:

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Nobody is questioning the need for the energy transition in Germany, but the debate is more about how ambitious we can and should be. The introduction of the EEG law was basically a cross-party decision, although it only became reality under the red-and-green government in 2000. The narrative of the energy transition has been a cross-party concept in Germany, and it is still widely discussed as such. All political parties share the narrative that we need energy transition. Everybody supports renewables, nobody is outspoken against it. There are, however, differences in terms of policies and the pace of policy implementation.

I asked his perception of the widely discussed environment versus economy dilemma in energy transition. He answered that: The structural change should be addressed properly. It is not correct to suppose that the coal miners would continue in this sector forever only because their grandparents were miners. Rather, the policy should be to introduce re-training programs in these regions and bring other industries into these regions and create employment in this context. The EU developed Just Transition Fund to help these regions. This can help to initiate and organize the structural change. Political communication is also important. Compared with the coal industry, positive environmental and health impacts are important benefits of renewable energies which should be communicated with the public.

The next question was about the public support for energy transition in Germany. He stressed that “In Germany, 80–85% of people support the renewables. So, the public support in general is very high. We should not believe what some anti-wind protesters try to make us believe. The truth is that these protestors definitely do not represent the broader public opinion in Germany.” Finally, we discussed which measures and strategies may empower energy transition policy implementation in Germany: “To gain more public support for new projects, it is important to increase involving the local people in this process, so they will see benefits for themselves and their communities. Also, you must reduce administrative barriers, make it easier to get building permissions and grid connection, support and encourage the self-consumption behind the meter for individual citizens as well as for big energy companies. We need to strengthen legal procedures to facilitate public participation and active involvement,” he argued. The seventh interview respondent is Gerolf Bücheler.79 He is a policy advisor in the field of climate protection and sustainability at Bundesverband Bioenergie e.V. (German Federal Bioenergy Association). We started our interview with a discussion of the effectiveness of energy targets at the EU level and national level. He argued that “In Germany, the pace of energy transition is still too slow. We have seen some success especially in electricity, but we still lack behind in the heating and cooling sector. A possible explanation can be that we started energy transition quite late in the heating sector.” Secondly, we discussed the effectiveness of state regulations in Germany to achieve energy transition. Mr. Bücheler commented that “The first EEG was quite successful in pushing the renewable energies in the electricity sector, but I don’t think that it can set a good example of state regulations for other states anymore due to the successive amendments and changes which added more complexity and more

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procedures to the system. While the first EEG consisted of 12 articles, now it is a vast amount of paper which hardly anybody really understands anymore, except for lawyers.” The next subject was the role of financial measures for the deployment of renewable energies. In this context, we discussed the advantages and disadvantages of different types of financial measures. He argued that: The politics must realize that if we really want to achieve GHG reductions, we need to incentivize it, which means we -the society and taxpayers- must be willing to finance the transition. So, the legal framework must be equipped with increased financing opportunities. At the beginning, using subsidies for infant industries was successful, then the question of switching to market-based approaches appeared. However, for bioenergy, we have seen that tendering and auctions are not very useful because the bids are too low, and it is not as reliable as a guaranteed feed-in tariff. I can understand the governments’ effort to lower the costs by switching to market-based approaches, but this system is not very suitable for the bioenergy.

The statistics show that in 2019, of 18,943 biogas plants in the EU zone, 9527 are in Germany, and most of them are operated by small- and medium-sized companies  – German Mittelstand. We discussed the reasons of this successful policy implementation in bioenergy, and what needs to be done to maintain this success. Mr. Bücheler argued that “The massive financial flows provided through the EEG enabled this success. However, the guaranteed feed-in-tariffs that lasted for 20 years will end in the coming years for an increasing number of biogas plants. Those plants will need new and reliable regulations and market stability to continue. The best method would either be a continuation period of the EEG or some other form of guaranteed feed-in tariff to help the operation of biogas plants.” Finally, we talked about the public support for bioenergy in Germany. He commented on the public debate revolved around maizification concept: Due to the bonus given to energy plants, maize was used too much in some areas. But the effect of the bonus will phase out sooner or later as it wasn’t renewed in later revisions of the EEG. Additionally, RED II introduced sustainability criteria for bioenergy plants, thus, the biomass plants must certify that what they are doing is sustainable. However, there is another public debate revolved around NIMBY concept. As an example, in 2021 in the town of Kösching, Audi wanted to build a wood-fired power plant to produce CO2-neutral heat and electricity with an aim to produce cars in a climate-neutral manner by 2025. The system would also provide heat and electricity for the households. However, in the referendum, 68.5% of the citizens of Kösching voted against the project. In this case, although the community would benefit from this project, the NIMBY argument dominated the scene.

Analysis and Discussion of the Interviews The interviews provided a detailed empirical look at the relationship between relevant drivers of acceptance and different contexts of acceptance. Renewable energy policy perceptions of the respondents have been measured by a five-item index, and the research findings are summarized, as follows. Respondents indicated a similar pattern of negative perception of renewable energy targets: the targets are defined as “too low, inadequate, not ambitious” both

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for the EU and for the member states in question. All respondents presented that “higher renewable energy targets are needed” to achieve energy transition. Responses to general perception of policy regulations reflected an overwhelming support for the German Renewable Energy Law (EEG). Representation of these policy regulations as “successful and effective” was derived from five respondents, while two commentators expressed “the need for better regulations” that would better fit in today’s conditions. Majority of the respondents indicated similar perceptions for the financial measures designed for the promotion of renewable energies: both feed-in tariff systems and market-based instruments have certain advantages dedicated to achieving different targets. For instance, at the onset of RE deployment, feed-in tariffs were perceived necessary to reduce the investors’ risks; in later stages as these technologies become more mature and cheaper, market-based instruments were perceived more convenient to reduce the costs. However, the support and positive perception dropped, and expressions of opposition increased sharply, when respondents were asked about the political will and accord for energy transition in their country. The responses varied from “not existent” to “not effective.” Finally, the level of public acceptance of renewable energies (and energy transition) is significantly positive in both countries. Representation of the public support as “positive, high, and very high” was derived from five respondents. The critical factors that influence the public support were described as “clear communication, distance to the project, and public participation.”

Conclusion This chapter investigated the political and public attitudes for energy transition in Germany and the Czech Republic. We proposed and tested two hypotheses. Firstly, political will and accord among the political parties have a positive effect on energy transition, and, secondly, public acceptance and involvement have a positive effect on energy transition. Based on our analyses, these hypotheses are confirmed. In the first part of this analysis, we analyzed the political scene. In Germany, we found a common political voice on energy transition with minor differences on preference for policy implementation. Energy transition, in this regard, is a cross-­ party decision and does not constitute a dividing line in the political spectrum in Germany. In the Czech Republic, we found a divided political scene and an ambiguous political stance over energy transition. In this context, we found both inter-party and intra-party divisions. Given the national circumstances, it seems that the environment versus economy dilemma circumvents the Czech politicians as they struggle to choose their side when they consider the support of their voters. In the second part, we analyzed the factors that influence the public’s reactions toward renewable energy projects. National opinion polls in both countries indicated strong public support for the expansion of renewables; however, local projects

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may face opposition from the host communities. The NIMBY phenomenon (not-in-­ my-backyard) can partly explain this hostility, i.e., the proximity to large-scale projects may influence the degree of acceptance as the local opponents focus on the negative effects of these projects on environment (danger for birds and bats), on landscape (land use and transmission lines), and on human health (sound and visual impacts). We can talk about a gap between strong overall public support for renewable energies at the national level and disapproval of specific projects at the local level in both countries. As a conclusion, on the political and public scene, a consensus is needed for energy transition, and this consensus can be created by ensuring the participation of various stakeholders into the process.

