Substantiality and Causality 9781614518693, 9781614518761

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Substantiality and Causality

Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis

Herausgegeben von/Edited by Herbert Hochberg, Rafael Hüntelmann, Christian Kanzian, Richard Schantz, Erwin Tegtmeier

Volume / Band 60

Substantiality and Causality Edited by Miroslaw Szatkowski and Marek Rosiak

ISBN 978-1-61451-876-1 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-1-61451-869-3 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-1-61451-949-2 ISSN 2198-2066 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2014 Walter de Gruyter Inc., Boston/Berlin/Munich Printing: CPI books GmbH, Leck ♾ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com

Contents Acknowledgements | IX Mirosław Szatkowski and Marek Rosiak Editorial Introduction | XI Part I

Substantiality and Causality – Different Approaches

Marek Rosiak Substantiality and Causality. Classical and Transcendental Approach | 3 Part II Causal Aspects of Substance Thomas Buchheim Remarks on the Ontology of Living Beings and the Causality of their Behavior | 21 1 Two arguments for the ontological difference between corporeal and psychic reality | 21 2 The somatic as symptom of the psychic | 26 3 An example for the causality of the psychic as such | 28 4 A general model proposal: psychophysical causality through favor | 30 Markku Keinänen Tropes, Causal Processes and Functional Laws | 35 1 Introduction | 35 2 Quantity tropes: the basic constituents of objects | 36 3 Functional laws | 40 4 Tropes and causal processes | 44 5 Conclusion | 47 Srećko Kovač Forms of Judgment as a Link between Mind and the Concepts of Substance and Cause | 51 1 Introduction | 51 2 The original unity of self-consciousness (Kant) | 54

VI | Contents 3 3.1 3.2 4

The logical deduction of the primitive forms of judgment from the original unity of self-consciousness (Kant) | 56 Concept | 57 Judgment | 58 Objective validity of the concepts of substance and cause | 64

Marek Piwowarczyk “I am a Force” – An Attempt of Ontological Interpretation of Ingarden’s Metaphor | 67 1 The metaphor of force in the essay Man and Time | 68 2 The philosophical concept of force | 73 3 The possibility of application of the concept of force to Ingarden’s ontology | 80 Part III Substantialistic Background of Causation Filip Kobiela The Causal Structure of the World in Ingarden’s Ontology | 93 1 The causal typology of events and their notation | 93 2 Determinism and the poles of the real world | 97 3 Causal life of monads and other systems | 101 4 The problem of chance | 104 5 Freedom in relatively isolated systems | 108 6 Conclusion | 110 Uwe Meixner The Case for Agent-Causation | 113 1 Symbols | 113 2 Conventions | 113 3 A picture of the causation of physical events as viewed in 19th-century physics | 114 4 Three alternative pictures of the causation of physical events as viewed in 20th-century physics | 114 5 Central agent-causal concepts | 115 6 A sufficient and agent-causal analysis of an action – of raising one’s arm | 117 7 Nine insufficient analyses of raising one’s arm | 118 8 Deviant causal chains? | 119 9 Causal responsibility and moral responsibility | 119 10 Illustrations | 120

Contents

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Seven objections to agent-causation answered | 121 Agent-causation and freedom of the will | 125 The way from freely willed behaviour to agent-causation | 126

Jeff Mitscherling Consciousness, Intentionality, and Causality | 129 1 The problem(s) | 129 2 Intentionality | 134 3 Formal causality in cognition | 137 4 Consciousness and the world | 141 Leszek Wroński The Common Cause Principle as a special case of the Principle of Sufficient Reason | 151 1 Introduction | 151 2 Reichenbach’s formulation and its variants | 152 3 Apparent counterexamples | 157 3.1 Arguments from conservation principles | 157 3.2 The “sea levels vs. bread prices” arguments | 158 3.3 The EPR correlations | 159 4 Conclusion: Principle of Sufficient Reason revisited | 160 Part IV Extension as a Constituent of Substance and Causality Damian Leszczyński Causality and Time. Some Remarks on Bergson’s Metaphysics | 165 1 Introduction | 165 2 Causality and space | 166 3 Non-spatiality and temporality of consciousness | 167 4 The problem of causal relation between the world and mind | 171 5 Conclusion | 172 Bartłomiej Skowron The Forms of Extension | 175 1 The extension as ontological difference | 175 2 Ontological explanation of extension | 176 3 A new direction for discussion on extension | 178 4 An attempt at clarification of extension | 180 5 Toward topological categorial ontology | 183

VIII | Contents Authors of Contributed Papers | 189 Author Index | 193 Subject Index | 196

Acknowledgements The publication of the book was preceded by the IInd International Ontological Workshop, held at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Łódź on 11-12 February 2013. However, not all the speakers who took part in the Workshop submitted their papers to the present volume and vice versa – not all the authors of the volume participated in the Workshop. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to all eleven authors who accepted the invitation to contribute to the volume and showed great understanding and patience during the publication process. We would also like to thank all speakers at the Ontological Workshop. Let us extend our heartfelt thanks to all those who provided selfless assistance in organizing the workshop. Thanks are also due to Mr Sławomir Szatkowski, for his voluntary help in preparing this volume for print. We have tried to make the best use of all his suggestions and corrections. Special thanks go to Dr. Bartłomiej Skowron, who helped to solve many technical problems that arose in the drafting of the text in LATEX.

Mirosław Szatkowski and Marek Rosiak

Mirosław Szatkowski and Marek Rosiak

Editorial Introduction

The fundamental character of the categories of substance and cause has always been recognized in metaphysics and ontology. Already Aristotle explicitly stated that the first philosophy is the study of the primary being, i. e., substance and its first causes. How deeply these categories underlie philosophical reflection can be seen very well in the Humean critique of the necessary connection. In his psychological interpretation of the origins of the notion of causality, intended as a definitive argument for the abolishment of the realistic understanding of this notion, he nevertheless assumed that there exists some sort of a causal bond between our experience and mental habits. The notions of substance and causality still play a fundamental role in the contemporary ontology, as it can be clearly seen in the phenomenological ontology of Ingarden – one of the most developed ontological systems of the present day. And on the other hand, when a contemporary attempt of formulating a radically antisubstantialistic metaphysics was undertaken – the case of A. N. Whitehead process metaphysics – serious suspicions arose as to its inconsistency. However, these categories so well rooted in philosophical tradition can show difficulties of their own and are by no means immune to criticism. The IInd Ontological Workshop, which took place in February 2013 in Łódź, was devoted to a critical discussion of some aspects of two fundamental ontological categories mentioned above. Participants exchanged their papers in advance with the aim of better preparation to the debate. Some results of the discussions at the workshop have been included in the definitive versions of contributions to the present volume. Some other critical comments will be mentioned below. The editors hope that the book will help the reader to notice some still debatable aspects of the subject of the workshop and that this could possibly stimulate further investigations in this field. The content of the volume has been divided as follows: after presenting two rival approaches to substantiality and causality: a traditional, ontological view vs. a transcendental one (Rosiak) there follow two sections: the first presents studies of substance as showing some causal aspects (Buchheim, Keinänen, Kovač, Piwowarczyk), whereas the other contains investigations of causality showing in a way its reference to the category of substance (Kobiela, Meixner, Mitscherling, Wroński). The last, short section contains two studies of extension (Leszczyński and Skowron) which can be regarded as a conceptual background of both substantiality and causality.

XII | Mirosław Szatkowski and Marek Rosiak Marek Rosiak has supplied a paper intended as a conceptual framework for investigations contributed by the participants of the workshop. He tries to briefly show how a change of perspective from metaphysical to transcendental influenced the understanding of categories of substantiality and causality. The transcendental approach to basic ontological notions is not just another extravagant philosophical hypothesis. It is rather an unavoidable consequence of the Cartesian discovery of the fundamental problem of knowledge. We must admit that neither a substance nor causation can be experienced by the senses. These categories are just some means of coherent organization of the data of experience. Instead of investigating if there are substances or causal interactions in reality, we should ask if the application of the notions of substance and/or causation has any advantages over the employment of alternative conceptual tools. The change of perspective to the transcendental one results in the cancellation of numerous puzzles of traditional metaphysics but at the same time new problems emerge. The most important is the task of discovering algorithms of the synthetical activity of the mind which lead to the constitution of the object of experience. The author presents his conjectures concerning such an application of the notions of substance and cause. Thomas Buchheim (“Remarks on the ontology of living beings and the causality of their behavior”) begins with the discussion of the two arguments, already developed by Aristotle, for the ontological difference between corporeal and psychic reality: (i). Things that are the subject or substrate of psychic states are essentially different from those that can be the subject of bodily states or somatic processes; (ii). No isomorphic mapping can be undertaken between a psychic phenomenon and a simultaneous bodily process. In relation to (i), Aristotle claims that psychic states do not have their own psychic subject, but always appear as embedded in life episodes of living individuals, and as long as they are corporeal, the subject of psychic states is a body. In one and the same complex body there can be states of both kinds: physical and psychic. In relation to (ii), Aristotle claims that psychic events are not somatic complexes. There exists some correlation between psychic and bodily processes but it does not mean that the spatiotemporal interior differentiation of one kind of processes can be mapped onto the other. The substance to which psychic states belong is not an incorporeal substance – psychic states always exist in correlation with certain bodily states inside the same corporeal complex substance. T. Buchheim calls this interior relation between these states a horizontal dualism, as opposed to a vertical relation where two different substances are taken into consideration. In his opinion, the Aristotelian view can be transferred to contemporary debates about psychic phenomena. As he requires, psychic phenomena – not identical with somatic states and processes, but always

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functioning inside the biographically individual life episodes – can be described as “operative states” of the whole system. His main thesis is that the sameness and variability of psychic states involves the sameness and variability of the operations. According to him, corporeal states are symptoms of the complete situation of a living being characterized psychically, whereas psychic states and processes are, on the one hand, characteristics of a life situation in which the whole living being finds itself, and, on the other hand, only certain symptoms of this situation and together they do not make up the psychic state. The general model of mental causality proposed by T. Buchheim has the following properties: (i). The organic body of a living being is a structure of functional systems, which, albeit mutually distinguishable, collaborate with each other; (ii). These systems consist of many subordinated causal connectives; (iii). The bodily symptoms and the psychic and mental states create patterns and relations that are not causally interconnected, but can rather be considered as a symptomatic expression of the behaviour or operative state of the whole living organism. Finally, T. Buchheim acknowledges that neuronal states play an important role for the entire behavior of a living being, and argues against considering neuro-phychological symptoms as complete correlates of psychic or mental states. Markku Keinänen (“Tropes, Causal Processes and Functional Laws”) starts from the characterization of the dispositionalist conception of properties. Basing on the assumption that all fundamental property tropes are dispositional, Keinänen argues that property tropes and the causal processes they produce can account for the truth of causal functional laws, i.e., laws of nature that describe the forces that the quantitative properties falling under a determinable generate as a function of their distance. In §2, he presents his own trope theory SNT. Generally, tropes are: particular (the distinct tropes are capable of being intrinsically exactly similar); countable individuals (they have certain determinate identity conditions and are countable ); categorially simple (every trope is either simple or composed of further property tropes); and identity independent existents. Tropes are, moreover, particular properties with the following features: (i). They always occur as colocated with other tropes; and (ii). They have a narrow particular nature to determine a single feature of the object possessing the trope. SNT differs from the above theory in the construction of objects (or substances). It divides the tropes constituting an object into: nuclear tropes (they are rigidly dependent on each other in determining the necessary features of a powerful particular) and contingent tropes (they are one-sidedly rigidly dependent on the nuclear tropes). Another distinctive feature of SNT is its account of the location of tropes – the location of a trope is determined by the location of the trope bundles in which it occurs. In §3, Keinänen explains why functional laws (such as Newton’s law of gravitation or Coulomb’s

XIV | Mirosław Szatkowski and Marek Rosiak law) are prima facie problematic for the trope theorist. And in §4, he claims that a large group of the dispositional properties figuring in functional laws are causal powers and that their manifestations are causal processes. In his approach, tropes and the causal processes they produce are the truthmakers of the instances of a determinate law. Keinänen’s approach is independent from the demand that the determinate laws of action are metaphysically necessary – this demand can, but need not be attached. Dispositional tropes are identified (in epistemic sense) by the kinds of causal processes they produce. Keinänen explains why the dispositional tropes and causal processes can take care of the governing function (=: some entity or entities forming the ontological basis for the co-ordination of the distinct determinate laws that belong to a single functional formula (functional law)). Srećko Kovač (“Forms of Judgment as a Link between Mind and the Concepts of Substance and Cause (Kant, Gödel)”) asks: how to define or axiomatically describe the concepts of substance and cause, and what kind of role – if any – should they play in any ontological theory? In his discussion, he focuses, first, on Gödel’s ontological proof. What is important, this theory is not generally accepted, has been revised many times, and – according to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem – if it should be comprehensive and include elementary arithmetic, it can guarantee neither (1) its own consistency nor (2) the solvability of each yes/no question which can be formulated in its language. Although Gödel did not provide any definitive list of primitive concepts, the concepts of substance and cause are permanently present on all his lists of philosophical concepts. The method recommended by Gödel for determining which concepts are the primitive ones and what kind of relations are going on between them is the phenomenological method. He refers to Kant, who was a precursor of this method founded by Husserl. What is, however, enigmatic in Kant’s conception is the “deduction” of categories of the concepts of substance and cause from the “original unity of self-consciousness”. S. Kovač reconstructs Kant’s derivation of the concepts of substance and cause in three steps: (i). Identification of various important aspects of the original unity of self-consciousness; (ii). The logical deduction – although without proposing any particular formalism – of the primitive forms of judgment from the original unity of self-consciousness; and (iii). Accenting the objective validity of the concepts of substance and cause, i.e., grounding these concepts in the primitive forms of human thinking. With reference to (i), four unities of self-consciousness are identified (four-fold analysis of the act of human thinking): analytic, synthetic, objective and necessary, of which the synthetic unity is for Kant the highest point of apperception. With reference to (ii), S. Kovač emphasizes that a concept has a form of analytic consciousness of a concrete representation, obtained by comparison, reflection and abstraction, which can be encountered in a variety of objects

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as their common note. The manner in which a concept together with other representations (concepts) is brought to the objective unity of self-consciousness is a judgment (= its logical form). The following three relations are three possible grades of strengthening the condition of the objectivity of a judgment: categorical judgment, hypothetical judgment and disjunctive judgment. And with reference to (iii), S. Kovač recapitulates that the logical function of the subject-predicate relation of representations in a judgment gives the substance-accident relation in an object; and the logical functions of the reason-consequent and the whole-part relations of representations in a judgment give the cause-effect relation between objects and the concept of community of objects, respectively. Finally, Kovač compares the Kantian cause-result with Gödel’s result regarding the essence in his ontological proof. Marek Piwowarczyk discusses a particular problem belonging to Ingardenian formal ontology of human being. The problem, although particular, is of great importance and its effective treatment demands considerable analytical skills. The author uses a complex apparatus of Ingarden’s ontology to interpret the constitutive nature of human being as a source of spontaneous actions. This task, essential to philosophical anthropology, was nevertheless fulfilled neither by Ingarden himself, nor by his pupils who worked in this field. Because Ingarden’s ontology, partly due to its terminological richness combined with a very systematic character, is not sufficiently well known even in Poland and even less so abroad, the author supplies a concise but quite instructive presentation of key notions of this theory. He also makes a substantial reference to the relevant philosophical tradition, both modern (Kant-Wolff-Leibniz line) and old (Aristotle and Aquinas). The overall result of these investigations is quite satisfying. It shows that systematic philosophy, preferring solid tradition to fashionable trends, can bring highly interesting results. Filip Kobiela investigates possible applications of Ingarden’s notion of causal bond of events to model several different arrangements of causal relations between objects of different kinds and their environment. He presents a classification of a possible “causal behaviour” of objects. The method of combinatorial analysis applied by the author is very characteristic for Ingarden who demonstrated its fruitfulness in the field of existential ontology. The author adapts this method to formal-ontological considerations. Ingarden’s ontology accepts a substantialistic premise that every event must have an object persisting in time as a carrier. This entails problems with the proper description of the event which consists in the becoming of the world, i.e. the totality of objects. On the other hand, causal characteristics of certain objects existing within the world show interest-

XVI | Mirosław Szatkowski and Marek Rosiak ing correspondences: e. g. a causal description of a Leibnizian monad and of a Democritean atom. The author’s investigations shed some light on the problem of chance and are relevant to the description of a partially isolated system – an important item in Ingarden’s ontological vocabulary. Uwe Meixner (“The Case for Agent-Causation”) offers some non-conformist ideas in the metaphysics of action. Essential findings of his contribution concern: (i) an analysis of raising one’s arm, i.e., a solution of the problem that was formulated by Wittgenstein in the following way: “Let us not forget this: when ‘I raise my arm’, my arm goes up. And the problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?”; (ii) definitions of causal and moral responsibility; (iii) responses to objections to agent-causation; and (iv) capturing the relation between agent-causation and freedom of the will. Central to Meixner’s approach is the following conception: P (= a human person) raises her arm between moments t1 and t2 – in other words, the going-up of P’s arm between t1 and t2 is an action of P – if, and only if, the going-up of P’s arm between t1 and t2 is agent-caused by P. This basic agent-causal analysis of action allows variations and modifications that point in the direction of a sophisticated agent-causal theory of action (which employs, for example, also the concept of intention). Jeff Mitscherling (“Intentionality, Formal Causality, and Consciousness”) maintains that the concept of intentionality together with the concept of (formal) causality are the key to solve the problem of how the mind relates to the body, and/or how consciousness relates to the world. And he adds that these concepts could also be a common ground for scientists in search of a philosophy and for philosophers in search of a science. He presents his own conception of intentionality and calls it the “new Copernican hypothesis” for phenomenology. In the traditional phenomenology all consciousness is intentional, whereas Mitscherling reverses this order – intentionality gives rise to consciousness. This idea can be found in Aristotle’s philosophy, and especially in his concept of formal causality and his model of cognition. Mitscherling shows how the relation between the cognizing subject and the cognized object, i.e., the relation between consciousness and the world, may be analyzed as an intentional structure originating in the object and proceeding by way of formal causality. His model of mind and its relation to the world (both entities are radically different) explains how we can cause our own actions. Mitscherling claims that the ontological structure of an object (:= its form) is identical with the logical structure of the cognition of that object (:= its concept) and that the act of cognition, which we express linguistically as what we commonly speak of as the concept of this or the concept of that, proceeds as the combination of a subject and a predicate. Going deeper into the nature of

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cognition, he – similarly to Husserl – maintains that the objectivation is a central task performed by the intentionality of consciousness. But, unlike Husserl, he says that this objectivation operates as a process of formal causality, and that this operation of objectivation, proceeding in accordance with the (formal) structure of the cognized object, informs the structure of the intentional act of the cognizing subject. In his opinion, Husserl wrongly identifies the objectivation as an operation performed by the intentionality of the cognizing subject’s consciousness. Mitscherling is aware that his theory of consciousness is not yet fully developed. What he does is to point out the fields of further research and demonstrate how many problems faced by current theories of the relation between consciousness and the world, or mind and reality, can be seen in a completely different light if one adopts an untypical model of the relation between consciousness and intentionality. Leszek Wroński deals with a special case of the principle of causality: a repeated common appearance of two events, which are not directly causally linked, can be explained by means of a cause common to both events in question. After giving a rigorous formulation of this principle in terms of the theory of probability the author considers some possible counterexamples to check if the Common Cause Principle holds without exceptions. Actually, because the definitive formulation of the principle in question is a mathematical theorem, it cannot be refuted by any counter-example. But precisely here a doubt arises: can a metaphysical principle, like the principle of causality, have the status of a mathematical truth? In other words: is the indeterministic standpoint logically inconsistent? Another question concerns an application of the theory of probability to the notion of causality: How does such an approach influence the meaning of the cause and causal bond? If the effect does not always follow the cause, their notions must be understood in a different way than it used to be in traditional metaphysics. Damian Leszczyński takes into consideration the Bergsonian approach to causality and time because of its remarkable originality with regard to metaphysical conceptions prevailing in modern and contemporary philosophy. Bergson’s holistic conception of the consciousness stands in sharp opposition to atomistic theories of mind. In his opinion, the scheme of spatial extension as a multiplicity of neighbouring separate portions of extension, is present in our common temporal scheme. But a direct experience of the stream of consciousness does not exhibit such a structure. The category of cause and effect assumes this spatial scheme as well – it can be seen in the separation of the two correlates. Bergson also criticized application of the distinction internal vs. external to the relation between mind and “outer” reality. However, does not Bergson’s idea of overlaping of qualities

XVIII | Mirosław Szatkowski and Marek Rosiak in “durée reele” assume extension as well? It seems that he did not discriminate between extension as such and its division into separate portions. Bartłomiej Skowron (“The Forms of Extension”) ponders on the question: What is the extension as such, and presents an idea that extension as the ontological characteristics of an object should be examined with the use of topological concepts. He examines different ontological moments of extension aiming at defining its formal characteristics: spatial dimension (immersing in space), divisibility, impenetrability, and being “everywhere in between” – these moments in different configurations determine various kinds of extension but do not provide its general and comprehensive definition. The author also comments on Rosiak’s spatial characteristic of extension as the possibility of co-existence of multitude of objects and the abundance of differences between places. In the author’s opinion, there are many types of extension and the adequate ontology is infinitely-categorial ontology – types of extension are the categories of formal ontology. These types of extension depend on the selection of appropriate topological properties from among connectedness, density, dimensionality, metrizability etc. Skowron also gives an example in which the extension of res extensa is bounded and of res cogitans is unbounded but unexpectedly these types of extension are identical from the topological perspective, i.e., they are homeomorphic. He argues that being extended is not the property which differentiates things and thoughts.

