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»»»»«»>>«»>»»»»»>»»» Mortimer J. Adler,
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Executive Editor
THE
SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province
Revised by Daniel
J.
Sullivan
VOLUME
II
William Benton, Publisher
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, INC CHICAGO LONDON TORONTO •
•
.H^-^«H•H•H«H-H••H•H•«H••^
is derived from the translation of The Summa Theoby Fathers of the English Dominican Province by arrangement with Burns, Gates & Washbourne Ltd., London, and Benziger Brothers,
The
text of this edition
logica
Inc.,
The
New
York.
bibliographical footnotes and bibliography in this edition are derived
the Piana Edition of the
Summa
from
Theologiae published by the Dominican
Fathers in Ottawa by arrangement with the Institute of Medieval Studies Albert le Grand of the University of Montreal. Copyright, 1941, by Col-
lege DOMINICAIN d'GtTAWA.
Copyright in the united states of America, 1952, by encyclop.^dia britanxica, inc.
Copyright 1952. Copyright under international copyright union by ENCYCLOP.tDIA BRH ANNICA, INC. AlL RIGHTS RESERVED UNDER PAN AMERICAN copyright CONVENTIONS BY ENCYCLOPiEDIA BRITANNICA, INC.
GENERAL CONTENTS, Part III.
I
VOL.
II
of the Second Part (Continued)
Treatise on Habits (QQ. 49-89)
IV. Treatise
V. Treatise
i
on Law (QQ. 90-108)
205
on Grace (QQ. 109-114)
338
Part
II
of the Second Part
Prologue I.
II.
III.
Treatise on Faith, Hope and Charity
(QQ. 1-46)
380
Treatise on Active and Contemplative Life (QQ. 179-182)
606
Treatise on the States of Life (QQ. 183-189)
625
THIRD PART Prologue I.
Treatise on the Incarnation (QQ. 1-26) 701
II.
Treatise on the Sacraments (QQ. 60-65) §47
Supplement to the Third Part (QQ. 69-99) I.
Treatise on the Resurrection
(QQ. 69-86) II.
885
885
Treatise on the Last Things
(QQ. 87-99)
997
CONTENTS, VOLUME Part
I
QUESTION
of the Second Part (continued) Treatise on Habits
1. In General PAGE QUESTION 49. Of Habits In General, As To Their Substance i 6 50. Of the Subject of Habits 51. 0/ the Cause of Habits, As To Their
52.
53. 54.
12 Formation 15 Of the Increase of Habits How Habits Are Corrupted or Diminished 19 22 Of the Distinction of Habits 2.
55. 56.
57. 58.
In Particular
— that
Good Habits
(a)
Virtues
is,
26 Of the Virtues, As To Their Essence 29 Of the Subject of Virtue Of the Intellectual Virtues 35 Of the Difference Between Moral and Intellectual Virtues
41
59.
Of Moral Virtue In Relation To The
60.
How
Passions the
45
Moral Virtues
Differ
From One
Another 49 Of the Cardinal Virtues 54 62. Of the Theological Virtues 59 63 63. Of the Cause of Virtues 66 64. Of the Mean of Virtue 65. Of the Connection of Virtues 70 66. Of Equality Among the Virtues 75 81 67. Of the Duration of Virtues After This Life 68. Of the Gifts 87 69. Of the Beatittides 96 loi 70. Of the Fruits of the Holy Ghost 61.
(b)
Evil Habits
— that
is,
Vices
Of Vice and Sin Considered in Themselves 105 iii 72,0/ The Distinction of Sins 73. Of the Comparison of One Sin With Another 119 128 74. Of the Subject of Sin 75. Of the Causes of Sin, In General 137 76. Of the Causes of Sin, In Particular 140 77. 0/ the Cause of Sin On the Part of the Sensi71.
tive Appetite
Of 79. Of 80. Of 81. Of 82.0/ S^.Of 84. Of 78.
that Cause of Sin
Which
Is
Malice
the External Causes of Sin
86.
156
As Regards the Devil 159 the Cause of Sin On The Part of Man 162 Original Sin, As To Its Essence 168 the Cause of Sin
the Subject of Original Sin the Cause of Sin, In Respect of Being the Cause of Another
85.
144 152
Of the Effects of Sin Of the Stoin of Sin
171
One Sin 174
178 184
II
S
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
VUl QUESTION 8. Of the Gift of Understanding
Of the Gift of Knowledge Of Unbelief In General 11.0/ Heresy 12. Of Apostasy IT,. Of the Sin of Blasphemy, In General 14. Of Blasphemy Against the Holy Ghost 15. 0/ the Vices Opposed To Knowledge Understanding 16. Of the Precepts of Faith, Knowledge, Understanding 9.
10.
Of Hope Of the Subject of Hope ig. Of the Gift of Fear 20. Of Despair 21.0/ Presumption 2 2.0/ the Precepts Relating To Hope and Fear 23. Of Charity, Considered In Itself 24. Of the Subject of Charity 25. 0/ the Object of Charity 26. 0/ the Order of Charity 1'].
18.
I'j.Of the Principal Act of Charity,
Which
PAGE 416 423 426
43^ 442
454 456 462 4^5 474 478
480 482
489 510
Hatred Acedia
562
Envy
566
32.
Peace
Mercy Beneficence
Almsdeeds
33. 0,' Fraternal Correction
Of Of 36. Of 37.0/ 38. 39.
40.
41. 42. 43. 44.
45. 46.
Of Of Of Of Of Of Of Of Of
the Sins
Which Are Contrary To Peace 570
Contention Schism
572
War
574 577
2.
Of the Fitness of the Incarnation Of the Mode of Union of the Word
701
Incarnate
709
Of the Mode of Union On the Part of the Person Assuming 723 4.0/ the Mode of Union On the Part of the Human Nature Assumed 730 5. Of the Manner of Union With Regard To the Parts of Human Nature 735 6. Of the Order of Assumption 740 7. Of the Grace of Christ as an Individual 3.
Man
745
Of the Grace of Christ as He Is the Head of the Church 756 9. Of Christ's Knowledge In General 763 10. Of the Beatific Knowledge of Christ's Soul 767 11.0/ the Knowledge Imprinted or Infused In the 8.
Soul of Christ 12.0/ the Acquired Knowledge of Christ's Soul IS14.
772 "j-jG
Of the Power of Christ's Soul 779 Of the Defects of Body Assumed By the Son of
God
784
Of the Defects of Soul Assumed By Christ 787 16. Of the Consequences of the Union with Regard To Those Things Which Arc Applicable To Christ In His Being and Becoming 796 17.0/ What Pertains To Christ's Unity from the 15.
Strife
581
583
18.
Scandal The Precepts of Charity
585 592 598 603
810 the Standpoint of Will Of What Pertains To the Power of Christ With 8i6 Regard to Operation 821 20. Of Christ's Subjection to the Father 823 21.0/ Christ's Prayer 22. Of the Priesthood of Christ 827 23. Of the Adoption of Christ 833 836 24. Of the Predestination of Christ 25. Of the Adoration of Christ 839 26. Of Christ as Called the Mediator of God and
the Gift of Folly,
Wisdom
Which
Is
Opposed To Wisdom
Of the Division of Life Into Active and Contemplative
606
607 Of the Contemplative Life 616 181. Of the Active Life 182.0/ the Active Life In Comparison With the 620 Contemplative Life 180.
Treatise on the States of Life 183.
Treatise on the Incarnation 1.
Sedition
Treatise on Active and Contemplative Life 179.
674 687
Third Part (QQ. 1-26; 60-65)
501
34.
ii.
0/ Of Of Of
663
Of the Different Kinds of Religious Life Of the Entrance Into Religious Life
452
and
35.
29.
30.
189.
Religious
and
520 527 53© 533 53^ 540 55° 558
28.
188.
444 447
Is
Love Of Joy
QUESTION PAGE Properly Consists 650 187.0/ Those Tilings That Are Appropriate To
Of Man's Various Duties and States In
General 625 Of Things Pertaining To the State of Perfec62 tion In General 185. Of Things Pertaining To the Episcopal State 639 186. Of Those Things In Which the Religious State
Standpoint of Being
Of What Pertains To the Unity
806 in Christ
From
19.
Man
845
Treatise on the Sacraments 60. 61. 62.
184.
Of the Of the Of the Grace Of the
Sacraments Necessity of the Sacraments Sacraments' Principal Effect,
847 855
Which
Is
858
Other Effect of the Sacraments, Which Character 864 870 64. Of the Causes of the Sacraments 879 65. Of the Number of the Sacraments 63.
Is a
CONTENTS PAGE
QUESTION
1.
Of the Subtlety of the Bodies of the
84.
Of the Agility of the Bodies of the Blessed 983 Of the Clarity of the Bodies of the Blessed 989 Of the Conditions under Which the Bodies of the Damned Will Rise Again 992
Blessed
69.
70.
85. 86.
Before the Resurrection
Of Matters Concerrdng the Resurrection, and First, of the Place Where Souls Are After Death 885 Of the Quality of the Soul After Leaving the Body, and the Punishment Inflicted On It By Material Fire
'ji.Of
Works
of Intercession for the
Dead
893 900
Of Prayers With Regard to the Saints in Heaven 917 73. Of the Signs That Will Precede the Judgment 922 74. Of the Fire of the Final Conflagration 925 2. The Resurrection Itself 75. Of the Resurrection 935 76. Of the Cause of the Resurrection 939 77. Of the Time and Manner of the Resurrec72.
tion 78.
Of the Term From Which Resurrection
79.
80.
974
Treatise on the Last Things
Of the Knowledge Which, After Rising Again, Men Will Have at the Judgment Concerning Merits and Demerits 997 88. Of the General Judgment, As To the Time and Place at Which It will Be 1000 89. Of Those Who Will Judge and Of Those Who Will Be Judged at the General Judgment 1005 90. Of the Form of the Judge in Coming To the Judgment 1012 91. 0/ the Quality of the World After the Judgment 1016 92. Of the Vision of the Divine Essence in Refer87.
ence to the Blessed
943
93.
of the
947
94.
Of the Conditions of Those Who Rise Again, and First, of Their Identity 951 Of the Integrity of the Bodies in the Resur-
95.
rection
97.
956 81. Of the Quality of Those Who Rise Again 964 82. Of the Condition of the Blessed After Their Resurrection 968
PAGE
83.
Supplement to the Third Part (QQ. 69-99) Treatise on the Resurrection
IS
QUESTION
Damned 96.
98.
99.
1025
Of the Happiness of the Saints and Their Mansions 1037 Of the Relations of the Saints Towards the Of Of Of Of Of
the Gifts of the Blessed the Aureoles
1040 1042
1049
Punishment of the Damned 1066 the Will and Intellect of the Damned 1072 God's Mercy and Justice Towards the the
Damned
1078
SUMMA TH EG LOGIC A
xfi
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Nestor, Epistola
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Glossula Interieda,
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Macrobius, Commentarius ex Cicerone
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Pelagius, Commentarius in Evangelium secundum Mar cum, PL 30, 609-668. Epistola I, Ad Demetriadem, PL 30, 16-47. Libellus Fidei Pelagii ad Innocentium, PL ,
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Peter Damian, De Novissimis
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ON HABITS
TREATISE 1.
In
General
QUESTION XLIX Of habits
tion," as
in general, as to their
substance {In Four Articles)
After
now
treating of
human
acts
human
acts,
and
of intrinsic prin-
first,
ciples, second, of extrinsic principles, (q.
The intrinsic principle is power and as we have treated of powers in the Lxxvn.
(q.
sqq.),
sider habits.
And
general; second, vices
and other
human
it
first
we
xc).
habit; but
First Part remains for us to con-
we
shall consider
them in and
shall consider virtues
like habits,
which are the prin-
Book on
stated in the
Therefore habit
On
and passions, we
pass on to the consideration of the princi-
ples of
is
the Predica-
ments} Now disposition is "the order of that which has parts," as stated in the Metaphysics} But this belongs to the predicament Position. is
the contrary,
Book on
not a quality.
The Philosopher
says, in the
the Predicaments,^ that "habit
is
a qual-
which it is difficult to change." / answer that. This word habitus (habit) is derived from habere (to have). Now habit is taken from this word in two ways in one way, according as man, or any other thing, is said to have something; in another way, according as a ity
;
particular thing tain
way
is
ordered {se habet) in a cer-
either in regard to itself, or in regard
Concerning habits in general there are four points to be considered: First, the substance of
something else. Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is had,
habits; second, their subject (q. l)
is
ciples of
acts (q. lv).
to
;
third, the
cause of their generation, increase, and corruption (q. li)
;
fourth,
how they
are distinguished
from one another (q. liv). Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether habit is a quality? (2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality? (3) Whether habit implies an order to an act? (4) Of the necessity of habit. Article
i.
Whether Habit
Is a Quality?
We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that habit is not a quality. Objection i. For Augustine says (qq. Lxxxin, qu. 73) :^ "This word 'habit' is derived from the verb 'To have.' " But "To have" pertains not only to quality, but also to the other categories, for we speak of ourselves as having quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is
not a quahty. Obj.
2.
Further, habit
of the predicaments, as
is
may
considered as one
be clearly seen in
Book on the Predicaments} But one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore
common
And so the Phiamong the post-predica-
to different genera.
losopher puts "to have"
ments,^ so called because they result from the different genera of things
oppoand the like. Now among things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the haver and that which is had; as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is sition,
medium, but only a
a
man
;
as, for instance,
priority, posterity,
relation; as for instance
companion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or a passion, but something after the manner of action or passion thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered. Therefore the Philosopher says^ that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had," as is the case in those things which we have about oura
is
said to have a
And
therefore these constitute a special
the.
selves.
habit
genus of things, which is called the predicament of Habit, of which the Philosopher says^ that
is
Obj.
not a quality. Further, "every habit
3.
is
a disposi^
1
PL
2
Aristotle, Categories, 8 (8^26).
40, 84.
Ibid. (9*10).
^Categories, 8 (9^3).
^Aristotle, v, 19 (1022^1). ^
IbU., 15 (15^17).
"^Metaphysics, v, 20 (1022^4).
^
Ibid.
SUMMA TEEOLOGICA "there
is
who
clothed."
is
But
if
regard to
in
habit
else, in that case
mode
of having
and of
is
or to something
itself
a quahty, since this
is
in respect of
some
this the
or in regard to another; thus health
is
a
And in this sense we speak of habit now. Therefore we must say that habit is a quality. habit."
Reply Ob.
i.
This argument takes "to have"
in the general sense, for in this sense it is
mon
to
many
predicaments, as
Reply Obj.
2.
we have
com-
said.
This argument takes habit
the sense in which
medium between
we understand
it
it is
in
to be a
the haver and that which
had, and in this sense
a predicament, as
is
we
have said. Reply Obj. 3. Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts. But this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to say: namely, "either ls to place. or as to power, or as to species." "In saying this," as Simplicius observes in his
Commentary
on the Predicaments,- "he includes all disposibodily dispositions, when he says 'as to tions place,' " and this belongs to the predicament Position, which is the order of parts in a place. "WTien he says 'as to power.' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as undeveloped science and virtue. "And when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue. :
—
Article
2.
Whether Habit
Is a Distinct
Species of Quality?
We
thus proceed to the Second Article: It
would seem that habit
is
not a distinct species
of quality.
Objection
i.
Because, as
habit, in so far as
it is
we have
a quality,
is
said (a. i),
a disposition
whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill. But this happens in regard to any quality, for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. Therefore habit
is
not a distinct species
of quality.
Obj.
2.
Book on
third species of quality. Therefore habit or dis-
position
not distinct from the other species
is
of quality.
Obj.
quality;
Philosopher says' that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself
are said to be dispositions or habits, just as sick-
ness and health." But heat and cold are in the
"to have" be taken according as a thing
ordered
is
between clothing and the man
a habit
Further, "difficult to change"
3.
2
not a
but rather to movement or passion. Now is determined to a species by a differ-
ity,
no genus
ence of another genus, but differences should be proper to a genus, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics."^ Therefore, since habit
is
said to
be a quality difficult to change,^ it does not seem to be a distinct species of quality. On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the
Book
071 the Predicaments^ that "one species of quahty is habit and disposition." / answer that, The Philosopher in the Book on the Predicameyits'' considers disposition and
first among the four species of qualSimphcius. in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the difference of these
habit as the
Now
ity.
species as follows.^
He
says that
"some quahties
are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its
some are from without, and
nature, and are always there; but
adventitious, being caused
these can be lost. Now the latter, that is, those which are adventitious are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of difficultly lost.
gard a thing
As
in the point of its
potency, and thus quality act,
;
and
being easily or
to natural qualities,
we have
some
this either
re-
being in a state of
the second species of
while others regard a thing w hich
deeply rooted in
it
is
in
or only
we have the on the surface, we have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is the shape of an animated being." on
its
surface. If deeply rooted,
third species of quality;
if
But this distinction of the species of quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and qualities pertaining to passion which are not natural but adventitious; and there are also many dispositions which are not adventitious but natural, as health, beauty and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the species, since that which is the more natural always first. Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking, imphes is
a certain
mode
of substance.
gustine says {Gen. ad.
lit. iv,
Now
mode, as Auwhich
3),^ "is that
Further, the Philosopher says in the the Predicaments'^ that "heat and cold
' habit which is in a power, as in its subject, imphes principally
a quality, and in this respect
is
explained in the book on the Soul.^
Further, that which
is
put
in
the
definition of a thing, belongs to
it
essentially.
But to be a principle of action,
is
put
we
in the
read in the Meta-
physics.- Therefore to be the principle of an act
belongs to power essentially.
is
is first
in
that which
every genus. If therefore,
a principle of act,
posterior to power.
Now
And
it
follows that
it
so habit and disposi-
tion will not be the first species of quality.
Obj. 3. Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But these do
not indicate relation to an act. Therefore not essential to habit to be a principle of ^
Soul,
m,
4 (429^6).
2
and of
to the thing's nature. If
is
is
ill
to its
part of the subject in which they are, imply
relation of a principle to an act.
essential
is,
to the end.
But there are some
relation to an act.
habit also
well or
nature, "or in regard to something else," that is,
a state of potency, but otherwise than before learning." Therefore habit does not imply the
definition of power, as
stated^
"a disposition
therefore the nature of the thing in which the
proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. Objection i. For everything acts according as
is
fur-
consequently, to
disposed either in regard to itself," that
itself
We
2.
is
either an
the end of nature,
Hence
in the definition of habit that
as
Article 3. Whether Habit Implies Order to an Act?
Obj.
it
thing's
primarily and principally relation to an act. For,
principles are designated.
is
by which some-
thing is done when necessary." And the Commentator says {De Anima, iii)^ that "habit is that by which we act when we will." / answer that, To have relation to an act may belong to habit both according to the notion of habit, and according to the subject in which the habit is. According to the notion of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act. For it is of the very notion of habit to imply
often take accidental instead of substantial dif-
in act.
that
which one attains by means of operation. Therefore habit implies relation not only to the very
Nor does
it is
is
operation, or the product of an operation, to
cult to
one
that "habit
this
clear that the
lastingness:
to
(De Bono
the contrary, Augustine says
word habit implies a certain while the word disposition does not.
rather than that he has the science. it is
On
Con jug. xx\y
it
is
Reply Obj.
Aristotle, v, 12 (1019*15).
Habit
is
an
act, in so far as
it
can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a state of potency in respect to operation. Therefore habit is called first act, and operation second act, as
Reply Obj.
2.
It is
it
not of the essence of habit
to be related to power, but to be related to
nature.
And
as nature precedes action, to
which
power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality. Reply Obj. 3. Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as »
Tiess, there results a change as to sickness and health. But change does not occur primarily and of themselves in regard to habits and dis-
state later
In
Cat.,
On
In
Cat., \TlI
(CG vm,
233.22;
on
(q.
cx,
Cat.,
if
it is
shall
we
take habit in
in this
way
its re-
chiefly that
habits are found in the soul, in so far as the soul
is
not determined to one operation but is many, which is a condition for a
indifferent to
we have
since the soul
through
its
said above (q. xlix, a. 4). is
the principle of operation
powers, therefore, regarded in this
sense, habits are in the soul in respect of its
vni (CG vin, 234.23).
powers.
^Ibid. (234.30).
6/«
we
a. 4).
the other hand,
lation to operation,
habit, as
234-II)^
partakers of the Divine Nature, then nothing some habit, namely, grace, from being
And
in Simplicius,
of a
man may become a parPeter i, that we may be
hinders
Unnamed,
is
nature; so that,
taker, according to II
2
vari-
ous habits in the various powers of the soul.^
And therefore we must say otherwise that, as was explained above (q. xldc, a. 2, Reply i), the adjustment of the passible qualities them-
Categories, 8 (0*3).
subject.
The Philosopher puts
higher nature, of which
1
essence
in respect of its powers.
quality.
positions of this kind.
it is
form. Therefore
its
habits are in the soul in respect of
On
if
it
But nature regards the essence
in respect of its essence that the soul is the
habit
goes quickly, or passible quality
a. 2).
of the soul rather than the powers, because
is
it
permanent. But when
For we speak of dispositions and
i.
habits in relation to nature, as stated above
has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and if it goes so far as to be
if
7
We
Reply Obj. 3. Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quahty, as some main-
then passed into the
2
Article 2. Whether the Soul Is the Subject of Habit Accordijig to Its Essence or According to its Power?
called habits absolutely.
tained^ differ
ART.
Q. 50.
vin (CG \Tn,
234.6).
^Ethics,
I.
13 (1103^3).
SUMMA TEEOLOGICA i. The essence of the soul pertains nature not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a form and nature to which someone is disposed. Reply Obj. 2. Accident is not of itself the
Reply Obj.
to
human
subject of accident. But since
themselves there according as
it
is
among
accidents
a certain order, the subject,
under one accident,
is
con-
is
ceived as the subject of a further accident. In this way we say that one accident is the subject of another; as for instance, a surface
the sub-
is
which sense power can be the
ject of colour, in
Reply Obj. 3. Habit takes precedence of power according as it implies a disposition to nature, as but power always implies a relation to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power does not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Therefore
it
is
pos-
we may
say that habit takes precedence of power as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes precedence of potency. For act is naturally terior to power. Or,
prior to potency, though potency
is
prior in the
order of generation and time, as stated in the
Metaphysics.^
Article 3. Whether There Can Be Any Habits in the Powers of the Sensitive Part? proceed thus to the Third Article: It
would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. Objection 1. For as the nutritive power is an irrational part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part. Obj. 2. Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes, for in them there is no will,
which
is
put in the definition of habit, as
we have
said above (q. xlix, a. 3). Therefore
there are
no habits
Obj.
3.
in the sensitive
powers.
Further, the habits of the soul are
sciences and virtues, and just as science lated \o the apprehensive power, so
is
is re-
virtue
But in the senpowers there are no sciences, since science is of universals, which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be related to the appetitive power. sitive
habits of virtue in the sensitive part. On the contrary. The Philosopher says^ that 1
Aristotle,
vn. 3
Thomas, In Meta., *
virtues, namely,
(io2g"5);
viii, 2.
Ethics, ni, 10 (iii7''23).
IX,
8 (1049^4).
Cf. St.
temperance and
forti-
tude, belong to the irrational part."
/ answer that,
The
considered in two ways
sensitive
powers can be
according as they act from natural instinct; secondly, according as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are :
first,
ordered to one thing, just as nature is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordered to various things. And thus there can be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something.
Reply Obj.
subject of habit.
We
"some
1.
The powers
of the nutritive
part do not have an inborn aptitude to obey the
command
and therefore there are no But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore habits can be in them for in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in the of reason,
habits in them.
;
Etiiics.^
Reply Obj. 2. The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the command of reason, but if they are left to themselves, such animals from natural instinct, and so there are no them ordered to operations. There are in them, however, certain dispositions in relation to nature, such as health and beauty. But because by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom to do things in this or that way, in this sense, after a fashion, we can admit the existence of habits in dumb animals; hence act
habits in
Augustine says (qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36)
:**
"We
most untamed beasts deterred by fear of pain from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we say that they are tame and gentle." But the habit is incomplete as to the use of the will, for they do not have that power of using or of refraining which seems to belong to the notion of habit, and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no habits in them. Reply Obj. 3. The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in the book on the Soul;^ but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they find the
act at the
command
3.\nstotle, *
PL
I,
of the reason.
13 (iio2^'25).
40, 25.
'Aristotle,
111.
II (434*12).
And
yet even
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
powers of sensitive apprehension we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facihty of memory, thought or imagination: hence also the Philosopher says^ that custom conduces much to a good memory. The reason for this is that these powers also are in the interior
Q. 50.
ART.
9
4
wisdom and understanding, which
ence,
habit of
the intellectual part
first principles, in
of the soul.
/ answer that, Concerning habits of knowing there have been various opinions. lect for all
powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptive of habits, but are ordered to their
in the interior sensitive powers.^
nature, just as the
members
of the body, for
there are no habits in them, but rather in the
powers which command
Article
4.
movements.
their
Whether There
Is
Any Habit
men, were bound to hold that habits
of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but
For it is maniand so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly in that, which, being numerically one, v/ould be common to all men. Therefore if there were but one single possible intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ from one
men
fest that
differ in habits,
another, could not be in the possible intellect
in the Intellect?
We
Some, sup-
posing that there was only one possible intel-
moved to act at the command of the reason. On the other hand the exterior apprehensive
fixed acts according to the disposition of their
the
is
would be in the interior which differ in various men.
as their subject, but
Fourth Article: It would seem that there are no habits in the
sensitive powers,
intellect.
trary to the
Objection i. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above (a. i). But the operations of man are common to soul and
that the sensitive powers are rational not
body, as stated in the treatise on the Soul}
which are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence.^ There-
proceed thus
to the
Therefore also are habits. But the intellect
is
not an act of the body.^ Therefore the intellect is
not the subject of a habit. Obj.
2.
Further, whatever
Now
is
in a thing is there
mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, is act only while what is composed of form and matter has potency and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is composed of matter and form. Now the intellect is form without matter. Therefore habit, which has potency at the same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect but only in the composite being, which is composed of soul and body. Obj.
3.
Further, "habit
thing," as
well or
ill
a disposition w^here-
is
it is
manifest
participation.^
by
Now
fore they are not in the sensitive powers, but in
that
when
itself.
Moreover he says
expressly-^
the possible intellect "thus becomes
each thing, that
when it is reduced to act by the intelligible species,
is,
in respect of singulars
then
knower
said to be in act, as the
it is
to be in act;
can act of even then
and
this
happens when the
itself," that it is
in
is,
said
by considering; "and
potency
however absolutely,
is
intellect
but not
in a sense;
as before learning
and
dis-
covering." Therefore the possible intellect itself
the subject of the habit of science, by which
is
the intellect, even though sidering,
is
this supposition is
also the
it
be not actually con-
able to consider. In the second place,
whom
power
contrary to the truth. For
belongs the operation belongs
to operate, so to
w^hom belongs
.disposed in regard to some-
the operation belongs also the habit. But to un-
is said.'* But that anyone should be disposed to an act of the intellect is
derstand and to consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit by which one
or
ill
due to some disposition of the body; hence it is stated'^ that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act of of the body.
the contrary,
^
Memory and
2
considers
Aristotle,
i,
i
Reminiscence, (403^8);
cf.
2
sci-
properly in the intellect
in his
since
itself.
Some said, as SimpHcius reports Commentary on the Predicaments,^'^ that, every operation of man is to a certain ex1.
tent an operation of the comxposite, as the Philossays,^^ therefore
no habit
only, but in the composite.
is
in the soul
And from
this
it
(452*28).
also
Aristotle, Soul, n, 9 (421*26).
is
Reply Obj.
opher
The Philosopher^ puts i,
4 (408^8).
^Ibtd., in, 4 (429*24'). ^Aristotle, Metaphysics, v, 20 (1022^10). 5
by
For
the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues,
also
some part
of Aristotle.
their essence, but only
just as to
by we are well
mind
the intellect
according to the
On
this supposition in the first place is con-
•
Ethics, vi, 3 (ii39''i6).
7 8
1°
Averroes, In Ethics,
Soul,
I,
m,
De An.,
in, 5, dig., t.
v
(vi, 2, 148D").
^Ethics, vi, 3 (1139^16). 13 (1102^13). (CG vm, 233.22). 4 (429^6). 11 /n Cat.,
^Soul,\, 1,4 (403*8; 408^8).
vm
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
lO
no habit
follows* that
in the intellect, for the
is
argument given not cogent. For habit
intellect is separate, as ran the
above. But the argument
is
not a disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the ob-
is
Therefore the habit must be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is related to the power as its object. ject.
Now
the act of understanding
common
not said to
is
and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in the book on the Soul.' But it is clear that the phantasm is related be
to soul
as object to the possible intellect.*'
lows that the intellectual habit
is
Hence
chiefly
it
on the
itself,
of the phantasm, which
sible intellect
is
is
common
the subject of habit; for that
able to be a subject of habit which
is
cy to many, and this belongs, above
is
in
poten-
all,
to the
possible intellect. Therefore the possible intellect
2.
As potency
to sensible being
belongs to corporeal matter, so potency to intellectual being belongs to the possible intellect.
Therefore nothing prevents habit from being in the possible intellect, for
it is
midway between
pure potency and perfect act. Reply Obj. 3. Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the possible intellect, therefore
it
by the which the
is
will is the subject of a habit.
/ answer that, Every power which it is
well disposed to
a rational power,
tion of habit,
is
in the
Whether Any Habit
Is in the Will?
Therefore the
will is
not the subject
of habit.
Obj. 2. Further, no habit is allotted to the agent intellect, as there is to the possible intellect, because the former is an active power.
But the
will is
above
cause
moves
all
^
VI, 2
all
12
i,
Aristotle,
i,
i
(BU
an active power, be-
the powers to their acts, as
Cf. Siraplicius, /«Ca/., VIII
Ennead,
principally
above
(CG
viii,
241.23); Plotinus,
inclined to
is
its
power
titive
is
object for the act of the appenothing but a certain inclina;
we have
tion, as
said above (q. vi, a. 4).
is
inclined sufficiently
by the nature of the
the power needs no quality to
But since
human hfe
it
is
necessary for the end power be
that the appetitive
it is not inchned by the nature of the power, which has a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that in the will and in the other appetitive powers there be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.
Reply Obj. 2. The agent intellect is active and in no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both "mover and moved. "-^ And therefore the comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to that which is somehow in only,
potency.
Reply Obj. 3. The will from the very nature power is inchned to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order of the
that action
' in order to act well, as we have stated above (q. xlix, a. 4). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits. But this is clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature. saries.
On
the contrary, In the Ethics,^
iComm. 2
18
(VI, 2,
161B).
Aristotle, vi, 6 (ii4i»5).
among
other
ture and partly
of art.
But the habit which is a disposition to operaand whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (q. l, a. 2), may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in tion,
respect of the individual nature:
—
in respect of
the specific nature, on the part of the soul
which, since
it
is
the form of the body,
itself, is
the
specific principle; but in respect of the individ-
ual nature, on the part of the body, which
the material principle. Yet in neither it
is
way does
happen that there are natural habits
in
man,
so that they are entirely from nature. In the
indeed, this does happen, since they have intelligible species naturally infused in them, which cannot be said of the human na-
angels,
ture, as Q.
we
Lxxxrv,
said in the First Part (q. lv, a.
2
A. 3).
3 See especially Albert, Summa de Bono, in Lottin, Le Droit Naturel, p. 117. Cf. also William of Au.xerre, Summa Aurea u, tr. 12, q. i (fol. 60 ra).
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence partly to nature and partly to some extrinsic principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the indi\ddual nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself ciples
is
;
thus the understanding of
called a natural habit. ^
For
first
prin-
owing
it is
to the ver>' nature of the intellectual soul that
Q. 51.
ART.
2
13
capable of knowing
itself
all things,
for thus
would have to be the act of all things, which God alone. Because that by which something is known, must be the actual likeness of the thing known. Hence it would follow, if the power of the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the hkeness and act of all things. Therefore there must be added to the angels' intellectual power some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood; for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and it
belongs to
not by their own essense that their intellect can be actually those things which they under-
man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part; and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part this he
stand. And so it is clear that not everything pertaining to a natural habit can belong to
cannot
know except through the intelligible spewhich he has received from phantasms. And for this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics- shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses. But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning in so far as one man, from the disposition
some can be caused by nature, and some
cies
as
—
more apt than another since we need the sensitive
of his organs of sense,
is
to understand well, powers for the operation of the intellect. In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the habit but ;
only as to certain of
its principles, as,
stance, the principles of
common law
to be the seeds of the virtues.^
for in-
are said
The reason
of
because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers. But on the part of the body, in respect of the this is
nature, there are some appetitive by way of natural beginnings. For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or the like. Reply Obj. i. This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; but reason itself and will belong to the nature of man. Reply Obj. 2. Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power, which however cannot pertain to the power itself. For individual
habits
instance, with regard to the angels,
pertain to the intellectual
power
it
cannot be of
itself to
1 On this point cf. Alexander ol 'Hales, John of Rochelle, Odo Rigaldus, in Lottin (RiSrP-1927, p. 269, 273, 277),
- II, 3
the power.
Reply Obj.
3.
Nature
we have
said above.
Droit Naturel, p. 117.
Summa
de Bono, in Lottin, L£
not equally inchned
And
so
it
not,
does not fol-
low that because some habits are natural that therefore
Article by Acts?
all
2.
are natural.
Whether Any Habit
Is
Caused
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that no habit can be caused by acts. Objection i. For habit is a quality, as we have said above (q. xlix, a. i). Now every quality caused in a subject, according as the latter
is
is
able to receive something. Since then the agent,
from the
fact that
it
acts, does not receive
but
seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts. Obj. 2. Further, the thing in which a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or cooled; but that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and passive, which is impossible, as stated in the rather gives,
it
Physics.'^
Obj.
3.
Further, the effect cannot be
more
But habit is more exthan the act which precedes the habit,
excellent than its cause. cellent
as
is
clear from, the fact that the latter pro-
duces more excellent acts. Therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit. On the contrary, The Philosopher teaches^ that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts. / answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act; for instance
19 (100*3).
Cf. especially Albert,
is
to cause all the various kinds of habits, since
4
Aristotle, vii, i (241^24).
^Ethics, n,
i
(1103*31).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
14 in fire there is ing.
And
caused by
only the active principle of heatin such an agent a habit cannot be
own
its
tomed, as agent
is
is
act, for
which reason natural
become accustomed or unaccus-
things cannot
stated in the Ethics} But a certain
found
to be
in
which there
is
both the
active and the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the appeti-
power proceed from that same power acit is moved by the apprehensive powpresenting the object; and further, the intel-
tive
cording as er
power, according as
lectual
conclusions, has, as
it
it
reasons about
were, an active principle
in a self-evident proposition.
Therefore by such
acts habits can be caused in their agents; not in-
deed with regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle of the act which is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and moved by another is disposed by the action of the agent; therefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers ac;
cording as they are
moved by
the reason, and as
the habits of science are caused in the intellect
moved by first propositions. The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something from that which moves it and thus according as
is
it
Reply Obj.
i.
;
a habit caused.
is
as
2.
to different
respects,
as
is
proved
in
the
Physics."^
Reply Obj.
The
act which precedes the habcomes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle than is the habit caused by it just as the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than it,
3.
Obj.
in so far as it
;
the science of conclusions.
it
We
if an act be very intense, can be the generating cause of a habit. Obj. 3. Further, health and sickness are hab-
its. But becomes
proceed thus to the Third Article:
It
act. i. For demonstration is an act of But science, which is the habit of one
happens that a man is healed or by one act. Therefore one act can
it ill,
cause a habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says:^ "As neither does one swallov/ nor one day make spring, so neither does one day nor a short time make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is
an operation in respect of a habit of perfect Therefore a habit of virtue, and for
virtue.'"-*
same reason, other habits, are not caused by one act. / answer that, As we have said already (a. 2), habit is caused by act, in so far as a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused in that which the
passive, the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Hence we see that because fire cannot at once overcome the com-
is
bustible, it does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that
by overcoming likeness on
it
is
many
it is
may
it
impress
power
power is
one
in
act,
things, while the reason judges in a
what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Therefore the appetitive power is not entirely overcome single act,
by
it,
to the
so as to be inclined as though naturally
same thing
in the majority of cases which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one
act,
;
but only by many.
But
in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principals one is the possible intellect itself; the other is the :
which Aristotle^
calls
the particular reason, that
power,^ with
memory and
is
"passive," and
the cogitative
imag'nation.
11,
i
(1103*19).
'Aristotle, viii, 5 (257*31).
With
regard then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its passive principle; thus one self-evident proposi^
Ethics,
I,
7 (ioqS^iS).
^Aristotle, Ethics, 'Aristotle,
because
inclined variously and
Objection reason.
its
clear that the active
reason cannot entirely over-
the appetitive
the appetitive to
entirely,
Now
it.
principle which
intellect
would seem that a habit can be caused by one
may
sity. But a habit is of acts. Therefore also
is
Article 3. Whether a Habit Can Be Caused by One Act?
may increase by they increase by intencaused by multipHcation
Further, as acts
2.
multiplication, so
come
The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself Reply Obj.
conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act.
^Soul, •
III, s
Cf. Part
i,
7,
13 (i098''i6; 1102*5).
(430*24).
I, Q.
Lxxvui,
a. 4.
PART
OF SECOND PART
I
tion convinces the intellect, so that
gives a
it
firm assent to the conclusion, but a probable this. Therefore a habit
proposition cannot do
of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the possible in-
but a habit of science can be caused
tellect;
by a
single act of the reason, so far as the pos-
sible intellect is
concerned. But with regard to
the lower apprehensive powers, the
same
acts
need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says that "meditation strengthens memory."^ Bodily habits, however, can be
caused by one act
if
the active principle
is
of
great power; sometimes, for instance, a strong
dose of medicine restores health at once. Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.
Article 4. Whether Any Habits Are Infused Man by God?
in
We
proceed thus to the Fourth Article:
would seem that no habit
is
infused in
It
man by
God. Objectioft
I.
He
therefore
For God treats infuses
habits
would infuse them into
all
equally. If
all
some,
into
which
is
He
clearly
untrue.
Obj.
Q. 52.
ART.
15
i
power of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above (q. V, A. 5). And since habits must be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore it is necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the power of human nature. Hence such habits can never be in man except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.
The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes without these second causes, as we have said in the First Part (q. cv, a. 6). Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power. He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the Apostles the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, though not so perfectly.
Reply Obj. 1. God, in respect of His Nature, the same to all, but, in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some unerring reason, gives certain things to some which He does not give is
to others.
God works mode which is
Further,
2.
cording to the
nature for
"it
Reply Obj.
in all things ac-
suitable to their
belongs to Divine providence to
preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom.
But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above (a. 2). Therefore
2.
That God works
mode
ing to their
in all accord-
does not prevent
God from
doing what nature cannot do; but it follows from this that He does nothing contrary to
iv).^
that which
God
Reply Obj. 3. Acts produced by an infused habit do not cause a habit, but strengthen the
by
does not cause habits to be in
man
except
is
suitable to nature.
already existing habit, just as the remedies
acts.
any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a Hke habit is caused."^ Consequently there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now this seems impossible, for two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into man by God.
of medicine given to a man who is naturally healthy do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had before.
On the contrary, It is written God filled him with the spirit
We have now to consider the increase of habits
Obj.
3.
Further,
under sta7iding.
if
(Ecclus. 15.5): of
Now wisdom
wisdom and
and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God. / answer that, Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons. The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is well disposed to an end which exceeds the 1
2
Memory and Reminiscence, Sect. 33 (PG 3, 733).
•Aristotle, Ethics,
11, i
i
(451*12).
(iioa'^ai).
QUESTION LII Of the increase of habits {In Three Articles)
under which head there are three points of
in-
Whether habits increase? (2) Wheththey increase by addition? (3) Wliether each
quiry: (i) er
act increases the habit?
Article
i.
Whether Habits Increase?
We
proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that habits cannot increase. Objection i. For increase concerns quantity.^ But habits are not in the genus quantity, but *
Aristotle, Physics, v, 2 (226*30).
SUMMA THEOWGICA
i6
Therefore there can be no
in that of quality.
increase of habits.
Obj.
2.
Further, "habit
a perfection."^
is
since perfection conveys a notion of end
But and
term, it seems that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase. Obj. 3. Further, those things which can be
more
or less are subject to alteration, for that
which from being less hot becomes more hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in the Physics} Therefore habits cannot increase.
On
the contrary, Faith
For Plotinus^ and the other Platonists^ held that qualities and habits themselves were susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material, and so had a certain indetermination on account of the infinity of matter. Others,' on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves were not susceptible of
more or less, but them (qnalia) are
that the things affected said to be
is
not more or
and yet it Lord
a habit,
is
opinions. For they held that
/ afiswer that, Increase, like other things is
transferred from bodi-
and spiritual things, on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under ly quantities to intellectual
is
Now
in corporeal quantities,
said to be great according as
the perfection of quantity due to
quantity
certain
which
And
it;
reaches
hence a
considered great in
is
so also in forms,
because
it
man
not considered great in an elephant.
is
we say
And
perfect.
is
it
lies
between the two preceding
some habits
themselves susceptible of more and
fore habits increase.
a thing
but the just
Predicaments.^ The third opinion was that of the Stoics,^ and
Lord, increase our faith. There-
the imagination.
less,
thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in the
(Luke
pertaining to quantity,
by
or less ac-
cording to diversity in participation; that, for instance, justice
increases; hence "the Disciples said to our 17. 5):
more
a thing
is
great
since good has the
are of
less,
for
and that some are not, such as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible of more or less, but
instance, the arts;
that material forms are.^°
In order that the truth in this matter be made we must observe that that in respect of
clear,
which a thing receives its species must be something fixed and stationar\', and as it were indivisible; for whatever attains to that thing is contained under the species, and whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another
more or
Hence
character of perfection, therefore "in things
species,
which are great, but not
opher says^^ that "species of things are like numbers," in which addition or subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness and other like quahties which are not denominated from a relation to something else, and much more so substance, which is per se being. But those things which receive their species from something to which they are related can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less; and none the less they remain in the same species, on account of the one-ness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more diminished, and yet it remains in the same
greater
is
tine says
Now
same
the
{De
in
quantity, to be
as to be better," as Augus-
Trin. vi. 8).^
the perfection of a form
sidered in two
ways
:
first,
may
be con-
in respect of the
form
itself;
secondly, in respect of the participation
of the
form by
its
subject. In so far as
we
con-
form in respect of way the form is said to
sider the perfections of a
the form
itself, in this
be httle or great; for instance great or Httle health or science. But in so far as
we
consider
the perfection of a form in respect of the participation of
more
it
by the
subject,
or less; for instance
it is
more
said to be
or less white
Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature and another to consider or healthy.
in respect of its participation
it
by
a subject.
less perfect.
the Philos-
In this way, then, there were four opinions
among
philosophers concerning intensity and
abatement of habits and forms, as Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the PredicamefUs*
s Cf. Simplicius, In Cat., viii (CG \nn, 284.14); Plotinus, VI Entiead, Tr. hi, 20 (BU vi. 149). ^ Ibid. (CG viii, 233.10). 6 Cf. Simplicius, InCat.,\ui. 8
Catenaries, 8 (10*30);
cf.
Simplicius, In Cat., viii
viii, 284.25). 1
Aristotle, Physics, vii, 3 (246*13).
^Ibid. (246*10).
*In
Cat., VIII
(CG
3
PL
42, 929.
viii, 284.12).
9
Cf. Simplicius,
In
Cat., viii
(CG
10
Cf. Simplicius, Ibid. (285.1).
^1
Metaphysics,
viii, 3 (i043*'33).
viii, 284.32).
(CG
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
on account of the one-ness of the term by which it is specifiied. We may observe the species,
same thing
in health
body
for a
;
nature of health, according as
it
may
position
is
so far as substance
be suitable. This
dis-
more
therefore variable as regards
and nevertheless the nature of health remains. Hence the Philosopher says:^ "Health itself may be more or less; for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health." Now these various dispositions and measures of health are
by way
name
the
if
of excess
perfect measure, then
health as greater or clear
how
crease in
But
if
a quality or itself,
we
we should not speak
of
Thus therefore it is form may increase or de-
less.
and how
it
by the
subject, thus again
some quahties and forms are susmore or less, and some not. Now
Simplicius^ assigns the cause of this diversity
being.
And
more
or less, because
it is
therefore every form which
cipated substantially by
its
be
more or less. And so the Philosopher says^ that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are further removed from substance, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less in respect of their participation by the subject.
Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity. For, as we have said, from which a thing receives its species must remain fixed and constant in something indivisible. Therefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated according to more or less. First because the participator that
species in respect of that form.
for this reason
no substantial form
is
And
partici-
pated according to more or less. And therefore the Philosopher says^ that, "as a number cannot ^Ethics, X, 3 (1173^24).
2/n
Cat., VIII
(CG
viii,
it
in respect of its character of indivisibil-
For
this reason
species of
number
we do
not speak of the
as varying in respect of
more
because each species of number is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, such as
and
less,
two-cubits-long, three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, such as double
and of
and
treble,
figures of quantity, such as triangle
and
This same explanation is given by Aristotle Predicaments,^ where, in explaining why
in the
figures are not susceptible of
more
or less, he
says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are likev/ise triangles
and
circles,"
participate
it
in its
indivisibihty. It is clear, therefore, since
;
that neither in these can there be such a thing
its
ity.
pates their nature must
as
has
pate
parti-
subject, cannot vary
of substance nothing
it
less are
per se
is
and lessening therefore in the genus is said to be more or less. And because quantity is near to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, therefore is
in intensity
be with matter," that
because indivisibility is essential to the very notion of such, and so whatever partici-
to the fact that substance in itself cannot
susceptible of
may
in respect of material dispositions,
tetragon.
cannot.
find that
ceptive of
in
in respect of
more and found in substance. Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible; and so if anything participate that form, it must partici-
is,
consider a quality or form in respect
of its participation
we
and defect. And most
of health were given to the
is,
is
participation of the specific form; "but in
its
which
17
1
neither can that which
the species of substance," that
attains to the
or less,
so
ART.
less, so
has a disposi-
tion suitable to an animal's nature, to
various dispositions
Q. 52.
be more or
we speak
of habits
and dispositions in respect of a relation to something,^ that in two ways intensity and lessening may be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for
instance,
we speak
of greater or less health; or
greater or less science, which extends to
more
or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of partici-
pation by the subject; equal science or health
in so far is
namely, as
participated
more
in
one than in another, according to a difference in aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they include indivisibility in their very notion. We shall say further on (q. lxvi, a. i) how it is with the virtues. Reply Obj. i. As the word "great" is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms, so also is the
word "growth," the term
of which
is
some-
thing great.
Reply Obj. 2. Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject
285.27).
^Physics, vn, 3 (246^1). * Metaphysics, vni, 3 (1044*9).
^Categories, 8 (11^7)*
Physics, vii, 3 (246^3; 247^1).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
i8
specific being. Nor again does the notion of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Therefore there is nothing its
to
hinder
or
less.
it
from being susceptive of more
form, but by the subject participating more or one and the same form. And just
less perfectly
Reply Obj.
3.
Alteration
is
primarily indeed
in the quahties of the third species;
but sec-
may
be in the qualities of the first an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like manner, ondarily
it
species. For, supposing
if
ence in participation in it by the subject. And therefore such increase of habits and other forms is not caused by an addition of form to
an alteration take place
in
the passions of
as
by an agent which
is
proved
science and virtue.^
to be
Whether Habit Increases by
2.
We
would seem that the increase
of habits
is
It
by way
of addition.
For the word "increase," as we have said (a. 2), is transferred to forms from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition hence it is said- that "increase is an addition to a magnitude Objection
i.
;
already existing." Therefore in habits also there is
2.
Further, habit
is
not increased except
by means of some agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject; for instance, that which heats causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase without 3.
in the
form
Further, as that which
(a. i) that
such an addition or sub-
would change the species, even as the species of colour is changed when a thing from If, on the other being pale becomes white. hand, this addition be understood as applying to the subject, this could only be either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say that cold increases in a man who, after being cold traction
—
one part of his body, is cold in several parts), some other subject is added, sharing in the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in either of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a greater white in
or hot thing.
not white,
is
above
some
more
crease by addition. For
we may find inmovement increases by
an addition either to the time
cept by an added whiteness.
term.
The Philosopher says:^ made hotter without mak-
"That which
is
hot
is
ing something hot in the matter that was not hot when the thing was less hot." Therefore, in is any addition made in when they increase. / ajiswer that, The solution of this question depends on what we have said above (a. i). For we said that increase and decrease in forms
like
manner, neither
other forms
which are capable of intensity and abatement happen in one way not on the part of the very form considered in itself, but through a differ»
Aristotle, Physics, vii, 3 (247*6; 248*6).
'Aristotle, Generation
and Corruption,
^Physics, IV, 9 (217*34).
i,
5 {320^30).
i), cer-
of these
potency to be white, so that which is less is in potency to be more white. But that which is not white is not made white except by the addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white is not made more white excontrary,
(a.
tain accidents are of themselves susceptible of
white
the
so,
if this increase in forms were understood by way of addition, this could only be either in the form itself or in the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already
is in
On
itself
Metaphysics,^
Since, however, as stated
addition.
Obj.
made
or because
no increase without addition. Obj.
is
to the form.
been stated
proceed thus to the Second Article:
something
were, to participate
it
were made, by an intense action of the agent itself, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though something were
as
added For
Article
in act
a form, not as though the
the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration follows as to
Addition?
is
actually hot, beginning, as
or less, in
course the
it
it lasts,
or to the
follows; and yet the species remains
same on account Nevertheless
of the one-ness of the
movement
tensity as to participation in
its
increases in in-
subject; that
is,
same movement can be executed more or less speedily or readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science inin so far as the
creases, as to the subject's participation in in intensity, in so far as
one
man
is
it,
quicker and
readier than another in considering the
same
conclusions.
As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said absolutely to *
Aristotle, VII, 8, 9 (i033''s;]i034^7).
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
be healthy or beautiful unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change in the sim-
which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them. ple qualities,
How
question affects virtues
this
we
shall
on (q. lxvi, a. i). Reply Obj. i. Even in bodily bulk increase twofold. First, by addition of one subject
to another; such
is
the increase of living things.
Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addiis the case with things subject
tion at all; such
to rarefaction, as
is
stated in the Physics}
Reply Obj. 2. The cause that increases a habit, always effects something in the subject, not however a new form. But it causes the subject to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form,
makes the form Reply Obj. 3. What
or
it
to extend further.
is not already white is in potency to that form, as not yet possessing the form of whiteness; hence the agent causes a new form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in potency to those forms, since it has them already actually; but it is in potency to a perfect mode of participation, and this it receives through the agent's action.
ART.
19
i
same or the same or a
but also in respect of
mode
of participation. For not only
unlike white, but also less white white, since there
more
to
is
is
different
black
is
less
more white
from one opposite
to
stated in the Physics.""
is
But since use of habits depends on the will, was shown above (q. l, a. 5), just as one
as
a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it, so also he may happen to use the habit in performing an act that is not in
who has
proportion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond proportion to the intensity of the habit, or
m
even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase of it, if we
may
speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For not every
morsel of food actually increases the animal's size, as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the multiphcation of food results at la^t in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the intensity of the act falls short proportionately of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening of
Article 3. Whether Every Act Increases Its Habit?
different.
unlike
movement from
white, even as
another, as
state further
is
Q. 53.
of their qualities being the
From
this
it is
clear
how
it.
to solve the objec-
tions.
We
proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that every act increases its habit. Objection i. For when the cause is increased the effect
is
increased.
habits, as stated
a habit increases
Obj.
2.
Now
above
when
acts are causes of
(q. li, a. 2). its
Therefore
Obj.
Further, of Hke things a like judg-
3.
But any
it.
Further, like
act
is
{In Three Articles)
is
like the habit
increased by
like.
from which
pro-
it
We must
the contrary, Opposite effects do not re-
from the same cause. But according to the some acts lessen the habit from which they proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly.
Therefore not every act increases
its
habit.
/ answer that, "Like acts cause like habits."^ are like or unlike not only in respect
Now things 2
Aristotle, iv, 7 (2i4''2). Aristotle, Ethics, 11, 2 (1104*29).
3
Aristotle,
1
IhU. (1104*18).
*Ihid., n, I (1103^21).
consider
how
habits are lost and head there are three points of inquiry: (i) Whether a habit can be this
corrupted? (2) Whether it can be diminished? (3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?
Article
i.
Whether a Habit Can Be Corrupted?
We proceed thus seem that
to the First Article: It
would
a habit cannot be corrupted.
i. For habit is within its subject second nature; (hence it is pleasant to
Objection
sult
Ethics,^
now
weakened; and under
ceeds. Therefore every act increases its habit.
On
QUESTION LIII HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED
acts are multiplied.
ment should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike.^ Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase
How
like a
habit.) Now so long as a thing is, its not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject remains.
act
from
nature
is
Further, whenever a form is corrupted, due either to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary; thus sickness ceases through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now science, which is a habit, can-
Obj.
2.
this is
B
Aristotle, V, 5 (229*^14).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
20 not be lost through corruption of since the intellect, which
its
subject,
subject, "is a sub-
is its
stance and
is
incorruptible."^ In like manner,
neither can
it
be
through the action of
lost
its
contrary, for intelligible species are not contrary to one another. 2 Therefore the habit of
way be
science can in no
Obj.
Further,
3.
some movement. But the habit which
of
science,
soul cannot be corrupted by a
in the
is
movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of the body. direct
And
yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species residing in the intellect, since the intellect independently
body is the proper abode of the species; which reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For of the for
same reason neither can habits or virtue
the
be corrupted since they also are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares,^ "virtue is
more
On
lasting than learning."
the cofitrary,
The Philosopher
says^ that
"forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science.'' Moreover,
by sinning
a
man
loses
a habit of virtue; and again, virtues are en-
gendered and corrupted by contrary acts.^ I ansiver that, A form is said to be corrupted in itself by its contrar\' accidentally, through its
contrary; nor can the agent intellect, which
When
therefore a habit
has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This for inis clearly the case with bodily habits stance, health and sickness. But those habits
—
if in the possible intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the agent intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both in itself and acci-
dentally.
Such are the habits of the
—
ence."
As
to virtues,
some
and
to these applies
ence and opinion.
of science which sible intellect,
is
but secondarily in the sensitive
powers of apprehension, as stated above (q. l, A. 3, Reply 3). Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted accidentally, on the part of the possible intellect, but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers.
We
must therefore inquire whether habits of
kind can be corrupted in themselves. If then there be a habit having a contrary, either on the part of itself or on the part of its this
1
Aristotle, Soul,
2
Aristotle, Metaphysics, vn, 7 {10^2^2).
^Ethics, *
I,
Longevity,
^Ethtcs,
i.
Now
2
sci-
these habits of the appetitive part
moved by
of virtue or of vice
ment
it
is
natural to
to be
it
the reason. Therefore a habit either
may
be corrupted by a judg-
whenever
of reason,
its
motion
is
con-
trary to such vice or virtue, whether through
ignorance, passion or deliberate choice.
Reply Obj. it is
of
like a
it.
And
i.
As stated
in the Ethics,^ a hab-
second nature, and yet so
is
it
it falls
short
that while the nature of a
way be taken away from a removed, though with difficulty. Reply Obj. 2. Although there ii- no contrary to intelligible species, yet there can be a conthing cannot in any
thing, a habit
is
trary to assertions
and
to the process of rea-
son, as stated above.
4 (4o8*'i8).
10 (1100^14).
II, I,
what we have said of
moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul, and the same may be said of the contrary are caused because
such is the habit chiefly indeed in the pos-
are intellectual,
—Some, however, namely the
vices.
;
them
of
residing in reason itself, as stated in the Ethics,^
corrupted indirectly. There are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless second-
prin-
first
both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any forgetfulness or deception whatever, even as the Philosopher says about prudence,^ that it cannot be lost by being forgotten. There is, however, in the possible intellect a habit caused by the reason, namely, the habit of conclusions, which is called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the part of those very propositions which are the starting-point of the reason; for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the assertion "Good is good."" Secondly, on the part of the process of reasoning, according as a sophistical syllogism is contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Hence it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of science. And so the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception is the corruption of sciciples,
that have an incorruptible subject cannot be
arily in a corruptible subject
is
the cause of that species, have a contrary. There-
;
subject being corrupted.
the possible intellect, has no
cies residing in
fore
lost.
corruption results from
all
cause, it can be corrupted in itself; but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted in itself. Now it is evident that an intelligible spe-
^Ibid., v^, 5 (1140^29). "'Interpretation, 14 (24*2>.
(lUQ^i;
*'i2).
(465*23).
8
3 (iioi^'y; 1105*15).
'Aristotle, vii, 10 (iis^'sO-
Aristotle, vi,
i,
2
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
ART.
Q. 53.
21
3
an obstacle to the act of science, in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive
them, so too they diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them; for the diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even as, on the other hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of its increase.
powers, which are impeded by corporal change. But the intelhgible movement of the reason
is
Reply Obj.
movement
Science
3.
of the body,
is
if
not taken away by
we
consider the root
the habit, but only as
itself of
may
it
prove
can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the habit. In like manner a habNevertheless it of virtue can be corrupted.
—
when
said that "virtue
it is
learning," this
is
more
lasting than
must be understood
in respect,
Reply Obj.
A
1.
a simple form. It
habit, considered in itself,
not thus that
is
it is
subject
ways which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potency is indeterminate, through its being able namely, to participate a form in various ways, or to exto decrease, but according to the different in
the use of virtue continues through the whole
tend to a greater or a smaller number of things. Reply Obj. 2. This argument would hold, if
of Uf e, but the use of learning does not.
the essence itself of a habit were in no
not of the subject or cause, but of the act; for
we do not
subject to decrease. This
Article
Whether a Habit Can Diminish?
2.
We
proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Objection i. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish. Obj. 2. Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not become
more
by reason of itself; otherwould follow that a species might be
or less intense
wise
it
predicated of
And if
or less. ing to
its it
individuals according to
can become less intense accord-
participation
its
more
by
its
subject,
would
it
way
say, but
rather that a certain decrease in the essence of
a habit has
its origin,
not in the habit, but in
subject.
its
3. No matter how we take an accivery notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take an
Reply Obj.
dent,
its
accident in the abstract,
it
implies relation to a
which relation begins
subject,
in the accident
and terminates in the subject; for whiteness is called "that by which a thing is white." Accordingly in defining an accident in the abstract,
we do first
we
not put the subject as though
it
were the
part of the definition, namely the genus, but
give
it
the second place, which
difference; thus
we say
is
that simitas
we
that of the is
"a curva-
follow that the habit has something proper to
ture of the nose." But
common to the habit and its whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in the book on the Sotd} Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form, which is impossible. Obj. 3. Further, the ver>' notion and nature of a habit as of any accident, is inherence in a subject, and therefore any accident is defined
concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the accident, for a white thing is
it
which
subject.
not
is
Now
with reference to it
its
subject. Therefore
a hab-
if
does not become more or less intense in
self,
ence in
its
no way
in
be diminished in subject, and consequently
neither can
On
it
its it
it-
inherwill
be
take accidents in the
called "something that has whiteness." Accord-
ingly in defining this kind of accident,
we
the subject as the genus, which
first
of a definition; for
we say
is
the
that a
snub-nose." Accordingly whatever
simum is
place
part is
"a
befitting
an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very notion of the accident is ascribed to that accident not in the abstract, but in the
concrete.
Such are increase and decrease in and therefore to be more or
certain accidents; less
white
is
not ascribed to whiteness but to
a white thing.
less intense.
if
The same
applies to habits
and
natural for contraries
other quahties, save that certain habits increase
same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore a habit can increase, it seems that it can also
or diminish by a kind of addition, as appears from what we have already said (q. lii, a. 2).
the contrary, It
is
to be apphcable to the
diminish.
/ answer that, Habits diminish, just as they
two ways,
increase, in
as
we have
already ex-
plained (q. lii, a. i). And since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders 1
Aristotle,
I,
I
(403*10).
Article 3. Whether a Habit Is Corrupted or Diminished Through Mere Cessation from Act?
We
proceed thus to the Third Article: It a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. Objection 1. For habits are more lasting than
would seem that
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
22 passible qualities, as
we have
explained above
and
of the inclination of the sensitive appetite
Reply 3; Q. l, a. i). But passible qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act; for whiteness is not lessened through not changing the sight, nor
of other external agencies. Therefore virtue
heat through ceasing to make something hot. Therefore neither are habits diminished or cor-
of those things that are pictured
rupted through cessation from act. Obj. 2. Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing is changed without
intellectual habits, strange fancies,
(q.
a
xlix,
moving
a. 2.
cause. Since therefore cessation
from
moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.
act does not imply a
Obj.
Further, the habits of science and
3.
virtue are in the intellectual soul which
is
above
Now
those things that are above time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such habits detime.
stroyed or diminished through length of time, if one fails for long to exercise them. 0?i the contrary,
The Philosopher
says^ that
"not only deception but also forgetfulness is the corruption of science." Moreover he says- that
"want of intercourse has dissolved many
a
In like manner other habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cesfriendship."
sation
from
act.
/ answer that, As stated in the Physics^ a thing
is
a cause of
movement
in
two ways.
of itself, and such a thing causes
First,
movement by
is
destroyed or lessened through cessation from The same applies to the intellectual habact.
—
which render
its,
tion.
man
Hence when man
ready to judge rightly by his imagina-
ceases to
them, arise
in opposition to
make
use of his
sometimes
in his imagination,
so that unless those fancies be. as
it
were, cut
by frequent use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge rightly and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary; and thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act. Reply Obj. i. Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat were or kept back
off
to increase.
Reply Obj. 2. Cessation from act is a moving cause conducive to corruption or diminution by removing the obstacles
to
them, as explained
above.
Reply Obj.
3.
The
intellectual part of the soul,
above time, but the senand therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the appetitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the Philosopher says'* that time makes us forget. considered in
itself, is
sitive part is subject to time,
its own form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, accidentally; for instance, that which
reason of
removes an obstacle.
It is in this latter
way
QUESTION LIV Of the distinction of habits
that
the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, in so far, that is. as
we
cease from exercising an act which overcame
the causes that destroyed or
For
it.
it
has been stated
weakened that hab-
(a. i) that habits are
destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies
which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to
make
moderate
to
essary result
use of his virtuous habit in order
his
own
is
that
occur outside the
passions or deeds, the nec-
many passions and deeds mode of virtue, by reason
{In Four Articles)
We
have now to consider the distinction of and under this head there are four
habits;
Whether many habits can one power? (2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects? (3) WTiether habits are divided into good and bad? (4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?
points of inquiry (i)
be
in
Article i. Whether in One Power?
We proceed thus to
Longevity,
2
^Ethics, viii, '
(465*23).
Habits Can Be
the First Article: It would
seem that there cannot be many habits power. Objection
i.
in
one
For when several things are
dis-
tinguished in respect of the of
same
too.
one
Now
habits and powers are distinguished in respect
jects.
same
thing,
namely
their acts
and ob-
Therefore they are multiplied in like
5 (ii57*'i3).
Aristotle, Physics, viii, 4 (254^7).
thing, if
them be multiplied the others are
of the 1
Many
*Ibid., IV, 12, 13 (221*32; 222*»l6).
PART
OF SECOND PART
I
manner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power. Obj.
Now
2.
Further, a power
a simple force.
is
one simple subject there cannot be
in
diversity of accidents, for the subject
cause of
how
its
accidents; and
it
does not appear
diverse effects can proceed from one simple
many
cause. Therefore there cannot be
habits
one power.
in
Obj.
3.
Further, just as the body
is
informicd
power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at the same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many by
shape, so
its
is
a
habits. Therefore several habits cannot be at
the
same time
On in
in
one power.
the contrary,
The
intellect
is
one power, vari-
ous sciences.
As stated above
/ answer that,
(q.
xlix, is
a. 4),
in po-
tency to something, either to nature, or to operation,
which
is
the end of nature.
As
to those
habits which are dispositions to nature, clear that several can be in
one subject we
may
it
is
one subject, since in
consider parts in various
Reply Obj.
i.
versity of species
diversity of genus according to matter, as stated
Metaphysics^ (since things that differ in matter belong to different genera), so, too, ge-
in the
neric diversity of objects entails a difference of
powers (therefore the Philosopher says
ly belong to different parts of the soul").
and consequently of habits
difference of acts,
Now
things that differ in genus differ in
species, but not vice versa. Therefore the acts
and habits of
powers
different
body, according to their disposition in
re-
differ in species,
does not follow that different habits are in different powers, for several can be in one power. it
as several genera may be included in one genus, and several species be contained in one species, so does it happen that there are several species of habits and powers. Reply Obj. 2. Although a power is simple as
And even
to its essence,
it is
multiple virtually, according
many
specifically different habits
man
But
specific difference of objects entails a specific
we take
as being parts of the hu-
in the
Ethics- that "those objects that differ generical-
as
humours
to acts
Just as in natural things diis according to the form, and
ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are various habits. Thus, if the
power
can belong to one power.
but
habits are dispositions of a thing that
23
2
of a determinate species. Consequently several
also.
which nevertheless, are tne habits of
ART.
habits, even as several specifically different acts,
the
is
Q. 54.
ing in a power, and inclining that
extends to
it
Consequently there
is
specifically different acts.
nothing to prevent
from being
many
in
one
power.
and if we take the limbs, that is, the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in harmony with nature is beauty; and thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same
Reply Obj. 3. A body is informed by its shape by its own terminal boundaries a habit however is not the terminal boundary of a power, but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Consequently one power cannot have several acts at the same time, except in so far as it might occur that one act is comprised in another just as neither can a body have sev-
subject.
eral shapes, except in so far as
however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to operation, and belong properly to the powers, thus, again, there may be several habits in one power. The reason for this is that
into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided fig-
spect of
human
we have the habit or if we take like parts,
nature
disposition of health; while,
such as nerves, bones, and
flesh,
of these in respect of nature
ness
is
the disposition
strength or lean-
;
If,
the subject of a habit
is
as
;
;
ure.
cannot understand several actually; and yet it can several things at the same time habitually.
For the
intellect
things at the
know
one shape enters
same time
a passive power, as
stated above (q. li, a. 2) for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was shown above {ibid.). Now a passive power is compared to the determinate act of any spe-
Article 2. Whether Habits Are Distinguished by Their Objects?
matter to form, because, just as matter determined to one form by one agent, so, too, is a passive power determined by the nature of one active object to an act specifically one. Therefore, just as several objects can move one passive power, so can one passive power be the
their objects.
;
cies as
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by Objection
is
subject of several acts or perfections specifically diverse.
Now habits
are quaHties or forms inher-
Now
1.
For contraries
differ in species.
the same habit of science regards con-
traries
;
thus medicine regards the healthy and
the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distin-
guished by objects specifically distinct. 1
Aristotle, v, 28 (1024^9); cf. x, 3 (1054^26).
2
VI, I (1139^8).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
24 Obj. habits.
2.
Further, different sciences are different sanrie scientific truth belongs to
But the
both the natural philosopher and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in the Physics} Therefore habdifferent sciences; thus
by their objects. Obj. 3. Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same. But the same act can beare not distinguished
its
long to different habits of virtue, if it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone,
be done for God's sake, is an act of charity, while if it be done in order to pay a debt it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity if it
by means of natural by the movement of heavy bodies towards the centre, and so forth. Now the whole force of a demonstration, which while the former proves
it
processes, for example,
is
"a syllogism producing science," as stated in
the Posterior Analytics,- depends on the mean.
And
consequently various means are as so
many
active principles, in respect of which the habits
of science are distinguished.
Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says,^ "the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative matters." Consequently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as
Moreover
diversity of active principles does.
of habits does not follow diversity of objects.
the ends are objects of the internal acts, with
On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects, as stated above (q. xvni, a. 5). But habits are dis-
is
which, above
the virtues are concerned, as
all,
evident from what has been said (q. xvin, A. 6; Q. XIX, A. 2, Reply i q. xxxiv, a. 4). ;
positions to acts. Therefore habits also are dis-
tinguished according to the diversity of objects. / answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit.
Hence the
specific distinction of habits
be taken in the ordinary way in which forms differ specifically, or according to that
may
mode
of distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species. Habits, however, imply order to something, and all things that imply order to something, are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordered. Now a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order, namely, to nature, and to an operation consequent to nature. Accordingly
habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things. First, in respect of the active principles
of such dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear
ply
I,
follows. (Re-
Reply Obj.
i.
differ in
In distinguishing powers, or
we must
consider the object not in
formal aspect, which may species or even in genus. And though
material but in
ifito
3.
Whether Habits Are Divided
Good and Bad?
We
proceed thus to the Third Article: It
would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. Objection i. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards contraries, as was stated above (a. 2, obj. i). Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad. Obj. 2. Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since
it is
its
common
to
all, it
cannot
be accounted a specific difference, as the Philosopher declares."* Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil. Obj. 3. Further, there can be different evil habits about one same object, for instance, intemperance and insensibihty about matters of concupiscence; and in like manner there can be several good habits, for instance,
and heroic or godlike
2, 3; A. 3).
also habits, its
from what
Article
human
virtue
virtue, as the Philosopher
clearly states.^ Therefore, habits are not divided
into
good and bad.
On
the contrary,
A
good habit
a bad habit, as virtue to vice.
is
contrary to
Now
contraries
a
are distinct specifically. Therefore habits are
known under known through the other.
divided specifically into good and bad habits. / answer that, As stated above (a. 2), habits
And consequently in so far as they agree in the one aspect of knowability, they belong to one
are specifically distinct not only in respect of
cognitive habit.
their relation to nature.
the distinction between specific contraries
is
real distinction, yet they are both
one aspect, since one
Reply Obj.
2.
The
is
natural philosopher proves
their objects
two ways.
and active
First,
principles, but also in
Now,
by reason of
this
the earth to be round by one means, the astrono-
or unsuitableness to nature. In this
proves this by for example, by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort,
habit
mer by another; for the means of mathematics, 1
Aristotle,
11,
2 (igs^'ss).
latter
«
is
specifically distinct
Aristotle,
i,
happens
in
their suitableness
way
from a bad
a
good habit.
2 (yi^'iS).
'Physics, u, 9 (200*15); Ethics, vu, 8 (1151*16). * Topics, IV, 6 (127*26). ^Ethics, VII, I (ii45'»is).
PART good habit
I
OF SECOND PART
one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to since a
human
is
nature, since they are according to rea-
son, while acts of vice are discordant with hu-
man
nature since they are against reason. Hence
it is
clear that habits are distinguished specifi-
cally
to nature,
to
an act that
is
suitable to a lower nature, while
another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature.
And
thus
human virtue, which human nature, is
made up
is
parts of fortitude,
many.
of
Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge.
Obj.
3.
But many conclusions belong
to but one science, geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up of many.
to
On
from the fact that one habit disposes
25
many
temperance, and other virtues.^ Therefore one habit
by the difference of good and bad.
Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation
ART. 4
Q. 54.
thus Tully assigns
it;
the contrary,
A habit,
since
it is
a quality,
made up many. Therefore one habit is not made up of many. / answer that, A habit directed to operation, But nothing simple
a simple form.
is
is
of
we
such as
are chiefly concerned with at present,
from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher nature. Reply Obj. i. The same habit may be about
Now every perfection proportioned to that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, though it is one, extends to many things in so far as they have something in
contraries, in so far as contraries agree in one
common,
common
object, so also a habit extends to
disposes to an act befitting distinct
aspect. Never, however, does
pen that contrary habits are
in
it
hap-
one species, since
contrariety of habits follows contrariety of as-
good and bad, namely, according as one habit is good, and another bad but not by reason of one habit being about something good, and another about something bad. Reply Obj. 2. The good which is common to pect. Accordingly habits are divided into
a perfection of a power.
is
is
every being,
is
not the difference constituting
nature, or to one principle, as
above (aa. If then
which
it
we
is
di-
is
begins by being imperfectly in the subject, and gradually perfected. The same apphes to other
Reply Obj.
The
2.
parts which are assigned
to each cardinal virtue, are not integral parts
form
a whole, but subjective or
we
(q. lvii, a. 6, Ans. 4;
shall explain further
Part II-II,
q.
on
xlviii).
Reply Obj. 3. In any science, he who acquires by demonstration scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfect-
habits.
For whatever is engendered, not at once, but Httle by Httle, seems to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by Httle, out of several acts, as stated above (q. li, a. 3). Therefore one habit is made up of several. Obj. 2. Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are assigned to one habObjection
a certain
after another, but to the fact that the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difflcultly changeable disposition, and also to the fact that
that combine to
many
it
multipHcity
many things save in relation to somefrom which it derives its unity. Reply Obj. 1. That a habit is engendered little by little is due not to one part being engendered
potential parts, as
of
this
extend to
Article 4. Whether One Habit Is Made up of Majiy Habits?
made up
shall find in
hence it is that a habit is a simple qualnot composed of several habits, even though extend to many things. For a habit does not
qualities.
is
clearly stated
ity,
incompatibility to that which is in keeping with nature; thus, various vices about one same matter are contrary to one virtue.
proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It
we
But since
it
We
was
consider a habit as to the things to
extends,
above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to their diverse
would seem that one habit
things
chiefly,
thing,
their suitability to various natures, as stated
of the
rected to one thing, to which the habit looks to
the evil that constitutes a difference of habits
specific thing are distinct in reference to
many
2,'^).
multiplicity.
it
same
some general aspect
they are related to one, for instance, to some specific aspect of the object, or to one
some determinate good by reason of suitability to some determinate, namely, the human, nature. In like manner is not a pure privation, but something determinate contrary to a determinate nature. Reply Obj. 3. Several good habits about one
is,
in so far as
;
the species of a habit, but
that
i.
And when he
obtains by demonstration the knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in him; but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, ly.
scientific
since
it
extends to more things, because the conand demonstrations of one science are
clusions
co-ordinate, and one flows 1
Rhetor., n, 54
(DD
i,
165).
from another.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
26
In Pa RTICULAR Good Habits that is, Virtues 2.
(a)
—
QUESTION LV Of the
tue
come now
individually.
to the consideration of habits
And
we have
since habits, as
said
(q. liv, a. 3), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits,
which are
nected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits (q. lxviii) in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins (q. lxxi).
But natural
virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither therefore are
On
human
virtues habits.
the contrary,
The Philosopher
says^ that
"science and virtue are habits."
/ answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfec-
and of other matters con-
virtues,
not a habit, but an action or a relation. 5. Further, just as there are human vir-
tues, so are there natural virtues.
{In Four Articles)
We
is
Obj.
virtues, as to their essence
tion of a power.
Now a
thing's perfection
sidered chiefly in relation to
its
is
con-
end. But the end
;
Now
five things
must be considered about
tues: (i) the essence of virtue; (2)
its
vir-
subject
(3) the division of virtue (q. lvii) (5) certain (4) the cause of virtue (q. lxiii) properties of virtue (q. lxiv). (q. lvi)
;
;
;
Under the
head, there are four points
first
Whether human virtue is a habit? (2) Whether it is an operative habit? (3) Whether it is a good habit? (4) Of the defiof inquiry:
(i)
nition of virtue.
Article
i.
Whether
Human
Virtue Is a Habit?
We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit. Objection i. For virtue is "the ultimate degree of power."^ But the ultimate degree of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is
the ultimate degree, as a point
is
to the genus of line. Therefore virtue ble to the genus of power,
and not
reducible is
reduci-
to the
genus
of habit.
Obj.
Further, Augustine says
2.
{De
Lib. Arb.
good use of free choice." But use of free choice is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act. Obj. 3. Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, ii,
igY
that "virtue
is
power
Therefore power is said to be it is determined to its act. Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determined to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many, and they are determined to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have said above (q. xlix, a. 4). Therefore human virtues are of
is act.
perfect according as
habits.
Reply Obj.
Sometimes we give the name
i.
of a virtue to that to which the virtue
namely, either to stance,
we
we
its
give the
is
directed,
object, or to its act; for in-
name
Faith, to that which
believe, or to the act of believing, as also to
the habit
we say
by which we beheve. When therefore
that "virtue
is
the highest degree of
power," virtue is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest point to which a power can reach is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a man can carr>' a hundredweight and not more, his virtue^ is put at a hundredweight,
and not
at sixty.
But the objection takes
vir-
tue as being essentially the highest degree of
power.
;
but acts. Obj. Eccl.
4.
1
xvy
that "virtue
Aristotle, Heavens,
PL > PL * PL 2
2.
Good
use of free choice
same sense
is
said
above (Reply i) that is to say, because it is that to which virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use as
;
Further, Augustine says, is
(De Moribus
the order of love,"
and (qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30)"' that "the ordering which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to use." Now order, or ordering, denominates either an action or a relation. Therefore virIn De
Reply Obj.
to be a virtue, in the
Ccelo,
i,
i,
11 (281*14; '18);
32, 1268; Retract.,
i,
9
(PL
Thomas,
32, 5q8).
32, 1322; City oj God, xv, 22
40, 19.
cf. St.
25.
(PL
41, 467).
of free choice.
Reply Obj.
3.
We
are said to merit
thing in two ways. First, as
we
by merit
by some-
itself, just
by running; and thus we we are said to merit by something as by the principle by which we as
are said to run
merit by acts. Secondly,
6
Categories, 8 (8^29).
«
In English
inal
meaning
gine being so
we should say
"strength," which
of the Latin virtus; thus
many
is
we speak
horse-power, to indicate
its
the orig-
of
an en-
strength.
PART we are said movement; and thus
merit, as
I
OF SECOND PART
to run
by the power
of
we
said to merit
by
are
and habits. Reply Obj. 4. When we say that virtue
order or ordering of love,
we
the
is
Article
Whether Human Virtue Is an
2.
Operative Habit?
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. Objection i. For Tully says (Tiiscul. iv, 13)^ that as health and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither
2.
Further, in natural things
we
find vir-
tue not only in reference to act, but also in
reference to being, as
is
some have
pher,^ since
from the Philoso-
clear
a virtue to be always,
while some have a virtue to be not always, but
some
at
Now
definite time.
as natural virtue
human human
in natural things, so is
beings. Therefore also
is
virtue in rational virtue
is
referred
not only to act, but also to being. Obj.
Further, the Philosopher says^ that
3.
virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which
man
made is
is
God Him-
the soul
is
Him. Therefore
disposed by being it
seems that
(likening
it,
as
it
were, to Him), but not
in reference to operation. It is not, therefore,
an
operative habit.
On
the contrary,
"the virtue
cff
The Philosopher
a thing
is
that which
says^ that
makes
its
on the part of the form,
is
is
it is
in act.
body
so constituted that the
holds the place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other animals, and the same is to be said of the powers which are common to the soul and body. Only those powers which are proper to the soul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Therefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit.
Reply Obj.
i.
Mode
of action follows on the
disposition of the agent; for such as a thing
such
And
is its act.
therefore, since virtue
some kind of
operation, there
is,
the
is
must
pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue
some corresponding
disposition.
Now
virtue
causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue
an ordered disposition of the soul, in so
itself is
far as, namely, the
powers of the soul are
in
some way ordered to one another, and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, in so far as it is a suitable disposition of the soul,
is
like health
and beauty, which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation.
Reply Obj. ing
is
which
2.
Virtue which
is
referred to be-
not proper to man, but only that virtue is
referred to works of reason, which are
proper to man.
Reply Obj.
vir-
called a quality of the soul in reference
God
to
Whom
like to
Now man
Now the best thing to which
Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl.
3),^ to
tue
best."
needs to be disposed by virtue
self, as II,
is
27
3
potential being, but power
is
the principle of action, since everything
principle of
virtue.
is
Obj.
is
acts in so far as
refer to the end to
which virtue is ordered, because in us love is set in order by virtue. Reply Obj. 5. Natural powers are of themselves determined to one act, but not the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we have said.
ART.
in reference to act,
which
virtues
Q. 55-
of matter, which
3.
As God's substance
of
some
operation.
man
is
His
act,
God is in respect Therefore, as we have said
the highest likeness of
to
above (q. hi, a. 2), happiness or beatitude by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.
work good." / answer that, Virtue, from the very nature
imphes some perfection of power, as we have said above (a. i). Therefore, since power is of two kinds, namely power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; of the word,
the perfection of each of these
But power 1
DD
iv, 30.
^Heavens,
1, 12 (281^28). Physics, vn, 3 (246^13). 2; 247'2). •
DD
'
Chap. 10
'
Ethics, VI, 5 (ii40*'i2).
IV, 30.
(DD
IV. 29).
•Chap. 51 (BU47). »o
"
City of God, xiv, 6 (PL 41, 409). (PL 41, 258); cf. Q. XXIV, a.
Ibid., IX, 4
2.
PART For the Stoics held that the
OF SECOND PART
soul's passions can-
man but the Periwho were founded by Aristotle, as Au-
not be in a wise or virtuous patetics,
I
;
dom from that
ART.
Q. 59.
47
3
passion." It
may be
said,
however,
when he says that a gentle man is not paswe are to understand this of inordinate
sionate,
gustine says,^ maintained that the passions are
passion.
compatible with moral virtue,
they be reduced
Reply Obj. 2. This and all similar arguments which TuUy brings forward in De Tuscul. QucBst.
This difference, as Augustine observes, was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intellectual appetite, that is, the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not. as the Peripatet-
take the passions in the sense of inordinate af-
to the
if
mean.
ics did, distinguish
affections of the their being
the passions from the other
human
movements
soul, in the point of
fections.
Reply Obj. 3. WTien a passion forestalls the judgment of reason so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as though commanded by reason, it helps tow^ard the execution of reason's
command.
of the sensitive appetite,
(whereas the other emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellectual appetite or will) but only in the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any affections in disaccord with reason. These affections could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately, but it would be possible for them to be in a wise man if they arose suddenly, because, in the words of Aulus Gellius, quoted by Augustine,^ "it is not in our power to call up
Article 3. Whether Sorrow Is Compatible Moral Virtue?
•with
We
,
proceed thus to the Third Article: It is incompatible with
would seem that sorrow virtue.
Aristotle says^ that
Objection i. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wisd. 8. 7 She, that is, Divine wisdom, teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude. Now the conversation of wisdom hath no bitterness, as we read further on {verse 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also. Obj. 2. Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states.^ But a hindrance to good works is incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Obj. 3. Further, Tully calls sorrow "a disease of the soul" (Tusc. QucBst. iv, 7).'^ But disease of the soul is incompatible with virtue, which is a good condition of the soul. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it. On the contrary, Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in Him. for He said (Matt. 26. 38) My soul is sorrowjid even unto death. Therefore sorrow is compatible with
ing a
virtue.
the visions of the soul,
when they
known
and must
as its fancies;
from awesome
arise
things, they
needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he slightly startled by fear, or depressed with
is
sorrow, as
if
these passions forestalled the use
of reason without his approving of such things or consenting to them."
Accordingly,
if
the passions be taken for in-
ordinate affections they cannot be in a virtuous
man,
way
liberately, as the Stoics maintained.
them deBut if the
movements
of the sen-
in such a
that he consent to
passions be taken for any
they can be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence sitive appetite,
"some describe virtue as bekind of freedom from passion and disturb-
ance; this
is
well as
many
:
/ answer that, As Augustine says,^ "the Stoics
incorrect, because the assertion
should be qualified"; they should have said that virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and time."
Reply Obj.
:
The Philosopher quotes
held that in the soul of the wise three
eviradeiai,'' that
is,
man
there are
three good passions,
"in place of the three disturbances
:
namely,
in-
this, as
stead of covetousness, desire; instead of mirth,
other examples in his books on
joy; instead of fear, caution." But they denied
i.
Logic, in order to illustrate not his owti mind,
that anything corresponding to sorrow could be
but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue ;* and the Philosopher rejects this opinion,^ when he says that "virtue is not free-
in the
1
lUd.
2
mind of a wise man, for two reasons. First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man, for they thought that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good
Ihid.
^Ethics, n, 3 (1104^24). * Cf. Cicero, Tuscul., m, 4 6 Loc. cit.
^Ethics, vu, 13 (1153^2); X, 5 (1175^17).
(DD
iv, 3).
?
DD n-,
8
City ol God. xiv. 8
5.
CPL
41, 411).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
48
man, so man's only evil is vice, which cannot in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve the life of the body is some good to man, although not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderto
be
man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to I John I. S: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to II Cor. 7. 10: The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto ate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous
Fourthly,
salvation.
because he
worthily sorrow for another's
sorrow
may
sin.
praise-
Therefore
compatible with moral virtue in the
is
same way as the other passions are when moderated by reason. Their second reason for holding this opinion is about evil present, while fear for evil to come, even as pleasure is about a
was that sorrow is
present good, while desire
Now
is
for a future good.
the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the
desire to have good that one does not possess or even the avoidance of future evil, may be consistent with virtue. But depression of the soul resulting from sorrow for a present evil is altogether contrary to reason, and therefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated, which is rejected by reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil, yet moderately, according as reason dictates.
Now
it
pertains to virtue that the sen-
be conformed to reason, as stated above (a. i, Reply 2). Hence moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful sitive appetite
is
a
mark
of virtue, as the Philosopher also says.^
Moreover,
this
since just as
proves useful for avoiding evil, is more readily sought for
good
the sake of pleasure, so
is evil
more strongly
shunned on account of sorrow. Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for is incompatible with virtue, since virtue rejoices in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how. Reply Obj. i. The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. things pertaining to virtue
^Ethics,
II,
6 (iio6''2o).
Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom. Reply Obj. 2. Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful, but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow. Reply Obj. 3. Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind, but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well disposed soul according to the present state of
life.
Article 4. Whether All the Moral Virtues Are Concerned with the Passions?
We
proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It all the moral virtues are concerned with the passions. Objection i. For the Philosopher says^ that "moral virtue is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (q. xxni, a. 4; q. xxxi, a. i; Q. XXXV, aa. I, 2). Therefore all the mortal virtues are about the passions.
would seem that
Obj.
Further, the subject of the moral vir-
2.
that which
by participation, as But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above (q. xxii, A. 3). Therefore every moral virtue is about the tues
is
is
rational
the Philosopher states.^
passions. 3. Further, some passion is to be found every moral virtue, and so either all are about
Obj. in
the passions, or none are. But
some
are about the
and temperance, as stated in the Ethics.^ Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions. On the contrary, Justice, which is a moral vir-
passions, as fortitude
tue,
is
not about the passions, as stated in the
Ethics.^
Moral virtue perfects the apby ordering it to good of reason. Now the good of reason is that which is moderated or ordered by reason. ConsequentI answer that,
petitive part of the soul
ly there are
moral virtues about
all
matters that
are subject to reason's ordering and moderation.
Now
reason orders not only the passions of the
sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the is, the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as stated above (q.
intellectual appetite, that
xxii, a. 3). Therefore not all the moral virtues
some are about passions, some about operations. Reply Obj. i. The moral virtues are not all
are about passions, but
about pleasures and sorrows as about their prop"^
Ethics,
*
Ibid.,
II,
Ill,
^Ibid., V,
,s
*3).
it
is
Accordingly, those things which are set
down
as merits in the beatitudes are a kind of prep2
I. I
City of God, xvii, 7 (PL 34, 1231).
688.
insatiable,"
is
states.^
in the carnal pleasure of the appe-
Cf. City of God,
PL
on
shall state further
namely our innate concupiscence of the
cf.
3
we
sin, as
carnal sins have a stronger impulse,
sins,
other things being equal. Three reasons
assigned for
1
Now
incontinent in lust than in anger"
spiritual sin.
the contrary, Gregory says {Moral, xxxiii,
shame than
sole
grievous the
greatest adhesion,
guilt.
sin is
own
against the sinner's
since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less
own soul. Now
theft belongs to covetousness, which
a carnal
is
ly spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt.
We
.
be taken on the part of sin is committed. For
whom
III,
95E); G/o55aLombardi (PL 192, 209);
iii,
on
12 (1119^8).
Ibid., VII, 6(ii49''2).
^Ihid.,111, 10 {111^^2).
5.5
(PL
26, 554).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
124 Objection
Because the greater a
i.
sin's cause,
more forcibly it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist, for it dethe
notes weakness in the sinner,
if he cannot easily due to weakness is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause.
and a
resist sin,
Obj.
sin that
is
Further, concupiscence
2.
a general
is
cause of sin. Hence a gloss on Rom. 7. 7, For I had not known concupiscence, says:^ "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence it forbids
Now
all evils."
piscence by which
grievous his
the greater the concu-
man
is
overcome, the
Therefore the gravity of a sin
sin.
diminished by the greatness of
is
Obj.
less
its
is
the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin. Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the
much
sin; so
reason
who
so that he
lacks the use of
altogether excused from sin, and he
is
who
sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased
by the greatness of
On
its
cause.
the contrary, If the cause be increased,
the effect
cause of
is
increased. Therefore the greater the
sin,
more grievous
the
answer
that, In the
the will to sin; for act as a tree to
Matt.
7. 18, .4
fruit.
And
it is
compared
its fruit,
good
as a gloss observes^
on
is,
the
more
grievous will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the
The
more grievously does man
it
were, being those by which the will
inclined to sin.
is
make
will to sin in will;
such
is
of the will.
more
Among
a distinction. For
we must them induce the
these causes
some
of
accord with the very nature of the is the proper object
the end, which
And by such
grievous, because a if
his will
man
sins
The
tariness.
increase of such a cause diminish-
es the sin, as stated.
Reply Obj.
2.
to include the
there sin.
If
concupiscence be understood
movement
of the will, then,
greater concupiscence, there
is
But
if
ment
movement
a
is
(vi,
of the concupis-
judgment of reason and the move-
of the will, diminishes the sin. Because
man who
stimulated by through a more grievous temptation, and therefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence taken in this sense follows the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, then the greater the concupiscence the graver the sin. For sometimes the movement of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly the
sins
because he
a greater concupiscence
is
falls
to its object.
This argument considers the
3.
cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated.
Article
7.
Whether a Circumstance
Aggravates a Sin?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It would seem that a circumstance does not aggrasin.
Objection
from
specify a
sin, for it is
sin
takes
its
gravity
a circumstance does not
an accident of sin. Thereis not taken from a
circumstance. Obj.
2.
Further, a circumstance
of evil; and
of
Now
fore the gravity of a sin
griev-
movement
Because
1.
its species.
more
i6E); Glossa interl. (vi, i6v); Glossa Lombardi (PL 191, 1416). Cf. Augustine, De Spir. el Lilt., 2 Glossa ordin. (v, 2gB). rv (PL 44, 204). Glossa ordin.
where
a greater
cible power, then a greater concupiscence, fore-
it is evil, it
if it is
is
either evil
causes, of itself, a species
not
evil, it
cannot
make a way
thing worse. Therefore a circumstance in no
aggravates a sin. Obj. 3. Further, the malice of a sin
from
its
turning
is
derived
away (from God). But circum-
stances affect sin on the part of the object to
which
it
turns. Therefore they
do not add
to the
sin's malice.
On
the contrary, Ignorance of a circumstance
sin. For he who sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven.'
diminishes
1
is
by concupiscence we understand a
passion, which
or not. If
(for example ignor-
ance), or which weaken the free
so
no
Reply Obj. i. This argument considers the moving cause, which diminishes volun-
made
is
the judgment of reason
it is
extrinsic
is
a cause sin
induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will to sin against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with the judgment of reason. Therefore those causes which weaken ously
much
voluntariness; and so
longer sinful.
vate a
sin.
other causes of sin are extrinsic and re-
mote, as
its
the act be altogether involuntary
if
to the sinful
tree cannot bring forth evil
the greater this cause
that
Reply Obj.
the sin.
genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, and is /
they diminish
stalling the
cause.
Further, as rectitude of the reason
3.
the will (for example weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as
3
Aristotle, Ethics,
iii, i (i
11 1*1).
PART Now this would not be the case stance aggravated a stance makes a sin
sin.
I
OP SECOND PART
unless a circum-
Therefore a circum-
more grievous. As the Philosopher says
Q. 73.
Reply Obj.
in / answer that, speaking of habits of virtue/ it is natural for a thing to be increased by that which causes it. Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance; for the fact that a man departs from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action. Therefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circum-
ART.
3
12s
not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance.
A
2.
circumstance
a sin either way. For
low that
may
may
aggravate
does not
if it is evil, it
fol-
constitutes the sin's species; for
it
it
multiply the ratio of evil within the same
And if it be not evil, it aggravate a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance. species, as stated above.
may
Reply Obj. 3. Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may
stances.
turn aside from the rule of reason through cor-
This happens in three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one genus to
ruption of any single circumstance
another. a
man
Thus
fornication
with one
who
is
is
the intercourse of
not his wife; but
if
to
be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin is drawn to another kind of sin, namely injustice, in so far as he usurps another's property; and in this respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornithis
cation. sin,
not
into another genus, but only
by
Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a
by drawing
it
multiplying the character of
man
sin.
Thus
if
a waste-
when he ought not, and to ought not to give, he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason his sin is more grievous, even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox, iii)^ ful
gives both
whom he
man commits many sins for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who educated him, to whom he owes
his lands, his house, his position in the re-
Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin
by
adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance. Thus, taking another's property constitutes the sin of theft but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another's property, the sin will be more grievous, although in itself, to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an ;
Reply Obj.
i.
Some circumstances do
specify
Article 8. Whether Sin Is Aggravated by Reason of Its Causing More Harm?
We
proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. Objection i. Because the harm done is an issue consequent to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above (q. xx, a. 5). Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm.
would seem that
Obj.
Further,
2.
harm
what
shalt thou do against
Thy wickedness may hurt a man thee. If, therefore, sins
causing more harm, sins against
Obj.
3.
man by
God
Further, greater
that
man
is
«
DD
1,
546.
is
measured
.
.
more grievous than
harm
is
inflicted
life of
on a
grace than
his natural life, because the life
better than the life of nature, so far
ought to despise his natural life lest he Now, speaking absolutely,
a
(1104*27).
.
is like
were aggravated through would follow that sins
depriving him of the
by taking away
Him?
that
or oneself.
Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give the species may aggravate a sin. Because, even as the goodness of a thing is weighed not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to
2
it
against our neighbour are
lose the Hfe of grace.
^Ibid.,u,
by
inflicted chiefly
is
our neighbour, because no one wishes to harm himself, and no one can harm God, according to Job 35. 6, 8: // thy iniquities be sins against
a moral act, as stated above (q. xviii, a. io).
an accident, so the malice of an act
evil.
reason.
of grace
evil act.
the act
This turning aside from the rule of reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man ought to be united by right
multiplied,
public."
make
the rule of reason suffices to
that "in taking his father's life a ;
for instance,
;
by doing something when one ought not or where one ought not. And to depart thus from
man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the hfe of grace by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were
grievous on account of
its
more
causing a greater
would follow that fornication, absois a more grievous sin than murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin harm,
it
lutely speaking,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
126
not more grievous on account of
is
causing
greater sin, but. on the contrary, a graver sin
Lib. Arb.
calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has heard nothing about the
its
a greater harm.
On
the contrary, Augustine says
14):^ "Since vice
iii,
vice
is
is
{De
contrary to nature, a as it dimin-
more grievous accordmg
the
ishes the integrity of nature."
ing of the integrity of nature
fore a sin
is
that,
the lessen-
a harm. There-
graver according as
is
harm. / answer
Now
Harm may bear
does more
it
a threefold re-
Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when a man does something with a mind to harm another, for example a murderer or a thief. In lation to sin.
harm aggravates the because then the harm is the direct
pains of hell would suffer greater pain in hell for
murder than for a sin of theft. But his not aggravated on account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in
a sin of sin is
the case of a believer, who,
it
seems
sins
more
grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his de-
But the gravity of this harm is caused by the gravity of sin. Reply Obj. i. As we have already stated (q. XX, A. 5) in treating of the goodness and malice
sire to sin.
solely
this case the quantity of
of external actions, the result of an action
sin directly,
foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and
malice of an act.
object of the sin.
Sometimes the harm
is
when
tended, for instance,
foreseen, but not in-
a
man
takes a short
cut through a field, the result being that he knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case again the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin indirectly, however, in so far, that is, as it is owing to his ;
will being strongly inclined to sin that a
man
does not forbear from doing, to himself or to
harm which he would not wish absolutely. Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended. And then if this harm is another, a
connected with the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly. But, on account of his
harm deemed punishable
neglecting to consider the
man
sue, a
is
sults of his action if
other hand, the
it
harm
sinful act, although
intended,
it
that might enfor the evil re-
be unlawful.
If,
on the
follows directly from the
be neither foreseen nor
aggravates the sin directly, because
it
whatever is directly consequent to a sin belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin for ;
instance, result
is
if
a
that
if
man is a notorious fornicator, the many are scandalized, and although
Reply Obj. vates a sin,
Although the harm done aggra-
2.
does not follow that this alone
it
renders a sin more grievous; in fact, order which of the
harm
itself
so far only as
Hence
it
it
lack of
renders the act more disordered.
does not follow, supposing
inflicted chiefly
by
harm
to be
sins against our neighbour,
that such sins are the
much
it is
aggravates a sin. Therefore that ensues aggravates a sin in
itself
most grievous, since a
is to be found in sins which man commits against God, and in some which he commits against himself. Moreover we might say that although no man can do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavour to do so in things concerning Him, for example by destroying faith, or by outraging holy things, which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though this
may
greater lack of order
be referred finally to some apparent good,
from some anxiety. Reply Obj. 3. This argument does not prove, for two reasons. First, because the murderer infor example, delivery
harm to his neighbours, who solicits the woman in-
tends directly to do
while the fornicator
such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen by him, yet it aggravates his sin di-
tends not
harm but
murder
the direct and sufficient cause of bodi-
rectly.
ly death, while
But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself incurs. Such harm, if accidentally connected with the sinful act, and if
sufficient cause of another's spiritual death, be-
is
cause no of his
man
own
pleasure. Secondly, because
no man can of himself be the
dies spiritually except
by sinning
will.
neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggra-
correspond with the gravman in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this harm is directly consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not make vate a
sin,
nor does
it
ity of the sin; for instance, if a
1
PL 32,
1291.
Article 9. Whether a Sin Is Aggravated by Reason of the Conditioji of the Person agai?ist Whom It Is Committed?
We
proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed.
would seem that
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
Objection i. For if this were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate a
because a virtuous
sin,
bears a wrong with equanimity
is
by the wrong done him, than
man who
less
harmed
who, through being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against
whom
gravate the
a sin
is
others,
committed does not ag-
sin.
Obj. 2. Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin, because, as
Cicero says (Paradox, his slave sins once;
many
life sins
iii)^
"The man who
kills
he that takes his father's
times." But the kinship of a per-
son sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, because every man is most near to himself, and yet
it is
less
grievous to
harm one-
than another, for example to kill one's own, than another's horse, as the Philosopher de-
Q. 73.
ART.
/ answer that,
127
9
The person sinned
against
is,
manner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above (a. 3) that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object, so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave as its object is a more principal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his neighbour, for whatever we do, it is on account of one of these that we do it, although there is a subordination of one to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in a
person sinned against, may be considered on the part of these three. First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united according as he is the more virtuous or more sacred to God, so that an injury inflicted on such a person comes back upon God, according to Zach. 2. 8: He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye. Therein respect of the
more grievous according
self
fore a sin
clares.^
committed against a person more closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official
Therefore kinship of the person sinned
against does not aggravate the sin.
Obj.
who
station.
Further, the condition of the person
3.
on account of knowledge, according to Wis. 6. 7 The mighty shall be mightily tormented, and Luke 12. 47: The servant who knew the will of shall be beaten and did it not his lord with many stripes. Therefore, in like manner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his dignity and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a poor man, since there is no respect of persons with God (Col. 3. 25), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin. sins aggravates a sin chiefly
his dignity or
.