Chapter 6

Policy Implementation

Introduction This chapter examines progress in energy transition in Germany and the Czech Republic through a set of key performance indicators. The analytical approach in this section is based on the analysis of these countries in achieving their national targets and progressing energy transition. The quantitative data on renewable energy deployment in both countries provide an insight into the operationalization of policy norms, objectives, and strategies for energy transition. This data also provides the means to scrutinize if national targets for 2020 have been fulfilled. The methodology of this chapter is to investigate renewable energy policy implementation in Germany and the Czech Republic based on statistical data sources. To this purpose, researchers use global and country-level energy statistics for different energy indicators. Indeed, there are many different data sources available, but only a few organizations collect periodical and reliable data for all the parameters of renewable energy, i.e., installation, production, and consumption. For this reason, we employ statistical data only from verifiable and periodical datasets generated by EurObserv’ER, Eurostat, IRENA, and IEA. These databases contain accurate data for all EU countries on an annual basis, so they are the most reliable sources for tracking the progress of renewable energies. These sources are also supplemented with trusted country-level statistics from the government entities (ministries, statistical agencies, energy regulatory offices) and sectoral associations (wind, solar, bioenergy associations).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Tanil, Sustainable Energy Development, Environment & Policy 63, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28065-8_6

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Development Trajectory of the Renewable Energies in the EU In the EU zone, owing to ambitious policies, financial incentives, and wide support, contribution of renewable energy sources to electricity generation has increased significantly in the last decade. While the share of renewable electricity was 15% in 2006 in the EU, this share doubled in a decade reaching to 30% in 2017. In 2020, renewable energy sources made up 37.5% of gross electricity consumption in the EU, up from 34.1% in 2019. The growth in electricity generated from renewable energy sources during the period 2010–2020 reflected an expansion in three renewable energy sources across the EU, i.e., wind power, solar power, and solid biofuels (including renewable waste). Hydroenergy with its relatively stable energy level in the last decade plays an essential role in the electricity system. Although producing a stable level of energy for more than a decade, its contribution to electricity generation has decreased from 36.5% in 2015 to 32.7% in 2020 due to dramatic development pace of other renewable energy sources. As opposed to other renewable energies that are developing fast, expansion of hydroenergy via construction of more dams is an important concern due to their considerable impact on flora, fauna, and landscapes. Thus, sector’s growth potential hinges on small hydro plants or modernization of existing facilities. In terms of deployment of renewable energy sources in the EU zone, development pace of wind energy and solar energy has been particularly noticeable. Indeed, IEA acknowledged that wind and solar energy are the key to decarbonizing the world’s electricity mix. In the EU zone, electricity generation from wind energy has significantly increased from 2010 onward with the new onshore and offshore wind installations. This fast pace of development made the wind energy the biggest renewable source for electricity generation in the EU zone. In 2020, electricity production from wind power in EU-27 is 397.5 TWh which corresponds to 37.6% of renewable electricity generation (EurObserv’ER, 2021a). Solar energy has also recorded a significant increase from 2010 onward and continuing its upward trend ever since. Today, it produces 144.2 TWh renewable electricity corresponding to 13.6% of the renewable electricity generation. In recent years, renewable energies dominated the newly installed energy capacities in the EU zone. Especially, in 2020, the solar PV weighed in at 55% and the wind energy at 32% of newly installed capacity (Fig. 6.1). When we comparatively analyze the EU member states in terms of their renewable energy capacities, we find that Germany, France, Italy, and Spain are the states with the highest installed renewable energy capacity. In fact, data series for the last decade shows that Germany is the leader of the EU zone in terms of installed renewable energy capacity. It is followed by France, Italy, and Spain. The five factors that accelerate the deployment of renewable energies contributed to this fast development of renewable energies in Germany (Fig. 6.2). In terms of installed renewable energy capacity as of 2020, the Czech Republic (4342  MW), Bulgaria (4347  MW), Hungary (2813  MW), Slovakia (2435  MW),

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Slovenia (1509  MW), Latvia (1829  MW), Lithuania (922  MW), and Estonia (726 MW) recorded a slower pace of development. In the EU, wind power is the biggest source of renewable energy for electricity generation. WindEurope reported that the cumulative capacity of wind energy in the EU-27 zone is 179 GW as of 2020, and wind energy accounted for 15% of the electricity consumed in the EU-27 zone (WindEurope, 2021). The annual growth in wind energy installed capacity has sustained in the EU zone over the last decade, and the EU-27 installed 10.5 GW of new wind power capacity in 2020 (WindEurope, 2021) (Fig. 6.3). In terms of installed wind energy capacity (onshore and offshore), EU’s three leaders are Germany (62.1 GW), Spain (26.8 GW), and France (17.4 GW). In terms

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of offshore wind power, Germany is the leader of the EU-27 zone with 7.7 GW of installed capacity. It was followed by the Netherlands (2.4 GW), Belgium (2.2 GW), and Denmark (1.7  GW) of installed offshore wind energy capacity. Among the Eastern European states, Poland has the highest installed wind energy capacity with 6.2  GW.  It is followed by the Czech Republic and Hungary. Slovakia has only 3 MW of total installed wind capacity (EurObserv’ER, 2022a). In 2020, Denmark and Ireland had the highest share of wind energy in their electricity mix with 48% and 38%, respectively. Wind energy constituted 27% of the electricity consumed in Germany, while its share was 22% in Spain and 25% in Portugal (WindEurope, 2021). The share of wind energy in the electricity mix is negligible both in the Czech Republic (1%) and in Hungary (2%). In Germany, since the introduction of the EEG law in 2000, wind energy developed dramatically and constituted an increasing share of electricity mix. In 2020, the share of wind energy in total electricity generation reached 27.1% and far surpassed nuclear energy (12.7%) and coal (brown coal 17.1%, hard coal 7.4%) (Fraunhofer ISE, 2021a). With this fast pace of development, wind energy acquired the largest share in German electricity production (Fig. 6.4). In Germany, onshore wind energy has an installed capacity of 54.9  GW with 29,608 wind turbines as of 2020. Furthermore, the EEG-2021 provided a new expansion target of 71 GW by 2030. To achieve this target, it is necessary to increase the cumulative capacity by about 30% over the next 10 years (Deutsche WindGuard, 2020a). However, newly installed onshore wind capacity in Germany plummeted in 2019, and the sector suffered its worst growth for the last two decades. In 2019, newly installed onshore wind turbine capacity dropped below 1 GW threshold for the first time, and this negative development caused stakeholders a serious concern. This stagnation may also jeopardize Germany’s 2030 renewable energy expansion target of 65% renewables in electricity production (Fig. 6.5). An explanation can be partly ascribed to the establishment of minimum distance rule in 2019 and partly to the local opposition. As we discussed before, a major hurdle to the expansion of onshore wind energy deployment in Germany was the local opposition. Some politicians argued that higher distances of wind turbines

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from residential areas can increase the acceptance of new wind energy projects. Thus, to ensure more acceptance by the residents, in 2019, the government introduced a nationwide minimum distance rule of 1000 m for wind turbines from the nearest settlement. However, this new constraint brought unexpected consequences: it reduced the existing space for new wind projects dramatically and brought the expansion to a standstill. After months of wrangling, on 18 May 2020, the government agreed to step back from this decision and left it to the federal states to decide whether they want to introduce such minimum distance rules of up to 1000  m

