Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (February-March 2020): Deterring North Korea 9780367491895, 9780367273576

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Survival GLOBAL POLITICS AND STRATEGY Volume 6 2 Numb er 1 | February-M arch 2 0 2 0

'As with any policy instrument, the more ambitious a sanction's goal, the less likely it is to succeed. Sanctions are most effective in inducing modest policy change, and least so in stopping military action or bringing about regime change - though there are successful cases of both/ Nigel Gould-Davies, Russia, the West and Sanctions, p. 9.

'Thus, North Korea seems prepared to deliberately dance at the edge of the nuclear cliff both in peacetime and during crisis ... [Kim Jong-un] calculates that a conventional invasion or a surprise attack would be unthinkable by the United States and its allies given the risks of uncontrollable escalation past the nuclear threshold/ Vipin Narang and Ankit Panda, North Korea: Risks of Escalation, p. 49.

'This illusion of control is being fostered by a new generation of strategic experts, civilian and military, whose rediscovery of the case for "limited" strategic nuclear war is providing the conceptual base for the force-modernisers' pet projects/ Seyom Brown, The New Nuclear MADness, p. 78.

Survival

GLOBAL POLITICS AND STRATEGY Volume 62 Num ben | February-March 2020

Contents Strategic Economic Statecraft

7

Russia, the West and Sanctions Nigel Gould-Davies Sanctions have reaffirmed international norms violated by Russia and probably deterred military escalation in Ukraine.

Colloquium: Deterring a Nuclear North Korea

29 31

Introduction Limiting North Korea's Coercive Nuclear Leverage Jina Kim and John K. Warden The US and allied goal should be to deter the use of North Korea's nuclear capabilities rather than to destroy them.

39

Nuclear Stability on the Korean Peninsula Adam Mount and Mira Rapp-Hooper The US and South Korea must afford Pyongyang a rational expectation of security but no hope of winning a limited conflict.

47

North Korea: Risks of Escalation Vipin Narang and Ankit Panda The most effective allied framework would employ deterrence by punishment at the nuclear level, and deterrence by denial at the conventional level.

55

Deterring North Korea Ian Campbell and Michaela Dodge If conventional deterrence fails, the US must be able to terminate war on favourable terms.

60

Noteworthy: After Soleimani - The Iran Crisis

Back to Arms Control

63

The New Nuclear MADness Seyom Brown Major powers are freshly integrating the use of nuclear weapons in actual combat into their strategies.

89

Lessons for Negotiating with North Korea Edward Ifft The immediate challenge is to consolidate progress already made and grab the low-hanging fruit.

The Cyber Challenge

107 Mixed Signals: A Flawed Approach to Cyber Deterrence Alexander Klimburg

Some risks of 'persistent engagement' could be mitigated by reducing its reliance on mixed signals and public communication.

Cover: KIM WON-JIN/AFP via Getty Images

Su rvivals^ Deterring North Korea

On the cover North Koreans watch the launch of a Hwasong12 rocket on a screen in Pyongyang on 16 September 2017.

Correction

The December 2019-January 2020 issue of Survival duplicated an erroneous photo-agency caption that referred to Sevastopol as part of Russia. We apologise for the editing error, w hich in no w ay reflects the IISS or Survival position regarding the illegality of Russia's annexation of Crimea.

131 Deterring Cyber Coercion: The Exaggerated Problem of Attribution David Blagden

Even an anonymous belligerent cannot avoid identifying its interests, which those seeking deterrence can then hold at risk.

Eastern Promises

149 Contemplating a Russia-Japan Rapprochement Olga Puzanova

Russia and Japan's narrow focus on their territorial dispute may inhibit its resolution as well as broader cooperation. 157 Political Transition on the Great Steppe: The Case of Kazakhstan Morena Skalamera Groce

President Nursultan Nazarbayev's successor may not have the experience or charisma necessary to ensure Kazakhstan's continued stability.

Balkan Errands

169 Serbian Interests in an Independent Kosovo A. Ross Johnson

Intra-Serbian dialogue is as necessary for normalisation as is resumed dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.

Review Essays

183 Greenland's Hidden Treasure Jeffrey Mazo

In The Ice at the End of the World, Jon Gertner excels in conveying the compelling human drama behind scientific exploration and research, without losing the science and its contemporary urgency.

191 The Church and the Military in Russia Mathieu Boulegue

Dmitry Adamsky's Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy offers a comprehensive account of the rising influence of the state-religion nexus on Russian military affairs.

Book Reviews

197 Russia and Eurasia Angela Stent 204 War, Conflict and the Military Rosa Brooks 213 Asia-Pacific Lanxin Xiang 219

Letter to the Editor Siavush Randjbar-Daemi

Closing Argument

221 Impeachment, Trump and US Foreign Policy Dana H. Allin

This is what the framers of the US Constitution were worried about.

Survival

GLOBAL POLITICS AND STRATEGY

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Russia, the West and Sanctions Nigel Gould-Davies

In March 2014 the United States and European Union imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its occupation of Crimea. They have steadily esca­ lated these measures on account of further Russian actions in Ukraine and beyond. This is an unprecedented development with major implications for Russia, Western policy and the future of sanctions themselves. It marks the first time that the West has restricted, rather than supported, post-Soviet Russia's integration into the global economy; the first time that Russia has been forced to seek alternatives to dependence on its most important eco­ nomic partners; and the first time a country of Russia's size and significance has been subject to major peacetime sanctions. While six years is a relatively short period for a sanctions regime to be implemented,1 especially on a large economy, it is long enough to afford tentative answers to several key questions: what is the impact of sanctions on Russia - what costs do they impose? How effective are these sanctions to what extent have they achieved, or are they likely to achieve, their goals? And what insights do Russian sanctions offer about sanctions in general as instruments of economic statecraft?

Nigel Gould-Davies teaches at Mahidol University International College in Thailand and is an associate fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House. From 2000-10, he served in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, including as ambassador to Belarus. He later held senior government-relations roles in the energy industry. He is author of Tectonic Politics: Global Political Risk in an Age ofTransformation (Brookings, 2019). Survival | voi. 62 no. 1 | February-M arch 2020 | pp. 7-28

DOI 10.1080/00396338.2020.1715060

8 I Nigel Gould-Davies

The theory of sanctions Sanctions disrupt trade, financial and investment relations to impose costs on a target state. These costs are not an end in themselves, but a means of achieving political goals. Sanctions translate economic costs into politi­ cal goals in four ways. Firstly, sanctions may seek to reverse unacceptable actions by the target state - that is, to compel it to restore the status quo ante. Compellence is always the hardest goal for any policy instrument to achieve.2 Once carried out, an action creates new commitments and reali­ ties. Undoing it risks undermining the credibility of other commitments and positions elsewhere. For these reasons, a state that might have been deterred from undertaking an action by the prior threat of sanctions might not undo the same action if it faces the threat of sanctions after having acted. Secondly, sanctions may seek to deter future actions by threatening retaliation. They can do so by pledging punishment and thus conveying the resolve to stop further unacceptable behaviour, or by inflicting costs that deny or limit the target's ability to take further action - for example, with an embargo on a critical technology or resource.3 A third modality is regime change - that is, the removal of transgres­ sors. Sanctions may seek to change not merely policy but also those who are responsible for it. By targeting a regime directly or by inflicting wider costs that incite popular pressure, sanctions can threaten, or impose, costs so great that the government is forced to step down.4 Finally, sanctions can function to condemn unacceptable behaviour and reaffirm norms and rules violated by it, thereby upholding international order. Significant symbolic actions are more than tokens; they influence shared beliefs, perceptions of resolve and expectations of future action among allies, target states, other potential transgressors and international observers. If principles of order are not symbolically upheld when chal­ lenged, their legitimacy may be eroded. One clear way of condemning an action is to punish the individuals and entities responsible for making and implementing it - for example, with a visa ban or foreign-asset freeze. Punishing transgressors does not reverse their action, nor is it likely to deter them in the future - they cannot be banned from travelling, or have their assets frozen, more than once. But

Russia, the West and Sanctions I 9

personal sanctions do symbolise the unacceptability of their actions, and may perhaps influence others' future calculations. Compellence, deterrence, regime change and condemnation are the transmission mechanisms that turn the economic impact of sanctions into political effects. In practice, most sanctions regimes seek to use more than one of these. If a given sanction cannot be justified in terms of at least one, it is unlikely to be effective.5 The most comprehensive and influential study of sanctions, based on 174 cases from 1914 to 2000, finds that they have been 'at least partially success­ ful' 34% of the time.6 More detailed analysis identifies several factors that influence the probability that a specific sanctions measure will succeed. As with any policy instrument, the more ambitious a sanction's goal, the less likely it is to succeed. Sanctions are most effective in inducing modest policy change, and least so in stopping military action or bringing about regime change - though there are successful cases of both.7 Sanctions are more likely to be effective if the sanctioning and target states were previ­ ously partners rather than adversaries, and if they enjoyed a strong trading relationship. In such a case, sanctions are seen as an aberration to be resolved, not a natural condition. A high level of trade also increases the target's vul­ nerability. Further, sanctions are more likely to succeed against democratic than authoritarian regimes. The latter can more easily limit the political effects by controlling the distribution of domestic economic costs and sup­ pressing the discontent they evoke. The nature and timing of sanctions are also key. An export embargo is the most traditional form of sanctions, but financial sanctions can work just as well. High early costs that shock their target have been most effective, whereas sanctions applied slowly and incrementally allow the target to build resilience. The standard policy direc­ tive is 'slam the hammer, don't turn the screw'.8 And of course, sanctions are more effective if the imposing states build wide international support for their implementation without inordinately diluting them. Conversely, if other countries support the target state, such as by supplying prohibited goods or finance, sanctions are less likely to bite. At first sight, this global experience suggests that Russian sanctions are unlikely to succeed. None of the factors associated with past success are

io I Nigel Gould-Davies

present. Sanctions were imposed in response to major, not modest, policy change. By early 2014, Russia's relationship with the West was already one of distrust, not partnership. Russia is an authoritarian, not a democratic, state. It is also a major power, not a small and isolated economy. Unlike other recent targets, Russia is not subject to UN sanctions. Nevertheless, the failure of Russian sanctions cannot be assumed from the wider lessons of sanctions. The correlates of previous success, though statistically robust, are only weakly significant, explaining just 15-24% of variation in sanctions outcomes. Reliable prediction of the efficacy of any specific sanction 'still lies beyond the grasp ... of current political and economic theories'.9 The distinctive features of particular cases also matter. Russia is a distinctive sanctions target in two especially significant ways. The first is its size. As the world's sixth-largest economy (measured in terms of purchasing-power parity), Russia is the largest country ever to face major peacetime sanctions. Only two previous cases are comparable. In 1935, Italy, then the eighth-largest economy, was sanctioned by the League of Nations following its invasion of Abyssinia; and in 1940, the United States sanctioned Japan, then the seventh-largest economy, in response to an oil embargo and financial-assets freeze. During the Cold War, Western sanctions did restrict economic ties with the Soviet Union, but these were less substantial than the constraints inherent in the latter's own anti-market ideology and system. When, from the 1960s, the Soviet authorities sought to stave off decline by deepening trade and investment with the West - through grain imports, oil and gas sales and foreign loans - the West largely obliged.10 The post-2014 period marks the first time that Western policy has been the primary con­ straint on Russia's participation in the global economy. Russia's size makes it unusually resilient, and its critical role as an energy supplier - its second distinctive feature as a sanctions target - compounds this factor. Export of raw materials dominates Russia's relationship with the global economy. In principle, this is a major vulnerability that sanction­ ing states might exploit: oil and gas constitute over 70% of Russia's exports and contribute nearly half of federal budget revenues. In practice, however, mutual dependence rules this out. Russia supplies 40% of EU gas imports and 27% of its oil imports. Its share of EU gas imports has risen since 2014,

Russia, the West and Sanctions I 11

and hovers at historical highs.11 The West, and especially Europe, is thus constrained from imposing severe and direct sanctions on Russian energy. Whereas energy-trade embargoes played an essential role in previous sanc­ tions regimes on major economies - notably on exports to interwar Italy and Japan, and more recently on imports from Iran and Iraq - they cannot do so with respect to Russia. In sum, before 2014 there were strong historical reasons to believe that sanctions on Russia would be ineffective. None of the factors associated with past sanctions success were present, while Russia's size and global role made it an inherently hard target. Both the ability to impose costs and to transmit them into political effects were thus limited. Western sanctions and Russia's response Since 2014, Western sanctions have escalated in several ways: they have become more varied in form and more severe in effects; they have responded to a broadening set of Russian actions; and they have targeted a wider range of actors. This escalation has come in three waves. The first wave was a response to Russian actions in Ukraine: its annexa­ tion of Crimea in March 2014, its role in the shoot-down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in July of that year, and its support for separatists in eastern Ukraine. Initial measures comprised sanctions against individuals and companies responsible for these violations. From July 2014, sanctions were expanded to include measures against the financial, energy and military sectors. The United States designed a new form of sanction, the Sectoral Sanctions Identification (SSI), to achieve this, prohibiting specific kinds of transactions in energy and finance rather than imposing a blanket ban on all business. These have restricted all but very short-term financing for the financial-services and energy sectors. They have also prohibited participa­ tion in deep-water oil projects and in Arctic offshore and shale exploration and production. The United States later signalled its readiness to widen sec­ toral sanctions to the railway, metals and mining sectors, though it has not applied them so far. The United States and the EU have coordinated closely on Ukraine-related sanctions. These have undergone little change except for some tightening of

12 I Nigel Gould-Davies

SSI measures and additions of sanctioned persons and entities in response to later Russian actions, notably the construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge to Crimea and the Russian attack on a Ukrainian ship and detention of its crew in the Kerch Strait in November 2018. The second set of sanctions was developed only by the US, primarily through the 2017 Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CA ATSA). The catalysts were Russia's influence operations and cyber attacks against the United States during the 2016 US presidential elec­ tion. CAATSA established new sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for these attacks. It also hardened Ukraine-related sanctions, in particular by imposing secondary sanctions on any foreign person or finan­ cial institution that violated them.12 It thereby enforced sanctions globally, marking a significant expansion of American power. By making these sanc­ tions mandatory, Congress also extended its influence over the executive in this policy area, reflecting, in part, bipartisan concerns about the appar­ ently close relationship between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump criticised CAATSA as 'seriously flawed' and signed it reluctantly.13 CAATSA continued to link Ukraine-related sanctions with the political situation there by providing for their easing should Russia take steps to fulfil the September 2014 Minsk agreement.14 But the statute crystallised a broader shift of mood against Russia, in two ways. Firstly, it made reference not only to Russia's Ukraine policy and cyber attacks, but also to corrup­ tion, human-rights violations, suppression of independent media, influence operations throughout Europe and Eurasia, and violations of security agree­ ments, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and Open Skies Treaty. It thus brought together in a single law several concerns about Russia that had previously been handled separately. Secondly, CAATSA served notice that more severe measures could be applied. It commissioned a US Treasury Department report on the most significant senior political figures and oligarchs, including their relationship to President Putin, their net worth and indices of their corruption, and the impact of applying secondary sanctions. The report was also to consider key parastatal bodies and the potential impact of sanctions, including debt and

Russia, the West and Sanctions I 13

equity restrictions. The intent was clear: Congress wanted to explore options for sanctions escalation. The Treasury's list, released in January 2018 on the eve of the statutory deadline, caused some embarrassment by appearing to reproduce the Forbes Russia Rich List, though a separate, classified list was also drawn up. But this did not negate the fact that Congress, by mandating the list, was contemplating a radical widening of sanctions targets. The third set of sanctions stemmed from the nerve-agent attack on former Russian military-intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury, England, in March 2018. The British government moved to apply more stringent standards and tighter scrutiny of foreign wealth and the resi­ dency rights of its owners.15 In May 2018, Roman Abramovich, who had bought Chelsea Football Club in 2003, acquired Israeli citizenship follow­ The US imposed ing reported delays with the renewal of his UK visa. Parliament pushed through a measure, long resisted by the government, requiring the lightly

personal sanctions on 24 Russians

regulated British Overseas Territories - where an estimated $100 billion of Russian money had been deposited over the previ­ ous decade - to set up registries of beneficiary company ownership by 2020. The most significant sanctions response came from the United States. On 6 April 2018 it imposed personal sanctions on 24 Russians, including seven major business figures and Alexey Miller, chief executive officer of Gazprom, the Russian state gas monopoly. As justification, the US Treasury Department did not cite Russia's involvement in the Salisbury incident but rather a broad 'pattern of malign activity around the globe' that included cyber hacking, elec­ toral interference and intervention in Syria, as well as occupation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine.16 The sanctions' stated purpose was not to punish officials responsible for authorising or implementing unacceptable actions, but to target 'Russian elites and oligarchs' on the basis that the 'Russian government operates for the disproportionate benefit of oligarchs and gov­ ernment elites', and that 'those who profit from this corrupt system will no longer be insulated from the consequences of their government's destabiliz­ ing activities'. This marked a shift in strategy. For the first time, Russians who were not formally part of the state were targeted in response to state actions.17

14 I Nigel Gould-Davies

These designations were severe and had a secondary application to any foreign person or entity 'knowingly facilitating significant transac­ tions' with the targets. The most stringent measures were applied to Oleg Deripaska, whose net worth was then $6.ybn. At a stroke, he and the compa­ nies in which he held a majority stake (including Rusal, the second-biggest aluminium producer in the world, listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange) were largely cut off from the international financial system. For the first time, the United States used its most potent financial weapons - honed against smaller states, terrorists and criminal groups after 9/11 - on a bil­ lionaire business figure, leading global companies and companies traded on international stock exchanges.

Sanctions are a defining feature of Russian-Western relations

The measures against Rusal illustrated the challenge of sanctioning a major global com­ modity supplier, as they were eased following serious disruption of the aluminium market. But the agreement that Deripaska reached with the US Treasury Department to facilitate this relaxation still afforded the US government

unprecedented influence over the ownership structure and governance of a major Russian company.18 Western, and especially American, sanctions, then, have become more varied in form and severe in effect, targeting a wider range of actors in response to a wider range of actions. This escalation has been a reac­ tion to Russian behaviour. Had Russia not carried out cyber attacks, the nerve-agent attack in Salisbury, its intervention in Syria and other provo­ cations, it is unlikely that sanctions would have been toughened in these ways. Indeed, EU member states might have defected from the sanctions regime. Instead, Western sanctions have been transformed from a discrete, potentially reversible set of specific measures into the instrument of choice for dealing with adverse Russian behaviour, and a defining feature of the Russian-Western relationship. Assessing how sanctions have impacted Russia must take into account Russia's own response.19As a large economy, Russia has an unusually abun­ dant array of options. It has combatted sanctions in four ways.

Russia, the West and Sanctions I 15

Firstly, it has sought to reduce the costs of sanctions by undermining their implementation. It has induced partners, knowingly or not, to break the sanctions regime or ignore violations. It is also exploring a 'crypto-rouble' to conceal illicit transactions.20 But these evasive tactics have been largely inef­ fective. The EU's common position has held up well, while US secondary sanctions have proved a particularly powerful deterrent, discouraging not only Western companies but even Chinese ones from engaging in prohibited transactions.21The US government's levy of a $2 million fine on ExxonMobil in July 2017, for agreements it had signed with Rosneft Oil Company when then-secretary of state Rex Tiller son was Exxon CEO, showed how even well-connected commercial interests held little sway in sanctions policy. Of course, no sanctions regime is watertight. Siemens halted sale of gas tur­ bines only when it emerged that these were being transferred to Crimea, and Dutch prosecutors are investigating alleged participation of Dutch companies in the building of the Kerch Strait Bridge. Some companies based in EU countries appear to be using local subsidiaries and third parties to breach the spirit, if not the letter, of sanctions law.22 But so far, evasion has not significantly mitigated sanctions costs for Russia. Secondly, Russia has tried to mitigate sanctions costs by finding other partners to replace Western ones, especially in the areas of corporate finance, foreign direct investment (FDI), and energy and military-use technologies prohibited by sanctions. On account of Russia's resurgent diplomacy, the Middle East has become a growing source of capital. A notable example was the complex and opaque 2018 deal by which the Qatar Investment Authority acquired an 18.93% stake in Rosneft for more than $iobn. For FDI and technology, China is the only feasible partner on a significant scale.23 The potential to substitute for Western partners is limited to transactions not subject to US secondary sanctions, which no country dares violate. Accordingly, Russia can find alternative partners for transactions subject to Western sectoral sanctions but not individual or corporate special designa­ tions. Moscow has showcased China's replacement of Western partners in the Yamal gas project as successful defiance of sanctions. By lending $i2bn, Chinese state banks helped rescue the project, enabling its completion ahead of schedule.

i6 I Nigel Gould-Davies

In practice, though, Russia has struggled to replace Western with nonWestern economic relations. China accounts for only 1.6% of Russia's FDI stock, far less than each of its major Western partners.24Since Chinese invest­ ment takes the form of specific project financing that serves Chinese state interests, rather than free capital, it cannot supplant Western finance. Nor can it supply much of the technology and expertise that Russia needs. And, despite warmer Sino-Russian relations since 2014, mutual trust remains limited, especially in the economic realm.25 Nor are the benefits costless: subject to Western sanctions, Russia has less leverage, which affords China growing opportunities to shape the terms of their relationship. The SinoRussian gas agreement, signed at the end of

Russia has few sanctions options o f its own

Putin's state visit to Beijing in May 2014, is widely believed to grant China highly advantageous pricing terms owing to Putin's need, after the annexation of Crimea, to demonstrate the avail­ ability of non-Western alternatives. The third way in which Russia resists sanctions

is through retaliation - a response that is practically unavailable to smaller sanctioned economies. In August 2014, Russia struck back against Western sanctions by banning most food imports with an eye to inflicting costs on EU countries and weakening their resolve to maintain sanctions. The effort has not succeeded: there is no correlation between the impact of Russia's measures on EU member states and a diminution of political support for easing sanctions on Russia.26 Those hardest hit have generally been able to find alternative markets. Furthermore, while the ban provided a short-term boost to Russian agriculture, it has also raised food costs, disproportion­ ately hurting poorer citizens. Most of the welfare loss has been transferred to domestic food producers.27Counter-sanctions remain in force, but in 2018 Russia ceased retaliating against new sanctions with further measures.28 Since hydrocarbon exports, on which Russia depends, dominate its trade with Western countries, it has few sanctions options of its own. Evasion, avoidance and retaliation are externally focused: they aim to reduce the economic costs of sanctions by, respectively, encouraging noncompliance, finding non-sanctioning partners and weakening the resolve

Russia, the West and Sanctions I 17

to maintain sanctions. Adaptation, the fourth and most important strategy, is domestically focused.29 It aims to limit both the costs of sanctions and their political consequences, and to increase resilience against anticipated future sanctions. As sanctions have escalated, and prospects of their easing receded, adaptive policies have become formal and systematic, notably in the July 2018 cross-government plan to combat sanctions' impacts and provide 'systemic support to victims of sanctions'.30 Russia has protected and stabilised vulnerable sectors by increasing the state's role - especially in banking, where 62% of assets are now stateowned.31 As well as bailing out or taking over individual companies, the state is offering new forms of support through credit lines, reinsurance and potential nationalisation of sanctioned assets. It is also changing regulations to help its companies escape sanctions. For instance, it has set up 'Special Administrative Regions' for companies to re-register, allowing them to conceal their ownership structure, and established a borrowing exchange for sanctioned companies. Requirements to repatriate foreign-exchange earnings have also been eased. The new sanctions era has reinforced Putin's long-standing concern with reducing external financial vulnerability, leading Russia to pursue an even more conservative fiscal policy. Russia's budget surplus was 2.9% of GDP in 2019, its largest since 2008, with the 2% value-added-tax rise in 2019 marking further tightening. Since 2014, Russia's budget-clearing oil price has more than halved, and now stands at $49 a barrel, its lowest in a decade. From 2016-19, the non-oil primary federal deficit fell from 9% to 6%. By 2022, Russia's international reserves are forecast to reach a record high of over $6oobn, the fourth highest in the world. In August 2019, Russia's sovereign-credit rating was upgraded to the level it enjoyed before the Crimea annexation. Russia is also reducing vulnerability by trying to limit its use of dollars in trade and reserves. After the April 2018 US sanctions were imposed, Russia sold 80% of its US Treasury bonds, possibly to pre-empt a potential asset freeze. For the first time, more than half of Russia's exports to China are paid in currencies other than the dollar - notably, the euro. Russia is also building a domestic financial-payments system as an alternative to the

i8 I Nigel Gould-Davies

SWIFT global network. This is not only as a backstop in case it is cut off from SWIFT, but also to conceal transactions from the US Treasury. Russia is dis­ cussing cooperation in its emerging system with other countries, including Turkey and Iran.32 In addition, Russia has stepped up efforts to produce the technology and expertise which sanctions now bar and other partners cannot provide. In 2015, the government drew up a strategy to foster self-reliance, primarily through state subsidies and contracts for favoured companies. But replacing the country's long dependence on high-technology imports with domestic alternatives has proved difficult, leading to higher costs and project delays.33 For security reasons, Russia has also sought to produce local substitutes for other, non-sanctioned Western goods, such as computer software. Here too, it has struggled to achieve its goals.34 Adaptation, like other anti-sanctions strategies, carries costs. Building up high reserves and a fiscal surplus means forgoing growth at a time when the economy is sluggish. Reducing dependence on the dollar makes transactions costlier and more complex.35 Overall, the impact of sanctions has been limited, but it is growing. Even if sanctions' impact on total GDP is small compared to other factors, notably the post-2014 fall in oil prices, incomes are lower due to sanctions, counter-sanctions and fiscal defences.36 Russia's access to international technology, expertise and skills is now restricted. An increasing number of major projects face delays.37 Russia is financially more resilient, but at the cost of poorer cumulative economic performance that will accelerate its relative decline. From 2014 to 2016, FDI in Russia fell 62%, and remains half of the 2013 level. Capital outflows have risen sharply, with 2018 witness­ ing Russia's fourth-highest outflows since 1992. The state is becoming even more dominant, leading to a less efficient, less transparent and more corrupt political economy. And sanctions have pushed Russia closer to China, on less favourable terms. Political effects Sanctions are imposing costs on Russia, but are they good Western policy? While disentangling the economic effects of sanctions from other factors such as oil prices is technically challenging, it is harder still to judge how

Russia, the West and Sanctions I 19

they influence political outcomes. This requires interpreting intentions and actions, and judging how these would have been different in the absence of sanctions. Western policy has explicitly used sanctions to bring about three effects. Firstly, sanctions have tried to compel Russian policy change. EU sanc­ tions 'aim at promoting a change of course in Russia's actions destabilising eastern Ukraine' and, from March 2015, at the 'complete implementation of the Minsk agreements'. The EU's wider sanctions-policy framework, updated in May 2018, states that their main purpose is to 'bring about a change in policy or activity by the target country' by creating 'incentives to encourage the required change in policy or activity'.38 By contrast, although the United States has imposed stronger measures against a wider range of Russian actions, it has been less explicit about seeking specific changes.39 Recognising the intrinsic difficulty of forcing major policy reversal, the West has been realistic enough not to set the return of Crimea to Ukraine as a sanctions goal. But sanctions have failed to achieve even the more limited goal of reaching a political settlement to end conflict in eastern Ukraine. Russia currently seems prepared to incur the costs of sanctions to maintain these positions. Secondly, sanctions have sought to deter future Russian actions. EU sanctions are intended as a 'strong warning' of the consequences of unac­ ceptable actions, and 'a powerful signal [that] destabilising Ukraine, or any other Eastern European neighbouring State, will bring heavy costs to [Russia's] economy'.40Whether sanctions have deterred Russia is difficult to assess, as that task requires scrutiny of what has not happened - that is, how Russia would have acted in the absence of sanctions. They can deter further actions only if they credibly convey resolve to impose even more serious measures in the event of escalation. The most plausible case of deterrence by punishment occurred in the first few months of Russia's incursion into eastern Ukraine. In September 2014, Russian-backed forces were poised to take Mariupol, a strategic port and the last city in Donetsk under Ukrainian government control. The United States and EU imposed their second wave of sectoral sanctions, warning of serious consequences should Russia persist with this action. Less public

20 I Nigel Gould-Davies

messages reportedly conveyed that further Russian escalation would lead to severe financial sanctions, potentially including Russia's exclusion from the SWIFT international payment system. Mariupol did not come under full-scale assault, and remained in Ukrainian government hands. Within a year, Russia's aspiration to create 'Novorossiya', a substantial entity carved from Ukrainian territory, had waned. Since then, events on the ground in Ukraine, though lethal and unpredictable, have not significantly escalated. Russia's subsequent efforts to build an alternative payment system suggest it believes the threat of SWIFT exclusion to be credible.41 Specific events, such as maritime violations in the Sea of Azov, have led to further limited sanctions whose costs are manageable to Russia. Sanctions have not deterred other forms of Russian behaviour that threaten Western interests, notably the Salisbury nerve-agent attack. But no response to such a previously unthinkable action had been announced beforehand. Without more information, it is not possible to determine whether the West's robust response has deterred Russia from further such actions. Thirdly, Western sanctions have been used to condemn violations of the international order. This function is more straightforward. It requires no specific response from the target state, but works by influencing wider beliefs and perceptions. Russian sanctions are explicitly designed to 'defend the rules-based international order'. They are a 'response to the Kremlin's attempts to disregard international norms' and to actions that 'cannot be accepted in the 21st century'.42 Personal sanctions have punished individu­ als and entities responsible. At the same time, Russia's own justifications for its actions have gained little traction. Even close allies have not recognised its annexation of Crimea or supported its intervention in Ukraine. The EU has continued to renew its common position on sanctions every six months since 2014, and implementation appears robust. After six years, sanctions present a mixed record. They were designed to inflict not acute shock but chronic and growing pain, which the side effects of Russia's adaptive measures have only exacerbated. Russian government technocrats and security officials alike have voiced growing alarm at their impact. Since 2017, public concern about sanctions and international isola­ tion has also risen sharply.43 Sanctions' growing contribution to domestic

Russia, the West and Sanctions I 21

stagnation and relative decline will become politically salient with the approach of the '2024 question': who will lead Russia after Putin's current presidential term expires? The ability of current sanctions to influence future Russian behaviour will depend partly on how far popular disillu­ sionment translates into political change. There is no guarantee it will do so, especially if the regime's willingness and ability to suppress mobilisation of dissent remains strong. New sanctions, however, could make such change more likely by chal­ lenging regime cohesion through elite interests. Russia's elites are highly dependent on access to Western financial and legal systems. They acquire wealth through access to the state, and then protect it from the state by sending much of it to over­

Russia's elites are seas jurisdictions that are beyond the state's reach. Such regulatory arbitrage between the rule of rela­ dependent on tionships and the rule of law helps to account for Western systems Russia's large capital outflows since the early 1990s. This has long been an essential modus operandi of the so-called oligarchs, but other elites, including state officials, practise it as well. Their ability to outsource wealth protection has long helped rec­ oncile them to an increasingly predatory state, thereby stabilising Russia's political economy. Starting in 2017, the most recent waves of sanctions have challenged this arrangement. Wider targeting beyond individual officials directly complicit in Russian actions, and tighter standards of scrutiny and trans­ parency of financial inflows, have provoked uncertainty and alarm, and a spike in capital outflows.44 If sanctions become more severe and compre­ hensive, elites will face new and difficult choices. A growing number may conclude that, by provoking these Western restrictions, the Russian state is jeopardising their vital interest in sending and keeping wealth securely overseas. Some elites may then seek to influence Russian policy and gov­ ernance, especially as the end of Putin's term approaches. Such moments of uncertainty in leadership transition or continuity have spawned sudden, significant change in several post-Soviet states through elite defection from putatively unassailable leaders.45 While it is uncertain that even severe elite

22 I Nigel Gould-Davies

concerns would produce political change in an increasingly authoritarian Russia, elites do have the resources and influence to seek it. No doubt they are already considering how the 2024 question will be resolved, and what role they might play. Sanctions that threaten their core interests would make this a more urgent matter still.46 By beginning to target elites, Western policymakers are pushing towards a new, if unstated, goal of pressuring domestic change. If such measures escalate, this may prove the most signifi­ cant way that sanctions impact Russia. *

*

*

Western sanctions have had limited direct impact on the Russian economy. But this is a false test of their efficacy. The West has recognised the unique challenge posed by Russia as a large, interdependent and resilient target. Sanctions have sought not to shock or isolate Russia, but to exert growing pressure mainly by restricting access of key sectors to technology and finance. Their cumulative impact is accelerating Russia's relative decline. This approach turns conventional wisdom upside down: sanctions are 'turning the screw', not 'slamming the hammer'. The outcome so far has confounded rather than confirmed the expectation that sanctions against Russia would be ineffective. While sanctions have not reversed major mili­ tary actions, they have symbolically reaffirmed international norms violated by Russian actions and at key moments probably deterred military escala­ tion in Ukraine. More broadly, the challenge of a uniquely difficult target has driven sanctions-policy innovations such as the SSI. Especially striking is the use of potent financial instruments to cut off key players from the global finan­ cial system. These measures have been limited so far, but their use has set a precedent and put Russian elites on notice. If further sanctions threaten their core interest in maintaining access to Western systems of wealth pro­ tection, elites may be incentivised to seek moderating change. The easing of sanctions, especially entrenched American ones, would likely require a major change in Russian governance. By targeting elites, sanctions them­ selves could encourage this.47

Russia, the West and Sanctions I 23

Furthermore, Western sanctions against Russia highlight the formidable structural power of the dollar as the world's reserve currency and primary medium of exchange. It enables the United States not only to isolate a target from the global financial system but to enforce the compliance of other states through the threat of secondary sanctions on them. The use of this power, however, has intensified the search by actual and potential targets for new ways to escape it.48 The very effectiveness of Russian sanctions could undermine that of similar measures against other states in the future. Sanctions' effectiveness will grow if the West remains firm and united in its application of them; if it imposes more severe restrictions on Russia's access to Western financial and legal services; and if Russia fails to develop effective countermeasures. More broadly, Western sanctions on Russia are a major development in economic statecraft that offer fresh insights into sanc­ tions innovation, responses, economic impacts and political consequences.49 Acknowledgements The author is grateful to the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT) for the award of a visiting research position that greatly supported this work, and to Maria Shagina, Ivan Tkachev and Gustav Gressel for their advice on several points.

Notes 1 By comparison, Western sanctions were imposed on the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. UN sanc­ tions were imposed on Iraq from 1990 to 2003, and on Iran from 2006 to 2016. 2 On the distinction between deter­ rence and compellence, see Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). 3 For a concise, recent overview, see Michael J. Mazarr, 'Understanding Deterrence', RAND Corporation Perspective, 2018, https://www.rand. org/content/dam/rand/pubs/per spectives/PE2oo/PE295/RAND_PE295.pdf.

4

5

See Manuel Oechslin, 'Targeting Autocrats: Economic Sanctions and Regime Change', European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 36, December 2014, pp. 24-40. This categorisation draws on Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 3rd ed., 2009). For a similar approach (with­ out regime change), see Francesco Giumelli, Coercing, Constraining and Signalling: Explaining UN and EU Sanctions After the Cold War

24

6 7

8

9 10

11

I Nigel Gould-Davies

(Colchester: ECPR Press, 2011). Hufbauer et aL, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, pp. 188-92. In addition to Hufbauer et aL, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, UN Targeted Sanctions Consortium data indicate that 'sanctions intended to constrain or to signal targets are nearly three times as effective (27% of the time) as sanc­ tions intended to coerce a change in behaviour (only 10% of the time)'. Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert and Marcus Tourinho (eds), Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 32. Hufbauer et aL, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, pp. 168-70. Ibid., pp. 188-92. There were a few exceptions. The major one was the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) regime restricting transfer of militarily useful technolo­ gies to the Soviet bloc. In addition, the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment linked normalisation of trade relations to Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union - a measure repealed only in 2012. Among other significant sanc­ tions, the United States briefly halted grain exports to the Soviet Union fol­ lowing the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and imposed sanctions on the building of the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline two years later in response to martial law in Poland. 'EU Imports of Energy Products Recent Developments', Eurostat, May 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfs-

12 13

14 15

16

17

cache/46i26.pdf. See also 'Energy Production and Imports', Eurostat, June 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ Energy_production_and_imports#The_ EU_and_its_Member_States_are_all_ net_importers_of_energy. See especially CAATSA sections 226 and 228. See, for example, Peter Baker and Sophia Kishkovsky, 'Trump Signs Russian Sanctions into Law, with Caveats', New York Times, 2 August 2017, https://www.nytimes. com/2017/08/02/wor ld/eur ope/trumprussia-sanctions.html. See CAATSA Sections 222, 227, 228 and 233. In particular, the government announced a review of investor visas and introduced a new instrument, the Unexplained Wealth Order, requiring investors to prove the legitimate ori­ gins of their wealth. 'Treasury Designates Russian Oligarchs, Officials, and Entities in Response to Worldwide Malign Activity', US Department of Treasury press release, 6 April 2018, https ://home.treasury, go v/news/ press-releases/smo338. Further US sanctions imposed in August 2019, mandated by chemicaland biological-warfare legislation, were widely seen as limited in scope. For example, debt sanctions covered only initial issue of non-roubledenominated Russian government paper - not secondary trading rouble loans and bonds or state-owned enterprise debt. See Maximilian Hess, 'Explaining Trump's Belated Russia Sanctions', Riddle, 16 August 2019,

Russia, the West and Sanctions I 25

https://www.ridl.io/en/explainingtrump-s-belated-russia-sanctions/. 18 See Brian O'Toole and Samantha Sultoon, 'Memo to Congress: Treasury's Plan to Lift Sanctions on Russian Oligarch's Companies Is a Good One', Atlantic Council, 11 January 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ memo-to-congress-treasury-s-planto-lift-sanctions-on-russian-oligarchs-companies-is-a-good-one/. For details of the Treasury's role in Rusal governance, see the letter from Andrea Gacki, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, to Sen. Lindsey Graham, 19 December 2018, https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/ Documents/20181219_notification_ removal.pdf. 19 For a good overview of economic impacts, see Iikka Korhonen, Fleli Simola and Laura Solanko, Sanctions, Counter-sanctions and Russia - Effects on Economy, Trade and Finance, BOFIT Policy Brief 2018 No. 4, https:// helda.helsinki.fi/bof/bitstream/

22

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handle/i 23456789/ i 55io/bpbo 4i 8.

pdf?sequence=i. 20 'MER predlozhilo ne raskryvat' danniye o sdelkakh krupnykh predpriyatii', RBK, 9 June 2018. On Russian plans to develop a crypto-rouble, see 'Putin Considers "Cryptorouble" as Moscow Seeks to Evade Sanctions', Financial Times, 2 January 2018. 21 On China's reluctance to undertake transactions with Russia that risk violating Western sanctions, see 'Pochemu Kitaiskie banki sobliudaiut sanktsii SShA protiv Rossiyan', Forbes (Russian edition), 15 November

25

2018, http://www.forbes.ru/ finansy-i-investicii/369239-pochemukitayskie-banki-soblyudayut-sankciissha-protiv-rossiyan. See, for example, 'How EU Firms Skirt Sanctions to Do Business in Crimea', Reuters, 21 September 2016, https ://uk. reuters.com/article/ukukraine-crisis-crimea-sanctions-insig/ exclusive-how-eu-firms-skirt-sanctions-to-do-business-in-crimea-idUKKCN11R1AL. In particular, Taiwan and Malaysia rival mainland China as a supplier of integrated circuits. Vietnam and South Korea also supply a substan­ tial amount. I am indebted to Ivan Tkachev for this information. Comparable figures for major Western partners are: United States, 8.9%; Germany, 7.5%; the UK, 7.1%; and France, 4.5%. UNCTAD, 'World Investment Report 2019', avail­ able at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/ DIAE/World%2olnvestment%20 Report/World_Investment_Report. aspx. See also Ivan Tkachev, 'A Quiet Revolution in the Analysis of Foreign Investments', Riddle, 2 August 2019, https://www.ridl.io/ en/a-quiet-revolution-in-the-analysisof-foreign-investments/. See, for example, Evgenii Karasyuk, 'Nedostroyennyi most. Pochemy Kitai tak malo investiruet v Rossiyu', Republic, 16 October 2018, https:// republic.ru/posts/92287. Russia has threatened to halt timber exports to China due to forestry exploita­ tion. 'Ministr prirodnykh resursov i ekologii: esli za lesom ne ukhazhivat', upavshee derevo rano ili pozdno prevratitsya v porokh',

26

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27

28

29

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Vedomosti, 15 August 2019, https:// www.vedomosti.ru/economics/ characters/2019/08/14/808823 -minis trprirodnih-resursov. Masha Hedberg argues that counter­ sanctions were crafted to impose higher costs on states that Russia saw as its major adversaries. Masha Hedberg, 'The Target Strikes Back: Explaining Countersanctions and Russia's Strategy of Differentiated Retaliation', Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 34, no. 1, 2018, pp. 35-54. Higher food prices due to Russia's import restrictions have cost consum­ ers nearly $7bn and raised the basic food bill by 4.8%. Domestic produc­ ers have captured 84% of this loss of welfare. 'Gordyie platiat vsem', Kommersant, 29 October 2019. See also 'Analitiki TsB podschitali raskhody naseleniya na podderzhku agrariev', Vedomosti, 5 June 2018. The Duma's proposed ban on tita­ nium exports, severely criticised by business as harmful to its interests, was withdrawn. The Duma also watered down a draft law that, by criminalising compliance with sanctions, would have further dis­ couraged foreign investment. For an overview of Russian attempts to adapt, see Richard Connolly, Russia's Response to Sanctions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). See 'V MinFin poyavitsya depart­ ment po protivodeistviyu sanktsii', Vedomosti, 20 July 2018; 'Na sanktsii otvetyat po punktam', Kommersant, 19 July 2018; 'SMI soobshchili ob utverzhdennom Silyuanovym plane borb'by s sanktsiyami', Vedomosti,

31

32

33

34

35

19 July 2018; and 'Sanktsii pustili na organy', Vedomosti, 19 April 2018. World Bank, 'Modest Growth; Focus on Informality', Russia Economic Report, June 2019, p. 11, http://documents.worldbank.org/ curated/en/332o8i 56o8954930ii/pdf/ Russia-Economic-Report-ModestGrowth-Focus-on-Informality.pdf. 'V Minfine soobshchili o slizhnostiakh otkaza ot dollara v torgovle', RBK, 31 July 2019, https://www.rbc.ru/finance s/3i/07/20i9/5d4036239a7947i55b5Ci db8?from=from_main. Gazprombank conducted the first transactions using the Russian messaging system, known as SPFS, in late 2017. For a good overview, see Maria Shagina, 'Russia's Import Substitution and the Pivot to Asia', Policy Memo, Harriman Institute, Columbia University, 24 June 2019, https:// harriman.columbia.edu/files/harriman/ Shagina%2oPolicy%2oMemo.pdf. See, for example, 'Moskva obnovit soft', Kommersant, 8 July 2019, https ://www.kommersant.ru/ doc/4024818. Russia has also relaxed some localisation requirements to attract more investment. See Oleg Vyugin, 'Kto zaplatit za dedollarizatsiyu rossiiskoi ekonomiki', Vedomosti, 8 October 2018, https://www.vedomosti.ru/ opinion/articles/2018/10/08/783023kto-zaplatit-za-dedollarizatsiyu. See also comments by Dmitry Timofeev, Director of the Finance Ministry Department for Control of Foreign Restrictions, in 'V Minfine soobshchili o slozhnostyakh otkaza ot dollara v torgovle', RBK, 31 July 2019. His department was created in late 2018 to

Russia, the West and Sanctions I 27

combat Western sanctions. 36 The International Monetary Fund estimates that the oil-price effect on growth is about three times greater than the sanctions effect. It also sug­ gests that 'structural problems in the domestic economy' could account for nearly half the shortfall in expected growth since 2014. IMF, 'Russian Federation: Staff Report for the 2019 Article IV Consultation', 25 June 2019, p. 58. 37 See Maria Shagina, 'Russia's Energy Sector: Evaluating Progress on Import Substitution and Technological Sovereignty', Global Risk Insights Special Report, April 2018, https://globalriskinsights. com/publications-special-reports/ gri-russian-energy-sector-importsubstitution. For example, ExxonMobil suspended major projects with Rosneft on offshore Arctic drilling, Shell with Gazprom Neft on shale oil, and the Sakhalin-2 consortium on liquefied-natural-gas expansion. 38 'Statement by the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy on Further EU Restrictive Measures Against Russia', 8 September 2014, https:// www.consilium.europa.eu/ media/2i993/i44839.pdf. See also Council of the European Union, 'Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy', 4 May 2018, https://data. consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ ST-5664-20i8-INIT/en/pdf. 39 Some US congressmen have described compellent goals. For example, in

August 2019 Senator Lindsey Graham called for 'crushing sanctions' until Putin 'ceases and desists meddling in the US electoral process, halts cyber-attacks on US infrastructure, removes Russia from Ukraine, and ceases efforts to create chaos in Syria'. US executive-branch officials, though, have generally not described sanctions in these terms. Jordain Carney, 'Senators Introduce Bill to Slap "crushing" New Sanctions on Russia', Hill, 2 August 2019, https:// thehill.com/homenews/senate/400074senators-introduce-bill-to-slapcrushing-new-sanctions-on-russia. 40 'Statement by the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and the President of the European Commission in the Name of the European Union on the Agreed Additional Restrictive Measures Against Russia', European Commission, 29 July 2014, https:// www.consilium.europa.eu/ media/220 i 5/ i 44 i 58 .pdf.

41 Stanislav Secrieru, 'Have EU Sanctions Changed Russia's Behaviour in Ukraine?', in 'On Target? EU Sanctions as Security Policy Tools', European Union Institute for Security Studies Report no. 25, September 2015, https:// www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ EUISSFiles/Report_25_EU_Sanctions. pdf. On sanctions' effectiveness in curbing Russian escalation in Ukraine, see also Edward Hunter Christie, 'The Design and Impact of Western Economic Sanctions Against Russia', RUSI Journal, vol. 161, no. 3, 2016, pp. 52-64. Even some who call for sanctions to be modified acknowledge this. See, for example,

28 I Nigel Gould-Davies

Sabine Fischer, 'A Permanent State of Sanctions?', SWP Comments 2017/C 11, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2017, https://www.swp-berlin. org/fileadmin/contents/products/ comments/2017C1i_fhs.p df. 42 See US Department of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Russia over Continued Aggression in Ukraine', 15 March 2019, https://home.treasury. gov/news/press-releases/sm629; and 'Statement by the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and the President of the European Commission in the Name of the European Union on the Agreed Additional Restrictive Measures against Russia'. 43 Polls conducted by the respected Levada Center indicate that in 2018 such concerns rose from 28% to 43%. See Timothy Frye, 'Crimea, Economic Sanctions and Rallying Around the Flag in Russia', Moscow Times, 2 July 2019; and Nigel Gould-Davies, 'Russian Concerns over Sanctions Are Growing', Chatham House Expert Comment, 16 October 2018, https:// w w w .cha thamhouse.org/expert/ comment/russian-concerns-o versanctions-are-growing. 44 Key measures include the 2019 US

45

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48

49

Corporate Transparency Act, and the EU 4th and 5th Money-Laundering Directives, passed in 2015 and 2018 respectively. See Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). For a discussion of elite dilemmas and responses to sanctions, see Nigel Gould-Davies, 'Oligarchs and Western Sanctions: The Dilemmas Facing Russia's Ultra-wealthy', PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 589, April 2019, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/ru/ node/10245. Despite the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was not repealed until 2012. The fact that the US Congress has again passed mandatory sanctions also suggests a long future for sanctions. Juan Zarate, Treasury's War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013). For the argument that the world is entering a new age of economic statecraft, see Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).

Colloquium: Deterring a Nuclear North Korea

North Korea is unlikely to fully eliminate its nuclear and missile arsenals in the foreseeable future. Although analysts publicly debate the precise extent of the country's capabilities, American and South Korean military com­ mands are developing procedures to deter a nuclear-armed North Korea. This deterrence challenge has evolved rapidly. Before 2017, North Korea had gradually developed a handful of rudimentary missile systems. Since then, it has demonstrated a new generation of more advanced systems, including more options at medium, intermediate and intercontinental ranges; multiple solid-fuel missiles; new short-range missiles capable of sophisticated manoeuvres in flight; more mobile missile launchers; and increased warhead yield. These advances have increased the threat that Pyongyang can pose to South Korea, Japan, US bases in the region and the continental United States. Even as North Korea's enormous land army has deteriorated, its asymmetric forces - including large artillery, naval, undersea and special-operations forces, new uninhabited-aerial-vehicles programmes and aggressive cyber capabilities - still represent formidable challenges. In the coming years, North Korea could attain alarming new capabilities, including low-yield or tactical nuclear explosives, a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile, and more complex payloads that include multiple warheads or penetration aids to defeat missile defences.

Adam Mount is Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Posture Project at the Federation of American Scientists. Survival | vol. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 29-30

DO I 10.1080/00396338.2020.1715061

30 I Colloquium: Deterring a Nuclear North Korea

The standard models of nuclear deterrence developed during the Cold War apply to two countries of roughly comparable levels of nuclear and conventional power. The North Korean challenge involves marked asym­ metries in both nuclear and conventional capabilities in favour of the United States and South Korea. Yet these advantages are also a source of risk, because a country that lacks confidence in the survivability of its nuclear arsenal or the capabilities of its conventional forces might be more inclined to resort to nuclear use to compensate for its inferiority. The challenge North Korea poses is this: how can the United States and its allies best exploit their advantages to enhance their security? Survival and the Federation of American Scientists have brought together four pairs of deterrence experts to discuss this challenge. Jina Kim and John K. Warden contend that the alliance should aim to reduce the coercive lever­ age of North Korea's nuclear weapons by engaging in arms control and, if necessary, enhancing its ability to conduct regime change and limit damage from North Korean attacks. Adam Mount and Mira Rapp-Hooper argue that stability should be the guiding principle for deterrence, which requires an equilibrium of forces that allows a rational expectation of security but no hope of prevailing in a conflict. Vipin Narang and Ankit Panda favour deterrence by punishment rather than decapitation, counterforce or regime change to manage nuclear risk. Ian Campbell and Michaela Dodge argue that Pyongyang can best be deterred if the allies can threaten overwhelm­ ing force at every level of escalation, including options to prevent as much damage as possible, new nuclear capabilities and invasion forces from the continental United States. The papers in this colloquium differ on the role of nuclear forces, whether threatening counterforce or decapitation strikes is stabilising or destabilising, whether punishment is likely to be effective, whether damage can be meaningfully limited, and other important issues. But the authors also exhibit considerable overlap. In particular, all agree that strong con­ ventional forces capable of defending against non-nuclear aggression are essential, and that the alliance must be prepared to fight and win a limited war. The most important point of concurrence is that North Korea can indeed be deterred.

Limiting North Korea's Coercive Nuclear Leverage Jin a Kim and John K. Warden

With negotiations aimed at rolling back North Korea's nuclear-weapons programme in a state of limbo, the United States and South Korea must con­ sider the possibility that they will have to deter and contain a nuclear-armed North Korea for at least an extended period. The two allies can reduce the likelihood of North Korean aggression by maintaining strong political ties, upgrading their combined military posture, effectively coordinating with Japan, and taking other prudent steps to strengthen conventional deterrence and reduce tension. But they must also take into account North Korea's nuclear weapons, and the key role that these weapons are likely to play in Pyongyang's national-security and military strategy. The United States and its allies do not need to pursue the maximalist goal of completely negating or eliminating North Korea's forces in the short term. Nor should they, at the other extreme, ignore the risk associated with North Korea having a larger, more survivable nuclear arsenal that provides it more coercive leverage in a conflict. Instead, the United States and South Korea should pursue a strategy that aims to reduce the coercive leverage that North Korea derives from nuclear weapons.

