Sun Yat-Sen, Nanyang and the 1911 Revolution 9814345474, 9789814345477

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SUNYAT-SEN

NANYANG AND TI-lE 1911 REVOLUTION

The Chinese Heritage Centre was established in May 1995 to promote knowledge and understanding of people of Chinese descent outside China and their heritage through research, publications, conferences and exhibitions. It also houses the Wang Gungwu Library which has a specialized focus on the Chinese overseas and their heritage. As the first organization to specialize in the study of Chinese communities outside China, it is most appropriate that the Centre be housed in the former Nanyang University’s historic Administration Block, which itself is a relic of the landmark establishment of the first and only Chinese-medium university outside China founded by the ethnic Chinese.

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued almost 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

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YAT-SE

NANYANG AND THE 1911 REVOLUTION

EDITED BY

L E E LA I T [] • L E E H [] C K 13 U AN

CHINESE HERITAGE CENTRE

I '

Singapore

and

I5EA5 INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

Singapore

First published in Singapore in 2011 by ISEAS Publications Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected]

• Website: bookshop.iseas.edu.sg

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2011 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publishers or their supporters. ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Sun Yat-sen, Nanyang and the 1911 revolution / edited by Lee Tai To and Lee Hock Guan. A collection of papers originally presented to an International Conference on Sun Yat-sen, Nanyang and the 1911 Chinese Revolution, organized by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 25–26 October 2010. 1. Sun Yat-sen, 1866–1925. 2. Sun Yat-sen, 1866–1925—Political and social views. 3. China—History—Revolution, 1911–1912. 4. China—Politics and government—1912–1937. 5. Chinese—Southeast Asia—Politics and government. I. Lee, Lai To. II. Lee, Hock Guan. III. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. IV. International Conference on Sun Yat-sen Nanyang and the 1911 Chinese Revolution (2010: Singapore) DS777 S95 2011 ISBN 9978-981-4345-45-3 (soft cover) ISBN 9978-981-4345-46-0 (hard cover) ISBN 9978-981-4345-47-7 (E-book PDF) Cover sketch: Reproduced with kind permission from the Sun Yat Sen Memorial Hall Typeset by International Typesetters Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Mainland Press Pte Ltd

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CONTENTS Acknowledgements

vii

List of Contributors

ix

Introduction Lee Lai To and Lee Hock Guan

xv

Keynote Address “Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of Modern Chinese Politics” Wang Gungwu

1

PART I: The Political Thoughts of Sun Yat-sen 1.

The British Model in Sun Yat-sen’s Vision of Modernization for China John Y. Wong

17

2.

On Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People: A Philosophy Approach Tony See Sin Heng

28

3.

Sun Yat-sen’s Idea of Regionalism and His Legacy Baogang He

44

4.

Sun Yat-sen and Japanese Pan-Asianists Yoko Miyakawa

61

PART II: Sun Yat-sen, Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Chinese Revolution 5.

Umbilical Ties: The Framing of Overseas Chinese as the Mother of Revolution Huang Jianli

75

v

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Contents

6.

Thailand and the Xinhai Revolution: Expectation, Reality and Inspiration Wasana Wongsurawat

130

7.

An Historical Turning Point: The 1911 Revolution and Its Impact on Singapore’s Chinese Society Ching Fatt Yong

148

8.

A Transnational Revolution: Sun Yat-sen, Overseas Chinese, and the Revolutionary Movement in Xiamen, 1900–12 James A. Cook

170

9.

Patriotic Chinese Women: Followers of Sun Yat-sen in Darwin, Australia Julia Martinez

200

PART III: Reports/Remembrances of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution 10. (Grand) Father of the Nation? Collective Memory of Sun Yat-sen in Contemporary China Ceren Ergenc

221

11. Historical Linkage and Political Connection: Commemoration and Representation of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution in China and Southeast Asia, 1946–2010 Wu Xiao An

245

12. Revolutionaries and Republicans: The French Press on Sun Yat-sen and the Xinhai Revolution Alexander Major

270

Concluding Remarks Prasenjit Duara

313

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The year 2011 marks the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Chinese Revolution which began with the Wuchang Uprising on 10 October 1911 and concluded with the collapse of dynastic rule in China that stretched back more than 2,000 years and the establishment of the Republic of China, Asia’s first republic. The 1911 Revolution was led by Sun Yat-sen and the Zhongguo Tongmenghui, which was first established in Tokyo in 1905 and followed by the formation of a Singapore branch and other branches in Southeast Asia. The Zhongguo Tongmenghui movement received massive support from the Overseas Chinese communities especially from the Nanyang. The latter contributed both manpower and funding to the 1911 Revolution and in that way played a role in the establishment of modern China. In view of the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution and Sun Yat-sen’s close relations with the Nanyang communities, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and the Chinese Heritage Centre, Singapore came together to host a two-day bilingual conference on the three-way relationships between Sun Yat-sen, Nanyang and the 1911 Revolution in October 2010 in Singapore. Previously in 2006 in connection with the 100th Anniversary of the Singapore chapter of Tongmenghui, the Chinese Heritage Centre had collaborated with the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall to organize a workshop entitled “Tongmenghui, Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Revisit”. Professor Leo Suryadinata, Director of the Chinese Heritage Centre, kindly help to draft the concept paper for this international conference. The conference was jointly coordinated and convened by Professor Suryadinata, Lee Lai To and Lee Hock Guan. We would like to thank the conference participants for devoting time and energy to prepare the papers for the conference. The two-day event went smoothly with constructive discussions all round. We were fortunate vii

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Acknowledgements

to have Professor Wang Gungwu who agreed to deliver the keynote speech which, as usual, provided the conference with issues to discuss during the rest of the proceedings. At the end of the conference, we were privileged to have Professor Prasenjit Duara provide some concluding remarks to round up the conference. We would like to thank the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall (SYSNMH) and the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCCI) for their generous financial support for the conference. In particular, special thanks to Mr Alvin Tan, Director of Heritage Institution, National Heritage Board, Mr Wan Shung Ming and Mr Lee Peng Shu, Board Directors of SYSNMH, and Ms Angela Ye, Manager of SYSNMH. Finally, we would like to thank Ambassador K. Kesavapany, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, for his support for the conference and Professor Leo Suryadinata, Director of the Chinese Heritage Centre, for generously helping to conceptualize the project as well as convening the conference. Needless to say, the views expressed in the various chapters are the responsibility of the paper-writers alone. In that regard, for the documentation and transliteration of Chinese names and places, we have decided to respect the system adopted by the individual authors. Lee Lai To Lee Hock Guan

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

James A. COOK, born and raised in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia until he was six, has been working on transnational China since 1995. After completing his Honours Thesis on Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia at the University of California, Santa Cruz in 1987, Professor Cook went on to complete his M.A. and Ph.D. at the University of California, San Diego. His advisors included Joseph Esherick, Paul Pickowicz, Dorothy Ko, and Takashi Fujitani, and his disseration analysed Republician-era Xiamen. After completing two years at Peking University’s Department of History, work on transnational China began in earnest at Xiamen University’s Taiwan Research Center under Professor Lin Renchuan (林仁川) and Mr Hong Puren (洪朴仁). He began his teaching career at Central Washington University in 1998. Currently he is Director of the university’s Asia/Pacific Studies programme and is the Principal Researcher of a National Science Foundation-funded grant looking at the history of water usage in northwest China. He is completing a book on Xiamen and transnational China. Prasenjit DUARA is a historian of China and more broadly of Asia in the twentieth century. He also writes on historical thought and historiography. Duara was Professor and Chairman of the History department at the University of Chicago. Since 2008 he has been Director of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences at the National University of Singapore where he is also Raffles Professor of Humanities and Director of the Asia Research Institute. Among his books are Rescuing History from the Nation (1995), Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (2003), an edited volume on Decolonization (2004), and Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900–1942 (1988), which won

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the Fairbank Prize of the AHA and the Levenson Prize of the AAS. In 2009 he published a collection of his essays, The Global and the Regional in China’s Nation-Formation. Duara’s essay, “Asia Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for our Times” (2010) may be accessed at . His work has been widely translated into Chinese, Japanese and Korean. Ceren ERGENC is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Political Science, Boston University. She has previously studied at Peking University for two years as a visiting graduate student and also at Taiwan Normal University, and worked at Fudan University as a programme coordinator. He was a research fellow at Renmin University during 2009–10. Baogang HE is Chairman in International Studies at the School of Politics and International Studies, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia. Professor He is the author of 4 single-authored books, 3 edited volumes, and 45 international-referred journal articles. His research interests cover deliberative democracy, Chinese democratization, Chinese politics, comparative politics, political theory, Asian regionalism, and federalism in Asia. HUANG Jianli is an Associate Professor with the History Department of the National University of Singapore. Within the university, he is concurrently a Research Associate with the East Asian Institute. His first field of study is on the history of student political activism and local governance in Republican China from the 1910s to 1940s. His second research area is on the post-war Chinese community in Singapore, especially its relationship vis-à-vis China and the larger Chinese diaspora. He has published a monograph on The Politics of Depoliticization in Republican China: Guomindang Policy towards Student Political Activism, 1927–1949 (1996) and co-authored The Scripting of a National History: Singapore and Its Past (2008). He also has articles in journals such as Modern Asian Studies, Journal of Oriental Studies, East Asian History, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, South East Asian Research, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Journal of Chinese Overseas and International Journal of Diasporic Chinese Studies. LEE Hock Guan is a Senior Fellow at the Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSPS) Programme, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore. His research interests include civil society and democratization, nationalism, ethnicity and citizenship, and education and nation-state

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formation in Southeast Asia, with special focus on Malaysia. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from Brandeis University, Waltham, USA. LEE Lai To joined the Department of Political Science at the then University of Singapore in Bukit Timah in 1974. He had been with the Department until 2010. During his stay at the University of Singapore and later on National University of Singapore (NUS), he was tasked to serve in various academic and administrative positions. He had also been active in international/regional academic and track two organizations. He left NUS in 2010 and joined the School of Humanities and Social Sciences as Senior Teaching Fellow and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies as Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University subsequently. Lee Lai To’s major publications include three single-authored books, eight edited or co-edited books and a vast number of articles in regional and international journals. His major research interest is regional security in the Asia Pacific. This includes territorial disputes in the region and PRC-Taiwan relations. He is also interested in Chinese politics, particularly land issues in rural areas and selected issues related to “overseas Chinese” studies. Alexander MAJOR is a Ph.D. candidate. His doctoral dissertion, “Money, Power and Civilisation: The French Agenda in Shanghai, 1870–1912”, aims to demonstrate how the policies of the Third Republic were exhibited through: (1) government involvement in the economic development of Shanghai throughout the period; (2) French political machinations with respect to other Powers in the Shanghai theatre; and (3) government positions on civilizing enterprise, filtered through the relationship between the French and Chinese populations of Shanghai. In this research Chinese reformers and revolutionaries, particularly Sun Yat-sen, play an important role through influence on the totality of events in the later part of the period and for direct modifications to French imperatives. Prior to these studies Mr Major lived in China for eight years — teaching History, English and International Business at several colleges and universities, including Qingdao Chemical University, Informatics College (Shanghai) and Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Julia MARTINEZ is a Senior Lecturer in History and Politics at the University of Wollongong. She has published in leading international journals on the themes of Indigenous Australian History and Asian History during the colonial period. Her current research interests include the history of Chinese diaspora, both in Vietnam and Australia; the history of

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Indonesian labour migration to Australia (working with Professor Adrian Vickers) and a history of domestic workers in the colonial Asia-Pacific. Her doctoral thesis (2000) explored the history of the port city of Darwin and its Asian and Indigenous populations. Yoko MIYAKAWA teaches “Modern Japanese History since Meiji” and “Nationalism in Japan” in the Department of History at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Currently she is finishing her Ph.D. dissertation on the construction of national identity in post-war Japan, analysing the shifting views of Japan and Japaneseness among Japanese conservative thinkers. Tony SEE Sin Heng is the Associate Director (Asia) of the European Graduate School (EGS) and Senior Lecturer in the Nanyang Academy of Fine Arts (NAFA), Singapore. He is currently doing research on cultural politics. He is an experienced Lecturer in International Studies in Monash University, Sunway Campus, Malaysia where he delivered courses related to Globalization, Nationalism, Migration, Refugees and International Law. He has a research interest in political philosophy and cultural studies and has recently published a book entitled Community without Identity: The Ontology and Politics of Heidegger (2009). He was awarded the National University of Singapore (NUS) Research Scholarship in 1998 and is currently interested in doing research on political philosophy, cultural politics and Southeast Asia. He hopes to contribute towards United Nations (UN) efforts in peace, education, culture, human rights and the rule of law. WANG Gungwu, National University of Singapore Professor (formerly Director, East Asian Institute) and Emeritus Professor of Australian National University. His books since 2000 include The Chinese Overseas: From Earthbound China to the Quest for Autonomy (2000); Don’t Leave Home: Migration and the Chinese (2001); 海外华人研究的大视野与新方向：王 賡武教授论文集 (2002); Anglo-Chinese Encounters since 1800: War, Trade, Science and Governance (2003); Diasporic Chinese Ventures (2004); 移民及 兴起的中国 (2005); 离乡别土： 境外看中华 (2007); 中华文明と中国 のゆくえ (2007); Wang Gungwu in Conversation with Asad-ul Iqbal Latif (2010). He recently edited Nation-building: Five Southeast Asian Histories (2005); and (with Zheng Yongnian) China and the New International Order (2008). He is a Fellow and former President of the Australian Academy of the Humanities; Member of Academia Sinica and Honorary Member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Science. In Singapore, he is Chairman of

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the East Asian Institute, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. Professor Wang received his B.A. (Hons.) and M.A. degrees from the University of Malaya in Singapore, and his Ph.D. at the University of London (1957). From 1986 to 1995, he was Vice-Chancellor of the University of Hong Kong. John Y. WONG is Professor of Modern History at the University of Sydney, Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and Fellow of the Royal Historical Society in Britain. His lifelong research on British imperalism is showcased in Deadly Dreams: Opium, Imperalism, and the ‘Arrow’ War (1856– 1860) in China (1998). That on China’s fate will crystallize in his forthcoming four-volume tome on The Founder of Modern China Sun Yatsen (1866–1925) in a Rapidly Globalising World (1800–2024). His “Limits of Naval Power: British Gunboat Diplomacy in China from the Nemesis to the Amethyst, 1839-1949” is anthologized in Naval History 1850-present (2007). Wasana WONGSURAWAT is a historian of modern China with special interest in Sino-Thai relations and the history of the Overseas Chinese in Thailand. She attained her doctoral degree in modern Chinese history from Oxford in 2007 and spent the next year as a postdoctoral research fellow at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. At present she is a Lecturer in Chinese and East Asian history at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. Her most recent publications include an article in Dynamics of the Cold War in Asia: Ideology, Identity and Culture (2009) which she co-edited with Tuong Vu. WU Xiao An, Ph.D. at the University of Amsterdam, is Professor of History at Peking University and Director of Peking University’s Center for the Study of Chinese Overseas. Among his publications is Chinese Business in the Making of a Malay State, 1882–1941 (2003). Ching Fatt YONG, Research Fellow, History Department, Flinders University, South Australia, has devoted the best part of his life researching the history of ethnic Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia of the colonial era. He is author of Tan Kah-kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend (1989), Chinese Leadership and Power in Colonial Singapore (1994), and The Origins of Malayan Communism (1997). He is a co-author, with R.B. McKenna, of The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949 (1990). Currently, he researches on post-World War II Singapore Chinese political leadership to 1965.

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INTRODUCTION Lee Lai To and Lee Hock Guan

This volume is a collection of papers in English presented at our conference to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution in China. While there are extensive research and voluminous publications on Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution, it was felt that less had been done on the Southeast Asian connections. Thus this volume tries to chip in some original and at times provocative analysis on not only Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution but also contributions from selected Southeast Asian countries. This volume starts with the keynote speech given by Wang Gungwu. Wang’s speech revisited his earlier thesis that Sun Yat-sen was China’s first modern politician. By comparing Sun with other Chinese in the 1860s generation, Wang noted that Sun was different from students sent to the United States by the Qing Government and selected figures from the Overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. By and large, Sun was able to plant a vision of ideals from the West and graft it onto Chinese traditions that still mattered to the majority of his followers. Sun was definitely not following the traditional mandarin-literati framework or the way of the upper class. Instead, he was interested in pushing for western political ideas and combining them with some of China’s popular ideas of legitimate authority and governance. Wang came to the conclusion that Sun’s ability to project his mixed vision in times of uncertainty in China would carve out a political life for Sun and make him “the first to offer a dedicated political leadership for a cause that set China on its own path to modernity”. In the light of Wang’s remarks, it is perhaps befitting to examine Sun’s vision or thoughts on modernity and nation-building. Thus the chapters in Part I starts with an analysis of the British influence on Sun Yat-sen’s vision xv

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of modernization with special reference to the Three Principles of the People by John Wong. Wong would like to suggest that Sun’s sojourn in London in 1896–97 had a lot of influence on his Three Principles of the People and his understanding of constitutional history. From various sources, Wong tried to highlight Sun’s intellectual debts to the British. This did not go down well with present-day nationalists who would like to emphasize Sun’s Chineseness as indicated in the chapter. However, to Wong, the construction of history by these nationalists is one-sided. This discourse on the Three Principles of the People is continued in Chapter 2 by Tong See Sin Heng. See took a different approach by examining the Three Principles of the People from a philosophical perspective to see if there are theoretical consistencies or inconsistencies in Sun’s political thought. In this regard, See differs from other scholars following basically the historical approach. Instead, he would like to explore if Sun’s political ideas, particularly his principle of nationalism, are conceptually consistent and relevant to contemporary times. For that purpose, See briefly examined Sun’s notion of nationalism by noting that Sun would emphasize national unity and reject cosmopolitanism. Sun would argue for limitations on the freedom for the Chinese people for the sake of national unity. As such, the rights and freedom of the state should come before individual liberties. If that was the case, See raised questions centering on the problems and practicality of Sun’s ideas, particularly his proposal to unite the different ethnic groups into one. He also suggested that it is not unthinkable that Sun, as a political opportunist or shrewd politician, was putting forward a republican programme adjusted to Chinese conditions for political transformation. Such a critical approach may invite more debates on whether Sun was more than a mere political rhetorician. Part I also deals with Sun’s ideas on Pan-Asianism. Both Baogang He and Yoko Miyakawa took a closer look at Sun’s speech on Pan-Asianism delivered in Kobe in 1924. For He, he started with the historical, political and cultural background of Sun’s thinking on regionalism and then scrutinized Sun’s lecture in Kobe closely. According to He, Sun’s speech was a response to Japanese requests and reactions to the West. Thus, his speech on the revival of Asia noted the leading role played by Japan. Sun claimed that while occidental civilization championed the Rule of Might, oriental civilization would favour the Rule of Right. Nonetheless, military force would still be needed to get rid of western imperialists in Asia. Based on the principle of right against might, Sun argued for Pan-Asianism by promoting a shared regional culture to fight against Western imperialism. Sun’s speech in Kobe was apparently

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aimed at gaining support from the Japanese audience and promoting SinoJapanese relations. It did not really have much impact on Japan although it was used by his followers like Wang Jingwei to justify Japanese rule in China later on. It must be added that Baogang He saw some continuity between Sun’s Pan-Asian regionalism and present-day proposals for regionalism and that some of his normative principles for Asian regionalism could still be relevant and useful. In Chapter 4, Yoko Miyakawa took a different route by focusing mainly on the Japanese scene with special reference to Sun’s view on Pan-Asianism. In this regard, she surveyed Japan’s Pan-Asianists in Meiji Japan and the thinking of Sun’s Japanese collaborators. Having summarized Sun’s speech in Kobe, Miyakawa examined briefly the interpretations of the speech by some scholars. As far as the impact on Japan was concerned, Miyakawa noted and agreed with He that the speech did not have much impact. The media did not pay much attention to the speech, and if it was reported, the focus was not on Sun’s call for Japan to re-examine its Asian policies but more on Japan’s positive role in inspiring other Asian nations. Miyakawa also noted the ambiguity about Sun’s ultimate intention in promoting Pan-Asianism. To be sure, Pan-Asianism was used by Sun to connect with Japanese Pan-Asianists and by Sino-Japanese collaborators to justify Japan’s invasion of China in the 1930s and 1940s. Unfortunately, Pan-Asianism did not succeed in solidifying Sino-Japanese relations, not to say all Asian nations. Pan-Asianism died together with Sun’ death, signalling that it was the personality of Sun and not Pan-Asianism that China was able to get support from Japan’s Pan-Asianists. In fact, Pan-Asianism failed miserably when Japan joined the “imperialist” club. After all, the forming of Pan-Asian solidarity among equal nations was problematic, “since the Japanese advocates envisioned Japan as its leader, while Chinese advocates such as Sun saw China as at least as the first among equals” according to Miyakawa. Part II focuses on Sun Yat-sen, Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution. The relationships between Sun Yat-sen and the Overseas Chinese and between Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution have in recent years garnered renew interest in view of the political and economic rise of China and what that means for the Overseas Chinese communities. For many years, Sun Yatsen lived and worked with various Overseas Chinese communities especially in the Nanyang and appealed to and mobilized them to support political changes that he and his associates were struggling to bring about in China. Although Sun Yat-sen was instrumental in engaging the Overseas Chinese in the 1911 Revolution, the nature and extent of the Overseas Chinese’s role

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in the 1911 Revolution has remained a contentious subject. However, also what has frequently been overlooked is how Sun Yat-sen’s activities and the 1911 Revolution impacted the local politics among the Overseas Chinese as well as their relationship with their host communities. Huang Jianli’s chapter examines the often repeated epithet “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution”. For Huang, this epithet is “less of an honest evaluation of the past record and more of an exhortation in a desperate appeal to Overseas Chinese for further assistance to overcome the prevailing quagmire of crises” in China. Although the epithet was not coined by Sun Yatsen, as frequently claimed, and was most likely an invention of the Overseas Chinese, it has persisted precisely because this epithet is “grounded upon both historicity and mythologization”. Historically, the Overseas Chinese especially in Nanyang did play a role in the 1911 Revolution: Sun and his associates did live among the Overseas Chinese as well as mobilize them to support their political causes and the Overseas Chinese did contribute both manpower and funds to the revolutionary movement in China. Nevertheless Huang shows that the exaggeration of the Overseas Chinese’s role in the 1911 Revolution became “entwined with the KMT-led mythologization and placement of Sun Yat-sen and his organizations onto a saintly pedestal”. In particular, during the Cold War era, the ideological and territorial split between PRC mainland and ROC Taiwan enhanced the “debate about whether the Overseas Chinese on balance had contributed sufficiently to qualify for the exalted motherhood status”. Predictably, the PRC and ROC staked out opposing position on the epithet with the former marking down and the latter exaggerating the Overseas Chinese role in the 1911 Revolution. However, in the post-Cold War era, the status of the epithet, and hence the exalted motherhood status of the Overseas Chinese, could be undergoing another round of re-evaluation and re-interpretation. Wasana Wongsurawat’s chapter evaluates the interpretations and expectations of the 1911 Revolution by the ethnic Chinese and progressive Thai journalists on the one hand and by conservative Thai journalists especially in the writings of King Vajiravudh, who wrote mostly under his pseudonym Asawaphahu, on the other hand. The expectations invoked by the 1911 Revolution were problematic because it was a republican revolution and Thailand then was an absolute monarchy state. The ethnic Chinese and progressive Thai journalists had to tread carefully in their expectations of the 1911 Revolution given the republican character of the Revolution and also the fact that it had inspired a failed anti-monarchy rebellion in Thailand in 1912. However, the author argues that despite the Thai Chinese supporters of the

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1911 Revolution “repeated denials of any ill intentions towards the existing political system in Siam during Vajiravudh’s reign, they actually contributed much more to undermining the absolute monarchy in Thailand”. Indeed, even Asawaphahu persistent criticisms of the 1911 Revolution and of the Thai Chinese for importing an “alien” idea into Thailand did not deter the Revolution from inspiring the 1932 Revolution which transformed Thailand into a constitutional monarchy. The impact of the 1911 Revolution on the Overseas Chinese community in colonial Singapore is the focus of Ching Fatt Fong’s chapter. The 1911 Revolution invariably enhanced the Singaporean Chinese society’s political ties with China as well as entrenched a China-oriented political tradition in the colony. However, when Yuan Shikai started to crackdown on the Kuomintang (KMT), and eventually banning it, and usurped power shortly after the 1911 Revolution, it led to a political fragmentation of the Singapore’s Chinese society, with one side supporting Yuan Shikai and another supporting KMT. Subsequently, the 1911 Revolution also “left behind two major legacies [in Singapore], one a KMT movement in British Malaya with Singapore as its nerve centre and the other, a non-partisan leadership led by Tan Kah Kee which was in full swing during the years of national salvation, 1937–41”. Despite the Singaporean KMT connections with the Chinese Government, the British felt threatened by the movement and thus banned the KMT on three occasions (1925, 1930 and 1949). In contrast to the KMT, the nonpartisan movement led principally by Tan Kah Kee was given the leadership of the China national salvation activities in the colony by the British. Nevertheless, both the KMT and non-partisan movements left various legacies in the colony especially in the areas of education and culture. At the turn of the twentieth century, political, economic, and social pressures in China and Southeast Asia contributed to the political integration of Hokkien communities on both sides of the South China Sea. James Cook’s chapter studies the role of the Nanyang Hokkiens in the growth of a transnational movement in Xiamen. Alienated by colonial racist, exclusionary social policies in Southeast Asia and spurred by the rising Chinese nationalism led an increasing portion of the Nanyang Hokkiens to direct their political aspirations towards China, rather than their host communities in Southeast Asia. Sun Yat-sen’s activities and revolutionary cause helped to inspire and instil a China-oriented Chinese transnationalism among the younger generation of Hokkiens in Singapore and British Malaya. In turn, the politically awakened Hokkiens played a significant role in the politics of China through their direct and indirect participation in the revolutionary affairs of Xiamen, their place

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of origin in China. Many of the politicized Hokkiens “began to re-examine their homeland … through the lens of their experience abroad, a past that was distinctly colonial and hegemonic in nature”. Consequently their image of modernity was distinctly transnational in nature; “neither attached to a distinct piece of territory nor the creation of a nation-state”. This migrant Hokkien transnationalism indeed was facilitated by the movement of people, products, and ideas between Xiamen and the Nanyang over time. Julia Martinez’s chapter examines “the lives of the young men and women who organized the Darwin Branch of the Kuomintang (KMT) during the 1920s and 1930s, in particular looking at the role of Chinese women in politics”. The role of Chinese women in politics in Darwin in the 1920s and 1930s pitted an older conservative group against a KMT group whose members were younger and educated. In general, the former subscribed to the traditional view that women should not be political leaders while the KMT group, consistent with Sun Yat-sen’s view, was supportive of women’s active participation in society and politics. Martinez focuses on the political involvement of Lena Lee in the Darwin KMT to illustrate the politics of gender among the Darwin Chinese community. Lena Lee was the only female leader in the KMT and her being a leader in the organization had strong support from the mostly male KMT membership. Tragically, Lena Lee took her own life at the age of thirty-two years by consuming an overdose of opium in part because of the conservatives’ vociferous criticisms of her being a woman and thus should not be playing a leadership role in politics. While there is no doubt that Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution are historically significant, it would be interesting to note the ways and means in which they have been commemorated or reported. Thus the chapters in Part III in this volume may shed some light in this area. For Ceren Ergenc’s chapter, it noted the economic, ideological and collective psychological reasons for the rise of Sun Yat-sen’s image although it also cautioned that there are factors which may not help promote the memory of Sun in postMao China. After a brief discussion on collective memory emphasizing that such memory is selective and open to negotiation, change and needs of the day, Ergenc examined the different agents and levels in the construction of Sun Yat-sen’s image. Essentially, these included elite/state level construction and local and bottom-up forces/responses. By going through official speeches, academic writings, productions by the media/literature/internet, and presentations in museums, Ergenc came to the conclusion that the most important sources or agents of the collective memory of Sun Yat-sen in reform China are mostly official and elite. Sun has also been depicted

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as a source of legitimacy for both the PRC and Taiwan. However, Ergenc would refute the claim that Sun may eventually replace Mao’s portrait above the Gate of Heavenly Peace. She would admit that Sun’s image is or can be popular. The next chapter by Wu Xiao An continues the analysis on the commemoration of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution, but with special reference to China and Southeast Asia. Based on a close reading of Renmin Ribao (the People’s Daily) from 1946 to 2010, Wu came up with a construction and reconstruction of the commemoration and representation of Sun and the 1911 Revolution in the two places. Having examined the importance of Nanyang as a base for fund-raising and organizational support for his revolution, Sun’s influence on non-Chinese nationalists in Southeast Asia, and the commemorations of Sun and the 1911 Revolution in contemporary China and Southeast Asia, Wu came to the conclusion that for both China and Southeast Asia, the construction and reconstruction of Sun and the 1911 Revolution are not conducted as scholarly intellectual pursuits but to fit into their own domestic agenda. For China, its agenda was initially more on the rationalization of the ideological basis and justification of the 1949 Revolution and Chinese Communist Party-Kuomintang (CCP-KMT) relations. It then shifted to the concern with cross-strait ties, notably the issue of national unification of China. For Southeast Asia, it was initially the Overseas Chinese communities and selected newly independent Southeast Asian countries commemorating Sun and the 1911 Revolution. It was not until the rise of China starting from the 1980s that more Southeast Asian countries, notably Singapore and Malaysia, began to rediscover the legacy of Sun and the 1911 Revolution to further mutual political and economic interests between Southeast Asia and China. On the whole, the commemorations of Sun and the 1911 Revolution in China and Southeast Asia, according to Wu, “have been dominated by politics whose agenda is influenced by revolution and ideology in the early decades and by culture, ethnicity and history in the later years”. For revolution and ideology, they were most obvious in the CCP-KMT confrontation and conflicts between nationalism and colonialism or imperialism. For culture, ethnicity and history, they were instrumental in promoting the agenda of political economy. Despite different agendas, Wu seems to be happy to see that the construction and reconstruction of Sun and the 1911 Revolution has become useful in cross-strait relations and Sino-Southeast Asian relations. The last chapter in Part III is not so much on the commemoration, but more on depiction or perceptions of Sun and the 1911 Revolution by

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the French media. The chapter writer, Alexander Major, ploughed through conservative daily Le Figaro and the intellectual newspaper Le Journal des Debats politiques et litteraires from mid-October 1911 until May 1912 to size up the French press presentation of Sun and the Revolution in three areas, namely, the road to revolution: Sun Yat-sen and the French, the reporting on the 1911 Revolution in the French press, and the French press and the shaping of French public opinion. Major’s observations were that while both newspapers seemed to favour the revolution in the early days, Le Figaro became more critical of it over time, preferring the strongman, Yuan Shikai to Sun’s republicanism while Le Journal des Debats “maintained an overall objectivity with a preference for a republic”. Otherwise, the two Paris dailies were about the same in the coverage of the revolution in the choice of events to cover and the type of coverage given. Both acknowledged that the Manchu dynasty had abused its position and it was natural for the revolutionaries to take action against it. To be sure, there were differences between the two dailies in some areas, notably in their analysis over the consolidation of the republic and the presidency. It remains to be noted that despite some harsh criticisms against Sun and being overtaken by Yuan Shikai as the most prominent and preferred character of the revolution, Sun would be rehabilitated when the suspicions about the hidden agenda of Yuan were proven true. However, as noted by Major towards the end of the chapter, it must be added that in-depth knowledge of Sun and his revolution is still “limited to scholarly investigation” in France. From the chapters covered in the book so far, one could see that there is quite a bit of politicization in the assessment and presentation of Sun and the 1911 Revolution. For the more academically inclined, they just hope that there could be more objectivity in such endeavours. Prasenjit Duara’s concluding remarks focus on the three terms “Sun Yatsen”, “Nanyang” and “1911 Republican Revolution” and their rather complex relation with one another. While Nanyang refers to the geographic area of the South Seas, usually referring to Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines, it is also used to mean the Chinese in the region. In the early 1900s upset by their failure to mobilize the Nanyang, Chinese nationalists disparaged the latter by claiming they “did not know their Chinese names; they did not know the language; they did not even know who they were”. Also, when the Nanyang became interested in affairs of their motherland, it was the conservative nationalists who at first had the upper hand before losing their advantage among the Nanyang to Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary supporters. But, what does “revolution” mean to Sun Yat-sen and to the

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different Chinese groups in Nanyang and China? Duara claims that for the Chinese then the meaning of “revolution” is linked to the Franco-American idea of citizenship and republicanism, Social Darwinism and the traditional idea of mandate from heaven. For the 1911 Revolution, he asserts that it was inspired by the emancipatory goals espoused by the Enlightenment on the one hand and the traditional Chinese idea of mandate from heaven on the other. The revolutionaries including Sun Yat-sen frequently would conflate the Enlightenment and traditional Chinese understanding of revolution. Lastly, he looks at the role and significance of Sun Yat-sen and the Overseas Chinese through the framework of “insiders and outsiders in history or the inside and the outside of history-making”. Broadly speaking, while Sun Yat-sen and Nanyang in different ways were outsiders in China, both were trying to influence insiders in China. For his Nanyang supporters, Sun Yatsen appealed to them because both were outsiders with shared emotional attachment to China and who wanted to create a new modern China which they could be proud of.

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KEYNOTE ADDRESS “SUN YAT-SEN AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN CHINESE POLITICS” Wang Gungwu Professor Leo Suryadinata reminded me that when I first wrote about Sun Yat-sen in 1952, it was twenty-seven years after his death and just over forty years after the 1911 Revolution. Some of the people I spoke to at the time had known Sun Yat-sen and they spoke of him with respect while admitting that they did not find it easy to understand him. Was he a failed politician but a great leader? Now he has been dead for eighty-five years and we are commemorating 100 years of the Revolution that he will always be identified with. We now know much more about him. Many scholars have worked on his life and work and each has sought to evaluate his place in history and especially his role in that Revolution. I have little to add to what has been published. But there is something I would like to revisit. I once described Sun Yat-sen as China’s first modern politician when he emerged as a leader of a revolution at the end of the nineteenth century. What kind of politics did he promote? In what ways were his politics modern? Modernity is a concept that has been much debated about, especially when juxtaposed with the word “tradition”. Most of the debates linked with Western attitudes towards China are not relevant here. The word “modern” was first used in the West to mark the progress that followed the struggles against tradition that its peoples were engaged in. It was not a word applied

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to Asia. For Asian leaders, Western power was the reality, and the question was how far to westernize if they were to defend their countries against being dominated or worse, either conquered or colonized. The first decisive response had come from the young Japanese samurai who helped to overthrow Tokugawa Shogunate. They were prepared to go all out to learn everything they needed from the West in order to fight back. Other Asian leaders were less ready to westernize to that extent and continued for the rest of the nineteenth century to reject any idea that their established ways needed to be changed by imitating the West. If they thought about being modern at all, it was in terms of learning to act like the West. The Japanese were the first to realize that the challenge they faced was not only superior military power or even economic power but also a system of ideas that was fundamentally different from their traditions of politics and government. It took several decades before what they learnt proved to be successful in catapulting the country to be a modern power alongside the Western Powers. Sun Yat-sen was born two years before the Meiji Restoration, in 1866, and grew up during the first decades of Japan’s road to that modernity. Many like him who grew up in the coastal areas of China open to Western trade, as well as those born in European colonies, were ready to understand how the Japanese saw the West differently. For these Chinese, the key feature of Japan’s quest for power was the dramatic and forceful way its young leaders overthrew the feudal Shogunate and restored central authority to the Emperor. By the time Sun Yat-sen took up the cause of rebellion in the 1880s and 1890s, many Chinese leaders were aware of what Japan had achieved. They were impressed by the careful way the Japanese studied European methods of military, economic and political reform, certainly much more systematically than the Chinese ever did. But few thought that the new kinds of politics being practised, through political parties established in imitation of those in Britain and Germany, were in any way responsible for Japan’s successes. The most radical mandarins were still calibrating what they thought were the optimal Western methods the Qing imperial system needed to become strong again. None who did that were described at the time as a politician, least of someone modern. Why should Sun Yat-sen be considered a modern politician? Why not Kang Youwei and his young followers who actually reached positions of power in 1898 and, after the failure of their attempts at reform, organized a political party called the Baohuangdang (保皇党, Protect Emperor Society)? Kang Youwei’s political activities deserve recognition as something that broke with the past, but Sun Yat-sen was organizing political rebellions in new ways before Kang’s Hundred Days’ Reform. The Xingzhonghui (兴中会,

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Restore China Society) that he founded in Hawaii in 1894 and in Hong Kong in 1895 was an even more recognizable political party with deep roots in Chinese practice. In revisiting the subject today, I want to re-examine the background to the decision to organize such a society and the origins of his thinking, and compare Sun Yat-sen with others of his generation who had educational and political experiences similar to his. Sun Yat-sen was born in 1866, so I shall focus on those born in the 1860s, a few years before and after him. By doing this, I am going further back beyond this conference’s celebration of the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution. I shall not, however, neglect the Nanyang and will make comparisons with those of the same generation who lived through the same times and shared other challenges in common. Let me sum up what were Sun Yat-sen’s experiences that were most relevant to his becoming the rebel that he was. When he was growing up in his hometown in Xiangshan county, he had heard stories of the Taiping rebels who had drawn on some ideas of the West to attack and nearly destroy the ancient Chinese political system. He was only two years old at the time that rebellion was finally crushed and what he heard would have been his first glimpse of armed revolts that were associated with a “Chinese” Christianity. The rebellion failed in part because the Western Powers rejected the Christianity as false. By the time he left home at the age of thirteen to join his brother in Hawaii in 1879, it was known that the Japanese had consolidated their westernizing transformations. Four years later, Sun returned to China and was then sent to Hong Kong to continue his studies. There he was immersed in learning from a British colonial government whose stability impressed many of his compatriots. He then went on, from 1887 to 1892, to study medicine in the first College of Medicine for Chinese in Hong Kong. Sun Yat-sen was not the first to study abroad in foreign schools. Many other fellow Cantonese had done that before him. They included several who had studied and converted to Christianity in Robert Morrison’s AngloChinese College in Malacca (later in Macao and Hong Kong) and those like Yung Wing (容闳, Rong Hong) who went to college in the United States and Wong Foon (黄宽, Huang Kuan) who studied medicine at the University of Edinburgh. Other prominent figures that followed included Ng Choy (伍才), or Wu Ting-fang (伍廷芳) and Ho Kai (何启, He Qi) from the colony of Hong Kong; both gained high positions of trust in the Qing and British administration. They were a generation older than Sun Yatsen and achieved successful careers as professionals and functionaries of the Chinese and British imperial systems. There was no room for any of them

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to contemplate any kind of modern politics. I shall, therefore, not dwell on them but focus attention on those who were of the same generation as Sun Yat-sen, those born in the 1860s. Sun Yat-sen’s understanding of what the West represented came to him in three parts: by listening to stories of the Taipings, reading the textbooks in his schools in Honolulu taught by his missionary teachers and in the schools in Hong Kong, and through the tutelage of British medical scientists at the College. His generation of Chinese was the first to experience the systematic application of European theory and practice to Asian life and thought. Although the Cantonese and other coastal Chinese had been conscious for centuries of the Western presence, their contacts with Europeans had been desultory. Even in the nineteenth century, British Hong Kong remained in the Cantonese sphere among people only slightly open to western ways. European ideas about business were not new to them, but the Chinese were very comfortable with their culture, their confidence in the superiority of Chinese ideas and institutions had never wavered, and western cultures did not evoke much respect. As for the Qing Government in Beijing, places like Guangdong and Macao were far away and, until close to the end of the century, the mandarins still thought that the Europeans were relatively easy to control. The Japanese thought differently. The Tokugawa leaders noted how the British navy defeated the obsolete Chinese forces, and how the murderous Taiping rebellion threatened the Qing dynasty. Thus when Commodore Perry’s “Black Ships” turned up in Tokyo Bay, it was an ominous moment. Although the Japanese had dealt with the Portuguese, Spanish, the Dutch and the English for over 300 years prior to the arrival of the U.S. fleet, that experience had been during times when Qing China was powerful and the West was not a threat to the East Asian order. There was no sense that western ideas of “modernity” could be transformative. The Qing court also became aware of the new challenges the country faced by the end of the Second Opium War in 1860. Twelve years later, only four years after the Meiji Restoration, they decided on a bold experiment. Thirty of Sun Yat-sen’s contemporaries, all born in the 1860s, were sent to study in the United States to learn how to deal with the challenges. For four years, between 1872 and 1875, thirty students were sent each year, making a total of 120 altogether. Much has been written about these privileged young boys, mostly aged between twelve and fifteen. We have a record of what they did in the eastern states of Connecticut, Massachusetts and New York where most of them were sent. We know how they spent their years there and how the Qing Government became increasingly concerned about

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the way they were being westernized. I use “westernized” because it was this concern that eventually led the project to be cancelled in 1881. That year, most of the young students were brought back to China without completing their studies and the experiment was abandoned. The Qing court decided that these students had been sent out too young. They did not understand the traditions of China well enough and, in their innocence, were vulnerable to the ideas of the West. They were thus learning not only western scientific knowledge but also ideas and values drawn from the Christian faith. They were losing sight of what it meant to be Chinese. In other words, the mandarins saw the young minds being contaminated by western ideas that were not in the interest of China. So the young men came home and continued their studies in China. Many were placed in minor positions, rather like interns, in various government departments. They had been sufficiently well trained in English and had basic knowledge of science and mathematics. Most of them were extremely bright and several went on to notable careers afterwards. Of those who succeeded in their work for various Chinese institutions, many made contributions to the development of China, the most famous being Jeme Tien Yow (詹天佑, Zhan Tianyou), the railroad engineer. Some became presidents of, and professors in, universities; others became officials in the customs and postal services; yet others went into the mining business. Some of them were active in foreign affairs, notably Tang Shaoyi (唐绍仪) and Liang Dunyan (梁敦彦). Two of them, Liu Yuling (刘玉麟) and Liang Cheng (梁诚), became well-known as ambassadors to the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively. The most successful of them contributed to the early industrialization of China and helped the country to respond to the western challenge. However, neither politics nor modern were words that would have arisen in their minds. Their job was to translate the new knowledge gained from the West to enable China to be prosperous and strong again. How could they do that and, at the same time, help China to withstand the multilayered pressures from the West? This experiment in American education was supported by reformist leaders like Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong and reflected the prevailing values of that era. The young men did not depart from those values when they pursued their careers after their return. None could be described as having any sustained interest in the conflict of political cultures or the ideas and practices of governance that the West represented. At least, there is no evidence of their thinking about such matters before 1911. Thus there was no question of any of them considering what it meant to be a

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politician. They were functionaries of the Qing Government and its agencies, and they did their best to defend the interests of the Qing Empire. Sun Yat-sen was born two years later than the youngest of the 120, who were all born between 1860 and 1864. Almost all of them came from the Pearl River Delta area, Cantonese from counties like Nanhai, Xinhui and Shunde and those nearby, including Sun’s own, Xiangshan. At least one of them, Zhou Shouchen (周寿臣), was born in the British colony of Hong Kong. Thus Sun Yat-sen came from a background similar to theirs. There was, however, an important difference from the start. Most of the 120 came from families with business or scholarly interests, sons of minor local scholars and small business people, families that were not rich but educated enough to have official ambitions for their sons. The young boys were also selected through an examination process and they were deemed to have been very bright. Sun Yat-sen would not have made the grade. He came from a poorer background, peasant families that needed to send their sons overseas. That was why his brother had gone to Hawaii, to try to make a better living than what the rural conditions in Xiangshan would have allowed. Thus, Sun Yatsen as the younger brother of a peasant sojourner would not have been one of the 120 even if he had been born a few years earlier. But, in other ways, Sun Yat-sen’s life was comparable. He also studied abroad and was open to the same ideas that influenced the 120 others who went to New England. The Iolani School that Sun Yat-sen went to in Honolulu was an Anglican mission school. He was taught more or less the same subjects, perhaps presented with a British slant instead of an American point of view. He would have encountered the same kind of teachers who taught European and American history; and was possibly using the same textbooks and reading the same literature texts taught in the English-speaking world at that time. He would have been introduced to ideas of politics in Britain and America, names like Cromwell and Napoleon, Washington and Jefferson, and even contemporary politicians like William Gladstone and Benjamin Disraeli, Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses Grant. And Sun Yat-sen was equally subject to Christian influences. In fact, it was his interest in Christianity that led his brother to worry that he would become a convert, so much so that he arranged to have him sent back home to be properly instructed. Like the others, Sun Yat-sen was not adequately trained in the Chinese classics or steeped in traditional ideas and practices to be able to resist the kind of Western influence that children from Chinese literati families might have been able to do. But there was another important, even crucial, difference. Hawaii was not New England. It was culturally

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pluralistic, an independent kingdom where there were not only Hawaiians, Americans and Europeans, but also many Chinese who were active in business. Although no more than 5 per cent of the population, the Chinese were already a significant community. In contrast, in New England, the young students sent there would have been without any Chinese community whatsoever. They were totally exposed to the western schools that they were sent to whereas Sun Yat-sen had his brother living close by. Even though he did go to an English school, he would have been living among other Chinese. In fact, almost all the Cantonese in Hawaii were from his own county of Xiangshan. Also relevant is that, through his brother and through the local community, he would have been familiar with the political background in which the Xiangshan migrants in Hawaii organized their secret societies to protect the interests of their compatriots and sustain the political ideal of restoring a Han Chinese Ming Dynasty. This had a special relevance to Sun Yat-sen’s induction to political action. During the early days of plotting rebellions, it was through such secret societies with their anti-Manchu traditions that he first understood the kind of politics that ordinary Chinese cared about. We know that when he founded the Xingzhonghui in Hawaii twenty years later, in 1894, it was the kind of secret society that everyone there was familiar with, the kind that had always supported the idea of returning power to the Han Chinese. Thus, in contrast to the 120 young students who went to New England, the big difference was that Sun Yat-sen maintained his community consciousness in Hawaii and, through his brother, remained in touch with traditional Chinese institutions like the secret societies. That link was not through the great philosophers and the Confucian texts, but through the ideas that inspired ordinary Chinese workers and small merchants to operate such societies. This was, of course, not peculiar to Hawaii. Similar societies were established in Southeast Asia where local variations of such semi-political organizations were available to all Chinese communities. Thus, the 120 students who returned to China remained half-educated young people who brought back the skills they had acquired and, conforming to prevailing traditions, went on to serve the Qing dynasty loyally. None of them challenged that framework during their working careers. Only after 1911 and the fall of the dynasty did a few of them engage in the kind of politics demanded in the new republican system that the revolution established. Sun Yat-sen, on the other hand, owed nothing to the state. When he studied in Hawaii, he lived in a community of ordinary Chinese. When he showed interest in Christianity, his brother packed him off back to

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his village. In his village, he was hostile to the practices he saw, traditional beliefs that his Christian teachings taught him were superstitions. When he demonstrated his stubborn rejection of these local practices, his actions reflected a deeper shift in mindset and may have been his first steps towards a sense of modernity. In the end, to save him from further trouble at home, he was sent to Hong Kong. Being Christian in the late nineteenth century was not necessarily associated with European wealth and power; it was possible to remain culturally Chinese while nursing his new Christian faith. As a student in Hong Kong, he went on to develop a deeper understanding of the West and would have become familiar with the emerging ideas of modernity. In the school established by the colonial government, he received an AngloChinese education more secular than that he received at the missionary Iolani School in Honolulu. This prepared him for medical studies at the new College of Medicine founded by second-generation Christians like He Qi (Sir Kai Ho Kai) as a modern institution, with doctors trained in Britain doing the teaching. But throughout all that time he remained a Christian and had several Christian friends who were equally dedicated to the task of saving the country. The College was carefully presented to the local Hong Kong people as an institution that trained young Chinese so that Western medicine could complement and support the traditions of Chinese medicine. Medical science was not yet trumpeted as superior to, and ultimately to replace, Chinese medicine. Sun Yat-sen was thus brought up in a mixed environment in which he could feel that what the West offered as new knowledge could also enhance and help preserve his Chinese heritage. Still, the time had not come when anyone spoke in terms of a dichotomy between what was modern and what was not. A key indicator of the intertwining of the new ideas that the West had to offer and the Chinese institutions that Sun Yat-sen depended on was the way his Christian friends joined him in appealing to secret societies to support their rebellious activities. Among his closest friends were men like Lu Haodong (陆皓东), Chen Shaobai (陈少白) and Zheng Shiliang (郑士 良) whose Christianity was an inspiration and no barrier to their rebellious activities. Zheng Shiliang was, in fact, an active member of a local secret society in his hometown and he worked hard to bring other secret societies to support Sun Yat-sen’s first rebellions, both in Guangzhou in 1895 and in Huizhou (惠州, Waichow) in 1900. It was significant that the Christian window through which Western innovative ideas were made available actually left the door open for many to use well-practised methods in organizing

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uprisings against the Manchu regime. It was a unique mixture of lofty ideals and popular means that made the politics relatively modern. The situation in the Nanyang, in the European colonies of Southeast Asia, was different. The Europeans were totally in charge and they saw the cultures of Overseas Chinese, like those of the local native populations, as steeped in superstitions and clearly backward. Sun Yat-sen did not visit the Nanyang until 1900. By that time, he was already a politician, a revolutionary, who was able to use his newfound and developing skills effectively among the Chinese communities there. The Qing forces had been thoroughly defeated by the Japanese. The reformers in Beijing were determined to learn from Japan and sent thousands of young civil and military students there. This was also when western armies were marching into Beijing and Chinese everywhere were angry, bewildered or in despair. Sun Yat-sen’s broader perspective of world affairs came from his having travelled in North America and Western Europe; he had learnt a great deal about political action from his dramatic escape from the Chinese legation in London in 1896. His experiences confirmed that China needed to learn from the more advanced western administrative and economic systems. He was already clear why the Chinese must master the modern ways that the West had begun to promote. Sun Yat-sen was now thirty-four years old. He had contacts among localborn peranakan Chinese like fellow-doctors Lim Boon Keng (林文庆) and Yin Suat Chuan (殷雪村), who were all younger and more influenced by the West than he was. Thanks to the pioneering work of Song Ong Siang, five years younger than Sun, on the history of such Chinese, we know much about the peranakan. That work has now been added to by recent research about the communities in the Straits Settlements. At the time, Sun Yat-sen was probably aware that, while these local-born Chinese had adapted to local institutions and cultures, they also retained the practices and values their ancestors had brought from China. They believed that these were what made them Chinese. While most of them were quick to learn from the West and adapted well to the prevailing systems of trade and governance, they did not seem to have been impressed by the idea of becoming more western and were certainly constrained by their local conditions from engaging in local or China politics. Sun Yat-sen was aware that large numbers of newcomers had come from China during the nineteenth century and that they had transplanted and updated the values from home and given the local communities a fresh sense of their Chinese roots. Throughout the Nanyang, the Chinese rarely lived as small isolated groups. On the whole, new migrants moved into towns and cities where they formed the biggest minorities. In this way,

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although there was an increasing range of cultural contacts and exchanges with natives and Europeans, most Chinese held strongly to received ways. But, unlike in China, theirs were the common traditions of ordinary people and not determined by the literati elites. These included religious institutions, and specific customs and practices identified by different groups. They also supported, until successive efforts by colonial governments to suppress them proved successful, the semi-political secret societies, each of which had their distinctive and exclusive rituals. The merchant classes were organized and offered leadership to help their members compete or collaborate with their European counterparts, and they also tried to understand how the West became so successful. This included learning about western business methods, science and technology, and special areas of medicine. They learnt to utilize the western laws introduced by the British and the Dutch. In that context, they knew enough about the West to recognize where the West provided advances and improvements on their older methods, yet most of them were absorbed in their respect for Chinese customs and practices. A few of the Overseas Chinese of Sun Yat-sen’s generation did go to English schools like Sun Yat-sen did in Hawaii and Hong Kong. Schools like Raffles Institution and Penang Free School were attracting the children of well-established families. Increasing numbers were exposed directly to British education and some of them, of the generation after Sun Yat-sen, went further and studied in the West. There were other differences. For example, modern though he was as a British-trained doctor, Lim Boon Keng went back to Chinese ways because he was brought up as a Peranakan. He remained involved in the Chinese business community and also served as a bridge between the community and the colonial authorities. Later, after the 1911 Revolution, he found it natural to become president of Xiamen University as a modern medical scientist who was also devoted to upholding traditional Confucian values. Song Ong Siang (宋旺相), on the other hand, came from a Christian family that had given up Chinese customs and practices in favour of a deep commitment to Christian life. But he had no political interests and was content to serve the colonial system as a loyal professional. That was modern enough for him. There was one exceptional case, someone who was older than Sun Yatsen. He was Gu Hongming (辜鸿铭), born nine years earlier in 1857, and his experience was more like that of the boys from the Pearl River delta sent to New England. Gu Hongming was born in Penang but sent at the age of thirteen to be educated in Britain, Germany and France. He studied longer years abroad than Sun Yat-sen and was more fully exposed to western ideas and institutions than any other Chinese had been. When he came back

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to the British colony and then went on to China, he became increasingly critical of the European ways that he had been brought up with. He knew the West better than any other Chinese of his time and was probably the most Europeanized Chinese in the nineteenth century. Yet his reaction was to turn against the West and dig deep into the classical Confucian tradition in defence of Chinese ways. Clearly, he had no truck with any idea of modernity. These familiar examples from Anglo-Chinese backgrounds similar to that of Sun Yat-sen illustrate how that generation of Chinese in different places responded to the West. In acquiring western education and new ideas, they were on the cusp of recognizing what the West was conscious of. Many westerners already thought of themselves as modern. For the young Chinese who were sent to the West to study at the end of nineteenth century, their experiences told them how progressive the West was, and how it provided the newest ideas that they wanted to bring back to their own people. Without exception, they were committed to using their knowledge to improve China’s position in the world. The differences among them were brought about by the way this identification with western success led them to seek different means to achieve their goals. Elsewhere in the Nanyang, other kinds of encounters with the West produced different results. The Chinese in the Philippine of Sun Yat-sen’s generation, for example, were mostly descended from those who had adapted to Spanish Catholicism for over two hundred years, and that experience had completely changed their way of life. Although the example of Jose Rizal attracted some hispanized Chinese to join Emilio Aguinaldo’s rebellion, and the Filipino rebel leaders are known to have sympathized with Sun Yat-sen’s political party as something equally modern, they played no part in inspiring Sun Yat-sen to his political awakening. As for the newcomers from China who arrived in the Philippines in the second half of the nineteenth century, they encountered Filipino nationalism as an anti-Spanish response to western dominance and had little direct knowledge of western developments. For all of them until the American occupation early in the twentieth century, the idea of modernity was not apparent. In Thailand, the experience of the West was minimal, as the Chinese responded to the values of Thai Buddhism in most traditional ways. However, the Chinese in the Netherlands East Indies produced very interesting responses. The Peranakan communities there were largely influenced by local cultures while adapting to Dutch institutions. They accepted that they were cultural hybrids and were even seen through Dutch eyes as some kind of Chinese sub-nationals. Nevertheless, for business as well as for other sentimental reasons, they remained conservative about the Chinese values

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that they inherited. Whether they were Chinese enough is less important than the fact that they preserved their heritage with great affection and responsibility. It was not meaningful for any of them to think in terms of being western or modern. But there were interesting exceptions. Let me take the example of someone who was, coincidentally born the same year as Sun Yat-sen. He was Oei Tiong Ham (黄仲涵, Huang Zhonghan) of Java who was born in 1866 and died one year before Sun Yat-sen, in 1924. Oei Tiong Ham’s father had come from China and, as a member of the rebel Xiaodaohui (小刀会, Small Sword Society) in Fujian, was anti-Manchu like the Taipings whom Sun Yat-sen so admired. He was part of the anti-Qing secret society tradition and asserted a kind of South China Han patriotism. He escaped when the rebellion failed and began a new life in Semarang. His son was born in Java and brought up as a Chinese, but his mother was from a local family. Oei Tiong Ham married a Peranakan and became accustomed to the Peranakan response to western rule. But he seemed to have inherited his father’s rebellious instincts about institutions in China, because he went on to rebel against the ideas that governed Chinese ways of doing business. By the 1890s, he had totally changed his mind about Chinese family commerce. He probably was the first Chinese to fully adopt western business methods in the expansion of his business empire. He chose to do so quite deliberately and his company Kian Guan (建源, Jianyuan) eventully became famous for being run like a European company, ultimately almost a typical Dutch multinational. Oei Tiong Ham saw himself more as a modernizer than a westernizer but, western or modern, he saw that as the way to go. A pragmatic realist in the competitive world of business, he would have thought that being modern or western was neither here nor there. He would have seen no real difference. But it would have been pointless for him to have contemplated, either for China or for the Netherlands East Indies, anything that could be described as political. The comparisons above point to some of the conditions necessary for someone to be a modern politician in China before 1895 and also suggest others that made it possible for Sun Yat-sen to behave as one. For his time, the basic conditions were two. One was that sufficient numbers of people agreed that the Qing regime was failing and that radical change was essential when no political challenge was possible within the system. The other was that people agreed that new ideas and institutions from outside could greatly help China to recover greatness, but they must be those that enabled the Chinese to change without having to abandon its values of

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morality, civilization and governance. At no time did Sun Yat-sen succumb to the idea of quanpan xihua (全盘西化, “total Westernization”) as a precondition of modernity. And, till the end of his life, he never doubted that the ideological pillars that supported the imperial system were no longer viable and that the republic he established was consistent with the political culture that the Chinese people practised. But taking the first step was always difficult and it had to be taken by organizations with a credible local base. In 1895, Sun Yat-sen had his Xingzhonghui; in 1900, this was augmented by secret societies operating in Huizhou where the rising was launched. Similarly, Kang Youwei’s supporters of the Baohuangdang of the Yangzi valley, in its one and only attempt at an uprising in 1900, also drew support from that region’s secret societies. The price of failure, everyone knew, was high. In Sun Yat-sen’s first two efforts at rebellion in 1895 and 1900, many died, including two of his closest Christian friends, Lu Haodong and Zheng Shiliang and many other Christian and secret society supporters. And the Baohuangdang rising in 1900 cost the lives of Tang Caichang (唐才常) and other secret society leaders. After the failures, Sun Yat-sen remained committed to armed political action. He had been inspired by his Christian faith to formulate a clear vision of the ideals from the West that could be grafted onto the traditions that still mattered to the bulk of his Chinese followers. His ability to do this, while Kang Youwei stayed loyal to the emperor he had served, became an increasingly important factor in Sun Yat-sen’s stature as a politician as more and more people observed the imperial system unravelling. No less important to his cause was the role of students who studied western goals and methods in Japan, found them attractive and became eager to introduce them on their return to China. When more and more were ready to engage in political acts, it was Sun Yatsen who was widely acknowledged as the man who had established the new politics of revolution dedicated to replace the old system altogether. The students sent to New England in the 1870s returned with western skills to serve a resilient political structure. In contrast, Sun Yat-sen lost faith in that system and became engaged, almost as in a new profession, in the radical politics of saving China from both its elite heritage as well as from the domineering West. He seems to have been aware that modernity did not have to be separated from a people’s heritage. He believed that Christianity was a powerful belief-system that supported Europe’s road to modernity and a great source of its strength. He saw modernity in the West as something that came out of the work of sifting, rejecting and improving on its very rich traditions. In the China that he knew, there had not been the opportunity to do that. Instead, the West had thrust its values on a weak

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and corrupt China. The struggle therefore was to adapt to their challenging modern values without abandoning the traditions that people needed in order to retain their self-respect. Sun Yat-sen was doing what many others were also trying to do, but he was the first to take his ideas for change onto a political stage that was rooted in Chinese practice but built outside the mandarin-literati framework. Although he had embraced a new world-view drawn from Christian concerns for society, he was imaginative enough to adapt a Chinese political organization for his revolutionary purposes. He took something that was common to the ordinary Chinese among whom he grew up, that is, the Chinese communities in Hawaii and Hong Kong, and was also found among the Overseas Chinese in the Straits Settlements and elsewhere. It was a political tradition long regarded as normal in Chinese rural and small town society. It was alive, much stronger than upper class Chinese appreciated, and its sustained power at this basic level was something that the elites totally misread. Thus, in formulating the ideas that eventually became central to his political party after the 1911 Revolution, he brought together a wide range of ideas that had converged in his mind. What he proposed was to choose a number of western political ideas, including concepts like sovereignty, democracy, republic, citizen-state, and concerns about people’s welfare and livelihood, and combine them with some of China’s own popular ideas of legitimate authority and governance. His eclectic ideas were not profound, his Christian faith not dogmatic, but they provided him with an alternative vision of China’s future and triggered his decision to lead. In his own way, he had learnt that this kind of inclusiveness was necessary to become a successful Chinese politician. What brought him to that confluence of ideas? At its core were the people and practices of the Xiangshan communities in China and in Hawaii. Add to these the schools he attended, the Christian values that he absorbed there and the Christian friends who shared his ability and willingness to harness secret society institutions to a moral and godly cause. In the end, unlike all others of his 1860s generation, it was Sun Yat-sen’s unique ability to project his mixed vision onto an increasingly insecure and uncertain Chinese people that made the difference and led him to carve out a life in politics. After revisiting the question, I have to admit that it is not important whether he was the first modern politician or how modern he was. But he was certainly the first to offer a dedicated political leadership for a cause that set China on its own path to modernity.

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PART I The Political Thoughts of Sun Yat-sen

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1 THE BRITISH MODEL IN SUN YAT-SEN’S VISION OF MODERNIZATION FOR CHINA John Y. Wong

Introduction Sun Yat-sen’s vision for a modern China is encapsulated in his Three Principles of the People. He professed in 1918 that what he had seen and heard in London in 1896–97 enabled him to synthesise his Three Principles.1 What exactly did he see and hear? During his sojourn in London in 1896–97, Sun Yat-sen did not keep a diary. One had to be reconstructed for him. This was done by tracking down at Stanford the reports of the private detective hired by the Chinese Legation to shadow him.2 Permission was sought from the grandson of Dr James Cantlie (whom Sun Yat-sen visited almost daily while in London) at Christchurch, Dorset, England, to read the diary of his grandmother, Lady Mabel Cantlie.3 In Shanghai and London might be located the diary and memoirs of some of the Chinese Legation staff in London.4 In Toyko was available the diary of Sun Yat-sen’s Japanese friend Minakata Kumagusu (1867–1941) who was visiting London at the time.5 A skeleton began to emerge, on which flesh was put with pertinent information sifted from the London daily newspapers, weekly journals, the British Foreign Office records, 17

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papers deposited at the First Historical Archives in Beijing, and relevant British biographies.6 The result was a substantial picture. The second step was to explore the places which Sun Yat-sen had visited; interview descendants of the people whom he had seen; analyse old notes and photographs; and follow up books or articles which he might have read. The third step was to pin down reports on all the interviews he might have given, the speeches he might have made, and the works he might have published during his sojourn in London in 1896–97. The last step was to search the text of his Three Principles to identify aspects which might bear hallmarks of his London experience. The aim was to discover concrete examples of how his daily life in London might have influenced him. After thirty-two years (1979–2011) of research, the following picture emerges.

Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles and Related Issues Principle of Nationalism Sun Yat-sen likened the peoples of China to a heap of sand, and modern nationalism to cement. The loose sand had fallen prey to western imperialism;7 but cement would bind it together to make concrete, enabling China to stand on its feet again.8 He arrived at this conclusion after experiencing first-hand modern British nationalism while he was in London. The most striking example was the explosion of nationalistic enthusiasm in June 1897, when Britons celebrated the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria’s accession to the throne. Sun Yat-sen witnessed both the Royal Procession in central London on 22 June 1897 and the Naval Review at Portsmouth on 26 June 1897. In both places the crowds burst into waves of spontaneous cheers for the Queen and the country. By contrast, the Chinese Emperor was feared as an absolute monarch, not loved like Queen Victoria. Sun Yat-sen was mightily impressed. Previously, he might have read about the national spirit of western nations in the late nineteenth century. He had actually experienced modern British national spirit while studying in Hong Kong,9 but not on this scale nor at this intensity. He became all the more determined that this sort of modern national spirit was what China needed.10

Principle of the People’s Rights The Chinese Legation’s private detective reported that on 13 January 1897, Sun Yat-sen visited Madame Tussaud’s Waxworks at Marylebone Road.11

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What did he see and learn? A search at the newspaper library at Colindale in London revealed that on this day, Madame Tussaud exhibited the waxworks of King John (reg. 1199–1216) signing the Magna Carta12 in 1215.13 The mere mention of Magna Carta would have warmed Sun Yat-sen’s heart, because it was the clause on Habeas Corpus14 therein on which his life once hinged. When he was detained in the Chinese Legation in October 1896, his former medical teachers in Hong Kong, Dr James Cantlie and Dr Patrick Manson, applied to the Central Criminal Court at the Old Bailey for a writ of Habeas Corpus, ordering the Chinese Minister to release him.15 Victorians attached a great deal of importance to Magna Carta, hailing it as the beginning of Britain’s ultimate triumph over monarchical despotism and attributing to it the beginnings of Britain’s parliamentary democracy. Sun Yat-sen seemed to have learnt much from the exhibition. Witness the fact that in his public lecture to the University of Hong Kong on 19 February 1923, he said that British politics was originally bad and corrupt; but Britons rose up against it and changed it for the better — a reference to the circumstances in which King John was forced to sign the Magna Carta.16 Also, in the wake of the 1911 Revolution, he and his comrades mapped out a variant of the British Parliament — the Provisional National Assembly.

Principle of the People’s Livelihood The Chinese Legation’s private detective reported that Sun Yat-sen went to the Royal Agricultural Hall at Islington on 8 December 1896.17 There, he saw the full glory of British husbandry — the largest and most important of the shows of Christmas fat stock held annually in England for “supplying the cattle markets of Smithfield and other places with the cheapest and best meat”. The 1896 show was the 99th of the series, and the total value of the prizes offered was £3,822. A total of 334 heads of cattle, 220 pens of sheep and 102 pens of pigs were the contestants.18 All this goes to prove the point which Sun Yat-sen subsequently made, namely, he needed to see an exhibition of good husbandry to realize China’s deficiencies in terms of looking after the livelihood of its people. The following discoveries prove the same point. The detective reported that on 11 December 1896, Sun Yat-sen visited the Crystal Palace to view the National Bicycle Show, where he spent the whole day.19 As for ocean transport, he saw some samples of Britain’s achievements on 10 March 1897 at the Royal Albert Dock in East London.20 Thither went great ocean-going cargo steamers to unload their cargoes: mainly of grain, tobacco and frozen

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meat.21 In addition, Sun Yat-sen had experienced a voyage on a British passenger liner as recently as 23–30 September 1896, when he sailed from New York to Liverpool on board the SS Majestic.22 Britain also had one of the world’s most efficient railway networks. By contrast, China could be plagued by surplus food rotting away in some areas and starvation in others. When Sun Yat-sen stepped down as the provisional president of China on 1 April 1912, he vowed to devote his life to building a national network of railways (which is what the Chinese Government is currently doing). Sun Yat-sen visited other British icons in connection with the synthesis of his Principle of the People’s Livelihood. The Imperial Institute exhibited products from the Empire for educational purposes.23 The South Kensington Museum had been founded in 1857 as an exhibition of decorative and applied art intended especially for the instruction of craftsmen and students.24 The Royal Botanic Gardens at Kew displayed important specimens from as far as the tropics. The Natural History Museum dealt with botany, entomology, zoology, mineralogy and geology.25 The Regent Street Polytechnic aimed at the advancement of practical science in connection with agriculture, the arts and manufactures.26 China at that time had nothing remotely similar to any of these.

Sun Yat-sen and Constitutional History Sun Yat-sen was sophisticated enough to pick and choose what he thought would suit China’s interests. In terms of his Principle of Nationalism, a Briton who might have an influence on him was the occupant of 12a Albert Road which Sun Yat-sen visited regularly. I have identified this person as Edwin Collins,27 who co-authored two articles with Sun Yat-sen while Sun Yat-sen was in London.28 Edwin Collins was a Hollier Hebrew Scholar of University College London. He translated, with an introduction, The Duties of the Heart, by Rabbi Bachye,29 and The Wisdom of Israel: Being Extracts from the Babylonian Talmud and Midrash Rabboth.30 He also wrote an Introduction for Marie Trevelyan’s Britain’s Greatness Foretold: The Story of Boadicea, the British Warrior-Queen.31 His Introduction, entitled “The Prediction Fulfilled”, was quite long (pp. xv–lxiv). In it, he set out to demonstrate the manner in which Boadicea prefigured Queen Victoria. Edwin Collins bore all the hallmarks of a British Israelite. British Israel was a strong school of thought in Victorian England.32 Seeking a Biblical explanation for Britain’s greatness, it claimed that the Anglo-Saxons were the lost tribe of Israel, whom, the Bible said, would be great one day.33 Although

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a Christian,34 Sun Yat-sen seemed to have steadfastly resisted the influence of British Israelites like Edwin Collins. However anxious he might have been to restore the confidence of his compatriots, he contrasted sharply with some Meiji (1868–1912) Japanese, whom Kakuzo Okakura (1862–1913) described as “approaching the West on their knees”.35 In terms of Sun Yat-sen’s Principle of the People’s Rights, Britain was a constitutional monarchy. But whatever laurels his British friends and former teachers might have heaped on the British monarchy, he persisted in his pursuit of a Chinese republic. In his reply to Professor Herbert Giles of Cambridge in 1896, he categorically stated that of all the leaders of the world, he admired the most, Tang and Wu, who respectively overthrew the last despotic monarchs of the ancient Chinese dynasties of Xia (c. 2070 BC–c. 1600 BC) and Shang (c. 1600 BC–c.1046 BC), and George Washington (1732–99) who adopted a republican constitution for the United States of America.36 In addition, some speculation about the estimated two hours and twenty minutes he spent during fourteen visits to Staircase 5 in the South Square of Gray’s Inn might be pertinent.37 The most likely person he would have seen was a 22-year-old journalist-turned-law student, Charles Hugh Horniman.38 The brief but frequent visits may suggest that Sun Yat-sen went to Horniman either to borrow and return books, or to seek quick advice on problems arising out of his reading. And it is plausible that Sun Yat-sen read, under Horniman’s guidance, The English Constitution, written in 1867 by Walter Bagehot. Witness what Sun Yat-sen said in a public speech in 1906: that he had studied the various constitutions of the world. Of the unwritten ones, the British was the best; but it could not be copied since it was shaped over a period of six to seven hundred years and most of it was customary.39 Again, in 1921, he referred to the British Constitution several times in his lecture entitled “Five Power Constitution”.40 He might even have read about the constitutional development in Britain since Magna Carta; witness his references to the abolition of the British monarchy by Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658) and its subsequent restoration.41 In his single-minded pursuit of a republic, he went to the extent of claiming that Britain was in fact a republic with a monarch.42

The Wider Picture The first generation of nationalists in the French colonies recognized their indebtedness to French thought, from the philosophers of the

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Enlightenment to the radicals of the twentieth-century French communism. When announcing Vietnam’s independence, Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) even quoted from the American Declaration of Independence as a means of expressing his goodwill and his indebtedness to western culture. However, post-independence Vietnam, but particularly Algeria, emphasize, instead, the profound influence of indigenous traditions on their revolutionary leaders. Similarly, the first generation of nationalists in India acknowledged their intellectual debt to British Culture. Both Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) and Pandit Nehru (1889–1964) were educated in Britain. True, Gandhi also enriched his ideas by drawing on ancient Hindu texts. From these texts he extracted a message of non-violence. However, Hindu nationalists today use the same texts to justify violent activism,43 masculinizing and militarizing the peaceful symbol of the Hindu God Ram.44 Their focus on Hindutva (Hindu-ness) is reminiscent of the extraordinary extent to which some Chinese ultra-nationalists have gone to emphasize Sun Yat-sen’s Han Chineseness.45 It is to be expected, therefore, that acknowledging the intellectual debts which the first generation of nationalists owed the colonial metropolis could incur a great deal of ire from today’s nationalists. The above discoveries about London having facilitated Sun Yat-sen’s synthesis of his Three Principles, for example, were condemned by Sun Yat-sen specialists from the Chinese mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong during the international conference organized by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to celebrate Sun Yat-sen’s 140th birthday and held at Zhongshan on 6–8 November 2006.46 Their condemnation substantiates the perception that not only political leaders but their citizens have a vested interest in promoting simple narratives which flatter their own group. They are hostile to histories which include a presentation of the other side of the story.47 This new trend does not augur well for historical research or the future of humankind. History, “by giving context and examples, helps when it comes to thinking about the present world. It aids in formulating questions, and without good questions, it is difficult to begin to think in a coherent way.”48 The history constructed by today’s nationalists is, at best, onesided. Consequently, the questions people may ask are equally one-sided. Under these circumstances, could their decisions avoid being one-sided and therefore ill-conceived?

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Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11

12

13 14

15

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Sun Yat-sen, “Sun Wen xueshuo, dibazhang” [Sun Yat-sen’s ideas, Chapter 8], written in 1918 and published in 1919, Guofu quanji [Collected Works of the Father of the Nation], vol. 1 (Taibei, 1989), p. 8. His original words referred to what he had seen and heard in Europe. Recent research shows that Europe read London. See John Y. Wong, The Origins of An Heroic Image: Sun Yat-sen in London, 1896–1897 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). The reports were appended to Luo Jialun, Lundun mengnan shiliao kaoding [Sources on the kidnapping of Sun Yat-sen in London] (Nanjing, 1935). Thanks to the help of Professor Ramon Myers, I eventually located this rare book at the East Asian Collection of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. I am grateful to Dr James Cantlie (the namesake of his grandfather) for his kind permission to do so. I wish to thank the late Professor Wu Deduo of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences for lending me his copy of Wu Zhonglian, Suiyao biji sizhong [Four kinds of notes made while accompanying the Minister on his foreign missions] (1902); and Mr Ford for lending me the book by Fengling, entitled Youyu jinzhi [Records of my travels] (1929) which he believed was one of only two copies in the West. I wish to thank Professor Junji Bano of Tokyo University for his help in this matter. These include those of Queen Victoria, the Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, the Superintendent of the Thames Valley Police Sir Melville L. MacNaghten, Dr James Cantlie, and Sir Halliday Macartney. Sun Yat-sen, “Minzu zhuyi, diyijiang” [On Nationalism, Lecture One], 27 January 1924, in Guofu quanji [Collected Works of the Father of the Nation], vol. 1 (Taibei, 1989), p. 3, lines 14–15. Sun Yat-sen, “Minquan zhuyi, di’erjiang” [On The People’s Rights, Lecture Two], 16 March 1924, in ibid., p. 68, lines 3–5. See John Y. Wong, Zhongshan xiansheng yu Yingguo [Sun Yat-sen and the British] (Taibei: Xuesheng shuju, 2005), Chapter 2. For an analysis of this episode, see John Y. Wong, Heroic Image, Chapter 6. Chinese Legation Archives, Slater to Chinese Minister, 3–21 January 1897, in Luo Jialun, Shiliao, p. 137. Magna Carta is an English charter, originally issued in 1215 and reissued later in the thirteenth century in modified versions, which included the most direct challenges to the monarch’s authority to date. The Times (London), 13 January 1897, p. 1, col. 5. Habeas corpus is a wirt, or legal action, through which a prisoner can be released from unlawful detention. FO 17/1718/pp. 22–32, Affidavits by Cantlie & Manson, 22 October 1896.

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24 16

17

18 19

20

21

22

23

24 25 26

27 28

29 30 31 32

33

34

35

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Sun Yat-sen’s public lecture at the University of Hong Kong, Daily Press (Hong Kong), 21 February 1923, cols. 1–3: at col. 3. Chinese Legation Archives, Slater to the Chinese Minister, 16 December 1896, in Luo Jialun, Shiliao, pp. 129–30. The Times, 7 December 1896, p. 4, col. 1. Chinese Legation Archives, Slater to Chinese Minister, 2–11 December 1896, in Luo Jialun, Shiliao, p. 130. Chinese Legation Archives, Slater to the Chinese Minister, 4–10 March 1897, in Luo Jialun, Shiliao, p. 147. H. M. Tomlinson, “Down in Dockland”, in Wonderful London: The World’s Greatest City described by Its Best Writers and Picture by Its Finest Photographers, vol. 1, edited by St. John Adcock (London: Fleetway House, n.d.), p. 151. Chinese Legation Archives, Minister Yang Ru in Washington to the Minister Gong Zhaoyuan in London, 25 September 1896, in Luo Jialun, Shiliao, pp. 16–17. W. Francis Aitken, “The Museums and Their Treasures”, in Wonderful London, p. 1105. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1104–5. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 1103. I am grateful to Mr M. Collier, Deputy Head of Library Services of the Polytechnic, for receiving me on 3 April 1984, and for drawing my attention to some relevant literature which is not commonly known. For a pertinent reference, see Ethel M. Wood, A History of the Polytechnic (London: MacDonald, 1965), p. 17. John Y. Wong, Heroic Image, pp. 222–25. They were “China’s Present and Future: The Reform Party’s Plea for British Benevolent Neutrality”, Fortnightly Review, vol. 61, no. 363 (1 March 1897): 424–40; and “Judicial Reform in China”, East Asia, vol. 1, no. 1 (1 July 1897): 3–13. British Library reference 14003.a.2, London, 1904. British Library reference 14003.a.10, London, around 1906. British Library reference 12631.m.11, London, 1900. As late as 1983, I could still find the contact details of a British Israel Society in the London phonebook, wrote to its secretary, and which received a very polite reply. Perhaps the best exponent of the views of British Israelites is the book by M. H. Gayer, himself an Israelite, entitled The Heritage of the Anglo-Saxon Race (Haverhill, MA: Destiny Publishers, 1941). Sun Yat-sen was baptized in 1884 while he was a student in Hong Kong. For details, see John Y. Wong’s forthcoming book on Sun Yat-sen’s early career. Okakura Kakuzo, The Book of Tea (Tokyo, 1906), p. 3.

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37 38 39

40

41

42 43

44

45

46

47

48

25

Sun Yat-sen to Herbert Giles, n.d. [I have speculated that the date was probably 14 November 1896]. See John Y. Wong, Sun Yixian zai Lundun — Sanmin zhuyi sixiang Lundun tanyuan [Exploring the London origins of Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People] (Taibei: Lian Jing, 2007), p. 111. See Table 4 in John Y. Wong, Heroic Image, p. 258. John Y. Wong, Heroic Image, pp. 257–61. Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Dongjing Minbao chuangkan yizhounian qingzhu dahui shang de yanshuo” [A speech made at the anniversary celebration of the founding of the Minbao newspaper in Tokyo], 1906, in Collected Works of Sun Yat-sen, vol. 1 (1982): 329–30. Sun Yat-sen, “Wuquan xianfa” [Five power constitution], 20 March 1921, in Guofu quanji [Collected Works of the Father of the Nation], vol. 3 (Taibei, 1989), pp. 233–42: at p. 237, lines 16–17, 19–20; p. 238, lines 3–4. Sun Yat-sen, “Minquan zhuyi diyi jiang” (On the Principle of the People’s Rights, Lecture One), 9 March 1924, in Guofu quanji [Collected Works of the Father of the Nation], vol. 1 (Taibei, 1989), pp. 5–67: at p. 61, lines 14–19. Ibid., p. 64, line 13. Romila Thapar, Interpreting Early India (India: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 61. See also Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Deepa M. Ollapally, The Politics of Extremism in South Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2008). Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 278. See John Y. Wong, “Sun Yixian zuji wenti tansuo” [Exploring Sun Yat-sen’s ancestry], in Jiuzhou xuelin [Chinese Culture Quarterly], no. 23, published conjointly by the City University of Hong Kong and Fudan University of Shanghai (Spring 2009): 101–91. A tape recording of the conference proceedings is deposited at the Guangdong Provincial Archives in Guangzhou. Lili Cole and Judy Barsalou, United or Divide? The Challenges of Teaching History in Societies Emerging From Violent Conflict, Special Report 163 (Washington, D.C.: United Institute of Peace, 2006), p. 10. Margaret MacMillan, “History: Handle with Care”, Oxford Today, Hilary Issue 2010, pp. 16–18: at p. 17. The article is an essay taken from her new book The Uses and Abuses of History (Canada: Penguin Books, 2008).

References Aitken, W. Francis. “The Museums and Their Treasures”. In Wonderful London: The World’s Greatest City described by Its Best Writers and Picture by Its Finest Photographers, 3 volumes, edited by St. John Adcock. London: Fleetway House, n.d.

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“China’s Present and Future: The Reform Party’s Plea for British Benevolent Neurality”. Fortnightly Review, vol. 61, no. 363 (1 March 1987): 424–40. Cole, Lili and Judy Barsalou. “United or Divide? The Challenges of Teaching History in Societies Emerging From Violent Conflict”. Special Report 163. Washington, D.C.: United Institute of Peace, 2006. Daily Press (Hong Kong), 21 February 1923. Gayer, M. H. The Heritage of the Anglo-Saxon Race. Haverhill, MA: Destiny Publishers, 1941. Jaffrelot, Christophe. The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. “Judicial Reform in China”. East Asia, vol. 1, no. 1 (1 July 1897): 3–13. Kakuzo, Okakura. The Book of Tea. Tokyo, 1906. Luo Jialun. Lundun mengnan shiliao kaoding [Sources on the kidnapping of Sun Yat-sen in London]. East Asian Collection of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Nanjing, 1935. MacMillan, Margaret. “History: Handle with Care”. Oxford Today, Hilary Issue 2010, pp. 16–18. Ollapally, Deepa M. The Politics of Extremism in South Asia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Sun Yat-sen. “China’s Present and Future: The Reform Party’s Plea for British Benevolent Neutrality”. Fortnightly Review (New series), vol. 61, no. 363 (1 March 1897): 424–40. ———. “Zai Dongjing Minbao chuangkan yizhounian qingzhu dahui shang de yanshuo”. A speech made at the anniversary celebration of the founding of the Minbao newspaper in Tokyo], 1906. In Collected Works of Sun Yat-sen, vol. 1 (1982): 329–30. ———. “Minquan zhuyi, di’erjiang” [On The People’s Rights, Lecture Two], 16 March 1924. In Guofu quanji [Collected Works of the Father of the Nation]. Taibei, 1989. ———. “Minquan zhuyi diyi jiang”. On the Principle of the People’s Rights, Lecture One), 9 March 1924. In Guofu quanji [Collected Works of the Father of the Nation]. Taibei, 1989. ———. “Minzu zhuyi, diyijiang” [On Nationalism, Lecture One), 27 January 1924. In Guofu quanji [Collected works of the Father of the Nation]. Taibei, 1989. ———. “Sun Wen xueshuo, dibazhang” [Sun Yat-sen’s ideas, Chapter 8]. Written in 1918 and published in 1919, Guofu quanji [Collected Works of the Father of the Nation]. Taibei, 1989. ———. “Wuquan xianfa” [Five power constitution], 20 March 1921. In Guofu quanji [Collected Works of the Father of the Nation]. Taibei, 1989. Thapar, Romila. Interpreting Early India. India: Oxford University Press, 1992. The Times (London), 7 December 1896 and 13 January 1897.

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Tomlinson, H. M. “Down in Dockland”. In Wonderful London: The World’s Greatest City described by Its Best Writers and Picture by Its Finest Photographers, 3 volumes, edited by St. John Adcock. London: Fleetway House, n.d. Wong, John Y. The Origins of An Heroic Image: Sun Yat-sen in London, 1896–1897. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. ———. Zhongshan xiansheng yu Yingguo [Sun Yat-sen and the British]. Taibei: Xuesheng shuju, 2005. ———. Sun Yixian zai Lundun: Sanmin zhuyi sixiang Lundun tanyuan [Exploring the London origins of Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People]. Taibei: Lian Jing, 2007. ———. “Sun Yixian zuji wenti tansuo” [Exploring Sun Yat-sen’s ancestry]. In Jiuzhou xuelin [Chinese Culture Quarterly], no. 23 (Spring 2009): 101– 91. Wood, Ethel M. A History of the Polytechnic. London: MacDonald, 1965. Wu Zhonglian. Suiyao biji sizhong [Four kinds of notes made while accompanying the Minister on his foreign missions]. 1902.