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between wind turbines and residential buildings in their state laws. Now the federal states are free to set distance rules that suit their geography and their expansion targets for wind energy. In terms of offshore wind energy, Germany officially brought 1.1 GW online in 2019 by commissioning three new wind farms: Merkur Offshore (252  MW), Deutsche Bucht (260.4 MW), and EnBW Hohe See (497 MW). The latter became the country’s biggest offshore wind farm. In 2020, the offshore wind energy installed capacity in Germany reached 7.8 GW with 1.501 wind turbines. The amendment to the Offshore Wind Energy Act, which was passed at the end of 2020, increased the previous expansion target from 15  GW to 20  GW by 2030. To achieve the new expansion target, the project areas have already been specified in the 2020 Site Development Plan (Deutsche WindGuard, 2020b). Compared to other EU member states, the Czech Republic is lagged behind in terms of installation of new wind farms. Several factors may explain this slow development pace of wind energy. Firstly, when compared with the coastal states on the North and Baltic Seas, the Czech Republic does not have favorable natural conditions for the development of wind energy. The places with adequate wind speed are unique and located only on the mountain ridges. Thus, the wind energy installations in the Czech Republic can’t compete with the highly efficient wind farms built in northern Germany. Secondly, the high installed capacity in neighboring Germany becomes another limiting factor to the development of wind energy in the Czech Republic, because when there are large surpluses of wind power, the price on the electricity market drops.1 Another obstacle to wind energy development is the reluctance of the population, local authorities, and some civic associations with ecological focus to the construction of new installations. As a consequence, all these factors result in sluggish growth of the wind energy in the Czech Republic. According to official statistics, gross electricity generation from wind energy has been around 700 GWh in 2019 and 2020 (Fig. 6.6). When we analyze the wind farms in the Czech Republic, we see that the biggest wind farm is Pnisecnice Wind Farm (commissioned in 2007/09) with 21 turbines and generating a nominal power of 42 MWh. The second biggest is the Vaclavice Wind Farm (commissioned in 2017) consisting of two parts. The first part has 11 turbines generating 22 MWh power, and the second part has 2 turbines generating 4.1 MWh nominal power. The third biggest is the Jindrichovice-Stara Wind Farm consisting of two parts. The first part was commissioned in 2010/12 and generates 9.2 MWh nominal power with its 4 turbines. The second part was commissioned in 2019 and generates 16.4 MWh nominal power with its 7 turbines. Finally, there is Horni Lodenice-Lipina Wind Farm (commissioned in 2009/07) with 9 turbines and generating 18  MWh nominal power. Other wind farms have either one or a few turbines and generate very small power.

 Price decision of the Energy Regulatory Office No. 3/2019 of 26 September 2019 establishing support for supported energy sources set the purchasing price of wind energy at Kc 1.93/kWh, which is the lowest price of the renewable energy sources in the Czech Republic. 1

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In the EU zone, hydropower is the second biggest source of renewable electricity production. Statistics show that Sweden, France, Italy, Austria, Spain, and Germany are the countries with the highest hydropower generation (Fig. 6.7). Compared to the top performers in the EU zone, Eastern European states recorded a very limited hydroenergy generation in 2020: the Czech Republic (3437 GWh), Poland (2937 GWh), and Slovakia (4799 GWh) (IRENA, 2022). Solar energy recorded a rapid growth rate in the EU zone due to steep cost reduction, flexibility, user-friendliness, and manifold applications. The factors such as

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drop in module prices and increasing self-consumption trend were supported by attractive feed-in premiums and regular calls for tender in European solar markets. These factors brought an impetus into the sector. The EU member states installed 18.2 GW of solar power capacity in 2020. This corresponds to 11% improvement over the 16.2 GW deployed in 2019 (SolarPower Europe, 2020). The best year for solar power growth was 2011 when EU member states installed 21.4 GW of new capacity. After 2011, 2020 became the second-best year with 18.2 GW of newly installed solar power capacity (SolarPower Europe, 2020) (Fig. 6.8). Germany is the largest solar market in the EU zone with its 53.7 GW of total installed capacity. It is followed by Italy with 21.6 GW of installed capacity. France takes the third rank with its 12 GW installed capacity. Spain ranks the fourth with its 10.2 GW installed solar capacity. In comparison, three Eastern European states have low installed solar PV capacities: Poland (6.2 GW), the Czech Republic and Hungary (2.1 GW), and Slovakia (0.5 GW) (IRENA, 2022). In terms of new capacity additions in 2020, Germany occupied the leadership position with 4.8  GW of new installations. It was followed by the Netherlands (2.8 GW) and Spain (2.6 GW) (SolarPower Europe, 2020). In 2020, Poland jumped into this list with 2.2 GW of newly installed solar energy, and this became a positive surprise for the EU’s solar sector. The self-consumption segment constituted the backbone of the growth in Poland: most of the Polish solar installations are smaller than 1 MW with the bulk of installed capacity is in the micro-generation segment under 50 kW. The Polish government supported this growth by offering favorable conditions to the prosumers. The support measures included net metering, feed-in tariffs, reduced VAT and income taxes, and low-interest loans (Fig. 6.9).

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In Germany, the share of solar PV in electricity expanded consistently in the last decade and reached 10% in 2020 (Fraunhofer ISE, 2022b). In 2020, solar systems generated more electricity (51 TWh) than hard coal-fired power stations (42.5 TWh) (Agora Energiewende, 2021). The main drivers of this growth in Germany are the state regulations and financial support measures. Especially, the roof-mounted PV systems enjoy favorable state support schemes. The solar systems up to a nominal power of 100 kW are entitled to guaranteed feed-in tariffs. New large-scale solar projects between 750 kW and 10 MW need to enter tendering process. For these projects, regular tenders take place three times a year, and in addition to them, there are technology-neutral innovation tenders. The first of these technology-neutral tenders took place in September 2020 and allocated nearly all of its 650 MW capacity to solar projects (Fraunhofer ISE, 2021b). The biggest solar PV power plant in Germany is the Weesow-Willmersdorf owned by the EnBW energy group. This solar farm is in Brandenburg, 30 km from Berlin. It can generate 180 million kWh of electricity per  annum, which equates to the annual consumption of 50,000 households. However, there are also some constraints for the development of the solar PV sector in Germany: Firstly, the planned tendered capacity is significantly lower than the current installation levels. So, the limits on the annual tenders hinder the potential of large commercial rooftops which are one of the most dynamic solar segments in the world. Another constraint is the obligation that the PV systems can only be constructed on arable land in 200-m corridors along federal motorways and railways. Thirdly, the EEG-2021 includes an obligation to install smart meters and remote controls for very small systems between 30 kW and 1 kW. This obligation

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increases the costs of residential rooftop segment, and it may impact negatively on the expansion. In the Czech Republic, solar PV systems experienced a boom period in 2010 and 2011 due to the subsidized price system. However, the experience turned out quite badly for the sector. When regional electricity distribution companies were required by law to pay high price to PV producers, they passed this additional cost to end consumers (Průša et al., 2013). This period led the public to perceive solar PV negatively, rather than through the lens of environmental benefits. In the following years, a number of restrictive measures were adopted, and this retroactive move stopped the development of the sector. As of 2020, the Czech Republic has 2.1 GW installed solar PV capacity and 2.2  TWh gross electricity production from solar PV.  This amount of solar PV energy is stable for the last decade. Its three neighboring countries demonstrate more or less similar profiles with Austria having 2 GW installed capacity, Hungary 2.1 GW, and Poland 3.9 GW (EurObserv’ER, 2022b) (Fig. 6.10). Bioenergy is extracted from biological sources on a renewable basis and can be used in all types of energy markets: electricity generation, heating and cooling, and transport. Because transport sector is not included in the context of this book, we focus on the generation of electricity and heat as the main forms of bioenergy in this section. Bioenergy is produced from by-products of forest management operations, from agricultural residues and energy crops, from animal by-products, and from solid municipal waste. Biogas is produced from the decomposition of biomass in the absence of oxygen (anaerobic digestion). Biogas can be used in the form of electricity or heat. Biogas can also be purified to be transformed into biomethane; then, it can be injected into the natural gas grid and used as a natural gas substitute to generate electricity or heat, or it can be used by natural gas vehicles. Five EU member states recorded the biggest growth in 2020: Denmark (29.2%), the Netherlands (16.7%), France (16.5%), Spain (11.1%), and Germany (2%).

