Summa Theologica by Thomas Aquinas [2, 1 ed.]

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LUCRETIUS EPICTETUS MARCUS AURELIUS

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TACITUS

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PTOLEMY

Introductory Volumes: 1.

2.

3.

The Great Conversation

The Great The Great

Ideas Ideas

5.

II ««»

«

4.

I

»

HOMER

COPERNICUS KEPLER

AESCHYLUS SOPHOCLES

17.

PLOTINUS

18.

AUGUSTINE

19.

THOMAS AQUINAS

I

THUCYDIDES

20.

THOMAS AQUINAS

II

7.

PLATO

21.

DANTE

8.

ARISTOTLE

I

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CHAUCER

9.

ARISTOTLE

II

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HIPPOCRATES GALEN

MACHIAVELLI HOBBES

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EUCLID

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MONTAIGNE

ARCHIMEDES APOLLONIUS

26.

SHAKESPEARE

I

NICOMACHUS

27.

SHAKESPEARE

II

EURIPIDES

ARISTOPHANES 6.

10.

11.

HERODOTUS

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GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD ROBERT MAYNARD HUrCHlNS, EDITOR IN CHIEF mi MM

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»»»»«»>>«»>»»»»»>»»» Mortimer J. Adler,

Associate Editor

Members of the Advisory Board: Stringfellow Barr, Scott Buchanan, John Erskinb, Clarence H. Faust, Alexander Meiklejohn, Joseph J. Schwab, Mark Van Doren. Editorial Consultants: A. F. B.

Clark,

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Wallace Brockway,

Lucas,

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Executive Editor

THE

SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province

Revised by Daniel

J.

Sullivan

VOLUME

II

William Benton, Publisher

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, INC CHICAGO LONDON TORONTO •

•

.H^-^«H•H•H«H-H••H•H•«H••^

is derived from the translation of The Summa Theoby Fathers of the English Dominican Province by arrangement with Burns, Gates & Washbourne Ltd., London, and Benziger Brothers,

The

text of this edition

logica

Inc.,

The

New

York.

bibliographical footnotes and bibliography in this edition are derived

the Piana Edition of the

Summa

from

Theologiae published by the Dominican

Fathers in Ottawa by arrangement with the Institute of Medieval Studies Albert le Grand of the University of Montreal. Copyright, 1941, by Col-

lege DOMINICAIN d'GtTAWA.

Copyright in the united states of America, 1952, by encyclop.^dia britanxica, inc.

Copyright 1952. Copyright under international copyright union by ENCYCLOP.tDIA BRH ANNICA, INC. AlL RIGHTS RESERVED UNDER PAN AMERICAN copyright CONVENTIONS BY ENCYCLOPiEDIA BRITANNICA, INC.

GENERAL CONTENTS, Part III.

I

VOL.

II

of the Second Part (Continued)

Treatise on Habits (QQ. 49-89)

IV. Treatise

V. Treatise

i

on Law (QQ. 90-108)

205

on Grace (QQ. 109-114)

338

Part

II

of the Second Part

Prologue I.

II.

III.

Treatise on Faith, Hope and Charity

(QQ. 1-46)

380

Treatise on Active and Contemplative Life (QQ. 179-182)

606

Treatise on the States of Life (QQ. 183-189)

625

THIRD PART Prologue I.

Treatise on the Incarnation (QQ. 1-26) 701

II.

Treatise on the Sacraments (QQ. 60-65) §47

Supplement to the Third Part (QQ. 69-99) I.

Treatise on the Resurrection

(QQ. 69-86) II.

885

885

Treatise on the Last Things

(QQ. 87-99)

997

CONTENTS, VOLUME Part

I

QUESTION

of the Second Part (continued) Treatise on Habits

1. In General PAGE QUESTION 49. Of Habits In General, As To Their Substance i 6 50. Of the Subject of Habits 51. 0/ the Cause of Habits, As To Their

52.

53. 54.

12 Formation 15 Of the Increase of Habits How Habits Are Corrupted or Diminished 19 22 Of the Distinction of Habits 2.

55. 56.

57. 58.

In Particular

— that

Good Habits

(a)

Virtues

is,

26 Of the Virtues, As To Their Essence 29 Of the Subject of Virtue Of the Intellectual Virtues 35 Of the Difference Between Moral and Intellectual Virtues

41

59.

Of Moral Virtue In Relation To The

60.

How

Passions the

45

Moral Virtues

Differ

From One

Another 49 Of the Cardinal Virtues 54 62. Of the Theological Virtues 59 63 63. Of the Cause of Virtues 66 64. Of the Mean of Virtue 65. Of the Connection of Virtues 70 66. Of Equality Among the Virtues 75 81 67. Of the Duration of Virtues After This Life 68. Of the Gifts 87 69. Of the Beatittides 96 loi 70. Of the Fruits of the Holy Ghost 61.

(b)

Evil Habits

— that

is,

Vices

Of Vice and Sin Considered in Themselves 105 iii 72,0/ The Distinction of Sins 73. Of the Comparison of One Sin With Another 119 128 74. Of the Subject of Sin 75. Of the Causes of Sin, In General 137 76. Of the Causes of Sin, In Particular 140 77. 0/ the Cause of Sin On the Part of the Sensi71.

tive Appetite

Of 79. Of 80. Of 81. Of 82.0/ S^.Of 84. Of 78.

that Cause of Sin

Which

Is

Malice

the External Causes of Sin

86.

156

As Regards the Devil 159 the Cause of Sin On The Part of Man 162 Original Sin, As To Its Essence 168 the Cause of Sin

the Subject of Original Sin the Cause of Sin, In Respect of Being the Cause of Another

85.

144 152

Of the Effects of Sin Of the Stoin of Sin

171

One Sin 174

178 184

II

S

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

VUl QUESTION 8. Of the Gift of Understanding

Of the Gift of Knowledge Of Unbelief In General 11.0/ Heresy 12. Of Apostasy IT,. Of the Sin of Blasphemy, In General 14. Of Blasphemy Against the Holy Ghost 15. 0/ the Vices Opposed To Knowledge Understanding 16. Of the Precepts of Faith, Knowledge, Understanding 9.

10.

Of Hope Of the Subject of Hope ig. Of the Gift of Fear 20. Of Despair 21.0/ Presumption 2 2.0/ the Precepts Relating To Hope and Fear 23. Of Charity, Considered In Itself 24. Of the Subject of Charity 25. 0/ the Object of Charity 26. 0/ the Order of Charity 1'].

18.

I'j.Of the Principal Act of Charity,

Which

PAGE 416 423 426

43^ 442

454 456 462 4^5 474 478

480 482

489 510

Hatred Acedia

562

Envy

566

32.

Peace

Mercy Beneficence

Almsdeeds

33. 0,' Fraternal Correction

Of Of 36. Of 37.0/ 38. 39.

40.

41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46.

Of Of Of Of Of Of Of Of Of

the Sins

Which Are Contrary To Peace 570

Contention Schism

572

War

574 577

2.

Of the Fitness of the Incarnation Of the Mode of Union of the Word

701

Incarnate

709

Of the Mode of Union On the Part of the Person Assuming 723 4.0/ the Mode of Union On the Part of the Human Nature Assumed 730 5. Of the Manner of Union With Regard To the Parts of Human Nature 735 6. Of the Order of Assumption 740 7. Of the Grace of Christ as an Individual 3.

Man

745

Of the Grace of Christ as He Is the Head of the Church 756 9. Of Christ's Knowledge In General 763 10. Of the Beatific Knowledge of Christ's Soul 767 11.0/ the Knowledge Imprinted or Infused In the 8.

Soul of Christ 12.0/ the Acquired Knowledge of Christ's Soul IS14.

772 "j-jG

Of the Power of Christ's Soul 779 Of the Defects of Body Assumed By the Son of

God

784

Of the Defects of Soul Assumed By Christ 787 16. Of the Consequences of the Union with Regard To Those Things Which Arc Applicable To Christ In His Being and Becoming 796 17.0/ What Pertains To Christ's Unity from the 15.

Strife

581

583

18.

Scandal The Precepts of Charity

585 592 598 603

810 the Standpoint of Will Of What Pertains To the Power of Christ With 8i6 Regard to Operation 821 20. Of Christ's Subjection to the Father 823 21.0/ Christ's Prayer 22. Of the Priesthood of Christ 827 23. Of the Adoption of Christ 833 836 24. Of the Predestination of Christ 25. Of the Adoration of Christ 839 26. Of Christ as Called the Mediator of God and

the Gift of Folly,

Wisdom

Which

Is

Opposed To Wisdom

Of the Division of Life Into Active and Contemplative

606

607 Of the Contemplative Life 616 181. Of the Active Life 182.0/ the Active Life In Comparison With the 620 Contemplative Life 180.

Treatise on the States of Life 183.

Treatise on the Incarnation 1.

Sedition

Treatise on Active and Contemplative Life 179.

674 687

Third Part (QQ. 1-26; 60-65)

501

34.

ii.

0/ Of Of Of

663

Of the Different Kinds of Religious Life Of the Entrance Into Religious Life

452

and

35.

29.

30.

189.

Religious

and

520 527 53© 533 53^ 540 55° 558

28.

188.

444 447

Is

Love Of Joy

QUESTION PAGE Properly Consists 650 187.0/ Those Tilings That Are Appropriate To

Of Man's Various Duties and States In

General 625 Of Things Pertaining To the State of Perfec62 tion In General 185. Of Things Pertaining To the Episcopal State 639 186. Of Those Things In Which the Religious State

Standpoint of Being

Of What Pertains To the Unity

806 in Christ

From

19.

Man

845

Treatise on the Sacraments 60. 61. 62.

184.

Of the Of the Of the Grace Of the

Sacraments Necessity of the Sacraments Sacraments' Principal Effect,

847 855

Which

Is

858

Other Effect of the Sacraments, Which Character 864 870 64. Of the Causes of the Sacraments 879 65. Of the Number of the Sacraments 63.

Is a

CONTENTS PAGE

QUESTION

1.

Of the Subtlety of the Bodies of the

84.

Of the Agility of the Bodies of the Blessed 983 Of the Clarity of the Bodies of the Blessed 989 Of the Conditions under Which the Bodies of the Damned Will Rise Again 992

Blessed

69.

70.

85. 86.

Before the Resurrection

Of Matters Concerrdng the Resurrection, and First, of the Place Where Souls Are After Death 885 Of the Quality of the Soul After Leaving the Body, and the Punishment Inflicted On It By Material Fire

'ji.Of

Works

of Intercession for the

Dead

893 900

Of Prayers With Regard to the Saints in Heaven 917 73. Of the Signs That Will Precede the Judgment 922 74. Of the Fire of the Final Conflagration 925 2. The Resurrection Itself 75. Of the Resurrection 935 76. Of the Cause of the Resurrection 939 77. Of the Time and Manner of the Resurrec72.

tion 78.

Of the Term From Which Resurrection

79.

80.

974

Treatise on the Last Things

Of the Knowledge Which, After Rising Again, Men Will Have at the Judgment Concerning Merits and Demerits 997 88. Of the General Judgment, As To the Time and Place at Which It will Be 1000 89. Of Those Who Will Judge and Of Those Who Will Be Judged at the General Judgment 1005 90. Of the Form of the Judge in Coming To the Judgment 1012 91. 0/ the Quality of the World After the Judgment 1016 92. Of the Vision of the Divine Essence in Refer87.

ence to the Blessed

943

93.

of the

947

94.

Of the Conditions of Those Who Rise Again, and First, of Their Identity 951 Of the Integrity of the Bodies in the Resur-

95.

rection

97.

956 81. Of the Quality of Those Who Rise Again 964 82. Of the Condition of the Blessed After Their Resurrection 968

PAGE

83.

Supplement to the Third Part (QQ. 69-99) Treatise on the Resurrection

IS

QUESTION

Damned 96.

98.

99.

1025

Of the Happiness of the Saints and Their Mansions 1037 Of the Relations of the Saints Towards the Of Of Of Of Of

the Gifts of the Blessed the Aureoles

1040 1042

1049

Punishment of the Damned 1066 the Will and Intellect of the Damned 1072 God's Mercy and Justice Towards the the

Damned

1078

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ON HABITS

TREATISE 1.

In

General

QUESTION XLIX Of habits

tion," as

in general, as to their

substance {In Four Articles)

After

now

treating of

human

acts

human

acts,

and

of intrinsic prin-

first,

ciples, second, of extrinsic principles, (q.

The intrinsic principle is power and as we have treated of powers in the Lxxvn.

(q.

sqq.),

sider habits.

And

general; second, vices

and other

human

it

first

we

xc).

habit; but

First Part remains for us to con-

we

shall consider

them in and

shall consider virtues

like habits,

which are the prin-

Book on

stated in the

Therefore habit

On

and passions, we

pass on to the consideration of the princi-

ples of

is

the Predica-

ments} Now disposition is "the order of that which has parts," as stated in the Metaphysics} But this belongs to the predicament Position. is

the contrary,

Book on

not a quality.

The Philosopher

says, in the

the Predicaments,^ that "habit

is

a qual-

which it is difficult to change." / answer that. This word habitus (habit) is derived from habere (to have). Now habit is taken from this word in two ways in one way, according as man, or any other thing, is said to have something; in another way, according as a ity

;

particular thing tain

way

is

ordered {se habet) in a cer-

either in regard to itself, or in regard

Concerning habits in general there are four points to be considered: First, the substance of

something else. Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is had,

habits; second, their subject (q. l)

is

ciples of

acts (q. lv).

to

;

third, the

cause of their generation, increase, and corruption (q. li)

;

fourth,

how they

are distinguished

from one another (q. liv). Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether habit is a quality? (2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality? (3) Whether habit implies an order to an act? (4) Of the necessity of habit. Article

i.

Whether Habit

Is a Quality?

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that habit is not a quality. Objection i. For Augustine says (qq. Lxxxin, qu. 73) :^ "This word 'habit' is derived from the verb 'To have.' " But "To have" pertains not only to quality, but also to the other categories, for we speak of ourselves as having quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is

not a quahty. Obj.

2.

Further, habit

of the predicaments, as

is

may

considered as one

be clearly seen in

Book on the Predicaments} But one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore

common

And so the Phiamong the post-predica-

to different genera.

losopher puts "to have"

ments,^ so called because they result from the different genera of things

oppoand the like. Now among things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the haver and that which is had; as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is sition,

medium, but only a

a

man

;

as, for instance,

priority, posterity,

relation; as for instance

companion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or a passion, but something after the manner of action or passion thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered. Therefore the Philosopher says^ that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had," as is the case in those things which we have about oura

is

said to have a

And

therefore these constitute a special

the.

selves.

habit

genus of things, which is called the predicament of Habit, of which the Philosopher says^ that

is

Obj.

not a quality. Further, "every habit

3.

is

a disposi^

1

PL

2

Aristotle, Categories, 8 (8^26).

40, 84.

Ibid. (9*10).

^Categories, 8 (9^3).

^Aristotle, v, 19 (1022^1). ^

IbU., 15 (15^17).

"^Metaphysics, v, 20 (1022^4).

^

Ibid.

SUMMA TEEOLOGICA "there

is

who

clothed."

is

But

if

regard to

in

habit

else, in that case

mode

of having

and of

is

or to something

itself

a quahty, since this

is

in respect of

some

this the

or in regard to another; thus health

is

a

And in this sense we speak of habit now. Therefore we must say that habit is a quality. habit."

Reply Ob.

i.

This argument takes "to have"

in the general sense, for in this sense it is

mon

to

many

predicaments, as

Reply Obj.

2.

we have

com-

said.

This argument takes habit

the sense in which

medium between

we understand

it

it is

in

to be a

the haver and that which

had, and in this sense

a predicament, as

is

we

have said. Reply Obj. 3. Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts. But this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to say: namely, "either ls to place. or as to power, or as to species." "In saying this," as Simplicius observes in his

Commentary

on the Predicaments,- "he includes all disposibodily dispositions, when he says 'as to tions place,' " and this belongs to the predicament Position, which is the order of parts in a place. "WTien he says 'as to power.' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as undeveloped science and virtue. "And when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue. :

—

Article

2.

Whether Habit

Is a Distinct

Species of Quality?

We

thus proceed to the Second Article: It

would seem that habit

is

not a distinct species

of quality.

Objection

i.

Because, as

habit, in so far as

it is

we have

a quality,

is

said (a. i),

a disposition

whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill. But this happens in regard to any quality, for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. Therefore habit

is

not a distinct species

of quality.

Obj.

2.

Book on

third species of quality. Therefore habit or dis-

position

not distinct from the other species

is

of quality.

Obj.

quality;

Philosopher says' that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself

are said to be dispositions or habits, just as sick-

ness and health." But heat and cold are in the

"to have" be taken according as a thing

ordered

is

between clothing and the man

a habit

Further, "difficult to change"

3.

2

not a

but rather to movement or passion. Now is determined to a species by a differ-

ity,

no genus

ence of another genus, but differences should be proper to a genus, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics."^ Therefore, since habit

is

said to

be a quality difficult to change,^ it does not seem to be a distinct species of quality. On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the

Book

071 the Predicaments^ that "one species of quahty is habit and disposition." / answer that, The Philosopher in the Book on the Predicameyits'' considers disposition and

first among the four species of qualSimphcius. in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the difference of these

habit as the

Now

ity.

species as follows.^

He

says that

"some quahties

are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its

some are from without, and

nature, and are always there; but

adventitious, being caused

these can be lost. Now the latter, that is, those which are adventitious are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of difficultly lost.

gard a thing

As

in the point of its

potency, and thus quality act,

;

and

being easily or

to natural qualities,

we have

some

this either

re-

being in a state of

the second species of

while others regard a thing w hich

deeply rooted in

it

is

in

or only

we have the on the surface, we have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is the shape of an animated being." on

its

surface. If deeply rooted,

third species of quality;

if

But this distinction of the species of quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and qualities pertaining to passion which are not natural but adventitious; and there are also many dispositions which are not adventitious but natural, as health, beauty and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the species, since that which is the more natural always first. Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking, imphes is

a certain

mode

of substance.

gustine says {Gen. ad.

lit. iv,

Now

mode, as Auwhich

3),^ "is that

Further, the Philosopher says in the the Predicaments'^ that "heat and cold

' habit which is in a power, as in its subject, imphes principally

a quality, and in this respect

is

explained in the book on the Soul.^

Further, that which

is

put

in

the

definition of a thing, belongs to

it

essentially.

But to be a principle of action,

is

put

we

in the

read in the Meta-

physics.- Therefore to be the principle of an act

belongs to power essentially.

is

is first

in

that which

every genus. If therefore,

a principle of act,

posterior to power.

Now

And

it

follows that

it

so habit and disposi-

tion will not be the first species of quality.

Obj. 3. Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But these do

not indicate relation to an act. Therefore not essential to habit to be a principle of ^

Soul,

m,

4 (429^6).

2

and of

to the thing's nature. If

is

is

ill

to its

part of the subject in which they are, imply

relation of a principle to an act.

essential

is,

to the end.

But there are some

relation to an act.

habit also

well or

nature, "or in regard to something else," that is,

a state of potency, but otherwise than before learning." Therefore habit does not imply the

definition of power, as

stated^

"a disposition

therefore the nature of the thing in which the

proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. Objection i. For everything acts according as

is

fur-

consequently, to

disposed either in regard to itself," that

itself

We

2.

is

either an

the end of nature,

Hence

in the definition of habit that

as

Article 3. Whether Habit Implies Order to an Act?

Obj.

it

thing's

primarily and principally relation to an act. For,

principles are designated.

is

by which some-

thing is done when necessary." And the Commentator says {De Anima, iii)^ that "habit is that by which we act when we will." / answer that, To have relation to an act may belong to habit both according to the notion of habit, and according to the subject in which the habit is. According to the notion of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act. For it is of the very notion of habit to imply

often take accidental instead of substantial dif-

in act.

that

which one attains by means of operation. Therefore habit implies relation not only to the very

Nor does

it is

is

operation, or the product of an operation, to

cult to

one

that "habit

this

clear that the

lastingness:

to

(De Bono

the contrary, Augustine says

word habit implies a certain while the word disposition does not.

rather than that he has the science. it is

On

Con jug. xx\y

it

is

Reply Obj.

Aristotle, v, 12 (1019*15).

Habit

is

an

act, in so far as

it

can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a state of potency in respect to operation. Therefore habit is called first act, and operation second act, as

Reply Obj.

2.

It is

it

not of the essence of habit

to be related to power, but to be related to

nature.

And

as nature precedes action, to

which

power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality. Reply Obj. 3. Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as »


Tiess, there results a change as to sickness and health. But change does not occur primarily and of themselves in regard to habits and dis-

state later

In

Cat.,

On

In

Cat., \TlI

(CG vm,

233.22;

on

(q.

cx,

Cat.,

if

it is

shall

we

take habit in

in this

way

its re-

chiefly that

habits are found in the soul, in so far as the soul

is

not determined to one operation but is many, which is a condition for a

indifferent to

we have

since the soul

through

its

said above (q. xlix, a. 4). is

the principle of operation

powers, therefore, regarded in this

sense, habits are in the soul in respect of its

vni (CG vin, 234.23).

powers.

^Ibid. (234.30).

6/«

we

a. 4).

the other hand,

lation to operation,

habit, as

234-II)^

partakers of the Divine Nature, then nothing some habit, namely, grace, from being

And

in Simplicius,

of a

man may become a parPeter i, that we may be

hinders

Unnamed,

is

nature; so that,

taker, according to II

2

vari-

ous habits in the various powers of the soul.^

And therefore we must say otherwise that, as was explained above (q. xldc, a. 2, Reply i), the adjustment of the passible qualities them-

Categories, 8 (0*3).

subject.

The Philosopher puts

higher nature, of which

1

essence

in respect of its powers.

quality.

positions of this kind.

it is

form. Therefore

its

habits are in the soul in respect of

On

if

it

But nature regards the essence

in respect of its essence that the soul is the

habit

goes quickly, or passible quality

a. 2).

of the soul rather than the powers, because

is

it

permanent. But when

For we speak of dispositions and

i.

habits in relation to nature, as stated above

has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and if it goes so far as to be

if

7

We

Reply Obj. 3. Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quahty, as some main-

then passed into the

2

Article 2. Whether the Soul Is the Subject of Habit Accordijig to Its Essence or According to its Power?

called habits absolutely.

tained^ differ

ART.

Q. 50.

vin (CG \Tn,

234.6).

^Ethics,

I.

13 (1103^3).

SUMMA TEEOLOGICA i. The essence of the soul pertains nature not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a form and nature to which someone is disposed. Reply Obj. 2. Accident is not of itself the

Reply Obj.

to

human

subject of accident. But since

themselves there according as

it

is

among

accidents

a certain order, the subject,

under one accident,

is

con-

is

ceived as the subject of a further accident. In this way we say that one accident is the subject of another; as for instance, a surface

the sub-

is

which sense power can be the

ject of colour, in

Reply Obj. 3. Habit takes precedence of power according as it implies a disposition to nature, as but power always implies a relation to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power does not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Therefore

it

is

pos-

we may

say that habit takes precedence of power as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes precedence of potency. For act is naturally terior to power. Or,

prior to potency, though potency

is

prior in the

order of generation and time, as stated in the

Metaphysics.^

Article 3. Whether There Can Be Any Habits in the Powers of the Sensitive Part? proceed thus to the Third Article: It

would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. Objection 1. For as the nutritive power is an irrational part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part. Obj. 2. Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes, for in them there is no will,

which

is

put in the definition of habit, as

we have

said above (q. xlix, a. 3). Therefore

there are

no habits

Obj.

3.

in the sensitive

powers.

Further, the habits of the soul are

sciences and virtues, and just as science lated \o the apprehensive power, so

is

is re-

virtue

But in the senpowers there are no sciences, since science is of universals, which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be related to the appetitive power. sitive

habits of virtue in the sensitive part. On the contrary. The Philosopher says^ that 1

Aristotle,

vn. 3

Thomas, In Meta., *

virtues, namely,

(io2g"5);

viii, 2.

Ethics, ni, 10 (iii7''23).

IX,

8 (1049^4).

Cf. St.

temperance and

forti-

tude, belong to the irrational part."

/ answer that,

The

considered in two ways

sensitive

powers can be

according as they act from natural instinct; secondly, according as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are :

first,

ordered to one thing, just as nature is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordered to various things. And thus there can be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something.

Reply Obj.

subject of habit.

We

"some

1.

The powers

of the nutritive

part do not have an inborn aptitude to obey the

command

and therefore there are no But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore habits can be in them for in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in the of reason,

habits in them.

;

Etiiics.^

Reply Obj. 2. The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the command of reason, but if they are left to themselves, such animals from natural instinct, and so there are no them ordered to operations. There are in them, however, certain dispositions in relation to nature, such as health and beauty. But because by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom to do things in this or that way, in this sense, after a fashion, we can admit the existence of habits in dumb animals; hence act

habits in

Augustine says (qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36)

:**

"We

most untamed beasts deterred by fear of pain from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we say that they are tame and gentle." But the habit is incomplete as to the use of the will, for they do not have that power of using or of refraining which seems to belong to the notion of habit, and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no habits in them. Reply Obj. 3. The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in the book on the Soul;^ but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they find the

act at the

command

3.\nstotle, *

PL

I,

of the reason.

13 (iio2^'25).

40, 25.

'Aristotle,

111.

II (434*12).

And

yet even

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

powers of sensitive apprehension we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facihty of memory, thought or imagination: hence also the Philosopher says^ that custom conduces much to a good memory. The reason for this is that these powers also are in the interior

Q. 50.

ART.

9

4

wisdom and understanding, which

ence,

habit of

the intellectual part

first principles, in

of the soul.

/ answer that, Concerning habits of knowing there have been various opinions. lect for all

powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptive of habits, but are ordered to their

in the interior sensitive powers.^

nature, just as the

members

of the body, for

there are no habits in them, but rather in the

powers which command

Article

4.

movements.

their

Whether There

Is

Any Habit

men, were bound to hold that habits

of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but

For it is maniand so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly in that, which, being numerically one, v/ould be common to all men. Therefore if there were but one single possible intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ from one

men

fest that

differ in habits,

another, could not be in the possible intellect

in the Intellect?

We

Some, sup-

posing that there was only one possible intel-

moved to act at the command of the reason. On the other hand the exterior apprehensive

fixed acts according to the disposition of their

the

is

would be in the interior which differ in various men.

as their subject, but

Fourth Article: It would seem that there are no habits in the

sensitive powers,

intellect.

trary to the

Objection i. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above (a. i). But the operations of man are common to soul and

that the sensitive powers are rational not

body, as stated in the treatise on the Soul}

which are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence.^ There-

proceed thus

to the

Therefore also are habits. But the intellect

is

not an act of the body.^ Therefore the intellect is

not the subject of a habit. Obj.

2.

Further, whatever

Now

is

in a thing is there

mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, is act only while what is composed of form and matter has potency and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is composed of matter and form. Now the intellect is form without matter. Therefore habit, which has potency at the same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect but only in the composite being, which is composed of soul and body. Obj.

3.

Further, "habit

thing," as

well or

ill

a disposition w^here-

is

it is

manifest

participation.^

by

Now

fore they are not in the sensitive powers, but in

that

when

itself.

Moreover he says

expressly-^

the possible intellect "thus becomes

each thing, that

when it is reduced to act by the intelligible species,

is,

in respect of singulars

then

knower

said to be in act, as the

it is

to be in act;

can act of even then

and

this

happens when the

itself," that it is

in

is,

said

by considering; "and

potency

however absolutely,

is

intellect

but not

in a sense;

as before learning

and

dis-

covering." Therefore the possible intellect itself

the subject of the habit of science, by which

is

the intellect, even though sidering,

is

this supposition is

also the

it

be not actually con-

able to consider. In the second place,

whom

power

contrary to the truth. For

belongs the operation belongs

to operate, so to

w^hom belongs

.disposed in regard to some-

the operation belongs also the habit. But to un-

is said.'* But that anyone should be disposed to an act of the intellect is

derstand and to consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit by which one

or

ill

due to some disposition of the body; hence it is stated'^ that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act of of the body.

the contrary,

^

Memory and

2

considers

Aristotle,

i,

i

Reminiscence, (403^8);

cf.

2

sci-

properly in the intellect

in his

since

itself.

Some said, as SimpHcius reports Commentary on the Predicaments,^'^ that, every operation of man is to a certain ex1.

tent an operation of the comxposite, as the Philossays,^^ therefore

no habit

only, but in the composite.

is

in the soul

And from

this

it

(452*28).

also

Aristotle, Soul, n, 9 (421*26).

is

Reply Obj.

opher

The Philosopher^ puts i,

4 (408^8).

^Ibtd., in, 4 (429*24'). ^Aristotle, Metaphysics, v, 20 (1022^10). 5

by

For

the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues,

also

some part

of Aristotle.

their essence, but only

just as to

by we are well

mind

the intellect

according to the

On

this supposition in the first place is con-

•

Ethics, vi, 3 (ii39''i6).

7 8

1°

Averroes, In Ethics,

Soul,

I,

m,

De An.,

in, 5, dig., t.

v

(vi, 2, 148D").

^Ethics, vi, 3 (1139^16). 13 (1102^13). (CG vm, 233.22). 4 (429^6). 11 /n Cat.,

^Soul,\, 1,4 (403*8; 408^8).

vm

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

lO

no habit

follows* that

in the intellect, for the

is

argument given not cogent. For habit

intellect is separate, as ran the

above. But the argument

is

not a disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the ob-

is

Therefore the habit must be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is related to the power as its object. ject.

Now

the act of understanding

common

not said to

is

and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in the book on the Soul.' But it is clear that the phantasm is related be

to soul

as object to the possible intellect.*'

lows that the intellectual habit

is

Hence

chiefly

it

on the

itself,

of the phantasm, which

sible intellect

is

is

common

the subject of habit; for that

able to be a subject of habit which

is

cy to many, and this belongs, above

is

in

poten-

all,

to the

possible intellect. Therefore the possible intellect

2.

As potency

to sensible being

belongs to corporeal matter, so potency to intellectual being belongs to the possible intellect.

Therefore nothing prevents habit from being in the possible intellect, for

it is

midway between

pure potency and perfect act. Reply Obj. 3. Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the possible intellect, therefore

it

by the which the

is

will is the subject of a habit.

/ answer that, Every power which it is

well disposed to

a rational power,

tion of habit,

is

in the

Whether Any Habit

Is in the Will?

Therefore the

will is

not the subject

of habit.

Obj. 2. Further, no habit is allotted to the agent intellect, as there is to the possible intellect, because the former is an active power.

But the

will is

above

cause

moves

all

^

VI, 2

all

12

i,

Aristotle,

i,

i

(BU

an active power, be-

the powers to their acts, as

Cf. Siraplicius, /«Ca/., VIII

Ennead,

principally

above

(CG

viii,

241.23); Plotinus,

inclined to

is

its

power

titive

is

object for the act of the appenothing but a certain inclina;

we have

tion, as

said above (q. vi, a. 4).

is

inclined sufficiently

by the nature of the

the power needs no quality to

But since

human hfe

it

is

necessary for the end power be

that the appetitive

it is not inchned by the nature of the power, which has a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that in the will and in the other appetitive powers there be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.

Reply Obj. 2. The agent intellect is active and in no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both "mover and moved. "-^ And therefore the comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to that which is somehow in only,

potency.

Reply Obj. 3. The will from the very nature power is inchned to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order of the

that action
' in order to act well, as we have stated above (q. xlix, a. 4). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits. But this is clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature. saries.

On

the contrary, In the Ethics,^

iComm. 2

18

(VI, 2,

161B).

Aristotle, vi, 6 (ii4i»5).

among

other

ture and partly

of art.

But the habit which is a disposition to operaand whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (q. l, a. 2), may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in tion,

respect of the individual nature:

—

in respect of

the specific nature, on the part of the soul

which, since

it

is

the form of the body,

itself, is

the

specific principle; but in respect of the individ-

ual nature, on the part of the body, which

the material principle. Yet in neither it

is

way does

happen that there are natural habits

in

man,

so that they are entirely from nature. In the

indeed, this does happen, since they have intelligible species naturally infused in them, which cannot be said of the human na-

angels,

ture, as Q.

we

Lxxxrv,

said in the First Part (q. lv, a.

2

A. 3).

3 See especially Albert, Summa de Bono, in Lottin, Le Droit Naturel, p. 117. Cf. also William of Au.xerre, Summa Aurea u, tr. 12, q. i (fol. 60 ra).

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence partly to nature and partly to some extrinsic principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the indi\ddual nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself ciples

is

;

thus the understanding of

called a natural habit. ^

For

first

prin-

owing

it is

to the ver>' nature of the intellectual soul that

Q. 51.

ART.

2

13

capable of knowing

itself

all things,

for thus

would have to be the act of all things, which God alone. Because that by which something is known, must be the actual likeness of the thing known. Hence it would follow, if the power of the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the hkeness and act of all things. Therefore there must be added to the angels' intellectual power some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood; for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and it

belongs to

not by their own essense that their intellect can be actually those things which they under-

man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part; and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part this he

stand. And so it is clear that not everything pertaining to a natural habit can belong to

cannot

know except through the intelligible spewhich he has received from phantasms. And for this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics- shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses. But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning in so far as one man, from the disposition

some can be caused by nature, and some

cies

as

—

more apt than another since we need the sensitive

of his organs of sense,

is

to understand well, powers for the operation of the intellect. In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the habit but ;

only as to certain of

its principles, as,

stance, the principles of

common law

to be the seeds of the virtues.^

for in-

are said

The reason

of

because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers. But on the part of the body, in respect of the this is

nature, there are some appetitive by way of natural beginnings. For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or the like. Reply Obj. i. This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; but reason itself and will belong to the nature of man. Reply Obj. 2. Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power, which however cannot pertain to the power itself. For individual

habits

instance, with regard to the angels,

pertain to the intellectual

power

it

cannot be of

itself to

1 On this point cf. Alexander ol 'Hales, John of Rochelle, Odo Rigaldus, in Lottin (RiSrP-1927, p. 269, 273, 277),

- II, 3

the power.

Reply Obj.

3.

Nature

we have

said above.

Droit Naturel, p. 117.

Summa

de Bono, in Lottin, L£

not equally inchned

And

so

it

not,

does not fol-

low that because some habits are natural that therefore

Article by Acts?

all

2.

are natural.

Whether Any Habit

Is

Caused

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that no habit can be caused by acts. Objection i. For habit is a quality, as we have said above (q. xlix, a. i). Now every quality caused in a subject, according as the latter

is

is

able to receive something. Since then the agent,

from the

fact that

it

acts, does not receive

but

seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts. Obj. 2. Further, the thing in which a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or cooled; but that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and passive, which is impossible, as stated in the rather gives,

it

Physics.'^

Obj.

3.

Further, the effect cannot be

more

But habit is more exthan the act which precedes the habit,

excellent than its cause. cellent

as

is

clear from, the fact that the latter pro-

duces more excellent acts. Therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit. On the contrary, The Philosopher teaches^ that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts. / answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act; for instance

19 (100*3).

Cf. especially Albert,

is

to cause all the various kinds of habits, since

4

Aristotle, vii, i (241^24).

^Ethics, n,

i

(1103*31).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

14 in fire there is ing.

And

caused by

only the active principle of heatin such an agent a habit cannot be

own

its

tomed, as agent

is

is

act, for

which reason natural

become accustomed or unaccus-

things cannot

stated in the Ethics} But a certain

found

to be

in

which there

is

both the

active and the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the appeti-

power proceed from that same power acit is moved by the apprehensive powpresenting the object; and further, the intel-

tive

cording as er

power, according as

lectual

conclusions, has, as

it

it

reasons about

were, an active principle

in a self-evident proposition.

Therefore by such

acts habits can be caused in their agents; not in-

deed with regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle of the act which is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and moved by another is disposed by the action of the agent; therefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers ac;

cording as they are

moved by

the reason, and as

the habits of science are caused in the intellect

moved by first propositions. The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something from that which moves it and thus according as

is

it

Reply Obj.

i.

;

a habit caused.

is

as

2.

to different

respects,

as

is

proved

in

the

Physics."^

Reply Obj.

The

act which precedes the habcomes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle than is the habit caused by it just as the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than it,

3.

Obj.

in so far as it

;

the science of conclusions.

it

We

if an act be very intense, can be the generating cause of a habit. Obj. 3. Further, health and sickness are hab-

its. But becomes

proceed thus to the Third Article:

It

act. i. For demonstration is an act of But science, which is the habit of one

happens that a man is healed or by one act. Therefore one act can

it ill,

cause a habit.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says:^ "As neither does one swallov/ nor one day make spring, so neither does one day nor a short time make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is

an operation in respect of a habit of perfect Therefore a habit of virtue, and for

virtue.'"-*

same reason, other habits, are not caused by one act. / answer that, As we have said already (a. 2), habit is caused by act, in so far as a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused in that which the

passive, the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Hence we see that because fire cannot at once overcome the com-

is

bustible, it does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that

by overcoming likeness on

it

is

many

it is

may

it

impress

power

power is

one

in

act,

things, while the reason judges in a

what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Therefore the appetitive power is not entirely overcome single act,

by

it,

to the

so as to be inclined as though naturally

same thing

in the majority of cases which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one

act,

;

but only by many.

But

in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principals one is the possible intellect itself; the other is the :

which Aristotle^

calls

the particular reason, that

power,^ with

memory and

is

"passive," and

the cogitative

imag'nation.

11,

i

(1103*19).

'Aristotle, viii, 5 (257*31).

With

regard then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its passive principle; thus one self-evident proposi^

Ethics,

I,

7 (ioqS^iS).

^Aristotle, Ethics, 'Aristotle,

because

inclined variously and

Objection reason.

its

clear that the active

reason cannot entirely over-

the appetitive

the appetitive to

entirely,

Now

it.

principle which

intellect

would seem that a habit can be caused by one

may

sity. But a habit is of acts. Therefore also

is

Article 3. Whether a Habit Can Be Caused by One Act?

may increase by they increase by intencaused by multipHcation

Further, as acts

2.

multiplication, so

come

The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself Reply Obj.

conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act.

^Soul, •

III, s

Cf. Part

i,

7,

13 (i098''i6; 1102*5).

(430*24).

I, Q.

Lxxvui,

a. 4.

PART

OF SECOND PART

I

tion convinces the intellect, so that

gives a

it

firm assent to the conclusion, but a probable this. Therefore a habit

proposition cannot do

of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the possible in-

but a habit of science can be caused

tellect;

by a

single act of the reason, so far as the pos-

sible intellect is

concerned. But with regard to

the lower apprehensive powers, the

same

acts

need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says that "meditation strengthens memory."^ Bodily habits, however, can be

caused by one act

if

the active principle

is

of

great power; sometimes, for instance, a strong

dose of medicine restores health at once. Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.

Article 4. Whether Any Habits Are Infused Man by God?

in

We

proceed thus to the Fourth Article:

would seem that no habit

is

infused in

It

man by

God. Objectioft

I.

He

therefore

For God treats infuses

habits

would infuse them into

all

equally. If

all

some,

into

which

is

He

clearly

untrue.

Obj.

Q. 52.

ART.

15

i

power of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above (q. V, A. 5). And since habits must be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore it is necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the power of human nature. Hence such habits can never be in man except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.

The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes without these second causes, as we have said in the First Part (q. cv, a. 6). Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power. He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the Apostles the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, though not so perfectly.

Reply Obj. 1. God, in respect of His Nature, the same to all, but, in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some unerring reason, gives certain things to some which He does not give is

to others.

God works mode which is

Further,

2.

cording to the

nature for

"it

Reply Obj.

in all things ac-

suitable to their

belongs to Divine providence to

preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div.

Nom.

But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above (a. 2). Therefore

2.

That God works

mode

ing to their

in all accord-

does not prevent

God from

doing what nature cannot do; but it follows from this that He does nothing contrary to

iv).^

that which

God

Reply Obj. 3. Acts produced by an infused habit do not cause a habit, but strengthen the

by

does not cause habits to be in

man

except

is

suitable to nature.

already existing habit, just as the remedies

acts.

any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a Hke habit is caused."^ Consequently there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now this seems impossible, for two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into man by God.

of medicine given to a man who is naturally healthy do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had before.

On the contrary, It is written God filled him with the spirit

We have now to consider the increase of habits

Obj.

3.

Further,

under sta7iding.

if

(Ecclus. 15.5): of

Now wisdom

wisdom and

and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God. / answer that, Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons. The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is well disposed to an end which exceeds the 1

2

Memory and Reminiscence, Sect. 33 (PG 3, 733).

•Aristotle, Ethics,

11, i

i

(451*12).

(iioa'^ai).

QUESTION LII Of the increase of habits {In Three Articles)

under which head there are three points of

in-

Whether habits increase? (2) Wheththey increase by addition? (3) Wliether each

quiry: (i) er

act increases the habit?

Article

i.

Whether Habits Increase?

We

proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that habits cannot increase. Objection i. For increase concerns quantity.^ But habits are not in the genus quantity, but *

Aristotle, Physics, v, 2 (226*30).

SUMMA THEOWGICA

i6

Therefore there can be no

in that of quality.

increase of habits.

Obj.

2.

Further, "habit

a perfection."^

is

since perfection conveys a notion of end

But and

term, it seems that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase. Obj. 3. Further, those things which can be

more

or less are subject to alteration, for that

which from being less hot becomes more hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in the Physics} Therefore habits cannot increase.

On

the contrary, Faith

For Plotinus^ and the other Platonists^ held that qualities and habits themselves were susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material, and so had a certain indetermination on account of the infinity of matter. Others,' on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves were not susceptible of

more or less, but them (qnalia) are

that the things affected said to be

is

not more or

and yet it Lord

a habit,

is

opinions. For they held that

/ afiswer that, Increase, like other things is

transferred from bodi-

and spiritual things, on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under ly quantities to intellectual

is

Now

in corporeal quantities,

said to be great according as

the perfection of quantity due to

quantity

certain

which

And

it;

reaches

hence a

considered great in

is

so also in forms,

because

it

man

not considered great in an elephant.

is

we say

And

perfect.

is

it

lies

between the two preceding

some habits

themselves susceptible of more and

fore habits increase.

a thing

but the just

Predicaments.^ The third opinion was that of the Stoics,^ and

Lord, increase our faith. There-

the imagination.

less,

thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in the

(Luke

pertaining to quantity,

by

or less ac-

cording to diversity in participation; that, for instance, justice

increases; hence "the Disciples said to our 17. 5):

more

a thing

is

great

since good has the

are of

less,

for

and that some are not, such as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible of more or less, but

instance, the arts;

that material forms are.^°

In order that the truth in this matter be made we must observe that that in respect of

clear,

which a thing receives its species must be something fixed and stationar\', and as it were indivisible; for whatever attains to that thing is contained under the species, and whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another

more or

Hence

character of perfection, therefore "in things

species,

which are great, but not

opher says^^ that "species of things are like numbers," in which addition or subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness and other like quahties which are not denominated from a relation to something else, and much more so substance, which is per se being. But those things which receive their species from something to which they are related can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less; and none the less they remain in the same species, on account of the one-ness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more diminished, and yet it remains in the same

greater

is

tine says

Now

same

the

{De

in

quantity, to be

as to be better," as Augus-

Trin. vi. 8).^

the perfection of a form

sidered in two

ways

:

first,

may

be con-

in respect of the

form

itself;

secondly, in respect of the participation

of the

form by

its

subject. In so far as

we

con-

form in respect of way the form is said to

sider the perfections of a

the form

itself, in this

be httle or great; for instance great or Httle health or science. But in so far as

we

consider

the perfection of a form in respect of the participation of

more

it

by the

subject,

or less; for instance

it is

more

said to be

or less white

Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature and another to consider or healthy.

in respect of its participation

it

by

a subject.

less perfect.

the Philos-

In this way, then, there were four opinions

among

philosophers concerning intensity and

abatement of habits and forms, as Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the PredicamefUs*

s Cf. Simplicius, In Cat., viii (CG \nn, 284.14); Plotinus, VI Entiead, Tr. hi, 20 (BU vi. 149). ^ Ibid. (CG viii, 233.10). 6 Cf. Simplicius, InCat.,\ui. 8

Catenaries, 8 (10*30);

cf.

Simplicius, In Cat., viii

viii, 284.25). 1

Aristotle, Physics, vii, 3 (246*13).

^Ibid. (246*10).

*In

Cat., VIII

(CG

3

PL

42, 929.

viii, 284.12).

9

Cf. Simplicius,

In

Cat., viii

(CG

10

Cf. Simplicius, Ibid. (285.1).

^1

Metaphysics,

viii, 3 (i043*'33).

viii, 284.32).

(CG

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

on account of the one-ness of the term by which it is specifiied. We may observe the species,

same thing

in health

body

for a

;

nature of health, according as

it

may

position

is

so far as substance

be suitable. This

dis-

more

therefore variable as regards

and nevertheless the nature of health remains. Hence the Philosopher says:^ "Health itself may be more or less; for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health." Now these various dispositions and measures of health are

by way

name

the

if

of excess

perfect measure, then

health as greater or clear

how

crease in

But

if

a quality or itself,

we

we should not speak

of

Thus therefore it is form may increase or de-

less.

and how

it

by the

subject, thus again

some quahties and forms are susmore or less, and some not. Now

Simplicius^ assigns the cause of this diversity

being.

And

more

or less, because

it is

therefore every form which

cipated substantially by

its

be

more or less. And so the Philosopher says^ that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are further removed from substance, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less in respect of their participation by the subject.

Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity. For, as we have said, from which a thing receives its species must remain fixed and constant in something indivisible. Therefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated according to more or less. First because the participator that

species in respect of that form.

for this reason

no substantial form

is

And

partici-

pated according to more or less. And therefore the Philosopher says^ that, "as a number cannot ^Ethics, X, 3 (1173^24).

2/n

Cat., VIII

(CG

viii,

it

in respect of its character of indivisibil-

For

this reason

species of

number

we do

not speak of the

as varying in respect of

more

because each species of number is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, such as

and

less,

two-cubits-long, three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, such as double

and of

and

treble,

figures of quantity, such as triangle

and

This same explanation is given by Aristotle Predicaments,^ where, in explaining why

in the

figures are not susceptible of

more

or less, he

says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are likev/ise triangles

and

circles,"

participate

it

in its

indivisibihty. It is clear, therefore, since

;

that neither in these can there be such a thing

its

ity.

pates their nature must

as

has

pate

parti-

subject, cannot vary

of substance nothing

it

less are

per se

is

and lessening therefore in the genus is said to be more or less. And because quantity is near to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, therefore is

in intensity

be with matter," that

because indivisibility is essential to the very notion of such, and so whatever partici-

to the fact that substance in itself cannot

susceptible of

may

in respect of material dispositions,

tetragon.

cannot.

find that

ceptive of

in

in respect of

more and found in substance. Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible; and so if anything participate that form, it must partici-

is,

consider a quality or form in respect

of its participation

we

and defect. And most

of health were given to the

is,

is

participation of the specific form; "but in

its

which

17

1

neither can that which

the species of substance," that

attains to the

or less,

so

ART.

less, so

has a disposi-

tion suitable to an animal's nature, to

various dispositions

Q. 52.

be more or

we speak

of habits

and dispositions in respect of a relation to something,^ that in two ways intensity and lessening may be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for

instance,

we speak

of greater or less health; or

greater or less science, which extends to

more

or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of partici-

pation by the subject; equal science or health

in so far is

namely, as

participated

more

in

one than in another, according to a difference in aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they include indivisibility in their very notion. We shall say further on (q. lxvi, a. i) how it is with the virtues. Reply Obj. i. As the word "great" is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms, so also is the

word "growth," the term

of which

is

some-

thing great.

Reply Obj. 2. Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject

285.27).

^Physics, vn, 3 (246^1). * Metaphysics, vni, 3 (1044*9).

^Categories, 8 (11^7)*

Physics, vii, 3 (246^3; 247^1).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

i8

specific being. Nor again does the notion of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Therefore there is nothing its

to

hinder

or

less.

it

from being susceptive of more

form, but by the subject participating more or one and the same form. And just

less perfectly

Reply Obj.

3.

Alteration

is

primarily indeed

in the quahties of the third species;

but sec-

may

be in the qualities of the first an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like manner, ondarily

it

species. For, supposing

if

ence in participation in it by the subject. And therefore such increase of habits and other forms is not caused by an addition of form to

an alteration take place

in

the passions of

as

by an agent which

is

proved

science and virtue.^

to be

Whether Habit Increases by

2.

We

would seem that the increase

of habits

is

It

by way

of addition.

For the word "increase," as we have said (a. 2), is transferred to forms from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition hence it is said- that "increase is an addition to a magnitude Objection

i.

;

already existing." Therefore in habits also there is

2.

Further, habit

is

not increased except

by means of some agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject; for instance, that which heats causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase without 3.

in the

form

Further, as that which

(a. i) that

such an addition or sub-

would change the species, even as the species of colour is changed when a thing from If, on the other being pale becomes white. hand, this addition be understood as applying to the subject, this could only be either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say that cold increases in a man who, after being cold traction

—

one part of his body, is cold in several parts), some other subject is added, sharing in the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in either of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a greater white in

or hot thing.

not white,

is

above

some

more

crease by addition. For

we may find inmovement increases by

an addition either to the time

cept by an added whiteness.

term.

The Philosopher says:^ made hotter without mak-

"That which

is

hot

is

ing something hot in the matter that was not hot when the thing was less hot." Therefore, in is any addition made in when they increase. / ajiswer that, The solution of this question depends on what we have said above (a. i). For we said that increase and decrease in forms

like

manner, neither

other forms

which are capable of intensity and abatement happen in one way not on the part of the very form considered in itself, but through a differ»

Aristotle, Physics, vii, 3 (247*6; 248*6).

'Aristotle, Generation

and Corruption,

^Physics, IV, 9 (217*34).

i,

5 {320^30).

i), cer-

of these

potency to be white, so that which is less is in potency to be more white. But that which is not white is not made white except by the addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white is not made more white excontrary,

(a.

tain accidents are of themselves susceptible of

white

the

so,

if this increase in forms were understood by way of addition, this could only be either in the form itself or in the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already

is in

On

itself

Metaphysics,^

Since, however, as stated

addition.

Obj.

made

or because

no increase without addition. Obj.

is

to the form.

been stated

proceed thus to the Second Article:

something

were, to participate

it

were made, by an intense action of the agent itself, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though something were

as

added For

Article

in act

a form, not as though the

the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration follows as to

Addition?

is

actually hot, beginning, as

or less, in

course the

it

it lasts,

or to the

follows; and yet the species remains

same on account Nevertheless

of the one-ness of the

movement

tensity as to participation in

its

increases in in-

subject; that

is,

same movement can be executed more or less speedily or readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science inin so far as the

creases, as to the subject's participation in in intensity, in so far as

one

man

is

it,

quicker and

readier than another in considering the

same

conclusions.

As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said absolutely to *

Aristotle, VII, 8, 9 (i033''s;]i034^7).

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

be healthy or beautiful unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change in the sim-

which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them. ple qualities,

How

question affects virtues

this

we

shall

on (q. lxvi, a. i). Reply Obj. i. Even in bodily bulk increase twofold. First, by addition of one subject

to another; such

is

the increase of living things.

Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addiis the case with things subject

tion at all; such

to rarefaction, as

is

stated in the Physics}

Reply Obj. 2. The cause that increases a habit, always effects something in the subject, not however a new form. But it causes the subject to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form,

makes the form Reply Obj. 3. What

or

it

to extend further.

is not already white is in potency to that form, as not yet possessing the form of whiteness; hence the agent causes a new form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in potency to those forms, since it has them already actually; but it is in potency to a perfect mode of participation, and this it receives through the agent's action.

ART.

19

i

same or the same or a

but also in respect of

mode

of participation. For not only

unlike white, but also less white white, since there

more

to

is

is

different

black

is

less

more white

from one opposite

to

stated in the Physics.""

is

But since use of habits depends on the will, was shown above (q. l, a. 5), just as one

as

a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it, so also he may happen to use the habit in performing an act that is not in

who has

proportion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond proportion to the intensity of the habit, or

m

even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase of it, if we

may

speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For not every

morsel of food actually increases the animal's size, as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the multiphcation of food results at la^t in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the intensity of the act falls short proportionately of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening of

Article 3. Whether Every Act Increases Its Habit?

different.

unlike

movement from

white, even as

another, as

state further

is

Q. 53.

of their qualities being the

From

this

it is

clear

how

it.

to solve the objec-

tions.

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that every act increases its habit. Objection i. For when the cause is increased the effect

is

increased.

habits, as stated

a habit increases

Obj.

2.

Now

above

when

acts are causes of

(q. li, a. 2). its

Therefore

Obj.

Further, of Hke things a like judg-

3.

But any

it.

Further, like

act

is

{In Three Articles)

is

like the habit

increased by

like.

from which

pro-

it

We must

the contrary, Opposite effects do not re-

from the same cause. But according to the some acts lessen the habit from which they proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly.

Therefore not every act increases

its

habit.

/ answer that, "Like acts cause like habits."^ are like or unlike not only in respect

Now things 2

Aristotle, iv, 7 (2i4''2). Aristotle, Ethics, 11, 2 (1104*29).

3

Aristotle,

1

IhU. (1104*18).

*Ihid., n, I (1103^21).

consider

how

habits are lost and head there are three points of inquiry: (i) Whether a habit can be this

corrupted? (2) Whether it can be diminished? (3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?

Article

i.

Whether a Habit Can Be Corrupted?

We proceed thus seem that

to the First Article: It

would

a habit cannot be corrupted.

i. For habit is within its subject second nature; (hence it is pleasant to

Objection

sult

Ethics,^

now

weakened; and under

ceeds. Therefore every act increases its habit.

On

QUESTION LIII HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED

acts are multiplied.

ment should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike.^ Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase

How

like a

habit.) Now so long as a thing is, its not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject remains.

act

from

nature

is

Further, whenever a form is corrupted, due either to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary; thus sickness ceases through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now science, which is a habit, can-

Obj.

2.

this is

B

Aristotle, V, 5 (229*^14).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

20 not be lost through corruption of since the intellect, which

its

subject,

subject, "is a sub-

is its

stance and

is

incorruptible."^ In like manner,

neither can

it

be

through the action of

lost

its

contrary, for intelligible species are not contrary to one another. 2 Therefore the habit of

way be

science can in no

Obj.

Further,

3.

some movement. But the habit which

of

science,

soul cannot be corrupted by a

in the

is

movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of the body. direct

And

yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species residing in the intellect, since the intellect independently

body is the proper abode of the species; which reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For of the for

same reason neither can habits or virtue

the

be corrupted since they also are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares,^ "virtue is

more

On

lasting than learning."

the cofitrary,

The Philosopher

says^ that

"forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science.'' Moreover,

by sinning

a

man

loses

a habit of virtue; and again, virtues are en-

gendered and corrupted by contrary acts.^ I ansiver that, A form is said to be corrupted in itself by its contrar\' accidentally, through its

contrary; nor can the agent intellect, which

When

therefore a habit

has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This for inis clearly the case with bodily habits stance, health and sickness. But those habits

—

if in the possible intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the agent intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both in itself and acci-

dentally.

Such are the habits of the

—

ence."

As

to virtues,

some

and

to these applies

ence and opinion.

of science which sible intellect,

is

but secondarily in the sensitive

powers of apprehension, as stated above (q. l, A. 3, Reply 3). Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted accidentally, on the part of the possible intellect, but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers.

We

must therefore inquire whether habits of

kind can be corrupted in themselves. If then there be a habit having a contrary, either on the part of itself or on the part of its this

1

Aristotle, Soul,

2

Aristotle, Metaphysics, vn, 7 {10^2^2).

^Ethics, *

I,

Longevity,

^Ethtcs,

i.

Now

2

sci-

these habits of the appetitive part

moved by

of virtue or of vice

ment

it

is

natural to

to be

it

the reason. Therefore a habit either

may

be corrupted by a judg-

whenever

of reason,

its

motion

is

con-

trary to such vice or virtue, whether through

ignorance, passion or deliberate choice.

Reply Obj. it is

of

like a

it.

And

i.

As stated

in the Ethics,^ a hab-

second nature, and yet so

is

it

it falls

short

that while the nature of a

way be taken away from a removed, though with difficulty. Reply Obj. 2. Although there ii- no contrary to intelligible species, yet there can be a conthing cannot in any

thing, a habit

is

trary to assertions

and

to the process of rea-

son, as stated above.

4 (4o8*'i8).

10 (1100^14).

II, I,

what we have said of

moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul, and the same may be said of the contrary are caused because

such is the habit chiefly indeed in the pos-

are intellectual,

—Some, however, namely the

vices.

;

them

of

residing in reason itself, as stated in the Ethics,^

corrupted indirectly. There are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless second-

prin-

first

both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any forgetfulness or deception whatever, even as the Philosopher says about prudence,^ that it cannot be lost by being forgotten. There is, however, in the possible intellect a habit caused by the reason, namely, the habit of conclusions, which is called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the part of those very propositions which are the starting-point of the reason; for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the assertion "Good is good."" Secondly, on the part of the process of reasoning, according as a sophistical syllogism is contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Hence it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of science. And so the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception is the corruption of sciciples,

that have an incorruptible subject cannot be

arily in a corruptible subject

is

the cause of that species, have a contrary. There-

;

subject being corrupted.

the possible intellect, has no

cies residing in

fore

lost.

corruption results from

all

cause, it can be corrupted in itself; but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted in itself. Now it is evident that an intelligible spe-

^Ibid., v^, 5 (1140^29). "'Interpretation, 14 (24*2>.

(lUQ^i;

*'i2).

(465*23).

8

3 (iioi^'y; 1105*15).

'Aristotle, vii, 10 (iis^'sO-

Aristotle, vi,

i,

2

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

ART.

Q. 53.

21

3

an obstacle to the act of science, in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive

them, so too they diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them; for the diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even as, on the other hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of its increase.

powers, which are impeded by corporal change. But the intelhgible movement of the reason

is

Reply Obj.

movement

Science

3.

of the body,

is

if

not taken away by

we

consider the root

the habit, but only as

itself of

may

it

prove

can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the habit. In like manner a habNevertheless it of virtue can be corrupted.

—

when

said that "virtue

it is

learning," this

is

more

lasting than

must be understood

in respect,

Reply Obj.

A

1.

a simple form. It

habit, considered in itself,

not thus that

is

it is

subject

ways which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potency is indeterminate, through its being able namely, to participate a form in various ways, or to exto decrease, but according to the different in

the use of virtue continues through the whole

tend to a greater or a smaller number of things. Reply Obj. 2. This argument would hold, if

of Uf e, but the use of learning does not.

the essence itself of a habit were in no

not of the subject or cause, but of the act; for

we do not

subject to decrease. This

Article

Whether a Habit Can Diminish?

2.

We

proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Objection i. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish. Obj. 2. Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not become

more

by reason of itself; otherwould follow that a species might be

or less intense

wise

it

predicated of

And if

or less. ing to

its it

individuals according to

can become less intense accord-

participation

its

more

by

its

subject,

would

it

way

say, but

rather that a certain decrease in the essence of

a habit has

its origin,

not in the habit, but in

subject.

its

3. No matter how we take an accivery notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take an

Reply Obj.

dent,

its

accident in the abstract,

it

implies relation to a

which relation begins

subject,

in the accident

and terminates in the subject; for whiteness is called "that by which a thing is white." Accordingly in defining an accident in the abstract,

we do first

we

not put the subject as though

it

were the

part of the definition, namely the genus, but

give

it

the second place, which

difference; thus

we say

is

that simitas

we

that of the is

"a curva-

follow that the habit has something proper to

ture of the nose." But

common to the habit and its whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in the book on the Sotd} Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form, which is impossible. Obj. 3. Further, the ver>' notion and nature of a habit as of any accident, is inherence in a subject, and therefore any accident is defined

concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the accident, for a white thing is

it

which

subject.

not

is

Now

with reference to it

its

subject. Therefore

a hab-

if

does not become more or less intense in

self,

ence in

its

no way

in

be diminished in subject, and consequently

neither can

On

it

its it

it-

inherwill

be

take accidents in the

called "something that has whiteness." Accord-

ingly in defining this kind of accident,

we

the subject as the genus, which

first

of a definition; for

we say

is

the

that a

snub-nose." Accordingly whatever

simum is

place

part is

"a

befitting

an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very notion of the accident is ascribed to that accident not in the abstract, but in the

concrete.

Such are increase and decrease in and therefore to be more or

certain accidents; less

white

is

not ascribed to whiteness but to

a white thing.

less intense.

if

The same

applies to habits

and

natural for contraries

other quahties, save that certain habits increase

same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore a habit can increase, it seems that it can also

or diminish by a kind of addition, as appears from what we have already said (q. lii, a. 2).

the contrary, It

is

to be apphcable to the

diminish.

/ answer that, Habits diminish, just as they

two ways,

increase, in

as

we have

already ex-

plained (q. lii, a. i). And since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders 1

Aristotle,

I,

I

(403*10).

Article 3. Whether a Habit Is Corrupted or Diminished Through Mere Cessation from Act?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. Objection 1. For habits are more lasting than

would seem that

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

22 passible qualities, as

we have

explained above

and

of the inclination of the sensitive appetite

Reply 3; Q. l, a. i). But passible qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act; for whiteness is not lessened through not changing the sight, nor

of other external agencies. Therefore virtue

heat through ceasing to make something hot. Therefore neither are habits diminished or cor-

of those things that are pictured

rupted through cessation from act. Obj. 2. Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing is changed without

intellectual habits, strange fancies,

(q.

a

xlix,

moving

a. 2.

cause. Since therefore cessation

from

moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.

act does not imply a

Obj.

Further, the habits of science and

3.

virtue are in the intellectual soul which

is

above

Now

those things that are above time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such habits detime.

stroyed or diminished through length of time, if one fails for long to exercise them. 0?i the contrary,

The Philosopher

says^ that

"not only deception but also forgetfulness is the corruption of science." Moreover he says- that

"want of intercourse has dissolved many

a

In like manner other habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cesfriendship."

sation

from

act.

/ answer that, As stated in the Physics^ a thing

is

a cause of

movement

in

two ways.

of itself, and such a thing causes

First,

movement by

is

destroyed or lessened through cessation from The same applies to the intellectual habact.

—

which render

its,

tion.

man

Hence when man

ready to judge rightly by his imagina-

ceases to

them, arise

in opposition to

make

use of his

sometimes

in his imagination,

so that unless those fancies be. as

it

were, cut

by frequent use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge rightly and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary; and thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act. Reply Obj. i. Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat were or kept back

off

to increase.

Reply Obj. 2. Cessation from act is a moving cause conducive to corruption or diminution by removing the obstacles

to

them, as explained

above.

Reply Obj.

3.

The

intellectual part of the soul,

above time, but the senand therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the appetitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the Philosopher says'* that time makes us forget. considered in

itself, is

sitive part is subject to time,

its own form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, accidentally; for instance, that which

reason of

removes an obstacle.

It is in this latter

way

QUESTION LIV Of the distinction of habits

that

the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, in so far, that is. as

we

cease from exercising an act which overcame

the causes that destroyed or

For

it.

it

has been stated

weakened that hab-

(a. i) that habits are

destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies

which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to

make

moderate

to

essary result

use of his virtuous habit in order

his

own

is

that

occur outside the

passions or deeds, the nec-

many passions and deeds mode of virtue, by reason

{In Four Articles)

We

have now to consider the distinction of and under this head there are four

habits;

Whether many habits can one power? (2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects? (3) WTiether habits are divided into good and bad? (4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?

points of inquiry (i)

be

in

Article i. Whether in One Power?

We proceed thus to

Longevity,

2

^Ethics, viii, '

(465*23).

Habits Can Be

the First Article: It would

seem that there cannot be many habits power. Objection

i.

in

one

For when several things are

dis-

tinguished in respect of the of

same

too.

one

Now

habits and powers are distinguished in respect

jects.

same

thing,

namely

their acts

and ob-

Therefore they are multiplied in like

5 (ii57*'i3).

Aristotle, Physics, viii, 4 (254^7).

thing, if

them be multiplied the others are

of the 1

Many

*Ibid., IV, 12, 13 (221*32; 222*»l6).

PART

OF SECOND PART

I

manner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power. Obj.

Now

2.

Further, a power

a simple force.

is

one simple subject there cannot be

in

diversity of accidents, for the subject

cause of

how

its

accidents; and

it

does not appear

diverse effects can proceed from one simple

many

cause. Therefore there cannot be

habits

one power.

in

Obj.

3.

Further, just as the body

is

informicd

power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at the same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many by

shape, so

its

is

a

habits. Therefore several habits cannot be at

the

same time

On in

in

one power.

the contrary,

The

intellect

is

one power, vari-

ous sciences.

As stated above

/ answer that,

(q.

xlix, is

a. 4),

in po-

tency to something, either to nature, or to operation,

which

is

the end of nature.

As

to those

habits which are dispositions to nature, clear that several can be in

one subject we

may

it

is

one subject, since in

consider parts in various

Reply Obj.

i.

versity of species

diversity of genus according to matter, as stated

Metaphysics^ (since things that differ in matter belong to different genera), so, too, ge-

in the

neric diversity of objects entails a difference of

powers (therefore the Philosopher says

ly belong to different parts of the soul").

and consequently of habits

difference of acts,

Now

things that differ in genus differ in

species, but not vice versa. Therefore the acts

and habits of

powers

different

body, according to their disposition in

re-

differ in species,

does not follow that different habits are in different powers, for several can be in one power. it

as several genera may be included in one genus, and several species be contained in one species, so does it happen that there are several species of habits and powers. Reply Obj. 2. Although a power is simple as

And even

to its essence,

it is

multiple virtually, according

many

specifically different habits

man

But

specific difference of objects entails a specific

we take

as being parts of the hu-

in the

Ethics- that "those objects that differ generical-

as

humours

to acts

Just as in natural things diis according to the form, and

ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are various habits. Thus, if the

power

can belong to one power.

but

habits are dispositions of a thing that

23

2

of a determinate species. Consequently several

also.

which nevertheless, are tne habits of

ART.

habits, even as several specifically different acts,

the

is

Q. 54.

ing in a power, and inclining that

extends to

it

Consequently there

is

specifically different acts.

nothing to prevent

from being

many

in

one

power.

and if we take the limbs, that is, the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in harmony with nature is beauty; and thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same

Reply Obj. 3. A body is informed by its shape by its own terminal boundaries a habit however is not the terminal boundary of a power, but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Consequently one power cannot have several acts at the same time, except in so far as it might occur that one act is comprised in another just as neither can a body have sev-

subject.

eral shapes, except in so far as

however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to operation, and belong properly to the powers, thus, again, there may be several habits in one power. The reason for this is that

into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided fig-

spect of

human

we have the habit or if we take like parts,

nature

disposition of health; while,

such as nerves, bones, and

flesh,

of these in respect of nature

ness

is

the disposition

strength or lean-

;

If,

the subject of a habit

is

as

;

;

ure.

cannot understand several actually; and yet it can several things at the same time habitually.

For the

intellect

things at the

know

one shape enters

same time

a passive power, as

stated above (q. li, a. 2) for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was shown above {ibid.). Now a passive power is compared to the determinate act of any spe-

Article 2. Whether Habits Are Distinguished by Their Objects?

matter to form, because, just as matter determined to one form by one agent, so, too, is a passive power determined by the nature of one active object to an act specifically one. Therefore, just as several objects can move one passive power, so can one passive power be the

their objects.

;

cies as

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by Objection

is

subject of several acts or perfections specifically diverse.

Now habits

are quaHties or forms inher-

Now

1.

For contraries

differ in species.

the same habit of science regards con-

traries

;

thus medicine regards the healthy and

the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distin-

guished by objects specifically distinct. 1

Aristotle, v, 28 (1024^9); cf. x, 3 (1054^26).

2

VI, I (1139^8).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

24 Obj. habits.

2.

Further, different sciences are different sanrie scientific truth belongs to

But the

both the natural philosopher and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in the Physics} Therefore habdifferent sciences; thus

by their objects. Obj. 3. Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same. But the same act can beare not distinguished

its

long to different habits of virtue, if it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone,

be done for God's sake, is an act of charity, while if it be done in order to pay a debt it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity if it

by means of natural by the movement of heavy bodies towards the centre, and so forth. Now the whole force of a demonstration, which while the former proves

it

processes, for example,

is

"a syllogism producing science," as stated in

the Posterior Analytics,- depends on the mean.

And

consequently various means are as so

many

active principles, in respect of which the habits

of science are distinguished.

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says,^ "the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative matters." Consequently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as

Moreover

diversity of active principles does.

of habits does not follow diversity of objects.

the ends are objects of the internal acts, with

On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects, as stated above (q. xvni, a. 5). But habits are dis-

is

which, above

the virtues are concerned, as

all,

evident from what has been said (q. xvin, A. 6; Q. XIX, A. 2, Reply i q. xxxiv, a. 4). ;

positions to acts. Therefore habits also are dis-

tinguished according to the diversity of objects. / answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit.

Hence the

specific distinction of habits

be taken in the ordinary way in which forms differ specifically, or according to that

may

mode

of distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species. Habits, however, imply order to something, and all things that imply order to something, are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordered. Now a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order, namely, to nature, and to an operation consequent to nature. Accordingly

habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things. First, in respect of the active principles

of such dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear

ply

I,

follows. (Re-

Reply Obj.

i.

differ in

In distinguishing powers, or

we must

consider the object not in

formal aspect, which may species or even in genus. And though

material but in

ifito

3.

Whether Habits Are Divided

Good and Bad?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. Objection i. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards contraries, as was stated above (a. 2, obj. i). Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad. Obj. 2. Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since

it is

its

common

to

all, it

cannot

be accounted a specific difference, as the Philosopher declares."* Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil. Obj. 3. Further, there can be different evil habits about one same object, for instance, intemperance and insensibihty about matters of concupiscence; and in like manner there can be several good habits, for instance,

and heroic or godlike

2, 3; A. 3).

also habits, its

from what

Article

human

virtue

virtue, as the Philosopher

clearly states.^ Therefore, habits are not divided

into

good and bad.

On

the contrary,

A

good habit

a bad habit, as virtue to vice.

is

contrary to

Now

contraries

a

are distinct specifically. Therefore habits are

known under known through the other.

divided specifically into good and bad habits. / answer that, As stated above (a. 2), habits

And consequently in so far as they agree in the one aspect of knowability, they belong to one

are specifically distinct not only in respect of

cognitive habit.

their relation to nature.

the distinction between specific contraries

is

real distinction, yet they are both

one aspect, since one

Reply Obj.

2.

The

is

natural philosopher proves

their objects

two ways.

and active

First,

principles, but also in

Now,

by reason of

this

the earth to be round by one means, the astrono-

or unsuitableness to nature. In this

proves this by for example, by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort,

habit

mer by another; for the means of mathematics, 1

Aristotle,

11,

2 (igs^'ss).

latter

«

is

specifically distinct

Aristotle,

i,

happens

in

their suitableness

way

from a bad

a

good habit.

2 (yi^'iS).

'Physics, u, 9 (200*15); Ethics, vu, 8 (1151*16). * Topics, IV, 6 (127*26). ^Ethics, VII, I (ii45'»is).

PART good habit

I

OF SECOND PART

one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to since a

human

is

nature, since they are according to rea-

son, while acts of vice are discordant with hu-

man

nature since they are against reason. Hence

it is

clear that habits are distinguished specifi-

cally

to nature,

to

an act that

is

suitable to a lower nature, while

another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature.

And

thus

human virtue, which human nature, is

made up

is

parts of fortitude,

many.

of

Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge.

Obj.

3.

But many conclusions belong

to but one science, geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up of many.

to

On

from the fact that one habit disposes

25

many

temperance, and other virtues.^ Therefore one habit

by the difference of good and bad.

Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation

ART. 4

Q. 54.

thus Tully assigns

it;

the contrary,

A habit,

since

it is

a quality,

made up many. Therefore one habit is not made up of many. / answer that, A habit directed to operation, But nothing simple

a simple form.

is

is

of

we

such as

are chiefly concerned with at present,

from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher nature. Reply Obj. i. The same habit may be about

Now every perfection proportioned to that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, though it is one, extends to many things in so far as they have something in

contraries, in so far as contraries agree in one

common,

common

object, so also a habit extends to

disposes to an act befitting distinct

aspect. Never, however, does

pen that contrary habits are

in

it

hap-

one species, since

contrariety of habits follows contrariety of as-

good and bad, namely, according as one habit is good, and another bad but not by reason of one habit being about something good, and another about something bad. Reply Obj. 2. The good which is common to pect. Accordingly habits are divided into

a perfection of a power.

is

is

every being,

is

not the difference constituting

nature, or to one principle, as

above (aa. If then

which

it

we

is

di-

is

begins by being imperfectly in the subject, and gradually perfected. The same apphes to other

Reply Obj.

The

2.

parts which are assigned

to each cardinal virtue, are not integral parts

form

a whole, but subjective or

we

(q. lvii, a. 6, Ans. 4;

shall explain further

Part II-II,

q.

on

xlviii).

Reply Obj. 3. In any science, he who acquires by demonstration scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfect-

habits.

For whatever is engendered, not at once, but Httle by Httle, seems to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by Httle, out of several acts, as stated above (q. li, a. 3). Therefore one habit is made up of several. Obj. 2. Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are assigned to one habObjection

a certain

after another, but to the fact that the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difflcultly changeable disposition, and also to the fact that

that combine to

many

it

multipHcity

many things save in relation to somefrom which it derives its unity. Reply Obj. 1. That a habit is engendered little by little is due not to one part being engendered

potential parts, as

of

this

extend to

Article 4. Whether One Habit Is Made up of Majiy Habits?

made up

shall find in

hence it is that a habit is a simple qualnot composed of several habits, even though extend to many things. For a habit does not

qualities.

is

clearly stated

ity,

incompatibility to that which is in keeping with nature; thus, various vices about one same matter are contrary to one virtue.

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It

we

But since

it

We

was

consider a habit as to the things to

extends,

above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to their diverse

would seem that one habit

things

chiefly,

thing,

their suitability to various natures, as stated

of the

rected to one thing, to which the habit looks to

the evil that constitutes a difference of habits

specific thing are distinct in reference to

many

2,'^).

multiplicity.

it

same

some general aspect

they are related to one, for instance, to some specific aspect of the object, or to one

some determinate good by reason of suitability to some determinate, namely, the human, nature. In like manner is not a pure privation, but something determinate contrary to a determinate nature. Reply Obj. 3. Several good habits about one

is,

in so far as

;

the species of a habit, but

that

i.

And when he

obtains by demonstration the knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in him; but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, ly.

scientific

since

it

extends to more things, because the conand demonstrations of one science are

clusions

co-ordinate, and one flows 1

Rhetor., n, 54

(DD

i,

165).

from another.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

26

In Pa RTICULAR Good Habits that is, Virtues 2.

(a)

—

QUESTION LV Of the

tue

come now

individually.

to the consideration of habits

And

we have

since habits, as

said

(q. liv, a. 3), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits,

which are

nected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits (q. lxviii) in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins (q. lxxi).

But natural

virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither therefore are

On

human

virtues habits.

the contrary,

The Philosopher

says^ that

"science and virtue are habits."

/ answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfec-

and of other matters con-

virtues,

not a habit, but an action or a relation. 5. Further, just as there are human vir-

tues, so are there natural virtues.

{In Four Articles)

We

is

Obj.

virtues, as to their essence

tion of a power.

Now a

thing's perfection

sidered chiefly in relation to

its

is

con-

end. But the end

;

Now

five things

must be considered about

tues: (i) the essence of virtue; (2)

its

vir-

subject

(3) the division of virtue (q. lvii) (5) certain (4) the cause of virtue (q. lxiii) properties of virtue (q. lxiv). (q. lvi)

;

;

;

Under the

head, there are four points

first

Whether human virtue is a habit? (2) Whether it is an operative habit? (3) Whether it is a good habit? (4) Of the defiof inquiry:

(i)

nition of virtue.

Article

i.

Whether

Human

Virtue Is a Habit?

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit. Objection i. For virtue is "the ultimate degree of power."^ But the ultimate degree of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is

the ultimate degree, as a point

is

to the genus of line. Therefore virtue ble to the genus of power,

and not

reducible is

reduci-

to the

genus

of habit.

Obj.

Further, Augustine says

2.

{De

Lib. Arb.

good use of free choice." But use of free choice is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act. Obj. 3. Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, ii,

igY

that "virtue

is

power

Therefore power is said to be it is determined to its act. Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determined to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many, and they are determined to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have said above (q. xlix, a. 4). Therefore human virtues are of

is act.

perfect according as

habits.

Reply Obj.

Sometimes we give the name

i.

of a virtue to that to which the virtue

namely, either to stance,

we

we

its

give the

is

directed,

object, or to its act; for in-

name

Faith, to that which

believe, or to the act of believing, as also to

the habit

we say

by which we beheve. When therefore

that "virtue

is

the highest degree of

power," virtue is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest point to which a power can reach is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a man can carr>' a hundredweight and not more, his virtue^ is put at a hundredweight,

and not

at sixty.

But the objection takes

vir-

tue as being essentially the highest degree of

power.

;

but acts. Obj. Eccl.

4.

1

xvy

that "virtue

Aristotle, Heavens,

PL > PL * PL 2

2.

Good

use of free choice

same sense

is

said

above (Reply i) that is to say, because it is that to which virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use as

;

Further, Augustine says, is

(De Moribus

the order of love,"

and (qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30)"' that "the ordering which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to use." Now order, or ordering, denominates either an action or a relation. Therefore virIn De

Reply Obj.

to be a virtue, in the

Ccelo,

i,

i,

11 (281*14; '18);

32, 1268; Retract.,

i,

9

(PL

Thomas,

32, 5q8).

32, 1322; City oj God, xv, 22

40, 19.

cf. St.

25.

(PL

41, 467).

of free choice.

Reply Obj.

3.

We

are said to merit

thing in two ways. First, as

we

by merit

by some-

itself, just

by running; and thus we we are said to merit by something as by the principle by which we as

are said to run

merit by acts. Secondly,

6

Categories, 8 (8^29).

«

In English

inal

meaning

gine being so

we should say

"strength," which

of the Latin virtus; thus

many

is

we speak

horse-power, to indicate

its

the orig-

of

an en-

strength.

PART we are said movement; and thus

merit, as

I

OF SECOND PART

to run

by the power

of

we

said to merit

by

are

and habits. Reply Obj. 4. When we say that virtue

order or ordering of love,

we

the

is

Article

Whether Human Virtue Is an

2.

Operative Habit?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. Objection i. For Tully says (Tiiscul. iv, 13)^ that as health and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither

2.

Further, in natural things

we

find vir-

tue not only in reference to act, but also in

reference to being, as

is

some have

pher,^ since

from the Philoso-

clear

a virtue to be always,

while some have a virtue to be not always, but

some

at

Now

definite time.

as natural virtue

human human

in natural things, so is

beings. Therefore also

is

virtue in rational virtue

is

referred

not only to act, but also to being. Obj.

Further, the Philosopher says^ that

3.

virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which

man

made is

is

God Him-

the soul

is

Him. Therefore

disposed by being it

seems that

(likening

it,

as

it

were, to Him), but not

in reference to operation. It is not, therefore,

an

operative habit.

On

the contrary,

"the virtue

cff

The Philosopher

a thing

is

that which

says^ that

makes

its

on the part of the form,

is

is

it is

in act.

body

so constituted that the

holds the place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other animals, and the same is to be said of the powers which are common to the soul and body. Only those powers which are proper to the soul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Therefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit.

Reply Obj.

i.

Mode

of action follows on the

disposition of the agent; for such as a thing

such

And

is its act.

therefore, since virtue

some kind of

operation, there

is,

the

is

must

pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue

some corresponding

disposition.

Now

virtue

causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue

an ordered disposition of the soul, in so

itself is

far as, namely, the

powers of the soul are

in

some way ordered to one another, and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, in so far as it is a suitable disposition of the soul,

is

like health

and beauty, which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation.

Reply Obj. ing

is

which

2.

Virtue which

is

referred to be-

not proper to man, but only that virtue is

referred to works of reason, which are

proper to man.

Reply Obj.

vir-

called a quality of the soul in reference

God

to

Whom

like to

Now man

Now the best thing to which

Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl.

3),^ to

tue

best."

needs to be disposed by virtue

self, as II,

is

27

3

potential being, but power

is

the principle of action, since everything

principle of

virtue.

is

Obj.

is

acts in so far as

refer to the end to

which virtue is ordered, because in us love is set in order by virtue. Reply Obj. 5. Natural powers are of themselves determined to one act, but not the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we have said.

ART.

in reference to act,

which

virtues

Q. 55-

of matter, which

3.

As God's substance

of

some

operation.

man

is

His

act,

God is in respect Therefore, as we have said

the highest likeness of

to

above (q. hi, a. 2), happiness or beatitude by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.

work good." / answer that, Virtue, from the very nature

imphes some perfection of power, as we have said above (a. i). Therefore, since power is of two kinds, namely power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; of the word,

the perfection of each of these

But power 1

DD

iv, 30.

^Heavens,

1, 12 (281^28). Physics, vn, 3 (246^13). 2; 247'2). •

DD

'

Chap. 10

'

Ethics, VI, 5 (ii40*'i2).

IV, 30.

(DD

IV. 29).

•Chap. 51 (BU47). »o

"

City of God, xiv, 6 (PL 41, 409). (PL 41, 258); cf. Q. XXIV, a.

Ibid., IX, 4

2.

PART For the Stoics held that the

OF SECOND PART

soul's passions can-

man but the Periwho were founded by Aristotle, as Au-

not be in a wise or virtuous patetics,

I

;

dom from that

ART.

Q. 59.

47

3

passion." It

may be

said,

however,

when he says that a gentle man is not paswe are to understand this of inordinate

sionate,

gustine says,^ maintained that the passions are

passion.

compatible with moral virtue,

they be reduced

Reply Obj. 2. This and all similar arguments which TuUy brings forward in De Tuscul. QucBst.

This difference, as Augustine observes, was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intellectual appetite, that is, the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not. as the Peripatet-

take the passions in the sense of inordinate af-

to the

if

mean.

ics did, distinguish

affections of the their being

the passions from the other

human

movements

soul, in the point of

fections.

Reply Obj. 3. WTien a passion forestalls the judgment of reason so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as though commanded by reason, it helps tow^ard the execution of reason's

command.

of the sensitive appetite,

(whereas the other emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellectual appetite or will) but only in the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any affections in disaccord with reason. These affections could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately, but it would be possible for them to be in a wise man if they arose suddenly, because, in the words of Aulus Gellius, quoted by Augustine,^ "it is not in our power to call up

Article 3. Whether Sorrow Is Compatible Moral Virtue?

•with

We

,

proceed thus to the Third Article: It is incompatible with

would seem that sorrow virtue.

Aristotle says^ that

Objection i. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wisd. 8. 7 She, that is, Divine wisdom, teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude. Now the conversation of wisdom hath no bitterness, as we read further on {verse 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also. Obj. 2. Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states.^ But a hindrance to good works is incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Obj. 3. Further, Tully calls sorrow "a disease of the soul" (Tusc. QucBst. iv, 7).'^ But disease of the soul is incompatible with virtue, which is a good condition of the soul. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it. On the contrary, Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in Him. for He said (Matt. 26. 38) My soul is sorrowjid even unto death. Therefore sorrow is compatible with

ing a

virtue.

the visions of the soul,

when they

known

and must

as its fancies;

from awesome

arise

things, they

needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he slightly startled by fear, or depressed with

is

sorrow, as

if

these passions forestalled the use

of reason without his approving of such things or consenting to them."

Accordingly,

if

the passions be taken for in-

ordinate affections they cannot be in a virtuous

man,

way

liberately, as the Stoics maintained.

them deBut if the

movements

of the sen-

in such a

that he consent to

passions be taken for any

they can be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence sitive appetite,

"some describe virtue as bekind of freedom from passion and disturb-

ance; this

is

well as

many

:

/ answer that, As Augustine says,^ "the Stoics

incorrect, because the assertion

should be qualified"; they should have said that virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and time."

Reply Obj.

:

The Philosopher quotes

held that in the soul of the wise three

eviradeiai,'' that

is,

man

there are

three good passions,

"in place of the three disturbances

:

namely,

in-

this, as

stead of covetousness, desire; instead of mirth,

other examples in his books on

joy; instead of fear, caution." But they denied

i.

Logic, in order to illustrate not his owti mind,

that anything corresponding to sorrow could be

but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue ;* and the Philosopher rejects this opinion,^ when he says that "virtue is not free-

in the

1

lUd.

2

mind of a wise man, for two reasons. First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man, for they thought that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good

Ihid.

^Ethics, n, 3 (1104^24). * Cf. Cicero, Tuscul., m, 4 6 Loc. cit.

^Ethics, vu, 13 (1153^2); X, 5 (1175^17).

(DD

iv, 3).

?

DD n-,

8

City ol God. xiv. 8

5.

CPL

41, 411).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

48

man, so man's only evil is vice, which cannot in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve the life of the body is some good to man, although not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderto

be

man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to I John I. S: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to II Cor. 7. 10: The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto ate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous

Fourthly,

salvation.

because he

worthily sorrow for another's

sorrow

may

sin.

praise-

Therefore

compatible with moral virtue in the

is

same way as the other passions are when moderated by reason. Their second reason for holding this opinion is about evil present, while fear for evil to come, even as pleasure is about a

was that sorrow is

present good, while desire

Now

is

for a future good.

the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the

desire to have good that one does not possess or even the avoidance of future evil, may be consistent with virtue. But depression of the soul resulting from sorrow for a present evil is altogether contrary to reason, and therefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated, which is rejected by reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil, yet moderately, according as reason dictates.

Now

it

pertains to virtue that the sen-

be conformed to reason, as stated above (a. i, Reply 2). Hence moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful sitive appetite

is

a

mark

of virtue, as the Philosopher also says.^

Moreover,

this

since just as

proves useful for avoiding evil, is more readily sought for

good

the sake of pleasure, so

is evil

more strongly

shunned on account of sorrow. Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for is incompatible with virtue, since virtue rejoices in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how. Reply Obj. i. The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. things pertaining to virtue

^Ethics,

II,

6 (iio6''2o).

Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom. Reply Obj. 2. Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful, but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow. Reply Obj. 3. Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind, but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well disposed soul according to the present state of

life.

Article 4. Whether All the Moral Virtues Are Concerned with the Passions?

We

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It all the moral virtues are concerned with the passions. Objection i. For the Philosopher says^ that "moral virtue is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (q. xxni, a. 4; q. xxxi, a. i; Q. XXXV, aa. I, 2). Therefore all the mortal virtues are about the passions.

would seem that

Obj.

Further, the subject of the moral vir-

2.

that which

by participation, as But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above (q. xxii, A. 3). Therefore every moral virtue is about the tues

is

is

rational

the Philosopher states.^

passions. 3. Further, some passion is to be found every moral virtue, and so either all are about

Obj. in

the passions, or none are. But

some

are about the

and temperance, as stated in the Ethics.^ Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions. On the contrary, Justice, which is a moral vir-

passions, as fortitude

tue,

is

not about the passions, as stated in the

Ethics.^

Moral virtue perfects the apby ordering it to good of reason. Now the good of reason is that which is moderated or ordered by reason. ConsequentI answer that,

petitive part of the soul

ly there are

moral virtues about

all

matters that

are subject to reason's ordering and moderation.

Now

reason orders not only the passions of the

sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the is, the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as stated above (q.

intellectual appetite, that

xxii, a. 3). Therefore not all the moral virtues

some are about passions, some about operations. Reply Obj. i. The moral virtues are not all

are about passions, but

about pleasures and sorrows as about their prop"^

Ethics,

*

Ibid.,

II,

Ill,

^Ibid., V,

,s

*3).

it

is

Accordingly, those things which are set

down

as merits in the beatitudes are a kind of prep2

I. I

City of God, xvii, 7 (PL 34, 1231).

688.

insatiable,"

is

states.^

in the carnal pleasure of the appe-

Cf. City of God,

PL

on

shall state further

namely our innate concupiscence of the

cf.

3

we

sin, as

carnal sins have a stronger impulse,

sins,

other things being equal. Three reasons

assigned for

1

Now

incontinent in lust than in anger"

spiritual sin.

the contrary, Gregory says {Moral, xxxiii,

shame than

sole

grievous the

greatest adhesion,

guilt.

sin is

own

against the sinner's

since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less

own soul. Now

theft belongs to covetousness, which

a carnal

is

ly spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt.

We

.

be taken on the part of sin is committed. For

whom

III,

95E); G/o55aLombardi (PL 192, 209);

iii,

on

12 (1119^8).

Ibid., VII, 6(ii49''2).

^Ihid.,111, 10 {111^^2).

5.5

(PL

26, 554).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

124 Objection

Because the greater a

i.

sin's cause,

more forcibly it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist, for it dethe

notes weakness in the sinner,

if he cannot easily due to weakness is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause.

and a

resist sin,

Obj.

sin that

is

Further, concupiscence

2.

a general

is

cause of sin. Hence a gloss on Rom. 7. 7, For I had not known concupiscence, says:^ "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence it forbids

Now

all evils."

piscence by which

grievous his

the greater the concu-

man

is

overcome, the

Therefore the gravity of a sin

sin.

diminished by the greatness of

is

Obj.

less

its

is

the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin. Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the

much

sin; so

reason

who

so that he

lacks the use of

altogether excused from sin, and he

is

who

sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased

by the greatness of

On

its

cause.

the contrary, If the cause be increased,

the effect

cause of

is

increased. Therefore the greater the

sin,

more grievous

the

answer

that, In the

the will to sin; for act as a tree to

Matt.

7. 18, .4

fruit.

And

it is

compared

its fruit,

good

as a gloss observes^

on

is,

the

more

grievous will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the

The

more grievously does man

it

were, being those by which the will

inclined to sin.

is

make

will to sin in will;

such

is

of the will.

more

Among

a distinction. For

we must them induce the

these causes

some

of

accord with the very nature of the is the proper object

the end, which

And by such

grievous, because a if

his will

man

sins

The

tariness.

increase of such a cause diminish-

es the sin, as stated.

Reply Obj.

2.

to include the

there sin.

If

concupiscence be understood

movement

of the will, then,

greater concupiscence, there

is

But

if

ment

movement

a

is

(vi,

of the concupis-

judgment of reason and the move-

of the will, diminishes the sin. Because

man who

stimulated by through a more grievous temptation, and therefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence taken in this sense follows the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, then the greater the concupiscence the graver the sin. For sometimes the movement of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly the

sins

because he

a greater concupiscence

is

falls

to its object.

This argument considers the

3.

cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated.

Article

7.

Whether a Circumstance

Aggravates a Sin?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It would seem that a circumstance does not aggrasin.

Objection

from

specify a

sin, for it is

sin

takes

its

gravity

a circumstance does not

an accident of sin. Thereis not taken from a

circumstance. Obj.

2.

Further, a circumstance

of evil; and

of

Now

fore the gravity of a sin

griev-

movement

Because

1.

its species.

more

i6E); Glossa interl. (vi, i6v); Glossa Lombardi (PL 191, 1416). Cf. Augustine, De Spir. el Lilt., 2 Glossa ordin. (v, 2gB). rv (PL 44, 204). Glossa ordin.

where

a greater

cible power, then a greater concupiscence, fore-

it is evil, it

if it is

is

either evil

causes, of itself, a species

not

evil, it

cannot

make a way

thing worse. Therefore a circumstance in no

aggravates a sin. Obj. 3. Further, the malice of a sin

from

its

turning

is

derived

away (from God). But circum-

stances affect sin on the part of the object to

which

it

turns. Therefore they

do not add

to the

sin's malice.

On

the contrary, Ignorance of a circumstance

sin. For he who sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven.'

diminishes

1

is

by concupiscence we understand a

passion, which

or not. If

(for example ignor-

ance), or which weaken the free

so

no

Reply Obj. i. This argument considers the moving cause, which diminishes volun-

made

is

the judgment of reason

it is

extrinsic

is

a cause sin

induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will to sin against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with the judgment of reason. Therefore those causes which weaken ously

much

voluntariness; and so

longer sinful.

vate a

sin.

other causes of sin are extrinsic and re-

mote, as

its

the act be altogether involuntary

if

to the sinful

tree cannot bring forth evil

the greater this cause

that

Reply Obj.

the sin.

genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, and is /

they diminish

stalling the

cause.

Further, as rectitude of the reason

3.

the will (for example weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as

3

Aristotle, Ethics,

iii, i (i

11 1*1).

PART Now this would not be the case stance aggravated a stance makes a sin

sin.

I

OP SECOND PART

unless a circum-

Therefore a circum-

more grievous. As the Philosopher says

Q. 73.

Reply Obj.

in / answer that, speaking of habits of virtue/ it is natural for a thing to be increased by that which causes it. Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance; for the fact that a man departs from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action. Therefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circum-

ART.

3

12s

not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance.

A

2.

circumstance

a sin either way. For

low that

may

may

aggravate

does not

if it is evil, it

fol-

constitutes the sin's species; for

it

it

multiply the ratio of evil within the same

And if it be not evil, it aggravate a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance. species, as stated above.

may

Reply Obj. 3. Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may

stances.

turn aside from the rule of reason through cor-

This happens in three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one genus to

ruption of any single circumstance

another. a

man

Thus

fornication

with one

who

is

is

the intercourse of

not his wife; but

if

to

be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin is drawn to another kind of sin, namely injustice, in so far as he usurps another's property; and in this respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornithis

cation. sin,

not

into another genus, but only

by

Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a

by drawing

it

multiplying the character of

man

sin.

Thus

if

a waste-

when he ought not, and to ought not to give, he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason his sin is more grievous, even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox, iii)^ ful

gives both

whom he

man commits many sins for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who educated him, to whom he owes

his lands, his house, his position in the re-

Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin

by

adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance. Thus, taking another's property constitutes the sin of theft but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another's property, the sin will be more grievous, although in itself, to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an ;

Reply Obj.

i.

Some circumstances do

specify

Article 8. Whether Sin Is Aggravated by Reason of Its Causing More Harm?

We

proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. Objection i. Because the harm done is an issue consequent to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above (q. xx, a. 5). Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm.

would seem that

Obj.

Further,

2.

harm

what

shalt thou do against

Thy wickedness may hurt a man thee. If, therefore, sins

causing more harm, sins against

Obj.

3.

man by

God

Further, greater

that

man

is

«

DD

1,

546.

is

measured

.

.

more grievous than

harm

is

inflicted

life of

on a

grace than

his natural life, because the life

better than the life of nature, so far

ought to despise his natural life lest he Now, speaking absolutely,

a

(1104*27).

.

is like

were aggravated through would follow that sins

depriving him of the

by taking away

Him?

that

or oneself.

Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give the species may aggravate a sin. Because, even as the goodness of a thing is weighed not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to

2

it

against our neighbour are

lose the Hfe of grace.

^Ibid.,u,

by

inflicted chiefly

is

our neighbour, because no one wishes to harm himself, and no one can harm God, according to Job 35. 6, 8: // thy iniquities be sins against

a moral act, as stated above (q. xviii, a. io).

an accident, so the malice of an act

evil.

reason.

of grace

evil act.

the act

This turning aside from the rule of reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man ought to be united by right

multiplied,

public."

make

the rule of reason suffices to

that "in taking his father's life a ;

for instance,

;

by doing something when one ought not or where one ought not. And to depart thus from

man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the hfe of grace by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were

grievous on account of

its

more

causing a greater

would follow that fornication, absois a more grievous sin than murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin harm,

it

lutely speaking,

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

126

not more grievous on account of

is

causing

greater sin, but. on the contrary, a graver sin

Lib. Arb.

calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has heard nothing about the

its

a greater harm.

On

the contrary, Augustine says

14):^ "Since vice

iii,

vice

is

is

{De

contrary to nature, a as it dimin-

more grievous accordmg

the

ishes the integrity of nature."

ing of the integrity of nature

fore a sin

is

that,

the lessen-

a harm. There-

graver according as

is

harm. / answer

Now

Harm may bear

does more

it

a threefold re-

Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when a man does something with a mind to harm another, for example a murderer or a thief. In lation to sin.

harm aggravates the because then the harm is the direct

pains of hell would suffer greater pain in hell for

murder than for a sin of theft. But his not aggravated on account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in

a sin of sin is

the case of a believer, who,

it

seems

sins

more

grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his de-

But the gravity of this harm is caused by the gravity of sin. Reply Obj. i. As we have already stated (q. XX, A. 5) in treating of the goodness and malice

sire to sin.

solely

this case the quantity of

of external actions, the result of an action

sin directly,

foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and

malice of an act.

object of the sin.

Sometimes the harm

is

when

tended, for instance,

foreseen, but not in-

a

man

takes a short

cut through a field, the result being that he knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case again the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin indirectly, however, in so far, that is, as it is owing to his ;

will being strongly inclined to sin that a

man

does not forbear from doing, to himself or to

harm which he would not wish absolutely. Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended. And then if this harm is another, a

connected with the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly. But, on account of his

harm deemed punishable

neglecting to consider the

man

sue, a

is

sults of his action if

other hand, the

it

harm

sinful act, although

intended,

it

that might enfor the evil re-

be unlawful.

If,

on the

follows directly from the

be neither foreseen nor

aggravates the sin directly, because

it

whatever is directly consequent to a sin belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin for ;

instance, result

is

if

a

that

if

man is a notorious fornicator, the many are scandalized, and although

Reply Obj. vates a sin,

Although the harm done aggra-

2.

does not follow that this alone

it

renders a sin more grievous; in fact, order which of the

harm

itself

so far only as

Hence

it

it

lack of

renders the act more disordered.

does not follow, supposing

inflicted chiefly

by

harm

to be

sins against our neighbour,

that such sins are the

much

it is

aggravates a sin. Therefore that ensues aggravates a sin in

itself

most grievous, since a

is to be found in sins which man commits against God, and in some which he commits against himself. Moreover we might say that although no man can do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavour to do so in things concerning Him, for example by destroying faith, or by outraging holy things, which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though this

may

greater lack of order

be referred finally to some apparent good,

from some anxiety. Reply Obj. 3. This argument does not prove, for two reasons. First, because the murderer infor example, delivery

harm to his neighbours, who solicits the woman in-

tends directly to do

while the fornicator

such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen by him, yet it aggravates his sin di-

tends not

harm but

murder

the direct and sufficient cause of bodi-

rectly.

ly death, while

But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself incurs. Such harm, if accidentally connected with the sinful act, and if

sufficient cause of another's spiritual death, be-

is

cause no of his

man

own

pleasure. Secondly, because

no man can of himself be the

dies spiritually except

by sinning

will.

neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggra-

correspond with the gravman in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this harm is directly consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not make vate a

sin,

nor does

it

ity of the sin; for instance, if a

1

PL 32,

1291.

Article 9. Whether a Sin Is Aggravated by Reason of the Conditioji of the Person agai?ist Whom It Is Committed?

We

proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed.

would seem that

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

Objection i. For if this were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate a

because a virtuous

sin,

bears a wrong with equanimity

is

by the wrong done him, than

man who

less

harmed

who, through being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against

whom

gravate the

a sin

is

others,

committed does not ag-

sin.

Obj. 2. Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin, because, as

Cicero says (Paradox, his slave sins once;

many

life sins

iii)^

"The man who

kills

he that takes his father's

times." But the kinship of a per-

son sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, because every man is most near to himself, and yet

it is

less

grievous to

harm one-

than another, for example to kill one's own, than another's horse, as the Philosopher de-

Q. 73.

ART.