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2 ON SUN YAT-SEN’S THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE: A PHILOSOPHY APPROACH Tony See Sin Heng

Introduction Although much scholarship has been devoted to the study of Sun Yatsen’s “three principles of the people” or “sanmin zhuyi” (三民主义) from a more or less historical perspective, relatively little has been devoted to an investigation of these principles from a philosophical perspective. The historical approach to the study of Sun’s “three principles” is, of course, significant and indispensible because they add dimension to our understanding of his political activities in China, but they are inadequate in terms of examining the theoretical consistencies and inconsistencies of Sun’s political thought, and they also do not clarify the nature of his thought in the context of the history of political ideas in China. In terms of the historical research on Sun’s political ideas, Huang Jianli’s chapter (Chapter 5 of this book) provides a clear and succinct context of the state of scholarship so far. Based on established research in the field, especially on the paradigm suggested by Winston Hsieh, Huang highlights that Chinese writings on Sun may be divided into two categories — that which belongs to the Kuomintang (KMT, 国民党) orthodoxy, and that which belongs to 28

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the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, 中国共产党) neo-orthodoxy, and if we add a third western-language writings that are published largely in the Euro-American world, we thus have a tripartite division in Sun Yat-sen scholarship.1 The first two categories are well regarded as orthodoxies with regards to Sun Yat-sen scholarship while the third category, arising mainly in the 1960s and which is also inclusive of Overseas Chinese research, offer new perspectives and interpretations which provides a diverse and more pluralistic approach to Sun’s work.2 The historical controversies and debates which came about from these obviously stem from a difference in approach and a lack of shared assumptions with regards to Sun. On the one hand, we have KMT-sympathetic scholars who tend to emphasize Sun’s importance and role in liberating China, and who are also highly critical of the CCP’s involvement and interpretation of events. On the other hand, we have scholars who are sympathetic to the CCP and who, whilst recognizing the significance of Sun’s revolutionary activities, nevertheless downplays his historical importance because his revolution was only seen as a necessary stage to the ones led by the Communist themselves. Although there are many points of agreement and disagreement between these two camps, they are at least united in terms of their regard for historical analysis. In addition to these two mainstream interpretations, Huang pointed out that there was also a third group of scholars, mainly western-trained and appearing mainly in the 1960s, who were more independent in their research and who did not need to tow any party line.3 Although these studies were also philosophically loaded and less than objective, they offer more pluralistic and offer diverse perspectives when it comes to Sun. To these three groups, we may actually add a fourth group of scholarly works. The opening up of exchanges, the increase in academic exchanges and research throughout the world, and especially in Taiwan and China, blurred the distinctions between the works. 4 Again, there are many points of difference and similarities between these works, but they tend to share certain commonalities, that is, they tend to approach Sun’s political ideas from a more-or-less historical perspective, they tend not to treat his three principles from a philosophical perspective and they tend to be more critical and much less reverent of Sun. An instance of this is the French scholar Marie-Claire Bèrgere who produced an internationally recognized work on Sun in which she argued that Sun does not have a “serious” political philosophy. This is mainly because his ideas were developed in the midst of his political struggles in China and they contained many contradictions and inconsistencies. She states that

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“Depending on one’s mood, one might either pronounce the work to be eclectic — or a hybrid hodgepodge. Chinese cultural pride is mixed with Leninist anti-imperialism, Montesquieu’s Laws rub shoulders with Lincoln’s precepts, and socialism in the manner of Henry George goes hand in hand with Marxism and traditional Chinese utopian thinking.”5 In addition to that, Sun’s ideology also supposedly led to “a syncretism that sometimes degenerates into incoherence” and what saves the text and lifts beyond contradictions is only its “optimism”.6 Another study which deserves special mention is John Y. Wong’s study of Sun’s Three Principles of the People in the context of his trip to London in his Sun Yat-Sen in London: 1896-1897.7 This study provides an excellent account of the genesis of Sun’s three principles of the people, an exhaustive study of the principles from a historical as well as political science perspectives, and it even provides a detailed list of books that Sun borrowed in the British library during his stay in London! This work no doubt serves as an indispensible study for works that purports to examine Sun’s three principles of the people. This chapter does not question the importance of taking a historical approach to Sun’s ideas, nor does it intend to challenge existing scholarship on the importance of Sun, but it does intend to offer a fresh approach from which to analyse Sun’s political ideas, namely, from the standpoint of political philosophy. The basic question underlying this chapter would be: where do Sun’s political ideas, more specifically, his principle of nationalism, stand in relation to political philosophy? Are these ideas conceptually consistent? What are the implications of these ideas? Are they relevant to contemporary times? Furthermore, what lessons can we draw from the ideas which may be relevant for an understanding of nationalism in Southeast Asia? These and other questions are the subject of our discussion. This chapter claims to be nothing more than a preliminary investigation into Sun Yat-sen’s political thought.

The Maoist “Challenge” to Sun Yat-sen There are innumerable studies, and critique, on Sun Yat-sen’s political thought from a Marxist-Maoist perspective. Here, we will only turn to an instance. When we do turn to Mao indeed, we find that Mao would regard only three contemporaries to have any ideas on how to rule China as a whole (chih-t’ien-hsia, 治天下). These potential candidates are, namely, Yuan Shikai, Sun Yat-sen and K’ang Yu-wei. And out of these three thinkers, Mao

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would only regard K’ang to have basic principles (ben-yuan, 本原) and even then, he did not truly recognize K’ang’s theoretical contribution to political thought but regarded his ideas as mainly rhetoric.8 We can, of course, take Mao’s judgment of K’ang with a pinch of salt because Mao was, after all, looking at things from a politically-charged Marxist perspective. What deserves our attention here is Mao’s implicit assessment of Sun — that the man is lesser than K’ang and since K’ang is largely a man of rhetoric speaks volumes about Mao’s analysis of Sun. This situation does not seem to be improved in the light of scholars’ attempt to establish Sun as an important political figure in modern Chinese history. Since Sun has been universally recognized, by scholars from both the KMT and CCP, as one of the first modern Chinese politicians, this analysis should not be a surprise. But the nagging question remains, was Sun indeed nothing more than a rhetorician? Was he no more than a politician? Or were there some principles in his thought which deserves our reflection, albeit, a different principle from the dominant discourse of the day? What were these principles? What is the extent to which they are consistent with one another? Is there any relevance to Sun’s thought in modern times? These are some of the questions that we would like to explore in this chapter.

Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People Sun Yat-sen’s political thought is best represented by the three principles of the people or “sanmin zhuyi” (三民主义). These three principles are, namely, “nationalism”, “democracy” and “the people’s livelihood”.9 If these three principles sounded like political slogans, it is only because Sun formulated them against the background of the American and French revolution, although he has also claimed that he has formulated these to suit the political situation in China. Although much has been written about the nature, genesis and issues arising from these three principles, a brief account of the principles here may be helpful. Firstly, the principle of nationalism “minzhu zhuyi” (民族主义) basically says that there must be nationalism before China can become strong and independent again. It is important to note that Sun does not merely use the term “nationalism” in its generalized sense but in the sense of a “state” that is derived from an ethnically homogeneous group of people. This is the main subject of this chapter and will be discussed at length later. The principle of democracy “minquan zhuyi” (民权主义) basically says that political right lies with the people. This principle, in the context of

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Sun’s times, is an obvious opposition to the monarchical constitutionalism of the time. An issue which arises from this principle is that although Sun did conceive of the rights as residing with the people, he also thought of the need to curb their freedom in the interest of the state and the question therefore is, who would be responsible for doing this and why would the people want to support a regime that curbs their freedom? This is also an important point which will be discussed later. The principle of people’s livelihood “minsheng zhuyi” (民生主义) suggests that Sun’s revolutionary efforts were aimed at the continued life and existence of China. There is evidence that Sun equated this with the principle of socialism, although he did not go to the extent of equating this with orthodox Marxist thought. The “socialism” that he has referred to in fact indicates a general concern for the life and economic well-being of the people. This will be the subject for the following chapter. These three principles were formulated by Sun with the intention of “saving” China. This is why Sun declared in no uncertain terms that the three principles of the people can also be called the nation’s “saving principles” or “jiuguo zhuyi” (救国主义). With regards to this, Sun believed that the principle of nationalism holds a preeminent position; this is because he believed that it was the loss of this principle in the social and political life of the Chinese people which led to their downfall. An issue which may arise is that this principle actually carries strong racial overtones. As Huang Jianli has indicated in his chapter, “Sun’s nationalism was underwritten by antiManchu sentiments which appealed to Han ethnocentrism and anti-Manchu political domination.”10 Historically, Sun recognized this difficulty in his thought and quickly switched his rhetoric as soon as the Manchu Qing regime had fallen. Instead of maintaining his anti-Manchu stance, he switched his rhetoric in favour of “a republic of five races” (五族共和), which included, naturally, the Manchus.11 From a political standpoint, this is of course a smart move, but from a philosophical standpoint, the status of his political ideas become suspect: are we to take them as attempts to derive a consistent set of principles, a political philosophy, which may be applied to China? Or are they better relegated to the status of political rhetoric? Are they intended to sway opinions and achieve political objectives having no substance in reality? In other words, was Mao’s assessment of Sun, indicated at the beginning of this chapter, essentially a correct one? Sun elaborated on these principles in a number of texts and over a period of twenty years. One of the most important texts exploring the

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three principles of the people is the one bearing the same title The Three Principles of the People. In addition to this text there are also other texts which clarify his political ideas. These are namely The Fundamentals of National Reconstruction ( jianguo fanglue 建国方略), The Bases of National Reconstruction (jianguo dagang 建国大纲) and the Congress Manifesto of 1924.12 Sun’s three principles also underwent revision over a period of twenty years. They were first formulated in 1905, crystallized about a decade later, and the actual text was published in 1924.13 At the earliest stage, Sun did not even use the term “The Three Principles of the People” but instead used the phrase “the three great principles” or “sanda zhuyi” (三大主义) to refer to his political philosophy.14 Again, that the principles underwent revision and development throughout this period did not necessarily imply that he changed his mind. Some scholars, ever fond of controversies, have tended to equate adjustments with fundamental changes. In the case of Sun’s three principles, although there were adjustments, there was no change in the fundamental spirit and purpose of his political reflections and they were all fundamentally aimed at “saving” China from feudal rule. How did Sun conceive of the saving role of these three principles, and how did these play out in historical context? What are some of the issues that arise from the pursuit of these principles? These will be discussed at length in the following sections. A substantive historical account of the principles has been discussed at length by many scholars. Huang Jianli, for instance, has already presented a concise but nevertheless insightful historical introduction to these three principles in history, and as such, we will not go into that here.15 What concerns us in this chapter is rather the theoretical or conceptual consistency of the three principles, which is the subject matter of the next section.

On Sun Yat-sen’s Principle of Nationalism It is now time to turn to Sun’s principle of nationalism or minzhu zhuyi (民族主义). According to Sun himself, this principle is fundamental to his political thought. It is fundamental to the extent that the troubles that besiege China, as innumerable as they may be, stem from the loss of this principle in the life of the Chinese people. This in turn led their being pushed, little by little, to the edge of destruction in modern times. Therefore, Sun argues that if this principle cannot be revived in modern times, the Chinese nation would come to an end. If the principle holds such an eminent position in his political thought, it is important we examine this principle in detail.

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Sun himself holds that his idea of nationalism is derived from the two words “nation” (民族) and “state” (国家). The first of these “nation” is in turn derived from the word natio which has the meaning of “natal” or “birth”.16 In the context of western political theory, the word “nation” would thus suggest of the coming to be of a people who was born in a similar territory, sharing similar cultural and religious background. This differs from the word “state” which would refer to the bureaucratic and political machinery that arises with the modern state system. This conceptual distinction between “nation” and “state”, obviously follows the discourse on “nation-state” in western political theory. This distinction is important because it explains how there could be many different “nations” residing within one state, as well as how one “nation” could exist in many different states. Sun’s understanding of nationalism was clearly influenced by western political theory. Some scholars have even suggested that Sun may have been influenced by the English idea of nation-state during his stay in the United Kingdom.17 Although there may be considerable differences between the English, Scotts and Welsh, for instance, in the sense that they are distinguished by different cultural, social and historical practices, they came to be unified in a new political entity called the “United Kingdom”. Sun’s conception of “nation-state” appears to be influenced precisely by this conception of ethnic groupings and political entity, that is the state, in his account of the Chinese nation-state. Sun firmly believes that nationalism is the fundamental principle for the survival of China. He believes that China, despite its glorious past, went into decline and even came to the edge of extinction due to the loss of this principle. In fact, Sun believes that this principle has been lost for hundreds of years, ever since the first “foreign” powers invaded and colonized China. Sun argues that since this principle is necessary for political efficacy, this principle must be revived in China before she can attain equality with the other nations at the international level. Sun’s emphasis on nationalism can be explained by his analysis of the problems facing China. In his analysis, the Chinese were subjugated because of a lack of national unity. In fact, in his analysis of the three principles, Sun has used the image of “a sheet of loose sand” (yipan shansha, 一盘散沙) to describe the lack of national consciousness among the Chinese. He believed that in contrast to other smaller nation-states, the Chinese nation was unable to stand as one because each community sought to further their own interests to the detriment of the nation. This in turn made China more vulnerable to foreign invasions and conquests. Hence, Sun proposed that in order to save

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China, the only possible antidote was the spread of an unshakable sense of self-worth and nationalist pride. In other words, they must forego their own self-interest and the interest of their own community and come to support the new imagery — “the Chinese nation”. How is China to attain national unity? Two main strategies can be deduced from his writings. Firstly, he proposes that China must avoid becoming pluralistic and become more solid and unyielding as “a rock”. How is China to become one since it has so many different ethnic groups? Sun was not unaware of this situation. His proposal was to reduce these fifty-six different ethnic groups in China into five major groups, and then further reducing these five into one. To begin with, he argues that from among the fifty-six ethnic groups in China, we can reduce them into five main groups, namely, the Hans, Manchus, Mongolians, Huis and Tibetans. These five major groups were chosen presumably because of their sheer number in China. These five ethnic groups, according to Sun, can be further reduced into “one” group. Sun states that in terms of the people of China, there are a few million Mongolians, a few million Manchus, a few million Tibetans, a million or so Huis, and a few million foreigners in China. Therefore in terms of the majority, all of these Chinese can be considered to be Han Chinese. In fact, Sun would even go so far as to argue that “nation” and “state” are co-extensive in the case of China, making it a unique nation in the world. This is because, according to Sun, since the Qing-Han period, the Chinese nation-state has been composed of “one” racial group. Sun’s emphasis on national unity and on the importance of racial and ethnic solidarity also meant that he rejects cosmopolitanism (shijie zhuyi, 世 界主义). He believes that introducing cosmopolitanism into China would be detrimental to China’s development. To be sure, Sun does not reject cosmopolitanism per se, but argues that without a strong sense of ethnic identity, the introduction of cosmopolitanism would only cause problems for China. He argues that although it may be appropriate for smaller nationstates, states which have already reached a certain level of development, through imperialistic ventures, it is inappropriate for China because it was still lacking in identity. China was, from the beginning, plagued by the problem of having multiple ethnic groups and communities, each serving their own communal interests and this has resulted in their inability to conceive of themselves as a “nation”. As a result, they have been subject to foreign invasion and colonial takeovers. In fact, Sun would even say that the promotion of cosmopolitan ideals in a place like China is a ploy by imperialistic forces to weaken the solidarity of China. Hence, what China needs to do is to first

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achieve a sense of national identity before it can seek to be a cosmopolitan political order. Secondly, in addition to his proposal that China must become more nationalistic, he also argues that there should be more limitations on the freedom for the Chinese people. This is because he does not see that the people in China lack in freedom. Instead, they have an excess of freedom, to the extent that they do not even notice the freedom that they have. The excessive freedom is compared to the air they breathe and Sun believes this has inhibited them from accomplishing anything on a unified basis. This was due to important developmental differences between the Chinese state and other states in the western world. According to Sun, there was a tendency for European monarchs, through the use of religions and disciplinary measures, to control their subjects’ entire lives.18 There was a shortage of freedom hence a fight to achieve emancipation. In contrast to this, the Chinese state’s interference in the daily lives of the people in society was in reality much more limited. Although there was more control in theory, under the appearance of having only one political entity, there was in fact less control in reality. The Chinese people were more pluralistic, more communal and less political. According to Sun, the Chinese were subjected to hardly any other constraints unlike their European counterparts. Apart from paying taxes, they pursued their interests, businesses and religious practices as they saw fit. Thus, despite all appearances, there was so much freedom that they do not notice it as much as the air they breathed. In addition to this, he also argues that this large measure of freedom led to a situation in which the Chinese were much more individualistic than their western counterparts and the Chinese did as they saw fit without bothering about the larger community. As stated by Sun, “we have had so much liberty without any unity and resisting power, because we have become a sheet of loose sand.”19 This aggregate of individuals with no real sense of community made China easy prey for foreign imperialism. And when the nation is subjugated by foreign powers, how can individual freedom exist? It made it “a slave of all”. The pursuit of individual freedom and interests that marked Chinese lives was what made them into slaves in the end. If the above representation of Sun’s political thought is correct, then it would strongly suggest that Sun, far from being inconsistent, was consistently pushing for a republican mode of political order. This is clear from his analysis of freedom and liberty in his writings. His analysis of democracy was as much about “people’s rights” and the liberal conception of politics as it was about equality and election. Furthermore, it is clear from his writings that

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“democracy” is understood in terms of “rights of the people” (minquan, 民权) instead of merely “government by the people” (minzhu, 民主). Again, when it comes to the question of liberty, Sun did not seem to be interested in the rights of each of individual but the rights of the state itself. Thus, contrary to what is generally thought, Sun was not advocating the freedom and rights of each individual but the rights and freedom of the state. The advantage of this position is that it would remove the apparent contradiction in his thought. Sun’s prescription is clear. There must be national unity first before individual liberty. This implies that individual liberties exist on the precondition of national liberty. This means that if necessary, individuals have to be sacrificed in the interest of national unity. He states that “we must break down individual liberty and become pressed together into an unyielding body like a firm rock which is formed by the addition of cement to sand.”20 Sun believed that the state must be free above all else, before the individuals can be free. Some scholars argue that this explains Sun’s critique of western-educated Chinese students who kept on pushing for more liberty in the like of European and American state. To be sure, Sun was not criticizing the West per se, but those who were espousing the liberal conception of politics. According to Sun, these students did not understand the basic condition of the Chinese people — which was that there was an excess and not shortage of freedom and thus, their push for more freedom and equality was nothing short of ideological stance. Their prescription is at best a prescription of ignorance, and at worst, a recipe for disaster. Greater freedom to the Chinese people would only bring about lesser concern for the community and the nation as a whole, and in turn bring about greater degree of slavery. This explains why Sun condemns the May Fourth Movement and the overly westernized, or rather, liberal approaches to political change in China. According to Sun, Europe followed its own path of political change; likewise China must follow its own path of transformation, which is none other than a republican mode of political order.

A Critique of Sun’s Principle of Nationalism In the previous section, we have briefly examined Sun’s political philosophy. He held nationalism to be vital to the survival of China and argued that this principle must be revived before China can survive. In relation to this fundamental axiom, he proposed a number of measures two of which is

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examined in this chapter. Firstly, he proposed that China can become “one” by reducing the different groups into one. Secondly, China can become “free” by limiting the freedom of the Chinese people. These two proposals come from his unique understanding of the history of China. Hence, logically what needs to be done is to restore the sense of nationhood among the Chinese and to limit their freedom, so that the Chinese nation can become independent and free again. Although this may sound desirable initially, the implications of these aims remain ambiguous, because what is proposed is that China become “one” and become “less free”. What are some philosophical questions which may arise from Sun’s political thought? Here we offer a number of theoretical questions which arise from his political theory. Firstly, is it possible for Sun’s proposal to unite the different groups into one to avoid the charge of racism? The proposal to reduce the fifty-six different ethnic groups into five in the first stage, and in the second stage to reduce these five into one strongly suggests that Sun overlooked important political, economic and cultural-religious differences that exist between the different groups. How is it possible for all of these groups to be united without doing violence to them in the first place? While this may sound unproblematic to a Han Chinese, one could easily imagine that it sounds dangerous to a non-Han Chinese. How is it possible to convince one to give up one’s ethnic identity and way of life in the interest of an abstract, albeit larger, entity called the “state”? Of what value is a successful state if one’s cultural identity, history and memory were erased? One way out of this impasse would be to suggest that Sun was not really thinking of reducing all of the people in China into one ethnically if homogeneous group, he was merely constructing a political rhetoric, one with political efficacy, to carve out a segment of the Chinese populace against Manchu rule. If we accept this proposition, then it would suggest that Sun was merely engaged in rhetoric rather than serious philosophizing about the nature of the Chinese state that he intends to build. Sun’s principle of nationalism could be seen in the context of his struggle against the Manchu regime. Some scholars have argued that Sun’s three principles of the people, especially the principle of nationalism, was targeted at the Manchu feudal government. The call for all in China to be “Chinese” can be seen as a political rhetoric, one that carves out an imaginary group against the dominant Manchu regime. This interpretation is not implausible because Sun was very much engaged in political activities to overthrow the existing regime, perhaps more so than being a philosopher who was interested in theoretical consistency. Yet another interpretation, and there

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is also historical evidence for this, is that Sun was targeting the Japanese when he was formulating the “nationalism” part of his Three Principles. This interpretation is also important because it helps us to see Sun’s political ideas in historical context. And yet, if this were his real intentions, then it remains to be seen if his political thought continues to be relevant today, because neither the Manchu nor the Japanese Imperial forces are now in power. Thus, seeing his thought in historical context brings up the problem of relevance for modern-day life. Secondly, even if we were to assume that all these different ethnic groups were willing to abandon their cultural identities, histories, languages, etc., the question remains as to how this can be done in practice? Cultural identity and historical memories are not something that can be abandoned and taken up at will. Also, it takes a period of time for new cultural identities to be ingrained. In this regard, it would appear that Sun would have no choice but to consider political indoctrination if he were serious about this principle. Thirdly, the problem with Sun’s idea is that, retrospectively, it has a totalitarian air to it. Assuming that it were possible, both theoretically and practically to unite these diverse entities into one, the question remains as to whether such a unity is desirable. In the interest of oneness there was no necessity for Sun to reduce the different ethnic groups into one, so long as the political entity is unified. In order to consider all the people in China as “Chinese” it is not necessary to reduce them to “Han Chinese”. In his haste to unite the Chinese people, perhaps Sun did not manage to consider other options. For example, each ethnic group can remain distinct while recognizing the sovereignty of the state. In this way, each can retain their own preferred way of life, culture, and religion, so long as they do not interfere with other ways of life. In this way, there can be many distinct ethnic groups without being reduced into one. In this way, there can be a strong Chinese state that does not destroy or eliminate the unique difference of each ethnic group. It is now proper to formulate our discussion so far. Sun saw that one of the chief reasons for the downfall of China can be found in its lack of nationalist pride and its lack of freedom. This, as he has mentioned, comes about because of foreign conquests. As a result, he has proposed that there should be national pride and unity, but the problem with this is Sun’s ideal of unity can only come about at the expense of ethnic and cultural identities in practice. Secondly, in his discussion on democracy and liberty, he has also argued that China’s independence must be sought, but at the

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expense of freedom for the people. This is because the problem with China, according to Sun, is not a lack of freedom, but having too much freedom. These reflections suggest that Sun was not muddled-headed when it comes to political theory but that there is an inner consistency to his thoughts. One would not be too far off in saying that Sun was proposing a form of republicanism that was adjusted with rhetoric to suit local Chinese conditions. His political affiliations aside, the question remains: why would anyone give up one’s identities in the interest of the state, and why would anyone limit one’s freedom in the interest of the state? The first proposition would, presumably, be more acceptable to Han Chinese because their norms and ways of life would be legitimized, but is hard to see how someone from another community would see and even throw in their support for this proposition. Again, his proposition to limit the freedom of the Chinese in order to bring about the freedom of the nation-state, while theoretically sound, throws up the question of why someone would want to limit their own freedom in the interest of the freedom of the nation-state. In the words of Anderson, why would someone give up their real freedom in the interest of an “imagined community?”21 Thus, it would appear that Sun’s political thought, though fully republican in some sense, and though adjusted to Chinese conditions, fail to address the question of practice.

Conclusion In this chapter we have examined Sun Yat-sen’s political philosophy as exemplified in his three principles of the people. More specifically, we have examined his principle of nationalism. We have noted that unlike what some scholars have argued, Sun was not confused in his political thinking but was responding to the political realities of his times, with some of the long-established republican ideas. In addition to this, he also demonstrated a subtle understanding of the difference between “nation” and “state” and between “democracy” and “liberty” in his analysis. What this chapter hope to achieve is to point out that the real issue may not be in his understanding of political philosophy, but in his proposal for political transformation. His analysis of China’s problem, that it is in a state of crisis because of a lack of nationalist pride and solidarity among its people and an excess of freedom on the part of the Chinese people, logically led to two proposals — on the one hand, he argues that China must become more unified and solid “as a rock” and on the other hand, it must also place more limits on the freedom of the people. These two proposals are not so much inconsistent as they

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are impossible. The reduction of the many ethnic groups into one does not seem to be nearly likely in practice, and placing limits on the freedom of the Chinese people does not seem to be desirable in the context of totalitarian control and political abuses in the twentieth century. Finally, based on our discussion so far, it would appear that a quick and easy way of approaching Sun’s political thinking would be by assuming that he was indeed a political opportunist, developing a political ideology in order to sway opinions for the purpose of gaining support to overthrow the Manchu regime. This does not lie within the realm of impossibility, Sun was a shrewd politician, period. But it would imply that Mao’s analysis of Sun was correct after all, and that we would have to lower our expectations whenever we approach Sun’s thought for nuggets of political wisdom as he could be nothing more than a political optimist and opportunist putting forward a Republican programme for political change. This non-romantic and realistic view of Sun is a far cry from many scholarly works that, for various purposes, would eulogize the figure of Sun. But it would at least explain why so many scholars shy away from adopting a philosophical and critical approach in studying Sun. On the other hand, although taking up such an interpretation may resolve many meta-research questions regarding Sun’s political thought, there remains a nagging feeling among scholars that Sun Yat-sen may have something more to say to us, that he was more than a mere political rhetorician. This item of faith is perhaps what draws so many scholars to the study of Sun Yat-sen, despite all of his inconsistencies and imperfections, he was after all, the father of modern China.

Notes 1

2 3 4 5

6 7

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Huang Jianli, “Writings on Sun Yat-sen, Tongmenghui and the 1911 Revolution: Surveying the Field and Locating Southeast Asia”, Tongmenghui, Sun Yat Sen and the Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Revisit, edited by Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Chinese Heritage Centre, 2006), pp. 61–107. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Bèrgere, Marie-Claire, Sun Yat-sen, translated by Lloyd Janet (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 354. Bèrgere, Ibid., p. 354. See John Y. Wong, Sun Yatsen zai Lundun, 1896–1897: Sanmin zhuyi sixiang tanyuan 孙忠山在伦敦, 1896–97: 三民主义思想探源 [London and the Chinese Revolution: Exploring the London Origins of Sun Yatsen’s Three Principles, 1896–1897] (Taibei: Lian Jing, 2007).

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9 10 11 12

13

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15 16

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Stuart Schram, “Mao Tse-tung’s Thought to 1949”, in An Intellectual History of Modern China, edited by Merle Goldman and Leo Ou-Fan Lee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 272. Bèrgere, Ibid. Huang, Ibid., p. 70. Huang, Ibid., p. 71. Sun Yat-sen, Jianguo fanglue 建国方略 [The Fundamentals of National Reconstruction] (Guangzhou, China: Guangdong renmin chuban she, 2007). See “San min zhu yi” 三民主义, in Sun Zhongshan quanji 孙中山全集 [Completed Works of Sun Yat-sen], vol. 5, 1890–1911 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1985), pp. 185–97. See Leo Suryadinata, “Tongmenghui, Sun Yat-sen and the Impact on Indonesia: A Revisit”, in Tongmenghui, Sun Yat Sen and the Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Revisit, edited by Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Chinese Heritage Centre, 2006), pp. 171–72. Leo Suryadinata has reported that this can be found in Minbao fakan ci 民报 发刊词, Sun Zhongshan quanji, vol. 1 (1890–1911), pp. 288–89. Huang, pp. 61–107. See Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism (Voulder, Colorado: West View Press, 1977). See John Y. Wong, Sun Yatsen zai Lundun, p. 346. Bèrgere, p. 371. Bèrgere, p. 372. Bèrgere, p. 372. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).

References Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. Bèrgere, Marie-Claire. Sun Yat-sen, translated by Lloyd Janet. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1994. Goldman, Merle and Ou-Fan Lee, Leo, eds. An Intellectual History of Modern China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Gordon, David. Sun Yatsen: Seeking a Newer China. Pearson, 2010. Hobsbawn, Eric. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Hsieh, Winston. Chinese Historiography on the Revolution of 1911: A Critical Survey and a Selected Bibliography. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975. Huang Jianli. “Writings on Sun Yat-sen, Tongmenghui and the 1911 Revolution: Surveying the Field and Locating Southeast Asia”. In Tongmenhui, Sun Yat-sen

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and the Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Revisit, edited by Leo Suryadinata. Singapore: Chinese Heritage Centre, 2006. Lary, Diana. China’s Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Lin Jiayou. Sun Zhongshan: Yu xin hai geming shi yanjiu de xing shenshi 孙中山: 与辛 亥革命史研究的新审视. Guangzhou: Guangdong Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2007. Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony. The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min Chu I. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1937. Schopflin, George. Nations, Identity, Power. London: Hurst, 1999. Seton-Watson, Hugh. Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism. Volder, Colorado: West View Press, 1977. Sun Yat-sen. Sun Zhongshan quanji 孙中山全集 [Completed Works of Sun Yat-sen]. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1985. ———. Jianguo fanglue 建国方略 [The Fundamentals of National Reconstruction]. Guangzhou, China: Guangdong renmin chuban she, 2007. ———. Zichuan Ji xushu geming jingli 自传及叙述革命经历. Guangzhou: Guangdong renming chubanshe, 2007. Suryadinata, Leo, ed. Tongmenghui, Sun Yat Sen and the Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Revisit. Singapore: Chinese Heritage Centre, 2006. Wilbur, Martin. Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. William, Maurice. Sun Yat-sen versus Communism: New Evidence Establishing China’s Right to the Support of Democratic Nations. Baltimore, Williams and Wilkins, 1932. Wong, John Y. Sun Yatsen zai Lundun, 1896–1897: Sanmin zhuyi sixiang tanyuan 孙忠山在伦敦, 1896–1897: 三民主义思想探源 [London and the Chinese Revolution: Exploring the London Origins of Sun Yatsen’s Three Principles, 1896–1897]: Taibei: Lian Jing, 2007. Woodhouse, Eiko. The Chinese Hsinhai Revolution: G.E. Morrison and Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1870–1920. London and New York: Routledge, 2004.

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3 SUN YAT-SEN’S IDEA OF REGIONALISM AND HIS LEGACY Baogang He Ideas of regionalism play constructive roles in guiding directions, providing visions, and setting up principles for organizing and creating regional communities. They touch upon the fundamental question of what kind of regional organizations should be formed, and how they should operate. In the first part of the twenty-first century, the process of regionalism has been speeded up and many proposals and ideas concerning regionalism have been put forward. In 1984, Japanese scholars proposed an Asian economic circle, which was later supported by the Japanese Government (Japan Research Institute 1988; Yotaro 1991). The South Korean Government in 1987 put forward an idea of a Yellow Sea economic circle (Jeong and Choe 2001). In 1987, Chen Kuiyao, a Hong Kong scholar, suggested that mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong should establish a Great China circle. In 1987, Indonesia suggested triangular economic cooperation among ASEAN, Japan and South Pacific countries. In 1990 the Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad (1995) proposed an East Asian Economic Caucus that drew both praises and criticisms. Singapore has strongly advocated the free trade zone of ASEAN. At the ASEAN business and investment summit in Bali, Indonesia on 6 October 2003, Singapore’s then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong called for the building of an ASEAN Economic Community: a single production base and a single market, with free movement of goods, services and capital. In 2008, the Rudd government proposed an “Asia Pacific Community” (APC) by the year 2020. In 2009, Yukio Hatoyama, former 44

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Japanese Prime Minister, proposed an East Asian Community, based on the European Union model, to rival the APC. In the above context, it is surprising that China often does not talk about its greater vision of regionalism. The absence of China’s grand vision of regionalism can be traced to the idea of regionalism in the early twentieth century. In this context, it is vital to understand Sun Yat-sen’s idea of Pan-Asianism which provides Chinese perceptions of regionalism and valuable sources. A growing Chinese literature has been devoted to Sun Yat-sen’s idea of Pan-Asianism. Sang Bin (2006) details with the historical background in which Sun developed his idea. After examining positive and negative evaluations of Sun’s idea of Asianism, Zhang Junmin (2002) suggests that Sun’s early idea was closest to the Japanese civic Asianism, and Sun warned of the danger of Japanese military Pan-Asianism. How Sun has changed his view of Asianism was also discussed by Guan Wei (2003) who stressed the influence of Li Dazhao’s neo-Asianism on Sun’s thought. Lin Jiayou (1994) highlights the centrality of Sun’s nationalism and locates his idea of Asianism in this intellectual context. Dong Po (2009) holds that Sun’s idea of Asianism offers an advice in managing the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. The above studies offer us insights, materials, perspectives and evaluative criteria, but provide too much evaluation without examining Sun’s idea in a systematic way. Often they presuppose the unchallenged principle of nationalism. Drawing on the above studies, this chapter examines Sun’s idea of Pan-Asianism, in particular his famous Kobe public speech on PanAsianism. The chapter first introduces the historical, political and cultural background to Sun’s idea. It then develops a content analysis of the Kobe lecture. It also assesses the complex impact of his idea, and his legacy which still has resonance today.

Historical Context Sun Yat-sen’s expressions of Pan-Asian regionalism were shaped by two important contextual factors. The first was China’s domestic situation. In the 1920s, China was fragmented and suffering from the constant threat of military conflict, with domestic warlords controlling significant areas of the country. For Sun Yat-sen, the root of this domestic strife was imperialism, and although Germany and Austria had lost their colonies following their defeat in the First World War and the young Soviet Union had renounced tsarist Russia’s past imperial policies in China, Sun’s major goal was to remove

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all imperialist forces from the country and nullify the unequal treaties that had been imposed by foreign powers, thereby putting an end to unfair treaty provisions, such as extraterritoriality and foreign control on Chinese customs and taxes. For Sun, this historical mission meant that building the region was a task that came second to the primary goal of building the Chinese nation-state. The second immediate factor was an international context in which concepts of Pan-Asianism were beginning to re-emerge. In 1924, the United States (U.S.) launched anti-Japanese campaigns first in California and then in other parts of the U.S. Eventually, the U.S. Congress passed the Immigration Act restricting Japanese immigration, causing a sensational outcry in Japan. Japan had been following the West in pursuing a path of modernization, but the actions of U.S. lawmakers led Japanese to rethink their relationship with the West and reconsider the role of race in shaping both Japan’s relations with the other imperial powers and its relations with its Asian neighbours such as China. The idea that Japan needed to unite with other Asians to oppose the imperialism of the western power began to gain greater influence in Japan. Although the concept of Pan-Asianism had emerged earlier, the U.S. laws served as a catalyst for the discussion of this issue, reviving enthusiasm for Pan-Asianism in Japan in the 1920s (Sang Bin 2006). Between 1911 and 1916, Sun had already promoted the idea of Asianism by emphasizing Sino-Japan cooperation, with Japan playing a leadership role. He even agreed to Manchuria being administrated by Japan when he proposed the idea of Pan-Asianism (Guan Wei 2003, p. 54). All these ideas were expressed in an unsystematic way. It was only in 1924 that Sun developed a systematic articulation of his idea of Asianism in his public lecture in Kobe. In 1924, Sun Yat-sen was invited by Generals Duan Qirui and Feng Yuxiang to discuss the national reunification and reconstruction in Beijing. Sun claimed that he had been unable to secure a ticket for direct passage by boat from Shanghai to Tianjin and so had to travel via Japan. However, this was actually Sun’s excuse so that he could make an attempt to garner Japanese support before arriving in Beijing. Before Sun’s trip to Japan, he had sent his personal envoy General Li Liejun to Japan in September 1924. Li sent a telegraph saying that Japanese reaction was very quiet and cold toward Sun’s idea of Pan-Asianism. Sun sent back a telegraph saying that “Japanese government was so cowardly that it would not accept my neoAsianism” (Sun Yat-sen 1986, p. 160). It was the first time that Sun had expressed his neo-Asianism. During his trip in Japan, five Japanese commercial organizations in Kobe invited Sun to talk about the issue of Pan-Asianism on

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28 November 1924. In this public speech, Sun provided some detailed ideas about Asian regionalism. His speech was essentially a response to a Japanese reaction to actions originally taken in the West. The initiative for Sun’s discussion of regionalism did not come from Sun himself, as his priorities at the time lay elsewhere.

Intellectual Sources Sun’s idea on Pan-Asianism can be seen as a mosaic: a mixture of Indian spiritual and Japanese civic Pan-Asianism, mixed with Li Dazhao’s idea of neo-Asianism. Theoretically, Sun synthesized all different views on Asianism into a pragmatic programme for his revolution and his foreign policies toward Japan. The original idea of Pan-Asianism came from the West. Having become disillusioned with their own Judeo-Christian or Greco-Roman cultural heritages, western intellectuals invented the idea of Pan-Asianism, which was soon adopted by Rabindranath Tagore (Hay 1970, p. 314). The idea of Pan-Asianism was an attempt to preserve the traditional cultures of Asia as a response to western imperialism in the early twentieth century. When intellectuals in all Asian societies felt the threat from the West to their sense of cultural and political integrity, there was a psychological need to hold onto an idealized conception of the East as a counterweight to western power and influence (Hay 1970, p. 312). Gandhi, Tagore, Aurobindo, and Radhakrishnan strived to revitalize Hinduism; Liang Shuming and Chang Chun-mai attempted to strengthen Confucian traditions; Liang Qichao, Buddhist traditions; Okakura and Noguchi, Japan’s artistic heritage; and so on. As Stephen Hay points out, “all of these leaders were deeply concerned that the cultural achievements of their ancestors be not only preserved but propagated on a pan-Asian or even global scale” (Hay 1970, p. 313). In India, Tagore proposed to establish what came to be called the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, a Pan-Asian Mainland free from western military, political, and cultural influence. He envisioned Japan and India joining in a common eastern civilization (Hay 1970, pp. 122 and 317). Tagore’s idea of Pan-Asianism ignored the many real differences between Japanese and Indian cultures and histories. “One such difference to which his Japanese critics drew frequent attention was that India lay supine under the rule of a Western power, while Japan was an independent sovereign state with a burgeoning empire of her own” (Hay 1970, p. 122). Japanese scholars believed that Japan would be completely colonized if Tagore’s doctrine

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were accepted. They stressed the value of resistance and fighting rather selfpraised moralism cherished by Tagore (Hay 1970, p. 240). Tagore felt pity for the Japanese who he believed were doing little to preserve their unique heritage and were following the western model instead. He thought that Japan was lost in the mire of western civilization. He was also disenchanted with the Japanese military way of uniting Asia. For Tagore, Japan’s expansionism was no more than an imitation of European imperialism and violated Japan’s true spirituality (Hay 1970, pp. 37–319). Tagore appealed to China’s youth to save the spirituality of the East from the materialism of the West. But the response he got was not what he wanted. The Chinese intellectuals such as Li Dazhao (Guan Wei 2003) replied that spirituality had so enfeebled India that she had fallen to the old West, and to save China from a similar fate, they were importing materialist doctrines from the new West, the Soviet Union (Hay 1970, p. 245). As early as 1916, Odera Kenkichi (1878–1949) elaborated the idea of Greater Asianism as a racial unity confronting the White Peril (Miwa 1990, p. 140). The idea of Pan-Asianism held that East Asians are the same yellow in opposition to the white race and that Japanese, Chinese and Koreans all should be unified to establish a new order and a greater East Asian CoProsperity Sphere. Rin Kaito, a journalist, called for the spirit of Japanese Pan-Asianism: “For over a century and a half the Asiatics have been pressed down by the Whites and subjected to western tyranny. But Japan, after defeating Russia, has aroused the sleeping Asiatics to shake off the western tyranny and torture” (Chamberlin 1937, p. 21). The idea then became increasingly popular, especially among high military officers, both active and retired. Major General Kenji Doihara, who had the reputation of being one of Japan’s most astute military diplomats and experts on the mainland of Asia, was an avowed believer in Pan-Asianism. The doctrine of “Asia for the Asiatics”, Doihara wrote in an issue of Dai Ajia Shugi, a magazine devoted to expounding Pan-Asian ideas, “is based on the supreme principle that Asia must be safeguarded and maintained by Asiatics” (Chamberlin 1937, p. 21). In other words, the Occidental should go, from China first of all, then from the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, India, and other parts of Asia. Under the conditions at the time, however, “Asia for the Asiatics” in practice was synonymous with “Japan over Asia” — Japanese supremacy in Asia and the withdrawal of the influence of the West (Chamberlin 1937, p. 22). General Iwane Matsui also described “an Asiatic League of Nations” as one of the ideals of his organization. He declared that Pan-Asianism had won followers in China, India, French Indo-China, the Philippines,

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and Afghanistan (Chamberlin 1937, p. 22). On 3 November 1938, Prime Minister Konoye Fumimaro proclaimed the New Order in East Asia. On 1 August 1940, Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke made public the concept of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. If Pan-Asianism took the form of religious spirit and non-violence in India, it assumed a military and violent form in Japan. This difference was reflected in different understandings of “spirit”. Japanese usually thought of the spirit of bushido, the martial ethos of the samurai warrior class which had dominated their society until its class privileges had been abolished in the late nineteenth century. Okura, for example, boiled down the National Spirit to complete loyalty to the state and all its activities: “The Japanese Spirit consists in realizing the glory of being a subject of the Emperor” (Hay 1970, pp. 319–21). By contrast, when non-Muslim Indian intellectuals spoke of “spirit”, they had in mind purely religious ideals (usually Brahmanical or Jain, sometimes with an admixture of Christian spirituality). Military Pan-Asianism contributed to Japan’s drive for expansion. Japanese Pan-Asianism justified the war against Korea and China by suggesting that it was to safeguard the “Japanese spirit that we cultivated for thousands of years” against the threat of Communism. For Okura, it was the war of “Asia” under which “each person of the country doing his own bit for the realization of idealism”, and as a result of the war, the Japanese had grown “spiritually strong and true” (Hay 1970, p. 320). In China, Li Dazhao, a Marxist and an active figure in the May Fourth Movement in 1919, strongly condemned the Japanese idea of Pan-Asianism. He pointed out that the idea of Pan-Asianism was an instrumental tool for Japanese imperialism, and that it was in fact a variant of Japanese nationalism. He highlighted the tension between democracy and Pan-Asianism, indicating that the latter violates the rights of others through expansion. He then articulated a Chinese version of neo-Asianism: all suppressed nations in Asia should gain independence and exercise self-determination first, then form an Asian union. Finally, together with Europe and America, they would achieve a world federation to enhance human happiness. Li was truly cosmopolitan in that his idea of neo-Asianism was not limited to Asia; its final goal was a world federation transcending the boundaries of race (Guan Wei 2003).

Sun Yat-sen’s Public Speech on Pan-Asianism Japan’s Example in the Revival of Asia Sun’s speech to his Japanese audience in Kobe began with the question on “what is Asia?” He saw Asia as possessing an ancient culture that had once

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been advanced, but was now very much in decline due to western imperial invasion. Its revival, however, was being led by Japan, which had managed to erase its unequal treaties with the West thirty years before and defeated Russia — a European imperial power — in war in 1905, which, he argued, demonstrated that Asia could be run by Asians. Sun regarded the Russian defeat by Japan as the defeat of the West by the East (Sun Yat-sen 1986, pp. 401–2). He regarded the Japanese victory as “our own victory”. Japan’s defeat of Russia gave rise to a great hope for the independence of Asia (Sun Yat-sen 1986, pp. 143–44). Sun spoke of his personal encounter in Europe where the British thought the Japanese victory was an omen for the white Europeans, and in Middle East where the Arabians claimed that Japan offered hope for an Asian revival and for the independence of other Asian nations (Sun Yat-sen 1986, p. 403). He noted that there was a movement towards unity in other parts of Asia and argued that Japan and China should follow this example and work together. The trend toward Asianism was intended to restore the gloriously great Asia (Sun Yat-sen 1986, p. 404).

Pan-Asianism and Civilizational Comparison Sun then talked about an American author who saw clearly this Asian trend and interpreted the victory of Japan over Russia as representing a new “yellow peril” that would threaten the white race. Sun did not mention the name of this author, but he was in fact referring to Lothrop Stoddard’s book The Rising Ride of Colour: Against White World Supremacy. Sun criticized this book as it regarded the independent thought in Asia as rebellion (Sun Yat-sen 1986, pp. 404–5). Comparing Europe and Asia, Sun claimed that Europe’s scientific materialist culture had enabled the imperial powers to build up their forces and conquer Asia using hegemonic means (ba dao), whereas Asian cultures in contrast look down upon military force and favour the moral leadership of the “kingly way” (or benevolent government) (wang dao). Oriental civilization stresses the Rule of Right, Occidental civilization the Rule of Might. The Rule of Right respects benevolence and virtue, while the Rule of Might respects only force and utilitarianism. The Rule of Right always influences people through justice and reason, while the Rule of Might always oppresses people with brute force and military measures. For Sun, the Oriental is thus the superior civilization. He gave the example of Nepal, where he claimed that despite the presence of British forces, the Nepalese had rejected the material culture of the British and still came to Beijing to pay their tribute (Sun Yat-sen 1986, pp. 405–6).

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Sun talked about Pan-Asianism being rooted in an emphasis on morality and justice, in stark contrast to the European powers’ pursuit of global conquest. He saw Japan’s role as returning to this Asian moral code and unifying the nationalities of Asia. Since the population of Asia was 900 million to Europe’s 400 million, European domination was clearly unfair and Asia needed to unite to take advantage of its greater numbers. He did not expect the western imperial powers to give up without a fight, saying that asking them to relinquish their claims to Asia would be like asking a tiger for its skin, and so military force would be needed to be used against the imperialists (Sun Yat-sen 1986, p. 408).

Pan-Asianism and the Soviet Union Sun, however, conceded that some Europeans were better than others, noting that some people in England and the United States were advocating Confucian ethics. In particular, Sun praised the actions of the Soviet Union in withdrawing Russia’s former imperial claims over China and in treating minorities well. Sun noted that even though the Soviet Union was a white country, it was following the Asian path of wang dao rather than the hegemonic ba dao, which offered hope for transcending racial barriers (Sun Yat-sen 1986, pp. 408–9). On 5 December 1924, Sun had told a Japanese visitor that for Japan’s sake it would be better to follow the true essence of Pan-Asianism, and that the first step to taking a more moral path would be to recognise the Soviet Union (Sun Yat-sen 1986, p. 466). Sun suggested that China, Japan and the Soviet Union should form a union. Sun’s attitude to the Soviet Union here demonstrates that his conception of Pan-Asian regionalism was not necessarily race-based.

Nature of Asianism Sun’s idea of Pan-Asianism was based on the philosophical principle of right against might, with benevolence and virtue as the foundations of PanAsianism. The problem underlying Pan-Asianism, the principle of Greater Asia, was a cultural problem, a problem of comparison and conflict between Oriental and Occidental culture and civilization. Sun advocated Pan-Asianism in order to restore the status of Asia. Only by the unification of all the peoples of Asia on the foundation of benevolence and virtue can they become strong and powerful. He argued that should all Asiatic peoples thus unite together and present a united front against the Occidentals, they will win the final victory (Sun Yat-sen 1941, pp. 147–49 and 158).

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Sun argued that the basis for Pan-Asianism lay in a shared regional culture rather than on building common regional political institutions. He contrasted what he saw as an Asian moral code with the ruthless imperialism of the West, claiming that the Asian way is to value morality over force and not to use might to solve problems. In making these claims, however, Sun ignored the differences that existed between the nations of the West while also oversimplifying Chinese culture in his claims about traditional attitudes to the use of force.

Political Message Sun spoke of the nature of Pan-Asianism being one of the suppressed nationalities fighting against western imperialism. For Sun, Pan-Asianism was the idea of an alliance among Asian states against western imperialism. Sun was attempting to save East Asia from tumult by actually carrying out the principles of reason and righteousness in uniting Japan, Manchukuo, and China so that the foundation of peace in East Asia may be firmly established. He concluded his speech with a strong statement that Japan had a choice — it had advanced technology and had taken on some European culture, but was also Asian, and so must make a careful moral decision about whether it wanted to pursue a future of ba dao or wang dao: Japan today has become acquainted with the Western civilization of the rule of Might, but retains the characteristics of the Oriental civilization of the rule of Right. Now the question remains whether Japan will be the hawk of the Western civilization of the rule of Might, or the tower of strength of the Orient. This is the choice which lies before the people of Japan (Sun Yat-sen 1986, p. 409).

Pan-Asianism as Foreign Policies Sun’s unique contribution was to turn the idea of Asianism into a foreign policy, although he failed in this regard. His public speech was aimed at a Japanese audience, in the hope that his use of the language of Asianism could help him gain support from Japan. His idea of Pan-Asianism was clearly tailored to further his instrumental political goals, rather than being a fully developed genuine concept. Sun planned to use the language of PanAsianism, which was gaining political momentum in Japan, to persuade Japan

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to develop friendly policies towards China. He was primarily concerned with gaining Japanese support for the Chinese republican revolution and its goals of national reunification, independence, and peace, and was willing to offer major concessions to do so. In this context, Sun did not refer to Chinese republicanism which destroyed Chinese monarchy, as Japanese monarchy was connected to Japanese Pan-Asianism in various ways. Sun delivered three public speeches to three different audiences in Japan and the language of Pan-Asian regionalism was only used in his public address to the Japanese audience. When addressing audiences of Chinese students and Kuomintang members, he did not discuss the issue of Pan-Asianism, preferring to focus on pressing matters for Chinese nationbuilding, such as reunification and the national congress. Talking to Chinese students, he emphasized reunification as a central theme (Sun Yat-sen 1986, pp. 367–68), and when speaking to Kuomintang members, he focused on issues relating to the failures of the revolution, such as the role of British imperialism in undermining revolutionary action in Guangdong (Sun Yatsen 1986, pp. 377–89). Although he used the language of Pan-Asianism, Sun’s main focus was the bilateral relationship between China and Japan. Rather than constructing regional institutions, Sun was concerned with gaining Japanese support to oppose the western powers. Sun appealed to an alliance between Japan and China on the basis of both being Oriental. “It is the duty of both the Japanese and Chinese peoples to rectify fundamentally the present Sino-Japanese relations, on a basis of the awakening consciousness of their position as Orientals” (Sun Yat-sen 1941, p. 153). “Sino-Japanese relations must be based on mutual friendship and co-operation with a view to liberating the Far East from the Domination of Western Imperialism, and to found a New Order by which the Far East should have been returned to the peoples of the Far East” (Sun Yat-sen 1941, p. xiv). Sun also stressed that China and Japan were brothers from a racial point of view. He argued that, under the principle of Pan-Asianism, Japan and China could together develop the natural resources in the West of the Pacific (Sun Yat-sen 1941, p. xiv). In exchange for Japan lending its support to the Chinese revolution and abandoning its unequal treaties, Sun agreed that he would not demand the immediate return of Manchuria to China (Sun Yat-sen 1986, p. 422). Sun also proposed that if Japan gave up its imperialist policies towards China, then the two countries could adopt an economic union, much like the bilateral free trade agreements negotiated by countries today (Sun Yat-sen 1986, p. 371). Sun attempted to make an emotional appeal to his Japanese audience

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by arguing that the Chinese had been following Japan’s revolutionary lead in trying to modernize their country, only to be abandoned and then forgotten by their Asian neighbour (Sun Yat-sen 1986, p. 365).

The Impact of Sun’s Speech It is clear that Sun’s speech did not have the impact in Japan that he desired. Only a very few intellectual scholars like Abe Isoo responded favourably to Sun’s suggestion that Japan should abolish the unequal treaties imposed on China (Chin and Yasui 1989, p. 13). The Japanese media did not write favourable stories about Sun’s speech. While it ignored his call for new Japanese policies towards China, it reported only the commendable aspects of the Japanese role in Asia (Hosaka 2009, p. 336). Japan’s policy towards China remained aggressive, ultimately leading to a full-scale military conflict. The ideas he expressed about Pan-Asian regionalism did have some impact in China, however, although not in the way that Sun intended. Wang Jingwei, who had been a senior Kuomintang figure and close associate of Sun, later adopted Sun’s ideas when he headed the Japanese puppet government in Nanjing in order to persuade the Chinese to accept Japanese rule. At that time, numerous organizations emerged around the country, with Chinese members numbering in the millions, to promote Pan-Asianism and the idea of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (Shi Guifang 2002, pp. 211–51). This distortion of Sun’s ideas meant that after the Japanese were defeated, the idea of Pan-Asianism was dismissed in China as simply a fig leaf for Japan’s military invasion. Sun’s idea was, however, highly praised by a Vietnamese person who said that “the capital city of Asian federation of all nations would be Guangdong” and by an Indian who regarded Sun as a “spiritual leader” of Asianism (Lin Jiayou 1994, p. 9). In Taiwan, many newspaper articles and public forums commemorated Sun’s contribution to Pan-Asianism after he died in 1925 (Sang Bin 2006). Sun’s idea of Pan-Asianism as a foreign policy towards Japan failed in real politics. This failure of Pan-Asianism provides lessons to be learnt. The most important lesson is about the proper balancing relationship between regionalism and nationalism. As the practical demands of each particular nationalism and the territorial and ideological rivalries among national states become more intense, less and less is said about pan-continental combinations. When China and Japan were antagonizing each other, nationalism and PanAsianism were incompatible with each other. Pan-Asianism lacked notions of how to deal with relations among member states within Asia. The

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revitalization of Asian cultural traditions and their democratization in fusion with the originally western idea of nationalism could lead to sharp conflict among Asian nations, rather than to the kind of Pan-Asian understanding that Tagore and others had hoped to see established (Hay 1970, p. 328). When East Asian regional identity was used to fight against the West externally and to override national identities internally, it became an imperialist doctrine and a political tool for Japanese expansion. Pan-Asianism mistakenly assumed the homogeneity of Asia in its imagined community. Pan-Asianism was supposed to be based on an imagined yellow race. The opposition of the West and East as well as materialism and spirituality, or the opposition of yellow and white races, was a mistaken assumption. As Hay points out, “as scattered intellectuals grew increasingly vocal in proclaiming the universal validity of their reinterpreted cultural heritages, and as modern transportation and communication enabled them to enter into personal contact with one another and with their Western Orientalist and Orientophile allies, their mutually contradictory images of Eastern civilization began to collide” (Hay 1970, p. 315). It should be noted, unfortunately, that the above ideas continue to play out in the current politics of regionalism in East Asia.

Patterns in the Expression of Asian Regionalism from Sun to Today There is some continuity between Pan-Asian regionalism as expressed by Sun and how it has been expressed in more recent times. This is despite vast differences in the contexts in which these discussions of regionalism have taken place, such as the level of economic integration between states, the effect of the end of the colonial relationships between Asian nations and the imperial powers, and the formation of the European Union. Sun’s regionalism was designed in order to struggle against imperialism, and although Asia has gone through the process of decolonization, the anti-imperialist legacy of Pan-Asian regionalism is still echoed in views — such as Mahathir’s in the 1990s (Mahathir 1995) — that call for an Asian region that excludes westerners. Sun’s anti-imperialist legacy remains a contemporary issue for Australia’s attempts to be included in the process of building the region. Nationalism is still the foundation of and driving force for regionalism. For Sun, Chinese national concerns drove his desire to pursue the idea of PanAsianism. Sun’s instrumental approach that placed national interests before the task of building the region has remained dominant today. In contemporary China, the domination of Chinese nationalist discourse makes little room for

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genuine regionalism but only uses regionalism as a tool to build the Chinese nation-state. Chinese nationalist grievances about historical humiliations make it difficult to accept multilateral cooperation with Japan which was responsible for that humiliation. As Gilbert Rozman (1998, p. 114) points out, “The consequences of China’s great power nationalism, whatever the cause, have been harmful for regionalism.” Sun’s idea on the priority of nationalism to regionalism, however, was distorted by Wang Jingwei who argued that Pan-Asianism being the core of East Asian order should guide nationalism, and used the idea of Pan-Asianism to justify Japanese rule in China. Wang Jingwei’s reversal of Sun’s idea in order to justify Japan’s imperial ambitions helps to explain why there are lasting suspicions in Asia about Pan-Asianism when it is presented as an idea that justifies taking away a portion of one’s state sovereignty. In contrast to his grand vision for building a new China, Sun had no overall vision for Asia. As a response to the Japanese situation, his idea of regionalism was driven by instrumental, rather than idealistic, concerns. Today, China still lacks a greater vision of regional development and cooperation. Chinese intellectuals seldom talk about great visions of regionalism except “Greater China”. If they do, they tend to criticize Pan-Asianism or neoAsianism (Shi 2002). To take the book edited by Liu and Regnier (2003) as an example, it is striking that mainland Chinese scholar Wei-Wei Zhang talks only about the concept of Greater China, whereas all the other chapters discuss various aspects of East Asian regionalism. In contrast, there are plenty of intellectual writings by Japanese scholars on their greater visions of East Asian regionalism. A concrete example is that at the International Symposium on “FTA: JSEPA and Beyond”. Long Yongtu, a former Vice-Minister in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, dismissed any idea of a greater Asian free trade zone and advocated a pragmatic state-dominated approach to regional development, whereas Noboru Hatakeyama and other Japanese scholars suggested an Asian version of Airbus, a Pan-Asian currency and an Asian economic union. Like Sun, the Chinese Government adjusts its political language depending on the audience. The contemporary audience for Chinese discussions of the idea of Asian regionalism consists of foreigners, while the nationalist language of such discussions is meant for communication with the domestic audience. The Chinese attitude to regionalism remains responsive to outsiders’ advocacy, and avoids taking the initiative in building the region. Rivalry between China and Japan also remains a factor in discussions about regionalism.

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Nevertheless, Chinese cultural attitudes and values have been changed and are still changing. We have already seen more assertive roles played by China in pushing regionalism. Professor Zhang Xizhen from Beijing University has argued that China should support Japan in playing a leading role and that Japan and China should be the core nations in building East Asian regionalism, suggesting that they can check each other and prevent the formation of one hegemon in the region. Professor Liang Yunxiang from Beijing University also argues that China and Japan should find common interest through the construction of Japan and China-led East Asian regionalism and that this cooperation is a fruitful way of improving Sino-Japan relations (Liang in Pai and Zhang 2002, pp. 35–45).

Conclusion Sun’s idea of regionalism is limited in that it does not discuss the possibility of a regional institutional architecture that takes away some sovereignty from each member state. Regionalism is seen more as a pragmatic way to encourage peaceful cooperation between governments, such as the cooperation between China and Japan, and Asian regionalism today takes a similar approach. Sun’s idea of Pan-Asian regionalism helps to illustrate why Asian approaches to regionalism have not followed the European model and have instead been more concerned with using the concept of regionalism to combat imperialism and build the nation-state. To develop genuine regionalism, East Asians must learn how to respect national sovereignty on the one hand but go beyond it on the other hand. Sun expressed his notion of neo-Asianism very vaguely in 1924. It went beyond the Japanese military form of Asianism and developed a number of normative principles for Asian regionalism. If he had lived longer and had more time to develop his idea, he would have articulated a grand vision of regionalism beyond a purely instrumental perception. Sun’s idea of regionalism has left behind a positive normative legacy. Below I would like to highlight three positive normative legacies of Sun’s idea of Asianism. Sun’s conception of regionalism was based on equality between nationstates, with equality preceding regional building and union. He argued strongly for the use of moral persuasion over the use of force, and he opposed military means of building regionalism. Instead, he argued that regional cooperation should be voluntary and based on consensus. These principles for regionalism are still applicable today in dealing with the tough question of hegemony in the process of regionalism. Normatively, regionalism is not attractive at all if one country dominates. Leadership should be rotated

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according to the equality principle. This normative legacy of Sun Yat-sen ought to be an intellectual resource for China to develop a series of strategies to ease the regional concerns about the Chinese intention of increasing its hegemony through regionalism. In support of his argument for Pan-Asian regionalism, Sun examined two quite different paths. The first was based on the metaphor of a family, with China playing the role of older brother to the Japanese junior sibling. Sun portrayed the conflict between the two countries as a dispute that must be reconciled because, even though it was a serious conflict, it was ultimately a dispute between members of the same family (Sun Yat-sen 1986, p. 410). This “brother” approach is relevant today in managing Sino-Japan relations. Similarly the language of brotherhood was also used to manage MalaysiaIndonesia relations. Today, it is suggested that both sides across the Taiwan Straits should work together in building Asian regionalism, given that they are “brothers” and share the same culture and written script. Sun’s second approach toward regionalism is an extension of the task of decolonization and nation-building; that is, the independence of Asian nations first, followed by the regionalization process. Nationalism in Asian countries would determine the direction of regionalism, with the collective desire of suppressed nationalities for independence from western imperialist powers leading to the building of an Asian region based on moral principles (Sun Yat-sen 1986, p. 409). This approach is also relevant today, and to some extent, is reflected in the ASEAN Way. It represents an Asian road towards regionalism, different from the European model of regionalization.

References Akaha, Tsuneo, ed. Politics and Economics in Northeast Asia: Nationalism and Regionalism in Contention. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. Chamberlin, William Henry. Japan over Asia. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1937. Chin Tokujin and Yasui Sankichi, eds. Sonbun: Koen “dai-ajiashugi” shiryoshu [Collected References for Sun-Yat-sen’s Speeches on “Pan-Asianism”]. Kyoto: Horitsu bunkasha, 1989. Dong Bo. “Qianxi Sun Zhongshan ‘Dayazhou Zhuyi’ Guan jiqi dui Zhongguo Dalu yu Taiwan Guanxi de Qishi” [“An Analysis of Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Pan-Asianism’ and its inspiration to the relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan”]. Tuanjie Zengkan [Supplement to Journal of Unity]. Guan Wei. “Lun Li Dazhao de Xin Yaxiya Zhuyi: Jiantan Sun Zhongshan Dayazhou Zhuyi zhi Bianqian” [“Li Dazhao’s Doctrine of Neo-Asianism: Considering the

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vicissitude of Sun Yat-sen’s Pan-Asianism”]. Beifang Luncong [The Northern Forum], vol. 6 (2003): 51–55. Hatakeyama, Noboru. “EAFTA, not a Dream but a Reality”. Paper presented at International Symposium on “FTA: JSEPA and Beyond”, organized by Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore, 7 March 2003. Hay, Stephen. Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and India. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970. He, Baogang. “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism”. Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 58, no. 1 (2005): 105–25. Hosaka Masayasu. Sonbun no shingai kakumei o tasuketa nihonjin [The Japanese who helped Sun Yat-sen’s Xinhai Revolution]. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 2009. Japan Research Institute. Promoting Comprehensive Economic Cooperation in an International Economic Environment Undergoing Dramatic Change: Toward the Construction of an Asian Network. Tokyo: EPA, 1988. Jeong, Kap-Young and Kwan-Kyoo Choe. “Northeast Asian Economic Regionalism: A Korean View”. Global Economic Review, vol. 30, no. 1 (2001): 103–19. Liang, Yunxiang. “Sino-Japan Relationship and East Asia System”. In Dongya diquhezuo yu hezuojizhi [Regional Cooperation and Mechanism in East Asia], edited by Pai Guohua and Zhang Xizhen. Beijing: Central Compliance and Translation Press, 2002. Lin Jiayou. “Sun Zhongshan Minzu Zhuyi Sixiang de Tezheng: Jianlun Sun Zhongshan Minzhu Zhuyi Sixiang chansheng de Wenhua Yinsu” [“The Features of Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalism: Moreover on the Cultural Sources of Sun Yatsen’s Nationalism”]. Zhongshan Daxue Xuebao Luncong [Journal of Sun Yat-sen University Forum], vol. 1 (1994): 1–17. Liu, Fu-Kuo and Philippe Regnier, eds. Regionalism in East Asia: Paradigm Shifting? London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. Mahathir, Mohamad and Shintaro Ishihara. The Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the Coming Century. Japan: Kodansha International, 1995. Miwa, Kimitada. “Japanese Polices and Concepts for A Regional Order in Asia, 1938–1940”. In The Ambivalence of Nationalism: Modern Japan between East and West, edited by James W. White, Michio Umegaki and Thomas R. H. Havens. Lanham: University Press of America, 1990. Pai, Guohua and Zhang Xizhen, eds. Dongya diquhezuo yu hezuojizhi [Regional Cooperation and Mechanism in East Asia]. Beijing: Central Compliance and Translation Press, 2002. Rozman, Gilbert. “Northeast Asia: Regionalism, A Clash of Civilizations, or A Strategic Quadrangle?” Asia-Pacific Review, vol. 5, no. 1 (1998): 105–24. Sang Bin. “Pairi Yimin Faan yu Sun Zhongshan de Dayazhou Zhuyi Yanjiang” [“The New Anti-Immigration Law and Sun Yat-sen’s Lecture on Pan-Asianism”]. Zhongshan Daxue Xuebao Shehui Kexue Ban [Journal of Sun Yatsen University Social Science Edition], vol. 6 (2006): 1–13.

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Sheng Banghe. “19 Shiji yu 20 Shiji zhijiao de Riben Yazhou Zhuyi” [“Japanese Asianism in the Transitional Period from the 19th to the 20th Century”]. Lishi Yanjiu [Historical Research], vol. 3 (2000): 125–35. Shi, Guifang. The Trap of the Same Language and the Same Race: The Rise and Fall of East Asia Cooperation Association. Beijing: Social Sciences Data Press, 2002. Stoddard, Lothrop. The Rising Ride of Color: Against White World Supremacy. London: Chapman and Hall Limited, 1922. Suk, Churl-Jin. “Outlook for Asian Regional Cooperation: European Experience”. In Dongya diquhezuo yu hezuojizhi [Regional Cooperation and Mechanism in East Asia], edited by Pai Guohua and Zhang Xizhen. Beijing: Central Compliance and Translation Press, 2002. Sun Yat-sen. Sun Zhongshan quanji: di Shiyi juan [Collected Works of Sun Yet-San: The 11th Volume]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986. ———. China and Japan: Natural Friends and Unnatural Enemies. Shanghai: China United Press, 1941. Yotaro, Kobayashi. “Nihon: Sai Ajia-ka” [The Re-Asianization of Japan]. Foresight, April 1991. Zhang Junmin. “Sun Zhongshan Dayazhou Zhuyi Sixiang Zairenshi” [“Reconsideration on Sun Yat-sen’s Pan-Asianism”]. Xueshu Yanjiu [Academic Research], vol. 10 (2002): 88–92.

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4 SUN YAT-SEN AND JAPANESE PAN-ASIANISTS Yoko Miyakawa In his pioneering post-war work on Pan-Asianism, Takeuchi Yoshimi, an expert on modern Chinese literature, noted in the 1960s that what was known in Japan as ajiashugi or Pan-Asianism was too variegated a concept to have any clear definition (2006, p. 255). “There are as many interpretations as there are books written about it”, as he put it. Indeed there are many different types of Pan-Asianists, but as Eri Hotta has recently observed, Pan-Asianists “were of one mind on the question of why they were Pan-Asianists, which was that ‘Asia was one’ and ‘Asia was weak’, and utterly and unconditionally at that” (2007, p. 49). Pan-Asianism, briefly defined, is an idea that called for the unity of Asian people in order to resist the plundering of Asia by western imperialists, an idea widely shared among nationalists and revolutionaries throughout Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.1 Pan-Asian sentiments emerged in Japan in the nineteenth century, but it was in Sun Yat-sen that the Japanese Pan-Asianists found inspiration for and a means with which to pursue their idea of Pan-Asian solidarity, or more specifically, close cooperation between Japan and China for the sake of Asian liberation. This chapter examines the Pan-Asianism of Sun Yat-sen by analysing his last major speech in Japan, and the Pan-Asianism of his Japanese supporters. It also discusses the success and failure of their PanAsian ideals.

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Japan’s Pan-Asianists in Meiji Japan Japan’s Pan-Asianism is often equated with imperialism and colonialism. However, in the late nineteenth century, Japanese Pan-Asianists regarded themselves as playing the role of promoting Asian solidarity for the sake of reviving Asia, and not for the sake of expanding Japan’s own interests in Asia. “Asia is One”, the famous opening line of Okakura Tenshin’s book, The Ideals of the East (1904), was an expression of this ideal that Asia is one and that Asia must be one in order to liberate itself from the subjugation by the West (Matsumoto 2000, pp. 54–57). The Japanese Pan-Asianists who came to develop close friendships with Sun Yat-sen shared Okakura’s diagnosis of an ailing Asia; but unlike Okakura, whose Asia extended far beyond East Asia, Sun’s Japanese supporters focused on the historical and cultural ties between Japan and China and on the role that China could play in the Asian struggle against western powers.2 They believed that the revival of China was the key to the revival of Asia as a whole. And the revival of China would require the revitalization of Chinese society, the first step of which was to overthrow the Manchu Government and regain Chinese sovereignty. Many Japanese activists travelled to China in search of a Chinese hero who could carry out the revolution. Their search finally led them to Sun Yat-sen (Jansen 1954, p. 59). Sun’s first visit to Japan was in 1895 and his last was in 1924. The Japanese people he came to know and develop close ties with during these years were numerous: some were reformers, nationalists and revolutionaries, while others were government officials, diplomats and politicians, and still others were scholars and businessmen. Among those Japanese supporters with whom Sun formed and maintained life-long relationships, a few names stand out. Let us first look at a few of these Japanese collaborators and their relationships with Sun.

Japanese Collaborators of Sun Yat-sen Miyazaki Tōten [1871–1922]’s close friendship and collaboration with Sun Yat-sen was legendary. Strongly influenced by his politically active elder brothers, Tōten came to embrace early the idea that the liberalization and democratization of China would be the prerequisite to the liberalization not only of Japan, but also of other Asian countries and even Africa from Western imperialists, leading eventually to the end of world poverty.3 Tōten shared with Sun not only a vision of Asian solidarity and republican idealism, but also “fears of Western domination of the Orient” (Jansen 1954, p. 58). Tōten’s

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autobiography, The Thirty-Three Years’ Dream, describes his life as a trusted friend and collaborator of Sun Yat-sen and the failed revolution in southern China in 1900. Tōten remained a dedicated and faithful supporter of Sun’s revolutionary efforts all his life, but became less directly involved in Sun’s affairs after the 1911 Revolution. Disappointed and angered by the Japanese Government’s increasingly expansionist policies in China and the growing arrogance of Japanese activists who became agents of Japanese militarism rather than those of the Chinese Revolution (Hosaka 2009, pp. 247–56), Tōten gradually turned reclusive, seeking solace in religion.4 He died quietly, away from the political upheavals of the day, in 1922. A Japanese who came to replace Tōten as Sun’s most trusted confidant after the revolution of 1911 was Yamada Jun’zabur ō [1876–1959] (Hosaka 2009, p. 272). Jun’zabur ō was the younger brother of Yamada Yoshimasa, who was captured and killed during the Waichow uprising in 1900, the first Japanese to die for the Chinese Revolution.5 While working for the South Manchurian Railway Company in an office inside the Shanghai branch of Mitsui & Co., which enabled him to have close contact with the Japanese in power, and thus to serve as a secret envoy for Sun, Jun’zabur ō dedicated his life to Sun’s efforts in liberating China. He admired and had great respect for Sun Yat-sen as a revolutionary leader and as a person, but at the same time he wanted the Chinese Revolution to succeed for the sake of his brother (Hosaka 2009, pp. 213–14). His large house in the Shanghai French Concession often served as a hideout for Chinese revolutionaries, including Sun, and their Japanese supporters.6 Through thick and thin, Jun’zabur ō remained one of the most faithful Japanese allies of Sun Yat-sen and Sun’s trust in him never wavered until the end of Sun’s life.7 Umeya Shōkichi [1868–1934] was another Japanese who dedicated his life to Sun’s revolutionary causes. Unlike Tōten and Jun’zabur ō, who helped Sun by serving as valuable conduits of Japanese aid — money, weapons, and contacts — to the Chinese Revolution, Shōkichi dedicated his own private wealth to Sun’s revolutionary activities. According to a recently published biography (Kosaka 2009), one day in 1895 Sun came to visit Shōkichi’s photo studio in Hong Kong, where they spent many hours discussing their visions of Asian solidarity. Moved by Sun’s determination to liberate China first and then Asia and the world, Shōkichi reportedly declared to Sun, “you carry out the revolution; I’ll take care of the funding” (Kosaka 2009, p. 57). And he did. He spent the bulk of the fortune he amassed through his movie business in Japan for Sun’s revolutionary efforts, which, according to one estimate, amounted to at least one trillion yen (about US$12.2 billion) in today’s value (Kosaka 2009, p. 13). His monetary support extended far and

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wide, from purchasing weapons to publishing revolutionary party organ papers, from buying airplanes to building airstrips, and from paying for Sun’s passage to exile to financially assisting Chinese revolutionaries and their families (Kosaka 2009, pp. 12–13). Because of his close contact with Sun and other Chinese revolutionary leaders, Shōkichi at times came to be questioned about his loyalty to Japan. But his vision of Asian liberation through Sino-Japanese cooperation and his pledge to support Sun’s revolution never left him until his death in 1934.8 Sun Yat-sen’s collaborators in Japan were not limited to the reformminded idealists that we have just discussed. Influential figures in the Japanese political establishment also came to develop sympathy for Sun and his revolutionary movement. The most notable among them were Inukai Tsuyoshi [1855–1932], a politician who had devoted his life to the formation of representative government in Japan (Jansen 1954, p. 3),9 and Tōyama Mitsuru [1855–1944], the don of Japan’s nationalist movement associated with Genyōsha (Dark Ocean Society). Both Inukai and Tōyama are wellknown for the protection and help they offered for many years not only to Sun but also to other Chinese and Asian nationalists and revolutionaries living in exile in Japan.10 Inukai Tsuyoshi had deep respect and awe towards Chinese culture,11 and shared Sun’s belief in Sino-Japanese cooperation as the basic foundation of Pan-Asian solidarity. Although he held Sun in high esteem, in the final analysis, it did not matter for Inukai whether it was Sun Yat-sen or K’ang Yu-wei who overthrew the Manchu Government as long as it would bring stability to China, which in turn would bring stability to all Asia.12 Inukai’s connection to the oligarchs proved valuable for Sun to secure a stay in Japan when the Japanese Government still regarded the Manchu court as the legitimate government of China. But once Inukai joined the cabinet in 1923, representing Japan’s national interests rather than being a critical voice of an opposition politician, he no longer seemed to be a Pan-Asianist, and his vision of Sino-Japanese cooperation eventually diverged from Sun’s.13 His change of heart was harshly criticized by Nakano Seigō who wrote in 1925 that Inukai’s Pan-Asianism was imperialism in the guise of Pan-Asian solidarity, an attempt to create Japanese imperialism as opposed to western imperialism, totally different from Sun’s vision of Pan-Asianism (Matsumoto 2000, pp. 127–31).14 Similarly, Tōyama Mitsuru shared with Sun a strong belief in Pan-Asian solidarity based on Asian virtues as the key to the liberation of Asia from the grip of western imperialists. But unlike Inukai, Tōyama advocated from the beginning an expansionist foreign policy and stressed the role of Japan

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in the project of rejuvenating Asia. For Tōyama, the revival of a weak Asia would require strong leadership, which could be provided only by Japan, the sole non-Western country which had succeeded in modernization without sacrificing its traditional ideals and values. By following Japan’s example, Asian countries could be transformed into viable nations, he believed. Although Tōyama remained a staunch supporter of Sun and his revolutionary efforts until Sun’s death,15 with his expansionist Pan-Asian vision he finally could not see eye to eye with Sun, who pursued more egalitarian cooperation among nations. Japan’s Pan-Asianists thus shared Sun’s vision of building a strong and independent Asia through close Sino-Japanese cooperation in one form or another.16 But what exactly did Sun Yat-sen mean by Pan-Asian solidarity? Let us examine his view of Pan-Asianism by analysing his last major speech delivered in Japan.

Sun’s View of Pan-Asianism On 28 November 1924, Sun Yat-sen delivered a speech to an enthusiastic audience in the auditorium of a high school in Kōbe, Japan. The speech, delivered four months before his death, was entitled “On Pan-Asianism” — a topic requested by his Japanese hosts. There are five major themes in his speech.17 First, the speech discusses how Japan’s abrogation of the unequal treaty with England in 1894, and in particular, its victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05, inspires the independence movements of Asian countries. Russia’s defeat by Japan, Sun maintains, is “the defeat of the West by the East” (Jansen 1954, p. 211). Second, the speech discusses how Western culture is “a culture of military rule”, governing through oppression and force, whereas Asian culture is “a culture of the kingly way”, in which people are governed through the Asian virtues of benevolence, justice and morality. Although the West is superior to the East in terms of material culture, Sun argues, Asian countries are superior in terms of morality: it is the Asian culture of right and not the Western culture of might that would prevail in the end, he predicts. Third, the speech holds that in order to realize Pan-Asianism and to restore the status of Asia, all Asian nations must be united under the principle of “the kingly way”. Pan-Asianism is possible, according to Sun, only by eliminating the oppression of Asian people, and of people throughout the world. Fourth, the speech maintains that Russia has adopted “the kingly way”, and for that reason is now being separated from Europe. Fifth and

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finally, the speech indicates that Japan, which possesses the essence of Asian virtues but also has learnt the military ways of the West, must make a decision as to whether it should serve as “an instrument of Western might” in oppressing other Asian nations, or a “bulwark of Oriental virtues” in defending those nations (Matsumoto 2000, p. 121). The significance of this famous speech has been variously interpreted, as have Sun’s intentions in making the speech. Scholars such as Marius Jansen have focused primarily on Sun’s call for Pan-Asian solidarity, downplaying the significance of his argument that Japan should re-examine its policies in Asia. Jansen writes that “it is clear that at the end of his life Sun Yatsen was still not convinced that Japan had chosen a course unfavourable to China” (1954, p. 212). Other scholars have maintained that the significance of Sun’s speech lay primarily in its argument that Japan should abolish its oppressive policies in Asia. Takeuchi Yoshimi argues that Sun’s speech was nothing but an expression of “his despair at the state of PanAsianism and the denunciation of Japanese imperialism” (2006, p. 267). Fujii Shōzō takes a similar view, pointing out that in his speech Sun never specifically stated that Japan was a country of the kingly way, while praising Russia as such a country (1966, p. 228). In fact, although Sun did not directly rebuke the Japanese Government in his speech, his criticism and mistrust of Japan for its policies on China and Korea was well-known.18 But probably the purpose of the speech was both: it was to press his familiar theme of Pan-Asianism as well as to urge Japan to take “the kingly way” and follow Russia’s example in “giving up all the special rights that the tsar had acquired” (Wilbur 1976, p. 12). Whatever Sun Yat-sen’s true intentions might have been, his speech was widely received in Japan as a testimonial to Sun’s commitment to PanAsianism. When Sun made his last visit to Japan, a strong sentiment for Pan-Asian solidarity was emerging. The rise in interest in Pan-Asianism was closely tied to the passage of the Immigration Act by the United States Congress in July 1924. Although the Immigration Act barred not only Japanese but also other Asians from immigrating to the United States, it was seen as being specifically directed against Japan. Anti-American sentiment in Japan, steadily rising since the Russo-Japanese War, acquired a new intensity with the passage of the Immigration Act, and generated among Japanese people a keen sense of the need for Asian solidarity as a way of resisting the United States. Sun Yat-sen’s speech on Pan-Asianism was delivered in such an atmosphere. It is not surprising, then, that his call for Japan to reexamine its Asian policy was unheard by his Japanese audience, while his call for Asian solidarity was heard in all its fullness.19

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Sun Yat-sen’s Commitment to Pan-Asianism Some writers argue that Sun Yat-sen no longer advocated Pan-Asianism after 1918,20 while others maintain that he continually espoused his belief in Pan-Asian solidarity until the end of his life.21 Whether it was his lifelong dream or not, Sun did advocate for much of his career the close SinoJapanese cooperation as “a means of reviving China and liberating all Asia” (Schiffrin 1989, p. 20). In a 1914 letter to the head of the Japanese Foreign Office, Sun wrote that “a Sino-Japanese alliance is the only path to freedom from European imperialism” (Jansen 1954, p. 192).22 In 1923, Sun even expressed his “hope [for] the revival of the Oriental people under the leadership of Japan” (Schiffrin 1989, p. 43), although it is not clear whether Sun really believed in the idea of a Pan-Asian alliance under Japanese leadership or simply used this as tactic in order to gain Japan’s support in China’s struggle for liberation. In fact Sun’s tireless call for Pan-Asian solidarity was most often directed to Japanese people. It could be that Sun kept urging Japan to join hands with China in a struggle against Western imperialism because he believed Japan’s monetary and political support was absolutely necessary in his fight for Chinese independence. His frequent speeches on the Pan-Asian theme might also have been more of an indication of what Japanese supporters loved to listen to, rather than of what he himself believed in (Jansen 1954, p. 160). After all, as Fujii Shōzō argues, what Sun was most essentially interested in was not “an abstract concept of Pan-Asianism, but the liberation of the Chinese people” (1966, p. 229). Despite this ambiguity about his ultimate intention, however, Pan-Asianism came to be interpreted by the Japanese as Sun Yat-sen’s real ideology — an interpretation later utilized by Sino-Japanese collaborators in their effort to justify Japan’s brutal oppression of China in the 1930s and 1940s.

The Success and Failure of Pan-Asian Visions A shared vision of Pan-Asian solidarity connected Sun Yat-sen with so many Japanese Pan-Asianists in Meiji Japan. Their deep friendship and collaboration contributed to no small degree to the success of the 1911 Revolution. Sun’s Pan-Asianism was successful in gathering a diverse group of people for his cause, and its success owed much to Sun Yat-sen as a person, one who inspired Japanese Pan-Asianists to join hands in the fight for China’s liberation.

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But in the end, Pan-Asianism did not succeed in solidifying the relationship between Japan and China, let alone in uniting all Asian nations, as Sun and his Japanese supporters had envisioned. Jansen argues that Sun’s personality, more than his ideology, was the basis of friendship and collaboration with his Japanese supporters (1954, p. 64). Such personal dedication, contributing to the success of Pan-Asianism, might also lead to its demise. Without Sun, Japan’s Pan-Asianists no longer had a core to rally around. The dream of Pan-Asian solidarity that Miyazaki Tōten, Yamada Jun’zabur ō and Umeya Shōkichi had dedicated their lives to seems to have died with Sun Yat-sen. The bigger factor contributing to this failure was the transformation of the geopolitical condition of Asia. As Jansen argues, the collaboration of diverse groups of Japanese with Sun was “possible only so long as they could agree on mutual foreign ... opponents — Western imperialism” (1954, p. 4). But by the early twentieth century, Japan has already taken the route of joining the imperialist club, and no longer saw itself as a member of a weak Asia. Thus, Inukai and Tōyama, who had been eager to help Sun in his effort to revive China, were no longer willing to listen to Sun’s plea to intervene with the Japanese Government to abolish all unequal treaties with China as the first step toward genuine Sino-Japanese friendship (Matsumoto 2000, pp. 114–18; Hosaka 2009, pp. 304–07, 329–30). Another problem is the ambiguity of what Pan-Asian solidarity would actually entail. For Sun Yat-sen, equality among Asian nations was “the prerequisite for real Pan-Asianism” (Fujii 1966, p. 230). But as George Jan argues, Sun’s “nationalist foreign policy was ... to restore Chinese benevolent hegemony in East Asia. His final goal was to restore China’s equality among nations and its leadership in Asia and the world” (1989, p. 150). Would that be acceptable for the Japanese? According to Park Young-jae, even in the early phases of Japan’s Pan-Asianism, none of its advocates envisioned egalitarian relations between Japan and Asia, and Japanese Pan-Asianists “invariably place[d] Japan at the apex of vertical relationships with other Asian nations” (Koschmann 1997, p. 85). In short, forming Pan-Asian solidarity among equal nations was problematic, since the Japanese advocates envisioned Japan as its leader, while Chinese advocates such as Sun saw China as at least as the first among equals.

Conclusion Thus the Pan-Asian solidarity that Sun Yat-sen and his Japanese supporters envisioned did not survive their earthly existence. Instead of promoting

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Sino-Japanese cooperation, Japan’s Pan-Asianism came to take an opposite course. But what would have happened if Japan had heeded Sun’s warning and taken a path of “the kingly way”, instead of following the steps of western imperialists? It may be a futile exercise to imagine such an outcome. But it is worth remembering that there was a time in our modern history, though only briefly, when Japanese and Chinese genuinely shared the vision of PanAsian solidarity and worked together for creating a new Asia.

Notes 1

2

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6

7

8

9

10

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For instance, Gi-Wook Shin discusses Pan-Asianism as an important ideology, along with nationalism, in Korea at the turn of the twentieth century (2006). But the revolutionary activities they carried out were not limited to China. The most famous such activity was their (and Sun’s) attempt to help Emilio Aguinaldo in his struggle against the United States for Philippine independence. For details, see Jansen (1954, pp. 68–74). On this issue Tōten was strongly influenced by his elder brother Tamizō, who was preoccupied with the problem of inequality in agrarian communities. According to some scholars, a solution Tamizō found in Henry George’s idea of the single-tax on land might have also influenced Sun in his formulation of one of the “three principles of the people”. Some argue that another cause of his melancholy might have been the realization that he was after all a Japanese and that once the revolution succeeded in China he would have had no role to play in a new China. See for instance, Watanabe (1976, pp. 321–24). Sun Yat-sen was quoted as saying that Yamada Yoshimasa was “the first foreigner who laid down his life for the Chinese Republic” (Jansen 1954, p. 96). In 1916 Jun’zaburō’s baby daughter, Tamiko, was brain-damaged by a bullet fired by one of the assassins who killed Chen Qimei at Yamada’s house in Shanghai (Hosaka 2009, pp. 15–16). The fact that Jun’zaburō was the only Japanese present at Sun’s deathbed is a testament of the deep ties between the two (Hosaka 2009, p. 350). Shōkichi was the only Japanese who accompanied Sun in his last journey from Beijing to Nanjing, where his body lay in state (Kosaka 2009, p. 228). He served as cabinet minister in several posts after 1923 and then Prime Minister from December 1931 to May 1932, when he was assassinated by young naval officers. Inukai’s house in Tokyo became a haven for Asian exiles in Japan (Hotta 2007, p. 41) and the recipients of Tōyama’s generous aid included Chiang Kai-shek, Kim Ok-kium, Rash Behari Bose, and many others. Inukai was a great admirer of Chinese classics and served as the head of the East Asia Society.