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Part I: Substantiality and Causality – Different Approaches

Marek Rosiak

Substantiality and Causality. Classical and Transcendental Approach Et quod olim et nunc et semper quaesitum est et semper dubitatum, quid ens, hoc est quae substantia. [Met. Z 1028b 3–4]

1 Philosophy is basically a search for first principles and a substance in the technical, Aristotelian sense, is a fundamental principle of reality. Principles put forward by some Aristotle’s forerunners, as I am going to argue, can be interpreted, in a somehow Hegelian sense, as partial, not quite satisfactory solutions, while the proposal of Aristotle himself seems to remain for ages the most satisfactory answer to the problem. Parmenides stressed emphatically that the principle of what there is must be absolutely simple and unique: Plurality and diversity implies negation and negative being, understood by him not as just privation but as non-being in a strict sense, is just nothing. Why did not Parmenides accept negative facts like A’s not being B or just A and B being different? The reason must be his rejection of all relations, including logical ones, like difference. Logical impossibility of any differences in being explains its absolute simplicity and uniqueness. However, the absolutely simple principle cannot account for a complex phaenomenal output (a fundamental problem of a monistic explanation). Denying plurality, complexity and change, Parmenides neglected the testimony of senses for the sake of logic alone. Thus he was left with a principle but no principiatum: a principium which could at most be ratio sui. His hen could serve no explanatory purpose and later it became clear that it could not been even self-explanatory as Plato had demonstrated in his Parmenides 137C – 142A. The final lesson of Parmenides’ metaphysics is that an absolutely simple being cannot be even self-explanatory and consequently is unable to explain anything at all. This already shows in nuce a dialectical tension between looking for the simplest explanation and its explanatory power: we require that an explanation should be simpler than the explanandum, but on the other hand, the simpler it is the harder it fits the complex output.

4 | Marek Rosiak A Parmenides contemporary – Heraclitus – took an opposite standpoint: He claimed that nothing permanent whatsoever exists and everything is in a process of flux. He did not base this conclusion on purely logical premises as Parmenides, but rather just generalized everyday observation that things change. Properly speaking, nothing changes – there is only a perpetual process of universal metamorphosis. There are no differences between things – only different qualities follow one another. Heraclitus’ standpoint seems to differ from that of Parmenides in every respect, but in fact they have a fundamental feature in common: they both are numerical monisms. Heraclitus was inclined to suppose that there is some permanence in the overwhelming flux – its constant and cyclic character. He was probably the first to realize that universal principle which he called logos can have an abstract character, being a rule of changes and not a material thing. He probably regarded this general principle of becoming as a mutual correlation of all aspects of reality: the universal flux is not chaotic. Its different aspects show a mutual correlation which, as the principle of changes, is not itself subject to change. As it belongs to the category of relations one can say that this relation is prior to its arguments. Apart from these formal features, Heraclitean logos remained, as far as we know, just a term without any closer characteristics. Hence this standpoint must be regarded as only a stimulus for further investigations. Plato made a remarkable effort to show how a general principle – an idea – determines an individuum. His metaphysical dualism refers back to both Heraclitus and Parmenides as a sort of a synthesis of their doctrines. Plato modified the standpoint of Parmenides by substituting to hen with the whole hierarchy of ideas having various degree of generality. Thus he accepted relations, including differences, rejected by Parmenides.¹ On the other hand he adopted the Heraclitean doctrine of panta rhei, claiming that individual things “always become and never really are”. He also agreed with Heraclitus that the sphere of becoming is subordinated to general principles: particulars refer to ideas. The chief problem of this standpoint was the explanation of the relation of exemplification or participation (methexis) holding between particulars and ideas. In a famous fragment of his Parmenides [130B - 134E] Plato checks two possible hypotheses: participation is a kind of the part-whole relation or a special similarity relation. Alas, neither hypothesis works.² Thus, a consequence has to be drawn, that no intelligible connection between quasi-Parmenidean world of ideas and Heraclitean world of be-

1 Plato’s conception of non-being, presented in The Sophist (258C - 259A) has an evidently relativistic (non in the sense of modern physics) character. 2 The consequence of the similarity hypothesis is an endless regressus, known as a famous “third man”. It must be stressed that this trouble is not a general problem of a realistic doctrine of uni-

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coming holds. This fundamental problem is known under the name of chorismos. But the collapse of the theory of ideas teaches us some lesson. Both the part-whole relation and similarity can hold only between objects of the same category: even when a lady’s behaviour bears some similarity to a cougar habits, both individuals belong to a common genus. And a real horse cannot contain ideal horseness or vice versa. Plato seems to have overlooked that relations taken from one domain cannot apply to arguments of a quite different nature. Aristotle, as a prominent pupil of Plato, had to be well aware of the problems of ideas. In Metaphysics he often refers to the third man problem, connected with the similarity hypothesis, but there is no hint at the other, “part-wholistic” hypothesis disproved by his master. This cannot be a simple overlooking. Indeed, Aristotle could not accept Plato’s negative evaluation of this hypothesis, as he tried to locate ideas (called by him “forms”) in individual objects. However, his doctrine of hylemorphism did not assume that matter and form compose an individual in a way analogous to a composition of pasta of flour and eggs. Being a descendant of the line of the aforementioned thinkers he could not just state that there is some special, unexplained in details, relation of containment between a form and a concrete object, because this would make no real progress with regard to platonic participation. A form of an object should be understood as an internal (“in re”) principle of its functioning – be it a spontaneous action or passive reaction to external stimuli. A form of a hammer, say, is just its suitability for hitting nails. Materials, shapes and connection of the parts of a hammer serve to this purpose. Being a hammer is not a quality and there is no an ideal hammer which is ideal for ideal hammering. An apropriate functioning in particular conditions is something quite different and can be executed only when a real hammer exists. Hence the existence of the function presupposes existence of a particular object but being a specific object presupposes having a definite function as well. It should be stressed here that as a consequence of this attempt of unifying form with individual, the status of what is changeable in it had considerably improved. For Plato a phenomenal being was just an imperfect picture of what really is – it was deprived of its own ontic position so to say. And of course for Parmenides what was not to hen was just a sheer illusion. But for Aristotle a so called accidental being, although not being a possible object of scientific knowledge, was still something objective, not illusory. An accident, being a derivative, non-

versals as some analytic philosophers claim – it is only a consequence of regarding methexis as similarity.

6 | Marek Rosiak fundametal being, was nevertheless something real, belonging to an object itself and not to its phenomenon only.

2 To understand properly Aristotle’s solution of the Platonic problem of chorismos we should proceed step by step. Misinterpretations of his standpoint with this fundamental respect were numerous and quite common. E. g. popular characteristics of his position as to the status of universals, which is termed moderate (immanent) realism, consists of the thesis: universalia (sunt) in re – in contrast to platonic universalia ante rebus. This thesis cannot be understood literally because, as I have mentioned earlier, the interpretation of participation as a part-whole relation was disproved already by Plato and it is certain that Aristotle did not simply ignore this criticism. If the principal form of an individual were contained in it, this individual would contain (in the very same sense of the term) still other parts. In fact it contains certain qualities etc. but their being contained implies possibility of one-sided detachment: Without such a quality as e. g. being young I will remain the same object, although an older one. But I cannot retain identity without being a man – this determination constitutes me as an object. Being a man has not an independent existence, it is not a separate entity as Plato claimed. A general form of a man exists only as a form of particular people. Its existence is dependent on individuals, but individuals are in turn essentially determined by this form. What we have here is double dependence: a form is existentially dependent on individuals and individuals are essentially dependent on their form. A substantial form can show itself “in action” only in an individual localized in particular spatio-temporal conditions. But its specific character does not depend on particular circumstances. An individual, a particular object, exists in different part-whole relations. If we have a construction made of LEGO bricks, the existence of its particular element is the necessary condition of the existence of the whole. According to Aristotle there must be objects existing in themselves, unconditionally. They are existentially independent. They still can have some components, but these must exist conditionally: only as components of such and such an individual and never as independent items. Not every individual object exists independently in the sense just described. To be a basic individual, an object has to exemplify a fundamental, substantial form (e. g. being a man).³ Having such a form enables an individual to

3 For Aristotle it is generally a form of a living creature.

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have other forms – accidental ones. E. g., being a man, I can be handsome or ugly (quality), tall or short (quantity), clever or dull (disposition, echein), running or sitting (situation, keisthai), loving or hating somebody (relation, pros ti), talking and listening (action and passion) and so on. An individual act of conversation as well as a talking couple are individuals but they have no their own substantial forms. This is why they are not basic individuals. Summarizing, one can say that basic individual (a primary substance) is a bearer of a substantial form (a secondary substance). All forms are modes of functioning of their object, but the substantial form is the principal, constitutive one, conditioning all others and not conditioned by other forms. That is why a whole composed of independent parts having their own substantial forms cannot be a (primary) substance: its form depends on forms of its components. Using modern terminology one can say that a primary individual has both its basic Dasein and its basic Sosein. If we take into consideration a living organism, its organs cannot exist independently – this apparently confirms the hypothesis that an organism is a primary substance. But dead body does not disappear without a trace – certain its components continue to exist. This shows the basic existential problem of Aristotelian metaphysics: Any bearer of a substantial form should be a primary individual, but as far as such a bearer is a material, extended being, it has only a conditioned existence – it exists in virtue of its components. Hence its form, as also conditioned, cannot be a secondary substance. In addition to a hierarchical description of a primary substance according to a table of categories, Aristotle provided an elaborated system of causes to characterize a primary substance not only in a static, synchronic and mereological aspect, but also in a dynamic perspective of becoming and change. Apart from matter⁴ and form, termed immanent causes, he introduced so called transcendent causes: agent (effective cause) and aim (final cause). Matter and agent characterize a primary substance with respect of its becoming and two other causes with respect of its being something definite. Moreover, one can regard matter and aim as passive limits of substantial activity while agent and form are factors acting within these limits: agent actualizes matter potency of becoming a new substance and form determines a substance tendency towards its aim. This dynamic aspect of a primary substance involves its becoming and subsequent changes. As to the changes, they are always changes of accidents preserving identical subject determined by a substantial form. Individual identity has to accompany changes of a substance because it is just substantial form which determines possible changes:

4 Not primary matter (prote hyle) but hyle eschate – a concrete thing having a potency of acquiring new features.

8 | Marek Rosiak I can bend an iron rod and pour the water but not the vice versa. I can study metaphysics being an animal rationale, but I cannot bloom. In similar external conditions substances of different kinds behave differently: a fish can breath in water but a human cannot. Particular qualities of a substance are determined not only by external conditions but by its essence (substantial form) as well. A substantial form is more than just a necessary condition of the existence of attributes: it is a principle of their possible changes. A unity of a subject of changes should be understood as a determined manner of reacting to external circumstances. Under extreme conditions this way of behaving may break: a substance may loose its identity. A rod bent too much can break in two. In such a case we do not say that a change of a substance happened – we rather claim that the substance in question has been destroyed.

3 There is some peculiar point in Aristotelian characteristics of a primary substance, which was often misinterpreted and consequently criticized. It is his claim that substantial activity has a teleological character. General purpose of a living organism consists in its preservation from destruction and generation of descendants – individuals having the same substantial form. The principle of teleology may indeed raise some doubts in case of an unconscious being. Preservation of an organism and species in its environment may be very well explained without a teleological assumption. In the beginning of the modern epoch teleological explanations were banned from science in favour of causal, purely mechanical ones. But at the same time a radical split of a human substance was declared by Descartes who discovered a radical difference between res extensa and res cogitans. Mind, deprived of causal influences of the material world showed to be a separate realm of ideas unable to act on one another. The only possible principle organizing the stream of cogitationes showed to be just teleology. It was clearly realized by Leibniz who said: “L’Action du principe interne, qui fait le changement ou le passage d’une perception á une autre, peut étre àppelle Appetition.” (Leibniz (1991), § 15). He adds: “la perception et ce qui en depend est inexplicable par des raisons mecaniques” [ibid. § 17] Perception of a monad is, in turn, “L’état passager qui enveloppe et represente une multitude dans l’unité, ou dans la substance simple” [ibid. § 14]. This “representation of a multitude in a unity” is a direct echo of a substance’s own structure: “les changements naturels des Monades viennent d’un principe interne” [ibid. § 11] The general idea behind these statements is that a spiritual substance applies, so to say, its own unity of stream of presentations to a multitude presented in them.

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A monad represents external reality in its own mental states by applying its own directly felt unity of consciousness to a variety of qualities present in its content. In Leibniz we find an argument of utmost importance for the problem of substance and reality in general. He denied real existence of a material, extended being on the basis that everything composed of independent parts (pieces) has a derivative existence, conditioned by the existence of its parts. And because parts of an extended being must be themselves extended (continuum cannot be composed of points), an infinite regressus lurks in the necessary conditions of the existence of a spatial being. Thus, the external reality thus is just other monads and extended things are only presentations deprived of their own existence. Both Descartes and Leibniz remained at the dualistic standpoint of the existence of external reality on one hand and its internal mental representation on the other. Le bon Dieu was needed to secure a correspondence between these two realms.⁵

4 Kant – like his contemporary, Laplace – tried to show that he “n’avait pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là”. Hence his Copernican revolution in philosophy: an effort to show that it is object which “accomodates” to the subject and not the vice versa. A step forward with regard to Descartes and Leibniz made by Kant consisted in the claim that subject does not produce representations of independently existing objects, but actually constitutes their presentations (so presented objects have no independent existence). Epistemological realists, belonging from a systematic, non-historic, point of view to the pre-Kantian epoch, think that the transcendental standpoint is just an alternative (and a more risky) option with regard to the problem of knowledge – opposite to their own standpoint. As if it were analogous to a case of making a decision whether to stay at home tonight or walk into darkness outside: Nobody should leave safe place without a sufficient reason. But making substance only a scheme of organization of the data of experience is not just a counterintuitive conclusion of a weird idea that mind is locked in a kind of a Platonic cave. We have to admit, that the substantial scheme always assumes more than the senses can provide. E. g. I assume that a substance exists continually but I can notice its presence only from time to time. I assume certain rule of its behaviour with regard

5 For the details of Leibniz’s approach to the epistemology of the mind-body problem see Rosiak (2013a).

10 | Marek Rosiak to external circumstances, but what I can observe at most is just some particular situations which conform to the rule in question. Kant has drawn conclusions not only from elaborate continental metaphysical systems like Cartesian dualistic theory or Leibniz’s monadology, but also from analyses of sense experience provided by British empiricists. In particular he agreed with Hume that we cannot experience a necessary connection of facts – we can only postulate it on the basis of certain facts. Unfortunately, Kant chose an inappropriate way to ground the transcendental hypothesis. To avoid arbitrary, dogmatic character of metaphysical statements – a constant threat to traditional doctrines of his predecessors – he appealed to geometry and arithmetics, claiming that a priori truth of their statements can be secured only by admittance that their domains are constituted by forms of our intuition. But obviously this is not the only possible explanation: It can be explained equally well by, e. g., the eidetic intuition. The right way of establishing the transcendental position is, in my opinion, a conclusive demonstration that extension (time and space), be it absolute or relational, cannot be objective.⁶ As we know, Kant regarded double notions of substance-accident and causeeffect as categories – a priori notions of utmost generality – and placed them under the categorial heading of relation as a pair of complementary notions (thesis and antithesis respectively). The notions in question function as pairs because they do not only work as generalizations of relevant particular appearances but they also refer different phenomenons to one another. These categories serve to unify phenomena in two different dimensions so to say. For example the category of substance-accident serves to subsume several distinct appearances of one and the same quality under a notion of a substance while several other appearances of changing qualities as an accident of some other substance. The category of causeeffect serves to state a necessary connection between these two, constituted in a way just mentioned, as they are regarded a cause and its effect. Let us remark on this occasion that this complex scheme does not work well. For example, being a substance means for Kant having an unchanging qualitative pattern. But how can such an immutable substance produce change of accidents in another substance? Interpreting a substantial substratum just as a permanent quality – an idea borrowed from Descartes – is a wrong step because then a unifying function of a substratum becomes uninteligible. Apart from these inadequacies the function of the relational categories is clear: They serve to connect changing accidents with their substratum and substances with one another.