On
.
.
.
.
.
Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written (III Kings They have destroyed Thy altars, they 19. 14) have slain Thy prophets with the sword. Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed by a man against those who are akin to him, according to Mich. 7. 6: The son dishonoureth the father, and the daughter riseth up the contrary,
:
the
is
On
the part of
it is
it is
evident
more grievously according person against whom' he sins is more
that he sins as the
man himself,
as
all
the
united to him, either through natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and, for this very reason sins all the more grievously, according to Ecclus. 14. 5 is evil to
himself, to
whom
will
the part of his neighbour, a
:
He
that
he be good?
man
On
more more per-
sins the
grievously according as his sin affects
sons, so that a sin committed against a public personage, for example a king or a prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more
grievous than a sin committed against a private it is expressly prohibited (Exod.
person; hence
22. 28): The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse. In like manner it would seem that an
injury done to a person of prominence
is all
the
more grave on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people. Reply Obj. i. He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as the former is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally;
but that the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenuate
against her mother. Furthermore, sins commit-
the sin of the injurer.
ted against persons of rank are expressly con-
Reply Obj. 2. The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his own will, for instance his possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does it of his own will. But in those things that are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spirit-
demned; thus
it is
saith to the king:
written (Job 34. 18):
"Thou
art
Who
an apostate^' ; who
calleth rulers ungodly. Therefore the condition
of the person sinned against aggravates the sin. 1
DD
^
Ethics, V, II (1138*28).
1,
546.
SUM MA THEOLOGICA
128 ual goods,
a graver sin to inflict an injury
it is
on oneself; for
man
it
is
a
more grievous
sin for a
to kill himself than another. Since,
how-
ever, things belonging to our neighbour are not
subject to the dominion of our will, the argu-
ment
prove, in respect of injuries done
fails to
to such things, that
it is
less grievous to sin in
unless indeed our neighbour be
their regard,
God
if
3.
There
is
excellent this. First,
punishes more severely those ;
who excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin; hence Our Lord said (Luke 12. 47) that the and servant who knew the will of his lord, shall be beaten with many stripes. did it not Secondly, on account of ingratitude, because
person, for instance one
.
.
.
is
poral goods, aggravates a sin, according to Wis. 6.
7
The mighty
:
shall be mightily tormented.
Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being specially inconsistent
Whether the Excellence of the
10.
Person Sinniftg Aggravates the Sin?
We proceed thus to the Tenth Article: It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the
sin.
For man becomes great chiefly God, according to Ecclus. 25. 13: How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord. Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to him for it is written (II Paral. 30. 18, 19): The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning. Obj. 2. Further, there is no respect of persons with God (Rom. 2. 11). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another for one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning. Obj. 3. Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason Objection
by cleaving
1.
to
;
of the excellence of the person sinning.
On
the contrary, Isidore says ii,
.
sin
many.
Bono,
.
.
done
who
for this
because such an injury redounds to the harm
Article
Four reasons may be asbecause a more excellent
in which a man excels is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins; and in this respect any excellence, even in tem-
no respect for persons
against a person of higher rank
of
more
is
signed for
every good
willing, or give his approval.
Reply Obj.
he
18).^
"A
sin
is
deemed
chastity, were to be a fornicator. Fourthly, on account of the example or scandal; because, as Gregory says {Pastor, i, 2):^ "Sin becomes much more scandalous when the sinner is honoured for his position" and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men bear them with more indignation. Reply Obj. i. The passage quoted alludes to those things which are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness. Reply Obj. 2. God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their sin, ;
as stated.
Reply Obj.
3.
The man who
excels in anything
reaps disadvantage not from the good which he has, but
from
his
abuse of
it.
QUESTION LXXIV Of the subject of
sin
{In Ten Articles)
We
must now consider the subject of vice or
under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (i) Whether the will can be the subject sin,
{De Summo so
with the excellence of the
person sinning; for instance, if a prince, who is set up as the guardian of justice, were to violate justice, or if a priest, who has taken the vow of
much
the
of sin? (2)
Whether
the will alone
is
the subject
more
of sin? (3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin? (4) Whether it can be the sub-
/ answer that, Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human nature, and such sins are less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in checking those sins, which nevertheless human weakness does not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from deliberation. And these sins are all the more imputed to a man according as
ject of mortal sin? (5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin? (6) Whether lingering
more grievous
as the sinner
is
held to be a
excellent person."
1
PL 83, 621.
pleasure or non-lingering pleasure are in the higher reason as in a subject? (7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is as in a subject
higher reason? (8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin? (9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin? (10) Whether there can be in the in the
»
PL
77. 16.
PART
OF SECOND PART
I
higher reason a venial sin directed to
its
proper
object?
Article
Whether
i.
cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysius says {Div. Norn.
will
i.
iv)^ that "evil
But
is
outside the will and the inten-
has the character of fore sin cannot be in the will.
tion."
Obj.
2.
sin
Further, the will
is
evil.
There-
directed either to
the good or to what seems good.
Now
fact that the will wishes the good,
Now
the will
because the first cause of sinning is the will, as Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10, 11).^ Therefore it is not the subject of sin. On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract, i, g)^ that "it
is
by the
will that
we
er a defect that
sin,
and
live
an
act, as stated
;
;
Therefore
sins. its
is
in the will
subject.
Reply Obj. will
follows that sin
it
i.
because the
the aspect of
Evil will
evil.
is said to be outside the does not tend to it under
But since some
Article
evil is
an ap-
Sect. 32
'
Aristotle, Physics,
•
PL 42, 104, PL 32. 596.
< '
11,
cf.
will, this
move
7 (198*24).
De
Physics, in, 3 (202*13).
Lib. Arb.,
Whether the Will Alone
2.
We
7
(PL
to those
external
Is the
proceed thus to the Second Article: It
would seem that the
will alone is the subject of
sin.
Objection
Anim.
x,
Now
will."
For Augustine says {De Duabus by the the subject of sin is the power by i.
10)^ that "no one sins except
which we
sin.
subject of
sin.
son.
2.
Therefore the will alone
Further, sin
Now good
and
is
an
is
the
evil contrary to rea-
evil pertaining to
reason are
the object of the will alone. Therefore the will
alone
is
Obj.
the subject of sin. 3.
Further, every sin
is
because, as Augustine states 18),^ "so true
that unless
it is
Lib. Arb. is
no
iii,
voluntary, sin at all."
of the other powers are not volun-
tary, except in so far as those
by the
a voluntary act,
{De
that every sin
be voluntary
it
Now the acts
is it
powers are moved
nor does this suffice for them to be the subject of sin, because then even the external members of the body, which are moved by the will, would be a subject of sin, which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the will
;
subject of sin.
On
the contrary. Sin
is
contrary to virtue, and
contraries are about one
same
thing.
But the
other powers of the soul besides the will are the subject of virtues, as stated above (q. lvi, aa. 3, 6). Therefore the will is not the only subject of sin. / answer that, As was shown above (a. i), whatever is a principle of a voluntary act is sin.
those which are iii,
defect
themselves, but
Now voluntary acts are not only
those which are elicited by the
732).
105;
apprehensive pow-
in the
Subject of Sin?
a subject of
(PG 3,
1
is
subject to the
other things. The contrary of this is to be observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove.
;
as
is
is
Obj.
above (q. XXI, A. I Q. Lxxi, AA. I, 6). Now some acts pass into external matter, for example to cut and to burn and such acts have for their matter and subject the thing into which the action passes. Thus the Philosopher states^ that "movement is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover." On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the agent, for example to desire and to know; and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin has to be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated above (q. i, a. i Q. xviii, A. 6), it follows that the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts and of evil acts or sins, is the principle of is
invincible. It remains there-
deemed a sin. Reply Obj. 3. This argument applies efficient causes whose actions pass into
also
righteously."
/ answer that, Sin
is
there
move
the efficient cause of sin,
is
when
does not
;
cide.^
fore that
matter, and which do not
it
evil,
the apprehensive power, as in the case of those
whose ignorance
from the
and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will. Therefore sin is in no way in the will. Obj. 3. Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin, because the efficient and the material cause do not coinsin
parent good, the will sometimes desires an and in this sense sin is in the will. sive
We proceed thus to the First Article: It would Objection
129
2
Reply Obj. 2. If the defect in the apprehenpower were in no way subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in
the Will Is a Subject
of Sin?
seem that the
ART.
Q. 74.
commanded by
will,
but also
the will, as
32, 1295).
PL 42, 104. ^ PL 32, i2gs;De 6
Vera Relig., xiv (PL 34, 133).
we
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
I30 stated above (q. vi,
a.
4) in treating of volun-
Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained from their acts, by the will. And these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same tariness.
subject.
with the deliberation of reason, as the Philosopher says.^ Therefore the movement of the
which is without the deliberation of not imputed to a man as a sin.
sensuality,
reason,
On
is
is written (Rom. 7. 19) I will I do not; but the evil
the contrary, It
The good which which I
which words Augus{Contra Julian, iii, 26),^ as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensuality. Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality. will not, that I do,
tine explains
Reply Obj. i. We do not sin except by the mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will. Reply Obj. 2. Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects. But the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason. Reply Obj. 3. The members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action. Therefore they are compared to the soul which moves them as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in the Politics} Morewill as first
members
over, the acts of the external
are ac-
may
tions that pass into external matter, as
be seen in the blow that is inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison.
/ answer that, As stated above (a. 2), sin be found in any power whose act can be
may
voluntary and disordered, in which consists the nature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality can be voluntary, in so far as the sensuality, or sensitive appetite,
clined to be
moved by
3.
Whether There Can Be Sin
ifi
the
We
Reply Obj.
Although some of the powers common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless in us they have a certain excellence through being united to the i.
reason; thus
we
surpass other animals in the
we have the powers of and reminiscence, as stated in the Part (q. lxxviii, a. 4). In the same way
sensitive part because
cogitation First
our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain excellence con-
Objection praised
i.
For
sin is
or blamed
the sensuality
is
proper to
for
common
his
to us
man who
actions.
and
Now
irrational
in this respect
subject of
2.
The
continual corruption of the
sensuahty is to be understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never completely destroyed in this Hfe, since, though the stain of ever, this corruption of the
ality.
hinder 2.
Further, "no
man
sins in
not avoid," as Augustine states
what he can-
{De
Lib. Arb.
But man cannot prevent the movement of the sensuality from being inordinate, since the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; hence it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine declares {De Trin. xii, 12, 13).^ Therefore the inordinate moveiii,
18).^
ment
of the sensuality
Obj.
not do
3. is
alone do 1
is
not a
Further, that which
man
not imputed to him as a
we seem
Aristotle,
i,
to
man from
"fomes" does not
using his rational will to check
individual inordinate movements, sentient of them, for instance
if
himself does
sin.
Now,
that
do ourselves, which we do
he be pre-
by turning
thoughts to other things. Yet while he
is
his
turn-
ing his thoughts to something else, an inordi-
nate
when
movement may
arise about this also; thus
a man, in order to avoid the
of concupiscence, turns his thoughts
movements away from
carnal pleasures to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated
sin.
How-
original sin passes, its effect remains.
animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the sensu-
Obj.
obey the rea-
it
sin.
Reply Obj.
the
sensuality.
is
And
can be the principle of a voluntary action, and, consequently, the
proceed thus to the Third Article: It sin in
fol-
of the sensitive part are
son.
Sensuality?
would seem that there cannot be
it
lows that sin can be in the sensuahty.
sisting in its natural aptitude to
Article
naturally in-
is
the will. Therefore
movement
Consequently a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the corruption we have just spoken about. But it is enough, for the conditions of a volunof vainglory will arise.
5 (1254^4).
PL 32, 1295. ' PL 42, 1007, 1009; chap. 6 (QR 1,423). 2
*
cf.
Peter Lombard, Sent., n, d. 24,
Ethics, IX,?, {iib^^is)-
PL 44, 733; Serm. ad Pop., serm. 188, 189). 8
xxx,
2,
3
(PL
38,
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
Q. 74.
ART.
131
5
tary sin that he be able to avoid each single
disorder in respect of the end can only belong
one.
to the
Reply Obj. 3. Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation
to the end. Therefore mortal sin cannot be in
of reason, since the principal part of
man
does
nothing there. Hence such an act is not perfectly a human act, and consequently it cannot
be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuahty as forestalls the reason is a venial sin, which is something imperfect in the genus of sin.
Article
Whether Mortal Sin Can Be
4.
in the Sensuality?
We
proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It sin can be in the sen-
would seem that mortal suahty.
Objection
i.
Now
object.
Because an act
it is
is
known by
commit
possible to
its
a mortal
sin about the objects of the sensuality, for example about carnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality. Obj. 2. Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in the sensuality, for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the
irrational
as
parts,
Therefore, since
it is
the
Philosopher
states.^
natural to contraries to be
about the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin. Obj.
3.
mortal
Further, venial sin
Now
sin.
is
a disposition to
and habit are
disposition
in
same subject. Since therefore venial sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (a. 3, Reply 3), mortal sin can be there also. On the contrary, Augustine says {Retract, i, 23),^ and a gloss on Rom. 7. 14 also says^ that the
inordinate
the
which
is
in those
movement
are in a state of grace, in
fore the inordinate
not a mortal
is
whom,
not to be found. There-
movement
of the sensuality
sin.
/ answer that, Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body's life causes
the body's death, so too a disorder which de-
which
is
the last end, causes spiritual death, which
is
stroys the principle of spiritual as stated above
life,
lxxii, a. 5).
mortal
sin,
Now
belongs to the reason alone, and not to
it
(q.
the sensuality, to order anything to the end, and 1
Ethics,
III,
10 (iii7''23).
2PL32,62I. ^
Glossa ordin.
1421).
(vi,
it is
to order others
the sensuality, but only in the reason.
Reply Obj. 1. The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin. Yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due not to its being an act of the sensuahty, but to its being an act of rea-
whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason. son, to
Reply Obj. 2. not only in that
An
act of virtue
is
perfected
an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice. Therefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power; and the same appHes to mortal sin, as just stated (Reit is
ply i).
Reply Obj. 3. A disposition may be related ways to that to which it disposes. For sometimes it is the same thing and is in the same subject; thus undeveloped science is a disposition to perfect science. Sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the same thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire. Sometimes it is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those things which are in three
ordered to one another in such a way that we can arrive at one through the other; for example goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science,
which
is
the venial sin that
in the intellect. In this is
in the sensuality
a disposition to mortal
sin,
which
is
way
may
be
in
the
reason.
concupiscense,
the sin of the sensuality, can even be
who
however, mortal sin is
of
power whose function
17E); Glossa Lombardi (PL 191, •.v:i.;4
A
Article
We
5.
Whether Sin Can Be
in the
Reason?
proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. Objection i. For the sin of any power is a defect in it. But the fault of the reason is not a sin; on the contrary, it excuses sin. For a man is excused from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. Obj. 2. Further, the primary subject of sin is the will, as stated above (a. i). Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. Obj. 3. Further, there can be no sin except about things which are under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not among those things which are under our control, since by nature some are mentally deficient, and
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
t$2
some
Therefore no sin
sagacious,
the
is
On
{De
the contrary, Augustine says
12)^ that sin
xii,
is
in the
Trin.
lower and in the higher
reason. / a7iswer that,
of that power, as 3).
2,
Now
The sin of any power is an act we have clearly shown (aa. i,
reason has a twofold act: one
proper act in respect of this is the act of
its
Now
the other
;
both of these ways there
in
sin in the reason. First, in so far as
knowledge of
truth,
the reason as a sin error about
what
which error
when
it is
when it ordered movements Secondly,
it
is its
proper object, and
knowing a truth
the act of the reason as directing the other ers.
For pleasure denotes a moveabove (q. XXXI, a. i). But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore lingering pleasure is not Objection
ment
reason.
is
it
is
in
is
pow-
may
be
errs in the
able and ought to know.
either
commands
the dis-
of the lower powers, or de-
liberately fails to check them.
Reply Obj.
i.
in the reason.
Obj. 2. Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object. Now a lingering pleasure is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of lingering pleasure is
imputed to
ignorance or
i.
of the appetitive power, as stated
not in the reason. Obj.
3.
Further, a thing
said to be linger-
is
(morosusy through taking a length of time. But length of time is no reason why an
ing
act should belong to a particular power. Therefore lingering pleasure does not belong to the
reason.
On
This argument considers the
the contrary, Augustine says
(De
Trin.
defect in the proper act of the reason in re-
xii,
proper object, and with regard to it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know; for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen. If, however, the defect of reason be about something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused
ure "goes no further than the mere thought of
and the defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers is always imputed
may sometimes
can always obviate this defect by means of its proper act.
internal passions. Consequently
spect of
the case
from
its
when
sin,
to reason as a sin, because
Reply Obj.
2.
when we were
it
As stated above
(q. xvii, a. i),
treating of the acts of the will
and reason, the will moves and precedes the reason in one way, and the reason moves and precedes the will in another, so that both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the reason, voluntary. Accordingly sin is found in the reason either through
12)'*
that
if
the pleasure, I
the
woman
deem
be like as though
this to
alone had partaken of the forbidden
Now
fruit."
the consent to a sensual pleas-
woman"
"the
denotes the lower
reason, as he himself explains (ibid.). There-
the sin of lingering pleasure
fore
the
in
is
reason.
/ answer that, directs
human
As already stated
be
in the
actions.
(a. 5), sin
reason in so far as
Now
it
evident that
it is
reason directs not only external acts, but also
son is
fails in directing
when
when
said to be in the reason, just as
Now
in directing external actions.
two ways,
the rea-
the internal passions, sin
it
it
fails
fails,
in
in directing internal passions. First,
through the reason being the principle of the
commands unlawful passions; for inwhen a man deliberately provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of concupiscence. Secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate,
will's act.
continues, notwithstanding, to dwell (immora-
being a voluntary defect
The Reply
to the
of
the
Third Objection
from what has been said (Reply
reason,
is
or
evident
when
it
stance
tur)
upon
it,
and
fails to
drive
it
away.
And
in
this sense the sin of lingering pleasure is said
i).
to be in the reason.
Article
6.
Pleasure Is
We
Whether the Sin of Lingering in the Reason?
proceed thus to the Sixth Article:
Reply Obj. i. Pleasure is indeed in the appower as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in accordance with what has been stated above (a. i),
petitive It
would seem that the sin of lingering pleasure (morosa dclectatio) is not in the reason.^
5-13
»PL42, *
On
ioo8.
this
problem and those which follow to the end of cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., 11, d. 24, chaps.
the question
(QR
tur., Pt.
I,
I.
422, 428); Albert the Great,
tr. 4, Q.
69, A. 3
(BO xxxiv,
' From the Latin, mora— delay. *PL42, 1007.
Summa dc
700).
Crea-
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
namely that actions which do not pass
into ex-
ternal matter are in their principles as in their subjects. 2. Reason has its proper elicited proper object, but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower powers that can be directed by the reason. And accordingly pleasure about sensible objects comes also under the direction of reason. Reply Obj. 3. Pleasure is said to be lingering not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells (immoratur) upon it, and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).^
Reply Obj.
act about
its
Q. 74.
ART.
possible, to its
if
to the
We
proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. Objection i. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, as stated above (q. xv, a. i). But the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason.
Obj.
2.
Further, "the higher reason
is
intent
on contemplating and consulting the eternal types," as Augustine states {De Trin. xii, 7).^ But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal types, since man does not always think about Divine things whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act
is
not always in the higher rea-
son.
Obj.
3.
Further, just as
man
can regulate his
external actions according to the eternal law,
so can he regulate his internal pleasures or
other passions. But consent to a pleasure with-
out deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine states {De Trin. 12).^ Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower xii,
4.
Further, just as the higher reason
excels the lower, so does the reason excel the
Now
sometimes man proceeds to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves his hand or foot. Therefore sometimes imagination.
may consent to a sinful independently of the higher reason. On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin.
also the lower reason act,
1
PL 42,
1008.
2
PL 42,
1005.
8
PL 42,
1008.
woman
has offered
the forbidden fruit to her husband."
/ answer that, Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges
and de-
about inteUigible matters, so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment the final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any propolivers its sentence
by resolving
into the first
it
principles, since, so long as there remains a yet
higher principle, the question can yet be submitted to it, and therefore the judgment is still
in suspense, the final sentence not being as
yet pronounced. But
it
is
evident that
human
by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally; and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above (q. xix, a. 4; q. lxxi, a. 6). Consequentacts can be regulated
since the rule of the Divine law
ly,
rule,
it
is
the higher
follows that the ultimate sentence, by
which judgment
pronounced, belongs which is intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts, the act itself comes last, and the pleasure which is the inducement to the act is a preamble to the act. Therefore the consent to an act belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the pleasure belongs to the lower reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court; although the higher reason can also judge of the pleasure, since whatever is subject to the judgis
finally
to the higher reason
ment
of the lower court,
judgment of the higher
reason.
Obj.
consummation by deed, we
are to understand that the
sition is delivered
Article 7. Whether the Sin of Consent Act Is in the Higher Reason?
133
7
12):^ "If the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses so far approves of any sin, as to point,
xii,
is
subject also to the
court,
but not con-
versely.
Reply Obj.
i.
Consent
is
an act of the ap-
petitive power, not absolutely, but in conse-
quence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, as stated above (q. xv, a. 3). Because the fact that the consent
is
finally given
due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason. to a thing
'.
There-
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
fore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated.
Further, anger
3.
Therefore
it
not a principal passhould not be placed among is
the principal vices.
Obj.
4.
177
4
the good of the body, and this regards
sin, as
example meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by gluttony, or the preservation of the species,
Further, just as covetousness or avar-
ice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of
stated above (a. 2). But avarice
is
put as
one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices. Obj. 5. Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these as for instance when one sins through ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, for example steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently enumerated. Oti the contrary stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (Moral. ;
xxxi,
ART.
Q. 84.
is
either the preservation of the individual, for
Obj. sion.
there
45).i
which good
final cause.
Now
this
kind
may take place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come under the consideration of art, because man's particular dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another. And it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration of origin
referred.
is
vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils.
Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which
all
men
seek naturally.
Now
in the first
place happiness implies perfection, since happiness
is
a perfect good, to which belongs excel-
lence or renown, which
is
vainglory. Secondly,
implies satiety, which
it
desired by pride or
covetousness seeks in the promise of riches. it implies pleasure, without which hap-
Thirdly, piness
is
impossible, as stated in the Ethics,^
this gluttony
On
,
by way of
namely riches, to These same four
external good,
is
which covetousness
and
/ answer that, As stated above (a. 3) the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially
there
ly,
example, sexual intercourse, sought inordinately by lust. Thirdfor
is
and
lust pursue.
the other hand, avoidance of good on ac-
count of an attendant
evil occurs in two ways. happens either in respect of one's own good, and thus we have acedia, which is sadness about one's spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily labour; or else it happens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to envy, which is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination with a view to vengeance, it
For
this
anger. Again, these
is
same
vices seek the con-
trary evils.
Reply Obj. i. Virtue and vice do not originate same way, since virtue is caused by the
in the
of art.
subordination of the appetite to reason, or to
Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital whose ends have certain fundamental
the unchangeable good, which
reasons for moving the appetite; and
it
is
in
respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated.
moves the appetite and of
its
appetite to son,
Now
two ways. First, directly very nature; thus good moves the seek it, while evil, for the same reato avoid
it.
Secondly,
and on account of something else, as it were; thus one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on acindirectly
count of some attendant evil. Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first
place, there
which derives
is
a certain good of the soul,
its aspect of desirability merely through being apprehended, namely the exc' to fortitude which pertains to the irascible power.
Reply Obj.
5.
The
difficulty
which
is
men-
tioned in this book of Augustine includes the
it
is
stated in the Metaphysics^ that
has a relation of order to something else. Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there is a good belonging to the very substance of nature, which
wounds affecting the appetitive powers, namely malice, weakness and concupiscence, for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. Error and vexation are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects
mode, species and order, and is sin. There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as stated above (aa.
of his concupiscence.
is
three
Article 4. Whether Privation of Mode, Species, and Order Is the Effect of Sin?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that privation of mode, species and not the effect of sin. Objection i. For x\ugustine says (De Natura
order
Boni,
good
is
my is
that "where these three abound, the
great
;
where they are
less,
there
is
less
good; where they are not, there is no good at all." But sin does not cancel out the good of nature. Therefore it does not take away mode, species and order.
own cause. But mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De Natura Boni, iv).2 Therefore privation of mode, species and Obj.
2,
Further, nothing
not the effect of sin. Obj. 3. Further, different effects result from
1
is
PL 42. 553.
2
its
neither destroyed nor diminished by
1,2), but is not entirely destroyed. Again, there the good of virtue and grace; this too has its
mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordered act itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of which is essentially sin.
Hence
it is
clear both
how
sin is
privation of mode, species and order, and it
how
destroys or diminishes mode, species and or-
der.
This
suffices for the Replies to the first
two
Objections.
Reply Obj. 3. Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above. And so they are destroyed or diminished together.
is its
sin itself is "the privation of
order
good has
PL 42, 553.
Article
5.
Whether Death and Other Bodily
Defects Are the Result of Sin?
We
proceed thus to the Fifth Article:
It
would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. 3
Aristotle, vin, 3 (io43''33).
SUMMA TEEOLOGICA
l82
Objection
Now
i
Because equal causes have equal
.
these defects are not equal in
all,
but abound in some more than in others,
al-
effects.
though original defects
seem
from which especially these
sin,
to result,
equal in
is
all,
as stated
(q. lxxxii, a. 4). Therefore death and such defects are not the result of sin. Obj. 2. Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But these defects are not re-
above
original sin. And although these defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless they are ordered according to the justice of God Who in-
them as punishments. Reply Obj. i. Causes that produce their effects directly, if equal, produce equal effects; flicts
penance. Therefore they are not the effect of
such causes be increased or diminished, is increased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle being removed do not point to equal effects. For supposing a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it
sin.
does not follow that the movements of the
moved when
Obj.
all sin is
removed by baptism or
Further, actual sin has
3.
result of
(Rom.
according to
of the
actual sin does not change the nature of the
less, therefore,
it
to
does original
some sin.
defect.
Much
Therefore death
and other bodily defects are not the
On 12):
the contrary,
By
one
man
The Apostle
says
5.
sin entered into this world,
and by sin death. I answer that. One thing causes another in two ways first, directly secondly, accidentally. ;
:
Directly, one thing
is
the cause of another
if it
produces its effect by reason of the power of its nature or form, from which it follows that the effect is directly intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and such defects are beside the intention of the sinner,
it is
evident that sin
is
not, of itself, the cause of these defects. Acci-
dentally, one thing
is
the cause of another
if it
by removing an obstacle; thus it is stated in the Physics^ that "by displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting causes
it
thereon." In this
way
the sin of our
the cause of death and
first
parent
such defects in human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken away, by which not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without all
any disorder whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as stated in the First Part (q. xcvn, A. i). Therefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent,
human nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder among the powers, as stated above (a. 3; q. lxxxii, a. 3), so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in just as
the body.
Now
the withdrawal of original justice has
the character of punishment, even as the with-
drawal of grace has. Consequently, death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of 1
stones resting on
ture of the
sin.
is
if
them will be equal, but that one will move with the greater velocity which has the greater weight according to the property of its nature, to which it is abandoned when the obstacle to its falhng is removed. Accordingly, when original justice is removed, the na-
more
character of guilt than original sin has. But
body by subjecting
for
the effect
Aristotle, viu, 4 (255^25).
human body
is left
to itself, so that
temperaments some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal in different
natural
all.
Reply Obj. 2. Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle (Rom. 8. 11) :
He
.
.
.
shall quicken
.
.
.
your mortal bodies,
because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you, but each is done according to the order of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should first of all be conformed to Christ's
immortahty and impassibility of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence, it sufferings before attaining to the
is
necessary that our bodies should remain, for
a time, subject to suffering, in order that
may
we
merit the impassibility of glory, in con-
formity with Christ.
Reply Obj.
3.
Two
things
may be
considered
substance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance of the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect; thus in actual sin, the
some sicken and die through eating too much. But as regards the fault, it deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects of the body, as original justice did. Therefore actual sin does not cause those defects, as original sin does.
Article 6. Whether Death and Other Defects Are Natural to Man?
We
proceed thus to the Sixth Article:
It
would seem that death and such defects are natural to man. Objection 1. For "the corruptible and the in-
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
But man is of the same genus as other animals, which are natcorruptible differ generically,"^
urally corruptible. Therefore
man
is
naturally
corruptible.
Obj.
2.
is
composed of con-
having within itself the cause of its corruption. But such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally cor-
ART,
for
6
183
which alternate generation and corruption
things are requisite.
and defect
tion
Further, whatever
Q. 85.
the good and the preservation of the universe,
And
in
in this respect corrup-
in things are natural, not indeed
as regards the inclination of the form,
which
is
traries is naturally corruptible, as
the principle of being and perfection, but as re-
ruptible.
gards the inclination of matter, which is allotted proportionately to its particular form according to the regulation of the universal agent. And al-
Obj.
3.
Further, a hot thing naturally con-
sumes moisture. Now human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore the vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated in the book on the Soul,^ it seems that death and such defects are natural to man.
On ever
the contrary, is
death (Wisd. ural to 2.
God made in man whatNow God made not
13). Therefore death
i.
is
not nat-
man.
Further, that which
called either a
is
natural cannot be
punishment or an
natural to a thing
is
1.
natural to him.
is
what
evil, since
suitable to
But death
it.
and such defects are the punishment of original sin, as stated above (a. 5). Therefore they are not natural to man. 3. Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its end. Now man's end is everlasting Happiness, as stated above (q. ii, a. 7; Q. v, AA, 3, 4). And the form of the human body is the rational soul, which is incorruptible, as was proved in the First Part (q. lxxv, a. 6). Therefore the human body is naturally incorruptible.
/ answer that, ible thing in
We may
two ways;
speak of any corruptfirst,
in respect of its
universal nature, secondly, as regards ular nature.
own power
A
its
partic-
thing's particular nature
is
in respect of this nature,
its
And
of action and self-preservation.
"every corruption and
contrary to nature," as stated in the book on the Heavens,^ since this power tends to the being and preservation of the thing to which
defect
is
On
the other hand, the universal nature
is
an
some universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly body; or again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by some to be "the Nature Who makes nature."^ This power intends active
can achieve
its
own
power
in
1
Aristotle, Metaphysics, x, 10 (1058^28).
2
Aristotle,
II,
8
Aristotle,
II,
4 (416^29). 6 (288^14). ^ Cf. Averroes, In de Ccelo i. comm. 2 (v, 3 A), where the expression Nature naturans is found; see also in Averroes, In Phys., II, comm. 11. (iv, 52C). Natura naturans
occurs in Bonaventure,/» Sent.y in, d.
8, d. 2
(QR in,
197).
perpetuity, except the ra-
tional soul, for the reason that the latter
is
not
entirely subject to matter, as other forms are;
indeed
it
has an immaterial operation of
its
as stated in the First Part (q. lxxv, a. 2).
own, Con-
sequently as regards his form, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible
But since that very form has a matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of
things.
that matter there results corruptibility in the
whole. In this respect
man
is
naturally cor-
ruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to itself,
but not as regards the nature of
his form.
The
-first
three objections argue on the side of
the matter, while the other three argue on the side of the form. Therefore in order to solve
them,
we must observe
which
is
that the
form of man,
the rational soul, in respect of
its in-
proportioned to its end, which is everlasting Happiness. But the human body, which is corruptible, considered in respect of its nature, is in a way proportioned to its form, and in another v/ay it is not. For we may note a twofold condition in any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen corruptibility
is
by the
agent, and is a natural condition of matThus, a smith in order to make a knife chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to be useful for cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife; but that iron is breakable ter.
and inclined to rust
belongs.
it
though every form intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being
results
from the natural
disposition of iron, nor does the
workman choose
but rather would do without he could. Therefore this disposition of mat-
this in the iron, it if
ter is not proportioned to the
workman's inten-
nor to the purpose of his art. In like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature, in respect of its being of a mixed temperament, in order that it may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and moving powers. But the fact that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature; indeed nature would tion,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
i84
choose an incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in form-
man
ing
supplied the defect of nature, and by
the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as
Part
was stated
God made
said that
it is
not death, and that death
the punishment of sin.
is
This
suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
Of the stain of Two
On
the contrary, It
clus. 47, 22)
Thou
:
said to
Solomon (Ec-
written (Ephes.
is
it
to
the effect of
sin.
A
/ answer that,
sin
was
hast stained thy glory; and
5. 27): That He might Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle; and in each case it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is it
present
QUESTION LXXXVI (In
of sin.
in the First
sense that
(q. xcvii, a. i). It is in this
turning away and privation of grace; and so it would follow that there is but one stain caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect
stain
when
corporeal things,
is
properly ascribed to
a bright
body
loses its
brightness through contact with another body,
Articles)
for example, a garment, gold, or silver, or the
We
must now consider the stain of sin, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul? (2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?
Article
i
.
proceed thus to the First Article: It
2.
Further, sin
is
chiefly in the will, as
stated above (q. lxxiv, aa. i, 2). Now "the will is in the reason," as stated in the book on the
Soul} But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering anything whatever; rather indeed is it
perfected thereby. Therefore neither
will stained
Obj.
3.
by
is
the
sin.
Further,
if
sin causes a stain, this stain
either something positive or a pure privation.
is
If
it
be something positive,
it
can only be
ther a disposition or a habit, for
it
ei-
seems that
nothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither disposition nor habit, for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit; for instance, in a
man who
after committing a mortal sin of prodigality,
is
so changed as to fall into a sin of the opposite vice.
Therefore the stain does not denote any-
pure privation. For
man's soul has a one from the refulgence of of reason, by which he is di-
twofold brightness the natural light
all sins
when is
the soul cleaves to things
iii,
9 (432^5).
by
love, there
when man
he cleaves to certain things against the light of reason and of the Divine law, as shown above (q. lxxi, a. 6). Therefore the loss of brightness occasioned by this contact is metaphorically called a stain on the soul. Reply Obj. i. The soul is not defiled by inferior things by their own power, as though they acted on the soul; on the contrary, the soul, by sins,
its
own
action, defiles itself, through cleaving
them inordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law. Reply Obj. 2. The action of the intellect is accomplished by the intelligible thing being in to
the intellect according to the that the intellect
fected,
by
it.
On
mode
of the intel-
not defiled, but perthe other hand, the act of
lect, so
is
movement towards things themselves so that love attaches the soul to the the will consists in a thing loved.
when g.
10:
it
Thus
it is
that the soul
is
stained
cleaves inordinately, according to Osee
They
.
.
.
became abominable
as those
things were which they loved.
Reply Obj.
3.
The
stain
is
neithsr something
positive in the soul, nor does
it
denote a pure
privation. It denotes a privation of the soul's
brightness in relation to
its
cause,
which
is
sin;
therefore different sins occasion different stains.
agree on the part of
shadow, which is the privation of through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the
is it
Contained among the works of Augustine. (PL 42,
1107). Aristotle,
;
a kind of contact in the soul, and
It is like a
light
«
ascribed to spiritual
a
thing positive in the soul. Again, neither
1
is
Now
gence of the Divine Hght, namely of wisdom and grace, by which man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now,
Whether Sin Causes a Stain on
would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. Objection i. For a higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature; hence the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says {Contra Quinque Hcereses, w)} Now the human soul is of a much higher nature than changeable things, to which it turns by sinning. Therefore it does not contract a stain from them by sinning. Obj.
Accordingly a stain
things in like manner.
rected in his actions; the other, from the reful-
the Sold?
We
like.
interposed bodies.
PART Article
2.
Whether
the Stain
I
OF SECOND PART
Remains
in the
proceed thus to the Second Article: It stain does not remain in
would seem that the
the soul after the act of
sin.
3.
Further, every effect depends on
Now
cause. sin.
past.
is
Obj.
the cause of the stain
Therefore when the act of sin
there, neither
On
its
the act of
is is
no longer
the stain in the soul.
is
the contrary, It
is
written (Jos. 22. ly): Is
a small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime remainit
you (Vulg., us) to this day? I answer that. The stain of sin remains
eth in
soul even
when
the act of sin
is
past.
in the
The reason
for this is that the stain, as stated above (a. i), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul,
on account of
its
withdrawing from the
reason or of the Divine law.
And
God, which parting causes the defect of bright-
movement causes local partwhen movement ceases, not removed, so neither, when
Therefore, just as
local distance
is
the act of sin ceases,
is
man
QUESTION LXXXVII Of the debt of punishment {In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider
(i)
The debt itself
man does not at once return to the which he was before, and it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the previous movement. Thus if one man be parted from another on account of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as the movement ceases, but he needs to draw near to him and to return by a contrary move-
(6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin? (7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin? (8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?
Article i. Whether the Debt of Punishment Is an Efect of Sin?
We
proceed thus to the First Article:
not an effect of
Objection
Now
For that which is accidentally seem to be its proper the debt of punishment is acciden1.
soul after the act of sin, except the disposition ;
but there does remain something priv-
namely the privation of union with the
Divine
light.
Reply Obj. 2. After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent body remains in the
same position and
relation as regards the illum-
inating body, and so the
But when the
shadow passes
at once.
sin is past, the soul does not re-
it is
beside the intention
of the sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is
not an effect of sin. Obj. 2. Further, evil
is
not the cause of good.
But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an effect of sin, which is evil. Obj.
in the
is
sin.
related to a thing does not
ment.
Nothing positive remains
It
would seem that the debt of punishment
effect.
or habit
Mor-
in quantity? (5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?
tally related to sin, for
ative,
(2)
is infinite
state in
i.
;
and venial sin, which differ in respect of the punishment due to them (q. lxxxviii). Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (i) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin? (2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another? (3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment? (4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that tal
vine law,
Reply Obj.
the stain removed.
light of
therefore so
remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in him. But as soon as, moved by grace, he returns to the Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is removed. For although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the Di-
long as
185
i
ness, just as local ing.
Objection i. For after an action, nothing remains in the soul except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as stated above (a. i, obj. 3). Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. Obj. 2. Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body, as stated above (a. I, Reply 3). But the shadow does not remain when the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the act of sin
ART.
main in the same relation to God. And so there is no comparison. Reply Obj. 3. The act of sin parts man from
Soul After the Act of Sin?
We
Q. 87.
3.
Further, Augustine says^ that "every
is its own punishment." But punishment does not incur a further debt of punishment, because then it would go on infin-
inordinate affection
Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment. itely.
On
the contrary, It
is
written
(Rom.
2.
9)
:
Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of
man
that worketh evil. But to work evil is to Therefore sin incurs a punishment which is
sig-
1
Confessions,
i,
19
(PL
32, 670).
sin.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
i86
and anguish. 1 answer that, The fact that whenever one thing rises up against another it suffers some detriment from it, passes over from natural things to human affairs. For we observe in natnified
by the words
tribulation
ther punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or
We
proceed thus to the Second Article: It sin cannot be the punishment
the other acts with greater energy, for which
would seem that
reason "hot water freezes more rapidly," as
of sin.
And man is
stated in the treatise on Meteorology}
so
we
to
find that the natural inclination of
who
repress those
evident that
is
are, in a
ciple rises
all
up against him.
rise
Now
it
things contained in an order,
manner, one,
of that order.
in relation to the prin-
Consequently, whatever
up against an order
is
put down by that
order or by the principle of that order.
And
be-
an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins commits an offence against an order. And therefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment. Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject. In the first place a man's nature is subjected to the cause sin
is
own
order of his
reason; secondly,
jected to the order of another
it
man who
is
sub-
governs
him
either in spiritual or in temporal matters,
as a
member
either of the state or of the house-
hold; thirdly,
it
is
subjected to the universal
order of the Divine government. these orders
disturbed by
is
acts against his reason,
Now
sin, for
each of
the sinner
and against human and
Divine law. Hence he incurs a threefold punishment; one, inflicted by himself, namely remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and
by God. Punishment follows sin, in an evil by reason of its lack
a third, inflicted
Reply Obj. far as sin
is
i.
order. Therefore just as evil
is
so of
accidental to the
sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is
the debt of punishment.
Reply Obj. 2. A just punishment may be inby God or by man. Hence the pun-
flicted either
ishment itself is the effect of sin, not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment, and that is an evil for ;
Dionysius says {Div. Norn, iv)^ that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." Consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the effect of sin.
Reply Obj.
This punishment of the inordidue to sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a fur-
nate affection
»
Aristotle,
2
Sect. 22
I,
3.
is
12 (348''32).
(PG3,
724).
law.
Article 2. Whether Sin Can Be the Punishment of Sin?
when one contrary supervenes,
ural things that
human
Objection to bring
is
i.
For the purpose of punishment to the good of virtue, as
man back
the Philosopher declares.^
bring
man back
to the
Now
good of
sin
does not
virtue, but leads
him
in the opposite direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin. Obj. 2. Further, just punishments are from
God, as Augustine says (qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82).'* But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. Obj. 3. Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above (q. lxxiv, AA.
I,
ment
2).
Therefore sin cannot be the punish-
of sin.
On the contrary, Gregory says {Horn, xi in Ezech.y that "some sins are punishments of others."
/ answer that, We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence; secondly, as to that which is accidental to it. Sin as such can in no way be the punishment of another. For sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. But punishment is essentially something against the will, as stated in the First Part (q. xlviii, a. 5). Consequently it is evident that sin, regarded in its essence, can in no way be the punishment of sin. On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another by removing an impediment to it. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Therefore since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment, and is from God, as stated above (q. lxxix, a. 3), the result is that the sin which ensues from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks
(Rom.
i.
24)
Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart, namely to their pas-
when he
says
:
sions; because, that
is,
when men
are deprived
of the help of Divine grace, they are »£//»«, X, 9(1 i8o»4). *
»
PL 40, 98. PL 76, 91s.
overcome
PART by
their passions. In this
way
I
OF SECOND PART
always said to be the punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it be an interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with one who endures considerable trouble and loss in order to achieve a sinful act, according to Wisd. We wearied ourselves in the way of iniq5. 7 sin is
:
on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punish-
tural to the one
who
cannot be of
in respect of a
preceding
sin,
but
also with regard to itself.
Reply Obj. i. Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed is for the good of those who are punished, when, that is, men arise from sin more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the it
of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of sinning. With regard to the other two ways, it is evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's amendment, since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning is of a nature to withdraw man from sin. Reply Obj. 2. This objection considers sin essentially as such; and the same answer applies
amendment
to the third objection.
Article
Debt
Whether Any Sin Incurs a
3.
We
proceed thus to the Third Article: It sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. Objection 1. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice
written (Isa. 27. 8) ure,
when
Now
it.
it
:
is
Hence
equality.
it is
In measure against meas-
shall be cast off, thou shalt judge
sin is temporal.
Therefore
it
does not
Obj.
2.
Further, "punishments are a kind of
medicine."^ But no medicine should be infinite,
because
it is
directed to an end, and "what
directed to an end
is
is
not infinite," as the Phi-
losopher states.^ Therefore no punishment should be infinite. Obj. 3. Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in
it
for
its
own
sake.
But God
hath not pleasure in the destructio7i of men (Vulg., of the living). Therefore He will not inflict eternal
Obj.
4.
punishment on man.
Further, nothing accidental
1
Aristotle, Ethics,
2
Politics,
I,
11,
3 (no4*'i7).
9 {^2S^^2^).
infinite duration.
:
ing sin.
I answer that.
is infinite.
As
stated above (a. i), sin in-
curs a debt of punishment through disturbing
an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Therefore so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must remain also. Now disturbance of an order is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable. For a defect which destroys the principle is always irreparable, although if the principle be saved, defects can be repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by Divine power; but, if the principle of sight is preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle by which one takes part in that order. Consequently if a sin destroys the principle of the order by which man's will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. the principle of this order
which whatever
is
the last end,
man
adheres by charity. Therefore sins turn man away from God, so as
to destroy charity, considered in themselves, in-
cur a debt of eternal punishment.
Reply Obj.
1.
Punishment
is
proportionate to
both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however, as Augustine says,^ is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact sin in point of severity
that adultery or
incur a debt of eternal punishment.
is
it is
the contrary. It is written (Matt. 25. These shall go into everlasting punishment; and (Mark 3. 29): He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlast-
to
would seem that no
not napunished. Therefore it
accidental, for
On
46)
Now
of Eternal Punishment?
187
3
is
uity. Thirdly,
ment not only
ART.
Q. 87.
But punishment
ment does not
murder call
is
for a
in a momomentary punish-
committed
ment; in fact they are punished sometimes by imprisonment or banishment for life, sometimes even by death. In such a case account is
—
not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the living, so that this
punishment, in
its
own way,
eternity of punishment inflicted
represents the
by God.
Now
according to Gregory'' "it is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity
should be punished in God's eternity." 3
3. i, .
.
2)
Much
every way. First indeed, becaiise the words of
God were committed
to
them; and
(Ps. 147.
He
hath not done in like manner to every nation: and His judgments He hath not made manifest unto them. I answer that. It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being given to the Jews rather 9)
:
than to other peoples that the Jewish people alone remained faithful to the worship of one
God, while the others turned away to idolatry; hence the latter were unworthy to receive the Law, lest a holy thing should be given to dogs.
make
angels.
it is
But
this reason does not
seem
fitting,
because
that people turned to idolatry even after the
Law had
been made, which was more grievous, from Exod. 32 and from Amos 5. 25, 26: Did you o^er victims and sacrifices to Me house of Israel? in the desert for forty years, But you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch, and the image of your idols, the star of your god, which you made to yourselves. Moreover Know thereit is stated expressly (Deut. 9. 6) as
is
clear
:
fore that the
Lord thy God giveth thee not
this
excellent land in possessioji for thy justices, for
thou art a very stiff -jiecked people: but the real reason is given in the preceding verse: That the Lord might accotnplish His word, which He
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham,
and Jacob.
Isaac,
What who
this
promise was
the promises
3.
is
shown by the Apos-
made and
says
God
many: but
as of
He
is
Christ."
And
the Law and other speboons to that people, on account of the promise made to their fathers that Christ should be born of them. For it was fitting that the people of whom Christ was to be born should be signahzed by a special sanctification, according to the words of Levit. ig. 2: Beye holy, because I am holy. Nor again was it on account of the merit of Abraham himself that this promise was made to him, namely, that Christ should be born of his seed, but of gratuitous election and calling of God. Hence it is
God vouchsafed both
.
written (Isa. 41, 2): just one
from the
He
not a respecter of persons if He gives them to some rather than to others. Hence Augustine
Saith
cial
.
243
He
to his seed.
one, ''And to thy seed, which
.
5
Abraham were
i6) that to
not, "A?td to his seeds," as of
so
Who
east,
hath raised up the hath called him to fol-
was merely from
gratuitous election that the patriarchs received
the promise, and that the people sprung from law, according to Deut. 4. 36, Thou didst) hear His words
out of the midst of the fire, because He loved thy fathers, and chose their seed after them. again
if
it
be asked
why He
chose this
people, and not another, that Christ might be
answer is given by Augustine {Tract, super Joann. xxvi):^ Why He draweth one and draweth not another, seek not thou to judge, if thou wish not to err." Reply Obj. 1. Although the salvation which was to come through Christ was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that Christ should be born of one people, which, for this reason, was privileged above other peoples, accordborn of them, a
Rom.
ing to
9.
fitting
4:
To whom, namely
the Jews,
belongeth the adoption as of children (of God), and the testament, and the giving of the .
.
.
Law;
.
.
.
whose are the
fathers,
and of
whom
is
Christ according to the flesh.
Reply Obj.
2.
;
PL 35,
1607.
He
man
is
:^
"All
teaches out of pity; but
He
whom whom
teaches not"
due to the condemnation of the hu-
race for the sin of the
first
parent.
Reply Obj. 3. The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on account of sin, but not the benefits of nature.
Among
the latter are the
ministries of the angels, which the very order
of various natures demands, namely, that the
lowest beings be governed through the intermediate beings; and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not only to men but also to beasts, according to Ps. 35. 7: Men and beasts Thou
Lord.
wilt preserve,
Article 5. Whether All Observe the Old Law?
Men Were Bomid To
proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It
would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old Law. Objection 1. Because whoever is subject to the king must be subject to his law. But the Old Law was given by God, Who is King of all the earth (Ps. 46. 8). Therefore tants of the earth were
bound
all
the inhabi-
to observe the
Law. Obj. 2. Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the Old Law, for it is written (Deut. 27. 26) Cursed be he that abideth not :
words of
in the
this law,
and
in work. If therefore other
fulfilleth
men
them not
could be saved
without the observance of the Old Law, the Jews would be in a worse condition than other
men. Obj.
3.
Further, the Gentiles were admitted
to the Jewish ritual
the Law, for
and
to the observances of
written (Exod. 12. 48): // any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to
it
is
keep the Phase of the Lord,
first
all his
males shall
be circumcised, and then shall he celebrate
according to the manner; and he shall be as he that is born in the land. But it would have been useless to admit strangers to the legal observances according to the Divine ordinance if they could have been saved v/ithout the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be saved without observing the Law. On the contrary, Dionysius says {C(bI. Hier. ix)^ that many of the Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels. But it is clear that it
Respect of persons takes place in those things which are given according to due; but it has no place in those things which are bestowed gratuitously. Because he who, out of generosity, gives of his own to one and not to another, is not a respecter of persons but if he were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were not to distribute them according to personal merits, he would be a respecter of persons. Now God bestows the benefits of salvation 1
Prcedest. Sanct. viii)
teaches not, out of justice
We
It is therefore evident that it
And
(De
teaches,
for this
low him?
them received the 37, Ye did (Vulg.,
ART.
is
says (Gal.
tle,
Q. 98.
on the human race gratuitously; therefore
2
PL 44, 971.
3
Sect. 4
(PG 3,
261).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
244
the Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore
some could be saved without observ^ing the Law. / answer that, The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural law, and added certain
own. Accordingly, as to those precepts of the natural law contained in the Old Law all were bound to observe the Old Law; not because they belonged to the Old Law, but because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts which were added by the Old Law, they were not binding on any save the Jewish people alone. The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above (a. 4), was given to the Jewish people that it might receive a prerogative of precepts of
its
holiness, in reverence for Christ
Who
was
to
be born of that people. Now whatever laws are enacted for the special sanctification of certain ones are binding on them alone; thus clerics
who
are set aside for the service of
bound
to certain obhgations to
God
which the
are
laity
bound by works of perfection, to which people living in the world are not bound. In like manner this people was bound to certain special observances, to which other peoples were not bound. Hence it is written (Deut. 18. 13) Thou shalt be perfect and without spot before the Lord thy God; and for this reason they used a kind of form of profession, as appears from Deut. 26. 3 / profess this day before the Lord thy God, etc. Reply Obj. i. Whoever are subject to a king are bound to observe his law which he makes for all in general. But if he orders certain things to be observed by the servants of his household, others are bound to them. Reply Obj. 2. The more a man is united to God, the better his state becomes. Therefore the more the Jewish people were bound to the worship of God, the greater their excellence are not
bound
likewise religious are
;
their profession to certain
:
:
over other peoples. Hence it is written (Deut. What other nation is there so renowned 4. 8) that hath ceremonies and just judgments, and :
all
the law? In like manner,
view, the state of clerics
is
from
this point of
better than that of
the laity, and the state of religious than that of those living in the world.
Reply Obj. tion
more
3.
The
Gentiles obtained salva-
perfectly and
more securely under
Law
than under the natand for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the laity are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular persons to those of the religious, although they can be saved without this. the observances of the ural law alone,
Article 6. Whether the Old Law Was Suitably Given at the Time of Moses?
We
proceed thus to the Sixth Article:
It
would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at the time of Moses. Objection i. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation which was to come through Christ, as stated above (aa. 2, 3). But man needed this saving remedy immediately after he had sinned. Therefore the Law should have been given immediately after sin. Obj. 2. Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of those from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning the seed, which is Christ (Gal. 3. 16) was first made to Abraham, as related in Gen. 12. 7. Therefore the Law should have been given at once at the time of Abraham. Obj. 3. Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended from Noe through Abraham, to whom the promise was made, so was He born of no other of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the promise was renewed, according to II Kings 23. i The man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the said. Therefore the Old Law God of Jacob should have been given after David, just as it was given after Abraham. :
.
On
.
.
the contrary.
The Apostle says
(Gal.
3.
19) that the Law was set because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He
made the
the promise, being ordained by angels in hand of a Mediator ; ordained, that is "given
in orderly fashion," as the gloss explains.^ There-
fore
it
was
fitting that the
Old
Law
should be
given in this order of time. / answer that. It was most fitting for the to be given at the time of Moses.
Law
The reason
may
be taken from two things in reis imposed on two kinds of men. Because it is imposed on some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law refor this
spect of which every law
strains and tames; and it is imposed on good men, who. through being instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil what they desire to do. Hence it was fitting that the Law should be given at such a time as would be appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride. For man was proud of two things, namely, of knowledge and of power. He was proud of his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suffice him for salvation; and accordingly, in order that his pride might be overcome in this matter, man * Glossa Lombardl (PL 192, 127); 83B).
cf.
Glossa ordin.
(vi,
PART was
the help of a written law.
OF SECOND PART
And man was
from experience that
learn
I
Q. 99.
the guidance of his reason without
left to
Of the precepts of the old law
defi-
about the time of Abraham man headlong into idolatry and the most
cient, since
had
fallen
shameful
vices. Therefore, after those times, it
was necessary for a written law to be given as a remedy for human ignorance, because by the Law is the knowledge of sin (Rom. 3, 20). But, after man had been instructed by the Law, his pride was convinced of his weakness through his being unable to fulfil what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes (Rom. 8. 3, 4), what the Law could not do in that it was weak through sending) His own the fleshy God sefit (Vulg., that the justification of the Law might Son, .
.
.
be fulfilled in us. With regard to good men, the
them
given
which was most needed by the when the natural law began to be obscured on account of the rank growth of sin; for it was fitting that this help should be bestowed on men in an orderly manner, so that they might be led from imperfection to perfection. Therefore it was becoming that the Old Law should be given between the law of nature and the law of grace. Reply Obj. 1. It was not fitting for the Old to
to be given at once after the sin of the
both because man was so confident in his own reasons that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law, and because as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened first
man
:
by habitual sinning. Reply Obj. 2. A law should not be given save to the people, since
it is
a general precept, as
stated above (q. xcvi, aa. 2, 3). Therefore at the time of Abraham God gave men certain familiar,
and, as
it
were, household precepts. But
when Abraham's descendants had multiplied, so as to form a people, and when they had been freed
We
must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (i) how they are distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept (q. c). Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether the Old Law contained several precepts or only one? (2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts? (3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts? (4) Whether besides these
Whether
How
it
it contains judicial precepts? (5) contains any others besides these?
the Old
Law
induced
men
to keep its
precepts.
as a help,
people, at the time
Law
(In Six Articles)
(6)
Law was
245
1
QUESTION XCIX
able to
was
his reason
ART.
from slavery,
it
was
fitting
that they
should be given a law; for slaves are not that part of the people or state to which
it is
fitting
Article
i. Whether One Precept?
We
the Old
proceed thus to the First Article: It
precept.
Objection i. Because a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above (q. xcn, a. 2, Reply i ) Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore .
it
contains but one precept.
Obj.
2.
Further, the Apostle says
.
.
.
15): Making void the Law of commandments contained in decrees, where he is referring to the Old Law, as the gloss
Law had to be given those of whom Christ
to the people, not only
was born received the Law, but the whole people, who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the promise made to Abraham, and in which he beheved, according to Rom. 4. II. Hence even before David, the Law had to be given to that people as soon as they were collected together. ^Politics,
III,
9 (1280*32);
cf. rv,
4 (1291*9).
13.
comprised in this neighbour as thyself. But this is only one commandment. Therefore the Old Law contained but one commandment. Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Matt. 7. 12): All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. For this is the Law and the prophets. But the whole of the Old Law is comprised in the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old Law contains but one commandment. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Ephes. 2.
passage.^
Since the
(Rom
commandment, it is word: Thou shalt love thy
9): If there be any other
says.^ 3.
Contains Only
would seem that the Old Law contains but one
for the law to be directed, as the Philosopher
Reply Obj.
Law
comments on the
Therefore the Old
Law
comprises
many commandments. / answer that, Since a precept of law
is
bind-
about something which must be done and, that a thing must be done arises from the
ing,
it is
necessity of
some
end.
Hence
it is
evident that
a precept impHes, in its very idea, relation to an end, in so far as a thing is commanded as being ^Glossa ordin.
Lombardi (PL (PL 17, 401).
(vi,
91F); Glossa interl. (v, 91V); Glossa cf. Ambrosiaster, In Ephes. 2.15
192, 185);
— SUMMA THEOLOGICA
9^
necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to be necessary or expedient to an end, and, accordingly, precepts may be given about various things as being ordered to one end. Consequently we must say that all the
Law are one in respect of one end, and yet they are many
precepts of the Old their relation to
in respect of the diversity of those things that
are ordered to that end.
Reply Obj.
i.
is
said to be one
as being ordered to one end; yet it comprises various precepts, according to the diversity of the things which it directs to the end. Thus also
one according to the unity of its end, because it aims at the building of a house; and yet it contains various rules, according to the variety of acts ordered to this. Reply Obj. 2. As the Apostle says (I. Tim. i. is
end of the commandment is charity since every law aims at establishing friendship, either between man and man, or between man and God. Therefore the whole Law is comprised in 5), the
one commandment, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, as expressing the end of all commandments, because love of one's neighbour includes love of God, when we love our neighbour for God's sake. Hence the Apostle this
commandment in place of the two which are about the love of God and of one's neighbour, and of which Our Lord said (Matt. 22. 40): On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets. Reply Obj. 3. As stated in the Ethics,^ "friendship towards another arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man looks on another as on himself. Hence when it is said, All things whatsoever yon would that men should do to you, do you also to them, this is an ex-
puts this
planation of the rule of neighbourly love contained implicitly in the words,
thy neighbour as thyself, so that tion of this
him, as
is
evident in regard to things that
reason seems to suffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law. Obj. 3. Further, the Old Law is said to be the letter that killeth (II Cor. 3. 6). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken, according to Ps. 118. 93 Thy justifications I will never forget, for by them Thou hast given me life. Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old :
The Old Law
the art of building
fails
are of faith, which are above reason. But man's
Thou it is
shalt love
an explana-
Law.
On
is written (Ecclus. 17.9): gave them discipline (Douay, instructions) and the law of life for an inheri-
He
Now
tance.
discipline belongs to morals;
the gloss on Heb. 12. 11
:
Now
We
Law
Contains
proceed thus to the Second Article: It
would seem that the Old
Law
contains no moral
precepts.
Objection
i.
For the Old
Law
is
distinct
from
the law of nature, as stated above (q. xci, a.\. 4, 5; Q. xcviii, A. 5). But the moral precepts
for
chastisement
is an exermorals by means of difficulties." Therefore the Law which was given by God comprised moral precepts. / answer that. The Old Law contained some moral precepts, as is evident from Exod. 20. 13, 15: Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not steal. This was reasonable, because just as the princi-
(disciplina), etc., says:^ "Discipline
human law is to create friendman and man, so the chief intenDivine law is to estabhsh man in
pal intention of
ship between tion of the
friendship with God.
Now
since likeness
is
the
reason of love, according to Ecclus. 13. 19: Every beast loveth its like, there cannot possibly
be any friendship of man to God, Who is supremely good, unless man becomes good. Therefore
it is
written (Levit. 19. 2;
shall be holy, for I
am
holy.
man is virtue, which makes
of
Therefore
it
was necessary
cf. 11.
You
45):
But the goodness its
possessor good.
for the
Old
Law
to
include precepts about acts of virtue, and these are the moral precepts of the Law.
Reply Obj.
i.
The Old Law
is
distinct
from
the natural law not as being altogether different it,
it. For just must the Divine
but as something added to
as grace presupposes nature, so
Article 2. Whether the Old Moral Precepts?
all
cise in
from
commandment.
the contrary, It
Moreover,
law presuppose the natural law. Reply Obj. 2. It was fitting that the Divine law should come to man's assistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient, but also in those things in which human reason may happen to be impeded. Now human reason could not go astray in the universal principle, is, as to the most common principles of
that
belong to the law of nature. Therefore they do
the natural law; but through being habituated
not belong to the Old Law. Obj. 2. Further, the Divine law should have come to man's assistance where human reason
to sin,
1
Aristotle, IX, 4 (ii06"i).
to be 2
it became obscured in the point of things done in detail. But with regard to the other
Glossa or din. (vi, 159B); Glossa Lombardi
S03).
(PL
192,
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
Q. 99.
ART.
247
3
drawn
besides the moral precepts there are others
from the common principles of the natural law, the reason of many men went astray, to the ex-
which are ceremonial. / answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the Divine law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God, while human law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men in relation to one another. Hence human laws have not concerned
moral precepts, which are
like conclusions
tent of judging to be lawful things that are evil
Hence there was need
for the au-
thority of the Divine law to rescue
man from
in themselves.
both these defects. Thus among the articles of faith not only are those things set forth to which reason cannot reach, such as the Trinity of the Godhead, but also to which right reason can attain, such as the Unity of the Godhead, in order to remove the manifold errors to which reason
Reply Obj.
As Augustine proves {De
3.
Spiri-
tu et Litera, xrv'),^ even the letter of the law
is
said to be the occasion of death, as to the moral is, it prescribes what good without furnishing the aid of grace for
precepts; in so far as, that fulfilment.
its
Article
3.
Whether the Old Law Comprises
Ceremonial, Besides Moral, Precepts?
We
proceed thus to the Third Article: It
would seem that the Old Law does not comprise ceremonial, besides moral, precepts.
Objection
man
is
tions.
i.
For every law that
for the purpose of directing
Now human
is
given to
human
ac-
actions are called moral, as
stated above (q. i, a. 3). Therefore it seems that the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than
Obj.
2.
Further, those precepts that are styled
ceremonial seem to refer to the Divine worship.
But Divine worship ly, religion,
the act of a virtue, name-
is
TuUy
which, as
says
{De Invent,
ii,
53)^ "offers worship and ceremony to the divine nature." Since, then, the moral precepts are
about acts of virtue, as stated above (a. 2), seems that the ceremonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral. Obj. 3. Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which signify something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes,^ "of all signs employed by men words hold the first place." Therefore there was no need for the Law to contain ceremonial precepts about certain fig-
it
urative actions.
On
common good
the contrary, It
is
written (Deut.
4.
13,
He wrote in two tables of 14) Ten words stone ; and He commanded me at that time that :
.
.
.
I should teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall do. But the ten commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore 1
PL 44,
2
DD 1,165.
'
Christian Doctrine,
And
of mankind.
be seen
for this reason
may On the other men to one an-
human
morals, as
in the rites of the Gentiles.
hand the Divine law directed other according to the demands of that order by which man is directed to God, which order was the chief aim of that law. Now man is directed to God not only by the interior acts of the mind, which are faith, hope, and love, but also by certain external works, whereby man makes profession of his subjection to God, and it is these works that are said to belong to the Divine wor-
—
This worship is called ceremony, the munia, that is, gifts of Ceres (who was the goddess of fruits), as some say,'' because at first offerings were made to God from the fruits; ship.
or because, as Valerius Maximus states,^ the word ceremony was introduced among the Latins to signify the
Divine worship, being de-
rived from a town near
moral precepts.
re-
they have devised many institutions relating to Divine matters, according as it seemed expedient for the formation of
is liable.
is
themselves with the institution of anything
lating to Divine worship except as affecting the
Rome
called Caere,
when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans were taken there since,
and most carefully preserved. Accordingly those Law which refer to the Divine
precepts of the
worship are specially called ceremonial. Reply Obj. 1. Human acts extend also to the Divine worship, and therefore the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these matters also. Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (q. xci, a. 3), the precepts of the natural law are general, and require to be determined: and they are determined both by human law and by Divine law. And just as these very determinations which are made by human law are said to be not of natural, but of positive law, so the determinations of the precepts of the natural law effected by the Divine law are distinct from the moral precepts which belong to the natural law. Therefore to worship God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept but the determination of this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by such and such sacrifices, and ;
216.
11,
3
(PL 34,
37),
*
Albert the Great, In Sent.,
B
Fact, et
Did. Memor.,
1. 1.
iv, d. i, a. 7
(DD
565).
(BO xxix,
19).
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
348
As stated above
such and such offerings, belongs to the ceremoConsequently the ceremonial pre-
pertains to the Divine law to direct
cepts are distinct from the moral precepts.
another and to God.
nial precepts.
Reply Obj.
3.
As Dionysius says
Now
God cannot
way
Now
2.
men
3),
it
one each of these belongs to
to the dictates of the natural
be manifested to
law, to which dictates the moral precepts are to
be referred; yet each of them has to be determined by Divine or human law, because naturally known principles are general, both in speculative and in practical matters. Accordingly just as the determination of the general precept about Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general precepts of that justice which is to be observed among men is effected by the judicial
they are not only expressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Therefore the things of
God
in a general
(aa.
except by means of sensible likenesses. these likenesses move the soul more when
i)/ the things of
men
{Cccl. Hier.
/ afiswer that,
are set forth in the Scriptures not only
by likenesses expressed
in
words, as in the case
of metaphorical expressions, but also
by
like-
nesses of things set before the eyes, which pertains to the ceremonial precepts.
precepts.
Whether, Besides the Moral and Ceremonial Precepts, There are Also Judicial
We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law; namely moral precepts,
Precepts?
which are dictated by the natural law; ceremonial precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship and judicial precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be maintained among men. Therefore the Apostle (Rom.
Article
4.
We
proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the
Old Law.
Objection Faust,
vi,
For Augustine says {Contra
i.
lY
that in the Old
Law
there are
life we have to lead, and precepts regarding the life that is foreshadowed." Now the precepts of the life we have to lead are moral precepts, and the precepts of the life that is foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of precepts we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law. Obj. 2. Further, a gloss on Ps. 118. 102, / have not declined from Thy judgments, says,^ that is, "from the rule of life Thou hast set for me." But a rule of life belongs to the moral
"precepts concerning the
—
precepts. Therefore the judicial precepts should
not be considered as distinct from the moral
3.
Further, judgment seems to be an act
of justice, according to Ps. 93. 15: Until justice
be turned into judgment. But acts of justice, the acts of other virtues, belong to the
like
moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and consequently should not be held as distinct from them. On the contrary, It is written (Deut. 6. i) These are the precepts, and ceremonies, and judgments, where precepts stands for moral precepts antonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and ceremonial precepts.
»Sect.3(PG3, '
PL 42,
228; X,
121). 2
(PL
42, 243).
*Glossa ordin. (in, 269A); Glossa Lombardi (PL 191, logs).
7.
12) after saying that the
that the
good:
commandment
Law
is just,
is
holy, adds
and holy, and
just, in respect of the judicial precepts;
holy, with regard to the ceremonial precepts
(since the
word sanctus
that which
is
that
is,
—holy—
appUed to and good, the moral preis
consecrated to God)
conducive to virtue, as to
;
cepts.
Reply Obj.
i.
Both the moral and the
precepts aim at the ordering of
human
judicial life,
and
consequently they are both comprised under one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, namely, under the precepts of the hfe we have to lead.
Reply Obj. 2. Judgment denotes execution of by an application of the reason to in-
justice,
dividual cases in a determinate way.
precepts.
Obj.
;
judicial precepts
have something
with the moral precepts
Hence the
common
in
they are derived from reason, and something in common with the ceremonial precepts in that they are determinain that
tions of general precepts.
This explains
why
sometimes "judgments" comprises both judicial and moral precepts, as in Deut. 5 i Hear, Israel, the ceremonies and judgments; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts, as in Levit. 18. 4: Yon shall do My judgments, and shall observe My precepts, where "precepts" denotes moral precepts, while "judgments" refers to judicial and ceremonial precepts. Reply Obj. 3. The act of justice, in general, pertains to the moral precepts, but its deter:
mination to some special kind of act pertains to the judicial precepts.
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
5. Whether the Old Law Contains Others Besides the Moral, Judicial, and Ceremonial Precepts?
Article
We
Any
Law
contains others
besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts.
Objection i. Because the judicial precepts belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man, while the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby
Now
shipped.
besides these
God
there are
is
wor-
many
other virtues, namely, temperance, fortitude, liberality,
and several others, as stated above
lx, a. 5). Therefore besides these precepts,
(q.
Law
the Old
Obj.
2.
should comprise others.
Further,
it is
written (Deut. 11. i):
Love the Lord thy God, and observe His precepts and ceremonies. His judgments and commandments. Now precepts concern moral matters, as stated above (a. 4). Therefore besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts, the Law contains others which are called "commandments (mandata)". Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Deut 6. 17): Keep the precepts of the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have (Vulg.,
—He hath)
commanded
dition to the above, the
Further,
Thy
it is
Law there are not only moral, ceremoand judicial precepts, but also others, called
"justifications."
On the contrary, It is written (Deut. 6. i.): These are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded you. And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the precepts of the Law are included under them. / answer that. Some things are included in .
.
the
Law by way
of precept
;
.
.
;
certain ones justly.
The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is twofold one according to the rule of reason, the other according to the rule of a law which prescribes that duty; thus the Philosopher distinguishes a twofold just moral and legal.^ Moral duty is twofold: for reason dictates that something must be done either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue would be destroyed, or as being useful for the better maintaining of the order of virtue. And
—
in this sense
pressed by bition, as
the Old
.
.
steal;
comprises "testi-
ing to a gloss )^ / will never forget. Therefore in
nial,
God the lawgiver: for example, Deut. 6. 4 Hear, Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord; and Gen. 1. 1.: In the beginning God created heaven and earth; and these are called "testimonies." Again it was necessary that in the Law certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law and punishments for those who transgress, as may be seen in Deut. 28.: // thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord Thy God He will make thee higher than all the nations, etc. and these are called "justifications," according as God punishes or rewards
thee. Therefore in ad-
written (Ps. 118. 93): justifications (that is, "Thy Law," accord4.
249
5
authority of
Law
monies." Obj.
ART.
:
proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It
would seem that the Old
Q. 99.
certain things should be set forth to indicate the
some of the moral precepts are
way of absolute command Thou shalt not kill. Thou
ex-
or prohishalt not
and these are properly called precepts.
Other things are prescribed or forbidden not as an absolute duty, but as something better to be done. These may be called "commandments (mandata) ,'' because they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion; an example of this is seen in Exod. 22. 26: // thou take of thy neighbour a garment in pledge^ thou shalt give it him again before sunset, and in other like cases. Therefore Jerome (Prcefat. in Comment, super Marc.y says that "justice is in the pre-
commandments." Duty as by the Law belongs to the judicial precepts
cepts, charity in the
fixed
as regards
human
affairs, to
the ceremonial pre-
cepts as regards Divine matters.
Nevertheless those ordinances also which re-
other things, as be-
punishments and rewards
may
ing ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts.
fer to
Now
the precepts refer to things which have to
testimonies, in so far as they testify to the Di-
be done, and to their fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, namely, the authority
vine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law m.ay be styled justifications, as being executions
and the benefit derived from
of legal justice. Furthermore the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those things be called precepts which God Himself prescribed, and those things com-
of the lawgiver,
the fulfilment, which benefit consists in the at-
tainment of some good, useful, pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it was necessary that in the Old Law
^
^Glossa 1090).
interl.
(iii,
268v); Glossa Lombard] (PL 191,
3
Ethics, V, 7 (1134^18). Cf. Pelagius, In Marc,
be called
proem. (PL 30,
Glossa ordin., on the beginning of
Mark
(v,
88E).
610);
cf.
—
;
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
05^
mandments which He enjoined {mandavit)
or rewards of the
through others, as the very word seems to de-
law.
On
note.
From this the Law are cial,
it
clear that all the precepts of
is
either moral, ceremonial, or judi-
and that other ordinances have not the
character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the precepts, as stated above.
Reply Obj. i. Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of duty. Consequently moral
//
commandments
the contrary, It
you be
written (Isa.
is
and
willing,
of the Divine
will
i.
19, 20)
:
hearken to Me, you
good tilings of the land. But if you and will provoke Me to wrath: the sword shall devour you. I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are led to assent to the conclusions by means of shall eat the will not,
syllogistic
arguments, so too in every law,
men
precepts by means of pun-
matters are determinable by law in so far as they
are led to observe
belong to justice, of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says {De hvoent. ii, 53).^ Therefore the legal just cannot be anything foreign to
ishments and rewards.
the ceremonial and judicial precepts.
in an based on principles more generally known, so also he who would persuade a man to the observance of any precepts needs to move him at first by things for which he has an affection; just as children are induced to do something, by means of little childish gifts. Now it has been said above (q. xcviii, AA. I, 2, 3) that the Old Law disposed
The Replies
said.
Article 6. Whether the Old Law Should Have Induced Mefi to the Observance of Its Precepts By Means of Temporal Promises a?id Threats?
We
proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It Law should not have induced men to the observance of its precepts
would seem that the Old
by means of temporal promises and
threats.
For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and love hence it is written (Deut. 10. 12): And fww, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk 171 His ways, and love Him? But the desire for temporal goods leads man away from God; for Augustine sa\'s (qq. Ixxxiii qu. 36), ^ that "covetousness is the bane of charity." Therefore temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver; and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher declares.^ Obj. 2. Further, the Divine law is more excelObjection
lent than
i.
human
law.
Now,
in sciences,
tice that the loftier the science, the
we no-
higher the
employs. Therefore, since human law employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the Divine law should
means
that
it
have used, not Obj.
3.
these, but
more
lofty means.
Further, the reward of justice and the
punishment of guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. But as stated in Ecclus. 9. 2, all temporal things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to him that o^ereth victims, and to him that despiseth sacrifices. Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set forth as punishments iDDi. 3
165.
«
PL 40,
25.
Cf. Politics VII, 2 (l324''23).
Now
it is
that in speculative sciences the
to be observed
means
are adap-
ted to the conditions of the hearer. Therefore just as in the sciences
to the other Objections are clear
from what has been
its
way
orderly
men
we should proceed
so that the instruction
is
to Christ as the imperfect disposes to the
Hence
perfect.
was given
it
to a people as yet
imperfect in comparison to the perfection which was to result from Christ's coming, and for this reason, that people is still
is
compared
under a pedagogue (Gal.
perfection of
man
to a child that 3.
24).
But the
consists in his despising tem-
poral things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is
from the words
clear
13, 15)
:
of the Apostle (Phil. 3. Forgetting the things that are behind, I
and stretching) forth myself
stretch (Vulg.,
to
Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be this minded. Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal goods, although in subordination to God. The perverse those that are before.
however place
their
.
end
.
.
in temporalities. It
therefore fitting that the Old
Law
was
should con-
men to God by means of temporal goods which the imperfect have an affection. Reply Obj. i. Covetousness, by which man places his end in temporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal goods which man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to the love of God, duct for
according to Ps. 48. 19:
when Thou
shall
do
He
ivell to
will praise
Thee,
him.
Reply Obj. 2. Human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or by punishments to be inflicted by men but the Divine law persuades men by means of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In this respect it em;
ploys higher means.
Reply Obj.
3.
As anyone can
see
who
reads
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
carefully the story of the Old Testament, the
common state of the people prospered under the Law as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as tbey departed from the precepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. But certain individuals, although they observed the
—
Law, met with misfortunes eihad already become spiritual (so that misfortune might withdraw them all the more from attachment to temporal things, and that their virtue might be tried) or because, while outwardly fulfilling the works of the Law, their heart was altogether fixed on temporal goods, and far removed from God, acjustice of the
ther because they
cording to Isa. 29. 13 (Matt. 15. 8): This peohonour eth Me with their lips; but their heart
is
jar from
Me.
2.
ART.
human
251
i
Further, the Divine law
is
more per-
But human law adds cergood morals to those that belong to the law of nature, as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is the same in all men, while these moral institutions are various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there why the Divine law should add to the law of nature ordinances pertaining to good fect than
law.
tain things concerning
morals,
Obj.
;
ple
Q. 100.
Obj.
3.
Further, just as natural reason leads
good morals in certain matters, so does faith hence it is written (Gal. 5.6) that faith worketh by charity. But faith is not included in the law of nature, since that which is of faith is above natural reason. Therefore not all the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of to
nature.
QUESTION C Of the moral precepts of the old law {In Twelve Articles)
We
must now consider each kind of precept of Law: and (i) the moral precepts, (2)
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 2. 14) that the Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law, which must be understood of things pertaining to
good morals. Therefore
Law
all the m^oral precepts belong to the law of nature.
the Old
of the
the ceremonial precepts (q. ci), (3) the judicial
/ answer that, The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and judicial precepts, are
precepts (q. civ). Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (i) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old
Law
belong to the
law of nature? (2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all the virtues? (3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue? (4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one another; (5) Their number; (6) Their order; (7) The manner in which they were given (8) Whether they ;
are dispensable? (9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept
Law? (10) Whether the mode of charcomes under the precept? (11) The distinction of other moral precepts. (12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified
of the ity
Article i. Whether All the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Belong to the Law of Nature?
We
proceed thus to the First Article: It all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. Objection i. For it is written (Ecclus. 17. 9) Moreover He gave them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance. But instruction
would seem that not
law of nature, since not learnt, but held by natural instinct. Therefore not all the moral precepts belong to the natural law. is
in contradistinction to the
the law of nature
is
about things pertaining of their very nature to
good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason, which is the proper
human acts, those morals are called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are discordant from reason. And as every judgment of speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so every judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated above (q. xciv, aa. 2, 4), from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some matters connected with human actions are so evident that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by means of these general first principles. But some matters cannot be the subject of judgment principle of
without much consideration of the various circumstances, which all are not able to do carefully, but only those who are wise, just as it is not possible for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those who are versed in philosophy. And lastly there are some matters of which man cannot judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction, such as the articles of faith.
It
is
therefore evident that since the moral
precepts are about matters which concern good morals, and since good morals are those which
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
252
are in accord with reason, and since also every
viUy
judgment of human reason must be derived in some way from natural reason, it follows, of necessity, that all of the moral precepts belong to the law of nature, but not all in the same way. For there are certain things which the natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done or not to be done: for example, Honour thy father and thy mother,
vine law, and a disobedience to the
and,
Thou
shalt not
and these belong
And
ly.
more
kill,
Thou
shalt not steal;
to the law of nature absolute-
there are certain things which, after a
careful consideration, wise
men
judge to
that "a sin
things to judge of which
human
Thou
shalt not
make
name
take the
to thyself a graven thing,
Thou shalt not Lord thy God in vain (Ex-
a7iy thing;
nor the likeness of of the
od. 20. 4, 7).
This
suffices for the Replies to the
Objec-
tions.
Article 2. Whether the Moral Precepts of the Law Are About All the Acts of Virtue?
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not about
Objection
all
i.
Law
of the Old
the acts of virtue.
For observance of the precepts called justification, accord-
is
ing to Ps. 118. 8: / will keep
But
justification
is
Thy
justifications.
the execution of justice.
above
xc,
(q.
must be
a.
is
ruled by a king
the laws of a state which
by
a few powerful is
Obj. 2. Further, that which comes under a precept has the character of a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone and
tual virtues set in
due. Therefore the precepts of the moral law are
not about the acts of the other virtues, but
only about the acts of justice. Obj.
3.
Further, every law
is
made
for the
common
good, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21).^ But of all the virtues justice alone regards the common good, as the Philosopher says.^ Therefore the moral precepts are only about the acts
of justice.
On
the contrary,
1
PL 82.
i
Ethics, w,
203; I
II,
Ambrose says {De Paradiso
10 (PL 82, 131).
(1130*4).
is
in a state
different
from
ruled by the people,
men
in the state.
Now
munity, and the Divine law for another kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil community, implying mutual duties of man and his fellow^s, and men are ordered to one another by outward acts, by which men hve in communion with one another. This life in common of man with man pertains to justice, whose proper function consists in directing the human community. Therefore human law makes precepts only about acts of justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this is only in so far as they assume the nature of justice, as the Philosopher explains.^ But the community for which the Divine law is ordained is that of men in relation to God, either in this life or in the Hfe to come. And therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters by which men are well ordered in their relations to God. Now man is united to God by his reason, or mind, in which is God's image. Therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters by which hu-
by the
of justice consists in rendering to each one his
made
must be
ordained for one kind of com-
man
virtues, for the proper act
Law
hence the Philosopher
teaches^ that the laws which are
which
Law
good, as stated
2), the precepts of the
kinds of community;
acts of justice.
none of the other
common
diversified according to the various
Therefore the moral precepts are only about
to
belongs
/ answer that, Since the precepts of the are ordered to the
or
some
it
to the Divine law to direct all the acts of virtue.
human law
there are
command-
sins contrary
to all the acts of virtue. Therefore
be obligatory. Such belong to the law of nature,
reason needs Divine instruction, by which we are taught about things of God: for example,
a transgression of the Di-
ments of heaven." But there are
yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less wise: for example. Rise up before the hoary head^ and honour the person of the aged man (Lev. 19. 32), and the like. And
is
son
reason
in
is
well ordered. But this
is
effected
acts of all the virtues, since the intellec-
good order the acts of the rea-
themselves, while the moral virtues set in
good order the acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior actions. It is therefore evident that the Divine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the virtues, yet so that certain matters, without which the order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation of precept, while other matters, which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel. Reply Obj. i. The fulfillment of the commandments of the Law, even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the '
PL
*
Ethics, \,
14, 309. I
*
Politics, IV, I (1289"
(ii29*»23).
I).
^
PART man
OF SECOND PART
I
character of justification, since
it
is
just that
should obey God; or again, because it is man should be sub-
just that all that belongs to ject to reason.
Reply Obj.
Justice properly so called re-
2.
man
gards the duty of one
to another; but all
the other virtues regard the duty of the lower
powers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks of a kind of metaphorical justice.^
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about the different kinds of community.
ART.
253
4 once from the
general principles, and those also which
first
become
man immediately
known
to
ciples.
And
through divinely mfused faith. Consequently two kinds of precepts are not reckoned among the precepts of the decalogue. First, general principles, for they need no further promulgation after being once inscribed on the natural reason to which they are self-evident; as, for instance, that one should do evil to no man, and other similar prin-
reason,
which the careful
again, those
flection of wise
since
men shows
re-
to be in accord with
the people receive these prin-
from God through being taught by wise
ciples
Article 3. Whether All the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Are Reducible to the Ten Precepts of the Decalogue?
Q. 100.
reflection can be gathered at
men. Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are
proceed thus to the Third Article: It
contained in the precepts of the decalogue, yet ways. For the first general principles are contained in them as principles in their
would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts
proximate conclusions; but those which are known through wise men are contained, con-
of the decalogue.
versely, as conclusions in their principles.
We
Objection cepts of the
For the
i.
Law
are,
and principal preThou shalt love the Lord first
thy God, and. Thou shalt love thy neighbotir, as stated in Matt.
22. 37, 39.
But these two
are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore not all the
moral precepts are
contained in the precepts of the decalogue. Obj.
Further, the moral precepts are not
2.
reducible to the ceremonial precepts, but rather contrariwise.
But among, the precepts of the
decalogue, one
is
ceremonial, namely,
Remem-
ber that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day (Exod. 20.8). Therefore the
reducible to
Obj.
3.
all
moral precepts are not
the precepts of the decalogue.
Further, the moral precepts are about
among
the acts of virtue. But
all
the precepts
of the decalogue are only such as regard acts of
may be seen by going through them Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts. On the contrary, The gloss on Matt. 5. 11. Blessed are ye when they shall revile you, etc., says that "Moses, after propounding the ten precepts, set them out in detail. "^ Therefore justice, as all.
the precepts of the
all
Law
are so
many
parts
of the precepts of the decalogue.
/ answer that, differ
fact
The precepts
of the decalogue
from the other precepts of the Law in the that God Himself is said to have given
the precepts of the decalogue, while
He
gave
the other precepts to the people through Moses.
Therefore the decalogue includes those precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately from God. Such are those which with but sHght »
Ethics, V,
1 1 (i
138^5).
2
Glossa ordin. (v, 19B).
in different
Reply Obj. first
i.
Those two principles are the
general principles of the natural law, and
are self-evident to
human
reason, either through
nature or through faith. Therefore
the pre-
all
cepts of the decalogue are referred to these, as
conclusions to general principles.
Reply Obj. 2. The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things of God, according to Ps. 45. 11 Be still and see that I am God. In this respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue, but not as to the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial precept. Reply Obj. 3. The notion of duty is not so patent in the other virtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the other virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts about acts of justice. Therefore the acts of justice especially come under the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of the Law. :
Article 4. Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Distinguished From One Another?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue (Exod. 20) are unsuitably distinguished from one another. Objection
from
faith.
virtue.
i.
For worship
Now
But that which
of the decalogue.
is
a virtue distinct
the precepts are about acts of
Thou
is
said at the beginning
shalt not have strange
gods before Me, belongs to
faith,
and that which
;
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
454
Thou
added,
is
thmg,
make
shalt not
.
any graven
belongs to worship. Therefore these
etc.,
are not one precept, as Augustine asserts (qq. Exod,, qit. Ixxi),^ but two.
m
Obj. the
Further, the affirmative precepts in
2.
Law
are distinct
from the negative precepts
Honour thy father and thy mother,
for example,
But this, / am the Lord thy God, is affirmative and that which follows, Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me, is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not, as Augustine says (loc. cit.) make
Thou
and,
shalt 7tot
kill. ;
one.
Obj.
3.
(Rom.
Further, the Apostle says
7.
had not knoum concupiscence, if the Law did not say: "Thou shalt not covet" Hence it seems that this precept, Thou shalt not covet, is one precept, and, therefore should not be di7)
:
/
vided into two. On the contrary stands the authority of Augustine, who in commenting on Exodus {loc. cit.y distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbour.
The
6.
No man can serve two masters, the two am the Lord thy God, and. Thou not have strange gods before Me seem to
24),
statements, / shalt
be of the same nature and to form one precept. Hence Origen (Hom. vii iji Exod.),^ who also distinguishes four precepts as referring to God, unites these
two under one precept; and puts in Thou shalt not make any
the second place.
.
.
.
graven thing; as third, Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain; and as fourth, Refnember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day. The other six he puts in the same way as Hesychius. Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything is not forbidden except as to the point of their being worshipped as gods for God commanded an image of the Seraphim (Vulg., Cherubim) to be made and placed in the tabernacle, as related in Exod. 25. 18 Augustine more fittingly unites these two, Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me, a7ty graven thing, and. Thou shalt not make
—
—
—
.
.
.
into one precept. Likewise to covet another's
precepts of the decalogue
wife, for the purpose of carnal knowledge, be-
are differently divided
by different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on Levit. 26. 26, Ten women shall bake your bread in one oven,
longs to the concupiscence of the flesh; but to
says that the precept of the Sabbath-day observ-
covet other things, which are desired for the purpose of possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes. Therefore Augustine puts (ibid.) as distinct precepts, that which forbids the coveting of another's goods and that which
/ answer that,
ance is not one of the ten precepts, because its observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time.^ But he distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the
Thou
thy God; the second, strange gods before
Me,
am
the
Lord
shalt not
have
being, /
first
(thus also Jerome dis-
tinguishes these two precepts, in his
ary on Osee 10. 10,* Ori thy iniquities)
;
—Vulg.,
comment-
— two
their
the third precept according to
him
make to thyself any graven thing; and the fourth. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. He states Thou
is,
shalt not
that there are six precepts pertaining to our
neighbour
;
the
first.
Honour thy
father and thy
mother; the second. Thou shalt not third.
And
this is better.
i. Worship is merely a declaraand therefore the precepts about worship should not be given as distinct from
Reply Obj.
tion of faith,
those about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about worship rather than about faith, because the precept about faith is presupposed to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the
precept of love. For just as the
general
Thou shalt not commit adidtery; the Thou shalt not steal; the fifth, Thou not bear false witness; the sixth, Thou
a subject having natural reason, and need no
promulgation, so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident principle to a subject possessed
cometh to God, must be(Heb. 11. 6). Hence it needs no other promulgation than the infusion of of faith: for he that
seems unfitting for the precept of the Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue, if it did not in any way belong to the decalogue.
lieve that
But, in the
first place, it
Secondly, because, since
it
is
written (Matt.
He
is
faith.
Reply Obj. 2. The affirmative precepts are from the negative when one is not com-
distinct
man should honour his parents does not include that he should not kill another man, nor does the latter in-
prised in the other; thus that 2
first
precepts of the natural law are self-evident to
shalt not covet.
1
Thus
he distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbour.
kill; the
fourth. shalt
prohibits the coveting of another's wife.
PL 34, 621. PL 34, 620;
Cf. Glossa ordin., super
Exod. 20.1
B).
»PG93,
iiso.
'•Bk.
Ill
(PL
25, 952).
(i,
163
6
PG 12, 351.
PART elude the former. But
when
OF SECOND PART
I
an affirmative pre-
we
cording to
I
mandment
is
is
included in a negative, or vice versa,
owner. In the same
its
way
there are not differ-
255
5
of the decalogue are ordered to charity, ac-
do not find that two distinct precepts are given thus there is not one precept saying that Thou shalt not steal, and another binding one to keep another's property intact, or to give it back to
cept
ART.
Q. 100.
Tim.
I.
The end of the com-
5:
charity. Therefore as there
is
a
precept referring to parents, so should there
have been some precepts referring to children and other neighbours. Obj.
Further, in every kind of
5.
sin, it
is
ent precepts about believing in God, and about
possible to sin in thought or in deed. But in
not beheving in strange gods.
some kinds
Reply Obj.
mon
notion,
of the
All covetousness has one
3.
com-
and therefore the Apostle speaks
commandment about covetousness
as
were one. But because there are vari^ ous special kinds of covetousness, therefore Authough
it
distinguishes
gustine
against coveting
;
prohibitions
different
for covetousness differs speci-
fically in respect of
the diversity of actions or
things coveted, as the Philosopher says.^
of sin,
namely
in theft
and adultery,
when it is said, not commit adultery, Thou shalt not
the prohibition of sins of deed,
Thou
shalt
steal, is distinct
from the
when
prohiibition of the sin
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's goods, and. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife. Therefore the same
of thought,
it is
said.
should have been done in regard to the sins of homicide and false Vv^itness. Obj.
6.
Further, just as sin happens through
disorder of the concupiscible part, so does
Article 5. Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Set Forth?
arise through disorder of the irascible part.
We
proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue (Exod. 20) are unsuitably set forth. Objection 1. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose {De Paradiso viii),^ is "a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the commandments of heaven." But sins are distinguished according as man sins against God, or his neighbour, or himself. Since, then, the deca-
logue does not include any precepts directing
man
in his relations to himself,
but only such
God and his seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently enumerated, Obj. 2. Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to the worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities, and the offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept about the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain others also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to as direct
him
neighbour,
it
the sacrificial
Obj.
3.
in his relations to
rite.
some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when it is said, Thou shalt not covet. Therefore the decalogue should have included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible, part. Therefore
it seems that the ten precepts of the decalogue are unfittingly enumerated.
On the contrary. It is written (Deut. 4. 13) He shewed you His covenant, which He comTnanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two tables of stone. I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), just as the precepts of human law direct man in his relations to the
God
include
tions
to
a
community or commonwealth of
are required
the
:
the head of the
^
all
our neighbours.
Ethics,^, SiiiT $^22,).
Now
the precepts
2pLi4^3og,
who
is
that
are his fellows and it
therefore neces-
sary that the Divine law should contain in the
place precepts ordering
tions to God,
and
cepts ordering
in the
man
the community:
Moreover the commandment of charity
that he behave well to
partners in the community. It
ding perjury. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. Therefore there should be also a precept of the decalogue, for-
extends to
first is
community; the other
he behave well to those
who
dren.
so the prein his rela-
men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell rightly in a community, two things
the sin of perjury, so also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against the teaching of God. But there is a precept forbid-
bidding blasphemy and false doctrine. Obj. 4. Further, just as man has a natural love for his parents, so has he also for his chil-
human community, man
cepts of the Divine law direct
first
Further, as sins against
it
But
man
in his rela-
second place other pre-
in his relations to other
are his neighbours
and
five
men
with him under
God.
Now man
owes three things to the head of first, fidelity;
secondly, rever-
ence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his master
honour to first commandment, in the words. Thou shalt not have strange gods. Reverence to his master requires that he should do nothing injurious to him, and this is conveyed by the second commandment, consists in his not giving sovereign
another, and this
is
the sense of the
SCMMA THEOLOGICA
2S6
name
Lord thy due to the master in return for the benelits which his subjects receive from him and to this belongs the third commandment of the sanctihcation of the Sabbath in memor>- of the creation of all things. To his neighbours a man behaves himself well both in particular and in general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted by paying his debts, and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about honouring one's parents. In general, as to all men by doing harm to none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed harm is done to one's neighbour sometimes
Thou
God
shaJt not take the
of the
in vain. Service is
in his person, that
and
this
not
kill;
is
is,
to his personal existence,
forbidden by the words. Thou shalt in a person united to liim
sometimes
as to the propagation of offspring, and this
prohibited by the words.
Thou
shalt net
is
commit
adultery: sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to both of these, and with regard to this
is
it
said.
done by word
is
Thou
shalt not steal.
forbidden
when
it is
said.
Harm Thou
those precepts only which refer to our neigh-
bour and
The
is
forbidden in the
God may
man
also
be
in
his
differ-
same way. For the first refers and therefore it is said. Thou shalt not make ... a graven thing; the second, to words, and therefore it is said. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain; entiated in this to deeds,
the third, to thoughts, because the sanctitication of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral precept, requires repose of the heart in
God. Or,
according to Augustine (/« Ps. 3:. : K^ by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the third. His goodness by which
are sanciitied, and in which
we
rest as in
we our
Reply Obj. i. This objection may be answered in two ways. First, because the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the precepts of charity.
Now
man to reGod and his neigh-
there was need for
ceive a precept about loving
bour, because in this respect the natural law had
become obscured on account
of sin. but not about the duty of loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law retained its vigour. Or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love of God and of one's neighbour, since
true self-love consists in directing oneself to
God. And for
PL JO.
be answered that the pre-
ple received
from God immediately; hence
written (^Deut. 10. 4):
He
it is
iirote in the tables,
according as He had written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you. And so the precepts of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand at once.
Now
cept implies the notion of duty. But
man. especially for
for a
it
a preis
easy
a believer, to under-
stand that, of necessity, he owes certain duties
God and
to
ters
to his neighbour. But that in matwhich regard himself and not another, m.an
has of necessity certain duties to himself,
is
not
seems that everyone is free in matters that concern himself. And therefore the precepts which prohibit so evident;
for.
disorders of a
at first glance,
man
it
with regard to himself reach
the people through the instruction of
men who
are versed in such matters. Consequently, they are not contained in the decalogue.
Reply Obj.
Law were
2.
All the solemnities of the Old
instituted in celebration of
some Di-
memor>' of past favours, or in sign of some favour to come, and in like manner all the sacrifices were oft'ered up with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine favours to be commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was called to mind by the sanctification of the Sabbath; therefore the reason for this precept
is
given in E.xod. 20. 11:
days the Lord made heaven and earth, etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and final was the repose of the mind in God. either, in In
six
life, by grace, or in the future life, and this repose was also foreshadowed the Sabbath-day observance; hence it is
the present
by in
glor>';
written (Isa. 5S. 13); // thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath from doing thy own will holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, in
My
last end.
»
mny
it
\*ine favour, either in
three precepts that direct
behaviour towards
God.
cepts of the decalogue are those which the peo-
shalt not bear false witness against thy neigh-
bour; harm done by thought words. Thou shalt not covet.
to
Secondly,
iSi.
this reason the
decalogue includes
and the holy of the Lord glorious. For these favours first and chiefly are borne in mind by men. especially by the faithful. But other solemnities were celebrated on account of cer-
favours which were temporal such as the celebration of the Passover in memor>- of the past favour of the
tain
particular
and
transitor\-.
delivery-
from
Eg>'pt.
and as
a sign of the future
Passion of Christ, which though temporal and transitor>', brought us to the repose of the
Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the precepts of the spiritual
alone,
decalogue.
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
3. As the Apostle says (Yith. 6. 16), men swear by one greater than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy. Hence, since oaths are com-
Reply Obj.
mon
to
all,
inordinate swearing
is
of the deca-
According to one interpretation, how-
logue.
ever, the words,
Thou
"Thou
shalt not
say that Christ
is
a
creature."^
Reply Obj. 4. That a m.an should not do harm anyone is an immediate dictate of his natural reason, and therefore the precepts that to
harm
forbid the doing of
men. But
are binding on
all
not an immediate dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in it is
return for another, unless he hap^pen to be in-
Now
debted to someone. father
from
is it
a son's debt to his
so evident that one cannot get
by denying
it,
were, the
first
6
the
of
237 decalogue are,
as
it
elements of the Law, there was
no need for mention of the
irascible passions,
but only of the concupiscible passions.
since the father
Article 6. Whether the Ten Precepts of the Decalogue Are Set in Proper Order?
We
name
shalt not take the
of the Lord thy God in vain are a prohibition of false doctrine, for one gloss expounds them thus:
ART.
precepts
the matter of
by a precept
a special prohibition
Q. TOO.
the
as
proceed thus to the Sixth Article:
logue are not set in proper order.
Objection i. Because love of one's neighbour seems to be prior to love of God, since our neighbour is better knov/n to us than God is, according to I John 4. 20: He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth^ how can he love God, Whom he seeth not? But the first three precepts belong to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbour. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order.
away
Obj.
the
by the
is
principle of generation and being, and also of
upbringing and teaching. Therefore the deca-
It
would seem that the ten precepts of the deca-
2.
Further, acts of virtue are prescribed
affirmative precepts,
and acts of vice are
forbidden by the negative precepts. But according to Boethius in his commentary on the
logue does not prescribe deeds of kindness or
Categories;' vices should be uprooted before
done to anyone except to one's parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to be indebted to their children for any favours
virtues
service to be
received, but rather the reverse
Again, a child
is
is
ents love their children as being a part of themselves," as the Philosopher states.^ Hence, just
no ordinance as to man's behaviour towards himself, so, for the same reason, it includes no precept about lov-
as the decalogue contains
5.
The
pleasure of adultery and
the usefulness of wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good,
and needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But murder and falsehood are, of themselves, obare,
of
Obj.
themselves, objects of appetite;
for this reason they
among
the pre-
3.
have preceded the affirmative.
Further, the precepts of the
Law
are
about men's actions. But actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. Therefore the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuitably placed last in order.
On
the contrary,
The things
i;:
ing one's children.
Reply Ob].
precepjts should
the case.
a part of his father, and "par-
are so^n. Therefore
cepts concerning our neighbour, the negative
The Apostle
that are of
(Rom.
13.
God, are well
or-
says
(V'ulg., Those that are, are ordained of God). But the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by God, as stated above ( k. 3;. Therefore they are arranged in fitting order. / answer that. As stated above Taa. 3,5, Reply
dered
i;, the precepts of the
the
mind
of
man
is
decalogue are such as ready to grasp at once.
man
Now
to love his neighbour
and the truth;, and are desired only for the sake of something else. Consequently with regard to sins of murder and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe,
more
by the reason as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. Moreover it is clear that since the order of rea-
not sins of thought, but only sins of deed. Reply Obj. 6. As stated above (q. xxv, a. i), ail the passions of the irascible part arise from
inordinately disposed towards his end,
jects of repulsion (since
it is
natural for
the pas.sions of the concupiscible part. Hence, ^
Glossa ordin., on Deut.
on Exod. 20.7
(i,
5.
11 d,
337A); Glossa
interl.,
i64rj; Isidore, Quaesi.in Vet. Test., In.