/ answer that,

127

9

The person sinned

against

is,

manner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above (a. 3) that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object, so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave as its object is a more principal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his neighbour, for whatever we do, it is on account of one of these that we do it, although there is a subordination of one to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in a

person sinned against, may be considered on the part of these three. First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united according as he is the more virtuous or more sacred to God, so that an injury inflicted on such a person comes back upon God, according to Zach. 2. 8: He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye. Therein respect of the

more grievous according

self

fore a sin

clares.^

committed against a person more closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official

Therefore kinship of the person sinned

against does not aggravate the sin.

Obj.

who

station.

Further, the condition of the person

3.

on account of knowledge, according to Wis. 6. 7 The mighty shall be mightily tormented, and Luke 12. 47: The servant who knew the will of shall be beaten and did it not his lord with many stripes. Therefore, in like manner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his dignity and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a poor man, since there is no respect of persons with God (Col. 3. 25), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin. sins aggravates a sin chiefly

his dignity or

.

On

.

.

.

.

.

Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written (III Kings They have destroyed Thy altars, they 19. 14) have slain Thy prophets with the sword. Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed by a man against those who are akin to him, according to Mich. 7. 6: The son dishonoureth the father, and the daughter riseth up the contrary,

:

the

is

On

the part of

it is

it is

evident

more grievously according person against whom' he sins is more

that he sins as the

man himself,

as

all

the

united to him, either through natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and, for this very reason sins all the more grievously, according to Ecclus. 14. 5 is evil to

himself, to

whom

will

the part of his neighbour, a

:

He

that

he be good?

man

On

more more per-

sins the

grievously according as his sin affects

sons, so that a sin committed against a public personage, for example a king or a prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more

grievous than a sin committed against a private it is expressly prohibited (Exod.

person; hence

22. 28): The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse. In like manner it would seem that an

injury done to a person of prominence

is all

the

more grave on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people. Reply Obj. i. He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as the former is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally;

but that the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenuate

against her mother. Furthermore, sins commit-

the sin of the injurer.

ted against persons of rank are expressly con-

Reply Obj. 2. The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his own will, for instance his possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does it of his own will. But in those things that are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spirit-

demned; thus

it is

saith to the king:

written (Job 34. 18):

"Thou

art

Who

an apostate^' ; who

calleth rulers ungodly. Therefore the condition

of the person sinned against aggravates the sin. 1

DD

^

Ethics, V, II (1138*28).

1,

546.

SUM MA THEOLOGICA

128 ual goods,

a graver sin to inflict an injury

it is

on oneself; for

man

it

is

a

more grievous

sin for a

to kill himself than another. Since,

how-

ever, things belonging to our neighbour are not

subject to the dominion of our will, the argu-

ment

prove, in respect of injuries done

fails to

to such things, that

it is

less grievous to sin in

unless indeed our neighbour be

their regard,

God

if

3.

There

is

excellent this. First,

punishes more severely those ;

who excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin; hence Our Lord said (Luke 12. 47) that the and servant who knew the will of his lord, shall be beaten with many stripes. did it not Secondly, on account of ingratitude, because

person, for instance one

.

.

.

is

poral goods, aggravates a sin, according to Wis. 6.

7

The mighty

:

shall be mightily tormented.

Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being specially inconsistent

Whether the Excellence of the

10.

Person Sinniftg Aggravates the Sin?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article: It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the

sin.

For man becomes great chiefly God, according to Ecclus. 25. 13: How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord. Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to him for it is written (II Paral. 30. 18, 19): The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning. Obj. 2. Further, there is no respect of persons with God (Rom. 2. 11). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another for one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning. Obj. 3. Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason Objection

by cleaving

1.

to

;

of the excellence of the person sinning.

On

the contrary, Isidore says ii,

.

sin

many.

Bono,

.

.

done

who

for this

because such an injury redounds to the harm

Article

Four reasons may be asbecause a more excellent

in which a man excels is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins; and in this respect any excellence, even in tem-

no respect for persons

against a person of higher rank

of

more

is

signed for

every good

willing, or give his approval.

Reply Obj.

he

18).^

"A

sin

is

deemed

chastity, were to be a fornicator. Fourthly, on account of the example or scandal; because, as Gregory says {Pastor, i, 2):^ "Sin becomes much more scandalous when the sinner is honoured for his position" and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men bear them with more indignation. Reply Obj. i. The passage quoted alludes to those things which are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness. Reply Obj. 2. God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their sin, ;

as stated.

Reply Obj.

3.

The man who

excels in anything

reaps disadvantage not from the good which he has, but

from

his

abuse of

it.

QUESTION LXXIV Of the subject of

sin

{In Ten Articles)

We

must now consider the subject of vice or

under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (i) Whether the will can be the subject sin,

{De Summo so

with the excellence of the

person sinning; for instance, if a prince, who is set up as the guardian of justice, were to violate justice, or if a priest, who has taken the vow of

much

the

of sin? (2)

Whether

the will alone

is

the subject

more

of sin? (3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin? (4) Whether it can be the sub-

/ answer that, Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human nature, and such sins are less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in checking those sins, which nevertheless human weakness does not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from deliberation. And these sins are all the more imputed to a man according as

ject of mortal sin? (5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin? (6) Whether lingering

more grievous

as the sinner

is

held to be a

excellent person."

1

PL 83, 621.

pleasure or non-lingering pleasure are in the higher reason as in a subject? (7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is as in a subject

higher reason? (8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin? (9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin? (10) Whether there can be in the in the

»

PL

77. 16.

PART

OF SECOND PART

I

higher reason a venial sin directed to

its

proper

object?

Article

Whether

i.

cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysius says {Div. Norn.

will

i.

iv)^ that "evil

But

is

outside the will and the inten-

has the character of fore sin cannot be in the will.

tion."

Obj.

2.

sin

Further, the will

is

evil.

There-

directed either to

the good or to what seems good.

Now

fact that the will wishes the good,

Now

the will

because the first cause of sinning is the will, as Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10, 11).^ Therefore it is not the subject of sin. On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract, i, g)^ that "it

is

by the

will that

we

er a defect that

sin,

and

live

an

act, as stated

;

;

Therefore

sins. its

is

in the will

subject.

Reply Obj. will

follows that sin

it

i.

because the

the aspect of

Evil will

evil.

is said to be outside the does not tend to it under

But since some

Article

evil is

an ap-

Sect. 32

'

Aristotle, Physics,

•

PL 42, 104, PL 32. 596.

< '

11,

cf.

will, this

move

7 (198*24).

De

Physics, in, 3 (202*13).

Lib. Arb.,

Whether the Will Alone

2.

We

7

(PL

to those

external

Is the

proceed thus to the Second Article: It

would seem that the

will alone is the subject of

sin.

Objection

Anim.

x,

Now

will."

For Augustine says {De Duabus by the the subject of sin is the power by i.

10)^ that "no one sins except

which we

sin.

subject of

sin.

son.

2.

Therefore the will alone

Further, sin

Now good

and

is

an

is

the

evil contrary to rea-

evil pertaining to

reason are

the object of the will alone. Therefore the will

alone

is

Obj.

the subject of sin. 3.

Further, every sin

is

because, as Augustine states 18),^ "so true

that unless

it is

Lib. Arb. is

no

iii,

voluntary, sin at all."

of the other powers are not volun-

tary, except in so far as those

by the

a voluntary act,

{De

that every sin

be voluntary

it

Now the acts

is it

powers are moved

nor does this suffice for them to be the subject of sin, because then even the external members of the body, which are moved by the will, would be a subject of sin, which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the will

;

subject of sin.

On

the contrary. Sin

is

contrary to virtue, and

contraries are about one

same

thing.

But the

other powers of the soul besides the will are the subject of virtues, as stated above (q. lvi, aa. 3, 6). Therefore the will is not the only subject of sin. / answer that, As was shown above (a. i), whatever is a principle of a voluntary act is sin.

those which are iii,

defect

themselves, but

Now voluntary acts are not only

those which are elicited by the

732).

105;

apprehensive pow-

in the

Subject of Sin?

a subject of

(PG 3,

1

is

subject to the

other things. The contrary of this is to be observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove.

;

as

is

is

Obj.

above (q. XXI, A. I Q. Lxxi, AA. I, 6). Now some acts pass into external matter, for example to cut and to burn and such acts have for their matter and subject the thing into which the action passes. Thus the Philosopher states^ that "movement is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover." On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the agent, for example to desire and to know; and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin has to be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated above (q. i, a. i Q. xviii, A. 6), it follows that the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts and of evil acts or sins, is the principle of is

invincible. It remains there-

deemed a sin. Reply Obj. 3. This argument applies efficient causes whose actions pass into

also

righteously."

/ answer that, Sin

is

there

move

the efficient cause of sin,

is

when

does not

;

cide.^

fore that

matter, and which do not

it

evil,

the apprehensive power, as in the case of those

whose ignorance

from the

and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will. Therefore sin is in no way in the will. Obj. 3. Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin, because the efficient and the material cause do not coinsin

parent good, the will sometimes desires an and in this sense sin is in the will. sive

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would Objection

129

2

Reply Obj. 2. If the defect in the apprehenpower were in no way subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in

the Will Is a Subject

of Sin?

seem that the

ART.

Q. 74.

commanded by

will,

but also

the will, as

32, 1295).

PL 42, 104. ^ PL 32, i2gs;De 6

Vera Relig., xiv (PL 34, 133).

we

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

I30 stated above (q. vi,

a.

4) in treating of volun-

Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained from their acts, by the will. And these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same tariness.

subject.

with the deliberation of reason, as the Philosopher says.^ Therefore the movement of the

which is without the deliberation of not imputed to a man as a sin.

sensuality,

reason,

On

is

is written (Rom. 7. 19) I will I do not; but the evil

the contrary, It

The good which which I

which words Augus{Contra Julian, iii, 26),^ as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensuality. Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality. will not, that I do,

tine explains

Reply Obj. i. We do not sin except by the mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will. Reply Obj. 2. Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects. But the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason. Reply Obj. 3. The members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action. Therefore they are compared to the soul which moves them as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in the Politics} Morewill as first

members

over, the acts of the external

are ac-

may

tions that pass into external matter, as

be seen in the blow that is inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison.

/ answer that, As stated above (a. 2), sin be found in any power whose act can be

may

voluntary and disordered, in which consists the nature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality can be voluntary, in so far as the sensuality, or sensitive appetite,

clined to be

moved by

3.

Whether There Can Be Sin

ifi

the

We

Reply Obj.

Although some of the powers common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless in us they have a certain excellence through being united to the i.

reason; thus

we

surpass other animals in the

we have the powers of and reminiscence, as stated in the Part (q. lxxviii, a. 4). In the same way

sensitive part because

cogitation First

our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain excellence con-

Objection praised

i.

For

sin is

or blamed

the sensuality

is

proper to

for

common

his

to us

man who

actions.

and

Now

irrational

in this respect

subject of

2.

The

continual corruption of the

sensuahty is to be understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never completely destroyed in this Hfe, since, though the stain of ever, this corruption of the

ality.

hinder 2.

Further, "no

man

sins in

not avoid," as Augustine states

what he can-

{De

Lib. Arb.

But man cannot prevent the movement of the sensuality from being inordinate, since the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; hence it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine declares {De Trin. xii, 12, 13).^ Therefore the inordinate moveiii,

18).^

ment

of the sensuality

Obj.

not do

3. is

alone do 1

is

not a

Further, that which

man

not imputed to him as a

we seem

Aristotle,

i,

to

man from

"fomes" does not

using his rational will to check

individual inordinate movements, sentient of them, for instance

if

himself does

sin.

Now,

that

do ourselves, which we do

he be pre-

by turning

thoughts to other things. Yet while he

is

his

turn-

ing his thoughts to something else, an inordi-

nate

when

movement may

arise about this also; thus

a man, in order to avoid the

of concupiscence, turns his thoughts

movements away from

carnal pleasures to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated

sin.

How-

original sin passes, its effect remains.

animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the sensu-

Obj.

obey the rea-

it

sin.

Reply Obj.

the

sensuality.

is

And

can be the principle of a voluntary action, and, consequently, the

proceed thus to the Third Article: It sin in

fol-

of the sensitive part are

son.

Sensuality?

would seem that there cannot be

it

lows that sin can be in the sensuahty.

sisting in its natural aptitude to

Article

naturally in-

is

the will. Therefore

movement

Consequently a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the corruption we have just spoken about. But it is enough, for the conditions of a volunof vainglory will arise.

5 (1254^4).

PL 32, 1295. ' PL 42, 1007, 1009; chap. 6 (QR 1,423). 2

*

cf.

Peter Lombard, Sent., n, d. 24,

Ethics, IX,?, {iib^^is)-

PL 44, 733; Serm. ad Pop., serm. 188, 189). 8

xxx,

2,

3

(PL

38,

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

Q. 74.

ART.

131

5

tary sin that he be able to avoid each single

disorder in respect of the end can only belong

one.

to the

Reply Obj. 3. Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation

to the end. Therefore mortal sin cannot be in

of reason, since the principal part of

man

does

nothing there. Hence such an act is not perfectly a human act, and consequently it cannot

be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuahty as forestalls the reason is a venial sin, which is something imperfect in the genus of sin.

Article

Whether Mortal Sin Can Be

4.

in the Sensuality?

We

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It sin can be in the sen-

would seem that mortal suahty.

Objection

i.

Now

object.

Because an act

it is

is

known by

commit

possible to

its

a mortal

sin about the objects of the sensuality, for example about carnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality. Obj. 2. Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in the sensuality, for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the

irrational

as

parts,

Therefore, since

it is

the

Philosopher

states.^

natural to contraries to be

about the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin. Obj.

3.

mortal

Further, venial sin

Now

sin.

is

a disposition to

and habit are

disposition

in

same subject. Since therefore venial sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (a. 3, Reply 3), mortal sin can be there also. On the contrary, Augustine says {Retract, i, 23),^ and a gloss on Rom. 7. 14 also says^ that the

inordinate

the

which

is

in those

movement

are in a state of grace, in

fore the inordinate

not a mortal

is

whom,

not to be found. There-

movement

of the sensuality

sin.

/ answer that, Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body's life causes

the body's death, so too a disorder which de-

which

is

the last end, causes spiritual death, which

is

stroys the principle of spiritual as stated above

life,

lxxii, a. 5).

mortal

sin,

Now

belongs to the reason alone, and not to

it

(q.

the sensuality, to order anything to the end, and 1

Ethics,

III,

10 (iii7''23).

2PL32,62I. ^

Glossa ordin.

1421).

(vi,

it is

to order others

the sensuality, but only in the reason.

Reply Obj. 1. The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin. Yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due not to its being an act of the sensuahty, but to its being an act of rea-

whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason. son, to

Reply Obj. 2. not only in that

An

act of virtue

is

perfected

an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice. Therefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power; and the same appHes to mortal sin, as just stated (Reit is

ply i).

Reply Obj. 3. A disposition may be related ways to that to which it disposes. For sometimes it is the same thing and is in the same subject; thus undeveloped science is a disposition to perfect science. Sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the same thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire. Sometimes it is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those things which are in three

ordered to one another in such a way that we can arrive at one through the other; for example goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science,

which

is

the venial sin that

in the intellect. In this is

in the sensuality

a disposition to mortal

sin,

which

is

way

may

be

in

the

reason.

concupiscense,

the sin of the sensuality, can even be

who

however, mortal sin is

of

power whose function

17E); Glossa Lombardi (PL 191, •.v:i.;4

A

Article

We

5.

Whether Sin Can Be

in the

Reason?

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. Objection i. For the sin of any power is a defect in it. But the fault of the reason is not a sin; on the contrary, it excuses sin. For a man is excused from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. Obj. 2. Further, the primary subject of sin is the will, as stated above (a. i). Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. Obj. 3. Further, there can be no sin except about things which are under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not among those things which are under our control, since by nature some are mentally deficient, and

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

t$2

some

Therefore no sin

sagacious,

the

is

On

{De

the contrary, Augustine says

12)^ that sin

xii,

is

in the

Trin.

lower and in the higher

reason. / a7iswer that,

of that power, as 3).

2,

Now

The sin of any power is an act we have clearly shown (aa. i,

reason has a twofold act: one

proper act in respect of this is the act of

its

Now

the other

;

both of these ways there

in

sin in the reason. First, in so far as

knowledge of

truth,

the reason as a sin error about

what

which error

when

it is

when it ordered movements Secondly,

it

is its

proper object, and

knowing a truth

the act of the reason as directing the other ers.

For pleasure denotes a moveabove (q. XXXI, a. i). But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore lingering pleasure is not Objection

ment

reason.

is

it

is

in

is

pow-

may

be

errs in the

able and ought to know.

either

commands

the dis-

of the lower powers, or de-

liberately fails to check them.

Reply Obj.

i.

in the reason.

Obj. 2. Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object. Now a lingering pleasure is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of lingering pleasure is

imputed to

ignorance or

i.

of the appetitive power, as stated

not in the reason. Obj.

3.

Further, a thing

said to be linger-

is

(morosusy through taking a length of time. But length of time is no reason why an

ing

act should belong to a particular power. Therefore lingering pleasure does not belong to the

reason.

On

This argument considers the

the contrary, Augustine says

(De

Trin.

defect in the proper act of the reason in re-

xii,

proper object, and with regard to it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know; for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen. If, however, the defect of reason be about something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused

ure "goes no further than the mere thought of

and the defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers is always imputed

may sometimes

can always obviate this defect by means of its proper act.

internal passions. Consequently

spect of

the case

from

its

when

sin,

to reason as a sin, because

Reply Obj.

2.

when we were

it

As stated above

(q. xvii, a. i),

treating of the acts of the will

and reason, the will moves and precedes the reason in one way, and the reason moves and precedes the will in another, so that both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the reason, voluntary. Accordingly sin is found in the reason either through

12)'*

that

if

the pleasure, I

the

woman

deem

be like as though

this to

alone had partaken of the forbidden

Now

fruit."

the consent to a sensual pleas-

woman"

"the

denotes the lower

reason, as he himself explains (ibid.). There-

the sin of lingering pleasure

fore

the

in

is

reason.

/ answer that, directs

human

As already stated

be

in the

actions.

(a. 5), sin

reason in so far as

Now

it

evident that

it is

reason directs not only external acts, but also

son is

fails in directing

when

when

said to be in the reason, just as

Now

in directing external actions.

two ways,

the rea-

the internal passions, sin

it

it

fails

fails,

in

in directing internal passions. First,

through the reason being the principle of the

commands unlawful passions; for inwhen a man deliberately provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of concupiscence. Secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate,

will's act.

continues, notwithstanding, to dwell (immora-

being a voluntary defect

The Reply

to the

of

the

Third Objection

from what has been said (Reply

reason,

is

or

evident

when

it

stance

tur)

upon

it,

and

fails to

drive

it

away.

And

in

this sense the sin of lingering pleasure is said

i).

to be in the reason.

Article

6.

Pleasure Is

We

Whether the Sin of Lingering in the Reason?

proceed thus to the Sixth Article:

Reply Obj. i. Pleasure is indeed in the appower as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in accordance with what has been stated above (a. i),

petitive It

would seem that the sin of lingering pleasure (morosa dclectatio) is not in the reason.^

5-13

»PL42, *

On

ioo8.

this

problem and those which follow to the end of cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., 11, d. 24, chaps.

the question

(QR

tur., Pt.

I,

I.

422, 428); Albert the Great,

tr. 4, Q.

69, A. 3

(BO xxxiv,

' From the Latin, mora— delay. *PL42, 1007.

Summa dc

700).

Crea-

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

namely that actions which do not pass

into ex-

ternal matter are in their principles as in their subjects. 2. Reason has its proper elicited proper object, but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower powers that can be directed by the reason. And accordingly pleasure about sensible objects comes also under the direction of reason. Reply Obj. 3. Pleasure is said to be lingering not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells (immoratur) upon it, and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).^

Reply Obj.

act about

its

Q. 74.

ART.

possible, to its

if

to the

We

proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. Objection i. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, as stated above (q. xv, a. i). But the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason.

Obj.

2.

Further, "the higher reason

is

intent

on contemplating and consulting the eternal types," as Augustine states {De Trin. xii, 7).^ But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal types, since man does not always think about Divine things whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act

is

not always in the higher rea-

son.

Obj.

3.

Further, just as

man

can regulate his

external actions according to the eternal law,

so can he regulate his internal pleasures or

other passions. But consent to a pleasure with-

out deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine states {De Trin. 12).^ Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower xii,

4.

Further, just as the higher reason

excels the lower, so does the reason excel the

Now

sometimes man proceeds to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves his hand or foot. Therefore sometimes imagination.

may consent to a sinful independently of the higher reason. On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin.

also the lower reason act,

1

PL 42,

1008.

2

PL 42,

1005.

8

PL 42,

1008.

woman

has offered

the forbidden fruit to her husband."

/ answer that, Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges

and de-

about inteUigible matters, so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment the final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any propolivers its sentence

by resolving

into the first

it

principles, since, so long as there remains a yet

higher principle, the question can yet be submitted to it, and therefore the judgment is still

in suspense, the final sentence not being as

yet pronounced. But

it

is

evident that

human

by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally; and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above (q. xix, a. 4; q. lxxi, a. 6). Consequentacts can be regulated

since the rule of the Divine law

ly,

rule,

it

is

the higher

follows that the ultimate sentence, by

which judgment

pronounced, belongs which is intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts, the act itself comes last, and the pleasure which is the inducement to the act is a preamble to the act. Therefore the consent to an act belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the pleasure belongs to the lower reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court; although the higher reason can also judge of the pleasure, since whatever is subject to the judgis

finally

to the higher reason

ment

of the lower court,

judgment of the higher

reason.

Obj.

consummation by deed, we

are to understand that the

sition is delivered

Article 7. Whether the Sin of Consent Act Is in the Higher Reason?

133

7

12):^ "If the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses so far approves of any sin, as to point,

xii,

is

subject also to the

court,

but not con-

versely.

Reply Obj.

i.

Consent

is

an act of the ap-

petitive power, not absolutely, but in conse-

quence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, as stated above (q. xv, a. 3). Because the fact that the consent

is

finally given

due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason. to a thing


'.

There-

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

fore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated.

Further, anger

3.

Therefore

it

not a principal passhould not be placed among is

the principal vices.

Obj.

4.

177

4

the good of the body, and this regards

sin, as

example meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by gluttony, or the preservation of the species,

Further, just as covetousness or avar-

ice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of

stated above (a. 2). But avarice

is

put as

one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices. Obj. 5. Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these as for instance when one sins through ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, for example steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently enumerated. Oti the contrary stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (Moral. ;

xxxi,

ART.

Q. 84.

is

either the preservation of the individual, for

Obj. sion.

there

45).i

which good

final cause.

Now

this

kind

may take place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come under the consideration of art, because man's particular dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another. And it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration of origin

referred.

is

vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils.

Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which

all

men

seek naturally.

Now

in the first

place happiness implies perfection, since happiness

is

a perfect good, to which belongs excel-

lence or renown, which

is

vainglory. Secondly,

implies satiety, which

it

desired by pride or

covetousness seeks in the promise of riches. it implies pleasure, without which hap-

Thirdly, piness

is

impossible, as stated in the Ethics,^

this gluttony

On

,

by way of

namely riches, to These same four

external good,

is

which covetousness

and

/ answer that, As stated above (a. 3) the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially

there

ly,

example, sexual intercourse, sought inordinately by lust. Thirdfor

is

and

lust pursue.

the other hand, avoidance of good on ac-

count of an attendant

evil occurs in two ways. happens either in respect of one's own good, and thus we have acedia, which is sadness about one's spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily labour; or else it happens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to envy, which is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination with a view to vengeance, it

For

this

anger. Again, these

is

same

vices seek the con-

trary evils.

Reply Obj. i. Virtue and vice do not originate same way, since virtue is caused by the

in the

of art.

subordination of the appetite to reason, or to

Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital whose ends have certain fundamental

the unchangeable good, which

reasons for moving the appetite; and

it

is

in

respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated.

moves the appetite and of

its

appetite to son,

Now

two ways. First, directly very nature; thus good moves the seek it, while evil, for the same reato avoid

it.

Secondly,

and on account of something else, as it were; thus one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on acindirectly

count of some attendant evil. Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first

place, there

which derives

is

a certain good of the soul,

its aspect of desirability merely through being apprehended, namely the exc' to fortitude which pertains to the irascible power.

Reply Obj.

5.

The

difficulty

which

is

men-

tioned in this book of Augustine includes the

it

is

stated in the Metaphysics^ that

has a relation of order to something else. Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there is a good belonging to the very substance of nature, which

wounds affecting the appetitive powers, namely malice, weakness and concupiscence, for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. Error and vexation are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects

mode, species and order, and is sin. There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as stated above (aa.

of his concupiscence.

is

three

Article 4. Whether Privation of Mode, Species, and Order Is the Effect of Sin?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that privation of mode, species and not the effect of sin. Objection i. For x\ugustine says (De Natura

order

Boni,

good

is

my is

that "where these three abound, the

great

;

where they are

less,

there

is

less

good; where they are not, there is no good at all." But sin does not cancel out the good of nature. Therefore it does not take away mode, species and order.

own cause. But mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De Natura Boni, iv).2 Therefore privation of mode, species and Obj.

2,

Further, nothing

not the effect of sin. Obj. 3. Further, different effects result from

1

is

PL 42. 553.

2

its

neither destroyed nor diminished by

1,2), but is not entirely destroyed. Again, there the good of virtue and grace; this too has its

mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordered act itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of which is essentially sin.

Hence

it is

clear both

how

sin is

privation of mode, species and order, and it

how

destroys or diminishes mode, species and or-

der.

This

suffices for the Replies to the first

two

Objections.

Reply Obj. 3. Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above. And so they are destroyed or diminished together.

is its

sin itself is "the privation of

order

good has

PL 42, 553.

Article

5.

Whether Death and Other Bodily

Defects Are the Result of Sin?

We

proceed thus to the Fifth Article:

It

would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. 3

Aristotle, vin, 3 (io43''33).

SUMMA TEEOLOGICA

l82

Objection

Now

i

Because equal causes have equal

.

these defects are not equal in

all,

but abound in some more than in others,

al-

effects.

though original defects

seem

from which especially these

sin,

to result,

equal in

is

all,

as stated

(q. lxxxii, a. 4). Therefore death and such defects are not the result of sin. Obj. 2. Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But these defects are not re-

above

original sin. And although these defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless they are ordered according to the justice of God Who in-

them as punishments. Reply Obj. i. Causes that produce their effects directly, if equal, produce equal effects; flicts

penance. Therefore they are not the effect of

such causes be increased or diminished, is increased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle being removed do not point to equal effects. For supposing a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it

sin.

does not follow that the movements of the

moved when

Obj.

all sin is

removed by baptism or

Further, actual sin has

3.

result of

(Rom.

according to

of the

actual sin does not change the nature of the

less, therefore,

it

to

does original

some sin.

defect.

Much

Therefore death

and other bodily defects are not the

On 12):

the contrary,

By

one

man

The Apostle

says

5.

sin entered into this world,

and by sin death. I answer that. One thing causes another in two ways first, directly secondly, accidentally. ;

:

Directly, one thing

is

the cause of another

if it

produces its effect by reason of the power of its nature or form, from which it follows that the effect is directly intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and such defects are beside the intention of the sinner,

it is

evident that sin

is

not, of itself, the cause of these defects. Acci-

dentally, one thing

is

the cause of another

if it

by removing an obstacle; thus it is stated in the Physics^ that "by displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting causes

it

thereon." In this

way

the sin of our

the cause of death and

first

parent

such defects in human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken away, by which not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without all

any disorder whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as stated in the First Part (q. xcvn, A. i). Therefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent,

human nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder among the powers, as stated above (a. 3; q. lxxxii, a. 3), so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in just as

the body.

Now

the withdrawal of original justice has

the character of punishment, even as the with-

drawal of grace has. Consequently, death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of 1

stones resting on

ture of the

sin.

is

if

them will be equal, but that one will move with the greater velocity which has the greater weight according to the property of its nature, to which it is abandoned when the obstacle to its falhng is removed. Accordingly, when original justice is removed, the na-

more

character of guilt than original sin has. But

body by subjecting

for

the effect

Aristotle, viu, 4 (255^25).

human body

is left

to itself, so that

temperaments some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal in different

natural

all.

Reply Obj. 2. Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle (Rom. 8. 11) :

He

.

.

.

shall quicken

.

.

.

your mortal bodies,

because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you, but each is done according to the order of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should first of all be conformed to Christ's

immortahty and impassibility of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence, it sufferings before attaining to the

is

necessary that our bodies should remain, for

a time, subject to suffering, in order that

may

we

merit the impassibility of glory, in con-

formity with Christ.

Reply Obj.

3.

Two

things

may be

considered

substance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance of the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect; thus in actual sin, the

some sicken and die through eating too much. But as regards the fault, it deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects of the body, as original justice did. Therefore actual sin does not cause those defects, as original sin does.

Article 6. Whether Death and Other Defects Are Natural to Man?

We

proceed thus to the Sixth Article:

It

would seem that death and such defects are natural to man. Objection 1. For "the corruptible and the in-

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

But man is of the same genus as other animals, which are natcorruptible differ generically,"^

urally corruptible. Therefore

man

is

naturally

corruptible.

Obj.

2.

is

composed of con-

having within itself the cause of its corruption. But such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally cor-

ART,

for

6

183

which alternate generation and corruption

things are requisite.

and defect

tion

Further, whatever

Q. 85.

the good and the preservation of the universe,

And

in

in this respect corrup-

in things are natural, not indeed

as regards the inclination of the form,

which

is

traries is naturally corruptible, as

the principle of being and perfection, but as re-

ruptible.

gards the inclination of matter, which is allotted proportionately to its particular form according to the regulation of the universal agent. And al-

Obj.

3.

Further, a hot thing naturally con-

sumes moisture. Now human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore the vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated in the book on the Soul,^ it seems that death and such defects are natural to man.

On ever

the contrary, is

death (Wisd. ural to 2.

God made in man whatNow God made not

13). Therefore death

i.

is

not nat-

man.

Further, that which

called either a

is

natural cannot be

punishment or an

natural to a thing

is

1.

natural to him.

is

what

evil, since

suitable to

But death

it.

and such defects are the punishment of original sin, as stated above (a. 5). Therefore they are not natural to man. 3. Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its end. Now man's end is everlasting Happiness, as stated above (q. ii, a. 7; Q. v, AA, 3, 4). And the form of the human body is the rational soul, which is incorruptible, as was proved in the First Part (q. lxxv, a. 6). Therefore the human body is naturally incorruptible.

/ answer that, ible thing in

We may

two ways;

speak of any corruptfirst,

in respect of its

universal nature, secondly, as regards ular nature.

own power

A

its

partic-

thing's particular nature

is

in respect of this nature,

its

And

of action and self-preservation.

"every corruption and

contrary to nature," as stated in the book on the Heavens,^ since this power tends to the being and preservation of the thing to which

defect

is

On

the other hand, the universal nature

is

an

some universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly body; or again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by some to be "the Nature Who makes nature."^ This power intends active

can achieve

its

own

power

in

1

Aristotle, Metaphysics, x, 10 (1058^28).

2

Aristotle,

II,

8

Aristotle,

II,

4 (416^29). 6 (288^14). ^ Cf. Averroes, In de Ccelo i. comm. 2 (v, 3 A), where the expression Nature naturans is found; see also in Averroes, In Phys., II, comm. 11. (iv, 52C). Natura naturans

occurs in Bonaventure,/» Sent.y in, d.

8, d. 2

(QR in,

197).

perpetuity, except the ra-

tional soul, for the reason that the latter

is

not

entirely subject to matter, as other forms are;

indeed

it

has an immaterial operation of

its

as stated in the First Part (q. lxxv, a. 2).

own, Con-

sequently as regards his form, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible

But since that very form has a matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of

things.

that matter there results corruptibility in the

whole. In this respect

man

is

naturally cor-

ruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to itself,

but not as regards the nature of

his form.

The

-first

three objections argue on the side of

the matter, while the other three argue on the side of the form. Therefore in order to solve

them,

we must observe

which

is

that the

form of man,

the rational soul, in respect of

its in-

proportioned to its end, which is everlasting Happiness. But the human body, which is corruptible, considered in respect of its nature, is in a way proportioned to its form, and in another v/ay it is not. For we may note a twofold condition in any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen corruptibility

is

by the

agent, and is a natural condition of matThus, a smith in order to make a knife chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to be useful for cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife; but that iron is breakable ter.

and inclined to rust

belongs.

it

though every form intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being

results

from the natural

disposition of iron, nor does the

workman choose

but rather would do without he could. Therefore this disposition of mat-

this in the iron, it if

ter is not proportioned to the

workman's inten-

nor to the purpose of his art. In like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature, in respect of its being of a mixed temperament, in order that it may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and moving powers. But the fact that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature; indeed nature would tion,

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

i84

choose an incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in form-

man

ing

supplied the defect of nature, and by

the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as

Part

was stated

God made

said that

it is

not death, and that death

the punishment of sin.

is

This

suffices for the

Replies to the Objections.

Of the stain of Two

On

the contrary, It

clus. 47, 22)

Thou

:

said to

Solomon (Ec-

written (Ephes.

is

it

to

the effect of

sin.

A

/ answer that,

sin

was

hast stained thy glory; and

5. 27): That He might Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle; and in each case it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is it

present

QUESTION LXXXVI (In

of sin.

in the First

sense that

(q. xcvii, a. i). It is in this

turning away and privation of grace; and so it would follow that there is but one stain caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect

stain

when

corporeal things,

is

properly ascribed to

a bright

body

loses its

brightness through contact with another body,

Articles)

for example, a garment, gold, or silver, or the

We

must now consider the stain of sin, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul? (2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?

Article

i

.

proceed thus to the First Article: It

2.

Further, sin

is

chiefly in the will, as

stated above (q. lxxiv, aa. i, 2). Now "the will is in the reason," as stated in the book on the

Soul} But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering anything whatever; rather indeed is it

perfected thereby. Therefore neither

will stained

Obj.

3.

by

is

the

sin.

Further,

if

sin causes a stain, this stain

either something positive or a pure privation.

is

If

it

be something positive,

it

can only be

ther a disposition or a habit, for

it

ei-

seems that

nothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither disposition nor habit, for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit; for instance, in a

man who

after committing a mortal sin of prodigality,

is

so changed as to fall into a sin of the opposite vice.

Therefore the stain does not denote any-

pure privation. For

man's soul has a one from the refulgence of of reason, by which he is di-

twofold brightness the natural light

all sins

when is

the soul cleaves to things

iii,

9 (432^5).

by

love, there

when man

he cleaves to certain things against the light of reason and of the Divine law, as shown above (q. lxxi, a. 6). Therefore the loss of brightness occasioned by this contact is metaphorically called a stain on the soul. Reply Obj. i. The soul is not defiled by inferior things by their own power, as though they acted on the soul; on the contrary, the soul, by sins,

its

own

action, defiles itself, through cleaving

them inordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law. Reply Obj. 2. The action of the intellect is accomplished by the intelligible thing being in to

the intellect according to the that the intellect

fected,

by

it.

On

mode

of the intel-

not defiled, but perthe other hand, the act of

lect, so

is

movement towards things themselves so that love attaches the soul to the the will consists in a thing loved.

when g.

10:

it

Thus

it is

that the soul

is

stained

cleaves inordinately, according to Osee

They

.

.

.

became abominable

as those

things were which they loved.

Reply Obj.

3.

The

stain

is

neithsr something

positive in the soul, nor does

it

denote a pure

privation. It denotes a privation of the soul's

brightness in relation to

its

cause,

which

is

sin;

therefore different sins occasion different stains.

agree on the part of

shadow, which is the privation of through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the

is it

Contained among the works of Augustine. (PL 42,

1107). Aristotle,

;

a kind of contact in the soul, and

It is like a

light

«

ascribed to spiritual

a

thing positive in the soul. Again, neither

1

is

Now

gence of the Divine Hght, namely of wisdom and grace, by which man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now,

Whether Sin Causes a Stain on

would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. Objection i. For a higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature; hence the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says {Contra Quinque Hcereses, w)} Now the human soul is of a much higher nature than changeable things, to which it turns by sinning. Therefore it does not contract a stain from them by sinning. Obj.

Accordingly a stain

things in like manner.

rected in his actions; the other, from the reful-

the Sold?

We

like.

interposed bodies.

PART Article

2.

Whether

the Stain

I

OF SECOND PART

Remains

in the

proceed thus to the Second Article: It stain does not remain in

would seem that the

the soul after the act of

sin.

3.

Further, every effect depends on

Now

cause. sin.

past.

is

Obj.

the cause of the stain

Therefore when the act of sin

there, neither

On

its

the act of

is is

no longer

the stain in the soul.

is

the contrary, It

is

written (Jos. 22. ly): Is

a small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime remainit

you (Vulg., us) to this day? I answer that. The stain of sin remains

eth in

soul even

when

the act of sin

is

past.

in the

The reason

for this is that the stain, as stated above (a. i), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul,

on account of

its

withdrawing from the

reason or of the Divine law.

And

God, which parting causes the defect of bright-

movement causes local partwhen movement ceases, not removed, so neither, when

Therefore, just as

local distance

is

the act of sin ceases,

is

man

QUESTION LXXXVII Of the debt of punishment {In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider

(i)

The debt itself

man does not at once return to the which he was before, and it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the previous movement. Thus if one man be parted from another on account of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as the movement ceases, but he needs to draw near to him and to return by a contrary move-

(6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin? (7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin? (8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?

Article i. Whether the Debt of Punishment Is an Efect of Sin?

We

proceed thus to the First Article:

not an effect of

Objection

Now

For that which is accidentally seem to be its proper the debt of punishment is acciden1.

soul after the act of sin, except the disposition ;

but there does remain something priv-

namely the privation of union with the

Divine

light.

Reply Obj. 2. After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent body remains in the

same position and

relation as regards the illum-

inating body, and so the

But when the

shadow passes

at once.

sin is past, the soul does not re-

it is

beside the intention

of the sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is

not an effect of sin. Obj. 2. Further, evil

is

not the cause of good.

But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an effect of sin, which is evil. Obj.

in the

is

sin.

related to a thing does not

ment.

Nothing positive remains

It

would seem that the debt of punishment

effect.

or habit

Mor-

in quantity? (5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?

tally related to sin, for

ative,

(2)

is infinite

state in

i.

;

and venial sin, which differ in respect of the punishment due to them (q. lxxxviii). Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (i) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin? (2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another? (3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment? (4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that tal

vine law,

Reply Obj.

the stain removed.

light of

therefore so

remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in him. But as soon as, moved by grace, he returns to the Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is removed. For although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the Di-

long as

185

i

ness, just as local ing.

Objection i. For after an action, nothing remains in the soul except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as stated above (a. i, obj. 3). Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. Obj. 2. Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body, as stated above (a. I, Reply 3). But the shadow does not remain when the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the act of sin

ART.

main in the same relation to God. And so there is no comparison. Reply Obj. 3. The act of sin parts man from

Soul After the Act of Sin?

We

Q. 87.

3.

Further, Augustine says^ that "every

is its own punishment." But punishment does not incur a further debt of punishment, because then it would go on infin-

inordinate affection

Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment. itely.

On

the contrary, It

is

written

(Rom.

2.

9)

:

Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of

man

that worketh evil. But to work evil is to Therefore sin incurs a punishment which is

sig-

1

Confessions,

i,

19

(PL

32, 670).

sin.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

i86

and anguish. 1 answer that, The fact that whenever one thing rises up against another it suffers some detriment from it, passes over from natural things to human affairs. For we observe in natnified

by the words

tribulation

ther punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or

We

proceed thus to the Second Article: It sin cannot be the punishment

the other acts with greater energy, for which

would seem that

reason "hot water freezes more rapidly," as

of sin.

And man is

stated in the treatise on Meteorology}

so

we

to

find that the natural inclination of

who

repress those

evident that

is

are, in a

ciple rises

all

up against him.

rise

Now

it

things contained in an order,

manner, one,

of that order.

in relation to the prin-

Consequently, whatever

up against an order

is

put down by that

order or by the principle of that order.

And

be-

an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins commits an offence against an order. And therefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment. Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject. In the first place a man's nature is subjected to the cause sin

is

own

order of his

reason; secondly,

jected to the order of another

it

man who

is

sub-

governs

him

either in spiritual or in temporal matters,

as a

member

either of the state or of the house-

hold; thirdly,

it

is

subjected to the universal

order of the Divine government. these orders

disturbed by

is

acts against his reason,

Now

sin, for

each of

the sinner

and against human and

Divine law. Hence he incurs a threefold punishment; one, inflicted by himself, namely remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and

by God. Punishment follows sin, in an evil by reason of its lack

a third, inflicted

Reply Obj. far as sin

is

i.

order. Therefore just as evil

is

so of

accidental to the

sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is

the debt of punishment.

Reply Obj. 2. A just punishment may be inby God or by man. Hence the pun-

flicted either

ishment itself is the effect of sin, not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment, and that is an evil for ;

Dionysius says {Div. Norn, iv)^ that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." Consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the effect of sin.

Reply Obj.

This punishment of the inordidue to sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a fur-

nate affection

»

Aristotle,

2

Sect. 22

I,

3.

is

12 (348''32).

(PG3,

724).

law.

Article 2. Whether Sin Can Be the Punishment of Sin?

when one contrary supervenes,

ural things that

human

Objection to bring

is

i.

For the purpose of punishment to the good of virtue, as

man back

the Philosopher declares.^

bring

man back

to the

Now

good of

sin

does not

virtue, but leads

him

in the opposite direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin. Obj. 2. Further, just punishments are from

God, as Augustine says (qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82).'* But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. Obj. 3. Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above (q. lxxiv, AA.

I,

ment

2).

Therefore sin cannot be the punish-

of sin.

On the contrary, Gregory says {Horn, xi in Ezech.y that "some sins are punishments of others."

/ answer that, We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence; secondly, as to that which is accidental to it. Sin as such can in no way be the punishment of another. For sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. But punishment is essentially something against the will, as stated in the First Part (q. xlviii, a. 5). Consequently it is evident that sin, regarded in its essence, can in no way be the punishment of sin. On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another by removing an impediment to it. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Therefore since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment, and is from God, as stated above (q. lxxix, a. 3), the result is that the sin which ensues from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks

(Rom.

i.

24)

Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart, namely to their pas-

when he

says

:

sions; because, that

is,

when men

are deprived

of the help of Divine grace, they are »£//»«, X, 9(1 i8o»4). *

»

PL 40, 98. PL 76, 91s.

overcome

PART by

their passions. In this

way

I

OF SECOND PART

always said to be the punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it be an interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with one who endures considerable trouble and loss in order to achieve a sinful act, according to Wisd. We wearied ourselves in the way of iniq5. 7 sin is

:

on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punish-

tural to the one

who

cannot be of

in respect of a

preceding

sin,

but

also with regard to itself.

Reply Obj. i. Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed is for the good of those who are punished, when, that is, men arise from sin more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the it

of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of sinning. With regard to the other two ways, it is evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's amendment, since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning is of a nature to withdraw man from sin. Reply Obj. 2. This objection considers sin essentially as such; and the same answer applies

amendment

to the third objection.

Article

Debt

Whether Any Sin Incurs a

3.

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. Objection 1. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice

written (Isa. 27. 8) ure,

when

Now

it.

it

:

is

Hence

equality.

it is

In measure against meas-

shall be cast off, thou shalt judge

sin is temporal.

Therefore

it

does not

Obj.

2.

Further, "punishments are a kind of

medicine."^ But no medicine should be infinite,

because

it is

directed to an end, and "what

directed to an end

is

is

not infinite," as the Phi-

losopher states.^ Therefore no punishment should be infinite. Obj. 3. Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in

it

for

its

own

sake.

But God

hath not pleasure in the destructio7i of men (Vulg., of the living). Therefore He will not inflict eternal

Obj.

4.

punishment on man.

Further, nothing accidental

1

Aristotle, Ethics,

2

Politics,

I,

11,

3 (no4*'i7).

9 {^2S^^2^).

infinite duration.

:

ing sin.

I answer that.

is infinite.

As

stated above (a. i), sin in-

curs a debt of punishment through disturbing

an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Therefore so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must remain also. Now disturbance of an order is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable. For a defect which destroys the principle is always irreparable, although if the principle be saved, defects can be repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by Divine power; but, if the principle of sight is preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle by which one takes part in that order. Consequently if a sin destroys the principle of the order by which man's will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. the principle of this order

which whatever

is

the last end,

man

adheres by charity. Therefore sins turn man away from God, so as

to destroy charity, considered in themselves, in-

cur a debt of eternal punishment.

Reply Obj.

1.

Punishment

is

proportionate to

both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however, as Augustine says,^ is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact sin in point of severity

that adultery or

incur a debt of eternal punishment.

is

it is

the contrary. It is written (Matt. 25. These shall go into everlasting punishment; and (Mark 3. 29): He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlast-

to

would seem that no

not napunished. Therefore it

accidental, for

On

46)

Now

of Eternal Punishment?

187

3

is

uity. Thirdly,

ment not only

ART.

Q. 87.

But punishment

ment does not

murder call

is

for a

in a momomentary punish-

committed

ment; in fact they are punished sometimes by imprisonment or banishment for life, sometimes even by death. In such a case account is

—

not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the living, so that this

punishment, in

its

own way,

eternity of punishment inflicted

represents the

by God.

Now

according to Gregory'' "it is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity

should be punished in God's eternity." 3


3. i, .

.

2)

Much

every way. First indeed, becaiise the words of

God were committed

to

them; and

(Ps. 147.

He

hath not done in like manner to every nation: and His judgments He hath not made manifest unto them. I answer that. It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being given to the Jews rather 9)

:

than to other peoples that the Jewish people alone remained faithful to the worship of one

God, while the others turned away to idolatry; hence the latter were unworthy to receive the Law, lest a holy thing should be given to dogs.

make

angels.

it is

But

this reason does not

seem

fitting,

because

that people turned to idolatry even after the

Law had

been made, which was more grievous, from Exod. 32 and from Amos 5. 25, 26: Did you o^er victims and sacrifices to Me house of Israel? in the desert for forty years, But you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch, and the image of your idols, the star of your god, which you made to yourselves. Moreover Know thereit is stated expressly (Deut. 9. 6) as

is

clear

:

fore that the

Lord thy God giveth thee not

this

excellent land in possessioji for thy justices, for

thou art a very stiff -jiecked people: but the real reason is given in the preceding verse: That the Lord might accotnplish His word, which He

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham,

and Jacob.

Isaac,

What who

this

promise was

the promises

3.

is

shown by the Apos-

made and

says

God

many: but

as of

He

is

Christ."

And

the Law and other speboons to that people, on account of the promise made to their fathers that Christ should be born of them. For it was fitting that the people of whom Christ was to be born should be signahzed by a special sanctification, according to the words of Levit. ig. 2: Beye holy, because I am holy. Nor again was it on account of the merit of Abraham himself that this promise was made to him, namely, that Christ should be born of his seed, but of gratuitous election and calling of God. Hence it is

God vouchsafed both

.

written (Isa. 41, 2): just one

from the

He

not a respecter of persons if He gives them to some rather than to others. Hence Augustine

Saith

cial

.

243

He

to his seed.

one, ''And to thy seed, which

.

5

Abraham were

i6) that to

not, "A?td to his seeds," as of

so

Who

east,

hath raised up the hath called him to fol-

was merely from

gratuitous election that the patriarchs received

the promise, and that the people sprung from law, according to Deut. 4. 36, Thou didst) hear His words

out of the midst of the fire, because He loved thy fathers, and chose their seed after them. again

if

it

be asked

why He

chose this

people, and not another, that Christ might be

answer is given by Augustine {Tract, super Joann. xxvi):^ Why He draweth one and draweth not another, seek not thou to judge, if thou wish not to err." Reply Obj. 1. Although the salvation which was to come through Christ was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that Christ should be born of one people, which, for this reason, was privileged above other peoples, accordborn of them, a

Rom.

ing to

9.

fitting

4:

To whom, namely

the Jews,

belongeth the adoption as of children (of God), and the testament, and the giving of the .

.

.

Law;

.

.

.

whose are the

fathers,

and of

whom

is

Christ according to the flesh.

Reply Obj.

2.

;

PL 35,

1607.

He

man

is

:^

"All

teaches out of pity; but

He

whom whom

teaches not"

due to the condemnation of the hu-

race for the sin of the

first

parent.

Reply Obj. 3. The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on account of sin, but not the benefits of nature.

Among

the latter are the

ministries of the angels, which the very order

of various natures demands, namely, that the

lowest beings be governed through the intermediate beings; and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not only to men but also to beasts, according to Ps. 35. 7: Men and beasts Thou

Lord.

wilt preserve,

Article 5. Whether All Observe the Old Law?

Men Were Bomid To

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It

would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old Law. Objection 1. Because whoever is subject to the king must be subject to his law. But the Old Law was given by God, Who is King of all the earth (Ps. 46. 8). Therefore tants of the earth were

bound

all

the inhabi-

to observe the

Law. Obj. 2. Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the Old Law, for it is written (Deut. 27. 26) Cursed be he that abideth not :

words of

in the

this law,

and

in work. If therefore other

fulfilleth

men

them not

could be saved

without the observance of the Old Law, the Jews would be in a worse condition than other

men. Obj.

3.

Further, the Gentiles were admitted

to the Jewish ritual

the Law, for

and

to the observances of

written (Exod. 12. 48): // any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to

it

is

keep the Phase of the Lord,

first

all his

males shall

be circumcised, and then shall he celebrate

according to the manner; and he shall be as he that is born in the land. But it would have been useless to admit strangers to the legal observances according to the Divine ordinance if they could have been saved v/ithout the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be saved without observing the Law. On the contrary, Dionysius says {C(bI. Hier. ix)^ that many of the Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels. But it is clear that it

Respect of persons takes place in those things which are given according to due; but it has no place in those things which are bestowed gratuitously. Because he who, out of generosity, gives of his own to one and not to another, is not a respecter of persons but if he were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were not to distribute them according to personal merits, he would be a respecter of persons. Now God bestows the benefits of salvation 1

Prcedest. Sanct. viii)

teaches not, out of justice

We

It is therefore evident that it

And

(De

teaches,

for this

low him?

them received the 37, Ye did (Vulg.,

ART.

is

says (Gal.

tle,

Q. 98.

on the human race gratuitously; therefore

2

PL 44, 971.

3

Sect. 4

(PG 3,

261).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

244

the Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore

some could be saved without observ^ing the Law. / answer that, The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural law, and added certain

own. Accordingly, as to those precepts of the natural law contained in the Old Law all were bound to observe the Old Law; not because they belonged to the Old Law, but because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts which were added by the Old Law, they were not binding on any save the Jewish people alone. The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above (a. 4), was given to the Jewish people that it might receive a prerogative of precepts of

its

holiness, in reverence for Christ

Who

was

to

be born of that people. Now whatever laws are enacted for the special sanctification of certain ones are binding on them alone; thus clerics

who

are set aside for the service of

bound

to certain obhgations to

God

which the

are

laity

bound by works of perfection, to which people living in the world are not bound. In like manner this people was bound to certain special observances, to which other peoples were not bound. Hence it is written (Deut. 18. 13) Thou shalt be perfect and without spot before the Lord thy God; and for this reason they used a kind of form of profession, as appears from Deut. 26. 3 / profess this day before the Lord thy God, etc. Reply Obj. i. Whoever are subject to a king are bound to observe his law which he makes for all in general. But if he orders certain things to be observed by the servants of his household, others are bound to them. Reply Obj. 2. The more a man is united to God, the better his state becomes. Therefore the more the Jewish people were bound to the worship of God, the greater their excellence are not

bound

likewise religious are

;

their profession to certain

:

:

over other peoples. Hence it is written (Deut. What other nation is there so renowned 4. 8) that hath ceremonies and just judgments, and :

all

the law? In like manner,

view, the state of clerics

is

from

this point of

better than that of

the laity, and the state of religious than that of those living in the world.

Reply Obj. tion

more

3.

The

Gentiles obtained salva-

perfectly and

more securely under

Law

than under the natand for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the laity are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular persons to those of the religious, although they can be saved without this. the observances of the ural law alone,

Article 6. Whether the Old Law Was Suitably Given at the Time of Moses?

We

proceed thus to the Sixth Article:

It

would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at the time of Moses. Objection i. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation which was to come through Christ, as stated above (aa. 2, 3). But man needed this saving remedy immediately after he had sinned. Therefore the Law should have been given immediately after sin. Obj. 2. Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of those from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning the seed, which is Christ (Gal. 3. 16) was first made to Abraham, as related in Gen. 12. 7. Therefore the Law should have been given at once at the time of Abraham. Obj. 3. Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended from Noe through Abraham, to whom the promise was made, so was He born of no other of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the promise was renewed, according to II Kings 23. i The man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the said. Therefore the Old Law God of Jacob should have been given after David, just as it was given after Abraham. :

.

On

.

.

the contrary.

The Apostle says

(Gal.

3.

19) that the Law was set because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He

made the

the promise, being ordained by angels in hand of a Mediator ; ordained, that is "given

in orderly fashion," as the gloss explains.^ There-

fore

it

was

fitting that the

Old

Law

should be

given in this order of time. / answer that. It was most fitting for the to be given at the time of Moses.

Law

The reason

may

be taken from two things in reis imposed on two kinds of men. Because it is imposed on some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law refor this

spect of which every law

strains and tames; and it is imposed on good men, who. through being instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil what they desire to do. Hence it was fitting that the Law should be given at such a time as would be appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride. For man was proud of two things, namely, of knowledge and of power. He was proud of his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suffice him for salvation; and accordingly, in order that his pride might be overcome in this matter, man * Glossa Lombardl (PL 192, 127); 83B).

cf.

Glossa ordin.

(vi,

PART was

the help of a written law.

OF SECOND PART

And man was

from experience that

learn

I

Q. 99.

the guidance of his reason without

left to

Of the precepts of the old law

defi-

about the time of Abraham man headlong into idolatry and the most

cient, since

had

fallen

shameful

vices. Therefore, after those times, it

was necessary for a written law to be given as a remedy for human ignorance, because by the Law is the knowledge of sin (Rom. 3, 20). But, after man had been instructed by the Law, his pride was convinced of his weakness through his being unable to fulfil what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes (Rom. 8. 3, 4), what the Law could not do in that it was weak through sending) His own the fleshy God sefit (Vulg., that the justification of the Law might Son, .

.

.

be fulfilled in us. With regard to good men, the

them

given

which was most needed by the when the natural law began to be obscured on account of the rank growth of sin; for it was fitting that this help should be bestowed on men in an orderly manner, so that they might be led from imperfection to perfection. Therefore it was becoming that the Old Law should be given between the law of nature and the law of grace. Reply Obj. 1. It was not fitting for the Old to

to be given at once after the sin of the

both because man was so confident in his own reasons that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law, and because as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened first

man

:

by habitual sinning. Reply Obj. 2. A law should not be given save to the people, since

it is

a general precept, as

stated above (q. xcvi, aa. 2, 3). Therefore at the time of Abraham God gave men certain familiar,

and, as

it

were, household precepts. But

when Abraham's descendants had multiplied, so as to form a people, and when they had been freed

We

must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (i) how they are distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept (q. c). Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether the Old Law contained several precepts or only one? (2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts? (3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts? (4) Whether besides these

Whether

How

it

it contains judicial precepts? (5) contains any others besides these?

the Old

Law

induced

men

to keep its

precepts.

as a help,

people, at the time

Law

(In Six Articles)

(6)

Law was

245

1

QUESTION XCIX

able to

was

his reason

ART.

from slavery,

it

was

fitting

that they

should be given a law; for slaves are not that part of the people or state to which

it is

fitting

Article

i. Whether One Precept?

We

the Old

proceed thus to the First Article: It

precept.

Objection i. Because a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above (q. xcn, a. 2, Reply i ) Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore .

it

contains but one precept.

Obj.

2.

Further, the Apostle says

.

.

.

15): Making void the Law of commandments contained in decrees, where he is referring to the Old Law, as the gloss

Law had to be given those of whom Christ

to the people, not only

was born received the Law, but the whole people, who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the promise made to Abraham, and in which he beheved, according to Rom. 4. II. Hence even before David, the Law had to be given to that people as soon as they were collected together. ^Politics,

III,

9 (1280*32);

cf. rv,

4 (1291*9).

13.

comprised in this neighbour as thyself. But this is only one commandment. Therefore the Old Law contained but one commandment. Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Matt. 7. 12): All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. For this is the Law and the prophets. But the whole of the Old Law is comprised in the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old Law contains but one commandment. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Ephes. 2.

passage.^

Since the

(Rom

commandment, it is word: Thou shalt love thy

9): If there be any other

says.^ 3.

Contains Only

would seem that the Old Law contains but one

for the law to be directed, as the Philosopher

Reply Obj.

Law

comments on the

Therefore the Old

Law

comprises

many commandments. / answer that, Since a precept of law

is

bind-

about something which must be done and, that a thing must be done arises from the

ing,

it is

necessity of

some

end.

Hence

it is

evident that

a precept impHes, in its very idea, relation to an end, in so far as a thing is commanded as being ^Glossa ordin.

Lombardi (PL (PL 17, 401).

(vi,

91F); Glossa interl. (v, 91V); Glossa cf. Ambrosiaster, In Ephes. 2.15

192, 185);

— SUMMA THEOLOGICA

9^

necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to be necessary or expedient to an end, and, accordingly, precepts may be given about various things as being ordered to one end. Consequently we must say that all the

Law are one in respect of one end, and yet they are many

precepts of the Old their relation to

in respect of the diversity of those things that

are ordered to that end.

Reply Obj.

i.

is

said to be one

as being ordered to one end; yet it comprises various precepts, according to the diversity of the things which it directs to the end. Thus also

one according to the unity of its end, because it aims at the building of a house; and yet it contains various rules, according to the variety of acts ordered to this. Reply Obj. 2. As the Apostle says (I. Tim. i. is

end of the commandment is charity since every law aims at establishing friendship, either between man and man, or between man and God. Therefore the whole Law is comprised in 5), the

one commandment, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, as expressing the end of all commandments, because love of one's neighbour includes love of God, when we love our neighbour for God's sake. Hence the Apostle this

commandment in place of the two which are about the love of God and of one's neighbour, and of which Our Lord said (Matt. 22. 40): On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets. Reply Obj. 3. As stated in the Ethics,^ "friendship towards another arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man looks on another as on himself. Hence when it is said, All things whatsoever yon would that men should do to you, do you also to them, this is an ex-

puts this

planation of the rule of neighbourly love contained implicitly in the words,

thy neighbour as thyself, so that tion of this

him, as

is

evident in regard to things that

reason seems to suffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law. Obj. 3. Further, the Old Law is said to be the letter that killeth (II Cor. 3. 6). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken, according to Ps. 118. 93 Thy justifications I will never forget, for by them Thou hast given me life. Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old :

The Old Law

the art of building

fails

are of faith, which are above reason. But man's

Thou it is

shalt love

an explana-

Law.

On

is written (Ecclus. 17.9): gave them discipline (Douay, instructions) and the law of life for an inheri-

He

Now

tance.

discipline belongs to morals;

the gloss on Heb. 12. 11

:

Now

We

Law

Contains

proceed thus to the Second Article: It

would seem that the Old

Law

contains no moral

precepts.

Objection

i.

For the Old

Law

is

distinct

from

the law of nature, as stated above (q. xci, a.\. 4, 5; Q. xcviii, A. 5). But the moral precepts

for

chastisement

is an exermorals by means of difficulties." Therefore the Law which was given by God comprised moral precepts. / answer that. The Old Law contained some moral precepts, as is evident from Exod. 20. 13, 15: Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not steal. This was reasonable, because just as the princi-

(disciplina), etc., says:^ "Discipline

human law is to create friendman and man, so the chief intenDivine law is to estabhsh man in

pal intention of

ship between tion of the

friendship with God.

Now

since likeness

is

the

reason of love, according to Ecclus. 13. 19: Every beast loveth its like, there cannot possibly

be any friendship of man to God, Who is supremely good, unless man becomes good. Therefore

it is

written (Levit. 19. 2;

shall be holy, for I

am

holy.

man is virtue, which makes

of

Therefore

it

was necessary

cf. 11.

You

45):

But the goodness its

possessor good.

for the

Old

Law

to

include precepts about acts of virtue, and these are the moral precepts of the Law.

Reply Obj.

i.

The Old Law

is

distinct

from

the natural law not as being altogether different it,

it. For just must the Divine

but as something added to

as grace presupposes nature, so

Article 2. Whether the Old Moral Precepts?

all

cise in

from

commandment.

the contrary, It

Moreover,

law presuppose the natural law. Reply Obj. 2. It was fitting that the Divine law should come to man's assistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient, but also in those things in which human reason may happen to be impeded. Now human reason could not go astray in the universal principle, is, as to the most common principles of

that

belong to the law of nature. Therefore they do

the natural law; but through being habituated

not belong to the Old Law. Obj. 2. Further, the Divine law should have come to man's assistance where human reason

to sin,

1

Aristotle, IX, 4 (ii06"i).

to be 2

it became obscured in the point of things done in detail. But with regard to the other

Glossa or din. (vi, 159B); Glossa Lombardi

S03).

(PL

192,

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

Q. 99.

ART.

247

3

drawn

besides the moral precepts there are others

from the common principles of the natural law, the reason of many men went astray, to the ex-

which are ceremonial. / answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the Divine law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God, while human law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men in relation to one another. Hence human laws have not concerned

moral precepts, which are

like conclusions

tent of judging to be lawful things that are evil

Hence there was need

for the au-

thority of the Divine law to rescue

man from

in themselves.

both these defects. Thus among the articles of faith not only are those things set forth to which reason cannot reach, such as the Trinity of the Godhead, but also to which right reason can attain, such as the Unity of the Godhead, in order to remove the manifold errors to which reason

Reply Obj.

As Augustine proves {De

3.

Spiri-

tu et Litera, xrv'),^ even the letter of the law

is

said to be the occasion of death, as to the moral is, it prescribes what good without furnishing the aid of grace for

precepts; in so far as, that fulfilment.

its

Article

3.

Whether the Old Law Comprises

Ceremonial, Besides Moral, Precepts?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

would seem that the Old Law does not comprise ceremonial, besides moral, precepts.

Objection

man

is

tions.

i.

For every law that

for the purpose of directing

Now human

is

given to

human

ac-

actions are called moral, as

stated above (q. i, a. 3). Therefore it seems that the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than

Obj.

2.

Further, those precepts that are styled

ceremonial seem to refer to the Divine worship.

But Divine worship ly, religion,

the act of a virtue, name-

is

TuUy

which, as

says

{De Invent,

ii,

53)^ "offers worship and ceremony to the divine nature." Since, then, the moral precepts are

about acts of virtue, as stated above (a. 2), seems that the ceremonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral. Obj. 3. Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which signify something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes,^ "of all signs employed by men words hold the first place." Therefore there was no need for the Law to contain ceremonial precepts about certain fig-

it

urative actions.

On

common good

the contrary, It

is

written (Deut.

4.

13,

He wrote in two tables of 14) Ten words stone ; and He commanded me at that time that :

.

.

.

I should teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall do. But the ten commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore 1

PL 44,

2

DD 1,165.

'

Christian Doctrine,

And

of mankind.

be seen

for this reason

may On the other men to one an-

human

morals, as

in the rites of the Gentiles.

hand the Divine law directed other according to the demands of that order by which man is directed to God, which order was the chief aim of that law. Now man is directed to God not only by the interior acts of the mind, which are faith, hope, and love, but also by certain external works, whereby man makes profession of his subjection to God, and it is these works that are said to belong to the Divine wor-

—

This worship is called ceremony, the munia, that is, gifts of Ceres (who was the goddess of fruits), as some say,'' because at first offerings were made to God from the fruits; ship.

or because, as Valerius Maximus states,^ the word ceremony was introduced among the Latins to signify the

Divine worship, being de-

rived from a town near

moral precepts.

re-

they have devised many institutions relating to Divine matters, according as it seemed expedient for the formation of

is liable.

is

themselves with the institution of anything

lating to Divine worship except as affecting the

Rome

called Caere,

when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans were taken there since,

and most carefully preserved. Accordingly those Law which refer to the Divine

precepts of the

worship are specially called ceremonial. Reply Obj. 1. Human acts extend also to the Divine worship, and therefore the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these matters also. Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (q. xci, a. 3), the precepts of the natural law are general, and require to be determined: and they are determined both by human law and by Divine law. And just as these very determinations which are made by human law are said to be not of natural, but of positive law, so the determinations of the precepts of the natural law effected by the Divine law are distinct from the moral precepts which belong to the natural law. Therefore to worship God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept but the determination of this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by such and such sacrifices, and ;

216.

11,

3

(PL 34,

37),

*

Albert the Great, In Sent.,

B

Fact, et

Did. Memor.,

1. 1.

iv, d. i, a. 7

(DD

565).

(BO xxix,

19).

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

348

As stated above

such and such offerings, belongs to the ceremoConsequently the ceremonial pre-

pertains to the Divine law to direct

cepts are distinct from the moral precepts.

another and to God.

nial precepts.

Reply Obj.

3.

As Dionysius says

Now

God cannot

way

Now

2.

men

3),

it

one each of these belongs to

to the dictates of the natural

be manifested to

law, to which dictates the moral precepts are to

be referred; yet each of them has to be determined by Divine or human law, because naturally known principles are general, both in speculative and in practical matters. Accordingly just as the determination of the general precept about Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general precepts of that justice which is to be observed among men is effected by the judicial

they are not only expressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Therefore the things of

God

in a general

(aa.

except by means of sensible likenesses. these likenesses move the soul more when

i)/ the things of

men

{Cccl. Hier.

/ afiswer that,

are set forth in the Scriptures not only

by likenesses expressed

in

words, as in the case

of metaphorical expressions, but also

by

like-

nesses of things set before the eyes, which pertains to the ceremonial precepts.

precepts.

Whether, Besides the Moral and Ceremonial Precepts, There are Also Judicial

We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law; namely moral precepts,

Precepts?

which are dictated by the natural law; ceremonial precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship and judicial precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be maintained among men. Therefore the Apostle (Rom.

Article

4.

We

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the

Old Law.

Objection Faust,

vi,

For Augustine says {Contra

i.

lY

that in the Old

Law

there are

life we have to lead, and precepts regarding the life that is foreshadowed." Now the precepts of the life we have to lead are moral precepts, and the precepts of the life that is foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of precepts we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law. Obj. 2. Further, a gloss on Ps. 118. 102, / have not declined from Thy judgments, says,^ that is, "from the rule of life Thou hast set for me." But a rule of life belongs to the moral

"precepts concerning the

—

precepts. Therefore the judicial precepts should

not be considered as distinct from the moral

3.

Further, judgment seems to be an act

of justice, according to Ps. 93. 15: Until justice

be turned into judgment. But acts of justice, the acts of other virtues, belong to the

like

moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and consequently should not be held as distinct from them. On the contrary, It is written (Deut. 6. i) These are the precepts, and ceremonies, and judgments, where precepts stands for moral precepts antonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and ceremonial precepts.

»Sect.3(PG3, '

PL 42,

228; X,

121). 2

(PL

42, 243).

*Glossa ordin. (in, 269A); Glossa Lombardi (PL 191, logs).

7.

12) after saying that the

that the

good:

commandment

Law

is just,

is

holy, adds

and holy, and

just, in respect of the judicial precepts;

holy, with regard to the ceremonial precepts

(since the

word sanctus

that which

is

that

is,

—holy—

appUed to and good, the moral preis

consecrated to God)

conducive to virtue, as to

;

cepts.

Reply Obj.

i.

Both the moral and the

precepts aim at the ordering of

human

judicial life,

and

consequently they are both comprised under one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, namely, under the precepts of the hfe we have to lead.

Reply Obj. 2. Judgment denotes execution of by an application of the reason to in-

justice,

dividual cases in a determinate way.

precepts.

Obj.

;

judicial precepts

have something

with the moral precepts

Hence the

common

in

they are derived from reason, and something in common with the ceremonial precepts in that they are determinain that

tions of general precepts.

This explains

why

sometimes "judgments" comprises both judicial and moral precepts, as in Deut. 5 i Hear, Israel, the ceremonies and judgments; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts, as in Levit. 18. 4: Yon shall do My judgments, and shall observe My precepts, where "precepts" denotes moral precepts, while "judgments" refers to judicial and ceremonial precepts. Reply Obj. 3. The act of justice, in general, pertains to the moral precepts, but its deter:

mination to some special kind of act pertains to the judicial precepts.

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

5. Whether the Old Law Contains Others Besides the Moral, Judicial, and Ceremonial Precepts?

Article

We

Any

Law

contains others

besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts.

Objection i. Because the judicial precepts belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man, while the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby

Now

shipped.

besides these

God

there are

is

wor-

many

other virtues, namely, temperance, fortitude, liberality,

and several others, as stated above

lx, a. 5). Therefore besides these precepts,

(q.

Law

the Old

Obj.

2.

should comprise others.

Further,

it is

written (Deut. 11. i):

Love the Lord thy God, and observe His precepts and ceremonies. His judgments and commandments. Now precepts concern moral matters, as stated above (a. 4). Therefore besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts, the Law contains others which are called "commandments (mandata)". Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Deut 6. 17): Keep the precepts of the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have (Vulg.,

—He hath)

commanded

dition to the above, the

Further,

Thy

it is

Law there are not only moral, ceremoand judicial precepts, but also others, called

"justifications."

On the contrary, It is written (Deut. 6. i.): These are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded you. And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the precepts of the Law are included under them. / answer that. Some things are included in .

.

the

Law by way

of precept

;

.

.

;

certain ones justly.

The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is twofold one according to the rule of reason, the other according to the rule of a law which prescribes that duty; thus the Philosopher distinguishes a twofold just moral and legal.^ Moral duty is twofold: for reason dictates that something must be done either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue would be destroyed, or as being useful for the better maintaining of the order of virtue. And

—

in this sense

pressed by bition, as

the Old

.

.

steal;

comprises "testi-

ing to a gloss )^ / will never forget. Therefore in

nial,

God the lawgiver: for example, Deut. 6. 4 Hear, Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord; and Gen. 1. 1.: In the beginning God created heaven and earth; and these are called "testimonies." Again it was necessary that in the Law certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law and punishments for those who transgress, as may be seen in Deut. 28.: // thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord Thy God He will make thee higher than all the nations, etc. and these are called "justifications," according as God punishes or rewards

thee. Therefore in ad-

written (Ps. 118. 93): justifications (that is, "Thy Law," accord4.

249

5

authority of

Law

monies." Obj.

ART.

:

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It

would seem that the Old

Q. 99.

certain things should be set forth to indicate the

some of the moral precepts are

way of absolute command Thou shalt not kill. Thou

ex-

or prohishalt not

and these are properly called precepts.

Other things are prescribed or forbidden not as an absolute duty, but as something better to be done. These may be called "commandments (mandata) ,'' because they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion; an example of this is seen in Exod. 22. 26: // thou take of thy neighbour a garment in pledge^ thou shalt give it him again before sunset, and in other like cases. Therefore Jerome (Prcefat. in Comment, super Marc.y says that "justice is in the pre-

commandments." Duty as by the Law belongs to the judicial precepts

cepts, charity in the

fixed

as regards

human

affairs, to

the ceremonial pre-

cepts as regards Divine matters.

Nevertheless those ordinances also which re-

other things, as be-

punishments and rewards

may

ing ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts.

fer to

Now

the precepts refer to things which have to

testimonies, in so far as they testify to the Di-

be done, and to their fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, namely, the authority

vine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law m.ay be styled justifications, as being executions

and the benefit derived from

of legal justice. Furthermore the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those things be called precepts which God Himself prescribed, and those things com-

of the lawgiver,

the fulfilment, which benefit consists in the at-

tainment of some good, useful, pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it was necessary that in the Old Law

^

^Glossa 1090).

interl.

(iii,

268v); Glossa Lombard] (PL 191,

3

Ethics, V, 7 (1134^18). Cf. Pelagius, In Marc,

be called

proem. (PL 30,

Glossa ordin., on the beginning of

Mark

(v,

88E).

610);

cf.

—

;

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

05^

mandments which He enjoined {mandavit)

or rewards of the

through others, as the very word seems to de-

law.

On

note.

From this the Law are cial,

it

clear that all the precepts of

is

either moral, ceremonial, or judi-

and that other ordinances have not the

character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the precepts, as stated above.

Reply Obj. i. Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of duty. Consequently moral

//

commandments

the contrary, It

you be

written (Isa.

is

and

willing,

of the Divine

will

i.

19, 20)

:

hearken to Me, you

good tilings of the land. But if you and will provoke Me to wrath: the sword shall devour you. I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are led to assent to the conclusions by means of shall eat the will not,

syllogistic

arguments, so too in every law,

men

precepts by means of pun-

matters are determinable by law in so far as they

are led to observe

belong to justice, of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says {De hvoent. ii, 53).^ Therefore the legal just cannot be anything foreign to

ishments and rewards.

the ceremonial and judicial precepts.

in an based on principles more generally known, so also he who would persuade a man to the observance of any precepts needs to move him at first by things for which he has an affection; just as children are induced to do something, by means of little childish gifts. Now it has been said above (q. xcviii, AA. I, 2, 3) that the Old Law disposed

The Replies

said.

Article 6. Whether the Old Law Should Have Induced Mefi to the Observance of Its Precepts By Means of Temporal Promises a?id Threats?

We

proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It Law should not have induced men to the observance of its precepts

would seem that the Old

by means of temporal promises and

threats.

For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and love hence it is written (Deut. 10. 12): And fww, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk 171 His ways, and love Him? But the desire for temporal goods leads man away from God; for Augustine sa\'s (qq. Ixxxiii qu. 36), ^ that "covetousness is the bane of charity." Therefore temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver; and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher declares.^ Obj. 2. Further, the Divine law is more excelObjection

lent than

i.

human

law.

Now,

in sciences,

tice that the loftier the science, the

we no-

higher the

employs. Therefore, since human law employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the Divine law should

means

that

it

have used, not Obj.

3.

these, but

more

lofty means.

Further, the reward of justice and the

punishment of guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. But as stated in Ecclus. 9. 2, all temporal things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to him that o^ereth victims, and to him that despiseth sacrifices. Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set forth as punishments iDDi. 3

165.

«

PL 40,

25.

Cf. Politics VII, 2 (l324''23).

Now

it is

that in speculative sciences the

to be observed

means

are adap-

ted to the conditions of the hearer. Therefore just as in the sciences

to the other Objections are clear

from what has been

its

way

orderly

men

we should proceed

so that the instruction

is

to Christ as the imperfect disposes to the

Hence

perfect.

was given

it

to a people as yet

imperfect in comparison to the perfection which was to result from Christ's coming, and for this reason, that people is still

is

compared

under a pedagogue (Gal.

perfection of

man

to a child that 3.

24).

But the

consists in his despising tem-

poral things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is

from the words

clear

13, 15)

:

of the Apostle (Phil. 3. Forgetting the things that are behind, I

and stretching) forth myself

stretch (Vulg.,

to

Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be this minded. Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal goods, although in subordination to God. The perverse those that are before.

however place

their

.

end

.

.

in temporalities. It

therefore fitting that the Old

Law

was

should con-

men to God by means of temporal goods which the imperfect have an affection. Reply Obj. i. Covetousness, by which man places his end in temporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal goods which man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to the love of God, duct for

according to Ps. 48. 19:

when Thou

shall

do

He

ivell to

will praise

Thee,

him.

Reply Obj. 2. Human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or by punishments to be inflicted by men but the Divine law persuades men by means of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In this respect it em;

ploys higher means.

Reply Obj.

3.

As anyone can

see

who

reads

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

carefully the story of the Old Testament, the

common state of the people prospered under the Law as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as tbey departed from the precepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. But certain individuals, although they observed the

—

Law, met with misfortunes eihad already become spiritual (so that misfortune might withdraw them all the more from attachment to temporal things, and that their virtue might be tried) or because, while outwardly fulfilling the works of the Law, their heart was altogether fixed on temporal goods, and far removed from God, acjustice of the

ther because they

cording to Isa. 29. 13 (Matt. 15. 8): This peohonour eth Me with their lips; but their heart

is

jar from

Me.

2.

ART.

human

251

i

Further, the Divine law

is

more per-

But human law adds cergood morals to those that belong to the law of nature, as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is the same in all men, while these moral institutions are various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there why the Divine law should add to the law of nature ordinances pertaining to good fect than

law.

tain things concerning

morals,

Obj.

;

ple

Q. 100.

Obj.

3.

Further, just as natural reason leads

good morals in certain matters, so does faith hence it is written (Gal. 5.6) that faith worketh by charity. But faith is not included in the law of nature, since that which is of faith is above natural reason. Therefore not all the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of to

nature.

QUESTION C Of the moral precepts of the old law {In Twelve Articles)

We

must now consider each kind of precept of Law: and (i) the moral precepts, (2)

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 2. 14) that the Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law, which must be understood of things pertaining to

good morals. Therefore

Law

all the m^oral precepts belong to the law of nature.

the Old

of the

the ceremonial precepts (q. ci), (3) the judicial

/ answer that, The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and judicial precepts, are

precepts (q. civ). Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (i) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old

Law

belong to the

law of nature? (2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all the virtues? (3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue? (4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one another; (5) Their number; (6) Their order; (7) The manner in which they were given (8) Whether they ;

are dispensable? (9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept

Law? (10) Whether the mode of charcomes under the precept? (11) The distinction of other moral precepts. (12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified

of the ity

Article i. Whether All the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Belong to the Law of Nature?

We

proceed thus to the First Article: It all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. Objection i. For it is written (Ecclus. 17. 9) Moreover He gave them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance. But instruction

would seem that not

law of nature, since not learnt, but held by natural instinct. Therefore not all the moral precepts belong to the natural law. is

in contradistinction to the

the law of nature

is

about things pertaining of their very nature to

good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason, which is the proper

human acts, those morals are called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are discordant from reason. And as every judgment of speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so every judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated above (q. xciv, aa. 2, 4), from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some matters connected with human actions are so evident that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by means of these general first principles. But some matters cannot be the subject of judgment principle of

without much consideration of the various circumstances, which all are not able to do carefully, but only those who are wise, just as it is not possible for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those who are versed in philosophy. And lastly there are some matters of which man cannot judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction, such as the articles of faith.

It

is

therefore evident that since the moral

precepts are about matters which concern good morals, and since good morals are those which

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

252

are in accord with reason, and since also every

viUy

judgment of human reason must be derived in some way from natural reason, it follows, of necessity, that all of the moral precepts belong to the law of nature, but not all in the same way. For there are certain things which the natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done or not to be done: for example, Honour thy father and thy mother,

vine law, and a disobedience to the

and,

Thou

shalt not

and these belong

And

ly.

more

kill,

Thou

shalt not steal;

to the law of nature absolute-

there are certain things which, after a

careful consideration, wise

men

judge to

that "a sin

things to judge of which

human

Thou

shalt not

make

name

take the

to thyself a graven thing,

Thou shalt not Lord thy God in vain (Ex-

a7iy thing;

nor the likeness of of the

od. 20. 4, 7).

This

suffices for the Replies to the

Objec-

tions.

Article 2. Whether the Moral Precepts of the Law Are About All the Acts of Virtue?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not about

Objection

all

i.

Law

of the Old

the acts of virtue.

For observance of the precepts called justification, accord-

is

ing to Ps. 118. 8: / will keep

But

justification

is

Thy

justifications.

the execution of justice.

above

xc,

(q.

must be

a.

is

ruled by a king

the laws of a state which

by

a few powerful is

Obj. 2. Further, that which comes under a precept has the character of a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone and

tual virtues set in

due. Therefore the precepts of the moral law are

not about the acts of the other virtues, but

only about the acts of justice. Obj.

3.

Further, every law

is

made

for the

common

good, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21).^ But of all the virtues justice alone regards the common good, as the Philosopher says.^ Therefore the moral precepts are only about the acts

of justice.

On

the contrary,

1

PL 82.

i

Ethics, w,

203; I

II,

Ambrose says {De Paradiso

10 (PL 82, 131).

(1130*4).

is

in a state

different

from

ruled by the people,

men

in the state.

Now

munity, and the Divine law for another kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil community, implying mutual duties of man and his fellow^s, and men are ordered to one another by outward acts, by which men hve in communion with one another. This life in common of man with man pertains to justice, whose proper function consists in directing the human community. Therefore human law makes precepts only about acts of justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this is only in so far as they assume the nature of justice, as the Philosopher explains.^ But the community for which the Divine law is ordained is that of men in relation to God, either in this life or in the Hfe to come. And therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters by which men are well ordered in their relations to God. Now man is united to God by his reason, or mind, in which is God's image. Therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters by which hu-

by the

of justice consists in rendering to each one his

made

must be

ordained for one kind of com-

man

virtues, for the proper act

Law

hence the Philosopher

teaches^ that the laws which are

which

Law

good, as stated

2), the precepts of the

kinds of community;

acts of justice.

none of the other

common

diversified according to the various

Therefore the moral precepts are only about

to

belongs

/ answer that, Since the precepts of the are ordered to the

or

some

it

to the Divine law to direct all the acts of virtue.

human law

there are

command-

sins contrary

to all the acts of virtue. Therefore

be obligatory. Such belong to the law of nature,

reason needs Divine instruction, by which we are taught about things of God: for example,

a transgression of the Di-

ments of heaven." But there are

yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less wise: for example. Rise up before the hoary head^ and honour the person of the aged man (Lev. 19. 32), and the like. And

is

son

reason

in

is

well ordered. But this

is

effected

acts of all the virtues, since the intellec-

good order the acts of the rea-

themselves, while the moral virtues set in

good order the acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior actions. It is therefore evident that the Divine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the virtues, yet so that certain matters, without which the order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation of precept, while other matters, which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel. Reply Obj. i. The fulfillment of the commandments of the Law, even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the '

PL

*

Ethics, \,

14, 309. I

*

Politics, IV, I (1289"

(ii29*»23).

I).

^

PART man

OF SECOND PART

I

character of justification, since

it

is

just that

should obey God; or again, because it is man should be sub-

just that all that belongs to ject to reason.

Reply Obj.

Justice properly so called re-

2.

man

gards the duty of one

to another; but all

the other virtues regard the duty of the lower

powers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks of a kind of metaphorical justice.^

The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about the different kinds of community.

ART.

253

4 once from the

general principles, and those also which

first

become

man immediately

known

to

ciples.

And

through divinely mfused faith. Consequently two kinds of precepts are not reckoned among the precepts of the decalogue. First, general principles, for they need no further promulgation after being once inscribed on the natural reason to which they are self-evident; as, for instance, that one should do evil to no man, and other similar prin-

reason,

which the careful

again, those

flection of wise

since

men shows

re-

to be in accord with

the people receive these prin-

from God through being taught by wise

ciples

Article 3. Whether All the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Are Reducible to the Ten Precepts of the Decalogue?

Q. 100.

reflection can be gathered at

men. Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

contained in the precepts of the decalogue, yet ways. For the first general principles are contained in them as principles in their

would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts

proximate conclusions; but those which are known through wise men are contained, con-

of the decalogue.

versely, as conclusions in their principles.

We

Objection cepts of the

For the

i.

Law

are,

and principal preThou shalt love the Lord first

thy God, and. Thou shalt love thy neighbotir, as stated in Matt.

22. 37, 39.

But these two

are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore not all the

moral precepts are

contained in the precepts of the decalogue. Obj.

Further, the moral precepts are not

2.

reducible to the ceremonial precepts, but rather contrariwise.

But among, the precepts of the

decalogue, one

is

ceremonial, namely,

Remem-

ber that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day (Exod. 20.8). Therefore the

reducible to

Obj.

3.

all

moral precepts are not

the precepts of the decalogue.

Further, the moral precepts are about

among

the acts of virtue. But

all

the precepts

of the decalogue are only such as regard acts of

may be seen by going through them Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts. On the contrary, The gloss on Matt. 5. 11. Blessed are ye when they shall revile you, etc., says that "Moses, after propounding the ten precepts, set them out in detail. "^ Therefore justice, as all.

the precepts of the

all

Law

are so

many

parts

of the precepts of the decalogue.

/ answer that, differ

fact

The precepts

of the decalogue

from the other precepts of the Law in the that God Himself is said to have given

the precepts of the decalogue, while

He

gave

the other precepts to the people through Moses.

Therefore the decalogue includes those precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately from God. Such are those which with but sHght »

Ethics, V,

1 1 (i

138^5).

2

Glossa ordin. (v, 19B).

in different

Reply Obj. first

i.

Those two principles are the

general principles of the natural law, and

are self-evident to

human

reason, either through

nature or through faith. Therefore

the pre-

all

cepts of the decalogue are referred to these, as

conclusions to general principles.

Reply Obj. 2. The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things of God, according to Ps. 45. 11 Be still and see that I am God. In this respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue, but not as to the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial precept. Reply Obj. 3. The notion of duty is not so patent in the other virtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the other virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts about acts of justice. Therefore the acts of justice especially come under the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of the Law. :

Article 4. Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Distinguished From One Another?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue (Exod. 20) are unsuitably distinguished from one another. Objection

from

faith.

virtue.

i.

For worship

Now

But that which

of the decalogue.

is

a virtue distinct

the precepts are about acts of

Thou

is

said at the beginning

shalt not have strange

gods before Me, belongs to

faith,

and that which

;

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

454

Thou

added,

is

thmg,

make

shalt not

.

any graven

belongs to worship. Therefore these

etc.,

are not one precept, as Augustine asserts (qq. Exod,, qit. Ixxi),^ but two.

m

Obj. the

Further, the affirmative precepts in

2.

Law

are distinct

from the negative precepts

Honour thy father and thy mother,

for example,

But this, / am the Lord thy God, is affirmative and that which follows, Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me, is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not, as Augustine says (loc. cit.) make

Thou

and,

shalt 7tot

kill. ;

one.

Obj.

3.

(Rom.

Further, the Apostle says

7.

had not knoum concupiscence, if the Law did not say: "Thou shalt not covet" Hence it seems that this precept, Thou shalt not covet, is one precept, and, therefore should not be di7)

:

/

vided into two. On the contrary stands the authority of Augustine, who in commenting on Exodus {loc. cit.y distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbour.

The

6.

No man can serve two masters, the two am the Lord thy God, and. Thou not have strange gods before Me seem to

24),

statements, / shalt

be of the same nature and to form one precept. Hence Origen (Hom. vii iji Exod.),^ who also distinguishes four precepts as referring to God, unites these

two under one precept; and puts in Thou shalt not make any

the second place.

.

.

.

graven thing; as third, Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain; and as fourth, Refnember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day. The other six he puts in the same way as Hesychius. Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything is not forbidden except as to the point of their being worshipped as gods for God commanded an image of the Seraphim (Vulg., Cherubim) to be made and placed in the tabernacle, as related in Exod. 25. 18 Augustine more fittingly unites these two, Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me, a7ty graven thing, and. Thou shalt not make

—

—

—

.

.

.

into one precept. Likewise to covet another's

precepts of the decalogue

wife, for the purpose of carnal knowledge, be-

are differently divided

by different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on Levit. 26. 26, Ten women shall bake your bread in one oven,

longs to the concupiscence of the flesh; but to

says that the precept of the Sabbath-day observ-

covet other things, which are desired for the purpose of possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes. Therefore Augustine puts (ibid.) as distinct precepts, that which forbids the coveting of another's goods and that which

/ answer that,

ance is not one of the ten precepts, because its observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time.^ But he distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the

Thou

thy God; the second, strange gods before

Me,

am

the

Lord

shalt not

have

being, /

first

(thus also Jerome dis-

tinguishes these two precepts, in his

ary on Osee 10. 10,* Ori thy iniquities)

;

—Vulg.,

comment-

— two

their

the third precept according to

him

make to thyself any graven thing; and the fourth. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. He states Thou

is,

shalt not

that there are six precepts pertaining to our

neighbour

;

the

first.

Honour thy

father and thy

mother; the second. Thou shalt not third.

And

this is better.

i. Worship is merely a declaraand therefore the precepts about worship should not be given as distinct from

Reply Obj.

tion of faith,

those about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about worship rather than about faith, because the precept about faith is presupposed to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the

precept of love. For just as the

general

Thou shalt not commit adidtery; the Thou shalt not steal; the fifth, Thou not bear false witness; the sixth, Thou

a subject having natural reason, and need no

promulgation, so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident principle to a subject possessed

cometh to God, must be(Heb. 11. 6). Hence it needs no other promulgation than the infusion of of faith: for he that

seems unfitting for the precept of the Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue, if it did not in any way belong to the decalogue.

lieve that

But, in the

first place, it

Secondly, because, since

it

is

written (Matt.

He

is

faith.

Reply Obj. 2. The affirmative precepts are from the negative when one is not com-

distinct

man should honour his parents does not include that he should not kill another man, nor does the latter in-

prised in the other; thus that 2

first

precepts of the natural law are self-evident to

shalt not covet.

1

Thus

he distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbour.

kill; the

fourth. shalt

prohibits the coveting of another's wife.

PL 34, 621. PL 34, 620;

Cf. Glossa ordin., super

Exod. 20.1

B).

»PG93,

iiso.

'•Bk.

Ill

(PL

25, 952).

(i,

163

6

PG 12, 351.

PART elude the former. But

when

OF SECOND PART

I

an affirmative pre-

we

cording to

I

mandment

is

is

included in a negative, or vice versa,

owner. In the same

its

way

there are not differ-

255

5

of the decalogue are ordered to charity, ac-

do not find that two distinct precepts are given thus there is not one precept saying that Thou shalt not steal, and another binding one to keep another's property intact, or to give it back to

cept

ART.

Q. 100.

Tim.

I.

The end of the com-

5:

charity. Therefore as there

is

a

precept referring to parents, so should there

have been some precepts referring to children and other neighbours. Obj.

Further, in every kind of

5.

sin, it

is

ent precepts about believing in God, and about

possible to sin in thought or in deed. But in

not beheving in strange gods.

some kinds

Reply Obj.

mon

notion,

of the

All covetousness has one

3.

com-

and therefore the Apostle speaks

commandment about covetousness

as

were one. But because there are vari^ ous special kinds of covetousness, therefore Authough

it

distinguishes

gustine

against coveting

;

prohibitions

different

for covetousness differs speci-

fically in respect of

the diversity of actions or

things coveted, as the Philosopher says.^

of sin,

namely

in theft

and adultery,

when it is said, not commit adultery, Thou shalt not

the prohibition of sins of deed,

Thou

shalt

steal, is distinct

from the

when

prohiibition of the sin

Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's goods, and. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife. Therefore the same

of thought,

it is

said.

should have been done in regard to the sins of homicide and false Vv^itness. Obj.

6.

Further, just as sin happens through

disorder of the concupiscible part, so does

Article 5. Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Set Forth?

arise through disorder of the irascible part.

We

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue (Exod. 20) are unsuitably set forth. Objection 1. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose {De Paradiso viii),^ is "a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the commandments of heaven." But sins are distinguished according as man sins against God, or his neighbour, or himself. Since, then, the deca-

logue does not include any precepts directing

man

in his relations to himself,

but only such

God and his seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently enumerated, Obj. 2. Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to the worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities, and the offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept about the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain others also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to as direct

him

neighbour,

it

the sacrificial

Obj.

3.

in his relations to

rite.

some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when it is said, Thou shalt not covet. Therefore the decalogue should have included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible, part. Therefore

it seems that the ten precepts of the decalogue are unfittingly enumerated.

On the contrary. It is written (Deut. 4. 13) He shewed you His covenant, which He comTnanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two tables of stone. I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), just as the precepts of human law direct man in his relations to the

God

include

tions

to

a

community or commonwealth of

are required

the

:

the head of the

^

all

our neighbours.

Ethics,^, SiiiT $^22,).

Now

the precepts

2pLi4^3og,

who

is

that

are his fellows and it

therefore neces-

sary that the Divine law should contain in the

place precepts ordering

tions to God,

and

cepts ordering

in the

man

the community:

Moreover the commandment of charity

that he behave well to

partners in the community. It

ding perjury. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. Therefore there should be also a precept of the decalogue, for-

extends to

first is

community; the other

he behave well to those

who

dren.

so the prein his rela-

men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell rightly in a community, two things

the sin of perjury, so also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against the teaching of God. But there is a precept forbid-

bidding blasphemy and false doctrine. Obj. 4. Further, just as man has a natural love for his parents, so has he also for his chil-

human community, man

cepts of the Divine law direct

first

Further, as sins against

it

But

man

in his rela-

second place other pre-

in his relations to other

are his neighbours

and

five

men

with him under

God.

Now man

owes three things to the head of first, fidelity;

secondly, rever-

ence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his master

honour to first commandment, in the words. Thou shalt not have strange gods. Reverence to his master requires that he should do nothing injurious to him, and this is conveyed by the second commandment, consists in his not giving sovereign

another, and this

is

the sense of the

SCMMA THEOLOGICA

2S6

name

Lord thy due to the master in return for the benelits which his subjects receive from him and to this belongs the third commandment of the sanctihcation of the Sabbath in memor>- of the creation of all things. To his neighbours a man behaves himself well both in particular and in general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted by paying his debts, and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about honouring one's parents. In general, as to all men by doing harm to none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed harm is done to one's neighbour sometimes

Thou

God

shaJt not take the

of the

in vain. Service is

in his person, that

and

this

not

kill;

is

is,

to his personal existence,

forbidden by the words. Thou shalt in a person united to liim

sometimes

as to the propagation of offspring, and this

prohibited by the words.

Thou

shalt net

is

commit

adultery: sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to both of these, and with regard to this

is

it

said.

done by word

is

Thou

shalt not steal.

forbidden

when

it is

said.

Harm Thou

those precepts only which refer to our neigh-

bour and

The

is

forbidden in the

God may

man

also

be

in

his

differ-

same way. For the first refers and therefore it is said. Thou shalt not make ... a graven thing; the second, to words, and therefore it is said. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain; entiated in this to deeds,

the third, to thoughts, because the sanctitication of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral precept, requires repose of the heart in

God. Or,

according to Augustine (/« Ps. 3:. : K^ by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the third. His goodness by which

are sanciitied, and in which

we

rest as in

we our

Reply Obj. i. This objection may be answered in two ways. First, because the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the precepts of charity.

Now

man to reGod and his neigh-

there was need for

ceive a precept about loving

bour, because in this respect the natural law had

become obscured on account

of sin. but not about the duty of loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law retained its vigour. Or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love of God and of one's neighbour, since

true self-love consists in directing oneself to

God. And for

PL JO.

be answered that the pre-

ple received

from God immediately; hence

written (^Deut. 10. 4):

He

it is

iirote in the tables,

according as He had written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you. And so the precepts of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand at once.

Now

cept implies the notion of duty. But

man. especially for

for a

it

a preis

easy

a believer, to under-

stand that, of necessity, he owes certain duties

God and

to

ters

to his neighbour. But that in matwhich regard himself and not another, m.an

has of necessity certain duties to himself,

is

not

seems that everyone is free in matters that concern himself. And therefore the precepts which prohibit so evident;

for.

disorders of a

at first glance,

man

it

with regard to himself reach

the people through the instruction of

men who

are versed in such matters. Consequently, they are not contained in the decalogue.

Reply Obj.

Law were

2.

All the solemnities of the Old

instituted in celebration of

some Di-

memor>' of past favours, or in sign of some favour to come, and in like manner all the sacrifices were oft'ered up with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine favours to be commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was called to mind by the sanctification of the Sabbath; therefore the reason for this precept

is

given in E.xod. 20. 11:

days the Lord made heaven and earth, etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and final was the repose of the mind in God. either, in In

six

life, by grace, or in the future life, and this repose was also foreshadowed the Sabbath-day observance; hence it is

the present

by in

glor>';

written (Isa. 5S. 13); // thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath from doing thy own will holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, in

My

last end.

»

mny

it

\*ine favour, either in

three precepts that direct

behaviour towards

God.

cepts of the decalogue are those which the peo-

shalt not bear false witness against thy neigh-

bour; harm done by thought words. Thou shalt not covet.

to

Secondly,

iSi.

this reason the

decalogue includes

and the holy of the Lord glorious. For these favours first and chiefly are borne in mind by men. especially by the faithful. But other solemnities were celebrated on account of cer-

favours which were temporal such as the celebration of the Passover in memor>- of the past favour of the

tain

particular

and

transitor\-.

delivery-

from

Eg>'pt.

and as

a sign of the future

Passion of Christ, which though temporal and transitor>', brought us to the repose of the

Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the precepts of the spiritual

alone,

decalogue.

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

3. As the Apostle says (Yith. 6. 16), men swear by one greater than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy. Hence, since oaths are com-

Reply Obj.

mon

to

all,

inordinate swearing

is

of the deca-

According to one interpretation, how-

logue.

ever, the words,

Thou

"Thou

shalt not

say that Christ

is

a

creature."^

Reply Obj. 4. That a m.an should not do harm anyone is an immediate dictate of his natural reason, and therefore the precepts that to

harm

forbid the doing of

men. But

are binding on

all

not an immediate dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in it is

return for another, unless he hap^pen to be in-

Now

debted to someone. father

from

is it

a son's debt to his

so evident that one cannot get

by denying

it,

were, the

first

6

the

of

237 decalogue are,

as

it

elements of the Law, there was

no need for mention of the

irascible passions,

but only of the concupiscible passions.

since the father

Article 6. Whether the Ten Precepts of the Decalogue Are Set in Proper Order?

We

name

shalt not take the

of the Lord thy God in vain are a prohibition of false doctrine, for one gloss expounds them thus:

ART.

precepts

the matter of

by a precept

a special prohibition

Q. TOO.

the

as

proceed thus to the Sixth Article:

logue are not set in proper order.

Objection i. Because love of one's neighbour seems to be prior to love of God, since our neighbour is better knov/n to us than God is, according to I John 4. 20: He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth^ how can he love God, Whom he seeth not? But the first three precepts belong to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbour. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order.

away

Obj.

the

by the

is

principle of generation and being, and also of

upbringing and teaching. Therefore the deca-

It

would seem that the ten precepts of the deca-

2.

Further, acts of virtue are prescribed

affirmative precepts,

and acts of vice are

forbidden by the negative precepts. But according to Boethius in his commentary on the

logue does not prescribe deeds of kindness or

Categories;' vices should be uprooted before

done to anyone except to one's parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to be indebted to their children for any favours

virtues

service to be

received, but rather the reverse

Again, a child

is

is

ents love their children as being a part of themselves," as the Philosopher states.^ Hence, just

no ordinance as to man's behaviour towards himself, so, for the same reason, it includes no precept about lov-

as the decalogue contains

5.

The

pleasure of adultery and

the usefulness of wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good,

and needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But murder and falsehood are, of themselves, obare,

of

Obj.

themselves, objects of appetite;

for this reason they

among

the pre-

3.

have preceded the affirmative.

Further, the precepts of the

Law

are

about men's actions. But actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. Therefore the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuitably placed last in order.

On

the contrary,

The things

i;:

ing one's children.

Reply Ob].

precepjts should

the case.

a part of his father, and "par-

are so^n. Therefore

cepts concerning our neighbour, the negative

The Apostle

that are of

(Rom.

13.