6 Rosiak (2013b).

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5 In Roman Ingarden’s ontology we find quite an elaborate analysis of a substantial structure which he calls a form of a subject of properties.⁷ Ingarden’s investigations assume an objective, not a transcendental, standpoint, but this does not affect the interesting and quite detailed description of a formal structure of a subject of properties. Ingarden distinguishes various kinds or levels of properties with respect to their stronger or looser connection with the substantial core which is called the constitutive nature of an object. Properties called absolutely proper are the most fundamental properties of an object and they are determined by the constitutive nature alone. They are essential to the object. The acquired properties are codetermined by some absolutely proper properties and an external event causing a change in the object. E. g. hitting a smooth wooden surface of a desk with a hammer leaves a deformation in it. The externally conditioned properties are still less connected with a subject: When I press a spring it changes its shape but when I stop pressing it returns quickly to the previous shape. There are purely relative determinations of an object too, as e.g. being bigger that something else and so on. Let us ignore the last type of determinations and reflect on externally conditioned properties. A shape of a twisted spring is its particular quality conditioned by the resilience of the material of the object and by the external force. But the resilience of the steel wire, of which the spring is made, is not just a single quality: it is a regular dependence of the shape of the wire on the tension in it. As we see in this example, the relation between an externally conditioned property and relevant acquired property is a relation between a particular case and a general rule. The resilience of a spring is in turn produced in it by the process of hardening the steel. This property then is conditioned by some still more fundamental property characteristic of the material of the spring: One can harden steel but not, say, gold. This last property, no matter how called (“ability to being hardened”), is one of the fundamental, constitutive properties of the steel – its absolutely proper property. It consists in a general rule that after appropriate treatment the material becomes hard. This means that it behaves so and so in given conditions. We see that general rules an object obeys can form a hierarchy of generality: ability of being hardened is more general property than being actually hardened. A constitutive nature of an object mentioned above should be interpreted as the most general of rules to which an object conforms. There must be such a unique rule to secure unity of all properties of the object in question. In case of physical objects

7 Ingarden (1965), Ch. VIII.

12 | Marek Rosiak their nature is just the most fundamental physical law ruling their behaviour – before the relativist revolution it was the law of gravitation. General character of properties understood as rules of behaviour is not the generality of universals and thus properties are not treated here as universals. A universal is basically an entity that can apply to many separate individuals in a very same manner. E. g. being a man in Socrates is identical with being a man in Alcibiades. Generality of a given property means that the same rule of behaviour can be presented by an object in different situations.⁸ Regularity of reactions to external stimulations cannot explain spontaneous behaviour of a substance. If it is spontaneous it cannot be only reactive.⁹ But there is a methodological problem of a relevant criterion: how to distinguish a case of a real spontaneity? Is a given case of a behaviour indeed spontaneous or rather reactive, being a consequence of an unknown cause? Such a dilemma shows very well that certain features of a subject cannot be just discovered in it – they can be only ascribed to it. And such is not only indetermination of certain actions – a reactive behaviour conforming to a general pattern cannot be just experienced – it is always hypothetically ascribed to a subject.¹⁰

6 Let us try to see how a notion of substance is applied to sense data. Before we start, an important reservation: We do not experience crude sense impressions in a standard epistemic situation. We already function in a world of constituted objects, in particular – substances. But we must admit that a substance as such cannot be sensually experienced. We do not just extract notions of object, substance, cause and effect and so on from sense experience – we assume them in this context. So what we present here is a constitutive hypothesis – how a notion of substance has to be applied step by step until a full blooded substance will emerge in our experience. First conditions, necessary to assume that we experience a substance, concern time and space. Whatever can be regarded a substance must exist continu-

8 The question of a “non-universal-like” character of the generality of properties was raised by Dr. Marek Piwowarczyk. 9 An ontological analysis of human spontaneity is undertaken by Dr. Marek Piwowarczyk in the article contained in this volume (Piwowarczyk (2014)). I agree with results of his investigations and I am very obliged to him for many stimulating discussions on this subject. 10 I am obliged to Prof. Uwe Meixner for directing my attention to the question of a spontaneous behaviour. See his paper in the present volume.

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ally and form one piece. It must be observed that a given qualitatively determined spatial region does not break into separate pieces during a given period of time. Let us assume that we deal with a certain amount of a coloured ideal gas in a glass cylinder with a piston on top of it. Of course, according to the atomistic theory of matter, gas is just a plurality of separate particles. As such it cannot satisfy the just mentioned preliminary condition of being one substance. Let us then assume that gas is rather a continuous medium – we do this just for the sake of brevity. If we take into account the atomistic nature of matter, we won’t be able to treat any macroscopic being as a substance. A compound substance in the literal sense cannot exist. As long as the gas is locked in a cylinder, it spreads out in the whole space under the piston and its volume can change according to the movements of the piston. We measure parameters of the gas: its volume, temperature and pressure. They depend on external circumstances: temperature and pressure in a longer period of time become equal to the analogous parameters outside the cylinder and a volume is a function of these two. When the pressure is constant (the unburdoned piston can move freely) we can observe that the volume of gas is proportional to its temperature: V/T = const. This regularity can be acknowledged as a property of the gas in the cylinder. It depends on the pressure of the gas (the higher is the pressure the slower gas expands) and we can call it its thermic expansibility. In the course of further inquieries we discover that even if all three parameters change, they preserve the condition that pV/T = const.: Expansibility and pressure are in a reverse ratio. This more general regularity, albeit has no special name, can be regarded as a property of our gas as well and it does not already depend on any external circumstances. Thus it can be regarded as an absolutely proper property of the gas in the cylinder. Finally we arrive at the conclusion that the constant in the last equation equals to nR, where n is a measure of the amount of the gas and R – the universal gas constant. For a given portion of gas the product nR is a fundamental determination on which all its remaining determinations depend, at least partially when they are codetermined by still other factors. While n characterizes the given amount of gas (number of moles), R is a universal characteristics of an ideal gas as such. Thus the constant R can be regarded as an analogon of Aristotelian substantial form, while n is taken for a quantitative characteristics of the matter (not pure matter of course but the matter of ideal gas). Together, as a product, they play the role of the constitutive nature of an object. If in the course of further investigations it showed that the correlation of gas parameters depends on still other circumstances, the product nR would lose a status of a fundamental determination of gas and become being regarded as its property. This shows that there is nothing mysterious in the notion of a constitu-

14 | Marek Rosiak tive nature of an object – it is just a hypothetically assumed fundamental unitary principle of the synthesis of data.

7 It seems that when we assume that a property is some general rule of correlation of qualities of an object, this has an unwelcome consequence that one and the same property can be owned by distinct objects which obey the same rule. To avoid this one must consider general rules as instantiated: a property is not just a rule but a rule being applied to particular circumstances. In the case of gas transformations described above a particular process of changes of external temperature makes general expansibility of an ideal gas a unique property of a given portion of gas in a particular spatiotemporal localization. Sometimes time and space are regarded the factors of individuation of a particular. The truth is that these determinations are not immediate factors of individuation but they determine external conditions of a given object and these in turn instantiate all general rules which apply to the object. A property understood accordingly to the proposed rules is evolving: Although the general principle assumed in it remains the same, particular circumstances of its application change. This is not a change of a property, which demands a change of a rule of reaction to external conditions. Ingarden sometimes says that properties can materialize or develop fully and dematerialize or deteriorate. This can be easily understood if the proposed interpretation is accepted: In some circumstances the rule can produce more prominent effects than in other cases. E. g. thermic expansibility produces bigger changes of volume under lower pressure – in such a situation we can say that expansibility of gas becomes more prominent. From the transcendental point of view the problem of individuation looks differently than in a classical perspective. It is not the problem of finding an immanent component, responsible for the individual character of the whole object, be it matter, form or whatsoever. It is rather the problem of regarding an object, being constituted in a process of subsequent application of different synthetic forms, as individual. What makes the result of such a constitution an individual? It must be some sort of a decision (like the Husserlian “Seinssetzung”) made by the mind and equivalent to the acknowledgement that its object is no more indetermined in any respect. Time and space are such definitive determinations of an object. When an object is spatially and temporally localized it is acknowledged to be wholly determined. A picture of six lines making four triangles can be interpreted as edges of a triangular pyramid:

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 A                  

But this picture does not determine whether the vertex A is situated before the face opposite to it or behind it. Only when we decide the spatial orientation of the pyramid, the picture becomes determined. Thus from the transcendental point of view time and space should be regarded as ultimate forms of determination of an object. “Setzen” in “Seinssetzung” means to localize in time and space. Without such localization an object would remain indetermined as to its relations with other objects. On the other hand, being localized in time and space, an object is situated among other objects and thanks to their interactions their properties become determined in a way described above.

8 Causal nexus can hold between objects having properties. With regard to a given volume of the gas (piston locked) a difference of the temperature between the outside and the inside of the cylinder can be regarded a cause leading to the relevant change of temperature and pressure in the cylinder. A cause should be understood as a disturbance of a state of balance in a given situation. Its effect is a process of reestablishing the balance of relevant parameters. A given value of temperature and pressure of the gas, being conditioned by the external temperature, can be regarded as externally conditioned properties of the gas. Its volume when the piston can move freely, according to the changes of pressure of the gas, is an externally conditioned property as well. The dependence of pressure on temperature (thermic expansibility), as conditioned by the position of the locked piston, can be regarded as an acquired property. Finally, the mutual interdependence of all three parameters: p, T, V, as determined by the universal gas constant and the amount of the gas, but not by any external circumstances, fulfils the characteristics of the absolutely proper property. This shows how properties of different types are mutually correlated.

16 | Marek Rosiak In case of gravitational phenomena a change of distance seems at first sight to be the cause of the relevant change of gravitational force, according to the equation F = GMm/r2 expressing a regular, functional dependence of force on distance. But a spatial distance as such cannot produce any real effect and a difference of distances still less so. A distance of bodies in a void (r) is not a determination of any substance, but a relation between substances. Acting of one substance on another is a relation, but active factor itself cannot be just a relation. In this case a causal connection holds between substances located at some distance. The regular dependence of force on distance of bodies belongs to the nature of the mass but is not a property of a mass. It looks like spatial relations between masses situated in the empty space do not fit the conceptual scheme: substance – causation. This problem, under the heading of the simple localization doctrine, was investigated by A. N. Whitehead in the critical part of his process metaphysics. As a result Whitehead, who regarded simple localization as an immanent component of the doctrine of substantialism, accused substantialism of inconsistency. But a spatial distance between substances, although not a property, is a relation which must be reckoned in when a gravitational interaction is taken into consideration. A regular dependence of the gravitational force on the distance between bodies is not a property because it cannot be ascribed to any single subject. Forces refer to bodies and the distance is a relation between them. Nevertheless, the dependence in question is grounded in the nature of the mass as arranged in space. Although the doctrine of the absolute space do not indeed fit substantialism, a relational doctrine of space (as, e.g. stated in Leibniz’s correspondence with Clarke) can do it very well. Would it be possible to ground functioning of causal laws in momentary events or processes instead of substances, as Whitehead tried? It seems that a process of becoming of an actual occasion – a fundamental entity in the process metaphysics – in accordance with certain preestablished rule, called the initial aim (of this actual occasion), cannot be described consistently. Self-constituting microprocess cannot be a fundament of the principle of its own constitution. So, eventually, assuming processual character of reality we feel forced to admit that its laws are platonic entities (or are grounded in an extra entity which is not just a process – this function in processual metaphysics is fulfilled by God). Thus, rejecting substantialism we have to admit platonism, which is certainly not the most welcomed consequence for processualists.

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9 What is the proper meaning of the phrase “a cause produces an effect”? Surely, the causal connection is always based on laws of nature. Take the law of gravitation – it determines a fall of a not suspended body in the gravitational field. A mass elevated over the surface of the Earth and suspended on a rope is in a state of equilibrium: its weight is balanced by the reaction of the rope. In this state no effect is produced. When the rope has been cut, a process of a free fall of the mass in the gravitational field begins: An event of breaking the balance starts the process of retaining it and this stops when the mass reaches the ground where its weight meets a reaction equal to it. If we set a sheet of paper on fire, an exothermic reaction starts and fire continues until only ashes remain – the chemical balance is reached on a new level. We can say that the cause here was an event which broke the state of equilibrium in a given region while its effect was a process directed at the retaining of the balance, perhaps in new circumstances. The state of equilibrium does not have to be static: a movement of a body along a straight line with a constant speed is a state of balance too. A circular movement of Earth around the Sun is a little more complicated case. It seems that the cause here is a constant change of a centripetal force direction and the relevant effect is a circulation of the Earth. Both the cause and its effect seem to be processes in this case. Swinging of a pendulum, oscillation of a spring, jumping of a ball on a hard surface, exemplify still more complex case. At first look a net force and a movement of a pendulum seem to be mutually dependent. On a closer inspection however we realize that it is the external force of gravitation which causes the movement of the pendulum starting from a deflected position. This movement in turn causes the change of a suspension force in the arm of the pendulum which modifies its movement. Taking all this into account one can say that a gravitational force causes the periodical movement of a pendulum which represents after all some state of a dynamic equilibrium. This equilibrium is in fact an endless process of changes.

Conclusion Kant claimed that the notions of substance-accident and cause-effect are pure a priori, i. e. they work as necessary assumptions of all natural knowledge. On closer inspection this does not seem true. We can certainly modify the content of these notions and even get rid of them – at some cost of course. We can conceive reality as a variety of not mutually connected events, but only few of us would be satisfied with such a chaotic picture. With a considerable effort we can stop our conceptual

18 | Marek Rosiak activity at all – it seems that some meditation practices lead to such an end. But if we prefer an organized picture of reality, the notions in question seem to be very useful and the notion of substance (or the notion of causally correlated plurality of substances) is much more effective in unifying experience than notions of (possibly causally correlated) processes or events. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude that in time some still more effective instrument of organizing data of experience will be found. Perhaps the only a priori feature of our mind is its ability to organize sense data in some way. Whether we make use of it and in what way is a matter of a habit or – sometimes – a deliberate choice.

Bibliography Ingarden, R. (1965), Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, Vol II, Tübingen. Leibniz, G. (1991) in Monadology, translated by N. Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press. Piwowarczyk, M. (2014), “’I am a Force’ – An Attempt of Ontological Interpretation of Ingarden’s Metaphor”, this volume. Rosiak, M. (2013a), “Leibniz’s Spiritualistic Metaphysics of the Corporeal Substance. A case Study of a Pre-Kantian Dualism”, in Dualistic Ontology of the Human Person, edited by M. Szatkowski, München: Philosophia Verlag. Rosiak, M. (2013b), “Realizm i Czas” [“Realism and Time”], in Świat, świadomość, wartości [World, Consciousness, Values], edited by D. Leszczyński and M. Rosiak, Wrocław.

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Part II: Causal Aspects of Substance

Thomas Buchheim

Remarks on the Ontology of Living Beings and the Causality of their Behavior* 1 Two arguments for the ontological difference between corporeal and psychic reality Aristotle developed two good arguments why one cannot identify psychic or mental states with bodily states or somatic processes (for instance neural activity in the brain) that are still broadly used today. The first argument states that things that are the subject or substrate of psychic states are essentially different to those that can be the subject of bodily states or somatic processes. The second argument says that between a psychic phenomenon and a simultaneous bodily process no isomorphic structure outline and therefore no analytically productive mapping can be undertaken. To begin with the first argument: while all bodies simply as such, that is, portioned in any size, both larger and however small, are subjects of somatic processes and bodily states, as the name already says, only a very small selection of them can function as subjects of psychic states, each taken as a whole, if they fulfill extremely restrictive conditions regarding their internal structure and external demarcation. Aristotle very deliberately refuses to assume that psychic phenomena have their own psychic subject – for instance, “the soul” taken in itself – because he recognizes clearly that such states (everything that we call “psychic” or “mental”) only appear as embedded in the vital context of living individuals who, as far we can see, are themselves complex bodies.¹ Although these complex bodies, according to Aristotle, have a soul or are animate, the soul is not an independent entity besides the complex body, but rather a special manner this body itself has of existing as a whole:

* I wish to thank Prof. Marcela García for the translation of this original German paper into English and for her helpful and competent discussion of its basic ideas. 1 Admittedly according to Aristotle not the same is to say for pure thinking and the nous which, as a substance of itself, ‘settles in’ with a living (human) being which already fulfills all the psychic qualifications for being able to think.

22 | Thomas Buchheim [1] Hence the rightness of the view that the soul cannot be without a body, while it cannot be a body. That is why it is in a body, and a body of a definite kind. It was a mistake, therefore, to do as former thinkers did, merely to fit it into a body without adding a definite specification of the kind or character of that body [...] It comes about as reason requires: the fulfillment ( ) of any given thing can only be realized in what is already capable of being that thing, i.e. in a matter of its own appropriate to it. From all this it is plain that soul is a fulfillment or account ( ) of something that possesses a capability of being such.²

Psychic and mental states can only be ascribed to this totality in its way of existing: the whole human (and only the whole) thinks; the whole deer (only the whole) scents something; the whole blackbird (only the whole) sings. All mental and psychic states are of biographical nature. That is, they only appear as embedded in life episodes of living individuals in their totality. As long as these individuals are corporeal, the subject of psychic and mental states is indeed – although complex and highly integrated – a body. This is at least Aristotle’s position. But the bodies that can be, on the one hand, subject of somatic or physical states and processes and, on the other hand, subjects of psychic or mental states are essentially different. While all bodies and bodily parts in any partition serve for the first kind, only those highly complex bodies in so far as they are alive come into question for the second kind. For this reason, in one and the same complex body there can be states of both kinds: firstly, physical states and this thoroughly in all its parts; secondly, psychic states, but only in the body as a whole and therefore always embedded in life episodes of the whole individual. In support of this view of Aristotle that is, in my opinion, exemplary also for the contemporary debate,³ I want to mention briefly two quotes from De anima, although there are many other passages in the philosopher’s work that would be relevant: [2] Yet to say that it is the soul which is angry is as if we were to say that it is the soul that weaves or builds houses. It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks, and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul.⁴ [3] The view we have just been examining, in company with most theories about the soul, involves the following absurdity: they all join the soul to a body, or place it in a body, without adding any specification of the reason of their union, or of the bodily conditions required for it. Yet such explanation can scarcely be omitted; for some community of nature is presupposed by the fact that the one acts and the other is acted upon, the one moves and the

2 de An. II 2, 414 a 19–28. 3 For some points of discussion and references of this neo-aristotelian picture to the contemporary debate on mental causality see in more detail my Buchheim (2013). 4 de An. I 4, 408 b 11–18.

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other is moved; but it is not the case that any two things are related to one another in these ways. All, however, that these thinkers do is to describe the specific characteristics of the soul; they do not try to determine anything about the body which is to contain it, as if it were possible, as in the Pythagorean myths, that any soul could be clothed in any body [...].⁵

We can call this first argument for the difference between psychic and bodily processes in short the argument of different complexity of the subjects. In the course of contemporary philosophical debate with neuroscience it was again formulated by Bennett and Hacker in their book The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. The authors mentioned referred to the false conclusion that stems from ignoring this argument as the “mereological fallacy”⁶, which consists in the inconsequential transition from the activities of the whole organism to those processes related to them in some relevant part (such as brain regions) of this organism. According to this fallacy, it seems as though our brain or certain parts of it would ‘think’ or ‘see’ or ‘feel’. We begin to ask ourselves how it is possible that besides electrochemical neuro-activity there are other states, namely psychic or mental ones, in the brain or elsewhere, or whether we should assume that ‘mens’, ‘soul’, ‘mind’ is something completely different in us that accomplishes these activities (seeing, thinking, and feeling). The second argument, which was also brought up by Aristotle, refers to the interior structure of life episodes and the psychic states and processes that are embedded in them, which seems to be completely different to that of bodies. While in the case of bodily processes, the individual momentary states of the parts involved actually make up the whole process accumulated spatiotemporally, in the case of life episodes we cannot dissect the whole event in the same way into spatiotemporal details and moments without losing something. Rather, the episode or psychic state (for instance an itch or a sight impression) disappears completely when we go below a certain extension of the spatiotemporal regions in which it appears. This can be expressed as follows: life episodes appear in space and time but cannot be sharply distinguished spatiotemporally as their bodily symptoms can be. However, if I’m not mistaken, this kind of distinguishability belongs essentially to all corporeal states and processes. Aristotle concluded that life episodes or psychic events could not themselves be presented or understood as somatic complexes, but require a peculiar scientific approach and treatment. I quote a related passage from the work On Generation and Corruption:

5 de An. I 3, 407 b 15–24. 6 Bennett and Hacker (2003), 68 ff.