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Inukai tried to forge an alliance between the revolutionaries and the reformist faction within the government (Hosaka 2009, pp. 79–80). Hosaka argues that even if Inukai had wanted to help Sun, he probably could not have done much because by then Japan had already decided to take an imperialist expansionist path (2009, p. 308). Nakano’s full critique is available in Chin and Yasui (1989, pp. 152–58). But in the 1940s Nakano himself came to embrace what he criticized as imperialism: Asia must be united under Japan’s leadership, he came to argue (Matsumoto 2000, pp. 106–07). When Sun spent nearly three years in exile in Japan after the failure of the revolution of 1913, it was Tōyama who took him under his wings, arranging for Sun to stay in a house next door to his and guarded by his men (Hosaka 2009, p. 262). Another important Japanese whom Sun Yat-sen trusted and relied upon as much as Tōten and Jun’zaburō was Kayano Nagatomo, a reporter in Shanghai and Hong Kong. In fact, he and Tōten were “rivals for Sun’s confidence” (Jansen 1954, p. 251). This summary of Sun Yat-sen’s Pan-Asianism speech is based on Chin and Yasui (1989, pp. 44–54); and Matsumoto (2000, pp. 119–23). Sun began publicly criticizing the Japanese government policy on China in 1917 (Chin and Yasui 1989, p. 16). But Sun seemed to have felt less threatened by Japan’s imperialism than by European imperialism. He once likened SinoJapanese relationship as that of a master and his faithful dog: “Japan is like a faithful guard dog protecting China from ravenous European invaders”; this was why China needed Japan now, he told angry Chinese youth calling for anti-Japan protests in Canton in 1923 (Hosaka 2009, pp. 298–99). The media did not pay much attention to his speech, and even newspapers and magazines that reported it tended to focus on Japan’s positive role in inspiring other Asian nations and ignored Sun’s call for Japan to re-examine its Asian policies. The Japanese media by then was in total agreement with the government that the unequal treaty between Japan and China should not be revised (Hosaka 2009, p. 336). As for intellectuals, only a handful, such as Abe Isoo, positively responded to Sun’s call and argued that Japan should lead the way in eliminating extraterritoriality imposed on China as the first step to build genuine Sino-Japanese friendship (Chin and Yasui 1989, p. 13). For example, Fujii (1966). For example, Jansen (1954), Wilbur (1976), and Schiffrin (1989). According to Yamada Jun’zaburō’s memoir, Sun always told anyone who listened to him that “unless Japan and China were united we would be persecuted by the White” (Hosaka 2009, p. 299).

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References Chin, Tokujin and Yasui Sankichi, eds. Sonbun: Kōen “dai-ajiashugi” shiryōshū [Collected references for Sun Yat-sen’s speeches on “Pan-Asianism”]. Kyoto: Hōritsu bunkasha, 1989. Fujii, Shōzō. Sonbun no kenkyū [The study of Sun Yat-sen]. Tokyo: Keisōshobō, 1966. Hosaka, Masayasu. Sonbun no shingai kakumei o tasuketa nihonjin [The Japanese who helped Sun Yat-sen’s Xinhai Revolution]. Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 2009. Hotta, Eri. Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War, 1931–1945. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Jan, George P. “The doctrine of nationalism and the Chinese revolution”. In Sun Yat-sen’s doctrine in the Modern World, edited by Chu-yuan Cheng. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989. Jansen, Marius. The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. Kosaka, Ayano. Kakumei o purodyūsushita nihonjin [The Japanese who supported the revolution]. Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2009. Koschmann, J. Victor. “Asianism’s ambivalent legacy”. In Network Power: Japan and Asia, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997. Matsumoto, Ken’ichi. Takeuchi Yoshimi ‘Nihon no ajiashugi’ seidoku [Critical reading of “Japan’s Pan-Asianism” by Takeuchi Yoshimi]. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2000. Okakura, Tenshin. The Ideals of the East. London: J. Murray, 1904. Schiffrin, Harold Z. “Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Time”. In Sun Yat-sen’s doctrine in the Modern World, edited by Chu-yuan Cheng. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989. Shin, Gi-Wook. Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. Takeuchi, Yoshimi. “Nihon no ajiashugi” [Japan’s Pan-Asianism]. In Takeuchi Yoshimi serekushon [Selected works of Takeuchi Yoshimi], vol. 2, edited by Marukawa Tetsushi and Suzuki Masahisa. Tokyo: Nihon keizai shuppansha, 2006. Watanabe, Kyōji. Hyōden: Miyazaki Tōten [A critical biography of Miyazaki Tōten]. Tokyo: Daiwa shobō, 1976. Wilbur, C. Martin. Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.

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PART II Sun Yat-sen, Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Chinese Revolution

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5 UMBILICAL TIES: THE FRAMING OF OVERSEAS CHINESE AS THE MOTHER OF REVOLUTION1 Huang Jianli

Introduction In encapsulating the dynamic triangular relationship between Sun Yat-sen 孙中山, Nanyang 南洋 (roughly transcribed as present-day Southeast Asia) and the 1911 Revolution 辛亥革命, the most frequently-used and iconic phrase has been “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution” 华侨为革 命之母. This short expression of praise underlies the premium accorded to Sun Yat-sen’s leadership of Xingzhonghui 兴中会 and Tongmenghui 同盟 会 in mobilizing the various Chinese migrant communities located outside of China for the overthrow of the Qing 清 dynasty and establishment of a republic. There is an instant logic to bestowing such a high honour upon the Overseas Chinese because Sun and many of his republican revolutionaries were after all exiles with a price on their heads and their conspiratorial organizations were born and operated primarily outside of China. The overseas provision of revolutionary assistance in terms of finance, manpower, propaganda and safe haven was critical. Yet, there remains an air of mystery 75

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in extant scholarship as to when, how and by whom the epithet was first uttered and the circumstances it was reiterated at later stages. Moreover, the framing of Overseas Chinese in this particular manner has been undermined by revisionist scholarship from the 1970s which tended to interrogate the efficacy of Sun Yat-sen’s overseas-based movement. The Wuchang Uprising 武昌起义 in October 1911, which took place in central China instead of along the southern periphery, is now acknowledged to be basically unanticipated and only tenuously linked to Sun. The momentous speed of the subsequent imperial abdication and ushering in of the Chinese republic was also primarily made possible only by the defection of the conservative constitutionalist gentry as well as Qing civil and military court officials. Overseas Chinese was not a key part of this eventual power play. The “Mother of Revolution” had no decisive role in the final delivery of the republican baby despite the epithet which has remained in circulation up to the present day. This chapter is not meant to resolve the argument on whether Overseas Chinese truly deserve the praiseworthy epithet. Its main purpose is to pin down the epithet’s surprisingly late origin, its tenacity and the cycles of usage throughout the ages. With a lack of constancy, there were times when it was repeatedly evoked and durations when it retreated into the background. Effort will be made to comprehend the context of both the evocations and silences. Omissions or silences are not easy to be managed in history writing but they are an integral part of the story. It is a story on how the epithet becomes a powerful mystifying symbol which mediates the three-way relationship among Sun, Nanyang and the 1911 Revolution in different configurations depending on the changing historical context and on how it serves as an umbilical cord connecting the Chinese diaspora with its ancestral land.

Founding Father on the Mother of Revolution In tracing the hazy origin of the epithet, it is inescapable to be confronted by a mountain of literature attributing it directly to Sun Yat-sen who had been named as the Founding Father 国父 of the Republic of China 中华 民国 that was inaugurated on 1 January 1912. This standard act of tagging the phrase to “the horse’s mouth” is pervasive and overwhelming. But did Sun actually say or write these exact words? By examining the extant pool of source materials, it becomes apparent that it was most unlikely for Sun to have made that exact pronouncement. One problematic evidence put forward refers to the prescribed words which

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Sun had allegedly penned in an unspecified year onto a horizontally-inscribed board for the office of Shaonian zhongguo chenbao 少年中国晨报 [Morning Newspaper of Young China] in San Francisco. That single claim with no elaboration or contextualization was made by the senior Kuomintang (hereafter abbreviated as KMT) 国民党 leader Qin Xiaoyi 秦孝仪 when he spoke at an oral history session in August 1980 in the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall 中正纪念堂 in Taipei.2 This fragment of information was picked up and re-circulated thrice by a Nanyang reading club.3 However, no one else came forth to confirm this, no further proof was offered and there was no follow-up coverage. If the wooden plaque had really existed and his personally penned words were precisely as such, the item would have created extremely high impact among scholars and the media way before 1980, or even after Qin’s late revelation. Such a seven-character inscription on open display for all these years could never have escaped public attention. It seems that Qin’s recollection was either unreliable or he had indulged in an act of momentary sensationalism. Indeed, although hundreds of pieces of secondary works have attributed the epithet to Sun, it appears that in all likelihood he had never used that exact phrase in any of his speeches and writings. It was at best a mere paraphrase of his general comments on the contribution of Overseas Chinese. Even from the paraphrasing angle, Sun could be tied firmly to such an effusive praise on only five identifiable instances. First is his 30 September 1916 speech which he delivered in Shanghai to welcome a group of Overseas Chinese soldiers. He commented that “the Overseas Chinese was really one of the most powerful forces when imperial rule was abolished”.4 The second instance was a 1916 circular which he issued to overseas branch members exhorting them to remember that “Overseas Chinese from various places had contributed vast amount of money for military expenses to overthrow imperial rule and they are also a model for our party army because they have returned to sacrifice their lives.”5 The third appears in a passage from a 1917 preface which Sun wrote for a popular novel about the Tongmenghui: “The launching of the Tongmenghui had relied heavily upon the contribution of the Overseas Chinese ... Only I know deeply that, without the Overseas Chinese group in Tongmenghui, there would have been neither the overthrow of the Qing dynasty nor setting up of the Republic.”6 The fourth traceable instance of paraphrasing is a speech which he offered to the launching-cum-social gathering of a party branch in Melbourne, Australia, in December 1921: “My overseas comrades had previously suffered together with me by contributing financially towards strengthening our

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military or bravely killing the traitors. Their revolutionary struggle lasted ten over years and yet seemed compressed into a single day. Hence, there is no absence of the two words ‘Overseas Chinese’ in the history of revolution and this has remained permanent in people’s minds.”7 Last but not least, we have Sun’s 15 October 1923 speech given at a KMT social gathering in Guangzhou in which he proclaimed that, “The overseas places are our party’s most developed areas. The KMT is in many Overseas Chinese localities. The mindset of Overseas Chinese has matured earlier and they are more advance in understanding the ideology of our party. Therefore, they are also ahead in revolution. Each and every of our revolution has drawn sustenance from the overseas comrades.”8 In sum, despite many claimed citations constantly tracing back to Sun, the single occasion when the Founding Father could have personally uttered or penned those exact words has only been recently disclosed and is problematic in nature. All the other five identifiable instances linking the epithet back to Sun are mere paraphrases of statements he made between 1916 and 1923. There is thus a need to move the scope of tracing the origin beyond Sun and to identify when and how the slogan had first appeared in full printed form and in what context. This process of tracking will provide evidence of usage but it will also unveiled instances of “silences” or “omissions” which are essential to exploring the “creation myth” of the epithet and seeing its evolution in a more holistic perspective. A useful starting point is the writings of two party veterans who had played a critical role in crafting the history of the KMT.

Early KMT History of Zou Lu and Feng Ziyou Zou Lu 邹鲁 (1885–1954) joined Sun’s revolutionary activities from 1905, participated in numerous uprisings, held various key positions within the KMT party-state apparatus, and helmed the Zhongshan University 中山 大学 from 1923 to 1940. He was also one of the few witnesses when Sun dictated his last will on his deathbed in Beijing in 1925. He gained a high place in KMT historiography when he published in 1929 a draft history of the party. This 1,686-page landmark volume in four parts captures the party’s organizational history, ideological messages, major uprisings and biographical profiles. Yet, it has remained silent on passing an overall judgment about the contribution of Overseas Chinese.9 The other major figure of early KMT historiography and one with exceptionally close ties to the Overseas Chinese was Feng Ziyou 冯自由 (1882–1958). He was born into an Overseas Chinese family in Japan, joined

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Sun in 1905 and became one of his key lieutenants in Hong Kong and the United States. With his strong revolutionary background and experience in journalism, Feng became one of the most important and productive participant-chroniclers of pre-1911 KMT history. Through a series of books published from 1928 to the 1950s, he wrote extensively about the history of the republican revolutionary movement, including its mobilization of Overseas Chinese. Going beyond a simple narrative, his inclusion of rare photographs, personal correspondences, membership lists and funding data has made his books a valuable primary source for scholars. Yet the epithet was never once cited by Feng as a direct pronouncement from Sun (or any other leading revolutionaries). Neither did Feng ever use it himself.10 Feng came closest to endorsing the epithet only when he wrote the preface for one of his books in Chongqing in November 1945: The greatest contribution to the founding of the Republic of China came from the Overseas Chinese. From Sun Yat-sen’s launching of the Xingzhonghui in Honolulu in 1894 to the success of the 1911 Revolution, not a single revolutionary attempt had been made without the assistance of the Overseas Chinese. Hence, one can sincerely confirm the recent comment by people that there would have been no revolution without the Overseas Chinese.11

Double Interrogation by Zhang Yongfu and Hu Hanmin For the seven-character epithet to make its appearance in black-and-white print, a large number of secondary writings have traced and tagged it to the 1933 publication of Zhang Yongfu (Teo Eng Hock) 张永福 (1872–1957). Zhang was a Chinese merchant in Singapore, started a revolutionary newspaper in 1903 which caught the eye of Sun, joined the Tongmenghui in 1905 and co-led the revolutionary branch activities in Singapore. The epithet in full form and in quotation marks appears in the opening sentence of his book: “Nowadays, there are many people who would admit to what Sun Yat-sen had said about ‘Overseas Chinese contributed to the Revolution’ 华侨有功革命 and ‘Overseas Chinese is the Mother of the Revolution’ 华侨 为革命之母.”12 Zhang’s opening statement and attribution to Sun became the standard reference point for many subsequent writers. Some erroneously offered these as an indisputable proof that Sun had himself used the phrase in the manner of a straightforward endorsement of the significant role played by the Overseas Chinese. They had neglected to examine the larger context and missed an important nuance in Zhang’s usage. His agenda as reflected in the full preface was not

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one of praise but a warning to his fellow Overseas Chinese not to be egoistic, opportunistic and complacent. To him, Sun had used the epithet merely as a way of encouraging Overseas Chinese to continue to strive and complete the revolutionary mission. Zhang regretted that many Overseas Chinese had been recklessly flashing their previous revolutionary involvement as a badge of honour and as a passport to secure positions and to climb the career ladder. While recognizing their past contribution, he urged them to be humble and to ask themselves a long list of pertinent questions as to whether they actually measured up to that honour of being the Mother of Revolution: a. b. c. d. e.

Do I have a deep understanding of Sun? Do I believe in the ideology of Sun? Had I been in cahoots with the Protect Emperor Party 保皇党? Had I given up the revolutionary path midway? How much risk and how much money had I offered for the revolutionary cause? f. What is my standing in the Overseas Chinese community? Do I have their support? g. Which revolutionary uprisings had I participated in? h. Had I ever infringed upon party charter and discipline? i. What contributions had I made towards the welfare of Overseas Chinese and what relief effort had I contributed towards the various disasters in China? j. Even if I had participated in the revolutionary enterprise, would I still be classified as a revolutionary Overseas Chinese if I am [now] involved in gambling and opium-smoking?13 Zhang Yongfu concluded his preface by urging Overseas Chinese to go beyond their past historical record of contribution and to fulfil their responsibility of nurturing the young republic so that the product of revolution could grow up strong and healthy. Only then, in his view, would the epithet be befitting.14 One other fascinating dimension of Zhang’s book is that it has “piggy-backed” on the transcript of a separate account written by Hu Hanmin 胡汉民 (1879–1936) who was among the handful of extremely close revolutionary followers of Sun and who was put in charge of the Tongmenghui Nanyang headquarters in Singapore in 1908. He was also a strong contender to succeed Sun but was outmanoeuvred by Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石 in the 1930s. Hu offered an undated oral account of “Nanyang and the Chinese Revolution” and this was transcribed and published as a long appendix within Zhang’s 1933 book.15 Indeed, Zhang made clear that he

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was writing his book primarily as a “supplement” 补充 to Hu’s critique of Overseas Chinese and their involvement in the revolution. Zhang urged his readers to reflect calmly and ask themselves whether they had the “perfect conditions to be the Mother of Revolution” 有没有做革命母亲的完 全条件 after being informed by Hu of the limitations of their previous revolutionary work and understanding of the party.16 Hu Hanmin did not evoke the epithet at all but his opening sentence has also been mythologized as a firm endorsement of it: “Looking at the history of revolution, Nanyang truly occupies an extremely important position; it is our party’s source for revolutionary planning and the base for revolutionary activities.”17 In this twenty-six-page report he provided useful details about the revolutionary activities of Sun and his comrades in Nanyang but the higher value derives from his insight and critique of the Overseas Chinese. Coming from a man who was later often associated with the KMT conservative rightwing, some of his comments were surprisingly along the Marxist line of class analysis. He critiqued that many Overseas Chinese were superstitious, easily fooled by Kang Youwei 康有为 and Liang Qichao’s 梁启超 Protect Emperor Party and had overly rated the importance of imperial scholarly honour and official ranks. He noted that the big capitalists were greedy and tight-fisted about money and were “most non-revolutionary, most afraid of revolution” 最不革命、最怕革命. Hence, the main revolutionary supporters were found only among the small merchants and general workers, thus allowing the party to have a firm and unshakable revolutionary base among the Overseas Chinese in Nanyang. He lamented that in the current post-revolutionary era, Nanyang Chinese had lost their revolutionary spirit, becoming involved only for money and power, and turning disunited, especially coming under the influence of the Reorganization Clique (of the KMT) 改组派 and the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter abbreviated as CCP) 中国共产党 (which to him was particularly successful in mobilizing the Hainanese 海 南人 who had been neglected by the KMT’s Whampoa Military Academy 黄埔军校). Hu’s final words were a positive rallying cry for Nanyang to correct its current disunity and shortcomings and to recover its past honour in being the KMT’s base for revolutionary planning. He exhorted that “the contribution of Nanyang towards China’s revolutionary history would never be dismissed; it would only continue to grow endlessly.”18

“First Instance” in 1929 and Currency in the Early 1930s Despite some extant scholarship pointing towards Zhang Yongfu’s October 1933 publication as the “first instance” when the epithet was recorded for

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posterity in print, this is erroneous as there are two other accounts before that of Zhang. First is another Nanyang publication of the same year of 1933 but ahead of Zhang’s in hitting the market by about eight months (February versus October). This refers to the volume compiled by Huang Jingwan 黄警 顽 and his editorial team partly in honour of the Perak 霹雳 revolutionary involvement in Malaya. Second is an even earlier source in the form of the minutes of meeting of a conference opening speech by a senior KMT leader Dai Jitao 戴季陶 in November 1929. Huang Jingwan’s 黄警顽 volume aims at putting on record the significant contribution of Overseas Chinese. Apart from his tribute to the Perak revolutionary veteran Zheng Luosheng 郑螺生 (1870–1939) and Zheng’s own essay, the editorial team used a large quantity of facsimile of Sun’s letters on KMT letterhead, certificates of appreciation, and photographs taken in Nanyang to affirm the role of Overseas Chinese. It was in his opening short tribute to Zheng Luosheng that he evoked the epithet: “Hence Sun Yat-sen had called Overseas Chinese as the Mother of Revolution and the Chinese people had praised Nanyang as the source of revolutionary planning.”19 The “first instance” of capturing the epithet in print, however, should rightfully be credited to another hitherto neglected source. This came from a set of minutes taken at the November 1929 meeting of the KMT Central Training Department 中央训练部 in relations to the convening of an Overseas Chinese Education Conference 华侨教育会议. The epithet was recorded as part of the opening remarks made by the head of the Department and chair of the meeting, Dai Jitao 戴季陶 (1891–1949). Dai was also one of the early revolutionaries helping Sun and became one of major writers for the revolutionary newspaper Guanghua ribao (Kwong Wah Yit Poh) 光华日报 in Penang. After Sun’s death, he was in close alignment with Chiang Kai-shek, assuming top posts within the KMT party-state, including the headship of the Central Training Department 中央训练部 and the Examination Yuan 考试院. In this conference, he urged immediate educational assistance for Overseas Chinese because “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution and the education of Overseas Chinese actually had extraordinary linkages with the survival of the entire Chinese people.”20 The overall picture emerging from this analysis is that the exact sevencharacter epithet had first appeared in print only towards the end of the 1920s and gained currency in the 1930s. The early 1930s was a heightened period of Overseas Chinese nationalism for various reasons. Firstly, it carried

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the hope for the beginning of a new era. KMT’s Northern Expedition had come to an end in December 1928 and the new Nationalist Government was in place. Sun Yat-sen’s body housed temporarily in Beijing where he died was transported in an epic journey to settle in his newly-built mausoleum in Nanjing on 1 June 1929.21 Even though there were still intra-party squabbles and residual warlordism, there was optimism in the air. Secondly, as a corollary, there was a simultaneous mood of external danger. Japanese intrusions into China had begun with the two Jinan incidents 济南事件 of 1927 and 1928 and even more dramatically with the September 1931 Manchurian incident 九一八事件. These events had greatly provoked the rise of nationalist sentiment from within China and among the Overseas Chinese communities. Thirdly, as Zheng’s essay in Huang’s compendium alerts us, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the newly installed KMT partystate had struck a diplomatic compromise with the British colonial authorities in Singapore and Malaya on 2 April 1930 to shut down the local KMT party branches and offices. Apart from proscribing their activities, Zheng observed that this deal had the effect of causing hurt 痛心 and awkward feelings 感 觉为难 among the Overseas Chinese and they had been hoping for further discussion and possible repeal of these British restrictions.22 This mixture of aroused Overseas Chinese nationalism running in parallel to a sense of disappointment with the Chinese home authorities for not doing enough to look after the diasporic Chinese in the 1930s was also hinted at in a commentary written by Feng Lieshan 冯列山 in November 1937, soon after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. After finishing his study at Fudan University 复旦大学, Feng had gone on to Britain and Germany for graduate courses in journalism. While stopping over in Singapore and Malaya on his way home, he became highly impressed by the nationalistic fund-raising activities mounted by the Overseas Chinese to help China to resist Japan. He praised them effusively, regarding them as being much more in tune with the modern notions of nation-states, nationalism and citizenry responsibility than those Chinese who had never travelled abroad. He reminded his readers that “Sun Yat-sen had ever said ‘Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution’ and these words confirmed the status of the Overseas Chinese in the history of modern China.” However, without going into details, he lamented in the same breathe that intellectuals within China had the feelings in recent years that “overseas compatriots never let down their ancestral land; rather, their ancestral land disappointed them”.23

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Fading Away in the 1940s as in Chen Chunan and Chen Jiageng If the epithet is regarded to have gained wide currency in the early 1930s as discussed, then its absence in the key works of Tongmenghui veterans Chen Chunan (Tan Chor Nam) 陈楚楠 (1884–1971) and Chen Jiageng (Tan Kah Kee) 陈嘉庚 (1874–1961) is indicative of a downward trend by the early 1940s. The cycles of waxing and waning appear to have been set in motion. Motherhood status is not a constant. Chen Chunan was a fellow Nanyang revolutionary with Zhang Yongfu in Singapore, apparently at one stage rotating between them the chairmanship of the Singapore branch of the Tongmenghui. In 1940, Chen gave a speech which was later published in newspapers and an academic journal to recapture the history of Sun’s stay in a villa in Singapore.24 He began with a critique of the many inaccuracies in extant local and overseas writings and asserted his own claim of authenticity and truthfulness despite a simultaneous honest admission of incomplete memory and the loss of documents. He emphasized the revolutionary consciousness and activities of himself and Zhang Yongfu prior to coming into direct contact with Sun. Once the contact was made and the Tongmenghui branch in Singapore launched, Chen claimed that the branch played a crucial role in planning various revolutionary uprisings. However, he did not evoke the epithet at all. The closest was his general comment that the Tongmenghui in Nanyang grew stronger by the day and the Nanyang comrades had taken part in almost all the uprisings in China either by contributing money or effort.25 Chen Jiageng was another young man who had joined the republican revolution cause and Tongmenghui activities. He was one of those Overseas Chinese who had risen rapidly in wealth to become a tycoon by the late 1910s. His wealth and activist personality propelled him to the forefront of leadership of the Chinese community in Nanyang and he became the flag bearer of Overseas Chinese nationalism. This was despite his bankruptcy by 1934 due to the Great Depression and to his generous contribution to the local Nanyang society and China. When Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and began its invasion of Southeast Asia in December 1941, Chen Jiageng fled to Indonesia for hiding and it was from there that he penned his memoir.26 He recalled the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution and how his native province of Fujian had overthrown the Qing authorities. A meeting was convened in the Fujian Association in Singapore with himself elected as chairman to oversee the immediate raising of funds to assist and to maintain order in Fujian.

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Another large sum of money was remitted when Sun Yat-sen stopped over in Singapore on his return journey to China for the presidential inauguration and asked for additional support. There is no mention of the epithet in his 1946 memoir or in published compendiums of his pre-1949 speeches and writings.27 The only traceable instance is a 1940 speech which Tan had made when he referred briefly to the shortened phrase of “Mother of Revolution” 革命之母 in exhorting a Nanyang team of community leaders about to visit wartime China to remain humble and to avoid arrogance.28 In later years, it appears that political correctness had served to exaggerate the tenuous link between Chen Jiageng and this epithet. He was after all regarded as the leading Overseas Chinese of the republican era and having the seven-character phrase being relayed by him personally was deemed as important. Positioning Chen as the most important Overseas Chinese patriot, Mao Zedong 毛泽东 in 1945 had praised him as the “Banner of the Overseas Chinese, Glory of the People” 华侨旗帜、民族光辉. In 1950, Chen had become disillusioned with the KMT and the British colonial authorities and decided to leave Singapore and to return permanently to live in the newly founded People’s Republic of China (hereafter abbreviated as PRC) 中华人民共和国. Six years later, at the commemoration of the 90th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen’s birthday, Chen affirmed that Sun had uttered that epithet while on a visit in Singapore.29 This affirmation was in turn played up by Dai Xueji 戴学稷 who was writing in 2008 for the official website of “The Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang” 中国国民党革命委员会中央委员会, an organ first set up by Song Qinglin 宋庆龄 and the anti-Chiang Kai-shek faction in 1949 and later existed within the PRC so as to give a semblance of multi-party representation under CCP rule. Dai pronounced “the famous patriotic Overseas Chinese Chen Jiageng as ever recalling that Mr Sun was very touched after witnessing how the Overseas Chinese had supported the revolution and Sun had said that Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution more than once.”30

Wartime Burning of Books and Dimming of Revolutionary Past Diminishing usage of the slogan during the 1940s was due in part to the outbreak of Pacific War which threw the entire Southeast Asia into turmoil. The Japanese invasion and occupation from December 1941 to August 1945 brought about permanent damages to the institutional and personal memories of Overseas Chinese involvement in the 1911 Revolution and the

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early post-1911 struggles. Although their intense involvement in anti-Japanese nationalistic activities from late 1920s to late 1930s in Nanyang had carried their nationalist sentiment and revolutionary memory to a great height, it was a deep fear of discovery of this engagement and of possible severe punishment by the invading Japanese military forces that induced a massive self-burning of documents and records of all sorts in 1941–42, especially among Chinese associations and schools. Almost all the records and memorabilia were self-destroyed across a wide segment of the Nanyang community, leaving a big and irretrievable gap in the institutional memory of the pre-war era and this abyss still constitutes a serious barrier to most scholarship today. The panic burning and disruption of memory was one main reason why the Chinese revolutionary past dimmed considerably in the minds of the Overseas Chinese community in the postwar era. Other forces at work had compounded the problem. For instance, the harshness of the Japanese Occupation period had shifted the centre of gravity of the Nanyang collective memory to their wartime sufferings. The post-war era was also one of local struggle for decolonization and independence as well as for post-independent nation-building and modernization. The gap resulting from this burning of books is most telling as one tries to reconstruct fragments of the revolutionary past from the various post-war souvenir magazines of Chinese associations and schools. Many of them had very little information or simply grossed over their previous involvement in the making of China’s Republican Revolution while making an explicit reference to the impact of the large-scale voluntary burning. The commemorative volume of the 91st anniversary of the Malacca Hainan Association in September 1960 is a pertinent example. Despite having been formed in 1874, it has nothing to say about the 1911 Revolution and its pre-1942 anti-Japanese activities. The only fragment suggesting previous association with the KMT Government is its acknowledgment that the consul-general from the Republic of China Gao Lingbai 高凌白 had officiated at the opening of its renovated building in 1936. It regrets twice in separate pages that there is a lack of clarity in its pre-war history because all community associations had to suddenly stop their activities or to disband and almost all their written records were destroyed.31 Similarly, even as it notes that “the association had a name change most likely in 1911 when the Qing dynasty was overthrown”, the 100th anniversary commemorative volume (1989) of the Malaysia Selangor Hainan Association acknowledges the gap in its history and a profound lament about the destruction.32 In some cases, apart from the self-burning, losses was also due to other circumstances such

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as the premises being abused during the Japanese Occupation period or when it was rented out to irresponsible tenants to etch out a living.33 The 1993 re-publication of the 1941 Du Nan xiansheng aisilu is an example of the attempt to recover a rare fragment of Nanyang revolutionary involvement in the 1911 Revolution lost during the burning of books prior to the Japanese invasion.34 Du Nan (Too Nam) 杜南 (1854–1939) was a Chinese tutor to Sun Yat-sen in Honolulu and a veteran Tongmenghui leader in Nanyang, taking direct charge of the Kuala Lumpur branch for many years. He died in October 1939 and a grand commemoration of his contributions towards the KMT party-state was held for him on 29 March 1940 (anniversary of the Huanghuagang Uprising). However, even before it could be distributed or put on sale, almost all copies of this 1941 commemorative volume were burnt to ashes on the eve of Japan’s invasion because of the concern that many anti-Japanese organizations and leaders in Singapore and Malaya could be identified and implicated through this publication. It was his grandson (from the family of the third son) who decided to have it republished in 1993 to commemorate the grandfather and to retrieve a part of the community history. Indicative of Du Nan’s strong ties with the KMT in the 1940s, many pages of the volume are filled with memorial plaques and tributes offered by KMT leaders and institutions. Photographs of the memorial service also show the funeral ceremony with the typical Sun Yat-sen photo at the centre stage being flanked by the two flags of the party and Republic of China (ROC) state and with these overlooking the entire hall. Most tellingly, one part of the huge vertical cloth banner couplet and a plaque had framed his contribution as affirming the “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution” 华侨故是 革命母.35 Another couplet offered a similar tribute: “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution, Du Nan is a veteran Tongmenghui member” 华侨是 革命之母、先生乃同盟旧人.36 The epithet was repeated twice more in the volume, including his grandson’s own epilogue piece in the re-publication.37 The dynamics of forgetting and remembering is indeed worthy of attention, and this too can be gleaned from the anniversary souvenir magazines of a KMT-associated reading club.

Last Surviving KMT-Associated Symbol in Singapore The Tongde shubaoshe (self-preferred translated name is “United Chinese Library”) 同德书报社 is a reading club founded by Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary followers in 1910. Its signage written horizontally on a wooden panel and mounted at the front of its premise today is said to be penned by

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Sun. Some of the other reading clubs were initially set up independently as a kind of public library to promote reading and the learning of current affairs. However, their potential as a tool for revolution was quickly grasped by Sun at the turn of the twentieth century and he issued personal instructions to convert them and to set up a few more new ones. They became the front organizations of the Tongmenghui and later the KMT and some even became formal party branches in that locality. It has been estimated that there were several hundreds of them in Chinese communities the world over.38 In Singapore, there were possibly as many as eleven but only Tongde shubaoshe has survived to the present day. It has four extant commemorative magazines (25th, 70th, 90th and 100th anniversaries) to enable us to recapture its history and direction. The 25th anniversary volume of 1935 has at first been assumed burnt and lost forever as part of the self-imposed destruction in advance of the Japanese invasion. It was only during the recent months of 2010 celebrations that its club management committee managed to chance upon it in their storeroom. Within this rediscovered volume, there is a short essay on “25 Years in Review” and it is evidently conscious of the works of Feng Ziyou, Zhang Yongfu and Hu Hanmin, and has even carried excerpts from them.39 There is no evocation of the epithet. Neither did the two calligraphic celebratory tributes offered by party veterans Zou Lu and Zhang Yongfu in this publication.40 It is only in the plaque contributed by Huang Yankai 黄 延凯, the ROC consul-general based in Penang that one could glean an abbreviated version of the epithet in praise of the reading club as the “Mother of Revolution” 革命之母.41 By the 70th anniversary of 1980, ties between rapidly changing Singapore as an independent young nation-state and the past revolutionary record of its Chinese community had been considerably diluted. Yet the Chinesespeaking community appeared anxious to do its part in preventing a complete break. Contents of this commemoration magazine reflect the distancing and connecting. Of the possibly eleven reading clubs in early Singapore (some of which were organized on a dialect/native-place basis), Tongde shubaoshe is the only one left standing.42 From the wide range of photographs showcasing its premise, the epithet was nowhere in sight. It has also not been written into any of the commemorative plaques or tributes offered for the 70th anniversary, even though the word revolution has appeared in the context of KMT’s anti-communist rhetoric. For instance, Bai Chongxi’s 白崇禧 (KMT general of Guangxi clique 广西派) tribute urges the Tongde shubaoshe to “spread the revolutionary spirit and secure the anti-communist victory” 发扬

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革命精神、争取反共胜利. Another one hints at the historical role played by the organization as the “Source Spring of Revolution” 革命源泉.43 An essay within this volume, while not invoking the epithet, captures the awkward tension of maintaining such post-war links with the Chinese revolutionary past. On the one hand, it emphasizes the important role played by Overseas Chinese in Sun’s revolution and argues that one must not let the long linkages with the Chinese Revolution be severed. On the other hand, it recognizes that the environment has changed significantly in the previous thirty odd years, with the Chinese Revolution turning inwards and many Southeast Asian countries becoming independent and leading to a change in national identity of the Overseas Chinese. It tries to get around the dilemma by defining and supporting Chinese “revolutionary” spirit, ideas and activities rather broadly under the vague generic slogans of freedom, equality, harmony, unity and charity.44 One other essay directly evokes the epithet and reminds its readers that the Tongde shubaoshe was one of the main overseas bases for Sun to promote his revolution and that it had also played a role in many key events from the beginning of the century to the 1980s, including being involved with the anti-Qing struggle for a republic, Northern Expedition, anti-Japanese war, anti-communism, anti-Soviet Union, cultural renaissance, famine relief and charity. In the author’s view, “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution” and this is one epithet which “deserves to be treasured and remembered and for us to persevere to the end and never to give up”.45 The most pertinent item in this 70th anniversary volume is Peng Songtao’s 彭松涛 essay reflecting on Singapore’s contribution towards the 1911 Revolution and the historical significance of the reading club: The words “Overseas Chinese” was highly popular during the revolutionary era and period of war against Japan. Sun Yat-sen had offered the 7-characters “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution” for an office panel banner of Shaonian zhongguo chenbao (Morning Newspaper of Young China) 少年中国晨报. This phrase has also been continuously cited by people who discuss the “Overseas Chinese problem” 华侨问题. The contribution of Overseas Chinese towards the revolution has been etched into the main accounting books 总簿 by this phrase. As an Overseas Chinese, one should feel proud of it.46

Peng’s essay also recycles Hu Hanmin’s words on “Nanyang as the revolutionary planning location, Nanyang as the revolutionary base”.47 Its concluding paragraphs lament the neglect of the Serene Sunset Villa (Wanqing yuan) 晚晴园 and Tongde shubanshe, pointing his finger at the Chinese

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Chamber of Commerce for displaying an attitude of tiredness in being held responsible for the villa’s maintenance and the Singapore Government for hesitating to gazette the reading club as a national monument for preservation. It argues that these are the only two remaining historical relics which could demonstrate Singapore’s exceptionally huge contribution towards the Chinese revolution and Chinese history. As a forerunner to the government’s latter sentiment in the 1990s (especially that of Minister George Yeo), it notes that Singapore had made enormous contribution towards the great enterprise of world progress despite its small territory.48 Xing Jizhong 邢济众 served as the editor of the 90th anniversary commemorative magazine (2000). Given his broad scholarly connections, he was able to invite a wide range of writer friends from Taiwan and China to contribute towards this volume. Moreover, Singapore in the previous two decades had also changed the tone of its governance to shift towards an “Asian values” discourse and a return to ethnic roots. This was manifested partly in the 1997 decision to support an extensive renovation of the Serene Sunset Villa which eventually reopened in November 2001 as the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall. Therefore, this commemorative volume is replete with the epithet. Zhou Xiaozhong 周孝中 from Jinan University 暨 南大学 affirmed that: “In Sun’s leadership of the democratic revolution, regardless of whether it is in terms of manpower, material or finance, it had close connections with Overseas Chinese. Hence, Sun Yat-sen had a famous phrase ‘Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution’. This was to give high praise to the contribution of the Overseas Chinese.”49 Another essay reiterates that Sun had proclaimed “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution” and argues that “it was only with the active support of Overseas Chinese that China’s modern revolution could have succeeded”.50 Wang Zhenchun 王振春, probably borrowing from Peng Songtao’s piece in the previous 70th anniversary magazine, also noted that Sun in San Francisco had offered the epithet on an inscribed board for a newspaper office and reaffirmed that the early Tongde shubaoshe and other revolutionary organizations had been playing the role of the “Mother of Revolution”.51 The 100th anniversary commemorative magazine of 2010 repeats several pieces from the 70th anniversary volume, including the essay by Peng Songtao. It also includes a long biography by later-day KMT leader Zheng Yanfen 郑彦棻 on Sun Yat-sen’s overseas activities but without evoking the epithet and offering no overall remarks on Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution.52 The epithet is conspicuously absent throughout the volume except for the reprinting of Peng’s essay.

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The Tongde shubaoshe has survived up to today as the last vestige of an institutional link between Singapore and the KMT, one which goes back to pre-1911. Apart from the publication of anniversary magazines, this linkage has also been maintained through its several yearly rituals centering on the birthday and death anniversaries of Sun Yat-sen and the Double Ten outbreak of Wuchang Uprising. However, like many Chinese clans and native-place associations in Singapore, it too is facing a serious problem of membership decline and leadership vacuum as the older generation passes away. Despite the rich historical resonance, the connection over the years has become increasingly more symbolic than substantive. The dilution would have been much more serious if not for the deliberate effort of the KMT in maintaining a strong interest towards the Overseas Chinese and using them as part of its precious arsenal in its Cold War battle against communist mainland China after its retreat to island Taiwan in 1949.

Major Plank of Cold War Narrative Emanating from Taiwan With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the loss of mainland China by the KMT to the CCP and its retreat to Taiwan were no longer just an outcome of a civil war or domestic struggle for power. They had been elevated into being part of the global Cold War between the “democratic free world” and the “totalitarian socialist states”. Taiwan became a bastion of the former and the KMT was most eager to lean on its past linkages with the Overseas Chinese to mobilize them for its cause to extinguish its communist rivals and recover the lost territory. The seven-character epithet became a choice ammunition for the Taiwanese authorities from the 1950s to the 1980s. Its significance was most visible in messages offered by Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo 蒋经国. For example, during the 10th Overseas Chinese Festival 第十届华侨 节 on 21 October 1962, Chiang Kai-shek pronounced: If we were to recall the success of the 1911 Revolution, the overseas compatriots had made enormous contribution and hence our Founding Father had said “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution” and they had permanently left a brilliant page in revolutionary history. I deeply hope that the new generation of overseas compatriots can emulate the spirit of these previous martyrs … [and] make even greater contribution towards the current righteous battle against the communists and Soviet Union.53

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A year later, one of Chiang’s key military officers Huang Zhenwu 黄珍 吾 echoed his top commander’s message in a book dedicated to the topic of Overseas Chinese and even gave it a new twist by substituting Taiwan’s national sovereign name “Republic of China” into the epithet: The founding father had said that “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution”. I can also say that “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of the Republic of China” 华侨是中华民国之母 … Today, the Republic of China and the Chinese race is again confronted with the crisis of survival. Our 600 million compatriots in mainland China are in extreme suffering, encountering continuous natural disasters and famine to the point of waiting for death! … Our government should quickly plan a counterattack so as to save our people and fulfill its responsibility. Our “Mother of Chinese Revolution” and “Mother of the Republic of China”, comprising of 16 million Overseas Chinese, should collectively prompt and assist our government towards the early completion of the great enterprise of counterattack and re-conquering our country.54

When the Cultural Revolution in mainland China was near its height, Chiang in 1968 exhorted: “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution” and Overseas Chinese Festival is the symbol of unity and patriotism of overseas compatriots … In these ten over years, the Maoist communists and bandits had implemented their overseas united front conspiracy … yet our overseas compatriots had maintained their nationalism, able to distinguish the good from the evil, persevered amidst danger and difficulties to stay on course and to contribute money and effort to the great enterprise of repelling the communists and recovering the country.55

Almost identical messages with the direct evocation of the epithet and targeting at the “communist bandits” were made by Chiang Kai-shek for the 19th, 20th and 22nd Overseas Chinese Festival in 1971, 1972 and 1974 respectively.56 His death in 1975 and the eventual passing of leadership baton over to his son Chiang Ching-kuo after a short interregnum did not change the course of leaning on this slogan as a way of mobilizing Overseas Chinese support for Taiwan’s strident anti-communist Cold War cause. In a political report made to the KMT national party congress in November 1976, Chiang Ching-kuo said: Our party is without limits in the cherishing of and having a sense of responsibility towards the mainland compatriots. It is similarly so

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towards our 20 million overseas compatriots! For many years, the overseas compatriots had provided the country with hearty support, material strength and financial resources as well as hammered at the communist bandits’ overseas united front conspiracy.… There are an increasing number of overseas compatriots returning to [Taiwan] to serve, invest and study.… Whenever I see them returning from afar, a sense of excitement and shame would build up in me! ‘Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution’ and, at every moment of difficulty in revolution, I would increasingly realized that this sentence is definitely true and entirely accurate 千真万确.57

Towards the end of 1978, a double political whammy hit Taiwan. First was President Jimmy Carter’s announcement of the transfer of U.S. diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to PRC on 16 December. This was followed by Deng Xiaoping’s manoeuvre at the Third Plenum of 11th National Party Congress of the CCP which had convened from 22 December to jettison Maoist policies and to embark on market reform and open door. Faced with the unprecedented challenge, Chiang Ching-kuo tried to rally his folks that the PRC’s talk of “modernization” is merely a “trick” and it could “either be a proof that communism is bankrupt or a lie to bluff the world by fooling the world’s politicians in order to strengthen its tyrannical rule”.58 He urged the Overseas Chinese to uphold their patriotism: “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution” and we can see this from many historical evidence since the founding of the Republic of China. “Overseas Chinese” and “patriotism” appears to be two phrases which are forever linked together. Whenever we mention the Overseas Chinese, there would definitely be the manifestation of patriotism. Whenever we mention patriotism, there would surely be the participation of Overseas Chinese … Everyone can see clearly that the recent American announcement to establish diplomatic relations with the communist bandits has dealt a major blow to human being’s struggle for freedom and democracy. This of course had compounded our difficulties in the big enterprise of recovering and reconstructing our nation. But this is also an opportunity for us to hone our courage and wisdom and to test our determination and confidence.59

As part of the concerted effort to overcome these setbacks and to rally the Overseas Chinese to its side, a major oral history conference of about a dozen party-state veterans and scholars gathered in the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall 中正纪念堂 on 4 August 1980 to give presentations on the

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chosen theme of “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution”. These proceedings were organized by and published in the December 1980 issue of Jindai Zhongguo [Modern China] 近代中国, a journal supervised by KMT leader Qin Xiaoyi. It was republished almost immediately as the second part of a March 1981 book on Huaqiao yu Zhongguo guomin geming yundong 华侨与 中国国民革命运动.60 In line with the conference theme and political agenda, speaker after speaker evoked the epithet repeatedly and their evocations need not be culled and reiterated here. Together with the above messages from the top KMT leadership, the epithet on Overseas Chinese had clearly become a major plank of the Cold War. It was into this partisan environment that a team of Nanyang scholars organized by the South Seas Society in Singapore had plunged into when they held a joint conference with four Taiwanese institutions in 1986 to examine the relationship between Nanyang Chinese and the 1911 Revolution.

Strenuous Reassertions at the 1986 Taiwan-Nanyang Conference The impetus for revisiting this topic was because of changing scholarship in Nanyang since the 1970s. In 1972, Ouyang Changda 欧阳昌大 as a history graduate of the Nanyang University published a major piece of revisionist work which dealt a bodily blow to the Singapore dimension of “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution”. Prompted by Zhang Yongfu’s 1933 teaser on whether the Overseas Chinese truly deserved the alleged Sun epithet, Ouyang examined in detail the response of the Chinese community in Singapore to the revolutionary overtures.61 The lack of support in various areas became evident to him. Most of the revolutionary newspapers had a short lifespan with insufficient readers and funding. Reading clubs were not that closely tuned in to revolutionary activities. Financial contribution was not substantial and most poured in only after the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising. He also noted the near absence of participants coming from Singapore in all revolutionary attempts, except for the 29 March 1911 Huanghuagang Uprising 黄花岗起义 which had eight. Moreover, although ethnic Chinese concentration in Singapore was then many times more than other urban centres in Southeast Asia and in Japan, party membership and participation in revolutionary activities had been disappointingly low. At about the same time, another Nanyang University history graduate, Yan Qinghuang (Yen Ching Hwang) 颜清湟, ploughed through essentially the same materials during his overseas graduate studies but arriving at a more

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favourable judgement. Based on his 1969 Australian National University doctoral dissertation, Yan’s 1976 book makes a strong pitch for the significant role played by Overseas Chinese in the 1911 Revolution, singling out the contribution of those in Singapore and Malaya as the most important.62 Notably, there was no cross-referencing between these two works even though Yan also readily admitted that the republican revolutionaries had faced great difficulties in garnering support and there were a few major obstacles to the mobilization of these diasporic communities.63 Yan believed that all these negative developments were on balance not enough to outweigh the contribution made by Overseas Chinese in terms of propaganda, sanctuary provision, manpower and finance. He arrived at a positive conclusion. Nonetheless, there is a slight hint of hesitation in Yan’s 1976 book because he chose to pronounce his judgement in a rather indirect and roundabout manner. The first line of the introduction states that “With the exception of the revolution in 1911, the Overseas Chinese have played a rather obscure and insignificant role in the revolutions of modern China.”64 The last line of the conclusion states that “If the financial contribution of the Overseas Chinese was indispensable to the success of the revolution, and the Overseas Chinese were to be termed by Dr Sun Yat-sen as ‘The Mother of the Revolution’, then the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya deserve to be honoured first and foremost.”65 This barely noticeable hesitation vaporized with the passage of time as evident at the 1986 Taiwan-Nanyang conference. A decade later, Yan had become much more direct and blunt at the conference organized jointly by the South Seas Society of Singapore 新加坡 南洋学会 (comprising primarily but not solely of scholars associated with the Nanyang University) and four other research institutions from Taiwan (Chinese History Society 中国历史学会, Academia Historica 国史馆, Institute of Modern History of the Academia Sinica 中央研究院近代史研 究所, and International Relations Research Centre of the National Cheng Chi University 国立政治大学国际关系研究中心). Team members from Singapore constituted nearly half of the contributors. Two sets of conference proceedings were eventually published.66 Yan had been visibly upset by the increasing academic trend since 1970s in both the Western and Chinese scholarly world to question the achievements of Sun Yat-sen, the republican revolutionary movement and the 1911 Revolution. He launched into a strong response: “Revisionist historians belittle the role of the Tongmenghui by rejecting its status as the mainstream of the revolution, and they also deny the contribution of the Overseas Chinese by claiming that the revolution was not made outside China. But this has contradicted historical facts.” He declared his intention to “reaffirm some of my conclusions which I

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believe are still valid” and argued that “when the 1911 Revolution is viewed in its totality, the Overseas Chinese did play an important role in the movement leading up to the overthrow of the Manchus”.67 The joint conference in fact became a platform for an unusual display of ideological Cold War sentiment and a major reassertion of KMT orthodox interpretations on Sun Yat-sen, Tongmenghui and the 1911 Revolution. The opening speeches by the national leaders of Taiwan were peppered with remarks that Taiwan “has spectacular achievements, especially in attaining outstanding economic growth which is regarded as a miracle by the Free World and even the CCP which has stolen mainland China cannot but admit that Taiwan has made great progress”.68 The CCP was accused of using “historiography as a weapon of united front battle”, “history in the service of politics”, and guilty of “thoroughly overthrowing the Chinese traditional interpretation of history and converting to the viewpoints of MarxismLeninism and Mao Zedong Thoughts to manage historical problems”.69 In particular, the CCP was charged with having “distorted the history of the 1911 Revolution as a Bourgeois Revolution” and “deliberately diluted the great achievements of the revolutionary pioneers and Overseas Chinese as led by Sun Yat-sen”. This was regarded as nothing less than “a malicious attempt to falsely borrow the name of scholarship in order to conduct the evil battles of united front”. The call was for more of such international scholarly conferences to expose such communist fraud.70 In such a politically-charged atmosphere, non-Taiwanese scholar Yan Qinghuang’s categorical stand against revisionist scholarship and the reiteration of his earlier research findings in stronger terms made him the star performer of the Taiwan conference. His paper prompted a conference commentator to warn that American revisionist scholars such as Joseph Esherick, Edward Rhoads and Philip Huang should be clearly labelled as the “New Left” and their influences ought not to be underestimated as they were then training future batches of young historians located in various important American universities.71 Another concurred that the community of American historians had since the 1960s come under the influence of the New Left which emphasized the achievement of the Chinese Communists and deliberately diminished the importance of the 1911 Revolution and Sun Yat-sen’s historical standing.72 A third person cautioned that “the Chinese Communists recently have been paying very close attention to the study of Overseas Chinese history and its main purpose is nothing but to diminish the standing of Sun Yat-sen in leading the revolution and to drive a wedge between the Overseas Chinese and the Republic of China”.73

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As part of the effort to forge closer relations between Taiwan and its Overseas Chinese constituency, Qin Xiaoyi personally hosted a cocktail dinner for the Singapore participants and firmly endorsed Yan’s theme on the centrality of the Overseas Chinese: “Everybody knows that our founding father clearly affirmed ‘Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution’ and based on the historical truth of the revolutionary founding of the Republic of China, we can say that ‘Nanyang Chinese were undoubtedly the mother of 1911 Revolution’ 南洋华人实为辛亥革命之母.”74 The above strenuous reassertions in Taipei in 1986 reflects the tense political atmosphere in Taiwan in the mid-1980s when the winds of anticommunist Cold War was blowing fiercely as the island was smiting from the rupture in diplomatic relations with the United States, Deng Xiaoping policy of reopening China and reforming its socialist economy, and SinoBritish agreement of 1984 on the imminent handing over of Hong Kong. When sporadic social unrests among workers and students broke out within mainland China from the mid-1980s as a result of the dramatic socioeconomic transformation, the KMT Taiwan seized upon it as a possible opening to retaliate. One Taiwanese agency in the forefront of mobilizing Overseas Chinese for its campaign is the Overseas Chinese Association 华 侨协会 which had been churning out a series of Overseas Chinese youth publications. One of its publications in 1988 concluded with the following rally call evoking Sun’s epithet: The Founding Father had claimed that “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution”. The reason is that whenever the ancestral land encountered difficulties and crises, the Overseas Chinese would always stay close with the ancestral land and unite together to resolve the difficulties. Nowadays, faced the very difficult prospect of countering the communists and recovering the nation, all our overseas compatriots should follow the fearless example set by their forefathers in revolutionary participation . . . draw a clear line against the bandits, resist the sweet temptations of their united front tactics, resist the investment profit enticements offered by their ‘opening of economy’ … [we should] encourage mainland students or cadres located overseas to defect towards freedom, support the mainland democratic movements.…, provoke widespread anti-Communist actions, prompt the early collapse of the Communist regime.…75

Awakening Dragon and Explorations of PRC Scholarship Despite the constant taunting from Taiwan from the 1950s to 1980s, the PRC had not resorted to such a parallel mobilization of the Overseas Chinese

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and repeated usage of the epithet. It was restrained by its Overseas Chinese policy of self-determination which Zhou Enlai 周恩来 had announced at the 1955 Bandung Conference. There were also the internal disruptions caused by the Cultural Revolution. It was not until its policy reversal towards embracing open door and market reform that wooing the Overseas Chinese became important again. Nevertheless, there was an early need to provide an official interpretation on Sun Yat-sen and the Overseas Chinese involvement in the 1911 Revolution. On this, the foundation was laid by Wu Yuzhang’s 吴玉章 The Revolution of 1911: A Great Democratic Revolution of China which was a book issued to mark the 50th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution in 1961 so as to help people “comprehend why this revolution took place at that time in China, what it achieved and why it failed”.76 There was no mention of the epithet but it laid down the basic Marxist framework of viewing the Overseas Chinese as being … a part of the Chinese bourgeoisie resided in foreign countries. Many of them had originally been small merchants, some had begun as workers. They had few connections with the feudal ruling class in the home country. Having come into contact with Western bourgeois culture and at the same time discriminated against by the foreigners, they were highly dissatisfied with the corrupt and impotent Qing government. It was natural for them to entertain revolutionary sentiments. It was among the Overseas Chinese bourgeoisie that Dr Sun Yat-sen’s activities began.77

A more direct comment offered at the same anniversary commemoration was that of Dong Biwu 董必武. He avoided the stock epithet closely associated with the KMT historiography and instead framed the Overseas Chinese as follows: Overseas Chinese was a strong supporter of the 1911 Revolution. These revolutionary Overseas Chinese comprised of capitalists in the realm of commerce and industry and with even more were workers and small commerce-industrialists. Being overseas, they had suffered greatly under the oppression of counter-revolutionary imperialism and were very much hoping that there would be a prosperous and strong ancestral land. They not only contributed financially to the revolutionary activities of Sun Yat-sen, they participated in them actively. About one third of the 72 martyrs who died at the Huanghuagang uprising were Overseas Chinese. They were the outstanding children of the Chinese people and pride of the entire community of patriotic Overseas Chinese.78

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The turbulent decade of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 meant the non-celebration of the 60th anniversary (1971) and any serious academic interest on the subject of Overseas Chinese. Those returned Overseas Chinese and citizens with foreign connections were blacklisted and they suffered greatly during the chaotic decade. The return to power of Deng Xiaoping and his use of Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in December 1978 to launch the market reform and open door policy signalled the changing of the tide. Liao Chengzhi 廖承志 who was the son of the assassinated veteran revolutionary Liao Zhongkai 廖仲恺 and who was taking charge of Overseas Chinese affairs had even proceeded slightly ahead to initiate CCP policy review on Overseas Chinese during at least two major party conferences in December 1977 and January 1978.79 The policy reversal may have its biggest impact on economics but the reverberations were also visible in the scholarly world. The first major stride which Dengist China took towards new scholarship in the realm of 1911 Revolution occurred during the 70th anniversary commemoration in 1981. The Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academic of Social Sciences in Beijing issued a special volume of collected documents on Huaqiao yu Xinhai geming 华侨与辛亥革命.80 There is no new research in this collection because it is essentially a reprint (mostly excerpts) of previous important publications about Overseas Chinese involvement. The team of editors acknowledges that “Overseas Chinese had made enormous contribution towards the 1911 Revolution but yet there had been very little and very scattered documentary records about this facet.” After citing Sun Yat-sen for having proclaimed that “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution”, it brings in Dong Biwu’s pronouncement twenty years ago as a way of justifying the special publication for commemoration.81 The climax of this 70th anniversary was a major conference held in Wuhan in October 1981 for more than a hundred PRC and foreign scholars, with 107 papers being presented. These were eventually published as a three-volume conference proceeding in mid-1983. In the realm of Overseas Chinese, the arguably most important essay in this collection is the piece written by a team of researchers from the Xiamen University 厦 门大学.82 Even more significant is that the team members drawn mainly from the Nanyang Research Institute 南洋研究所 of the university was able to secure state funding in 1987 as part of the Seventh Five-Year Research Grant to expand their research project for a more complete charting of “the contributions of Overseas Chinese towards the revolution and reconstruction of their ancestral land”. Their final publication came out in December 1993, totally as many as 767 pages and packed full of data on many facets of

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linkages between China and its diaspora.83 This has become an important reference text and sourcebook for Overseas Chinese studies. Its contents and lines of inquiry have turned into a model template for many subsequent writings, especially those from within the PRC and sometimes it had been relied upon without adequate citation. In this 1993 Xiamen University research work, direct reference to the epithet was made twice. The epithet was firmly attributed to Sun Yat-sen: “Sun Yat-sen had on numerous occasions highly praised the great contributions of compatriot Chinese towards the 1911 Revolution. Almost everyone knows that he had ever uttered ‘Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution’. If we were to examine the position and function of the Overseas Chinese within the entire revolution, we would easily understand the deep meaning embedded in this phrase.” It states that “these words formally appeared in written words” 正式见于文字记载 for the first time in Zhang Yongfu’s account (which is erroneous as discussed earlier).84 In the judgment of these researchers, “among all the comments which Sun Yat-sen had made about the Overseas Chinese, the most weighty, most substantive form and also most widely circulated words is “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution”. They cited numerous passages from Sun’s own speeches, letters and writings which emphasized the critical importance of Overseas Chinese in his revolutionary attempt, including his speech which was delivered to a gathering at the KMT party branch in Melbourne and that of the preface he wrote for Tongmenghui yanyi (both of which have been discussed earlier in this chapter).85 They then posed the question of “How then should we interpret and handle these famous words?” They suggested that we should regard them as a “substantive affirmation and encouragement” of the role played by Overseas Chinese. They went on to provide a detailed Marxist-flavoured analysis of the Overseas Chinese society by including views on “medium or small bourgeoisie”, “the laboring class”, as well as their relationship with the Qing court, “feudal forces of China”, and the colonial authorities. A list of names was provided to highlight those contributors of 1911 Revolution who had made the extreme sacrifice of “foregoing their family and entire fortune” 倾家荡产.86 Their most important insight is that they contested the epithet’s privileging of outside forces in understanding the dynamics of the 1911 Revolution. The “Outside versus Inside” analysis came to be borrowed or plagiarized by many other subsequent writings. Without providing names or citations, they argued that some people had misunderstood the “true meaning” 真实含义 of this epithet and had “overly emphasized” 过分强

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调 the role played by the Overseas Chinese, to the point when they even proposed the notion that “there would have been no revolution without the Overseas Chinese” 无华侨即无革命 . To them, this was a distortion of the relationship between “China Within” and “China Without” 国内与国 外的关系. Firstly, this was because the elemental nurturing forces for this revolution came from the nationalist contradictions 民族矛盾 and class conflicts 阶级矛盾 within modern China. Ever since the Opium War, the Chinese society had been in great turbulence and the “root of revolution was still located within China” 革命的根子还是在国内. Secondly, the Overseas Chinese themselves were pushed towards the revolutionary path only by forces unleashed by “internal revolutionary storms” 内地革命风 潮. Thirdly, the Overseas Chinese were awakened by China’s own bourgeois revolutionary leaders such as Sun Yat-sen and Zou Rong 邹容 who wrote the virulent anti-Manchu tract Gemingjun (Revolutionary Army) 革命军.87 While the Xiamen University researchers were working on their projects, another group centred in Beijing had been stimulated by the 70th anniversary and launched a new organization called the Zhongguo huaqiao lishi xuehui 中国华侨历史学会 (China’s History Society on the Overseas Chinese) in 1981. The society quickly proceeded to organize three major conferences at the national level and participated in numerous local seminars. In 1988–89, it selected sixty-eight essays and published them in a two-volume collection which has become a landmark publication of the Beijing association.88 Hong Sisi 洪丝丝 who wrote its preface and contributed an essay advocated the need to probe deeper into issues despite political sensitivities and difficulties with terminology over the term “Overseas Chinese”. He mentioned Sun’s epithet as being “most widely circulated” and cited Zhang Yongfu as the source. He cautioned that this epithet should be taken only “as a metaphor” with Sun using “figurative speech to express how his revolution began from amongst the Overseas Chinese” and thus one “should not measure its accuracy in a mechanical fashion”. 89 His advice on the metaphorical dimension and need to avoid a mechanical approach was quickly taken up by other PRC writers.90 Zhou Nanjing 周南京 of Peking University 北京大学 who eventually rose to leadership position within this History Society and his university colleague Li Anshan 李安山 were the two Beijing-based scholars most eager to frame the epithet at a higher level approaching that of a theoretical construct. By attaching the adjective “lun” 论 to the epithet, Zhou posited a “Theory of Overseas Chinese as Mother of Revolution” 华侨革命之母论 as sitting among other “li lun” (theories) 理论 which he regarded as having

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been used to understand the history of Overseas Chinese — including the “Overseas Chinese colonialism theory” 华侨殖民论 associated with Liang Qichao 梁启超, “Theory of Plural Society” 多元社会论 of J.S. Furnivall, “Class Theory of Overseas Chinese Society” 华侨社会阶级论 of Marxism, “National Melting Pot Theory” 民族熔炉论 of William Skinner as well as “Theory of External China” 外中国论 and “Theory of Multiple Identities” 多种认同论 of Wang Gungwu.91 However, it appears that Zhou’s approach has its limits because the simplistic addition of an adjective “lun”/theory to Sun’s epithet without any further layering of sophisticated logic and content is unlikely to make this proposition to view the epithet as a theoretical construct an attractive one. Zhou’s colleague Li Anshan also made a parallel thrust by arguing that the Overseas Chinese studies in the 1930s had shifted away from “direct observatory narratives” 直观描述 to “theoretical explorations” 理论探讨. One aspect was the “Overseas Chinese as Mother of Revolution Theory” 华 侨革命之母论 which to him was a manifestation of the influential “Overseas Chinese Nationalism Theory” 华侨民族主义论.92 Li also went on to express his concern that privileging the role of Overseas Chinese was problematic because it introduced a debate on insider-outsider prioritization: The basic elements of all Chinese revolutions (inclusive of 1911) could only form on Chinese soil; Revolutionary thinking could only ferment and matured on Chinese land; Revolutionary organization could only be effectively used among the Chinese people; the main revolutionary strength could only have come from the masses from within China. As a social reality, revolution itself is a natural product from the intensification of various contradictions from within China. Because the major leaders of 1911 Revolution all had overseas experience and adding on to this was the great assistance extended by the Overseas Chinese, this had led them to often neglect the social basis from within China which were in support of the revolution. Because too much emphasis have been given to the contributions and culture of Overseas Chinese as well as the relative neglect of internal revolutionary strength, this theory has found to be lacking in terms of analyzing the main reason and driving force for the Chinese Revolution.93

Coincidentally, while the PRC scholarship was addressing the perceived imbalance of “an over-dominating outside perspective” as embedded in the logic of the epithet of “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution”, there was a competitive stirring in Singapore and Penang to accentuate their respective Nanyang role in the 1911 Revolution from outside of China.

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This Nanyang counter-current was manifested through the popular culture dynamics of museum display, theatre performance and movie making.

Images in the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall of Singapore The Serene Sunset Villa in Singapore was built in the 1880s by a local wealthy merchant reportedly as a love-nest for his mistress. Its quantum leap to revolutionary fame began when Zhang Yongfu bought the villa in 1905 for his aged mother to spend her sunset years but later offered it as a base for Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary activities. Sun visited Singapore eight times from 1900 to the January 1912 inauguration of the Republic of China and stayed at the villa on three occasions. Other prominent republican revolutionary leaders who had also stayed there included Huang Xing 黄兴, Wang Jingwei 汪精卫 and Hu Hanmin. It was under this roof that several of the anti-Qing uprisings were planned. During his third visit in 1906, Sun used the villa to launch the Singapore branch of the Tongmenghui. In July 1908, this branch was upgraded to be the Nanyang headquarters. However, the Singapore office quickly plunged into decline and a disappointed Sun decided to relocate the Nanyang headquarters northwards to Penang in 1909–10. After the 1911 Revolution, the villa went through several cycles of change which need not be discussed in detail here.94 In 1994, the Singapore Government decided to gazette it as a national monument and, under the leadership of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, it underwent a major renovation from 1997 to be transformed into a memorial hall. George Yeo, then Minister for Information and the Arts, was the prime mover in having the dilapidated villa changed into what he regarded as “a cultural shrine for all ethnic Chinese Singaporeans”.95 The grand old statesman Lee Kuan Yew gave his endorsement by opening the restored villa as the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall 孙中山南洋纪念馆 on 12 November 2001 in celebration of the 135th anniversary of Sun’s birth. He also agreed to have a partial quote from his interview with Time magazine engraved onto a three-metre tall granite stele erected in the front garden: “One man changed China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen” 孙中山: 一个改变 中国命运的人.96 The focus of the exhibits is on Sun’s ties with the Southeast Asian Chinese communities, including his visits to Singapore, Penang, Ipoh, Kuala Pilah of Negri Sembilan, Kuala Lumpur as well as outlying rubber

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plantations and tin mines. The centrepiece is a six metre-by-three metre oil painting entitled “Overseas Chinese — Mother of the Revolution” 华侨是 革命之母 by a China-born artist depicting Sun in 1907 addressing more than a hundred tin miners and rubber plantation workers and their families at Kampar in the Kinta Valley of Perak, Malaysia. It lays claim to being the largest piece of oil painting ever done in Singapore. Apart from bringing back the epithet in such an impactful manner, the Memorial Hall also draws attention to a new gender dimension by highlighting the hitherto little discussed female character of Chen Cuifen 陈 粹芬. One key display in the Singapore Gallery is a set of ten life-sized wax figures made to order by craftsmen. It depicts a secret meeting in the villa attended by Sun Yat-sen and his close revolutionary associates. Included in this display was Chen who was portrayed as a wax figurine serving tea to the men gathered around a table but visitors were told in the narrative that she was both Sun’s second wife and comrade. Known among the revolutionaries as the “Nanyang woman” 南洋婆 for having accompanied Sun for many of his activities in this part of the world, Chen had helped to raise funds and carried out revolutionary missions such as smuggling firearms and conveying secret messages. This new Nanyang gender angle to the “Mother of Revolution” was magnified in the theatre performance staged to celebrate the grand opening of the Memorial Hall, almost to the point of displacing the big man Sun Yat-sen.

Centrality of Women in Theatre Performance on “A Hundred Years in Waiting” The 2001 performance was commissioned by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Feng Zhonghan (Foong Choon Hon) 冯仲 汉, as the director of the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall. They had approached Guo Baokun (Kuo Pao Kun) 郭宝昆, doyen of the local Chinese theatre and who was most associated with employing multicultural strategies, to stage a play on “The Life and Times of Sun Yat-sen”.97 Feng must have counted on Guo’s play to edify the life and times of Sun Yat-sen along the lines of the mammoth oil painting in the Memorial Hall, as could be expected of one who valued Chinese history and culture. However, Guo’s production “A Hundred Years in Waiting” was far from being a replica of that. Guo’s starting point was that the play should appeal to a younger audience and have a Southeast Asian perspective, rather than “entrench the Chinese-speaking elders’ impression of an aged, reverent ‘Father of China’

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story”. To this end he drew in other local theatre practitioners and the play ended up as a joint venture between two theatre companies, three playwrights and two directors. The epithet was indirectly interrogated when his team of young playwrights and directors raised questions publicly on “Why does the Chinese Revolution matter to us?” and subverted the state’s desired narrative by portraying Sun in the play as a distant and ghostly presence at best, and by centering the story on three women: Lu Muzhen 卢慕贞, Sun’s dutiful and model wife; Chen Cuifen 陈粹芬, Sun’s secondary wife and revolutionary partner; as well as Ah He 阿和, their innocent and simple maid.98 Much stage time was devoted to the enigmatic Chen Cuifen who was portrayed as “one of his closest comrades ... messenger, bombmaker, confidante, caretaker of revolutionaries and activist for Dr Sun’s cause” and as one harbouring an “incomprehensible love” for Sun.99 The entire play was packed full of multilingual dialogue, operatic and modern dance movements, as well as a constant stream of multimedia images and voices. Reviewers were fairly unanimous in expressing dissatisfaction, especially on the superficial treatment of Sun and his unresolved relationship with Chen. One commentator wrote: Through this play, one has been hoping to see the various personal facets of this great man. Yet, what I saw was disconnected and superficial. At best it is just an experimental art performance. What is most disappointing to me was that it has failed to let the audience have a deeper understanding of Sun’s personal life and character. We cannot hope that this play will help the younger audience to have a better knowledge of Sun’s life and his career.100

Another reviewer pointed out that this performance should be interpreted as a critique of the orthodoxy on Chinese nationalism which had in the last century had been so tightly woven around Sun that there was little room for alternative understandings. To him, the deliberate decentering of the larger-than-life historical actor by focusing on three women gestures at the possibilities of alternative histories from the margin.101

A Place under the Sun for Penang as the Key Overseas Revolutionary Base While Singapore was moving full speed ahead from the late 1990s in renovating the villa and launching the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall so as to position Singapore as the hub of Nanyang revolutionary activities at

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the beginning of the twentieth century, the Chinese community in Penang was also awakening to a desire to reclaim the island’s rightful place under the sun. Penang was eventually the preferred headquarters of Sun’s Nanyang activities when Singapore proved to be a disappointment barely after a year of operation. The transfer was finalized by August 1910. Most of Sun’s key associates had congregated in Penang at various points in time and the significant but the abortive Huanghuagang Uprising (also termed as Second Guangzhou Uprising), which erupted just a few months before the October 1911 Revolution was also planned there. The one notable regret is that there is currently no known photograph depicting Sun in Penang. Zhang Shaokuang (Teoh Shiaw Khuan) 张少宽, with an intense interest in the local history of Chinese community in Penang, was one of those at the forefront of a campaign to regain Penang’s pole position. In 2004, he weaved together numerous pieces he had previously written into a new book Penang Conference and the 1911 Chinese Revolution: How Dr Sun Yat-sen Plotted to Change Chinese History. One of the endorsers in his preface had no qualms in claiming Penang as the “Mecca of the Mother of Revolution” 革命之母 圣地. Although Zhang himself admitted that “the phrase ‘Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution’ is not suitable in this twenty-first century”, he felt that it is a fact that Overseas Chinese in colonial Malaya was indeed the main force of the Chinese Revolution.102 He made clear his anger at extant writings which had not accurately depicted the role played by Penang. He was particularly harsh towards Feng Ziyou who wrote several of the early KMT history pieces, accusing him of having a superiority complex, of abuses in the selection of materials and employment, and of being disrespectful to Penang Chinese. Zhang confessed that he was driven by a strong desire to “return justice to history, rebuild the role of the small island of Penang on the international historical stage, and to struggle for honour on behalf of Malaysia!”103 That enthusiasm to reconnect Penang with its revolutionary past was shared by several other Penang residents and the island’s governing authorities. Two historical sites were set up in rapid succession in 2001 to mark Sun’s orchestration of revolutionary activities in Penang: a shop house in 120 Armenian Street (renamed as the Sun Yat Sen Penang Base 孙中山 槟城基地纪念馆 and doubled up as the premise of the Penang Sun Yat Sen Society 槟城孙中山协会) and a bungalow at 65 MacAlister Road (Sun Yatsen Memorial Center 孙中山纪念馆).104 At various points in time, they had served as the Tongmenghui Penang branch and later Nanyang headquarters as well as the premise of the reading club Penang Philomatic Union 槟城

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阅书报社 which was launched at Sun’s urging. The former also rolled out the first issue of the Penang revolutionary newspaper Guanghua ribao and hosted a follow-up meeting for the Huanghuagang Uprising.105 The gender angle on “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution” came through in the Penang story of the 1911 Revolution even more strongly than Singapore in terms of the lives of two lady revolutionaries. First was Chen Bijun 陈璧君 who was the daughter of a conservative merchant in Penang but who became mesmerized by the republican cause and the handsome leading revolutionary Wang Jingwei. Against her father’s wishes, she became deeply involved in the revolution, becoming an accomplice in Wang’s attempt to assassinate a Manchu Prince Regent in Beijing in 1910 and funding it by selling her mother’s jewellery. When the attempt failed and Wang was imprisoned, she went around raising money for his rescue. Wang was released soon after the Qing dynasty fell and the two got married.106 The profiling of this Penang daughter’s revolutionary patriotism was not without its sensitivity and problems because Wang was later to become one of the key KMT leaders, almost next in importance to Chiang Kai-shek, and only to fall into disgrace when he opted for collaboration with Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Even more important was Sun’s secondary wife Chen Cuifen whom, as discussed, has surfaced in the Singapore memorial hall and celebratory theatre performance. She emerged prominently in the Penang story because she and the rest of Sun’s direct family (brother Sun Mei 孙眉, first wife Lu Muzhen and two daughters Sun Yan 孙琰 and Sun Wan 孙婉) (son Sun Ke 孙科 was away in the United States for his study) had joined Sun and lived in Penang from late 1910 to early 1912. Through the fuller narrative provided in Penang, we learnt that Chen had apparently met Sun when she was not even twenty years old and became his constant companion during his years in exile. She not only attended to his daily routine of life but also participated in propaganda printing, fund raising and even risky revolutionary activities. Although she was of Fujian ancestry and born in Hong Kong, she was regarded by her contemporary revolutionaries as a “Nanyang woman” given the time she had spent there. She parted from Sun only after the 1911 Revolution and stayed in Macao for a brief period before returning to live in various parts of Malaya(sia). She passed away in Hong Kong in 1962 and was later re-buried in the Sun family graveyard in Guangdong.107 The Penang story of these two “mothers” of revolution was writ large onto the celluloid screen when a movie “Road to Dawn” 夜、明 was made

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depicting the brief period when Sun was staying in Penang from July to December 1910 as a prelude or road leading to the final successful 1911 Revolution and dawn of a new era (one of the many other working titles of the movie had been “Penang Huanghua” 槟城黄花). The idea was to craft a history story combining romance and revolution against the backdrop of Penang’s scenery, heritage buildings, and its multi-ethnic and multi-religious society (including the showcasing of its proud peranakan culture). It was floated as early as 2001 but the joint China-Malaysia film took much longer to prepare than expected and was finally premiered only in June 2007. Apart from the technical issues such as fund raising and film setting, the Penang coordinator Wu Meirun (Goh Mei Loon) 吴美润 revealed that one big hurdle was pertaining to the historical identity of Chen Cuifen: “The identity of Chen Cuifen as the woman behind Sun was more sensitive as we want to let her to walk from behind to the forefront of the stage. Due to the fact that Song Qingling is the Mother of Modern China, very few people know about Chen and there are only limited source materials while China demands a high standard of historical accuracy.”108 Eventually strong political support at the highest level was forthcoming, including from the then Vice-President of the PRC Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 (who had visited the Penang Revolutionary Base in April 2002), Chairman of the PRC’s Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Wu Bangguo 吴邦国, Prime Minister of Malaysia Abdullah Badawi and Chief Minister of Penang Xu Zhigeng (Koh Tsu Koon) 许子根.109 The eventual movie locks on to the brief period when Sun was spending time together with Chen Cuifen in Penang. Chen Bijun and Wang Jingwei were not formally included because of the controversial wartime collaboration. But shadows of Penang’s Chen Bijun can be seen in the fictional character Xu Danrong 徐丹蓉 as the impressionable Peranakan daughter of a wealthy conservative Penang merchant. The plot thus revolves around two romantic couples (Sun and Chen Cuifen as well as Xu and her lover) and has several iconic assassination attempts thrown in, with the two ladies bravely rescuing Sun from grave danger.110 From the movie organizer’s point of view, “although it has fictional elements, the movie is based on historical events” and the satisfaction is that “many Malaysians have become more aware and interested in the story of Dr Sun Yat Sen in Penang and the part played by Malaysians in the China Revolution of 1911”.111 Three years after the premier screening of the joint China-Malaysia movie, Taiwan too weigh in on the importance of Penang Overseas Chinese on the 1911 Revolution by sending a large delegation from its various government

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and scholarly institutions to Penang for an international conference on “Sun Yat-sen and Huanghuagang Uprising — Penang Conference and Chinese Overseas”, 27–28 March 2010. Guanghua ribao (Kwong Wah Yit Poh) 光华日报 which is the sole surviving Penang newspaper started by Sun’s revolutionary group was drafted to host some of the activities and it gave high media publicity to the event. Citing a pronouncement by the president of one of Taiwan’s universities, a newspaper headline loudly proclaimed that “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution”.112 Taiwanese scholar Shao Zonghai 邵宗海 from the Chinese Cultural University 中国文化大学 in a post-conference commentary urged that the KMT governing authorities in Taiwan today “must necessarily increase research and empirical studies on Sun Yat-sen’s overseas revolutionary activities, especially those in Southeast Asia”.113

Conclusion The epithet “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution” has emerged as the most widely-quoted, shorthand phrase to encapsulate the tripartite relations among Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese abroad, and the 1911 Republican Revolution. Its popularity does not rest merely on its attractive ring tone of being a pleasant-sounding jingle with seven Chinese characters. Its attraction is instead grounded upon both historicity and mythologization. Historically speaking, Sun and his revolutionary associates had indeed operated primarily from outside of China — among the Overseas Chinese communities. This was especially so for the communities located in Nanyang as they had provided the revolutionaries with safe haven and with the critical resources of propaganda, finance and manpower. Yet, the exalted positioning of the Overseas Chinese was also entwined with the KMT-led mythologization and placement of Sun Yat-sen and his organizations onto a saintly pedestal. The spinning of the KMT orthodoxy was especially vigorous after the death of Sun in March 1925 and even more so after the KMT’s consolidation of power in Nanjing from about 1928–29. With the kernel of truth being increasingly sugar-coated with additional layers, it was inevitable that there would be debate about whether the Overseas Chinese on balance had contributed sufficiently to qualify for the exalted motherhood status. This chapter is not meant to resolve the doubts on whether Overseas Chinese deserve the epithet. Its main purpose is to trace its origin and cycles of usage through the ages and to appreciate the changing context of evocations and silences.

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Except for the most unlikely claim of an inscribed wooden panel installed in a San Francisco newspaper office, it is almost certain from all the tracing that Sun had never spelled out those exact seven Chinese characters verbally or in print. On five occasions, he had used only words which at best amounted to a paraphrasing of the epithet. None of these occasions were in the midst of the 1911 Revolution and all were between 1916 and 1923. The epithet’s first traceable appearance in full form and in print was after the death of Sun and in a set of minutes of meeting for a November 1929 conference in Nanjing on Overseas Chinese education. It appeared twice again in 1933, within the publications of two Tongmenghui veterans living in Nanyang. The epithet was thus not formulated before, during or in the immediate months after the 1911 Revolution, but years later. Its eventual formulation was not in the context of a detached, scholarly assessment benefiting from the hindsight of having the dust of revolution settled. Instead, the contextual environment for its formulation was one of “incomplete revolution” in which the young Chinese republic lurched endlessly from one crisis to another, beginning with the rule of Yuan Shikai 袁世凯 and the post-Yuan republican warlords. The epithet in full or paraphrased form was thus less of an honest evaluation of the past record and more of an exhortation in a desperate appeal to Overseas Chinese for further assistance to overcome the prevailing quagmire of crises. Another impetus for its formulation had been the need to raise public wariness about a group of Nanyang opportunists who had been flaunting their Overseas Chinese credential and past revolutionary record in order to claim high official posts and financial reward from the newly established republican regimes. For all the haziness and uncertainties surrounding its initial conception, the epithet has become a powerful symbolic marker which is tied to the notion of motherhood for a watershed event which put an end to more than 2,000 years of centralized imperial rule and ushered in a modern nation-state. It is one which is closely linked to the ebb and flow of Chinese nationalism from the turn of the twentieth century. This Sino-centric nationalism challenged and undermined the transnationality of the Chinese diasporic movement of goods, people and ideas. The broad, transnational diasporic flow could never quite escape the powerful grasp of nation-state in the sense that the tracing of “flight paths” (of human migrants in particular) would inevitably lead to “re-territorialization” and a reassertion of China as the original source or epicentre of diasporic components. Nation-state territorial markers could not be easily erased, despite the intensifying winds of globalization and transnationalism.

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The epithet had the necessary magnetism and resonance to assist in re-territorializing and linking the far-flung Chinese diasporic communities back to China. That explains its continuous currency and efficacy up to the present, even though there had been two major challenges to overcome in the process of connecting. First was the ever-changing socio-political environment at both the local and international levels which one must necessarily adjust to. Second, there was the vexing post-1949 dilemma on which particular Chinese national entity should the Chinese abroad be reattaching themselves to. The ideological and territorial split between PRC mainland and ROC Taiwan with their loud and competing claims for sovereignty and legitimacy had greatly complicated matters. The popularity and potency of the epithet was never a constant and there were periods when it was frequently evoked in public discourse and times when it retreated from the forefront. Its high circulation in the early 1930s stood in contrast to the fading out from the 1940s. In the post-war era, each of the different regions of Nanyang, Taiwan and mainland China had their own rhythm of evocations. Nanyang’s general distancing from the epithet amidst occasional remembering was very much affected by several new factors, such as the self-destruction of documents on the eve of Japanese Occupation, the painful process of post-war decolonization and nationalist struggle in Southeast Asia, as well as the post-independent Southeast Asian emphasis on nation-building and developmental economics. KMT Taiwan’s frequent and frantic evocations of the epithet from 1950s to 1980s was primarily driven by its expulsion from mainland China, aspiration to recover its lost land, and the Cold War rubric of a titanic struggle against a master communist conspiracy orchestrated by the “evil empire” of the Soviet Union. CCP’s mainland China generally avoided depicting the Overseas Chinese as the Mother of Revolution even after its recent awakening to the need to reconnect with them in the drive towards market reform and open door economy. There was the post-1978 desire and action to mobilize the financial resources and entrepreneurial acumen of Chinese abroad but the epithet was simply too closely associated with the KMT, its history and its ideology. Their preferred functional slogan was either the more generic word of “patriotism” or “hometown sentimentalism”. Resurgence of interest in the epithet in post1978 PRC was essentially confined to the scholarly world, most noticeably in its writings about the history of pre-1949 Republican China. At the level of popular culture, neither PRC China nor KMT Taiwan was taking the lead in reshuffling the ingredients and recasting the images of the epithet for popular consumption in terms of museum display, theatre

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performance or movie making. Instead, it was the Nanyang communities in Singapore and Penang that had crafted a new popular culture dimension for the epithet during the crossover to the twenty-first century and the new millennium. They had “engendered” the three-way relationship between Sun, Nanyang and the 1911 Revolution by deliberately surfacing and strategically placing two women associated with Nanyang (Chen Cuifen and Chen Bijun) as centrepieces of their narrative. The Nanyang brew from the late 1990s to 2000s was thus a special concoction with an exciting new flavour. The epithet of “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution” may cursorily appear to some as being formulaic and propagandistic. However, instead of being homogenous, dull and determinate, it has proven to be pluralistic and vibrant and has been evolving along an uncertain path of trajectory. The year 2011 is the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution and intense competition for the privilege and format of commemorations have already erupted not only between China and Taiwan but also among the various cities within China. It is an exciting time to watch how the epithet will further evolve and to ascertain whether there will yet be another twist in the umbilical cord tying the disaporic Chinese with their ancestral land in this centenary year.

Notes 1

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This chapter was first presented at the conference on “Sun Yat-sen, Nanyang and the 1911 Chinese Revolution”, organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, the Chinese Heritage Centre, and the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall, Singapore, 25–26 October 2010. It has first been published with slight variations in Frontiers of History in China, vol. 6, no. 2 (June 2011): 183–228. The author wishes to thank the editor of the journal for giving permission to re-publish in this conference volume as well as to credit Prasenjit Duara for his financial and intellectual support, and to Choo Yam Wai and Wei Bingbing for their research assistance. Qin Xiaoyi 秦孝仪, “Huaqiao wei geming zhimu” 华侨为革命之母 [Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution], Jindai Zhongguo 近代中国 [Modern China], vol. 20 (December 1980): 31. Reprinted in Haiwai chubanshe 海外出 版社, ed., Huaqiao yu zhongguo guomin geming yundong 华侨与中国国民革命 运动 [Overseas Chinese and the Chinese National Revolutionary Movement] (Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1981), p. 183. This refers to Tongde Shubaoshe 同德书报社 of Singapore and its souvenir magazines of 1981, 2000, and 2010. See my later discussion on this reading club.