Jina Kim is a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and adjunct professor at Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies. John K. Warden, the lead author, is a researcher in the Strategy, Forces and Resources Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in Alexandria, VA. The views, opinions and findings expressed here should not be construed as representing the official position of either the US Department of Defense or the IDA. Survival | voi. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 31-38

DOI 10.1080/00396338.2020.1 715062

32 I Jiña Kim and John K. Warden

The role of nuclear weapons for North Korea Nuclear weapons are central to North Korea's current national-security strategy.1 With the rudimentary capability that North Korea has already achieved, Pyongyang has significantly raised the potential costs of US or South Korean pursuit of regime change, and it has done so without fully modernising its ageing conventional weapons systems. However, while survival is paramount, it is not the North Korean regime's only objective; it also seeks international respect, a weakened US-South Korea alliance, greater independence from China and Russia, and the eventual reunifica­ tion of the Korean Peninsula on Pyongyang's terms. Traditionally, North Korea has attempted to achieve these objectives through a combination of coercive diplomacy involving implicit threats and limited aggression to pressure South Korea, the United States, Japan and others into concessions, and direct military action, most notably its attempt to conquer South Korea in the Korean War.2 Like all states that acquire nuclear weapons, North Korea is probably somewhat emboldened. It could be more belligerent in its pursuit of pre­ existing goals, expand its objectives and become less likely to back down in crises.3 As a result of what it perceives to be mutual deterrence at the level of major war, North Korea is likely to be more willing to pursue low-level aggression that challenges the United States and its allies.4 North Korea might, for example, use coercion or limited aggression to attempt to rede­ fine its maritime border with South Korea in the Yellow Sea, reduce the US military presence on the Korean Peninsula, or drive a wedge between South Korea and Japan. Critically, however, North Korea's conduct is likely to be regulated by how credibly it can threaten nuclear escalation. Pyongyang's will­ ingness to initiate aggression or steadfastly press its interests in a crisis will depend on how effective it assesses its nuclear threats will be in con­ vincing South Korea, the United States and Japan to accommodate those interests. Pyongyang would be bolder if it had greater confidence that, in a conflict that escalates farther than it intended, it had the option of con­ ducting limited nuclear strikes to persuade the United States and its allies to choose de-escalation.

Lim iting North Korea's Coercive Nuclear Leverage I 33

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's regime would measure the coercive leverage that it derives from nuclear threats in terms of the capability of its nuclear forces to cause damage that the United States and its allies cannot bear relative to the US and allied ability to hold them at risk.5 In employ­ ing nuclear weapons, North Korea would be gambling that an extremely risky step - escalating a conflict against a militarily superior opponent while violating the long-standing international norm of non-use - would be more likely to result in accommodation of its interests than the demise of the regime. With a more survivable and capable nuclear arsenal, North Korea would believe that it had more robust options for controlling the pace and scale of escalation. With this capability, Pyongyang might calculate that the United States and its allies would be unwilling to accept the significant additional risk of pursuing regime change even after North Korea has con­ ducted nuclear strikes. The United States and its allies have a clear interest in limiting the coercive leverage that Pyongyang derives from its nuclear-weapons capa­ bilities. The two means of doing so are arms control and improving US and allied military capabilities to strike and defend against North Korea's nuclear forces. The arms-control approach An arms-control approach would reduce the nuclear threat to the United States and its allies by limiting the size and sophistication of North Korea's nuclear forces. While keeping North Korean disarmament as a long-term objective, the US and its allies could, in the short term, seek to constrain the build-up of North Korea's nuclear arsenal, limit operational nuclear forces and slow qualitative capability improvements. The goal should be to find an agreed-upon equilibrium at which the regime is satisfied that it has a minimum deterrent sufficient to deter unprovoked invasion, but not a large, diverse arsenal such that Seoul, Washington and Tokyo fear that Pyongyang is likely to initiate major aggression. In theory, an equilibrium should exist because the coercive leverage and associated nuclear forces required for North Korea to deter invasion are significantly lower than the leverage and associated forces required to deter, say, the United States' pursuit of regime

34 I Jiña Kim and John K. Warden

change after North Korea has significantly raised US and allied stakes by conducting nuclear strikes. Indeed, North Korea's nuclear force is arguably poised in just this way today. The primary benefit of an arms-control approach is that it has the poten­ tial to reduce the North Korean nuclear threat without a costly US and allied military build-up. In exchange for verified limits on North Korea's nuclear development and deployments, the United States and South Korea could offer commensurate incentives.6 The US could also consider some limitations on its military posture and activities on and around the Korean Peninsula to assure Pyongyang of the credibility of its minimum deterrent.7 In principle, North Korea could calculate that these benefits - along with the bonus of being able to invest more resources into the development of its own economy, a stated regime objective - exceed the benefits associ­ ated with having additional coercive leverage derived from a larger, more capable nuclear arsenal. But the arms-control approach also presents formidable challenges. To start, it would be difficult to find a level of nuclear capability that would provide enough security to North Korea while simultaneously assuring the United States and its allies that North Korea would be unlikely to con­ template major conventional aggression backed by nuclear coercion. That would require aligning threat perceptions and assessments of capabilities - a difficult task. And even if the parameters of an agreement were settled, it is not easy to envision or design a verification arrangement that North Korea would accept, and that the United States and its allies would judge to be effective. On both of these issues, there would also be a significant likeli­ hood that the United States, South Korea and Japan would not be of a single mind, potentially preventing an agreement. The military-capabilities approach If an arms-control approach fails, the United States and its allies could seek to functionally limit North Korea's nuclear forces by developing military capabilities that can threaten them with destruction. As North Korea expands and improves its nuclear arsenal, it will probably take advantage of dispersed, mobile capabilities and hardened facilities to increase

Lim iting North Korea's Coercive Nuclear Leverage I 35

force survivability. US and allied military capabilities such as improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, more precise and destructive long-range strike, and enhanced active and passive defences would allow the United States and its allies to threaten to disable a significant portion of North Korea's nuclear forces, and thus limit the potential damage that North Korea could inflict. If Pyongyang fears that its employment of nuclear weapons, rather than prompting accommodation, would result in a US and allied decision to destroy as much of its nuclear force as possible and pursue regime change, a high-stakes gamble to employ nuclear weapons to manage escalation would be far less likely. In pursuing damage-limitation capabilities, the US and allied goal should be to deter the use of North Korea's nuclear capabilities rather than to destroy them. As with arms control, the United States and its allies should seek an equi­ librium at which North Korea does not live in perpetual fear of unprovoked invasion but is also not tempted to conduct major conventional aggres­ sion. Threatening a significant portion of North Korea's nuclear arsenal, as opposed to imperilling the entire arsenal, is also the only realistic goal given the inherent difficulty of finding, fixing, tracking, striking and intercepting nuclear forces in conflict. Considering resource constraints and trade-offs, the United States and its allies should diligently pursue only capabilities that are credible and cost effective, and that cannot be easily countered. The overall aim should be to avoid two situations in which North Korean nuclear use would be more likely during crisis and conflict.8 Firstly, esca­ lation is more likely if North Korea believes that it can employ nuclear weapons and live to fight another day. If Pyongyang thinks that it has the upper hand in risk-taking and escalation management, it will be less likely to back down in a crisis and more likely to gamble on conducting nuclear strikes in a conflict. A second type of instability arises if North Korea calcu­ lates that the United States and its allies are intent on pursuing maximalist objectives. In that case, even a low-probability strategy of nuclear escalation might be a more attractive option for Kim's regime than accepting its inevi­ table demise. Accordingly, the US and its allies should make it clear that they will not pursue regime change so long as North Korea avoids using weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, but at the same

36 I Jiña Kim and John K. Warden

time indicate that counterforce strikes and the pursuit of regime change are plausible options if North Korea employs nuclear weapons against South Korea, the United States or Japan. Since Pyongyang has no counterforce option that would significantly degrade US nuclear forces, its only potential path to surviving a nuclear crisis is winning a game of nuclear brinkmanship. However, simply threatening proportionate retaliation may be insufficient to deter North Korean nuclear use in certain extreme circumstances. Kim's dearest inter­ ests - the survival of his regime and its loyalists - are fairly parochial. And the regime's tolerance for pain is fairly high, as demonstrated by the harsh conditions it has been willing to allow North Koreans to endure. These factors make it more difficult to deter North Korea than other potential US adversaries. Pyongyang may also perceive that it has more at stake in an escalating conflict on the Korean Peninsula than the other players, par­ ticularly the United States, and therefore may think it has an advantage in manipulating nuclear risk. It follows that the United States and its allies must be prepared to deter Pyongyang primarily by denial, with conventional forces to counter limited aggression, and active and passive defences to reduce the effectiveness of limited nuclear strikes. But they must also seek to make deterrence by pun­ ishment credible by threatening what North Korea values most - the regime itself - to persuade it that nuclear escalation is a losing gamble.9 Without a significant counterforce capability to match North Korea's growing nuclear force, it would be difficult for the United States to continue to credibly threaten regime change as the cost of North Korean nuclear use because the likely cost to the US - significant retaliation against scores of US cities would be even worse than the costs associated with accommodating North Korea after it employed nuclear weapons. Critically, however, the United States and its allies do not need a perfectly effective counterforce capability. They only need to make sufficiently credible in Pyongyang's eyes the threat of damage limitation and regime change after North Korea has conducted nuclear strikes. *

*

*

Lim iting North Korea's Coercive Nuclear Leverage I 37

That said, the United States and its allies should only attempt to signifi­ cantly degrade North Korea's nuclear forces or attempt decapitation if their wartime objective is unconditional surrender. In most circumstances, the US and its allies should respond to North Korean conventional aggres­ sion by pursuing crisis de-escalation and matching their planned military campaigns to this objective. Conducting counterforce strikes against North Korea's nuclear forces would be viewed by Pyongyang as a prelude to regime change, likely resulting in North Korean retaliation. That step there­ fore should be reserved only for extreme circumstances, such as when North Korea has already conducted nuclear strikes against South Korea, Japan or the United States. Notes 1

See 'La w on C o n so lid a tin g P ositio n

Balance of Pow er and the Balance

of N u cle ar W eapons State A d o p ted ',

of Terror', in P au l Seabury (ed.),

Ko rean C en tral N ew s A ge n cy, 1

The B alance o f P o w er (Scranton, PA:

A p ril 2013, https://kcnaw atch.co/

C han dler, 1965), pp. 185-201.

new stream /1451896124-739013370/

5

law -o n -co n so lid atin g-p o sitio n 2

3

4

See John K . W arden, 'N o rth Ko rea's N u cle ar Posture: A n E v o lv in g

ofnuclear-w eapons-state-adopted/.

C h allen ge for U .S. Deterrence',

See A le xan d er G eorge, F o rcefu l

P ro liferatio n Papers 58, IF R I Security

P ersu a sio n : C oercive D ip lo m a cy as an

Studies Center, M arch 2017, https://

A ltern a tiv e to War (W ashington D C :

w w w . if r i.or g/sites/default/files/atom s/

U nited States Institute of Peace Press,

files/w arden_north_korea_nuclear_

1991), pp. 4-7; and K e n E. G ause,

posture_2017.pdf; and M atthew

N o rth K orean C a lcu lu s in the M a ritim e

K ro e n ig, The L o g ic o f A m erica n N u clea r

E n v iro n m en t: C overt V ersus O v ert

S tr a teg y : W hy S tra teg ic S u p erio rity

P rovoca tio n (A le xa n d ria , V A : Center

M a tters (N ew Yo rk: O xfo rd U n iv e rsity

for N a v a l A n a ly sis, June 2013).

Press, 2018).

See M ark S. B ell, 'Beyond

6

O n the benefits of arm s control w ith

Em boldenm ent: H o w A cq u irin g

N orth Ko rea and the form it could

N uclear W eapons C an Change Foreign

take, see John K . W arden and A n k it

P o licy', Intern ational S ecu rity, vo l. 40,

Panda, 'G o a ls for A n y A rm s C on trol

no. 1, Sum m er 2015, pp. 87-119.

Proposal w ith N orth K o re a', B u lletin

See Brad Roberts, The C ase fo r U S

o f the A to m ic S cie n tists , 13 Febru ary

N u clea r W eapons in the 2 1 st C en tu ry

(Redw ood C ity , C A : Stanford

2019, http s ://thebulletin.org/2019/02/ go als-for-any-arm s-co ntro l-prop osal-

U n iv e rsity Press, 2015), pp. 97-103, 199; and G lenn H . Snyder, 'The

w ith-north-korea/. See also Van Jackson, 'R is k Realism : The A rm s

38 I Jiña Kim and John K. Warden C o n tro l Endgam e for N orth Korea

C en tu ry C h allen ge for the U nited

P o licy ', Center for a N ew A m erican

States', Liverm o re Papers on G lo b al

Security, 24 Septem ber 2019, https://

Se cu rity N o. 4, Law rence Liverm o re N atio n al Labo ratory Center for G lo bal

w w w .cnas.org /publications/reports/ risk-re a lism ?fb clid = Iw A R o 8 T D Ll v S f 4 iw Ju 2 iI-b P N lr 3 p e P w LS r 81z7

8

Se cu rity Research, Ju ly 2018, pp. 41-6. 9

The U nited States w arned P yo n gyan g

fA o O IC zq u b k 9sA U G 7 V R i-Z 8 .

in the 2018 N u cle ar Posture R eview

See exam ples of these m easures in

that 'a n y N orth Ko rean nu clear attack

A d am M ount and A n d rea Berger,

against the U nited States or its allie s

R ep o rt o f the In tern ation al S tu d y G roup

and partners is unacceptable and

on N o rth K orea P o licy (W ashington D C :

w ill resu lt in the end of that regim e'.

Federation of A m erican Scientists,

U S D epartm ent of D efense, 'N u cle ar

2 0 1 9 ), P p . 3 5 - 7 .

Posture R eview 2018', Febru ary 2018,

In other w ords, the U nited States

p. 33, https://m edia.defense.gov/2018/

and its a llie s sh ou ld pursue 'nuclear-

Feb/o2/2ooi872886/-i/-i/1/2018-

use sta b ility'. See John K . W arden,

N U C L E A R -P O S T U R E -R E V IE W -

'Lim ite d N u cle ar W ar: The 21st

F IN A L -R E P O R T .P D F .

Nuclear Stability on the Korean Peninsula Adam Mount and Mira R app-H ooper

In facing a nuclear-armed North Korea, the core interests of the United States and South Korea are preserving the freedom, safety and prosperity of their soldiers and citizens on the peninsula, and reducing to the greatest extent possible the risk of attacks on the American homeland. The allies do not have an interest in generating instability on the peninsula by attempt­ ing to collapse or overthrow the regime in Pyongyang. Rather, they should seek to deter its aggression, revisionism and use of military force. The most effective way to serve these defensive interests is to ensure that allied deter­ rence strategy, operational concepts and force posture preserve stability on the Korean Peninsula. A stable system is one that, when disturbed, tends to return to the status quo ante rather than to encourage escalation.1 Crisis stability on the pen­ insula requires that misperceptions and minor provocations that could otherwise develop into conflict instead tend to de-escalate. Stability does not result from trust, perfect information or arithmetic calculations about numbers of missiles and tanks; it is inherently a perceptual balance. Nuclear stability exists if Pyongyang does not believe it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict or to delegate authority to use them such that they might be employed first, whether advertently or inadvertently.

Adam Mount is Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Posture Project at the Federation of American Scientists. Mira Rapp-Hooper is the Stephen A. Schwarzman Senior Fellow for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Survival | voi. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 39-46

DOI 10.1080/00396338.2020.1 715063

40 I Adam Mount and Mira Rapp-Hooper

To fulfil these conditions, North Korea must believe that its nuclear forces and command-and-control systems can survive a first strike sufficiently to credibly retaliate despite allied theatre and national missile-defence systems. The infrequency and opacity of communication between Washington and Pyongyang increases the risk of misperception and miscalculation, and will encourage each side to assume the other's malign intent.2 Deterring North Korea Accepting stability as a guiding objective can help the alliance to address the most likely cause of war on the peninsula: deliberate or inadvertent North Korean escalation after an initial act of aggression that it intended to remain limited. Lowering the risk of deliberate North Korean escalation requires maintaining a capability to decisively and rapidly defeat aggression at any level of escalation. Lowering the risk of inadvertent escalation requires that the alliance minimise the possibility that Pyongyang could perceive itself as under general attack intended to destroy the regime, its leadership or its nuclear forces. In short, maintaining stability on the peninsula requires alli­ ance planners to deprive Pyongyang of reasons to escalate early in a crisis or to structure their nuclear forces in ways that could exacerbate the risks of nuclear use due to accident or miscalculation. To meet these objectives, the United States and South Korea must main­ tain an equilibrium of forces that affords Pyongyang a rational expectation of security but no hope of winning a limited conflict. To do so, allied forces must credibly demonstrate three intentions under three different sce­ narios: in peacetime, to lower escalation risks, shape Pyongyang's arsenal and enhance the credibility of US security guarantees; in limited war, to maintain escalation dominance; and in an unlimited war, to prevail if North Korean attacks preclude a return to stability that serves allied interests. The challenge of allied deterrence is to maintain a force posture that meets all three conditions. Given the vast disparity in military power, the latter two conditions are relatively easy to meet. As to the first, stability is best served by declaratory and operational positions that demonstrate restraint by limiting allied capabilities, but that are sufficient to meet defen­ sive objectives in a crisis.

Nuclear Stability on the Korean Peninsula I 41

To convince Pyongyang that it does not need to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict or quantitatively expand its forces, the United States and South Korea should consistently reiterate their position that they have no intention of changing the regime by force and calibrate allied force posture, military exercises and public communications to enhance the credibility of this guarantee.3 This would reduce the risk of Pyongyang misperceiving itself as under attack and minimise the regime's incentives to posture its nuclear forces in dangerous ways. Allied forces should be calibrated to clearly demonstrate that an invasion is unlikely. South Korean ground forces should maintain a capability to repulse limited incursions and destroy artillery positions, but most regular manoeuvre forces should adopt a posture that signals they are not preparing for offensive operations. Exercises, including combined assurance and deterrence missions, should take place far from North Korean territory to minimise the risk that Pyongyang perceives it is under attack and should not overtly rehearse leadership-decapitation strikes. The allies should also take extreme care during crises to avoid unintentionally signalling preparations for general war.4 To decrease the coercive value of North Korea's nuclear arsenal and lower Pyongyang's incentives to use nuclear weapons for political exploita­ tion, the allies should show strong alliance cohesion, demonstrate political resolve to resist blackmail and seek arms-control agreements to prevent deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons.5 The United States should privately acknowledge North Korea's nuclear capabilities, affirming that it too is deterred. If the regime believes otherwise, North Korea may expand and diversify its arsenal to include dangerous capabilities such as low-yield warheads or solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles. If the regime assesses that Washington doubts its ability to produce a re-entry vehicle or an operationally effective nuclear warhead, it may opt to demonstrate them through, for example, provocative testing. And if the regime thinks that the United States is preparing to destroy its command-and-control networks, it may devolve nuclear-use authority or employ nuclear weapons pre-emptively. Accordingly, the alliance should convey defensive intent and present to Pyongyang a tolerable, if asymmetric, balance of forces consistent with its security requirements.

42 I Adam Mount and Mira Rapp-Hooper

Discouraging brinkmanship To discourage brinkmanship, the alliance's defensive forces should retain and communicate their ability to prevail in a conflict at any level of aggres­ sion - that is, to maintain escalation dominance - so as to deny North Korea its objectives in any possible military contingency.6 Here, deterrence by denial is more credible than deterrence by punishment given the North Korean regime's disregard for its population. The alliance's exercises and statements should communicate its resolve to impose costs on the regime that modestly exceed what is required for denial in order to prevent recidivism. This would require stating and dem­ onstrating the capability to degrade North Korea's military assets, including submarines, mobile artillery launchers, uninhabited aerial vehicles, cyber capabilities and special-operations forces. Maintaining stability A stability-seeking strategy only makes sense as long as Pyongyang's actions are consistent with stability. In a crisis in which North Korea's nuclear, chemical and biological forces could be used, allied forces on the peninsula should use all available assets to track them. In the event that the US intelligence community warns that Kim Jong-un has ordered a major attack that would cause significant loss of life, allied forces on and around the peninsula should be prepared to act to prevent that strike from occurring and, in extreme circumstances, to pre-emptively destroy North Korea's nuclear- or biological-weapons arsenals or the leadership and commandand-control networks that initiate their use. For crisis-management purposes, Washington should not trust that a counterforce strike will be successful. Given that it could prompt Pyongyang to release its remaining nuclear forces, the option should be considered a last resort in the face of imminent mass-casualty attacks. In light of the alliance's superiority in conventional forces, and due to their flexibility, credibility and ability to deny North Korea limited objec­ tives, integrated US and South Korean conventional forces should be the primary elements of deterrence. American nuclear forces serve a narrow function on the peninsula. Extended nuclear deterrence is a political signal

Nuclear Stability on the Korean Peninsula • 43

to disabuse Pyongyang of any mistaken perception that it can escalate its way out of a fight, use its nuclear forces to coerce South Korea or thwart the United States from coming to Seoul's defence. No additional nuclear capa­ bilities or changes in existing posture are required to meet these objectives. The United States should not plan to strike a target with nuclear weapons if it can be effectively destroyed with conventional weapons.7 Nuclear use should not be considered unless it is physically necessary to prevent an imminent nuclear or biological attack against the US or its allies.8 Insofar as the alliance accepts stability as a guiding objective, it should seize the opportunity to coordinate with China. The Chinese Communist Party has long prioritised stability on the Korean Peninsula over assertive efforts to forestall Pyongyang's nuclear developments, and it is no longer clear that the People's Liberation Army would support North Korea in a major war on the peninsula, particularly if Pyongyang started it.9 Seoul and Washington should encourage Beijing to act as a private conduit to Pyongyang to affirm the allied security guarantee against regime change, to discourage Pyongyang from taking aggressive or destabilising actions that could cause crises, and to help de-escalate any crises that do arise. Alternatives to stability There are two main alternatives to a deterrence posture that seeks to preserve stability. Both assume that deterrence requires the regime to be uncertain about its ability to inflict damage on the United States and its allies, whether because allied missile defences can prevent damage or because counter­ force or decapitation strikes can prevent North Korean attacks from being launched. However, effective deterrence cannot depend on damage limi­ tation because the regime may assess, correctly or incorrectly, that it can overcome these challenges. The United States and South Korea cannot be certain of their ability to prevent damage from North Korean attacks with missile defences.10 North Korea's tube artillery and its expanding missile inventories, which now include missiles capable of sophisticated manoeuvres in flight, severely complicate the task of US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot missile batteries stationed in South Korea. While missile defences can plausibly

44 I Adam Mount and Mira Rapp-Hooper

protect some targets in Japan and Guam, the allies cannot be confident of total success. The US ground-based, mid-course defence (GMD) system that is supposed to protect the continental United States has an even less reliable testing record and is making little technological headway.11 If Pyongyang's missile forces continue to expand or incorporate countermeasures, the likelihood of successful damage limitation will decline further. Others believe that deterrence requires convincing the regime that it could not survive a conflict with its arsenal intact. Through shows of force and deployments of additional forces, the alliance can visibly and cred­ ibly threaten the regime with decapitation, counterforce operations and rapid escalation to dissuade conflict initiation. But the sophistication, size and concealment of the North Korean arsenal means that any counterforce attempt is unlikely to succeed completely.12 It is not technologically possible for the United States or its allies to com­ pletely deny North Korea the ability to inflict severe damage on their territory with pre-emptive action before launch, or missile defences after launch. A deterrence posture predicated on damage limitation is either a coin flip or a bluff. Both types of damage limitation provide the regime with incentives to expand and improve its arsenal, escalate rapidly in a crisis or posture its arsenal in dangerous ways (for instance, by patrolling its missiles more fre­ quently or delegating nuclear-release authority). Moreover, arguments that establish specific expectations for certain levels of damage limitation are strategically arbitrary and neglect the inherently perceptual quality of these calculations: even if the allies think they can limit damage sufficiently to deter Pyongyang, they cannot be certain Pyongyang will agree. Arguments that do not identify specific confidence thresholds are poor guides for policy. *

*

#

Given North Korea's burgeoning capabilities, a stability-seeking strategy may not succeed indefinitely. Compared to alternative approaches that risk antagonising the regime or driving it to expand its arsenal, however, such a strategy does provide conditions conducive to arms-control negotiations that could forge a more durable condition of stability in the future.

Nuclear Stability on the Korean Peninsula I 43

Notes 1

Th an ks to Tom Plant for this h e lp fu l

Requirem ents: Tow ard a Sustain able

form ulation. For further elaboration,

N atio n a l C o n se n su s', B ro o kin gs

see A d am M ount and A n drea Berger,

In stitu tio n , Septem ber 2017, https://

'R ep ort of the F A S International

w w w .b ro okings.edu /w p-co ntent/

Stu d y G roup on N orth Korea P o licy ',

uploads/2 0 i 7 /o9 /fp_2 0 i 7 0 9 2 o_

Federation of A m erican Scientists,

deterrence_report.pdf. The authors

2019, https://fas.org/w p-content/

recom m end that the a llie s 'reduce

u p lo ad s/m e d ia/FA S-D P R K -SG .p d f;

the coercive valu es of the D P R K 's

and A d am M ount, 'C o n ven tio n al

m issile s th rough integrated re gio n al

D eterrence of N orth Ko rea', Federation of A m erican Scientists,

m issile defense and conven tio nal

2019, https://fas.org/w p-content/

2

against n o n -kin etic actions, in clu d in g

m ore debate on the concept of stra-

cyber attacks, crim in a l activity, assas-

tegic sta b ility, see Jam es M. A cton,

sination, subversio n and a range of

'R e cla im in g Strategic Sta b ility ',

other destructive activities. In m any

in E lb rid ge A . C o lb y and M ichael

cases, it m ay be effective to im pose

S. G erson (eds), S tr a te g ic S ta b ility:

graduated costs in response. Flow ever,

C o n ten d in g In terp reta tio n s (C a rlisle , PA :

deterring these kin d s of attacks is less

A rm y W ar C ollege, 2013).

lik e ly to be su ccessful than defending against them.

See Robert Je rvis and M ira Rapp7

Sagan, 'Th e N u clear N ecessity

A ffairs, 3 A p ril 2018, https://

P rin cip le: M akin g U S Targeting P o licy

w w w .f oreignaff air s.com /articles/

Conform w ith Eth ics & the La w s of

north-korea/2018-04-03/perception-

W ar', D a edalus, vo l. 143, no. 4, F a ll

and-m isperception-korean-peninsula.

2016, pp. 62-74.

The stu d y group also argues that

8

W hether this standard is consistent

interaction can help to further enhance

w ith 'no first use' or 'so le purpose' nuclear declaratory p o licies depends

th is com m itm ent. M ount and Berger,

on an assessm ent of the like lih o o d that this conditio n w ill exist.

'R ep ort of the F A S Internation al Stu d y G roup on N orth Ko rea P o licy ', p. 72.

9

See O rian a S k y la r M astro, 'W h y C h in a

P o litica l appointees faile d to ap preciate these risk s d u rin g the tensions of

W on't Rescue N orth K o re a', F o reign A ffa irs, vo l. 97, no. 1, January/February

2017. See Van Jackson, O n the B rin k:

2018, pp. 38-67.

T rum p, Kim , and the Threat o f N u clea r W ar (N ew York: Cam brid ge U n ive rsity

Press, 2018). 5

See Jeffrey G. Le w is and Scott D .

on the Korean Peninsula', Foreign

sustained d ip lo m atic and econom ic

4

In additio n, the alliance sh ou ld defend

uploads/2019/12/FA S-C D N K.pdf. For

H ooper, 'Perception and M isperception

3

strike ca p a b ilitie s'. 6

See Robert E in h o rn and Stephen P ife r, 'M eeting U S D eterrence

10 See A le xan d er K riss, 'W h y D am age Lim ita tio n Isn 't the A n sw er to the N orth Ko rean Threat', War on the R o ck s, 19 Septem ber 2017, https:// w ar onther o cks.com/2017/09/

46 I Adam Mount and Mira Rapp-Hooper w hy-dam age-lim itation -isnt-th e-

Scientists, 23 June 2016, https://w w w .

answ er-to-the-north-korean-threat/;

ucsusa.org/resources/disastrous-us-

and K in gsto n R eif, 'M issile Defense

approach-strategic-m issile-defense.

C a n 't Save U s from N orth Ko rea',

In 2019, the M issile D efense A ge n cy

W ar on the R o ck s , 29 M ay 2017,

cancelled the Redesigned K ill Vehicle

h ttp s ://waronther o cks.com /2017/05/

after five years of w ork, send ing

m issile-defense-cant-save-us-from -

the agency back to the d raw in g

north-korea/. For an argum ent that

board on future im provem ents. See

m issile defence is valu able even

K in gsto n R e if, 'N a tio n al M issile

though it 'cannot d e cisive ly influence

Defense Set B ack', A rm s C on trol Today ,

the strategic calcu lu s of a regio nal

Ju ly/A u gu st 2019, https://w w w .

aggressor', see Brad Roberts, 'O n the

arm s control.or g/act/2019-07/ne w s/

Strategic Value of B a llistic M issile

national-m issile-defense-set-back.

D efense', P ro liferatio n Papers 50, IF R I

12 See A b rah am D en m ark, 'Th e

Secu rity Stud ies Center, June 2014,

U S C a n 't G et R id of N o rth

https ://w w w .if ri. org/sites/default/files/

K o re a 's N u ke s W ith o u t P a y in g

atom s/files/pp5oroberts.pdf. 11 See La u ra G rego, George N . Le w is and D a v id W right, 'Sh ie ld ed

a C a ta stro p h ic P rice ', F o re ig n P o lic y , 15 Septem ber 2017, https://

foreignpolicy.com /2017/09/13/

from O versigh t: The D isastro u s

th e -u -s-ca n t-ge t-rid -o f-n o rth -ko re a s-

U S A p p ro ach to Strategic M issile

n u ke s-w ith o u t-p a yin g -a -ca ta -

D efense', U n io n of Concerned

stro p h ic-p rice /.

North Korea: Risks of Escalation Vipin Narang and A nkit Panda

In 2017, North Korea conducted three flight tests of two different intercontinental-ballistic-missile (ICBM) designs. Technical experts largely assess that the reliability of these missiles is low. Nevertheless, American war planners must assume that Pyongyang can hold US cities at risk, as noted in 2017 by senior US officials, including then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford and former US Strategic Command chief General John Hyten.1 That is, American planners must consider a North Korean thermonuclear weapon successfully detonating in the contiguous United States a genuine possibility. This new risk has implications for both conventional and nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis North Korea. The allied deterrence posture that best manages it is one that seeks to dissuade Kim Jong-un from initiating a potentially unlimited war through nuclear first use by assuring him that any employment of nuclear weapons would result in the end of his regime by any means necessary - includ­ ing nuclear weapons. This posture is also most likely to have the salutary effect of assuring South Korea and Japan that US extended-deterrence commitments remain robust despite the rapid advances in North Korean capabilities. In peacetime, however, US declaratory policy should be to abjure regime change or disarming North Korea by force.

Vipin Narang is an associate professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and a member of MIT's Security Studies Program. Ankit Panda is an adjunct senior fellow in the Defense Posture Project at the Federation of American Scientists and author of the forthcoming Kim Jo n g Un a n d the Bom b (Hurst, 2020). Survival | voi. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 47-54

DOI 10.1080/00396338.2020.1715064

48 I Vipin Narang and Ankit Panda

The rub is that acknowledging Kim's fresh nuclear capabilities could embolden the Korean People's Army to engage in conventional brinkman­ ship.2Accordingly, the alliance should maintain a robust level of readiness - including a substantial US military presence on the peninsula - to assure North Korea that the costs of an incursion across the Military Demarcation Line would be high and the odds of success low. South Korea's independ­ ent military capabilities will play an important role in buttressing this posture. For instance, Seoul should continue to develop the so-called K3 suite of capabilities: Kill Chain, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR). That is, we propose a punishment-denial deterrence framework: one that employs deterrence by punishment at the nuclear level, and deterrence by denial at the con­ ventional level, to most effectively deter North Korea while minimising unintentional escalation risks. Permanent brinkmanship The importance of establishing the aforementioned punishment-denial framework for deterrence stems from North Korean leader Kim's fear of a conventional attack, decapitation strikes, and a surprise conventional or nuclear counterforce attack by the United States and its allies. Managing a nuclear North Korea - a reality likely to persist for the foreseeable future requires managing the associated risks of escalation. North Korea's growing suite of short-, medium-, intermediate- and longrange nuclear-weapons capabilities flesh out a North Korean nuclear strategy premised on asymmetrically escalating in a conflict, enabled by a two-tier strategic nuclear force. Kim wants first and foremost to preserve his regime. Accordingly, he seeks to deter any major conventional aggression against his territory. The first tier of North Korea's nuclear forces - consisting of short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles - would hold at risk US and allied military assets in theatre, includ­ ing Japan, South Korea and Guam. North Korean statements have suggested that the transgression of some unspecified military threshold would result in Pyongyang's pre-emptive employment of nuclear weapons to degrade the alliance's ability to initiate and sustain a conventional invasion.

North Korea: Risks of Escalation I 49

Kim would then expect to survive North Korea's nuclear first use by posturing his conventional force and keeping his nuclear ICBMs in reserve, holding US territory at risk and thereby deterring American nuclear retali­ ation for North Korea's first use of nuclear weapons.3 At this point, further escalation by the United States to defend South Korea and Japan would potentially expose an American city to nuclear devastation. But the United States' standing down would ostensibly terminate a conflict on terms favourable to Kim. Thus, North Korea seems prepared to deliberately dance at the edge of the nuclear cliff both in peacetime and during crisis. Kim's strategy is predicated on a permanent state of brinkmanship on the Korean Peninsula, making a stability-seeking approach to deterrence highly fraught. He calcu­ lates that a conventional invasion or a surprise attack would be unthinkable by the United States and its allies given the risks of uncontrollable escalation past the nuclear threshold. Inadvertent escalation Given North Korea's risk-courting strategy, mechanisms of inadvertent escalation on and around the Korean Peninsula deserve serious consideration. Some inadvertent escalation risks involve misperception, and arise when action taken by one party, presumed to be mundane and non-escalatory, is perceived by the other to be highly threatening. These risks exist in peacetime, in a crisis and during war. Since North Korea's stated threshold for nuclear use is in-theatre signalling of an impending conventional invasion of its territory or a bolt-out-of-the-blue decapitation strike, these risks are particularly acute. The indicators of a forthcoming attack could be indistinguishable from bolstering conventional defences. Actions taken by the United States, South Korea and Japan in peacetime or in a crisis to better posture con­ ventional forces for rapid reaction to any North Korean provocation, for instance, might be interpreted by Kim's regime as escalatory, or as a prelude to an attack. Considering the quantitatively lean nature of Kim's nuclear forces, and the concern that they may not survive an attack (or that he will be unable to maintain command and control over them during an attack),

50 I Vipin Narang and Ankit Panda

use-or-lose pressures will weigh heavily, making North Korea more inclined to go nuclear early in a crisis. To deter North Korea from introducing nuclear weapons into a crisis prematurely or as a result of misperception, allied decapitation threats need to be diffuse in peacetime and acute in a crisis. US nuclear declaratory policy toward Pyongyang should make clear that under no circumstances can Kim employ nuclear weapons and expect to survive. As of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, this was America's declared policy. In an extended-deterrence context, to reassure US allies, Washington should proclaim that any nuclear attack on the territory of South Korea or Japan will be met with requisite retaliation. The United States should abandon any notion of a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack to disarm North Korea by force.4 The US should make clear that any credible indications that North Korea is preparing to use nuclear weapons will be met with a pre-emptive con­ ventional counterforce strike. (A more robust US military presence on the Korean Peninsula would improve the odds of a successful conventional counterforce campaign.) Previous US declaratory statements promising North Korea an 'effective and overwhelming' response appear sufficient for this purpose. Beyond Kim's misperceiving American conventional movements or exercises as a prelude to a major conventional attack, two additional potential triggers of inadvertent escalation should guide allied planning. The first is Kim's fear of a surprise decapitation attack that attempts to kill him. Indicators of such a strike could be much lighter than those of a major conventional attack. A limited stand-off air package, for instance, could do the job if the US were aware of his location in real time, and therefore could prompt the inference. In an atmosphere of heightened tensions, only a couple of B-i bombers headed his way, even if intended only to desensitise North Korean air defences, could spook him. Kim might order a pre-emptive nuclear attack on the air bases the regime assesses to be involved, or put in place a dead-hand procedure whereby if he is killed or believed to be dead a standing order would require North Korean forces to launch nuclear weapons in revenge, ensuring that his nuclear forces 'fail deadly'. The latter scenario, while perhaps unlikely, cannot be ruled out.

North Korea: Risks of Escalation I 51

Finally, Kim could become convinced that the United States was attempt­ ing a surprise conventional (or, he may fear, nuclear) counterforce attack to disarm him by force. If the diplomatic process stalls or goes into a deep coma, and hardliners in the United States increasingly call for military action, Kim's fears of such an attack are likely to grow. There would be few if any indica­ tions of a US surprise counterforce attack, especially one from the air or sea. US deployment of ballistic missiles with short flight times to Pyongyang after the expiration of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty may contrib­ ute to these fears.5The use-them-or-lose-them mentality could take hold, and Kim could be incentivised to pre-emptively launch his nuclear weapons. Structurally, the United States' overwhelming conventional and nuclear superiority imposes heavy pressure on North Korea's nuclear forces and command and control in a conflict or decapitation scenario. This is unavoid­ able. What is avoidable is creating the circumstances for misperceptions in which Kim would fear that the United States was about to attack North Korea or him, and give him an itchy trigger finger. The US and South Korea can forestall such a situation by avoiding any sudden moves that could amplify pre-crisis and intra-crisis inadvertent escalation risks while sus­ taining a robust and credible posture that promises to punish any moves by North Korea that would initiate an unlimited war and deny Pyongyang space for manoeuvre in a limited conflict. Confidence-building measures and risk reduction At the declaratory level, US policy should coalesce around reducing incentives for early, massive nuclear use by North Korea in a crisis. In particular, Washington should forswear decapitation, a surprise disarm­ ing counterforce attack or regime change during peacetime. While North Korea is unlikely to completely trust such declarations, certain steps can be taken to render US intentions clearer and more credible. The paucity of high-quality air-defence and early-warning systems in North Korea has left Pyongyang particularly sensitive to local strategic-bomber operations. Accordingly, the United States, in consultation with allies, should declare an end to peacetime bomber assurance and deterrence (BAAD) operations on the Korean Peninsula. (Pyongyang assumes the non-nuclear B-iB to be

52

1 Vipin Narang and Ankit Panda

nuclear-capable.) In a crisis, private assurances among allies concerning bomber movements would make sense to facilitate force-posture adjust­ ments for potential retaliation, but public statements concerning bomber movements should be avoided. Similarly, the US should declare that it will not use offensive cyber capabilities to disrupt North Korean nuclear command-and-control systems in peacetime. Kim no doubt expects kinetic and non-kinetic attempts to sever his ability to command and communicate with his nuclear-weapons operators in a conflict, but if those fears arise in peacetime, he is more likely to favour positive controls over his nuclear weapons and consider use pre­ delegation, which would increase the risk of nuclear-weapons use in a crisis.6 Finally, to better understand North Korea's thinking on the role of nuclear weapons in its national-defence strategy, the United States should approach representatives of the Korean People's Army Strategic Force about engaging in exploratory, open-ended dialogue. These efforts should be paired with inter-Korean and US/United Nations Command-North Korea conventional confidence-building measures.7 Given the existing escalation challenges on the Korean Peninsula, the United States must accompany these efforts with a parallel process of arms control, focused on verifiably capping the qualitative and quantitative growth of North Korea's arsenal.8 A larger, more survivable arsenal may prove stabilising with respect to use-or-lose pressures, reducing inadvertent escalation risks, but it would contribute to the coercive leverage of North Korea's weapons in a crisis. The pursuit of damage limitation and conven­ tional counterforce capabilities by the United States and allies should be weighed against the negative effects they may have on arms-control efforts. North Korea is less likely to enter into talks on verifiably capping its arsenal or other arms-control measures if it perceives itself to be vulnerable to a disarming first strike. *

*

Deterrence by punishment is the most favourable and least risky way to deter nuclear use on the Korean Peninsula, while conventional deterrence

North Korea: Risks of Escalation I 53

by denial is the only responsible way of managing instability that may arise as a result of North Korea's conventional brinkmanship. Both forms of deter­ rence would benefit from heightened trilateral coordination among the US, South Korea and Japan. More broadly, ongoing US diplomacy and strategic communication remain essential to stability on the Korean Peninsula. Notes 1

See P h il Stew art, 'U S N uclear Com m ander Says A ssu m in g N orth

Jo u rn a l , 28 Febru ary 2018.

5

Korea Tested H yd ro ge n Bom b',

2

Reuters, 13 Septem ber 2017,

N u clear Threat', F o reign P o licy , 14

http s://w w w .reuter s.com /ar tide/

N ovem ber 2019, http s://foreign po licy.

us-no rthkorea-m issiles-usa-hydrogen-

com /2019/11/14/us-m issiles-asia-inf-

id U S K C N iB P 3 3 i.

north-korea-nuclear-threat-grow /.

See S. Paul Kapur, D angerous D eterrent:

6

to M anage a N u clear N orth Ko rea',

in South A sia (Palo A lto, C A : Stanford

F o reign A ffa irs, 6 Decem ber 2018,

U niversity Press, 2007); and M ark S. Bell,

https://w w w .foreignaffairs.com /

'Beyond Em boldenm ent: H ow A cq uiring

article s/n o rth -ko re a/2 0 i8 -n -i9 /righ t-

N uclear Weapons Can Change Foreign

w ay-m anage-nuclear-north-korea. 7

See Van Jackson, 'R is k R e alism ',

i, Sum m er 2013, pp. 87-119.

Center for a N ew A m erican Security,

See V ip in N a ra n g, N u c le a r S tr a te g y in

24 Septem ber 2019, https://w w w .cnas. or g /p u b licatio ns/rep orts/risk-realism .

the M o d ern E ra : R e g io n a l P o w e r s an d In te rn a tio n a l C o n flict (P rin ceto n , N J:

P rin ce to n U n iv e rsity Press, 2014), 4

See A n k it Panda, 'Th e R ig h t W ay

N uclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict

Policy', International Security , vol. 40, no. 3

See A n k it Panda, 'N e w U .S. M issile s in A sia C o u ld Increase the N orth Korean

8

See John K . W arden and A n k it Panda, 'G o a ls for A n y A rm s C o n tro l Proposal

pp. 19-20.

w ith N o rth Ko rea', B u lle tin of the

Som e prom inent figures, of course,

A tom ic Scientists (blog), 13 February

have not done so. See, for exam ple,

2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/02/

John Bolton, 'Th e Le g a l Case for

go als-for-any-arm s-co ntro l-prop osal-

S trik in g N orth Korea F irst', W all S treet

w ith-north-korea/.

54 I Vipin Narang and Ankit Panda

Deterring North Korea Ian Cam pbell and M ichaela D odge

The United States holds a nuclear- and conventional-force advantage over North Korea at almost every level of the escalatory ladder. Nevertheless, stakes on the peninsula are asymmetrical in many ways, and defeating North Korea could mean immense losses for the United States and South Korea. Miscalculations and misconceptions are possible. The North Korean regime may misinterpret US signals and Ted lines'. Pyongyang might also be willing to escalate with conventional and nuclear weapons sooner in a conflict than the United States. North Korea could have one or more of several objectives, including extracting more international aid, driving a wedge between the US and South Korea, preserving North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's regime and unifying the Korean Peninsula under its rule. It is a reasonable assump­ tion that the regime ranks these objectives - for instance, Kim probably cares more about regime survival than about extracting international aid - although they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The United States judges that the main purpose of North Korea's forces is to guarantee regime survival and increased leverage over South Korea, Japan and the United States.1

Ian Cam pbell is an active-duty US Marine Corps officer currently studying at American University. Michaela Dodge is a research scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy. Survival | voi. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 55-59

DOI 10.1080/00396338.2020.1715065

56 I Ian Cam pbell and Michaela Dodge

A useful metaphor The US-South Korea alliance's response to North Korean escalation should approximate the slow but inexorable flow of lava. That is, the North Korean leadership must see US escalation coming at various speeds and from mul­ tiple directions, recognise the futility of resistance based on the damage the US could do to regime objectives and conclude that it is better off ceasing provocation. The prospect of an American response must remain threaten­ ing to North Korea despite its new weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Damage-limitation measures such as advanced decontamina­ tion teams, missile defence and increasing the US military's resilience in a conflict involving nuclear, biological or chemical weapons would bolster the credibility of the threat and strengthen deterrence by denying North Korea the ability to achieve its goals. Finding the right balance is even more important now that North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and is developing delivery systems that have the potential to reach the continental United States.2The ultimate deci­ sion to escalate is in North Korea's hands. But the United States and South Korea must do their best to shape that decision. Planning considerations for escalation dominance To dominate on the conventional portion of the escalation ladder, the United States needs a variety of conventional and nuclear capabilities to work in concert. Quick and responsive conventional forces that are less vulnerable to North Korean indirect-fire assets would be especially valuable in signal­ ling the resolve to dominate escalation. A continuing US forward presence is therefore essential. If hostilities do break out, the United States' assumption would be that South Korea would initially respond to North Korean aggression using local forces coordinated within the framework of combined allied leadership; the US would then reinforce the South Korean effort with decisive naval, air and ground forces. The full deployment of these forces would be predictable but gradual due to the time required to move significant forces to the Korean Peninsula. A sufficiency of US forces based on the peninsula is therefore critical to mitigating the potential for North Korean miscalculation. Those

Deterring North Korea I 57

forces serve as a 'tripwire' in case of North Korea's uncontrolled escalation, and must be substantive enough to delay any North Korean consolidation of gains south of the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) until off-peninsula forces are able to deploy. Additional concerns that do not fit neatly into the concept of the escalation ladder stem from North Korea's special-operations forces and nonconventional capabilities, including cyber. These capabilities are intended to disrupt and degrade US and South Korean response options in what have until recently been assumed to be secure rear areas. The United States must be able to counter and mitigate these capabilities. Building greater resiliency into basing infrastructure and key logistical nodes would signal to North Korea that it cannot effectively impede US force deployment. In an escalation scenario, both sides are likely to attempt to leverage advantages in mobility, precision, speed and tempo-generating ability. A coherent US conventional-force capability, immediately deployable from within South Korea, carries escalation credibility largely on account of the political significance of direct US military involvement - skin in the game. Such conventional forces are closely watched by North Korea. Their movement from secure basing points south of the DMZ into the weaponsengagement zone, subject to layered North Korean indirect fire, would bolster deterrence by communicating the United States' willingness to confront and defeat North Korea by accepting the risk to these forces as a prelude to deploying more substantial naval and air assets.3 North Korea would then be presented with a difficult decision as to whether it should continue to escalate. If conventional deterrence fails and hostilities move up to the nuclear-, biological- or chemical-weapons segment of the escalatory ladder, the United States must be able to terminate war on favourable terms. The US and South Korea must be able to quickly destroy the North Korean weapons that can do the most damage, including nuclear, biological and chemical ones. To achieve this goal, the US must be able to exploit a full range of specifically tailored kinetic and non-kinetic options, including pre-launch strike capabilities, cyber and command-and-control disrup­ tions, and nuclear weapons.

58 I Ian Cam pbell and Michaela Dodge

Furthermore, the North Korean leadership must perceive the US as pos­ sessing the capability to effectively target North Korea's nuclear weapons and command-and-control assets. Given that North Korea has spent decades building tunnels and hardened facilities to protect the regime and its weapons, doing so would likely require a mixture of conventional and nuclear forces. The latter could include nuclear warheads capable of destroying hardened and deeply buried targets without generating large fallout. Such warheads are currently not in the US arsenal. Allied support for escalation dominance The United States' regional network of alliances, partnerships and basing facilities is one of the strongest advantages the US has over North Korea. The United States must ensure that its allies would be supportive of US steps despite potential concerns about escalation. Allied cooperation would expand US options and help ensure escalation dominance. While in-place forces are the first signal of alliance willingness to escalate in the Korean theatre of operations, US force movements in Japan would impart the intent and capability to intensify escalation. Assuring Japan of US military support may require improving the logistical infrastructure for the rapid long-distance deployment of US forces into the Korean theatre, and in particular the modernisation of its tankeraircraft, strategic-airlift and military-sealift capabilities.4 Missile defence can also play an indispensable role in ensuring Japan's cooperation, as it mitigates the potential damage from North Korean ballistic-missile attacks on Japanese targets. Collectively, these improvements would minimise disruptions to US force deployment and ensure that North Korea fully considers US conventionalresponse capabilities in an escalating crisis. All key US strategic documents highlight the United States' concern about North Korea's ballistic-missile and WMD capabilities. US homeland defence and regional ballistic-missile-defence architectures will continue to play an important role in US efforts to deter North Korea and assure allies. But the current US missile-defence programme could be inadequate depending on the rate of advance of North Korean capabilities.

Deterring North Korea I 59

The United States and its allies face a major challenge in ensuring that North Korea remains deterred from instigating a large-scale provocation. The best way of doing this is to present to North Korea's leadership the prospect of an unstoppable, predictable and highly destructive set of responses. Notes 1

See W hite H ouse, 'N a tio n al Secu rity

3

A m e rica', Decem ber 2017, p. 2,

crises in Taiw an and G erm any, w here

https://w w w .w hitehouse.gov/

in te n tio n ally targetin g U S forces ru ns the risk of undesired escalation.

w p-content/uploads/2017/12/NSSF in a l-12-18-2017-0905 .pdf. 2

Sim ila r dyn am ics have been assessed w ith respect to U S involvem ent in

Strategy of the U nited States of

4

See U S Institute of Peace, 'P ro v id in g

See G ian G entile et al., 'Fo u r

for the Com m on Defense: The

Problem s on the Ko rean Peninsula:

Assessm ent and Recom m endations

N o rth K o re a's E xp an d in g N u cle ar

of the N atio n al Defense Strategy

C a p a b ilitie s D riv e a C om plex Set of

C o m m issio n ', 2018, p. 34, https://

Problem s', R A N D Corpo ratio n, 2019,

w w w .usip.org/sites/default/

https://w w w .rand.org/pubs/tools/

files/2018-1 l/p ro vid in g-fo r-th e -

TL271.htm l.

com m on-defense.pdf.

Noteworthy After Soleimani - The Iran Crisis 'Iran paid no price for its repeated lethal attacks on coalition forces or its interference in Iraqi affairs. By 2011, Tehran had achieved its strategic goal of a relatively stable Iraq that no longer posed a military threat to Iran. By relying on a small footprint of forces and using thirdparty militias to confront British and US forces, Iran had minimised its own losses.

[...]

The Iraqi conflict also helped to transform the role and stature of the Quds Force. Soleimani's relationship with the Supreme Leader considerably deepened during this period. As a result, the Quds Force's domination of Iran's policy in Iraq stood in stark contrast to the limited role played by Iran's foreign ministry, especially as the Quds Force assigned its senior officers as Iran's ambassadors to Baghdad. A new generation of the Quds Force cadre acquired valuable experiences in working with Arab militias against Western forces in Iraq and saw that they could undertake indirect threats against them without incurring any direct response against Iran.

[...]

A significant challenge to Iran's success came with the rise of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL. The dramatic initial success of ISIS forces in Iraq in June 2014 compelled Soleimani to play a more significant role in the direction of Iraqi militias in combat to sustain Iraqi allies, and to prevent the collapse of Iraq and establishment of an ISIS state on Iran's western border. Iran transferred hundreds of advisers to the Iraqi government, shipped tonnes of weapons to the Kurds and recalled Shia militias from Syria to confront ISIS forces, which seemed at one point close to threatening Baghdad.' Excerpts from the Novem ber 2 0 1 9 IISS Strategic Dossier on Iran's networks o f influence in the Middle fast.1 'At the direction of the President, the U.S. military has taken decisive defensive action to protect U.S. personnel abroad by killing Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. [...] He had orchestrated attacks on coalition bases in Iraq over the last several months including the attack on December 27th - culminating in the death and wounding of additional American and Iraqi personnel. General Soleimani also approved the attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad that took place this week. This strike was aimed at deterring future Iranian attack plans.' The US D epartm ent o f Defense issues a statem ent on 2 Ja nuary 2020?