24 | Thomas Buchheim [4] An additional absurdity is that the soul should consist of the elements, or that it should be one of them. How are the soul’s alterations to take place? How, e.g., is the change of being musical to being unmusical, or how is memory or forgetting, to occur? For clearly, if the soul be Fire, only such properties will belong to it as characterize Fire qua Fire; while if it be compounded, only the corporeal modifications will occur to it. But the changes we have mentioned are none of them corporeal. The discussion of these difficulties, however, is a task appropriate to a different investigation.⁷

What Aristotle says here about the ‘matter of the soul’ as was supposed at the time, fire, also holds good mutatis mutandis today for the very much discussed ‘soul matter’ of neural activity in our brain. This activity, in its somatic profile, cannot account for the properties and sequences of activity that we discover in psychic phenomena within the vital context, like for instance meaning something (intentionality) or to feel a certain way (experience quality). It’s difficult to see how to interpret what seems to actually happen embedded in a life episode (like remembering something) directly as a somatic process. According to Aristotle we should rather do the same that we still do today, namely to speak of a mere correlation between what happens somatically and what happens in a life episode;⁸ a correlation in which the spatiotemporal interior differentiation of both sides clearly cannot be mapped onto the other. That is why one side behaves as a somatic complex but the other one doesn’t. [5] the alteration of that which undergoes alteration is also caused by the above-mentioned characteristics, which are affections of some underlying quality. Thus we say that a thing is altered by becoming hot or sweet or thick or white; and we make these assertions alike of what is inanimate and of what is animate, and further, where animate things are in question, we make them both of the parts that have no power of sense perception and of the senses themselves. For in a way even the senses undergo alteration, since actual perception is a

7 GC II 6, 334 a 9–15. 8 The correlation of psychic state and brain state is itself a product of theories and cannot be an immediate object of experiments; immediately determinable are the correlations between short term behavior events and cerebral activity. Cf. on this topic Kurthen (2006), 28: “This is the structure of these experiments: primarily we have the investigation of a relation between an instruction and a behavior; secondarily, on the one hand relations between the instruction and those thoughts it involves against the background of cognitive science, on the other hand, a relation between a behavior event and those brain processes that accompany this event (or even just their indicators, as in an fMRI experiment [functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging]). The relation between thoughts (the actual phenomena of sensation in the monkey, the actual episode of memory in the human) and brain processes appears at least in a tertiary perspective – and therefore at a highly theoretical level, not directly at the level of ‘data’ – as the relation between the supposed mental ‘component’ of a behavior and the brain processes measured directly or indirectly.”

Remarks on the Ontology of Living Beings motion through the body ( a certain way.⁹

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) in the course of which the sense is affected in

Aristotle seems to be very conscious of the fact that the change of state in a series of life episodes is not spatiotemporally distinguishable in the way a sequence of bodily states is. He determines therefore that the first only appears ‘through’ or with support of the second, although it is not to be identified with it. Indeed, that which definitely has different properties (here: different spatiotemporal distinguishability) cannot be identical according to Leibniz’s principle of identity. Nevertheless, it doesn’t follow for Aristotle that psychic or life episodes belong to a non-corporeal substance. Rather, the substance to which they belong is a certain complex body that simultaneously exemplifies nonetheless such different kinds of states.¹⁰ Every psychic event (thoughts, sensations, feelings) is according to Aristotle a culmination (climax, emphasis) of its being alive that the whole system generates. Even mere life – for instance in sleep or unconsciousness – requires the coordinated activity of the whole body and its parts: metabolism, circulation, muscular tone, nervous dispositions, etc. A sensation, a pain, a dream, a calculation, catching a ball or keeping balance are climaxes or culminations of being alive sustained by this active basis. Just as the mere being-alive relates to the integrated detailed states of the whole body and its parts, so does the culmination relate to the integrated variations of those detailed states of the whole system. This is what Aristotle calls self-accomplishment or fulfillment (energeia or entelecheia). Every accomplishment of a psychic function is such a culmination or an operative state of the whole system. But both, and ¹¹ are embedded in life episodes and require therefore the whole complex body in its interior organization, the whole living individual.

9 Physik VII 2, 244 b 6–12. 10 This was reformulated by Peter F. Strawson as an argument for the special ontological status of self-conscious persons, but is valid in a reduced form for all living systems from a certain level of development: “What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.” (Strawson (1959), 101 f.). Strawson has certain reasons to apply the concept of person primitively and exclusively to individuals with self-consciousness; he especially rejects the analysis of person as “animated body” or “embodied anima”, as if these were simpler and the person composed of these. At the same time it seems necessary to use the double aspect of such predicates also for non-personal living beings without having to consider the “animated body” as a composition of body and soul. 11 Cf. Metaph. IX 8, 1050 a 24.

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2 The somatic as symptom of the psychic Psychic states are thus necessarily understood as states in their own right; but they do not belong as such to an incorporeal substance of their own. They exist in correlation with certain bodily states of the same corporeal complex substance as a whole.¹² This relation I call horizontal dualism, because it is not a vertical relation of layering two different substances and their different classes of properties, but rather an intertwining of two orders of the same material in one single substance (as a fugue of two melodies with different rhythm in a musical piece).¹³ Indeed, both happen within the same horizon, namely the spatiotemporal horizon of corporality in general. However, some are internal culminations or, as Aristotle says, self-fulfillments (entelecheiai, energeiai) of the complete bodily system; the other are partial states that are consistently spatiotemporally distinguishable, and relate as ink to the readable syllables of life episodes. The culmination would not be possible if the foundation for it were not given, the ‘being alive’ of the whole individual. According to Aristotle, for all psychic events or psychic states, we should keep in mind the difference between ‘primary’ and culminating entelecheia, between the foundation-giving actualization or activity and the summit-building one. The first one, that is, the primary entelecheia of the whole system is according to Aristotle the defining concept of the soul; the second one, the entelecheia that is brought to culmination, is the common expression for all kinds of soul functions, which Aristotle sometimes also calls ˆ or ˆ [use made of something].¹⁴ The relation between soul and psychic state is not that between an underlying subject and a property, but rather the relation between basic disposition and performance or between basic form and developed culmination, like the graph of a mathematical function, for instance a parabola, where we can distinguish between the base and the maximum of the function. I think that this Aristotelian image of psychic phenomena can be transferred to contemporary debates without infringement against principles of modern scientific thought. Psychic states can never be identified with somatic states and processes that are determined on bodily parts and are added up out of bodily parts into particular regional patterns of activity. Rather, they are embedded without ex-

12 I have described this in more detail as an Aristotelian model of a possible solution to the bodysoul problem from a contemporary perspective in Buchheim (2006a). 13 Cf. for this concept of a weak dualism in the same horizon of the corporeal in general, Buchheim (2006b), 38–49. 14 Cf. de An. II 4, 415 a 19 and PA I 5, 645 b 14–22; Metaph. IX 8, 1050 a 23–b2.

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ception in life episodes that are biographically relevant, that is, they characterize the life-sustaining and life-configuring behavior of the whole organism. Within these life episodes there are particular psychic phenomena that can best be described as ‘operative states’ of the whole system that accumulate in operations of the living being in question (for instance motor, aesthetic, linguistic, cognitive operations). The sameness and variability of psychic states involves the sameness and variability of the operations – this is in any case my thesis. The characteristics of psychic states show to what kind of life episodes they belong and what kind of operations can be achieved through them. If you can’t hold your balance, you cannot ride a bike; if you cannot see, you cannot paint; if you can’t add, you cannot multiply or calculate a complicated equation; if you can’t hear the beat, you cannot dance, etc. It is always certain operative complete states with a certain psychophysical profile that enable incorporation in certain activities and operative sequences, and with them the progress of corresponding actions. An action or operation fails if the operative states do not possess the corresponding psychophysical profile that represents the key to the progress of the action. The thresholds of certain actions we will never cross; others only after a long time and practice; again others after a short time or even from birth. The culminations of our life episodes are accordingly simple or exigent, aspired or common. I had already mentioned the expression with which I want to refer to the pairing relationship between psychic-biographical being and simultaneous bodily correlate (be it a state of the brain or of circulation or of the skin, or other somatic organ states): corporeal states are symptoms of the complete situation (‘life situation’) of a living being characterized psychically. All psychic states and processes are (according to the first argument) characteristics of a life situation in which the whole living being finds itself; all somatic states (according to the second argument) are only certain symptoms of this situation, and together they do not make up the psychic state. We also do not know exactly which groups of symptoms accompany which psychic events and clearly it is not always the exact same with the same ones.¹⁵ Unreasonably, we tend to consider just neuro-physiological

15 Aristotle also pointed out this curiosity: [6] “It seems that all the affections of soul ( ˆ ) involve a body – passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in ˆ all these there is a concurrent affection of the body. In support of this we may point to the fact that, while sometimes on the occasion of violent and striking occurrences ( ) there is ´ no excitement or fear felt, on others faint and feeble stimulations produce these emotions, viz. when the body is already in a state of tension resembling its condition when we are angry. Here is a still clearer case: in the absence of any external cause of terror we find ourselves experiencing the feelings of a man in terror.” (de An. I 1, 403 a 16–24)

28 | Thomas Buchheim symptoms as complete correlate of a psychic or mental state. However, this is barely justifiable. It is possible, of course, that particular patterns of neuronal stimulation be typical to a greater extent for particular psychic states or mental performances, so to speak symptoms that are necessarily paired with them, while other somatic symptoms seem interchangeable. On the other hand, much research on brain injuries shows that very different areas and therefore also different neuro-symptoms are required for the same psychic functions. The often mentioned plasticity of the brain indicates that there isn’t a special set of neuro-symptoms that is exclusively correlated to the psychic state or even identified with it. Symptoms remain a concomitant phenomenon and they are not themselves the whole matter of fact of psychic life.

3 An example for the causality of the psychic as such The false limitation, in my opinion, of the symptoms of the psychic to a so-called ‘neuronal correlate’ has led to think that the psychic state or mental performance is a mere epiphenomenon or a causally irrelevant appendix of the neuronal processes in our brain, a sort of superstructure or a shadow of what happens in the brain and makes us feel this or think that, etc. I am convinced that this is a onesided reversal of the actual dependencies. It often seems the other way around, that specific symptoms – also neuronal – only follow a certain life situation and its psychic characteristics. When we don’t even notice that our blood pressure is too high or that this or that brain function are impaired, then nothing changes in the established course of the total behavior. It is only once we become aware of certain signals that we can see to it that also those neuronal symptoms change. A very interesting experiment that Jose M. Carmena and Miguel A. L. Nicolelis made some years ago at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina USA, documents in an impressive way what I want to claim here:¹⁶ The team around Nicolelis und Carmena researched the behavior of monkey subjects operating robot prostheses through so-called Brain-Machine Interfaces, that is, they explored the question of which neuronal populations and in what state of stimulation underlie which fine motor operations of the arms or the prosthetic arms. To this end, they let the monkeys play a computer game that they

16 See Carmena (Nicolelis et al.).

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controlled with a joystick. The task was to hit a blinking point that appeared on the screen as soon and effectively as possible, etc. During the game, the monkeys’ brain activity in certain brain areas was recorded, with a relatively fine definition for those neuronal populations supposed to elicit the control movements of the arms. The monkeys learned to play the game well pretty quickly and they liked to play it. At the same time the brain signals, additionally conditioned by a simple learning program, were applied to control a robot arm that began to make similar movements to the monkey’s. In order to achieve a more exact focusing of the neuronal signals relevant to control, the contacts between the monkey’s joystick and “his” computer with the game on screen were interrupted after a certain time and the computer was fed instead the signals from the monkey’s brain. That is, the monkey’s arms were not in fact controlling the game anymore, but the brain directly. This led first to a serious decrease in the game performance of all monkeys, but this was followed by a significant change in behavior and a reorganization of the neuro-active symptoms until the game performance rose again almost to its original values: the monkey would first make control movements with its arms that were too big, protruding, so as to compensate the decrease in performance. In this way, the neuronal populations involved and their stimulation curves on the points of measurement changed, until finally this neuro-activity led to similar results as before in a reformed and newly organized way. The monkeys realized pretty quickly that the movement of their arms was causally irrelevant and controlled the computer game henceforth without arm movement, only through brain activity. The development of this experiment shows clearly what kind of groups of phenomena seems to be causally subordinate to the other: the decrease in game performance changes the life situation of the monkeys that is characterized, let’s say, through disappointment and anger about the results being suddenly worse. The anger produces an effort to improve the situation again. This effort leads to the significant reorganization of bodily symptoms, for instance to the protruding arm movements with the control pole. Since this does not help the monkeys, the neuronal populations in the monkey’s brain, firing chaotically by now, are selected in a different way as before: those that lead to signals that improve the game performance again are favored and bestow upon the monkey’s life renewed success of the operation sequence of the whole game; others are repressed and ebb away due to irrelevance. In this way, the monkey learns to control the computer game with slightly reorganized neuronal fire directly with the brain. Important for us is just that the reorganization of neuronal symptoms in the operation sequence of the game follows the biographically affected life circumstances with their embedded psychic states and not the other way around.

30 | Thomas Buchheim Because the monkey gets angry and attempts to return to the earlier successful state, neuronal fire is selected differently and the best variables for game success are favored. Formulated in general: we cross the threshold of the corresponding next step of a biographical operation by reorganization of the bodily symptoms that accompany the performance of the activity. When we balance an egg on a spoon and run to the finish line, we reach the next step and the finish line only if the somatic symptoms are constantly reorganized according to the success of the operation. Now this seems not only valid for balance acts and arm movements that we have learned to control voluntarily and consciously, but also for neuronal populations and stimulation patterns in our brain, as the experiment above teaches. They also follow the proposed success of the operation, and we make variations chaotically and serendipitously until we advance to the corresponding next threshold of the desired operation thanks to an appropriate population. Our operative abilities of thought, for instance in calculating or reading, could certainly be built this way. And since the brain has such plastic properties, operations achieved successfully once or several times are a good path for the fruitful progress of our life.

4 A general model proposal: psychophysical causality through favor In this way it seems possible to describe a general model for the causality of biographical episodes and the psychic states embedded in them: the organic body of a living being is not subject to a unitary causal succession from one moment to the next, but it builds a structure of functional systems that are relatively strongly demarcated from each other but overlap and are thus capable of coordination. These systems in turn break down into multiple subordinated causal connections. For this reason, the bodily symptoms of different biographical episodes and the psychic and mental states embedded in them are often dispersed throughout the whole body, they build patterns and relations that are not immediately connected to each other in a causal connection relevant to the complete behavior but are rather a symptomatic expression of the behavior or operative state of the whole living organism, as was described above by means of Aristotle’s arguments. That is why the sum of somatic symptoms, including the neuronal ones, is available according to life situation and adequate biographical way of behavior through which such an organism is maneuvered. When we learn something, for instance, we expose our body to a situation that is appropriate to re-organize a

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particular part of the somatic symptoms of our operation. For instance, we repeat a certain foreign word or sound until we can articulate them fluently and correctly. Or we try to stay on the bike saddle until it becomes easier to find balance through higher-speed. We create circumstances then, for each other and often just for ourselves, in which particular symptoms, including neuronal ones, are favored, in order to advance to the next corresponding threshold of our operations. And when we are practicing something, we remain before this threshold searching and chaotically varying until we cross it and the operation progresses. What is unacceptable, as mentioned at the beginning, is the view that those operative complete states (formulated in Aristotelian manner: the ‘culminations’ or entelecheiai of our being alive) are identical with the corresponding somatic symptom or the neuronal pattern etc. because in that case we would have to renounce the truth of the affirmation that psychic and mental states and sequences as such and in their non-somatic characteristics could be causal for the somatic continuation of our existence. We cultivate thought because its symptomatic expression brings enormous advantages and improvements to our behavior and thus to the somatic profile of the course of our life. These advantages are due to our thinking, not to the neuronal fire that, without attention to operative rules of thought, could take in each of us a completely different direction. Thought as such has certain characteristics, as is probably clear to everyone, that no somatic process or set of processes can possess. Some examples are: – Intentionality (to mean something, significance) – Subjectivity (experience quality; first-person perspective) – Reflexivity (self-transparency; awareness that I am the one who is thinking) – Integration of foreign perspectives (empathy, communication, speech-character) – Truth-orientation (thoughts aim at truth) – Normativity (we take pertinent norms into account in our actions) These and other characteristics must be able to leave their causal footprint in our corporeal existence. Therefore, it is insufficient to say that either mental dispositions are mere neuronal states (identity theory) or that mental dispositions supervene on neuronal ones (without their own causal relevance) or that they have causal relevance due to their identity with neuronal states (anomalous monism). In all these models the characteristics of thought I mentioned are causally depotentiated. The causal explanation for what happens is not thought, but neuronal states. In the experiment described above, it was clearly the monkey’s desire to improve its game performance again that was the cause for the reorganization of its brain activity. The

32 | Thomas Buchheim monkey finds itself in a peculiar life situation that doesn’t only affect the state of its brain, but its complete disposition as monkey with certain interests and experiences (which certainly possess intentional characteristics). This situation favors, as we said, the production of particular neuronal states and neglects others. A brain always produces whole populations of related micro-states not only single ones, which do differ on certain traits from each other. Such variations could be accentuated through being more favorable for the progress of ongoing life-episodes and almost eliminated through neglect. The concept of favor or serendipity is meaningful and important in any case where change in a comprehensive context is systematically paired with change in the individual members or symptoms of the context. Here, a particular change in the member involved can favor or compromise another particular change in the comprehensive context. And vice versa, a particular change in the comprehensive context can favor or compromise a particular change in the members of the context. Also related to each other in this way are the comprehensive life situations in which an organism finds itself, and the symptoms in individual body parts that accumulate on certain operative states of the whole organism. Thus, in my view, a model of psychophysical causal connection through favor could look something like this: (1) We learn by maneuvering each other and ourselves into certain life situations and so creating adequate circumstances for particular productions, and not others, which modify our life situation. We are in turn able to incorporate these favored productions to similar situations as enhancing characteristics; we can then maneuver ourselves again into these, in order to become more secure through further favor of the corresponding states, that is, in order to practice (‘favoring spiral’). (2) Such a favoring spiral is the grounding basis of operation. An operation is distinguished from a sequence of events because there is not an immediate causal connection but an operative one between its individual phases. That is, they are connected through a sequence or development of life situations through which favored bodily states (and also neuronal states) are produced one after the other. Balancing a bowl full of soup to the table is an example of an operation. The muscular contractions and angles of the members depend on sensations of how much the level fluctuates. If you don’t master the operation, the waves will inevitably build up because you allow adverse tensions free play, you select them wrongly. (3) Operation attempts slowly create passages and bridges of capacities or better: abilities. That means: more or less long segments in which the sequence of life situations remains on track for the operation and does not slip out of hand as it does for the beginner soup-balancer. Favoring is already preparing for the next

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situations that will follow up. That is why there is disappointment when someone does not master operations flexibly enough. (4) The fourth step consists in the fact that we almost always avoid disappointment, that is, we bring our operations to an end through adapting to the special situation through which we must ‘navigate’ the sequence of life situations. It is still important for all human operations to create particular adequate spaces in which operations can be successful at all, if they are very complex. Also on this point we do much for each other, as at the beginning of learning. So in general it is possible that we behave in a particular way in a causal sense on account of the specific characteristics of our mental dispositions like intentionality, subjectivity, contextuality, reflexivity and intersubjectivity of thoughts and volitions, etc. If the explained model of mental causality were to seem acceptable, then the theory of identity of the mental with what is physically describable would be clearly false; the concept of supervenience as well as anomalous monism without psychophysical causality would be insufficient. In fact, there would be an authentic causality of mental states, which would indeed be states of physical-material beings, but not somatic, i.e. physically describable and explainable states of such beings. Besides, a specific mark of the mental would be especially highlighted, namely that we enable and must enable each other to make such mental states an important and ever more important aspect of our lives. Since we must originally ‘be maneuvered’ into life situations, this seems to me a key perspective for Social Neuroscience.