Exod., chap. 29, on 20.7 ''PL 83, ^Ethics, vm, 12 (1161^19),
.301).
it is
evident that a thing
is
so
much
the
easily grasped
son begins with the end, that, for a
man
to be is
su-
premely contrary to reason. Now the end of human life and society is God. Consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the decalogue first of all, to direct man to God, since the contrary to this is most grievous. Thus also, in an army, which is ordered to the com»
In Cat.
Ari:t., iv
rpL
64, 277}.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
258
mander
as to
end,
its
requisite first that the
it is
commander, most grievous; and
soldier should be subject to the
and the opposite of secondly
it is
this is
requisite that he should be in co-
ordination with the other soldiers.
Now among
those things by which
ordered to God, the subjected to
common
in
first is
that
man
we
are
should be
Him faithfully, by having nothing with His enemies. The second is show Him reverence. The
that he should
that he should offer
Him
third
Thus,
his service.
in
an army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a compact with the foe than to be insolent to his commander; and this last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point of service to him.
As
to the precepts that direct
man
in his be-
haviour towards his neighbor, it is evident that it is more contrary to reason, and a more grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons to whom he is most indebted. Consequently, among those precepts that direct man in his relations to his neighbour the first place
is
parents.
given to that one which regards his Among the other precepts we again
find the order to be according to the gravity
of sin. For
it is
to reason to sin
more grave and more contrary by deed than by word and by
word than by thought. And among sins of deed, murder which destroys life in one already living is more grievous than adultery, which imperils the life of the unborn child; and adultery is more grave than theft, which regards external goods.
Reply Ohj. ter
i.
Although our neighbour
known than God by
is
bet-
way of the senses, God is the reason for
the love of our neighbour, as shall be declared
on (Part H-H,
xxv,
q.
a.
i
;
2). Hence the precepts ordering man manded precedence of the others.
Reply Obj.
2.
Just as
God
is
q.
to
xxvi,
God
a.
de-
the universal
principle of being in respect of all things, so is
a father a principle of being in respect of
Therefore the precept regarding parents was fittingly placed after the precepts regarding God. This argument holds in respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of deed, although even then it is not altogether cogent. For although in the order of execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown, according to Ps. t,2>- i5 Turn away from evil, and do good, and Isa. i. 16, 17: Cease to do perversely; learn to do well, yet in the order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice,
his son.
•
because "the crooked
line
is
known by
the
and by the law
is
the knowledge of
(Rom. 3. 20). Hence the affirmative precept demanded the first place. However, this is not
sin
the reason for the order, but that which is given above. Because in the precepts regarding God,
which belong precept
is
to the first table,
placed
last,
implies a less grievous
Reply Obj. first
the order of
in
sin.
Although
3.
an affirmative
since its transgression
sin of
thought stands
execution, yet
its
pro-
hibition holds a later position in the order of
reason.
Article 7. Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Formulated?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated.
Objection rect
man
i.
For the affirmative precepts
di-
to acts of virtue, while the negative
precepts withdraw
him from
acts of vice.
But
every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one another. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a negative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative precepts should be in
framed
in
some matters, and negative precepts
in others.
Obj.
Further, Isidore says (Etym.
2.
ii,
lo)^
based on reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Divine law. Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each precept, and not only in the that every law
first
and
man
is
third.
Further, by observing the precepts deserves to be rewarded by God. But the
Obj.
the
nevertheless the love of
later
straight";^
3.
Divine promises concern the rewards of the precepts. Therefore the promise should have been included in each precept, and not only in the second and fourth. Obj. 4. Further, the Old Law is called "the law of fear,"^ in so far as it induced men to observe the precepts by means of the threat of punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old Law. Therefore a threat of punishment should have been included in each, and not only in the first and second. 5. Further, all the commandments of should be retained in the memory, for it
Obj.
God
written (Prov.
is
3.
3): Write
bles of thy heart. Therefore 1
Aristotle, Soul,
i,
5
them in the tawas not fitting
(411*5).
(PL 82, 199). 3 Cf. Augustine, De Mor. Eccl, fraAdimant., vii (PL 42, 159).
«PL82,
it
130; V, 3
i,
28 (PL 32, 1334); Con-
PART
OP SECOND PART
I
memory should be made commandment only. Consequently
Q. 100.
ART.
that mention of the
are already on the
in the third
benefit
seems that the precepts of the decalogue
it
are unsuitably formulated.
On the contrary, It is written (Wisd. ii. 21) God made all things, in measure, number and weight. Much more therefore did He obthat
serve a suitable
manner in formulating His Law. The highest wisdom is con-
/ answer that,
tained in the precepts of the Divine law; hence
written (Deut.
it is
4.
6)
:
This
is
your wisdom
and understanding in the sight of nations. Now it belongs to wisdom to arrange all things in due manner and order. Therefore it must be evident that the precepts of the
Law
are suitably
iig to depart
from
us,
Affirmation of one thing always
i.
leads to the denial of
its
opposite, but the
denial of one opposite does not always lead
no
expected from them; therefore a promise of reward is added to the precept about honouring one's parents. The same apphes to the precept forbidding idolatry, since thereby is
seemed that men were hindered from
it
re-
ceiving the apparent benefit which they think
they can get by entering into a compact with the demons.
Reply Obj. against those
4.
Punishments are necessary
who
are prone to evil, as stated in
the Ethics."^ Therefore a threat of punishment
is
only affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade evils to which men were prone. Now
men were prone
to idolatry
by reason
of the
general custom of the nations. Likewise
set forth.
Reply Obj.
g
way
men
are prone to perjury on account of the frequent
use of oaths. Hence to the first
it is
that a threat
is
affixed
two precepts.
negative precepts, extends to more persons, as
Reply Obj. 5. The commandment about the Sabbath was made in memory of a past blessing. Therefore special mention of the memory is made in it. Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a determination joined to it that does not belong to the natural law, and therefore this precept needed a special admon-
a primary dictate of reason, than that one ought
ition.
to the affirmation of the other.
For
it
follows
not black, but it does not follow that if it is not black, it is white, because negation extends further than that
if
a thing
is
white,
it is
And hence too, that one ought not do harm to another, which pertains to the
affirmation. to
someone a service or kindness. Nevertheit is a primary dictate of reason that man
to do less
a debtor in the point of rendering a service
is
from whom he has rehe has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two whose favours no man can sufficiently repay, namely, God and man's father, as stated in the Ethics.^ Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts, one about the honour due to parents, the other about the celebration of the Sabbath in memory of the Divine favour. Reply Obj. 2. The reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest; hence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the
Article 8. Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Dispensable?
We
or kindness to those
ceived kindness,
if
precepts include ceremonial matter, or a deter-
mination of a general moral precept; thus the first precept includes the determination, Thou shalt not make a graven thing; and in the third precept the Sabbath-day is fixed. Consequently there was need to state the reason in each case.
Reply Obj.
3.
their actions to
Generally speaking
some point of
men
direct
utihty. Conse-
quently in those precepts in which it seemed that there would be no useful result, or that some utility might be hindered, it was necessary to add a promise of reward. And since parents »
Aristotle, viii, 14 (1163^15).
proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It
would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.
Objection
i.
For the precepts of the deca-
logue belong to the natural law. But the natural
law
fails in
human
some
cases and
is
changeable, Uke
nature, as the Philosopher says.^
Now
the failure of law to apply in certain particular cases
is
above
a reason for dispensation, as stated xcvi, a. 6; q. xcvii, a. 4). There-
(q.
fore a dispensation can be granted in the pre-
cepts of the decalogue.
Further, man stands in the same relahuman law as God does to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of a law made by man. Therefore, since the pre-
Obj.
2.
tion to
cepts of the decalogue are ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our superiors are God's vicegerents on earth; for the Apostle says (II Cor. 2. 10) For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the perso?i of Christ. Therefore superiors can dispense with :
the precepts of the decalogue. ^Ibid.,x,9iiiSoU)^
Ethics, Y, 7 (ii34''29).
— SUMMA THEOLOGICA
26o Obj.
3.
among
Further,
decalogue
is
men
in
when according
to
men
as
precepts of the second table contain the order
one forbidding murder.
But
given by
seems that a dispensation this precept,
who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is God; while the
the precepts of the
for instance,
is
human
the prescription of
law, such
it
evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. There-
fore
ing
Further, the observance of the Sab-
we
the
of
is ordained by a precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this precept, for it is written (I Machab. 2. 4): And they determined in that day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the Sab-
bath
bath-day,
we
will fight against him.
Therefore
the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.
On
undue be done
5,
ing of the natural law which contains the very
order of justice, for
Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by dispensation. / answer that, As stated above {loc. cit. cf. i), precepts
admit of dispensation when
there occurs a particular case in which, letter of the
the lawgiver
is
frustrated.
of every lawgiver to the
common and
of justice
if
the
law be observed, the intention of is
Now
directed
the intention
first
and
chiefly
good; secondly, to the order virtue,
whereby the common
preserved and attained. If therefore there be any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or the very
good
is
order of justice and virtue, such precepts contain the intention of the lawgiver,
fore are indispensable. For instance,
community
a law
and thereif
in
were enacted, such as
some
this,
man
should work for the destruction of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that no man should do anything that no
such precepts would not admit But if other precepts were enacted, subordinate to the above, and determining certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far as the omission of these pre-
unjust or of
evil,
dispensation.
cepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts
which contain the
tention of the lawgiver. For instance
the safeguarding of the commonwealth,
if,
it
in-
for
were
enacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on
account of some greater
Now
utility.
the precepts of the decalogue contain
a never-failing prin-
be preserved. But he
speaking in reference to certain fixed modes
13),
principally to the precepts of the decalogue.
is
of observing justice, which fail to apply in cer-
everlasting covenant, which,
seems, applies
it
ciple that justice should
tain cases.
it
in this sense that
Consequently the precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever. Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher is not speak-
is
the contrary are the words of Isa. 24.
it is
that noth-
and that each
are to take the precepts of the decalogue.
where some are reproved for that they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the
obj.
to anyone,
one be given his due; for
pensable. 4.
among men,
of justice to be observed
decalogue are dis-
the precepts
Obj.
the very intention of the lawgiver,
As the Apostle says
(II Tim. 2. cannot deny Himself. But He would deny Himself if He were to do away with the very order of His own justice, since He is justice itself. Therefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one
Reply Obj.
God
2.
continueth faithful,
He
another.
Reply Obj.
3.
The
slaying of a
man
is
for-
bidden in the decalogue in so far as it bears the character of something undue, for in this sense the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not undue for evil-doers or foes of the commonwealth to be slain hence this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue, and such a kiUing is no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine observes {De Lib. Arb. i, 4).^ In like manner when a man's property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose it this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue. ;
Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away the spoils of the Egyptians (Exod. 12. 35), this was not theft, since it was due to them by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son (Gen. 22), he did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death. For He it is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first par-
—
and if a man be the executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murent,
1PL32,
1226.
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
ART.
Q. 100.
261
9
Again Osee,
derer any more than God would be. by taking unto himself a wife of fornications, or an adulterous woman (Osee i, 2), was not
do it well; but if you do it sorrowfully, it is done in thee, not by thee." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law.
guilty either of adultery or of fornication, be-
On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has the habit of virtue, as
cause he took unto himself one who was his by command of God, Who is the Author of the Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the notion of justice which they contain, are unchangeable but as to any determination by apphcation to individual actions for instance that this or that be murder, theft, in this point they admit of or adultery, or not change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in such matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as marriage and the like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such matters as are subject to human jurisdiction; for in this respect men stand in the place of God, but not in all respects. Reply Obj. 4. This determination was an interpretation rather than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath if he does something necessary for human welfare, as Our Lord proves (Matt. 12. 3 seq.). ;
—
Article 9. Whether the Mode of Virtue Falls Under the Precept of the Law?
We
proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law. Objection i. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice should be done justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely, and in like
manner
But
as to the other virtues.
it is
commanded (Deut. 16. 20) that thou shalt follow justly after that which is just. Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept. Obj.
Further, that which belongs to the
2.
intention of the lawgiver comes chiefly under
But the intention of the lawgiver
the precept.
directed chiefly to
is
make men
stated in the Ethics,^ and
man
tuous
mode
to
act
the Philosopher explains.^
Now
whoever
trans-
gresses a precept of the law deserves to be
institution of marriage.
it
virtuous, as
belongs to a vir-
virtuously.
Therefore the
of virtue falls under the precept.
punished.
Hence
would follow that a man who
it
has not the habit of virtue would deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the intention of the law, which aims at leading
man
by habituating him
to virtue,
good works. Therefore the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept. / answer that, As stated above (q. xc, a. 3, Reply 2), a precept of law has constraining power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law is brought to bear falls directly under the precept of the law. Now the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in the Ethics,"^ because that properly falls under the precept of the law for which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are differently situated as to the appointment of penalties, since the penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which come under the judgment of the lawgiver; for the law punto
ishes in accordance with the verdict given.
Now
man, the framer of human law is able to judge only of outward acts, because man seeth those things that appear, according to I Kings 16. 7; but
God
alone, the framer of the Divine law,
is
movements of wills, The searcher of hearts
able to judge of the inward
according to Ps.
and
reins
is
7.
10:
God.
Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect it
regarded by the Divine, but not by the hulaw and in another way, it is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine law. Now the mode of virtue consists in three things, as is
man
;
the Philosopher states in the Ethics.^
The
first
man
should act "knowingly", and this subject to the judgment of both Divine and that
is is
or necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver; on which the gloss says:^
law, because what a man does in ignorance he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and Divine law, certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be punishable or pardonable. The second point is that a man should act "deliberately, that is, from choice, choosing that
"Whatever ye
particular action for
Obj.
3.
Further, the
mode
of virtue seems to
consist properly in working willingly
and with
But this falls under a precept of the Divine law, for it is written (Ps. 99. 2) Serve ye the Lord with gladness; and (II Cor. 9. 7): pleasure.
:
Not with sadness
1
Aristotle,
do, do gladly,
11, i
and then you
(1103^3).
226A); on II Cor. 9.7 ustine, Ennar. in Psalm. (PL 37, 11 74). 2
Glossa ordin.
will
(iii
(vi,
72A); Aug-
human
its
los^i 7) V, 8
3
Ethics,
*
Aristotle, x, 9 (ii79*'ii)Aristotle, 11, 4 (1105*31),
6
II,
4
(i
;
(i
own
sake," where a
135^24).
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
2&a[
twofold internal
movement
is
implied, of voli-
and of intention, about which we have spoken above (qq. viii, xii); and concerning these two. Divine law alone, and not human law, is able to judge. For human law does not tion
punish the man who wishes to slay but slays not, whereas the Divine law does, according to Matt. 5. 22: Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment.
The a firm
third point
is
that he should "act from
and immovable principle," which firm-
ness belongs properly to a habit, and implies that the action proceeds this respect, the
mode
from a rooted
habit. In
of virtue does not fall
under the precept either of Divine or of human by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the law who gives due honour to his parents and yet has not the habit of law, since neither
piety.
filial
Reply Obj. i. The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls under the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right, but not that they be done from the habit of justice. Reply Obj. 2. The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the law, and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter itself of the precept, and this is something leading or disposing to virtue, namely, an act of virtue. For the end of the precept and the matter of the precept are not the same, just as neither in other things
is
same as the means to the end. Reply Obj. 3. That works of virtue should be done without sadness falls under the precept of the Divine law, for whoever works with sadness works unwiUingly. But to work with the end the
pleasure, that
is,
joyfully or cheerfully, in one
respect falls under the precept, namely, in so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one's neighbour (which love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure; and in another respect it does not fall under the precept, in so far as pleasure ensues from a habit; for
"pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a habit," as stated in the Ethics} For an act
may
give pleasure either on account of
or through
its
its
end,
proceeding from an appropriate
habit.
Article 10. Whether the Mode of Charity Falls Under the Precept of the Diviiie Law?
We proceed thus to the Tenth Article: It would seem that the mode of charity falls under
Objection
1
Aristotle.
11,
3 (1104^3).
For
it is
written (Matt. 19. 17) keep the command-
life,
From this it seems to follow that the observance of the commiandments suffices for entrance into life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into hfe unless they are done ments.
from
charity, for
is
it
written (I Cor. 13. 3): my goods to feed the
// / should distribute all
if I should deliver my body to be burned^ and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment.
poor, and
Obj. 2. Further, the mode of charity consists, properly speaking, in doing all things for God.
But
this falls
under the precept, for the Apostle
says (I Cor. 10. 31) Do all to the glory of God. Therefore the mode of charity falls under the :
precept.
Obj. 3. Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, it follows that one
can
fulfil
the precepts of the law without hav-
Now what can be done without charbe done without grace, which is always united with charity. Therefore one can fulfil the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error of Pelagius, as Augustine declares ceres. Ixxxviii).^ Therefore the mode of (De
ing charity. ity can
H
charity
On ment
is
commandment. Whoever breaks a commandmortally. If therefore the mode of
included in the
the contrary, sins
charity falls under the precept,
it
follows that
whoever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has not charity acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows that whoever has not charity sins mortally in whatever he does, however good this may be in itself, which is absurd. / answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this question.^ For some have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept, and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this precept, because he can dispose himself to receive charity from God. Nor (they say) does it follow that a man not having charity sins mortally whenever he does something good of its kind, because it is an affirmative precept that binds one to act from charity, and is binding not for all time, but only for such time as one is in a state of charity. On the other hand, some have said that the mode of charity
is
altogether outside the precept.
Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of charity can be consid»
the precept of the Divine law.
i.
// thou wilt enter into
PL 42. 47.
«Cf. Albert the Great, In Sent.,
xxvm, 677).
m,
d. 36, a.
6
(BO
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
and ered in two ways. First, as an act by thus it falls under the precept of the law which
Q. loo.
ART.
ii
263
itself,
specially prescribes
the
it,
namely, Thoii shall love shall love thy
Lord thy God, and Thou
neighbour. In this sense, the
first
opinion
is,
accord-
ing as the acts of the other virtues are ordered to
which is the end of the commandment, Tim. i 5 f or it has been said above
charity,
as stated in I
;
.
Reply 3
Reply 3) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of the act ordered to that end. In this sense the second opin(q. XXI, A. I,
ion
is
;
A. 4,
mode
true in saying that the
of charity
under the precept, that is to say that this commandment, Honour thy father, does not mean that a man must honour his father from charity, but merely that he must honour him. Therefore he that honours his father, yet has not charity, does not break this precept, although he does break the precept concerning the act of charity, for which reason he deserves to be punished. Reply Obj. i. Our Lord did not say, // thou wilt enter into life, keep one commandment, but keep all the commandme?its, among which does not
fall
commandment concerning the God and our neighbour. Reply Obj. 2. The precept of charity contains the injunction that God should be loved from included the
is
love of
our vdiole heart, which means that all things would be referred to God. Consequently man
cannot
fulfil
the precept of charity unless he
also refer all things to God. Therefore he that honours his father and mother is bound to honour them from charity, not in virtue of the precept. Honour thy father and mother, but in
virtue of the precept.
thy
God
Thou
shall love the
with thy whole heart.
And
Lord
since these
are two affirmative precepts not binding for
all
times, they can be binding each one at a differ-
ent time, so that fils
it
may happen
that a
man
ful-
the precept of honouring his father and
mother without
at the same time breaking the precept concerning the omission of the mode of
charity.
Reply Obj.
Man
3.
cannot
cepts of the law unless he
which Consequently it of charity,
maintained, for grace.
fulfil all
fulfil
the pre-
the precept
is
impossible without charity.
is
not possible, as Pelagius to fulfil the law without
man
We
true.
is
Because it is not impossible to observe this precept which regards the act of charity, since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he possesses it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, that
Article ii. Whether It Is Right to Distinguish Other Moral Precepts of the Law Besides the Decalogue? proceed thus to the Eleventh Article: It
would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Objection 1. Because, as Our Lord declared (Matt. 21. 40), on these two commandments of charity dependeth the whole law and the prophets. But these two commandments are explained by the ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there is no need for other precepts. 2. Further, the moral precepts are disfrom the judicial and ceremonial precepts, as stated above (q. xcix, aa. 3, 4). But the determinations of the general moral precepts pertain to the judicial and ceremonial precepts, and the general moral precepts are contained in
Obj.
tinct
the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the
decalogue, as stated above (a. 3). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral precepts besides the decalogue.
Obj.
3.
Further, the moral precepts are about
the acts of
all
the virtues, as stated above (a.
2). Therefore, as the
Law
contains, besides the
decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to reh-
and
gion, liberality, mercy,
chastity, so there
should have been added some precepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude, sobriety, and so forth. And yet such is not the case. It is therefore not right to distinguish other moral precepts in the Law besides those of the decalogue.
On
the contrary, It
law of the Lord
But man
is
is
is
written (Ps. 18. 8)
:
The
unspotted, converting souls.
preserved from the stain of sin and
converted to God by other moral precepts besides those of the decalogue. Therefore
his soul
it
was
is
right for the
Law
to include other
moral
precepts.
/ answer that. As is evident from what has been stated (q. xcix, a. 3), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from their institution alone, since before they were instituted it seemed of no consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But the moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural reason, even if they were never included in the Law. Now of these
some are most cerand so evident as to need no promulgation. Such as the commandments of the love of God and our neighbour, and others like these, as stated above (a. 3, a. 4, Reply i), which are, there are three grades: for tain,
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
264
were, the ends of the commandments. Hence no man can have an erroneous judgment
To
about them. Some precepts are more detailed, the reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp. And yet they need to be promulgated, because human judgment, in a few instances, happens to be led astray concerning
according to Deut. 23. ig: Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury ; and the prohibi-
as
it
them. These are the precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of which is not so evident to everyone, but only
These are moral precepts added to by God through Moses and Aaron. But since the things that are evident are the principles by which we know those that are not evident, these other moral precepts added to to the wise.
the decalogue, and given to the people
the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so many corollaries. Thus the first
commandment
of the decalogue forbids the
worship of strange gods, and to
other precepts forbidding things relating to the worship of idols; thus it is written (Deut. 18.
Neither let there be joimd among you 10, 11) anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, neimaking them to pass through the fire: ther let there be any wizard nor charmer, nor :
.
.
The second commandment
dead.
Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag; and universally all prohibitions relating to peculations and larceny. To the eighth commandment, forbidding false testimony, is added the prohibition against false judgment, according to Exod. 23. 2 Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of the most part, to stray from the truth; and the prohibition against lying {ibid. 7) Thou shalt fly lying; and the pro:
:
hibition against detraction, according to Levit.
Thou shalt not be a detractor, nor among the people. To the other two commandments no further precepts are added, 19.
forbids per-
16:
a whisperer
because they forbid
Reply Obj.
i.
all
kinds of evil desires.
The precepts
are ordered to the love of
of the decalogue
God and
our neigh-
bour as pertaining evidently to our duty towards them; but the other precepts are so ordered as pertaining to
Reply Obj.
.
anyofie that consulteth pythofiic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the
is
tion against fraud, according to Deut. 25. 13:
added
this are
commandment which prohibits added the precept forbidding usury,
the seventh
theft,
them 2.
less evidently.
It is in virtue of their institu-
tion that the ceremonial
and
judicial precepts
are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue, not
by reason
of a natural instinct, as in
the case of the superadded moral precepts.
To this is added the prohibition of blasphemy (Levit. 24. 15 seq.) and the prohibition of false doctrine (Deut. 13.). To the third commandment are added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth commandment prescrib-
Reply Obj. 3. The precepts of a law are ordered for the common good, as stated above (q.
honour due to parents is added the precept about honouring the aged, according to Levit. iQ. 32: Rise up before the hoary head, and ho?tour the person of the aged man, and
chastity, in so far as the generative act conduces
jury.
ing the
likewise
all
precepts prescribing the reverence
to be observed towards our betters, or kindli-
ness towards our equals or inferiors.
To
the
fifth commandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of hatred and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbour, according
to Levit. 19. 16:
Thou
shall 7iot stand against
the blood of thy neighbour ; likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother {ibid. 17)
Thou
To
shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart.
the sixth
commandment which
forbids adul-
is added the prohibition about whoredom, according to Deut. 23. 17: There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel; and the pro-
tery,
hibition against unnatural
sins,
according to
Levit 18. 22, 23: Thou shalt not lie with manthou shalt not copulate with any beast. kind .
.
.
xc, A. 2). And since those virtues which direct our conduct towards others pertain directly to
the
common
to the
good, as also does the virtue of
common good
of the species, hence pre-
cepts bearing directly on these virtues are given,
both in the decalogue and
As
to the act of fortitude there are the orders
in addition to
it.
be given by the commanders in the war, which undertaken for the common good, as is clear from Deut. 20. 3, where the priest is commanded Be not afraid, do not give (to speak thus) back. In like manner the prohibition of acts of gluttony is left to paternal admonition, since it is contrary to the good of the household; hence it is said (Deut. 21. 20) in the person of parents He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling, and to debauch-
to is
:
:
ery and banquetings.
Article 12. Whether the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Justified Man?
We
proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:
It
would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man.
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
Objection i. Because the Apostle says (Rom. For not the hearers of the Law are justi2. 13) fied before God^ but the doers of the Law shall :
be justified. But the doers of the
who
fulfil
Law
are those
the precepts of the Law. Therefore
the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of justification. Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Levit. 18. 5)
My
laws and My judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them. But the spiritual life of man is through justice. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause
Keep
Obj.
3.
human
man, since there
is
law.
is more effiBut human law justifies
a kind of justice consisting
in fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the
On 6)
:
Law
the contrary.
The
justified
man.
The Apostle
says (II Cor.
letter killeth, which, according to
{De
3.
Au-
the moral precepts, which are about actions. Therefore the
justify
man by
causing justice.
on the other hand, by understand the execution of the precepts of the
Law
aimed at
in so far as they
which is just, not in itself, but by being a determination of the Divine law. Hence it is said of
men
as they disposed
to the justifying grace of Christ,
which they {Con-
also signified, because as Augustine says
"even the life of that people foretold and foreshadowed Christ." But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must notice that it can be contra Faust, xxii, 24),^
sidered as
it
save through the devotion and obedience of those who complied with them. On the other hand the moral and judicial precepts, either in general or also in particular, contained that is
moral precepts
just in itself; but the
contained that which
is
just in itself according
to that general justice which is every virtue according to the Ethics,^ while the judicial precepts pertained to special justice, which is about
contracts connected with the
human mode
of
between one man and another. Reply Obj. i. The Apostle takes justification
Reply Obj.
The man who
2.
Law
is
fulfilled
said to live in
the
them
because he did not incur the penalty of death, which the Law inflicted on its transgressors. The Apostle quotes this passage in this sense (Gal. 3. 12).
Reply Obj. 3. The precepts of human law man by acquired justice it is not about
justify
this that
;
we
are inquiring now, but only about
that justice which
is
before God.
exists in the habit or in the act, so
that accordingly justification
may
be taken in
QUESTION
two ways. First, according as man is made just by becoming possessed of the habit of justice; secondly, according as he does works of justice, so
man
these precepts that they did not justify
precepts of the
is,
in
offering worship to
for the execution of justice.
was conferred by the precepts
man, but
individually they contained that
note a sign of justice or a disposition to justice. If justice be taken in the last two ways it is it
all
justified
and properly the causing of justice, while secondarily and improperly, as it were, it may de-
of the Law, in so far, that
we
thus
as a whole contained something just in itself,
life,
evident that
justification justice,
various ways. For the ceremonial precepts taken
safeguard of health, so justification means
first
human
moral precepts could not
If,
which
Spir. et Lit. xiv),^ refers
by
justified
works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God. Hence this justice could not be caused by
even to the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts did not cause justice. / answer that. Just as healthy is said properly and first of that which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign or a gustine
4.
265
i
Abraham were
2: //
;
Further, the Divine law
precepts of the
ART.
Q. loi.
Rom.
God but taken
of justification.
cacious than
to
that in this sense justification
is
themselves
nothing
than the execution of justice. Now justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or the infused virtue, as is clear from what has been stated (q. lxiii, a. 4). The acquired virtue is caused by works; but the infused virtue is caused by God Himself through His grace. The latter is true justice, of which we are speaking now, and in respect of which a man is said to be just before God, according
CI
Of the ceremonial precepts in {In Four Articles)
else
1
»
PL 44, 215. PL 42, 417.
We must now consider the ceremonial precepts. And
first
we must
consider
secondly, their cause
(q.
them cii)
;
in themselves
thirdly, their
duration (q. cm). Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i) The nature of the ceremonial precepts; (2) Whether they are figurative? (3) Whether there should have been many of them? (4) Of their various kinds. 'Aristotle, V,
I
(1129^30).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
266
are not those which pertain to the worship
Article
Whether
i.
the
Nature of the Cere-
of God.
in Their Pertaining
monial Precepts Consists to the Worship of God?
On
the contrary, It
is
written (Exod. 18. 19,
20) Be thou to the people in those things that pertain to God and shew the people the :
We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to the worship of God.i Objectio7i I. Because, in the Old Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence from food (Levit. ii.) and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes, for example (Levit. 19. 19) Thou shall not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts; and again :
38): To make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments. But these are not moral precepts, since they do not remain
(Num.
in the
15.
New
Law. Nor are they
judicial precepts,
.
.
.
.
.
.
ceremonies and the manner of worshipping. I answer that, As stated above (q. xcix, a. 4), the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts by which man is directed to God, just as the judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts by which he is
directed to his neighbour.
rected to
God by
Now man
the worship due to
is
di-
Him.
Therefore those precepts are properly called ceremonial which pertain to the Divine worship.
The reason
for their being called so
was
given above {ibid., A. 3), when we established the distinction between the ceremonial and the
since they do not pertain to the pronouncing of
other precepts.
judgment between man and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in no way to pertain to the worship of God.
Reply Obj. i. The Divine worship includes not only sacrifices and the like, which seem to
Therefore the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to Divine Worship.
by which His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him; thus too in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the end comes under the science whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which regard the clothing and food of God's worshippers, and other such matters, pertain to a certain preparation of the ministers, with the view of fitting them for the Divine worship, just as those
Ohj.
some
Further,
2.
state that the cere-
monial precepts are those which pertain to solemnities, as though they were so called from the cerei (candles) which are lit up on those
many
occasions.^
But
solemnities
pertain
other
besides
things
the worship
to
of
God.
be directed to
God
immediately, but also those
things
who
the Divine worship.
administer to a king make use of certain observances. Consequently such are contained under the ceremonial precepts.
Obj. 3. Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are norms, that is, rules, of salvation, because the Greek xcitpe is the same as the Latin
Reply Obj. 2. The alleged explanation of the name does not seem very probable, especially as the Law does not contain many instances
does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their pertaining to
Therefore
salve.
But
it
all
the precepts of the
Law
are rules
special
of the lighting of candles in solemnities, since
of salvation, and not only those that pertain
even the lamps of the Candlestick were fur-
God. Therefore not only those precepts which pertain to the Divine worship
nished with
are called ceremonial.
taining to the Divine worship were
to the worship of
Obj.
4.
Perplex,
Further, Rabbi
iii)^
that "the ceremonial precepts are
those for which there
But there
is
Moses says (Doct.
is
no evident reason."
evident reason for
many
things
pertaining to the worship of God, such as the
observance of the Sabbath, the feasts of the Passover and of the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason for which is set down in the Law. Therefore the ceremonial precepts 1
Cf. Albert the Great.
19); Cicero,
De Nat.
In
Deor.,
Sent., iv, d.
11,
28
(DD
i,
a. 7
iv, 124);
(BO xxix. De Invent.^
li,5,^(DDr, 165). «
Albert, In
.Sent., iv, d. i, A. 7
•Chap. 28 (FR 314).
(BO xxix,
18).
2.
oil
Nevertheless
of olives, as stated in Levit. 24. we may say that all things per-
more
care-
observed on solemn festivals, so that all ceremonial precepts may be included under the observance of solemnities. Reply Obj. 3. Neither does this explanation of the name appear to be very much to the fully
point, since the
but Latin.
word "ceremony"
We may
is
not Greek
say, however, that, since
man's salvation is from God those precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation which direct man to God. And accordingly those which refer to Divine worship are called ceremonial precepts.
Reply Obj. 4. This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a certain amount of prob-
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
not that they are called ceremonial precisely because there is no evident reason for them, bat rather this is a kind of consequence. For since the precepts referring to the
ability;
Divine worship must be figurative, as we shall state further on (a. 2), the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very evident.
Article 2. Whether the Cere?nonial Precepts Are Figurative?
We
proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not figurative. Objection i. For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in such a way as to be easily understood, as Augustine states,^ and this seems very necessary in the framing of a law because precepts of law are proposed to the populace, for which reason "a law should be manifest," as Isidore declares (Etym. v, 21).^ therefore
If
the precepts
of
given as figures of something,
the it
Law were
seems
that
fied.
Obj. 2. Further, whatever is done for the worship of God, should be entirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions in representation of others seems to savour of the theatre or of poetry, because formerly the actions performed in theatres were done to represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such things should not be done for the worship of God. But the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship, as stated above (a. i). Therefore they should not be figurative. Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchirid. iii, iv)^ that "God is worshipped chiefly by faith,
hope, and charity." But the precepts of hope and charity are not figurative. There-
fore
the
faith,
ceremonial precepts should not be
figurative.
Obj. 4. Further, Our Lord said (John 4. 24) is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must :
God
adore Him in spirit and in truth. But a figure not the very truth: in fact one is divided against the other. Therefore the ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine worship, should not be figurative.
is
On
the contrary.
The Apostle says
(Coloss.
judge you in meat 17) Let no man or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or 2, 16,
*
.
Christian Doctrine, iv,
PL 82, 3 PL 40, 2
:
203;
II,
10
232,233.
(PL
8,
.
.
10 (PL 34, 98, 99).
82, 131).
ART.
267
2
or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come. I answer that. As stated above (a. i; q.
xcix, AA. 3, 4), the ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now the Divine worship
is
twofold: interior, and
For since man
is composed of soul and body, each of these should be applied to the worship of God, the soul by an interior worship, the body by an outward worship hence it is written (Ps. 83. 3) My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God. And as the body
external.
;
:
is
God through
ordered to
ward worship
the soul so the out-
ordered to the internal worship. Now interior worship consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect and affections.
in
is
Therefore according to the various ways
which the
intellect
who worships God
and
affections of the
man
are rightly united to God,
his external actions are applied in various
ways
to the Divine worship.
For
unfit-
Moses should have delivered these precepts without explaining what they signiting
Q. loi.
new moon^
of the
human
in
the state of future happiness, the
on the Divine Truth Therefore the external worship will not consist in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of God, proceeding from the inward knowledge and affection, according to Isa. 51. 3: Joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of praise. But in the present state of life we are unable to gaze upon the Divine Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Divine light to shine upon us under the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states; in various ways, however, according to the various states of human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine Truth manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to that manifestation as yet opened out, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 9. 8). Hence the external worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not only of the future truth to be manifested in our heavenly country, but also of Christ, Who is the way leading to that heavenly truth. But under the New Law this way is already revealed, and therefore it needs no longer to be foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds as something past or present; and the truth of the glory to come, which is not yet revealed, alone needs to be foreshadowed. This is what the Apostle says (Heb. 10. i) The Law has (Vulg., having) a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things, for a shadow is less than an image, so that the image belongs to the New Law, but the shadow to the intellect will gaze
in Itself.
—
Old.
:
—
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
268
The
God
are not to except in proportion to his capacity, otherwise he would be in danger of downfall were he to despise what he cannot
Reply Obj
be revealed to
Hence
grasp.
I.
things of
man
was more
it
beneficial that the
Divine mysteries should be revealed to primitive people under a veil of figures that thus they might know them at least implicitly by using those figures to the honour of God. Reply Obj. 2. Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical expressions because they are lacking in truth, so does it fail to grasp Divine things perfectly on account of the sublimity of the truth they contain. And therefore in both cases there
is
need of signs by means of sen-
sible figures.
Reply Obj.
Augustine
3.
is
speaking there of
internal worship, to which, however, external worship should be ordered, as stated above.
The same answer jection, because
to practise
Ob-
applies to the Fourth
men were
taught by Christ
more perfectly the
spiritual
wor-
worship
God
in spirit
and
in truth ^ as stated in
Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts. On the contrary, It is written (Osee 8. 12): hifn) My mani/ shall write to them (Vulg., fold laws; and (Job 11. 6): That He might
John
4.
show
thee the secrets of His wisdom, and that
His
Law
23.
is
manifold.
As
I answer that. i) every law
stated above (q. xcvi., a.
given to a people.
is
Now
a peo-
two kinds of men. Some are prone to evil, and have to be coerced by the precepts of the law, as stated above (q. xcv, a. i) some are inclined to good, either from nature or from custom, or rather from grace, and these have to be taught and improved by means of the pre-
ple contains
;
cepts of the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of men it was expedient that the Old Law should contain many ceremonial precepts. For in that people there were many prone to idolatry,
and therefore
them by means
was
it
necessar>' to recall
of ceremonial precepts
from
the worship of idols to the worship of God.
ship of God.
since men served idols in many ways, it was necessary on the other hand to devise many means of repressing every single one and again, to lay many obligations on such men in order
And Article
Many
3.
Whether There Should Have Been
Cerefnonial Precepts?
;
We
proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.
that being burdened, as
were, by their duties
it
to the Divine worship, they might have no time
As to those who were inwas again necessary that there
Objection i. For those things which lead to an end should be proportionate to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as stated above (aa. I, 2), are ordered to the worship of God, and to the foreshadowing of Christ. Now there is
for the service of idols.
and but one God, of Whom are all things, one Lord Jesus Christy by Whom are all things (I Cor. 8. 6). Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.
the mystery of Christ, which was foreshadowed by these ceremonial precepts, brought many benefits to the v;orld, and afforded men many considerations, which needed to be signified by
.
Obj.
Further, the great
2.
number
.
.
of the cere-
monial precepts was an occasion of transgression, according to the words of Peter (Acts 15. 10): Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have beefi able to bear? the transgression of the Divine precepts
Now is
an
obstacle to man's salvation. Since, therefore, every law should conduce to man's salvation,
seems that the ceremonial precepts should not have been given in great number. as Isidore says
Obj.
3.
{Etym.
v, 3),^ it
Further, the ceremonial precepts re-
ferred to the outward and bodily worship of
God, as stated above (a. 2). But the Law should have lessened this bodily worship: since it directed »
PL 82.
men
to Christ,
109: n, 10
(PL
Who
82. igg).
taught them to
clined to good,
should be
it
many
ceremonial precepts; both be-
cause thus their mind was turned to
many
God
in
ways, and more diligently, and because
various ceremonies.
Reply Obj. to an
end
is
i.
WTien that which
sufficient to lead to
is
it,
ordered
then one
such thing suffices for one end; thus one remedy, if it be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore man to health, and then the remedy needs not to be repeated. But when that which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs to be multiplied thus many remedies are given :
to a sick
him.
Now
man when one
is
not enough to heal
the ceremonies of the Old
weak and imperfect, both
Law were
for representing the
mystery of Christ, on account of its surpassing excellence, and for subjugating men's minds to God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 7. 18, 19) There is a setting aside of the former coinmandment because of the weakficss and tmprofitablemss theieof, for the law brought nothing to
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
Consequently these ceremonies needed to be in great number. Reply Obj. 2. A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser transgressions that the greater may be perfection.
And
avoided.
therefore, in order to avoid the
and the pride which would arise Jews were they to fulfil all the precepts of the Law, the fact that they would in consequence find many occasions of disobedience did not prevent God from giving sin of idolatry,
in the hearts of the
them many ceremonial precepts. Reply Obj. 3. The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways. Thus it forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any person.
Many
such things did it enact for the lessening of bodily worship, as Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex, iii).^ Nevertheless it was necessary not to attenuate the bodily worship of
away
God
so
much
as to allow
men
to fall
into the worship of idols.
ART.
Q. loi.
269
4
and judgments and ceremonies. Therefore the observances should not be considered as a part of the ceremonies.
Obj. 5. Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the ceremonial, since they were a shadow of things to come (Coloss. 2. 16,
and the same may be said of the oblations as appears from the words of the Apostle (Heb. 9. 9) and yet these do not seem to be included in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above division of ceremonies is 17)
:
and
gifts,
;
unsuitable.
On
the contrary, In the Old
above
is
called a ceremony.
(Num.
are called ceremonies shall offer a calf
.
.
Law
.
each of the
For the 15.
and the
sacrifices
They
24):
and Of
sacrifices
libations thereof, as the ceremonies require.
the sacrament of Order
it is written (Levit. 7. This is the anointing of Aaron and his 35) sons in the ceremonies. Of sacred things also it is written (Exod. 38. 21) These are the instru:
:
Article 4. Whether the Ceremonies of the Old Law Are Suitably Divided into Sacrifices, Sacred Things^ Sacraments, and Observances?
We
proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law
ments of the tabernacle of the testimony in the ceremonies of the Levites.
the observances
you
.
.
.
it is
shall turn
And
.
.
.
again of
written (III Kings
9.
6)
:
//
away from following Me, and
which Christ delivered Himself an oband a sacrifice to God (Eph. 5. 2). Therefore none but the sacrifices were ceremonies. Obj. 2. Further, the Old Law was ordered to the New. But in the New Law the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in the Old Law there should be no distinction between sacrifices and sacraments. Obj. 3. Further, a sacred thing is something dedicated to God, in which sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be consecrated. But all the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the worship of God, as stated above (a. i). Therefore all ceremonies were sacred things. There-
not observe (Douay, keep) My ceremonies which I have set before you. I answer that, As stated above (aa. 1,2), the ceremonial precepts are ordered to the Divine worship. Now in this worship we may consider the worship itself, the worshippers, and the instruments of worship. The worship consists specially in sacrifices, which are offered up in honour of God. The instruments of worship refer to the sacred things, such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. With regard to the worshippers two points may be considered. The first point is their preparation for Divine worship, which is effected by a sort of consecration either of the people or of the ministers; and to this the sacraments refer. The second point is their particular mode of Hfe, whereby they are distinguished from those who do not worship God, and to this pertain the observances; for instance, in matters of food, clothing, and so
fore sacred things should not be taken as a part
forth.
are unsuitably divided into sacrifices, sacred
sacraments and observances} Objection i. For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done thijigs,
only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed the sacrifice in
lation
4.
Further, Observances are so called
from having to be observed. But all the precepts Law had to be observed, for it is written (Deut. 8. 11): Observe (Douay, Take heed) and beware lest at any time thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His commandments of the
1
Chap. 32 (FR 32s).
*
CI. Peter
chap. 4
Lombard,
(QR II,
746).
.
Reply Obj.
of the ceremonies.
Obj.
will
Sent., rv, d. i, chap. 6
(QR 11,
748),
rifices to
i.
It
.
.
was necessary for the
sac-
be offered both in some certain place
and by some certain men, and all this pertained to the worship of God. Therefore just as their sacrifices signified Christ the victim, so too their
sacraments and sacred things foreshadowed the sacraments and sacred things of the New Law, while their observances foreshadowed the mode of life of the people under the New Law all of
—
which things pertain to Christ.
:
SUMMA TEEOLOGICA
27©
Reply Obj.
2.
The
sacrifice of the
New Law,
namely, the Eucharist, contains Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification; for He sanctified the people by His own blood (Heb. 13. 12). Hence this Sacrifice is also a sacrament.
Article
i
.
Whether There Was Any Cause
for the Ceremonial Precepts?
We proceed thus to the First Article: seem that there was no cause
would
It
for the ceremonial
Old Law did not conforeshadowed Him; hence they are not called sacraments. In order to signify this there were certain sacraments apart from the sacrifices of the Old Law, which sacraments were figures of the sanctification to come.
precepts.
Nevertheless to certain consecrations certain
based on reason." But if the observances of the Old Law were based on reason, it would have been useless to void them by the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore there was no reason for the ceremonial observances of
But the
sacrifices of the
tain Christ, but
sacrifices
were united.
Reply Obj. 3. The sacrifices and sacraments were of course sacred things. But certain things were sacred through being dedicated to the Divine worship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments. Therefore they retained the common designation of sacred things. Reply Obj. 4. Those things which pertained to the
God
mode
of hfe of the people
retained the
common
who worshipped
designation of ob-
servances, in so far as they
fell
short of the
above. For they were not called sacred things because they had no immediate connection with the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its
vessels had.
But by a
sort of consequence
they were matters of ceremony, in so far as they affected the fitness of the people who worshipped God.
Reply Obj. 5. Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed place, so were they offered at fixed times, for which reason the solemn festivals
seem
things.
lo be
The
reckoned among the sacred
oblations and gifts are counted to-
gether with the sacrifices; hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5. i) Every high-priest taken from :
ordained for men in things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts
among men^ and
is
sacrifices.
QUESTION
CXI
cere-
cause for the ceremonial precepts? (2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal
Mak-
by substituting
evangelical precepts, which are
is,
the Old Law.
Law succeeded the law of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason save that man's obedience might be tested, as Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. viii, 6, 13),^ concerning the prohibition about the tree of life. Therefore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the purpose of testing man's obedience, having no reason in themObj.
Further, the Old
2.
law of nature. But
in the
selves.
Obj. 3. Further, man's works are called moral according as they proceed from reason. If therefore there is any reason for the ceremonial precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts. It seems therefore that there
was no
cause for the ceremonial precepts, for the reason of a precept is taken from some cause.
On
the contrary. It
The commandment of
is
the
written (Ps. 18. 9) is lightsome, en-
Lord
But the ceremonial preof God. Therefore they are lightsome, and yet they would not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause. / answer that, Since, according to the Philos-
lightening the eyes. cepts are
commandments
it is
things in
the function of a wise
man
to set
those things which proceed
order,
(Rom.
13. i).
Now
there
well ordered. First, that they be ordered to their
due end, which
is
the principle of the whole
order in matters of action, since those things that happen by chance outside the intention of the end, or which are not done seriously but for
causes of the sacrifices.
(4) The causes of the sacraments. (5) The causes of the sacred things. (6) The causes of the observances.
15,
are two conditions required for things to be
monial precepts, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether there was any
The
decrees, that
as the Apostle states
(In Six Articles)
or figurative? (3)
2.
from the Divine wisdom must be well ordered,
precepts
must now consider the causes of the
Because on Ephes.
I.
as to the carnal observances,
opher,^
Of the causes of the ceremonial
We
Objectioji
ing void the law of the commandments, the gloss says,^ "that is, making void the Old Law
^Glossa
(vi,
intcrl.
giv); Glossa Lombardi (PL 192,
185). »
PL 34. 377; 383.
»
Metaphysics,
i,
2
(982*18).
PART
I
OF SECOND PART
fun, are said to be lacking in order. Secondly,
that which
done
is
in
view of the end should be
proportionate to the end.
From
this it follows
that the reason for whatever leads to the end
is
taken from the end; thus the reason for the disposition of a saw is taken from cutting, which end, as stated in the Physics}
is its
Now
it is
evident that the ceremonial precepts, like
all
Q. 102.
the Passover
ART,
2
271
written (Exod. 13. 9) /^ shall be as a sign in thy hand, and as a memorial it is
:
much more did the ceremonial precepts have none but a
before thy eyes. Therefore other
figurative reason.
Obj.
2.
cause.
its
Further, an effect
But
all
is
proportionate to
the ceremonial precepts are
figurative, as stated
above
(q. ci, a. 2).
There-
the other precepts of the Law, were institutions
fore they have no other than a figurative cause.
wisdom; hence it is written (Deut. is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations. Consequently we must say that the ceremonial precepts were ordered to a certain end, from which their reasonable
Obj. 3. Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a certain thing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or not, it seems that it has not a literal cause. Now there are
of Divine
6)
4.
:
This
causes can be gathered.
Reply Obj. i. It may be said that there was no reason for the observances of the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in the very nature of the thing done; for instance that a garment should not be made of wool and linen. But there could be a reason for them in their relation to something else, namely, in so far as something was signified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the decrees of the New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and the love of God, are reasonable from the very nature of the act. Reply Obj. 2. The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil. And yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something else, since it signified
something.
And
precepts of the Old
so
also
Law were
the
ceremonial
reasonable on
account of their relation to something else. Reply Obj. 3. The moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable causes, as for instance, Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not steal. But the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to something else, as stated above.
Article
2.
Whether the Ceremonial Precepts or Merely a
Have a Literal Cause Figurative Cause?
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a Hteral but merely a figurative cause. Objection i. For among the ceremonial pre-
^, on account of the fear of future punishment. But the damned are undergoing these punishments, so that they abhor them yet more. Therefore, much more are they restrained from blaspheming.
very great sin, through belonging to the same genus as unbehef and being an aggra-
also, is a
the
We
in
it
man
3)
shall
clear
acquires neither merit
Reply Obj. i. If we compare murder and blasphemy as regards the objects of those sins, it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin committed directly against God, is more grave than murder, which is a sin against one's neighbour. On the other hand, if we compare them in respect of the harm wrought by them, murder is the graver sin, for murder does more harm to ones neighbour than blasphemy does to God. Since, however, the gravity of a sin depends on
they blasphemed the name of God, Who hath power over these plagues, and a gloss on these words says^ that "those who are in hell, though aware that they are deservedly punished, will
the intention of the perverse will, rather than
nevertheless complain that
on the
effect of the deed, as
(Part l-II,
Q.
Lxxiii, A. 8),
was shown above it
follows that, as
nor sin which he did not already possess in this life. Now many will be damned who were not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore, will they blaspheme in the life to come.
On
the co7itrary, It
blasphemy
in
Reply Obj. 2. A gloss on the words. Let blasphemy be put away from you (Eph. 4. 31) says: "Blasphemy is worse than perjury."^ The
away from God's
.
it
God
Now
so powerful
is
would be and conse-
this
their present state,
quently
.
written (Apoc. 16. 9): great heat, and
them thus."
as to torture
the blasphemer intends to do harm to God's honour, absolutely speaking he sins more grievously than the murderer. Nevertheless murder takes precedence, as to punishment, among sins committed against our neighbour. .
is
The men were scorched with
be in their future state.
will also
/ answer that.
As
stated above (aa.
testation of the Divine goodness
the notion of blasphemy.
Now
hell retain their perverse will
is
those
is
are in
turned
they love the
things for which they are punished,
them
3), de-
who
which
justice, since
i,
necessary to
would wish
(PL
191,
they could, and hate the punishments inflicted on them for those same sins.
700); Cassiodorus, Expos, in Psalt., super Ps. 74.4
(PL
They
^
Glossa ordin. (in, iq;B); Glossa Lombardi
70, 537). ^ *
Glossa ordin. (iv, 38E). Glossa ordin. (vi, 95B); Augustine, Contra Mendac.,
Chap. 19 (PL
40. S4s).
to use
if
regret indeed the sins which they have committed, not because they hate them, but because they are punished for them. According*
Glossa ordin. (vi, 266A).
PART ly this detestation of the
II
OF SECOND PART
Divine justice
is
will
ART,
Q. 14.
certain malice
i
447
And
credible that after the resurrection they
weakness; but the sin against the Holy Ghost
them, the interior blasphemy of the heart. it
in
divided against sin committed through ignorance, and sin committed through
is,
blaspheme God with the tongue, even as
Him
with their voices. Reply Obj. i. In the present life men are deterred from blasphemy through fear of punishment which they think they can escape. But in the saints will praise
hell the
damned have no hope
divided against the sin against the Son of
is
Man the
(Matt.
mitted
is
through
Obj.
Therefore the sin against not the same as the sin com-
12. 32).
Holy Ghost
whose opposites
of escape, so
they are borne towards whatever their perverse will suggests to them. Reply Obj. 2. Merit and demerit pertain to
is
certain differ,
Further,
3.
malice,
since
things
are themselves different.
The
sin against the
Holy
that, in despair,
Ghost
the state of a wayfarer, and so good
terminate species. But sin committed through certain malice is not a special kind of sin, but a condition or general circumstance of sin, which can affect any kind of sin at all. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same
torious in them, while evil
is
the blessed, on the other hand, good
meritorious but
is
meri-
is
demeritorious. In is
not
Hapthe damned, evil
part of their reward of
manner, in is not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damnation. Reply Obj. 3. Whoever dies in mortal sin bears with him a will that detests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in this respect there can be blasphemy in him. piness.
And,
in like
GHOST
We must now consider in particular blasphemy Holy Ghost, under which head there Whether blasthe sin against the Holy Ghost is the
against the
are four points of inquiry: (i)
same as the sin committed through certain mahce? (2) Of the species of this sin. (3) Whether it cannot be forgiven? (4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost before committing other sins? Article i. Whether the Sin Against the Holy Ghost Is the Same as the Sin Committed Through Certain Malice?
We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice.
Objection is
1.
Because the
sin against the
own
de-
committed through certain malice. The Master says (2 Sent., d. 43)^ that to sin against the Holy Ghost is "to as the sin
On
the contrary,
take pleasure in the malice of sin for its own sake." Now this is to sin through certain malice.
Therefore it seems that the sin committed through certain malice is the same as the sin against the Holy Ghost. / answer that, Three meanings have been
nasius (Super Matt. 12. 32),^ Hilary (Can.
Holy
the sin of blasphemy, according to
Matt. 12. 32. But not every sin committed through certain malice is a sin of blasphemy, since many other kinds of sin may be committed through certain malice. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice. Obj. 2. Further, The sin committed through
xii
Ambrose
(Super Luc. 12. 10, Whosoever speaketh a word, etc.),^ Jerome (Super Matt. 12),^ and Chrysostom (Horn. xU in Matt.),^ say that the sin against the Holy Ghost is literally to utter a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, whether by Holy Spirit we understand the essential name applicable to the whole Trinity, each Person of which is a Spirit and is holy, or the personal name of one of the Persons of the Trinity. In the latter sense blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is distinct from blasphemy against the Son of Man (Matt. 12. Matt.),^
in
(In Four Articles)
Ghost
its
Ghost. For the earlier doctors, namely Atha-
Of blasphemy against the holy
or
a generic sin, having
given to the sin or blasphemy against the Holy
QUESTION XIV
phemy
is itself
32), for Christ did certain things in respect of human nature, by eating, drinking, and the
His
while He did others in respect of His Godhead, by casting out devils, raising the dead, and the like, which things He did both by like actions,
own Godhead and by the operHoly Ghost, of Whom He was full, according to His human nature. Now the Jews began by speaking blasphemy against the Son of Man, when they said (Matt. 11. 19) that He was a glutton, ... a w-ine drinker, and a friend the
power
of His
ation of the
of publicans; but afterwards they blasphemed against the Holy Ghost, when they ascribed to the prince of devils those works which Christ 1
Chap.
I
(QR I,
PL 9, 989. 5 PL 26, 83. 3
533).
Two
{In
demands
perhaps because envy manifestly arises from vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either by Isidore^ or by Cassian
{De
to joy in his evil.
its
should have some principal reason for
itself the origin of several
is not directly the same as envy, but is a result of it, because grief over our neighbour's good which is envy, gives rise
another's misfortune
seem that discord
not a
is
Is a Si?i?
the First Article: It would sin.
For to be in disaccord with man is to sever oneself from another's will. But this does not seem to be a sin, because God's will alone, and not our neighbour's, is the rule of our own will. Therefore discord is not a sin. Objection
Obj.
2
i.
Further,
sin, sins also
Whoever induces another
himself. But
it
to
appears not to be
a sin to incite others to discord, for
it is
writ-
knowing that the one part were Sadducees, and the other Pharten (Acts 23. 6) that Paul,
out in the council: Men brethren, I a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope and resurrection of the dead I am
isees, cried
am
called in question.
And when
he had so said,
there arose a dissension betweeft the Pharisees
and the Sadducees. Therefore discord
is
not a
sin.
Obj. 3. Further, Sin, especially mortal sin, not to be found in a holy man. But discord to be found even among holy men, for it
is is is
There arose a dissension between Paul and Barnabas, so that they departed one from another. Therefore discord is not a sin, and least of all a mortal sin. written (Acts 15. 39)
0« the
contrary, Dissensions, that
are reckoned 5.
among
20), of which
that they the sin.
:
it is
is,
discords,
the works of the flesh (Gal. said afterwards {verse 21)
who do such
things shall not obtain
kingdom of God. Now nothing, save mortal excludes man from the kingdom of God.
Therefore discord is a mortal sin. / answer that, Discord is opposed to concord.
PART
II
OF SECOND PART
Now,
as stated above (q. xxix, a. 3) concord results from charity, in so far as charity joins
many
hearts together in one thing, which
is
Divine good, secondarily, the good of our neighbour. Therefore discord is a sin, in so far as it is opposed to this concord. But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed by discord in two ways: first, dichiefly the
rectly, secondly, accidentally.
and movements are said
Now, human
acts
to be direct (per se)
when they
are according to one's intention. Therefore a man directly is in disaccord with his neighbour when he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine good and his neighbour's good, to which he ought to consent. This is a mortal sin in respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity, although the first movements of such discord are venial sins by reason of their being imperfect acts.
The
accidental in
human
acts
is
that which
Hence when, sevgood pertaining to God's honour, or our neighbour's profit, while one thinks a certain thing good, and another thinks conoccurs beside the intention.
eral intend a
trariwise, the discord
is
in this case accidentally
contrary to the Divine good or that of our
Q. 37.
ART.
2
571
be him that soweth discord among brethren. On the other hand, to arouse a discord by which an evil concord (that is, concord in an evil will) is destroyed, is praiseworthy. In this way Paul was to be commended for sowing discord among those who agreed together in evil, because Our Lord also said of Himself (Matt. 10. 34) / came not to send peace, but the sword. Reply Obj. 3. The discord between Paul and Barnabas was accidental and not direct, because each intended some good, yet the one thought one thing good, while the other thought something else, which was owing to ciency;
human
defi-
controversy was not about
for that
necessary to salvation. Moreover was ordained by Divine providence on count of the good which would ensue.
things this
Article
Whether Discord
2.
Is a
all
ac-.
Daughter
of Vainglory?
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that discord is not a daughter of vainglory.
Objection
1.
Now
For anger
is
a vice distinct
from
apparently the daughter of anger, according to Prov. 15. 18: A pas-
vainglory.
discord
is
is neither sinful nor be accompanied by an error about things necessary to salvation, or by undue obstinacy, since it has also been stated above (q. xxix, aa. 1,3, Reply 2) that the concord which is an effect of charity is union of wills, not of opinions. It follows from this that discord is sometimes the sin of one party only, for instance, when one wills a good which the other knowingly resists; while sometimes it implies sin in both parties, as when each dis-
sionate man stirreth up strifes. Therefore it is not a daughter of vainglory. Obj. 2. Further, Augustine expounding the
from the other's good, and loves his o^^Tl. Reply Obj. i. One man's will considered in itself is not the rule of another man's will but
such is discord, because Jerome in commenting on Matt. 12. 25, Every kingdom divided against
neighbour. Such discord against charity, unless
it
sents
;
in so
far as our neighbour's will adheres to
God's
will, it
becomes
according
in consequence, a rule
its proper measure. Therefore it is a sin to be in disaccord with such a will, because by that very fact one is in disaccord with the Divine rule. Reply Obj. 2. Just as a man's will that adheres to God is a right rule, to disaccord with which is a sin, so too a man's will that is opposed to God is a perverse rule, to disaccord with which is good. Hence to cause a discord by which a good concord resulting from charity is destroyed, is a grave sin; hence it is
regulated
written
(Prov.
6.
to
16)
:
Six things there are,
which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth, which seventh is stated (verse 19) to
7. 39, As yet the Spirit was not given, says (Tract, xxxii)^ "MaHce severs, char-
words of John ity unites."
Now
discord
is
none other than a
separation of wills. Therefore discord arises
from malice, that
envy, rather than from
is,
vainglory.
Obj. evils,
3.
Further, Whatever gives rise to
would seem
itself shall
be
to be a capital vice.
made
many
Now
desolate, says:^ "Just as
concord makes small things thrive, so discord brings the greatest things to ruin." Therefore discord should itself be accounted a capital vice, rather than a daughter of vainglory. On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral, xxxi, 45).^ / answer that. Discord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so far, namely, as one man's will holds fast to one thing, while the other man's will holds fast to something else. Now if a man's will holds fast to its own ground,
due to the fact that he prefers what is to that which belongs to others, and if he do this inordinately, it is due to pride and this is
his
1
3
own
PL 35, 1646. PL 76, 621.
2
PL
26, 82; cf. Sallu3t, Jugurth.
SUMMA TnEOLOGICA
572
whereby a man own way of thinking, and departs
vainglory. Therefore discord,
holds to his
from that of others,
reckoned to be a daugh-
is
ter of vainglory.
Reply Obj.
:
Strife
i.
not the same as dis-
is
cord, for strife consists in external deeds,
so
it
fitting that
is
which
and
should arise from anger,
it
mind
incites the
to hurt one's neighbour;
discord however consists in a divergence in the
movements
from pride
of wills, which arises
or vainglory, for the reason given above.
Reply Obj. that which
we may
In discord
2.
consider
the term from which, that
is
be pleased that his neighbour commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (Philip, i. 17): Some out of contentio7i preach Christ, and afterwards he says {verse 18) In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice. Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.
is,
an-
from which we recede, and in this from envy; and again we may consider that which is the term to which, that is, something of our own to which we cling, and in this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment the term to which is more important than the term from which (because the end is of more account than the beginning), discord is accounted a daughter of vainglory rather than of envy, though it may arise from both for different reasons, as stated. Reply Obj. 3. The reason why concord makes
Obj. 3. Further, It happens that people contend either in the courts or in disputations, with-
out any spiteful purpose, and with a good intention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with heretics. Hence a gloss on I
Kings 14. I. It come to pass one day, etc. says.^ "CathoHcs do not raise contentions with herethey are
unless
challenged to dis-
other's will
tics
respect
pute." Therefore contention
it
arises
small things thrive, while discord brings the greatest to ruin, is because the more united a force
the stronger
is,
it is
xvii).^
Hence
it
is
while the more disbecomes (De Causis.
it is,
the weaker
united
it
evident that this
the proper effect of discord which
is
is
part of
a disunion
first
is
not a mortal
sin.
Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according to Job 39. 32 Shall he that
Obj.
4.
:
contendeth with God be so easily silenced? And yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the
Lord said of him {ibid. 42. 7) You have not spoken the thing that is right before me, as my servant lob hath. Therefore contention is not always a mortal sin. :
On
the contrary, It
who
is
against the precept of
Contend 2. 14) not in words. Moreover (Gal. 5. 20) contention is included among the works of the fiesh, and as the Apostle
says (II Tim.
stated there {verse 21) they
:
who do such
things
kingdom of God. Now whatman from the kingdom of God
shall not obtain the
ever excludes a
and
is
against a precept,
of wills,
and in no way indicates that other vices arise from discord, as though it were a
fore contention
capital vice.
some
is
/ answer that.
is
a
mortal
sin.
There-
a mortal sin.
To contend
is
to tend against
one. Therefore just as discord denotes a
contrariety of wills, so contention signifies con-
QUESTION XXXVIII
trariety of speech.
{In
Two
For
this reason
when
a
man
contrasts various contrary things in a speech,
Of contention
this is called
Articles)
'^
contentio ," which Tully calls one
ad Heren. iv, where he says that "it consists in developing a speech from contrary things, for instance: Adulation has a pleasant beginning, and a most of the rhetorical colours {Rhet.
We
must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether contention is a mortal sin? (2) Whether
it is
a daughter of vainglory?
15),^
bitter end."
Now
Article
i.
Whether Contention
Is a
Mortal
Sin?
We proceed
thus to the First Article: It seems
that contention
spiritual in
is
not a mortal
i.
them, according to Luke
was also a strife amongst the which of them should .
Therefore contention Obj.
tion,
sin.
For there is no mortal sin in men, and yet contention is to be found
Objection
2.
»Sect. 16
Further,
(BA
No
179.13).
is
.
And
we must
praised.
As
whether
his
not a mortal
well disposed
sin.
man
should
consider whether he contends is to be blamed, and then he should be the manner, we must consider
or against falsehood,
there
be the greatest.
first
against the truth, and then he
disciples of Jesus,
22. 24:
.
may be looked at with regard to the intention of the contentious party; secondly, with regard to the manner of contending. As to the intencontrariety of speech
two ways:
in
to
manner
of contending is in keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would be praiseworthy; hence Tully ^
Glossa ordin.
>DDi,S7.
(11,
77A).
PART says (Rhet. ad Heren.
iii,
II
OF SECOND PART
13)^ that "contention
a sharp speech suitable for proof and refuta-
is
tion"; or whether
it
exceeds the demands of
the persons and matter in dispute, in which case
blameworthy. Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the truth and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose defines contention: "Contention is a disclaimer of the truth with clamorous confidence." If, however, contention denote a disavowal of what is false, with the proper measure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy; but if it denote a disavowal of falsehood, together with an inordinate manner, it can be a venial sin, unless perhaps the contention be conducted so inordinately as to give scandal to others. Hence the Apostle after saying (II Tim. 2. 14) Contend not in words, adds, for it is to no profit, hut to the subverting of
ART,
Q. 38.
2
573
son with God; yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to defend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be inordinate in
mind
or in speech.
it is
:
the hearers.
Reply Obj. i. The disciples of Christ did not contend together with the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up for what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their contention, because they contended about a matter which they ought not to have contended about, namely the primacy of honour for they were not spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage;^ and for this reason Our Lord checked them. Reply Obj. 2. Those who preached Christ out of contention were to be blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of faith, but preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth by the fact that they thought they would raise affliction to the Apostle who was preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their contention, but in the fruit that would result from it, namely that Christ would be made known; for evil is sometimes the occasion of good results. Reply Obj. 3. Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when, in contending before a judge, ;
a
man
gainsays the truth of justice, or in a dis-
putation, intends to
impugn the
true doctrine.
In this sense Catholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse.
court or in a disputation,
But when, whether it is
in
incomplete, that
is, in respect of the acrimony of speech, not always a mortal sin.
it is
Reply Obj. 4. Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For Job had said (13. 3): / will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to rea1
DD
I,
40.
^Glossa ordin., super Luc. 22.24 (v. 177B); Bede, In Luc., bk. VI, super 22.24 (PL 92, 598).
Article
Whether Contention
2.
Is a
Daughter
of Vainglory?
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that contention is not a daughter of vainglory.
Objection
and hence there
is
For contention
i.
is
akin to zeal,
written (I Cor. 3.3): Whereas
it is
among you
zeal
(Douay,
envying) and
contention, are you not cardial, and walk ac-
cording to men? Now zeal pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy. Obj. 2. Further, Contention is accompanied
by
raising of the voice.
But "the voice
raised
is
on account of anger," as Gregory declares {Moral, xxxi, 45).^ Therefore contention too
from anger.
arises
3. Further, Among other things knowledge seems to be the matter of pride and vainglory, according to I Cor. 8. i Knowledge puffeth up. Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by knowledge we do not im-
Obj.
:
truth, we know it. Therefore contennot a daughter of vainglory. On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral, xxxi).''
pugn the tion
is
/ answer that, As stated above (q. xxxvn, 2), discord is a daughter of vainglory, because each of the parties in disaccord clings A.
to his
own
the other.
opinion, rather than acquiesce with
Now
it is
proper to pride and vain-
own glory. And just as peodiscordant when they hold to their own
glory to seek one's ple are
opinion in their hearts, so are they contentious
when each defends
own
opinion by words. reckoned a daughter of vainglory for the same reason as discord. his
Consequently contention
to
Reply Obj. envy in so
1.
is
Contention, like discord,
far as a
man
akin
is
severs himself
from
whom he is discordant, or with he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to something, it is akin to pride and vainglory, because, namely, he clings to his own opinion, as stated above. the one with
whom
Reply Obj.
2.
The contention
of which
we
are speaking puts on a loud voice for the pur-
pose of impugning the truth, so that
it is
not
Hence it does not contention arises from the same
the chief part of contention.
follow that
source as the raising of the voice. Reply Obj. 3 Pride and vainglory are occa3
PL
76, 621.
''Ibid.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
574
sioned chiefly by goods, even those that are
contrary to them, for instance, when a man for when a thing is proud of his humility;
way, it does so not directly but which way nothing hinders one contrary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason why the per se and direct effects of pride or vainglory, should not result from the contraries of those things which are arises in this
/ answer that, As Isidore says {Etym. viii, schism "takes its name from being a scission of minds," and scission is opposed to unity. Therefore the sin of schism is one that is di3),^
accidentally, in
rectly and per se opposed to unity. For in the moral as in the physical order, the species is not constituted by that which is accidental. Now, in the moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and that which results beside the
the occasion of pride.
intention,
QUESTION XXXIX Of schism {In Four Articles)
We
must now consider the vices contrary to
peace, which belong to deeds; such as schism, (q. xli), sedition (q. xlii), and war xl). In the first place, then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether
strife (q.
schism
a special sin? (2)
is
Whether
it is
graver
than unbelief? (3) Of the power exercised by schismatics;
(4)
Of the punishment
inflicted
on them.
for this
is
i.
Whether Schism
Is a Special Sin?
We
proceed thus to the First Article: It seems that schism is not a special sin. Objection i. For schism, as Pope Pelagius I. says (Epist. ad Viator, et Pancrat.),^ "denotes a
But every
division."
sin causes a division, ac-
Your sins have divided 2 between you and your God. Therefore schism
cording to Isa. 59. is
not a special
:
sin.
A man is apparently a schishe disobeys the Church. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of the Church, because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii)^ is "disobedience against the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin Obj.
matic
2.
Further,
if
a schism.
is
Obj.
3.
Further, Heresy also divides a
from the unity of
faith. If, therefore, the
schism denotes a division, differ, as a special sin,
On
it
man word
would seem not to
from the
sin of unbelief.
the contrary, Augustine {Contra Faust.
between schism and heresy, for he says that "a schismatic is one who holds the same faith, and practises the same worship, as others, and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the community but a heretic is one who holds another faith from that of the Catholic Church." Therefore schism is not a general sin.
xx),^ distinguishes
;
^
MA
IX, 7.S1; cf. Gratian,
Q. I, can. 34,
Schisma.
»
PL
'
Chap. 3 (PL
469}.
(RF
i,
Dccretum,
Pt. 11,
causa xxiv,
979)-
14, 309.
42, 369); cf.
as
were, accidental.
it
Contra Crescon., u, 3 (PL 43,
is
Hence the
the chief unity, and the particular
unity of several individuals
among themselves
subordinate to the unity of the Church, even
as the
Article
is,
schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the reason that the schismatic intends to sever himself from that unity which is the effect of charity; because charity unites not only one person to another with the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole Church in unity of spirit. Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully and intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church; sin of
mutual adaptation of each member of a
natural body
subordinate to the unity of the
is
whole body. Now the unity of the Church consists in two things namely, in the mutual con:
nection or
communion
Church, and again
members
the
in
Church
of the
according to Coloss.
of the
members
of the
the subordination of
2. 18,
all
one head, ig:Puffed up by the to the
sense of his flesh, and not holding the Head, from which the whole body, by joints and
bands, being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the increase of God. Now this Head is Christ Himself, Whose vicegerent in the Church
is
the Sovereign Pontiff.
Therefore schismatics are those who refuse to submit to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold communion with those members of the Church who acknowledge his supremacy. division between man and from sin is not intended by the happens beside his intention as a re-
Reply Obj.
God
i.
The
that results
sinner;
it
sult of his turning inordinately to a
good, and so
it is
Reply Obj. in rebelliously
2.
changeable
not schism properly so called.
The essence
of schism consists
disobeying the
commandments;
say "rebelliously," since a schismatic both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church, and refuses to submit to her judg-
and
I
ment. But every sinner does not do this, and so every sin is a schism. Reply Obj. 3. Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of those things to which each *
PL 82,
297.
PART
II
OF SECOND PART
opposed per se and directly. For heresy is per se opposed to faith, while schism is per se opposed to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Therefore just as faith and charity are different
Obj.
is
although whoever lacks
virtues,
faith
and heresy are although whoever is a heretic
charity, so too schism vices,
in his
to Titus (3. 10)
is
also a
what commentary on the Epistle
schismatic, but not conversely. This
Jerome says
lacks
different
is
'T consider the difference be-
:^
tween schism and heresy to be that heresy holds schism severs a man from the Church." Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is the road to the loss of faith, according to I Tim. I. 6: From which things, that is, charity and the like, some going astray, are turned aside into vain babbling, so too, schism is the road to heresy. Therefore Jerome adds false doctrine while
(ibid.) that "at the outset
it
is
2.
Whether Schism
Is a
A
Further,
575
greater good
is
opposed
to a greater evil, according to the Philosopher.^
Now
schism
is
opposed to charity, which
is
greater virtue than faith to which unbelief
a is
opposed, as shown above (q. xxiii, a. 6). Therefore schism is a graver sin than unbelief. On the contrary. That which results from an addition to something else surpasses that thing
good or in evil. Now heresy results from something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt doctrine, as Jerome declares in the passage quoted above (a. i. Reply 3). either in
Therefore schism is a less grievous sin than unbehef. / answer that, The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways: first, according to the species of that sin, secondly, according to its
circumstances.
And
since
particular
circum-
between
be varied in an infinite number of ways. Therefore if one were to ask in general which of two
Graver Sin
Uftbelief?
is the graver, the question must be understood to refer to the gravity derived from the sin's genus. Now the genus or species of a sin is taken from its object, as shown above (Part
sins
I-II, Q. Lxxii, A.
i;
fore the sin which
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief. Objection i. For the graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to Deut. 25. 2: According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be. Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely than even the sin
2
stances are infinite in number, so too they can
certain respect, to find a difference
Than
3.
ART.
possible, in a
schism and heresy; yet there is no schism that does not devise some heresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason for separating from the Church."
Article
Q. 39.
of unbelief or idolatry for
we read
(Exod. 32. 28), that some were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of idolatry; but of the sin of schism we read (Num. 16. 30) // the Lord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow thern down, and all things that belong Jo them, and they go down alive into hell, you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord God. Moreover the ten tribes who were guilty of schism in revolting from the rule of David were most severely punished (IV Kings 17). Therefore the sin of schism is graver than the sin of unbelief. :
good
is,
Lxxiii, A. 3). Thereopposed to the greater
Q.
in respect of its genus,
for instance a sin
than a sin
graver
is
more
grievous,
committed against God is committed against one's
neighbour.
Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God Himself, according as He is
is
in Himself the First Truth, on which faith founded; but schism is opposed to ecclesias-
which is a participated good, and a good than God Himself. Therefore it is
tical unity,
lesser
manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous than the sin of schism, although
may happen that a particular schismatic sins more grievously than a particular unbeliever, it
either because his
cause his sin
is
contempt
is
greater, or be-
a source of greater danger, or
individual," as the Philosopher states.^ Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude, namely, ecclesiastical unity, while unbelief is contrary to the particular good of one man,
some similar reason. Reply Obj. i. It had already been declared to that people by the law which they had received that there was one God, and that no other God was to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed among them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no need for those who sinned against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be punished in an unusual manner; it was enough that they should
namely the faith of an individual. Therefore it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief,
be punished in the usual way. On the other hand, it was not so well known among them that
Obj. is
2.
1
PL 26,
"The good of the multitude more godlike than the good of the
Further,
greater and
633.
2
Ethics,
I,
2
(1094^10).
for
^Ihid.,
vm,
10 (1160^9).
— SUMMA THEOLOGICA
576
Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it was necessary for those who rebelled against his authority to be
punished
in a
miraculous
We may
by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more severely punished in that people, because they were inclined to seditions and schisms. For it is written (I Esd. This city since days gone by has rebelled 4. 15) against its kings; and seditions and wars were raised therein (Vulg.,
This city
is
and hurt fid to the kings and provinces, wars were raised therein of old.). Now and sometimes a more severe punishment is inflict.
.
ed for a frequently repeated sin (as stated above, Part I-II, q. cv, a. 2, Reply 9), because punishments are medicines intended to keep
man away from
sin,
so
that where there
is
more severe punishbe inflicted. As regards the ten
greater proneness to sin, a
ment ought tribes,
to
they were punished not only for the sin
of schism, but also for that of idolatry, as stat-
ed
in the
Bapt.)
passage quoted.
2. Just as the good of the multitude is greater than the good of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic good to which that multitude is directed, even as the
Reply Obj.
good of a rank of soldiers in the army is less than the good of the commander-in-chief. In like manner the good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed, is less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is opposed. Reply Obj. 3. Charity has two objects; one is its principal object and is the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object and is our neighbour's good. Now schism and other sins against our neighbour, are opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good, which is
"One who
•}
rated from the Church, have a spiritual power.
Obj.
Further, Pope
3.
command who were
Urban
We
proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that schismatics have some power. Objection i. For Augustine says {Contra Donat. i, i) :^ "Just as those who come back to the Church after being baptized, are not bap*PL43,
100.
"We
by bishops
themselves consecrated according to rite, but have separated themselves by schism from the Roman Church, should be received mercifully and that their Orders should be acknowledged, when they rethe Catholic
turn to the unity of the Church, provided they
be of commendable
life and knowledge." But would not be so, unless spiritual power were retained by schismatics. Therefore schismatics have spiritual power. On the contrary, Cyprian says in a letter {Ep. X\\)-} which is quoted in the Decretals:^
this
"He who observes
neither unity of spirit nor
the concord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church, and from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal
pow-
er or honour."
/ answer that, Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the other a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of the
Church are immovable
so long as the consecrated thing remains, as ap-
pears even in inanimate things, since an altar,
once consecrated, is not consecrated again unit has been broken up. Consequently such
less
seen even in natural things,
Whether Schismatics Have Any
II says:^
that persons consecrated
opposed to the spiritual good of the multitude. 3.
{De Unico
is
a
Article Power?
Order have
since they retain their Orders.
Further, Augustine says
2.
than the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so these sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, hatred of God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its principal object, is not less grievous than unbelief. Nevertheless of all sins committed by man against his neighbour, the sin of schism would seem to be the greatest, because it is less
Now
separated can confer a sacrament even as he can have it." But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very great power. Therefore schismatics who are sepa-
a rebellious
city,
return after being
a kind of power. Therefore schismatics
Obj.
also reply
:
.
is
some power
and unusual manner.
who
tized again, so those
ordained, are not ordained again."
power
as this remains, as to
its
essence, in
man who
has received it by consecration, as long as he lives, &ven if he fall into schism or heresy; and this appears from the fact that if he come back to the Church, he is not consethe
crated again. Since, however, the lower power
ought not to exercise is
it
moved by
its
act except in so far as
the higher power, as it
may
be
follows that such
persons lose the use of their power, so that it is not lawful for them to use it. Yet if they use 2 Cf. De Bap. contra Donat., vi 5. (PL 43, 200). 'Council of Piacenza, x (MA xx, 806); cf. Gratian, Dccrctum, 11, causa ix, Q. i, can. 5, Ordinationse (RF i,
602). *
Cf.
PL
4,
355; the text of this letter
of the letters of St. Cornelius {Epist., x, 6
Gratian, Dccretum,
anus (RF
i,
568).
11,
causa
is
also given as
PL 3.
one
816).
vii, Q. i, can. 6,
Novali-
PART power has
II
OF SECOND PART
sacramental acts, because in these things man acts only as God's instrument, so that sacramental effects are not this
it,
On
its effect in
precluded on account of any fault whatever in the person who confers the sacrament. On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is conferred by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this does not stay with the recipient immiovably, so that it does not remain in heretics and schismatics; and
consequently they neither absolve nor excommunicate, nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and
Q. 40.
ART.
the contrary, It
i is
577 written
(Num.
16. 26)
Depart from the tents of these wicked men, those, namely, who had caused the schism, and touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins.
I answer that. According to Wisd. 11. ly, By what things a man sinneth, by the same also
he shoidd be punished (Vulg.,
Now
he
is
torment-
shown above (a. i), commits a twofold sin first by separating himself from communion with the members of the Church, and in this respect the fitting puned).
a schismatic, as :
Replies to the Objections.
ishment for schismatics is that they be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse submission to the head of the Church, and therefore, since they are unwilling to be controlled by the Church's spiritual power, it is just that they should be compelled by the secular power. Reply Obj. i. It is not lawful to receive Bap-
Article 4. Whether It Is Right That Schismatics Should Be Punished With Excommunication?
tism from a schismatic save in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man to quit this life marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from
if they do, it is invalid. Accordingly when it is said that such persons have no spiritual power, it is to be understood as referring either to the second power, or if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to the essence of the power, but to its law-
ful use.
This
suffices for the
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished with excommunication. Objection i. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly of a share in the sacraments. But Augustine says {Contra Donat. vi, 5)^ that Baptism can be received from a schismatic. Therefore it seems that excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics. Obj.
2.
faithful
astray,
is the duty of Christ's back those who have gone
Further, It
to
lead
and so
it is
written against certain per-
That which was driven away you have not brought again, neither have you bought that which was lost. Now schismatics are more easily brought back by such as may hold communion with them. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be excommusons (Ezech. 34. 4)
:
nicated.
A double punishment is not one and the same sin, according to Nahum i. 9: God will not judge the same twice (Septuagint Version.). Now some receive a temporal punishment for the sin of schism, according to xxiii, q. v.,^ where it is stated: Obj.
3.
Further,
inflicted for
"Both divine and earthly laws have laid down that those who are severed from the unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must be punished by the secular power." Therefore they ought not to be punished with excommunication. ^
PL 43,
2
Gratian, Decretum, can. 44, Qualinos.
200.
(RF i,
943).
whom
he
may
receive
it,
whether from a Jew
or a pagan, than deprived of that mark, which
bestowed in Baptism. Reply Obj. 2. Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse by which a person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the Church those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation brings them back somewhat, because through confusion at their separation, they are sometimes led to do is
penance.
Reply Obj.
3.
The punishments
of the pres-
when one compel a man, another is added, just as physicians employ several bodily medicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when excommunication does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs the compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment suffices, another should not be employed. ent hfe are medicinal, and therefore
punishment does not
suffice to
QUESTION XL Of war {In Four Articles)
We
must now consider war, under which head Whether some kind of war is lawful? (2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight? (3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes? (4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days? there are four points of inquiry: (i)
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
578
course to the material sword in defending that
Article
Whether
i.
It is
Always Sinful
common
To Wage War?
We proceed thus to the First Article: seems that it is always sinful to wage war. Objection i. Because punishment is not except for
flicted
sin.
Now
those
It
in-
who wage war
Our Lord with punishment, according to Matt. 26. 52: All that take the sword shall perish with the sword. Therefore are threatened by
wars are unlawful.
all
2. Further, Whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Matt. 5. 39) Bnt I say to you not to resist evil; and (Rom. 12. 19): Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath.
Obj.
:
Therefore war Obj.
is
always
Obj. thing
con-
the Church, since those trials
deprived
are
sin.
On
of
who
are slain in these
ecclesiastical
said
are in authority (Ps. 81. 4) Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the :
for this reason Augus(Contra Faust, xxii, 75):^ "The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands, of those who hold the supreme authority."
hand of the sinner; and tine says
who
that those
it
what
restore
Thirdly,
burial.
seems that war is a sin absolutely. the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon
Therefore
it is
who
to those
is
required,
namely
are attacked should be attacked
has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to
contrary
is
exercise of a lawful
itself lawful, as is
take place in
weal against external enemies. Hence
evident in exercises
The
Further,
war
always a
is
the sciences.
of
:
Secondly, a just cause sin, is
disturbances,
But warlike exercises which tournaments are forbidden by
Therefore war
4.
is
internal
evil-doers, according to the
because they deserve it on account of some fault. Therefore Augustine says (q. x, super Jos.) :^ "A just war is usually described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state
trary to an act of virtue. But to peace.
against
words of the Apostle (Rom. 13. 4) He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common
sinful.
Further, Nothing, except
3.
weal
when they punish
it
it is
has seized unjustly." necessary that the belligerents
should have a right intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoid-
Hence Augustine says (De Verb.
on the son of the centurion:^ "If the Christian Religion forbade war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the Gospel would
ance of
rather have been counselled to cast aside their
tives of aggrandisement, or cruelty, but with
arms, and to give up soldiering altogether. On the contrary, they were told: 'Do violence to
Dom.) sinful
evil.
"True religion does not look upon as those wars that are waged not for mo:^
the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-
three things are necessary. First, the authority
and of uplifting the good," For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii) :^ "The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and re-
by whose command the war
lentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of
waged. For it is not the business of a private person to declare war, because he can
power, and such things, all these are rightly condemned in war." Reply Obj. i. As Augustine says (Contra "To take the sword is to arm Faust, xxii) oneself in order to take the life of anyone, without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority." On the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by
and be content with your pay' no man; (Luke 3. 14). If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he did not forbid .
.
.
soldiering." / atiswer that, In order for a
of the sovereign is
war
to be just,
to be
seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private person to
summon
together the
people, which has to be done in wartime. as the care of the to those
who
common
are in authority,
And
it
And
is
committed
is
their busi-
common
weal of the kingdom or province subject to them. just as it is lawful for them to have re-
ness to watch over the city,
weal
doers,
:''
the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as 2
PL
*
Cl. Gratian,
A pud Ep. ad Marcel., cxxxvm, chap. 2 (PL 53, 531). Cf. Gratian, Decretum, Pt. 11, causa xxm, Q. i, can. 2 Paratus ii;/wr.i (RFi.Sqi). ^
zeros
(PL
12 6
«
>
42, 448.
(RF
Quacst. in HepL, vi
I,
(PL
34. 781)-
causa xxm, Q. i, can. 6, 893); see Augustine, City oj God, xix,
Decretum,
41, 637).
Chap. 74 (PL 42, 447). Chap. 70 (PL 42, 444).
rt. 11,
PART
OF SECOND PART
II
a public person) through zeal for justice, so to speak, of God,
by the authority,
take the sword, but to use
by another, and so
And
ment.
as
it
is
and
not to
commissioned
does not deserve punish-
it
yet even those
who make
sinful use
of the sword are not always slain with the
sword, but they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they are
punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.
Reply Obj.
2.
{De Serm. Dom.
Monte,
in
i),^ should always be borne in readiness of mind, so that we be ready to obey them, and,
necessary, to refrain from resistance or self-
if
defence. Nevertheless for a
man
it is
necessary sometimes
to act otherwise for the
good, or for the good of those with
common
whom
he
is
Hence Augustine says {Ep. ad Mar'} "Those whom we have to punish with
Obj.
cellin.)
necessary to handle in ways against their will. For when we are
many
stripping a
man
it
is
of the lawlessness of sin,
it is
2.
Further, Pope Leo
Therefore Obj.
3.
Further, It seems to be the same
man does a thing himself, or consents being done by another, according to Rom. I. 32: They who do such things, are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but they
whether a to
its
them that do them. Now seem to consent to a thing, who induce others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce others to fight, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. HortatuY that "Charles v/ent to war v;ith the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of Adrian, bishop of those,
above
all,
Rome." Therefore they Obj.
4.
Now
is
it
also are allowed to fight.
Further, Wliatever
torious in itself
is
is
right
and meri-
lawful for prelates and clerics.
sometimes right and meritorious to
make war, for Omni timorey
it is
written
that "if a
(xxiii, qu. 8, can.
man
die for the true
save his country, or in defence of Christians, God will give him a heavenly reward." Therefore it is lawful for bishops and faith, or to
clerics to fight.
On
slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike
the contrary. It
was
said to Peter as rep-
resenting bishops and clerics (Matt. 26. 52)
no such danger, and hence they were called exercises of arms or bloodless wars, as Jerome states in an epistle (cf. Veget.,
Put up —
—DeReMilit.i).^
to fight.
Article 2. Whether It Is Law Jul for Clerics and Bishops To Fight?
the good of a
exercises presented
writes (xxiii,
lawful for bishops to fight.
it is
also that consent to
an internal enemy." Reply Obj. 3. Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord came not to send upon earth (Matt. 10. 34). Hence Augustine says {Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix) :^ "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace." Reply Obj. 4. Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in
IV
we commanded our people to gather together, and ordered them to go down to the sea-shore."
more hopeless than the happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil will, like
this
can. Igitur):^
8,
good for him to be vanquished, since nothing is
579
Now
"As adverse tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some said that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and covertly; for which reason qu.
fighting.
a kindly severity,
2
seems to be above all the duty of prelates, for Gregory says {Horn, in Ev. xiv) :^ "The wolf comes upon the sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and was not, leaveth the sheep, and flieth, for he fears lest the wolf hurt him, and dares not stand up against his injustice." Therefore it is lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.
Precepts of this kind, as Au-
gustine observes
ART.
Q. 40.
ing at the hands of the foe.
its
again thy sword into the scabbard (Vulg., it is not lawful for them
place). Therefore
/ answer that. Several things are requisite for
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems lawful for clerics and bishops to fight. Objection i. For, as stated above (a. i), wars are lawful and just in so far as they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffer1
Chap. 19 (PL 34, 1260);
2
Epist., 138.2
(PL
4
Chaps. 9-28
(DD
cf.
Epist., 138. 2
Si, S3i).
664-672);
II,
23
2
(PL33, S3i).
PL 2,3, 856. (DD 684).
human
society,
and a number of by a number
things are done better and quicker of persons than
by one,
as the Philosopher ob-
serves,^ while certain occupations are so inconsistent with 6
PL
one another, that they cannot be
76, 1128.
6 Gratian, Decretum (RF i, 954); cf. Leo Ludovicum Angus turn (MA xiv, 888). ">
Gratian, Decretum,
(RF i,
^lUd. ^
Politics,
I,
2 (1252^3).
955).
iv,
Epist.
Ad
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
sSo fittingly exercised at the
who
same time; hence those
are assigned to important duties are for-
bidden to occupy themselves with things of small im.portance. Thus according to human laws, soldiers
who
are assigned to warlike pur-
engage
suits are forbidden to
Now
in
commerce.
warlike pursuits are altogether incom-
and a cleric two reasons. The first reason is a general one, because, namely, warlike pursuits are full patible with the duties of a bishop for
of unrest, so that they hinder the
much from
mind very
the contemplation of Divine things,
the praise of God, and prayers for the people,
which belong to the duties of a cleric. Therefore as commercial enterprises are forbidden to clerics, because they entangle the mind too much, so too are warlike pursuits, according to II Tim. 2. ^•. No mail being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business. The second reason is a special one, because, namely, all the clerical Orders are directed to the ministry of the altar, on w^hich the Passion of Christ just
represented sacramentally, according to I As often as yon shall eat this bread,
is
Cor. II. 26:
and drink the
chalice,
you
shall
show the death
of the Lord, until He come. Therefore it is unbecoming for them to slay or shed blood, and is
it
more
shed their
fitting that
own blood
they should be ready to
for Christ, so as to imitate
deed what they portray in their ministry. For reason it has been decreed^ that those who shed blood, even without sin, become irregular. Now no man w^ho has a certain duty to perform can lawfully do that which renders him unfit for that duty. Therefore it is altogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to the shedding of blood. Reply Obj. i. Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the oppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons, according to the saying of the Apostle (II Cor. 10. 4): The weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God. Such are salutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate, the sentence of excommunication. in
this
Testament
the priests were comsound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this purpose that bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to war; and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of them take up arms themselves. Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (q. xxiii, a. 4, Reply 2) every power, art or virtue that pertains to the end, has to dispose that which is
manded
(Jos. 6. 4)
to
Now, among
directed to the end.
the faithful,
carnal wars should be considered as having for their
end the Divine
clerics to dispose
spiritual
Therefore
clerics are deputed.
good to which the duty of
it is
and counsel other men
to en-
gage in just wars. For they are forbidden to take up arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an occupation is unbecoming their persons.
Reply Obj. 4. Although it is meritorious to wage a just war, nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their being assigned to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.
Article
Whether
3.
Ambushes
It Is
Lawful To Lay
War?
in
We proceed thus to the Third Article: seems that it is unlawful to lay ambushes
It in
war.
Objection
Thou
i.
For
it is
written (Deut. 16. 20)
which is But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even in a shall follow justly after that
just.
just war.
Obj. 2. Further, Ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states {Contra Mend, xv).^ Therefore, as "one is bound to keep faith with one's enemy," as Augustine states {Ep. ad Bonifac. clxxxix),^ it seems that it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.
Obj.
3.
Further, It
is
written (Matt.
7.
12):
authority of their superiors, take part in wars,
Whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them, and we ought to ob-
not indeed by taking up arms themselves, but
serve this in
by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly, by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual helps. Thus in the Old
Now
Reply Obj.
'
2.
Prelates and clerics may, by the
Gratian, Decrctum,
I7S).
pt.
I,
d. L, can. 4,
Miror.
(RF
I,
all
our dealings with our neighbour.
our enemy
since no
man
is
our neighbour. Therefore,
wishes ambushes or deceptions
it seems that no one ought to carry on war by laying ambushes.
to be prepared for himself,
*
PL 40,
539-
'PL 33,
856.
PART
II
OF SECOND PART
On the contrary, Augustine says
(QQ. in Heptateuch., qu. X, super Jos.):^ "Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be carried on openly or by ambushes," and he proves this by the authority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai (Jos. 8. 2). / answer that, The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two ways. First, through being told something false,
this is
Ambrose
Secondly, a
we
(De
states
Offic.
man may
i,
29).
be deceived by what
we do not
say or do, because
declare our
purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always bound to do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, according to Matt. 7. 6: Give not that which holy, to dogs. Therefore
is
much more ought
the plan of campaign to be hidden from the
enemy. For his
purpose
among
reason
this
that a soldier has to learn lest it
is
other things
the art of conceahng
come to the enemy's knowlBook on Strategy by Fron-
edge, as stated in the
tinus.^ Concealment of this kind is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully employed in a just war. Nor can these ambushes
ART,
581
i
unlawful to fight on holy days. Obj. 3. Further, No inordinate deed should be done to avoid temporal harm. But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an inordinate is it
deed. Therefore no one should fight on a holy
day even through the need of avoiding temporal
harm
On
the contrary. It
is
written (I Machab.
The Jews rightly determined Whosoever shall come up against us 2.
41)
:
the Sabbath-day,
I answer that.
or through the breaking of a promise,
always unlawful. No one ought to deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain rights of war and convenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies, as
and
Q. 41.
therefore,
.
.
.
saying:
to fight
on
we will fight against him. The observance of holy days
no hindrance to those things which are ordered to man's safety, even that of his body. Hence Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (John 7. 23) Are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day? is
:
Hence physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days. Yet much more reason there for safeguarding the common weal (by which many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both temporal and spiritual
is
prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual. Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding
the
common weal
of the faithful,
it is
lawful to
carry on a war on holy days, provided there be
need for doing so; because it would be to tempt God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain from fighting. However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight on a holy day, for the reasons given. And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
be properly called deceptions, nor are they contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have an inordinate v/ill if he were unwilling that others should hide from him. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
QUESTION XLI Of {In
strife
Two
Articles)
We must now consider strife,^ under which head Article 4. Whether on Holy Days?
It is
Lawful To Fight
strife is a sin? (2)
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It seems unlawful to fight on holy days. Objection i. For holy days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God. Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Exod. 20. 8, for Sabbath is interpreted rest. But wars are full of unrest. Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days. Obj. 2. Further, Certain persons are reproached (Isa. 58. 3) because on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of strife, and of striking with their fists. Much more, 1
PL 34,
3
Straiagematum.,
781.
2PL16, 1 1.
(DD
there are two points of inquiry: (i)
68.
504).
Whether
it is
Whether
a daughter of
anger?
Article
i.
Whether
Strife Is
Always a Sin?
We
proceed thus to the First Article: It seems that strife is not always a sin. Objection i. For strife seems a kind of contention; hence Isidore says (Etym. x)^ that the word "rixosus (quarrelsome) is derived from the snarling (rictu) of a dog, because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict; he delights in brawling, and provokes contention." Now contention is not always a sin. Neither, therefore,
is
strife.
denotes fighting between individuals.
*
Strife here
5
PL 82, 392.
— :
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
582
Obj. 2. Further, It is related (Gen. 26. 21) that the ser\'ants of Isaac digged another well,
and for that they quarrelled likemse. is
Now
it
not credible that the household of Isaac quarreproved by him,
relled publicly, without being
supposing
it
were a
Therefore
sin.
strife is
not a
sin.
Obj. 3. Further, Strife seems to be a war between individuals. But war is not always sinful. Therefore strife is not always a sin. On the contrary, Strifes^ are reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5. 20), and they
who do such
things shall not obtain the
kingdom
of God. Therefore strifes are not only sinful, but they are even mortal sins. / answer that, While contention impHes a
"and dehghts
brawling." Thirdly, he provokes it
goes on, "and pro-
vokes contention."
Reply Obj.
2.
The
sense of the text
is
not that
the servants of Isaac quarrelled, but that the
inhabitants
of
country
that
with
quarrelled
them. Therefore these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who bore the calumny (cf. Gen. 21. 20).
it
Reply Obj. 3. In order for a war to be just must be declared by authority of the govern-
ing power, as stated above (q. xl,
a.
however proceeds from a private anger or hatred. For if the servants
i), strife
feeling
of
of a sover-
eign or judge, in virtue of their public authority,
attack certain
men and
it is
20 says' that strifes are "when persons strike one another through anger." Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it takes place be-
thority.
Hence
who
case
but those
it
these defend themselves,
who who
not the former of strife, but those
contradiction of words, strife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5.
in
others to quarrel, and thus
are said to be guilty resist the public au-
not the assailants in this
is
are guilty of strife and
commit
who defend themselves beyond
sin,
order.
tween private persons, being declared not by public authority, but rather
Therefore
will.
strife is
by a disordered
always
sinful.
In fact
man who
attacks annot without mortal sin that one inflicts harm on another even if the deed be done by the hands. But in him who defends himself, it may be without sin, or it may a mortal sin in the
it is
other unjustly, for
it is
sometimes involve a venial sin, or sometimes a mortal sin; and this depends on his purpose and on his manner of defending himself. For if his sole purpose be to withstand the injury done to him, and he defend himself with due moderation, it is no sin, and one cannot say properly that there is strife on his part. But if, on the other hand, his self-defence be inspired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a sin. It is
a venial sin,
if
a slight
movement
he does not defending himself;
or vengeance obtrude itself, or
much
exceed moderation in
of hatred
if
a mortal sin if he makes for his assailant with the fixed intention of killing him, or inflicting grievous harm on him.
but
it is
Reply Obj. i. Strife is not just the same as contention, and there are three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which express the inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrel-
some man
always ready to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, "ever ready to contradict," that is to say, whether the other man says or does well or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself, and so the passage proceeds, 1
is
The Douay Version has
^Glossa 159)-
inlerl.
(vi,
"quarrels."
87V); Glossa
Lombardi (PL
192,
Article 2. Whether of Anger?
Strife Is a
Daughter
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that strife is not a daughter of anger. Objection i. For it is written (James 4. i): Whence are wars and contentions? Are they not from your concupiscences, which war in your members? But anger is not in the concupiscible part. Therefore strife is a daughter, not of .
.
.
anger, but of concupiscence.
Obj.
He
2.
Further, It
that boasteth
reth up quarrels.
Now
strife is
stir-
apparently the
seems that
strife
a daughter of pride or vainglory which
make
same is
written (Prov. 28, 25):
is
and puffeth up himself,
as quarrel. Therefore
it
man
boast and puff himself up. 3. Further, It is written (Prov. 18. 6) The lips of a fool intermeddle with strife. Now folly differs from anger, for it is opposed, not
a
Obj.
:
to meekness, but to
wisdom
or prudence. There-
not a daughter of anger. Obj. 4. Further, It is written (Prov. 10. 12) Hatred stirreth up strifes. But "hatred arises fore strife
is
:
from envy," according 45). 3 Therefore strife
to
Gregory {Moral,
xxxi,
is
not a daughter of anger,
is
written (Prov. 17. 19)
but of envy. Obj.
He
5.
that
Further, It studieth
discords,
soweth (Vulg., is a daughter of
loveth) quarrels. But discord vainglor>', as stated
Therefore
above
(q.
xxxvii,
a.