God, are well

or-

says

(V'ulg., Those that are, are ordained of God). But the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by God, as stated above ( k. 3;. Therefore they are arranged in fitting order. / answer that. As stated above Taa. 3,5, Reply

dered

i;, the precepts of the

the

mind

of

man

is

decalogue are such as ready to grasp at once.

man

Now

to love his neighbour

and the truth;, and are desired only for the sake of something else. Consequently with regard to sins of murder and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe,

more

by the reason as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. Moreover it is clear that since the order of rea-

not sins of thought, but only sins of deed. Reply Obj. 6. As stated above (q. xxv, a. i), ail the passions of the irascible part arise from

inordinately disposed towards his end,

jects of repulsion (since

it is

natural for

the pas.sions of the concupiscible part. Hence, ^

Glossa ordin., on Deut.

on Exod. 20.7

(i,

5.

11 d,

337A); Glossa

interl.,

i64rj; Isidore, Quaesi.in Vet. Test., In.

Exod., chap. 29, on 20.7 ''PL 83, ^Ethics, vm, 12 (1161^19),

.301).

it is

evident that a thing

is

so

much

the

easily grasped

son begins with the end, that, for a

man

to be is

su-

premely contrary to reason. Now the end of human life and society is God. Consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the decalogue first of all, to direct man to God, since the contrary to this is most grievous. Thus also, in an army, which is ordered to the com»

In Cat.

Ari:t., iv

rpL

64, 277}.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

258

mander

as to

end,

its

requisite first that the

it is

commander, most grievous; and

soldier should be subject to the

and the opposite of secondly

it is

this is

requisite that he should be in co-

ordination with the other soldiers.

Now among

those things by which

ordered to God, the subjected to

common

in

first is

that

man

we

are

should be

Him faithfully, by having nothing with His enemies. The second is show Him reverence. The

that he should

that he should offer

Him

third

Thus,

his service.

in

an army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a compact with the foe than to be insolent to his commander; and this last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point of service to him.

As

to the precepts that direct

man

in his be-

haviour towards his neighbor, it is evident that it is more contrary to reason, and a more grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons to whom he is most indebted. Consequently, among those precepts that direct man in his relations to his neighbour the first place

is

parents.

given to that one which regards his Among the other precepts we again

find the order to be according to the gravity

of sin. For

it is

to reason to sin

more grave and more contrary by deed than by word and by

word than by thought. And among sins of deed, murder which destroys life in one already living is more grievous than adultery, which imperils the life of the unborn child; and adultery is more grave than theft, which regards external goods.

Reply Ohj. ter

i.

Although our neighbour

known than God by

is

bet-

way of the senses, God is the reason for

the love of our neighbour, as shall be declared

on (Part H-H,

xxv,

q.

a.

i

;

2). Hence the precepts ordering man manded precedence of the others.

Reply Obj.

2.

Just as

God

is

q.

to

xxvi,

God

a.

de-

the universal

principle of being in respect of all things, so is

a father a principle of being in respect of

Therefore the precept regarding parents was fittingly placed after the precepts regarding God. This argument holds in respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of deed, although even then it is not altogether cogent. For although in the order of execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown, according to Ps. t,2>- i5 Turn away from evil, and do good, and Isa. i. 16, 17: Cease to do perversely; learn to do well, yet in the order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice,

his son.

•

because "the crooked

line

is

known by

the

and by the law

is

the knowledge of

(Rom. 3. 20). Hence the affirmative precept demanded the first place. However, this is not

sin

the reason for the order, but that which is given above. Because in the precepts regarding God,

which belong precept

is

to the first table,

placed

last,

implies a less grievous

Reply Obj. first

the order of

in

sin.

Although

3.

an affirmative

since its transgression

sin of

thought stands

execution, yet

its

pro-

hibition holds a later position in the order of

reason.

Article 7. Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Formulated?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated.

Objection rect

man

i.

For the affirmative precepts

di-

to acts of virtue, while the negative

precepts withdraw

him from

acts of vice.

But

every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one another. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a negative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative precepts should be in

framed

in

some matters, and negative precepts

in others.

Obj.

Further, Isidore says (Etym.

2.

ii,

lo)^

based on reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Divine law. Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each precept, and not only in the that every law

first

and

man

is

third.

Further, by observing the precepts deserves to be rewarded by God. But the

Obj.

the

nevertheless the love of

later

straight";^

3.

Divine promises concern the rewards of the precepts. Therefore the promise should have been included in each precept, and not only in the second and fourth. Obj. 4. Further, the Old Law is called "the law of fear,"^ in so far as it induced men to observe the precepts by means of the threat of punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old Law. Therefore a threat of punishment should have been included in each, and not only in the first and second. 5. Further, all the commandments of should be retained in the memory, for it

Obj.

God

written (Prov.

is

3.

3): Write

bles of thy heart. Therefore 1

Aristotle, Soul,

i,

5

them in the tawas not fitting

(411*5).

(PL 82, 199). 3 Cf. Augustine, De Mor. Eccl, fraAdimant., vii (PL 42, 159).

«PL82,

it

130; V, 3

i,

28 (PL 32, 1334); Con-

PART

OP SECOND PART

I

memory should be made commandment only. Consequently

Q. 100.

ART.

that mention of the

are already on the

in the third

benefit

seems that the precepts of the decalogue

it

are unsuitably formulated.

On the contrary, It is written (Wisd. ii. 21) God made all things, in measure, number and weight. Much more therefore did He obthat

serve a suitable

manner in formulating His Law. The highest wisdom is con-

/ answer that,

tained in the precepts of the Divine law; hence

written (Deut.

it is

4.

6)

:

This

is

your wisdom

and understanding in the sight of nations. Now it belongs to wisdom to arrange all things in due manner and order. Therefore it must be evident that the precepts of the

Law

are suitably

iig to depart

from

us,

Affirmation of one thing always

i.

leads to the denial of

its

opposite, but the

denial of one opposite does not always lead

no

expected from them; therefore a promise of reward is added to the precept about honouring one's parents. The same apphes to the precept forbidding idolatry, since thereby is

seemed that men were hindered from

it

re-

ceiving the apparent benefit which they think

they can get by entering into a compact with the demons.

Reply Obj. against those

4.

Punishments are necessary

who

are prone to evil, as stated in

the Ethics."^ Therefore a threat of punishment

is

only affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade evils to which men were prone. Now

men were prone

to idolatry

by reason

of the

general custom of the nations. Likewise

set forth.

Reply Obj.

g

way

men

are prone to perjury on account of the frequent

use of oaths. Hence to the first

it is

that a threat

is

affixed

two precepts.

negative precepts, extends to more persons, as

Reply Obj. 5. The commandment about the Sabbath was made in memory of a past blessing. Therefore special mention of the memory is made in it. Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a determination joined to it that does not belong to the natural law, and therefore this precept needed a special admon-

a primary dictate of reason, than that one ought

ition.

to the affirmation of the other.

For

it

follows

not black, but it does not follow that if it is not black, it is white, because negation extends further than that

if

a thing

is

white,

it is

And hence too, that one ought not do harm to another, which pertains to the

affirmation. to

someone a service or kindness. Nevertheit is a primary dictate of reason that man

to do less

a debtor in the point of rendering a service

is

from whom he has rehe has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two whose favours no man can sufficiently repay, namely, God and man's father, as stated in the Ethics.^ Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts, one about the honour due to parents, the other about the celebration of the Sabbath in memory of the Divine favour. Reply Obj. 2. The reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest; hence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the

Article 8. Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Dispensable?

We

or kindness to those

ceived kindness,

if

precepts include ceremonial matter, or a deter-

mination of a general moral precept; thus the first precept includes the determination, Thou shalt not make a graven thing; and in the third precept the Sabbath-day is fixed. Consequently there was need to state the reason in each case.

Reply Obj.

3.

their actions to

Generally speaking

some point of

men

direct

utihty. Conse-

quently in those precepts in which it seemed that there would be no useful result, or that some utility might be hindered, it was necessary to add a promise of reward. And since parents »

Aristotle, viii, 14 (1163^15).

proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It

would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.

Objection

i.

For the precepts of the deca-

logue belong to the natural law. But the natural

law

fails in

human

some

cases and

is

changeable, Uke

nature, as the Philosopher says.^

Now

the failure of law to apply in certain particular cases

is

above

a reason for dispensation, as stated xcvi, a. 6; q. xcvii, a. 4). There-

(q.

fore a dispensation can be granted in the pre-

cepts of the decalogue.

Further, man stands in the same relahuman law as God does to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of a law made by man. Therefore, since the pre-

Obj.

2.

tion to

cepts of the decalogue are ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our superiors are God's vicegerents on earth; for the Apostle says (II Cor. 2. 10) For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the perso?i of Christ. Therefore superiors can dispense with :

the precepts of the decalogue. ^Ibid.,x,9iiiSoU)^

Ethics, Y, 7 (ii34''29).

— SUMMA THEOLOGICA

26o Obj.

3.

among

Further,

decalogue

is

men

in

when according

to

men

as

precepts of the second table contain the order

one forbidding murder.

But

given by

seems that a dispensation this precept,

who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is God; while the

the precepts of the

for instance,

is

human

the prescription of

law, such

it

evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. There-

fore

ing

Further, the observance of the Sab-

we

the

of

is ordained by a precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this precept, for it is written (I Machab. 2. 4): And they determined in that day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the Sab-

bath

bath-day,

we

will fight against him.

Therefore

the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.

On

undue be done

5,

ing of the natural law which contains the very

order of justice, for

Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by dispensation. / answer that, As stated above {loc. cit. cf. i), precepts

admit of dispensation when

there occurs a particular case in which, letter of the

the lawgiver

is

frustrated.

of every lawgiver to the

common and

of justice

if

the

law be observed, the intention of is

Now

directed

the intention

first

and

chiefly

good; secondly, to the order virtue,

whereby the common

preserved and attained. If therefore there be any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or the very

good

is

order of justice and virtue, such precepts contain the intention of the lawgiver,

fore are indispensable. For instance,

community

a law

and thereif

in

were enacted, such as

some

this,

man

should work for the destruction of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that no man should do anything that no

such precepts would not admit But if other precepts were enacted, subordinate to the above, and determining certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far as the omission of these pre-

unjust or of

evil,

dispensation.

cepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts

which contain the

tention of the lawgiver. For instance

the safeguarding of the commonwealth,

if,

it

in-

for

were

enacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on

account of some greater

Now

utility.

the precepts of the decalogue contain

a never-failing prin-

be preserved. But he

speaking in reference to certain fixed modes

13),

principally to the precepts of the decalogue.

is

of observing justice, which fail to apply in cer-

everlasting covenant, which,

seems, applies

it

ciple that justice should

tain cases.

it

in this sense that

Consequently the precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever. Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher is not speak-

is

the contrary are the words of Isa. 24.

it is

that noth-

and that each

are to take the precepts of the decalogue.

where some are reproved for that they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the

obj.

to anyone,

one be given his due; for

pensable. 4.

among men,

of justice to be observed

decalogue are dis-

the precepts

Obj.

the very intention of the lawgiver,

As the Apostle says

(II Tim. 2. cannot deny Himself. But He would deny Himself if He were to do away with the very order of His own justice, since He is justice itself. Therefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one

Reply Obj.

God

2.

continueth faithful,

He

another.

Reply Obj.

3.

The

slaying of a

man

is

for-

bidden in the decalogue in so far as it bears the character of something undue, for in this sense the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not undue for evil-doers or foes of the commonwealth to be slain hence this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue, and such a kiUing is no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine observes {De Lib. Arb. i, 4).^ In like manner when a man's property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose it this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue. ;

Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away the spoils of the Egyptians (Exod. 12. 35), this was not theft, since it was due to them by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son (Gen. 22), he did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death. For He it is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first par-

—

and if a man be the executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murent,

1PL32,

1226.

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

ART.

Q. 100.

261

9

Again Osee,

derer any more than God would be. by taking unto himself a wife of fornications, or an adulterous woman (Osee i, 2), was not

do it well; but if you do it sorrowfully, it is done in thee, not by thee." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law.

guilty either of adultery or of fornication, be-

On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has the habit of virtue, as

cause he took unto himself one who was his by command of God, Who is the Author of the Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the notion of justice which they contain, are unchangeable but as to any determination by apphcation to individual actions for instance that this or that be murder, theft, in this point they admit of or adultery, or not change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in such matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as marriage and the like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such matters as are subject to human jurisdiction; for in this respect men stand in the place of God, but not in all respects. Reply Obj. 4. This determination was an interpretation rather than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath if he does something necessary for human welfare, as Our Lord proves (Matt. 12. 3 seq.). ;

—

Article 9. Whether the Mode of Virtue Falls Under the Precept of the Law?

We

proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law. Objection i. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice should be done justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely, and in like

manner

But

as to the other virtues.

it is

commanded (Deut. 16. 20) that thou shalt follow justly after that which is just. Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept. Obj.

Further, that which belongs to the

2.

intention of the lawgiver comes chiefly under

But the intention of the lawgiver

the precept.

directed chiefly to

is

make men

stated in the Ethics,^ and

man

tuous

mode

to

act

the Philosopher explains.^

Now

whoever

trans-

gresses a precept of the law deserves to be

institution of marriage.

it

virtuous, as

belongs to a vir-

virtuously.

Therefore the

of virtue falls under the precept.

punished.

Hence

would follow that a man who

it

has not the habit of virtue would deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the intention of the law, which aims at leading

man

by habituating him

to virtue,

good works. Therefore the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept. / answer that, As stated above (q. xc, a. 3, Reply 2), a precept of law has constraining power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law is brought to bear falls directly under the precept of the law. Now the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in the Ethics,"^ because that properly falls under the precept of the law for which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are differently situated as to the appointment of penalties, since the penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which come under the judgment of the lawgiver; for the law punto

ishes in accordance with the verdict given.

Now

man, the framer of human law is able to judge only of outward acts, because man seeth those things that appear, according to I Kings 16. 7; but

God

alone, the framer of the Divine law,

is

movements of wills, The searcher of hearts

able to judge of the inward

according to Ps.

and

reins

is

7.

10:

God.

Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect it

regarded by the Divine, but not by the hulaw and in another way, it is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine law. Now the mode of virtue consists in three things, as is

man

;

the Philosopher states in the Ethics.^

The

first

man

should act "knowingly", and this subject to the judgment of both Divine and that

is is

or necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver; on which the gloss says:^

law, because what a man does in ignorance he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and Divine law, certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be punishable or pardonable. The second point is that a man should act "deliberately, that is, from choice, choosing that

"Whatever ye

particular action for

Obj.

3.

Further, the

mode

of virtue seems to

consist properly in working willingly

and with

But this falls under a precept of the Divine law, for it is written (Ps. 99. 2) Serve ye the Lord with gladness; and (II Cor. 9. 7): pleasure.

:

Not with sadness

1

Aristotle,

do, do gladly,

11, i

and then you

(1103^3).

226A); on II Cor. 9.7 ustine, Ennar. in Psalm. (PL 37, 11 74). 2

Glossa ordin.

will

(iii

(vi,

72A); Aug-

human

its

los^i 7) V, 8

3

Ethics,

*

Aristotle, x, 9 (ii79*'ii)Aristotle, 11, 4 (1105*31),

6

II,

4

(i

;

(i

own

sake," where a

135^24).

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

2&a[

twofold internal

movement

is

implied, of voli-

and of intention, about which we have spoken above (qq. viii, xii); and concerning these two. Divine law alone, and not human law, is able to judge. For human law does not tion

punish the man who wishes to slay but slays not, whereas the Divine law does, according to Matt. 5. 22: Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment.

The a firm

third point

is

that he should "act from

and immovable principle," which firm-

ness belongs properly to a habit, and implies that the action proceeds this respect, the

mode

from a rooted

habit. In

of virtue does not fall

under the precept either of Divine or of human by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the law who gives due honour to his parents and yet has not the habit of law, since neither

piety.

filial

Reply Obj. i. The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls under the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right, but not that they be done from the habit of justice. Reply Obj. 2. The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the law, and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter itself of the precept, and this is something leading or disposing to virtue, namely, an act of virtue. For the end of the precept and the matter of the precept are not the same, just as neither in other things

is

same as the means to the end. Reply Obj. 3. That works of virtue should be done without sadness falls under the precept of the Divine law, for whoever works with sadness works unwiUingly. But to work with the end the

pleasure, that

is,

joyfully or cheerfully, in one

respect falls under the precept, namely, in so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one's neighbour (which love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure; and in another respect it does not fall under the precept, in so far as pleasure ensues from a habit; for

"pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a habit," as stated in the Ethics} For an act

may

give pleasure either on account of

or through

its

its

end,

proceeding from an appropriate

habit.

Article 10. Whether the Mode of Charity Falls Under the Precept of the Diviiie Law?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article: It would seem that the mode of charity falls under

Objection

1

Aristotle.

11,

3 (1104^3).

For

it is

written (Matt. 19. 17) keep the command-

life,

From this it seems to follow that the observance of the commiandments suffices for entrance into life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into hfe unless they are done ments.

from

charity, for

is

it

written (I Cor. 13. 3): my goods to feed the

// / should distribute all

if I should deliver my body to be burned^ and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment.

poor, and

Obj. 2. Further, the mode of charity consists, properly speaking, in doing all things for God.

But

this falls

under the precept, for the Apostle

says (I Cor. 10. 31) Do all to the glory of God. Therefore the mode of charity falls under the :

precept.

Obj. 3. Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, it follows that one

can

fulfil

the precepts of the law without hav-

Now what can be done without charbe done without grace, which is always united with charity. Therefore one can fulfil the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error of Pelagius, as Augustine declares ceres. Ixxxviii).^ Therefore the mode of (De

ing charity. ity can

H

charity

On ment

is

commandment. Whoever breaks a commandmortally. If therefore the mode of

included in the

the contrary, sins

charity falls under the precept,

it

follows that

whoever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has not charity acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows that whoever has not charity sins mortally in whatever he does, however good this may be in itself, which is absurd. / answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this question.^ For some have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept, and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this precept, because he can dispose himself to receive charity from God. Nor (they say) does it follow that a man not having charity sins mortally whenever he does something good of its kind, because it is an affirmative precept that binds one to act from charity, and is binding not for all time, but only for such time as one is in a state of charity. On the other hand, some have said that the mode of charity

is

altogether outside the precept.

Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of charity can be consid»

the precept of the Divine law.

i.

// thou wilt enter into

PL 42. 47.

«Cf. Albert the Great, In Sent.,

xxvm, 677).

m,

d. 36, a.

6

(BO

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

and ered in two ways. First, as an act by thus it falls under the precept of the law which

Q. loo.

ART.

ii

263

itself,

specially prescribes

the

it,

namely, Thoii shall love shall love thy

Lord thy God, and Thou

neighbour. In this sense, the

first

opinion

is,

accord-

ing as the acts of the other virtues are ordered to

which is the end of the commandment, Tim. i 5 f or it has been said above

charity,

as stated in I

;

.

Reply 3

Reply 3) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of the act ordered to that end. In this sense the second opin(q. XXI, A. I,

ion

is

;

A. 4,

mode

true in saying that the

of charity

under the precept, that is to say that this commandment, Honour thy father, does not mean that a man must honour his father from charity, but merely that he must honour him. Therefore he that honours his father, yet has not charity, does not break this precept, although he does break the precept concerning the act of charity, for which reason he deserves to be punished. Reply Obj. i. Our Lord did not say, // thou wilt enter into life, keep one commandment, but keep all the commandme?its, among which does not

fall

commandment concerning the God and our neighbour. Reply Obj. 2. The precept of charity contains the injunction that God should be loved from included the

is

love of

our vdiole heart, which means that all things would be referred to God. Consequently man

cannot

fulfil

the precept of charity unless he

also refer all things to God. Therefore he that honours his father and mother is bound to honour them from charity, not in virtue of the precept. Honour thy father and mother, but in

virtue of the precept.

thy

God

Thou

shall love the

with thy whole heart.

And

Lord

since these

are two affirmative precepts not binding for

all

times, they can be binding each one at a differ-

ent time, so that fils

it

may happen

that a

man

ful-

the precept of honouring his father and

mother without

at the same time breaking the precept concerning the omission of the mode of

charity.

Reply Obj.

Man

3.

cannot

cepts of the law unless he

which Consequently it of charity,

maintained, for grace.

fulfil all

fulfil

the pre-

the precept

is

impossible without charity.

is

not possible, as Pelagius to fulfil the law without

man

We

true.

is

Because it is not impossible to observe this precept which regards the act of charity, since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he possesses it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, that

Article ii. Whether It Is Right to Distinguish Other Moral Precepts of the Law Besides the Decalogue? proceed thus to the Eleventh Article: It

would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Objection 1. Because, as Our Lord declared (Matt. 21. 40), on these two commandments of charity dependeth the whole law and the prophets. But these two commandments are explained by the ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there is no need for other precepts. 2. Further, the moral precepts are disfrom the judicial and ceremonial precepts, as stated above (q. xcix, aa. 3, 4). But the determinations of the general moral precepts pertain to the judicial and ceremonial precepts, and the general moral precepts are contained in

Obj.

tinct

the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the

decalogue, as stated above (a. 3). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral precepts besides the decalogue.

Obj.

3.

Further, the moral precepts are about

the acts of

all

the virtues, as stated above (a.

2). Therefore, as the

Law

contains, besides the

decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to reh-

and

gion, liberality, mercy,

chastity, so there

should have been added some precepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude, sobriety, and so forth. And yet such is not the case. It is therefore not right to distinguish other moral precepts in the Law besides those of the decalogue.

On

the contrary, It

law of the Lord

But man

is

is

is

written (Ps. 18. 8)

:

The

unspotted, converting souls.

preserved from the stain of sin and

converted to God by other moral precepts besides those of the decalogue. Therefore

his soul

it

was

is

right for the

Law

to include other

moral

precepts.

/ answer that. As is evident from what has been stated (q. xcix, a. 3), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from their institution alone, since before they were instituted it seemed of no consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But the moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural reason, even if they were never included in the Law. Now of these

some are most cerand so evident as to need no promulgation. Such as the commandments of the love of God and our neighbour, and others like these, as stated above (a. 3, a. 4, Reply i), which are, there are three grades: for tain,

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

264

were, the ends of the commandments. Hence no man can have an erroneous judgment

To

about them. Some precepts are more detailed, the reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp. And yet they need to be promulgated, because human judgment, in a few instances, happens to be led astray concerning

according to Deut. 23. ig: Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury ; and the prohibi-

as

it

them. These are the precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of which is not so evident to everyone, but only

These are moral precepts added to by God through Moses and Aaron. But since the things that are evident are the principles by which we know those that are not evident, these other moral precepts added to to the wise.

the decalogue, and given to the people

the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so many corollaries. Thus the first

commandment

of the decalogue forbids the

worship of strange gods, and to

other precepts forbidding things relating to the worship of idols; thus it is written (Deut. 18.

Neither let there be joimd among you 10, 11) anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, neimaking them to pass through the fire: ther let there be any wizard nor charmer, nor :

.

.

The second commandment

dead.

Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag; and universally all prohibitions relating to peculations and larceny. To the eighth commandment, forbidding false testimony, is added the prohibition against false judgment, according to Exod. 23. 2 Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of the most part, to stray from the truth; and the prohibition against lying {ibid. 7) Thou shalt fly lying; and the pro:

:

hibition against detraction, according to Levit.

Thou shalt not be a detractor, nor among the people. To the other two commandments no further precepts are added, 19.

forbids per-

16:

a whisperer

because they forbid

Reply Obj.

i.

all

kinds of evil desires.

The precepts

are ordered to the love of

of the decalogue

God and

our neigh-

bour as pertaining evidently to our duty towards them; but the other precepts are so ordered as pertaining to

Reply Obj.

.

anyofie that consulteth pythofiic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the

is

tion against fraud, according to Deut. 25. 13:

added

this are

commandment which prohibits added the precept forbidding usury,

the seventh

theft,

them 2.

less evidently.

It is in virtue of their institu-

tion that the ceremonial

and

judicial precepts

are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue, not

by reason

of a natural instinct, as in

the case of the superadded moral precepts.

To this is added the prohibition of blasphemy (Levit. 24. 15 seq.) and the prohibition of false doctrine (Deut. 13.). To the third commandment are added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth commandment prescrib-

Reply Obj. 3. The precepts of a law are ordered for the common good, as stated above (q.

honour due to parents is added the precept about honouring the aged, according to Levit. iQ. 32: Rise up before the hoary head, and ho?tour the person of the aged man, and

chastity, in so far as the generative act conduces

jury.

ing the

likewise

all

precepts prescribing the reverence

to be observed towards our betters, or kindli-

ness towards our equals or inferiors.

To

the

fifth commandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of hatred and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbour, according

to Levit. 19. 16:

Thou

shall 7iot stand against

the blood of thy neighbour ; likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother {ibid. 17)

Thou

To

shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart.

the sixth

commandment which

forbids adul-

is added the prohibition about whoredom, according to Deut. 23. 17: There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel; and the pro-

tery,

hibition against unnatural

sins,

according to

Levit 18. 22, 23: Thou shalt not lie with manthou shalt not copulate with any beast. kind .

.

.

xc, A. 2). And since those virtues which direct our conduct towards others pertain directly to

the

common

to the

good, as also does the virtue of

common good

of the species, hence pre-

cepts bearing directly on these virtues are given,

both in the decalogue and

As

to the act of fortitude there are the orders

in addition to

it.

be given by the commanders in the war, which undertaken for the common good, as is clear from Deut. 20. 3, where the priest is commanded Be not afraid, do not give (to speak thus) back. In like manner the prohibition of acts of gluttony is left to paternal admonition, since it is contrary to the good of the household; hence it is said (Deut. 21. 20) in the person of parents He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling, and to debauch-

to is

:

:

ery and banquetings.

Article 12. Whether the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Justified Man?

We

proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:

It

would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man.

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

Objection i. Because the Apostle says (Rom. For not the hearers of the Law are justi2. 13) fied before God^ but the doers of the Law shall :

be justified. But the doers of the

who

fulfil

Law

are those

the precepts of the Law. Therefore

the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of justification. Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Levit. 18. 5)

My

laws and My judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them. But the spiritual life of man is through justice. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause

Keep

Obj.

3.

human

man, since there

is

law.

is more effiBut human law justifies

a kind of justice consisting

in fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the

On 6)

:

Law

the contrary.

The

justified

man.

The Apostle

says (II Cor.

letter killeth, which, according to

{De

3.

Au-

the moral precepts, which are about actions. Therefore the

justify

man by

causing justice.

on the other hand, by understand the execution of the precepts of the

Law

aimed at

in so far as they

which is just, not in itself, but by being a determination of the Divine law. Hence it is said of

men

as they disposed

to the justifying grace of Christ,

which they {Con-

also signified, because as Augustine says

"even the life of that people foretold and foreshadowed Christ." But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must notice that it can be contra Faust, xxii, 24),^

sidered as

it

save through the devotion and obedience of those who complied with them. On the other hand the moral and judicial precepts, either in general or also in particular, contained that is

moral precepts

just in itself; but the

contained that which

is

just in itself according

to that general justice which is every virtue according to the Ethics,^ while the judicial precepts pertained to special justice, which is about

contracts connected with the

human mode

of

between one man and another. Reply Obj. i. The Apostle takes justification

Reply Obj.

The man who

2.

Law

is

fulfilled

said to live in

the

them

because he did not incur the penalty of death, which the Law inflicted on its transgressors. The Apostle quotes this passage in this sense (Gal. 3. 12).

Reply Obj. 3. The precepts of human law man by acquired justice it is not about

justify

this that

;

we

are inquiring now, but only about

that justice which

is

before God.

exists in the habit or in the act, so

that accordingly justification

may

be taken in

QUESTION

two ways. First, according as man is made just by becoming possessed of the habit of justice; secondly, according as he does works of justice, so

man

these precepts that they did not justify

precepts of the

is,

in

offering worship to

for the execution of justice.

was conferred by the precepts

man, but

individually they contained that

note a sign of justice or a disposition to justice. If justice be taken in the last two ways it is it

all

justified

and properly the causing of justice, while secondarily and improperly, as it were, it may de-

of the Law, in so far, that

we

thus

as a whole contained something just in itself,

life,

evident that

justification justice,

various ways. For the ceremonial precepts taken

safeguard of health, so justification means

first

human

moral precepts could not

If,

which

Spir. et Lit. xiv),^ refers

by

justified

works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God. Hence this justice could not be caused by

even to the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts did not cause justice. / answer that. Just as healthy is said properly and first of that which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign or a gustine

4.

265

i

Abraham were

2: //

;

Further, the Divine law

precepts of the

ART.

Q. loi.

Rom.

God but taken

of justification.

cacious than

to

that in this sense justification

is

themselves

nothing

than the execution of justice. Now justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or the infused virtue, as is clear from what has been stated (q. lxiii, a. 4). The acquired virtue is caused by works; but the infused virtue is caused by God Himself through His grace. The latter is true justice, of which we are speaking now, and in respect of which a man is said to be just before God, according

CI

Of the ceremonial precepts in {In Four Articles)

else

1

»

PL 44, 215. PL 42, 417.

We must now consider the ceremonial precepts. And

first

we must

consider

secondly, their cause

(q.

them cii)

;

in themselves

thirdly, their

duration (q. cm). Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i) The nature of the ceremonial precepts; (2) Whether they are figurative? (3) Whether there should have been many of them? (4) Of their various kinds. 'Aristotle, V,

I

(1129^30).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

266

are not those which pertain to the worship

Article

Whether

i.

the

Nature of the Cere-

of God.

in Their Pertaining

monial Precepts Consists to the Worship of God?

On

the contrary, It

is

written (Exod. 18. 19,

20) Be thou to the people in those things that pertain to God and shew the people the :

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to the worship of God.i Objectio7i I. Because, in the Old Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence from food (Levit. ii.) and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes, for example (Levit. 19. 19) Thou shall not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts; and again :

38): To make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments. But these are not moral precepts, since they do not remain

(Num.

in the

15.

New

Law. Nor are they

judicial precepts,

.

.

.

.

.

.

ceremonies and the manner of worshipping. I answer that, As stated above (q. xcix, a. 4), the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts by which man is directed to God, just as the judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts by which he is

directed to his neighbour.

rected to

God by

Now man

the worship due to

is

di-

Him.

Therefore those precepts are properly called ceremonial which pertain to the Divine worship.

The reason

for their being called so

was

given above {ibid., A. 3), when we established the distinction between the ceremonial and the

since they do not pertain to the pronouncing of

other precepts.

judgment between man and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in no way to pertain to the worship of God.

Reply Obj. i. The Divine worship includes not only sacrifices and the like, which seem to

Therefore the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to Divine Worship.

by which His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him; thus too in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the end comes under the science whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which regard the clothing and food of God's worshippers, and other such matters, pertain to a certain preparation of the ministers, with the view of fitting them for the Divine worship, just as those

Ohj.

some

Further,

2.

state that the cere-

monial precepts are those which pertain to solemnities, as though they were so called from the cerei (candles) which are lit up on those

many

occasions.^

But

solemnities

pertain

other

besides

things

the worship

to

of

God.

be directed to

God

immediately, but also those

things

who

the Divine worship.

administer to a king make use of certain observances. Consequently such are contained under the ceremonial precepts.

Obj. 3. Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are norms, that is, rules, of salvation, because the Greek xcitpe is the same as the Latin

Reply Obj. 2. The alleged explanation of the name does not seem very probable, especially as the Law does not contain many instances

does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their pertaining to

Therefore

salve.

But

it

all

the precepts of the

Law

are rules

special

of the lighting of candles in solemnities, since

of salvation, and not only those that pertain

even the lamps of the Candlestick were fur-

God. Therefore not only those precepts which pertain to the Divine worship

nished with

are called ceremonial.

taining to the Divine worship were

to the worship of

Obj.

4.

Perplex,

Further, Rabbi

iii)^

that "the ceremonial precepts are

those for which there

But there

is

Moses says (Doct.

is

no evident reason."

evident reason for

many

things

pertaining to the worship of God, such as the

observance of the Sabbath, the feasts of the Passover and of the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason for which is set down in the Law. Therefore the ceremonial precepts 1

Cf. Albert the Great.

19); Cicero,

De Nat.

In

Deor.,

Sent., iv, d.

11,

28

(DD

i,

a. 7

iv, 124);

(BO xxix. De Invent.^

li,5,^(DDr, 165). «

Albert, In

.Sent., iv, d. i, A. 7

•Chap. 28 (FR 314).

(BO xxix,

18).

2.

oil

Nevertheless

of olives, as stated in Levit. 24. we may say that all things per-

more

care-

observed on solemn festivals, so that all ceremonial precepts may be included under the observance of solemnities. Reply Obj. 3. Neither does this explanation of the name appear to be very much to the fully

point, since the

but Latin.

word "ceremony"

We may

is

not Greek

say, however, that, since

man's salvation is from God those precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation which direct man to God. And accordingly those which refer to Divine worship are called ceremonial precepts.

Reply Obj. 4. This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a certain amount of prob-

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

not that they are called ceremonial precisely because there is no evident reason for them, bat rather this is a kind of consequence. For since the precepts referring to the

ability;

Divine worship must be figurative, as we shall state further on (a. 2), the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very evident.

Article 2. Whether the Cere?nonial Precepts Are Figurative?

We

proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not figurative. Objection i. For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in such a way as to be easily understood, as Augustine states,^ and this seems very necessary in the framing of a law because precepts of law are proposed to the populace, for which reason "a law should be manifest," as Isidore declares (Etym. v, 21).^ therefore

If

the precepts

of

given as figures of something,

the it

Law were

seems

that

fied.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is done for the worship of God, should be entirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions in representation of others seems to savour of the theatre or of poetry, because formerly the actions performed in theatres were done to represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such things should not be done for the worship of God. But the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship, as stated above (a. i). Therefore they should not be figurative. Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchirid. iii, iv)^ that "God is worshipped chiefly by faith,

hope, and charity." But the precepts of hope and charity are not figurative. There-

fore

the

faith,

ceremonial precepts should not be

figurative.

Obj. 4. Further, Our Lord said (John 4. 24) is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must :

God

adore Him in spirit and in truth. But a figure not the very truth: in fact one is divided against the other. Therefore the ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine worship, should not be figurative.

is

On

the contrary.

The Apostle says

(Coloss.

judge you in meat 17) Let no man or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or 2, 16,

*

.

Christian Doctrine, iv,

PL 82, 3 PL 40, 2

:

203;

II,

10

232,233.

(PL

8,

.

.

10 (PL 34, 98, 99).

82, 131).

ART.

267

2

or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come. I answer that. As stated above (a. i; q.

xcix, AA. 3, 4), the ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now the Divine worship

is

twofold: interior, and

For since man

is composed of soul and body, each of these should be applied to the worship of God, the soul by an interior worship, the body by an outward worship hence it is written (Ps. 83. 3) My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God. And as the body

external.

;

:

is

God through

ordered to

ward worship

the soul so the out-

ordered to the internal worship. Now interior worship consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect and affections.

in

is

Therefore according to the various ways

which the

intellect

who worships God

and

affections of the

man

are rightly united to God,

his external actions are applied in various

ways

to the Divine worship.

For

unfit-

Moses should have delivered these precepts without explaining what they signiting

Q. loi.

new moon^

of the

human

in

the state of future happiness, the

on the Divine Truth Therefore the external worship will not consist in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of God, proceeding from the inward knowledge and affection, according to Isa. 51. 3: Joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of praise. But in the present state of life we are unable to gaze upon the Divine Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Divine light to shine upon us under the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states; in various ways, however, according to the various states of human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine Truth manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to that manifestation as yet opened out, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 9. 8). Hence the external worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not only of the future truth to be manifested in our heavenly country, but also of Christ, Who is the way leading to that heavenly truth. But under the New Law this way is already revealed, and therefore it needs no longer to be foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds as something past or present; and the truth of the glory to come, which is not yet revealed, alone needs to be foreshadowed. This is what the Apostle says (Heb. 10. i) The Law has (Vulg., having) a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things, for a shadow is less than an image, so that the image belongs to the New Law, but the shadow to the intellect will gaze

in Itself.

—

Old.

:

—

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

268

The

God

are not to except in proportion to his capacity, otherwise he would be in danger of downfall were he to despise what he cannot

Reply Obj

be revealed to

Hence

grasp.

I.

things of

man

was more

it

beneficial that the

Divine mysteries should be revealed to primitive people under a veil of figures that thus they might know them at least implicitly by using those figures to the honour of God. Reply Obj. 2. Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical expressions because they are lacking in truth, so does it fail to grasp Divine things perfectly on account of the sublimity of the truth they contain. And therefore in both cases there

is

need of signs by means of sen-

sible figures.

Reply Obj.

Augustine

3.

is

speaking there of

internal worship, to which, however, external worship should be ordered, as stated above.

The same answer jection, because

to practise

Ob-

applies to the Fourth

men were

taught by Christ

more perfectly the

spiritual

wor-

worship

God

in spirit

and

in truth ^ as stated in

Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts. On the contrary, It is written (Osee 8. 12): hifn) My mani/ shall write to them (Vulg., fold laws; and (Job 11. 6): That He might

John

4.

show

thee the secrets of His wisdom, and that

His

Law

23.

is

manifold.

As

I answer that. i) every law

stated above (q. xcvi., a.

given to a people.

is

Now

a peo-

two kinds of men. Some are prone to evil, and have to be coerced by the precepts of the law, as stated above (q. xcv, a. i) some are inclined to good, either from nature or from custom, or rather from grace, and these have to be taught and improved by means of the pre-

ple contains

;

cepts of the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of men it was expedient that the Old Law should contain many ceremonial precepts. For in that people there were many prone to idolatry,

and therefore

them by means

was

it

necessar>' to recall

of ceremonial precepts

from

the worship of idols to the worship of God.

ship of God.

since men served idols in many ways, it was necessary on the other hand to devise many means of repressing every single one and again, to lay many obligations on such men in order

And Article

Many

3.

Whether There Should Have Been

Cerefnonial Precepts?

;

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.

that being burdened, as

were, by their duties

it

to the Divine worship, they might have no time

As to those who were inwas again necessary that there

Objection i. For those things which lead to an end should be proportionate to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as stated above (aa. I, 2), are ordered to the worship of God, and to the foreshadowing of Christ. Now there is

for the service of idols.

and but one God, of Whom are all things, one Lord Jesus Christy by Whom are all things (I Cor. 8. 6). Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.

the mystery of Christ, which was foreshadowed by these ceremonial precepts, brought many benefits to the v;orld, and afforded men many considerations, which needed to be signified by

.

Obj.

Further, the great

2.

number

.

.

of the cere-

monial precepts was an occasion of transgression, according to the words of Peter (Acts 15. 10): Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have beefi able to bear? the transgression of the Divine precepts

Now is

an

obstacle to man's salvation. Since, therefore, every law should conduce to man's salvation,

seems that the ceremonial precepts should not have been given in great number. as Isidore says

Obj.

3.

{Etym.

v, 3),^ it

Further, the ceremonial precepts re-

ferred to the outward and bodily worship of

God, as stated above (a. 2). But the Law should have lessened this bodily worship: since it directed »

PL 82.

men

to Christ,

109: n, 10

(PL

Who

82. igg).

taught them to

clined to good,

should be

it

many

ceremonial precepts; both be-

cause thus their mind was turned to

many

God

in

ways, and more diligently, and because

various ceremonies.

Reply Obj. to an

end

is

i.

WTien that which

sufficient to lead to

is

it,

ordered

then one

such thing suffices for one end; thus one remedy, if it be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore man to health, and then the remedy needs not to be repeated. But when that which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs to be multiplied thus many remedies are given :

to a sick

him.

Now

man when one

is

not enough to heal

the ceremonies of the Old

weak and imperfect, both

Law were

for representing the

mystery of Christ, on account of its surpassing excellence, and for subjugating men's minds to God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 7. 18, 19) There is a setting aside of the former coinmandment because of the weakficss and tmprofitablemss theieof, for the law brought nothing to

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

Consequently these ceremonies needed to be in great number. Reply Obj. 2. A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser transgressions that the greater may be perfection.

And

avoided.

therefore, in order to avoid the

and the pride which would arise Jews were they to fulfil all the precepts of the Law, the fact that they would in consequence find many occasions of disobedience did not prevent God from giving sin of idolatry,

in the hearts of the

them many ceremonial precepts. Reply Obj. 3. The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways. Thus it forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any person.

Many

such things did it enact for the lessening of bodily worship, as Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex, iii).^ Nevertheless it was necessary not to attenuate the bodily worship of

away

God

so

much

as to allow

men

to fall

into the worship of idols.

ART.

Q. loi.

269

4

and judgments and ceremonies. Therefore the observances should not be considered as a part of the ceremonies.

Obj. 5. Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the ceremonial, since they were a shadow of things to come (Coloss. 2. 16,

and the same may be said of the oblations as appears from the words of the Apostle (Heb. 9. 9) and yet these do not seem to be included in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above division of ceremonies is 17)

:

and

gifts,

;

unsuitable.

On

the contrary, In the Old

above

is

called a ceremony.

(Num.

are called ceremonies shall offer a calf

.

.

Law

.

each of the

For the 15.

and the

sacrifices

They

24):

and Of

sacrifices

libations thereof, as the ceremonies require.

the sacrament of Order

it is written (Levit. 7. This is the anointing of Aaron and his 35) sons in the ceremonies. Of sacred things also it is written (Exod. 38. 21) These are the instru:

:

Article 4. Whether the Ceremonies of the Old Law Are Suitably Divided into Sacrifices, Sacred Things^ Sacraments, and Observances?

We

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law

ments of the tabernacle of the testimony in the ceremonies of the Levites.

the observances

you

.

.

.

it is

shall turn

And

.

.

.

again of

written (III Kings

9.

6)

:

//

away from following Me, and

which Christ delivered Himself an oband a sacrifice to God (Eph. 5. 2). Therefore none but the sacrifices were ceremonies. Obj. 2. Further, the Old Law was ordered to the New. But in the New Law the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in the Old Law there should be no distinction between sacrifices and sacraments. Obj. 3. Further, a sacred thing is something dedicated to God, in which sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be consecrated. But all the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the worship of God, as stated above (a. i). Therefore all ceremonies were sacred things. There-

not observe (Douay, keep) My ceremonies which I have set before you. I answer that, As stated above (aa. 1,2), the ceremonial precepts are ordered to the Divine worship. Now in this worship we may consider the worship itself, the worshippers, and the instruments of worship. The worship consists specially in sacrifices, which are offered up in honour of God. The instruments of worship refer to the sacred things, such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. With regard to the worshippers two points may be considered. The first point is their preparation for Divine worship, which is effected by a sort of consecration either of the people or of the ministers; and to this the sacraments refer. The second point is their particular mode of Hfe, whereby they are distinguished from those who do not worship God, and to this pertain the observances; for instance, in matters of food, clothing, and so

fore sacred things should not be taken as a part

forth.

are unsuitably divided into sacrifices, sacred

sacraments and observances} Objection i. For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done thijigs,

only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed the sacrifice in

lation

4.

Further, Observances are so called

from having to be observed. But all the precepts Law had to be observed, for it is written (Deut. 8. 11): Observe (Douay, Take heed) and beware lest at any time thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His commandments of the

1

Chap. 32 (FR 32s).

*

CI. Peter

chap. 4

Lombard,

(QR II,

746).

.

Reply Obj.

of the ceremonies.

Obj.

will

Sent., rv, d. i, chap. 6

(QR 11,

748),

rifices to

i.

It

.

.

was necessary for the

sac-

be offered both in some certain place

and by some certain men, and all this pertained to the worship of God. Therefore just as their sacrifices signified Christ the victim, so too their

sacraments and sacred things foreshadowed the sacraments and sacred things of the New Law, while their observances foreshadowed the mode of life of the people under the New Law all of

—

which things pertain to Christ.

:

SUMMA TEEOLOGICA

27©

Reply Obj.

2.

The

sacrifice of the

New Law,

namely, the Eucharist, contains Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification; for He sanctified the people by His own blood (Heb. 13. 12). Hence this Sacrifice is also a sacrament.

Article

i

.

Whether There Was Any Cause

for the Ceremonial Precepts?

We proceed thus to the First Article: seem that there was no cause

would

It

for the ceremonial

Old Law did not conforeshadowed Him; hence they are not called sacraments. In order to signify this there were certain sacraments apart from the sacrifices of the Old Law, which sacraments were figures of the sanctification to come.

precepts.

Nevertheless to certain consecrations certain

based on reason." But if the observances of the Old Law were based on reason, it would have been useless to void them by the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore there was no reason for the ceremonial observances of

But the

sacrifices of the

tain Christ, but

sacrifices

were united.

Reply Obj. 3. The sacrifices and sacraments were of course sacred things. But certain things were sacred through being dedicated to the Divine worship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments. Therefore they retained the common designation of sacred things. Reply Obj. 4. Those things which pertained to the

God

mode

of hfe of the people

retained the

common

who worshipped

designation of ob-

servances, in so far as they

fell

short of the

above. For they were not called sacred things because they had no immediate connection with the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its

vessels had.

But by a

sort of consequence

they were matters of ceremony, in so far as they affected the fitness of the people who worshipped God.

Reply Obj. 5. Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed place, so were they offered at fixed times, for which reason the solemn festivals

seem

things.

lo be

The

reckoned among the sacred

oblations and gifts are counted to-

gether with the sacrifices; hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5. i) Every high-priest taken from :

ordained for men in things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts

among men^ and

is

sacrifices.

QUESTION

CXI

cere-

cause for the ceremonial precepts? (2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal

Mak-

by substituting

evangelical precepts, which are

is,

the Old Law.

Law succeeded the law of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason save that man's obedience might be tested, as Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. viii, 6, 13),^ concerning the prohibition about the tree of life. Therefore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the purpose of testing man's obedience, having no reason in themObj.

Further, the Old

2.

law of nature. But

in the

selves.

Obj. 3. Further, man's works are called moral according as they proceed from reason. If therefore there is any reason for the ceremonial precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts. It seems therefore that there

was no

cause for the ceremonial precepts, for the reason of a precept is taken from some cause.

On

the contrary. It

The commandment of

is

the

written (Ps. 18. 9) is lightsome, en-

Lord

But the ceremonial preof God. Therefore they are lightsome, and yet they would not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause. / answer that, Since, according to the Philos-

lightening the eyes. cepts are

commandments

it is

things in

the function of a wise

man

to set

those things which proceed

order,

(Rom.

13. i).

Now

there

well ordered. First, that they be ordered to their

due end, which

is

the principle of the whole

order in matters of action, since those things that happen by chance outside the intention of the end, or which are not done seriously but for

causes of the sacrifices.

(4) The causes of the sacraments. (5) The causes of the sacred things. (6) The causes of the observances.

15,

are two conditions required for things to be

monial precepts, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether there was any

The

decrees, that

as the Apostle states

(In Six Articles)

or figurative? (3)

2.

from the Divine wisdom must be well ordered,

precepts

must now consider the causes of the

Because on Ephes.

I.

as to the carnal observances,

opher,^

Of the causes of the ceremonial

We

Objectioji

ing void the law of the commandments, the gloss says,^ "that is, making void the Old Law

^Glossa

(vi,

intcrl.

giv); Glossa Lombardi (PL 192,

185). »

PL 34. 377; 383.

»

Metaphysics,

i,

2

(982*18).

PART

I

OF SECOND PART

fun, are said to be lacking in order. Secondly,

that which

done

is

in

view of the end should be

proportionate to the end.

From

this it follows

that the reason for whatever leads to the end

is

taken from the end; thus the reason for the disposition of a saw is taken from cutting, which end, as stated in the Physics}

is its

Now

it is

evident that the ceremonial precepts, like

all

Q. 102.

the Passover

ART,

2

271

written (Exod. 13. 9) /^ shall be as a sign in thy hand, and as a memorial it is

:

much more did the ceremonial precepts have none but a

before thy eyes. Therefore other

figurative reason.

Obj.

2.

cause.

its

Further, an effect

But

all

is

proportionate to

the ceremonial precepts are

figurative, as stated

above

(q. ci, a. 2).

There-

the other precepts of the Law, were institutions

fore they have no other than a figurative cause.

wisdom; hence it is written (Deut. is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations. Consequently we must say that the ceremonial precepts were ordered to a certain end, from which their reasonable

Obj. 3. Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a certain thing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or not, it seems that it has not a literal cause. Now there are

of Divine

6)

4.

:

This

causes can be gathered.

Reply Obj. i. It may be said that there was no reason for the observances of the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in the very nature of the thing done; for instance that a garment should not be made of wool and linen. But there could be a reason for them in their relation to something else, namely, in so far as something was signified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the decrees of the New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and the love of God, are reasonable from the very nature of the act. Reply Obj. 2. The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil. And yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something else, since it signified

something.

And

precepts of the Old

so

also

Law were

the

ceremonial

reasonable on

account of their relation to something else. Reply Obj. 3. The moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable causes, as for instance, Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not steal. But the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to something else, as stated above.

Article

2.

Whether the Ceremonial Precepts or Merely a

Have a Literal Cause Figurative Cause?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a Hteral but merely a figurative cause. Objection i. For among the ceremonial pre-

^, on account of the fear of future punishment. But the damned are undergoing these punishments, so that they abhor them yet more. Therefore, much more are they restrained from blaspheming.

very great sin, through belonging to the same genus as unbehef and being an aggra-

also, is a

the

We

in

it

man

3)

shall

clear

acquires neither merit

Reply Obj. i. If we compare murder and blasphemy as regards the objects of those sins, it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin committed directly against God, is more grave than murder, which is a sin against one's neighbour. On the other hand, if we compare them in respect of the harm wrought by them, murder is the graver sin, for murder does more harm to ones neighbour than blasphemy does to God. Since, however, the gravity of a sin depends on

they blasphemed the name of God, Who hath power over these plagues, and a gloss on these words says^ that "those who are in hell, though aware that they are deservedly punished, will

the intention of the perverse will, rather than

nevertheless complain that

on the

effect of the deed, as

(Part l-II,

Q.

Lxxiii, A. 8),

was shown above it

follows that, as

nor sin which he did not already possess in this life. Now many will be damned who were not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore, will they blaspheme in the life to come.

On

the co7itrary, It

blasphemy

in

Reply Obj. 2. A gloss on the words. Let blasphemy be put away from you (Eph. 4. 31) says: "Blasphemy is worse than perjury."^ The

away from God's

.

it

God

Now

so powerful

is

would be and conse-

this

their present state,

quently

.

written (Apoc. 16. 9): great heat, and

them thus."

as to torture

the blasphemer intends to do harm to God's honour, absolutely speaking he sins more grievously than the murderer. Nevertheless murder takes precedence, as to punishment, among sins committed against our neighbour. .

is

The men were scorched with

be in their future state.

will also

/ answer that.

As

stated above (aa.

testation of the Divine goodness

the notion of blasphemy.

Now

hell retain their perverse will

is

those

is

are in

turned

they love the

things for which they are punished,

them

3), de-

who

which

justice, since

i,

necessary to

would wish

(PL

191,

they could, and hate the punishments inflicted on them for those same sins.

700); Cassiodorus, Expos, in Psalt., super Ps. 74.4

(PL

They

^

Glossa ordin. (in, iq;B); Glossa Lombardi

70, 537). ^ *

Glossa ordin. (iv, 38E). Glossa ordin. (vi, 95B); Augustine, Contra Mendac.,

Chap. 19 (PL

40. S4s).

to use

if

regret indeed the sins which they have committed, not because they hate them, but because they are punished for them. According*

Glossa ordin. (vi, 266A).

PART ly this detestation of the

II

OF SECOND PART

Divine justice

is

will

ART,

Q. 14.

certain malice

i

447

And

credible that after the resurrection they

weakness; but the sin against the Holy Ghost

them, the interior blasphemy of the heart. it

in

divided against sin committed through ignorance, and sin committed through

is,

blaspheme God with the tongue, even as

Him

with their voices. Reply Obj. i. In the present life men are deterred from blasphemy through fear of punishment which they think they can escape. But in the saints will praise

hell the

damned have no hope

divided against the sin against the Son of

is

Man the

(Matt.

mitted

is

through

Obj.

Therefore the sin against not the same as the sin com-

12. 32).

Holy Ghost

whose opposites

of escape, so

they are borne towards whatever their perverse will suggests to them. Reply Obj. 2. Merit and demerit pertain to

is

certain differ,

Further,

3.

malice,

since

things

are themselves different.

The

sin against the

Holy

that, in despair,

Ghost

the state of a wayfarer, and so good

terminate species. But sin committed through certain malice is not a special kind of sin, but a condition or general circumstance of sin, which can affect any kind of sin at all. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same

torious in them, while evil

is

the blessed, on the other hand, good

meritorious but

is

meri-

is

demeritorious. In is

not

Hapthe damned, evil

part of their reward of

manner, in is not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damnation. Reply Obj. 3. Whoever dies in mortal sin bears with him a will that detests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in this respect there can be blasphemy in him. piness.

And,

in like

GHOST

We must now consider in particular blasphemy Holy Ghost, under which head there Whether blasthe sin against the Holy Ghost is the

against the

are four points of inquiry: (i)

same as the sin committed through certain mahce? (2) Of the species of this sin. (3) Whether it cannot be forgiven? (4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost before committing other sins? Article i. Whether the Sin Against the Holy Ghost Is the Same as the Sin Committed Through Certain Malice?

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice.

Objection is

1.

Because the

sin against the

own

de-

committed through certain malice. The Master says (2 Sent., d. 43)^ that to sin against the Holy Ghost is "to as the sin

On

the contrary,

take pleasure in the malice of sin for its own sake." Now this is to sin through certain malice.

Therefore it seems that the sin committed through certain malice is the same as the sin against the Holy Ghost. / answer that, Three meanings have been

nasius (Super Matt. 12. 32),^ Hilary (Can.

Holy

the sin of blasphemy, according to

Matt. 12. 32. But not every sin committed through certain malice is a sin of blasphemy, since many other kinds of sin may be committed through certain malice. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice. Obj. 2. Further, The sin committed through

xii

Ambrose

(Super Luc. 12. 10, Whosoever speaketh a word, etc.),^ Jerome (Super Matt. 12),^ and Chrysostom (Horn. xU in Matt.),^ say that the sin against the Holy Ghost is literally to utter a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, whether by Holy Spirit we understand the essential name applicable to the whole Trinity, each Person of which is a Spirit and is holy, or the personal name of one of the Persons of the Trinity. In the latter sense blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is distinct from blasphemy against the Son of Man (Matt. 12. Matt.),^

in

(In Four Articles)

Ghost

its

Ghost. For the earlier doctors, namely Atha-

Of blasphemy against the holy

or

a generic sin, having

given to the sin or blasphemy against the Holy

QUESTION XIV

phemy

is itself

32), for Christ did certain things in respect of human nature, by eating, drinking, and the

His

while He did others in respect of His Godhead, by casting out devils, raising the dead, and the like, which things He did both by like actions,

own Godhead and by the operHoly Ghost, of Whom He was full, according to His human nature. Now the Jews began by speaking blasphemy against the Son of Man, when they said (Matt. 11. 19) that He was a glutton, ... a w-ine drinker, and a friend the

power

of His

ation of the

of publicans; but afterwards they blasphemed against the Holy Ghost, when they ascribed to the prince of devils those works which Christ 1

Chap.

I

(QR I,

PL 9, 989. 5 PL 26, 83. 3

533).

Two

{In

demands

perhaps because envy manifestly arises from vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either by Isidore^ or by Cassian

{De

to joy in his evil.

its

should have some principal reason for

itself the origin of several

is not directly the same as envy, but is a result of it, because grief over our neighbour's good which is envy, gives rise

another's misfortune

seem that discord

not a

is

Is a Si?i?

the First Article: It would sin.

For to be in disaccord with man is to sever oneself from another's will. But this does not seem to be a sin, because God's will alone, and not our neighbour's, is the rule of our own will. Therefore discord is not a sin. Objection

Obj.

2

i.

Further,

sin, sins also

Whoever induces another

himself. But

it

to

appears not to be

a sin to incite others to discord, for

it is

writ-

knowing that the one part were Sadducees, and the other Pharten (Acts 23. 6) that Paul,

out in the council: Men brethren, I a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope and resurrection of the dead I am

isees, cried

am

called in question.

And when

he had so said,

there arose a dissension betweeft the Pharisees

and the Sadducees. Therefore discord

is

not a

sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Sin, especially mortal sin, not to be found in a holy man. But discord to be found even among holy men, for it

is is is

There arose a dissension between Paul and Barnabas, so that they departed one from another. Therefore discord is not a sin, and least of all a mortal sin. written (Acts 15. 39)

0« the

contrary, Dissensions, that

are reckoned 5.

among

20), of which

that they the sin.

:

it is

is,

discords,

the works of the flesh (Gal. said afterwards {verse 21)

who do such

things shall not obtain

kingdom of God. Now nothing, save mortal excludes man from the kingdom of God.

Therefore discord is a mortal sin. / answer that, Discord is opposed to concord.

PART

II

OF SECOND PART

Now,

as stated above (q. xxix, a. 3) concord results from charity, in so far as charity joins

many

hearts together in one thing, which

is

Divine good, secondarily, the good of our neighbour. Therefore discord is a sin, in so far as it is opposed to this concord. But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed by discord in two ways: first, dichiefly the

rectly, secondly, accidentally.

and movements are said

Now, human

acts

to be direct (per se)

when they

are according to one's intention. Therefore a man directly is in disaccord with his neighbour when he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine good and his neighbour's good, to which he ought to consent. This is a mortal sin in respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity, although the first movements of such discord are venial sins by reason of their being imperfect acts.

The

accidental in

human

acts

is

that which

Hence when, sevgood pertaining to God's honour, or our neighbour's profit, while one thinks a certain thing good, and another thinks conoccurs beside the intention.

eral intend a

trariwise, the discord

is

in this case accidentally

contrary to the Divine good or that of our

Q. 37.

ART.

2

571

be him that soweth discord among brethren. On the other hand, to arouse a discord by which an evil concord (that is, concord in an evil will) is destroyed, is praiseworthy. In this way Paul was to be commended for sowing discord among those who agreed together in evil, because Our Lord also said of Himself (Matt. 10. 34) / came not to send peace, but the sword. Reply Obj. 3. The discord between Paul and Barnabas was accidental and not direct, because each intended some good, yet the one thought one thing good, while the other thought something else, which was owing to ciency;

human

defi-

controversy was not about

for that

necessary to salvation. Moreover was ordained by Divine providence on count of the good which would ensue.

things this

Article

Whether Discord

2.

Is a

all

ac-.

Daughter

of Vainglory?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that discord is not a daughter of vainglory.

Objection

1.

Now

For anger

is

a vice distinct

from

apparently the daughter of anger, according to Prov. 15. 18: A pas-

vainglory.

discord

is

is neither sinful nor be accompanied by an error about things necessary to salvation, or by undue obstinacy, since it has also been stated above (q. xxix, aa. 1,3, Reply 2) that the concord which is an effect of charity is union of wills, not of opinions. It follows from this that discord is sometimes the sin of one party only, for instance, when one wills a good which the other knowingly resists; while sometimes it implies sin in both parties, as when each dis-

sionate man stirreth up strifes. Therefore it is not a daughter of vainglory. Obj. 2. Further, Augustine expounding the

from the other's good, and loves his o^^Tl. Reply Obj. i. One man's will considered in itself is not the rule of another man's will but

such is discord, because Jerome in commenting on Matt. 12. 25, Every kingdom divided against

neighbour. Such discord against charity, unless

it

sents

;

in so

far as our neighbour's will adheres to

God's

will, it

becomes

according

in consequence, a rule

its proper measure. Therefore it is a sin to be in disaccord with such a will, because by that very fact one is in disaccord with the Divine rule. Reply Obj. 2. Just as a man's will that adheres to God is a right rule, to disaccord with which is a sin, so too a man's will that is opposed to God is a perverse rule, to disaccord with which is good. Hence to cause a discord by which a good concord resulting from charity is destroyed, is a grave sin; hence it is

regulated

written

(Prov.

6.

to

16)

:

Six things there are,

which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth, which seventh is stated (verse 19) to

7. 39, As yet the Spirit was not given, says (Tract, xxxii)^ "MaHce severs, char-

words of John ity unites."

Now

discord

is

none other than a

separation of wills. Therefore discord arises

from malice, that

envy, rather than from

is,

vainglory.

Obj. evils,

3.

Further, Whatever gives rise to

would seem

itself shall

be

to be a capital vice.

made

many

Now

desolate, says:^ "Just as

concord makes small things thrive, so discord brings the greatest things to ruin." Therefore discord should itself be accounted a capital vice, rather than a daughter of vainglory. On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral, xxxi, 45).^ / answer that. Discord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so far, namely, as one man's will holds fast to one thing, while the other man's will holds fast to something else. Now if a man's will holds fast to its own ground,

due to the fact that he prefers what is to that which belongs to others, and if he do this inordinately, it is due to pride and this is

his

1

3

own

PL 35, 1646. PL 76, 621.

2

PL

26, 82; cf. Sallu3t, Jugurth.

SUMMA TnEOLOGICA

572

whereby a man own way of thinking, and departs

vainglory. Therefore discord,

holds to his

from that of others,

reckoned to be a daugh-

is

ter of vainglory.

Reply Obj.

:

Strife

i.

not the same as dis-

is

cord, for strife consists in external deeds,

so

it

fitting that

is

which

and

should arise from anger,

it

mind

incites the

to hurt one's neighbour;

discord however consists in a divergence in the

movements

from pride

of wills, which arises

or vainglory, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. that which

we may

In discord

2.

consider

the term from which, that

is

be pleased that his neighbour commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (Philip, i. 17): Some out of contentio7i preach Christ, and afterwards he says {verse 18) In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice. Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.

is,

an-

from which we recede, and in this from envy; and again we may consider that which is the term to which, that is, something of our own to which we cling, and in this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment the term to which is more important than the term from which (because the end is of more account than the beginning), discord is accounted a daughter of vainglory rather than of envy, though it may arise from both for different reasons, as stated. Reply Obj. 3. The reason why concord makes

Obj. 3. Further, It happens that people contend either in the courts or in disputations, with-

out any spiteful purpose, and with a good intention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with heretics. Hence a gloss on I

Kings 14. I. It come to pass one day, etc. says.^ "CathoHcs do not raise contentions with herethey are

unless

challenged to dis-

other's will

tics

respect

pute." Therefore contention

it

arises

small things thrive, while discord brings the greatest to ruin, is because the more united a force

the stronger

is,

it is

xvii).^

Hence

it

is

while the more disbecomes (De Causis.

it is,

the weaker

united

it

evident that this

the proper effect of discord which

is

is

part of

a disunion

first

is

not a mortal

sin.

Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according to Job 39. 32 Shall he that

Obj.

4.

:

contendeth with God be so easily silenced? And yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the

Lord said of him {ibid. 42. 7) You have not spoken the thing that is right before me, as my servant lob hath. Therefore contention is not always a mortal sin. :

On

the contrary, It

who

is

against the precept of

Contend 2. 14) not in words. Moreover (Gal. 5. 20) contention is included among the works of the fiesh, and as the Apostle

says (II Tim.

stated there {verse 21) they

:

who do such

things

kingdom of God. Now whatman from the kingdom of God

shall not obtain the

ever excludes a

and

is

against a precept,

of wills,

and in no way indicates that other vices arise from discord, as though it were a

fore contention

capital vice.

some

is

/ answer that.

is

a

mortal

sin.

There-

a mortal sin.

To contend

is

to tend against

one. Therefore just as discord denotes a

contrariety of wills, so contention signifies con-

QUESTION XXXVIII

trariety of speech.

{In

Two

For

this reason

when

a

man

contrasts various contrary things in a speech,

Of contention

this is called

Articles)

'^

contentio ," which Tully calls one

ad Heren. iv, where he says that "it consists in developing a speech from contrary things, for instance: Adulation has a pleasant beginning, and a most of the rhetorical colours {Rhet.

We

must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether contention is a mortal sin? (2) Whether

it is

a daughter of vainglory?

15),^

bitter end."

Now

Article

i.

Whether Contention

Is a

Mortal

Sin?

We proceed

thus to the First Article: It seems

that contention

spiritual in

is

not a mortal

i.

them, according to Luke

was also a strife amongst the which of them should .

Therefore contention Obj.

tion,

sin.

For there is no mortal sin in men, and yet contention is to be found

Objection

2.

»Sect. 16

Further,

(BA

No

179.13).

is

.

And

we must

praised.

As

whether

his

not a mortal

well disposed

sin.

man

should

consider whether he contends is to be blamed, and then he should be the manner, we must consider

or against falsehood,

there

be the greatest.

first

against the truth, and then he

disciples of Jesus,

22. 24:

.

may be looked at with regard to the intention of the contentious party; secondly, with regard to the manner of contending. As to the intencontrariety of speech

two ways:

in

to

manner

of contending is in keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would be praiseworthy; hence Tully ^

Glossa ordin.

>DDi,S7.

(11,

77A).

PART says (Rhet. ad Heren.

iii,

II

OF SECOND PART

13)^ that "contention

a sharp speech suitable for proof and refuta-

is

tion"; or whether

it

exceeds the demands of

the persons and matter in dispute, in which case

blameworthy. Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the truth and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose defines contention: "Contention is a disclaimer of the truth with clamorous confidence." If, however, contention denote a disavowal of what is false, with the proper measure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy; but if it denote a disavowal of falsehood, together with an inordinate manner, it can be a venial sin, unless perhaps the contention be conducted so inordinately as to give scandal to others. Hence the Apostle after saying (II Tim. 2. 14) Contend not in words, adds, for it is to no profit, hut to the subverting of

ART,

Q. 38.

2

573

son with God; yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to defend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be inordinate in

mind

or in speech.

it is

:

the hearers.

Reply Obj. i. The disciples of Christ did not contend together with the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up for what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their contention, because they contended about a matter which they ought not to have contended about, namely the primacy of honour for they were not spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage;^ and for this reason Our Lord checked them. Reply Obj. 2. Those who preached Christ out of contention were to be blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of faith, but preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth by the fact that they thought they would raise affliction to the Apostle who was preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their contention, but in the fruit that would result from it, namely that Christ would be made known; for evil is sometimes the occasion of good results. Reply Obj. 3. Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when, in contending before a judge, ;

a

man

gainsays the truth of justice, or in a dis-

putation, intends to

impugn the

true doctrine.

In this sense Catholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse.

court or in a disputation,

But when, whether it is

in

incomplete, that

is, in respect of the acrimony of speech, not always a mortal sin.

it is

Reply Obj. 4. Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For Job had said (13. 3): / will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to rea1

DD

I,

40.

^Glossa ordin., super Luc. 22.24 (v. 177B); Bede, In Luc., bk. VI, super 22.24 (PL 92, 598).

Article

Whether Contention

2.

Is a

Daughter

of Vainglory?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that contention is not a daughter of vainglory.

Objection

and hence there

is

For contention

i.

is

akin to zeal,

written (I Cor. 3.3): Whereas

it is

among you

zeal

(Douay,

envying) and

contention, are you not cardial, and walk ac-

cording to men? Now zeal pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy. Obj. 2. Further, Contention is accompanied

by

raising of the voice.

But "the voice

raised

is

on account of anger," as Gregory declares {Moral, xxxi, 45).^ Therefore contention too

from anger.

arises

3. Further, Among other things knowledge seems to be the matter of pride and vainglory, according to I Cor. 8. i Knowledge puffeth up. Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by knowledge we do not im-

Obj.

:

truth, we know it. Therefore contennot a daughter of vainglory. On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral, xxxi).''

pugn the tion

is

/ answer that, As stated above (q. xxxvn, 2), discord is a daughter of vainglory, because each of the parties in disaccord clings A.

to his

own

the other.

opinion, rather than acquiesce with

Now

it is

proper to pride and vain-

own glory. And just as peodiscordant when they hold to their own

glory to seek one's ple are

opinion in their hearts, so are they contentious

when each defends

own

opinion by words. reckoned a daughter of vainglory for the same reason as discord. his

Consequently contention

to

Reply Obj. envy in so

1.

is

Contention, like discord,

far as a

man

akin

is

severs himself

from

whom he is discordant, or with he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to something, it is akin to pride and vainglory, because, namely, he clings to his own opinion, as stated above. the one with

whom

Reply Obj.

2.

The contention

of which

we

are speaking puts on a loud voice for the pur-

pose of impugning the truth, so that

it is

not

Hence it does not contention arises from the same

the chief part of contention.

follow that

source as the raising of the voice. Reply Obj. 3 Pride and vainglory are occa3

PL

76, 621.

''Ibid.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

574

sioned chiefly by goods, even those that are

contrary to them, for instance, when a man for when a thing is proud of his humility;

way, it does so not directly but which way nothing hinders one contrary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason why the per se and direct effects of pride or vainglory, should not result from the contraries of those things which are arises in this

/ answer that, As Isidore says {Etym. viii, schism "takes its name from being a scission of minds," and scission is opposed to unity. Therefore the sin of schism is one that is di3),^

accidentally, in

rectly and per se opposed to unity. For in the moral as in the physical order, the species is not constituted by that which is accidental. Now, in the moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and that which results beside the

the occasion of pride.

intention,

QUESTION XXXIX Of schism {In Four Articles)

We

must now consider the vices contrary to

peace, which belong to deeds; such as schism, (q. xli), sedition (q. xlii), and war xl). In the first place, then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether

strife (q.

schism

a special sin? (2)

is

Whether

it is

graver

than unbelief? (3) Of the power exercised by schismatics;

(4)

Of the punishment

inflicted

on them.

for this

is

i.

Whether Schism

Is a Special Sin?

We

proceed thus to the First Article: It seems that schism is not a special sin. Objection i. For schism, as Pope Pelagius I. says (Epist. ad Viator, et Pancrat.),^ "denotes a

But every

division."

sin causes a division, ac-

Your sins have divided 2 between you and your God. Therefore schism

cording to Isa. 59. is

not a special

:

sin.

A man is apparently a schishe disobeys the Church. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of the Church, because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii)^ is "disobedience against the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin Obj.

matic

2.

Further,

if

a schism.

is

Obj.

3.

Further, Heresy also divides a

from the unity of

faith. If, therefore, the

schism denotes a division, differ, as a special sin,

On

it

man word

would seem not to

from the

sin of unbelief.

the contrary, Augustine {Contra Faust.

between schism and heresy, for he says that "a schismatic is one who holds the same faith, and practises the same worship, as others, and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the community but a heretic is one who holds another faith from that of the Catholic Church." Therefore schism is not a general sin.

xx),^ distinguishes

;

^

MA

IX, 7.S1; cf. Gratian,

Q. I, can. 34,

Schisma.

»

PL

'

Chap. 3 (PL

469}.

(RF

i,

Dccretum,

Pt. 11,

causa xxiv,

979)-

14, 309.

42, 369); cf.

as

were, accidental.

it

Contra Crescon., u, 3 (PL 43,

is

Hence the

the chief unity, and the particular

unity of several individuals

among themselves

subordinate to the unity of the Church, even

as the

Article

is,

schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the reason that the schismatic intends to sever himself from that unity which is the effect of charity; because charity unites not only one person to another with the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole Church in unity of spirit. Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully and intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church; sin of

mutual adaptation of each member of a

natural body

subordinate to the unity of the

is

whole body. Now the unity of the Church consists in two things namely, in the mutual con:

nection or

communion

Church, and again

members

the

in

Church

of the

according to Coloss.

of the

members

of the

the subordination of

2. 18,

all

one head, ig:Puffed up by the to the

sense of his flesh, and not holding the Head, from which the whole body, by joints and

bands, being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the increase of God. Now this Head is Christ Himself, Whose vicegerent in the Church

is

the Sovereign Pontiff.

Therefore schismatics are those who refuse to submit to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold communion with those members of the Church who acknowledge his supremacy. division between man and from sin is not intended by the happens beside his intention as a re-

Reply Obj.

God

i.

The

that results

sinner;

it

sult of his turning inordinately to a

good, and so

it is

Reply Obj. in rebelliously

2.

changeable

not schism properly so called.

The essence

of schism consists

disobeying the

commandments;

say "rebelliously," since a schismatic both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church, and refuses to submit to her judg-

and

I

ment. But every sinner does not do this, and so every sin is a schism. Reply Obj. 3. Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of those things to which each *

PL 82,

297.

PART

II

OF SECOND PART

opposed per se and directly. For heresy is per se opposed to faith, while schism is per se opposed to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Therefore just as faith and charity are different

Obj.

is

although whoever lacks

virtues,

faith

and heresy are although whoever is a heretic

charity, so too schism vices,

in his

to Titus (3. 10)

is

also a

what commentary on the Epistle

schismatic, but not conversely. This

Jerome says

lacks

different

is

'T consider the difference be-

:^

tween schism and heresy to be that heresy holds schism severs a man from the Church." Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is the road to the loss of faith, according to I Tim. I. 6: From which things, that is, charity and the like, some going astray, are turned aside into vain babbling, so too, schism is the road to heresy. Therefore Jerome adds false doctrine while

(ibid.) that "at the outset

it

is

2.

Whether Schism

Is a

A

Further,

575

greater good

is

opposed

to a greater evil, according to the Philosopher.^

Now

schism

is

opposed to charity, which

is

greater virtue than faith to which unbelief

a is

opposed, as shown above (q. xxiii, a. 6). Therefore schism is a graver sin than unbelief. On the contrary. That which results from an addition to something else surpasses that thing

good or in evil. Now heresy results from something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt doctrine, as Jerome declares in the passage quoted above (a. i. Reply 3). either in

Therefore schism is a less grievous sin than unbehef. / answer that, The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways: first, according to the species of that sin, secondly, according to its

circumstances.

And

since

particular

circum-

between

be varied in an infinite number of ways. Therefore if one were to ask in general which of two

Graver Sin

Uftbelief?

is the graver, the question must be understood to refer to the gravity derived from the sin's genus. Now the genus or species of a sin is taken from its object, as shown above (Part

sins

I-II, Q. Lxxii, A.

i;

fore the sin which

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief. Objection i. For the graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to Deut. 25. 2: According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be. Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely than even the sin

2

stances are infinite in number, so too they can

certain respect, to find a difference

Than

3.

ART.

possible, in a

schism and heresy; yet there is no schism that does not devise some heresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason for separating from the Church."

Article

Q. 39.

of unbelief or idolatry for

we read

(Exod. 32. 28), that some were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of idolatry; but of the sin of schism we read (Num. 16. 30) // the Lord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow thern down, and all things that belong Jo them, and they go down alive into hell, you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord God. Moreover the ten tribes who were guilty of schism in revolting from the rule of David were most severely punished (IV Kings 17). Therefore the sin of schism is graver than the sin of unbelief. :

good

is,

Lxxiii, A. 3). Thereopposed to the greater

Q.

in respect of its genus,

for instance a sin

than a sin

graver

is

more

grievous,

committed against God is committed against one's

neighbour.

Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God Himself, according as He is

is

in Himself the First Truth, on which faith founded; but schism is opposed to ecclesias-

which is a participated good, and a good than God Himself. Therefore it is

tical unity,

lesser

manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous than the sin of schism, although

may happen that a particular schismatic sins more grievously than a particular unbeliever, it

either because his

cause his sin

is

contempt

is

greater, or be-

a source of greater danger, or

individual," as the Philosopher states.^ Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude, namely, ecclesiastical unity, while unbelief is contrary to the particular good of one man,

some similar reason. Reply Obj. i. It had already been declared to that people by the law which they had received that there was one God, and that no other God was to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed among them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no need for those who sinned against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be punished in an unusual manner; it was enough that they should

namely the faith of an individual. Therefore it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief,

be punished in the usual way. On the other hand, it was not so well known among them that

Obj. is

2.

1

PL 26,

"The good of the multitude more godlike than the good of the

Further,

greater and

633.

2

Ethics,

I,

2

(1094^10).

for

^Ihid.,

vm,

10 (1160^9).

— SUMMA THEOLOGICA

576

Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it was necessary for those who rebelled against his authority to be

punished

in a

miraculous

We may

by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more severely punished in that people, because they were inclined to seditions and schisms. For it is written (I Esd. This city since days gone by has rebelled 4. 15) against its kings; and seditions and wars were raised therein (Vulg.,

This city

is

and hurt fid to the kings and provinces, wars were raised therein of old.). Now and sometimes a more severe punishment is inflict.

.

ed for a frequently repeated sin (as stated above, Part I-II, q. cv, a. 2, Reply 9), because punishments are medicines intended to keep

man away from

sin,

so

that where there

is

more severe punishbe inflicted. As regards the ten

greater proneness to sin, a

ment ought tribes,

to

they were punished not only for the sin

of schism, but also for that of idolatry, as stat-

ed

in the

Bapt.)

passage quoted.

2. Just as the good of the multitude is greater than the good of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic good to which that multitude is directed, even as the

Reply Obj.

good of a rank of soldiers in the army is less than the good of the commander-in-chief. In like manner the good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed, is less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is opposed. Reply Obj. 3. Charity has two objects; one is its principal object and is the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object and is our neighbour's good. Now schism and other sins against our neighbour, are opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good, which is

"One who

•}

rated from the Church, have a spiritual power.

Obj.

Further, Pope

3.

command who were

Urban

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that schismatics have some power. Objection i. For Augustine says {Contra Donat. i, i) :^ "Just as those who come back to the Church after being baptized, are not bap*PL43,

100.

"We

by bishops

themselves consecrated according to rite, but have separated themselves by schism from the Roman Church, should be received mercifully and that their Orders should be acknowledged, when they rethe Catholic

turn to the unity of the Church, provided they

be of commendable

life and knowledge." But would not be so, unless spiritual power were retained by schismatics. Therefore schismatics have spiritual power. On the contrary, Cyprian says in a letter {Ep. X\\)-} which is quoted in the Decretals:^

this

"He who observes

neither unity of spirit nor

the concord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church, and from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal

pow-

er or honour."

/ answer that, Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the other a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of the

Church are immovable

so long as the consecrated thing remains, as ap-

pears even in inanimate things, since an altar,

once consecrated, is not consecrated again unit has been broken up. Consequently such

less

seen even in natural things,

Whether Schismatics Have Any

II says:^

that persons consecrated

opposed to the spiritual good of the multitude. 3.

{De Unico

is

a

Article Power?

Order have

since they retain their Orders.

Further, Augustine says

2.

than the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so these sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, hatred of God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its principal object, is not less grievous than unbelief. Nevertheless of all sins committed by man against his neighbour, the sin of schism would seem to be the greatest, because it is less

Now

separated can confer a sacrament even as he can have it." But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very great power. Therefore schismatics who are sepa-

a rebellious

city,

return after being

a kind of power. Therefore schismatics

Obj.

also reply

:

.

is

some power

and unusual manner.

who

tized again, so those

ordained, are not ordained again."

power

as this remains, as to

its

essence, in

man who

has received it by consecration, as long as he lives, &ven if he fall into schism or heresy; and this appears from the fact that if he come back to the Church, he is not consethe

crated again. Since, however, the lower power

ought not to exercise is

it

moved by

its

act except in so far as

the higher power, as it

may

be

follows that such

persons lose the use of their power, so that it is not lawful for them to use it. Yet if they use 2 Cf. De Bap. contra Donat., vi 5. (PL 43, 200). 'Council of Piacenza, x (MA xx, 806); cf. Gratian, Dccrctum, 11, causa ix, Q. i, can. 5, Ordinationse (RF i,

602). *

Cf.

PL

4,

355; the text of this letter

of the letters of St. Cornelius {Epist., x, 6

Gratian, Dccretum,

anus (RF

i,

568).

11,

causa

is

also given as

PL 3.

one

816).

vii, Q. i, can. 6,

Novali-

PART power has

II

OF SECOND PART

sacramental acts, because in these things man acts only as God's instrument, so that sacramental effects are not this

it,

On

its effect in

precluded on account of any fault whatever in the person who confers the sacrament. On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is conferred by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this does not stay with the recipient immiovably, so that it does not remain in heretics and schismatics; and

consequently they neither absolve nor excommunicate, nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and

Q. 40.

ART.

the contrary, It

i is

577 written

(Num.

16. 26)

Depart from the tents of these wicked men, those, namely, who had caused the schism, and touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins.

I answer that. According to Wisd. 11. ly, By what things a man sinneth, by the same also

he shoidd be punished (Vulg.,

Now

he

is

torment-

shown above (a. i), commits a twofold sin first by separating himself from communion with the members of the Church, and in this respect the fitting puned).

a schismatic, as :

Replies to the Objections.

ishment for schismatics is that they be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse submission to the head of the Church, and therefore, since they are unwilling to be controlled by the Church's spiritual power, it is just that they should be compelled by the secular power. Reply Obj. i. It is not lawful to receive Bap-

Article 4. Whether It Is Right That Schismatics Should Be Punished With Excommunication?

tism from a schismatic save in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man to quit this life marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from

if they do, it is invalid. Accordingly when it is said that such persons have no spiritual power, it is to be understood as referring either to the second power, or if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to the essence of the power, but to its law-

ful use.

This

suffices for the

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished with excommunication. Objection i. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly of a share in the sacraments. But Augustine says {Contra Donat. vi, 5)^ that Baptism can be received from a schismatic. Therefore it seems that excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics. Obj.

2.

faithful

astray,

is the duty of Christ's back those who have gone

Further, It

to

lead

and so

it is

written against certain per-

That which was driven away you have not brought again, neither have you bought that which was lost. Now schismatics are more easily brought back by such as may hold communion with them. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be excommusons (Ezech. 34. 4)

:

nicated.

A double punishment is not one and the same sin, according to Nahum i. 9: God will not judge the same twice (Septuagint Version.). Now some receive a temporal punishment for the sin of schism, according to xxiii, q. v.,^ where it is stated: Obj.

3.

Further,

inflicted for

"Both divine and earthly laws have laid down that those who are severed from the unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must be punished by the secular power." Therefore they ought not to be punished with excommunication. ^

PL 43,

2

Gratian, Decretum, can. 44, Qualinos.

200.

(RF i,

943).

whom

he

may

receive

it,

whether from a Jew

or a pagan, than deprived of that mark, which

bestowed in Baptism. Reply Obj. 2. Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse by which a person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the Church those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation brings them back somewhat, because through confusion at their separation, they are sometimes led to do is

penance.

Reply Obj.

3.

The punishments

of the pres-

when one compel a man, another is added, just as physicians employ several bodily medicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when excommunication does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs the compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment suffices, another should not be employed. ent hfe are medicinal, and therefore

punishment does not

suffice to

QUESTION XL Of war {In Four Articles)

We

must now consider war, under which head Whether some kind of war is lawful? (2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight? (3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes? (4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days? there are four points of inquiry: (i)

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

578

course to the material sword in defending that

Article

Whether

i.

It is

Always Sinful

common

To Wage War?

We proceed thus to the First Article: seems that it is always sinful to wage war. Objection i. Because punishment is not except for

flicted

sin.

Now

those

It

in-

who wage war

Our Lord with punishment, according to Matt. 26. 52: All that take the sword shall perish with the sword. Therefore are threatened by

wars are unlawful.

all

2. Further, Whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Matt. 5. 39) Bnt I say to you not to resist evil; and (Rom. 12. 19): Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath.

Obj.

:

Therefore war Obj.

is

always

Obj. thing

con-

the Church, since those trials

deprived

are

sin.

On

of

who

are slain in these

ecclesiastical

said

are in authority (Ps. 81. 4) Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the :

for this reason Augus(Contra Faust, xxii, 75):^ "The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands, of those who hold the supreme authority."

hand of the sinner; and tine says

who

that those

it

what

restore

Thirdly,

burial.

seems that war is a sin absolutely. the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon

Therefore

it is

who

to those

is

required,

namely

are attacked should be attacked

has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to

contrary

is

exercise of a lawful

itself lawful, as is

take place in

weal against external enemies. Hence

evident in exercises

The

Further,

war

always a

is

the sciences.

of

:

Secondly, a just cause sin, is

disturbances,

But warlike exercises which tournaments are forbidden by

Therefore war

4.

is

internal

evil-doers, according to the

because they deserve it on account of some fault. Therefore Augustine says (q. x, super Jos.) :^ "A just war is usually described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state

trary to an act of virtue. But to peace.

against

words of the Apostle (Rom. 13. 4) He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common

sinful.

Further, Nothing, except

3.

weal

when they punish

it

it is

has seized unjustly." necessary that the belligerents

should have a right intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoid-

Hence Augustine says (De Verb.

on the son of the centurion:^ "If the Christian Religion forbade war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the Gospel would

ance of

rather have been counselled to cast aside their

tives of aggrandisement, or cruelty, but with

arms, and to give up soldiering altogether. On the contrary, they were told: 'Do violence to

Dom.) sinful

evil.

"True religion does not look upon as those wars that are waged not for mo:^

the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-

three things are necessary. First, the authority

and of uplifting the good," For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii) :^ "The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and re-

by whose command the war

lentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of

waged. For it is not the business of a private person to declare war, because he can

power, and such things, all these are rightly condemned in war." Reply Obj. i. As Augustine says (Contra "To take the sword is to arm Faust, xxii) oneself in order to take the life of anyone, without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority." On the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by

and be content with your pay' no man; (Luke 3. 14). If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he did not forbid .

.

.

soldiering." / atiswer that, In order for a

of the sovereign is

war

to be just,

to be

seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private person to

summon

together the

people, which has to be done in wartime. as the care of the to those

who

common

are in authority,

And

it

And

is

committed

is

their busi-

common

weal of the kingdom or province subject to them. just as it is lawful for them to have re-

ness to watch over the city,

weal

doers,

:''

the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as 2

PL

*

Cl. Gratian,

A pud Ep. ad Marcel., cxxxvm, chap. 2 (PL 53, 531). Cf. Gratian, Decretum, Pt. 11, causa xxm, Q. i, can. 2 Paratus ii;/wr.i (RFi.Sqi). ^

zeros

(PL

12 6

«

>

42, 448.

(RF

Quacst. in HepL, vi

I,

(PL

34. 781)-

causa xxm, Q. i, can. 6, 893); see Augustine, City oj God, xix,

Decretum,

41, 637).

Chap. 74 (PL 42, 447). Chap. 70 (PL 42, 444).

rt. 11,

PART

OF SECOND PART

II

a public person) through zeal for justice, so to speak, of God,

by the authority,

take the sword, but to use

by another, and so

And

ment.

as

it

is

and

not to

commissioned

does not deserve punish-

it

yet even those

who make

sinful use

of the sword are not always slain with the

sword, but they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they are

punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.

Reply Obj.

2.

{De Serm. Dom.

Monte,

in

i),^ should always be borne in readiness of mind, so that we be ready to obey them, and,

necessary, to refrain from resistance or self-

if

defence. Nevertheless for a

man

it is

necessary sometimes

to act otherwise for the

good, or for the good of those with

common

whom

he

is

Hence Augustine says {Ep. ad Mar'} "Those whom we have to punish with

Obj.

cellin.)

necessary to handle in ways against their will. For when we are

many

stripping a

man

it

is

of the lawlessness of sin,

it is

2.

Further, Pope Leo

Therefore Obj.

3.

Further, It seems to be the same

man does a thing himself, or consents being done by another, according to Rom. I. 32: They who do such things, are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but they

whether a to

its

them that do them. Now seem to consent to a thing, who induce others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce others to fight, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. HortatuY that "Charles v/ent to war v;ith the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of Adrian, bishop of those,

above

all,

Rome." Therefore they Obj.

4.

Now

is

it

also are allowed to fight.

Further, Wliatever

torious in itself

is

is

right

and meri-

lawful for prelates and clerics.

sometimes right and meritorious to

make war, for Omni timorey

it is

written

that "if a

(xxiii, qu. 8, can.

man

die for the true

save his country, or in defence of Christians, God will give him a heavenly reward." Therefore it is lawful for bishops and faith, or to

clerics to fight.

On

slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike

the contrary. It

was

said to Peter as rep-

resenting bishops and clerics (Matt. 26. 52)

no such danger, and hence they were called exercises of arms or bloodless wars, as Jerome states in an epistle (cf. Veget.,

Put up —

—DeReMilit.i).^

to fight.

Article 2. Whether It Is Law Jul for Clerics and Bishops To Fight?

the good of a

exercises presented

writes (xxiii,

lawful for bishops to fight.

it is

also that consent to

an internal enemy." Reply Obj. 3. Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord came not to send upon earth (Matt. 10. 34). Hence Augustine says {Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix) :^ "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace." Reply Obj. 4. Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in

IV

we commanded our people to gather together, and ordered them to go down to the sea-shore."

more hopeless than the happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil will, like

this

can. Igitur):^

8,

good for him to be vanquished, since nothing is

579

Now

"As adverse tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some said that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and covertly; for which reason qu.

fighting.

a kindly severity,

2

seems to be above all the duty of prelates, for Gregory says {Horn, in Ev. xiv) :^ "The wolf comes upon the sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and was not, leaveth the sheep, and flieth, for he fears lest the wolf hurt him, and dares not stand up against his injustice." Therefore it is lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.

Precepts of this kind, as Au-

gustine observes

ART.

Q. 40.

ing at the hands of the foe.

its

again thy sword into the scabbard (Vulg., it is not lawful for them

place). Therefore

/ answer that. Several things are requisite for

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems lawful for clerics and bishops to fight. Objection i. For, as stated above (a. i), wars are lawful and just in so far as they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffer1

Chap. 19 (PL 34, 1260);

2

Epist., 138.2

(PL

4

Chaps. 9-28

(DD

cf.

Epist., 138. 2

Si, S3i).

664-672);

II,

23

2

(PL33, S3i).

PL 2,3, 856. (DD 684).

human

society,

and a number of by a number

things are done better and quicker of persons than

by one,

as the Philosopher ob-

serves,^ while certain occupations are so inconsistent with 6

PL

one another, that they cannot be

76, 1128.

6 Gratian, Decretum (RF i, 954); cf. Leo Ludovicum Angus turn (MA xiv, 888). ">

Gratian, Decretum,

(RF i,

^lUd. ^

Politics,

I,

2 (1252^3).

955).

iv,

Epist.

Ad

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

sSo fittingly exercised at the

who

same time; hence those

are assigned to important duties are for-

bidden to occupy themselves with things of small im.portance. Thus according to human laws, soldiers

who

are assigned to warlike pur-

engage

suits are forbidden to

Now

in

commerce.

warlike pursuits are altogether incom-

and a cleric two reasons. The first reason is a general one, because, namely, warlike pursuits are full patible with the duties of a bishop for

of unrest, so that they hinder the

much from

mind very

the contemplation of Divine things,

the praise of God, and prayers for the people,

which belong to the duties of a cleric. Therefore as commercial enterprises are forbidden to clerics, because they entangle the mind too much, so too are warlike pursuits, according to II Tim. 2. ^•. No mail being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business. The second reason is a special one, because, namely, all the clerical Orders are directed to the ministry of the altar, on w^hich the Passion of Christ just

represented sacramentally, according to I As often as yon shall eat this bread,

is

Cor. II. 26:

and drink the

chalice,

you

shall

show the death

of the Lord, until He come. Therefore it is unbecoming for them to slay or shed blood, and is

it

more

shed their

fitting that

own blood

they should be ready to

for Christ, so as to imitate

deed what they portray in their ministry. For reason it has been decreed^ that those who shed blood, even without sin, become irregular. Now no man w^ho has a certain duty to perform can lawfully do that which renders him unfit for that duty. Therefore it is altogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to the shedding of blood. Reply Obj. i. Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the oppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons, according to the saying of the Apostle (II Cor. 10. 4): The weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God. Such are salutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate, the sentence of excommunication. in

this

Testament

the priests were comsound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this purpose that bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to war; and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of them take up arms themselves. Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (q. xxiii, a. 4, Reply 2) every power, art or virtue that pertains to the end, has to dispose that which is

manded

(Jos. 6. 4)

to

Now, among

directed to the end.

the faithful,

carnal wars should be considered as having for their

end the Divine

clerics to dispose

spiritual

Therefore

clerics are deputed.

good to which the duty of

it is

and counsel other men

to en-

gage in just wars. For they are forbidden to take up arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an occupation is unbecoming their persons.

Reply Obj. 4. Although it is meritorious to wage a just war, nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their being assigned to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.

Article

Whether

3.

Ambushes

It Is

Lawful To Lay

War?

in

We proceed thus to the Third Article: seems that it is unlawful to lay ambushes

It in

war.

Objection

Thou

i.

For

it is

written (Deut. 16. 20)

which is But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even in a shall follow justly after that

just.

just war.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states {Contra Mend, xv).^ Therefore, as "one is bound to keep faith with one's enemy," as Augustine states {Ep. ad Bonifac. clxxxix),^ it seems that it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.

Obj.

3.

Further, It

is

written (Matt.

7.

12):

authority of their superiors, take part in wars,

Whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them, and we ought to ob-

not indeed by taking up arms themselves, but

serve this in

by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly, by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual helps. Thus in the Old

Now

Reply Obj.

'

2.

Prelates and clerics may, by the

Gratian, Decrctum,

I7S).

pt.

I,

d. L, can. 4,

Miror.

(RF

I,

all

our dealings with our neighbour.

our enemy

since no

man

is

our neighbour. Therefore,

wishes ambushes or deceptions

it seems that no one ought to carry on war by laying ambushes.

to be prepared for himself,

*

PL 40,

539-

'PL 33,

856.

PART

II

OF SECOND PART

On the contrary, Augustine says

(QQ. in Heptateuch., qu. X, super Jos.):^ "Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be carried on openly or by ambushes," and he proves this by the authority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai (Jos. 8. 2). / answer that, The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two ways. First, through being told something false,

this is

Ambrose

Secondly, a

we

(De

states

Offic.

man may

i,

29).

be deceived by what

we do not

say or do, because

declare our

purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always bound to do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, according to Matt. 7. 6: Give not that which holy, to dogs. Therefore

is

much more ought

the plan of campaign to be hidden from the

enemy. For his

purpose

among

reason

this

that a soldier has to learn lest it

is

other things

the art of conceahng

come to the enemy's knowlBook on Strategy by Fron-

edge, as stated in the

tinus.^ Concealment of this kind is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully employed in a just war. Nor can these ambushes

ART,

581

i

unlawful to fight on holy days. Obj. 3. Further, No inordinate deed should be done to avoid temporal harm. But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an inordinate is it

deed. Therefore no one should fight on a holy

day even through the need of avoiding temporal

harm

On

the contrary. It

is

written (I Machab.

The Jews rightly determined Whosoever shall come up against us 2.

41)

:

the Sabbath-day,

I answer that.

or through the breaking of a promise,

always unlawful. No one ought to deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain rights of war and convenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies, as

and

Q. 41.

therefore,

.

.

.

saying:

to fight

on

we will fight against him. The observance of holy days

no hindrance to those things which are ordered to man's safety, even that of his body. Hence Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (John 7. 23) Are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day? is

:

Hence physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days. Yet much more reason there for safeguarding the common weal (by which many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both temporal and spiritual

is

prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual. Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding

the

common weal

of the faithful,

it is

lawful to

carry on a war on holy days, provided there be

need for doing so; because it would be to tempt God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain from fighting. However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight on a holy day, for the reasons given. And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

be properly called deceptions, nor are they contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have an inordinate v/ill if he were unwilling that others should hide from him. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

QUESTION XLI Of {In

strife

Two

Articles)

We must now consider strife,^ under which head Article 4. Whether on Holy Days?

It is

Lawful To Fight

strife is a sin? (2)

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It seems unlawful to fight on holy days. Objection i. For holy days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God. Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Exod. 20. 8, for Sabbath is interpreted rest. But wars are full of unrest. Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days. Obj. 2. Further, Certain persons are reproached (Isa. 58. 3) because on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of strife, and of striking with their fists. Much more, 1

PL 34,

3

Straiagematum.,

781.

2PL16, 1 1.

(DD

there are two points of inquiry: (i)

68.

504).

Whether

it is

Whether

a daughter of

anger?

Article

i.

Whether

Strife Is

Always a Sin?

We

proceed thus to the First Article: It seems that strife is not always a sin. Objection i. For strife seems a kind of contention; hence Isidore says (Etym. x)^ that the word "rixosus (quarrelsome) is derived from the snarling (rictu) of a dog, because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict; he delights in brawling, and provokes contention." Now contention is not always a sin. Neither, therefore,

is

strife.

denotes fighting between individuals.

*

Strife here

5

PL 82, 392.

— :

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

582

Obj. 2. Further, It is related (Gen. 26. 21) that the ser\'ants of Isaac digged another well,

and for that they quarrelled likemse. is

Now

it

not credible that the household of Isaac quarreproved by him,

relled publicly, without being

supposing

it

were a

Therefore

sin.

strife is

not a

sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Strife seems to be a war between individuals. But war is not always sinful. Therefore strife is not always a sin. On the contrary, Strifes^ are reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5. 20), and they

who do such

things shall not obtain the

kingdom

of God. Therefore strifes are not only sinful, but they are even mortal sins. / answer that, While contention impHes a

"and dehghts

brawling." Thirdly, he provokes it

goes on, "and pro-

vokes contention."

Reply Obj.

2.

The

sense of the text

is

not that

the servants of Isaac quarrelled, but that the

inhabitants

of

country

that

with

quarrelled

them. Therefore these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who bore the calumny (cf. Gen. 21. 20).

it

Reply Obj. 3. In order for a war to be just must be declared by authority of the govern-

ing power, as stated above (q. xl,

a.

however proceeds from a private anger or hatred. For if the servants

i), strife

feeling

of

of a sover-

eign or judge, in virtue of their public authority,

attack certain

men and

it is

20 says' that strifes are "when persons strike one another through anger." Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it takes place be-

thority.

Hence

who

case

but those

it

these defend themselves,

who who

not the former of strife, but those

contradiction of words, strife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5.

in

others to quarrel, and thus

are said to be guilty resist the public au-

not the assailants in this

is

are guilty of strife and

commit

who defend themselves beyond

sin,

order.

tween private persons, being declared not by public authority, but rather

Therefore

will.

strife is

by a disordered

always

sinful.

In fact

man who

attacks annot without mortal sin that one inflicts harm on another even if the deed be done by the hands. But in him who defends himself, it may be without sin, or it may a mortal sin in the

it is

other unjustly, for

it is

sometimes involve a venial sin, or sometimes a mortal sin; and this depends on his purpose and on his manner of defending himself. For if his sole purpose be to withstand the injury done to him, and he defend himself with due moderation, it is no sin, and one cannot say properly that there is strife on his part. But if, on the other hand, his self-defence be inspired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a sin. It is

a venial sin,

if

a slight

movement

he does not defending himself;

or vengeance obtrude itself, or

much

exceed moderation in

of hatred

if

a mortal sin if he makes for his assailant with the fixed intention of killing him, or inflicting grievous harm on him.

but

it is

Reply Obj. i. Strife is not just the same as contention, and there are three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which express the inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrel-

some man

always ready to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, "ever ready to contradict," that is to say, whether the other man says or does well or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself, and so the passage proceeds, 1

is

The Douay Version has

^Glossa 159)-

inlerl.

(vi,

"quarrels."

87V); Glossa

Lombardi (PL

192,

Article 2. Whether of Anger?

Strife Is a

Daughter

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that strife is not a daughter of anger. Objection i. For it is written (James 4. i): Whence are wars and contentions? Are they not from your concupiscences, which war in your members? But anger is not in the concupiscible part. Therefore strife is a daughter, not of .

.

.

anger, but of concupiscence.

Obj.

He

2.

Further, It

that boasteth

reth up quarrels.

Now

strife is

stir-

apparently the

seems that

strife

a daughter of pride or vainglory which

make

same is

written (Prov. 28, 25):

is

and puffeth up himself,

as quarrel. Therefore

it

man

boast and puff himself up. 3. Further, It is written (Prov. 18. 6) The lips of a fool intermeddle with strife. Now folly differs from anger, for it is opposed, not

a

Obj.