Bibliography Aristotle (1984), The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revides Oxford Translation, Vol. I, edited by J. Barnes, Princeton UP. Bennett, M. and Hacker, P. (2003), The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Oxford. Bennett, M., Dennett, D., Hacker, P. and Searle, J. (2007), Neuroscience and Philosophy. Brain, Mind, and Language, with Introduction and Conclusion by Daniel Robinson, New York. Buchheim, Th. (2006a), “Sômatikê energeia – ein aktualisierter Vorschlag des Aristoteles zur Lösung des Leib-Seele-Problems” [“Sômatikê energeia – an actualized suggestion of Aristotle for the solution of the body-soul problem”], in Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Antwortversuche aus medizinisch-naturwissenschaftlicher, philosophischer und theologischer Sicht [The soul-body problem. Attempts to reply from a medical-scientific, philosophical and theological point of view], edited by F. Hermanni and Th. Buchheim, München: Fink, 85– 106. Buchheim, Th. (2006b), Unser Verlangen nach Freiheit, Hamburg: Meiner.

34 | Thomas Buchheim Buchheim, Th. (2013), “Ein neo-aristotelischer Vorschlag zum Verständnis mentaler Kausalität. Eine Replik”, in Philosophisches Jahrbuch: 120, 372–393. Cacioppo, J. T., Shelley, E. T. et al. (eds.) (2002), Foundations in Social Neuroscience, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Carmena, J. M., Nicolelis, M. A. L. et al. (2003), “Learning to Control a Brain-Machine Interface for Reaching and Grasping by Primates”, in PloS Biology: I(2), 193–208. (http://biology.plosjournals.org) Davidson, D. (1980), “Mental Events”, in Actions and Events, by D. Davidson, Oxford: Clarendon. Jackson, Frank (1982), “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, in The Philosophical Quarterly: 32, 127–136. Kim, J. (1993), Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kurthen, M. (2006), “Der Augenblick des Bewusstseins und die lange Zeit des Gehirns. Über den möglichen Beitrag der Kognitiven Neurowissenschaft zur Lösung des GehirnGeist-Problems”, in Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Antwortversuche aus medizinischnaturwissenschaftlicher, philosophischer und theologischer Sicht, edited by F. Hermanni and Th. Buchheim, München: Fink, 21–37. Pauen, M. and Achim, S. (eds.) (2002), Phänomenales Bewusstsein – Rückkehr zur Identitätstheorie?, Paderborn. Stich, S. (1983), From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Strawson, P. F. (1959), Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London/ New York.

Markku Keinänen

Tropes, Causal Processes and Functional Laws 1 Introduction According to the dispositionalist conception of natural properties, all fundamental intrinsic natural properties are dispositional: necessarily, if object a instantiates intrinsic property F, property F bestows on a with certain definite causal powers to act in certain ways in certain kinds of circumstances. Two related observations give a strong support for the dispositionalist conception of properties: first, it seems that all empirically discovered fundamental intrinsic properties (e.g., masses, electric charges, spin quantum numbers, quark colour charges) are physical quantities and dispositional properties of objects (Ellis (2001), 115; Mumford (2006)). The bearers of these properties (i.e., fundamental physical microparticles such as electrons and quarks) are powerful particulars, i.e., all of their intrinsic properties are dispositional. Second, we identify the fundamental properties (such as masses and charges) by means of the laws of nature (Newton’s law of gravitation, Coulomb’s law), which describe the associated causal powers, or, the behaviour of objects having these properties in different kinds of circumstances. If we maintain that some radically different laws of nature could be true of these properties or that the same laws could describe the causal powers associated with quite different properties, it is difficult to say of what properties we are talking about.¹ Hence, the dispositionalism about fundamental properties (in some form) accords with the empirical ways the fundamental properties are identified (by means of the associated causal powers the laws of nature describe).² According to certain prominent recent dispositionalists (Ellis (2001);

1 Yates (Yates (2012), sec. 2.1) gives an excellent overview of the difficulties a “quidditist” believer of the possibility of radically different laws of nature faces with respect to the identification of properties. 2 Dispositionalism in a wide sense covers both (strong) “dispositional essentialism”, according to which laws of nature are metaphysically necessary (Ellis and Lierse (1994); Ellis (2001); Bird (2007)) and weaker positions such as Hendry’s and Rowbottom’s (Hendry and Rowbottom (2009)) “weak dispositional essentialism”, according to which laws could have been slightly different.

36 | Markku Keinänen Mumford (2004); Bird (2007)), dispositional properties are also sufficient truthmakers for the functional laws describing the associated causal powers. We need not introduce any further entities such as relations between universals to make them true. As a consequence, certain dispositionalist theories claim to have an ontological benefit of accounting for the truth of functional laws without introducing such contestable entities as laws or relations between universals (cf. Mumford (2004); Yates (2012), sec. 2.2). Most of the leading recent dispositionalists are advocates of property universals. They have formulated their accounts either exclusively by means of Russellian property universals (Bird (2007)) or by means of tropes and Neo-aristotelian property kind universals (Ellis (2001)). The tropes vs. universals debate has been considered independent of the dispositionalism vs. categoricalism debate. Alternatively, since the laws of nature seem to make claims about property universals, universals might be considered to have an advantage over tropes. In this article, I argue that the dispositional tropes and the causal processes they produce can, in relevant part, account for the truth of causal functional laws (such as Coulomb’s law): laws of nature that describe the forces the quantitative properties falling under a determinable generate as a function of their distance. I adopt the trope theory SNT of powerful particulars, which I have defended elsewhere (Keinänen (2011)). In section 3, I explain why functional laws are prima facie problematic for the trope theorist. I adopt the claim that a large group of the dispositional properties figuring in functional laws are causal powers and that their manifestations are causal processes (cf. Ellis and Lierse (1994) and Ellis (2001)) in order to deal with these difficulties (section 4). To get these arguments off the ground, I give a short overview of the trope theory SNT and the resemblance of quantity tropes, which is the topic of the next section.

2 Quantity tropes: the basic constituents of objects Tropes are concrete (i.e., spatio-temporal or, at least, temporal) particulars.³ Most of the alternative trope theories (i.e., trope bundle theories of substance) agree in certain main features of property tropes. Tropes have the paradigmatic category

3 Certain trope theorists (such as Williams (1953), 7–8; Campbell (1990), 53–56 and Denkel (1996)) allow of the possibility of non-spatial (e.g., purely temporal) tropes. However, since it is contestable whether there can be such tropes, I will not consider them further here.

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features of fundamental concrete particulars. First, they are particular: the distinct tropes are capable of being intrinsically exactly similar.⁴ As spatio-temporal entities tropes usually have a single, possibly extended, spatio-temporal location. Second, they are countable individuals, i.e., they have certain determinate identity conditions and are countable.⁵ As a consequence, any trope is distinct from all other individuals. Third, as fundamental entities tropes are categorially simple: every trope is either simple or it is composed of further property tropes. Objects (or, substances) are certain kinds of aggregates of property tropes. Finally, tropes have certain determinate identity conditions independent of the identity conditions of any other entity; they are identity independent existents.⁶ Moreover, tropes are particular properties: they have two further features in addition to the standard category features of fundamental concrete particulars. First, property tropes can exist as spatio-temporally co-located (or, compresent) with each other. Since some simple substances (i.e. powerful particulars) might also be capable of co-location, this does not count as a distinctive feature of tropes. Rather, it is distinctive to tropes that they always occur as co-located with the other tropes. Second and more importantly, tropes have a thin particular nature to determine a single feature of the object possessing the trope (Campbell (1990), 59–60; Simons (2003), sec.6). It is customary to identify tropes with the natures they determine. For instance, a 1kg trope of object a might be considered as that particular mass of object a. Nevertheless, tropes are entityentities with the above category features and cannot be identified with anything less determinate (such as “natures”). Therefore, I am confined to claiming that the nature of 1 kg trope t of object a is to determine the mass of object a having t as a certain kind of proper part.⁷

4 Cf. Williams (Williams (1986)) and Ehring (Ehring (2011)), for a defence of this account of particularity. 5 Lowe (Lowe (1998), ch.3) calls entities with both determinate identity conditions and countability individual objects. In different categorial schemes, these category features (e.g., particularity, determinate identity conditions and countability) can vary independently of each other. Thus, for instance, universals might be considered as countable individual objects or non-countable entities with determinate identity conditions. 6 Most of the recent trope theorists consider the individuation of tropes as primitive, cf., e.g., Campbell (1990); Ehring (2011) and Keinänen and Hakkarainen (2013). Schaffer (Schaffer (2001)) individuates tropes by their spatio-temporal location, which seems to conflict with their identity independence. 7 The different trope theories analyze inherence (i.e., the relation between a property trope and the object possessing the trope) in different ways, cf. Keinänen (Keinänen (2011), 429ff.) for an overview.

38 | Markku Keinänen Although mainly agreeing about the above category of features of tropes, the alternative trope theories (i.e., trope bundle theories of substance) differ in the construction of objects (or, substances). According to the trope theory SNT (Keinänen (2011), sec. 4), only simple substances (powerful particulars) trope bundles, whilst complex objects are constituted by simpler objects. The SNT divides the tropes constituting an object into two distinct groups. First, it introduces one or more nuclear tropes rigidly dependent on each other to determine the necessary features of a powerful particular (such as a down quark or an electron).⁸ The distinct nuclear tropes of substance must fall under distinct determinables (mass, charge, etc.). Second, many simple substances must have contingent tropes, which are one-sidedly rigidly dependent on the nuclear tropes. Property trope t is a part of substance i if and only if t is rigidly dependent only on its nuclear tropes. Simple substances are trope aggregates in which all of the rigid dependencies of the member tropes are fulfilled. The most important distinctive feature of the SNT relative to Simons’ (Simons (1994)) nuclear theory, from which it is developed, is to provide a comprehensive account of location of tropes. The main idea is that tropes are not independently located entities. Rather, their location is determined by the location of the trope bundles in which they occur. Here, it suffices to consider the location of nuclear tropes. According to the SNT, the mutually rigidly dependent nuclear tropes of substance i form an individual (the n-bundle) that is in the basic spatio-temporal relations determining the location of the n-bundle. Since the n-bundle is a minimal entity occurring in the basic spatio-temporal relations, its location determines the location of the nuclear tropes. Nuclear tropes must have some location and their existence entails the existence of the n-bundle. Consequently, the existence of nuclear tropes also entails that they are co-located (Keinänen (2011), 438–440). Further, the location of the nuclear tropes determines the centre of influence (spatio-temporal location) of a powerful particular of which they are parts. Elementary fermions constitute the best a posteriori examples of powerful particulars. For instance, it seems that a down quark has a mass trope of 4.8 MeV, charge trope of -1/3e and a spin quantum number trope in its trope nucleus. Moreover, the SNT allows of a powerful particular to have some contingent tropes. Colour charge tropes of a quark might be good candidates.

8 Let “≤ ” be a relation of improper parthood between distinct entities (cf. Simons (1987), 112) for the definition) and “E!” the predicate of (singular) existence. Trope e is strongly rigidly dependent on trope f , if SRD(e, f ) = ¬(E!f ) ∧ ((E!e → E!f ) ∧ ¬(f ≤ e)) holds.

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The standard way to describe the resemblance of tropes is by means of primitive internal relation of exact similarity or less than exact resemblance.⁹ According to the SNT, all tropes are quantities. Therefore, I propose a more accurate description of their “resemblances” in terms of the different formal relations of proportion and the relation of order.¹⁰ For instance, 1kg trope t is in formal relation of 1:1 proportion to any other 1kg trope. Similarly, all and only mass tropes are mutually connected by some formal relation of proportion; the tropes falling under a distinct determinable (e.g., charge tropes) do not bear the relations of proportion to any mass trope of 1/2. Moreover, all mass tropes mutually are connected by the formal relation of order, i.e., “equal or greater than”, which explains the asymmetry of proportion relations (1:1 proportions excluded). Trope t is a mass trope if and only if t bears some relation of proportion and the relation of order to any mass trope. The proposed account seems to deal with the “resemblances” between most of the basic physical quantities (such as electric charge, spin, and space-time interval) if we keep in mind that many of them (e.g., charges) can have both positive and negative values.¹¹ In such case, the relations of proportion also take positive and negative values. Although the proportions between quantity tropes are not conventional, the choice of the quantitative unit is.¹² Why are we entitled to consider the relations of proportion and order as formal ontological relations? Why don’t we need to introduce further entities, e.g., the relational tropes of proportion to account for the proportions between distinct tropes? Here, I am confined to pointing out that the relations of proportion between tropes have two general characteristics of a formal ontological relation and are plausibly considered as formal relations.¹³ First, assuming that all tropes

9 Cf. (Campbell (1990), 36ff); (Maurin (2002)); (Simons (2003), sec.6). 10 The present suggestion to employ the relations of proportion to spell out the relations between determinate quantities is inspired by Bigelow’s & Pargetter’s (Bigelow and Pargetter (1990), 55– 62) theory. Bigelow and Pargetter introduce proportions as second-degree relation universals, i.e., relations between relation universals. In the present approach, the proportion relations are treated as formal relations, cf. below. 11 However, we need to develop the approach further in order to have a similar account of the necessary relations between the tropes of quark colour charge. Moreover, we need further work to generalize the present approach to the tropes determining distances in different directions and to specify the formal relations between them. 12 When we introduce the unit of electric charge, we have a freedom to choose which of the values of charge are negative and which positive if we keep the positive and negative proportions as fixed. 13 For more discussion of formal relations, cf. Smith and Mulligan (1983); Smith (1998); Keller and Correia (2004) and the other articles in the same issue of Dialectica.

40 | Markku Keinänen are quantities, every trope must be connected to certain other quantity tropes by some proportion relation. It must have a specific position in a network formed by the distinct proportion relations. Hence, as do mereological relations and the relations of existential dependence, the relations of proportion form a network and the existence of a trope presupposes that it has some specific position in the different networks of these different formal relations. Second, since the existence of trope t presupposes that we can specify its proportion relations to the other tropes, the relations of proportion (as are the other formal relations) are ungrounded internal relations, i.e., they obtain because the related entities exist. Consider, for instance, the relation of 3:1 proportion between -e charge trope t1 and -e/3 charge trope of t2 . Necessarily, if t1 and t2 exist, they are in the relation 3:1 proportion to each other. Further, because t1 and t2 are the tropes they are, i.e., they have their specific thin nature, they are connected by the relation 3:1 proportion. In similar way, we can argue that the relations of order are formal relations. Since formal relations are ungrounded internal relations, they are not relational entities but rather relational predications made true by the entities related; instead of calling them formal relations, we could call them formal ontological predications. We can go even further and identify determinate and determinable kinds of tropes with certain kind terms applying to tropes. Here, it suffices to point out that given trope t belongs to certain determinate kind D, e.g., is a 1kg trope because it is the trope it is and bears the relation of 1:1 proportion to any 1kg trope. Consequently, trope t is a (minimal) truthmaker of the claim that t is a 1kg trope. Similarly, trope t suffices to make true the proposition that t is a mass trope.

3 Functional laws Functional laws (such as Newton’s inverse square law of gravitation and Coulomb’s law) spell out relations between determinate quantities falling under some distinct determinables (e.g., masses, distances and gravitational attractions by some force). In expressing these relations, they are completely indiscriminative between the distinct determinates falling under a determinable: if true, a functional law holds true for every determinate value of each quantity it contains. Given that (at least some) functional laws are true law statements, they pose a prima facie difficulty for the trope nominalist. Let us call a law statement expressing a relation between (the most specific) determinates falling certain determinables a determinate law (e.g., Newton’s law of gravitation for some specific masses and some specific distance). The truth of the functional law (“deter-

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minable law”) entails that a prima facie infinite number of determinate laws are true. The first difficulty results from the observation that the determinate laws are logically independent of each other. Since the determinate laws are mutually logically independent, the co-ordination of the distinct determinate laws (that they fall under the same functional formula, the determinable law) seems to need for an explanation. Second, if determinable quantities such as mass have uninstantiated but possibly instantiated values, the functional law entails truths about uninstantiated but possibly instantiated determinate quantities (such as masses). Prima facie, these truths need to have a truthmaker (cf. Armstrong (1997), 243– 248). Before spelling out of why these are difficulties for the trope nominalist, we must specify some principles of truthmaking and how the truth of determinate laws depends on what exists. Certain leading dispositionalists (e.g., Ellis (2001); Mumford (2004)) maintain that dispositional properties are sufficient truthmakers for functional laws such as Newton’s law of gravitation or Coulomb’s law. Intuitively, these laws are just law statements whose truth is grounded by the existence of dispositional properties. A more explicit expression of this idea requires that we specify the principles of truthmaking we presuppose. Here, I am confined to assuming two standard principles of truthmaking: first, truthmakers are entities of any category and the items made true are (atomic) propositions (truth-bearers). Second, the existence of truthmaker(s) entails the truth of the proposition made true. If a group of entities makes proposition p jointly true, then the existence of all of the entities belonging to the group entails that p is true.¹⁴ Two distinct dispositional properties D1 and D2 (two distinct determinate mass universals) are not sufficient truthmakers for the determinate law concerning them. Rather, it seems that all instantiations of these dispositional properties (mass universals) in certain distance from each other constitute a sufficient truthmaker. For instance, one might maintain that the instantiations of two distinct values of mass, say M1 x and M2 y and the instantiations of the dyadic relation of distance Rxy by all objects x and y having these masses in distance R from each other make jointly true the determinate law of gravitation concerning masses M1 and M2 in distance R.