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Fig. 6.10  Development trajectory of solar PV energy in the Czech Republic (2010–2020). (IRENA, 2022)

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Notwithstanding the smallest growth rate, Germany produced more than half of the EU’s biogas with 7.7  Mtoe in 2020. Italy generated slightly more than 2  Mtoe energy from biogas in 2020, followed by France with 1.1 Mtoe. Compared to these best examples, the Eastern European states have marginal energy production from biogas, with the Czech Republic producing 0.59 Mtoe, Poland 0.32 Mtoe, Slovakia 0.13  Mtoe, and Hungary 0.089  Mtoe (EurObserv’ER, 2021a). Still, the Czech Republic ranks as the 4th biggest energy producer from biogas (Fig. 6.11). Of 18,943 biogas plants across Europe, 9527 are in Germany. The explanation for the high number of biogas plants and high production level in Germany is highly effective state regulations that promoted the development of the biogas sector by providing generous feed-in tariffs. They helped the biogas industry in Germany to be dominated by small- and-medium-sized companies – typically the farmers. They use renewable energy crops like maize or turnips as well as manure and turn them into gas which is then burned in a CHP plant to generate electricity and heat (Fig. 6.12). Compared to this figure, the Czech Republic had 574 biogas plants, some of which were built with the support of EU grants (Czech Biogas Association, 2019). For instance, Kněžice biogas plant was built in 2006, when the municipality of Kněžice implemented a project called energy self-sufficient village. On the other side of the medallion, wider public acceptance is not always forthcoming. Due to environmental concerns about growing crops for fuel and complaints about odor defects from existing biogas plants that co-ferment animal feces, some citizens and civic associations fight against the construction of new biogas stations in their local communities. Economic factors are also important in hindering the development of biogas plants in the Czech Republic because the average price level for processed biowaste is lower than it is in the neighboring countries. If the Czech Republic 9000 8000 7000

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solves its societal and economic problems associated with the bioenergy, it can open a window of opportunity for further development of the sector. Another renewable energy technology, i.e., waste incineration with energy recovery method, is a sustainable and hygienic option to reuse municipal waste that is not suitable for recycling. When recycling is not possible, treating the municipal waste by an incineration plant is the only way to prevent it from ending up in landfills. In the EU-27, waste incineration plants generated 9.2 Mtoe of primary energy in 2020. This output indicated a slight increase (1.6%) over 2019. In recent years, energy production from municipal waste did not increase much in the EU. This stagnation can be attributed to the advanced waste prevention, composting, and recycling. This explanation especially holds true for Germany where composting and recycling rates are high. Similarly, in Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium, where landfilling is almost nonexistent or very low, drops in energy production can be explained by waste prevention or by increased recycling rates. In Eastern European countries, there is still a high percentage of waste ended in landfills. This means that there is still a growth potential by incineration. Therefore, the governments of Eastern European countries must put stronger efforts to the construction of waste-to-energy plants (Fig. 6.13). In 2020, electricity remained the main energy recovery mode from waste incinerators. Germany became the leader in electricity generated from municipal waste with 5.8  TWh. It was followed by Italy (2.3  TWh), France and the Netherlands (2.1 TWh), and Sweden (1.6 TWh). The Eastern European states recorded very low electricity output from municipal waste, as illustrated by Poland (0.18  TWh), Hungary (0.16 TWh), the Czech Republic (0.11 TWh), and Slovakia (0.04 TWh) (EurObserv’ER, 2021a). The new EU legislation requires 65% recycling rate for municipal waste, so, as a future projection, there will be a need for an additional

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waste treatment capacity. This requires a careful state planning especially in those EU member states that have no or very little WtE capacity. The final renewable energy method that we analyze here is the energy recovery from solid biomass. This method is mainly used to produce electricity and heat. Solid biomass heat can either be distributed via district heating networks or used directly by the end consumers in residential or industrial sectors. While primary energy production and consumption remained almost stable across the EU over a decade, the variation is among the individual member states. Forested countries such as Finland, Estonia, and Latvia export a significant part of their production, while Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Poland import part of the solid biofuels they use. The remaining gap between production and consumption is made up by imports from the USA, Canada, and Russia (Fig. 6.14). In terms of electricity generation from solid biomass, Germany, Finland, and Sweden are the leaders of the EU zone. Poland ranks the fourth in this list. An interesting case here is the Netherlands which doubled its electricity generation from 2019 to 2020 by 103.8% to produce 5.78 TWh. Czech Republic and Hungary, in comparison, generate marginal amounts of electricity from solid biomass (Fig. 6.15).

Fulfilment of the 2020 Renewable Energy Targets in the EU This section provides an in-depth review of the EU member states’ achievement of their individual renewable energy targets. We ask the crucial question: “Does the actual share of energy from renewable sources meet the EU member states’ national

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targets based on the 2009/28/EC Directive?” In this regard, the year 2020 marks an important review point for the policy-makers and policy researchers (Fig. 6.16). Three member states achieved over 40% of renewable energy in gross energy consumption in the EU zone. These countries are Sweden, Finland, and Latvia. Three member states achieved over 30% of renewable energy in gross energy consumption in the EU zone. These countries are Austria, Portugal, and Denmark. We

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Fig. 6.16  The share of renewable energy in total gross final energy consumption in the EU zone (2020). (EurObserv’ER, 2021a)

can categorize these six states as pacesetters due to their pace setting in terms of energy transition into renewables.

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Six member states achieved just over 20% of renewable energies target in 2020. In this group, we find Lithuania (26.8%), Slovenia (25%), Romania (24.5%), Bulgaria (23.3%), Greece (21.7%), and Spain (21.2%). Four Visegrad countries and Germany set low national targets for 2020, i.e., less than 20% of renewable energy. Germany achieved 19.3% of renewable energy, while the Czech Republic and Slovakia achieved 17.3%. Poland achieved 16.1% and Hungary achieved 13.9% of renewable energies. These rates were not in par with the other EU member states. Thus, we can categorize these five states as fence-­ sitters due to their slow pace of development in achieving energy transition. In terms of share of renewable energy in gross electricity consumption in 2020, three member states recorded the highest rates in the EU zone. Austria became the leader of this group with 78.2% share. It was followed by Sweden (74.5%) and Denmark (65.3%). We can label these member states as pacesetters in terms of renewable electricity. Four Visegrad countries were in the group of countries with the lowest shares of RE electricity in the EU zone in 2020: Slovakia (23.1%), Poland (16.2%), the Czech Republic (14.8%), and Hungary (11.9%). Thus, we can categorize these four states as fence-sitters due to their slow pace of development in renewable electricity (Fig. 6.17). The statistical data demonstrate that the share of renewable electricity has increased considerably in all EU member states since the early 2000s. In 2020, 21 member states achieved higher than 20% of renewable electricity, and there are six states showing slow progress. These varying results depend on the renewable energy potential and the state support policies they implemented. This progress continues in the EU zone after the fulfilment of 2020 targets. In 2020, most of the newly installed electrical capacity in the EU zone was based on renewable energy technologies: only 6% of the 32.3 GW of the new electrical % 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0