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“Zaihu huanying congjun huaqiao dahuishang de yanshuo” 在沪欢迎从军华 侨大会上的演说 [Speech at the Shanghai Welcoming Convention for Overseas Chinese Troops], Sun Zhongshan quanji 孙中山全集 [Completed Works of Sun Yat-sen], vol. 3 (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), p. 374. Cited from Haiwai chubanshe, ed., Huaqiao yu zhongguo guomin geming yundong, pp. 23–24. This is probably the 1916 “Zhi haiwai geming tongzhi shu” 至海外革命同志书 [Circular to Overseas Revolutionary Comrades] erroneously referred to by many writers and yet could not be located in any major compendium on Sun. Preface by Sun dated April 1917 for Zhao Gongbi 赵公壁, Tongmenghui yanyi 同盟会演义 [Romance of the Tongmenghui], cited in Ibid., pp. 24, 165. “Meilibin fenbu dangsuo luocheng bing kai kenqin dahui xunci zhiyi” 美 利滨分部党所落成并开恳亲大会训词之一 [One of the Speeches at the Launching-cum-Social Gathering of the Party Branch in Melbourne], in Zongli quanji 总理全集 [Completed Works of Sun Yat-sen], edited by Hu Hanmin 胡汉民 (Shanghai: Minzhi shuju, 1930) [Mimeographed version by Shanghai Shudian as Minguo congshu 民国丛书 series, vols. 90 and 91], part 1, p. 1065. Some have suggested that Meilibin is the transliteration for Philippines. For example, see Qin Xiaoyi, “Huaqiao wei geming zhimu”, p. 31. This is erroneous because the two messages (pp. 1065–67) make reference to party organizations in Australia and the South Pacific and Meilibin should be Melbourne, see also Guo Cunxiao 郭存孝, “Guofu Sun Zhongshan xiansheng zuiai Aodaliya huaqiao” 国父孙中山先生垂爱澳大利亚华侨 [Founding Father Sun Yat-sen’s Love for Overseas Chinese in Australia], Qiaoxie zazhi 桥协杂志 [Magazine of the Overseas Chinese Association (Taipei)], vol. 79 (2003): 20–25. “Zai Guangzhou Zhongguo Guomindang kenqin dahui de yanshuo” 在广 州中国国民党恳亲大会的演说 [Speech at the KMT Social Gathering in Guangzhou], Sun Zhongshan quanji, vol. 8, p. 280. Zou Lu 邹鲁, Zhongguo Guomindang shigao 中国国民党史稿 [Draft History of the Chinese Nationalist Party] (Shanghai, 1929). This has been republished as part of the long series on Minguo congshu 民国丛书 [Book Series on Republican China], vols. 25–26 (Shanghai: Shangwu yingshuguan, mimeographed version of 1947). Feng Ziyou’s 冯自由 four notable collections, with some duplication of materials, are: (a) Zhonghua minguo kaiguoqian gemingshi 中华民国开国前革 命史 [Revolutionary History before the Founding of the Republic of China], vol. 1 (1928), vol. 2 (1930) in Shanghai [Other subsequent volumes were planned but never materialized. Second edition of vol. 1 in 1944 and vol. 2 in 1946 in Chongqing; third edition of both in 1954 in Taipei]; (b) Geming yishi 革命逸史 [Unofficial History of the 1911 Revolution], Reprint edition (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1981); Zhou Nanjing 周南京, Fengyu tongzhou: Dongnanya yu huaren wenti 风雨同舟：东南亚与华人问题 [On the Same

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Boat regardless of Wind or Rain: Southeast Asia and the Chinese Problem] (Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 1995), p. 381, informs us that six volumes of this work were completed in China between 1939 and 1948, with the pre-1949 Shangwu 商务 publishing the first five volumes and the later Zhonghua shuju 中华书局 publishing all six in 1981 (with reprint in 1987); Taiwan has also reissued this series in 1965, (c) Huaqiao geming kaiguoshi 华 侨革命开国史 [History of the Overseas Chinese in Revolution and Founding of the Republic] (Chongqing, October 1946) [Second edition in Shanghai, January 1947 and third edition in Taipei, August 1953]; (d) Huaqiao geming zuzhi shihua 华侨革命组织史话 [Historical Narratives on Overseas Chinese Organizations] (Taipei, June 1953). Item (a) is his earliest publication and there is no mention of the epithet. Its volume 2 has an entire chapter (no. 39) devoted specifically to the theme of “Nanyang Overseas Chinese and the Revolutionary Movement” (mentioned in his preface he wrote for Zhang Yongfu’s 1933 book) and yet there is still no mention of the epithet. Feng Ziyou, Huaqiao geming kaiguoshi, preface, p. 1. Zhang Yongfu 张永福, Nanyang yu chuangli minguo 南洋与创立民国 [Nanyang and the Establishment of the Chinese Republic] (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, October 1933), p. 1. There is a variation of the book title in the copyright page: Huaqiao yu chuangli minguo 华侨与创立民国 [Overseas Chinese and the Establishment of the Chinese Republic]. Zhang’s book is not the first from Nanyang to put on record their participation in the 1911 Revolution. The honour is likely to belong to Chen Xinzheng 陈新 政, Huaqiao gemingshi 华侨革命史 [Revolutionary History of the Overseas Chinese], 1921, publication details uncertain, based on the transcript of a lengthy speech delivered to the Penang Philomatic Union in 1921, there is no mention of the epithet here. Zhang Yongfu, Nanyang yu chuangli minguo, pp. 1–2. Ibid., pp. 2–3. Hu Hanmin’s verbal account was transcribed by Zhang Zhen 张振 as “Nanyang and the Chinese Revolution” 南洋与中国之革命, appendix in Ibid., pp. 1–26. Zhang Yongfu’s preface in Ibid., pp. 2–3. Hu’s oral transcript in Ibid., appendix, p. 1. Ibid., pp. 18–26. Huang Jingwan 黄警顽 et al. eds., Nanyang Pili huaqiao geming shiji 南洋霹 雳华侨革命史迹 [Revolutionary record of the Overseas Chinese in Nanyang Perak] (Shanghai: Wenhua meishu dushu gongshi, February 1933), no pagination. The copyright page indicates a variation of the book title as Zhonghua geming shiji 中华革命史迹 [Chinese Revolutionary Record]. Zheng Luosheng joined the Tongmenghui in 1907, founded the Perak branch, and rose to become a member of the Supervisory Yuan 监察院 of the KMT Government in 1931.

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Minutes of Meeting, November 1929, in Zhongguo dierlishi dang’anguan 中 国第二历史档案馆, ed., Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian 中华民 国史档案资料汇编 [Collection of Documents from the Chinese Republican Archives], vol. 5, no. 1, Section on Part 2 of Education (Nanjing: Jiangshu Guji chubanshe, 1994), p. 962. The quoted passage is cited from the text as a paraphrase of Dai’s speech made on 1 November at the opening session. The following tangential article has alerted me to this vital information: Bao Aiqin 包爱芹, “Nanjing guomin zhengfu de huaqiao jiaoyu zhengce yu cuoshi” 南京 国民政府的华侨教育政策与措施 [Educational Policies and Implementation Measures of the Nationalist Government in Nanjing for the Overseas Chinese], Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu 华侨华人历史研究 [Overseas Chinese History Studies], vol. 4 (December 2006): 58–59. The grand ceremony in re-burying Sun in Nanjing had sparked an attempt (appears to be eventually abortive) to set up a special permanent memorial within the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum 中山陵 complex to mark the revolutionary contribution of Overseas Chinese. See the letter appealing for donation in Nanyang Shangbao 南洋商报, 28 and 31 May 1929. Huang Jingwan et al., eds., Nanyang Pili huaqiao geming shiji, no pagination. Feng’s guest commentary on “National Crisis and Overseas Compatriots”, Nanyang Shangbao, 7 November 1937. The conversion of this Serene Sunset Villa into the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall in 2001 is discussed later in this chapter. Chen Chunan 陈楚楠, “Wangqingyuan yu Zhongguo geming shilue” 晚晴园 与中国革命史略 [A Short History of the Relations between the Serene Sunset Villa and the Chinese Revolution], first printed in Xinzhou ribao (Sin Chew Jit Poh) 星洲日报, 4–10 Jan 1940, reprinted in Dongnanya yanjiu xuebao 东南亚 研究学报 [Journal of Southeast Asian Studies], vol. 1 (August 1970): 50–54. Chen Jiageng 陈嘉庚, Nanqiao huiyilu 南侨回忆录 [Memoir of a Southern Sojourner], two volumes (New Jersey: Global Publishing, 1993), pp. 9–10. Memoir was completed in June 1944 and first published in Singapore in 1946. See Chen Jiageng, “Weiju shibai caishi kechi” 畏惧失败才是可耻 [Fear of Failure is the True Shame], Dongfang zazhi 东方杂志 [Eastern Miscellany], vol. 31, no. 7 (1934) and Chen Jiageng yanlunji 陈嘉庚言论集 [Collection of Speeches and Writings of Chen Jiageng], Speeches from 1947–49 (Singapore, 1949). See also Yang Jinfa (Yong Ching Fatt) 杨进发, Zhanqian de Chen Jiageng yanlun shiliao yu fenxi 战前的陈嘉庚言论史料与分析 [Chen Jiageng in Pre-war Singapore: Documents and Analysis] (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1980). Nanyang Shangbao, 6 March 1940. Chen Suiyang 陈水杨, “Chen Jiageng zai jinian Sun Zhongshan xiansheng dancheng de yichi jianghua” 陈嘉庚在纪念孙中山先生诞辰的一次讲话 [Chen Jiageng’s Speech in Commemorating the Birth of Sun Yat-sen], Xiamen

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wenshi ziliao 厦门文史资料 [Literary and Historical Documents of Xiamen], vol. 11 (December 1986): 1–3. Yong Ching Fatt’s authoritative biography on Chen had a reference on him reminiscing about Sun in 1956 but it was not about the epithet. See Yong Ching Fatt, Tan Kah-Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 176, 224 fn 3. The original source cited by Yong is Chen Bisheng 陈碧笙 and Yang Guozhen 杨国桢, Chen Jiageng zhuan 陈嘉庚传 [Biography of Chen Jiageng] (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1982) [First printed by Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1981], p. 20, and there is no reference to the epithet here. Dai Xueji 戴学稷, “Sun Zhongshan, Xinma huaqiao yu Xinhai geming” 孙中山、新马华侨与辛亥革命 [Sun Yat-sen, Overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia and the 1911 Revolution], 9 October 2008, in the website of The Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, (accessed 3 September 2010). Chen’s pronouncement was cited as having come from Chen’s article on “Zhuiyi Sun Zhongshan” 追忆孙中山 [Retrospection on Sun Yat-sen], in Sun Zhongshan shengping shiye zhuiyilu 孙中山生平事业追忆录 [Memoirs on the Life and Career of Sun Yat-sen], edited by Sang Mingxuan 尚明轩 et al. (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, June 1986), p. 66. This attribution to Chen Jiageng is repeated in a scholarly article a year later. See Su Quanyou 苏全有, “Huidang yuansu yu Sun Zhongshan lingdao de wuzhuang qiyi” 会党元素与孙中山领导的武装 起义 [Secret Society Factor and the Armed Revolts Led by Sun Yat-sen], in Xiamen daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 厦门大学学报 — 哲学社会科 学版 [Journal of Xiamen University — Arts and Social Sciences], vol. 2 (2009): 55, 57. Maliujia Qiongzhou huiguan jiushiyi zhounian jinian tekan 马六甲琼州会馆九 十一周年纪念特刊 [Souvenir Magazine of the 91st Anniversary of the Malacca Hainan Association] (Malacca, 1960), no pagination. Malaiya Xuelaner Qiongzhou huiguan: Qingzhu bainian zhounian ji tianhougong gaimu jinian tekan 马来西亚雪兰莪琼州会馆：庆祝百年周年暨天后宫开 幕纪念特刊 [Souvenir Magazine of the 100th Anniversary of the Malaysia Selangor Hainan Association and Opening of Its Tianhou Temple] (Kuala Lumpur, 1989), p. 7. For example, see Mapo Guangdong huiguan qishi zhounian jinian tekan 麻坡 广东会馆七十周年纪念特刊 [Souvenir Magazine of the 70th Anniversary of the Muar Guangdong Association], 1989, p. 33; Guandan Hainan huiguan yibainian zhounian jinian tekan 关丹海南会馆一百年周年纪念特刊 [Souvenir Magazine of the 100th Anniversary of the Kuantan Hainan Association] (Kuantan, 1995), pp. 31, 62. A non-native place association example of having suffered both the burning of documents and abuse of premises during the Occupation period is that of the Renjing cishan baihua jushe 人镜慈善白 话剧社, see Renjing sanshiernian jiniankan 人镜三十二年纪念刊 [Souvenir

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Magazine of the 32nd anniversary of Renjing (theatre group)] (Kuala Lumpur, 1952), no pagination. Anonymous, Du Nan Xiansheng aisilu 杜南先生哀思录 [A Record of Sad Reflections on Mr Too Nam] (Kuala Lumpur, 1941). Republished by his grandson Too Chee Cheong 杜志昌 in 1993. I wish to thank Zhu Yanhui (pen name Chu Luda 朱鲁大) for the generous gift of this book which also contains a reprint of his brief biography on Du Nan in Xinzhou ribao, 29 November 1986. Ibid., photographs in pp. 16–17. The cloth banner is a derivative of a memorial plaque from one of the guests: 华侨固是革命母、国父曾推贰字师 (memorial plaque in p. 2). The second part of the couplet probably makes reference to another of Sun’s popular expression, that is, “Grand Love 博爱”. Ibid., plaque in p. 17. See the memorial plaque from a public school for Overseas Chinese in Haiphong of Vietnam (p. 26) and the grandson’s epilogue (no pagination). For a sample listing of such clubs the world over, see Yang Hanxiang’s 杨汉翔 list in Bincheng yueshu baoshe ershisi zhounian jinian tekan 槟城阅书报社二十 四周年纪念特刊 [Souvenir Magazine of the 24th Anniversary of the Penang Philomatic Union], 1931, pp. 11–14. Feng Ziyou had also provided some names in his various volumes. Fang Huainan 方怀南, ed., Tongde shubaoshe ershiwunian jinian kan 同德书 报社二十五年纪念刊 [25th Anniversary Souvenir Magazine of the Tongde shubaoshe] (Singapore, 1935), pp. 31–32, 41–44. I am thankful to Wong Sin Keong for sharing a copy of this “rediscovered” magazine with me. Ibid., p. 24. Ibid., p. 30. Wu Yixiang 吴以湘, Wang Houren王厚仁, and Chen Bietong 陈别同, eds., Tongde shubaoshe qishi zhounian jinian tekan 同德书报社七十周年纪念特 刊 [70th Anniversary Special Souvenir Magazine of the Tongde shubaoshe] (Singapore, 1981), p. 181. Ibid., pp. 46, 56. Ibid., Long Ma 龙马, “Zhongguo geming de chuantong tezhi” 中国革命的传统 特质 [Traditional Special Characteristics of Chinese Revolution], pp. 127–28. Ibid., Cai Qirui 蔡启瑞, “Zenyang wei woshe zuochu gongxian” 怎样为我社 作出贡献 [How to Contribute towards Our Club], p. 180. Ibid., Peng Songtao 彭松涛, “Xinjiapo dui Xinhai Geming de gongxian jian Tongde shubaoshe de lishi yiyi” 新加坡对辛亥革命的贡献兼同德书报社的历 史意义 [The Contribution of Singapore towards the 1911 Revolution and the Historical Significance of Tongde shubaoshe], p. 138. The essay is reprinted in the 100th Anniversary Souvenir Magazine of 2010. As discussed in the opening sections of this chapter, Peng’s comment on the signage in San Francisco is probably taken from Qin Xiaoyi’s oral history account and this is not likely to have been true.

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Ibid. Ibid., p. 142. Xing Jizhong 邢济众, ed., Tongde shubaoshe jiushi zhounian jinian tekan 同德 书报社九十周年纪念特刊 [90th Anniversary Special Souvenir Magazine of the Tongde shubaoshe] (Singapore, 2000), essay by Zhou Xiaozhong 周孝中, “Sun Zhongshan guanhuai qiaosheng” 孙中山关怀侨生 [Sun Yat-sen’s Caring Concern about the Overseas Chinese], p. 111. Ibid., essay by Jian Xingqiang 简兴强, “Sun Zhongshan xiansheng zai Xinjiapo ersanshi” 孙中山先生在新加坡二、三事 [Two or Three Matters Relating to Sun Yat-sen in Singapore], p. 137. Ibid, essay by Wang Zhenchun 王振春, “Lantian baiyun hua Tongde” 蓝天 白云话同德 [Talking about Tongde shubaoshe under the Blue Sky and White Clouds], p. 139. Zhan Zunquan 詹尊权, ed., Tongde shubaoshe bainian jinian tekan 同德书报 社百年纪念特刊 [100th Anniversary Special Souvenir Magazine of the Tongde shubaoshe] (Singapore, 2010); Zheng Yanfen 郑彦棻, “Sun dazongtong zai haiwai” 孙大总统在海外 [President Sun in Overseas], pp. 113–21, has a section dealing with his time in Nanyang. It makes the poignant observation that Sun spent thirty of his sixty years living out of China and that he left China for Honolulu at age fourteen, thus Sun had spent only less than sixteen years of his adult life within China (most of these after the 1911 Revolution). Haiwai chubanshe, ed., Huaqiao yu zhongguo guomin geming yundong, p. 63. Huang Zhenwu 黄珍吾, Huaqiao yu Zhongguo geming 华侨与中国革命 [Overseas Chinese and the Chinese Revolution] (Taipei: Guofang yanjiuyuan, 1963), pp. 411–12. Haiwai chubanshe, ed., Huaqiao yu zhongguo guomin geming yundong, p. 82. Message for the 16th Overseas Chinese Festival, 21 October 1968. Ibid., pp. 84–85. Ibid., pp 101–02, “First Political Report at the 11th National Party Congress of the Kuomintang”, 13 November 1976. Ibid., pp. 118–19, Speech at the “Commemoration on Founding of the Republic”, 1 January 1979. Ibid., pp. 119–21. Welcome speech at the “Conference for Global Overseas Chinese to Unite against Communism”, 27 February 1979. The conference was attended by more than 600 delegates (p. 199). See the previously cited Jindai Zhongguo (December 1980): 9–58 and Haiwai chubanshe, ed., Huaqiao yu zhongguo guomin geming yundong, pp. 165–326. Ouyang Changda 欧阳昌大, “Xingjiapo huaren dui Xinhai geming de fanying” 星加坡华人对辛亥革命的反应 [Reactions of Singapore Chinese to the 1911 Revolution], in Xingjiapo huazushi lunji 星加坡华族史论集 [An Anthology of the History of Singapore Chinese], edited by Kua Bak Lim 柯木林 and Ng Chin Keong 吴振强 (Singapore, 1972), pp. 91–118. This book chapter is based on the author’s 1969/70 (11th batch) graduating

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thesis at the Department of History, Nanyang University. The discussion in this section on the 1986 joint conference is based on Huang Jianli, “Writings on Sun Yat-sen, Tongmenghui and the 1911 Revolution: Surveying the Field and Locating Southeast Asia”, in Tongmenghui, Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Revisit, edited by Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Chinese Heritage Centre, 2006), pp. 90–98. Yan belongs to the 2nd batch of history graduates (1960–61) at the Nanyang University. Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976), is based on his “Chinese Revolutionary Movement in Malaya, 1900–1911”, Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, 1969. His other related publications are (a) The Role of the Overseas Chinese in the 1911 Revolution; Southeast Asia Research Paper Series No. 3, Southeast Asian Studies Programme, Nanyang University (Singapore: Chopmen Enterprises, 1978); (b) Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Singapore and Malaya, 1877–1912, Working Paper in Asian Studies Paper No. 6, Centre for Asian Studies, The University of Adelaide, 1979; (c) “Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution”, Papers on Far Eastern History 19 (March 1979): 55–89. Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. xviii, 145–211. Ibid., p. xvii. Ibid., p. 318. Xinhai geming yu Nanyang huaren yantaohui lunwen bianji weiyuanhui 辛亥革命与南洋华人研讨会论文辛亥革命与南洋华人研讨会论文编辑 委员会, ed., Xinhai geming yu Nanyang huaren yantaohui lunwenji 辛亥革 命与南洋华人研讨会论文集 [An Anthology of Conference Papers on the 1911 Revolution and Nanyang Chinese] (Taipei, 1986); Lee Lai To, ed., The 1911 Revolution: The Chinese in British and Dutch Southeast Asia (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1987). Yen Ching Hwang, “Nanyang Chinese and the 1911 Revolution”, in The 1911 Revolution: The Chinese in British and Dutch Southeast Asia, pp. 20, 26, 31. Xinhai geming yu Nanyang huaren yantaohui lunwen bianji weiyuanhui, ed., Xinhai geming yu Nanyang huaren yantaohui lunwenji, p. 3. Ibid., p. 14. Ibid., p. 15. Ibid., p. 428. Ibid., p. 432. Ibid., p. 434. Ibid., p. 8. Li Weilin 李为麟, Huaqiao gemingshi 华侨革命史 [The Revolutionary History of Overseas Chinese], 2nd ed. (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1990), p. 104. Wu Yuzhang, The Revolution of 1911: A Great Democratic Revolution of China (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1962), publisher’s note in frontispiece.

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Ibid., p. 8. Renmin ribao 人民日报 (the People’s Daily), 10 October 1961. Haiwai chubanshe, ed., Huaqiao yu zhongguo guomin geming yundong, pp. 201–02. Zhongguo shehui gexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo 中国社会科学院近代史研究 所 [Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academic of Social Sciences], ed., Huaqiao yu Xinhai geming 华侨与辛亥革命 [Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1981). As pointed out in our earlier discussion on Feng Ziyou, his works also underwent a major reprint effort in 1981 in celebration of the 70th anniversary. Zhonghua shuju 中华书局 reprinted the entire six volumes of his pre-1949 Geming yishi 革命 逸史 [Unofficial History of the 1911 Revolution]. Ibid., Editor’s Words, pp. 1–2. Kong Li 孔立, Chen Zaizheng 陈在正, Lin Jinzhi 林金枝, and Guo Liang 郭梁, “Huaqiao yu Xinhai geming” 华侨与辛亥革命 [Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution], in Jinian Xinhai Geming qishi zhounian xueshu taolunhui wenji 纪念辛亥革命七十周年学术讨论会文集 [Proceedings of the Conference Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of the 1911 Revolution], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), pp. 397–421. Li Guoliang 李国梁, Lin Jinzhi 林金枝, and Cai Renlong 蔡仁龙, Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe 华侨华人与中国革命和建设 [Overseas Chinese-Chinese Overseas and the Chinese Revolution and Reconstruction] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, December 1993). Li Guoliang was apparently introduced as Guo Liang 郭梁 in the preface, p. 6. Possibly as a spinoff from this research project, another parallel volume on the general history of Overseas Chinese was produced by the researchers at Xiamen University: Wu Fengbin 吴凤斌, Zhuang Guotu 庄国土, Lin Jinzhi 林金枝, Guo Liang 郭 梁, and Cai Renlong 蔡仁龙, Dongnanya huaqiao tongshi 东南亚华侨通史 [General History of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, May 1994), Chapter 13 on “1911 Revolution and the Southeast Asian Chinese” is written by Zhuang Guotu. Li Guoliang, Lin Jinzhi and Cai Renlong, Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe, pp. 77, 98. Ibid., p. 98. Ibid., pp. 101–04. Ibid. pp. 99–100. Zheng Min 郑民 and Liang Chuming 梁初鸣, Huaqiao huaren shi yanjiuji 华侨华人史研究集 [An Anthology on the History of Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas], vols. 1–2 (Beijing: Xinhua shudian, 1988–89). Hong Sisi 洪丝丝, “Huaqiao lishi yanjiu de jige wenti” 华侨历史研究的 几个问题 [Several Problems in the Study of Overseas Chinese History] and “Huaqiao dui Xinhai geming de juda gongxian” 华侨对辛亥革命的巨大贡献

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[Enormous Contribution of Overseas Chinese towards the 1911 Revolution], in Ibid., pp. 1, 9, 147. His comments on political sensitivity and terminology can be taken as a critique of Wang Gungwu’s works without naming him. For Wang’s own struggle over these two issues, see Huang Jianli, “Conceptualizing Chinese Migration and Chinese Overseas: The Contribution of Wang Gungwu”, in China and International Relations: The Chinese View and the Contribution of Wang Gungwu, edited by Zheng Yongnian (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 139–57. This article is also available in Journal of Chinese Overseas, vol. 6, no. 1 (May 2010): 1–21. For example, see Zhou Rundong 周润东, “Ruhe lijie ‘huaqiao shi geming zhimu’” 如何理解 “华侨是革命之母” (How to Interpret “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution”), Shengli luntan 胜利论坛 [Victory Forum] 4 (1996): 71. No citation is offered here. Zhou Nanjing, Fengyu tongzhou: Dongnanya huaren wenti. See part four, chapter on “Haiwai huaren lishi lilun chutan” 海外华人历史理论初 探 [Preliminary Study into the Theories on History of Chinese Overseas], pp. 372–82. This chapter also appeared as an essay dated as 27 August 2001 on “Zhongguo qiaowang” 中国侨网 [Website of Chinese Sojourners], (accessed 3 September 2010). Li Anshan 李安山, “Zhonghua minguo shiqi huaqiao yanjiu shuping” 中华 民国时期华侨研究述评 [Overseas Chinese Studies and Critique during the Chinese Republican Era], in Jindaishi yanjiu 近代史研究 [Modern Historical Research], vol. 4 (2002): 307–10, 312. An expanded version of this article has appeared as Li Anshan, “Zhongguo huaqiao huaren yanjiu de lishi yu xianzhuang gaishu” 中国华侨华人研究的历史与现状概述 [A Survey of the History and Current Status of PRC Studies on Overseas Chinese-Chinese Overseas], essay dated 7 January 2006, posted on “Xueshu jiaoliuwang” 学术交流网 [Website for the Exchange of Scholarship], (accessed 3 September 2010). Li Anshan, “Zhonghua minguo shiqi huaqiao yanjiu shuping”, p. 312. Discussion in this section and the next is based upon Huang Jianli and Hong Lysa, “History and the Imaginaries of ‘Big Singapore’: Positioning the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 35, no. 1 (February 2004): 65–89. Revised version is available as Chapter 9 in Hong Lysa and Huang Jianli, The Scripting of a National History: Singapore and Its Pasts (Singapore: NUS Press in conjunction with Hong Kong University Press, 2008), pp. 181–204. Speech by George Yeo on 12 November 1996, Press Release 33 Nov/03B1/96/11/12; Straits Times, 13 and 15 November 1996; Lianhe Zaobao 联合早 报, 15 November 1996. Lee Kuan Yew’s interview on “Handling China” with Time, 7 April 1997, p. 57. Feng’s role was reflected in the message and acknowledgment in the 2001 Singapore Arts Festival Special Programme booklet. Original title of the project

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was revealed by Guo during the post-performance public seminar on the night of 8 June 2001. Feng’s initiative is also briefly noted in Straits Times, 24 January 2002. Straits Times, 11 June 2001. 2001 Singapore Arts Festival Special Programme Booklet, p. 2. Lianhe Zaobao, 22 June 2001. The commentator is Liu Huixia (Lau Wai Har) 刘蕙霞, a retired long-serving head of the National Institute of Education and a flag bearer of mainstream Chinese culture and language. Lianhe Zaobao, 11 June 2001. The reviewer is Ke Siren (Quah Sy Ren) 柯思仁 who is both a practitioner and scholar on theatre studies. Zhang Shaokuang 张少宽, Sun Zhongshan yu Bineng huiyi: Cedong Guangzhou sanerjiu zhiyi 孙中山与庇能会议：策动广州三、二九之役 [Penang Conference and the 1911 Chinese Revolution: How Dr Sun Yat-sen Plotted to Change Chinese History] (Penang: Nanyang tianye yanjiushi, 2004), pp. xii–xiii, xv. Ibid., pp. 11, 76–78. Both projects were launched in 2001 but the former with a strong adaptation of the Sun Yat-sen narrative into the Penang local context is regarded as being much better received than the latter with its Sino-centricity. A substantial discussion of the two, in addition to the memorial halls of Sun in Singapore and Hong Kong, can be found in Daniel P.S. Goh, “The Postcoloniality of Sun Yat-sen Memorials in Hong Kong, Penang and Singapore”, paper presented at “Sun Yat-sen and Huanghuagang Uprising; Penang Conference and Chinese Overseas”, Penang, 27–28 March 2010. Khoo Salma Nasution, Sun Yat Sen in Penang (Penang: Areca Books, 2008), passim. Ibid., pp. 6, 27. One of the best and early primary source on Chen Bijun is Chen Xinzheng 陈新政, Huaqiao gemingshi 华侨革命史 [Revolutionary History of Overseas Chinese] [Penang, 1921], transcript of Tongmenghui veteran leader Chen’s speech to the Philomatic Union in 1921, pp. 17–18. See also Bincheng yueshu baoshe ershisi zhounian jinian tekan 槟城阅书报 社二十四周年纪念特刊 (Souvenir Magazine of the 24th Anniversary of the Penang Philomatic Union) [Penang, 1931], p. 6 on Chen Bijun being one of those who attended the preparatory meeting for the setting up of this reading club. In the early days of the 1911 Revolution commemoration in Penang, the gender role was not highlighted; see news report in Nanyang Shangbao, 16 October 1923. Khoo Salma Nasution, Sun Yat Sen in Penang, pp. 82–87, 92–93. There is no footnoting of sources in this booklet. The best sources confirming the existence of and providing detailed information on Chen Cuifen is an oral history account on Chen’s later half of her life in Lianhe Zaobao, 17 December 2002 and Liu Yusheng 刘禺生, Shizaitang zhaiyi 世载堂杂忆 [Miscellaneous Memory of Shizaitang], 2nd ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997), pp. 160–63.

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Liu also alerted us that Feng Ziyou too had a small reference on Chen Cuifen (also known as Ruifen 瑞芬 and Xiangling 香菱) who diligently looking after Sun and his revolutionaries. See Feng Ziyou, Geming yishi, vol. 3, pp. 1–2, fn 6. Chen Xinzheng, Huaqiao gemingshi, p. 11, too has a fleeting indication of Chen Cuifen’s presence in Penang. Yang Hanxiang’s 杨汉翔 essay in Bincheng yueshu baoshe ershisi zhounian jinian tekan, p. 12, identifies those family members who were staying with Sun in Penang as being his brother Sun Mei, two daughters, his first wife Lu and a so-called “Fourth Aunty” 四姑 who was “the secondary wife or concubine of Sun Yat-sen” 总理侧室. In contrast to this, a recent study of Song Qingling’s personal letters revealed that Song was extremely upset about the mid-1910s public rumours about her living together with Sun even before he divorced the first wife Lu Muzhen but there was no mention of Chen Cuifen at all. See Zhang Jieming 张洁明, “Song Qingling dui Sun Zhongshan de teshu huainian” 宋庆龄对孙中山的特殊怀念 [Song Qingling’s Special Remembrance of Sun Yat-sen], Shiji 世纪 [Century], vol. 4 (July 2010): 4–9. Interview with Wu Meirun 吴美润, Malaixiya Bincheng Hainan huiguan jinian tekan 马来西亚槟城海南会馆纪念特刊 [Souvenir Magazine of the Penang Hainan Association of Malaysia, 1993–2007] (Penang, 2007), pp. 312–13. Road to Dawn: Filming in Penang (Penang: Areca Books, 2007), passim. Assassination is a major template in the popular culture exposition of Sun’s revolutionary life. The 2009 Hong Kong movie “Bodyguards and Assassins” 十月围城 which devoted the entire film to this theme is a classic example. For the Penang movie “Road to Dawn”, a local history enthusiast Zheng Yongmei 郑永美 who had written about Hakka 客家 dialect group’s assistance to Sun Yat-sen objected strongly to the suggestion that the Qing consuls in Penang had ever initiated any assassination plot against Sun. Guanghua ribao (Kwong Wah Yit Poh) 光华日报, 28 March 2010, supplement. Road to Dawn: Filming in Penang, p. 12. Guanghua ribao, 28 March 2010. Shao Zonghai 邵宗海, “Xinma ‘Sun Zhongshan yanjiu’ dui Taiwan de qishi” 新马“孙中山研究” 对台湾的启示 [Singapore-Malaysia’s “Sun Yat-sen Studies” as an Inspiration for Taiwan], Lianhe Zaobao (Singapore), 9 April 2010.

References Bao Aiqin 包爱芹. “Nanjing guomin zhengfu de huaqiao jiaoyu zhengce yu cuoshi” 南京国民政府的华侨教育政策与措施 [Educational Policies and Implementation Measures of the Nationalist Government in Nanjing for the Overseas Chinese]. Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu 华侨华人历史研究 [Overseas Chinese History Studies], vol. 4 (December 2006): 58–59.

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1946. Second edition in Shanghai, January 1947 and third edition in Taipei, August 1953. ———. Huaqiao geming zuzhi shihua 华侨革命组织史话 [Historical Narratives on Overseas Chinese Organizations]. Taipei, June 1953. ———. Geming yishi 革命逸史 [Unofficial History of the 1911 Revolution]. Reprint edition. Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1981. Goh, Daniel P.S. “The Postcoloniality of Sun Yat-sen Memorials in Hong Kong, Penang and Singapore”. Paper presented at “Sun Yat-sen and Huanghuagang Uprising: Penang Conference and Chinese Overseas”, 27–28 March 2010. Guandan Hainan huiguan yibainian zhounian jinian tekan 关丹海南会馆一百年 周年纪念特刊 [Souvenir Magazine of the 100th Anniversary of the Kuantan Hainan Association]. Kuantan, 1995. Guanghua ribao (Kwong Wah Yit Poh) 光华日报, 28 March 2010. Guo Cunxiao 郭存孝. “Guofu Sun Zhongshan xiansheng zuiai Aodaliya huaqiao” 国父孙中山先生垂爱澳大利亚华侨 [Founding Father Sun Yat-sen’s Love for Overseas Chinese in Australia]. Qiaoxie Zazhi 桥协杂志 [Magazine of the Overseas Chinese Association (Taipei)], vol. 79 (2003): 20–25. Haiwai chubanshe 海外出版社, ed. Huaqiao yu zhongguo guomin geming yundong 华侨与中国国民革命运动 [Overseas Chinese and the Chinese National Revolutionary Movement]. Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1981. Hong Lysa and Huang Jianli. The Scripting of a National History: Singapore and Its Pasts. Singapore: NUS Press in conjunction with Hong Kong University Press, 2008. Hu Hanmin 胡汉民, ed. Zongli quanji 总理全集 [Completed Works of Sun Yat-sen]. Shanghai: Minzhi shuju, 1930. Huang Jianli. “Writings on Sun Yat-sen, Tongmenghui and the 1911 Revolution: Surveying the Field and Locating Southeast Asia”. In Tongmenghui, Sun Yatsen and the Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Revisit, edited by Leo Suryadinata. Singapore: Chinese Heritage Centre, 2006. ———. “Conceptualizing Chinese Migration and Chinese Overseas: The Contribution of Wang Gungwu”. In China and International Relations: The Chinese View and the Contribution of Wang Gungwu, edited by Zheng Yongnian. London: Routledge, 2010. Same article is also available in Journal of Chinese Overseas, vol. 6, no. 1 (May 2010): 1–21. Huang Jianli and Hong Lysa. “History and the Imaginaries of ‘Big Singapore’: Positioning the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall”. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 35, no. 1 (February 2004): 65–89. Huang Jingwan 黄警顽 et al., eds. Nanyang Pili huaqiao geming shiji 南洋霹雳华 侨革命史迹 [Revolutionary record of the Overseas Chinese in Nanyang Perak]. Shanghai: Wenhua meishu dushu gongshi, February 1933. Huang Zhenwu 黄珍吾. Huaqiao yu Zhongguo geming 华侨与中国革命 [Overseas Chinese and the Chinese Revolution]. Taipei: Guofang yanjiuyuan, 1963.

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Khoo Salma Nasution. Sun Yat Sen in Penang. Penang: Areca Books, 2008. Kong Li 孔立, Chen Zaizheng 陈在正, Lin Jinzhi 林金枝, and Guo Liang 郭梁. “Huaqiao yu Xinhai geming” 华侨与辛亥革命 [Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution]. Jinian Xinhai Geming qishi zhounian xueshu taolunhui wenji 纪念辛亥革命七十周年学术讨论会文集 [Proceedings of the Conference Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of the 1911 Revolution], vol. 1. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983. Lee Lai To, ed. The 1911 Revolution: The Chinese in British and Dutch Southeast Asia. Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1987. Li Anshan 李安山. “Zhonghua minguo shiqi huaqiao yanjiu shuping” 中华民国时 期华侨研究述评 [Overseas Chinese Studies and Critique during the Chinese Republican Era]. Jindaishi yanjiu 近代史研究 [Modern Historical Research], vol. 4 (2002): 307–10, 312. ———. “Zhongguo huaqiao huaren yanjiu de lishi yu xianzhuang gaishu” 中国华 侨华人研究的历史与现状概述 [A Survey of the History and Current Status of PRC Studies on Overseas Chinese-Chinese Overseas], 7 January 2006. “Xueshu jiaoliuwang” 学术交流网 [Website for the Exchange of Scholarship]. (accessed 3 September 2010). Li Guoliang 李国梁, Lin Jinzhi 林金枝，and Cai Renlong 蔡仁龙. Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe 华侨华人与中国革命和建设 [Overseas Chinese-Chinese Overseas and the Chinese Revolution and Reconstruction]. Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, December 1993. Li Weilin 李为麟. Huaqiao gemingshi 华侨革命史 [The Revolutionary History of Overseas Chinese]. 2nd ed. Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1990. Lianhe Zaobao 联合早报, 15 November 1996, 11 June 2001, 22 June 2001, 17 December 2002, 9 April 2010. Liu Yusheng 刘禺生. Shizaitang zhaiyi 世载堂杂忆 [Miscellaneous Memory of Shizaitang]. 2nd ed. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997. Malaixiya Bincheng Hainan huiguan jinian tekan 马来西亚槟城海南会馆纪念 特刊 [Souvenir Magazine of the Penang Hainan Association of Malaysia, 1993–2007]. Penang, 2007. Malaiya Xuelaner Qiongzhou huiguan: Qingzhu bainian zhounian ji tianhougong gaimu jinian tekan 马来西亚雪兰莪琼州会馆：庆祝百年周年暨天后宫 开幕纪念特刊 [Souvenir Magazine of the 100th Anniversary of the Malaysia Selangor Hainan Association and Opening of Its Tianhou Temple]. Kuala Lumpur, 1989. Maliujia Qiongzhou huiguan jiushiyi zhounian jinian tekan 马六甲琼州会馆九十 一周年纪念特刊 [Souvenir Magazine of the 91st Anniversary of the Malacca Hainan Association]. Malacca, 1960. Mapo Guangdong huiguan qishi zhounian jinian tekan 麻坡广东会馆七十周年纪 念特刊 [Souvenir Magazine of the 70th Anniversary of the Muar Guangdong Association], 1989.

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Nanyang Shangbao 南洋商报, 16 October 1923, 28 and 31 May 1929, 7 November 1937, 6 March 1940. Ouyang Changda 欧阳昌大. “Xingjiapo huaren dui Xinhai geming de fanying” 星 加坡华人对辛亥革命的反应 [Reactions of Singapore Chinese to the 1911 Revolution]. In Xingjiapo huazushi lunji 星加坡华族史论集 [An Anthology of the History of Singapore Chinese], edited by Kua Bak Lim 柯木林 and Ng Chin Keong 吴振强. Singapore, 1972. Qin Xiaoyi 秦孝仪. “Huaqiao wei geming zhimu” 华侨为革命之母 [Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution]. Jindai Zhongguo 近代中国 [Modern China], vol. 20 (December 1980): 31. Renjing sanshiernian jiniankan 人镜三十二年纪念刊 [Souvenir Magazine of the 32nd anniversary of Renjing (theatre group)]. Kuala Lumpur, 1952. Renmin ribao 人民日报 (the People’s Daily), 10 October 1961. Road to Dawn: Filming in Penang. Penang: Areca Books, 2007. Shao Zonghai 邵宗海. “Xinma ‘Sun Zhongshan yanjiu’ dui Taiwan de qishi” 新马 “孙中山研究” 对台湾的启示 [Singapore-Malaysia’s “Sun Yat-sen Studies” as an Inspiration for Taiwan]. Lianhe Zaobao (Singapore), 9 April 2010. Straits Times, 13 and 15 November 1996, 11 June 2001, 24 January 2002. Su Quanyou 苏全有. “Huidang yuansu yu Sun Zhongshan lingdao de wuzhuang qiyi” 会党元素与孙中山领导的武装起义 [Secret Society Factor and the Armed Revolts Led by Sun Yat-sen]. Xiamen daxue xuebao — zhexue shehui kexue ban 厦门大学学报 — 哲学社会科学版 [Journal of Xiamen University — Arts and Social Sciences], vol. 2 (2009): 55, 57. Sun Zhongshan quanji 孙中山全集 [Completed Works of Sun Yat-sen]. Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1984. Wu Fengbin 吴凤斌, Zhuang Guotu 庄国土, Lin Jinzhi 林金枝, Guo Liang 郭 梁, and Cai Renlong 蔡仁龙. Dongnanya huaqiao tongshi 东南亚华侨通史 [General History of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia]. Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, May 1994. Wu Yixiang 吴以湘, Wang Houren 王厚仁, and Chen Bietong 陈别同, eds. Tongde shubaoshe qishi zhounian jinian tekan 同德书报社七十周年纪念特刊 [70th Anniversary Special Souvenir Magazine of the Tongde shubaoshe]. Singapore, 1981. Wu Yuzhang. The Revolution of 1911: A Great Democratic Revolution of China. Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1962. Xing Jizhong 邢济众, ed. Tongde shubaoshe jiushi zhounian jinian tekan 同德书报 社九十周年纪念特刊 [90th Anniversary Special Souvenir Magazine of the Tongde shubaoshe]. Singapore, 2000. Xinhai geming yu Nanyang huaren yantaohui lunwen bianji weiyuanhui 辛亥革命 与南洋华人研讨会论文辛亥革命与南洋华人研讨会论文编辑委员会, ed. Xinhai geming yu Nanyang huaren yantaohui lunwenji 辛亥革命与南洋华人研

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讨会论文集 [An Anthology of Conference Papers on the 1911 Revolution and Nanyang Chinese]. Taipei, 1986. Yang Jinfa (Yong Ching Fatt) 杨进发. Zhanqian de Chen Jiageng yanlun shiliao yu fenxi 战前的陈嘉庚言论史料与分析 [Chen Jiageng in Pre-war Singapore: Documents and Analysis]. Singapore: South Seas Society, 1980. Yen Ching Hwang. The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976. ———. The Role of the Overseas Chinese in the 1911 Revolution. Southeast Asia Research Paper Series No. 3, Southeast Asian Studies Programme, Nanyang University. Singapore: Chopmen Enterprises, 1978. ———. Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Singapore and Malaya, 1877–1912. Working Paper in Asian Studies Paper No. 6. Centre for Asian Studies, The University of Adelaide, 1979. ———. “Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution”. Papers on Far Eastern History 19 (March 1979): 55–89. ———. “Nanyang Chinese and the 1911 Revolution”. In The 1911 Revolution: The Chinese in British and Dutch Southeast Asia, edited by Lee Lai To. Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1987. Yong Ching Fatt. Tan Kah-Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987. Zhan Zunquan 詹尊权, ed. Tongde shubaoshe bainian jinian tekan 同德书报社 百年纪念特刊 [100th Anniversary Special Souvenir Magazine of the Tongde shubaoshe]. Singapore, 2010. Zhang Jieming 张洁明. “Song Qingling dui Sun Zhongshan de teshu huainian” 宋庆龄对孙中山的特殊怀念 [Song Qingling’s Special Remembrance of Sun Yat-sen]. Shiji 世纪 (Century), vol. 4 (July 2010): 4–9. Zhang Shaokuang 张少宽. Sun Zhongshan yu Bineng huiyi: Cedong Guangzhou sanerjiu zhiyi 孙中山与庇能会议：策动广州三、二九之役 [Penang Conference and the 1911 Chinese Revolution: How Dr Sun Yat-sen Plotted to Change Chinese History]. Penang: Nanyang tianye yanjiushi, 2004. Zhang Yongfu 张永福. Nanyang yu chuangli minguo 南洋与创立民国 [Nanyang and the Establishment of the Chinese Republic]. Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, October 1933. Zheng Min 郑民 and Liang Chuming 梁初鸣. Huaqiao huaren shi yanjiuji 华侨华 人史研究集 [An Anthology on the History of Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas], vols. 1–2. Beijing: Xinhua shudian, 1988–89. Zhongguo dierlishi dang’anguan 中国第二历史档案馆, ed. Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian 中华民国史档案资料汇编 [Collection of Documents from the Chinese Republican Archives]. Nanjing: Jiangshu Guji chubanshe, 1994.

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Zhongguo shehui gexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo 中国社会科学院近代史研究所 [Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academic of Social Sciences], ed. Huaqiao yu Xinhai geming 华侨与辛亥革命 [Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1981. Zhou Nanjing 周南京. Fengyu tongzhou: Dongnanya yu huaren wenti 风雨同舟： 东南亚与华人问题 [On the Same Boat regardless of Wind or Rain: Southeast Asia and the Chinese Problem]. Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 1995. ———. “Haiwai huaren lishi lilun chutan” 海外华人历史理论初探 [Preliminary Study into the Theories on History of Chinese Overseas]. “Zhongguo qiaowang” 中国侨网 [Website of Chinese Sojourners], 27 August 2001. (accessed 3 September 2010). Zhou Rundong 周润东. “Ruhe lijie ‘huaqiao shi geming zhimu’” 如何理解 “华侨是 革命之母” [How to Interpret “Overseas Chinese is the Mother of Revolution]. Shengli luntan 胜利论坛 [Victory Forum] 4 (1996): 71. Zou Lu 邹鲁. Zhongguo Guomindang shigao 中国国民党史稿 [Draft History of the Chinese Nationalist Party]. Shanghai, 1929. Republished as part of the long series on Minguo congshu 民国丛书 [Books on Republican China], vols. 25–26. Shanghai: Shangwu yingshuguan, mimeographed version of 1947.

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6 THAILAND AND THE XINHAI REVOLUTION: EXPECTATION, REALITY AND INSPIRATION1 Wasana Wongsurawat

Introduction Up through the earliest decades of the twentieth century, the Thai public generally was rarely concerned with the domestic political affairs of any foreign country beyond peninsular Southeast Asia. Events in China, however, proved a major exception. The Xinhai Revolution of 1911 was, by all accounts, among the best documented and best publicized political upheavals in the history of Thai journalism. This was, of course, partly due to the very large ethnic Chinese population in Thailand at that time. Chinese and Japanese official sources2 agree that, at least up to the end of the Second World War, Thailand hosted the largest Overseas Chinese community in the world. The last major influx of Chinese migrant workers was a major driving force behind King Chulalongkorn’s (Rama V, 1868–1910) modernization projects in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It was the values and aspirations of these resident aliens that resulted in the momentous proliferation of Chinese newspapers and Chinese educational institutions of various sorts in Thailand.3 130

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Another significant factor contributing to the unusually high profile of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution in the eyes of many Thai people was the overt concern and obvious anxiety of the Thai ruling class about the possibility that such an anti-monarchic upheaval could break out in the Kingdom as well. In fact, the Thai court had been well aware, long before the outburst of that revolution, of the dangers of allowing the general public to be exposed to foreign political systems and ideas. Consequently, only a limited circle of high-ranking members of the royal family and young nobles destined to serve the court had been allowed to obtain higher education in Europe and America during Chulalongkorn’s reign. Exposure to different political ideas and developments from the West was jealously guarded and carefully restricted in the local educational system. As Kasian Tejapira has noted,4 no alternative political ideology or mode of government was introduced to the general public in Thailand via Western education. Instead, this information entered into public awareness, becoming vastly popular among the lowest roots of urban society, through the writings of Chinese revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen, whose words were published in numerous Chinese newspapers of the time and translated into Thai by Overseas Chinese activists and journalists. When it became obvious in the earliest decades of the twentieth century that the proliferation of seditious ideas via the Chinese-language press was getting out of hand, King Vajiravudh (Rama VI, 1910–25) made the dramatic decision to join the ranks of the journalists of his time in an attempt to make use of journalism and the press to support his own political agenda.5 He then became, without doubt, the most prolific Thai critic of the Xinhai Revolution. In the midst of the outbursts of enthusiasm among ethnic Chinese and progressive Thai journalists, King Vajiravudh, writing mostly under his pseudonym Asawaphahu, was among the very few to make sobering comments — questioning the true validity of the 1911 cataclysm and wondering if the dictatorship of Yuan Shikai could truly be the consequence of a “successful” revolution.6 Not surprisingly, critics of Vajiravudh never hesitate to point out that the monarch felt threatened by the possibility that such a revolution might break out within his own realm, and that he therefore preferred for the sake of his own political position that, not only the Xinhai, but all revolutions, be deemed failures. This is probably not far from the actual facts. Nonetheless, one should not be too quick to dismiss the critiques of Asawaphahu as self-serving propaganda. Closer investigation reveals the intriguing image of a Thai monarch who grasps with unexpected clarity the complexity of Chinese politics in his own time. Even more noteworthy is the fact that, despite his well crafted arguments and his position as head of state,

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Vajiravudh’s views on the revolution appear to have carried much less weight than the outbursts of sheer enthusiasm from patriotic Overseas Chinese and progressive Thai journalists of the early twentieth century. The major difference between the skepticism of Asawaphahu and the enthusiasm of supporters of the 1911 Revolution — among whom Xiao Focheng was the prime example — is in their definition of success. Revolutionaries aspire to transform society by overthrowing the existing regime, which they view as unjust, oppressive, and ineffective. Journalist supporters therefore tended to see the success of the Xinhai Revolution in the toppling of the Qing Dynasty. On the other hand, critics of revolutions generally, especially those closely involved with a ruling regime, tend to judge the success of a revolt by the success of the regime that emerges from it. Since revolutionaries give more thought to toppling rather than building a regime, while critics (especially a contemporary ruling monarch) tend to be much more interested in maintaining a workable order, it is not surprising that the two views are hardly on the same wavelength. For advocates, revolutions are an inspiration, but for those who sit on the throne, they represent a cautionary tale. The 1911 Revolution in China inspired supporters of the 1912 Rebellion in Thailand, who though they failed, were the precursors of the 1932 Revolution which transformed the throne of the Chakri into a constitutional monarchy.7 Asawaphahu’s writings, however, not only accurately describe the failures of the regimes that resulted from the Xinhai Revolution, but also anticipate quite correctly the kinds of inadequacies that were to arise in the wake of the Thai revolution of 1932. This chapter will investigate “expectations” regarding the 1911 Revolution, as expressed by supporting views of ethnic Chinese and progressive Thai journalists in the first decade of the twentieth century; the political realities that resulted from the revolution, as assessed in the writings of Asawaphahu; and how the Xinhai Revolution, despite all its shortcomings, has continued to inspire Thai revolutionaries since the foiled rebellion of 1912, to the regime-toppling coup of 1932, and up to the present day.

Expectations The first decade of the twentieth century must have been quite an exciting time for the Overseas Chinese of Nanyang. After centuries of neglect by the Qing court and suffering the fiercely menacing attitudes of officials in their own ancestral homeland, the Overseas Chinese finally came into their own in the modern history of China. In 1900, just two years after

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he was ousted from his position of influence in the Qing court with the abrupt and miserable end of his “Hundred-Day Reform”, Kang Youwei went on a tour of Southeast Asia to recruit support for his “Association for the Protection of the Emperor” [bao huang hui, 保皇会], propagating his “Three Protection Doctrine”, that is, protect the nation, protect the race and protect education [bao guo, 保国; bao zhong, 保种; bao jiao, 保教].8 The basic idea behind the campaign was quite simple. The Qing court had been usurped by ultra-conservative and corrupt forces of the Empress Dowager who had dangerously undermined China’s modernizing process by putting an end to Kang’s reform movement. Kang had barely escaped with his life and had lost most of his influence on the mainland. His only hope of putting the Middle Kingdom back on the modernization track was to gain support from the Overseas Chinese. To achieve this, Kang had to stir up their nationalist fervor [bao guo, 保国], remind them of racial and blood ties with their ancestral homeland [bao zhong, 保种], and encourage their nationalist consciousness. These values would be the heritage of their children and grandchildren via a well-established Chinese educational system [bao jiao, 保教] throughout Southeast Asia. Living in a region widely colonized by European imperialist powers, and having experienced many aspects of Western modernity, these Overseas Chinese well understood the urgent need for modernization in China. The crucial point, however, in Kang’s decision to seek their support was that the Nanyang Chinese were not only in a position to help the Qing court, but that they were now an essential factor in China’s salvation. It was not long after Kang Youwei’s momentous visit that the Qing court awoke to the contemporary importance of Overseas Chinese. After the disastrous consequences of the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the century, even the Empress Dowager and her cohorts realized that swift moves towards modernization would be the only chance to save the Manchu ruling class from their dire political situation. Like Kang, the Qing court viewed financial support from Overseas Chinese as a safer engine for their modernization projects than loans from aggressive imperialist powers. Gaining support from the Overseas Chinese would also reduce the base of support for dissident factions such as Kang’s reformist movement. Hence, the Manchu broke with their long tradition of disdain towards the Overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia, and sent their agents to garner as much financial support as possible. They managed this by selling to the wealthy communities of sojourners what they wanted most from the Qing court, that is, acceptance and recognition in the form of official positions and ceremonial gowns that could be bought with hard cash. The substantial success of this “southern expedition” by the

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Manchu rapidly improved the Overseas Chinese position in relation to the Qing court. By 1903, one of Nanyang’s most successful Chinese capitalists, Zhang Bizhi, was summoned, for the second time, to an audience with the Empress Dowager who made him no less than her personal advisor in the area of modernization.9 Suddenly it seemed that everyone was calling upon the Overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia to “save the nation”. Not surprisingly, when the revolutionary movement of Sun Yat-sen eventually picked up the Southeast Asian trail, the Overseas Chinese of Nanyang were already well versed in the rhetoric of modernization and nationalism. Still, Sun Yat-sen’s campaign did have something more to offer. That revolutionary movement went far beyond Qing court politics of acceptance and recognition, calling instead for full-scale revolution. The Nanyang Chinese were called upon to assist in the overthrow of the oppressive, ineffectual, and corrupt Manchu regime, and to help establish a new, modern, righteous, and capable regime governed by the Han people themselves. The Overseas Chinese in this grand design were to be no less than the mother of the revolution! They were no longer treated as mere appendages of the empire, called upon only in times of crisis. They were instead being hailed as the architects of a new China. Sun appealed to the age-old anti-Manchu ideology of the Chinese secret societies, which were still alive and well in the Overseas Chinese communities of Southeast Asia. He called upon them to “overthrow the Qing and restore the Ming” [ fan qing fu ming, 翻清复明], adding a modern touch of republicanism to the ancient slogan. The Qing court that had neglected them for centuries was, after all, their arch enemy. The fall of the Ming in 1644 was actually a major reason why so many of their forebears had fled the ancestral homeland in the first place. Sun Yat-sen, a well-educated Overseas Chinese who had experienced modernity, growing up overseas in Hawaii came to lead them, the patriotic Overseas Chinese who had experienced modernity during their years of toil in European colonies and the major port cities of Siam. Together, they would empower a revolution that would usher China into a golden age of modernity, equality and justice. Sun Yat-sen visited Thailand at least four times in the years leading up to the Xinhai Revolution.10 For many other Overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, Sun’s visit to Thailand was the cause of much excitement. Sun received much support from Xiao Focheng [萧佛成, 1864–1939], a leading personality in Thailand’s Chinese community in the early twentieth century. By 1907, a branch of Sun’s Revolutionary Alliance [tongmenghui, 同盟会] had been established in Bangkok. In the county which at that time

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boasted the largest Overseas Chinese community in the world,11 Xiao was a local leader, responsible for dispensing revolutionary propaganda and for rallying support for Sun’s activities on the mainland. Xiao was a Hokkien Chinese born in the Strait Settlements. Xiao’s father, relocating his family to Thailand while Xiao was still very young, had made a fortune in the rice and shipping business. Xiao was well educated in both the Thai and Chinese languages and a perfect local candidate to carry out Sun’s grand designs. Descended from a loyal Ming official, Xiao’s family had deep connections within the anti-Manchu secret societies in Nanyang. Upon completing his education, Xiao chose the journalist profession and became editor of the first bilingual (Thai/Chinese) newspaper in Thailand. His knowledge of classical Chinese was extensive enough to gain respect within the Chinese community, while his Thai language skills enabled him to communicate with local officialdom and to convey his ideas to the Thai general public as well. Perhaps even more significantly, Xiao was born in British Malaya and registered as a British subject. This allowed him to enjoy extraterritorial rights in Thailand, and granted him much more freedom and security in his politically risky profession as a newspaperman.12 Xiao Focheng led the journalistic efforts on behalf of Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Alliance through the publication of a series of newspapers established precisely to serve as mouthpieces for the movement. The first of this series was the Zhongguo Ribao 中国日报, which was first published in Hong Kong in 1905. Xiao made a couple of attempts to establish a voice for the Tongmenghui in Thailand, but did not have much success until he began publishing the Huaxian Xinbao 华暹新报 in 1907.13 Huaxian Xinbao supported the revolutionary cause by propagating two major themes related to current developments in Chinese politics. His ideas gained some notoriety, attracting a wide range of readers in the Chinese community and among progressive Thai thinkers, as well. His writing also made him some enemies in high places both within the Chinese community and among the highest ranks of the Thai ruling class. The first of the two themes regularly espoused by Xiao was couched in anti-Manchu rhetoric. This approach was aimed at more traditional and conservative readers sympathetic to secret societies, and at old established families with a long tradition of anti-Manchu ideology. News articles and editorial pieces espousing this theme tend to emphasize the oppression, corruption and ineffectiveness of Manchu rule. They lament the great shame and sufferings endured by the Han people since the Manchu conquest, mocking the Qing court and its failures — from the Taiping Rebellion to

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the Opium War — to safeguard the empire from enemies both domestic and foreign. The conclusion is inevitably that China could return to her former glory only by the revolutionary overthrow of the Qing Dynasty. The following are typical examples of some of the writing in this anti-Manchu vein: That the Manchu government has announced that a constitution is about to be promulgated is simply a lie to pacify the people. The Manchu have caused tremendous harm to the Chinese people. The Manchu always want to have power over the Chinese. Just look at the government, all important offices such as the Ministers of Defense and Finance. They are all Manchu … Now the Manchu worry that the Chinese will try to reclaim wealth and power from their hands. Nor do they want the Chinese to attain the same rights as the Manchu currently possess. Why then would they allow a constitution? If there were really a constitution, the Chinese would seize all power and positions from them. They only say such things to trick the Chinese into stopping their rioting for a short while.14 The revolutionary aim to overthrow the Manchu government is actually the duty of all who were born in China; it is not simply the mission of one or two people. The Manchu government has no substantial means of governing. They are only capable of selling land and giving up power or benefits to foreigners … Those who have had to suffer from their unjust oppression are not limited only to the Chinese people. The Mongols, the Hui, the Tibetans, as well as Manchu who are common citizens are also fellow sufferers. Hence, all these nationals should join forces with the Chinese nation in destroying the Manchu government.15

Articles such as the above excerpts were not aimed only at rallying support from readers in the Chinese community in Thailand. Xiao also sought to discredit Kang Youwei’s reformist movement and to counter the work of agents of the Qing court who were also actively rallying support for their own nationalist and modernization projects throughout Nanyang during the first decade of the twentieth century. These anti-Manchu diatribes emphasize that no reform could truly occur in China if the Qing Dynasty remained in power. All reform policies, whether propagated by Kang Youwei or by the Qing Court itself, were nothing more than lies conjured up to pacify the Chinese people and to delay revolution indefinitely. The second and perhaps more problematic theme put forward by the Chinese revolutionary voice in Thailand criticized the political system to which the Qing Empire subscribed as oppressive, ineffectual and obsolete. Articles

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representing this theme often raise questions concerning the justification of absolute monarchy, making veiled suggestions that republicanism appears to be a more modern and logical system of government. In the excerpt cited below, Xiao invokes a vague explanation of Rousseau’s theory to support Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary ideology. Human beings in the world should all equally enjoy freedom. No one should accept being a prisoner under the power of others … The French sage named Rousseau … said that each citizen is a part of the power of the sovereign. The sovereign power is the freedom of a country. Each citizen is already a part of the country and therefore enjoys a part of its freedom as well. The power of the sovereign is also a part of the country. Establishing a country requires territory, citizens, and freedom. These three factors are most important. Hence, freedom is a crucial part of having a country. He also said that the power of the sovereign does not belong to him personally, but is appointed to him by the people … The sovereign power is the freedom of a country, which is the congregation of all individual affairs. Each individual is a part of the sovereign power. Therefore, each citizen is the sovereign and the sovereign is a citizen. The two may not be differentiated.16

Not surprisingly, this latter theme, widely propagated in Xiao’s newspapers towards the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, was highly problematic in the political context of his country of residence. Xiao later repeatedly denied that he harbored any ill intentions towards the Thai absolute monarchy. He insisted that his republicanism was strictly limited to the Chinese context. Nonetheless, many of the highest echelons of the Thai ruling class were doubtful that such a fervent supporter of Chinese republican revolution could give wholehearted allegiance to the absolute monarchy in Thailand. Furthermore, regardless of what Xiao’s true intentions towards the Thai absolute monarchy were, much of his writing had already started to influence some sectors of the Chinese community in Thailand in a more subversive direction. By the time Sun Yat-sen made his last visit to Thailand in 1908, the Revolutionary Alliance was already well known among Thai authorities for its notorious anti-monarchist tendencies. Xiao’s publications succeeded in bringing a much larger crowd to hear Sun talk at the Chinese Club in Bangkok on 1 December of that year. Sun actually included some fiery criticism of the absolute monarchy in his speech, inciting hundreds of people in the audience to support dynastic overthrow. Thai authorities

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promptly ordered him to leave the Kingdom for good. A little over three full years passed from the day of Sun’s final expulsion from Thailand to the establishment of the Republic of China and his brief moments of power in the early months of 1912. In the same period in Thailand, tides of change also appeared to be gathering momentum quite rapidly. The organization of political factions within the Chinese community in Thailand towards the end of King Chulalongkorn’s reign was significantly influenced by Sun’s visit, by the establishment of the Tongmenghui branch and the Chinese Club in Bangkok, and by the proliferation of local Chinese-language newspapers and Chinese schools. Toward the end of the 1900s, passive aggressive methods of protest such as strikes and boycotts of imported goods had been introduced with some degree of success among working classes and business circles in Bangkok’s Chinatown. By 1910, the biggest and most severe labour strike in the history of modern Thailand occurred with far-reaching effects and long-term consequences. This was the Chinese Strike of 1910, which was organized mostly by leaders of secret societies in protest against the last series of tax reforms under King Chulalongkorn’s administration. The reforms included an increase in the capitation tax rate for Chinese nationals, making them responsible for paying the same amount as native Thai nationals. The strike included almost all Chinese workers, employees, and entrepreneurs in nearly every sector of every type of business. The strike brought Bangkok and every major city in the country to a virtual stand-still for three full days. Ultimately, however, the strike was unsuccessful in attaining its stated goal. The series of tax reforms in question was not revised in any way, and by the end of Chulalongkorn’s reign, Chinese nationals were required to pay the same rate of capitation tax as the Thais. However, the strike served as an important historical marker of the true influence of the Overseas Chinese in the Thai economy and of their ability to organize and express their collective demands in a strong and powerful way never before experienced in Thailand. Barely two years after the Chinese strike of 1910, a plot was foiled which aimed to bring about a revolution, assassinate the monarch, and possibly establish a republic. Investigations revealed close connections between the plotters and leading members of the Tongmenghui in Bangkok. Some of the ringleaders had been heavily influenced by Xiao Focheng’s articles on republicanism and the Chinese revolutionary movement.17 All things considered, Sun Yat-sen’s four visits to Thailand, and Xiao Focheng’s journalistic propaganda appear to have succeeded more in provoking political unrest in Thailand than in furthering the revolution in China.

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Reality With all the excitement of Sun Yat-sen’s visits and the great expectations associated with the seemingly successful Chinese Revolution, it would be fair to say that King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) ascended the throne at a volatile moment in Thai political history. The King had been well aware, since the turn of the century, of the escalating levels of nationalist excitement among his ethnic Chinese subjects, but he had been deeply disturbed, as well, in the last year of his father’s reign, by their three-day strike’s brazen display of economic might. The young king’s impression doubtless became more vivid when, within months of his ascension to the throne, a republican plot involving his own assassination, with close connections to Chinese political activists, was foiled. For Vajiravudh, it was clear that rather than influencing the situation in China, rising nationalist sentiment among ethnic Chinese in Siam was a serious threat to the stability of the political system in Thailand, and to his own political position. Thai government propaganda therefore turned substantially towards discrediting Sun Yat-sen and the Xinhai Revolution, not for the purpose of weakening or destroying a distant newborn republic, but for the sake of the survival of Vajiravudh’s own realm as he knew it. A fundamental policy of King Vajiravudh’s reign was the promotion of Thai nationalism in campaigns which included more than a fair share of anti-Sinicism. Probably one of the most widely publicized of his writings in international academia today is “The Jews of the Orient”, a case-inpoint statement of the king’s own anti-Chinese brand of nationalism. The piece is heavily influenced by anti-Semitic ideas popular in Europe during the period of his studies in Oxford in the late nineteenth century. In “The Jews of the Orient”, Vajiravudh basically compares what he perceives as negative similarities between the Jewish and Chinese Diasporas. The article concludes that the Chinese are worse than the Jews, because the Chinese tend to return a great portion of their wealth to China, rather than doing as the Jews did, which was to reinvest their earnings in their host country.18 His nationalist strategy was, on the one hand, to use the ethnic Chinese as the convenient and appropriate Other against which native Thai could differentiate, and therefore better identify themselves. This process of cultivating a strong national identity would become a crucial foundation for the Thai nationalist sentiment which Vajiravudh desperately needed to support his political position. At the same time, “The Jews of the Orient”, also attempted to encourage cultural assimilation of later generations of local ethnic Chinese. In discrediting “Chineseness” and the Chinese race,

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Vajiravudh suggested that assuming a Thai cultural identity and subscribing to Thai nationalism would be a “civilizing” move, and perhaps the only way to be saved from perishing along with the rapidly deteriorating Chinese nation. Vajiravudh repeatedly employed this same logic and reasoning in many of his writings. Another obvious example is the article “Comparison of Surnames and Clan Names”,19 in which he emphasizes that his decision to promulgate the Surname Act in Thailand was in accordance with civilized tradition, doing as the English do. In explaining the differences between surnames and the clan names favoured by the Chinese, Vajiravudh insists that clan names were used in pre-modern and less civilized societies plagued with war and barbarity — China and Scotland being two major examples. Surnames, he argued, are used in more civilized societies that have achieved unity and harmony, such as in a modern nation like England. The Surname Act of Thailand must definitely be a civilized development in the direction of the English, avoiding degeneration into barbarism like the Chinese. Aside from his ongoing attempts to discredit “Chineseness” and Chinese culture as underdeveloped and obsolete, King Vajiravudh also wrote many articles directly attacking the character and moral standards of the leaders of both major political movements in China, as well as political leaders of the Chinese community in Thailand who appeared too enthusiastic about China’s national salvation and not nearly excited enough about Thailand’s nationalist movement. In this respect, Xiao Focheng was often criticized for his dubious loyalty — presenting himself as a leader of the Chinese community while publishing his ideas in Thai-language newspapers and claiming to be a Thai journalist, but enjoying extraterritorial rights as a subject of the British crown. As for people who advertise themselves as Thai, but socialize only with their Chinese friends and relatives, and are always pro-China in their sentiments, concerning these people I remain doubtful of their intentions. A person could only be either Thai or Chinese. One could not be both at the same time. People who act as if they were both at the same time are usually both Thai and Chinese. These people are like chameleons that change their colors to suit their surroundings. When they are among Thai people, they become Thai. Then when they meet a group of Chinese people, they become Chinese. Many of this sort are subjects of foreign powers. They are the ones who present themselves as the speakers and politicians of the half-Thai, half-Chinese. They set themselves up as the leaders of modern ideas. They are speakers and journalists in Bangkok newspapers. I used to be amazed and hurt upon hearing that some of my Thai compatriots admire the viewpoints of

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these people. They should know better and realize that these people are only Thai when they talk. Don’t they know that these people could be whatever suits them? How could my compatriots trust someone who could have two or even three nationalities at the same time? For example, someone who claims to be Thai, but boasts about being a leader in the Chinese community, and also is a subject of a European empire as well, what sort of person is he?20

In discrediting ethnic Chinese leaders as untrustworthy, Vajiravudh also attempted to discredit the political movements which those leaders claimed to represent. If the leader could not be trusted, how could his political agenda be worth supporting? Vajiravudh employed this line of reasoning repeatedly in many of his writings concerning political developments in China. Later, with the rise of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, the King commented on the patriotic activities of the students of Chinese schools in Thailand as follows: This is the nature of the Chinese, which could not be easily cured. No matter what kind of association is established, it will always become a secret society, specializing in embezzling money more than anything else. The Association of Chinese Students is no exception. Despite elegant words in their manifesto, ultimately they are simply an instrument of a certain person or a certain group in embezzling money from their compatriots.21

Ultimately, in Vajiravudh’s view, political development in China had very little to do with what was happening in Thailand during the same period, and vice versa. A political movement within the Chinese community in Thailand could hardly have any concrete influence on what was happening in China. The King believed that there was a vast, unbridgeable gap between the reality of China and that of the Overseas Chinese in Thailand — an ocean separated them by vast distances. The Overseas Chinese had not exerted any real influence in Chinese politics since time immemorial. Leaders like Xiao Focheng and the secret society masters only created the illusion of connectivity by bringing in famous personalities in exile like Kang Youwei and Sun Yat-sen in order to enrich themselves through make-believe support for the “national salvation” of China. Vajiravudh’s version of reality-check for the Chinese community in Thailand as regards the Xinhai Revolution may seem harsh and self-serving. Even so, it remains a solid possibility that Xiao Focheng’s journalistic

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propaganda on behalf of republicanism may have been more of a catalyst to instigate the foiled 1912 Rebellion in Thailand than the toppling of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Vajiravudh demonstrated this possibility by pointing out a number of illogical points in the Chinese nationalist propaganda of Xiao and other leaders of the Chinese community in Thailand. The king showed how these leaders themselves were mistaken about quite a few key matters concerning Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary movement. First and foremost, Vajiravudh questioned whether Yuan Shikai really believed in Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary ideology. Would he actually deliver the sort of “New China” promised by Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People and by much of Xiao Focheng’s republican propaganda? As early as 1912, Vajiravudh translated and published E. J. Dillon’s article, “The Disintegration of China”, from the British magazine, Nineteenth Century and After, no. 428 (October 1912). In this article, Dillon questions Yuan’s true political intentions, expressing doubts about the latter’s commitment to Sun Yat-sen’s brand of republicanism. He predicts that Yuan’s regime will be a military dictatorship and that China under Yuan will be even worse off than under the Manchu, since the newly established Republic of China lacked all the crucial institutions, and its bureaucracy remained very weak and incomplete. Like Vajiravudh, Dillon did not believe in the Chinese Revolution. The English writer pointed out that the entire dynastic system was being wiped out with no well-planned, well-executed, political system to replace it. China was being ushered towards further disintegration and a future in which the ascendancy of warlords would be virtually unavoidable.22 Later in 1915, when Yuan Shikai expressed his intentions to return China to the dynastic system and to establish himself as emperor, Vajiravudh, writing as Asawaphahu, published the article, “The New Emperor”,23 in response to Xiao Focheng’s recent newspaper articles expressing outrage against what he perceived as Yuan’s backward political ideology. Asawaphahu concluded that republicanism could not succeed in the orient after all, and that no matter how modern and Westernized Sun Yat-sen’s ideas may have appeared to be, they all proved quite useless when put into practice in China. Despite all the civil wars, revolutions, and unrest, the orient would always return to monarchism — Yuan’s regime being a case in point. Not long after the publication of “The New Emperor”, Asawaphahu published another long article, “The Cult of Following”,24 criticizing people who like to follow examples of the West without truly understanding the logic or reasoning behind Western actions or traditions, and ending up causing more harm than good to their own society. Not surprisingly, Sun Yat-sen and

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his revolutionary movement were the prime example of the “The Cult of Following”. Asawaphahu ended this article with a stern warning to so-called “progressive” thinkers in Thailand at the time that might be considering following in Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary track: My fellow compatriots! Please think carefully about this. Emulating your ancestors would benefit you truly. It is better than allowing yourself to follow in the path of those mindless people who ape everything the Westerners do and claim to be political experts. These people have already delayed China’s prosperity for a whole century. Now that we see the example of how the Cult of Following has harmed China, we should all try to be mindful and do our best to bring development and prosperity to our country in ways that suit our culture and history best. This would be better than striving towards something that our people remain unready to embrace. We may all help our country by fulfilling our duties to the best of our abilities and refraining from indiscriminately following the ways of the West.25

The underlying message is quite obvious. If anyone attempted to overthrow the Chakri Dynasty or remove Vajiravudh from the throne, Thailand, not unlike China, would face a very difficult period of disintegration, at the end of which the country would probably return to the dynastic system anyway, making all efforts of the revolutionaries completely futile.

Inspiration A rather long and elaborate debate concerning various political ideas and government systems took place between King Vajiravudh, writing as Asawaphahu, and Xiao Focheng through a series of newspaper articles published continuously in the King’s mouthpiece, Nangsuepimthai, and in Xiao’s Chinosiamwarasap for nearly the entire reign of Rama VI (1910–25). However, it seems as if, on the subject of revolution, the two were describing and discussing two completely different concepts. Xiao awaited “the Revolution” with the keenest expectation. He wrote and published with absolute confidence that the world, especially China, would become a better place if and when the revolutionaries succeeded. What this long aspired-to “success” would actually look like, however, was never clearly defined. Before 1912, it was described roughly as the overthrow of the Qing regime and the establishment of the Republic of China. Nonetheless, once those two goals were achieved, Yuan Shikai’s ascension to power did not seem right, or in accord with Sun Yat-sen’s ideology. Xiao realized that the true success of the

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revolution might not have been attained after all, since the position of power had been hijacked by a military dictator. Sun, who was supposed to be the “father of the revolution”, was once again forced into exile. Xiao continued to support the revolution with great expectation for the grand day that Sun Yat-sen’s righteous regime would finally take control and establish a truly democratic Republic of China. Even after Sun passed away in 1925, Xiao continued to believe in the revolution of the Three Principles of the People and supported Hu Hanmin’s faction, which Xiao trusted would eventually achieve the revolutionary success that he had been awaiting with great expectation throughout his life. Vajiravudh, on the other hand, understood revolution as the transformation of a government system, and judged revolutionary achievement according to the success of the regime which was supposed to be the outcome of the revolution. Such was the perspective of one who was already in a position to wield governing power, a position quite opposite to both Xiao Focheng and Sun Yat-sen during most of their political careers and before 1911. Vajiravudh envisioned a successful revolution as well-planned, well-executed, and resulting in a smooth transition of power. The new governing system would allow development to go forward efficiently and effectively. Hence, when Yuan Shikai took over and reverted to authoritarian rule, eventually attempting to re-establish the dynastic system, the failure of the Xinhai Revolution was complete in Vajiravudh’s view. At the same time, by reading all that led up to the Revolution of 1911 as false expectation and political illusion, Vajiravudh failed to see another important long-term aspect of the revolution. Although Xiao Focheng’s life-long great expectations may not have been answered by the actual outcome of the revolution, the awesome expectation that drives individuals like him and Sun Yat-sen to devote their lives to a revolutionary cause is a powerful inspiration which gives rise to later generations of revolutionaries. The Xinhai Revolution inspired the 1912 Rebellion in Thailand which, though it failed, inspired the People’s Party, who led the 1932 Revolution, ending absolute monarchy in Thailand and transforming the Kingdom into a constitutional monarchy. Of course, the regime that followed the 1932 Revolution was far from perfect, and was not nearly as democratic as the leaders of the People’s Party had boasted at the dawning of 24 June 1932, when they first seized power. In fact, nearly eighty years later, Thailand is still struggling with the democratic system — most definitely a complete failure according to Vajiravudh’s standards. Whether or not the 1932 Revolution was a premature transformation remains a crucial subject for debate that continues to split the history field in Thailand right down the middle to

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this day. But all agree that the revolution also continues to be a significant inspiration for every single major political upheaval in Thailand since the end of the Second World War. This is probably not too different from the fact that Sun Yat-sen and the Xinhai Revolution continue to be a fundamental part of the political ideology of both the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, even though nobody is quite sure whose side the “Father of the Revolution” was actually on.

Conclusion Every major revolution is like a big splash in the middle of the small pond of world history. It causes big circular ripples that expand all the way to the furthest edges of the pond. These sudden ripples might cause excitement among creatures at the far edges of the pond, and encourage them to join in the commotion and make their own splashes as well. However, as could be expected, splashes made at the edge of the pond would tend to affect the edge of the pond much more than the middle where the first inspirational splash occurred. Sun Yat-sen came to Thailand at least four times during the first decade of the twentieth century to rally support for his revolutionary movement. The revolution then broke out in China in a military camp at a time when Sun himself was not even in the country. Overseas Chinese patriots like Xiao Focheng and his cohorts in Thailand would like to have played a more significant role in toppling the dynastic regime in China. Despite repeated denials of any ill intentions towards the existing political system in Siam during Vajiravudh’s reign, they actually contributed much more to undermining the absolute monarchy in Thailand. Similarly, Vajiravudh’s seemingly menacing nationalist propaganda like “The Jews of the Orient” was probably less intended as an attack on the Xinhai Revolution or the Republic of China than a strategic move to curb the enthusiasm of Siam’s very large, resident Overseas Chinese community. The King hoped — but ultimately failed — to discourage another revolutionary splash whose effects would continue to ripple through Thai society and Thai politics even to this day.

Notes 1

2

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The research for this chapter was partially funded with the support of Thailand Research Funds (TRF) and the National Research University Project HS10254 (Chula Unisearch, Chulalongkorn University). AH: Foreign Affairs; 172–1/0703(4)012, DSTP, June 1942–October 1943. See also, George Hicks, ed., Overseas Chinese Remittances from Southeast Asia

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3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14 15 16 17

18

19

20 21

22

23

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1910–1940 (Singapore: Select Books, 1993). G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957). Kasian Tejapira, Commodifying Marxism: The Formation of Modern Thai Radical Culture, 1927–1958 (Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2001). Walter F. Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1978). National Archives: Rama VI; r.6 n.20.13/23. Asawaphahu, “The New Emperor” [botkhwam “wangti ong mai” doy asawaphahu], 18 September 1915. Thaemsuk Noomnandha, The First Young Turks: Rebels of 1912 [young turk run raek: kabot ro so nueng roi samsip] (Bangkok: Saitan, 2002). Qiu Jianzhang, “Lun wan qing zhengfu de huaqiao jiaoyü zhengce”, Henan Daxue Xuebao, vol. 42, no. 4 (2002): 59. Michael R. Godley, The Mandarin Capitalists of Nanyang: Overseas Chinese enterprises in the modernization of China, 1893–1911 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 93. Xie Guang, Political Activities of the Overseas Chinese in Thailand, 1906–1939 [taiguo huaqiao de zhengzhi huodong, 1906–1939] (Bangkok: Center for Chinese Studies, Chulalongkorn Univesity, 2003), p. 16. Penpisut Intharabhirom, Seow Hudseng Sriboonruang (Bangkok: Department of History, Chulalongkorn University, 2004), p. 22. Murashima Eiji, Politics of the Chinese in Siam [kanmuan chin siam] (Bangkok: Center for Chinese Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1996), pp. 1–2. Huaxian Xinbao was published together with a Thai-language newspaper, Chino-Siam Warasap, making it the first bilingual newspaper in the history of Thai journalism. See Penpisut Intharabhirom, Seow Hudseng Sriboonruang, pp. 12–13. Huaxian Xinbao, 12 January 1909. Huaxian Xinbao, 3 February 1909. Huaxian Xinbao, 4 February 1909. Thaemsuk Noomnanda, The First Young Turks: The Rebellion of 1912 [young turk run raek: kabot ro so roy sam sip] (Bangkok: Saithan, 2002). Asawaphahu, “The Jews of the Orient” and “Wake Up Siam!” (Bangkok: Chuanphim, 1985). Asawaphahu, “Comparison of Surnames and Clan Names”, in Collection of King Vajiravudh’s Writings [pramuan botphrarachanipon nai phrabatsomdetphramon gkutklaochaoyuhua] (Bangkok: Sirisarn, 1961), pp. 45–54. Vajiravudh, King. Pakinakakhadi (Bangkok: Barnnakarn, 1972), pp. 18–19. National Archives: Rama VI; r.6 n.20/11, Memorandum to Chaophraya Yommarat, 4 June 1919. Emile Joseph Dillon, The Disintegration of China [khwam krachat krachai haeng muang chin], translated by Asawaphahu (Bangkok: Nangsuepimthai, 1912). National Archives: Rama VI; r.6 n.20.13/23. Asawaphahu, “The New Emperor” [botkhwam “wangti ong mai” doy asawaphahu], 18 September 1915.

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25

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Asawaphahu “The Cult of Following” [Latthi ao yang] (Bangkok: Tharmbarnnakarn, 1976). Ibid.

References Asawaphahu. “The New Emperor” [botkhwam “wangti ong mai” doy asawaphahu], 18 September 1915. ———. “Comparison of Surnames and Clan Names”. In Collection of King Vajiravudh’s Writings [pramuan botphrarachanipon nai phrabatsomdetphramon gkutklaochaoyuhua]. Bangkok: Sirisarn, 1961. ———. “The Cult of Following” [Latthi ao yang]. Bangkok: Tharmbarnnakarn, 1976. ———. “The Jews of the Orient”. Bangkok: Chuanphim, 1985. ———. “Wake Up Siam!” Bangkok: Chuanphim, 1985. Dillon, Emile Joseph. The Disintegration of China [khwam krachat krachai haeng muang chin], translated by Asawaphahu. Bangkok: Nangsuepimthai, 1912. Eiji, Murashima. Politics of the Chinese in Siam [kanmuan chin siam]. Bangkok: Center for Chinese Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1996. Godley, Michael R. The Mandarin Capitalists of Nanyang: Overseas Chinese enterprises in the modernization of China, 1893–1911. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Hicks, George. ed. Overseas Chinese Remittances from Southeast Asia 1910–1940. Singapore: Select Books, 1993. Huaxian Xinbao, 12 January 1909, 3–4 February 1909. Intharabhirom, Penpisut. Seow Hudseng Sriboonruang. Bangkok: Department of History, Chulalongkorn University, 2004. Noomnandha, Thaemsuk. The First Young Turks: Rebels of 1912 [young turk run raek: kabot ro so nueng roi samsip]. Bangkok: Saitan, 2002. Qiu Jianzhang. “Lun wan qing zhengfu de huaqiao jiaoyü zhengce”. In Henan Daxue Xuebao, vol. 42, no. 4 (2002): 59. Skinner, G. William. Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957. Tejapira, Kasian. Commodifying Marxism: The Formation of Modern Thai Radical Culture, 1927–1958. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2001. Vajiravudh, King. Pakinakakhadi. Bangkok: Barnnakarn, 1972. Vella, Walter F. Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1978. Xie Guang. Political Activities of the Overseas Chinese in Thailand, 1906–1939 [taiguo huaqiao de zhengzhi huodong, 1906–1939]. Bangkok: Center for Chinese Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 2003.

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7 AN HISTORICAL TURNING POINT: THE 1911 REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT ON SINGAPORE’S CHINESE SOCIETY Ching Fatt Yong

Introduction Chinese nationalism in Singapore began in 1877 with the establishment of a Chinese consulate-general, the first in Southeast Asian Chinese history. From 1877 to 1894, the emergent Chinese nationalism was more cultural in content with Consul-General Tso Ping Lung (1850–1924) playing an enlightened but pivotal role in stimulating the intellectual awakening among the Chinese-educated immigrants and English-educated Straits Chinese. During his term of office (1881–91), he promoted a Confucian movement, chaired debates among the Straits Chinese on current affairs and lectured the Chinese immigrants on Chinese culture and civilization. Besides, he personally awarded students who composed the best essays or classical Chinese poems graded by himself. Coupled with the late Qing’s diplomatic drives and the sales of Qing’s titles and degrees to the higher echelon of the Chinese society for improved prestige and social mobility, Tso’s cultural endeavours bore fruit in the form of a pro-Qing’s cultural nationalism. However, all these efforts of the Qing Government and officials were undone 148

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by the defeat of China at the hands of the Japanese in the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) which resulted in the ceding of Taiwan to the victor. From 1894 to 1911, there blossomed forth a political nationalism with two diverse and opposing strains, one led by K’ang Yu-wei (1866–1929), a pro-Qing and pro-monarchist reformist and the other by Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), an anti-Qing revolutionary and a staunch republican. Both K’ang and Sun made Singapore an important base in Southeast Asia for enlisting Chinese support for their respective political causes. To these ends, K’ang helped to organize a semi-secret society, the Pao Huang Hui [Emperor Protection Society] in 1900 to promote his movement, while Sun initiated the formation of a Singapore branch of the Tongmenghui (TMH, the United League) in 1906 to rally public support. Both societies utilized print media (such as TMH’s Chong Shing Yit Poh versus reformists’ Union Times) to propagate their respective ideologies which often resulted in political polemics, involving such issues as revolution and reformism as panacea for China’s problems. Being largely from the upper echelons of the mercantile society, K’ang’s supporters made the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC) its stronghold since its formation in 1906. By contrast, Sun’s supporters, being less well-established and prominent, found support from Chinese of lower classes. In addition, the TMH had a number of reading rooms (such as the Sin Chew Reading Room, founded in 1903 and the Tung Teh Reading Room, formed in 1911) as its front organizations. These reading rooms served as venues for disseminating revolutionary ideologies and recruitment of new members for the TMH. On the whole, the British authorities seemed to be more lenient toward reformists vis-àvis Sun’s supporters, Sun Yat-sen himself suffered the humiliation of being deported in 1900 for a period of five years.1 However, the British were unable to stamp out rising Chinese nationalism, fuelled by political rivalries and increasing sympathy for Sun’s cause by the local Chinese population. Chinese nationalist fervour boiled over when news of the outbreak of the Doubletenth Revolution in Central China reached Singapore. With a realistic possibility of a regime change, the political rivals in Singapore mapped out new tactics and strategies for challenges ahead of them.