:

to meekness, but to

wisdom

or prudence. There-

not a daughter of anger. Obj. 4. Further, It is written (Prov. 10. 12) Hatred stirreth up strifes. But "hatred arises fore strife

is

:

from envy," according 45). 3 Therefore strife

to

Gregory {Moral,

xxxi,

is

not a daughter of anger,

is

written (Prov. 17. 19)

but of envy. Obj.

He

5.

that

Further, It studieth

discords,

soweth (Vulg., is a daughter of

loveth) quarrels. But discord vainglor>', as stated

Therefore

above

(q.

xxxvii,

a.

2).

strife is also.

On the C07itrary, Gregory says (Moral, xxxi, 45)^ that "anger gives rise to strife"; and it »

PL

76, 621.

*

PL 76,

621.

PART is

man stirreth up

OF SECOND PART

II

written (Prov. 15. 18; 29. 22):

A

passionate

strifes.

I answer that, As stated above (a. i), strife denotes an antagonism extending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another. Now there are two ways in which one man may intend to

that strife

and

is

one's

other

QUESTION XLII Of (In

knows and withstands his intention. This is what we mean by strife, and it belongs properly to

must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (i)

Whether

it is

a special sin? (2)

Whether

it is

a

mortal sin?

that sedition

from what has been said above about the pas-

other sins.

man

Articles)

We

the desire of vengeance, for the not content to hurt secretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him to feel the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for what he has done, as may be seen

angry

sedition

Two

directed to the hurt of

enemy either openly or secretly. In anway a man intends to hurt another who

anger which

583

the daughter of vainglory properly

another. In one way it is as though he intended absolutely the other's hurt, which in this case is the outcome of hatred, for the inis

i

directly.

harm

tention of hatred

ART.

Q. 42.

among themselves. Even so any sin may command the act of another sin, by directing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove

quarrel

is

is

Article

properly speaking, strife arises

.

Whether Sedition

Objection x),^

is

i.

:

It

seems

not a special sin distinct from

For, according to Isidore (Etym.

"a seditious

man

among minds, and

from anger. Reply Obj.

Is a Special

We proceed thus to the First Article

sion of anger (Part I-II, Q. xlvi, a. 6, Reply 2). Therefore,

i

Sin Distifict from Other Sins?

is

one who sows dissent

begets discord."

Now, by

Reply Obj. 2. Boasting and puffing up of self which are the result of anger or vainglory, are

provoking the commission of a sin, a man sins by no other kind of sin than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems that sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord. Obj. 2. Further, Sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism takes its name from scission, as stated above (q. xxxix, a. i). Therefore it seems that the sin of sedition is not dis-

not the direct but the occasional cause of quar-

tinct

Q.

XXV, AA.

whatever arises also

I-II,

2), all the irascible passions arise

I,

from those

As stated above (Part

i.

of the concupiscible part, so that

the immediate outcome of anger, from concupiscence as from its first

is

root.

rels or strife, because,

when

a

man

resents an-

other being preferred to him, his anger

and then

ed,

is

arous-

his anger results in quarrel

and

strife.

reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor those vices which arise from them, as appears from Moral, xxxi,^ where both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a special sin, distinct from other sins. On the contrary, Seditions are mentioned as is

Reply Obj. I-II, Q.

from that of schism. 3. Further, Every special sin that is distinct from other sinj, is either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice. Now sedition Obj.

Anger, as stated above (Part XLViii, A. 3) hinders the judgment of 3.

the reason, so that

Hence they have due to a defect

a

it

bears a likeness to folly.

common

effect, since it is

in the reason that a

man

designs

among

from other

to hurt another inordinately.

distinct

Reply Obj. 4. Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it is not the proper effect

/ answer that, Sedition is a special sin, having something in common with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has something in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain antagonism, and it differs from them in two points. First, because war and strife denote actual aggression on either side, while sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression, or the preparation for such aggression. Hence a gloss on II Cor. 12. 20 says^ that "seditions are tumults tending to fight," when, that is, a number of people make preparations with the

of hate, because it is

when one man hates another him in a quar-

beside his intention to hurt

relsome and open manner, since sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, he sees himself prevailing, he endeavours to harm him with strife and quarrel. But to hurt a man in

a quarrel

is

the proper effect of anger, for

the reason given above.

Reply Obj.

5.

Strifes give rise to hatred

discord in the hearts of those

and

are guilty

and so he that "studies," that is intends sow discord among others, causes them to

of strife, to

who

1

PL

82, 394.

^Glossa

sins (II Cor. 12. 20).

2Chap. 45 (PL76, 621). Glossa Lombardi (PL

interl. (vi, 771);

192, 89).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

584

intention of fighting. Secondly, they differ in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against external foes, being as it were between one peo-

between one individual and another, or between few people on one side and few on the other, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between the mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part. Therefore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good, namely the unity and

ple and another, while strife

cites others to sedition,

and since sedition de-

notes a kind of discord,

it

follows that a sedi-

one who creates discord, not of any kind, but between the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only in him who

man

is

sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one another inordinately. Reply Obj. 2. Sedition differs from schism in two respects. First, because schism is opposed

the contrary,

The Apostle

forbids sedi-

sins (II Cor. 12. 20).

As

/ answer that,

is

peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin. Reply Obj. i. A seditious man is one who in-

tious

On

tions together with other things that are mortal

tion

stated above (a. i), sedi-

contrary to the unity of the multitude,

is

is, the people of a city or kingdom. Now Augustine says^ that wise men understand the word people to designate "not any crowd of persons, but the assembly of those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and for the common good." Therefore it is evident that the unity to which sedition is opposed is the unity of law and common good; hence it follows manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common good. Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its gravity will be all the greater according as the common good which it assails surpasses the private good

that

which

is

by

assailed

strife. is first and most grievously; those who are led by them

Accordingly the sin of sedition

who

chiefly in its authors,

and secondly

in

it is

sin

ecclesiastical unity, while sedition is contrary

common good. Those, however, who defend the common good, and withstand

temporal or secular unity of the multi-

the seditious party, are not themselves seditious,

tude, for instance of a city or kingdom. Second-

even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because he defends himself, as stated above

to the spiritual unity of the multitude,

to the

namely

schism does not imply any preparation for a bodily fight as sedition does, but only a spirily,

to disturb the

(q. XLI, a. i).

Reply Obj.

tual dissent.

common

it

the parts of a multitude.

always a mortal

Article 2. Whether Sedition Is Always a Mortal Sin?

dently good

XL,

(q.

We

proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that sedition is not always a mortal sin. Objection i. For sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight," according to the gloss quoted above (a. i). But fighting is not always a mortal sin;

indeed

it is

sometimes just and lawful, as

stated above (q. xl, a.

i

;

q.

xli, a. i).

Much

good, as stated above

But sedition runs counter

A. i).

common good Reply Obj.

lawful to fight, provided

It is

1.

be for the

Reply Obj. 3. Sedition, like schism, is contained under discord, since each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but between

to the

of the multitude, so that

it

is

sin.

Discord from what is not evibe without sin, but discord evidently good cannot be without 2.

may

from what is and sedition

is discord of this kind, for it contrary to the unity of the multitude, which

sin; is is

a manifest good.

Reply Obj.

3.

A

tyrannical government

is

not

because it is directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler, as the Philosopher states.^ Consequently there is no just,

government of

more, therefore, can sedition be without a mor-

sedition in disturbing a

tal sin.

unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so

Obj.

2.

Further, Sedition

is

a kind of discord,

this kind,

inordinately that his subjects suffer greater

harm

above (a. i. Reply 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes without any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.

from the consequent disturbance than from the

Obj. 3. Further, It is praiseworthy to deliver multitude from a tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some dissension in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks

courages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for this is tyranny, since it is ordered to the private good of the ruler and to the injury of

to retain the tyrant, while the rest strive to de-

the multitude.

as stated

a

rather that

is

1

City oJGod,

II,

without mortal

2

Politics,

7 (i279''6)

III,

it

is

the tyrant

guilty of sedition, since he en-

throne him. Therefore there can be sedition sin.

Indeed

tyrant's government.

21

(PL

41, 67). ;

Ethics, viu, 10 (ii6o*>8).

PART

II

OF SECOND PART

QUESTION XLIII Of scandal It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice, those, namely, whereby one harms one's neighbour unjustly. But scandal seems to be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here consider scandal, under which head there are eight points

What

scandal? (2) Whether

is

a sin? (3) Whether it is a special sin? (4) Whether it is a mortal sin? (5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized? (6) Whether

scandal

i

585

when he

offends or

weakens him. Now scandal is divided against offence and weakness, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14. 21) It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is of ended, or scandalized, or weakened. Therefore the above definition of scandal :

(In Eight Articles)

of inquiry: (i)

ART.

Q. 43.

hour's spiritual downfall

is

they can give scandal? (7) Whether spiritual goods are to be given up on account of scandal? (8) Whether temporal things are to be given up on account of scandal?

unfitting.

is

On

the

Matt.

Jerome in expounding Dost thou know that the Phari-

contrary,

15. 12,

when they heard

"When we

this word, etc., says:^ read 'Whosoever shall scandalize,'

the sense

'Whosoever

sees,

is

shall,

by deed

or word,

occasion another's downfall.' " / answer that. As Jerome observes {ibid.) "the Greek aKav8a\ov may be rendered offence, downfall, or a stumbling against some-

For when a body, while moving along it may happen to stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down such an obstacle is a (TKavddXov. In hke manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be disposed to a spiritual downfall by thing."

a path, meets with an obstacle,

;

Whether Scandal Is Fittingly Defined As Being Something Less Rightly Article Said or

i.

Done That Occasions

Spiritual

another's

Downfall?

We proceed thus to the First Article: It seems that scandal is unfittingly defined as "something less rightly said or done that occa-

word or deed,

nature disposes a

man

cept that which has

For scandal is a sin as we shall state further on (a. 2). Now, according to Augustine {Contra Faust, xxii, 27),^ "a sin is a word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God." Therefore the definition given above is

what

1.

insufficient, since

Obj.

omits thought or desire.

it

Further, Since

2,

one

right acts

is

among

more virtuous

virtuous or

or

more

right

than another, that one alone which has perfect rectitude would not seem to be a less right one. therefore, scandal

If,

said or done,

it

except the best of Obj. cause.

3.

a scandal.

all, is

An

Further,

occasion

is

an accidental

But nothing accidental should enter a

definition,

because

it

defined. Therefore

scandal, to say that

Obj.

somicthing less rightly

is

follows that every virtuous act

4.

does not specify the thing

it

is

it is

unfitting, in defining

an occasion.

Further, Whatever a

man

does

may

be the occasion of another's spiritual downfall, because accidental causes are indeterminate. Consequently, if scandal is something that occasions another's spiritual downfall, any deed or

word can be a

scandal.

And

this

seems un-

reasonable.

Obj. 1

5.

Further,

PL 42, 418.

A man

occasions his neigh-

is,

as

;

sions spiritual downfall."

Objection

in so far, that

one man by his injunction, inducement or example, moves another to sin and this is scandal properly so called. Now nothing by its very

fall,

dal

is

to spiritual downfall ex-

some lack

of rectitude, since

perfectly right secures

man

against a

instead of conducing to his downfall. Scantherefore, fittingly defined as "something

is,

less rightly

done or

said, that occasions another's

spiritual downfall."^ i. The thought or desire of evil hidden in the heart, and therefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an obstacle conducing to his spiritual downfall; hence it cannot come under the head of scandal. Reply Obj. 2. A thing is said to be less right, not because something else surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack of rectitude, either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or through having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man were to sit at meat in the idol's temple (I Cor. 8. 10), though this is not sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil intention, yet, since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a semblance of worshipping the idol, it might occasion another man's spiritual downfall. Hence the Apostle says (I Thessal. From all appearance of evil refrain your5. 22) selves. Scandal is therefore fittingly described as something done "less rightly," so as to com-

Reply Obj.

lies

:

2

3

PL 26, hi; cf. Glossa interl, on Matt. 18.8 Glossa interl. on Matt. 18.8 (v, 56r).

(v, 561).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

586 prise both whatever

is

sinful in itself,

and

all

that has an appearance of evil.

Reply Obj. Lxxv, AA.

Q.

be a

As stated above (Part I-II, Lxxx, A. i), nothing: can cause of a man's spiritual down3.

2,

sufficient

results in downfall.

3; Q.

which is sin, save his own will. Therefore another man's words or deeds can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to that downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford not a cause, but an occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an accidental cause. Nor is there any reason why certain definitions should not make mention of things that are accidental, since what is accidental to one may be proper to something else; thus the accidental cause is mentioned in the definition of chance.^ Reply Obj. 4. Another's word or deed may be the cause of another's sin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a man either intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into sin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a character as to lead

Article

We

fall,

another into sin; for instance, when a

man

has an appearance of

sin.

In this case he that

does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an occasion of another's spiritual downfall, and One man's so his act is called "active scandal." word or deed is the accidental cause of another's sin, when he neither intends to lead him into sin, nor does what is of a nature to lead him into sin, and yet this other one, through being

—

is

led into sin, for instance, into

envy of another's good, and then he who does this righteous act, does not, so far as he is concerned, afford an occasion of the other's downfall, but it is this other one who takes the occasion according to

Rom.

7.8: Sin taking occasion

by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupisce7ice. Therefore this is passive, without active scandal, since he that acts rightly does not, for his

own

part, afford the occasion

of the other's downfall.

Sometimes therefore

happens that there is active scandal in the one together with passive scandal in the other, as when one commits a sin being induced to it by another; sometimes there is active without passive scandal, for instance when one, by word or deed, provokes another to sin, and the latter does not consent; and sometimes there is passive without active scandal, as we have already it

said.

Reply Obj. to scandal;

5.

Weakness denotes proneness

while offence signifies resentment

against the person 1

Aristotle, Physics,

11,

who commits 5 (197*5).

a

sin,

which

2.

Whether Scandal

proceed

Is a Sin?

Second Article:

thtis to the

It

would seem that scandal is not a sin. Objection i. For sins do not occur from neccessity, since all sin is voluntary, as stated above (Part I-II, Q. Lxxrv, a. i q. lxxx, a. i). Now it is written (Matt. 18. 7): It must needs be that scandals come. Therefore scandal is not a ;

sin.

Obj.

Further,

2.

No

sin arises

from a sense

of dutifulness, because a good tree cannot bri?ig

forth evil fruit (Matt.

come from

7.

But scandal may Our Lord

18).

a sense of dutifulness, for

said to Peter (Matt. 16. 23) Thou art a scandal unto Me, in reference to which words Jerome says^ that "the Apostle's error was due to his sense of dutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil." Therefore scandal is not always :

a sin.

publicly commits a sin or does something that

ill-disposed,

may be sometimes without spiritual and scandal is the stumbhng that

resentment downfall;

Obj.

3.

Further, Scandal denotes a stumbling.

But he that stumbles does not always fall. Therefore scandal, which is a spiritual fall, can be without

On

sin.

the contrary, Scandal

Now

rightly said or done."^

rectitude

with

is

a

sin.

is "something less anything that lacks

Therefore scandal

is

always

sin.

/ answer that.

As already stated

(a. i,

Reply

two kinds, passive scandal in the person scandalized, and active scandal in the person who gives scandal, and so occasions

4), scandal

is

of

a downfall. Accordingly passive scandal

ways a

is

al-

person scandalized for he is not scandalized except in so far as he succumbs sin in the

;

and that is a sin. Yet there can be passive scandal without sin on the part of the person whose action has octo a spiritual downfall,

casioned the scandal, as for instance,

person like

is

when

a

scandalized at another's good deed. In

manner active scandal is always a sin in who gives scandal, since either what

the person

only have the appearance

he does

is

a sin, or

of sin,

it

should always be

if it

left

undone out of

that love for our neighbour which binds each

one to be solicitous for his neighbour's salvation, so that if he persists in doing it he acts against charity. Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person scandalized, as stated above (a. i, Reply 4). Reply Obj. i. These words, It must needs be ^

In Matt., Bk.

' Cf.

Glossa

in, super 16.23

interl.,

(PL

26, 124).

super Matt. 18.8

(v, 56r).

PART

II

OF SECOND PART

ART.

Q. 43.

4

5^7

that scandals come, are to be understood to

brother be grieved, thou walkest not

convey not the absolute, but the conditional necessity of scandal; in which sense it is necessary that whatever God foresees or foretells must happen, provided it be taken together with such foreknowledge, as explained in the

cording to charity. Therefore scandal

now is

ac-

a spe-

cial sin.

/ answer that, As stated above

(a. i.

2), scandal is twofold, active

A.

Reply 4;

and passive.

First Part (q. xiv, a. 13, Reply 3; q. xxiii, a. 6,

Passive scandal cannot be a special sin, because through another's word or deed a man may fall

Reply 2).

into

Or we may say occurring

is

a necessity of end, because they

deed does not constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not imply a special deformity in

.

.

.

who

are re-

may he made manifest (I Cor. 11. 19). Or scandals must occur because of the condition of man who fails to shield himself from sin. Thus a physician on seeing a man partaking of unsuitable food might say that such a man must proved

injure his health, which

is

to be understood on

the condition that he does not change his diet.

In Hke manner

men

it

must be that scandals come

fail to

change their

evil

mode

of

living.

Reply Obj. 2. In that passage scandal is taken wide sense for any kind of hindrance. For Peter wished to hinder Our Lord's Passion

in the

out of a sense of dutifulness towards Christ.

Reply Obj.

No man

stumbles spiritually, without being kept back somewhat from advancing in God's way, and that is at least a venial sin.

Article

3.

and the fact that a man

sin;

takes occasion to sin from another's word or

are useful in order that they

so long as

any kind of

that the necessity of scandals

3.

Whether Scandal

Is a Special Sin?

We

opposition to a special virtue.

On

the other hand, active scandal

may

be un-

derstood in two ways, directly and accidentally. The scandal is accidental when it is beside the a man does not indeed or word, to occasion another's spiritual downfall, but merely to satisfy his own will. In such a case even active scandal is not a special sin, because a species is not constituted by that which is accidental. Active scandal is direct when a man intends,

agent's intention, as tend,

by

by

when

his inordinate

word or deed, to draw another and then it becomes a special kind of

his inordinate

into sin, sin

on account of the intention of a special kind

of end, because moral actions take their species

from

above (Part I-II, q. Hence, just as theft and murder are special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting the intention of doing a special I,

their end, as stated

A. 3; Q. XVIII, A. 6).

proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that scandal is not a special sin. Objection i. For scandal is "something said or done less rightly."^ But this apphes to every kind of sin. Therefore every sin is a scandal, and consequently, scandal is not a special sin. Obj. 2. Further, Every special kind of sin, or every special kind of injustice, may be found

injury to one's neighbour, so too, scandal

separately from other kinds, as stated in the

pect of a special sin from the end intended, as

Ethics? But scandal is not to be found separatefrom other sins. Therefore it is not a special kind of sin.

stated above.

ly

Obj.

3.

Further, Every special sin

is

consti-

tuted by something which specifies the moral

But the notion of scandal consists in its being something done in the presence of others, and the fact of a sin being committed openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance, does not seem to constitute the species of a sin. act.

Therefore scandal

On

is

the contrary,

cial sin

opposed to

it.

ten

(Rom.

14. 15)

:

active scandal, but

Reply Obj.

opposed to

If,

Matt. 18.8

1

Cf. Glossa Inter., super

2

Aristotle, v, 2 (1130^19).

it is

writ-

because of thy meat, thy (v, 56r).

2.

it

may

derive the formal as-

Active scandal can be found

when a man scanby a deed which is not a

separate from other sins, as dalizes his neighbour

an appearance of evil. Scandal does not derive the species of a special sin from the circumstance in question, but from the intention of the end, as stated above. sin in itself, but has

Reply Obj.

We

is

a

in-

harm to his neighbour, and it opposed to fraternal correction, by which a man intends the removal of a special kind of harm. Reply Obj. 1. Any sin may be the matter of

Article

But scandal

is

directly

sin.

a special virtue, namely charity. For

man

tends a special

is

special virtue has a spe-

not a special

A

special kind of sin, because thereby a

4.

3.

Whether Scandal

Is a

Mortal Sin?

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that scandal is a mortal sin. Objection 1. For every sin that is contrary to charity is a mortal sin, as stated above (q.

XXXV,

A,

scandal

is

3; Part I-II, Q. lxxxviii, a. 2). But contrary to charity, as stated above

.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

588 (aa.

3): Therefore scandal

2,

Obj.

No

Further,

2.

is

a mortal sin.

except mortal sin de-

sin

serves the punishment of eternal damnation. But scandal deserves the punishment of eternal

damnation, according to Matt. 18. 6: He that one of these little ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a millstone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowfied in the depth of the sea. shall scandalize

Jerome says on this passage,^ "it is better to receive a brief punishment for

For, as

much

another into venial

sin, to lead

be a venial

And

Article

Whether Passive

5.

Happen Even

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It seems that passive scandal may happen even to the perfect.

Objectioft

I.

and yet

For Christ was supremely per-

He

said to Peter (Matt. 16. 23):

Further, Every sin committed against God is a mortal sin, because mortal sin alone turns man away from God. Now scandal is a sin

fore can other perfect

against God, for the Apostle says (I Cor. 8. When you wound the weak conscience of 12)

life.

Obj.

3.

:

brethren, (Vulg.,— PF^ew you sin thus against the brethren and wound their weak consciefice.) you sin against Christ. Therefore scanthe

dal

always a mortal

is

On

may

be a venial sin to lead a person into venial sin, and yet this would be to give scandal. Therefore scandal may be a venial

sin.

/ answer that. As stated above (a. i), scandal

denotes a stumbling by which a person is disposed to a spiritual downfall. Consequently passive scandal may sometimes be a venial sin, when it consists in a stumbling and nothing

more, for instance, when a person is disturbed by a movement of venial sin occasioned by another's inordinate word or deed. But sometimes it is

a mortal sin,

when

the stumbling results

in a downfall, for instance

when

a person goes

commit a mortal sin through aninordinate word or deed.

so far as to other's

Active scandal,

if it

be accidental,

may some-

be a venial sin; for instance, when, through a slight indiscretion, a person either commits a venial sin, or does something that is not a sin in itself, but has some appearance

times

of evil.

On

the other hand,

it

is

sometimes a

because a person commits a sin, or because he has such contempt for his neighbour's spiritual welfare that he declines, for the sake of procuring it, to forego

mortal mortal

sin, either

doing what he wishes to do. But

in the case of

when

a person intends he intends to lead him into mortal sin, his own sin will be mortal; and in like manner if he intends by committing

active direct scandal, as

to lead another into sin,

if

a mortal sin himself to lead another into venial sin. But if he intends, by committing a venial 1

PL 26,

133.

Thou

art a scandal to

Obj.

Me. Much more

men

there-

suffer scandal.

Further, Scandal denotes an obsta-

2.

which

is brought into a person's spiritual even perfect men can be hindered in their progress along the spiritual life, according to I Thess. 2. 18: We woidd have come to you. I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath hindered us. Therefore even perfect men can

cle

Now

suffer scandal.

sin.

the contrary, It

May

Sca?idal

to the Perfect?

fect;

fault,

Ob-

this suffices for the Replies to the

jections.

than to await everlasting torments." Therefore scandal is a mortal sin. a

there will

sin,

sin of scandal.

Obj.

Further,

3.

Even

perfect

to venial sins, according to I

say that we have no Now passive scandal

sin,

men

John

are liable

i.

we deceive

we

8: If

ourselves.

is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial, as stated above (a, 4). Therefore passive scandal may be found in per-

fect

men.

On Matt.

the contrary, Jerome, in 18.

6,

He

commenting on

that shall scandalize one of

ones, says:^ "Observe that

these

little

little

one that

is

it is

the

scandalized, for the elders do

not take scandal." / answer that, Passive scandal implies that

the

mind

of the person

who

takes scandal

is

adherence to good. Now no man can be unsettled who adheres firmly to something immovable. The elders, that is, the perfect, adhere to God alone. Whose goodness is unchangeable, for though they adhere to their superiors, they do so only in so far as these adhere to Christ, according to I Cor. 4. 16: Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ. Therefore, however much others may appear to

unsettled in

them

its

conduct themselves

to

ill

in

word and

deed, they themselves do not stray from their righteousness, according to Ps. that trust in the

he shall not be

Lord

moved

shall be as

who adhere

to

They Sion:

for ever that dwelleth in

Jerusale?n. Therefore scandal

those

i:

Mount

124.

God

is

not found in

perfectly by love, ac-

Much peace have they and to them there is ?to stumbling-block (scandalum ) cording to Ps. 118. 165: that love

*

PL 26,

Thy

133.

law,

PART Reply Obj.

OF SECOND PART

II

As stated above

Reply 2), in this passage, scandal is used in a broad sense to denote any kind of hindrance. Hence Our Lord said to Peter: Thou art a scandal to Me, i.

(a. 2,

because he was endeavouring to weaken Our Lord's purpose of undergoing His Passion. Reply Obj. 2. Perfect men may be hindered the performance of external actions.

in

But

they are not hindered by the words or deeds of others from tending to God in the internal acts of the will, according to Rom, 8. s^, 39 Neither '

death, nor life

.

.

.

shall be able to separate us

from the love of God. Reply Obj. 3. Perfect men sometimes

says or does

is

589

7

inordinate.

the perfect to order

Let

Now

all their

it

belongs to

actions according

all

things be done decently and according to

order; and they are careful to do this especially

which not only would they do wrong, but would also be to others an occain those matters in

And if indeed they fail moderation in such words or deeds as come to the knowledge of others, this has its origin in human weakness because of which they fall short of perfection. Yet they do not fall sion of wrong-doing.

in this

short so far as to stray far from the order of fall into

reason, but only a

and

ter,

but they are not scandalized (taking scandal in its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although there can be an approach to scandal

mitting

My

ART.

to the rule of reason, as stated in I Cor. 14. 40:

venial sins through the weakness of the flesh;

in them, according to Ps. 72. 2:

Q. 43.

feet were

almost moved.

this is

little

reasonably take from

to is

and

in

some

slight

mat-

not so grave that anyone can it

an occasion for com-

sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Passive scandal is always due some active scandal; yet this active scandal not always in another, but in the very person is scandahzed, because, that is, he scandal-

who Article

Found

6.

Whether Active Scandal Can Be

in the Perfect?

We

proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It seems that active scandal can be found in the perfect.

For passion is the effect of acsome are scandalized passively by

Objection

Now

i.

izes himself.

Reply Obj. 2. In the opinion of Augustine^ and of Paul also, Peter sinned and was to be blamed in withdrawing from the gentiles in order to avoid the scandal of the Jews, because this somewhat incautiously, so that the

he did

Dost thou know that the Pharithis word, were scandalized? Therefore active scandal can be found

gentiles who had been converted to the faith were scandalized. Nevertheless Peter's action was not so grave a sin as to give others sufficient ground for scandal. Hence they were guilty of passive scandal, while there was no active scan-

in the perfect.

dal in Peter.

tion.

the words or deeds of the perfect, according to

Matt. sees,

14. 12:

when they heard

Obj.

2.

Holy Ghost, was in the state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles, for When I saw that they it is written (Gal. 2. 14) :

walked not uprightly unto the truth of the Gospel, all:

Reply Obj.

Further, Peter, after receiving the

I said to Cephas, that is, Peter, before them If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner

3.

The

venial sins of the perfect

consist chiefly in sudden

movements, which be-

If, however, they commit any venial sins even in their ex-

ing hidden cannot give scandal.

ternal words or deeds, these are so slight as to be insufficient in themselves to give scandal.

of the gentiles, and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles to live as do the

Article 7. Whether Spiritual Goods Should Be Given Up on Account of Scandal?

Jews? Therefore active scandal can be

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It seems that spiritual goods ought to be given up on account of scandal. Objection 1. For Augustine {Contra Ep. Parmen, iii, 2)2 teaches that punishment for sin

in the

perfect.

Obj.

3.

a venial

Further, Active scandal

sin.

But venial

men. Therefore active fect men.

On

is

perfect in per-

more opperfection than passive scandal. But

the contrary. Active scandal

posed to

sometimes

may be in scandal may be sins

is

passive scandal cannot be in the perfect.

Much

therefore, can active scandal be in them. / answer that. Active scandal, properly so called, occurs when a man says or does a thing which in itself is of a nature to occasion an-

less,

other's downfall,

and that

is

only

when what he

should cease when the peril of schism is feared. But punishment of sins is a spiritual good, since

an act of justice. Therefore a spiritual good be given up on account of scandal. Obj. 2. Further, The Sacred Doctrine is a most spiritual thing. Yet one ought to desist from it on account of scandal, according to it is

is

to

^Epist., XXVIII, 3 (PL 2,3, 113); Epist., xl, 3 (PL si* ^ PL 43. 92. 156) Epist., Lxxxii, 2 (PL 2>2>, 277);

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

590

Matt. 7. 6: Give not that which is holy, to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine turfiing upon you, they tear you. Therelest fore a spiritual good should be given up on ac.

.

.

count of scandal. Obj.

3.

Further, Since fraternal correction

is

Now

must be made in spiritual them are necessary for sal-

a distinction

goods. For

some

of

and cannot be omitted without mortal and it is evident that no man ought to

vation, sin,

commit a mortal sin in order to prevent another from sinning, because according to the order

an act of charity, it is a spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is omitted out of charity, in order to avoid giving scandal to others, as Augustine observes.^ Therefore a spiritual good should be

of charity a

given up on account of scandal. Obj. 4. Further, Jerome says^ that in order to avoid scandal we should give up whatever it is

scandal.

man ought

to love his

own

spirit-

more than another's. Therefore one ought not to give up that which is necesual

welfare

sary for salvation,

order to avoid giving

in

possible to omit without prejudice to the threefold truth, that is, the truth of life, of justice

Again a distinction seems necessary among which are not necessary for salvation, because the scandal which arises from such things sometimes proceeds from malice;

and of doctrine. Now the observance of the counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often

spiritual

be omitted without prejudice to this threefold truth; otherwise whoever omitted them would always be guilty of sin, and yet such things are the greatest of spiritual works. Therefore spiritual works should be omitted on ac-

spiritual things

when a man wishes to hinder those goods by stirring up scandal. This is

for instance

the scandal of the Pharisees, dalized at

Our Lord's

scan-

Our Lord

teaches (Matt. 15. 14) that we ought to treat suchlike scandal with contempt.

Sometimes scandal proceeds from weakness or ignorance, and such

count of scandal.

who were

teaching, and

is

the scandal of

little

sin is

ones. In order to avoid this kind of scandal,

a spiritual good, since any sin brings spiritual harm to the sinner. Now it seems that one ought

goods ought to be either concealed, or sometimes even deferred (if this can be done without incurring immediate danger), until the matter being explained the scandal cease. If, however, the scandal continue after the matter has been explained, it would seem to be due to malice, and then it would no longer be right to omit that spiritual good in order to avoid such-

Obj.

5.

The avoidance

Further,

sometimes

commit

to

of

any

a venial sin in order to

avoid scandalizing one's neighbour, for instance when by sinning venially one would prevent someone else from committing a mortal sin; for one

is

bound

damnation of

to hinder the

much

one's neighbour as

own

as one can without

spiritual

which is not Therefore one ought to give up a spiritual good in order to avoid

like scandal.

scandal.

view but

prejudice to one's

precluded by a venial

On

the contrary, Gregory says {Horn. Super

Ezech. vii) truth,

salvation,

sin.

it is

"If people are scandalized at the

:^

better to allow the birth of scandal,

than to abandon the truth." belong, above spiritual

all

Now

spiritual

goods

others, to the truth. Therefore

goods are not to be given up on ac-

count of scandal. / answer that, Although scandal

is

twofold,

active and passive, the present question does

not apply to active scandal, for since active scandal is something said or done less rightly, nothing ought to be done that implies active scandal.

The question

does, however, apply to passive

scandal, and accordingly

ought to be given up 1

City of God,

Wm.

I,

(PL

in

we have

to see

what

order to avoid scandal.

41, 22).

Summa

Aurca, in, tr. 24, q. 4 (236v^); also Hugh of St. Cher, In Matt. 18.7 (vi, 61); cf. also Gregory the Great, In Ezech., hom., vii (PL 76, *

Cf.

842).

8

of Auxcrre,

PL

76, 842.

Reply Obj. i. In the infliction of punishment not the punishment itself that is the end in

it is

its

medicinal properties in checking punishment partakes of the na-

sin; therefore

ture of justice, in so far as if it is

it

checks

sin.

But

evident that the infliction of punishment

more numerous and more grievous committed, the infliction of punishment will no longer be a part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking, when, that is, the excommunication of a few threatens to bring about the danger of a schism, for in that case it would not pertain to the truth of justice to pronounce excommunication. Reply Obj. 2. With regard to a man's doctrine two points must be considered, namely,

will result in sins being

the truth which ing.

The

that,

first

is

taught, and the act of teach-

of these

is

necessary for salvation, it is to teach should

namely, he whose duty

not teach what

is

contrary to the truth, and

that he should teach the truth according to the

requirements of times and persons therefore on to suppress the truth and ;

no account ought he

PART

II

OF SECOND PART

teach error in order to avoid any scandal that might ensue. But the act itself of teaching is

—

one of the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (q. XXXII, A. 2), and so the same is to be said of it as of the other works of mercy, of which we shall speak further on (Reply 4). Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (q. xxxiii, a. i), fraternal correction aims at the correction of a brother, and therefore it is to be counted among spiritual goods in so far as this end can be obtained, which is not the case if the brother be scandalized through being corrected. And so, if the correction be omitted in order to avoid scandal, no spiritual good is given up.

Reply Obj. 4. The truth of life, of doctrine, and of justice comprises not only whatever is necessary for salvation, but also whatever is a

means

of obtaining salvation

according to

I

Be

Cor. 12. 31:

more

perfectly,

zealous for the

better gifts. Therefore neither the counsels nor

even the works of mercy are to be altogether omitted in order to avoid scandal; but sometimes they should be concealed or deferred, on account of the scandal of the little ones, as stated above. Sometimes, however, the observance of the counsels and the fulfilment of the works of mercy are necessary for salvation. This may be seen in the case of those who have vowed to keep the counsels, and of those whose duty it is to reheve the wants of others, either in temporal matters (as by feeding the hungry), or in spiritual matters (as by instructing the ignorant), whether such duties

Q. 43.

ART.

8

S9I

Article 8. Whether Temporal Goods Should Be Given Up on Account of Scandal?

We

proceed thus to the Eighth Article:

It

would seem that temporal goods should be given up on account of scandal. Objection i. For we ought to love our neighbour's spiritual welfare which is hindered by scandal more than any temporal goods whatever. But we give up what we love less for the sake of what we love more. Therefore we should give up temporal goods in order to avoid scandalizing our neighbour.

Obj. 2. Further, According to Jerome's rule,^ whatever can be given up without prejudice to the threefold truth should be given up in order to avoid scandal. Now temporal goods can be given up without prejudice to the threefold truth. Therefore they should be given up in order to avoid scandal.

Obj. 3. Further, No temporal good is more necessary than food. But we ought to give up taking food on account of scandal, according to

Rom. for

14. 15:

whom

Destroy not him with thy meat

Christ died.

Much more

therefore

should all other temporal goods be given up on account of scandal.

of prelates, or

Obj. 4. Further, The most fitting way of safeguarding and recovering temporal goods is the court of justice. But it is unlawful to have recourse to justice, especially if scandal ensues, for it is written (Matt. 5. 40) If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and (I Cor. 6. 7) Already indeed there is plainly a fatdt among you, that you have lawsuits one with

person in

another.

arise

from

their being enjoined as in the case

from the need on the part of the want; and then the same applies to

these things as to others that are necessary for salvation.

Reply Obj. 5. Some have said that one ought commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandal.^ But this implies a contradiction, since if it ought to be done, it is no longer evil or sin-

:

:

a sin cannot be a matter of choice.

may happen however

that,

circumstance, something

It

on account of some

is

not a venial

sin,

though it would be were it not for that circumstance; thus an idle word is a venial sin, when it is uttered uselessly, yet if it be uttered for a reasonable cause, it is neither idle nor sinful. And though venial sin does not deprive a man of grace which is his means of salvation, yet, in so far as it disposes him to mortal sin,

forego temporal goods on account of scandal. Obj.

up

(PL

49,

Further,

We

ought,

it

seems, to give

temporal goods which are

connected with spiritual goods, and yet we ought to give them up on account of scandal. For the Apostle while sowing spiritual things did not accept a temporal stipend lest he should give any hindra7ice to the Gospel of Christ as we read I Cor. 9. 12. For a like reason the Church does not demand tithes in certain countries, in order to avoid scandal. Much more, therefore, ought we to give up other temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.

On 2

Cassianus, Collationes, Coll. xvn, chap. 17 1063). 1

5.

least of all those

tends to the loss of salvation.

it

do you not rather take wrong?

not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded? Therefore it seems that we ought to

to

ful, for

Why

why do you

Cf.

the contrary, Blessed

Hugh

of St. Cher,

Thomas

In Univ.

Test.,

of Cantersuper Matt.

18.7 (VI, 61); Alexander of Hales, S. T., ii-ii, n. 862

m,

821).

(QR

SUMMA

THEOLOGICA 592 Reply Obj. 2. If it were permissible for wickbury demanded the restitution of Church proped men to rob other people of their property, erty, notwithstanding that the king took scanthis would tend to the detriment of the truth dal from his doing so.^ of life and justice. Therefore we are not always / answer that, A distinction must be made in bound to give up our temporal goods in order temporal goods, for either they are ours, or they are committed to us to take care of them someone else; thus the goods of the Church are committed to prelates, and the goods of the community are entrusted to all such persons as

to avoid scandal.

Reply Obj.

for

have authority over the latter case the care of

common

weal. In this

such things (as of things

held in deposit) devolves of necessity on those persons to whom they are entrusted, and therefore,

even as other things that are necessary up on

for salvation, they are not to be given

account of scandal.

On

the other hand, as re-

gards those temporalities of which

we have

the

dominion, sometimes, on account of scandal,

we we

are

bound

to give

them

up. and sometimes

we abandon them we have them in our pos-

are not so bound, whether

by giving them up, if session, or by omitting to claim them, if they are in the possession of others. For if the scandal arise from this through the ignorance or weakness of others (in which case, as stated above,

a. 7, it is

we

scandal of the Httle ones)

up such temporalities altogether, or the scandal must be abated by some other means, namely, by some kind of admonition. Hence Augustine says {De Senn. Dom. in Monte, i, 20) } "Thou shouldst give so as to

must

either give

injure neither thyself nor another, as

much

as

not to give up temporal goods for the sake of those who stir up scandals of this kind, for this would both be harmful to the common good,

would give wicked men an opportunity would be injurious to the plunderers themselves, who would remain in sin as long as they were in possession of another's property. Hence Gregory says {Moral, xxxi, 13) :^ "Sometimes we ought to suffer those who rob us of our temporalities, while sometimes we since

it

of plunder, and

should resist them, as far as equity allows, in the hope not only that we may safeguard our property, but also lest those

not theirs

This

may

who

take what

lose themselves."

suffices for the

Reply

to the First

Ob-

jection.

John of

*

Cf.

»

PL 34.

Salisbury, vitaS.

1264.

is

»

PL

Tfwmae (PL

76, 586.

lyo, 200).

intention

from food on

account of scandal, because our welfare requires that we should take food, but he intended to counsel abstinence from a particular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal, according to I Cor. 8. 13: / will fiever eat flesh, lest I should scandalize

my

brother.

Reply Obj. 4. According to Augustine {De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 19)'* this precept of Our Lord is to be understood of "the preparedness of the mind," namely, that man should be prepared,

if

it

be expedient, to suffer being

harmed or defrauded, rather than go to law. But sometimes it is not expedient, as stated above (Reply 2). The same applies to the saying of the Apostle.

Reply Obj. 5. The scandal which the Apostle avoided arose from an error of the gentiles who were not used to this payment. Hence he was obliged to give it up for the time being, so that they might be taught first of all that such a

payment was a duty. For a hke reason the Church refrains from demanding tithes in those countries where it is not customary to pay them.

thou canst lend, and if thou refusest what is asked, thou must yet be just to him, indeed thou wilt give him something better than he asks, if

thou reprove him that asks unjustly." Sometimes, however, scandal arises from malice. This is scandal of the Pharisees, and we ought

The Apostle had no

3.

of counselling total abstinence

QUESTION XLIV Of the precepts

of charity

{In Eight Articles)

We must

now

consider the Precepts of Charity,

under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (i) Whether precepts should be given about charity? (2) Whether there should be one or two? (3) Whether two suffice? (4) Whether it

is

fittingly prescribed that

we should

love

God, with thy whole heart? (5) Whether it is fittingly added: With thy whole mind, etc.? (6)

Whether

it

is

possible to

fulfil this

precept in

Of the precept: Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself: (8) Whether the or-

this life? (7)

der of charity

is

included in the precept?

Article i. Whether Any Precept Should Be Given about Charity?

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that no precept should be given about charity.

:

PL 34,

133.

»

PL

this

76, 621.

*

PL

75, 947.

PART

II

OF SECOND PART

Obj.

3.

Further, Anger especially

is

is

pertaining to folly, namely, "hatred of God and despair of the life to come"; thus he divides

written (Prov.

7.

22)

Immediately he jolloweth her, that is, the harlot .. not knowing that he is drawn like a fool .

to bonds.

I answer that, As already stated

(a. 2), folly,

caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be incapable of judging spiritual things. Now man's sense is in so far as it is a sin, is

plunged into earthly things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest pleasures; and these absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore the folly which is a sin arises chiefly

from lust. Reply Obj.

i.

605

3

the cause

some persons, and this pertains to folly. Therefore folly arises from anger rather than from lust. the contrary, It

ART.

should have a distaste for God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of lust,

is

of fury and madness in

On

Q. 46,

a

Therefore folly daughter of duplicity rather than of lust, this pertains to duplicity.

It is part of folly that a

man

two parts as it were. Reply Obj. 2. These words of the Apostle are

folly into

to be understood, not causally but essentially,

because, namely, worldly

wisdom

itself is folly

with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to worldly wisdom is a cause of this folly.

Reply Obj.

3,

Anger by reason of

stated above

(Part

its

keen-

ness,

as

A. 2),

produces a great change in the nature of it conduces very much

I-II,

q.

xlviii,

the body, and therefore

to the folly which results from a bodily impediment. On the other hand the folly which is caused by a spiritual impediment, namely by the mind being plunged into earthly things, arises chiefly

from

lust, as stated

above.

ON ACTIVE AND

TREATISE

CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE house, I shall repose myself with her. Therefore it would seem that life is unfittingly di-

QUESTION CLXXIX Of the division of life into active and contemplative Two

{In

We

vided into active and contemplative.

On

must next consider active and contempla-

tive life. This consideration will

be fourfold:

Of the division of life into active and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life (q. CLXxx); (3) Of the active hfe (q. clxxxi) (4) Of the comparison between the active and (i)

;

the contemplative Hfe (q. clxxxii).

Under the inquiry:

first

(i)

head there are two points of

Whether

life

is

Gregory says (Hom. n, "There is a twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the active Hfe and the contemplative." / answer that. Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined, is that which is most becoming to it from itself; and so every Hving thing gives proof of its Hfe by that operation which is most proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. contrary,

the

super Ezech.)

Articles)

fittingly divided

:^

into active

Thus the

this is

ishment and generation; the Hfe of animals in sensation and movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting according to reason. Therefore also in men the life of every man would seem to be that in which he delights most, and on which he is most intent, and that in which especially they wish to pass their time with their friends, as stated in the Ethics.^ Ac-

and contemplative? (2) Whether an adequate division?

Article

i.

into Active

Whether Life Is Fittingly Divided and Contemplative?

We proceed thus to the First Article: It seems that hfe is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative. Objection i. For the soul is the principle of Hfe by its essence; for the Philosopher says^ that "in living things to live soul

is

tion

by

is

to be."

Now

the

that life

is

not fittingly

is

said to consist in nour-

men

cordingly since certain

are especially in-

are especially intent on external actions,

would seem divided into active and

powers. Therefore

of plants

tent on the contemplation of truth, while others

the principle of action and contemplaits

life

lows that man's

it

life is fittingly

it fol-

divided into ac-

and contemplative. Reply Obj. 1. Each thing's proper form that makes it actually to be is the principle of operation proper to that thing. Hence to live is, tive

contemplative. Obj. 2. Further, The division of that which comes afterwards is unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and contemplative, or speculative and practical, are differences of the intellect,^ while "to Hve" comes before "to understand," since "to live" comes soul, as the Philosopher states.^

living things, to be, because living things through having being from their form, act in such and such a way. Reply Obj. 2. Life in general is not divided into active and contemplative, but ^he life of man, who derives his species from having an

is

intellect,

through the vegetative Therefore life unfittingly divided into active and contem-

first

to

living

things

plative.

Obj. ;*

and therefore the same division apand human life.

plies to intellect 3.

The word

Further,

movement, according iv)

in

"life"

Nom.

but contemplation consists rather in

according to Wisd.

8.

16:

When

Reply Obj. 3. It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external movements. Never-

implies

to Dionysius {Div.

theless to contemplate

rest,

I enter into

my

is itself

scribed as a

movement

;

l5o«/.II,4(4l5*'i3)*

Ibid., Ill, 10 (433*14).

*

Sect. lo

(PG 3,

705);

cf. VI, 2

'

Ibid.,

(PG 3,

II,

a

movement

the intellect, in so far as every operation

4 (415*24).

857).

606

6

PL

•

Aristotle, ix, 12 (1172*5).

76, 952.

in

is

of

de-

which sense the Phi-

PART

II

OF SECOND PART

losopher says^ that sensation and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as the act of a perfect thing

is

a

movement. In

this

way Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv)^ ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation, namely straight, circular,

Article

2.

into Active

and obUque.

Whether Life Is Adequately Divided and Contemplative?

We

proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that life is not adequately divided into active and contemplative.

Objection

i.

For the Philosopher says^ that

"there are three most excellent kinds of the

life,"

would seem and the contem-

of pleasure, the civil which

life

to be the

same

as the active,

plative Hfe. Therefore the division of hfe into

contemplative would seem to be

active and

inadequate. Obj.

2.

kinds of

Further, Augustine mentions^ three

life,

namely the

life

of "leisure" which

pertains to the contemplative, the "busy" life

ART.

Q. 180.

607

i

Reply Obj. i. The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals therefore as the Phi;

losopher says,^

it

is

the

life

Hence

of a beast.

not included in this division of the Hfe of a man into active and contemplative. Reply Obj. 2. A mean is a combination of extremes, and therefore it is virtually contained it is

in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in white and black. In Hke manner active and con-

templative comprise that which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one of the absolutes predominates, so too, in the mean of Hfe sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds. Reply Obj. 3. All the occupations of human state

actions, if directed to the requirements of the present Hfe in accord with right reason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of the present life by means of weU-

ordered activity. If, on the other hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they

which pertains to the active, and a third "composed of both." Therefore it would seem that life is inadequately divided into active and

prised under the active Hfe. Those

human

contemplative.

truth belong to the contemplative

life.

Obj.

3.

Further, Man's

life is diversified

QUESTION CLXXX

there are

the contrary, These two lives are signi-

by the two wives of Jacob (Gen. 19) the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel; and by the two hostesses of our Lord the contemplative life by Mary, and the active life by Martha (Luke 10. 38), as Gregory declares {Moral vi, 37).^ Now this signification would not be fitting if there Vv^ere more than two lives. fied

:

:

Therefore

life is

adequately divided into active

and contemplative. / answer that, As stated

Of the contemplative

in the foregoing

Ar-

(Reply 2), this division applies to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is divided into active and contempla-

end of intellectual knowledge is knowledge itself of truth, which per-

must now consider the contemplative

Hfe,

under which head there are eight points of

Whether the contemiplative Hfe

quiry: (i)

in-

per-

tains to the intellect only, or also to the affec-

Whether the moral

tions? (2)

virtues pertain

to the contemplative Hfe? (3) Whether the con-

templative Hfe consists in one action or in several? (4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the contemplative

Hfe?

man

ticle

life

(In Eight Articles)

We

than the active and the contemplative.

On

not com-

ac-

more than two occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that Hfe should be divided into more kinds are occupied.

is

occupations that are directed to the consideration of

men

cording to the different actions in which

Now

belong to the Hfe of pleasure, which

(5)

Whether the contemplative

in this state

life

of

can arise to the vision of God?

(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). (7) Of the pleasure of contemplation. (8)

Of the dura-

tion of contemplation.

tive, since the

either the

tains to the contemplative intellect, or

some

external action, which pertains to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too

is adequately divided into active and contemplative.

Whether the Contemplative Life the Affections, and Pertains Wholly to the Intellect? Article

i.

Has Nothing To Do With

We proceed thus to the First Article:

It

seems

that the contemplative Hfe has nothing to do

with the affections and pertains wholly to the 1

Soul,

III, 7

(431*4).

^Ethics,!, s (1095^17). * City of God, xix, 2, 3, 19 «;

PL 75,

764.

2

Sect. 8

(PL

(PG 3,

704).

intellect.

Objection

41, 624; 627; 647). ^

toe.

cit.

i. "^

For the Philosopher says^ that

Metaphysics,

11. i

(993^20).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

6o8 "the end of contemplation

is

Now

truth."

truth

pertains wholly to the intellect. Therefore

would seem that the contemplative

life

it

wholly

of an appetible good, both lovable and dehghtful,

2.

Further, Gregor>' says {Moral,

that "Rachel, which

is

vi.

37)^

interpreted 'vision of the

contemplative life." Now the vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the contemplative life beprinciple,' signifies the

longs properly to the intellect.

Obj.

3.

Further, Gregory says {Horn,

Ezech.y that life

it

ii

in

pertains to the contemplative

"to rest from external action."

Now

the

power inclines to exit would seem that the contemplative Hfe has nothing to do with the

affective

pertains to the appeti-

it

2.

We

are urged to the vision of

namely God, by the love for it; hence Gregory says {Horn, ii in Ezech.y that "the contemplative life tramples on all cares and longs to see the face of its Creator." Reply Obj. 3. The appetitive power moves not only the bodily members to perform exthe

principle,

first

ternal actions, but also the intellect to practise

the

act

of

contemplation,

stated

as

the

in

Article.

or appetitive

ternal actions. Therefore

appetitive power.

On

in this respect

Reply Obj.

regards the intellect. Obj.

and

tive power.

the contrary, Gregory says {ibid.) that

"the contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God and our neighbour, and to desire nothing beside our Creator." Now desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as stated above (Part I-II, Q. XXV, A. 2). Therefore the contemplative Hfe has also something to do with the affective or appetitive power. / answer that, As stated above (q. clxxix, A. i) the contemplative life is said of those who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (Part I-II, q. xii, a. i), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards

Article

Whether the Moral Virtues Pertain

2.

Contemplative Life?

to the

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative hfe.

Objection i. For Gregory says {Horn, ii in Ezech.y that "the contemplative hfe is to cling to the love of God and our neighbour with the whole mind." Now all the moral virtues, whose acts are prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God and of our neighbour, for love

Law (Rom.

13.

.

.

.

is

the fulfilling of the

10). Therefore

would seem

it

that the moral virtues belong to the contemplative

Obj.

life.

The contemplative life is contemplation of God; for {Horn, ii in Ezech.y that "the

Further,

2.

chiefly directed to the

Gregory says

mind tramples on

intellect,

all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its Creator." Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart, which is a result of moral virtue. For it is written (Matt. 5. 8) Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God; and (Heb. 12. 14): Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God. Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the con-

because, as

templative

the essence of the action, pertains to the intel-

but as regards what moves to the exercise it belongs to the will, which moves the other powers, even the intellect, to their

lect,

of that action all

above (Part

actions, as stated

Now

the appetitive

I-II, q. ix, a. i).

power moves one

to ob-

serve things either with the senses or with the

sometimes for love of the thing seen it is written (Matt. 6. 21), where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also, sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one acquires by observation. Hence Gregory makes the contemplative

consist in "the love of through loving God we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life terminates in

God,"

life to

in so far as

delight,

which

is

seated in the affective power,

the result being that love also

becomes more

intense.

i

PL 75,

Obj.

3.

life.

Further, Gregory says

764.

2

PL 76, 953.

{Hom.

ii

in

Ezech.y that "the contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," and so it is signified by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gen. 29. 17) that she was of a beautiful countenance. Now the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues,

Ambrose says {De

especially temperance, as Offic.

i,

43).^ Therefore

it

seems that the moral

virtues pertain to the contemplative

On

the contrary.

The moral

rected to external actions.

Reply Obj. I. From the very fact that truth the end of contemplation, it has the aspect

is

:

{Hovi. s 7

ii

in

PL 76, 953. PL 16, 93.

Ezech.y that *IbU. '

Loc.

cit.

it

life.

virtues are di-

Now

Gregory says

belongs to the con^lUd.

Uhid,

PART templative

II

OF SECOND PART

"to rest from external action."

life

Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the contemplative life. / answer that, A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways, essentially or as a predisposition. The moral virtues do not belong to the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the contemplative life is the consideration of truth. And as the Philosopher states,^ "knowledge," which pertains to the consideration of truth, "has httle influence on the moral virtues"; hence he declares^ that the moral virtues pertain to active but not to contemplative happiness. On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life as a predisposition. For the act of contemplation, in which the contemplative life essentially consists is hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which

withdraw the

Now

from intelligible and by outward disturbances.

soul's intention

to sensible things,

the moral virtues curb the impetuosity of

far that

virtues belong

dispositively to the contemplative

Reply Obj.

i.

As stated

in

Article, the contemplative life

life.

the foregoing

has

its

moving

cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the love of

God and

requisite to the contemplative

our neighbour life.

is

Now moving

but dispose and perfect

it.

Therefore

it

does not

to the contemplative Hfe.

Reply Obj.

2.

Holiness, that

is,

cleanness of

caused by the virtues that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the reason; and peace is caused by jusheart,

tice

is

which

is

about operations, according to

Isa.

The work of justice shall be peace, since he who refrains from wronging others lessens 32. 17,

all is it in

temperance, which restrains

the concupiscences which especially darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since sexual pleasures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as

Augustine says (Soliloq.

i,

10).^

Article 3. Whether There Are Various Actions Pertaining to the Contemplative Life?

We proceed thus to the Third Article: It seems that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative

life.

For Richard of S. Victor'* distinguishes between contemplation, meditation, and cogitation. Yet all these apparently pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that there are various actions pertaining Objection

i.

to the contemplative

Obj.

life.

The Apostle

Further,

2.

says (II Cor.

But we beholding (specidantes) the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same clarity. (Vulg., into the same image from glory to glory.) Now this be3.

18)

:

.

.

.

longs to the contemplative

life.

Therefore in

addition to the three mentioned above, vision (speculatio) belongs to the contemplative

causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, follow that the moral virtues belong essentially

609

3

as they share the order of reason;

is

and above

the passions, and quell the disturbance of out-

ward occupations. Hence moral

ART.

Q. 180.

lover of her beauty. On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, in so

Obj.

Further, Bernard says

3.

and greatest contemplaadmiration of the Majesty." Now according to Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii, 15)^ admiration is a kind of fear. Therefore it would V, 14)^ that "the first

tion

is

seem that several templative Obj.

4.

Further, Prayer, reading, and medita-

tion, are said to life.'^

acts are requisite for the con-

life.

belong to the contemplative

Again, hearing belongs to the contempla-

tive life, since

stated that

it is

Mary (by whom

and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and clean-

at the Lord's feet, heard His

ness of heart.

requisite for the contemplative Hfe.

Reply Obj. 3. Beauty, as stated above (q. cxLV, A. 2), consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these has its roots

tion on

the

occasions

of

quarrels

because both the light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence since the contemplative Hfe consists in an act of the reason, there is beauty in it per se and in the reason,

essentially; therefore

it is

of the contemplation of 1

Ethics, n, 4 (1105^2).

written (Wis.

8.

^Ihid.. x, 8 (iiyS^g).

the contemplative

Therefore

On

sitting

life is signified)

word (Luke

.

.

.

10. 39).

would seem that several acts are

it

the contrary. Life signifies here the opera-

which a

man

is

chiefly intent.

Therefore

there are several operations of the contem-

if

plative

life,

there will be, not one, but several

contemplative

lives.

/ answer that, We are now speaking of the contemplative life as it pertains to man. Now 3

PL 32,

*

De Grat.

6

PL

182, 806.

7

Cf.

Hugh of St.

2)

wisdom: / became a

life.

(De Consid.

80s).

878.

Contemplatiia, 8

i,

4 (PL 196, 66).

PG 94. 932.

Victor, Allegor. in N.T.,

iii,

3

(PL

175,

:

SUMMA TUEOLOGICA

6io

Nom.

according to Dionysius (Div.

man and

tween

angel there

be-

vii)'

this difference,

is

that an angel has an insight of the truth

by

simple apprehension, while as man arrives at the insight of a simple truth by a process from

from the apprehension of a thing that Hence it results from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was stated above (a. i) that contemplation termiresulting

surpasses our power.

nates in the affections.

Reply Obj.

several things. Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one act in which

it

is

finally

completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its unity. Yet it has

many Some

by which

acts

arrives at this final act.

it

of these pertain to the reception of prin-

from which

ciples,

it

proceeds to the contem-

plation of truth; others are concerned with de-

ducing from the principles, the truth the knowledge of which is sought and the last and crown;

ing act

the contemplation itself of the truth.

is

Reply Obj.

i.

According to Richard of S. Vicwould seem to pertain

Man

4.

reaches the knowledge of

truth in two ways. First, by

means

of things

received from another. In this way, as regards the things he receives from God, he needs pray-

according to Wisd.

er,

and the

spirit of

7.

7,

/ called

upon God,

misdom came upon me, while

as regards the things he receives from man, he needs hearing, in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and reading, in so far as he re-

ceives from the tradition of

Holy Writ. Secondhe needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he requires meditation.

ly,

tor {loc. cit.) cogitation to the consideration

(ifispectio)

of the

from which a person intends

things

one simple

Hence

truth.

cogitation

many

to gather

may com-

4. Whether the Contemplative Life Consists in the Contemplation of God Alone, or Also in the Consideration of Any

Article

prise not only the perceptions of the senses in

Truth Whatever?

the knowing of certain effects, but also the data

We proceed thus to the fourth Article: It seems that the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of any truth. Objection 1. For it is written (Ps. 138. 14) Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul knoweth right well. Now the knowledge of God's works is effected by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem that it pertains to the contemplative hfe to contemplate not only the divine truth, but also any other. Obj. 2. Further, Bernard says {De Consid. v, 14)^ that "contemplation consists in admiration first of God's m.ajesty, secondly of His judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises." Now of these four the first alone regards the divine truth, and the other three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life consists not only in the contempla-

of the imagination, and again the discourse of

reason about the various signs or of anything that conduces to the truth in view, although, according to Augustine, (De Trin. xiv, y),^ cogitation

may

signify

any actual operation of the

Meditation would seem to be the process of reason from certain principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth; and consideration has the same meaning, according to Bernard {De Consid. ii, 2),^ although, acintellect.

cording to the Philosopher,"* every operation of

may be called consideration. But contemplation regards the simple act of gazing (intuitio) on the truth; hence Richard says

the intellect

again^ that "contemplation

and of

gaze; meditation

its

of the truth;

is

the soul's clear

is

upon the object

free dwelling {contuitus)

the survey {intuitio)

mind while occupied in searching for the and cogitation is the mind's glance which

prone to wander." Reply Obj. 2. According to a gloss of Augustine on his passage {De Triii. xv, 8),^ "beholding {speadatio) denotes seeing in a mirror {speailo), not from a watch-tower {specula)." Now to see a thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect in which its likeness is reflected. Hence "beholding" would seem to be reducible

is

1

Sect.

3

PL

6

Dc

6

PL

bardi

2

(PG

3,

3.

Admiration

869).

Obj.

is

PL 42, I

a kind of fear

Ui 2'' 11).

cf.

192, 28).

i, 3, 4 (PL 106, 66; 67). Glossa ordin. {yi, 65 E); Glossa

contemplation.

6)^

(De

distinguishes six species of

The

first

belongs to "the imagi-

The second is in "the imagination guided by reason," and consists in considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. poreal things.

third

is

in the

"reason based on the imagi-

nation"; when, that the

fourth

Lom-

i,

nation alone," and consists in thinking of cor-

of

1042.

Further, Richard of S. Victor

3.

Conte^npl.

ConlempL,

42, 1067;

(PL

«

*Soul,u,

182. 745.

Grat.

eration of truth regarding the divine effects.

The

to meditation.

Reply Obj.

tion of the divine truth, but also in the consid-

son," 7

PL

visible is

we

from the consideration

is,

rise

to

the invisible.

when

the

182, 806.

mind 8

is

PL

The

and according to reaintent on things invisible

"in the reason

196, 70.

PART

II

OF SECOND PART

of which the imagination has no knowledge. fifth is ''above the

elation

we know

reason,"

when by

The

divine rev-

things that cannot be compre-

hended by the human reason. The sixth is "above reason and against reason"; when, that is, by the divine enlightening we know things that seem contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of the mystery of the Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to pertain Therefore the contempla-

to the divine truth.

tion of truth regards not only the divine truth,

but also that which is considered in creatures. Obj. 4. Further, In the contemplative hfe the

contemplation of truth perfection of man.

human

of the

sought as being the

is

Now any truth is a perfection

intellect.

Therefore the contem-

plative life consists in the contemplation of

any

truth.

On

the contrary, Gregory says (Moral, vi,

37)^ that "in contemplation

we seek

which is God." / answer that, As stated above

the prin-

ciple,

may

(a. 2),

belong to the contemplative

life

a thing in

two

ways: principally, and secondarily or as a predisposition. That which belongs principally to the contemplative life is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this contemplation is the end of the whole human Hfe. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8)^ that "the contemplation of God is promised us as being the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfection of our joys." This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, when we shall see God face to face, and it will make us perfectly happy. But now the contemplation of the divine truth is open to us imperfectly, namely through a glass and in a dark manner (I Cor. 13. 12). Hence it bestows on us a certain beginning of happiness, which starts now and will be continued in the life to come; hence the Philosopher^ places man's ultim.ate happiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible object. Since, However, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation of God Himself, according to

God

.

.

.

Rom.

I.

20,

The

the things that are made, it follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also belongs in a secondary way to the contemplative hfe, acis,

as

man

{De Vera

1

PL

guided in this

Accordingly

it

clear

is

from what has been

3) that four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative Hfe: first, the said (aa.

2,

moral virtues; secondly, other acts apart from contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; fourthly, the complement of

which

all,

the contemplation of the divine truth

is

itself.

Reply Obj. i. David sought the knowledge of God's works so that he might be led by them to God hence he says elsewhere (Ps. 142.5,6): / meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee. ;

Reply Obj. 2. By considering the divine judgments man is guided to the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the divine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God's mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be vouchsafed.

Reply Obj. 3. These six denote the steps by which we ascend by means of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step consists in the perception of sensible things themthe second step consists in going forward

selves

;

from

sensible to intelligible things; the third

step

is

to judge of sensible things according to

inteUigible things;

the fourth

is

the absolute

consideration of the intelligible things to which

one has attained by means of sensibles; the contemplation of those intelligible

fifth is the

things that are unattainable bles,

but which the reason

sixth step

is

by means of

is

sensi-

able to grasp; the

the consideration of such intelligible

things as the reason can neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime contemplation of divine truth, in

which contemplation

is

ultimately perfected.

Reply Obj.

4.

The ultimate

intellect is the divine truth;

perfection of the

and other truths

perfect the intellect in relation to the divine truth.

way

to

Article

5.

Whether in the Present State of Can Reach

Life the Contemplative Life to the Vision of the

We

Divine Essence?

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It

seems that

in the present state of life the con-

templative hfe can reach to the vision of the

xxixY that "in the study of exercise an empty and but should make them the step-

Divine essence. Objection 1. For, as stated in Gen. 32. 30, Jacob said: / have seen God face to face, and my soul has been saved. Now the vision of God's face is the vision of the Divine essence. There-

Relig.

we must not

futile curiosity,

ing."

Hence Augustine says

the knowledge of God. creatures

is

611

5

invisible things of

are clearly seen, being understood by

cording, that

ART.

Q. 180.

ping-stone to things unperishable and everlast-

75, 764.

^Ethics, X, 7 (1177^17).

2 4

PL PL

42, 831. 34, 14s.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

6l2

would seem that in the present life one fore may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in His essence. Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says {Moral, vi, 37)^ that contemplative men "withdraw within themit

selves in order to explore spiritual things, nor do they ever carry with them the shadows of

things corporeal or if these follow them they prudently drive them away; but being desirous of seeing the boundless light, they suppress all the images by which they tend to circumscribe themselves, and through longing to reach what is above them, they overcome that which they

Now man is not hindered from seeing the Divine essence, which is the boundless light, save by the necessity of turning to coiporeal phantasms. Therefore it would seem that the contemplation of the present life can extend to the vision of the boundless light in its essence. Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says {Dial, ii, 35) :^ are."

"All creatures are small to the soul that sees its Creator; therefore when the man of God, (the

blessed Benedict, namely), saw a fiery globe

tower and angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only see such things by the light of God." Now the blessed Benedict in the

Therefore the contemplation of the present Hfe can extend to the vision of the essence of God. On the contrary, Gregory says {Horn, ii in Ezech.) :^ "As long as we live in this mortal

was

still

flesh,

in this life.

no one reaches such a height of contemplamind on the ray

tion as to fix the eyes of his itself of

As Augustine says {Gen. ad

"no one seeing God lives this wherein the bodily senses have their play; and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal senses, he is not caught up into that vision." This has been carefully discussed above (q. clxxv, aa. 4, 5), where we spoke of rapture, and in the First Part (q. XII, A. 11), where we treated of the vision of God. Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways. First, with regard to Lit.

xii,

mortal

27),''

life

say by actually making use of the bodily senses, and thus contemplation in

act, that is to

the present

life

can in no

way

attain to the

vision of God's essence. Secondly, one in this life potentially

and not

act, that is to say,

when

the mortal body as

its

1


i5/.,

•PL ^ PL

76, 953.

76, 293; Cf. Glossa ordin., on Gen. 32. 30 (1,96 F). Soul.in, 7 (431*16)•Sect. 2 (PG3, 121). *

PART

II

OF SECOND PART

Therefore he adds (ibid.) "For however Httle he may see of the Creator's light, all created things become petty to him."

Divine

light.

:

6. Whether the Operation of Contemplation Is Fittingly Divided Into a Threefold

Article

Movement,

Circular, Straight,

We

proceed thus to the Sixth Article: seems that the operation of contemplation

swoop down

one time to a great to earth,

and

they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag behind many times; others a circle

now more now

less

extended; and

immovably in would seem that there

others remain suspended almost It

one place. Therefore

is

are only three

and oblique {Div. Nom. \v)} For contemplation pertains exclusively to rest, according to Wisd. 8. i6, When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her. Now movement is opposed to rest. Therecircular, straight,

Objection

613

height, at another

On

movement,

unfittingly divided into a threefold

6

rise at

fly in

and Oblique?

ART.

Q. 180.

For some of these

i.

it

movements

of contemplation.

the contrary, stands the authority of Di-

onysius (loc. cit.). I answer that. As stated above

(q.

clxxix,

Reply 3), the operation of the intellect, in which contemplation essentially consists, is

A. I,

called a

movement

in so far as

movement

is

the

fore the operations of the contemplative life

act of a perfect thing, according to the Philoso-

should not be described as movements. Obj. 2. Further, The action of the contempla-

things that

tive Hfe pertains to the intellect, according to

which

man

Now

Dionysius describes these movements as being different in the angels from what they are in the soul. For he says {loc. cit.) that the circular movement in the angel is "according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and the good." On the other hand, he assigns the circular movement of the soul to several things The first of which is "the withdrawal of the soul into itself from externals"; the second is "a certain concentration of its powers," by which it is rendered free of error and of outward occupation; and the third is "union with those things that are above it." Again, he describes differently their respective straight movements. For he says that like the angels.

is

:

the straight

movement

of the angel

is

"that

by

which he proceeds to the care of those things that are beneath him." On the other hand, he describes the straight

being twofold

:

movement

first, "its

of the soul as

progress towards things

that are near it"; secondly, "its uplifting

from

external things to simple contemplation." Fur-

he assigns a different obhque movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement of the angels to the fact that "while providing for those who have less they remain unchanged in relation to God"; but he assigns the oblique ther,

movement is

of the soul to the fact that "the soul

it

is

not take place without movement, the result that even intelligible operations are described

is

movements, and are differentiated in likeness movements. Now of bodily movements, local movements are the most perfect and come first, as proved in the Physics;^ thereas

to various

fore the foremost

are described

among

intelligible operations

by being likened

to them.

These

movements are of three kinds; for there is the circular movement, by which a thing moves uniformly round one point as centre, another the straight movement, by which a thing goes from one point to another; the third is oblique, being composed as it were of both the others. Consequently, in intelhgible operations, that which is absolutely uniform is compared to ciris

cular movement; the intelligible operation by which one proceeds from one point to another is compared to the straight movement; while the intelligible operation which unites some-

thing of uniformity with progress to various is compared to the oblique movement. Reply Obj. i. External bodily movements are opposed to the rest of contemplation, which consists in rest from outward occupations; but

points

movements

the

of intellectual operations belong

to the rest of contemplation.

Reply Obj.

2.

Man

is

like the angels in intel-

{De

the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in

lect generically,

they are differently related to uniformity. For

above. Obj.

ligible things,

it

to the

ways mentioned

would seem that

the operations of contemplation are unfittingly assigned according to the

through sensible knowledge of inteland since sensible operations do

we come

but the intellectual power is much higher in the angel than in man. Consequently these movements must be ascribed to men and angels in different ways, according as

enlightened in Divine knowledge by reasoning

and discoursing." Therefore

pher.^ Since, however,

3.

Contempt,

Further, Richard of i,

movements Sect. 8

sY

mentions

many

S.

Victor

other different

in likeness to the birds of the air.

(PG 3.

704)-

2

PL

196, 68.

two

respects. First, because

intelligible truth 3

Soul,

III,

it

does not require

from the variety of composite

7 (431*4).

*

Aristotle, viii, 7 (26o»26).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

6i4

understands the trutn of intelligible things not discursively, but by simple intuition. On the other hand, the inthings;

tellect

secondly, because

of

the soul

from sensible

acquires intelligible truth

things,

and understands

it

by a

certain discourse of the reason.

Therefore Dionysius assigns the circular move-

ment

of the angels to the fact that their intui-

tion of

God

is

uniform and unceasing, having

neither beginning nor end; even as a circular

movement having

neither beginning nor end

is

uniformly around the one same centre. But on the part of the soul, before it can arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack of uniformity needs

which arises from the variety of external things, and this is removed by the soul withdrawing from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the circuto be

removed.

First, that

movement of the soul is "the soul's withdrawal into itself from external objects." Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires to be removed from the soul, and this is owing to the discourse of reason. This is done by directing all the soul's operations to the simple conlar

templation of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated by his saying in the second place

must be uniformly concentrated," in other v/ords that discourse must be laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on the contemplation of the one simple truth. In this operation of the soul there is no error, even as there is clearly no error in the understanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition. Afterwards, these two things being presupposed, he mentions thirdly the uniformity which is Hke that of the angels, for that "the soul's intellectual powers

then

all

things being laid aside, the soul con-

tinues in the contemplation of

God

alone. This

he expresses by saying: " Then being thus made uniform, by being brought to unity (that is, conformity) and with its powers united, it is conducted to the good and the beautiful." The straight movement of the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one thing to another by considering them, but only to the order of his providence,

namely

to the fact that the

higher angel enlightens the lower angels through the angels that are intermediate.

He

indicates

when he says "The angel's movement takes a straight line when he proceeds to the care of this

:

things subject to him, taking in his course what-

ever things are direct," that

is,

in

the dispositions of the direct order.

movement

in the soul

The

it

keeping

The

v/ith

straight

he ascribes however to

the soul's proceeding from exterior sensibles to

the knowledge of intelligible objects.

oblique

movement

in the angels

he des-

composed of the straight and circular movements, in so far as their care for those beneath them is in accordance with their cribes as being

contemplation of God. The oblique movement in the soul he also declares to be partly straight

and partly

circular, in so far as in reasoning

it

makes use of the light received from God. Reply Obj. 3. These varieties of movement that are taken from the distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either straight and oblique

movement, because they all denote the discourse of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or from the part to the whole, it will be. as he explains, from above to below; if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to left; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and forwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing, near at hand

movement

or far remote, the

The

will

be circular.

discourse of reason from sensible to in-

telligible objects, if

it

be according to the order

of natural reason, belongs to the straight

ment; but

move-

be according to the Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the oblique movement as explained above (Reply 2). That alone which he describes as immobility belongs to the if it

movement. Hence it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of contemplation with much circular

greater fulness and depth.

Article 7. Whether There Contemplation?

Is Delight in

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It seems that there is no delight in contemplation. Objection i. For delight belongs to the appetitive power; but contemplation resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there is no delight in contemplation. Obj. 2. Further, All strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight. Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory says

Ezech.y that "when the soul strives God, it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes, because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the unbounded light, and at another time it {Horn,

ii

in

to contemplate

almost succumbs, because even while tasting it fails." Therefore there is no delight in contemplation.

Obj.

3.

Further, Delight

is

the result of a

perfect operation, as stated in the Ethics."^ 1

PL

76, 955.

2

Aristotle, x, 4 (i

1

74''23).

Now

PART

II

OF SECOND PART

the contemplation of wayfarers is imperfect, according to I Cor. 13. 12, We see now through a glass in a dark manner. Therefore it seems that there

Obj.

4.

is

no dehght

Further,

obstacle to delight.

contemplative

in the

life.

A lesion of the body is an Now contemplation causes

a lesion of the body; thus

it is

stated (Gen. 32.)

had said {verse 30) / have seen God face to face, he halted on his foot, ... because he touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank. Therefore it seems that there is no dethat after Jacob

hght in contemplation.

On

the contrary. It

is

written of the contem-

plation of

wisdom (Wisd.

tion hath

no

8.

16)

:

bitterness, nor her

Her conversacompany any

tediousness, but joy a?id gladness; and Gregory

says (Horn,

ii

m Ezech.Y

that "the contempla-

tive life is sweetness exceedingly lovable."

/ answer that. There

come

to

may

And more delightful still does this beone who has the habit of wisdom and

science, the result of

which

is

that he contem-

plates without difficulty. Secondly, contempla-

may

be dehghtful on the part of its object, one contemplates that which one loves even as bodily vision gives pleasure not only because to see is pleasurable in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since, then, the contemplative hfe consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, to which charity moves us, as stated above (aa. 1,2, Reply i), tion

in so far as ;

follows that there

it

plative

life,

is

615

7

templation of God. And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the affections, since one dehghts in seeing the object loved, and the very delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Hence

Gregory says (Hom. ii in Ezech.Y that "when see one whom we love, we are so aflame as to love him more." And this is the ultimate perfection of the contemplative hfe, namely that the Divine truth be not only seen but also loved. Reply Obj. 2. Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of an external thing hinders dehght in that thing. For a man delights not in a thing against which he strives. But in that for which he strives he dehghts yet more when he

we

has obtained

it,

other things being equal. There-

fore Augustine says^ that "the

be delight in any particular contemplation in two ways. First by reason of the operation itself, because each individual delights in the operation which befits him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal, the result being that all men naturally desire to know, so that consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth.

ART.

Q. 180.

delight in the contem-

not only by reason of the contem-

was

more

peril there

in the battle, the greater the joy in the

triumph." But there is no strife or struggle in contemplation from the truth which we contemplate being contrary to us, though there is on the part of our defective understanding and our corruptible body which drags us down to lower things, according to Wisd. 9. 15, The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth

museth upon many

when man he loves his

own

down

things.

mind

that

it

that

the

Hence

is

attains to the contemplation of truth,

it

yet more, while he hates the

more

deficiency and the weight of his cor-

ruptible body, so as to say with the Apostle

(Rom.

7.

24)

shall deliver

:

Unhappy man

me from

that I

am, who

the body of this death?

Therefore Gregory says {Hom. ii in Ezech.):^ "When God is once known by desire and understanding,

He

Reply Obj.

withers 3.

all

carnal pleasure in us."

The contemplation

of

God

in

imperfect in comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner

this life is

the delight of the wayfarer's contemplation

is

by reason of the Divine

imperfect as com.pared with the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is written (Ps.

In both respects the delight surpasses all hudelight, both because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as stated above (Part I-II, Q. XXXI, A. 5), when we were treating of the passions, and because the love itself by which God is loved out of charity surpasses

35. 9) -.Thou shall make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure. Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to be had by

plation itself, but also love.

man

all love.

Hence

it is

written (Ps. ZZ- 9)

•

taste

and see that the Lord is sweet. Reply Obj. i. Although the contemplative

life

consists essentially in an act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since it is through charity that one is urged to the con1

PL 76, 956.

wayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that which is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says:^ "It

happens that these substances, excellent beyond compare, and divine, are less accessible to our knowledge, and though we grasp them but feebly,

from

nevertheless

PL 76, 954. 4 PL 76, 955.

2

their

excellence

that

8

Confessions, viii, 7

(PL

^

Parts oj Animals,

5 {6^j^24,).

i,

32, 752).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

6i6

knowledge gives us more delight than any of those things that are round about us"; and Gregory says in the same sense (loc. cit.) "The :

contemplative lovable; for

it

life

is

exceedingly

sweetness

carries the soul

away above

itself,

opens heaven and discovers the spiritual world to the eyes of the mind." Reply Obj. 4. After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot, "because we need to grow weak in the love of the world before we wax strong in the love of God," as Gregory says {loc. cit.). Therefore, as he goes on to say, "when we have known the sweetness of God, we it

have one foot sound while the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans only on that foot which is sound."

tive life begins here so as

tinuous.

Objection

i.

For the contemplative

sists essentially in

Now

tellect.

this life will

all

be

the intellectual perfections of

made

void, according to I Cor.

Whether prophecies

13. 8,

con-

life

things pertaining to the in-

shall be

made

void,

or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be

destroyed. Therefore the contemplative

made

life is

—

ity of the incorruptible part of the soul,

the intellect, so that

—and because

2.

Further,

A man tastes the sweetness of

contemplation by snatches and for a short time only. Hence Augustine says,^ "Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost yet through soul, to a strange sweetness, my grievous weight I sink down again." Again, .

.

.

Gregory commenting on the words of Job 4. 15, When a spirit passed before me, says:^ "The mind does not remain long at rest in the sweetness of inward contemplation, for it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity of the light." Therefore the contemplative not continuous.

life is

Further, That which is not connatural cannot be continuous. Now "the contemplative life," according to the Philosopher,^ "is better than the life which is according to man." Therefore it seems that the contemplative life is not continuous.

Obj.

On

work, as the Philosopher observes.^ Reply Obj. i. The manner of contemplation is not the same here as in heaven; yet the contemplative hfe is said to remain by reason of charity, in which it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory speaks in this sense {Hom. ii in Ezech.) :^ "The contemplative hfe begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the fire of love which begins to burn here is aflame with a yet greater love when

we

Him Whom we love." 2. No action can

see

:

the contrary,

Our Lord

said

Mary

(Luke

10.

templation

*

»

Confessions, x, 65 (PL 32, 807). 75. 711. * PL Ethics, X, 7 (ii77'>26). 76, 954.

is

last long at its

the highest point of con-

to reach the uniformity of Divine

contemplation, according to Dionysius

Nom.

Wy

and

as

we have

{Div.

stated above (a.

6,

Reply 2). Hence although contemplation cannot last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as regards the other contemplative acts.

Reply Obj. contemplative

3.

The Philosopher

life to

be above

declares the

man

because it something which is incor-

befits us "so far as there is in us

namely the intellect, and impassible in itself, so that can endure longer.

divine,"

ruptible

its

act

QUESTION CLXXXI Of the active

life

{In Four Articles)

We

must now consider the active life, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active life? (2) Whether prudence pertains to the active hfe? (3) 6

'PL

Now

highest pitch.

3.

hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her, since as Gregory says {Horn, ii in Ezech.),^ "the contempla42)

works of the contemplative

we do not work with our bodies, so that we the more able to persevere in this kind of

man

to

in the

namely

can endure after this hfe,

it

Reply Obj.

void.

Obj.

be perfected

continuous for two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for "there is nothing contrary to the pleasure of contemplation," as stated in the Topics.^ But even in our regard contemplative hfe is continuous, both because it belongs to us in respect of the activ-

are

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It seems that the contemplative life is not con-

may

/ answer that, A thing may be described as continuous in two ways: first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is evident that in regard to itself contemplative life is

life

Article 8. Whether the Contemplative Life Is Continuous?

it

our heavenly home."

in

Aristotle,

13 (io6»s8). ^ Ethics, X. 7 (1177*21). 'Sect. 9 (PG 3, 705); cf. 165).

Whether

teach-

I,

PL 76, 954. Cat. Hier.,

7

De

m,

2

(PG

3.

PART

OF SECOND PART

II

Of the dur-

ing pertains to the active life? (4)

virtues are chiefly directed not to the contem-

Philosopher i. Whether All the Acts of the Moral Virtues Pertain to the Active Life?

Article

We proceed thus to the First Article:

It

that the acts of the moral virtues do not

seems

all

per-

of

is

little

says'*

or no avail."

tive life; for

is

ii

in

Ezech.y that

so

it is

clear that

which reason the Philosopher^ sub-

the active Hfe.

give bread to the hungry,"

And

ordinates the moral virtues to the happiness of

Objection i. For the active life seems to regard only our relations with other persons.

Hence Gregory says {Horn,

Hence the

that "for virtue knowledge

the moral virtues belong essentially to the ac-

tain to the active life.

life is to

617

2

plation of truth but to operation.

ation of the active Hfe.

"the active

ART.

Q. 181.

Reply Obj. i. The chief of the moral virtues justice by which one man is directed in his

relations towards another, as the Philosopher

Hence

proves.^

the active

life is

described with

and after mentioning many things that regard

reference to our relations with other people, be-

our relations with other people he adds finally, "and to give to each and every one whatever he

but principahy.

Now we are not directed in our relations

needs."

to others

by

all

the acts of moral virtues, but

only by those of justice and

above 3).

2,

not

(q. lviii, aa.

2,

its

parts, as stated

8; Part I-II, Q. lx, aa.

Therefore the acts of the moral virtues do pertain to the active

all

cause

Obj.

2.

life.

Further, Gregory says {Horn,

ii

in

who was

blear-eyed but fruitful

signifies the active life,

which being occupied

Ezech.)

'}

"Lia

with works, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbour both by word and example to its

consists in these things, not exclusively,

it

Reply Obj.

It is possible

2.

so again

when

man makes

a

to contemplation, such things are

der the contemplative

when we

practise the

good

the active

active life

begets a numerous offspring of good this

would seem

to

life.

sitions

It

may

also be repHed, however, that the is

a disposition to the contemplative

belong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues do not pertain to

On Bono,

the contrary, Isidore says iii,

15)

:^

"In the active

{De Summo must

of

all

;

I

PL 76, 953-

^Ibid.

3

Article

PL 83, 690.

2.

Whether Prudence Pertains

to

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that prudence does not pertain to the active Hfe.

Objection

life all vices

be extirpated by the practice of good works, in order that in the contemplative life the mxind's eye being purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine light." Now all vices are not extirpated save by the acts of the moral virtues. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the active Hfe. / answer that. As stated above (q. clxxix, a. i) the active and the contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of men intent on different ends. One of these occupations is the consideration of the truth and this is the end of the contemplative life, while the other is external work to which the active life is directed. Now it is evident that the moral first

comprised un-

the other hand,

virtues belong to the active Hfe.

the Active Life?

the active Hfe.

On

works of the moral virtues and not as dispoto the contemplative life, the moral

Hfe.

3.

life.

in themselves,

Further, As stated above (q. clxxx, A. 2), the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and perfection Obj.

use of things per-

taining to the active Hfe merely as dispositions

as being

it

Now

deeds."

acts of aU

bour to good by example, and this is what Gregory here ascribes to the active life. Reply Obj. 3. Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of another virtue passes, in a certain way, into the species of the latter virtue,

belong to charity, by which we love our neighbour, rather than to the moral virtues. Therefore it seems that the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to

imitation

by the

the moral virtues for one to direct one's neigh-

i.

For

just as the contemplative

Hfe pertains to the cognitive power, so the active life pertains to the appetitive power.

Now

prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive power. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life. Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says {Horn, n in Ezech.y that "the active Hfe being occupied with work, sees less," and therefore it is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that one may judge rightly of what has to be done. Therefore it seems that prudence does not pertain to the active life. Obj. 3. Further, Prudence stands between the moral and the inteUectual virtues. Now just as ^£/^iC5, ^

II,

4(1105^2).

Ibid., V, I (1129^27).

6 7

7Wi.,x, 8(1178^9). Bk. II (PL 76. 954).

;

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

6i8

the moral virtues belong to the active life, as stated in the foregoing Article, so do the intel-

man

tion of the active life enables a

clearly in judging of

what

is

more

to see

to be done,

which

life.

belongs to prudence, both on account of ex-

would seem that prudence perneither to the active nor to the contem-

perience, and on account of the mind's attention,

lectual virtues pertain to the contemplative

Therefore

it

tains plative Hfe, but to an intermediate kind of Ufe,

of which Augustine

On

the contrary,

make mention.^ The Philosopher

since

"when

Reply Obj. says^ that

mind

the

is

attentive

it

takes on

all

force," as Sallust observes (Coftjur. Catil.).''

its

Prudence

3.

is

said to be interme-

diate between the intellectual

and the moral same subject

prudence pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong. / answer that, As stated above (a. i, Reply 3 Part I-II, Q. XVIII, A. 6), if one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, espe-

virtues because

moral matters, to the species of the it is directed; for instance "he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer," according to the Philosopher Now it is evident that the knowledge of prudence is directed to the works of the

things about which it is occupied, because it is occupied sometimes with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with external things.

moral virtues as its end, since it is "right reason about things to be done,"* so that the ends of the moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher says in the same book.^ Accordingly, just as it was stated above (a. i. Reply 3) that the moral virtues in one who directs them to the quiet of contemplation belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which is of itself directed to the works

We proceed thus to the Third Article It seems that teaching is a work not of the active but of the contemplative Hfe. Objection i. For Gregory says {Horn, v in Ezech.y that "the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods proclaim them to their brethren, whose souls they inflame with

of the moral virtues, belongs directly to the

the contemplative hfe.

active life, provided we take prudence in its proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it. If however we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any kind of human knowledge,

Obj. 2. Further, Act and habit would seem to be brought back to the same kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom, for the Philosopher says that "to be able to teach is an indication of knowledge."^ Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the contemplative life. Obj. 3. Further, Prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the contemplative life. Now even the prayer by which one prays for another belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it belongs also to the contemplative hfe to acquaint another, by teaching him, of the truth we have meditated. On the contrary, Gregory says {Horn, ii in Ezech.):^^ "The active life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of

cially in

thing to which

.•'

then prudence, as regards a certain part of it, life. In this sense

belongs to the contemplative

Tully {De

lY says that "the man who is and quickly to grasp the truth

Offic.

able

most

and

to unfold his reasons,

clearly

is

usually considered

most prudent and wise." Reply Obj. i. Moral works take their species from their end, as stated above (Part I-II, Q. XVIII, aa. 4, 6), and therefore the knowledge pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the very knowledge of truth but the knowledge of prudence, through having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to be

;

to the active

life.

Reply Obj.

2.

makes

a

things

Being occupied with external

man

see

less

in

intelligible

which are separated from sensible objects with which the works of the active life are

things,

concerned. Nevertheless the external occupa-

it

resides in the

as the intellectual virtues, but accords wholly

with the moral virtues as to matter. But this third kind of life is intermediate between the active and the contemplative hfe as regards the

Article

3.

Whether Teaching

Is a

Work

of

the Active or of the Contemplative Life?

love for their hidden beauty." But this pertains to teaching. Therefore teaching

wisdom." / answer

that,

fold object.

For teaching

and speech

The

is

a

work

of

act of teaching has a twois

conveyed by speech,

the audible sign of the interior

is

concept. Accordingly one object of teaching

is

the matter or object of the interior concept; *

CityoJ God, XIX,

'

FAhics, X, 8 (ri78'*i6).

*

Ibid.,

«

DD IV, 428.

VIS

2, 3,

(ii4o''2o).

19

(PL »

41, 624; 625; 647). Ibid., v,

and as

to this object teaching belongs

some-

2 (ii,3o''24).

6/tjj.^x, 8(1178^17).

7

Chap. SI (BU

»

Metaphysics,

47).

1,

i

(981^7)-

»Bk.i(PL76,827). " Bk. 11 (PL 76,

953).

PART

II

OF SECOND PART

Q. 181.

times to the active, sometimes to the contemplative Hfe. It belongs to the active hfe when a

to

man

this hfe.

conceives a truth inwardly so as to be di-

rected by

it

outward action; but

in his

longs to the contemplative life

inwardly

conceives

whose

an

Hence Augustine

intelligible

and

consideration

when

love

"Let

says:^

he

it

a

truth

in

delights.

them choose

the better part," namely the

for themselves

contemplative life "let them be busy with the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with the knowledge that saves," thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the contemplative life. The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and thus the object of teach;

ing

the hearer.

is

As

to this object all teaching

belongs to the active

Reply Obj. it

is

i.

The

authority quoted speaks

2.

this

press his interior concept in words, so as to

man to understand the truth. 3. He who prays for another does nothing towards the man for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible truth bring another

Reply Obj.

but he who teaches another does something in his regard by external action. Hence the comfails.

4.

Whether the Active Life Remains

After This Life?

is

after this

On

life.

the contrary, Gregory says {Horn,

Ezech.)

:^

"The

in

ii

active hfe ends with this world,

but the contemplative

life

begins here, to be per-

fected in our heavenly home."

/ answer that, As stated above (a. i), the ac-

end

in external actions;

and

if

these are referred to the quiet of contemplation,

templative cease,

and

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It seems that the active life remains after this life. Objection i. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active Hfe, as stated above (a. i). But the moral virtues endure after this life according to Augustine {De Trin. xiv, 9).^ Therefore seemingly the active life remains after

the active

But

Further, Teaching others belongs to life,

as stated in the foregoing Ar-

in the hfe to

come when we

shall be be possible, even as apparently it is in the angels of whom one enlightens, cleanses, and perfects another, which refers to the receiving of knowledge, according

like the angels, teaching will

1

Serm. ad Popuh, serm. civ,

2

PL 42,

1046.

there be any external actions at

all,

we shall rest and we shall and love, we shall love and praise." And he had said before^ that there God City of God,^ "there

see, v/e shall see

"will be seen without end, loved without weary-

praised without tiring: such will be the occupation of all, the common love, the univering,

sal activity."

Reply Obj.

i. As stated above (q. cxxxvi, a. Reply i), the moral virtues will remain not as to those actions which are about the means, but as to the actions which are about the end. Such acts are those that conduce to the quiet of con-

I,

Augustine denotes by "rest," and this rest excludes not only outward disturbance but also the inward disturbance of the passions.

Reply Obj.

i

(PL 38,

616).

2.

The contemplative

as

life,

stated above (q. clxxx, a. 4), consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and as to this, one

angel does not teach another, since according to Matt.

this hfe. 2.

if

these will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says at the end of the

templation, which in the words quoted above

We

ticle.

lasting a thing

seems to be able to endure after this life. But the active hfe seems to be more lasting in itself; for Gregory says {Horn. V in Ezech.y that "we can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are in no way able to maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative hfe." Therefore the active hfe is much more able than the contemplative to endure it

life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of external actions will

its

Habit and act have a common argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach in so far as he is able to ex-

Obj.

The more

it

remains after

for that very reason they belong to the con-

Hence

Article

more

life

matter, in so far

Reply Obj.

parison

619

4

Eier. vii).^ Therefore

concerned with the consideration and

love of truth. object.

Further,

3.

tive hfe has its

expressly of doctrine as to as

Obj.

in itself, the

which external

to

life

actions pertain.

ART.

{CcbI.

would seem that the active

be-

man

Dionysius

18.

10,

the

little

one's angels,

who

belong to the lower order, always see the face of the Father; and so, in the hfe to come, no man will teach another of God, but we shall all see

Him as He is (I John 3. 2), This is in keeping with the saying of Jeremias (31. 34): They shall teach no more every man his neighbour, .

(PG3, 2oq). (PL 76, 82s). 6 xxn, 30 (PL 41, 804). 3

Sect. 3

4

Bk.

I

B

Bk. 7

II

(PL 76, 954). (PL 41, 802).

Ibid.

.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

620

men would seem

know me, from the least of them even to the greatest. But as regards things pertaining to the dispensation of the mysteries of God, one angel teaches another by cleansing, enhghtening, and perfecting him; and thus they have something of the active life so long as the world lasts, from

ter

the fact that they are occupied in administering

active

to the creatures below them. This

templative.

saying:

Know

the Lord: for all shall

signified

is

Jacob saw angels ascending the which refers to contemand descending, which refers to acplation, tion. Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks {Moral. ii, 3),^ "they do not wander abroad from the Divine vision in such a way as to be deprived of the joys of inward contemplation." Hence in them the active life does not differ from the

by the

fact that

ladder (Gen. 28. 12),

—

—

contemplative Hfe as

it

—

does in us for

whom

life

Obj.

more

is

all

habits and acts, com-

to the

more excellent; thus more excellent, com-

the military art, being the

mands

it

be-

command

the contemplative, as appears from the words

addressed to Moses (Exod. 19. 21), Go down and charge the people, lest they shotdd have a

mind

to pass the fixed limits to see the Lord.

away from

any property of either life considered in itself, but from our own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights of contemplation by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds {ibid.) that "the mind through its very weakness being repelled from that immense height recoils on itself."

Now

the art of the bridle-maker.

longs to the active Hfe to direct and

Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the administering to lower creatures, for this does not belong to us not by rea-

not from

than the con-

excellent

Further, In

2.

manding belongs

the contemplative.

life arises

life

who are placed in a position of honour and power; hence Augustine says^ that "in our actions we must not love honour or power in this life." Therefore it would seem that the

contemplation.

contemplative

the active

lates,

Therefore the active

bility of the

Now

belongs to persons of higher rank, namely pre-

the works of the active life are a hindrance to

son of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of our seeing God. Reply Obj. 3. That the durability of the active life in the present state surpasses the dura-

and better,"

to be worthier

as the Philosopher says.^

Obj.

No man

Further,

3.

more

life is

excellent than

should be taken

a greater thing in order to be occu-

pied with lesser things, for the Apostle says

Be zealous for the some are taken away from the

(I Cor. 12. 31)

Now

contemplative

better gifts.

:

state of the

to the occupations of the

life

active Hfe, as in the case of those

who

are trans-

ferred to the state of prelacy. Therefore

would seem that the active

life is

more

it

excel-

lent than the contemplative.

On

Our Lord

the contrary,

Mary

42):

shall not be take7i

away from

10.

the contemplative Hfe

is

Now Mary

her.

a figure of the contemplative

is

(Luke

said

hath chosen the best part, which life.

Therefore

more exceUent than

the active.

QUESTION CLXXXII

/

Of the active life in comparison WITH the contemplative LIFE must now consider the active

parison with the contemplative

life,

that.

more

comunder which life in

head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Which of them is greater import or excellence?

Which of them has the greater merit? (3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active Hfe? (4) Of their order. (2)

We

i.

Is

More

proceed thus to the First Article: It life is more excellent than

seems that the active

which

some

this

by

eight reasons."*

contemplative

which

is

'

PL

75.556.

For "that which belongs to bet-

The

life befits

best in him,

reply that the

because the according to that

first is

man

namely the

intellect,

and

proper objects, namely intelHgibles; the active Hfe however is occupied with externals. Hence Rachel, by whom the according to

its

life

is

signified,

interpreted

is

"the vision of the principle," whereas as Gregory says {Moral, vi, 37)^ the active Hfe is signified

by Lia who was "blear-eyed." The second

reason ^

i.

we must

contemplative life absolutely is more excellent than the active; and the Philosopher proves

is

the contemplative.

Objection

certain

nevertheless are surpassed by another in

contemplative

Whether the Active Life Excellent Than the Contemplative? Article

Nothing prevents

excellent in themselves

respect. Accordingly

{In Four Articles)

We

answer

things being

Topics,

because the contemplative

m,

life

can be

I (ii6'>i2).

City of God, xix, 19 (PL 41, 647). * Ethics, X, 7, 8 (1177*12; 1178*9).

»

6

PL 75.

764.

PART

II

more continuous, although not

OF SECOND PART

ART.

Q. 182.

Reply Obj.

as regards the

621

2

Not only

1.

the active life con-

highest degree of contemplation, as stated above

cerns prelates, but they should also excel in the

clxxx, a. 8; q. clxxxi, a. 4, Reply and so Mary, by whom the contemplative

3),

contemplative

life

tor,

(q.

time because the contemmore dehghtful than the active;

signified, is described as sitting all the

is

at the Lord's feet. Thirdly,

plative Hfe

is

hence Augustine says^ that "Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted." Fourthly, because in the contemplative life man is more selfsufficient, since he needs fewer things for that purpose; therefore it was said (Luke 10. 41): Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things. Fifthly, because the contemplative life is loved more for its own sake, while the active Hfe is directed to some-

Hence it is written (Ps. 26. 4) One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord thing else.

all

:

the days of

my

life,

that I

may

see the de-

action,

hence Gregory says (Pas-

life;

"A

n, i):^

prelate should be foremost in

more upHfted than others

in

contem-

plation."

Reply Obj.

2.

The contemplative

life consists

mind. For Gregory says (Hom. in in Ezech.y that "the contemplative life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal but of eternal things." And Boethius says {De Consol. v, 2) :^ "The soul of man must be more free while it continues to gaze on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things." Therefore it is evident that the active Hfe does not directly command the contemplative Hfe, but prescribes certain works of the active Hfe as dispositions to the contemplative life, which it accordingly serves rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says {loc. cit. in Ezech.y that "the active life is bondage, but the contem.plative life is freedom." in a certain liberty of

because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest, according to Ps. 45. II, Be still and see that I am God. Seventhly, because the contemplative Hfe is according to Divine things, while active Hfe is according to human things; hence Augustine says:^ "'In the beginning was the Word': to Him was Mary hearkening; 'The word was made flesh' Him was Martha serving." Eighthly, because the contemplative life is according to that which is most proper to man, namely his intellect; in the works of the active Hfe however the lower powers also, which are common to us and brutes, have their part; hence (Ps. 35. 8) after the words. Men and beasts thou Lord, that which is special to wilt preserve,

upon us we must devote ourselves to the search for and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even then we must not

man

altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest

light of the Lord. Sixthly,

:

added {verse 10)

is

In Thy

:

we

light

shall

Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Luke 10. 42) when He says Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her, which words Augustine expounds thus:^ "Not, Thou :

— — She has chosen —Because shaU not be

hast chosen badly but, better? Listen,

of the active Hfe on account of of the present pelled

to

;

in a restricted sense

and

in a particular

case one should prefer the active Hfe on ac-

count of the needs of the present Hfe. Thus too the Philosopher says:"* "It is better to philosophize than to be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich." 1

Serm. ad PopuL,

^

Ibid., CIV, 2

3

Ibid.,

serra.

(PL 38, cm, 4 (PL 38,

cm,

4

(PL

life,

contemplation

forsake

Hence Augustine

some necessity

yet not so as to be comaltogether.

"The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest toil," the work namely of says:^

the active Hfe. "If no one imposes this burden

its

we

sweetness, and this

burden overwhelm us." Hence it is clear that a person is called from the contemplative to the active Hfe, this is done by way not of taking away but of addition.

when

2. Whether the Active Life Is of Greater Merit Than the Contemplative?

Article

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the active Hfe is of greater merit than the contemplative.