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capacity was based on coal-fired power plants, while only 3% of it was based on gas-fired power plants. Meanwhile, photovoltaic power plants constituted 55% of the newly installed capacity, and the wind energy constituted 32% of it. No new nuclear units were added to the electricity mix. Only Germany (1055  MW) and Poland (950  MW) commissioned new fossil fuel-fired power plants in 2020 (Fig. 6.18). We have seen the variable geometry in the EU zone regarding the pace of energy transition. In this context, one may also question the impact of energy import dependency on the urgency of energy transition. We hypothesize that a higher import dependence may influence the decision of a faster renewable energy deployment to break the chains of political and economic dependence on other countries. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed statistical data on EU member states’ import dependency on Russia for natural gas (Eurostat, 2022). The highest levels of import dependency in 2020 are found among the Eastern European and Baltic countries. The Czech Republic and Latvia have 100% of dependence on Russia for their natural gas imports; this situation is more or less similar for Estonia (98%) and Hungary (95%). The level of dependency is slightly lower for Slovakia (85.4%). Poland and Germany demonstrate a similar level of dependency with 69.5% and 68.6%, respectively. Among these member states, only Latvia and Estonia have high shares of renewable energy in their energy mix (42% and 30%, respectively); the remaining countries in this group demonstrate a low share of renewable energies in their energy mix (below 20%) in 2020. Such high levels of import dependency are not sustainable in the long term because import dependency creates insecurity and international conflict. From an economic perspective, natural gas is subject to global price fluctuations. From a political perspective, high dependence on energy imports can be used as a leverage by the suppliers. As a result of both factors, supply interruptions can occur. In these situations, what happens to the local industry and households remains highly unpredictable. Indeed, several times of such crisis have been experienced over different conflictive situations. The most recent example is the termination of natural gas imports from Russia due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine earlier this year. This crisis demonstrated to the European states the urgency of Fig. 6.18  Distribution of additional electrical capacity connected in EU-27 (2020). (EurObserv’ER, 2021a)

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energy independence, which could be only achieved via energy transition into renewable energies.

Future Projections for the Renewable Energies in the EU The current situation in EU-27 in terms of energy transition shows that all renewable energy technologies have recorded a considerable increase in recent years. Especially, the wind energy led the development of renewable energies in Europe. In 2020, it provided 14.3% of the total electricity generation with 2781.4 TWh. This share was even higher in those countries that put wind energy at the center of their energy transition. For instance, Denmark recorded 56.8% of wind energy in its electricity mix in 2020, while Ireland achieved 35.8%, Lithuania 29.2%, Portugal 23.2%, and Germany 23.1%. Hydropower appears as the second most important sector for renewable electricity generation in Europe with 346.3 TWh electricity production, corresponding to a 32.7% share. Sweden enjoyed being the top hydropower producer in the EU, and it was followed by France and Italy. While wind energy and hydroenergy contributed most to renewable electricity generation in the EU, in the recent years, solar energy has recorded a big expansion progress than any other renewable source. In 2020, the EU’s solar electricity generation reached 144.2  TWh with 16.5% growth than the previous year. Now, the solar energy accounts for 13.6% of the renewable electricity output and 5.2% of total electricity output in the EU, and it is continuously increasing its rank among renewable technologies. It is a particularly important energy source for the southernmost countries such as Malta (11.1%), Greece (9.2%), Italy (8.9%), and Spain (7.9%) with higher shares in their electricity mix. Biomass energy in all its forms (solid biomass, biogas, and renewable municipal waste) generated 163.2 TWh of electricity in 2020 with 1.9% increase from the previous year. In 2020, biomass electricity output increased in several member states such as Spain (by 16.9%), Poland (by 7.6%), Estonia (by 38.6%), and Portugal (by 16.6%). The biggest increase was recorded by the Netherlands which doubled its electricity generation from biomass by 103.8% to generate 5.8 TWh. This success can be attributed to the increased use of wood pellets in CHP plants (Fig. 6.19). Based on the current situation in 2020, we can provide future projections for the energy transition in Europe and present a few policy recommendations to policy-­ makers at all levels. Today, wind energy represents an increasing share of electricity supply in the EU zone, and its role is developing even further. The European Commission projects that among the renewables, wind will be the dominant technology in 2050, representing 51–56% of the energy production in all decarbonization scenarios (European Commission, 2018). The future trajectory is that the wind capacity will increase from 179 GW in 2020 to 350 GW in 2030 and to 700–1200 GW in 2050 in different scenarios (European Commission, 2018).

Future Projections for the Renewable Energies in the EU Fig. 6.19  Share of renewable energy sectors in electricity generation in the EU-27 (2020). (EurObserv’ER, 2021a)

131 Geothermal 0.6%

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Hydro, 32.70%

However, electricity generation by wind turbines poses some challenges for the engineers. These challenges basically stem from the uncertainty of meteorological conditions and power fluctuations. There are also certain challenges for the policy-­ makers related to policy design, policy procedures, and public support. Firstly, there is the question of designing an appropriate state financial support, at least in the initial development phase. Secondly, there is the contentious minimum distance rule that is applied in some EU member states. This rule may help overcome the local citizens’ disturbances from the nearby wind turbines; however, it also blocks the possibility for further development of wind farms. When we consider that modern wind farms consist of low-noise, modern, and efficient turbines, there is no justification for the minimum distance rule. Thirdly, there is an urgent need for an ambitious and suitable public policy design that promotes and supports new wind energy installments. If we consider that the wind power is an important driver of renewable energy deployment and a major contributor to national and European policy targets, the importance of policy design is well appreciated. Therefore, the EU governments must quickly address the permitting issues and procedures, put in place effective strategies, incorporate market signals, and design appropriate support measures. Solar power’s spectacular growth made it one of the cornerstones of energy transition in the EU. There are many good reasons for the solar energy’s recent positive development: the costs have reduced steeply, and manifold applications are flexible and user-friendly. The policy experts have an optimistic outlook for the development of the EU solar market. For instance, SolarPower Europe projects in its High Scenario that the EU will reach up to 292.8 GW total installed capacity by 2024 (SolarPower Europe, 2020) on the assumption that there will be no import taxes for solar products, no prohibitive taxes or fees on self-consumption/storage, or any other barriers that may slow down the solar power. In the Low Scenario, the projection is that the EU will add over 60 GW to operate a 200.3 GW solar capacity by the end of 2024 (SolarPower Europe, 2020). When we investigate the EU solar market, we see that the market depends more on commercial and residential roof-mounted systems and less on big PV power

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plants. This shows that the prosumers have an increasing role in the expansion of the sector. So, the EU policy-makers must put more focus on the development of small-­ scale solar PV sector by devising measures for incentivizing self-consumption. European legislation also provides a legal base for such policy designs. The RES Directive (Directive 2018/2001) asked the member states to set up a regulatory framework to ensure that individuals have the right to produce, use their own output, store, and sell electricity, without having to bear unreasonable charges. Policy experts confirm that there is a significant potential for solar market growth in Europe. SolarPower Europe projects that the rooftop solar systems in the EU could generate between 680 TWh and 1300 TWh (SolarPower Europe, 2020). To make the most of this potential, the EU governments must create state regulations, favorable market framework conditions, and financial support mechanisms. Firstly, they can design solar mandates for all new and existing buildings with suitable rooftops. Secondly, they can couple these mandates with financial support schemes to citizens and businesses that wish to install on-site solar and storage systems. Such a policy design would also help to reduce the CO2 emissions and reduce energy demand in the buildings. Therefore, the EU governments need to overcome their bureaucratic hurdles to use their available potentials. Hydropower is the oldest form of renewable electricity production in the EU accounting for around 10% of the current electricity production. Due to geographical conditions, its growth potential in Europe is limited, apart from small hydropower plants or modernization of the existing facilities. The potential of new small hydropower plants is significantly affected by environmental legislation such as EU Water Framework Directive and Natura 2000 network of protected sites that aim to protect the biodiversity of rivers and water courses. Therefore, hydropower’s long-­ term reliability depends on the evolution of climate conditions. The bioenergy sector can make a good contribution to the EU’s energy transition goal. It effectively reduces the greenhouse gases, replaces fossil energies, and prevents farming, manure, and waste-related methane emissions to be released into the air. As we discussed before, the RES Directive (Directive 2018/2001) introduced the sustainability criteria and the greenhouse gas emissions saving criteria for energy from biofuels, bioliquids, and biomass (Article 29). Based on this provision, bioenergy generation can only be classified as a renewable energy source, if it fulfills more stricter criteria. In all future decarbonization scenarios, biogas has a prominent role as it is fully interchangeable with natural gas and its combustion is considered carbon neutral. The European Commission projects that the whole consumption of biogas in the EU will increase from 16.6  Mtoe in 2019 to some 30  Mtoe in 2030, and then range between 45 Mtoe and 79 Mtoe in 2050 (European Commission, 2018). Thus, there is a good growth potential for biogas in the EU energy system. The solid biomass has the technical capacity to substitute coal in producing heat and electricity, so it has seen a significant growth in the EU zone. As a future trajectory, the European Commission projects that the EU’s biomass capacity will reach 60 GW in 2030, and then either stabilize at that point, or grow very moderately up to 83  GW in 2050 (European Commission, 2018). Thus, biomass energy will