2).
strife is also.
On the C07itrary, Gregory says (Moral, xxxi, 45)^ that "anger gives rise to strife"; and it »
PL
76, 621.
*
PL 76,
621.
PART is
man stirreth up
OF SECOND PART
II
written (Prov. 15. 18; 29. 22):
A
passionate
strifes.
I answer that, As stated above (a. i), strife denotes an antagonism extending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another. Now there are two ways in which one man may intend to
that strife
and
is
one's
other
QUESTION XLII Of (In
knows and withstands his intention. This is what we mean by strife, and it belongs properly to
must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (i)
Whether
it is
a special sin? (2)
Whether
it is
a
mortal sin?
that sedition
from what has been said above about the pas-
other sins.
man
Articles)
We
the desire of vengeance, for the not content to hurt secretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him to feel the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for what he has done, as may be seen
angry
sedition
Two
directed to the hurt of
enemy either openly or secretly. In anway a man intends to hurt another who
anger which
583
the daughter of vainglory properly
another. In one way it is as though he intended absolutely the other's hurt, which in this case is the outcome of hatred, for the inis
i
directly.
harm
tention of hatred
ART.
Q. 42.
among themselves. Even so any sin may command the act of another sin, by directing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove
quarrel
is
is
Article
properly speaking, strife arises
.
Whether Sedition
Objection x),^
is
i.
:
It
seems
not a special sin distinct from
For, according to Isidore (Etym.
"a seditious
man
among minds, and
from anger. Reply Obj.
Is a Special
We proceed thus to the First Article
sion of anger (Part I-II, Q. xlvi, a. 6, Reply 2). Therefore,
i
Sin Distifict from Other Sins?
is
one who sows dissent
begets discord."
Now, by
Reply Obj. 2. Boasting and puffing up of self which are the result of anger or vainglory, are
provoking the commission of a sin, a man sins by no other kind of sin than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems that sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord. Obj. 2. Further, Sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism takes its name from scission, as stated above (q. xxxix, a. i). Therefore it seems that the sin of sedition is not dis-
not the direct but the occasional cause of quar-
tinct
Q.
XXV, AA.
whatever arises also
I-II,
2), all the irascible passions arise
I,
from those
As stated above (Part
i.
of the concupiscible part, so that
the immediate outcome of anger, from concupiscence as from its first
is
root.
rels or strife, because,
when
a
man
resents an-
other being preferred to him, his anger
and then
ed,
is
arous-
his anger results in quarrel
and
strife.
reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor those vices which arise from them, as appears from Moral, xxxi,^ where both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a special sin, distinct from other sins. On the contrary, Seditions are mentioned as is
Reply Obj. I-II, Q.
from that of schism. 3. Further, Every special sin that is distinct from other sinj, is either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice. Now sedition Obj.
Anger, as stated above (Part XLViii, A. 3) hinders the judgment of 3.
the reason, so that
Hence they have due to a defect
a
it
bears a likeness to folly.
common
effect, since it is
in the reason that a
man
designs
among
from other
to hurt another inordinately.
distinct
Reply Obj. 4. Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it is not the proper effect
/ answer that, Sedition is a special sin, having something in common with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has something in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain antagonism, and it differs from them in two points. First, because war and strife denote actual aggression on either side, while sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression, or the preparation for such aggression. Hence a gloss on II Cor. 12. 20 says^ that "seditions are tumults tending to fight," when, that is, a number of people make preparations with the
of hate, because it is
when one man hates another him in a quar-
beside his intention to hurt
relsome and open manner, since sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, he sees himself prevailing, he endeavours to harm him with strife and quarrel. But to hurt a man in
a quarrel
is
the proper effect of anger, for
the reason given above.
Reply Obj.
5.
Strifes give rise to hatred
discord in the hearts of those
and
are guilty
and so he that "studies," that is intends sow discord among others, causes them to
of strife, to
who
1
PL
82, 394.
^Glossa
sins (II Cor. 12. 20).
2Chap. 45 (PL76, 621). Glossa Lombardi (PL
interl. (vi, 771);
192, 89).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
584
intention of fighting. Secondly, they differ in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against external foes, being as it were between one peo-
between one individual and another, or between few people on one side and few on the other, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between the mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part. Therefore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good, namely the unity and
ple and another, while strife
cites others to sedition,
and since sedition de-
notes a kind of discord,
it
follows that a sedi-
one who creates discord, not of any kind, but between the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only in him who
man
is
sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one another inordinately. Reply Obj. 2. Sedition differs from schism in two respects. First, because schism is opposed
the contrary,
The Apostle
forbids sedi-
sins (II Cor. 12. 20).
As
/ answer that,
is
peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin. Reply Obj. i. A seditious man is one who in-
tious
On
tions together with other things that are mortal
tion
stated above (a. i), sedi-
contrary to the unity of the multitude,
is
is, the people of a city or kingdom. Now Augustine says^ that wise men understand the word people to designate "not any crowd of persons, but the assembly of those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and for the common good." Therefore it is evident that the unity to which sedition is opposed is the unity of law and common good; hence it follows manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common good. Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its gravity will be all the greater according as the common good which it assails surpasses the private good
that
which
is
by
assailed
strife. is first and most grievously; those who are led by them
Accordingly the sin of sedition
who
chiefly in its authors,
and secondly
in
it is
sin
ecclesiastical unity, while sedition is contrary
common good. Those, however, who defend the common good, and withstand
temporal or secular unity of the multi-
the seditious party, are not themselves seditious,
tude, for instance of a city or kingdom. Second-
even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because he defends himself, as stated above
to the spiritual unity of the multitude,
to the
namely
schism does not imply any preparation for a bodily fight as sedition does, but only a spirily,
to disturb the
(q. XLI, a. i).
Reply Obj.
tual dissent.
common
it
the parts of a multitude.
always a mortal
Article 2. Whether Sedition Is Always a Mortal Sin?
dently good
XL,
(q.
We
proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that sedition is not always a mortal sin. Objection i. For sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight," according to the gloss quoted above (a. i). But fighting is not always a mortal sin;
indeed
it is
sometimes just and lawful, as
stated above (q. xl, a.
i
;
q.
xli, a. i).
Much
good, as stated above
But sedition runs counter
A. i).
common good Reply Obj.
lawful to fight, provided
It is
1.
be for the
Reply Obj. 3. Sedition, like schism, is contained under discord, since each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but between
to the
of the multitude, so that
it
is
sin.
Discord from what is not evibe without sin, but discord evidently good cannot be without 2.
may
from what is and sedition
is discord of this kind, for it contrary to the unity of the multitude, which
sin; is is
a manifest good.
Reply Obj.
3.
A
tyrannical government
is
not
because it is directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler, as the Philosopher states.^ Consequently there is no just,
government of
more, therefore, can sedition be without a mor-
sedition in disturbing a
tal sin.
unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so
Obj.
2.
Further, Sedition
is
a kind of discord,
this kind,
inordinately that his subjects suffer greater
harm
above (a. i. Reply 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes without any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.
from the consequent disturbance than from the
Obj. 3. Further, It is praiseworthy to deliver multitude from a tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some dissension in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks
courages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for this is tyranny, since it is ordered to the private good of the ruler and to the injury of
to retain the tyrant, while the rest strive to de-
the multitude.
as stated
a
rather that
is
1
City oJGod,
II,
without mortal
2
Politics,
7 (i279''6)
III,
it
is
the tyrant
guilty of sedition, since he en-
throne him. Therefore there can be sedition sin.
Indeed
tyrant's government.
21
(PL
41, 67). ;
Ethics, viu, 10 (ii6o*>8).
PART
II
OF SECOND PART
QUESTION XLIII Of scandal It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice, those, namely, whereby one harms one's neighbour unjustly. But scandal seems to be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here consider scandal, under which head there are eight points
What
scandal? (2) Whether
is
a sin? (3) Whether it is a special sin? (4) Whether it is a mortal sin? (5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized? (6) Whether
scandal
i
585
when he
offends or
weakens him. Now scandal is divided against offence and weakness, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14. 21) It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is of ended, or scandalized, or weakened. Therefore the above definition of scandal :
(In Eight Articles)
of inquiry: (i)
ART.
Q. 43.
hour's spiritual downfall
is
they can give scandal? (7) Whether spiritual goods are to be given up on account of scandal? (8) Whether temporal things are to be given up on account of scandal?
unfitting.
is
On
the
Matt.
Jerome in expounding Dost thou know that the Phari-
contrary,
15. 12,
when they heard
"When we
this word, etc., says:^ read 'Whosoever shall scandalize,'
the sense
'Whosoever
sees,
is
shall,
by deed
or word,
occasion another's downfall.' " / answer that. As Jerome observes {ibid.) "the Greek aKav8a\ov may be rendered offence, downfall, or a stumbling against some-
For when a body, while moving along it may happen to stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down such an obstacle is a (TKavddXov. In hke manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be disposed to a spiritual downfall by thing."
a path, meets with an obstacle,
;
Whether Scandal Is Fittingly Defined As Being Something Less Rightly Article Said or
i.
Done That Occasions
Spiritual
another's
Downfall?
We proceed thus to the First Article: It seems that scandal is unfittingly defined as "something less rightly said or done that occa-
word or deed,
nature disposes a
man
cept that which has
For scandal is a sin as we shall state further on (a. 2). Now, according to Augustine {Contra Faust, xxii, 27),^ "a sin is a word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God." Therefore the definition given above is
what
1.
insufficient, since
Obj.
omits thought or desire.
it
Further, Since
2,
one
right acts
is
among
more virtuous
virtuous or
or
more
right
than another, that one alone which has perfect rectitude would not seem to be a less right one. therefore, scandal
If,
said or done,
it
except the best of Obj. cause.
3.
a scandal.
all, is
An
Further,
occasion
is
an accidental
But nothing accidental should enter a
definition,
because
it
defined. Therefore
scandal, to say that
Obj.
somicthing less rightly
is
follows that every virtuous act
4.
does not specify the thing
it
is
it is
unfitting, in defining
an occasion.
Further, Whatever a
man
does
may
be the occasion of another's spiritual downfall, because accidental causes are indeterminate. Consequently, if scandal is something that occasions another's spiritual downfall, any deed or
word can be a
scandal.
And
this
seems un-
reasonable.
Obj. 1
5.
Further,
PL 42, 418.
A man
occasions his neigh-
is,
as
;
sions spiritual downfall."
Objection
in so far, that
one man by his injunction, inducement or example, moves another to sin and this is scandal properly so called. Now nothing by its very
fall,
dal
is
to spiritual downfall ex-
some lack
of rectitude, since
perfectly right secures
man
against a
instead of conducing to his downfall. Scantherefore, fittingly defined as "something
is,
less rightly
done or
said, that occasions another's
spiritual downfall."^ i. The thought or desire of evil hidden in the heart, and therefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an obstacle conducing to his spiritual downfall; hence it cannot come under the head of scandal. Reply Obj. 2. A thing is said to be less right, not because something else surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack of rectitude, either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or through having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man were to sit at meat in the idol's temple (I Cor. 8. 10), though this is not sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil intention, yet, since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a semblance of worshipping the idol, it might occasion another man's spiritual downfall. Hence the Apostle says (I Thessal. From all appearance of evil refrain your5. 22) selves. Scandal is therefore fittingly described as something done "less rightly," so as to com-
Reply Obj.
lies
:
2
3
PL 26, hi; cf. Glossa interl, on Matt. 18.8 Glossa interl. on Matt. 18.8 (v, 56r).
(v, 561).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
586 prise both whatever
is
sinful in itself,
and
all
that has an appearance of evil.
Reply Obj. Lxxv, AA.
Q.
be a
As stated above (Part I-II, Lxxx, A. i), nothing: can cause of a man's spiritual down3.
2,
sufficient
results in downfall.
3; Q.
which is sin, save his own will. Therefore another man's words or deeds can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to that downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford not a cause, but an occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an accidental cause. Nor is there any reason why certain definitions should not make mention of things that are accidental, since what is accidental to one may be proper to something else; thus the accidental cause is mentioned in the definition of chance.^ Reply Obj. 4. Another's word or deed may be the cause of another's sin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a man either intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into sin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a character as to lead
Article
We
fall,
another into sin; for instance, when a
man
has an appearance of
sin.
In this case he that
does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an occasion of another's spiritual downfall, and One man's so his act is called "active scandal." word or deed is the accidental cause of another's sin, when he neither intends to lead him into sin, nor does what is of a nature to lead him into sin, and yet this other one, through being
—
is
led into sin, for instance, into
envy of another's good, and then he who does this righteous act, does not, so far as he is concerned, afford an occasion of the other's downfall, but it is this other one who takes the occasion according to
Rom.
7.8: Sin taking occasion
by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupisce7ice. Therefore this is passive, without active scandal, since he that acts rightly does not, for his
own
part, afford the occasion
of the other's downfall.
Sometimes therefore
happens that there is active scandal in the one together with passive scandal in the other, as when one commits a sin being induced to it by another; sometimes there is active without passive scandal, for instance when one, by word or deed, provokes another to sin, and the latter does not consent; and sometimes there is passive without active scandal, as we have already it
said.
Reply Obj. to scandal;
5.
Weakness denotes proneness
while offence signifies resentment
against the person 1
Aristotle, Physics,
11,
who commits 5 (197*5).
a
sin,
which
2.
Whether Scandal
proceed
Is a Sin?
Second Article:
thtis to the
It
would seem that scandal is not a sin. Objection i. For sins do not occur from neccessity, since all sin is voluntary, as stated above (Part I-II, Q. Lxxrv, a. i q. lxxx, a. i). Now it is written (Matt. 18. 7): It must needs be that scandals come. Therefore scandal is not a ;
sin.
Obj.
Further,
2.
No
sin arises
from a sense
of dutifulness, because a good tree cannot bri?ig
forth evil fruit (Matt.
come from
7.
But scandal may Our Lord
18).
a sense of dutifulness, for
said to Peter (Matt. 16. 23) Thou art a scandal unto Me, in reference to which words Jerome says^ that "the Apostle's error was due to his sense of dutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil." Therefore scandal is not always :
a sin.
publicly commits a sin or does something that
ill-disposed,
may be sometimes without spiritual and scandal is the stumbhng that
resentment downfall;
Obj.
3.
Further, Scandal denotes a stumbling.
But he that stumbles does not always fall. Therefore scandal, which is a spiritual fall, can be without
On
sin.
the contrary, Scandal
Now
rightly said or done."^
rectitude
with
is
a
sin.
is "something less anything that lacks
Therefore scandal
is
always
sin.
/ answer that.
As already stated
(a. i,
Reply
two kinds, passive scandal in the person scandalized, and active scandal in the person who gives scandal, and so occasions
4), scandal
is
of
a downfall. Accordingly passive scandal
ways a
is
al-
person scandalized for he is not scandalized except in so far as he succumbs sin in the
;
and that is a sin. Yet there can be passive scandal without sin on the part of the person whose action has octo a spiritual downfall,
casioned the scandal, as for instance,
person like
is
when
a
scandalized at another's good deed. In
manner active scandal is always a sin in who gives scandal, since either what
the person
only have the appearance
he does
is
a sin, or
of sin,
it
should always be
if it
left
undone out of
that love for our neighbour which binds each
one to be solicitous for his neighbour's salvation, so that if he persists in doing it he acts against charity. Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person scandalized, as stated above (a. i, Reply 4). Reply Obj. i. These words, It must needs be ^
In Matt., Bk.
' Cf.
Glossa
in, super 16.23
interl.,
(PL
26, 124).
super Matt. 18.8
(v, 56r).
PART
II
OF SECOND PART
ART.
Q. 43.
4
5^7
that scandals come, are to be understood to
brother be grieved, thou walkest not
convey not the absolute, but the conditional necessity of scandal; in which sense it is necessary that whatever God foresees or foretells must happen, provided it be taken together with such foreknowledge, as explained in the
cording to charity. Therefore scandal
now is
ac-
a spe-
cial sin.
/ answer that, As stated above
(a. i.
2), scandal is twofold, active
A.
Reply 4;
and passive.
First Part (q. xiv, a. 13, Reply 3; q. xxiii, a. 6,
Passive scandal cannot be a special sin, because through another's word or deed a man may fall
Reply 2).
into
Or we may say occurring
is
a necessity of end, because they
deed does not constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not imply a special deformity in
.
.
.
who
are re-
may he made manifest (I Cor. 11. 19). Or scandals must occur because of the condition of man who fails to shield himself from sin. Thus a physician on seeing a man partaking of unsuitable food might say that such a man must proved
injure his health, which
is
to be understood on
the condition that he does not change his diet.
In Hke manner
men
it
must be that scandals come
fail to
change their
evil
mode
of
living.
Reply Obj. 2. In that passage scandal is taken wide sense for any kind of hindrance. For Peter wished to hinder Our Lord's Passion
in the
out of a sense of dutifulness towards Christ.
Reply Obj.
No man
stumbles spiritually, without being kept back somewhat from advancing in God's way, and that is at least a venial sin.
Article
3.
and the fact that a man
sin;
takes occasion to sin from another's word or
are useful in order that they
so long as
any kind of
that the necessity of scandals
3.
Whether Scandal
Is a Special Sin?
We
opposition to a special virtue.
On
the other hand, active scandal
may
be un-
derstood in two ways, directly and accidentally. The scandal is accidental when it is beside the a man does not indeed or word, to occasion another's spiritual downfall, but merely to satisfy his own will. In such a case even active scandal is not a special sin, because a species is not constituted by that which is accidental. Active scandal is direct when a man intends,
agent's intention, as tend,
by
by
when
his inordinate
word or deed, to draw another and then it becomes a special kind of
his inordinate
into sin, sin
on account of the intention of a special kind
of end, because moral actions take their species
from
above (Part I-II, q. Hence, just as theft and murder are special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting the intention of doing a special I,
their end, as stated
A. 3; Q. XVIII, A. 6).
proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that scandal is not a special sin. Objection i. For scandal is "something said or done less rightly."^ But this apphes to every kind of sin. Therefore every sin is a scandal, and consequently, scandal is not a special sin. Obj. 2. Further, Every special kind of sin, or every special kind of injustice, may be found
injury to one's neighbour, so too, scandal
separately from other kinds, as stated in the
pect of a special sin from the end intended, as
Ethics? But scandal is not to be found separatefrom other sins. Therefore it is not a special kind of sin.
stated above.
ly
Obj.
3.
Further, Every special sin
is
consti-
tuted by something which specifies the moral
But the notion of scandal consists in its being something done in the presence of others, and the fact of a sin being committed openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance, does not seem to constitute the species of a sin. act.
Therefore scandal
On
is
the contrary,
cial sin
opposed to
it.
ten
(Rom.
14. 15)
:
active scandal, but
Reply Obj.
opposed to
If,
Matt. 18.8
1
Cf. Glossa Inter., super
2
Aristotle, v, 2 (1130^19).
it is
writ-
because of thy meat, thy (v, 56r).
2.
it
may
derive the formal as-
Active scandal can be found
when a man scanby a deed which is not a
separate from other sins, as dalizes his neighbour
an appearance of evil. Scandal does not derive the species of a special sin from the circumstance in question, but from the intention of the end, as stated above. sin in itself, but has
Reply Obj.
We
is
a
in-
harm to his neighbour, and it opposed to fraternal correction, by which a man intends the removal of a special kind of harm. Reply Obj. 1. Any sin may be the matter of
Article
But scandal
is
directly
sin.
a special virtue, namely charity. For
man
tends a special
is
special virtue has a spe-
not a special
A
special kind of sin, because thereby a
4.
3.
Whether Scandal
Is a
Mortal Sin?
proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that scandal is a mortal sin. Objection 1. For every sin that is contrary to charity is a mortal sin, as stated above (q.
XXXV,
A,
scandal
is
3; Part I-II, Q. lxxxviii, a. 2). But contrary to charity, as stated above
.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
588 (aa.
3): Therefore scandal
2,
Obj.
No
Further,
2.
is
a mortal sin.
except mortal sin de-
sin
serves the punishment of eternal damnation. But scandal deserves the punishment of eternal
damnation, according to Matt. 18. 6: He that one of these little ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a millstone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowfied in the depth of the sea. shall scandalize
Jerome says on this passage,^ "it is better to receive a brief punishment for
For, as
much
another into venial
sin, to lead
be a venial
And
Article
Whether Passive
5.
Happen Even
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It seems that passive scandal may happen even to the perfect.
Objectioft
I.
and yet
For Christ was supremely per-
He
said to Peter (Matt. 16. 23):
Further, Every sin committed against God is a mortal sin, because mortal sin alone turns man away from God. Now scandal is a sin
fore can other perfect
against God, for the Apostle says (I Cor. 8. When you wound the weak conscience of 12)
life.
Obj.
3.
:
brethren, (Vulg.,— PF^ew you sin thus against the brethren and wound their weak consciefice.) you sin against Christ. Therefore scanthe
dal
always a mortal
is
On
may
be a venial sin to lead a person into venial sin, and yet this would be to give scandal. Therefore scandal may be a venial
sin.
/ answer that. As stated above (a. i), scandal
denotes a stumbling by which a person is disposed to a spiritual downfall. Consequently passive scandal may sometimes be a venial sin, when it consists in a stumbling and nothing
more, for instance, when a person is disturbed by a movement of venial sin occasioned by another's inordinate word or deed. But sometimes it is
a mortal sin,
when
the stumbling results
in a downfall, for instance
when
a person goes
commit a mortal sin through aninordinate word or deed.
so far as to other's
Active scandal,
if it
be accidental,
may some-
be a venial sin; for instance, when, through a slight indiscretion, a person either commits a venial sin, or does something that is not a sin in itself, but has some appearance
times
of evil.
On
the other hand,
it
is
sometimes a
because a person commits a sin, or because he has such contempt for his neighbour's spiritual welfare that he declines, for the sake of procuring it, to forego
mortal mortal
sin, either
doing what he wishes to do. But
in the case of
when
a person intends he intends to lead him into mortal sin, his own sin will be mortal; and in like manner if he intends by committing
active direct scandal, as
to lead another into sin,
if
a mortal sin himself to lead another into venial sin. But if he intends, by committing a venial 1
PL 26,
133.
Thou
art a scandal to
Obj.
Me. Much more
men
there-
suffer scandal.
Further, Scandal denotes an obsta-
2.
which
is brought into a person's spiritual even perfect men can be hindered in their progress along the spiritual life, according to I Thess. 2. 18: We woidd have come to you. I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath hindered us. Therefore even perfect men can
cle
Now
suffer scandal.
sin.
the contrary, It
May
Sca?idal
to the Perfect?
fect;
fault,
Ob-
this suffices for the Replies to the
jections.
than to await everlasting torments." Therefore scandal is a mortal sin. a
there will
sin,
sin of scandal.
Obj.
Further,
3.
Even
perfect
to venial sins, according to I
say that we have no Now passive scandal
sin,
men
John
are liable
i.
we deceive
we
8: If
ourselves.
is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial, as stated above (a, 4). Therefore passive scandal may be found in per-
fect
men.
On Matt.
the contrary, Jerome, in 18.
6,
He
commenting on
that shall scandalize one of
ones, says:^ "Observe that
these
little
little
one that
is
it is
the
scandalized, for the elders do
not take scandal." / answer that, Passive scandal implies that
the
mind
of the person
who
takes scandal
is
adherence to good. Now no man can be unsettled who adheres firmly to something immovable. The elders, that is, the perfect, adhere to God alone. Whose goodness is unchangeable, for though they adhere to their superiors, they do so only in so far as these adhere to Christ, according to I Cor. 4. 16: Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ. Therefore, however much others may appear to
unsettled in
them
its
conduct themselves
to
ill
in
word and
deed, they themselves do not stray from their righteousness, according to Ps. that trust in the
he shall not be
Lord
moved
shall be as
who adhere
to
They Sion:
for ever that dwelleth in
Jerusale?n. Therefore scandal
those
i:
Mount
124.
God
is
not found in
perfectly by love, ac-
Much peace have they and to them there is ?to stumbling-block (scandalum ) cording to Ps. 118. 165: that love
*
PL 26,
Thy
133.
law,
PART Reply Obj.
OF SECOND PART
II
As stated above
Reply 2), in this passage, scandal is used in a broad sense to denote any kind of hindrance. Hence Our Lord said to Peter: Thou art a scandal to Me, i.
(a. 2,
because he was endeavouring to weaken Our Lord's purpose of undergoing His Passion. Reply Obj. 2. Perfect men may be hindered the performance of external actions.
in
But
they are not hindered by the words or deeds of others from tending to God in the internal acts of the will, according to Rom, 8. s^, 39 Neither '
death, nor life
.
.
.
shall be able to separate us
from the love of God. Reply Obj. 3. Perfect men sometimes
says or does
is
589
7
inordinate.
the perfect to order
Let
Now
all their
it
belongs to
actions according
all
things be done decently and according to
order; and they are careful to do this especially
which not only would they do wrong, but would also be to others an occain those matters in
And if indeed they fail moderation in such words or deeds as come to the knowledge of others, this has its origin in human weakness because of which they fall short of perfection. Yet they do not fall sion of wrong-doing.
in this
short so far as to stray far from the order of fall into
reason, but only a
and
ter,
but they are not scandalized (taking scandal in its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although there can be an approach to scandal
mitting
My
ART.
to the rule of reason, as stated in I Cor. 14. 40:
venial sins through the weakness of the flesh;
in them, according to Ps. 72. 2:
Q. 43.
feet were
almost moved.
this is
little
reasonably take from
to is
and
in
some
slight
mat-
not so grave that anyone can it
an occasion for com-
sin.
Reply Obj. 1. Passive scandal is always due some active scandal; yet this active scandal not always in another, but in the very person is scandahzed, because, that is, he scandal-
who Article
Found
6.
Whether Active Scandal Can Be
in the Perfect?
We
proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It seems that active scandal can be found in the perfect.
For passion is the effect of acsome are scandalized passively by
Objection
Now
i.
izes himself.
Reply Obj. 2. In the opinion of Augustine^ and of Paul also, Peter sinned and was to be blamed in withdrawing from the gentiles in order to avoid the scandal of the Jews, because this somewhat incautiously, so that the
he did
Dost thou know that the Pharithis word, were scandalized? Therefore active scandal can be found
gentiles who had been converted to the faith were scandalized. Nevertheless Peter's action was not so grave a sin as to give others sufficient ground for scandal. Hence they were guilty of passive scandal, while there was no active scan-
in the perfect.
dal in Peter.
tion.
the words or deeds of the perfect, according to
Matt. sees,
14. 12:
when they heard
Obj.
2.
Holy Ghost, was in the state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles, for When I saw that they it is written (Gal. 2. 14) :
walked not uprightly unto the truth of the Gospel, all:
Reply Obj.
Further, Peter, after receiving the
I said to Cephas, that is, Peter, before them If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner
3.
The
venial sins of the perfect
consist chiefly in sudden
movements, which be-
If, however, they commit any venial sins even in their ex-
ing hidden cannot give scandal.
ternal words or deeds, these are so slight as to be insufficient in themselves to give scandal.
of the gentiles, and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles to live as do the
Article 7. Whether Spiritual Goods Should Be Given Up on Account of Scandal?
Jews? Therefore active scandal can be
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It seems that spiritual goods ought to be given up on account of scandal. Objection 1. For Augustine {Contra Ep. Parmen, iii, 2)2 teaches that punishment for sin
in the
perfect.
Obj.
3.
a venial
Further, Active scandal
sin.
But venial
men. Therefore active fect men.
On
is
perfect in per-
more opperfection than passive scandal. But
the contrary. Active scandal
posed to
sometimes
may be in scandal may be sins
is
passive scandal cannot be in the perfect.
Much
therefore, can active scandal be in them. / answer that. Active scandal, properly so called, occurs when a man says or does a thing which in itself is of a nature to occasion an-
less,
other's downfall,
and that
is
only
when what he
should cease when the peril of schism is feared. But punishment of sins is a spiritual good, since
an act of justice. Therefore a spiritual good be given up on account of scandal. Obj. 2. Further, The Sacred Doctrine is a most spiritual thing. Yet one ought to desist from it on account of scandal, according to it is
is
to
^Epist., XXVIII, 3 (PL 2,3, 113); Epist., xl, 3 (PL si* ^ PL 43. 92. 156) Epist., Lxxxii, 2 (PL 2>2>, 277);
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
590
Matt. 7. 6: Give not that which is holy, to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine turfiing upon you, they tear you. Therelest fore a spiritual good should be given up on ac.
.
.
count of scandal. Obj.
3.
Further, Since fraternal correction
is
Now
must be made in spiritual them are necessary for sal-
a distinction
goods. For
some
of
and cannot be omitted without mortal and it is evident that no man ought to
vation, sin,
commit a mortal sin in order to prevent another from sinning, because according to the order
an act of charity, it is a spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is omitted out of charity, in order to avoid giving scandal to others, as Augustine observes.^ Therefore a spiritual good should be
of charity a
given up on account of scandal. Obj. 4. Further, Jerome says^ that in order to avoid scandal we should give up whatever it is
scandal.
man ought
to love his
own
spirit-
more than another's. Therefore one ought not to give up that which is necesual
welfare
sary for salvation,
order to avoid giving
in
possible to omit without prejudice to the threefold truth, that is, the truth of life, of justice
Again a distinction seems necessary among which are not necessary for salvation, because the scandal which arises from such things sometimes proceeds from malice;
and of doctrine. Now the observance of the counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often
spiritual
be omitted without prejudice to this threefold truth; otherwise whoever omitted them would always be guilty of sin, and yet such things are the greatest of spiritual works. Therefore spiritual works should be omitted on ac-
spiritual things
when a man wishes to hinder those goods by stirring up scandal. This is
for instance
the scandal of the Pharisees, dalized at
Our Lord's
scan-
Our Lord
teaches (Matt. 15. 14) that we ought to treat suchlike scandal with contempt.
Sometimes scandal proceeds from weakness or ignorance, and such
count of scandal.
who were
teaching, and
is
the scandal of
little
sin is
ones. In order to avoid this kind of scandal,
a spiritual good, since any sin brings spiritual harm to the sinner. Now it seems that one ought
goods ought to be either concealed, or sometimes even deferred (if this can be done without incurring immediate danger), until the matter being explained the scandal cease. If, however, the scandal continue after the matter has been explained, it would seem to be due to malice, and then it would no longer be right to omit that spiritual good in order to avoid such-
Obj.
5.
The avoidance
Further,
sometimes
commit
to
of
any
a venial sin in order to
avoid scandalizing one's neighbour, for instance when by sinning venially one would prevent someone else from committing a mortal sin; for one
is
bound
damnation of
to hinder the
much
one's neighbour as
own
as one can without
spiritual
which is not Therefore one ought to give up a spiritual good in order to avoid
like scandal.
scandal.
view but
prejudice to one's
precluded by a venial
On
the contrary, Gregory says {Horn. Super
Ezech. vii) truth,
salvation,
sin.
it is
"If people are scandalized at the
:^
better to allow the birth of scandal,
than to abandon the truth." belong, above spiritual
all
Now
spiritual
goods
others, to the truth. Therefore
goods are not to be given up on ac-
count of scandal. / answer that, Although scandal
is
twofold,
active and passive, the present question does
not apply to active scandal, for since active scandal is something said or done less rightly, nothing ought to be done that implies active scandal.
The question
does, however, apply to passive
scandal, and accordingly
ought to be given up 1
City of God,
Wm.
I,
(PL
in
we have
to see
what
order to avoid scandal.
41, 22).
Summa
Aurca, in, tr. 24, q. 4 (236v^); also Hugh of St. Cher, In Matt. 18.7 (vi, 61); cf. also Gregory the Great, In Ezech., hom., vii (PL 76, *
Cf.
842).
8
of Auxcrre,
PL
76, 842.
Reply Obj. i. In the infliction of punishment not the punishment itself that is the end in
it is
its
medicinal properties in checking punishment partakes of the na-
sin; therefore
ture of justice, in so far as if it is
it
checks
sin.
But
evident that the infliction of punishment
more numerous and more grievous committed, the infliction of punishment will no longer be a part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking, when, that is, the excommunication of a few threatens to bring about the danger of a schism, for in that case it would not pertain to the truth of justice to pronounce excommunication. Reply Obj. 2. With regard to a man's doctrine two points must be considered, namely,
will result in sins being
the truth which ing.
The
that,
first
is
taught, and the act of teach-
of these
is
necessary for salvation, it is to teach should
namely, he whose duty
not teach what
is
contrary to the truth, and
that he should teach the truth according to the
requirements of times and persons therefore on to suppress the truth and ;
no account ought he
PART
II
OF SECOND PART
teach error in order to avoid any scandal that might ensue. But the act itself of teaching is
—
one of the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (q. XXXII, A. 2), and so the same is to be said of it as of the other works of mercy, of which we shall speak further on (Reply 4). Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (q. xxxiii, a. i), fraternal correction aims at the correction of a brother, and therefore it is to be counted among spiritual goods in so far as this end can be obtained, which is not the case if the brother be scandalized through being corrected. And so, if the correction be omitted in order to avoid scandal, no spiritual good is given up.
Reply Obj. 4. The truth of life, of doctrine, and of justice comprises not only whatever is necessary for salvation, but also whatever is a
means
of obtaining salvation
according to
I
Be
Cor. 12. 31:
more
perfectly,
zealous for the
better gifts. Therefore neither the counsels nor
even the works of mercy are to be altogether omitted in order to avoid scandal; but sometimes they should be concealed or deferred, on account of the scandal of the little ones, as stated above. Sometimes, however, the observance of the counsels and the fulfilment of the works of mercy are necessary for salvation. This may be seen in the case of those who have vowed to keep the counsels, and of those whose duty it is to reheve the wants of others, either in temporal matters (as by feeding the hungry), or in spiritual matters (as by instructing the ignorant), whether such duties
Q. 43.
ART.
8
S9I
Article 8. Whether Temporal Goods Should Be Given Up on Account of Scandal?
We
proceed thus to the Eighth Article:
It
would seem that temporal goods should be given up on account of scandal. Objection i. For we ought to love our neighbour's spiritual welfare which is hindered by scandal more than any temporal goods whatever. But we give up what we love less for the sake of what we love more. Therefore we should give up temporal goods in order to avoid scandalizing our neighbour.
Obj. 2. Further, According to Jerome's rule,^ whatever can be given up without prejudice to the threefold truth should be given up in order to avoid scandal. Now temporal goods can be given up without prejudice to the threefold truth. Therefore they should be given up in order to avoid scandal.
Obj. 3. Further, No temporal good is more necessary than food. But we ought to give up taking food on account of scandal, according to
Rom. for
14. 15:
whom
Destroy not him with thy meat
Christ died.
Much more
therefore
should all other temporal goods be given up on account of scandal.
of prelates, or
Obj. 4. Further, The most fitting way of safeguarding and recovering temporal goods is the court of justice. But it is unlawful to have recourse to justice, especially if scandal ensues, for it is written (Matt. 5. 40) If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and (I Cor. 6. 7) Already indeed there is plainly a fatdt among you, that you have lawsuits one with
person in
another.
arise
from
their being enjoined as in the case
from the need on the part of the want; and then the same applies to
these things as to others that are necessary for salvation.
Reply Obj. 5. Some have said that one ought commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandal.^ But this implies a contradiction, since if it ought to be done, it is no longer evil or sin-
:
:
a sin cannot be a matter of choice.
may happen however
that,
circumstance, something
It
on account of some
is
not a venial
sin,
though it would be were it not for that circumstance; thus an idle word is a venial sin, when it is uttered uselessly, yet if it be uttered for a reasonable cause, it is neither idle nor sinful. And though venial sin does not deprive a man of grace which is his means of salvation, yet, in so far as it disposes him to mortal sin,
forego temporal goods on account of scandal. Obj.
up
(PL
49,
Further,
We
ought,
it
seems, to give
temporal goods which are
connected with spiritual goods, and yet we ought to give them up on account of scandal. For the Apostle while sowing spiritual things did not accept a temporal stipend lest he should give any hindra7ice to the Gospel of Christ as we read I Cor. 9. 12. For a like reason the Church does not demand tithes in certain countries, in order to avoid scandal. Much more, therefore, ought we to give up other temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.
On 2
Cassianus, Collationes, Coll. xvn, chap. 17 1063). 1
5.
least of all those
tends to the loss of salvation.
it
do you not rather take wrong?
not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded? Therefore it seems that we ought to
to
ful, for
Why
why do you
Cf.
the contrary, Blessed
Hugh
of St. Cher,
Thomas
In Univ.
Test.,
of Cantersuper Matt.
18.7 (VI, 61); Alexander of Hales, S. T., ii-ii, n. 862
m,
821).
(QR
SUMMA
THEOLOGICA 592 Reply Obj. 2. If it were permissible for wickbury demanded the restitution of Church proped men to rob other people of their property, erty, notwithstanding that the king took scanthis would tend to the detriment of the truth dal from his doing so.^ of life and justice. Therefore we are not always / answer that, A distinction must be made in bound to give up our temporal goods in order temporal goods, for either they are ours, or they are committed to us to take care of them someone else; thus the goods of the Church are committed to prelates, and the goods of the community are entrusted to all such persons as
to avoid scandal.
Reply Obj.
for
have authority over the latter case the care of
common
weal. In this
such things (as of things
held in deposit) devolves of necessity on those persons to whom they are entrusted, and therefore,
even as other things that are necessary up on
for salvation, they are not to be given
account of scandal.
On
the other hand, as re-
gards those temporalities of which
we have
the
dominion, sometimes, on account of scandal,
we we
are
bound
to give
them
up. and sometimes
we abandon them we have them in our pos-
are not so bound, whether
by giving them up, if session, or by omitting to claim them, if they are in the possession of others. For if the scandal arise from this through the ignorance or weakness of others (in which case, as stated above,
a. 7, it is
we
scandal of the Httle ones)
up such temporalities altogether, or the scandal must be abated by some other means, namely, by some kind of admonition. Hence Augustine says {De Senn. Dom. in Monte, i, 20) } "Thou shouldst give so as to
must
either give
injure neither thyself nor another, as
much
as
not to give up temporal goods for the sake of those who stir up scandals of this kind, for this would both be harmful to the common good,
would give wicked men an opportunity would be injurious to the plunderers themselves, who would remain in sin as long as they were in possession of another's property. Hence Gregory says {Moral, xxxi, 13) :^ "Sometimes we ought to suffer those who rob us of our temporalities, while sometimes we since
it
of plunder, and
should resist them, as far as equity allows, in the hope not only that we may safeguard our property, but also lest those
not theirs
This
may
who
take what
lose themselves."
suffices for the
Reply
to the First
Ob-
jection.
John of
*
Cf.
»
PL 34.
Salisbury, vitaS.
1264.
is
»
PL
Tfwmae (PL
76, 586.
lyo, 200).
intention
from food on
account of scandal, because our welfare requires that we should take food, but he intended to counsel abstinence from a particular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal, according to I Cor. 8. 13: / will fiever eat flesh, lest I should scandalize
my
brother.
Reply Obj. 4. According to Augustine {De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 19)'* this precept of Our Lord is to be understood of "the preparedness of the mind," namely, that man should be prepared,
if
it
be expedient, to suffer being
harmed or defrauded, rather than go to law. But sometimes it is not expedient, as stated above (Reply 2). The same applies to the saying of the Apostle.
Reply Obj. 5. The scandal which the Apostle avoided arose from an error of the gentiles who were not used to this payment. Hence he was obliged to give it up for the time being, so that they might be taught first of all that such a
payment was a duty. For a hke reason the Church refrains from demanding tithes in those countries where it is not customary to pay them.
thou canst lend, and if thou refusest what is asked, thou must yet be just to him, indeed thou wilt give him something better than he asks, if
thou reprove him that asks unjustly." Sometimes, however, scandal arises from malice. This is scandal of the Pharisees, and we ought
The Apostle had no
3.
of counselling total abstinence
QUESTION XLIV Of the precepts
of charity
{In Eight Articles)
We must
now
consider the Precepts of Charity,
under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (i) Whether precepts should be given about charity? (2) Whether there should be one or two? (3) Whether two suffice? (4) Whether it
is
fittingly prescribed that
we should
love
God, with thy whole heart? (5) Whether it is fittingly added: With thy whole mind, etc.? (6)
Whether
it
is
possible to
fulfil this
precept in
Of the precept: Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself: (8) Whether the or-
this life? (7)
der of charity
is
included in the precept?
Article i. Whether Any Precept Should Be Given about Charity?
We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that no precept should be given about charity.
:
PL 34,
133.
»
PL
this
76, 621.
*
PL
75, 947.
PART
II
OF SECOND PART
Obj.
3.
Further, Anger especially
is
is
pertaining to folly, namely, "hatred of God and despair of the life to come"; thus he divides
written (Prov.
7.
22)
Immediately he jolloweth her, that is, the harlot .. not knowing that he is drawn like a fool .
to bonds.
I answer that, As already stated
(a. 2), folly,
caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be incapable of judging spiritual things. Now man's sense is in so far as it is a sin, is
plunged into earthly things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest pleasures; and these absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore the folly which is a sin arises chiefly
from lust. Reply Obj.
i.
605
3
the cause
some persons, and this pertains to folly. Therefore folly arises from anger rather than from lust. the contrary, It
ART.
should have a distaste for God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of lust,
is
of fury and madness in
On
Q. 46,
a
Therefore folly daughter of duplicity rather than of lust, this pertains to duplicity.
It is part of folly that a
man
two parts as it were. Reply Obj. 2. These words of the Apostle are
folly into
to be understood, not causally but essentially,
because, namely, worldly
wisdom
itself is folly
with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to worldly wisdom is a cause of this folly.
Reply Obj.
3,
Anger by reason of
stated above
(Part
its
keen-
ness,
as
A. 2),
produces a great change in the nature of it conduces very much
I-II,
q.
xlviii,
the body, and therefore
to the folly which results from a bodily impediment. On the other hand the folly which is caused by a spiritual impediment, namely by the mind being plunged into earthly things, arises chiefly
from
lust, as stated
above.
ON ACTIVE AND
TREATISE
CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE house, I shall repose myself with her. Therefore it would seem that life is unfittingly di-
QUESTION CLXXIX Of the division of life into active and contemplative Two
{In
We
vided into active and contemplative.
On
must next consider active and contempla-
tive life. This consideration will
be fourfold:
Of the division of life into active and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life (q. CLXxx); (3) Of the active hfe (q. clxxxi) (4) Of the comparison between the active and (i)
;
the contemplative Hfe (q. clxxxii).
Under the inquiry:
first
(i)
head there are two points of
Whether
life
is
Gregory says (Hom. n, "There is a twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the active Hfe and the contemplative." / answer that. Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined, is that which is most becoming to it from itself; and so every Hving thing gives proof of its Hfe by that operation which is most proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. contrary,
the
super Ezech.)
Articles)
fittingly divided
:^
into active
Thus the
this is
ishment and generation; the Hfe of animals in sensation and movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting according to reason. Therefore also in men the life of every man would seem to be that in which he delights most, and on which he is most intent, and that in which especially they wish to pass their time with their friends, as stated in the Ethics.^ Ac-
and contemplative? (2) Whether an adequate division?
Article
i.
into Active
Whether Life Is Fittingly Divided and Contemplative?
We proceed thus to the First Article: It seems that hfe is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative. Objection i. For the soul is the principle of Hfe by its essence; for the Philosopher says^ that "in living things to live soul
is
tion
by
is
to be."
Now
the
that life
is
not fittingly
is
said to consist in nour-
men
cordingly since certain
are especially in-
are especially intent on external actions,
would seem divided into active and
powers. Therefore
of plants
tent on the contemplation of truth, while others
the principle of action and contemplaits
life
lows that man's
it
life is fittingly
it fol-
divided into ac-
and contemplative. Reply Obj. 1. Each thing's proper form that makes it actually to be is the principle of operation proper to that thing. Hence to live is, tive
contemplative. Obj. 2. Further, The division of that which comes afterwards is unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and contemplative, or speculative and practical, are differences of the intellect,^ while "to Hve" comes before "to understand," since "to live" comes soul, as the Philosopher states.^
living things, to be, because living things through having being from their form, act in such and such a way. Reply Obj. 2. Life in general is not divided into active and contemplative, but ^he life of man, who derives his species from having an
is
intellect,
through the vegetative Therefore life unfittingly divided into active and contem-
first
to
living
things
plative.
Obj. ;*
and therefore the same division apand human life.
plies to intellect 3.
The word
Further,
movement, according iv)
in
"life"
Nom.
but contemplation consists rather in
according to Wisd.
8.
16:
When
Reply Obj. 3. It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external movements. Never-
implies
to Dionysius {Div.
theless to contemplate
rest,
I enter into
my
is itself
scribed as a
movement
;
l5o«/.II,4(4l5*'i3)*
Ibid., Ill, 10 (433*14).
*
Sect. lo
(PG 3,
705);
cf. VI, 2
'
Ibid.,
(PG 3,
II,
a
movement
the intellect, in so far as every operation
4 (415*24).
857).
606
6
PL
•
Aristotle, ix, 12 (1172*5).
76, 952.
in
is
of
de-
which sense the Phi-
PART
II
OF SECOND PART
losopher says^ that sensation and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as the act of a perfect thing
is
a
movement. In
this
way Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv)^ ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation, namely straight, circular,
Article
2.
into Active
and obUque.
Whether Life Is Adequately Divided and Contemplative?
We
proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that life is not adequately divided into active and contemplative.
Objection
i.
For the Philosopher says^ that
"there are three most excellent kinds of the
life,"
would seem and the contem-
of pleasure, the civil which
life
to be the
same
as the active,
plative Hfe. Therefore the division of hfe into
contemplative would seem to be
active and
inadequate. Obj.
2.
kinds of
Further, Augustine mentions^ three
life,
namely the
life
of "leisure" which
pertains to the contemplative, the "busy" life
ART.
Q. 180.
607
i
Reply Obj. i. The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals therefore as the Phi;
losopher says,^
it
is
the
life
Hence
of a beast.
not included in this division of the Hfe of a man into active and contemplative. Reply Obj. 2. A mean is a combination of extremes, and therefore it is virtually contained it is
in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in white and black. In Hke manner active and con-
templative comprise that which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one of the absolutes predominates, so too, in the mean of Hfe sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds. Reply Obj. 3. All the occupations of human state
actions, if directed to the requirements of the present Hfe in accord with right reason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of the present life by means of weU-
ordered activity. If, on the other hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they
which pertains to the active, and a third "composed of both." Therefore it would seem that life is inadequately divided into active and
prised under the active Hfe. Those
human
contemplative.
truth belong to the contemplative
life.
Obj.
3.
Further, Man's
life is diversified
QUESTION CLXXX
there are
the contrary, These two lives are signi-
by the two wives of Jacob (Gen. 19) the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel; and by the two hostesses of our Lord the contemplative life by Mary, and the active life by Martha (Luke 10. 38), as Gregory declares {Moral vi, 37).^ Now this signification would not be fitting if there Vv^ere more than two lives. fied
:
:
Therefore
life is
adequately divided into active
and contemplative. / answer that, As stated
Of the contemplative
in the foregoing
Ar-
(Reply 2), this division applies to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is divided into active and contempla-
end of intellectual knowledge is knowledge itself of truth, which per-
must now consider the contemplative
Hfe,
under which head there are eight points of
Whether the contemiplative Hfe
quiry: (i)
in-
per-
tains to the intellect only, or also to the affec-
Whether the moral
tions? (2)
virtues pertain
to the contemplative Hfe? (3) Whether the con-
templative Hfe consists in one action or in several? (4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the contemplative
Hfe?
man
ticle
life
(In Eight Articles)
We
than the active and the contemplative.
On
not com-
ac-
more than two occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that Hfe should be divided into more kinds are occupied.
is
occupations that are directed to the consideration of
men
cording to the different actions in which
Now
belong to the Hfe of pleasure, which
(5)
Whether the contemplative
in this state
life
of
can arise to the vision of God?
(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). (7) Of the pleasure of contemplation. (8)
Of the dura-
tion of contemplation.
tive, since the
either the
tains to the contemplative intellect, or
some
external action, which pertains to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too
is adequately divided into active and contemplative.
Whether the Contemplative Life the Affections, and Pertains Wholly to the Intellect? Article
i.
Has Nothing To Do With
We proceed thus to the First Article:
It
seems
that the contemplative Hfe has nothing to do
with the affections and pertains wholly to the 1
Soul,
III, 7
(431*4).
^Ethics,!, s (1095^17). * City of God, xix, 2, 3, 19 «;
PL 75,
764.
2
Sect. 8
(PL
(PG 3,
704).
intellect.
Objection
41, 624; 627; 647). ^
toe.
cit.
i. "^
For the Philosopher says^ that
Metaphysics,
11. i
(993^20).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
6o8 "the end of contemplation
is
Now
truth."
truth
pertains wholly to the intellect. Therefore
would seem that the contemplative
life
it
wholly
of an appetible good, both lovable and dehghtful,
2.
Further, Gregor>' says {Moral,
that "Rachel, which
is
vi.
37)^
interpreted 'vision of the
contemplative life." Now the vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the contemplative life beprinciple,' signifies the
longs properly to the intellect.
Obj.
3.
Further, Gregory says {Horn,
Ezech.y that life
it
ii
in
pertains to the contemplative
"to rest from external action."
Now
the
power inclines to exit would seem that the contemplative Hfe has nothing to do with the
affective
pertains to the appeti-
it
2.
We
are urged to the vision of
namely God, by the love for it; hence Gregory says {Horn, ii in Ezech.y that "the contemplative life tramples on all cares and longs to see the face of its Creator." Reply Obj. 3. The appetitive power moves not only the bodily members to perform exthe
principle,
first
ternal actions, but also the intellect to practise
the
act
of
contemplation,
stated
as
the
in
Article.
or appetitive
ternal actions. Therefore
appetitive power.
On
in this respect
Reply Obj.
regards the intellect. Obj.
and
tive power.
the contrary, Gregory says {ibid.) that
"the contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God and our neighbour, and to desire nothing beside our Creator." Now desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as stated above (Part I-II, Q. XXV, A. 2). Therefore the contemplative Hfe has also something to do with the affective or appetitive power. / answer that, As stated above (q. clxxix, A. i) the contemplative life is said of those who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (Part I-II, q. xii, a. i), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards
Article
Whether the Moral Virtues Pertain
2.
Contemplative Life?
to the
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative hfe.
Objection i. For Gregory says {Horn, ii in Ezech.y that "the contemplative hfe is to cling to the love of God and our neighbour with the whole mind." Now all the moral virtues, whose acts are prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God and of our neighbour, for love
Law (Rom.
13.
.
.
.
is
the fulfilling of the
10). Therefore
would seem
it
that the moral virtues belong to the contemplative
Obj.
life.
The contemplative life is contemplation of God; for {Horn, ii in Ezech.y that "the
Further,
2.
chiefly directed to the
Gregory says
mind tramples on
intellect,
all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its Creator." Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart, which is a result of moral virtue. For it is written (Matt. 5. 8) Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God; and (Heb. 12. 14): Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God. Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the con-
because, as
templative
the essence of the action, pertains to the intel-
but as regards what moves to the exercise it belongs to the will, which moves the other powers, even the intellect, to their
lect,
of that action all
above (Part
actions, as stated
Now
the appetitive
I-II, q. ix, a. i).
power moves one
to ob-
serve things either with the senses or with the
sometimes for love of the thing seen it is written (Matt. 6. 21), where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also, sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one acquires by observation. Hence Gregory makes the contemplative
consist in "the love of through loving God we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life terminates in
God,"
life to
in so far as
delight,
which
is
seated in the affective power,
the result being that love also
becomes more
intense.
i
PL 75,
Obj.
3.
life.
Further, Gregory says
764.
2
PL 76, 953.
{Hom.
ii
in
Ezech.y that "the contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," and so it is signified by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gen. 29. 17) that she was of a beautiful countenance. Now the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues,
Ambrose says {De
especially temperance, as Offic.
i,
43).^ Therefore
it
seems that the moral
virtues pertain to the contemplative
On
the contrary.
The moral
rected to external actions.
Reply Obj. I. From the very fact that truth the end of contemplation, it has the aspect
is
:
{Hovi. s 7
ii
in
PL 76, 953. PL 16, 93.
Ezech.y that *IbU. '
Loc.
cit.
it
life.
virtues are di-
Now
Gregory says
belongs to the con^lUd.
Uhid,
PART templative
II
OF SECOND PART
"to rest from external action."
life
Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the contemplative life. / answer that, A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways, essentially or as a predisposition. The moral virtues do not belong to the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the contemplative life is the consideration of truth. And as the Philosopher states,^ "knowledge," which pertains to the consideration of truth, "has httle influence on the moral virtues"; hence he declares^ that the moral virtues pertain to active but not to contemplative happiness. On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life as a predisposition. For the act of contemplation, in which the contemplative life essentially consists is hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which
withdraw the
Now
from intelligible and by outward disturbances.
soul's intention
to sensible things,
the moral virtues curb the impetuosity of
far that
virtues belong
dispositively to the contemplative
Reply Obj.
i.
As stated
in
Article, the contemplative life
life.
the foregoing
has
its
moving
cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the love of
God and
requisite to the contemplative
our neighbour life.
is
Now moving
but dispose and perfect
it.
Therefore
it
does not
to the contemplative Hfe.
Reply Obj.
2.
Holiness, that
is,
cleanness of
caused by the virtues that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the reason; and peace is caused by jusheart,
tice
is
which
is
about operations, according to
Isa.
The work of justice shall be peace, since he who refrains from wronging others lessens 32. 17,
all is it in
temperance, which restrains
the concupiscences which especially darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since sexual pleasures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as
Augustine says (Soliloq.
i,
10).^
Article 3. Whether There Are Various Actions Pertaining to the Contemplative Life?
We proceed thus to the Third Article: It seems that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative
life.
For Richard of S. Victor'* distinguishes between contemplation, meditation, and cogitation. Yet all these apparently pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that there are various actions pertaining Objection
i.
to the contemplative
Obj.
life.
The Apostle
Further,
2.
says (II Cor.
But we beholding (specidantes) the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same clarity. (Vulg., into the same image from glory to glory.) Now this be3.
18)
:
.
.
.
longs to the contemplative
life.
Therefore in
addition to the three mentioned above, vision (speculatio) belongs to the contemplative
causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, follow that the moral virtues belong essentially
609
3
as they share the order of reason;
is
and above
the passions, and quell the disturbance of out-
ward occupations. Hence moral
ART.
Q. 180.
lover of her beauty. On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, in so
Obj.
Further, Bernard says
3.
and greatest contemplaadmiration of the Majesty." Now according to Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii, 15)^ admiration is a kind of fear. Therefore it would V, 14)^ that "the first
tion
is
seem that several templative Obj.
4.
Further, Prayer, reading, and medita-
tion, are said to life.'^
acts are requisite for the con-
life.
belong to the contemplative
Again, hearing belongs to the contempla-
tive life, since
stated that
it is
Mary (by whom
and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and clean-
at the Lord's feet, heard His
ness of heart.
requisite for the contemplative Hfe.
Reply Obj. 3. Beauty, as stated above (q. cxLV, A. 2), consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these has its roots
tion on
the
occasions
of
quarrels
because both the light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence since the contemplative Hfe consists in an act of the reason, there is beauty in it per se and in the reason,
essentially; therefore
it is
of the contemplation of 1
Ethics, n, 4 (1105^2).
written (Wis.
8.
^Ihid.. x, 8 (iiyS^g).
the contemplative
Therefore
On
sitting
life is signified)
word (Luke
.
.
.
10. 39).
would seem that several acts are
it
the contrary. Life signifies here the opera-
which a
man
is
chiefly intent.
Therefore
there are several operations of the contem-
if
plative
life,
there will be, not one, but several
contemplative
lives.
/ answer that, We are now speaking of the contemplative life as it pertains to man. Now 3
PL 32,
*
De Grat.
6
PL
182, 806.
7
Cf.
Hugh of St.
2)
wisdom: / became a
life.
(De Consid.
80s).
878.
Contemplatiia, 8
i,
4 (PL 196, 66).
PG 94. 932.
Victor, Allegor. in N.T.,
iii,
3
(PL
175,
:
SUMMA TUEOLOGICA
6io
Nom.
according to Dionysius (Div.
man and
tween
angel there
be-
vii)'
this difference,
is
that an angel has an insight of the truth
by
simple apprehension, while as man arrives at the insight of a simple truth by a process from
from the apprehension of a thing that Hence it results from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was stated above (a. i) that contemplation termiresulting
surpasses our power.
nates in the affections.
Reply Obj.
several things. Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one act in which
it
is
finally
completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its unity. Yet it has
many Some
by which
acts
arrives at this final act.
it
of these pertain to the reception of prin-
from which
ciples,
it
proceeds to the contem-
plation of truth; others are concerned with de-
ducing from the principles, the truth the knowledge of which is sought and the last and crown;
ing act
the contemplation itself of the truth.
is
Reply Obj.
i.
According to Richard of S. Vicwould seem to pertain
Man
4.
reaches the knowledge of
truth in two ways. First, by
means
of things
received from another. In this way, as regards the things he receives from God, he needs pray-
according to Wisd.
er,
and the
spirit of
7.
7,
/ called
upon God,
misdom came upon me, while
as regards the things he receives from man, he needs hearing, in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and reading, in so far as he re-
ceives from the tradition of
Holy Writ. Secondhe needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he requires meditation.
ly,
tor {loc. cit.) cogitation to the consideration
(ifispectio)
of the
from which a person intends
things
one simple
Hence
truth.
cogitation
many
to gather
may com-
4. Whether the Contemplative Life Consists in the Contemplation of God Alone, or Also in the Consideration of Any
Article
prise not only the perceptions of the senses in
Truth Whatever?
the knowing of certain effects, but also the data
We proceed thus to the fourth Article: It seems that the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of any truth. Objection 1. For it is written (Ps. 138. 14) Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul knoweth right well. Now the knowledge of God's works is effected by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem that it pertains to the contemplative hfe to contemplate not only the divine truth, but also any other. Obj. 2. Further, Bernard says {De Consid. v, 14)^ that "contemplation consists in admiration first of God's m.ajesty, secondly of His judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises." Now of these four the first alone regards the divine truth, and the other three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life consists not only in the contempla-
of the imagination, and again the discourse of
reason about the various signs or of anything that conduces to the truth in view, although, according to Augustine, (De Trin. xiv, y),^ cogitation
may
signify
any actual operation of the
Meditation would seem to be the process of reason from certain principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth; and consideration has the same meaning, according to Bernard {De Consid. ii, 2),^ although, acintellect.
cording to the Philosopher,"* every operation of
may be called consideration. But contemplation regards the simple act of gazing (intuitio) on the truth; hence Richard says
the intellect
again^ that "contemplation
and of
gaze; meditation
its
of the truth;
is
the soul's clear
is
upon the object
free dwelling {contuitus)
the survey {intuitio)
mind while occupied in searching for the and cogitation is the mind's glance which
prone to wander." Reply Obj. 2. According to a gloss of Augustine on his passage {De Triii. xv, 8),^ "beholding {speadatio) denotes seeing in a mirror {speailo), not from a watch-tower {specula)." Now to see a thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect in which its likeness is reflected. Hence "beholding" would seem to be reducible
is
1
Sect.
3
PL
6
Dc
6
PL
bardi
2
(PG
3,
3.
Admiration
869).
Obj.
is
PL 42, I
a kind of fear
Ui 2'' 11).
cf.
192, 28).
i, 3, 4 (PL 106, 66; 67). Glossa ordin. {yi, 65 E); Glossa
contemplation.
6)^
(De
distinguishes six species of
The
first
belongs to "the imagi-
The second is in "the imagination guided by reason," and consists in considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. poreal things.
third
is
in the
"reason based on the imagi-
nation"; when, that the
fourth
Lom-
i,
nation alone," and consists in thinking of cor-
of
1042.
Further, Richard of S. Victor
3.
Conte^npl.
ConlempL,
42, 1067;
(PL
«
*Soul,u,
182. 745.
Grat.
eration of truth regarding the divine effects.
The
to meditation.
Reply Obj.
tion of the divine truth, but also in the consid-
son," 7
PL
visible is
we
from the consideration
is,
rise
to
the invisible.
when
the
182, 806.
mind 8
is
PL
The
and according to reaintent on things invisible
"in the reason
196, 70.
PART
II
OF SECOND PART
of which the imagination has no knowledge. fifth is ''above the
elation
we know
reason,"
when by
The
divine rev-
things that cannot be compre-
hended by the human reason. The sixth is "above reason and against reason"; when, that is, by the divine enlightening we know things that seem contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of the mystery of the Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to pertain Therefore the contempla-
to the divine truth.
tion of truth regards not only the divine truth,
but also that which is considered in creatures. Obj. 4. Further, In the contemplative hfe the
contemplation of truth perfection of man.
human
of the
sought as being the
is
Now any truth is a perfection
intellect.
Therefore the contem-
plative life consists in the contemplation of
any
truth.
On
the contrary, Gregory says (Moral, vi,
37)^ that "in contemplation
we seek
which is God." / answer that, As stated above
the prin-
ciple,
may
(a. 2),
belong to the contemplative
life
a thing in
two
ways: principally, and secondarily or as a predisposition. That which belongs principally to the contemplative life is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this contemplation is the end of the whole human Hfe. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8)^ that "the contemplation of God is promised us as being the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfection of our joys." This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, when we shall see God face to face, and it will make us perfectly happy. But now the contemplation of the divine truth is open to us imperfectly, namely through a glass and in a dark manner (I Cor. 13. 12). Hence it bestows on us a certain beginning of happiness, which starts now and will be continued in the life to come; hence the Philosopher^ places man's ultim.ate happiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible object. Since, However, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation of God Himself, according to
God
.
.
.
Rom.
I.
20,
The
the things that are made, it follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also belongs in a secondary way to the contemplative hfe, acis,
as
man
{De Vera
1
PL
guided in this
Accordingly
it
clear
is
from what has been
3) that four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative Hfe: first, the said (aa.
2,
moral virtues; secondly, other acts apart from contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; fourthly, the complement of
which
all,
the contemplation of the divine truth
is
itself.
Reply Obj. i. David sought the knowledge of God's works so that he might be led by them to God hence he says elsewhere (Ps. 142.5,6): / meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee. ;
Reply Obj. 2. By considering the divine judgments man is guided to the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the divine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God's mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be vouchsafed.
Reply Obj. 3. These six denote the steps by which we ascend by means of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step consists in the perception of sensible things themthe second step consists in going forward
selves
;
from
sensible to intelligible things; the third
step
is
to judge of sensible things according to
inteUigible things;
the fourth
is
the absolute
consideration of the intelligible things to which
one has attained by means of sensibles; the contemplation of those intelligible
fifth is the
things that are unattainable bles,
but which the reason
sixth step
is
by means of
is
sensi-
able to grasp; the
the consideration of such intelligible
things as the reason can neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime contemplation of divine truth, in
which contemplation
is
ultimately perfected.
Reply Obj.
4.
The ultimate
intellect is the divine truth;
perfection of the
and other truths
perfect the intellect in relation to the divine truth.
way
to
Article
5.
Whether in the Present State of Can Reach
Life the Contemplative Life to the Vision of the
We
Divine Essence?
proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It
seems that
in the present state of life the con-
templative hfe can reach to the vision of the
xxixY that "in the study of exercise an empty and but should make them the step-
Divine essence. Objection 1. For, as stated in Gen. 32. 30, Jacob said: / have seen God face to face, and my soul has been saved. Now the vision of God's face is the vision of the Divine essence. There-
Relig.
we must not
futile curiosity,
ing."
Hence Augustine says
the knowledge of God. creatures
is
611
5
invisible things of
are clearly seen, being understood by
cording, that
ART.
Q. 180.
ping-stone to things unperishable and everlast-
75, 764.
^Ethics, X, 7 (1177^17).
2 4
PL PL
42, 831. 34, 14s.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
6l2
would seem that in the present life one fore may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in His essence. Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says {Moral, vi, 37)^ that contemplative men "withdraw within themit
selves in order to explore spiritual things, nor do they ever carry with them the shadows of
things corporeal or if these follow them they prudently drive them away; but being desirous of seeing the boundless light, they suppress all the images by which they tend to circumscribe themselves, and through longing to reach what is above them, they overcome that which they
Now man is not hindered from seeing the Divine essence, which is the boundless light, save by the necessity of turning to coiporeal phantasms. Therefore it would seem that the contemplation of the present life can extend to the vision of the boundless light in its essence. Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says {Dial, ii, 35) :^ are."
"All creatures are small to the soul that sees its Creator; therefore when the man of God, (the
blessed Benedict, namely), saw a fiery globe
tower and angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only see such things by the light of God." Now the blessed Benedict in the
Therefore the contemplation of the present Hfe can extend to the vision of the essence of God. On the contrary, Gregory says {Horn, ii in Ezech.) :^ "As long as we live in this mortal
was
still
flesh,
in this life.
no one reaches such a height of contemplamind on the ray
tion as to fix the eyes of his itself of
As Augustine says {Gen. ad
"no one seeing God lives this wherein the bodily senses have their play; and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal senses, he is not caught up into that vision." This has been carefully discussed above (q. clxxv, aa. 4, 5), where we spoke of rapture, and in the First Part (q. XII, A. 11), where we treated of the vision of God. Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways. First, with regard to Lit.
xii,
mortal
27),''
life
say by actually making use of the bodily senses, and thus contemplation in
act, that is to
the present
life
can in no
way
attain to the
vision of God's essence. Secondly, one in this life potentially
and not
act, that is to say,
when
the mortal body as
its
1
i5/.,
•PL ^ PL
76, 953.
76, 293; Cf. Glossa ordin., on Gen. 32. 30 (1,96 F). Soul.in, 7 (431*16)•Sect. 2 (PG3, 121). *
PART
II
OF SECOND PART
Therefore he adds (ibid.) "For however Httle he may see of the Creator's light, all created things become petty to him."
Divine
light.
:
6. Whether the Operation of Contemplation Is Fittingly Divided Into a Threefold
Article
Movement,
Circular, Straight,
We
proceed thus to the Sixth Article: seems that the operation of contemplation
swoop down
one time to a great to earth,
and
they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag behind many times; others a circle
now more now
less
extended; and
immovably in would seem that there
others remain suspended almost It
one place. Therefore
is
are only three
and oblique {Div. Nom. \v)} For contemplation pertains exclusively to rest, according to Wisd. 8. i6, When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her. Now movement is opposed to rest. Therecircular, straight,
Objection
613
height, at another
On
movement,
unfittingly divided into a threefold
6
rise at
fly in
and Oblique?
ART.
Q. 180.
For some of these
i.
it
movements
of contemplation.
the contrary, stands the authority of Di-
onysius (loc. cit.). I answer that. As stated above
(q.
clxxix,
Reply 3), the operation of the intellect, in which contemplation essentially consists, is
A. I,
called a
movement
in so far as
movement
is
the
fore the operations of the contemplative life
act of a perfect thing, according to the Philoso-
should not be described as movements. Obj. 2. Further, The action of the contempla-
things that
tive Hfe pertains to the intellect, according to
which
man
Now
Dionysius describes these movements as being different in the angels from what they are in the soul. For he says {loc. cit.) that the circular movement in the angel is "according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and the good." On the other hand, he assigns the circular movement of the soul to several things The first of which is "the withdrawal of the soul into itself from externals"; the second is "a certain concentration of its powers," by which it is rendered free of error and of outward occupation; and the third is "union with those things that are above it." Again, he describes differently their respective straight movements. For he says that like the angels.
is
:
the straight
movement
of the angel
is
"that
by
which he proceeds to the care of those things that are beneath him." On the other hand, he describes the straight
being twofold
:
movement
first, "its
of the soul as
progress towards things
that are near it"; secondly, "its uplifting
from
external things to simple contemplation." Fur-
he assigns a different obhque movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement of the angels to the fact that "while providing for those who have less they remain unchanged in relation to God"; but he assigns the oblique ther,
movement is
of the soul to the fact that "the soul
it
is
not take place without movement, the result that even intelligible operations are described
is
movements, and are differentiated in likeness movements. Now of bodily movements, local movements are the most perfect and come first, as proved in the Physics;^ thereas
to various
fore the foremost
are described
among
intelligible operations
by being likened
to them.
These
movements are of three kinds; for there is the circular movement, by which a thing moves uniformly round one point as centre, another the straight movement, by which a thing goes from one point to another; the third is oblique, being composed as it were of both the others. Consequently, in intelhgible operations, that which is absolutely uniform is compared to ciris
cular movement; the intelligible operation by which one proceeds from one point to another is compared to the straight movement; while the intelligible operation which unites some-
thing of uniformity with progress to various is compared to the oblique movement. Reply Obj. i. External bodily movements are opposed to the rest of contemplation, which consists in rest from outward occupations; but
points
movements
the
of intellectual operations belong
to the rest of contemplation.
Reply Obj.
2.
Man
is
like the angels in intel-
{De
the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in
lect generically,
they are differently related to uniformity. For
above. Obj.
ligible things,
it
to the
ways mentioned
would seem that
the operations of contemplation are unfittingly assigned according to the
through sensible knowledge of inteland since sensible operations do
we come
but the intellectual power is much higher in the angel than in man. Consequently these movements must be ascribed to men and angels in different ways, according as
enlightened in Divine knowledge by reasoning
and discoursing." Therefore
pher.^ Since, however,
3.
Contempt,
Further, Richard of i,
movements Sect. 8
sY
mentions
many
S.
Victor
other different
in likeness to the birds of the air.
(PG 3.
704)-
2
PL
196, 68.
two
respects. First, because
intelligible truth 3
Soul,
III,
it
does not require
from the variety of composite
7 (431*4).
*
Aristotle, viii, 7 (26o»26).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
6i4
understands the trutn of intelligible things not discursively, but by simple intuition. On the other hand, the inthings;
tellect
secondly, because
of
the soul
from sensible
acquires intelligible truth
things,
and understands
it
by a
certain discourse of the reason.
Therefore Dionysius assigns the circular move-
ment
of the angels to the fact that their intui-
tion of
God
is
uniform and unceasing, having
neither beginning nor end; even as a circular
movement having
neither beginning nor end
is
uniformly around the one same centre. But on the part of the soul, before it can arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack of uniformity needs
which arises from the variety of external things, and this is removed by the soul withdrawing from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the circuto be
removed.
First, that
movement of the soul is "the soul's withdrawal into itself from external objects." Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires to be removed from the soul, and this is owing to the discourse of reason. This is done by directing all the soul's operations to the simple conlar
templation of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated by his saying in the second place
must be uniformly concentrated," in other v/ords that discourse must be laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on the contemplation of the one simple truth. In this operation of the soul there is no error, even as there is clearly no error in the understanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition. Afterwards, these two things being presupposed, he mentions thirdly the uniformity which is Hke that of the angels, for that "the soul's intellectual powers
then
all
things being laid aside, the soul con-
tinues in the contemplation of
God
alone. This
he expresses by saying: " Then being thus made uniform, by being brought to unity (that is, conformity) and with its powers united, it is conducted to the good and the beautiful." The straight movement of the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one thing to another by considering them, but only to the order of his providence,
namely
to the fact that the
higher angel enlightens the lower angels through the angels that are intermediate.
He
indicates
when he says "The angel's movement takes a straight line when he proceeds to the care of this
:
things subject to him, taking in his course what-
ever things are direct," that
is,
in
the dispositions of the direct order.
movement
in the soul
The
it
keeping
The
v/ith
straight
he ascribes however to
the soul's proceeding from exterior sensibles to
the knowledge of intelligible objects.
oblique
movement
in the angels
he des-
composed of the straight and circular movements, in so far as their care for those beneath them is in accordance with their cribes as being
contemplation of God. The oblique movement in the soul he also declares to be partly straight
and partly
circular, in so far as in reasoning
it
makes use of the light received from God. Reply Obj. 3. These varieties of movement that are taken from the distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either straight and oblique
movement, because they all denote the discourse of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or from the part to the whole, it will be. as he explains, from above to below; if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to left; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and forwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing, near at hand
movement
or far remote, the
The
will
be circular.
discourse of reason from sensible to in-
telligible objects, if
it
be according to the order
of natural reason, belongs to the straight
ment; but
move-
be according to the Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the oblique movement as explained above (Reply 2). That alone which he describes as immobility belongs to the if it
movement. Hence it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of contemplation with much circular
greater fulness and depth.
Article 7. Whether There Contemplation?
Is Delight in
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It seems that there is no delight in contemplation. Objection i. For delight belongs to the appetitive power; but contemplation resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there is no delight in contemplation. Obj. 2. Further, All strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight. Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory says
Ezech.y that "when the soul strives God, it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes, because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the unbounded light, and at another time it {Horn,
ii
in
to contemplate
almost succumbs, because even while tasting it fails." Therefore there is no delight in contemplation.
Obj.
3.
Further, Delight
is
the result of a
perfect operation, as stated in the Ethics."^ 1
PL
76, 955.
2
Aristotle, x, 4 (i
1
74''23).
Now
PART
II
OF SECOND PART
the contemplation of wayfarers is imperfect, according to I Cor. 13. 12, We see now through a glass in a dark manner. Therefore it seems that there
Obj.
4.
is
no dehght
Further,
obstacle to delight.
contemplative
in the
life.
A lesion of the body is an Now contemplation causes
a lesion of the body; thus
it is
stated (Gen. 32.)
had said {verse 30) / have seen God face to face, he halted on his foot, ... because he touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank. Therefore it seems that there is no dethat after Jacob
hght in contemplation.
On
the contrary. It
is
written of the contem-
plation of
wisdom (Wisd.
tion hath
no
8.
16)
:
bitterness, nor her
Her conversacompany any
tediousness, but joy a?id gladness; and Gregory
says (Horn,
ii
m Ezech.Y
that "the contempla-
tive life is sweetness exceedingly lovable."
/ answer that. There
come
to
may
And more delightful still does this beone who has the habit of wisdom and
science, the result of
which
is
that he contem-
plates without difficulty. Secondly, contempla-
may
be dehghtful on the part of its object, one contemplates that which one loves even as bodily vision gives pleasure not only because to see is pleasurable in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since, then, the contemplative hfe consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, to which charity moves us, as stated above (aa. 1,2, Reply i), tion
in so far as ;
follows that there
it
plative
life,
is
615
7
templation of God. And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the affections, since one dehghts in seeing the object loved, and the very delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Hence
Gregory says (Hom. ii in Ezech.Y that "when see one whom we love, we are so aflame as to love him more." And this is the ultimate perfection of the contemplative hfe, namely that the Divine truth be not only seen but also loved. Reply Obj. 2. Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of an external thing hinders dehght in that thing. For a man delights not in a thing against which he strives. But in that for which he strives he dehghts yet more when he
we
has obtained
it,
other things being equal. There-
fore Augustine says^ that "the
be delight in any particular contemplation in two ways. First by reason of the operation itself, because each individual delights in the operation which befits him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal, the result being that all men naturally desire to know, so that consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth.
ART.
Q. 180.
delight in the contem-
not only by reason of the contem-
was
more
peril there
in the battle, the greater the joy in the
triumph." But there is no strife or struggle in contemplation from the truth which we contemplate being contrary to us, though there is on the part of our defective understanding and our corruptible body which drags us down to lower things, according to Wisd. 9. 15, The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth
museth upon many
when man he loves his
own
down
things.
mind
that
it
that
the
Hence
is
attains to the contemplation of truth,
it
yet more, while he hates the
more
deficiency and the weight of his cor-
ruptible body, so as to say with the Apostle
(Rom.
7.
24)
shall deliver
:
Unhappy man
me from
that I
am, who
the body of this death?
Therefore Gregory says {Hom. ii in Ezech.):^ "When God is once known by desire and understanding,
He
Reply Obj.
withers 3.
all
carnal pleasure in us."
The contemplation
of
God
in
imperfect in comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner
this life is
the delight of the wayfarer's contemplation
is
by reason of the Divine
imperfect as com.pared with the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is written (Ps.
In both respects the delight surpasses all hudelight, both because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as stated above (Part I-II, Q. XXXI, A. 5), when we were treating of the passions, and because the love itself by which God is loved out of charity surpasses
35. 9) -.Thou shall make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure. Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to be had by
plation itself, but also love.
man
all love.
Hence
it is
written (Ps. ZZ- 9)
•
taste
and see that the Lord is sweet. Reply Obj. i. Although the contemplative
life
consists essentially in an act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since it is through charity that one is urged to the con1
PL 76, 956.
wayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that which is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says:^ "It
happens that these substances, excellent beyond compare, and divine, are less accessible to our knowledge, and though we grasp them but feebly,
from
nevertheless
PL 76, 954. 4 PL 76, 955.
2
their
excellence
that
8
Confessions, viii, 7
(PL
^
Parts oj Animals,
5 {6^j^24,).
i,
32, 752).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
6i6
knowledge gives us more delight than any of those things that are round about us"; and Gregory says in the same sense (loc. cit.) "The :
contemplative lovable; for
it
life
is
exceedingly
sweetness
carries the soul
away above
itself,
opens heaven and discovers the spiritual world to the eyes of the mind." Reply Obj. 4. After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot, "because we need to grow weak in the love of the world before we wax strong in the love of God," as Gregory says {loc. cit.). Therefore, as he goes on to say, "when we have known the sweetness of God, we it
have one foot sound while the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans only on that foot which is sound."
tive life begins here so as
tinuous.
Objection
i.
For the contemplative
sists essentially in
Now
tellect.
this life will
all
be
the intellectual perfections of
made
void, according to I Cor.
Whether prophecies
13. 8,
con-
life
things pertaining to the in-
shall be
made
void,
or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be
destroyed. Therefore the contemplative
made
life is
—
ity of the incorruptible part of the soul,
the intellect, so that
—and because
2.
Further,
A man tastes the sweetness of
contemplation by snatches and for a short time only. Hence Augustine says,^ "Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost yet through soul, to a strange sweetness, my grievous weight I sink down again." Again, .
.
.
Gregory commenting on the words of Job 4. 15, When a spirit passed before me, says:^ "The mind does not remain long at rest in the sweetness of inward contemplation, for it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity of the light." Therefore the contemplative not continuous.
life is
Further, That which is not connatural cannot be continuous. Now "the contemplative life," according to the Philosopher,^ "is better than the life which is according to man." Therefore it seems that the contemplative life is not continuous.
Obj.
On
work, as the Philosopher observes.^ Reply Obj. i. The manner of contemplation is not the same here as in heaven; yet the contemplative hfe is said to remain by reason of charity, in which it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory speaks in this sense {Hom. ii in Ezech.) :^ "The contemplative hfe begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the fire of love which begins to burn here is aflame with a yet greater love when
we
Him Whom we love." 2. No action can
see
:
the contrary,
Our Lord
said
Mary
(Luke
10.
templation
*
»
Confessions, x, 65 (PL 32, 807). 75. 711. * PL Ethics, X, 7 (ii77'>26). 76, 954.
is
last long at its
the highest point of con-
to reach the uniformity of Divine
contemplation, according to Dionysius
Nom.
Wy
and
as
we have
{Div.
stated above (a.
6,
Reply 2). Hence although contemplation cannot last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as regards the other contemplative acts.
Reply Obj. contemplative
3.
The Philosopher
life to
be above
declares the
man
because it something which is incor-
befits us "so far as there is in us
namely the intellect, and impassible in itself, so that can endure longer.
divine,"
ruptible
its
act
QUESTION CLXXXI Of the active
life
{In Four Articles)
We
must now consider the active life, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active life? (2) Whether prudence pertains to the active hfe? (3) 6
'PL
Now
highest pitch.
3.
hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her, since as Gregory says {Horn, ii in Ezech.),^ "the contempla42)
works of the contemplative
we do not work with our bodies, so that we the more able to persevere in this kind of
man
to
in the
namely
can endure after this hfe,
it
Reply Obj.
void.
Obj.
be perfected
continuous for two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for "there is nothing contrary to the pleasure of contemplation," as stated in the Topics.^ But even in our regard contemplative hfe is continuous, both because it belongs to us in respect of the activ-
are
We proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It seems that the contemplative life is not con-
may
/ answer that, A thing may be described as continuous in two ways: first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is evident that in regard to itself contemplative life is
life
Article 8. Whether the Contemplative Life Is Continuous?
it
our heavenly home."
in
Aristotle,
13 (io6»s8). ^ Ethics, X. 7 (1177*21). 'Sect. 9 (PG 3, 705); cf. 165).
Whether
teach-
I,
PL 76, 954. Cat. Hier.,
7
De
m,
2
(PG
3.
PART
OF SECOND PART
II
Of the dur-
ing pertains to the active life? (4)
virtues are chiefly directed not to the contem-
Philosopher i. Whether All the Acts of the Moral Virtues Pertain to the Active Life?
Article
We proceed thus to the First Article:
It
that the acts of the moral virtues do not
seems
all
per-
of
is
little
says'*
or no avail."
tive life; for
is
ii
in
Ezech.y that
so
it is
clear that
which reason the Philosopher^ sub-
the active Hfe.
give bread to the hungry,"
And
ordinates the moral virtues to the happiness of
Objection i. For the active life seems to regard only our relations with other persons.
Hence Gregory says {Horn,
Hence the
that "for virtue knowledge
the moral virtues belong essentially to the ac-
tain to the active life.
life is to
617
2
plation of truth but to operation.
ation of the active Hfe.
"the active
ART.
Q. 181.
Reply Obj. i. The chief of the moral virtues justice by which one man is directed in his
relations towards another, as the Philosopher
Hence
proves.^
the active
life is
described with
and after mentioning many things that regard
reference to our relations with other people, be-
our relations with other people he adds finally, "and to give to each and every one whatever he
but principahy.
Now we are not directed in our relations
needs."
to others
by
all
the acts of moral virtues, but
only by those of justice and
above 3).
2,
not
(q. lviii, aa.
2,
its
parts, as stated
8; Part I-II, Q. lx, aa.
Therefore the acts of the moral virtues do pertain to the active
all
cause
Obj.
2.
life.
Further, Gregory says {Horn,
ii
in
who was
blear-eyed but fruitful
signifies the active life,
which being occupied
Ezech.)
'}
"Lia
with works, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbour both by word and example to its
consists in these things, not exclusively,
it
Reply Obj.
It is possible
2.
so again
when
man makes
a
to contemplation, such things are
der the contemplative
when we
practise the
good
the active
active life
begets a numerous offspring of good this
would seem
to
life.
sitions
It
may
also be repHed, however, that the is
a disposition to the contemplative
belong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues do not pertain to
On Bono,
the contrary, Isidore says iii,
15)
:^
"In the active
{De Summo must
of
all
;
I
PL 76, 953-
^Ibid.
3
Article
PL 83, 690.
2.
Whether Prudence Pertains
to
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that prudence does not pertain to the active Hfe.
Objection
life all vices
be extirpated by the practice of good works, in order that in the contemplative life the mxind's eye being purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine light." Now all vices are not extirpated save by the acts of the moral virtues. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the active Hfe. / answer that. As stated above (q. clxxix, a. i) the active and the contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of men intent on different ends. One of these occupations is the consideration of the truth and this is the end of the contemplative life, while the other is external work to which the active life is directed. Now it is evident that the moral first
comprised un-
the other hand,
virtues belong to the active Hfe.
the Active Life?
the active Hfe.
On
works of the moral virtues and not as dispoto the contemplative life, the moral
Hfe.
3.
life.
in themselves,
Further, As stated above (q. clxxx, A. 2), the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and perfection Obj.
use of things per-
taining to the active Hfe merely as dispositions
as being
it
Now
deeds."
acts of aU
bour to good by example, and this is what Gregory here ascribes to the active life. Reply Obj. 3. Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of another virtue passes, in a certain way, into the species of the latter virtue,
belong to charity, by which we love our neighbour, rather than to the moral virtues. Therefore it seems that the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to
imitation
by the
the moral virtues for one to direct one's neigh-
i.
For
just as the contemplative
Hfe pertains to the cognitive power, so the active life pertains to the appetitive power.
Now
prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive power. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life. Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says {Horn, n in Ezech.y that "the active Hfe being occupied with work, sees less," and therefore it is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that one may judge rightly of what has to be done. Therefore it seems that prudence does not pertain to the active life. Obj. 3. Further, Prudence stands between the moral and the inteUectual virtues. Now just as ^£/^iC5, ^
II,
4(1105^2).
Ibid., V, I (1129^27).
6 7
7Wi.,x, 8(1178^9). Bk. II (PL 76. 954).
;
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
6i8
the moral virtues belong to the active life, as stated in the foregoing Article, so do the intel-
man
tion of the active life enables a
clearly in judging of
what
is
more
to see
to be done,
which
life.
belongs to prudence, both on account of ex-
would seem that prudence perneither to the active nor to the contem-
perience, and on account of the mind's attention,
lectual virtues pertain to the contemplative
Therefore
it
tains plative Hfe, but to an intermediate kind of Ufe,
of which Augustine
On
the contrary,
make mention.^ The Philosopher
since
"when
Reply Obj. says^ that
mind
the
is
attentive
it
takes on
all
force," as Sallust observes (Coftjur. Catil.).''
its
Prudence
3.
is
said to be interme-
diate between the intellectual
and the moral same subject
prudence pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong. / answer that, As stated above (a. i, Reply 3 Part I-II, Q. XVIII, A. 6), if one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, espe-
virtues because
moral matters, to the species of the it is directed; for instance "he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer," according to the Philosopher Now it is evident that the knowledge of prudence is directed to the works of the
things about which it is occupied, because it is occupied sometimes with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with external things.
moral virtues as its end, since it is "right reason about things to be done,"* so that the ends of the moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher says in the same book.^ Accordingly, just as it was stated above (a. i. Reply 3) that the moral virtues in one who directs them to the quiet of contemplation belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which is of itself directed to the works
We proceed thus to the Third Article It seems that teaching is a work not of the active but of the contemplative Hfe. Objection i. For Gregory says {Horn, v in Ezech.y that "the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods proclaim them to their brethren, whose souls they inflame with
of the moral virtues, belongs directly to the
the contemplative hfe.
active life, provided we take prudence in its proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it. If however we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any kind of human knowledge,
Obj. 2. Further, Act and habit would seem to be brought back to the same kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom, for the Philosopher says that "to be able to teach is an indication of knowledge."^ Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the contemplative life. Obj. 3. Further, Prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the contemplative life. Now even the prayer by which one prays for another belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it belongs also to the contemplative hfe to acquaint another, by teaching him, of the truth we have meditated. On the contrary, Gregory says {Horn, ii in Ezech.):^^ "The active life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of
cially in
thing to which
.•'
then prudence, as regards a certain part of it, life. In this sense
belongs to the contemplative
Tully {De
lY says that "the man who is and quickly to grasp the truth
Offic.
able
most
and
to unfold his reasons,
clearly
is
usually considered
most prudent and wise." Reply Obj. i. Moral works take their species from their end, as stated above (Part I-II, Q. XVIII, aa. 4, 6), and therefore the knowledge pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the very knowledge of truth but the knowledge of prudence, through having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to be
;
to the active
life.
Reply Obj.
2.
makes
a
things
Being occupied with external
man
see
less
in
intelligible
which are separated from sensible objects with which the works of the active life are
things,
concerned. Nevertheless the external occupa-
it
resides in the
as the intellectual virtues, but accords wholly
with the moral virtues as to matter. But this third kind of life is intermediate between the active and the contemplative hfe as regards the
Article
3.
Whether Teaching
Is a
Work
of
the Active or of the Contemplative Life?
love for their hidden beauty." But this pertains to teaching. Therefore teaching
wisdom." / answer
that,
fold object.
For teaching
and speech
The
is
a
work
of
act of teaching has a twois
conveyed by speech,
the audible sign of the interior
is
concept. Accordingly one object of teaching
is
the matter or object of the interior concept; *
CityoJ God, XIX,
'
FAhics, X, 8 (ri78'*i6).
*
Ibid.,
«
DD IV, 428.
VIS
2, 3,
(ii4o''2o).
19
(PL »
41, 624; 625; 647). Ibid., v,
and as
to this object teaching belongs
some-
2 (ii,3o''24).
6/tjj.^x, 8(1178^17).
7
Chap. SI (BU
»
Metaphysics,
47).
1,
i
(981^7)-
»Bk.i(PL76,827). " Bk. 11 (PL 76,
953).
PART
II
OF SECOND PART
Q. 181.
times to the active, sometimes to the contemplative Hfe. It belongs to the active hfe when a
to
man
this hfe.
conceives a truth inwardly so as to be di-
rected by
it
outward action; but
in his
longs to the contemplative life
inwardly
conceives
whose
an
Hence Augustine
intelligible
and
consideration
when
love
"Let
says:^
he
it
a
truth
in
delights.
them choose
the better part," namely the
for themselves
contemplative life "let them be busy with the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with the knowledge that saves," thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the contemplative life. The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and thus the object of teach;
ing
the hearer.
is
As
to this object all teaching
belongs to the active
Reply Obj. it
is
i.
The
authority quoted speaks
2.
this
press his interior concept in words, so as to
man to understand the truth. 3. He who prays for another does nothing towards the man for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible truth bring another
Reply Obj.
but he who teaches another does something in his regard by external action. Hence the comfails.
4.
Whether the Active Life Remains
After This Life?
is
after this
On
life.
the contrary, Gregory says {Horn,
Ezech.)
:^
"The
in
ii
active hfe ends with this world,
but the contemplative
life
begins here, to be per-
fected in our heavenly home."
/ answer that, As stated above (a. i), the ac-
end
in external actions;
and
if
these are referred to the quiet of contemplation,
templative cease,
and
proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It seems that the active life remains after this life. Objection i. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active Hfe, as stated above (a. i). But the moral virtues endure after this life according to Augustine {De Trin. xiv, 9).^ Therefore seemingly the active life remains after
the active
But
Further, Teaching others belongs to life,
as stated in the foregoing Ar-
in the hfe to
come when we
shall be be possible, even as apparently it is in the angels of whom one enlightens, cleanses, and perfects another, which refers to the receiving of knowledge, according
like the angels, teaching will
1
Serm. ad Popuh, serm. civ,
2
PL 42,
1046.
there be any external actions at
all,
we shall rest and we shall and love, we shall love and praise." And he had said before^ that there God City of God,^ "there
see, v/e shall see
"will be seen without end, loved without weary-
praised without tiring: such will be the occupation of all, the common love, the univering,
sal activity."
Reply Obj.
i. As stated above (q. cxxxvi, a. Reply i), the moral virtues will remain not as to those actions which are about the means, but as to the actions which are about the end. Such acts are those that conduce to the quiet of con-
I,
Augustine denotes by "rest," and this rest excludes not only outward disturbance but also the inward disturbance of the passions.
Reply Obj.
i
(PL 38,
616).
2.
The contemplative
as
life,
stated above (q. clxxx, a. 4), consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and as to this, one
angel does not teach another, since according to Matt.
this hfe. 2.
if
these will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says at the end of the
templation, which in the words quoted above
We
ticle.
lasting a thing
seems to be able to endure after this life. But the active hfe seems to be more lasting in itself; for Gregory says {Horn. V in Ezech.y that "we can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are in no way able to maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative hfe." Therefore the active hfe is much more able than the contemplative to endure it
life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of external actions will
its
Habit and act have a common argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach in so far as he is able to ex-
Obj.
The more
it
remains after
for that very reason they belong to the con-
Hence
Article
more
life
matter, in so far
Reply Obj.
parison
619
4
Eier. vii).^ Therefore
concerned with the consideration and
love of truth. object.
Further,
3.
tive hfe has its
expressly of doctrine as to as
Obj.
in itself, the
which external
to
life
actions pertain.
ART.
{CcbI.
would seem that the active
be-
man
Dionysius
18.
10,
the
little
one's angels,
who
belong to the lower order, always see the face of the Father; and so, in the hfe to come, no man will teach another of God, but we shall all see
Him as He is (I John 3. 2), This is in keeping with the saying of Jeremias (31. 34): They shall teach no more every man his neighbour, .
(PG3, 2oq). (PL 76, 82s). 6 xxn, 30 (PL 41, 804). 3
Sect. 3
4
Bk.
I
B
Bk. 7
II
(PL 76, 954). (PL 41, 802).
Ibid.
.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
620
men would seem
know me, from the least of them even to the greatest. But as regards things pertaining to the dispensation of the mysteries of God, one angel teaches another by cleansing, enhghtening, and perfecting him; and thus they have something of the active life so long as the world lasts, from
ter
the fact that they are occupied in administering
active
to the creatures below them. This
templative.
saying:
Know
the Lord: for all shall
signified
is
Jacob saw angels ascending the which refers to contemand descending, which refers to acplation, tion. Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks {Moral. ii, 3),^ "they do not wander abroad from the Divine vision in such a way as to be deprived of the joys of inward contemplation." Hence in them the active life does not differ from the
by the
fact that
ladder (Gen. 28. 12),
—
—
contemplative Hfe as
it
—
does in us for
whom
life
Obj.
more
is
all
habits and acts, com-
to the
more excellent; thus more excellent, com-
the military art, being the
mands
it
be-
command
the contemplative, as appears from the words
addressed to Moses (Exod. 19. 21), Go down and charge the people, lest they shotdd have a
mind
to pass the fixed limits to see the Lord.
away from
any property of either life considered in itself, but from our own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights of contemplation by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds {ibid.) that "the mind through its very weakness being repelled from that immense height recoils on itself."
Now
the art of the bridle-maker.
longs to the active Hfe to direct and
Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the administering to lower creatures, for this does not belong to us not by rea-
not from
than the con-
excellent
Further, In
2.
manding belongs
the contemplative.
life arises
life
who are placed in a position of honour and power; hence Augustine says^ that "in our actions we must not love honour or power in this life." Therefore it would seem that the
contemplation.
contemplative
the active
lates,
Therefore the active
bility of the
Now
belongs to persons of higher rank, namely pre-
the works of the active life are a hindrance to
son of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of our seeing God. Reply Obj. 3. That the durability of the active life in the present state surpasses the dura-
and better,"
to be worthier
as the Philosopher says.^
Obj.
No man
Further,
3.
more
life is
excellent than
should be taken
a greater thing in order to be occu-
pied with lesser things, for the Apostle says
Be zealous for the some are taken away from the
(I Cor. 12. 31)
Now
contemplative
better gifts.
:
state of the
to the occupations of the
life
active Hfe, as in the case of those
who
are trans-
ferred to the state of prelacy. Therefore
would seem that the active
life is
more
it
excel-
lent than the contemplative.
On
Our Lord
the contrary,
Mary
42):
shall not be take7i
away from
10.
the contemplative Hfe
is
Now Mary
her.
a figure of the contemplative
is
(Luke
said
hath chosen the best part, which life.
Therefore
more exceUent than
the active.
QUESTION CLXXXII
/
Of the active life in comparison WITH the contemplative LIFE must now consider the active
parison with the contemplative
life,
that.
more
comunder which life in
head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Which of them is greater import or excellence?
Which of them has the greater merit? (3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active Hfe? (4) Of their order. (2)
We
i.
Is
More
proceed thus to the First Article: It life is more excellent than
seems that the active
which
some
this
by
eight reasons."*
contemplative
which
is
'
PL
75.556.
For "that which belongs to bet-
The
life befits
best in him,
reply that the
because the according to that
first is
man
namely the
intellect,
and
proper objects, namely intelHgibles; the active Hfe however is occupied with externals. Hence Rachel, by whom the according to
its
life
is
signified,
interpreted
is
"the vision of the principle," whereas as Gregory says {Moral, vi, 37)^ the active Hfe is signified
by Lia who was "blear-eyed." The second
reason ^
i.
we must
contemplative life absolutely is more excellent than the active; and the Philosopher proves
is
the contemplative.
Objection
certain
nevertheless are surpassed by another in
contemplative
Whether the Active Life Excellent Than the Contemplative? Article
Nothing prevents
excellent in themselves
respect. Accordingly
{In Four Articles)
We
answer
things being
Topics,
because the contemplative
m,
life
can be
I (ii6'>i2).
City of God, xix, 19 (PL 41, 647). * Ethics, X, 7, 8 (1177*12; 1178*9).
»
6
PL 75.
764.
PART
II
more continuous, although not
OF SECOND PART
ART.
Q. 182.
Reply Obj.
as regards the
621
2
Not only
1.
the active life con-
highest degree of contemplation, as stated above
cerns prelates, but they should also excel in the
clxxx, a. 8; q. clxxxi, a. 4, Reply and so Mary, by whom the contemplative
3),
contemplative
life
tor,
(q.
time because the contemmore dehghtful than the active;
signified, is described as sitting all the
is
at the Lord's feet. Thirdly,
plative Hfe
is
hence Augustine says^ that "Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted." Fourthly, because in the contemplative life man is more selfsufficient, since he needs fewer things for that purpose; therefore it was said (Luke 10. 41): Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things. Fifthly, because the contemplative life is loved more for its own sake, while the active Hfe is directed to some-
Hence it is written (Ps. 26. 4) One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord thing else.
all
:
the days of
my
life,
that I
may
see the de-
action,
hence Gregory says (Pas-
life;
"A
n, i):^
prelate should be foremost in
more upHfted than others
in
contem-
plation."
Reply Obj.
2.
The contemplative
life consists
mind. For Gregory says (Hom. in in Ezech.y that "the contemplative life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal but of eternal things." And Boethius says {De Consol. v, 2) :^ "The soul of man must be more free while it continues to gaze on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things." Therefore it is evident that the active Hfe does not directly command the contemplative Hfe, but prescribes certain works of the active Hfe as dispositions to the contemplative life, which it accordingly serves rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says {loc. cit. in Ezech.y that "the active life is bondage, but the contem.plative life is freedom." in a certain liberty of
because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest, according to Ps. 45. II, Be still and see that I am God. Seventhly, because the contemplative Hfe is according to Divine things, while active Hfe is according to human things; hence Augustine says:^ "'In the beginning was the Word': to Him was Mary hearkening; 'The word was made flesh' Him was Martha serving." Eighthly, because the contemplative life is according to that which is most proper to man, namely his intellect; in the works of the active Hfe however the lower powers also, which are common to us and brutes, have their part; hence (Ps. 35. 8) after the words. Men and beasts thou Lord, that which is special to wilt preserve,
upon us we must devote ourselves to the search for and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even then we must not
man
altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest
light of the Lord. Sixthly,
:
added {verse 10)
is
In Thy
:
we
light
shall
Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Luke 10. 42) when He says Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her, which words Augustine expounds thus:^ "Not, Thou :
— — She has chosen —Because shaU not be
hast chosen badly but, better? Listen,
of the active Hfe on account of of the present pelled
to
;
in a restricted sense
and
in a particular
case one should prefer the active Hfe on ac-
count of the needs of the present Hfe. Thus too the Philosopher says:"* "It is better to philosophize than to be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich." 1
Serm. ad PopuL,
^
Ibid., CIV, 2
3
Ibid.,
serra.
(PL 38, cm, 4 (PL 38,
cm,
4
(PL
life,
contemplation
forsake
Hence Augustine
some necessity
yet not so as to be comaltogether.
"The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest toil," the work namely of says:^
the active Hfe. "If no one imposes this burden
its
we
sweetness, and this
burden overwhelm us." Hence it is clear that a person is called from the contemplative to the active Hfe, this is done by way not of taking away but of addition.
when
2. Whether the Active Life Is of Greater Merit Than the Contemplative?
Article
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the active Hfe is of greater merit than the contemplative.
Objection i. For merit impHes relation to reward; and reward is due to labour, according to I Cor. 3. 8, Every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labour. Now labour is ascribed to the active Hfe, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says {Horn, ii
38, 615). 6
617). 615).
called
is
better.
it
taken away from her. But the burden of necessity shah at length be taken from thee but the sweetness of truth is eternal."