Objection i. For merit impHes relation to reward; and reward is due to labour, according to I Cor. 3. 8, Every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labour. Now labour is ascribed to the active Hfe, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says {Horn, ii

38, 615). 6

617). 615).

called

is

better.

it

taken away from her. But the burden of necessity shah at length be taken from thee but the sweetness of truth is eternal."

Yet

Sometimes a man

3.

the contemplative Hfe to the works

deprive ourselves of

see light.

Why

Reply Obj.

away from

*

Topics,

m,

2 (iiS^io).

8

PL 77, 26. PL 76, 809.

«

PL 9

7 PL 63, 836. 76, 812. City oj God, xix, 19 (PL 41 647). ,

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

622

"Whosoever is converted to God of all sweat from labour, that is, he

busy about much serving (Luke

in Ezech.)-}

cause

must first must take Lia, that afterwards he may rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the prin-

40). Therefore the contemplative life

is

cally of greater merit than the active

life.

Therefore the active

ciple."

life

is

of greater

would seem that the con-

increase of merit with regard to the essential

not of greater merit than the

reward consists chiefly in charity, a sign of which is external labour borne for Christ's sake. Yet a much more expressive sign of this is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this hfe, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation. Reply Obj. 2. In the state of future happiness man has arrived at perfection, and therefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the greater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without some imperfection, and can always be-

a

come; commenting on John 21. have him to remain till I come,

certain beginning of the happiness to

So I

will

says {Tract, cxxiv in Joann.)-} "This

may

be

expressed more clearly: Let perfect works fol-

conformed to the example of My pasand let contemplation begun here remain I come, that it may be perfected when I come." And Gregory says {loc. cit. in

Me

low sion,

until shall

Ezech.) that "the

of contemplation begins

life

here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly

Now

home."

the

come

to

life

will

be a state

not of meriting but of receiving the reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative Hfe would seem to have less of the character of merit than the active, but more of the character of reward.

Obj.

3.

Further, Gregory says (Horn,

Ezech.y that "no

God

man

tive life. Therefore

templative

life is

xii

in

more acceptable to Now by the zeal for

sacrifice is

than zeal for souls."

souls a

it

active.

O71 the contrary, Gregory says (Moral, vi) :^ "Great are the merits of the active Hfe, but

greater

Q.

still

those of the contemplative."

/ answer that, As stated above (Part I-II, cxiv, A. 4), the root of merit is charity; and,

while, as stated above consists in the love of

the love of

God

is

by

(q.

xxv,

a.

God and our

itself

the

i), charity

neighbour,

more meritorious

than the love of our neighbour, as stated above (q. xxvii, a. 8). Therefore that which pertains

more

directly to the love of God is of its very genus more meritorious than that which pertains directly to the love of our neighbour for God's sake. Now the contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of God; for Augustine says^ that "the love of truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contem-

plative

life,

for

it is

that truth above

all

which

the contemplative life seeks, as stated above (q.

clxxx,

a. 4; Q.

cLxxxi,

A. 4,

Reply 2).

On

the other hand, the active life is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbour, be-

iBk. »

^

II

(PL

-.^

turns to the occupations of the ac-

life is

therefore Augustine 22,

This

moreover asserted by Gregory {Horn, iii in "The contemplative life surpasses in Ezech.)

is

life, because the latter labours under the stress of present work," by reason of the necessity of assisting our neighbour, "while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of the coming rest," that is the contemplation of God. Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the active life than another by the works of the contemplative life. For instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then suffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the time being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake. Thus the Apostle said (Rom. 9. 3) / wished myself to be an anathema from Christ, for my brethren; which words Chrysostom expounds as follows {De Compunct. i) 'J "His mind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired above all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he pleased Christ." Reply Obj. 1. External labour conduces to the increase of the accidental reward, but the

The contemplative

Further,

2.

lo.

generi-

merit the active

merit than the contemplative. Obj.

it is

76, 954).

»

PL 35,

1^74.

* Chap. Bk. I (PL 76. 932). 37 (PL 75, 764). City oj God, XIX, 19 (PL 41, 647).

:

come more perfect; therefore it does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on account of the practice of greater Divine charity.

Reply Obj.

A

God Him;

sacrifice

is

rendered to

spiritually

when something

is

offered to

and of

man's goods. God specially accepts

all

that of the

Him

3.

human

soul

Now

when

it

man

is

offered to

ought to offer to God, in the first place, his soul, according to Ecclus. 30. 24. Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God; in the second place, the souls of others, according to Apoc. 22. 17, He that hearin sacrifice.

Bk.

I

(PL

76, 809).

a

^

PG 47. 405.

PART man

a

OF SECOND PART

II

him say: Come. And the more

eth, let

unites his

own

closely

or another's soul to God,

more acceptable is his sacrifice to God; therefore it is more acceptable to God that one the

apply one's own soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to action. Consequently the statement that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls," does not mean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to God one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other external gifts.

Article 3. Whether the Contemplative Life Is Hindered By the Active Life?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active Hfe. Objection i. For the contemplative hfe requires a certain stillness of mind, according to

Be

Ps. 45. 2,

the active

still,

life

and see that I

am God;

but

involves restlessness, according

of view the active life

train in the

is

Now

a req-

(Hom.

ii

in

Ezech.y that "Lia

is

camp

of action.

Thus

after careful

explore spiritual

things, whether they no them the shadows of the things corporeal or, if these foHow them, whether they prudently drive them away." Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contemplative, by quelling the interior passions which give rise to the phantasms by which contemplato

longer carry with

tion

is

hindered.

And

this suffices for the

Re-

the Objections; for these arguments

consider the occupation itself of external acand not the effect which is the modera-

tion of the passions.

active

a hindrance to clear vision; for Gregory

life is

says

life.

a help to the contem-

is

cast down with too great a sorrow when those goods are withdrawn. In this way they will know when they withdraw within themselves, in order

tions,

contemplative

this point

study they will learn whether they no longer wrong their neighbour, whether they bear with equanimity the wrongs their neighbours do to them, whether their soul is neither overcome with joy in the presence of temporal goods, nor

the active Hfe hinders the contemplative.

Further, Clearness of vision

and from

hindered by the lack Hence Gregory says {loc. cit.): "Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation must first of aU

plies to

2.

;

of order of the internal passions.

Luke 10. 41, Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled aboiit many things. Therefore Obj.

623

is

plative, since the latter

to

uisite for the

ART. 4

Q. 182.

ternal passions of the soul

blear-

Article

4.

Whether the Active Life Precedes

the Contemplative?

eyed and fruitful, because the active life, being occupied with works, sees less." Therefore the

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It seems that the active Hfe does not precede the

active life hinders the contemplative.

contemplative.

Obj. other. life

One contrary hinders

Further,

3.

Now

the active and the contemplative

are apparently contrary to one another,

since the active life

is

busy about many things,

while the contemplative hfe attends to the con-

templation of one; therefore they

differ in

op-

Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by

position to one another.

the active.

On the contrary, Gregory says {Moral, vi, 37) :2 "Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation must first of all train in the camp

The

active Hfe

may

be consid-

ered from two points of view. First, as regards the attention to and practice of external works

and thus

it is

1.

For the contemplative Hfe perGod, while the ac-

tains directly to the love of

tive Hfe pertains to the love of our neighbour.

Now

the love of

neighbour, since

God's sake.

It

God we

precedes the love of our love our neighbour for

seems therefore the contempla-

tive Hfe also precedes the active Hfe.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says {Horn, ii in Ezech.) i^ "It should be observed that while a weH-ordered Hfe proceeds from action to contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the contemplative to the active Hfe." Therefore the active Hfe

of action."

/ answer that.

Objection

the

evident that the active Hfe hin-

ders the contemplative, in so far as

impossible for one to be busy with external action and at the same time give oneself to Divine contemplation. Secondly, active Hfe may be conit is

sidered as quieting and putting in order the in-

iBk.n(PL76,9S4).

2

PL 75,

763.

is

not absolutely

prior to the contemplative.

Obj. 3. Further, It would seem that there is not necessarily any order between things that are suitable to different subjects.

Now

the ac-

and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects; for Gregory says {Moral. vi, 37):^ "Often those who were able to contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when pressed with occupation; and tive

3

PL 76, 954.

)

Further,

4.

No man

'

is

more perfect than

lead a solitary

that of

life.

Our Lord

(Luke 11. and putteth it

said

lighteth a candle

nor under a bushel.

in a hidden place,

Now

would seem to be in a hidden place, and to be doing no good to any man. Therefore it would seem that their those

who

lead a solitary life

religious life

Obj.

5.

not more perfect.

is

Further, That which

man's nature

is

is

in

apparently more pertinent to

the perfection of virtue. But

man

is

naturally

a social animal, as the Philosopher says.^ Therefore it would seem that to lead a solitary life

is

not more perfect than to lead a com-

n.^unity life.

On

{De Oper. "those are holier who keep

the contrary, Augustine says

Monach.

23)''

that

themselves aloof from the approach of all, and give their whole mind to a life of prayer." / answer that. Solitude, like poverty, is not the essence of perfection, but a means to it. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers {Coll. i,

7)^ the

Abbot Moses says that

even as fasting and other

means

"solitude,"

like things, "is a sure

of acquiring purity of heart."

Now

it is

evident that solitude is a means adapted not to action but to contemplation, according to

Osee 2. (Douay, 1

PL

14, /

PL

.

imll lead her into solitude

.

2

22, 1077.

^Politics,
'thing that can have the nature of being, and ^ Glossa ordin. (v, i25A);cf. Bede, horn, See Peter Lombard, Sent., in, d. xrv, chap.

«

Sect. 4

(PG3.

817).

is

con-

forth from the agent;

but

of the thing, for the reason that action

that

knowledge of what He knows that is, how to do what He knows; and thus that He can do all things.

He

is He said to be omnipotent; not that the omnipotence of the Man is distinct (as neither is His Godhead) from that of the Son of God, but because there is one Person of God and man. Reply Obj. 2. According to some,^ knowledge and active power are not of the same character; for an active power flows from the very nature

so

come

not always possessed by the very

is

essence of the knower, since assimilation of the

or speculative. Therefore

s:

receives omnipotence in time, which the Son of God had from eternity. The result of this union is that as the Man is said to be God,

all

Obj. 3. Further, the soul of Christ has all knowledge. Now knowledge is either practical

2,

Man

of

power, and thus

is

i

2

(PL

(QR

94, 11); 11,

610).

by the But

knower

may

it

be had by

to the thing

known

aid of hkenesses that are received. this reason

seems not to be enough, be-

we may understand by a obtained from another, so also may we cause even as

likeness

by a form obtained from another, as water or iron heats, by heat borrowed from fire. Hence there would be no reason why the soul of Christ, as it can know all things by the likenesses of all things impressed upon it by God, cannot do these things by the same likenesses. It has,

that what

the higher

act

therefore, to be further considered is is

received in the lower nature from

possessed in an inferior manner;

not received by water in the perfection and strength it had in fire. Therefore, since the soul of Christ is of an inferior nature to the for heat

is

Divine Nature, the likenesses of things are not received in the soul of Christ in the perfection

and strength they had

And hence soul

is

it is

Divine Nature.

in the

that the knowledge of Christ's

inferior to Divine

knowledge as regards

manner of knowing, for God knows things more perfectly than the soul of Christ; and also as regards the number of things known, since the soul of Christ does not know all that God can do, and these God knows by the knowledge of simple intelligence (although it knows all the

things

present,

past,

and future which God

knows by the knowledge

of vision). So, too, the

likenesses of things infused into Christ's soul

do not equal the Divine power 2

Peter Lombard, Sent., in,

see William of Auxerre, Q. I (ii7ra).

d. xiv,

Summa

in acting

chap.

Aurea,

i(QR 111,

i,

—that

11, 608); chap, s,

THIRD PART is,

so as to do

the same

all

manner

God can do, or to do in God does, Who acts with an

that

as

might wherof the creature is not capable. Now there is no thing to know which in some way an infinite power is needed, although a certain kind of knowledge belongs to an infinite power; yet there are things which can be done only by an infinite power, as creation and the like, as is plain from what has been said

infinite

the First Part

in

xlv,

(q.

a.

5,

3, Reply 3; Q. XXV, A. Christ's soul which, being a creature,

Lxv, A.

Hence

Reply 3; q. 3, Reply 4). is

power, can know, indeed, all things, but not in every way. Yet it cannot do all things, which pertains to the nature of omnipotence; and, amongst other things, it is clear that it cannot create itself. Reply Obj. 3. Christ's soul has practical and speculative knowledge, yet it is not necessary that it should have practical knowledge of all those things of which it has speculative knowledge. Because for speculative knowledge a mere conformity or assimilation of the knower to the thing known suffices, whereas for practical knowledge it is required that the forms of the things in the intellect should be operative. Now to have a form and to impress this form upon something else is more than merely to have the finite in

form as to shine and to illuminate is more than merely to shine. Hence the soul of Christ has a speculative knowledge of creation (for it knows how God creates), but it has no practical knowledge of this mode, since it has no knowledge operative of creation. ;

Article 2. Whether the Soul of Christ Had Omnipotence With Regard To the Changing of Creatures?

We

ART.

Q. 13

by the rational, loyand righteous spirit of Hfe." But the soul of Christ moves even the highest spirits, enlightsinful rational spirit of Hfe

ening them, as Dionysius says {CceI. Hier. vii)^ Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ has omnipotence with regard to the changing of creatures.

Obj.

er as well as the rest

miraculously changed from their course, as Dionysius proves (Ep. ad Poly carp.). ^ Therefore Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to the changing of creatures.

On

the contrary,

Him Who

longs to

belongs to

plain

2.

perfect of

be

all

creatures.

moved by another

says

{De

is

the most

But every creature can

creature; for Augustine

4)^ that "even as the denser and lower bodies are ruled in a fixed way by the subtler »

PL

Trin.

iii,

and stronger bodies, so are

42, 873.

all

bodies by

Now

this

alone, according to

/ answer that, Two distinctions are here needed. Of these the first is with respect to the

changing of creatures, which is threefold. The natural, being brought about by the proper agent according to the order of nature; the second is miraculous, being brought about by a first is

supernatural agent above the accustomed order and course of nature, as to raise the dead; the third is according as every creature may be brought to nothing. The second distinction has to do with Christ's soul, which may be looked at in two ways first in its proper nature and with its power of na:

ture or of grace; secondly, as it is the instruof the Word of God, personally united to

Therefore if we speak of the soul of Christ in proper nature and with its power whether of nature or of grace, it had power to cause those its

effects

proper to a soul (for example, to rule the

direct human acts, and also, by the fulness of grace and knowledge to enhghten all rational creatures failing short of its perfection), in a

But Further, the soul of Christ

creatures be-

conserves them.

gard to the changing of creatures. Therefore this does not belong to Christ's soul.

creatures.

Obj.

God

To transmute

Heb. i. 3: Upholding all things by the word of His power. Therefore God alone has omnipotence with re-

body and

from Gen. i. i In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the changing of is

high-

its

works of powof the graces. But every

change of the creature can belong to the grace of miracles, since even the heavenly bodies were

meant

creatures, as

Further, Christ's soul had in

3.

est degree the grace of miracles or

ment Him.

all

781

al

proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the changing of creatures. Objection i. For He Himself says (Matt. 28. 18) All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth. Now by the words "heaven and earth" are :

2

the spirit rational of life; and the truant and

if

manner

we speak

befitting a rational creature.

of the soul of Christ as

the instrument of the

Word

it is

united to Him,

it

had an instrumental power to effect all the miraculous changes which can be ordered to the end of the Incarnation, which is to re-establish all things that are in heaven and on earth. But the changings of creatures according as 2

Sect. 3

(PG

3, 209).

^Epist., vii, 2

(PG

3, 1080).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

782

they may be brought to nothing corresponds to the creation of things, whereby they were brought from nothing. And hence even as God alone can create, so, too, He alone can return creatures to nothing, and He alone upholds them

Objection

Or t hod.

For Damascene says {De Fide all natural things were vol-

i.

20)^ that

iii,

"He

untary to Christ;

He

willed to thirst.

Now God

die, etc."

He

is

woidd

creatures.

the natural operations of His

they

Reply Obj. given a

Him"

little

i.

fall

As Jerome says:^ "Power

—that

is,

to Christ as

man

—"Who

is

while before was crucified, buried in the

tomb, and afterwards rose again." But all power said to have been given Him by reason of the union, whereby it was brought about that a Man was omnipotent, as was said above (a. i. Reply is

i).

made known

although this was

And

to the

angels before the Resurrection, yet after theRes-

was made known

urrection

it

Remigius

says.^

when they

are

to all

Resurrection our Lord says that

Him

in

Reply Obj.

2.

given to

men, as

Now, things are said to happen made known. Hence after the all

power

is

heaven and on earth. Although every creature can

be changed by some other creature, except, indeed, the highest angel, and even it can be enlightened by Christ's soul, yet not every change that can be made in a creature can be made by a creature, since some changes can be made by God alone. Yet all changes that can be made in creatures can be

made by

the soul of Christ, as

the instrument of the Word, but not in its proper nature and power, since some of these changes pertain to the soul neither in the order of nature nor in the order of grace.

Reply Obj.

(H-H,

Q.

3.

As was

CLXxviii,

A.

said in the I,

Second Part

Reply i), the grace is given to the soul

of mighty works or miracles

cause

—

He

might communicate it is written (Matt. 10. i) that, having called His twelve disciples together, He gave thern power over unclean spirits, to cast them out, and to heal all manner of diseases, and all mariner of infirmities.

miracles, but also that this grace to others.

Hence

Obj.

2.

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

would seem that Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to His own booy. i/n Matt., IV, on 28.18 (PL 26, 226). Cf. St. Thomas, Catena Aurea, In Malt.,

»

He

things whatsoever it

seems that

human

fect in Christ than in

own body.

nature was more per-

Adam, who had

a

body

entirely subject to the soul, so that nothing

could happen to the body against the will of

—

and this on account of the original which it had in the state of innocence. Much more, therefore, had Christ's soul omnipotence with regard to His body. Obj. 3. Further, the body is naturally changed by the imagination of the soul, and so much more changed the stronger the soul's imagination, as was said in the First Part (q. cxvii, A. 3, Reply 2, 3). Now the soul of Christ had most perfect strength as regards both the imagination and the other powers. Therefore the soul of Christ was omnipotent with regard to His own body. On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 2. 17) that it behoved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren, and especially as regards what belongs to the condition of human nature. But it belongs to the condition of human nature that the health of the body and its nourishment and growth are not subject to the the soul justice

bidding of reason or

God

will, since

Who

natural things

the author of Therefore they were not subject in Christ. Therefore Christ's soul was not omnipotent with regard to His own body. are subject to

alone

is

nature.

/ answer that. As stated above (a. 2), Christ's may be viewed in two ways. First, in its

soul

proper nature and power; and in this way, as of making exterior bodies it was incapable change from the course and order of nature, so, too, was it incapable of changing its own body

from

its

own

its

natural disposition, since the soul, of nature, has a determinate relation to

body. Secondly Christ's soul may be viewed instrument united in person to God's

its

as an

thus every disposition of His

own

body was wholly subject to His power. Nevertheless, since the power of an action is not properly attributed to the instrument, but to the

principal agent, this omnipotence to the

Word

of

Reply Obj. 28.18.

willed to

had omnipotence with regard to

Further,

Word; and Article 3. Whether the Soul of Christ Had Omnipotence With Regard To His Own Body?

all

(Ps. 113. 11). Therefore

Christ's soul

of a saint, so that these miracles are wrought

not by his own, but by Divine power. Now this grace was bestowed on Christ's soul most exthat is, not only that He might work cellently

hath done

He

omnipotent be-

called

back to nothing. And thus it must be said that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence with regard to the changing of in being, lest

He

willed to hunger,

willed to fear,

»

PG

94, 1084.

God i.

is

attributed

rather than to Christ's soul.

This saying of Damascene

re-

THIRD PART Divine will of Christ, since, as he says in the preceding chapter (ch. 19, cf. 14, 15),^ "it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to suffer and do what fers to the

was proper to it." Reply Obj. 2. It was no part of the original justice which Adam had in the state of innocence that a man's soul should have the power of changing his own body to any form, but that it should keep it from any hurt. Yet Christ could have assumed even this power if He had wished. But since man has three states namely, innocence, sin, and glory, even as from the state of glory He assumed comprehension, and from the state of innocence, freedom from sin, so also from the state of sin did He assume the neces-

—

sity of being will

be said

under the penalties of

this life, as

(q. xiv, a. 2).

Reply Obj. 3. If the imagination be strong, for the body obeys naturally in some things example, as regards falling from a beam set on high since the imagination was formed to be

—

—

a principle of local motion, as

said in the trea-

is

on the Sotd} So, too, as regards alteration in heat and cold, and their consequences, for the passions of the soul, according to which the heart is moved, naturally follow the imagination, and thus by arousing the spirits the whole body is altered. But the other corporeal dispositions which have no natural relation to the imagination are not changed by the imaginafor example, the tion, however strong it is shape of the hand, or foot, or such-like.

tise

—

Article 4. Whether the Soul of Christ Had Omnipotence As Regards the Execution of His Will?

Q. 13

ART.

7S3

4

country. Therefore

He

could not carry out the purpose of His will in everything. Obj. 3. Further, a man does not ask from another for what he can do himself. But our Lord besought the Father, praying for what He

wished to be done, for it is written (Luke 6. 1 2) He went out into a mountain to pray, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God. Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in all things.

On

the contrary, Augustine says (qq. Nov. '.^ It is impossible for the

et Vet. Test., qu. 77) will of the

Saviour not to be

possible for

Him

to will

fulfilled

:

nor

is it

what He knows ought

not to come to pass. / answer that, Christ's soul willed things in two ways. First, what was to be brought about by Himself; and it must be said that He was capable of whatever He willed thus, since it would not befit His wisdom if He willed to do anything of Himself that was not subject to His power. Secondly, He wished things to be brought about by the Divine power, as the resurrection of His own body and such miraculous deeds, which He could not effect by His own power, except as the instrument of the Godhead, as was said above (a. 2). Reply Obj. i. As Augustine says:'' "What came to pass, this Christ must be said to have willed. For it must be remarked that this happened in the country of the Gentiles, to whom it was not yet time to preach. Yet it would have been invidious not to welcome such as came

spontaneously for the faith. Hence He did not wish to be heralded by His own, and yet He wished to be sought; and so it came to pass."

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence as regards the execution of His own

it may be said that this will of Christ was not with regard to what was to be carried out by it but with regard to what was to be done by others, which did not come under His human

will.

will.

We

Objection

i.

For

it is

written

that entering into a house,

(Mark

He would

7.

24)

that no

should know it, and He could not be hid. Therefore He could not carry out the purpose

man

of His will in

Obj.

2.

all

things.

Further, a

command

is

a sign of will,

was said in the First Part (q. xrx, a. 12). But our Lord commanded certain things to be done, and the contrary came to pass, for it is as

written (Matt.

9. 30, 31) that Jesus strictly charged them whose eyes had been opened, saying: See that no man know this. But they going out spread His fame abroad in all that

Or

Hence in the letter of Pope Agatho,^ which was approved in the Sixth Council,^ we read: "When He, the Creator and Redeemer of all, wished to be hid and could not, must not this be referred only to His human will which He deigned to assume in time?" Reply Obj. 2. As Gregory says (Moral, xix, 23)/ by the fact that Our Lord charged His mighty works to be kept secret, "He gave an example to His servants coming after Him that they should wish their miracles to be hidden;

and 3 ^

1

2

PG

PG

PG

94, 1080; Cf. 94, 1037; 94, 1045. Aristotle, iii, 9, 10 (432^13; 433*9).

6

'

yet, that others

may profit by

their example,

* Ibid. Ambrosiaster (PL 35, 2271). 1, Ad Augustas Imperatores (PL 87, 1177). Cone. Cpolit. Ill, actio 4 (MA xi, 250).

Episi.,

PL

76, 120.

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

784 they are thus this

made command

And

public against their will." signified

His

human glory, according to John My own glory. Yet He wished

will to fly 8, 50,

from

/ seek not

absolutely,

and

tion is,

and

vision, but the fulness of health" (that

the vigour of incorruptibility). Therefore

the body of Christ was incorruptible and with-

out any defect. Further, penalty

by His Divine will, that the miracle wrought should be pubHshed for the good of

of fault.

others.

cording to

Reply Obj. 3. Christ prayed both for things that were to be brought about by the Divine power, and for what He Himself was to do by His human will, since the power and operation of Christ's soul depended on God, Who works in all (Vulg., you), both to will and to accom-

fore defects of body,

especially

plish

(Phil.

2.

13).

QUESTION XIV Of the defects of body assumed by the son of god {In Four Articles)

We must now consider the defects Christ assumed in the human nature; and, first, of the defects of body;

secondly, of the defects of

soul (q. XV.).

head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether the Son of God should have assumed in human nature defects of body?

Under the

first

Whether He assumed the necessity of being subject to these defects? (3) Whether He contracted these defects? (4) Whether He assumed (2)

these defects?

all

Article i. Whether the Son of God in Human Nature Ought To Have Assumed Dejects

Body?

of

We proceed thus to

the First Article: It would seem that the Son of God ought not to have assumed human nature with defects of body. Objection i. For as His soul is personally united to the Word of God, so also is His body. But the soul of Christ had every perfection, both of grace and truth, as was said above (q. VII, A. 9; Q. IX, seqq.). Hence, His body also ought to have been in every way perfect, not having any imperfection in it. Obj. 2. Further, the soul of Christ saw the Word of God by the vision wherein the blessed see, as was said above (q. ix, a. 2), and thus the soul of Christ was blessed. Now by the beatification of the soul the body is glorified; since, as Augustine says {Ep. ad Dios. cxviii),^ "God made the soul of a nature so strong that from

the fulness of its blessedness there pours over even into the lower nature (that is, the body), not indeed the bliss proper to the beatific frui1

Chap. 3 (PL

33, 439).

Obj.

3.

But there was no I Pet.

is

the consequence

fault in Christ, ac-

Who did no guile. Therewhich are penalties, ought

2.22:

not have been in Him. Obj. 4. Further, no reasonable man assumes what keeps him from his proper end. But by such bodily defects the end of the Incarnation seems to be hindered in many ways. First, because by these infirmities men were kept back from knowing Him, according to Isa. 53. 2, 3: {.There was no sightliness^ that we should be desirous of Him. Despised and the most abject of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity, and His look was, as it were, hidden and despised, whereupon we esteemed Him not.

Secondly, because the desire of the holy Fathers

would not seem

person

it

is

be

to

fulfilled, in

whose

written (Isa. 51. 9): Arise, arise, strength, Thou Arm of the Lord.

put on Thy Thirdly, because

it

would seem more

fitting for

the devil's power to be overcome and man's

weakness- healed, by strength than by weakness. Therefore it does not seem to have been fitting that the

Son of God assumed human na-

ture with infirmities or defects of body.

On

the contrary. It

is

written (Heb.

2,

18)

For in that wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succour them also that are tempted. Now He came to succour us; hence David said of Him (Ps. 120. i.): / have lifted up my eyes to the inomitains, from whence help shall come to me. Therefore it was fitting for the Son of God to assume flesh subject to human infirmities, in order to suffer and be tempted in it and so bring succour to us. / answer that, It was fitting for the body assumed by the Son of God to be subject to human infirmities and defects; and especially for three reasons. First, because it was in order to satisfy for the sin of the

human

race that the

Son of God, having taken flesh, came into the world. Now one satisfies for another's sin by taking on himself the punishment due to the sin of the other. But these bodily defects, namely, death, hunger, thirst, and the like, are the punishment of sin, which was brought into the world by Adam, according to Rom. 5. 12: By one 77ian sin entered into this world, and by sin death. Hence it was useful for the end of the Incarnation that He should assume these penalties in our flesh and in our stead, according

THIRD PART He

to Isa. 53. 4, Surely

hath

home

our infirm-

ities.

Secondly, in order to cause belief in the Incarnation. For since

men

to

only as

the Son of

it is

human

nature

is

known

subject to these defects,

if

God had assumed human nature with-

out these defects, He would not have seemed to be true man, nor to have true, but imaginary, flesh, as

the Manicheans held.^

said, Phil. 2. y.

He

.

.

.

And

so, as is

ART.

form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man. Hence, Thomas, by the sight of His wounds, was recalled to the faith, as related John. 20. 26.

785

show us an example of

Article

Objection

Obj. Orthod.

it

were, of the

satisfaction for that sin; but the principle

is

the habit of soul, whereby one is inclined to wish to satisfy for another, and from which the satisfaction has its efficacy, for satisfaction would not be efficacious unless it proceeded from charity, as will be explained (Suppl. q. XIV, A. 2). Hence, the soul of Christ had to be perfect as regards the habit of knowledge and virtue, in order to have the power of satisfying, but His body was subject to infirmities, that the matter of satisfaction should not be wanting.

Reply Obj. 2. From the natural relationship which is between the soul and the body, glory flows into the body from the soul's glory. Yet this natural relationship in Christ was subject to the will of His Godhead, and thereby it came to pass that the Happiness remained in the soul, and did not flow into the body, but the flesh suffered what belongs to a nature capable of suffering; thus Damascene says {De Fide

Whether Christ Assumed the

subject to these defects.

another's sin are the matter, as

sufferings

2.

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that Christ was not of necessity He was

For

1.

the prophet

4. The infirmity assumed by Christ did not impede, but greatly furthered the end 1

See below, q. xvi, a. i. 94, 1080; cf. Ill, 14, 15

PG

Christ:

94, 1037, 1045).

will,

and

2.

Further,

iii,

all

Damascene says {De Fide

20) r^ "Nothing forced is seen in is voluntary." Now what is volun-

not necessary. Therefore these defects were not of necessity in Christ. tary

is

Obj. thing

3. Further, necessity is induced by somemore powerful. But no creature is more

powerful than the soul of Christ, to which it pertained to preserve its own body. Therefore these defects were not of necessity in Christ. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8. 3) that God sent His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh.

Now

it is

a condition of sinful flesh

under the necessity of dying, and suffering other like passions. Therefore the necessity to be

of suffering these defects

was

/ answer that. Necessity

in Christ's flesh.

One is a necessity of constraint, brought about by an external agent, and this necessity is contrary to both nature and

will, since

internal principle.

ther the

form

The

is

twofold.

these flow from an

other

is

natural neces-

from the natural principles (as

it is

necessary for

fire

—

ei-

to heat),

it is necessary for a body composed of contraries to be dissolved). Hence, with this necessity, which results from the matter, Christ's body was subject to the necessity of death and other like defects, since, as was said'' "it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to do and suffer what was proper to it." And this necessity results from the principles of human flesh, as was said above in this article. But if we speak of necessity of 3

(PG

written (Isa. 53. 7):

was His own

ly defects.

or the matter (as

sins.

it

speaking of the offering of the Passion. But will is opposed to necessity. Therefore Christ was not of necessity subject to bodi-

and do what was proper to it." Reply Obj. 3. Punishment always follows sin actual or original, sometimes of the one punished, sometimes of the one for whom he who suffers the punishment satisfies. And so it was with Christ, according to Isa. 53. 5: He was wounded for our iniquities. He was bruised for

Reply Obj.

is

is

sity, resulting

fer

it

offered because

Orthod. iii, 19)^ that, "it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to suf-

"

al-

Necessity of Being Subject to These Defects.

and defects. Hence it said (Heb. 12. 3) that He endured such opposition from sinners against Himself, that you be not wearied, fainting in your minds. Reply Obj. 1. The penalties one suffers for

our

And

though these infirmities concealed His Godhead, they made known His Manhood, which is the way of coming to the Godhead, according to Rom. 5. I, 2: By Jesus Christ ive have access to God. Moreover, the ancient Fathers did not desire bodily strength in Christ, but spiritual strength, with which He vanquished the devil and healed human weakness.

patience by valiantly bearing up against hu-

man

2

of the Incarnation, as above stated.

emptied Himself, taking

the

Thirdly, in order to

Q. 14

*

PG, 94 1084. John Damascene, De Fide

Orth.,

iii,

19

(PG

94, 1080).

SUMMA TEEOLOGICA

786

constraint, as contrary to the bodily nature,

thus again was Christ's body in its own natural condition subject to necessity in regard to the

and the scourge that struck.

nail that pierced

as such necessity

Yet according the will,

is

contrary to

clear that in Christ these defects

it is

—

understood the order of effect to cause that is, that is said to be contracted which is derived of necessity together with its cause. Now the cause of death and the like defects in human nature is sin, since by sin death entered into this world, according to Rom. 5. 12. And hence

who

incur these defects as due to sin, are

were not of necessity as regards either the Di-

they

vine will or the human will of Christ considered absolutely, as following the deliberation of rea-

properly said to contract them.

son, but only as regards the natural

of the will, according as

it

movement

naturally shrinks

from death and bodily hurt. Reply Obj. i. Christ is said to be o§ered because it was His own will that is, Divine will and deliberate human will, although death was contrary to the natural movement of His hu-

—

man

Damascene says {De Fide Orthod.

will, as

Reply Obj. been said. Reply Obj.

This

2.

from what has

plain

is

Nothing was more powerful

3.

than Christ's soul, absolutely; yet there was nothing to hinder a thing being more powerful in regard to this or that effect, as a nail for pierc-

And

ing.

this I say, in so far as Christ's soul is

considered in

its

own proper nature and power.

Christ

—

Thus

23, 24).^

iii,

Now

had not these defects as due to sin, since, as Augustine, expounding John 3. 31, He that Cometh from above, is above all, says:^ "Christ came from above that is, from the height of human nature, which it had before the fall of the first man." For He received human nature without sin, in the purity which it had in the state of innocence. In the same way He might have assumed human nature without defects. it

is

clear that Christ did not contract

if taking them upon Himself as due to sin, but by His own will. Reply Obj. i. The flesh of the Virgin was conceived in original sin, and therefore contracted these defects. But from the Virgin, Christ's flesh assumed the nature without fault, and He might likewise have assumed the nature without its penalty. But He wished to bear its pen-

these defects as

work of our redemption, as stated above (a. i). Therefore He had these defects not that He contracted them, but that He assumed them. Reply Obj. 2. The cause of death and other corporeal defects of human nature is twofold: the first is remote, and results from the mate-

alty in order to carry out the

Article

Whether Christ Contracted

3.

—

Bodily Dejects?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

would seem that Christ contracted bodily defects.

Objection

we

i.

For we are said

derive with our nature

Christ, together with

to contract

from

human

birth.

what But

nature, derived

His bodily defects and infirmities through His birth from His mother, whose flesh was subject to these defects. Therefore it seems that He contracted these defects. Obj.

Further, what

2.

ciples of nature

and hence

is

is

is

caused by the prin-

derived together with nature,

contracted.

Now

are caused by the principles of

these penalties

human

nature.

3.

Further, Christ

is

made up

of the

human body, because

of contraries.

But

this cause

likened to other

it

was

Hence the

held in check by original justice.

proximate cause of death and other defects is sin, whereby original justice is withdrawn. And thus, because Christ was without sin. He is said not to have contracted these defects, but to have assumed them.

Reply Obj.

men

3.

Christ was

in the quality

and not

made

in the

like

other

cause of these

defects; and hence, unlike others.

Therefore Christ contracted them. Obj.

rial principles is

He

did not

contract them.

men

in these defects, as is written Heb. 2. 17. But other men contract these defects. Therefore it seems that Christ contracted these de-

4.

Assumed

Whether Christ Ought To Have

All the Bodily Dejects of

Men?

We

fects.

On

the contrary,

through

man

Article

sin.

These defects are contracted

according to

Rom.

By

one by sin, Christ. There5.

12:

sin entered into this world, aftd

death.

Now

sin

had no place

in

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that Christ ought to have assumed all the bodily defects of men. Objection i. For Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. iii, 6, 18) :^ "What is unassumable is

fore Christ did not contract these defects. 2

/ answer that, In the verb "to contract" 1

PG 94,

1088, 1092.

is

Cf.

HuRh

of St. Cher,

(vi, ,^oiva). 3

PG

94, IC30S, 1071.

In Univ.

Test.,

on John 3.31

THIRD PART incurable." But Christ fects.

He

Therefore

came

to cure all our de-

ought to have assumed

all

our defects. Obj.

2.

Further,

it

was said

(a. i,

Reply i),

that in order to satisfy for us, Christ ought to

have had perfective habits of soul and defects

Now

of body.

the fulness of

body,

He

Obj.

3.

as regards the soul, all

He assumed

grace. Therefore as regards the

ought to have assumed Further, amongst

all

all

defects.

bodily defects

death holds the chief place. Now Christ assumed death. Much more, therefore, ought He to have

assumed other

On

ART.

Q. 15

787

I

Reply Obj. i. All particular defects of men are caused by the corruptibihty and capacity for suffering of the body, some particular causes being added; and hence, since Christ healed the capacity for suffering and corruptibility of our body by assuming it, He consequently healed other defects.

all

Reply Obj. 2. The fulness of all grace and knowledge was due to Christ's soul of itself, from the fact of its being assumed by the Word of God; and hence Christ assumed all the fulness of wisdom and grace absolutely. But He as-

sumed our defects

defects.

as a steward, in order to sat-

by contrary

and not that they belonged. to Him of Himself. Hence it was not necessary for Him to assume them all, but only such as sufficed to satisfy for the sin of the whole na-

that Christ

ture.

the contrary, Contraries cannot take place

simultaneously in the same. ities

Now some

infirm-

are contrary to each other, being caused

principles. Hence it could not be assumed all human infirmities. / answer that, As stated above (a. i), Christ assumed human defects in order to satisfy for the sin of human nature, and for this it was necessary for Him to have the fulness of knowledge and grace in His soul. Hence Christ ought to have assumed those defects which flow from the common sin of the whole nature, yet are

isfy for our sin,

Reply Obj.

3.

the sin of our

nacy toward well-doing.

Some other defects do not flow from the whole of human nature in common on account of the sin of our first parent, but are caused in

some men by

certain particular causes, as

and the like; and these desometimes brought about by the fault of the man for example, from inordinate eating; sometimes by a defect in the formative leprosy, epilepsy, fects are

—

power. Now neither of these pertains to Christ, since His flesh was conceived of the Holy Ghost, Who has infinite wisdom and power, and cannot err or fail; and He Himself did nothing wrong in the order of His life.

But there are some third defects, to be found amongst all men in common, by reason of the sin of our first parent, as death, hunger, thirst,

and the like; and all these defects Christ assumed, which Damascene {De Fide Orthod. i, 11; iii, 20)^ calls "natural and non-detracting passions" ture in

—

natural, as following all

common;

PG

94, 844, io8i.

na-

non-detracting, as implying

no defect of knowledge or grace. 1

human

men from

no parity.

QUESTION XV Of the defects

of soul assumed

by christ

edge and grace.

some defects that are incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace, as ignorance, a proneness towards evil, and an obsti-

to all

parent; but not other defects, although they are less than death. Hence there is

not incompatible with the perfection of knowl-

And thus it was not fitting for Him to assume all human defects or infirmities. For there are

Death comes

first

{In Ten Articles)

We

must now consider the defects pertaining and under this head there are ten points of inquiry: (i) Whether there was sin in Christ? (2) Whether there was the jomes of sin in Him? (3) Whether there was ignorance? (4) Whether His soul was passible? (5) Whether in Him there was sensible pain? (6) Whether there was sorrow? (7) Whether there was fear? (8) Whether there was wonder? (9) Whether there was anger? (10) Whether He was at once wayfarer and comprehensor? to the soul;

Article

i.

Whether There Was Sin

in Christ?

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that there was sin in Christ. Objection 1. For it is written (Ps. 21. 2): God, My God, look upon me : why hast Thou forsaken Me? Far from My salvation are the words of My sins. Now these words are said in the person of Christ Himself, as appears from His having uttered them on the cross. Therefore it would seem that in Christ there were sins.

Obj.

2.

Further, the Apostle says

12) that in

cause also

all

was

Adam

(Rom.

5.

—namely, be-

have sinned

in Adam by origin. Now Christ Adam by origin. Therefore He

were in

all

sinned in him.

;

SUMMA TEEOLOGICA

788

gave Himself to us as a pattern of living." Now man needs a pattern not merely of right living, but also of repentance for sin. Therefore it seems that in Christ there ought to have been sin, that He might repent of His sin, and thus

which Augustine quotes,^ the first regards "Our Lord and His Body," since "Christ and His Church are taken as one person." And thus Christ, speaking in the person of His members, not says (Ps. 21. 2): The words of My sins that there were any sins in the Head. Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. X, 20),^ Christ was in Adam and the other fathers not altogether as we were. For we were in Adam as regards both seminal principle and bodily substance, since, as he goes on to say: "As in the seed there is a visible bulk and an invisible virtue, both have come from Adam. Now Christ took the visible substance of His flesh from the Virgin's flesh; but the principle of His conception did not spring from the seed of man, but far otherwise from on high." Hence He was not in Adam according to semi-

afford us a pattern of repentance.

nal principle, but only according to bodily sub-

Obj. 3 Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 2. 18) that in that, wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succour

them also that are tempted. Now above all do we require His help against sin. Therefore it seems that there was sin in Him. Obj.

4.

Further,

Him

it is

written (II Cor.

5.

21)

knew no sin (that is, Christ), for us God hath made sin. But that really is, which has been made by God. Therefore there that

was

that

really sin in Christ.

Obj.

5.

Further, as Augustine says

Christ, xi),^ "in the

man

{De Agone

Christ the Son of

God

—

—

8.

stance.

And

46) Which of you shall convince Me of sin? I answer that. As was said above (q. xiv, A. i), Christ assumed our defects that He might satisfy for us, that He might prove the

human

nature from

On

He

the contrary,

Himself says (John

:

human

truth of His

He might

nature, and that

become an example of virtue to us. Now it is plain that by reason of these three things He ought not to have assumed the defect of sin. First, because sin in no way works our satisfaction rather, it impedes the power of satisfying, since, as it is written (Ecclus. 34. 23), The Most High approveth not the gifts of the ;

wicked. Secondly, the truth of His ture

is

not proved by

belong to

human

human

sin, since sin

nature, of which

na-

does not

God

is

materially

even as

therefore Christ did not receive

Adam

Adam

received his body materially

from the slime of the

earth, actively

And thus Christ did not sin He was only as regards His Reply Obj.

Now

sin

free

from

sin;

As Damascene says (De Fide two ways: first, with reference to His natural and hypostatic property, as when it is said that God became man, and that He suffered for us; secondly, with reference to His personal and relative property, when things are said of Him in Reply Obj. iii,

1.

25),' things are said of Christ in

our person which in no

way belong

to

Him

of

Himself. Hence, in the seven rules of Tichonius'' »

PL

40, 298.

«

PG

Q4, 1093.

*

De Scptcm

Reg.

»

PG

(PL

satisfying for us.

Him

Reply Obj.

God made

4.

but that it is

of

He made Him

written (Osee

My

people

by the law that

way

4.

Christ sin,

He had

He own

it is

not,

a victim for sin, even as

8)

:

They

—they —that

is,

shall eat the sins

who And in

the priests,

ate the victims offered for sin.

hath laid on is. He gave

—

sin in Himself,

written (Isa. 53. 6) that the Lord iniquity of us all (that

Him the Him up

men)

made Him

;

or

to be a victim

He made Him

for the

sin (that

have the likeness of sinful (Rom. 8. 3), and this on account of the passible and mortal body He assumed. Reply Obj. 5. A penitent can give a praiseworthy example not by having sinned, but by freely bearing the punishment of sin. And hence Christ set the highest example to penitents, since He willingly bore the punishment, not of His own sin, but of the sins of others. is,

to

flesh), as is written

94, 1081.

18, 15).

for His

sin.

sins of all

Orthod.

by

otherwise the punishment

His mouth.

:

whom

in

matter.

bore would have been due to

indeed, in such sort that

—

from God.

Adam,

does not further satisfaction, but hinders it, as has been said. Hence, it was not necessary for Him to have sin, but He was wholly

sown in it against its nature by the devil, as Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. iii, 20).^ Thirdly, because by sinning He could afford no example of virtue, since sin is opposed to virtue. Hence Christ in no way assumed the defect of sin either original or actual according to what is written (I Pet. 2. 22) Who did no sin, neither was guile found in

—

in

In His temptation and passion

3.

Christ has succoured us

the

cause, but rather has been

actively, but only

—and from the Holy Ghost actively

6

Christian Doctrine, in, 31

«

PL

34. 424-

(PL

34, 82).

THIRD PART q.isART.s Article

2.

m

of Sin

We

Whether There Was

the

"Fomes"

Christ?

contrary to reason.

Second Article: It Christ there was the fomes

proceed thus to

would seem that

789

belongs to the very nature of the fomes of sin an inclination of the sensual appetite to what is

in

the,

And hence

since in Christ the virtues

of sin.

For the fomes of sin, and the passibility and mortahty of the body spring from the same principle, namely, from the withdrawal of original justice, whereby the inferior powers of the soul were subject to the reason, and the body to the soul. Now passibility and mortality of body were in Christ. Therefore there was also the fomes of sin. Objection

i.

Damascene says {De Fide was by consent of the Divine will that the flesh of Christ was allowed to suffer and do what was proper to it." But it is Obj.

Further, as

2.

Orthod.

iii,

19),^ "it

it is

plain that

more perfect the virtues are in any man, the weaker the fomes of sin becomes in him. Hence, the

fomes of

degree, the

sin

were in was not

their highest in

Him;

be-

cause also this defect cannot be ordered to satisfaction, but rather inclined to what is contrary to satisfaction.

Reply Obj.

1.

The

powers pertaining have a natural capac-

inferior

to the sensitive appetite

ity to be obedient to reason but not the bodily powers, nor those of the bodily humours, nor ;

those of the vegetative soul, as in the Ethics.^

And hence

is

made

plain

perfection of virtue,

which

proper to the

flesh to lust after its pleasures.

is in accordance with right reason, does not exclude passibility of body yet it excludes the fomes of sin, the nature of which consists

Now

fomes of

nothing more than

in the resistance of the sensitive appetite to

since the

sin is

concupiscence, as the gloss says^ on it

Rom.

7. 8,

seems that in Christ there was the fomes of Obj.

3.

Further,

it is

by reason of the fomes

of sin that the flesh lusteth against the spirit, as

written (Gal.

to be so

much

5.

17).

But the

spirit is

shown

the stronger and worthier to be

crowned according as the more completely it overcomes its enemy namely, the concupiscence of the flesh, according to II Tim. 2, 5, he is not crowned except he strive lawfully. Now Christ had a most valiant and conquering spirit, and one most worthy of a crown, according to Apoc. 6. 2 There was a crown given Him, and He went forth conquering that He might conquer. Therefore it would especially seem that the fomes of sin ought to have been in Christ.

—

:

On

reason.

The flesh naturally desires what by the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite; but the flesh of man, who is a rational animal, desires this after the manner and order of reason. And thus with the concupisReply Obj.

pleasing to

is

sin,

is

;

the contrary, It

That which Ghost.

Now

is

is

written (Matt.

Holy

20)

of the Holy Ghost drives out sin and

conceived in her

the

i.

the inclination to sin, which

is

cence of the sensitive appetite Christ's flesh naturally sought food, drink, and sleep, and

is

it

sub-

does not therefore follow that in

plies the lust after pleasurable things against

the order of reason. 3. The spirit some extent by

Reply Obj. fortitude to

gives evidence of resisting that con-

cupiscence of the flesh which

is

yet a greater fortitude of spirit

it.

make

it

Christ there was the fomes of sin, for this im-

implied in the

and so much the more as the virtue is more perfect; thus, temperance controls the concupiscible appetite, fortitude and meekness the irascible appetite, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, q. lvi, a. 4). But there

Yet

14).''

its

in the irrational part of the soul,

all

sought according to right reason, as plain from Damascene {De Fide Orthod. iii,

else that is

is

word fomes. Therefore in Christ there ought not to have been the fomes of sin. / answer that. As was said above (q. vn, AA. 2, 9), Christ had grace and all the virtues most perfectly. Now moral virtues, which are

2.

it

strength the flesh

is

opposed to

it;

shown

by

is

if

thoroughly overcome,

so as to be incapable of lusting against the spir-

And hence

spirit

And

this belonged to Christ, whose reached the highest degree of fortitude. although He suffered no internal assault

on the part of the fomes of sin. He sustained an external assault on the part of the world and the devil, and won the crown of victory by overcoming them.

ject to reason,

Article

3.

Whether

in Christ There

Was

Ignorance?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

would seem that there was ignorance in Christ. Objection 1 For that is truly in Christ which .

iPG

94, 1080; cf. chap. 14

(PG, 1037); chap. 15 (PG

belongs to

94, 1045).

^Glossa 1416).

interl.

(vi,

i6v); Glossa

Lombardi (PL

191,

it

Him

in

His

does not belong to 8

Aristotle,

i,

human

nature, although

Him in His

13 (1102^28).

Divine Nature,

*PG

94, 1036.

SVMMA THEOLOGICA

790

and death. But ignorance belongs to Christ in His human nature; for Damascene )i that "He assumed says (De Fide Ort hod. lii, 21 an ignorant and enslaved nature." Therefore as suffering

ignorance was truly in Christ. Obj. 2. Further, one is said to be ignorant through defect of knowledge. Now some kind of knowledge was wanting to Christ, for the

(H Cor. 5. 21) Hifu that knew no He hath made sin. Therefore there

Apostle says us

sin, for

was ignorance

in Christ.

For it is written (Isa. 8. 4) before the child know to call his father and his shall be mother, the strength of Damascus taken away. Therefore in Christ there was ignoObj.

Further,

3.

:

.

.

.

rance of certain things.

not taken away by ignorance. But Christ came to take away our ignorance; for He came to enlighten them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death (Luke O71 the contrary,

Ignorance

79). Therefore there

I.

is

was no ignorance

in

shall be taken away. Nor are we to understand this as if He had been some time a man without knowing it, but before He know (that is, before He is a man having human knowledge), literally, the strength of Damascus and the spoils of Samaria shall be taken away by the King of the Assyrians or spiritually, "before His birth He will save His people solely by invocation," as a gloss expounds it.^ Augustine however says^ that this was fulfilled in the adoration of the Magi. For he says: "Before He uttered human words in human

mascus

.

.

.

—

—

flesh.

that

He

is,

received the strength of Damascus,

the riches which

in riches the first place

themselves were the spoils of Samaria. Because Samaria is taken to signify idolatry, since this people, having turned away from the Lord, the

first spoils

/ answer that, As there was the fulness of grace and virtue in Christ, so too there was the

fore he

all

knowledge, as is plain from what (q. vn, aa. 2, 5, 7, 8; qq. as the fulness of grace and virtue

ix-xii).

Now

excluded the fomes of

in Christ

sin,

so the ful-

ness of knowledge excluded ignorance, which is opposed to knowledge. Hence, even as the

fomes of

sin

was not

in Christ, neither

was there

And in this way "beknow" may be taken to mean "be-

domination of idolatry." fore the child

fulness of

idols. Hence these were which the child took from the

turned to the worship of

Christ.

has been said above

Damascus vaunted (for is given to gold). They

show himself

Article

4.

Whether

to

know."

Christ's Soul

Was Passible?

We

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that the soul of Christ was not passible.

Objection

For nothing

i.

suffers except

by

reason of something stronger, since "the agent is clear from Auand from the Phino creature was stronger than

greater than the patient," as

is

ignorance in Him.

gustine {Gen. ad

Reply Obj. i. The nature assumed by Christ be viewed in two ways. First, in its specific nature, and thus Damascene calls it "ignorant and enslaved"; hence he adds: "For man's na-

losopher.^

Now

lit. xii, 16),'*

may

Christ's soul. Therefore Christ's soul could not

ture

suffer at the hands of any creature; and hence it was not passible, for its capability of suffering would have been to no purpose if it could not have suffered at the hands of anything. Obj. 2. Further, Tully {De Tusc. Quces. m,

a slave of

is

Him

(that

is,

God)

Who made

has no knowledge of future things." Secondly, it may be considered with regard to what it has from its union with the Divine hypo-

and

it;

it

from which it has the fulness of knowledge and grace, according to John i. 14: We saw Him (Vulg., His glory) as it were the Onlybegotten of the Father, full of grace and truth; and in this way the human nature in Christ was not affected with ignorance. Reply Obj. 2. Christ is said not to have known sin, because He did not know it by experience; but He knew it by simple knowledge. Reply Obj. 3. The prophet is speaking in this passage of the human knowledge of Christ; for he says: Before the Child (that is, in His stasis,

human Joseph,

know to call His father (that is, who was His reputed father), and His

PG

;

:

sions.

Obj.

seem

3.

Further, the soul's passions would

same as the fomes cf sin, hence (Rom. 7. 5) calls them the passions Now the fomes of sin was not in Christ,

to be the

the Apostle

of

sins.

as

was

it seems that there His soul and hence His soul

said (a. 2). Therefore

were no passions

was not

in

;

passible.

nature)

mother (that 1

10)^ says that the soul's passions are ailments.

But Christ's soul had no ailment for the soul's ailment results from sin, as is plain from Ps. 40. 5 Heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee. Therefore in Christ's soul there were no pas-

94, 1084.

is,

Mary), the strength of Da-

'

Glossa inlerl

(iv,

2

2v); Jerome,

In Isaiam (PL

[8).

2 (PL 38 1034). f>Soul,m, 5 (430^18). «

»5em., ecu,

*PL34,

DD IV,

7.

467.

24,

THIRD PART On

the contrary, It

the person of Christ

—not

sins,

:

is

My

written (Ps. 87. 4) in soul is filled with evils

human

indeed, but

"pains," as a gloss expounds

it.^

evils

—that

Hence

is,

the soul

of Christ was passible.

/ answer that, suffer in

A

two ways

:

body may

soul placed in a first

with a bodily passion

ART.

Q. 15

rowful' in very deed; yet hold sway over His soul, that ful

He

and

sion

a bodily passion through bodily hurt

reason

for since

the soul is the form of the body, soul and body have but one being, and hence, when the body is disturbed by any bodily passion, the soul, too,

—

must be accidentally disturbed that is, in the being which it has in the body. Therefore, since Christ's body was passible and mortal, as was said above (q. xiv, aa. i, 2), His soul also was But the soul its

is

said to suffer with an animal

operation,

to the soul, or as

—

either as

of the soul

it is

it is

proper

more than

of

And although the soul is said to suffer way through sensation and understand-

the body. in this ing, as

was said

in the

Second Part

(l-II, Q.

XXII, A. 3; Q. XLi, A. i), nevertheless the affections of the sensitive appetite are most properly called passions of the soul.

Now

these were in

Christ, even as all else pertaining to ture.

Hence Augustine

says:^

man

affection in

a true

human

Nevertheless sions

were

;

for there

Him Who had

was no

false hu-

a true body and

soul."

we must know

that these pas-

in Christ otherwise than in us, in

three ways. First, as regards the object, since in

us these passions very often tend towards what unlawful, but not so in Christ. Secondly, as

is

regards the principle, since these passions in us frequently forestall the judgment of reason, but in Christ all

movements

of the sensitive appetite

it

has

its

is,

the

begin-

will He subjected Himself to these corpoand animal passions. Reply Obj. 2. Tully is speaking there accord-

real

who did not name of passions to all but only to the disorderly movements of the sensitive appetite. Now, it is manifest that passions like these were

ing to the opinions of the Stoics,^

give the

not in Christ.

Reply Obj. 3. The passions of sins are movements of the sensitive appetite that tend to unlawful things and these were not in Christ, as neither was the fomes of sin. ;

Article

as

He

the effect, because in us these movements, at times, do not remain in the sensitive appetite,

but deflect the reason; but not so in Christ, since by His disposition the movements that are

We

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It

in Christ.

Objection 1. For Hilary says {De Trin. x) :^ "Since with Christ to die was life, what pain may He be supposed to have suffered in the sacrament of His death. Who bestows hfe on such as die for Him?" And further on he says:^

"The Only-begotten assumed true man, not God; and although blows struck Him and wounds were inflicted on Him, and scourges fell upon Him, and the cross lifted ceasing to be

Him

^Glossa hiterl. (iii, 2i6r); Glossa Lombardi 811); Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. (PL 36, mo), 2 City of God, xiv, 9 (PL 41, 415).

was (PL

in

up, yet these wrought in deed the veheof the passion, but brought no pain,"

there was no true pain in Christ.

2. Further, it would seem to be proper to conceived in original sin to be subject to

Obj.

the necessity of pain. But the flesh of Christ was

not conceived in sin, but of the Holy Ghost in the Virgin's womb. Therefore it lay under no necessity of suffering pain.

remained

in the sensitive appetite that the reason

Whether There Was Sensible Pain

would seem that there was no true sensible pain

be-

as regards

5.

in Christ?

flesh

Ubid.

and a propassion when

a perfect pas-

—that

own

dispensation, when He willed; even came man when He willed." Thirdly,

flesh so

it is

dominates the soul

it

Reply Qbj. i. The soul of Christ could have prevented these passions from coming upon it, and especially by the Divine power; yet of His

mence Hence

human

grow sorrow-

ther.

sprang from the disposition of the reason. Hence Augustine says^ that "Christ assumed these movements in His human soul by an unfailing

naturally becoming to

a propassion

said to have 'begun to

to be sad' "; so that

;

passion should

by

man's na-

"Our Lord having

designed to live in the form of a servant, took these upon Himself whenever He judged they

ought to be assumed

lest a it is

ning in the sensitive appetite, but goes no fur-

of necessity passible in like manner.

passion in

is

when

secondly, with an animal passion. It suffers with ;

791

5

no way hindered in doing what was right. Hence Jerome says" that "Our Lord, in order to prove the reality of the assumed manhood, 'was sor-

Obj.

3.

Further, the delight of the contem-

plation of Divine things dulls the sense of pain hence the martyrs in their passions bore up more

191, 4

On Matt.

6

Cf.

6

PL

26.37

Part I-II, 10, 350,

Q.

(PL

26, 205).

XXIV, 7

PL

a. 2.

10, 361.

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

792

by thinking of the Divine love. But Christ's soul was in the perfect enjoyment of contemplating God, Whom He saw in essence, as was said above (q. ix, a. 2). Therefore He

patiently

He

is written (Isa. 53. 4) hath borne our infirmities and carried

mind

so kept in the

as not to overflow into

the sensitive powers, lest sensible pain should

thereby be prevented.

Article

could feel no pain. Ofi the contrary, It Sitrely

was

Whether There Was Sorrow

6.

in

Christ?

We

proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It

our sorrows. I answer that, As

would seem that in Christ there was no sorrow. Objection i. For it is written of Christ (Isa.

said in the

42. 4)

is plain from what has been Second Part (I-H, Q. xxxv, a. 7), for true bodily-pain are required bodily hurt and the sense of hurt. Now Christ's body was able to be hurt, since it was passible and mortal, as above stated. (q. xiv, aa. 1,2); neither was the sense of hUrf wanting to 'it' since Christ's soul possessed perfectly all natural powers. There-

fore no one should doubt but that in Christ there

was true pain. Reply Obj.

i.

In

all

these and similar words,

Hilary does not intend to exclude the reahty of the pain, but the necessity of it. Hence after the foregoing he adds:^ "Nor, when He thirsted, or

He

:

Obj.

2.

shall befall the just

sad.

was most

This

the

is

name

word "necessity"

uses the

above stated flesh

in reference to the

cause of these defects, which

first

is

is

sin,

as

(q. xiv, aa. i, 3), so that Christ's

said not to have lain under the necessity

was no Hence he adds: "For He (that is, one proper to His origin, Christ) had a body

of these defects, in the sense that there sin in

it.

—

through the unholiness of our conception, but subsisted in the form of our body by the strength of His power." But as regards the proximate cause of these defects, which is composition of contraries, the flesh of Christ lay under the necessity of these defects, as was said above (q. xiv, a. 2).

which did not

Reply Obj. to pain,

of

its

2.

exist

Flesh conceived in sin

is

subject

not merely on account of the necessity

natural principles, but from the necessity

of the guilt of sin.

Now this necessity

was not

in

Christ, but only the necessity of natural principles.

Reply Obj. 3. As was said above (q. xrv, a. Reply 2), by the power of the Godhead of Christ Happiness was kept in the soul, so as not I,

in

Obj.

Obj.

:

Ambrose says (De

He had

Trin.

sorrow; for

He

ii,

7)^ that "as a

bore

my

man

sorrow. I call

sorrow, fearlessly, since I preach the cross."

it

As was said above (a. 5, Reply by Divine dispensation the joy of contemplation remained in Christ's mind so as not to overflow into the sensitive powers, and thereby / answer that,

3),

shut out sensible pain.

pain

is

Now

even as sensible

in the sensitive appetite, so also is sor-

row. But there

is

a difference of motive or ob-

ject; for the object

and motive of pain

perceived by the sense of touch, as

hurt

is

when any-

one is wounded, but the object and motive of sorrow is anything hurtful or evil interiorly apprehended either by the reason or the imagination, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. xxxv, AA. 2, 7), as when anyone grieves over -

364

Furthermore, as Augustine says:*

4.

:

150);

10,

is evil,

"Sorrow regards the things we suffer unwillingly." But Christ suffered nothing against His He was ofwill, for it is written (Isa. 53. 7) fered because it was His own will. Hence there was no sorrow in Christ. On the contrary. Our Lord said (Matt. 26. 38) My soul is sorrowftd even unto death. And

and mortality should be taken away; and for the same reason the delight of contemplation

PL

Him: The

Further, the Philosopher says^ that

3.

sorrow

to overflow into the body, lest His passibility

1

according to Jer. 23. 6:

that they shall call

and to be shunned." But in was no evil to be shunned. Therefore there was no sorrow in Christ.

acceded, not to the

And he

just,

saddened save by man esteems his goods, and these the just man would was saddened by the has given him. But is

the just

Him.

Christ there

custom."

shall not

Lord, our just one. Therefore there was no sor-

sumed, so that the custom of our body was atoned for by the custom of our nature. Or when its

Now

only justice and virtue as he cannot lose; otherwise be subject to fortune if he loss of the goods fortune Christ

it

the reason of this the Stoics

the loss of his goods.

"all

He

And

asserted^ to be that no one

ty of the body, the body's customs were as-

took drink or food,

man,

Whatever

row

body's necessity, but to

written (Prov. 12. 21):

it is

make him

hungered, or wept, was the Lord seen to drink, or eat, or grieve. But in order to prove the reali-

He

nor troublesome.

shall not be sad

Further,

Cf. .\rnim, Frafimrnls, vol.

iii,

below, Q. XLVi, A. 6, Arg. 2. ^Ethics, vri, 13 (ii53*'i). * City 0/ God, XIV, 6 (PL 41, 409);

424).

chap.

9, sect.

3

(ill,

cf.

»

PL

16, 594.

cf.

chap. 15

(PL

41,

THIRD PART the loss of grace or money.

Now

Christ's soul

could apprehend things inwardly as hurtful ther to Himself, as His passion and death,

ei-

—or

to others, as the sin of His disciples, or of the

Jews that

killed

be true pain

Him. And hence,

in Christ, so too

as there could

could there be true

sorrow; otherwise, indeed, than in us, in the three

ways above stated

(a, 4),

Q. IS

i. ;

beginning as a propassion. Hence

He

(Matt. 26. 37):

and

it is

written

began to grow sorrowful is one thing to be sorrow-

to be sad. For "it and another to grow sorrowful," as Jerome says, on this text.^ Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says,^ for the three passions, desire, joy, and fear, the Stoics held three evwadelas that is, good passions in the soul of the wise man namely, for desire, will; for joy, dehght; for fear, caution. But as regards sorrow, they denied it could be in the soul of the wise man, for sorrow regards evil already present, and they thought that no evil could befall a wise man; and they denied this because they beheved that only the virtuous is good, since it makes men good, and that nothing is evil except what is sinful, whereby men be-

—

:

come wicked.

Now

although what

is man's chief man's chief evil, since these pertain to reason, which is supreme in man, yet there are certain secondary goods of man, which pertain to the body, or to the ex-

is

sinful

is

virtuous

is

terior things that minister to the body. And hence in the soul of the wise man there may be sorrow in the sensitive appetite by his apprehending these evils, without this sorrow disturbing the reason. And in this way are we to understand that whatsoever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him sad, because his reason is troubled by no misfortune. And thus Christ's sorrow was a propassion, and not a passion. Reply Obj. 3. All sorrow is an evil of punishment; but it is not always an evil of fault, except only when it proceeds from an inordinate affection. Hence Augustine says:^ "Whenever these affections follow reason, and are caused when and where needed, who will dare to call

them diseases or vicious passions?" Reply Obj. 4. There is no reason why

2

not of

itself

be contrary to the

In Matt., IV, on 26.37 (PL 26, 205). City of God, XIV, 8 (PL 41, 411).

^Ibid., XIV, 9

(PL

41, 414).

ordered to health.

And

selves involuntary, and caused sorrow, although they were voluntary as ordered to the end, which is the redemption of the human race.

Article

7.

Whether There Was Fear

Obj.

2.

Further, Hilary says

"I ask those

who

He

reason that

will,

and

{De

think thus, does

It

Trin. x) it

:'*

stand to

die, Who by exfrom the Apostles, enthe glory of martyrdom?"

should dread to

pelling all dread of death

couraged them to Therefore it is unreasonable that there should be fear in Christ. Obj. 3. Further, fear seems only to regard what a man cannot avoid. Now Christ could have avoided both the evil of punishment which He endured, and the evil of fault which befell others. Therefore there was no fear in Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (Mark 14. 33) Jesus began to fear and to be heavy. I answer that, As sorrow is caused by the :

apprehension of a present evil, so also is fear caused by the apprehension of a future evil. Now the apprehension of a future evil, if the evil be quite certain, does not arouse fear. Hence the Philosopher says^ that we do not fear a thing

some hope of avoiding it. For no hope of avoiding it the evil is considered present, and thus it causes sorrow unless there

when

there

is

is

rather than fear.

two ways.

in

fear may be considered according as the sensitive

Hence

First,

appetite naturally shrinks from bodily hurt,

sorrow

if it is

present,

and thus fear was Secondly, fear

may

and by fear

if it is

by

future

in Christ, even as sorrow. be considered in the uncer-

tainty of the future event, "as

when

at night

we

are frightened at a sound, not knowing what is"

as

;

and

in this

way

there

was no

it

fear in Christ,

Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. iii, 23).^ 1. The just man is said to be with-

Reply Obj.

out dread in so far as dread implies a perfect

man from what reason dictates. thus fear was not in Christ, but only as a propassion. Hence it is said (Mark 14. 33) that passion drawing

a thing

in Christ?

proceed thus to the Seventh Article:

would seem that there was no fear in Christ. Objection i. For it is written (Prov. 28. i): The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread. But Christ was most just. Therefore there was no fear in Christ.

ful

good, and what

is

it

thus Christ's death and passion were of them-

We

Sorrow was not in Christ, as a perfect passion yet is was in Him in a state of

1

but only as

sired,

eral.

Reply Obj.

793

7

yet be willed by reason of the end to which it is ordered, as bitter medicine is not of itself de-

when we were

speaking of the passions of Christ's soul in gen-

may

ART.

And 4

PL

6

Rhetoric,

«

PG 94,

10, 350. 11,

5 (1382^29).

1089.

—

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

794

Jesus began to fear and to be heavy, with a propassion, as Jerome expounds.^ Reply Obj. 2. Hilary^ excludes fear from Christ in the same way that he excludes sorrow

—

that is. as regards thenecessity of fearing. And yet to show the reality of His human nature, He voluntarily assumed fear, even as sorrow. Reply Obj. 3. Although Christ could have

avoided future evils by the power of His Godhead, yet they were unavoidable, or not easily avoidable by the weakness of the

der at what He Himself wondered at. Hence Augustine says {Super Gen. cont. Manich. 1, 8)*^:

"Our Lord wondered

who

8.

Whether

be caused.

Reply Obj.

flesh.

Was Wonder

Tliere

in

Christ did not marvel at the

2.

proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It would seem that in Christ there was no wonder. Objection i. For the Philosopher says^ that wonder results when we see an effect without knowing its cause; and thus wonder belongs only to the ignorant.

Now

was said (a. wonder in Christ.

3).

Therefore

;

Christ was most magnanimous. Therefore there was no wonder in Christ. Obj. 3. Further, no man wonders at what he himself can do. Now Christ could do whatsoever was great. Therefore it seems that He wondered

mous man does not wonder." But

at nothing.

the contrary, It

—

is

written (Matt. is,

8.

10)

the words of the

I answer that, Wonder properly regards what new and unusual. Now there could be nothing new and unusual as regards Christ's Divine is

knowledge; nor as regards the human knowledge whereby He knew things in the Word, or by which He saw things by infused species. Yet things could be new and unusual with regard to His experimental knowledge, in regard to which new things could occur to Him day by day. Hence, if we speak of Christ with respect to His Divine knowledge, and His beatific and even His infused knowledge, there was no wonder in Christ. But if we speak of Him with respect to experimental knowledge, wonder could be in Him; and He assumed this affection for our instruction

—that

in order to teach us to

is,

i/n Matt., IV, on 26.37 (PL 26, 205). 2/« Matt., on 26.37 (PL 9, 1066). ^Metaphysics, «

PG

94, 982.

I,

2

(982*'i7; 983*12). 6

above.

Ethics, IV, 3 (n25»2).

Article

Whether There Was Anger in Christ?

9.

We

Obj. 2. Further, Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. ii, 15)^ that "wonder is fear springing from the imagination of something great" and hence the Philosopher says^ that "the magnani-

Jesus hearing this that marvelled. centurion

Reply Obj. 3. He could do all things by the Divine power, for with respect to this there was no wonder in Him, but only with respect to His human experimental knowledge, as was said

there was no igno-

in Christ, as

there was no

On

was great with respect was great with respect

it

to others.

We

rance

if it

to Himself, but because

Christ?

order to show us

still

Centurion's faith as

Article

in

need to be so affected, must wonder. Hence all these emotions are not signs of a disturbed mind, but of a Master teaching." Reply Obj. i. Although Christ was ignorant of nothing, yet new things might occur to His experimental knowledge, and thus wonder would that we,

won-

proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It would seem that there was no anger in Christ. Objection i. For it is written (Jas. i. 20): The anger of man worketh not the justice of God. Now whatever was in Christ pertained to the justice of God, since of Him it is written (I Cor.

30) For He (Vulg., Who) of God is justice. Therefore it seems us

I.

:

made unto that there

.

.

.

was no anger

in Christ.

opposed to meekness, But Christ was meek. Therefore there was no anger in Him. Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral, v, 45)* that "anger that comes of evil blinds the eye of the mind, but anger that comes of zeal disturbs it." Now the mind's eye in Christ was neither blinded nor disturbed. Therefore in Christ there was neither sinful anger nor zealous anger. On the contrary, It is written (John 2. 17) that the words of Ps. 68. 10, the zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up, were fulfilled in Him. / answer that. As was said in the Second Part (I-H, Q XLVi, A. 3, Reply 3, and H-H, q. CLViii, A. 2, Reply 3), anger is an effect of sorrow. For when sorrow is inflicted upon someone, Obj.

as

is

2.

Further, anger

plain

from the

there arises within

is

Ethics."^

him

a desire of .he sensitive

appetite to repel this injury brought upon himself or others. Hence anger is a passion composed of sorrow and the desire of revenge. Now it was said (a. 6) that sorrow could be in Christ. As to the desire of revenge it is sometimes with that is. when anyone seeks revenge beyond sin the order of reason and in this way anger could

—

;

«

PL

34, 180.

8PL7S,

726.

^

Aristotle, iv, 5 (1125^26).

THIRD PART not be in Christ, for this kind of anger

Q. 15

ART.

called

Obj.

Sometimes, however, this desire without sin indeed is praiseworthy for example, when anyone seeks revenge according to the order justice, and this is called zealous anger. 2 For Augustine says^ that "he is eaten up by

obtain

sinful anger. ^ is

is

—

—

God, who seeks to better it, and if he cannot right it, bears with it and sighs." Such was the anger that was in Christ. Reply Obj. i. As Gregory says (Moral, v, sometimes 45),^ anger is in man in two ways, it forestalls reason, and causes it to operate, and in this way it is properly said "to work," for zeal for the house of

whatever

He

sees to be evil in

—

operations are attributed to the principal agent.

way that we must understand that anger of man worketh not the justice of

It is in this

the

God. Sometimes anger follows reason, and is, as it were, its instrument, and then the operation, which pertains to justice, is not attributed to

no way impeded the act of rea-

son.

Article 10. Whether Christ Was At Once a Wayfarer and a Comprehensor?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article: It would seem that Christ was not at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor. Objection i. For it belongs to a wayfarer to be moving toward the end of Happiness, and to a comprehensor it belongs to be resting in the end. Now to be moving towards the end and to be resting in the end cannot belong to the same. Therefore Christ could not be at once wayfarer and comprehensor. ^Gxtgory, Ibid. « Tract., X,

on John

^Ibid. 2.17

(PL 35,

1471).

*

PL 75,

725.

795

Further, to tend to Happiness, or to does not pertain to man's body, but to

hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios. "upon the inferior nature, which is

cxviii.)^ that

the body, there overflows, not indeed the

Hap-

piness which belongs to such as enjoy and un-

derstand, the fulness of health, that

our of incorruption."

Now

is,

the vig-

although Christ had

He fully enjoyed God in His mind. Therefore Christ was not a wayfarer but a comprehensor. Obj. 3. Further, the Saints, whose souls are a passible body,

heaven and whose bodies are in the tomb, enjoy Happiness in their souls, although their in

bodies are subject to death, yet they are called not wayfarers, but only comprehensors. Hence, with equal reason would it seem that Christ was a pure comprehensor and in no since His

way

a wayfarer,

mind enjoyed God although His body

was mortal.

On

ferior part, so, conversely, the passions of the

inferior part in

it,

his soul;

anger but to reason.

Reply Obj. 2. It is the anger which outsteps the bounds of reason that is opposed to meekness, and not the anger which is controlled and brought within its proper bounds by reason, for meekness holds the mean in anger. Reply Obj. 3. In us the natural order is that the soul's powers mutually impede each other that is, if the operation of one power is intense, the operation of the other is weakened. This is the reason why any movement whatsoever of anger, even if it be tempered by reason, dims the mind's eye of him who contemplates. But in Christ, by control of the Divine power, every power was allowed to do what was proper to it, and one power was not impeded by another. Hence, as the joy of His mind in contemplation did not impede the sorrow or pain of the in-

2.

10

the contrary, It

is

written (Jer. 14. 8)

Why wilt Thou

be as a stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man turning in to lodge?

I answer that, A man is called a wayfarer from tending to Happiness, and a comprehensor from having already obtained Happiness, according to I Cor. 9. 24: So run that you may comprehend (Douay, obtain); and Phil. 3. 12: / follow after, if by any means I may comprehend (Douay, obtain). Now man's perfect Happiness consists in both soul and body, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. iv, A. 6). In the soul, as regards what is proper to it, according as the mind sees and enjoys God; in the body, according as the body will rise spiritual in power and glory and incorruption, as is written I Cor. 15. 42. Now before His passion Christ's mind saw God fully, and thus He had Happiness as far as it regards what is proper to the soul but Happiness was wanting with regard to all else, since His soul was passible, and His body both passible and mortal, as is clear from the above (a. 4; Q. XIV, AA. I, 2). Hence He was at once comprehensor, since He had the Happiness proper to the soul, and at the same time wayfarer, since He was tending to Happiness as regards what was wanting to His Happiness. Reply Obj. i. It is impossible to be moving towards the end and resting in the end in the same respect; but there is nothing against this ;

under a different respect, as when a man is at once a knower with regard to what he already knows, and yet is a learner with regard to what he does not know. Reply Obj. 2. Happiness principally and prop6

Chap. 3 (PL 3s, 439).

;

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

ygfi

erly belongs to the soul with regard to the mind, yet secondarily and, so to say, instrumentally, bodily goods are required for Happiness

thus the Philosopher says^ that exterior goods minister organically to Happiness. Reply Obj. 3. There is no parity between the soul of a saint

and of Christ, for two reasons:

because the souls of saints are not passible, as Christ's soul was; secondly, because their bodies do nothing by which they tend to Happiness, as Christ by His bodily sufferings tended to Happiness as regards the glory of His body.

Objection i. For every affirmative proposiremote matter is false. Now this propo-

tion in

are applicable to christ in his being and becoming

seem

now consider the consequences of the union and first as to what belongs to Christ in Himself; secondly, as to what belongs to Christ in relation to God the Father (q. xx) thirdly, as to what belongs to Christ in relation to us :

;

first,

there occurs a twofold

about such things as belong to Christ according to being and becoming the second regards such things as belong to Christ by reason of unity (q. xvii). Under the first head there are twelve points of first is

;

Whether this is true: God is man? (2) Whether this is true: Man is God? (3) Whether Christ may be called a lordly man? (4) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Son of God, and conversely? (5) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Divine Nature, and what belongs to the Son of God of the human nature? (6) Whether this is true: The Son of God was made man? (7) Whether this is true: Man was made God? (8) Whether this is true: Christ is a creature? (9) Whether this is true: This man, pointing out Christ, began to be? or always was? (10) Whether this is true: Christ as man is a creature? (11) Whether this is true: Christ as man is God? (12) Whether

inquiry: (i)

this is true: Christ as

man

is

a hypostasis or

"God

Is

i.

Whether This

Further, the three Divine Persons are

mutual agreement than the human

nature and the Divine. But in the mystery of the Incarnation one Person is not predicated of another; for we do not say that the Father is

seems that

the Son, or conversely. Therefore

it

human nature ought not to be God by saying that God is man.

predicated of

Obj. 3. Further, Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.y that, "as the soul and the flesh are one man, so are God and man one Christ." But this

The

soul

God

is

the body. Therefore this

man. Obj. 4. Further, it was said in the First Part (q. xxxix, a. 4) that what is predicated of God false:

is

is

not relatively but absolutely, belongs to the whole Trinity and to each of the Persons. But this word man is not relative, but absolute. Hence, if it is predicated of God, it would follow that the whole Trinity and each of the Per-

sons

is

On

man and ;

this is clearly false.

the contrary, It

written (Phil.

is

Who

2. 6,

7)

emptied being in the form of God, Himself, taking the form of a servant, being .

.

.

made in the likeness of man, and in habit found as a man; and thus He Who is in the form of God is man. Now He Who is in the form of God is God. Therefore God is man. / answer that, This proposition, God is man, is

all Christians, yet not in the same For some admit the proposition, but

admitted by

way by

all.

not in the proper acceptation of the terms. Thus the Manicheans say^ the

Word

of

God

man,

is

not indeed true, but fictitious man, since they say that the Son of God assumed an imaginary body, and thus God is called man as a bronze figure

is

called

So, too, those

man who

has the figure of a man.

if it

held that Christ's body and

soul were not united^ could not

true man, but that

by reason

He

is

of the parts.

were disproved above

sa}'

that

God is man

figuratively called

Now both (q.

ii,

these opinions

a.

5;

Q.

v,

aa.

Some, on the contrary, hold the reality on the part of man, but deny the reality on the part of

Is True:

Man''? 2

We proceed thus to seem

2.

in greater

1,2).

person?

Article

to be false.

Obj.

also

We must

The

most widely apart. Therefore, since the is affirmative, it would

cate are

aforesaid proposition

is false:

{In Twelve Articles)

consideration.

is in remote matter, since by the subject and predi-

the

Of the consequences of the union with regard to those things which

(q. xxv). Concerning the

man,

is

the forms signified

first,

QUESTION XVI

God

sition,

that this

is

the First Article: It

false:

God

is

man.

would


The Archbishop

for

Whom

a suppositum of

word man may be

Cf. Ps. 8i.6;

2 Cf.

is

truly

human

na-

and properly

10.34-

a. 6.

of Sens; cf. above, Q.

this

11,

A. 6.

;

the concrete of the concrete.

Reply Obj.

God because

4.

This word

man

is

predicated of

of the union in person, and this

union impHes a relation. Hence it does not follow the rule of those words which are absolutely predicated of God from eternity.

Article

2.

Whether This

Is True:

"Man Is God"?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that this is false: Man is God. Objection i. For God is an incommunicable name; hence (Wisd. 13. 10; 14. 21) idolaters are rebuked for giving the name of God. which is incommunicable, to wood and stones. Hence with equal reason does it seem unbecoming that this word God should be predicated of man. Obj. 2. Further, whatever is predicated of the predicate may be predicated of the subject. But

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

y^ God

this is true:

the Father, or:

is

Trinity. Therefore, it

seems that

Man

ther, or:

is

3.

God

is

the

Man is God, Man is the Fa-

true that

this also is true:

Therefore the Obj.

if it is

the Trinity. But these are false.

first is false.

Further,

it

written (Ps. 80. 10):

is

There shall be no new God in thee. But man is something new, for Christ was not always man. Therefore this is false: Man is God.

On

the contrary, It

Of whom is

is

God

all things,

over

Christ, according to the this is true:

written

is

(Rom.

9.

Christ according to the flesh,

Man

blessed for ever. flesh, is

5)

Who Now

man. Therefore

God.

is

/ answer that, Granted the reality of both naand of the that is. Divine and human tures

—

—

union in person and hypostasis, this is true and proper: Man is God, even as this: God is man. For this word man may stand for any hypostasis of human nature, and thus it may stand for the Person of the Son of God, Whom we say is a hypostasis of human nature. Now it is manifest that the

word God

is

truly and properly predi-

cated of the Person of the Son of God, as was said in the First Part (q. xxxix, a. 4). Hence

remains that this God.

it

Reply Obj.

i.

is

true and proper

own

Man

is

name

Idolaters attributed the

of the Deity to stones and their

:

wood considered

in

nature, because they thought there

them. But we do not of the Deity to the man in

was something divine attribute the

name

in

His human nature, but in the eternal suppositum, which by union is also a suppositum of

human

nature, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. This word Father is predicated of this word God according as this word God stands for the Person of the Father.

way

And

in this

not predicated of the Person of the Son, because the Person of the Son is not the Person of the Father. And, consequently, it is it

is

not necessary that this word Father be predicated of this word is

Man,

predicated, since

Man

of which the

word God

stands for the Person

Article

Whether Christ Can Be Called

3.

a Lordly Man^?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

would seem that Christ can be called a lordly man. Objection 1. For Augustine says {Qq. Ixxxiii. qu. 36)^ that "we are to be counselled to hope for the goods that were in the Lordly Man," and he is speaking of Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ was a lordly man. Obj.

Further, as lordship belongs to Christ

2.

by reason of His Divine Nature, so does manhood belong to the human nature. Now God is said to be humanized, as is plain from Damascene {De Fide Orthod. iii, 11),'* where he says that "being humanized manifests the conjunction with man." Hence with like reason may it Obj.

3.

Further, as lordly

On 19)

the contrary, Augustine says {Retract,

"I do not see that

:^

of the suppositum, assert a

it

new God. But

does not follow that this

would

follow,

if

we we

As was said above when we say "the Man Christ

signify the eternal suppositum,

man might

Christ,'' this

he

assumed

is

The

which

is

we the

be called lordly, since hon-

to a participation of Divine said.*^ is

And, even

in this

not called "divine"

question

»

PL

tPt.

why we

*

40, 26. Ill,

Cf. fn.

^

Cf.

717 above.

Reply

Jesus,"

is hardly apposite in English. S. Thomas can say in Latin, c.o,., oratio dominica (the Lord's Prayer) or passio dominica (Our Lord's Passion), but not speak of our Lord as homo dominicus (a lordly man). 2

explains

7

I, p.

(a. 2,

"the Man Christ Jesus," we mean a created suppositum, as those who assert two supposita in

even as must be said by those who assert that there are two supposita in Christ.^ Cf. fn.

the Lord

denominatively from lord, it cannot truly and properly be said that this Man is lordly, but rather that He is Lord. But if, when we say

PL

^

is

denominatively, since this takes away from the truth of the union. Hence, since we say lordly

»

Man

i,

rightly call

Person of the Son of God, because there is only one suppositum of both natures. Now God and Lord are predicated essentially of the Son of God, and hence they ought not to be predicated

stands for a created suppositum;

held that

He

/ answer that, 3),

way, the human nature

not new, but eternal. And because this word God is predicated of man not on account of the human nature, but by reason

we may

Jesus Christ a lordly man, since Himself."

our, as the Nestorians

is

lordly.

is Divine derived from Deus (God). But Dionysius {Eccl. Hier. iv)^ calls Christ "the most Divine Jesus." Therefore with like reason may Christ be called a lordly man.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the human nature in Christ is something new, yet the suppositum of

human nature

is

derived from

is

lord, so

of the Son.

the

man

be said denominatively that this

sect.

32, 616.

PG

io(PG3,

94, 1024.

484).

;

I, p. 717 above. Nestorius, in Cyril of

(PG (PG 94,

Nestorio

76, 252);

Ill, 2

988).

Alexandria,

Dial,

John Damascene, De Fide

cum

Orth.,

THIRD PART by

essence, but "deified"

—

by

not, indeed,

its

being converted into the Divine Nature, but by its conjunction with the Divine Nature in one hypostasis, as

Fide Orthod.

Reply Obj.

1.

from Damascene {De

plain

is

iii,

ii, 17).^

i,

19)

;2

hence, after the

foregoing words {Retract, ibid.), he adds: "Wherever I have said this" namely, that

— man — "I wish

it unsaid, Christ Jesus is a lordly having afterwards seen that it ought not to be said, although it may be defended with some reason" that is, because one might say that He was called a lordly man by reason of the human

—

word man signifies, and not by reason of the suppositum. Reply Obj. 2. This one suppositum, which is of the human and Divine natures, was first of that is, from eternity. Afthe Divine Nature terwards in time it was made a suppositum of human nature by the Incarnation. And for this reason it is said to be humanized not that it assumed a man, but that it assumed human nanameture. But the converse of this is not true ly, that a suppositum of human nature assumed nature, which this

—

—

—

the Divine Nature; hence

Reply Obj.

3.

we may not

say a

man.

ART.

4

799

proper to God, since God is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it belongs to the human nature to be created, temporal and mutable. Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God. contrary to what

is

Augustine retracts these and

the hke words {Retract,

deified or lordly

Q. 16

Obj.

is

Further, to attribute to

2.

defective seems to take

honour, and to be a blasphemy.

human

tains to the

God what

is

away from the Divine

Now

what per-

nature contains a kind of

and the like. Hence seems that what pertains to the human nature can in no way be said of God. Obj. 3. Further, to be assumed pertains to the human nature; yet it does not pertain to God. Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God. On the contrary, Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. iii, 4)^ that "God assumed the idioms" defect, as to suffer, to die,

it

that

is,

the properties

—"of

God

flesh, since

is

and the God of glory was

said to be passible, crucified."

/ answer that,

On

this question there

was a and

difference of opinion between Nestorians

The Nestorians wished to divide in this way namesuch as pertained to human nature

Catholics.

—

words predicated of Christ, ly,

that

should not be predicated of God, and that such

This word Divine

usually

is

as pertained to the Divine Nature should not be

predicated even of things of which the word

predicated of the

God

say that

"If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings to the

"the Divine Essence is God," by reason of idenand that "the Essence belongs to God,"

Word, let him be anathema." But if there are any words applicable to both natures, of them they predicated what pertained to both natures, as the name "Christ" or "Lord." Hence they granted that Christ was born of a Virgin, and that He was from eternity, but they did not say that God was born of a Virgin, or that the Man was from eternity. Catholics on the other hand maintained that words which are said of Christ either in His

is

predicated essentially

;

thus

we

tity;

or

is

"Divine," on account of the different

way

and we speak of the "Divine Word," though the Word is God. So, too, we say "a Divine Person," just as we say "the person of Plato," on account of its different mode of signification. But lordly is not predicated of those of which lord is predicated; for we are not accustomed to call a man who is a lord, lordly, but whatsoever belongs to a lord is called lordly, of signifying;

as the lordly will, or the lordly hand, or the lordly possession.

And hence

the

Our Lord, cannot be

man

Christ,

Who is

called lordly yet His flesh can be called lordly flesh and His passion the ;

lordly passion.

Whether What Belongs to the Son Predicated of the Son of God, and Conversely?

Article of

4.

Man Can Be

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God. Objection i. For opposites cannot be said of the same. Now, what belongs to human nature 1

PG

94, 1024; 1069.

2

PL

32, 616.

Divine or either of

in

God

Man. Hence Nestorius

His human nature or of man.

Hence

may

said:*

be said

Cyril says

:^

"If

anyone ascribes to two persons or substances" that is, hypostases "such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by Himself of Himself, and beheves that some are to be apphed to the Man, and apportions some to the Word alone let him be anathema." And the reason of this is that, since there is one hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is signified by the name of either nature. Thus

—

—

—

3

PG

94, 1000.

^Anathema

12, translation of

Ad

Mercator (PL

48, 923).

Nestorium, anath. 4 (PG 77, 120); cf. Council of Ephesus, Pt. i, chap. 26 (MA iv, 1082; DZ 116); also Mercator's translation (PL 48, 840). ^

Epist., XVII,

— SUMMA TEEOLOGICA

goo

whether we say man or God, the hv-postasis of Divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of the Man may be said what belongs to the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis of the Divine Nature; and of God may be said what

belongs to the

human

of

human

its

we do not

it

being predicated. Thus, although things predicated of

distinguish

Christ, yet we distinguish that by reason of which they are predicated, since those things that belong to the Divine Nature are predicated of Christ in His Divine Nature, and those that

belong to the Christ in His says

{De

human nature are predicated of human nature. Hence Augustine

Trin.

i,

ii):^

"We must

distinguish

God

same

And

thus opposites

are predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures.

Reply Obj. 2. If the things pertaining to dewere attributed to God in His Divine Nature, it would be a blasphemy, since it would be a lessening of His honour. But there is no kind of wrong done to God if they are attributed to Him in His assumed nature. Hence in a disfect

course of the Council of Ephesus^ it is said; "God accounts nothing a wrong which is the occasion of man's salvation. For no lowliness

He assumed for us injures that Nature which can be subject to no injury, yet makes lower things Its own, to save our nature. Therefore, since these lowly and worthless things do no harm to the Divine Nature but bring about our salvation, how dost thou maintain that what was the cause of our salvation was the occasion that

harm

of

to

God?"

Reply Obj.

man

and thus 1

2

'

3.

To be assumed

it

pertains to hu-

suppositum, but in does not belong to God.

nature not in

PL PL

42, 840.

Pt.

Ill,

its

itself;

42, 836.

chap. 10

hom. n (PG

(MA

77, 1372).

V, 20s);

Theodotus Ancyranus,

na-

Objection i. For what belongs to the human is predicated of the Son of God, and of God. But God is His own Nature. Therefore,

what belongs

to the

human

nature

may be predi-

cated of the Divine Nature.

Obj.

2.

nature. thod. sius

Further, the flesh pertains to

But

iii, 6),"*

and

human

Damascene says {De Fide Or"we say, after the blessed Athana-

as

Cyril, that the

incarnate." Therefore

Nature of the Word was would seem with equal

it

human nature be said of the Divine Nature. Obj. 3. Further, what belongs to the Divine Nature belongs to Christ's human nature, such

reason that what belongs to the

may

know

future things and to possess saving

power. Therefore

it

would seem with equal

rea-

human may be

said

son that what belongs to the

On

It is impossible for opposites to

in different aspects.

human

nature

of the Divine Nature.

the

to the

ture can be said of the Divine Nature.

said."

be predicated of the same in the same respects, but nothing prevents their being predicated of

Nature?

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It

as to

i.

Human

Predicated of the

We

what is said by Scripture in reference to the form of God, and what in reference to the form of a servant"; and further on he says (13):^ "The prudent, careful, and devout reader will discern the reason and point of view of what is Reply Obj.

Son

to the

Predicated of the Divine Nature and What Belongs to the Son of

would seem that what belongs

must be borne in mind that in a proposition in which something is predicated of another, we must not merely consider what the predicate is predicated of, but also the reason of

Whether What Belongs

5.

Man Can Be

of

nature, as of a hypostasis

nature.

Nevertheless,

Article

4) ;^ "When we mention the Goddo not predicate of it the idioms"

iii,

head we that

Damascene says {De Fide

the contrary,

Orthod. is,

the properties

we do not say

—"of the humanity;

for

Godhead is passible or creatable." Now the Godhead is the Divine Nature. Therefore what is proper to the human that the

nature cannot be said of the Divine Nature. / answer that, What belongs to one cannot be said of another, unless they are both the

same;

thus capable of laughter can be predicated only

man.

Now

mystery of the Incarnation natures are not the same, but the hypostasis of the two natures is the same. And hence what belongs to one nature cannot be predicated of the other if they are taken in the abstract. Now concrete words stand for the hypostasis of the nature; and hence of concrete words we may predicate indifferently what belongs to either nature whether the word of which they are predicated refers to each nature, as the word Christ, by which is signified "both the Godhead anointing and the manhood anointed"; or to the Divine Nature alone, as this word "God" or "the Son of God"; or to the manhood alone, as this word "Man" or "Jesus." Hence Pope Leo says {Ep. ad PalcBst. cxxiv) :® "It is of no consequence from what substance of

in the

the Divine and

human

—

*

PG

«

Chap.

94, 1008. 7

(PL

^

PG

54. 1066).

94, 997-

THIRD PART we name

Christ; because since the unity of per-

son remains inseparably, one and the same is Man by His flesh, and alto-

altogether Son of

God by

gether Son of

the

Godhead which He

has with the Father." Reply Obj. i. In God, Person and Nature are

and by reason of this identity the Divine Nature is predicated of the Son of God. Nevertheless, its mode of predication is different, and hence certain things are said of the Son of God which are not said of the Divine Nature thus we say that the Son of God is born, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature is born, as was said in the First Part (q. xxxix, A. 5). So, too, in the mystery of the Incarnation we say that the Son of God suffered, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature suffered. Reply Obj. 2. Incarnation implies union with flesh, rather than any property of flesh. Now in really the same,

;

Christ each nature

is

united to the other in per-

son; and by reason of this union the Divine said to be incarnate

and the human

nature deified, as stated above

(q. ii, a. i, Re-

Nature

is

Reply Obj. 3. What belongs to the Divine Nature is predicated of the human nature not, indeed, as

belongs essentially to the Di-

it

vine Nature, but as

human

nature.

it

is

participated

Hence, whatever

participated by the

human

by the

cannot

be

nature (as to be un-

in no way prediBut the Divine Nature received nothing by participation from the human nature; and hence what belongs to the human nature can in no way be predicated of

created and omnipotent),

cated of the

human

is

nature.

the Divine Nature.

Article

6.

Whether This

Is True:

"God Was

Made Man''? proceed thus to the Sixth Article:

It

would seem that this is false: God was made man. Objection i. For since man signifies a sub-

made man is to be made absolute"God was made absolutely." Therefore this is false: God was made man. Obj. 2. Further, to be made man is to be changed. But God cannot be the subject of stance, to be

ly.

But

this is false

:

change, according to Mai.

and I change made man. Obj.

ART.

801

6

On the contrary, It is written (John i. 14): The Word was made flesh; and as Athanasius "when he

says {Ep. ad Epictetum) ,^

Word was made flesh,' it God was made man."

as

is

if it

said,

The

were said that

/ answer that, A thing is said to be made that which begins to be predicated of it for the first time. Now to be man is truly predicated of God, as stated above (a. i), yet in such sort that it pertains to God to be man, not from eternity, but from the time of His assuming human nature. Hence, this is true, God was made man, though it is understood differently by some, even as this, God is man, as we said above (a. i). Reply Obj. i. To be made man is to be made

absolutely in

all

those in

whom human

nature

begins to be in a newly created suppositum. But

God the

is

said to have been

human

made man because

nature began to be in an eternally

pre-existing suppositum of the Divine Nature.

And hence for God to be made man mean that God was made absolutely.

does not

As stated above, to be made is newly predicated of another. Hence, whenever anything is predicated for the first time of another, and there is Reply Obj.

2.

implies that something

ply 3)-

We

Q. 16

3.

not.

Further,

Hence

man

3.

6: /

am

this is false

the Lord, :

God was

as predicated of Christ

stands for the Person of the Son of God. But

God was made the Person of the Son of God. Therefore this is false: God was made man. this is false:

a change in that of which

it is predicated, then be made is to be changed; and this takes place in whatever is predicated absolutely, for whiteness or greatness cannot newly affect anything, unless it be newly changed to whiteness or greatness. But whatever is predicated relatively can be newly predicated of anything without its change, as a man may be made to be on the right side without being changed, and merely by the change of him on whose left side he was. Hence in such cases not all that is said to be made is changed, since it may happen by the change of something else. And it is thus we say of God: Lord, Thou art made (Douay, hast been) our refuge (Ps. 89. i). Now to be

to

man

belongs to God by reason of the union, which is a relation. And hence to be man is newly predicated of God without any change in Him, by a change in the human nature, which is assumed to a Divine Person. And hence, when it is said, God was made man, we understand no change on the part of God, but only on the part of the human nature. Reply Obj. 3. Man stands not for the bare Person of the Son of God, but according as it subsists in human nature. Hence, although this is false, "God was made the Person of the Son of God," yet this is true, "God was made man"

by being united 1PG26.

1061.

to

human

nature.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

8o2

Article

Made

Whether This

7.

Is

True:

that

God?''

We

would seem that this is true: Man was made God. Objection i. For it is written (Rom. i. 2,3): Which He had promised before by His prophets in the holy Scriptures, concerning His Son Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh. Now Christ, as man. is of the seed of David according to the flesh. Therefore man was made the Son of God.

(De

Further, Augustine says

2.

Trin.

i,

was this assumption, which made God man, and man God." But by reason of this assumption this is true: God was made man. Therefore, in like manner, this is true: Man was made God. Obj. 3. Further, Gregory Nazianzen says "God was humanized and (Ep. ad Chelid. ci) man was deified, or whatever else one may like to call it." Now God is said to be humanized by being made man. Therefore with equal reason man is said to be deified by being made God; and thus it is true that "Man was made God." that "such

13)^

'."^

Obj. 4. Further, when it is said that "God was made man," the subject of the making or

change

is

not God, but

word man

the

human

nature, which

Now

that seems to

signifies.

be the subject of the making to which the mak-

Hence Man was made God is truer than God was made man. On the contrary, Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. iii, 2) :^ "We do not say that man was ing

is

attributed.

deified,

"man" has not

are to understand

a personal, but a simple

For although "this man" was not namely, this suppositum the Person of the Son of God was eternally God, yet man, speaking commonly, was not always God. supposition.

proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It

Obj.

we

phrases; unless, indeed,

"Man Was

but that

God was humanized." Now

to

made God, because

—

—

Thirdly, properly understood, this participle to man with respect God, as the term of the making. And in this sense, granted that the Person or hypostasis in Christ are the same as the suppositum of God

"made" attaches making to

and Man,

Man

was shown

as

proposition

false,

is

(q. ii, aa.

2,

3), this

when

it

is

because,

said,

was made God, "man" has a personal

suppositum; because to be God is not verified of the Man in His human nature, but in His suppositum. Now the suppositum of human nature, of Whom "to be God" is verified, is the same as the hypostasis or Person of the Son of God, Who was always God. Hence it cannot be said that this Man began to be God, or is made God, or that He was made God. But if there were a different person or hypostasis of God and man, so that "to be God"

was predicated of the man, and, conversely, by reason of a certain conjunction of supposita, or of personal dignity, or of affection or in-

the Nestorians

dwelling, as

equal reason might

—

it

made God that is, joined God was made Man that

—

Reply Obj.

1.