References

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continue to contribute to the energy transition targets of the EU member states in the forthcoming years. We recognize that the road to energy transition is not free from obstacles. The policy-makers in a given country may encounter both economic and noneconomic obstacles on their path to energy transition. Economic barriers would be related to the cost of renewable energy technologies. These may become a major barrier to their adoption because the absence of adequate funding opportunities and financing products for renewable energy technologies discourage the investors. When state subsidies and various financial incentives are provided in the initial stage of development, a strong growth in renewable deployment is clearly observed, and this is accompanied by a significant reduction in the cost of the principal technologies. Noneconomic barriers would be related to the policy uncertainty and risk from ineffective policy design, discontinuity, or insufficient transparency of policies and legislation. The lack of a strong policy design and complicated, slow, or nontransparent procedures discourage the investors. As we argued before, lack of public acceptance of renewable energy technologies and lack of political will to support and implement energy transition policy inevitably hinder the renewable energy deployment. The statistical data show that high shares of renewables in the EU member states can be attributed to the adoption of bold and sustained policy measures as well as to the countries’ natural capacities. To a large extent, introduction of effective renewable energy policies and policy incentives targeting different stages of technology innovation and market development provide remarkable growth of renewable energies. The policy recommendation to policy-makers at all levels is to be aware of the barriers and use a mix of policy instruments to overcome them.

References Agora Energiewende. (2021). Die Energiewende im Corona-Jahr: Stand der Dinge 2020. Rückblick auf die wesentlichen Entwicklungen sowie Ausblick auf 2021. Berlin. Retrieved from www.agora-­energiewende.de Bundesverband WindEnergie. (2021, December 31). Installed wind energy capacity in Germany. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from German wind energy in numbers: https://www.wind-­energie. de/english/statistics/statistics-­germany/ Czech Biogas Association. (2019). National platform for biogas. Retrieved 06 15, 2021, from https://www.czba.cz/en.html Deutsche WindGuard. (2020a). Status of onshore wind energy development in Germany. Deutsche WindGuard GmbH. Retrieved from https://www.wind-­energie.de/english/statistics/ statistics-­germany/ Deutsche WindGuard. (2020b). Status of offshore wind energy development in Germany. Deutsche WindGuard GmbH. Retrieved from https://www.wind-­energie.de/english/statistics/ statistics-­germany/ EurObserv’ER. (2021a). The state of renewable energies in Europe. EurObserv’ER. EurObserv’ER. (2021b). Solid biofuels barometer. EurObserv’ER. EurObserv’ER. (2022a). Wind energy barometer. EurObserv’ER. EurObserv’ER. (2022b). Photovoltaic barometer. EurObserv’ER.

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European Commission. (2018). In-depth analysis in support of the commission communication COM(2018) 773. Brussels. Eurostat. (2020). SHARES (Short Assessment of Renewable Energy Sources) summary results. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/shares Eurostat. (2022). NRG_IND_IDOGAS. Natural gas import dependency by country of origin. Retrieved November 20, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database?node_code= nrg_ind_idogas Fraunhofer ISE. (2021a). Net public electricity generation in Germany in 2020. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from Energy Charts: https://energy-­charts.info Fraunhofer ISE. (2021b). Recent facts about Photovoltaics in Germany. Retrieved from https:// www.ise.fraunhofer.de/ Fraunhofer ISE. (2022a). Annual wind share of electricity production in Germany. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from Energy Charts: https://energy-­charts.info Fraunhofer ISE. (2022b). Annual solar share of electricity production in Germany. Retrieved April 18, 2022, from Energy Charts: https://energy-­charts.info/ German Biogas Association. (2020). German biogas market data 2019/2020. Retrieved from https://www.biogas.org/ IRENA. (2021). Renewable capacity statistics. International Renewable Energy Agency. IRENA. (2022). Renewable energy statistics. The International Renewable Energy Agency. Průša, J., Klimešováa, A., & Janda, K. (2013). Consumer loss in Czech photovoltaic power plants in 2010–2011. Energy Policy, 63, 747–755. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.08.023 SolarPower Europe. (2020). EU market outlook for solar power 2020–2024. WindEurope. (2021). Wind energy in Europe: 2020 statistics and the outlook for 2021–2025. Brussels.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

We Can Reshape Our Energy Systems On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, and as of September 2022, this aggression has been continuing. The war has had a significant impact on energy prices and agricultural commodity prices in Europe and the rest of the world. The crisis has aggravated the energy crisis in Europe and further jeopardized global food security. Energy prices had already been rising since the second half of 2021. After the war, they have risen further. This situation resulted in concerns over security of energy supply in the EU.  Due to the suspension of gas deliveries to several EU member states, the EU has to device new measures for the member states to ensure diversification of gas supply and to fill the gas storage before the winter season. In addition, measures have adopted to reduce gas demand through energy-saving programs. In addition, in June 2022, the EU imposed a ban on Russian crude oil and petroleum products. As a result, the European Union has realized that it must end its dependence on fossil fuel imports from Russia. With this aim, European Commission developed the REPowerEU plan. The core elements of the plan are energy saving, increased production of clean energy, and diversification of energy supplies. The crisis accelerated the policy-makers’ recognition that the renewable energies are the cheapest and cleanest sources of energy available, and they can be produced domestically, which helps reducing the need for energy imports. The REPowerEU plan is developed so as to speed up the green transition and spur massive investment in renewable energy. Therefore, renewable energies are important to achieve global environmental sustainability goals. Policy-makers are increasingly aware of renewable energy’s wide range of benefits, including energy security, reduced import dependency, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, prevention of biodiversity loss, improved human health, job creation, and rural development. For environmental © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Tanil, Sustainable Energy Development, Environment & Policy 63, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28065-8_7

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sustainability, they protect the biodiversity, fauna and flora, and natural resources from the hazardous effects of the extraction and the use of fossil fuels. For economy, renewable energy technologies have the potential to provide a range of new jobs, create new industrial opportunities, and lead to technology innovations. They generate significant direct employment opportunities particularly during early phases of construction and installation, and in later phases, they create longer-term positions in the areas of operation and management. By generating new employment opportunities, they contribute to economic growth and welfare. For society, they avoid the adverse effects of air pollution on human health and contribute to the well-being of citizens. Energy transition is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reshape the future, and we need all countries to cooperate and act simultaneously to achieve this goal. Over the last years, national discussions on gradual phasing out of coal have accelerated in Europe’s top-three lignite countries, Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The German Coal Commission proposed to close all hard coal- and lignite-­fired power plants by 2038 at the latest, and the German parliament adopted this plan. A Coal Commission was also set up in the Czech Republic, and it determined the same date as Germany for the Czech Republic’s coal phase-out. In January 2022, the Czech Republic rescheduled its coal phase-out date as 2033. Alongside the government decision, the Czech energy market also started the energy transition. Czech utility ČEZ has announced that it will drastically cut coal from its power and heating operations, lowering the amount of electricity it produces from coal from 39% to 12.5% by 2030. Poland scheduled a later date for its coal phase-­ out as 2049.