14 A group (or, a plurality) of entities exists if and only if all its members exist. Certain entities make jointly true proposition p if and only if their plurality makes p true. I adopt the following familiar entailment principle for joint truthmaking: if a plurality of entities makes a proposition p true, then the existence of the plurality (and all members of the plurality) entails that p is true, cf. Mulligan et al. (Mulligan (Simons and Smith), sec. 6).

42 | Markku Keinänen Unfortunately, this is not quite right. Truthmakers are entities (existent beings) whose existence is supposed to entail the truth made true. On the above account, the individual instances of a determinate law of gravitation are made true by the pairs of objects instantiating the determinate masses and distance relation R. Nevertheless, all objects having these properties in a certain distance from each other that actually obey a determinate law of gravitation do not jointly make the determinate law true for their existence does not entail that all pairs of objects that fulfil the same condition obey the determinate law. Since the trope theorist cannot postulate general facts, we must reject the demand that determinate laws are made true. For the present purposes, suffices it to maintain that a determinate law is true because it does not have falsifying instances: if two arbitrary objects x and y fulfil the antecedent condition (i.e., have masses M1 and M2 in distance R), they also fulfil the consequent condition (attract each other by certain force F).¹⁵ Assume now that properties and relations are tropes instead of universals. The situation changes as follows: an instance of the corresponding law is made true by mass tropes t1 (of value M1 ), t2 (of value M2 ) and by relational trope r (of distance R) determining the distance between tropes t1 and t2 . ¹⁶ The determinate law is true because it does not have falsifying instances. Given that two objects having dispositional tropes falling under these determinates exist and are in certain distance R from each other, they attract each other by certain force F. Thus, on this view, the existence of the property tropes and relational tropes at issue entails that the instances of the corresponding determinate law are true: necessarily, if the property and relational tropes exist, the instances of the determinate law hold true. There is no room for considering, e.g., the value of natural constant associated with the law (such as gravitational constant or Coulomb constant) as metaphysically contingent.¹⁷ The dispositionalist trope nominalist can now suggest a generalization of this strategy to ground the truth of functional laws: since the determinate laws falling under a functional law do not have counter-instances, also the functional law is

15 Yates (Yates (2012), sec. 3.3) uses a similar technique to ground the laws of nature by using Bird’s (Bird (2007)) conditional analysis of dispositions. However, according to his approach, dispositional properties are equivalent to conjunctions of stimulus manifestation conditionals. No manifestation partners are introduced. 16 I here make a simplifying assumption that the distances between tropes are accounted for by the relational tropes of distance between the trope bundles having the tropes as their parts, although there are other alternatives: e.g., that they are grounded by the relational tropes of occupation between tropes and the regions of space-time. 17 Hence, “weak dispositional essentialism” in any of its forms is ruled out, cf. note 2.

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true. Nevertheless, the two prima facie difficulties discussed above seem to block this suggestion: Governing function: we must introduce some entity or entities that ontologically ground the co-ordination of the distinct determinate laws falling under a single functional formula (functional law). Since the determinate laws are logically independent of each other, it seems that their truthmakers cannot make true (or, ontologically ground) the further claim that the determinate laws fall under a single functional formula, i.e., are co-ordinated. While realists might introduce determinable universals to ground this claim, the trope nominalist does not have such further ontological resources at her disposal.¹⁸ Second, and even more seriously, the truthmakers of the instances of determinate laws (existent determinate property and relation tropes) do not make true the instances of determinate laws about the possible but uninstantiated determinate quantities (e.g., specific uninstantiated masses). Since functional laws (e.g., Newton’s law of gravitation) seem to entail such propositions, we need to introduce some further entities to make them true: Guaranteeing function: we must postulate some entity or entities that ontologically ground the fact that the true functional law (e.g., Newton’s law of gravitation) is true of every (instantiated or uninstantiated) possible value of the quantities it contains. Again, it seems to be a natural choice to introduce determinable universals to make the instances of a functional law true. By the same token, it seems that the resources of the present approach are seriously limited. While characterizing dispositional property tropes, we are able to rely on contextual claims on them that are not consequences of their role as truthmakers of the instances of a determinate law. For instance, we are entitled to maintain that a determinate law describing the behaviour of the tropes belonging to exactly the same determinate kinds does not have any falsifying instances. Similarly, it is fairly unproblematic to maintain that if the distinct determinate dispositional tropes fall under a single determinable, the distinct determinate laws de-

18 Armstrong (Armstrong (1997)) introduces determinable universals to ground functional laws. Ellis (Ellis (2001), sec. 2) postulates determinable universals (considered as kinds of tropes) for the more general purpose of accounting for the division of tropes into determinable kinds.

44 | Markku Keinänen scribing their behaviour fall under a single functional formula. What is the missing element?

4 Tropes and causal processes In this section, I argue that the missing element is causal processes. Given that we provide a correct description of the kinds of causal processes certain kinds of dispositional property tropes generate, we are able to understand why their behaviour can be described with the help of a functional formula. Unlike many standard approaches, the present approach does not rely on the stimulus manifestation conditionals in the description of the “essences” of dispositional properties. Rather, on the present approach, dispositional properties are best classified on the basis of their characteristic effects.¹⁹ In general level, Ellis (Ellis (2001), 128) makes a useful three-fold distinction between propensities (dispositions to behave in a certain way in any of the wide range of circumstances: e.g., a propensity of a radium atom to decay in certain time in a certain way), capacities (dispositions distinguishable by the kinds of consequent events they are able to produce, e.g., inertial mass) and causal powers (dispositions to produce forces of a certain kind, e.g., gravitational mass). Ellis maintains that the fundamental properties are dispositions of some of these basic kinds. I leave open the question of whether the number of different kinds of fundamental dispositions can still be reduced. Here, I am confined to describing the role of causal powers in connection with causal processes and leave the other kinds of dispositions to some other occasion. Salient examples of causal powers functional laws characterize are gravitational masses and electric charges. An object possessing a trope of a determinate kind of causal power (e.g., -e charge trope t1 ) produces an attractive or a repulsive force on an object possessing another trope of the same determinable kind (e.g., e charge trope t2 ). We can refer to the manifestations of causal powers by means of the traditional terminology of forces: e.g., gravitational attraction by force F to a certain direction. Nevertheless, instead of relying on primitive forces, the current quantum physics describes the manifestations as energy-transfer processes constituted by the exchange of the “force-carrier” bosons (such as gluons and photons).²⁰

19 Cf. Ellis (2001), 123 ff. For instance, the characteristic effects of causal powers are the causal processes they produce. 20 Cf. Griffiths (1987) for a useful introduction into physical theories (quantum electrodynamics and quantum chromodynamics) about these processes.

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Hence, I assume that the manifestations of causal powers are causal processes.²¹ They involve collections of physically primitive entities (virtual bosons), which are emitted by a fermion and exist until some fermion absorbs them. It would be tempting to identify these basic causal processes with (collections of) their mediators but the exact categorization of these entities would require a closer look at the physical reality.²² In many cases, quantity tropes (e.g., -e charge tropes) belonging to a determinate kind produce these processes in presence of “manifestation partners”, which are further tropes falling under the same determinable (charge tropes) in a certain distance from the first tropes. The laws of action describing the generation of causal processes by the tropes falling under a single determinable are functional laws (such as Coulomb’s law or Newton’s gravitation law). Any two tropes generating a causal process are mutually connected by some relation of proportion (they belong to the same determinable kind). Moreover, if the relevant functional law is true, the forces that result from the causal processes the different kinds of tropes falling under the same determinable produce are mutually connected by the relations of proportion in accordance with the proportion relations between the tropes. Take, e.g., the scalar form of Coulomb’s law, where q1 and q2 are different electric charges, k e is the Coulomb constant and |F| the absolute value of the resulting electrostatic force: q1 q2 r2 The force F associated with a causal process produced by the charge tropes of different determinate kinds (determining q1 and q2 ) varies in accordance with the proportion relations between the charge tropes if distance r remains constant. Consequently, the dispositional property tropes and causal processes take care of the governing function, i.e., the co-ordination of determinate laws under a single | F| = k e

21 Cf. Ellis and Lierse (1994); Ellis (2001) and Handfield (2010). Both Ellis and Handfield assume that the manifestations of all dispositional properties are processes (of some general type) that divide into natural kinds. However, I will not discuss these further assumptions here. 22 Morganti (Morganti (2009)) proposes a unified account of all elementary particles of the Standard Model as trope bundles. However, because virtual bosons have process-like features and an existentially dependent status, it is highly questionable whether they should be treated as any kinds of objects. Thus, it seems that the trope bundle theory of bosons still needs to be worked out.

46 | Markku Keinänen functional law.²³ We need not introduce any further entities. Similarly, because the tropes belonging to the same determinate kind (i.e., tropes connected by 1:1 proportion) produce causal processes with resulting forces in 1:1 proportions to each other, determinate laws do not have any falsifying instances. It seems that the force necessarily associated with a causal process is not further dispositional property but rather determined by the structure of the corresponding causal process. However, the more exact characterization of the determination would require a quantum mechanical characterization of the process. On the present approach, the truthmakers of the instances of a determinate law are tropes and the causal processes they produce. Thus, unlike the dispositionalist conception of truthmaking described in the previous section, the present approach is not committed to the claim that the determinate laws of action are metaphysically necessary. Nor does it need to reject the claim. It is consistent with the present approach that the value of a natural constant associated with a functional law (e.g., Coulomb constant) is metaphysically contingent and that all dispositional tropes of a determinable kind (e.g., charge tropes) could have produced causal processes in a slightly different way. Nevertheless, I have not yet dealt with the guaranteeing function: introduced an entity or entities to ground the truth of a functional law for the possible but uninstantiated values of the dispositional properties. Let e/6 be such value of electric charge (the physical inaccuracy of this example does not matter because there might well be possible but uninstantiated values of some other dispositional properties, e.g., masses). If true, Coulomb law predicts that dispositional e/6 charge trope t1 would, in presence of trope t2 of positive unit charge e in a fixed distance from t1 , produce electrostatic repulsion 1/2 times of the repulsion produced by e/3 charge trope t3 and unit charge trope t2 . On the present account, dispositional tropes are (partly) identified by the kinds of causal processes they produce. I use the term “identification” here for individuation in epistemic sense, i.e., how we are able to actively identify tropes as non-identical with the other tropes.²⁴ By contrast, I suggest to take the individuation of tropes as primitive and reject the further claim that the kinds of causal processes a trope produces individuate it (in metaphysical sense). Since trope t

23 Similarly, after arguing against the view that laws of nature could be considered to have a genuine governing role (or, the role of determining the course of events given certain initial conditions), Mumford (Mumford (2004), sec. 11) assigns the governing role to dispositional properties. 24 Cf. Keinänen and Hakkarainen (2013), sec. 1, for the distinction between identification and individuation in metaphysical sense. We argue that tropes are identified (in epistemic sense) as properties of certain kinds of substances (op cit., sec. 4). Moreover, tropes are identified by their location and nature together with the kinds of causal processes they produce.

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has its nature independently of the existence of the other tropes, the network of proportion relations in which trope t is does not individuate it either. However, we can use these proportion relations to help the identification of trope t. Consider now possible e/6 charge trope t1 taken up above. We would have some clear ways to identify trope t1 (as a property of a certain kind of object and a trope that would produce certain kinds of effects in presence of certain existent tropes). Therefore, the existence of t1 seems to be conceivable. By contrast, it is not clear whether the predictions Coulomb law makes about the behaviour of t1 are true. Compare them with the counterfactual claims about the behaviour of actual property tropes. Assume that two powerful particulars instantiate a positive unit charge (the charge of e) and that the distance between them varies. The repulsive Coulomb force the powerful particulars exert on each other varies in accordance with Coulomb law. There might be some uninstantiated distances between two powerful particulars having the charge of e. However, we have clear reason to maintain that repulsive force varies in accordance with the inverse square law: the respective causal process (and electro-magnetic field) spreads evenly in a threedimensional space. By contrast, we lack similar means of assessing the truth of the counterfactual about the behaviour trope t1 . Unless we can find a clear method of assessing the truth of such counterfactual claims as instances of the determinate law about the behaviour t1 , I remain sceptical of whether the corresponding determinate laws are true. The present approach explains why the dispositional tropes and causal processes can take care of the governing function, i.e., determine that the resulting forces accord with the functional formula. By contrast, we lack similar means of dealing with the guaranteeing function, i.e., to secure that the functional law is true of every possible value of the quantities it contains. Since the causal laws of action are not entities but rather statements about the behaviour of objects (and their constituent tropes) and the resulting causal processes, I do not consider this as a serious defect. Although all tropes falling under a certain determinable and the causal processes they produce act in accordance with a functional law, there might still be limitations in the domain of application of the law: the kinds of possible properties of which it is true.

5 Conclusion Starting with the assumption that all fundamental property tropes are dispositional, I have argued in the present paper that property tropes and the causal

48 | Markku Keinänen processes they produce can, in relevant part, account for the truth of the causal functional laws. First, tropes fall under determinates and determinables because they are connected by the formal relations of proportion. Second, the manifestations of the most dispositional property tropes are causal processes. The forces (e.g., gravitational force, Coulomb force) resulting from these causal processes are connected by the proportion relations in accordance with the proportion relations between the tropes producing the processes. Hence, property tropes and the respective causal processes suffice to secure that the resulting forces accord with the functional formula. While we seem to be able to account for the truth of the functional formula for every determinate value of existent causal powers, this bottom-up approach gives no guarantee that the functional law is true of every of its possible but uninstantiated values.

Acknowledgments This paper has been written during my period as a Visiting Fellow in the Department of Philosophy, University of Durham. I would like to thank Professor E. J. Lowe and Mr David Westland for critical comments on the earlier versions of the paper.

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Keinänen, M. (2011), “Tropes – the Basic Constituents of Powerful Particulars?”, in Dialectica: 65, 419–450. Keinänen, M. and Hakkarainen, J. (2013), “The Problem of Trope Individuation: A Reply to Lowe”, forthcoming in Erkenntnis. Keller, P. and Correia, F. (2004), “Introduction”, Dialectica: 58, 275–278. Lowe, E. J. (1998), The Possibility of Metaphysics – Substance, Identity and Time, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lowe, E. J. (2006), The Four-Category Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lowe, E. J. (2009), More Kinds of Being, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Massin, O. (2009), “The Metaphysics of Forces”, in Dialectica: 64, 555–589. Maurin, A. S. (2002), If Tropes, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Morganti, M. (2009), “Tropes and Physics”, in Grazer Philosophische Studien: 78, 185–205. Mulligan, K., Simons, P. M. and Smith, B. (1984), “Truthmakers”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: 54, 278–321. Mumford, S. (2004), Laws in Nature, London: Routledge. Mumford, S. (2006), “The Ungrounded Argument”, in Synthese: 149, 471–489. Schaffer, J. (2001), “The Individuation of Tropes”, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy: 79, 147–157. Simons, P. M. (1987), Parts – a Study in Ontology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Simons, P. M. (1994), “Particulars in Particular Clothing – Three Trope Theories of Substance”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: 54, 553–575. Simons, P. M. (2003), “Tropes, Relational”, in Conceptus: 35, 53–73. Smith, B. (1998), “The Basic Tools of Formal Ontology”, in Formal Ontology in Information Systems, edited by N. Guarino, Amsterdam, IOS Press. Smith, B. and Mulligan, K. (1983), “Framework for Formal Ontology”, in Topoi: 2, 73–85. Williams, D. C. (1953), “On the Elements of Being I”, in Review of Metaphysics: 7, 3–18. Williams, D. C. (1986), “Universals and Existents”, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy: 64, 1–14. Yates, D. (2012), “The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcomig.

Srećko Kovač

Forms of Judgment as a Link between Mind and the Concepts of Substance and Cause (Kant, Gödel)

1 Introduction At present, we do not have a standard, generally accepted formal ontological theory, on the ground of which we could precisely know the meaning and the role of the concepts of substantiality and causality. Hence, there is an open question about how to define or axiomatically describe the concepts of substance and cause, and whether these concepts should have any important role at all in an ontological theory. In addition, it is in advance not clear how to justify this or that choice of a theory as an appropriate formalization of ontology. To give an example, Gödel’s ontological system GO (built for the purpose of an ontological proof of the existence of God, see Gödel (1995b)), as one possible candidate for a standard ontological theory, is far from being generally accepted, and many revisions of the theory have been proposed (see Hájek (2011)). The situation is no better with other formalized ontologies that have been proposed so far. In addition, Gödel’s incompleteness theorem (1931) uncovered an essential insufficiency of all formal (syntactical) systems which include elementary arithmetic – in Gödel’s philosophical interpretation: the reduction of mathematics (including logic) to formal systems contains a sort of syntactic “materialism”, which cannot give sufficient foundations for a theory to be a (“secure”) science in the most proper sense: it can guarantee neither (1) its own consistency nor (2) the solvability of each yes/no question which can be formulated in the language of the theory (cf. (Gödel, 1995a, pp. 376–381)). Gödel’s incompleteness result also applies to classical higher-order logic, for instance in the shape of a formal ontological system. Namely, undecidable sentences can be constructed also in GO, which is a second-order modal system: if G is an undecidable sentence of Peano arithmetic, then PA → G is an undecidable sentence in GO (where PA is the conjunction of the axioms of Peano arithmetic that describe denumerability). Nonmodal higher-order logic is notably complete with respect to Henkin models (with a higher-order domain as a subset of the power set of the product of the corre-

52 | Srećko Kovač sponding lower-order domains), but for the price of the expressive defect of the non-categoricity of the condition PA. However, it is not complete with respect to some comprehensive ontology (with a higher-order domain “automatically” generated as the power set of the corresponding lower-order domains). Beside this intrinsic insufficiency of formal systems, questions also arise regarding why have the concepts of substance and cause in ontology at all, what the origin of these concepts is, and what their primary meaning is, independently of particular formal systems. To start from Gödel, the concepts of substance and cause are regularly mentioned on his lists of “main categories” (Wang, 1996, p. 166), “philosophical concepts” (Wang, 1996, p. 179, see also p. 315), together with other concepts like “action”, “reason”, “necessity”, “force” and others. Furthermore, although Gödel sometimes mentions that he has no definitive list of “primitive concepts” (Wang, 1996, pp. 120, 288), he occasionally claims that cause should be “the fundamental philosophical concept”, to which all other concepts should be reduced (Gödel, 1995b, pp. 432-433).¹ How could we eventually decide which concepts are the primitive ones, and, especially, if the concepts of substance and cause are among them, what the relationship is between the concepts of substance and cause? Gödel’s instruction is that a systematic method, which could lead to the primitive concepts and axioms that would describe their interrelations, should include phenomenology.² Here is what Gödel generally has in mind under the phenomenological method: what is essential in phenomenology is “to understand what is going on in our mind” (Wang, 1996, p. 167), introspection (e.g. (Wang, 1996, p. 169)), an “attitude of mind which enables one to direct one’s attention rightly” (Wang, 1996, p. 171); further, the phenomenological method should comprise “directing our attention ... onto our own acts in the use of these concepts, onto our powers in carrying out

1 According to Wang (speaking about Gödel): “The main task of philosophy as he saw it was (1) to determine its primitive concepts, and (2) to analyse or perceive or understand these concepts well enough to discover the principal axioms about them, so as to ‘do for metaphysics as much as Newton did for physics’” (Wang, 1996, p. 288). 2 “Transcendental phenomenology with epoché as its methodology is the investigation (without knowledge of scientific facts) of the cognitive process, so as . . . to find the objective concepts” (Wang, p. 166). Gödel adds: “Phenomenology is not the only approach. Another approach is to find a list of the main categories (e.g., causation, substance, action) and their interrelations, which, however, are to be arrived at phenomenologically” (Wang, 1996, p. 166). Cf. also: “Leibniz believed in the ideal of seeing the primitive concepts clearly and distinctly. When Husserl affirmed our ability to ‘intuit essences’, he had in mind something like what Leibniz believed” (Wang, 1996, p. 168).