'A harsh retaliation is waiting for the criminals whose filthy hands spilled his blood and the blood of other martyrs in last night's incident.' Iranian Suprem e Leader Sa yyid A li Kham enei com m ents on the killing o f General Qasem Soleim ani, leader o f Iran's Quds Force, in a US airstrike in Baghdad on 3 January.3

Survival | vol. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 60-62

DOI 10.1080/00396338.2020.1715066

N o te w o rth y

I 61

'America's action without any doubt is an act of state terrorism.' Iranian Foreign Minister M oham m ad Ja va d Zarif.4

'Soleimani was an enemy of the United States. That's not a question. The question is this - as reports suggest, did America just assassinate, without any congressional authorization, the second most powerful person in Iran, knowingly setting off a potential massive regional war?' US Senator Chris M urphy tweets on 3 January.5

'Let this serve as a WARNING that if Iran strikes any Americans, or American assets, we have... ....targeted 52 Iranian sites (representing the 52 American hostages taken by Iran many years ago), some at a very high level & important to Iran & the Iranian culture, and those targets, and Iran itself, WILL BE HIT VERY FAST AND VERY HARD. The USA wants no more threats!' US President D onald Trump tweets on 4 January.6

'Like ISIS, like Hitler, Like Genghis! They all hate cultures. Trump is a "terrorist in a suit". He will learn history very soon that NOBODY can defeat "the Great Iranian Nation & Culture'" Iran's Inform ation and Telecom munications Minister M oham m ad Ja va d Azari-Jahrom i tweets on 5 January.7

'The Islamic Republic of Iran will end its final limitations in the nuclear deal, meaning the limitation in the number of centrifuges. Therefore Iran's nuclear program will have no limitations in production including enrichment capacity and percentage and number of enriched uranium and research and expansion.' The Iranian governm ent announces that it will no longer abide by the restrictions on enrichm ent in the nuclear deal' officially the Jo in t Com prehensive Plan o f Action (JCPOA), agreed to in 201 5.8

'There's been no decision made to leave Iraq, period.' US Secretary o f Defense Mark T. Esper speaks during a news conference on 6 January following a vote by the Iraqi parliam ent to expel US troops from Iraq.9

'Iraq cannot be allowed to sink into chaos, and certainly not under the control of extremists. Therefore, it is important not to let up now in the fight against Islamic State.' German Defence Minister Annegret Kram p-Karrenbauer.'0

'Frankly, the Europeans haven't been as helpful as I wish that they could be ... This was a good thing for the entire world.' US Secretary o f State Mike Pom peo.u

'God the almighty has promised to get his revenge, and God is the main avenger.' G eneral Esm ail G haani, Soleim ani's replacem ent as head o f the Q uds Force, speaks at the late general's funeral.'2

'Iran took & concluded proportionate measures in self-defense under Article 51 of UN Charter targeting base from which cowardly armed attack against our citizens & senior officials were launched. We do not seek escalation or war, but will defend ourselves against any aggression.' Zarif tweets after attacks on 8 January by Iranian forces on two Iraqi military bases that host American troops.'3

62

I N o te w o rth y

Sources 7 Mohammad Javad Azari-Jahromi (@azarijahromi), Tweet, 5 January 2020, https//

1 IISS, Iran's Networks of Influence in the Middle East (London: IISS, 2019), pp. 20-1.

2

US Departm ent of Defense, 'Statement by the Departm ent of Defense',

2

January

2020,

https://w w w .defense.gov/New sroom /Releases/Release/

twitter.com/azarijahromi/status/1213743924952666114.

8 'A Sea of Mourners in Iran, and New Threats from Both Sides', New York Times, 7 January

Article/2049534/statem ent-by-the-departm ent-of-defense/.

2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/world/middleeast/iran-soleimani.html.

3 Julian Borger et al„ 'Fears of New Conflict in Middle East as Tehran Vows to Avenge Killing', Guardian, 3 January 2020, https://www.theguardian.corn/world/2020/jan/03/

9 Ibid. 10 Alissa J. Rubin et al., 'Iran Ends Nuclear Limits as Killing of Iranian General Upends

¡ran-vows-revenge-for-us-trump-killing-of-top-general-qassem-suleimani.

Mideast', NewYorkTimes, 6 January 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/world/

4 Ibid.

middleeast/iran-general-soleimani-iraq.html.

5

Chris Murphy (@ChrisMurphyCT), Tweet, 3 January 2020, https://twitter.conn/

11 Conrad Duncan,'Iran Crisis: Pompeo Criticises UK and Other US Allies for “Not Being

ChrisMurphyCT/status/1212913952436445185?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp

Helpful" in Response to Soleimani Killing', Telegraph, 6 January 2020, httpsV/www. ¡ndependent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/pompeo-soleimani-trump-iran-

%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet.

6

Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Tweet, 4 January 2020, https^/twitter.

com/realDonaldTrump/status/1213593974679769093;

and

Donald

Trump

(@

crisis-war-uk-france-germany-a9270571.html. 12 'A Sea of Mourners in Iran, and New Threats from Both Sides'.

realDonaldTrump), Tweet, 4 January 2020, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/

13 Mohammad Javad Zarif (@JZarif), Tweet, 8 January 2020, https://twitter.com/JZanf/

status/1213593975732527112.

status/1214736614217469953?s=20.

The New Nuclear MADness Seyom Brown

Driven by new technologies and the recrudescence of their global tripolar rivalry, the United States, Russia and China have openly moved beyond their standard public reiterations that nuclear war is unwinnable and a threat to the survival of the human species. Each of them acknowledges that it is currently modernising its nuclear arsenal not only to uphold deterrence by making sure it can withstand a full-scale enemy attack and still retaliate, but also to enhance the country's capabilities for actually fighting limited and presumably controllable nuclear war. No matter that the United Nations General Assembly, by an overwhelm­ ing majority, has approved a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which upon receiving 50 ratifications will become international law. The nine nuclear-armed countries and most of their allies boycotted the UN meeting last July in which the vote on the treaty was taken. The US, British and French delegations issued a joint demarche declaring: 'We do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become a party to it.' The Russians and Chinese were somewhat less categorical in dismissing the treaty, but in absenting them­ selves from the vote they too signalled that by not becoming parties to it they are not legally subject to its provisions. While abolitionists are hailing the UN-approved treaty as a huge step toward ridding the world of nuclear weapons, strategic hawks in the

Seyo m Brown, author of Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Fruman to

Obama (Columbia University Press, third edition, 2015), is Professor Emeritus in the Departm ent of Politics, Brandeis University. Survival | vol. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 63-88

DOI 10.1080/00396338.2020.1715067

64 I Seyo m Brow n

nuclear-armed states are pressing their militaries to fully integrate nuclear weapons into their force postures and war plans. They contend, along with some prominent arms-control experts, that technological advances such as increasingly accurate delivery systems and low-yield nuclear warheads have falsified the key abolitionist claim that nuclear weapons are inherently instruments of mass extermination of civilians and therefore immoral as well as illegal. Nuclear modernisation: from Obama to Trump The expanded role of nuclear war -fighting capabilities was the principal theme of the Trump administration's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), even if not explicitly referred to as such. The NPR's promotion of a 'flexible' and 'tailored' nuclear arsenal featuring weapons with variable destruc­ tive yields has been invoked by the Pentagon and the arms-production industry in support of the ongoing comprehensive programme of nuclear modernisation, projected to cost some $1.7 trillion over the coming three decades. Weighing in on behalf of funds requested in summer 2018 for the programme, then-secretary of defense Jim Mattis avowed: 'Nuclear mod­ ernization is affordable and is the number one priority of the Department of Defense.' This stance is not entirely new. Several of the advanced weapons systems covered by the nuclear-modernisation programme were endorsed by the Obama administration. When Barack Obama was president, however, the public was told the modernisation was needed to shore up US capabilities for deterring the resort to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by US enemies. Donald Trump's NPR and corollary statements by Pentagon officials today advertise the improved nuclear arsenal as also essential for deterring and responding to other forms of aggression, includ­ ing directed-energy and cyber attacks. President Obama did refuse to endorse restrictions making deterrence the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal. And he let it be known that he would veto legislation which would prohibit the first use of nuclear weapons. The explanation for this stance was that the threat of a nuclear response might still be necessary to deter massive attacks using biological or

The New Nuclear MADness I 65

chemical weapons, or similarly destructive capabilities. Moreover, despite the urgings of arms-control groups, the military persuaded the president to keep US intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on alert, ready to launch pre-emptively in the event of an imminent enemy nuclear attack - the 'use them or lose them' justification. Yet the basic thrust of the Obama adminis­ tration's 2010 NPR was toward denuclearising US grand strategy as much as possible. The 2010 NPR recognised that a precondition for substantial denuclearisa­ tion was the beefing up of the country's conventional and other non-nuclear strategic capabilities. Accordingly, this was given special emphasis in Obama's follow-on guidance to the military, directing US forces 'to conduct deliberate planning for non-nuclear strike options to assess what objec­ tives and effects could be achieved ... and to propose possible means to make these objectives and effects achievable'. Although 'not a substitute for nuclear weapons, planning for non-nuclear strike options' was described as 'a central part of reducing the role of nuclear weapons'. All in all, the Obama administration's stance on the retention of a robust nuclear arsenal, while firm, was apologetic and surrounded with heavierthan-ever constraints on its use. The president's articulated promise to work toward a world free of nuclear weapons was sincere, though even he admitted the goal was unlikely to be achieved in his lifetime. Meanwhile, the objective was to make sure that non-nuclear weapons and strategies would increasingly bear the lion's share of the country's deterrent as well as defence needs. Trump's NPR pointed in a very different direction. Reminiscent of the Eisenhower administration's posture in the wake of the Korean War, it openly brandished a capacity to employ nuclear weapons in response even to local and limited aggression. Although the 2018 NPR says the US military would use nuclear weapons only in 'extreme circumstances', the document and corollary statements are elastic with respect to what situations might be considered 'extreme' and therefore justify a US nuclear response. The concept could easily be stretched to encompass a nuclear-armed enemy's non-nuclear aggression, such as a Russian blockade of the Baltic Sea, a North Korean conventional artillery attack on Seoul or a paralysing Chinese cyber

66 I Seyom Brown

attack against Taiwan - all standard scenarios in US contingency plans and war games. Kinetic or cyber attacks designed to disable US space satellites or other key components of US military command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) systems might also be regarded as extreme acts war­ ranting a nuclear response, even if they occurred in a conflict which had not yet escalated to nuclear levels. Is the flexible nuclear war-fighting capability called for in the 2018 NPR a cool-headed adaptation to emergent geostrategic realities? Or is it an irra­ tional response, encouraged by weapons entrepreneurs, to political and military threats that can and should be countered with less lethal strate­ gies and technologies? Just how radical is this apparent departure from the regime of mutual nuclear deterrence between the superpowers, which is widely believed to have prevented the US-Soviet Cold War from becoming a hot war? MAD: its essence and entrenchment The Kennedy administration, in repudiating its predecessor's nuclear-reliant national-security policy, emphasised, as did successive administrations, that the essential function of the US nuclear arsenal was to deter nuclear aggression against the United States or its allies (except for its possible role in countering a Soviet conventional attack in Europe). This was conveyed recurrently in doctrinal statements and descriptions of the US strategic nuclear 'triad' - the three-legged posture of land-based, sea-based and bomber-carried nuclear weapons - warning the Kremlin that at least one of the legs of the US nuclear triad would survive any Soviet nuclear attack, no matter how massive, with sufficient capability to inflict a devastating counter-attack that would dwarf any gains the Kremlin hoped to achieve. Secretary of defense Robert McNamara went so far as to publicly quantify the horrendous magnitude of the threatened retaliation: Our alert forces alone carry more than 2,200 weapons, each averaging more than the explosive equivalent of one megaton of TNT. Four hundred of these delivered on the Soviet Union would be sufficient to destroy over one-third of her population and one-half of her industry.

The New Nuclear MADness I 67

At least 70 million Russians would be incinerated at the outset of the war - not to speak of the additional massive fatalities from radiation and other long-term effects. Pentagon strategists called this US nuclear capability assured destruction (AD). And when the Soviets touted a comparable arsenal, mutual assured destruction (MAD) became the all-too-appropriate moniker for the pre­ sumed deterrence relationship. MAD also established the primary terms of reference for the US-Russian strategic arms-control negotiations for five decades, producing the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) accord and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, plus some half-dozen follow-on agreements, in which each side would forgo counterforce weapons and strat­ egies designed to substantially degrade the opponent's AD capability. All of this was premised on the putative necessity of each side holding the other's population hostage so as to guarantee that neither would start a nuclear war. Citizen groups, such as the Arms Control Association and the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, fell into line, albeit reluctantly, seeing MAD as a means of capping the nuclear arms race and deterring the disas­ trous escalation of crises. For validation, they invoked Winston Churchill's famous remark: 'It may well be that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have reached a stage in the story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation.' Every so often, Moscow and Washington would each insist that none of its strategic deployments offensive or defensive - would destabilise the basic nuclear balance of terror. The only significant official and publicly voiced effort to break out of the MAD paradigm was Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) - his vision of a comprehensive, nationwide capability for destroying incoming missiles. Arguing that 'to rely on the specter of [massive] retaliation' to deter nuclear attack was 'a sad commentary on the human condition', he asked: Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them? ... What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?

68 I Seyom Brown

Accordingly, he called upon the scientific community, 'those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete'. Reagan's animus against nuclear weapons was evident in his 1986 summit with Mikhail Gorbachev, in which the leaders debated total-nucleardisarmament schemes and nearly agreed on the parameters of one before the meeting broke up over the SDI issue. Reagan saw non-nuclear ABMs as discouraging nuclear attack during progress toward nuclear disarmament; once that goal was achieved, each side's anti-missile systems could also be disbanded or, by mutual agreement, kept as a hedge against cheating. Gorbachev was suspicious. He saw Reagan's SDI as a possible US ruse to gain a nuclear-first-strike capability which could degrade the Soviet AD arsenal. But the anti-nuclear convictions of both leaders, plus their desire to end the Cold War, allowed them to temporarily put aside the ABM issue and to negotiate the first major nuclear-arms reduction agreement between the superpowers: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed by Reagan and Gorbachev in Washington in December 1987. The INF Treaty - now null and void, with the US and Russia each accusing the other of abrogating it - required both sides to dismantle all of their landbased medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles deployed in (or targeted on) Europe, while leaving their intercontinental MAD arsenals intact. With the end of the Cold War, the SDI programme was scaled back. The world was told that the US ABMs which continued to be developed and deployed were designed only to shoot down the missiles of smaller 'rogue' powers. US officials insisted that the defensive missiles were physically incapable of being employed to degrade either Russia's or China's nuclear arsenals. Moscow and Beijing, however, remained sceptical of Washington's claims that these ABMs could not be readily converted into anti-Russian and anti-Chinese systems. In recent years, as in the negotiation of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), Russia and the United States have agreed to pare down the number of their deployed offensive strategic nuclear warheads to roughly 1,500 on each side. Yet even a fraction of the deliverable

The New Nuclear MADness I 69

megatonnage remaining in their arsenals could obliterate both of them as functioning societies and jeopardise the healthy survival of the human species. The justification for these arsenals remains the presumed equation that MAD capabilities equals mutual deterrence (though the State Department has urged officials to stop using the embarrassing acronym MAD and to refer instead to 'mutual assured stability'). Serious strategists have known all along, however, that while MAD might be very important for discour­ aging the escalation of conflict to holocaust levels, it is falsely equated with mutual deterrence, in that it bypasses crucial 'what if' questions. For instance, what if, in an escalating military conflict with the United States, the Russians, the Chinese or possibly the North Koreans launched a 'limited' nuclear strike ostensibly for the purpose of coercing a cease­ fire and negotiations? How should the United States respond? What if the enemy's initial strike, or intra-war nuclear escalation, was all-out, and directed at both military and civilian targets - would that justify a similar US nuclear strike? Or if it became evident that a nuclear and cyber attack designed to paralyse the US retaliatory capability was imminent, should the US commander-in-chief pre-emptively order such a counterforce attack against the enemy? Toward MAD-plus Confronting these awful issues, all US presidents since the Second World War wanted alternatives to a nuclear holocaust, and continued to work with the military to enlarge the menu of options in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) from which limited and presumably controllable nuclear responses to nuclear attack could be selected, thus preserving some possibility of a nuclear ceasefire prior to Armageddon. Occasionally, the existence of such 'what if' planning - 'what if deterrence fails?' - was even publicly revealed. Thus, early in his presidency, John Kennedy encouraged McNamara to float, and publicly discuss, the concept of a controlled nuclear response to nuclear aggression, according to which US retaliation would avoid targets in or close to population centres. But the 'no cities' rule of nuclear engage­ ment was ridiculed by the Soviets and rejected by most NATO strategists as

70 I Seyom Brown

unenforceable. Although McNamara's subsequent public statements about the nuclear arsenal dwelt exclusively on its massive destructive capacity, secretly he continued to seek other options. President Richard Nixon, who was hardly squeamish when it came to employing military force, likewise found the prospect of having to actually implement the AD threat 'disturbing'. In his 1970 report to Congress on US foreign policy, drafted by national security advisor Henry Kissinger, Nixon asked: Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?

Kissinger himself, in secret National Security Council deliberations, admitted: 'To have the only option that of killing 80 million people is the height of immorality.' He drafted the president's January 1974 National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242 which instructed the military to widen the range of nuclear-strike alternatives in the SIOP so as to 'permit control over the timing and pace of attack execution, in order to provide the enemy opportunities to reconsider his actions'. In the event that the con­ trolled and graduated nuclear escalation did not compel the enemy to come to terms, however, NSDM 242 provided that the withheld US forces would then be employed against the 'political, economic, and military resources critical to the enemy's postwar power, influence, and ability to recover' from the war - in other words, assured destruction of the enemy was still the ultimate option. Secretary of defense James Schlesinger, a leader of the let's-revise-MAD faction within the government, got the military to translate NSDM 242's MAD-plus concept into a comprehensive array of strategies for effectively fighting nuclear wars, not just deterring them - thus presumably also strengthening deterrence by making the US threats of retaliation to nuclear aggression more credible. These alternative strategies were the subject of

The New Nuclear MADness I 71

Schlesinger's top-secret April 1974 'Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons' (endorsed by Nixon and then by Gerald Ford) stipulat­ ing a wide range of attack options for conducting nuclear war at various levels of intensity and 'within clearly defined boundaries ... to signal to the enemy our desire to keep the war limited'. Yet no options were to be completely foresworn, including the targeting of urban centres - indeed, a capability for 'holding high value targets hostage' was still embraced as crucial for keeping the war under control. The commanders were enjoined to prepare for limited nuclear strikes that would not force premature or unwanted escalation. Accordingly, 'options should be developed to with­ hold attacks on ... the enemy's highest command structure including soft and hard command centers serving high civil or military authority'. The secretary of defense affirmed that 'it is not the intent of this policy guid­ ance to target civilian population per se', and that planning 'will not include residential structures as objective targets' (emphasis added). The qualifica­ tion was needed, Schlesinger went on to admit, because even in a limited nuclear war, 'substantial damage to residential structures and population may nevertheless result' from the necessary counter-military operations. Also, although deliberate counter-population attacks were to be withheld, the document explicitly stated they were 'not ruled out'. The public received some notice of these alterations to US strategic nuclear doctrine and war plans in a series of relatively candid news con­ ferences and presentations to congressional committees by Schlesinger, in which he revealed the administration's intention to acquire 'precision instruments that would be used in a limited counterforce role'. This would give the president a 'broader range of options', such as 'a more efficient hard-target kill capability than we now possess'. Schlesinger summed up the strategic logic by saying: 'We do not propose to let any enemy put us in a position where we are left with no more than a capability to hold his cities hostage after the first phase of a nuclear conflict.' The administration was not dispensing with the threat to destroy enemy cities; this threat was still to be brandished, and implemented as a last resort if the more restricted nuclear attacks failed to coerce the enemy to call off the war prior to its esca­ lation to holocaust levels.

72 I Seyom Brown

The SIOP inherited by Jimmy Carter, reflecting NSDM 242 and Schlesinger's menu of strategies for the use of nuclear weapons, must have been hard for the most pacifistic of US presidents to accept, especially as he had endorsed the MAD-only concept of nuclear deterrence and arms control in his election campaign. But late in Carter's term, in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and intelligence that Moscow was engaged in a major build-up of strategic nuclear capabilities, secretary of defense Harold Brown and national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski con­ vinced the president that the United States needed even more flexibility in the SIOP. The result was Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), which ensured that pre-planned options for nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union and its allies would contain 'flexible sub-options that will permit ... sequen­ tial selection of attacks on a full range of military targets, industrial targets providing immediate military support, and political control targets, while retaining a survivable and enduring capability that is sufficient to attack a broader set of urban and industrial targets'. Like Schlesinger's policy guid­ ance, PD-59 urged that 'Methods of attack on particular targets should be chosen to limit collateral damage to urban areas, general industry and pop­ ulation targets ... and should include the option of withholds to limit such collateral damage.' But it also echoed the Schlesinger document by insisting that this moral constraint be 'consistent with effectively covering the objec­ tive target'. Although PD-59 was given the highest secrecy classifications, Carter publicly confirmed press reports that the United States had devel­ oped what he called a 'Countervailing Strategy' featuring, initially, in the event of a failure of deterrence, selective nuclear retaliatory strikes, so as to 'preserve the possibility of bargaining effectively to terminate the [nuclear] war on acceptable terms'. As far as can be ascertained on the basis of subsequently declassified documents (much remains classified), the basic 'if-deterrence-fails' phi­ losophy and guidance for the use of nuclear weapons outlined in PD-59 continues to govern the contents of what used to be the SIOP (now called OPLAN 8010-12), which is stored in the president's 'football' briefcase con­ taining his nuclear-use options. The Pentagon's declassified 2013 'Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy' affirms that all plans must be

The New Nuclear MADness I 73

consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict. Accordingly, plans will, for example, apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and objects. The United States will not intentionally target civilian populations or civilian objects.

In military jargon, the US 'does not rely on a "counter-value" or "minimum deterrence" strategy'. Rather, the presidentially mandated strategy 'requires the United States to maintain significant counterforce capabilities against potential adversaries'. (Any amendments by the Trump administration to this guidance, if they exist, have not been declassified.) Yet the ultimate sanction - presumably still operational, and rationalised as necessary to deter any escalation beyond limited nuclear war - remains the threat to totally destroy the enemy's ability to function as a society. The demise of the Cold War ushered in a period in which there was scant official comment on US strategies for using nuclear weapons. Even president George W. Bush's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty - his ratio­ nale being the need to develop missile defences against so-called rogue states that were developing their own nuclear arsenals - generated little public debate. The post-9/11 preoccupation with terrorism and presum­ ably irrational enemies did, however, occasion the Bush administration's September 2002 publication of its National Security Strategy justifying pre-emptive, or even preventive, use of nuclear weapons against those plotting nuclear aggression who might not be deterred by threats of retaliation. But apart from some critiques by policy intellectuals of the administration's confusion of pre-emptive with preventive strikes, Bush's remarkably open embrace of nuclear-first-use war plans failed to provoke substantial debate. The policy community's discourse on nuclear matters, mostly led by think tanks, now focused on the proliferation problem, especially the acquisition of WMD by rogue states and terrorists. Another question of interest was whether the United States was fulfilling its obliga­ tions under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty) to pursue negotiations leading to its own nuclear disarmament.

74 I Seyom Brown

Most of the think-tank studies, however, were premised on the retention by the nuclear-armed countries of their arsenals and therefore on the assump­ tion that the way to prevent further proliferation was for the United States to provide reliable security guarantees to non-nuclear adherents to the NonProliferation Treaty. More than during the Cold War, it was argued, such extended-deterrence ('nuclear umbrella') commitments had to be strength­ ened and offered to additional countries because of the otherwise weakened credibility of collective-security bonds in the increasingly anarchic post-Cold War international system. All the more reason, said the champions of nuclear modernisation, to give the president useable (low-yield and precise) nuclear weapons and target options, and to publicise them. Counterpoint: the new abolitionism Worried that the US extended-deterrence pledges would not be able to overcome the desire of more countries, as well as terrorist movements, to acquire their own nuclear weapons, and fearful that if nuclear war did break out its escalation to horrific levels would be very difficult to prevent, Kissinger and three other elder statesmen (former secretary of state George Shultz, former secretary of defense William Perry and former Senate Armed Services Committee chair Sam Nunn) startled governments and the atten­ tive public alike by publishing on 4 January 2007 an article in the Wall Street Journal embracing what each of these 'realists' had previously considered unrealistic: 'the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical mea­ sures toward achieving that goal'. In subsequent articles, however, the 'Gang of Four' (as they came to be called by the press) revealed that they believed the goal of a nuclear-disarmed world was very far off. And the practical steps they were recommending for eventually getting there turned out to be largely the same measures the arms-control community had for years been advancing for avoiding acci­ dental nuclear war (such as de-alerting the ICBMs). The Gang of Four made clear they were not expecting anything like a wholesale dismantling of the US, Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals in the near future. Still, ban-the-bomb militants, who since the end of the Cold War had been finding it difficult to mobilise a broad-based movement, were energised.

The New Nuclear MADness I 75

Their cause, now suddenly deemed warranted by mainline and authorita­ tive strategists, had become freshly popular. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) was launched in Melbourne, Australia, in 2007 and rapidly connected with and spawned partner organisations around the world. Also inspired by the drama of arch-realist Kissinger and colleagues endorsing universal and complete nuclear disarmament as a goal for the United States, some 100 prominent political, military, civic and intellectual leaders convened in Paris in December 2008 to formulate and announce their commitment to work toward 'Global Zero' - a framework plan for even­ tually eliminating nuclear weapons, starting with significant, but phased, reductions in the US and Russian arsenals. The two new abolitionist movements - ICAN and Global Zero - differed somewhat over how to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. ICAN con­ centrated on building support for a treaty that would make it illegal for any country to use, or even to possess, nuclear weapons. Global Zero, whose leadership included many former diplomats, retired generals and admirals, and former high-level policymakers of the nuclear-armed countries, was reluctant to support a treaty that would make the United States, the United Kingdom and France, for example, international outlaws. While supporters of Global Zero pressed their countries to pare down, or at least not augment, their nuclear arsenals, and to adhere to no-first-use and other policies for denuclearising their grand strategies, ICAN redoubled its campaign for an absolute ban-the-bomb treaty, getting most governments (though not the nuclear-armed countries) to sign on to the so-called Humanitarian Initiative to unequivocally 'prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated risks'. President Obama's embrace of the goal of 'a world without nuclear weapons', which he famously voiced in Prague in April 2009, and his pledge to 'reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy' were more in line with the Global Zero and Gang of Four approaches than with the here-and-now abolitionism of ICAN. The president's soaring rhetoric in Prague in favour of eventual total nuclear disarmament got the headlines, but his speech contained a caveat that was ignored in most news reports:

y6 I Seyom Brown

'As long as [nuclear] weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee the defense of our allies.' The 2010 NPR would later affirm that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces, including deployed and stockpiled nuclear weapons, highly capable nuclear delivery systems and command and control capabilities, and the physical infrastructure and the expert personnel needed to sustain them. These nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries, reassuring allies and partners around the world, and promoting stability globally and in key regions.

The energised abolitionists nonetheless were able to mobilise wide support for a ban-the-bomb treaty ... of sorts. If and when the treaty obtains sufficient ratifications to make it international law, the United States and its allies, not being parties to the treaty, will not be legally bound to adhere to its provisions. The treaty could have been written more strongly by making it illegal for any state to possess or use nuclear weapons, but in the prepa­ ratory treaty-drafting conferences it became clear to the abolitionists that while the majority of national governments were willing to bind themselves to abstinence, they were not ready to enforce a supranational prohibition on the already nuclear-armed countries. For the time being, then, in order to generate moral and political pressure on the hold-out governments, the abolitionists are relying on the universalistic statements in the treaty's preamble - which are unequivocal. According to the treaty: the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons ... pose grave implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations ... Any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules

The New Nuclear MADness I 77

of international humanitarian law ... Any use of nuclear weapons would also be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.

This fresh articulation of unequivocal opposition to the bomb has not as yet brought the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons any closer. If any­ thing, it has activated the nuclear-armed governments to exaggerate what nuclear weapons have accomplished and presumably must still be relied on to accomplish. For example, the US, UK and French governments issued a joint statement opposing the treaty in which they claimed that it is incompatible with the policy of nuclear deterrence, which has been essential to keeping the peace in Europe and North Asia for over 70 years. A purported ban on nuclear weapons that does not address the security concerns that continue to make nuclear deterrence necessary cannot result in the elimination of a single nuclear weapon and will not enhance any country's security, nor international peace and security. It will do the exact opposite by creating even more divisions at a time when the world needs to remain united in the face of growing threats ... This treaty offers no solution to the grave threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program, nor does it address other security challenges that make nuclear deterrence necessary.

The Kremlin's case against the treaty, articulated by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, contended that it 'provokes deep disagreements among members of the international community and can have a destabilizing effect on the proliferation regime. I want to emphasize that we share the goal of building a nuclear-weapon-free world but it should not be achieved with such one­ sided methods, on which the [treaty] is based/ The prospect for a realisation of a world without nuclear weapons which seemed to have brightened with its endorsement by the Gang of Four, Obama and other world leaders - seems as dim as ever, perhaps even more dim, given the renewed obsession of the military superpowers not to fall behind one another in their capacity to engage in high-tech military conflict, including controllable nuclear warfare.

78 I Seyom Brown

The new nuclear MADness Strategies and capabilities for using nuclear weapons in actual combat are being freshly integrated into the grand strategies of the United States, Russia, China and the other nuclear-armed states. I call this development the 'New Nuclear MADness' to emphasise the illusion, or delusion, of esca­ lation control once belligerents start vying for position on the inherently slippery rungs of the escalation ladder while continuing to depend on the threat of unconstrained, society-wide destruction to compel adherence to the controlled-warfare norms. This illusion of control is being fostered by a new generation of strategic experts, civilian and military, whose rediscovery of the case for 'limited' strategic nuclear war is providing the conceptual base for the forcemodernisers' pet projects. In turn, the new technologies now being grafted into nuclear-force postures and war plans are being seized upon by the new strategists in their elaboration of a wide variety of arguably realistic (no longer only theoretical) scenarios in which the belligerents rationally engage in controllable duels on the nuclear-escalation ladder. Favoured new weapons, most of which are to be employed in conjunction with offensive cyber capabilities, include nuclear-armed long-range stand-off (LRSO) cruise missiles, hypersonic delivery systems, streamlined stealth bombers and nuclear-weaponised drones. The limited-nuclear-war mavens are especially intrigued by 'dial-a-yield' options, which allow for a reduction in the explosive power of nuclear warheads prior to launch to a level substantially below those of the Hiroshima bomb. (The yields can also be dialled up if maximum destruction is sought.) The central idea is that the escalation ladder has many rungs between conventional war and nuclear Armageddon on which battles can be fought in accord with the international rules of war and 'just war' principles. Yet to ensure that the fighting does not escalate to the irrational and immoral rungs, the belligerents will continue to threateningly brandish, and temporarily withhold, their horrific AD capabilities. The new US nuclear-war planning resembles the military guidance that Kissinger and Schlesinger convinced Nixon to approve, and which was incorporated into Carter's countervailing strategy and the SIOPs of subse­ quent administrations. But the envisioned scenarios were until now regarded

The New Nuclear MADness I 79

as very low-probability occurrences, and any decision to step across the nuclear threshold would have required the most profound of deliberations. By contrast, the current 'flexible' and 'tailored' approach bragged about in the 2018 NPR verges on normalising the introduction of nuclear weapons into a variety of military situations. Some war games involve the devolution of nuclear-use decisions to field commanders, while future-war planning contemplates programming artificial-intelligence systems with capabilities for making the crucial escalatory choices of when and how to go nuclear. The November-December 2018 issue of Foreign Affairs contained a sym­ posium on the question 'Do Nuclear Weapons Matter?' that signalled a new era in thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. The most revealing contribution was by Elbridge Colby, an increasingly influential young strat­ egist whose ideas helped shape the Trump administration's 2017 National Security Strategy and its 2018 NPR. Titled 'If You Want Peace Prepare for Nuclear War: A Strategy for the New Great Power Rivalry', Colby's article lays bare the emergent thinking in the Pentagon more clearly and openly than did the NPR. It calls for a readiness 'to fight a limited nuclear war and come out on top', warning that the Russians and the Chinese are each trying to achieve such a capability vis-à-vis the United States. Colby posits that 'any future confrontation with Russia or China could go nuclear'. He forecasts struggles in which 'each combatant may be tempted to reach for the nuclear saber to up the ante and test the other side's resolve, or even just to keep fighting'. For example, he suggests that, 'should Moscow seize the Baltics or Beijing invade Taiwan, both U.S. foes are likely to threaten to use or actually use nuclear weapons to close the door on U.S. counterattacks or to drastically curtail their effectiveness ... The idea behind Moscow's nuclear strategy', he insists, 'is to use tailored nuclear weapons to settle a war on Russia's terms, gambling that going nuclear will intimi­ date the United States into backing down - a strategy known as "escalate to de-escalate".' China too, he avers, is developing accurate and lower-yield nuclear weapons with which it could test how far the United States is willing to go in defence of Taiwan and other US allies and partners. Although admitting that crossing the nuclear threshold could be perilous, Colby cautions against 'fixating too much on the uncontrollability of nuclear

8o I

Seyom Brown

war7 so as not to encourage US enemies to conclude that Washington is so fearful of a conflict escalating to Armageddon that it would never resort to using nuclear weapons except as necessary for the survival of the United States itself. 'The bottom line is that if the United States wants to sustain its alliance architecture in Europe and Asia, it must adapt its strategy to face an opponent prepared to escalate with nuclear weapons/ The adaptations would convey through military exercises, official statements and, especially, modernisations of the nuclear arsenal - that the United States, no less than Russia and China, 'is prepared to conduct limited, effective, nuclear operations'. Even among US strategists who have been prominent supporters of nuclear arms control there is increasing openness to force-modernisation initiatives and strategies for expanding the menu of nuclear options, par­ ticularly those intended to minimise collateral damage to civilians. Thus, Stanford University Professor Scott Sagan, in his contribution to the Foreign Affairs symposium, contends that Tower-yield nuclear warheads and advanced conventional weapons ... would make U.S. deterrence both more ethical and more effective' - more ethical in ensuring that US nuclear-war plans conformed to the just-war principles of proportionality and protecting non-combatants; and more effective because these constraints 'would make the possibility of U.S. retaliation inherently more credible'. The enhanced credibility of the US threat to respond with nuclear weapons to any nuclear aggression does not, argues Sagan, lower the threshold to enemy escalation, as critics of nuclear modernisation maintain; it raises that threshold. Such optimistic assessments ignore the uncomfortable prospect that the capabilities and strategies for fighting 'controllable' and 'limited' nuclear wars will increase the likelihood that the United States itself, rather than one of its nuclear-armed enemies, will take the first step across the fateful threshold. Indeed, securing the wherewithal, in weaponry and doctrine, for doing so and prevailing is one of the main themes of the Trump administration's NPR, which does more than threaten to do so only in extreme circumstances. The new NPR calls for a fuller implementation of the programmes under way to integrate nuclear weapons into the country's grand strategy. The openly expressed goal is to make the nuclear arsenal 'increasingly flexible [in order] to tailor deterrence strategies across a range

The New Nuclear MADness I 81

of potential adversaries and threats'. The nuclear posture is to be flexible with respect to targets, explosive yield of warheads, rules of engagement and so forth 'to ensure that nuclear or non-nuclear aggression against the United States, allies, and partners will fail to achieve its objectives'. Significantly, the non-nuclear aggression referred to, as well as possible nuclear responses to it, is not restricted to what has been typically called 'con­ ventional' warfare. The NPR's concepts are also designed to relate nuclear military operations to unconventional forms of warfare in the expanding spectrum of capabilities that new technologies are generating. The way the document promotes integration with cyber, artificial intelligence and other advanced capabilities as they mature is one of its most troubling features. It advances a military culture in which the step across the threshold and onto the nuclear-escalation ladder may occur pre­ cipitously - or inadvertently - without adequate prior (and profound) deliberation as to the conse­ quences, case by case. Like the dial-a-yield warhead, several of the

Several

'modernisations' could disastrously expand a conflict

'modernisations' could result in the inadvertent and disastrous expansion of a conflict rather than serving as a means for its control. Particularly concerning is the pervasive deployment of 'dual-capacity' systems - the military's term for systems that can carry either or both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. Yes, this provides enhanced flexibility for combat operations, but it also risks confusing the enemy as to what kind of attack it is about to suffer, and what the prime targets are. Moreover, inadvertent escalation to major nuclear war can be provoked by the initial employment of advanced non-nuclear weapons like cyber, which the enemy believes have the mission of disabling or at least degrading its AD force. Another technological driver of possible inadvertent nuclear war is the increasing reliance by major military powers on hypersonic missile-delivery systems capable of travelling more than five times the speed of sound (Vladimir Putin claims Russia's newest systems will be capable of 20 times the speed of sound), leaving insufficient time for intelligence agencies and top officials in the target country to confidently identify and confirm the nature of an incoming attack, let alone to decide how to respond.

82 I Seyom Brown

A recent RAND Corporation study warns that these problems will 'encourage the threatened nations to take such actions as devolution of command and control of strategic forces, wider dispersion of such forces, a launch-on-warning posture, or a policy of preemption during a crisis'. The tempting technological fix is to devolve onto computers the ability to instan­ taneously digest the information about an incoming or imminent attack and to select the appropriate response, a prospect that is no longer the province of science fiction. Meanwhile, the ongoing integration of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons and strategies is a classic example of the mantra 'be careful what you wish for'. Instead of providing commanders more handles for preventing unwanted escalation, the integration itself is increasing the likelihood of the kinds of misperception that can trigger inadvertent and uncontrollable nuclear war. This negative dynamic is a core finding of an unclassified but highly detailed study of the military command-andcontrol systems of the United States, Russia and China conducted by James Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Published in the Summer 2018 issue of International Security and titled 'Escalation Through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War', Acton's study appropriately uses the problematic-sounding term 'entanglement' rather than the Pentagon's preferred term 'integration' to describe the interactions between the nuclear and non-nuclear domains. His most worrisome finding is that the US nuclear C3I system is becoming increasingly reliant on dual-use assets, raising the likelihood of the system being attacked in an escalating conflict, which could precipitate a pre-emptive nuclear strike should national command authorities interpret the anti-C3l attack as designed to paralyse the country's military capabilities across the board. Given that key C3I components and enablers are predominantly located in Earth-orbiting space satellites, it's no wonder that Russia and China, as well as the United States, have been testing and urgently investing in anti-satellite (ASAT) kinetic and cyber capabilities, while hypocritically preaching against the militarisation of outer space.

The New Nuclear MADness I 83

The quest for sane alternatives Those who advocate preparations to fight at any level - in the furthest depths of the ocean or high above Earth, with nuclear weapons if neces­ sary - appear to be winning the debates on national-security policy in Moscow, Beijing and Washington, largely by default. Few strategists apart from Acton have offered a challenge to the entanglement of nuclear and non-nuclear forces. This may be because there seem to be few viable alter­ natives to the technologically driven (con)fusion. Acton himself comes up with no systemic remedies, merely suggesting more resilient (survivable, dispersed and redundant) C3I to reduce fears that one's retaliatory capabil­ ity will be paralysed by a combination of counterforce and cyber strikes; public declarations affirming the absolutely vital interest in survivable C3I, and therefore the high risks an enemy would run in attempting to disable it; and perhaps a cessation of ASAT testing. Unfortunately, there are no technological fixes in the offing for substan­ tially reducing today's use-them-or-lose-them paranoia and preparations for pre-emptive nuclear attack. International legal initiatives, such as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, may be feel-good placebos for the signatories, but are bereft of means to cure the nuclear-armed states of their addiction to military potions that are destabilising crucial deterrent balances (thus validating the aphorism 'paranoids have real enemies'). The likely prospect, therefore, is that the global debate over the role of nuclear weapons will continue to pit abolitionists seeking enforcement corollaries to the prohibition treaty against nuclear-modernisation and -normalisation strategists charged with defining the parameters of their countries' nuclear arsenals. That being the line-up, the latter will have broad scope to adopt nuclear-war-fighting policies as they see fit. However, alarms such as Acton's have begun to generate some support in think tanks and in Congress, as well as among members of the public, for new and realistic arms-control alternatives to both the unenforceable prohibition treaty and the military posture that is recklessly blurring the distinctions between non-nuclear and nuclear war. One such alternative might be the comprehensive and strategically sophisticated proposal offered by Bruce Blair and his colleagues at Global Zero in The End of Nuclear Warfighting:

84 I Seyom Brown

Moving to a Deterrence-only Posture. (Blair, a co-founder of Global Zero, is a former ICBM launch-control officer who has made nuclear arms control his vocation.) Their analysis confirms Acton's findings about the danger­ ous features of the US nuclear posture. In response, they propose that 'the United States should adopt a deterrence-only policy based on no first use of nuclear weapons, no counterforce against opposing nuclear forces ... and no hair-trigger response. This policy requires only a small highly survivable second-strike force and resilient nuclear command, control, and communi­ cations (C3)/ Blair and his colleagues know that their proposal for a not-quite-zero nuclear-force posture has no chance of becoming US policy during the Trump era, even if it garners considerable support in Congress. Their hope is that it will become a plank of the Democratic Party's platform for the 2020 election and be championed by the party's candidate for president. But it has problems which are sure to be raised even by Democratic strategic experts, as well as by non-partisan think tanks, insofar as its deterrence-only posture can be seen as a return to the rigid and morally problematic aspects of MAD. There are sure to be objections, for example, to the stipulations in the Global Zero document that Five new strategic submarines (SSBNs) backed by a small reserve fleet of 40 strategic bombers would fully support the policy, which requires robust capabilities to destroy a nuclear aggressor's key elements of state control and sources of its power and wealth. All other existing nuclear forces, including silo-based missiles (ICBMs) should be phased out and all other planned U.S. nuclear force programs should be cancelled.

Targeting 'key elements of [an enemy's] state control and sources of its power and wealth' would unavoidably result in collateral damage to civil­ ians, especially from the nuclear detonations and firestorms, even if they were not the primary targets of the retaliatory threats and attacks. The deterrence-only proposal does contemplate an increasing role for more dis­ criminatory weapons ('conventional', cyber) as the technologies mature,

The New Nuclear MADness I 85

and, to avoid escalation to all-out nuclear war, it rules out counterforce attacks against the enemy's strategic forces. But then why use, or threaten to use, any nuclear weapons at all for inflicting the punishing retaliation? The proposal verges on urging complete non-use (not just no first use), arguing that 'no valid requirement exists to acquire new "low-yield" nuclear weapons' and that those already in the US stockpile 'can be mostly elimi­ nated and their assignments given to modern conventional weapons whose accuracy makes them as lethal as tactical nuclear weapons'. Yet there is a fudge in saying that low-yield nuclear weapons can be 'mostly eliminated', raising the question: why retain even one or two? These problems are sure to be exposed in forthcoming congressional hearings. Still, the proposal's appearance is salutary insofar as it will help generate an informed awareness of the need for alternatives to the plans being developed in the Pentagon for conducting (and 'winning') major mili­ tary conflicts with Russia or China - plans in thrall to the notion of limited and controllable nuclear war. To disenthrall military planners from that siren song, there must be serious discussion between US strategic experts and their Russian and Chinese counterparts about the insanity of any such war, and the urgency of high-tech therapy in the form of mutual exercises of military de-confliction and de-escalation. The deeper therapy for curing the nuclear MADness will have to go beyond such military and crisis measures, however. Exactly what it will entail, and whether and when the still-nuclear-armed countries will be ready for it, remains to be seen. Meanwhile, for the planet to avoid the ulti­ mate catastrophe of large-scale nuclear warfare, each statesperson with the power to press the proverbial nuclear button will need to exhibit a degree of prudence and wisdom the world has rarely seen. Notes United Nations, 'Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', July 2017, available from the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, http://www.un.org/disarmament/

2

wmd/nuclear/tpnw. 'Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom and France

86 I Seyom Brown

Following the Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons', 7 July 2017, https://usun.usmission.gov/jointpress-statement-from-the-permanentrepresentatives-to-the-united-nationsof-the-united-states-united-kingdomand-france-following-the-adoption/?_ ga=2.26o6384.148698243.1576503253744348311.1576503253. 3 US Department of Defense, 'Nuclear Posture Review 2018', https://media. defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTUREREVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF. 4 Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, letter to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, 3 June 2018, available at https://www.documentcloud.org/ documents/4505370-Read-Mattis-letterdefending-the-new-low-yield.html. 5 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, 'Obama Unlikely To Favor No First Use of Nuclear Weapons', New York Times, 6 September 2016. 6 US Department of Defense, 'Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010', April 2010, https://dod.defense.gov/ Portals/i/features/defenseRe vie ws/ NPR/2oio_Nuclear_Posture_Review_ Report.pdf. See also Seyom Brown, 'Beyond MAD: Obama's Realistic but Risky - Effort to Reduce the Role of Nuclear Weapons', Survival, vol. 55, no. 6, December 2013-January 2014, 7

8

pp- 1 3 5 - 4 6 .

US Department of Defense, 'Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C.', 2013, p. 4, available at https://www.globalsecurity.org/ wmd/library/policy/dod/us-nuclearemployment-strategy.pdf. US Department of Defense, 'Nuclear

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Posture Review 2018', p. II. "'Mutual Deterrence" Speech by Sec. of Defense Robert McNamara', San Francisco, CA, 18 September 1967, available at http://www. atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/ Deterrence.shtml. Winston Churchill, speech in the House of Commons, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th series (1 March 1955), vol. 537, cols 1,894-95. Ronald Reagan, 'Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security', 23 March 1983, available at https://www. reaganfoundation.org/media/128846/ nati0n4.pdf. US Department of State, 'Mutual Assured Stability: Essential Components and Near Term Actions', 14 August 2012, https://20092017.state.gov/documents/ organization/ 196789.pdf. Richard Nixon, 'U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace', 1970, p. 122. Henry A. Kissinger, quoted in 'Minutes of the Verification Panel Held August 9,1973', p. 8, available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/ NSAEBBi73/SIOP-22.pdf. Richard Nixon, 'National Security Decision Memorandum 242', p. 2, https// www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/ documents/nsdm_242.pdf. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 'Policy Guidance for the Employment of N uclear W eapons', 3 A p ril 1974,

pp. 2, 5, available at https://nsarchive 2. g w u.edu/N SAEBB/N SAEBB173/ SIOP-25.pdf. 17 US Department of Defense, 'Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975 '/ 1974 -

The New Nuclear MADness I 87

18 White House, 'Presidential Directive/ NSC-59', 25 July 1980, pp. 2, 3-4, avail­ able at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/ nukevault/ebb39o/docs/7-25-8o%2o PD%2059-pdf. 19 M. Cutler, 'Carter Directive Modifies Strategy for a Nuclear War', Washington Post, 6 August 1980. 20 US Department of Defense, 'Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C/, pp. 4-3. 21 White House, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', September 2002, available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/ documents/organization/63362 .pdf. 22 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, 'A World Free of Nuclear Weapons', Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007. 23 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, 'Toward a Nuclear Free World', Wall Street Journal, 3 January 2008. See also their 'Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation', Wall Street Journal, 7 March 2011. 24 See ICAN, 'Humanitarian Initiative', http://www.icanw.org/campaign/ humanitarian-initiative; and ICAN, 'A Pledge to Fill the Legal Gap', Vienna Conference 2014, p. 2. 25 White House, 'Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered', 3 April 2009, https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ the-press-office/remarks-presidentbarack-obama-pr ague-delivered. 26 US Department of Defense, 'Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010', p. 6. 27 United Nations, 'Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons'.

Emphasis added. 28 'Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom and France Following the Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons'. 29 'Russia Doesn't Plan to Join Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons - Lavrov', Sputnik International, 12 October 2018, https://sputniknews.com/ russia/201801191060881071-lavrovrussia-treaty-nuclear-weapons/. 30 A prominent figure in this recrudes­ cence is Brad Roberts: see his The Case for Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016). See also Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner, On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014). 31 The myriad of escalatory options available to nuclear-armed bellig­ erents are imaginatively laid out by Vince A. Manzo and John K. Warden in their article, 'After Nuclear First Use, What?', Survival, vol. 60, no. 3, June-July 2018, pp. 133-60. 32 See Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History (London: Penguin Books, 2018); Robert H. Latiff, Future War: Preparing for the New Global Battlefield (New York: Vintage Books, 2017); and Andrew Futter, Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018). 33 Elbridge Colby, 'If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War', Foreign Affairs, vol. 97, no. 6, November-December 2018, https://

88

34

35

36

37

38

I Seyom Brown

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ china/20i8-io-i5/if-you-want-peaceprepare-nuclear-war. Ibid. Scott D. Sagan, 'Armed and Dangerous: When Dictators Get the Bomb', Foreign Affairs, vol. 97, no. 6, November-December 2018, pp. 35-43. US Department of Defense, 'Nuclear Posture Review 2018', p. VIII. Emphasis added. 'Russia Will Deploy New Hypersonic Missile Systems in 2019, Putin Says', National Public Radio, 27 December 2018. Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the

Spread of a New Class of Weapons (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), p. xiii. 39 James M. Acton, 'Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War', International Security, vol. 43, no. 1, Summer 2018, pp. 56-99. 40 Bruce G. Blair with Jessica Sleight and Emma Claire Foley, The End of Nuclear Warfighting: Moving to a Deterrenceonly Posture (Washington DC: Global Zero, September 2018), p. 6, https:// www.globalzero.org/wp-content/ uploads/2018/09/ANPR-Final.pdf. 41 Ibid., p. 10. Emphasis added.

Lessons for Negotiating with North Korea Edward Ifft

Leader Kim Jong-un's year-end speech to the Korean Workers' Party plenum appeared to confirm what many North Korea watchers long ago concluded: that the country will never accept 'denuclearisation', at least not at any price the US would be willing to pay. Kim's statement was conditional, however, predicated on whether 'the US persists in its hostile policy', meaning its sanctions and military posture vis-à-vis Pyongyang. And while Kim lam­ basted Washington's 'brigandish attitude', and what he characterised as insincere efforts to resume dialogue, he did not rule out re-engagement with the United States. In response, US President Donald Trump again boasted of having good personal relations with Kim. However superficial these relations may be, Trump's desire for a foreign-policy victory before the November election makes re-engagement likely, albeit with tension if North Korea resumes long-range missile tests. If negotiations over its nuclear-weapons programme ever do begin in earnest, and recognising that the 'earnest' part is a big if, it is worth considering how they should ensue. Applying certain lessons learned in earlier arms-control negotiations, some of which encountered problems similar to those that are now frustrating negotiators and observers, could move the process forward. Hopes that this time will be different rest primarily on several new devel­ opments. Firstly, a sense of heightened danger, especially to the United

Edward Ifft, now a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, helped negotiate and im plem ent many of the key nuclear-arms-control agreements of the past 45 years, primarily as a senior US State Departm ent official.