Man was

—and

to

God

is,

joined to man.

that

In these words of the Apostle to the Person be considered

"Who" which refers Son of God ought not to

the relative of the

then with

said,'*

be said that

as affecting the predicate, as

if

someone

al-

same as to be deified. Hence this is false: Man was made God. / answer that, This proposition, Man was

ready existing of the seed of David according

made God, may be understood in three ways. First, so that the participle "made" absolutely determines either the subject or the predicate;

it ought to be taken as affecting the subject, with this meaning that the Son of God was made to Him ("namely, to the honour of the

and

Father," as a gloss expounds

be made

Man is

God

in this

of

sense

Whom

God made,

the

is

it

it is

is

the

And in God was made sense that we are

as will be said (aa. 8, 9).

same sense this is man. But it is not of the

now

false, since neither

predicated was made, nor false: this

speaking.

Secondly,

it

may

be so understood that the

word "made" determines the composition, with this meaning: Man was made God that is, And it was brought about that Man is God.

—

in this sense

both are true

—namely,

that

Man

was made God and that God was made Man. But this it not the proper sense of these 1

PL 42,

840.

2

pG 37,

180.

a

PG

94,

988

to the flesh

was made the Son of God

—and

in this sense that the objection takes

is

it.

it

But

—

it),^ being of the seed of David according to the flesh, as if to say "the Son of God having flesh of the seed

David to the honour of God." Reply Obj. 2. This saying of Augustine is to be taken in the sense that by the assumption that took place in the Incarnation it was brought about that Man is God and God is Man; and in this sense both sayings are true, of

as stated above.

The same

* See above, q. ^Glossa interl.

1305).

to be said in the reply to the

is

ii,

a. 6.

(vi,

3v);

Glossa Lombard!

(PL

191,

THIRD PART third, since to

be deified

is

the same as to be

made God. Reply Obj. 4. A term placed in the subject is taken materially that is, for the suppositum; placed in the predicate it is taken formally that is, for the nature signified. Hence when it is said that Man was made God, the being made is not attributed to the human nature

—

but to the suppositum of the

Which

God from

human

nature.

and hence it does not befit Him to be made God. But when it is said that God was made Man, the making is is

eternity,

taken to be terminated in the human nature. Hence, properly speaking, this is true God was :

made Man, and

this is false:

Man

was made

God; even as if Socrates, who was already a man, were made white, and were pointed out, this would be true: This man was made white to-day, and this would be false: This white thing was made man to-day. Nevertheless, if on the part of the subject there is added some word signifying human nature in the abstract, it might be taken in this way for the subject of the making for example, if it were said that "human nature was made the Son of God's."

—

Article

8.

Whether This Is True:

''

Christ Is

a Creature"?

We

proceed thus to the Eighth Article:

would seem that

It

this is true: Christ is a crea-

For Pope Leo says:^ "A new and unheard of covenant: God Who is and Objection is

made

Now we may

cate of Christ whatever the

came by the Incarnation. true: Christ

Obj.

is

predi-

Son of God beTherefore this

is

a creature.

Further, the properties of both na-

2.

may

be predicated of the common hypoboth natures, no matter by what word they are signified, as stated above (a. 5). But it is the property of human nature to be created, as it is the property of the Divine Nature to be Creator. Hence both may be said of Christ namely, that He is a creature and that he is uncreated and Creator. tures

stasis of

3. Further, the principal part of a man the soul rather than the body. But Christ, by reason of the body which He took from the

Obj.

is

Virgin,

Virgin. is

said absolutely to be born of the

is

Therefore by reason of the soul which it ought to be said absolutely

created by God,

that 1

He

is

Among

cxxvin (PL

a creature.

the

works of Augustine, Serm. Suppos.,

39, 1998).

8

803

On the contrary, Ambrose says "Was Christ made by a word? Was Christ created by a command?" as if to say: No! Hence he adds: "How can there be a creature in God? For God has a simple not a composite Nature." Therefore

it

must not be granted that "Christ

a creature."

is

/ answer that. As Jerome says,^ "words spoken out of order lead to heresy" hence with us and heretics the very words ought not to be in common, lest we seem to countenance their error. Now the Arian heretics said'^ that Christ was a creature and less than the Father, not only in His human nature, but even in His Divine Person. And hence we must not say absolutely that Christ is a creature or less than the Father, but with a qualification namely, in His human nature. But such things as could not be considered to belong to the Divine Person in Itself may be predicated absolutely of Christ by reason of His human nature; thus we say absolutely that Christ suffered, died and was buried, even as in corporeal and human beings, things of which we may doubt whether they belong to the whole or the part, if they are observed to exist in a part, are not predicated of the whole absolutely that is, without qualification, for we do not say that the Ethiopian is white but that he is white as regards his teeth; but we say without qualification that he is curly, since this can only belong ;

—

—

him

as regards his hair.

Reply Obj.

i.

a creature."

ART.

:^

to

ture.

was,

Q. 16

i.

Sometimes, for the sake of

word

brevity, the holy doctors use the

"crea-

ture" of Christ without any qualifying term;

we should however qualification, "as

take

as

understood the

man."

Reply Obj. 2. All the properties of the human, just as of the Divine Nature, may be predicated equally of Christ. Hence Damascene says "Christ,

Who

(De Fide Orthod. is God and Man,

4)^

iii,

is

that

called cre-

ated and uncreated, divisible and indivisible."

Nevertheless things of which

we may doubt

what nature they belong are not to be predicated without a quahfication. Hence he afterwards adds (De Fide Orthod. iv, 5)^ that "the to

one hypostasis" created in

its

—

that

of Christ

is,

Godhead and created

hood"; even so conversely, we ^DeFide,!, 16 (PL 3

Cf. Glossa ordin.,

Lombard,

Sent., iv, d.

PG 94,

997.

"is

may

un-

man-

not say

16, 575).

on Osee 2.16

xm,

^ Cf. Athanasius, Epist. Epiphanius, Adv. Haeres., cf. above, q. x, a. 2, Reply 6

—

in its

«

chap.

De 11,

2

(iv,

(QR

11,

cf.

Peter

818).

Synod., xvi

(PL

26, 708);

haeres. 69

(PG

42, 213);

2,

i.

PG 94,

336A);

1

109.

— :

;

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

8o4

without qualification, "Christ is incorporeal" or "impassible," in order to avoid the error of Manes/ who held that Christ had not a true body, nor truly suffered, but we must say, with

was incorporeal and impassible in His Godhead. Reply Obj. 3. There can be no doubt how the birth from the Virgin applies to the Person of the Son of God, as there can be in the case of creation; and hence there is no parity. a qualification, that Christ

than the Father, so he maintained that He began to be, saying there was a time when He

was not.^ Reply Obj. qualified

Article

Whether This

9.

Is True: "This

Man,

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It would seem that this Man, pointing out Christ, began to be. Objection i. For Augustine says {Tract, cv in Joann.y that "before the world was, neither were we, nor the Mediator of God and men the Man Jesus Christ." But what was not always, has begun to be. Therefore this Man, pointing to Christ, began to be. Obj. 2. Further, Christ began to be Man. But to be man is to be absolutely. Therefore this man began to be, absolutely. Obj. 3. Further, "man" impHes a suppositum of human nature. But Christ was not always a suppositum of human nature. Therefore this Man began to be. On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13. 8) Jesus Christ yesterday and to-day: and the same for ever. I answer that, We must not say that "this Man" pointing to Christ "began to be," unless we add something. And this for a two-

—

—

First, for this proposition is false

fold reason.

absolutely,

in

the judgment of the

Catholic

one suppositum and one hypostasis, as also one Person. For according to -this, when we say Faith, which affirms that in Christ there

"this

Man," pointing

positum

is

is

to Christ, the eternal sup-

meant,

necessarily

eternity to begin to be

is

with

incompatible.

Whose Hence

Man

began to be. Nor does it matter that to begin to be refers to the human nature, which is signified by this word man, because the term placed in the subject this

is

false: This

not taken formally so as to signify the nature, but is taken materially so as to signify the suppositum, as was said (a. 7; Reply 4). is

Secondly, because even

were

true,

it

if

this

proposition

ought not to be made use of with-

out qualification, in order to avoid the heresy of Arius, who, since he pretended that the Per-

son of the Son of ^

See

fn. 3, p.

God

7y6 above.

a creature and less

is ^

PL

35, 1907.

is,

The words quoted must be we must say that the Man

Jesus Christ was not, before the world was,

His humanity.

in

Reply Obj. 2. With this word "begin" we cannot argue from the lower to the higher. For if this began to be white, that began to be coloured. And this because "to begin" implies being now and not before; for it does not follow if This was not white before that therefore it was not coloured before. Now, to be absolutely is higher than to be man. Hence this does not follow: therefore He began Christ began to be Man it

does not follow

therefore

Pointing Out Christ, Began To Be"?

i.

—that

it

—

to be.

Reply Obj.

This word Man, as

3.

for Christ, although ture,

it

signifies the

taken na-

it is

human

which began to be, nevertheless stands for

the eternal suppositum which did not begin to

Hence, since

be.

signifies

it

the suppositum

when placed in the subject, and refers to the nature when placed in the predicate, therefore this is false The Man Christ began to be but this is true: Christ began to be Man. ;

:

Article

Whether This

10.

Man Is a Creature"? We proceed thus to

as

would seem that

this

is

Is True: "Christ

the Tenth Article: It

Man

false: "Christ as

a creature," or "began to be."

is

Objection Christ as this

is

For nothing

i.

human

except the

Man

also

the

is

false:

in Christ is created

nature.

human

But

this is

false:

nature. Therefore

Christ as

Man

is

a

crea-

ture.

Obj.

2.

Further, the predicate

is

predicated

of the term placed in reduplication, rather than

of the subject of the proposition; as say:

A

body

as coloured

that the coloured 8,)

we must not

Christ

is

Christ as

Obj.

man

3.

a

is visible.

is

I

But as stated

(a.

Man

nor consequently that

a creature.

Further, whatever

man

when

visible, if follows

absolutely grant that the

creature;

Man

is

is

predicated of

predicated of him per se and absolutely, for per se is the same as "in virtue

a

as

of itself," as

is

is

said in the Metaphysics.^

But

See above, q. x, a. 2, Reply i; q. xvi, a. 8; also Part I, Q. XLii, A. 2, Reply 4; cf. further, Athanasius, Epist. encycl. ad Episc. Acgypti (PG 25, 573); Epist. ad Jo'Aanum '

(PG 26, 8iq); Epist. ad AJros Episc. (PG 26, 1038); Basil, hom. XVI (PG 31, 473); Hilary, De Trin., xu (PL 10, 444) cf. Nicaean Creed (M.\ 11, 6O7; DZ 54). *

Aristotle, v, 18 (1022*14; *2s).

THIRD PART this

is

false: Christ

Hence

creature.

Man

is

On

is

this,

per se and absolutely a too, is false: Christ as

a creature.

But

tor or creature.

Man is Creator. Therefore Man is a creature.

either Crea-

is, is

Christ as

false:

this is

this is true: Christ

as

/ answer that,

Article as

the contrary, Whatever

When we

say "Christ as

Man"

word "man" may be added in the reduplication either by reason of the suppositum or by reason of the nature. If it be added by rea-

Man

created, this will be false: Christ as

But

creature.

belongs to

Him

a

be added by reason of the

if it

human nature, it is true, the human nature or in it

is

by reason of

since

the

human

to be a creature, as

nature,

was said

(A. 8).

It must however be borne in mind that the term thus added by the reduplication signifies

the nature rather than the suppositum, since it is

added as a predicate, which

mally, for

taken for-

is

the same to say Christ as

it is

Man

and to say Christ as He is a Man. Hence this is to be granted rather than denied Christ as Man is a creature. But if something further be added whereby [the term covered by the reduplica:

tion] is attracted to the suppositum, this prop-

osition

to be denied rather than granted, for

is

instance were one to say: Christ as "this" is

Man

a creature.

Reply Obj.

man

nature,

i.

Although Christ

He

word creature

has

human

is

not the hu-

nature.

Now

the

naturally predicated not only

is

manhood

is

a creature and that

ii.

80s

Whether This

Man Is God"? We proceed thus

to the

Is True,

'Christ

Eleventh Article:

It

Obj.

Further, to forgive sins

2.

God, according to

blot out thy iniquities for

Christ as

But

9. 6:

I

Isa. 43. 25:

My

proper to

is

am He

own

sake.

that

But

Man

forgives sin, according to Matt.

that

you may know that the Son of

Man

hath power on earth to forgive sins, etc. Therefore Christ as Man is God. Obj. 3. Further, Christ is not Man in gen-

but

eral,

is

this particular

Man.

Now

Christ,

God, since by "this Man" we signify the eternal suppositum which is God naturally. Therefore Christ as Man is God. as this

On as

as

Man,

is

the contrary.

Man belongs to Man is God, it

God

—which

is

Whatever belongs every man. Now,

to Christ if

follows that every

Christ

man

is

clearly false.

/ answer that, This term man when placed may be taken in two ways.

in reduphcation

First as referring to the nature,

and

in this

way

not true that Christ as Man is God, because the human nature is distinct from the Divine by a difference of nature. Secondly it may be taken by reason of the suppositum, and in this way, since the suppositum of the human nature it is

in Christ

is

the Person of the Son of God, to

Whom it belongs per se to be God, it is true that Christ, as

Man,

is

God. Nevertheless because

we

the term placed in the reduplication signifies

man

the nature rather than the suppositum, as stated

of abstract but also of concrete things, since

say that

ii

would seem that Christ, as Man, is God. Objection i. For Christ is God by the grace of union. But Christ, as Man, has the grace of union. Therefore Christ as Man is God.

this

son of the suppositum, since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is eternal and un-

ART.

Q. i6

above in the

(a. 10), hence this is to be denied rather than granted: Christ as Man is God. Reply Obj. i. It is not with regard to the

was

same respect that a thing moves towards, and

because the nature is created and the suppositum uncreated, therefore, although it is not granted absolutely that "this man is a creature," yet it is granted that "Christ

something; for to move belongs to a of its matter or subject, and to be in act belongs to it by reason of its form. So too it is not with regard to the same respect that it belongs to Christ to be ordered to be God by the grace of union, and to be God. For the first belongs to Him in His human nature, and the second, in His Divine Nature. Hence this is true Christ as Man has the grace of union; yet not this: Christ as Man is God. Reply Obj. 2. The Son of Man has on earth the power of forgiving sins, not by virtue of the human nature, but by virtue of the Divine Nature, in which Divine Nature resides the power of forgiving sins by authority, whereas

is

a creature. Reply Obj.

refers to the

Man

2.

as placed in the subject

suppositum but, as placed

reduplication refers rather to the nature, as stated above.

as

Man

is

a creature."

Reply Obj. is

And

belongs to every man who human nature alone to have human nature. Hence of every

3. It

a suppositum of

his being only in

such suppositum ture as

man,

it

it

is

follows that

if it is

a crea-

a creature absolutely.

But

Christ is a suppositum not merely of human nature but also of the Divine Nature, in which He has an uncreated being. Hence it does not

follow that

if

He

is

creature absolutely.

a creature as

Man He

is

a

that

it is,

thing

by reason

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

8o6 in the

human

nature

resides instrumentally

it

and ministerially. Hence Chrysostom expounding this passage says;^

earth to forgive

"He

said pointedly 'on

order to show that by

sins,' in

an indivisible union He united human nature to the power of the Godhead, since although He was made Man, yet He remained the Word of

God." Reply Obj.

human and

When we

3.

Man

say "this man," the

is

''Christ

would seem that Christ as Man is a person. Objection i. For what belongs to every man belongs to Christ as

Man,

since

He

men

according to Phil. 2.7: Being likeness of men. But every man

is

made is

Therefore Christ as Man is a person. Obj. 2. Further, Christ as Man stance of rational nature.

But He

a person

is

in the

a person. a sub-

is

not a uni-

He

versal substance; therefore

Now

like other

is an individual nothing else than

is

an individual substance of rational nature, as Boethius says {De Duab. Nat.)} Therefore Christ as

Obj.

human

3.

Man

a person.

is

Further, Christ as

Man

is

a being of

nature, and a suppositum and a hypos-

same nature. But every hypostasis and suppositum and being of human nature is

tasis of the

a person. Therefore Christ as

On

Man is a Man is

person.

not an Therefore if Christ as Man is a person it would follow that in Christ there are two persons one temporal and the other eternal, which is erroneous, as was said above (q. the contrary, Christ as

eternal person.

apart from the Divine Nature, and yet the

6; Q. IV, A. 2).

/ answer that, As was said (aa. 10, 11), the term Man placed in the reduplication may refer either to the suppositum or to the nature.

Hence when

it is

said: Christ as

Man

is

a per-

taken as referring to the suppositum,

son,

if it is

it is

clear that Christ as

the suppositum of

Man

human

a person, since

is

nature

is

nothing else

than the Person of the Son of God. But if it be taken as referring to the nature, it may be understood in two ways. First, we may so

understand it as if it belonged to human nature to be in a person, and in this way it is true, for whatever subsists in human nature is a person. 1

2

Thomas, Cat. Aurca, on Mark, Chap. 4 (PL 64, 1343). Cf.

2.10.

this.

It belongs to

i.

every

man

to be

a person, according as everything subsisting in

human to the

His

nature

Man

a person.

is

Now,

this is

proper

Christ that the Person subsisting in

human

not caused by the prin-

nature

is

human

nature, but

eternal.

Hence

He is a person, as Man, and way He is not, as stated above.

in an-

is

one way

2.

The

individual substance which

included in the definition of a person means a complete substance subsisting of itself and is

separate from

all else.

Otherwise, a man's hand

might be called a person, since

it is

a kind of

individual substance; nevertheless, because

it

an individual substance existing in something else, it cannot be called a person; nor, for the same reason, can the human nature in Christ, although it may be called something individual and singular. Reply Obj. 3. As a person signifies something complete and self-subsisting in rational nature, so a hypostasis, suppositum, and being of nature in the genus of substance, signify something that subsists of itself. Hence, as human nature is not of itself a person apart from the Person of the Son of God, so likewise it is not of itself a hypostasis or suppositum or a being of nature. Hence in the sense in which we deny that "Christ as Man is a person" we must deny is

all

the other propositions.

—

II, A.

by the principles of the due to the human nature;

notion of person requires

other

It

is

way Christ as Man is not a person, human nature does not exist of itself

Reply Obj.

proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:

taken that in Christ a prop-

in this

ciples of the

God."

Article 12. Whether This Is True: as Mail Is a Hypostasis or Person"?

substance.

may be

nature,

since the

in

We

it

Reply Obj.

demonstrative pronoun "this" attracts "man" to the suppositum; and hence "Christ as this Man, is God," is a true proposition rather than "Christ as

Secondly

er personality, caused

QUESTION XVII Of what pertains to

Christ's unity FROM the standpoint OF BEING {In Two Articles)

We must now consider what pertains to Christ's unity in general. For, in their proper place,

we

must determine what pertains to unify and plurality in detail; thus we determined (q. ix) that there is only one knowledge in Christ, and it will be concluded hereafter (q. xxxv, a. 2) that there

is

not only one nativity in Christ.

Hence we must consider

Christ's unity (i) of

being; (2) of will (q. xviii) (q. xix).

Under the inquiry: (i)

is

(3) of operation

head there are two point? of is one or two? (2) only one being in Christ?

first

Whether Christ

Whether there

;

THIRD PART Article

Whether Christ

i.

Is

One

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that Christ is not one, but two. Objection i. For Augustine says {De Trin. i, 7) :^ "Because the form of God took the form of a servant, both are God by reason of God Who assumed, yet both are Man by reason of the

man assumed." Now "both" may

when

only be said

there are two. Therefore Christ

is

two.

one thing and another there are two. Now Christ is one thing and another; for Augustine says (Enchir. He took xxxv) :^ "Being in the form of God being both in one; the form of a servant but He was one of these as Word, and the other as man." Therefore Christ is two. Obj. 3. Further, Christ is not only man; for, thus He would be a mere man. Therefore He is something else than man, and thus in Christ there is one thing and another. Therefore Christ Obj.

Further, where there

2.

is

.

.

.

.

.

.

two.

is

Obj. 4. Further, Christ is something that the Father is, and something that the Father is not. Therefore Christ is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two. Obj.

Further, as in the mystery of the Trin-

5.

Persons in one Nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation there are two natures in one Person. But on account of the unity of the Nature, notwithstanding the distinction of Person, the Father and Son are one, according to John 10. 30: / and the Father are one. Therefore, notwithstanding the unity of Person, Christ is two on account of the duahty ity there are three

of nature.

Obj.

6.

Further, the Philosopher says^ that

"one" and "two" are predicated denominatively. Now Christ has a duality of nature. Therefore Christ

Obj.

7.

is

two.

"Further, as accidental form makes a

thing otherwise (alterum) so does substantial

form make another thing (aliudy as Porphyry Now in Christ there are two substantial natures, the human and the Divine. Therefore Christ is one thing and another. Therefore says.'*

Christ

is

On Nat.)

two.

the contrary^ Boethius says :^

"Whatever

in so far as

is,

But we confess that Christ

is.

(De Duab.

it is, is

one."

Therefore Christ

/ answer that, Nature, considered in

3 *

*

PL

42,

807

I

is

—

—

—

829

2

PL

40, 250.

Physics, III, 3 (202^18). Isagoge, Boethius' translation

is, as it is signified by the suppositum. For we cannot truly say that Christ is human

nature, because

human nature

is not naturally suppositum. But we say that Christ is a man, even as Christ is God. Now God signifies one having Godhead, and man signifies one having manhood. Yet one having

predicated of

manhood

is

its

differently signified

Chap. 4 (PL

64, 1346).

by the word

man and by the word Jesus or Peter. For this word man impHes one having manhood indistinctly, even as the word God implies indistinctly one having the Godhead; but the word Peter or Jesus implies one having manhood distinctly that is, with its determinate individ-

—

ing the

—

as Son of God implies one havGodhead under a determinate personal

ual properties

property.

Now the dual number is placed in Christ with regard to the natures. Hence, if both the natures were predicated in the abstract of Christ,

would follow that Christ is two. But because the two natures are not predicated of Christ except as they are signified in the suppositum, it

it

must be by reason of the suppositum that "one" or "two" is predicated of Christ. Now some placed two supposita in Christ, and one Person, which, in their opinion, would seem to be the suppositum completed with its final compleHence, since they placed two supposita in Christ, they said that God is two, in the neuter. But because they asserted one Person, they said that Christ is one, in the mascuhne, for the neuter gender signifies something unformed and imperfect, whereas the masculine signifies something formed and perfect.^ On the other hand, the Nestorians, who asserted two Persons in Christ,^ said that Christ is two not only in the tion.^

itself,

^

But since we

717 above. Cf. William of Auxerre,

See

fn. i, p.

Summa Aurea, in, tr. i, chap. 8 Cf. Q. II, A. 6. 8 (ii3va). Cf. Cyril of Alexandria, Adv. Nestor ii Blasphemias, ii,

I, Q. 8

(CG

—

—that

^ 1

it

neuter, but also in the masculine.^

one.

is

ART.

used in the abstract, cannot truly be predicated of the suppositum or person, except in God, in Whom "what it is" and "that by which it is" do not differ, as stated in the First Part (q. XXIX, a. 4, Reply i). But in Christ, since there are two natures namely, the Divine and the human one of them namely, the Divine may be predicated of Him both in the abstract and in the concrete, for we say that the Son of God, Who is signified by the word Christ, is the Divine Nature and is God. But the human nature cannot be predicated of Christ in the abstract, but only in the concrete as

Two?

or

Q. 17

rv, 35.6).

6

(PG

76, 85); see also

(vii, 473).

DTC,

art.

Hyposiaiique {Union)

— SUMMA TEEOLOGICA

8o8

maintain one person and one suppositum in Christ, as

that

—

clear

is

we say

from

that Christ

q. ii, aa. 2, 3, it is

follows

one not merely

in the

masculine, but also in the neuter. Reply Obj. i. This saying of Augustine

is not "both" referred to the predicate, so as to mean that Christ is both, but it refers to the subject. And thus "both" does not stand for two supposita, but for two words signifying two natures in the concrete. For I

to be taken as

if

but an indistinct suppositum that is, according as it underlies the nature and not the individuating properties. Hence it does not follow that in the concrete; not, indeed, in a distinct,

—

in

Christ

—

—

man assumed." When it is said that

on account of the

"Christ is Reply Obj. 2. one thing and another," this saying is to be ex"having this nature and plained in this sense another." And it is in this way that Augustine explains it (Contra Fehc. xi),^ where, after say-

—

"In the mediator of God and man, the Son of God is one thing, and the Son of Man another," he adds, "I say another thing by reason of the difference of substance, and not an-

ing,

other thing by reason of the unity of person." Hence Gregory Nazianzen says {Ep. ad Chelid. ci):- "If

we must speak

briefly, that of

which

one thing and another; thus the invisible is not the same as the visible, and what is without time is not the same as what is in time. Yet they are not one and another; far from it. For both these are one." Reply Obj. 3. This is false: "Christ is only man," because it does not exclude another suppositum, but another nature, since terms placed in the predicate are taken formally. But if anythe Saviour

is, is

added whereby it is drawn to the supfor inpositum, it would be a true proposition stance, "Christ is only that which is man." Nevertheless, it would not follow that He is "any other thing than man," because "another thing

is

—

thing," since

it

refers to a diversity of sub-

stance, properly refers to the suppositum, even as all relative things bearing a personal relation.

But

it

does follow: Therefore

He

has another

nature.

Reply Obj.

4.

When

it

is

said,

"Christ

is

something that the Father is," "something" signifies the Divine Nature, which is predicated even in the abstract of the Father and Son. But when it is said, "Christ is something that is not the Father," "something" signifies not the human nature as it is in the abstract, but as it is * Vigilius Tapsensus, De Unit. Trin., chap. 14 (PL 62, 344) or chap. 11 (PL 42, 1166).

«PG37,

180.

one thing and another, or that

ture in Christ, which

of God,

is

He

human

is

na-

the Person of the Son

not accounted numerically with the Divine Nature, which is predicated of the Fais

ther and Son.

—

can say that "both" namely, God and Man "are God" on account of God Who assumes; and "both" namely, God and Man "are Man

is

two, since the suppositum of the

Reply Obj.

5.

In the mystery of the Divine is predicated even in

Trinity the Divine Nature

hence it may be said absolutely that the three Persons are one. But in the mystery of the Incarnation both natures are not predicated in the abstract of Christ hence it cannot be said absolutely that the abstract of the three Persons

;

;

Christ

is

two.

6. Two signifies what has duality, not in another, but in the same thing of which "two" is predicated. Now what is predicated is

Reply Obj.

which is implied by the Hence, although Christ has duality of nature, yet, because He has not duality of suppositum, it cannot be said that Christ is two. Reply Obj. 7. "Otherwise" implies diversity said of the suppositum,

word

Christ.

of accident.

Hence

diversity of accident suffices

for anything to be called "otherwise" absolute-

But "another thing" implies diversity of subNow not merely the nature, but also the suppositum is said to be a substance, as is said

ly.

stance.

in the

Metaphysics.^ Hence diversity of nature

does not suffice for anything to be called "another thing" absolutely unless there is diversity of suppositum.

But diversity of nature makes

"another thing" relatively if

there

is

—that

is,

in nature

no diversity of suppositum.

Article 2. Whether There Is Only One Being in Christ?

We

proceed thus to the Second Article: It in Christ there is not only one being, but two. Objection i. For Damascene says {De Fide Or t hod. iii, 13-15)'* that whatever follows the nature is doubled in Christ. But being follows

would seem that

is from the form. Hence two beings. Obj. 2. Further, the being of the Son of God is the Divine Nature itself, and is eternal, whereas the being of the Man Christ is not the Divine

the nature, for being in Christ there are

Nature, but is a temporal being. Therefore there is not only one being in Christ. Obj. 3. Further, in the Trinity, although there '

Aristotle, v. 8 (ioi7'*23).

*

PG

94,

1033-1061.

THIRD PART

ART.

Q. 17

809

2

are three Persons, yet on account of the unity

the one person of Socrates, and hence there

only one being. But in Christ

from these only the one being of Socrates. so happened that after the person of Socrates was constituted there accrued to him hands or feet or eyes, as happened to him who was born blind, no new being would be thereby added to Socrates, but only a relation to these because, that is, he would be said to be not only with reference to what he had previously, but also with reference to what accrued

of nature there

is

there are two natures, though there son. Therefore in Christ there

one Pernot only one

is

is

being but two. Obj. 4. Further, in Christ the soul gives some being to the body, since it is its form. But it does not give the Divine being, since this is is another

uncreated. Therefore in Christ there

being besides the Divine being; and thus in Christ there

On

is

not only one being.

the contrary, Everything

if it

—

him afterwards.

to

said to be a

is

arises

And

And

human

thus, since the

nature

is

united

and being are convertible. Therefore, if there were two beings in Christ and not one only, Christ would be two and not one. / answer that, Because in Christ there are two natures and one hypostasis, it follows that things belonging to the nature in Christ must be two, and that those belonging to the hypostasis in Christ must be only one. Now being pertains both to nature and to hypostasis to hypostasis as to that which has being, and to nature as to that by which something has being. For nature is taken after the manner of a form, which is said to be a being because something is by it; as for instance by whiteness a thing is white, and by manhood a thing is man. Now it must be borne in mind that if there is a form or nature which does not pertain to the personal being of

Son of God hypostatically or personally as was said above (q. ii, a. 6), and not accidentally, it follows that by the human nature there accrued to Him no new personal being,

the subsisting hypostasis, this being is not said to belong to the person absolutely, but relative-

ture

being, in so far as

it is

one, for one

;

ly; just as to

not as he there

is

is

be white

is

the being of Socrates

Socrates, but as he

no reason why

is

white.

this being should

And

not be

multiplied in one hypostasis or person, for the

being whereby Socrates

is

the being whereby he

is

from a musician. But the

white

is

distinct

being which belongs to the very hypostasis or

person in itself cannot possibly be multipHed in one hypostasis or person, since it is impossible that there should not be one being for one therefore, the

God

the Son of

human

nature accrued to

not hypostatically or personal-

but accidentally, as some maintained,^ it would be necessary to assert two beings in Christ one according as He is God the other according as He is Man; just as in Socrates we place one being according as he is white, and another according as he is a man, since "being white" does not pertain to the personal being ly,

—

—

of Socrates.

But being possessed of a head, being

corporeal, being animated, 1

See

but only a new relation of the pre-existing personal being to the human nature, in such a way that the Person is said to subsist not only in the Divine, but also in the human nature.

Reply Obj. 1. Being is consequent upon naupon that which has being but as upon that whereby a thing is, whereas it is consequent upon person or hypostasis as upon that which has being. Hence it has unity from the unity of hypostasis rather than duahty from the ture not as

duality of the nature.

Reply Obj.

Q.

II,

A. 6.

—

all

these pertain to

The

2.

of God, which

is

eternal being of the

is

Son

the Divine Nature, becomes

the being of man, in so far as the

human

assumed by the Son of God

na-

to unity

of Person.

Reply Obj.

3.

As was

said in the First Part

Reply 3; Q, Lxxv, a. 5, Reply 4), since the Divine Person is the same as the Na(q.

l, a.

2,

ture, there

is

no distinction

in the

Divine Per-

sons between the being of the Person and the

being of the Nature, and, consequently, the three Persons have only one being. But they

would have a triple being if the being of the Person were distinct in them from the being of the Nature.

Reply Obj.

thing. If,

to the

In Christ the soul gives being it makes it actually animated, to give it the fulfilment of its nature 4.

to the body, since

which is and species. But fected

by the

—

if

we

consider the body per-

soul without the hypostasis hav-

this whole, composed of soul and body, as signified by the word humanity, does not signify "what is," but "that by which it is." Hence being belongs to the subsisting person, according as it has a relation to such a nature,

ing both

and of

this relation the soul is the cause, in so

far as

it

the body.

perfects

human

nature by informing

— SUMMA THEOLOGICA

Sio

done. And Ambrose, quoting this to the Emperor Gratian {De Fide ii, 7)^ says: "As He assumed my will. He assumed my sorrow"; and

QUESTION XVIII Of what pertains to the unity

in

on Luke

Christ from the standpoint of will

(loc. cit.y

Man

to the

{In Six Articles)

the will of

We

must now consider unity as regards the will and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether the Divine will and the human are different in Christ? (2) Whether in ;

Christ's

human nature

distinct

from the

the will of sensuality

will of

is

reason? (3) Whether

as regards the reason there were several wills in Christ? (4) Whether there was free choice

Whether Christ's human will was always conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed? (6) Whether there was any conin Christ? (5)

trariety of wills in Christ?

Article

i

.

Whether There Are Two Wills

in

Christ?

We

proceed thus to the First Article: It in Christ there are not two

would seem that

one Divine, the other human. Objection 1. For the will is the

wills,

first

mover

whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and ruler was the Divine will, since in Christ everything human was moved by the Divine will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was only one will, namely, the Divine, and ruler

Obj.

2.

in

Further, an instrument

own will but by Now the human nature

by

its

is

the will of

not

moved

its

mover.

was the

of Christ

in-

human namoved by its own will,

strument of His Godhead. Hence the ture of Christ

was not

but by the Divine will. Obj. 3. Further, that alone

is

multiplied in

Christ which belongs to the nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature, for natural things are of necessity, whereas

what

is

vol-

untary is not of necessity. Therefore there is but one will in Christ. Obj. 4. Further, Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. iii, 14)^ that "to will in this or that way belongs not to our nature but to our intellect that is, to our personal intellect." But every will is this or that will, since there is nothing in not at the same time in some Therefore all will belongs to the person. But in Christ there was and is but one person. Therefore in Christ there is only one will. On the contrary, Our Lord says (Luke 22.

a genus which

one of

is

its species.

42): Father

if

Thou

wilt,

from Me. But yet not 1

PG

94, 1036.

remove

My

this chalice

will but

Thine be

Godhead

—the

man

he says: "His will

Father's, to the

He

refers

Godhead. For

temporal, and the will of the

is

eternal."

/ answer that,

Some

placed only one will in

have had different moFor Apollinaris did not hold an intellectual soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word was in place of the soul,'' or even in place of the intellect.^ Hence since Christ, but they

seem

to

tives for holding this.

"the will says,^

it

human

is

in the reason," as the

Philosopher

followed that in Christ there was no

and thus there was only one will in and all who held one composite nature in Christ^ were forced to place one will in Him. Nestorius,^ too, who maintained that the union of God and man was one of affection and will, held only one will in

Him.

will,

So, too, Eutyches

Christ.

But later on, Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch,^ Cyrus of Alexandria, ^° and Sergius of Constantinople^^ and some of their followers, ^^ held that there is one will in Christ, although they held that in Christ there are two natures united in a hypostasis; because they beheved that Christ's nature never moved with its own mobut only in so far as it was moved by the

human tion,

Godhead, as is plain from the counciliar letter of Pope Agatho.^^ And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople^-* it was decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, in the following passage: "In accordance with what the Prophets of old taught us concerning Christ, and as He taught us Himself, and the Symbol of the Holy Fathers has handed down to us, we confess two natural wills in Him and two natural operations." 2

PL

^

16, 594-

Bk. X, on 22.42 (PL

15, 1911)-

See above, Q. v, a. 3. 6 Cf. Athanasius, Contra A pollinarium, i, 2 (PG 26, 1096); Gregory of Nazianzus, Epist., ecu (PG 37, 333); Gregory of Nyssa, Adv. ApolL, n. 35 (PG 45, 1201); Theophilus of Alexandria, Epist. ad Totius Acgypti Episc, anni 402, Jerome's translation (PL 22, 795); Augustine, QQ. 83, Qu. 80 (PL 40, 93); Socrates, Hist. Ecd., 11, 16 (PG 67, 364) ;Theodore the Ncstoriaii, Hacret. Fabul. Compcnd. *

IV, ^

8 (PG 83, 425). See above, q. 11, a.

^

m,

Soui,

^

6.

9 (432''s)-

See above,

q.

'Cf. Council of Constantinople in, actio 11 Sii-518).

^°Ibid., actio 13

^^Ibid., actio 12

(MA

(MA

ii,

a. 6.

(MA

xi,

xi, 567).

xi, 534).

For example, Pyrrhus; cf. Cone. Lateran. Romanum (MA X, 1002); Theodorus Pharanitanus, Ibid. (MA x, 959, 962); Paul of Constant., Ibid. (MA x, 1023). " Epist., Ill (PL 87, 1221). Cf. Cone. Cpolit, in, Act. 4 12

(MA

XI, 291).

" Actio

18,

(MA

xi, 638).

THIRD PART Q.iS ART. And

much

was necessary to say. For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature, as was shown above (q. this

it

tains to the perfection of

one of

its

the will per-

human

nature, being

natural powers, even as the intellect, in the First Part (q. lxxix, a.

was stated

as

Now

2; Q. v; Q. IX, A. i).

IV, A.

Reply 2; Q. Lxxx, A. 2). Hence we must say that the Son of God assumed a human will, together with human nature. Now by the assumpI,

tion of human nature the Son of God suffered no diminution of what pertains to His Divine Nature, to which it belongs to have a will, as was said in the First Part (q. xix, a. i). Hence it must be said that there are two wills in Christ that is, one human, the other Divine.

—

Reply Obj.

i.

Whatever was

nature of Christ was the Divine will; yet

moved

in the

human

at the bidding of

does not follow that in Christ there was no movement of the will proper to human nature, for the good wills of other saints are

Who

it

moved according

worketh

complish, as

in

them both

is

written

to the will of God, to will

Phil.

2.

and to For

13.

acal-

though the will cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, yet it can be moved inwardly by God, as was said in the First Part (q. cv, a. 4;

And

thus, too, Christ

Q. cvi, A. 2; Q.

CXI, A. 2).

by His human

will followed the

Divine will according to Ps. 39. 9; That I should do Thy will, my God, I have desired it. Hence Augustine says {Contra Maxim, ii, 20) :^ "Where the Son says to the Father, 'Not what I will, but what Thou wiliest,' what do you gain by adding your own words and saying 'He shows that His will was truly subject to His Father,' as if we denied that man's will ought to be subject to God's will?" Reply Obj. 2. It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its nature. For an inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by the craftsman with only a corporeal movement; but an instrument animated by a sensitive soul

by

is

moved by

the sensitive appetite,

and an instrument animated with a rational soul is moved by its will, as by the command of his lord the servant is moved to act, the servant being like an animate as a horse

its rider,

And hence human nature of

instrument, as the Philosopher says.^ it

was

in this

manner

that the

Christ was the instrument of the Godhead, and was moved by its own will. Reply Obj. 3, The power of the will itself is 1

PL

42, 789.

^Politics,

I,

4 (1253^32); Ethics,

viii, 11 (1161^4).

811

2

and necessarily follows upon the nature. But the movement or act of this power which is also called will is sometimes natural and necessary for example, with respect to Happiness; and sometimes springs from the free choice of reason and is neither necessary nor natural, as is plain from what has been stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. x, aa. i, 2).^ And yet even reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, is natural. Hence natural,

—

—

besides the Divine will

human

in Christ a

it is

will,

necessary to place

not only as a natural

power, or a natural movement, but also as a

movement. Reply Obj. 4. When we say "to will in a certain way," we signify a determinate mode of rational

Now

willing.

a determinate

thing of which

it is

mode

the mode.

regards the

Hence

since the

will pertains to the nature, "to will in a certain

way" belongs

to the nature, not indeed con-

sidered absolutely, but as

in a hypostasis

it is

Hence the human will of Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being in a Divine hypostasis that is, it was always of such a kind.

—

moved

in

Divine

will.

Article

accordance with the bidding of the

2.

Whether

in Christ

There

Was Any

Will of Sensuality Besides the Will of Reason?

We

proceed thus to the Second Article: It

would seem that

in Christ there

was no

will of

sensuality besides the will of reason.

For the Philosopher says^ that and in the sensitive appetite are the irascible and concupiscible Objection

"the will

parts."

is

1.

in the reason,

Now

appetite.

sensuality signifies the sensitive

Hence

in Christ there

was no

will of

sensuality.

Obj.

2.

Further, according to Augustine

{De

sensuahty is signified by the serpent. But there was nothing serpent-like Trin.

xii,

12, 13)^ the

in Christ, for

He had

the likeness of a

venomous

animal without the venom, as Augustine says {De Pecc. Merit, et Remiss, i, 32)^ commenting on John 3. 14, As Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert. Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuahty.

Further, will is consequent upon nawas said (a. i, Reply 3). But in Christ there was only one nature besides the Divine. Hence in Christ there was only one human will. On the contrary, Ambrose says {De Fide ii, 7) -J "Mine is the will which He calls His own,

Obj.

3.

ture, as

3

See also Part

^

Soul,

6

PL

III,

I, Q. Lxxxii, a. 2. 6 PL 42, 1007, 1008. 9 (432''5).

44, 145.

'

PL

16, 594.

— SUMMA THEOLOGICA

8ia

we

this

Man He assumed my

sorrow." From are given to understand that sorrow

because as

human

pertains to the

Now

will of Christ.

row pertains to the sensuality, as was the Second Part (I-II, Q. xxiii, a. i; i).

A.

Therefore

xxv,

q.

seems, in Christ there

it

is

a

Obj.

Further, the appetitive power

2.

versified in

man by

/ answer that, As was said (q. iv, a. 2 q. v, i), the Son of God assumed hu;

A. 9; Q. IX, A.

difference of sense

nature together with everything pertaining human nature. Now in hu-

in the

same way

we hold

must be allowed that there was sensuality in Christ. But it must be borne in mind that sen-

it

pation, as

is

is

Reply Obj.

is

in the reason," as stated

may

a will

by

equally be said that the participation.

This argument

i.

will, essentially so called,

intellectual part

;

made

partici-

from the Philosopher.^ And

clear

because "the will above (Arg. i), it sensuality

it is

by

said to be rational

Is

which

based on the only in the

is

but the will so-called by par-

ticipation can be in the sensitive part, in so far

as

obeys reason.

it

Reply Obj. serpent

—not

suality,

2.

Sensuality

is

signified

by the

as regards the nature of the sen-

which Christ assumed, but as regards

the corruption of the fomes, which

was not

is

the difference

both of which were in Christ. Therefore there a double will in Him, one intellectual and

the other rational.

nature is included animal nature, as the genus in its species. Hence the Son of God must have assumed together with the human nature whatever pertains to the perfection of animal nature, one of which things is the sensitive appetite, which is called sensuality. Consequently

is

intellect

as regards man's apprehension,

man

obey reason,

and

the difference of reason and intellect,

was

to

di-

prehensive power, and hence according to the

to the perfection of

suality or the sensual appetite, since

is

the difference of the ap-

of sensitive and intellectual appetite in man. But

will of sensuality besides the will of reason.

man

the foregoing wills were in

Christ.

sor-

said in

Hence both

nature.

in

Christ.

Reply Obj. 3. Where there is one thing on account of another, there seems to be only one; thus a surface which is visible by colour is one visible thing with the colour. So, too, because the sensuality is called the will only because it partakes of the rational will, there is said to be but one human will in Christ, even as there is but one human nature.

Obj.

3.

Further, some^ ascribe to Christ a will

of piety, which can only be on the part of reason. Therefore in Christ on the part of reason

there are several wills.

On

the contrary, In every order there is one mover. But the will is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore in one man there is only one will, properly speaking, which is the will of reason. But Christ is one man. Therefore in Christ there is only one hufirst

man

will.

I answer that, As stated above (a. i. Reply 3), the will is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the act. Hence if the will is taken it is necessary to place two wills two species of acts of the will in Christ on the part of the reason. For the will, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. viii, aa. 2, 3), regards both the end and the means, and is affected differently towards both. For towards the end it is borne simply and absolutely, as towards what is good in itself but towards the means it is borne under a certain relation, as the goodness of the means depends on something

for the act,

that

is,

;

Hence the act of the will, according as it drawn to anything desired of itself, as health, which act is called by Damascene^ OeKrjaLs that is, simple will and by the Masters^ will as nature, is different from the act of the will as it is drawn to anything that is desired only in order to something else, as to take medicine; and this act of the will Damascene calls*"' ^ovXijacs that is, counselling will, and the Masters.^ will as reason. But this diversity of acts does not diversify the power, since both acts regard the one comelse.

is

—

—

—

Whether in Christ There Were Two Wills As Regards the Reason?

Article

We

3.

proceed thus to the Third Article: It in Christ there were two wills

would seem that

3

HuRh

of St. Victor,

De

Quat. Volunt. Christ. (PL 176,

Bonaventure, In Sent.,

as regards the reason.

841);

Objection i. For Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. ii, 22)^ that there is a double will in man namely, the natural will which is called

(QR III, 369); A. 2, Q. 2. (QR m, *De Fide Orth., 11, 22 (PG 94,

—

6

cf.

Cf. Peter

(QR

/SouXr/ats-

A. 2, Q. 3

*

Ethics,

I,

13 (iio2''3o).

*

PG

94, 944.

Sent.,

421); Alexander of Hales,

SeXrjdLS,

and the rational will which is called Now Christ in His human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of human

Lombard,

II,

11,

d. xvii, a.

q.

3

(QR

I,

i,

944)d.

Sumtna

xxrv, chap. 3 Theol.,

i-ii,

n.

388

465); Bonaventure, In Sent., n, d. xxrv, Pt. I, (QR II, 566); Albert the Great, In Sent., m, d.

XVII, A. 5 (BO XXVIII, 304). 8 Loc. cit. ^

iii,

373).

Hugh

of St. Victor, Loc.

cit.

THIRD PART mon

aspect of the object, which

Hence we must say that if we the power of the will, in Christ

human

will, essentially

ticipation

an

are speaking of

there

is

so called and not

nature, which reason, which

Reply Obj.

called 6e\r](ns,

is

and a

as the Philosopher says^ choice differs

from

will in this, that will of itself regards the

will as

a. 8).

Reply Obj. 3. The will of piety would not seem to be distinct from the will considered as nature, since it flees from another's evil absolutely considered.

Whether There Was Free Choice

in

proceed thus to the Fourth Article:

It

Article

4.

Christ?

We

would seem that

in Christ there

was no

free

choice.

Objection Orthod.

For Damascene says {De Fide

i.

14)^ that yvoifxr]

iii,

—that

is,

thinking or cogitation, and TrpoalpeaLS

opinion,

—that

is,

"cannot possibly be attributed to Our Lord, if we wish to speak with accuracy." But in the things of faith especially we must speak with accuracy. Therefore there was no election in Christ and consequently no free choice, of election,

which election Obj.

"choice

is

the act,

Further, the Philosopher says^ that

2.

is

a desire of something after taking

Now

counsel."

counsel does not appear to be in

we do not take counsel conwe are certain of. But was certain of everything. Hence there

Christ, because

cerning such things as Christ

was no counsel and consequently no free choice

to the nature of means.

end, while choice regards the means.

simple will

the

is

choice (electio)

i.

lxxix,

(q.

—^which pertains

another

Now,

These two wills are not diversified according to the power but only according to the difference of act, as we have said. Reply Obj. 2. The intellect and the reason are not distinct powers, as was said in the First Part

813

5

the other whereby His will was drawn to anything willed on account of its being ordered to

by par-

called jSouXr/ats.

is

ART.

Q. 18

but one

but if we are speaking of the will as thus distinguish in Christ a will as

;

we

act,

goodness.

is

and

son,

rum (q. is

is

same is

the

And

thus

as the will as nature, but

same

as the will as rea-

the proper act of free choice (libe-

arbitrium), as was said in the First Part

lxxxiii,

a. 3).

placed in Christ,

and consequently choice, as was said

Hence, since

we must free

will as reason

also place choice,

choice,

whose act

is

in the First Part (ibid.; cf.

I-II, Q. XIII, A. i).

Reply Obj. i. Damascene excludes choice from Christ in so far as he considers that doubt is implied in the word choice. Nevertheless doubt is not necessary to choice, since it belongs even to God Himself to choose, according to Eph. I. 4: He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, although in God there is no doubt. Yet doubt is accidental to choice when it is in an ignorant nature. We may also say the same of whatever else is mentioned in the authority quoted.

Reply Obj. yet

it

2.

Choice presupposes counsel,

follows counsel only as determined by

judgment. For what

we judge

to

be done,

choose, after the inquiry of counsel, as

we

is stated.'*

Hence

if anything is judged necessary to be done without any preceding doubt or inquiry,

this suffices for choice. Therefore it is plain that doubt or inquiry belong to choice not essentially, but only when it is in an ignorant nature. Reply Obj. 3. The will of Christ, though determined good, is not determined to this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even as to the blessed, to choose with a free choice confirmed

in good.

Christ.

in

5. Whether the Human Will of Christ Altogether Conformed to the Divine Will in the Thing Willed?

is indifferent. But was determined to good, since He could not sin, as stated above (q. xv, aa. i, 2). Hence there was no free choice in Christ.

Article

On the contrary, It is He shall eat butter and

would seem that the human will in Christ did not will anything except what God willed. Objection 1. For it is written (Ps. 39. 9) in the person of Christ: That I should do Thy will: my God, I have desired it. Now he who desires to do another's will, wills what the other wills. Hence it seems that Christ's human will willed nothing but what was willed by His Di-

Obj.

3.

Further, free choice

Christ's will

know

written (Isa.

15):

7.

honey, that He may to choose the good, an act of free choice. Therefore there

to refuse the evil

and

which is was free choice in Christ. / answer that, As was said above (a. 3), there was a twofold act of the will in Christ one whereby His will was drawn to anything willed in itself, which pertains to the nature of an end; :

^

PG 94,

^Ethics,

1044. 111,

2 (iii2«i5); cf. vi, 2 (1139^23).

Was

We

vine

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It

will.

Obj. ^Ibid.,

2.

Further, Christ's soul had most per-

m,

2 (iiii''26).

*Ibid.,

ill,

3 (1113*9).

SUMMA TEEOLOGICA

8i4

Eph.

all

will

son

which sur-

19, the charity of Christ,

3.

knowledge. Now charity makes men will what God wills hence the Philosopher says^ that one mark of friendship is to will and choose

passeth

all

;

the same. Therefore

human

t-he

will in Christ

was willed by His Di-

willed nothing else than

vine

will.

Obj.

3.

Further, Christ was a true compre-

hensor. But the Saints

who

are comprehensors

heaven will only what God wills, otherwise they would not be happy, because they would not obtain whatever they will, for blessed is he "who has what he wills, and wills nothing amiss," as Augustine says {De Trin. xiii, 5).^ Hence in His human will Christ wills nothing else than does the Divine will. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim, ii, 20) :^ "When Christ says 'Not what I will, but what Thou wilt. He shows Himself to have willed something else than did His Father; and this could only have been by His human heart, since He did not transfigure our weakness into His Divine but into His human in

/ answer that,

As was

said (aa.

2,

—

agree, in so

—

is,

its

as reason considers

relation to the will of

a friend.

Reply Obj. 3. Christ was at once comprehensor and wayfarer, since He was enjoying God in His mind and had a passible body. Hence things repugnant to His natural will and to His sensitive appetite could happen to Him in His

by participation, and the rational whether considered after the manner of

Article

manner

of reason.

Now

it

(q. xiii, a. 3, Reply i; Q. xiv, Reply 2) that by a certain dispensation the Son of God before His Passion "allowed His flesh to do and suffer what was proper

to it."

powers

And

in like

manner He allowed all the do and suffer what be-

of His soul to

longed to them.

Now

is

it

clear that the will

Whether There Was Contrariety

We

proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It

would seem that there was contrariety of

wills

in Christ.

Objection

was said above I,

6.

of Wills in Christ?

called will

nature, or after the

A.

that

far,

something willed in

3), in Christ

according to His human nature there is a maninamely, the will of sensuality, which fold will will,

He

passible flesh.

will."

is

what God did not; but in His will as reaalways willed the same as God, which appears from what He says (Matt. 26. 39): Not as I will, but as Thou wilt. For He willed in His reason that the Divine will should be fulfilled although He said that He willed something else by another will. Reply Obj. i. By His rational will Christ willed the Divine will to be fulfilled; but not by His will of sensuality, the movement of which does not extend to the will of God nor by His will considered as nature which is borne towards things absolutely considered, and not in relation to the Divine Will. Reply Obj. 2. The conformity of the human will to the Divine regards the will of reason, according to which the wills even of friends

com-

our knowledge, according to

feet charity, which, indeed, surpasses the

prehension of

i.

For contrariety of

wills regards

contrariety of objects, just as contrariety of

movements as

is

plain

springs from contrariety of terms, from the Philosopher.^ Now Christ

His different walls wished contrary things. For in His Divine will He wished for death, from which He shrank in His human will, hence

in

the sensuahty and the will absolutely consid-

Athanasius says:^ "When Christ says 'Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me; yet not My will, but Thine be done,'^ and again, 'The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh the human, which weak,'^ He denotes two wills through the weakness of the flesh shrank from and His Divine will eager for the the passion

ered shrink from burning, which, nevertheless,

passion."

of sensuality naturally shrinks from sensible pains and bodily hurt. In like manner, the will as nature turns from what is against nature

and what

is

evil in itself, as

yet the will as reason

may

death and the like;

at times choose these

things in relation to an end, as in a

the will as reason health.

Now

it

may

was the

mere man

choose for the end of will of

God

—

—

plain that in His will of sensuality and in His rational will considered as nature, Christ could

was contrariety of

Obj.

2.

Further,

it is

written (Gal.

the flesh lusteth against the spirit, it

against the flesh.

one thing, and the

Now when

5.

wills

17) that

and the

spir^

the spirit desires

flesh another, there is con-

Physics, V, s (229"25). ^}Dc huarn. cl Cout. Arianos, written against ApoUina*

rius. n. 21

^Ethics, IX, 4 (ii66«7). ' PL 42, 789. « PL 42, I030.

there

in Christ.

that Christ

should undergo pain, suffering, and death, not that these of themselves were willed by God, but for the sake of man's salvation. Hence it is

Hence

« ^

(PG

26, 1021).

Matt. 26.39; Matt 2641;

cf. Mark 14.36; Luke Mark 14.38.

22.42.

THIRD PART trariety of wills.

But

this

was

in Christ

;

for

by

Q. 18

ART.

ment

of the sensitive appetite would reach the

815

6

the will of charity which the Holy Spirit was causing in His mind, He willed the passion, ac-

rational will.

cording to Isa. 53. 7; He was offered because it was His own will, yet in His flesh He shrank from the passion. Therefore there was con-

natural will and the sensitive will in Christ

trariety of wills in

Him.

3.

Further,

it is

Now

agony seems to imply a certain struggle in a soul drawn to contrary things. Hence it seems that there was contrariety of will in Christ.

On

the contrary, In the decisions of the Sixth

Council^

it

"We

said:

is

confess two natural

must be

it

said that although the

wished what the Divine will did

and His rational

will

not wish, yet there was no contrariety

of wills in

written (Luke 22. 43) that being in an agony, He prayed the longer.

Obj.

And hence

Him.

because neither His nat-

First,

ural will nor the will of sensuahty rejected the

reason for which the Divine will and the will of the human reason in Christ wished the passion.

For the absolute pertain to

it

will of Christ

human

vation of the

wished the

race, although

it

to will this for the sake of

movement

thing further, but the

sal-

did not

some-

of sensuality

to extend so far. Secondly, because

not in opposition, as evil-minded heretics but following His human will, and neither withstanding nor striving against, but rather being subject to, His Divine and om-

was not able

nipotent will."

the other hand, neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from or retarded

wills,

assert,^

/ answer where there

Contrariety can exist only opposition in the same and as re-

that, is

gards the same. For

if

the diversity exists as

neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ was impeded or retarded by the natural

on

will or the appetite of sensuality. So, too,

the the

movement movement

of the natural

human

will

and

of the sensuality in Christ. For

pleased Christ, in His Divine will, and also His will of reason, that His natural will and

regards diverse things, and in diverse subjects, this would not suffice for the nature of con-

it

trariety,

nor even for the nature of contradicif a man were well formed or healthy as regards his hand, but not as regards his foot. Hence for there to be contrariety of wills in

will of sensuality should

tion

to the order of their nature.

anyone

willing something else than did the Divine will

—for example, it is

necessary,

first,

that the diversity

For

of wills should regard the same.

if

the will

of one regards the doing of something with ref-

erence to some universal reason, and the will of another regards the not doing the same with reference to

some

particular reason, there

—

is

not complete contrariety of will for example, when a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged for the good of the commonwealth, and one of the latter's

kindred wishes him not to be hanged on

account of a private love, there

is

in

that in Christ there

be moved according

Hence it is clear was no opposition or con-

trariety of wills.

Reply Obj.

i.

The

fact of

any

will in Christ

proceeded from the Divine will itself, by whose permission the human nature in Christ was moved by its proper movements, as Damascene says {De Fide Or t hod. iii., 14, 19).^ Reply Obj. 2. In us the desires of the spirit are impeded or retarded flesh;

by the

desires of the

not occur in Christ. Hence in

this did

Christ there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit, as in us.

Reply Obj.

no contrariety

3.

The agony

in Christ

was not

of wills; unless, indeed, the desire of the private good went so far as to wish to hinder the

in the rational part of the soul, in as far as

public good for the private good

versity of motives, as

—

in that case

the opposition of wills would regard the same.

Secondly, for contrariety of wills it should be in the same

essary that

it

nec-

is

will.

For

man

wishes one thing with his rational appetite and wishes another thing with his sensiif

a

tive appetite, there

is

no contrariety, unless the

sensitive appetite so far prevailed as to change

or at least keep back the rational appetite; for in this case

something of the contrary move-

it

implies a struggle in the will arising from a di-

when anyone, on his reason considering one, wishes one thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary. For this springs

from the weakness of the reason,

unable to judge which is the best absolutely. Now this did not occur in Christ, since by His reason He judged it to be best absolutely that the Divine will regarding the salvation of the human race should be fulfilled by His

which

is

passion. Nevertheless, there

was an agony

in

Christ as regards the sensitive part, in so far as Actio 18 (MA XI, 638; DZ 291). Cf. Council of Constantinople, in, Actio 12, Epist. of Sergius of Constant., ad Honorium (MA xi, 534) actio II, Macarius, ad Constantinum (MA xi, 514). 1

2

it

implied a dread of coming trial, as Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii, 15; iii, 18, 23)*

says

;

3PG

94, 1037; io8o.

*PG

94, 932; 1073; 1087.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

£i6

erated there

QUESTION XIX Of what pertains to the power of Christ with regard to operation

Manhood,

as the healing of the lepers or the

raising of the dead.

Christ there

{In Four Articles)

is

must now consider the unity of Christ's operation; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether in Christ there was one or several operations of the Godhead and Manhood? (2) Whether in Christ there were several operations of the human nature? (3) Whether Christ by His human operation merited anything for Himself? (4) Whether He merited anything for us by it?

8)

Whether

in Christ There Is

Only

One Operation of the Godhead and Manhood?

We

it

seems that

proceed thus to the First Article: It in Christ there is but one

would seem that

different

powers? Cannot the

lesser operate as

And

can there be one operation where there are different substances?" the greater?

The

/ answer that, xviii,

i),

A.

who

aforesaid heretics

placed one operation in Christ.'* Now in order better to understand their erroneous opinion, in

mind

that wherever there are

several ordered agents, the inferior

are

than operations.

Now

but one composite operation in Christ. Obj. 2. Further, there is but one operation of the principal and instrumental agent. Now the human nature in Christ was the instrument of

part of the thing operating, which

—

there

is

the Divine, as was said above (q. vii, a. i. Reply 3; Q. viii, a. I, Reply i; Q. xviii, a. i, Reply 2). Hence the operations of the Divine and human natures in Christ are the same.

Obj.

Further, since in Christ there are two

3.

natures in one hypostasis or person, whatever pertains to the hypostasis or person is one and the same. But operation pertains to the hypostasis or person, for

it is

only a subsisting sup-

positum that operates; hence, according to the Philosopher^ acts are of singulars. Christ there

is

Hence

in

only one operation of the God-

head and the Manhood. Obj.

4.

Further, as being belongs to a sub-

sisting hypostasis, so also does operation.

But

on account of the unity of hypostasis there is only one being in Christ, as was above stated (q. xvii, a. 2). Hence, on account of the same unity, there is one operation in Christ. Obj. 5. Further, where there is one thing op(PG

1

Sect. 6

2

Metaphysics,

3, 644). i,

i

(gSi^ib).

is

moved

by the superior, as in man the body is moved by the soul and the lower powers by the reason. And thus the actions and movements of the inferior principle

1.

(q.

placed one will in Christ

Godhead and the Manhood. For Dionysius says (Div. Norn. ii):^ "The most loving operation of God is made manifest to us by the supersubstantial Word having taken flesh integrally and truly, and having operated and suffered whatsoever befits His human and Divine operation." But he here mentions only one human and Divine operation, which is called in Greek deavdpLKTj that is, God-manlike. Hence it seems that operation of the

Objection

in

On the contrary, Ambrose says {De Fide ii, :^ "How can the same operation spring from

we must bear i.

Hence

but one operation of the Godhead

and the Manhood.

We

Article

one operation. But the same Godhead and the

is

thing was operated by the

highest principle

we

say of

man

is

things

operated rather

what pertains to the

properly the operation

;

thus

that to walk, which belongs to

the feet, and to touch, which belongs to the hand, are things operated by the man one of which is operated by the soul through the

—

feet, the

other through the hands.

And because

the same soul that operates through both

it is

there

is

moving

only one indifferent operation, on the principle;

but difference

the

is

first

found on

is

what is operated. Now, as in a mere body is moved by the soul, and the by the rational appetite, so in the

the part of

man

the

sensitive

Lord Jesus Christ the human nature and ruled by the Divine. Hence they

is

moved

said that

one indifferent operation on the part of operating, but divers things operated, since the Godhead of Christ did one thing by Itself, as to uphold all things by the word of His power and another thing by His human nature, as to walk in body. Hence the Sixth Council quotes the words of Severus the heretic,^ who said: "What things were done and wrought by the one Christ, differ greatly; for some are becoming to God, and some are human, as to walk bodily on the earth is indeed there

the

is

Godhead

—

human, but

to give hale steps to sickly limbs,

'

PL

16, 598.



Soul,

Cf

.

III,

Part

is

(42);

32).

m,

5 *

(PL

and secondly

in the

in the

moves the

I,

6

/jj^.^

34. 282).

Aristotle, i (450*12).

i^

4 (4o8*'27).

lxxvi, a. i cf. also (129); Epinomis, x (898c); Timaeus,

Lxxxi,

Q. i

a.

i

;

q.

;

Phacdrus (249).

x (618); Phacdo (82); Timaeus (76, 90); -Augustine, City of God, xii, 26 (PL 41, 375)9 Cf. Aristotle, Soul, i, 3 (406^26); Physics, viii, 9 (265**

PL PL

cf.

the soul, all

refuted by the Philosopher^^

9 (432^6).

Plato, Alcibiades,

cf.

34, 480.

of

body.

separated

Alchcr of Clairvaux (PL 40, 791). 34, 475;

first

bodily organ in so far as the soul

^Republic, ^

moved by

is

so that this act "to see"

things they did

Remember

glutton (Luke 16. 25): didst receive

it

an

evident consequence of transmigration which

6

in this world.

as a is

^0

Soul,

I,

3

Uos^i)'

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART who proves

that the soul does not

and that

is

it

no way moved

in

move

itself,

in respect of

such operations as seeing, feeling, and the like, but that such operations are movements of the composite only. We must therefore conclude

no way

that the acts of the sensitive powers in

remain

perhaps

in the separated soul, except

remote origin. Reply Obj. i. Some deny that

as in their

Augustine's: for

who compiled

it is

this

book

is

ascribed to a Cistercian

from Augustine's works, and added things of his own. Hence we are not to take what is written there, as having authority. however,

If,

it

authority should be maintained,

its

must be said that the meaning

it

separated soul

is

that the

is

affected with imagination and

Q. 70

ART.

897

3

mind, imaginatively, so are they in the separated soul intellectually, but not that they are in the separated soul imaginatively.

Reply Obj.

As stated

4.

in the first

book of

memory

has a twofold meaning. Sometimes it means a power of the sensitive part, in so far as its gaze extends over past time; and in this way the act of the memory Sentences,^

will

not be in the separated soul.

And

so the

Philosopher says^ that "when this," that

is

the

body, "is corrupted, the soul remembers not." In another way memory is used to designate that part of the imagination which pertains to the intellectual part, in so far namely as

from

stracts

it

differences of time, since

all

it

abre-

gards not only the past but also the present, and

{De

other like powers, not as though such affection were the act of the aforesaid powers, but in the sense that the soul will be affected in the future life for good or ill according to the things which it committed in the body through the imagination and other like powers, so that the imagination and such powers are not supposed to elicit that affection, but to have elicited in the body

Taking memory in this sense the separated soul will remember.^ Reply Obj. 5. Love, joy, sorrow, and the like, have a twofold meaning. Sometimes they denote passions of the sensitive appetite, and thus they will not be in the separated soul, be-

the merit of that affection.

a definite

Reply Obj. body not

2.

The

soul

is

said to feel through

as though the act of feeling be-

the

longed to the soul by itself, but as belonging to the whole composite by reason of the soul, just

we

as

say that heat heats. That which

namely that the soul

feels

some

feels

ment

added,

means

the body, such as fear and so forth, it

is

things without that

of the

body that takes place

in the acts of

do not occur without any bodily movement. It may also be replied that Augustine is speaking according to the opinion of the Platonists who maintained this as stated above.

Reply Obj.

3.

Augustine speaks there as for

the most part throughout that book, as one inquiring and not deciding. For

it is

clear that

no comparison between the soul of a sleeper and the separated soul, since the soul is

of the sleeper uses the organ of imagination wherein corporeal likenesses are impressed; which cannot be said of the separated soul. Or

we may

reply that likenesses of things are in the soul, both as to the sensitive and imaginative

power and

as to the intellectual power, with

greater or lesser abstraction

material

conditions.

from matter and

Therefore

Augustine's

comparison holds in this respect that just as the images of corporeal things are in the soul of the dreamer or of one who is carried out of his 1

Trin. xiv,

11).^

way they are not exercised without movement of the heart. In another

cause in this

way they denote

acts of the will

and

which

is

way they

in the

be even as delight will be there without bodily movement, even as it is in God, namely in so far as it is a simple movement of the will. In this sense the Philosopher says^ that "God's joy is one simple delight." intellectual part,

in this

will

in the separated soul,

such things without the outward move-

the proper senses, since fear and like passions

there

the future as Augustine says

Cf. also Part

I, Q.

lxxvii, a.

5,

Reply

3.

Article

Can

3.

Suffer

We

Whether the Separated Soul from a Bodily Fire?

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

would seem that the separated soul cannot suffer from a bodily fire. Objection 1. For Augustine says :^ "The things that affect the soul well or

ill

after its separation

from the body are not corporeal but resemble corporeal things." Therefore the separated soul

not punished with a bodily

is

Obj.

fire.

Further, Augustine says^ that the

2.

always more excellent than the patient. impossible for any body to be more excellent than the separated soul. Therefore it cannot suffer from a body.

agent

But

is

it is

^In

Sent., d.

Q. 2, A. s,

^Soul,

ad

I,

m,

q. 4, a. i,

ad

2; cf. Sent.,

m,

d.

xxvi,

4.

4 (4o8''27).

*

PL

6

Cf. Part

42, 1047. I, Q.

LXXVII,

a. 8; q.

lxxxix,

a. 6.

^Ethics, VII, 14 (1154^26). 7 Gen. ad lit., xii, 32 (PL 34, 480). ^Ibid., XII, 16 (PL 34, 467); cf. De Musica, vi, s 32,

n68).

(PL

— SUMMA TEEOLOGICA

898 Obj.

Further, According to the Philoso-

3.

{De Duab. Natur.y only

pher^ and Boethius

those things that agree in matter are active and passive in relation to one another. But the soul

and corporeal fire do not agree in matter, since there is no matter common to spiritual and corporeal things; and therefore they cannot be changed into one another, as Boethius says Therefore the separated soul does not

{ibid.).

from a bodily

suffer

fire.

is acted upon from the agent. Therefore if the soul suffer from the bodily fire, it will receive something from it. Now whatsoever is

Obj.

Further, Whatsoever

4.

receives something

received in a thing

mode

is

received according to the

Therefore that which is received in the soul from the fire is in it not materially but spiritually. Now the forms of Therefore though

its

per-

be granted that the soul suffer from the bodily fire, this will not conduce to its punishment, but rather to its fections.

it

perfection.

Obj. 5. Further, If it be said that the soul is punished merely by seeing the fire, as Gregory would seem to say {Dial, iv, 29),^ on the con-

—

If the soul sees the fire of hell,

it

can-

save by intellectual vision, since it has not the organs by which sensitive or imag-

not see

it

inative vision

is

But

effected.

it

would seem

impossible for intellectual vision to be the cause of sorrow, since "there

no sorrow contrary

is

to the pleasure of considering," according to

the Philosopher.'* Therefore the soul

by that

ished

Obj. suffers

held by

not pun-

vision.

Further, If

6.

is

be said that the soul fire through being

it

from the corporeal it,

even as now

it

is

held by the body

while living in the body, on the contrary,

The soul while body in so far

living in the

body

is

held by the

as there results one thing

from

the soul and the body, as from form and matwill not be the form of that Therefore it cannot be held by the fire in the manner spoken of above. Obj. 7. Further, Every bodily agent acts by contact. But a corporeal fire cannot be in contact with the soul, since contact is only between ter.

But the soul

corporeal

fire.

come together. not from that fire.

whom

Obj.

8.

Further,

An

organic agent does not

act on a remote object except through acting on

the intermediate objects; therefore 1

Generation and Corruption,

«

Chap. 6 (PL

»

PL

77, 368.

it is

I,

lo (328*19).

I,

13 (io6»38).

64, 1350). ••

Topics,

able to

distance in proportion to

fixed

But

its

demons

souls, or at least the

to

sometimes outside the place of hell, since sometimes they appear to men even in this world and yet they are not then free from punishment, for just as the glory of the saints is never interrupted, so neither is the punishment of the damned. And yet we do not find that all the intermediate things suffer from the fire of hell; nor again is it credible that any corporeal things of an elemental nature has such a power that its action can reach to such a distance. Therefore it does this equally applies, are

;

not seem that the pains suffered by the souls of the

On

damned

are inflicted by a corporeal

the contrary,

The

fire.

possibility of suffering

from a corporeal fire is equally consistent with separated souls and with demons. Now demons suffer

from corporeal

ished by that

fire

fire

since they are pun-

into which the bodies of the

damned will be cast after the resurrection, and which must be as corporeal fire. This is evident from the words of our Lord (Matt. 25. 41), Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil, etc. Therefore separated souls also can suffer from that fire. Further, Punishment should correspond to sin.

Now

the

body by perverse concupiscence.

fore

it is

made

ing

from

in sinning the soul subjected itself to

Thereshould be punished by besubject to a bodily thing by suffering

just that

it

it.

Further, There

is greater union between form and matter than between agent and patient. Now the diversity of spiritual and corporeal nature does not hinder the soul from being the form of the body. Therefore neither is it an obstacle to its suffering from a body. / answer that, Given, from what we have said above^ that the fire of hell is not called so metaphorically, nor an imaginary fire, but a real corporeal fire, we must say that the soul will suffer punishment from a corporeal fire, since our Lord said (Matt. 25. 41) that this fire was prepared for the devil and his angels, who are incorporeal even as the soul. But ho>v it is that

they can thus suffer

is

explained in

many

For some have said that the mere

corporeal things whose bounds

Therefore the soul suffers

a

at

power.

of the recipient.

things existing spiritually in the soul are

trary,

act

ways.

fact that

fire makes the soul suffer from and so Gregory {Dial, iv, 29)^ says: "The soul suffers from the fire by merely seeing it." But this does not seem sufficient, because whatever is seen, from the fact that it is

the soul sees the

the

fire;

'

Thomas, In

«

PL

77, 368.

Sent., rv, d. xliv, q. 3, A. 2,

I.

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART

Q. 70

ART.

899

3

a perfection of the seer; therefore it cannot conduce to his punishment, as seen. Sometimes, however, it is of a penal or sadden-

virtue of a spiritual agent, should act on the

ing nature accidentally, in so far, that

by

seen,

is

as

is,

it

apprehended as something hurtful, and con-

is

sequently, besides the fact that the soul sees the fire,

the

must be some relation of the soul to according to which the fire is hurtful

there fire,

Hence others have fire

said that although a cor-

cannot burn the soul, the soul never-

theless apprehends

it

as hurtful to itself,

and

in consequence of this apprehension is seized with fear and sorrow, in fulfilment of Ps. 13. 5, They have trembled for fear, where there was

no fear. Hence Gregory says^ that "the soul burns through seeing itself aflame." But this, again, seems insufficient, because in this case the soul would suffer from the fire not in reality but only in apprehension, for

passion of sorrow or pain

although a real

may

result

from a

Augustine observes {Gen. ad Lit. xii, 32),^ it cannot be said in relation to that passion that one really suffers from the thing, but from the likeness of the thing that is seen. Moreover, this kind of suffering would be more unhke real suffering than that which results from imaginary vision, since the latter is stated to result from real images of things, which images the soul carries about with it, whereas the former results from false conceptions which the erring soul imagines; and furthermore, it is not probable that separated souls or demons, who are endowed with keen intelfalse imagination, as

ligence, fire to

would think hurt them

if

it

possible for a corporeal

they were in no

way

dis-

tressed thereby.

Hence others say that it is necessary to admit that the soul suffers even really from the corporeal fire; and so Gregory says:^ "We can gather from the words of the Gospel that the soul suffers from the fire not only by seeing it, but also by feeling it." They explain the possi-

They say that this corcan be considered in two ways. First, as a corporeal thing, and thus it has not the power to act on the soul. Secondly, as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice. For the order of Divine justice demands that bihty of this as follows.

poreal

fire

the soul which

by sinning subjected

itself to

corporeal things should be subjected to also in punishment.

Now

them

an instrument acts not only in virtue of its own nature, but also in virtue of the principal agent; therefore it is not unreasonable if that fire, seeing that it acts in 1

Ibid.

man

same way as

or demon, in the

explained the sanctification of the soul

the sacraments.''

But, again, this does not seem to suffice, since every instrument, in acting on that on which it is

used instrumentally, has

own connatural

its

action besides the action whereby

it

tue of the principal agent; in fact

to the soul.

poreal

spirit of a

we have

2

PL

34, 480.

3

Loc.

cit.

the former that

filling

it

acts in vir-

it is

by

ful-

effects the latter action,

even

as, in Baptism, it is by laving the body that water sanctifies the soul, and the saw by cutting wood produces the shape of a house.

Hence we must allow the

exercise on the

fire to

soul an action connatural to the

fire, in order be the instrument of Divine justice in the punishment of sin, and for this reason we must say that a body cannot naturally act on a spirit, nor in any way be hurtful or distressful to it, except in so far as the latter is in some way united to a body; for thus we ob-

that

may

it

serve that the corruptible body the soul (Wisd.

9.

15).

Now

a body in two ways. In one ter, so

from

that

a load upon is united to

is

a spirit

way

as

form

to

matone

their union there results

thing absolutely, and the spirit that is thus united to a body both quickens the body and is

somewhat burdened by the body; but

it is not thus that the spirit of man or demon is united to the corporeal fire. In another way as the mover is united to the things moved, or as a

thing placed

united to place, even as incor-

is

way created incorporeal spirits are confined to a place, being in one place in such a way as not to be in

poreal things are in a place. In this

another.

Now although of its nature a

thing

able to confine an incorporeal spirit

is

to a place,

it

is

not able of

its

corporeal

nature to de-

tain an incorporeal spirit in the place to which is

it

confined,

and so

to tie

it

to that place

be unable to seek another, since a spirit is not by nature in a place so as to be subject to place. But it is added over and above corporeal fire as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice thus to detain a spirit; and thus it has a penal effect on it, by hindering that

it

from fulfilling its own will, that is by hinderit from acting where it will and as it will. This way is asserted by Gregory {Ibid.). For in explaining how the soul can suffer from that fire by feeling it, he expresses himself as follows: "Since Truth declares the rich sinner to be condemned to fire, will any wise man deny that the souls of the wicked are imprisoned in it

ing

4

m,

Thomas, In

Sent., rv, d.

Q. LXII, A. I.

i,

Q. i, A. 4; cf. above.

Part

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

900

flames?" Julian says the same' as quoted by the (iv Sent. d. 44) :^ "If the incorporeal

Master

held by the body, why not be held after death by a corporeal

spirit of a living

shall

it

man

is

and Augustine says^ that "just as, although the soul is spiritual and the body corfire?"

man

poreal,

so fashioned that the soul

is

united to the body as giving

is

and on ac-

it life,

count of this union conceives a great love for body, so it is chained to the fire, as receiving punishment from it, and from this union its

conceives a loathing."

Accordingly

we must

unite

the above

all

order to understand perfectly how the soul suffers from a corporeal fire, so as to say that the fire of its nature is able to have an incorporeal spirit united to

modes together

it

in

as a thing placed

united to a place, that as it is enabled

is

the instrument of Divine justice to detain

it

enchained as

fire is really

spect this

were, and in this re-

fire

tormented by the

it is

ory {Ibid.) mentions

all

fire.

as quoted above.

ply that Augustine

means

Hence Greg-

may

"•

Or we may

re-

to say that the things

which are the proximate occasion of the soul's pain or sorrow are spiritual, since it would not be distressed unless it apprehended the fire as hurtful to it; and so the fire as apprehended is the proximate cause of its distress, whereas the corporeal fire which exists outside the soul is the remote cause of its distress. Reply Obj. 2. Although the soul is more excellent absolutely than the fire, the fire

atively

more

that

as

is,

is rel-

excellent than the soul, in so far,

it is

Reply Obj.

the instrument of Divine justice. 3.

The Philosopher and Boethius

are speaking of the action

Nevertheless, intellectual vision

row

whereby the patient

changed into the nature of the agent. Such is not the action of the fire on the soul, and consequently the argument is not conclusive. Reply Obj. 4. By acting on the soul the fire bestows nothing on it but detains it, as stated above. Hence the argument is not to the point. Reply Obj. 5. In intellectual vision sorrow is not caused by the fact that something is seen, since the thing seen as such can in no way be contrary to the intellect. But in the sensible vision the thing seen, by its very action on the is

be accidentsight,

in

so

of the organ.

may

cause sor-

apprehended hurts through being seen,

in so far as the thing seen is

as hurtful, not that

it

way

but in some other

the soul in seeing the

altogether. It

is

thus that

fire is distressed.

6. The comparison does not hold every respect, but it does in some, as explained above. Reply Obj. 7. Although there is no bodily contact between the soul and body, there is a certain spiritual contact between them (even

Reply Obj.

in

mover

as the

of the heaven, being spiritual,

touches the heaven, when spiritual contact) in the

object

is

it moves it, with a same way as a painful

said to touch, as stated in the treatise

on Generation and Corruption.^ This mode of contact

is

sufficient for action.

never outside

these in order, as

harmony

destroys the

it

as something hurt-

be seen from the above quotations. Reply Obj. i. Augustine speaks there as one inquiring, and so he expresses himself otherwise

when deciding

far as

Reply Obj.

spirit,

may

something corruptive of the

and

hurtful to the

thus the soul seeing the ful to

it

sight so as to be seen, there ally

8.

The

hell,

souls of the

damned

are

except by Divine permission,

either for the instruction or for the trial of the

And wherever

elect.

they are outside hell they

nevertheless always see

its fire

as prepared for

their punishment.

Therefore, since this vision

the immediate

cause of their distress, as

is

stated above (Reply i), wherever they are, they suffer

from

hell-fire.

Even

so prisoners, though

somewhat from the seeing themselves condemned to it.

outside the prison, suffer prison,

Hence

just as the glory of the elect is not diminished neither as to the essential nor as to the accidental reward if they happen to be outside the empyrean (in fact this somewhat conduces to their glory), so the punishment of the damned is in no way diminished, if by God's

permission they happen to be outside hell for a time. A gloss on James 3. 6, inflameth the wheel of our nativity, etc., is in agreement with this, for it is worded thus: "The devil, wherever he is,

whether

in the air or

under the earth, drags

with him the torments of his flames."^ But the objection argues as though the corporeal fire spirit immediately in the same torments bodies.

tortured the

way

as

it

QUESTION LXXI Of works

of intercession for THE DEAD

{hi Fourteen Articles)

We

must now consider works of intercession Under this head there are four-

for the dead. *

Julian, Bishop of Toledo, Prognostic

482). »

2

Chap.

7

(QR

City oj God, xxi, 10

11,

17

(PL

", 1003).

(PL

41, 725).

*

Ibid,

96, B Aristotle, i, 6 (323*22). ^Glossa ordin. (vi, 213F); Bede, hi Jac. (PL 93, 27).

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART teen points of inquiry: (i)

Whether

interces-

Q. 71

ART.

901

1

18. 4, the soul that sinneth, the

same

shall die.

sory works performed by one person can profit

Therefore neither does one person profit by

others? (2) Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living? (3) Whether the intercessory works of sinners profit the dead? (4)

another's good.

Whether intercessory works for the dead those who perform them? (5) Whether

profit

written

is

(Ps.

them

all

118.

that fear

members of the one body of the Church. Now one member is assisted by another. Therefore one man can be assisted by

works for one dead person

profit that person

works for many avail each one as much as if they were offered for each individual? (14) Whether general works of intercession avail special ones are not offered, as

as special

It

Further, All the faithful united together by

more than others? (13) Whether intercessory

much

contrary,

inter-

Whether they profit tory? (7) Whether they avail the children in limbo? (8) Whether in any way they profit those who are in heaven? (9) Whether the prayer of the Church, the Sacrament of the altar, and almsgiving profit the departed? (10) Whether indulgences granted by the Church profit them? (11) Whether the burial service profits the departed? (12) Whether intercessory

whom

the

who are in hell? (6) those who are in purga-

cessory works profit those

those for

On

6^): I am a partaker with Thee, etc.

and general prayers of

cession together avail those for

whom

inter-

they are

offered?

charity are

the merits of another. / answer that,

Our

of Happiness. Secondly, for something consequent upon a state; thus by some work a man merits an accidental reward, or a rebate of punishment. And for both these purposes our actions may avail in two ways: first, by state

way

of merit, secondly,

by way

of prayer, the

difference being that merit rehes on justice, and

prayer on mercy, since he his petition

who prays

from the mere

liberality

obtains of the

one he prays. Accordingly we must say that the work of one person in no way can avail another for acquiring a state by

Article i. Whether the Works of Intercession of One Person Can Profit Others?

actions can avail for two

purposes. First, for acquiring a certain state; thus by a meritorious work a man obtains the

namely, a

man

is

way

of merit, so that,

able to merit eternal life

by

would seem that the works of intercession {suf-

the works which I do, because the share of glory is awarded according to the measure of the recipient, and each one is disposed by his

fragia) of one person cannot profit others.

own and not by

We

proceed thus to the First Article:

Objection

What

For

1.

it

is

written (Gal.

6.

It

8)

man

shall sow, those also shall one person reaped fruit from the intercessory works of another, he would reap from another's sowing. Therefore a person receives no fruit from the intercessory

things a

Now

he reap.

if

M'Orks of others.

Obj.

2.

Further, It belongs to God's justice

that each one should receive according to his

and so the psalm

merits,

wilt render to every

Now

it is

Therefore

(61. 13) says:

man according

Thou

to his works.

impossible for God's justice to it

is

impossible for one

man

fail.

to be

by the works of another. Further, A work is meritorious on the same count as it is praiseworthy, namely

assisted

Obj.

3.

in so far as it is voluntary.

Now

one

man

is

not

work of another. Therefore can the work of one man be meritorious

praised for the neither

and

fruitful for another.

Obj.

4.

to repay for evil.

Further, It belongs to Divine justice good for good in the same way as evil But no man is punished for the evil-

doings of another; indeed, according to Ezech.

another's actions,

—disposed,

by being worthy of reward. By way of prayer, however, the work of one may that

is

to say,

profit another while

he is a wayfarer, even for acquiring a state; for instance, one man may obtain the first grace for another, and since the

answer to prayer depends on the liberality of God, to Whom we pray, it may extend to whatever is subject to the order of the Divine power. On the other hand, as regards that which is consequent upon or accessory to a state, the work of one may avail another, not only by way of prayer but even by way of merit, and this happens in two ways. First, on account of their communion in the root of the work, which root is charity in meritorious works. Therefore all who are united together by charity acquire some benefit from one another's works, although according to the measure of each one's state, since even in heaven each one will rejoice in the goods of others. Hence it is that the

an 1

communion

of saints

article of faith. ^ Secondly, Cf.

The Apostles Creed (DZ

6).

is laid

down

as

through the in-

SUMMA TEEOLOGICA

902 tention of the doer

who

does certain works

specially for the purpose that they

such

persons,

so

those

that

somewhat the works

may

profit

works become

whom

of those for

they

are done, as though they were bestowed on

them by the

doer.

And

so they can avail

them

Article

similar purpose

that

does not change

their state.

Reply Obj. of eternal

that reapeth lasting.

.

Now

This reaping

i.

.

4. 36,

gathercth jridt unto

.

a share of eternal life

to a man save for we may petition life, this

the receiving

is

John

as stated in

life,

his

own works,

is

And he

life

ever-

not given

for although

for another that he obtain

never happens except by means of his at the prayers of

own works, when namely, one, another

merits eternal

given the grace whereby he

is

life.

Whether

the

Dead Can Be

Assisted

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the dead cannot be assisted by the works of the hving. Objection

either for the fulfilment of satisfaction or for

some

2.

by the Works of the Living?

(II Cor.

5.

First,

i.

10)

:

We

because the Apostle says

must

be manifested be-

all

fore the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done. Therefore nothing

can accrue to a man from the works of others, which are done after his death and when he is no longer in the body. Obj. 2. Further, This also seems to follow from the words of Apoc. 14. 13, Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord for their works .

.

.

follow them. Obj. 3. Further, It belongs only to one

who

not contrary to Divine justice if a man receives the fruit of the works done by a man who is

on the way to advance on account of some deed. Now after death men are no longer wayfarers, because to them the words of Job 19. 8, refer: He hath hedged in my path round about, and I cannot pass. Therefore the dead cannot be assisted by a person's intercessory

one with him

works.

Reply Obj. 2. The work that is done for another becomes his for whom it is done, and in like manner the work done by a man who is one with me is somewhat mine. Hence it is

in charity, or of

works done for

him. This also happens according to

human

justice, so that the satisfaction offered

by one

is

accepted in lieu of another's.

Reply Obj.

3. Praise is not given to a person save according to his relation to an act, and

therefore praise

is

"in relation to something."^

no man is made or shown to be well or ill disposed to something by another's deed, it follows that no man is praised for another's

And

since

deeds save accidentally, in so far as he

somewhat the cause

of those deeds,

by

is

giv-

inducement, or by any other means. On the other hand, a work is meritorious to a person not only by reason of his disposition, but also in view of something consequent upon his disposition or state, as appears from what has been ing

assistance,

counsel,

said.

Reply Obj. tice to take

4. It is

directly contrary to jus-

away from

a person that

which

is

what is not his not contrary to justice, but surpasses

his due, but to give a person

due

is

the bounds of justice, for

it is

a person cannot be hurt by the

liberality. ills

Now

of another,

unless he be deprived of something of his own.

Consequently

it

is

not

becoming that one

should be punished for another's sins, as that one should acquire

I,

12 (iioi*'i2).

Obj. 4. Further, No one is assisted by the deed of another unless there be some community of hfe between them. Now there is no community between the dead and the living, as the Philosopher says.^ Therefore the intercessions of the living do not profit the dead. On the contrary are the words of II Machab. 12. 46: It is ... a holy and wholesome thought

pray for the dead, that they may be loosed sins. But this would not be profitable unless it wdre a help to them. Therefore the intercessory works of the living profit the dead. Further, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. to

from

i):^

"Of no small weight

is

the authority of

the Church whereby she clearly approves of the

custom by which a commendation of the dead has a place in the prayers which the priests pour forth to the Lord God at His altar." This

custom was established by the apostles themDamascene in a sermon on works of intercession for the dead,"* where he expresses himself thus: "Realizing the naselves according to the

ture of the Mysteries the disciples of the Sav-

and His holy apostles sanctioned a commemoration of those who had died in the faith, being made in the awe-inspiring and life-giving Mysteries." This is also confirmed by the auiour

some advantage from

the good deeds of another. ^Ethics,

it is

is

^

Ethics,

»

PL

*

De His Qui

I,

II (1101*35).

40, 593.

in Fide Dormierunt,

m (PG 95,

249).

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART

ART.

Q. 71

903

3

thority of Dionysius {Hier. Eccl. vii)/ where he mentions the rite of the Early Church in

be helped by others in the matter of their being delayed from receiving their final reward, be-

praying for the dead, and, moreover, asserts

cause in this respect they are

that the works of intercession of the living the dead.^ Therefore we must believe without any doubt.

profit this

/ answer that, Charity, which

uniting the

members

is

the bond

of the Church, extends

not only to the living, but also to the dead die in charity.

For charity which

the soul, even as the soul

is

is

the

who

life

of

the Hfe of the body,

Reply Ohj.

still

wayfarers.

Although the communion of civic deeds, of which the Philosopher speaks, is impossible between the dead and the living, because the dead are outside civic life, the communication of the spiritual hfe is possible between them, for that life is founded on charity towards God, to Whom the spirits of the dead live. 4.

has no end; Charity never jalleth away (I Cor. 13. 8).

Moreover, the dead

live in the

memory

of the living, and therefore the intention of

the living can be directed to them.

Hence

two ways even as they profit the living, both on account of the bond of charity and on account of the intention being directed to them. Nevertheless, we must not beHeve that the intercessory works of the living profit them so as to change their state from unhappiness to happiness or conversely; but they avail for the lessening of punishment or something of the kind that involves no change in the state of in

i.

Man

while living in the body

merited that such things should avail him after death. Therefore if he is assisted thereby after is,

nevertheless, the result of the

things he has done in the body.

Or we may

proceed thus to the Third Article:

reply, according to

John Damas-

cene in the sermon quoted above, that these

words refer to the retribution which will be made at the final judgment, of eternal glory or eternal unhappiness; for then each one will receive only according as he himself has done in the body. Meanwhile, however, he can be assisted by the intercessions of the living. Reply Ohj. 2. The words quoted refer expressly to the sequel of eternal retribution as

It

would seem that intercessory works performed by sinners do not profit the dead. Ohjection 1. For, according to John 9. 31,

God doth

not hear sinners.

Now if their prayers

were to profit those for whom they pray, they would be heard by God. Therefore the intercessory prayers performed by them do not profit the dead.

Ohj.

2.

10)^ that

Further, Gregory says {Pastoral,

"when an

offensive person

is

i,

sent to

intercede, the wrath of the angered party

the dead.

this life, this

We

the

intercessory works of the living profit the dead

Reply Ohj.

Article 3. Whether Suffrages Performed hy Sifiners Profit the Dead?

is

provoked to harsher measures." Now every sinner is offensive to God. Therefore God is not inclined to mercy by the intercession of sinners, and consequently their works of intercession are of no avail. Ohj. 3. Further, A person's deed would seem to be more fruitful to the doer than to another. But a sinner merits nothing for himself by his deeds. Much less, therefore, can he merit for another.

Ohj. 4. Further, Every meritorious work must be a living work, that is to say, formed by charity. Now works done by sinners are dead. Therefore the dead for whom they are done cannot be assisted thereby.

On

No man can know man whether the

from the opening words: Blessed are Or we may reply that deeds done on their behalf are somewhat their own, as stated above (a. i). Reply Ohj. 3. Although, strictly speaking,

latter

after death souls are not in the state of the

of grace, a

way, yet in a certain respect they are still on the way, in so far as they are delayed awhile in their advance towards their final reward. Therefore, strictly speaking, their way is hedged in round about, so that they can no more be changed by any works in respect of the state of happiness or unhappiness. Yet their way is not so hedged around that they cannot IPG3, 556. 2/^,^-^, (PG3, 560).

ask intercessory works for his dead, and consequently many would be deterred from ob-

is

Ohj.

clear

the dead, etc.

for

5.

certain

the contrary,

about another

be in a state of sin or of grace. If, thereworks were profit-

fore, only those intercessory

by those could not

able that are done

man

who are in a state know of whom to

taining works of intercession.

Ohj.

6.

According to Augustine

Further,

(Enchir. ex),* as quoted in the text (iv Sent. d. 45),^

the dead are assisted by works of in-

tercession according as while living they merit3

PL

6

Lombard, chap.

77, 23.

*

2

PL

40, 283.

(QR

11,

1006).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

904 ed to be assisted after death

Therefore the

not only to the just but also to sinners (Matt.

measured

5. 45), not indeed on account of their merits, but of His pity. Hence a gloss on John 9. 31, Cud doth uot hear sinners, says^ that he speaks as one "unanointed" and as not seeing clearly. Reply Obj. 2. Although the sinner's prayer

worth of prayers of intercession

is

according to the disposition of the person for whom they are performed. Therefore it would appear that it differs not whether they be per-

formed by good or by wicked persons. / answer that, Two things may be considered in the intercessions performed by the wicked. First, the deed done (opus operatiim), for instance the sacrifice of the altar. And since our sacraments have their efficacy from themselves independently of the deed of the doer, and are equally efficacious by whomsoever they are per-

formed, in this respect the intercessory works of the wicked profit the departed. Secondly, we may consider the deed of the doer (opus operans), and then

we must draw

another; in another

way

and

it is

an-

this

that priest, although a sinner, profit the de-

when he acts as the ment of another, for the work of the ment belongs more to the principal parted. Secondly,

Therefore, although he

ment act

who

instruinstru-

agent.

acts as the instru-

of another be not in a state of merit, his

may

be meritorious on account of the prinif a servant being in

cipal agent; for instance

do any work of mercy at the command of master who has charity. Hence, if a person dying in charity command works of intercession to be offered for him, or if some other person having charity prescribe them, those works of intercession avail for the departed, even though the persons by whom they are performed be in sin. Nevertheless they would avail more if those persons were in charity, because then those works would be meritorious on two counts. Reply Obj. i The prayer offered by a sinner is sometimes not his but another's, and consequently in this respect is worthy to be heard by God. Nevertheless, God sometimes hears sinners, when, namely, they ask for something acceptable to God. For God dispenses His goods

sin

his

.

I

Sect. 4

(PG

3,

3os).

offers the prayer.

Reply Obj.

who performs

3.

The reason why is

because he

by reason of

of profiting

his

profit another,

Reply Obj.

4.

who

is

is

own

Nevertheless, as stated above,

way

the sinner

these works of interces.sion gains

nothing thereby

it

not capable indisposition.

may

in

some

disposed.

Although the sinner's deed is it is his own, it may be

not living in so far as so

living in

far as

is

it

another's, as stated

above. Since, however, the argiime?its in the con-

to himself or to

in so far as

happens in two ways. First, when the sinner, offering works of intercession, represents the whole Church; for instance a priest when he performs the burial service in church. And since one in whose name or in whose stead a thing is done is understood to do it himself as Dionysius asserts (CcbI. Hier. xiii),' it follows that the intercessory works of other's deed,

may

a distinction;

because the deed of a sinner who offers intercessory works may be considered in one way in so far as it is his own deed, and thus it can in

no way be meritorious either

not acceptable in so far as he is offensive, be acceptable to God on account of another in whose stead or at whose command he

is it

trary sense

would seem

to

show

that

it

matters

not whether one obtain intercession from good

from

or

evil persons,

we must

reply to

them

also.

Although one cannot know for another whether he be in the state of salvation, one may infer it with probability from what one sees outwardly of a man, for a tree is known by its fruit (Matt. 7. 16). Reply Obj. 6. In order that intercession avail

Reply Obj.

5.

certain about

it is requisite that the one for whom performed be capable of availing by it, and a man has become capable of this by his own works which he did in his hfe-time. This is what Augustine means to say. Nevertheless, works must be such that they can profit him, and this depends not on the person for whom the intercession is performed, but rather on the one who offers the intercessory works whether by performing them or by command-

another,

it

is

ing them.

Article

4.

Whether Intercessory Prayers

Offered by the Living for the

Those

Who

Offer

Dead Profit

Them?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that intercessory works offered by the living for the dead do not profit those who them. Objection i. For according to human justice a man is not absolved from his own debt if he pays a debt for another man. Therefore a man is not absolved from his own debt for the rea-

offer

^Glossa 1718).

interl. (v, 2i5r);

Augustine, In Joann. (PL 35,

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART son that by offering works of intercession he has paid the debt of the one for whom he ofObj. 2. Further, Whatever a man does, he should do it as best he can. Now it is better to assist two than one. Therefore if one who by works of intercession has paid the debt of a dead person

own

freed from his

is

would seem that one ought never

to

debt,

it

satisfy

for oneself but always for another.

Obj.

Further, If the satisfaction of one

3.

satisfies

him equally

for another profits

whom

with the one for

he

satisfies, it will like-

wise equally profit a third person if he satisfy for him at the same time, and Hkewise a fourth and so on. Therefore he might satisfy for all

by one work of

which

satisfaction,

is

absurd.

On

the contrary, It is written (Ps. 34. 13) prayer shall be turned into my bosom.

My

Therefore, in like manner, intercessory works

who

that are offered for others profit those

The Damascene who jell asleep in

Further, those

when about to anoint a ment or other holy oil,

man

sick first

with the oint-

of all he,"

and afterwards

The work

his neighbour." is

who

profit

are in hell.

1. For it is written (II Machab. 40): They found under the coats of the slain some of the donaries of the idols .,

Objection

12.

.

.

which the law forbiddeth to the lews, and yet we read further on {verse 43) that Judas sent twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem .

.

.

to be offered for the sins of the dead.

Now

clear that they sinned mortally through

is

it

acting against the Law, and consequently that

they died in mortal sin, and were taken to hell. Therefore works of intercession profit those

who

are in hell.

2. Further, The text (iv Sent. d. 45)2 quotes the saying of Augustine (Enchir. cx)^ that "those whom works of intercession profit

Obj.

of intercession that

cession that

counted as belonging to the per-

is

whom

is

it

done, while absolving

him

from the debt of punishment, does not absolve the performer from his own debt of punishment, because in this compensation we have to consider the equality of justice, and this work of satisfaction can be equal to the one debt without being equal to the other, for the debts of two sinners require a greater satisfaction

than the debt of one. Secondly, it may be considered as meriting eternal life, and this it has as proceeding from its root, which is charity, in this

whom

way it

is

it

profits not only the person

done, but also and

still

This sufBces for the Replies to the Objections; for the first considered the

tercession as a

others consider Sect. 18

(PG

work it

as meritorious.

95, 264).

work of

in-

of satisfaction, while the

only those

fore works of intercession profit even those

who

are in hell.

Obj. 3. Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. cap ult.):^ "If here the prayers of the just avail those who are alive, how much more do they, after death, profit those alone

who

are

Hence we may works are more profit-

their holy prayers?"

gather that intercessory

Now they Hving even though they be in mortal sin, for the Church prays daily for sinners that they be converted to God. Therefore intercessory works avail also for the dead who are in mortal sin. Obj. 4. Further, In the Lives of the Fathers able to the dead than to the living.

profit the

3)^ we read, and Damascene resermon of his that Macarius discovered the skull of a dead man on the road, and that after praying he asked whose head it was, and the head replied that it had belonged to a pagan priest who was condemned to hell; and yet he confessed that he and others were assisted by the prayers of Macarius. Therefore the intercessory works of the Church profit (iii,

172:

vi,

lates^ in a

even those who are

more

the doer.

Now

are in hell are said to be damned. There-

worthy of

answered.

done for another may be considered in two ways. First, as expiating punishment by way of compensation which is a condition of satisfaction, and in this way the work of inter-

1

those

who

thus the question at issue

/ answer that,

for

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It

abatement of their damnation."

is

and

We

would seem that works of intercession

the faith :^ "Just as

strives for his neighbour's salvation first of all profits himself

son for

Article 5. Whether Works of Intercession Those Who Are in Hell?

says in the sermon

namely the anointer, "shares in the anointing and thus proceeds to anoint the patient, so whoever

And

905

s

gain either entire forgiveness, or at least an

satisfy.