Yet
Sometimes a man
3.
the contemplative Hfe to the works
deprive ourselves of
see light.
Why
Reply Obj.
away from
*
Topics,
m,
2 (iiS^io).
8
PL 77, 26. PL 76, 809.
«
PL 9
7 PL 63, 836. 76, 812. City oj God, xix, 19 (PL 41 647). ,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
622
"Whosoever is converted to God of all sweat from labour, that is, he
busy about much serving (Luke
in Ezech.)-}
cause
must first must take Lia, that afterwards he may rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the prin-
40). Therefore the contemplative life
is
cally of greater merit than the active
life.
Therefore the active
ciple."
life
is
of greater
would seem that the con-
increase of merit with regard to the essential
not of greater merit than the
reward consists chiefly in charity, a sign of which is external labour borne for Christ's sake. Yet a much more expressive sign of this is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this hfe, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation. Reply Obj. 2. In the state of future happiness man has arrived at perfection, and therefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the greater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without some imperfection, and can always be-
a
come; commenting on John 21. have him to remain till I come,
certain beginning of the happiness to
So I
will
says {Tract, cxxiv in Joann.)-} "This
may
be
expressed more clearly: Let perfect works fol-
conformed to the example of My pasand let contemplation begun here remain I come, that it may be perfected when I come." And Gregory says {loc. cit. in
Me
low sion,
until shall
Ezech.) that "the
of contemplation begins
life
here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly
Now
home."
the
come
to
life
will
be a state
not of meriting but of receiving the reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative Hfe would seem to have less of the character of merit than the active, but more of the character of reward.
Obj.
3.
Further, Gregory says (Horn,
Ezech.y that "no
God
man
tive life. Therefore
templative
life is
xii
in
more acceptable to Now by the zeal for
sacrifice is
than zeal for souls."
souls a
it
active.
O71 the contrary, Gregory says (Moral, vi) :^ "Great are the merits of the active Hfe, but
greater
Q.
still
those of the contemplative."
/ answer that, As stated above (Part I-II, cxiv, A. 4), the root of merit is charity; and,
while, as stated above consists in the love of
the love of
God
is
by
(q.
xxv,
a.
God and our
itself
the
i), charity
neighbour,
more meritorious
than the love of our neighbour, as stated above (q. xxvii, a. 8). Therefore that which pertains
more
directly to the love of God is of its very genus more meritorious than that which pertains directly to the love of our neighbour for God's sake. Now the contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of God; for Augustine says^ that "the love of truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contem-
plative
life,
for
it is
that truth above
all
which
the contemplative life seeks, as stated above (q.
clxxx,
a. 4; Q.
cLxxxi,
A. 4,
Reply 2).
On
the other hand, the active life is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbour, be-
iBk. »
^
II
(PL
-.^
turns to the occupations of the ac-
life is
therefore Augustine 22,
This
moreover asserted by Gregory {Horn, iii in "The contemplative life surpasses in Ezech.)
is
life, because the latter labours under the stress of present work," by reason of the necessity of assisting our neighbour, "while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of the coming rest," that is the contemplation of God. Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the active life than another by the works of the contemplative life. For instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then suffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the time being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake. Thus the Apostle said (Rom. 9. 3) / wished myself to be an anathema from Christ, for my brethren; which words Chrysostom expounds as follows {De Compunct. i) 'J "His mind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired above all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he pleased Christ." Reply Obj. 1. External labour conduces to the increase of the accidental reward, but the
The contemplative
Further,
2.
lo.
generi-
merit the active
merit than the contemplative. Obj.
it is
76, 954).
»
PL 35,
1^74.
* Chap. Bk. I (PL 76. 932). 37 (PL 75, 764). City oj God, XIX, 19 (PL 41, 647).
:
come more perfect; therefore it does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on account of the practice of greater Divine charity.
Reply Obj.
A
God Him;
sacrifice
is
rendered to
spiritually
when something
is
offered to
and of
man's goods. God specially accepts
all
that of the
Him
3.
human
soul
Now
when
it
man
is
offered to
ought to offer to God, in the first place, his soul, according to Ecclus. 30. 24. Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God; in the second place, the souls of others, according to Apoc. 22. 17, He that hearin sacrifice.
Bk.
I
(PL
76, 809).
a
^
PG 47. 405.
PART man
a
OF SECOND PART
II
him say: Come. And the more
eth, let
unites his
own
closely
or another's soul to God,
more acceptable is his sacrifice to God; therefore it is more acceptable to God that one the
apply one's own soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to action. Consequently the statement that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls," does not mean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to God one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other external gifts.
Article 3. Whether the Contemplative Life Is Hindered By the Active Life?
We
proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active Hfe. Objection i. For the contemplative hfe requires a certain stillness of mind, according to
Be
Ps. 45. 2,
the active
still,
life
and see that I
am God;
but
involves restlessness, according
of view the active life
train in the
is
Now
a req-
(Hom.
ii
in
Ezech.y that "Lia
is
camp
of action.
Thus
after careful
explore spiritual
things, whether they no them the shadows of the things corporeal or, if these foHow them, whether they prudently drive them away." Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contemplative, by quelling the interior passions which give rise to the phantasms by which contemplato
longer carry with
tion
is
hindered.
And
this suffices for the
Re-
the Objections; for these arguments
consider the occupation itself of external acand not the effect which is the modera-
tion of the passions.
active
a hindrance to clear vision; for Gregory
life is
says
life.
a help to the contem-
is
cast down with too great a sorrow when those goods are withdrawn. In this way they will know when they withdraw within themselves, in order
tions,
contemplative
this point
study they will learn whether they no longer wrong their neighbour, whether they bear with equanimity the wrongs their neighbours do to them, whether their soul is neither overcome with joy in the presence of temporal goods, nor
the active Hfe hinders the contemplative.
Further, Clearness of vision
and from
hindered by the lack Hence Gregory says {loc. cit.): "Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation must first of aU
plies to
2.
;
of order of the internal passions.
Luke 10. 41, Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled aboiit many things. Therefore Obj.
623
is
plative, since the latter
to
uisite for the
ART. 4
Q. 182.
ternal passions of the soul
blear-
Article
4.
Whether the Active Life Precedes
the Contemplative?
eyed and fruitful, because the active life, being occupied with works, sees less." Therefore the
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It seems that the active Hfe does not precede the
active life hinders the contemplative.
contemplative.
Obj. other. life
One contrary hinders
Further,
3.
Now
the active and the contemplative
are apparently contrary to one another,
since the active life
is
busy about many things,
while the contemplative hfe attends to the con-
templation of one; therefore they
differ in
op-
Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by
position to one another.
the active.
On the contrary, Gregory says {Moral, vi, 37) :2 "Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation must first of all train in the camp
The
active Hfe
may
be consid-
ered from two points of view. First, as regards the attention to and practice of external works
and thus
it is
1.
For the contemplative Hfe perGod, while the ac-
tains directly to the love of
tive Hfe pertains to the love of our neighbour.
Now
the love of
neighbour, since
God's sake.
It
God we
precedes the love of our love our neighbour for
seems therefore the contempla-
tive Hfe also precedes the active Hfe.
Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says {Horn, ii in Ezech.) i^ "It should be observed that while a weH-ordered Hfe proceeds from action to contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the contemplative to the active Hfe." Therefore the active Hfe
of action."
/ answer that.
Objection
the
evident that the active Hfe hin-
ders the contemplative, in so far as
impossible for one to be busy with external action and at the same time give oneself to Divine contemplation. Secondly, active Hfe may be conit is
sidered as quieting and putting in order the in-
iBk.n(PL76,9S4).
2
PL 75,
763.
is
not absolutely
prior to the contemplative.
Obj. 3. Further, It would seem that there is not necessarily any order between things that are suitable to different subjects.
Now
the ac-
and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects; for Gregory says {Moral. vi, 37):^ "Often those who were able to contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when pressed with occupation; and tive
3
PL 76, 954.
)
Further,
4.
No man
'
is
more perfect than
lead a solitary
that of
life.
Our Lord
(Luke 11. and putteth it
said
lighteth a candle
nor under a bushel.
in a hidden place,
Now
would seem to be in a hidden place, and to be doing no good to any man. Therefore it would seem that their those
who
lead a solitary life
religious life
Obj.
5.
not more perfect.
is
Further, That which
man's nature
is
is
in
apparently more pertinent to
the perfection of virtue. But
man
is
naturally
a social animal, as the Philosopher says.^ Therefore it would seem that to lead a solitary life
is
not more perfect than to lead a com-
n.^unity life.
On
{De Oper. "those are holier who keep
the contrary, Augustine says
Monach.
23)''
that
themselves aloof from the approach of all, and give their whole mind to a life of prayer." / answer that. Solitude, like poverty, is not the essence of perfection, but a means to it. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers {Coll. i,
7)^ the
Abbot Moses says that
even as fasting and other
means
"solitude,"
like things, "is a sure
of acquiring purity of heart."
Now
it is
evident that solitude is a means adapted not to action but to contemplation, according to
Osee 2. (Douay, 1
PL
14, /
PL
.
imll lead her into solitude
.
2
22, 1077.
^Politics,
'thing that can have the nature of being, and ^ Glossa ordin. (v, i25A);cf. Bede, horn, See Peter Lombard, Sent., in, d. xrv, chap.
«
Sect. 4
(PG3.
817).
is
con-
forth from the agent;
but
of the thing, for the reason that action
that
knowledge of what He knows that is, how to do what He knows; and thus that He can do all things.
He
is He said to be omnipotent; not that the omnipotence of the Man is distinct (as neither is His Godhead) from that of the Son of God, but because there is one Person of God and man. Reply Obj. 2. According to some,^ knowledge and active power are not of the same character; for an active power flows from the very nature
so
come
not always possessed by the very
is
essence of the knower, since assimilation of the
or speculative. Therefore
s:
receives omnipotence in time, which the Son of God had from eternity. The result of this union is that as the Man is said to be God,
all
Obj. 3. Further, the soul of Christ has all knowledge. Now knowledge is either practical
2,
Man
of
power, and thus
is
i
2
(PL
(QR
94, 11); 11,
610).
by the But
knower
may
it
be had by
to the thing
known
aid of hkenesses that are received. this reason
seems not to be enough, be-
we may understand by a obtained from another, so also may we cause even as
likeness
by a form obtained from another, as water or iron heats, by heat borrowed from fire. Hence there would be no reason why the soul of Christ, as it can know all things by the likenesses of all things impressed upon it by God, cannot do these things by the same likenesses. It has,
that what
the higher
act
therefore, to be further considered is is
received in the lower nature from
possessed in an inferior manner;
not received by water in the perfection and strength it had in fire. Therefore, since the soul of Christ is of an inferior nature to the for heat
is
Divine Nature, the likenesses of things are not received in the soul of Christ in the perfection
and strength they had
And hence soul
is
it is
Divine Nature.
in the
that the knowledge of Christ's
inferior to Divine
knowledge as regards
manner of knowing, for God knows things more perfectly than the soul of Christ; and also as regards the number of things known, since the soul of Christ does not know all that God can do, and these God knows by the knowledge of simple intelligence (although it knows all the
things
present,
past,
and future which God
knows by the knowledge
of vision). So, too, the
likenesses of things infused into Christ's soul
do not equal the Divine power 2
Peter Lombard, Sent., in,
see William of Auxerre, Q. I (ii7ra).
d. xiv,
Summa
in acting
chap.
Aurea,
i(QR 111,
i,
—that
11, 608); chap, s,
THIRD PART is,
so as to do
the same
all
manner
God can do, or to do in God does, Who acts with an
that
as
might wherof the creature is not capable. Now there is no thing to know which in some way an infinite power is needed, although a certain kind of knowledge belongs to an infinite power; yet there are things which can be done only by an infinite power, as creation and the like, as is plain from what has been said
infinite
the First Part
in
xlv,
(q.
a.
5,
3, Reply 3; Q. XXV, A. Christ's soul which, being a creature,
Lxv, A.
Hence
Reply 3; q. 3, Reply 4). is
power, can know, indeed, all things, but not in every way. Yet it cannot do all things, which pertains to the nature of omnipotence; and, amongst other things, it is clear that it cannot create itself. Reply Obj. 3. Christ's soul has practical and speculative knowledge, yet it is not necessary that it should have practical knowledge of all those things of which it has speculative knowledge. Because for speculative knowledge a mere conformity or assimilation of the knower to the thing known suffices, whereas for practical knowledge it is required that the forms of the things in the intellect should be operative. Now to have a form and to impress this form upon something else is more than merely to have the finite in
form as to shine and to illuminate is more than merely to shine. Hence the soul of Christ has a speculative knowledge of creation (for it knows how God creates), but it has no practical knowledge of this mode, since it has no knowledge operative of creation. ;
Article 2. Whether the Soul of Christ Had Omnipotence With Regard To the Changing of Creatures?
We
ART.
Q. 13
by the rational, loyand righteous spirit of Hfe." But the soul of Christ moves even the highest spirits, enlightsinful rational spirit of Hfe
ening them, as Dionysius says {CceI. Hier. vii)^ Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ has omnipotence with regard to the changing of creatures.
Obj.
er as well as the rest
miraculously changed from their course, as Dionysius proves (Ep. ad Poly carp.). ^ Therefore Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to the changing of creatures.
On
the contrary,
Him Who
longs to
belongs to
plain
2.
perfect of
be
all
creatures.
moved by another
says
{De
is
the most
But every creature can
creature; for Augustine
4)^ that "even as the denser and lower bodies are ruled in a fixed way by the subtler »
PL
Trin.
iii,
and stronger bodies, so are
42, 873.
all
bodies by
Now
this
alone, according to
/ answer that, Two distinctions are here needed. Of these the first is with respect to the
changing of creatures, which is threefold. The natural, being brought about by the proper agent according to the order of nature; the second is miraculous, being brought about by a first is
supernatural agent above the accustomed order and course of nature, as to raise the dead; the third is according as every creature may be brought to nothing. The second distinction has to do with Christ's soul, which may be looked at in two ways first in its proper nature and with its power of na:
ture or of grace; secondly, as it is the instruof the Word of God, personally united to
Therefore if we speak of the soul of Christ in proper nature and with its power whether of nature or of grace, it had power to cause those its
effects
proper to a soul (for example, to rule the
direct human acts, and also, by the fulness of grace and knowledge to enhghten all rational creatures failing short of its perfection), in a
But Further, the soul of Christ
creatures be-
conserves them.
gard to the changing of creatures. Therefore this does not belong to Christ's soul.
creatures.
Obj.
God
To transmute
Heb. i. 3: Upholding all things by the word of His power. Therefore God alone has omnipotence with re-
body and
from Gen. i. i In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the changing of is
high-
its
works of powof the graces. But every
change of the creature can belong to the grace of miracles, since even the heavenly bodies were
meant
creatures, as
Further, Christ's soul had in
3.
est degree the grace of miracles or
ment Him.
all
781
al
proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the changing of creatures. Objection i. For He Himself says (Matt. 28. 18) All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth. Now by the words "heaven and earth" are :
2
the spirit rational of life; and the truant and
if
manner
we speak
befitting a rational creature.
of the soul of Christ as
the instrument of the
Word
it is
united to Him,
it
had an instrumental power to effect all the miraculous changes which can be ordered to the end of the Incarnation, which is to re-establish all things that are in heaven and on earth. But the changings of creatures according as 2
Sect. 3
(PG
3, 209).
^Epist., vii, 2
(PG
3, 1080).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
782
they may be brought to nothing corresponds to the creation of things, whereby they were brought from nothing. And hence even as God alone can create, so, too, He alone can return creatures to nothing, and He alone upholds them
Objection
Or t hod.
For Damascene says {De Fide all natural things were vol-
i.
20)^ that
iii,
"He
untary to Christ;
He
willed to thirst.
Now God
die, etc."
He
is
woidd
creatures.
the natural operations of His
they
Reply Obj. given a
Him"
little
i.
fall
As Jerome says:^ "Power
—that
is,
to Christ as
man
—"Who
is
while before was crucified, buried in the
tomb, and afterwards rose again." But all power said to have been given Him by reason of the union, whereby it was brought about that a Man was omnipotent, as was said above (a. i. Reply is
i).
made known
although this was
And
to the
angels before the Resurrection, yet after theRes-
was made known
urrection
it
Remigius
says.^
when they
are
to all
Resurrection our Lord says that
Him
in
Reply Obj.
2.
given to
men, as
Now, things are said to happen made known. Hence after the all
power
is
heaven and on earth. Although every creature can
be changed by some other creature, except, indeed, the highest angel, and even it can be enlightened by Christ's soul, yet not every change that can be made in a creature can be made by a creature, since some changes can be made by God alone. Yet all changes that can be made in creatures can be
made by
the soul of Christ, as
the instrument of the Word, but not in its proper nature and power, since some of these changes pertain to the soul neither in the order of nature nor in the order of grace.
Reply Obj.
(H-H,
Q.
3.
As was
CLXxviii,
A.
said in the I,
Second Part
Reply i), the grace is given to the soul
of mighty works or miracles
cause
—
He
might communicate it is written (Matt. 10. i) that, having called His twelve disciples together, He gave thern power over unclean spirits, to cast them out, and to heal all manner of diseases, and all mariner of infirmities.
miracles, but also that this grace to others.
Hence
Obj.
2.
We
proceed thus to the Third Article: It
would seem that Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to His own booy. i/n Matt., IV, on 28.18 (PL 26, 226). Cf. St. Thomas, Catena Aurea, In Malt.,
»
He
things whatsoever it
seems that
human
fect in Christ than in
own body.
nature was more per-
Adam, who had
a
body
entirely subject to the soul, so that nothing
could happen to the body against the will of
—
and this on account of the original which it had in the state of innocence. Much more, therefore, had Christ's soul omnipotence with regard to His body. Obj. 3. Further, the body is naturally changed by the imagination of the soul, and so much more changed the stronger the soul's imagination, as was said in the First Part (q. cxvii, A. 3, Reply 2, 3). Now the soul of Christ had most perfect strength as regards both the imagination and the other powers. Therefore the soul of Christ was omnipotent with regard to His own body. On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 2. 17) that it behoved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren, and especially as regards what belongs to the condition of human nature. But it belongs to the condition of human nature that the health of the body and its nourishment and growth are not subject to the the soul justice
bidding of reason or
God
will, since
Who
natural things
the author of Therefore they were not subject in Christ. Therefore Christ's soul was not omnipotent with regard to His own body. are subject to
alone
is
nature.
/ answer that. As stated above (a. 2), Christ's may be viewed in two ways. First, in its
soul
proper nature and power; and in this way, as of making exterior bodies it was incapable change from the course and order of nature, so, too, was it incapable of changing its own body
from
its
own
its
natural disposition, since the soul, of nature, has a determinate relation to
body. Secondly Christ's soul may be viewed instrument united in person to God's
its
as an
thus every disposition of His
own
body was wholly subject to His power. Nevertheless, since the power of an action is not properly attributed to the instrument, but to the
principal agent, this omnipotence to the
Word
of
Reply Obj. 28.18.
willed to
had omnipotence with regard to
Further,
Word; and Article 3. Whether the Soul of Christ Had Omnipotence With Regard To His Own Body?
all
(Ps. 113. 11). Therefore
Christ's soul
of a saint, so that these miracles are wrought
not by his own, but by Divine power. Now this grace was bestowed on Christ's soul most exthat is, not only that He might work cellently
hath done
He
omnipotent be-
called
back to nothing. And thus it must be said that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence with regard to the changing of in being, lest
He
willed to hunger,
willed to fear,
»
PG
94, 1084.
God i.
is
attributed
rather than to Christ's soul.
This saying of Damascene
re-
THIRD PART Divine will of Christ, since, as he says in the preceding chapter (ch. 19, cf. 14, 15),^ "it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to suffer and do what fers to the
was proper to it." Reply Obj. 2. It was no part of the original justice which Adam had in the state of innocence that a man's soul should have the power of changing his own body to any form, but that it should keep it from any hurt. Yet Christ could have assumed even this power if He had wished. But since man has three states namely, innocence, sin, and glory, even as from the state of glory He assumed comprehension, and from the state of innocence, freedom from sin, so also from the state of sin did He assume the neces-
—
sity of being will
be said
under the penalties of
this life, as
(q. xiv, a. 2).
Reply Obj. 3. If the imagination be strong, for the body obeys naturally in some things example, as regards falling from a beam set on high since the imagination was formed to be
—
—
a principle of local motion, as
said in the trea-
is
on the Sotd} So, too, as regards alteration in heat and cold, and their consequences, for the passions of the soul, according to which the heart is moved, naturally follow the imagination, and thus by arousing the spirits the whole body is altered. But the other corporeal dispositions which have no natural relation to the imagination are not changed by the imaginafor example, the tion, however strong it is shape of the hand, or foot, or such-like.
tise
—
Article 4. Whether the Soul of Christ Had Omnipotence As Regards the Execution of His Will?
Q. 13
ART.
7S3
4
country. Therefore
He
could not carry out the purpose of His will in everything. Obj. 3. Further, a man does not ask from another for what he can do himself. But our Lord besought the Father, praying for what He
wished to be done, for it is written (Luke 6. 1 2) He went out into a mountain to pray, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God. Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in all things.
On
the contrary, Augustine says (qq. Nov. '.^ It is impossible for the
et Vet. Test., qu. 77) will of the
Saviour not to be
possible for
Him
to will
fulfilled
:
nor
is it
what He knows ought
not to come to pass. / answer that, Christ's soul willed things in two ways. First, what was to be brought about by Himself; and it must be said that He was capable of whatever He willed thus, since it would not befit His wisdom if He willed to do anything of Himself that was not subject to His power. Secondly, He wished things to be brought about by the Divine power, as the resurrection of His own body and such miraculous deeds, which He could not effect by His own power, except as the instrument of the Godhead, as was said above (a. 2). Reply Obj. i. As Augustine says:'' "What came to pass, this Christ must be said to have willed. For it must be remarked that this happened in the country of the Gentiles, to whom it was not yet time to preach. Yet it would have been invidious not to welcome such as came
spontaneously for the faith. Hence He did not wish to be heralded by His own, and yet He wished to be sought; and so it came to pass."
proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence as regards the execution of His own
it may be said that this will of Christ was not with regard to what was to be carried out by it but with regard to what was to be done by others, which did not come under His human
will.
will.
We
Objection
i.
For
it is
written
that entering into a house,
(Mark
He would
7.
24)
that no
should know it, and He could not be hid. Therefore He could not carry out the purpose
man
of His will in
Obj.
2.
all
things.
Further, a
command
is
a sign of will,
was said in the First Part (q. xrx, a. 12). But our Lord commanded certain things to be done, and the contrary came to pass, for it is as
written (Matt.
9. 30, 31) that Jesus strictly charged them whose eyes had been opened, saying: See that no man know this. But they going out spread His fame abroad in all that
Or
Hence in the letter of Pope Agatho,^ which was approved in the Sixth Council,^ we read: "When He, the Creator and Redeemer of all, wished to be hid and could not, must not this be referred only to His human will which He deigned to assume in time?" Reply Obj. 2. As Gregory says (Moral, xix, 23)/ by the fact that Our Lord charged His mighty works to be kept secret, "He gave an example to His servants coming after Him that they should wish their miracles to be hidden;
and 3 ^
1
2
PG
PG
PG
94, 1080; Cf. 94, 1037; 94, 1045. Aristotle, iii, 9, 10 (432^13; 433*9).
6
'
yet, that others
may profit by
their example,
* Ibid. Ambrosiaster (PL 35, 2271). 1, Ad Augustas Imperatores (PL 87, 1177). Cone. Cpolit. Ill, actio 4 (MA xi, 250).
Episi.,
PL
76, 120.
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
784 they are thus this
made command
And
public against their will." signified
His
human glory, according to John My own glory. Yet He wished
will to fly 8, 50,
from
/ seek not
absolutely,
and
tion is,
and
vision, but the fulness of health" (that
the vigour of incorruptibility). Therefore
the body of Christ was incorruptible and with-
out any defect. Further, penalty
by His Divine will, that the miracle wrought should be pubHshed for the good of
of fault.
others.
cording to
Reply Obj. 3. Christ prayed both for things that were to be brought about by the Divine power, and for what He Himself was to do by His human will, since the power and operation of Christ's soul depended on God, Who works in all (Vulg., you), both to will and to accom-
fore defects of body,
especially
plish
(Phil.
2.
13).
QUESTION XIV Of the defects of body assumed by the son of god {In Four Articles)
We must now consider the defects Christ assumed in the human nature; and, first, of the defects of body;
secondly, of the defects of
soul (q. XV.).
head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether the Son of God should have assumed in human nature defects of body?
Under the
first
Whether He assumed the necessity of being subject to these defects? (3) Whether He contracted these defects? (4) Whether He assumed (2)
these defects?
all
Article i. Whether the Son of God in Human Nature Ought To Have Assumed Dejects
Body?
of
We proceed thus to
the First Article: It would seem that the Son of God ought not to have assumed human nature with defects of body. Objection i. For as His soul is personally united to the Word of God, so also is His body. But the soul of Christ had every perfection, both of grace and truth, as was said above (q. VII, A. 9; Q. IX, seqq.). Hence, His body also ought to have been in every way perfect, not having any imperfection in it. Obj. 2. Further, the soul of Christ saw the Word of God by the vision wherein the blessed see, as was said above (q. ix, a. 2), and thus the soul of Christ was blessed. Now by the beatification of the soul the body is glorified; since, as Augustine says {Ep. ad Dios. cxviii),^ "God made the soul of a nature so strong that from
the fulness of its blessedness there pours over even into the lower nature (that is, the body), not indeed the bliss proper to the beatific frui1
Chap. 3 (PL
33, 439).
Obj.
3.
But there was no I Pet.
is
the consequence
fault in Christ, ac-
Who did no guile. Therewhich are penalties, ought
2.22:
not have been in Him. Obj. 4. Further, no reasonable man assumes what keeps him from his proper end. But by such bodily defects the end of the Incarnation seems to be hindered in many ways. First, because by these infirmities men were kept back from knowing Him, according to Isa. 53. 2, 3: {.There was no sightliness^ that we should be desirous of Him. Despised and the most abject of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity, and His look was, as it were, hidden and despised, whereupon we esteemed Him not.
Secondly, because the desire of the holy Fathers
would not seem
person
it
is
be
to
fulfilled, in
whose
written (Isa. 51. 9): Arise, arise, strength, Thou Arm of the Lord.
put on Thy Thirdly, because
it
would seem more
fitting for
the devil's power to be overcome and man's
weakness- healed, by strength than by weakness. Therefore it does not seem to have been fitting that the
Son of God assumed human na-
ture with infirmities or defects of body.
On
the contrary. It
is
written (Heb.
2,
18)
For in that wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succour them also that are tempted. Now He came to succour us; hence David said of Him (Ps. 120. i.): / have lifted up my eyes to the inomitains, from whence help shall come to me. Therefore it was fitting for the Son of God to assume flesh subject to human infirmities, in order to suffer and be tempted in it and so bring succour to us. / answer that, It was fitting for the body assumed by the Son of God to be subject to human infirmities and defects; and especially for three reasons. First, because it was in order to satisfy for the sin of the
human
race that the
Son of God, having taken flesh, came into the world. Now one satisfies for another's sin by taking on himself the punishment due to the sin of the other. But these bodily defects, namely, death, hunger, thirst, and the like, are the punishment of sin, which was brought into the world by Adam, according to Rom. 5. 12: By one 77ian sin entered into this world, and by sin death. Hence it was useful for the end of the Incarnation that He should assume these penalties in our flesh and in our stead, according
THIRD PART He
to Isa. 53. 4, Surely
hath
home
our infirm-
ities.
Secondly, in order to cause belief in the Incarnation. For since
men
to
only as
the Son of
it is
human
nature
is
known
subject to these defects,
if
God had assumed human nature with-
out these defects, He would not have seemed to be true man, nor to have true, but imaginary, flesh, as
the Manicheans held.^
said, Phil. 2. y.
He
.
.
.
And
so, as is
ART.
form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man. Hence, Thomas, by the sight of His wounds, was recalled to the faith, as related John. 20. 26.
785
show us an example of
Article
Objection
Obj. Orthod.
it
were, of the
satisfaction for that sin; but the principle
is
the habit of soul, whereby one is inclined to wish to satisfy for another, and from which the satisfaction has its efficacy, for satisfaction would not be efficacious unless it proceeded from charity, as will be explained (Suppl. q. XIV, A. 2). Hence, the soul of Christ had to be perfect as regards the habit of knowledge and virtue, in order to have the power of satisfying, but His body was subject to infirmities, that the matter of satisfaction should not be wanting.
Reply Obj. 2. From the natural relationship which is between the soul and the body, glory flows into the body from the soul's glory. Yet this natural relationship in Christ was subject to the will of His Godhead, and thereby it came to pass that the Happiness remained in the soul, and did not flow into the body, but the flesh suffered what belongs to a nature capable of suffering; thus Damascene says {De Fide
Whether Christ Assumed the
subject to these defects.
another's sin are the matter, as
sufferings
2.
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that Christ was not of necessity He was
For
1.
the prophet
4. The infirmity assumed by Christ did not impede, but greatly furthered the end 1
See below, q. xvi, a. i. 94, 1080; cf. Ill, 14, 15
PG
Christ:
94, 1037, 1045).
will,
and
2.
Further,
iii,
all
Damascene says {De Fide
20) r^ "Nothing forced is seen in is voluntary." Now what is volun-
not necessary. Therefore these defects were not of necessity in Christ. tary
is
Obj. thing
3. Further, necessity is induced by somemore powerful. But no creature is more
powerful than the soul of Christ, to which it pertained to preserve its own body. Therefore these defects were not of necessity in Christ. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8. 3) that God sent His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh.
Now
it is
a condition of sinful flesh
under the necessity of dying, and suffering other like passions. Therefore the necessity to be
of suffering these defects
was
/ answer that. Necessity
in Christ's flesh.
One is a necessity of constraint, brought about by an external agent, and this necessity is contrary to both nature and
will, since
internal principle.
ther the
form
The
is
twofold.
these flow from an
other
is
natural neces-
from the natural principles (as
it is
necessary for
fire
—
ei-
to heat),
it is necessary for a body composed of contraries to be dissolved). Hence, with this necessity, which results from the matter, Christ's body was subject to the necessity of death and other like defects, since, as was said'' "it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to do and suffer what was proper to it." And this necessity results from the principles of human flesh, as was said above in this article. But if we speak of necessity of 3
(PG
written (Isa. 53. 7):
was His own
ly defects.
or the matter (as
sins.
it
speaking of the offering of the Passion. But will is opposed to necessity. Therefore Christ was not of necessity subject to bodi-
and do what was proper to it." Reply Obj. 3. Punishment always follows sin actual or original, sometimes of the one punished, sometimes of the one for whom he who suffers the punishment satisfies. And so it was with Christ, according to Isa. 53. 5: He was wounded for our iniquities. He was bruised for
Reply Obj.
is
is
sity, resulting
fer
it
offered because
Orthod. iii, 19)^ that, "it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to suf-
"
al-
Necessity of Being Subject to These Defects.
and defects. Hence it said (Heb. 12. 3) that He endured such opposition from sinners against Himself, that you be not wearied, fainting in your minds. Reply Obj. 1. The penalties one suffers for
our
And
though these infirmities concealed His Godhead, they made known His Manhood, which is the way of coming to the Godhead, according to Rom. 5. I, 2: By Jesus Christ ive have access to God. Moreover, the ancient Fathers did not desire bodily strength in Christ, but spiritual strength, with which He vanquished the devil and healed human weakness.
patience by valiantly bearing up against hu-
man
2
of the Incarnation, as above stated.
emptied Himself, taking
the
Thirdly, in order to
Q. 14
*
PG, 94 1084. John Damascene, De Fide
Orth.,
iii,
19
(PG
94, 1080).
SUMMA TEEOLOGICA
786
constraint, as contrary to the bodily nature,
thus again was Christ's body in its own natural condition subject to necessity in regard to the
and the scourge that struck.
nail that pierced
as such necessity
Yet according the will,
is
contrary to
clear that in Christ these defects
it is
—
understood the order of effect to cause that is, that is said to be contracted which is derived of necessity together with its cause. Now the cause of death and the like defects in human nature is sin, since by sin death entered into this world, according to Rom. 5. 12. And hence
who
incur these defects as due to sin, are
were not of necessity as regards either the Di-
they
vine will or the human will of Christ considered absolutely, as following the deliberation of rea-
properly said to contract them.
son, but only as regards the natural
of the will, according as
it
movement
naturally shrinks
from death and bodily hurt. Reply Obj. i. Christ is said to be o§ered because it was His own will that is, Divine will and deliberate human will, although death was contrary to the natural movement of His hu-
—
man
Damascene says {De Fide Orthod.
will, as
Reply Obj. been said. Reply Obj.
This
2.
from what has
plain
is
Nothing was more powerful
3.
than Christ's soul, absolutely; yet there was nothing to hinder a thing being more powerful in regard to this or that effect, as a nail for pierc-
And
ing.
this I say, in so far as Christ's soul is
considered in
its
own proper nature and power.
Christ
—
Thus
23, 24).^
iii,
Now
had not these defects as due to sin, since, as Augustine, expounding John 3. 31, He that Cometh from above, is above all, says:^ "Christ came from above that is, from the height of human nature, which it had before the fall of the first man." For He received human nature without sin, in the purity which it had in the state of innocence. In the same way He might have assumed human nature without defects. it
is
clear that Christ did not contract
if taking them upon Himself as due to sin, but by His own will. Reply Obj. i. The flesh of the Virgin was conceived in original sin, and therefore contracted these defects. But from the Virgin, Christ's flesh assumed the nature without fault, and He might likewise have assumed the nature without its penalty. But He wished to bear its pen-
these defects as
work of our redemption, as stated above (a. i). Therefore He had these defects not that He contracted them, but that He assumed them. Reply Obj. 2. The cause of death and other corporeal defects of human nature is twofold: the first is remote, and results from the mate-
alty in order to carry out the
Article
Whether Christ Contracted
3.
—
Bodily Dejects?
We
proceed thus to the Third Article: It
would seem that Christ contracted bodily defects.
Objection
we
i.
For we are said
derive with our nature
Christ, together with
to contract
from
human
birth.
what But
nature, derived
His bodily defects and infirmities through His birth from His mother, whose flesh was subject to these defects. Therefore it seems that He contracted these defects. Obj.
Further, what
2.
ciples of nature
and hence
is
is
is
caused by the prin-
derived together with nature,
contracted.
Now
are caused by the principles of
these penalties
human
nature.
3.
Further, Christ
is
made up
of the
human body, because
of contraries.
But
this cause
likened to other
it
was
Hence the
held in check by original justice.
proximate cause of death and other defects is sin, whereby original justice is withdrawn. And thus, because Christ was without sin. He is said not to have contracted these defects, but to have assumed them.
Reply Obj.
men
3.
Christ was
in the quality
and not
made
in the
like
other
cause of these
defects; and hence, unlike others.
Therefore Christ contracted them. Obj.
rial principles is
He
did not
contract them.
men
in these defects, as is written Heb. 2. 17. But other men contract these defects. Therefore it seems that Christ contracted these de-
4.
Assumed
Whether Christ Ought To Have
All the Bodily Dejects of
Men?
We
fects.
On
the contrary,
through
man
Article
sin.
These defects are contracted
according to
Rom.
By
one by sin, Christ. There5.
12:
sin entered into this world, aftd
death.
Now
sin
had no place
in
proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that Christ ought to have assumed all the bodily defects of men. Objection i. For Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. iii, 6, 18) :^ "What is unassumable is
fore Christ did not contract these defects. 2
/ answer that, In the verb "to contract" 1
PG 94,
1088, 1092.
is
Cf.
HuRh
of St. Cher,
(vi, ,^oiva). 3
PG
94, IC30S, 1071.
In Univ.
Test.,
on John 3.31
THIRD PART incurable." But Christ fects.
He
Therefore
came
to cure all our de-
ought to have assumed
all
our defects. Obj.
2.
Further,
it
was said
(a. i,
Reply i),
that in order to satisfy for us, Christ ought to
have had perfective habits of soul and defects
Now
of body.
the fulness of
body,
He
Obj.
3.
as regards the soul, all
He assumed
grace. Therefore as regards the
ought to have assumed Further, amongst
all
all
defects.
bodily defects
death holds the chief place. Now Christ assumed death. Much more, therefore, ought He to have
assumed other
On
ART.
Q. 15
787
I
Reply Obj. i. All particular defects of men are caused by the corruptibihty and capacity for suffering of the body, some particular causes being added; and hence, since Christ healed the capacity for suffering and corruptibility of our body by assuming it, He consequently healed other defects.
all
Reply Obj. 2. The fulness of all grace and knowledge was due to Christ's soul of itself, from the fact of its being assumed by the Word of God; and hence Christ assumed all the fulness of wisdom and grace absolutely. But He as-
sumed our defects
defects.
as a steward, in order to sat-
by contrary
and not that they belonged. to Him of Himself. Hence it was not necessary for Him to assume them all, but only such as sufficed to satisfy for the sin of the whole na-
that Christ
ture.
the contrary, Contraries cannot take place
simultaneously in the same. ities
Now some
infirm-
are contrary to each other, being caused
principles. Hence it could not be assumed all human infirmities. / answer that, As stated above (a. i), Christ assumed human defects in order to satisfy for the sin of human nature, and for this it was necessary for Him to have the fulness of knowledge and grace in His soul. Hence Christ ought to have assumed those defects which flow from the common sin of the whole nature, yet are
isfy for our sin,
Reply Obj.
3.
the sin of our
nacy toward well-doing.
Some other defects do not flow from the whole of human nature in common on account of the sin of our first parent, but are caused in
some men by
certain particular causes, as
and the like; and these desometimes brought about by the fault of the man for example, from inordinate eating; sometimes by a defect in the formative leprosy, epilepsy, fects are
—
power. Now neither of these pertains to Christ, since His flesh was conceived of the Holy Ghost, Who has infinite wisdom and power, and cannot err or fail; and He Himself did nothing wrong in the order of His life.
But there are some third defects, to be found amongst all men in common, by reason of the sin of our first parent, as death, hunger, thirst,
and the like; and all these defects Christ assumed, which Damascene {De Fide Orthod. i, 11; iii, 20)^ calls "natural and non-detracting passions" ture in
—
natural, as following all
common;
PG
94, 844, io8i.
na-
non-detracting, as implying
no defect of knowledge or grace. 1
human
men from
no parity.
QUESTION XV Of the defects
of soul assumed
by christ
edge and grace.
some defects that are incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace, as ignorance, a proneness towards evil, and an obsti-
to all
parent; but not other defects, although they are less than death. Hence there is
not incompatible with the perfection of knowl-
And thus it was not fitting for Him to assume all human defects or infirmities. For there are
Death comes
first
{In Ten Articles)
We
must now consider the defects pertaining and under this head there are ten points of inquiry: (i) Whether there was sin in Christ? (2) Whether there was the jomes of sin in Him? (3) Whether there was ignorance? (4) Whether His soul was passible? (5) Whether in Him there was sensible pain? (6) Whether there was sorrow? (7) Whether there was fear? (8) Whether there was wonder? (9) Whether there was anger? (10) Whether He was at once wayfarer and comprehensor? to the soul;
Article
i.
Whether There Was Sin
in Christ?
We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that there was sin in Christ. Objection 1. For it is written (Ps. 21. 2): God, My God, look upon me : why hast Thou forsaken Me? Far from My salvation are the words of My sins. Now these words are said in the person of Christ Himself, as appears from His having uttered them on the cross. Therefore it would seem that in Christ there were sins.
Obj.
2.
Further, the Apostle says
12) that in
cause also
all
was
Adam
(Rom.
5.
—namely, be-
have sinned
in Adam by origin. Now Christ Adam by origin. Therefore He
were in
all
sinned in him.
;
SUMMA TEEOLOGICA
788
gave Himself to us as a pattern of living." Now man needs a pattern not merely of right living, but also of repentance for sin. Therefore it seems that in Christ there ought to have been sin, that He might repent of His sin, and thus
which Augustine quotes,^ the first regards "Our Lord and His Body," since "Christ and His Church are taken as one person." And thus Christ, speaking in the person of His members, not says (Ps. 21. 2): The words of My sins that there were any sins in the Head. Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. X, 20),^ Christ was in Adam and the other fathers not altogether as we were. For we were in Adam as regards both seminal principle and bodily substance, since, as he goes on to say: "As in the seed there is a visible bulk and an invisible virtue, both have come from Adam. Now Christ took the visible substance of His flesh from the Virgin's flesh; but the principle of His conception did not spring from the seed of man, but far otherwise from on high." Hence He was not in Adam according to semi-
afford us a pattern of repentance.
nal principle, but only according to bodily sub-
Obj. 3 Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 2. 18) that in that, wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succour
them also that are tempted. Now above all do we require His help against sin. Therefore it seems that there was sin in Him. Obj.
4.
Further,
Him
it is
written (II Cor.
5.
21)
knew no sin (that is, Christ), for us God hath made sin. But that really is, which has been made by God. Therefore there that
was
that
really sin in Christ.
Obj.
5.
Further, as Augustine says
Christ, xi),^ "in the
man
{De Agone
Christ the Son of
God
—
—
8.
stance.
And
46) Which of you shall convince Me of sin? I answer that. As was said above (q. xiv, A. i), Christ assumed our defects that He might satisfy for us, that He might prove the
human
nature from
On
He
the contrary,
Himself says (John
:
human
truth of His
He might
nature, and that
become an example of virtue to us. Now it is plain that by reason of these three things He ought not to have assumed the defect of sin. First, because sin in no way works our satisfaction rather, it impedes the power of satisfying, since, as it is written (Ecclus. 34. 23), The Most High approveth not the gifts of the ;
wicked. Secondly, the truth of His ture
is
not proved by
belong to
human
human
sin, since sin
nature, of which
na-
does not
God
is
materially
even as
therefore Christ did not receive
Adam
Adam
received his body materially
from the slime of the
earth, actively
And thus Christ did not sin He was only as regards His Reply Obj.
Now
sin
free
from
sin;
As Damascene says (De Fide two ways: first, with reference to His natural and hypostatic property, as when it is said that God became man, and that He suffered for us; secondly, with reference to His personal and relative property, when things are said of Him in Reply Obj. iii,
1.
25),' things are said of Christ in
our person which in no
way belong
to
Him
of
Himself. Hence, in the seven rules of Tichonius'' »
PL
40, 298.
«
PG
Q4, 1093.
*
De Scptcm
Reg.
»
PG
(PL
satisfying for us.
Him
Reply Obj.
God made
4.
but that it is
of
He made Him
written (Osee
My
people
by the law that
way
4.
Christ sin,
He had
He own
it is
not,
a victim for sin, even as
8)
:
They
—they —that
is,
shall eat the sins
who And in
the priests,
ate the victims offered for sin.
hath laid on is. He gave
—
sin in Himself,
written (Isa. 53. 6) that the Lord iniquity of us all (that
Him the Him up
men)
made Him
;
or
to be a victim
He made Him
for the
sin (that
have the likeness of sinful (Rom. 8. 3), and this on account of the passible and mortal body He assumed. Reply Obj. 5. A penitent can give a praiseworthy example not by having sinned, but by freely bearing the punishment of sin. And hence Christ set the highest example to penitents, since He willingly bore the punishment, not of His own sin, but of the sins of others. is,
to
flesh), as is written
94, 1081.
18, 15).
for His
sin.
sins of all
Orthod.
by
otherwise the punishment
His mouth.
:
whom
in
matter.
bore would have been due to
indeed, in such sort that
—
from God.
Adam,
does not further satisfaction, but hinders it, as has been said. Hence, it was not necessary for Him to have sin, but He was wholly
sown in it against its nature by the devil, as Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. iii, 20).^ Thirdly, because by sinning He could afford no example of virtue, since sin is opposed to virtue. Hence Christ in no way assumed the defect of sin either original or actual according to what is written (I Pet. 2. 22) Who did no sin, neither was guile found in
—
in
In His temptation and passion
3.
Christ has succoured us
the
cause, but rather has been
actively, but only
—and from the Holy Ghost actively
6
Christian Doctrine, in, 31
«
PL
34. 424-
(PL
34, 82).
THIRD PART q.isART.s Article
2.
m
of Sin
We
Whether There Was
the
"Fomes"
Christ?
contrary to reason.
Second Article: It Christ there was the fomes
proceed thus to
would seem that
789
belongs to the very nature of the fomes of sin an inclination of the sensual appetite to what is
in
the,
And hence
since in Christ the virtues
of sin.
For the fomes of sin, and the passibility and mortahty of the body spring from the same principle, namely, from the withdrawal of original justice, whereby the inferior powers of the soul were subject to the reason, and the body to the soul. Now passibility and mortality of body were in Christ. Therefore there was also the fomes of sin. Objection
i.
Damascene says {De Fide was by consent of the Divine will that the flesh of Christ was allowed to suffer and do what was proper to it." But it is Obj.
Further, as
2.
Orthod.
iii,
19),^ "it
it is
plain that
more perfect the virtues are in any man, the weaker the fomes of sin becomes in him. Hence, the
fomes of
degree, the
sin
were in was not
their highest in
Him;
be-
cause also this defect cannot be ordered to satisfaction, but rather inclined to what is contrary to satisfaction.
Reply Obj.
1.
The
powers pertaining have a natural capac-
inferior
to the sensitive appetite
ity to be obedient to reason but not the bodily powers, nor those of the bodily humours, nor ;
those of the vegetative soul, as in the Ethics.^
And hence
is
made
plain
perfection of virtue,
which
proper to the
flesh to lust after its pleasures.
is in accordance with right reason, does not exclude passibility of body yet it excludes the fomes of sin, the nature of which consists
Now
fomes of
nothing more than
in the resistance of the sensitive appetite to
since the
sin is
concupiscence, as the gloss says^ on it
Rom.
7. 8,
seems that in Christ there was the fomes of Obj.
3.
Further,
it is
by reason of the fomes
of sin that the flesh lusteth against the spirit, as
written (Gal.
to be so
much
5.
17).
But the
spirit is
shown
the stronger and worthier to be
crowned according as the more completely it overcomes its enemy namely, the concupiscence of the flesh, according to II Tim. 2, 5, he is not crowned except he strive lawfully. Now Christ had a most valiant and conquering spirit, and one most worthy of a crown, according to Apoc. 6. 2 There was a crown given Him, and He went forth conquering that He might conquer. Therefore it would especially seem that the fomes of sin ought to have been in Christ.
—
:
On
reason.
The flesh naturally desires what by the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite; but the flesh of man, who is a rational animal, desires this after the manner and order of reason. And thus with the concupisReply Obj.
pleasing to
is
sin,
is
;
the contrary, It
That which Ghost.
Now
is
is
written (Matt.
Holy
20)
of the Holy Ghost drives out sin and
conceived in her
the
i.
the inclination to sin, which
is
cence of the sensitive appetite Christ's flesh naturally sought food, drink, and sleep, and
is
it
sub-
does not therefore follow that in
plies the lust after pleasurable things against
the order of reason. 3. The spirit some extent by
Reply Obj. fortitude to
gives evidence of resisting that con-
cupiscence of the flesh which
is
yet a greater fortitude of spirit
it.
make
it
Christ there was the fomes of sin, for this im-
implied in the
and so much the more as the virtue is more perfect; thus, temperance controls the concupiscible appetite, fortitude and meekness the irascible appetite, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, q. lvi, a. 4). But there
Yet
14).''
its
in the irrational part of the soul,
all
sought according to right reason, as plain from Damascene {De Fide Orthod. iii,
else that is
is
word fomes. Therefore in Christ there ought not to have been the fomes of sin. / answer that. As was said above (q. vn, AA. 2, 9), Christ had grace and all the virtues most perfectly. Now moral virtues, which are
2.
it
strength the flesh
is
opposed to
it;
shown
by
is
if
thoroughly overcome,
so as to be incapable of lusting against the spir-
And hence
spirit
And
this belonged to Christ, whose reached the highest degree of fortitude. although He suffered no internal assault
on the part of the fomes of sin. He sustained an external assault on the part of the world and the devil, and won the crown of victory by overcoming them.
ject to reason,
Article
3.
Whether
in Christ There
Was
Ignorance?
We
proceed thus to the Third Article: It
would seem that there was ignorance in Christ. Objection 1 For that is truly in Christ which .
iPG
94, 1080; cf. chap. 14
(PG, 1037); chap. 15 (PG
belongs to
94, 1045).
^Glossa 1416).
interl.
(vi,
i6v); Glossa
Lombardi (PL
191,
it
Him
in
His
does not belong to 8
Aristotle,
i,
human
nature, although
Him in His
13 (1102^28).
Divine Nature,
*PG
94, 1036.
SVMMA THEOLOGICA
790
and death. But ignorance belongs to Christ in His human nature; for Damascene )i that "He assumed says (De Fide Ort hod. lii, 21 an ignorant and enslaved nature." Therefore as suffering
ignorance was truly in Christ. Obj. 2. Further, one is said to be ignorant through defect of knowledge. Now some kind of knowledge was wanting to Christ, for the
(H Cor. 5. 21) Hifu that knew no He hath made sin. Therefore there
Apostle says us
sin, for
was ignorance
in Christ.
For it is written (Isa. 8. 4) before the child know to call his father and his shall be mother, the strength of Damascus taken away. Therefore in Christ there was ignoObj.
Further,
3.
:
.
.
.
rance of certain things.
not taken away by ignorance. But Christ came to take away our ignorance; for He came to enlighten them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death (Luke O71 the contrary,
Ignorance
79). Therefore there
I.
is
was no ignorance
in
shall be taken away. Nor are we to understand this as if He had been some time a man without knowing it, but before He know (that is, before He is a man having human knowledge), literally, the strength of Damascus and the spoils of Samaria shall be taken away by the King of the Assyrians or spiritually, "before His birth He will save His people solely by invocation," as a gloss expounds it.^ Augustine however says^ that this was fulfilled in the adoration of the Magi. For he says: "Before He uttered human words in human
mascus
.
.
.
—
—
flesh.
that
He
is,
received the strength of Damascus,
the riches which
in riches the first place
themselves were the spoils of Samaria. Because Samaria is taken to signify idolatry, since this people, having turned away from the Lord, the
first spoils
/ answer that, As there was the fulness of grace and virtue in Christ, so too there was the
fore he
all
knowledge, as is plain from what (q. vn, aa. 2, 5, 7, 8; qq. as the fulness of grace and virtue
ix-xii).
Now
excluded the fomes of
in Christ
sin,
so the ful-
ness of knowledge excluded ignorance, which is opposed to knowledge. Hence, even as the
fomes of
sin
was not
in Christ, neither
was there
And in this way "beknow" may be taken to mean "be-
domination of idolatry." fore the child
fulness of
idols. Hence these were which the child took from the
turned to the worship of
Christ.
has been said above
Damascus vaunted (for is given to gold). They
show himself
Article
4.
Whether
to
know."
Christ's Soul
Was Passible?
We
proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that the soul of Christ was not passible.
Objection
For nothing
i.
suffers except
by
reason of something stronger, since "the agent is clear from Auand from the Phino creature was stronger than
greater than the patient," as
is
ignorance in Him.
gustine {Gen. ad
Reply Obj. i. The nature assumed by Christ be viewed in two ways. First, in its specific nature, and thus Damascene calls it "ignorant and enslaved"; hence he adds: "For man's na-
losopher.^
Now
lit. xii, 16),'*
may
Christ's soul. Therefore Christ's soul could not
ture
suffer at the hands of any creature; and hence it was not passible, for its capability of suffering would have been to no purpose if it could not have suffered at the hands of anything. Obj. 2. Further, Tully {De Tusc. Quces. m,
a slave of
is
Him
(that
is,
God)
Who made
has no knowledge of future things." Secondly, it may be considered with regard to what it has from its union with the Divine hypo-
and
it;
it
from which it has the fulness of knowledge and grace, according to John i. 14: We saw Him (Vulg., His glory) as it were the Onlybegotten of the Father, full of grace and truth; and in this way the human nature in Christ was not affected with ignorance. Reply Obj. 2. Christ is said not to have known sin, because He did not know it by experience; but He knew it by simple knowledge. Reply Obj. 3. The prophet is speaking in this passage of the human knowledge of Christ; for he says: Before the Child (that is, in His stasis,
human Joseph,
know to call His father (that is, who was His reputed father), and His
PG
;
:
sions.
Obj.
seem
3.
Further, the soul's passions would
same as the fomes cf sin, hence (Rom. 7. 5) calls them the passions Now the fomes of sin was not in Christ,
to be the
the Apostle
of
sins.
as
was
it seems that there His soul and hence His soul
said (a. 2). Therefore
were no passions
was not
in
;
passible.
nature)
mother (that 1
10)^ says that the soul's passions are ailments.
But Christ's soul had no ailment for the soul's ailment results from sin, as is plain from Ps. 40. 5 Heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee. Therefore in Christ's soul there were no pas-
94, 1084.
is,
Mary), the strength of Da-
'
Glossa inlerl
(iv,
2
2v); Jerome,
In Isaiam (PL
[8).
2 (PL 38 1034). f>Soul,m, 5 (430^18). «
»5em., ecu,
*PL34,
DD IV,
7.
467.
24,
THIRD PART On
the contrary, It
the person of Christ
—not
sins,
:
is
My
written (Ps. 87. 4) in soul is filled with evils
human
indeed, but
"pains," as a gloss expounds
it.^
evils
—that
Hence
is,
the soul
of Christ was passible.
/ answer that, suffer in
A
two ways
:
body may
soul placed in a first
with a bodily passion
ART.
Q. 15
rowful' in very deed; yet hold sway over His soul, that ful
He
and
sion
a bodily passion through bodily hurt
reason
for since
the soul is the form of the body, soul and body have but one being, and hence, when the body is disturbed by any bodily passion, the soul, too,
—
must be accidentally disturbed that is, in the being which it has in the body. Therefore, since Christ's body was passible and mortal, as was said above (q. xiv, aa. i, 2), His soul also was But the soul its
is
said to suffer with an animal
operation,
to the soul, or as
—
either as
of the soul
it is
it is
proper
more than
of
And although the soul is said to suffer way through sensation and understand-
the body. in this ing, as
was said
in the
Second Part
(l-II, Q.
XXII, A. 3; Q. XLi, A. i), nevertheless the affections of the sensitive appetite are most properly called passions of the soul.
Now
these were in
Christ, even as all else pertaining to ture.
Hence Augustine
says:^
man
affection in
a true
human
Nevertheless sions
were
;
for there
Him Who had
was no
false hu-
a true body and
soul."
we must know
that these pas-
in Christ otherwise than in us, in
three ways. First, as regards the object, since in
us these passions very often tend towards what unlawful, but not so in Christ. Secondly, as
is
regards the principle, since these passions in us frequently forestall the judgment of reason, but in Christ all
movements
of the sensitive appetite
it
has
its
is,
the
begin-
will He subjected Himself to these corpoand animal passions. Reply Obj. 2. Tully is speaking there accord-
real
who did not name of passions to all but only to the disorderly movements of the sensitive appetite. Now, it is manifest that passions like these were
ing to the opinions of the Stoics,^
give the
not in Christ.
Reply Obj. 3. The passions of sins are movements of the sensitive appetite that tend to unlawful things and these were not in Christ, as neither was the fomes of sin. ;
Article
as
He
the effect, because in us these movements, at times, do not remain in the sensitive appetite,
but deflect the reason; but not so in Christ, since by His disposition the movements that are
We
proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It
in Christ.
Objection 1. For Hilary says {De Trin. x) :^ "Since with Christ to die was life, what pain may He be supposed to have suffered in the sacrament of His death. Who bestows hfe on such as die for Him?" And further on he says:^
"The Only-begotten assumed true man, not God; and although blows struck Him and wounds were inflicted on Him, and scourges fell upon Him, and the cross lifted ceasing to be
Him
^Glossa hiterl. (iii, 2i6r); Glossa Lombardi 811); Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. (PL 36, mo), 2 City of God, xiv, 9 (PL 41, 415).
was (PL
in
up, yet these wrought in deed the veheof the passion, but brought no pain,"
there was no true pain in Christ.
2. Further, it would seem to be proper to conceived in original sin to be subject to
Obj.
the necessity of pain. But the flesh of Christ was
not conceived in sin, but of the Holy Ghost in the Virgin's womb. Therefore it lay under no necessity of suffering pain.
remained
in the sensitive appetite that the reason
Whether There Was Sensible Pain
would seem that there was no true sensible pain
be-
as regards
5.
in Christ?
flesh
Ubid.
and a propassion when
a perfect pas-
—that
own
dispensation, when He willed; even came man when He willed." Thirdly,
flesh so
it is
dominates the soul
it
Reply Qbj. i. The soul of Christ could have prevented these passions from coming upon it, and especially by the Divine power; yet of His
mence Hence
human
grow sorrow-
ther.
sprang from the disposition of the reason. Hence Augustine says^ that "Christ assumed these movements in His human soul by an unfailing
naturally becoming to
a propassion
said to have 'begun to
to be sad' "; so that
;
passion should
by
man's na-
"Our Lord having
designed to live in the form of a servant, took these upon Himself whenever He judged they
ought to be assumed
lest a it is
ning in the sensitive appetite, but goes no fur-
of necessity passible in like manner.
passion in
is
when
secondly, with an animal passion. It suffers with ;
791
5
no way hindered in doing what was right. Hence Jerome says" that "Our Lord, in order to prove the reality of the assumed manhood, 'was sor-
Obj.
3.
Further, the delight of the contem-
plation of Divine things dulls the sense of pain hence the martyrs in their passions bore up more
191, 4
On Matt.
6
Cf.
6
PL
26.37
Part I-II, 10, 350,
Q.
(PL
26, 205).
XXIV, 7
PL
a. 2.
10, 361.
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
792
by thinking of the Divine love. But Christ's soul was in the perfect enjoyment of contemplating God, Whom He saw in essence, as was said above (q. ix, a. 2). Therefore He
patiently
He
is written (Isa. 53. 4) hath borne our infirmities and carried
mind
so kept in the
as not to overflow into
the sensitive powers, lest sensible pain should
thereby be prevented.
Article
could feel no pain. Ofi the contrary, It Sitrely
was
Whether There Was Sorrow
6.
in
Christ?
We
proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It
our sorrows. I answer that, As
would seem that in Christ there was no sorrow. Objection i. For it is written of Christ (Isa.
said in the
42. 4)
is plain from what has been Second Part (I-H, Q. xxxv, a. 7), for true bodily-pain are required bodily hurt and the sense of hurt. Now Christ's body was able to be hurt, since it was passible and mortal, as above stated. (q. xiv, aa. 1,2); neither was the sense of hUrf wanting to 'it' since Christ's soul possessed perfectly all natural powers. There-
fore no one should doubt but that in Christ there
was true pain. Reply Obj.
i.
In
all
these and similar words,
Hilary does not intend to exclude the reahty of the pain, but the necessity of it. Hence after the foregoing he adds:^ "Nor, when He thirsted, or
He
:
Obj.
2.
shall befall the just
sad.
was most
This
the
is
name
word "necessity"
uses the
above stated flesh
in reference to the
cause of these defects, which
first
is
is
sin,
as
(q. xiv, aa. i, 3), so that Christ's
said not to have lain under the necessity
was no Hence he adds: "For He (that is, one proper to His origin, Christ) had a body
of these defects, in the sense that there sin in
it.
—
through the unholiness of our conception, but subsisted in the form of our body by the strength of His power." But as regards the proximate cause of these defects, which is composition of contraries, the flesh of Christ lay under the necessity of these defects, as was said above (q. xiv, a. 2).
which did not
Reply Obj. to pain,
of
its
2.
exist
Flesh conceived in sin
is
subject
not merely on account of the necessity
natural principles, but from the necessity
of the guilt of sin.
Now this necessity
was not
in
Christ, but only the necessity of natural principles.
Reply Obj. 3. As was said above (q. xrv, a. Reply 2), by the power of the Godhead of Christ Happiness was kept in the soul, so as not I,
in
Obj.
Obj.
:
Ambrose says (De
He had
Trin.
sorrow; for
He
ii,
7)^ that "as a
bore
my
man
sorrow. I call
sorrow, fearlessly, since I preach the cross."
it
As was said above (a. 5, Reply by Divine dispensation the joy of contemplation remained in Christ's mind so as not to overflow into the sensitive powers, and thereby / answer that,
3),
shut out sensible pain.
pain
is
Now
even as sensible
in the sensitive appetite, so also is sor-
row. But there
is
a difference of motive or ob-
ject; for the object
and motive of pain
perceived by the sense of touch, as
hurt
is
when any-
one is wounded, but the object and motive of sorrow is anything hurtful or evil interiorly apprehended either by the reason or the imagination, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. xxxv, AA. 2, 7), as when anyone grieves over -
364
Furthermore, as Augustine says:*
4.
:
150);
10,
is evil,
"Sorrow regards the things we suffer unwillingly." But Christ suffered nothing against His He was ofwill, for it is written (Isa. 53. 7) fered because it was His own will. Hence there was no sorrow in Christ. On the contrary. Our Lord said (Matt. 26. 38) My soul is sorrowftd even unto death. And
and mortality should be taken away; and for the same reason the delight of contemplation
PL
Him: The
Further, the Philosopher says^ that
3.
sorrow
to overflow into the body, lest His passibility
1
according to Jer. 23. 6:
that they shall call
and to be shunned." But in was no evil to be shunned. Therefore there was no sorrow in Christ.
acceded, not to the
And he
just,
saddened save by man esteems his goods, and these the just man would was saddened by the has given him. But is
the just
Him.
Christ there
custom."
shall not
Lord, our just one. Therefore there was no sor-
sumed, so that the custom of our body was atoned for by the custom of our nature. Or when its
Now
only justice and virtue as he cannot lose; otherwise be subject to fortune if he loss of the goods fortune Christ
it
the reason of this the Stoics
the loss of his goods.
"all
He
And
asserted^ to be that no one
ty of the body, the body's customs were as-
took drink or food,
man,
Whatever
row
body's necessity, but to
written (Prov. 12. 21):
it is
make him
hungered, or wept, was the Lord seen to drink, or eat, or grieve. But in order to prove the reali-
He
nor troublesome.
shall not be sad
Further,
Cf. .\rnim, Frafimrnls, vol.
iii,
below, Q. XLVi, A. 6, Arg. 2. ^Ethics, vri, 13 (ii53*'i). * City 0/ God, XIV, 6 (PL 41, 409);
424).
chap.
9, sect.
3
(ill,
cf.
»
PL
16, 594.
cf.
chap. 15
(PL
41,
THIRD PART the loss of grace or money.
Now
Christ's soul
could apprehend things inwardly as hurtful ther to Himself, as His passion and death,
ei-
—or
to others, as the sin of His disciples, or of the
Jews that
killed
be true pain
Him. And hence,
in Christ, so too
as there could
could there be true
sorrow; otherwise, indeed, than in us, in the three
ways above stated
(a, 4),
Q. IS
i. ;
beginning as a propassion. Hence
He
(Matt. 26. 37):
and
it is
written
began to grow sorrowful is one thing to be sorrow-
to be sad. For "it and another to grow sorrowful," as Jerome says, on this text.^ Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says,^ for the three passions, desire, joy, and fear, the Stoics held three evwadelas that is, good passions in the soul of the wise man namely, for desire, will; for joy, dehght; for fear, caution. But as regards sorrow, they denied it could be in the soul of the wise man, for sorrow regards evil already present, and they thought that no evil could befall a wise man; and they denied this because they beheved that only the virtuous is good, since it makes men good, and that nothing is evil except what is sinful, whereby men be-
—
:
come wicked.
Now
although what
is man's chief man's chief evil, since these pertain to reason, which is supreme in man, yet there are certain secondary goods of man, which pertain to the body, or to the ex-
is
sinful
is
virtuous
is
terior things that minister to the body. And hence in the soul of the wise man there may be sorrow in the sensitive appetite by his apprehending these evils, without this sorrow disturbing the reason. And in this way are we to understand that whatsoever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him sad, because his reason is troubled by no misfortune. And thus Christ's sorrow was a propassion, and not a passion. Reply Obj. 3. All sorrow is an evil of punishment; but it is not always an evil of fault, except only when it proceeds from an inordinate affection. Hence Augustine says:^ "Whenever these affections follow reason, and are caused when and where needed, who will dare to call
them diseases or vicious passions?" Reply Obj. 4. There is no reason why
2
not of
itself
be contrary to the
In Matt., IV, on 26.37 (PL 26, 205). City of God, XIV, 8 (PL 41, 411).
^Ibid., XIV, 9
(PL
41, 414).
ordered to health.
And
selves involuntary, and caused sorrow, although they were voluntary as ordered to the end, which is the redemption of the human race.
Article
7.
Whether There Was Fear
Obj.
2.
Further, Hilary says
"I ask those
who
He
reason that
will,
and
{De
think thus, does
It
Trin. x) it
:'*
stand to
die, Who by exfrom the Apostles, enthe glory of martyrdom?"
should dread to
pelling all dread of death
couraged them to Therefore it is unreasonable that there should be fear in Christ. Obj. 3. Further, fear seems only to regard what a man cannot avoid. Now Christ could have avoided both the evil of punishment which He endured, and the evil of fault which befell others. Therefore there was no fear in Christ.
On the contrary, It is written (Mark 14. 33) Jesus began to fear and to be heavy. I answer that, As sorrow is caused by the :
apprehension of a present evil, so also is fear caused by the apprehension of a future evil. Now the apprehension of a future evil, if the evil be quite certain, does not arouse fear. Hence the Philosopher says^ that we do not fear a thing
some hope of avoiding it. For no hope of avoiding it the evil is considered present, and thus it causes sorrow unless there
when
there
is
is
rather than fear.
two ways.
in
fear may be considered according as the sensitive
Hence
First,
appetite naturally shrinks from bodily hurt,
sorrow
if it is
present,
and thus fear was Secondly, fear
may
and by fear
if it is
by
future
in Christ, even as sorrow. be considered in the uncer-
tainty of the future event, "as
when
at night
we
are frightened at a sound, not knowing what is"
as
;
and
in this
way
there
was no
it
fear in Christ,
Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. iii, 23).^ 1. The just man is said to be with-
Reply Obj.
out dread in so far as dread implies a perfect
man from what reason dictates. thus fear was not in Christ, but only as a propassion. Hence it is said (Mark 14. 33) that passion drawing
a thing
in Christ?
proceed thus to the Seventh Article:
would seem that there was no fear in Christ. Objection i. For it is written (Prov. 28. i): The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread. But Christ was most just. Therefore there was no fear in Christ.
ful
good, and what
is
it
thus Christ's death and passion were of them-
We
Sorrow was not in Christ, as a perfect passion yet is was in Him in a state of
1
but only as
sired,
eral.
Reply Obj.
793
7
yet be willed by reason of the end to which it is ordered, as bitter medicine is not of itself de-
when we were
speaking of the passions of Christ's soul in gen-
may
ART.
And 4
PL
6
Rhetoric,
«
PG 94,
10, 350. 11,
5 (1382^29).
1089.
—
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
794
Jesus began to fear and to be heavy, with a propassion, as Jerome expounds.^ Reply Obj. 2. Hilary^ excludes fear from Christ in the same way that he excludes sorrow
—
that is. as regards thenecessity of fearing. And yet to show the reality of His human nature, He voluntarily assumed fear, even as sorrow. Reply Obj. 3. Although Christ could have
avoided future evils by the power of His Godhead, yet they were unavoidable, or not easily avoidable by the weakness of the
der at what He Himself wondered at. Hence Augustine says {Super Gen. cont. Manich. 1, 8)*^:
"Our Lord wondered
who
8.
Whether
be caused.
Reply Obj.
flesh.
Was Wonder
Tliere
in
Christ did not marvel at the
2.
proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It would seem that in Christ there was no wonder. Objection i. For the Philosopher says^ that wonder results when we see an effect without knowing its cause; and thus wonder belongs only to the ignorant.
Now
was said (a. wonder in Christ.
3).
Therefore
;
Christ was most magnanimous. Therefore there was no wonder in Christ. Obj. 3. Further, no man wonders at what he himself can do. Now Christ could do whatsoever was great. Therefore it seems that He wondered
mous man does not wonder." But
at nothing.
the contrary, It
—
is
written (Matt. is,
8.
10)
the words of the
I answer that, Wonder properly regards what new and unusual. Now there could be nothing new and unusual as regards Christ's Divine is
knowledge; nor as regards the human knowledge whereby He knew things in the Word, or by which He saw things by infused species. Yet things could be new and unusual with regard to His experimental knowledge, in regard to which new things could occur to Him day by day. Hence, if we speak of Christ with respect to His Divine knowledge, and His beatific and even His infused knowledge, there was no wonder in Christ. But if we speak of Him with respect to experimental knowledge, wonder could be in Him; and He assumed this affection for our instruction
—that
in order to teach us to
is,
i/n Matt., IV, on 26.37 (PL 26, 205). 2/« Matt., on 26.37 (PL 9, 1066). ^Metaphysics, «
PG
94, 982.
I,
2
(982*'i7; 983*12). 6
above.
Ethics, IV, 3 (n25»2).
Article
Whether There Was Anger in Christ?
9.
We
Obj. 2. Further, Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. ii, 15)^ that "wonder is fear springing from the imagination of something great" and hence the Philosopher says^ that "the magnani-
Jesus hearing this that marvelled. centurion
Reply Obj. 3. He could do all things by the Divine power, for with respect to this there was no wonder in Him, but only with respect to His human experimental knowledge, as was said
there was no igno-
in Christ, as
there was no
On
was great with respect was great with respect
it
to others.
We
rance
if it
to Himself, but because
Christ?
order to show us
still
Centurion's faith as
Article
in
need to be so affected, must wonder. Hence all these emotions are not signs of a disturbed mind, but of a Master teaching." Reply Obj. i. Although Christ was ignorant of nothing, yet new things might occur to His experimental knowledge, and thus wonder would that we,
won-
proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It would seem that there was no anger in Christ. Objection i. For it is written (Jas. i. 20): The anger of man worketh not the justice of God. Now whatever was in Christ pertained to the justice of God, since of Him it is written (I Cor.
30) For He (Vulg., Who) of God is justice. Therefore it seems us
I.
:
made unto that there
.
.
.
was no anger
in Christ.
opposed to meekness, But Christ was meek. Therefore there was no anger in Him. Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral, v, 45)* that "anger that comes of evil blinds the eye of the mind, but anger that comes of zeal disturbs it." Now the mind's eye in Christ was neither blinded nor disturbed. Therefore in Christ there was neither sinful anger nor zealous anger. On the contrary, It is written (John 2. 17) that the words of Ps. 68. 10, the zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up, were fulfilled in Him. / answer that. As was said in the Second Part (I-H, Q XLVi, A. 3, Reply 3, and H-H, q. CLViii, A. 2, Reply 3), anger is an effect of sorrow. For when sorrow is inflicted upon someone, Obj.
as
is
2.
Further, anger
plain
from the
there arises within
is
Ethics."^
him
a desire of .he sensitive
appetite to repel this injury brought upon himself or others. Hence anger is a passion composed of sorrow and the desire of revenge. Now it was said (a. 6) that sorrow could be in Christ. As to the desire of revenge it is sometimes with that is. when anyone seeks revenge beyond sin the order of reason and in this way anger could
—
;
«
PL
34, 180.
8PL7S,
726.
^
Aristotle, iv, 5 (1125^26).
THIRD PART not be in Christ, for this kind of anger
Q. 15
ART.
called
Obj.
Sometimes, however, this desire without sin indeed is praiseworthy for example, when anyone seeks revenge according to the order justice, and this is called zealous anger. 2 For Augustine says^ that "he is eaten up by
obtain
sinful anger. ^ is
is
—
—
God, who seeks to better it, and if he cannot right it, bears with it and sighs." Such was the anger that was in Christ. Reply Obj. i. As Gregory says (Moral, v, sometimes 45),^ anger is in man in two ways, it forestalls reason, and causes it to operate, and in this way it is properly said "to work," for zeal for the house of
whatever
He
sees to be evil in
—
operations are attributed to the principal agent.
way that we must understand that anger of man worketh not the justice of
It is in this
the
God. Sometimes anger follows reason, and is, as it were, its instrument, and then the operation, which pertains to justice, is not attributed to
no way impeded the act of rea-
son.
Article 10. Whether Christ Was At Once a Wayfarer and a Comprehensor?
We proceed thus to the Tenth Article: It would seem that Christ was not at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor. Objection i. For it belongs to a wayfarer to be moving toward the end of Happiness, and to a comprehensor it belongs to be resting in the end. Now to be moving towards the end and to be resting in the end cannot belong to the same. Therefore Christ could not be at once wayfarer and comprehensor. ^Gxtgory, Ibid. « Tract., X,
on John
^Ibid. 2.17
(PL 35,
1471).
*
PL 75,
725.
795
Further, to tend to Happiness, or to does not pertain to man's body, but to
hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios. "upon the inferior nature, which is
cxviii.)^ that
the body, there overflows, not indeed the
Hap-
piness which belongs to such as enjoy and un-
derstand, the fulness of health, that
our of incorruption."
Now
is,
the vig-
although Christ had
He fully enjoyed God in His mind. Therefore Christ was not a wayfarer but a comprehensor. Obj. 3. Further, the Saints, whose souls are a passible body,
heaven and whose bodies are in the tomb, enjoy Happiness in their souls, although their in
bodies are subject to death, yet they are called not wayfarers, but only comprehensors. Hence, with equal reason would it seem that Christ was a pure comprehensor and in no since His
way
a wayfarer,
mind enjoyed God although His body
was mortal.
On
ferior part, so, conversely, the passions of the
inferior part in
it,
his soul;
anger but to reason.
Reply Obj. 2. It is the anger which outsteps the bounds of reason that is opposed to meekness, and not the anger which is controlled and brought within its proper bounds by reason, for meekness holds the mean in anger. Reply Obj. 3. In us the natural order is that the soul's powers mutually impede each other that is, if the operation of one power is intense, the operation of the other is weakened. This is the reason why any movement whatsoever of anger, even if it be tempered by reason, dims the mind's eye of him who contemplates. But in Christ, by control of the Divine power, every power was allowed to do what was proper to it, and one power was not impeded by another. Hence, as the joy of His mind in contemplation did not impede the sorrow or pain of the in-
2.
10
the contrary, It
is
written (Jer. 14. 8)
Why wilt Thou
be as a stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man turning in to lodge?
I answer that, A man is called a wayfarer from tending to Happiness, and a comprehensor from having already obtained Happiness, according to I Cor. 9. 24: So run that you may comprehend (Douay, obtain); and Phil. 3. 12: / follow after, if by any means I may comprehend (Douay, obtain). Now man's perfect Happiness consists in both soul and body, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. iv, A. 6). In the soul, as regards what is proper to it, according as the mind sees and enjoys God; in the body, according as the body will rise spiritual in power and glory and incorruption, as is written I Cor. 15. 42. Now before His passion Christ's mind saw God fully, and thus He had Happiness as far as it regards what is proper to the soul but Happiness was wanting with regard to all else, since His soul was passible, and His body both passible and mortal, as is clear from the above (a. 4; Q. XIV, AA. I, 2). Hence He was at once comprehensor, since He had the Happiness proper to the soul, and at the same time wayfarer, since He was tending to Happiness as regards what was wanting to His Happiness. Reply Obj. i. It is impossible to be moving towards the end and resting in the end in the same respect; but there is nothing against this ;
under a different respect, as when a man is at once a knower with regard to what he already knows, and yet is a learner with regard to what he does not know. Reply Obj. 2. Happiness principally and prop6
Chap. 3 (PL 3s, 439).
;
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
ygfi
erly belongs to the soul with regard to the mind, yet secondarily and, so to say, instrumentally, bodily goods are required for Happiness
thus the Philosopher says^ that exterior goods minister organically to Happiness. Reply Obj. 3. There is no parity between the soul of a saint
and of Christ, for two reasons:
because the souls of saints are not passible, as Christ's soul was; secondly, because their bodies do nothing by which they tend to Happiness, as Christ by His bodily sufferings tended to Happiness as regards the glory of His body.
Objection i. For every affirmative proposiremote matter is false. Now this propo-
tion in
are applicable to christ in his being and becoming
seem
now consider the consequences of the union and first as to what belongs to Christ in Himself; secondly, as to what belongs to Christ in relation to God the Father (q. xx) thirdly, as to what belongs to Christ in relation to us :
;
first,
there occurs a twofold
about such things as belong to Christ according to being and becoming the second regards such things as belong to Christ by reason of unity (q. xvii). Under the first head there are twelve points of first is
;
Whether this is true: God is man? (2) Whether this is true: Man is God? (3) Whether Christ may be called a lordly man? (4) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Son of God, and conversely? (5) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Divine Nature, and what belongs to the Son of God of the human nature? (6) Whether this is true: The Son of God was made man? (7) Whether this is true: Man was made God? (8) Whether this is true: Christ is a creature? (9) Whether this is true: This man, pointing out Christ, began to be? or always was? (10) Whether this is true: Christ as man is a creature? (11) Whether this is true: Christ as man is God? (12) Whether
inquiry: (i)
this is true: Christ as
man
is
a hypostasis or
"God
Is
i.
Whether This
Further, the three Divine Persons are
mutual agreement than the human
nature and the Divine. But in the mystery of the Incarnation one Person is not predicated of another; for we do not say that the Father is
seems that
the Son, or conversely. Therefore
it
human nature ought not to be God by saying that God is man.
predicated of
Obj. 3. Further, Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.y that, "as the soul and the flesh are one man, so are God and man one Christ." But this
The
soul
God
is
the body. Therefore this
man. Obj. 4. Further, it was said in the First Part (q. xxxix, a. 4) that what is predicated of God false:
is
is
not relatively but absolutely, belongs to the whole Trinity and to each of the Persons. But this word man is not relative, but absolute. Hence, if it is predicated of God, it would follow that the whole Trinity and each of the Per-
sons
is
On
man and ;
this is clearly false.
the contrary, It
written (Phil.
is
Who
2. 6,
7)
emptied being in the form of God, Himself, taking the form of a servant, being .
.
.
made in the likeness of man, and in habit found as a man; and thus He Who is in the form of God is man. Now He Who is in the form of God is God. Therefore God is man. / answer that, This proposition, God is man, is
all Christians, yet not in the same For some admit the proposition, but
admitted by
way by
all.
not in the proper acceptation of the terms. Thus the Manicheans say^ the
Word
of
God
man,
is
not indeed true, but fictitious man, since they say that the Son of God assumed an imaginary body, and thus God is called man as a bronze figure
is
called
So, too, those
man who
has the figure of a man.
if it
held that Christ's body and
soul were not united^ could not
true man, but that
by reason
He
is
of the parts.
were disproved above
sa}'
that
God is man
figuratively called
Now both (q.
ii,
these opinions
a.
5;
Q.
v,
aa.
Some, on the contrary, hold the reality on the part of man, but deny the reality on the part of
Is True:
Man''? 2
We proceed thus to seem
2.
in greater
1,2).
person?
Article
to be false.
Obj.
also
We must
The
most widely apart. Therefore, since the is affirmative, it would
cate are
aforesaid proposition
is false:
{In Twelve Articles)
consideration.
is in remote matter, since by the subject and predi-
the
Of the consequences of the union with regard to those things which
(q. xxv). Concerning the
man,
is
the forms signified
first,
QUESTION XVI
God
sition,
that this
is
the First Article: It
false:
God
is
man.
would
The Archbishop
for
Whom
a suppositum of
word man may be
Cf. Ps. 8i.6;
2 Cf.
is
truly
human
na-
and properly
10.34-
a. 6.
of Sens; cf. above, Q.
this
11,
A. 6.
;
the concrete of the concrete.
Reply Obj.
God because
4.
This word
man
is
predicated of
of the union in person, and this
union impHes a relation. Hence it does not follow the rule of those words which are absolutely predicated of God from eternity.
Article
2.
Whether This
Is True:
"Man Is God"?
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that this is false: Man is God. Objection i. For God is an incommunicable name; hence (Wisd. 13. 10; 14. 21) idolaters are rebuked for giving the name of God. which is incommunicable, to wood and stones. Hence with equal reason does it seem unbecoming that this word God should be predicated of man. Obj. 2. Further, whatever is predicated of the predicate may be predicated of the subject. But
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
y^ God
this is true:
the Father, or:
is
Trinity. Therefore, it
seems that
Man
ther, or:
is
3.
God
is
the
Man is God, Man is the Fa-
true that
this also is true:
Therefore the Obj.
if it is
the Trinity. But these are false.
first is false.
Further,
it
written (Ps. 80. 10):
is
There shall be no new God in thee. But man is something new, for Christ was not always man. Therefore this is false: Man is God.
On
the contrary, It
Of whom is
is
God
all things,
over
Christ, according to the this is true:
written
is
(Rom.
9.
Christ according to the flesh,
Man
blessed for ever. flesh, is
5)
Who Now
man. Therefore
God.
is
/ answer that, Granted the reality of both naand of the that is. Divine and human tures
—
—
union in person and hypostasis, this is true and proper: Man is God, even as this: God is man. For this word man may stand for any hypostasis of human nature, and thus it may stand for the Person of the Son of God, Whom we say is a hypostasis of human nature. Now it is manifest that the
word God
is
truly and properly predi-
cated of the Person of the Son of God, as was said in the First Part (q. xxxix, a. 4). Hence
remains that this God.
it
Reply Obj.
i.
is
true and proper
own
Man
is
name
Idolaters attributed the
of the Deity to stones and their
:
wood considered
in
nature, because they thought there
them. But we do not of the Deity to the man in
was something divine attribute the
name
in
His human nature, but in the eternal suppositum, which by union is also a suppositum of
human
nature, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2. This word Father is predicated of this word God according as this word God stands for the Person of the Father.
way
And
in this
not predicated of the Person of the Son, because the Person of the Son is not the Person of the Father. And, consequently, it is it
is
not necessary that this word Father be predicated of this word is
Man,
predicated, since
Man
of which the
word God
stands for the Person
Article
Whether Christ Can Be Called
3.
a Lordly Man^?
We
proceed thus to the Third Article: It
would seem that Christ can be called a lordly man. Objection 1. For Augustine says {Qq. Ixxxiii. qu. 36)^ that "we are to be counselled to hope for the goods that were in the Lordly Man," and he is speaking of Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ was a lordly man. Obj.
Further, as lordship belongs to Christ
2.
by reason of His Divine Nature, so does manhood belong to the human nature. Now God is said to be humanized, as is plain from Damascene {De Fide Orthod. iii, 11),'* where he says that "being humanized manifests the conjunction with man." Hence with like reason may it Obj.
3.
Further, as lordly
On 19)
the contrary, Augustine says {Retract,
"I do not see that
:^
of the suppositum, assert a
it
new God. But
does not follow that this
would
follow,
if
we we
As was said above when we say "the Man Christ
signify the eternal suppositum,
man might
Christ,'' this
he
assumed
is
The
which
is
we the
be called lordly, since hon-
to a participation of Divine said.*^ is
And, even
in this
not called "divine"
question
»
PL
tPt.
why we
*
40, 26. Ill,
Cf. fn.
^
Cf.
717 above.
Reply
Jesus,"
is hardly apposite in English. S. Thomas can say in Latin, c.o,., oratio dominica (the Lord's Prayer) or passio dominica (Our Lord's Passion), but not speak of our Lord as homo dominicus (a lordly man). 2
explains
7
I, p.
(a. 2,
"the Man Christ Jesus," we mean a created suppositum, as those who assert two supposita in
even as must be said by those who assert that there are two supposita in Christ.^ Cf. fn.
the Lord
denominatively from lord, it cannot truly and properly be said that this Man is lordly, but rather that He is Lord. But if, when we say
PL
^
is
denominatively, since this takes away from the truth of the union. Hence, since we say lordly
»
Man
i,
rightly call
Person of the Son of God, because there is only one suppositum of both natures. Now God and Lord are predicated essentially of the Son of God, and hence they ought not to be predicated
stands for a created suppositum;
held that
He
/ answer that, 3),
way, the human nature
not new, but eternal. And because this word God is predicated of man not on account of the human nature, but by reason
we may
Jesus Christ a lordly man, since Himself."
our, as the Nestorians
is
lordly.
is Divine derived from Deus (God). But Dionysius {Eccl. Hier. iv)^ calls Christ "the most Divine Jesus." Therefore with like reason may Christ be called a lordly man.
Reply Obj. 3. Although the human nature in Christ is something new, yet the suppositum of
human nature
is
derived from
is
lord, so
of the Son.
the
man
be said denominatively that this
sect.
32, 616.
PG
io(PG3,
94, 1024.
484).
;
I, p. 717 above. Nestorius, in Cyril of
(PG (PG 94,
Nestorio
76, 252);
Ill, 2
988).
Alexandria,
Dial,
John Damascene, De Fide
cum
Orth.,
THIRD PART by
essence, but "deified"
—
by
not, indeed,
its
being converted into the Divine Nature, but by its conjunction with the Divine Nature in one hypostasis, as
Fide Orthod.
Reply Obj.
1.
from Damascene {De
plain
is
iii,
ii, 17).^
i,
19)
;2
hence, after the
foregoing words {Retract, ibid.), he adds: "Wherever I have said this" namely, that
— man — "I wish
it unsaid, Christ Jesus is a lordly having afterwards seen that it ought not to be said, although it may be defended with some reason" that is, because one might say that He was called a lordly man by reason of the human
—
word man signifies, and not by reason of the suppositum. Reply Obj. 2. This one suppositum, which is of the human and Divine natures, was first of that is, from eternity. Afthe Divine Nature terwards in time it was made a suppositum of human nature by the Incarnation. And for this reason it is said to be humanized not that it assumed a man, but that it assumed human nanameture. But the converse of this is not true ly, that a suppositum of human nature assumed nature, which this
—
—
—
the Divine Nature; hence
Reply Obj.
3.
we may not
say a
man.
ART.
4
799
proper to God, since God is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it belongs to the human nature to be created, temporal and mutable. Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God. contrary to what
is
Augustine retracts these and
the hke words {Retract,
deified or lordly
Q. 16
Obj.
is
Further, to attribute to
2.
defective seems to take
honour, and to be a blasphemy.
human
tains to the
God what
is
away from the Divine
Now
what per-
nature contains a kind of
and the like. Hence seems that what pertains to the human nature can in no way be said of God. Obj. 3. Further, to be assumed pertains to the human nature; yet it does not pertain to God. Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God. On the contrary, Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. iii, 4)^ that "God assumed the idioms" defect, as to suffer, to die,
it
that
is,
the properties
—"of
God
flesh, since
is
and the God of glory was
said to be passible, crucified."
/ answer that,
On
this question there
was a and
difference of opinion between Nestorians
The Nestorians wished to divide in this way namesuch as pertained to human nature
Catholics.
—
words predicated of Christ, ly,
that
should not be predicated of God, and that such
This word Divine
usually
is
as pertained to the Divine Nature should not be
predicated even of things of which the word
predicated of the
God
say that
"If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings to the
"the Divine Essence is God," by reason of idenand that "the Essence belongs to God,"
Word, let him be anathema." But if there are any words applicable to both natures, of them they predicated what pertained to both natures, as the name "Christ" or "Lord." Hence they granted that Christ was born of a Virgin, and that He was from eternity, but they did not say that God was born of a Virgin, or that the Man was from eternity. Catholics on the other hand maintained that words which are said of Christ either in His
is
predicated essentially
;
thus
we
tity;
or
is
"Divine," on account of the different
way
and we speak of the "Divine Word," though the Word is God. So, too, we say "a Divine Person," just as we say "the person of Plato," on account of its different mode of signification. But lordly is not predicated of those of which lord is predicated; for we are not accustomed to call a man who is a lord, lordly, but whatsoever belongs to a lord is called lordly, of signifying;
as the lordly will, or the lordly hand, or the lordly possession.
And hence
the
Our Lord, cannot be
man
Christ,
Who is
called lordly yet His flesh can be called lordly flesh and His passion the ;
lordly passion.
Whether What Belongs to the Son Predicated of the Son of God, and Conversely?
Article of
4.
Man Can Be
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God. Objection i. For opposites cannot be said of the same. Now, what belongs to human nature 1
PG
94, 1024; 1069.
2
PL
32, 616.
Divine or either of
in
God
Man. Hence Nestorius
His human nature or of man.
Hence
may
said:*
be said
Cyril says
:^
"If
anyone ascribes to two persons or substances" that is, hypostases "such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by Himself of Himself, and beheves that some are to be apphed to the Man, and apportions some to the Word alone let him be anathema." And the reason of this is that, since there is one hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is signified by the name of either nature. Thus
—
—
—
3
PG
94, 1000.
^Anathema
12, translation of
Ad
Mercator (PL
48, 923).
Nestorium, anath. 4 (PG 77, 120); cf. Council of Ephesus, Pt. i, chap. 26 (MA iv, 1082; DZ 116); also Mercator's translation (PL 48, 840). ^
Epist., XVII,
— SUMMA TEEOLOGICA
goo
whether we say man or God, the hv-postasis of Divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of the Man may be said what belongs to the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis of the Divine Nature; and of God may be said what
belongs to the
human
of
human
its
we do not
it
being predicated. Thus, although things predicated of
distinguish
Christ, yet we distinguish that by reason of which they are predicated, since those things that belong to the Divine Nature are predicated of Christ in His Divine Nature, and those that
belong to the Christ in His says
{De
human nature are predicated of human nature. Hence Augustine
Trin.
i,
ii):^
"We must
distinguish
God
same
And
thus opposites
are predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures.
Reply Obj. 2. If the things pertaining to dewere attributed to God in His Divine Nature, it would be a blasphemy, since it would be a lessening of His honour. But there is no kind of wrong done to God if they are attributed to Him in His assumed nature. Hence in a disfect
course of the Council of Ephesus^ it is said; "God accounts nothing a wrong which is the occasion of man's salvation. For no lowliness
He assumed for us injures that Nature which can be subject to no injury, yet makes lower things Its own, to save our nature. Therefore, since these lowly and worthless things do no harm to the Divine Nature but bring about our salvation, how dost thou maintain that what was the cause of our salvation was the occasion that
harm
of
to
God?"
Reply Obj.
man
and thus 1
2
'
3.
To be assumed
it
pertains to hu-
suppositum, but in does not belong to God.
nature not in
PL PL
42, 840.
Pt.
Ill,
its
itself;
42, 836.
chap. 10
hom. n (PG
(MA
77, 1372).
V, 20s);
Theodotus Ancyranus,
na-
Objection i. For what belongs to the human is predicated of the Son of God, and of God. But God is His own Nature. Therefore,
what belongs
to the
human
nature
may be predi-
cated of the Divine Nature.
Obj.
2.
nature. thod. sius
Further, the flesh pertains to
But
iii, 6),"*
and
human
Damascene says {De Fide Or"we say, after the blessed Athana-
as
Cyril, that the
incarnate." Therefore
Nature of the Word was would seem with equal
it
human nature be said of the Divine Nature. Obj. 3. Further, what belongs to the Divine Nature belongs to Christ's human nature, such
reason that what belongs to the
may
know
future things and to possess saving
power. Therefore
it
would seem with equal
rea-
human may be
said
son that what belongs to the
On
It is impossible for opposites to
in different aspects.
human
nature
of the Divine Nature.
the
to the
ture can be said of the Divine Nature.
said."
be predicated of the same in the same respects, but nothing prevents their being predicated of
Nature?
proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It
as to
i.
Human
Predicated of the
We
what is said by Scripture in reference to the form of God, and what in reference to the form of a servant"; and further on he says (13):^ "The prudent, careful, and devout reader will discern the reason and point of view of what is Reply Obj.
Son
to the
Predicated of the Divine Nature and What Belongs to the Son of
would seem that what belongs
must be borne in mind that in a proposition in which something is predicated of another, we must not merely consider what the predicate is predicated of, but also the reason of
Whether What Belongs
5.
Man Can Be
of
nature, as of a hypostasis
nature.
Nevertheless,
Article
4) ;^ "When we mention the Goddo not predicate of it the idioms"
iii,
head we that
Damascene says {De Fide
the contrary,
Orthod. is,
the properties
we do not say
—"of the humanity;
for
Godhead is passible or creatable." Now the Godhead is the Divine Nature. Therefore what is proper to the human that the
nature cannot be said of the Divine Nature. / answer that, What belongs to one cannot be said of another, unless they are both the
same;
thus capable of laughter can be predicated only
man.
Now
mystery of the Incarnation natures are not the same, but the hypostasis of the two natures is the same. And hence what belongs to one nature cannot be predicated of the other if they are taken in the abstract. Now concrete words stand for the hypostasis of the nature; and hence of concrete words we may predicate indifferently what belongs to either nature whether the word of which they are predicated refers to each nature, as the word Christ, by which is signified "both the Godhead anointing and the manhood anointed"; or to the Divine Nature alone, as this word "God" or "the Son of God"; or to the manhood alone, as this word "Man" or "Jesus." Hence Pope Leo says {Ep. ad PalcBst. cxxiv) :® "It is of no consequence from what substance of
in the
the Divine and
human
—
*
PG
«
Chap.
94, 1008. 7
(PL
^
PG
54. 1066).
94, 997-
THIRD PART we name
Christ; because since the unity of per-
son remains inseparably, one and the same is Man by His flesh, and alto-
altogether Son of
God by
gether Son of
the
Godhead which He
has with the Father." Reply Obj. i. In God, Person and Nature are
and by reason of this identity the Divine Nature is predicated of the Son of God. Nevertheless, its mode of predication is different, and hence certain things are said of the Son of God which are not said of the Divine Nature thus we say that the Son of God is born, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature is born, as was said in the First Part (q. xxxix, A. 5). So, too, in the mystery of the Incarnation we say that the Son of God suffered, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature suffered. Reply Obj. 2. Incarnation implies union with flesh, rather than any property of flesh. Now in really the same,
;
Christ each nature
is
united to the other in per-
son; and by reason of this union the Divine said to be incarnate
and the human
nature deified, as stated above
(q. ii, a. i, Re-
Nature
is
Reply Obj. 3. What belongs to the Divine Nature is predicated of the human nature not, indeed, as
belongs essentially to the Di-
it
vine Nature, but as
human
nature.
it
is
participated
Hence, whatever
participated by the
human
by the
cannot
be
nature (as to be un-
in no way prediBut the Divine Nature received nothing by participation from the human nature; and hence what belongs to the human nature can in no way be predicated of
created and omnipotent),
cated of the
human
is
nature.
the Divine Nature.
Article
6.
Whether This
Is True:
"God Was
Made Man''? proceed thus to the Sixth Article:
It
would seem that this is false: God was made man. Objection i. For since man signifies a sub-
made man is to be made absolute"God was made absolutely." Therefore this is false: God was made man. Obj. 2. Further, to be made man is to be changed. But God cannot be the subject of stance, to be
ly.
But
this is false
:
change, according to Mai.
and I change made man. Obj.
ART.
801
6
On the contrary, It is written (John i. 14): The Word was made flesh; and as Athanasius "when he
says {Ep. ad Epictetum) ,^
Word was made flesh,' it God was made man."
as
is
if it
said,
The
were said that
/ answer that, A thing is said to be made that which begins to be predicated of it for the first time. Now to be man is truly predicated of God, as stated above (a. i), yet in such sort that it pertains to God to be man, not from eternity, but from the time of His assuming human nature. Hence, this is true, God was made man, though it is understood differently by some, even as this, God is man, as we said above (a. i). Reply Obj. i. To be made man is to be made
absolutely in
all
those in
whom human
nature
begins to be in a newly created suppositum. But
God the
is
said to have been
human
made man because
nature began to be in an eternally
pre-existing suppositum of the Divine Nature.
And hence for God to be made man mean that God was made absolutely.
does not
As stated above, to be made is newly predicated of another. Hence, whenever anything is predicated for the first time of another, and there is Reply Obj.
2.
implies that something
ply 3)-
We
Q. 16
3.
not.
Further,
Hence
man
3.
6: /
am
this is false
the Lord, :
God was
as predicated of Christ
stands for the Person of the Son of God. But
God was made the Person of the Son of God. Therefore this is false: God was made man. this is false:
a change in that of which
it is predicated, then be made is to be changed; and this takes place in whatever is predicated absolutely, for whiteness or greatness cannot newly affect anything, unless it be newly changed to whiteness or greatness. But whatever is predicated relatively can be newly predicated of anything without its change, as a man may be made to be on the right side without being changed, and merely by the change of him on whose left side he was. Hence in such cases not all that is said to be made is changed, since it may happen by the change of something else. And it is thus we say of God: Lord, Thou art made (Douay, hast been) our refuge (Ps. 89. i). Now to be
to
man
belongs to God by reason of the union, which is a relation. And hence to be man is newly predicated of God without any change in Him, by a change in the human nature, which is assumed to a Divine Person. And hence, when it is said, God was made man, we understand no change on the part of God, but only on the part of the human nature. Reply Obj. 3. Man stands not for the bare Person of the Son of God, but according as it subsists in human nature. Hence, although this is false, "God was made the Person of the Son of God," yet this is true, "God was made man"
by being united 1PG26.
1061.
to
human
nature.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
8o2
Article
Made
Whether This
7.
Is
True:
that
God?''
We
would seem that this is true: Man was made God. Objection i. For it is written (Rom. i. 2,3): Which He had promised before by His prophets in the holy Scriptures, concerning His Son Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh. Now Christ, as man. is of the seed of David according to the flesh. Therefore man was made the Son of God.
(De
Further, Augustine says
2.
Trin.
i,
was this assumption, which made God man, and man God." But by reason of this assumption this is true: God was made man. Therefore, in like manner, this is true: Man was made God. Obj. 3. Further, Gregory Nazianzen says "God was humanized and (Ep. ad Chelid. ci) man was deified, or whatever else one may like to call it." Now God is said to be humanized by being made man. Therefore with equal reason man is said to be deified by being made God; and thus it is true that "Man was made God." that "such
13)^
'."^
Obj. 4. Further, when it is said that "God was made man," the subject of the making or
change
is
not God, but
word man
the
human
nature, which
Now
that seems to
signifies.
be the subject of the making to which the mak-
Hence Man was made God is truer than God was made man. On the contrary, Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. iii, 2) :^ "We do not say that man was ing
is
attributed.
deified,
"man" has not
are to understand
a personal, but a simple
For although "this man" was not namely, this suppositum the Person of the Son of God was eternally God, yet man, speaking commonly, was not always God. supposition.
proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It
Obj.
we
phrases; unless, indeed,
"Man Was
but that
God was humanized." Now
to
made God, because
—
—
Thirdly, properly understood, this participle to man with respect God, as the term of the making. And in this sense, granted that the Person or hypostasis in Christ are the same as the suppositum of God
"made" attaches making to
and Man,
Man
was shown
as
proposition
false,
is
(q. ii, aa.
2,
3), this
when
it
is
because,
said,
was made God, "man" has a personal
suppositum; because to be God is not verified of the Man in His human nature, but in His suppositum. Now the suppositum of human nature, of Whom "to be God" is verified, is the same as the hypostasis or Person of the Son of God, Who was always God. Hence it cannot be said that this Man began to be God, or is made God, or that He was made God. But if there were a different person or hypostasis of God and man, so that "to be God"
was predicated of the man, and, conversely, by reason of a certain conjunction of supposita, or of personal dignity, or of affection or in-
the Nestorians
dwelling, as
equal reason might
—
it
made God that is, joined God was made Man that
—
Reply Obj.
1.
Man was
—and
to
God
is,
joined to man.
that
In these words of the Apostle to the Person be considered
"Who" which refers Son of God ought not to
the relative of the
then with
said,'*
be said that
as affecting the predicate, as
if
someone
al-
same as to be deified. Hence this is false: Man was made God. / answer that, This proposition, Man was
ready existing of the seed of David according
made God, may be understood in three ways. First, so that the participle "made" absolutely determines either the subject or the predicate;
it ought to be taken as affecting the subject, with this meaning that the Son of God was made to Him ("namely, to the honour of the
and
Father," as a gloss expounds
be made
Man is
God
in this
of
sense
Whom
God made,
the
is
it
it is
is
the
And in God was made sense that we are
as will be said (aa. 8, 9).
same sense this is man. But it is not of the
now
false, since neither
predicated was made, nor false: this
speaking.