Survival | voi. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 89-106

DOI 10.1080/00396338.2020.1715069

90 I Edward Ifft

States, owing to North Korea's successful series of nuclear-weapons tests, including apparently of a thermonuclear device, and advances in produc­ ing long-range ballistic missiles, has motivated the US to seek an agreement. This represents a departure from the Obama administration's policy of 'strategic patience', which basically failed. Trump is given to seeking bold moves and prides himself on his negotiating prowess, and success in this area would be a major accomplishment. Secondly, South Korean President Moon Jae-in seeks to end, or at least ameliorate, decades of hostility, punctuated by a highly militarised and impenetrable border artificially dividing the Korean Peninsula. Unlike his predecessor, he seems willing to undertake initiatives and assume some risks toward this end. In 2018, he met three times with Kim. Thirdly, while it is difficult to understand fully the motivations of Kim Jong-un and his isolated regime, he appears to be somewhat satisfied with having reached a military-technical plateau in the nuclear and ballisticmissile areas. In his eyes, this may provide some level of security from outside interference and attack. It may also afford him some bargaining power. By giving up some portion of his nuclear-weapons and ballisticmissile programmes, while adopting a less confrontational stance, he may well see an opportunity to gain relief from sanctions, a more productive relationship with South Korea, a formal end to the Korean War and generally a more normal position in the world. Goals A frequently stated goal for the Korean issue is 'denuclearisation' or, more recently, 'complete denuclearisation'. Although these terms are now enshrined in various important documents, they are unfortunate and misleading. They have not been clearly defined by any of the three major participant countries and are obviously not agreed among them. Rather than entering into a long and probably acrimonious negotiation about what these terms mean, the sides would do well to focus on what specifically should be eliminated or constrained, and how. The United States and the Soviet Union gave up early in their arms-control negotiations on trying to agree on the meaning of the word 'strategic', even though the subject of

Lessons for Negotiating with North Korea I 91

successful negotiations for more than 45 years has been 'strategic offensive arms'. They simply proceeded to specify those weapons systems on which they could agree, and ceased arguing about whether anything 'strategic' had been left out or some system captured was or wasn't truly 'strategic'. Setting aside for a moment the overriding question about whether North Korea ever really would give up its nuclear arsenal, there are practical prob­ lems with the term 'complete denuclearisation'. One is that the Singapore Summit Joint Statement calls for the 'complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula', not just North Korea.1 This distinction is frequently missed in commentaries in which there seems to be the expectation that any constraints, including verification, would apply only to the North a completely unrealistic view. An agreement that prohibits something in North Korea, but allows it in South Korea, would be dead on arrival. But the obligations can be formulated broadly, even if they are relevant to only one party. This should not pose great problems to South Korea, which is already a non-nuclear-weapons state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has ratified the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Another problem with the term is the improbability that any of the parties really expect to ban civilian nuclear reactors on the Korean Peninsula. Previous agreements have allowed North Korea to have such reactors and even promised it assistance in constructing them, while South Korea gets about 27% of its electricity from nuclear reactors. Moreover, the parties pre­ sumably also do not intend to prohibit nuclear medicine in the treatment of cancer and other diseases, though this is implied in the term. A more general goal has been stated repeatedly as 'complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation', now recast by the Trump administration as 'final, fully verified denuclearisation'. Aside from this being a bumpersticker approach to a highly complicated problem, this adds additional undefined and overly ambitious terms to the equation.2If North Korea could be persuaded to trade away nuclear weapons, it would seem more palatable for Pyongyang to contemplate a nuclear-weapons-free zone. This concept is well understood, as five such zones already exist. Restrictions on uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing (already agreed in the 1992 SouthNorth 'Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula'),

92 I Edward Ifft

and constraints on ballistic missiles and fissile materials for weapons, could be added later. Separating the nuclear and missile portions of negotiations could be particularly expeditious, with priority given to the former. The Trump administration has called for North Korea also to give up chemical and biological weapons. This might be better phrased as seeking a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone on the Korean Peninsula. This goal would imply that both Koreas should, at a minimum, be parties to the four key treaties: the NPT, the CTBT, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. South Korea is already a member of all four (the CTBT has not entered into force, of course), while North Korea is a party to the Biological Weapons Convention only. The US has not required that North Korea join these fundamental arms-control agree­ ments as a key part of any overall settlement, perhaps on account of the Trump administration's general disdain for multilateral agreements. The situation regarding the CTBT is particularly awkward for the US, given the Republican Party's antipathy to ratification. However, North Korea's key neighbours - South Korea, Japan, China and Russia - are all signatories and are in a strong position to urge North Korea to join. All have also ratified the CTBT, except China, which appears to be waiting for the US to do so. Step-by-step approach Requiring a country to admit guilt for past transgressions, or even ambiguous activities of disputed legality, can be a huge stumbling block to an agreement on future activities. Demands on Iraq and Iran for a full accounting of their previous nuclear activities failed. The effort to understand past activities using voluntary declarations, interviews, open sources and intelligence is legitimate. However, it may be unwise to let a lack of full understanding of the past block agreement on the future. In the civil sphere, disputes are some­ times settled when an individual or organisation refuses to fully explain past activities or admit guilt for such activities, but agrees not to conduct such activities in the future. To make progress in negotiating with North Korea, the United States would do well to adopt this kind of pragmatism. That said, given the deep distrust on all sides, it seems clear that goals can only be reached through a step-by-step approach. This could mean a

Lessons for Negotiating with North Korea I 93

series of agreements or a comprehensive agreement implemented in stages. Trump and Kim both seem to prefer a comprehensive approach, which would be better suited to summit diplomacy. This would require a series of reciprocal moves, with pauses to assure that obligations taken in any one stage were being fully implemented as agreed. Thus, arms control would be tightened, while sanctions would be loosened and normalisation advanced in parallel. Both the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) involved discrete stages with interim goals and requirements. In this case, certain major steps would be required. They include but are not limited to, not necessarily in this order, the following: •

Overall agreement on goals

•

Accession by North Korea to the NPT as a non-nuclearweapons state,3 the CTBT and other relevant international agreements, obligations to include International Atomic

•

Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope Safeguards and the Additional Protocol Agreement on the detailed disposition (conversion or elimi­ nation) of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapons test sites, nuclear-weapons production and storage facilities, to include agreement on details for the relevant procedures and timelines

•

Agreement on verification procedures, especially on-site inspection

•

Agreement on information to be exchanged - for example, to establish and maintain a shared, up-to-date baseline database

•

Agreement on civilian nuclear facilities, including the role

•

of the IAEA Easing of sanctions on North Korea

•

Formal termination of the Korean War

•

Normalisation of relations between North and South Korea and

• •

between North Korea and the US Other improvements in bilateral relations between North and South Korea Security commitments among the parties, as appropriate

94 I Edward Ifft

Some of these subjects are largely technical, while others are essentially political and, at the moment, Pollyannaish. The qualitative difference in steps that would be required of each side is rather unusual in arms-control agreements, which tend to contain like-for-like exchanges - for example, that of numbers, technical characteristics and locations of similar systems. While this factor could introduce difficulties in terms of what is considered fair, it could also open up a wider range of possible terms of trade, and useful precedents do exist.4 Timing is clearly an important and difficult problem, with the order in which actions are taken already a highly contentious issue. Four substantive areas - arms control, sanctions, new relations among the parties and what could be called a peace regime - are broadly relevant. The Trump admin­ istration clearly wants to get the arms-control - that is, the nuclear - issues resolved first, and only thereafter to deal with general political and peace issues, including the easing of sanctions. North Korea insists that political issues, and especially easing of sanctions, should be handled before the nuclear-arms-control issues are taken up. A similar problem has deadlocked attempts to establish a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, with one side insisting on 'peace' first, then arms control, while the other wants the reverse order. In such cases, the obvious compromise is parallel progress in both areas, which has worked in USSoviet arms-control negotiations. For example, after months of frustration in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks, the two sides finally negotiated constraints on offence and defence simultaneously. The START negotiations on aircraft and ballistic missiles followed a similar pattern, even though the two sides had different priorities. The negotiation of the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties in 1974-76 as a package is yet another example. North Korea and the CTBT For the CTBT to enter into force, eight states that possess nuclear technol­ ogy must ratify it in addition to the 168 countries that have already done so. These are the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Syria, Iran and North Korea. The conventional wisdom has long been that North Korea

Lessons for Negotiating with North Korea I 95

might well be the most difficult to persuade and the last to join. However, developments over the past two years - in particular, the personal involve­ ment of the presidents of the US, South Korea and North Korea in finding a comprehensive solution to the long-standing tensions on the Korean Peninsula - may invalidate this pessimistic assumption. Signature of the CTBT by North Korea should be an early step, even before its nuclear weapons are eliminated. Lassina Zerbo, executive secre­ tary of the CTBT Organization in Vienna, has discussed the importance of the CTBT in solving the broader problem and stated that 'the path to the ver­ ifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula runs through the CTBT'.5 This should not be difficult to achieve, since, if North Korea agrees to give up its nuclear weapons, it would make no sense for it to insist on a right to test such weapons. North Korea could quickly begin to cooperate with the CTBT Organization in Vienna. This would include participating in the rel­ evant working groups, including the International Monitoring System; the treaty provides for this in Articles IV and VII. The CTBT Organization could also furnish training for North Korean personnel, either in North Korea itself or in Vienna. A more distant prospect might be for North Korea to offer to host an on-site-inspection field exercise. The benefits of conducting such exercises near where actual nuclear explosions have recently occurred are obvious. Test tunnels On 24 May 2018, North Korea conducted explosions to close the entrances to its test site at Punggye-ri. Members of the media were invited and a video of the events was broadcast worldwide. A number of observers quickly discounted the event's significance on the grounds that the test mountain was no longer useable in any case, that 'international inspectors' were not invited and that the tunnels could be reopened. These criticisms may have been too harsh for several reasons. Firstly, North Korea's action was unilateral. Secondly, no agreement had called for it. Thirdly, the method used - high explosives to seal off the tunnels - is basically the one the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) used to close about 181 tunnels at Degelen Mountain at the former Soviet test site in Kazakhstan, where more

g6 I Edward Ifft

than 200 nuclear tests had been carried out. No treaty required this action. Kazakhstan had already made clear it did not wish to possess or test nuclear weapons, and the primary purpose of the detonations was to prevent tunnel access to scavengers seeking to recover copper wiring and steel rails, appar­ ently unaware that there were plutonium and other hazards there.6 Since no international agreement required the measures that North Korea took, it is not clear how international inspectors would have been relevant. In any case, trained inspectors would hardly have been necessary to verify that the tunnel entrances were indeed closed. Perhaps inspectors, including mining engineers, could be used at some point if it were necessary to determine that no other adits existed, assuming they were prohibited. Inspectors could also determine how thoroughly the tunnel entrances had been collapsed. With sufficient excavation and reinforcement, of course, the closed tunnels could be reopened; but that would hardly escape the notice of inspectors after an agreement prohibiting such actions were in force. Whether to bar preparations to test was a contentious item in CTBT negotiations, and, as it stands, the treaty only prohibits 'nuclear explosions', and not preparations for such explosions. The CTBT does not prohibit test tunnels or emplacement holes, which neither the US nor Russia closed after signing the CTBT. They need not do so even when it enters into force. The US has emplacement holes at its Nevada National Security Site, and con­ ducts underground hydrodynamic tests there. The same goes for Russia at its Novaya Zemlya Test Site. France is the only nuclear-armed country to have closed its test site. What arrangements might be made regarding North Korea's similar facilities remains to be seen, but these precedents are rel­ evant. In any case, it is difficult to see how ridiculing unilateral actions by North Korea, which seem to have been made in good faith and are certainly steps in the right direction, can advance progress in the upcoming negotia­ tions. Similar considerations could apply to North Korea's offer to shut down its ballistic-missile engine-test facility and launch pad at Dongchang-ri. Data exchange The establishment of an agreed 'baseline' of what exists at the beginning of an elimination or limitation process is essential in enabling the parties

Lessons for Negotiating with North Korea I 97

to understand whether the agreed obligations are being carried out. This is especially the case if large numbers are involved. A number of analysts have expressed indignation that North Korea has not yet provided a com­ prehensive list of all its nuclear assets. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has demanded that provision of such data be the first step in the process of eliminating North Korea's nuclear-weapons programmes. While this would certainly be helpful in an ideal world, it is not a realistic demand and is unsupported by precedent. The demand drew outrage from the North Koreans, who said they would not negotiate with Pompeo. He made simi­ larly unrealistic demands of Iran, with similarly counterproductive results. No existing agreement calls for North Korea to provide such data. Insisting that it do so now, to put it crudely, would essentially require Pyongyang to give the Americans information on where to drop the bombs and send the marines. No sensible negotiator would expect Kim to see creating such vulnerability, for nothing in return, to be in North Korea's interest. The relevant example here is START. Under this treaty, and con­ tinuing under New START, the US and the Soviet Union/Russia generated huge baseline lists of each other's relevant assets, followed by thousands of regular updates between the two sides' Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. The way in which this came about is instructive. The sides negotiated for months over what data would be exchanged in the treaty. A detailed 'Memorandum of Understanding' ran to over 100 pages, but with blanks where the information would be inserted. Thus, there was a clear under­ standing of exactly what information would be provided and how it would be kept current. However, the actual numbers and specific locations were provided - the blanks filled in - only late in the negotiating process, when both sides were confident that all the key issues had been resolved and that there would be a legally binding agreement. Unilateral actions vs agreed procedures American consternation has arisen over the fact that, aside from explosive testing, North Korea appears not to have suspended its overall nuclearweapons programmes or begun dismantling its nuclear-weapons stockpile, which would be welcome evidence of good intentions. But no agreement to

98 I Edward Ifft

take such actions is in place, and there are no agreed procedures for doing so. Allowing the passage of time to change the facts on the ground in a way that improves North Korea's negotiating position would not be helpful and could provide an incentive for North Korea to drag out the negotiations. But agreements to freeze the production of nuclear warheads and lock in North Korea's unilateral moratoria on nuclear and long-range ballisticmissile testing would be difficult to negotiate, especially if no compensatory concessions were offered, and certain aspects of any arrangements would not be verifiable in the near term. History again provides useful lessons. South Africa is frequently cited as a good example of how unilateral actions can work in eliminating nuclear weapons. However, even with its very small stockpile and remarkable cooperation, it took the IAEA years to verify that the actions taken were as claimed. It is highly unlikely that North Korea will be as transparent and cooperative as South Africa was. The better example is Iraq. Iraq unilater­ ally eliminated its WMD stockpile and related materials and equipment. But it did so rather haphazardly and kept poor records. As a result, inter­ ested parties were unable to confirm the disposition of Iraq's WMD, with disastrous results. The lesson is that it would be better to wait until agreed conversion or elimination procedures were in place, along with the appro­ priate procedures for verification, than to encourage unilateral actions. Accordingly, establishing agreed procedures should be a high priority in negotiations, even if their implementation must await other aspects of the overall settlement. Civil nuclear programmes What civil nuclear activities should be allowed on the Korean Peninsula will be a thorny issue. As noted, in spite of the apparent meaning of 'complete denuclearisation', it is implausible that all radioactive materials will be banned from that part of the world. Nuclear medicine would continue, presumably with the appropriate security measures. Nuclear power and research reactors will be another matter. South Korea now has 24 operational nuclear reactors, with five under construction and six more proposed, while North Korea has no operational power reactors, but has been constructing

Lessons for Negotiating with North Korea I 99

one at the Yongbyon complex.7 In addition to the so-called 5 megawatt reactor at Yongbyon used to produce plutonium, North Korea has a small research reactor supplied by the Soviet Union in 1963 and an experimental 25-30 MW light-water reactor apparently close to becoming operational. Under the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework, North Korea was allowed two light-water reactors, to be supplied by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), but this work was suspended three years later. In the Six-Party Talks in 2005, North Korea agreed to end all of its 'nuclear programmes'. Its current position regarding civilian nuclear reactors is unclear, but should be revealed soon enough, and it is unlikely that Pyongyang believes its number should be zero.8 The solution involving the fewest proliferation and verification concerns would be to prohibit all reactors in the North, while allowing them in the South. Given the investments made in this area by North Korea and its argu­ ment that it should be treated the same as other countries that verifiably give up nuclear weapons, a permanent ban would probably be infeasible. But North Korea might accept a time-limited ban or a ban pending confir­ mation of its non-proliferation bona fides. In any case, IAEA safeguards are quite capable of managing the proliferation risks of civilian reactors. The knottier issue involves providing the fuel for the reactors and dis­ posing of the spent fuel. Reprocessing spent fuel should be prohibited for obvious reasons. Allowing enrichment of fresh fuel, but only to reactor grade, would be one solution. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action permits Iran to enrich uranium up to 3.67%, and the IAEA has proven it can monitor that. However, the Trump administration's objection to that provision, echoed by Israel, and the administration's withdrawal from the agreement at least partially because of it, suggests that another solution will be needed in the case of North Korea. That would be to require North Korea to purchase fuel from a reliable source abroad and send it back to that source when spent. The obvious candidate to provide such services would be Russia or the IAEA fuel bank in Kazakhstan. In a January 2019 speech at Stanford University, US Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun said that North Korea had offered to dismantle its enrichment facili­ ties. Assuming that's accurate, this solution may be attainable.9

îoo I Edward Ifft

One additional consideration could make the solution easier to achieve. A country seeking nuclear weapons but lacking the required technical expertise and materials, like North Korea about 15 years ago, is much more likely to use civilian nuclear facilities to that end than one that already has a mature nuclear-weapons programme. Since North Korea is now in the latter category, a tightly controlled and monitored civilian nuclear pro­ gramme poses far less risk in North Korea than it would in, say, Iran. Analogous considerations apply to civilian space programmes and longrange ballistic missiles. Verification The effective verification of whatever terms are agreed will obviously be a major element of any successful arrangement. The simplest portion of this task would probably be verification of a ban on nuclear explosions. Even if North Korea were not a member of the CTBT, or were a member when the treaty was not yet in force, the International Monitoring System could confi­ dently be expected to detect any violations. Even though that system is not yet fully completed, its seismic and radionuclide stations have performed well in detecting the North Korean tests: all six were immediately identified by the seismic network. If the CTBT were in force and North Korea were a member, on-site inspection would also be available to clarify ambiguous situations. The conversion or elimination of specified facilities and missiles should not be overwhelmingly daunting. This has been accomplished under several arms-control treaties, as well as in Iraq. The tougher problem will be dealing with nuclear warheads and fissile material. Although several countries reg­ ularly dismantle nuclear weapons safely and securely, they have never been dismantled under agreed procedures or international inspection. In fact, no agreed procedures even exist - an inconvenient reality that is not dealt with in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This remains one of the great unsolved problems of nuclear arms control. With goodwill and technical expertise on all sides, however, a solution that works for the North Korea situation could probably be found. In the meantime, the sides could agree on temporary secure storage of nuclear devices, perhaps disarmed. The same considerations would apply to fissile material. Verification could

Lessons for Negotiating with North Korea I 101

be entrusted to the IAEA or some other special body. Verifying that all nuclear weapons are gone will be a difficult task under any scenario. The most straightforward solution would be to establish agreed and verifiable procedures for the elimination of nuclear warheads in North Korea. In the event that such a solution to the warhead problem cannot be negotiated with North Korea, workarounds could be considered. For instance, when nuclear weapons were left on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan as the Soviet Union dissolved, the weapons were returned to Russian territory and the three successor states joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapons states. No outside verification was required and all the parties were satisfied. Russia dismantled at least some of the weapons and turned the fissile material into reactor fuel. Hypothetically, North Korea could send its nuclear weapons to a nuclear-weapons state. China and Russia would be the leading choices. Presumably with the assistance of North Korean scientists and engineers, the weapons would be put into safe and secure storage or given some other fate, with the receiving country provid­ ing certification. No further verification would be necessary, though some form of monitoring could become feasible. There would still be an extensive inspection regime in North Korea to verify, among other things, the absence of nuclear weapons, but it would not involve their dismantlement. Another possibility, probably more acceptable to North Korea, would be to keep the nuclear weapons in North Korea, but put them 'beyond use'. The Provisional Irish Republican Army devised this artfully enigmatic term in referring to the disablement, demonstrated in various ways, of their con­ ventional weapons in connection with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which substantially ended the Northern Irish conflict. Specific measures, of course, would have to be proposed and accepted. Both of these ideas would be less satisfying to arms-control experts than the more straightforward approach of elimination in situ under strict inter­ national control. But if that result appears unattainable in the short term, they could, if properly formulated and implemented as interim measures, move the process of reaching an overall settlement forward. The history of verifi­ cation in North Korea suggests that Pyongyang could be receptive.10 When North Korea was still a member of the NPT, it allowed the IAEA to conduct

102

I Edward Ifft

in-country inspections. In 1999, the DTRA, with North Korea's cooperation, visited an underground facility thought by some to be nuclear-related. Also in the late 1990s, the US On-Site Inspection Agency - later incorporated into the DTRA - maintained an office in Seoul, the primary purpose of which was to help prepare South Korea to host on-site inspections expected to occur as a result of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Between 1999 and 2004, senior US officials visited North Korea for arms-control purposes. Working out verification provisions need not wait for North Korea's declaration of all its nuclear assets and programmes.11 Indeed, finding agreement on procedures for the elimination of missiles did not depend on how many missiles there were or where they were located in the negotiation of the INF Treaty or the START treaties. In fact, for those who demand an early indication of whether North Korea is serious about the general com­ mitments it has made, how they approach the verification problem would be an excellent indicator of their intent. The summits If there is to be any progress toward denuclearisaton in the Trump era, it will surely come about through a summit process. The Singapore Summit on 12 June 2018 was the first meeting between a sitting US president and a leader of North Korea. The atmosphere appeared to be cordial. As expected, the Summit Statement was quite general, but did address key issues between the sides. They committed to establishing new relations between the US and North Korea and to building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea agreed to 'work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' and to reaffirm the 27 April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, which capped the first inter-Korean summit in more than a decade. This earlier document had contained the pledge to achieve the complete denucleari­ sation of the Korean Peninsula, but went further in proclaiming that the agreement 'precludes the use of force in any form against each other'.12 In key respects, the Singapore Statement fell short of the Panmunjom meeting and the earlier Six-Party Talks. It contained no specifics, no timelines and no mention of verification. It did establish some rapport between the two leaders, displace what had become incendiary rhetoric on both sides

Lessons for Negotiating with North Korea I 103

and put in motion a diplomatic process. Following the summit, however, President Trump agreed to suspend major US-South Korea joint military exercises, calling them 'provocative'. Afterwards, he stated, ludicrously, that 'there is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea'.13 Both of these remarks drew strong criticism among US and allied commentators.14 But Kim did offer to shut down the Dongchang-ri (sometimes called Sohae) missile-engine test facility and missile/satellite launch pad, and President Moon welcomed the summit results.15 The second summit was held in Hanoi, Vietnam, on 27-28 February 2019. It ended in failure when Trump walked out before the scheduled con­ clusion, which was to have included a lunch and signing ceremony. North Korea reportedly asked for the removal of the UN Security Council sanctions imposed in 2016-17 in exchange for the closure of portions of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which was more than the US was willing to offer. But the breakdown did not produce hostile rhetoric, and both sides appear to wish to continue negotiations. The third encounter between the two presidents occurred on 30 June 2019 in the demilitarised zone between North and South Korea. This was a brief photo opportunity of no discernible substance, but the meeting did at least yield pledges to resume staff-level discussions. Whatever happens in bilateral encounters, South Korea has a key role to play. China and Russia, since they are the neighbours most sympathetic to and trusted by North Korea, cannot be ignored. There have been at least four meetings between Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi Jinping since Kim became North Korea's leader, and the 23 April 2019 summit between Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok has probably brought Russia back into the game. Serious negotiations have yet to begin. US and North Korean teams did meet in Stockholm for eight hours on 5 October 2018, but the meeting ended prematurely when North Korea's chief negotiator claimed the US had arrived 'empty-handed' and had 'not discarded its old stance and attitude'. Even so, it is encouraging that for 18 months up until the end of 2019, a de facto partial freeze-for-freeze was in place. North Korea did not conduct nuclear explosions or long-range ballistic-missile flight tests, and the US and South Korea did not conduct large-scale joint military exercises.

104 I Edward Ifft

The negotiating tracks seem to have cleaved fairly neatly, with nuclear weapons an issue for the US and North Korea, and North-South confidence and security-building matters left primarily for the Moon-Kim channel.16 Timing remains problematic. In his January 2019 speech at Stanford, Biegun declared that 'we didn't say we won't do anything until you do every­ thing', suggesting pragmatic flexibility.17 But later more senior US officials appeared to contradict this representation.18 Confusion and inconsistency in the US position has hampered the nego­ tiations. Given the disappointing results of the Hanoi Summit, it should at last be clear that nuclear disarmament of North Korea must be regarded as a long-term objective. A comprehensive study by the Federation of American Scientists recently noted that 'there is no mix of economic, diplomatic, or military pressure that can verifiably eliminate North Korea's arsenal on acceptable terms in the next few years'.19 The emphasis now should be on establishing stability on the Korean Peninsula and preventing the unlimited expansion of North Korea's WMD and missile programmes and arsenals. *

*

*

It is unclear whether there will be another Trump-Kim summit until further progress is made on specific issues at a lower diplomatic level. Useful work on non-nuclear issues could still be carried out in the Moon-Kim channel, however, if North Korea were willing to resume engagement with Seoul. Like the futile effort to concur on a definition of denuclearisation, the ongoing failure to agree on whether satellite launches are included in a cessation of ballistic-missile flight tests is causing charges of bad faith. The issue needs urgent discussion and resolution. For each side to pretend that its interpretation has been accepted by the other side, when this is clearly not the case, is counterproductive. The immediate challenge is to consolidate progress already made and grab the low-hanging fruit. Restoring and formalising some version of the effective freeze-for-freeze would make eminent sense. Other helpful meas­ ures could include closure of key portions of the Yongbyon complex - in particular, to assure that plutonium and tritium production has ceased -

Lessons for Negotiating with North Korea I 105

and a declaration that the Korean War has finally ended. It would also be useful to establish liaison or interest offices in Pyongyang and Washington. Finally, it should be a priority for North Korea to sign the CTBT. In any case, focused engagement is essential. Notes 1 'Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong-un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit', 12 June 2018, https://www.whitehouse. gov/briefings-statements/jointstatement-president-donald-j-trumpunited-states-america-chairman-kimjong-un-democratic-peoples-republickorea-singapore-summit/. 2 Simon Denyer, 'Confusion Over North Korea's Definition of Denuclearization Clouds Talks', Washington Post, 16 January 2019, https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/ asia_pacific/confusion-over-northkoreas-definition-of-denuclearizationclouds-talks/20i9/oi/i5/c6ac3ia8 -i6fc-ne9-a896-fi04373C7ffd_story.html. 3 For North Korea to join the NPT as a nuclear-weapons state would be broadly unacceptable. Ideally, it would become a non-nuclear-weapons state by giving up all of its nuclear weapons, which of course would involve complex legal and sequencing issues. If it retained some, it would become like India and Pakistan, with limitations. Whether some new NPT category should be created for states that possess nuclear weapons but are willing to accept the non-proliferation obligations of the NPT remains a complicated legal issue.

4

See Siegfried S. Hecker, Robert L. Carlin and Elliot A. Serbin, 'A Comprehensive History of North Korea's Nuclear Program and Lessons Learned', Center for International Security and Cooperation, 23 May 2018, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/ content/cisac-north-korea. 5 Lassina Zerbo, 'The Nuclear Test Ban and the Verifiable Denuclearization of North Korea', Arms Control Today, November 2018, https://armscontrol. org/sites/default/files/files/documents/ ACT_N0v2018_Feature_Zerb0.pdf. 6 Eben Harrell and David E. Hoffman, 'Plutonium Mountain: Inside the 17-year Mission to Secure a Dangerous Legacy of Soviet Nuclear Testing', Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, 15 August 2013, https://www.belfercenter.org/ publication/plutonium-mountaininside-17-year-mission-secure-legacysoviet-nuclear-testing. 7 'World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements', World Nuclear Association, November 2019, https ://www .world-nuclear.org/ information-library/facts-and-figures/ world-nuclear-power-reactors-anduranium-requireme.aspx. 8 After a visit to North Korea in which he consulted several North Korean

io6 I Edward Ifft

experts, Anton Khlopkov, Director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies, Moscow, indicated that for Pyongyang, denuclearisation did not mean a ban on North Korea's peace­ ful use of nuclear energy. See 'North Korea Unlikely to Agree to Unilateral Denuclearization - Expert', TASS, 22 November 2018, https://tass.com/ world/1032100. 9 See Stephen Biegun, 'Remarks on DPRK at Stanford University', US Department of State, 31 January 2019, https://www.state.g0v/p/eap/ris/

14

15

rm/20i9/oi/288702.htm.

10 See Hecker, Carlin and Serbin, 'A Comprehensive History of North Korea's Nuclear Program and Lessons Learned'; and Gary Samore, 'North Korean Verification: Good Enough for Government Work?', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 31 August 2018, https://thebulletin.0rg/2018/08/ north-korean-verification-goodenough-for-government-work/. 11 See Siegfried S. Hecker, 'Why Insisting on a North Korean Nuclear Declaration Up Front Is a Big Mistake', 38 North, 28 November 2018, https://www.38north.org/2018/11/ sheckeri 12818. 12 'Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula', Reuters, 27 April 2018, https://uk.reuters. com/article/uk-northkoreasouthkorea-summit-statemen/ panmunjom-declaration-for-peaceprosperity-and-unification-of-thekorean-peninsula-idUKKBN 1HY193. 13 'Joint Statement of President Trump

16

17 18

19

and Chairman Kim Jong-un at the Singapore Summit', 12 June 2018, https ://www. whitehouse.gov/ briefings-statements/joint-statementpresident-donald-j-trump-unitedstates-america-chairman-kim-jong-undemocratic-peoples-republic-koreasingapore-summit/. See, for example, Mark Fitzpatrick, 'Kim Jong-un's Singapore Sting', Survival, vol. 60, no. 4, AugustSeptember 2018, pp. 29-36. For further discussion of the state of play, see 'DPRK: Desiring Peace?', in International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018), pp. 92-101. For further discussion of this chan­ nel, see Chung Min Lee and Kathryn Botto, 'President Moon Jae-in and the Politics of Inter-Korean Detente', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 16 November 2018, https:// carnegieendowment.org/2018/11/16/ president-moon-jae-in-and-politics-ofinter-korean-d-tente-pub-77730. Biegun, 'Remarks on DPRK at Stanford University'. Kelsey Davenport, 'An Uncertain Future for North Korean Talks', Arms Control Association, April 2019, https://www. armscontr ol.org/act/2019-04/news/ uncertain-future-north-korean-talks. Adam Mount and Andrea Berger, 'Report of the International Study Group on North Korea Policy', Federation of American Scientists, 2019, p. 2, https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/ media/FAS-DPRK-SG.pdf.

Mixed Signals: A Flawed Approach to Cyber Deterrence Alexander Klimburg

The conduct and deployment of the United States Cyber Command's (CYBERCOM) vision of 'persistent engagement' represents a radical and largely unwelcome departure from previous notions of conflict in cyberspace. It builds on a number of questionable assumptions about the international history and perception of cyber conflict, the role and strategic direction of information warfare, and the general dynamics of deterrence. Ultimately, it justifies a much more aggressive CYBERCOM mission that ignores the potential for unwanted effects that could prove to be highly destabilising in an already volatile international security environment. Overall, persistent engagement is a very high-risk approach to developing cyber deterrence that is likely to not only trigger new forms of retaliation but also accelerate the already rapid international proliferation of offensive cyber capabilities. In the worst-case scenario, it may even pose a risk to the internet as we know it. Some of the risks associated with the concept could, however, be partially alleviated by reducing its reliance on mixed signals and an excess of public communication. Persistent engagement: theory and criticism The promotion of CYBERCOM to a fully independent combat command in 2018 marked the emancipation of US military cyber capabilities from the intel­ ligence world. While some observers, including the present author, thought

Alexander Klimburg is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Survival | voi. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 107-130

DOI 10.1080/00396338.2020.1715071

io8 I Alexander Klimburg

that this development might help foster much-needed transparency on cyber capabilities, recent developments have taken a darker turn.1 Building on an already controversial doctrine of 'active defense in cyberspace', the US Department of Defense (DoD) put forward a new public cyber strategy in 2018 that emphasised the concept of 'defend forward'.2 According to Jeff Kosseff of the United States Naval Academy, defending forward has three basic components: positioning, warning and influencing.3 CYBERCOM's vision of persistent engagement, which represents the implementation of the DoD strategy, encompasses all three activities, and while each can be criticised as potentially destabilising to international security, the operation­ alisation of the 'influencing' component may be particularly so. CYBERCOM's General Paul Nakasone gave an indication of what was to come when, in his Senate confirmation hearings in March 2018, he was asked about deterring Russian and Chinese cyber attacks. 'They do not think that much will happen to them', he responded. T hey do not fear us.' He went on to say that, 'As cyberspace develops, the longer that we have inactivity, the longer our adversaries are able to establish their own norms - and I think that is very, very important that we realize that.'4 This view was reflected in the DoD cyber strategy of defend forward, leveraging the already well-established 'persistent presence' of CYBERCOM in adversar­ ies' networks into an actual operational mandate to disrupt any emerging attacks and thus to 'persistently engage'.5 To accomplish this, Nakasone has indicated that CYBERCOM will not be a 'response force' anymore, but rather a force that engages in operations 'below the level of armed attack' on a running basis.6 Overall, CYBERCOM is being positioned less as a strategic-weapons carrier and a key element of an overall strategic-deterrence capability, and more as a special-operations command. The risk of getting these roles entangled is evident with the reversal of traditional signalling practices, with more talk about usually non-public, covert-action-type roles, and less about potential strategic (that is, 'above the threshold of armed attack') capabilities to be used in wartime. The evolving vision of persistent engagement has largely been communicated through a series of articles and press releases, rather than through official publications

Mixed Signals: A Flawed Approach to Cyber Deterrence I 109

and doctrines.7 This is in keeping with the strategy's dependence on public signals to communicate intent to adversaries. While a discussion of strategic-warfare capabilities would increase transparency and probably increase stability, the sudden emphasis on public discussion of low-level, peacetime cyber attacks is doing the opposite. As decades of experience with arms control have shown, transparency on strategic weapons helps reduce the scope for misunderstandings, provides for clarity of intent, and helps establish norms of restraint and communication. But public communication of offensive covert action - revealing to the public details of secret attacks conducted against an adversary - generally does the reverse, both fostering norms of aggression and underlining the lack of communication. What is true of the conventional-arms world is doubly so in cyberspace,

Over-

the eponymous information domain where kinetic cyber warfare (officially 'information operations')

communication

is encouraging has an uneasy but undoubted symbiosis with its non-kinetic cousin, 'information warfare', with its an arms race emphasis on propaganda, disinformation and covert influencing. As Nakasone has said, in cyberspace the principle danger is the weaponisation of information.8 Unfortunately, the signalling mandated by persistent engagement has extended to over-communication in public - itself an example of weaponised information that diminishes the benefits of the defend-forward strategy, lends legitimacy to information-warfare operations as a form of conflict and simultaneously encourages an already accelerating cyber arms race. The empirical justification of CYBERCOM's new offensive vision has been shaky from the start. The academic underpinnings of persistent engagement were presented in a 2017 article by Richard Harknett and Michael Fischerkeller, which was released just as the former was conclud­ ing his stint as CYBERCOM's first resident scholar.9 The very title of the article, 'Deterrence Is Not a Credible Strategy for Cyberspace', indicates that the authors thought it was possible (and desirable) to frame the strategy as one of 'non-deterrence'. Their analysis rests on the belief that, as part of an 'agreed competition' concept, it would be possible to completely

no

I Alexander Klimburg

contain cyber conflict within its own domain. This would be non-escalatory due to the invisible hand of 'tacit bargaining', through which adversaries would feel out the borders of allowable conflict and come to a stable conflict scenario. According to this logic, not only is there less chance of inadvert­ ent escalation over the threshold of armed conflict when engaging in the cyber domain, but this kind of engagement would also avoid retaliation in other domains, such as diplomacy and trade, or even in physical conflict zones, such as Syria and the Persian Gulf. The authors also seem to suggest that cyber could effectively function as a 'pressure valve' for international tensions, concentrating the inevitable tit for tat (the tacit bargaining) of international security to a more controllable and less

There is no clear

dangerous environment.10

The many suppositions of Harknett and Fischerkeller's article have been roundly criticised.11 theory o f victory Although the idea of agreed competition is presented as deriving from Herman Kahn's idea of 'agreed battle', the article never answers the basic question of why an adversary would allow itself to be constrained in a way that clearly favours the United States. Cyber experts Brandon Valeriano and Benjamin Jensen have drawn on a comprehensive historical dataset of cyber operations to argue instead that such operations on their own seldom produce concessions. Normally, they need to be accompanied by other actions, such as diplomatic overtures, to work - an approach which the authors contend the US has employed to great effect in the past, despite Nakasone's assessment that cyber deterrence has failed.12 Overall, few observers would agree that outcomes in cyber­ space are as easy to predict as advocates of persistent engagement seem to believe. On the contrary, the basic assumption of diplomacy over at least the last decade is that cyberspace is the domain most prone to misinterpretation and miscalculation.13Finally, there is no clear theory of victory in persistent engagement and no strategic endgame, only the purpose of creating opera­ tional advantages in cyberspace. There is no agreement as to what the basic strategic game is, or what constitutes its winning and losing factors. More troublingly, persistent engagement does not articulate a sound reasoning as to why any escalation in cyberspace would produce good

Mixed Signals: A Flawed Approach to Cyber Deterrence I m

outcomes for the United States. Tom Bossert, US President Donald Trump's first homeland security advisor, has explicitly questioned parts of the strategy. In a June 2018 Wired article, he is quoted as saying, 'I want to make sure we don't end up in an escalatory cyber exchange where we lose more than they do', and as pointing out that 'in many respects the US economy and infrastructure is far more reliant on digitization and automation than Russia's, giving the Kremlin an inherent advantage in any future no-holdsbarred cyberwar. He paraphrases former US secretary of defense Ash Carter: "If you're doused in gasoline, don't start a match-throwing contest.'"14 The entire rationale for the strategy, as outlined by Nakasone himself, relies on a version of cyber history that not all observers will agree with. For instance, Nakasone has said that the US mostly faced an intelligence-gathering threat before 2013, which then escalated into denial-based attacks before moving towards destructive attacks (presumably including informationwarfare attacks in 2016) and preparations for armed conflict.15 Overlooked by this narrative is any consideration of how the adversary - or even many US friends and allies - would see the causality of these developments. In an alternative narrative, US dominance in persistent-presence espionage was publicly revealed through the intelligence disclosures of 2013, at the same time as the first real cyber weapon, Stuxnet, was attributed to the United States. Among allies in Europe, such as Germany, these revelations were often badly received, and the reaction among neutrals, such as Brazil, was even more negative. Not many European observers would agree with the assessment of persistent engagement's supporters that the US has been 'too passive' in cyberspace. In some cases, a different conclusion can be drawn: that cyber attacks have been responses to US activity. Nakasone has cited Iranian cyber aggression to justify persistent engagement, but Iranian activities can also be framed as responses to US cyber operations, such as Stuxnet and Flame.16 The Shamoon malware that Iran used to target Saudi Arabia reused components of the US-attributed Flame malware - effectively directing a US cyber weapon back at one of its allies.17 Seen from this perspective, at least some of the increase in cyber-related activity directed against the United States has been a direct result of public disclosures of the advanced state of US cyber capabilities and operations. Instead of producing

112 I

Alexander Klimburg

a deterrent effect, these disclosures seem to have contributed to an increase in cyber tensions. This does not bode well for the principle of persistent engagement as currently expressed. Both the academic theory and the policy statements surrounding persistent engagement have a strained relationship with the overall concept of deterrence, as well as with those of balance of power, proliferation and arms control. Before 2016, modern US deterrence followed a logic that is often expressed as a ladder, from entanglement, norms and resilience to punishment.18Purists may argue that only the last two - the ability to absorb an attack, and the ability to conduct an attack - represent classic deterrence.19 Contending that the US strategy of 'denial' or 'resilience' has clearly failed in recent years, they have turned to an existing solution for the problem and radically reinterpreted it. In 2011, the nascent weakness in US cyber­ deterrence policy - insofar as this had been formally expressed - had already been identified as a lack of 'credibility' or, in technical terms, a seeming inability to communicate the strength of US cyber capabilities in order to dissuade an adversary. It was the same conundrum made famous by Dr. Strangelove - how can one expect a deterrent effect if the very instrument of deterrence is a secret? In cyber terms, the effect was dubbed the 'Cartwright Conjecture' by Jason Healey after General James Cartwright, the former head of Strategic Command who, in 2011, was already complaining that 'w e've got to talk about our offensive capabilities and train to them; to make them credible ... You can't have something that's a secret be a deterrent. Because if you don't know it's there, it doesn't scare you.'20This was by no means an isolated message.21At that time, the strategic capability being communicated was one of overwhelming US intelligence-gathering capabilities. Within the US government, intelligence-gathering capabilities have res­ olutely been portrayed as neutral, or even defensive, in nature. Yet many allies, as well as private-sector actors within the US itself, do not share this view. A number of foreign leaders - not only of neutral countries, but of friends and allies of the US - have concluded that the United States' ability to maintain a persistent presence on all kinds of networks is tantamount to being able to strike them at will. Never mind that it takes time to prepare complicated strikes across highly segmented networks, or that it can be

Mixed Signals: A Flawed Approach to Cyber Deterrence I 113

difficult for CYBERCOM to get campaigns approved through the inter­ agency process - these are problems only the attacker can see. From a defender's point of view, it can be very difficult to differentiate between advanced espionage attempts and imminent acts of war - including by the United States. When US dominance in persistent presence became publicly apparent after 2013, it was only natural that a number of nations - some of them US adversaries, but not all - feared that it would not be long before the US took the simple step from persistent presence to persistent engage­ ment. Although major US initiatives such as the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (launched in 2009 with an estimated budget of $40 billion over five years) were cast as being 'defen­ sive' in nature, the programmes could clearly serve as the foundation for offensive cyber activity: the same

Claims o f US

sensors and implants intended to provide warning of hostile cyber activity could easily be repurposed for

passivity seem

disingenuous offensive activity. This being the case, and given the historical record of presumed US cyber operations, Nakasone's claims in his 2017 Senate confirmation hearing that the United States has been a passive actor in cyberspace seems disingenuous, at best. The significant increase in all forms of offensive cyber behaviour against the US after 2013 has been described as a deterrence failure. Yet advocates of persistent engagement have been unable to explain why deterrence failed, or to express whether the failure was complete or only partial. There is at least some evidence to suggest that the escalation was due to perceived US strength in cyber, not weakness. Following the work of Valeriano and Jensen, whose dataset indicates that responses to cyber attacks have historically been proportional and not intentionally escalatory,22 this could imply that some of the increased activity publicly reported since 2013 may in fact have been responses by US adversaries - responses that have been recalibrated to take into account a much more dominant US position in cyberspace than these adversaries had been aware of. Either way, friendly and less friendly nations alike have rushed to compete in an escalating cyber arms race, one which the US may have played a decisive role in accelerating even before the publication of persistent

i i 4 I Alexander Klimburg

engagement.23 The very term 'cyber arms race', while not particularly contentious in itself, is difficult to fully circumscribe. The phenomenon bears little resemblance to historic arms races and cannot be quantified by numbers of weapons systems, as was possible during the missile-gap race of the 1960s or the battleship/dreadnought race of the 1900s. Yet even though it is not even clear exactly what these offensive capabilities entail, there is little disagreement that a number of nations are increasingly seeking them, and that the overall level of destructive cyber attacks is rising. A 2016 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimated that at least 30 nations were actively pursuing offensive cyber capabilities, a number that has likely continued to increase year on year as the number of cyber incidents continues to rise.24 Much like the United States after 2013, many nations have seen a significant increase in malicious behaviour in cyberspace. The Council on Foreign Relations has reported that, with two notable dips in 2012 and 2016, cyber-espionage activity worldwide increased tenfold from 2009 to 2019.25 Much of the damage caused by recent cyber incidents such as the WannaCry and NotPetya ransom ware attacks, as well as routing and kinetic-equivalent attacks on media and industry, was concentrated outside of the United States. Paired with a significant increase in psychological, informationwarfare activities, this has prompted many of the hardest-hit nations (including Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, among others) to make significant adjustments to their cyber postures, in particular by building offensive capabilities. At the same time, anecdotal information suggests that not even these comparatively advanced nations have fully understood what these new cyber capabilities are actually intended to do - if they are intended to focus on 'strategic strike' (for instance against critical infrastructure), 'battlefield cyber' (acting as a sort of electronic warfare) or online covert action.26 This relative confusion about mission parameters will only be accentuated by the new CYBERCOM vision. Early US signalling in response to the Cartwright Conjecture may have intended to go beyond emphasising American strength in online covert action to illustrate the country's ability to conduct a 'global strike' of overwhelming

Mixed Signals: A Flawed Approach to Cyber Deterrence I 115

force in wartime - in essence, framing cyber as a strategic capability, a kind of digital weapon of mass destruction. CYBERCOM's intent differs, however, from the low-level silent professionalism of those engaged in strategic deter­ rence or the targeted focus of tailored access operations in the intelligence world. The role model for persistent engagement is not strategic command or the intelligence community, but rather special-operations command, whose mission has been to counter the adversary all the time, everywhere. General Nakasone has stated that, 'unlike the nuclear realm, where our strategic advantage or power comes from possessing a capability or weapons system, in cyberspace it's the use of cyber capabilities that is strategically consequential'.27 Not only does this remark suggest that the United States must use offensive capabilities visibly, but it also implies that other nations have a clear interest in doing so as well. Yet encouraging a permissive norm that implicitly favours cyber aggression as a tool of peacetime statecraft is likely only to expand the already murky grey area of modern conflict, and the difference between covert action and military activity.28 A number of significant adverse effects can be expected among a range of countries - US allies and friends, neutrals and US adversaries alike - which are unlikely to be in the US interest. First-order effects: 'out of band' and 'diagonal' retaliation Jason Healey and Neil Jenkins have argued that the impact of the new persistent-engagement strategy could be assessed by looking at the number of cyber attacks against the US. A decline in attacks would indicate that the strategy was effective, while an increase would suggest it was ineffective or counterproductive.29 This approach seems too simplistic for at least two reasons. Firstly, US adversaries may simply retaliate with non-cyber means, drawing on the example the US has already set. One of the most successful acts of US cyber deterrence was the use of Department of Justice indictments against specific foreign cyber actors. Following the indictment of five Chinese hackers associated with the People's Liberation Army in 2015, a landmark deal was reached between then-president Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping that resulted in a significant decline - by up to 90%, according to a report by the security company FireEye30 - in

n 6 I Alexander Klimburg

Chinese-attributed intellectual-property theft. Other indictments against Russian and Iranian hackers have followed. US adversaries may seek to devise their own 'out of band' responses to US cyber activity, perhaps by drawing on the copious amount of leaked materials on offensive US cyber capabilities now in the public domain. Alternatively, they may respond with more 'conventional' means, for instance by increasing their support for the non-US side in adversarial situations such as trade conflicts, maritime disputes and weapons proliferation. US adversaries might also respond 'diagonally' by responding with cyber-enabled means that defy the simple characterisation of 'cyber attack'. The kind of social-media activity associated with Russia's informationwarfare campaign against the United States is but one example of this approach. Other cyber means could potentially be deployed in an even more covert manner, making attribution difficult even with the deployment of the United States' full range of intelligence-collection measures. The recent spate of cyber-crime attacks directed against state and local governments across the United States may be another example of a diago­ nal approach to cyber retaliation. From January to July 2019, more than 55 state and local governments in the US were hit by ransomware attacks.31 Although there had been no public attribution of these activities to foreign actors by the time this article went to press, some of them used a stolen US cyber exploit, dubbed 'EternalBlue'. This exploit had been posted for sale by a group calling itself 'Shadow Brokers', which some have speculated may be a front for Russian intelligence actors.32 When cyber criminals did not immediately respond to the possibilities inherent in this new exploit, the WannaCry and NotPetya campaigns were launched, drawing attention not just to the possibilities of EternalBlue, but also to the efficacy of ransomware attacks themselves. Even if the current spate of cyber attacks against state and local governments in the US was not directed by a foreign adversary, it would be relatively easy for governments to encourage such activity in the future, thus inflicting real pain on targets and demonstrating the ability of national cyber defenders to respond to provocations. The underlying enabling factor for this scenario is the poor state of basic national cyber security across the United States. A 2019 report by the US

Mixed Signals: A Flawed Approach to Cyber Deterrence I 117

Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that of the 3,000 cyber­ security recommendations that have been made to federal agencies since 2010, more than 1,000 had yet to be implemented.33 These vulnerabilities also extend to the DoD's own basic war-fighting capabilities. According to a GAO report from 2018, 'almost all the weapons that the DOD tested between 2012 and 2017, including the F-35 jet and missile systems, have "mission critical" cyber vulnerabilities and can be "easily hacked" using "relatively simple tools and techniques'".34As poor as federal cyber-security efforts are, the situation at the state and local levels is significantly worse: a 2019 survey indicated that there remains a large difference between state and federal cyber-security capabilities.35 The state and local agencies polled said they had high confidence in their ability to 'prevent' a cyber attack in only 19% of cases (compared to 41% of federal agencies), and only 28% of those canvassed said they would be able to 'recover' (versus 55% of federal agencies). The nation's privately held critical infrastructure is more difficult to assess, but is largely considered to be more capable, and the United States' overall cyber-security stance tends to be ranked highly by more politically minded ratings - the International Telecommunications Union, for example, ranked the US overall at number two worldwide.36 More technical ratings, however, like that of the National Cyber Security Index, give the US a more middling assessment - placing it, for instance, in thirteenth place world­ wide.37 The only good news, if it can be called that, to emerge from these findings is that the poor state of US national cyber security is mirrored by that of Russia and China. Second-order effects: emerging cyber powers and their strategic dilemma A major reason for the vulnerable state of US cyber security has to do with scale - large nations have inherently more attack surface to cover, and the US easily has the greatest attack surface of them all.38 However, the opposite is therefore also true - smaller nations on balance have a much easier task in building national cyber security, and this has significant repercussions for how they play their own game of strategic deterrence. Yet the asymmetric strength of small players has been largely overlooked in most conventional analyses of cyber powers.

n 8 I Alexander Klimburg

Smaller nations often benefit from increased cooperation between the civilian and military, and state and non-state sectors, and generally face fewer challenges in coordinating emergency measures. Some even have the ability to disconnect from the global internet if necessary.39 Smaller countries may also benefit from a more stringent legal and regulatory framework that requires a minimum level of cyber defence, not just from various levels of government but also from the private sector. For nations like, say, the Netherlands, the task of coordinating with 100-300 criticalinfrastructure providers, and a comparable number of local and federal government networks, is a completely different task than dealing with many tens of thousands of civilian assets and non-military governmental networks, as in the United States.40 A smaller attack surface means fewer critical-infrastructure providers that need to be communicated with, fewer government agency networks that need to be hardened and less scope for friction in a crisis. Essentially, this means that smaller advanced cyber nations have an inherent advantage in pursuing national cyber security compared with very large nations such as the United States, or indeed Russia and China. All things considered, a number of smaller nations might actually do quite well in a force-on-force conflict with a major cyber power. The ability of many smaller nations to potentially absorb cyber blows is no less significant in a wartime scenario than advantageous defensive geog­ raphy would be in a ground operation. Yet the 'high ground' advantage of smaller states in presenting a smaller attack surface in the cyber domain may not have been adequately factored into analysts' calculations, including those that informed the drafting of persistent engagement. As a corollary to this, smaller nations' ability to conduct deterrence by punishment - a strat­ egy that persistent engagement has heavily incentivised them to pursue - is not well understood. The nature of the offensive cyber capabilities currently being developed by the 'next 30' nations examined in the 2016 CSIS study may not be clear, but there is no reason to believe that they relate only to cyber-crime-style scenarios, such as denial-of-service or even ransomware attacks. Instead, it should be assumed that these cyber powers can 'turn the lights off' - that is, launch a strategic strike on the critical infrastructure of an enemy. While

Mixed Signals: A Flawed Approach to Cyber Deterrence I 119

it is much easier to temporarily shut down a nation's infrastructure net­ works than to damage them beyond repair, 'temporary' disruptions can still impose catastrophic costs on a nation's economy and limit its ability to main­ tain domestic order. The destructive potential of the next 30 may be orders of magnitude less than that of the United States or a near-peer cyber power, but some of these countries still possess a minimal deterrence capability that, much like the small nuclear arsenals of France, the UK and China, could inflict an unacceptable level of retaliatory punishment on a potential aggressor, no matter their overwhelming technical superiority. While detractors may say that mere cyber attacks should not be compared to the horror of a nuclear exchange, the effects of weeks-long black­ outs, the destruction of financial information and the breakdown of most forms of commu­ nication should not be underestimated. The next-30 cyber nations may therefore possess something which was previously unavailable

The next-30 cyber nations may have a defensive advantage

to them: not just a strategic-weapons capabil­ ity - a virtual strike force no less potent than a wing of bombers or ballistic missiles - but also a defensive advantage towards larger foes. The sheer number of nations that may be able to reciprocally threaten a major power could be historically unprecedented. There was briefly a time, in the late 1950s, when it seemed possible that dozens of nations would eventually deploy nuclear weapons; even small countries like Switzerland deliberated the possibility of creating their own nuclear deterrent.41 In the end, many of these opted to form alliances with existing nuclear powers instead. Today, persistent engagement may be changing the way such nations provide for their own security. Instead of depending on the pro­ tective umbrella of their friends, many now have their own budding deterrence-by-punishment capability in the cyber domain, in addition to having become better able to resist the effects of a strategic cyber strike against themselves. Some are also being incentivised by persistent engage­ ment not only to develop offensive capabilities, but to use them as well. After all, persistent engagement postulates that cyber conflict is not only to be welcomed, but to be engaged in so as to be 'understood'. Any country not

120 I Alexander Klimburg

carrying out cyber attacks would, like those that did not test nuclear bombs, be excluded from the main table and left without a voice. This is seen as a perverse incentive by those who advocate for non-proliferation and argue that the increased distribution of destructive weapons increases the likeli­ hood not only that one will be used, but that all will be used. Third-order effects: weaponising information and changing the internet In February 2019, it was reported that some unspecified action had been taken by CYBERCOM in November 2018 against the Internet Research Agency, a notorious social-media 'troll factory' headquartered in St Petersburg. The New York Times said that the organisation had been shut down 'for a number of days' as part of an effort to secure the US midterm elections.42 Unlike many other parts of the Russian security apparatus, the Internet Research Agency does not seem to engage in 'hacking' - that is, it does not launch its own intrusions. Rather, it is widely accepted that the agency engages only in spreading disinformation,43 something that may not even be illegal under international law. CYBERCOM's action against it may well have fallen beneath the 'use of force' or 'armed attack' threshold (a dis­ tinction not usually made in the United States anyway), but its public nature implies an acceptance of kinetic-effect cyber attacks - it sent the message that it is okay to hack what you consider 'fake news'. If the targeting of actors that have only a propaganda function (rather than being directly responsible for cyber attacks) becomes normalised, then more conventional media organisations, as well as civil-society and non-governmental organisations, may become admissible targets. Russia might conclude, for example, that foreign support for domestic democ­ racy activists falls under the heading of 'information and psychological actions aimed at undermining ... the homeland', to borrow language from the 2016 Russian Information Security Doctrine.44 Likewise, Beijing might find Chinese-language translations of the New York Times provocative.45 International disputes may emerge about 'bad content', such as propa­ ganda, social-media campaigns and unkind opinion pieces.46 In this way, persistent engagement might encourage the very risk that it was intended to alleviate: the weaponisation of information.