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our acts, etc.”, and should “produce in us a new state of consciousness in which we describe in detail the basic concepts we use in our thought, or grasp other basic concepts hitherto unknown to us” (Gödel, 1995a, pp. 382-383). Gödel refers to Husserl and Kant as having made the first steps in building up a phenomenological method. According to Gödel, Husserl is more systematic than Kant.³ However, although Gödel mentions that Kant’s theory is in some aspects unclear, and contains errors and inconsistencies (Gödel (1995a), (Wang, 1996, p. 171-172)), Kant’s theory is praised by Gödel for containing “deep truths” if understood “correctly” and “in a broader sense” (Gödel, 1995a, pp. 384-387) (for Gödel’s attitude toward Kant, see Kovač (2008a)). One of the points which Kant left unclear, unfinished, and subject to disputes until the present time is precisely the “deduction” of categories, most importantly, of the concepts of substance and cause, from, in the last instance, the “original unity of self-consciousness” as the fundamental principle of logic and ontology (“transcendental philosophy”, see B 134 note). In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant sketches the “metaphysical deduction of categories” from the primitive forms of judgment, where the categories of substance and cause are “deduced” (in the sense of ‘being justified’) on the ground of the forms of categorical and hypothetical judgments, respectively. However, the deduction of the primitive forms of judgment is only fragmentarily sketched and indicated in scattered parts of Kant’s work. It is the most disputed link in the whole justification and derivation of the concepts of substance and cause. We propose that the main lines of this link can be reconstructed and consistently completed on the ground of the fragments in Kant’s work.⁴ In the here proposed and sketched reconstruction of the systematic derivation (see Kovač (1992) for a variant of such reconstruction), we start, following Kant, from the most general and simple unity available in our mind, from our act

3 “Husserl does what Kant did, only more systematically” (Wang, 1996, p. 171). “Husserl’s thoroughly systematic [beginning] is better than Kant’s sloppy architectonic” (Wang, 1996, p. 298). Regarding categories: “Kant recognizes that all categories should be reduced to something more fundamental. Husserl tries to find that more fundamental idea which is behind all categories” (Wang, 1996, p. 171). 4 General logic in the systematic form (as a science, “demonstrated doctrine”, which gives “an exhaustive exposition and a strict proof of the formal rules of all thought”, B IX) is to be distinguished from the logic of Kant’s lectures, as well as from “Jäsche Logic”, which are meant for a didactic, not primarily for a systematic (scientific) purpose. Kant’s opinion was that a purely theoretic and systematic presentation of a subject would be rather damaging for the beginning students at their age of intellectual development (cf. Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem Winterhalbenjahre von 1765–1766 (Kant, 1910-, II, pp. 305–306)).

54 | Srećko Kovač of thinking (“I think”, “the act of apperception” B 137), and proceed to the conditions of the possibility of this unity, to acts and forms of thought by means of which this “original unity” is established. Thus, we deal only with “conceptual” (“logical”, “analytical”), not intuitive, conditions of unity in thinking. The reconstruction (see also Kovač (1992)) starts from Klaus Reich’s proposal (Reich (1948)), but departs from his reconstruction mainly in the order and direction of the deduction of logical forms.⁵ Because of the generality of the sketch, we do not propose any particular formalism for the proposed reconstruction of the system. We also do not claim that Kant had precisely such a derivation of logic deduction in mind, but some such deduction he probably might have had in mind, and this is at least partially explicitly confirmed in his work - whenever possible, in our reconstruction we will refer to respective places in Kant’s text.

2 The original unity of self-consciousness (Kant) (1) Analytic unity of self-consciousness. Our reconstruction begins with the most general and most simple unity of a given manifold of my representations (das Mannigfaltige der Vorstellungen, B 129) of which I can be aware (we follow Kant’s analysis in B 131-136). This unity is “me”, the representing agent: to “me” all these representations are possibly given, in the sense that I can “accompany” (begleiten) each of these representations by a thinking act (“I think”): [I think]a, [I think]b, . . . , where a, b, etc. do not connote any ordering or other structure of representations except of their being possibly thought of by the same thinking agent. (a) In order to unambiguously be “me” for me, “me” has to be self-conscious (apperception) 5 Let us note that only a minority of scholars agree with the possibility and justifiability of a systematic derivation of Kant’s logic from the original unity of self-consciousness (which is, according to Kant, the understanding, Verstand, itself, B 134 note). Wolff’s deduction of Kant’s table of judgments Wolff (1995) starts from Kant’s conception of the human uderstanding as the faculty of “knowledge by means of concepts” (and is based on the passage “The logical employment of the understanding” and §9 of the Critique of Pure Reason). Achourioti and van Lambalgen Achourioti and van Lambalgen (2011) prove the completeness of Kant’s table of judgments by the use of geometric logic and geometric implications. Let us remark that Kant’s use of “tabular method” to present his twelve forms of judgment indicates that what is presented is an “already finished doctrinal structure in its whole connection” (“ein schon fertiges Lehrgebäude in seinem ganzem Zusammenhange”, “Jäsche Logic” (Kant, 1910-, IX, p. 149)).

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– there is no need for it to be further accompanied by any other representation, and (b) in order for the manifold to be given to “me”, “me” has to be conscious of the representations given to it (“me” “accompanies” all my representations). Taking (a) and (b) together, Kant names this self-consciousness “original” (ursprüngliche) self-consciousness (B 132). Without the possibility that “I think” accompanies my representations, they would be impossible or at least “nothing for me” (B 131). This self-conscious accompanying of all my representations is nothing already “given”, but an act which I (my intellect, understanding) each time executes anew. This “I think” is, at first, what Kant calls the “analytic unity of selfconsciousness”, since it is one and the same (self-conscious) instance to which all my representations are related – it is the “thoroughgoing (durchgängig) identity” of my self-consciousness in all the manifold of my representations, and in it all my representations “can stand together” in an “original combination” (ursprüngliche Verbindung). (2) Synthetic unity of self-consciousness. The next stage of the unity of our representations follows on the ground of the further analysis of “I think”. Namely, the manifold: [I think]a, [I think]b, etc., contains a “conjoining” (hinzusetzen) of representations to one another by the same “I think”: [I think](a, b, . . .). Otherwise, there is no guarantee that what accompanies our representations is not each time some other or empirically different “I think” (empirical consciousness). Thus, as Kant states, the analytic unity of self-consciousness is possible only under the condition of the synthetic unity of self-consciousness”, or, in other words, the synthetic unity of self-consciousness is a condition of the possibility of the analytic unity of self-consciousness itself (B 133). (3) Objective unity of self-consciousness. As Kant further shows (B §17), the synthetic unity of self-consciousness is objective (“objectively valid”) since in the synthesis of representations a relation of representations to the concept of an object (x) is established: [I think](a, b, . . .)(x). As Kant states, it is the “unity of consciousnesss in the synthesis” of representations which unites our representations in the concept of an object (B 137). Hence, in the synthetic unity of self-consciousness, insofar as it is unity, the moment of objectivity is contained: synthetic unity of self-consciousness is objective unity, it is an “objective condition of all knowledge” (B 138). Thus we can also say that the synthetic unity of self-consciousness is not possible as unity without being objective unity of self-consciousness. (4) Necessary unity of self-consciousness. Finally, since the manifold of our representations can be something only with respect to the unity of “I think”, as

56 | Srećko Kovač already mentioned under (1), the unity of self-consciousness is, in this sense, necessary (B 140, 142, 135). In other words, without it there are no representations for us: (a, b, . . .)(x), . . . \[I think] = nothing.

Let us emphasize that what is necessary, with respect to the manifold of representations, is only this one and the same “I think”, without any empirical conditions added (B §§18-19). It is also necessary with respect to the unity of representations in the concept of an object (see (3)) – an empirical unity of consciousness is not such an identical (“universally valid”) reference point of all possible representations, since it is changeable from person to person, from psychological state to psychological state, and yields only subjective validity (B §§18-19). (5) “The highest point”. This most general four-fold analysis of our act of thinking (as the analytic, synthetic, objective, and necessary unity of self-consciousness) should, in the Kantian approach, be the starting point for the foundations of logic and transcendental philosophy. Kant emphasizes in the Critique of Pure Reason the moment of the synthetic unity of self-consciousness, since this is the form under which the a priori extending of our knowledge is possible. Thus he says: The synthetic unity of apperception is therefore that highest point, to which we must fasten [heften] all the employment of the understanding [Verstandesgebrauch], even the whole of logic, and after it [nach ihr], transcendental philosophy. Indeed this faculty of apperception is the understanding [Verstand] itself.⁶

3 The logical deduction of the primitive forms of judgment from the original unity of self-consciousness (Kant) The question of the completeness of the Kantian table of twelve primitive forms of judgments cannot be decided by comparison with some outer class of models. It is a purely intrinsic question, which can be decided only in relation to Kant’s theory of the unity of original self-consciousness we have sketched above. If it could be shown that his table of judgments, in a way, exhausts all the moments of the original unity of self-consciousness as applied to the general theory of judgments, this could be a reliable sign that Kant’s completeness thesis holds. But such a deduction of judgment forms stands in the context of the whole general logic, as 6 B 134*, Kemp Smith’s translation, modified.

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it should be established on the ground of the theory of the unity of original selfconsciousness. We restrict ourselves here to some necessary remarks about Kant’s general theory of concepts, and then focus on the general theory of judgments, especially on the moments of relation, from which Kant claims the categories of substance and cause should be derived.⁷ The original unity of self-consciousness as the most general unity of our representations would not be possible if I were not able to distinguish myself from the manifold of representations, and I could not be conscious of this manifold (and combine representations in the manifold with one another) if I were not able to distinguish the representations in the manifold from one another. This is possible, at first, only if the analytic unity of consciousness can be specifically “attached” to a singular representation in the manifold of representations, to distinguish it from other representations.

3.1 Concept The “attaching” of the unity of consciousness to a singular representation leads to general logic and its general theory of concepts. A concept has a form of the analytic consciousness of a concrete representation (e.g. “red”), which as an identical representation can be encountered on a variety of objects as their common note (Merkmal). By comparison we become conscious of the identity and difference of representations, by reflection we think of a representation as belonging to objects (universality), which relation is essential for a concept, and by abstraction we separate the chosen general representation from other representations. We see that a concept is possible only in the context of synthetic, objective, and therefore necessary consciousness (because of combinations with other representations, relations with objects, everything on the ground of the necessity of consciousness): [a](b, c, . . .)(x), where a is a concept, b, c, . . . , other representations combined with a, and x is an object to which a, as well as b, c, . . . belong. However, a concept as such has on itself only analytic consciousness abstracted out of these interconnections of representations (Logik (Kant, 1910-, XVI, Refl. 2862-2884)).

7 A full systematic derivation of Kant’s general logic on the foundations of his theory of original unity of self-consciousness is proposed in Kovač (1992).

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3.2 Judgment Since a concept as a “common note” belongs to objects (reflection), it obviously presupposes and includes an objective unity of consciousness of the concept with the representation (concept, possibly different) of objects to which it belongs, as well as with other, different representations (concepts) which also belong to the same objects. What a concept presupposes is thus that it is together with other representations (concepts) “brought to the objective unity of self-consciousness”. The “manner of bringing given representations to the objective unity of selfconsciousness” (paraphrase of B 141) is, according to Kant, a judgment, more precisely, its “logical form” (B 104).⁸ It is clear that a concept also presupposes a synthesis of representations into a representation (again a concept) of an object (since the concept contains the reflection that it belongs to this object).⁹ But for now it suffices that an object can be analytically represented by some of its notes (by a concept). The question of how some concept of an object can be synthesized leads to the “metaphysical deduction of categories”, which will in fact apply the logical form of judgments (which represents the objective validity of concepts) to the synthesis of concepts. In the four aspects of the original unity of self-consciousness, we can recognize the four “titles” of Kant’s table of judgments (B 95): (1) insofar as judgment includes analytic consciousness, and thus conceptual generality, it has a quantity; (2) in the sense in which it includes synthetic consciousness, the combination of representations, judgment has a quality; (3) with respect to the objective unity of consciousness, a representation of objective validity in a judgment, judgment has a relation; and finally (4), since judgment also includes necessary consciousness, only by means of which the objective unity of consciousness is possible (see B 140, 142), judgment has a modality of thought (of consciousness) itself. It is obvious that by covering with this “titles” all the four aspects of the original unity of self-consciousness Kant’s theory of judgment should in general be complete with respect to its origin (i.e. to the theory of original selfconsciousness). The justification of singular “moments” under titles (1), (2), and (4) in Kant’s table of judgments is almost self-evident ((1) universal and par-

8 Cf. also iudicium est repraesentatio unitatis obiectivae... in conscientia variorum conceptuum (Kant, 1910-, XVI, Refl. 3052). See also (Kant, 1910-, XVI, Refl. 3045). 9 “A representation which is to be thought as common to different representations is regarded as belonging to such as have, in addition to it, also something different. Consequently it must previously be thought in synthetic unity with other (though, it may be, only possible) representations, before I can think in it the analytic unity of consciousness, which makes it a conceptus communis”, B 134*.

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ticular, (2) affirmative and negative, (4) problematic, assertoric, and apodictic judgments). According to quantity, a judgment represents to what extent some (general) representation is objectively valid (for “all” or for “some” objects of a certain kind), i.e. to what extent the representation is analytically contained in some manifold. But we can think of this analytic containment only on condition that this representation can be combined (synthesized) with the representation of this manifold – which pertains to the quality of judgment. This synthetic unity of representations with respect to one another is thought in a judgment as a unity in an object (it is not an association of representations in this or that empirical state of the subject, B 140, 142), that is, the representations synthesized with one another in a judgment stand in an objective relation. Let us remark that the title of relation refers exactly to the aspect by means of which Kant generally defines judgment in the logical sense (unity of consciousness).¹⁰ The relation of a judgment is our central point of interest. Kant defines it as a relation of a representation (an “assertion”) to the condition of its objective validity (see (Reich, 1948, pp. 47, 63-67), (Longuenesse, 1998, pp. 93-95), (Kovač, 1992, pp. 88-89)). Of three possible relations, the first is the condition of the objective validity of concepts, and the next is always the logical condition of the preceding one. In the result, the three possible relations are three possible grades of strengthening the condition of the objectivity of a judgment.

3.2.1 Categorical judgment In the first relation (categorical judgment), a concept is asserted as a predicate (a) under the condition of its validity for underlying object (x) represented under the subject (b) of a judgment (cf. (Reich, 1948, pp. 72-73), (Kovač, 1992, 89-91)): [Q]x, which is contained under b, is also under a, where Q is “all” or “some” (Kant, 1910-, XVI, Refl. 3096),

for short: Qx(b, a), where Q is “all” or “some”.

10 “Die categorie des Verhaltnisses (der Einheit des Bewußtseins) ist die Vornehmste unter allen. Denn Einheit betrifft eigentlich nur das Verhaltnis; also macht dieses den Inhalt der Urtheile überhaupt aus” (Kant, 1910-, XVIII, Refl. 5854).

60 | Srećko Kovač Predicate, a, as a concept, “contains” analytic unity of consciousness. It is subordinated to the condition of the subject, b (which is also a concept with analytic unity of consciousness), under which the object is represented, and to which, possibly, other predicates belong.¹¹ The subject therefore has (in the representation of the object) synthetic unity of consciousness. The predication (belonging) itself represents objective unity of consciousness of the predicate with respect to the subject. Further, a predicate cannot be thought as contradicting its subject, that is, it cannot deny the condition of its own objective validity. However, mutually contradictory predicates (denying one another) can be thought as belonging to the same subject: they need not be excluded by the analysis of the subject, and can be objectively valid with respect to the same subject synthetically, in different non-logical aspects (for example, in different times). This condition is expressed by Kant in his “principle of contradiction” (B 189-193): “no predicate contradictory of a thing can belong to it”, i.e. “not(a, not-a)”. It is obvious that Kant’s categorical logic is “paraconsistent” (non-explosive under inconsistency) since “(b, a and non-a)” (for simplicity we leave out quantification) is not a contradiction, provided that a or non-a do not contradict b (see Kovač (2008b)). To take a look from the standpoint of Kant’s “transcendental logic”, this form of judgment, as a “function of our understanding” (Verstand), will be shown to be precisely the function, which in application to the manifold of representations in one intuition gives categories of substance and accident (B 104-105, see below).

3.2.2 Hypothetical judgment Under which logical condition can it be decided between the objective validity of “(b, a)” and the objective validity of “(b, non-a)” (that is, between “S is P” and “S is non-P”)? It could only be a form that itself represents an objective unity, that is, it should be a judgment (possibly another one). The asserted judgment is a consequent that “follows” from the conditioning judgment as its reason. Note that in a categorical judgment the conditions which can decide between “S is P”

11 “Das Subjekt eines Urtheils, dessen Vorstellung den Grund der synthetischen Einheit einer Manifgaltigkeit von Prädikaten enthält, ist Objekt (Metaphysik (Kant, 1910-, XVIII, Refl. 6350, p. 676)). Also “Der Begriff der die synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption des Manigfaltigen enthält, ist der Begriff von einem objekt. Er ist auch das Subjekt eines Urtheils, das viele Prädikate hat” (Kant, 1910-, XVIII, Refl. 6350, pp. 676–677).

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and “S is non-P” can only be non-logical (e.g. time). Hence, to assert a judgment, its reason is needed – this is the co-called principle of sufficient reason: “each assertion has its reason”. Since, by a reason, “a and non-a” is excluded as belonging to the same subject, now the Aristotelian form of the principle of contradiction follows: not(b, a and not-a). On the other side, reasons are thought in a hypothetical judgment only hypothetically (in an “if-clause”). Therefore, the objective validity of reasons may be undecided, and, because of this lack of knowledge, the possibility occurs neither to assert “(b, a)” nor “(b, non-a)”. In this sense, it can be said that the Kantian logic of reasons is “paracomplete” (not obeying the principle of excluded middle). As Kant indicates in his “transcendental logic”, the function of understanding by means of which the hypothetical form of a judgment is produced is one and the same that establishes the category of causality, when applied to the manifold of representations in one intuition (B 104-105, see below).

3.2.3 Disjunctive judgment Under which condition can the deficiency in establishing the full objective validity of a judgment (due to the hypotheticity of reasons) be overcome? It is the condition of completing the assertions so as to form an objectively valid whole, within which the objectively valid assertion should be contained as one of its parts. In the third relation (disjunctive judgment, in the exclusive sense) assertions are put under the condition of the whole of (objectively valid) knowledge, so that if the objectively valid assertion is not in one part of the whole, for that reason, it has to be within the remaining parts of the whole, and vice versa. That is, assertions themselves are mutually exclusive but complementary reasons: [Q]x, which is contained under a, is under b or c, etc., where Q is “all” or “some” (Kant, 1910-, XVI, Refl. 3096),

for short: Qx(a, b or c, etc.), where Q is “all” or “some”.