Secondly,
it
may
be so understood that the
word "made" determines the composition, with this meaning: Man was made God that is, And it was brought about that Man is God.
—
in this sense
both are true
—namely,
that
Man
was made God and that God was made Man. But this it not the proper sense of these 1
PL 42,
840.
2
pG 37,
180.
a
PG
94,
988
to the flesh
was made the Son of God
—and
in this sense that the objection takes
is
it.
it
But
—
it),^ being of the seed of David according to the flesh, as if to say "the Son of God having flesh of the seed
David to the honour of God." Reply Obj. 2. This saying of Augustine is to be taken in the sense that by the assumption that took place in the Incarnation it was brought about that Man is God and God is Man; and in this sense both sayings are true, of
as stated above.
The same
* See above, q. ^Glossa interl.
1305).
to be said in the reply to the
is
ii,
a. 6.
(vi,
3v);
Glossa Lombard!
(PL
191,
THIRD PART third, since to
be deified
is
the same as to be
made God. Reply Obj. 4. A term placed in the subject is taken materially that is, for the suppositum; placed in the predicate it is taken formally that is, for the nature signified. Hence when it is said that Man was made God, the being made is not attributed to the human nature
—
but to the suppositum of the
Which
God from
human
nature.
and hence it does not befit Him to be made God. But when it is said that God was made Man, the making is is
eternity,
taken to be terminated in the human nature. Hence, properly speaking, this is true God was :
made Man, and
this is false:
Man
was made
God; even as if Socrates, who was already a man, were made white, and were pointed out, this would be true: This man was made white to-day, and this would be false: This white thing was made man to-day. Nevertheless, if on the part of the subject there is added some word signifying human nature in the abstract, it might be taken in this way for the subject of the making for example, if it were said that "human nature was made the Son of God's."
—
Article
8.
Whether This Is True:
''
Christ Is
a Creature"?
We
proceed thus to the Eighth Article:
would seem that
It
this is true: Christ is a crea-
For Pope Leo says:^ "A new and unheard of covenant: God Who is and Objection is
made
Now we may
cate of Christ whatever the
came by the Incarnation. true: Christ
Obj.
is
predi-
Son of God beTherefore this
is
a creature.
Further, the properties of both na-
2.
may
be predicated of the common hypoboth natures, no matter by what word they are signified, as stated above (a. 5). But it is the property of human nature to be created, as it is the property of the Divine Nature to be Creator. Hence both may be said of Christ namely, that He is a creature and that he is uncreated and Creator. tures
stasis of
3. Further, the principal part of a man the soul rather than the body. But Christ, by reason of the body which He took from the
Obj.
is
Virgin,
Virgin. is
said absolutely to be born of the
is
Therefore by reason of the soul which it ought to be said absolutely
created by God,
that 1
He
is
Among
cxxvin (PL
a creature.
the
works of Augustine, Serm. Suppos.,
39, 1998).
8
803
On the contrary, Ambrose says "Was Christ made by a word? Was Christ created by a command?" as if to say: No! Hence he adds: "How can there be a creature in God? For God has a simple not a composite Nature." Therefore
it
must not be granted that "Christ
a creature."
is
/ answer that. As Jerome says,^ "words spoken out of order lead to heresy" hence with us and heretics the very words ought not to be in common, lest we seem to countenance their error. Now the Arian heretics said'^ that Christ was a creature and less than the Father, not only in His human nature, but even in His Divine Person. And hence we must not say absolutely that Christ is a creature or less than the Father, but with a qualification namely, in His human nature. But such things as could not be considered to belong to the Divine Person in Itself may be predicated absolutely of Christ by reason of His human nature; thus we say absolutely that Christ suffered, died and was buried, even as in corporeal and human beings, things of which we may doubt whether they belong to the whole or the part, if they are observed to exist in a part, are not predicated of the whole absolutely that is, without qualification, for we do not say that the Ethiopian is white but that he is white as regards his teeth; but we say without qualification that he is curly, since this can only belong ;
—
—
him
as regards his hair.
Reply Obj.
i.
a creature."
ART.
:^
to
ture.
was,
Q. 16
i.
Sometimes, for the sake of
word
brevity, the holy doctors use the
"crea-
ture" of Christ without any qualifying term;
we should however qualification, "as
take
as
understood the
man."
Reply Obj. 2. All the properties of the human, just as of the Divine Nature, may be predicated equally of Christ. Hence Damascene says "Christ,
Who
(De Fide Orthod. is God and Man,
4)^
iii,
is
that
called cre-
ated and uncreated, divisible and indivisible."
Nevertheless things of which
we may doubt
what nature they belong are not to be predicated without a quahfication. Hence he afterwards adds (De Fide Orthod. iv, 5)^ that "the to
one hypostasis" created in
its
—
that
of Christ
is,
Godhead and created
hood"; even so conversely, we ^DeFide,!, 16 (PL 3
Cf. Glossa ordin.,
Lombard,
Sent., iv, d.
PG 94,
997.
"is
may
un-
man-
not say
16, 575).
on Osee 2.16
xm,
^ Cf. Athanasius, Epist. Epiphanius, Adv. Haeres., cf. above, q. x, a. 2, Reply 6
—
in its
«
chap.
De 11,
2
(iv,
(QR
11,
cf.
Peter
818).
Synod., xvi
(PL
26, 708);
haeres. 69
(PG
42, 213);
2,
i.
PG 94,
336A);
1
109.
— :
;
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
8o4
without qualification, "Christ is incorporeal" or "impassible," in order to avoid the error of Manes/ who held that Christ had not a true body, nor truly suffered, but we must say, with
was incorporeal and impassible in His Godhead. Reply Obj. 3. There can be no doubt how the birth from the Virgin applies to the Person of the Son of God, as there can be in the case of creation; and hence there is no parity. a qualification, that Christ
than the Father, so he maintained that He began to be, saying there was a time when He
was not.^ Reply Obj. qualified
Article
Whether This
9.
Is True: "This
Man,
We proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It would seem that this Man, pointing out Christ, began to be. Objection i. For Augustine says {Tract, cv in Joann.y that "before the world was, neither were we, nor the Mediator of God and men the Man Jesus Christ." But what was not always, has begun to be. Therefore this Man, pointing to Christ, began to be. Obj. 2. Further, Christ began to be Man. But to be man is to be absolutely. Therefore this man began to be, absolutely. Obj. 3. Further, "man" impHes a suppositum of human nature. But Christ was not always a suppositum of human nature. Therefore this Man began to be. On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13. 8) Jesus Christ yesterday and to-day: and the same for ever. I answer that, We must not say that "this Man" pointing to Christ "began to be," unless we add something. And this for a two-
—
—
First, for this proposition is false
fold reason.
absolutely,
in
the judgment of the
Catholic
one suppositum and one hypostasis, as also one Person. For according to -this, when we say Faith, which affirms that in Christ there
"this
Man," pointing
positum
is
is
to Christ, the eternal sup-
meant,
necessarily
eternity to begin to be
is
with
incompatible.
Whose Hence
Man
began to be. Nor does it matter that to begin to be refers to the human nature, which is signified by this word man, because the term placed in the subject this
is
false: This
not taken formally so as to signify the nature, but is taken materially so as to signify the suppositum, as was said (a. 7; Reply 4). is
Secondly, because even
were
true,
it
if
this
proposition
ought not to be made use of with-
out qualification, in order to avoid the heresy of Arius, who, since he pretended that the Per-
son of the Son of ^
See
fn. 3, p.
God
7y6 above.
a creature and less
is ^
PL
35, 1907.
is,
The words quoted must be we must say that the Man
Jesus Christ was not, before the world was,
His humanity.
in
Reply Obj. 2. With this word "begin" we cannot argue from the lower to the higher. For if this began to be white, that began to be coloured. And this because "to begin" implies being now and not before; for it does not follow if This was not white before that therefore it was not coloured before. Now, to be absolutely is higher than to be man. Hence this does not follow: therefore He began Christ began to be Man it
does not follow
therefore
Pointing Out Christ, Began To Be"?
i.
—that
it
—
to be.
Reply Obj.
This word Man, as
3.
for Christ, although ture,
it
signifies the
taken na-
it is
human
which began to be, nevertheless stands for
the eternal suppositum which did not begin to
Hence, since
be.
signifies
it
the suppositum
when placed in the subject, and refers to the nature when placed in the predicate, therefore this is false The Man Christ began to be but this is true: Christ began to be Man. ;
:
Article
Whether This
10.
Man Is a Creature"? We proceed thus to
as
would seem that
this
is
Is True: "Christ
the Tenth Article: It
Man
false: "Christ as
a creature," or "began to be."
is
Objection Christ as this
is
For nothing
i.
human
except the
Man
also
the
is
false:
in Christ is created
nature.
human
But
this is
false:
nature. Therefore
Christ as
Man
is
a
crea-
ture.
Obj.
2.
Further, the predicate
is
predicated
of the term placed in reduplication, rather than
of the subject of the proposition; as say:
A
body
as coloured
that the coloured 8,)
we must not
Christ
is
Christ as
Obj.
man
3.
a
is visible.
is
I
But as stated
(a.
Man
nor consequently that
a creature.
Further, whatever
man
when
visible, if follows
absolutely grant that the
creature;
Man
is
is
predicated of
predicated of him per se and absolutely, for per se is the same as "in virtue
a
as
of itself," as
is
is
said in the Metaphysics.^
But
See above, q. x, a. 2, Reply i; q. xvi, a. 8; also Part I, Q. XLii, A. 2, Reply 4; cf. further, Athanasius, Epist. encycl. ad Episc. Acgypti (PG 25, 573); Epist. ad Jo'Aanum '
(PG 26, 8iq); Epist. ad AJros Episc. (PG 26, 1038); Basil, hom. XVI (PG 31, 473); Hilary, De Trin., xu (PL 10, 444) cf. Nicaean Creed (M.\ 11, 6O7; DZ 54). *
Aristotle, v, 18 (1022*14; *2s).
THIRD PART this
is
false: Christ
Hence
creature.
Man
is
On
is
this,
per se and absolutely a too, is false: Christ as
a creature.
But
tor or creature.
Man is Creator. Therefore Man is a creature.
either Crea-
is, is
Christ as
false:
this is
this is true: Christ
as
/ answer that,
Article as
the contrary, Whatever
When we
say "Christ as
Man"
word "man" may be added in the reduplication either by reason of the suppositum or by reason of the nature. If it be added by rea-
Man
created, this will be false: Christ as
But
creature.
belongs to
Him
a
be added by reason of the
if it
human nature, it is true, the human nature or in it
is
by reason of
since
the
human
to be a creature, as
nature,
was said
(A. 8).
It must however be borne in mind that the term thus added by the reduplication signifies
the nature rather than the suppositum, since it is
added as a predicate, which
mally, for
taken for-
is
the same to say Christ as
it is
Man
and to say Christ as He is a Man. Hence this is to be granted rather than denied Christ as Man is a creature. But if something further be added whereby [the term covered by the reduplica:
tion] is attracted to the suppositum, this prop-
osition
to be denied rather than granted, for
is
instance were one to say: Christ as "this" is
Man
a creature.
Reply Obj.
man
nature,
i.
Although Christ
He
word creature
has
human
is
not the hu-
nature.
Now
the
naturally predicated not only
is
manhood
is
a creature and that
ii.
80s
Whether This
Man Is God"? We proceed thus
to the
Is True,
'Christ
Eleventh Article:
It
Obj.
Further, to forgive sins
2.
God, according to
blot out thy iniquities for
Christ as
But
9. 6:
I
Isa. 43. 25:
My
proper to
is
am He
own
sake.
that
But
Man
forgives sin, according to Matt.
that
you may know that the Son of
Man
hath power on earth to forgive sins, etc. Therefore Christ as Man is God. Obj. 3. Further, Christ is not Man in gen-
but
eral,
is
this particular
Man.
Now
Christ,
God, since by "this Man" we signify the eternal suppositum which is God naturally. Therefore Christ as Man is God. as this
On as
as
Man,
is
the contrary.
Man belongs to Man is God, it
God
—which
is
Whatever belongs every man. Now,
to Christ if
follows that every
Christ
man
is
clearly false.
/ answer that, This term man when placed may be taken in two ways.
in reduphcation
First as referring to the nature,
and
in this
way
not true that Christ as Man is God, because the human nature is distinct from the Divine by a difference of nature. Secondly it may be taken by reason of the suppositum, and in this way, since the suppositum of the human nature it is
in Christ
is
the Person of the Son of God, to
Whom it belongs per se to be God, it is true that Christ, as
Man,
is
God. Nevertheless because
we
the term placed in the reduplication signifies
man
the nature rather than the suppositum, as stated
of abstract but also of concrete things, since
say that
ii
would seem that Christ, as Man, is God. Objection i. For Christ is God by the grace of union. But Christ, as Man, has the grace of union. Therefore Christ as Man is God.
this
son of the suppositum, since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is eternal and un-
ART.
Q. i6
above in the
(a. 10), hence this is to be denied rather than granted: Christ as Man is God. Reply Obj. i. It is not with regard to the
was
same respect that a thing moves towards, and
because the nature is created and the suppositum uncreated, therefore, although it is not granted absolutely that "this man is a creature," yet it is granted that "Christ
something; for to move belongs to a of its matter or subject, and to be in act belongs to it by reason of its form. So too it is not with regard to the same respect that it belongs to Christ to be ordered to be God by the grace of union, and to be God. For the first belongs to Him in His human nature, and the second, in His Divine Nature. Hence this is true Christ as Man has the grace of union; yet not this: Christ as Man is God. Reply Obj. 2. The Son of Man has on earth the power of forgiving sins, not by virtue of the human nature, but by virtue of the Divine Nature, in which Divine Nature resides the power of forgiving sins by authority, whereas
is
a creature. Reply Obj.
refers to the
Man
2.
as placed in the subject
suppositum but, as placed
reduplication refers rather to the nature, as stated above.
as
Man
is
a creature."
Reply Obj. is
And
belongs to every man who human nature alone to have human nature. Hence of every
3. It
a suppositum of
his being only in
such suppositum ture as
man,
it
it
is
follows that
if it is
a crea-
a creature absolutely.
But
Christ is a suppositum not merely of human nature but also of the Divine Nature, in which He has an uncreated being. Hence it does not
follow that
if
He
is
creature absolutely.
a creature as
Man He
is
a
that
it is,
thing
by reason
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
8o6 in the
human
nature
resides instrumentally
it
and ministerially. Hence Chrysostom expounding this passage says;^
earth to forgive
"He
said pointedly 'on
order to show that by
sins,' in
an indivisible union He united human nature to the power of the Godhead, since although He was made Man, yet He remained the Word of
God." Reply Obj.
human and
When we
3.
Man
say "this man," the
is
''Christ
would seem that Christ as Man is a person. Objection i. For what belongs to every man belongs to Christ as
Man,
since
He
men
according to Phil. 2.7: Being likeness of men. But every man
is
made is
Therefore Christ as Man is a person. Obj. 2. Further, Christ as Man stance of rational nature.
But He
a person
is
in the
a person. a sub-
is
not a uni-
He
versal substance; therefore
Now
like other
is an individual nothing else than
is
an individual substance of rational nature, as Boethius says {De Duab. Nat.)} Therefore Christ as
Obj.
human
3.
Man
a person.
is
Further, Christ as
Man
is
a being of
nature, and a suppositum and a hypos-
same nature. But every hypostasis and suppositum and being of human nature is
tasis of the
a person. Therefore Christ as
On
Man is a Man is
person.
not an Therefore if Christ as Man is a person it would follow that in Christ there are two persons one temporal and the other eternal, which is erroneous, as was said above (q. the contrary, Christ as
eternal person.
apart from the Divine Nature, and yet the
6; Q. IV, A. 2).
/ answer that, As was said (aa. 10, 11), the term Man placed in the reduplication may refer either to the suppositum or to the nature.
Hence when
it is
said: Christ as
Man
is
a per-
taken as referring to the suppositum,
son,
if it is
it is
clear that Christ as
the suppositum of
Man
human
a person, since
is
nature
is
nothing else
than the Person of the Son of God. But if it be taken as referring to the nature, it may be understood in two ways. First, we may so
understand it as if it belonged to human nature to be in a person, and in this way it is true, for whatever subsists in human nature is a person. 1
2
Thomas, Cat. Aurca, on Mark, Chap. 4 (PL 64, 1343). Cf.
2.10.
this.
It belongs to
i.
every
man
to be
a person, according as everything subsisting in
human to the
His
nature
Man
a person.
is
Now,
this is
proper
Christ that the Person subsisting in
human
not caused by the prin-
nature
is
human
nature, but
eternal.
Hence
He is a person, as Man, and way He is not, as stated above.
in an-
is
one way
2.
The
individual substance which
included in the definition of a person means a complete substance subsisting of itself and is
separate from
all else.
Otherwise, a man's hand
might be called a person, since
it is
a kind of
individual substance; nevertheless, because
it
an individual substance existing in something else, it cannot be called a person; nor, for the same reason, can the human nature in Christ, although it may be called something individual and singular. Reply Obj. 3. As a person signifies something complete and self-subsisting in rational nature, so a hypostasis, suppositum, and being of nature in the genus of substance, signify something that subsists of itself. Hence, as human nature is not of itself a person apart from the Person of the Son of God, so likewise it is not of itself a hypostasis or suppositum or a being of nature. Hence in the sense in which we deny that "Christ as Man is a person" we must deny is
all
the other propositions.
—
II, A.
by the principles of the due to the human nature;
notion of person requires
other
It
is
way Christ as Man is not a person, human nature does not exist of itself
Reply Obj.
proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:
taken that in Christ a prop-
in this
ciples of the
God."
Article 12. Whether This Is True: as Mail Is a Hypostasis or Person"?
substance.
may be
nature,
since the
in
We
it
Reply Obj.
demonstrative pronoun "this" attracts "man" to the suppositum; and hence "Christ as this Man, is God," is a true proposition rather than "Christ as
Secondly
er personality, caused
QUESTION XVII Of what pertains to
Christ's unity FROM the standpoint OF BEING {In Two Articles)
We must now consider what pertains to Christ's unity in general. For, in their proper place,
we
must determine what pertains to unify and plurality in detail; thus we determined (q. ix) that there is only one knowledge in Christ, and it will be concluded hereafter (q. xxxv, a. 2) that there
is
not only one nativity in Christ.
Hence we must consider
Christ's unity (i) of
being; (2) of will (q. xviii) (q. xix).
Under the inquiry: (i)
is
(3) of operation
head there are two point? of is one or two? (2) only one being in Christ?
first
Whether Christ
Whether there
;
THIRD PART Article
Whether Christ
i.
Is
One
We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that Christ is not one, but two. Objection i. For Augustine says {De Trin. i, 7) :^ "Because the form of God took the form of a servant, both are God by reason of God Who assumed, yet both are Man by reason of the
man assumed." Now "both" may
when
only be said
there are two. Therefore Christ
is
two.
one thing and another there are two. Now Christ is one thing and another; for Augustine says (Enchir. He took xxxv) :^ "Being in the form of God being both in one; the form of a servant but He was one of these as Word, and the other as man." Therefore Christ is two. Obj. 3. Further, Christ is not only man; for, thus He would be a mere man. Therefore He is something else than man, and thus in Christ there is one thing and another. Therefore Christ Obj.
Further, where there
2.
is
.
.
.
.
.
.
two.
is
Obj. 4. Further, Christ is something that the Father is, and something that the Father is not. Therefore Christ is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two. Obj.
Further, as in the mystery of the Trin-
5.
Persons in one Nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation there are two natures in one Person. But on account of the unity of the Nature, notwithstanding the distinction of Person, the Father and Son are one, according to John 10. 30: / and the Father are one. Therefore, notwithstanding the unity of Person, Christ is two on account of the duahty ity there are three
of nature.
Obj.
6.
Further, the Philosopher says^ that
"one" and "two" are predicated denominatively. Now Christ has a duality of nature. Therefore Christ
Obj.
7.
is
two.
"Further, as accidental form makes a
thing otherwise (alterum) so does substantial
form make another thing (aliudy as Porphyry Now in Christ there are two substantial natures, the human and the Divine. Therefore Christ is one thing and another. Therefore says.'*
Christ
is
On Nat.)
two.
the contrary^ Boethius says :^
"Whatever
in so far as
is,
But we confess that Christ
is.
(De Duab.
it is, is
one."
Therefore Christ
/ answer that, Nature, considered in
3 *
*
PL
42,
807
I
is
—
—
—
829
2
PL
40, 250.
Physics, III, 3 (202^18). Isagoge, Boethius' translation
is, as it is signified by the suppositum. For we cannot truly say that Christ is human
nature, because
human nature
is not naturally suppositum. But we say that Christ is a man, even as Christ is God. Now God signifies one having Godhead, and man signifies one having manhood. Yet one having
predicated of
manhood
is
its
differently signified
Chap. 4 (PL
64, 1346).
by the word
man and by the word Jesus or Peter. For this word man impHes one having manhood indistinctly, even as the word God implies indistinctly one having the Godhead; but the word Peter or Jesus implies one having manhood distinctly that is, with its determinate individ-
—
ing the
—
as Son of God implies one havGodhead under a determinate personal
ual properties
property.
Now the dual number is placed in Christ with regard to the natures. Hence, if both the natures were predicated in the abstract of Christ,
would follow that Christ is two. But because the two natures are not predicated of Christ except as they are signified in the suppositum, it
it
must be by reason of the suppositum that "one" or "two" is predicated of Christ. Now some placed two supposita in Christ, and one Person, which, in their opinion, would seem to be the suppositum completed with its final compleHence, since they placed two supposita in Christ, they said that God is two, in the neuter. But because they asserted one Person, they said that Christ is one, in the mascuhne, for the neuter gender signifies something unformed and imperfect, whereas the masculine signifies something formed and perfect.^ On the other hand, the Nestorians, who asserted two Persons in Christ,^ said that Christ is two not only in the tion.^
itself,
^
But since we
717 above. Cf. William of Auxerre,
See
fn. i, p.
Summa Aurea, in, tr. i, chap. 8 Cf. Q. II, A. 6. 8 (ii3va). Cf. Cyril of Alexandria, Adv. Nestor ii Blasphemias, ii,
I, Q. 8
(CG
—
—that
^ 1
it
neuter, but also in the masculine.^
one.
is
ART.
used in the abstract, cannot truly be predicated of the suppositum or person, except in God, in Whom "what it is" and "that by which it is" do not differ, as stated in the First Part (q. XXIX, a. 4, Reply i). But in Christ, since there are two natures namely, the Divine and the human one of them namely, the Divine may be predicated of Him both in the abstract and in the concrete, for we say that the Son of God, Who is signified by the word Christ, is the Divine Nature and is God. But the human nature cannot be predicated of Christ in the abstract, but only in the concrete as
Two?
or
Q. 17
rv, 35.6).
6
(PG
76, 85); see also
(vii, 473).
DTC,
art.
Hyposiaiique {Union)
— SUMMA TEEOLOGICA
8o8
maintain one person and one suppositum in Christ, as
that
—
clear
is
we say
from
that Christ
q. ii, aa. 2, 3, it is
follows
one not merely
in the
masculine, but also in the neuter. Reply Obj. i. This saying of Augustine
is not "both" referred to the predicate, so as to mean that Christ is both, but it refers to the subject. And thus "both" does not stand for two supposita, but for two words signifying two natures in the concrete. For I
to be taken as
if
but an indistinct suppositum that is, according as it underlies the nature and not the individuating properties. Hence it does not follow that in the concrete; not, indeed, in a distinct,
—
in
Christ
—
—
man assumed." When it is said that
on account of the
"Christ is Reply Obj. 2. one thing and another," this saying is to be ex"having this nature and plained in this sense another." And it is in this way that Augustine explains it (Contra Fehc. xi),^ where, after say-
—
"In the mediator of God and man, the Son of God is one thing, and the Son of Man another," he adds, "I say another thing by reason of the difference of substance, and not an-
ing,
other thing by reason of the unity of person." Hence Gregory Nazianzen says {Ep. ad Chelid. ci):- "If
we must speak
briefly, that of
which
one thing and another; thus the invisible is not the same as the visible, and what is without time is not the same as what is in time. Yet they are not one and another; far from it. For both these are one." Reply Obj. 3. This is false: "Christ is only man," because it does not exclude another suppositum, but another nature, since terms placed in the predicate are taken formally. But if anythe Saviour
is, is
added whereby it is drawn to the supfor inpositum, it would be a true proposition stance, "Christ is only that which is man." Nevertheless, it would not follow that He is "any other thing than man," because "another thing
is
—
thing," since
it
refers to a diversity of sub-
stance, properly refers to the suppositum, even as all relative things bearing a personal relation.
But
it
does follow: Therefore
He
has another
nature.
Reply Obj.
4.
When
it
is
said,
"Christ
is
something that the Father is," "something" signifies the Divine Nature, which is predicated even in the abstract of the Father and Son. But when it is said, "Christ is something that is not the Father," "something" signifies not the human nature as it is in the abstract, but as it is * Vigilius Tapsensus, De Unit. Trin., chap. 14 (PL 62, 344) or chap. 11 (PL 42, 1166).
«PG37,
180.
one thing and another, or that
ture in Christ, which
of God,
is
He
human
is
na-
the Person of the Son
not accounted numerically with the Divine Nature, which is predicated of the Fais
ther and Son.
—
can say that "both" namely, God and Man "are God" on account of God Who assumes; and "both" namely, God and Man "are Man
is
two, since the suppositum of the
Reply Obj.
5.
In the mystery of the Divine is predicated even in
Trinity the Divine Nature
hence it may be said absolutely that the three Persons are one. But in the mystery of the Incarnation both natures are not predicated in the abstract of Christ hence it cannot be said absolutely that the abstract of the three Persons
;
;
Christ
is
two.
6. Two signifies what has duality, not in another, but in the same thing of which "two" is predicated. Now what is predicated is
Reply Obj.
which is implied by the Hence, although Christ has duality of nature, yet, because He has not duality of suppositum, it cannot be said that Christ is two. Reply Obj. 7. "Otherwise" implies diversity said of the suppositum,
word
Christ.
of accident.
Hence
diversity of accident suffices
for anything to be called "otherwise" absolute-
But "another thing" implies diversity of subNow not merely the nature, but also the suppositum is said to be a substance, as is said
ly.
stance.
in the
Metaphysics.^ Hence diversity of nature
does not suffice for anything to be called "another thing" absolutely unless there is diversity of suppositum.
But diversity of nature makes
"another thing" relatively if
there
is
—that
is,
in nature
no diversity of suppositum.
Article 2. Whether There Is Only One Being in Christ?
We
proceed thus to the Second Article: It in Christ there is not only one being, but two. Objection i. For Damascene says {De Fide Or t hod. iii, 13-15)'* that whatever follows the nature is doubled in Christ. But being follows
would seem that
is from the form. Hence two beings. Obj. 2. Further, the being of the Son of God is the Divine Nature itself, and is eternal, whereas the being of the Man Christ is not the Divine
the nature, for being in Christ there are
Nature, but is a temporal being. Therefore there is not only one being in Christ. Obj. 3. Further, in the Trinity, although there '
Aristotle, v. 8 (ioi7'*23).
*
PG
94,
1033-1061.
THIRD PART
ART.
Q. 17
809
2
are three Persons, yet on account of the unity
the one person of Socrates, and hence there
only one being. But in Christ
from these only the one being of Socrates. so happened that after the person of Socrates was constituted there accrued to him hands or feet or eyes, as happened to him who was born blind, no new being would be thereby added to Socrates, but only a relation to these because, that is, he would be said to be not only with reference to what he had previously, but also with reference to what accrued
of nature there
is
there are two natures, though there son. Therefore in Christ there
one Pernot only one
is
is
being but two. Obj. 4. Further, in Christ the soul gives some being to the body, since it is its form. But it does not give the Divine being, since this is is another
uncreated. Therefore in Christ there
being besides the Divine being; and thus in Christ there
On
is
not only one being.
the contrary, Everything
if it
—
him afterwards.
to
said to be a
is
arises
And
And
human
thus, since the
nature
is
united
and being are convertible. Therefore, if there were two beings in Christ and not one only, Christ would be two and not one. / answer that, Because in Christ there are two natures and one hypostasis, it follows that things belonging to the nature in Christ must be two, and that those belonging to the hypostasis in Christ must be only one. Now being pertains both to nature and to hypostasis to hypostasis as to that which has being, and to nature as to that by which something has being. For nature is taken after the manner of a form, which is said to be a being because something is by it; as for instance by whiteness a thing is white, and by manhood a thing is man. Now it must be borne in mind that if there is a form or nature which does not pertain to the personal being of
Son of God hypostatically or personally as was said above (q. ii, a. 6), and not accidentally, it follows that by the human nature there accrued to Him no new personal being,
the subsisting hypostasis, this being is not said to belong to the person absolutely, but relative-
ture
being, in so far as
it is
one, for one
;
ly; just as to
not as he there
is
is
be white
is
the being of Socrates
Socrates, but as he
no reason why
is
white.
this being should
And
not be
multiplied in one hypostasis or person, for the
being whereby Socrates
is
the being whereby he
is
from a musician. But the
white
is
distinct
being which belongs to the very hypostasis or
person in itself cannot possibly be multipHed in one hypostasis or person, since it is impossible that there should not be one being for one therefore, the
God
the Son of
human
nature accrued to
not hypostatically or personal-
but accidentally, as some maintained,^ it would be necessary to assert two beings in Christ one according as He is God the other according as He is Man; just as in Socrates we place one being according as he is white, and another according as he is a man, since "being white" does not pertain to the personal being ly,
—
—
of Socrates.
But being possessed of a head, being
corporeal, being animated, 1
See
but only a new relation of the pre-existing personal being to the human nature, in such a way that the Person is said to subsist not only in the Divine, but also in the human nature.
Reply Obj. 1. Being is consequent upon naupon that which has being but as upon that whereby a thing is, whereas it is consequent upon person or hypostasis as upon that which has being. Hence it has unity from the unity of hypostasis rather than duahty from the ture not as
duality of the nature.
Reply Obj.
Q.
II,
A. 6.
—
all
these pertain to
The
2.
of God, which
is
eternal being of the
is
Son
the Divine Nature, becomes
the being of man, in so far as the
human
assumed by the Son of God
na-
to unity
of Person.
Reply Obj.
3.
As was
said in the First Part
Reply 3; Q, Lxxv, a. 5, Reply 4), since the Divine Person is the same as the Na(q.
l, a.
2,
ture, there
is
no distinction
in the
Divine Per-
sons between the being of the Person and the
being of the Nature, and, consequently, the three Persons have only one being. But they
would have a triple being if the being of the Person were distinct in them from the being of the Nature.
Reply Obj.
thing. If,
to the
In Christ the soul gives being it makes it actually animated, to give it the fulfilment of its nature 4.
to the body, since
which is and species. But fected
by the
—
if
we
consider the body per-
soul without the hypostasis hav-
this whole, composed of soul and body, as signified by the word humanity, does not signify "what is," but "that by which it is." Hence being belongs to the subsisting person, according as it has a relation to such a nature,
ing both
and of
this relation the soul is the cause, in so
far as
it
the body.
perfects
human
nature by informing
— SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Sio
done. And Ambrose, quoting this to the Emperor Gratian {De Fide ii, 7)^ says: "As He assumed my will. He assumed my sorrow"; and
QUESTION XVIII Of what pertains to the unity
in
on Luke
Christ from the standpoint of will
(loc. cit.y
Man
to the
{In Six Articles)
the will of
We
must now consider unity as regards the will and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether the Divine will and the human are different in Christ? (2) Whether in ;
Christ's
human nature
distinct
from the
the will of sensuality
will of
is
reason? (3) Whether
as regards the reason there were several wills in Christ? (4) Whether there was free choice
Whether Christ's human will was always conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed? (6) Whether there was any conin Christ? (5)
trariety of wills in Christ?
Article
i
.
Whether There Are Two Wills
in
Christ?
We
proceed thus to the First Article: It in Christ there are not two
would seem that
one Divine, the other human. Objection 1. For the will is the
wills,
first
mover
whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and ruler was the Divine will, since in Christ everything human was moved by the Divine will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was only one will, namely, the Divine, and ruler
Obj.
2.
in
Further, an instrument
own will but by Now the human nature
by
its
is
the will of
not
moved
its
mover.
was the
of Christ
in-
human namoved by its own will,
strument of His Godhead. Hence the ture of Christ
was not
but by the Divine will. Obj. 3. Further, that alone
is
multiplied in
Christ which belongs to the nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature, for natural things are of necessity, whereas
what
is
vol-
untary is not of necessity. Therefore there is but one will in Christ. Obj. 4. Further, Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. iii, 14)^ that "to will in this or that way belongs not to our nature but to our intellect that is, to our personal intellect." But every will is this or that will, since there is nothing in not at the same time in some Therefore all will belongs to the person. But in Christ there was and is but one person. Therefore in Christ there is only one will. On the contrary, Our Lord says (Luke 22.
a genus which
one of
is
its species.
42): Father
if
Thou
wilt,
from Me. But yet not 1
PG
94, 1036.
remove
My
this chalice
will but
Thine be
Godhead
—the
man
he says: "His will
Father's, to the
He
refers
Godhead. For
temporal, and the will of the
is
eternal."
/ answer that,
Some
placed only one will in
have had different moFor Apollinaris did not hold an intellectual soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word was in place of the soul,'' or even in place of the intellect.^ Hence since Christ, but they
seem
to
tives for holding this.
"the will says,^
it
human
is
in the reason," as the
Philosopher
followed that in Christ there was no
and thus there was only one will in and all who held one composite nature in Christ^ were forced to place one will in Him. Nestorius,^ too, who maintained that the union of God and man was one of affection and will, held only one will in
Him.
will,
So, too, Eutyches
Christ.
But later on, Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch,^ Cyrus of Alexandria, ^° and Sergius of Constantinople^^ and some of their followers, ^^ held that there is one will in Christ, although they held that in Christ there are two natures united in a hypostasis; because they beheved that Christ's nature never moved with its own mobut only in so far as it was moved by the
human tion,
Godhead, as is plain from the counciliar letter of Pope Agatho.^^ And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople^-* it was decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, in the following passage: "In accordance with what the Prophets of old taught us concerning Christ, and as He taught us Himself, and the Symbol of the Holy Fathers has handed down to us, we confess two natural wills in Him and two natural operations." 2
PL
^
16, 594-
Bk. X, on 22.42 (PL
15, 1911)-
See above, Q. v, a. 3. 6 Cf. Athanasius, Contra A pollinarium, i, 2 (PG 26, 1096); Gregory of Nazianzus, Epist., ecu (PG 37, 333); Gregory of Nyssa, Adv. ApolL, n. 35 (PG 45, 1201); Theophilus of Alexandria, Epist. ad Totius Acgypti Episc, anni 402, Jerome's translation (PL 22, 795); Augustine, QQ. 83, Qu. 80 (PL 40, 93); Socrates, Hist. Ecd., 11, 16 (PG 67, 364) ;Theodore the Ncstoriaii, Hacret. Fabul. Compcnd. *
IV, ^
8 (PG 83, 425). See above, q. 11, a.
^
m,
Soui,
^
6.
9 (432''s)-
See above,
q.
'Cf. Council of Constantinople in, actio 11 Sii-518).
^°Ibid., actio 13
^^Ibid., actio 12
(MA
(MA
ii,
a. 6.
(MA
xi,
xi, 567).
xi, 534).
For example, Pyrrhus; cf. Cone. Lateran. Romanum (MA X, 1002); Theodorus Pharanitanus, Ibid. (MA x, 959, 962); Paul of Constant., Ibid. (MA x, 1023). " Epist., Ill (PL 87, 1221). Cf. Cone. Cpolit, in, Act. 4 12
(MA
XI, 291).
" Actio
18,
(MA
xi, 638).
THIRD PART Q.iS ART. And
much
was necessary to say. For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature, as was shown above (q. this
it
tains to the perfection of
one of
its
the will per-
human
nature, being
natural powers, even as the intellect, in the First Part (q. lxxix, a.
was stated
as
Now
2; Q. v; Q. IX, A. i).
IV, A.
Reply 2; Q. Lxxx, A. 2). Hence we must say that the Son of God assumed a human will, together with human nature. Now by the assumpI,
tion of human nature the Son of God suffered no diminution of what pertains to His Divine Nature, to which it belongs to have a will, as was said in the First Part (q. xix, a. i). Hence it must be said that there are two wills in Christ that is, one human, the other Divine.
—
Reply Obj.
i.
Whatever was
nature of Christ was the Divine will; yet
moved
in the
human
at the bidding of
does not follow that in Christ there was no movement of the will proper to human nature, for the good wills of other saints are
Who
it
moved according
worketh
complish, as
in
them both
is
written
to the will of God, to will
Phil.
2.
and to For
13.
acal-
though the will cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, yet it can be moved inwardly by God, as was said in the First Part (q. cv, a. 4;
And
thus, too, Christ
Q. cvi, A. 2; Q.
CXI, A. 2).
by His human
will followed the
Divine will according to Ps. 39. 9; That I should do Thy will, my God, I have desired it. Hence Augustine says {Contra Maxim, ii, 20) :^ "Where the Son says to the Father, 'Not what I will, but what Thou wiliest,' what do you gain by adding your own words and saying 'He shows that His will was truly subject to His Father,' as if we denied that man's will ought to be subject to God's will?" Reply Obj. 2. It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its nature. For an inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by the craftsman with only a corporeal movement; but an instrument animated by a sensitive soul
by
is
moved by
the sensitive appetite,
and an instrument animated with a rational soul is moved by its will, as by the command of his lord the servant is moved to act, the servant being like an animate as a horse
its rider,
And hence human nature of
instrument, as the Philosopher says.^ it
was
in this
manner
that the
Christ was the instrument of the Godhead, and was moved by its own will. Reply Obj. 3, The power of the will itself is 1
PL
42, 789.
^Politics,
I,
4 (1253^32); Ethics,
viii, 11 (1161^4).
811
2
and necessarily follows upon the nature. But the movement or act of this power which is also called will is sometimes natural and necessary for example, with respect to Happiness; and sometimes springs from the free choice of reason and is neither necessary nor natural, as is plain from what has been stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. x, aa. i, 2).^ And yet even reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, is natural. Hence natural,
—
—
besides the Divine will
human
in Christ a
it is
will,
necessary to place
not only as a natural
power, or a natural movement, but also as a
movement. Reply Obj. 4. When we say "to will in a certain way," we signify a determinate mode of rational
Now
willing.
a determinate
thing of which
it is
mode
the mode.
regards the
Hence
since the
will pertains to the nature, "to will in a certain
way" belongs
to the nature, not indeed con-
sidered absolutely, but as
in a hypostasis
it is
Hence the human will of Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being in a Divine hypostasis that is, it was always of such a kind.
—
moved
in
Divine
will.
Article
accordance with the bidding of the
2.
Whether
in Christ
There
Was Any
Will of Sensuality Besides the Will of Reason?
We
proceed thus to the Second Article: It
would seem that
in Christ there
was no
will of
sensuality besides the will of reason.
For the Philosopher says^ that and in the sensitive appetite are the irascible and concupiscible Objection
"the will
parts."
is
1.
in the reason,
Now
appetite.
sensuality signifies the sensitive
Hence
in Christ there
was no
will of
sensuality.
Obj.
2.
Further, according to Augustine
{De
sensuahty is signified by the serpent. But there was nothing serpent-like Trin.
xii,
12, 13)^ the
in Christ, for
He had
the likeness of a
venomous
animal without the venom, as Augustine says {De Pecc. Merit, et Remiss, i, 32)^ commenting on John 3. 14, As Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert. Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuahty.
Further, will is consequent upon nawas said (a. i, Reply 3). But in Christ there was only one nature besides the Divine. Hence in Christ there was only one human will. On the contrary, Ambrose says {De Fide ii, 7) -J "Mine is the will which He calls His own,
Obj.
3.
ture, as
3
See also Part
^
Soul,
6
PL
III,
I, Q. Lxxxii, a. 2. 6 PL 42, 1007, 1008. 9 (432''5).
44, 145.
'
PL
16, 594.
— SUMMA THEOLOGICA
8ia
we
this
Man He assumed my
sorrow." From are given to understand that sorrow
because as
human
pertains to the
Now
will of Christ.
row pertains to the sensuality, as was the Second Part (I-II, Q. xxiii, a. i; i).
A.
Therefore
xxv,
q.
seems, in Christ there
it
is
a
Obj.
Further, the appetitive power
2.
versified in
man by
/ answer that, As was said (q. iv, a. 2 q. v, i), the Son of God assumed hu;
A. 9; Q. IX, A.
difference of sense
nature together with everything pertaining human nature. Now in hu-
in the
same way
we hold
must be allowed that there was sensuality in Christ. But it must be borne in mind that sen-
it
pation, as
is
is
Reply Obj.
is
in the reason," as stated
may
a will
by
equally be said that the participation.
This argument
i.
will, essentially so called,
intellectual part
;
made
partici-
from the Philosopher.^ And
clear
because "the will above (Arg. i), it sensuality
it is
by
said to be rational
Is
which
based on the only in the
is
but the will so-called by par-
ticipation can be in the sensitive part, in so far
as
obeys reason.
it
Reply Obj. serpent
—not
suality,
2.
Sensuality
is
signified
by the
as regards the nature of the sen-
which Christ assumed, but as regards
the corruption of the fomes, which
was not
is
the difference
both of which were in Christ. Therefore there a double will in Him, one intellectual and
the other rational.
nature is included animal nature, as the genus in its species. Hence the Son of God must have assumed together with the human nature whatever pertains to the perfection of animal nature, one of which things is the sensitive appetite, which is called sensuality. Consequently
is
intellect
as regards man's apprehension,
man
obey reason,
and
the difference of reason and intellect,
was
to
di-
prehensive power, and hence according to the
to the perfection of
suality or the sensual appetite, since
is
the difference of the ap-
of sensitive and intellectual appetite in man. But
will of sensuality besides the will of reason.
man
the foregoing wills were in
Christ.
sor-
said in
Hence both
nature.
in
Christ.
Reply Obj. 3. Where there is one thing on account of another, there seems to be only one; thus a surface which is visible by colour is one visible thing with the colour. So, too, because the sensuality is called the will only because it partakes of the rational will, there is said to be but one human will in Christ, even as there is but one human nature.
Obj.
3.
Further, some^ ascribe to Christ a will
of piety, which can only be on the part of reason. Therefore in Christ on the part of reason
there are several wills.
On
the contrary, In every order there is one mover. But the will is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore in one man there is only one will, properly speaking, which is the will of reason. But Christ is one man. Therefore in Christ there is only one hufirst
man
will.
I answer that, As stated above (a. i. Reply 3), the will is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the act. Hence if the will is taken it is necessary to place two wills two species of acts of the will in Christ on the part of the reason. For the will, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. viii, aa. 2, 3), regards both the end and the means, and is affected differently towards both. For towards the end it is borne simply and absolutely, as towards what is good in itself but towards the means it is borne under a certain relation, as the goodness of the means depends on something
for the act,
that
is,
;
Hence the act of the will, according as it drawn to anything desired of itself, as health, which act is called by Damascene^ OeKrjaLs that is, simple will and by the Masters^ will as nature, is different from the act of the will as it is drawn to anything that is desired only in order to something else, as to take medicine; and this act of the will Damascene calls*"' ^ovXijacs that is, counselling will, and the Masters.^ will as reason. But this diversity of acts does not diversify the power, since both acts regard the one comelse.
is
—
—
—
Whether in Christ There Were Two Wills As Regards the Reason?
Article
We
3.
proceed thus to the Third Article: It in Christ there were two wills
would seem that
3
HuRh
of St. Victor,
De
Quat. Volunt. Christ. (PL 176,
Bonaventure, In Sent.,
as regards the reason.
841);
Objection i. For Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. ii, 22)^ that there is a double will in man namely, the natural will which is called
(QR III, 369); A. 2, Q. 2. (QR m, *De Fide Orth., 11, 22 (PG 94,
—
6
cf.
Cf. Peter
(QR
/SouXr/ats-
A. 2, Q. 3
*
Ethics,
I,
13 (iio2''3o).
*
PG
94, 944.
Sent.,
421); Alexander of Hales,
SeXrjdLS,
and the rational will which is called Now Christ in His human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of human
Lombard,
II,
11,
d. xvii, a.
q.
3
(QR
I,
i,
944)d.
Sumtna
xxrv, chap. 3 Theol.,
i-ii,
n.
388
465); Bonaventure, In Sent., n, d. xxrv, Pt. I, (QR II, 566); Albert the Great, In Sent., m, d.
XVII, A. 5 (BO XXVIII, 304). 8 Loc. cit. ^
iii,
373).
Hugh
of St. Victor, Loc.
cit.
THIRD PART mon
aspect of the object, which
Hence we must say that if we the power of the will, in Christ
human
will, essentially
ticipation
an
are speaking of
there
is
so called and not
nature, which reason, which
Reply Obj.
called 6e\r](ns,
is
and a
as the Philosopher says^ choice differs
from
will in this, that will of itself regards the
will as
a. 8).
Reply Obj. 3. The will of piety would not seem to be distinct from the will considered as nature, since it flees from another's evil absolutely considered.
Whether There Was Free Choice
in
proceed thus to the Fourth Article:
It
Article
4.
Christ?
We
would seem that
in Christ there
was no
free
choice.
Objection Orthod.
For Damascene says {De Fide
i.
14)^ that yvoifxr]
iii,
—that
is,
thinking or cogitation, and TrpoalpeaLS
opinion,
—that
is,
"cannot possibly be attributed to Our Lord, if we wish to speak with accuracy." But in the things of faith especially we must speak with accuracy. Therefore there was no election in Christ and consequently no free choice, of election,
which election Obj.
"choice
is
the act,
Further, the Philosopher says^ that
2.
is
a desire of something after taking
Now
counsel."
counsel does not appear to be in
we do not take counsel conwe are certain of. But was certain of everything. Hence there
Christ, because
cerning such things as Christ
was no counsel and consequently no free choice
to the nature of means.
end, while choice regards the means.
simple will
the
is
choice (electio)
i.
lxxix,
(q.
—^which pertains
another
Now,
These two wills are not diversified according to the power but only according to the difference of act, as we have said. Reply Obj. 2. The intellect and the reason are not distinct powers, as was said in the First Part
813
5
the other whereby His will was drawn to anything willed on account of its being ordered to
by par-
called jSouXr/ats.
is
ART.
Q. 18
but one
but if we are speaking of the will as thus distinguish in Christ a will as
;
we
act,
goodness.
is
and
son,
rum (q. is
is
same is
the
And
thus
as the will as nature, but
same
as the will as rea-
the proper act of free choice (libe-
arbitrium), as was said in the First Part
lxxxiii,
a. 3).
placed in Christ,
and consequently choice, as was said
Hence, since
we must free
will as reason
also place choice,
choice,
whose act
is
in the First Part (ibid.; cf.
I-II, Q. XIII, A. i).
Reply Obj. i. Damascene excludes choice from Christ in so far as he considers that doubt is implied in the word choice. Nevertheless doubt is not necessary to choice, since it belongs even to God Himself to choose, according to Eph. I. 4: He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, although in God there is no doubt. Yet doubt is accidental to choice when it is in an ignorant nature. We may also say the same of whatever else is mentioned in the authority quoted.
Reply Obj. yet
it
2.
Choice presupposes counsel,
follows counsel only as determined by
judgment. For what
we judge
to
be done,
choose, after the inquiry of counsel, as
we
is stated.'*
Hence
if anything is judged necessary to be done without any preceding doubt or inquiry,
this suffices for choice. Therefore it is plain that doubt or inquiry belong to choice not essentially, but only when it is in an ignorant nature. Reply Obj. 3. The will of Christ, though determined good, is not determined to this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even as to the blessed, to choose with a free choice confirmed
in good.
Christ.
in
5. Whether the Human Will of Christ Altogether Conformed to the Divine Will in the Thing Willed?
is indifferent. But was determined to good, since He could not sin, as stated above (q. xv, aa. i, 2). Hence there was no free choice in Christ.
Article
On the contrary, It is He shall eat butter and
would seem that the human will in Christ did not will anything except what God willed. Objection 1. For it is written (Ps. 39. 9) in the person of Christ: That I should do Thy will: my God, I have desired it. Now he who desires to do another's will, wills what the other wills. Hence it seems that Christ's human will willed nothing but what was willed by His Di-
Obj.
3.
Further, free choice
Christ's will
know
written (Isa.
15):
7.
honey, that He may to choose the good, an act of free choice. Therefore there
to refuse the evil
and
which is was free choice in Christ. / answer that, As was said above (a. 3), there was a twofold act of the will in Christ one whereby His will was drawn to anything willed in itself, which pertains to the nature of an end; :
^
PG 94,
^Ethics,
1044. 111,
2 (iii2«i5); cf. vi, 2 (1139^23).
Was
We
vine
proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It
will.
Obj. ^Ibid.,
2.
Further, Christ's soul had most per-
m,
2 (iiii''26).
*Ibid.,
ill,
3 (1113*9).
SUMMA TEEOLOGICA
8i4
Eph.
all
will
son
which sur-
19, the charity of Christ,
3.
knowledge. Now charity makes men will what God wills hence the Philosopher says^ that one mark of friendship is to will and choose
passeth
all
;
the same. Therefore
human
t-he
will in Christ
was willed by His Di-
willed nothing else than
vine
will.
Obj.
3.
Further, Christ was a true compre-
hensor. But the Saints
who
are comprehensors
heaven will only what God wills, otherwise they would not be happy, because they would not obtain whatever they will, for blessed is he "who has what he wills, and wills nothing amiss," as Augustine says {De Trin. xiii, 5).^ Hence in His human will Christ wills nothing else than does the Divine will. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim, ii, 20) :^ "When Christ says 'Not what I will, but what Thou wilt. He shows Himself to have willed something else than did His Father; and this could only have been by His human heart, since He did not transfigure our weakness into His Divine but into His human in
/ answer that,
As was
said (aa.
2,
—
agree, in so
—
is,
its
as reason considers
relation to the will of
a friend.
Reply Obj. 3. Christ was at once comprehensor and wayfarer, since He was enjoying God in His mind and had a passible body. Hence things repugnant to His natural will and to His sensitive appetite could happen to Him in His
by participation, and the rational whether considered after the manner of
Article
manner
of reason.
Now
it
(q. xiii, a. 3, Reply i; Q. xiv, Reply 2) that by a certain dispensation the Son of God before His Passion "allowed His flesh to do and suffer what was proper
to it."
powers
And
in like
manner He allowed all the do and suffer what be-
of His soul to
longed to them.
Now
is
it
clear that the will
Whether There Was Contrariety
We
proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It
would seem that there was contrariety of
wills
in Christ.
Objection
was said above I,
6.
of Wills in Christ?
called will
nature, or after the
A.
that
far,
something willed in
3), in Christ
according to His human nature there is a maninamely, the will of sensuality, which fold will will,
He
passible flesh.
will."
is
what God did not; but in His will as reaalways willed the same as God, which appears from what He says (Matt. 26. 39): Not as I will, but as Thou wilt. For He willed in His reason that the Divine will should be fulfilled although He said that He willed something else by another will. Reply Obj. i. By His rational will Christ willed the Divine will to be fulfilled; but not by His will of sensuality, the movement of which does not extend to the will of God nor by His will considered as nature which is borne towards things absolutely considered, and not in relation to the Divine Will. Reply Obj. 2. The conformity of the human will to the Divine regards the will of reason, according to which the wills even of friends
com-
our knowledge, according to
feet charity, which, indeed, surpasses the
prehension of
i.
For contrariety of
wills regards
contrariety of objects, just as contrariety of
movements as
is
plain
springs from contrariety of terms, from the Philosopher.^ Now Christ
His different walls wished contrary things. For in His Divine will He wished for death, from which He shrank in His human will, hence
in
the sensuahty and the will absolutely consid-
Athanasius says:^ "When Christ says 'Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me; yet not My will, but Thine be done,'^ and again, 'The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh the human, which weak,'^ He denotes two wills through the weakness of the flesh shrank from and His Divine will eager for the the passion
ered shrink from burning, which, nevertheless,
passion."
of sensuality naturally shrinks from sensible pains and bodily hurt. In like manner, the will as nature turns from what is against nature
and what
is
evil in itself, as
yet the will as reason
may
death and the like;
at times choose these
things in relation to an end, as in a
the will as reason health.
Now
it
may
was the
mere man
choose for the end of will of
God
—
—
plain that in His will of sensuality and in His rational will considered as nature, Christ could
was contrariety of
Obj.
2.
Further,
it is
written (Gal.
the flesh lusteth against the spirit, it
against the flesh.
one thing, and the
Now when
5.
wills
17) that
and the
spir^
the spirit desires
flesh another, there is con-
Physics, V, s (229"25). ^}Dc huarn. cl Cout. Arianos, written against ApoUina*
rius. n. 21
^Ethics, IX, 4 (ii66«7). ' PL 42, 789. « PL 42, I030.
there
in Christ.
that Christ
should undergo pain, suffering, and death, not that these of themselves were willed by God, but for the sake of man's salvation. Hence it is
Hence
« ^
(PG
26, 1021).
Matt. 26.39; Matt 2641;
cf. Mark 14.36; Luke Mark 14.38.
22.42.
THIRD PART trariety of wills.
But
this
was
in Christ
;
for
by
Q. 18
ART.
ment
of the sensitive appetite would reach the
815
6
the will of charity which the Holy Spirit was causing in His mind, He willed the passion, ac-
rational will.
cording to Isa. 53. 7; He was offered because it was His own will, yet in His flesh He shrank from the passion. Therefore there was con-
natural will and the sensitive will in Christ
trariety of wills in
Him.
3.
Further,
it is
Now
agony seems to imply a certain struggle in a soul drawn to contrary things. Hence it seems that there was contrariety of will in Christ.
On
the contrary, In the decisions of the Sixth
Council^
it
"We
said:
is
confess two natural
must be
it
said that although the
wished what the Divine will did
and His rational
will
not wish, yet there was no contrariety
of wills in
written (Luke 22. 43) that being in an agony, He prayed the longer.
Obj.
And hence
Him.
because neither His nat-
First,
ural will nor the will of sensuahty rejected the
reason for which the Divine will and the will of the human reason in Christ wished the passion.
For the absolute pertain to
it
will of Christ
human
vation of the
wished the
race, although
it
to will this for the sake of
movement
thing further, but the
sal-
did not
some-
of sensuality
to extend so far. Secondly, because
not in opposition, as evil-minded heretics but following His human will, and neither withstanding nor striving against, but rather being subject to, His Divine and om-
was not able
nipotent will."
the other hand, neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from or retarded
wills,
assert,^
/ answer where there
Contrariety can exist only opposition in the same and as re-
that, is
gards the same. For
if
the diversity exists as
neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ was impeded or retarded by the natural
on
will or the appetite of sensuality. So, too,
the the
movement movement
of the natural
human
will
and
of the sensuality in Christ. For
pleased Christ, in His Divine will, and also His will of reason, that His natural will and
regards diverse things, and in diverse subjects, this would not suffice for the nature of con-
it
trariety,
nor even for the nature of contradicif a man were well formed or healthy as regards his hand, but not as regards his foot. Hence for there to be contrariety of wills in
will of sensuality should
tion
to the order of their nature.
anyone
willing something else than did the Divine will
—for example, it is
necessary,
first,
that the diversity
For
of wills should regard the same.
if
the will
of one regards the doing of something with ref-
erence to some universal reason, and the will of another regards the not doing the same with reference to
some
particular reason, there
—
is
not complete contrariety of will for example, when a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged for the good of the commonwealth, and one of the latter's
kindred wishes him not to be hanged on
account of a private love, there
is
in
that in Christ there
be moved according
Hence it is clear was no opposition or con-
trariety of wills.
Reply Obj.
i.
The
fact of
any
will in Christ
proceeded from the Divine will itself, by whose permission the human nature in Christ was moved by its proper movements, as Damascene says {De Fide Or t hod. iii., 14, 19).^ Reply Obj. 2. In us the desires of the spirit are impeded or retarded flesh;
by the
desires of the
not occur in Christ. Hence in
this did
Christ there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit, as in us.
Reply Obj.
no contrariety
3.
The agony
in Christ
was not
of wills; unless, indeed, the desire of the private good went so far as to wish to hinder the
in the rational part of the soul, in as far as
public good for the private good
versity of motives, as
—
in that case
the opposition of wills would regard the same.
Secondly, for contrariety of wills it should be in the same
essary that
it
nec-
is
will.
For
man
wishes one thing with his rational appetite and wishes another thing with his sensiif
a
tive appetite, there
is
no contrariety, unless the
sensitive appetite so far prevailed as to change
or at least keep back the rational appetite; for in this case
something of the contrary move-
it
implies a struggle in the will arising from a di-
when anyone, on his reason considering one, wishes one thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary. For this springs
from the weakness of the reason,
unable to judge which is the best absolutely. Now this did not occur in Christ, since by His reason He judged it to be best absolutely that the Divine will regarding the salvation of the human race should be fulfilled by His
which
is
passion. Nevertheless, there
was an agony
in
Christ as regards the sensitive part, in so far as Actio 18 (MA XI, 638; DZ 291). Cf. Council of Constantinople, in, Actio 12, Epist. of Sergius of Constant., ad Honorium (MA xi, 534) actio II, Macarius, ad Constantinum (MA xi, 514). 1
2
it
implied a dread of coming trial, as Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii, 15; iii, 18, 23)*
says
;
3PG
94, 1037; io8o.
*PG
94, 932; 1073; 1087.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
£i6
erated there
QUESTION XIX Of what pertains to the power of Christ with regard to operation
Manhood,
as the healing of the lepers or the
raising of the dead.
Christ there
{In Four Articles)
is
must now consider the unity of Christ's operation; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether in Christ there was one or several operations of the Godhead and Manhood? (2) Whether in Christ there were several operations of the human nature? (3) Whether Christ by His human operation merited anything for Himself? (4) Whether He merited anything for us by it?
8)
Whether
in Christ There Is
Only
One Operation of the Godhead and Manhood?
We
it
seems that
proceed thus to the First Article: It in Christ there is but one
would seem that
different
powers? Cannot the
lesser operate as
And
can there be one operation where there are different substances?" the greater?
The
/ answer that, xviii,
i),
A.
who
aforesaid heretics
placed one operation in Christ.'* Now in order better to understand their erroneous opinion, in
mind
that wherever there are
several ordered agents, the inferior
are
than operations.
Now
but one composite operation in Christ. Obj. 2. Further, there is but one operation of the principal and instrumental agent. Now the human nature in Christ was the instrument of
part of the thing operating, which
—
there
is
the Divine, as was said above (q. vii, a. i. Reply 3; Q. viii, a. I, Reply i; Q. xviii, a. i, Reply 2). Hence the operations of the Divine and human natures in Christ are the same.
Obj.
Further, since in Christ there are two
3.
natures in one hypostasis or person, whatever pertains to the hypostasis or person is one and the same. But operation pertains to the hypostasis or person, for
it is
only a subsisting sup-
positum that operates; hence, according to the Philosopher^ acts are of singulars. Christ there
is
Hence
in
only one operation of the God-
head and the Manhood. Obj.
4.
Further, as being belongs to a sub-
sisting hypostasis, so also does operation.
But
on account of the unity of hypostasis there is only one being in Christ, as was above stated (q. xvii, a. 2). Hence, on account of the same unity, there is one operation in Christ. Obj. 5. Further, where there is one thing op(PG
1
Sect. 6
2
Metaphysics,
3, 644). i,
i
(gSi^ib).
is
moved
by the superior, as in man the body is moved by the soul and the lower powers by the reason. And thus the actions and movements of the inferior principle
1.
(q.
placed one will in Christ
Godhead and the Manhood. For Dionysius says (Div. Norn. ii):^ "The most loving operation of God is made manifest to us by the supersubstantial Word having taken flesh integrally and truly, and having operated and suffered whatsoever befits His human and Divine operation." But he here mentions only one human and Divine operation, which is called in Greek deavdpLKTj that is, God-manlike. Hence it seems that operation of the
Objection
in
On the contrary, Ambrose says {De Fide ii, :^ "How can the same operation spring from
we must bear i.
Hence
but one operation of the Godhead
and the Manhood.
We
Article
one operation. But the same Godhead and the
is
thing was operated by the
highest principle
we
say of
man
is
things
operated rather
what pertains to the
properly the operation
;
thus
that to walk, which belongs to
the feet, and to touch, which belongs to the hand, are things operated by the man one of which is operated by the soul through the
—
feet, the
other through the hands.
And because
the same soul that operates through both
it is
there
is
moving
only one indifferent operation, on the principle;
but difference
the
is
first
found on
is
what is operated. Now, as in a mere body is moved by the soul, and the by the rational appetite, so in the
the part of
man
the
sensitive
Lord Jesus Christ the human nature and ruled by the Divine. Hence they
is
moved
said that
one indifferent operation on the part of operating, but divers things operated, since the Godhead of Christ did one thing by Itself, as to uphold all things by the word of His power and another thing by His human nature, as to walk in body. Hence the Sixth Council quotes the words of Severus the heretic,^ who said: "What things were done and wrought by the one Christ, differ greatly; for some are becoming to God, and some are human, as to walk bodily on the earth is indeed there
the
is
Godhead
—
human, but
to give hale steps to sickly limbs,
'
PL
16, 598.
Soul,
Cf
.
III,
Part
is
(42);
32).
m,
5 *
(PL
and secondly
in the
in the
moves the
I,
6
/jj^.^
34. 282).
Aristotle, i (450*12).
i^
4 (4o8*'27).
lxxvi, a. i cf. also (129); Epinomis, x (898c); Timaeus,
Lxxxi,
Q. i
a.
i
;
q.
;
Phacdrus (249).
x (618); Phacdo (82); Timaeus (76, 90); -Augustine, City of God, xii, 26 (PL 41, 375)9 Cf. Aristotle, Soul, i, 3 (406^26); Physics, viii, 9 (265**
PL PL
cf.
the soul, all
refuted by the Philosopher^^
9 (432^6).
Plato, Alcibiades,
cf.
34, 480.
of
body.
separated
Alchcr of Clairvaux (PL 40, 791). 34, 475;
first
bodily organ in so far as the soul
^Republic, ^
moved by
is
so that this act "to see"
things they did
Remember
glutton (Luke 16. 25): didst receive
it
an
evident consequence of transmigration which
6
in this world.
as a is
^0
Soul,
I,
3
Uos^i)'
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART who proves
that the soul does not
and that
is
it
no way moved
in
move
itself,
in respect of
such operations as seeing, feeling, and the like, but that such operations are movements of the composite only. We must therefore conclude
no way
that the acts of the sensitive powers in
remain
perhaps
in the separated soul, except
remote origin. Reply Obj. i. Some deny that
as in their
Augustine's: for
who compiled
it is
this
book
is
ascribed to a Cistercian
from Augustine's works, and added things of his own. Hence we are not to take what is written there, as having authority. however,
If,
it
authority should be maintained,
its
must be said that the meaning
it
separated soul
is
that the
is
affected with imagination and
Q. 70
ART.
897
3
mind, imaginatively, so are they in the separated soul intellectually, but not that they are in the separated soul imaginatively.
Reply Obj.
As stated
4.
in the first
book of
memory
has a twofold meaning. Sometimes it means a power of the sensitive part, in so far as its gaze extends over past time; and in this way the act of the memory Sentences,^
will
not be in the separated soul.
And
so the
Philosopher says^ that "when this," that
is
the
body, "is corrupted, the soul remembers not." In another way memory is used to designate that part of the imagination which pertains to the intellectual part, in so far namely as
from
stracts
it
differences of time, since
all
it
abre-
gards not only the past but also the present, and
{De
other like powers, not as though such affection were the act of the aforesaid powers, but in the sense that the soul will be affected in the future life for good or ill according to the things which it committed in the body through the imagination and other like powers, so that the imagination and such powers are not supposed to elicit that affection, but to have elicited in the body
Taking memory in this sense the separated soul will remember.^ Reply Obj. 5. Love, joy, sorrow, and the like, have a twofold meaning. Sometimes they denote passions of the sensitive appetite, and thus they will not be in the separated soul, be-
the merit of that affection.
a definite
Reply Obj. body not
2.
The
soul
is
said to feel through
as though the act of feeling be-
the
longed to the soul by itself, but as belonging to the whole composite by reason of the soul, just
we
as
say that heat heats. That which
namely that the soul
feels
some
feels
ment
added,
means
the body, such as fear and so forth, it
is
things without that
of the
body that takes place
in the acts of
do not occur without any bodily movement. It may also be replied that Augustine is speaking according to the opinion of the Platonists who maintained this as stated above.
Reply Obj.
3.
Augustine speaks there as for
the most part throughout that book, as one inquiring and not deciding. For
it is
clear that
no comparison between the soul of a sleeper and the separated soul, since the soul is
of the sleeper uses the organ of imagination wherein corporeal likenesses are impressed; which cannot be said of the separated soul. Or
we may
reply that likenesses of things are in the soul, both as to the sensitive and imaginative
power and
as to the intellectual power, with
greater or lesser abstraction
material
conditions.
from matter and
Therefore
Augustine's
comparison holds in this respect that just as the images of corporeal things are in the soul of the dreamer or of one who is carried out of his 1
Trin. xiv,
11).^
way they are not exercised without movement of the heart. In another
cause in this
way they denote
acts of the will
and
which
is
way they
in the
be even as delight will be there without bodily movement, even as it is in God, namely in so far as it is a simple movement of the will. In this sense the Philosopher says^ that "God's joy is one simple delight." intellectual part,
in this
will
in the separated soul,
such things without the outward move-
the proper senses, since fear and like passions
there
the future as Augustine says
Cf. also Part
I, Q.
lxxvii, a.
5,
Reply
3.
Article
Can
3.
Suffer
We
Whether the Separated Soul from a Bodily Fire?
proceed thus to the Third Article: It
would seem that the separated soul cannot suffer from a bodily fire. Objection 1. For Augustine says :^ "The things that affect the soul well or
ill
after its separation
from the body are not corporeal but resemble corporeal things." Therefore the separated soul
not punished with a bodily
is
Obj.
fire.
Further, Augustine says^ that the
2.
always more excellent than the patient. impossible for any body to be more excellent than the separated soul. Therefore it cannot suffer from a body.
agent
But
is
it is
^In
Sent., d.
Q. 2, A. s,
^Soul,
ad
I,
m,
q. 4, a. i,
ad
2; cf. Sent.,
m,
d.
xxvi,
4.
4 (4o8''27).
*
PL
6
Cf. Part
42, 1047. I, Q.
LXXVII,
a. 8; q.
lxxxix,
a. 6.
^Ethics, VII, 14 (1154^26). 7 Gen. ad lit., xii, 32 (PL 34, 480). ^Ibid., XII, 16 (PL 34, 467); cf. De Musica, vi, s 32,
n68).
(PL
— SUMMA TEEOLOGICA
898 Obj.
Further, According to the Philoso-
3.
{De Duab. Natur.y only
pher^ and Boethius
those things that agree in matter are active and passive in relation to one another. But the soul
and corporeal fire do not agree in matter, since there is no matter common to spiritual and corporeal things; and therefore they cannot be changed into one another, as Boethius says Therefore the separated soul does not
{ibid.).
from a bodily
suffer
fire.
is acted upon from the agent. Therefore if the soul suffer from the bodily fire, it will receive something from it. Now whatsoever is
Obj.
Further, Whatsoever
4.
receives something
received in a thing
mode
is
received according to the
Therefore that which is received in the soul from the fire is in it not materially but spiritually. Now the forms of Therefore though
its
per-
be granted that the soul suffer from the bodily fire, this will not conduce to its punishment, but rather to its fections.
it
perfection.
Obj. 5. Further, If it be said that the soul is punished merely by seeing the fire, as Gregory would seem to say {Dial, iv, 29),^ on the con-
—
If the soul sees the fire of hell,
it
can-
save by intellectual vision, since it has not the organs by which sensitive or imag-
not see
it
inative vision
is
But
effected.
it
would seem
impossible for intellectual vision to be the cause of sorrow, since "there
no sorrow contrary
is
to the pleasure of considering," according to
the Philosopher.'* Therefore the soul
by that
ished
Obj. suffers
held by
not pun-
vision.
Further, If
6.
is
be said that the soul fire through being
it
from the corporeal it,
even as now
it
is
held by the body
while living in the body, on the contrary,
The soul while body in so far
living in the
body
is
held by the
as there results one thing
from
the soul and the body, as from form and matwill not be the form of that Therefore it cannot be held by the fire in the manner spoken of above. Obj. 7. Further, Every bodily agent acts by contact. But a corporeal fire cannot be in contact with the soul, since contact is only between ter.
But the soul
corporeal
fire.
come together. not from that fire.
whom
Obj.
8.
Further,
An
organic agent does not
act on a remote object except through acting on
the intermediate objects; therefore 1
Generation and Corruption,
«
Chap. 6 (PL
»
PL
77, 368.
it is
I,
lo (328*19).
I,
13 (io6»38).
64, 1350). ••
Topics,
able to
distance in proportion to
fixed
But
its
demons
souls, or at least the
to
sometimes outside the place of hell, since sometimes they appear to men even in this world and yet they are not then free from punishment, for just as the glory of the saints is never interrupted, so neither is the punishment of the damned. And yet we do not find that all the intermediate things suffer from the fire of hell; nor again is it credible that any corporeal things of an elemental nature has such a power that its action can reach to such a distance. Therefore it does this equally applies, are
;
not seem that the pains suffered by the souls of the
On
damned
are inflicted by a corporeal
the contrary,
The
fire.
possibility of suffering
from a corporeal fire is equally consistent with separated souls and with demons. Now demons suffer
from corporeal
ished by that
fire
fire
since they are pun-
into which the bodies of the
damned will be cast after the resurrection, and which must be as corporeal fire. This is evident from the words of our Lord (Matt. 25. 41), Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil, etc. Therefore separated souls also can suffer from that fire. Further, Punishment should correspond to sin.
Now
the
body by perverse concupiscence.
fore
it is
made
ing
from
in sinning the soul subjected itself to
Thereshould be punished by besubject to a bodily thing by suffering
just that
it
it.
Further, There
is greater union between form and matter than between agent and patient. Now the diversity of spiritual and corporeal nature does not hinder the soul from being the form of the body. Therefore neither is it an obstacle to its suffering from a body. / answer that, Given, from what we have said above^ that the fire of hell is not called so metaphorically, nor an imaginary fire, but a real corporeal fire, we must say that the soul will suffer punishment from a corporeal fire, since our Lord said (Matt. 25. 41) that this fire was prepared for the devil and his angels, who are incorporeal even as the soul. But ho>v it is that
they can thus suffer
is
explained in
many
For some have said that the mere
corporeal things whose bounds
Therefore the soul suffers
a
at
power.
of the recipient.
things existing spiritually in the soul are
trary,
act
ways.
fact that
fire makes the soul suffer from and so Gregory {Dial, iv, 29)^ says: "The soul suffers from the fire by merely seeing it." But this does not seem sufficient, because whatever is seen, from the fact that it is
the soul sees the
the
fire;
'
Thomas, In
«
PL
77, 368.
Sent., rv, d. xliv, q. 3, A. 2,
I.
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART
Q. 70
ART.
899
3
a perfection of the seer; therefore it cannot conduce to his punishment, as seen. Sometimes, however, it is of a penal or sadden-
virtue of a spiritual agent, should act on the
ing nature accidentally, in so far, that
by
seen,
is
as
is,
it
apprehended as something hurtful, and con-
is
sequently, besides the fact that the soul sees the fire,
the
must be some relation of the soul to according to which the fire is hurtful
there fire,
Hence others have fire
said that although a cor-
cannot burn the soul, the soul never-
theless apprehends
it
as hurtful to itself,
and
in consequence of this apprehension is seized with fear and sorrow, in fulfilment of Ps. 13. 5, They have trembled for fear, where there was
no fear. Hence Gregory says^ that "the soul burns through seeing itself aflame." But this, again, seems insufficient, because in this case the soul would suffer from the fire not in reality but only in apprehension, for
passion of sorrow or pain
although a real
may
result
from a
Augustine observes {Gen. ad Lit. xii, 32),^ it cannot be said in relation to that passion that one really suffers from the thing, but from the likeness of the thing that is seen. Moreover, this kind of suffering would be more unhke real suffering than that which results from imaginary vision, since the latter is stated to result from real images of things, which images the soul carries about with it, whereas the former results from false conceptions which the erring soul imagines; and furthermore, it is not probable that separated souls or demons, who are endowed with keen intelfalse imagination, as
ligence, fire to
would think hurt them
if
it
possible for a corporeal
they were in no
way
dis-
tressed thereby.
Hence others say that it is necessary to admit that the soul suffers even really from the corporeal fire; and so Gregory says:^ "We can gather from the words of the Gospel that the soul suffers from the fire not only by seeing it, but also by feeling it." They explain the possi-
They say that this corcan be considered in two ways. First, as a corporeal thing, and thus it has not the power to act on the soul. Secondly, as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice. For the order of Divine justice demands that bihty of this as follows.
poreal
fire
the soul which
by sinning subjected
itself to
corporeal things should be subjected to also in punishment.
Now
them
an instrument acts not only in virtue of its own nature, but also in virtue of the principal agent; therefore it is not unreasonable if that fire, seeing that it acts in 1
Ibid.
man
same way as
or demon, in the
explained the sanctification of the soul
the sacraments.''
But, again, this does not seem to suffice, since every instrument, in acting on that on which it is
used instrumentally, has
own connatural
its
action besides the action whereby
it
tue of the principal agent; in fact
to the soul.
poreal
spirit of a
we have
2
PL
34, 480.
3
Loc.
cit.
the former that
filling
it
acts in vir-
it is
by
ful-
effects the latter action,
even
as, in Baptism, it is by laving the body that water sanctifies the soul, and the saw by cutting wood produces the shape of a house.
Hence we must allow the
exercise on the
fire to
soul an action connatural to the
fire, in order be the instrument of Divine justice in the punishment of sin, and for this reason we must say that a body cannot naturally act on a spirit, nor in any way be hurtful or distressful to it, except in so far as the latter is in some way united to a body; for thus we ob-
that
may
it
serve that the corruptible body the soul (Wisd.
9.
15).
Now
a body in two ways. In one ter, so
from
that
a load upon is united to
is
a spirit
way
as
form
to
matone
their union there results
thing absolutely, and the spirit that is thus united to a body both quickens the body and is
somewhat burdened by the body; but
it is not thus that the spirit of man or demon is united to the corporeal fire. In another way as the mover is united to the things moved, or as a
thing placed
united to place, even as incor-
is
way created incorporeal spirits are confined to a place, being in one place in such a way as not to be in
poreal things are in a place. In this
another.
Now although of its nature a
thing
able to confine an incorporeal spirit
is
to a place,
it
is
not able of
its
corporeal
nature to de-
tain an incorporeal spirit in the place to which is
it
confined,
and so
to tie
it
to that place
be unable to seek another, since a spirit is not by nature in a place so as to be subject to place. But it is added over and above corporeal fire as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice thus to detain a spirit; and thus it has a penal effect on it, by hindering that
it
from fulfilling its own will, that is by hinderit from acting where it will and as it will. This way is asserted by Gregory {Ibid.). For in explaining how the soul can suffer from that fire by feeling it, he expresses himself as follows: "Since Truth declares the rich sinner to be condemned to fire, will any wise man deny that the souls of the wicked are imprisoned in it
ing
4
m,
Thomas, In
Sent., rv, d.
Q. LXII, A. I.
i,
Q. i, A. 4; cf. above.
Part
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
900
flames?" Julian says the same' as quoted by the (iv Sent. d. 44) :^ "If the incorporeal
Master
held by the body, why not be held after death by a corporeal
spirit of a living
shall
it
man
is
and Augustine says^ that "just as, although the soul is spiritual and the body corfire?"
man
poreal,
so fashioned that the soul
is
united to the body as giving
is
and on ac-
it life,
count of this union conceives a great love for body, so it is chained to the fire, as receiving punishment from it, and from this union its
conceives a loathing."
Accordingly
we must
unite
the above
all
order to understand perfectly how the soul suffers from a corporeal fire, so as to say that the fire of its nature is able to have an incorporeal spirit united to
modes together
it
in
as a thing placed
united to a place, that as it is enabled
is
the instrument of Divine justice to detain
it
enchained as
fire is really
spect this
were, and in this re-
fire
tormented by the
it is
ory {Ibid.) mentions
all
fire.
as quoted above.
ply that Augustine
means
Hence Greg-
may
"•
Or we may
re-
to say that the things
which are the proximate occasion of the soul's pain or sorrow are spiritual, since it would not be distressed unless it apprehended the fire as hurtful to it; and so the fire as apprehended is the proximate cause of its distress, whereas the corporeal fire which exists outside the soul is the remote cause of its distress. Reply Obj. 2. Although the soul is more excellent absolutely than the fire, the fire
atively
more
that
as
is,
is rel-
excellent than the soul, in so far,
it is
Reply Obj.
the instrument of Divine justice. 3.
The Philosopher and Boethius
are speaking of the action
Nevertheless, intellectual vision
row
whereby the patient
changed into the nature of the agent. Such is not the action of the fire on the soul, and consequently the argument is not conclusive. Reply Obj. 4. By acting on the soul the fire bestows nothing on it but detains it, as stated above. Hence the argument is not to the point. Reply Obj. 5. In intellectual vision sorrow is not caused by the fact that something is seen, since the thing seen as such can in no way be contrary to the intellect. But in the sensible vision the thing seen, by its very action on the is
be accidentsight,
in
so
of the organ.
may
cause sor-
apprehended hurts through being seen,
in so far as the thing seen is
as hurtful, not that
it
way
but in some other
the soul in seeing the
altogether. It
is
thus that
fire is distressed.
6. The comparison does not hold every respect, but it does in some, as explained above. Reply Obj. 7. Although there is no bodily contact between the soul and body, there is a certain spiritual contact between them (even
Reply Obj.
in
mover
as the
of the heaven, being spiritual,
touches the heaven, when spiritual contact) in the
object
is
it moves it, with a same way as a painful
said to touch, as stated in the treatise
on Generation and Corruption.^ This mode of contact
is
sufficient for action.
never outside
these in order, as
harmony
destroys the
it
as something hurt-
be seen from the above quotations. Reply Obj. i. Augustine speaks there as one inquiring, and so he expresses himself otherwise
when deciding
far as
Reply Obj.
spirit,
may
something corruptive of the
and
hurtful to the
thus the soul seeing the ful to
it
sight so as to be seen, there ally
8.
The
hell,
souls of the
damned
are
except by Divine permission,
either for the instruction or for the trial of the
And wherever
elect.
they are outside hell they
nevertheless always see
its fire
as prepared for
their punishment.
Therefore, since this vision
the immediate
cause of their distress, as
is
stated above (Reply i), wherever they are, they suffer
from
hell-fire.
Even
so prisoners, though
somewhat from the seeing themselves condemned to it.
outside the prison, suffer prison,
Hence
just as the glory of the elect is not diminished neither as to the essential nor as to the accidental reward if they happen to be outside the empyrean (in fact this somewhat conduces to their glory), so the punishment of the damned is in no way diminished, if by God's
permission they happen to be outside hell for a time. A gloss on James 3. 6, inflameth the wheel of our nativity, etc., is in agreement with this, for it is worded thus: "The devil, wherever he is,
whether
in the air or
under the earth, drags
with him the torments of his flames."^ But the objection argues as though the corporeal fire spirit immediately in the same torments bodies.
tortured the
way
as
it
QUESTION LXXI Of works
of intercession for THE DEAD
{hi Fourteen Articles)
We
must now consider works of intercession Under this head there are four-
for the dead. *
Julian, Bishop of Toledo, Prognostic
482). »
2
Chap.
7
(QR
City oj God, xxi, 10
11,
17
(PL
", 1003).
(PL
41, 725).
*
Ibid,
96, B Aristotle, i, 6 (323*22). ^Glossa ordin. (vi, 213F); Bede, hi Jac. (PL 93, 27).
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART teen points of inquiry: (i)
Whether
interces-
Q. 71
ART.
901
1
18. 4, the soul that sinneth, the
same
shall die.
sory works performed by one person can profit
Therefore neither does one person profit by
others? (2) Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living? (3) Whether the intercessory works of sinners profit the dead? (4)
another's good.
Whether intercessory works for the dead those who perform them? (5) Whether
profit
written
is
(Ps.
them
all
118.
that fear
members of the one body of the Church. Now one member is assisted by another. Therefore one man can be assisted by
works for one dead person
profit that person
works for many avail each one as much as if they were offered for each individual? (14) Whether general works of intercession avail special ones are not offered, as
as special
It
Further, All the faithful united together by
more than others? (13) Whether intercessory
much
contrary,
inter-
Whether they profit tory? (7) Whether they avail the children in limbo? (8) Whether in any way they profit those who are in heaven? (9) Whether the prayer of the Church, the Sacrament of the altar, and almsgiving profit the departed? (10) Whether indulgences granted by the Church profit them? (11) Whether the burial service profits the departed? (12) Whether intercessory
whom
the
who are in hell? (6) those who are in purga-
cessory works profit those
those for
On
6^): I am a partaker with Thee, etc.
and general prayers of
cession together avail those for
whom
inter-
they are
offered?
charity are
the merits of another. / answer that,
Our
of Happiness. Secondly, for something consequent upon a state; thus by some work a man merits an accidental reward, or a rebate of punishment. And for both these purposes our actions may avail in two ways: first, by state
way
of merit, secondly,
by way
of prayer, the
difference being that merit rehes on justice, and
prayer on mercy, since he his petition
who prays
from the mere
liberality
obtains of the
one he prays. Accordingly we must say that the work of one person in no way can avail another for acquiring a state by
Article i. Whether the Works of Intercession of One Person Can Profit Others?
actions can avail for two
purposes. First, for acquiring a certain state; thus by a meritorious work a man obtains the
namely, a
man
is
way
of merit, so that,
able to merit eternal life
by
would seem that the works of intercession {suf-
the works which I do, because the share of glory is awarded according to the measure of the recipient, and each one is disposed by his
fragia) of one person cannot profit others.
own and not by
We
proceed thus to the First Article:
Objection
What
For
1.
it
is
written (Gal.
6.
It
8)
man
shall sow, those also shall one person reaped fruit from the intercessory works of another, he would reap from another's sowing. Therefore a person receives no fruit from the intercessory
things a
Now
he reap.
if
M'Orks of others.
Obj.
2.
Further, It belongs to God's justice
that each one should receive according to his
and so the psalm
merits,
wilt render to every
Now
it is
Therefore
(61. 13) says:
man according
Thou
to his works.
impossible for God's justice to it
is
impossible for one
man
fail.
to be
by the works of another. Further, A work is meritorious on the same count as it is praiseworthy, namely
assisted
Obj.
3.
in so far as it is voluntary.
Now
one
man
is
not
work of another. Therefore can the work of one man be meritorious
praised for the neither
and
fruitful for another.
Obj.
4.
to repay for evil.
Further, It belongs to Divine justice good for good in the same way as evil But no man is punished for the evil-
doings of another; indeed, according to Ezech.
another's actions,
—disposed,
by being worthy of reward. By way of prayer, however, the work of one may that
is
to say,
profit another while
he is a wayfarer, even for acquiring a state; for instance, one man may obtain the first grace for another, and since the
answer to prayer depends on the liberality of God, to Whom we pray, it may extend to whatever is subject to the order of the Divine power. On the other hand, as regards that which is consequent upon or accessory to a state, the work of one may avail another, not only by way of prayer but even by way of merit, and this happens in two ways. First, on account of their communion in the root of the work, which root is charity in meritorious works. Therefore all who are united together by charity acquire some benefit from one another's works, although according to the measure of each one's state, since even in heaven each one will rejoice in the goods of others. Hence it is that the
an 1
communion
of saints
article of faith. ^ Secondly, Cf.
The Apostles Creed (DZ
6).
is laid
down
as
through the in-
SUMMA TEEOLOGICA
902 tention of the doer
who
does certain works
specially for the purpose that they
such
persons,
so
those
that
somewhat the works
may
profit
works become
whom
of those for
they
are done, as though they were bestowed on
them by the
doer.
And
so they can avail
them
Article
similar purpose
that
does not change
their state.
Reply Obj. of eternal
that reapeth lasting.
.
Now
This reaping
i.
.
4. 36,
gathercth jridt unto
.
a share of eternal life
to a man save for we may petition life, this
the receiving
is
John
as stated in
life,
his
own works,
is
And he
life
ever-
not given
for although
for another that he obtain
never happens except by means of his at the prayers of
own works, when namely, one, another
merits eternal
given the grace whereby he
is
life.
Whether
the
Dead Can Be
Assisted
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the dead cannot be assisted by the works of the hving. Objection
either for the fulfilment of satisfaction or for
some
2.
by the Works of the Living?
(II Cor.
5.
First,
i.
10)
:
We
because the Apostle says
must
be manifested be-
all
fore the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done. Therefore nothing
can accrue to a man from the works of others, which are done after his death and when he is no longer in the body. Obj. 2. Further, This also seems to follow from the words of Apoc. 14. 13, Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord for their works .
.
.
follow them. Obj. 3. Further, It belongs only to one
who
not contrary to Divine justice if a man receives the fruit of the works done by a man who is
on the way to advance on account of some deed. Now after death men are no longer wayfarers, because to them the words of Job 19. 8, refer: He hath hedged in my path round about, and I cannot pass. Therefore the dead cannot be assisted by a person's intercessory
one with him
works.
Reply Obj. 2. The work that is done for another becomes his for whom it is done, and in like manner the work done by a man who is one with me is somewhat mine. Hence it is
in charity, or of
works done for
him. This also happens according to
human
justice, so that the satisfaction offered
by one
is
accepted in lieu of another's.
Reply Obj.
3. Praise is not given to a person save according to his relation to an act, and
therefore praise
is
"in relation to something."^
no man is made or shown to be well or ill disposed to something by another's deed, it follows that no man is praised for another's
And
since
deeds save accidentally, in so far as he
somewhat the cause
of those deeds,
by
is
giv-
inducement, or by any other means. On the other hand, a work is meritorious to a person not only by reason of his disposition, but also in view of something consequent upon his disposition or state, as appears from what has been ing
assistance,
counsel,
said.
Reply Obj. tice to take
4. It is
directly contrary to jus-
away from
a person that
which
is
what is not his not contrary to justice, but surpasses
his due, but to give a person
due
is
the bounds of justice, for
it is
a person cannot be hurt by the
liberality. ills
Now
of another,
unless he be deprived of something of his own.
Consequently
it
is
not
becoming that one
should be punished for another's sins, as that one should acquire
I,
12 (iioi*'i2).
Obj. 4. Further, No one is assisted by the deed of another unless there be some community of hfe between them. Now there is no community between the dead and the living, as the Philosopher says.^ Therefore the intercessions of the living do not profit the dead. On the contrary are the words of II Machab. 12. 46: It is ... a holy and wholesome thought
pray for the dead, that they may be loosed sins. But this would not be profitable unless it wdre a help to them. Therefore the intercessory works of the living profit the dead. Further, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. to
from
i):^
"Of no small weight
is
the authority of
the Church whereby she clearly approves of the
custom by which a commendation of the dead has a place in the prayers which the priests pour forth to the Lord God at His altar." This
custom was established by the apostles themDamascene in a sermon on works of intercession for the dead,"* where he expresses himself thus: "Realizing the naselves according to the
ture of the Mysteries the disciples of the Sav-
and His holy apostles sanctioned a commemoration of those who had died in the faith, being made in the awe-inspiring and life-giving Mysteries." This is also confirmed by the auiour
some advantage from
the good deeds of another. ^Ethics,
it is
is
^
Ethics,
»
PL
*
De His Qui
I,
II (1101*35).
40, 593.
in Fide Dormierunt,
m (PG 95,
249).
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART
ART.
Q. 71
903
3
thority of Dionysius {Hier. Eccl. vii)/ where he mentions the rite of the Early Church in
be helped by others in the matter of their being delayed from receiving their final reward, be-
praying for the dead, and, moreover, asserts
cause in this respect they are
that the works of intercession of the living the dead.^ Therefore we must believe without any doubt.
profit this
/ answer that, Charity, which
uniting the
members
is
the bond
of the Church, extends
not only to the living, but also to the dead die in charity.
For charity which
the soul, even as the soul
is
is
the
who
life
of
the Hfe of the body,
Reply Ohj.
still
wayfarers.
Although the communion of civic deeds, of which the Philosopher speaks, is impossible between the dead and the living, because the dead are outside civic life, the communication of the spiritual hfe is possible between them, for that life is founded on charity towards God, to Whom the spirits of the dead live. 4.
has no end; Charity never jalleth away (I Cor. 13. 8).
Moreover, the dead
live in the
memory
of the living, and therefore the intention of
the living can be directed to them.
Hence
two ways even as they profit the living, both on account of the bond of charity and on account of the intention being directed to them. Nevertheless, we must not beHeve that the intercessory works of the living profit them so as to change their state from unhappiness to happiness or conversely; but they avail for the lessening of punishment or something of the kind that involves no change in the state of in
i.
Man
while living in the body
merited that such things should avail him after death. Therefore if he is assisted thereby after is,
nevertheless, the result of the
things he has done in the body.
Or we may
proceed thus to the Third Article:
reply, according to
John Damas-
cene in the sermon quoted above, that these
words refer to the retribution which will be made at the final judgment, of eternal glory or eternal unhappiness; for then each one will receive only according as he himself has done in the body. Meanwhile, however, he can be assisted by the intercessions of the living. Reply Ohj. 2. The words quoted refer expressly to the sequel of eternal retribution as
It
would seem that intercessory works performed by sinners do not profit the dead. Ohjection 1. For, according to John 9. 31,
God doth
not hear sinners.
Now if their prayers
were to profit those for whom they pray, they would be heard by God. Therefore the intercessory prayers performed by them do not profit the dead.
Ohj.
2.
10)^ that
Further, Gregory says {Pastoral,
"when an
offensive person
is
i,
sent to
intercede, the wrath of the angered party
the dead.
this life, this
We
the
intercessory works of the living profit the dead
Reply Ohj.
Article 3. Whether Suffrages Performed hy Sifiners Profit the Dead?
is
provoked to harsher measures." Now every sinner is offensive to God. Therefore God is not inclined to mercy by the intercession of sinners, and consequently their works of intercession are of no avail. Ohj. 3. Further, A person's deed would seem to be more fruitful to the doer than to another. But a sinner merits nothing for himself by his deeds. Much less, therefore, can he merit for another.
Ohj. 4. Further, Every meritorious work must be a living work, that is to say, formed by charity. Now works done by sinners are dead. Therefore the dead for whom they are done cannot be assisted thereby.
On
No man can know man whether the
from the opening words: Blessed are Or we may reply that deeds done on their behalf are somewhat their own, as stated above (a. i). Reply Ohj. 3. Although, strictly speaking,
latter
after death souls are not in the state of the
of grace, a
way, yet in a certain respect they are still on the way, in so far as they are delayed awhile in their advance towards their final reward. Therefore, strictly speaking, their way is hedged in round about, so that they can no more be changed by any works in respect of the state of happiness or unhappiness. Yet their way is not so hedged around that they cannot IPG3, 556. 2/^,^-^, (PG3, 560).
ask intercessory works for his dead, and consequently many would be deterred from ob-
is
Ohj.
clear
the dead, etc.
for
5.
certain
the contrary,
about another
be in a state of sin or of grace. If, thereworks were profit-
fore, only those intercessory
by those could not
able that are done
man
who are in a state know of whom to
taining works of intercession.
Ohj.
6.
According to Augustine
Further,
(Enchir. ex),* as quoted in the text (iv Sent. d. 45),^
the dead are assisted by works of in-
tercession according as while living they merit3
PL
6
Lombard, chap.
77, 23.
*
2
PL
40, 283.
(QR
11,
1006).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
904 ed to be assisted after death
Therefore the
not only to the just but also to sinners (Matt.
measured
5. 45), not indeed on account of their merits, but of His pity. Hence a gloss on John 9. 31, Cud doth uot hear sinners, says^ that he speaks as one "unanointed" and as not seeing clearly. Reply Obj. 2. Although the sinner's prayer
worth of prayers of intercession
is
according to the disposition of the person for whom they are performed. Therefore it would appear that it differs not whether they be per-
formed by good or by wicked persons. / answer that, Two things may be considered in the intercessions performed by the wicked. First, the deed done (opus operatiim), for instance the sacrifice of the altar. And since our sacraments have their efficacy from themselves independently of the deed of the doer, and are equally efficacious by whomsoever they are per-
formed, in this respect the intercessory works of the wicked profit the departed. Secondly, we may consider the deed of the doer (opus operans), and then
we must draw
another; in another
way
and
it is
an-
this
that priest, although a sinner, profit the de-
when he acts as the ment of another, for the work of the ment belongs more to the principal parted. Secondly,
Therefore, although he
ment act
who
instruinstru-
agent.
acts as the instru-
of another be not in a state of merit, his
may
be meritorious on account of the prinif a servant being in
cipal agent; for instance
do any work of mercy at the command of master who has charity. Hence, if a person dying in charity command works of intercession to be offered for him, or if some other person having charity prescribe them, those works of intercession avail for the departed, even though the persons by whom they are performed be in sin. Nevertheless they would avail more if those persons were in charity, because then those works would be meritorious on two counts. Reply Obj. i The prayer offered by a sinner is sometimes not his but another's, and consequently in this respect is worthy to be heard by God. Nevertheless, God sometimes hears sinners, when, namely, they ask for something acceptable to God. For God dispenses His goods
sin
his
.
I
Sect. 4
(PG
3,
3os).
offers the prayer.
Reply Obj.
who performs
3.
The reason why is
because he
by reason of
of profiting
his
profit another,
Reply Obj.
4.
who
is
is
own
Nevertheless, as stated above,
way
the sinner
these works of interces.sion gains
nothing thereby
it
not capable indisposition.
may
in
some
disposed.
Although the sinner's deed is it is his own, it may be
not living in so far as so
living in
far as
is
it
another's, as stated
above. Since, however, the argiime?its in the con-
to himself or to
in so far as
happens in two ways. First, when the sinner, offering works of intercession, represents the whole Church; for instance a priest when he performs the burial service in church. And since one in whose name or in whose stead a thing is done is understood to do it himself as Dionysius asserts (CcbI. Hier. xiii),' it follows that the intercessory works of other's deed,
may
a distinction;
because the deed of a sinner who offers intercessory works may be considered in one way in so far as it is his own deed, and thus it can in
no way be meritorious either
not acceptable in so far as he is offensive, be acceptable to God on account of another in whose stead or at whose command he
is it
trary sense
would seem
to
show
that
it
matters
not whether one obtain intercession from good
from
or
evil persons,
we must
reply to
them
also.
Although one cannot know for another whether he be in the state of salvation, one may infer it with probability from what one sees outwardly of a man, for a tree is known by its fruit (Matt. 7. 16). Reply Obj. 6. In order that intercession avail
Reply Obj.
5.
certain about
it is requisite that the one for whom performed be capable of availing by it, and a man has become capable of this by his own works which he did in his hfe-time. This is what Augustine means to say. Nevertheless, works must be such that they can profit him, and this depends not on the person for whom the intercession is performed, but rather on the one who offers the intercessory works whether by performing them or by command-
another,
it
is
ing them.
Article
4.
Whether Intercessory Prayers
Offered by the Living for the
Those
Who
Offer
Dead Profit
Them?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that intercessory works offered by the living for the dead do not profit those who them. Objection i. For according to human justice a man is not absolved from his own debt if he pays a debt for another man. Therefore a man is not absolved from his own debt for the rea-
offer
^Glossa 1718).
interl. (v, 2i5r);
Augustine, In Joann. (PL 35,
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART son that by offering works of intercession he has paid the debt of the one for whom he ofObj. 2. Further, Whatever a man does, he should do it as best he can. Now it is better to assist two than one. Therefore if one who by works of intercession has paid the debt of a dead person
own
freed from his
is
would seem that one ought never
to
debt,
it
satisfy
for oneself but always for another.
Obj.
Further, If the satisfaction of one
3.
satisfies
him equally
for another profits
whom
with the one for
he
satisfies, it will like-
wise equally profit a third person if he satisfy for him at the same time, and Hkewise a fourth and so on. Therefore he might satisfy for all
by one work of
which
satisfaction,
is
absurd.
On
the contrary, It is written (Ps. 34. 13) prayer shall be turned into my bosom.
My
Therefore, in like manner, intercessory works
who
that are offered for others profit those
The Damascene who jell asleep in
Further, those
when about to anoint a ment or other holy oil,
man
sick first
with the oint-
of all he,"
and afterwards
The work
his neighbour." is
who
profit
are in hell.
1. For it is written (II Machab. 40): They found under the coats of the slain some of the donaries of the idols .,
Objection
12.
.
.
which the law forbiddeth to the lews, and yet we read further on {verse 43) that Judas sent twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem .
.
.
to be offered for the sins of the dead.
Now
clear that they sinned mortally through
is
it
acting against the Law, and consequently that
they died in mortal sin, and were taken to hell. Therefore works of intercession profit those
who
are in hell.
2. Further, The text (iv Sent. d. 45)2 quotes the saying of Augustine (Enchir. cx)^ that "those whom works of intercession profit
Obj.
of intercession that
cession that
counted as belonging to the per-
is
whom
is
it
done, while absolving
him
from the debt of punishment, does not absolve the performer from his own debt of punishment, because in this compensation we have to consider the equality of justice, and this work of satisfaction can be equal to the one debt without being equal to the other, for the debts of two sinners require a greater satisfaction
than the debt of one. Secondly, it may be considered as meriting eternal life, and this it has as proceeding from its root, which is charity, in this
whom
way it
is
it
profits not only the person
done, but also and
still
This sufBces for the Replies to the Objections; for the first considered the
tercession as a
others consider Sect. 18
(PG
work it
as meritorious.
95, 264).
work of
in-
of satisfaction, while the
only those
fore works of intercession profit even those
who
are in hell.
Obj. 3. Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. cap ult.):^ "If here the prayers of the just avail those who are alive, how much more do they, after death, profit those alone
who
are
Hence we may works are more profit-
their holy prayers?"
gather that intercessory
Now they Hving even though they be in mortal sin, for the Church prays daily for sinners that they be converted to God. Therefore intercessory works avail also for the dead who are in mortal sin. Obj. 4. Further, In the Lives of the Fathers able to the dead than to the living.
profit the
3)^ we read, and Damascene resermon of his that Macarius discovered the skull of a dead man on the road, and that after praying he asked whose head it was, and the head replied that it had belonged to a pagan priest who was condemned to hell; and yet he confessed that he and others were assisted by the prayers of Macarius. Therefore the intercessory works of the Church profit (iii,
172:
vi,
lates^ in a
even those who are
more
the doer.
Now
are in hell are said to be damned. There-
worthy of
answered.
done for another may be considered in two ways. First, as expiating punishment by way of compensation which is a condition of satisfaction, and in this way the work of inter-
1
those
who
thus the question at issue
/ answer that,
for
proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It
abatement of their damnation."
is
and
We
would seem that works of intercession
the faith :^ "Just as
strives for his neighbour's salvation first of all profits himself
son for
Article 5. Whether Works of Intercession Those Who Are in Hell?
says in the sermon
namely the anointer, "shares in the anointing and thus proceeds to anoint the patient, so whoever
And
905
s
gain either entire forgiveness, or at least an
satisfy.