Short-term lmpact The Singapore TMH members and sympathizers came out en masse to celebrate the downfall of the Qing dynasty. Their first action was the burning of the imperial dragon flags as an open and ceremonious defiance to the

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Qing regime.2 The new revolutionary flags, a white sun floating across the blue sky to redden the Earth all over as the design, were hoisted in many Chinese shops and houses in Singapore. A second casualty was the voluntary or forced clippings of Chinese pigtails, then known as towchangs, a symbolic ending to foreign subjugation of Chinese people.3 A third casualty was the street sweepers, employees of Singapore’s Municipal Commission, who bore the brunt of having to clean up “ankle deep” debris or remains of exploded firecrackers which carpeted Market Street and the long line of North and South Bridge Roads.4 They had to perform the same tasks repeatedly as celebrations of political success in Singapore had only just begun. The celebrations were genuine and widespread which prompted a Straits Times reporter to provide a figure of 10,000 revolutionary members in Singapore after enquiry,5 out of a Chinese population of 220,000. Within the first two months of the Revolution, four fund-raising campaigns were reported to be in operation in Singapore. The first two were of a short and sharp affair with “queueless” Chinese and enlightened Cantonese women donating funds for the relief of Chinese soldiers in China and of Chinese women and children rendered destitute by the ravages of war in China.6 However, the other two campaigns were better organized, more protracted and community-based, e.g., the Hokkien Protection Fund (13 November 1911–16 August 1912) and the Kwangtung Protection Fund (20 November 1911–August 1912). These two Funds mobilized fellow provincials to raise large donations for the maintenance of law and order as well as security of independent Kwangtung and Fukien provinces respectively. Interestingly, the two Funds were less politically divisive since their officebearers consisted of prominent TMH members and SCCC leaders. Take the Hokkien Protection Fund as an example, the president, Tan Kah Kee (1874–1961) was both a TMH member and SCCC member while Lim Peng Siang (1872–1944), a staunch SCCC leader was its treasurer. Other prominent SCCC leaders, such as Yeo Cheng Hai and Ong Hui Ghee were also co-opted into the large fund-raising committee for soliciting donations among Hokkien firms and individuals. Although not the wealthiest and most prominent, Tan Kah Kee made his name as a dedicated leader who had an analytical mind, organizational power and courage of his own conviction. Under the collective leadership, the Hokkien Protection Fund raised a sum of $129,000 by the end of the campaign in August 1912. By contrast, the Kwangtung Protection Fund raised a sum of $200,000, a better result due largely to the utilization of more human and institutional resources.7 These fund-raising events foreshadowed more to come as the outcome of the revolution had been confirmed.

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What fuelled the TMH members’ fervour to unleash unprecedented energies and skills for the mobilization of Singapore’s Chinese population for China politics, social and educational change and economic development was a set of intertwined political and historical circumstances then prevailing in China and in Singapore. Included in these was Sun Yat-sen’s eighth and final visit to Singapore on 15 December 1911 on his way to China from Europe. Although his stay was brief, he gave enormous encouragement to the TMH leaders to fight for the revitalization of China. Sun Yat-sen’s words strengthened their morale and resolve to make sacrifices for China and the well-being of local Chinese society. Besides, Sun’s achievements gave them pride as fellow countrymen to shoulder responsibility to help bring about the modernization of China. A second stimulus was the election of Sun Yat-sen as the provisional president of Chinese Republic on 1 January 1912 as new hopes for a better China to emerge. Finally, the success of the 1911 Revolution gave them confidence to fight for political power and community influence so as to effect change within the Chinese society locally.

Rivalries between the Two Chinese Chambers of Commerce Prior to the 1911 Revolution, the SCCC had dominated the community power by playing vital leadership role in China politics and local affairs. A case in point concerns the deaths of both Empress Dowager and Emperor Kuang Hsu in November 1908. To commemorate the double tragedies, the SCCC strongly urged the Chinese communities in both Singapore and Malaya to close their shops for one day and their schools for three days as a mark of national condolences. In defiance of the SCCC’s direction, some TMH members opened their shops for business. Moreover, they celebrated on the day of mourning which irked the SCCC. As a result, some shops belonging to the TMH members were smashed up. Riots and violence would have spread further afield had not the local police prevented the impending celebrations. The Secretary for Chinese Affairs played down the importance of this incident by merely mentioning that the TMH members were discredited by their seemingly provocative actions.8 This 1908 mourning incident served as an historical factor for more power struggle between the TMH and the SCCC in 1912. The 1912 power struggle took the form of forming a counter Chinese Chamber of Commerce vis-a-vis the SCCC. What led to this was the SCCC’s refusal to convene a meeting on 1 January 1912 to discuss community celebrations of Sun Yat-sen’s installation as provisional president of the

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Chinese Republic on that day. Failing to act, Teo Eng Hock (1871–1958), a TMH founder and a SCCC member, convened a meeting on that day with some 200 concerned Chinese in attendance. The meeting ended in disarray mainly because of the SCCC supporters rejecting the idea of celebration on the grounds that the Qing dynasty had not yet fallen and that any such celebrations would invite British intervention. Disillusioned with the SCCC’s inability to represent a larger community interest, Teo Eng Hock and his TMH colleagues went about to found a rival chamber. In February 1912, the new Chamber’s constitution was adopted and so was its name, the Chinese Merchants General Chamber of Commerce (CMGCC). On 22 March 1912, the British authorities in Singapore had it registered, followed by the official approval by the Peking Government under President Yuan Shikai in April 1912. In May 1912, a sixty-member Council of the CMGCC was elected into the office by a membership of over 500. Being born six years later than that of the SCCC, it was often coined as the new Chamber. Out of the sixty office-bearers, Sim Chu Kim (1866–1915) and Lew Hong Sek (?-1922) were elected president and vice-president of the new Chamber. Both were businessmen of good standing. While Lew was a Hokkien and emergent banker, Sim was known to be most active in supporting Sun Yatsen after the 1911 Revolution. He was a Teochew commission agent from Boat Quay dealing with tropical produce. By contrast, the president of the SCCC in 1912, Liao Chia Heng (1874–1934) had built up a business empire, ranging from trade, commerce, banking to rubber estate ownership and was a prominent multi-millionaire of his times. Lim Peng Siang (1872–1944), the SCCC president in 1913, was an immigrant who had also established a business empire in oil and rice millings, shipping, trade, commerce, insurance and banking. He was also a multi-millionaire and bilingual in his own right. 9 A leadership study of the new Chamber (1912–14) may reveal that many of the sixty office-bearers were up-and-coming community and political leaders of the 1910s and 1920s, including Khoo Kok Wah (1872–1932), Tan Ean Khiam (1881–1943), and Chua Kah Cheong (1872–1944). In contrast, the SCCC leaders of the 1910s and 1920s were the cream of the business community in Singapore in general and of the Chinese business community in particular. Rivalry between the two Chambers was real and, at times, tense. The contest for community power and influence largely falls in three main areas: patriotic fund-raising campaigns for the central government in Peking, divergent attitudes and policies towards President Yuan Shikai as the legitimate ruler of China, and political struggle at party level in Singapore. In order to boost the depleted coffers of the Yuan Government, both the Chambers simultaneously

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launched fund-raising campaigns in June 1912 at the promptings of the Chinese Government and Kuomintang (KMT) officials in Peking. The SCCC instituted a committee named Chung Hwa Kuo Min Ch’ien (CHKMC, Chinese National Fund) to collect donations and to sell Chinese bonds. Not to be outdone, the CMGCC also set up a rival committee, named Hua Ch’iao Ai Kuo Ch’ien (HCAKC, Overseas Chinese Patriotic Fund) for fund collecting only. Both committees competed peacefully and separately for donations. Forms of fund collections included daily door knockings, staging of variety shows, and organization of propaganda groups for making public speeches in public places to arouse Chinese patriotism. While Chinese women were mobilized to raise funds among female members of the community, at that time both had yet to mobilize Chinese schools and students as well as Chinese print media to help their campaigns. By January 1913, the SCCC’s committee scored a moral victory by netting a sum of $291,840 as compared to a meager sum of $53,156 collected by the HCAKC. The results reflected that the SCCC had more financial muscles and networks while its counterpart did reach down to the grassroots for fund collections. The frantic fund-raising campaigns of the two Chambers politicized the Chinese society, making China and China politics part and parcel of the Chinese continuing concerns in Singapore. If 1912 was a year of peaceful competition and co-existence between the rival Chambers, 1913 was a year of hostility and confrontation over President Yuan’s dictatorial rule in China. In March 1913, President Yuan instigated the assassination of Sung Chiao-Jen, the parliamentary leader of the Peking KMT. He went on to suppress the KMT’s military uprising in Central China in July that year, and later followed by the banning of the China KMT in November 1913. Naturally, while both the CMGCC and the Singapore KMT were most hostile towards Yuan’s regime drifting into dictatorship, the SCCC either gave tacit support or overt approval of Yuan’s anti-KMT measures. On one occasion in May 1913, the SCCC even passed a resolution in support of Yuan's foreign loan of £25 million, seemingly for boosting the treasury of the central government, to the chagrin of the Singapore KMT and CMGCC members. Between April 1912 and February 1913, there had been five major attempts made either by the Yuan Government or the KMT officials for a merger. On each occasion, the SCCC was unwilling to give concessions due largely to its own financial strengths, its mistrust of its political opponents and its special status as an exempted society.10 In any case, the Yuan Government withdrew its recognition of the CMGCC in October 1913. In August 1914, the new Chamber dissolved itself under duress from the British authorities.

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The Singapore Kuomintang (KMT) and Its Front Organizations The 1911 Revolution gave a new lease of life to the secret or semi-secret TMH in Singapore when it was transformed into a Singapore Lodge of the Peking Kuomintang (KMT) in December 1912. The transformation from the TMH to an open, legal and properly structured political party in Singapore was first initiated by Sun Yat-sen in September 1912. He dispatched two emissaries, Lu Tien Min and Chiu Chi Hsien, from Shanghai to Singapore to help reorganize it. Lu was an editor-in-chief of a Chinese newspaper in Shanghai, Min Kuo Sin Wen, and Chiu was on the staff of the Shanghai Overseas Chinese Association. On 23 December 1912, the Straits Settlements Executive Council accepted the party as a registered society, then known as the Singapore Lodge of the Peking Kuomintang. For the Singapore Lodge, 1913 was an outstanding year for organization and mobilization of political activism. It encouraged all TMH branches in Malacca, Penang and Malay States to transform themselves as KMT branches, making the KMT a pan-Malayan movement. Second, it launched membership drives, netting a membership of 2,000, about less than 1 per cent of Singapore’s Chinese population. With a sizable membership, the Singapore KMT elected 123 office-bearers in July 1913. Out of this large cast, at least sixteen were identified by the British as Straits Chinese, six of whom held top positions (Tan Chay Yan and Teo Eng Hock as honorary presidents; Lim Boon Keng, Tan Boo Liat and Lim Nee Soon as presidents; and Tan Chor Nam as chairman of the Counselling Bureau). Lim Boon Keng was one of the most outstanding Straits Chinese leaders of his generation — a Queen’s Scholar, a medical practitioner, a Legislative Councillor, an entrepreneur, Chancellor of Xiamen University (1921–37), a bilinguist and a true internationalist who appreciated civilisations of the East and the West. It was a coup for the KMT to have Lim Boon Keng (1869–1957) at the helm because he gave respectability to the movement while assuring the British that the movement was in good hands. A second characteristic concerning the 1913 leadership list was that most were former TMH and reading room leaders with proven leadership qualities. A third characteristic was that the majority of them were businessmen, born in China, with a sprinkling of medical doctors, newspaper editors and school teachers. Finally, five office-bearers were women, signalling the beginning of a women’s liberation movement in colonial Singapore. Apart from the July 1913 electioneering euphoria, there were three tangible achievements in 1913. In June 1913, the KMT leaders promoted

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Chinese education by founding an Anglo-Chinese Girls’ School, giving women’s education a head start. In July 1913, Lim Boon Keng preached Sun Yat-sen’s ideologies of Nationalism, Democracy and People’s Livelihood in Muar, Johore, and helped organize a Muar branch of the KMT. In the Federated Malay States, Perak remained a stronghold for the KMT with twenty-seven branches and sub-branches registered in the month of July 1913. A third achievement was sheltering and assisting in settling some 300 political refugees from China. These refugees arrived after a KMT military uprising in July 1913 against the Yuan regime had failed. Some of them found employments in Chinese schools in British Malaya. Despite its legal status, the KMT movement in Singapore was never plain sailing. Being affiliated with the Peking Head Lodge, its fortunes in Singapore were tied up with those of the Head Lodge in Peking. During 1913, President Yuan Shikai turned hostile against the Peking Head Lodge by first assassinating its parliamentary leader in March, followed by the suppression of the KMT military uprising in Central China in July. On 4 November 1913, President Yuan proscribed the China KMT altogether, putting Singapore’s KMT Lodge in an invidious position. Amid despair and disillusionment over the KMT movement in China, Sun Yat-sen decided to start afresh by founding a new political party, The Chinese Revolutionary Party (CRP), in July 1914. From the headquarters’ of the CRP in Tokyo, Sun Yat-sen directed all overseas KMT branches to be closed so as to make way for the birth of the CRP branches. In Singapore, the British likewise pressurized the KMT branch to furnish names and addresses of all KMT members as part of the requirements of the Societies Ordinance amendments of 1913.11 This subtle political control tactic created fear and doubts among KMT members that finally helped seal the fate of the Singapore KMT movement. The loss of the Singapore KMT was a huge setback. However, its various front organizations were still operative, such as reading rooms, social clubs and an educational association. The first reading room was founded in Singapore by Rev. Tay Sek Tin (1872–1944) in 1903. It provided reading materials and preached Christian gospel every Wednesday night to any interested persons as a means of recruiting new converts. Known as the Sin Chew Reading Room, it was soon turned into one for disseminating revolutionary ideology by two revolutionary pioneers — Teo Eng Hock and Tan Chor Nam (1884–1971). It often hosted public lectures on anti-Manchu themes which proved to be popular with audiences. However, on occasions, local medical practitioner, Chen Su Lan, was also invited to speak on “malaria, causes, prevention and cure” for members free of charge.12 From a humble beginning in 1903

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with a small membership of fifty, it grew to 600 in 1913 with an elected office-bearers of eighty-one. Many of the eighty-one office-bearers had been members of former TMH or KMT members during the heady days of 1913. The 1913 office of the Sin Chew Reading Room was headed by Lim Nee Soon (1879–1936), a founder of the TMH and one of the three presidents of the KMT in Singapore. Its treasurer, Lew Hong Sek was a former TMH member, a KMT office-bearer and vice-president of the CMGCC. Another important and successful reading room to emerge in August 1911 was Tung Teh Reading Room, founded by prominent TMH members, such as Pan Chao Peng, Chang Jen Nan, Ho Hsin Tien, Chao Taio Chi, Sim Lian Fang, Teo Eng Hock and Lim Nee Soon. It adopted similar programmes as those of the Sin Chew Reading Room as a recruitment centre for the Singapore KMT. In 1922, the Registrar of Societies demanded Tung Teh Reading Room to adopt a new constitution with an added clause “not to interfere with politics”. As a result, the Tung Teh Reading Room expanded its programmes by instituting evening classes for Chinese and English languages. Besides, it also promoted indoor and outdoor sports, with a soccer team competing locally. The 1911 Revolution provided stimulus for the emergence of more reading rooms along dialect grouping lines. In October 1912, Hakka members from the TMH branched out to form their own Chih Tung Reading Room. It only lasted a brief nine months, being deregistered by the British on 14 July 1913. Former TMH members from the Hainanese community in Singapore founded Tung Wen Reading Room in October 1913. It lasted until 1925 when the Registrar of Societies terminated its registration for being a KMT front organization. In 1913, thirteen Cantonese members from the defunct TMH organized their Ping Min Reading Room. The membership of this reading room consisted largely of barbers and goldsmiths. Not to be outdone, former TMH members from the Hockchew community also founded their own reading room during 1913. Known as the Ai Chun Reading Room, it ceased operation in 1914 due to financial problems but was revived in 1917. Between 1914 and 1922, three more reading rooms appeared in Chinese news media, including Lo Ying (1914), Yang Chih (1916) and Kuan Nan (1922). However, their histories have remained obscure to this day. At grassroots level, reading rooms in Singapore propagated revolutionary ideologies, recruited potential members for the party and provided basic training grounds for future party leaders. Here lay the historical significance of the reading rooms as front organizations of the TMH and the KMT. One other front organization of the KMT during the 1912–14 era was social clubs. Prior to the 1911 Revolution, there had existed in Singapore a

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first revolutionary social club in Hsiao Tao Yuan Club (Small Peach Orchard Club), founded by Teo Eng Hock and Tan Chor Nam in 1903. This social club was never registered, hence its secret nature and illegal status. Although it remained small in membership, its leaders went on to found the Sin Chew Reading Room, the TMH, the CMGCC and the KMT. Strangely enough, there was no revolutionary social club movement after the 1911 Revolution with one exception. The exception was the founding of the Tung Jan Club in 1912 by devoted TMH members from the Cantonese community, such as Li Seng Yee, Ho Teh Ju, Ho Lo Ju, and others. It promoted the KMT movement by providing leadership, making donations and supported the cause of Sun Yat-sen. In 1914, the Tung Jan Club became a sub-branch of the Singapore KMT which endorsed Sun Yat-sen’s call to establish branches of the new Chinese Revolutionary Party.13 Two other social clubs, the Go Loo and the Ee Hoe Hean, which rendered support to Sun Yat-sen’s cause deserve some comments here. Founded in 1907 by the Chinese consul-general, the Go Loo Club admitted reputable businessmen from the Hokkien community, some of whom were TMH and KMT members. These included Lew Hong Sek, Khoo Kok Wah (1872–1932) and Tan Ean Khiam (1881–1943). In the post–1911 era, Khoo Kok Wah served as its president for fifteen years, turning it into a pro-KMT bankers’ club. The Ee Hoe Hean Club was the most important and influential social club of the pre-World War II era. Although it was not a front organization of the TMH and the KMT, it supported Sun Yat-sen’s cause and nation-building programmes after the 1911 Revolution. Besides, some of its members, such as Lim Boon Keng, Tan Boo Liat, Tan Kah Kee, Teo Eng Hock, Lim Nee Soon and Tan Chor Nam, were personally known by and close to Sun Yat-sen. It was these members who initiated the launching of the Hokkien Protection Fund in November 1911. It was again members from the Ee Hoe Hean who prompted the SCCC to campaign for funds in 1912 to strengthen the coffers of the Chinese central government in Peking.14 Reputed as a millionaire’s club throughout much of its history, the Ee Hoe Hean Club was a power in its own right. From 1923 when Tan Kah Kee captured its leadership, it served as one of his most important bases for China politics as a non-partisan nationalist. One of the KMT’s front organizations with a heavier concentration of intellectuals was the Nanyang Chinese General Education Association (NCGEA). Founded in August 1912, its membership included school teachers and community leaders. Its objectives included forging closer ties with educational development in China, promoting primary school teachers’

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training and establishing secondary schools for Chinese graduates from primary schools. In addition, it aimed at popularizing the use of Mandarin in conversation and as a teaching medium in schools. Finally, it signalled its intention to edit textbooks for use by students in Singapore and hoped to develop a Chinese school system along modern lines.15 The NCGEA had affiliated bodies in the Malay States and Sarawak and the support of prominent KMT leaders, such as Tan Boo Liat, Lim Boon Keng, Ng Sing Pheng (1873–1951), Lee Chin Tian (1875–1965), and Lan Chin Ching. Lan Chin Ching, a Hakka pawnshop owner, must have had great passion for education, for he was elected its vice-president for three terms (1913–15). This association lasted until 1921 when the British authorities closed it down on political grounds. As an educational arm of the KMT, it competed with the SCCC in promoting Chinese education in Singapore and elsewhere.

The Singapore Chinese Chamber Commerce and Its Political Arms The SCCC came out of the 1911 Revolution somewhat weakened and defensive. It saw with apprehension the marching of the TMH forces — the emergence of a counter Chamber in April 1912 and the registration of the Singapore KMT as a legitimate political party in December that same year. It simply could not sit idly by. To prevent the erosion of its power and influence within Singapore’s Chinese society, it welcomed the assistance of the Peking Kung Ho Tang (Republican Party) to establish a branch in Singapore. The Peking Kong Ho Tang had been formed in May 1912 by vice-president of China, Li Yuan Hung, in opposition to the Peking KMT in parliament or outside it. In March 1913, the Registrar of Societies had it registered as the Singapore branch of the Peking Kung Ho Tang. In April 1913, a provisional list of office-bearers of 107 was made public, with Chew Jim Him as provisional president and See Boo Ih as provisional vicepresident. While Chew was a Teochew shop owner and a Board Director of the Chinese Commercial Bank in Singapore for the years 1913 and 1915, See was an established Hokkien businessman who was public-minded but conservative in China politics. The rest of the 107 office-bearers were exclusively drawn from the SCCC members. The Singapore Kung Ho Tang had foreshadowed to hold an election of office-bearers in July 1913 but was forced to drop the idea all together because its Peking Head Office had merged with other minor parties in May 1913 to be renamed the Chin Pu Tang (Progressive Party). It was not until January 1914 that the Singapore Kung Ho Tang members decided to become a branch of the Peking Chin

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Pu Tang which was duly registered as a legal society in May 1914. By 1915, China politics in Singapore had rapidly run out of steam due largely to the death of parliamentary democracy, President Yuan’s insatiable ambitions for the imperial throne and Japanese threats looming large. In Singapore, 1915 saw the decline and demise of the flurries of political activism derived from the 1911 Revolution. While the Chin Pu Tang was left without a cause with many disillusioned and frustrated members lamenting what future a new China had, the KMT was turned into a secret society in the Chinese Revolutionary Party to make any meaningful impact on society. Since the “unfinished” 1911 Revolution had yet to run its course, there were still opportunities for the KMT members to make a difference. In any case, the 1911 Revolution created a rare opportunity for the Chinese partisans in Singapore to acquire a taste of real politics in operation. While it deepened their sentimental attachments to China, it also enhanced their political ties with China. In its wake, a pro-China tradition was consolidated in areas far beyond China politics.

Partisan Collaboration in the Realm of Economic Development China politics in Singapore following the 1911 Revolution had been divisive, unpalatable and even brutal among the participants of contending political parties. However, the 1911 Revolution also created potential avenues of nation-building in China and gave impetus to economic development among the Chinese business elite overseas. It was in the realm of economic development that brought about unity of purpose and collaboration among the partisans. It should be noted that 1912 was a year of peaceful co-existence and competition among the partisans. A case in point is the Tan Kah Kee-led Hokkien Protection Fund (November 1911–August 1912) which mobilized members from the SCCC and the TMH to campaign for funds towards the maintenance of law and order in their home province, Fukien. Similarly, partisans from both political camps also pooled their manpower and resources together to raise funds for the security of their home province, Kwangtung. In other words, political conditions had not deteriorated sufficiently to undermine cooperation for new economic projects among the partisans. It is thus not surprising that when Lim Peng Siang and his brother-in-law, Lee Choon Guan (1868–1924) floated the idea of founding a Hokkien bank in Singapore, they had the whole Hokkien community behind it. Many TMH

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members subscribed to its shares and were elected into its Board of Directors, including Tan Kah Kee, Tan Chay Yan, C.S. Yin, Khoo Kok Wah, Lew Hong Sek and Tan Siang Ching during the years, 1912–14. This first Hokkien bank in Singapore, named the Chinese Commercial Bank Ltd., held its first meeting for shareholders on 17 August 1912 at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce premises. It was reported that its nominal capital was $4,000,000 but its present issue of $2,000,000 was “oversubscribed”.16 During the First World War years when China politics was at its lowest ebb, a spirit of cooperation was even more noticeable. With the availability of capital and improved banking experiences, the Hokkien community under the leadership of Lim Boon Keng, Lim Peng Siang, Khoo Kok Wah and Lee Choon Guan, founded the Ho Hong Bank Ltd., in 1917 and the Overseas Chinese Bank Ltd., in 1919. By then, old political wounds had healed and past confrontational encounters forgiven. In summary, it is clear that China politics of the heady days divided the Chinese society in Singapore. However, sound economic projects which demanded good will, trust and cooperation among the partisans to make them work served as healing process for all participants.

Long-term Impact The 1911 Revolution made short-term impact on Singapore’s Chinese society with Chinese nationalism in action, an open and organized party politics experimented and political and ideological divisions manifested. In the end, it left behind two major legacies — a tenacious KMT movement and a formidable non-partisan leadership of Tan Kah Kee which twisted and turned into the twilight years of British colonial rule.

The Singapore Kuomintang Movement under Duress For the records of the Singapore KMT movement, the Chinese Revolutionary Party era (1915–19) was not its proudest. Its secrecy, dormancy, factionalism and low morale among members prevented it from expansion. In Singapore, the CRP maintained a branch and two sub-branches with some of the staunchest TMH members managing them, including Teo Eng Hock, Ho Teh Ju, and Fu Yang Hua. From 1920 to 1925, there were signs of the KMT revival. First, the CPR was replaced by the Kuomintang (KMT) and its reorganization completed by 1923. Second, Chinese vernacular school teachers with KMT leanings and

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their students took part in a boycott of Japanese goods movement in 1919 in protest against the Versailles Treaty permitting Japanese to occupy Tsing Tao, an island off Shantung province. This resulted in the deportation of Tan Choon Yeow (Ai Tong School Headmaster, Singapore) and Chng Suat Hean (Ai Tong School) which rekindled the flames of Chinese nationalism.17 In response to political unrest in Chinese schools, the British enacted the Registration of Schools Ordinances in 1920 to register all Chinese vernacular schools, their staff and patrons. The furore that followed prompted the British to deport more teachers and close down one of KMT’s front organizations, the Nanyang Chinese General Education Association. To prevent the Singapore KMT from harnessing feelings of community discontent, Sir Laurence Guillemard, governor of the Straits Settlements, sought permission from the Colonial Office (CO) in 1922 to ban the KMT in British Malaya. Both the Colonial and Foreign Offices did not see it fit to impose a ban until 1925 due to more changing political development in China. The rationale as presented by Guillemard included the spectre of international communism which had influenced China via the united front of the China KMT and the Chinese Communist Party. Second, in Gulllernard’s view, Sun Yat-sen was increasingly anti-British and pro-Bolshevik and his posture was likely to make the overseas branches to be more anti-British. Finally, the Singapore KMT branches were unregistered secret societies which had their own rules and regulations. In British view, this was an imperium in imperio not to be tolerated under any circumstances.18 Despite a ban, the Singapore KMT did not cease operating due to a number of new dynamic circumstances emerging. First, the arrival of Chinese communists from South China provided some impetus to the KMT movement. The communists had enormous skills and passion for organizing trade unions, night schools and political parties. During the years 1926 and 1927, they joined the KMT in British Malaya to organize new branches or take control of the existing ones. In 1927, for example, they controlled twenty-one of the KMT sub-branches out of a total of twenty-nine in Singapore.19 Second, the split of the first united front in China between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party in April 1927 and the unification of China of 1928 under a Kuomintang regime led to China’s KMT to take charge of all overseas branches. This meant that Nanking’s KMT headquarters was to be the nerve centre of all overseas movement — providing guidance, leadership, resources to organize a panMalayan movement free of communist influences. In June 1928, Nanking KMT’s special envoy, Iu Teng Chan, arrived in Singapore to assist in the reorganization of the Singapore and Malayan branches. Iu was born into a

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mining family in Perak of Hakka origin and was a graduate of the Nanking Political College and a member of the Organization Department of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT. During his six-month sojourn, Iu helped form the Malayan Head Branch of the China KMT (BMHB), reorganize many Singapore and Malayan branches, register party members by purging communist applicants and inaugurate the First All-Malaya Delegates Convention in January 1929. At the convention, some 70 party delegates from British Malaya elected 15 office-bearers to the BMHB. Out of the 15 office-bearers, 8 were elected into the Executive Committee (Teo Eng Hock, Tay Sau Peng of Klang, Ho Yu Khuan of Penang, among others) and 5 into the Supervisory Committee (Wong Kat San of Johore Bahru, Chan Chan Mooi of Kuala Lumpur and Chu Chee Chiong of Singapore). Most of these were TMH old guards, established businessmen and community leaders. In 1929, the Singapore branches had a membership of 1,270, about 50 per cent less than its 1913 numbers. The BMHB survived 1929 to hold a second All-Malaya Delegates Convention in Singapore between 4 and 7 February 1930 to elect new officebearers for the 1930 term of office. When all seemed to be forging ahead for the Malayan KMT, an enraged new governor, Sir Cecil Clementi, summoned seventeen KMT leaders for a Government House meeting on 20 February 1930 to press for a new ban. At the historic meeting, Clementi brushed aside the KMT’s arguments that its existence was to eliminate communists and communism. Instead, he condemned the KMT leaders for flouting colonial laws for operating under a ban. Besides, he questioned the loyalty of some of the KMT leaders who were British subjects by calling them “double-headed snakes”.20 Having run out of diplomatic language, Clementi demanded the KMT leaders to close down their branches forthwith. Clementi did not mince his words, he sent four top KMT leaders packing during 1930, including Teh Lay Seng, Png Chi Cheng, Teh Sau Peng and Lim Yew Tong. Clementi’s actions against the KMT created a diplomatic crisis between China and Great Britain which led to negotiations between British Minister to Peking, Sir Miles Lampson and China’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Wang Cheng Ting. In April 1931, a Wang-Lampson Agreement had been struck which stipulated that the Malayan KMT was not allowed to organize, propagate ideology and raise funds but members could become individual members of the China KMT. This then remained an established policy of the British until the post-World War II years when the Malayan KMT was given legal status as a political party. The KMT made steady but good progress in Singapore and Malaya in the immediate post-war years, 1946–49. It reached a high point in 1948 when

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the Singapore KMT had twenty-three branches with a total membership of 5,000. In May and June 1948 when the KMT’s Youth Corps merged with the KMT, the total Singapore and Malayan KMT membership was estimated to be 45,000 strong, or 1.7 per cent of the Chinese population of the two territories. However, Sir Franklin Gimson, governor of Singapore, argued that the KMT in Singapore was a foreign political party, which “militates against the growth of a Malayan civic consciousness”.21 Against the historical background of decolonization, Gimson’s rationale proved persuasive, thus acceptable to the Colonial Office. In May 1949, the Singapore KMT was banned a third and last time. In August 1949, the Malayan Government followed suit by gazetting the banning of all Malayan KMT branches. The KMT movement in Singapore and Malaya made long-term impacts in the Chinese societies of these two territories. In Singapore, it promoted Chinese education by funding, maintaining and staffing vernacular Chinese schools with modernizing effects. It founded a number of front organizations such as reading rooms and social clubs which enriched the social and cultural life of their members. It published various Chinese newspapers, thereby improving the intellectual standards of their readers. In 1931, the KMT members succeeded in controlling the SCCC, thus providing seasoned leadership to the Chinese society. Even before the banning of the KMT in May 1949, KMT members within the SCCC sided with non-KMT members to fight for Chinese language, education and Singapore citizenship. The demise of the KMT in 1949 encouraged its members to adopt Singapore as their homeland.

The Non-Partisan Leadership of Tan Kak Kee in Command Tan Kah Kee (1874–1961) had been an anti-Qing nationalist since 1910 when he lopped off his queue. In 1911, he joined the TMH as a sworn enemy of the Qing. In early 1912, he remitted $50,000 to Sun Yat-sen personally as pledged. From November 1911 to August 1912, he presided over a Hokkien Protection Fund in Singapore to raise a sum of some $130,000 to keep Fukien province independent of Qing control. If the KMT movement in British Malaya was an outgrowth of the 1911 Revolution, it is fair to say that Tan Kah Kee’s non-partisan leadership was also an offshoot of the Revolution. In Singapore, the aftermath of the 1911 Revolution did not please him, for there were conflicts and disunity deriving from power struggle involving his personal friends. Tan Kah Kee deeply believed that the Chinese society should work harmoniously now that the Qing dynasty had fallen. In order to disentangle himself from party politics, he decided to remain non-partisan

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and to be above partisan politics. He was fortunate to be able to immerse in his fund-raising campaign for Fukien province for a period of nine months, after which he left for his home village Chi Mei, Fukien, to embark on his educational drive in nation-building. By the time he returned back to Singapore in September 1913, China politics had largely subsided. On two occasions (1940 and 1947), Tan Kah Kee explained why he had remained “non-partisan”. He reiterated that since he was not able to lead others he was not prepared to be led by others.22 Tan Kah Kee seemed to have intended to give an impression that his answers really came from a man steeped in Confucian wisdom and modesty. Tan Kah Kee was to appreciate later that it was his non-partisan leadership in China politics which won him colonial sanction and community support. During the National Salvation era (1937– 41), Tan Kah Kee’s political posture was in vogue, his slogan being “Southeast Asian Chinese patriotism towards China was above parties and factions”. In 1944 when in refuge in East Java, Tan Kah Kee summed up his own journey thus far by saying that he had established his business enterprises before being capable of serving the society and of leading the Southeast Asian Chinese to help China resist foreign aggression. As a young immigrant at the age of seventeen in 1890, Tan Kah Kee’s business experiences were in rice trade, pineapple canning and marketing. It was not until 1904 that he branched out on his own by concentrating on pineapple canning and planting. In 1906, he ventured into rubber plantation industry which made him a millionaire in 1911. Tan Kah Kee became a multimillionaire during the First World War by becoming a ship owner engaged in Southeast Asian and China trade. During the 1920s, Tan Kah Kee and his brother, Tan Keng Hean (1889–1936) built a business empire based on rubber, e.g., rubber planting, milling, trading, manufacturing, rubber goods retailing and rubber plantation ownership. At the height of Tan Kah Kee’s business career in 1925, he made a net profit of $7.8 million. In 1934, due largely to debts and depressed market during the Depression (1929–34), Tan Kah Kee & Co. Ltd. voluntarily dissolved itself. Having firmly established himself in the business world by 1911, Tan Kah Kee decided that it was time to start fulfilling his social responsibility by serving the society. “To serve” invariably meant to sacrifice one’s time, financial, intellectual and manpower resources for a worthy cause. The 1911 Revolution became a watershed event which spurred him on to do greater things for China and Singapore. What better ways to serve China by founding modern schools in his home village and in Amoy (Xiamen), Fukien province. He started off by setting up a primary school in 1913 in his home village, Chi Mei, to be followed in 1917 by a secondary school. By 1927, there existed in

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Chi Mei ten different schools and colleges. His educational mission blossomed forth in 1921 when he single-handedly founded the Xiamen University which he financed and maintained for seventeen years until 1937. In terms of total educational funding, Tan Kah Kee himself gave a figure in 1946 of $8 million, the Straits Times suggested a sum of $10 million in 1954 and his second son, Tan Khuat Siang, updated it to $20 million as his father’s lifetime contribution.23 In Singapore, his track record on educational promotion was impressive. From 1907 to 1919, Tan Kah Kee was an important founder of six Chinese schools, including Tao Nan (1907), Ai Tong (1912), Chung Fook Girls School (1915), Chung Pun (1915), Nanyang Girls’ School (1918) and the Singapore Chinese High School (1919). The Nanyang Chinese General Education Association was the first to promote the concept of a secondary Chinese school education in Singapore. However, Tan Kah Kee was the first to lead the Chinese community in Singapore and Malacca to found a secondary school at the urgings of the Tung Teh Reading Room. Although the high school was opened in 1919, the fund-raising campaigns did not stop until 1920. A total sum of $700,000 was pledged by donors but, due to economic depression in 1920, only $400,000 was collected.24 Educational donations and promotions aside, Tan Kah Kee led five fund-raising campaigns between 1917 and 1934 for charity. They included the Tientsin Flood Relief Fund (1917), the Kwangtung Flood Relief Fund (1918), the Fukien and Kwangtung Flood Relief Fund (1924), the Singapore Children Protection Association Maintenance Fund (1925) and the Bukit Ho Swee Fire Relief Fund (1934). Each campaign demanded his time and leadership for months on end. His large business empire with impressive employment figures, his many educational endeavours with success stories and his public-mindedness towards victims of natural disasters elevated his public profile, enhanced his prestige and improved his social status. To consolidate his status as a community leader, he needed strong and reliable power bases. He found the most important power base in 1923 when he was elected president of the Ee Hoe Hean Club (EHHC), then widely known as a millionaire’s club. He went about broadening its membership by inviting leaders from all other dialect groups in Singapore to join it. By so doing, Tan Kah Kee believed that club members would have better rapport and cohesion, thus more capable of mobilizing support from members of each dialect group. However, Tan Kah Kee also needed to capture the leadership of the Hokkien Association, known as the Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan (SHHK), as his own power base. He succeeded in being its president in 1929 and in reforming it into a new

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and dynamic-institution with a proper constitution, member registration, annual election, management structure and responsibilities of office-bearers. The 1929 list of office-bearers consisted of established businessmen and many younger and new bloods, the cream of the Hokkien community in Singapore. With the control of the most important EHHC as his power base, Tan Kah Kee was able to launch numerous fund-raising campaigns from 1928 to 1941 under his non-partisan leadership. These included the Shantung Relief Fund (May 1928–January 1929) for the relief of casualties arising from military conflicts between Chiang Kai-shek’s army and that of the Japanese, Premier Chiang’s Birthday Aeroplane Fund (1936), the Singapore China Relief Fund (1937–41) and the Southseas China Relief Fund Union (1938–41). Take the Singapore China Relief Fund as an example, the fundraising campaign was turned into a massive political movement for national salvation against Japanese invasion of China. Apart from utilizing traditional community institutions for fund-raising, it was not difficult for the Fund to foster closer links with various socio-political groups and parties, such as the English-educated Straits Chinese, the Malayan Communist Party’s front organizations, and the KMT and its various networks, for a common goal of China relief. The Sino-Japanese War, the national salvation movement and the politicization process all kept Chinese nationalism on the boil. As arbiters of colonial and China politics, the British legitimized and sanctioned Tan Kah Kee’s leadership to lead the national salvation movement on three grounds. First, Tan Kah Kee’s leadership was not party-based, hence less able to shake the foundation of the British rule. Second, by handing over the leadership to Tan Kah Kee to conduct a “properly constituted” campaign for national salvation, it effectively prevented the KMT right and the MCP left from capturing it. Third, Tan Kah Kee was a proven community leader, thus more willing to accept government advice and more capable to be answerable to the government. Here lay the importance and success of Tan Kah Kee’s non-partisan leadership as a model for the mobilization of community support towards China’s salvation. In the post-World War II years, Tan Kah Kee discarded his non-partisan posture because he had chosen Mao Tse-tung as the saviour of the Chinese people. For his shrewd judgment, Tan Kah Kee was invited by Mao himself to visit Peking in 1949. Meanwhile, the British in Singapore made it difficult for Tan Kah Kee to stay in the colony for his pro-Mao leanings against the backdrops of the Cold War and the Malayan Emergency. While in Peking, he accepted government positions which helped him to decide to live out

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his life in China. From 1950, Tan Kah Kee achieved much by rebuilding the Chi Mei schools and Xiamen University. He passed away in 1961 at the age of eighty-seven.

Conclusion As an important turning point in China politics in Singapore, the 1911 Revolution saw Chinese nationalism openly in action, party politics legally experimented and power struggle overtly contested. While China politics divided Singapore’s Chinese society, it thoroughly politicized the society through the organization and mobilization of institutions and manpower for power and influence by the partisans. By so doing, it strengthened local Chinese political ties with China and consolidated a China-oriented political tradition. On the long-term impact, the 1911 Revolution left behind two major legacies, one a KMT movement in British Malaya with Singapore as its nerve centre and the other, a non-partisan leadership led by Tan Kah Kee which was in full swing during the years of national salvation, 1937–41. The KMT movement was never plain sailing despite its China and Chinese government connections. This was largely due to rigid British political control which had it banned on three occasions (1925, 1930 and 1949). Nevertheless, the movement left behind legacies in its own right, including social change, cultural and educational development and political awakening. For Tan Kah Kee, the 1911 Revolution left him a legacy of non-partisan political stance, which became crystallized into a non-partisan leadership. He succeeded in building a business empire based on rubber and established a pre-eminent community leadership from 1928 when China was unified under Chiang Kai-shek. Between 1911 and 1928, Tan Kah Kee succeeded in building a pre-eminent community leadership status via his numerous services to society, not to mention his securing two important power bases in the Ee Hoe Hean Club and the Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan. Although he threw in his lot with Chiang Kai-shek from 1928, he promoted his model of non-partisan leadership for community support. Partly due to the nature and content of non-partisan leadership being based on traditional institutions, such as clan, huay kuans, social, educational and cultural organizations, guilds, clubs and professional bodies and, to a lesser extent, Chinese secret societies, the British handed over the leadership to Tan Kah Kee in China’s hours of need. As for Tan Kah Kee, he left behind his own legacies to societies in Singapore and in South China, including among others

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educational promotion, social reforms, a non-partisan political leadership model and the spirit of entrepreneurship for economic development. Lastly, the 1911 Revolution saw the beginning of consolidation of China connections through impact of Chinese nationalism, the processes of China politics and Chinese political activisms. These China connections were deepened and broadened as China was further under internal pressure and external duress. It was not until the 1950s that more potent Singapore nationalism and Singapore party politics finally triumphed over China politics and Chinese nationalism which had dogged the colonial authorities for two generations.

Notes 1

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Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution (Kuala Lumpur: OUP, 1976), pp. 43–44. Straits Times, 7 November 1911. Straits Times, 7 November 1911, 8 November 1911. Straits Times, 7 November 1911. Straits Times, 23 October 1911. Song Ong Siang, One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore, reprint (Kuala Lumpur: OUP, 1967), p. 471. Straits Times, 11 November 1911, 19 November 1911. C. F. Yong, Tan Kah-Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend (Singapore, OUP, reissue, 1989), pp. 177–78. W. D. Barnes, “Chinese Protectorate”, Annual Reports of the Straits Settlements for 1908 (Singapore, 1909), p. 121. For more information on Lim Peng Siang, see C. F. Yong, “Lim Peng Siang and the Building of the Ho Hong Empire in Colonial Singapore”, Asian Culture 28 (June 2004): 1–26. C. F. Yong, Chinese Leadership and Power in Colonial Singapore (Singapore: Times Academic Press, reprint, 1992), pp. 37–41. CO 275/596, Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs (MRCA), no. 45 (May 1934): 16. Straits Times, 20 March 1911. C. F. Yong and R. B. KcKenna, The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990), p. 31. Nanyang Siang Pau, 5 September 1936. Lat Pau, 23 August 1912. Straits Times, 20 August 1912. Yik Kuan Poh, 30 August 1919, 9 September 1919, 25 October 1919, 20 November 1919, 7 January 1920.

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C. F. Yong and R. B. McKenna, “The Kuomintang Movement in Malaya and Singapore, 1911–1925”, JSEAS, vol. 12, no. 1 (March 1981): 130–32. CO 273/537/28053, Enclosure to Straits Despatch, 16 February 1927, pp. 2–3. CO 371/14728/2803, Government House Meeting, Sir Cecil Clementi and seventeen office-bearers of the BMHB of the KMT, 20 February 1930. CO537/4835/54463, see telegram from Sir F. Gimson to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, CO, 17 February 1949. Chen Chia Keng (Tan Kah Kee), Nan-chiao Hui-i-lu (Hong Kong: Chao Yuan Publishing Co., 1977), p. 97. Nan Chiau Jit Pao, 30 September 1947. C. F. Yong, Tan Kah Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend (Singapore, OUP, reissue, 1989), p. 87. C. F. Yong, Collected Papers on the Studies of Chen Jia Geng (Beijing: China Friendship Publication Co., 1988), pp. 136–37.

References Barnes, W. D. “Chinese Protectorate”. Annual Reports of the Straits Settlements for 1908. Singapore, 1909. Lat Pau, 23 August 1912. Nan Chiau Jit Pao, 30 September 1947. Nanyang Siang Pau, 5 September 1936. Song Ong Hiang. One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore. Reprint. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967. Straits Times, 20 March 1911, 23 October 1911, 7–8 November 1911, 11 November 1911, 19 November 1911, 20 August 1912. Tan Kah Kee. Nan-chiao Hui-i-lu. Hong Kong: Chao Yuan Publishing Co., 1977. Yen Ching Hwang. The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976. Yik Kuan Poh, 30 August 1919; 9 September 1919; 25 October 1919; 20 November 1919; 7 January 1920. Yong, C. F. Collected Papers on the Studies of Chen Jia Geng. Beijing, China Friendship Publication Co., 1988. ———. Tan Kah Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend. Singapore: Oxford University Press, reissue, 1989. ———. Chinese Leadership and Power in Colonial Singapore. Singapore: Times Academic Press, reprint, 1992. ———. “Lim Peng Siang and the Building of the Ho Hong Empire in Colonial Singapore”. Asian Culture 28 (June 2004): 1–26. Yong, C. F. and R. B. McKenna. “The Kuomintang Movement in Malaya and Singapore, 1911–1925”. JSEAS, vol. 12, no. 1 (March 1981): 130–32. ———. The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990.

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8 A TRANSNATIONAL REVOLUTION: SUN YAT-SEN, OVERSEAS CHINESE, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN XIAMEN, 1900–12 James A. Cook Historical analyses of the relationship between the locale and the Chinese nation have often attempted to place the development of a Chinese national identity into some sort of linear framework that leads to nationalism and nation-building. Beginning in the 1990s, however, some analysts argued that local and provincial identities have much to do with how the nation was imagined and that the local was often intimately connected with the national.1 Indeed, viewing local identity as historically dynamic has forced us to realize that questions of history, national values, and Chinese identity are not drawn from a single narrative. As one searches through the past of modern China, it quickly becomes apparent that the form and substance of what the nation meant to the Chinese people differed from place to place. One of the most crucial questions that many local communities faced in the first half of the twentieth century was how to maintain a meaningful local identity while being committed to building a strong nation. In turning our attention to Xiamen, one is immediately struck by how the complexity of the relationship between the city and its overseas 170

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émigrés influenced this relationship. Like many other Chinese cities, important political and economic forces such as warlordism, imperialism, and nationalism certainly affected the relationship between Xiamen and the nation. In Xiamen, however, ties to the nation, both economic and political, were in large part managed and overseen by a group of people that had spent long periods of time overseas — the city’s Overseas Chinese (Huaqiao). Drawn from both the city and the villages scattered across southern Fujian (Minnan), the southern Fujianese or Hokkien had dominated seaborne commerce with Southeast Asia (Nanyang) for centuries. This tradition of maritime trade also meant that the ways in which questions of national identity were negotiated by city residents was, in turn, affected by their international experiences. Much of what can be termed a “Xiamen identity” grew out of a mixture of a dynamic entrepreneurial culture and a cosmopolitanism that had been born in southern Fujian but raised in Southeast Asia. By the start of the twentieth century, in response to the political chaos of China and the colonialism of Southeast Asia, many of Xiamen’s Huaqiao began to imagine Minnan as a distinct community with its own past traditions. By mobilizing a revamped Confucianism and a distinct historical identity and wedding it to the commercial success of Overseas Chinese merchant life, many elite Huaqiao envisioned a new China that combined a “Chinese” past with the modernity of Southeast Asia. Much of this transnational imagery sprang from the experiences of being a “Foreign Oriental” in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the cultural nationalism that stood at the heart of Minnan identity had developed to a much greater extent amongst Huaqiao than those who had remained in China. The transnational cultural networks that linked Xiamen and Southeast Asia were varied, running the gamut from formal organizations such as secret societies, provincial associations, Chinese schools, and Chinese Chambers of Commerce to clan associations and extended family relationships. These social, cultural, and familial institutions dominated Huaqiao communities throughout Southeast Asia to a much greater extent than at home, and shaped and strengthened Hokkien identity in many of Xiamen’s expatriate communities. Furthermore, the fact that Huaqiao were cut off from the formal institutions of the Chinese state meant that many turned to these more informal networks and questions of maintaining cultural identity in order to build political capital. Finally the absence of a territorial base to attach their own nationalist imaginings explains how cultural associations played a much greater part in the political identity of Xiamen’s Huaqiao than their mainland counterparts. These various social, cultural, and political

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impulses led many Huaqiao to substitute the more localized identity of Minnan or southern Fujian for that of the larger province or Chinese nation. Ultimately these forces became the basis of a startling Chinese transnationalism that designated Xiamen as one of the poles in the Overseas Chinese universe. Trans signifies both the movement through space and across boundaries (such as borders between nation-states), and the changing nature of things. Thus the term “transnationalism” refers not only to movement, but also to a degree of simultaneity. Since many of Xiamen’s residents were constantly criss-crossing the South China Sea, they developed multiple familial, economic, and social ties that facilitated their involvement in China and Southeast Asia. In other words, their lives existed in both China and abroad. Technological advances in steamship transportation, print media, and other forms of communication made possible a constant movement of people and ideas and an increasingly intense interweaving of Overseas Chinese communities abroad and their homes in China. Xiamen’s transnational modernity, however, also grew simultaneously with global capitalism and colonialism in Southeast Asia, and the city’s development cannot be separated from these forces. The process of building this transnational Minnan identity would, of course, go through several different phases. Meted by distance, an affinity or longing for home had certainly been resident amongst the earliest overseas settlers. The earliest political mobilization of this consciousness was initially organized around the secret societies that had accompanied Hokkien emigration to the South Seas from the very beginning. For example the 5,000-strong Ghee Hin, a Hokkien-speaking triad society in Malaya and Singapore, not only organized emigration abroad but was also utilized by Britain’s colonial administrators as a means of social control. 2 The antiManchu political stance of most triad gangs combined with their heavy involvement in the economic life of Overseas Chinese communities meant that many Huaqiao continued to be exposed to anti-Qing rhetoric long after it had died out on mainland China. Indeed, revolutionary organizers found that invoking images of the pirate/rebel Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) in their battle with China’s rulers over the political loyalties of the Overseas Chinese was extremely effective. Of the many politicians who vied for the leadership within the Overseas Chinese community, Sun Yat-sen was one of the most successful. Certainly it was the four years he spent in Hawaii between 1879 and 1883 amongst both wealthy merchants and common labourers that familiarized Sun not only with American republicanism but also the hopes and aspirations of

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the Overseas Chinese communities. In many ways his vision of a strong, republican China that could compete economically with the West deeply appealed to many Overseas Chinese frustrated with their own second-class treatment and lack of government support. The “mothers of the Chinese revolution”, as the Overseas Chinese were later referred to in Kuomintang party history, played a critical role in Sun’s movement, particularly up and down the southeast coast of China. This chapter will analyse the initial coalescence of an increasingly robust transnational Chinese political universe and its relationship with Sun Yat-sen during the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries. Chinese nationalism and Western racism within the Nanyang colonies, combined with increasingly vigorous attempts by Sun Yat-sen to solidify Overseas Chinese support, certainly helped to stimulate nationalism within Xiamen’s overseas residents. But the real engine of development lay in the villages linked via Amoy to the Nanyang. As more and more residents of Minnan’s qiaoxiang journeyed back and forth to Southeast Asia, they not only solidified relations on a village level, enmeshing the Fujian village with the Southeast Asian Chinatown, but also acted as the foundation of Chinese transnationalism. The process by which Xiamen became the focus of the political aspirations of transnational Chinese communities on both sides of the South China Sea and the elaboration of political organizations designed to further that mixing will be another key issue.

Nanyang’s Revolutionary Roots Recent scholarship on Sun Yat-sen has tended to emphasize the messiness of the revolutionary movement at the expense of the traditional Kuomintang view of Sun as father of the Chinese Revolution, charismatic leader, and theorist who laid the foundation of party ideology. Later accounts tend to portray Sun as an opportunist with optimistic but muddled ideas who jealously guarded his own interests.3 In these accounts, Sun is often reduced to one among many factions attempting to overthrow the Qing dynasty. His most recent treatment, by Marie-Claire Bergère, returns Sun to centre stage, rescuing him from more recent Western debates that tend to view the eclipse of the Qing dynasty as a result of deep societal shifts in China’s interior that eventually reassigned the Manchus to the dustbin of history.4 “Such a reading of history”, Bergère argues, “which relegates the role of coastal China to background, completely sweeps away the importance of Sun Yatsen.”5 Sun certainly played a critical role within the Nanyang Chinese communities so closely tied to southeast coastal China. Initially a polarizing figure, he was

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eventually able to take advantage of the growing politicization of the region and use it to his advantage in his rivalries with both the Qing dynasty and the reformist movements. Equally critical, however, was the role that both Sun and the 1911 Revolution played in integrating political movements within Chinese communities on both sides of the South China Sea. While it is impossible to pinpoint the start of the revolutionary movement in Southeast Asia, we should consider the revolutionary ties part of a growing politicization of Chinese communities on both sides of the South China Sea. Each of these developments fed the other, and the revolutionary movement in China could never have succeeded without the capital, both human and financial, provided by Nanyang’s Overseas Chinese. The last decade of the nineteenth century certainly does not mark the beginning of the revolutionary movement, but China’s loss in the SinoJapanese War and the failure of Sun Yat-sen’s Canton Uprising, both in 1895, nonetheless played a critical role in its stimulation. Two years earlier, the Baba intellectual Lim Boon Keng had established his Straits Philomatic Society in Singapore. The society itself represented a meeting of the European and the Chinese diasporas in Singapore, bringing together British and Chinese intellectuals to debate the changes facing Singapore. The contributions of Chinese members such as Lim Boon Keng (Lin Wenqing) (1869–1957), Khoo Seok Wan (Qiu Shuyuan) (1874–1941), and Tan Teck Soon (1859– 1922) to the organization’s periodical, Straits Chinese Magazine, as well as other local newspapers reveals much about the emerging Overseas Chinese intellectualism that had a profound impact on the Chinese revolutionary movement in the Nanyang. Articles authored by these men displayed a deep unease with British colonialism while conceptualizing Chinese civilization as both progressive and open to change. Initially, however, it was the reformers Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao who would have the deepest impression on Overseas Chinese intellectual communities. Kang’s message of a reformed Confucianism that embraced elements of modernity while purging some of the most conservative elements of the philosophy was particularly appealing to cultural nationalists like Lim Boon Keng, Khoo Seok Wan, and Tan Teck Soon. Living in a colonial environment that viewed Chinese culture as archaic and unchanging, Kang’s message of a modern Confucianism appealed to the more cosmopolitan world view and the particular Chinese identity of Southeast Asia’s Chinese. Additionally Kang enjoyed the prestige of a true scholar and an advisor to the Emperor. Indeed Kang’s thinking spurred a surge of interest in China across Southeast Asia that was also skillfully exploited by his colleague Liang Qichao. Liang’s own writings wove together an introduction of Social

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Darwinism and a passionate criticism of the aggressive nature of the Western powers. Together, the two men’s works spurred Overseas Chinese reformists like Lim, Khoo, and Tan to spread their message. The new vehicle of modern newspapers, such as the Thien Nan Shin Pao, would be the vehicle. The depth of Kang and Liang’s impact can particularly be seen in Khoo Seok Wan’s works. Khoo was born along the southeastern coast of Fujian in Haideng County and followed his father to Singapore at age seven. Although raised in Singapore, he returned to China at age fifteen to undertake a formal Chinese education and eventually passed both the county and provincial-level examinations. He would fail the national-level exams in 1895, but his experience in Beijing during the Sino-Japanese War along with trips to Shanghai and Hong Kong convinced him of China’s need to modernize. At the end of the year, he returned to Singapore for a short period before he had to return to his home district of Haideng in order to accompany his father’s body for burial in 1897, at the highpoint of Kang and Liang’s influence in China. His time in colonial Singapore made him an easy recruit to the mixture of reformed Confucianism and Western science that made up the reform agenda. Conversations with Kang’s followers in Xiamen convinced him of China’s need for reform. After his return, he published over forty pieces in Thien Nan Shin Pao in support of the reform movement. In 1900, he hosted Kang for over eighteen months, before arguments between the two over the financing of the reform movement dissolved their friendship. Many of his articles were designed to introduce the aims of the Reform Movement to the Chinese community in Singapore and Malaya. Khoo’s work, however, also shows subtle hints of his transnational education. First, the non-political reforms, particularly in education, stand out. Khoo wrote extensively about the need to reform the Chinese educational system in Singapore and the need for education for women. Traditionally, education in China prepared one for a bureaucratic career. In Southeast Asia, however, commerce rather than government service was virtually the only career path for Overseas Chinese. Additionally, since female members of a family were expected to assist in the daily operations of family businesses, they too needed to be literate and competent in mathematics. At the same time, however, Khoo’s strong foundation in classical Chinese made him a strong proponent of remaining loyal to Confucius, albeit in Kang’s new clothes. Finally, his father’s own experiences as a merchant convinced Khoo of the importance of commerce in China’s future development. Since commercial opportunities were what brought many Chinese to Singapore, the emphasis on commercial success and the need for education to prepare for competition in the roughand-tumble life of the area should come as no surprise.6

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Owing to the work of Lim, Tan, and Khoo, Kang’s reform agenda quickly spread throughout the Nanyang. Because of their close proximity, the Overseas Chinese communities in the Dutch East Indies were the quickest to embrace the reform banner. In 1899, Lim’s Philomatic Society translated portions of Kang Youwei’s Confucius as a Reformer into Malay for distribution within the Malay-speaking Peranakan Chinese community in Batavia. At the same time, itinerant Overseas Chinese book sellers in the Dutch East Indies began to add primers in Confucian classics or Chinese domestic magazines translated into Malay or Romanized Hokkien to their catalogues for sale throughout Java, Sumatra, Singapore, and the Malay Peninsula.7 Tan and Lim made frequent trips to Batavia in order to assist in the development of the Hokkien Chinese intellectual community, and they played a critical role in the opening of the Li Po, a Confucian reform paper written in Malay. Finally, the opening of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Kuan (Zhonghua huiguan) in 1899, Batavia’s first Confucian Association, strengthened the intellectual ties between the two communities. Indeed, the organization’s decision to make English a compulsory second language in its Chinese schools instead of Dutch reveals the important influence of the Singapore intellectuals on the East Indies movement. Eventually, however, Sun Yat-sen’s calls for revolution eclipsed Kang’s message of reform within the Overseas Chinese intellectual circles. Having laboured in the colonial environments of Western republics, Hokkien merchants had already been exposed to the ideas and thinking of Western republicanism. Sun’s messages of revolution and a strong China that would be able to protect the interests and increase the prestige of her citizens abroad slowly penetrated both the intellectual and business elites, eventually also jumping class and dialect group boundaries within the Chinese community in Singapore and across the Nanyang. Finally, the splintering of Kang and Liang’s relations and the latter’s decision to forsake violent revolution for gradual change also helped to tarnish the reformist cause. Indicative of just how attractive Sun’s message had become by middle of the first decade of the twentieth century was Lim Boon Keng’s own decision to forsake Kang Youwei and become one of the founding members of the Tongmenghui in Singapore. How did this change come about in the colony’s leading reformer? As early as 1903 articles by Lim began to appear in the Strait’s Chinese Magazine that discussed China’s future and the role of the Overseas Chinese in the country’s political and economic development. Lim issued an impassioned call within Singapore’s Overseas Chinese community to return to China and become more involved in modernization efforts. For

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example, in “The Role of the Baba in the Development of China”, Lim argued as follows: And when the Straits-born Chinese with proper qualifications arrive in China he finds that he is the sort of individual destined by nature to reconcile the great Chinese Nation to the ways of the great world beyond China….Our intercourse with Europeans enables us to work smoothly and successfully with the Europeans of any nationality in China and experts will through our mediation succeed in piloting any enterprise through the desired goal without those disastrous catastrophes which ended in the resignation of European officers and which have disfigured almost all Chinese enterprises of late years….We are more cosmopolitan in our tastes and habits, and in China we can pull along much in the same way the apostle Paul, a Greek unto the Greeks and a Gentile among Gentiles.8

Lim’s biblical references were astute. Like Paul’s efforts in spreading Christianity within the Roman Empire, Overseas Chinese will spread a new religion of modernization within China. Having been exposed in Southeast Asia to the enormous changes wrought by modern commerce and steam transport, Lim saw the role of returned Overseas Chinese as apostles of modernity. It would be their responsibility to help guide their homeland along the tricky path of constructing modern cities, building ports and other transportation systems, and build China’s commercial future. He went on to pointedly call for the Straits Chinese to return home as follows: … take your fair share of the heritage that belongs to the son of Han… Moreover, as British subjects you must enjoy all the benefits that accrue from the spread of British influence which unfortunately has not been in evidence for some years in China.9

Lim’s writings display a passionate commitment to China’s development; a zeal born out of his time in both Southeast Asia and England. Deeply impressed by the industrial might he saw in Edinburgh during his medical studies and angered over the racism colonial authorities displayed towards Chinese residents, Lim and other young Overseas Chinese intellectuals demanded a strong and modern China that would be respected by the West. While Kang Youwei’s works initially provided a plan for this new China, when the Reformist cause floundered in the first decade of the twentieth century owing to in-fighting within its camp and continued criticism by Sun that it supported an alien dynasty, revolution won over reform. Lim’s writings

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helped push many Overseas Chinese intellectuals and business elites to become more directly involved in mainland politics. By the end of the decade, newspapers, literary debate, and Chinese cultural activities had drawn a whole new generation of Huaqiao into a much more passionate involvement with mainland politics. Overseas Chinese intellectuals had successfully forged a new intellectual milieu that recognized their role in the politics of China. As the “apostles of modernization”, they had a critical role to play in China’s future. It would take less than a decade for that attraction to become even stronger as anger over their exclusion from politics in Singapore led many, including Lim Boon Keng, to return home. Similarly, other progressive Overseas Chinese leaders in Batavia, Manila, Penang, and Saigon also joined that battle through their own newspapers, reading rooms, and debating societies. Whether the topic was economic reform in China, Confucian revival, or revolution, the appearance of like-minded associates in Overseas Chinese centres scattered across the Nanyang allowed Sun Yat-sen and his associates to build their revolutionary movement upon the hopes and desires of the growing Nanyang Chinese community.

Nanyang’s Revolutionaries The intellectual shifts just outlined provided the foundation for Sun’s revolutionary apparatus. The role of Overseas Chinese in the revolutionary organizations that made up the heart of Sun Yat-sen’s anti-Manchu movement has already generated a tremendous amount of detailed research.10 Described as the “mothers of the revolution” by Sun’s supporters, referring to their crucial monetary and organizational support, many Huaqiao were honoured by Sun for their patriotism. Overseas Chinese from Xiamen were amongst the earliest and most vocal supporters of the revolutionary cause. Partly this was due to their sheer numbers: Huaqiao from Minnan dominated the Overseas Chinese population of Southeast Asia. More important, however, were the historical ties that the people of southern Fujian played in anti-Manchu uprisings. The Qing court never forgot the support the merchants of Minnan had afforded the pirate-rebel Koxinga, and as recently as 1853 several of Xiamen’s overseas brethren had played a crucial role in the Small Swords Uprising that eventually occupied Shanghai and Xiamen.11 Finally, the important role of anti-Manchu secret societies in Overseas Chinese economic and social life preserved the spirit of Chinese resistance against the Manchu conquerors long after it had died out on the mainland. Triad membership swelled in 1853 as thousands of Small Sword members fled Xiamen for the Straits colonies after the failure of their uprising. Official estimates of the membership of

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“Dangerous Societies” conducted in 1876 counted over 34,000 members in Singapore and Penang alone.12 It was in this atmosphere that Sun Yat-sen allied with other radicals from China living abroad to form the Tongmenghui, or China United League, in 1905. Initially, Sun’s most fervent supporters were radical, foreign students located in Japan, Europe, and the United States, and other exiled revolutionaries such as Huang Xiang and Sun Jiaoren. The organization quickly realized, however, that the Overseas Chinese communities represented an important source of financial and organizational support. In April 1906 the League’s Southeast Asia Bureau was established in Singapore in a famous meeting attended by Sun at the Wanqingyuan villa. Although the Tongmenghui relied heavily on Sun’s fellow Cantonese for support, Hokkienese were also heavily involved. Branches of the organization were quickly opened in Manila, Singapore, Penang, Rangoon, Batavia, Hanoi, Malacca, and elsewhere throughout Southeast Asia.13 Certainly part of the Sun’s success in recruiting Xiamen’s Huaqiao had to do with the relaxed political conditions in Southeast Asia. In China, Sun was a rebel with a price on his head and any sort of revolutionary activity obviously had to be done with great care and secrecy. Although Sun was viewed with suspicion by colonial authorities in Southeast Asia and was banned from entering several colonies, the relatively open political atmosphere of Nanyang nonetheless allowed Sun much more latitude to move about the region and organize the émigré community. Thus, in many of these early revolutionary organizations, Xiamen’s Overseas Chinese played even greater roles in organization and funding than their brethren back home and this ultimately led to a greater degree of political involvement and sophistication amongst Huaqiao communities. For example, in Singapore it was the Xiamen Huaqiao Tan Chor Nam (Chen Jingnan) (1884–1971) who led the drive to found the society in Singapore. Like many other Huaqiao intellectuals, Tan had originally been attracted to the reformist movement by the writings of Khoo Seok Wan. After the falling out between Khoo and Kang led to the fragmentation of the Singapore reformist movement in 1901,14 Tan, like many other Huaqiao, embraced more revolutionary causes. Tan was particularly fond of Zou Rong’s famous pamphlet, The Revolutionary Army (Geming jun). Zou’s anti-Manchuism and the stark calls for action to save the Chinese race struck a chord in many of Xiamen’s Overseas Chinese who were searching for a means of cultural survival. Moreover, Xiamen’s legacy as a base for anti-Manchu resistance during the fall of the Ming had never been forgotten overseas and the increasing ability of revolutionaries to combine that tradition with anti-Manchu rhetoric and the call for a new

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and different future for China became an explosive mix within Southeast Asia’s Huaqiao communities.15 Tan Chor Nam quickly became heavily involved in Singapore’s revolutionary circles. Writing under the pen name “Siming zhou shaonian” (A youngster from Siming county, a referral to Xiamen’s name under Koxinga’s administration), he published several articles for revolutionary periodicals.16 In 1903 Tan helped found Southeast Asia’s first revolutionary newspaper, the Thoe Lam Jit Poh (Tu nan ribao) or “Facing the South Daily”, which aimed to raise revolutionary sentiment among Singapore’s affluent merchant community. Tan also had tens of thousands of Zou Rong’s pamphlets printed up and distributed throughout Southeast Asia and southern China. Word of Tan’s exploits eventually reached Sun Yat-sen and when the Singapore branch of the organization was formed, Tan was elected chairman. Other Hokkien members included Lim Boon Keng, Tan Kah Kee, Zhuang Xiquan, Wang Zhenbang, and Li Si Ming.17 Revolutionaries repeatedly played on Xiamen’s history as a base for Zheng Chenggong’s Qing resistance in their attempts to organize the Hokkien community. For example, Tan Chor Nam evoked the memories of Minnan patriots and solemn promises of vengeance that were handed down from generation to generation that were a part of the popular culture of Singapore’s Huaqiao community in his own writings.18 This historical tradition was also reinforced by the propaganda of the revolutionary leaders. When Sun’s personal secretary, Wang Jingwei, visited Penang in 1908 he would remark as follows: The fact that this club was founded by our Fujian compatriots enables me to recall the revolutionary history of the Fujian people. After the Manchus entered the famous Shanhai gate, many patriots rose to resist the Manchu conquest. But the history of Zheng Chenggong is great and inspiring. Zheng Chenggong not only occupied Xiamen and Jinmen to fight the entire Manchu army, later he also made Taiwan a part of China. His contribution to the expansion of Chinese territory cannot be easily forgotten. I hope all of you will not forget this paragraph of the revolutionary history of your province. Although Zheng Chenggong is dead, his Fujian compatriots should continue his anti-Manchu career, support the revolution and overthrow the Manchus in order to restore our lost territory and earn honour for your province.... By doing so, you will console the spirit of your ancestors in heaven.19

By evoking Xiamen’s past as a pirate lair and rebel base, revolutionaries were clearly integrating images of the future nation with Minnan sentiment. This

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strategy not only raised the political consciousness of Xiamen’s Huaqiao and financial support for the revolutionary cause, but also laid the groundwork for the identification of “China” as a nation within the traditions and history of south Fujian. Support of Sun’s revolutionary activities now had a precise historical antecedent in Zheng Chenggong’s anti-Manchu resistance of the seventeenth century. Since Xiamen had been one of Zheng’s bases, it was “natural” for Hokkien Huaqiao to support Sun’s cause. Owing to their time spent abroad in the colonial confines of Southeast Asia, many Overseas Chinese from Southeast East embraced Sun’s call for republican revolution and a strong China. Angry over the racism that prevented them from playing more visible leadership roles in their adopted homes, more and more Huaqiao turned to China, particularly their homes in and around Xiamen, as an arena for their political aspirations. Western democracies had already condemned the Qing dynasty as a feudal relic, not worthy of respect. Thus it became the responsibility of men like Lim Boon Keng to build a new China that incorporated the experiences of Overseas Chinese society. Sun Yat-sen was to be the first leader of this transnational movement.

Revolution in Xiamen Certainly Overseas Chinese returning from Manila, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies played a critical role in the establishment of the Tongmenghui in Xiamen. Since Southeast Asia’s Overseas Chinese population was one of Sun and the Revolutionary Alliance’s biggest financial supporters, we should not be surprised that the revolutionary movement in the city was particularly strong. Once again, we see how the desire for a strong China that could protect the wealth and power of Overseas Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia helped to shape the revolutionary movement in China. Eventually much of the politicization of the south China coast would be coloured by experiences overseas. After establishing cells in many of the Overseas Chinese centres in Southeast Asia, Sun Yat-sen and Tan Chor Nam turned their attention to the establishment of clandestine cells throughout southern Fujian. Xiamen, with its foreign concession on Gulangyu and its strong ties to Overseas Chinese communities, was chosen as the base of operations for Fujian province.20 In February 1907, Tan dispatched several members of the Singapore branch of the Tongmenghui in order to coordinate activities with local revolutionaries. The home of the revolutionary movement in the city was the concession organized by American and British entrepreneurs near the city on the small

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island of Gulangyu. Home to many Western churches, foreign schools, and business enterprises, Gulangyu’s extraterritorial status provided the perfect cover for Sun’s revolutionary activities. Additionally, the island contained the homes of many of city’s wealthiest Overseas Chinese businessmen. Many of them had business interests that crisis-crossed the South China Sea and several were avid followers of Sun. With their financial and political assistance, the revolutionary presence grew. Posing as Chinese Christian acolytes at an American missionary hospital, the Singapore revolutionaries Shi Ming, Chen Jinfang, and Huang Wenceng established a “Christian Self-Government Coalition” ( Jidujiao ziwei hui ) as a front for their mutinous activities.21 Their assumed missionary status allowed them to move quickly and efficiently throughout the region. Another revolutionary to return to Fujian was Huang Naishang (1849–1924). Huang hailed from the Minqing district of Fujian. Although he came from a modest background, Huang was able to pass the provincial examinations and obtain the zhuren degree in 1894 at the age of forty-six. Huang later moved to Beijing and immediately became heavily involved in reformist politics. During the 100 Days period of 1898, Huang submitted eight memorials to the throne and was forced to flee to Singapore after Empress Cixi’s coup. Huang’s credentials and academic honours garnered him much respect within Singapore’s Overseas Chinese community and the marriage of his daughter to Lim Boon Keng drew him even closer into revolutionary circles. Huang abandoned reform for revolution after meeting Sun Yat-sen in 1900. In 1902, Huang and Tan Chor Nam organized the distribution of 5,000 copies of Zou Rong’s The Revolutionary Army under a false cover throughout south Fujian and eastern Guangdong. Over the next ten years, Huang would make several trips back to China to organize armed uprisings and propaganda activities for the Tongmenghui. Later that year, the revolutionary Qiu Jinjing (1888–1977) returned to Xiamen to assist in coordinating propaganda activities for south Fujian. Qiu, who had grown up in the qiaoxiang or Huaqiao villages just outside Xiamen, had spent several years in Burma and was one of the founding members of the Rangoon Tongmenghui. After setting up residence on Gulangyu, Qiu opened several reading rooms throughout Xiamen and distributed several hundred copies of The Revolutionary Army throughout Xiamen.22 In May 1911, Qiu was joined by another veteran revolutionary, Wang Zhenbang (1881–1947). Wang had originally hailed from one of the many Huaqiao villages (qiaoxiang) that surrounded Xiamen, but had moved to Singapore at a young age. After joining the Tongmenghui in 1907, Wang was dispatched to the Dutch East Indies to help organize revolutionary activities throughout Southeast

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Asia. When news of the execution of seventy-two “revolutionary martyrs” by Qing authorities after the failure of the April Canton Uprising touched off a storm of protest in Xiamen, Wang returned to his native land to organize anti-Qing activities. The two men immediately began publication of an underground newspaper, Awaken the South (Nanxing bao), to spread news of the growing revolutionary movement and also began training a “revolutionary army” made up of local students and workers.23 Revolutionary activities quickly moved into high gear after news of the Wuhan uprising reached Xiamen in mid-October. On November 5, rumours that a “revolutionary army” was approaching Xiamen caused local merchants to shutter their store windows and closed the city’s markets. Although the soldiers did not appear, the rumour nonetheless caused the city’s Manchu leaders to flee to Shanghai two days later. Fuzhou declared independence on November 9, delivering the provincial administration into the hands of the revolutionary forces.24 With government officials now absent, Wang Zhenbang began to organize a revolutionary administration to govern the city, and Wang’s forces declared independence from the Qing court on November 14. The next day local Tongmenghui members, Huaqiao revolutionaries, and local merchants organized a “citizens’ committee” to administer the city.25 The news of the fall of the Manchu Government was greeted with great celebration abroad. Overseas Chinese communities immediately organized fund-raising drives for the new republic. In Singapore, a November 10 meeting to publicize the fall of Fuzhou was attended by over 1,000 people. Several thousand dollars was collected on the spot and a “Relief Fund for the Chinese Martyrs” was organized. Headed by Tan Chor Nam and the businessman Tan Kah Kee, over $100,000 was remitted to Fujian.26 Enthusiasm for the new regime reached beyond the pocketbook; some of Southeast Asia’s elite students contemplated returning to China to work for the building of a new nation. Teams of students began to arrive in Xiamen by the start of 1912 to work for the new regime.27 In January 1912, Sun Yat-sen was sworn in as the new president of the Chinese Republic. Although Sun would step aside one month later to allow the former Qing prime minister and Beiyang general Yuan Shikai to assume the nation’s top office in the hopes of building a more united China, Overseas Chinese nonetheless rejoiced over the birth of the Chinese republic. Shortly thereafter the Tongmenghui would be reorganized into the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT), and many Huaqiao would hold important posts within the new party.28 Within Xiamen several returned Overseas Chinese were elected to the city council, including its new chairman, Zhuang Yinan

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(1855–1938). Zhuang was a veteran revolutionary who had been the chief of the Tongmenghui branch in Rangoon and had published the revolutionary paper Liaoguang xin bao. He had also personally contributed thousands of dollars to the revolutionary cause.29 In recognition of their support of the revolutionary cause, the new republic moved quickly to establish government organizations that would guarantee the rights of Overseas Chinese at home and abroad. One of the most important innovations was the institution of a whole new official apparatus for handling Huaqiao affairs. In January 1912, Overseas Chinese Lin Gecun and Zhang Qi requested that the new provincial government “establish an organization to protect and work for the interests of Overseas Chinese”.30 Similar petitions were presented to Beijing. In October 1912 authorization for the establishment of China’s first Overseas Chinese bureau of management, the Jinan ju or the Southern Affairs Bureau, was promulgated. Lim Boon Keng, the Singapore intellectual, was named as its first director and the bureau opened satellite offices in Fuzhou, Quanzhou, and Zhangzhou. The organization’s responsibilities included the issuance of passports, the coordination of colonization efforts, Overseas Chinese educational affairs, promotion of commercial affairs, the issuance of travel passes and visas, investigation of social conditions for Chinese living overseas, the approval of Overseas Chinese representatives, and reports to the central government.31 Despite government attempts to improve relations with its overseas brethren, relations between the national government and many Overseas Chinese soured. Much of this was due to the political breakdown of the republic. As relations between Yuan Shikai and Sun’s Kuomintang turned from bad to worse in early 1913, eventually resulting in heavy fighting between the two groups over the summer, Overseas Chinese became heavily involved in the anti-Yuan resistance. Yuan’s power base had always rested on his control of China’s northern armies and he had few connections and little experience with the nation’s émigré population. Sun, on the other hand, could count on the strong network of personal relations and institutional ties throughout Nanyang from his Tongmenghui days and his own overseas background. Not surprisingly many Huaqiao threw their support behind the Kuomintang (KMT). Relations between Beijing and Nanyang reached a boiling point in late July when Fujian declared independence as part of the Kuomintang’s “Second Revolution” against Yuan Shikai. Overseas Chinese immediately threw their support behind the Fujian military governor, Sun Daoren, who had allied himself with Sun Yat-sen. Unfortunately Sun and his supporters were defeated, and he was forced to flee China in August. After the defeat

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of the KMT’s forces, Yuan ordered one of his generals, Li Houji, to assume control of the Fujian provincial administration, bringing the province firmly under his control.

A Growing Transnationalism As we can see, Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary movement played a critical role in the stimulation of a new transnational Chinese political sphere. Initially many Overseas Chinese turned to politics out of a hope that a strong China would help influence their place and position abroad. In other words, they became involved with revolutionary efforts in order to affect their lives in Southeast Asia. Once the genie was let out of the bottle, so to speak, it was difficult for many politicized Huaqiao to return to apolitical lives. Many of Sun’s supporters were immensely talented individuals who were shut out of higher-level political offices and achievements due to the closed nature of the colonial political environment. While local charity and dialect-group activism could provide some satisfaction, it was clear that only in China could these aspirations truly mature. If Overseas Chinese wanted to become leaders outside of their immediate community, China, not Southeast Asia, was really their only venue of choice. Thus, Sun’s revolutionary movement unleashed a number of unexpected changes, including the development of a group of transnational Chinese politicians whose business and political interests spanned the South China Sea. China’s warlord era (1917–27) provided another opportunity for these transnational politicians to play a key role in mainland politics. While the decade between the death of Yuan Shikai and the establishment of the Kuomintang’s Nanjing regime certainly found China at a low point in its history, it also provided a window of opportunity for the elaboration of local projects of nation-building. The chaos of the central government meant that Beijing’s ability to influence or control events beyond the confines of the city was limited; local autonomy movements could proceed unhindered and many did across the face of China. In southern Fujian, this project was heavily influenced by Overseas Chinese both inside and outside China. Naturally the new modernization projects and political movements that were conceived by these transnational political forces reflected the experiences of Overseas Chinese within the milieu of colonial Southeast Asia. For example, regional economic development programmes implemented in and around Xiamen closely resembled those pursued by the various Nanyang colonial regimes. A relentless emphasis on transportation and communications

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infrastructure, mineral extraction, and trade were the hallmarks of colonial Southeast Asia and they certainly found their way into the imaginings of many of Xiamen’s Huaqiao. Thus Sun’s Tongmenghui did more than play a critical role in bringing an end to China’s feudal political system, it also created a transnational political movement that slowly integrated the political aspirations of Xiamen’s residents on both sides of the South China Sea. The Nanyang Chinese community would take on an increasingly important leadership role in the cities of southeast coastal China via new political organizations such as the Fujian Overseas Chinese Village Salvation Society (VSS) (Minqiao jiuxiang yundong hui ). The failure of Sun’s Second Revolution of 1913 ushered in a decade-long era of political instability in Fujian under the corrupt leadership of General Li Houji (1869–1942).32 In order to fund his troops, Li resorted to typical warlord financial practices that ultimately devastated the rural economy of the province. Local communities were bankrupted when Li demanded entire villages to purchase over one million yuan in war bonds in 1918. Moreover, many peasant families were forced to cultivate opium in lieu of crops in order to fund Li’s armies. Provincial finances were treated in a similarly roughshod manner. Li ordered the Bank of Fujian to print a flood of worthless bank notes and accepted large loans from the Japanese-controlled Bank of Taiwan.33 Finally, his attack on Guangdong in October 1917 set in motion the Guangdong-Fujian War of 1918, whose battles would rage across southern Fujian, destroying many of the ancestral villages of Xiamen’s Huaqiao. Li’s blatant disregard for the province and the continuing chaos caused by his military campaigns elicited public calls of autonomy for southern Fujian by Overseas Chinese leaders.34 In the spring and summer of 1920 fighting between warlord forces in Fujian and Guangdong erupted again. Cantonese forces attacked the village of Anhai, just north of Xiamen, robbing over 2,000 families of over 1.5 million yuan and killing dozens who resisted their demands. The village was also the home to many Overseas Chinese residing in the Philippines and the robberies were given extensive coverage in the Manila Overseas Chinese press. Continued pillaging by the Cantonese forces eventually stimulated returned Overseas Chinese in Xiamen to establish an “Overseas Chinese Debating Society” (Huaqiao tanhua hui ) in October in order to find ways to end the bloodshed and further regional economic development. Hoping to end the violence and to organize resistance against Li, the organizers of the society called upon Xiamen’s Overseas Chinese population to wage a public crusade for the removal of the general.35 “Many Overseas Chinese”, explained

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one merchant, “live on both sides of the sea and have families in both places. The unfortunate events that are destroying Fujian also have a deep impact on Chinese here in Singapore.”36 In October 1922 war would break out once again in Fujian as Nationalist (Kuomintang) forces from Guangdong attacked Li Houji. The attacks, led by General Xu Chongzhi, were a part of Sun Yat-sen’s attempt to reunify China once again under his control.37 In response to the latest round of violence, over seventy of Manila’s leading Huaqiao met on November 19 to discuss ways to arrest Fujian’s chaos. The meetings resulted in the establishment of the Philippines Overseas Chinese Self-Government Association (Lufei huaqiao zizhi jijin hui) that called for the removal of Li Houji’s troops and the formal establishment of southern Fujian as a special administrative zone to be governed by the Overseas Chinese community. Telegrams were immediately sent to the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and other Nanyang Chinese organizations calling for “patriotic Overseas Chinese to join us in demanding an independent Fujian under Overseas Chinese leadership”.38 The rhetoric of an autonomous Fujian under Overseas Chinese administration grew louder: Your overseas countrymen are extremely distressed over the current troubles caused by marauding troops that are befalling their ancestral villages, and that the local residents are unable to save themselves … therefore we advocate self-government upon which to build the future … Thus we have established this organization whose goal is to establish self-government in Fujian, which we will move towards with a determined spirit. The new Fujian of the Republic can depend on its overseas brethren and its 30 million Fujianese brothers.39

Continued fighting in southern Fujian had instigated another round of political organizing by the Hokkien community overseas as Fujian selfgovernment associations sprouted up throughout the region and quickly established charitable funds to relieve their war-weary cousins at home.40 General Li Houji was finally forced to flee Fujian in October 1922, but the loss of the province’s strongman, combined with the retreat of Nationalist forces back to Guangdong, only served to plunge the province into even greater disarray. Fighting broke out across the province as subordinate military commanders and bandit chieftains fought each other over eversmaller chunks of territory. Xiamen fell into the hands of Li’s former lieutenant, Zang Zhiping.41 The continuing chaos, however, also stimulated the growing transnational political movement. On 22 June 1924 the Fujian

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Overseas Chinese Village Salvation Society (VSS) (Nanyang Minqiao jiuxiang hui) was established in order to coordinate united action by all Hokkien overseas to rebuild their “homeland”. Designed to unify all of the various self-government societies scattered across Southeast Asia, it immediately called upon those Fujianese living abroad to lead in the reconstruction of their ancestral villages as follows: No area of our sacred mountains and rivers is free from the ravages brought by militarists, bandits, and pirates. Never before has our province suffered so much misery in history. For this reason we have invited our brethren to organize this association as the vanguard in the Village Salvation Movement … to gather unity and strength in a massive way we have coordinated with the Southern Fujian Overseas Chinese of every port in the Nanyang region in order to build a self-governing province for the peace, order, and welfare of the 30 million inhabitants of the 63 districts of Fujian.42

While it is clear that the organization saw southern Fujian as an autonomous base of power, one can nonetheless see in the calls for independence the continued development of a transnational Chinese identity. When the VSS called for the “Southern Fujian Overseas Chinese of every port in the Nanyang region” to work for Fujian, it was, in fact, calling upon Hokkien Chinese scattered across Southeast Asia to come together as a political force. While Xiamen and southern Fujian were the initial focus of the VSS, the movement hoped to establish a transnational organization, made up of Fujianese on both sides of the South China Sea, to administer the entire province. By the end of the year, twenty branches of the VSS had been established in Manila, Xiamen, Singapore, Batavia, Rangoon, Penang, and Hanoi. A propaganda department was also established to publicize the organization and the plight of the homeland throughout the region.43 After several months of organizational and propaganda work, VSS leaders organized their next regional congress in May 1926 to discuss long-term plans for the development of south Fujian and to help publicize their efforts. Over fifty Overseas Chinese representatives from the various Nanyang committees, local officials from each county in southern Fujian, reporters from the major overseas and Xiamen newspapers, and municipal officials participated.44 Those in attendance included political, economic, and cultural figures from both Fujian and abroad such as Huang Yizhu, Lim Boon Keng, Tan Kah Kee, Xie Laomei, Huang Zhongxun, Xu Youchao, Chen Sanduo, Dai Jinhua, and Wu Kecheng. After two weeks of meetings, VSS Chair Li Qingquan announced an ambitious plan for the economic, political, and educational development

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that would result in a “new Fujian”. Li noted the province’s recent troubles in his opening address: Today our ancestral villages lie in complete chaos, the result of years of warfare and neglect by the central government. The people of Fujian, who have gone abroad, look back at their villages as their treasures, yet these places are treated roughly by outsiders who do not understand their value … through our cooperative effort we can remake Fujian and build its future.45

Moreover, as vice-chair Huang Mengkui remarked, it was the Overseas Chinese, because of their experiences in the colonies of the United States, France, Holland, and Britain, who had the determination and knowledge to build a modern Xiamen.46 Pointing to the dynamic entrepreneurial culture and cosmopolitanism that lay at the heart of Hokkien success overseas, the leaders of the VSS now moved forward with constructing a vision of the nation that would combat the destructive tendencies of warlord rule while integrating all Hokkien with the fate of Fujian province. The measures adopted by the organization reflected a transnational modernity that was raised within the colonial confines of Southeast Asia, but applied to the conditions of southeast coastal China. It included: (1) the establishment of a municipal planning association at Xiamen University to guide the development of the city as the financial, transportation, and cultural capital of the entire region; (2) the institution of an anti-opium smoking and cultivation drive that was designed to end years of forced opium production and consumption under Li Houji’s warlord regime; (3) the creation of a central command centre to aid in the development of local self-protection corps throughout Minnan, the coordination of regional bandit-suppression campaigns, and the preservation of local order; (4) the construction of an “Overseas Chinese Model Village” outside of Xiamen for Huaqiao who could not return to their ancestral villages; (5) a plan for the construction of new roads throughout the region and the lengthening of the current Zhangzhou-Xiamen rail line to the coal reserves located outside Longyan in western Fujian; and (6) the organization of a Huaqiao political action committee that would promote self-government for the region, demanding that the areas surrounding Xiamen and Zhangzhou be designated as special zones for Overseas Chinese investment and administration.47 Hoping to transfer their economic success from Southeast Asia to Fujian, VSS leaders openly admitted to be employing the same hegemonic

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strategies for the development of Fujian as those employed by colonial administrators in Southeast Asia. For example, the initiative that received the greatest publicity, the proposal by Huang Yizhu and Li Qingquan to lengthen the Zhang-Xia rail line, was born out of the role railroads had played in the opening of Southeast Asia to global trade. Many Huaqiao hoped to duplicate that feat in Fujian province by linking the commercial centre of Xiamen with the rich coal mines located at Longyan. The VSS plan called for a total investment of 16,000,000 yuan in the railroad, to be raised strictly from local and Overseas Chinese investors. Additional funding was also sought in order to develop coal production at Longyan, an area which one French expert claimed “contained enough coal to supply the entire world for 50 years”.48 Also, to the east of Zhangzhou were the rich iron fields of Longxi. The industrial potential of combining Longyan’s coal and Longxi’s iron was obvious to VSS leaders; the two could act as the foundation of a new industrial economy supplied by the exploitation of the province’s raw materials to the west. At the VSS meetings Huang Yizhu and Li Qingquan presented detailed plans to transform Zhangzhou into a major transportation centre whose products could then be shipped to China, Southeast Asia, Japan, and America from Xiamen’s deep-water port.49 The plan, if successful, would obviously transform Xiamen into a flourishing commercial and shipping centre that would rival its cousins throughout China and Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, just as preparations for the extension of the rail line moved into its final stages, warfare broke out yet again in November 1926. Fujian warlord Zhou Yingren and the armies of the Kuomintang’s Northern Expedition battled across southern Fujian for control of the province. By December, Zhou’s forces had been routed and a new KMT administration had been installed in Fuzhou. Nonetheless, the unsettled military and political situation in Fujian and the fighting that accompanied the KMT’s National Revolution of 1927 made it impossible to proceed with construction. By the end of the year, Huang Yizhu and Li Qingquan had decided to call a temporary halt to the project.50 Finally, the abrupt change in the national political situation, with the seating of a new Nationalist regime under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing, suddenly made it impossible to move ahead with projects that emphasized self-government and local development. The jubilation that greeted the KMT’s unification of the country and the establishment of a new regime that demanded a united China suddenly made the rhetoric of Overseas Chinese autonomy extremely circumspect.