Energy Transition Policy Energy transition policies may take many forms, such as subsidies for the deployment of renewable energies, regulations and strategies for the requirement of certain percentage of energy generated from renewable sources, and incentives for individuals and businesses to adopt clean energies. Governments and international organizations around the world have been adopting different strategies and implementing various energy transition policies in order to promote renewable energies and to achieve a more sustainable energy mix. The European Union is playing a significant role in promoting energy transition policies across Europe by setting ambitious targets for renewable energy deployment and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In this context, member states adopted key laws such as the Renewable Energy Directive, Energy Efficiency Directive, and Emissions Trading System. In addition to legislation, the EU is also supporting the expansion of renewable energy through financial incentives and funding for research and development. The EU also promotes regional energy cooperation and single energy market to increase energy security and diversify energy supply.

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Germany has implemented several policies to promote energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources as part of its efforts to combat climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. One key policy is the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, or EEG), which was first enacted in 2000 and has been revised several times since. The EEG provides subsidies for the development and deployment of renewable energy technologies and sets targets for the percentage of energy that must be generated from renewable sources. Another important policy is the Renewable Heating Act (Erneuerbare-Wärmegesetz, or EEWärmeG), which promotes renewable energy use for heating. Overall, Germany’s energy transition policy has led to significant progress in the adoption of renewable energy. Now, the country is generating a large share of its electricity from renewable energy sources. The transition is ongoing, and there are still challenges to be addressed, including the need to upgrade the power grid to accommodate the integration of renewable energy sources and the need to phase out coal-fired power plants. The Czech Republic has made some progress in the transition to renewable energies in recent years, but the country still relies heavily on fossil fuels, particularly coal, for electricity generation. The Czech government has set targets to increase the use of renewable energies and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and it has implemented several policies to support this transition. These include the Renewable Energy Sources Act, which set targets for the share of energy that must be generated from renewable sources. It also provides funding for renewable energy projects and energy efficiency measures. However, the country’s energy mix is still heavily dependent on coal, and there has been some resistance to energy transition, including from the coal industry and some political parties. The country also faces challenges in upgrading its power grid to accommodate the integration of renewable energy sources.

Research Outcomes The energy transition is a complex process, and it involves a range of economic, political, and social factors that interconnect in multifaceted ways. To understand and analyze this process, a number of theoretical frameworks have been developed. These frameworks are utilized to create a systematic approach to understanding the factors that influence the adoption and diffusion of renewable energy technologies. In this book, we overviewed the literature on energy transition and synthesized five key research hypotheses for energy transition: H1. Policy targets are contextual drivers of change and have a positive effect on the energy transition. H2. State regulations create trust and stability in key actors and have a positive effect on energy transition.

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H3. Policies supporting renewables create stimulus and encourage the market actors toward renewable energy investments and have a positive effect on the energy transition. H4. Political will and accord among the political parties have a positive effect on the energy transition. H5. Public acceptance and involvement have a positive effect on the energy transition. We tested these assumptions in two different national contexts: Germany and the Czech Republic. A qualitative framework was developed for this analysis, and political discourses, governmental and ministerial papers and reports, legislation, media sources, public surveys, and academic publications were analyzed. The outcomes of this analysis made up the structural framework in these countries. We analyzed how these structural frameworks impacted on actual policy implementation by making statistical data analysis for the deployment of renewable energies in the last two decades. This analysis produced useful outcomes: Hypothesis 1: We argued that an effective target setting for the midterm and long term is the first step to achieve energy transition because policy targets (normative framework) are contextual drivers of policy change and, thereby, have a positive effect on policy outputs (legislative framework). The European Union set its 2020 target for the share of renewable energies in the overall consumption of energy as 20% and its 2030 target as 32%. It also set an objective of a climate-­ neutral Union by 2050. In line with these policy targets, Germany set out its national target as 18% by 2020 and 30% by 2030 for the share of renewable energies in total energy consumption. It also set an ambitious target of complete greenhouse gas neutrality by 2050. In comparison, the Czech Republic set out its national target as 14% by 2020 and 22% by 2030 for the share of renewable energies in total energy consumption. These targets serve as contextual drivers for the policy-makers in developing necessary state regulations; for this reason, they are important benchmarks in delivering necessary policy outcomes. In this context, national and European policy-makers need to establish and publicize their long-­ term renewable energy visions in cooperation with technology experts, civil society, and market analysts. These roadmaps need to clearly describe the ­journey to energy transition. The policy targets must include banning or phasing out fossil fuels, targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or zero emission commitments, and sectoral targets to achieve certain share of renewable energies. Such targets are effective not only in expressing governments’ commitment to energy transition and but also in sending a positive signal to the industries, businesses, and the citizens to follow suit. The progress toward stated policy goals should also be tracked at regular intervals. Hypothesis 2: We argued that it is necessary to set stable, transparent, and effective state regulations for the renewable energies. State regulations are importance since they create trust and stability in key actors, and have a positive effect on policy outcomes. In this context, we have seen that the European Union and its member states (Germany and the Czech Republic) set up a stable and transparent

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legislative framework for the renewable energies. In Germany, the EEG and EEWӓrmeG are good examples for effective state regulation which can act as a trigger for new renewable energy investments. In the Czech Republic, Energy Act, Energy Management Act, and Renewable Energy Sources Act are the basic elements of legislative framework in energy policy, and they include several policy measures designed to increase the share of renewables in electricity sector and heating and cooling sector. We argued that this regulatory approach by the state is important to initiate and implement the desired change in all energy sectors. This analysis validated the necessity and positive impact of state regulations. Germany’s successful Renewable Energy Law (EEG) has been a good example of an effective state regulation to divert private cash flows into climate protection measures. We can say that EEG can be a role model for other states that wish to undertake the policy vision for energy transition. Policy-makers in other countries must also establish a strong framework of law and regulations to enable the launch and penetration of the renewable energies in a country. Hypothesis 3: States need to designate various forms of financial support mechanisms to encourage renewable energy investments by individuals, businesses, industries, and energy communities. The supporting policies are important to create stimulus in the market toward renewable energies and, thus, have a positive effect on policy outcomes. Feed-in tariffs provide long-term certainty of receiving support and reduced risk for producers; thus, they create a basis for long-term investment planning. By this way, they enable less mature and more expansive renewables’ early market penetration. Market-oriented policies aim to produce a fixed amount of renewable energy at the lowest cost through the market. Thus, they increase competition between renewable technologies, and encourage expansion and development of more efficient technologies. Since each support policy serves a different purpose, it would be best to use them at different stages of policy implementation. This analysis found that Germany implemented feed-in tariffs successfully in the initial phase of renewable energy development. The EEG 2000 provided a remuneration system based on a fixed, regressive feed-in tariff for renewable sources, and this enabled the fast development of the renewable energies with the involvement of a wide range of public participants in the system. By this way, they were successful to lower the range of risks associated with the introduction of capital-intensive technologies and the development of new markets. We found a similar framework in the Czech Republic as well. The Act on Renewable Energy Sources (2005 and 2012) promoted the use of renewable electricity by means of feed-in tariff and green bonuses (market premium). Later, we have seen a tendency in both countries toward more market-­oriented policies with the introduction of competitive bidding or auctions. Therefore, this analysis validated the success of a mix of instruments to promote renewable energy deployment, especially in the early stages. In this context, national and regional authorities need to establish effective supportive policies to maximize the contribution of all stakeholders in energy transition. Public policies that promote large-scale deployment of renewable energies