On

ART.

Profit

fered them.

who

Q. yi

Obj.

5.

in hell.

The Damascene

Further,

in the

same

sermon^ relates that Gregory, while praying for Trajan, heard a voice from heaven saying 2 Lombard, chap. 2 (QR 11, 1007). 8

PL PL

«

De His Qui

7

PG 95,

3

40, 283.

'

PG

3, 561.

73, 707; IOI3-

264.

in Fide Dormierunl, 10

(PG

95, 256).

SUMMA TEEOLOGICA

9o6

him: "I have heard thy voice, and I pardon Trajan," and of this fact the Damascene adds in the same sermon (ibid.) "the whole East and West are witnesses." Yet it is clear that Trajan was in hell, since "he put many martyrs to a cruel death" (ibid.). Therefore the intercessory works of the Church avail even for to

who

those

On

are in hell.

the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier.

"The high priest prays not for the unby so doing he would act counter to the Divine order," and a commentator^ on the same place says that "he prays not that sinners be forgiven, because his prayer for them would not be heard." Therefore works of inter-

vii):*

clean, because

cession do not avail those

who

(namely, after the judgment day) for

men

to the everlasting fire, as there

is

summoned The

to

the presence

text

of

the

man

just

depart

life

profit

them.

/ answer that, There have been three opin-

some have said must be made in this

ions about the damned. For that a twofold distinction

matter. First, as to time; for they said that

judgment day no one in hell will be by any intercession, but that before the judgment day some are assisted by the intercessory works of the Church. Secondly, they

after the assisted

made

among those who are deSome of these, they said, are those namely who have died without

a distinction

tained in hell.

very bad,

faith and the sacraments, and these, since they were not of the Church, neither by grace nor '

PG

2

Maximus, In De

(PG

contra 3

PL

Eccl. Ilicr., chap. vni. Pt.

181); Cf. Albert, 2

(BO xxx,

In

m,

sect. 7

Sent., iv, d. xlv, a. 3,

Sed

610).

76, 739.

Peter Lombard, chap. 2 (QR 11, 1007). ^Serm. ad Popiil, Scrm. CLXXii, chap. 2 (PL 38, 937).

*

endeavoured

in various

and consequently they ways to avoid this dif-

namely

the judgment day, for their souls

till

be reunited to their bodies, and will be cast back into the punishments of hell without hope of pardon. But this opinion seems incompatible with Divine providence, which leaves nothing unordered in things. For guilt cannot be restored to order save by punishment; therefore it is impossible for punishment to cease, unless first of all guilt be expiated, so that, as guilt remains for ever in the damned, their punishment will in no way be interrupted. For this reason the followers of Gilbert de la Porree^ devised another explanation. These will

said that the process in the lessening of punish-

ments by intercessory works is as the process in dividing a line, which though finite, is indefinitely divisible, and is never destroyed by division, if it is diminished not by equal but by proportionate quantities, for instance if we begin by taking away a quarter of the whole and, secondly, a quarter of that quarter, and then a quarter of this second quarter, and so on indefinitely. In like manner, they say by the first work of intercession a certain proportion of the punishment is taken away, and by the second an equally proportionate part of the remainder. But this explanation is in many ways defective. First, because it seems that indefinite division which is applicable to continuous cannot

quantity

be transferred

Peri Archon, i, 6 (PG 11, 169); Moral., XXXIV, 19 (PL 76, 737). •

3. 564.

4,

the error of Origen,^

is

would

that punishment altogether, which

absolutely as Origen maintained, but for a time,

without the faith that worketh by charity and its sacraments, in vain do his friends have recourse to such acts of kindness." Now all the damned come under that head. Therefore intercessory works do not this

away

now

(iv Sent. d. 45)'' quotes

the words of Augustine:^ "If a

take

con-

and his angels who are sentenced to eternal punishment, and for this same reason the saints pray not for dead unbelieving and wicked men, because, indeed, knowing them to be already condemned to eternal punishment, they shrink from pleading for them by the merit of their prayers before they Judge." Further,

that a multiplicity of intercessory works

For Praepositinus said^ that intercessory works for the damned can be so multiplied that they are entirely freed from punishment, not

for not praying for the devil

are

cannot avail; while others are not very bad, who belonged to the Church as actual members, who had the faith, frequented the sacraments and performed works generically good, and for these the intercessory works of the Church ought to avail. Yet they were confronted with a difficulty which troubled them, for it would seem to follow from this (since the punishment of hell is finite in intensity although infinite in duration) those namely

ficulty.

are in hell.

Further, Gregory says (Moral, xxxiv, 19):^ "There is the same reason for not praying then

demned

by name, the intercessory works of the Church

''

Summa,

Summa

Pt. iv (fol. Ssrb);

Aurea,

d. XLvi, Pt.

I,

d. XLVI, A. 2 8

CL

Pt. iv (303ra);

Q. I, A. I

(QR

(BO XXX,

630).

Albert,

In

cf.

to

spiritual

Gregory the Great,

see William of Auxerre, Bonaventure, In Sent., iv,

IV,

957); Albert,

Sent., iv, d. xlvi, a. 2

In

Sent., iv,

(BO xxx,

630).

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART quantity; secondly, because there

why

the second

work

is

of intercession,

no reason if it

be of

they

than the first thirdly, because punishment cannot be diminished unless guilt be diminished, even as it cannot be done away unless

is

;

the guilt be done away; fourthly, because in the division of a line

thing which

is

we come

at length to

not sensible, for a sensible body

not indefinitely divisible, and thus

is

some-

follow that after

many works

it

of intercession

the remaining punishment would be so as not to be felt,

would little

and thus would no longer be

a punishment.

Hence

William of Auxerre said^ that intercessory works profit the damned not by diminishing or interrupting their punishment, but by fortifying the person punished, even as a man who is carrying a heavy load might bathe his face in water, for thus he would be enabled to carry it better, and yet his load would be none the lighter. But this again is impossible, because according to Gregory {Moral, ix)^ a man suffers

more as

some fire;

or less from the eternal

his

suffer

fire

accord-

and consequently more, some less, from the same

guilt

deserves,

therefore since the guilt of the

damned

remains unchanged, it cannot be that he suffers less punishment. Moreover, this opinion is presumptuous, as being in opposition to the statements of holy men, and groundless as being based on no authority. It is also unreasonable. First, because the damned in hell are cut off

from the bond of charity

in virtue of

which

the departed are in touch with the works of the

Secondly, because they have entirely

living.

come final

to the

award

who are ment or

end of Hfe, and have received the for their merits, even as the saints

in heaven.

For the remaining punish-

glory of the body does not

make them

be wayfarers, since glory essentially and

to

same with the unhappiness of the damned, and so radically resides in the soul.

It

is

as to the essential reward.

However, we may admit,

manner

in a certain

meas-

in which, according to

some, be said that they profit neither by diminishing nor interrupting their punishment, nor again by diminishing their sense of punishment, but intercessory works profit the damned,

^

Cf. Albert, Ibid., See also

XLVi, Pt. 2

I,

A. I, Q. I

Chap. 65 (PL

;

withdrawn from them when intercessory works are offered for them. Yet even this is impossible according to the general law, because as Augustine says {De Cura pro

Mort.

—and —"the

xiii)2

damned

this applies especially to the

spirits of the

they see nothing of what ly

departed are where

men do

or of what and consequentthey know not when intercessory works are

happens to them

(QR

Bona venture, In

IV, 958).

75, 913).

from above

in this life,"

if it

Sent., iv, d.

to

some of the damned

of the general law. This, however, of great uncertainty; therefore it

in despite

is

a matter

is

safer to

say absolutely that intercessory prayers do not profit the damned, nor does the Church intend to pray for them, as appears from the authors

quoted above.'' Reply Obj. 1. The donaries to the idols were not found on those dead so that they might be taken as a sign that they were carried off in reverence to the idols, but they took them as conquerors because they were due to them by right of war. They sinned, however, venially by covetousness, and consequently they were not damned in hell, and thus works of intercession could profit them. Or we may say, according to some, that in the midst of fighting, seeing they were in danger, they repented of their sin, according to Ps. 77. 34, When He slew them, then they sought Him, and this can be held as a probable opinion. Therefore the

was made for them. Reply Obj. 2. In these words damnation is taken in a broad sense for any kind of punishment, so as to include also the punishment of purgatory which is sometimes entirely expiated by works of intercession, and sometimes not offering

entirely, but diminished.

the

their punishment cannot be diminished as neither can the glory of the saints be increased

ure, the

907

5

offered for them, unless this relief be granted

others found another explanation. For

ing

ART.

knew themselves to be so outcast as to be a care to no one and this matter of sorrow

equal worth, should diminish the punishment less

Q. 71

by withdrawing from the damned some matter of sorrow, which matter they might have if

is

Reply Obj. 3. Intercession for a dead person more acceptable than for a living person, as

regards his being in greater want, since he cannot help himself as a living person can. But a living person is better off in that he can be taken from the state of mortal sin to the state of grace, which cannot be said of the dead. there is not the same reason for praying

Hence

for the dead as for the living.

Reply Obj. 4. This assistance did not consist a diminishment of their punishment, but in this alone (as stated in the same place) that when he prayed they were permitted to see one 3 PL 40, 605. * On the Contrary, i, 2 3. in

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

9o8

another, and in this they had a certain joy. not

but imaginary, in the fulfilment of their

real

Even so the demons are said to rejoice when they draw men into sin, although this in no way diminishes their punishment, as neither desire.

is

the joy of the angels diminished by the fact

that they take pity on our

Reply Obj. 5. Concerning the incident of Trajan it may be supposed with probability that he was recalled to life at the prayers of blessed Gregory, and thus obtained the grace whereby he received the pardon of his sins and in consequence was freed from punishment. The same applies to all those who were miraculously raised from the dead, many of whom were evidently idolaters and damned. For we must say likewise of all such persons that they were consigned to hell, not finally, but as was actually due to their own merits according to justice, and that according to higher causes, in view of which it was foreseen that they would be recalled to life, they were to be disposed of otherwise.

Or we may say with some that Trajan's soul was not freed absolutely from the debt of eternal punishment, but that his punishment was suspended for a time, that

ment day. Nor does

it

is,

be purified there, and to the kingdom. Now nothing can be purified unless something be done to it. Therefore intercessory works offered by the living do not diminish the punishment being pure

of purgatory.

Obj.

ills.

until the judg-

follow that this

is

the

may may come

order that they

who

If intercessory

4.

works availed those would

are in purgatory, those especially

them which are offered at their Yet these do not always avail; for instance, if a person before dying were to provide for so many works of intercession to be offered for him that if they were offered they would suffice for the remission of his entire punishment. Now supposing these works of seem

to avail

behest.

intercession to be delayed until he

is

released

from punishment, they will profit him nothing. For it cannot be said that they profit him before they are discharged, and after they are fulfilled he no longer needs them, since he is already released. Therefore works of intercession do not avail those who are in purgatory. On the contrary, As quoted in the text (iv Sent. d. 45),^ Augustine says {Enchir. cx)^ that

prayers of intercession profit those who are not very good or not very bad. Now such are those W'ho are detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc.

Further, Dionysius says

{Eccl. Bier, vii)^

general result of works of intercession, because

that "the godlike priest in praying for the de-

things happen differently in accordance with

parted prays for those

the general law from that which

and yet contracted certain stains through hu-

in particular cases

the bounds of

and by

human

privilege.

affairs differ

power {De Cura pro Mort. xwi)}

of the signs of the Divine

says

is

permitted

Even

so

from those

as Augustine

We

proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It would seem that works of intercession do not profit even those who are in purgatory. Objection i. For purgatory is a part of hell. Now "there is no redemption in hell,"^ and it in hell?

Who

Thee Therefore works of intercession do not

written (Ps.

profit those

6.

who

6),

shall confess to

are in purgatory.

The punishment of purgaTherefore if some of the punishment is abated by works of intercession, it would be possible to have such a great number of prayers of intercession that the punishment would be entirely remitted, and consequently the sin entirely unpunished; and this would seem incompatible with Divine justice. Obj. 3. Further, Souls are in purgatory in Obj.

tory

»

2.

Further,

is finite.

PL

40, 606.

2

Office of the dead,

frailty."

Now

lived a holy

life,

such persons are detained

in purgatory. Therefore, etc.

/ answer that, The punishment of purgais intended to supplement the satisfaction which was not fully completed in the body. Consequently, since, as stated above (a. i, Reply tory

Article 6. Whether Works of Intercession Profit Those Who Are in Purgatory?

is

man

who

Res p.,

vii.

works of one person can whether the latter be living or dead, the intercessory works of the living, without any doubt, profit those who 2; Q. XIII, A. 2), the

avail for another's satisfaction,

are in purgatory.

Reply Obj. those

who

i.

The words quoted

are in the hell of the

refer to

damned, where

is no redemption for those who are finally consigned to that punishment. We may also reply with Damascene {Serm. de DormientibusY that such statements are to be explained

there

with reference to the lower causes, that is according to the demands of the merits of those

who

are consigned to those punishments. But according to the Divine mercy, which transcends human merits, it happens otherwise s

Peter Lombard, chap.

*

PL

«

Sect. 8

40, 283.

(PG

'

2

(QR n, 1007). (PG 3, 560). sect. 2 (PG 95.

Sect. 4

95, 253);

cf.

249).

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART through the prayers of the just than is imphed by the expressions quoted in the authorities above. Now "God changes His sentence but not his counsel," as Gregory says.^ Hence Damascene {loc. cit.y quotes as instances of this

Achab and Ezechias,

the Ninevites, is

it

in

whom

apparent that the sentence pronounced

against

them by God was commuted by the

Divine mercy.^ Reply Obj. 2. It is not unreasonable that the punishment of those who are in purgatory be entirely done away by the multiplicity of intercessions. But it does not follow that the sins remain unpunished, because the punishment of one undertaken in lieu of another is credited

gatory

Q. 71

ART.

temporal,

is

8

the

as regards

eternal retribution none can be defrauded save

by

his

own

Article

7.

fault.

Whether Works of Intercession Who Are in Limbo?

Avail the Childreji

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It would seem that works of intercession avail who

the children

are in limbo.

Objection i. For they are not detained there except for another's sin. Therefore it is most fitting that

they should be assisted by the in-

tercessory prayers of others.

Obj. it is

Further, In the text (iv Sent.

2.

d. 45)'*

held from the words of Augustine {Enchir.

works of the Church ob-

to that other.

cx.)^ the intercessory

Reply Obj. 3. The purifying of the soul by the punishment of purgatory is nothing else

tain forgiveness for those

than the expiation of the guilt that hinders it from obtaining glory. And since, as stated above, the guilt of one person can be expiated

909

—although

bad.

Now

those

ment

children

who

who

are not

are not very reckoned among

are very bad, since "their punish-

very

light. "*^ Therefore the intercessory prayers of the Church avail them. is

sidered in relation either to the principal agent

On the contrary, The text (ibid.) quotes Augustine as saying^ that intercessory prayers do not avail those who have departed hence without the faith that works by love. Now the children departed thus. Therefore intercessory works do not avail them. / answer that, Unbaptized children are not detained in limbo save because they lack the state of grace. Hence, since the state of the dead cannot be changed by the works of the living, especially as regards the merit of the essential reward or punishment, the intercessions of the living cannot profit the children

or to the secondary agent. I say, then, that the

in limbo.

by the punishment which another undergoes

in

not unreasonable that one person be purified by another satisfying for him.

his stead,

it is

Reply Obj. 4. Intercession avails on two namely the action of the agent and the action done {Ex opere operante and ex opere operato). By action done I mean not only the sacrament of the Church, but the effect incidental to that action, thus from the giving of alms there follow the relief of the poor and counts,

—

their prayer to

God

manner the action

for the deceased. In like

of the agent

may

be con-

dying person, as soon as he provides for certain prayers of intercession to be offered for him, receives the full reward of those intercessions, even before they are discharged, as regards the efficacy of the intercessions that

from the action as proceeding from the But as regards the efficacy of the intercessions arising from the action done or from the action as proceeding from the secondary agent, he does not receive the fruit beresults

principal agent.

fore the intercessions are discharged.

And

if,

he happens to be released from his punishment, he will in this respect be deprived before

this,

Reply Obj.

i.

Although original

that one person can be assisted

dren in limbo are in such a state that they cannot be assisted, because after this Hfe there is no time for obtaining grace. Reply Obj. 2. Augustine is speaking of those who are not very bad, but have been baptized. This is clear from what precedes: "Since these sacrifices, whether of the altar or of any alms whatsoever, are offered for those who have been baptized," etc.

Whether Works of Intercession Heaven?

Article

fall

Profit the Saints in

—

^

Moral. XVI, 37 (PL

2

Sect. 14

3

Jonas, 3.10; III Kings 21.29;

(PG

We

20.5.

proceed thus to the Eighth Article:

Peter

^Op.

IV Kings

8.

It

would seem that in some way intercessory works profit the saints in heaven. "

75, 1144).

95, 261).

such

account, nevertheless the souls of the chil-

its

of the fruit of the intercessions,

and this will back upon those by whose fault he was then defrauded. For it is not unreasonable that a person be defrauded in temporal matters by another's fault, and the punishment of pur-

sin is

by another on

">

Lombard (QR

Cii.,

Sertn.

chap, xciii

11,

1007).

(PL

^

PL

40, 283.

40, 275).

ad Pop., serm. clxxii,

2

(PL

38, 937).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

QIO Objection

i.

the mass say:^

For the words of the

"Even

as they (that

collect in

is,

the sac-

raments) avail thy saints unto glory, so may they profit us unto healing." Now foremost

in-

Reply Obj.

i.

Such expressions do not mean

that the saints receive an increase of glory in

the sacrifice of the

themselves through our observing their feasts,

but that we profit thereby in celebrating their glory with greater solemnity. Thus, through our knowing or praising God, and through His

intercessions

all

is

in heaven.

Obj. 2. Further, The sacraments cause what they signify. Now the third part of the host, that namely which is dropped into the chalice, signifies those who lead a happy life in heaven.

Therefore Obj.

intercessions

the

profit those

who

the

Church

The own

saints rejoice in

heaven

ance. Therefore the joy of the saints in heaven increases on account of the good works of the

and consequently our works of

living,

inter-

cession also profit them.

Obj.

Further,

4.

glory thus increasing

somewhat

in

us,

there

accrues something, not to God, but to us.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the sacraments cause what they signify, they do not produce this effect in respect of everything that they signify;

are in heaven.

Further,

3.

of

goods, but also in the not only in their goods of others; hence it is written (Luke 15. 10): There is (Vu\g.,—shall be) joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing pen-

The Damascene

says (Serm.

de Dormient.y quoting the words of Chrysostom:^ "For if the heathens," he says, "bum the dead together with what has belonged to them, how much more shouldst thou, a believer, send forth a believer together with what has belonged to him, not that they also may be brought to ashes like him, but that thou may-

surround him with greater glory by so if he be a sinner who has died, that

est

by works of

tercession.

Therefore intercessions profit the saints

among altar.

are not able to be assisted

doing; and

otherwise, since they signify Christ, they would produce something in Christ (which is absurd). But they produce their effect on the recipient of the sacrament in virtue of that which is signified

by the sacrament. Thus

it

does not

fol-

low that the sacrifices offered for the faithful departed profit the saints, but that by the merits of the saints which we commemorate, or which are signified in the sacrament, they profit others for whom they are offered. Reply Obj. 3. Although the saints in heaven rejoice in all our goods, it does not follow that if our joys be increased their joy is also increased formally, but only materially, because every passion is increased formally in respect of the formal aspect of its object. Now the formal aspect of the saints' joy, no matter what they rejoice in, is God Himself, in Whom they cannot rejoice more and less, for other-

thou mayest loose him from his sins, and if he be just, that thou mayest add to his meed and reward!" And thus the same conclusion

wise their essential reward, consisting of their

follows.

joice with

On

the contrary,

As quoted

in the text (iv

d. 45),'* Augustine says:^ "It is insulting pray for a martyr in church, since we ought

Sent. to

commend ourselves to his prayers." To be assisted belongs to one who

to

Further,

in need. But the saints in heaven are without any need whatever. Therefore they are not assisted by the intercessions of the Church. / answer that, Intercession by its very na-

is

ture

implies

the

giving

of

some

assistance,

which does not apply to one who suffers no default, since no one is able to be assisted except he who is in need. Hence, as the saints in heaven are free from all need, being inebriated with the plenty of God's house (Ps. 35. 10), they

joy in God, would vary. Hence from the fact that the goods are multiplied, wherein they re-

God as the formal aspect of their does not follow that their joy is intensified, but that they rejoice in more things. Consequently it does not follow that they are assisted by our works. Reply Obj. 4. The sense is not that an in-

joy,

it

crease of

meed

or reward accrues to the saint

from the intercessions offered by a person, but that this accrues to the offerer. Or we may reply that the blessed departed

may

derive a

reward from intercessions through having, while living, provided for intercessory works to be offered for himself, and this was meritorious for him.

Article

9.

Whether the Prayers of the Church, and Alms Profit

the Sacrifice of the Altar, 1

Postcommunion, Feast 2

30).

Sect. 6

(PG

of S.

'/n Matt., hom. xxx (PG

human nature

Whether whatever

tained materially will rise again?

position at the resurrection, especially as re-

is

will rise

(2)

tained belonging to the truth of will rise again? (5)

purities,

of

human body

head

Whether

Whether the hair and nails will? (3) Whether the humours will? (4) Whether whatever the body con-

But speaking of what is fitting, it is more probable that even the parts will retain their

geneous or

this

neither rise

does not.

it

of the

the resurrection?

again in

the

form.

its artificial

returns to another part of another species,

in

integrity of the

Under

resurrection.

members

the

all

the

a particular substance, and in this

a statue

But

matter, in respect of

its

must next consider the

bodies in

(QRii, looi).

Obj.

3.

Further,

The body

may

shall rise again

be rewarded for the works which the soul did through it. Now the member of which a thief has been deprived for theft, and who has afterwards done penance and is saved, cannot be rewarded at the resurrection, neither for any good deed, since it has not co-operated in any, nor for evil deeds, since the punishment of the member would redound to the punishment of the man. Therefore the members will not all rise again wuth man. On the contrary, The other members belong more to the truth of human nature than hair and nails. Yet these will be restored to man at the resurrection according to the text (iv. Sent. d. 44).^ Much more therefore does this apply to the other members. that

»

it

Lombard (QR

11,

looi).

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART The works of God are perfect (Deut. 32. 4). But the resurrection will be the work of God. Therefore man will be remade perfect in all his members. / answer that, As stated in the book on the Soul,^ the soul stands in relation to the body Further,

form and end, but also as efficient cause. For the soul is compared to the body as art to the thing made by art, as the Philosopher says,^ and whatever is shown forth not only as

its

explicitly in the

product of art

is all

contained

and originally in the art. In like manner whatever appears in the parts of the body is all contained originally and, in a way, implicitly

Thus

implicitly in the soul.

an art would not be perfect

just as the

of

product lacked

if its

any of the things contained

work

in

the art,

so

man be perfect, unless the whole contained enfolded in the soul be out-

be

ART.

Q. 80

2

957

not with vile superfluities but with humours of an excellent kind. will

filled

Reply Obj. 3. The acts by which we merit are not the acts, properly speaking, of hand or foot but of the whole man, even as the work of art ascribed not to the instrument but to the

is

Therefore though the member which was cut off before a man's repentance craftsman.

did not co-operate with

him

in the

state in

which he merits glory, yet man himself merits that the whole man may be rewarded, who with his whole being serves God.

Article 2. Whether the Hair and Nails Will Rise Again in the Human Body?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the hair and nails will not human

neither could

rise again in the

that

For just as hair and nails result from the surplus of food, so do urine, sweat and other superfluities or dregs. But these will

is

wardly unfolded body correspond

body, nor would the

in the

in full proportion to the soul.

Objection

Since then at the resurrection man's body m.ust

not

correspond entirely to the soul, for it will not rise again except according to the relation it

will hair

bears to the rational soul, also

must

rise

it

follows that

man

again perfect, seeing that he

is

thereby repaired in order that he may obtain his ultimate perfection. Consequently all the

members

that are

now

in

man's body must be

in the

hair

:

whole soul

in the

same way as one part is to members be considered

another.^ If then the

in the light of the first relationship, their

end

not operation, but rather the perfect being of the species, and this is also required after the resurrection; but

if

they be considered in

end

is

that

when

operation.

And

yet

it

does not follow

the operation fails the instrument

is

nails.

Further, Of

human

body.

3.

is

But hair and nails are not perfected by a sensitive soul, for we do not feel with them according to the book on the Soul."^ Therefore since the human body rises not again except because it is perfected by a rational soul, it would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again.

On

A

the contrary, It

Further, Hair and nails were given to man Now the bodies of men, especially of the elect ought to rise again with all

their

adornment. Therefore they ought to

they never proceed to action, so that the wisof God be thereby glorified. Reply Obj. 2. The entrails will rise again in the body even as the other members, and they

body.^

Aristode, II, 4 (415^7). Generation of Animals,

'

Aristotle, Soul,

11,

ii,

4 (74o*'25).

i (4i2'»23).

written (Luke 21. 18)

as an ornament.

parts of the

1

is

hair of your head shall not perish.

sary for the virtue of the soul's powers to be shown in their bodily instruments, even though

2

is perfected by a not perfected by a sensi-

tive soul.

again with the hair.

dom

less therefore will

Further, Nothing

because an instrument serves not only to accomplish the operation of the agent, but also to show its power. Hence it will be necesuseless,

Much

nails.

rational soul that

is

the Hght of the second relationship, then their

2.

and

Obj.

according to the relation of matter to form, or according to the relation of instrument to agent, since the whole body is compared to the

and

all the superfluities that are produced from food, seed comes nearest to the truth of human nature, since though superfluous it is needed. Yet seed will not rise again

restored at the resurrection.

Reply Obj. i. The members may be considered in two ways in relation to the soul either

again with the body. Neither therefore

rise

Obj.

body.

1.

The soul is work of

/ answer that.

body

as art

is

to the

body

so an animated

Now

to the art,

and

animated is

to the

as art to its instruments

body

art

is

rise

;

and

called an "organic"

employs certain instruments

for the accomplishment of the

work intended,

and these instruments belong to the primary intention of art, and it also uses other instruments for the safe-keeping of the principal in*

Aristotle,

6

Cf. Aristotle, Soul,

i,

5 (410*30). 11, i

(4i2'»28).

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

958

struments, and these belong to the secondary intention of art; thus the art of warfare employs a sword for fighting, and a sheath for the

are

safe-keeping of the sword. And so among the parts of an animated body, some are directed

not directed to the resurrection except in so far as it is perfected by the rational soul. Therefore the humours will not

to the

accomplishment of the

soul's operations,

still

in

process of generation because they

are potentially flesh and bone. Therefore they are not yet perfected

the

human body

by the rational

soul.

Now

is

for instance the heart, liver, hand, foot, while others are directed to the safe-keeping of the

rise again.

other parts as leaves to cover fruit; and thus hair and nails are in man for the protection

constitution of the

with

of other parts. Consequently, although they do not belong to the primary perfection of the

appears from the statement of Augustine (De Spir. et Anima, xv)^ that "the body consists

human body,

they belong to the secondary perwill rise again with all

and since man

fection,

the perfections of his nature,

and nails Reply Obj.

it

will rise again in

hair

follows that

him.

i. Those superfluities are voided by nature as being useful for nothing. Hence they do not belong to the perfection of the hu-

man

On

Whatever enters

the contrary,

it.

Now

of functional

human body

into the

will rise again

this applies to the

humours, as

members; the functional mem-

bers of homogeneous parts; and the homoge-

neous parts of humours." Therefore the humours will rise again in the body. Further, Our resurrection will be conformed to the resurrection of Christ.

Now

in Christ's

resurrection His blood rose again;

the wine would not

otherwise

now be changed

perfection of the individual, as hair and nails

into His blood in the Sacrament of the altar. Therefore the blood will rise again in us also, and in hke manner the other humours. I answer that. Whatever belongs to the integrity of human nature in those who take

but only for the perfection of the species.

part in the resurrection will rise again, as stated

Reply Obj. 3. Hair and nails are nourished and grow, and so it is clear that they share in some operation, which would not be possible unless they were parts in some way perfected by the soul. And since in man there is but one soul, namely the rational soul, it is clear that they are perfected by the rational soul, alof sense, as neither do bones,

above (aa. i, 2). Hence whatever humidity of the body belongs to the integrity of human nature must rise again in man. Now there is a threefold humidity in man. There is one which occurs as receding from the perfection of the individual, either because it is on the way to corruption, and is voided by nature, for instance urine, sweat, matter, and so forth, or because it is directed by nature to the preser-

tain that these will rise

vation of the species in some individual, either

not so with those superfluities which nature reserves for the production of hair and nails which she needs for the protecbody. It

is

members. Reply Obj. 2. Seed

tion of the

are,

is

not required for the

though not so far as to share in the operation

and yet it is ceragain and that they

—

—

belong to the integrity of the individual.

by the act of the generative power, as seed, or by the act of the nutritive power, as milk.

Article 3. Whether the Humours Will Rise Again in the Body?

None

We proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that the humours will not rise

the person rising again.

again in the body.

not yet reached its ultimate perfection, which nature achieves in the individual, yet it is di-

Objection i. For it is written (I Cor. 15. 50) Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom

Now

of God. fore

it

blood

not

will

will possess

rise

the

the chief humour. There-

is

again in the blessed,

who

kingdom of God, and much

less in others.

Obj.

2.

make up

Further, for waste.

Humours

Now

are intended to

after the resurrection

there will be no waste. Therefore the

not

rise

Obj.

body

will

again with humours. 3.

Further, That which

generation in the

human body

fected by the rational soul.

is is

Now

in process of

not yet perthe

humours

of these humidities will rise again, be-

cause they do not belong to the perfection of

The second kind

of humidity

is

one that has

it by nature; and this is of two kinds. For there is one kind that has a definite form and is contained among the parts of the body, for instance the blood and the other humours which nature has directed to the members that are produced or nourished from them, and yet they have certain definite forms like the other parts of the body, and consequently will rise again with the other parts of the body. But another kind of humidity is in transition from form to form, namely from the form of hu-

rected to

1

Alcher of Clairvavix (PL 40, 791).

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART mour

to the

form of member. Humidities of

because after the body will be estabhshed in its form, so that one will not pass into another. Therefore this humidity that is actually in transition from one form to another will not rise again. Now this humidity may be considered in a twofold state, either as being at the beginning of its transformation, and thus it is called ros, namely the humidity that is found in the cavities of the smaller veins, or as in the course of transformation and already beginning to undergo alteration, and thus it is called canihium; but in neither state will it rise again. The third kind of humidity is that which has already reached its ultimate perfection that nature intends in the body of the individual, and has already undergone transformation and become incorporate with the members. This is called gluten, and since it belongs to the substance of the members it will rise kind will not

this

rise again,

resurrection each part of the

—

again just as the

members

Q. 80 ART. 4 959 from God, not equally, but each one according to its mode, so too the humours are in some way perfected by the rational soul, yet not in the same measure as the more pertion

fect parts.

Article 4. Whether Whatever in the Body Belonged to the Truth of Human Nature Will Rise Again In It?

We

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It in the body, belonging to the truth of human nature will not all

would seem that what was rise again in

it.

Objection

1.

truth of

flesh of the

nature.

is

changed into the sometimes the

Now

ox or of other animals

food. Therefore

is

taken as

whatever belonged to the

if

truth of human nature will rise again, the flesh of the ox or of other animals will also rise again,

which cannot be admitted. Obj.

2.

truth of

will.

For food

human

Further, Adam's rib belonged to the nature in him, as ours does

human

Reply Obj. i. In these words of the Apostle and blood do not denote the substance of flesh and blood but deeds of flesh and blood, which are either deeds of sin or the operations of the animal life. Or we may say with Augustine in his letter to Consentius^ that flesh and blood here signify the corruption which is now predominant in flesh and blood; hence the Apostle's words continue: Neither shall cor-

thing from different

men

to rise again. Yet it is possible for something in different men to be-

ruption possess incorrupfion.

long to the truth of

human

flesh

Reply Obj.

2.

Just as the

members

that serve

for generation will be after the resurrection for

the integrity of

human

operation accomplished the

humours be

in the

for waste, but to restore

nature, and not for the

now by them, so will body not to make up the integrity of human

nature and to show forth

But Adam's rib will rise again not in but in Eve, for otherwise Eve would not again at all since she was made from that Therefore whatever belonged in man to

in us.

Adam rise rib.

the truth of

human

nature will not

all

rise

again in him.

Obj.

a

if

3.

Further, It

man were

is

impossible for the same

nature, for instance

to partake of

would be changed into

human

flesh

which

his substance.

Therefore whatever be-

there will not rise again in man longed in him to the truth of human nature. Obj. 4. Further, If it be said that not all the flesh partaken of belongs to the truth of human

Just as the elements are in the course of generation in relation to mixed bodies,

nature, and that consequently some of it may possibly rise again in the one man and some in the other, on the contrary: That which is

because they are their matter, yet not so as to be always in transition when in the mixed body,

derived from one's parents would especially seem to belong to the truth of human nature.

mem-

Reply Obj.

its

natural power.

3.

humours

—

human

one who partook of nothing but human were to beget children, that which his child derives from him must be of the flesh of other men partaken of by his father, since the seed is from the surplus of food, as the Philosopher proves.^ Therefore what belongs to

body, just as the other parts do, although they do not reach its entire perfection, as the other parts do, and although the elements have not

the truth of human nature in that child belonged also to the truth of human nature in other men of whose flesh his father had par-

perfect forms as mixed bodies have. But as all the parts of the universe receive their perfec-

taken.

so too are the bers.

And

in relation to the

for this reason as the elements in the

parts of the universe have definite forms,

by

reason of which they, like mixed bodies, belong to the perfection of the universe, so too the

humours belong

^Epist., ccv, 2 274).

to the perfection of the

(PL

33, 943);

cf.

Enchir., xci

(PL

40,

But

if

flesh

Obj. 5. Further, If it be said that what was changed into seed was not that v/hich belonged 2

Generation of Animals,

i,

18 (726*26).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

q6o

human

nature in the flesh of but something not belonging on the conto the truth of human nature. trary: Let us suppose that some one is fed entirely on embryos in which there seems to be to the truth of

the

men

eaten,

—

ated; and that this multiplies by is

it

itself,

so that

possible for the seed of which the child

begotten to be detached from

from the parents. If then the surplus food be changed into seed, that which belonged to the and truth of human nature in the embryos

it by the beand that again the detached part multiplies in the child, so that he reaches perfect quantity by growth, and so on; and that thus was the whole human race multiplied. Therefore according to this opinion, whatever is produced by nourishment, although it seem to have the appearance of flesh and blood, does

have received a rational soul, the must belong to resurrection applies to them

not belong to the truth of human nature. Others held that something new is added to

nothing but what belongs to the truth of nature, since whatever

is

in

them

is

human derived

—

after these

the truth of

—

human And

nature in the child begotten same being

thus, since the

of that seed.

is

getter,

human nature by the natural transformation of the food into the human body if the truth of

cannot rise again in two subjects, it will be impossible for whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in both to rise again in both

we

of them.

if

Whatever belonged to the truth of human nature was perfected by the

the individual, to the preservation and perfec-

On

the contrary,

rational soul.

by the

Now

it is

through being perfected

rational soul that the

human body

is

consider the truth of

human

nature in the

species to the preservation of v/hich the act

of the generative

we

power

is

consider the truth of

tion of

directed, but that

human

nature in

which the act of the nutritive power is which is added by food belongs

directed, that

human nature of the innot primarily but secondarily. For

to the truth of the

directed to the resurrection. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature

dividual,

will rise again in

each one. Further, If anything belonging to the truth of human nature in a man be taken from his

first

body, this will not be the perfect body of a man. Now all imperfection of a man will be

mour, that namely which is begotten of the seed of which the human race was originally fashioned, and that what is changed from food into true flesh and blood does not belong prin-

removed

at the resurrection, especially in the

whom

was promised (Luke hair of their head should

they assert that the truth of human nature, and foremost, consists in the radical hu-

cipally to the truth of

human

nature in this

18)

particular individual but secondarily; and that

perish. that not a Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in a man will rise again in him. / answer that, "Everything is related to truth in the same way as to being, "^ because a thing is true when it is as it appears to him who actually knows it. For this reason Avicenna says^ that "the truth of anything is a property of the being immutably attached to it." Accordingly a thing is said to belong to the truth of human nature because it belongs prop-

nevertheless this can belong principally to the

elect, to

it

21.

erly to the being of human nature, and this is what shares the form of human nature, just as true gold is what has the true form of gold from which gold derives its proper being. In order therefore to see what it is that belongs to the truth of human nature, we must observe that there have been three opinions on that question. For some have maintained that nothing begins anew to belong to the truth of human nature, and that whatever belongs to the

truth of

human nature, all of it belonged to human nature when this was cre-

the truth of 1

Aristotle, Metaphysics,

'

Meta.,

VIII,

6 (icxira).

li, i

(993^30).

human nature in another individual begotten of the seed of the former. For

truth of

who

is

they assert that seed

is

the surplus from food,

either mingled with something belonging prin-

human nature in the besome, or without any such

cipally to the truth of getter, according to

admixture, as others maintain.

nutrimental

humour

in

And

thus the

one becomes the rad-

humour in another. The third opinion is that something new begins to belong principally to the truth of human ical

nature even in this individual, because distinction in the human body does not require that any signate material part needs to remain

whole lifetime;

any signate whereas it remains always as regards what belongs to the species in it, although as regards what is material in it, it may ebb and flow. And thus the nutrimental humour is not distinct from the radical on the part of its principle (so that throughout

part one

it

the

may

take

is

indifferent to this,

be called radical when begotten of the seed,

and nutrimental when produced by the food), but rather on the part of the term, so that

it

SUPPLEMENT TO T BIRD PART be called radical when

it

reaches the term of

generation by the act of the generative, or even nutritive power, but nutrimental

when

it

has

not yet reached this term, but is still on the way to give nourishment. These three opinions

have been more fully exposed and examined in the Second Book of the Sentences (ii. Sent. d. 30);^ therefore there is no need for repetition here, except in so far as the question at issue is

must accordingly be observed that

It

this

question requires different answers according

For the

to these opinions.

count of

its

tiplication is able to

truth

of

number

human

opinion on ac-

each

of

admit perfection of the

nature, both as regards the

of individuals

quantity

first

explanation of the process of mul-

and as regards the due

individual,

without taking

which is produced from food for this is not added except for the purpose of resisting the destruction that might result from the action of natural heat, as lead is added to silver lest it be destroyed in melting. Thereinto account that

fore since at the resurrection

must be restored

human

nature

to its perfection, nor does

the natural heat tend to destroy the natural

humour, there will be no need for anything resulting from food to rise again in man, but that alone will rise again which belonged to the truth of the

and

ual,

in

human

nature of the individ-

multiphed. is

does not belong principally to the truth of hunature to the same extent as that which

man

came

Secondly, because the addition of to the first radical humour results in the whole mixture not sharing the truth of the specific nature as perfectly as the first.

opinion, since

it

maintains that

produced from food

is

needed for the

humour

first did; and the Philosopher instances as an example^ the mixing of water with wine, which always weakens the strength of the wine, so

that in the end the wine becomes watery, so that although the second water is drawn into the species of wine, it does not share the species of wine as perfectly as the first water added to

the

Even

wine.

so

which

that

changed from food into

flesh

is secondly does not so per-

fectly attain to the species of flesh as that which was changed first, and consequently does not belong in the same degree to the truth of human

nature nor to the resurrection. Accordingly it is clear that this opinion maintains that the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature principally will rise again, but not the

whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature secondarily.

The

somewhat from the some respects agrees with it. It

third opinion differs

second and differs

The second what

and so on, as much as is required to restore is proved by two reasons. First, because that which was added was intended to restore what was wasted at first, and thus it

this reaches the aforesaid perfection

number and quantity by being detached and

961

4

quantity. This

extraneous

concerned.

ART.

Q. 80

stance of a man's body will all be restored, and of that which was added secondly, thirdly,

in

in

that

it

under the form of the truth of

maintains that whatever flesh

human

and bone

all

is

belongs to

nature, because this opin-

perfection of quantity in the individual and

ion does not distinguish as remaining in

from generation, has to admit that something of this product from food shall rise again; not all, however, but only so much as is required for

during his whole lifetime any signate matter that belongs essentially and primarily to the

for the multiplication that results

the perfect restoration of its

individuals.

was

Hence

human

nature in

all

this opinion asserts that

substance of the seed will begotten of this seed, because this belongs chiefly to the truth of human nature in him, while of that which that

all

rise

in the

again in this

man who was

afterwards he derives from nourishment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed for the perfection of his quantity, and not

all, because this does not belong to the perfection of human nature, except in so far as nature requires it for the perfection of quantity. Since

however this nutrimental humour is subject to ebb and flow the restoration will be effected in this order, that what first belonged to the sub1

Q.

II,

A. I.

man

truth of human nature, besides something ebbing and flowing, that belongs to the truth of

human

nature merely on account of the perfection of quantity, and not on account of the primary being of the species, as the second opinion asserted. But

it states that all the parts that are not beside the intention of the nature

generated belong to the truth of human nature as regards what they have of the species, since thus they remain, but not as regards what they

have of matter since thus they are indifferent to ebb and flow; so that we are to understand that the same thing happens in the parts of one man as in the whole population of a city, for each individual is cut off from the population by death, while others take their place; and so the parts of the people flow back and forth materi*

Generation and Corruption,

i,

5 (.322*31).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

962

but remain formally, since these others occupy the very same offices and positions from which the former were withdrawn, so that the commonwealth is said to remain the selfsame. In ally,

manner, while certain parts are on the ebb and others are being restored to the same shape and position, all the parts flow back and forth as to their matter, but remain as to their like

man

and nevertheless the selfsame

species;

remains.

On the other hand, the third opinion agrees with the second, because it holds that the parts which come secondly do not reach the perfection of the species so perfectly as those which come first, and consequently the third opinion same thing

asserts that the

rises again in

man

as the second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For it holds that the

whole of what

is

produced from the seed

will

not because it belongs to the truth of human nature otherwise than that which comes after, but because it shares the truth of rise again,

—

which same perfectly order the second opinion applied to those things that are produced afterwards from food, in

human nature more

which point also these two opinions agree. Reply Obj. 1. A natural thing is what it is, not from its matter but from its form; therefore, although that part of matter which at one time was under the form of bovine flesh rises again in man under the form of human flesh, it does not follow that the flesh of an ox rises again,

but the flesh of a man; otherwise

one might conclude that the clay from which

Adam's body was fashioned

The second

shall

rise

again.

opinion, however, grants this ar-

gument. Reply Obj.

2.

That

rib did

not belong to the

perfection of the individual in Adam, but was directed to the multiplication of the species.

Hence

it

will rise again

not in

Adam

but in

Eve, just as the seed will rise again, not in the begetter, but in the begotten. Reply Obj. 3. According to the first opinion it is easy to reply to this argument, because the flesh that is eaten never belonged to the truth of human nature in the eater, but it did belong to the truth of human nature in him whose flesh was eaten, and thus it will rise again in the latter but not in the former. But according to the second and third opinions, each one will rise again in that in which he approached nearest to the perfect participation of the power of the species, and

if

he approached equally in

both, he will rise again in that in which he first,

because

in that

he

first

was directed

was

to the

resurrection by union with the rational soul of that

the

man. Hence fle.sh

human nature sible for

if

there were any surplus in

eaten not belonging to the truth of it

in the first

man,

it

will

be pos-

to rise again in the second. Other-

wise what belonged to the resurrection in the first will rise

again in

ond. But in the second

him and not its

place

is

in the sec-

taken either

by something of that which was the product from other food, or if he never partook of any

human flesh, the substitution made by Divine power so far as the perfec-

other food than is

tion of quantity requires, as

does in those

it

who

die before the perfect age.

take

away from numerical

Nor does

this

identity, as neither

does the ebb and flow of parts.

Reply Obj. argument

According to the first opinion For that opinion asserts that the seed is not from the surplus food, so that the flesh eaten is not changed into the seed of which the child is begotten. But according to the other two opinions we must reply that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to be changed into seed, bethis

cause

it is

4. is

after

easily answered.

much

separation that the seed

from the food, since seed is the ultimate surplus of food. That part of the eaten flesh which is changed into seed belongs to the truth of human nature in the one born of the seed more than in the one of whose flesh the seed was the product. Hence, according to the rule already laid down (Reply 3), whatever was changed into the seed will rise again in the person born of the seed, while the remaining matter will rise again in him of whose flesh the seed was the product. Reply Obj. 5. The embryo is not concerned with the resurrection before it is animated by a rational soul, in which state much has been added to the seminal substance from the subis

distilled

stance of food, since the child the mother's

that

nourished in

man partook

the sup-

and some one were begotten of its surplus, which was in the seminal substance will

position that a that

is

womb. Consequently on

indeed

rise

of such food,

again in the one begotten of that

it contain something that would have belonged to the seminal substance in those from whose flesh being eaten the seed was produced, for this would rise again in the first but not in the second. The remainder of the eaten flesh, not being changed into seed, will clearly rise again in the first, the Divine power su[)plying deficiencies in both. The first opinion is not troubled by this objection, since it does not hold the seed to be from the surplus

seed; unless

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART food, but there are

may

as

it

Sentences

many

other reasons against

be seen in the Second Book of the Sent. d. 30).^

(ii.

Q. 80

ART.

human

lation to the

man materially belongs human nature in so far

We

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It would seem that whatever was materially in a man's members will all rise again. Objection i. For the hair, it seems, is less concerned in the resurrection than the other members. Yet whatever was in the hair will all rise again, if not in the hair, at least in other parts of the body, as Augustine says,^ quoted in the text (iv. Sent. d. 44).^

fore whatever

bers will

Obj.

Much more

there-

in the other

mem-

was materially

all rise

by the rational soul, matter. But the human

are perfected as to species so are the parts as to

body

directed to the resurrection through

is

was

in a

consider the tothe matter that

man from

the beginning of his

The body

derives

its totality

from the same cause as it derives its divisibilBut division into parts belongs to a body in respect of matter the disposition of which is quantity in respect of which it is ity into parts.

divided. Therefore totality

is

ascribed to the

in respect of its parts of matter. If

then

the parts of matter rise not again, neither

all

will the

whole body

rise again,

which cannot

be admitted.

On

species, as the third opinion states (a. 4),

me more

opinion seems to

others. Therefore the

permanent tion.'^ If,

The

parts of matter are not

body but ebb and flow, as book on Generation and Corrup-

in the

stated in the

therefore,

again, either the

all

the parts of matter rise

body of one who

be very dense, or

will

it

will

rises again

be immoderate

in quantity.

Further, whatever belongs to the truth of nature in one man can all be a part of matter in another man, if the latter were to

human

partake of his flesh. Therefore if all the parts of matter in one man were to rise again it follows that in one man there will rise again that which belongs to the truth of human nature

which is absurd. / answer that, What is in man materially is not directed to the resurrection except in so far as it belongs to the truth of human nature, because it is in this respect that it bears a rein another,

^

Q.

II,

A. I

;

cf.

Part I,

Q.

'^City of God, xxii, 19

(PL

40, 273).

3

QR

ji^

which

probable than the

whole of what

is

in

man

will rise again, if

we speak

species which

dependent on quantity, shape,

is

of the totality of the

position and order of parts, but the whole will

not

rise

again

we speak

if

of the totahty of

matter.

The second and first opinions, however, do make this distinction, but distinguish be-

tween parts both of which have the species and matter. But these two opinions agree in that they both state that what is produced from the seed will all rise again even if we speak of tothey differ in this that opinion maintains that nothing will

first

rise again of that

which was engendered from

food, while the second holds that something,

but not

of

all,

above (a. 4). Reply Obj.

1.

Just as

body

parts of the

will

it

jooi.

all

again,

that

is

i.

41, 780); Enchir. 4

Aristotle,

i,

lxxxix

5 (321^24).

as

stated

in the other

we speak

of the totality of the species, but not if we speak of material totality, so is it with the hair. In the other parts something accrues from nourishment which causes growth, and this is accountif

we speak

of totality of

occupies another place and position in the body, and is under other parts of dimension, and there accrues something which does not cause growth, but serves to make up species, since

it

by nourishing; and this is not accounted as another part of the whole considered in relation to the species, since it does not occupy another place or position in the body than that which was occupied by the part that has passed away, although it may be accounted another part if we consider the totahty of matfor waste

The same

applies to the hair. Augustine, speaking of the cutting of hair that was a part causing growth of the body; thereter.

however,

is

must

not however as regards it should be immoderate, but it will rise again in other parts as deemed expedient by Divine providence. Or else he refers to the case when something will fore

it

rise again,

the quantity of hair, lest

be lacking to the other parts, for then

cxix, a.

(PL

rise

will rise again, if

ed as another part,

the contrary,

life to

the end would surpass the quantity due to his

tality of matter, while

body

indeed to the truth of as it has something of all

the

Further,

is in

we

not only the parts of species but also the parts of matter will all rise again. 3.

that

all, if

being perfected by a rational soul. Therefore

Obj.

all

not

again.

Further, Just as the parts of the flesh

2.

tality of

Now

matter; because

the species, but not

Article 5. Whether Whatever Was Materially in a Man's Members Will All Rise Again?

963

5

souls.

it

will

be

possible for this to be supphed from the surplus of hair.

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

964

Reply Obj.

According to the third opinion

2.

parts of species arc the

same

for the Philosopher does not

as parts of matter,

make

this distinc-

tion^ in order to distinguish different parts, but in order to

show that the same parts may be

considered both in respect of species, as to

what belongs to the form and species in them, and in respect of matter, as to that which is under the form and species. Now it is clear that the matter of the flesh has no relation to the rational soul except in so far as

it is

under

such a form, and consequently by reason of

it

directed to the resurrection. But the first and second opinions which draw a distinction between parts of species and parts of matter it is

say that although the rational soul perfects both parts, it does not perfect parts of matter except by means of the parts of species, and so they are not equally directed to the resur-

Reply Obj.

3.

In the matter of things suband corruption it is neces-

ject to generation

sary to presuppose indefinite dimensions before the reception of the substantial form.

Consequently division which is made according to these dimensions belongs properly to matter. But complete and definite quantity comes to matter after the substantial form that

is

made

;

therefore di-

reference to definite

in

quantity regards the species especially when definite position of parts belongs to the essence of the species, as in the

human

body.

rise

AGAIN {In Four Articles)

We must rise

now

again.

consider the quahty of those

Under

points of inquiry:

who

this

head there are four

(i

Whether

)

all

will

rise

again in the youthful age? (2) Whether they will be of equal stature? (3) Whether all will

be of the same sex? (4) Whether they will again to the animal life?

Article of the

We

i.

Whether

All Will Rise

rise

Again

Same Age? proceed thus to the First Article: It

would seem that all will not rise again of the same, namely the youthful age. Objection i. Because God will take nothing pertaining to man's perfection from those who rise again, especially from the blessed. Now age pertains to the perfection of man, since old *

Generation and Corruption,

i,

5 (32i*'24).

demands reverence. There-

Obj.

Age

Further,

2.

reckoned according

is

to the length of past time.

Now

it is

impossible

have passed. Therefore it is impossible for those v/ho were of greater age to be brought back to a youthful age. Obj. 3. Further, That which belonged most to the truth of human nature in each individfor past time not to

Now

ual will especially rise again in him.

sooner a thing was in

man

the

the

more would

it

have belonged to the truth of human nature, because in the end, through the strength of the species being weakened the human body is likened to watery wine according to the Philosopher.2 Therefore if all are to rise again of

seem

to

same

the rise

age,

more

it is

fitting that

they should

again in the age of childhood.

On

is written (Eph. 4. 13) unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ. Now Christ rose again of youthful age, which begins about the age of thirty years, as Augustine says.^ Therefore others also will rise again of a youthful age.

the contrary, It

we

all

Further,

meet

Man

.

.

.

will rise again at the

fect stage of nature.

Now human

most per-

nature

is

at

the most perfect stage in the age of youth.

Therefore all will I answer that,

rise

Man

again of that age. will rise again

without

any defect of human nature, because as God founded human nature without a defect, even so will

QUESTION LXXXI Of the quality of those who

the age that

is

fore the old will not rise again of a youthful age.

Until

rection.

vision

age

He

restore

it

without defect.

Now human

nature has a twofold defect. First, because it has not yet attained to its ultimate perfection. Secondly, because it has already gone back from its ultimate perfection. The first defect is found in children, the second in the aged, and consequently in each of these human nature will be brought by the resurrection to the state of its ultimate perfection which is in the youthful age, at which the movement of growth terminates, and from which the movement of decrease begins.

Reply Obj. i. Old age calls for reverence not on account of the state of the body which is at fault, but on account of the soul's wisdom which is taken for granted on account of its being advanced in years. Therefore in the elect there will remain the reverence due to old age on account of the fulness of Divine wisdom which will be in them, but the defect of old age will not be in them. Reply Obj. 2. We speak of age not as re1, 10(328*26). City oj God, XXII, 15 (PL 41. 777).

*/6ui., »

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART gards the number of years, but as regards the state which the human body acquires from

Hence Adam

and

Q. 8i

2

965

matter from which

to the

Now

ART.

it

is

namely the Divine, power and all the ashes from

the self-same,

have been formed in the youthful age on account of the particular condition of body which he had at the first day of his formation. Thus the argument is not to

power. Therefore the resurrection of

the point.

will bring

years.

Reply Ohj.

3.

is

The

said to

strength of the species

more perfect

said to be

young man, nourishment

in a child

is

than in a

as regards the ability to transform in a certain

way, even as

it is

more

perfect in the seed than in the mature man.

In youth, however,

it is

more perfect

as regards

restored.

will restore all bodies,

which the humian bodies

will be restored are equally disposed to receive the action of that

them

same conclusion

the

On

the

all

men

same quantity, and

to the

so

follows.

Natural quantity results Now the nature of the individual will not be altered at the resurrection. Therefore neither will its natural contrary,

from each individual's nature.

quantity. But

all

are not of the

same natural

the term of completion. Therefore that which

quantity. Therefore

belonged principally to the truth of human nature will be brought to that perfection which it has in the age of youth, and not to that perfection which it has in the age of a child, wherein the humours have not yet reached their ul-

the

by resurrection

timate disposition.

Neither therefore will there be the same quanti-

same

all

will

not

rise

again of

stature.

Further,

Human

nature will not be restored

to glory or to punishment.

there will not be the or punishment

in

all

same quantity those

who

But

of glory

rise

again.

ty of stature.

Article

2.

Whether All Will Rise Again

Same

of the

We

Stature?

proceed thus to the Second Article: It

would seem that

all will rise

again of the

same

stature.

Objection i. For just as man is measured by dimensive quantity, so is he by the quantity of time. Now the quantity of time will be re-

duced to the same measure

in

all,

since all

same age. Therefore the dimensive quantity will also be reduced to the

will rise again of the

same measure in all, of the same stature. Obj.

2.

Further,

so that

all will rise

The Philosopher

again

says^ that

same nature have a certain and measure of size and growth." Now this limitation can only arise by virtue of the form, with which the quantity as well as all

/ answer that, At the resurrection human nature will be restored not only in the selfsame species but also in the selfsame individual, and consequently we must observe in the resurrection what is requisite not only to the specific but also to the individual nature. Now the specific nature has a certain quantity which it

neither exceeds nor fails without error, and

yet this quantity has certain degrees of latitude and is not to be attached to one fixed measure;

and each individual

some degree

at

in the

human

species aims

of quantity befitting his indi-

vidual nature within the bounds of that latitude, and reaches it at the end of his growth, if there

"all things of the

has been no error in the working of nature, re-

limit

sulting in the addition of something to or the subtraction of something from the aforesaid quantity, the measure of which is gauged ac-

the other accidents ought to agree. Therefore

men have

same specific form, there should be the same measure of quantity the

cording to the proportion of heat as expanding,

be of a quantity proportionate to the natural power which first

and of humidity as expansive, in point of which all are not of the same power. Therefore all will not rise of the same quantity, but each one will rise again of that quantity which would have been his at the end of his growth if nature had not erred or failed, and the Divine power will subtract or supply what was excessive or lacking in man. Reply Obj. i. It has already been explained

formed his body, for otherwise those who could not be brought to a greater quantity by the

of the

since

all

in respect of

occur.

matter in

at the resurrection.

of the

same

Obj.

man

all,

unless an error should

But the error of nature

3.

Therefore

will

be set right

all will rise

again

stature.

Further, It will be impossible for

in rising again to

power

of nature will never rise again of a greater

quantity, which

is

false.

Therefore that quantity

must be proportionate to the power which will restore the human body by the resurrection, 1

Soul,

II,

4 (4i6»i6).

Reply 2) that all are said to rise again age, not as though the same length of time were befitting to each one, but because (a.

I,

same

the same state of perfection will be in

which state

is

all,

indifferent to a great or small

quantity.

Reply Obj.

2.

The quantity

of a particular

SUMMA THRO LOGICA

966

individual corresponds not only to the form

/ answer that, Just as, considering the nature

of the species, but also to the nature or matter

of the individual, a different quantity

of the individual; therefore the conclusion does

to different

not follow. Reply Obj.

of the individual, a different sex

The quantity

3.

of those

who

will

be raised from the dead is not proportionate to the restoring power, because the latter does not belong to the power of the body, nor to

—

the ashes, as to the state in which they are before the resurrection, but to nature which the individual had at first. Nevertheless if the

—

men, so

also, considering the

due

due to

dif-

same diversity

ferent men. Moreover, this

becoming

is

is

nature is

to the perfection of the species, the

which are filled by this very and quantity. Therefore just

different degrees of

difference of sex

men

as

will

will rise again of various stature, so

they

And though

again of different sex.

rise

there be difference of sex there will be no

shame

formative power on account of some defect was unable to effect the due quantity that is befitting to the species, the Divine power will supply

in seeing

the defect at the resurrection, as in dwarfs, and in like manner in those who by immoderate

Reply Obj. 1. When it is said that we shall meet Christ unto a perfect man, this refers not to the male sex but to the strength of soul which will be in all, both men and women. Reply Obj. 2. Woman is subject to man on

have exceeded the due bounds of nature.

size

3. Whether Male Sex?

Article the

We

All Will Rise

Again of

proceed thus to the Third Article:

would seem that

all will rise

It

again of the male

sex.

Objection that etc.

1.

For

it

is

written (Eph.

4.

13)

meet unto a perfect man, Therefore there will be none but the

we

male

shall

all

all

account of the frailty of nature, as regards both vigour of soul and strength of body. After the resurrection, however, the difference in those points will be not on account of the difference of sex, but by reason of the difference of merits. Hence the conclusion does not follow. Reply Obj. 3. Although the begetting of a

woman

sex.

Obj.

one another, since there will be no lust to invite them to shameful deeds which are the cause of shame.

Further, In the world to

2.

come

"all

nature,

beside the intention of a particular

is

in the intention of universal nature,

it is

pre-eminence will cease," as a gloss observes^ on I Cor. 15. 24. Now woman is subject to man in the natural order. Therefore women will rise again not in the female but in the

which requires both sexes for the perfection of the human species. Nor will any defect result from sex as stated above (Reply 2).

male

Article 4. Whether All Will Rise Again Animal Life?

sex.

Obj.

Further, That which

3.

is

produced

in-

cidentally and beside the intention of nature will

not rise again, since

moved

at

the resurrection.

We

would seem that they

Now

animal

the female

is produced beside the intention of nature, through a fault in the formative power of the seed, which is unable to bring the matter of the fetus to the male form; therefore the Philosopher says^ that the female is "a misbegotten male." Therefore the female sex will not rise

make

again.

men

sex

On wiser,

the contrary, Augustine says:^ it

seems,

who doubt not

"Those are

that both sexes

will rise again."

Further, At the resurrection

God

will restore

He made him at the creation. Now He made woman from the man's rib (Gen. 2. 22). Therefore He will also restore the female

man

to

what

sex at the resurrection. ^

(vi, 2 3

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It

error will be re-

all

Glossa Lombardi (PL igi, 1679); cf. Glossa ordin. s8B); Augustine, qq. lxxxiii, qu. 69 (PL 40, 76). Generation oj Animals, 11, 3 (7.^7''24). City oj God, xxii, 17 (PL 41, 778).

to

life,

will

again to the

rise

or in other words that they will

use of the acts of the nutritive and gen-

erative powers.

Objection i. For our resurrection will be conformed to Christ's. But Christ is said to have eaten after His resurrection (John 21.;

Luke

24).

Therefore,

will eat,

Obj.

and

Further,

2.

after

in like

The

resurrection

the

manner

beget.

distinction of sexes

is

manner the instruments which serve the nutritive power

directed to generation are directed to eating.

;

and

in like

Now man

will rise again

Therefore he will e.xercise the acts of the generative and nutritive powers. Obj. 3. Further, The whole man will be beatified both in soul and in body. Now beatitude or happiness, according to the Philosopher,* consists in a perfect operation. Therefore it must be that all the powers of the soul and all with

*

all

Ethics,

these.

I,

7 (logS'^is);

I,

13 (iio2"5); x, 7 (1177*12).

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART members have

the

the resurrection.

their respective acts after

And

same conclusion

so the

4. Further, After the resurrection there be perfect joy in the blessed. Now such a joy includes all pleasures, since happiness is a state rendered perfect by the accumulation of

Obj.

will

goods, and the perfect

nothing. Since then there

that which lacks

is is

much

pleasure in

the act of the generative and nutritive powers

would seem that such acts belonging to animal life will be in the blessed, and much more in others, who will have less spiritual bodies. it

On 30)

the contrary, It

is

written (Matt. 22.

In the resurrection they shall neither

:

marry nor be married. is

directed to

supply

defect resulting from death, and to the

human race, and make up for waste, and

multipHcation of the is

directed to

eating to in-

crease quantity. But in the state of the resurrection the

number

human

of

be evident to

will

it

Hence

all.

Christ

is

said

have eaten by dispensation in the sense in which lawyers say that "a dispensation is a relaxation of the general law"^ because Christ made an exception to that which is common to those who rise again (namely not to partake of food) for the aforesaid motive. Hence the argument does not prove. Reply Obj. 2. The distinction of sexes and the difference of members W\\\ be for the

human

nature

in the individual.

Hence

restoration of the perfection of

both

and

in the species

does not follow that they are without purpose, although they lack their animal operait

tions.

Further, Generation the

967

4

to

follows as above.

all

ART.

Q. 8i

of such proof at the general resurrection, since

race will already have the

individuals

preordained by God,

since generation will continue

up

to that point.

In like manner each man will rise again in due quantity; neither will death be any more, nor any waste affect the parts of man. Therefore the acts of the generative and nutritive powers would be void of purpose. / answer that. The resurrection will not be necessary to man on account of his primary perfection, which consists in the integrity of

Reply Obj. 3. These operations do not belong man as man, as also the Philosopher states,^ and so the happiness of the human body does not consist in them. But the human body will be glorified by an overflow from the reason whereby man is man, in so far as the body to

be subject to reason.

will

Reply Obj.

4. As the Philosopher says""^ the pleasures of the body are medicinal, because

man

they are applied to

for the removal of

weariness; or again, they are unhealthy, in so far as man indulges in those pleasures inordinately, as though they as a

man whose

were

taste

is

real pleasures, just

vitiated delights in

things which are not delightful to the healthy.

Consequently

it

does not follow that such pleas-

those things that belong to his nature, since

ures as these belong to the perfection of hap-

man

piness, as the Jews'*

life

can attain to this in his present state of

by the action of natural causes; but the

certain

and Turks^ maintain, and

known

heretics

as

the

Chihasts

as-

necessity of the resurrection regards the attain-

serted;^ who, moreover, according to the Phi-

ment

losopher's teaching,^

of his ultimate perfection, Vv^hich consists

in his reaching his ultimate end.

Consequently

those natural operations which are directed to

cause or preserve the primary perfection of nature will not be in the resurrection;

human

such are the actions of the animal

life in

man,

would seem to have an unhealthy appetite, since according to him none but spiritual pleasures are pleasures absolutely, and to be sought for their own sake. Therefore these alone are requisite for Happiness.

the action of the elements on one another, and the

movement

of the heavens;

therefore

these will cease at the resurrection.

And

all

since

1

being directed to the primary perfection of nature, it follows that they will not be in the resurrection.

Reply Obj. i. When Christ partook of that meal. His eating was an act, not of necessity as though human nature needed food after the resurrection,

but

of

power,

so

as

to

prove

that He had resumed the true human nature which He had in that state wherein He ate and drank with His disciples. There will be no need

Raymond ;

of Pennafort, Summa, Bk. in, tit. 29, Glossa ordin. in Decretum, Pt. 11, causa i,

Q. 7, can. 5, Requisitis

(i,

563®').

2£/Aic5,x, 7(1177^26).

to eat, drink, sleep, beget, pertain to the animal life,

Cf.

sect. 2 (346^)

^Ibid., VII, 14 (1154^26); X, 5 (ii7s*'i6). 4 Cf. UJE, art. "Future Life" (iv, 484); TJE, art. "Paradise" (ix, 515), where the texts from the Rabbinical Scriptures are cited.

Koran, chap. 36 (SL 364) chap. 44 (SL 404). especially Cerinthus; see Caius Ro manus, Disputatio adv. Proclum, in Eusebius, Hisi. Eccl 6

Cf. the

6

Or Millenarians;

;

(PG

PG

cf. 10, 25); Epiphanius, Adv. haeres. 77, n. 36 (PG 42, 696); Au gustine. City oj God, xx, 7 (PL 41, 667), De Haeres., chap, III,

28

20,

Baercs., Bk.

8

(PL

42,

27);

Millenarisme

273;

ill, t. ii,

cf.

DTC,

art.

Cerinthe

(11,

(x, 1761).

''Ethics, VII, 14 (1154^20); x, 5 (1176*10).

2154); art,

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

;68

Obj.

QUESTION LXXXII after their resurrection {hi Four Articles)

must now consider the conditions under rise again, and (i) the im-

which the blessed

passibility of their bodies;

(2) their subtlety

(q. lxxxiii); (3) their agility (q. lxxxw) (4) their clarity (q. lxxxv). Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i)

were

On

i. Whether the Bodies of the Saints Be Impassible After the Resurrection?

proceed thus to the First Article: It seems that the bodies of the saints will not be

But man, after the resurrection, is

is

pas-

will

be

the defini-

never be dissociated from him. Therefore the body will be passible. Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is in potency to the form of another thing is passible in relation

tion of

man, which

would seem that suffer,

if

we

their per-

grant

their

the contrary, Everything passible

is

cor-

be impassible.

The stronger is not passive to the weaker. But no body will be stronger than the bodies of the saints, of which it is written (I Cor. 15. 43) /^ w sown in weakness, it shall Further,

:

We

impassible after the resurrection. Objection i. For everything mortal

not

Now the bodies of the saints be incorruptible after the resurrection, according to I Cor. 15. 42, It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption. Therefore they

will

Article

will

loss of substance.

equally impassible? (3) Whether this impassibility renders the glorious bodies insensible? (4) Whether in them all the senses are in act?

a mortal rational animal, for such

more incon-

ruptible, because increase of passion results in

will

sible.

is

bodies to be passible.

Whether

at the resurrection the saints will rise again im.passible in body? (2) Whether all will be

in Christ, it

fections

;

Will

Further, Actual defect

than potential defect. But passibility denotes merely potential defect. Since then there will be certain actual defects in the bodies of the blessed, such as the scars of the wounds in the martyrs, even as they

Of the condition of the blessed

We

5.

sistent with perfection

will

something else; for this is what is meant by being passive to another thing.' Now the bodies of the saints will be in potency to the to

form of another thing after the resurrection, it is under one form, does not lose its potency to another form. But since matter, according as

power. Therefore they will be impassible. / answer that, We speak of a thing being passive in two ways. First in a broad sense, and

rise in

thus every reception

is

called a passion,

whether

the thing received be fitting to the receiver

and perfect

The sible

or contrary to

it,

it

and corrupt

it.

glorious bodies are not said to be impas-

by the removal of

this

kind of passion,

since nothing pertaining to perfection

is

to

be

removed from them. In another way we use the word passive properly, and thus Damascene defines passion {De Fide Orthod. ii, 22)^ as being "a movement contrary to nature." Hence an immoderate movement of the heart is called its passion, but a moderate movement is called its

operation.

The reason of this is that whatis drawn to the bounds of the

the bodies of the saints after the resurrection will have matter in common with the elements,

ever

because they will be restored out of the same matter of which they are now composed. Therefore they will be in potency to another form, and thus will be passible. Obj. 3. Further, According to the Philoso-

to itself, so that, therefore, the patient as such

have a natural inclination to be active and passive towards one another. Now the bodies of the saints will be composed of contraries after the resurrection, even as now. Therefore they will be passible.

urrection. Therefore they are said to be im-

pher,^ contraries

Obj.

4.

Further,

In

the

blood and humours will

above

(q.

lxxx,

a. 3).

(324''2).

it

to passion in the bodies of the saints after res-

passible.

The reason however

of this impassibility

assigned differently by different persons. ascribe

it

to

the

is

Some

condition of the elements,

as to substance, yet that they will be deprived

saints will be passible after the resurrection. Aristotle, Getieration

drawn beyond its own bounds within which was confined. Accordingly taking passion in its proper sense there will be no potentiality

is

as stated

of the humours. Therefore the bodies of the

'

agent, since the agent assimilates the patient

sickness and such

the

passions arise in the body through the antipathy

2/WJ.

patient

which will be different then from what it is now. For they say that the elements will remain then,

human body

rise again,

Now,

is

and Corruption,

i,

7 (323^29).

and passive quahties. But this does not seem to be true, because the active and passive qualities belong to the perfection of the elements, so that if the elements were of their active

»PG94,94i.

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART

Q. 82

ART.

969

i

them in the body of the man they would be less perfect than

of His glory, according to the operation whereby also He is able to subdue all things unto

now. Moreover since these quaHties are the proper accidents of the elements, being caused by their form and matter, it would seem most absurd for the cause to remain and the effect to be removed. Therefore others say that the qualities will remain, but deprived of their proper activities, the Divine power so doing for the preservation of the human body. This however would seem to be untenable, since the action and passion of the active and passive qualities is necessary for the mixture (of the elements), and according as one or the other preponderates the mixed (bodies) differ in their respective temperaments, and this must apply to the bodies of

(Phil. 3. 21). And again, a heavenly nature cannot exercise such power over the human body as to take from it its elemental nature which is passible by reason of its essen-

restored without that rises again,

those

who

rise again, for

they will contain flesh

and bones and like parts, all of which demand temperaments. Moreover, according to

different this,

impassibihty could not be one of their

would not imply a disposition merely an external preventive to passion, namely the power of God, which might produce the same effect in a human body even in this state of life. Consequently others say that in the body itself there will be something preventing the passion of a glorified body, namely the nature of a fifth^ or heavenly body, which they maingifts,

because

it

in the impassible substance, but

tain enters into the composition of a

human

body, to the effect of blending the elements together in harmony so as to be fitting matter for the rational soul; but that in this state of Hfe, on account of the preponderance of the elemental nature, the human body is passible like other elements, whereas in the resurrection the nature of the fifth body will predominate,

human body

will be made impasheavenly body. But this cannot stand, because the fifth body does not enter materially into the composition of a human body, as was proved above.^ Moreover it is absurd to say that a natural power, such as the power of a heavenly body, should endow the human body with a property of glory, such as the impassibihty of a glorified body, since the Apostle ascribes to Christ's power the transformation of the human body, because such as is the heavenly, such also are they that are heavenly (I Cor. 15. 48), and He will reform

so that the

sible in likeness to the

body of our lowness, made like to the body The other four being the elements. This fifth element was known to the peripatetic philosophers as the quinthe 1

which they held heavenly bodies to be formed. Thomas, In Sent., dist. xvii, q. 3, a. i; of. Part. I,

tessence, of 2

St.

Q. xci, A. I,

Reply

2.

Himself

tial constituents.

Consequently we must say otherwise that passion results from the agent overcoming the patient, for otherwise it would not draw it to its own bounds. Now it is impossible for all

agent to overcome patient except through the weakening of the hold which the form of the patient has over

passion which

is

its

matter,

if

we speak

against nature, for

passion in this sense that

we

of the is

it

are speaking

of

now

for matter traries,

is not subject to one of two conexcept through the cessation or at least

the lessening of the hold which the other conit. Now the human body and all that it contains will be perfectly subject to the trary has on

rational soul, even as the soul will be perfectly

subject to God. Therefore for the glorified

body

it will

be impossible

to be subject

to

any

change contrary to the disposition whereby it is perfected by the soul. And consequently those bodies will be impassible. Reply Obj. i. According to Anselm {Cur Deus Homo, ii, ii),^ "mortal is included in the philosophers' definition of man, because they did not believe that the whole man could be

ever immortal," for they had no experience of rnan otherwise than in this state of mortahty.

Or we may say

that since, according to the Phi-

losopher,'' essential differences are us,

we sometimes employ

in order to

to

signify essential differences

which the accidental differences "mortal"

unknown

accidental differences

result.

from Hence

put in the definition of man, not mortahty were essential to man, but because that which causes passibility and mortahty in the present state of hfe, namely composition of contraries, is essential to man, but it will not cause it then, on account of the triumph of the soul over the body. Reply Obj. 2. Potency is twofold, tied {ligata) and free; and this is true not only of active but also of passive potency. For the form ties the potency of matter, by determining it to one thing, and it is thus that it overcomes it. And since in corruptible things form does not perfectly overcome matter, it cannot tie it completely so as to prevent it from someis

as though

times receiving a disposition contrary to the 3

PL

*

Metaphysics,

158, 411. vii, 12

(1038*13).

SUM MA THEOLOGICA

P70 form through some passion. But

in the saints

have complete dominion over the body, and it will be after the resurrection, the soul will

altogether impossible for

minion, because

it

it

do-

this

lose

to

be immutably subject to

will

God, which was not the case

in the state of

innocence. Consequently those bodies will retain substantially the same potency as they

have now to another form; yet that potentiality will remain tied by the triumph of the soul over the body, so that it will never be realized by actual passion.

Reply Obj.

3.

The elemental

qualities are the

instruments of the soul, as stated in the book on the Soul,'^ for the heat of fire in an animal's body is directed in the act of nutrition by the soul's

power.

When, however,

principal

the

but more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty though in the body, yet not of the body but of virtue." Nevertheless those martyrs who have been maimed and deprived of their limbs will not be without those limbs in the resurrection of the dead, for to

(Luke

said

21. 18):

A

them

it is

hair oj your head shall

not perish.

Article

Whether

2.

Be Equally

All Will

Impassible?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that all will be equally impassible. Objection 1. For a gloss on I Cor. 15. 42, It is sown in corruption, says that all have equal immunity from suffering.^ Now the gift of impassibility consists in immunity from

no defect in the instrument, no action proceeds from the instrument except in accordance with the disposition of the principal agent. Consequently

suffering.

in the bodies of the saints after the resurrection,

tion or privation of passibility. Therefore

no action or passion will result from the elemental qualities that is contrary to the disposition of the soul which has the preservation of the body in view. Reply Obj. 4. According to Augustine {Ep. ad Consent, ccv, i)^ "the Divine power is able to remove whatever qualities He will from this visible and tangible body, other quahties remaining." Hence even as in a certain respect

cannot be greater in one subject than in another. Obj. 3. Further, A thing is more white if it have less admixture of black. But there will be no admixture of passibility in any of the saints' bodies. Therefore they will all be equally

greater in merit than others. Therefore, since

He

deprived the flames of the Chaldees' furnace power to burn, since the bodies of the children were preserved without hurt, while in

impassibility

of the

greater in

another respect that power remained,

gift of clarity.

agent

is

perfect,

those flames

remove

and there

is

since

consumed the wood, so will He from the humours while

passibility

leaving their nature unchanged.

It

this is

scars of

wounds

brought

Reply Obj.

5.

The

will

not

be in the saints, nor were they in Christ, in so far as they imply a defect, but as signs of the

most steadfast virtue whereby the saints suffered for the sake of justice and faith, so that this will increase their own and others' joy.^

Hence Augustine

says:*

"We

feel

an unde-

scribable love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire to see in that

Christ's

be equally impas-

all will

Further, Negations are not subject

2.

more

or less.

Now

impassibility

is

a negait

impassible.

On

the contrary,

tionate to merit.

is

Reward should be propor-

Now some

a reward,

some than

in

all,

would seem

it

to be

in others.

Further, Impassibility

Now

of the saints were

is

divided against the

the latter will not be equal

according to I Cor.

15.

41. Therefore

neither will impassibility be equal in / answer that, Impassibility

ered in two ways, either in

all.

may be

itself,

consid-

or in respect

its cause. If it be considered in itself, since denotes a mere negation or privation, it is not subject to be more or less, but will be equal in all the blessed. On the other hand, if

of

about.

wounds

Obj. to be

has been

how

explained in the Article

Therefore

sible.

kingdom the

their bodies,

in

scars of the

which they bore for

name. Perhaps indeed we

them, for

this will

not

make them

shall

less

see

comely

it

we

it in relation to its cause, thus it be greater in one person than in another. Now its cause is the dominion of the soul over the body, and this dominion is caused by the soul's unchangeable enjoyment of God. Consequently in one who enjoys God more perfect-

consider

will

there

ly,

is

a greater cause of impassibility.

Reply Obj.

i.

This gloss

passibility in itself

is

and not

speaking of im-

in relation to its

cause. 4(41 s^'iS).

1

Aristotle,

2

PL ,v^,

'

Cf. Part III, Q. Liv, A. 4, Reply 3.

i5/. 3

(PL22, 1047).

History oj Animals,

vii, 1 (581^20).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

1056

since the barren were accursed. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity. Obj. 4. Further, The same reward is not due to virginity observed, and virginity lost. Yet an aureole is sometimes due to lost virginity; for instance if a maiden is violated unwillingly at the order of a tyrant for confessing Christ.

Therefore an aureole Obj.

Further,

5.

A

is

not due to virginity. reward is not due

special

which is in us by nature. But virginity inborn in every man both good and wicked. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity. Obj. 6. Further, As widowhood is to the to that

is

sixtyfold fruit, so fold fruit,

and

virginity to the hundred-

is

Now

to the aureole.

the sixty-

which it is due. For some say that the aureole is due to the act. So that she who actually remains a virgin will have the aureole provided she be of the number of the saved. But this would seem unreasonable, because in this case those who have the will to marry and nevertheless die before marrying would have the aureole. Hence others hold that the aureole is due to the state and as to the kind of virginity to

not to the act, so that those virgins alone merit the aureole who by vow have placed themselves in the state of observing perpetual virginity.

But

this also

seems unreasonable, because

possible to have the

it is

same intention of observ-

vow as with a vow. be said otherwise that merit is

ing virginity without a

may

not due to every widow, but only, as some say, to one who vows to remain a widow. Therefore it would seem that neither is the aureole due to any kind of virginity, but

Hence

only to that which is observed by vow. Obj. 7. Further, Reward is not given to that which is done of necessity, since all merit de-

mind and body is an object of choice, as appears from what has been said above. ^ Conse-

pends on the will. But some are virgins of necessity, such as those who are naturally coldblooded, and eunuchs. Therefore an aureole is not always due to virginity. On the contrary, A gloss on Exod. 25. 25: Thou shalt also make a little golden crown (coronam aiireolam) says.^ "This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins sing in the presence of the Lamb, those, namely, who follow the Lamb wherever He goes." Therefore the reward due to virginity is called an

who had

aureole.

sense for any joy added to the essential joy of heaven, the aureole will be applicable even to

fold fruit

is

Further, It is written (Isa. 56. 4) Thus saith the Lord to the eunuchs; and the text continues .a name better {verse 5) / will give to them :

.

:

.

than sons and daughters; and a gloss says:^ "This refers to their peculiar and transcendent glory." Now the eunuchs who have made them-

it

due to every virtuous act commanded by charity. Now virginity comes under the genus of virtue in so far as perpetual incorruption of

quently the aureole

is

due to those virgins alone

the purpose of observing perpetual

virginity, whether or no they have confirmed this purpose by vow, and this I say with reference

—

to the aureole in its proper signification of a

—

reward due to merit, although this purpose at some time have been interrupted, integrity of the flesh remaining nevertheless, provided it be found at the end of life, because virginity of the mind may be restored, although

may

virginity of the flesh cannot.

however, we take the aureole in

If

who

those

its

broad

are incorrupt in flesh, although they

had not the purpose of observing perpetual virginity. For without doubt they will rejoice in

selves

the incorruption of their body, even as the innocent will rejoice in having been free from sin, although they had no opportunity of sin-

(Matt.

ning, as in the case of baptized children.

eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven 19. 12) denote virgins. Therefore it would seem that some special reward is due to virginity, and this is called the aureole. / answer that, Where there is a notable kind of victory, a special crown is due. Therefore since by virginity a person wins a signal victory over the flesh, against which a continuous battle is waged: The flesh lusteth against the spirit, etc. (Gal. 5. 17), a special crown called the aureole is due to virginity. This indeed is the common opinion of all; but all are not agreed *

Glossa ordin.

91,410). ' Glossa 40, 409).

(i,

178B); Bede,

interl. (iv, g^r)

;

De

Tabernaculo,

Augustine, De Virgin.,

i,

6

(PL

xxv (PL

But

not the proper meaning of an aureole, although it is very commonly taken in this this is

sense.

Reply Obj.

i.

In some respects virgins ex-

perience a greater conflict in remaining conti-

nent and in other respects, widows, other things being equal. For virgins are inflamed by con;

cupiscence, and by the desire of experience, which arises from a certain curiosity as it were, which makes man more willing to see what he has never seen. Sometimes, moreover, this concupiscence is increased by their esteeming the pleasure to be greater that it is in reality, and 3

In

Sent., iv, d. 33, Q. 3, aa.

i, 2.

;

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART by

their failing to consider the grievances at-

taching to this pleasure. In these respects widows experience the lesser conflict, yet theirs is the greater conflict by reason of their recollection of the pleasure. Moreover, in different subjects

one motive

is

stronger than another according

to the various conditions

subject, because

one,

and others

we may say tain,

and dispositions of the

some are more susceptible to However, whatever

to another.

of the degree of conflict, this

—that the

is

cer-

more perfect the most perfect and most

virgin's victory

than the widow's, for kind of victory

brilliant

is

is

never to have yield-

ed to the foe; and the crown is due, not to the battle but to the victory gained by the battle. Reply Obj. 2. There are two opinions about this. For some say that the Blessed Virgin has not an aureole in reward of her virginity, if we take aureole in the proper sense as referring to a conflict, but that she has something

more

than an aureole, on account of her most perfect purpose of observing virginity. Others say that she has an aureole even in its proper significa-

and that a most transcendent one, for though she experienced no conflict, she had a certain conflict of the flesh, but owing to the tion,

exceeding strength of her virtue, her flesh was so subdued that she did not feel this conflict.

This, however,

would seem

reason, for since

we

to be said without

believe the Blessed Virgin

have been altogether immune from the infomes on account of the perfection of her sanctification, it is wicked to suppose that there was in her any conflict with the flesh, since such conflict is only from the inclination of the fomes, nor can temptation from the flesh be without sin, as declared by a gloss^ on II Cor. 12. 7, There was given me a sting of my flesh. Hence we must say that she has an aureole properly speaking, so as to be conformed in this to those other members of the Church in whom virginity is found; and although she had no conflict by reason of the temptation which is of the flesh, she had the temptation which is of the enemy, who feared not even to

clination of the

Christ (Matt. 4.). Reply Obj. 3. The aureole ginity except as adding

some

is

not due to vir-

excellence to the

other degrees of continence. If Adam had not sinned, virginity would have had no perfection

over conjugal continence, since in that case marriage would have been honourable, and the marriage-bed unsulHed, for it would not have been dishonoured by lust; hence virginity Glossa ordin. (vi, 76E) Glossa Lombard! Augustine, City of God, xix, 4 (PL 41, 629). 1

;

(PL

192, 84)

Q. 96

ART.

5

1057

would not then have been observed, nor would an aureole have been due to it. But the condi-

human nature being changed, virginity has a special beauty of its own, and consequently a special reward is assigned to it. tion of

During the time of the Mosaic law, when the God was to be continued by means of the carnal act, it was not altogether praiseworthy to abstain from carnal intercourse; therefore no special reward would be given for such a purpose unless it came from a Divine inspiration, as is believed to have been the case with Jeremias and Ehas, of whose marriage we do not read.^ Reply Obj. 4. If a virgin is violated, she does worship of

not forfeit the aureole, provided she retain unfailingly the purpose of observing perpetual virginity,

Nor does

and

in

no way consent

to the act.

she forfeit virginity thereby; and this

maintained whether she be violated for the or for any other cause whatever. But if she suffer this for the faith, this will count to her for merit, and will be a kind of martyrdom. Therefore Lucy said: "If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity wiU receive a double crown" ;^ not that she has two aureoles of virginity, but that she will receive a double reward, one for observing virginity, the other for the outrage she has suffered. Even supposing that one thus violated should conceive, she would not for that reason forfeit her virginity; nor would she be equal to Christ's mother, in whom there was integrity of the flesh together with integrity of the mind. Reply Obj. 5. Virginity is inborn in us as to that which is material in virginity, but the purpose of observing perpetual incorruption, from which virginity derives its merit, is not inborn, but comes from the gift of grace. is

faith,

Reply Obj. 6. The sixtyfold fruit is due, not widow, but only to those who retain

to every

the purpose of remaining widows, even though

they do not make it the matter of a vow, even we have said in regard to virginity. Reply Obj. 7. If cold-blooded persons and eunuchj have the will to observe perpetual incorruption even though they were capable of sexual ivitercourse, they must be called virgins and merit the aureole, for they make a virtue of nece?'sity. If, on the other hand, they have the will to marry if they could, they do not merit the aureole. Hence Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin, xxiv):* "For those like eunuchs as

Jen me,

2

Cf.

3

Office 0^ St.

cember

13th).

Epist., xxii

Lucy; 4

(PL 22, 408). (Dominican Breviary, De-

led., vi

PL 40, 408.

— SUMMA THEOLOGICA

ros8

whose bodies are so formed that they are unable to beget, it suffices when they become Christians and keep the commandments of God, that they have a mind to have a wife if they could, in order to rank with the faithful

who

are married."

Article 6. Whether an Aureole Is Due Martyrs?

We

to

tyrs. i. For an aureole is a reward given works of supererogation, and therefore Bede commenting on Exod. 25. 25, Thou shalt also

Objection

for

.

.

.

crown, says:^ "This

may be who by

more perfect life go beyond commandments." But to die for

freely choosing a

the general

confessing the faith

sometimes an obligation,

is

and not a work of supererogation, as appears from the words of Rom. 10. 10, With the heart, believe unto justice, but with the

we

confession

is

made unto

salvation.

mouth

Therefore

not always due to martyrdom. Obj. 2. Further, According to Gregory^ "the freer the service, the more acceptable it is." Now martyrdom has a minimum of freedom,

an aureole

since

is

is

it

a punishment inflicted

by another

person with force. Therefore an aureole is not due to martyrdom, since it is accorded to surpassing merit.

Obj.

3.

Further,

Martyrdom

consists not only

death externally, but also in the interior act of the will; therefore Bernard in a sermon on the Holy Innocents^ distinguishes in will and not in death, three kinds of martyr,

in suffering

—

as John; in both will

and death, as Stephen;

death and not in will, as the Innocents. Accordingly if an aureole were due to martyrdom, it would be due to voluntary rather than exterin

martyrdom, since merit proceeds from

nal

will.

Yet such is not the case. Therefore an aureole not due to martyrdom.

is

for her Son's death."

Since

fering.

Obj. 5. Further, Penance itself is a kind of martyrdom, and so Gregory says (Horn, iii in Ev.):^ "Although persecution has ceased to ofi'er

proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It is not due to mar-

make another

—namely

then no aureole corresponds to interior sorrow, neither should one correspond to outward suf-

the opportunity, yet the peace

we enjoy

is

martyrdom, since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit." But no aureole is due to penance which consists in external works. Neither therefore is an aureole due to every external martyrdom. Obj. 6. Further, An aureole is not due to an unlawful work. Now it is unlawful to lay hands on oneself, as Augustine declares,^ and yet the Church celebrates the martyrdom of some who laid hands upon themselves in order to escape

not without

would seem that an aureole

rightly referred to the reward of those

pierced'

its

the fury of tyrants, as in the case of certain

women

at

12)."

viii,

Antioch (Eusebius, Eccles. Hist. Therefore an aureole is not always

due to martyrdom. Obj. person for

7.

is

some

Further, It happens at times that a

wounded

for the faith,

Now

time.

it is

and survives one

clear that such a

a martyr, and yet it seems an aureole is not due to him, since his conflict did not last until death. Therefore an aureole is not always due to martyrdom, Obj. 8. Further, Some suffer more from the loss of temporal goods than from the affliction even of their own body, and this is shown by is

many afflictions for the sake of Therefore if they are despoiled of their temporal goods for Christ's sake they would

their bearing

gain.

seem

to be martyrs, and yet an aureole is not apparently due to them. Therefore the same

conclusion follows as before. Obj. 9. Further, A martyr would seem to be no other than one who dies for the faith, and so Isidore says {Etym. vii, 11):^ "They are called martyrs in Greek, witnesses in Latin, be-

Obj. 4. Further, Bodily suffering is less than mental, which consists of internal sorrow and

cause they suffered in order to bear witness to

But mternal suffering is also a kind of martyrdom; therefore Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption:' 'T should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace; thus: 'Thine own soul a sword hath

Now

afflictions of soul.

1

De

2

Cf. Gratian, Dccrctum, Pt.

Tahernaculo,

ad can. 4 (RF I,

14 »

(PL

PL

i,

i,

949);

6

(PL

cf.

are virtues more excellent than such as justice, charity, and so forth, since these cannot be without grace, and yet no aureole is due to them. Therefore it seems

there

faith,

neither

ii, causa 23, Q. 6, append, Augustine, De Adult. Conjung.,

(PL

30, 142).

an aureole due to martyrdom.

»

PL

«

City oj God,

^

PG

Bernice *Epist., IX

is

Obj. 10. FuFther,

qi, 4og).

40, 459).

183. 130.

and strove unto death for the truth."

Christ,

7

(PL

Even

as the truth of faith

76, 1089.

26 (PL 41, 31; 34; 39). John Chrysostom, Horn, de SS. Mart. Prosdoce (PG 50, 639); Ambrose, De Virg., lu, i,

17, 20,

20, 769; cf. et

16, 241).

8

PL 82,

290.

;

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART from God, so

is

is all

Ambrose

other truth, as

"every truth by whomsoever uttered is from the Holy Ghost." Therefore if an aureole is due to one who suffers death for

Q. 96

the truth of faith, in like

martyrdom as Reply Obj.

manner

also

it is

due

death for any other virtue and yet apparently this is not the case. suffer

The common good

1059

is death suffered for Christ's sake; not the pain but the cause that makes

for

who

6

dom, which

declares,^ since

to those

ART.

it is

the martyr.

sake

is,

Consequently an aureole

due to

is

well as to virginity. i.

To

suffer death for Christ's

absolutely speaking, a

erogation, since every one

is

work

of super-

not bound to con-

greater

fess his faith in the face of a persecutor; yet

than the good of the individual. Now if a man die in a just war in order to save his country, an aureole is not due to him. Therefore even though he be put to death in order to keep the

in certain cases it is necessary for salvation,

Obj. II. Further,

is

faith that is in himself, no aureole is due to him; and consequently the same conclusion

follows as above.

Obj. 12. Further, All merit proceeds from

when, that

is, a person is seized by a persecutor and interrogated as to his faith which he is then bound to confess. Nor does it follow that he does not merit an aureole. For an aureole is due to a work of supererogation, not as such,

but as having a certain perfection. Therefore so long as this perfection remains, even though

Yet the Church celebrates the martyrdom of some who had not the use of free

the supererogation cease, one merits the aure-

Therefore they did not merit an aureole; and consequently an aureole is not due to

Reply Obj. 2. A reward is due to martyrdom, not in respect to the exterior infliction, but because it is suffered voluntarily, since we merit

free choice.

choice.

martyrs.

all

On

the contrary, Augustine says '^

Virgin, xlvi)

"No

one, I think,

{De Sancta would dare

Now an auredue to virginity, and consequently also to martyrdom. Further, The crown is due to one who has

ole.

only through that which

is

in us.

prefer virginity to martyrdom."

and naturally contrary to the

ole is

the will that suffers

But

striven.

in

martyrdom the

strife presents

a special difficulty. Therefore a special aureole is due to martyrdom. / answer that, Just as in the spirit there is a conflict with the internal concupiscences, so is there in man a conflict with the passion that is inflicted from without. Therefore, just as a special crown, which we call an aureole, is due

most perfect victory by which we

to the

umph

over the concupiscences of the

a word, to virginity, so too an aureole

the most perfect victory that

is

won

tri-

flesh, in is

due to

against ex-

ternal assaults.

Now

it

will,

the

more

is

difficult

the

more is shown

for Christ's sake

to be firmly established in Christ,

quently a higher reward

is

due

and conse-

to him.

Reply Obj.

3. There are certain acts which, very selves, contain intense pleasure or difficulty, and in such the act always adds to the character of merit or demerit, since in the performance of the act, the will, on account

in their

the aforesaid intensity, must undergo a change from the state in which it was before. Consequently, other things being equal, one who performs an act of lust sins more than one who merely consents in the act, because in the very act the will is increased. In like manner of

martyrdom there a very great difficulty, the will to suffer martyrdom does not reach the degree of merit due since in the act of suffering

is

the most perfect victory over passion

caused from without

is

considered from two

points of view. First from the greatness of the passion.

And

that which one suffers voluntarily

Now among

all

passions inflicted from

without, death holds the

first

sexual concupiscences are chief

place, just as

among

internal

to actual martyrdom by reason of its difficulty; although indeed it may possibly attain to a higher reward if we consider the root of merit,

since the will of one

may

man

to suffer

martyrdom

possibly proceed from a greater charity

when a man conquers death and things directed to death, his is a most perfect victory. Secondly, the perfection of victory is considered from the point of view

than another man's act of martyrdom. Hence one who is willing to be a martyr may by his will merit an essential reward equal to or greater than that which is due to an actual martyr.

of the motive of conflict, when, namely, a man strives for the most honourable cause, which is

to the conflict itself of

passions. Consequently,

Christ Himself.

is

Both these things are In I

1

Cf.

2

PL 40, 424.

Cor.,

on

But the aureole

12.3

(PL

to be

found

17, 258),

in

martyr-

due to the difficulty inherent martyrdom, and so it not due to those who are martyrs only in is

will.

Reply Obj. 4. Just as pleasures of touch, which are the matter of temperance, hold the

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

io6o

among

chief place

and

all

pleasures both internal

external, so pains of touch surpass

Consequently an aureole

pains.

other

due to the

of suffering pains of touch, for in-

difficulty

stance,

is

all

forth, rather than

from blows and so

to the difficulty of bearing internal sufferings,

of which, however, one

by reason

is

not pro-

cause they died in prison, having been

wounded

long before, as in the case of Pope Marceilus.'' Accordingly in whatever way suffering for Christ's sake be continued unto death, whether death ensue or not, a man becomes a martyr and m.erits the aureole. If, however, it be not

continued unto death, this

is

not a reason for

com-

calling a person a martyr, as in the case of the

parison.

It is in this sense that Jerome speaks. Reply Obj. 5. The sufferings of penance are not a martyrdom properly speaking, because

blessed Sylvester, whose feast the Church does not solemnize as a martyr's, since he ended his days in peace, although previously he had un-

they do not consist in things directed to the causing of death, since they are directed merely to the taming of the flesh; and if any one go

dergone certain sufferings.

by

perly called a martyr, except

beyond

this

measure, such

deserving of blame. are spoken of as a

a kind of

afflictions will

However such martyrdom by

be

afflictions

a kind of

comparison, and they surpass the sufferings of martyrdom in duration but not in intensity. Reply Obj. 6. According to Augustine^ it is lawful to no one to lay hands on himself for any reason whatever unless, perhaps it be

done by Divine impulse as an example of fortitude that others may despise death. Those

whom

to

the objection refers are believed to

have brought death on themselves by Divine stirring, and for this reason the Church celebrates their martyrdom. Reply Obj. 7. If any one receive a mortal wound for the faith and survive, without doubt he merits the aureole, as appears in the case of blessed Cecilia

who

survived for three days,^ in prison.^ But,

and many martyrs who died even

if

the

wound he

receives

is

the occasion of his dying, he

is

not mortal, yet is believed to

merit the aureole (although some say that he does not merit the aureole if he happens to die

through his own carelessness or neglect). For this neglect would not have occasioned his death except on the supposition of the wound which he received for the faith, and consequently this wound previously received for the faith is the original occasion of his death, so that he would not seem to lose the aureole for that reason, unless his neglect were such as to involve a mortal sin, which would deprive him of both aurea and aureole. If, however, by some chance or other he were not to die of the mortal wound, or again if the wounds received were not mortal, and he were to die while in prison, he would still

of

merit the aureole.

some

Hence

the

saints is celebrated in the

martyrdom Church be-

Reply Obj. 8. Even as temperance is not about pleasures of money, honours, and the like, but only about pleasures of touch as being the principal of all, so fortitude is about dangers of death as being the greatest of all.^ Consequently the aureole is due to such injuries only as are inflicted on a person's own body and are of a nature to cause death. Accordingly whether a person lose his temporal possessions, or his good name, or anything else of the kind, for Christ's sake, he does not for that reason become a martyr, nor merit the aureole. Nor is it possible in an ordered way to love external things more than one's body, and disordered love does not help one to merit an aureole nor again can sorrow for the loss of corporeal things be equal to the sorrow for the slaying of the ;

body and other like things. Reply Obj. 9. The sufficient motive for martyrdom is not only confession of the faith, but any other virtue, not civic but infused, that has Christ for its end. For one becomes a witness of Christ by any virtuous act, in so far as the works which Christ perfects in us bear witness to His goodness. Hence some virgins were slain for virginity which they desired to keep, for instance blessed Agnes and others whose martyrdom is celebrated by the Church.*' Reply Obj. 10. The truth of faith has Christ for end and object, and therefore its confession if suffering be added to it, merits an aureole, not only on the part of the end but also on the part of the matter. But the confession of any other truth is not a sufficient motive for martyrdom by reason of its matter, but only on the part of the end; for instance

were willing to be than sin against

City of God,

i,

17, 20, 26

(PL

Him by

telling

any

lie

what-

The uncreated good surpasses Hence any created end,

Reply Obj.

11.

created

good.

41, 31, 34, 3q).

Feast of St. Caecilia, 22 Nov., led. Breviary. • Baronius, Annales Eccl., ad annum 323 2

a person

ever.

all '

if

slain for Christ's sake rather

6,

Dominican

(iv, 57*).

Acta Sanctorum,

16 Jan.,i,4(BLii,376').

*

Cf.

6

.Aristotle, Ethics, in, 6 (1115*24).

8

Cf.

die.

Ada Satictorum, die 21 Jan. (BL 11,

718*).

— SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART whether it be the common or a private good, cannot confer so great a goodness on an act as can the uncreated end, when, that is, an act is done for God's sake. Hence when a person dies for the common good without referring it to Christ, he will not merit the aureole; but if he refer it to Christ he will merit the aureole and he will be a martyr; for instance if he defends his country from the attack of an enemy

who

designs to corrupt the faith of Christ, and

suffers death in that defence.

Reply Obj.

12.