Mixed Signals: A Flawed Approach to Cyber Deterrence I 121

In June 2019, the New York Times reported that, at the same time the US was targeting the Information Research Agency, it was also deploying offensive cyber capabilities within the Russian power grid.47A similar intru­ sion of US power grids - using a malware package known as BlackEnergy - was noticed in 2011 and publicly reported on soon after. A version of BlackEnergy was also used in December 2015 to cause a large-scale black­ out in western Ukraine.48 These two intrusions, both of them attributed to Russia, ultimately drew attention to themselves, even though there was a blackout only in the 2015 action. In June 2019, however, the United States raised the ante. Rather than 'allowing' their own pre-deployment operation to be discovered and reported on by Russian actors, the Americans reported it themselves, stating that since 2018 US malware had been present in the Russian power grid in order to effect a kinetic-equivalent strike if necessary. The intent of this disclosure was likely to make it clear to the Russians that, if necessary, the US was ready to accept a level of 'mutually assured dis­ ruption'. At least as important was the message that CYBERCOM had not abandoned its strategic-warfare role. Yet the United States' public declara­ tion of its willingness to significantly violate the sovereignty of an adversary in peacetime (something that would not happen when, say, fielding bal­ listic missiles) seems to present a novel situation for international law. It also provided strong reinforcement for the Russian and Chinese strategic narrative that politics is the extension of warfare, a reversal of Karl von Clausewitz's famous definition of warfare as an extension of politics. By effectively declaring that the United States considered the pre-deployment of cyber weapons within an adversary's critical infrastructure as being per­ missible (rather than simply being 'caught in the act', as the Russians were), CYBERCOM took a big step away from the established international legal order that the United States has helped to create. It also implicitly accepted a norm of mutual hostage-taking or 'mutually assured debilitation', a huge strategic concession that seems to imply US acceptance of a level of parity with adversaries where previously it could insist on hegemony. Moreover, it implied that CYBERCOM, if not the entire US government, has accepted the core Marxist-Leninist argument that 'peacetime' and 'wartime' are arti­ ficial distinctions.

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It is clear that persistent engagement poses several direct challenges to the existing international order. For instance, not only does it mandate the forward- or pre-deployment of cyber weapons inside the networks of other countries before a dispute has crossed the threshold of armed conflict, it also suggests that operations beneath this threshold can be justified for any number of reasons, including as countermeasures against relatively 'soft' disinformation and propaganda activity. There is no reason to suppose that this way of thinking will be confined to the United States - any number of the next-30 cyber powers could also embrace these principles. Persistent engagement may also challenge the management, and there­ fore the shape and form, of the global internet as we know it. Depictions of cyberspace as increasingly violent will accelerate a growing trend to describe the management of the internet in security-related terms. This has been an abiding diplomatic objective of a sizeable faction of states, led by Russia and China, for many years - arguably since 1998.49These states have proposed an International Code of Conduct for Information Security,50 the latest version of which was endorsed by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2016. The greatest risk the code's supporters see to their own cyber security is not so much infrastructure-targeting cyber attacks, but rather information warfare intended to achieve the despised outcome of 'regime change'. For these cyber powers, encouraging diplomatic discus­ sion on 'countering foreign political influence' is a key objective. To further this goal, backers of the Code of Conduct have challenged the way the global internet is run. To date, the internet has been managed by a regime comprising multiple government, civil-society and private-sector actors.51 This is known as the multi-stakeholder approach to internet gov­ ernance, and it has proven to be remarkably resilient, as well as beneficial for the internet's growth. Yet Code of Conduct supporters wish to replace this multi-stakeholder model with an intergovernmental one. They also wish to 'securitise' cyberspace by shifting norms of surveillance, data pro­ tection and human rights online, a desire that has been expressed by some Western governments too. In May 2015, Theresa May, then prime minister of the UK, announced that the British government would be taking a much more restrictive approach to user behaviour in cyberspace and to internet

Mixed Signals: A Flawed Approach to Cyber Deterrence I 123

freedoms in general in response to a number of terrorist incidents. May was fiercely criticised when she refused to counter accusations that these amounted to Chinese-style internet restrictions.52 Already, some governments have misused critical internet infrastructure to facilitate their own espionage activity, such as in the 2019 attacks attrib­ uted to Iranian actors on the Domain Name System (sometimes described as the 'telephone book' of the internet).53There is also interest in connecting the management of the Domain Name System to international efforts intended to counter cyber crime, including the dissemination of 'bad content', as variously defined. In this sense, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation's argument that changing the management of internet resources is needed to halt the rise in cyber conflict may be gaining ground. If the liberal-democratic argument that the multi-stakeholder model has worked well and served as an effective firebreak against authoritarian desires to control the internet is rejected, then all users - including those in liberal democracies - will be faced with a very different information envi­ ronment than that of the previous 20 years. In this new environment, all information is likely to be treated as a potential weapon, and thus subject to government intervention and state negotiations. By effectively encouraging cyber conflict, the persistent-engagement vision greatly increases the appeal of the argument that a much stronger government role in achieving 'cyber peace' is needed, and that ultimately, this perilous domain needs an inter­ governmental model to manage it. *

*

*

Persistent engagement may be driving unwanted effects in a number of ways, but the mixed signalling and over-communication the strategy encourages seem particularly at fault. Publicly advocating in favour of the use of offensive cyber means can only be detrimental to international peace and security, and produce an overall increase in cyber conflict. Emerging cyber nations will be incentivised not only to develop offensive cyber capa­ bilities but also to use them - which may lead to the discovery that they can in fact compete with great powers. At the same time, hallowed principles

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of international order and internet governance may be undermined, to the benefit of countries whose interests may run counter to those of the United States and liberal democracies everywhere. A reconsideration of the basic premises of persistent engagement may show that past US deterrence policy was actually effective - as in the case of the US-China deal that produced a decline in Chinese intellectual-property theft. It may also show that the current high level of cyber aggression has resulted from foreign perceptions of US strength, not US weakness. Instead of publicly reinforcing its dominant posture and conflating transparency with propaganda, the United States might be better served by walking more softly in cyberspace even as it retains a big stick. Adopting a policy of genuine transparency would have a much-needed stabilising effect by limiting the threat of inadvertent escalation or loss of escalation control. Such a policy should feature multilevel discussions, with varying levels of confidentiality, about strategic cyber capabilities and their command and control, alongside ongoing international discus­ sions on norms of restraint.54 The obvious benefits of this approach explain why the United States' closest allies and partners have almost unanimously advocated for it. Any covert cyber activities that impair these discussions, rather than advancing them, should remain just that - covert. Otherwise, mixing signals in the cyber domain is a recipe for serious adverse effects that threaten to undermine the security not just of the United States, but of all liberal democracies and of the internet itself. Acknowledgements Parts of this article were commissioned as a White Paper for the US Cyberspace Solarium Commission.

Notes 1 There was admirable public discus­ sion on the stand-up of the new Cyber Mission Force from 2015, which now includes some 133 Cyber Mission Teams. While the exact capabilities

and tasks of these units are still classi­ fied, the public acknowledgement of their existence, as well as their general role, has supported a widespread Western diplomatic effort to have

Mixed Signals: A Flawed Approach to Cyber Deterrence I 125

2

3

4

5

urgent arms-control-related discus­ sions with nations such as Russia and China on their cyber capabilities. 'Defend forward', which encompasses the concept of 'continuous engagement', is one of the three tasks named in the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy. See US Department of Defense, 'Department of Defense Cyber Strategy: Summary', 2018, p. 1, https://media.defense.gov/2018/ Sep/18/200204165 8/-1/-1/i/C YB ER_ STRATEGY_SUMMARYJFINAL. PDF. CYBERCOM's vision of 'defend forward' is 'persistent engagement'. For a good attempt at untangling the different strategies, see Robert Chesney, 'The 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy: Understanding "Defense Forward" in Light of the NDAA and PPD-20 Changes', Lawfare, 25 September 2019, https://www.lawfareblog. com/2018-dod-cyber-strategyunderstanding-defense-forward-lightndaa-and-ppd-20-changes. Jeff Kosseff, 'The Contours of "Defend Forward" Under International Law', 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, NATO CCD COE, 2019, https://ccdcoe.org/ uploads/2oi9/o6/Art_i7_TheContours-of-Defend-Forward.pdf. Quoted in Lauren Williams, 'Nakasone Talks Cyber Deterrence at Confirmation Hearing', Defense Systems, 2 March 2019, https ://defensesys terns.com/ articles/2018/03/02/nakasonecybercom-confirmation.aspx. See 'Statement of General Paul M. Nakasone Commander of the United States Cyber Command Before the

6

7

8

9

10

Senate Committee on Armed Services', 14 February 2019, https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ Nakasone_02-14-19.pdf. Paul M. Nakasone, 'A Cyber Force for Persistent Operations', Joint Force Quarterly, no. 92, ist Quarter 2019, http://cs.brown.edu/courses/ csci 1800/sources/2019_o i_22 J F Q_ CyberRoleForPersistentOperations_ Nakasone.pdf. The first indications of what was called 'continuous engage­ ment' appeared in a March 2018 CYBERCOM memorandum entitled 'Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority: Command Vision for US Cyber Command'. This was published just after Nakasone first aired these views in his Senate confirmation hear­ ing on 2 March. 'An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone', Joint Force Quarterly, no. 92, ist Quarter 2019, https://ndupress. ndu.edu/P0rtals/68/D0cuments/jfq/ jfq-92/jfq-92_4-9_Nakasone-Interview. pdf. See also Alexander Klimburg, The Darkening Web: The War for Cyberspace (New York: Penguin Press, 2017). Michael P. Fischerkeller and Richard J. Harknett, 'Deterrence Is Not a Credible Strategy for Cyberspace', Orbis, vol. 61, no. 3, Summer 2017, pp. 381-93, https://www.fpri.org/ article/2017/06/deterrence-notcredible-strategy-cyberspace/. Ibid. See also Michael P. Fischerkeller and Richard J. Harknett, 'Persistent Engagement and Tacit Bargaining: A Path Toward Constructing Norms in Cyberspace', Lawfare, 9 November 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/ persistent-engagement-and-tacit-

126 I Alexander Klimburg

11

12 13

14

15 16

bargaining-path-toward-constructingnorms-cyberspace. For the analysis of the 'pressure valve' aspect of the argument, see Jacquelyn G. Schneider, 'Persistent Engagement: Foundation, Evolution and Evaluation of a Strategy', Lawfare, 10 May 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/ persistent-engagement-foundationevolution-and-evaluation-strategy; and Brandon Valeriano and Benjamin Jensen, 'The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint', Cato Institute, 15 January 2019, https://www.cato. org/publications/policy-analysis/ myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint. See Schneider, 'Persistent Engagement'; and Valeriano and Jensen, 'The Myth of the Cyber Offense'. Valeriano and Jensen, 'The Myth of the Cyber Offense'. Cyber has been described as a domain that is particularly prone to inadvertent escalation and loss of escalation control. See, for example, OSCE, 'OSCE Participating States, in Landmark Decision, Agree to Expand List of Measures to Reduce Risk of Tensions Arising from Cyber Activities', 10 March 2016, https:// www.osce.org/cio/226656. Andy Greenberg, 'Flow Not to Prevent a Cyberwar with Russia', Wired, June 2019, https://www.wired. com/story/russia-cyberwar-escalationpower-grid/. 'An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone', p. 5. See Collin Anderson and Karim Sadjadpour, Tran's Cyber Threat: Espionage, Sabotage, and Revenge', Carnegie Endowment for

17

18

19

20

21

22 23

International Peace, 2018, https:// carnegieendowment.org/files/ Iran_Cyber_Final_Full_v2.pdf. Kim Zetter, 'The NS A Acknowledges What We All Feared: Iran Learns From US Cyberattacks', Wired, 10 February 2015, https://www.wired.com/2015/02/ nsa-acknowledges-feared-iran-learnsus-cyberattacks/. An example of this can be found in the January 2011 'National Security Space Strategy', the unclassified summary of which is available at https://www. dni. go v/files/documents/N ewsroom/ Reports%2oand%2oPubs/20i i_ nationalsecurityspacestrategy.pdf. See, for example, Joseph Nye, 'Deterrence in Cyberspace', Project Syndicate, 3 June 2019, https://www. project-syndicate.org/commentary/ deterrence-in-cyberspace-persistentengagement-by-j oseph-s-nye-2019-06. See Andrea Shalal-Esa, 'Ex-U.S. General Urges Frank Talk on Cyber Weapons', Reuters, November 2011, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-cyber-cartwrightidUSTRE7A5i4C2omio6; and Jason Healey, 'Getting the Drop in Cyberspace', Lawfare, August 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/ getting-drop-cyberspace. For an in-depth discussion of the mes­ saging of this phase, see Klimburg, The Darkening Web. Valeriano and Jensen, 'The Myth of the Cyber Offense'. For some evidence of how US cyber behaviour may have encouraged similar responses among adversar­ ies, see Anthony Craig and Brandon Valeriano, 'Conceptualising Cyber Arms Races', 8th International

Mixed Signals: A Flawed Approach to Cyber Deterrence I 127

Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2016, https://ccdc0e.0rg/upl0ads/2018/10/ Art-io-Conceptualising-Cyber-ArmsRaces.pdf. James Andrew Lewis, 'The Rationale for Offensive Cyber Capabilities', Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 June 2016, https://www.csis.org/blogs/ csis-strategic-technologies-blog/ rationale-offensive-cyber-capabilities. Council on Foreign Relations, 'Cyber Operations Tracker', https://www.cfr.org/interactive/ cyber-operations#Takeaways. For further explanation of this segmentation, see Klimburg, The Darkening Web. 'An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone', p. 4. Emphasis in original. A permissive norm is defined here as a norm that explicitly encourages certain 'negative' practices in the belief that they may produce 'positive' results that are worth the cost. One example of a permissive norm is the use of a 'shot across the bow' to signal final warning between naval warships, which has been adopted in both air defence and anti-submarine opera­ tions as well. Jason Healey and Neil Jenkins, 'Rough and Ready: Frameworks to Measure Persistent Engagement and Deterrence', SIPA, 2019, https://i. blackhat.com/USA-19/Thursday / us-19-Healey-Rough-and-ReadyFrameworks-to-Measure-PersistentEngagement-and-Deterrence-wp.pdf. See FireEye, 'Redline Drawn: China Recalculates Its Use of Cyber Espionage', June 2016, https:// www.fireeye.com/content/dam/

31

32

33

34

35

fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rptchina-espionage.pdf. Maggie Miller, 'Report Finds Majority of 2019 Ransomware Attacks Have Targeted State and Local Governments', Hill, August 2019, https://thehill.com/policy/ cybersecurity/459049-report-findsmaj ority-of-2019-ransom war e-attackshave-targeted-state-and. See Patricia Mazzei, 'Hit by Ransomware Attack, Florida City Agrees to Pay Hackers $600,000', New York Times, 19 June 2019, https:// www.ny times.com/2019/06/19/us/ florida-riviera-beach-hacking-ransom. html; Scott Shane, 'N.S.A. Contractor Arrested in Biggest Breach of U.S. Secrets Pleads Guilty', New York Times, 28 March 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/05/25/us/nsa-hacking-toolbaltimore.html; and "'N SA Malware" Released by Shadow Brokers Hacker Group', BBC News, 10 April 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/ technology-39553241. US Government Accountability Office, 'Urgent Actions Are Needed to Address Cybersecurity Challenges Facing the Nation', GAO-18-622, September 2018, https://www.gao. gov/products/GAO-18-622. Taylor Armerding, 'GAO Report Confirms Major Gaps in Government Cybersecurity', Forbes, 4 January 2019, https://www.forbes.com/ sites/taylorarmerding/2019/01/04/ gao-report-confirms-majorgaps-in-governmentcybersecurity/#3347do2a6672. Ponemon Institute, 'State of Cybersecurity in Local, State & Federal Government', October

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36

37 38

39

2015, https://www.ponemon. org/local/upload/file/State%20 of%2oCybersecurity%2oin%20 Government%2oFINAL2.pdf. ITU, 'Global Cyber security Index (GCI) 2018', https://www.itu.int/ dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI .012018-PDF-E.pdf. National Cyber Security Index, https:// ncsi.ega.ee/ncsi-index/. For a discussion of what a cyber 'attack surface' could entail, see Lily Hay Newman, 'Hacker Lexicon: What Is an Attack Surface?', Wired, 12 March 2017, https://www. wired.com/2017/03/hacker-lexiconattack-surface/. See also Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Lam Thuy Vo and Danny Yadron, 'Cataloging the World's Cyberforces', Wall Street Journal, 28 December 2015, http:// graphics.wsj.com/world-cataloguecyberwar-tools/?mod=article_inline. While Russia is well known to have examined the possibility of disconnecting from the internet in an emergency, other nations have also experimented with 'internet kill switches'. This type of strategy is more easily implemented by nations that do not have many global-internet access points, such as China. See Catalin Cimpanu, 'Oracle: China's Internet Is Designed More Like an Intranet', ZDNet, 23 July 2019, https://www.zdnet.com/article/ oracle-chinas-internet-is-designedmore-like-an-intranet/. Such a move could be logical in wartime, as it would greatly reduce the country's attack surface. See Violet Blue, 'Russia Is Going to Test an Internet "Kill Switch", and Its Citizens Will

40

41

42

43

44

Suffer', B@d P@ssword, 28 February 2019, https://www.engadget. com/2019/02/28/russia-putin-internetkill-switch-cybersecurity/. The exact numbers of assets or services considered 'critical' are invariably classified. However, cer­ tain US documents provide a glimpse of the scale of the problem, which is further compounded by the dif­ ferences between federal and local governments. See Newman, 'Hacker Lexicon'. Rob Edwards, 'Swiss Planned a Nuclear Bomb', New Scientist, 25 May 1996, https://www.newscientist. com/article/mgi50203io-50o-swissplanned-a-nuclear-bomb/. Julian E. Barnes, 'Cyber Command Operation Took Down Russian Troll Farm for Midterm Elections', New York Times, 26 February 2019, https://www. nytimes.com/2019/02/26/us/politics/ us-cyber-command-russia .html. See, for instance, the work of the EU's East StratCom Task Force at https:// euvsdisinfo.eu. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 'Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation', 5 December 2016, https:// www .mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/ official_documents/-/asset_publisher/ CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2563163. For further analysis of Russian views on information warfare, see Holger Molder, 'The War of N arratives: Putin's Challenge to International Security Governance in Ukraine', Estonian Journal of Military Studies, February 2016, available at https:// www.academia.edu/31235753/ THE_WAR_OF_NARRATIVES_

Mixed Signals: A Flawed Approach to Cyber Deterrence I 129

PUTIN_S_CHALLENGE_TO_ i n t e r n a t i o n a l _s e c u r i t y _ GOVERN A N CEJN JJK RA IN E. See Bill Marczark et al., 'China's Great Cannon', Citizen Lab, University of Toronto, April 2015, https://citizenlab. ca/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/ ChinasGreatCannon.pdf. See Klimburg, The Darkening Web. David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, 'U.S. Escalates Online Attacks on Russia's Power Grid', New York Times, 15 June 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/06/ 15/us/politics/trumpcyber-russia-grid.html. New Jersey Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Cell, 'BlackEnergy', 10 August 2017, https:// www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/ ics-malwarevariants/blackenergy. See UN General Assembly, 'Letter Dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General', UN Doc. A/69/273,13 January 2015, http:// www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ ws.asp?m=A/69/723. For the Code of Conduct, see UN General Assembly, 'Letter Dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General', UN Doc. A/66/359, 14 September 2011, http://content.netmundial.br/files/67.pdf. Ibid.

51 Joseph Nye reintroduced the 'regime complex' model to describe how vari­ ous initiatives work in cyberspace. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr, 'The Regime Complex for Managing Global Cyber Activities', Global Commission on Internet Governance, Paper Series: No. 1, May 2014, https://www.cigionline. org/sites/default/files/gcig_paper_no 1. pdf. The model was further devel­ oped in Alexander Klimburg and Louk Faesen, 'A Balance of Power in Cyberspace', European Cybersecurity Journal, vol. 3, no. 4, June 2018. 52 Andrew Griffin, 'Theresa May Doesn't Rule out Regulating the Internet like China: "Let's Work with the Companies'", Independent, 3 June 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/ life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/ theresa-may-internet-regulatingregulation-china-general-electionlondon-attack-bridge-a7774221.html. 53 Brian Krebs, 'A Deep Dive on the Recent Widespread DNS Hijacking Attacks', Krebs on Security, 18 February 2019, https:// krebsonsecurity.com/2019/02/a-deepdive-on-the-recent-widespread-dnshijacking-attacks/. 54 Claims of the demise of the normative approach have been greatly exagger­ ated. By calling out norm violations, it becomes increasingly clear what constitutes good and bad behaviour in cyberspace, and who the good and bad actors are. The rising number of states willing to engage in attribution of cyber attacks is often given as evi­ dence of this.

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Deterring Cyber Coercion: The Exaggerated Problem of Attribution David Blagden The potential damage from possible cyber attacks is rising as the sophisti­ cation of cyber weapons increases.1 Accordingly, the question of whether such attacks can be deterred is an increasingly salient one for governments, national-security agencies and the populations they seek to protect.2 One characteristic of cyber attack, its potential for anonymity, is often taken as an insurmountable barrier to effective deterrence based on retaliatory punish­ ment. But such assumptions are misguided. Coercion is the form of hostile political influence that deterrence seeks to oppose, and in order to coerce, a belligerent must necessarily identify that which it values. Attempted coercion thereby serves as a preference-revelation mechanism. Even if a bel­ ligerent can escape identifying itself via anonymous cyber attack, it cannot escape identifying interests that it holds dear, which can then be held at risk by those seeking deterrence. The political interests being advanced by a cyber attack will often make the identity of the aggressor clear, of course, even if the origin of the attack itself cannot be readily traced via technical means.3While a cyber attack may be technically anonymous, the strategic interaction of which it is a part can make clear whose interests are at stake. Yet many actors could have similar interests, meaning that the specific aggressor might remain unidentified.

David Blagden is Senior Lecturer in International Security at the University of Exeter's Strategy and Security Institute. Survival | voi. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 131-148

DOI 10.1080/00396338.2020.1715072

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Such reservations over strategic attribution are overblown, however. This is because they conflate two different variables within the deterrence cal­ culus: aggressor identity and aggressor interests. These variables do often correlate: if you want to retaliate against an attacker's territory, for instance, you need to know whose territory. Yet it is possible to identify valued inter­ ests of an attacker without identifying those interests' sole holder. And crucially, coercion is not possible without identifying the interests being advanced, in cyberspace or anywhere else, since the very nature of coercion requires revelation of desired changes in behaviour.4 Russia, for example, would not need to identify which specific NATO country cyber-attacked it to still identify - and hold at risk - interests shared by all NATO members. It is therefore possible to retaliate against revealed preferences - to achieve successful strategic attribution of interests - even when strategic attribution of a specific attacker identity remains challenging. Many actors may hold similar interests while only one of them may be responsible for a particular cyber attack, but that need not matter: the very factor that obscures their specific identities (their shared interests) also means that retaliating against those interests will punish the underlying aggressor. The fact that the spe­ cific attacker may have 'gotten away with it' in terms of not being identified individually will be little consolation when its interests have nonetheless been impaired. And knowing as much beforehand, it is possible for deter­ rence to hold based on the threat of subsequent retaliatory punishment. What is the value of such analysis? After all, cyber weapons are ill-suited tools for explicit coercive signalling, since their capability is often unclear prior to their use, and degraded by their revelation insofar as defenders can patch exposed vulnerabilities.5And many categories of hostile cyber action - attrition of an opponent's capabilities, hacking for enjoyment or publicity, covert cyber espionage, cyber-enabled theft, subversion and disinformation, and so forth - are pressing security concerns but do not achieve their effects via the issuance of coercive threats. Also, cyber deterrence has hardly been an unambiguous success thus far; there have been plenty of cyber attacks against states with retaliatory means at their disposal, despite successful culprit attribution and superior relative power. Examples include the 2012 attacks on the US financial system and Saudi Aramco, the 2013 attack on the

Deterring Cyber Coercion: The Exaggerated Problem of Attribution I 133

Sands Casino and the 2014 attack on Sony Pictures. On top of all this, one could question the value of more deterrence theory while empirical scholar­ ship on cyber aggression remains relatively sparse. None of these rejoinders hold water, however. By themselves, cyber threats are indeed flawed tools of coercive signalling. But taken in strategic context, a wide range of hostile cyber actions meet a reasonable defini­ tion of coercion: cost imposition in pursuit of behavioural change.6 If an attacker seeks to coercively exploit a favourably changed balance of power following successful attrition or extortion, if a protester draws attention to a cause in a way that generates coercive political costs, or if cyber espionage delivers information that is utilised coercively in another domain, coercive interests are being advanced.7 Meanwhile, observed cyber attacks - those that, for whatever reason, have not been deterred - are not evidence of the futility of the deterrent enterprise, since defenders' resolve to impose punishment rises with the severity of the attack suffered while the pool of capable-enough potential culprits shrinks. For example, North Korea going undeterred in its 2014 Sony hack - a rudimentary and low-damage attack - does not mean that deterrence has failed with respect to great-power use of more capable cyber weaponry against other major states.8 Lastly, owing to unavoidable selection bias, the empirical study of non-occurrences will underplay deterrence's causal significance; cyber-deterrence theory can help offset this imbalance.9 Escalation dominance and the'return address'problem Deterrence is achieved when an actor - a state, an armed group or an individual - concludes that the likely costs of an attack exceed the likely benefits.10 Opponents can be deterred in two ways.11 Deterrence by denial occurs when a potential aggressor concludes that attack will be ineffec­ tive because of the strength of the countermeasures in place: it is denied the opportunity of achieving its coercive objectives. Deterrence by punish­ ment, in contrast, does not promise to diminish an attack's effectiveness, but rests on the threat of retaliation of sufficient magnitude that the aggres­ sor will be worse off than if it had not attacked in the first place: it will be punished after the fact. Deterring or thwarting cyber attack via effective

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denial measures, such as information and communications technology (ICT) hardening and resilience, is of course an important component of effective cyber deterrence. But the focus here is deterrence of those threats that cannot be reliably denied. There is no reason in principle that the use of any new weapon cannot be deterred via the threat of retaliation using the same or alternative weapons systems. To be insusceptible to such 'cross-domain' deterrence - deterrence reliant on the threat of costs imposed in an operational domain other than that in which the original attack occurred - a new weapon would have to possess destructive capability that no other existing weapon could match and be available exclusively to one party. Yet while the second condition may hold for certain cyber weapons given differential rates of development, the first condition will not obtain for cyber capabilities, because nuclear weapons can already impose essentially unlimited costs.12Although nuclear retaliation against irritant-level cyber disruption would lack ethical and psy­ chological credibility, the general point is that the risk of escalation to more serious retaliation into different domains raises the potential costs of even low-level attacks - a variant of 'escalation equivalence' logic.13 A similar logic underpinned Cold War 'tripwire' military deployments. US, British and French garrisons positioned in West Berlin, for example, could not hold the city against the Red Army, but created an unacceptable risk of escalation to general war with NATO's nuclear powers if Soviet forces attacked.14 The prominence of deterrence by punishment in Western cyber strategy has grown in line with capabilities and understanding. The 2011 cyber­ defence strategies of the United States and United Kingdom - the two most capable Western cyber powers - did not mention retaliation, although both referred to deterrence and dwelt extensively on hardening and resilience.15 Following Edward Snowden's revelations of Anglo-American capabili­ ties, however, both countries have become less reluctant to discuss their full range of options. The 2015 US cyber-defence strategy, for instance, stressed that 'the United States must be able to declare or display effec­ tive response capabilities to deter an adversary from initiating an attack', while the 2016 UK strategy has an explicit subsection on offensive capa­ bilities as a component of deterrence.16 The Western allies have also made

Deterring Cyber Coercion: The Exaggerated Problem of Attribution I 135

it increasingly explicit that cross-domain retaliation is a component of their thinking.17 Most recently, US posture innovations stemming from the 2018 National Cyber Strategy - the 'Cyber Deterrence Initiative' (which aims to bolster retaliatory deterrence through collective alliance responses) and the 'persistent engagement' doctrine (which contemplates a continuous cycle of tracking and offensive action against emerging cyber threats) - display yet more emphasis on punishment.18 There are impor­ tant questions, discussed later, about whether rising faith in the efficacy of offensive operations - especially of the pre-emptive variety - as a response to threatened aggression could itself become an escalatory risk.19 Yet the fact remains that threatened escalation is already an important component of major powers' responses to emerging cyber threats, and unlikely to be retracted. For effective deterrence via the threat of punish­ ment, however, a potential attacker needs to know there is a significant chance of actually being punished. Assessments of this likelihood focus on the defender's

Cyber attacks may prove untraceable

capability and resolve: does the victim of an attack have the incentives, determination and wherewithal to retaliate by imposing a sufficient level of costs?20 Embedded in the capability half of the equation is a crucial sub­ sidiary question: can the aspiring deterrer target its retaliation in the first place? Absent a 'return address', no amount of retaliatory firepower will deter if attackers can be confident it will never be directed against any­ thing they value. This is where cyber attack poses a challenge for deterrence. Sophisticated cyber attacks may prove untraceable, even by the most advanced cyber­ security agencies.21 Masking internet protocol addresses, routing attacks via numerous connected computers ('bots') that have wittingly or otherwise been turned into a cross-border network, initiating an attack from a cyber­ cafe or public library, hacking and utilising some unsuspecting individual's internet-connected mobile phone, and so forth, may facilitate apparently unattributable cyber attacks.22 Furthermore, even if the computer used to initiate an attack can be identified, it is a greater challenge to prove who was sitting at it, or on whose orders they acted.23 The ongoing state-versus-

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private arms race in encryption technology only intensifies the problem.24 While progress is being made in cyber forensics, technological innovation nevertheless appears unlikely to render all cyber attacks traceable in the near future.25 Crucially, however, cyber attacks are not actually as anony­ mous as their technical characteristics might imply, and so do not enjoy the immunity from targeted retaliation that is often feared. The coercive revelation of preferences Key research in cyber deterrence and coercion is united around the pivotal importance of attribution. For Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, 'attribution is fundamental: almost any response to a specific offence - law enforce­ ment, diplomatic, or military - requires identifying the offender first'.26 Erica Borghard and Shawn Lonergan similarly contend that 'coercion in cyberspace requires attribution to be effective', while Martin Libicki reasons that coercion must be visibly associated with the coercer to operate, the logic being that the coercer must identify themselves if they are to cause the behavioural change they desire.27 These assessments are aligned with seminal early analyses of the role of punishment in deterrence, which treated the existence of an identified enemy against which retaliation could be directed as a baseline assumption.28 Such orthodoxies, however, obscure a vital distinction in the logic of punishment, with substantial implications for the cyber-deterrence debate. Retaliatory punishment is about imposing costs on political, economic and social interests - populations, cities, forces, wealth, status and anything else from which the attacker derives utility. The specific identity of the attacker is not an interest, and has no necessary political content. Of course, many important interests are exclusively associated with a particular identity, usually a state holding territory. Accordingly, deterrence by threatening some package of political, economic and social assets that are located in a particular territory requires the identification of the custodian of that terri­ tory. For this reason, the conflation of interests and identities was largely unproblematic in Cold War deterrence: for practical purposes, the interests that each aspiring deterrer sought to hold at risk were synonymous and coextensive with an exclusive identified adversary.

Deterring Cyber Coercion: The Exaggerated Problem of Attribution I 137

While many interests are indeed unique to a specific holder, many others are not. Notwithstanding the Cold War experience, deterrence based on the threat of retaliatory punishment does not inherently require attribution of the attacker's identity, provided relevant interests can be ascertained. A cyber attack is a form of coercion, whereby an actor seeks to impose costs on an adversary to induce it to change its behaviour so that it aligns with the coercer's political, social and economic preferences.29 To advance a set of political interests via coercion, a coercer at least implicitly identifies those interests by specifying what behavioural change it wants to encourage. Attempted coercion therefore serves as a mechanism of pref­ erence revelation. Such preference revelation may make the identity of a cyber coercer clear, even if the cyber attack itself cannot be traced via technical means.30 If the interests that the cyber coercion seeks to advance align solely with the unique identifiable interests of a particular state or group, then that actor will have identified itself. Similarly, if a cyber aggressor exploits a success­ ful attack via non-cyber means - say, conventional military action while an opponent's command-and-control systems have been taken temporar­ ily offline by a cyber attack31 - this too may reveal the attacker's identity. Yet even where a specific attacker is not identifiable via these revealed preferences, preference revelation remains useful for deterrence: if there are a dozen possible culprits behind a given cyber attack, the very thing that makes them hard to distinguish - their similar interests - also unifies them. Thus, while the precise identity of the attacker may indeed remain unclear, this still does not preclude an effective counter-value deterrent posture. The interests the coercion seeks to advance can be identified as something the attacker - whoever it was - values, and be held at risk via the threat of retaliation.32 The most high-profile cyber attack to date represents a key example of interest attribution in the absence of specific attacker identification. Iran did not need state-of-the-art cyber forensics to have a good idea that the Stuxnet attack on its nuclear facilities uncovered in 2010 was launched by Israel, the United States or one of those two states' allies. While more than one techni­ cally capable actor had an interest in retarding Iran's nuclear programme,

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making it impossible to identify the specific attacker based on desired behav­ ioural change alone, there were interests common to all possible attackers - the security of the United States' Middle Eastern allies - that Iran could have held at risk to achieve deterrence. Stuxnet was not an attack of explicit coercive signalling, of course; it was covert attrition, intended to degrade a capability. Nevertheless, that attrition was then exploited coercively in noncyber domains and, once discovered - as it was always likely to be - the interests of its perpetrators were not hard to discern even if specific attacker identity remained opaque. The principal barrier to Iran's achieving deter­ rence was not the anonymity of the cyber attack, but its military inferiority and associated paucity of sufficiently credible retaliatory options. Cyber attacks on Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), Finland (2013) and Ukraine (2014) - strategically attributable to Russia, even if technical attribution remained challenging - reflected the failure of deterrence for similar reasons. Beyond such observed incidents, however, the cyber attacks contemplated but not conducted due to the likely costs of potential retaliation would be the most probative indicators of effective deterrence of cyber attacks via the threat of retaliation. Yet such cases remain by definition largely unobservable. Caveats and qualifications On balance, there are grounds for optimism about prospects for deterring cyber attacks via both cyber and non-cyber retaliatory means, at least by countries powerful enough to threaten meaningful costs. Five broad caveats, however, counsel against wholesale reliance on counter-value deterrence. Firstly, cyber attacks conducted by individuals solely to disrupt, without intending to change behaviour, are unlikely to be amenable to deterrence. Since such individuals would not be seeking to advance a political purpose, they would have no identifying cause and could thus be genuinely anonymous. The same may be true of those who hack solely to bring private information to public attention.33 It may also be true of those who hack solely for financial enrichment, absent any higher coercive purpose. Fortunately, hackers in these three categories are less likely to command the resources needed for cyber attacks causing mass destruction or large-scale casualties.34

Deterring Cyber Coercion: The Exaggerated Problem of Attribution I 139

Secondly, deterrence by denial (hardening ICT systems) may have less severe humanitarian consequences than deterrence by punishment, thereby suffer fewer credibility gaps, and therefore be preferable for both practical and moral reasons.35That said, deterrence by denial can also fail if perceived as non-credible, in which case the threat of punishment may achieve what the threat of denial cannot.36Relatedly, much malicious cyber activity consti­ tutes an irritating nuisance rather than an act of war,37 so aspiring deterrers will have to weigh their desire to deter major attacks against their desire to avoid dangerous escalation over minor infringements.38 Aspiring deterrers thus have to decide the level at which to set their retaliation threshold, how to gradate it and how explicitly to declare it.39 The upshot is that deterrence via threat of retaliatory punishment should be viewed as complementary to deterrence by denial.40 Thirdly, a particularly effective cyber attack could neutralise its target's cross-domain capability to retaliate, which would obviously undermine deterrence by retaliation.41Such an attack would be hard to achieve.42Still, the prospect of a pre-emptive cyber attack that removed subsequent retaliatory capability could become a perilous source of crisis instability.43Among recent Western posture innovations, the Cyber Deterrence Initiative - reflecting Washington's goal of coordinating retaliation against cyber attack among its allies - aims to bolster second-strike credibility and therefore increase stabil­ ity. But persistent engagement - embodying Washington's stated intention to pre-empt possible hostile cyber action - could cut the other way, incentivising US adversaries to strike first rather than risk waiting to be forcibly disarmed. Fourthly, relying on deterrence that infers targets for retaliation via technically anonymous aggressors' coercive goals poses the risk that devious third parties will try to trick their enemies into mutual conflict by framing them through false-flag operations.44 If Russia decided that its strategic interests would be served by China and the United States' weakening each other militarily, for example, it might conduct a technically anonymous cyber attack on US forces in Asia that seemingly benefitted China - or even one with ostensibly Chinese technical characteristics - leading Washington to believe Beijing was commencing hostilities against its regional interests. This could provoke swift US retaliation and equally swift Chinese escalation

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owing to each side's fear of losing first-move advantages.45 Moreover, even without the successful framing of an innocent party as the target for misdirected retaliation, false-flag operations may sow doubt and preclude effective retaliation, undermining the credibility of punishment threats. This problem is context-specific and surmountable, however. Between two parties with a less offence-dominant strategic relationship than the con­ temporary US-Chinese situation is often taken to be46 - and even that is contestable on the cyber front47 - a dearth of first-move advantages could allow scope for diplomatic consultation over the origin of the attack.48 If the framed aggressor repudiated the coercive goals that appeared to point in its direction, consciously and visibly eschewing the potential benefits of the apparent coercion, it would credibly signal that it was not to blame.49 For example, if a party that appeared to benefit from a cyber attack on another state's internet-connected military logistics chain refrained from taking offensive conventional action even while the attack victim's forces were immobilised by the attack's effects, that would be a costly - and thus credi­ ble - signal of restraint. The third party attempting such framing would then itself be in a perilous situation: if its own subversive agenda were uncov­ ered, the two parties it had attempted to trick could retaliate in concert.50 Thus, third-party framing is not a risk-free option, and the threat could be minimised if potential cyber adversaries pursued deterrent postures that downplayed first-move advantages. Indeed, the major powers have already done so at the top rung of the escalatory ladder by way of establishing survivable nuclear arsenals. Similarly, non-malicious cyber accidents could be falsely construed as attacks.51 But again, identifying the coercive interests at stake could mitigate the risk of errant retaliation, and the repudiation of the coercive benefits would duly signal blamelessness. Finally, recognising that cyber coercion will always seek to advance some set of interests does not mean that discerning such interests will be easy. Coercers, to be sure, will often want to be correctly identified so as to max­ imise the clarity of intended signals.52 But many potential cyber attackers may instead prefer to achieve their strategic goals via covert cyber action to avoid possible retaliatory costs and - as discussed throughout - cyberspace is particularly amenable to such concealment and obscuration.53

Deterring Cyber Coercion: The Exaggerated Problem of Attribution I 141

Accordingly, those seeking to hold the relevant interests at risk to effect deterrence may have to look at the indirect consequences of the initial cyber attack to isolate the set of interests being advanced. Alternatively, the target of such an attack could hold all of the interests seemingly being advanced at risk - and the more severe the suffered attack, the easier it is to make expansive retaliatory threats credible54 - removing the necessity of choos­ ing among enemies. Indeed, in retaliating for Stuxnet against Israel (via its Hizbullah and Hamas proxies), the United States (via the 2012 US finan­ cial hack) and Saudi Arabia (via the 2012 Saudi Aramco cyber attack), Iran appeared to take this route. Jon Lindsay notes, of course, that punishing many for the crimes of a few can be 'unpopular' and 'illegitimate', and could 'counterproductively embolden' opponents.55 But with high-enough stakes and enough relative power, illegitimacy, unpopularity and agitated enemies may be a price worth paying to ensure that the underlying culprits are punished.56 Furthermore, target calculations would also be subject to iterative refinement. For instance, if the potential beneficiaries of the inter­ ests ranked as being advanced the most by an attack refused to repudiate the coercive gains, they would effectively certify that those were the inter­ ests that should suffer retaliation. By contrast, the repudiation of those gains would signal that a different set of interests than those the attack seemed intended to advance should be held at risk. *

*

*

Deterring cyber attacks by threatening to impair the interests they are pre­ sumed to advance, as opposed to focusing on identifying a sole attacker, is not without peril. It risks retaliating against innocent states or civilians, which incurs ethical costs and potential blowback, while cross-domain escalation may become dangerously unstable, especially if policymakers become inordinately confident in the efficacy of offensive cyber operations. Nevertheless, the anonymity of cyberspace is not the fundamental obstacle to counter-value deterrence it is often supposed to be, for attempting to coerce via cyber means reveals interests that can be held at risk. Accordingly, as the damage potential of cyber weaponry continues to increase, governments

142 I David Blagden

and the populations they seek to protect may gain security from the threat of retaliatory punishment. For all of its ethical uncertainties, therefore, this form of deterrence remains the final backstop of major powers' strategic postures, and could constitute as potent an instrument against cyber threats as it has against those in the nuclear and conventional domains. Acknowledgements The author thanks Ben Buchanan, Andrew Futter, Erik Gartzke, Jon Lindsay, Kubo Macak, Patrick Porter, Simon Smith, Peter Watkins and especially Helena Mills for inval­ uable comments on drafts of this article.

Notes 1 On cyber-capability growth, see Dale Peterson, 'Offensive Cyber Weapons: Construction, Development, and Employment', Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 36, no. 1, February 2013, pp. 120-4. For reference, a cyber attack is understood as the intentional use of computer code - a 'cyber weapon' - to harm or exert hostile control over another party's information and com­ munications technology (ICT) systems or networks, along with the physical systems and living beings dependent upon them. 2 Some have derided discussions of cyber deterrence as misguidedly applying an outdated 'Cold War para­ digm' to an ill-suited strategic context. See, for example, Daniel Steed, 'Cyber War, Let's Get Real(ist)', War on the Rocks, 14 October 2013, https:// warontherocks.com/2013/10/cyberwar-lets-get-realist/. There is nothing 'Cold War' about deterrence, how­ ever, despite the nuclear era bringing the concept new-found prominence. Rather, it is a timeless and neces-

sary attribute of interactions between mutually armed parties under anarchy: see Ben Buchanan, 'Cyber Deterrence Isn't MAD; It's Mosaic', Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, International Engagement on Cyber IV, 2014, p. 131. It is therefore an entirely appropriate concept for the cyber age. 3 See Richard L. Kugler, 'Deterrence of Cyber Attacks', in Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr and Larry K. Wentz (eds), Cyberpower and National Security (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2009), pp. 309-41; Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), p. 44; and Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, 'Attributing Cyber Attacks', Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 38, nos. 1-2, February 2015, pp. 4-37. 4 Erica D. Borghard and Shawn M. Lonergan, 'The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace', Security Studies, vol. 26, no. 3, May 2017, pp. 452-81. 5 Key recent works on cyber deterrence/ coercion share this perspective. Jon R.

Deterring Cyber Coercion: The Exaggerated Problem of Attribution I 143

Lindsay argues that 'cyber operations are unsuited for coercive signaling' in Tipping the Scales: The Attribution Problem and the Feasibility of Deterrence against Cyberattack', Journal of Cybersecurity, vol. 1, no. I, September 2015, p. 54. Borghard and Lonergan similarly contend that 'signaling in cyberspace is the most problematic of all the domains', in 'The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace', p. 456. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 4. As Borghard and Lonergan's own Schelling-derived caveat admits, coercion need not take the form of explicit threat-issuance to nonetheless be operative; the key is simply that it is inferred by targets, based on their assessment of others' capabilities, interests and behaviours. 'The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace', p. 455, note II. Indeed, cyber capabilities may yield coercive options well beyond mere signalling and threat-issuance: see David Betz, 'Cyberpower in Strategic Affairs: Neither Unthinkable nor Blessed', Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 35, no. 3, November 2012, pp. 689-711. Lindsay, 'Tipping the Scales', p. 59. This is not to deny that states are using cyber exploits against each other all the time, but simply a rec­ ognition that no major power has (as of December 2019) suffered a cyberinduced mass-casualty attack. The Pyongyang-backed WannaCry attack in 2017 perhaps has come closest, insofar as it disrupted various national healthcare systems and thereby

9

10

11

12

13

harmed a large number of patients. See Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, 'Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies', World Politics, vol. 41, no. 2, January 1989, pp. 143-69; and Lindsay, 'Tipping the Scales', p. 34. On this relation­ ship between observed events (for instance, deterrence success or failure) and explanatory theory, see David Blagden, 'Induction and Deduction in International Relations: Squaring the Circle between Theory and Evidence', International Studies Review, vol. 18, no. 2, June 2016, pp. 193-213. See Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 8-14; and Pape, Bombing to Win, pp. 13-14. The risk of global commerce and communications disruption may also deter potential cyber attackers if they fear the self-harm of such disruption. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr, 'Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace', International Security, vol. 41, no. 3, Winter 2016/17, pp. 44-71. However, this article's focus is attacks that aggressors would have otherwise judged to be advantageous absent their opponent's deterrent strategies, all else being equal, rather than those forgone due to other concerns. A qualification would arise if cyber attacks became capable of compromis­ ing nuclear command and control, thus removing the risk of cross­ domain retaliation. This is a more precise rendering of Herman Kahn's concept of 'escala­ tion dominance'. Such dominance

144 I David Blagden

14 15

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17

may be unobtainable in a world of multiple nuclear powers, but retalia­ tory equivalence creates deterrence through the threatened escalation to ever greater yet still not advantageous pain. See Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 50, 55-7; and Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008 [1966]), p. 104. Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 47. US Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace", 2011, https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/ media/Projects/ISPAB/documents/ DOD-Strategy-for-Operating-inCyberspace.pdf; HM Government, The UK Cyber Security Strategy: Protecting and Promoting the UK in a Digital World (London: UK Cabinet Office, 2011), https://www.gov.uk/ govemment/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/6096 l/uk-cybersecurity-strategy-final.pdf. US Department of Defense, "The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy", 2015, https:// archive.defense.go v/home/ features/20i5/o4i5_cyber-strategy/ final_2oi5_dod_cyber_strategy_for_ web.pdf, p. 11; HM Government, National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (London: UK Cabinet Office, 2016), h ttp s://w w w .go v.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/567242/national_ cyber_security_strategy_2016.pdf, pp. 41-52. See David E. Sanger and Elisabeth Bumiller, "Pentagon to Consider

Cyber Attacks Acts of War", New York Times, 31 May 2011, http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/06/01/us/ politics/oicyber.html?_r=i; Finbarr Bermingham, 'NATO Summit 2014: Cyber-attack Could Trigger Retaliation from all NATO Members', International Business Times, 5 September 2014, http://www.ibtimes. co.uk/nato-summit-2014-cyberattack-could-trigger-retaliation-allnato-members-1464230; and Anna Mikhailova,'UK Could Retaliate Against Cyber Attacks with Missiles, Attorney General Says', Daily Telegraph, 23 May 2018, https://www. telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/05/23/ uk-has-legal-right-retaliate-againstcyber-attacks-missiles/. The US government's invocation of cyber theft as a motive for its trade sanctions on China is consistent with this pattern. See "A Quick Guide to the US-China Trade War', BBC, 16 December 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ business-45899310. 18 White House, 'National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America', 2018, https://www. whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2018/09/N ational-CyberStrategy.pdf. See also Theresa Hitchens, "US Urges "Likeminded" Countries to Collaborate on Cyber Deterrence', Breaking Defense, 24 April 2019, https:// breakin gd ef ense .com/2019/04/ us-urging-likeminded-countries-tocollaborate-on-cyber-deterrence/; and Greg Myre, "'Persistent Engagement": The Phrase Driving a More Assertive US Spy Agency', NPR, 26 August 2019, https://www.