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include FITs, tenders and auctions, and investment incentives (grants, loans, tax reductions, or exemptions). In the initial phase of renewable energies, feed-in policies are more effective to promote renewable energy investments since they provide investment security for a large scale of actors. At the later stage, a shift to market-­ based approaches would improve cost-effectiveness. A word of caution here is that opponents of market-based approaches argue that the auctions favor large-scale developers and disadvantage citizen-driven initiatives. Thus, the decision should be taken based on the relevant socio-economic condition of the country, and when necessary, governments should reform the support mechanisms periodically and adjust them to the changing technological innovations and changing needs. Most importantly, they need to maintain these support mechanisms transparent, sustainable, simple, and accessible for all stakeholders, i.e., the industries, businesses, citizens, and energy communities. Different countries prefer implementing different supporting policies because every country has a different natural, social, and institutional environment. In this research, we suggest policy-makers to adopt a mix of policy instruments for the promotion of renewable energies; however, effectiveness of this policy mix is also an important concern, since it does not always mean that the use of more policies would necessarily bring about better results. The main reason is that if there is a policy conflict or policy overlap, then the policy effect may either stagnate or even decrease. This undesired outcome is expected when the number of policy instruments increases. Then, the policy effect either stagnates or even declines. The positive expectation, i.e., increased policy effectiveness, would only be true when the supportive policies complement each other. Therefore, the implementation of a greater number of policy instruments does not always generate stronger outcomes. Policy-makers must consider policy overlapping and interaction, and design renewable energy policies accordingly. Hypothesis 4: We argued that political stability and consensus over coal phase-out and deployment of renewable energies have a positive impact on the successful implementation of energy transition policy. A detailed analysis of political party programs in Germany released that all major political actors support the energy transition policy. As comparison, in the Czech Republic, we have seen the existence of political-economic lobbies that maintain support for the conventional energy forms, and act as ardent opponents of a coal phase-out in the short term. This set an unambitious political scene in the Czech Republic for energy transition. Most importantly, the country’s reliance on domestically produced coal acted as a crucial barrier for energy transition because most political parties have presented country’s abundant coal resources as a provider of energy security at affordable prices for the businesses and consumers. As a result, implementation of energy transition has been slower in the Czech Republic. This comparative analysis validated the important role of political consensus over the energy transition policy. In this context, all political actors need to make coal phase-out a policy priority, and they need to maintain consensus over a clear timetable. Strong political will is needed, particularly in the initial stage, to stimulate deployment of renewable energy technologies.

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Hypothesis 5: As the final hypothesis, we argued that public acceptance and involvement in the process have a positive effect on the energy transition. The analysis showed that in Germany, public surveys carried out by independent agencies all displayed positive results and confirmed that public acceptance of energy transition policy is high and an overwhelming majority of the people in Germany supports energy transition, whereas in the Czech Republic, public opinion polls showed that the environment, climate change, and energy transition do not appear as the most critical issues for the Czech public. Indeed, a successive analysis of the period 2019–2022 revealed that the economic concerns, inflation, and cost of living dominated the Czech public agenda, followed by the social concerns such as immigration, housing, health, and social security. However, public support for renewable energies can be problematic in some national or regional contexts. To build sociopolitical support, national and regional authorities need to communicate the renewable energy vision to the public clearly. The national and regional authorities need to understand and accept that energy transition takes time and continual improvement requires mobilizing all stakeholders. They also need to be aware of the community concerns on renewable energy development, and they need to pursue effective responses to these concerns. Firstly, the governments can advance citizen support for renewables via awareness campaigns. The awareness-raising campaigns have been employed widely in recent years. The informative and educational programs and public campaigns create public support for the renewable energy technologies, and also encourage behavioral changes in energy use and climate-friendly decisions. Secondly, governments can embrace improved public participation in the policy-making phase. The use of good governance approach is important because the public demands transparency about the process, so the authorities need to be clear and open in their institutional procedures. Also, public consultation in policy-making leads to greater democratic engagement of the citizens into the process and, therefore, increases social acceptance of the new energy projects. Thirdly, the governments can also make efforts to better share the economic benefits with host communities via local share offers and community-run energy projects.

Pathway to 2030 Given the significant scale of the challenge posed by the energy transition, a concerted effort is needed from governments to make renewables a key component of their sustainable energy mix. Both the more experienced member states that have already moved forward along the path of energy transition and the less experienced ones that are still exploring the options should coordinate their efforts. Strong policy action is needed, especially in the initial phase, to stimulate deployment of the renewable energy technologies. We also need a major coordinative effort by the EU.  The EU needs to regularly track the progress of the member states, project

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policy implementation, promote the best practices to inspire other member states, and assist lagged-behind states in necessary capacity building. There are a wide range of energy scenarios that consider the role of renewable energies in the future energy mix of Europe. These scenarios show that the growth in renewable energies will be a global trend, so it will not be constrained to particular states. These scenarios also show that the full spectrum of renewable energy technologies will be deployed greatly in the future. Wind energy, solar energy, and bioenergy will make the largest contributions to our future energy mix. Future research in this area can focus on the strategies for the fulfilment of 2030 renewable energy targets. A nexus between energy and climate policies must be drawn to bring these policies even closer. The circular economy approach that brings together the themes of environmental policy (waste and pollution), industrial policy (recycling and new materials), and research and innovation policy is a good place to start. The most recent policy targets and strategies for 2030 targets need to be analyzed in this wider perspective.

Contribution of This Book In this book, our objective has been to identify the most promising renewable energy technologies and resources for Germany and the Czech Republic. We have examined how institutional frameworks in these nations can be improved, including supportive policies, regulations, and financing mechanisms. Recognizing the crucial role of public participation in energy transition, we have also investigated public awareness, acceptance, and engagement in both countries. The insights derived from this research may serve as a valuable reference for other nations, providing examples and lessons learned from Germany and the Czech Republic’s experiences for a successful transition towards a higher share of renewable energies in their energy mix. What is the unique contribution of this book to your understanding of energy transition in the EU zone? Major strengths of this book reside in its broad approach to the study of energy policy. Firstly, this book applied a broad perspective to energy transition via the analysis of policy actors, policy design, and policy implementation. This all-encompassing analysis facilitated a complete understanding of the mechanisms of energy transition. Secondly, we provided an overview of all EU member states in terms of fulfilment of their 2020 national renewable energy targets. The presupposition here is that the move away from coal in one or a few EU member states does not automatically lead to the achievement of the EU’s climate targets if other member states continue to produce energy from coal. For this reason, we employed a comparative perspective to equip the readers with a wider lens when evaluating the success of ongoing energy transition in the EU zone. We believe that only such a wide perception would help the readers to understand the importance of common strategies to coordinate energy transition policies in the EU. Finally, this research did not limit itself to explanations solely focused on economic,

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technological, or geographic advantage. We believe that employing only one factor to account for energy transition are not sophisticated enough to explain different pace of energy transition in different national contexts. Thus, we hold the assumption that the governments, industry, communities, and the individuals all have a role in achieving energy transition. With this conviction, we incorporated all relevant factors that can contribute to energy transition: the role of state regulatory framework, effective target setting, effective policy design with adequate financial support measures, the role of political will, and the role of public support for energy transition. We argued that only when we consider all these factors we can correctly explain the success of energy transition in a country.