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Conclusion This chapter has outlined how political, economic, and social pressures in China and Southeast Asia contributed to the growing political integration of Hokkien communities on both sides of the South China Sea. It was a combination of Chinese nationalism and racist, exclusionary social policies in Southeast Asia that succeeded in alienating a larger and larger portion of the Overseas Chinese community abroad and eventually reset their political landscape. China, rather than their communities in Southeast Asia, became the focus of political aspirations. As many began to re-examine their homeland, however, they did so through the lens of their experience abroad, a past that was distinctly colonial and hegemonic in nature. This process began in the late nineteenth century as Overseas Chinese community leaders, exposed to the derogatory views of many colonial administrators that viewed Chinese culture as weak and effeminate, began to search for new ways to bolster their position in Asia. They noticed the military support and patriotic acclaim that European settlers in Southeast Asia enjoyed and it stood in stunning contrast to the condemnation of the Qing Dynasty towards their own achievements. What if they too could enjoy the same support from a strong and powerful China? How would that reality change their position in Southeast Asia? Eventually colonialism would unleash powerful new forces that would force many Overseas Chinese to confront both the question of the very survival of China and their role in their homeland’s fate. When reform failed to achieve the goal of a strong China capable of opposing Western colonialism and supporting its own “settlers”, Overseas Chinese intellectuals such as Lim Boon Keng and Tan Chor Nam turned to the promise of republican revolution espoused by Sun Yat-sen. The activities of Sun’s Revive China and United Leagues not only forced many Overseas Chinese to confront the question of how a weak Qing dynasty handicapped their political ambitions throughout the Nanyang, but also sent many back to Fujian and Guangdong to help lead the revolutionary movement. This was a critical step in the development of Chinese transnationalism; a new, younger generation of Overseas Chinese, many of them educated in Southeast Asia, began to play a direct role in the politics within both China and Overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. The end result was a crop of nationalistic, politically-savvy operatives who were now experienced in politics on both sides of the transnational Chinese community. The early years of republican government in China were a disappointment for the young Nanyang revolutionaries. China remained weak and divided.

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More importantly the centralizing tendencies of the Yuan Shikai Government had little sympathy for the plight for China’s overseas settlers. Ironically, the fall of China into political chaos with the death of Yuan in 1916 and the rise of separatist warlords provided fertile soil for the development of transnational political organizations. The outbreak of World War I unleashed a huge demand for the labour and commercial acumen of the Hokkien abroad. This sent increasing numbers of young men back and forth across the South China Sea in search of their fortune. The increasing cultural and economic ties between the two areas were the foundation of Chinese transnationalism; they were the glue that held the communities together. Since colonialism shut the Overseas Chinese out of political power in Southeast Asia, the rapid deterioration of the power of the Beijing Government and the rise of the federalist movement provided a new outlet for the political ambitions for Nanyang’s Huaqiao. In the case of Fujian, for example, continued upheaval triggered a greater interest in provincial affairs and a realization that the province provided many Overseas Chinese with an opportunity to become important political actors for the first time. They now had an arena that not only allowed, but also welcomed their skills and investments. Their vision of modernity was distinctly transnational in nature. It was neither attached to a distinct piece of territory nor the creation of a nation-state. Instead it relied upon the movement of people, products, and ideas across space and time. As trade between Southeast Asia and Europe exploded over the first two decades of the twentieth century, the movement of Chinese labourers and businessmen kept pace. The ability of steamships to move people and goods quickly and efficiently led to the development of transnational migrant circuits that connected Xiamen to the Nanyang communities and vice versa. Eventually this web of economic and cultural forces became politicized, providing Sun his opportunity. It was also the foundation of a growing political integration that would continue to bloom over the first half of the twentieth century. Many of the intellectual and political motivations that stirred people like Lim Boon Keng to embrace Sun’s calls for revolution were certainly part of the inspiration behind later organizations like the VSS. Thus the impact of Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary organizations, particularly the Tongmenghui, was not limited to 1911. They played a critical role in not only stimulating the transnational politicization of Overseas Chinese communities across the region, but also laid the foundation for later organizations such as the VSS. The experience gained in organizing,

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funding, writing propaganda, and publishing newspapers for the benefit of the revolutionary cause did not disappear. Indeed, when a weak Beijing provided an opportunity for a transnational modernity to flower throughout southern Fujian in the mid-1920s, the desire to see a safe and secure homeland motivated many Hokkien abroad to return home and work for modernization. They quickly employed the same political skills honed in the battle to overthrow the Qing dynasty for their new mission of saving Fujian from Li Houji and other warlords. Employing the talents they acquired in Southeast Asia, their vision of the future incorporated many of the same techniques used by Western governments to exploit their colonies. Up and down the southeast coast of China returned Overseas Chinese laboured to develop transportation, commerce, and mining, the bedrock of Nanyang’s own spectacular development. While many Western historians have embraced explanations of the 1911 Revolution that clearly limit Sun’s role, along the southeast coast of China we can see that his political movement stimulated a transnational revolution. Tongmenghui members politicized and energized Overseas Chinese communities, redirecting their political energies back to China. Looking at the decades both before and after 1911 we find a growing Huaqiao population, moving back and forth across the South China Sea with increasing speed and ease, which grew to be a force for change in and around Xiamen. Sun Yat-sen and the Tongmenghui unleashed a revolutionary movement that continued to grow across the region throughout the twentieth century.

Notes 1

2

3

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See R. Keith Schoppa, “Province and Nation: The Chekiang Provincial Autonomy Movement, 1917–27”, Journal of Asian Studies 36, no. 4 (December 1977): 661–74; Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 177–204; Wen-hsin Yeh, Provincial Passages: Culture, Space, and the Origins of Chinese Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). Yen Ching-hwang, A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia, 1800–1911 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 113–14. Harold Schriffrin, Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968) and C. Martin Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). Marie-Claire Bergère, Sun Yat-sen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

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Ibid., p. 418. For more information on the development of Singapore’s transnational system of education, see James Cook, “Currents of Education and Identity: Overseas Chinese and Minnan Schools, 1912–37”, Twentieth Century China 25, no. 2 (April 2000): 1–31. Ian Proudfoot, Early Malay Printed Books: A Provisional Account of Materials Published in the Singapore-Malay Area Up to 1920 (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaysia, 1993), pp. 20–31. Lim Boon Keng, “The Role of the Baba in the Development of China”, The Straits Chinese Magazine 7, no. 3 (1903): 94. Ibid. See especially Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976). Hong Puren 洪朴仁, Minnan xiaodao hui qiyi shiliao xuanbian 闽南小刀会起 义史料选编 [Selected Historical Materials on the South Fujian Small Knives Society Revolt] (Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe, 1993). C.B. Buckley, An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore (Singapore: Kelly & Walsh, 1902), p. 580. Xiamen huaqiao zhi bianzuan weiyuan hui 厦门华侨志编纂委员会, Xiamen huaqiao zhi 厦门华侨志 [The Gazetteer of Xiamen’s Overseas Chinese] (Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe, 1991), p. 122; Lea E. Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1916 (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 54–112; and Yen, ibid., pp. 88–100. Khoo publicly accused Kang of embezzling $50,000 in funds contributed by Overseas Chinese in Australia. Khoo would later disassociate himself with reformism and throw his allegiance to the Manchus. Ibid., p. 55. Chen Jingnan, “Wanqing yuan yu Zhongguo geming shilu”, Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushi nian wenxian, vol. 1, pt. 11 (Taibei: Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushi nian wenxian bianzuan weiyuan hui, 1965), p. 533; Zhang Yongfu 张永福, Nanyang yu chuangli minguo 南洋与创立民国 [The Southern Seas and the Foundation of the Republic] (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1933), p. 8. Chen Jingnan, ibid., p. 534; Yen, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, p. 54. Qiu Jinjing 丘廑兢, “Xinhai geming zai Xiamen” 辛亥革命在厦门 [The 1911 Revolution at Xiamen]. Xiamen wenshi ziliao 厦门文史资料, no. 1 (March 1963): 1–13. Yen, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, p. 60. Wang Jingwei, “Minqiao yu ying re chen zhanzu geming”, in Bincheng yeshu baoshe niansi zhounian jinian tekan, edited by Yang Hanxing (Penang: n.p., n.d.), p. 148. Xiamen huaqiao zhi, ibid., p. 123. Qiu, p. 2. Ibid.

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26 27

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Xiamen huaqiao zhi, pp. 122–24, 369; Qiu, pp. 3–7. United States Department of State, Consular Reports: Xiamen, 1910–1929, Julean H. Arnold to Secretary of State, 7 November 1911. Qiu, pp. 6–12. Unfortunately the new government was unable to control the city and Xiamen slowly slid into chaos. Battles between the “voluntary police” under the command of local merchants and the “revolutionary police” headed by Wang Zhenbang exploded into the streets. Moreover, inter-clan squabbling also burst into the open, turning the city’s streets into a battle zone. While the arrival of an American warship restored order, the city remained uneasy until the arrival of the new Daotai, former sub-prefect Yuan Hongda, from Fuzhou. Xiamen huaqiao zhi, p. 124. United States Department of State, Records of the Department of State relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910–1929; Julean H. Arnold to Secretary of State, 6 January 1912. Feng Ziyou 冯自由, Huaqiao geming kaiguo shi 华侨革命开国史 [A History of the Overseas Chinese, the Revolution, and the Creation of the Republic] (Shanghai:Shangwu shuju, 1947), pp. 121–22. After the Wuchang uprising, Zhuang had been selected by Sun as the head of the entire Nanyang operations and had been crucial in funnelling overseas funds to revolutionaries within China. Upon his return to the city in 1912, he has became a prominent figure in local politics and was appointed an advisor to the provincial government. Zhuang was also one of the key players in the move to establish Xiamen as a separate county in April 1912. Zeng Yanding 曾沿丁, “Zhuang Yin’an shilue” 庄银安事略 [A Record of Zhuang Yin’an’s Life]. Xiamen wenshi ziliao 厦门文史资料, no. 18 (October 1991): 79–82; Xiamen huaqiao zhi, p. 350. As quoted in Shen Lu 沈芦, “Jinanju: she zai Xiamen de Zhongguo di yi ge qiaowu jiguan” 暨南局：设在厦门的中国第一个侨务机关 [The Jinan Bureau: Xiamen’s First Overseas Chinese Bureau]. Xiamen wenshi ziliao 厦门 文史资料, no. 13 (April 1988): 13–15. “Fujian jinan ju zhangcheng”, in Fujian sheng dangan guan 福建省档案馆, Fujian huaqiao dangan shiliao 福建华侨档案史料 [Historical Materials on the Overseas Chinese of Fujian] (Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990), pp. 1–4. Li Houji originally hailed from Jiangsu and came from a family with a long military tradition. After studying military science, he had become attached to Li Hongzhang’s private military guard. In 1894, he entered the Beiyang military academy and after graduation had become attached to one of Yuan Shikai’s general, Wu Fengling. After Wu’s death in military action at Hankou during the 1911 Revolution, Li Houji was elevated to commander of the 7th Brigade. During the fighting surrounding the Second Revolution, Li’s forces would play a key role in the occupation of the Wusong batteries surrounding Shanghai and in the pacification of the city for Yuan Shikai’s forces. After the defeat of Sun’s forces, Yuan rewarded Li Houji with the military governorship

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36 37

38 39

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of Fujian province. Li’s arrival also placed the renegade province under the control of one of his most-trusted generals. For more, see Pan Shouzheng 潘守正, “Li Houji zai Fujian” 李厚基在福建 [Li Houji at Fujian], Fujian wenshi ziliao 福建文史资料, no. 9 (1985): 1–2. Pan Shouzheng, pp. 12–13. For example, see the criticisms contained in Ju Shi, “Huaqiao jinri yingyou de juewu”, Feilubin qiao jiaoyi yanjiu chuban she, vol. 1, no. 18 (7 November 1921): 2–3. Feilubin Minlila Zhonghua shanghui chuban weiyuan hui 菲律宾岷里拉 中华商会出版委员会, Feilubin Minlila Zhonghua shanghui sanshi zhounian jinian kan 菲 律 宾 岷 里 拉 中 华 商 会 三 十 周 年 纪 念 刊 [The Thirtieth Anniversary Commemoration of the Manila Philippines Chinese Chamber of Commerce] (Manila: Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1936), jia 97. Hereafter FMZSH. Huaqiao shangbao, 21 November 1921. Xu Chongzhi (1887–1965) was one of Sun Yat-sen’s leading generals in the 1920s. In early 1922, Sun ordered Xu and Chen Jiongming north to defeat warlords in Jiangxi and Jiangsu provinces. At the time, Chen Jiongming was Sun Yat-sen’s most important military supporter as governor of Guangdong. In the spring of 1922, Chen began to openly oppose Sun’s plans for a northern expedition to reunify China under Sun’s leadership. Chen was a great advocate of federalism and self-government and Sun’s centralizing tendencies were opposed to these ideals. Sun dismissed Chen from his posts in his government in April 1922 and Chen retired to his hometown of Huizhou. In June, however, Chen rebelled and reoccupied Canton. Sun suddenly found himself at the wrong end of a military coup organized by Chen’s supporters and was forced to flee Canton to Shanghai. He then ordered Xu Chongzhi, then in Jiangsu, to return to Canton and dislodge Chen. In order to do so, however, Xu had to first dislodge Li Houji from Fujian, thus precipitating the October 1922 fighting. Xiamen huaqiao zhi, p. 124. As quoted in Shi Xueqin 施雪琴, “Nanyang minqiao jiuxiang yundong yu Zhanglong lu chuan jihua” 南洋民桥救乡运动与漳龙路矿运动 [The Village Assistance Movement of the Southeast Asian Overseas Chinese of South Fujian and the Zhang-long railroad and mining plan]. Nanyang wenti yanjiu 南洋问 题研究, vol. 4 (1995): 46. Ibid. The KMT forces under the command of Xu Chongzhi that had driven Li Houji out of Fujian were forced to suddenly return to Guangdong in March 1923 after the rebellion by Chen Jiongming against Sun Yat-sen. FMZSH, jia 45. “Jiuxiang yundong faqi yilai zhi gaikuang”, Xinmin ribao, 22 June 1926. Xiamen huaqiao zhi, ibid., p. 130. Nanyang minqiao jiuxiang hui 南洋民侨救乡会, Nanyang minqiao jiuxiang hui

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linshi baogao shu 南洋民侨救乡会临时报告书 [The Temporary Report of the Fujian Overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia’s Save the Village Society] (Xiamen: Nanyang minqiao jiuxiang hui, 1926), pp. 18–19. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 8–18. Xiamen huaqiao zhi, p. 131. “Jiuxiang yundong faqi yilai zhi gaikuang”, Xinmin ribao, 22 June 1926. Lin Jinzhi 林金枝, Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiye shi ziliao xuanji: Fujian juan 近代华侨投资国内企业史资料选集: 福建卷 [Selected Historical Research Materials on Modern, Domestic Investment by Overseas Chinese: Fujian Edition] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1985), p. 241.

References Bergère, Marie-Claire. Sun Yat-sen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. Buckley, C.B. An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore. Singapore: Kelly & Walsh, 1902. Chen Jingnan. “Wanqing yuan yu Zhongguo geming shilu”. Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushi nian wenxian, vol. 1, pt. 11. Taibei: Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushi nian wenxian bianzuan weiyuan hui, 1965. Cook, James A. “Currents of Education and Identity: Overseas Chinese and Minnan Schools, 1912–1937”. Twentieth Century China 25, no. 2 (April 2000): 1–31. Duara, Prasenjit. Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. ———. “Nationalists Among Transnationalists: Overseas Chinese and the Idea of China, 1900–1911”. In Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism, edited by Donald M. Nonini and Aihwa Ong. New York: Routledge, 1997. Feilubin Minlila Zhonghua shanghui chuban weiyuan hui 菲律宾岷里拉中华商 会出版委员会. Feilubin Minlila Zhonghua shanghui sanshi zhounian jinian kan 菲律宾岷里拉中华商会三十周年纪念刊 [The Thirtieth Anniversary Commemoration of the Manila Philippines Chinese Chamber of Commerce]. Manila: Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1936. Feng Ziyou 冯自由. Huaqiao geming kaiguo shi 华侨革命开国史 [A History of the Overseas Chinese, the Revolution, and the Creation of the Republic]. Shanghai: Shangwu shuju, 1947. Fujian sheng dangan guan 福建省档案馆. Fujian huaqiao dangan shiliao 福建华 侨档案史料 [Historical Materials on the Overseas Chinese of Fujian]. Beijing: Dangan chubanshe, 1990. Hong Puren 洪朴仁. Minnan xiaodao hui qiyi shiliao xuanbian 闽南小刀会起义史 料选编 [Selected Historical Materials on the South Fujian Small Knives Society Revolt]. Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe, 1993.

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Lim Boon Keng. “The Role of the Baba in the Development of China”. The Straits Chinese Magazine 7, no. 3 (1903): 94–100. Lin Jinzhi 林金枝. Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiye shi ziliao xuanji: Fujian juan 近代华侨投资国内企业史资料选集: 福建卷 [Selected Historical Research Materials on Modern, Domestic Investment by Overseas Chinese: Fujian Edition]. Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1985. Nanyang minqiao jiuxiang hui 南洋民侨救乡会. Nanyang minqiao jiuxiang hui linshi baogao shu 南洋民侨救乡会临时报告书 [The Temporary Report of the Fujian Overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia’s Save the Village Society]. Xiamen: Nanyang minqiao jiuxiang hui, 1926. Pan Shouzheng 潘守正. “Li Houji zai Fujian” 李厚基在福建 [Li Houji at Fujian]. Fujian wenshi ziliao 福建文史资料, no. 9 (1985): 1–23. Proudfoot, Ian. Early Malay Printed Books: A Provisional Account of Material Published in Singapore-Malay Area Up to 1920. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaysia, 1993. Qiu Jinjing 丘廑兢. “Xinhai geming zai Xiamen” 辛亥革命在厦门 [The 1911 Revolution at Xiamen]. Xiamen wenshi ziliao 厦门文史资料, no. 1 (March 1963): 1–13. Schoppa, R. Keith. “Province and Nation: The Chekiang Provincial Autonomy Movement, 1917–1927”. Journal of Asian Studies 36, no. 4 (December 1977): 661–74. Schriffin, Harold. Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. Shen Lu 沈芦. “Jinanju: she zai Xiamen de Zhongguo di yi ge qiaowu jiguan” 暨南局：设在厦门的中国第一个侨务机关 [The Jinan Bureau: Xiamen’s First Overseas Chinese Bureau]. Xiamen wenshi ziliao 厦门文史资料, no. 13 (April 1988): 13–21. Shi Xueqin 施雪琴. “Nanyang minqiao jiuxiang yundong yu Zhanglong lu chuan jihua” 南洋民桥救乡运动与漳龙路矿运动 [The Village Assistance Movement of the Southeast Asian Overseas Chinese of South Fujian and the Zhang-long railroad and mining plan]. Nanyang wenti yanjiu 南洋问题研究, no. 4 (1995): 46–50. United States Department of State. Records of the Department of State relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910–1929. Washington, D.C.: National Archives, 1960. Wilbur, C. Martin. Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. Williams, Lea E. Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1916. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960. Xiamen huaqiao zhi bianzuan weiyuan hui 厦门华侨志编纂委员会. Xiamen huaqiao zhi 厦门华侨志 [The Gazetteer of Xiamen’s Overseas Chinese]. Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe, 1991.

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Yeh, Wen-hsin, ed. Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976. ———. A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia, 1800–1911. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986. Zeng Yanding 曾沿丁. “Zhuang Yin’an shilue” 庄银安事略 [A Record of Zhuang Yin’an’s Life]. Xiamen wenshi ziliao 厦门文史资料, no. 18 (October 1991): 79–82. Zhang Yongfu 张永福. Nanyang yu chuangli minguo 南洋与创立民国 [The Southern Seas and the Foundation of the Republic]. Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1933. Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushi nian wenxian bianzuan weiyuan hui 中华民国开 国五十年文献编纂委员会. Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushi nian wenxian 中华 民国开国五十年文献 [Essays on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Republic of China]. Taibei: Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushi nian wenxian bianzuan weiyuan hui, 1969.

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9 PATRIOTIC CHINESE WOMEN: FOLLOWERS OF SUN YAT-SEN IN DARWIN, AUSTRALIA Julia Martinez This chapter examines the lives of the young men and women who organized the Darwin Branch of the Kuomintang (KMT) during the 1920s and 1930s, in particular looking at the role of Chinese women in politics. The influence of Sun Yat-sen in the Nanyang was most obvious during the period when the children of the 1911 Revolution were of an age to take up his aim of making a modern Chinese community. In 1925, when Sun Yat-sen died, the executive members of the Darwin KMT were aged between twenty and thirty. They were well-known figures in this small northern Australian port-town that boasted a Chinese population of some 400 people. If we were to judge by the surviving photographs there was a certain glamour about the members of the KMT. They dressed in the fashionable western clothes of the time. The men were physically fit, being keen promoters of sports. They were well-educated, in both English and Chinese, and were eloquent public speakers on matters of local, national and international significance. They were, one might argue, the embodiment of Sun Yat-sen’s modern young Chinese. In this 1930 wedding photograph (see Figure 9.1), we can see Chin Mon Di, the president of the Darwin KMT wearing the twelve-pointed white sun on his lapel. To the right of the bridegroom is Gee Ming Ket, secretary of KMT until 1930. To the left of the bride is Selina Hassan (nee Lee), secretary of KMT after 1930. 200

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Figure 9.1 Wedding of Gee Ming Ket and Selina Hassan

Source: Wedding Group, PH0238/2055, Spillet Collection, Northern Territory Library.

Like Sun Yat-sen, and many other Nanyang Chinese, the young Chinese in Darwin were nominal Christians. 1 There had been a shift towards Christianity in Darwin during the 1920s. In the 1911 census, most Chinese gave their religion as Confucianism but by 1933 only 4 per cent followed Chinese traditions, though it was common for people to attend both church and temple.2 One example of this change was that some KMT members were married in the Catholic Church with executive members acting as best man and speech-giver.3 The majority of the KMT officials spoke Cantonese with families originating from Guangdong and Hong Kong, while dialect groups included Hakka, Sze Yap and Heung-san.4 Not all Chinese in Darwin supported the KMT. The older Chinese merchants belonged to the Wah On Society which survived into the 1930s as a rival group to the KMT. In many cases it was their children who were members of the new KMT. The KMT was first established in Australia in Sydney in 1920.5 By 1927, they claimed that 80 per cent of adult Chinese residents in Australia were financial members of the KMT and by 1929 there were forty branches throughout Australia.6 The Darwin branch was established on 5 May 1924. Prior to this, in December 1923, a Chinese Recreation Club was established according to the agenda laid out for the Chinese Nationalist Party in 1921

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in which the KMT supported a programme of physical fitness for Chinese citizens. Their goal was to “help the physical development of such residents by establishing gymnasiums and encouraging other forms of physical exercise”.7 An emphasis on youth sporting associations was a common factor in nationalist programmes of this era as it encouraged strong citizens and a sense of group identity. The president of the Recreation Club was Gee Ming Ket who went on to become secretary of the KMT. His role was political even in 1923. When the Darwin Town Council attempted to ban the Chinese from using community sporting facilities, Gee Ming Ket spoke out publicly in the local newspaper in support of the rights of Chinese residents.8

Women in Politics after the 1911 Revolution One of the most challenging areas of social and political reform facing China and the Nanyang as a result of Sun Yat-sen’s Revolution was the role of Chinese women and the idea that they be allowed to take a more active part in society and in politics. One of Sun Yat-sen’s three principles was that of moving China towards democracy. If we take democracy to include equal rights for all citizens, then support for women in politics should have been a central part of his plans. But in 1911, in most of the modern world, the notion of democracy did not include equal rights for women. For example, Britain did not allow women the vote until 1918. Even so, the seeds of change were evident even on the eve of the Chinese Revolution. For those Chinese living in Darwin, news of China included the message that there was a role for women in politics. In 1912, the Northern Territory Times referred to a group of Chinese women in Shanghai, described as the “Lady Republicans”, organizing the first women’s political fund-raising event.9 In 1913, the newspaper likened educated Chinese women who were politically active to the suffragettes in England. 10 And these activities by women increased by the end of the decade. As Anthony Sweeting notes, there was an increased “feminism in China and Hong Kong stimulated especially amongst the educated classes during the ‘May Fourth’ period”.11 In 1924, Sun Yat-sen established the Central Women’s Department of the KMT, with feminist He Xiangning taking a leading role in its organization. This department was aimed at encouraging Chinese women to support social change and to become teachers.12 According to Louise Edwards, shortly before his death in 1925, when Sun Yat-sen was preparing for the National Assembly he was lobbied by the Women’s National Assembly Promotion Association (WNAPA), a United Front organization based in Shanghai, to include women in the Assembly. Following the National Assembly, it

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was reported that women had declared that: “We women ought to liberate ourselves from our prison of darkness now.”13 Xiang Jingyu, who led the WNAPA, was a CCP member who believed that gender equality required the unity of all oppressed groups. Unfortunately, her political career came to an abrupt end when she was executed on 1 May 1928 during a CCP purge.14 Mary Ann Tétreault notes that after the split with the CCP, the KMT took steps to improve women’s rights, introducing equal inheritance rights and freedom of marriage but after 1934, with a return to Confucian values, these new codes were not enforced. By this time, women who wished to continue their political activism, such as Song Qingling, the widow of Sun Yat-sen, were increasingly turning to CCP women’s groups.15 Certainly, much of the literature on Chinese women’s political role emphasizes the early influence of the CCP, such as Christina Kelley Gilmartin’s Engendering the Chinese Revolution, Communist Politics, and Mass Movements in the 1920s.16 Despite the growing literature on Chinese women in China, the study of Chinese women in politics in the Nanyang has received little attention, perhaps because women represented such a small percentage of the overall Chinese population. But in the northern port of Darwin, a town which does not figure very prominently in the history of Nanyang Chinese, we find an example of a woman who during the 1920s took on a leadership role in the KMT. Lena Pak Fong arrived in Australia in 1924 and following her marriage to Willie Lee became known as Mrs Lena Lee.17 She became the vice-president of the Darwin KMT until her untimely death in 1930. The short life of Lena Lee demonstrates the eagerness with which young Chinese women took up the cause espoused by Sun Yat-sen and the difficulties they faced in challenging old mores. In this chapter I will consider the extent to which Sun Yat-sen’s teaching shaped the lives of these Darwin KMT members, examining their childhood influences and education, their political activities in the 1920s, their views of the role of women, and finally the circumstances surrounding the tragic death of Lena Lee in 1930.

Chinese Education for the Children of the Revolution, 1900–20 Lena Lee was born in Darwin in 1902, named Leena Pak Fong on her birth certificate. In her letters she signed her name Chong Shue Hing. Her father was Chin Yam Yan (or Chin Yim Yin), a prominent Darwin merchant from the Sze Yup region, born in Xui Hi (Sun Woy), Moy See Hing, located to the south of Canton. Lena’s mother was one of his several wives.18

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Despite being born in Australia, Lena grew up in Hong Kong, where she would have had the opportunity to attend a range of girls’ schools given that her father had the funds to support her education. Staci Ford notes that there were three influential girls’ schools which opened in Hong Kong, Ying Wa (1900), St. Stephens (1906) and Diocesan Girls’ School (1913). Sun Yat-sen put the education of Chinese women at the forefront of his national reforms, and even in the later years of the Qing dynasty, there were already moves “to support women’s education for national enlightenment and progress”.19 Historian Barbara James claimed that Lena Lee was educated at the University of Hong Kong (HKU). While clearly her level of education was remarkable for a woman of this period, it is not possible to confirm this claim. In 1921 the first three female students permitted to enroll at the HKU were Rachel Irving, the daughter of Dr E.A. Irving, former Registrar of HKU and Director of Education in the colonial government, and Chinese students Lai Po-cheun who studied medicine, and Irene Cheng.20 In order to have completed her degree in time to return to Australia by early 1924, Lena would have needed to be amongst these first women. It is possible that instead she was educated in Guangdong given that Chinese universities had also opened their doors to women during this period. Certainly if we consider the kind of political atmosphere prevalent in universities during this period, it is not difficult to see how Lena developed her passion for politics. Irene Cheng recalled that in 1923 at HKU, as part of the celebration of the anniversary of the Revolution in 10 October 1911, one of the female students made her “maiden speech on the subject of ‘Patriotic Chinese Women’”.21 Many of the students at HKU were ardent followers of Sun Yat-sen, as demonstrated by the enthusiastic welcome he received when he addressed the HKU Student’s Union in February 1923.22 On her arrival in Australia, Lena’s marriage to Willie Lee in 1924 cemented an alliance between her father and the grandson of his deceased business partner, Lee Hang Gong. This alliance of merchant families represented old China, but the marriage also coincided with the establishment of the Darwin KMT. By marrying into the Lee family, whose youngest members were already politically active, Lena was adding to their political strength. The loyalty which the descendants of Lee Hang Gong felt towards China was not diminished by the fact that Lee Hang Gong had married an English wife, Sarah Bowman. Lee Hang Gong was born in Sung Ding, Canton, and had come to Australia in 1854 during the gold rush. He moved to Darwin later in life as an established merchant. Amongst his many business

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ventures, Lee Hang Gong was also an importer of opium. Lee Hang Gong’s son Arthur, was born in 1867, and was married to a woman from Hong Kong and their son Willie was born in 1887.23 Arthur had a large family and although he owned the Wheel of Fortune tin mine their financial position was always somewhat precarious. Willie’s sister, Selina Hassan (nee Lee) was born in 1901, and was an active member of the KMT, while his brother Arthur Lee (born 1897) was the treasurer and Darwin representative at the 1931 annual conference of the KMT. All the Lee children were born in Darwin but spent the greater part of their childhoods in Hong Kong and China. When Arthur was seven and Selina just three years old the family went to live in Hong Kong. When their father died in 1908, Willie and their mother returned to Darwin, but the three other children, Selina, Arthur and Jack went to live with their father’s second wife in Canton until 1910. Willie, the eldest, had missed out on this opportunity to have a Chinese education and in later years admitted that he was unable to read Chinese. In contrast, by the time Selina returned to live in Darwin, aged ten, she spoke Cantonese as her first language and only a little English. When she turned eighteen Selina Lee was married in Canton to a Muslim man Ali Hassan and they returned to Darwin where he managed the Holmes Butchery.24 Gee Ming Ket (Tommy Ming Ket) who held the position of secretary of the Darwin KMT and later worked as the editor of the KMT’s Sydneybased Chinese Times was a man of considerable eloquence despite his humble beginnings.25 He was born in Darwin just two years before Lena, in 1900. He was the son of Gee Kee Fow, a fisherman from the Daly River, a country area inland from Darwin. Gee Ming Ket was sent to China in 1905 and lived there for six years, before coming back to Darwin on the eve of the 1911 Revolution. As a teenager in Darwin, he worked in modest employment, first as a waiter and then as a tailor. In 1911, the White Australia policy was extended to include the banning of Chinese from various employments. The Fisheries Act was amended making it illegal for Chinese to obtain a fishing license, a move which no doubt left Gee Ming Ket’s father financially vulnerable. At the age of seventeen, Gee Ming Ket returned to China. The conditions imposed by the Department of Immigration were such that he was required to return to Australia within three years.26 During this trip he was married in China, but he was not permitted to bring his wife back to Australia permanently. In later years he unsuccessfully petitioned the Australian Government to alter the immigration restrictions so as to allow his Chinese wife, and those of other Chinese, to visit Australia more frequently.27

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Some of the KMT members attended school in Canton. When Reverend Lo arrived in Darwin from Guangdong province, he went straight to the headquarters of the KMT, being already acquainted with several former students in Darwin who had been educated in Canton.28

Education in the Nanyang in the 1920s Promoting a modern education was a central element of Sun Yat-sen’s plan to modernize China. After the establishment of Sun Yat-sen’s government in Canton in 1923, a bureau was set up to oversee Nanyang Chinese affairs. Wang Gungwu has noted that the strength of the influence of the KMT overseas during the 1920s was largely due to the fact that hundreds of teachers were imported from China to provide a modern education for young Overseas Chinese. Wang Gungwu also points out that it was paradoxical that this teaching, designed to foster loyalty to China, was heavily influenced by western ideas.29 The Darwin KMT executive proudly acknowledged these European influences. Gee Ming Ket, as secretary, described the leaders of the KMT in China as “patriotic men, educated in European Universities”, and argued that if Chinese wanted “prosperity and freedom they must have a unified stable government based on the best European models”.30 Gee Ming Ket, like most of the Darwin KMT, was an Australian-born Chinese and therefore a dual citizen, with loyalties to both China and Australia. As Charlie Houng On, a Darwin KMT member, wrote in 1932, “though we are proud of our Chinese Nationality, and of being members of the oldest civilization that the world has to show, we are also proud of the land of our adoption.”31 After the arrival of Lena Lee in Darwin in 1924 she was put in charge of teaching at the Chinese school. Classes went from seven to eight in the morning after which children were expected to attend the Darwin State School or the Convent school. In the afternoon, Chinese school ran again from four to six and then again after dinner from seven to nine p.m.32 At this time in Darwin the subject of Chinese education was one of considerable controversy for those who believed in a “White Australia”. In 1925 Miss Finniss, daughter of Councillor Finniss, and member of the Anglican Church, helped to organize a petition demanding that the Darwin State School be re-organized so as to separate the white children from the Chinese and Aboriginal children. At the time there were 44 white, 66 Chinese and 11 “quadroon” and “half-caste” students at the school. The petition was refused and a letter from the Administrator of the Northern Territory, Frederick Charles Urquhart, questioned “whether separation as urged by the petitioners

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might not tend to the accentuation of racial differences with unfortunate effects on the general peace”. He argued that this “ingrained prejudice” should not be regarded as a governing factor.33 As a result of these enquiries, the Inspector of Schools, C. L. Fox visited the Chinese school and spoke to Lena Lee. He was very impressed with the diligence of the Chinese children who were attending both schools and reported that he had been told that the Chinese school’s “principal aims are to foster a love of all that is good in the Chinese race and to give the pupils such a knowledge of the Chinese language as will enable them to use it intelligently in business and correspondence conducted with the land of their ancestors”.34 Apparently all the extra tuition paid off as in 1927, one of Lena’s students, Charles Lee won the Northern Territory Scholarship Exam allowing him to attend secondary school in Southport, Queensland. He went on to obtain a Bachelor of Arts from University of Queensland and then entered the Diplomatic Corps and went on the first Australian mission to China.35 Despite this evidence of success, in 1932, Ah Cheong, leader of the Wah On society, asked that the government allow them to import assistants directly from China, stating: It is regretted that the younger Australian born Chinese in Darwin are not proving suitable for responsible employment in this direction because they do not possess the required Chinese education …36

This apparent lack of faith in the Chinese education programme may, of course, been partly the product of the strained relations between the Wah On society and the KMT. On the other hand, Lena Lee clearly had the skills required by the Chinese merchants given that she herself worked as the bookkeeper for the business of Yuen See Kee.

The Politics of Women in the Darwin KMT There is no question that during the 1920s it was men that dominated the KMT in Australia. A 1923 photograph of the officer-bearers of the Chinese Nationalist Party, taken in Melbourne, shows thirty-seven young men and only one woman.37 It is for this reason that the arrival of Lena Lee is so significant. Certainly Gee Ming Ket was an avid supporter of women’s liberation which in his view included supporting their participation in sporting activities. He criticized the more conservative Darwin Chinese in 1929 stating: “They hate to see liberty and freedom being granted to Chinese

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women — they even hate to see Chinese wives and daughters enjoying a little fresh air or outdoor recreation.”38 While it was not usual for older Chinese women in Darwin to take a public role in the community, this did not prevent them from giving their opinion at home. Certainly the older generation women were not afraid to speak out, even in disagreement. According to Henry Lee, adopted son of the Lee family, in 1930 when there were communist-backed unemployment demonstrations, the young men of the Lee family joined in the protest in solidarity with the unionists. Henry recalls that grandmother Lee called the men to return. She was horrified that they chose to support the union, given that the union had refused to support them.39 While it was true that the Chinese were not accepted by all unionists, in fact they were supported by the left-wing unionists in Darwin. In 1928, KMT members interviewed Jock Nelson, the Northern Territory Member of Parliament, in regard to union membership.40 The North Australian Workers Union (NAWU), established in 1927, had refused to grant membership to Chinese workers. When one of the Australian-born Chinese asked why they should be debarred from the union,41 Nelson responded that “if he were dictator he would throw open the union to all Australian born” and that he understood the union was taking a vote to that effect. The motion to include Chinese in the NAWU was rejected with only one-third of members voting in favour of allowing Chinese membership.42 Those that supported the Chinese were the communist members of the NAWU who believed that all should be members “irrespective of color”.43 The support shown to the union by the KMT members in 1930 eventually paid off as by the mid-1930s, the Australian-born Chinese were allowed to join the NAWU. On the question of women’s role in public affairs there was a tendency for the Europeans to assume that the Chinese would be anti-women. Darwin journalist, Jessie Litchfield, recalled that when she applied for the job of editor of Darwin’s Northern Territory Times in 1930, the owner had “pleaded that his typographist was a pure-blooded Chinese, who would object to taking orders from a woman”. She had responded that “Walter was on the Committee of the Kuo Min Tang, which believed in the advancement of women”.44 Certainly at this time there was considerable opposition to the prominent role taken by Lena Lee in Darwin politics coming from the older, more conservative Chinese. A critic in the Northern Standard complained that: the old Conservative Chinese of Darwin will have nothing to do with this association whose chief say-so is a woman. Rightly it is pointed out that these people do not represent Chinese manners and thought”.45

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The irony of this criticism was that the Northern Standard newspaper was owned by the NAWU, a union which professed to a socialist agenda and yet in this instance they are supporting the conservative Chinese. Gee Ming Ket, wrote to the Standard to support Lena, describing her as “a highly respected and very clever lady” and noted that she was their delegate at the recent Nationalist conference in Sydney where she had “acquitted herself with great honour … and was received with the utmost courtesy by the Chinese Consul General and Sydney merchants generally”.46 He noted that extracts from her speech had been published in Chinese newspapers across Australia. Gee Ming Ket continued: Thankful are we that the majority of young Australian-born Chinese are joining our Society but the old Conservative Chinese are naturally opposed to any change. When did the Conservatives of any country do any real and permanent good for the working classes? The Conservative Chinese — like all other Conservatives — hate change. That sort of conservatism has held China in bonds of slavery for centuries.47

The Northern Territory Times published a contribution defending Lena Lee. The author wrote: Believing that the emancipation of her country was imminent, she has fearlessly advocated the absolutely knocking out of foreign capitalists from China. We have lady members of parliament in Australia and the Imperial Parliament possesses nine lady members ... Are these women out of place? If not, what is wrong with a Chinese woman emulating her western sisters and trying to assist her lesser educated brethren? 48

The divide between the Conservatives and the KMT was not only about the issue of a woman as leader. A few months earlier, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Darwin KMT, speeches were made honouring Sun Yat-sen, stating “Let us not forget what our great leader said in his will: ‘The work of the revolution is not yet done.’” We know that early in his life he realized the tyranny under which the Chinese people were being ground. The Manchus who were the rulers of the country paying no thought to the welfare of the people. The more he studied the problem the more he was effected by the existing state of practical slavery of the Chinese people — the real people of the country …49

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This revolutionary talk about slavery in China was quite at odds with the tone and language usually employed by the Chinese merchants of Darwin, who rarely spoke out on matters of politics.

The Death of Lena Lee While it was clear that there was an ideological conflict within the Chinese community in 1929, it is doubtful that any of those involved had anticipated its effect on Lena Lee. She was unable to tolerate what she saw as a shift away from the teachings of Sun Yat-sen. On 20 January 1930, Lena Lee took her own life, drinking an overdose of opium. Her husband Willie Lee told the story at the inquest into her death. He had left early for work, leaving her asleep. About 6.15 a car came to the butcher shop. The driver (Quin Ming), my brother told me my wife was unconscious. I rushed into the car and returned home. I found my wife in bed unconscious. She was fully dressed. My mother and sister were there. There was a smell of opium around the bed. I found a glass with some black fluid in it and a bottle of vinegar. I rang up for the Doctor. … The doctor arrived shortly afterwards. I remained in the room until she died. My wife was not an opium addict. She would have nothing to do with it. In my opinion she must have got the opium from the steamer.50

Her use of opium to commit suicide was unexpected and ironic, given what she stood for. The fact that both her father Yam Yan and the Lee Hang Gong family had been in the business of importing opium made the use of opium something that she was undoubtedly familiar with, but there can be no doubt that she would have strongly disapproved of its continued use in Darwin. Her death was evidently not an accident, nor an act of the moment. It was deliberate and planned. She left two carefully worded letters, one to the KMT and the other to her mother (step-mother) in China. The letters were translated from Chinese by Gee Ming Ket. In writing to the KMT, she revealed the strength of her feelings about the recent changes within the KMT: I as a member have always tried to do my best towards the party but recently as the result of some alteration I am concerned considerably. So therefore I leave this note to inform you our loyal comrades that I will have to depart from you all forever. Those who are intelligent will follow Sun Yet Sen.51

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In the letter to her mother she asked that her mother take the $2,000 that she had owed to her from Ah See and use it for herself. She clearly regretted that she had not been able to return to China, telling her mother that being “so many years parted I hoped from time to time to return”. She does not give her mother a reason for her suicide other than to say that she was “so tired of life”. It should be acknowledged that quite apart from her activities with the KMT, Lena’s life was one of hard work, teaching children, doing bookkeeping and life in the small town of Darwin could not have been easy for her. It was a simple life in terms of material possessions. She lived on the top floor of the Eastern Café in Darwin’s Chinatown with her husband Willie Lee. They shared the house with his brother, Jack Lee, who owned the Eastern Café, and his wife and children. At the age of twenty-eight, she had no children of her own. For a woman of education, her role in the KMT would have been at the central to her reason for living. The response of the Northern Territory Times to her death was evidence of the esteem that she had inspired: The deceased lady was one of the new era ladies of Chinese thought and education and a strong advocate for the emancipation of Chinese womanhood. Her death will leave a gap in the ranks of the Kuo Min Tang which will be hard to fill.52

Her funeral was well-attended and she was interred at the Government Garden cemetery. The ceremony was led by Reverend Stanley Jarvis, who spoke of her as a “Christian Chinese of exceptional education” and praised her for using her abilities “for the advancement of her compatriots”. Wreaths were placed on the grave from the Kuo Min Tang Melbourne and the Headquarters of Kuo Min Tang Sydney. The Sydney Headquarters sent a telegram offering their condolences and stating that the “party loses a loyal, active worker”.53 A few months later, when Amy Johnson, the first person to fly solo from Britain to Australia, landed in Darwin, Gee Ming Ket presented her with a plaque on behalf of the KMT. He wrote on open letter praising her achievements, which also reflects something of his feelings about Lena Lee: … there is a great force in this world … hitherto untried or so hampered in many ways that its best has not come to light. Now we can see that given equal opportunity we can look to women to provide not only the great brain power required in the medical legal political judicial journalist and other fields; but acts of heroism and gallantry … surpassing anything of the kind recorded by either sex in the history of the world.54

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In 1931 at the Nationalist Annual conference, Lena’s brother-in-law, Arthur Lee, was sent as the delegate from Darwin. The conference was opened by a Special Commissioner from Nanking and delegates were present from New Zealand, Fiji, Solomon Islands, and most states of Australia. In recognition of Lena Lee’s work, the chairman spoke of her as “an able and loyal member whose death was a great loss”. According to the report in the Northern Standard, the “meeting stood in silence with bowed heads in memory of the late Sun Yat Sen and Mrs Lee”.55 As for the hostility between the White Australian officials and the KMT, that was less evident after her death. At a KMT celebration in 1931 to mark the 20th anniversary of the Chinese Republic, the Administrator of the Northern Territory, Colonel Robert Weddell, gave his approval to the KMT, stating: He had been asked why should the Australian born Chinese have such a society as the Kuo Min Tang and he had replied that just as the English had their society of St. George, the Irishman the Hibernian Society and the Scotchman the Caledonian Society, so should the Chinese be entitled to have their society and he hoped the Kuo Min Tang will continue to flourish …

The Mayor, J. Brogan, also attended the celebration. During the proceedings the Chinese sang the Chinese National Anthem and the chairman, Chin Mon, made a speech, stating that … exactly 20 years ago, the great Republic of China came into being, and the richest and most populous country in the world, broke the chains of slavery and oppression it had endured for so many centuries, and set its people on the high road to peace, prosperity, and equality among the other nations of the world.

His speech was translated into English by Selina Hassan for the benefit of the non-Chinese audience.56 If the Darwin KMT had lost Lena Lee as its female representative, then Selina Hassan was stepping up to ensure that women were still represented. In a photograph taken during the 1933 visit to the Darwin KMT by the Chinese Consul to Australia, Dr Chen, Selina Hassan sits by his side. Despite these fine speeches, however, there was still a great deal of conflict within the KMT, both in Darwin and in Sydney, conflict which reflected the ongoing troubles in China. In 1932, the KMT was taking

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steps to curb criticisms from both the communist-leaning Chinese and the more conservative Chinese. By this time, Gee Ming Ket was working in Sydney as the editor of the KMT Chinese Times. John Fitzgerald in his book Big White Lie mentions Gee Ming Ket in the context of his discussion of the persecution of Vivian Chow. Fitzgerald describes Chow as “heir to a Chinese Masonic lineage” and a man who was proud of the Chinese Australian role in the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. 57 After 1928, as editor of United China Magazine, an Australian-Chinese paper published in Shanghai, Chow was critical of the nationalist government. When Chow returned to Australia in 1932 the Chinese consul-general tried to have him deported. The Sydney KMT members were hostile towards Chow, counting it among their duties to inform on those Chinese-Australians who criticized the nationalist government. According to Chow, Gee Ming Ket, in his new role as a Sydney KMT officer, was amongst those who hounded him for his Communist leanings.58 In 1932 there were also hostilities between the Wah On Society and the Darwin KMT. After a partial victory of the Chinese over the Japanese, the KMT executive asked the Wah On Society to celebrate with flags and firecrackers. Chin Ack Ming, manager of Fang Chong Loong and secretary of the Wah On Society, responded stating that: “we were in Australia and not in China, and members did not like to fly flags on business premises as there was a lot of Japanese in town.”59 On behalf of the KMT, Chin Mon Di responded that, “In future any motions decided by the K.M.T. are for uniting the Chinese and you must not think otherwise, and you must carry [them] out without alteration.” As a result of this, a meeting was called but the meeting quickly degenerated into a brawl, with punches being thrown between the members of the two societies. During the subsequent Darwin Police Court hearing, the Wah On Society was described as a society of which all Chinese were members, which conducted affairs with the Joss House, and engaged in philanthropic activities, such as sending the bones of the deceased back to China and housing the elderly. The Kuomintang on the other hand was described as having political objectives with some thirty members. It was stated that no Chinese merchants were members of the Darwin KMT, even though they were members of the KMT of China. According to Willie Lee, at least part of the provocation to fight had come about after Lee Cheong Kwong had made comments about his late wife Lena Lee. Lee Cheong Kwong had reminded Willie Lee of the time when Lena Lee had been telling the Wah Oh Society to “Do this and do

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that”. Understandably sensitive to the renewal of this argument, Willie Lee had offered to fight Lee Cheong Kwong but his mother and Albert Fong held him back. In any case, the meeting erupted in fighting resulting in several KMT members being charged with assault. Albert Fong Yuen gave evidence in court confirming that, “A few years ago, when Mrs. Lee was secretary she said in future the K.M.T. and Wah On had to do their own business. Why we are here to-day is to discuss K.M.T. matters again.”60 It is clear that the antagonism faced by Lena Lee in her role in the KMT was not merely as a result of her being a woman. The divisions between the Wah On Society and the KMT were broader in scope. It is also important to recognize that even while Lena Lee was lauded as a loyal KMT member, she had also voiced her disquiet over the changes in the KMT, a disquiet which was strong enough to make her decide to take her own life. Despite these doubts, as a patriotic Chinese woman, she remained loyal to Sun Yatsen to the end. Despite being born in Australia, her loyalty to China was based on the fact that she had spent most of her life in China, had been educated in China (or Hong Kong) and had spent only the last six years of her life in Australia. Her life in Australia was dominated by continuing the work of the 1911 Revolution and bringing this message to a new generation of Nanyang Chinese.

Notes 1

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Dr T.P. Woo, from Hong Kong, speaking in Sydney, Northern Standard, 11 March 1927. Diana Giese, Beyond Chinatown: Changing perspectives on the Top End Chinese experience (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 1995), pp. 43–44. Northern Standard, 12 January 1926, 17 April 1931. Giese, Beyond Chinatown, p. 43. Shirley Fitzgerald, Red Tape, Gold Scissors: The story of Sydney’s Chinese (Sydney: State Library of New South Wales Press, 1997), pp. 113–14. “The Chinese Question”, Adelaide Observer, reprinted in the Northern Standard, 28 January 1927; Letter to the Editor, Northern Standard, 18 October 1929. Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Chinese Nationalist Party of Australasia, 1921, cited in C.F. Yong, The New Gold Mountain: The Chinese in Australia, 1901–1921 (Richmond, South Australia: Raphael Arts, 1977), p. 268. “Soccer Football”, Northern Territory Times, 28 December 1923. Northern Territory Times, 16 February 1912, p. 3.

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Northern Territory Times, 17 August 1913, p. 7. Sweeting cited in Staci Ford, “Women, Gender, and HKU”, in An Impossible Dream: Hong Kong University from Foundation to Re-establishment, 1910–1950, edited by Chan Lau Kit-ching & Peter Cunich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 125. Helen Rappaport, “He Xiangning”, in Encyclopedia of Women Social Reformers, Volume One (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2001), p. 292. Cited in Louise Edwards, Gender, Politics, and Democracy: Women’s Suffrage in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 158. Ibid., p. 149. Mary Ann Tétrault, Women and revolution in Africa, Asia and the New World (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), p. 140. Christina Kelley Gilmartin’s Engendering the Chinese Revolution: Communist Politics, and Mass Movements in the 1920s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). Northern Territory Times, 7 May 1929. Barbara James, No Man’s land: Women of the Northern Territory (Sydney: Collins Publishers Australia, 1989), p. 122. Staci Ford, “Women, Gender, and HKU”, in An Impossible Dream, p. 121. Ford, “Women, Gender, and HKU”, in An Impossible Dream, pp. 123–24. Irene Cheng, “Women Students and Graduates”, in University of Hong Kong: The First 50 Years, 1911–1961, edited by Brian Harrison (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1962), p. 151. Brian Harrison, “The Years of Growth”, in University of Hong Kong: The First 50 Years, p. 52. Selina Hassan (nee Lee), Transcript of Interview with Barbara James, 1979, NTRS 226, TS 236, Northern Territory Archives Service. Selina Hassan (nee Lee), Transcript. John Fitzgerald, Big White Lie: Chinese Australians in White Australia (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2007), p. 150. Certificate of Exemption from Dictation Test — Ming Ket, E752 1917/25, National Archives of Australia (NAA). “No Progress, North Australia”, Brisbane Courier, 20 June 1929, p. 19. Giese, Beyond Chinatown, p. 17. Wang Gungwu, Community and Nation: China, Southeast Asia and Australia (Kensington: Asian Studies Association of Australia with Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp. 33–35. Northern Standard, 11 October 1929. Charlie Houng On to Minister for the Interior, 5 July 1932, A1/1 32/2186, NAA. Henry Lee, Transcript of Interview with S. Saunders, 1981, NTRS 226, TS261, Northern Territory Archives Service (NTAS), Darwin.

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Urquhart to Secretary, Home and Territories Dept., 8 September 1925, A1/15 38/10188, NAA, Canberra. Cited in Timothy G. Jones, The Chinese in the Northern Territory (Darwin: Charles Darwin University Press, 2005), p. 104. Ibid. Ah Cheong and other Chinese residents to H. Nelson, 15 August 1932, Al/l 38/2599, NAA. Yong, The New Gold Mountain, p. 155. Northern Standard, 11 October 1929. S. Saunders, Interview with Henry Lee, 9 April 1981, NTRS 226 TS 261, p. 18, NTAS. Nelson in CPD, vol. 120, House of Representatives, 14 March 1929, p. 1254; Letter from Nelson, 1925, MS 1009, 25/3503, Latham Papers, National Library of Australia. Northern Territory Times, 25 September 1928. Workers’ Weekly, 13 April 1928. Andrew Markus, “Talka Longa Mouth”, in Who Are Our Enemies? Racism and the Australian Working Class, edited by A. Curthoys and A. Markus (Sydney: Hale & Ire monger, 1978), pp. 147–48. Jessie Litchfield, “Press Collect”, unpublished manuscript, Litchfield Paper, MS 132, p. 2, National Library of Australia. Northern Standard, 8 October 1929. “The Kuo Ming Tang”, Northern Standard, 11 October 1929, p. 7. Ibid. “Kuo Ming Tang”, Northern Territory Times, 11 October 1929, p. 3. Northern Territory Times, 7 May 1929, p. 5. “Inquest on Mrs Lena Lee”, Northern Territory Times, 24 January 1930, p. 6. Ibid. Northern Territory Times, 21 January 1930, p. 2. Ibid. James, No Man’s Land, p. 119. Northern Standard, 17 February 1931. “20th Anniversary of Chinese Republic”, Northern Standard, 13 October 1931. Fitzgerald, Big White Lie, p. 149. Ibid., pp. 149–50. Members of the KMT in 1932 were Chin Mon Di, president; Selina Hassan, secretary; Committee members included Arthur Lee, Yee Hong On, Lew Wah, Leung Soo, and Leung Sing. “Darwin Police Court”, Northern Standard, 8 April 1932. Northern Standard, 12 April 1932, p. 4.

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References “20th Anniversary of Chinese Republic”. Northern Standard, 13 October 1931. Cheng, Irene. “Women Students and Graduates”. In University of Hong Kong: The First 50 Years, 1911–1961, edited by Brian Harrison. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1962. “Darwin Police Court”. Northern Standard, 8 April 1932. Edwards, Louise. Gender, Politics, and Democracy: Women’s Suffrage in China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008. Fitzgerald, John. Big White Lie: Chinese Australians in White Australia. Sydney: UNSW Press, 2007. Fitzgerald, Shirley. Red Tape, Gold Scissors: The Story of Sydney’s Chinese. Sydney: State Library of New South Wales Press, 1997. Ford, Staci. “Women, Gender, and HKU”. In An Impossible Dream: Hong Kong University from Foundation to Re-establishment, 1910–1950, edited by Chan Lau Kit-ching and Peter Cunich. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Giese, Diana. Beyond Chinatown: Changing Perspectives on the Top End Chinese Experience. Canberra: National Library of Australia, 1995. Gilmartin, Christina Kelley. Engendering the Chinese Revolution: Communist Politics, and Mass Movements in the 1920s. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. Harrison, Brian. “The Years of Growth”. In University of Hong Kong: The First 50 Years, 1911–1961, edited by Brian Harrison. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1962. “Inquest on Mrs Lena Lee”. Northern Territory Times, 24 January 1930, p. 6. James, Barbara. No Man’s Land: Women of the Northern Territory. Sydney: Collins Publishers Australia, 1989. Jones, Timothy G. The Chinese in the Northern Territory. Darwin: Charles Darwin University Press, 2005. “Kuo Ming Tang”. Northern Territory Times, 11 October 1929, p. 3. Litchfield, Jessie. “Press Collect”. Unpublished manuscript. National Library of Australia. Litchfield Paper, MS 132, p. 2. Markus, Andrew. “Talka Longa Mouth”. In Who Are Our Enemies? Racism and the Australian Working Class, edited by A. Curthoys and A. Markus. Sydney: Hale & Ire monger, 1978. “No Progress, North Australia”. Brisbane Courier, 20 June 1929, p. 19. Northern Standard, 12 January 1926; 8 October 1929; 11 October 1929; 18 October 1929; 17 February 1931; 17 April 1931; 12 April 1932, p. 4; Northern Territory Times, 16 February 1912, p. 3; 17 August 1913, p. 7; 25 September 1928; 7 May 1929; 21 January 1930, p. 2. Rappaport, Helen. “He Xiangning”. In Encyclopedia of Women Social Reformers, Volume One. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2001.

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“Soccer Football”. Northern Territory Times, 28 December 1923. Tétrault, Mary Ann. Women and Revolution in Africa, Asia and the New World. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994. “The Chinese Question”. Adelaide Observer, reprinted in the Northern Standard, 28 January 1927. “The Kuo Ming Tang”. Northern Standard, 11 October 1929, p. 7. Wang Gungwu. Community and Nation: China, Southeast Asia and Australia. Kensington: Asian Studies Association of Australia with Allen & Unwin, 1992. Workers’ Weekly, 13 April 1928. Yong, C. F. The New Gold Mountain: The Chinese in Australia, 1901–1921. Richmond, South Australia: Raphael Arts, 1977.

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PART III Reports/Remembrances of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution

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10 (GRAND)FATHER OF THE NATION? COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF SUN YAT-SEN IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA Ceren Ergenc

Introduction Reform and opening up in 1978 was a starting point for China to change its economic and social system gradually. This gradual change brought about certain political changes as well. When Deng Xiaoping initiated the reforms that transformed economic and social structure of China, he refrained from identifying the ideological orientation of the process. However, it soon turned out that it actually mattered “if the cat was black or white” because the structural changes that the country going through was changing the identity of its people as well. The transformation that the state and society were going through required identifying the sources of this new identity, and both the ruling elite and the community influentials in the society got engaged in an ongoing search for different symbols that would legitimize the new order. Ideologies such as liberal Westernism, schools of thought such as Confucianism, historical periods such as Ming dynasty or Republican era are among the many to serve as a source for the collective identity of Chinese state and people in the making. 221

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These changes in the state structure and society required a re-evaluation of values to associate with. While some of these values were new to China, either imported as a policy or as an inevitable result of increasing interaction with the outside world, some other sources of legitimacy for the new regime were to be found in its own past. Selective remembering and interpretation of history becomes not history as documented but collective memory as a source of contemporary values and identifications. When old ideals are abandoned, collective memory provides values people can identify with. Selectivity of what to remember helps justification of the new orders and mindsets. There are two simultaneous challenges that the new government face: (1) how to legitimately incorporate the “continuities and discontinuities” (Aguliar 2002) of Mao era in their new identity; (2) how to fill the vacuum that the absence of the image of Mao Zedong in the collective consciousness. While Mao’s place in the new order is more or less “engineered” by the new decision-making elite, there is a marketplace of historical figures and ideas for alternatives to a national leader. Moreover, making of this collective memory is no longer monolithic. Along with the governing elite, the intellectual elite, community influentials and even local communities intentionally or unintentionally participate in construction of a new collective memory of reform China. Sun Yat-sen is one of the historical figures that come to mind in search for a past national leader to collectively identify with. Whether Sun Yat-sen will replace Mao Zedong as a national symbol capable of unifying state and society in reform China is a too complicated question to lend itself to dichotomic answers. There is the complex interaction of different factors that brings Sun Yat-sen back as a source of legitimacy. Therefore, understanding the interaction of these factors with one another and with the broader trends in Chinese society would help us understand the reasons why Sun Yat-sen might or might not appear as a strong historical image in reform China. There are different factors in contemporary China that supports the memory of Sun Yat-sen as a nation-wide historical figure and these factors will be examined in the following section. However, this chapter argues that what determines prospects of Sun Yat-sen’s memory is not the incentives behind such a social construction but the agents and means of this construction. That is, national memories at times are constructed and imposed in a top-down fashion by the central government agencies or officials at any level but they must be positively received and accepted by the society as a whole or parts of it. Alternatively, vernacular or local memories challenge or modify the more visible top-down versions. The result

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is almost always an amalgamation of the official and bottom-up memory constructions. In Sun Yat-sen’s case, his memory image is not fully accepted by Chinese society, not because of the negative input by some non-officials actors (such as Taiwanese internet media, as will be explained in the following sections) but by the fact that the dominant representation of Sun Yat-sen in contemporary memory realms remains too elite and disconnected. In the following section I will briefly examine the reasons why Sun Yatsen’s memory may or may not be politically relevant for contemporary China. After clarifying the political background the agents of memory operate, I will describe the realms of memory with specific examples of how different processes are at work.

Why Sun Yat-sen’s memory is politically relevant for Contemporary China? There are economic, ideological and collective psychological reasons that create an environment conducive to the rise of Sun Yat-sen’s image. When Deng Xiaoping announced the new era, the reform cadres had limited vision about what the next step would be. Restrained by both discrepancies between China’s realities and Western capitalist model as well as criticisms they face from native conservative forces for distorting country’s ideology, Deng “groped for” not only different economic models but new sources of legitimacy that would support his new project as well. The livelihood principle of Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People provided Deng with a historically justified economic model. The economic model Sun proposes draws significant parallelisms with the form of state capitalism Deng had in mind in the 1980s. Therefore, 1980s witnessed Deng publicly mentioning Sun’s name every time he felt he did not have the elite support required to implement reformist policies. Similarly, intellectual elite rediscovered Sun Yat-sen as a potential historical figure when they were in search for a new theme that they could safely enjoy the academic and intellectual freedom they recently won in the reform era (see the section on academic writing on Sun Yat-sen in reform era). In the 1990s, politically speaking, Sun Yat-sen maintained the positive image he obtained in Deng’s era. Jiang Zemin as the successor of Deng Xiaoping, wanted to surpass Sun Yat-sen and Deng as an ideologue, but he still felt the necessity to refer to Sun while claiming superiority to him. When his aides announced the Three Representatives, they repeatedly emphasized how the Three Representatives is both inspired by the Three Principles but is also free from the flaws of it.

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Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People served other sentiments in contemporary China as well. Three decades of reform era witnessed different versions of nationalism and the Nationalism principle and other writings of Sun Yat-sen provided theoretical ground for all these different interpretations. The anti-Manchu feeling Sun Yat-sen propagated for generated support for his anti-Qing uprisings throughout China prior to the 1911 Revolution. Later, his formulation of Chinese nation composed of five ethnicity which laid the foundations of modern Chinese nation-state. Han nationalism and the status of minorities are still based on the same understanding of Chineseness. In the 1980s, reformist, developmentalist patriotism was dominant in Chinese intellectual circles and public opinion. This worldview was based on modernization through westernization and therefore found Sun’s anti-feudal rhetoric compatible with its own. Sun Yat-sen’s western education and both his writings that condemns Chinese imperial tradition as the source of old China’s backwardness and his policies and projects to modernize the army, railroads, education provided a legitimate reference point for the intellectuals of the 1980s. This can be seen in the academic writings but also in the media that has broader reach in public. This included popular press publishing the complete works of Sun Yat-sen or references to Sun in the famous documentary called “River Elegy” that pioneers the western orientation of the 1980s. The rapid recovery and success in the 1980s generated a commonly shared sense of proud and self-centred patriotism (Gries 2001). This shared sense of proudness produced a victor discourse (Volkan 1997) that easily incorporated Sun Yat-sen’s rhetoric. The 1990s witnessed a reversal of the western orientation of the 1980s due to both increasing confidence in the “Chinese way” and disappointment with the perceived negative attitude of the western countries towards China. Public opinion dropped the victor discourse of the previous decade and adopted a victim discourse that focuses on the humiliation and oppression from outsiders. That developed a xenophobic and aggressive nationalism (Gries 2001; Fewsmith 2008). Western orientation of the 1980s was perceived as submission to western imperialism and was dismissed. Sun Yat-sen’s modernization project was also dismissed by association. New government rhetoric that emphasized a system “with Chinese characters” also triggered dismissal of westernization projects. One area that welcomed Sun Yat-sen’s thought was cross-strait relations. Chinese official stance and public opinion viewed Taiwan as separated from mainland China by western imperialism in the aftermath of World War II. Sun Yat-sen is known to be an anti-imperialist figure in China’s

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republican history and his place in popular imagination is conducive to such identification. Sympathy felt for Sun’s anti-imperialist cause has been an important factor in cross-strait relations. Since Sun Yat-sen was also seen as the father of the nation in Taiwan, mainland decision-makers thought this common point as a unifying factor between Chinese and Taiwanese public opinion. This cultural strategy worked until Taiwanese politics made a sharp turn away from emphasizing its Chineseness. Last but not the least, the country, particularly the governing elite in their regime legitimacy anxiety, are in search for a new, “charismatic” leader when the Mao cult as the “savior of the nation” was denounced. Mao Zedong had been defined as the leader around whom the whole country was united. The often negative record of the Mao period and the de-emphasis of Marxist-Leninist ideology and consequently Mao Zedong Thought after the opening up have weakened Mao’s image as the virtuous leader. However, he continues to be the symbol that unifies the whole country because of the residual strength of popular mobilization during the communist period. Mao’s decreased political relevance has changed the nature of Mao’s symbol: the last decades of transition to a market society have transformed Mao Zedong from a distant political leader to a pop cultural cult and object of specific “memory” industry (Barme 1996).1 Although the popular salience of the image of Mao Zedong still secures certain degree of political influence, several other historical figures appear to be alternatives. Sun Yat-sen, being one of them is gradually rising in the official and elite discourse as an alternative national symbol. The 1911 Revolution is regarded not as a rival but complementary event to the 1949 Revolution; and Sun Yat-sen who had been a depoliticized historical figure, is implicitly suggested as a national leader around whom more people in contemporary China could agreeably gather than those that would do for Mao.

Why is Sun Yat-sen’s memory not politically relevant for Contemporary China? The public sphere in reform China hosts a multitude of collective memory images that can serve as historical identifications. Sun Yat-sen appears to be one among many with occasional highlights and comebacks. There are several reasons why the memory of Sun Yat-sen might not triumph over others in the market place of images. One of the reasons lies inherent in the very nature of collective memory in contemporary Chinese society. The multiplicity of inputs that are

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interacting in the public space does not allow any one of them to dominate the transformation monolithically. Unlike the previous era where all the intervening factors has to be tested against the Mao Zedong Thought, reform era enjoys “islands” of ideologies and actors. Similarly, the political culture of the reform era has changed parallel to the institutional changes. Generational change in party cadres, professionalization of bureaucracy and separation of powers (Fewsmith 2008) have led to depersonalization of politics. Even though younger generation of leaders feel the necessity of legitimacy that the legacy of a historical charismatic leader would provide for them, Chinese society grew out of the hierarchical political community that it was during the Mao era. Accompanied with the increasing individualism and political atomization of Chinese youth, the new dynamics of Chinese society would not lend themselves to mass mobilization in the name of a historical leader. Apart from the political psychological reasons, international politics also downplayed Sun’s emerging role in contemporary China. De-Sinification of Taiwanese politics in post-Chiang era challenged the memory of Sun Yat-sen as the father of the nation in Taiwan. Since the main purpose of focusing on Sun Yat-sen was to be on the same page with Taiwan, when Taiwan denounced Sun Yat-sen, the point was lost for mainland politicians as well. This is a brief review of arguments. Now let’s look at the complex network of factors.

How Sun Yat-sen’s memory is worked into China’s collective consciousness? Collective memory is the recollections a particular community, be it a family, dialogue group, ethnic/religious community, nation, or (parts of ) international society, of a past event or era. Collective memory is the remembrance of not what actually had happened, but how what happened is reflected in memories as they were shared, passed on and also constructed by the contemporary societies. History is only a part of collective memory, and not necessarily the most important one at all times. It is important to highlight this point because the term “memory” does not readily reveal the contemporariness of the concept. Collective memory, in essence, takes the terms and the concepts of the individual psychology and applies them to a society. As a result, the terms are transferred, but the meaning is not really the same. Individual memory is a memory in its most traditional sense, that is, what a person remembers from the past. Even though it is subject to change and reinterpretation in time, it

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does not lose its link to the individual and turn into a rhetoric. Collective memory is not really a memory in this sense, it is called a “memory” of the society, but for each individual in this society, this consists of what they learn by being a part of this particular society. So, for individuals, it is their knowledge base, it is what they know, or what they think they know, not what they remember. In the collective memory, history is not preserved as such, but is a representation of the present. That is, there are three types of memory: memory as history, memory as narratives about the past, and memory as discourse which reproduces itself relatively autonomously of the historical facts and the people who experienced or transmitted them (Berger 2006).2 Memory-history is the remembrance written by those who experience it; memory-narrative is told and transmitted to the next generations by those who experience it; memory as discourse is now a transgenerational “knowledge” personally. As Confino soundly states, every society sets up images of the past; but the curious question is why some of these images fail and some of them triumph (Confino 1997). As, this statement reveals, collective memory is selective. A social group normally “choose to remember” parts of the common past that correspond with the present-day interests of the perceived selfidentity and “forgets” the rest. Furthermore, according to Halbwachs, the past of a social group is collectively remembered according to social needs of today. In the collective memory, history is not preserved as such, but is a representation of the present. Halbwachs who coined the term “collective memory” for the first time, asserts that the social processes and the social environment influence not only people’s personal memories but also community’s shared memories about the past. Such collective memories are crucial for the formation of the identity of groups such as families, social classes as well as larger entities such as nations. Again, of crucial importance in the construction of the memory of a social group are current social needs and concerns (Halbwachs 1992). They are transmitted across generations and the transmission is done in order to serve contemporary purposes because collective memory studies examine “how the construction of the past, through a process of invention and appropriation, affected the relationship of power within the society” (Hobsbawm 1992). How are the “national” collective memories constructed? Multiple factors perform roles at various levels in the construction of a collective memory. The two levels that collective memory is negotiated back and forth are the official and societal levels. Official narratives shape societal memory through education, the media, and cultural institutions. Society, in return, challenges

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the official narrative through public opinion and the dissenting collective memories. In any case, scholars all agree on the methods of diffusion of the memory. As soon as one takes politics as a project, all the symbols, memories, and dreams for the future of patriotism are open for construction. Construction and interpretation are continuous and interactive rather than being once and for all and one-way processes. The values attached to the symbols, memories and visions of the future are negotiated back and forth between the elite (be it the ruling class or intellectuals) and various parts of society. Individuals in the community receive and reproduce this body of knowledge through rituals (like commemorations), education, the media, places (like museums), and local networks. Collective memory is a mediated action. Its cognition is not coordinated or intentional but socially distributed across the agents and the texts. The contestation over the distribution of visual symbolism takes place in the storage of external memory, such as written texts and designed places (Wertsch 2002, p. 12). As Connerton asserts, no collective memory can exist without reference to a socially specific spatial framework (Connerton 1989, p. 34). Boyarin argues that the body is a dimension of symbolism and memory, the others being time and space. Body politics ranges from personification of nation/country (China as raped woman) to using the body as memory-catalyst in the space, such as statues, monuments erected in the name of a person, pictures, museums, and exhibitions (Boyarin 1994, p. 24). Historical, political and cultural factors interact in the formation of a collective memory. History is a source of collective memory. Events happened and their reminiscences are the primary source of collective memories. In time, the agents of the memory change from the first-hand witnesses of the events to the later generations who grow up with the narratives of the events. When collective memory as history is replaced by collective memory as narrative, Berger argues, a change in the conceptualization of the past events is highly probable because generations living in different social environments conceive the narratives differently (Berger 2006, p. 18). For example, a generation who does not experience war might underestimate the memories of the previous war and could more easily engage into a prowar rhetoric. When “politics is in command”, the state (or, a part of it) reorganizes the narrative according to the domestic and international political environment of the day. Collective memory at this stage is totally transformed into a discourse. While the collective memory of the relevant period sustains a considerable level of continuity, the discourse that is based on this collective memory is open to negotiation and change according to the political needs

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of the day. “Shifts in the constellation of interests of the state will translate into shifts in the official narrative” (Berger 2006, p. 22). In response to domestic or international developments, certain groups in a society might demand alteration of the official narrative or inclusion of their version into it. For example, empowered with the international normative regime of ethnic rights, an ethnic group in a country might demand revision of the official narrative of a past event related to them, and the state, if it has a regime responsive to its citizens, might be forced to modify the narrative even if it is not in accordance with the state interest, per se. Collective memories always change. Sometimes, however, what perseveres prevails over the change for several reasons. Memory of an event might be frozen under a suppressive political regime. Another reason for continuity is historical conditions.

Agents/Levels of Collective Memory in the Construction of Sun Yat-sen’s image There are different levels and agents of collective memory in the construction of Sun Yat-sen’s image in contemporary China. The viability of Sun Yat-sen’s image as a political symbol depends on the power and interaction of these agents unfolded at different levels. The most visible agent is the state. Since the governing elite of the reform era faces legitimacy crisis in the absence of a strong and charismatic leader in transitional times, Sun Yat-sen’s public image is controlled by the top elite. For example, the commemorative speeches about Sun Yat-sen reveal the political orientation of the day. The design of the public spaces also exposes Sun Yat-sen’s position in official history. The state-led collective memory constructs the official discourse on Sun Yat-sen with both domestic and international political concerns. Similar to all official narratives, it is imposed on the public from above. Its reception by public can be positive or negative depending on circumstances and the end result would be an amalgamation of both as a result of this impositionreception/rejection process. A different kind of top-down collective memory construction process is by intellectual elite who shape the public opinion. Public intellectuals, academics, journalists, filmmakers, novelists produce academic, media and literature works to produce certain narratives and images of historical figures, including Sun Yat-sen. These opinion leaders seek different goals when they disseminate popular and semi-popular narratives of Sun Yat-sen. Some of them highlight certain memories to create a particular image of Sun Yat-sen

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and give a public political message through this image. The liberal-minded intellectuals of the 1980s are an example for that. Some other community influentials have professional concerns in mind, such as introducing new literary or visual styles to the art scene in China. In both cases, the versions of collective memory offered by the intellectual elite is a top-down one as the public is located in the position of a passive consumer. Similar to the reception of official narratives, the role public can play is limited to the reception/rejection. There are also bottom-up forces of collective memory which counters these elite level construction of Sun Yat-sen’s image. One of them balances the elite impact with a vernacular impetus coming from the social media and popular literature. The blog and forum posts, internet literature and marketoriented publishing bring in different currents of thought or what would be better received by the average public. Another source that breaks the elite construction comes from the central-local axis. Local communities and the local officials who come from these communities or who feel responsive to their populations bring about memories that reflect the sensitivities of local populations. Local museums are examples of that.

Speeches The government of the PRC has been acknowledging Sun Yat-sen and the Xinhai Revolution since the early years. An official statement was issued for every anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution and Sun Yat-sen’s birthday, and the commemoration of Sun Yat-sen’s decease. The decade turns of these events were celebrated/commemorated at a larger scale than other years, and reflected the current government’s view on the historical importance of Sun Yat-sen and the Xinhai Revolution for contemporary political purposes. The 1950s witnessed two major events related to Sun Yat-sen, one is the 30th commemoration of his passing away in 1955 and the 90th anniversary of his birth. In 1955, Zhou Enlai called him “the great hero of China’s democratic revolution (中国伟大的民主主义革命家)”, and further qualified this title by stating that the PRC elite saw the democratic revolution (read: Xinhai Revolution) as the predecessor of their revolution in terms of patriotism, commitment to independence and struggle (Zhang 2001, p. 60). In 1956, Zhou added more to Sun Yat-sen’s qualities that were appreciated by the leaders of PRC: leading the struggle to overthrow feudalism and imperialism. Zhou also praised Sun for “updating” his original Three

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Principles of People to make it compatible with the Soviet ideology which the ruling elite of the 1950s PRC was also subscribing to. Zhou’s words were in line with the document Mao Zedong published in the same year. Mao emphasized three aspects that made Sun Yat-sen relevant for the day. That Xinhai Revolution was a preparatory stage for the socialist revolution; that Xinhai Revolution prepared grounds for a democratic platform; and that he created an environment conducive for advancement of the socialist revolution by revising his original Three Principles of People in accordance with Soviet advices (以俄为师). Other anniversaries which are of smaller scale than these two trendsetting events, followed the same line with few additions. Among the additions are the contributions of Sun Yat-sen to the economic development of the country, and his support to the independence of Asian nations. The desired re-unification with Taiwan was also grounded in Sun-style patriotism. In the 1960s, Sun Yat-sen’s place in the political/historical discourse was stated again in two major events: 50th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution and 100th anniversary of Sun’s birth. In this decade, however, there was a major change in the way the nomenclature ascribed to him. His democratic revolution which had been seen as a predecessor of the socialist revolution a decade ago was now seen as petit-bourgeois and subscribing to “regressive” methods of a democratic revolution. The achievements of the Xinhai Revolution was also seen under a relatively negative light. It was claimed that the Xinhai Revolution did not have the social forces and inertia to succeed in a real transformation, and it was only carried through with the help of Chinese and Soviet communists. This interpretation was not challenged up until the 1980s. The 1980s witnessed drastic changes in the reading of Sun Yat-sen and the Xinhai Revolution in relation to Chinese past and present. The conference on Sun Yat-sen held as early as 1981 marked almost a paradigm change in the scholarly works regarding Sun and his period. This conference was also a turning point in terms of increasing interactions among scholars from the mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The role of the Xinhai Revolution as the predecessor of the socialist revolution was restored at this time. The 12th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen’s birth in 1986 made clear a new policy: Peng Zhen announced that Sun Yat-sen’s understanding of national unity will be the basis of reform era decision-makers’ new policy towards Taiwan — a rhetoric that has been employed steadily throughout the 1990s as well (Zhang 2001, p. 61).

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Academic Writing During the years from 1949 to 1966, the role of the 1911 Revolution and Sun Yat-sen’s contribution to the 1949 Revolution was at the centre of academic work. During 1976–84. Sun’s Three Principles served as “a bridge” between revolutionary and democratic regimes. Another political incentive was the economic development policy. The years between 1985–90 witnessed broadening of the research realm to psychology and theology. From 1990 to the present, Sun Yat-sen has been recontextualized according to the ideological orientation of the modernization project. In this era, professional incentives replaced political incentives of the previous era. Below is a more detailed analysis of the history of scholarly work on Sun Yat-sen in mainland China. The sources of collective memory vary from formal (official discourse, academic production, loosely defined) to informal (the media, literature, pop culture, loosely defined) and the interaction and contestation among these two loose sets of sources bring about the often complex identification of the society with a historical symbol. The symbolic power of several historical personas at the turn of the twentieth century is contested between academic and popular realms and the meaning attached to the era is produced as a result of this contestation. Even though the scholarly research about the Xinhai Revolution went through phases coloured with different ideologies and scientific paradigms, and therefore served different interpretations of historical personas at several occasions, a certain degree of continuity in interpretation of history was maintained. When a historical TV drama trend started in the broadcast media, some of the productions personified historical figures under a new light according to either political orientation of the production team, market demands, or both. To determine whether it is for market demand or some political agenda, one must look at the case. For example, in the early 2000s, Qing dynasty dramas were popular whereas in the late 2000s plots concerning the Republican era replaced the dynastical soap operas. This change can be explained with market demands, whereas if there is a radically “revisionary” depiction of a historical figure, an event or an era, it can be attributed to the political goals of the production team. These “revisionary” depictions received both positive and negative reactions from both scholarly circles who felt their professional authority is challenged, and from regular audience who felt their established norms and perceptions were challenged. There is a visible contestation between the academic and popular sources of collective memory. An alternative argument

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claims that the contestation is not primarily between the scholarly world and popular culture but between the “elite culture” whose agents, scholars and media producers alike, try to mold the collective memory, and the “vernacular culture” which reacts to modifications in its self-identification (Chen in Müller 2007, p. 27). A recent example of such controversy was about how Li Hongzhang and Empress Cixi as historical figures and the Xinhai Revolution and Sun Yat-sen Thought as historical events and ideologies were represented in a television series called “Towards the Republic” in 2003. The conservative circles were enraged for the positive depiction of Li Hongzhang contrary to the academic tradition; and the liberal circles were enraged when the last episode of the series was banned from airing on CCTV (; Lim 2003). The last episode has a long monologue by Sun Yat-sen on the urgency of democratization, a liberal understanding of rights, and the damage that the corrupt officials made to the system (). Below are two cases that exemplify how collective memory changes. The academic writing demonstrates the changes in the intellectual perceptions, and the interventions to spaces of memory unfold the indirect way collective memory is molded.

Sun Yat-sen Revisited in Academic Literature The research on the 1911 Revolution and Sun Yat-sen has passed through several phases in China.3 After the period of 1949–66, there was a decadelong pause during the Cultural Revolution. The second phase of the research activities started after 1976 and lasted till 1984. The change in the midst of 1980s takes place because of the interaction with the inter-national research community after the reform and opening up of China. The third phase of 1985–90 then gave place to the contemporary era (Wang 1999). The characteristics of these periods are as follows: the focus of the first period was the consolidation of the revolution. Therefore the studies on the 1911 Revolution were also on the role of the 1911 Revolution and Sun Yat-sen’s contribution to the 1949 Revolution. There were two debates at that time: (1) whether Sun Yat-sen proposed a real bourgeois revolution leading to a capitalist state, or if he saw it as a preliminary phase to socialism; (2) whether the construction of the revolutionary ideology was before or after the establishment of the Revolutionary Alliance.4 There was no research during the Cultural Revolution. In the following period, there was a shift from political emphasis (anti-imperialism, anti-

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feudalism, anti-terrorism) to the economic development policy of Sun Yat-sen. Moreover, the Three Principles begun to be interpreted as “a bridge” between revolutionary and democratic regimes. The characteristic of this period is the broadening of the scope of research and specialization. A new generation of historians began to work on detailed subjects, such as the pre1911 Revolution uprisings, the Yuan Shikai era, the 2nd Revolution of 1913, and the United Front. The years 1985–90 witnessed the greatest amount of research on a wide range of topics from Sun Yat-sen’s personal life, background, position and influence on the Three Great Policies, the Principle of Livelihood/Socialism, the Beiyang Army, Sun Yat-sen’s views on Asia and the international predicament China found itself in, his attitude towards Confucianism, towards foreign aid and investment. The reason for that was, after the reform and opening up of China, the historians were able to concentrate on this long-neglected period of history and a series of international conferences were held and a collection of Sun’s works was published. For the fourth period (1991–99), Wang highlights two important points, namely, that works on the 1911 Revolution should be evaluated within the broader context of Chinese history and China’s situation today; and that Sun Yat-sen studies should not be limited to his life since he (or the myth that surrounds him) is highly influential for the following phases of Chinese history. To sum up, the image of Sun Yat-sen has been revisited first in the academic literature, about a decade before the similar kind of change has begun to be observed in other platforms of the public sphere.