Deterring Cyber Coercion: The Exaggerated Problem of Attribution I 145

19

20

21 22

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npr.org/2019/08/26/74724863 6/ persistent-engagement-the-phrasedriving-a-more-assertive-u-s-spyagency?t=i5778o3786687. Brandon Valeriano and Benjamin Jensen, The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint (Washington DC: Cato Institute, 2019), https://www. cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/ pa862.pdf. Paul Cornish et al., On Cyber Warfare (London: Chatham House, 2010), pp. 42-3. See also Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 2-3. Nye, 'Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace', pp. 49-52. Cornish et al., On Cyber Warfare, p. 13; Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwarfare, pp. 41-52. Evidence suggests that the Russian and Chinese governments, among others, see the use of arms-length 'non-state' cyber proxies as deni­ able tools of coercive statecraft. See Alexander Klimberg, 'Mobilising Cyber Power', Survival, vol. 53, no. 1, February-March 2011, pp. 41-60. Daniel Moore and Thomas Rid, 'Cryptopolitik and the Darknet', Survival, vol. 58, no. 1, FebruaryMarch 2016, pp. 7-38. Certainly, progress is being made on this, particularly in identifying technical 'fingerprints' of major states' cyber attacks. See Stewart Baker, 'The Attribution Revolution', Foreign Policy, 17 June 2013, https:// f oreignpolicy.com/2013/06/17/theattribution-revolution/; and Brian M. Mazanec and Bradley A. Thayer,

26 27

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29

Deterring Cyber Warfare: Bolstering Strategic Stability in Cyberspace (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 57-63. Nevertheless, this is unlikely to become perfect, particularly as attackers adapt to defenders' progress, and given the potential for falseflag attacks as discussed below. All other fields of military-technological development have witnessed iterative back-and-forth dynamics between offensive penetration and defensive shielding, so recent innovations in cyber fingerprinting will be countered by anonymisation innovations. Rid and Buchanan, 'Attributing Cyber Attacks', pp. 30-1. Borghard and Lonergan, 'The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace', p. 459; Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, p. 128. Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), pp. 14-16. Pape, Bombing to Win, p. 12. Compellence is sometimes treated separately from coercion, but since it essentially represents 'total' coercion, here it is cast as coercive. Ibid., p. 4. See also Schelling, Arms and Influence, p p

. 6 9 -9 1 .

30 Kugler, 'Deterrence of Cyberattacks', pp. 309-10. 31 Erik Gartzke, 'The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth', International Security, vol. 38, no. 2, Fall 2013, pp. 41-73. 32 Holding interests at risk without specifically identified attribution

goes beyond valuable recent work on interests as a route to attribution. See, for instance, Rid and Buchanan,

146 I David Blagden 'Attributing Cyber Attacks', p. 8. 33 Both 'recreational' and 'hacktivist' attackers do have interests that can be jeopardised, of course, but doing so via punishment is challenging. The former values the opportunity to commit a successful attack for the mere thrill of it, making punishment and denial one and the same. The latter values something that the wider population may value too - transpar­ ency in public life - so punishing their interests could also penalise people that the state is charged with protecting. 34 Certain capability gaps between individual hackers and state-level cyber forces have closed over time. An example is the reduced need for state-level supercomputers to break encryption due to bot technol­ ogy. See Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, pp. 47-8. Even so, as those with the greatest resources (power­ ful states and corporations foremost among them) push out the frontier of technological sophistication, the chances of sparsely resourced indi­ viduals or groups - however talented - keeping pace becomes small. Such state-versus-individual capability disparities are thus likely to persist, even if gifted hackers close gaps in certain areas. Stuxnet, in particular, shows the extraordinary resources required - including a replica of the entire targeted infrastructure and an expert human-intelligence operation to penetrate air-gapped systems - to propagate an attack of even modest state-level strategic significance. See Jon R. Lindsay, 'Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare', Security

Studies, vol. 22, no. 3, July 2013, pp.

365-404.

35 Sarah Kreps and Jacquelyn Schneider, 'Escalation Firebreaks in the Cyber, Conventional, and Nuclear Domains: Moving Beyond Effects-based Logics', Journal of Cybersecurity, vol. 5, no. 1, September 2019, pp. 1-11. Libicki sees the risk of third-party censure and opprobrium as a fundamental chal­ lenge to the credibility of deterrence by retaliation in response to cyber attack as being greater than it has been for the deterrence of nuclear attack, particularly on the grounds that numerous capable third parties may join the fight. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, p. 42. See also Lindsay, 'Tipping the Scales', p. 37. Yet while facing normative opprobrium may indeed affect a state's retaliatory resolve, there is no clear reason third parties would join hostilities against a retaliating state - opening them­ selves to re-retaliation in the process - simply to censure it for retaliating. A related argument, albeit with differ­ ent causal underpinnings, is that an attack's victim may be self-deterred from certain retaliatory cyber options through fear that they would result in fratricide of their own ICT sys­ tems. Ibid., p. 57. This is a relevant concern, but one contingent on the cyber weapon in question - and on aspiring deterrers' weighting of abso­ lute versus relative gains and losses - rather than a fundamental barrier to retaliation per se. 36 Kenneth Geers, 'The Challenge of Cyber Attack Deterrence', Computer Law and Security Review, vol. 26, no. 3, May 2010, pp. 300-1.

Deterring Cyber Coercion: The Exaggerated Problem of Attribution I 147

37 Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, 'Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace', Security Studies, vol. 24, no. 2, June 2015, pp. 316-48. 38 Lawrence J. Cavaiola, David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, 'Cyber House Rules: On War, Retaliation and Escalation', Survival, vol. 37, no. 1, February-March 2015, pp. 81-104. 39 See Lindsay, 'Tipping the Scales', pp. 58-64. This trade-off exists through­ out deterrent posture - 'asymmetric escalation' doctrines deliver much deterrence but with escalatory dan­ gers, for example, while 'assured retaliation' doctrines offer less deter­ rence of low-level irritations but also fewer escalatory risks. See Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 17-20. 40 Threatening success-prevention may be inherently more credible than threatening punishment, since the former promises minimised costs on both sides. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, p. 16. Deterrence by punishment also cedes control of the decision over how much pain to bear to one's opponent, and may therefore also be less precise and reliable when dealing with aggressors of uncertain cost-tolerance and risk-acceptance. Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), p. 39. 41 James J. Wirtz, 'The Cyber Pearl Harbor', Intelligence and National Security, vol. 32, no. 6, September 2017, pp. 758-67. Of course, this is not to suggest that pulling off such a success­ ful attack - or achieving the strategic

shock/paralysis that it might induce - would be easy or even feasible, but it could be an attractive prospect for an aspiring aggressor. James J. Wirtz, 'The Cyber Pearl Harbor Redux: Helpful Analogy or Cyber Hype?', Intelligence and National Security, vol. 33, no. 5, April 2018, pp. 771-3. 42 A common characteristic of cyber attack is uncertainty even on the attacker's part over precisely what effects their action will produce. See Borghard and Lonergan, 'The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace', p. 456. 43 See Ben Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking, Trust, and Fear Between Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); and Herbert Lin, 'Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace', Strategic Studies Quarterly (Cyber Special Edition), vol. 6, no. 3, Fall 2012, p. 46-70. For theoretical background, see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976 [1832]), pp. 75-89; Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1 9 9 1 ), p p . 2 -3 .

44 Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, p. 44. 45 David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, 'Cyber Warfare and Sino-American Crisis Instability', Survival, vol. 56, no. 4, August-September 2014, pp. 8-10; Joshua Rovner, 'Two Kinds of Catastrophe: Nuclear Escalation and Protracted War in Asia', Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 40, no. 5, July 2017, pp. 699-706. 46 Avery Goldstein, 'First Things

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47

48

49

50

First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in US-China Relations', International Security, voi. 37, no. 4, Spring 2013, pp. 49-89. See Rebecca Slayton, 'What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment', International Security, voi. 41, no. 3, Winter 2016/17, pp. 72-109; and Valeriano and Jensen, The Myth of the Cyber Offense. Furthermore, while cyber dynamics may contribute to worrisome offence dominance in the larger US-China relationship, Western fears of rela­ tive cyber weakness vis-à-vis China may also be overblown. See Jon R. Lindsay, 'The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Friction and Fiction', International Security, voi. 39, no. 3, Winter 2014/13, pp. 7-47; and Rovner, 'Two Kinds of Catastrophe', p. 712. See Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 64-6; and Andrew Kydd, 'Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation', International Organization, voi. 54, no. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 323-37. One attempt at cataloguing such attacks alleges 33 such admitted attacks since the 1930s, with state use of sponsored false-flag terrorist attacks as a pretext for preferred state policy emerging as a favourite. '33 Admitted False Flag Attacks', WashingtonsBlog, 23 February 2013, https://www. globalresearch.ca/33-admitted-false-

flag-attacks/3432931. 51 See Lucas Kello, 'The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft', International Security, vol. 38, no. 2, Fall 2013, p. 31. Such accidents become increasingly likely as system complexity increases. 52 Borghard and Lonergan, 'The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace', p. 439. 53 See David F. Rudgers, 'The Origins of Covert Action', Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 33, no. 2, April 2000, p p

. 2 4 9 -6 2 .

54 Lindsay, 'Tipping the Scales', p. 63. 55 Ibid., p. 37. 56 In the absence of precise identification of specific insurgent or terrorist attackers, counter-insurgent or counter-terrorist forces may resort to punishing the attackers' manifested interests - say, razing an insurgent­ hosting village or somehow retarding terrorists' political cause. See Gil Merom, 'Strong Powers in Small Wars: The Unnoticed Foundations of Success', Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 9, no. 2, September 1998, pp. 38-63; and Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, 'Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done', International Security, vol. 30, no. 3, Winter 2003/06, pp. 87-123. On drawing parallels between cyber attack and insurgency, see Lindsay, 'Tipping the Scales', p. 37. This approach can involve heavy moral costs and blowback, but the point is that there is a rationale motivating the incurrence of such costs.

Contemplating a Russia-Japan Rapprochement Olga Puzanova

The territorial dispute over the islands referred to as the Southern Kurils by Russia and the Northern Territories by Japan arose after the Soviet Union took control of them at the end of the Second World War as a result of Japan's defeat. It has become a major issue in relations between Moscow and Tokyo, hindering bilateral relations for the past several decades. According to recent polls, nearly three-quarters of Japanese do not believe any pro­ gress is now achievable in negotiations, yet about the same number believe that they should continue. Some of these think that the result of the talks should be the immediate return of all the territories to Japan, while others would settle for a compromise solution.1 A 77% majority of Russians are against even considering the transfer of the territories to Japan, and 96% of the population of the Kuril Islands themselves oppose it.2 Resolving disagreements with Russia over the islands could, to be sure, enable the government of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to pursue a more independent foreign policy, in line with his apparent objectives.3 A strong connection with one of the largest actors in the region would cer­ tainly help Tokyo balance against the growing influence of Beijing and its eclipse of Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Russia, for its part, could use a solid partner in Asia in addition to China to blunt fears of and reactions to a Sino-Russian strategic alliance. Yet it is also possible that nar­ rowly focusing on the territorial dispute inhibits Russia and Japan from

Olga Puzanova is a research assistant at the International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism and a lecturer at the National Research University Higher School of Economics. Survival | vol. 62no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 149-156

DOI 10.1080/00396338.2020.1715076

150 I Olga Puzanova

strengthening broader bilateral cooperation that would ease the resolution of that very dispute. Useful precedent An earlier territorial dispute between Russia and China may be instructive. It was ultimately settled by way of three major agreements: in 1991 for the eastern part of the border from North Korea to Mongolia; in 1994 for the western part of the border from Mongolia to Kazakhstan; and in 2004 for the islands of Bolshoy (Abagaitu), Tarabarov (Yinlong) and Bolshoy Ussuriisky (Heixiazi). These dispositions essentially involved clarifying border demar­ cations made in the mid-nineteenth century. But resolution did not follow a straightforward path, and was not merely the product of formal negotiation. Under the Treaty of Peking concluded in 1860, China recognised the Russian Empire as sovereign over lands on the left bank of the Amur River and those between the Ussuri River and the Pacific Ocean. But the sov­ ereignty of the rivers themselves and the islands within them remained indeterminate, as state borders were assumed to start at the river banks. The Soviet Union annexed the river islands and began to claim that the border was China's bank. After coming to power in 1949, the communist govern­ ment of China did not dispute the border because the Soviet Union was a major partner, but following the Sino-Soviet split in 1962, the Chinese gov­ ernment insisted on border talks, which began in 1964.4 The Soviet Union agreed to demarcate the borders in accordance with the thalweg principle, recognised in international law, whereby borders extend through the centre of the main channel of the river. That meant that islands between the main channel and the Chinese bank should be returned to China. In July 1964, however, Chinese leader Mao Zedong, at a meeting with a Japanese delegation, mentioned that larger territories in Soviet Siberia and the Far East were potentially disputable, prompting Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to withdraw the Soviet delegation from the talks.5 Open con­ frontation arose at the border in 1969. Little progress occurred until Mikhail Gorbachev came to power with an eye to reducing the Soviet Union's global military presence. He was willing to remove the three major obsta­ cles Beijing saw to normalising relations with Moscow: Soviet troops in

Contemplating a Russia-Japan Rapprochement I 151

Mongolia, their extensive presence on the Sino-Soviet border and support for Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia. Western sanctions stemming from the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 supplied an additional incentive for Beijing to forge warmer relations with Moscow. The two communist states thus established a relatively smooth rap­ prochement.6But this did not immediately yield resolution of the territorial issues. The first of the three border-demarcation agreements, signed shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union but ratified afterwards, omitted the three islands, deferring consideration to the last phase of the negotiations. In the meantime, bilateral relations became qualitatively better than they had been, overcoming Russia's wariness of another communist regime and China's worries about post-Soviet Russia's potential rapprochement with the United States. A series of important bilateral accords materialised. In 1994, a Joint Declaration described Sino-Russian relations as 'truly equal relations of good-neighbourliness, friendship and mutually advantageous cooperation based on the principles of peaceful coexistence'.7 In 1996 and 1997, agreements on military confidence-building and mutual reduction of military forces along the border areas were signed. These three agreements set the table for others. In June 1997, a special agreement on regular meetings between officials established a formal mech­ anism for facilitating economic cooperation between Russia and China. The leaders of the two countries, worried about the US desire to unilaterally dominate the international system, signed a declaration aiming to promote multipolarity and a new international order, reflecting the converging posi­ tions of the two powers. The 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation recognised the existing border, precluding rival ter­ ritorial claims.8 The same year, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was established, creating a framework for multilateral cooperation in Central Asia. By 2003, China had become Russia's fourth-largest trading partner and Russia China's eighth largest. Bilateral trade quadrupled from $5.8 to $21.2 billion.9 These propitious developments facilitated the resolution of the dispute over the islands in 2004. The territory of the two smaller islands was divided roughly 50/50 between Russia and China, with a smaller part of the largest

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one, Bolshoy Ussuriisky, going to China. This dispensation eliminated a potential source of bilateral tension and secured a strategic partnership between Beijing and Moscow that has facilitated the latter's still-unfolding turn to the East. But neither the dispute-resolution process nor the treaty itself created close ties between Moscow and Beijing. Instead, both served to consolidate and formalise substantive progress already achieved. Bilateral relations overall had to improve significantly first, so as to diminish the overall importance of the territorial issue in the larger context. The Russo-Japanese dispute The Russo-Japanese territorial problem differs from the Sino-Russian one in that there is no dominant geopolitical factor that has produced a strong mutual desire to build warmer relations. Politically, a peace treaty with Russia probably would not materially affect Japan's pro-American foreignpolicy course. Economically, a treaty alone likely would not induce Japan to increase investment flows into Russia. Nevertheless, national interests may now be sufficiently compelling to incentivise better relations. This was not always the case. Japan officially controlled the islands in question by virtue of the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda, which established the borders between the two empires, while the status of the island of Sakhalin remained undetermined. The St Petersburg agreement of 1875 confirmed that Sakhalin was a Russian territory and that all of the islands, including the currently disputed four, belonged to Japan. Over the course of the next few decades, Japanese communities of some 17,000 people developed on the islands. The Portsmouth Treaty at the end of the Russo-Japanese War gave Japan the southern part of Sakhalin as well. After its defeat in the Second World War, Japan had to renounce all its occupied territories under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, signed in San Francisco in 1951. It also renounced 'all right, title and claim to the Kuril Islands', as well as other possessions includ­ ing Sakhalin. The Soviet Union annexed the remaining islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Habomai and Shikotan to its territory, deporting the Japanese popu­ lation. Japan did not recognise the four islands as being part of the Kurils and claimed them as its own territory.

Contemplating a Russia-Japan Rapprochement I 153

Diplomatic ties between the two nations were restored by the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration of 1956. Often omitted in discussions of Russia-Japan relations is the fact that the first clause of the declaration clearly expressed the joint intention of both countries to end the bilateral conflict that had remained formally open since the Second World War: 'The state of war between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall cease on the date on which this Declaration enters into force and peace, friendship and good-neighbourly relations between them shall be restored/10 Article 9 of the document also expresses the Soviet Union's intention to cede the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan to Japan, but states that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan would only occur after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan.11 No such treaty ever materialised, however. In Moscow's view, the USJapan security treaty had changed the strategic situation in the region and rendered the pledge null and void. The US also advised Japan against a ter­ ritorial compromise with Moscow, threatening to terminate economic aid and retain Okinawa. Due to domestic perceptions of post-war victimisation and humiliation, nationalism was also growing in Japan and dampening inclinations to resolve territorial disputes. From the Soviets' standpoint, ceding the territories would have been an unnecessary and unwarranted revision of the results of the Second World War, and would have established a potentially dangerous precedent weakening Russian claims on other parts of the Russian territory, notably in Eastern Europe. In present circumstances, however, Russia may be ready for a compro­ mise, and has proposed holding a dialogue based on the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration.12 The Sino-Russian example suggests that while specific border arrangements are negotiable, one side cannot expect to get all of the territory it claims. In a final settlement, Moscow might, for example, agree to the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, while Japan would recognise Russia's sovereignty over the rest of the disputed territory. Until recently, Japan had demonstrated little willingness to compromise, demanding that Russia recognise Japanese sovereignty over all four islands, transfer two to Japan immediately and continue negotiations on the remaining two.

154 I Olga Puzanova

Under Abe, however, Tokyo seems more inclined to support Moscow's calls for broad bilateral cooperation as a prelude to resolving the territorial dispute. Such an approach enabled Russia to resolve its territorial issues with China, and might favourably influence other border disputes in the region, such as the Sino-Indian one.13 *

*

*

On 5 September 2019, Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin met at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. It was their twenty-seventh meeting. While the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan continues to be an issue, the dialogue between the two leaders has produced several promising developments. Abe emphasised the 'strategic importance' of strengthening relations with Moscow in the political and economic sphere as well as that of joint projects on the disputed islands, which could even­ tually help facilitate the conclusion of a peace treaty. Putin, for his part, stressed the significance of bilateral documents signed during his visit to Japan. He also noted that strengthening trust and neighbourly relations would make it possible to 'create conditions for finding mutually acceptable solutions for the most complex issues'.14 Officials from both countries held monthly meetings in 2019 in the hope of accelerating discussions on future cooperation and overcoming differences that have endured over the past seven decades. Significant growth in bilateral trade has already occurred; in 2018, it reached $2ibn. Russia's turn to the East, its interest in Asia and Japan, and its wish to avoid excessive dependency on China as a partner, along with Japan's desire for greater independence in the international arena and its fears of a growing China, may well bring the two countries closer together in spite of their outstanding territorial disagreement - and facilitate its resolution. Acknowledgement The research for this article was supported by a grant from the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs of the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow.

Contemplating a Russia-Japan Rapprochement I 155

Notes 1 'Shitsumon to Kaito (Ichigatsu Bun) Hoppo Ryodo Mondai ga Shintensuru to "Omowanai" 72.9 Pasento', Sankei News, 21 January 2019, https://www. sankei.com/politics/news/190121/ plti90i2iooi6-ni .html. 2 'Opros Pokazal, Chto 77% Rossiian Vystupaiut Protiv Peredachi Iaponii Iuzhnyh Kuril', Ria Novosti, https:// ria. ru/20190128/1549996832 .html; 'Zhiteli Iuzhnyh Kuril Vystupili Protiv Peredachi Ostrovov Iaponii', Ria Novosti, https://ria. ru/20i902i9/i55i053278.htm l.

Kristin Surak, 'Shinzo Abe and the Rise of Japanese Nationalism', New Statesman, 15 May 2019, https:// www.newstatesman.com/world/ asia/2019/05/shinzo-abe-and-risejapanese-nationalism. 4 Andrey Dikarev, Alexander Lukin and Nikita Stepanov (eds), Diplomat Chicherinskoi Shkoly (Moscow: Ves' mir, 2018), p. 107. 5 Sergei Goncharov and Li Danhui, 'On "Territorial Claims" and "Inequitable Treaties" in Russian-Chinese Relations: Myth and Reality', Far Eastern Affairs, vol. 32, no. 3, 2004, p. 102. 6 Evgeny Bazhanov, 'Ot Druzhby cherez Konfrontatsiiu k Normalizatsii. Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia s 1949 g. do 1991 g.', in Alexander Lukin (ed.), Rossiia i Kitai: Chetyre Veka Vzaimodeistviia (Moscow: Ves' mir,

7

2013), pp. 217-99. 'Sovmestnaya Rossiysko-Kitayskaya Deklaratsiya', in Grigory Karasin (ed.), Sbornik Rossiisko-Kitaiskikh Dogovorov 1949-1999 (Moscow: Terra-Sport, 1 9 9 9 ), p . 2 7 1 .

8

9

10

3

11 12

13

13

Alexander Lukin, China and Russia: The New Rapprochement (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), pp. 96-109. 'Ot Normalizatsii k Strategicheskomu Partnerstvu: Rossiia i Kitai Posle Raspada SSSR', in Lukin (ed.), Rossiia i Kitai, pp. 373-84. 'Joint Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan', 19 October 1956, http://worldjpn.gnps. ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19561019. DiE.html. Ibid. 'Putin: Deklaratsii 1956 Goda SSSR i Iaponii Nedostatochno Dlia Podpisaniia Mirnogo Dogo vor a', Vesti ekonomika, https://www.vestifinance. ru/articles/i 10233. Ajay Kamalakaran, 'Using the Russia-China Border Agreement as a Model', Russia Beyond, 16 September 2014, https://www. rbth.com/blogs/2014/09/16/ using_the_russia-china_border_ agreement_as_a_model_38329. 'Press Statements Following Talks with Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe', 29 June 2019, http://en.kremlin. ru/events/president/news/60860.

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Political Transition on the Great Steppe: The Case of Kazakhstan Morena Skalamera Groce

On 19 March 2019, Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev stepped down after three decades in power. Presidential elections were hastily called for 9 June 2019, a year ahead of schedule. Frustration with the slow pace of economic and social reform had sparked some protests in the months preceding Nazarbayev's resignation,1 and then-acting head of state Kassym-Jomart Tokayev appeared to acknowledge the public's dis­ enchantment in his address announcing the election, saying that it would help speed up reform, 'remove uncertainty over the country's political future ... and resolve the socio-economic development issues'.2The subse­ quent transition was carefully managed to bolster stability and continuity. Nazarbayev remained in charge of the ruling Nur Otan party and the powerful Security Council, and has assumed the title of 'Leader of the Nation' for life, affording him extensive powers in defining Kazakhstan's domestic and foreign policy. As Tokayev, the country's new president, stated in his inauguration speech, 'the final word on domestic and foreign policy will rest with [Nazarbayev]; this is determined by law - he was and remains the Leader of the Nation'.3 In a further move to control the succession process, and possibly even to stage-manage a dynastic succes­ sion, Nazarbayev appointed his eldest daughter, Dariga, as speaker of the Senate and therefore next in line for the presidency.4

Morena Skalamera Groce is an assistant professor of Russian and International Studies at Leiden University. She conducted fieldwork in Almaty, Kazakhstan, where she lived for two years. Survival | voi. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 157-168

DO I 10.1080/00396338.2020.1715078

158 I Morena Skalamera Groce

Among the secular authoritarian regimes of Central Asia, Kazakhstan is the wealthiest and most endowed with natural resources. By 2017, the country had amassed $147 billion in foreign direct investment - one-third as much as Russia, whose economy is nine times the size. Gross domestic output per capita exceeds 90% of Russia's, up from less than 30% when the Soviet Union broke up.5The country is rich in petroleum and natural gas, as well as uranium, coal, gold, aluminium and silver. Conventional wisdom dictates that state control over revenues from valuable commodities like these undermines the development of an autonomous civil society and gives rulers the means to co-opt potential opponents.6While these rents generate a trade surplus, they do not contribute to the modernisation of the national economy. Instead, elites' asymmetrical access to commodity rents perpetuates the existence of neo-patrimonial regimes and, ultimately, plays a key role in explaining the stability of quasitraditional elite networks. Yet Kazakhstan remains a puzzling case. Since 2014, the country has suffered a period of collapsing oil prices, bringing economic development almost to a halt. Despite this, the current regime remains largely unchallenged. It is received wisdom as well that autocratic or dictatorial regimes need to offer plenty of economic opportunities to their power base in order to maintain legitimacy and a tight grip over their heavily controlled, statist economies.7 Resource-rich regimes stay in power when they are able to keep their cronies happy by paying them well, and to co-opt any opposi­ tion.8In Russia, for example, Daniel Treisman found that Boris Yeltsin's and Vladimir Putin's approval ratings in the 1990s and 2000s closely tracked the country's economic growth rates.9 In Kazakhstan, the overall performance of the economy is closely linked to fluctuations in the price of petroleum, and most of the country's wealth hinges on oil rents. This being the case, the 2014 oil-price slump and subsequent recession should have posed a sig­ nificant challenge to the incumbent regime. It did not. Indeed, the system became even more consolidated at the top. In a comparative study of post-Soviet patrimonial regimes published in 2014, Henry Hale challenged the conventional wisdom by demonstrating that exogenous shocks, rather than bringing about significant changes in the

Political Transition on the Great Steppe: The Case of Kazakhstan I 159

politico-economic order, can actually sustain a regime's patrimonial core.10 He convincingly argued that the world is full of very poor countries with long-lived leaders, suggesting that the key is not the absolute value of the pay-offs provided by the regime, but rather the relative value of what a patron can credibly promise to provide, and the continuing expectation that he will be in a position to carry on distributing these pay-offs. Thus, dimin­ ished resource rates are not a strong predictor of meaningful regime change, even in periods of presidential succession. While Kazakhstan is richer and enjoys a relatively more enlightened authoritarian regime than its Central Asian neighbours, Nazarbayev has successfully constructed a pyramid of patron-client ties based in a presidency that largely dominates national politics, keeping

Change can actually

alternative patrons weak and their own pyra­

sustain a regime

mids localised. This explains why, to quote Tokayev, Nazarbayev 'will have special, one might say priority, importance in developing and making strategic deci­ sions', even after having left the presidency.11 Hale would argue that, for authoritarianism to function effectively, the regime needs a formal vehicle

through which to exercise power and implement orders, such as a prag­ matic ruling party, a reliable military or a presidential constitution.12 This account stresses vertical power relations among actors in a patronal system. However, this article supports an alternative patron-client model, one that identifies a more horizontal pathway to regime consolidation. The case of Kazakhstan suggests that informal elite networks are likely to emerge as a major source of regime consolidation when a secular authori­ tarian state is confronted with significant political or economic uncertainty. Such conditions are often present at moments of change, such as the depar­ ture of a long-serving leader. In such periods, the networks surrounding the leader begin to mobilise their followers in a quiet struggle over succes­ sion, while at the same time working to maintain stability by preventing challengers from consolidating their own power. This process is especially important in cases of less repressive authoritarian regimes, where some open protest is allowed. In such cases, informal networks are critical means

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of spreading the autocrat's message and recruiting followers, mobilising as many people as possible to fight for the government's cause. Indeed, infor­ mal networks of activists are likely to become the primary vehicle by which the incumbent networks' ideas are spread. In this way, civil-society actors are co-opted well before they are able to bring about substantive institu­ tional reform. Failing reforms, entrenched interests and personalised relationships Although factors such as a leader's departure or an economic recession can generate tremendous centrifugal pressures even in highly autocratic, personalistic regimes, it is clear that they are no guarantee of revolutionary change. Nor do institutional reforms necessarily increase the likelihood of regime change: variations in institutions toward a more hybrid regime sometimes have the effect of giving powerful elites both the incentive and the capacity to block threats to their tenure and to the systems they constructed, while at the same time avoiding more open political struggles for succession. Yet there has been only limited study of the effects of elites' interest in maintain­ ing stability and continuity instead of pushing for revolutionary change and an open struggle for power in the circumstance of autocratic political suc­ cession. Existing studies are also silent about whether and to what extent an autocrat's own demand for economic reform can be severely circumscribed or compromised due to a failure to recognise that most decisions are made by deeply entrenched elites at the top. In March 2017, the Kazakh parliament passed a constitutional reform aimed at seriously reducing the president's powers, redistributing leverage and democratising the political system as a whole. Another reform package, known as 'hundred steps in the right direction', is intended to forge a dynamic private sector to deliver jobs to a growing legion of unemployed youths otherwise susceptible to radicalisation. The package aims to improve the courts, the civil service and e-government. Fiscal reforms, including tax increases and cuts to spending and energy subsidies, are intended to gradu­ ally erode Kazakhstan's patrimonial welfare state.13 Yet these sweeping reform packages have been largely ineffective. The wealth gap is worsen­ ing, particularly after several rounds of currency devaluation and inflation

Political Transition on the Great Steppe: The Case of Kazakhstan I 161

wiped out the savings of the middle class.14The slow implementation of the reforms is provoking increasing public frustration and small-scale protests. Institutional reforms are distrusted because they are subject to manipulation and arbitrary constraints imposed by the elite, which fears the outcome of unfettered competition. Meanwhile, the cost of participating in any genuine opposition is usually very high. The relative weakening of state authority in Kazakhstan is not likely to result in démocratisation, and may even serve to reverse such modest démocratisation as has been achieved. With the progressive weakening of the core, the autocrat's modernisation dictums may no longer fully affect the behaviour of oligarchic interest groups, which will quietly resist changes that undermine the social and economic basis of their own power. Meanwhile, illiberal institutions lack the incentive to integrate alternative interests and views. Thus, the major stumbling block for Kazakhstan's efforts at promot­ ing economic liberalisation and a gradual political opening is the presence of elite groups formed mostly on the basis of personalised solidarity. A 'rally-round-the-leader' approach among impoverished but 'first-entrant' elites - including the stavlenniki, hand-picked by the departing leader to act as 'safeguards' - allows them to tailor the design of new institutions to their own advantage, even if that means sacrificing revolutionary change for the sake of stability.15 Kazakhstan lacks developed 'parties of power' and a strong military apparatus. Collective behaviour is usually organised around personal ties rather than abstract principles such as ideological belief, party allegiance, economic class or ethnic background.16 Thus, powerful actors use infor­ mal channels to secure access to the power resources of the state and keep potential challengers at bay.17 At the same time, they seek to transcend the narrow, exclusivist networks that exist within particular clans, tribes, regions or ethnic groups, and thereby to avoid becoming identified with exclusivist identity groups. President Nazarbayev was careful to keep those appointed to positions of power in the regions, including the regional heads (akims), under central control, while simultaneously trying to minimise ties of solidarity among relatives, close friends and other in-groups within the country's complicated clan networks.

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Collective-action theory holds that members of various (and potentially competing) sub-networks must agree not only that the time has come to switch their allegiance to a new patron, but also who that person will be.18 Individual clients are unlikely to try to challenge the leadership of the patron by themselves. In cases where people expect a president and his entourage to remain powerful (and in a position to wield carrots and sticks), this expectation serves to maintain that power. A decision among elites to stick with existing power structures can also be explained through a logic of 'path dependence'.19 Path dependence is the notion that states, institu­ tions or leaders become committed to certain development trajectories as a result of previous knowledge and decisions, which are essentially contin­ gent upon historically specific beliefs and values. In other words, history is 'sticky', leaving its imprint on decision-making far into the future. In one extreme example, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's inner circle attempted to hide the news of his death for a period in order to delay political transi­ tion.20 Thus, the self-preserving rules of the game can prevent change even in the presence of shocks such as a leader's departure or the disruption of lucrative oil rents. Although Eurasia is changing in ways that favour China, Russia contin­ ues to wield significant influence in Central Asia, providing the region's most crucial security-related public goods and dominating its military architecture.21 Moreover, Russia shares a political, historical and cultural affinity with the region that its rivals lack.22Russian continues to be widely spoken in Central Asia and is the region's uncontested lingua franca, while Russian TV and radio remain popular. Used thoughtfully, these built-in advantages will ensure Russia's strong position in Eurasia for decades to come. Russia's propaganda machine does not seem shy about using these assets to undermine potential opponents for Central Asian influence. Russia views its linguistic, cultural and military links as an instrument to shore up its influence against the challenges posed by Chinese growth and Western influence. After the 2017 terror attacks in St Petersburg, the Kremlin warned Central Asian leaders that the system that supported migrants' remit­ tances from Russia might be substantially revised if the Central Asian

Political Transition on the Great Steppe: The Case of Kazakhstan I 163

regimes did not continue to work closely with Russia's security appa­ ratus.23 According to the Russian Federal Migration Service, 10-16% of Central Asia's active labour force works in Russia.24 At the same time, a more assertive Russia has taken a share of responsibility for the reorgani­ sation of the region's massive bureaucracies and security apparatuses (the successors of the Soviet KGB), providing Moscow with another means of wielding disproportionate power.25 *

*

*

Nazarbayev's savvy in turning Kazakhstan into a multinational, politi­ cally pluralistic republic with a market-oriented economy raises questions about how competent his successor will be in defining and advancing the country's interests. There are several potential threats to Kazakhstan's sta­ bility, including any political and economic uncertainty; the possibility of fragmentation along regional or clan-determined lines; the threat of radical Islam; and the dilemmas inherent in managing the country's precarious position between a prospering China and a newly reassertive Russia.26Any radicalisation of the country's large ethnic-Russian minority could trigger a more interventionist approach in Moscow.27 The new regime faces the chal­ lenges of strengthening national identities, building more effective political institutions and coping with sluggish economic growth. While there is no immediate threat to American interests from developments in Central Asia, it is possible that, in a system marked by personalised rule, Nazarbayev's successor may not have the experience, savoir faire or charisma necessary to ensure continued stability and prosperity. New regimes in Kazakhstan and elsewhere might seek to change existing political practices. The United States could capitalise on this by positioning itself as a generator of new ideas. US policies should, however, set modest goals. Previous Western expectations of a big leap toward démocratisation in Central Asia were premature. Ethnic tensions persist in the region, which has no prior experience with democracy, and many of Central Asia's emerg­ ing young, Western-educated leaders are attracted to the statist capitalism that has brought relative stability to Russia and tremendous prosperity to

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China.28 The mere formality of Nazarbayev's relinquishment of power, the persistent clout of his loyalist apparatchiks and the public's low expecta­ tions for genuine change in the near future mean that the new regime is unlikely to make radical changes. Demographic trends may work in the West's favour, however. According to 2018 estimates, the median age in Kazakhstan is 30 years for men and 32 years for women, with nearly half of the country's population born during Nazarbayev's reign.29 Since the early 2000s, young Kazakhs have enjoyed political stability and relative material affluence, developing a strong consumerist culture.30 Even with growing government restrictions on media, religion and formal public expression, they have been raised in a compara­ tively free country. The new generation of Central Asian elites, in contrast to the old guard, might gradually become more open to political liberalisa­ tion, and might consider démocratisation as an appealing, albeit distant, goal. Their political programmes might be influenced by several factors, not the least of which is the status of their countries' relations with the United States, a country which many of the younger elite have either travelled to or studied in thanks to a spate of post-Soviet exchange and professionaldevelopment programmes, such as the well-funded and expansive Bolashak Programme.31 Additionally, the replacement of Russian by English as the predominant second language among Kazakhs was a long-standing policy goal for Nazarbayev, and has been adopted by many of the younger min­ isters in his cabinet. American overtures might be better received by young people who have been exposed to the official trilingualism introduced into the national curriculum by Nazarbayev's Kazakhstan-2030 programme.32 Among Kazakhstan's long-term challenges are the need to address con­ tinued reliance on energy exports and mineral wealth; the problem of capital deficiency; and the strength of informal networks in deciding how business operates in the sectors which generate large revenue streams, particularly oil, gas and minerals. With a more vigorous trade and investment policy, the US could help local governments implement the much-needed reforms. In the face of slow but inexorable generational change, younger elites might respond to concrete offers of advice on how to remedy the ills of corruption, the weak rule of law, and the toxic interweaving of the political and busi-

Political Transition on the Great Steppe: The Case of Kazakhstan I 165

ness elite by embracing better governance and working to address economic stagnation through development initiatives. Helping Central Asian coun­ tries build strong state administrations would allow them to pursue more effectively a balanced, multi-vector foreign policy in an attempt to maximise their own independence in a geopolitically fraught region, a development that would favour American interests. Notes 1

'Dozens of Mothers Protest in Kazakhstan Demanding Government Support', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 8 February 2019, https://www. rferl.org/a/dozens-of-mo thers-protes tin-kazakhstan-demanding-government-support/29759290.html. 2 Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, 'Kazakhstan to Hold Snap Presidential Elections', Financial Times, 9 April 2019, https://www.ft.com/

5

content/7752ecic- 5 a9 C-ne 9-9 dde-

7aedcaoao8ia. See Leonid Bershidsky, 'Kazakh Autocrat Shows Putin How to Keep Power', Moscow Times, 20 March 2019, https://www. themosco wtimes.com/2019/03/20/ kazakh-autocrat-shows-putin-howto-keep-power-a64879; and 'Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the Joint Session of the Chambers of Parliament', 20 March 2019, http://www.akorda.kz/en/ speeches/internal_political_affairs/ in_speeches_and_addresses/ speech-by-the-president-of-therepublic-of-kazakhstan-kassymjomart-tokayev-at-the-joint-session-ofthe-chambers-of-parliament. 4 See 'Kazakhstan Has Entered the

6

3

7

8

Post-Nazarbayev Transition', Financial Times, 24 March 2019, https://www. ft.com/content/85 ib3 C34~4bfc-11e9bbc9-69i7dce3dc62; and Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, 'Nazarbayev's Daughter Becomes Kazakh Heir Apparent', Financial Times, 20 March 2019, https://www.ft.com/ content/beeb20dc-4af9-i ie9-8b7fd490Ó7eof5od. 'Kazakhstan Has Entered the PostNazarbayev Transition'. See Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, 'Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism', Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 2, April 2002, pp. 51-66. See, for instance, Michael Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013); and Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (eds), The Rentier State: Essays in the Political Economy of Arab Countries (New York: Croom Helm, 1987). For a detailed analysis of these dynamics, see Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). See also M. Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia (New York:

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9

10

11

12

13

Cambridge University Press, 2005). Daniel S. Treisman, "Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia Under Yeltsin and Putin", American Journal of Political Science, vol. 55, no. 3, July 2011, pp. 590-609. Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). "After 30 Years, Kazakhstan Gets a New Ruler. Sort Of", New York Times, 22 March 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/20i9/o3/22/opinion/sunday/ kazakhstan-president-nazarbayevresignation.html. Henry E. Hale, "Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia", World Politics, vol. 63, no. 4, October 2011, pp. 581-617. See also Dirk Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-building (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 155-61. Additional reforms are meant to cut through red tape, streamline cus­ toms, and improve the electrical grid and transportation. Additionally, the English-law-based Astana International Financial Centre - com­ plete with a stock exchange, a court and an arbitration tribunal - has been launched with the intent of becoming the region's financial and economic hub. The centre is co-owned by the Shanghai Stock Exchange and closely connected to the Dubai International Financial Centre. See, for instance, "Steppe Change: Kazakhstan: The Crossroads of the New Silk Road", The Economist, 1 July 2017, https:// www.ec0n0mist.c0m/asia/2017/07/01/

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20

21

kazakhstan-the-crossroads-of-thenew-silk-road. Paul Stronsky, 'What's Behind Nazarbayev's Surprise Resignation "Ruse" in Kazakhstan?', World Politics Review, 8 March 2019. Joel S. Heilman, "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions', World Politics, vol. 50, no. 2, January 1998, pp. 203-34. See Kathleen Collins, The Logic of Clan Politics in Central Asia: Its Impact on Regime Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See Vladimir Gel'man, "The Technocratic Traps of Post-Soviet Reforms', PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 504, February 2018. See Mancur Olson, "The Logic of Collective Action in Soviet-type Societies', Journal of Soviet Nationalities, vol. i, Summer 1990. For a detailed explication of the logic of path dependence, see Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). See Meghan O. Sullivan, Windfall: How the New Energy Abundance Upends Global Politics and Strengthens America's Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), p. 190. See Morena Skalamera, "Russia's Lasting Influence in Central Asia", Survival, vol. 59, no. 6, December 2017-January 2018, pp. 123-42.

22 See Roy Allison, "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy", International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 2, March 2004, pp. 277-93. 23 See David Filipov, "Russia's Aggressive Response to the St.

Political Transition on the Great Steppe: The Case of Kazakhstan I 167

24

25 26

27

Petersburg Subway Bombing Is Raising Questions', Washington Post, 7 May 2017; and Edward Lemon, 'Russia Sees IS as Reason to Boost Control in Central Asia', Eurasianet, 11 November 2014, https://eurasianet. org/s/russia-sees-is-as-reason-toboost-control-in-central-asia. 'V Rossiiu edet vsio bol'she migrantov iz stran TsA' [More and more migrants from Central Asia go to Russia], Centre 1,10 July 2017, https:// centrei.com/world/v-rossiyu-edetvsyo-bolshe-migrantov-iz-stran-tsa/. See Skalamera, 'Russia's Lasting Influence in Central Asia'. On the threat of radical Islam, see Erlan Karin, 'Central Asia: Facing Radical Islam', IFRI, Russia/NIS Center, White Paper, February 2017, pp. 13-14. See Jack Farchy, 'Central Asia: After the Strongmen', Financial Times, 13 May 2013.

28 See Barbara Junisbai, 'What Makes "Ardent Democrats" in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan?', PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 489, October 2017. 29 See the CIA's World Factbook entry on Kazakhstan at https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html. 30 See Marlene Laruelle (ed.), The Nazarbayev Generation: Youth in Kazakhstan (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019). 31 Adele Del Sordi, 'Sponsoring Student Mobility for Development and Authoritarian Stability: Kazakhstan's Bolashak Programme', Globalizations, vol. 13, no. 2, 2018, pp. 213-31. 32 See 'Trekh'iazychie kak propusk v bol'shoi mir' [Trilingualism as a Gateway to the World Community], Nur KZ, 13 September 2017, https:// www.nur.kz/1618073-trekhyazychiekak-propusk-v-bolshoy-mir.html.

i68 I Morena Skalamera Groce

Serbian Interests in an Independent Kosovo A. Ross Johnson

Following resolution of the name dispute between Greece and North Macedonia, the troubled relationship between Serbia and Kosovo remains - along with dysfunctional governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina - the major source of instability in the Balkans. Both Serbia and Kosovo aspire to strengthen their ties with Western Europe and join the European Union. Serbia has been a candidate for EU membership since 2012, and Chapter 35 of Serbia's accession document stipulates that progress 'w ill be meas­ ured in particular against Serbia's continued engagement towards a visible and sustainable improvement in relations with Kosovo'.1 Kosovo signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2016 and faces the same challenge of normalising relations with Serbia before it can advance toward EU membership. Normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo stagnated after a first wave of EU-brokered bilateral agreements in 2011-15. Relations worsened in 2018-19 as Belgrade intensified efforts to block Kosovo's mem­ bership in international organisations such as UNESCO and Interpol, to lobby countries to reverse their recognition of Kosovo, and even to prevent Serbian players on foreign soccer teams from competing in matches against Kosovo teams. Relations were also burdened by the postponement of EU visa-free travel for Kosovars and by Pristina's imposition of high tariffs

A. Ross Johnson is History and Public Policy Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Senior Advisor to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Survival | voi. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 169-182

DOI 10.1080/00396338.2020.1715080

170 I A. Ross Johnson

on imports from Serbia (as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina). Normalisation prospects were further complicated by international discussion - fuelled by hints from Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Kosovo President Hashim Thagi - of possible border changes, presumably involving northern Kosovo and Serbia's Presevo Valley. Such a 'land swap' would incorporate Serbs in northern Kosovo into Serbia and Albanians in the Presevo Valley into Kosovo, but it would not resolve the status of the majority of Kosovo Serbs who live south of the Ibar River. US and West European leaders in 2019 repeatedly urged a resumption of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. Visiting Belgrade in July, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that he and German Chancellor Angela Merkel would convene another meeting with the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo 'in order to find a global and sustainable solution',2yet no such meeting had taken place by the time this article went to press. In any case, another meeting for the sake of a meeting will accomplish little. If revived dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is to lead to normalised relations, it must embrace respect for legitimate Serbian interests in a sovereign Kosovo state within present borders accepted as such by Serbia. Normalisation will also require an end to current Serbian government policies implying extra­ territoriality for Kosovo Serbs, and to punitive Kosovo government policies against Serbia, especially high tariffs on imports. This article suggests how core Serbian interests can be accommodated in an independent Kosovo that today already provides extensive group minority rights for Kosovo Serbs.3 Kosovo after Yugoslavia Serbia was forced out of its Kosovo province in 1999 by local insurgency and a NATO air campaign.4 Both were in response to a decade of brutal Serbian repression of Kosovo's majority-Albanian population instigated by presi­ dent Slobodan Milosevic - repression still not acknowledged or apologised for by Serbia. Under Milosevic, local self-government, Albanian-language schools and civil liberties were abolished, and ethnic Albanians were forci­ bly expelled. Following Serbia's withdrawal, Kosovo was administered for nine years by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in keeping with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244.5 Security

Serbian Interests in an Independent Kosovo I 171

was provided by the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). Kosovo became independently self-governing in 2008 as a state enabled and recognised by the United States, 23 EU members and about half of UN member states. The Republic of Kosovo controls its own borders, including that with Serbia (although smuggling of goods and people continues). It has a single police force, the Kosovo Police. It is transforming its Kosovo Security Force into a small army of 5,000, under the security umbrella provided by KFOR. Although Kosovo's status is still formally constrained by the terms of UNSC Resolution 1244, it now has most of the attributes of a fully sovereign state. That said, Serbia - along with Russia, China, five EU members and about half of UN member states - does not recognise Kosovo's statehood, and with Russian support has prevented it from joining the United Nations and most international organisations. The 2006 Serbian constitution (adopted after the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) defines Kosovo as an autonomous jurisdiction that is an integral part of Serbia.6In official Serbian usage, the 'Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija' has the same legal status as the 'Autonomous Province of Vojvodina' in northeastern Serbia. But theory and political practice diverge. Serbia acknowledges that it does not govern in Pristina. President Vucic, who has called Serbia's withdrawal from Kosovo 'a major national defeat', has admitted that in Kosovo 'there is no Serbia, no [Serbian] authority except in health and education'.7 Serbia has negotiated with Kosovo on a bilateral basis under EU auspices, and it implicitly accepted Kosovo's sovereignty in the 2013 Brussels Agreement, which stated that the Kosovo Police and Kosovo courts, operating within Kosovo institutions, were the sole police and judicial authorities.8 Belgrade has reached some 30 bilateral technical agreements with Kosovo concern­ ing energy, missing persons, mutual recognition of university diplomas, telecommunications and other issues - not the kind of agreements a state would conclude with a constituent province - though many have not been fully or even partly implemented.9 Myths, monuments, minorities Serbia's stake in Kosovo is an amalgam of three elements: myths of the medieval Serbian state and especially its defeat by the Ottoman Empire

172 I

A. Ross Johnson

at Kosovo Polje in 1389; the cultural and religious heritage of medieval Orthodox Church structures and lands (Metohija means 'church lands'); and the fate of Kosovo Serbs as ethnic co-nationals. Geography is less impor­ tant: the territory itself, in its present boundaries, had not been part of the independent Serbian state for a century before the First World War, and its borders were still changing into the 1950s. Nor has Serbia ever demonstrated an interest in the fate of the Kosovo population as a whole. The majority ethnic-Albanian population was first repressed and then neglected in Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslavia (Albanians were often referred to by the derogatory term Shiptar); empowered as Kosovo gained most of the powers of a con­ stituent Yugoslav republic under decentralised communist rule in the 1970s and 1980s;10 severely repressed in the 1990s under Milosevic; and thereafter ignored except as a perceived threat to Kosovo Serbs. Serbian presidents Vojislav Kostunica, Boris Tadic and Tomislav Nikolic visited Kosovo in the decade after 2000 but limited their visits to Serbian communities. They ignored the majority-Albanian population. The Kosovo myth was glorified by Milosevic as he fanned and exploited Serbian nationalism to seize and maintain power. Initially downplayed after 1999, the myth of 1389 is again being exploited by President Vucic's political opponents, including former foreign minister Vuk Jeremic. Yet the myth, however fervently believed by some Serbs, lacks policy relevance. It does not frame any current Serbian interest in Kosovo apart from a need to safeguard Serbian cultural and religious heritage sites and to foster the well-being of fellow Serbs - interests that do not require a historical myth to sustain them. Serbia understandably seeks guarantees for the preserva­ tion and safekeeping of the hundreds of Serbian Orthodox monasteries, churches and other cultural sites in 'Kosovo and Metohija'.11 Four of the monasteries are UNESCO World Heritage sites. Many were damaged or destroyed after 1999 and especially during a rampage in March 2004, in which ethnic Albanians sought revenge against their former oppressors.12It is also understandable that Serbia seeks security guarantees for a declining Kosovo Serb population that today numbers around 93,000, more than half of which live in communities that are not contiguous with Serbia but rather scattered south of the Ibar River.