On
ART.
Profit
fered them.
who
Q. yi
Obj.
5.
in hell.
The Damascene
Further,
in the
same
sermon^ relates that Gregory, while praying for Trajan, heard a voice from heaven saying 2 Lombard, chap. 2 (QR 11, 1007). 8
PL PL
«
De His Qui
7
PG 95,
3
40, 283.
'
PG
3, 561.
73, 707; IOI3-
264.
in Fide Dormierunl, 10
(PG
95, 256).
SUMMA TEEOLOGICA
9o6
him: "I have heard thy voice, and I pardon Trajan," and of this fact the Damascene adds in the same sermon (ibid.) "the whole East and West are witnesses." Yet it is clear that Trajan was in hell, since "he put many martyrs to a cruel death" (ibid.). Therefore the intercessory works of the Church avail even for to
who
those
On
are in hell.
the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier.
"The high priest prays not for the unby so doing he would act counter to the Divine order," and a commentator^ on the same place says that "he prays not that sinners be forgiven, because his prayer for them would not be heard." Therefore works of inter-
vii):*
clean, because
cession do not avail those
who
(namely, after the judgment day) for
men
to the everlasting fire, as there
is
summoned The
to
the presence
text
of
the
man
just
depart
life
profit
them.
/ answer that, There have been three opin-
some have said must be made in this
ions about the damned. For that a twofold distinction
matter. First, as to time; for they said that
judgment day no one in hell will be by any intercession, but that before the judgment day some are assisted by the intercessory works of the Church. Secondly, they
after the assisted
made
among those who are deSome of these, they said, are those namely who have died without
a distinction
tained in hell.
very bad,
faith and the sacraments, and these, since they were not of the Church, neither by grace nor '
PG
2
Maximus, In De
(PG
contra 3
PL
Eccl. Ilicr., chap. vni. Pt.
181); Cf. Albert, 2
(BO xxx,
In
m,
sect. 7
Sent., iv, d. xlv, a. 3,
Sed
610).
76, 739.
Peter Lombard, chap. 2 (QR 11, 1007). ^Serm. ad Popiil, Scrm. CLXXii, chap. 2 (PL 38, 937).
*
endeavoured
in various
and consequently they ways to avoid this dif-
namely
the judgment day, for their souls
till
be reunited to their bodies, and will be cast back into the punishments of hell without hope of pardon. But this opinion seems incompatible with Divine providence, which leaves nothing unordered in things. For guilt cannot be restored to order save by punishment; therefore it is impossible for punishment to cease, unless first of all guilt be expiated, so that, as guilt remains for ever in the damned, their punishment will in no way be interrupted. For this reason the followers of Gilbert de la Porree^ devised another explanation. These will
said that the process in the lessening of punish-
ments by intercessory works is as the process in dividing a line, which though finite, is indefinitely divisible, and is never destroyed by division, if it is diminished not by equal but by proportionate quantities, for instance if we begin by taking away a quarter of the whole and, secondly, a quarter of that quarter, and then a quarter of this second quarter, and so on indefinitely. In like manner, they say by the first work of intercession a certain proportion of the punishment is taken away, and by the second an equally proportionate part of the remainder. But this explanation is in many ways defective. First, because it seems that indefinite division which is applicable to continuous cannot
quantity
be transferred
Peri Archon, i, 6 (PG 11, 169); Moral., XXXIV, 19 (PL 76, 737). •
3. 564.
4,
the error of Origen,^
is
would
that punishment altogether, which
absolutely as Origen maintained, but for a time,
without the faith that worketh by charity and its sacraments, in vain do his friends have recourse to such acts of kindness." Now all the damned come under that head. Therefore intercessory works do not this
away
now
(iv Sent. d. 45)'' quotes
the words of Augustine:^ "If a
take
con-
and his angels who are sentenced to eternal punishment, and for this same reason the saints pray not for dead unbelieving and wicked men, because, indeed, knowing them to be already condemned to eternal punishment, they shrink from pleading for them by the merit of their prayers before they Judge." Further,
that a multiplicity of intercessory works
For Praepositinus said^ that intercessory works for the damned can be so multiplied that they are entirely freed from punishment, not
for not praying for the devil
are
cannot avail; while others are not very bad, who belonged to the Church as actual members, who had the faith, frequented the sacraments and performed works generically good, and for these the intercessory works of the Church ought to avail. Yet they were confronted with a difficulty which troubled them, for it would seem to follow from this (since the punishment of hell is finite in intensity although infinite in duration) those namely
ficulty.
are in hell.
Further, Gregory says (Moral, xxxiv, 19):^ "There is the same reason for not praying then
demned
by name, the intercessory works of the Church
''
Summa,
Summa
Pt. iv (fol. Ssrb);
Aurea,
d. XLvi, Pt.
I,
d. XLVI, A. 2 8
CL
Pt. iv (303ra);
Q. I, A. I
(QR
(BO XXX,
630).
Albert,
In
cf.
to
spiritual
Gregory the Great,
see William of Auxerre, Bonaventure, In Sent., iv,
IV,
957); Albert,
Sent., iv, d. xlvi, a. 2
In
Sent., iv,
(BO xxx,
630).
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART quantity; secondly, because there
why
the second
work
is
of intercession,
no reason if it
be of
they
than the first thirdly, because punishment cannot be diminished unless guilt be diminished, even as it cannot be done away unless
is
;
the guilt be done away; fourthly, because in the division of a line
thing which
is
we come
at length to
not sensible, for a sensible body
not indefinitely divisible, and thus
is
some-
follow that after
many works
it
of intercession
the remaining punishment would be so as not to be felt,
would little
and thus would no longer be
a punishment.
Hence
William of Auxerre said^ that intercessory works profit the damned not by diminishing or interrupting their punishment, but by fortifying the person punished, even as a man who is carrying a heavy load might bathe his face in water, for thus he would be enabled to carry it better, and yet his load would be none the lighter. But this again is impossible, because according to Gregory {Moral, ix)^ a man suffers
more as
some fire;
or less from the eternal
his
suffer
fire
accord-
and consequently more, some less, from the same
guilt
deserves,
therefore since the guilt of the
damned
remains unchanged, it cannot be that he suffers less punishment. Moreover, this opinion is presumptuous, as being in opposition to the statements of holy men, and groundless as being based on no authority. It is also unreasonable. First, because the damned in hell are cut off
from the bond of charity
in virtue of
which
the departed are in touch with the works of the
Secondly, because they have entirely
living.
come final
to the
award
who are ment or
end of Hfe, and have received the for their merits, even as the saints
in heaven.
For the remaining punish-
glory of the body does not
make them
be wayfarers, since glory essentially and
to
same with the unhappiness of the damned, and so radically resides in the soul.
It
is
as to the essential reward.
However, we may admit,
manner
in a certain
meas-
in which, according to
some, be said that they profit neither by diminishing nor interrupting their punishment, nor again by diminishing their sense of punishment, but intercessory works profit the damned,
^
Cf. Albert, Ibid., See also
XLVi, Pt. 2
I,
A. I, Q. I
Chap. 65 (PL
;
withdrawn from them when intercessory works are offered for them. Yet even this is impossible according to the general law, because as Augustine says {De Cura pro
Mort.
—and —"the
xiii)2
damned
this applies especially to the
spirits of the
they see nothing of what ly
departed are where
men do
or of what and consequentthey know not when intercessory works are
happens to them
(QR
Bona venture, In
IV, 958).
75, 913).
from above
in this life,"
if it
Sent., iv, d.
to
some of the damned
of the general law. This, however, of great uncertainty; therefore it
in despite
is
a matter
is
safer to
say absolutely that intercessory prayers do not profit the damned, nor does the Church intend to pray for them, as appears from the authors
quoted above.'' Reply Obj. 1. The donaries to the idols were not found on those dead so that they might be taken as a sign that they were carried off in reverence to the idols, but they took them as conquerors because they were due to them by right of war. They sinned, however, venially by covetousness, and consequently they were not damned in hell, and thus works of intercession could profit them. Or we may say, according to some, that in the midst of fighting, seeing they were in danger, they repented of their sin, according to Ps. 77. 34, When He slew them, then they sought Him, and this can be held as a probable opinion. Therefore the
was made for them. Reply Obj. 2. In these words damnation is taken in a broad sense for any kind of punishment, so as to include also the punishment of purgatory which is sometimes entirely expiated by works of intercession, and sometimes not offering
entirely, but diminished.
the
their punishment cannot be diminished as neither can the glory of the saints be increased
ure, the
907
5
offered for them, unless this relief be granted
others found another explanation. For
ing
ART.
knew themselves to be so outcast as to be a care to no one and this matter of sorrow
equal worth, should diminish the punishment less
Q. 71
by withdrawing from the damned some matter of sorrow, which matter they might have if
is
Reply Obj. 3. Intercession for a dead person more acceptable than for a living person, as
regards his being in greater want, since he cannot help himself as a living person can. But a living person is better off in that he can be taken from the state of mortal sin to the state of grace, which cannot be said of the dead. there is not the same reason for praying
Hence
for the dead as for the living.
Reply Obj. 4. This assistance did not consist a diminishment of their punishment, but in this alone (as stated in the same place) that when he prayed they were permitted to see one 3 PL 40, 605. * On the Contrary, i, 2 3. in
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
9o8
another, and in this they had a certain joy. not
but imaginary, in the fulfilment of their
real
Even so the demons are said to rejoice when they draw men into sin, although this in no way diminishes their punishment, as neither desire.
is
the joy of the angels diminished by the fact
that they take pity on our
Reply Obj. 5. Concerning the incident of Trajan it may be supposed with probability that he was recalled to life at the prayers of blessed Gregory, and thus obtained the grace whereby he received the pardon of his sins and in consequence was freed from punishment. The same applies to all those who were miraculously raised from the dead, many of whom were evidently idolaters and damned. For we must say likewise of all such persons that they were consigned to hell, not finally, but as was actually due to their own merits according to justice, and that according to higher causes, in view of which it was foreseen that they would be recalled to life, they were to be disposed of otherwise.
Or we may say with some that Trajan's soul was not freed absolutely from the debt of eternal punishment, but that his punishment was suspended for a time, that
ment day. Nor does
it
is,
be purified there, and to the kingdom. Now nothing can be purified unless something be done to it. Therefore intercessory works offered by the living do not diminish the punishment being pure
of purgatory.
Obj.
ills.
until the judg-
follow that this
is
the
may may come
order that they
who
If intercessory
4.
works availed those would
are in purgatory, those especially
them which are offered at their Yet these do not always avail; for instance, if a person before dying were to provide for so many works of intercession to be offered for him that if they were offered they would suffice for the remission of his entire punishment. Now supposing these works of seem
to avail
behest.
intercession to be delayed until he
is
released
from punishment, they will profit him nothing. For it cannot be said that they profit him before they are discharged, and after they are fulfilled he no longer needs them, since he is already released. Therefore works of intercession do not avail those who are in purgatory. On the contrary, As quoted in the text (iv Sent. d. 45),^ Augustine says {Enchir. cx)^ that
prayers of intercession profit those who are not very good or not very bad. Now such are those W'ho are detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc.
Further, Dionysius says
{Eccl. Bier, vii)^
general result of works of intercession, because
that "the godlike priest in praying for the de-
things happen differently in accordance with
parted prays for those
the general law from that which
and yet contracted certain stains through hu-
in particular cases
the bounds of
and by
human
privilege.
affairs differ
power {De Cura pro Mort. xwi)}
of the signs of the Divine
says
is
permitted
Even
so
from those
as Augustine
We
proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It would seem that works of intercession do not profit even those who are in purgatory. Objection i. For purgatory is a part of hell. Now "there is no redemption in hell,"^ and it in hell?
Who
Thee Therefore works of intercession do not
written (Ps.
profit those
6.
who
6),
shall confess to
are in purgatory.
The punishment of purgaTherefore if some of the punishment is abated by works of intercession, it would be possible to have such a great number of prayers of intercession that the punishment would be entirely remitted, and consequently the sin entirely unpunished; and this would seem incompatible with Divine justice. Obj. 3. Further, Souls are in purgatory in Obj.
tory
»
2.
Further,
is finite.
PL
40, 606.
2
Office of the dead,
frailty."
Now
lived a holy
life,
such persons are detained
in purgatory. Therefore, etc.
/ answer that, The punishment of purgais intended to supplement the satisfaction which was not fully completed in the body. Consequently, since, as stated above (a. i, Reply tory
Article 6. Whether Works of Intercession Profit Those Who Are in Purgatory?
is
man
who
Res p.,
vii.
works of one person can whether the latter be living or dead, the intercessory works of the living, without any doubt, profit those who 2; Q. XIII, A. 2), the
avail for another's satisfaction,
are in purgatory.
Reply Obj. those
who
i.
The words quoted
are in the hell of the
refer to
damned, where
is no redemption for those who are finally consigned to that punishment. We may also reply with Damascene {Serm. de DormientibusY that such statements are to be explained
there
with reference to the lower causes, that is according to the demands of the merits of those
who
are consigned to those punishments. But according to the Divine mercy, which transcends human merits, it happens otherwise s
Peter Lombard, chap.
*
PL
«
Sect. 8
40, 283.
(PG
'
2
(QR n, 1007). (PG 3, 560). sect. 2 (PG 95.
Sect. 4
95, 253);
cf.
249).
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART through the prayers of the just than is imphed by the expressions quoted in the authorities above. Now "God changes His sentence but not his counsel," as Gregory says.^ Hence Damascene {loc. cit.y quotes as instances of this
Achab and Ezechias,
the Ninevites, is
it
in
whom
apparent that the sentence pronounced
against
them by God was commuted by the
Divine mercy.^ Reply Obj. 2. It is not unreasonable that the punishment of those who are in purgatory be entirely done away by the multiplicity of intercessions. But it does not follow that the sins remain unpunished, because the punishment of one undertaken in lieu of another is credited
gatory
Q. 71
ART.
temporal,
is
8
the
as regards
eternal retribution none can be defrauded save
by
his
own
Article
7.
fault.
Whether Works of Intercession Who Are in Limbo?
Avail the Childreji
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It would seem that works of intercession avail who
the children
are in limbo.
Objection i. For they are not detained there except for another's sin. Therefore it is most fitting that
they should be assisted by the in-
tercessory prayers of others.
Obj. it is
Further, In the text (iv Sent.
2.
d. 45)'*
held from the words of Augustine {Enchir.
works of the Church ob-
to that other.
cx.)^ the intercessory
Reply Obj. 3. The purifying of the soul by the punishment of purgatory is nothing else
tain forgiveness for those
than the expiation of the guilt that hinders it from obtaining glory. And since, as stated above, the guilt of one person can be expiated
909
—although
bad.
Now
those
ment
children
who
who
are not
are not very reckoned among
are very bad, since "their punish-
very
light. "*^ Therefore the intercessory prayers of the Church avail them. is
sidered in relation either to the principal agent
On the contrary, The text (ibid.) quotes Augustine as saying^ that intercessory prayers do not avail those who have departed hence without the faith that works by love. Now the children departed thus. Therefore intercessory works do not avail them. / answer that, Unbaptized children are not detained in limbo save because they lack the state of grace. Hence, since the state of the dead cannot be changed by the works of the living, especially as regards the merit of the essential reward or punishment, the intercessions of the living cannot profit the children
or to the secondary agent. I say, then, that the
in limbo.
by the punishment which another undergoes
in
not unreasonable that one person be purified by another satisfying for him.
his stead,
it is
Reply Obj. 4. Intercession avails on two namely the action of the agent and the action done {Ex opere operante and ex opere operato). By action done I mean not only the sacrament of the Church, but the effect incidental to that action, thus from the giving of alms there follow the relief of the poor and counts,
—
their prayer to
God
manner the action
for the deceased. In like
of the agent
may
be con-
dying person, as soon as he provides for certain prayers of intercession to be offered for him, receives the full reward of those intercessions, even before they are discharged, as regards the efficacy of the intercessions that
from the action as proceeding from the But as regards the efficacy of the intercessions arising from the action done or from the action as proceeding from the secondary agent, he does not receive the fruit beresults
principal agent.
fore the intercessions are discharged.
And
if,
he happens to be released from his punishment, he will in this respect be deprived before
this,
Reply Obj.
i.
Although original
that one person can be assisted
dren in limbo are in such a state that they cannot be assisted, because after this Hfe there is no time for obtaining grace. Reply Obj. 2. Augustine is speaking of those who are not very bad, but have been baptized. This is clear from what precedes: "Since these sacrifices, whether of the altar or of any alms whatsoever, are offered for those who have been baptized," etc.
Whether Works of Intercession Heaven?
Article
fall
Profit the Saints in
—
^
Moral. XVI, 37 (PL
2
Sect. 14
3
Jonas, 3.10; III Kings 21.29;
(PG
We
20.5.
proceed thus to the Eighth Article:
Peter
^Op.
IV Kings
8.
It
would seem that in some way intercessory works profit the saints in heaven. "
75, 1144).
95, 261).
such
account, nevertheless the souls of the chil-
its
of the fruit of the intercessions,
and this will back upon those by whose fault he was then defrauded. For it is not unreasonable that a person be defrauded in temporal matters by another's fault, and the punishment of pur-
sin is
by another on
">
Lombard (QR
Cii.,
Sertn.
chap, xciii
11,
1007).
(PL
^
PL
40, 283.
40, 275).
ad Pop., serm. clxxii,
2
(PL
38, 937).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
QIO Objection
i.
the mass say:^
For the words of the
"Even
as they (that
collect in
is,
the sac-
raments) avail thy saints unto glory, so may they profit us unto healing." Now foremost
in-
Reply Obj.
i.
Such expressions do not mean
that the saints receive an increase of glory in
the sacrifice of the
themselves through our observing their feasts,
but that we profit thereby in celebrating their glory with greater solemnity. Thus, through our knowing or praising God, and through His
intercessions
all
is
in heaven.
Obj. 2. Further, The sacraments cause what they signify. Now the third part of the host, that namely which is dropped into the chalice, signifies those who lead a happy life in heaven.
Therefore Obj.
intercessions
the
profit those
who
the
Church
The own
saints rejoice in
heaven
ance. Therefore the joy of the saints in heaven increases on account of the good works of the
and consequently our works of
living,
inter-
cession also profit them.
Obj.
Further,
4.
glory thus increasing
somewhat
in
us,
there
accrues something, not to God, but to us.
Reply Obj. 2. Although the sacraments cause what they signify, they do not produce this effect in respect of everything that they signify;
are in heaven.
Further,
3.
of
goods, but also in the not only in their goods of others; hence it is written (Luke 15. 10): There is (Vu\g.,—shall be) joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing pen-
The Damascene
says (Serm.
de Dormient.y quoting the words of Chrysostom:^ "For if the heathens," he says, "bum the dead together with what has belonged to them, how much more shouldst thou, a believer, send forth a believer together with what has belonged to him, not that they also may be brought to ashes like him, but that thou may-
surround him with greater glory by so if he be a sinner who has died, that
est
by works of
tercession.
Therefore intercessions profit the saints
among altar.
are not able to be assisted
doing; and
otherwise, since they signify Christ, they would produce something in Christ (which is absurd). But they produce their effect on the recipient of the sacrament in virtue of that which is signified
by the sacrament. Thus
it
does not
fol-
low that the sacrifices offered for the faithful departed profit the saints, but that by the merits of the saints which we commemorate, or which are signified in the sacrament, they profit others for whom they are offered. Reply Obj. 3. Although the saints in heaven rejoice in all our goods, it does not follow that if our joys be increased their joy is also increased formally, but only materially, because every passion is increased formally in respect of the formal aspect of its object. Now the formal aspect of the saints' joy, no matter what they rejoice in, is God Himself, in Whom they cannot rejoice more and less, for other-
thou mayest loose him from his sins, and if he be just, that thou mayest add to his meed and reward!" And thus the same conclusion
wise their essential reward, consisting of their
follows.
joice with
On
the contrary,
As quoted
in the text (iv
d. 45),'* Augustine says:^ "It is insulting pray for a martyr in church, since we ought
Sent. to
commend ourselves to his prayers." To be assisted belongs to one who
to
Further,
in need. But the saints in heaven are without any need whatever. Therefore they are not assisted by the intercessions of the Church. / answer that, Intercession by its very na-
is
ture
implies
the
giving
of
some
assistance,
which does not apply to one who suffers no default, since no one is able to be assisted except he who is in need. Hence, as the saints in heaven are free from all need, being inebriated with the plenty of God's house (Ps. 35. 10), they
joy in God, would vary. Hence from the fact that the goods are multiplied, wherein they re-
God as the formal aspect of their does not follow that their joy is intensified, but that they rejoice in more things. Consequently it does not follow that they are assisted by our works. Reply Obj. 4. The sense is not that an in-
joy,
it
crease of
meed
or reward accrues to the saint
from the intercessions offered by a person, but that this accrues to the offerer. Or we may reply that the blessed departed
may
derive a
reward from intercessions through having, while living, provided for intercessory works to be offered for himself, and this was meritorious for him.
Article
9.
Whether the Prayers of the Church, and Alms Profit
the Sacrifice of the Altar, 1
Postcommunion, Feast 2
30).
Sect. 6
(PG
of S.
'/n Matt., hom. xxx (PG
human nature
Whether whatever
tained materially will rise again?
position at the resurrection, especially as re-
is
will rise
(2)
tained belonging to the truth of will rise again? (5)
purities,
of
human body
head
Whether
Whether the hair and nails will? (3) Whether the humours will? (4) Whether whatever the body con-
But speaking of what is fitting, it is more probable that even the parts will retain their
geneous or
this
neither rise
does not.
it
of the
the resurrection?
again in
the
form.
its artificial
returns to another part of another species,
in
integrity of the
Under
resurrection.
members
the
all
the
a particular substance, and in this
a statue
But
matter, in respect of
its
must next consider the
bodies in
(QRii, looi).
Obj.
3.
Further,
The body
may
shall rise again
be rewarded for the works which the soul did through it. Now the member of which a thief has been deprived for theft, and who has afterwards done penance and is saved, cannot be rewarded at the resurrection, neither for any good deed, since it has not co-operated in any, nor for evil deeds, since the punishment of the member would redound to the punishment of the man. Therefore the members will not all rise again wuth man. On the contrary, The other members belong more to the truth of human nature than hair and nails. Yet these will be restored to man at the resurrection according to the text (iv. Sent. d. 44).^ Much more therefore does this apply to the other members. that
»
it
Lombard (QR
11,
looi).
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART The works of God are perfect (Deut. 32. 4). But the resurrection will be the work of God. Therefore man will be remade perfect in all his members. / answer that, As stated in the book on the Soul,^ the soul stands in relation to the body Further,
form and end, but also as efficient cause. For the soul is compared to the body as art to the thing made by art, as the Philosopher says,^ and whatever is shown forth not only as
its
explicitly in the
product of art
is all
contained
and originally in the art. In like manner whatever appears in the parts of the body is all contained originally and, in a way, implicitly
Thus
implicitly in the soul.
an art would not be perfect
just as the
of
product lacked
if its
any of the things contained
work
in
the art,
so
man be perfect, unless the whole contained enfolded in the soul be out-
be
ART.
Q. 80
2
957
not with vile superfluities but with humours of an excellent kind. will
filled
Reply Obj. 3. The acts by which we merit are not the acts, properly speaking, of hand or foot but of the whole man, even as the work of art ascribed not to the instrument but to the
is
Therefore though the member which was cut off before a man's repentance craftsman.
did not co-operate with
him
in the
state in
which he merits glory, yet man himself merits that the whole man may be rewarded, who with his whole being serves God.
Article 2. Whether the Hair and Nails Will Rise Again in the Human Body?
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the hair and nails will not human
neither could
rise again in the
that
For just as hair and nails result from the surplus of food, so do urine, sweat and other superfluities or dregs. But these will
is
wardly unfolded body correspond
body, nor would the
in the
in full proportion to the soul.
Objection
Since then at the resurrection man's body m.ust
not
correspond entirely to the soul, for it will not rise again except according to the relation it
will hair
bears to the rational soul, also
must
rise
it
follows that
man
again perfect, seeing that he
is
thereby repaired in order that he may obtain his ultimate perfection. Consequently all the
members
that are
now
in
man's body must be
in the
hair
:
whole soul
in the
same way as one part is to members be considered
another.^ If then the
in the light of the first relationship, their
end
not operation, but rather the perfect being of the species, and this is also required after the resurrection; but
if
they be considered in
end
is
that
when
operation.
And
yet
it
does not follow
the operation fails the instrument
is
nails.
Further, Of
human
body.
3.
is
But hair and nails are not perfected by a sensitive soul, for we do not feel with them according to the book on the Soul."^ Therefore since the human body rises not again except because it is perfected by a rational soul, it would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again.
On
A
the contrary, It
Further, Hair and nails were given to man Now the bodies of men, especially of the elect ought to rise again with all
their
adornment. Therefore they ought to
they never proceed to action, so that the wisof God be thereby glorified. Reply Obj. 2. The entrails will rise again in the body even as the other members, and they
body.^
Aristode, II, 4 (415^7). Generation of Animals,
'
Aristotle, Soul,
11,
ii,
4 (74o*'25).
i (4i2'»23).
written (Luke 21. 18)
as an ornament.
parts of the
1
is
hair of your head shall not perish.
sary for the virtue of the soul's powers to be shown in their bodily instruments, even though
2
is perfected by a not perfected by a sensi-
tive soul.
again with the hair.
dom
less therefore will
Further, Nothing
because an instrument serves not only to accomplish the operation of the agent, but also to show its power. Hence it will be necesuseless,
Much
nails.
rational soul that
is
the Hght of the second relationship, then their
2.
and
Obj.
according to the relation of matter to form, or according to the relation of instrument to agent, since the whole body is compared to the
and
all the superfluities that are produced from food, seed comes nearest to the truth of human nature, since though superfluous it is needed. Yet seed will not rise again
restored at the resurrection.
Reply Obj. i. The members may be considered in two ways in relation to the soul either
again with the body. Neither therefore
rise
Obj.
body.
1.
The soul is work of
/ answer that.
body
as art
is
to the
body
so an animated
Now
to the art,
and
animated is
to the
as art to its instruments
body
art
is
rise
;
and
called an "organic"
employs certain instruments
for the accomplishment of the
work intended,
and these instruments belong to the primary intention of art, and it also uses other instruments for the safe-keeping of the principal in*
Aristotle,
6
Cf. Aristotle, Soul,
i,
5 (410*30). 11, i
(4i2'»28).
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
958
struments, and these belong to the secondary intention of art; thus the art of warfare employs a sword for fighting, and a sheath for the
are
safe-keeping of the sword. And so among the parts of an animated body, some are directed
not directed to the resurrection except in so far as it is perfected by the rational soul. Therefore the humours will not
to the
accomplishment of the
soul's operations,
still
in
process of generation because they
are potentially flesh and bone. Therefore they are not yet perfected
the
human body
by the rational
soul.
Now
is
for instance the heart, liver, hand, foot, while others are directed to the safe-keeping of the
rise again.
other parts as leaves to cover fruit; and thus hair and nails are in man for the protection
constitution of the
with
of other parts. Consequently, although they do not belong to the primary perfection of the
appears from the statement of Augustine (De Spir. et Anima, xv)^ that "the body consists
human body,
they belong to the secondary perwill rise again with all
and since man
fection,
the perfections of his nature,
and nails Reply Obj.
it
will rise again in
hair
follows that
him.
i. Those superfluities are voided by nature as being useful for nothing. Hence they do not belong to the perfection of the hu-
man
On
Whatever enters
the contrary,
it.
Now
of functional
human body
into the
will rise again
this applies to the
humours, as
members; the functional mem-
bers of homogeneous parts; and the homoge-
neous parts of humours." Therefore the humours will rise again in the body. Further, Our resurrection will be conformed to the resurrection of Christ.
Now
in Christ's
resurrection His blood rose again;
the wine would not
otherwise
now be changed
perfection of the individual, as hair and nails
into His blood in the Sacrament of the altar. Therefore the blood will rise again in us also, and in hke manner the other humours. I answer that. Whatever belongs to the integrity of human nature in those who take
but only for the perfection of the species.
part in the resurrection will rise again, as stated
Reply Obj. 3. Hair and nails are nourished and grow, and so it is clear that they share in some operation, which would not be possible unless they were parts in some way perfected by the soul. And since in man there is but one soul, namely the rational soul, it is clear that they are perfected by the rational soul, alof sense, as neither do bones,
above (aa. i, 2). Hence whatever humidity of the body belongs to the integrity of human nature must rise again in man. Now there is a threefold humidity in man. There is one which occurs as receding from the perfection of the individual, either because it is on the way to corruption, and is voided by nature, for instance urine, sweat, matter, and so forth, or because it is directed by nature to the preser-
tain that these will rise
vation of the species in some individual, either
not so with those superfluities which nature reserves for the production of hair and nails which she needs for the protecbody. It
is
members. Reply Obj. 2. Seed
tion of the
are,
is
not required for the
though not so far as to share in the operation
and yet it is ceragain and that they
—
—
belong to the integrity of the individual.
by the act of the generative power, as seed, or by the act of the nutritive power, as milk.
Article 3. Whether the Humours Will Rise Again in the Body?
None
We proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that the humours will not rise
the person rising again.
again in the body.
not yet reached its ultimate perfection, which nature achieves in the individual, yet it is di-
Objection i. For it is written (I Cor. 15. 50) Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom
Now
of God. fore
it
blood
not
will
will possess
rise
the
the chief humour. There-
is
again in the blessed,
who
kingdom of God, and much
less in others.
Obj.
2.
make up
Further, for waste.
Humours
Now
are intended to
after the resurrection
there will be no waste. Therefore the
not
rise
Obj.
body
will
again with humours. 3.
Further, That which
generation in the
human body
fected by the rational soul.
is is
Now
in process of
not yet perthe
humours
of these humidities will rise again, be-
cause they do not belong to the perfection of
The second kind
of humidity
is
one that has
it by nature; and this is of two kinds. For there is one kind that has a definite form and is contained among the parts of the body, for instance the blood and the other humours which nature has directed to the members that are produced or nourished from them, and yet they have certain definite forms like the other parts of the body, and consequently will rise again with the other parts of the body. But another kind of humidity is in transition from form to form, namely from the form of hu-
rected to
1
Alcher of Clairvavix (PL 40, 791).
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART mour
to the
form of member. Humidities of
because after the body will be estabhshed in its form, so that one will not pass into another. Therefore this humidity that is actually in transition from one form to another will not rise again. Now this humidity may be considered in a twofold state, either as being at the beginning of its transformation, and thus it is called ros, namely the humidity that is found in the cavities of the smaller veins, or as in the course of transformation and already beginning to undergo alteration, and thus it is called canihium; but in neither state will it rise again. The third kind of humidity is that which has already reached its ultimate perfection that nature intends in the body of the individual, and has already undergone transformation and become incorporate with the members. This is called gluten, and since it belongs to the substance of the members it will rise kind will not
this
rise again,
resurrection each part of the
—
again just as the
members
Q. 80 ART. 4 959 from God, not equally, but each one according to its mode, so too the humours are in some way perfected by the rational soul, yet not in the same measure as the more pertion
fect parts.
Article 4. Whether Whatever in the Body Belonged to the Truth of Human Nature Will Rise Again In It?
We
proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It in the body, belonging to the truth of human nature will not all
would seem that what was rise again in
it.
Objection
1.
truth of
flesh of the
nature.
is
changed into the sometimes the
Now
ox or of other animals
food. Therefore
is
taken as
whatever belonged to the
if
truth of human nature will rise again, the flesh of the ox or of other animals will also rise again,
which cannot be admitted. Obj.
2.
truth of
will.
For food
human
Further, Adam's rib belonged to the nature in him, as ours does
human
Reply Obj. i. In these words of the Apostle and blood do not denote the substance of flesh and blood but deeds of flesh and blood, which are either deeds of sin or the operations of the animal life. Or we may say with Augustine in his letter to Consentius^ that flesh and blood here signify the corruption which is now predominant in flesh and blood; hence the Apostle's words continue: Neither shall cor-
thing from different
men
to rise again. Yet it is possible for something in different men to be-
ruption possess incorrupfion.
long to the truth of
human
flesh
Reply Obj.
2.
Just as the
members
that serve
for generation will be after the resurrection for
the integrity of
human
operation accomplished the
humours be
in the
for waste, but to restore
nature, and not for the
now by them, so will body not to make up the integrity of human
nature and to show forth
But Adam's rib will rise again not in but in Eve, for otherwise Eve would not again at all since she was made from that Therefore whatever belonged in man to
in us.
Adam rise rib.
the truth of
human
nature will not
all
rise
again in him.
Obj.
a
if
3.
Further, It
man were
is
impossible for the same
nature, for instance
to partake of
would be changed into
human
flesh
which
his substance.
Therefore whatever be-
there will not rise again in man longed in him to the truth of human nature. Obj. 4. Further, If it be said that not all the flesh partaken of belongs to the truth of human
Just as the elements are in the course of generation in relation to mixed bodies,
nature, and that consequently some of it may possibly rise again in the one man and some in the other, on the contrary: That which is
because they are their matter, yet not so as to be always in transition when in the mixed body,
derived from one's parents would especially seem to belong to the truth of human nature.
mem-
Reply Obj.
its
natural power.
3.
humours
—
human
one who partook of nothing but human were to beget children, that which his child derives from him must be of the flesh of other men partaken of by his father, since the seed is from the surplus of food, as the Philosopher proves.^ Therefore what belongs to
body, just as the other parts do, although they do not reach its entire perfection, as the other parts do, and although the elements have not
the truth of human nature in that child belonged also to the truth of human nature in other men of whose flesh his father had par-
perfect forms as mixed bodies have. But as all the parts of the universe receive their perfec-
taken.
so too are the bers.
And
in relation to the
for this reason as the elements in the
parts of the universe have definite forms,
by
reason of which they, like mixed bodies, belong to the perfection of the universe, so too the
humours belong
^Epist., ccv, 2 274).
to the perfection of the
(PL
33, 943);
cf.
Enchir., xci
(PL
40,
But
if
flesh
Obj. 5. Further, If it be said that what was changed into seed was not that v/hich belonged 2
Generation of Animals,
i,
18 (726*26).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
q6o
human
nature in the flesh of but something not belonging on the conto the truth of human nature. trary: Let us suppose that some one is fed entirely on embryos in which there seems to be to the truth of
the
men
eaten,
—
ated; and that this multiplies by is
it
itself,
so that
possible for the seed of which the child
begotten to be detached from
from the parents. If then the surplus food be changed into seed, that which belonged to the and truth of human nature in the embryos
it by the beand that again the detached part multiplies in the child, so that he reaches perfect quantity by growth, and so on; and that thus was the whole human race multiplied. Therefore according to this opinion, whatever is produced by nourishment, although it seem to have the appearance of flesh and blood, does
have received a rational soul, the must belong to resurrection applies to them
not belong to the truth of human nature. Others held that something new is added to
nothing but what belongs to the truth of nature, since whatever
is
in
them
is
human derived
—
after these
the truth of
—
human And
nature in the child begotten same being
thus, since the
of that seed.
is
getter,
human nature by the natural transformation of the food into the human body if the truth of
cannot rise again in two subjects, it will be impossible for whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in both to rise again in both
we
of them.
if
Whatever belonged to the truth of human nature was perfected by the
the individual, to the preservation and perfec-
On
the contrary,
rational soul.
by the
Now
it is
through being perfected
rational soul that the
human body
is
consider the truth of
human
nature in the
species to the preservation of v/hich the act
of the generative
we
power
is
consider the truth of
tion of
directed, but that
human
nature in
which the act of the nutritive power is which is added by food belongs
directed, that
human nature of the innot primarily but secondarily. For
to the truth of the
directed to the resurrection. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature
dividual,
will rise again in
each one. Further, If anything belonging to the truth of human nature in a man be taken from his
first
body, this will not be the perfect body of a man. Now all imperfection of a man will be
mour, that namely which is begotten of the seed of which the human race was originally fashioned, and that what is changed from food into true flesh and blood does not belong prin-
removed
at the resurrection, especially in the
whom
was promised (Luke hair of their head should
they assert that the truth of human nature, and foremost, consists in the radical hu-
cipally to the truth of
human
nature in this
18)
particular individual but secondarily; and that
perish. that not a Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in a man will rise again in him. / answer that, "Everything is related to truth in the same way as to being, "^ because a thing is true when it is as it appears to him who actually knows it. For this reason Avicenna says^ that "the truth of anything is a property of the being immutably attached to it." Accordingly a thing is said to belong to the truth of human nature because it belongs prop-
nevertheless this can belong principally to the
elect, to
it
21.
erly to the being of human nature, and this is what shares the form of human nature, just as true gold is what has the true form of gold from which gold derives its proper being. In order therefore to see what it is that belongs to the truth of human nature, we must observe that there have been three opinions on that question. For some have maintained that nothing begins anew to belong to the truth of human nature, and that whatever belongs to the
truth of
human nature, all of it belonged to human nature when this was cre-
the truth of 1
Aristotle, Metaphysics,
'
Meta.,
VIII,
6 (icxira).
li, i
(993^30).
human nature in another individual begotten of the seed of the former. For
truth of
who
is
they assert that seed
is
the surplus from food,
either mingled with something belonging prin-
human nature in the besome, or without any such
cipally to the truth of getter, according to
admixture, as others maintain.
nutrimental
humour
in
And
thus the
one becomes the rad-
humour in another. The third opinion is that something new begins to belong principally to the truth of human ical
nature even in this individual, because distinction in the human body does not require that any signate material part needs to remain
whole lifetime;
any signate whereas it remains always as regards what belongs to the species in it, although as regards what is material in it, it may ebb and flow. And thus the nutrimental humour is not distinct from the radical on the part of its principle (so that throughout
part one
it
the
may
take
is
indifferent to this,
be called radical when begotten of the seed,
and nutrimental when produced by the food), but rather on the part of the term, so that
it
SUPPLEMENT TO T BIRD PART be called radical when
it
reaches the term of
generation by the act of the generative, or even nutritive power, but nutrimental
when
it
has
not yet reached this term, but is still on the way to give nourishment. These three opinions
have been more fully exposed and examined in the Second Book of the Sentences (ii. Sent. d. 30);^ therefore there is no need for repetition here, except in so far as the question at issue is
must accordingly be observed that
It
this
question requires different answers according
For the
to these opinions.
count of
its
tiplication is able to
truth
of
number
human
opinion on ac-
each
of
admit perfection of the
nature, both as regards the
of individuals
quantity
first
explanation of the process of mul-
and as regards the due
individual,
without taking
which is produced from food for this is not added except for the purpose of resisting the destruction that might result from the action of natural heat, as lead is added to silver lest it be destroyed in melting. Thereinto account that
fore since at the resurrection
must be restored
human
nature
to its perfection, nor does
the natural heat tend to destroy the natural
humour, there will be no need for anything resulting from food to rise again in man, but that alone will rise again which belonged to the truth of the
and
ual,
in
human
nature of the individ-
multiphed. is
does not belong principally to the truth of hunature to the same extent as that which
man
came
Secondly, because the addition of to the first radical humour results in the whole mixture not sharing the truth of the specific nature as perfectly as the first.
opinion, since
it
maintains that
produced from food
is
needed for the
humour
first did; and the Philosopher instances as an example^ the mixing of water with wine, which always weakens the strength of the wine, so
that in the end the wine becomes watery, so that although the second water is drawn into the species of wine, it does not share the species of wine as perfectly as the first water added to
the
Even
wine.
so
which
that
changed from food into
flesh
is secondly does not so per-
fectly attain to the species of flesh as that which was changed first, and consequently does not belong in the same degree to the truth of human
nature nor to the resurrection. Accordingly it is clear that this opinion maintains that the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature principally will rise again, but not the
whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature secondarily.
The
somewhat from the some respects agrees with it. It
third opinion differs
second and differs
The second what
and so on, as much as is required to restore is proved by two reasons. First, because that which was added was intended to restore what was wasted at first, and thus it
this reaches the aforesaid perfection
number and quantity by being detached and
961
4
quantity. This
extraneous
concerned.
ART.
Q. 80
stance of a man's body will all be restored, and of that which was added secondly, thirdly,
in
in
that
it
under the form of the truth of
maintains that whatever flesh
human
and bone
all
is
belongs to
nature, because this opin-
perfection of quantity in the individual and
ion does not distinguish as remaining in
from generation, has to admit that something of this product from food shall rise again; not all, however, but only so much as is required for
during his whole lifetime any signate matter that belongs essentially and primarily to the
for the multiplication that results
the perfect restoration of its
individuals.
was
Hence
human
nature in
all
this opinion asserts that
substance of the seed will begotten of this seed, because this belongs chiefly to the truth of human nature in him, while of that which that
all
rise
in the
again in this
man who was
afterwards he derives from nourishment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed for the perfection of his quantity, and not
all, because this does not belong to the perfection of human nature, except in so far as nature requires it for the perfection of quantity. Since
however this nutrimental humour is subject to ebb and flow the restoration will be effected in this order, that what first belonged to the sub1
Q.
II,
A. I.
man
truth of human nature, besides something ebbing and flowing, that belongs to the truth of
human
nature merely on account of the perfection of quantity, and not on account of the primary being of the species, as the second opinion asserted. But
it states that all the parts that are not beside the intention of the nature
generated belong to the truth of human nature as regards what they have of the species, since thus they remain, but not as regards what they
have of matter since thus they are indifferent to ebb and flow; so that we are to understand that the same thing happens in the parts of one man as in the whole population of a city, for each individual is cut off from the population by death, while others take their place; and so the parts of the people flow back and forth materi*
Generation and Corruption,
i,
5 (.322*31).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
962
but remain formally, since these others occupy the very same offices and positions from which the former were withdrawn, so that the commonwealth is said to remain the selfsame. In ally,
manner, while certain parts are on the ebb and others are being restored to the same shape and position, all the parts flow back and forth as to their matter, but remain as to their like
man
and nevertheless the selfsame
species;
remains.
On the other hand, the third opinion agrees with the second, because it holds that the parts which come secondly do not reach the perfection of the species so perfectly as those which come first, and consequently the third opinion same thing
asserts that the
rises again in
man
as the second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For it holds that the
whole of what
is
produced from the seed
will
not because it belongs to the truth of human nature otherwise than that which comes after, but because it shares the truth of rise again,
—
which same perfectly order the second opinion applied to those things that are produced afterwards from food, in
human nature more
which point also these two opinions agree. Reply Obj. 1. A natural thing is what it is, not from its matter but from its form; therefore, although that part of matter which at one time was under the form of bovine flesh rises again in man under the form of human flesh, it does not follow that the flesh of an ox rises again,
but the flesh of a man; otherwise
one might conclude that the clay from which
Adam's body was fashioned
The second
shall
rise
again.
opinion, however, grants this ar-
gument. Reply Obj.
2.
That
rib did
not belong to the
perfection of the individual in Adam, but was directed to the multiplication of the species.
Hence
it
will rise again
not in
Adam
but in
Eve, just as the seed will rise again, not in the begetter, but in the begotten. Reply Obj. 3. According to the first opinion it is easy to reply to this argument, because the flesh that is eaten never belonged to the truth of human nature in the eater, but it did belong to the truth of human nature in him whose flesh was eaten, and thus it will rise again in the latter but not in the former. But according to the second and third opinions, each one will rise again in that in which he approached nearest to the perfect participation of the power of the species, and
if
he approached equally in
both, he will rise again in that in which he first,
because
in that
he
first
was directed
was
to the
resurrection by union with the rational soul of that
the
man. Hence fle.sh
human nature sible for
if
there were any surplus in
eaten not belonging to the truth of it
in the first
man,
it
will
be pos-
to rise again in the second. Other-
wise what belonged to the resurrection in the first will rise
again in
ond. But in the second
him and not its
place
is
in the sec-
taken either
by something of that which was the product from other food, or if he never partook of any
human flesh, the substitution made by Divine power so far as the perfec-
other food than is
tion of quantity requires, as
does in those
it
who
die before the perfect age.
take
away from numerical
Nor does
this
identity, as neither
does the ebb and flow of parts.
Reply Obj. argument
According to the first opinion For that opinion asserts that the seed is not from the surplus food, so that the flesh eaten is not changed into the seed of which the child is begotten. But according to the other two opinions we must reply that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to be changed into seed, bethis
cause
it is
4. is
after
easily answered.
much
separation that the seed
from the food, since seed is the ultimate surplus of food. That part of the eaten flesh which is changed into seed belongs to the truth of human nature in the one born of the seed more than in the one of whose flesh the seed was the product. Hence, according to the rule already laid down (Reply 3), whatever was changed into the seed will rise again in the person born of the seed, while the remaining matter will rise again in him of whose flesh the seed was the product. Reply Obj. 5. The embryo is not concerned with the resurrection before it is animated by a rational soul, in which state much has been added to the seminal substance from the subis
distilled
stance of food, since the child the mother's
that
nourished in
man partook
the sup-
and some one were begotten of its surplus, which was in the seminal substance will
position that a that
is
womb. Consequently on
indeed
rise
of such food,
again in the one begotten of that
it contain something that would have belonged to the seminal substance in those from whose flesh being eaten the seed was produced, for this would rise again in the first but not in the second. The remainder of the eaten flesh, not being changed into seed, will clearly rise again in the first, the Divine power su[)plying deficiencies in both. The first opinion is not troubled by this objection, since it does not hold the seed to be from the surplus
seed; unless
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART food, but there are
may
as
it
Sentences
many
other reasons against
be seen in the Second Book of the Sent. d. 30).^
(ii.
Q. 80
ART.
human
lation to the
man materially belongs human nature in so far
We
proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It would seem that whatever was materially in a man's members will all rise again. Objection i. For the hair, it seems, is less concerned in the resurrection than the other members. Yet whatever was in the hair will all rise again, if not in the hair, at least in other parts of the body, as Augustine says,^ quoted in the text (iv. Sent. d. 44).^
fore whatever
bers will
Obj.
Much more
there-
in the other
mem-
was materially
all rise
by the rational soul, matter. But the human
are perfected as to species so are the parts as to
body
directed to the resurrection through
is
was
in a
consider the tothe matter that
man from
the beginning of his
The body
derives
its totality
from the same cause as it derives its divisibilBut division into parts belongs to a body in respect of matter the disposition of which is quantity in respect of which it is ity into parts.
divided. Therefore totality
is
ascribed to the
in respect of its parts of matter. If
then
the parts of matter rise not again, neither
all
will the
whole body
rise again,
which cannot
be admitted.
On
species, as the third opinion states (a. 4),
me more
opinion seems to
others. Therefore the
permanent tion.'^ If,
The
parts of matter are not
body but ebb and flow, as book on Generation and Corrup-
in the
stated in the
therefore,
again, either the
all
the parts of matter rise
body of one who
be very dense, or
will
it
will
rises again
be immoderate
in quantity.
Further, whatever belongs to the truth of nature in one man can all be a part of matter in another man, if the latter were to
human
partake of his flesh. Therefore if all the parts of matter in one man were to rise again it follows that in one man there will rise again that which belongs to the truth of human nature
which is absurd. / answer that, What is in man materially is not directed to the resurrection except in so far as it belongs to the truth of human nature, because it is in this respect that it bears a rein another,
^
Q.
II,
A. I
;
cf.
Part I,
Q.
'^City of God, xxii, 19
(PL
40, 273).
3
QR
ji^
which
probable than the
whole of what
is
in
man
will rise again, if
we speak
species which
dependent on quantity, shape,
is
of the totality of the
position and order of parts, but the whole will
not
rise
again
we speak
if
of the totahty of
matter.
The second and first opinions, however, do make this distinction, but distinguish be-
tween parts both of which have the species and matter. But these two opinions agree in that they both state that what is produced from the seed will all rise again even if we speak of tothey differ in this that opinion maintains that nothing will
first
rise again of that
which was engendered from
food, while the second holds that something,
but not
of
all,
above (a. 4). Reply Obj.
1.
Just as
body
parts of the
will
it
jooi.
all
again,
that
is
i.
41, 780); Enchir. 4
Aristotle,
i,
lxxxix
5 (321^24).
as
stated
in the other
we speak
of the totality of the species, but not if we speak of material totality, so is it with the hair. In the other parts something accrues from nourishment which causes growth, and this is accountif
we speak
of totality of
occupies another place and position in the body, and is under other parts of dimension, and there accrues something which does not cause growth, but serves to make up species, since
it
by nourishing; and this is not accounted as another part of the whole considered in relation to the species, since it does not occupy another place or position in the body than that which was occupied by the part that has passed away, although it may be accounted another part if we consider the totahty of matfor waste
The same
applies to the hair. Augustine, speaking of the cutting of hair that was a part causing growth of the body; thereter.
however,
is
must
not however as regards it should be immoderate, but it will rise again in other parts as deemed expedient by Divine providence. Or else he refers to the case when something will fore
it
rise again,
the quantity of hair, lest
be lacking to the other parts, for then
cxix, a.
(PL
rise
will rise again, if
ed as another part,
the contrary,
life to
the end would surpass the quantity due to his
tality of matter, while
body
indeed to the truth of as it has something of all
the
Further,
is in
we
not only the parts of species but also the parts of matter will all rise again. 3.
that
all, if
being perfected by a rational soul. Therefore
Obj.
all
not
again.
Further, Just as the parts of the flesh
2.
tality of
Now
matter; because
the species, but not
Article 5. Whether Whatever Was Materially in a Man's Members Will All Rise Again?
963
5
souls.
it
will
be
possible for this to be supphed from the surplus of hair.
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
964
Reply Obj.
According to the third opinion
2.
parts of species arc the
same
for the Philosopher does not
as parts of matter,
make
this distinc-
tion^ in order to distinguish different parts, but in order to
show that the same parts may be
considered both in respect of species, as to
what belongs to the form and species in them, and in respect of matter, as to that which is under the form and species. Now it is clear that the matter of the flesh has no relation to the rational soul except in so far as
it is
under
such a form, and consequently by reason of
it
directed to the resurrection. But the first and second opinions which draw a distinction between parts of species and parts of matter it is
say that although the rational soul perfects both parts, it does not perfect parts of matter except by means of the parts of species, and so they are not equally directed to the resur-
Reply Obj.
3.
In the matter of things suband corruption it is neces-
ject to generation
sary to presuppose indefinite dimensions before the reception of the substantial form.
Consequently division which is made according to these dimensions belongs properly to matter. But complete and definite quantity comes to matter after the substantial form that
is
made
;
therefore di-
reference to definite
in
quantity regards the species especially when definite position of parts belongs to the essence of the species, as in the
human
body.
rise
AGAIN {In Four Articles)
We must rise
now
again.
consider the quahty of those
Under
points of inquiry:
who
this
head there are four
(i
Whether
)
all
will
rise
again in the youthful age? (2) Whether they will be of equal stature? (3) Whether all will
be of the same sex? (4) Whether they will again to the animal life?
Article of the
We
i.
Whether
All Will Rise
rise
Again
Same Age? proceed thus to the First Article: It
would seem that all will not rise again of the same, namely the youthful age. Objection i. Because God will take nothing pertaining to man's perfection from those who rise again, especially from the blessed. Now age pertains to the perfection of man, since old *
Generation and Corruption,
i,
5 (32i*'24).
demands reverence. There-
Obj.
Age
Further,
2.
reckoned according
is
to the length of past time.
Now
it is
impossible
have passed. Therefore it is impossible for those v/ho were of greater age to be brought back to a youthful age. Obj. 3. Further, That which belonged most to the truth of human nature in each individfor past time not to
Now
ual will especially rise again in him.
sooner a thing was in
man
the
the
more would
it
have belonged to the truth of human nature, because in the end, through the strength of the species being weakened the human body is likened to watery wine according to the Philosopher.2 Therefore if all are to rise again of
seem
to
same
the rise
age,
more
it is
fitting that
they should
again in the age of childhood.
On
is written (Eph. 4. 13) unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ. Now Christ rose again of youthful age, which begins about the age of thirty years, as Augustine says.^ Therefore others also will rise again of a youthful age.
the contrary, It
we
all
Further,
meet
Man
.
.
.
will rise again at the
fect stage of nature.
Now human
most per-
nature
is
at
the most perfect stage in the age of youth.
Therefore all will I answer that,
rise
Man
again of that age. will rise again
without
any defect of human nature, because as God founded human nature without a defect, even so will
QUESTION LXXXI Of the quality of those who
the age that
is
fore the old will not rise again of a youthful age.
Until
rection.
vision
age
He
restore
it
without defect.
Now human
nature has a twofold defect. First, because it has not yet attained to its ultimate perfection. Secondly, because it has already gone back from its ultimate perfection. The first defect is found in children, the second in the aged, and consequently in each of these human nature will be brought by the resurrection to the state of its ultimate perfection which is in the youthful age, at which the movement of growth terminates, and from which the movement of decrease begins.
Reply Obj. i. Old age calls for reverence not on account of the state of the body which is at fault, but on account of the soul's wisdom which is taken for granted on account of its being advanced in years. Therefore in the elect there will remain the reverence due to old age on account of the fulness of Divine wisdom which will be in them, but the defect of old age will not be in them. Reply Obj. 2. We speak of age not as re1, 10(328*26). City oj God, XXII, 15 (PL 41. 777).
*/6ui., »
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART gards the number of years, but as regards the state which the human body acquires from
Hence Adam
and
Q. 8i
2
965
matter from which
to the
Now
ART.
it
is
namely the Divine, power and all the ashes from
the self-same,
have been formed in the youthful age on account of the particular condition of body which he had at the first day of his formation. Thus the argument is not to
power. Therefore the resurrection of
the point.
will bring
years.
Reply Ohj.
3.
is
The
said to
strength of the species
more perfect
said to be
young man, nourishment
in a child
is
than in a
as regards the ability to transform in a certain
way, even as
it is
more
perfect in the seed than in the mature man.
In youth, however,
it is
more perfect
as regards
restored.
will restore all bodies,
which the humian bodies
will be restored are equally disposed to receive the action of that
them
same conclusion
the
On
the
all
men
same quantity, and
to the
so
follows.
Natural quantity results Now the nature of the individual will not be altered at the resurrection. Therefore neither will its natural contrary,
from each individual's nature.
quantity. But
all
are not of the
same natural
the term of completion. Therefore that which
quantity. Therefore
belonged principally to the truth of human nature will be brought to that perfection which it has in the age of youth, and not to that perfection which it has in the age of a child, wherein the humours have not yet reached their ul-
the
by resurrection
timate disposition.
Neither therefore will there be the same quanti-
same
all
will
not
rise
again of
stature.
Further,
Human
nature will not be restored
to glory or to punishment.
there will not be the or punishment
in
all
same quantity those
who
But
of glory
rise
again.
ty of stature.
Article
2.
Whether All Will Rise Again
Same
of the
We
Stature?
proceed thus to the Second Article: It
would seem that
all will rise
again of the
same
stature.
Objection i. For just as man is measured by dimensive quantity, so is he by the quantity of time. Now the quantity of time will be re-
duced to the same measure
in
all,
since all
same age. Therefore the dimensive quantity will also be reduced to the
will rise again of the
same measure in all, of the same stature. Obj.
2.
Further,
so that
all will rise
The Philosopher
again
says^ that
same nature have a certain and measure of size and growth." Now this limitation can only arise by virtue of the form, with which the quantity as well as all
/ answer that, At the resurrection human nature will be restored not only in the selfsame species but also in the selfsame individual, and consequently we must observe in the resurrection what is requisite not only to the specific but also to the individual nature. Now the specific nature has a certain quantity which it
neither exceeds nor fails without error, and
yet this quantity has certain degrees of latitude and is not to be attached to one fixed measure;
and each individual
some degree
at
in the
human
species aims
of quantity befitting his indi-
vidual nature within the bounds of that latitude, and reaches it at the end of his growth, if there
"all things of the
has been no error in the working of nature, re-
limit
sulting in the addition of something to or the subtraction of something from the aforesaid quantity, the measure of which is gauged ac-
the other accidents ought to agree. Therefore
men have
same specific form, there should be the same measure of quantity the
cording to the proportion of heat as expanding,
be of a quantity proportionate to the natural power which first
and of humidity as expansive, in point of which all are not of the same power. Therefore all will not rise of the same quantity, but each one will rise again of that quantity which would have been his at the end of his growth if nature had not erred or failed, and the Divine power will subtract or supply what was excessive or lacking in man. Reply Obj. i. It has already been explained
formed his body, for otherwise those who could not be brought to a greater quantity by the
of the
since
all
in respect of
occur.
matter in
at the resurrection.
of the
same
Obj.
man
all,
unless an error should
But the error of nature
3.
Therefore
will
be set right
all will rise
again
stature.
Further, It will be impossible for
in rising again to
power
of nature will never rise again of a greater
quantity, which
is
false.
Therefore that quantity
must be proportionate to the power which will restore the human body by the resurrection, 1
Soul,
II,
4 (4i6»i6).
Reply 2) that all are said to rise again age, not as though the same length of time were befitting to each one, but because (a.
I,
same
the same state of perfection will be in
which state
is
all,
indifferent to a great or small
quantity.
Reply Obj.
2.
The quantity
of a particular
SUMMA THRO LOGICA
966
individual corresponds not only to the form
/ answer that, Just as, considering the nature
of the species, but also to the nature or matter
of the individual, a different quantity
of the individual; therefore the conclusion does
to different
not follow. Reply Obj.
of the individual, a different sex
The quantity
3.
of those
who
will
be raised from the dead is not proportionate to the restoring power, because the latter does not belong to the power of the body, nor to
—
the ashes, as to the state in which they are before the resurrection, but to nature which the individual had at first. Nevertheless if the
—
men, so
also, considering the
due
due to
dif-
same diversity
ferent men. Moreover, this
becoming
is
is
nature is
to the perfection of the species, the
which are filled by this very and quantity. Therefore just
different degrees of
difference of sex
men
as
will
will rise again of various stature, so
they
And though
again of different sex.
rise
there be difference of sex there will be no
shame
formative power on account of some defect was unable to effect the due quantity that is befitting to the species, the Divine power will supply
in seeing
the defect at the resurrection, as in dwarfs, and in like manner in those who by immoderate
Reply Obj. 1. When it is said that we shall meet Christ unto a perfect man, this refers not to the male sex but to the strength of soul which will be in all, both men and women. Reply Obj. 2. Woman is subject to man on
have exceeded the due bounds of nature.
size
3. Whether Male Sex?
Article the
We
All Will Rise
Again of
proceed thus to the Third Article:
would seem that
all will rise
It
again of the male
sex.
Objection that etc.
1.
For
it
is
written (Eph.
4.
13)
meet unto a perfect man, Therefore there will be none but the
we
male
shall
all
all
account of the frailty of nature, as regards both vigour of soul and strength of body. After the resurrection, however, the difference in those points will be not on account of the difference of sex, but by reason of the difference of merits. Hence the conclusion does not follow. Reply Obj. 3. Although the begetting of a
woman
sex.
Obj.
one another, since there will be no lust to invite them to shameful deeds which are the cause of shame.
Further, In the world to
2.
come
"all
nature,
beside the intention of a particular
is
in the intention of universal nature,
it is
pre-eminence will cease," as a gloss observes^ on I Cor. 15. 24. Now woman is subject to man in the natural order. Therefore women will rise again not in the female but in the
which requires both sexes for the perfection of the human species. Nor will any defect result from sex as stated above (Reply 2).
male
Article 4. Whether All Will Rise Again Animal Life?
sex.
Obj.
Further, That which
3.
is
produced
in-
cidentally and beside the intention of nature will
not rise again, since
moved
at
the resurrection.
We
would seem that they
Now
animal
the female
is produced beside the intention of nature, through a fault in the formative power of the seed, which is unable to bring the matter of the fetus to the male form; therefore the Philosopher says^ that the female is "a misbegotten male." Therefore the female sex will not rise
make
again.
men
sex
On wiser,
the contrary, Augustine says:^ it
seems,
who doubt not
"Those are
that both sexes
will rise again."
Further, At the resurrection
God
will restore
He made him at the creation. Now He made woman from the man's rib (Gen. 2. 22). Therefore He will also restore the female
man
to
what
sex at the resurrection. ^
(vi, 2 3
proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It
error will be re-
all
Glossa Lombardi (PL igi, 1679); cf. Glossa ordin. s8B); Augustine, qq. lxxxiii, qu. 69 (PL 40, 76). Generation oj Animals, 11, 3 (7.^7''24). City oj God, xxii, 17 (PL 41, 778).
to
life,
will
again to the
rise
or in other words that they will
use of the acts of the nutritive and gen-
erative powers.
Objection i. For our resurrection will be conformed to Christ's. But Christ is said to have eaten after His resurrection (John 21.;
Luke
24).
Therefore,
will eat,
Obj.
and
Further,
2.
after
in like
The
resurrection
the
manner
beget.
distinction of sexes
is
manner the instruments which serve the nutritive power
directed to generation are directed to eating.
;
and
in like
Now man
will rise again
Therefore he will e.xercise the acts of the generative and nutritive powers. Obj. 3. Further, The whole man will be beatified both in soul and in body. Now beatitude or happiness, according to the Philosopher,* consists in a perfect operation. Therefore it must be that all the powers of the soul and all with
*
all
Ethics,
these.
I,
7 (logS'^is);
I,
13 (iio2"5); x, 7 (1177*12).
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART members have
the
the resurrection.
their respective acts after
And
same conclusion
so the
4. Further, After the resurrection there be perfect joy in the blessed. Now such a joy includes all pleasures, since happiness is a state rendered perfect by the accumulation of
Obj.
will
goods, and the perfect
nothing. Since then there
that which lacks
is is
much
pleasure in
the act of the generative and nutritive powers
would seem that such acts belonging to animal life will be in the blessed, and much more in others, who will have less spiritual bodies. it
On 30)
the contrary, It
is
written (Matt. 22.
In the resurrection they shall neither
:
marry nor be married. is
directed to
supply
defect resulting from death, and to the
human race, and make up for waste, and
multipHcation of the is
directed to
eating to in-
crease quantity. But in the state of the resurrection the
number
human
of
be evident to
will
it
Hence
all.
Christ
is
said
have eaten by dispensation in the sense in which lawyers say that "a dispensation is a relaxation of the general law"^ because Christ made an exception to that which is common to those who rise again (namely not to partake of food) for the aforesaid motive. Hence the argument does not prove. Reply Obj. 2. The distinction of sexes and the difference of members W\\\ be for the
human
nature
in the individual.
Hence
restoration of the perfection of
both
and
in the species
does not follow that they are without purpose, although they lack their animal operait
tions.
Further, Generation the
967
4
to
follows as above.
all
ART.
Q. 8i
of such proof at the general resurrection, since
race will already have the
individuals
preordained by God,
since generation will continue
up
to that point.
In like manner each man will rise again in due quantity; neither will death be any more, nor any waste affect the parts of man. Therefore the acts of the generative and nutritive powers would be void of purpose. / answer that. The resurrection will not be necessary to man on account of his primary perfection, which consists in the integrity of
Reply Obj. 3. These operations do not belong man as man, as also the Philosopher states,^ and so the happiness of the human body does not consist in them. But the human body will be glorified by an overflow from the reason whereby man is man, in so far as the body to
be subject to reason.
will
Reply Obj.
4. As the Philosopher says""^ the pleasures of the body are medicinal, because
man
they are applied to
for the removal of
weariness; or again, they are unhealthy, in so far as man indulges in those pleasures inordinately, as though they as a
man whose
were
taste
is
real pleasures, just
vitiated delights in
things which are not delightful to the healthy.
Consequently
it
does not follow that such pleas-
those things that belong to his nature, since
ures as these belong to the perfection of hap-
man
piness, as the Jews'*
life
can attain to this in his present state of
by the action of natural causes; but the
certain
and Turks^ maintain, and
known
heretics
as
the
Chihasts
as-
necessity of the resurrection regards the attain-
serted;^ who, moreover, according to the Phi-
ment
losopher's teaching,^
of his ultimate perfection, Vv^hich consists
in his reaching his ultimate end.
Consequently
those natural operations which are directed to
cause or preserve the primary perfection of nature will not be in the resurrection;
human
such are the actions of the animal
life in
man,
would seem to have an unhealthy appetite, since according to him none but spiritual pleasures are pleasures absolutely, and to be sought for their own sake. Therefore these alone are requisite for Happiness.
the action of the elements on one another, and the
movement
of the heavens;
therefore
these will cease at the resurrection.
And
all
since
1
being directed to the primary perfection of nature, it follows that they will not be in the resurrection.
Reply Obj. i. When Christ partook of that meal. His eating was an act, not of necessity as though human nature needed food after the resurrection,
but
of
power,
so
as
to
prove
that He had resumed the true human nature which He had in that state wherein He ate and drank with His disciples. There will be no need
Raymond ;
of Pennafort, Summa, Bk. in, tit. 29, Glossa ordin. in Decretum, Pt. 11, causa i,
Q. 7, can. 5, Requisitis
(i,
563®').
2£/Aic5,x, 7(1177^26).
to eat, drink, sleep, beget, pertain to the animal life,
Cf.
sect. 2 (346^)
^Ibid., VII, 14 (1154^26); X, 5 (ii7s*'i6). 4 Cf. UJE, art. "Future Life" (iv, 484); TJE, art. "Paradise" (ix, 515), where the texts from the Rabbinical Scriptures are cited.
Koran, chap. 36 (SL 364) chap. 44 (SL 404). especially Cerinthus; see Caius Ro manus, Disputatio adv. Proclum, in Eusebius, Hisi. Eccl 6
Cf. the
6
Or Millenarians;
;
(PG
PG
cf. 10, 25); Epiphanius, Adv. haeres. 77, n. 36 (PG 42, 696); Au gustine. City oj God, xx, 7 (PL 41, 667), De Haeres., chap, III,
28
20,
Baercs., Bk.
8
(PL
42,
27);
Millenarisme
273;
ill, t. ii,
cf.
DTC,
art.
Cerinthe
(11,
(x, 1761).
''Ethics, VII, 14 (1154^20); x, 5 (1176*10).
2154); art,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
;68
Obj.
QUESTION LXXXII after their resurrection {hi Four Articles)
must now consider the conditions under rise again, and (i) the im-
which the blessed
passibility of their bodies;
(2) their subtlety
(q. lxxxiii); (3) their agility (q. lxxxw) (4) their clarity (q. lxxxv). Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i)
were
On
i. Whether the Bodies of the Saints Be Impassible After the Resurrection?
proceed thus to the First Article: It seems that the bodies of the saints will not be
But man, after the resurrection, is
is
pas-
will
be
the defini-
never be dissociated from him. Therefore the body will be passible. Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is in potency to the form of another thing is passible in relation
tion of
man, which
would seem that suffer,
if
we
their per-
grant
their
the contrary, Everything passible
is
cor-
be impassible.
The stronger is not passive to the weaker. But no body will be stronger than the bodies of the saints, of which it is written (I Cor. 15. 43) /^ w sown in weakness, it shall Further,
:
We
impassible after the resurrection. Objection i. For everything mortal
not
Now the bodies of the saints be incorruptible after the resurrection, according to I Cor. 15. 42, It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption. Therefore they
will
Article
will
loss of substance.
equally impassible? (3) Whether this impassibility renders the glorious bodies insensible? (4) Whether in them all the senses are in act?
a mortal rational animal, for such
more incon-
ruptible, because increase of passion results in
will
sible.
is
bodies to be passible.
Whether
at the resurrection the saints will rise again im.passible in body? (2) Whether all will be
in Christ, it
fections
;
Will
Further, Actual defect
than potential defect. But passibility denotes merely potential defect. Since then there will be certain actual defects in the bodies of the blessed, such as the scars of the wounds in the martyrs, even as they
Of the condition of the blessed
We
5.
sistent with perfection
will
something else; for this is what is meant by being passive to another thing.' Now the bodies of the saints will be in potency to the to
form of another thing after the resurrection, it is under one form, does not lose its potency to another form. But since matter, according as
power. Therefore they will be impassible. / answer that, We speak of a thing being passive in two ways. First in a broad sense, and
rise in
thus every reception
is
called a passion,
whether
the thing received be fitting to the receiver
and perfect
The sible
or contrary to
it,
it
and corrupt
it.
glorious bodies are not said to be impas-
by the removal of
this
kind of passion,
since nothing pertaining to perfection
is
to
be
removed from them. In another way we use the word passive properly, and thus Damascene defines passion {De Fide Orthod. ii, 22)^ as being "a movement contrary to nature." Hence an immoderate movement of the heart is called its passion, but a moderate movement is called its
operation.
The reason of this is that whatis drawn to the bounds of the
the bodies of the saints after the resurrection will have matter in common with the elements,
ever
because they will be restored out of the same matter of which they are now composed. Therefore they will be in potency to another form, and thus will be passible. Obj. 3. Further, According to the Philoso-
to itself, so that, therefore, the patient as such
have a natural inclination to be active and passive towards one another. Now the bodies of the saints will be composed of contraries after the resurrection, even as now. Therefore they will be passible.
urrection. Therefore they are said to be im-
pher,^ contraries
Obj.
4.
Further,
In
the
blood and humours will
above
(q.
lxxx,
a. 3).
(324''2).
it
to passion in the bodies of the saints after res-
passible.
The reason however
of this impassibility
assigned differently by different persons. ascribe
it
to
the
is
Some
condition of the elements,
as to substance, yet that they will be deprived
saints will be passible after the resurrection. Aristotle, Getieration
drawn beyond its own bounds within which was confined. Accordingly taking passion in its proper sense there will be no potentiality
is
as stated
of the humours. Therefore the bodies of the
'
agent, since the agent assimilates the patient
sickness and such
the
passions arise in the body through the antipathy
2/WJ.
patient
which will be different then from what it is now. For they say that the elements will remain then,
human body
rise again,
Now,
is
and Corruption,
i,
7 (323^29).
and passive quahties. But this does not seem to be true, because the active and passive qualities belong to the perfection of the elements, so that if the elements were of their active
»PG94,94i.
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART
Q. 82
ART.
969
i
them in the body of the man they would be less perfect than
of His glory, according to the operation whereby also He is able to subdue all things unto
now. Moreover since these quaHties are the proper accidents of the elements, being caused by their form and matter, it would seem most absurd for the cause to remain and the effect to be removed. Therefore others say that the qualities will remain, but deprived of their proper activities, the Divine power so doing for the preservation of the human body. This however would seem to be untenable, since the action and passion of the active and passive qualities is necessary for the mixture (of the elements), and according as one or the other preponderates the mixed (bodies) differ in their respective temperaments, and this must apply to the bodies of
(Phil. 3. 21). And again, a heavenly nature cannot exercise such power over the human body as to take from it its elemental nature which is passible by reason of its essen-
restored without that rises again,
those
who
rise again, for
they will contain flesh
and bones and like parts, all of which demand temperaments. Moreover, according to
different this,
impassibihty could not be one of their
would not imply a disposition merely an external preventive to passion, namely the power of God, which might produce the same effect in a human body even in this state of life. Consequently others say that in the body itself there will be something preventing the passion of a glorified body, namely the nature of a fifth^ or heavenly body, which they maingifts,
because
it
in the impassible substance, but
tain enters into the composition of a
human
body, to the effect of blending the elements together in harmony so as to be fitting matter for the rational soul; but that in this state of Hfe, on account of the preponderance of the elemental nature, the human body is passible like other elements, whereas in the resurrection the nature of the fifth body will predominate,
human body
will be made impasheavenly body. But this cannot stand, because the fifth body does not enter materially into the composition of a human body, as was proved above.^ Moreover it is absurd to say that a natural power, such as the power of a heavenly body, should endow the human body with a property of glory, such as the impassibihty of a glorified body, since the Apostle ascribes to Christ's power the transformation of the human body, because such as is the heavenly, such also are they that are heavenly (I Cor. 15. 48), and He will reform
so that the
sible in likeness to the
body of our lowness, made like to the body The other four being the elements. This fifth element was known to the peripatetic philosophers as the quinthe 1
which they held heavenly bodies to be formed. Thomas, In Sent., dist. xvii, q. 3, a. i; of. Part. I,
tessence, of 2
St.
Q. xci, A. I,
Reply
2.
Himself
tial constituents.
Consequently we must say otherwise that passion results from the agent overcoming the patient, for otherwise it would not draw it to its own bounds. Now it is impossible for all
agent to overcome patient except through the weakening of the hold which the form of the patient has over
passion which
is
its
matter,
if
we speak
against nature, for
passion in this sense that
we
of the is
it
are speaking
of
now
for matter traries,
is not subject to one of two conexcept through the cessation or at least
the lessening of the hold which the other conit. Now the human body and all that it contains will be perfectly subject to the trary has on
rational soul, even as the soul will be perfectly
subject to God. Therefore for the glorified
body
it will
be impossible
to be subject
to
any
change contrary to the disposition whereby it is perfected by the soul. And consequently those bodies will be impassible. Reply Obj. i. According to Anselm {Cur Deus Homo, ii, ii),^ "mortal is included in the philosophers' definition of man, because they did not believe that the whole man could be
ever immortal," for they had no experience of rnan otherwise than in this state of mortahty.
Or we may say
that since, according to the Phi-
losopher,'' essential differences are us,
we sometimes employ
in order to
to
signify essential differences
which the accidental differences "mortal"
unknown
accidental differences
result.
from Hence
put in the definition of man, not mortahty were essential to man, but because that which causes passibility and mortahty in the present state of hfe, namely composition of contraries, is essential to man, but it will not cause it then, on account of the triumph of the soul over the body. Reply Obj. 2. Potency is twofold, tied {ligata) and free; and this is true not only of active but also of passive potency. For the form ties the potency of matter, by determining it to one thing, and it is thus that it overcomes it. And since in corruptible things form does not perfectly overcome matter, it cannot tie it completely so as to prevent it from someis
as though
times receiving a disposition contrary to the 3
PL
*
Metaphysics,
158, 411. vii, 12
(1038*13).
SUM MA THEOLOGICA
P70 form through some passion. But
in the saints
have complete dominion over the body, and it will be after the resurrection, the soul will
altogether impossible for
minion, because
it
it
do-
this
lose
to
be immutably subject to
will
God, which was not the case
in the state of
innocence. Consequently those bodies will retain substantially the same potency as they
have now to another form; yet that potentiality will remain tied by the triumph of the soul over the body, so that it will never be realized by actual passion.
Reply Obj.
3.
The elemental
qualities are the
instruments of the soul, as stated in the book on the Soul,'^ for the heat of fire in an animal's body is directed in the act of nutrition by the soul's
power.
When, however,
principal
the
but more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty though in the body, yet not of the body but of virtue." Nevertheless those martyrs who have been maimed and deprived of their limbs will not be without those limbs in the resurrection of the dead, for to
(Luke
said
21. 18):
A
them
it is
hair oj your head shall
not perish.
Article
Whether
2.
Be Equally
All Will
Impassible?
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that all will be equally impassible. Objection 1. For a gloss on I Cor. 15. 42, It is sown in corruption, says that all have equal immunity from suffering.^ Now the gift of impassibility consists in immunity from
no defect in the instrument, no action proceeds from the instrument except in accordance with the disposition of the principal agent. Consequently
suffering.
in the bodies of the saints after the resurrection,
tion or privation of passibility. Therefore
no action or passion will result from the elemental qualities that is contrary to the disposition of the soul which has the preservation of the body in view. Reply Obj. 4. According to Augustine {Ep. ad Consent, ccv, i)^ "the Divine power is able to remove whatever qualities He will from this visible and tangible body, other quahties remaining." Hence even as in a certain respect
cannot be greater in one subject than in another. Obj. 3. Further, A thing is more white if it have less admixture of black. But there will be no admixture of passibility in any of the saints' bodies. Therefore they will all be equally
greater in merit than others. Therefore, since
He
deprived the flames of the Chaldees' furnace power to burn, since the bodies of the children were preserved without hurt, while in
impassibility
of the
greater in
another respect that power remained,
gift of clarity.
agent
is
perfect,
those flames
remove
and there
is
since
consumed the wood, so will He from the humours while
passibility
leaving their nature unchanged.
It
this is
scars of
wounds
brought
Reply Obj.
5.
The
will
not
be in the saints, nor were they in Christ, in so far as they imply a defect, but as signs of the
most steadfast virtue whereby the saints suffered for the sake of justice and faith, so that this will increase their own and others' joy.^
Hence Augustine
says:*
"We
feel
an unde-
scribable love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire to see in that
Christ's
be equally impas-
all will
Further, Negations are not subject
2.
more
or less.
Now
impassibility
is
a negait
impassible.
On
the contrary,
tionate to merit.
is
Reward should be propor-
Now some
a reward,
some than
in
all,
would seem
it
to be
in others.
Further, Impassibility
Now
of the saints were
is
divided against the
the latter will not be equal
according to I Cor.
15.
41. Therefore
neither will impassibility be equal in / answer that, Impassibility
ered in two ways, either in
all.
may be
itself,
consid-
or in respect
its cause. If it be considered in itself, since denotes a mere negation or privation, it is not subject to be more or less, but will be equal in all the blessed. On the other hand, if
of
about.
wounds
Obj. to be
has been
how
explained in the Article
Therefore
sible.
kingdom the
their bodies,
in
scars of the
which they bore for
name. Perhaps indeed we
them, for
this will
not
make them
shall
less
see
comely
it
we
it in relation to its cause, thus it be greater in one person than in another. Now its cause is the dominion of the soul over the body, and this dominion is caused by the soul's unchangeable enjoyment of God. Consequently in one who enjoys God more perfect-
consider
will
there
ly,
is
a greater cause of impassibility.
Reply Obj.
i.
This gloss
passibility in itself
is
and not
speaking of im-
in relation to its
cause. 4(41 s^'iS).
1
Aristotle,
2
PL ,v^,
'
Cf. Part III, Q. Liv, A. 4, Reply 3.
i5/. 3
(PL22, 1047).
History oj Animals,
vii, 1 (581^20).
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
1056
since the barren were accursed. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity. Obj. 4. Further, The same reward is not due to virginity observed, and virginity lost. Yet an aureole is sometimes due to lost virginity; for instance if a maiden is violated unwillingly at the order of a tyrant for confessing Christ.
Therefore an aureole Obj.
Further,
5.
A
is
not due to virginity. reward is not due
special
which is in us by nature. But virginity inborn in every man both good and wicked. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity. Obj. 6. Further, As widowhood is to the to that
is
sixtyfold fruit, so fold fruit,
and
virginity to the hundred-
is
Now
to the aureole.
the sixty-
which it is due. For some say that the aureole is due to the act. So that she who actually remains a virgin will have the aureole provided she be of the number of the saved. But this would seem unreasonable, because in this case those who have the will to marry and nevertheless die before marrying would have the aureole. Hence others hold that the aureole is due to the state and as to the kind of virginity to
not to the act, so that those virgins alone merit the aureole who by vow have placed themselves in the state of observing perpetual virginity.
But
this also
seems unreasonable, because
possible to have the
it is
same intention of observ-
vow as with a vow. be said otherwise that merit is
ing virginity without a
may
not due to every widow, but only, as some say, to one who vows to remain a widow. Therefore it would seem that neither is the aureole due to any kind of virginity, but
Hence
only to that which is observed by vow. Obj. 7. Further, Reward is not given to that which is done of necessity, since all merit de-
mind and body is an object of choice, as appears from what has been said above. ^ Conse-
pends on the will. But some are virgins of necessity, such as those who are naturally coldblooded, and eunuchs. Therefore an aureole is not always due to virginity. On the contrary, A gloss on Exod. 25. 25: Thou shalt also make a little golden crown (coronam aiireolam) says.^ "This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins sing in the presence of the Lamb, those, namely, who follow the Lamb wherever He goes." Therefore the reward due to virginity is called an
who had
aureole.
sense for any joy added to the essential joy of heaven, the aureole will be applicable even to
fold fruit
is
Further, It is written (Isa. 56. 4) Thus saith the Lord to the eunuchs; and the text continues .a name better {verse 5) / will give to them :
.
:
.
than sons and daughters; and a gloss says:^ "This refers to their peculiar and transcendent glory." Now the eunuchs who have made them-
it
due to every virtuous act commanded by charity. Now virginity comes under the genus of virtue in so far as perpetual incorruption of
quently the aureole
is
due to those virgins alone
the purpose of observing perpetual
virginity, whether or no they have confirmed this purpose by vow, and this I say with reference
—
to the aureole in its proper signification of a
—
reward due to merit, although this purpose at some time have been interrupted, integrity of the flesh remaining nevertheless, provided it be found at the end of life, because virginity of the mind may be restored, although
may
virginity of the flesh cannot.
however, we take the aureole in
If
who
those
its
broad
are incorrupt in flesh, although they
had not the purpose of observing perpetual virginity. For without doubt they will rejoice in
selves
the incorruption of their body, even as the innocent will rejoice in having been free from sin, although they had no opportunity of sin-
(Matt.
ning, as in the case of baptized children.
eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven 19. 12) denote virgins. Therefore it would seem that some special reward is due to virginity, and this is called the aureole. / answer that, Where there is a notable kind of victory, a special crown is due. Therefore since by virginity a person wins a signal victory over the flesh, against which a continuous battle is waged: The flesh lusteth against the spirit, etc. (Gal. 5. 17), a special crown called the aureole is due to virginity. This indeed is the common opinion of all; but all are not agreed *
Glossa ordin.
91,410). ' Glossa 40, 409).
(i,
178B); Bede,
interl. (iv, g^r)
;
De
Tabernaculo,
Augustine, De Virgin.,
i,
6
(PL
xxv (PL
But
not the proper meaning of an aureole, although it is very commonly taken in this this is
sense.
Reply Obj.
i.
In some respects virgins ex-
perience a greater conflict in remaining conti-
nent and in other respects, widows, other things being equal. For virgins are inflamed by con;
cupiscence, and by the desire of experience, which arises from a certain curiosity as it were, which makes man more willing to see what he has never seen. Sometimes, moreover, this concupiscence is increased by their esteeming the pleasure to be greater that it is in reality, and 3
In
Sent., iv, d. 33, Q. 3, aa.
i, 2.
;
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART by
their failing to consider the grievances at-
taching to this pleasure. In these respects widows experience the lesser conflict, yet theirs is the greater conflict by reason of their recollection of the pleasure. Moreover, in different subjects
one motive
is
stronger than another according
to the various conditions
subject, because
one,
and others
we may say tain,
and dispositions of the
some are more susceptible to However, whatever
to another.
of the degree of conflict, this
—that the
is
cer-
more perfect the most perfect and most
virgin's victory
than the widow's, for kind of victory
brilliant
is
is
never to have yield-
ed to the foe; and the crown is due, not to the battle but to the victory gained by the battle. Reply Obj. 2. There are two opinions about this. For some say that the Blessed Virgin has not an aureole in reward of her virginity, if we take aureole in the proper sense as referring to a conflict, but that she has something
more
than an aureole, on account of her most perfect purpose of observing virginity. Others say that she has an aureole even in its proper significa-
and that a most transcendent one, for though she experienced no conflict, she had a certain conflict of the flesh, but owing to the tion,
exceeding strength of her virtue, her flesh was so subdued that she did not feel this conflict.
This, however,
would seem
reason, for since
we
to be said without
believe the Blessed Virgin
have been altogether immune from the infomes on account of the perfection of her sanctification, it is wicked to suppose that there was in her any conflict with the flesh, since such conflict is only from the inclination of the fomes, nor can temptation from the flesh be without sin, as declared by a gloss^ on II Cor. 12. 7, There was given me a sting of my flesh. Hence we must say that she has an aureole properly speaking, so as to be conformed in this to those other members of the Church in whom virginity is found; and although she had no conflict by reason of the temptation which is of the flesh, she had the temptation which is of the enemy, who feared not even to
clination of the
Christ (Matt. 4.). Reply Obj. 3. The aureole ginity except as adding
some
is
not due to vir-
excellence to the
other degrees of continence. If Adam had not sinned, virginity would have had no perfection
over conjugal continence, since in that case marriage would have been honourable, and the marriage-bed unsulHed, for it would not have been dishonoured by lust; hence virginity Glossa ordin. (vi, 76E) Glossa Lombard! Augustine, City of God, xix, 4 (PL 41, 629). 1
;
(PL
192, 84)
Q. 96
ART.
5
1057
would not then have been observed, nor would an aureole have been due to it. But the condi-
human nature being changed, virginity has a special beauty of its own, and consequently a special reward is assigned to it. tion of
During the time of the Mosaic law, when the God was to be continued by means of the carnal act, it was not altogether praiseworthy to abstain from carnal intercourse; therefore no special reward would be given for such a purpose unless it came from a Divine inspiration, as is believed to have been the case with Jeremias and Ehas, of whose marriage we do not read.^ Reply Obj. 4. If a virgin is violated, she does worship of
not forfeit the aureole, provided she retain unfailingly the purpose of observing perpetual virginity,
Nor does
and
in
no way consent
to the act.
she forfeit virginity thereby; and this
maintained whether she be violated for the or for any other cause whatever. But if she suffer this for the faith, this will count to her for merit, and will be a kind of martyrdom. Therefore Lucy said: "If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity wiU receive a double crown" ;^ not that she has two aureoles of virginity, but that she will receive a double reward, one for observing virginity, the other for the outrage she has suffered. Even supposing that one thus violated should conceive, she would not for that reason forfeit her virginity; nor would she be equal to Christ's mother, in whom there was integrity of the flesh together with integrity of the mind. Reply Obj. 5. Virginity is inborn in us as to that which is material in virginity, but the purpose of observing perpetual incorruption, from which virginity derives its merit, is not inborn, but comes from the gift of grace. is
faith,
Reply Obj. 6. The sixtyfold fruit is due, not widow, but only to those who retain
to every
the purpose of remaining widows, even though
they do not make it the matter of a vow, even we have said in regard to virginity. Reply Obj. 7. If cold-blooded persons and eunuchj have the will to observe perpetual incorruption even though they were capable of sexual ivitercourse, they must be called virgins and merit the aureole, for they make a virtue of nece?'sity. If, on the other hand, they have the will to marry if they could, they do not merit the aureole. Hence Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin, xxiv):* "For those like eunuchs as
Jen me,
2
Cf.
3
Office 0^ St.
cember
13th).
Epist., xxii
Lucy; 4
(PL 22, 408). (Dominican Breviary, De-
led., vi
PL 40, 408.
— SUMMA THEOLOGICA
ros8
whose bodies are so formed that they are unable to beget, it suffices when they become Christians and keep the commandments of God, that they have a mind to have a wife if they could, in order to rank with the faithful
who
are married."
Article 6. Whether an Aureole Is Due Martyrs?
We
to
tyrs. i. For an aureole is a reward given works of supererogation, and therefore Bede commenting on Exod. 25. 25, Thou shalt also
Objection
for
.
.
.
crown, says:^ "This
may be who by
more perfect life go beyond commandments." But to die for
freely choosing a
the general
confessing the faith
sometimes an obligation,
is
and not a work of supererogation, as appears from the words of Rom. 10. 10, With the heart, believe unto justice, but with the
we
confession
is
made unto
salvation.
mouth
Therefore
not always due to martyrdom. Obj. 2. Further, According to Gregory^ "the freer the service, the more acceptable it is." Now martyrdom has a minimum of freedom,
an aureole
since
is
is
it
a punishment inflicted
by another
person with force. Therefore an aureole is not due to martyrdom, since it is accorded to surpassing merit.
Obj.
3.
Further,
Martyrdom
consists not only
death externally, but also in the interior act of the will; therefore Bernard in a sermon on the Holy Innocents^ distinguishes in will and not in death, three kinds of martyr,
in suffering
—
as John; in both will
and death, as Stephen;
death and not in will, as the Innocents. Accordingly if an aureole were due to martyrdom, it would be due to voluntary rather than exterin
martyrdom, since merit proceeds from
nal
will.
Yet such is not the case. Therefore an aureole not due to martyrdom.
is
for her Son's death."
Since
fering.
Obj. 5. Further, Penance itself is a kind of martyrdom, and so Gregory says (Horn, iii in Ev.):^ "Although persecution has ceased to ofi'er
proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It is not due to mar-
make another
—namely
then no aureole corresponds to interior sorrow, neither should one correspond to outward suf-
the opportunity, yet the peace
we enjoy
is
martyrdom, since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit." But no aureole is due to penance which consists in external works. Neither therefore is an aureole due to every external martyrdom. Obj. 6. Further, An aureole is not due to an unlawful work. Now it is unlawful to lay hands on oneself, as Augustine declares,^ and yet the Church celebrates the martyrdom of some who laid hands upon themselves in order to escape
not without
would seem that an aureole
rightly referred to the reward of those
pierced'
its
the fury of tyrants, as in the case of certain
women
at
12)."
viii,
Antioch (Eusebius, Eccles. Hist. Therefore an aureole is not always
due to martyrdom. Obj. person for
7.
is
some
Further, It happens at times that a
wounded
for the faith,
Now
time.
it is
and survives one
clear that such a
a martyr, and yet it seems an aureole is not due to him, since his conflict did not last until death. Therefore an aureole is not always due to martyrdom, Obj. 8. Further, Some suffer more from the loss of temporal goods than from the affliction even of their own body, and this is shown by is
many afflictions for the sake of Therefore if they are despoiled of their temporal goods for Christ's sake they would
their bearing
gain.
seem
to be martyrs, and yet an aureole is not apparently due to them. Therefore the same
conclusion follows as before. Obj. 9. Further, A martyr would seem to be no other than one who dies for the faith, and so Isidore says {Etym. vii, 11):^ "They are called martyrs in Greek, witnesses in Latin, be-
Obj. 4. Further, Bodily suffering is less than mental, which consists of internal sorrow and
cause they suffered in order to bear witness to
But mternal suffering is also a kind of martyrdom; therefore Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption:' 'T should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace; thus: 'Thine own soul a sword hath
Now
afflictions of soul.
1
De
2
Cf. Gratian, Dccrctum, Pt.
Tahernaculo,
ad can. 4 (RF I,
14 »
(PL
PL
i,
i,
949);
6
(PL
cf.
are virtues more excellent than such as justice, charity, and so forth, since these cannot be without grace, and yet no aureole is due to them. Therefore it seems
there
faith,
neither
ii, causa 23, Q. 6, append, Augustine, De Adult. Conjung.,
(PL
30, 142).
an aureole due to martyrdom.
»
PL
«
City oj God,
^
PG
Bernice *Epist., IX
is
Obj. 10. FuFther,
qi, 4og).
40, 459).
183. 130.
and strove unto death for the truth."
Christ,
7
(PL
Even
as the truth of faith
76, 1089.
26 (PL 41, 31; 34; 39). John Chrysostom, Horn, de SS. Mart. Prosdoce (PG 50, 639); Ambrose, De Virg., lu, i,
17, 20,
20, 769; cf. et
16, 241).
8
PL 82,
290.
;
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART from God, so
is
is all
Ambrose
other truth, as
"every truth by whomsoever uttered is from the Holy Ghost." Therefore if an aureole is due to one who suffers death for
Q. 96
the truth of faith, in like
martyrdom as Reply Obj.
manner
also
it is
due
death for any other virtue and yet apparently this is not the case. suffer
The common good
1059
is death suffered for Christ's sake; not the pain but the cause that makes
for
who
6
dom, which
declares,^ since
to those
ART.
it is
the martyr.
sake
is,
Consequently an aureole
due to
is
well as to virginity. i.
To
suffer death for Christ's
absolutely speaking, a
erogation, since every one
is
work
of super-
not bound to con-
greater
fess his faith in the face of a persecutor; yet
than the good of the individual. Now if a man die in a just war in order to save his country, an aureole is not due to him. Therefore even though he be put to death in order to keep the
in certain cases it is necessary for salvation,
Obj. II. Further,
is
faith that is in himself, no aureole is due to him; and consequently the same conclusion
follows as above.
Obj. 12. Further, All merit proceeds from
when, that
is, a person is seized by a persecutor and interrogated as to his faith which he is then bound to confess. Nor does it follow that he does not merit an aureole. For an aureole is due to a work of supererogation, not as such,
but as having a certain perfection. Therefore so long as this perfection remains, even though
Yet the Church celebrates the martyrdom of some who had not the use of free
the supererogation cease, one merits the aure-
Therefore they did not merit an aureole; and consequently an aureole is not due to
Reply Obj. 2. A reward is due to martyrdom, not in respect to the exterior infliction, but because it is suffered voluntarily, since we merit
free choice.
choice.
martyrs.
all
On
the contrary, Augustine says '^
Virgin, xlvi)
"No
one, I think,
{De Sancta would dare
Now an auredue to virginity, and consequently also to martyrdom. Further, The crown is due to one who has
ole.
only through that which
is
in us.
prefer virginity to martyrdom."
and naturally contrary to the
ole is
the will that suffers
But
striven.
in
martyrdom the
strife presents
a special difficulty. Therefore a special aureole is due to martyrdom. / answer that, Just as in the spirit there is a conflict with the internal concupiscences, so is there in man a conflict with the passion that is inflicted from without. Therefore, just as a special crown, which we call an aureole, is due
most perfect victory by which we
to the
umph
over the concupiscences of the
a word, to virginity, so too an aureole
the most perfect victory that
is
won
tri-
flesh, in is
due to
against ex-
ternal assaults.
Now
it
will,
the
more
is
difficult
the
more is shown
for Christ's sake
to be firmly established in Christ,
quently a higher reward
is
due
and conse-
to him.
Reply Obj.
3. There are certain acts which, very selves, contain intense pleasure or difficulty, and in such the act always adds to the character of merit or demerit, since in the performance of the act, the will, on account
in their
the aforesaid intensity, must undergo a change from the state in which it was before. Consequently, other things being equal, one who performs an act of lust sins more than one who merely consents in the act, because in the very act the will is increased. In like manner of
martyrdom there a very great difficulty, the will to suffer martyrdom does not reach the degree of merit due since in the act of suffering
is
the most perfect victory over passion
caused from without
is
considered from two
points of view. First from the greatness of the passion.
And
that which one suffers voluntarily
Now among
all
passions inflicted from
without, death holds the
first
sexual concupiscences are chief
place, just as
among
internal
to actual martyrdom by reason of its difficulty; although indeed it may possibly attain to a higher reward if we consider the root of merit,
since the will of one
may
man
to suffer
martyrdom
possibly proceed from a greater charity
when a man conquers death and things directed to death, his is a most perfect victory. Secondly, the perfection of victory is considered from the point of view
than another man's act of martyrdom. Hence one who is willing to be a martyr may by his will merit an essential reward equal to or greater than that which is due to an actual martyr.
of the motive of conflict, when, namely, a man strives for the most honourable cause, which is
to the conflict itself of
passions. Consequently,
Christ Himself.
is
Both these things are In I
1
Cf.
2
PL 40, 424.
Cor.,
on
But the aureole
12.3
(PL
to be
found
17, 258),
in
martyr-
due to the difficulty inherent martyrdom, and so it not due to those who are martyrs only in is
will.
Reply Obj. 4. Just as pleasures of touch, which are the matter of temperance, hold the
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
io6o
among
chief place
and
all
pleasures both internal
external, so pains of touch surpass
Consequently an aureole
pains.
other
due to the
of suffering pains of touch, for in-
difficulty
stance,
is
all
forth, rather than
from blows and so
to the difficulty of bearing internal sufferings,
of which, however, one
by reason
is
not pro-
cause they died in prison, having been
wounded
long before, as in the case of Pope Marceilus.'' Accordingly in whatever way suffering for Christ's sake be continued unto death, whether death ensue or not, a man becomes a martyr and m.erits the aureole. If, however, it be not
continued unto death, this
is
not a reason for
com-
calling a person a martyr, as in the case of the
parison.
It is in this sense that Jerome speaks. Reply Obj. 5. The sufferings of penance are not a martyrdom properly speaking, because
blessed Sylvester, whose feast the Church does not solemnize as a martyr's, since he ended his days in peace, although previously he had un-
they do not consist in things directed to the causing of death, since they are directed merely to the taming of the flesh; and if any one go
dergone certain sufferings.
by
perly called a martyr, except
beyond
this
measure, such
deserving of blame. are spoken of as a
a kind of
afflictions will
However such martyrdom by
be
afflictions
a kind of
comparison, and they surpass the sufferings of martyrdom in duration but not in intensity. Reply Obj. 6. According to Augustine^ it is lawful to no one to lay hands on himself for any reason whatever unless, perhaps it be
done by Divine impulse as an example of fortitude that others may despise death. Those
whom
to
the objection refers are believed to
have brought death on themselves by Divine stirring, and for this reason the Church celebrates their martyrdom. Reply Obj. 7. If any one receive a mortal wound for the faith and survive, without doubt he merits the aureole, as appears in the case of blessed Cecilia
who
survived for three days,^ in prison.^ But,
and many martyrs who died even
if
the
wound he
receives
is
the occasion of his dying, he
is
not mortal, yet is believed to
merit the aureole (although some say that he does not merit the aureole if he happens to die
through his own carelessness or neglect). For this neglect would not have occasioned his death except on the supposition of the wound which he received for the faith, and consequently this wound previously received for the faith is the original occasion of his death, so that he would not seem to lose the aureole for that reason, unless his neglect were such as to involve a mortal sin, which would deprive him of both aurea and aureole. If, however, by some chance or other he were not to die of the mortal wound, or again if the wounds received were not mortal, and he were to die while in prison, he would still
of
merit the aureole.
some
Hence
the
saints is celebrated in the
martyrdom Church be-
Reply Obj. 8. Even as temperance is not about pleasures of money, honours, and the like, but only about pleasures of touch as being the principal of all, so fortitude is about dangers of death as being the greatest of all.^ Consequently the aureole is due to such injuries only as are inflicted on a person's own body and are of a nature to cause death. Accordingly whether a person lose his temporal possessions, or his good name, or anything else of the kind, for Christ's sake, he does not for that reason become a martyr, nor merit the aureole. Nor is it possible in an ordered way to love external things more than one's body, and disordered love does not help one to merit an aureole nor again can sorrow for the loss of corporeal things be equal to the sorrow for the slaying of the ;
body and other like things. Reply Obj. 9. The sufficient motive for martyrdom is not only confession of the faith, but any other virtue, not civic but infused, that has Christ for its end. For one becomes a witness of Christ by any virtuous act, in so far as the works which Christ perfects in us bear witness to His goodness. Hence some virgins were slain for virginity which they desired to keep, for instance blessed Agnes and others whose martyrdom is celebrated by the Church.*' Reply Obj. 10. The truth of faith has Christ for end and object, and therefore its confession if suffering be added to it, merits an aureole, not only on the part of the end but also on the part of the matter. But the confession of any other truth is not a sufficient motive for martyrdom by reason of its matter, but only on the part of the end; for instance
were willing to be than sin against
City of God,
i,
17, 20, 26
(PL
Him by
telling
any
lie
what-
The uncreated good surpasses Hence any created end,
Reply Obj.
11.
created
good.
41, 31, 34, 3q).
Feast of St. Caecilia, 22 Nov., led. Breviary. • Baronius, Annales Eccl., ad annum 323 2
a person
ever.
all '
if
slain for Christ's sake rather
6,
Dominican
(iv, 57*).
Acta Sanctorum,
16 Jan.,i,4(BLii,376').
*
Cf.
6
.Aristotle, Ethics, in, 6 (1115*24).
8
Cf.
die.
Ada Satictorum, die 21 Jan. (BL 11,
718*).
— SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART whether it be the common or a private good, cannot confer so great a goodness on an act as can the uncreated end, when, that is, an act is done for God's sake. Hence when a person dies for the common good without referring it to Christ, he will not merit the aureole; but if he refer it to Christ he will merit the aureole and he will be a martyr; for instance if he defends his country from the attack of an enemy
who
designs to corrupt the faith of Christ, and
suffers death in that defence.
Reply Obj.
12.