The Media/Literature/Internet Towards the Republic (TR) is about the events from late 19th century into the Republican era. It is full of bold characters, heroes and villains. It is also famous for the deleted last scene in which Sun Yat-sen makes a long monologue about how he sees the Revolution. The criticisms embedded in this text also reveals how Sun Yat-sen was depicted and perceived in this era. Sun starts with his worry about the predicament of the country. That they fought for freedom but stuck with corrupt officials; Chinese people deserve freedom and rule of law. That is, there is a not so subtle message to the current regime. Sun Yat-sen is depicted as a benevolent leader in contrast to the current government which is dealing with a major legitimacy crisis

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in the aftermath of SARS handled in a non-transparent and unaccountable fashion. Sun’s criticism towards corrupt officials and factionalism in this deleted last scene can be read as criticism towards the contemporary government. Sun Yat-sen is perceived as a legitimately impartial historical persona to voice these criticisms (at least by the filmmakers, if not the censorship officials — which also makes TR a bottom-up collective memory input. However, still, the image created for Sun Yat-sen is one of an elite, somewhat disconnected from ordinary people). Bodyguards and Assassins (B & A), contrary to TR, tells the story of the 1911 Revolution through the lives of the ordinary people. The plot is about ordinary people who died for the Revolution without even knowing who Sun Yat-sen was or what the Revolution was about. The movie does not have an explicit political message neither for the day nor for today, but it is possible to say that it plainly depicts how ordinary people position themselves vis-à-vis heroes in extraordinary days, in this case, revolutionaries during a revolution. Sun Yat-sen is depicted positively, like a hero, but without the details about what he intended to achieve. However, the tales of ordinary people in the movie give the audience a reference point that they can relate to. In this sense, it is similar to the local museums which will be examined in the following section. A third type of bottom-up collective memory input is different from the first two. The movies TR and B&A, no matter how different their focuses are, are products of intellectual elite whereas internet literature in the form of blog entries or circulated messages are truly vernacular products. An example of these circulated messages is in the form of a puzzle. This puzzle is possibly originated from Taiwan after the start of the de-Sinification movement. These anecdotes and comics depict Sun Yat-sen not through his political achievements or thoughts but personal life and implies a personal history that Chinese society traditionally would not approve. The recipients of these virtual messages are mostly the same group with the movies described above: urban educated youth. They are exposed to mixed messages and respond responsively, bringing about an amalgamated imagination.

Museums There are many museums on Sun Yat-sen, some of them are national museums reinforcing official discourses such as Nanjing Museum, Nanjing Sun Yat-sen Museum and Tiananmen Square on National Days as a public

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space; and some of them represent particular or popular priorities such as Beijing Song Qing-ling Museum, Zhongshan Museum and Macao Museum. Below is a description of some of them.

Tiananmen Square Tiananmen Square has always been one of the most politically important spaces in China since it was built during the Ming dynasty in the early 15th century. Not only its existence but also the parts and pieces of the space have had symbolic state significance. Tiananmen Square had been designed as a space for royal symbolism, and has remained mainly as a space for state actions. However, from time to time, it has turned out to be a public space for the masses to express themselves. To conclude, Tiananmen Square is a collective symbol of legitimacy in China. This symbolism has both temporal and spatial dimensions: temporally, whatever happens in the Square means something; spatially, whatever is placed on the Square means something. Hanging portraits on the main gate of the Forbidden City has been a symbolism commonly used in Chinese politics since the 1949 Revolution. As it is known, there is a portrait of Mao Zedong. Few would have doubts about what this picture symbolizes. Along with Mao Zedong, Marx, Engels, Stalin, and Lenin’s portraits were hung since the founding years of the People’s Republic as a sign of their ideological solidarity. Stalin and Lenin’s portraits were removed during the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s. Marx and Engels’ kept their places until 1989 in which the new ideological orientation was consolidated. Since the late 1990s, on National Days and Workers’ Days, Sun Yat-sen’s portrait, which is in the same artistic style and in the same size with Mao’s, has been placed on the northernmost end of Tiananmen Square, symmetrically facing Mao’s portrait, with a slogan calling him “the father of the nation” (Guofu 国父), like in Taiwan.5 Symbolically speaking, at the very centre of the “Middle Kingdom”, two founding leaders of China are facing each other. On the one side, the founder of the last and the latest Chinese state scrutinizes the people whom he provided with sovereignty. He had always been accepted as the founder of the new China with the revolution in 1949. The 1911 Revolution had always been regarded as a “well-intentioned petitbourgeois attempt”. However, now, on the other side, there is a portrait of Sun Yat-sen. The very existence of the portrait as well as its location in the space symbolizes the implicit and gradual rise of new possibilities of having an alternative to Mao Zedong, and the alternative being Sun Yat-sen.

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There is a number of museums about Sun Yat-sen in China, which fall into two broad categories: “national” museums which portray Sun Yat-sen wholly and more or less in line with the official discourse; and “local” museums that focus on the period of Sun Yat-sen relevant to their own locality, such as his childhood in Zhongshan Museum or the years he professionally practised medicine in Macao Museum. Even though the local museums are more informative regarding the history of Sun Yat-sen,6 one of the national museums will be examined as an example of how national political discourses are constructed as this chapter focuses on the formation of the collective memory at the national level.

Nanjing Museum Nanjing Museum of the United Government displays the end of the Qing Dynasty, the 1911 Revolution, Sun Yat-sen, Kuomintang (KMT), the Nanjing Government, Chiang Kai-shek, Nationalists, and the United Fronts. The complex is the former government centre of the Nationalist Nanjing Government. The museum is designed to represent two faces of the same history (history of Kuomintang under Sun Yat-sen’s and Chiang Kai-shek’s rule), with different emotional attachments. Since the complex was not built for museumification purposes but real-life places converted into a museum, the space intermingles, and even overlaps these two contradictory memories. One may leave a hall exhibiting Sun Yat-sen’s heroic actions and may walk into an exhibition hall loathing Chiang Kai-shek as a traitor; or two tags hung consecutively may be about the achievements of the 1911 Revolution and failure of the Nationalist Government because the meeting hall was used by both. To strengthen this split feeling, each of the meeting halls at the entrance used by both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, is dedicated to a leader, the one on the left to Sun Yat-sen and the one on the right to Chiang Kai-shek. The first buildings are dedicated to Chiang Kai-shek and post-Sun KMT. The last building before the rear gate is the Sun Yat-sen Building. It is a new building, added to the complex after renovation in the early 1990s — an indication of the new emphasis on Sun Yat-sen. The buildings are in the middle of a small garden full of realist style statues. The statues are all of Sun Yat-sen, either alone or with Soong Qing-ling or fellow revolutionaries who are a part of his image associated with new China.

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There are two separate buildings, which are connected by a glass tunnel on the first storey. The buildings are four storey and spiral-shaped. The spiral shape makes stairs unnecessary since one can walk up from one building and down out of the next one. The organization of the museum is also in line with the architecture. Instead of disconnected/independent exhibition halls, there is one single exhibition, which proceeds chronologically without a break. This architectural design gives the sense of continuity, which connects Sun Yat-sen to modern Chinese history from which he had long been cut off. The first part is the chronological narration of Sun Yat-sen’s life. This narrative is also placed in a broader historical context of political and social predicament of China then. The exhibition is composed of two kinds of material: the material used are all first-hand archival material such as photographs and written documents such as personal letters, diaries, meeting statements, telegraphs, posters and fliers of him and his fellow plotters within and out of mainland China. The second type of materials is installations, and representations in the form of symbolic maps, wax installations, and 3D pictures. The orientation of the museum is easier to read in these materials since they directly reflect the intentions of the designers. The chronology begins with the historical and geographical background of where and when Sun Yat-sen was born into. It continues with his formative years, education, family, teachers and classmates, some of whom later turned into fellow plotters. The early Revolutionary Alliance period and the years abroad are followed by the professional organization of the revolutionary movement. The Revolution is depicted at length in several different aspects. These include the disabilities of governance after the revolution, power struggle, international context, and administrative scratch until his death. His marriage with Soong Qing-ling, who was also a significant political and social figure and his contacts in the national and international intellectual circles are also described in detail. For this matter, the influential military, political and intellectual currents in which Sun Yat-sen was not directly involved, such as May Fourth Movement and formation of the Communist Party, were also included in the broader framework of the exhibition. Interestingly, Three Great Policies, which constitute a considerable part of Beijing Soong Qing-ling Museum, is not displayed in this museum. The reason might be that Beijing museum was founded in the early 1980s when Sun Yat-sen was still seen through the lenses of communist ideology. Contrarily, Nanjing Museum was founded in the early 1990s when Sun Yatsen’s nationalism and economic policies were more and more often referred to.

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To sum up, the message given here is rather subtle. The selection of photographs and documents emphasize: (a) the non-royal family background which relates to his thoughts on people’s livelihood; (b) foreign connections which used to be condemned before (the transition also explains the overemphasis on Soviet advisors at the expense of western and Japanese mentors, supporters and fellow revolutionaries); (c) his contribution to the modernization of China (which has long been acknowledged by scholars but not politicians). As for the second part, the messages are explicitly given: (a) misery of the people before the 1911 Revolution; (b) Sun Yat-sen’s close connection to the people (a reverse image of him as a petit-bourgeois intellectual); (c) Sun Yat-sen’s portrayal in military uniform — accruements of military power that he actually did not posses (again a reversal of his image as a petit-bourgeois intellectual); (d) anti-imperialist dimension of the 1911 Revolution; (e) the modern outlook of him and his fellow revolutionaries to emphasize the modernizing dimension of the revolution; and, last but not the least, (f ) the anti-imperialist stance of the revolution.

Conclusion The dominant sources/agents of collective memory of Sun Yat-sen in reform China are mostly official and elite. This fact has positive and negative implications for the collective memory of Sun Yat-sen. Strengths of elitedominated collective memory construction is that it can be worked into policy and therefore it can be realized more effectively. As for weaknesses, identification based on elite construction would hardly gain momentum and might even face forceful reaction from popular “counter-memory”. To trace the power of popular memory, we can look at the examples such as Bodyguards and Assassins and Zhongshan Museum. Sun Yat-sen has been a source of legitimacy in both mainland China and Taiwan. This fact can be observed in three phases. First, he had been a central figure for transformation and construction of the new China in its early stages. However, later in the second phase, his image had been systematically depoliticized in mainland China, as a response to transformation of the same image to a national cult in Taiwan. Finally, since the last decades of opening up, economic liberalization and nationalization of the state ideology have placed Sun Yat-sen back to the centre of the debate. Given the diverse dynamics of the transition period, the Chinese public sphere is inhabited in a wide array of symbolisms. Nationalism has been

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observed in two forms: popular nationalism and patriotism. Official discourse tends to manipulate symbols and memories in order to channel patriotic feeling towards certain policy orientations, whereas popular nationalism defines, undefines and redefines elements of collective memory in a rather spontaneous way. Thurston claims that Sun Yat-sen may eventually replace Mao’s portrait above the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Thurston 1997); but this would be a farfetched prediction. The 1911 Revolution is suggested in the official and elite discourse as not a rival but a complementary event to the 1949 Revolution; and Sun Yat-sen who had been a depoliticized historical figure, is implicitly suggested as a national leader around whom more people in contemporary China could agreeably gather than would do around Mao considering the new political and economic orientation. There are a number of reasons why Sun Yat-sen’s image is (or can be) popular. First of all, Sun Yat-sen’s ideological stance is much less solid and less strictly defined than Mao’s. This flexibility (to the extent of vagueness) helps people from different walks of life to associate themselves with Sun Yat-sen. Nationalists might cherish the Three Principles of People as the basis of the nationalist thought in China; conservatives would possibly second the almost authoritarian Republican views of Sun Yat-sen in his post-1911 period; those who advocate economic liberalization also take the Three Principles of People as a basis for their attachment to Sun Yat-sen. According to Bergère, “Sun seemed the ideal forerunner of Deng Xiaoping and the Four Modernizations” (Bergère 1998). The most important factor that helps revisiting Sun Yat-sen and his thought at different phases of history and with different political intentions is the incompleteness of his image in history. Unlike Mao who lived for a long time, and did and did not do so many things, Sun Yat-sen died at an early stage of his own project. Therefore, not only his main project, the Republic, but also his ideology, orientation, even his personal life were left unfinished. This “unfinishedness” provided the memory of Sun Yat-sen with openness to continuous interpretations in terms of time and variety. As it is happening now in contemporary China, his memory and image can easily be manipulated according to the needs of the moments, geography and group of people in need of a mobilizing hero. Several developments that took place since the 1980s can be seen as reasons why manipulation of Sun Yat-sen’s image is happening now in China. Two major developments shaped CCP’s approach to Sun Yat-sen:

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one is the 1989 incident; another is the increasing salience of the Taiwan pro-independence movement. Sun Yat-sen’s portrait was placed in its current location on Tiananmen Square only a couple of years after the 1989 incident. The view that CCP has been in search of new role models and new ideals since the 1989 incident is commonly accepted among Chinese scholars. “Placing Sun in Tiananmen Square for May 1 is an appeal to nationalism and unity for Chinese everywhere, regardless of political outlook; it could be part of party’s drive to replace communist ideology with a more neutral authoritarianism based on traditional Chinese values and national pride” (quoted in Platt 1997). Authoritarian Republican views of Sun Yat-sen in his late period fit very well with the CCP’s new authoritarian stance after the democratic wave in the 1980s. Another twist happened in the second half of the 1990s and coincided with the renovation of the Nanjing Museum with a renewed emphasis on Sun Yat-sen. That twist was the pro-independence movement in Taiwan. As a part of nativization of Taiwan’s national history and culture, the proindependence camp, led by Lee Teng-hui, challenged Sun Yat-sen’s image as the father of the nation. The tension peaked when the revision of the textbooks at the expense of the Nationalist version of the history was offered. As a response to declining salience of Sun Yat-sen’s image in Taiwan, the CCP, which had refrained from a strong explicit attachment to him, restructured its stance towards the issue and has begun to hold a more solid position on Sun Yat-sen. The 2000s seem to fall short of this enthusiasm, mostly due to the ups and downs in the party politics in Taiwan and cross-strait relations. Sun Yat-sen’s legitimacy seems to be quite low for all political orientations in Taiwan, particularly for the younger generation born after democratization; that is why it also fails to be a source of attraction for mainland Chinese discourses in cross-strait relations. The societal dynamics in mainland China does not support the introduction of a new all-too-powerful leader into the political stage either. The popular sentiment among the younger generation born in the reform era is towards institutionalization and depersonification of administration. Under current circumstances, Sun Yat-sen would infiltrate into the collective consciousness of the Chinese people not through a leadership cult but through his practices and writings that would suggest different “models” and pathways for China.

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Notes 1

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5

6

The products vary from souvenirs to soap operas; from biographies to fictions in literature; from songs to family museums. Besides, with the revival of religion in rural China, Mao Zedong has transformed into a god in traditional faith. Thurston claims that “in one of the most curious twists of Chinese history, Mao, who spent much of his life attacking superstitious thinking, is being transformed into a folk deity (Thurston 1997). Others, such as Wertsch (2002) developed the same notion in different wordings. Among the scholars, several differences revolve around the characteristics of the revolution. Generally speaking, Japanese scholars tend to regard it as a revolution towards modernization or a military revolution; mainland Chinese scholars as a bourgeoisie revolution; Taiwanese scholars as a nationalist revolution; Western scholars as a social revolution or a gentry-led reform. Besides, the “New” Three Principles of the People (the Three Great Policies), PanAsianism in Sun Yat-sen Thought, universalism and materialism vs. spiritualism were frequently debated. The characteristics of this period are: Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought, determinism, and praxis-oriented research. Sun Yat-sen’s portrait had been hung over where Mao’s portrait is hung now for the first time when Chiang Kai-shek shifted the capital to Nanjing. For example Zhongshan Museum reveals more than any other museum the importance of kinship ties and the role of Overseas Chinese in plotting Xinhai Revolution and the series of attempts following its failure. An entire floor is devoted to the families, clans and important Overseas Chinese persona contributed to the Revolution — an important factor often overlooked by the official, national narrative.

References Barkan, E. The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices. New York: Norton, c2000. Barme, G. Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996. Berger, Thomas. “The Model Penitent? German Historical Memory and Foreign Policy and Historical Memory in Comparative Perspective”. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, United States, 22 March 2006. Bergère, M-C. Sun Yat-sen (translated) by Lloyd. California: Stanford University Press, 1998. Boyarin, J. Remapping Memory: The Politics of Time Space. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, c1994.

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Buruma, I. The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1994. Confino, A. The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, c1997. Connerton, P. How Societies Remember. Cambridge, England and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Epstein, I. The Unfinished Revolution in China. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1947. Fewsmith, J. China since Tiananmen: From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Gries, P. H. China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. Guo shiyoujiangjinhui 郭世佑蒋金晖. “Wushinian lai dalu xuezhe guanyu xinhai shiqi Sun Zhongshan minzu zhuyi sixiang yaniu shuping” 五十年来大陆学 者关于辛亥时期孙中山民族主义思想研究述评 [Scholars from mainland China during the past fifty years Sun Yat-sen on Xinhai Studies on nationalist ideology]. Dongnan xueshu 东南学术 [Southeast Academic Research], no. 4 (2000). Halbwachs, M. On Collective Memory. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992. Hobsbawm, E. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Lu, T. Guanyu Sun Zhongshan San Da Zhengci Yanjiu de jiu ge Wenti [On Sun Yatsen Literature]. Beijing: Beijing Normal University, 1986. Macdonald, S. and G. Fyfe, ed. Theorizing Museums: Representing Identity and Diversity in a Changing World. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996. Müller, G. Representing History in Chinese Media: The TV Drama Zou Xiang Gonghe [Towards the Republic]. Berlin, 2007. Platt, K. What’s in a Face? Portrait Shift Hints At China’s Next Step. , 1997. Spence, J. Children of the Dragon. New York: Collier Books, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990. Sun Hongyun 孙宏云. “Sun Zhongsan wuquan xianfa sixiang yanjiu shuping” 孙 中山五权宪法思想研究述评 [A Summary of mainland China’s Studies on Sun Yat-sen’s Five-power Constitution]. Shixue yuekan 史学月刊 [Journal of Historical Science], no. 11 (2007). Tang, W. Public Opinion and Political Change in China. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005. Tilly, C. “Afterword”. In Remapping Memory: The Politics of Time Space, by J. Boyarin. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, c1994. Thurston, A. , 1997. Unger, J. Chinese Nationalism. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, c1996.

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Urry, J. “How Societies Remember the Past”. In Theorizing Museums: Representing Identity and Diversity in a Changing World, edited by S. Macdonald and G. Fyfe. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996. Volkan, V. Blood Lines from Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997. Wang Jie. 50 Nianlaide Sun Zhongshan Yanjiu, Jindaishi Yanjiu [50 Years of Sun Yatsen Research, Modern History Research], vol. 5, 1999. Wei, C.X.G. and X. Liu, ed. Chinese Nationalism in Perspective: Historical and Recent Cases. Westport, conn.: Greenwood Press, 2001. ———. Exploring Nationalisms of China: Themes and Conflicts. Westport, conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002. Wertsch, J.R. Voices of Collective Remembering. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Yang Wenshun 杨文顺. “20 shiji 90 niandai yilai Sun Zhongshan minzu zhuyi sixiang yanjiu zongsu” 20 世纪 90 年代以来孙中山民族主义思想研究综 述. Mongxiong shifan xueyuan yuebao 楚雄师范学院学报, vol. 123, no. 18 (August 2008). Zhang Hai Peng 张海鹏. “Wushi nian lai Zhongguo dalu dui Sun Zhongshan de jinian yu pingjia” 五十年来中国大陆对孙中山的纪念与评价 [50 Years in China to commemorate Sun Yat-sen and evaluation]. Taiwan Sun Zhongshan jinian guan zhuban de “Sun Zhongshan yu xiandai Zhongguo” xueshu yantaohui 台湾孙中山纪念馆主办的“孙中山与现代中国”学术研讨会, 2001. Zheng, Y. Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.









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11 HISTORICAL LINKAGE AND POLITICAL CONNECTION: COMMEMORATION AND REPRESENTATION OF SUN YAT-SEN AND THE 1911 REVOLUTION IN CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1946–20101 Wu Xiao An

Introduction Over centuries, China-Southeast Asian interactions have been best manifested through the tributary system from above and the Overseas Chinese or Chinese Overseas from below. However, over decades after World War II, the linkages of the two were overshadowed by the imagined China threat on the one hand and suspicions of the loyalty of Overseas Chinese on the other because of the Cold War and nation-building processes. Only with the end of Cold War and the rapid rise of China, China and Southeast Asia have started to be reconnected with each other substantially and at an unprecedented rate. From the dusty past, the long-neglected prominent figures like Admiral Zheng He and Dr Sun Yat-sen have eventually been rediscovered for that 245

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purpose. Zheng He’s case serves perfectly to refute the China threat, while Sun Yat-sen’s legacy proudly exhibits how Nanyang and Nanyang Chinese contribute to the making of a modern China. In Southeast Asia, neglected memorial halls and temples are hence renovated and rebuilt on the dusty and even damaged sites with government funding and private donations. Likewise, there have been symposiums, films and exhibitions on these subjects. Such development is an amazing contrast with the socio-political landscape just a few decades ago. How and why were Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution represented in China and Southeast Asia under changing situations? How and why were they imagined and commemorated differently in different periods? Based on the reports in the People’s Daily from 1946 to 2010 in China, the chapter, while not studying Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution per se, tries to construct and reconstruct their commemoration and representation in China and Southeast Asia and their dynamics.

Sun Yat-sen and Nanyang Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary activities and legacy in Nanyang should at least include three aspects: (1) directly, his own physical involvements; (2) indirectly, his fellow compradors’ activities under his leadership; and (3) the activities after the 1911 Revolution. As Duara argues, it was only after the 1911 Revolution that Sun Yat-sen’s legacy and influences in Nanyang had started to be dominant spiritually and consolidated institutionally by bypassing the forces of pro-Qing bao huang hui 保皇会 [Association for the Protection of the Emperor].2 Likewise, interestingly in the case of China, it was only following the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925 that he was mystically worshipped in modern Chinese politics and society when he was constructed as a national icon by the KMT regime. Because of time constraint, this chapter would focus on his physical presence in Nanyang. In terms of financial and human resources, there is no doubt that Nanyang Chinese contributed greatly to the 1911 Revolution. However, it is the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, and even Europe, rather than Nanyang, that Sun Yat-sen had physically stayed longer and benefited most spiritually. It was not until the middle of the year 1900 that Nanyang started to become Sun Yat-sen’s main revolutionary bases. The reason that Sun Yat-sen was forced to turn to Nanyang as his main revolutionary bases instead was due to the deportation of Sun by the Japanese Government and the geographical proximity of Nanyang to South China, notably, Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong.

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For Sun Yat-sen, Nanyang had two significant dimensions or sources for his revolutionary mobilization: one was Nanyang Chinese contributions to fund-raising and organizational support underpinned by the common ethnic identity and Chinese nationalism in terms of the anti-Manchu and anti-imperialist cause; the other was local non-Southeast Asian Chinese nationalists, who was inspired and united by Asianism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries due to the common Asian anti-colonisalism and Asian nationalist awakening.3 For the former, Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia were the three main targets, and Saigon, Hanoi, Singapore and Penang were headquarters for Sun’s Nanyang revolutionary organizational activities. For the latter, Southeast Asian nationalists, Phan Boi Chau in Vietnam, Ponce in the Philippines, and Sukarno in Indonesia were the most prominent. They benefited from or were inspired by Sun Yat-sen and his works, directly or indirectly. In sum, just like Sun’s dual emphasis on Chinese Nationalism and Asianism, Sun’s Nanyang revolutionary networks also had two major components: one was that of the Nanyang Chinese, the other was that of the non-Chinese Southeast Asians. It should be noted that we should not treat Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary itinerary and activities in various places of Nanyang separately from that in other parts of the world. In fact, Sun’s activities in various places of Nanyang form an integral part of his global revolutionary network for his AntiManchu revolution. Although Sun Yat-sen’s physical activities were centred on Hanoi, Saigon, Singapore and Penang, it did not mean that he confined his revolutionary activities to these cities alone. To be sure, these cities functioned as headquarters of Sun’s global revolutionary network because of their geographical and strategic significance. However, other than Southeast Asia, Sun’s revolutionary network included Japan, Hong Kong and China as far as Asia was concerned. The choice of shifting revolutionary headquarters as Sun’s physical bases was both strategic and tactical. Strategically, the geographical, economic and political significance of these places facilitated Sun’s transnational movements; tactically, new headquarters had to be established as Sun was sometimes deported from one country to another. Sun’s Nanyang revolutionary network was underpinned by Chinese nationalism, Vietnamese nationalism, Filipino nationalism, and Indonesian nationalism and connected, inspired and packed under Asianism in their fights against colonialism and imperialism. It is amazing to note that within a few years, Sun Yat-sen’s transnational revolutionary network was able to penetrate into Nanyang Chinese social organizations and trading networks and build up new and powerful organizational, financial and media forces from the region. For Nanyang, with the incorporation of Sun’s revolutionary

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network, a political community across various territorial boundaries began to emerge. The new Nanyang revolutionary network not only represented a more united Overseas Chinese nationalism, but also paved the way for the formation of a Southeast Asian regional identity via various Chinese communities. In terms of periods, Sun’s activities in Nanyang from 1900 to 1911 could be divided into two stages: the first stage was 1900–05, the second one was 1906–11. In terms of geography, Sun’s activities in the first stage focused on Indo-China and the Philippines.4 As for the second stage, they were concentrated on British Malaya, Siam, British Burma and Dutch Indies. Beyond Hanoi, Saigon, Singapore and Penang, his Nanyang revolutionary network was extended to other places of British Malaya, Siam, Dutch Indies, British Burma and the Philippines, consisting of around 130 branches and reading clubs. The organizational network was coordinated and maintained through Sun Yat-sen’s instructions, his close cronies (e.g. Yu Lieh, Hu Han Ming, Wang Jingwei, and Huang Xin), and prominent local Chinese followers (e.g. Chan Chor Nam, Teo Eng Hock and Lim Ngee Soon in Singapore, Goh Say Eng and Ng Kim Keng in Penang, and Zhuang Yingan in Rangoon).5 If we take the Philippines as an example, Sun Yat-sen visited the Philippines as early as the 1890s. He managed to establish relations with the Filipino revolution. His medical professor in Hong Kong, Dr Lorenzo Marquez, was a close friend of Jose Rizal. He helped the Philippine revolutionary government under Aguinaldo via his friend Mariano Ponce to purchase weapons and ammunitions from Japan twice, although the shipment failed to reach the Philippines eventually. His classmate in Hong Kong, Dr Tee Han Kee, was the leader of the pro-Sun group in Manila.6 Even in 1910, Sun wrote from Singapore to his American comrade, Charles Beach Boothe, mentioning his intention to visit Manila in the coming few months and asking the latter’s introduction to his friends in the Philippines. Sun also explored whether Boothe could request his close American friend, who was an ex-American general in the Philippines, to introduce him to visit local officials there.7 In a very long memorial article written by Sun’s widow Madam Song and published in the People’s Daily during Sun’s centennial birthday commemoration, it was not a coincidence that Song quoted Mariano Ponce’s words in particular to illustrate Sun’s enthusiasm about the Philippine revolution: With utmost interest watching its development, Sun Yat-sen was very familiar with the current revolutionary situations in the Philippines. With great enthusiasm, he studied the works and stories of Jose Rizal

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and Del Pilar, the nation’s greatest heroes. … In the eyes of Sun Yat-sen, the problems of many Far Eastern countries were so closely connected so that in order for us to better understand each separate country’s own problem it was essential that these countries should be throughout studied as an integral subject. … Therefore, Sun Yat-sen was one of the most enthusiastic patrons to ‘Oriental Youth Association’, which was set up in Tokyo by students from Korea, China, Japan, India, Siam and the Philippines. … Sun Yat-sen was truly concerned with every issue related to the Far East. He studied these issues and helped find the ways to the solutions with the parties concerned.8

Table 11.1 Sun Yat-sen’s Visits to Nanyang, 1900–119 Place

Number of Visits

Date

Duration

Hanoi and Saigon

6

1) Jun 1900 2) Dec 1902 3) July 1905 4) Oct 1905 5) Sep 1906 6) Mar 1907

1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)

more than 2 weeks around 3 weeks — around 6 months — over 1 year

Singapore

9

1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)

July 1900 July 1905 Feb 1906 July 1906 Mar 1907 Mar 1908 Dec 1908 July 1910 15 Dec 1911

1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)

3 days 1 day almost 2 weeks 1.5 months a few days 3 months 5 months 1 week 1 day

Penang

6

1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)

Autumn 1905 July 1906 July 1908 Oct 1908 July 1910 12 Dec 1911

1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)

a few days — 1.5 months 3 days 4.5 months 1 day

Bangkok

2

1) June 1905 2) Nov 1908

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While in the case of the Dutch Indies, although there was no evidence to show that Sun Yat-sen was physically present there, it is known that he had been watching over and maintaining contacts with some people in the area by correspondence. Indonesian Chinese warmly welcomed the 1911 Revolution. To celebrate the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) in Nanjing on 19 February 1912, for example, many Chinese in Surabaya went to the streets to organize assemblies, burn firecrackers and hang flags of ROC. But the Surabaya Chinese celebration was suppressed by the Dutch colonial authorities. The Dutch colonial police had shot 3 Chinese dead, injured 10 and arrested more than 100. This was the so-called sensational “Surabaya Event”. Besides intensive diplomatic mediations and protests, Sun Yat-sen convened a cabinet meeting and reached a four-point resolution with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 26 February. The resolution included the release of arrested Chinese within three days, pay for Chinese property losses, pay for the killed and the injured, and equal treatment of Overseas Chinese in Indonesia. The Dutch authorities were eventually forced to accept these terms and conditions. “The Surabaya Event” was the first diplomatic challenge imposed onto the newly established ROC. Its satisfactory settlement proved a significant triumph for Sun Yat-sen.10 It is important to note that it is not a coincidence that it was after the 1911 Revolution that Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary thought started to be influential and his revolutionary movement started to be popular among Nanyang Chinese.

The Commemorations of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution in China Because Sun Yat-sen was very much associated with the 1911 Revolution, and vice versa, it is almost impossible to separate each commemoration without mentioning the other. Prior to 1949, the commemoration of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution in China had been monopolized by the KMT regime. Sun and the Revolution were regarded as a fundamental part of orthodox KMT party historiography in the highest esteem. In the case of Sun Yat-sen, for example, he was mystically worshipped and deliberately represented as a matchless icon to unite and consolidate the KMT regime ideologically as well as politically after his death. Sun was hence symbolized and ritualized into the various aspects of KMT political, economic, educational and socio-cultural lives. Sun was not only a great revolutionary but also a frustrated one. It was claimed that the KMT and Jiang Jieshi were the legitimate successors to Sun’s unfulfilled revolution. As the “Founding Father of Modern China”, Sun Yat-sen was worshipped as a

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flawless political god, a social ritual and an ideological legacy, hence providing the KMT and Jiang Jieshi with the foundation of legitimacy, ideology and dynamics.11 The deliberate construction of Sun’s political symbols consisted of his memorial halls, monuments and statures, portraits and sculptures, songs and dresses, school textbooks, and many cities, towns, roads, schools, libraries, and parks all over China that were named after Sun. The most prominent was obviously the construction of Sun Yat-sen’s mausoleum in Nanjing.12 After 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over the commemorations of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution in mainland China. Indeed it took a little while before this happened and was conducted in a different style from the previous KMT practice. Despite rapturous applause from the Chinese audience, both Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution received mild criticisms by the PRC regime and CCP Marxist scholars due to their bourgeois class backgrounds.13 Nevertheless, interestingly, the post-1949 CCP commemorations also served as an ideological propaganda. Notably, Beijing claimed that the CCP, rather than the KMT, was the true legitimate successor to Sun Yat-sen’s unfulfilled revolutionary cause. Sun and his Revolution also served as a common political legacy for the eventual unification with Kuomintang-ruled Taiwan. The commemorations usually centred around three important dates: 12 March (date of Sun’s death), 10 October (date of the revolution) and 12 November (date of Sun’s birth). However, as the date of death is ritually regarded as one of sorrow, it is not proper to organize any big organizational commemoration for it, although there are regular annual memorial activities reported to indicate the collective national remembrances. Therefore, in terms of political significance, the commemoration usually focuses on the other two important dates: the anniversary of the 1911 Revolution and Sun Yat-sen’s birthday. The 100th and 50th anniversary commemorations are the most significant, but this is not absolutely true as always because of political situations in mainland China and Taiwan. For example, there was almost no big commemoration over the decades during the Cultural Revolution. And when the DPP came to power in Taiwan in 2000, the commemoration of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution in China became more fundamental in terms of cross-strait political dynamics. Although Sun Yat-sen is usually associated with the 1911 Revolution, and vice versa, yet it is distinguishable between the two interconnected commemorations. Over a half century between 1946 and 2010, and as far as Sun Yat-sen’s birthday commemoration is concerned, five years are most important: 1946, 1956, 1986, 1996 and 2006. While for the 1911 Revolution anniversary commemoration over the same period, four years are

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most significant: 1961, 1981, 1991 and 2001. The considerations for highlevel commemorations in these years are not only because of the Chinese tradition that attaches importance to the tenth or centennial anniversary, but also because of changing political situations across the Taiwan Strait. In other words, the political/policy considerations, international, domestic, or crossstrait, are the fundamental considerations behind the commemorations. The different policy considerations in the period under study can be categorized into three different stages and orientations.

First stage, from 1946 to 1976 For the period 1946 and 1949, there were some articles and radio announcements mentioning Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution on the CCP side. However, there were no deliberate commemorations and the announcements served purely for the military purpose of promoting the United Front after World War II. Even for some years following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, although there were official commemorations, the 1911 Revolution was regarded as a scholarly and politically sensitive domain. Only after 1956 when Chairman Mao’s famous memorial article on Sun Yat-sen was published that serious research on the subject began to emerge. In the first stage before 1976, the icon of Sun Yat-sen was constructed more ideologically and politically. The construction focused on the revolution and its internationalism serving the PRC’s international Table 11.2 The Statistics of the People’s Daily Reports about the Commemorations of Sun Yat-sen’s Birthday and the 1911 Revolution, 1946–2006 Year

Birthday’s Reports in November

Reports of the Year

Birthday

1946 1956 1966 1976 1986 1996 2006

Nil 136 16 1 92 36 23

57 218 24 7 200 129 84

80th 90th 100th 110th 120th 130th 140th

Sources: The People’s Daily, 1946–2006.

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Table 11.3 The Statistics of the People’s Daily Reports about the Anniversary Celebration of the 1911 Revolution and Sun Yat-sen, 1951–2001 Year 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001

Commemoration Reports in October Nil 43 None 138 47 31

Reports of the Year 16 82 None 293 105 99

Anniversary 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th

Sources: The People’s Daily, 1951–2001.

and domestic politics. It consisted of two aspects, that is, Sun as the founding father of the modern China on the one hand and his Asianism on the other. For Sun’s revolution, it was constructed that the CCP under Mao Zedong, rather than the KMT under Jiang Jieshi, was the true successor to Sun Yatsen’s revolutionary cause. For Sun’s Asianism, it was used to emphasize that the PRC was the brother of Asian and African countries under the umbrella of Mao’s Third World paradigm. Sun Yat-sen’s 90th birthday commemoration in 1956 was especially meaningful. Firstly, it was the first top-level magnificent commemoration since the CCP came to power in 1949, in which both the central government and all provincial governments were mobilized to organize this priority event. Chairman Mao Zedong himself attended the commemoration conference of 11 November that lasted for four hours. He wrote a famous memorial article, entitled “In Memorial of Mr. Sun Yat-sen”, which was published in the newspapers. In that article, Mao raised two fundamental points regarding the assessment of Sun Yat-sen that set the basic tune for the commemoration and study of Sun Yat-sen. They were firstly that Sun Yat-sen was a great Chinese revolutionary pioneer and all modern Chinese, except for a few reactionaries, are successors to Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary cause. Secondly, Sun Yat-sen’s unfulfilled dream of “strengthening and modernizing China” would certainly come true under the CCP leadership and Mao envisioned that China would have even greater changes, turning itself into a modern and strong world power in forty-five years when the centurial anniversary of the 1911 Revolution would be commemorated.14

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In addition, the conference, in which 150 foreign diplomatic delegates and guests from 30 countries and 40 Overseas Chinese were invited to attend, was the first high profile international function to showcase China’s national commemoration of Sun Yat-sen’s birthday. It was very unusual, if not unprecedented, that the People’s Daily published 34 articles and reports under titles specifically relating to Sun Yat-sen within 3 days from 11 to 13 November. Just for the 12 November issue, 17 articles were devoted to Sun. The other important occasion of attaching importance to Overseas Chinese and their contribution is the 1981 commemoration. It was an encouraging and positive political announcement to denote China’s changing policy towards Overseas Chinese, who had been labelled as bad and reactionary elements during Cultural Revolution. It is not a coincidence that the issue of 12 November 1956 of the People’s Daily published one article by Chen Qiyou, entitled “Overseas Chinese would never forget Mr Sun Yatsen”,15 while the issues on 19 September and 12 October 1981 of the same paper, another two complementary articles by Hong Sisi and Zhuang Xiquan, entitled “Overseas Chinese’s Great Contribution to the 1911 Revolution” and “Nanyang Chinese and the 1911 Revolution”, respectively.16 As for the commemoration of the 1911 Revolution, the year 1961 was very significant. It was not a coincidence and an isolated event. To put in perspective, the 1961 commemoration of the 1911 Revolution was of course encouraged by the 1956 commemoration of Sun Yat-sen’s 90th birthday.17 To a great extent, its political and intellectual significance could be comparable to the 1956 commemoration of Sun Yat-sen’s birthday. It was the first time that the 1911 Revolution was magnificently saluted by the CCP as “a great democratic revolution” and that a national symposium was held in Wuhan with around 100 prominent scholars, bearing in mind that no scholars dared to touch on such a sensitive topic not so long before. The 1961 commemoration of the 1911 Revolution was also conducted at one of the highest levels. The conference, dated 9 October, was attended by ten thousand participants, chaired by Zhou Enlai in his capacity as the chairman of CPPCC and attended by Liu Shaoqi in his capacity as president of the PRC.18 Unfortunately, that good atmosphere was soon spoiled by the Cultural Revolution. By tradition, the 1966 commemoration of Sun Yat-sen’s birthday as the centennial anniversary should be more important than the 1956 commemoration. Indeed it was prepared in that way one year earlier. On 24 October 1965, the Standing Committee of CPPCC convened a third

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conference chaired by Zhou Enlai decided to commemorate Sun Yat-sen’s centurial birthday the following year. A Preparation Committee was set up, consisting of 271 prominent high-level officials of the central committee of the CCP and other senior social activists. The chairman was Liu Shaoqi, but not Mao Zedong, and Song Qingling, Dong Biwu, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Lin Biao and Deng Xiaoping were among the 62 deputy chairmen. Liao Chenzhi was the secretary-general.19 On 31 October, the Preparation Committee had its first conference convened by Chairman Liu Shaoqi, who made an important speech on Sun Yat-sen and his contribution and passed eight measures on the commemoration.20 Nanjing, Shanghai and Guangzhou also set up their respective branch preparatory committees and each was headed by the number one official of Jiangsu province, Shanghai municipal city and Guangdong province. During February and March 1966, these three key provincial committees also convened their first conferences to work out their own commemorative measures.21 However, ironically, in November 1966, the commemoration did not turn out as planned due to the dramatic changing political climate. More ironically, on the occasion of the commemoration conference held on 12 November, Preparatory Committee Chairman Liu Shaoqi did not even have a chance to give a speech, although it was reported that he was present. On the other hand, Chairman Mao Zedong’s article on Sun Yat-sen written in November 1956 was read loudly by workers, peasants, and PLA delegates before the opening of the commemorative conference, although neither Mao Zedong nor Lin Biao showed up at the conference. The conference was opened by a revolutionary veteran, Dong Biwu, and attended by 10,000 delegates. The keynote speakers were Dong Biwu, Zhou Enlai, Song Qingling and He Xiangning. Not surprisingly, Zhou Enlai also began his speech at the conference by quoting Mao Zedong’s article of 1956. It was obvious that the domestic political struggle against Liu Shaoqi, international anti-imperialism (USA) and anti-revisionism (Soviet Union) dominated the commemoration agenda, highlighting the great helmsman, Chairman Mao, and his Cultural Revolution.22 During the Cultural Revolution, a few reports were mentioned that occasional commemoration activities were held in the years of 1967 and 1972–76. However, there was an absence of any mention of Sun Yat-sen during the years from 1968 to 1971. Even worse, Sun Yatsen was labelled as Niugui Shesheng [all sorts of bad elements] by Jiang Qing. Both the Zhongshan Memorial Hall at Beijing Fragrant Hill and the Zhongshan Memorial Pavilion at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou were forced to close and many valuable relics were taken away and destroyed.23

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Second Stage, from 1977 to 1995 In this stage, cross-strait relations and national unification were targeted as the prime aim. The new situations were that since the two life-long rivals, Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi, had already passed away, there should be less ideological conflict, and more economic and trading cooperation, thus deliberately putting aside old feuds between the CCP and KMT. Among various commemorations during this stage, the 1981 commemoration of the 1911 Revolution is the most significant one. It signified the CCP’s new changing policy under the new era towards Taiwan and the KMT, calling for CCP-KMT cooperation for the third time and emphasizing the common blood identity of Chineseness by leaving behind past feuds and looking forward to the great Chinese revival. In terms of scale, level and dimension, it could be comparable to the 1956 commemoration of the Sun Yat-sen’s 90th birthday anniversary activities. However, unlike its previous commemorations, which were confined to the domestic political gatherings, the Chinese Central Government invited distinguished overseas guests from Hong Kong, Macau and foreign countries to attend the grand ceremony for the first time since the founding of the PRC.24 Interestingly, and for the first time too, scholars from Taiwan were invited to attend the international conference on the 1911 Revolution held in Wuhan. Although Taiwan scholars failed to attend the Wuhan conference eventually, the regret was eased in early April 1982 at the Chicago conference of the Association of Asian Studies (AAS), in which two scholarly delegations from mainland China and Taiwan, each consisting of five professors and one working staff, were invited to present their views together in one panel. They were joined by another six scholars from the United States and Japan. The panel was entitled “The 1911 Revolution and the Establishment of the Republic: Review After 70 Years”, and it was the most important and longest session of the AAS 1982 annual conference and had its biggest audience, filling a 500-seat auditorium.25 The overall context was that it was the first grand commemoration under the new era of reform and opening and modernization strategy after the Cultural Revolution. Both Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi had already passed away and a new generation of leadership came to power on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Internationally, Sino-American relations improved as demonstrated by the establishment of formal diplomatic ties. Obviously, this had a huge impact on the Taiwan regime. In this regard, it is especially important to note that the unification of Taiwan and the mainland had been projected as one of the Three Grand Missions of China in the 1980s. At least three significant events were fundamental in shaping the changing policy and

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the 1981 commemoration. Firstly, on the special day of New Year, that is, 1 January 1979, the NPC Standing Committee issued a message entitled “A Public Letter to Taiwan Compatriots”, conveying New Year’s greetings from the people in the mainland and calling for the end of the military tension and non-contact status among the people across the Taiwan Straits.26 Secondly, the NPC Vice-Chairman, Sun Yat-sen’s widow, Song Qingling, died on 29 May 1981. Before her death, the CCP Central Political Bureau decided to accept Madam Song as a formal member of the CCP on 15 May27 and the NPC Standing Committee passed a resolution to appoint her as the Honorary Chairwoman of PRC.28 It’s not a coincidence that the first meeting of the CPPCC Preparatory Committee was convened and chaired by Deng Yingchao on 19 May when Song was in a very critical condition. At that meeting, it was decided that scholars from Taiwan and guests from overseas would be welcome to attend the commemoration.29 Moreover, the next day after Song’s death, it was officially announced that all Song’s relatives and friends from Taiwan were welcome to attend her funeral scheduled on 3 June. Special planes from Taiwan’s China Airlines were allowed to land at the airports of Beijing and Shanghai and all costs concerned would be borne by Song’s Funeral Committee.30 Thirdly, on another special day, namely, China’s National Day on 1 October 1981, the NPC Speaker Ye Jianying’s “Nine-Point Policy concerning Taiwan’s Unification with the Motherland” was published, calling for the third CCP-KMT cooperation and listing a series of concrete policy measures for that purpose.31 One year earlier, at the thirteenth conference of the CPPCC Standing Committee, dated 7 October 1980, it was decided that China would hold a grand commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution. The Preparatory Committee of 171 VIPs were set up with the NPC Speaker Ye Jianying as chairman, Song Qingling, Deng Xiaopeng, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Deng Yingchao as associate chairmen and Quwu, a veteran of the 1911 Revolution, as secretary-general, indicating the highest level and significance of the event.32 On 9 October, the 70th anniversary grand commemoration in Beijing was opened by the NPC Speaker Ye Jianying. Party Secretary-General Hu Yaobang gave a keynote speech, and Deng Xiaopeng, Zhao Ziyang and Deng Yingchao were present. Over 10,000 guests attended and all ambassadors and diplomats stationed in China were invited.33 All provincial and municipal city capitals also hosted their respective commemorations. In his speech as Party secretary-general, Hu Yaobang openly invited fifteen VIPs in Taiwan, including Jiang Jingguo and Song Meiling, and all other Taiwan compatriots to visit the mainland and their homeland, be it for the purpose of having a visit or a talk.34 In order to

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highlight a close linkage between the 1911 Revolution and the unification cause, the CPPCC Vice-Chairwoman, Deng Yingchao, again hosted a tea party for the invited guests to discuss the NPC Speaker Ye Jianying’s “Nine Points” policy and the CCP Secretary-General Hu Yaobang’s speech in the morning of the very next day.35 The 1991 commemoration of the 1911 Revolution was also meaningful, not only because it took place after the 1989 “June 4 Event” and the fall of Berlin Wall, but also because it was held before Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” and the “Wang-Koo Talk” in Singapore in 1992. Moreover, it took place under the new leadership both in the mainland and Taiwan, that is, Jiang Zemin in the case of the CCP and Lee Teng-hui in the case of the KMT. By the time of the 1991 commemoration, China had sent a clear signal to the outside world, including Taiwan, that the Chinese Government would firmly adhere to reform and the opening policy and that the Chinese Government would be against any attempt to promote Taiwan’s independence. Simply put, under the circumstances, Beijing manifested that it would continue the policy of reform and the opening to the outside world and its peaceful unification with Taiwan. On 9 October, a Beijing conference at the highest level was convened with the presence of all seven standing committee members of the CCP Political Bureau, including Jiang Zemin, Yang Shangkun, Li Peng and Wan Li. It was attended by 5,000 participants. Chinese President Yang Shangkun and the Chinese KMT Central Committee Honorary Chairman Quwu gave keynote speeches respectively.36

Third Stage, from 1996 up to the Present In this stage, owing to Taiwan changing political situations, a new dimension emphasizing anti-Taiwan independence is added as a very important working or policy priority. The context was the tense cross-strait relations as a result of Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States. It became worse after the DPP candidate, Chen Shuibian, came to power in 2000 and got himself re-elected for another term four years later on. This posed a great challenge both for the CCP and KMT. The third CCP-KMT cooperation was hence called upon and Sun’s legacy was constructed as the very founding linkage for China’s unification cause. Under these new situations, the 2001 commemoration of the 1911 Revolution and the 2006 commemoration of Sun Yat-sen’s 140th birthday turned out especially significant for cross-strait relationship. The former was a very good occasion for the CCP to pronounce its firm and clear policy on the Taiwan issue under Chen Shuibian’s new regime, while the latter formed

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a solid foundation to renew the CCP-KMT historic cooperation under the common umbrella of Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary cause. The forthcoming centurial anniversary commemoration of the 1911 Revolution would be even more magnificent and meaningful. Firstly, the KMT has taken back power from the DPP in 2008; secondly, the “three direct links” were realized on 15 December 2008, and the historic ECFT took into effect on 1 July 2010. Thus the commemoration has its economic dimension as well as political significance. For example, it would be the first time that the commemoration is jointly held in Taipei by two sides. Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution have become a common historical and cultural legacy for cross-strait relations. Moreover, one important point is that Sun Yat-sen’s “People’s Livelihood” principle has a direct relevance for contemporary China. As announced by the official Xinhua News Agency in a report on the establishment of the CPPCC Preparatory Committee headed by Political Bureau Member Wang Gang, the commemoration of Sun Yat-sen’s birthday and the 1911 Revolution in 2011 would take place in a new historical circumstance. It would further consolidate the unity among the Chinese all over the world and certainly promote Chinese peaceful unification across the Straits of Taiwan.37

The Commemorations of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution in Nanyang The commemoration of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution in Nanyang takes place only occasionally, rather than annually as practised in China. Initially, it was useful to promote friendly diplomatic relations with the PRC in the 1950s, notably for Indonesia, Vietnam and Burma. However, other countries, such as Singapore and Malaysia, deliberately kept China at a distance. For the former, it was due to the similar background in which their independence was secured. For the latter, it was because of the sensitive domestic ideological issue and communal politics. It was not until about twenty years ago that Singapore and Malaysia began to rediscover the legacy of Sun Yat-sen for Nanyang’s re-engagement with China. Likewise, it is not a coincidence that in the last decade, Zheng He’s voyage from 1405 and 1433 was rediscovered by both China and Southeast Asia to serve their respective political and economic interests. Because of ideology and the Cold War, it is interesting to note that the high-level commemorations in Indonesia, Burma and Vietnam in the 1950s were in contrast with the deliberate official negligence in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. It is equally interesting to note that Singapore and Malaysia have recently turned out to be the most enthusiastic countries in conducting the recent series of memorials.

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That shift was coincided with the reorientation of Cold War politics in Asia, Sino-Southeast Asian relations, and the changing domestic political dynamics in Singapore and Malaysia. Another shift is the changing theme of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution commemorations. One interesting contrast is that the commemoration in the 1950s was initiated and implemented by the Overseas Chinese communities, endorsed and promoted by the non-Chinese Southeast Asian nationalist revolutionary leadership, and focused on Sun Yat-sen and his ideological legacy of revolutionary nationalism and Asianism, while the current memorials in the 2000s are mainly concerned with historical legacy and cultural heritage in Nanyang (endorsed and appropriated by the authorities). Moreover, it is important to note that nowadays both the government of Singapore and local state of Penang have duly realized the merit of such heritage, either in terms of domestic agenda or international implication. Unlike the pre-1990s, they are now proud, but no longer shy as before, of that connection with China. In a word, it would be justifiable to note that the theme of the commemoration in the 1950s was the emphasis on Sun Yat-sen’s legacy among Southeast Asian nationalist leadership in Indonesia, Vietnam and Burma in the conduct of the revolutionary movements, while the theme in the 2000s highlights Nanyang’s legacy in the 1911 Revolution. Here, Nanyang and Nanyang Chinese were deliberately coined, emphasizing the more historical and cultural aspects despite the unavoidable political dimension. The 1956 commemoration of Sun Yat-sen’s birthday in Nanyang took place in the contexts of international anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism and domestic nation-building in the region. Prior to the commemoration, there were three important visits to promote Sino-Southeast Asian relations They are Madam Song’s visits to Burma and Indonesia in January 1956 and August 1956 respectively, and President Soeharto’s visit to China in October 1956. All three visits were arranged during their National Day’s celebration and took place under the umbrella of Asia as one family following the Bandung Conference in 1955. If Song’s visit to Burma in January 1956 was just part of her fifty-day visit to South Asia including India and Pakistan, then the other two visits deserve special mention. For these two visits, Sun and his legacy were usually engaged as a key topic of speeches for both sides and obviously formed a significant linkage for mutual cultivation of closer diplomatic relations as well as personal friendship. In the case of Indonesia, it was from Sun Yat-sen that Sukarno for the first time had learnt about the idea of “Asia as One Family” and Sun’s “Three People’s Principles”. These had much influence on Sukarno’s revolutionary

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enlightenment and cause, and Sukarno praised Sun as a revolutionary leader not only for China, but also for the whole Asia.38 In this context, it is no wonder that Sun’s widow Madam Song was chosen to head the Southeast Asian visit on China’s behalf. Sukarno’s visit to China lasted for half a month and was welcome at the highest level by China. Led by Chairman Mao, almost the whole team of Chinese leadership, including Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Song Qingling, went to airport to welcome Sukarno’s visit and Mao again saw Sukarno off at the airport for his continuous visit to other places in China.39 In Beijing, Madam Song, accompanied by Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, invited Sukarno to her home for a banquet. And after dinner, together with Peng Zhen, Song herself even took Sukarno to visit Wangfujing Department Store.40 Beyond Beijing, Sukarno, accompanied by Vice-Premier Chen Yi, paid a tribute to Sun Yat-sen’s tomb in Nanjing immediately after his arrival at the airport.41 He also made a deliberate effort to visit Sun’s old residence in Shanghai. It was in Sun’s old residence in Shanghai that Sukarno received a special gift from Song via her secretary. Interestingly, the special gift was all related to Sun Yat-sen, including Sun’s copper portrait, his funeral commemoration album, and a wedding photo with Song. Moreover, at his request, Sukarno also received another special present from Song, that is, a photo of Song’s youth day kept at Sun Yat-sen’s residence, as Sukarno mentioned that he once saw that photo in 1929 and kept it for his private record, but was lost after he was arrested.42 Southeast Asian delegations from Burma, Indonesia and Vietnam were invited to attend the 1956 Sun Yat-sen’s 90th birthday commemoration in Beijing. Delegates were usually friendship association officials, congressmen and university scholars. Among thirteen invited conference speeches by distinguished foreign guests were three delivered by delegates from Southeast Asian countries of Burma, Indonesia and Vietnam.43 However, Chinese government and leadership also received telegraphic greetings from their counterparts of Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia and Vietnam, among whom were Premier U Ba Swe and Chairman U Nu of Burma, King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, President Sukarno and Premier Sastroamijoyo of Indonesia, and Chairman Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam.44 While in Nanyang, mainly in Burma and Indonesia, these non-Chinese Southeast Asian national and local leaders joined the various commemoration gatherings and gave keynote speeches. These functions were usually organized and attended by Nanyang Overseas Chinese, including veterans of Tongmenghui and KMT. The local mainstream newspapers highlighted these activities and published a series of memorial articles.

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In Burma, prior to the commemoration day, the local Chinese newspapers had published telegraphic greetings by Burmese national leaders and a series of important articles by Burmese vice-premier, government ministers, political veterans, newspaper editors-in-chief and film directors. On 10 November, at the press conference and on a radio speech, Chairman U Nu reiterated that border talks between Burma and Chinese were sincere and friendly and based on the five peaceful co-existence principles set by the Bandung conference. In particular, U Nu mentioned that the Chinese Government would welcome any delegate from Taiwan for peace negotiations, that the Sun Yat-sen 90th Birthday Commemoration Preparation Committee would even sent an invitation to the KMT in Taiwan and that he had passed on such Chinese Government’s attitude to Secretary of State Dulles. 45 On 11 November, commemoration conferences were held by Overseas Chinese in Rangoon, Mandalay, Tavoy and other cities.46 In Indonesia, the Commemoration Organizing Committee was set up in Jakarta, consisting of more than eighty members, many of whom were the veterans of Xingzhonghui, Tongmenghui and KMT, including Sun Yat-sen’s ex-bodyguard Lin Guoxing.47 On the night of 12 November, Overseas Chinese in Jakarta held a magnificent commemoration conference with 3,000 people present. President Sukarno was invited to give a keynote speech, in which Sun Yat-sen’s internationalism was elaborated in the contexts of Chinese domestic nationalism and contemporary global antiimperialism. Among distinguished guests were Indonesian Second DeputySpeaker, Jakarta Mayor (his wife present on his behalf ), Jakarta Vice-Mayor, Chinese Ambassador, and diplomats from Soviet Union and other Asian and African countries. Except for having their own commemoration conferences, various Chinese communities from Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya and Palembang also sent special delegates to attend the general conference in Jakarta. By the time of the Sun Yat-sen 90th birthday commemoration, it turned out to be a Sino-Indonesian and Asian-African friendship and solidarity conference.48 As for Vietnam, there was no such grand conference as in Burma and Indonesia because of its on-going domestic anti-imperialist military struggle. However, in two days of November, newspapers in Hanoi consecutively published memorial articles on Sun Yat-sen and his connections with Vietnam by local scholars and Chinese veterans of Tongmenghui. For the sake of Vietnamese domestic military struggle, they of course highlighted the theme of Sun’s influence on Vietnamese revolutionary nationalism and mutual assistance between Sino-Vietnamese revolutionary comrades. It was

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decided that the commemoration meetings, organized by Vietnam-China Friendship Association, would be held in Hanoi and Haiphong on 16 and 17 November respectively.49 For the current wave of commemorations, especially in Singapore and Malaysia, historical and cultural projects overweigh ideological and political concerns, unlike the ones in Indonesia, Burma and Vietnam in the 1950s. Two outstanding examples are the Sun Yat-sen Nanyang Memorial Hall in Singapore and the Sun Yat-sen Centre in Penang, which showcase how the mixed history, culture and ethnicity are instrumental in shaping the local, national and regional agendas under changing situations. 50 It is not a coincidence that these two states, where the Chinese are the majority community, host the current wave of Southeast Asian commemoration activities. Also, in the context of improving SinoVietnamese relations after more than a decade of tension and conflict, it is not surprising that eight institutions and associations in Vietnam, including the Vietnamese Historical Society, organized a joint conference in Hanoi to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution.51 Perhaps, such shifts can be seen as: (1) to make up for their absence in involving themselves with Chinese grand commemorative activities in the 1950s; (2) a manifestation of historical reality of their close involvement with the 1911 Revolution that was deliberately neglected and even forgotten over decades; (3) an effort to structure or re-structure their own cultural and historical memory and heritage so that the construction and reconstruction of Sun Yat-sen, Nanyang, and the 1911 Revolution formed an integral part of their own communal, local and even national history; and (4) a political and economic platform to engage China and promote Chineseness in the context of China’s rise and prospect of peaceful unification. On the other hand, it should be added that the current wave of commemorations seem to have been considered to be normal as they would no longer cause political suspicion from governments and local communities.

Conclusion In shaping Chinese modern history, Sun Yat-sen was an epoch-making revolutionary pioneer and the 1911 Revolution was a watershed democratic event. Both in China and Southeast Asia, Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution are engaged, constructed and reconstructed more as politicalideological icon, rather than as pure scholarly intellectual subject, serving

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their domestic agenda respectively with the implications going far beyond the very personality and event. There was not only a difference between the pre1949 KMT commemoration and the post-1949 CCP commemoration, but also a contrast between the Southeast Asian commemoration in the 1950s and the current Southeast Asian commemoration. Behind the dynamics of commemoration and representation of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution, for China, its priority agenda is more ideological concern of revolution and the CCP-KMT rivalry initially. Later, it is shifted to the less ideological issue of national unification cause across the Taiwan Straits. For Southeast Asia, it has been mainly the business of Overseas Chinese communities and instrumental linkages emphasized by some newly independent countries of Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam, and recently, Singapore and Malaysia in particular. From what we have presented, the commemorations of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution in China and Southeast Asia have been dominated by politics whose agenda is influenced by revolution and ideology in the early decades and by culture, ethnicity and history in the later years. Revolution and ideology were both domestic and international. These would include the confrontation between the CCP and KMT on the one hand and conflicts between nationalism and colonialism or imperialism on the other. Culture, ethnicity and history are instrumentals for promoting the agenda of political economy, either national or international. The different commemorations in different periods by different peoples and governments in China and Southeast Asia tell us not only about the structured difference of the regimes in the CCP-ruled Mainland and the KMT-ruled Taiwan, but also about the fundamental difference of the circumstances in shaping Southeast Asian nations of Indonesia, Vietnam and Burma on the one hand and Singapore and Malaysia on the other. More importantly, they tell us how the value of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution and even the history of Chinese nationalism are remembered, appreciated and appropriated differently by these different peoples and different regimes under different circumstances. Even ironically, under the current changing circumstances, despite different purposes and agendas behind all these different peoples and governments, one point is common and certain: that Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution have now turned out to be a historical linkage, political legacy and new dynamics, not only for cross-strait relations, but also for China-Southeast Asian interaction. Is that driven by a new Asian dynamics, if not a new and evolving Asianism, in the context of a global China?

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Notes 1

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The research for this chapter was funded by Kiriyama Education Foundation at Peking University, for which support the author is grateful. To Professor Cheah Boon Kheng and especially Professor Caroline Hau, the author would like to record his appreciations for their constructive comments. Prasenjit Duara, The Global and the Regional in China’s Nation-formation (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 151–66. Caroline S. Hau and Takashi Shiraishi, “Daydreaming About Rizal Tetcho: On Asianism as Network and Fantasy”, Philippines Studies 57, no. 3 (2009): 329–88. Wang Gungwu, “Sun Yat-Sen and Singapore”, in China and Southeast Asia, Volume IV: Interactions from the End of the Nineteenth Century to 1911, edited by Geoff Wade (London: Routledge, 2009). For the details, see Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976). Andrew R. Wilson, “Ambition and Identity: China and the Chinese in the Colonial Philippines, 1885–1912”, Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1998, pp. 182, 184–85, 192–93. See also, Zhang Kaiyuan 章 开 沅 , “Tongmenghui ji ‘Minbao’ de yuan yuan” 同盟会及《民报》的渊源”, Wenshi zhishi 文史知识 [Cultural and Historical Knowledge], no. 9 (2005): 11. Sun Yat-sen to Charles Beach Boothe, 15 July 1910, Sun Zhongshan quanji 孙中山全集 [The Complete Collection of Sun Yat-sen], Volume one: 1890– 1911 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), p. 468. Renmin ribao, [the People’s Daily] 人民日报 [the People’s Daily]，13 November 1966. This quotation is directly translated from Song’s Chinese article without checking with Mariano Ponce’s original version. Renmin ribao [the People’s Daily] 人民日报, 9 October 1981; Edwin Lee, The British As Rulers Governing Multiracial Singapore, 1867–1914 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1991), pp. 218–26; (Yuenan) Ruan Wenqing (越南) 阮文庆, “Sun Zhongshan zai yuenan de yingxiang” 孙中山在越南的影响 [Sun Yat-sen’s Influence in Vietnam], Dongnanya zongheng 东南亚纵横 [Around Southeast Asia], no. 1 (2008): 69–74; Wang Xihui 王希辉 and Huang Jing 黄金, “Yuenan huajiao yu Sun Zhongshan lingdao de geming yundong” 越南华侨与孙中山领导的革命运动 [Vietnamese and Chinese Revolutionary Movement led by Sun Yat-sen], bagui qiaokan [Bagui Overseas Journal], no. 4 (2006): 62–65; Qin Suhan 秦素菡, “Yuenan huaqiao huangjingnan yu Sun Zhongshan geming” [Huang Jingnan and Sun Yatsen’s Revolution], Dongnanya nanya yanjiu 东南亚南亚研究 [Southeast Asia and South Asian Studies], no. 2 (2009): 60–65; Wang Gungwu, 2009, pp. 295–306. Wangye 王叶, “1912 nian sishui canan: Sun Zhongshan lianshou huqiao zhansheng waiqiang” [1912 “Swabaya tragedy”: Sun Yat-sen overseas joint

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, 12 November 1956.

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11

12

13

14 15 16 17 18

19 20 21

22

23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

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protection against foreign powers], Qiaoyuan 侨园 [Chinese Overseas], no. 11 (2009): 68–69. See James R. Shirley, “Control of the Kuomintang after Sun Yat-sen’s Death”, The Journal of Asian Studies 25, no. 1 (1965): 69–82. Delin Lai, “Searching for a Modern Chinese Monument: The Design of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing”, Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 64, no. 1 (2005): 22–55; Chen Yunqian 陈蕴茜, Chongbai yu jiyi: Sun Zhongshan fuhao de jiangou yu chuanbo 崇拜与记忆：孙中山符号的 建构与传播 [Worship and Memory: The Construction and Dissemination of Sun Sign] (Nanjing 南京: Nanjing daxue chubanshe 南京大学出版社, 2009); Li Gongzhong 李恭忠, Zhongshan Ling: Yige xiandai zhengzhi fuhao de dansheng 中山陵：一个现代政治符号的诞生 [Sun Yat-sen: The Birth of a Modern Political Symbol] (Beijing 北京: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe 社会科学文献出版社, 2009). Edmund S. K. Fung, “Post-1949 Chinese Historiography on the 1911 Revolution”, Modern China 4, no. 2 (1978): 181–214; Zhang Kaiyuan, “A General Review of the Study of the Revolution of 1911 in the People’s Republic of China”, The Journal of Asian Studies 39, no. 3 (1980): 525–31. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 12 November 1956. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 12 November 1956. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 18 September 1981, 12 October 1981. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 16 September 2010. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 10 October 1961, 24 October 1961, and 24 November 1961. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 25 October 1965. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 1 November 1965. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 12 February 1966, 20 February 1966, 21 March 1966. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 11 November 1966, 13 November 1966, 15 November 1966. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 1966–76, 13 March 1977, 21 November 1977, 16 November 1978. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 6 October 1981. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 25 March 1982, 7 April 1982. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 1 January 1979. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 1 May 1981. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 17 May 1981. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 20 May 1981. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 31 May 1981. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 1 October 1981. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 8 October 1981.

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Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution in China and Southeast Asia 33 34 35 36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43

44 45 46 47 48 49 50

51

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Renmin ribao 人民日报, 10 October 1981. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 10 October 1981. The chairman was Deng Xiaopeng. Renmin ribao, 人民日报, 11 October 1981. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 12 January 1991, 10 October 1991, 16 October 1991. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 23 October 2010. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 17 August 1956, 27 September 1956. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 1 October 1956. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 4 October 1956. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 10 October 1956. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 12 October 1956. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 9 November 1956, 12 November 1956, 7 December 1956. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 12 November 1956. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 13 November 1956. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 14 November 1956. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 10 November 1956. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 15 November 1956. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 14 November 1956. Huang Jianli and Hong Lysa, “History and the Imaginaries of ‘Big Singapore’: Positioning the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 35, no. 1 (2004): 65–89. See also Hong Lysa and Huang Jianli, The Scripting of a National History: Singapore and Its Pasts (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), pp. 181–204. Renmin ribao 人民日报, 10 October 1956.

References Chen Yunqian 陈蕴茜. Chongbai yu jiyi: Sun Zhongshan fuhao de jiangou yu chuanbo 崇拜与记忆：孙中山符号的建构与传播 [Worship and Memory: The Construction and Dissemination of Sun Sigh]. Nanjing 南京: Nanjing daxue chubanshe 南京大学出版社, 2009. Duara, Prasenjit. The Global and the Regional in China’s Nation-formation. London: Routledge, 2009. Fung, Edmund S. K. “Post-1949 Chinese Historiography on the 1911 Revolution”. Modern China 4, no. 2 (1978): 181–214. Hau, Caroline S. and Takashi Shiraishi. “Daydreaming about Rizal Tetcho: On Asianism as Network and Fantasy”. Philippines Studies 57, no. 3 (2009): 329–88. Hong Lysa and Huang Jianli. The Scripting of a National History: Singapore and its Pasts. Singapore: NUS Press, 2008.

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Huang Jianli and Hong Lysa. “History and the Imaginaries of ‘Big Singapore’: Positioning the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall”. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 35, no. 1 (2004): 65–89. Lai, Delin. “Searching for a Modern Chinese Monument: The Design of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing”. Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 64, no. 1 (2005): 22–55. Lee, Edwin. The British As Rulers Governing Multiracial Singapore, 1867–1914. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1991. Li Gongzhong 李恭忠. Zhongshan Ling: Yige xiandai zhengzhi fuhao de dansheng 中山陵：一个现代政治符号的诞生 [Sun Yat-sen: The Birth of a Modern Political Symbol]. Beijing 北京: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe 社会科学 文献出版社, 2009. Lianhe Zaobao, 23 October 2010. Qin Suhan 秦素菡. “Yuenan huaqiao huangjingnan yu Sun Zhongshan geming” [Huang Jingnan and Sun Yat-sen’s Revolution]. Dongnanya nanya yanjiu 东 南亚南亚研究 [Southeast Asia and South Asian Studies], no. 2 (2009): 60–65. Renmin Ribao [the People’s Daily], 17 August 1956, 27 September 1956, 1 October 1956, 4 October 1956, 10 October 1956, 12 October 1956, 9 November 1956, 10 November 1956, 12 November–7 December 1956, 10 October 1961, 24 October 1961, 24 November 1961, 25 October 1965, 1 November 1965, 12 February 1966, 20 February–21 March 1966, 11 November 1966, 13 November 1966, 15 November 1966, 13 March 1977, 21 November 1977, 16 November 1978, 1 January 1979, 8 October 1980, 16–17 May 1981, 20 May 1981, 31 May 1981, 18 September 1981, 1 October 1981, 6 October 1981, 9–12 October 1981, 25 March 1982, 7 April 1982, 12 January 1991, 10 October 1991, 16 October 1991, 16 September 2010. Shirley, James R. “Control of the Kuomintang after Sun Yat-sen’s Death”. The Journal of Asian Studies 25, no. 1 (1965): 69–82. Sun Zhongshan quanji 孙中山全集 [The Complete Collection of Sun Yat-sen]. Volume one: 1890–1911. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981. Wang Gungwu. “Sun Yat-Sen and Singapore”. In China and Southeast Asia. Volume IV: Interactions from the end of the nineteenth century to 1911, edited by Geoff Wade. London: Routledge, 2009. Wang Xihui 王希辉 and Huang Jing 黄金. “Yuenan huajiao yu Sun Zhongshan lingdao de geming yundong” 越 南 华 侨 与 孙 中 山 领 导 的 革 命 运 动 [Vietnamese and Chinese Revolutionary Movement led by Sun Yat-sen]. Bagui qiaokan [Bagui Overseas Journal], no. 4 (2006): 62–65. Wangye 王叶. “1912 nian sishui canan: Sun Zhongshan lianshou huqiao zhansheng waiqiang” [1912 “Swabaya tragedy”: Sun Yat-sen overseas joint protection against foreign powers]. Qiaoyuan 侨园 [Chinese Overseas], no. 11 (2009): 68–69.

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Wilson, Andrew R. “Ambition and Identity: China and the Chinese in the Colonial Philippines, 1885–1912”. Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1998. Yen Ching Hwang. The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976. (Yuenan) Ruan Wenqing [(越南)阮文庆]. “Sun Zhongshan zai yuenan de yingxiang” 孙中山在越南的影响 [Sun Yat-sen’s Influence in Vietnam]. Dongnanya zongheng 东南亚纵横 [Around Southeast Asia], no. 1 (2008): 69–74. Zhang Kaiyuan. “A General Review of the Study of the Revolution of 1911 in the People’s Republic of China”. The Journal of Asian Studies 39, no. 3 (1980): 525–31. ———. “Tongmenghui ji ‘Minbao’ de yuan yuan” 同盟会及《民报》的渊源”. Wenshi zhishi 文史知识 [Cultural and Historical Knowledge], no. 9 (2005): 11.

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12 REVOLUTIONARIES AND REPUBLICANS: THE FRENCH PRESS ON SUN YAT-SEN AND THE XINHAI REVOLUTION Alexander Major For many nineteenth-century Chinese, only the Han ethnicity could be viewed as legitimate Chinese rulers. Like the Mongol Khans of the Yuan dynasty,1 the Manchu of the Qing dynasty were widely viewed as foreign invaders. While, in the early days of the regime, the Qing were able to forge alliance with influential Han administrators, and contrived to position themselves as the heir to the Ming dynasty, putting down the peasant rebellion that had caused the collapse of the previous regime in 1644, the notion that they were foreign masters never left the majority Han population. Manchu officials dominated at court, were present at all levels of government, and Manchu soldiers were garrisoned in all the important urban centres to assure the stability of the regime.2 Imperial regulations favouring the Manchu were a tolerable irritant to the subjects of the empire during the prosperous Kang-Qian period,3 but became an intolerable invasion of sovereignty when fortunes turned bad in the nineteenth century. Significantly, the demonstration of weakness evident in the loss of the Opium War (1839–42) to Britain instigated a series of open rebellions and secessionist movements in the West and South, dividing the attention of the Court for the last half of the century. 270

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While rebellion raged, other agitators sought reform to re-establish the authority of the dynasty through the will of the people. The One Hundred Days Reform (1898) of the Guangxu Emperor, with the advice of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, is one example of a non-revolutionary reform movement in the late Qing period. However, the abject failure of the movement and the harsh reaction of the conservative forces in the government only further convinced revolutionaries that the removal of the Qing was the only hope for China. Sun Yat-sen believed the best remedy was to transit into a republic. He began actively looking to reverse the Qing regime in the 1890s. By 1894 he had established the Xingzhonghui (Revive China Society) to work toward this goal. The group’s oath “Expel the northern barbarians, revive Zhonghua, and establish a unified government” (驱逐鞑虏，恢复中华，建立合众政府) gives a clear indication of the subversive intent. Though this organization did not acquire significant influence on its own, once merged into the Tongmenghui, and later Kuomintang, it was part of the greater revolutionary movement that ultimately saw the end of the Qing dynasty.

European Colonialism in East Asia The Portuguese and Dutch were the first to establish a presence in the Far East, with territorial possessions dating from the late Ming period.4 It was arguably the British, however, who had the greatest impact on future events in China. Starting with Singapore in 1819, the British aggressively pursued Far Eastern trade opportunities and eroded the traditional influence of the Chinese court. This friction came to a head with the Opium War which ultimately opened China to foreign occupation through the Treaty Port/Concession system. This created a crisis for the Qing as it exposed an unanticipated level of weakness to internal enemies, who were able to increase their recruitment by promising to remove the dynasty. This attitude would be evident in both the reform and revolutionary movements of the ensuing decades. While the French were not the first to arrive in East Asia, they were significant players in the colonial movement in the region. Prior to the Treaty of Whampoa (1844), French presence in the Far East, not including Jesuit missionaries, was limited to occasional trade voyages to Guangzhou. Though the earliest French presence in India and the Indian Ocean dated from the seventeenth century,5 France did not have a permanent settlement further East until the establishment of the Treaty Ports. Significantly to China, and the future relationship with Sun Yat-sen, France staked a claim in Southeast Asia, first acquiring territory in 1862, and expanding that conquest into French

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Indochina which ran along much of China’s southern border. This geopolitical circumstance, as much as any philosophical kinship, is the key impetus to the relationship that developed between Sun Yat-sen and the French. French colonialism in Asia had revolved around Indochina for decades preceding the Xinhai Revolution, and extended for decades after. It was this territorial concern, and the possibility of further expansion into the provinces of southern China, that drove French interest in a relationship with Sun. The potential for economic advantage, combined with regional colonial competition with the British, who had staked claims in Singapore and Burma, and the need to protect French citizens in China, pushed the expansionist movement to consider all options. For the expansionists, Yunnan was the prized territory. Even before Sun had offered the French a way into the province, they were coveting its riches, as revealed by an 1899 intelligence report: Yunnan abounds in minerals of all kinds. Iron is the most common metal, followed by copper, tin, zinc, lead, cinnabar and silver. Gold can be found, especially in the bed of the Yangtze river. Precious stones have been noted, rubies, topaz, sapphires, emeralds and several unusual varieties of jade. The alluvial terrain is in general suitable for all kinds of farming. Almost all the products of Europe are cultivated on the plateaux and in the south one encounters all those of the tropic zone.6

As Sun’s initial strategy involved establishing a foothold in the south, a relationship with the French was a natural fit for both sides.

Research Objectives The modern French are somewhat defined by their revolutionary and republican traditions, and Sun Yat-sen is known as both a revolutionary and the “Father of the Chinese Republic”. This commonality of identity begs investigation into French media characterizations of the Chinese revolution and its republican leader. Sun made the choice to pursue a republic early on, after reaching the conclusion that it was the form of government with the best chance of success, despite the fact that there were only a few republics in existence at the time.7 Within this revolutionary and republican movement some elements of the French tradition are evident. The doctrine of popular freedom, respect of

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human rights, and the implementation of equality, present in the Chinese republican ideology have their roots in the French revolution of 1789.8 The French republican notion of liberty, equality, fraternity, which had only recently reached the Chinese revolutionaries in 1911, was an inspiration for the movement. However, the distinction between the ideological and practical impact of French revolutionary philosophy must not be confused. In fact, the main contribution of the French tradition to the Chinese Revolution was in political ideas and the individual development of revolutionary leaders, rather than as a blueprint for practical implementation.9 Despite this, in 1912, in the throes of a successful republican revolution, French and Chinese guests to the celebration at the Hotel Continental in Paris toasted the special and eternal relationship of the two sister Republics. But what did this mean for the portrayal of Chinese revolutionaries and republicans in the French press? The characterization of Sun and the revolution in a leading French populist conservative daily, Le Figaro, and the leading intellectual newspaper, Le Journal des Débats politiques et littéraires, says much about how the personalities and events of China were presented to the French constituency and what biases the French would carry towards Sun and the Revolution going forward into the Republican period. Questions such as whether Sun Yat-sen was portrayed as a liberating hero or subversive villain? Was Chinese Republicanism viewed as a continuation of the French tradition, a new strain of republicanism, a hybrid, or a farce? And, what aims were the French publications looking to achieve by their characterizations of Sun and the Revolution? These questions may be answered through this undertaking. By this exercise, we may understand a part of the enduring international legacy of Sun Yat-sen. The articles on Sun Yat-sen and the Revolution that appear in the two newspapers integral to this study from mid-October 1911 until May 1912 provide the most important primary evidence of the characterizations published in the French press. The comprehensive biography of Sun Yat-sen produced by Marie-Claire Bergère and some of her earlier collaborations on the 1911 Revolution offer insight into Sun’s developing relationship with the French. Marianne Bastid’s analysis of the explicit and implicit impact of French republicanism on the Chinese movement illustrates the philosophical links. Jeffrey Barlow’s thorough account of Sun Yat-sen and the French in Indochina from 1900 to 1908 and various contributions on the thought of Sun Yat-sen complete the source pool that facilitated the acquisition of viable results. The French press presentation of Sun and the revolution will be revealed in three steps: (1) the road to revolution: Sun Yat-sen and the French — which

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explores topics such as the background of French republicanism, Sun’s early relationship with the French, and the stakes of the revolution for France and China; (2) the reporting on the Xinhai Revolution in the French press — with topics including the analysis of the two source newspapers, the selection bias of the stories on the revolution for a French audience, and the rationalizing of the Chinese conflict in the French press; and (3) the French press and the shaping of French public opinion — which deals with the portrayal of Sun Yat-sen in the French press, the presentation of the republican programme to the French readers and French media analysis of the consolidation of the Chinese republic.

The Road to Revolution: Sun Yat-sen and the French The first republican constitution in France was the Montagnard Constitution of June 1793. Based on the principles outlined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), with additional rights such as the superiority of popular sovereignty over national sovereignty, the right of association, the right to public education, the right of rebellion (and obligation to rebel if the government violates the rights of the people), and the right to work — this Constitution was the theoretical basis for the Constitution of the Second (1848) and Third (1875) French republics. Sun Yat-sen’s machinations and the Xinhai Revolution occurred around the mid-point of the Third Republic in France. This regime had emerged from the ashes of humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), which included the loss of sovereignty over French territory. Key values and the principles of enlightenment philosophy were central to the republic replacing the Second Empire. This commitment is evidenced by the fact that the republicans’ insistence on maintaining the tricolore banner as national flag contributed to the failure of an attempted monarchical restoration; and, the motto “Liberté, égalité, fraternité” was, for the first time, made official, manifesting a French revolutionary identity that would be carried overseas during the colonial expansion to come. The Third Republic would embrace its role as the constitutional embodiment of Enlightenment philosophical principles, even if practice did not always follow suit.10

Sun Yat-sen’s Relationship with the French before the Revolution Sun Yat-sen sought out cooperation with the French as a result of careful consideration of the political possibilities. His assessment of the situation

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would seem to have been proven correct by the fact that the French expansionists were keen to explore the relationship after Sun’s initial pitch for a collaborative effort to Paul Doumer.11 More than a decade before the Xinhai Revolution, Sun made his first diplomatic contact with the French. Requesting a formal letter of introduction from Jules Harmond, the French Minister to Tokyo, Sun hoped to get an audience with Doumer in Indochina to discuss his plans and the part the French could play. The French, however, took a cautious approach. Harmond suggested to Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé that it would be prudent to accommodate Sun, as he was believed to have Japanese support, a rival to French ambitions in the Asian theatre. To this end, Doumer was advised to appear open to Sun’s ideas, to reduce the possibility that the latter would resort to seeking Japanese assistance in southern China. Sun was not blocked from making contact with Doumer, but was not issued the requested letter.12 Harmond told Paris that he felt it would be a good idea to allow Sun to have the meeting so that they could get an account of his plans.13 Probably owing to concerns over opposition to the expansionist movement in Paris, Doumer understated his meeting with Sun in communication with the Foreign Ministry; suggesting that Sun’s plans were not feasible and that he was not capable of leading his proposed campaign. Despite this assessment of Sun, Doumer was asked to provide more details of the encounter. In a subsequent dispatch he reported that during his meeting with Sun in Saigon he offered ambiguous support, but stated that while France was committed to the Far East, there was no desire to see China in revolution or other turmoil. Noting that Sun did not seem to be well-connected to the secret societies, Doumer predicted he would be unable to make significant inroads.14 The sincerity of Doumer’s remarks is called into question by later events. While there is no documentation of the proceedings of the meeting itself, and it is possible he said the things to Sun that he reported to Paris, Doumer’s continued efforts to gain French advantage in Yunnan and willingness to work with Sun to this end, suggest a different sort of meeting occurred. Circumstantially, the fact that Doumer instigated the plans for the 1902 meeting through the French Minister to Tokyo would suggest that he saw some value in cultivating the relationship with an eye to furthering French advantage in southern China on the back of Sun’s revolutionary ideas.15 This relationship was also motivated by the fact that Sun was seeking to create a secessionist federation of the southern provinces bordering on French territory, rather than creating his republic in the entirety of Chinese territory which was militarily impractical. This course was more realistic as Qing power was weakest and local dissent strongest in this region.

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The possibility of Sun and the French working in alliance was seriously investigated in the middle of the decade. French intelligence officers accompanied Sun’s organizer throughout southern China to make a firsthand appraisal of his strength and influence on behalf of the Colonial Lobby supporters in the French Government and the expansionists of Indochina. The resulting report overestimated the extent and strength of manpower and equipment at Sun’s disposal, and overstated the likelihood of a successful southern secessionist state being formed as a result.16 Jean-Baptiste Paul Beau replaced Doumer as governor-general of Indochina in October 1902. He stayed in the office until February 1908, a period which corresponds with Sun’s closest ties to the French. While not an avowed member of the expansionist movement, he did nothing to block their machinations in concert with Sun’s ambitions. Sun and the French expansionists of Indochina were willing partners in the pursuit of individual ambitions. For Sun the relationship with the French developed on two levels, initially through the official channels of Tokyo, Hanoi, Beijing and Paris; but when French Government directives shifted in favour of the maintenance of the status quo in China in 1906, the relationship with the expansionist merchants of Indochina flourished. However, as early as 1906, the southern secessionist state strategy that Sun had been organizing for since at least 1900, was falling out of favour. Reforms launched by the central government were tempering resistance and gaining support from southern leaders. Student activists were adopting an anti-foreign posture, a direct affront to Sun’s reliance on foreign assistance in the establishment of his southern state. Despite these conditions, ardent supporters in France and Asia were still willing to back Sun’s aspirations, and through 1907 and 1908, the search continued for a base along the Indochina frontier.17 The result of Sun’s ties with the French and subsequent loss of official support would seem to be evident in a change in strategy after 1908, as the revolutionary focus moved to recruiting New Army allegiance, and away from the secret societies, bandits and foreign arms.18 Though Sun never did receive direct French aid, the relationship was important to both parties. Sun’s promised concessions allowed the expansionists to dream of extending French influence and territory from Indochina; and Sun held that when the moment arrived, the French would provide the capital and expertise to consolidate his fledgling state. The removal from powerful positions of Sun’s most staunch French allies, men like Doumer and Eugene Etienne, put an end to these plans.19 The expansionists in Indochina would never regain their influence, and Sun was forced to re-evaluate his strategy.