Serbian Interests in an Independent Kosovo I 173

International discussion of Kosovo sometimes overlooks the fact that, in modern times, ethnic Serbs have never been a majority in Kosovo, and today constitute only 5% of the territory's population of some 1.8 million. Albanians constitute some 90% of the population, and Turkish and other minorities 5%. According to Yugoslav census data, the corresponding pro­ portions in 1961 were 24% Serbs and 67% Albanians; in 1971, they were 18% Serbs and 74% Albanians. By 1981, Serbs were only 15% of the popu­ lation, and by 1991 only 11%.13During Milosevic's repression of Albanians in the 1990s, only 1,300 Serbian families moved to Kosovo, a point made by President Vucic in 2019 when he recalled veteran journalist Aleksandar Tijanic's words: 'Serbs are willing to sacrifice their lives for Kosovo, but few of them would be willing to live there.'14The precipitous decline in the Serb population, both in relative and absolute terms, over the past 75 years has been a consequence of outmigration, war and the disparate birth rates of Serbs and Albanians. The last major decline occurred in 1999, when some 65,000 Serbs fled or were expelled from Kosovo after the withdrawal of the Serbian army and police, leaving an estimated 130,ooo.15 No major outmigration occurred when Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, though the total Serb population has since declined. Few who departed in 1999 have returned. Group minority rights Kosovo statehood was brokered by the US and key EU members in 2008 con­ tingent on guarantees of extensive group minority rights for Kosovo Serbs at the state and local levels. As recommended by UN special representative Martti Ahtisaari, the Kosovo constitution stipulates that one government minister and two deputy ministers must be Kosovo Serbs, and that ten parliamentary seats (out of 120) must be allocated to Kosovo Serb candi­ dates.16 Constitutional changes require a double supermajority - two-thirds of all parliamentary delegates plus two-thirds of the 20 minority delegates. Serbian has co-equal status with Albanian as an official language.17 Group minority rights for Kosovo Serbs are also embodied in the structure of the Kosovo state, which is decentralised, as recommended by Ahtisaari, on an ethnic basis. Ten of Kosovo's 38 municipalities are Serb-majority,

174 I A. Ross Johnson

with Serb mayors and Serb-dominated assemblies (27 municipalities are Albanian-majority and one is Turkish-majority). The unified Kosovo Police, which replaced the UNMIK police force in 2008, reserves for ethnic Serbs the position of police chief and most subordinate positions in Serb-majority municipalities. Kosovo Serbs constitute some 12% of the force - more than twice their proportion of the Kosovo population. The EU-brokered Brussels Agreement agreed to by then-prime minis­ ters Ivica Dacic and Hashim Thagi in 2013 provided for the formation of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities separate from the all-Kosovo Association of Municipalities, to coordinate education, social and health ser­ vices, economic development and municipality planning in Serb-majority areas. Yet the association has never been formed due to disagreement over its authority - an ambiguity that should have been clarified in 2013.18 On 27 May 2019, President Vucic repeated the Serbian demand that the association have 'supervisory functions' and 'executive powers'. For Kosovo Albanians this is a red flag, a reversion to the separate jurisdiction Belgrade proposed prior to 2008 - a Kosovo equivalent of the Bosnian 'Republika Srpska' but one strictly controlled from Belgrade that would transform group minority rights into extra-territoriality.19 Partocracy via parallel structures The Kosovo constitution and Kosovar institutions provide group minority rights for ethnic Serbs equal to or greater than those guaranteed to ethnic minorities in other countries that have annexed territory in post-war settlements.20 But Belgrade continues to support administrative structures and social-welfare institutions for Kosovo Serbs - so-called 'parallel structures' - especially in the four Serb-majority municipalities north of the Ibar River. While the six Serb-majority municipalities south of the Ibar mostly function according to the Kosovo constitution, the four corruptionand crime-plagued municipalities north of the river mostly do not.21 In all ten municipalities, the Serbian government in Belgrade appoints the heads of Serbian schools and hospitals or clinics, and provides them with direct financial assistance, bypassing the Pristina government. Moreover, Belgrade continues to appoint titular heads and lower-level officials of larger

Serbian Interests in an Independent Kosovo I 175

municipalities and regions within 1999 borders, even though these officials have no government function in the non-Serb-majority municipalities. For example, Belgrade appoints the head of the 'temporary Pristina municipality office' located in the Serb-majority municipality of Gracanica, the head of the 'temporary Pec municipality office' located in the Serb-majority town of Gorazdevac and so on. Belgrade has also appointed to positions in its parallel structures all ten ethnic Serb members of the Kosovo parliament.22 These officials are paid directly from the Serbian state budget, meaning that those who also function within the post-2008 Kosovo institutions receive two salaries. Some 40,000 Kosovo Serbs, or nearly half of the total Kosovo Serb population, receive salaries directly from Belgrade.23 Appointments to and funding of the parallel structures are the direct responsibility of the Serbian Government Office for Kosovo and Metohija. The office's director, currently Marko Djuric, regularly convenes meetings in Belgrade with all Kosovo Serb parliamentary deputies and mayors, as well as other officials. The office is currently developing a network of ties between the Serb-majority Kosovo municipalities and municipalities in what it terms 'Central Serbia'. It encourages with some success Serbian students to enrol in the 'University of Pristina Temporarily in Kosovska Mitrovica', which is in North Mitrovica. Both the extensive group minority rights for Kosovo Serbs incorporated into the Kosovo constitution and the extra-constitutional parallel structures have, over the past decade, become a channel for intensified influence and control of Kosovo Serbs by the Serbian government, which has shifted from advocating a boycott of all Kosovo institutions to encouraging engagement using political instruments controlled from Belgrade. It has used the paral­ lel structures to impose policies and to install loyalists of President Vucic's ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which in 2014 organised the Serbian List (Srpska lista or SL) as the SNS's de facto Kosovo branch. All ten Kosovo Serb delegates elected to the Kosovo parliament in October 2019 belong to the SL, as do the mayors of all ten Serb-majority municipalities. As the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia concluded, after interview­ ing Kosovo Serbs in late 2018, 'the Serbian List, under the control of Serbia's SNS and [President Vucic], directly influences people's every-day lives,

176 I A. Ross Johnson

given that it has a firm grip on all jobs - [whether] in education, healthcare or administration. Possibilities for getting ... other jobs are null/24 In this sense, Belgrade has imposed a 'partocracy' in Kosovo. In the first 15 years after 1999, individual Kosovo Serb politicians and activists emerged with their own views of Kosovo Serb interests that sometimes diverged from Belgrade policies. The mayor of one Serbmajority community told this author in 2004 that his real problem was not his Albanian constituents but interference from Belgrade. In the past five years, such independent voices have been silenced by repression, intimidation, corruption and violence - most dramatically in the case of independent politician Oliver Ivanovic, who was assassinated outside his North Mitrovica office in January 2018. Also in 2018, the head of the Serbian medical facility in Gracanica was demoted and replaced by an SL loyalist. Slobodan Petrovic, the leader of the Independent Liberal Party who defected from the SL in 2017, is routinely denounced by Belgrade as betraying Serbian interests. There are independent Serb-majority non­ governmental organisations operating both north and south of the Ibar River that obtain funding from Western governments and foundations, promote independent thinking and organise civic projects, but these cur­ rently lack significant political influence. Toward normalisation Successful breakaway territories usually reconcile with their former home­ lands only slowly, and with difficultly. This was true of the United States, Ireland, Finland, East Timor and many others, and will surely be true of Kosovo and Serbia as well. Mutual diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadors are not on the horizon. Still, there are steps toward nor­ malisation that could be taken by both countries as a means of forging closer ties with the EU and its member states. Both Pristina and Belgrade should complete the implementation of the many technical agreements they have signed. Pristina should end its prohibitive tariffs on the import of Serbian goods. It should provide enhanced security guarantees, with international backing, for Serbian cultural and religious sites in Kosovo, and prevent any repetition of the March 2004 violence against them. This might include

Serbian Interests in an Independent Kosovo I 177

granting an international organisation, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the authority to arbitrate any disputes about Serbian Orthodox Church properties.25 Belgrade should end its campaign to exclude Kosovo from international organisations, with the understanding that UN membership for Kosovo is a special case requiring a change in Russian policy. The myth of 1389 should be left to the historians, and Belgrade should focus on the interests of the Serb minority in an independent Kosovo in a manner consistent with Kosovo institutions, just as it fosters the welfare of the 187,000 Serbs in Croatia (representing 4.4% of the population, according to the 2011 census) consistent with Croatian institutions. Specifically, Belgrade should acknowledge the extent of group minor­ ity rights currently guaranteed to Kosovo Serbs by the Kosovo constitution and Kosovo institutions. It should encourage formation of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities to play a coordinating role among the ten Serb-majority municipalities, rather than to become an intermediate level of government subject to control by Belgrade. Such a move would cer­ tainly appeal to the ten municipalities, which should welcome the chance to develop ties among themselves without transferring their authority over local issues to a viceroy.26 Serbia should terminate its support for parallel administrative structures and curtail the unilateral operations of its Office for Kosovo and Metohija. It should cease dissuading Kosovo Serbs from joining the Kosovo Security Force. It should continue providing financial support for education, health and other social services for Kosovo Serbs - support Pristina will welcome so long as it is transparent and mutually agreed. Belgrade should also support cultural projects for Kosovo Serbs that are agreed with the Kosovo govern­ ment - just as, on a smaller scale, Austria supports projects in support of South Tyrolese culture in agreement with Rome. Finally, and most challenging, the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo will eventually require a change in the relationship between Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs. A dialogue is needed with Kosovo Serb leaders who are not merely the instruments of directives from Belgrade but political actors in their own right, with their own standing and interests.

178 I A. Ross Johnson

This kind of intra-Serbian dialogue is as necessary for normalisation as is resumed dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. France has suggested additional conditionality for the accession of new states to the EU. But as Wolfgang Ischinger, the veteran German dip­ lomat, has argued, the European Union and its member states must not foreclose eventual EU membership for Serbia and Kosovo.27 Instead, the Union should continue with its economic support of both countries and implement visa-free travel to the EU for Kosovars. The United States and EU member states cannot impose solutions, but they can encourage the necessary steps toward normalisation. Notes 1

Conference on Accession to the European Union - Serbia, Accession Document', 30 November 2015, p. 2, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ document/AD-i2-20i5-INIT/en/pdf. 2 'Macron Vows to Help Restart Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue', France 24, 16 July 2019, https://www.france24. com/en/20190716-macron-vows-helprestart-serbia-kosovo-dialogue. 3 This article is based in part on the author's discussions with officials and experts in Belgrade in October 2017, and with 25 Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian politicians, civil-society activists and international officials in Kosovo in September 2018. 4 Adam Roberts, 'NATO's "Humanitarian War" over Kosovo', Survival, vol. 41, no. 3, Autumn 1999, pp. 102-23. 5 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244,10 June 1999, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/ peacemaker.un.0rg/files/990610_ SCRi244%28i999%29.pdf. 6 Serbia's 2006 constitution consid­

ers Kosovo an integral part of Serbia entitled to 'substantial autonomy', but on terms to be defined by a future law of the Serbian parliament and thus not constitutionally guaranteed. This lan­ guage was approved in a referendum that excluded all Kosovo Albanians. See Daniel Serwer, From War to Peace in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Ukraine (Cham: Palgrave Pivot, 2019), p. 78. Serbian law and administrative regulations assume that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia, and current Serbian maps show an 'Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija' as it existed in 1999, subdivided into five districts (okrugi) and 38 munici­ palities (opstine). Serbian law thus does not acknowledge the territorial reorganisation imposed by UNMIK between 1999 and 2008, or the cur­ rent decentralisation embodied in the Kosovo constitution. 7 'Speech of President of the Republic of Serbia in Kosovska Mitrovica 09.09.2018.', 11 September 2018, https://www.

Serbian Interests in an Independent Kosovo ! 179

predsednik.rs/en/press-center/news/ speech-president-republic-serbiakosovska-mitrovica-09092018; and 'Govor predsednika Republike Srbije Aleksandr a Vucica u Narodnoj Skupstini Republike Srbije 27.05.2019 godine', 28 May 2019, https://www. predsednik.rs/lat/pres-centar/vesti/ govor-predsednika-republike-srbijealeksandra-vucica-u-narodnojskupstini-republike-srbije-27052019godine. Despite this admission, Vucic's government continues to support proto-political administrative authorities, the so-called 'parallel structures', in Kosovo. 'First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations', initialled on 19 April 2013 on separate copies, available at http://www.rts.rs/upload/storyBoxFileData/2013/04/20/3224318/ Originalni%2otekst%2oPredloga%2o sporazuma.pdf (Serbia copy with initials and notation) and http:// www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/ docs/FIRST_AGREEMENT_OF_ PRINCIPLES_GOVERNING_ THE_NORMALIZATION_OF_ RELATIONS,_APRIL_i9,_20i3_ BRUSSELS_en.pdf (Kosovo copy with initials). See also Serwer, From War to Peace in the Balkans, p. 85. See Donika Emini and Isidora Stakic, 'Belgrade and Pristina: Lost in Normalisation?', European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2018, https://www.iss.europa. eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/ Brief%205%2oBelgrade%2oand%20 Pristina.pdf; and Dusan Janjic, 'Normalization Challenges: Analysis of the Negotiation Process and

10

11

12

13

14

Implementation of the Brussels Agreement', Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 2015 (with texts of agreements), http://fer.org.rs/ wp-content/uploads/2017/12/107FORUM-Policy-Paper-2015-ENG.pdf. A. Ross Johnson, 'Political Leadership in Yugoslavia; Evolution of the League of Communists', RAND Report R-3049, May 1983, unclassified release February 2019, https://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/208961. The Serbian Orthodox Church claims 1,500 such sites. Maja Zivanovic, 'Don't Abandon Kosovo, Serbian Church Urges Govt', Balkan Insight, 11 May 2018, https:// balkaninsight.c0m/2018/05/11/ serbian-orthodox-church-againstkosovo-independence-05 -11 -2018/. A. Ross Johnson, 'Kosovo: Keeping the Lid On', Floover Digest, no. 3, 2004, https://www.hoover.org/ research/keeping-lid. Census data from Johnson, 'Political Leadership in Yugoslavia'; and 'Govor predsednika Republike Srbije Aleksandra Vucica u Narodnoj Skupstini Republike Srbije 27.05.2019 godine'. Vucic added in his speech that the population of Kosovo Serbs can be assumed to have shrunk by 2,000 people as of 2017. Tim Judah discusses alternative population numbers in 'Kosovo's Demographic Destiny Looks Eerily Familiar', BIRN, 7 November 2019, https:// balkaninsight.com/2019/11/07/ kosovos-demographic-destiny-lookseerily-familiar/. Tijanic's comment was made during an interview with Blic in 2013: Tamara Spaic, 'Tijanic: Prvi odgovoran za

180 I A. Ross Johnson

15

16

17

18

Kosovo je knez Lazar i njegovi radni rezultati', Blic, 26 May 2013, https:// www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/tijanic-prviodgovoran-za-kosovo-je-knez-lazar-injegovi-radni-rezultati/4ykhovv. For Vucic's remarks, see 'Vucic za RTS: Da su nas ostavili na miru, mozda bismo se i dogovorili sa Albancima', RTS, 8 July 2019, http://www.rts.rs/page/ stories/sr/story/9/politika/3582928/ vucic-za-rts-da-su-nas-ostavilina-miru-mozda-bismo-se-i-dogovorilisa-albancima.html. European Stability Initiative, 'The Lausanne Principle: Multiethnicity, Territory and the Future of Kosovo's Serbs', 7 June 2004, p. 18. 'Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement' (the 'Ahtisaari Plan'), April 2007, available at https://2001-2009.state.g0v/p/eur/ rls/fs/ioi244.htm. Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, http://www. kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/ ConstitutioniKosovo.pdf. The Brussels Agreement was rati­ fied by the Kosovo parliament and accepted by the Serbian parliament in June 2013. Disagreements immedi­ ately ensued on the competence of the proposed Association of Serb-majority Municipalities and specifically whether it could have executive authority - in other words, whether the head of the association could issue directives to m unicipality m ayors. The Kosovo Constitutional Court ruled against this provision while not objecting otherwise to the association. Controversy about this issue in both Serbia and Kosovo thwarted agree­ ment on other issues.

19 Outgoing Kosovo prime minister Ramush Haradinaj rejected dialogue with Serbia on territorial division in an interview with Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty in July 2019: 'Haradinaj: Kosovo Ready for Dialogue with Belgrade as Long as Serb Enclave Not a Condition', Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 23 July 2019, https:// www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/intervjuramus-haradinaj/30o68937.html. 20 Examples include the rights afforded to Hungarians in Romanian Transylvania and Slovakia, and to Austrian Tyrolese in northern Italy. For a discussion of how power­ sharing works in South Tyrol, see Stephen J. Larin and Marc Roggla, 'Participatory Consociationalism? No, but South Tyrol's Autonomy Convention Is Evidence that Power­ sharing Can Transform Conflicts', Nations and Nationalism, vol. 25, no. 3, 2019, pp. 1,018-41. 21 This conclusion is based on my September 2018 discussions in Kosovo. A useful analysis of the situation in the Serb-majority munici­ palities as of 2013 can be found in Bojan Elek, Limits of Ethnic Bargaining: Serbian Enclaves in Kosovo, MA disser­ tation, Central European University, 2013, available at https://scholar. google.com/scholar?q=Bojan+Elek+.+2 oi3.+%E2%8o%9CLimits+of+Ethnic+B argaining:+Serbian+Enclaves+in+Koso vo.% E2%8o%9D +M aster% E2%8o%99s

+thesis+Central+European+University. 22 See the investigative report­ ing of Amra Zejneli Loxha for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 'Srpski rukovodioci sa kosovskim platama', 26 February 2019, https://

Serbian Interests in an Independent Kosovo I 181

www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ kosovo-paralelne-strukture-lokalnasamoupr ava-srbij a/29792112 .html; and "Duple funkcije za predstavnike Srpske liste", 19 December 2019, https://www.sl0b0dnaevr0pa.0rg/a/ duple-funkcije-za-predstavnikesrpske-liste/30334048.html. The parallel structures were examined in the International Crisis Group report "North Kosovo: Dual Sovereignty in Practice", Europe Report No. 2 ii, 14 March 2011, https://www. refworld.org/pdfid/4d7f23e82.pdf; and the report of the Kosovo govern­ ment's Coordinator's Office for the Strategy Regarding North of Kosovo, "Report on Parallel Institutions on North of Kosovo", May 2011, https:// www.peacefare.net/wp-content/ uploads/2011/06/English-Version-ofReport-2011-3.pdf. Interview with a prominent Kosovo Serb in Pristina in September 2018.

24 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 'Serbian Community in Kosovo: Frozen Life in a Frozen Conflict', January 2019, pp. 22-3, http://www.helsinki.org.rs/doc/ kosovo%2020i9%2oeng.pdf. 25 This suggestion was made by Edward P. Joseph, "Serbia Needs Kosovo's Respect, Not Its Land", Foreign Policy, 21 May 2019. Daniel Serwer has sug­ gested additional steps the Kosovo government could take to reassure Belgrade in his article "What Serbia Can Get", peacefare.net, 26 April 2019, https://w w w .peacefare.net/2019/04/26/ what-serbia-can-get/. 26 This conclusion is based on inter­ views with Kosovo Serb officials in September 2018. 27 Wolfgang Ischinger, "A Roadmap for the Balkans', Politico, 3 July 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/ balkans-roadmap-political-settlementserbia-kosovo-eu-conundrum/.

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82 I A. Ross Johnson

Review Essay

Greenland's Hidden Treasure Jeffrey Mazo

The Ice at the End of the World: An Epic Journey into Greenland's Buried Past and Our Perilous Future

Jon Gertner. New York: Random House, 2019. $28.00.418 pp.

When stories appeared in mid-August 2019 that US President Donald Trump had raised the idea, in discussions with aides, of buying Greenland from the Danes, no one - including those aides - knew whether to take him seriously. Trump proved serious enough that he cited the backlash against his sug­ gested 'real estate deal' as the reason for cancelling a planned state visit to Denmark at the end of the month. Yet there was at least some method behind his apparent madness: by virtue of its physical and human geography and natural resources, the world's largest island is of considerable global strate­ gic importance and could be considered vital to US national security. The Trump-Greenland farce played out months after Jon Gertner fin­ ished writing The Ice at the End of the World, or he surely would have given it considerable attention. Even someone versed in Arctic history and politics might be surprised to learn that, as Gertner points out, this was not the first time the US had proposed to buy Greenland from the Danes. In 1946, an offer of $100 million, intended to secure crucial air bases built during the Second World War, was treated with the same incredulity and indifference that greeted Trump's proposal seven decades later (p. 162).

Jeffrey Mazo is an IISS consulting member and a contributing editor to Survival. Survival | vol. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 183-190

DOI 10.1080/00396338.2020.1715082

184 I Jeffrey Mazo

Neither Greenland's strategic importance nor its potential oil and mineral wealth are central to Gertner's mostly backwards-looking exploration of the island and its ice. The focus is rather on a treasure trove of information entombed in that ice. Without the kilometres-deep cores extracted from the ice sheets in Greenland and later Antarctica beginning in the early 1950s, our understanding of the size and rate of past climate variations on scales from decades to tens of millennia would be much weaker, and hence our projections of near-term global warming less reliable. And, although over half the book is devoted to the 'heroic age' of Arctic exploration from the Middle Ages to the Second World War, the reader would be well advised to pay this part close attention, as much for entertain­ ment as for background and context for the story of post-war research. Beyond this focus, The Ice at the End of the World is an extended, real-world case study of the dynam­ ics of discovery Gertner explored in his first book, The Idea Factory (reviewed in the December 2013-January 2014 issue of Survival). He there explored, through the example of Bell Labs, how personalities, management structures and policies, and working environments can interact to allow creativity to blossom, and how this can be extended from the 'factory of ideas' embodied by a particular institution to a 'geography of ideas', in which many inter­ locking small efforts in physical proximity can mesh to make an equally powerful engine of innovation. The core issue German meteorologist Alfred Wegener (1880-1930) is today best known for his 1912 theory of continental drift, rejected by mainstream geology until it was vindicated by the discovery of plate tectonics in the 1960s and 1970s. But his passion was Greenland and its ice sheet: he took part in four expedi­ tions there (1907-08,1912-13,1929 and 1930) and is buried on the ice sheet, where he died returning from a supply run to Eismitte, the research station his team had established at the centre of the ice.

Greenland's Hidden Treasure I 185

One of the key questions his last expedition hoped to investigate was whether the ice sheet was growing, shrinking or stable. An answer would take decades of data-gathering under the best of circumstances. In the event, his team gathered only a year's data on the movement of glaciers and dug a 15-metre pit in the ice to reveal its stratigraphy. A French expedition estab­ lished 'Station Centrale' on the site of Eismitte in 1949-51, where it drilled a 150 m, poor-quality ice core. It was not until the early 1950s that system­ atic data collection resumed, under the auspices of the US military. After a three-year, 1,800 km 'traverse' of the ice sheet during which pits were dug every 40 km, a team from the US Army Corps of Engineers' new Snow, Ice and Permafrost Research Establishment (SIPRE) tentatively concluded that the ice sheet was in fact in equilibrium. In 1956-57, SIPRE pioneered deep drilling at another site on the ice sheet with two cores reaching depths of 305 m and 411 m, providing a continuous record of climate going back about 900 years. Then, over a six-year period starting in 1961, SIPRE's successor organisation, the Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL), reached bedrock at the bottom of the ice sheet at 1,388 m at a site called Camp Century. This 100,000-year climate record, published in 1969, appeared to give the first inklings that 'climate could change quickly and drastically' (p. 204). This unexpected finding raised eyebrows, but could just as easily have been noise in the data. To firm up the data, members of the CRREL team formed the Greenland Ice Sheet Project (GISP) in 1970. Between 1978 and 1981, at a Distant Early Warning Line radar site known as Dye-3, GISP drilled a 2,037 m ice core down to the bedrock. It was almost immediately obvious that CRREL's find­ ings were not an anomaly; the core showed 'wild swings in climate between ten and thirteen thousand years ago ... that seemed to have no relation to gradual trends of warming or cooling that were assumed to characterize climate shifts' (p. 212). These could amount to about io°C 'in less than a human lifetime' (p. 214). Between 1989 and 1993, GISP and a European collaboration (Greenland Ice Core Project or GRIP) drilled parallel cores at sites about 30 km apart, reaching 3,054 m and 3,028 m respectively, providing a matching record

i86 I Jeffrey Mazo

going back no,ooo years. The cores confirmed once and for all that, about 11,700 years ago, temperatures warmed by io°C in the space of a few years, marking the transition from the Ice Age to the modern, civilisation-friendly climate. It was now clear that warnings of imminent, rapid global warming due to greenhouse-gas emissions were not just theoretical. By the mid-1980s, moreover, the question of whether the Greenland ice sheet was stable, growing or shrinking had still not been resolved. Remote sensing from aircraft in the 1990s appeared to show that the sheet was losing about 51 km3 a year, but it was not until the early years of the twentyfirst century that satellite data confirmed that Greenland was not just losing ice, but was losing ice at an ever-increasing rate. Greenland did not just provide data for ancient climates to inform global-warming models; it was a bellwether of the drastic and accelerating warming that climatologists had been predicting. Richard Alley, one of the scientists on the GISP-2 project, told Gertner that climate change on the scale observed in Greenland's past 'could pose the most momentous physical challenge we have ever faced, with widespread crop failures and social disruption' (p. 232). Logistics vs tactics This much could have been gleaned from any number of summaries on climate science published in the last decade, particularly the comprehensive 2014 'Fifth Assessment Report' by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. But it is one thing to read the dry conclusions of scientific papers; where Gertner excels is in conveying the compelling human drama - the evolving uncertainties, struggles and difficult personalities - behind the research, without losing the science. There is an old saying among military leaders: 'amateurs talk tactics; professionals talk logistics'. The sentiment could as well apply to explora­ tion and scientific investigation. Most histories of Arctic exploration focus on the adventure story. Gertner does not neglect this aspect, but puts the 'heroic age' squarely in the context of the challenges of organisation and supply that make the adventure possible. In the post-war period, when huge American Cold War military budgets gave polar science effectively infinite resources by modem standards (p. 174), Gertner notes that 'field

Greenland's Hidden Treasure I 187

experiments to retrieve deep ice cores soon became like ice sheet expedi­ tions without the dogs or the roving or the hunger' (p. 205). The US military came in force to Greenland during the Second World War, establishing weather stations for forecasting and air bases for convoy protection and ferrying aircraft, not to mention thwarting German efforts to establish their own clandestine weather stations. America may have failed in its effort to buy Greenland from Denmark in 1946, but in 1951 the US began construction of Thule Air Base on the site of a Second World War weather station and gravel airstrip, at a cost of $25 billion in modern dollars and a logistical effort on a par with the Normandy landings or the Manhattan Project. According to Gertner, the base was 'conceived in paranoia and dressed gaudily in propaganda' (p. 159). The first is debatable, the second irrefuta­ ble. The military needed to promote Arctic science for reasons of its own - for constructing and maintaining infrastructure in such a harsh environ­ ment, and for improved weather forecasting. With the advent of the Cold War, the Arctic had become an even more important strategic theatre. It was at this time that SIPRE was established, and scientific research became the public face of what Gertner calls 'the relentless militarization of the ice sheet' (p. 184). This militarisation was mainly in the form of roads, gravel ramps, crevasse infill, snowploughs, ski-equipped aircraft, tractors and Weasels (tank-like vehicles designed for the US Army for use on ice and snow) - in other words, transportation infrastructure. Camp Century, where CRREL did its deep-ice drilling, was presented to the public and media as a research and development base, but its main and classified purpose was to test both construction methods and the concept of the proposed 'Ice Worm' system, which would have involved 600 intermediaterange ballistic missiles being moved around in tunnels underneath the ice sheet by rail, over an area the size of the US state of Alabama. As Gertner notes, 'the idea would come to seem preposterous in later years' (p. 193). But that was only after it had been tried and tested. Whether it would have been strategically appropriate is another question entirely. Nevertheless, Camp Century played a crucial role in the development of ice-core research, piggybacking on the military effort. Even the earlier

i88 I Jeffrey Mazo

French expedition relied on Weasels its leader had found neglected in a surplus-equipment camp in Fontainebleau Forest. Similarly, access to the centre of the ice sheet was essentially free for scientists up to the mid-1960s, freeloading on military flights. By the late 1960s, after the military money dried up, it cost $6,ooo-$8,ooo an hour, in an era where science budgets were also more constrained. On the other hand, relying on military resources and priorities meant that research locations were often not optimum for scien­ tific purposes. GISP was formed after the military money petered out, and spent years searching for the best site to drill and conducting test cores, only to settle on Dye-3 a* the insistence of its funder, the National Science Foundation (NSF), due to cost. Doing science Even well-funded research relies on ingenuity and ad hoc solutions, includ­ ing Rube Goldberg or Heath Robinson contraptions, to a much greater extent than the popular image of science as portrayed, for example, by Hollywood. The original probing of the atomic nucleus was done with apparatus less sophisticated than that found in many modern high-school classrooms. The first atomic bomb tested at Alamogordo in 1945 was held together by duct tape. At the same time, science is a collaborative effort, both over time and between different approaches and multiple lines of evidence. Gertner shows, in multiple vignettes, how research in Greenland reflects both sides of this coin. Scientists struggled with resources even when they were effectively unlimited; they went down blind alleys; they built on each other's work. By the start of this decade, 'Greenland was like Los Alamos in the 1940s ... except here it was all about the science and impacts of lost ice' (p. 272). If ice-sheet research took off as a spin-off of the Cold War, it soon became an international effort. In the mid-1950s, when there was still plenty of US mil­ itary money available, SIPRE presented its ice-drilling projects in Greenland as a major US contribution to the upcoming International Geophysical Year (IGY), a 67-nation, 18-month (1957-58) collaborative effort in earth and space science. A main focus of the IGY was Antarctica, and Greenland served as a test bed for techniques and logistics to be deployed there. Later, GISP was

Greenland's Hidden Treasure I 189

funded not just by the NSF but by public and private sources in Denmark and Switzerland. The GRIP team that worked in parallel with GISP-2 included one of the founders of GISP (a Dane) as well as scientists from Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Switzerland and the UK, under the auspices of the European Science Foundation. Although the two teams were expected to drill at the same rate, most of the 'first generation' of American drillers and ice scientists involved with SIPRE and CRREL had aged out, and a new gen­ eration had yet to gain the necessary experience and expertise. This failure to conserve capabilities was not insignificant: the GISP team took a full year longer than GRIP to complete its work. The increasing sophistication of ice-sheet core drilling and analysis from the 1950s to the 1990s was not, however, the result merely of increased expe­ rience and expertise. There were mutually reinforcing trends in technology such as automated processing of ice samples, advances in computing, meas­ uring tools such as laser altimeters, GPS, the reliability of aircraft and so on. There was also a mutual reinforcement between the scientific results and the willingness to fund further research, a link between declining scientific and policy uncertainty. Scientific advance is not linear; it is like solving a detective mystery or a crossword puzzle, with blind alleys and overlooked evidence, and the whole greater than the sum of its parts. *

*

*

Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen wrote in 1890 that the consensus was that Greenland's 'unknown interior in all probability contained no wealth or material treasures' (p. 12). He and his five companions had just become the first people to cross the ice sheet. Their motives were complex: adven­ ture and fame, certainly, but also scientific curiosity (the first thing Nansen learned when he arrived on the west coast was that he had been awarded his PhD). The hope was that by understanding Greenland's ice sheet in the present day, scientists could gain insight into the earth's Ice Age past. It was only six years later that another Scandinavian scientist, the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius, first calculated that human-caused carbon-dioxide emis­ sions could be significant enough to cause global warming.

190 I Jeffrey Mazo

A century and a quarter later, Greenland is still a treasure house of infor­ mation about the history and fate of the planet. The reader who comes to The Ice at the End of the World seeking explicit insights into current geopoliti­ cal and geo-economic issues in the Arctic will not find them here, but will find something better: an extended essay on the importance of pure scien­ tific research, institutional flexibility, infrastructure development and the climate crisis, packaged as a compelling human story of a struggle against the elements and the unknown.

Review Essay

The Church and the Military in Russia Mathieu Boulègue

Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy: Religion, Politics, and Strategy

Dmitry Adamsky. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019. $90.00. 376 pp.

As the Orthodox faith became an important feature of Russian identity and national ideology in the 2000s, the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and those of the state in military and nuclear affairs converged. Especially significant are the ROC's social function in the armed forces and the impact of the Orthodox faith on nuclear deterrence and escalation dynamics. Since the early 2000s, the militarisation and 'Orthodoxisation' of public spaces have been powerful tools of social control under President Vladimir Putin. Dmitry Adamsky's Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy offers a detailed and comprehensive account of the growth and intensification of the state-religion nexus and its influence on Russian military affairs. He argues persuasively that the ROC, the armed forces and nuclear policymakers have established a symbiotic relationship since the fall of the Soviet Union. As early as 2000, Russia's National Security Concept called for 'spiritual renewal' and protection from foreign spiritual influences.1Since 2009, reli­ gious education has been allowed in Russian schools, where an 'Orthodoxy module' was introduced in 2012.2 Good Russian soldiers must first be good

Mathieu Boulegue is a research fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House).

Survival | voi. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 191-196

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Orthodox schoolchildren. Together the armed forces and the ROC have turned patriotic mobilisation - that is, propping up traditional Russian values such as family, morality, military service and religion in opposition to a morally decadent West - into a staple of Putinism.3 As Adamsky puts it, the ROC has established itself as a social force connecting faith, patri­ otism and military affairs. Thus, the ROC is now the official protector of the Kremlin's conservative turn, employed as an enabler to instil stateapproved patriotic values and to nurture a desire to defend the Motherland and a sense of patriotic sacrifice. Recent Russian military interventions have been presented in religious terms and the ROC has been active in their pro­ motion. For instance, the ROC publicly declared the

RUSSIAN

XU CLEA R ORTHODOXY

war in Syria a 'holy battle' while the Russian military command compared it to an 'act of war for control over the Lord's crèche'.4 Social control A key social function of the ROC is to provide reli­ gious support and pastoral care for Russian troops.

Dm itry Adamsky

In the 1990s, the ROC helped the armed forces shape a 'new professional ethos' by instilling ideological meaning, motivation and discipline into the mili­ tary endeavour (pp. 2, 155). For instance, after the

Kursk submarine sank in the Barents Sea in August 2000, killing all 118 crew members, the ROC increased its reach within the Northern Fleet by opening churches inside military bases. While initially intended as an essentially charitable activity, the Kremlin soon seized upon it as a mecha­ nism of discipline and inspiration. Under Patriarch Kirill, military clergy were restored in 2009, and the armed forces became increasingly catechised. Priests are now being inte­ grated into military units. The Ministry of Defence has unveiled plans to train clergymen with airborne troops to operate basic military vehicles, weapons and communication equipment, and to assist with medical care and evacuation. Adamsky also notes that 'mobile churches' have been deployed in combat zones in Syria to provide pastoral care. A variant is the

The Church and the Military in Russia I 193

'flying church': an aircraft from which priests and icons are parachuted into combat areas.5 Ceremonies are regularly held to bless troops and consecrate military hardware and weapons systems. The Kremlin has also instrumentalised the ROC to advance national mobilisation and conscription through religious and patriotic messages. In addition, the Kremlin has enlisted the ROC's military chaplaincy to bolster troops' morale and overall combat readiness and resilience. Adamsky characterises the Orthodox faith as a 'force multiplier' and an 'equalizer to material inferiority' (p. 101). This role is acutely important because Moscow is concerned about motivation and preparedness in the Russian armed forces, having, in July 2018, reconstituted the Main Directorate for PoliticalMilitary Affairs of the Russian Armed Forces under the aegis of the Ministry of Defence. Partly because the ROC's involvement in mobilisation is quite recent, however, it remains unclear how effective the Church has been in terms of firming up the morale and patriotic motivation of the Russian armed forces overall. In line with official state policy, the ROC has been promoting the concept of Russkiy Mir since its inception in 2014. Based on the concept of the Russian world as a historical, social, cultural, ethnic, linguistic and spiritual totality encompassing the Russian diaspora as well as indigenous Russians, the government-sponsored Russkiy Mir Foundation targets Russians and their descendants residing outside the Russian Federation, and is used to justify the protection of Russia's national interests abroad.6 Through the narrative of the 'Third Rome', the Kremlin has presented Russia as the defender of the Christian world and its ailing communi­ ties - notably Middle Eastern Christians in Syria. Within the Russian military, the ROC has reinforced patriotic and traditional values among army personnel and increased Russia's resilience against unconventional destabilisation efforts from perceived enemies. Adamsky also points to the ROC's role as a potential 'career multiplier' (p. 9). Although too close an alignment between the Christian faith and military promotion could impede the integration of Russia's Muslim communities, especially from the North Caucasus, into the armed forces, being a devout Orthodox Christian can still pay off in terms of career advancement.

194 I Mathieu Boulegue

Nuclear deterrence and escalation dynamics All major religions have had to grapple with the morality of nuclear weapons in the context of their religious ethos and national identity. No established religion seems to advocate the use of nuclear weapons. Most lean towards nuclear disarmament, or at the very least nuclear restraint.7 The Kremlin, however, has instrumentalised the ROC by prevailing on it to link Russia's nuclear capability to its geopolitical destiny. Adamsky's book explores in great detail the role of the 'nuclear priesthood' and of the ROC in strategic thinking about nuclear issues, including its contribution to myth-making about the 'divine predestination' of Russia's military nuclear power (p. 73). Starting in the 1990s, nuclear work has been described in highly religious terms asserting the holy mission of the nuclear weapons themselves. As the ROC started offering pastoral care for the troops, it also became the implicit 'guardian angel' of the nuclear-weapons industry, and therefore the ulti­ mate protector of the Motherland (pp. 75-6,112). In the 1990s, the ROC built churches within the nuclear-weapons industry, designated patron saints for nuclear institutions and adopted the practice of consecrating nuclear weapons. In the 2010s, 'nuclear priests' became more present in the military nuclear complex. They were assigned to billets at the tactical-operational level and in close proximity to the weapons themselves. Blessing nukes, however, has prompted a backlash. A church commission was established to consider the issue, and the ROC may end the practice. Thus, the role and use of nuclear weapons in Russia is not set in stone in the Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, Moscow's mantra has been that 'to stay Orthodox, Russia should be a strong nuclear power' and that 'to stay a strong nuclear power, Russia should be Orthodox' (p. 235). Putin himself has alluded to nuclear weapons in religious terms - for example, casting Russian victims of a potential nuclear first strike as 'martyrs'.8 Patriarch Kirill, for his part, has recognised that Russia must possess nuclear weapons to 'remain a sovereign state'.9 The ROC's position regarding the morality of nuclear weapons, however, is more nuanced than the term 'state-religion nexus' suggests. If the ROC's senior leadership seems to support nuclear weapons in broad terms, that is because stark criticism of the Kremlin's nuclear policy would diminish the

The Church and the Military in Russia I 195

Church's political influence. ROC clergy do advocate the need to preserve peace and maintain nuclear restraint. But unlike other Christian churches, which advocate denuclearisation and disarmament, the ROC explicitly sup­ ports nuclear deterrence.10 Here Adamsky sees some potential for nuclear crisis instability and loss of escalation control. Specifically, he worries that two potentially diverging lines of authority could emerge: that of the military commanders respon­ sible for issuing nuclear orders, and that of priests offering guidance to nuclear-weapons operators. He argues that the 'theocratization of the Russian strategic community' could help 'overcome moral and ethical selfrestraint' among those in charge of launching nuclear missiles (p. 10). Yet given its apparent ambivalence, the Church could just as easily focus on the calamity of nuclear war and the sanctity of deterrence, in which case it could constrain escalation and prevent nuclear conflict. Either way, the pos­ sible integration of the ROC into Russian national-security decision-making could make it less predictable and complicate deterrence overall, if not lead to escalation on religious grounds.11 *

*

*

Adamsky's Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy opens a relatively new and unexplored field of research in Russia studies: the role of the ROC in Russian strategic and military affairs. As Adamsky warns, however, the ROC's influence should not be overestimated. The Orthodox faith is one factor among many that influ­ ence military decisions. At the same time, its influence in Russian strategy and security policy is likely to outlive the current Russian leadership, and to continue to shape Russian strategic thinking and military operations. Notes 1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 'National Security Concept of the Russian Federation', 10 January 2000, https:// fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/

gazetao 12400 .htm. 2 Jeremy W. Lamoreaux and Lincoln Flake, 'The Russian Orthodox Church, the Kremlin, and Religious (Illiberalism in Russia', Palgrave Communications,

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Mathieu Boulègue

no. 115, September 2018. International Crisis Group, 'Patriotic Mobilisation in Russia', Report No. 251, 4 July 2018, https://www. crisisgroup.org/eur ope-centr al-asia/ caucasus/russianorth-caucasus/251patriotic-mobilisation-russia. Ishaan Tharoor, 'The Christian Zeal Behind Russia's War in Syria', Washington Post, 1 October 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ gdpr-consent/?destination=%2fnews %2fworldviews%2fwp%2f20i5%2fi o%2foi%2fthe-christian-zeal-behindrussias-war-in~syria%2f%3f; Andrey Kartapolov and Oleg Falichev, 'Right First to Attack', VPK News, 11 September 2018, https://www.vpknew s.ru/articles/44913. 'Genuine Christian Army: Russian Military Builds a "Flying Church'", YouTube, 28 August 2016, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=WRFN2up8tco. See Kimberly Marten, 'Vladimir Putin: Ethnic Russian Nationalist', Washington Post, 19 March 2014, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/news/ monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/vladimirputin-ethnic-russian-nationalist/. See, for instance, an in-depth analysis of religious perspectives in Emmanuelle Maître, 'Is Nuclear Deterrence Morally Defensible? Religious Perspectives', Fondation

8

9

10

11

pour la Recherche Stratégique, Recherches & Documents, no. 05/2016, November 2016, https://www. fr strategie.org/sites/defaul t/files/ documents/publications/rechercheset-documents/2016/201605 .pdf. '"Aggressors Will Be Annihilated, We Will Go to Heaven as Martyrs", Putin Says', Moscow Times, 18 October 2018, https://www.themoscowtimes. com/2018/10/19/aggressors-will-beannihilated-we-will-go-to-heaven-asmartyrs-putin-say 8-363235. 'Russia Needs Nuclear Weapons Patriarch Kirill', Sputnik News, 11 September 2009, https://sputniknews. com/russia/20090911156098682/. See Maître, 'Is Nuclear Deterrence Morally Defensible? Religious Perspectives'; and 'On the Consecration of Nuclear Weapons: Answers of Orthodox and Catholic Theologians', proCatholic.ru, http:// procatholic.ru/voprosy-i-otvety/chastozadavaemye/1i2-ob-ostalnom/674-obosvyashchenii-yadernogo-oruzhiyaotvety-pravoslavnogo-i-katolicheskogo-bogoslovov. See Paul Goble, 'Russian Orthodoxy Shaping Moscow's Nuclear Policies', Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 16, no. 70,14 May 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/ russian-orthodoxy-shaping-moscowsnuclear-policies/.

Book Reviews

Russia and Eurasia

Angela Stent

Russia and America: The Asym m etric Rivalry

Andrei P.Tsygankov. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019. £16.99. 245 pp.

Andrei Tsygankov sets out to explain why US-Russia relations have sharply deteriorated since President Vladimir Putin's return to the Kremlin in 2012 and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. He does this by placing Moscow and Washington's ties in the broader context of an international transition toward a multipolar, 'post-Western' world in which Russia has begun to fill the void left by a declining United States. This book reflects the litany of grievances that the Kremlin and its supporters frequently cite: after the USSR's collapse, the West refused to recognise Russia's interests, including its conviction that it has a right to a 'sphere of privileged interests' in the post-Soviet space. Instead, the West created a Euro-Atlantic security system without Russia. This is not a new Cold War, the author argues, but an asymmetric rivalry, in which Russia is increasingly able to assert itself as a great power despite its economic and demographic weakness. In Tsygankov's telling, the United States, by denying Russia recognition of its status, sphere of influence and sovereignty, is largely to blame for the current parlous state of relations. Russia interfered in the 2016 US presiden­ tial election, he says, not because it believed Donald Trump would win, but because it sought leverage over Hillary Clinton, whose election it feared. But Trump was elected and, to 'a large extent, Putin's and Trump's worldviews are compatible. Both leaders can be described as pragmatic, great power nationalists' (p. 43). Survival | voi. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 197-203

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Even though Russia welcomed Trump's election, the Kremlin has been dis­ appointed by his inability to deliver on his promises of a better relationship. The impact of Russian election interference on US domestic politics and the con­ straints imposed by the raft of sanctions adopted in response to Russia's actions have greatly limited Trump's freedom of manoeuvre. As a result, Tsygankov says, US-Russia relations can no longer follow the post-Cold War pattern of cycles of cooperation and conflict, and have entered uncharted territory. Tsygankov's assertion that the West rebuffed Russia's desire for increased participation in European affairs is questionable. The European Union has made multiple efforts to involve Russia in partnership activities, with meagre results. The NATO-Russia Council has also failed to live up to initial expecta­ tions because of ambivalence on both sides. The author's assertion that 'Washington and Brussels want Ukraine in their sphere of influence' (p. 84) can also be challenged. If that were so, EU and NATO membership would be on offer - and neither is. Tsygankov's solution to the Ukraine crisis - a neutral Ukraine with guarantees for ethnic minorities, and provisions for Ukraine to develop economic ties with the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union - is one that has support in many quarters, but would only be viable if Ukrainians themselves wanted it. Tsygankov predicts that the most likely scenario for US-Russia relations is continued asymmetric rivalry with elements of circumscribed cooperation. There will be a limited positive agenda going forward, and the main task will be to prevent a broader global or regional confrontation. It is, he emphasises, a negative agenda for the foreseeable future. Ukraine and the Art of Strategy

Lawrence Freedman. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. $27.95.233 pp.

Sir Lawrence Freedman, one of the world's leading authorities on strategic theory, sets out to examine whether the body of that theory - largely devel­ oped during the Cold War - can explain how the Ukraine conflict broke out, how it has evolved and how it might end. This discussion of the relevance of classical strategic theory to the history of the Ukraine conflict is both timely and illuminating. In recounting the origins of the current Ukraine crisis, which began when former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych - after years of negotiations - rejected an Association Agreement with the EU largely because of Russian pressure on Ukraine to join the rival Eurasian Economic Union, Freedman faults both sides: 'It is arguable that both the EU and Russia were unwise to demand

Russia and Eurasia I 199

that Ukraine choose between them when the country was so polarized and any choice was unlikely to be definitive' (p. 73). Yanukovych's rejection of the EU sparked the wave of protests which even­ tually led to his fleeing the country in February 2014, quickly followed by Russia's annexation of Crimea and the launch of a war between separatists and the government in Kiev, in which 14,000 people have died. Freedman recounts the various phases of this war; the limits on Western support for Ukraine for fear of provoking a more aggressive Russian response; and the signing of the Minsk agreement in February 2015, which remains the only foundation for ending the conflict. Meanwhile, relations between Russia and the West remain largely adversarial. Freedman assesses that the 'Russo-Ukraine conflict provides more exam­ ples of bad strategy than of good' and that the 'biggest failures were Russian' (p. 164). Although many assume that because Russians are chess players they think strategically, Putin's expertise is in fact in judo (he was the Leningrad judo champion in 1976 and still practises the sport today), in which tactics are more important than strategy. He appears not to have had a strategy in Ukraine and, after a decisive and successful first move, victory in Crimea was not repeated in the Donbas region. Freedman draws a number of conclusions from his analysis of the RussoUkraine war, including that it is far easier to start a war than to win one. Superior firepower can gain territory but is of little help in administration, and the separatist leaders in the Donbas have hardly provided effective leadership. Russia's tactics of cyber attacks and social-media campaigns have disoriented its opponents, but they have not made Ukrainians more compliant with Russian interests. Indeed, the war has in many ways consolidated a unified Ukrainian identity that did not exist before, the exact opposite of what Russia wanted to achieve. In this protracted conflict, in which fatigue has set in, the 'biggest failure of Ukrainian strategy was to use the Russian threat as a reason to let up on domestic reform and anticorruption' (p. 183). With the new Zelensky government in Kiev, and the resumption of the Normandy talks, might the conflict be resolved? Freedman's analysis gives scant hope on this score. Russian Political War: Moving Beyond the Hybrid

Mark Galeotti. Abingdon: Routledge, 2019. £45.00.126 pp.

Russia's geopolitical challenge to the West, writes Mark Galeotti, is not a 'hybrid war' but a political war. Since the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea,

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he argues, the term 'hybrid war' has come to mean everything that Russia does to antagonise the West, from armed invasion by 'little green men' to spreading falsehoods on social media, but the definition is now so broad that it is of little utility. His goal is to provide a more accurate characterisation of Russia's multifaceted challenge. Hybrid war has a long pedigree, going back at least to the time of the Trojan Horse. But the roots of Russia's current actions stem from a conviction that the West is out to weaken Russia or, as Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev put it, the US 'would very much like Russia not to exist at all' (p. 17). Given Russia's limited resources, it has to use all available means to conduct 'guerrilla geopolitics' against the West. Galeotti identifies the main actors in Russia's multilayered political-war strategies. The Ministry of Defence is a key actor, and the Kremlin exercises tight political oversight over the military. Nevertheless, Putin and his Kremlin do not control everything, and freelancing is an important element: Russia 'has adopted an innovative and parsimonious approach that, in effect, mobi­ lizes the ambitions and imaginations of sundry adhocrats, actors and agencies' (p. 60). Different people or groups can be mobilised depending on the target. Recently, the Wagner Group has become increasingly important in fighting in Syria, Ukraine, the Central African Republic and other places. Although it is technically a private military group, it largely pursues the Kremlin's militarypolitical agenda. The Kremlin has also enlisted the services of a variety of groups to support separatists in the Donbas, including Cossacks, paramilitary groups such as the Night Wolves motorcycle gang and the 'Crimintern' - organised-crime figures who are active in Ukraine and elsewhere. The official intelligence services - the FSB, SVR and GRU - are also key players in Russia's anti-Western campaign, despite rivalries both within and between the services. They lay the groundwork for active operations. The secu­ rity services have done well under Putin, with increasing budgets and growing powers bestowed on them by a president who, as a former KGB officer, is one of them and favours them. Another important supporting institution is the Russian Orthodox Church, which has increasingly become a state church. Its head, Patriarch Kirill, has described Putin's presidency as a 'miracle of God' (p. 97). The church is a key element in the soft power that Russia deploys abroad. Galeotti concludes that while one should be concerned about Russia's current non-linear approach to war, the instruments which Russia uses - from decep­ tion and propaganda to coercive diplomacy and subversion - have been around

Russia and Eurasia I 201

as long as states have existed. The West's challenge is to reduce its vulnera­ bility to Russian subversion by strengthening the rule of law, social cohesion and independent media - and creating transparent financial institutions which control the flows of money from Russia. Between Two Fires: Truth, Am bition, and Com promise in Putin's Russia

Joshua Yaffa. New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2020. $28.00.342 pp.

In this illuminating book, Joshua Yaffa presents a nuanced picture of contem­ porary Russia, answering the questions of why the Putin system survives and why Russians of all ages still support him. The essence of this system is the 'wily man', as the pioneering Russian sociologist Yuri Levada termed post-Soviet citi­ zens, something more durable than Homo sovieticus. The Russian wily man 'not only tolerates deception, but is willing to be deceived, and even ... requires selfdeception for the sake of his own self-preservation' (p. 10). Yaffa argues that most Russians are 'neither Stalin nor Solzhenitsyn, but, in their own way, merely wily' (p. 11). He illustrates this by focusing on the compromises that people from different walks of life in key Russian institutions have made. Many began as critics of the regime, but all have adapted to the system and have attempted to reconcile the irreconcilable. There is Konstantin Ernst, the talented general director of Channel One, Russia's main state-run television station, which hosts some of the most viru­ lently anti-Western talk shows. Ernst began his professional life as a critic of the system, but now works closely with the Kremlin, including producing the impressive opening ceremony of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. Ernst believes that television has two priorities: to mobilise the country and to inform the pop­ ulation about what is happening. Every other wily man and woman portrayed in this book has made com­ promises with the state, always hoping that, by going some way to meet its demands, the state will then back off. It rarely does in Putin's Russia. Heda Saratova, who began life as a human-rights campaigner in Chechnya, has increasingly made compromises with 'Putin's dragon', Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. She now works with him to bring home Chechen women and children who joined the Islamic State (ISIS). Pavel Adelgeim, a dissident priest in Soviet times who subsequently died under questionable circumstances, grew increasingly alarmed as the Russian Orthodox Church under Putin became the state church, moving further away from its pastoral and humanitarian duties into the political realm. The Orthodox Church, says Yaffa, has never come to terms with its historical collaboration with the KGB.

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Yaffa visits Perm-36, part of Joseph Stalin's Gulag that became a museum designed to expose the horrors of the Soviet camp system - until Putin came to power and the state took over the museum, enforcing a selective view of the history of repressions. The result is that without questioning the legitimacy of the state itself - society can remember and mourn the victims of political repressions, but discussing the perpetrators is off limits; that chain of guilt, if fully examined, would lead uncomfortably back to the state and those who serve it. (p. 228)

In the 1980s and 1990s, writes Yaffa, the state became weak, but society itself did not become stronger. So, when Putin came to power, the public readjusted to a more habitual submissive environment - hence the persistence of wiliness and of the Putin system. The Bridge: Natural Gas in a Redivided Europe

Thane Gustafson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020. £31.95/$39.95.506 pp.

In this comprehensive analysis of Russia's energy ties with Europe, Thane Gustafson examines why Russia's gas exports to Europe remain controver­ sial three decades after the Cold War ended. He also explains why, despite tense relations with Europe and US opposition to the Nord Stream II pipe­ line, Russia's two-way gas bridge will endure and continue to bind Russia and Europe together in the twenty-first century. The book tells three stories: the development and evolution of Soviet and Russian gas policy; the evolution and expansion of the EU and its gas system; and the axis of crisis involving Russian gas supplies to Ukraine and Germany. Gustafson provides interesting portraits of the original Soviet Gazoviki (gas professionals) who disagreed about how to develop this new industry. He recounts the origins of the first Soviet-Western Europe deal whereby gas began to flow to Austria, Italy and West Germany in the early 1970s. Indeed, the gas deal was an important part of West German chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, providing an economic foundation for the political outreach to Moscow. Since 1972, natural gas has formed an integral part of the GermanRussian relationship. Another element of historical continuity has been US suspicion of Russian gas exports to Europe and Washington's unsuccessful attempts to prevent the construction of gas pipelines. In 1982, the Reagan administration - in a situation strikingly similar to today's US sanctions on Nord Stream II - imposed sanctions

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on exports of energy-related technology to the USSR, hoping to prevent its European allies from selling pipeline components for the construction of the Yamal gas pipeline. The Europeans largely defied the sanctions and the Soviets responded by developing their own compressor-manufacturing capabilities. When the USSR collapsed, Russia had the largest gas industry in the world. In subsequent years, the gas industry was never broken up, nor was it fully privatised. It remains a mainstay of the Russian economy. Tutin', writes Gustafson, 'is unique among world leaders in the active interest he has taken in the gas industry and in the depth of his knowledge' (p. 278). The gas business, he reminds us, is highly technical and highly complex. Ukraine was the birthplace of the Russian gas industry but, when the USSR collapsed, its reserves had declined and overnight it went from a producer to a transit country and importer of Russian gas: 'Ukraine desperately needed Russian gas, for which it could not pay' (p. 318). Since 1992, Russia and Ukraine have been involved in an endless series of negotiations over gas supply and price, with Gazprom reducing the amounts it exports through Ukraine. Gustafson makes a strong case for Nord Stream II as the lowest-cost route from Siberia to Europe. He also argues that Russia does not have unprecedented leverage over Europe through its gas supplies because of recent changes in EU energy regulations. Going forward, Russia will increasingly have a commercial stake in being seen as a reliable supplier to Europe.