Some

say that the use of

reason was by the Divine power accelerated in the Innocents slain for Christ's sake, even as

John the Baptist while yet in his mother's in that case they were truly martyrs in both act and will, and have the aureole. Others say, however, that they were martyrs in act only and not in will; and this seems to in

womb, and

be the opinion of Bernard, who distinguishes three kinds of martyrs, as stated above (obj. 3). In this case the Innocents, even as they do not fulfil all the conditions of martyrdom, and yet are martyrs in a sense, in that they died for Christ, so too they have the aureole, not in all its perfection, but by a kind of participation, in so far as they rejoice in having been slain in Christ's service; thus it was stated above (a. 5) in reference to baptized children, that they will have a certain joy in their innocence and carnal integrity.

ART,

Q. 96

I061

7

many who

that the devil deceives

up with the honour of the master's chair. Therefore it would seem that an aureole is not due to preaching and teaching. On the contrary, A gloss on Eph. i. 18, 19, That you may know what is the exceeding greatness, etc., says:^ "The holy doctors will have an increase of glory above that which all have in common." Therefore, etc. Further, A gloss on Cant. 8. 12, My vineyard is before me, says:^ "He describes the pecuhar reward which He has prepared for His doctors." Therefore doctors will have a peculiar reward, and we call this an aureole. / answer that, Just as by virginity and martyrdom a person wins a most perfect victory over the flesh and the world, so is a most per.

.

.

fect victory gained over the devil when a person not only refuses to yield to the devil's assaults, but also drives him out, not from himself alone, but from others also. Now this is done by preaching and teaching, and so an aureole is due to preaching and teaching, even as to virginity and martyrdom. Nor can we admit, as some affirm, that it is due to prelates only, who are able to preach and teach by virtue of their office, but it is due to all whosoever exercise this act lawfully. Nor is it due to prelates, although they have the office of preaching, unless they actually preach, since a crown is due not to the habit, but to the actual strife, according to II Tim. 5, Fg shall not be .

Article 7. Whether an Aureole Is Due Doctors?

to

(Vulg.,

proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It would seem that an aureole is not due to doctors. Objection i. For every reward to be had in the Hfe to come will correspond to some act of virtue. But preaching or teaching is not the act of a virtue. Therefore an aureole is not due to teaching or preaching.

Obj.

2.

is

.

.

not) crowned, except he strive law-

fully.

We

Further, Teaching and preaching are

the result of studying and being taught.

are puffed

Now

Reply Obj.

Preaching and teaching are namely mercy, and therefore

i.

acts of a virtue,

they are reckoned

among

the spiritual alms-

deeds.

Reply Obj. 2. Although ability to preach and is sometimes the outcome of study, the practice of teaching comes from the will, which is informed with charity infused by God; and teach

thus

its

act can be meritorious.

are not acquired by a man's study, since we merit not by our natural and acquired gifts. Therefore no aureole will be merited in the

Reply Obj. 3. Exaltation in this life does not lessen the reward of the other life, except for him who seeks his own glory from that exaltation; moreover he who turns that exaltation

future hfe for teaching and preaching.

to the profit of others acquires thereby a reward

the things that are rewarded in the future life

Obj.

Further, Exaltation in the hfe to come corresponds to humiliation in the present life, because he that humbleth himself shall be 3.

exalted (Matt. 23. 12). But there is no humihation in teaching and preaching; in fact they are occasions of pride, for a gloss on Matt. 4. 5, Then the devil took Him up, says^ 1

Glossa ordin. (v, 15F).

for himself.

aureole

Still,

when

is

it

due to teaching,

stated that an

is to be understood of the teaching of things pertaining to salvation, by which teaching the devil is ex-

pelled ^

is

from men's

Glossa ordin.

(vi,

hearts, as

Glossa ordin.

(iii,

by

a kind of spir-

90E); Glossa Lombardi (PL 192,

177). 3

this

367F).

—

—

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

io62

ten (Apoc.

itual weapon, of which it is said (II Cor. lo. 4) The weapons of our warfare are not carnal but hut 7nighty to God). spiritual (Vulg.,

21)

3.

I will give to

To him

:

sit

also have overcome,

that shall overcome,

Me

with

and

in

am

My

throne, as I

down

set

in

My

With My Father in His throne). Therefore we must say with others Father's throne (Vulg.,

Article

Whether an Aureole

8.

is

Due

that although there is nothing of the nature of an aureole in Christ, there is nevertheless something more excellent than any aureole.

to Christ?

We

proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It would seem that an aureole is due to Christ. Objection i. For an aureole is due to virgin-

Reply Obj. 1. Christ was most truly virgin, martyr, and doctor; yet the corresponding accidental reward in Christ is a neghgible quan-

martyrdom, and teaching. Now these three were pre-eminently in Christ. Therefore an aureole is especially due to Him. Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is most perfect in human things must be especially ascribed to Christ. Now an aureole is due as the reward of most excellent merits. Therefore it is also due ity,

comparison with the greatness of His Hence He has not an aureole in its proper sense. Reply Obj. 2. Although the aureole is due to a most perfect work, yet with regard to us, so tity in

essential reward.

far as

to Christ.

Obj.

3.

Further, C>T)rian says

(De Habit.

whom

Virg.)^ that "virginity bears a likeness to God." Therefore the exemplar of virginity is in God.

would seem that an aureole to Christ even as God.

Therefore

On

it

the contrary,

An

aureole

is

is

thus

Therefore

He

never had an aureole

There are two opinions on this For some say that Christ has an aureole

/ answer that,

Him

there

is

both conflict and victory, and consequently a crown in its proper acceptation. But if we consider the question carefully, although the notion of aurea or crown is becoming to Christ,

the notion of aureole fact that aureole

is

is

not.

For from the very

a diminutive term

from one

in

in its fulness.

implies a certain inferiority, and

it

Whom

is

the

3. Although in some way virginexemplar in God, that exemplar is not homogeneous. For the incorruption of God, which virginity imitates, is not in God in the

has

ity

its

Article

never

afterwards.

in its strict sense, seeing that in

found

not found in Christ in

is

same way

Further, Christ's reward was never increased. Now Christ had no aureole from the moment

point.

it

is

Reply Obj.

described as

He had

denotes the

it

fulness of every perfection.

to Christ.

of His conception, since then

a diminutive term,

that perfection

Accordingly

due

joy in being conformed to Christ. Now no one is conformed or likened to himself, as the Philosopher says.2 Therefore an aureole is not due

fought.

is

it

participation of a perfection derived

it

fol-

as in a virgin.

Whether an Aureole

9.

Is

Due

Angels?

to the

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It would seem that an aureole is due to the angels. Objection i. For Jerome (Serm. de AsS2imp.y speaking of virginity says: "To live without the flesh while living in the flesh is to live as an angel rather than as a man"; and a gloss on I Cor. 7. 26, For the present necessity, says'* that "virginity is the portion of the angels." Since then an aureole corresponds to virginity,

Obj.

it

would seem due

to the angels.

Further, Incorruption of the spirit

2.

is

denotes something possessed by participation and not in its fulness. Therefore an aureole is becoming to those who partici-

more

excellent than incorruption of the flesh.

Now

there

gels,

since

pate in the perfect victory by imitating Him in Whom the fulness of perfect victory is

aureole

lows that

realised.

it

And

therefore, since in Christ the no-

is found chiefly and fully, for by His victory others are made victors, as shown by the words of John 16. 33, Have cotifidence, I have overcome the world, and Apoc. 5. 5, Behold the lion of the tribe of Juda

tion of victory

— .

.

.

—

hath prevailed, it is not fitting for Christ to have an aureole, but to have something from

which 1

all

aureoles are derived.

PL 4, 477.

'

Hence

it is

Metaphysics, x, 3 (io54*'6).

writ-

is

is

incorruption of spirit in the an-

they never sinned. Therefore an due to them rather than to men in-

corrupt in the flesh and

some

Obj. ing.

3.

Now

ening,

Further,

An

and perfecting

sinned at

IX

(PL

*C7lossa ordin.

1596) Augustine, ;

'PG3,

273.

by

us,

is

due to teach-

cleansing, enlight-

as

Dionysius says

10).^ Therefore at least the

vi,

aureole of doctors £/^i5/.,

aureole

angels teach us

{Hier. Eccles.

3

who have

time.

is

due to them.

30, 131). (vi,

De

43E); Glossa Lombardi (PL 191, Virgin., xiii

(PL

40, 401).

—

:

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART On He

the contrary, It

is

written (II Tim.

2.

5)

shall not be (Vulg., is not) crowned, except he strive lawfully. But there is no con.

flict

.

.

Therefore an aureole

in the angels.

is

not

due to them. not due to an act that not performed through the body; therefore

is

it is

aureole

is

not due to lovers of virginity, martyrdom, them if they do not practise

teaching,

or

outwardly. But angels are incorporeal

spirits.

Therefore they have no aureole. / answer that, An aureole is not due to the angels. The reason of this is that an aureole, properly speaking, corresponds to some perfecsurpassing merit.

of

tion

Now

which make for perfect merit

in

those

man

things

are con-

natural to angels, or belong to their state in general, or to their essential reward. Therefore

the angels have not an aureole in the

sense as an aureole

Reply Obj.

1.

is

same

due to men.

Virginity

is

said to be an an-

gelic life, in so far as virgins imitate

what angels have by nature. For

it is

by grace

not owing

to a virtue that angels abstain altogether

from

pleasures of the flesh, since they are incapable of such pleasures.

Reply Obj. spirit

2.

Perpetual incorruption of the

in the angels merits their essential re-

ward, because since in

Q. 96

be seen

ART.

11

1063

in their bodily scars

;

therefore Au-

"We feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their

gustine says:^

bodies, which they bore for Christ's name. Per-

An

Further,

will

it is

haps indeed we shall see them, for this will not make them less comely, but more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty, though in the body, yet not of the body but of virtue." Therefore it would seem that the martyr's aureole is also in his

manner

is

impossible after they

have fallen. Reply Obj. 3. The acts whereby the angels teach us belong to their glory and their common state therefore they do not thereby merit an aureole. ;

in

hke

On the contrary. The souls now in heaven have aureoles, and yet they have no body. Therefore the proper subject of an aureole is the soul and not the body. Further, All merit is from the soul. Therefore the whole reward should be in the soul. / answer that. Properly speaking the aureole is in the mind, since it is joy in the works to which an aureole is due. But even as from the joy in the essential reward, which is the aurea, there results a certain comeliness in the body, is the glory of the body, so from the joy

which

the aureole there results a certain bodily comeliness, so that the aureole is chiefly in the mind, but by a kind of overflow it shines forth in the body. in

necessary for their salvation,

them recovery

body; and

the aureoles of others.

This

suffices for the

tions. It

Replies to the Objec-

must be observed, however,

that the

beauty of the scars which will appear in the bodies of the martyrs cannot be called an aureole, since some of the martyrs will have an aureole in which such scars will not appear, for instance those who were put to death by drowning, starvation, or the squalor of prison.

Article

Due

Whether an Aureole Is Also

10.

to the

Body?

Article

We

proceed thus to the Tenth Article: It would seem that an aureole is also due to the body. Objection 1. For the essential reward is greater than the accidental. But the dowries which belong to the essential reward are not only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore there is also an aureole which pertains to the accidental rev/ard.

Obj.

Punishment in soul and sin committed through the body. Therefore a reward both in soul and in body is due to merit gained through the body. But the aureole is merited through works 2.

Further,

body corresponds

to

of the body. Therefore an aureole

is

also

due

ii.

Whether Three Aureoles Are

Fittingly Assigned, Those 0} Virgins, of Martyrs, and of Doctors?

We

proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:

It

would seem that the three aureoles of virgins, martyrs, and doctors are unfittingly assigned. Objection 1. For the aureole of martyrs corresponds to their virtue of fortitude, the aureole of virgins to the virtue of temperance, and the aureole of doctors to the virtue of prudence. Therefore it seems that there should be a fourth aureole corresponding to the virtue of justice. Obj. 2. Further, A gloss on Exod. 25. 25:

A

polished crown, etc., says^ that "a golden {aurea) crown is added, when the Gospel prem-

ises

eternal life to those

who keep

the com-

to the body.

Obj.

3.

Further,

A

^

certain fulness of virtue

will shine forth in the bodies of martyrs,

and

City of God, xxii, 19

^Glossa ordin.

(PL 91,

409).

(i,

(PL

41, 782).

178B); Bede,

De

Tabernaculo,

i,

6

SUM MA THEOLOGICA

1064

mandments: 'If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments' (Matt. 19. 17). To this is added the little golden crown (aureola) when it is

all

said: 'If thou wilt be perfect, go

that thou hast,

and give

21). Therefore an aureole

Obj.

Further,

3.

wholly to

God by

the

is

sell

due to poverty.

A man vow

and

to the poor' " (ibid.

subjects himself

of obedience; there-

fore the greatest perfection consists in the vow it would seem that an

by and He was a virgin, by His personal purity. Therefore doctors, martyrs and virgins are most perfectly conformed to Him, and for this reason an aureole is due to them. Reply Obj. i. There is no conflict to be obser^^ed in the act of justice as in the acts of

Nor

due to obedience. Obj. 4. Further, There are also many other works of supererogation in which one will rejoice in the life to come. Therefore there are many aureoles besides the above three.

an act of prudence; of charity or mercy,

Obj. faith

5.

Further, Just as a

man

spreads the

by preaching and teaching, so does he by

publishing written works. Therefore a fourth

due to those who do this. / answer that, An aureole is an exceptional reward corresponding to an exceptional vic-

aureole

is

tory; therefore the three aureoles are assigned accordance with the exceptional victories in

such an ing

act,

We may embraces cial

due to martyrs who win the victory in this battle. In the conflict with the devil, the chief victory is to expel the enemy not only from oneself but also from the hearts of others; this is done by teaching and preaching, and consequently the third aureole is due to doctors and

Some, however, distinguish the three aureoles accordance v/ith the three powers of the soul,

by saying that the three aureoles correspond to the three chief acts of the soul's three high-

For the act of the rational power publish the truth of faith even to others,

est powers. is

to

and

to this act the aureole of doctors

is

due;

power is to overand to this act the aureole of martyrs is due; and the highest act of the concupiscible power is to abstain altogether from the greatest carnal pleasures, and to this act the aureole of virgins is due.

is

it.

Although poverty

work

a

is

of

it

or

whereby

persecution

broken. Hence an aureole

poverty, but judicial power

is

is

due to

his

own

not due to it,

by

rea-

son of the humiliation consequent upon poverty. The gloss quoted takes aureole in the

broad sense for any reward given for excellent merit.

We

reply in the

same way

Fourth Objections. Reply Obj. 5. An aureole

commit

is

to the Third

and

due to those who

the sacred doctrine to writing, but

it is

not distinct from the aureole of doctors, since the compiling of writing is a way of teaching.

Article

12.

Whether the

We

Virgin's Aureole

proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:

would seem that the greatest of

Others again, distinguish the three aureoles accordance with those things whereby we

most excellently conformed to Christ. For the mediator between the Father and the world. Hence He was a doctor, by manifest-

aureole

is

i.

For

it is

they follow the

Lamb

He

and

that no other

goeth,

It

the

said of virgins (Apoc.

14. 4) that

(ibid.

3)

whithersoever

man

could say the canticle which the virgins sang. aureole.

for Christ's sake,

virgin's

all.

Objection

Therefore

He was

not due to 2.

does not take the highest place in a spiritual conflict, because the love of temporal goods assails a man less than carnal conperfection,

come even death

are

it is

the virtues, and therefore a spe-

is

Reply Obj.

the highest act of the irascible

in

in so far as

Is the Greatest of All?

preachers.

in

—

are inclined to the practice of

also reply, with others, that justice

aureole

cupiscence

In the conflict with the world, the chief victory is to suffer the world's persecution even until death. Therefore the second aureole is

is

an act by such

or again of wisdom, as direct-

all

body

virginity.

—

true that to teach

is it

in fact rather is it

it.

which beset every man. For in the conflict with the flesh, he above all wins the victory who abstains altogether from sexual pleasures which are the chief of this kind and such is a virgin. Therefore an aureole is due to ;

we

habits that

in

the three conflicts

re-

a martyr,

suffering the persecution of the world;

the other virtues.

is

He was

ceived from the Father;

of obedience. Therefore

aureole

He had

which

ing to the world the truth

Obj.

2.

virgins

have

the

Further, Cyprian

most

excellent

(De Habit. Virg.y more illus-

says of virgins that they are "the

trious portion of Christ's flock." Therefore the

due to them. would seem that the martyr's aureole is the greatest. For Haymo, commenting on Apoc. 14. 3, No ?tian could say the hymn, says^ that "virgins do not all take prece2/„ j^p^c. (PL 117, 1106) PL 4. 455.

greater aureole

Obj.

'

3.

is

Again,

it

:

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART

Q. 96

ART.

1065

13

dence of married folk; but only those who in addition to the observance of virginity are

by

the tortures of their passion on a par with married persons who have suffered martyrdom." Therefore martyrdom gives virginity its precedence over other states, and consequently a greater aureole is due to virginity. Obj. 4. Again, it would seem that the greatest aureole is due to doctors. For the Church mihtant is modelled after the Church trium-

Now

Church militant the greatest honour is due to doctors (I Tim. 5. 17): Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy

phant.

in the

of double honour, especially they who labour word and doctrine. Therefore a greater

Article 13. Whether One Person Has an Aureole more Excellently Than Another Person?

We

of doctrine

is

due to them

Church trium-

in the

phant. / answer that, Precedence of one aureole over

another

may

points. First,

be considered from two standfrom the point of view of the

conflicts, that aureole

painful,

while

the

with the

conflict

fraught with greater danger, since lasting

and threatens us

at

flesh

it

closer

is

is

more

quarters.

Secondly, from the point of view of the things

about which the battle is fought, and thus the doctor's aureole takes precedence of all others, since this conflict is about inteUigible goods, while the other conflicts are about sensible passions. Nevertheless, the precedence that is considered in view of the conflict is more essential to the aureole, since the aureole, according to its proper character, regards the victory and

perfectly than another person.

For things which have reached

1.

term are not subject to intension or lesNow the aureole is due to works which have reached their term of perfection. Therefore an aureole is not subject to intension or their

sening.

lessening.

Obj.

2.

Further, Virginity

being more or

is

not subject to

denotes a kind of privation, and privations are not subject to intension or lessening. Therefore neither does less, since it

the reward of virginity, the virgin's aureole, that is, receive intension or lessening.

On

being considered greater

which is due to the more strenuous battle. Looking at it thus the martyr's aureole takes precedence of the others in one way, and the virgin's in another. For the martyr's battle is more strenuous in itself, and more intensely

more

Objection

in the

aureole

proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article:

would seem that one person has not the aureole either of virginity, or of martyrdom, or It

the contrary,

The

aurea. But the aurea

aureole

is

more

is

added to the

intense in one

than in another. Therefore the aureole is also. / answer that, Since merit is somewhat the cause of reward, rewards must be diversified according as merits are diversified, for the intension or lessening of a thing follows from the intension or lessening of its cause. Now the merit of the aureole may be greater or lesser. There-

may

fore the aureole

also be greater or lesser.

We

must observe, however, that the merit of an aureole may be intensified in two ways first,

on the part of

its

cause, secondly on the

may happen to be two persons, one of whom, out of lesser charity, suffers greater torments of martyrdom, or

part of the work. For there

is

more constant

in preaching, or again with-

consid-

draws himself more from carnal pleasures. Accordingly, intension not of the aureole but of the aurea corresponds to the mtension of merit derived from its root, while intension of the

ered from our standpoint through the conflict being at closer quarters. Therefore the martyr's

aureole corresponds to intension of merit derived from the kind of act. Consequently it is

aureole

possible for one

the battle, and the difficulty of fighting which is

viewed from the standpoint of the battle

of greater importance than that which

is

is

the greatest absolutely of all; for

this reason a gloss "all the

is

on Matt.

5.

10, says^ that

other beatitudes are perfected in the

which refers to the martyrs," namely, Blessed are they that suffer persecution. For this reason, too, the Church in enumerating the saints together places the martyrs before the doctors and virgins. Yet nothing hinders the other aureoles from being more excellent in some particular way. And this suffices for the eighth,

Replies to the Objections. ^Glossa ordin. 3

(PL 34,

1234).

(v,

19A); Augustine,

is

i,

merits less in

martyrdom

Reply Obj. i. The merits to which an aureole due do not reach the term of their perfection

absolutely, but according to their species, even as fire is specifically the most subtle of bodies.

Hence nothing hinders one aureole being more excellent than another, even as one fire is more subtle than another.

Reply Obj. De Serm. Dom.,

who

as to his essential reward to receive a greater aureole for his martyrdom.

2.

The

virginity of one

may be

greater than the virginity of another by reason of a greater withdrawal from that which is con-

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

io66

trary to virginity, so that virginity is stated to be greater in one who avoids more the occasions

For in this way privations may when a man is said to be more bhnd removed further from the possession

of corruption. increase, as if

he

is

of sight.

QUESTION XCVII Of the punishment of the damned (In Seven Articles)

In due sequence we must consider those things that concern the damned after the judgment:

The punishment of the damned, and the by which their bodies will be tormented; (2) matters relating to their will and intellect in (q. xcviii); (3) God's justice and mercy

(i) fire

regard to the Under the

damned first

(q.

xcix).

head there are seven points

I answer that, According to Basil

world will fight with Him against the unwise. This is also becoming to Divine justice, that whereas they departed from One by sin, and placed their end in material things which are many and various, so should they be tormented

many ways and from many sources. Reply Obj. i. It is because fire is most painful, through its abundance of active force, that the name of fire is given to any torment if it

in

be intense.

Whether their weeping is corporeal? (4) Whether their darkness is material? (5) Whether the fire whereby they are tormented is corporeal? (6) Whether it is of the same species as our fire? (7) Wheth-

cleanse; therefore

mented

is

corporeal? (3)

er this fire is

beneath the earth?

Article i. Whether in Hell the Damned Are Tormented By the Sole Punishment of Fire?

We

proceed thus to the First Article: It

would seem that in hell the damned are tormented by the sole punishment of fire. Objection i. For in Matt. 25. 41, where their condemnation is declared, mention is made of Depart from Me, you fire only, in the words :

cursed, into everlasting

Obj.

2.

Further,

fire.

Even

as the

punishment of

due to venial sin, so is the punishment of hell due to mortal sin. Now no other punishment but that of fire is stated to be in purgatory, as appears from the words of I Cor. 3. 13: The fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it is. Therefore neither in hell will there be a punishment other than of fire. Obj. 3. Further, Variety of punishment affords a respite, as when one passes from heat to cold. But we can admit no respite in the damned. Therefore there will not be various purgatory

is

punishments, but that of

On

the contrary. It

is

fire

alone.

written (Ps. 10. 7):

Fire and brimsto?ie and storms of winds shall be the portloji of their cup.

written (Job. 24. 19) Let him pass from the snow waters to excessive heat.

Further, It

is

:

i

world there will be a separation of the elements, whatever is pure and noble remaining above for the glory of the blessed, and whatever is ignoble and sordid being cast down for the punishment of the damned, so that just as every creature will be to the blessed a matter of joy, so will all the elements conduce to the torture of the damned, according to Wis. 5. 21, the whole

(i) Whether in hell the damned are tormented with the sole punishment of fire? (2) Whether the worm by which they are torof inquiry:

(Hom.

in Ps. 28),^ at the final cleansing of the

Reply Obj.

The punishment

2.

it

of purgatory

but

to

should be inflicted by

fire

intended chiefly

not

is

to

torment,

alone which is above all possessed of cleansing power. But the punishment of the damned is not directed to their cleansing. Consequently the comparison

fails.

Reply Obj. 3. The damned will pass from the most intense heat to the most intense cold, without this giving them any respite, because they will suffer from external agencies not by the change of their body from its original natural disposition, and the contrary passion affording a respite by restoring an equable or moderate temperature, as happens now, but by a spiritual action, in the same way as sensible objects act on the senses, being perceived by impressing the organ with their forms according to their spiritual and not their material being.

Article

2.

Whether the

Worm of the Damned

Is Corporeal?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the worm by which the damned are tormented is corporeal. Objection i. For flesh cannot be tormented by a spiritual worm. Now the flesh of the damned will be tormented by a worm He will give fire and worms into their flesh (Judith 16. 21), and: The vengeance on the flesh of the un:

godly

is fire

fore that

Obj.

2.

PG 29,

a7id

worm

worms

(Ecclus.

7.

207; cf. In Hexaem., hom. vi (PG ^Cityof God, x\i,g {PL 41, 725). 1

19). There-

be corporeal. Further, Augustine says:^ "Both, will

29, 121).

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART namely

and worm,

fire

will

be the punishment

of the body." Therefore, etc.

On

"The un-

the contrary, Augustine says:^

quenchable fire and the restless worm in the punishment of the damned are explained in various ways by different persons. Some refer both to the body, some, both to the soul; others refer the

fire, in

worm

the literal sense, to the body,

and this seems the more probable." / answer that, After the day of judgment, no animal or mixed body will remain in the renewed world except only the body of man, because the former are not directed to incorruption, nor after that time will there be generation or corruption. Consequently the worm ascribed to the damned must be understood to be not of a corporeal but of a spiritual nature, and this is the remorse of conscience, which is called a worm because it originates from the corruption of sin, and torments the soul, as a corporeal worm born of corruption torments by gnawing. Reply Obj. i. The very souls of the damned are called their flesh because they were subject the

to the soul metaphorically,

Or we may reply

to the flesh.

that the flesh will

be tormented by the spiritual worm, according as the afflictions of the soul overflow into the body, both here and hereafter. Reply Obj. 2. Augustine speaks by way of comparison. For he does not wish to assert absolutely that this worm is material, but that it is better to say that both are to be understood materially than that both should be understood only in a spiritual sense, for then the damned would suffer no bodily pain. This is clear to anyone that examines the context of his words in

ART.

Q. 97

ment and sorrow

1067

4

Now

give ye to her.

sinners

had internal and external pleasure in their sin. Therefore they will also have external weeping. On the contrary, Corporeal weeping results from dissolving into tears. Now there cannot be a continual dissolution from the bodies of the damned, since nothing is restored to them by food; for everything finite is consumed if something be continually taken from it. Therefore the weeping of the damned will not be corporeal.

/ answer that,

Two

in corporeal weeping.

things are to be observed

One

is

the resolution of

and as to this corporeal weeping cannot be in the damned, since after the day of judgment, the movement of the first movable being at an end, there will be neither generation, nor corruption, nor bodily change, and in the resotears

:

humour needs to be genershed forth in the shape of tears.

lution of tears that

ated which

Therefore

is

in this respect it will

be impossible

for corporeal weeping to be in the

damned. The

other thing to be observed in corporeal weeping is a certain agitation and disturbance of the head and eyes, and in this respect weeping be possible in the damned after the resur-

will

rection, for the bodies of the damned will be tormented not only from without, but also from

body is affected at the instance of the soul's passion towards good or evil. In this sense weeping is a proof of the within, according as the

body's resurrection, and corresponds to the pleasure of sin, experienced by both soul and

body.

This

suffices for the

Replies to the Objec-

tions.

this passage.

Article

Whether the Weeping of the

Article

3.

Damned

Will

Be Corporeal?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that the weeping of the damned will be corporeal. Objection i. For a gloss on Luke 13. 28, There will be weeping, says^ that "the weeping with which our Lord threatens the wicked is a proof of the resurrection of the body." But this would not be the case if that weeping were merely spiritual. Therefore, etc. Obj. 2. Further, The pain of the punishment corresponds to the pleasure of the sin, according to Apoc. 18. 7: As much as she hath glorified herself

and lived

in delicacies, so

much

tor-

^Ibid., XX, 22 (PL 41, 694), ^Glossa ordin. (v, 161F); Jerome, In Matt., i, on 8.12 (PL 26, 53) Bade, In Matt., 11, on 8.12 (PL 92.41). ;

Whether the Damned Are

4.

in

Material Darkness?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that the damned are not in matedarkness.

rial

Objection

But

{Moral,

no

1.

For commenting on Job

10. 22,

everlasting horror dwelleth, Gregory says ix,

66):^ "Although that

light for comfort, yet, that it

fire will

give

may torment

the more it does give light for a purpose, for by the light of its flame the wicked will see their followers whom they have drawn thither from

the world." Therefore the darkness there is not material. Obj. 2. Further, The damned see their own punishment, for this increases their punishment. But nothing is seen without light. Therefore there 8

is

PL 75, 915.

no material darkness

there.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

io68 Obj.

have

the subject of light and darkness, except the

of sight after being reunited to their

eyes of the damned, which will be darkened

Further, There the

3.

power But

the

power would be

this

bodies.

damned

will

useless to

them

they see something. Therefore, since nothing is seen unless it be in the light, it would seem that they are not in absolute darkness. On the contrary, It is written (Matt. 22.

utterly.

This

unless

13)

Bind

:

into

his

hands and

and cast him Commenting on

Article

these words Gregory says {Moral, ix, 65) :^ "If this fire gave any hght, he would by no means

be described as cast into exterior darkness." Further, Basil says {Horn, i in Ps. 28, 7, The voice of the Lord divideth the flame of firey that by God's might the brightness of the

5.

Whether

Replies to the Objections.

the Fire of Hell Will

Be

Corporeal?

We

his feet,

darkness.

exterior

the

suffices for the

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It

would seem that the bodies of the

of hell

fire

damned

whereby the

be tormented will

will

not be corporeal. Objection i. For Damascene says {De Fide

its

power of burn-

iv, 27):^ "The devil, and demons, and man, namely Antichrist, together with the ungodly and sinners, will be cast into everlasting fire, not material fire, such as that which

ing, so that its brightness will

conduce to the

we

fire will

be separated from

Orthod. his

have, but such as

thing corporeal

Other points relating to the punishment of the damned have been decided above (q.

when severed from

LXXXVI, A. 3).^ / answer that, The disposition of hell will be such as to be adapted to the utmost unhappiness of the damned. Therefore accordingly

Z2):^ "In

both light and darkness are there, in so far as they are most conducive to the unhappiness of the

Now

damned.

seeing

is

in itself pleasant

for, as stated in the Metaphysics,^ "the sense of sight is most valued, because thereby many

Yet

things are known." that seeing

is

painful,

it

happens accidentally

when we

see things that

are hurtful to us, or displeasing to our will. Consequently in hell the place must be so dis-

posed for seeing as regards light and darkness that nothing be seen clearly, and that only such things be dimly seen as are able to bring anguish

the

to

heart.

much

as

is

dark.

are capable of tormenting the soul. The natural situation of the place is enough for this, since in the centre of the earth,

where

hell is

said to be, fire cannot be otherwise than thick and cloudy, and reeky as it were.

Some hold

that this darkness

is

caused by

massing together of the bodies

the

damned, which

will so

fill

of

the

the place of hell with

numbers, that no air will remain, so that there will be no translucid body that can be

their

Obj.

PL 75, 912.

2

PG

»

Cf also

*

Aristotle,

.

29, 2Q7; cf. Q.

Lxx, I, i

In Uexaem., horn, vi (PG 2q, 121). A. 3 In Sent., iv, d. 44, Q- 3. A. i. ;

(080*23).

every-

The

Further,

2.

souls of the

damned

their bodies are cast into

But Augustine says {Gen. ad Lit. xii, my opinion the place to which the committed after death is spiritual and

hell fire.

soul

is

not corporeal." Therefore, Obj.

3.

etc.

Further, Corporeal

fire in

the person

who

is

the

mode

action does not follow the

its

mode

of

of guilt in

burnt at the stake, but rather

mode of humid and dry, for same corporeal fire we see both good and wicked suffer. But the fire of hell, in its mode does

follow the

it

in the

of torture or action, follows the

person

the

in

mode

therefore

iv, 43):^ "There is but it does not torture equally. For each one will suffer as

hell

of guilt

Gregory indeed but one

punished;

says {Dial, fire,

all

sinners

much

pain

according as his guilt deserves." Therefore this fire will

On

not be corporeal.

the contrary,

doubt not that the is

it

He

fire

says {Dial,

of hell

is

iv,

29)

:^

"I

corporeal, since

certain that bodies are tortured there."

The is written (Wisd. 5. 21): agaiiist the unwise. world shall fight But the whole world would not fight against the unwise if they were punished with a spiritual and not a corporeal punishment. Therefore they Further, It

.

.

.

.

.

.

be punished with a corporeal fire. answer that. There have been many opinions about the fire of hell. For some philos-

will

/

ophers, as Avicenna,^ not believing in the resurrection, thought that the soul alone would be punished after death. And as they consid-

ered »

is

of hell will not be corporeal.

absolutely

Yet by Divine disthere is a certain amount of light, as suffices for seeing those things which

speaking, the place position,

Therefore,

God knoweth." Now

material. Therefore the fire

joy of the blessed, and the heat of the flame to the torment of the damned." Therefore the damned will be in material darkness.

SPG 'PL •

it

impossible for the soul, being incor-

04,1225.

6PL,s4, 480.

PL

8 77, 368. 77. 401. Mcta., tr. IX, chap. 7 (io6vb).

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART poreal, to be punished with a corporeal fire, they denied that the fire by which the wicked are punished is corporeal, and pretended that all statements as to souls being punished in future after death by any corporeal means are to be taken metaphorically. For just as the joy and happiness of good souls will not be about any corporeal object, but about something spiritual, namely the attainment of their end, so will the torment of the wicked be merely spiritual, in that they will be grieved at being separated from their end, the desire for which is

them by

in

nature. Therefore, just as

all

de-

ART.

Q. 97

1069

5

maintained that souls return to the stars that are their compeers. But this is absolutely absurd according to the Philosopher's teaching, since the soul uses a definite bodily organ, even as art uses definite instruments, so that it cannot pass from one

body

to another, as Pythagoras

is

stated^ to have

maintained.3 As to the statement of Augustine we shall say below how it is to be answered (Reply 2).

However, whatever we may say of the fire we must admit that the fire which will torment the bodies that torments the separated souls,

damned

scriptions of the soul's dehght after death that

of the

seem

since one cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body unless that punishment itself be bod-

to denote bodily pleasure,

—

for instance,

that they are refreshed, that they smile,

—must be

and so

after the resurrection

is

corpore-

al,

taken metaphorically, so also

ily.

such descriptions of the soul's suffering for inas seem to imply bodily punishment, stance, that they burn in fire, or suffer from

the

Therefore Gregory {Dial, iv, 29)'' proves of hell to be corporeal from the very fact that the wicked will be cast there after the resurrection. Again Augustine, as quoted

the stench, and so forth. For as spiritual pleas-

in the text of iv. Sent. d. 44,^ clearly admits^

forth,

are

all

—

ure and pain are

unknown

to

the majority,

these things need to be declared under the

fig-

ure of corporeal pleasures and pains, in order that

men may be moved

the

more

to the desire

or fear of them. Since, however, in the

punishment of the

damned

there will be not only pain of loss corresponding to the turning away that was in their sin, but also pain of sense corresponding to the

conversion,

it

follows that

it

is

not enough to

hold the above manner of punishment. For this reason Avicenna himself {loc. cit.) added another explanation, by saying that the souls of the wicked are punished after death not

by

bodies but by likenesses of bodies; just as in a

dream

it

seems to a

man

that he

is

suffering

various pains on account of such images being

Even Augustine seems to hold this kind of punishment {Gen. ad Lit. xii, in his imagination.

from the text. But this would seem an unreasonable statement. For the imagination is a power that makes use of a bodily organ, so that it is im32),^ as

is

clear

he might avoid

said that the soul separated

body uses

A.

how

3)

this is the point at issue for

have said elsewhere

the souls of the

damned

(q.

lxx,

are punished

by this corporeal fire. Reply Obj. 1. Damascene does not absolutely deny that this fire is material, but that it is material as our fire, since it differs from ours in some of its properties. We may also reply that since that fire does not change bodies as to their matter, but acts on them for their punishment

by a kind of son that regards

spiritual action,

it is for this reastated not to be material, not as substance, but as to its punitive

it is

its

on bodies and, still more, on souls. Reply Obj. 2. The assertion of Augustine may be taken in this way, that the place whither souls are conveyed after death is described effect

as incorporeal in so far as the soul is there not corporeally, that is as bodies are in a place,

and

in its

the

principal

as an organ

—

opinion of certain philosophers of old,

PL 34, 481.

We

the present.

this diffi-

some part of the heavenly body, to which the human body needs to be conformed, in order to be perfected by the rational soul, which is like the movers of the heavenly body, thus following somewhat the 1

And

corporeal.

from the

occur in the soul separated from the body, as Therefore Avicenna

in the soul of the dreamer.

culty,

by which the bodies are tormented

that the fire is

but in some other spiritual way, as angels are in a place. Or we may reply that Augustine is expressing an opinion without deciding the point, as he often does in those books. Reply Obj. 3. That fire will be the instrument of Divine justice inflicting punishment. Now an instrument acts not only by its own power

possible for such visions of the imagination to

also {loc. cit.), that

fire

who

own way, but agent,

Therefore although 2

Aristotle, Soul,

3

Cf.

i,

also by the power of and as directed by it.

fire is

not able, of

own

Diogenes Laertes, who quotes the verse Zenophon mouth of Pythagoras; cf. Diels, Doxographi

puts in the

Graeci, pp. 557, 587. 4 PL 77, 368. s

its

3 (407''2 2).

BQR 11,1003.

City of God, xxi, 10

(PL 41,

725).

SUMMA TEEOLOGICA

I070

power, to torture certain persons more or less, according to the measure of sin, it is able to do so nevertheless in so far as

action

its

by the ordering of Divine

lated

so the fire of the furnace

is

regu-

is

justice; even

things a man sinneth by the same also he is tormented. Now men sin by the sensible things of this world. Therefore

is

it

just that they

should be punished by those same things.

regulated by the

As stated

/ afiswer that.

book on Me-

in the

forethought of the smith, according as the effect

teorology,^ fire has other bodies for

of his art requires.

for the reason that of

the greatest power of action.

Article

Same

6.

Whether the Fire of Hell As Ours?

Is of the

under two conditions:

Species

We

own

existing in its

in

ter,

whether of earth, as

air,

as in the flame.

which we see. For Augustine says/ and is quoted in the text,^ "In my opinion no man knows of what kind is the everlasting fire, un-

however

species as the corporeal fire

Objection

i.

less the Spirit of

But

all

God has revealed it to anyone." all know the nature of this

or nearly

of ours. Therefore that fire

fire

same

not of the

is

Obj.

2.

Further, Gregory commenting on Job

20. 26, i4 fire that is not kindled shall devour him, says {Moral, xv, 29.)^ "Bodily fire needs bodily fuel in order to become fire; neither can it be except by being kindled, nor live unless it be renewed. On the other hand the fire of hell, since it is a bodily fire, and burns in a bod-

way

ily

the wicked cast therein,

is

neither kin-

human endeavour, nor kept

dled by

alive with

Hence

its

fire is

own

has found

it

matter, as

in

burning

coal, or of

Under whatever conditions be found, it is always of the same

fire

so far as the nature of fire

is conbe a difference of species as to the bodies which are the matter of fire. Therefore flame and burning coal differ specifically, and hkewise burning wood and red-hot

species,

cerned, but there

iron; nor does point,

species as this.

matter,

sphere, and in a strange mat-

would seem that

proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It this fire is not of the same

its

the elements

all

it

may

signify, as to this particular

whether they be kindled by force, as

the case of iron, or ciple, as is

by a natural

in

intrinsic prin-

happens with sulphur. Accordingly it is of the same spe-

clear that the fire of hell

we

cies as the fire

have, so far as the nature

concerned. But whether that fire subsists in its proper matter, or if it subsists in a strange matter, whatever that matter may be, of fire

is

we know

And

not.

specifically

way it may differ we have, considered

in this

from the

fire

fuel,

materially. It has, however, certain properties

at one

differing

but once created endures unquenchably; and the same time it needs no kindling, and lacks not heat." Therefore it is not of the same nature as the fire that we see. Obj.

3.

Further,

The

everlasting and the cor-

ruptible differ essentially, since they agree not

even

But

according to the Philosopher.'* of ours is corruptible, whereas the

in genus, this fire

other

is

everlasting:

Depart from Me, you

cursed, into everlasting fire

(Matt.

25.

41).

Therefore they are not of the same nature. Obj. 4. Further, It belongs to the nature of this fire of ours to give light.

But the

fire

of

hence the saying of Job 18. 5: Shall not the light of the wicked be extinguished? Therefore ... as above. On the contrary. According to the Philosopher,^ "every water is of the same species as every other water." Therefore in like manner every fire is of the same species as every

hell gives

other

no

1

as regards the nature of the

Reply Obj.

i.

is

written (Wisd. 11.17):

City of God, xx, 16 (PL 41, 682). Peter Lombard, Sent., iv, d. 44, chap. 6

3

PL

*

Metaphysics, x, lo (i058''26).

75, ioq8.

^Topics,!, 5 (lOi^ig).

By what

(QR

11,

1003).

Augustine

with regard to gard to its nature. fire

Reply Obj.

its

fire. is

speaking of that

matter, and not with re-

This fire of ours is kept alive kindled by man, because it is introduced into a foreign matter by art and force. But that other fire needs no fuel to keep it alive, because either it subsists in its own 2.

with fuel, and

matter, or

is

not by force

in a foreign matter,

is

but by nature from an intrinsic principle. Therefore it is kindled not by man but by God, Who fashioned its nature. This is the meaning of the words of Isaias (30.

of the Lord dling it.

is

Reply Obj.

fire.

Further, It

*

light;

from our fire, for instance that it needs no kindling, nor is kept alive by fuel. But the differences do not argue a difference of species

damned

2)2>)

•

The breath

as a torreftt of brimstone kin-

3.

Even

as the bodies

of the

be of the same species as now, although now they are corruptible, whereas then they will be incorruptible, both by the ordering of Divine justice, and on account of the cessation of the heavenly movement, so is 6

will

Aristotle, iv,

i

(379'*i6).

— SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART with the

it

will

To

4.

give light does not belong

according to any mode of existence, own matter it gives no light there-

fire

since in its fore

it

;

does not shine in

ing to the philosophers,

own sphere accordand in like manner in

its

certain foreign matters

when

it is

does not shine, as

it

an opaque earthly substance such

in

as sulphur.

me

forth

ART.

Q. 97

.

.

.

is, into hell," and in the Gospel (Matt. 40) the words in the heart of the earth have the same sense, for as the heart is in the middle of an animal, so is hell supposed to be in the middle of the earth.

The same happens

also

when

its

12.

/ answer that, As Augustine says,^ and he is quoted in the text,^ "I am of opinion that no one knows in what part of the world hell is situated, unless the Spirit of

answers

species.

rash decision. For

is

this to iv,

in

Article 7. Whether the Fire of Hell Is Beneath the Earth?

We

God

has revealed

some one." Therefore Gregory

obscured by thick smoke. Therefore that the fire of hell gives no light is not sufficient proof of its being of a different

brightness

1071

7

into the heart of the sea, says,^

"that

be punished.

Reply Obj. to

by which those bodies

of hell

fire

{Dial.

42)^ having been questioned on this point :

"About

some part

think

it

matter

this

I

dare not give a

some have thought

hell to

of the earth's surface;

to be beneath the earth."

He

be

others

shows

more probable for from the very meaning of

the latter opinion to be the

would seem that

two reasons. First the word. These are

earth.

the nether regions (infernus), for the reason

proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It this fire is not beneath the

Objection

For

i.

(Job. 18. 18),

it

is

And God

said of the shall

damned

remove him out

world). Therefore the of the globe (Douay, fire whereby the damned will be punished is

not beneath the earth but outside the globe. Obj. 2. Further, Nothing violent or accidental

can be everlasting. But this fire will be in hell for ever. Therefore it will be there not by force but naturally. Now fire cannot be under the earth save by violence. Therefore the fire of hell is

Obj.

not beneath the earth. 3. Further, After the day of judgment

the bodies of in hell.

Now

all

the

damned

will

those bodies will

fill

be tormented a place. Con-

sequently, since the multitude of the

damned

be very great, for the number of fools is i. 15), the space containing that fire must also be very great. But it would seem unreasonable to say that there is so great a hollow within the earth, since all the parts of the earth naturally tend to the centre. Therefore that fire will not be beneath the earth. will

infinite (Eccl.

Obj.

4.

Further,

neth, by the

same

By what

things a

man

sin-

also he is

tormented (Wisd. II. 17). But the wicked have sinned on the earth. Therefore the fire that punishes them should not be under the earth.

On

the contrary, It

is

written (Isa. 14, 9)

:

Hell below was iit an uproar to meet Thee at Thy coming. Therefore the fire of hell is beneath us. Further, Gregory says {Dial, iv, 42):^ "I see not

what hinders us from believing that

beneath the earth. Further, A gloss on Jonas

hell is

1

PL 77, 401,

2. 4,

Thou

words: "If

we

call it

beneath us (inferitis), what earth is heaven, such should be hell in relation to earth." Secondly, from the words of Apoc. 5. 3: No man was able, neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor under the earth, to open the book, where the words "in heaven" that

it

is

in relation to

refer to the angels, "on earth" to

men

living in

the body, and "under the earth" to souls in

Augustine too {Gen. ad

hell.

34)^ seems to indicate two reasons for the congruity of hell being under the earth. One is that "since Lit. xii,

the souls of the departed sinned through love of the flesh, they should be treated as the dead flesh is accustomed to be treated, by being buried beneath the earth." The other is that heaviness is to the body what sorrow is to the spirit, and joy (of spirit) is as lightness (of

body). Therefore "just as in reference to the body, all the heavier things are beneath the others, if they are placed in order of gravity, so in reference to the spirit, the lower place

occupied by

is

more sorrowful"; empyrean is a fitting place

whatever

and thus even as the

is

for the joy of the elect, so the lowest part of

the earth

is

the damned.

a fitting place for the sorrow of Nor does it signify that Augus-

tine {ibid.) says that "hell

is stated or beheved under the earth," because he withdraws this {Retract, ii, 24)^ where he says: "I think I should have said that hell is beneath the earth, rather than have given the reason why it is stated or believed to be under the earth."

to be

^

Glossa interl.

3

Ciiy of God, xx, 16 (PL 41, 682). Lombard, Sent., iv, d. 44, chap. 6 (QRii, 1003). PL 77, 400.

4

hast cast

his

6

«

PL 34, 482.

(iv.

375r).

'PL 32, 640.

^

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

I072

However, some philosophers have maintained

sinned in soul and body will be punished in

beneath the terrestrial orb, but above the surface of the earth, on that part which is opposite to us. This seems to have been the meaning of Isidore when he asserted that "the sun and the moon will stop in the place wherein they w^ere created, lest the wicked should enjoy this light in the midst of their torments."^ But this is no argument, if we assert that hell is under the earth. We have already stated how these words may be ex-

it does not follow that a man will be punished in the very place where he sinned, because the place due to the damned is other from that due to wayfarers. We may also reply that these words refer to the punishments inflicted on man on the way, according as each sin has its corresponding punishment, since "every disordered love is its own punishment," as Augustine states.^

that

hell

plained

situated

is

both. But

QUESTION XCVIII Of the will and intellect of the DAMNED

(q. xci, a. 2).

Pythagoras held^ the place of punishment to be in a fiery sphere situated, according to him, in the middle of the whole world, and he called

{In Nine Articles)

the prison-house of Jupiter as Aristotle re-

it

lates.^

It

however, more in keeping with it is beneath the earth.

is,

Scripture to say that

Reply Obj. i. The words of Job, God shall remove him out of the globe, refer to the surface of the earth, that is from this world. This is how Gregory expounds it {Moral, xiv, 22)^ where he says: "He is removed from the globe when, at the coming of the heavenly judge, he is taken away from this world wherehe now prides himself in Nor does globe here signify

in

his wickedness."

the universe, as

though the place of punishment were outside the whole universe.

Reply Obj. 2. Fire continues in that place for all eternity by the ordering of Divine justice, although according to its nature an element cannot last for ever outside its own place, especially if things

were

to

remain

in this state of

We

must next consider matters pertaining to Under this head there are nine points of inquiry: (i) Whether every act of will in the damned is evil? (2) Whether they ever repent of the evil they have done? (3) Whether they would rather not be than be? (4) Whether they would wish others to be damned? (5) Whether the wicked hate God? (6) Whether they can demerit? (7) Whether they can make use of the knowledge acquired in this life? (8) Whether they ever think of God? (9) Whether they see the will and intellect of the damned.

the glory of the blessed?

Article the

Whether Every Act of Will

i.

Damned

We

proceed thus to the First Article:

would seem that not every act of

generation and corruption. The fire there will be of the very greatest heat, because its heat will be all gathered together from all parts, through being surrounded on all sides by the cold of

damned

the earth.

stand." Since, then,

Reply Obj. 3. Hell will never lack sufficient room to admit the bodies of the damned, since

not worse

hell

is

Obj. "evil

great enough to contain

is

damned. Reply Obj. 4. It does not follow of necessity that by what things a man sinneth, by the same tormented, except as regards the principal instruments of sin, because man having

also he

'

is

Cf. Glossa ordin.,

dore,

De

on

Ord. Crcatur., v

Isa. 60.19 (iv,

(PL

Etymol, XIV, 9 (PL 82. 526). 2 Diogenes Laertes, Viiac opltortim, VIII, »

Heavens,

I,

11,

31

(DD

99A);

83, 924); xill

et

cf.

also Isi-

(PL

83, 946);

Placita Clarorum Philos-

211).

X3 (293*^1).

the

PL

75, 1053.

best,

off

men who

are

than the demons,

2.

is

it

damned

are

would seem

Further, As Dionysius says (ibid.) J

altogether involuntary." Therefore

damned

they will

will anything,

thing good or apparently good.

Now

it

as

if

some-

a will that

good is itself good. Therefore the damned can have a good will. Obj. 3. Further, Some will be damned who, directly ordered to

while in this world, acquired certain habits of virtue, for instance heathens

who had

civic vir-

Now

a will elicits praiseworthy acts by reason of virtuous habits. Therefore there may be praiseworthy acts of the will in some of the tues.

damned. ^

^

iv),^

that they also can have a good will.

never are satisfied (Prov. 30. 15, 16). Nor is it unreasonable that God's power should maintain within the bowels of the earth a hollow the bodies of the

For according to Dionysius "the demons desire the good namely to be, to live, to under-

i.

Nom.

and the

accounted one of the three things that

all

It

will in the

is evil.

Objection {Div.

in

Is Evil?

Confessions,

•Sect. 23

i,

ig

(PG3,

(PL

72s).

3:

670). 7

Sect. 32

(PG3,

732).

— SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART On

the contrary,

An

obstinate will can never are

m

will.

my

good

Obj.

will.

will is theirs

that.

this or be inclined by their affections to this beand evil, always them This will is in turned away from cause they are completely nor can a will be the last end of a right will, to that same end. directed be it except good good, they Hence even though they will some be able to call one that so well it will do not account. their will good on that Dionysius must, i. The words of

some

ture's inclination to

particular good.

natural inchnation

this

is

is

na-

And

corrupted by

good which desired by them under

as this their wickedness, in so far

they desire naturally is certain evil circumstances.

Yet it good. teem that which is evil as though it were evil. Hence their will is do Reply Obj. 3. The habits of civic virtue because those not remain in the separated soul, civic Hfe which the in only us perfect virtues not remain after this Ufe. Even into acthey remained, they would never come by the obtion, being enchained, as it were,

though

will

stinacy of the mind.

Repent of 2. Whether the Damned They Have Done? We proceed thus to the Second Article: would seem that the damned never repent

Article the Evil

It

of

the evil they have done.

Objection i. For Bernard says on the Canthat "the dammed ever consent to the evil

ticle^

De

Arb., IX

Consider., v, 12

(PL

sed contra

i

(PL

;

(BO xxx,

689).

cf.

182, 802);

Albert,

182, 1017)

to the angels."

is

Damascene man what

to

But the

tics,

or through obstinacy, as those

glad

when they have done

angel's

who

are

and rejoice

evil,

in

14).

There-

said of the

damned

(Prov.

most wicked things

2.

fore, etc.

On

the contrary. It

(Wisd. (Vulg.,

3)

5.

:

is

Repenting within themselves

Saying within themselves, repenting). The Philosopher says^ that "the

Further,

wicked are

full of

repentance; for afterwards

they are sorry for that in which previously they took pleasure." Therefore the damned, being

most wicked, repent all the more. / answer that, A person may repent of sin in two ways in one way directly, in another way

He repents of a sin directly who hates sin as such; and he repents accidentally who hates it on account of something connected with it, for instance punishment or someaccidentally.

thing of that kind. Accordingly the wicked will not repent of their sins directly, because consent in the malice of sin will remain in them;

but they will repent accidentally, in so far as they will suffer from the punishment inflicted on them for sin.

Reply Obj.

In

De

Grat. et Lib.

Sent., iv, d. 50, A. 3.

i.

The damned

will wickedness,

but shun punishment, and thus accidentally they repent of wickedness committed. Reply Obj. 2. To wish one had not sinned on account of the shamefulness of vice is a good will; but this will not be in the wicked. Reply Obj. 3. It will be possible for the damned to repent of their sins without turning their will away from sin, because in their sins they will shun not what they previously desired,

Cf.

"death

:

Evil, as evil, does not move Reply Obj. thought to be good. the will, but in so far as it is that they eswickedness their of comes 2.

1

4),^

he cannot withdraw from the choice whereby he previously sinned. Therefore the damned also cannot repent of the sins committed by them. Obj. 4. Further, The wickedness of the damned in hell will be greater than that of sinners in the world. Now in this world some sinners repent not of the sins they have committed, either through blindness of mind, as here-

to

which

ii,

will is irrevocable after his fall, in that

can be good. But their deliberate it is in their power of themselves, according as

will,

was

their fall

in

yet

Further, According to

3.

{De Fide Orthod.

may be consid/ answer that, A twofold will deliberate will the namely damned, ered in the will is theirs and the natural will. Their natural of nature Author the of but not of themselves call Who gave nature this inclination which we remains nature since Therefore the natural will. will in them them, it follows that the natural

Reply Obj. be understood of the natural

1073

2

they had not sinned, and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

m

But the blessed never have an Neither therefore have the damned

iv\\

ART.

repent they have done." Therefore they never of the sins they have committed. Obj. 2. Further, To wish one had not sinned will never have a is a good will. But the damned good will. Therefore the damned will never wish

evil. Now men who )e inclined except to demons, lamned will be obstinate even as the good. be never can will rherefore their redamned is Fiirther, As the will of the blessed the of will the so is

ation to evil, egard to good.

Q. 98

but something

else,

namely the punish-

ment. 2

PG

94, 877.

'

Ethics, IX, 4 (1166^24).

—

:

:

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

I074

Reply Obj.

However

4.

obstinate

men may

be in this world, they repent of the sins accidentally if they are punished for them. Thus

Augustine says (qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) \^ "We see the most savage beasts are deterred from the

by fear of pain."

greatest pleasures

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

would seem impossible for the damned, by right and deliberate reason, to will not to be. Objection 1. For Augustine says {De Lib. Arb. iii, 7) '} "Consider how great a good it is to be, since both the happy and the unhappy will it; for to be and yet to be unhappy is a greater thing than not to be at all." 2.

Preference supposes election. But not to be it has not the appearance of good, for it is nothing. Therefore not to be cannot be more desirable to the 8)

:^

not a matter of choice since

damned than Obj.

3.

to be.

Now

to be shunned.

since

evil,

The

Further,

greater evil

not to be

is

the

to leave nothing. Therefore not to be

more

is

more

shunned than to be unhappy; and thus same conclusion follows as above.

to be

the

On

the contrary, It

men

hi those days

death shall Further,

fly

.

is

.

.

written (Apoc.

9.

in

it is

shall desire to die,

(Ecclus. 41.

3,

to die,

Much

desirable

to

damned

the

and so

more, therefore,

it is

is

written is

"not to be"

damned according

the

to

their

deliberate reason. / answer that.

two ways.

Not

to be

may

be considered

First, in itself,

may

be considered as a relief from a painful some unhappiness, and thus not to be takes on the aspect of good, since "to lack an evil is a kind of good" as the Philosopher says.-* In this way it is better for the damned it

life

1

or from

PL 40,

»PL32,

says,^ but absolutely.

Non being is subject to choice, but only accidentally, as stated already (Reply i). not in

25.

2

2.

itself,

Reply Obj.

Although not to be is very it removes being, it is very good, in so far as it removes unhappiness, which is the greatest of evils, and thus it is preferred 3.

in so far as

evil,

not to be.

^Article

4. Whether in Hell the Damned 'Would Wish Others Were Damned Who Are Not Damned?

We

proceed this to the Fourth Article: It in

hell

the

damned would who are not

wish others were damned

Objection of the rich

i.

man

For

it is

said

(Luke

16. 27,

28)

that he prayed for his brethren,

lest they should come into the place of torments. Therefore in Hke manner the other

damned would not wish, at least, be damned in hell. Obj. 2. Further, The damned

their friends

in the flesh to

are not deprived of their inordinate affections. Now some of the damned loved inordinately some who are not damned. Therefore they would not desire

their

that

evil,

is,

that

they should be

Obj. 3. Further, the damned do not desire the increase of their punishment. Now if more

were damned, their punishment would be greater, even as the joy of the blessed is increased by an increase in their number. Therefore the

damned who are

On

desire

PL 32. *

1280.

Ethics, \,i{ii2g^d>).

not

the

damnation of those

saved.

the contrary,

^Glossa ordin. 1281.

life,

of unhappiness, as the Philosopher

damned.

and thus it can in no way be desirable, since it has no aspect of good, but is pure privation of good. Secondly, in

referable to an evil and corrupt life

damned. of

welcome to the man that is in need, and to him whose strength jaileth; who is in a decrepit age, and that is in care about all things, and to the distrustful that loseth wisdom (Vulg., patience).

this as

not

death, thy sentence

4):

desired by

and a

end to unhappiness. For

stated that to be and to live are all naturally, we are not to take

is

and

all

some

it

would seem that

from them.

The unhappiness

desirable to

as putting an

6)

unhappiness of this world. Now order to escape the unhappiness of this world,

surpasses

tally,

when

the greatest

is

removes good altogether, so as

it

Reply Obj. i. The saying of Augustine is to be understood in the sense that not to be is a matter of choice not in itself but acciden-

Reply Obj.

Further. Augustine argues thus {ibid.

is

Jerome observes:^ "It is better not be than to be evilly." In this sense the damned can prefer not to be, according to their deliberate reason.

Not To Be?

Obj.

a gloss of to

Article 3. Whether the Damned By Right and Deliberate Reason Woidd Will

We

not to be than to be unhappy. Hence it is said (Matt. 26. 24): It were better for him, if that man had not been born, and (Jerem. 20. 14) Cursed be the day wherein I was born, where

(iv,

A

gloss on Isa.

14. 9, are

139E); Jerome, In Jerem. (PL

838).

^Ethics, IX, 9 (11 70^22),

2.1,

:

.

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART risen

up from

their thrones, says

are comforted by having

:^

"The wicked

many companions

in

their punishment."

Further, Envy reigns supreme in the damned. Therefore they grieve for the happiness of the blessed, and desire their damnation.

/ answer that.

heaven there

will

Even

as

in

the blessed in

damned

goods. Consequently the sight of the happiness of the saints will give them very great pain; hence it is written (Isa. 26. 11): Let the en-

and be confounded, and

vious people see

let

devour Thy enemies. Therefore they will all the good were damned. Reply Obj. i. So great will be the envy of the damned that they will envy the glory even of their kindred, since they themselves are supremely unhappy, for this happens even in

fire

wish

this

life,

when envy

increases.

Nevertheless

they will envy their kindred less than others, and their punishment would be greater if all their kindred

were damned, and others saved,

some

of their kindred were saved. For

than

if

this reason the rich man prayed that his brethren might be warded from damnation, for he knew that some are guarded therefrom. Yet

he would rather that his brethren were damned as well as all the rest.

Reply Obj. tue

is

2.

Love that

is

not based on vir-

easily cut off, especially in evil

men, as

the Philosopher says.^ Hence the damned will not preserve their friendship for those whom

they loved inordinately. Yet the will of them remain perverse, because they will continue to love the cause of their inordinate

will

loving.

Although an increase in the number of the damned results in an increase of each one's punishment, so much the more will their hatred and envy increase that they will prefer to be more tormented with many rather than less tormented alone.

Reply Obj.

Article

5.

3.

Whether the Damned Hate God?

We

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It would seem that the damned do not hate God. Objection 1. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Norn, i),^ "the beautiful and good that is the cause of all goodness and beauty is be1

Glossa ordin.

(iv,

32E);

cf.

Jerome, In Isaiam (PL

Ethics,

vm,

8 (1159^7).

^

Sect. 10

(PG 3,

6

1075

since "evil

is

altogether involuntary," as Diony-

Nom. iv).* Now God is goodTherefore no one can hate Him.

sius asserts (Div.

ness

itself.

On

the contrary, It

The pride of them

written (Ps. 73. 23)

is

708).

Thee ascendeth

that hate

contiiiually

The

I answer that,

or evil apprehended.

appetite

two ways, namely

in

who

blessed,

see

is

Now God

Him

moved by good is

apprehended

Himself, as by the in His essence; and in

in

by us and by the damned. Since, then. He is goodness by His essence, He cannot in Himself be displeasing to any will; therefore whoever sees Him in His essence cannot hate Him. On the other hand, some of His

His

effects, as

effects

are displeasing to

as they are

may

a person

the will in so far

opposed to any one, and accordingly

God

hate

not in Himself, but Therefore the damned, perceiving God in His punishment, which is the effect of His justice, hate Him, even as they hate the punishment inflicted on them. Reply Obj. 1. The saying of Dionysius refers to the natural appetite; and even this is rendered perverse in the damned, by that which is added to it by their deliberate will, as stated above (a. i. Reply i). Reply Obj. 2. This argument would prove if the damned saw God in Himself, as being in His essence.

by reason of His

Article

We

6.

effects.

Whether

the

Damned Demerit?

proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It

would seem that the damned demerit. Objection 1. For the damned have an will, as

stated in the last Distinction of

iv.

evil

Sent.^

But they demerited by the evil will that they had here. Therefore if they do not demerit there, their damnation is to their advantage. Obj. 2. Further, The damned are on the same footing as the demons. Now the demons demerit after their fall, and thus God inflicted a punishment on the serpent, who induced man to sin (Gen. 3. 14, 15). Therefore the damned also demerit.

Obj.

3.

Further,

An

inordinate act that pro-

ceeds from a deliberate will

is

not excused

from demerit, even though there be necessity of which one is oneself the cause, for the drunken man deserves a double punishment

24,

165). 2

ART.

as neither can one will badness itself,

itself,

be most perfect charity, so

there will be the most perfect hate. Therefore as the saints will rejoice in all goods, so will the damned grieve for all in the

Q. 98

loved of all." But this is God. Therefore God cannot be the object of anyone's hate. Obj. 2. Further, No one can hate goodness

(PG 3,

4

Sect. 32

6

Dist. 50, chap,

732). i

(QR 11,

1032).

^

SUM MA THEOLOGICA

LOj6

he commit a crime throut^h being drunk. the damned were themselves the cause of their own obstinacy, owing to which they are under a kind of necessity of sinning. Therefore since their act proceeds from their free

Reply Obj.

if

Now

from demerit. the contrary, Punishment is divided

choice, they are not excused

On

against fault.

Now

the perverse

damned proceeds from their

is

will

their obstinacy,

of

the

which

punishment. Therefore the perverse damned is not a fault by which they

will of the

may

profitable to

of evil, the result being that the

Further, After reaching the last term there

no further movement, or advancement in good or evil. Now the damned, especially after the judgment day, will have reached the last term of their damnation, since "then there will cease to be two cities," according to Augustine {Enchir. cxi).^ Therefore after the judgment day the damned will not demerit by their perverse will, for if they did their damnation would is

be augmented. / answer that,

We must draw a distinction between the damned before the judgment day and after. For all are agreed that after the judgment day there will be neither merit nor demerit. The reason for this is because merit or demerit is directed to the attainment of some further good or evil, and after the day of judgment good and evil will have reached their ultimate consummation, so that there will be no further addition to good or evil. Consequently, good will in the blessed will not be a merit but a reward, and evil will in the damned will be not a demerit but a punishment only. For works of virtue belong especially to the state of happiness, and their contraries to the other hand,

demons

the

demerit

that, before

the judgment day, both the good merit and

it

damned

are

clear

that

is

for

are,

regards

as

which reason the latter secondary punish-

their

ment.

The reason why they are 3. from demerit is not because they are under the necessity of sinning, but because they have reached the highest of Reply Obj. excused

evils.

However, the necessity of sinning of which

we

are ourselves the cause, in so far as

necessity, excuses

from

it is

a

because every sin needs to be voluntary; but it does not excuse, in so far as it proceeds from a previous act of the will, and consequently the whole demerit of the subsequent sin would seem to belong to the previous sin. sin,

Article 7. Whether the Damned Can Make Use of the Knowledge They Had in This World?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It would seem that the damned are unable to make use of the knowledge they had in this world.

Objection

i.

For there

is

very great pleasure

knowledge. But we must not admit that they have any pleasure. Therefore they cannot make use of the knowledge they had previously, by applying their the

in

consideration

consideration to

Obj.

some say

degree un-

they gain no advantage from their sin. Reply Obj. 2. Men who are damned are not occupied in drawing others to damnation, as

the state of unhappiness.^

On

Hence

incapable of demerit.

not

demerit.

It is in the highest

i.

have reached the highest degree

it.

Further,

2.

of

The damned

suffer greater

pains than any pains of this world.

when one

world,

is

in

Now

very great pain,

in this

it is

im-

demerit. But this cannot apply to

possible to consider any intelligible conclusions,

the essential reward or to the principal punish-

through being distracted by the pains that one suffers. Much less therefore can one do so in

the

damned

both have reached the term. Possibly, however, this may apply to the accidental reward, or secondary punishment, which are subject to increase until the day of judgment. Especially may this apply to the demons, or to the good angels, by whose ment, since

in this respect

activities som.e are

drawn

to salvation,

the joy of the blessed angels

some

to

of the

demons

is

whereby

increased, and

damnation, wherclw the punishment is

hell.

Obj. time.

3.

Further,

Ethics.

Ill,

'

.Aristotle, Ethics,

*

Cf. Part

A. 4,

Reply

2.

I, Q.

i,

2

PL 40,

damned

will forget

here.

On the contrary. It is who was damned (Luke

said to the rich

man

25): Reviember that thou didst receive good things in thy life16.

time, etc. Therefore they will consider about

augmented."*

5 (iii3''3i).

are subject to

the cause of for-

is

getfulness."^ Therefore the

what they knew

the things they 1

The damned

But "length of time

284.

Further,

10(1 loo^j).

Lxii, A. 9, Reply 3; Part 11 -II, Q.

xm,

The

knew

here.

intelligible

species remain in

the separated soul, as stated above '

Aristotle, Physics, iv, 13 (222^*19).

(q.

lxx,

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART Reply 3; Part I, Q. Lxxxrx, a. 6). Therefore, if they could not use them these would

Q. 98

ART.

1077

9

A. 2,

remain in them to no purpose. / answer that, Even as in the saints, on account of the perfection of their glory, there will be nothing but what is a matter of joy, so there will be nothing in the damned but what is a matter and cause of sorrow; nor will anything that can pertain to sorrow be lacking, so that their unhappiness is consummate. Now

known

brings

some respect, either on the part things known, because we love them,

of the

the part of the knowledge, because

fitting

the consideration of certain things

us joy, in

or on

it is

and perfect. There may also be a reason for sorrow both on the part of the things known, because they are of a grievous nature, and on the part of the knowledge, if we consider its imperfection; for instance a person may consider his defective knowledge about a certain thing, which he would desire to know perfectly. Accordingly, in the damned there will be actual consideration of the things they knew previously as matters of sorrow, but not as a cause of pleasure. For they will consider both the evil they have done, and for which they were damned, and the delightful goods they have lost, and on both counts they will suffer torments. Likewise they will be tormented with the thought that the knowledge they had of speculative matters was imperfect, and that they missed its highest degree of perfection which they might have acquired. Reply Obj. i. Although the consideration of knowledge

delightful in itself,

is

it

may

acci-

dentally be the cause of sorrow, as explained

above.

Reply Obj.

In this world the soul

Article 8. Whether the Damned Will Ever Think of God?

We

proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It

would seem that the damned will sometimes think of God. Objection i. For one cannot hate a thing actually unless one think about

damned

it.

Now

the

God, as stated in the text of the fourth book of the Sentences in the last Distinction.^ Therefore they will think of God sometimes. will hate

Obj. 2. Further, The damned will have remorse of conscience. But the conscience suffers remorse for deeds done against God. Therefore they will sometimes think of God. On the contrary, Man's most perfect thoughts are those which are about God, whereas the

damned

will

be in a state of the greatest imper-

fection. Therefore they will not think of

God.

/ answer that, One may think of God in two ways. First, in Himself and according to that

which

proper to Him, namely that He is the all goodness, and thus it is altogether impossible to think of Him without delight, so is

fount of

damned will by no means think of Him way. Secondly, according to something accidental as it were to Him in His effects, such as His punishments, and so forth, and in this respect the thought of God can bring that the

in this

sorrow, so that in this think of God.

way

the

damned

will

Reply Obj. I. The damned do not hate God except because He punishes and forbids what agreeable to their evil will, and consequently they will think of Him only as punishing and forbidding. This suffices for the Reply to the

is

to a corruptible body,

Second Objection, since conscience will not have remorse for sin except as forbidden by

consideration

the Divine

commandment.

not be so

Article

Whether the Damned See the

much

Glory of the Blessed?

the body. life

the

2.

On

soul

is

united

and therefore the soul's hindered by the suffering of

is

the other hand, in the future

drawn by the body may suffer, have a most clear view of

will

body, but however

the

9.

those things that can be a cause of anguish

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It would seem that the damned do not see the

to

glory of the blessed.

the

soul

will

it.

Reply Obj.

Time

causes forgetfulness accidentally, in so far as the movement of which it

is

3.

the measure

after the

is

the cause of change. But

judgment day there

ment

will

be no move-

of the heavens; therefore neither will it be possible for forgetfulness to result from any lapse of time however long. Before the judgment day, however, the separated soul is not changed from its disposition by the heavenly

movement.

Objection 1. For they are more distant from the glory of the blessed than from the happenings of this world. But they do not see what happens in regard to us; hence Gregory commenting on Job. 14. 21, Whether his children come to honour etc. says {Moral, xii, 21):^

"Even as those who still live know not in what place are the souls of the dead, so the dead 1

Dist. so, chap. 2

2

PL 75, 999.

(QR 11,

1034),

SUMMA

1078

TllEOLOGICA

who have hved in the body know not the things which regard the hfe of those who are in the flesh."

Much

therefore, can they see the

less,

glory of the blessed.

Obj. 2. Further, That which is granted as a great favour to the saints in this life is never

granted to the damned. Now it was granted as a great favour to Paul to see the life in which the saints hve for ever with God, as the 12. 2 states.^ Therefore the not see the glory of the saints.

gloss on II Cor.

damned

On

will

the contrary, It

man

that the rich

saw Abraham

.

.

I answer that,

ment day, a

way

is

stated

(Luke

16. 23)

midst of his torments and Lazarus in his bosom. in the

.

The damned, before

the judg-

will see the blessed in glory, in

as to

know, not what that glory

such

is like,

but only that they are in a state of glory that surpasses all thought. This will trouble them, both because they will, through envy, grieve

Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners? (2) Whether by God's mercy all punishment both of men and of demons comes to an end? (3) Whether at least the punishment of men comes to an end? (4) Whether at least the punishment of Christians has an end? (5) Whether there is an end to the punishment of those who have performed works of mercy? i. Whether By Divine Justice an Eternal Punishment Is Inflicted on Sinners?

Article

We

proceed thus to the First Article:

It

would seem that an eternal punishment is not inflicted on sinners by Divine justice. Objectiofi I. For the punishment should not exceed the fault: According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be (Deut. 25.

2).

Now

fault

temporal. There-

is

fore the punishment should not be eternal.

Obj.

2.

Further, Of two mortal sins one

is

for-

greater than the other, and therefore one should

feited that glor>\ Hence it is written (Wisd. 5. 2) concerning the wicked Seeing it they shall be troubled with terrible fear. After the judgment day, however, they will be altogether deprived

receive a greater punishment than the other.

for their happiness,

and because they have

:

of seeing the blessed; nor will this lessen their punishment, but will increase it, because they will bear in remembrance the glory of the blessed which they saw at or before the judgment, and this will torment them. Moreover they will be tormented by finding themselves considered unworthy even to see the glory

which the saints merit to have. Reply Obj. i. The happenings of this life would not, if seen, torment the damned in hell as the sight of the glory of the saints. Therefore the things which happen here are not shown to the

damned

in the

same way

as the saints'

although also of the things that happen here, those are shown to them which are capable of causing them sorrow.

glory;

Reply Obj.

Paul looked upon that life live with God, by actual exand by hoping to have it more 2.

wherein the saints perience of

it

perfectly in the

life to

come. Not so the damned,

and therefore the comparison

god's

We must next

consider God's justice and mercy towards the damned, under which head there Glossa

ititerl. (vi,

761); Glossa

(i)

Therefore eternal

punishment is not due to every sin; and if it is not due to one, it is due to none, since they are not infinitely distant from one another. Obj. 3. Further, A just judge does not punish except in order to correct, and therefore it is stated^ that "punishments are a kind of medicine." Now, to punish the wicked eternally does not lead to their correction, nor to that of others, since then there will be no one in

who can be

future

corrected thereby. Therefore

punishment is not inflicted for sins according to Divine justice. Obj. 4. Further, No one washes that which is not desirable for its own sake, except on aceternal

count of some advantage. Now God does not wish punishment for its own sake, for He delights not in punishment.^ Since then no advantage can result from the perpetuity of punishment, it would seem that He ought not to inflict such a punishment for sin. 5. Further, Nothing accidental lasts for But punishment is one of those things that happen accidentally, since it is contrary

Obj.

Obj.

seem

6.

it

The

Further.

cannot be everlasting. justice of

God would

brought on account of ingratitude a person deserves to lose all benefits; and to require that sinners should be

to nothing, because

(In Five Articles)

*

greater than eternal pun-

infinite.

to nature. Therefore

mercy and justice towards the damned

are five points of inquiry:

is

is

it

ever.'*

fails.

QUESTION XCIX Of

But no punishment ishment, since

Whether by

Lombardi (PL

192, 79).

among 2

other benefits of

Aristotle. Ethics,

'Cf.Wisd. *

ii,

God

there

is

being

3 (1104^17).

1.13.

Aristotle, Heavens,

i,

2 (269*'6)

;

cf. ii,

3 (286*17).

— SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART Therefore it would seem just that the sinner who has been ungrateful to God should lose his being. But if sinners be brought to nothing, their punishment cannot be everlasting. Therefore it would seem out of keeping with Divine justice that sinners should be punitself.

ished for ever.

On 46)

:

the contrary, It is written (Matt. 25, These, namely the wicked, shall go into

everlasting piinishment.

Further, As reward

is

to merit, so

is

punish-

to guilt. Now, according to Divine justice, an eternal reward is due to temporal merit: Every one who seeth the Son and believeth in may have) Him hath (Vulg., that everyone life everlasting. Therefore according to Divine justice an everlasting punishment is due to temporal guilt. Further, According to the Philosopher,^ punishment is meted according to the dignity of the person sinned against, so that a person who strikes one in authority receives a greater punishment than one who strikes anyone else. Now whoever sins mortally sins against God, Whose commandments he breaks, and Whose honour he gives another, by placing his end in some one other than God. But God's majesty is infinite. Therefore whoever sins mortally deserves infinite punishment; and consequently it seems just that for a mortal sin a man should be punished for ever. / answer that. Since punishment is measured in two ways, namely according to the degree of its severity, and according to its length of time, the measure of punishment corresponds

ment

.

to the

measure of

.

.

fault, as regards the

degree

more grievously

a per-

of severity, so that the

son sins the more grievously is he punished As much as she hath glorified herself and lived :

much torment and sorrow give ye to her (Apoc. 18. 7). The duration of the punishment does not, however, correspond with in delicacies, so

the duration of the fault, as Augustine says,^ for adultery which is committed in a short space of time is not punished with a momentary penalty even according to

human

laws.

But the duration of punishment regards the disposition of the sinner, for sometimes a person who commits an offence in a city is rendered by his very offence worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens, either by perpetual exile or even by death; sometimes however he is not rendered worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of i£Mic5,v, 5(1132^28). 2

City of God, xxi, 11 (PL 41, 725).

ART.

Q. 99

1079

i

the citizens, and therefore in order that he

become a

fitting

member

may

of the State, his pun-

ishment

is prolonged or curtailed, according as expedient for his amendment, so that he may live in the city in a becoming and peaceful

is

manner. So too, according to Divine justice, sin renders a person worthy to be altogether cut off from the fellowship of God's city, and this is the effect of every sin committed against charwhich is the bond uniting this same city

ity,

together. Consequently, for mortal sin which

contrary to charity a person is expelled for ever from the fellowship of the saints and conis

demned

to everlasting punishment, because as

men are cut off from this perishable city by the penalty of the first death, so are they excluded from that imperishable Augustine says,^ "as

city by the punishment of the second death." That the punishment inflicted by the earthly

state

is

not regarded as everlasting

either because

man

is

accidental,

does not endure for ever,

or because the state itself comes to an end. Therefore if man lived for ever, the punishment of exile or slavery, which

human

law,

would remain

is

pronounced by

him

for ever. On the other hand, as regards those who sin in such a way as not to deserve to be entirely cut off from the fellowship of the saints, such as those who sin venially, their punishment wil be so

much

in

the shorter or longer according or less fit to be cleansed,

more

as they are

through sin clinging to them more or less this observed in the punishments of this world and of purgatory according to Divine justice. We find also other reasons given by the saints ;

is

why some

condemned

are justly

to everlasting

punishment for a temporal sin. One is because they sinned against an eternal good by despising eternal Hfe. This is mentioned by Augustine:^ "He is become worthy of eternal evil, who destroyed in himself a good which could be eternal." Another reason is because man sinned in his

own

eternity;

therefore Gregory says belongs to the great justice of the judge that those should never cease to (Dial, iv, 44), 5

be punished

who And

never ceased to be objected that some sin mortally propose to amend their life

desire sin."

who

''it

in this life

if

it

at some time, and that these accordingly would not be deserving of eternal punishment, it must be replied according to some that Gregory

speaks of the will that deed. For he

who

is

made manifest by

falls into

Ubid. (PL 41, 726). *Ibid., 12

(PL

41, 727).

the

mortal sin of his

6PL

77,404.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

io8o

own will puts himself in a state from which he cannot be rescued unless God help him; therefore from the very fact that he

he

to sin,

is

willing

willing to remain in sin for ever.

is

For man is a mind that goetJi, namely to sin, and retiirneth not by his own power (Ps. 77. 39). Thus if a man were to throw himself into a pit from which he could not get out without help, one might say that he wished to remain there for ever, whatever else he may have thought himself. Another and a better answer is that from the very fact that he commits a mortal sin, he places his end in a creature; and 1

since the whole of life

is

directed to

its

end,

it

follows that for this very reason he directs the whole of his hfe to that sin, and is willing to in sin for ever

remain

if

he could do so with

may

be intended for the correction and tranwho remain in the state. Accordingly the damnation of the wicked is quillity of the others

for the correction of those

who

are

now

in the

Church; for punishments are intended for cor-

when they are being inflicted, but also when they are decreed. Reply Obj. 4. The everlasting punishment rection not only

of the wicked will not be altogether useless. For they are useful for two purposes. First,

because thereby the Divine justice is safeguarded which is acceptable to God for its own

Hence Gregory says {Dial, iv, 44) "Almighty God on account of His loving kindness dehghts not in the torments of the unhappy, but on account of His justice. He is for ever unappeased by the punishment of the wicked." sake.

:"*

what Gregory says on Job

Secondly, they are useful, because the elect

esteem the deep as growing old {Moral, xxxiv, 19) •} 'The wicked only put an end to sinning because their life came to an end they would indeed have wished to live

therein, when they see God's justice them, and realize that they have escaped them. Hence it is written (Ps. 57. 12): The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge, (Isa. 66. 24) They, namely the etc., and wicked, shall be a loathsome sight^ to all flesh,

impunity. This 41.

He

23,

is

shall

;

for ever, that they might continue in sin for ever, for they desire rather to sin than to Hve." Still

may

another reason

punishment of mortal thereby one offends since

fore

sin

be given

God Who

is infinite.

punishment cannot be

intensity, because the creature infinite quality,

an

in duration.

And

it

must be

again there

why

the

eternal, because

is

is

is

There-

infinite

in

incapable of

infinite at least

a fourth reason

for the same, because guilt remains for ever, since it cannot be remitted without grace, and

receive grace after death; nor should punishment cease so long as guilt re-

men cannot mains.

Reply Obj.

i.

Punishment does not have to

be equal to fault as to the amount of duration, as is seen to be the case also with human laws. We may also reply with Gregory^ that although sin

is

temporal

in act, it is eternal in will.

rejoice in

:

namely

to the saints, as a gloss says.^

expresses himself in

Gregory

same sense :^ "The

the

wicked are all condemned to eternal punishment, and are punished for their own wickedness. Yet they will burn to some purpose, namely that the just may all both see in God the joys they receive, and perceive in them the torments they have escaped, for which reason they will acknowledge themselves for ever the debtors of Divine grace, the more that they will see how the evils which they overcame by its assistance are punished eternally." Reply Obj. 5. Although the punishment relates to the soul accidentally, tially to the soul infected

guilt will

remain

ishment also

will

Reply Obj.

it

with

relates essen-

guilt.

And

since

punbe everlasting. Punishment corresponds to

in the soul for ever, its

Reply Obj. 2. The degree of intensity in the punishment corresponds to the degree of gravity in the sin; therefore mortal sins unequal in gravity will receive a punishment unequal in

properly speaking, in respect of the lack of order in the fault, and not of the dignity in

intensity but equal in duration.

case, a

on those who are not altogether expelled from

Reply Obj.

3.

The punishments

inflicted

the society of their fellow-citizens are intended for their correction, whereas those punishments whereby certain persons are wholly banished from the society of their fellow-citizens are

not intended for their correction, although they

the person offended; for

191 »

Cf. Glossa interl. ,

(in,

iQQv); Glossa

736) Augustine, Enarr. in Ps.

PL

;

76, 738.

'

Ibid.

(PL 36,

Lomhardi (PL ggS).

punishment of

if

the latter were the

infinite intensity

would

correspond to every sin. Accordingly, although a man deserves to lose his being from the fact that he has sinned against God, the author of his being, yet, in view of the lack of order of the act itself, loss of being is not due to him, < ^

^

6.

fault,

PL 77. 404Ad satictatem

I'isionis,

which

St.

Thomas

takes to sig-

nify being satiated with joy.

^Glossa 703).

interl. (iv, '

Loc.

cit.

io8v); Jerome, In Isaiam (PL 24,

—

—

:

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART presupposed to merit and demerit, nor is being lost or corrupted by the lack of order of sin; and consequently privation of being cannot be the punishment due to any sin. since being

is

ART.

Q. 99

:

1081

3

the false prophets (Vulg.,

the beast and false

prophet, etc.) shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever, which is the Scriptural expression for eternity. Secondly, because this opin-

mercy in one direction and depreciated it in another. For it would seem equally reasonable for the good angels to remain in eternal happiness and for the wicked angels to be eternally punished. Therefore just as he maintained that the demons and the souls of the damned are to be delivered at length from their sufferings, so he maintained that the angels and the souls of the blessed will at length pass from their happy state to the ion exaggerated God's

Article 2. Whether By God's Mercy All Punishment of the Damned, Both Men and DemonsJ Comes to an End?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that by God's mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes an end.

to

Objection

i.

For

it is

written (Wisd. 11. 24)

Lord, because Thou hast mercy upon all, Thou canst do all things. But among all things the demons also are included, since they are

God's creatures. Therefore also their punishwill come to an end. Obj. 2. Further, God hath concluded all in

ment

unbelief), that

sin (Vulg.,

He may have mercy

(Rom. 11. 32). Now God has concluded demons under sin, that is to say, He permitted them to be concluded. Therefore it would seem that in time He has mercy even on on

all

the

the demons.

Obj.

3.

Homo,

ii,

Further,

As Anselm says {Cur Deus

God

4),^ "it is not just that

should

permit the utter loss of a creature which He made for happiness." Therefore, since every rational creature

was created

would seem unjust for

kxc happiness,

be allowed to

to

it

it

the contrary, It

41): Depart from

and

is

written (Matt. 25. cursed, into ever-

Me, you

which is prepared for the devil Therefore they will be punished

lasting fire,

this life.

Reply Obj. i. God, for His own part, has mercy on all. Since, however, his mercy is ruled by the order of His wisdom, the result that it does not reach to certain people who render themselves unworthy of that mxcrcy, as

is

do the demons and the damned who are obstinate in wickedness.

even

in

And

them His mercy

yet

we may say

that

finds a place, in so

far as they are punished less than they wholly deserve but not that they are entirely delivered

from punishment. Reply Obj. 2. In the words quoted the

dis-

tribution (of the predicate) regards the genera

and not the individuals, so that the statement applies to

that

is,

men

in the state of wayfarer, because,

He had mercy

both on Jews and on

Gentiles, but not on every Gentile or every Jew.

perish altogether.

On

unhappiness of

his angels.

eternally.

Further, Just as the good angels were made happy through turning to God, so the bad angels were made unhappy through turning away from God. Therefore if the unhappiness of the wicked angels comes at length to an end, the happiness of the good will also come to an

Reply Obj.

Anselm means

3.

that

it is

not

just with regard to appropriateness to God's

goodness, and

speaking of the creature gendoes not become the Divine goodness that a whole genus of creature fail erically.

For

is

it

of the end for

which it was made; therefore unbecoming for all men or all angels to be damned. But there is no reason why some men or some angels should perish for ever, is

it

because the intention of the Divine will filled in

the others

who

is ful-

are saved.

end, v/hich cannot be admitted.

/ answer that. As Augustine says^ "Origen erred in maintaining that the

demons

will at

length, through God's mercy, be delivered their

punishment." But

demned by because

this error

1

:

PL 158, 402. City of God, xxi, 17, 23 (PL 41, 73i; 735);

PeriArchon,

i,

6 (PG

11, 165; 1 68).

cf.

Origen

3.

Whether God's Mercy

Men To Be

Suffers

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

at least

men

Objection

My

At

Punished Eternally?

would seem that God's mercy does not

clearly contrary to the authority

Holy Writ (Apoc. 20. 9, 10) The devil who seduced them was cast into the pool of fire and brimstone, where both the beasts and of

2

We

from

has been con-

the Church for two reasons. First

it is

Article Least

suffer

to be punished eternally. i.

spirit shall

For

it is written (Gen. 6. 3) not remain in man for ever,

because he is flesh, where "spirit" denotes indignation, as a gloss observes.^ Therefore, since God's indignation is not distinct from His punishment, 3

man

Glossa interl.

will (i,

not be punished eternally. In Pentai. (PL 91, 224).

501) ; Bede,

— SUMMA THEOLOGICA

io82

The charity of the saints in this life makes them pray for their enemies. Now they will have more perfect charity in Obj.

2.

Further,

men who die without charity, since men what their fall was to the

the souls of ''death

to

is

Damascene says

angels," as

Reply Obj.

{loc. cit.).

pray then for their enemies who are damned. But the prayers of the saints cannot be in vain, since they are most acceptable to God. Therefore at the saints' prayers the Divine mercy will in time deliver the damned from their punishment. Obj. 3. Further, God's foretelling of the punishment of the damned belongs to the prophecy of threats. Now the prophecy of threats is not always fulfilled, as appears from what was said of the destruction of Nineve (Jonas 3.) and yet it was not destroyed as foretold by the prophet, who also was troubled for that very

This saying refers to man generically, because God's indignation was at

would seem that

to be converted. For if we knew that they were foreknown to death, we should no more pray for them than for the demons. And since

that

life.

Therefore they

will

;

reason (4. i). Therefore

it

much more will the threat of eternal punishment be commuted by God's mercy for a more lenient punishment, when this will be able to give sorrow to none but joy to

Obj.

4.

Further,

to the point,

where

The words it is

all.

of Ps. 76. 8 are

God then be God then cast

said: Will

angry for ever? (Vulg., Will off for ever?) But God's anger is His punishment. Therefore, etc. Obj. 5. Further, A gloss on Isa. 14. 19, But thou art cast out, etc., says:' "Even though all souls shall have rest at last, thou never shalt," and it refers to the devil. Therefore it would seem that all human souls shall at length have rest

from

On

their pains.

written (Matt. 25. 46) of the elect together with the damned: These the contrary, It

is

punishment: but the just, into life everlasting. But it is inadmissible that the life of the just will ever have an end. Therefore it is inadmissible that the punishment of the damned will ever come to an end. Further, As Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. ii, 4)^ "death is to men what their fall was to the angels." Now after their fall the angels could not be restored. Therefore neither can man after death. And thus the punishment of the damned will have no end. / answer that, As Augustine says,^ some evaded the error of Origen by asserting that the demons are punished everlastingly, while holding that all men, even unbelievers, are at length set free from punishment. But this statement is altogether unreasonable. For just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness and therefore have to be punished for ever, so too are shall go into everlasting

'

Glossa intcrl.

(iv,

H'^).

2PGQ4.877. ^

City of God, XXI, 17, 18 (PL 41, 731, 732).

i.

removed from the human race by the coming of Christ. But those who were unwilling to be included or to remain in this reconciliation effected by Christ, perpetuated the Divine anger in themselves, since no other way of reconciliation is given to us save that which is length

through Christ.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine^ and Gregory {Moral, xxxiv, 19)^ say, the saints in this life pray for their enemies that they may be converted to God, while it is yet possible for them

who

for those

depart this

life

without grace

there will be no further time for conversion,

no prayer

will be offered for them, neither by Church militant, nor by the Church triumphant. For that which we have to pray for them is, as the Apostle says (II Tim. 2. 25, 26), that God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover themselves from

the

the snares of the devil.

Reply Obj. phetically

3.

A

punishment threatened pro-

only then

is

commuted when

there

is

a change in the merits of the person threatened.

Hence: / will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation shall .

repent of their evil that I 18.

evil,

have thought to do

Therefore,

7).

.

.

I also will repent of the since

the

damned cannot be changed,

to

them

merits the

of

(Jer.

the

threatened

punishment

will always be fulfilled in them. Nevertheless the prophecy of threats is always fulfilled in a certain sense, because as Augustine says:^ "Nineve has been overthrown, that

was

and

good Nineve is built up, that was and the houses remained standing, the city was overthrown in its wicked ways." Reply Obj. 4. These words of the Psalm refer to the vessels of mercy, which have not made themselves unworthy of mercy, because in this life (which may be called God's anger on account of its unhappiness) He changes vessels of mercy into something better. Hence the Psalm continues {verse 11): This is the

not

evil,

;

a

for while the walls

*

City oj God, XXI, 24 (PL 41, 736).

B

PL

«0/>.

44 (PL 77, 404). XXI, 24 (PL 41. 739).

76, 739. Cf. also Dial., iv, cit.,

j

—

:

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART change of the right hand of the most High. We may also reply that they refer to mercy as granting a relaxation but not setting free altogether if it be referred also to the damned. Hence the Psalm does not say: Will He from

His anger shut up His mercies? but in His anger, because the punishment will not be done away entirely; but His mercy will have effect by diminishing the punishment while it continues. 5. This gloss is speaking not abon an impossible supposition in order to throw into relief the greatness of the devil's sin, or of Nabuchodonosor's.

Reply Obj.

solutely but

Article

4.

Whether

the

Punishment of

To an End God?

Christians Is Brought

By

Mercy

the

of

We

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that at least the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of God.

Objection

For he that believeth and

1.

is

baptized shall be saved (Mark 16. 16). Now this apphes to every Christian. Therefore all Christians will at length be saved. Obj.

He

2.

Further, It

that eateth

is

written (John

6.

My body and drifiketh My Now

55): blood

meat and drink of which Christians partake in common. hath eternal

Therefore Obj.

3.

life.

this is the

Christians will be saved at length. Further, // any man's work burn, he all

Q. 99

for Christians

;

ART.

1083

4

although they stated the matter

ways. For some said that whoever

in different

received the sacraments of faith would be im-

mune from

eternal punishment.

alone are exempt from eternal punishment

But it

Holy Writ, for (James 2. 20) Faith without dead, and (Matt. 7. 21) Not every

works

written is

:

one that saith to Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter kingdom of heaven: but he that doth the will of My Father Who is in heaven; and in

into the

sinners with eternal punishment.

The unjust God.

of God,

6.

9)

kingdom of

Christians are unjust. There-

fore Christians will not

dom

written (I Cor.

shall not possess the

Now some

all

come

to the king-

and consequently they

will

be

punished for ever. Further, It

is

those

other passages

who

will not all

written (II Pet.

2.

21)

:

It

had

been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them. Now those who know not the way of truth will be punished for ever. Therefore Christians who have turned back after knowing it will also be punished

Consequently

persevere in the faith unto the end be exempt from eternal punishment,

other crimes.

Reply Obj. i. Our Lord speaks there of formed faith that worketh by love (Vulg., charity. Gal. 5. 6) in which whosoever dies shall be saved. But to this faith not only is the error of unbelief opposed, but also any mortal sin whatsoever.

Reply Obj. not to those

2. The saying of our Lord refers who partake only sacramentally,

and who sometimes by receiving unworthy eat and drink judgment to themselves (I Cor. 11. 29), but to those who eat spiritually and are incorporated with Him by charity, which incorporation

is

the effect of the sacram.ental

who approach

for ever.

eating, in those

answer that. According to Augustine^ there have been some who predicted a delivery from eternal punishment not for all men, but only

fore, so far as the

/

1

Holy Scripture threatens

unless in the end they prove to be free from

be saved in the end. is

who

this is clearly contrary to

is

many

the contrary. It

is

persevere to the end in the Catholic faith, however guilty they may have been of other crimes.

yet so as by fire (I Cor. 3. 15), where it is a question of those who have the foundation of the Christian faith. Therefore all such persons

On

this

sacraments of faith, and yet have not faith, without which it is impossible to please God (Heb. II. 6). Therefore others said that those alone will be exempt from eternal punishment who have received the sacrswnents of faith, and professed the Catholic faith. But against this it would seem to be that at one time some people profess the Catholic faith, and afterwards abandon it, and these are deserving not of a lesser but of a greater punishment, since according to II Pet. 2. 21, it had been better for them not to have known the way of justice than, after they have known it, to turn back. Moreover it is clear that heresiarchs who renounce the Catholic faith and invent new heresies sin more grievously than those who have conformed to some heresy from the first. And therefore some have maintained that those

shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved,

will

But

contrary to the truth, since some receive the

City of God, xxi, 19 (PL 41, 733).

concerned, sin

may

it

worthily. There-

power of the sacrament

is

brings us to eternal Hfe, although

deprive us of that fruit, even after

have received worthily.

we

::

SUMMA TUEOLOGICA

1084

Reply Obj.

3.

foundation

the

In this passage of the Apostle

formed

denotes

faith,

upon

which whosoever shall build venial sins shall suffer loss, because he will be punished for them by God yet he himself sJmll be saved in the end by fire, either of temporal tribulation, or of the punishment of purgatory which will be after ;

death.

kingdom, and consequently some of be punished eternally. Further, It is written (James 2. 10) Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all. Therefore whoever keeps the law as regards the works of mercy and omits other works, is guilty of transgressing the law, and consequently will be puneternal

them

will

:

ished eternally.

Whether All Those Who Perform Works of Mercy Will Be Punished Eternally?

Article

We

5.

proceed thus to the Fifth Article:

It

would seem that all who perform works of mercy will not be punished eternally, but only

who

those

neglect those works.

Objection 1. For it is written (James 2. 13) Judgment without mercy to him that hath not dofie mercy; and (Matt. 5. 7): Blessed are the merciful for they shall obtain mercy. Obj.

2.

Further, (Matt. 25. 35-46)

we

find

a description of our Lord's discussion with the

damned and

the elect.

But

this discussion is

only about works of mercy. Therefore eternal punishment will be awarded only to such as

/ answer that, As Augustine says in the book quoted above,^ some have maintained that not all who have professed the Catholic faith will be freed from eternal punishment, but only those who persevere in works of mercy, although they be guilty of other crimes. But this cannot stand, because without charity nothing can be acceptable to God, nor does anything profit unto eternal life in the absence of charity. Now it happens that certain persons persevere in works of mercy without having charity. Therefore nothing profits them to the meriting of eternal life, or to exemption from eternal punishment, as may be gathered from I Cor.

Most evident

13. 3.

this in the case of those

is

have omitted to practise works of mercy; and

who

consequently the same conclusion follows as

many things, they nevertheless spend something in works of mercy. We must therefore conclude that all whosoever die in mortal sin, neither faith nor works of mercy will free them from eternal punishment, not even after any length of time whatever.

before.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Matt. 6. 12) Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors, and further on {verse 14) For if you will forgive ffien their offences, your heavenly :

Father will forgive you also your offences. Therefore it would seem that the merciful, who forgive others their offences, will themselves obtain the forgiveness of their sins, and conse-

quently will not be punished eternally. Obj.

4.

Further,

A

gloss of

Ambrose on

I

lay hands on other people's property, for

after seizing on

Reply Obj. 1. Those will obtain mercy who show mercy in an ordered manner. But those

who

while merciful to others are neglectful of themselves do not show mercy in an ordered manner; rather do they strike at themselves by their evil actions. Therefore such persons will

says:^

not obtain the mercy that sets free altogether, even if they obtain that mercy which rebates

the inconstancy of the flesh, without doubt he

somewhat their due punishment. Reply Obj. 2. The reason why the discussion refers only to the works of mercy is not because

Tim.

4. 8,

Godliness

is

profitable to all things,

"The sum total of a Christian's rule of life consists in mercy and godliness. Let a man follow this, and though he should suffer from be scourged, but he will not perish, whereas boast of no other exercise but that of the body will suffer everlasting punishment." Therefore those who persevere in works of mercy, though they be shackled with fleshly sins, will not be punished eternally; and thus the same conclusion follows as before. will

who can

he

On

the contrary, It

is

written (I Cor.

6.

9,

eternal

those

punishment

who omit

will

be inflicted on none but

those works, but because eter-

punishment will be remitted to those who sinning have obtained forgiveness by their works of mercy, making unto themselves friends of the mammon of iniquity (Luke 16. 9). Reply Obj. 3. Our Lord said this to those who nal

after

ask that their debt be forgiven, but not to those persist in sin. Therefore the repentant

nor adulterers, etc., shall possess the kingdom of God. Yet many are such who practise works of mercy. Therefore the merciful will not all come to the

who

(PL 192, 348); 120A) Ambrosiaster (PL 17, 500).

of the inconstancy that consists in venial sin,

10)

^

Neither fornicators,

:

Glbssa Lombard! ;

.

.

.

cf.

Glossa ordin.

(vi,

alone will obtain by their v,orks of mercy the forgiveness that sets

Reply Obj. ^

4.

The

City 0/ God, XXI, 22

(PL

them

free altogether.

gloss of

41, 735).

Ambrose speaks

SUPPLEMENT TO THIRD PART from which a man will be freed through the works of mercy after the punishment of purgatory, which he calls a scourging. Or, if he speaks of the inconstancy of mortal sense

is

that those

fall into sins

who

sin,

the

while yet in this

life

of the flesh through frailty are dis-

Q. 99

ART.

5

1085

posed to repentance by works of mercy. Therefore such a one will not perish, that is to say, he will be disposed by those works not to perish, through grace bestowed on him by our Lord, Who is blessed for evermore,

Amen.

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