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The Stakes of the Revolution The purpose of the revolution for Sun Yat-sen was to arrive at a state governed by the Three Principles of the People.20 This is not to suggest that the revolution itself was governed by these principles, it was not. The revolution, phase one, was a means to this end; and, phase two, was to be undertaken by whatever means necessary to arrive at the desired conclusion. During the revolution the principles were to be dangled as a carrot to drive the revolutionary movement as a reward for ultimate victory. While reformers such as Liang Qichao considered Han and Manchu to be both part of a larger Chinese racial entity, and therefore possible partners in a reformed governmental system; the revolutionaries led by Sun employed an intractable anti-Manchuism, which made reconciliation impossible. Only expulsion of the Manchu and seizure of power by the Han could provide a just government for China. This attitude mirrored contemporary western attitudes toward race which held that the different regions of Europe were inherently different at the most basic levels. One early argument against reconciliation was published in the Min Pao. It argued that Qing moves to establish a constitution were disingenuous, and merely an attempt to weaken the revolutionary movement by suggesting the possibility of equality between Han and Manchu. The article concludes that only the Han people are qualified to draw up a constitution for China, and to make that possible, the Manchu must first be expelled. The second step is to establish a republican, non-authoritarian government.21 It is interesting to note that the same Qing regime that Sun was using to rally support for his republican revolution was executing a series of modernizing reforms at least as progressive as those proposed by the revolutionaries. The modernization of the military was already underway (these very troops being instrumental in the success of the Xinhai Revolution), the war against opium was ongoing, and investment in infrastructure and communications systems, including foreign sponsored railways, was significant. Ironically, the high cost of these reforms raised resistance to the Court throughout the country, on which Sun could build his revolution. In fact, it was this negative, antiManchu campaign, more than the notion of a modern republic, that inspired the Chinese in the revolutionary programme. Sun Yat-sen’s desire to tear down the old regime before establishing the republic is rooted in the lessons of history, as the Chinese dynastic system had periodically regenerated itself for thousands of years. In fact, the French Third Republic faced a similar chore as 1789 had been followed by two Napoleonic Empires, two Monarchical restorations and one other brief

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attempt at a republic (the Second Republic — 1848–52). Thus, the strict adherence to a total removal of the Manchu from positions of power can be understood in its correct context and the republican parallels with France can be discerned. Beyond the ideological kinship there were practical components to French support of the Chinese republicans. Sun’s revolutionary strategy had two key elements that relied on French cooperation in Indochina. First, he needed access to the communications infrastructure to unite rebel groups and coordinate the movement. Second, he needed French complicity in acquiring and distributing arms and munitions for the active revolution. An arrangement was reached in 1902, whereby Sun would have free access to the frontier in return for controlling the opium bandits that were so problematic for the French of Indochina.22 Further promises of extended influence in southern China by Sun were more to ensure French capital investment and technical and intellectual expertise after a successful campaign, than a sale of sovereignty for assistance to the revolution. For the French expansionists, the potential benefits to be reaped from Sun’s promises made the somewhat risky prospect of supporting his programme a chance worth taking.23 French public opinion was influenced by various factors when it came to the subject of expansion in the period leading up to the Xinhai Revolution. This in turn was influenced by a degree of flux within the groups that supported an expansionist policy, such as the Colonial Lobby. The leading factor in any foreign policy discussion was the ever-present tension with Germany. Debate raged over a retaliatory war (or preparations for the widely anticipated next German attack) or the prestige of an overseas empire that would draw resources away from national defence, but improve the strength of the national economy. Due to the ebb and flow of political fortunes under the Third Republic it was never easy to ascertain which policy would hold the ascendancy. In fact, it was not uncommon for both supporters and opponents of colonial expansion to hold high office within the same government. As a result, bureaucrats were loath to take decisive action, in fear that a policy shift may put their actions under critical scrutiny. This fluid political environment provided enough cover for the expansionists to work with Sun discretely, as public opinion was neither decidedly for or against their aims. The intelligence service that was created by the French Ministry of War, under the direction of Captain Boucabeille, to survey events in the Far East, became a tool of the expansionists.24 Boucabeille may have been Sun Yat-sen’s greatest ally among the French. He kept Sun apprised of the nature of debate in government circles over the Chinese revolutionary question, and even relayed

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Sun’s positions back to the French. He offered encouragement, recording those who supported Sun in Paris and lobbied that support with the hypothetical advantages to be gained should the revolution succeed. Those who favoured closer ties with the Qing Government countered that Sun’s strength was overestimated and posed no real threat to the Chinese dynasty. It was changes to the political landscape in France that most compromised government support for Sun and the revolutionary movement. In October 1906 the French cabinet collapsed. While most of the ministers re-emerged in its replacement, Eugène Etienne, Minister for War, was not among them. Etienne had been the most stringent supporter of expansionism and led the Colonial Lobby. In 1901 he had founded the Comité de L’Asie Française with the stated purpose “to make provision for the partition of China and the organization of Indochina”.25 The new Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, was the leading proponent of the Continental Policy, which advocated strengthening the metropole against Germany. Thus, for him, colonial issues were of little concern, except that risky enterprise, such as those in China, which could strain relations with Britain, the chief European ally against Germany, were to be strictly avoided.26 The absence of Etienne from Cabinet caused the Indochina support network to dissolve. The weakened expansionists lost the battle for influence to the anti-colonial, pro-Manchu lobby in Beijing. The exact make up of Sun’s French support is not known, but evidence suggests it was strong and extensive. It is noteworthy that Sun’s French power centres, recognized by the Quai d’Orsay in 1910, were the seat of political power, Paris, and the port city of Le Havre, which had developed economic ties with Indochina.27 Even with this body of support, resistance to Sun and the Indochina expansionists was growing in France. Those who still pushed colonial enterprise were abandoning Asia and focusing on Africa.28 With relations between France and Germany deteriorating, political support for Southeast Asian adventure would no longer be forthcoming. After years of pressure, the French finally acquiesced to demands that Sun be refused safe haven in Indochina. The Quai d’Orsay received a dispatch from the governor-general of Indochina, in early 1908, stating that Sun was “found” to be in Hanoi and would be immediately deported to Singapore.29 This move was as much related to pressure from French anti-colonialists as from the Qing. Backed into a corner by their own aggressive agenda, the governor-general’s office was faced with the awkward choice of admitting their ties to Sun and defending him or bowing to the pressure and deporting him. Initially, only Sun was ordered out. Leading deputies remained, continued the agitation on the frontier and kept covert ties with French authorities and expansionists.30

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Despite both parties’ desire to continue to build towards revolution, after 1908, cooperation with France ceased to be an important part of the revolutionary programme. By 1911, France, Indochina and the southern frontier were completely disengaged from the revolution that actually occurred.

Reporting on the Xinhai Revolution in the French Press From about 1890 to the Xinhai Revolution, French policy with regard to China evolved from aggressive expansionism to negotiated mutually beneficial arrangements with the Qing Government. At the mid-point of this period, the Boxer Rebellion illustrated the perils of anti-foreign sentiment, and while Europe remained militarily superior, the cost of subjugating the antipathy was out of proportion to the advantages accrued. After the uprising, expansion amounted to incremental additions to existing possessions and agreements, rather than the seizure of new territories. As the Chinese Government began to take a direct interest in national development, the need for foreign capital increased. In this move, mutually advantageous arrangements were reached, particularly with France. This had a direct impact on the Chinese revolutionary movement. Those elements supportive of Sun, who previously had enough leeway to provide discrete aid, often with unofficial government support, by 1908 had found that pressure resulting from changing intergovernmental relationships and events in Europe and Southeast Asia, made such involvements too risky to maintain. The military modernization programme in China was making armed intimidation more difficult for the western powers. This situation was troubling for the French military presence in Indochina, which, by 1908, began to consider the possibility of defeat in an open conflict with China.31 A French military report of that year observed the creation of two divisions of New Army troops in Guangdong and Guangxi and the reorganization of the provincial defence forces there, seemingly to counter the insurrectionist movement, with the added advantage of acting as a deterrent to foreign military encroachment on Chinese sovereignty. Under these conditions, there was a heightened risk of escalation from even the most minor incident.32 Despite the shift in French policy towards closer ties with the Qing and the abandonment of Sun Yat-sen, when the Court reported that Frenchmen had been implicated in revolutionary skirmishes on the southern frontier, the French admitted the involvement, but declared that it was beyond the scope of the democratic French Government to inhibit private citizens from making free associations.33

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In 1908, the killing of a French officer who had captured rebels crossing into French Indochina, by Qing forces who had been pursuing the rebels, turned French sympathies towards the revolutionaries. For many observers the incident demonstrated the modern and civilized attitude of the rebels who accepted their detention by the French officer, in contrast with the savage response of the Qing troops. Still, as pressure mounted to deny Sun his base of operations in the Indochina frontier, the bulk of his forces were deported to Singapore, where the French had negotiated with the British for their admittance. The turn of French opinion away from Sun was made less painful by the fact that Sun, despite financial viability and French support, had failed to gain a permanent base in southern China. When the break between Sun and Indochina was made permanent in 1908, the French could only conclude that their chance of unwanted conflict with China had been diminished, at no real cost, since Sun had proven unable to deliver.34

Le Figaro and Le Journal des Débats All the political movements of the French Third Republic were represented in the various newspapers on offer — republican, moderate and radical being the most common. The focus of individual papers would often vary according to the political climate and changes of ownership or direction.35 In 1879, Le Figaro came under new direction, becoming more serious and focused. This made for an easy transition from monarchist to conservative republican paper in the early days of the Third Republic. Drawing higher revenues through advertising than other Parisian dailies permitted the enlargement of the paper to include more pages. In fact, it became the largest of the papers in Paris. Its populist appeal and marketing strategies put Le Figaro among the most widely read papers of the period.36 Though directed towards a mass audience of conservative republicans in Paris, Le Figaro did not suffer for quality. While not quite recognized in the same class as Le Journal des Débats, many of the best writers of the period contributed occasionally or regularly, and with its greater amount of total content a mix of original and reprinted texts appeared. Though modest in circulation, Le Journal des Débats held considerable influence. Known for giving particular attention to foreign news, stories were frequently reprinted from foreign sources throughout Europe and from the United States. This habit is evident in the reporting of the Xinhai Revolution, though the choice of stories selected for communication to the French audience is somewhat revealing. The quality and quantity of opinion

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and commentary was among the largest in France and the standard of writing was acknowledged to be of the highest standard for a daily newspaper. Once viewed as a conservative monarchist newspaper, by the early twentieth century, it was considered to be the organ of the centre-left politician, intellectual and liberal bourgeoisie.37 Maintaining a format that devoted more space to analysis and commentary than to news reporting, Le Journal des Débats remained influential despite a circulation of only 26,000 copies in 1910.38 Considering the social position of its readership, its reputation for quality in writing and commentary, and position on the political spectrum, Le Journal des Débats offers an important insight into how Sun Yat-sen and the Xinhai Revolution were presented in France. In the case of Le Figaro, the influence is in the raw numbers reached, rather than the inclusion of that readership in the vanguard of French public opinion. For this reason, the reach and contrast of this daily newspaper alongside Le Journal des Débats provides a balanced look at how the French understood Sun Yat-sen and the Xinhai Revolution as events were unfolding.

Reporting the News of the Revolution In reporting the news of the revolution, the French press covered many areas from troop movements and battle synopses to imperial edicts and financial conditions. The news reporting of the revolution, in both Le Figaro and Le Journal des Débats tended towards a factual account of events, often picked up from other news outlets, but, with respect to Sun Yat-sen and the republicans, the choice of events reported, and additional commentary provided, reveals a bias in line with the format of each paper and its readership.

Articles on the Republicans As early as 13 October 1911, Le Figaro was reporting on the republican possibilities in China. The headline to the news of the revolution that day read “La révolution en Chine: Projet de République” [The Revolution in China: Potential Republic] and suggests that the revolutionaries will try to re-organize the provinces in which they are active into a republic under the presidency of Sun Yat-sen. The article is also quick to point out the good behaviour of revolutionary troops towards foreign nationals. In the earliest stages both newspapers showed a slight favouring of the revolution in the news reports they ran. The positive spin on the revolution is demonstrated in Le Figaro on 25 October, with the reporting of Sun

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Yat-sen’s preparations to leave the United States, confident of success. On the military aspects of the revolution, this issue reported that Hubei was completely under republican control, and Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang were mostly taken; and, even in Beijing, sympathies appeared to be with the revolution, reporting that the public opinion in northern China was generally in favour of the republicans, but without the same fervour as in the south where the vast majority of the population welcomed the republicans as liberators.39 The reporting of this revolution as successful, republican and with the support of the people reveals the editorial position of the newspaper at that time. The contrasting of this revolution — characterized as only anti-dynastic — with the Boxer Rebellion — which was described as xenophobic and antiforeign, thus demanded intervention — betrays a bias of endorsement for this struggle. It is further predicted that if the revolutionaries continue to respect foreign lives and property, the nations of Europe will not intervene.40 With respect to the discovery of concealment of facts about the revolution by the Court, Le Figaro opines that it is characteristic of the government to deny any problems affecting the universal harmony of the nation. Only when the problem is corrected, or suppressed, is mention of it made, to the effect that it was nothing significant as it is no longer an issue. The analysis concludes that this attitude will be difficult to carry through the current disturbance.41 Le Figaro reports that the National Assembly offered the Throne conditions to end the revolution — immediately constitute a parliament, overhaul the Cabinet, eliminate the noble class, and give amnesty to political prisoners.42 The story would seem to demonstrate a desire in the republicans to end the bloodshed, while promoting the image of Court intransigence, upon refusal of these reasonable conditions. There are also news reports about Sun Yat-sen in Le Figaro, but after Yuan Shikai becomes involved on the Qing side, they are either benign or negative. The one line note picked up from the Morning Post blandly announces the arrival of revolutionary leader, Sun Yat-sen, in Shanghai.43 Subsequently and without commentary, it is reported that Sun is to be elected president of the provisional government of the United Provinces of China, form a government and offer conditions to the Manchu court.44 Bias against Sun Yat-sen is shown in a brief item, reprinted from Berlin which states that Sun has been sworn in as provisional president of the Republic, but his election is subject to recognition by the powers,45 and in a report that Beijing was organizing elections in the northern provinces, while the National Assembly

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at Nanjing was doing the same in the south.46 The first story suggests that Sun’s appointment is illegitimate, while the second raises fears that Sun will create a split in the country.

A Preference for Yuan Shikai For the first time, sympathies in favour of the government are revealed in the news item announcing the recall of Yuan Shikai, whose work during the Boxer Rebellion in favour of a national assembly and government reforms, and in the modernization of the military are hailed in the news brief. His political fall and exile are attributed to palace intrigue; he is lauded as the most visible statesman of China.47 A report of Yuan’s conditions for taking his appointment was published on 21 October. The key points include the convening of a parliament in the next year and the power to conclude a treaty with the revolutionaries.48 This item does not outwardly betray a particular bias in Le Figaro. However, the listing of the key points — pro-democratic and pro-peace — are an attempt to portray Yuan in a positive light. Certainly, the subsequent inclusion of the piece from the New York Herald indicating that diplomatic and government circles now predicting victory for the Throne is meant to improve the profile of Yuan among French readers.49 Building on the newly created sympathy for the Qing-Yuan partnership, the announcement of the amnesty for revolutionaries (including Sun Yat-sen) proposed by the Throne is a reversal of early characterizations of stubborn intractability.50 A story titled “Le Reveil” [The Awakening] before the return of Yuan Shikai, demonstrates the change in preference of Le Figaro. Methodically going over each deception in the reporting of the events of the revolution coming out of Beijing, such as false stories about the cutting of telegraph and rail lines, it is determined that the lies came from the government, and that the revolutionaries had acted in good faith. In consideration of the resources, financial and military, and the leadership enjoyed by the revolutionaries, victory is anticipated in this communication with one caveat. The recall of Yuan Shikai, “the only statesman of China”, to the imperial fold is the one circumstance that could raise questions about the final result. Yuan’s loyalty to the court is questionable, but he is viewed as the only person capable of saving the regime, as the creator of the New Army, a friend of Japan, and leader of the reform movement. Or, he could be the final piece missing for the revolution, an accomplished military leader.51

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Media Bias Up until late October, when Yuan Shikai agreed to lead the imperial forces, it is clear that both newspapers ran stories and commentaries that supported the revolution — highlighting the integrity, respect for foreigners and commitment to republican principles, while demonizing the Imperial government — exposing lies, arrogance and intransigence. Both also predict ultimate victory for the revolution. However, after Yuan Shikai is enlisted to lead the fight against revolution, this trend changes. Le Figaro immediately questions whether the revolution will be successful and starts speculating over the type of government that will emerge and what role Yuan will play in it. At this time, the concession terms published in an edict from the Throne, which are reported to include an assembly, a reorganized Cabinet and amnesty for revolutionaries and political prisoners, are hailed as a significant development.52 Le Journal des Débats is not as willing to abandon the republic or endorse Yuan. As the inevitability of the success of the revolution became obvious through the month of December, there was little reporting of military activities, but discussions of how the negotiations to end the conflict would take shape. Under this assurance of victory, Sun made his way to China. His arrival in Shanghai on 25 December 1911 by English steamship, was noted in the 27 December issue of Le Journal des Débats, which described the arrival as it would the travels of any government dignitary in a short release. News details from the preceding weeks, which were only known after the arrival in Paris of the Courrier de Chine, provide some negative images of anarchy in the provinces of the southern interior, noting that in Shanxi, eight Europeans were massacred, and as of December 18, the religious missions were still in danger; banks had been looted; according to information provided by Catholic missionaries, 20,000 Manchu were massacred, the Protestant missionaries believe that the number of such victims was only 8,000; communications with Gansu were completely cut off; it was believed that the Muslims were on the march in Shanxi; and, the former Dalai Lama returned to Tibet, protected by Russian and English soldiers.53 These stories, while mostly unsubstantiated, give an impression of lawlessness in the wake of the revolution. This may have been intended to undermine French confidence in the republicans’ ability to restore order. Albert de Pouvourville54 offers his analysis of the chaotic political situation that developed at the end of hostilities and the commencement of negotiations — two days previous to his article of 6 January, the two sides had agreed to elect an assembly to determine the make up of the new regime; the

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previous day, the provisional council declared the republic with Sun Yat-sen as president; and on the day of writing, Sun announced that he would prefer to step down in favour of Yuan Shikai. With the departure of the Emperor from Beijing, Yuan was left as the sole representative of an Empire, without an Emperor, without any money, and with dwindling military support, as divisions continued to defect to the republicans. He was also a candidate for the top job in the republic he had been fighting against. De Pouvourville’s final assessment was to pity the country that cannot find anyone who feels strong and popular enough to set the course for the nation.55 Obviously pro-Yuan, de Pouvourville’s intent is to ridicule the republicans to promote French favour towards Yuan Shikai. The announcement of a change in the official name of China is described as a curiosity for the benefit of cartographers. By decree of Sun Yat-sen, the name was officially changed from Zhong-Guo to Zhong-Hua-Guo.56 The notion of the “flower republic”, while appreciated in China, was comical in the West, further undermining Sun with the readers of Le Figaro. Tensions between the republicans and Yuan Shikai were reported on 23 January as a result of a telegraph message from Beijing to The Times, under the heading “La Rivalité de Sun Yat-sen et de Yuan Shikai” in Le Journal des Débats. The article reports republican suspicions over Yuan’s sudden change of heart in agreeing to take up the presidency. Sun expressed concern that Yuan may plan to establish a semi-monarchical dictatorship and requested that Yuan not get involved with the republican government until it had been recognized by the Great Powers and the throne had abdicated, transferring power to the republican government. 57 Le Journal des Débats shows sympathy for Yuan Shikai in this matter, and the wording of the article makes Sun appear petty and paranoid, while no suspicion is cast on Yuan in light of Sun’s claims. As the date of abdication approaches, it is reported that the republic has reorganized the government with Yuan as president and Sun as vice-president, a move intended to ensure a stable transition of power.58 The resignation of Sun Yat-sen and the Nanjing cabinet, with the recommendation that Yuan Shikai be immediately selected the new president, is reported in Le Figaro. The president of the National Assembly commended Sun for his service and selflessness, adding the success of the republic would be due to his deeds.59 The assembly of Nanjing telegraphed Yuan to inform him that he had been unanimously elected president by the assembly. News of the republic is celebrated in many cities, but not in Beijing.60 These two stories present an even appraisal and do not condemn Sun and the republicans,

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likely because the unstated goal of the newspaper has been achieved and the battle is over: Yuan Shikai is the president.

Issues of Direct Interest for the French The reporting on issues of French interest in the Far East tended to revolve around the safety of French nationals, business and the likelihood of military intervention. Both newspapers generally supported a non-interventionist stance. Robert de Caix of Le Journal des Débats, despite his concerns over the potential damage of the conflict, explicitly supports French non-intervention, saying that the foreign powers must be limited to following events with interest as China attempts to make enormous political and social changes.61 Similarly, Le Figaro notes that a loan application from the Court was refused by the union of the four powers, as it was felt such a loan would violate the pledge of neutrality.62 Reports on military activity frequently cite the position of foreign vessels, but only as observers, and perhaps as a deterrent. Occasionally, however, reports indicate willingness for a more active involvement in the conflict. Le Figaro presents, with embarrassment, the French military situation in the combat area of China. Declaring that France has been concerned with everyone — Yuan Shikai, Sun Yat-sen, and the child Emperor — except their own interests. De Pouvourville reveals that France has the smallest contingent of ships of any of the Powers, and communicates the hazards of this position by noting that the only losses to any foreign power to date came when French factories were hit by imperial troops targeting republican forces hiding in the vicinity. The suggestion is that a strong presence may have discouraged the imperial forces from risking reprisal in an attack that damaged French property.63 From the commencement of hostilities, the revolutionary leadership was explicit that no harm was to befall the foreigners at their hands, under the punishment of death for disobedience. Yet, despite these assurances to protect foreign rights, property and lives, which were communicated through both newspapers, a note of concern taken from The Times appears in Le Figaro, raising some important points, including the possibility that an unscrupulous foreign power may use an intervention to “protect its interests” as a pretext to pursue other ambitions. It also points out that the republican assurances are phrased as a veiled threat; that respect would continue as long as there is the neutrality of foreign powers, but not longer.64 Le Journal des Débats reports on statements made by Sun, who while travelling in the United States, reiterated his commitment to the safety and

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security of foreign nationals and property. Among Sun’s other comments was his suspicion that Yuan Shikai is not fully committed to defending the Throne.65 A few days later, Le Figaro offered an opinion on the proper role of the powers in this conflict, which stated that they should concern themselves only with the protection of their nationals and not with the exploitation of China in the event of Manchu collapse; proposing that China be left to the Chinese as a matter of French diplomatic policy.66 The variable in this position on the Chinese conflict was suspicion over the intentions of Germany and Japan. This was in line with the broader international relationship experienced by France. The French press reported Russian suspicions that Germany was preparing an intervention in an attempt to secure more territory in the northeast, and an item from the Daily News that Japan may be prepared to intervene in favour of the dynasty, was contradicted by Le Figaro commentator, A. Fitz-Maurice, who expressed his doubt citing Japanese sympathies in favour of the revolutionaries and the advantages that may accrue for Japan, if the revolution were to succeed.67 In either case, concern over German and Japanese intervention, on one side or the other, escalating the conflict, is present in both papers. In the propaganda campaign between the republicans and Yuan Shikai over the establishment of the new regime, all of the foreign legations in Beijing received identical communiqués from the republicans, stating that if talks were to break down, the fault lay with Yuan Shikai. However, an article, reprinted from the New York Herald, offers that those foreign diplomats would not hold Yuan, but the republicans, responsible. Yuan, having released all of his correspondence to the foreign legations, is seen to have acted properly and offered all reasonable concessions. The republicans are now cast as petty opportunists in Le Figaro, concerned with maintaining their own power and status at the expense of the nation, unable to come together in government due to deep internal philosophical divisions and debts owed to bandits and secret societies that assisted in the launch of the revolution.68 As the revolution was a major international news item, curiosity about China was increased among the French population. In response to this interest, Le Figaro included a Chinese pronunciation and definition table for place and proper names on the front page of the 20 October issue. A week later, a similar informational piece references the revolution as the preoccupying news of China as an opening to deal with changes to the Chinese diet in recent times, declaring the national cuisine of China to be dead.69

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Reporting on the Chinese in France The situation of the Chinese in France, particularly in Paris, was also news for both papers. Due to his previous relationship with France and international notoriety, the visit of Sun Yat-sen to Paris en route from the United States to China merited mention in Le Figaro, but was not reported in Le Journal des Débats. The article reports that Sun reiterated the programme of the republic in French political circles — a federal republic, essentially modern, but preserving some of the ancient traditions of old China, and a commitment to end the violence; China will be open to foreign trade and initiatives, while reserving the right to pursue a tariff policy to protect its interests; and finally, a commitment to respect the treaties and agreements concluded by the Qing dynasty, even those imposed by force.70 All of these points would strike a chord with a French audience. In his article, de Pouvourville adds that the revolutionary organization in Europe, mostly comprised of students who came to study science and engineering, was buoyed by the visit of Sun. The comité de la Jeune-Chine, created in Paris, was named the central committee and director of all the Chinese centres of Europe, and maintained telegraphic communication with the revolutionaries in China.71 A more general piece on the Chinese of Paris is offered by Le Figaro on 14 January 1912. It deals with the decline in the Chinese population of Paris, as two-thirds of the 160 Chinese living in Paris returned to China in conjunction with the revolution; and, the activities of the Chinese students in Paris as organizers of the revolution. Of the remaining Chinese in Paris, some are identified as traders, pedicurists and workers in a soybean factory. It also deals with the plight of the Chinese diplomats, who had yet to receive instruction from either the Throne or the republican government, noting that there are none among the Chinese of Paris that do not align themselves with the revolution. Adding, that the Chinese Minister to Paris is married to a French woman and perhaps that is the reason that he is able to grasp republicanism easier than the other Chinese. The article concludes by asking how to say Vive la République! in Chinese, and answering with Min Guo Wan Sui. Explaining that Guo means “country” and Min means “people”, so “the republic” is the country where the government is in the hands of the people.72 French musicologist and author of La Musique Chinoise, Louis Laloy, contributed a substantial piece on reactions to the establishment of the Chinese republic in Paris. He gives details of two celebratory parties attended by an international contingent in Paris on 10 and 14 March 1912. The

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first taking place in the hôtel des Sociétés savantes, les Orientaux de Paris, offered the Comité républicain chinois the opportunity to discretely toast the success of their movement. The event was enlivened by the remarks of an Egyptian guest, made in English, which concluded with “Vive la Chine indépendante! Vive la Perse indépendante! Vive l’Égypte indépendante! Vive les Indes indépendantes! Vivent toutes les nationalités qui luttent pour la liberté!”, which were met with applause. The second event hosted 400 invited guests at the Hotel Continental, and included many of the leading citizens of France from politics, art and science, as well as Chinese diplomats and students from all over Europe. Invitations in the name of the Union sino-française and of the Comité républicain chinois d’Europe, brought together a distinguished gathering that included leading French politician Paul Painlevé. Laloy reports that the speeches included significant praise for Sun Yat-sen, the great apostle of Republicanism, noted for his dogged pursuit of the Chinese republic, but with enough restraint and humility to step aside once it was achieved. Another speaker noted that the Republic is primarily a means for the development of the people, and not to be used as the opportunity to take away an individual’s strength and virtue. An unnamed recent president of the Council of Ministers intimated that among Europeans, only those who put power above the law denounced China as a threat to Europe. The Chinese chargé d’affaires to Paris, expressed hope for a better relationship between France and China, while noting that France had yet to recognize the Chinese republic. Laloy concludes that China is committed to progress, declaring that China has reclaimed the benefits of a civilization, and questioning the right of France to deny this recognition.73 These articles fed the appetite for knowledge about the people and places involved in the revolution and republic being fought for in the Far East. Where the Journal des Débats shows favour for the republic in its discussions of the Chinese in France, Le Figaro’s portrayal has a distinctly different bias.

The French Press Rationalize the Conflict In the search for an authoritative commentary on the conflict in China, Le Figaro offers a long piece reporting the results of interviews with a French missionary stationed in the Yangzi Valley. It provides a French perspective on the issues that precipitated the revolution. The missionary confirms earlier assertions that the revolution is anti-dynastic and not xenophobic, outlining several of the abuses perpetrated by the dynasty. However, the article’s author notes the irony that while repudiating suggestions of xenophobia, the leaders of the revolution rally their forces with cries of “China to the Chinese”.

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Speaking of the likelihood of success for the revolution, particularly in the large southern provinces where Manchu power was notoriously weak, and considering that the New Army had sided with the revolution, the missionary thinks at least a secessionist state is probable. He doubts the possibility for the establishment of a unified republic. Citing deep regional differences, he concedes that perhaps a federation would be possible, but more likely several small states would emerge. The article concludes that while the revolution is on the road to success, many disappointments await its leaders and proponents, as they have improperly calculated the distance between their goals and reality.74 For the French audience, this expert analysis would have gone a long way in confirming sympathy for the revolution while reducing expectations for the emergence of a great Eastern republic. Just before the declaration of the republic, the Russian Minister to Beijing provided an interview to Le Figaro’s correspondent in St. Petersburg on the situation in China. Minister Korostovetz explains that part of the success of the revolution came from its spontaneous eruption which caught the dynasty unaware; the fact that the revolutionaries were preparing for a November launch meant that planning, materials and infrastructure were already partly in place when the tension burst in October. Asked whether the revolutionaries had been able to reform institutional evils in the provinces where they held power, the Russian minister indicated that they had. Asked if there were divisions among the revolutionaries, he responded that there were none of significance, but that two camps existed — the republicans of Sun Yat-sen and the constitutional monarchists of Kang Youwei. He proposed that the constitutional monarchists were in the majority and would establish the new government, most likely with Yuan Shikai — described as capable and diplomatic, shrewd and opportunistic, and most importantly, the only man who can govern China — in power. Further noting that Yuan carried real authority, and was not afraid to take responsibility, a quality considered very rare among the Chinese.75 This endorsement of Yuan Shikai in Le Figaro further enhanced his place as the preference in France, at the expense of Sun Yat-sen. The 31 January issue of Le Journal des Débats ran a letter dated 4 January that was quite critical of negative Western press reaction to the revolution and characterizations of it as xenophobic. The unsigned letter from a Shanghaibased source well-acquainted with the dynamics of the Sino-French economic relationship lauds the progress to come under the republic and attempts to rally French opinion to support the fledgling government with French capital investment. The running of this strongly pro-republican opinion, from a French source implicated in business in China, suggests that Le Journal des

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Débats was now, more than ever, on the side with the victors and carried the hopes for a future of prosperous Sino-French relations under the new republic.76

The French Press and the Shaping of French Public Opinion The shaping of French public opinion was undertaken through both partisan commentary and coercive reporting. Areas such as the portrayal of the revolutionaries, Sun Yat-sen, the republican movement and programme, and the process to consolidate the republic received a great deal of this attention in the French press.

The Portrayal of the Republican Movement When Le Figaro ran a short news item reporting that American missionaries were advised, for their own safety, that an uprising would occur the following day near Beijing, echoing a similar circumstance involving the missionaries in Wuchang, just before the rising of that city,77 the intention was to demonstrate the restraint, compassion and modernity of the revolutionaries in contrast to the old regime. By this time, Sun Yat-sen’s reputation was well-established in France. This favourable opinion is made evident by the assertion in the 26 October edition of Le Journal des Débats that the revolutionary movement, which was supposed to be confined to a localized uprising, was growing day by day. And, Sun, who prepared the revolution, was justified in his confidence that the progress of events would lead to victory.78 In presenting this positive vision of the revolutionary leader, the newspaper endorses the movement. By contrast, the dynasty is completely out of favour as an option. In Le Figaro, de Pouvourville writes that the Qing officials have lost all shame and face in trying to preserve their dynasty. With respect to Sun, he mentions that in Paris, as with all the capitals he has visited, Sun has established Chinese republican organizations and an opinion favourable to his cause and himself.79 The rise of prominence of Yuan Shikai is proportional to the fall in the esteem given to the republican movement by de Pouvourville in Le Figaro. The republicans’ rejection of a republican-style constitutional monarchy proposal from Yuan Shikai, on behalf of the court, is met with scorn by de Pouvourville. The decision to install Sun as president is condemned as the biggest mistake that could be committed.80 Claiming to make these comments in a spirit completely favourable to the liberal movement in China, de

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Pouvourville fears the move is detrimental to Chinese interests and beneficial only to the ambitious. A dispatch from Beijing, dated 29 December, reminds readers that Yuan Shikai had previously claimed the revolution could be suppressed, but now it cannot for lack of money. Further, Yuan has consented to accept the will of the majority, but as a monarchist, he will never serve the republic.81 Again, Yuan is being promoted by Le Figaro. First, he is absolved of blame for the defeat of his forces, then presented as a democrat for accepting the people’s will, but maintains his integrity by refusing to collaborate with his former enemy. With the favour of Le Figaro fully behind Yuan Shikai, either as president of the republic or on the throne of a new constitutional monarchy, the republicans who succeeded in creating the regime change are condemned to secondary status, explicitly or by omission.

The Character and Leadership of Sun Yat-sen The characterization of Sun Yat-sen changes even more than that of the republican movement from October 1911 to April 1912. In illustrating Sun’s plan for his movement, both Le Figaro (14 October) and Le Journal des Débats (15 October) reprinted an interview given by his friend, Dr James Cantlie, to the Pall Mall Gazette, which highlights Sun’s personal character — Christian by birth, with a calm disposition, friendly and quiet, wellread, a polyglot, and fully committed to republicanism — with the declared assertion of Le Figaro that he has the skills to be president of the republic, should it be proclaimed. Dr Cantlie points out the favourable circumstances of this attempt at republican revolution — well-funded, well-armed, and a large contingent of foreign trained soldiers with questionable loyalty to the throne — which serves as a justification for Sun’s previous failed revolutionary attempts when those conditions were not present. His political programme — described in Le Journal des Débats through a sympathetic analysis of the 1904 brochure — The Solution to the China Question — which would grant broad autonomy to the provinces, is hailed as modern and progressive, and is declared superior to the situation among the states of the United States of America and the relationship between Britain and former colonies, Canada and Australia.82 In identifying the prominent figures of the insurrection, Le Figaro presents Sun Yat-sen as Supreme Leader of the revolution, reminding readers of a biography featured in an earlier edition of the paper. They also mention a manifesto issued by Sun to all foreigners stating that there was nothing to fear as long as neutrality was maintained towards the quarrel between Manchu

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and anti-Manchu forces.83 In this way, further contrasting Sun with the old regime, Sun was presented as a friend to the West. Even in the early days of the conflict, not all opinion was entirely positive towards Sun. Le Journal des Débats ran an excerpt from the English paper, the Daily Chronicle, describing Sun’s recent attempts to raise money in western banks for the revolution, but ends with a sceptical inquisition from the Journal des Débats correspondent: Is Sun-Yat-Sen really leader of this revolution? Is he an ally or instrument of some other characters? The writer concludes that these are questions that cannot be answered currently.84 Similarly, in an indirect endorsement of Sun’s modernity and commitment to republican principles, Le Journal des Débats included a brief mention of Sun’s commitment to gender equality in suffrage and the absolute power of the people.85 But, the following day, Robert de Caix offered an opinion piece questioning the wisdom of Sun’s declaration of suffrage rights, wondering if it was merely a ploy to gain support and funds from the Americans.86 At this point Sun Yat-sen is portrayed in the French press as a patriot. An opinion piece entitled “Sun-Yat-Sen et la Révolution Chinoise” [Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Revolution] published towards the end of October 1911, lauds the presence and accomplishments of Sun. The author speaks of two personal meetings with Sun, in Hong Kong in 1904 and in Hanoi in 1907. Anointing him the brains of the Chinese revolutionary movement, the author offers a short biography, including discussion of previous failed attempts at revolution. When discussing his revolutionary discourse, he is described as eloquent and persuasive; persuasive enough to get a strong endorsement of his potential leadership of a Chinese republic from the author. She asserts that Sun knows how to use all the tools at his disposal, adding that perhaps soon, even Yuan Shikai will endorse him.87 This type of glorification, however, does not last. Following reversals suffered by the revolutionaries at the hands of Yuan Shikai, Sun is depicted in a less flattering light in a news report of his presence in New York. Reported to be agitated, he allegedly refused to speak with reporters and asked that his presence in the city not be published.88 De Pouvourville adds his own harsh assessment of Sun at this point in the revolution. Claiming that Sun is far better known in France and the United States than in China, and that his support in China is more noisy than numerous, the most damning declaration is that Sun has no authority, outside a few loyalists. The fact that Sun has remained away from China since hostilities began only adds to the question — why is Sun giving speeches in Chicago while young men die for his cause in China?89

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Le Figaro and Le Journal des Débats ran identical reports of the inspection of the navy on the Yangzi River near Nanjing by President Sun. Significantly, both note that the British, German and American ships present did not offer a salute to Sun.90 The action and the report undermine Sun’s authority and question his legitimacy as president of the Republic, and are clearly intended to communicate that message to the French people. De Pouvourville again shows his preference for Yuan Shikai over Sun Yat-sen in a piece entitled “Le Sceptre ou la Mort” in the 27 January issue of Le Figaro. Describing a meeting of the republican assemblies of Nanjing and Shanghai as a mock meeting which neither Beijing nor Europe recognize as having any authority, he questions the resulting edict which declares that Yuan Shikai will be responsible for discussing and clarifying, together with President Sun, the interests and immediate future of the new regime. The story adds that though Sun was less well known in his own country, he inspired confidence in the foreign powers, but was now prepared to resign from his office in favour of Yuan, despite the reservations of loyal revolutionaries. Under the new arrangement, de Pouvourville anticipates reorganization into a federal empire, which he had originally predicted three months earlier, with Yuan as leader of the central government, asking why we fear the word that best applies to the role he hopes for Yuan — Emperor. If this were to happen, it would be for the greater good of China, according to de Pouvourville, at least in the eyes of Europe. The powers have known of Yuan Shikai for some time. They feel his work rate, astute diplomacy, intelligence and modernity, as demonstrated through the patience and sharpness he demonstrated in working with the irreconcilable court and passionate republicans, are the makings of the best possible leadership for China. While Europe did not trust the dynasty for covertly supporting the Boxers and other xenophobic anti-foreign groups and assorted bandits, they have faith in Yuan, seeing in him the moral strength to re-establish order and peace in the vast nation. De Pouvourville writes that Sun’s willingness to step aside shows his preference for the triumph of his ideas over personal success, as he has consented to remove himself from power so as not to impede the work of national regeneration. De Pouvourville concludes that Yuan stands alone and unchallenged among Chinese diplomats.91 The tabulation of Sun’s impact on the regime change in China is not at all flattering in Le Figaro. Noting that instead of travelling to China as an apostle, Sun remained confined to Nanjing and Shanghai, two large cosmopolitan cities, where he had gathered all his followers, and where his authority did not extend beyond the river and the suburbs; he was quickly stripped of his phantom power.92

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Le Journal des Débats takes a different approach by running the text of an interview given by Sun Yat-sen explaining his resignation to a correspondent of the Daily Telegraph. Sun states that the completion of the political revolution was the launching point for his next undertaking, the greatest social revolution in the history of the world. He declares that the future of the republic is in transformative socialism.93

The Chinese Republican Programme In the context of the relationship of France with republicanism, reporting on the republican programme proposed in China was an abiding interest of both newspapers. The first mention appears in Le Figaro which reports the declaration of the republic in Hubei province, replete with flags flying over the three principal cities.94 Le Journal des Débats published Sun’s agenda for the establishment of the republic he envisioned in three points: 1. the suppression of the foreign dynasty of the Manchu and establishment of a provisional government; respecting all the rights acquired by the foreign powers and their nationals; 2. the proclamation of the Republic; 3. the reform of all institutions in the model of European nations and Japan.95 The dissemination of this plan would have been useful in quelling the fears of a French audience concerned about potential turmoil arising from revolution. By mid-November, Le Journal des Débats was reporting the governing programme of the revolutionaries, including cabinet positions, the capital of the republic (provisionally Nanjing, pending its capture), and president (Sun Yat-sen, in absentia). The first national convention had been organized with delegates en route at the time of reporting. The programme was explained to contain the following elements: • • • • •

autonomy for each province central direction of military affairs Nanjing as capital Sun Yat-sen as president encouragement of industry in all regions of the country

The provincial delegates, already on their way to Shanghai, would convene the first national convention. The military was expected to capture Nanjing within a week.96

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In conjunction with the rise of Yuan Shikai in the conflict, support for alternatives to the republic began to increase. In its 1 December issue, Le Journal des Débats reprinted a commentary from The Times, suggesting a limited monarchy under the guidance of a living constitution that would permit evolution into a republic, under the presumption that China was decades away from being ready for such modernity. The writer asserts that while republicanism enjoyed a strong endorsement from Sun and his supporters, the bulk of sober Chinese thought strongly rejected such a notion.97 With Sun now present in China, Le Journal des Débats begins reporting his movement as the true leader of the republicans. On 7 January both Le Figaro and Le Journal des Débats ran the manifesto sent by Sun Yat-sen to all nations. The text amounts to a justification of the now completed armed rebellion and sets the framework for international relations with the new republican regime. Perhaps in an attempt to stifle foreign intervention in a potential counter-revolution, several conciliatory points are enumerated, including respecting Manchu treaties with the foreign powers; taking on national debts incurred before the revolution; maintaining the rights of the foreign concessions, their residents and goods; removing restrictions on trade; exercising religious tolerance; and, committing to the best possible relationship with foreign nations. In conclusion, the manifesto seeks international recognition for the Republic.98 The manifesto is only signed by Sun Yat-sen, indicating his position as the individual empowered to speak on behalf of the new government. It is noteworthy that the bulk of information and analysis on republican proposals and programmes comes from Le Journal des Débats. The bias of the two Parisian dailies is clearly revealed when it comes to the actions of the republicans. Whereas Le Figaro is always willing to challenge or question or offer Yuan Shikai as a preferred alternative, Le Journal des Débats tends to report the information as it is given or, perhaps, with a view to its impact on France without judging the ramifications for China.

The French Press Analysis of the Validity of the Chinese Republican Movement The installation of Yuan Shikai into the equation quickly eroded support for Sun Yat-sen and the revolution among contributors to Le Figaro. On 22 October, de Pouvourville, consistently the harshest critic of Sun, declares that China is not suited to becoming a republic; for the moment it is a rallying cry, but has no more legitimacy than that. For de Pouvourville, that is enough

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to doubt the possibility that Sun Yat-sen and his supporters would triumph. On the other hand, he concludes that Yuan occupies the political centre, and can draw more support, he is loved by his soldiers, and has the most loyal supporters. Contrarily, the revolutionary group is thought to be divided, and Sun carries the burden of his years in exile and Christianity. 99 De Pouvourville provides a deep analysis of the situation at the end of October. After assessing the role of the secret societies in the revolution, he concludes that the dynasty could not be saved, except by foreign intervention, a course he passionately opposed. Yet he does not hold much hope for a successful republic either. Concluding that a general revolution is possible and viable in a centralized nation, but despite the faults of the Manchu Government, popular hatred was not strong enough to bring all of the scattered interests of China into one true nation.100 With Yuan leading the imperial forces, complete victory for the republicans is no longer deemed inevitable by the French press. Questions arise over what form the government will take when the conflict is over and whether a liberal and successful republic can be inaugurated and maintained.101 Further analysis of the political situation in China by de Pouvourville suggests, again, that a republic will not work. He proposes a federal empire as the optimum system. As to a republic, he claims that the principles and conventions of the system in the West are a myth for the Chinese, and even if they cease to be a myth, they would only act as a lure into an untenable situation.102 De Pouvourville’s criticism is somewhat tempered by an interview by E. Dupuy with a Chinese republican living in France in an edition of Le Figaro, published three days later. The Chinese guest confesses that he is granting the interview because Dupuy is French, the republicans love France, and want to be well-understood there. He goes on to explain that, in their estimation, republicanism is not a fantasy for China, but an attainable reality. After ten years of study and preparation, interviews with European statesmen, and confirmation that their educated countrymen could draw on Rousseau’s Social Contract, they decided to pursue a republic. The republic should take the form of a large federation in the model of the United States. The Constitution is to be implemented in three phases: (1) provisional government; (2) a partial application of the Constitution; and (3) the Republic. They predict at least ten years to fully implement the system — using the example of universal suffrage, which will rely upon every Chinese being morally and intellectually able to understand the value of the ballot. Economically, free trade will be pursued, as China is a nation of raw materials. Europeans will be welcomed and offered a safe environment. Credit for the emancipation of China is given to scholars, engineers, thinkers and missionaries of Europe. Dupuy

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notes that, upon parting, his guest carried himself with all the manners of a western gentleman.103 For de Pouvourville, questions remain about the leadership of Sun Yatsen as he takes a slow and circuitous route back to China. The provisional government of the republic is, however, exposed for its semantic fallacy — republic in name only. This is allegedly for the best, as a true republic would be doomed to failure in China and what the people really want is the return to the federal empire that ruled for thousands of years. Or, even call it a republic to appease the ideologues, as long as the system remains familiar. Ultimately, Yuan is believed to be the only man that could keep the entirety of the nation unified. Without his leadership, the nation must certainly break up along the lines of its regional identities. In the end, de Pouvourville supposes that avoiding foreign intervention as the situation settled, would be a victory in itself.104 De Pouvourville shows some frustration over the slow process to consolidate the government, observing that Yuan has been acclaimed, then slandered; Sun was hailed in triumph in Europe, yet barely accepted in his own country. Looking back on his proof that Yuan was fully equipped for the job, he questions why so many now doubt his abilities. The new plan is that Yuan should assume the presidency with Sun as vice-president. This is hailed as a brilliant idea, but of questionable viability, as he patronisingly wonders, if the ideal compromise can be reached one day, is it likely to happen in China?105

The French Press Analysis of Issues on the Abdication and the Presidency After the main military campaign had stopped and the Republic had been proclaimed, the exchange of propaganda between the republicans, Yuan Shikai and the Throne increased. With each looking to blame another at every disagreement, the French press, again betrayed their bias in the reporting of the incidents. The arrival of Sun Yat-sen in China allowed the republicans to take a firmer position with Yuan Shikai. In an article titled “Yuan Shikai et les républicains” [Yuan Shikai and the Republicans], Le Journal des Débats reports the contents of a telegram from Shanghai to the New York Herald, demanding that Yuan Shikai declare his position on the republic, and that if no reply was received by 3 January 1912, Sun would be offered the presidency joining the Cabinet already in place.106 In the early days of the revolution, Sun had stated that he was not seeking the presidency, but would assume the role if he was deemed the best able to fill it.107

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In the 14 January edition of Le Figaro and the 15 January edition of Le Journal des Débats, the same text was run, and the decision of the former monarchy to abdicate, and the preparations being initiated to facilitate the event are discussed.108 Three weeks later, concern is increasing among the republicans that the Manchu have yet to abdicate. Sun publicly stated that he did not want a resumption of hostilities, but other revolutionaries threaten military action against Beijing.109 Both Le Figaro and Le Journal des Débats published the same telegram to foreign legations in Beijing, condemning Yuan Shikai for what is believed to be an attempt to seize power by asking the Emperor to abdicate and the National Assembly to dissolve at the same time. The republicans still intend to offer Yuan the presidency, but want assurances that he will be faithful to the movement. While both newspapers appear neutral on this issue, the problems arising from extending the armistice reported in Le Figaro on the same day are blamed on the arrogance of the Republicans.110 In light of the previous incident, Sun requested that Yuan come to Nanjing to be properly invested as president of the Republic by the National Assembly, as his current powers were conferred by the outgoing emperor.111 Le Journal des Débats picked up a report from the Daily Telegraph correspondent in Beijing listing the points agreed by Yuan and the National Assembly delegation for the establishment of the coalition government under Yuan.112 On the subject of Sun’s resignation as president, Le Journal des Débats notes the contribution of the Chinese of Malaya in an article in the 25 March edition. Outlining the significant support Sun enjoyed in this region, he is identified as their man and the election of Yuan Shikai as president of the Republic is said to have caused them great disappointment.113

French Opinions on Government Structure and Personnel While the form and personnel of the Republic were debated and changed through the first three months of 1912, the two newspapers had the opportunity to pass judgement on the revolution, the republic and the leadership. On 30 December, Le Journal des Débats announced the unanimous election of Sun Yat-sen as president of the Republic in one line, without any accompanying analysis or opinion. The next issue adds that Sun has been elected provisional president and will assume the vice-presidency if Yuan will take over as president. It was reported by Le Journal des Débats on 6 January 1912 that Yuan Shikai had sent a very courteous letter to Sun, thanking him for offering to give up the presidency and added that the people would be free to decide their future government.114 The preliminary arrangements

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on abdication brought a dispatch from The Times correspondent which was picked up by Le Journal des Débats. Significantly, the plans for the replacement of Sun by Yuan Shikai as president of the Republic are covered, and seem to meet with the approval of the journalist.115 Tensions over Yuan Shikai’s commitment to the republic are eventually sorted out and the way is clear for Yuan to assume the presidency. However, the court resists an immediate abdication, preferring to wait for the result of the National Convention.116 The throne would confirm this decision as reported on 27 January. The same article goes on to discuss the conditions under which Sun would pass leadership of the republic to Yuan Shikai, but includes an official statement from the Assembly that they strongly oppose this action, which was entirely conceived by Sun himself.117 An imperial edict asking Yuan to negotiate terms of a republic with Sun’s provisional government was published on 6 February. It also stated that preparations for a full abdication were in progress and the military of both sides informally committed to armistice and made calls to reunify as the Chinese nation under normal conditions with a stable government capable of restoring order.118 In a personal interview with The Times correspondent in Nanjing, Sun reiterated his intention to step down in favour of Yuan after the abdication. He also indicated his feeling that the provisional government should remain in office for one year, then elections for the full assembly should be held. The 15 February issue marked the first time that the headline preceding an article about China read “La République Chinoise” [the Chinese Republic] rather than “La Révolution Chinoise” [the Chinese Revolution]. The ensuing article reported the receipt by all foreign legations in China of edicts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that with the ascension of the new government, members of the former imperial regime were no longer empowered to speak for China.119 A second item picked up from the New York Herald discusses concern in the Republican camp that the abdication edict transferred power directly to Yuan and not the republic. While the Chinese press noted that the edict did not contain the word “abdicate”, and suggested that the people be prepared for a surprise.120 Nevertheless, the 17 February issue reports that Yuan was unanimously confirmed as president of the provisional government the previous day. The National Assembly in Nanjing convened a delegation to go to Beijing empowered to negotiate the specifics of the governing coalition with Yuan. They also voted to recommend Beijing as the national capital, pending the approval of the military.121 The delegation was persuaded to confirm Beijing as the capital in order to establish the most effective coalition. Sun endorsed the plan.122

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Grading the Revolution and Republic Le Journal des Débats contains a lengthy assessment of the proposed Chinese constitution upon its cabinet approval in April 1912. The summary of the main points of the constitution compiled by l’agence d’Extrême-Orient is included in this issue, though without direct analysis.123 The final issue of Le Journal des Débats to deal with issues pertaining to the Xinhai Revolution is dated 24 May 1912. Two significant sub-headings of the article deal with “Evolution and Revolution in China” and ask “Is China made for the Republic?” The first part is the summary of a conference, retracing the events of 1909–12 in China, given by Jean Rodes under the banner of the Comité de l’Asie française. Rodes concludes that Yuan, who had the capacity to quell the revolution with loyal northern troops, is an opportunist who used the republican revolutionaries and popular discontent with the dynasty to wrest power for himself. He declares the reformist republic a fraud, as it was largely due to expensive reforms that the Manchu fell from favour in China. In the second article, it is boldly stated that the republic will fail to unify China,124 adding that the modern revolutionary with strong moral values, like Sun Yat-sen, is very rare, and that a people who rejected reforms from the old regime will be just as likely to rise against similar policies, even from a new government. The conclusion is that scepticism towards the Chinese republic is wise. Subsequent events tell us this assessment was very shrewd.

Conclusion Trading on a good name that had been cultivated over a decade of close relations with France, Sun Yat-sen and the Xinhai Revolution were initially favourites of the French media. Though Sun’s relationship with the French Government had run its full course before the commencement of the Xinhai Revolution, he still had several powerful allies among the French, as the Colonial Lobby saw great advantage in working with him. When Sun visited France, he was received by highly placed officials, giving him a certain degree of notoriety despite the absence of noteworthy accomplishments. In this period, Le Figaro and Le Journal des Débats serviced a markedly different clientele, which was made obvious in their reporting on Sun and the Revolution. While both initially seemed to favour the revolution, Le Figaro became more antagonistic over time, preferring the authoritarian strongman, Yuan Shikai, to Sun’s devoted republicanism; while Le Journal des Débats

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maintained an overall objectivity with a preference for a republic, if not an endorsement of either man as leader. The reporting of news of the Revolution was largely the same between the two Paris dailies in the choice of events to cover and the type of coverage given. Le Figaro offered more variety, volume and original content; while Le Journal des Débats showed more of an emphasis on the political machinations of the key players. Issues of foreign non-intervention, the protection of French nationals, and the activities of the Chinese in France are handled by both sources. While Le Figaro adds some general interesting stories about China, and raises suspicions about the intentions of rivals, namely, Germany and Japan, with respect to the conflict in China. Both newspapers acknowledge that the Manchu dynasty had abused its position and do not fault the revolutionaries for taking action. But in reporting the inter-relationships between the revolutionaries, Yuan Shikai and the Throne, Le Figaro tends to favour Yuan Shikai, Le Journal des Débats tends to favour the revolutionaries, and both tend to oppose the Dynasty. The republican movement goes from universally approved, to highly doubted by Le Figaro. Similarly, Sun Yat-sen who is initially hailed for his modernity, intelligence and western values, is cast aside by both sources, even being vilified and ridiculed by Le Figaro. Reporting on the Republican programme is almost exclusively done by Le Journal des Débats. The analysis tends to focus on the structure of the system, rather than on the viability of the proposals. Le Figaro does not shy away from offering commentary on the republican plan, mostly concluding that the programme is unrealistic. The analysis over the consolidation of the republic and the presidency differs in the two records. Le Figaro is quite clearly hoping for a pseudo-republic led by Yuan Shikai, and Le Journal des Débats is looking for the creation of a viable republic first and foremost. From the content of these two journals, it is clear that by the time of the establishment and consolidation of the Chinese republic, Sun Yat-sen was not viewed as its founder. He may have been credited as the person who set the stage for the revolution, but the republic belonged to Yuan Shikai. The presentation of Sun Yat-sen to the French public took many different forms in the articles of Le Figaro and Le Journal des Débats. Despite some harsh criticisms and being overtaken by Yuan Shikai as the most prominent and preferred character of the drama in China, Sun’s reputation would be rehabilitated. As suspicions about the hidden agenda of Yuan were proven true, Le Journal des Débats openly supported the renewed efforts of Sun to establish a proper liberal republic in China. Even Le Figaro identified Sun

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as the father of the Chinese Republic and liberator of his people by 1929.125 Despite this history — the daily reporting of republican revolution and the close relationship Sun Yat-sen and the French once enjoyed — there is little evidence of that legacy today. In France, Sun Yat-sen is a name that may provoke a hint of recognition, perhaps the correct identification of him as a Chinese historical figure, but little else. For the moment, in-depth knowledge of SunYat-sen and the Xinhai Revolution in France is limited to scholarly investigation.

Notes 1

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This dynasty (1271–1368) was founded by Genghis Khan and was the line of Kublai Khan who became known to Europe through the travels of Marco Polo. Jean Chesneaux et al., China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution, translated by Anne Destenay (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976). From the Kangxi Emperor (1661–1722) to the Qianlong Emperor (1735–96); 康乾盛世 kang qian sheng shi. The Portuguese presence at Aomen (Macao) dated from 1557; the Dutch set up in the East Indies and Taiwan in 1619 and 1624, respectively. The Indian colonies included: Chandernagore (1673), Pondicherry (1674), Yanam (1723), Mahe (1725), and Karikal (1739); Indian Ocean colonies founded in the same period: the Île de Bourbon (Réunion, 1664), Île de France (Mauritius, 1718), and the Seychelles (1756). Archives d’Outre-Mer (AOM), Indochine, B11 (29), carton 32, État-Major of the troops in Indochina, 2nd Bureau, intelligence, “Notes on Yunnan”, 15 December 1899. Marie-Claire Bergère, Sun Yat-sen, translated by Janet Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 162. Marianne Bastid, “L’ouverture aux idées d’Occident: quelle influence de la Révolution française sur la révolution républicaine de 1911?”, in Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident, N°2, L'idée révolutionnaire et la. (Chine: la question du modèle, 1983), p. 28. Marianne Bastid, pp. 33–34. William Fortescue, The Third Republic in France, 1870–1940: Conflicts and Continuities (London: Routledge, 2000). Paul Doumer was governor-general of Indochina from February 1897 to March 1902. Jeffrey G. Barlow, Sun Yat-sen and the French, 1900-1908 (Berkeley: Centre for Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1979), p. 52.

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19 20 21

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AOM, Indochina, B11 (36), carton 33, French Minister in Tokyo to MAE, July 1900. AOM, Indochina, B11 (36), carton 33, Doumer to MAE, 27 October 1900. Barlow, p. 53. Barlow, p. 31. Barlow, p. 69. Harold Z. Schriffen, “The Enigma of Sun Yat-sen”, in China in Revolution, edited by Mary Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Barlow, p. 69. The Three Principles of the People (三民主义 san min zhu yi). Min Pao (The People’s Journal), Tokyo, 1905–10; reprint, Taipei, 1969, first ts’e, p. 40. Barlow, p. 54. Barlow, p. 26. Bergère, p. 119. Henri Brunschwig, French Colonialism, 1871–1914: Myths and Realities (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 117. Barlow, p. 66. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères MAE, Internal Affairs, China, no. 203, Intelligence of the Chinese Revolutionaries, 26 August 1910. French trade with Indochina had been moving against the Metropole for some time, and in 1906, exports to Indochina had been exceeded by imports from there for the first time since 1893. Brunschwig, p. 193. MAE, Foreign Affairs, China, no. 200, Governor-General to Foreign Affairs, 16 January 2008. Barlow, p. 79. Barlow, p. 46. AOM B11 (37), carton 34, Military Attaché, Peking, 6 January 2008. MAE, Foreign Affairs, China, no. 238, French Minister Peking to Wai Wu Pu. Barlow, p. 86. Marc Martin, Médias et Journalistes de la République (Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob, 1997), p. 98. Martin, p. 98. Raymond Manevy, La Presse de la IIIe République (Paris: Joseph Foret, Éditeur, 1955), p. 209. Martin, p. 95. A. Fitz-Maurice, “Les progrès des révolutionnaires”, Le Figaro, 25 October 1911, p. 2. “Mouvement antidynastique et non xénophobe”, Le Figaro, 14 October 1911, p. 2. Albert de Pouvourville, “La Lutte Obscure”, Le Figaro, 22 October 1911, p. 3.

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“La Révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 28 October 1911, p. 2. The reformers to benefit from the amnesty include: (1) Revolutionaries before 1898, including Sun Yat-sen and some of his friends; (2) Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, sentenced to death in 1898, when the Empress Cixi returned to power, and many of their friends and supporters of constitutional reform; (3) the Han rebels of 1900 and various revolts of Guangxi, Guangzhou, Yunnan, etc.; (4) the rebels involved in the current uprising in Sichuan, Hubei and various other Chinese provinces in 1911. “La Révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 27 December 1911, p. 2. “Chez Les Républicains”, Le Figaro, 28 December 1911, p. 2. “La Révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 4 January 1912, p. 2. “La Révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 6 January 1912, p. 2. “Le Rappel de Youan Chi Kaï”, Le Figaro, 16 October 1911, p. 2. “Les conditions de Youan Chi Kaï”, Le Figaro, 21 October 1911, p. 2. “La Révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 30 October 1911, p. 2. “La Révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 3 November 1911, p. 2. Albert de Pouvourville, “Le Reveil”, Le Figaro, 20 October 1911, p. 2. A. Fitz-Maurice, “Soumission du Fils du Ciel”, Le Figaro, 31 October 1911, p. 1. “Nouvelles diverses”, Le Figaro, 7 January 1912, p. 2. Albert de Pouvourville was a frequent contributor to Le Figaro on the Far East. He lived in China and Indochina several times in military service and as a private citizen, becoming a Taoist. He was considered to be an expert on China and Chinese society. Albert de Pouvourville, “Les événements en Chine”, Le Figaro, 6 January 1912, p. 2. “Hors Paris”, Le Figaro, 23 January 1912, p. 1. “La Rivalité de Sun Yat Sen et de Yuan Chi Kai”, Le Journal des Débats, 23 January 1912, p. 2. “La Révolution Chinoise”, Le Journal des Débats, 2 February 1912, p. 2. “La Révolution Chinoise”, Le Figaro, 16 February 1912, p. 2. “La Révolution Chinoise”, Le Figaro, 17 February 1912, p. 2. Robert de Caix, “L’Insurrection en Chine”, Le Journal des Débats, 19 October 1911, p. 2. “Le Gouvernement de Pékin désemparé”, Le Figaro, 24 October 1911, p. 2. “Les événements de Chine”, Le Figaro, 6 November 1911, p. 4. “Les intérêts étrangers”, Le Figaro, 15 October 1911, p. 2. “La Guerre Civile en Chine”, Le Journal des Débats, 25 October 1911, p. 2. “Le Petite République: Les affaires de Chine”, Le Figaro, 29 October 1911, p. 2. “il n’y a rien autre à faire, pour le moment, qu’à laisser la Chine aux Chinois. Et, en tout cas, cette formule doit être la devise de la diplomatie française.” “Les intérêts étrangers”, Le Figaro, 15 October 1911, p. 2.

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“La Révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 6 January 1912, p. 2. “Petites Curiosités”, Le Figaro, 27 October 1911, p. 1. “La Révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 25 November 1911, pp. 2–3. Albert de Pouvourville, “Les événements de Chine”, Le Figaro, 4 December 1911, p. 2. Pierre Giffard, “Les Chinoise de Paris”, Le Figaro, 14 January 1912, p. 3. Louis Laloy, “Voix de l’Asie”, Le Journal des Débats, 16 March 1912, p. 2. E. Dupuy, “L’Opinion d’un missionnaire”, Le Figaro, 17 October 1911, p. 2. René Marchand, “M. Korostovetz, Ministre de Russie a Pékin sur la Situation en Chine”, Le Figaro, 24 December 1911, p. 2. “Lettre de Chine”, Le Journal des Débats, 31 January 1912, p. 2. “Les embarras du gouvernement Impérial”, Le Figaro, 22 October 1911, p. 2. “Le Gouvernement et les Rebelles”, Le Journal des Débats, 26 October 1911, p. 2. Albert de Pouvourville, “La Révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 26 November 1911, p. 2. Albert de Pouvourville, “La Coupure”, Le Figaro, 30 December 1911, p. 2. “la plus grosse erreur qui pouvait être commise.” “À Pékin”, Le Figaro, 30 December 1911, p. 2. J. Coudurier, “Le plan de Sun-Yat-Sen”, Le Figaro, 14 October 1911, p. 2 and “Le plan du chef de la révolution”, Le Journal des Débats, 15 October 1911, p. 2. “Les Chefs”, Le Figaro, 15 October 1911, p. 2. “L’Opinion en Angleterre”, Le Journal des Débats, 17 October 1911, p. 2. “L’Insurrection en Chine”, Le Journal des Débats, 18 October 1911, p. 2. “SunYat-Sen a déclaré dans une réunion politique que dans la moderne république chinoise les hommes et les femmes auraient un droit de vote égal. Les deux Chambres et le président seront élus par le peuple.” Robert de Caix, “L’Insurrection en Chine”, Le Journal des Débats, 19 October 1911, p. 2. Amy Luz, “Sun-Yat-Sen et la Révolution Chinoise”, Le Journal des Débats, 26 October 1911, p. 2. “La Guerre Civile en Chine”, Le Journal des Débats, 30 October 1911, p. 2. Albert de Pouvourville, “La Révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 6 November 1911, p. 4. “La révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 14 January 1912, p. 2 and “Inspection de la flotte par le président”, Le Journal des Débats, 15 January 1912, p. 2. “On a remarque que les navires de guerre anglais, allemands et américains n’ont pas rendu le salut au yacht présidentiel.”

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Albert de Pouvourville, “Le Sceptre ou la Mort”, Le Figaro, 27 January 1912, p. 2. “Les Temps Nouveau”, Le Figaro, 17 February 1912, p. 2. “Les Raisons de la Démission de Sun Yat Sen”, Le Journal des Débats, 6 April 1912, p. 2. “La République proclamée”, Le Figaro, 15 October 1911, p. 2. Amy Luz, “Sun-Yat-Sen et la Révolution Chinoise”, Le Journal des Débats, 26 October 1911, p. 2. “Le Programme Gouvernemental des Révolutionnaires”, Le Journal des Débats, 18 November 1911, p. 2. “Un document chinois sur la Révolution”, Le Journal des Débats, 1 December 1911, p. 2. “(républicanisme) est énergiquement repoussée par tous les Chinois de sens rassis.” “Manifeste des républicains aux puissances”, Le Figaro, 7 January 1912, p. 2 and “Un manifeste des républicains”, Le Journal des Débats, 7 January 1912, p. 2. Albert de Pouvourville, “La Lutte Obscure”, Le Figaro, 22 October 1911, p. 3. Albert de Pouvourville, “Les Causes Profondes”, Le Figaro, 28 October 1911, p. 2. “Le Suprême Espoir”, Le Figaro, 2 November 1911, p. 2. Albert de Pouvourville, “Les événements de Chine”, Le Figaro, 6 November 1911, p. 4. E. Dupuy, “Une Visite à des Révolutionnaires chinois”, Le Figaro, 9 November 1911, p. 2. Albert de Pouvourville, “La Révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 26 November 1911, p. 2 “Les événements de Chine”, Le Figaro, 6 February 1912, p. 2. “Yuan Chi Kaï et les républicains”, Le Journal des Débats, 27 December 1911, p. 1. “Le Programme de Sun-Yat-Sen”, Le Journal des Débats, 15 October 1911, p. 2. “Qu’on choisisse le meilleur d’entre nous pour chef … si on ne trouve pas meilleur que moi, je serai ce chef.” “La révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 14 January 1912, p. 2 and Le Journal des Débats, 15 January 1912, p. 2. “La révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 7 February 1912, p. 2. “La Révolution en Chine”, Le Figaro, 30 January 1912, p. 2 and “Une notecirculaire de Sun Yat Sen”, Le Journal des Débats, 30 January 1912, p. 2. “La République Chinoise”, Le Figaro, 14 February 1912, p. 2. “Le Gouvernement Provisoire”, Le Journal des Débats, 10 March 1912, p. 2. “La révolution chinoise et les États malais”, Le Journal des Débats, 25 March 1912, p. 2.

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“Yuan Chi Kai et les républicains”, Le Journal des Débats, 6 January 1912, p. 2. “La Révolution Chinoise”, Le Journal des Débats, 20 January 1912, p. 2. “La Révolution Chinoise”, Le Journal des Débats, 25 January 1912, p. 2. “La Révolution Chinoise”, Le Journal des Débats, 27 January 1912, p. 2. “Un édit impérial accepte la République”, Le Journal des Débats, 6 February 1912, p. 2. “Le Nouveau Régime”, Le Journal des Débats, 15 February 1912, p. 1. “Le Nouveau Régime”, Le Journal des Débats, 15 February 1912, pp. 1–2. “Election de Yuan Chi Kai à la présidence”, Le Journal des Débats, 17 February 1912, p. 2. “Les Républicains de Nankin”, Le Journal des Débats, 6 March 1912, p. 2. “Le Programme de Sun Yat Sen”, Le Figaro, 6 April 1912, p. 2 and “La République Chinoise”, Le Journal des Débats, 6 April 1912, p. 2. “Évolution et Révolution en Chine” and “La Chine est-elle faite pour la république?”, Le Journal des Débats, 24 May 1912, p. 2. ”La république ne réussira pas à unifier la Chine.” “Le plus beau mausolée du monde”, Le Figaro, 20 May 1929, p. 2.

References “À Pékin”. Le Figaro, 30 December 1911, p. 2. Barlow, Jeffrey G. Sun Yat-sen and the French, 1900–1908. Berkeley: Centre for Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1979. Bergère, Marie-Claire. Sun Yat-sen, translated by Janet Lloyd. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. Brunschwig, Henri. French Colonialism, 1871–1914: Myths and Realities. New York: Praeger, 1966. Chesneaux, Jean et al. China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution, translated by Anne Destenay. New York: Pantheon Books, 1976. “Chez Les Républicains”. Le Figaro, 28 December 1911, p. 2. Coudurier, J. “Le plan de Sun-Yat-Sen”. Le Figaro, 14 October 1911, p. 2. ———. “Le plan du chef de la révolution”. Le Journal des Débats, 15 October 1911, p. 2. de Caix, Robert. “L’Insurrection en Chine”. Le Journal des Débats, 19 October 1911, p. 2. de Pouvourville, Albert. “La Coupure”. Le Figaro, 30 December 1911, p. 2. ———. “La Lutte Obscure”. Le Figaro, 22 October 1911, p. 3. ———. “La Révolution en Chine”. Le Figaro, 28 October 1911, p. 2; 30 October 1911, p. 2; 3 November 1911, p. 2; 6 November 1911, p. 4; 25 November

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1911, pp. 2-3; 26 November 1911, p. 2; 27 December 1911, p. 2; 4 January 1912, p. 2; 6 January 1912, p. 2; 14 January 1912, p. 2; 30 January 1912, p. 2; 7 February 1912, p. 2. ———. “Le Reveil”. Le Figaro, 20 October 1911, p. 2. ———. “Le Sceptre ou la Mort”. Le Figaro, 27 January 1912, p. 2. ———. “Les Causes Profondes”. Le Figaro, 28 October 1911, p. 2. ———. “Les événements de Chine”. Le Figaro, 6 November 1911, p. 4; 4 December 1911, p. 2; Le Figaro, 6 January 1912, p. 2. Dupuy, E. “L’Opinion d’un missionnaire”. Le Figaro, 17 October 1911, p. 2. ———. “Une Visite à des Révolutionnaires chinois”. Le Figaro, 9 November 1911, p. 2. “Election de Yuan Chi Kai à la présidence”. Le Journal des Débats, 17 February 1912, p. 2. “Évolution et Révolution en Chine”. Le Journal des Débats, 24 May 1912, p. 2. Fitz-Maurice, A. “Les progrès des révolutionnaires”. Le Figaro, 25 October 1911. ———. “Soumission du Fils du Ciel”. Le Figaro, 31 October 1911, p. 1. Fortescue, William. The Third Republic in France, 1870–1940: Conflicts and Continuities. London: Routledge, 2000. Giffard, Pierre. “Les Chinoise de Paris”. Le Figaro, 14 January 1912, p. 3. “Hors Paris”. Le Figaro, 23 January 1912, p. 1. “Inspection de la flotte par le président”. Le Journal des Débats, 15 January 1912, p. 2. “La Chine est-elle faite pour la république?” Le Journal des Débats, 24 May 1912, p. 2. “La Guerre Civile en Chine”. Le Journal des Débats, 25 October 1911, p. 2; 30 October 1911, p. 2. “La République Chinoise”. Le Journal des Débats, 6 April 1912, p. 2. “La République Proclamée”. Le Figaro, 15 October 1911, p. 2. “La Révolution Chinoise”. Le Figaro, 14 February 1912, p. 2; 16 February 1912, p. 2; 17 February 1912, p. 2. “La Révolution Chinoise”. Le Journal des Débats, 20 January 1912, p. 2; 25 January 1912, p. 2; 27 January 1912, p. 2; 2 February 1912, p. 2. “La Révolution Chinoise et les États malais”. Le Journal des Débats, 25 March 1912, p. 2. “La Rivalité de Sun Yat Sen et de Yuan Chi Kai”. Le Journal des Débats, 23 January 1912, p. 2. Laloy, Louis. “Voix de l’Asie”. Le Journal des Débats, 16 March 1912, p. 2. Le Journal des Débats, 15 January 1912, p. 2. “Le Gouvernement de Pékin désemparé”. Le Figaro, 24 October 1911, p. 2. “Le Gouvernement et les Rebelles”. Le Journal des Débats, 26 October 1911, p. 2. “Le Gouvernement Provisoire”. Le Journal des Débats, 10 March 1912, p. 2. “Le Nouveau Régime”. Le Journal des Débats, 15 February 1912, pp. 1–2.

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“Le Petite République: Les affaires de Chine”. Le Figaro, 29 October 1911, p. 2. “Le plus beau mausolée du monde”. Le Figaro, 20 May 1929, p. 2. “Le Programme de Sun Yat Sen”. Le Figaro, 6 April 1912, p. 2. “Le Programme de Sun-Yat-Sen”. Le Journal des Débats, 15 October 1911, p. 2. “Le Programme Gouvernemental des Révolutionnaires”. Le Journal des Débats, 18 November 1911, p. 2. “Le Rappel de Youan Chi Kaï”. Le Figaro, 16 October 1911, p. 2. “Le Suprême Espoir”. Le Figaro, 2 November 1911, p. 2. “Les Chefs”. Le Figaro, 15 October 1911, p. 2. “Les conditions de Youan Chi Kaï”. Le Figaro, 21 October 1911, p. 2. “Les embarras du gouvernement Impérial”. Le Figaro, 22 October 1911, p. 2. “Les événements de Chine”. Le Figaro, 6 November 1911, p. 4. “Les événements de Chine”. Le Figaro, 6 February 1912, p. 2. “Les intérêts étrangers”. Le Figaro, 15 October 1911, p. 2. “Les Raisons de la Démission de Sun Yat Sen”. Le Journal des Débats, 6 April 1912, p. 2. “Les Républicains de Nankin”. Le Journal des Débats, 6 March 1912, p. 2. “Les Temps Nouveau”. Le Figaro, 17 February 1912, p. 2. “Lettre de Chine”. Le Journal des Débats, 31 January 1912, p. 2. “L’Insurrection en Chine”. Le Journal des Débats, 18 October 1911, p. 2. “L’Opinion en Angleterre”. Le Journal des Débats, 17 October 1911, p. 2. Luz, Amy. “Sun-Yat-Sen et la Révolution Chinoise”. Le Journal des Débats, 26 October 1911, p. 2. “Manifeste des républicains aux puissances”. Le Figaro, 7 January 1912, p. 2. Marchand, René. “M. Korostovetz, Ministre de Russie a Pékin sur la Situation en Chine”. Le Figaro, 24 December 1911, p. 2. Martin, Marc. Médias et Journalistes de la République. Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob, 1997. Min Pao [The People’s Journal]. Tokyo, 1905–10. Reprint, Taipei, 1969. “Mouvement antidynastique et non xénophobe”. Le Figaro, 14 October 1911, p. 2. “Nouvelles diverses”. Le Figaro, 7 January 1912, p. 2. “Petites Curiosités”. Le Figaro, 27 October 1911, p. 1. Raymond Manevy. La Presse de la IIIe République. Paris: Joseph Foret, Éditeur, 1955. Schriffen, Harold Z. “The Enigma of Sun Yat-sen”. In China in Revolution, edited by Mary Wright. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. “Un document chinois sur la Révolution”. Le Journal des Débats, 1 December 1911, p. 2. “Un édit impérial accepte la République”. Le Journal des Débats, 6 February 1912, p. 2.

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“Un manifeste des républicains”. Le Journal des Débats, 7 January 1912, p. 2. “Une note-circulaire de Sun Yat Sen”. Le Journal des Débats, 30 January 1912, p. 2. “Yuan Chi Kaï et les républicains”. Le Journal des Débats, 27 December 1911, p. 1; 6 January 1912, p. 2.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS Prasenjit Duara I want to thank Dr Lee Lai To, His Excellency Ambassador K. Kesavapany, as well as Professor Leo Suryadinata, for organizing this amazing conference and organizing it before anybody else does so that we can steal the thunder. I was asked to make a few comments as a discussant. Some of you have come to me and said, “Oh well, let’s see how you do your keynote speech at the end.” I said, “There is no keynote speech, just some concluding points. Please do not have much expectation. That way we can release you early, so that we can all go home.” I also want to apologize that I am unable to make comments on the individual papers mainly because I could only attend to one set of papers. But I tried to look through many of them. I will comment on the three terms, “Sun Yat-sen”, “Nanyang”, and “the 1911 Republican Revolution” contained in the conference title “Sun Yat-sen, Nanyang and the 1911 Revolution”. Now, each one of these terms is a very important topic in itself and each of these can have a very complex relation with one another. So, I want to see how we have tried to relate them in our conference and how we can think about these issues. The word “Nanyang” as we all know refers to the regions of the South Seas, but basically, it also refers to the Chinese in this region. There was an old migration of course, long before the late nineteenth-century plantation migration, of people who came to be called the “Peranakans” in addition to the later migrations of the late nineteenth century with which you are all familiar. But when nationalists like Hu Hanmin and others tried to organize the Nanyang Chinese for the revolutionary cause in the early 1900s, they were very frustrated. They would say that the Nanyang Chinese did not know their Chinese names; they did not know the language; they did not even know they were Chinese. Hu said that the only way you could tell they were Chinese was because they sported the Manchu queue and then he said that is exactly 313

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what he and the other nationalists wanted to get rid of. So, it was a very ironic development. You could only recognize the Chinese by cutting off the way to identify them. He also found that they were a very diverse group, divided by dialect groups, by class, and so on. The revolutionaries in the first decade of the twentieth century complained bitterly that they were not making any great headway among these Nanyang Chinese because the Nanyang Chinese were much more interested in the symbols of imperial identity and loyalty. They loved to wear the feathers and the caps, and followed the dress codes set by the Manchu or Qing imperial court. The revolutionaries were not even the next most popular group. That position went to the constitutional monarchist group of Kang Youwei and the Baohuanghui which you heard about. Kang Youwei had a very major reception among people in the Straits, from both the Baba Chinese like Lim Boon Keng and the Peranakans in the Dutch Indies. The Zhonghua Hui Guan invited Kang Youwei to a big meeting where he gave his lectures. He was very popular and the windows were welling over with people coming to hear Kang Youwei’s talk in 1902 or so. That was the situation with the Nanyang Chinese before 1911. The second term that we have is “revolution”. The question of revolution is a very complicated one. What does it mean? There were at least three senses of the understanding of revolution in China alone. (1) The FrancoAmerican idea of citizenship and republicanism; this was interpreted in China to refer to a nation of awakened citizens versus conditions of slavery under the Manchus. The 1911 Revolution created a sense and idea of China as a modern and unified entity, although, of course, you still had different dialect groups, different business and political interests, and other conflicting interests and views. But the idea of a Chinese nation became common to all of them. And in different circumstances, like the anti-Japanese movement during the Pacific war, that would be very important for mobilization. But actually, I think, these older community lines and divisions were not really wiped out as Wu Xiao An’s chapter has shown. Indeed, these differences were not transformed until state building and nation-building in the 1960s and 1970s. (2) Revolution was tied to Social Darwinism. It was a popular ideology in East Asia that made sense of the competitive capitalist universe into which China was drawn. People were seen as races, groups and nations with the potential to compete and survive or be eliminated. The Chinese leaders saw themselves as the yellow race with a fighting chance to compete with the whites unlike the other lesser races, the blacks, browns and red races! While this was a source of hope it also led to contempt for other communities, especially the Manchus who were regarded as inferior. (3) Secret societies. For them, geming referred

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to the change in the mandate of heaven and did not necessarily refer to the modern sense of the word “revolution”. The two uses occupied two different ideologies or even cosmologies. In the Western enlightenment sense, geming as revolution was a future-oriented, transformative concept reflecting the idea of progress. For the secret societies, it was to return to the ideals of the Chinese sage kings. They sought to symbolize this return by wearing Ming era dress and paraphernalia. In the 1911 Revolution, we see that the two different meanings of geming have to be understood in two different philosophical systems, two different ideologies, and two different vocabularies. Revolution in the modern sense comes out of the ideas of enlightenment history where people were to be emancipated and their whole life totally transformed, whereas in the historical Chinese version, it referred to a whole different philosophy. Certainly the traditional idea of geming was also very profound. Geming here meant changing the mandate of heaven; it meant bringing in a new set of virtuous rulers who would reform and recreate the ancient institutions for contemporary purposes. But it did not necessarily lead to notions of revolutionary progress and liberation and those kinds of things. However, the two notions of geming were often conflated even by people like Sun Yat-sen. When he was working with the secret societies he would often used the language of zhengyi (loyalty and righteousness) from the older cosmology of geming to bring them into the cause. But then, there was also a problem, because when they were victorious in a local rebellion, the secret society would appear wearing Ming dynasty clothes because for them the purpose of their rebellion was to go back to the ideals of the sage kings. They were really achieving the mandate of heaven and sought to go back in time. This is a very different notion of revolution than one that sought to make progress. That would cause a lot of problems for the modern revolutionaries. Nonetheless, that was a significant part of revolution. For Nanyang Chinese, “revolution” combined some of these meanings, yet yielded different ones. For the secret societies, it contained some meaning of Ming revivalism with which they had been associated in the minds of the revolutionaries from the beginning. They had been seen as the heroic resistors to the Manchu invasion who had to seek exile in the South Seas. For the Nanyang elites, the Republic represented the start of a new and strong state which could help them hold their heads high. Of course, the social Darwinist dimension might have also complicated their attitudes towards the host communities. But, more or less, for many of the Nanyang Chinese, the revolution was something which could restore economic, political, and more fundamentally,

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a psychological sense of being able to stand up for themselves. For that, the most important thing was to have an independent and powerful state. So in a very interesting way, geming here perhaps refers, as Professor Wang Gungwu has also pointed out, much more to the statist dimension, to the establishment of a new powerful state rather than the revolutionary emancipatory dimension which was there but not as powerful. They were perhaps not as keen on the idea of a revolution of all the people. The 1949 Revolution in China had a much stronger sense of “all the people”. That was not the meaning it seems to me here. In fact, I will reinforce this point. Huang Jianli’s chapter on the Overseas Chinese as the Mother of the Revolution (1911) suggests that this was a phrase that the KMT supported during the Cold War. Yet this was also the period when the communists strongly endorsed the idea of revolution. So the KMT notion of revolution was obviously different and much more conservative than that of the CCP. To this extent, you can also see that the meaning of revolution is very specific and very different for the Overseas Chinese. Let me come to the third element. The third element is none other than Sun Yat-sen. What makes someone like Sun Yat-sen tick in China? I would say he became just as important in Nanyang. Although, I have also said he did not really hit it off before 1911, he suddenly became a very powerful figure after 1911. What is it about him? I think there is a very interesting and important historical dimension to this. It has to do with insiders and outsiders in history or the inside and the outside of history-making. I have written a whole book, not on Sun Yat-sen, but on this issue. The book I have written is called The Global and the Regional in China’s Nation-formation.1 Very simply, I advocate changing the lens by which we view history because we have tended to view it very much as happening within some kind of political entity that has evolved over time. History is seen as an internal movement, an evolution of an entity. If we change our lens, we see that historical movement tends to be circular as well (though never returning quite to the same point); something that comes from outside, is transformed inside, goes out again and comes back in different ways. Of course, if we view it like this, we can ask a whole set of questions as to why we have depicted something only as internal and so on. But I will not go into that. The entire relationship of Nanyang to China can be seen in this framework, and the role of Sun Yat-sen is a very important pivot in that relationship. It is interesting to see how much of an outsider and how much of an insider is Sun Yat-sen. In some ways, I feel he is more of an outsider, right? He studied Western medicine, he has a Christian background, he has all

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those foreign experiences, he knows all these people all over the world, and he is very cosmopolitan. But what makes him an insider here is that he knows Cantonese, he has close relationships, and so on. He also has connections with secret society groups, the Zhigongtang. These people are very important to him and this gives him a lot of cache. It lets him operate in politics as well. That is something he has. But what he does not have, what he really misses is the literati cultural status. Marius Jansen wrote a book about him in Tokyo, Yokohama.2 Basically, the Chinese literati in exile there looked down on him. People like Zhang Taiyan would hardly care to meet him. Kang Youwei and his people thought of him as a barbarian. They really saw him as an outsider and he had to compensate for that. But it seems to me that it makes the point. In some ways, the problems of Sun Yat-sen were the problems of an outsider trying to become an insider to translate the new categories into action within China. He tried many different things. We do not have time to go into this. And I would say this is also to some extent the issue involved with the Nanyang Chinese. We can return once again to Huang Jianli’s chapter. Nanyang Chinese also have very much a sense of being outsiders with the possibility of influencing the insiders, whether for idealistic reasons, for instrumental reasons or just reasons of identity. The Nanyang Chinese saw themselves very much in the colonial mirror. The colonial studies paradigm cannot be applied to China but you can apply it to Nanyang Chinese, because they do a lot of things that are shaped by the colonial circumstances. In part because they are seen as outsiders in China, they want to say “we are the Mother of the Revolution” and that they played an important role in achieving the Chinese Revolution. They want to say that “we are among the strong modernizing force in China”. So that it then produces a certain irritant. We see this irritation most of all in Mao Zedong’s China where Overseas Chinese were very suspect, especially during the Cultural Revolution. Let me make one last point. How can we think of the role of Sun Yatsen for Nanyang today? You know, as I was listening, I found that there has been one missing term in this conference. The one chapter I heard — there may have been others — that did address the missing term was Wasana Wongsurawat’s chapter. This conference cannot be simply about Nanyang Chinese, China and Sun Yat-sen. The Nanyang Chinese were also living in different places, different states with different communities, with different people. These particular circumstances have also informed the situation of Nanyang Chinese with China and Sun Yat-sen. Wongsurawat, I thought, made a very interesting three-way discussion of how the Thai Government

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and Thai intellectuals influenced the situation of the Chinese in Thailand at the time. It then becomes a very complex, interesting relationship. We get to see not only how the Nanyang Chinese were affected, but also how the Chinese Revolution has also influenced Thai history. Let me finally note that we may be asking old questions for a changed generation. Now many of you are young. How many young Nanyang people are interested in this problem of Sun and the 1911 Revolution in China? Is it a question mainly for our older generation? I think it is very important to keep the legacy Sun Yat-sen alive. I think we need to think of the more universal dimension of his thought. Note that Sun’s Three People’s Principles was deeply influenced by the Soviet Revolution. Sun is very thankful to Lenin and he thinks of Russia as very important because it witnessed a humanistic revolution with worldwide significance. It was not just anti-imperialistic, it also uplifted others. That is one of the strongest universal elements in someone like Sun Yat-sen. How does this message, and his notion of Ba Dao versus Wang Dao become meaningful? Or is it that in this day and age, the only way someone like Sun Yat-sen can be meaningful to the wider populace, not just younger Chinese people but others as well, is through love stories. I mean this is what we are seeing in the film of his life in Penang, etc. People want to understand him as a real person. Is that a bad way to go? Or can we find other ways to make this revolutionary legend more relevant in the life and destiny of contemporary Nanyang societies?

Notes 1

2

Prasenjit Duara, The Global and Regional in China’s Nation-Formation (London: Routledge, 2008). Marius Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat Sen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954).

References Duara, Prasenjit. The Global and Regional in China’s Nation-Formation. London: Routledge, 2008. Jansen, Marius. The Japanese and Sun Yat Sen. Standford, CA: Standford University Press, 1954.

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