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War, Conflict and the Military Rosa Brooks

At War: The Military and American Culture in the Twentieth Century and Beyond

David Kieran and Edwin A. Martini, eds. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2018. £27.95/$37.95.399 pp.

A central paradox of America's post-9/11 wars is their simultaneous omnipres­ ence and invisibility. Most young Americans have lived their whole lives in a nation at war, but only a tiny fraction of those aged 18 to 24 have served in the military, and young Americans are far less likely than those from previous generations to have a close friend or immediate family member in the military. Perhaps as a result, most young Americans take the existence of more-or-less perpetual war for granted, but have little understanding of the ways in which America's relationship to war and the military has changed over time, or of the profound ways in which American society has been shaped by war. At War, a collection of essays by 16 historians, is intended to help remedy this. Aimed primarily at an undergraduate audience, the introduction, by editors David Kieran and Edwin Martini, addresses young Americans directly: '[Your] connection to [war] may seem distant, at best', they write. 'However, nearly every aspect of American culture, and significant parts of your own everyday life, have been shaped by the histories of war and militarism in American society' (pp. 1-2). The US Department of Defense is America's largest employer, one of the country's largest landowners and the recipient of a larger share of federal discretionary spending than all other US government departments and agencies combined (pp. 4-5). More than that, the military has historically 'been the site of pitched battles over social issues', from race and civil rights to issues of gender and sexual orientation, and attitudes towards war and military service often play a 'decisive role in American political culture' (pp. 3, 4). Yet traditional military history focuses on tactics, strategy and leadership, and when students think of military history, they often think of it as 'something that happens elsewhere', on battlefields that are 'both geographically and temporally remote' (p. 3). The 16 essays in At War offer a corrective primer on the complex ways in which war and the military intersect with broader American political, cultural and economic issues. Chapter One, by Sahr Conway-Lanz, looks at the evolution of American and international ideas about war and law; Chapter Two, by Stefan Aune, examines changing American attitudes towards empire. Other chapters take on military demographics, the military-industrial complex, race, gender, war and the environment, war and film, and a wide range of other topics. Survival | voi. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 204-212

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The essays in At War break little new ground, but they aren't meant to: they are intended to introduce students to the body of scholarship that might loosely be called war and culture studies, and collectively, they provide plenty of fodder for discussion and debate. Aune's essay, for instance, reminds us that America's foreign military bases account for about 95% of all foreign military bases worldwide (p. 41). John Kinder's essay, 'The Embodiment of War', high­ lights a perpetual dilemma for militaries: what does one do with all the dead bodies created by war? Historically, he tells us, the US military collected and warehoused the bodies of the American dead, only returning remains to family members at the war's end. It wasn't until the Korean War that US policy shifted to 'concurrent return' of the bodies of dead soldiers to their families (pp. 231-2). Susan Carruthers's essay, 'Communications Media, the U.S. Military and the War Brought Home', looks at the ways in which changing communication tech­ nologies - in particular, electronic communications and social media - affect our mental geography of war, bringing it closer but also normalising it. At War is an excellent collection of essays, one that could easily form the main text in an undergraduate course on war and society, and while the book's primary focus is on the United States, many of the issues explored in At War will be relevant in other countries as well: in particular, the chapters on film, communications, visual culture, memory and the body will resonate well beyond American university classrooms. The essays vary in their originality and impact, but in a book that aims to provide a general overview rather than a series of deep dives, this is more than forgivable. After Combat: True War Stories from Iraq and Afghanistan

Marian Eide and Michael Gibler. Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2018. £22.99/$29.95.258 pp.

Despite their ubiquity and apparent permanence, America's post-9/11 wars remain heavily mythologised, and the experiences of the men and women who serve in those wars are often overshadowed by myths and stereotypes. Military service is viewed as both heroic and harrowing, uplifting yet apt to be mentally and morally damaging. With ideas about military service formed primarily through movies, televi­ sion and video games, many civilians assume, for instance, that most military veterans have been in combat and have killed (or, at the very least, have fired their weapons at other humans in an attempt to kill them). Civilians often hold contradictory attitudes about veterans, convinced that they are more disci­ plined and patriotic than non-veterans, but also convinced that most veterans suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and that veterans are more

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likely than non-veterans to suffer from mental illness. In fact, only about half of post-9/11 veterans have had combat experience, and studies suggest that PTSD rates among veterans range from 10-20%. After Combat offers a bracing dose of nuance and reality. Drawn from interviews with dozens of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans, it offers layered and deeply human perspectives on what it is like to serve in America's protean post9/11 wars. Aside from a short introduction describing the book's origins and methodologies, After Combat is primarily oral history, consisting of numerous brief, anonymous, first-person accounts of life in the US military, from enlistment and training to deployment and homecoming. The anonymity granted by the authors proves crucial, enabling many of the veterans quoted in After Combat to share experiences and perspectives they might otherwise have self-censored. As the authors note in their brief intro­ duction, media coverage of war leans towards the sensational rather than the ordinary, but 'most deployments do not meet the expectation of war experi­ ence laid down by stories from Appomattox, Ypres, or even Khe Sanh' (p. xii). In consequence, many veterans suppress their own stories. Indeed, this is one of After War's most powerful messages: military personnel are no more immune than civilians to myths and stereotypes about war and soldiers, and when their own experiences don't match their expectations - or the expecta­ tions they believe civilians hold - they often feel disappointed, embarrassed or ashamed. After Combat offers a taste of what readers might think of as 'traditional' war narratives: some of the interviewees talk about firelights, ambushes and impro­ vised explosive devices. But mostly, the veterans who tell their stories offer a decidedly unglamorous account of life at war. There is boredom and stupidity; there are bad smells and crass bunkmates; there are deliveries from Amazon and steak and shrimp dinners at the chow hall. 'I didn't have to shoot at anybody; I didn't have to kill anybody', recalls one interviewee (p. 33). 'It wasn't like Band of Brothers, where you're sitting in the foxhole shooting, like you're thinking it's going to be', says another. 'Most of combat experience was driving down the road and waiting for the next explosive device to go off' (pp. 144-5). One veteran recalls the numbing sameness of daily life on an American forward operating base in Iraq: 'It got so routine, that I could tell you the number of steps I would take between each spot, how many steps I would walk in a day ... No one really gave me the heads up that, "Hey, you should probably, like, bring a Gameboy or something'" (p. 48). Another remembers the stench: 'It always smelled so bad anywhere you went on base. There weren't any sophis­ ticated plumbing systems. There was just this hole that all the poop and all the

War, Conflict and the Military I 207

water would go into, and they would empty that out in the mornings. And you would always smell that everywhere' (p. 43). In stark contrast to media narratives of heroism, several of the veterans quoted in After Combat emphasise the chaos, absurdity and incompetence they encoun­ tered. 'You think people should be able to shoot in the Infantry', recalls one, but many 'can't shoot. They can't aim' (p. 166). Another comments, 'Whatever you're doing ... it's probably utterly irrelevant. When you're ... helping to craft the next version of the campaign plan, you're like, "Well, this is total stupidity. What are we even doing? None of these objectives are even achievable'" (p. 20). Many veterans talk about the difficulties of coming home to a nation that rewards service members with corporate discounts and ritual incantations of gratitude, but shows little interest in learning about their lives, motivations or experiences. Some interviewees are surprised and embarrassed by how much they miss deployment. 'It was easy; it was simpler ... You did guard at night, and then you went to sleep, and then you woke up, and you did what you were told ... I miss the brotherhood ... I miss seeing explosions or bombs dropped. There's nothing cooler' (p. 216). Others struggle with feelings of guilt and dis­ appointment: 'I feel a sense of shame and failure for not suffering more', says one. This isn't survivor guilt, exactly; it's discomfort that deploying to fight in America's wars was 'never as bad as people thought' (p. 219). After Combat resists summaries and generalisations. It's a straightforward and honest compendium of granular and heterogeneous stories, and as such, it offers a powerful alternative to the patriotic cant so often used either to justify militarism, or to justify ignoring or vilifying those sent to serve in America's wars. The book offers no grand narratives or sweeping conclusions about con­ flict or combat - and therein lies its value. Surrogate Warfare: The Transformation of War in the Twenty-first Century

Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019. £26.50/$34.95.244 pp.

Sometimes, it's better not to fight your own battles. The average soldier in the armies of militarily and technologically sophisticated states today faces less risk of death than soldiers in times past, but states that send their own troops into combat cannot entirely eliminate the risk of casualties, losses, misconduct and mistakes - all of which can lead to both domestic and international backlash. In Surrogate Warfare, Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli argue that both states and non-state actors are increasingly turning to 'surrogate warfare', in which they delegate violent and coercive activities to other actors in an effort to minimise

2o 8 I Book Reviews

the cost and risk of direct engagement. Surrogate warfare is attractive to states because it permits 'externalizing the burden of warfare and the consequences it involves ... be they political, operational, strategic or legal' (p. 3). In and of itself, this is hardly new; actors have employed surrogates to augment their forces (or do their dirty work for them) since the beginning of written history. Indeed, Krieg and Rickli open their first chapter with an account of Pharaoh Ramses II's victory over the Hittites in the thirteenth century BCE, a victory that would have been impossible without timely help from Canaanite and Numidian mercenaries. Today, Krieg and Rickli assert, we are seeing a 'return to the pre-modern forms of warfare when empires and city-states were trying to secure their place in a system whose anarchy went far beyond that in realist conceptualizations' (p. 197). But, the authors contend, today's surrogate warfare typically arises under different conditions and in response to different motivations than in the past, and contemporary states (and other actors) can externalise the burdens of warfare not merely to humans but to new technologies, including, increasingly, autonomous systems animated by artificial intelligence. In the past, the authors argue, states and other actors generally faced clear and readily identified adversaries with territorial ambitions, and relied on sur­ rogates primarily to enhance their own capabilities or ensure deniability. In contrast, today's actors operate in a world in which 'conflicts have become more globalized, privatized, securitized and mediatized' (p. 194). Indeed, 'one could argue that the authority of the state in the twenty-first century is the weakest it has been since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648' (p. 196). States today face threats that are often distant and diffuse, and may involve non-kinetic means of coer­ cion and disruption, such as cyber attacks and information warfare, in addition to organised violence. At the same time, today's states must operate under con­ stant media scrutiny, raising the cost of mistakes. Krieg and Rickli assert that in this context - facing 'immense pressure' from domestic publics to provide security from an ever-expanding, impossible-to-manage array of threats while also facing potential domestic and international backlash for actions perceived as aggressive or coercive - states become ever more likely to seek to externalise the cost of warfare and other forms of coercive action. Surrogate Warfare is ambitious in scope, aiming to create a theoretical umbrella under which a range of related but distinguishable concepts can shelter: proxy war, compound warfare, remote warfare and so on. 'Surrogate warfare', the authors argue, better captures the common element of the externalisation of costs, and enables consideration of technological as well as human surrogates. States increasingly rely upon non-human proxies, from drones to hackers, much

War, Conflict and the Military I 209

as they once turned to mercenary forces. And to states struggling 'to be ready to take military action anywhere at short notice in a multidimensional battlespace along a nonlinear front for an indefinite period of time', the use of both human and machine proxies may look like a panacea (p. 66). It's not. Precisely because it reduces the perceived costs of war, surrogate warfare potentially lowers the threshold for using force and coercion, and raises troubling questions of democratic accountability (p. 160). In Surrogate Warfare, Krieg and Rickli offer a warning as well as a proposed analytical framework. In an increasingly anarchic international order, weakening states face growing incentives to externalise the costs of war and coercion - but to fully externalise risk, states must grant more and more autonomy to their sur­ rogates. Yet the more states grant autonomy to surrogates (whether human or machine), the more they reduce their own ability to control strategic out­ comes, which potentially contributes to global instability or backlash, further weakening state power. Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics

Austin Carson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018. £30.00/$35.00. 325 pp.

States hedge against the risks associated with modern warfare in a variety of ways: they employ surrogates; they make use of new technologies to fight remotely; they seek to disrupt, destroy, coerce and control using non-kinetic means - and, when possible, they try to hide their own role, to evade both inter­ national condemnation and domestic pressures. In Secret Wars, Austin Carson takes up an apparent puzzle associated with covert forms of international con­ flict. States frequently attempt to keep their own role in conflicts secret, and the reasons for this are intuitively obvious. But at times, states also choose to keep the secrets of their adversaries, for reasons that are far less clear. During the Korean War, for instance, US decision-makers discovered that the Soviet Union was secretly sending its own military pilots into combat against US pilots. In fact, 'one intelligence review from July 1952 ... estimated that 25,000-35,000 Soviet military personnel were "physically involved in the Korean war", and concluded that "a de facto air war exists over North Korea between the UN and the USSR"'. Yet 'neither Moscow nor Washington gave any public indication that direct combat was taking place'. Only 50 years later did declassified intelligence documents reveal that US decision-makers had known all along (pp. 1-2). This 'collusive secrecy', Carson argues, makes little sense under classical theories of international relations. On the surface, at least, rival states appear

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to have every incentive to expose and denounce the aggressive, destabilising or unlawful behaviour of their adversaries. And yet they frequently choose not to do so. Carson suggests that collusive secrecy is, in fact, an adaptive response to 'the nature of escalation dynamics in modern war and the difficulty of bound­ ing conflict'. In an era in which 'industrialization, nationalism and the advent of nuclear weapons' have made large-scale conflict escalation 'astoundingly destructive and costly', the same factors that lead states to conduct their own interventions covertly also lead them to refrain from publicising the covert actions of their adversaries (p. 26). Specifically, 'intervenors use covert means and detectors react with collusion to cope with two threats to escalation control: hawkish domestic pressure and poor communication among adversaries' (p. 26). States may choose to keep their own interventions secret to avoid criticism from domestic audiences opposed to intervention (perhaps out of fear that any intervention will escalate), but states may equally choose to keep their adversary's covert actions secret out of fear that 'going public' will lead to pressure from domestic hawks to 'do something', forcing unwanted and risky escalation. Engaging in collusive secrecy therefore also signals to adversaries a desire to engage in only limited war, which in turn reduces the risk of escalation due to a misreading of adversary intentions. Carson notes, but leaves largely unexplored, two complicating factors for states considering covert action or collusive secrecy. Firstly, covert action poses ethical challenges for democratic governments. Regardless of whether secrecy is intended to prevent or enable escalation, it reduces democratic accountability (p. 312), and may lower the threshold for engaging in warfare by reducing domestic political costs. Secondly, the omnipresence of both state and private surveillance technologies and social media make secrecy ever more difficult to sustain, poten­ tially obviating the relevance and value of covert interventions. Carson suggests that 'states will adapt' (p. 303), but how they will do so is less clear. Carson supports his arguments with well-chosen case studies from the Spanish Civil War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Soviet war in Afghanistan. While the cases are effective in illustrating the ways in which collusive secrecy can be a function of states' desire to avoid escalatory spirals, Carson devotes less time to exploring other possible reasons states might refrain from 'outing' an adversary's covert interventions, some of which might cut in opposite directions. A state might, for instance, choose to feign ignorance of an adversary's covert activities not to avoid escalation, but simply to enhance the element of strategic surprise, lulling the adversary into underestimating the likelihood of a planned retaliatory action - including a deliberately escalatory

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retaliation. In the end, perhaps the most we can conclude is that some states engage in collusive secrecy to avoid escalation, some of the time. Com mand: The Twenty-First-Century General

Anthony King. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. £19.99/$25.99.484 pp.

Twentieth-century paradigms of command envisioned military commanders as occupying 'a singular position at the top of a steeply graded military hierar­ chy', writes Anthony King in Command: The Twenty-First-Century General, and displaying 'a heroic form of generalship', motivating the troops and providing 'personal exemplary leadership' (p. 180). But in a messy twenty-first-century world in which everything is globalised, the use of force has been democra­ tised, technological advances occur at lightning speed, and non-kinetic forms of coercion and control increasingly compete with organised violence, this older model of command, King argues, is increasingly obsolete. In Command, King explores historical and twentieth-century archetypes of military command and finds them inadequate. In the twenty-first century, secure and instantaneous digital communication technologies theoretically enable commanders to 'control the entire battle in real time, communicating immediately with all their subordinates'. In fact, 'commanders are now in danger of being suffocated with information' (pp. 290-1). Meanwhile, 'even conventional, high-intensity military operations now involve civil, political and informational engagement' (p. 291). Concepts such as hybrid warfare and multi-domain battle emphasise that modern commanders need to operate effectively 'not only in the physical ... but also in the virtual, informational and electro-magnetic spheres' (p. 294). Just as changing social and technological conditions have led many corporate actors to reduce hierarchies and develop 'flatter, more flexible and responsive networks', argues King (p. 23), military command structures are evolving as well, becoming less dependent on individual leadership and more collective in nature. King examines division-level command structures in the United States' and the United Kingdom's post-9/11 wars, and concludes that 'to address increased coordination problems generals have been forced to distribute their decision-making authority to empowered subordinates, forming executive teams, closely united around a common understanding of the mission' (p. 18). This has led to the emergence of 'highly professionalized command collectives ... displacing a formerly more individualist, instinctive system' (p. 20). King views this as a necessary evolution, but one that is 'potentially radical - even unwelcome' to many military leaders, challenging their self-perceptions.

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The notion of collective command 'replaces a celebration of revered personal martial qualities, like intelligence, bravery, courage and nobility, with an emphasis on the more mundane mechanics' of command. In his own interviews, King notes, many successful generals 'questioned the idea that command could be shared. James Mattis, for instance, argued that decision-making could not be collective: "the enemy will dance around you." David Petraeus was equally adamant: "There is one commander. He is the guy. Everyone else is in support of him"' (p. 21). Yet despite their rhetorical resistance, King observes, both Mattis and Petraeus were, in practice, virtuosos of collective command, success­ fully devolving decision-making to a carefully chosen group of deputies. King persuasively argues that command collectives are better suited to twenty-first-century military challenges than traditional, individualist command models, but Command is both most intriguing and least convinc­ ing when King situates debates about military command within the wider context of recent 'organizational and social transformation'. Confronted by a range of complex and globalised economic and security challenges, the West, he notes, 'has descended into an ever-deepening crisis' in the last decade (p. xi). 'Even more than Foucault knew, power is becoming capillary, running along a complex arterial system of multiple interconnections. Sovereignty is shared ... cooperation with other states is required' (p. xiv). To be effective in this environ­ ment, King asserts, political leaders, like military commanders, 'need to be able to construct alliances and teams, coordinating agents, partners and proxies ... Political power has become collective, dispersed and distributed' (p. xv). The evolution of political power, King seems to suggest, is as necessary and inevitable as the evolution of military command structures. And yet, as King laments in the introduction to Command, British and American voters have opted for the vision of Nigel Farage and Donald Trump over a more col­ lectivist vision. Farage and Trump 'promote an atavistic ideal of leadership', offering, as the 'solution to the complexity of global politics', the 'personality of an individual savior, mobilizing ethno-nationalist resentments' (p. xv). In King's view, this approach to political leadership is as manifestly inadequate to twenty-first-century challenges as traditional, individualist approaches are to military leadership. To King, the world's need for 'command collectives, not individualists' is self-evident. To voters, it is apparently less so.

Asia-Pacific

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Asia-Pacific

Lanxin Xiang

Chinese Spies: From Chairm an Mao to Xi Jinping

Roger Faligot. Natasha Lehrer, trans. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2019. £30.00/$34.95.568 pp.

This ambitious book aims at describing and analysing the entire history of Chinese spy activities under the Communist Party in a volume of some 500 pages. An endorsement on its cover describes it as 'an astounding and exhaus­ tive who's who of Chinese espionage', but does it deserve such lofty praise? Certainly, author Roger Faligot, a French investigative journalist, presents an impressive story, offering a panoramic view of Communist China's clandestine world. Espionage in pre-revolutionary China, however, receives only 50-odd pages of discussion, most notably introducing Kang Sheng, a 'Moscow returnee' known as the 'Chinese Beria'. Kang was able to gain Mao Zedong's confidence despite the chairman's distrust of Joseph Stalin's protégés through his ruthless efforts as head of an internal purge machine that helped Mao to rid himself of political opponents. The book's discussion of the People's Republic's first spy chief, Zhou Enlai, and his cohorts contains some conspicuous mistakes. For example, Faligot claims that China's two most powerful spy masters at the time, Li Kenong, the future head of military intelligence, and Luo Ruiqing, the future minister of public security, were hand-picked and groomed by Zhou because they had per­ sonal ties to him. Li is said to have been a Chinese work-study student in Paris in the early 1920s, when Zhou was a student leader there (p. 27), and Luo is said to have had a student-teacher relationship with Zhou at the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton in the late 1920s, where Zhou was in charge of the politi­ cal department (p. 59). Neither claim is true, as Li never went to France, and Luo did not attend the main campus of the Whampoa Academy, but rather a small offshoot campus in Wuhan, Hubei province. These imagined connections are not trivial mistakes, and may reflect the author's overreliance on anecdotes, fancies, hearsay, sensational legal cases and unsolved mysteries. References rarely supply page numbers, and often cite dubious sources, including 'inter­ views'. The book's dramatic style does make for good reading, but its many factual mistakes and misspelled names signal that it is neither good investiga­ tive journalism nor serious scholarship.

One more serious error should be pointed out. Faligot claims that, when Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) member Zhou Yongkang was brought down for corruption in 2013, President Xi Jinping deliberately downgraded the Survival | vol. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 213-218

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status of the head of the powerful Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (a post Zhou had held for years), which is in charge of Chinese law enforcement and intelligence. According to the author, 'For the first time in the history of the [Communist Party], this position no longer came with a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee' (p. 385). In fact, of all the 12 men who have held this post since the founding of the People's Republic - a list of whom ironically appears in Appendix II - only three have held a seat on the PSC. China's New Red Guards: The Return of Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao Zedong

Jude D. Blanchette. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. £18.99/$27.95.206 pp.

For some time, many foreign observers of China have appeared to believe that, as the Chinese economy grows, the country's leadership will become increasingly unideological and begin to move closer to the Western model of governance. This belief has proven wrong so far. Most analysis on the recent revival of Maoist ideology in China tends to focus on the top leadership, and particularly on President Xi's personal outlook. In China's New Red Guards, however, Jude Blanchette shifts focus to the bottom-up movement of Mao revivalists repre­ sented by a group of left-leaning intellectuals whose main mouthpiece is the website Wu You Zhi Xiang ), or 'the Utopian World'. The inspiration for this movement can be traced to a 'neo-authoritarian' response to liberal criticism of communist rule that resulted from China's economic opening in the early 1980s. One of the lead theorists was a young intellectual at Fudan University, Wang Huning, who is now a member of the PSC and the party's ideology tsar. According to Wang in 1993, "the formation of democratic institutions requires the existence of specific historical, social and cultural conditions. Until these conditions are mature, political power should be directed toward the development of these conditions' (p. 33). This kind of neo-authoritarianism, sometimes labelled Chinese neoconservatism, has never become mainstream Chinese thinking. But it has enjoyed the tacit support, to various degrees, of successive Chinese leaders after Mao's death in 1976. All Chinese neo-authoritarians reject multiparty political systems and foreign interference in China. But the Utopian World group is unique in two ways. Firstly, although it was initiated and is supported mainly by 'princelings' - descendants of the communist political elite - it has proven skilful not only in mobilising grassroots support by harnessing popular anger about China's rapidly widening income gap, but also in appropriating the virtues of the first generation of revolutionaries to attack the dark side of

Asia-Pacific I 215

the market. For many years, the Utopian group's spiritual leader was Bo Xilai, himself a princeling who emphasised egalitarianism and neo-Maoism (p. 103). Secondly, while neo-authoritarian theorists like Wang Huning do not deny that the ultimate objective is the establishment of some type of democratic insti­ tutions, the Utopian movement from the very beginning showed no interest in any democratic reform at all. The group's objection to all Western values dis­ tinguishes it from the other voices in China's political and intellectual debates. Indeed, the leading advocates of the Utopian movement have gone so far as to call for a 'second Cultural Revolution' to purify the cultural and political value system of the party, and of Chinese society more generally (p. 154). After Bo was purged in 2012, the Utopian group quickly flocked to a new leader, whose rise to power has been publicly lauded as a victory for the group's ideology. Xi Jinping is certainly sympathetic to the basic tenets of the Utopian movement as a means of repelling foreign values and domestic resistance to his power. Whether or not the Utopians will be as havoc-wreaking as the Red Guard movement was in the 1960s, as the title of this book seems to suggest, remains to be seen. South Korean Identity and Global Foreign Policy: Dream of Autonom y

Patrick Flamm. Abingdon: Routledge, 2019. £120.00/$ 155.00. 170 pp.

For much of what was a traumatic twentieth century for Koreans, their nation was seen as a 'shrimp among whales', dwarfed by the stronger powers of China, Japan, Russia and the United States (p. 1). Since the end of the Cold War, however, South Korea has been undergoing fundamental identity changes, the foreign-policy implications of which are the focus of this study. Until the late nineteenth century, the Korean Peninsula was part of the Sinocentric cultural sphere and tributary system. After China's defeat by Meiji Japan in the 1890s, Korea became a colony of the Japanese empire. The end of Japanese rule in 1945 was followed by the Korean War, which resulted in the division of the peninsula by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) became a bridgehead of the protectorate system led by the United States in the fight against global communism. Thus, South Korea had little chance to autonomously develop its own national identity until the end of the Cold War, which coincided with the remarkable transformation of the country from an authoritarian state to a liberal democracy. This was a par­ ticularly important development because previous regimes, mostly military dictatorships, had suppressed the popular assertion of Korean identity through

2i6 I Book Reviews

nationalism, which was often expressed in terms of anti-Japanese and antiAmerican feelings (p. 22). The end of the Cold War thus provided South Korea with a historic oppor­ tunity to redefine itself as a leading middle power. The country's successful programme of economic development allowed it to move 'from the periphery to the center', according to the author (p. 136), who suggests that South Korea's active engagement in global governance, especially its role in international peacekeeping and its 'green leadership', is also connected to its 'rising middlepower7agenda. President Lee Myung-bak, for example, placed peacekeeping at the centre of his 'middle-power activism' (p. 83). The precarious rivalry of the two Korean states is not necessarily an obstacle to the resurgence of nationalism. On the contrary, South Korea and its northern counterpart share a common self-image rooted not only in history but also in a presumed common struggle for liberation from any type of foreign domi­ nance. North Korea's juche strategy is clearly aimed at reducing its dependency on China in the economic and security spheres, while South Korea's 'sunshine policy' reflects its preference for diplomatic engagement with North Korea over any kind of forcible regime change in Pyongyang (p. 21). One significant implication of South Korea's new self-image is that it may make Washington's alliance management in the Asia-Pacific increasingly intractable. This book is framed with the usual jargon of international-relations theory, but is nevertheless interesting and thought-provoking. Speaking Out in Vietnam: Public Political Criticism in a Communist Party-ruled Nation

Benedict J.Tria Kerkvliet. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019. £41.00/$49.95.224 pp.

It is commonly assumed that in single-party states such as China and Vietnam, political criticism is always repressed. Reports from Freedom House or US con­ gressional research offices often describe Vietnamese authorities, for example, as intolerant of political dissent of any kind. But Western labels such as 'totali­ tarian', 'authoritarian' and even 'market Leninist', when applied to communist states of the type seen in Vietnam and China, fail to capture the interactive rela­ tionship between the authorities and the people in those states, says Benedict Tria Kerkvliet (p. 3). Through detailed study and analysis, the author rejects simplistic generali­ sations about communist regimes today, arguing that in the case of Vietnam, public political criticism has since the mid-1990s 'evolved into a prominent feature of [the country's] political landscape' that state authorities have shown

Asia-Pacific I 217

some tolerance toward (p. 3). Vietnamese citizens can now protest and voice their criticisms in several areas. For instance, the labour strike is a common method of protesting about working and living conditions. Even though non­ government labour organisations remain weak, 5,813 strikes took place between 1995 and 2015 (p. 15). The state mostly tolerated these strike actions, and in some cases made efforts to improve labour conditions: in 2015 the government decided to amend the country's social-insurance law, and the minimum wage increased by 33% between 2013 and 2015. Protests questioning the patriotism of the Community Party of Vietnam have also taken place. These protests usually relate to what are perceived as China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea. The government has good reason to tolerate such protests and to use them as bargaining chips with China on a variety of related issues, such as fishing or resource exploration. One form of public criticism that the state has discour­ aged is any advocacy of regime change. But even here it has tolerated leading critics such as Nguyen Thanh Giang, who has published numerous books, arti­ cles, poems, essays and letters criticising the communist regime and calling for the 'democratization of Vietnam' (pp. 87-8). What explains the expansion of public criticism in Vietnam? The author believes that a combination of factors have contributed to this phenomenon: the rapid expansion of the market economy, the ubiquitous use of new communica­ tion technologies and, importantly, the realisation by the authorities that they have to pay attention to people's grievances in order to boost the party's ruling legitimacy. In addition, democracy advocates in Vietnam are often closely asso­ ciated with anti-China activists: the author contends that there is considerable 'interaction and overlap' between these two groups (p. 142). Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions

Brad Glosserman. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019. £24.00/$32.95.262 pp.

Brad Glosserman has produced a well-informed book on contemporary Japan, which he believes is 'understudied, undervalued and underappreciated in the analysis and conduct of international relations', in part because of being over­ shadowed by a rising China, and in part because of having Tost its way after the end of the Cold War' (p. 1). A ccording to Glosserm an, Japan did not know recession until the early 1990s, w h en a m assive economic bubble burst, ending the long-established national consensus. This consensus, also know n as the Yoshida Doctrine, w as based on the assum ption that Japan could alw ays focus on econom ic d evel­ opm ent, m eaning that great-pow er politics and dom estic structural problem s

2i8 I Book Reviews

were overlooked by the political elite for decades. Japan was thrown into chaos when the consensus collapsed in 1992. Succeeding governments have tried to reverse the course, but to no avail. The author considers Junichiro Koizumi to be modern Japan's most impor­ tant reformer. During his five-year tenure as prime minister beginning in 2001, he pushed for neoliberal economic reforms, and 'three years into his term, Japan enjoyed five consecutive quarters of growth and managed to almost reach 3 percent growth by the fourth quarter in 2003' (P* 33 )- But Koizumi's government also brought one of Japan's most important bilateral relation­ ships, that with China, to a virtual standstill. Today, the Japanese business community acknowledges that the Japanese economy's eventual emergence from the lost decade of the 1990s owed a great deal to China's rapid rise during the same period (p. 100). Koizumi was the first sitting prime minister since 1983 to visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, doing so six times during his tenure (p. 22). After Koizumi left office in 2006, the Sino-Japanese relation­ ship continued to deteriorate, leading to a major flare-up over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands in 2012. Glosserman sees Japan's role in regional security arrangements as having declined considerably. On the one hand, Japanese economic power and inter­ national influence have been declining since the country's long recession. On the other, a strong China that is increasingly willing to flex its muscles, along with a reckless, nuclear-armed North Korea, have changed the region's security agenda and calculations (p. 113). After Koizumi, however, politics in Japan returned to old habits. Shinzo Abe's seemingly successful tenure as prime minister, according to the author, is nothing but 'Peak Japan', that is to say, the Abe years 'are an interlude, a last gasp by great power traditionalists to boost their nation's standing and to secure a leading role in regional and global councils. They will be frustrated as a combination of structural constraints and attitudinal barriers conspire to limit both Japan's capacity to play that role and its desire to do so' (p. 233). Will the 2020 Tokyo Olympics provide a boost? Unlikely, says the author (p. 243).

Letter to the Editor Iran's Presidents Sir: I refer you to Ray Takeyh's review of my monograph, The Quest for Authority in Iran: A History of the Presidency from Revolution to Rouhani, in the OctoberNovember 2019 issue of Survival. While he is of course entitled to his opinion and criticisms, he has grossly misrepresented the contents of the book in two ways. The first is to claim that Ahmadinejad's presidency receives only a passing glance, even though it may turn out to be one of the Islamic Republic's most important turning points'. In fact, no fewer than three chap­ ters of the book, spanning pages 175 to 238, are devoted to Ahmadinejad. Even more puzzling is Takeyh's second assertion: that I ignore the Rouhani presidency altogether. Besides featuring President Rouhani on the cover and in the title, the book includes a full chapter (pp. 238-63) on him, chart­ ing his political career from his youth to his re-election in 2017. My analyses of both Iranian presidents are based on the focused study of a wide range of Persian primary-source material, much of it never before used in Western academic or policy literature. Siavush Randjbar-Daemi University of St Andrews

Survival | vol. 62 no. 1 | February-March 2020 | pp. 219-220

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220 I Letter to the Editor

Closing Argument

Impeachment, Trump and US Foreign Policy Dana H. Allin

Some of you on this committee appear to believe that Russia and its security services did not conduct a campaign against our country - and that perhaps, somehow, for some reason, Ukraine did. This is a fictional narrative that has been perpetrated and propagated by the Russian security services themselves ... Russia was the foreign power that systematically attacked our democratic institutions in 2016.1

So stated Fiona Hill, former senior director for European and Russian affairs on the National Security Council of Donald Trump's White House, testifying on 21 November 2019 at the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearings that would lead to Trump's impeachment. Her words attested to something surreal, a kind of hall of mirrors in which the pattern of behaviour for which the president was to be impeached persisted in the impeachment hearings themselves. Trump had acted as a conduit for Russian propaganda, and his advocates on the committee were doing the same thing for the purpose of defending him. Trump's 25 July 2019 phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is famous mainly for the US president's demand that, in

Dana H. Allin is Editor of Survival and IISS Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Affairs. Survival | voi. 62 no. 1 | February-M arch 2020 | pp. 221-232

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222 I Dana H. Allin

exchange for a White House meeting and the release of $400 million in appropriated military aid, Zelensky should publicly announce an inves­ tigation into the Ukrainian business dealings of Hunter Biden. In 2014, Hunter had joined the board of Ukraine's Burisma energy company, and it is reasonable to surmise that he was offered the lucrative seat because his father, Joe Biden, was at the time vice president of the United States. While this likelihood may be a redundant reminder that connections matter, and matter unfairly, there is zero evidence that Hunter or his father did anything wrong. It is obvious that the US president wanted the public announcement of a spurious investigation in order to politically damage the former vice president, a leading contender to challenge Trump next autumn, and that Trump used Ukraine's precarious position in the face of ongoing Russian aggression as leverage to extract this political benefit. Such was precisely the kind of corrupt transaction with a foreign power that the eighteenth-century framers of the United States Constitution were worried about when they drafted the impeachment clause.2And in this US-Ukraine case, there was a kind of two-way osmosis of corruption, as former New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani flew to Kiev with an entourage of misfits as the president's personal, albeit unofficial, envoy to broker the production of Biden dirt from disreputable oligarchs and disaffected prosecutors. Along the way, they orchestrated the smearing and dismissal of an American ambassador, Marie Yovanovitch, who appeared to stand in the way of these schemes. Still more surreal was Trump's other ask in the phone call with Zelensky: I would like you to do us a favor though, because our country has been through a lot and Ukraine knows a lot about it. I would like you to find out what happened with the whole situation with Ukraine, they say Crowdstrike ... I guess you have one of your wealthy people ... The server, they say Ukraine has it. There are a lot of things that went on, the whole situation. I think you're surrounding yourself with some of the same people. I would like to have the Attorney General call you or your people and I would like you to get to the bottom of it. As you saw yesterday, that whole nonsense ended with the very poor performance

Impeachment Trump and US Foreign Policy I 223

by a man named Robert Mueller, an incompetent performance, but they say a lot of it started with Ukraine. Whatever you can do, it's very important that you do it if possible.3

This is every bit as insane as it sounds. 'Crowdstrike' is a Californiabased cyber-security firm, with a Russian-born owner, that was hired by the Hillary Clinton campaign to investigate the hacking of its emails. That hacking, along with the earlier attack on Democratic National Committee servers, was the work of Russian intelligence, which then transmitted the emails to WikiLeaks for publication.4 The contents were about as embarrassing as any typical correspondence that the sender might not want the whole world to read - which is to say, only slightly. However, for relatively uninformed voters, any news about 'emails' associated with candidate Clinton fed into a broader narrative about her careless use of a private server to send State Department emails, an inconsequential infraction that became inflated in the national conver­ sation about such presumably grave Clinton criminality that Trump campaign rallies and the 2016 Republican National Convention featured mass chants of 'Lock her up!' The Russian hacking operations, then, were politically successful. And they were part of a larger campaign, including sophisticated social-media operations, outlined in the report of Special Counsel Robert Mueller, and in the texts of criminal indictments from Mueller's office, on Russian efforts to promote Trump's presidential campaign and damage Clinton's. The Mueller Report did not establish any criminal conspiracy between the Trump campaign and these Russian operatives, but it found that the cam­ paign knew about and 'welcomed' the Russians' work on its behalf.5 That work has continued. In a deft piece of propaganda ju-jitsu, the Russians apparently convinced the president of the United States, a large swathe of the Fox News audience and some Republican members of the House Intelligence Committee that it was Ukraine, not Russia, that inter­ fered in the US election. 'They say a lot of it started with Ukraine', Trump told the Ukrainian president, after alluding to his apparent belief that the Clinton server was somehow physically located in Ukraine.6

224 I Dana H. Allin

As for why the Russians conducted covert operations on behalf of the Trump campaign: they may not have expected him to be elected, but they could have expected that the campaign's damage to political civility would also impair a President Hillary Clinton's capacity to govern. And in the happy, if unlikely, event that Trump were to become president, his hostility to allies, affinity for autocrats and expressed admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin might make for US policies more congenial to Moscow. In any event, Trump's extreme and chaotic personality could lower American prestige and global influence by a notch or two, while deepening US domestic political divisions. Confusion to the enemy was a subtext of a short article by Russian General Valery Gerasimov, published in 2013 in a Russian military journal, and widely discussed.7To be sure, as some Russian contributors to Survival have recently emphasised, Gerasimov's explicit point was mainly about Russia's own vulnerabilities in a continuum between kinetic and political-information warfare.8 Gerasimov claimed, somewhat fancifully, that the West through political means had turned stable Middle Eastern states - Libya and Syria - into places of anarchy almost overnight, and intended to do the same to Eurasian partners of Russia and even Russia itself. But arguably the implicit message was that Russia should be employ­ ing the same strategies against Western democracies. Moscow does appear, in any event, to be trying. It has benefited, for this purpose, from the dystopian transformation of global media into the internet-connected social media of virtually limitless fake news. Contrary to early techno-utopian forecasts, connectivity has not promoted the best of human nature or critical understanding. With the demotion of traditionally important editorial gatekeepers, Russian propagandists have, for example, been able to exploit Western Europeans' natural anxieties about mass migration to cultivate virulent fraudulent narratives, such as the invented story of the kidnapping and rape of a Russian-German young girl by a gang of Arabs. In America, said Hill in her prepared statement, President Putin and the Russian security services operate like a super pac. They deploy millions of dollars to weaponize our own

Impeachment Trump and US Foreign Policy I 225

political opposition research and false narratives. When we are consumed by partisan rancor, we cannot combat these external forces as they seek to divide us against each other, degrade our institutions, and destroy the faith of the American people in our democracy ... Russia's security services and their proxies have geared up to repeat their interference in the 2020 election. We are running out of time to stop them. In the course of this investigation, I would ask that you please not promote politically driven falsehoods that so clearly advance Russian interests.9

One way the Russians might be seeking to damage America is by helping to elect a president who is incapable of conducting a coherent foreign policy. Trump is certainly not the first US president to make foreign-policy statements and decisions damaging to American interests. It has become almost conventional wisdom, for instance, that George W. Bush's deci­ sion to invade Iraq weakened America and destabilised the Middle East. There is no reason to doubt, however, that Bush believed he was acting to protect American lives and promote American interests. Trump is the first American president in living memory - indeed, in the present and past century, and maybe going back to Andrew Johnson in the century before that - about whom one cannot have the same confidence. Doubts on this score do not require a full-blown scenario of a Manchurian Candidate as president; nor do they require unknowable information about the president's inner motivations. These are doubts about capability: the capability to distinguish between right and wrong, and the capability to judiciously consider the strategic consequences of actions. The former should be easier, but when the president releases a plainly inculpatory summary of his phone conversation with Zelensky and considers it exculpatory - 'perfect', as he has stated repeatedly - it seems possible that he really doesn't get it. The latter capability, to understand strategy as a matter of second- and third-order consequences, is difficult for anyone. It was often observed that Trump in his first three years in

226 I Dana H. Allin

office had the benefit of facing no acute foreign-policy crises. Then he created one. The decision to assassinate Major-General Qasem Soleimani, head of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force, on 3 January 2020, was a climactic stage in a crisis the US president had set in motion by abrogating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear agreement), an Obama administration achievement that Trump derided as the 'worst deal ever negotiated'.10 The deal had in fact been working as its American promoters intended: Iran was complying, had dismantled much of its nuclear infrastructure, had reduced its stockpile of fissile material, had accepted permanent and intrusive international inspections, and was significantly further away from a nuclear-weapons capability than before the deal. To make sure that the deal was truly dead, the Trump administration launched, in effect, a campaign of economic warfare. It reimposed American sanctions, used the threat of extraterritorial sanctions against its allies and partners to force them to cut off trade as well, and induced massive reductions of Iran's oil rev­ enues. It is difficult to see how the administration really expected Iran to respond. Iran's posture in the region, relying on militia proxies, has hardly been benign - certainly not since the Islamic Revolution. But even a less aggressive power would have had to push back. Indeed, there are few self-respecting nations that would consider surrender, under such circumstances, the default option. The pushback entailed, inter alia, shooting down an American drone, attacking Saudi gas facilities, a missile strike by an Iran-backed Iraqi Shia militia that killed an American contractor in Iraq, and rioting by Iranbacked Iraqi Shi'ites that breached the outer wall of the US Embassy in Baghdad. Trump, facing an election campaign, and having criticised American wars in the Middle East in his last campaign, did not seem inclined to retaliate at a level that might re-establish deterrence. Then, his national-security team brought him a set of retaliatory options that included the traditional range - limited, medium, extreme - with the cus­ tomary expectation that he would choose the middle one. Instead, he chose to lethally target Iran's second-most-powerful leader.

Impeachment, Trump and US Foreign Policy I 227

Trump made this choice in the throes of his impeachment drama. 'Wag the dog' accusations - that is, charges that he was going to war to distract from a scandal or gin up political support - are difficult to prove and anyway often illogical. In this case, they would seem to be at odds with Trump's apparent avoidance of military responses on the basis of political calculation. Still, we must wonder about the relationship between his impeachment stresses and his foreign-policy decisions, particularly because the impeachment was about foreign policy. There are of course precedents for these questions. Bill Clinton was in the eye of his Monica Lewinsky storm, for which he would also be impeached, when he ordered airstrikes on terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. Two of Clinton's national-security aides who were involved in that decision wrote recently that they found it 'surreal' and 'mind-bending' to face the prevailing 'wag the dog' narrative when facing what they knew to be 'an urgent national security threat'. So, they are cautious about direct­ ing similar charges at Trump. Still, they argue, it is important to consider the actual merits, in terms of US national security, of killing Soleimani: Suleimani was not a target of opportunity. He was by no means an elusive figure like Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi or bin Laden. Western intelligence services knew where he was most days of the year, and he was a frequent visitor to Baghdad. Nor, for that matter, is there any serious argument that Suleimani's removal from the scene would yield the United States any substantive security benefits or geopolitical advantages.11

Perhaps the most salient precedent arose 46 years ago, in the domestic crisis over Watergate that ultimately forced president Richard Nixon to resign under the threat of certain impeachment. The Israeli-Arab Yom Kippur War of 1973 coincided with a tense episode of this crisis: the socalled Saturday Night Massacre in which Nixon demanded the firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox because Cox would not with­ draw his subpoena for seven of Nixon's Oval Office tapes. Nixon had to accept the resignations of Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy

228 I Dana H. Allin

Attorney General William Ruckelshaus to get to the number three in the Justice Department, Solicitor General Robert Bork, who agreed to fire Cox. It was on that Saturday night that the administration made a calculated decision to escalate, placing American nuclear forces on alert to deter Soviet intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet that gamble, and an earlier massive airlift of US supplies to Israel, was embedded in secretary of state and national security advisor Henry Kissinger's relentless diplo­ macy with Moscow, Cairo, Damascus and Jerusalem. And these moves were successful. They resulted in a strengthened American position in the Middle East, including a de facto alliance with Egypt and an eventual peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Furthermore, Nixon himself had very little to do with the nuclear alert; with the president preoccupied, morose and drinking heavily, Kissinger and a small group of unelected officials took it upon themselves to act. As I wrote about this episode 26 years ago, Kissinger had presented himself as managing the crisis by careful attention to the delicate nuance of American interests. Israel could not lose to Arab armies bearing Soviet arms, but neither could it achieve a victory that ruined [Egyptian president Anwar] Sadat. The Soviet Union had been pushed out of the Mideast under the cover of dátente; it could not be allowed back in under any pretext, notwithstanding that its motives for intervention, according to Kissinger, were to defend a slipping strategic position.12

It would be a stretch to imagine the current administration managing the unfolding consequences of Soleimani's assassination with compara­ ble skill. The administration's defenders, to be sure, will note that as of this writing a stalemate seemed to have been restored: the Iranians retali­ ated with missile strikes against Iraqi bases containing American troops without killing any of them. Both sides appeared ready to leave it at that - for now. Trump's advocates might even make claims for a second-order consequence. In the tense expectation of an American response, Iranians mistakenly fired missiles at a Ukrainian airliner after its take-off from the Tehran airport, killing all 176 passengers and crew. The dead included

Impeachment Trump and US Foreign Policy I 2 2 9

Iranians, some related to government officials. A mass outpouring of Iranian protests displaced the mourning for Soleimani. The idea circu­ lated of a 'Chernobyl moment' that could shake Iran's regime just as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster rattled the Soviet regime in its later years. The case for positive consequences would recycle the dubious logic propounded by some supporters of the Iraq invasion in 2003: use massive violence to disrupt a corrupt, brutal status quo, and good things will emerge. The problem, of course, is that what actually emerged from the Iraq invasion was chaos and civil war, not to mention the empowering of Iran. The notion of a cathartic Chernobyl moment fails to recognise that, in the aftermath of Chernobyl, the United States embraced and encouraged a reformist Soviet leadership. The Trump administration has no plans, and arguably no capacity, for such diplomacy with Iran.

As Survival goes to press, the United States Senate has convened as a jury in the impeachment case against President Trump. The verdict is not in doubt: conviction requires a two-thirds majority, and the Republican senators who dominate the chamber have made it clear that none of the evidence produced so far would move more than a tiny few of them, if any, to vote for removing the president from office. In fact, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi had made a conscious decision not to pursue Trump's impeachment, even though the Mueller Report deter­ mined that the president had acted on at least ten occasions to obstruct the FBI's and Mueller's own investigation. Her reasoning was political, and it also reflected a pragmatic approach to her constitutional responsibilities. Democrats' wave victory in the 2018 congressional elections had put mod­ erate Democrats in putatively conservative and Trump-friendly districts, where impeachment would be unpopular. Pelosi, a politician who knows how to count votes, wanted to protect those moderates and, by extension, her new majority. At the same time, the virtual impossibility of Senate con­ viction seemed to impose the pragmatic imperative. The conventional view was that impeachment without conviction could well strengthen Trump in his 2020 re-election campaign - an abjectly perverse result.

230 I Dana H. Allin

But these considerations were upended by an anonymous CIA analyst who filed an official 'whistle-blower' complaint about Trump's phone call with Zelensky and his broader campaign to squeeze the Ukrainians for political benefit.13 The complaint was forwarded to the chairmen of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. At this point, Pelosi and fellow House Democrats saw no choice. The Trump-Ukraine affair was an extension of the Trump-Russia affair, and indicated that violations of the Constitution were ongoing. He would not, perhaps could not, stop. Failure to impeach would effectively normalise and condone the violations. The fear of perverse consequences has not disappeared, however. The president's base of fervent supporters will feel agitated and aggrieved by impeachment - and vindicated by his Senate acquittal. The Wall Street Journal reported that the president told associates that killing Soleimani was useful for solidifying support in the Senate trial among Senate Iran hawks.14 And there is at least anecdotal evidence of a correlation between increased pressure on the president and more erratic presidential behaviour. With no Kissinger in the White House, 2020 could be a long year. Notes 1 'Opening Statement of Dr. Fiona Hill to the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence', New York Times, 21 November 2019, https://www. nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/21/ us/politics/fiona-hill-openings tatement-ukr aine.html. 2 According to Alexander Hamilton, impeachment would 'proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or viola­ tion of some public trust'. Alexander Hamilton, 'The Federalist Papers: No. 65', 7 March 1788, Yale Law School, The Avalon Project, https:// avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/

fed65.asp. See also Noah Feldman, 'Is Trump Above the Law?', New York Review of Books, vol. 67, no. 1,16 January 2020, https://www. nybooks.com/articles/2020/01/16/ is-trump-above-the-law/. 3 'Full Document: Trump's Call with the Ukrainian President', New York Times, 30 October 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/interactive/2oi9/o9/25/us/politics/ trump-ukraine-transcript.htm l.

4

See, for example, US Department of Homeland Security, 'Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security', 7 October 2016, https://

Impeachment, Trump and US Foreign Policy I 231

5

6 7

8

9

10

w w w .dhs.go v/ne ws/2016/10/07/j ointstatement-department-homelandsecurity-and-office-director-national. Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, 'Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election7, US Department of Justice, vol. I, March 2019, p. 5, https://www.justice.gov/storage/ report.pdf. 'Full Document: Trump's Call with the Ukrainian President'. Valery Gerasimov, 'The Value of Science is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations', VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kurier, 26 February 2013. Alexander D. Chekov et al., 'War of the Future: A View from Russia', Survival, vol. 61, no. 6, December 2019-January 2020, pp. 25-48. 'Opening Statement of Dr. Fiona Hill to the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence'. Quoted in, for example, Rick Gladstone,

Tran Appears Ready to Reduce Compliance With Nuclear Deal', New York Times, 6 May 2019, https://www. nytimes.com/2019/05/06/world/middleeast/iran-trump-nuclear-deal.html. 11 Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, 'Trump's "Wag the Dog" Moment', Foreign Policy, 7 January 2020, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/07/ trump-suleimani-iran-assassinationwag-dog-clinton/. 12 Dana H. Allin, Cold War Illusions: America, Europe and Soviet Power, 19691989 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p- 4813 'Document: Read the Whistle-Blower Complaint', New York Times, 26 September 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/interactive/2019/09/26/us/politics/ whistle-blower-complaint.html. 14 Michael C. Bender et al., 'Trump's New National Security Team Made Fast Work of Iran Strike', Wall Street Journal, 9 January 2020, https://www. wsj.com/articles/trumps-ne w-nationalsecurity-team-made-fast-work-of-iranstrike-i 1578619195.

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