Some
say that the use of
reason was by the Divine power accelerated in the Innocents slain for Christ's sake, even as
John the Baptist while yet in his mother's in that case they were truly martyrs in both act and will, and have the aureole. Others say, however, that they were martyrs in act only and not in will; and this seems to in
womb, and
be the opinion of Bernard, who distinguishes three kinds of martyrs, as stated above (obj. 3). In this case the Innocents, even as they do not fulfil all the conditions of martyrdom, and yet are martyrs in a sense, in that they died for Christ, so too they have the aureole, not in all its perfection, but by a kind of participation, in so far as they rejoice in having been slain in Christ's service; thus it was stated above (a. 5) in reference to baptized children, that they will have a certain joy in their innocence and carnal integrity.
ART,
Q. 96
I061
7
many who
that the devil deceives
up with the honour of the master's chair. Therefore it would seem that an aureole is not due to preaching and teaching. On the contrary, A gloss on Eph. i. 18, 19, That you may know what is the exceeding greatness, etc., says:^ "The holy doctors will have an increase of glory above that which all have in common." Therefore, etc. Further, A gloss on Cant. 8. 12, My vineyard is before me, says:^ "He describes the pecuhar reward which He has prepared for His doctors." Therefore doctors will have a peculiar reward, and we call this an aureole. / answer that, Just as by virginity and martyrdom a person wins a most perfect victory over the flesh and the world, so is a most per.
.
.
fect victory gained over the devil when a person not only refuses to yield to the devil's assaults, but also drives him out, not from himself alone, but from others also. Now this is done by preaching and teaching, and so an aureole is due to preaching and teaching, even as to virginity and martyrdom. Nor can we admit, as some affirm, that it is due to prelates only, who are able to preach and teach by virtue of their office, but it is due to all whosoever exercise this act lawfully. Nor is it due to prelates, although they have the office of preaching, unless they actually preach, since a crown is due not to the habit, but to the actual strife, according to II Tim. 5, Fg shall not be .
Article 7. Whether an Aureole Is Due Doctors?
to
(Vulg.,
proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It would seem that an aureole is not due to doctors. Objection i. For every reward to be had in the Hfe to come will correspond to some act of virtue. But preaching or teaching is not the act of a virtue. Therefore an aureole is not due to teaching or preaching.
Obj.
2.
is
.
.
not) crowned, except he strive law-
fully.
We
Further, Teaching and preaching are
the result of studying and being taught.
are puffed
Now
Reply Obj.
Preaching and teaching are namely mercy, and therefore
i.
acts of a virtue,
they are reckoned
among
the spiritual alms-
deeds.
Reply Obj. 2. Although ability to preach and is sometimes the outcome of study, the practice of teaching comes from the will, which is informed with charity infused by God; and teach
thus
its
act can be meritorious.
are not acquired by a man's study, since we merit not by our natural and acquired gifts. Therefore no aureole will be merited in the
Reply Obj. 3. Exaltation in this life does not lessen the reward of the other life, except for him who seeks his own glory from that exaltation; moreover he who turns that exaltation
future hfe for teaching and preaching.
to the profit of others acquires thereby a reward
the things that are rewarded in the future life
Obj.
Further, Exaltation in the hfe to come corresponds to humiliation in the present life, because he that humbleth himself shall be 3.
exalted (Matt. 23. 12). But there is no humihation in teaching and preaching; in fact they are occasions of pride, for a gloss on Matt. 4. 5, Then the devil took Him up, says^ 1
Glossa ordin. (v, 15F).
for himself.
aureole
Still,
when
is
it
due to teaching,
stated that an
is to be understood of the teaching of things pertaining to salvation, by which teaching the devil is ex-
pelled ^
is
from men's
Glossa ordin.
(vi,
hearts, as
Glossa ordin.
(iii,
by
a kind of spir-
90E); Glossa Lombardi (PL 192,
177). 3
this
367F).
—
—
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
io62
ten (Apoc.
itual weapon, of which it is said (II Cor. lo. 4) The weapons of our warfare are not carnal but hut 7nighty to God). spiritual (Vulg.,
21)
3.
I will give to
To him
:
sit
also have overcome,
that shall overcome,
Me
with
and
in
am
My
throne, as I
down
set
in
My
With My Father in His throne). Therefore we must say with others Father's throne (Vulg.,
Article
Whether an Aureole
8.
is
Due
that although there is nothing of the nature of an aureole in Christ, there is nevertheless something more excellent than any aureole.
to Christ?
We
proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It would seem that an aureole is due to Christ. Objection i. For an aureole is due to virgin-
Reply Obj. 1. Christ was most truly virgin, martyr, and doctor; yet the corresponding accidental reward in Christ is a neghgible quan-
martyrdom, and teaching. Now these three were pre-eminently in Christ. Therefore an aureole is especially due to Him. Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is most perfect in human things must be especially ascribed to Christ. Now an aureole is due as the reward of most excellent merits. Therefore it is also due ity,
comparison with the greatness of His Hence He has not an aureole in its proper sense. Reply Obj. 2. Although the aureole is due to a most perfect work, yet with regard to us, so tity in
essential reward.
far as
to Christ.
Obj.
3.
Further, C>T)rian says
(De Habit.
whom
Virg.)^ that "virginity bears a likeness to God." Therefore the exemplar of virginity is in God.
would seem that an aureole to Christ even as God.
Therefore
On
it
the contrary,
An
aureole
is
is
thus
Therefore
He
never had an aureole
There are two opinions on this For some say that Christ has an aureole
/ answer that,
Him
there
is
both conflict and victory, and consequently a crown in its proper acceptation. But if we consider the question carefully, although the notion of aurea or crown is becoming to Christ,
the notion of aureole fact that aureole
is
is
not.
For from the very
a diminutive term
from one
in
in its fulness.
implies a certain inferiority, and
it
Whom
is
the
3. Although in some way virginexemplar in God, that exemplar is not homogeneous. For the incorruption of God, which virginity imitates, is not in God in the
has
ity
its
Article
never
afterwards.
in its strict sense, seeing that in
found
not found in Christ in
is
same way
Further, Christ's reward was never increased. Now Christ had no aureole from the moment
point.
it
is
Reply Obj.
described as
He had
denotes the
it
fulness of every perfection.
to Christ.
of His conception, since then
a diminutive term,
that perfection
Accordingly
due
joy in being conformed to Christ. Now no one is conformed or likened to himself, as the Philosopher says.2 Therefore an aureole is not due
fought.
is
it
participation of a perfection derived
it
fol-
as in a virgin.
Whether an Aureole
9.
Is
Due
Angels?
to the
We proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It would seem that an aureole is due to the angels. Objection i. For Jerome (Serm. de AsS2imp.y speaking of virginity says: "To live without the flesh while living in the flesh is to live as an angel rather than as a man"; and a gloss on I Cor. 7. 26, For the present necessity, says'* that "virginity is the portion of the angels." Since then an aureole corresponds to virginity,
Obj.
it
would seem due
to the angels.
Further, Incorruption of the spirit
2.
is
denotes something possessed by participation and not in its fulness. Therefore an aureole is becoming to those who partici-
more
excellent than incorruption of the flesh.
Now
there
gels,
since
pate in the perfect victory by imitating Him in Whom the fulness of perfect victory is
aureole
lows that
realised.
it
And
therefore, since in Christ the no-
is found chiefly and fully, for by His victory others are made victors, as shown by the words of John 16. 33, Have cotifidence, I have overcome the world, and Apoc. 5. 5, Behold the lion of the tribe of Juda
tion of victory
— .
.
.
—
hath prevailed, it is not fitting for Christ to have an aureole, but to have something from
which 1
all
aureoles are derived.
PL 4, 477.
'
Hence
it is
Metaphysics, x, 3 (io54*'6).
writ-
is
is
incorruption of spirit in the an-
they never sinned. Therefore an due to them rather than to men in-
corrupt in the flesh and
some
Obj. ing.
3.
Now
ening,
Further,
An
and perfecting
sinned at
IX
(PL
*C7lossa ordin.
1596) Augustine, ;
'PG3,
273.
by
us,
is
due to teach-
cleansing, enlight-
as
Dionysius says
10).^ Therefore at least the
vi,
aureole of doctors £/^i5/.,
aureole
angels teach us
{Hier. Eccles.
3
who have
time.
is
due to them.
30, 131). (vi,
De
43E); Glossa Lombardi (PL 191, Virgin., xiii
(PL
40, 401).
—
:
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART On He
the contrary, It
is
written (II Tim.
2.
5)
shall not be (Vulg., is not) crowned, except he strive lawfully. But there is no con.
flict
.
.
Therefore an aureole
in the angels.
is
not
due to them. not due to an act that not performed through the body; therefore
is
it is
aureole
is
not due to lovers of virginity, martyrdom, them if they do not practise
teaching,
or
outwardly. But angels are incorporeal
spirits.
Therefore they have no aureole. / answer that, An aureole is not due to the angels. The reason of this is that an aureole, properly speaking, corresponds to some perfecsurpassing merit.
of
tion
Now
which make for perfect merit
in
those
man
things
are con-
natural to angels, or belong to their state in general, or to their essential reward. Therefore
the angels have not an aureole in the
sense as an aureole
Reply Obj.
1.
is
same
due to men.
Virginity
is
said to be an an-
gelic life, in so far as virgins imitate
what angels have by nature. For
it is
by grace
not owing
to a virtue that angels abstain altogether
from
pleasures of the flesh, since they are incapable of such pleasures.
Reply Obj. spirit
2.
Perpetual incorruption of the
in the angels merits their essential re-
ward, because since in
Q. 96
be seen
ART.
11
1063
in their bodily scars
;
therefore Au-
"We feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their
gustine says:^
bodies, which they bore for Christ's name. Per-
An
Further,
will
it is
haps indeed we shall see them, for this will not make them less comely, but more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty, though in the body, yet not of the body but of virtue." Therefore it would seem that the martyr's aureole is also in his
manner
is
impossible after they
have fallen. Reply Obj. 3. The acts whereby the angels teach us belong to their glory and their common state therefore they do not thereby merit an aureole. ;
in
hke
On the contrary. The souls now in heaven have aureoles, and yet they have no body. Therefore the proper subject of an aureole is the soul and not the body. Further, All merit is from the soul. Therefore the whole reward should be in the soul. / answer that. Properly speaking the aureole is in the mind, since it is joy in the works to which an aureole is due. But even as from the joy in the essential reward, which is the aurea, there results a certain comeliness in the body, is the glory of the body, so from the joy
which
the aureole there results a certain bodily comeliness, so that the aureole is chiefly in the mind, but by a kind of overflow it shines forth in the body. in
necessary for their salvation,
them recovery
body; and
the aureoles of others.
This
suffices for the
tions. It
Replies to the Objec-
must be observed, however,
that the
beauty of the scars which will appear in the bodies of the martyrs cannot be called an aureole, since some of the martyrs will have an aureole in which such scars will not appear, for instance those who were put to death by drowning, starvation, or the squalor of prison.
Article
Due
Whether an Aureole Is Also
10.
to the
Body?
Article
We
proceed thus to the Tenth Article: It would seem that an aureole is also due to the body. Objection 1. For the essential reward is greater than the accidental. But the dowries which belong to the essential reward are not only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore there is also an aureole which pertains to the accidental rev/ard.
Obj.
Punishment in soul and sin committed through the body. Therefore a reward both in soul and in body is due to merit gained through the body. But the aureole is merited through works 2.
Further,
body corresponds
to
of the body. Therefore an aureole
is
also
due
ii.
Whether Three Aureoles Are
Fittingly Assigned, Those 0} Virgins, of Martyrs, and of Doctors?
We
proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:
It
would seem that the three aureoles of virgins, martyrs, and doctors are unfittingly assigned. Objection 1. For the aureole of martyrs corresponds to their virtue of fortitude, the aureole of virgins to the virtue of temperance, and the aureole of doctors to the virtue of prudence. Therefore it seems that there should be a fourth aureole corresponding to the virtue of justice. Obj. 2. Further, A gloss on Exod. 25. 25:
A
polished crown, etc., says^ that "a golden {aurea) crown is added, when the Gospel prem-
ises
eternal life to those
who keep
the com-
to the body.
Obj.
3.
Further,
A
^
certain fulness of virtue
will shine forth in the bodies of martyrs,
and
City of God, xxii, 19
^Glossa ordin.
(PL 91,
409).
(i,
(PL
41, 782).
178B); Bede,
De
Tabernaculo,
i,
6
SUM MA THEOLOGICA
1064
mandments: 'If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments' (Matt. 19. 17). To this is added the little golden crown (aureola) when it is
all
said: 'If thou wilt be perfect, go
that thou hast,
and give
21). Therefore an aureole
Obj.
Further,
3.
wholly to
God by
the
is
sell
due to poverty.
A man vow
and
to the poor' " (ibid.
subjects himself
of obedience; there-
fore the greatest perfection consists in the vow it would seem that an
by and He was a virgin, by His personal purity. Therefore doctors, martyrs and virgins are most perfectly conformed to Him, and for this reason an aureole is due to them. Reply Obj. i. There is no conflict to be obser^^ed in the act of justice as in the acts of
Nor
due to obedience. Obj. 4. Further, There are also many other works of supererogation in which one will rejoice in the life to come. Therefore there are many aureoles besides the above three.
an act of prudence; of charity or mercy,
Obj. faith
5.
Further, Just as a
man
spreads the
by preaching and teaching, so does he by
publishing written works. Therefore a fourth
due to those who do this. / answer that, An aureole is an exceptional reward corresponding to an exceptional vic-
aureole
is
tory; therefore the three aureoles are assigned accordance with the exceptional victories in
such an ing
act,
We may embraces cial
due to martyrs who win the victory in this battle. In the conflict with the devil, the chief victory is to expel the enemy not only from oneself but also from the hearts of others; this is done by teaching and preaching, and consequently the third aureole is due to doctors and
Some, however, distinguish the three aureoles accordance v/ith the three powers of the soul,
by saying that the three aureoles correspond to the three chief acts of the soul's three high-
For the act of the rational power publish the truth of faith even to others,
est powers. is
to
and
to this act the aureole of doctors
is
due;
power is to overand to this act the aureole of martyrs is due; and the highest act of the concupiscible power is to abstain altogether from the greatest carnal pleasures, and to this act the aureole of virgins is due.
is
it.
Although poverty
work
a
is
of
it
or
whereby
persecution
broken. Hence an aureole
poverty, but judicial power
is
is
due to
his
own
not due to it,
by
rea-
son of the humiliation consequent upon poverty. The gloss quoted takes aureole in the
broad sense for any reward given for excellent merit.
We
reply in the
same way
Fourth Objections. Reply Obj. 5. An aureole
commit
is
to the Third
and
due to those who
the sacred doctrine to writing, but
it is
not distinct from the aureole of doctors, since the compiling of writing is a way of teaching.
Article
12.
Whether the
We
Virgin's Aureole
proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:
would seem that the greatest of
Others again, distinguish the three aureoles accordance with those things whereby we
most excellently conformed to Christ. For the mediator between the Father and the world. Hence He was a doctor, by manifest-
aureole
is
i.
For
it is
they follow the
Lamb
He
and
that no other
goeth,
It
the
said of virgins (Apoc.
14. 4) that
(ibid.
3)
whithersoever
man
could say the canticle which the virgins sang. aureole.
for Christ's sake,
virgin's
all.
Objection
Therefore
He was
not due to 2.
does not take the highest place in a spiritual conflict, because the love of temporal goods assails a man less than carnal conperfection,
come even death
are
it is
the virtues, and therefore a spe-
is
Reply Obj.
the highest act of the irascible
in
in so far as
Is the Greatest of All?
preachers.
in
—
are inclined to the practice of
also reply, with others, that justice
aureole
cupiscence
In the conflict with the world, the chief victory is to suffer the world's persecution even until death. Therefore the second aureole is
is
an act by such
or again of wisdom, as direct-
all
body
virginity.
—
true that to teach
is it
in fact rather is it
it.
which beset every man. For in the conflict with the flesh, he above all wins the victory who abstains altogether from sexual pleasures which are the chief of this kind and such is a virgin. Therefore an aureole is due to ;
we
habits that
in
the three conflicts
re-
a martyr,
suffering the persecution of the world;
the other virtues.
is
He was
ceived from the Father;
of obedience. Therefore
aureole
He had
which
ing to the world the truth
Obj.
2.
virgins
have
the
Further, Cyprian
most
excellent
(De Habit. Virg.y more illus-
says of virgins that they are "the
trious portion of Christ's flock." Therefore the
due to them. would seem that the martyr's aureole is the greatest. For Haymo, commenting on Apoc. 14. 3, No ?tian could say the hymn, says^ that "virgins do not all take prece2/„ j^p^c. (PL 117, 1106) PL 4. 455.
greater aureole
Obj.
'
3.
is
Again,
it
:
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART
Q. 96
ART.
1065
13
dence of married folk; but only those who in addition to the observance of virginity are
by
the tortures of their passion on a par with married persons who have suffered martyrdom." Therefore martyrdom gives virginity its precedence over other states, and consequently a greater aureole is due to virginity. Obj. 4. Again, it would seem that the greatest aureole is due to doctors. For the Church mihtant is modelled after the Church trium-
Now
Church militant the greatest honour is due to doctors (I Tim. 5. 17): Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy
phant.
in the
of double honour, especially they who labour word and doctrine. Therefore a greater
Article 13. Whether One Person Has an Aureole more Excellently Than Another Person?
We
of doctrine
is
due to them
Church trium-
in the
phant. / answer that, Precedence of one aureole over
another
may
points. First,
be considered from two standfrom the point of view of the
conflicts, that aureole
painful,
while
the
with the
conflict
fraught with greater danger, since lasting
and threatens us
at
flesh
it
closer
is
is
more
quarters.
Secondly, from the point of view of the things
about which the battle is fought, and thus the doctor's aureole takes precedence of all others, since this conflict is about inteUigible goods, while the other conflicts are about sensible passions. Nevertheless, the precedence that is considered in view of the conflict is more essential to the aureole, since the aureole, according to its proper character, regards the victory and
perfectly than another person.
For things which have reached
1.
term are not subject to intension or lesNow the aureole is due to works which have reached their term of perfection. Therefore an aureole is not subject to intension or their
sening.
lessening.
Obj.
2.
Further, Virginity
being more or
is
not subject to
denotes a kind of privation, and privations are not subject to intension or lessening. Therefore neither does less, since it
the reward of virginity, the virgin's aureole, that is, receive intension or lessening.
On
being considered greater
which is due to the more strenuous battle. Looking at it thus the martyr's aureole takes precedence of the others in one way, and the virgin's in another. For the martyr's battle is more strenuous in itself, and more intensely
more
Objection
in the
aureole
proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article:
would seem that one person has not the aureole either of virginity, or of martyrdom, or It
the contrary,
The
aurea. But the aurea
aureole
is
more
is
added to the
intense in one
than in another. Therefore the aureole is also. / answer that, Since merit is somewhat the cause of reward, rewards must be diversified according as merits are diversified, for the intension or lessening of a thing follows from the intension or lessening of its cause. Now the merit of the aureole may be greater or lesser. There-
may
fore the aureole
also be greater or lesser.
We
must observe, however, that the merit of an aureole may be intensified in two ways first,
on the part of
its
cause, secondly on the
may happen to be two persons, one of whom, out of lesser charity, suffers greater torments of martyrdom, or
part of the work. For there
is
more constant
in preaching, or again with-
consid-
draws himself more from carnal pleasures. Accordingly, intension not of the aureole but of the aurea corresponds to the mtension of merit derived from its root, while intension of the
ered from our standpoint through the conflict being at closer quarters. Therefore the martyr's
aureole corresponds to intension of merit derived from the kind of act. Consequently it is
aureole
possible for one
the battle, and the difficulty of fighting which is
viewed from the standpoint of the battle
of greater importance than that which
is
is
the greatest absolutely of all; for
this reason a gloss "all the
is
on Matt.
5.
10, says^ that
other beatitudes are perfected in the
which refers to the martyrs," namely, Blessed are they that suffer persecution. For this reason, too, the Church in enumerating the saints together places the martyrs before the doctors and virgins. Yet nothing hinders the other aureoles from being more excellent in some particular way. And this suffices for the eighth,
Replies to the Objections. ^Glossa ordin. 3
(PL 34,
1234).
(v,
19A); Augustine,
is
i,
merits less in
martyrdom
Reply Obj. i. The merits to which an aureole due do not reach the term of their perfection
absolutely, but according to their species, even as fire is specifically the most subtle of bodies.
Hence nothing hinders one aureole being more excellent than another, even as one fire is more subtle than another.
Reply Obj. De Serm. Dom.,
who
as to his essential reward to receive a greater aureole for his martyrdom.
2.
The
virginity of one
may be
greater than the virginity of another by reason of a greater withdrawal from that which is con-
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
io66
trary to virginity, so that virginity is stated to be greater in one who avoids more the occasions
For in this way privations may when a man is said to be more bhnd removed further from the possession
of corruption. increase, as if
he
is
of sight.
QUESTION XCVII Of the punishment of the damned (In Seven Articles)
In due sequence we must consider those things that concern the damned after the judgment:
The punishment of the damned, and the by which their bodies will be tormented; (2) matters relating to their will and intellect in (q. xcviii); (3) God's justice and mercy
(i) fire
regard to the Under the
damned first
(q.
xcix).
head there are seven points
I answer that, According to Basil
world will fight with Him against the unwise. This is also becoming to Divine justice, that whereas they departed from One by sin, and placed their end in material things which are many and various, so should they be tormented
many ways and from many sources. Reply Obj. i. It is because fire is most painful, through its abundance of active force, that the name of fire is given to any torment if it
in
be intense.
Whether their weeping is corporeal? (4) Whether their darkness is material? (5) Whether the fire whereby they are tormented is corporeal? (6) Whether it is of the same species as our fire? (7) Wheth-
cleanse; therefore
mented
is
corporeal? (3)
er this fire is
beneath the earth?
Article i. Whether in Hell the Damned Are Tormented By the Sole Punishment of Fire?
We
proceed thus to the First Article: It
would seem that in hell the damned are tormented by the sole punishment of fire. Objection i. For in Matt. 25. 41, where their condemnation is declared, mention is made of Depart from Me, you fire only, in the words :
cursed, into everlasting
Obj.
2.
Further,
fire.
Even
as the
punishment of
due to venial sin, so is the punishment of hell due to mortal sin. Now no other punishment but that of fire is stated to be in purgatory, as appears from the words of I Cor. 3. 13: The fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it is. Therefore neither in hell will there be a punishment other than of fire. Obj. 3. Further, Variety of punishment affords a respite, as when one passes from heat to cold. But we can admit no respite in the damned. Therefore there will not be various purgatory
is
punishments, but that of
On
the contrary. It
is
fire
alone.
written (Ps. 10. 7):
Fire and brimsto?ie and storms of winds shall be the portloji of their cup.
written (Job. 24. 19) Let him pass from the snow waters to excessive heat.
Further, It
is
:
i
world there will be a separation of the elements, whatever is pure and noble remaining above for the glory of the blessed, and whatever is ignoble and sordid being cast down for the punishment of the damned, so that just as every creature will be to the blessed a matter of joy, so will all the elements conduce to the torture of the damned, according to Wis. 5. 21, the whole
(i) Whether in hell the damned are tormented with the sole punishment of fire? (2) Whether the worm by which they are torof inquiry:
(Hom.
in Ps. 28),^ at the final cleansing of the
Reply Obj.
The punishment
2.
it
of purgatory
but
to
should be inflicted by
fire
intended chiefly
not
is
to
torment,
alone which is above all possessed of cleansing power. But the punishment of the damned is not directed to their cleansing. Consequently the comparison
fails.
Reply Obj. 3. The damned will pass from the most intense heat to the most intense cold, without this giving them any respite, because they will suffer from external agencies not by the change of their body from its original natural disposition, and the contrary passion affording a respite by restoring an equable or moderate temperature, as happens now, but by a spiritual action, in the same way as sensible objects act on the senses, being perceived by impressing the organ with their forms according to their spiritual and not their material being.
Article
2.
Whether the
Worm of the Damned
Is Corporeal?
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the worm by which the damned are tormented is corporeal. Objection i. For flesh cannot be tormented by a spiritual worm. Now the flesh of the damned will be tormented by a worm He will give fire and worms into their flesh (Judith 16. 21), and: The vengeance on the flesh of the un:
godly
is fire
fore that
Obj.
2.
PG 29,
a7id
worm
worms
(Ecclus.
7.
207; cf. In Hexaem., hom. vi (PG ^Cityof God, x\i,g {PL 41, 725). 1
19). There-
be corporeal. Further, Augustine says:^ "Both, will
29, 121).
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART namely
and worm,
fire
will
be the punishment
of the body." Therefore, etc.
On
"The un-
the contrary, Augustine says:^
quenchable fire and the restless worm in the punishment of the damned are explained in various ways by different persons. Some refer both to the body, some, both to the soul; others refer the
fire, in
worm
the literal sense, to the body,
and this seems the more probable." / answer that, After the day of judgment, no animal or mixed body will remain in the renewed world except only the body of man, because the former are not directed to incorruption, nor after that time will there be generation or corruption. Consequently the worm ascribed to the damned must be understood to be not of a corporeal but of a spiritual nature, and this is the remorse of conscience, which is called a worm because it originates from the corruption of sin, and torments the soul, as a corporeal worm born of corruption torments by gnawing. Reply Obj. i. The very souls of the damned are called their flesh because they were subject the
to the soul metaphorically,
Or we may reply
to the flesh.
that the flesh will
be tormented by the spiritual worm, according as the afflictions of the soul overflow into the body, both here and hereafter. Reply Obj. 2. Augustine speaks by way of comparison. For he does not wish to assert absolutely that this worm is material, but that it is better to say that both are to be understood materially than that both should be understood only in a spiritual sense, for then the damned would suffer no bodily pain. This is clear to anyone that examines the context of his words in
ART.
Q. 97
ment and sorrow
1067
4
Now
give ye to her.
sinners
had internal and external pleasure in their sin. Therefore they will also have external weeping. On the contrary, Corporeal weeping results from dissolving into tears. Now there cannot be a continual dissolution from the bodies of the damned, since nothing is restored to them by food; for everything finite is consumed if something be continually taken from it. Therefore the weeping of the damned will not be corporeal.
/ answer that,
Two
in corporeal weeping.
things are to be observed
One
is
the resolution of
and as to this corporeal weeping cannot be in the damned, since after the day of judgment, the movement of the first movable being at an end, there will be neither generation, nor corruption, nor bodily change, and in the resotears
:
humour needs to be genershed forth in the shape of tears.
lution of tears that
ated which
Therefore
is
in this respect it will
be impossible
for corporeal weeping to be in the
damned. The
other thing to be observed in corporeal weeping is a certain agitation and disturbance of the head and eyes, and in this respect weeping be possible in the damned after the resur-
will
rection, for the bodies of the damned will be tormented not only from without, but also from
body is affected at the instance of the soul's passion towards good or evil. In this sense weeping is a proof of the within, according as the
body's resurrection, and corresponds to the pleasure of sin, experienced by both soul and
body.
This
suffices for the
Replies to the Objec-
tions.
this passage.
Article
Whether the Weeping of the
Article
3.
Damned
Will
Be Corporeal?
We
proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that the weeping of the damned will be corporeal. Objection i. For a gloss on Luke 13. 28, There will be weeping, says^ that "the weeping with which our Lord threatens the wicked is a proof of the resurrection of the body." But this would not be the case if that weeping were merely spiritual. Therefore, etc. Obj. 2. Further, The pain of the punishment corresponds to the pleasure of the sin, according to Apoc. 18. 7: As much as she hath glorified herself
and lived
in delicacies, so
much
tor-
^Ibid., XX, 22 (PL 41, 694), ^Glossa ordin. (v, 161F); Jerome, In Matt., i, on 8.12 (PL 26, 53) Bade, In Matt., 11, on 8.12 (PL 92.41). ;
Whether the Damned Are
4.
in
Material Darkness?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that the damned are not in matedarkness.
rial
Objection
But
{Moral,
no
1.
For commenting on Job
10. 22,
everlasting horror dwelleth, Gregory says ix,
66):^ "Although that
light for comfort, yet, that it
fire will
give
may torment
the more it does give light for a purpose, for by the light of its flame the wicked will see their followers whom they have drawn thither from
the world." Therefore the darkness there is not material. Obj. 2. Further, The damned see their own punishment, for this increases their punishment. But nothing is seen without light. Therefore there 8
is
PL 75, 915.
no material darkness
there.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
io68 Obj.
have
the subject of light and darkness, except the
of sight after being reunited to their
eyes of the damned, which will be darkened
Further, There the
3.
power But
the
power would be
this
bodies.
damned
will
useless to
them
they see something. Therefore, since nothing is seen unless it be in the light, it would seem that they are not in absolute darkness. On the contrary, It is written (Matt. 22.
utterly.
This
unless
13)
Bind
:
into
his
hands and
and cast him Commenting on
Article
these words Gregory says {Moral, ix, 65) :^ "If this fire gave any hght, he would by no means
be described as cast into exterior darkness." Further, Basil says {Horn, i in Ps. 28, 7, The voice of the Lord divideth the flame of firey that by God's might the brightness of the
5.
Whether
Replies to the Objections.
the Fire of Hell Will
Be
Corporeal?
We
his feet,
darkness.
exterior
the
suffices for the
proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It
would seem that the bodies of the
of hell
fire
damned
whereby the
be tormented will
will
not be corporeal. Objection i. For Damascene says {De Fide
its
power of burn-
iv, 27):^ "The devil, and demons, and man, namely Antichrist, together with the ungodly and sinners, will be cast into everlasting fire, not material fire, such as that which
ing, so that its brightness will
conduce to the
we
fire will
be separated from
Orthod. his
have, but such as
thing corporeal
Other points relating to the punishment of the damned have been decided above (q.
when severed from
LXXXVI, A. 3).^ / answer that, The disposition of hell will be such as to be adapted to the utmost unhappiness of the damned. Therefore accordingly
Z2):^ "In
both light and darkness are there, in so far as they are most conducive to the unhappiness of the
Now
damned.
seeing
is
in itself pleasant
for, as stated in the Metaphysics,^ "the sense of sight is most valued, because thereby many
Yet
things are known." that seeing
is
painful,
it
happens accidentally
when we
see things that
are hurtful to us, or displeasing to our will. Consequently in hell the place must be so dis-
posed for seeing as regards light and darkness that nothing be seen clearly, and that only such things be dimly seen as are able to bring anguish
the
to
heart.
much
as
is
dark.
are capable of tormenting the soul. The natural situation of the place is enough for this, since in the centre of the earth,
where
hell is
said to be, fire cannot be otherwise than thick and cloudy, and reeky as it were.
Some hold
that this darkness
is
caused by
massing together of the bodies
the
damned, which
will so
fill
of
the
the place of hell with
numbers, that no air will remain, so that there will be no translucid body that can be
their
Obj.
PL 75, 912.
2
PG
»
Cf also
*
Aristotle,
.
29, 2Q7; cf. Q.
Lxx, I, i
In Uexaem., horn, vi (PG 2q, 121). A. 3 In Sent., iv, d. 44, Q- 3. A. i. ;
(080*23).
every-
The
Further,
2.
souls of the
damned
their bodies are cast into
But Augustine says {Gen. ad Lit. xii, my opinion the place to which the committed after death is spiritual and
hell fire.
soul
is
not corporeal." Therefore, Obj.
3.
etc.
Further, Corporeal
fire in
the person
who
is
the
mode
action does not follow the
its
mode
of
of guilt in
burnt at the stake, but rather
mode of humid and dry, for same corporeal fire we see both good and wicked suffer. But the fire of hell, in its mode does
follow the
it
in the
of torture or action, follows the
person
the
in
mode
therefore
iv, 43):^ "There is but it does not torture equally. For each one will suffer as
hell
of guilt
Gregory indeed but one
punished;
says {Dial, fire,
all
sinners
much
pain
according as his guilt deserves." Therefore this fire will
On
not be corporeal.
the contrary,
doubt not that the is
it
He
fire
says {Dial,
of hell
is
iv,
29)
:^
"I
corporeal, since
certain that bodies are tortured there."
The is written (Wisd. 5. 21): agaiiist the unwise. world shall fight But the whole world would not fight against the unwise if they were punished with a spiritual and not a corporeal punishment. Therefore they Further, It
.
.
.
.
.
.
be punished with a corporeal fire. answer that. There have been many opinions about the fire of hell. For some philos-
will
/
ophers, as Avicenna,^ not believing in the resurrection, thought that the soul alone would be punished after death. And as they consid-
ered »
is
of hell will not be corporeal.
absolutely
Yet by Divine disthere is a certain amount of light, as suffices for seeing those things which
speaking, the place position,
Therefore,
God knoweth." Now
material. Therefore the fire
joy of the blessed, and the heat of the flame to the torment of the damned." Therefore the damned will be in material darkness.
SPG 'PL •
it
impossible for the soul, being incor-
04,1225.
6PL,s4, 480.
PL
8 77, 368. 77. 401. Mcta., tr. IX, chap. 7 (io6vb).
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART poreal, to be punished with a corporeal fire, they denied that the fire by which the wicked are punished is corporeal, and pretended that all statements as to souls being punished in future after death by any corporeal means are to be taken metaphorically. For just as the joy and happiness of good souls will not be about any corporeal object, but about something spiritual, namely the attainment of their end, so will the torment of the wicked be merely spiritual, in that they will be grieved at being separated from their end, the desire for which is
them by
in
nature. Therefore, just as
all
de-
ART.
Q. 97
1069
5
maintained that souls return to the stars that are their compeers. But this is absolutely absurd according to the Philosopher's teaching, since the soul uses a definite bodily organ, even as art uses definite instruments, so that it cannot pass from one
body
to another, as Pythagoras
is
stated^ to have
maintained.3 As to the statement of Augustine we shall say below how it is to be answered (Reply 2).
However, whatever we may say of the fire we must admit that the fire which will torment the bodies that torments the separated souls,
damned
scriptions of the soul's dehght after death that
of the
seem
since one cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body unless that punishment itself be bod-
to denote bodily pleasure,
—
for instance,
that they are refreshed, that they smile,
—must be
and so
after the resurrection
is
corpore-
al,
taken metaphorically, so also
ily.
such descriptions of the soul's suffering for inas seem to imply bodily punishment, stance, that they burn in fire, or suffer from
the
Therefore Gregory {Dial, iv, 29)'' proves of hell to be corporeal from the very fact that the wicked will be cast there after the resurrection. Again Augustine, as quoted
the stench, and so forth. For as spiritual pleas-
in the text of iv. Sent. d. 44,^ clearly admits^
forth,
are
all
—
ure and pain are
unknown
to
the majority,
these things need to be declared under the
fig-
ure of corporeal pleasures and pains, in order that
men may be moved
the
more
to the desire
or fear of them. Since, however, in the
punishment of the
damned
there will be not only pain of loss corresponding to the turning away that was in their sin, but also pain of sense corresponding to the
conversion,
it
follows that
it
is
not enough to
hold the above manner of punishment. For this reason Avicenna himself {loc. cit.) added another explanation, by saying that the souls of the wicked are punished after death not
by
bodies but by likenesses of bodies; just as in a
dream
it
seems to a
man
that he
is
suffering
various pains on account of such images being
Even Augustine seems to hold this kind of punishment {Gen. ad Lit. xii, in his imagination.
from the text. But this would seem an unreasonable statement. For the imagination is a power that makes use of a bodily organ, so that it is im32),^ as
is
clear
he might avoid
said that the soul separated
body uses
A.
how
3)
this is the point at issue for
have said elsewhere
the souls of the
damned
(q.
lxx,
are punished
by this corporeal fire. Reply Obj. 1. Damascene does not absolutely deny that this fire is material, but that it is material as our fire, since it differs from ours in some of its properties. We may also reply that since that fire does not change bodies as to their matter, but acts on them for their punishment
by a kind of son that regards
spiritual action,
it is for this reastated not to be material, not as substance, but as to its punitive
it is
its
on bodies and, still more, on souls. Reply Obj. 2. The assertion of Augustine may be taken in this way, that the place whither souls are conveyed after death is described effect
as incorporeal in so far as the soul is there not corporeally, that is as bodies are in a place,
and
in its
the
principal
as an organ
—
opinion of certain philosophers of old,
PL 34, 481.
We
the present.
this diffi-
some part of the heavenly body, to which the human body needs to be conformed, in order to be perfected by the rational soul, which is like the movers of the heavenly body, thus following somewhat the 1
And
corporeal.
from the
occur in the soul separated from the body, as Therefore Avicenna
in the soul of the dreamer.
culty,
by which the bodies are tormented
that the fire is
but in some other spiritual way, as angels are in a place. Or we may reply that Augustine is expressing an opinion without deciding the point, as he often does in those books. Reply Obj. 3. That fire will be the instrument of Divine justice inflicting punishment. Now an instrument acts not only by its own power
possible for such visions of the imagination to
also {loc. cit.), that
fire
who
own way, but agent,
Therefore although 2
Aristotle, Soul,
3
Cf.
i,
also by the power of and as directed by it.
fire is
not able, of
own
Diogenes Laertes, who quotes the verse Zenophon mouth of Pythagoras; cf. Diels, Doxographi
puts in the
Graeci, pp. 557, 587. 4 PL 77, 368. s
its
3 (407''2 2).
BQR 11,1003.
City of God, xxi, 10
(PL 41,
725).
SUMMA TEEOLOGICA
I070
power, to torture certain persons more or less, according to the measure of sin, it is able to do so nevertheless in so far as
action
its
by the ordering of Divine
lated
so the fire of the furnace
is
regu-
is
justice; even
things a man sinneth by the same also he is tormented. Now men sin by the sensible things of this world. Therefore
is
it
just that they
should be punished by those same things.
regulated by the
As stated
/ afiswer that.
book on Me-
in the
forethought of the smith, according as the effect
teorology,^ fire has other bodies for
of his art requires.
for the reason that of
the greatest power of action.
Article
Same
6.
Whether the Fire of Hell As Ours?
Is of the
under two conditions:
Species
We
own
existing in its
in
ter,
whether of earth, as
air,
as in the flame.
which we see. For Augustine says/ and is quoted in the text,^ "In my opinion no man knows of what kind is the everlasting fire, un-
however
species as the corporeal fire
Objection
i.
less the Spirit of
But
all
God has revealed it to anyone." all know the nature of this
or nearly
of ours. Therefore that fire
fire
same
not of the
is
Obj.
2.
Further, Gregory commenting on Job
20. 26, i4 fire that is not kindled shall devour him, says {Moral, xv, 29.)^ "Bodily fire needs bodily fuel in order to become fire; neither can it be except by being kindled, nor live unless it be renewed. On the other hand the fire of hell, since it is a bodily fire, and burns in a bod-
way
ily
the wicked cast therein,
is
neither kin-
human endeavour, nor kept
dled by
alive with
Hence
its
fire is
own
has found
it
matter, as
in
burning
coal, or of
Under whatever conditions be found, it is always of the same
fire
so far as the nature of fire
is conbe a difference of species as to the bodies which are the matter of fire. Therefore flame and burning coal differ specifically, and hkewise burning wood and red-hot
species,
cerned, but there
iron; nor does point,
species as this.
matter,
sphere, and in a strange mat-
would seem that
proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It this fire is not of the same
its
the elements
all
it
may
signify, as to this particular
whether they be kindled by force, as
the case of iron, or ciple, as is
by a natural
in
intrinsic prin-
happens with sulphur. Accordingly it is of the same spe-
clear that the fire of hell
we
cies as the fire
have, so far as the nature
concerned. But whether that fire subsists in its proper matter, or if it subsists in a strange matter, whatever that matter may be, of fire
is
we know
And
not.
specifically
way it may differ we have, considered
in this
from the
fire
fuel,
materially. It has, however, certain properties
at one
differing
but once created endures unquenchably; and the same time it needs no kindling, and lacks not heat." Therefore it is not of the same nature as the fire that we see. Obj.
3.
Further,
The
everlasting and the cor-
ruptible differ essentially, since they agree not
even
But
according to the Philosopher.'* of ours is corruptible, whereas the
in genus, this fire
other
is
everlasting:
Depart from Me, you
cursed, into everlasting fire
(Matt.
25.
41).
Therefore they are not of the same nature. Obj. 4. Further, It belongs to the nature of this fire of ours to give light.
But the
fire
of
hence the saying of Job 18. 5: Shall not the light of the wicked be extinguished? Therefore ... as above. On the contrary. According to the Philosopher,^ "every water is of the same species as every other water." Therefore in like manner every fire is of the same species as every
hell gives
other
no
1
as regards the nature of the
Reply Obj.
i.
is
written (Wisd. 11.17):
City of God, xx, 16 (PL 41, 682). Peter Lombard, Sent., iv, d. 44, chap. 6
3
PL
*
Metaphysics, x, lo (i058''26).
75, ioq8.
^Topics,!, 5 (lOi^ig).
By what
(QR
11,
1003).
Augustine
with regard to gard to its nature. fire
Reply Obj.
its
fire. is
speaking of that
matter, and not with re-
This fire of ours is kept alive kindled by man, because it is introduced into a foreign matter by art and force. But that other fire needs no fuel to keep it alive, because either it subsists in its own 2.
with fuel, and
matter, or
is
not by force
in a foreign matter,
is
but by nature from an intrinsic principle. Therefore it is kindled not by man but by God, Who fashioned its nature. This is the meaning of the words of Isaias (30.
of the Lord dling it.
is
Reply Obj.
fire.
Further, It
*
light;
from our fire, for instance that it needs no kindling, nor is kept alive by fuel. But the differences do not argue a difference of species
damned
2)2>)
•
The breath
as a torreftt of brimstone kin-
3.
Even
as the bodies
of the
be of the same species as now, although now they are corruptible, whereas then they will be incorruptible, both by the ordering of Divine justice, and on account of the cessation of the heavenly movement, so is 6
will
Aristotle, iv,
i
(379'*i6).
— SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART with the
it
will
To
4.
give light does not belong
according to any mode of existence, own matter it gives no light there-
fire
since in its fore
it
;
does not shine in
ing to the philosophers,
own sphere accordand in like manner in
its
certain foreign matters
when
it is
does not shine, as
it
an opaque earthly substance such
in
as sulphur.
me
forth
ART.
Q. 97
.
.
.
is, into hell," and in the Gospel (Matt. 40) the words in the heart of the earth have the same sense, for as the heart is in the middle of an animal, so is hell supposed to be in the middle of the earth.
The same happens
also
when
its
12.
/ answer that, As Augustine says,^ and he is quoted in the text,^ "I am of opinion that no one knows in what part of the world hell is situated, unless the Spirit of
answers
species.
rash decision. For
is
this to iv,
in
Article 7. Whether the Fire of Hell Is Beneath the Earth?
We
God
has revealed
some one." Therefore Gregory
obscured by thick smoke. Therefore that the fire of hell gives no light is not sufficient proof of its being of a different
brightness
1071
7
into the heart of the sea, says,^
"that
be punished.
Reply Obj. to
by which those bodies
of hell
fire
{Dial.
42)^ having been questioned on this point :
"About
some part
think
it
matter
this
I
dare not give a
some have thought
hell to
of the earth's surface;
to be beneath the earth."
He
be
others
shows
more probable for from the very meaning of
the latter opinion to be the
would seem that
two reasons. First the word. These are
earth.
the nether regions (infernus), for the reason
proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It this fire is not beneath the
Objection
For
i.
(Job. 18. 18),
it
is
And God
said of the shall
damned
remove him out
world). Therefore the of the globe (Douay, fire whereby the damned will be punished is
not beneath the earth but outside the globe. Obj. 2. Further, Nothing violent or accidental
can be everlasting. But this fire will be in hell for ever. Therefore it will be there not by force but naturally. Now fire cannot be under the earth save by violence. Therefore the fire of hell is
Obj.
not beneath the earth. 3. Further, After the day of judgment
the bodies of in hell.
Now
all
the
damned
will
those bodies will
fill
be tormented a place. Con-
sequently, since the multitude of the
damned
be very great, for the number of fools is i. 15), the space containing that fire must also be very great. But it would seem unreasonable to say that there is so great a hollow within the earth, since all the parts of the earth naturally tend to the centre. Therefore that fire will not be beneath the earth. will
infinite (Eccl.
Obj.
4.
Further,
neth, by the
same
By what
things a
man
sin-
also he is
tormented (Wisd. II. 17). But the wicked have sinned on the earth. Therefore the fire that punishes them should not be under the earth.
On
the contrary, It
is
written (Isa. 14, 9)
:
Hell below was iit an uproar to meet Thee at Thy coming. Therefore the fire of hell is beneath us. Further, Gregory says {Dial, iv, 42):^ "I see not
what hinders us from believing that
beneath the earth. Further, A gloss on Jonas
hell is
1
PL 77, 401,
2. 4,
Thou
words: "If
we
call it
beneath us (inferitis), what earth is heaven, such should be hell in relation to earth." Secondly, from the words of Apoc. 5. 3: No man was able, neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor under the earth, to open the book, where the words "in heaven" that
it
is
in relation to
refer to the angels, "on earth" to
men
living in
the body, and "under the earth" to souls in
Augustine too {Gen. ad
hell.
34)^ seems to indicate two reasons for the congruity of hell being under the earth. One is that "since Lit. xii,
the souls of the departed sinned through love of the flesh, they should be treated as the dead flesh is accustomed to be treated, by being buried beneath the earth." The other is that heaviness is to the body what sorrow is to the spirit, and joy (of spirit) is as lightness (of
body). Therefore "just as in reference to the body, all the heavier things are beneath the others, if they are placed in order of gravity, so in reference to the spirit, the lower place
occupied by
is
more sorrowful"; empyrean is a fitting place
whatever
and thus even as the
is
for the joy of the elect, so the lowest part of
the earth
is
the damned.
a fitting place for the sorrow of Nor does it signify that Augus-
tine {ibid.) says that "hell
is stated or beheved under the earth," because he withdraws this {Retract, ii, 24)^ where he says: "I think I should have said that hell is beneath the earth, rather than have given the reason why it is stated or believed to be under the earth."
to be
^
Glossa interl.
3
Ciiy of God, xx, 16 (PL 41, 682). Lombard, Sent., iv, d. 44, chap. 6 (QRii, 1003). PL 77, 400.
4
hast cast
his
6
«
PL 34, 482.
(iv.
375r).
'PL 32, 640.
^
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
I072
However, some philosophers have maintained
sinned in soul and body will be punished in
beneath the terrestrial orb, but above the surface of the earth, on that part which is opposite to us. This seems to have been the meaning of Isidore when he asserted that "the sun and the moon will stop in the place wherein they w^ere created, lest the wicked should enjoy this light in the midst of their torments."^ But this is no argument, if we assert that hell is under the earth. We have already stated how these words may be ex-
it does not follow that a man will be punished in the very place where he sinned, because the place due to the damned is other from that due to wayfarers. We may also reply that these words refer to the punishments inflicted on man on the way, according as each sin has its corresponding punishment, since "every disordered love is its own punishment," as Augustine states.^
that
hell
plained
situated
is
both. But
QUESTION XCVIII Of the will and intellect of the DAMNED
(q. xci, a. 2).
Pythagoras held^ the place of punishment to be in a fiery sphere situated, according to him, in the middle of the whole world, and he called
{In Nine Articles)
the prison-house of Jupiter as Aristotle re-
it
lates.^
It
however, more in keeping with it is beneath the earth.
is,
Scripture to say that
Reply Obj. i. The words of Job, God shall remove him out of the globe, refer to the surface of the earth, that is from this world. This is how Gregory expounds it {Moral, xiv, 22)^ where he says: "He is removed from the globe when, at the coming of the heavenly judge, he is taken away from this world wherehe now prides himself in Nor does globe here signify
in
his wickedness."
the universe, as
though the place of punishment were outside the whole universe.
Reply Obj. 2. Fire continues in that place for all eternity by the ordering of Divine justice, although according to its nature an element cannot last for ever outside its own place, especially if things
were
to
remain
in this state of
We
must next consider matters pertaining to Under this head there are nine points of inquiry: (i) Whether every act of will in the damned is evil? (2) Whether they ever repent of the evil they have done? (3) Whether they would rather not be than be? (4) Whether they would wish others to be damned? (5) Whether the wicked hate God? (6) Whether they can demerit? (7) Whether they can make use of the knowledge acquired in this life? (8) Whether they ever think of God? (9) Whether they see the will and intellect of the damned.
the glory of the blessed?
Article the
Whether Every Act of Will
i.
Damned
We
proceed thus to the First Article:
would seem that not every act of
generation and corruption. The fire there will be of the very greatest heat, because its heat will be all gathered together from all parts, through being surrounded on all sides by the cold of
damned
the earth.
stand." Since, then,
Reply Obj. 3. Hell will never lack sufficient room to admit the bodies of the damned, since
not worse
hell
is
Obj. "evil
great enough to contain
is
damned. Reply Obj. 4. It does not follow of necessity that by what things a man sinneth, by the same tormented, except as regards the principal instruments of sin, because man having
also he
'
is
Cf. Glossa ordin.,
dore,
De
on
Ord. Crcatur., v
Isa. 60.19 (iv,
(PL
Etymol, XIV, 9 (PL 82. 526). 2 Diogenes Laertes, Viiac opltortim, VIII, »
Heavens,
I,
11,
31
(DD
99A);
83, 924); xill
et
cf.
also Isi-
(PL
83, 946);
Placita Clarorum Philos-
211).
X3 (293*^1).
the
PL
75, 1053.
best,
off
men who
are
than the demons,
2.
is
it
damned
are
would seem
Further, As Dionysius says (ibid.) J
altogether involuntary." Therefore
damned
they will
will anything,
thing good or apparently good.
Now
it
as
if
some-
a will that
good is itself good. Therefore the damned can have a good will. Obj. 3. Further, Some will be damned who, directly ordered to
while in this world, acquired certain habits of virtue, for instance heathens
who had
civic vir-
Now
a will elicits praiseworthy acts by reason of virtuous habits. Therefore there may be praiseworthy acts of the will in some of the tues.
damned. ^
^
iv),^
that they also can have a good will.
never are satisfied (Prov. 30. 15, 16). Nor is it unreasonable that God's power should maintain within the bowels of the earth a hollow the bodies of the
For according to Dionysius "the demons desire the good namely to be, to live, to under-
i.
Nom.
and the
accounted one of the three things that
all
It
will in the
is evil.
Objection {Div.
in
Is Evil?
Confessions,
•Sect. 23
i,
ig
(PG3,
(PL
72s).
3:
670). 7
Sect. 32
(PG3,
732).
— SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART On
the contrary,
An
obstinate will can never are
m
will.
my
good
Obj.
will.
will is theirs
that.
this or be inclined by their affections to this beand evil, always them This will is in turned away from cause they are completely nor can a will be the last end of a right will, to that same end. directed be it except good good, they Hence even though they will some be able to call one that so well it will do not account. their will good on that Dionysius must, i. The words of
some
ture's inclination to
particular good.
natural inchnation
this
is
is
na-
And
corrupted by
good which desired by them under
as this their wickedness, in so far
they desire naturally is certain evil circumstances.
Yet it good. teem that which is evil as though it were evil. Hence their will is do Reply Obj. 3. The habits of civic virtue because those not remain in the separated soul, civic Hfe which the in only us perfect virtues not remain after this Ufe. Even into acthey remained, they would never come by the obtion, being enchained, as it were,
though
will
stinacy of the mind.
Repent of 2. Whether the Damned They Have Done? We proceed thus to the Second Article: would seem that the damned never repent
Article the Evil
It
of
the evil they have done.
Objection i. For Bernard says on the Canthat "the dammed ever consent to the evil
ticle^
De
Arb., IX
Consider., v, 12
(PL
sed contra
i
(PL
;
(BO xxx,
689).
cf.
182, 802);
Albert,
182, 1017)
to the angels."
is
Damascene man what
to
But the
tics,
or through obstinacy, as those
glad
when they have done
angel's
who
are
and rejoice
evil,
in
14).
There-
said of the
damned
(Prov.
most wicked things
2.
fore, etc.
On
the contrary. It
(Wisd. (Vulg.,
3)
5.
:
is
Repenting within themselves
Saying within themselves, repenting). The Philosopher says^ that "the
Further,
wicked are
full of
repentance; for afterwards
they are sorry for that in which previously they took pleasure." Therefore the damned, being
most wicked, repent all the more. / answer that, A person may repent of sin in two ways in one way directly, in another way
He repents of a sin directly who hates sin as such; and he repents accidentally who hates it on account of something connected with it, for instance punishment or someaccidentally.
thing of that kind. Accordingly the wicked will not repent of their sins directly, because consent in the malice of sin will remain in them;
but they will repent accidentally, in so far as they will suffer from the punishment inflicted on them for sin.
Reply Obj.
In
De
Grat. et Lib.
Sent., iv, d. 50, A. 3.
i.
The damned
will wickedness,
but shun punishment, and thus accidentally they repent of wickedness committed. Reply Obj. 2. To wish one had not sinned on account of the shamefulness of vice is a good will; but this will not be in the wicked. Reply Obj. 3. It will be possible for the damned to repent of their sins without turning their will away from sin, because in their sins they will shun not what they previously desired,
Cf.
"death
:
Evil, as evil, does not move Reply Obj. thought to be good. the will, but in so far as it is that they eswickedness their of comes 2.
1
4),^
he cannot withdraw from the choice whereby he previously sinned. Therefore the damned also cannot repent of the sins committed by them. Obj. 4. Further, The wickedness of the damned in hell will be greater than that of sinners in the world. Now in this world some sinners repent not of the sins they have committed, either through blindness of mind, as here-
to
which
ii,
will is irrevocable after his fall, in that
can be good. But their deliberate it is in their power of themselves, according as
will,
was
their fall
in
yet
Further, According to
3.
{De Fide Orthod.
may be consid/ answer that, A twofold will deliberate will the namely damned, ered in the will is theirs and the natural will. Their natural of nature Author the of but not of themselves call Who gave nature this inclination which we remains nature since Therefore the natural will. will in them them, it follows that the natural
Reply Obj. be understood of the natural
1073
2
they had not sinned, and thus the same conclusion follows as above.
m
But the blessed never have an Neither therefore have the damned
iv\\
ART.
repent they have done." Therefore they never of the sins they have committed. Obj. 2. Further, To wish one had not sinned will never have a is a good will. But the damned good will. Therefore the damned will never wish
evil. Now men who )e inclined except to demons, lamned will be obstinate even as the good. be never can will rherefore their redamned is Fiirther, As the will of the blessed the of will the so is
ation to evil, egard to good.
Q. 98
but something
else,
namely the punish-
ment. 2
PG
94, 877.
'
Ethics, IX, 4 (1166^24).
—
:
:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
I074
Reply Obj.
However
4.
obstinate
men may
be in this world, they repent of the sins accidentally if they are punished for them. Thus
Augustine says (qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) \^ "We see the most savage beasts are deterred from the
by fear of pain."
greatest pleasures
proceed thus to the Third Article: It
would seem impossible for the damned, by right and deliberate reason, to will not to be. Objection 1. For Augustine says {De Lib. Arb. iii, 7) '} "Consider how great a good it is to be, since both the happy and the unhappy will it; for to be and yet to be unhappy is a greater thing than not to be at all." 2.
Preference supposes election. But not to be it has not the appearance of good, for it is nothing. Therefore not to be cannot be more desirable to the 8)
:^
not a matter of choice since
damned than Obj.
3.
to be.
Now
to be shunned.
since
evil,
The
Further,
greater evil
not to be
is
the
to leave nothing. Therefore not to be
more
is
more
shunned than to be unhappy; and thus same conclusion follows as above.
to be
the
On
the contrary, It
men
hi those days
death shall Further,
fly
.
is
.
.
written (Apoc.
9.
in
it is
shall desire to die,
(Ecclus. 41.
3,
to die,
Much
desirable
to
damned
the
and so
more, therefore,
it is
is
written is
"not to be"
damned according
the
to
their
deliberate reason. / answer that.
two ways.
Not
to be
may
be considered
First, in itself,
may
be considered as a relief from a painful some unhappiness, and thus not to be takes on the aspect of good, since "to lack an evil is a kind of good" as the Philosopher says.-* In this way it is better for the damned it
life
1
or from
PL 40,
»PL32,
says,^ but absolutely.
Non being is subject to choice, but only accidentally, as stated already (Reply i). not in
25.
2
2.
itself,
Reply Obj.
Although not to be is very it removes being, it is very good, in so far as it removes unhappiness, which is the greatest of evils, and thus it is preferred 3.
in so far as
evil,
not to be.
^Article
4. Whether in Hell the Damned 'Would Wish Others Were Damned Who Are Not Damned?
We
proceed this to the Fourth Article: It in
hell
the
damned would who are not
wish others were damned
Objection of the rich
i.
man
For
it is
said
(Luke
16. 27,
28)
that he prayed for his brethren,
lest they should come into the place of torments. Therefore in Hke manner the other
damned would not wish, at least, be damned in hell. Obj. 2. Further, The damned
their friends
in the flesh to
are not deprived of their inordinate affections. Now some of the damned loved inordinately some who are not damned. Therefore they would not desire
their
that
evil,
is,
that
they should be
Obj. 3. Further, the damned do not desire the increase of their punishment. Now if more
were damned, their punishment would be greater, even as the joy of the blessed is increased by an increase in their number. Therefore the
damned who are
On
desire
PL 32. *
1280.
Ethics, \,i{ii2g^d>).
not
the
damnation of those
saved.
the contrary,
^Glossa ordin. 1281.
life,
of unhappiness, as the Philosopher
damned.
and thus it can in no way be desirable, since it has no aspect of good, but is pure privation of good. Secondly, in
referable to an evil and corrupt life
damned. of
welcome to the man that is in need, and to him whose strength jaileth; who is in a decrepit age, and that is in care about all things, and to the distrustful that loseth wisdom (Vulg., patience).
this as
not
death, thy sentence
4):
desired by
and a
end to unhappiness. For
stated that to be and to live are all naturally, we are not to take
is
and
all
some
it
would seem that
from them.
The unhappiness
desirable to
as putting an
6)
unhappiness of this world. Now order to escape the unhappiness of this world,
surpasses
tally,
when
the greatest
is
removes good altogether, so as
it
Reply Obj. i. The saying of Augustine is to be understood in the sense that not to be is a matter of choice not in itself but acciden-
Reply Obj.
Further. Augustine argues thus {ibid.
is
Jerome observes:^ "It is better not be than to be evilly." In this sense the damned can prefer not to be, according to their deliberate reason.
Not To Be?
Obj.
a gloss of to
Article 3. Whether the Damned By Right and Deliberate Reason Woidd Will
We
not to be than to be unhappy. Hence it is said (Matt. 26. 24): It were better for him, if that man had not been born, and (Jerem. 20. 14) Cursed be the day wherein I was born, where
(iv,
A
gloss on Isa.
14. 9, are
139E); Jerome, In Jerem. (PL
838).
^Ethics, IX, 9 (11 70^22),
2.1,
:
.
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART risen
up from
their thrones, says
are comforted by having
:^
"The wicked
many companions
in
their punishment."
Further, Envy reigns supreme in the damned. Therefore they grieve for the happiness of the blessed, and desire their damnation.
/ answer that.
heaven there
will
Even
as
in
the blessed in
damned
goods. Consequently the sight of the happiness of the saints will give them very great pain; hence it is written (Isa. 26. 11): Let the en-
and be confounded, and
vious people see
let
devour Thy enemies. Therefore they will all the good were damned. Reply Obj. i. So great will be the envy of the damned that they will envy the glory even of their kindred, since they themselves are supremely unhappy, for this happens even in
fire
wish
this
life,
when envy
increases.
Nevertheless
they will envy their kindred less than others, and their punishment would be greater if all their kindred
were damned, and others saved,
some
of their kindred were saved. For
than
if
this reason the rich man prayed that his brethren might be warded from damnation, for he knew that some are guarded therefrom. Yet
he would rather that his brethren were damned as well as all the rest.
Reply Obj. tue
is
2.
Love that
is
not based on vir-
easily cut off, especially in evil
men, as
the Philosopher says.^ Hence the damned will not preserve their friendship for those whom
they loved inordinately. Yet the will of them remain perverse, because they will continue to love the cause of their inordinate
will
loving.
Although an increase in the number of the damned results in an increase of each one's punishment, so much the more will their hatred and envy increase that they will prefer to be more tormented with many rather than less tormented alone.
Reply Obj.
Article
5.
3.
Whether the Damned Hate God?
We
proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It would seem that the damned do not hate God. Objection 1. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Norn, i),^ "the beautiful and good that is the cause of all goodness and beauty is be1
Glossa ordin.
(iv,
32E);
cf.
Jerome, In Isaiam (PL
Ethics,
vm,
8 (1159^7).
^
Sect. 10
(PG 3,
6
1075
since "evil
is
altogether involuntary," as Diony-
Nom. iv).* Now God is goodTherefore no one can hate Him.
sius asserts (Div.
ness
itself.
On
the contrary, It
The pride of them
written (Ps. 73. 23)
is
708).
Thee ascendeth
that hate
contiiiually
The
I answer that,
or evil apprehended.
appetite
two ways, namely
in
who
blessed,
see
is
Now God
Him
moved by good is
apprehended
Himself, as by the in His essence; and in
in
by us and by the damned. Since, then. He is goodness by His essence, He cannot in Himself be displeasing to any will; therefore whoever sees Him in His essence cannot hate Him. On the other hand, some of His
His
effects, as
effects
are displeasing to
as they are
may
a person
the will in so far
opposed to any one, and accordingly
God
hate
not in Himself, but Therefore the damned, perceiving God in His punishment, which is the effect of His justice, hate Him, even as they hate the punishment inflicted on them. Reply Obj. 1. The saying of Dionysius refers to the natural appetite; and even this is rendered perverse in the damned, by that which is added to it by their deliberate will, as stated above (a. i. Reply i). Reply Obj. 2. This argument would prove if the damned saw God in Himself, as being in His essence.
by reason of His
Article
We
6.
effects.
Whether
the
Damned Demerit?
proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It
would seem that the damned demerit. Objection 1. For the damned have an will, as
stated in the last Distinction of
iv.
evil
Sent.^
But they demerited by the evil will that they had here. Therefore if they do not demerit there, their damnation is to their advantage. Obj. 2. Further, The damned are on the same footing as the demons. Now the demons demerit after their fall, and thus God inflicted a punishment on the serpent, who induced man to sin (Gen. 3. 14, 15). Therefore the damned also demerit.
Obj.
3.
Further,
An
inordinate act that pro-
ceeds from a deliberate will
is
not excused
from demerit, even though there be necessity of which one is oneself the cause, for the drunken man deserves a double punishment
24,
165). 2
ART.
as neither can one will badness itself,
itself,
be most perfect charity, so
there will be the most perfect hate. Therefore as the saints will rejoice in all goods, so will the damned grieve for all in the
Q. 98
loved of all." But this is God. Therefore God cannot be the object of anyone's hate. Obj. 2. Further, No one can hate goodness
(PG 3,
4
Sect. 32
6
Dist. 50, chap,
732). i
(QR 11,
1032).
^
SUM MA THEOLOGICA
LOj6
he commit a crime throut^h being drunk. the damned were themselves the cause of their own obstinacy, owing to which they are under a kind of necessity of sinning. Therefore since their act proceeds from their free
Reply Obj.
if
Now
from demerit. the contrary, Punishment is divided
choice, they are not excused
On
against fault.
Now
the perverse
damned proceeds from their
is
will
their obstinacy,
of
the
which
punishment. Therefore the perverse damned is not a fault by which they
will of the
may
profitable to
of evil, the result being that the
Further, After reaching the last term there
no further movement, or advancement in good or evil. Now the damned, especially after the judgment day, will have reached the last term of their damnation, since "then there will cease to be two cities," according to Augustine {Enchir. cxi).^ Therefore after the judgment day the damned will not demerit by their perverse will, for if they did their damnation would is
be augmented. / answer that,
We must draw a distinction between the damned before the judgment day and after. For all are agreed that after the judgment day there will be neither merit nor demerit. The reason for this is because merit or demerit is directed to the attainment of some further good or evil, and after the day of judgment good and evil will have reached their ultimate consummation, so that there will be no further addition to good or evil. Consequently, good will in the blessed will not be a merit but a reward, and evil will in the damned will be not a demerit but a punishment only. For works of virtue belong especially to the state of happiness, and their contraries to the other hand,
demons
the
demerit
that, before
the judgment day, both the good merit and
it
damned
are
clear
that
is
for
are,
regards
as
which reason the latter secondary punish-
their
ment.
The reason why they are 3. from demerit is not because they are under the necessity of sinning, but because they have reached the highest of Reply Obj. excused
evils.
However, the necessity of sinning of which
we
are ourselves the cause, in so far as
necessity, excuses
from
it is
a
because every sin needs to be voluntary; but it does not excuse, in so far as it proceeds from a previous act of the will, and consequently the whole demerit of the subsequent sin would seem to belong to the previous sin. sin,
Article 7. Whether the Damned Can Make Use of the Knowledge They Had in This World?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It would seem that the damned are unable to make use of the knowledge they had in this world.
Objection
i.
For there
is
very great pleasure
knowledge. But we must not admit that they have any pleasure. Therefore they cannot make use of the knowledge they had previously, by applying their the
in
consideration
consideration to
Obj.
some say
degree un-
they gain no advantage from their sin. Reply Obj. 2. Men who are damned are not occupied in drawing others to damnation, as
the state of unhappiness.^
On
Hence
incapable of demerit.
not
demerit.
It is in the highest
i.
have reached the highest degree
it.
Further,
2.
of
The damned
suffer greater
pains than any pains of this world.
when one
world,
is
in
Now
very great pain,
in this
it is
im-
demerit. But this cannot apply to
possible to consider any intelligible conclusions,
the essential reward or to the principal punish-
through being distracted by the pains that one suffers. Much less therefore can one do so in
the
damned
both have reached the term. Possibly, however, this may apply to the accidental reward, or secondary punishment, which are subject to increase until the day of judgment. Especially may this apply to the demons, or to the good angels, by whose ment, since
in this respect
activities som.e are
drawn
to salvation,
the joy of the blessed angels
some
to
of the
demons
is
whereby
increased, and
damnation, wherclw the punishment is
hell.
Obj. time.
3.
Further,
Ethics.
Ill,
'
.Aristotle, Ethics,
*
Cf. Part
A. 4,
Reply
2.
I, Q.
i,
2
PL 40,
damned
will forget
here.
On the contrary. It is who was damned (Luke
said to the rich
man
25): Reviember that thou didst receive good things in thy life16.
time, etc. Therefore they will consider about
augmented."*
5 (iii3''3i).
are subject to
the cause of for-
is
getfulness."^ Therefore the
what they knew
the things they 1
The damned
But "length of time
284.
Further,
10(1 loo^j).
Lxii, A. 9, Reply 3; Part 11 -II, Q.
xm,
The
knew
here.
intelligible
species remain in
the separated soul, as stated above '
Aristotle, Physics, iv, 13 (222^*19).
(q.
lxx,
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART Reply 3; Part I, Q. Lxxxrx, a. 6). Therefore, if they could not use them these would
Q. 98
ART.
1077
9
A. 2,
remain in them to no purpose. / answer that, Even as in the saints, on account of the perfection of their glory, there will be nothing but what is a matter of joy, so there will be nothing in the damned but what is a matter and cause of sorrow; nor will anything that can pertain to sorrow be lacking, so that their unhappiness is consummate. Now
known
brings
some respect, either on the part things known, because we love them,
of the
the part of the knowledge, because
fitting
the consideration of certain things
us joy, in
or on
it is
and perfect. There may also be a reason for sorrow both on the part of the things known, because they are of a grievous nature, and on the part of the knowledge, if we consider its imperfection; for instance a person may consider his defective knowledge about a certain thing, which he would desire to know perfectly. Accordingly, in the damned there will be actual consideration of the things they knew previously as matters of sorrow, but not as a cause of pleasure. For they will consider both the evil they have done, and for which they were damned, and the delightful goods they have lost, and on both counts they will suffer torments. Likewise they will be tormented with the thought that the knowledge they had of speculative matters was imperfect, and that they missed its highest degree of perfection which they might have acquired. Reply Obj. i. Although the consideration of knowledge
delightful in itself,
is
it
may
acci-
dentally be the cause of sorrow, as explained
above.
Reply Obj.
In this world the soul
Article 8. Whether the Damned Will Ever Think of God?
We
proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It
would seem that the damned will sometimes think of God. Objection i. For one cannot hate a thing actually unless one think about
damned
it.
Now
the
God, as stated in the text of the fourth book of the Sentences in the last Distinction.^ Therefore they will think of God sometimes. will hate
Obj. 2. Further, The damned will have remorse of conscience. But the conscience suffers remorse for deeds done against God. Therefore they will sometimes think of God. On the contrary, Man's most perfect thoughts are those which are about God, whereas the
damned
will
be in a state of the greatest imper-
fection. Therefore they will not think of
God.
/ answer that, One may think of God in two ways. First, in Himself and according to that
which
proper to Him, namely that He is the all goodness, and thus it is altogether impossible to think of Him without delight, so is
fount of
damned will by no means think of Him way. Secondly, according to something accidental as it were to Him in His effects, such as His punishments, and so forth, and in this respect the thought of God can bring that the
in this
sorrow, so that in this think of God.
way
the
damned
will
Reply Obj. I. The damned do not hate God except because He punishes and forbids what agreeable to their evil will, and consequently they will think of Him only as punishing and forbidding. This suffices for the Reply to the
is
to a corruptible body,
Second Objection, since conscience will not have remorse for sin except as forbidden by
consideration
the Divine
commandment.
not be so
Article
Whether the Damned See the
much
Glory of the Blessed?
the body. life
the
2.
On
soul
is
united
and therefore the soul's hindered by the suffering of
is
the other hand, in the future
drawn by the body may suffer, have a most clear view of
will
body, but however
the
9.
those things that can be a cause of anguish
We proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It would seem that the damned do not see the
to
glory of the blessed.
the
soul
will
it.
Reply Obj.
Time
causes forgetfulness accidentally, in so far as the movement of which it
is
3.
the measure
after the
is
the cause of change. But
judgment day there
ment
will
be no move-
of the heavens; therefore neither will it be possible for forgetfulness to result from any lapse of time however long. Before the judgment day, however, the separated soul is not changed from its disposition by the heavenly
movement.
Objection 1. For they are more distant from the glory of the blessed than from the happenings of this world. But they do not see what happens in regard to us; hence Gregory commenting on Job. 14. 21, Whether his children come to honour etc. says {Moral, xii, 21):^
"Even as those who still live know not in what place are the souls of the dead, so the dead 1
Dist. so, chap. 2
2
PL 75, 999.
(QR 11,
1034),
SUMMA
1078
TllEOLOGICA
who have hved in the body know not the things which regard the hfe of those who are in the flesh."
Much
therefore, can they see the
less,
glory of the blessed.
Obj. 2. Further, That which is granted as a great favour to the saints in this life is never
granted to the damned. Now it was granted as a great favour to Paul to see the life in which the saints hve for ever with God, as the 12. 2 states.^ Therefore the not see the glory of the saints.
gloss on II Cor.
damned
On
will
the contrary, It
man
that the rich
saw Abraham
.
.
I answer that,
ment day, a
way
is
stated
(Luke
16. 23)
midst of his torments and Lazarus in his bosom. in the
.
The damned, before
the judg-
will see the blessed in glory, in
as to
know, not what that glory
such
is like,
but only that they are in a state of glory that surpasses all thought. This will trouble them, both because they will, through envy, grieve
Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners? (2) Whether by God's mercy all punishment both of men and of demons comes to an end? (3) Whether at least the punishment of men comes to an end? (4) Whether at least the punishment of Christians has an end? (5) Whether there is an end to the punishment of those who have performed works of mercy? i. Whether By Divine Justice an Eternal Punishment Is Inflicted on Sinners?
Article
We
proceed thus to the First Article:
It
would seem that an eternal punishment is not inflicted on sinners by Divine justice. Objectiofi I. For the punishment should not exceed the fault: According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be (Deut. 25.
2).
Now
fault
temporal. There-
is
fore the punishment should not be eternal.
Obj.
2.
Further, Of two mortal sins one
is
for-
greater than the other, and therefore one should
feited that glor>\ Hence it is written (Wisd. 5. 2) concerning the wicked Seeing it they shall be troubled with terrible fear. After the judgment day, however, they will be altogether deprived
receive a greater punishment than the other.
for their happiness,
and because they have
:
of seeing the blessed; nor will this lessen their punishment, but will increase it, because they will bear in remembrance the glory of the blessed which they saw at or before the judgment, and this will torment them. Moreover they will be tormented by finding themselves considered unworthy even to see the glory
which the saints merit to have. Reply Obj. i. The happenings of this life would not, if seen, torment the damned in hell as the sight of the glory of the saints. Therefore the things which happen here are not shown to the
damned
in the
same way
as the saints'
although also of the things that happen here, those are shown to them which are capable of causing them sorrow.
glory;
Reply Obj.
Paul looked upon that life live with God, by actual exand by hoping to have it more 2.
wherein the saints perience of
it
perfectly in the
life to
come. Not so the damned,
and therefore the comparison
god's
We must next
consider God's justice and mercy towards the damned, under which head there Glossa
ititerl. (vi,
761); Glossa
(i)
Therefore eternal
punishment is not due to every sin; and if it is not due to one, it is due to none, since they are not infinitely distant from one another. Obj. 3. Further, A just judge does not punish except in order to correct, and therefore it is stated^ that "punishments are a kind of medicine." Now, to punish the wicked eternally does not lead to their correction, nor to that of others, since then there will be no one in
who can be
future
corrected thereby. Therefore
punishment is not inflicted for sins according to Divine justice. Obj. 4. Further, No one washes that which is not desirable for its own sake, except on aceternal
count of some advantage. Now God does not wish punishment for its own sake, for He delights not in punishment.^ Since then no advantage can result from the perpetuity of punishment, it would seem that He ought not to inflict such a punishment for sin. 5. Further, Nothing accidental lasts for But punishment is one of those things that happen accidentally, since it is contrary
Obj.
Obj.
seem
6.
it
The
Further.
cannot be everlasting. justice of
God would
brought on account of ingratitude a person deserves to lose all benefits; and to require that sinners should be
to nothing, because
(In Five Articles)
*
greater than eternal pun-
infinite.
to nature. Therefore
mercy and justice towards the damned
are five points of inquiry:
is
is
it
ever.'*
fails.
QUESTION XCIX Of
But no punishment ishment, since
Whether by
Lombardi (PL
192, 79).
among 2
other benefits of
Aristotle. Ethics,
'Cf.Wisd. *
ii,
God
there
is
being
3 (1104^17).
1.13.
Aristotle, Heavens,
i,
2 (269*'6)
;
cf. ii,
3 (286*17).
— SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART Therefore it would seem just that the sinner who has been ungrateful to God should lose his being. But if sinners be brought to nothing, their punishment cannot be everlasting. Therefore it would seem out of keeping with Divine justice that sinners should be punitself.
ished for ever.
On 46)
:
the contrary, It is written (Matt. 25, These, namely the wicked, shall go into
everlasting piinishment.
Further, As reward
is
to merit, so
is
punish-
to guilt. Now, according to Divine justice, an eternal reward is due to temporal merit: Every one who seeth the Son and believeth in may have) Him hath (Vulg., that everyone life everlasting. Therefore according to Divine justice an everlasting punishment is due to temporal guilt. Further, According to the Philosopher,^ punishment is meted according to the dignity of the person sinned against, so that a person who strikes one in authority receives a greater punishment than one who strikes anyone else. Now whoever sins mortally sins against God, Whose commandments he breaks, and Whose honour he gives another, by placing his end in some one other than God. But God's majesty is infinite. Therefore whoever sins mortally deserves infinite punishment; and consequently it seems just that for a mortal sin a man should be punished for ever. / answer that. Since punishment is measured in two ways, namely according to the degree of its severity, and according to its length of time, the measure of punishment corresponds
ment
.
to the
measure of
.
.
fault, as regards the
degree
more grievously
a per-
of severity, so that the
son sins the more grievously is he punished As much as she hath glorified herself and lived :
much torment and sorrow give ye to her (Apoc. 18. 7). The duration of the punishment does not, however, correspond with in delicacies, so
the duration of the fault, as Augustine says,^ for adultery which is committed in a short space of time is not punished with a momentary penalty even according to
human
laws.
But the duration of punishment regards the disposition of the sinner, for sometimes a person who commits an offence in a city is rendered by his very offence worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens, either by perpetual exile or even by death; sometimes however he is not rendered worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of i£Mic5,v, 5(1132^28). 2
City of God, xxi, 11 (PL 41, 725).
ART.
Q. 99
1079
i
the citizens, and therefore in order that he
become a
fitting
member
may
of the State, his pun-
ishment
is prolonged or curtailed, according as expedient for his amendment, so that he may live in the city in a becoming and peaceful
is
manner. So too, according to Divine justice, sin renders a person worthy to be altogether cut off from the fellowship of God's city, and this is the effect of every sin committed against charwhich is the bond uniting this same city
ity,
together. Consequently, for mortal sin which
contrary to charity a person is expelled for ever from the fellowship of the saints and conis
demned
to everlasting punishment, because as
men are cut off from this perishable city by the penalty of the first death, so are they excluded from that imperishable Augustine says,^ "as
city by the punishment of the second death." That the punishment inflicted by the earthly
state
is
not regarded as everlasting
either because
man
is
accidental,
does not endure for ever,
or because the state itself comes to an end. Therefore if man lived for ever, the punishment of exile or slavery, which
human
law,
would remain
is
pronounced by
him
for ever. On the other hand, as regards those who sin in such a way as not to deserve to be entirely cut off from the fellowship of the saints, such as those who sin venially, their punishment wil be so
much
in
the shorter or longer according or less fit to be cleansed,
more
as they are
through sin clinging to them more or less this observed in the punishments of this world and of purgatory according to Divine justice. We find also other reasons given by the saints ;
is
why some
condemned
are justly
to everlasting
punishment for a temporal sin. One is because they sinned against an eternal good by despising eternal Hfe. This is mentioned by Augustine:^ "He is become worthy of eternal evil, who destroyed in himself a good which could be eternal." Another reason is because man sinned in his
own
eternity;
therefore Gregory says belongs to the great justice of the judge that those should never cease to (Dial, iv, 44), 5
be punished
who And
never ceased to be objected that some sin mortally propose to amend their life
desire sin."
who
''it
in this life
if
it
at some time, and that these accordingly would not be deserving of eternal punishment, it must be replied according to some that Gregory
speaks of the will that deed. For he
who
is
made manifest by
falls into
Ubid. (PL 41, 726). *Ibid., 12
(PL
41, 727).
the
mortal sin of his
6PL
77,404.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
io8o
own will puts himself in a state from which he cannot be rescued unless God help him; therefore from the very fact that he
he
to sin,
is
willing
willing to remain in sin for ever.
is
For man is a mind that goetJi, namely to sin, and retiirneth not by his own power (Ps. 77. 39). Thus if a man were to throw himself into a pit from which he could not get out without help, one might say that he wished to remain there for ever, whatever else he may have thought himself. Another and a better answer is that from the very fact that he commits a mortal sin, he places his end in a creature; and 1
since the whole of life
is
directed to
its
end,
it
follows that for this very reason he directs the whole of his hfe to that sin, and is willing to in sin for ever
remain
if
he could do so with
may
be intended for the correction and tranwho remain in the state. Accordingly the damnation of the wicked is quillity of the others
for the correction of those
who
are
now
in the
Church; for punishments are intended for cor-
when they are being inflicted, but also when they are decreed. Reply Obj. 4. The everlasting punishment rection not only
of the wicked will not be altogether useless. For they are useful for two purposes. First,
because thereby the Divine justice is safeguarded which is acceptable to God for its own
Hence Gregory says {Dial, iv, 44) "Almighty God on account of His loving kindness dehghts not in the torments of the unhappy, but on account of His justice. He is for ever unappeased by the punishment of the wicked." sake.
:"*
what Gregory says on Job
Secondly, they are useful, because the elect
esteem the deep as growing old {Moral, xxxiv, 19) •} 'The wicked only put an end to sinning because their life came to an end they would indeed have wished to live
therein, when they see God's justice them, and realize that they have escaped them. Hence it is written (Ps. 57. 12): The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge, (Isa. 66. 24) They, namely the etc., and wicked, shall be a loathsome sight^ to all flesh,
impunity. This 41.
He
23,
is
shall
;
for ever, that they might continue in sin for ever, for they desire rather to sin than to Hve." Still
may
another reason
punishment of mortal thereby one offends since
fore
sin
be given
God Who
is infinite.
punishment cannot be
intensity, because the creature infinite quality,
an
in duration.
And
it
must be
again there
why
the
eternal, because
is
is
is
There-
infinite
in
incapable of
infinite at least
a fourth reason
for the same, because guilt remains for ever, since it cannot be remitted without grace, and
receive grace after death; nor should punishment cease so long as guilt re-
men cannot mains.
Reply Obj.
i.
Punishment does not have to
be equal to fault as to the amount of duration, as is seen to be the case also with human laws. We may also reply with Gregory^ that although sin
is
temporal
in act, it is eternal in will.
rejoice in
:
namely
to the saints, as a gloss says.^
expresses himself in
Gregory
same sense :^ "The
the
wicked are all condemned to eternal punishment, and are punished for their own wickedness. Yet they will burn to some purpose, namely that the just may all both see in God the joys they receive, and perceive in them the torments they have escaped, for which reason they will acknowledge themselves for ever the debtors of Divine grace, the more that they will see how the evils which they overcame by its assistance are punished eternally." Reply Obj. 5. Although the punishment relates to the soul accidentally, tially to the soul infected
guilt will
remain
ishment also
will
Reply Obj.
it
with
relates essen-
guilt.
And
since
punbe everlasting. Punishment corresponds to
in the soul for ever, its
Reply Obj. 2. The degree of intensity in the punishment corresponds to the degree of gravity in the sin; therefore mortal sins unequal in gravity will receive a punishment unequal in
properly speaking, in respect of the lack of order in the fault, and not of the dignity in
intensity but equal in duration.
case, a
on those who are not altogether expelled from
Reply Obj.
3.
The punishments
inflicted
the society of their fellow-citizens are intended for their correction, whereas those punishments whereby certain persons are wholly banished from the society of their fellow-citizens are
not intended for their correction, although they
the person offended; for
191 »
Cf. Glossa interl. ,
(in,
iQQv); Glossa
736) Augustine, Enarr. in Ps.
PL
;
76, 738.
'
Ibid.
(PL 36,
Lomhardi (PL ggS).
punishment of
if
the latter were the
infinite intensity
would
correspond to every sin. Accordingly, although a man deserves to lose his being from the fact that he has sinned against God, the author of his being, yet, in view of the lack of order of the act itself, loss of being is not due to him, < ^
^
6.
fault,
PL 77. 404Ad satictatem
I'isionis,
which
St.
Thomas
takes to sig-
nify being satiated with joy.
^Glossa 703).
interl. (iv, '
Loc.
cit.
io8v); Jerome, In Isaiam (PL 24,
—
—
:
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART presupposed to merit and demerit, nor is being lost or corrupted by the lack of order of sin; and consequently privation of being cannot be the punishment due to any sin. since being
is
ART.
Q. 99
:
1081
3
the false prophets (Vulg.,
the beast and false
prophet, etc.) shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever, which is the Scriptural expression for eternity. Secondly, because this opin-
mercy in one direction and depreciated it in another. For it would seem equally reasonable for the good angels to remain in eternal happiness and for the wicked angels to be eternally punished. Therefore just as he maintained that the demons and the souls of the damned are to be delivered at length from their sufferings, so he maintained that the angels and the souls of the blessed will at length pass from their happy state to the ion exaggerated God's
Article 2. Whether By God's Mercy All Punishment of the Damned, Both Men and DemonsJ Comes to an End?
We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that by God's mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes an end.
to
Objection
i.
For
it is
written (Wisd. 11. 24)
Lord, because Thou hast mercy upon all, Thou canst do all things. But among all things the demons also are included, since they are
God's creatures. Therefore also their punishwill come to an end. Obj. 2. Further, God hath concluded all in
ment
unbelief), that
sin (Vulg.,
He may have mercy
(Rom. 11. 32). Now God has concluded demons under sin, that is to say, He permitted them to be concluded. Therefore it would seem that in time He has mercy even on on
all
the
the demons.
Obj.
3.
Homo,
ii,
Further,
As Anselm says {Cur Deus
God
4),^ "it is not just that
should
permit the utter loss of a creature which He made for happiness." Therefore, since every rational creature
was created
would seem unjust for
kxc happiness,
be allowed to
to
it
it
the contrary, It
41): Depart from
and
is
written (Matt. 25. cursed, into ever-
Me, you
which is prepared for the devil Therefore they will be punished
lasting fire,
this life.
Reply Obj. i. God, for His own part, has mercy on all. Since, however, his mercy is ruled by the order of His wisdom, the result that it does not reach to certain people who render themselves unworthy of that mxcrcy, as
is
do the demons and the damned who are obstinate in wickedness.
even
in
And
them His mercy
yet
we may say
that
finds a place, in so
far as they are punished less than they wholly deserve but not that they are entirely delivered
from punishment. Reply Obj. 2. In the words quoted the
dis-
tribution (of the predicate) regards the genera
and not the individuals, so that the statement applies to
that
is,
men
in the state of wayfarer, because,
He had mercy
both on Jews and on
Gentiles, but not on every Gentile or every Jew.
perish altogether.
On
unhappiness of
his angels.
eternally.
Further, Just as the good angels were made happy through turning to God, so the bad angels were made unhappy through turning away from God. Therefore if the unhappiness of the wicked angels comes at length to an end, the happiness of the good will also come to an
Reply Obj.
Anselm means
3.
that
it is
not
just with regard to appropriateness to God's
goodness, and
speaking of the creature gendoes not become the Divine goodness that a whole genus of creature fail erically.
For
is
it
of the end for
which it was made; therefore unbecoming for all men or all angels to be damned. But there is no reason why some men or some angels should perish for ever, is
it
because the intention of the Divine will filled in
the others
who
is ful-
are saved.
end, v/hich cannot be admitted.
/ answer that. As Augustine says^ "Origen erred in maintaining that the
demons
will at
length, through God's mercy, be delivered their
punishment." But
demned by because
this error
1
:
PL 158, 402. City of God, xxi, 17, 23 (PL 41, 73i; 735);
PeriArchon,
i,
6 (PG
11, 165; 1 68).
cf.
Origen
3.
Whether God's Mercy
Men To Be
Suffers
proceed thus to the Third Article: It
at least
men
Objection
My
At
Punished Eternally?
would seem that God's mercy does not
clearly contrary to the authority
Holy Writ (Apoc. 20. 9, 10) The devil who seduced them was cast into the pool of fire and brimstone, where both the beasts and of
2
We
from
has been con-
the Church for two reasons. First
it is
Article Least
suffer
to be punished eternally. i.
spirit shall
For
it is written (Gen. 6. 3) not remain in man for ever,
because he is flesh, where "spirit" denotes indignation, as a gloss observes.^ Therefore, since God's indignation is not distinct from His punishment, 3
man
Glossa interl.
will (i,
not be punished eternally. In Pentai. (PL 91, 224).
501) ; Bede,
— SUMMA THEOLOGICA
io82
The charity of the saints in this life makes them pray for their enemies. Now they will have more perfect charity in Obj.
2.
Further,
men who die without charity, since men what their fall was to the
the souls of ''death
to
is
Damascene says
angels," as
Reply Obj.
{loc. cit.).
pray then for their enemies who are damned. But the prayers of the saints cannot be in vain, since they are most acceptable to God. Therefore at the saints' prayers the Divine mercy will in time deliver the damned from their punishment. Obj. 3. Further, God's foretelling of the punishment of the damned belongs to the prophecy of threats. Now the prophecy of threats is not always fulfilled, as appears from what was said of the destruction of Nineve (Jonas 3.) and yet it was not destroyed as foretold by the prophet, who also was troubled for that very
This saying refers to man generically, because God's indignation was at
would seem that
to be converted. For if we knew that they were foreknown to death, we should no more pray for them than for the demons. And since
that
life.
Therefore they
will
;
reason (4. i). Therefore
it
much more will the threat of eternal punishment be commuted by God's mercy for a more lenient punishment, when this will be able to give sorrow to none but joy to
Obj.
4.
Further,
to the point,
where
The words it is
all.
of Ps. 76. 8 are
God then be God then cast
said: Will
angry for ever? (Vulg., Will off for ever?) But God's anger is His punishment. Therefore, etc. Obj. 5. Further, A gloss on Isa. 14. 19, But thou art cast out, etc., says:' "Even though all souls shall have rest at last, thou never shalt," and it refers to the devil. Therefore it would seem that all human souls shall at length have rest
from
On
their pains.
written (Matt. 25. 46) of the elect together with the damned: These the contrary, It
is
punishment: but the just, into life everlasting. But it is inadmissible that the life of the just will ever have an end. Therefore it is inadmissible that the punishment of the damned will ever come to an end. Further, As Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. ii, 4)^ "death is to men what their fall was to the angels." Now after their fall the angels could not be restored. Therefore neither can man after death. And thus the punishment of the damned will have no end. / answer that, As Augustine says,^ some evaded the error of Origen by asserting that the demons are punished everlastingly, while holding that all men, even unbelievers, are at length set free from punishment. But this statement is altogether unreasonable. For just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness and therefore have to be punished for ever, so too are shall go into everlasting
'
Glossa intcrl.
(iv,
H'^).
2PGQ4.877. ^
City of God, XXI, 17, 18 (PL 41, 731, 732).
i.
removed from the human race by the coming of Christ. But those who were unwilling to be included or to remain in this reconciliation effected by Christ, perpetuated the Divine anger in themselves, since no other way of reconciliation is given to us save that which is length
through Christ.
Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine^ and Gregory {Moral, xxxiv, 19)^ say, the saints in this life pray for their enemies that they may be converted to God, while it is yet possible for them
who
for those
depart this
life
without grace
there will be no further time for conversion,
no prayer
will be offered for them, neither by Church militant, nor by the Church triumphant. For that which we have to pray for them is, as the Apostle says (II Tim. 2. 25, 26), that God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover themselves from
the
the snares of the devil.
Reply Obj. phetically
3.
A
punishment threatened pro-
only then
is
commuted when
there
is
a change in the merits of the person threatened.
Hence: / will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation shall .
repent of their evil that I 18.
evil,
have thought to do
Therefore,
7).
.
.
I also will repent of the since
the
damned cannot be changed,
to
them
merits the
of
(Jer.
the
threatened
punishment
will always be fulfilled in them. Nevertheless the prophecy of threats is always fulfilled in a certain sense, because as Augustine says:^ "Nineve has been overthrown, that
was
and
good Nineve is built up, that was and the houses remained standing, the city was overthrown in its wicked ways." Reply Obj. 4. These words of the Psalm refer to the vessels of mercy, which have not made themselves unworthy of mercy, because in this life (which may be called God's anger on account of its unhappiness) He changes vessels of mercy into something better. Hence the Psalm continues {verse 11): This is the
not
evil,
;
a
for while the walls
*
City oj God, XXI, 24 (PL 41, 736).
B
PL
«0/>.
44 (PL 77, 404). XXI, 24 (PL 41. 739).
76, 739. Cf. also Dial., iv, cit.,
j
—
:
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART change of the right hand of the most High. We may also reply that they refer to mercy as granting a relaxation but not setting free altogether if it be referred also to the damned. Hence the Psalm does not say: Will He from
His anger shut up His mercies? but in His anger, because the punishment will not be done away entirely; but His mercy will have effect by diminishing the punishment while it continues. 5. This gloss is speaking not abon an impossible supposition in order to throw into relief the greatness of the devil's sin, or of Nabuchodonosor's.
Reply Obj.
solutely but
Article
4.
Whether
the
Punishment of
To an End God?
Christians Is Brought
By
Mercy
the
of
We
proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that at least the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of God.
Objection
For he that believeth and
1.
is
baptized shall be saved (Mark 16. 16). Now this apphes to every Christian. Therefore all Christians will at length be saved. Obj.
He
2.
Further, It
that eateth
is
written (John
6.
My body and drifiketh My Now
55): blood
meat and drink of which Christians partake in common. hath eternal
Therefore Obj.
3.
life.
this is the
Christians will be saved at length. Further, // any man's work burn, he all
Q. 99
for Christians
;
ART.
1083
4
although they stated the matter
ways. For some said that whoever
in different
received the sacraments of faith would be im-
mune from
eternal punishment.
alone are exempt from eternal punishment
But it
Holy Writ, for (James 2. 20) Faith without dead, and (Matt. 7. 21) Not every
works
written is
:
one that saith to Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter kingdom of heaven: but he that doth the will of My Father Who is in heaven; and in
into the
sinners with eternal punishment.
The unjust God.
of God,
6.
9)
kingdom of
Christians are unjust. There-
fore Christians will not
dom
written (I Cor.
shall not possess the
Now some
all
come
to the king-
and consequently they
will
be
punished for ever. Further, It
is
those
other passages
who
will not all
written (II Pet.
2.
21)
:
It
had
been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them. Now those who know not the way of truth will be punished for ever. Therefore Christians who have turned back after knowing it will also be punished
Consequently
persevere in the faith unto the end be exempt from eternal punishment,
other crimes.
Reply Obj. i. Our Lord speaks there of formed faith that worketh by love (Vulg., charity. Gal. 5. 6) in which whosoever dies shall be saved. But to this faith not only is the error of unbelief opposed, but also any mortal sin whatsoever.
Reply Obj. not to those
2. The saying of our Lord refers who partake only sacramentally,
and who sometimes by receiving unworthy eat and drink judgment to themselves (I Cor. 11. 29), but to those who eat spiritually and are incorporated with Him by charity, which incorporation
is
the effect of the sacram.ental
who approach
for ever.
eating, in those
answer that. According to Augustine^ there have been some who predicted a delivery from eternal punishment not for all men, but only
fore, so far as the
/
1
Holy Scripture threatens
unless in the end they prove to be free from
be saved in the end. is
who
this is clearly contrary to
is
many
the contrary. It
is
persevere to the end in the Catholic faith, however guilty they may have been of other crimes.
yet so as by fire (I Cor. 3. 15), where it is a question of those who have the foundation of the Christian faith. Therefore all such persons
On
this
sacraments of faith, and yet have not faith, without which it is impossible to please God (Heb. II. 6). Therefore others said that those alone will be exempt from eternal punishment who have received the sacrswnents of faith, and professed the Catholic faith. But against this it would seem to be that at one time some people profess the Catholic faith, and afterwards abandon it, and these are deserving not of a lesser but of a greater punishment, since according to II Pet. 2. 21, it had been better for them not to have known the way of justice than, after they have known it, to turn back. Moreover it is clear that heresiarchs who renounce the Catholic faith and invent new heresies sin more grievously than those who have conformed to some heresy from the first. And therefore some have maintained that those
shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved,
will
But
contrary to the truth, since some receive the
City of God, xxi, 19 (PL 41, 733).
concerned, sin
may
it
worthily. There-
power of the sacrament
is
brings us to eternal Hfe, although
deprive us of that fruit, even after
have received worthily.
we
::
SUMMA TUEOLOGICA
1084
Reply Obj.
3.
foundation
the
In this passage of the Apostle
formed
denotes
faith,
upon
which whosoever shall build venial sins shall suffer loss, because he will be punished for them by God yet he himself sJmll be saved in the end by fire, either of temporal tribulation, or of the punishment of purgatory which will be after ;
death.
kingdom, and consequently some of be punished eternally. Further, It is written (James 2. 10) Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all. Therefore whoever keeps the law as regards the works of mercy and omits other works, is guilty of transgressing the law, and consequently will be puneternal
them
will
:
ished eternally.
Whether All Those Who Perform Works of Mercy Will Be Punished Eternally?
Article
We
5.
proceed thus to the Fifth Article:
It
would seem that all who perform works of mercy will not be punished eternally, but only
who
those
neglect those works.
Objection 1. For it is written (James 2. 13) Judgment without mercy to him that hath not dofie mercy; and (Matt. 5. 7): Blessed are the merciful for they shall obtain mercy. Obj.
2.
Further, (Matt. 25. 35-46)
we
find
a description of our Lord's discussion with the
damned and
the elect.
But
this discussion is
only about works of mercy. Therefore eternal punishment will be awarded only to such as
/ answer that, As Augustine says in the book quoted above,^ some have maintained that not all who have professed the Catholic faith will be freed from eternal punishment, but only those who persevere in works of mercy, although they be guilty of other crimes. But this cannot stand, because without charity nothing can be acceptable to God, nor does anything profit unto eternal life in the absence of charity. Now it happens that certain persons persevere in works of mercy without having charity. Therefore nothing profits them to the meriting of eternal life, or to exemption from eternal punishment, as may be gathered from I Cor.
Most evident
13. 3.
this in the case of those
is
have omitted to practise works of mercy; and
who
consequently the same conclusion follows as
many things, they nevertheless spend something in works of mercy. We must therefore conclude that all whosoever die in mortal sin, neither faith nor works of mercy will free them from eternal punishment, not even after any length of time whatever.
before.
Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Matt. 6. 12) Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors, and further on {verse 14) For if you will forgive ffien their offences, your heavenly :
Father will forgive you also your offences. Therefore it would seem that the merciful, who forgive others their offences, will themselves obtain the forgiveness of their sins, and conse-
quently will not be punished eternally. Obj.
4.
Further,
A
gloss of
Ambrose on
I
lay hands on other people's property, for
after seizing on
Reply Obj. 1. Those will obtain mercy who show mercy in an ordered manner. But those
who
while merciful to others are neglectful of themselves do not show mercy in an ordered manner; rather do they strike at themselves by their evil actions. Therefore such persons will
says:^
not obtain the mercy that sets free altogether, even if they obtain that mercy which rebates
the inconstancy of the flesh, without doubt he
somewhat their due punishment. Reply Obj. 2. The reason why the discussion refers only to the works of mercy is not because
Tim.
4. 8,
Godliness
is
profitable to all things,
"The sum total of a Christian's rule of life consists in mercy and godliness. Let a man follow this, and though he should suffer from be scourged, but he will not perish, whereas boast of no other exercise but that of the body will suffer everlasting punishment." Therefore those who persevere in works of mercy, though they be shackled with fleshly sins, will not be punished eternally; and thus the same conclusion follows as before. will
who can
he
On
the contrary, It
is
written (I Cor.
6.
9,
eternal
those
punishment
who omit
will
be inflicted on none but
those works, but because eter-
punishment will be remitted to those who sinning have obtained forgiveness by their works of mercy, making unto themselves friends of the mammon of iniquity (Luke 16. 9). Reply Obj. 3. Our Lord said this to those who nal
after
ask that their debt be forgiven, but not to those persist in sin. Therefore the repentant
nor adulterers, etc., shall possess the kingdom of God. Yet many are such who practise works of mercy. Therefore the merciful will not all come to the
who
(PL 192, 348); 120A) Ambrosiaster (PL 17, 500).
of the inconstancy that consists in venial sin,
10)
^
Neither fornicators,
:
Glbssa Lombard! ;
.
.
.
cf.
Glossa ordin.
(vi,
alone will obtain by their v,orks of mercy the forgiveness that sets
Reply Obj. ^
4.
The
City 0/ God, XXI, 22
(PL
them
free altogether.
gloss of
41, 735).
Ambrose speaks
SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART from which a man will be freed through the works of mercy after the punishment of purgatory, which he calls a scourging. Or, if he speaks of the inconstancy of mortal sense
is
that those
fall into sins
who
sin,
the
while yet in this
life
of the flesh through frailty are dis-
Q. 99
ART.
5
1085
posed to repentance by works of mercy. Therefore such a one will not perish, that is to say, he will be disposed by those works not to perish, through grace bestowed on him by our Lord, Who is blessed for evermore,
Amen.
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