Thus, this relation stands under the principle of the excluded middle, “a or nota”, which finally yields a sort of standard logic obeying all the three mentioned logical laws.

62 | Srećko Kovač Note that disjunctive judgment (the same holds of hypothetical judgment as well) can be quantified. This means that the relation of judgments cannot be determined by the “main operator”. Clearly (analytically), there is no further condition that could be logically added to the condition of the whole of knowledge, in relation to which the full objectivity of our representations (which is the logical essence of a judgment) could be obtained. From the transcendental logical aspect, the logical form of disjunctive judgment is a function of understanding which in the manifold of representations in one intuition gives the category of mutual influence of substances (agent and patient, community) (B 104-105, see below). Remark 3.1. If we compare three grades of the relation of a judgment with the aspects of the original unity of self-consciousness, it can be seen, first, that categorical judgment represents an objective unity of consciousness (the logical essence of judgment) in our representations as bringing an analytic unity of consciousness (contained in a predicate as a concept) under the condition of a synthetic unity of consciousness (in a subject),¹² secondly, that hypothetical judgment combines the objective unity of consciousness: it represents one objective unity of consciousness in relation to another objective unity of consciousness (assertion as grounded in a reason), and thirdly, that objective unity of consciousness is subsumed under the necessary unity of the consciousness of complementary assertions as reasons, one of which exclusively has to have objective validity. Let us remark that in each judgment the condition (subject, reason, whole) and the assertion (predicate, consequence, member), which enter the judgment relation, should already be given in a logical form of at least implicit objective validity (concept, judgment). This excludes, as it seems, antinomies from logic. For example, "This judgment is not true" is not a judgment because it does not have a subject, which should be the same as the antinomic "This judgment is not true" itself. Thus, we have no subject because, again, we have no judgment, and so on, without a definitely established judgment relation (of an assertion to its condition). On the other hand, for reason of antinomicity, too, "not-predicable of itself’" is not a predicate,¹³ and therefore cannot be included in a judgment relation either. Neither can "This

12 As can be seen, the predicate-subject relation reflects in concrete representations the original relation of self-consciousness according to which the analytic unity of self-consciousness is possible only under the condition of the synthetic unity of consciousness (B 133, 135). 13 See Russell’s letter to Frege from 16.6.1902 (Reich, 1948, p. 125).

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judgment is false" nor "not-predicable of itself" fulfil the requirement of the analytic unity (identity) of consciousness, which has to be attached to each concept.

3.2.4 Modality Modality of judgments is essentially interconnected with relation. A judgment can bring given representations under the objective unity of consciousness only if a consciousness of this objective unity of consciousness is possible. That is, a sort of objective self-consciousness of a judgment, i.e. consciousness of its own objective unity as given (not merely of the given representations that make its content), should be possible for each judgment. What can here be distinguished can only be a modality, strength (“energy”), of the objective unity of consciousness itself, as we have seen it gradually increase from the possibility of mutually contradictory predications, to actual (true) judgment that is grounded in a reason, to necessary judgment as determined by other judgments (as reasons) within some whole of knowledge (B 100) (problematic, assertoric, and apodictic judgments).¹⁴ Remark 3.2 (Completeness). Kantian forms of judgments, as can be seen, define some very general features of logical thinking, across possible specific formal systems, delineating the gradual strengthening of logics by means of the strength of logical laws contained in a form of judgment, and are thus barely without loss in structure and semantics, and without artificiality, translatable into sentences of a particular formalism. Although the above “deduction” is not reduced to the rigor of some logical formalism, it is hardly to be seen what could be possibly missing in Kant’s table of judgments with respect to his basic theory of the original unity of self-consciousness. Kant’s table of judgments thus seems to be complete. Remark 3.3 (Inference). Let us mention that the transition from judgment to inference as the condition of the possibility of judgment should be similar to the general transition from the objective to necessary unity of self-consciousness. The objective unity of consciousness of a judgment is possible because the representations in a judgment belong to one another only by means of their relationship to the necessary unity of self-consciousness (not merely to the empirical, casual subjective state of consciousness, which is not objective) – which does not mean that the represen-

14 On a comparison of the relation and the modality of judgments in Kant see Letter to Reinhold 19.5.1789 (Kant, 1910-, XI, p. 45), B 99-101, and (Reich, 1948, pp. 73-76).

64 | Srećko Kovač tations themselves should necessarily belong to one another (cf. B 142). That representations are united by means of their relationship to the necessary unity of consciousness is represented by assigning them a role and interconnecting them within the necessary derivation in an inference. The necessity of an inference (as a necessary unity of consciousness) is precisely the reason why each empirical reasoning agent has to accept what was proven by an inference.

4 Objective validity of the concepts of substance and cause As Kant states (cf. B 105, 143), it is one and the same acts (operations) of one and the same intellect that we employ in giving unity to the manifold of concepts and establishing in them a form of a judgment, and in giving unity to the manifold of an intuition and establishing in it a transcendental content (the concept of an object). An objectively valid form of a judgment (being the logical essence of a judgment) cannot be anything other than the form already contained in the object. This is so because the form already contained in the object (the concept of an object) is nothing else but a synthetic unity produced by the original selfconsciousness. By means of judgment, original self-consciousness only analyses what it has already synthesized into a concept of the object. Because of this, primitive concepts of objects (categories) can be found precisely by means of primitive forms of judgments. Leaving aside other categories, we thus finally come to deduce the concepts of substance and cause as the primitive concepts (categories) originating from the power of thinking itself (original self-consciousness): the logical function of the subject-predicate relation of representations in a judgment gives, if applied to representations in an intuition, the substance-accident relation in an object; similarly, the logical functions of the reason-consequent and the whole-part relations of representations in a judgment give, if applied to representations in an intuition, the cause-effect (dependence) relation between objects and the concept of community of objects (reciprocity between agent and patient), respectively. Thus, in the ontologically proper way, we predicate an accident to its substance, we assert a state of objects as dependent on (another) state of objects as its cause, and we divide a whole into reciprocally interacting parts (cf. B 128-129). (The three “schematisms” that mediate between the two heterogeneous kinds of representations, i.e.

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between a concept and a temporal intuition, are a) permanence and transience, b) anterior and posterior, and c) simultaneity.¹⁵) With respect to the categories of relation we note the same gradation of strength as in judgments: the determination of a substance by its accidents is objectively conditioned by the causes of this determination. And, further, each causal relationship stands in the context of mutual causal interrelationship within a causal whole. Accordingly, three fundamental relation categories outline the epistemological gradation: a) probabilistic knowledge of a “field of possibilities” around a persistent object (substance); b) constructive knowledge of causal explanations; c) holistic knowledge of mutual causal interdependencies. On the ground of our reconstruction, it seems that we, as thinking and intuiting beings, are necessarily referred to think in the categories of substantiality and causality (including holistic causal structures), since they are in the last instance founded in the most primitive ways of how our intellect functions on given representations. It is interesting, in the end, to compare this Kantian result regarding relation categories with the parallel result envisaged by Gödel. As already mentioned, Gödel claimed several times that he has no definitive list of primitive concepts.¹⁶ But on other places, he states that “cause” should be the fundamental concept of philosophy. Both claims should be put in the light of Gödel’s accepted idea of egological phenomenological foundations of knowledge. We add two remarks. (1) In his ontological system GO, Gödel defines the essence of an object x as a property that is the reason of all the properties of x ((Gödel, 1995b, p. 403, Definition 2) – what we have read as a reason-consequent relation is in Gödel’s formalization a necessary conditional). So predicates are unambiguously determined by the essence of the subject (if the subject has any essence) as by their reason, and, accordingly, from the categorial standpoint, accidents would be caused by the essence of the substance to which they inhere. Inherence is thus reduced to causation. Of course, reciprocal influence is a causal whole. (2) If logical functions are not only forms of objectivity, but also a real part of objectivity, then they have a place within causal interdependencies. Our intellect, as a part of a causal whole, may then not be completely at our disposal: “the active intellect works on the passive intellect which somehow shadows what the former is doing and helps us as a

15 See, for example, (Longuenesse, 1998, ch. 11). 16 The possibility to arrive at some definitive primitive concepts may have something to do with whether we are thereby dependent on intuition or not. “Number theory needs concrete intuition, but elementary logic does not need it. Non-elementary logic involves the concept of set, which also needs concrete intuition. Understanding a primitive concept is by abstract intuition” (Wang, 1996, p. 217).

66 | Srećko Kovač medium” (Wang, 1996, p. 189). This may perhaps explain Gödel’s statement that he did not arrive at some definitive list of primitive concepts. But this also leaves open the perspective of the perfection of our mind in understanding primitive concepts, especially once we have the means for the “systematic and conscious advance” in this understanding (Gödel, 1995a, p 385).

Acknowledgment The paper is prepared in frame of a project financed by the Polish National Centre of Science (NCN, DEC – 13/08/M/HS1/00439).

Bibliography Achourioti, T. and van Lambalgen, M. (2011), “A formalization of Kant’s transcendental logic”, in Review of Symbolic Logic: 4, 254–289. Gödel, K. (1986–2002), Collected Works, edited by S. Feferman et al., vol. 1–5, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gödel, K. (1995a), “The modern development of the foundations of mathematics in the light of philosophy”, in Gödel (1986–2002), vol. 3, 374–387. Gödel, K. (1995b), “Ontological proof”, “Texts relating to the ontological proof”, in Gödel (1986–2002), vol. 3, 403–404, 429–437. Hájek, P. (2011), “Gödel’s ontological proof and its variants”, in Kurt Gödel and the Foundations of Mathematics, edited by M. Baaz et al., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, I. (1910-), Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Reimer, Berlin; Berlin and Leipzig: de Gruyter (Also Kants Werke I–IX, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968). Kant, I. (1787), Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2nd ed. 1787 (B), vol. III (1st ed. 1781, Kant (1910)), vol. IV) (Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N. Kemp Smith, New York: MacMillan, 1965). Kovač, S. (1992), Logika kao ‘demonstrirana doktrina’, Zagreb: HFD. Kovač, S. (2008a), “Gödel, Kant, and the path of a science”, in Inquiry: 51, 147–169. Kovač, S. (2008b), “In what sense is Kantian principle of contradiction non-classical”, in Logic and Logical Philosophy: 17, 251–274. Longuenesse, B. (1998), Kant and the Capacity to Judge, translated by C. T. Wolfe, Princeton University Press. Reich, K. (1948), Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteils-tafel, 2nd ed., Berlin: Schoetz. Van Heijenoort, J. (1967), From Frege to Gödel: a Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879– 1931, Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press. Wang, H. (1996), A Logical Journey, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. Wolff, M. (1995), Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteils-tafel, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann.

Marek Piwowarczyk

“I am a Force” – An Attempt of Ontological Interpretation of Ingarden’s Metaphor* Professor Andrzej Półtawski, a great Polish phenomenologist and anthropologist, often emphasizes that words “I am a force” written by his teacher Roman Ingarden in the essay Man and Time (Ingarden (2001)) are of great importance in the whole Ingardenian anthropological thought.¹ Being moderately critical of Ingarden’s ontology, Półtawski claims that these words more adequately express the ontological situation of the man in the world and characterize human beings better than all ontological considerations contained in Ingarden’s opus magnum – The Controversy over the Existence of the World (Ingarden (1987)). Many times in private conversations professor Półtawski used to tell me: “‘I am a force’ it tells about the mode of existence of the man more than three volumes of The Controversy”. In this article I want to show that ontological interpretation of Ingarden’s metaphor of force is possible. At the first glance it seems to be an enterprise that runs against Półtawski’s intentions but I think it is not so. Firstly, I do not want to deny other dimensions in which the metaphor can function. Secondly, I am sure that the Ingardenian ontology, consistently developed and modified, allows to grasp the meaning of the metaphor in the spirit which, at least in some respects, would be close to Półtawski’s intentions. The most important task here is to express the fundamental dynamism of the man. The main thesis of the article is: Ingarden’s metaphor of force can be expressed in categories of his ontology, modified and developed with the use of philosophical concept of force known from philosophical systems of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff. My disquisition is subordinated to the justification of this thesis: in the first section I present the aforementioned metaphor and expound the ontological context in which it can be considered, in the second one I present the philosophical concept of force and in the third I apply it

* This is a translation of my article “Jestem siłą ...”. Próba ontologicznej interpretacji Ingardenowskiej metafory. See, Piwowarczyk (2013a). 1 See, “Roman Ingarden – metafizyk wolności” in Półtawski (2011), 19–39, and other texts published in this book:“ Moja edukacja filozoficzna”; “Świat a ontologia Ingardena”; “Metafizyczny testament Romana Ingardena”.

68 | Marek Piwowarczyk to Ingarden’s ontology and show that the ontology modified this way can be the proper context of better understanding of the phrase “I am a force”.²

1 The metaphor of force in the essay Man and Time Many Ingardenian scholars emphasize that the short dissertation Man and Time (Ingarden (2001)) is highly significant for the interpretation of Ingarden’s thought.³ For this essay allows to put in a somewhat different context the whole “ontological machinery” which we know from far more technical works of Polish phenomenologist and especially from The Controversy over the Existence of the World (Ingarden (1987)). Man and Time reveals different countenance of Ingarden – as a thinker interested not only in detailed analysis of concepts but also as a man who experiences his own humanity in its full, it means: dramatic, form. For how dramatic are questions asked in the essay: Who am I (...), remaining in time, building myself in time due to my deeds, or being disintegrated, if I will diminish the tense of my inner effort, when I will only for a moment take pot luck, not trying to hold myself in my “hand”? Who am I, hidden somewhere “behind” my sensations, yet “living” in them, discharging in them, attaining the distinctiveness of my own being in them, completing my constitution in them? Who am I, not this chunk of meat and bones, but I – arising from my blood and bones: the acting man?⁴

Just to these questions Ingarden provides answers which begin with the words “I am a force”: I am a force, which multiplies itself, builds itself and surpasses itself, if only it manages to concentrate and does not disperse itself into small moments of surrender to suffering or pleasure. I am a force which (...) traces of body bears on itself (...) but also all body’s abilities turns into strengthening of itself. I am a force, which (...) assimilates this world (...). I am a force which wants to consolidate itself (...). I am a force which dreams in a yearning about the greatest treasures of admiration and happiness and aims at realization of them (...). I am

2 My text is strongly influenced by Marek Rosiak’s article “Substantiality and Causality: Traditional and Transcendental Approach”, in this volume. Many theses of mine were inspired by this article and by considerations concerning properties (in Ingardenian narrow sense) contained in M. Rosiak’s book Studia z problematyki realizmu-idealizmu (Rosiak (2013)). I am also grateful to Marek Rosiak for very inspiring private communication. 3 See Kobiela (2011), 111. 4 Ingarden (2001), 67–68, (my translation).

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a force, which survives adversities, if feels and knows that by its free deed it can call from nonbeing that what will be left, when it will already burn out in the fight. I am a force which wants to be free.⁵

We must admit it is one of the most beautiful Polish texts on human being.⁶ Its poetic mood and inspiration equal the greatest works of Polish poetry. One can also easily find here a lot of motifs present in this poetry – like in Leopold Staff’s poem The Smith or later in the whole Zbigniew Herbert’s output with its heroic envoy Be faithful. Go. It is also easy to associate these words with many philosophical trends – Ingarden mentioned Bergson here. All these sentences starting with “I am a force” clause can be set in the context of various issues: axiological, anthropological and ontological (metaphysical). My interest is the metaphor of force only in the ontological context. In order to expound this context we should consider the basic problem of Man and Time, the problem which leads to questions answered with “I am a force”. This is the old problem of the mode of existence in time. For we can experience ourselves in time in two ways:⁷ In the first one it seems that what “really exist” is ourselves, while time is only something derivative and phenomenal; in the second one on the contrary: time and transformations occurring in it constitute the only reality whereas we completely surrender to annihilation in these transformations.⁸

The first time experience is the experience of ourselves as solid beings, resisting the flow of time, resisting changes which occur in time. It leads to belief that we are entities transcending time, unaffected by time, even ruling time. The time itself seems to be mere illusion, some secondary reality in which we live but which is in a sense beside ourselves. The second time experience is the experience of destructive power of time. It is the experience of permanent perishing, falling into past, irretrievable loss of actuality. It makes us think about time as the reality which rules us, bringing irresistible destruction. We already do not think about ourselves as something which is in or beside time but we treat time as existing in us, building but also destroying us. It turns out that we are entities constituted

5 Ingarden (2001), 68–69, (my translation). 6 However this beauty is probably lost in my artless translation. 7 Władysław Stróżewski (see Stróżewski (2004)) thinks, not without reason, that in Ingarden (2001) there are implicitly present four types of time experience. I do not want to complicate the issue and engage myself in additional exegetic analyses whether we have in fact four experiences or only two ones but for example two-sided. Thus I tell about two types of time experience. 8 Ingarden (2001), 41.

70 | Marek Piwowarczyk and perishing in time. These experiences seem to be of equal importance but the issue is whether they can be reconciled. When we consider this problem in the ontological context, we must admit that this is nothing different than the old question of substantialism related to human being. We can express it in more technical terms which are in usage on the ground of Ingarden’s ontology: are objects enduring in time (from now on I will name them “substances”) the only existing things? or maybe are there processes and events as well? If there exist temporally determined objects of all these types, which of them are ontologically prior and what kind of relationships can we find among objects of different types?⁹ From Ingarden (1987) we know that Ingarden was a substantialist: according to him substances are ontologically prior over processes and events. The criterion of division of the whole domain of temporally determined objects is for Ingarden the mode of their existence in time: endurance, becoming and occurring. Substances exist in various moments of their existence in this way that they are fully determined (characterized) in those moments although these determinations can be different in different moments.¹⁰ But at least one of characteristics (called constitutive nature), fulfilling, among others, the function of determining the individual identity of object,¹¹ has to remain: it is unchangeable in the sense it cannot be exchanged to other.¹² Endurance consists in being completely, fully constituted; in having fully determined qualitative make-up in each moment of an object’s existence. Some fragments of this make-up remain in successive moments. This is the reason why an object retains its own identity in time. In turn processes exist in various moments in the sense that in those moments different phases of processes take place.¹³ These phases can be named temporal parts of processes. Yet we must be careful with the word “part”. It is correlated with the word “whole” and the latter is conceived by Ingarden at least in two ways: as “a summative whole” and as “an absolute whole”. The absolute whole consists

9 In the next four paragraphs I draw from Piwowarczyk (2013b). 10 Ingarden (1987), 207–232. 11 Ingarden is not clear with respect to this claim. He often contrasts the constitutive nature to generic qualities such as humanity or animality and says the nature is the “self” of object but on the other hand he maintains that in the case of objects of some types their constitutive natures are not qualitatively unique. 12 Thus unchangeability of constitutive nature (and of some other characteristics called absolutely proper properties) should be conceived as its irreplaceability. However Ingarden thinks constitutive natures of some special types (constitutive natures of living entities) can develop in the sense of becoming more “intense”. 13 Ingarden (1987), 193–207.

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fullness of determinations or in other words: fullness of constitution. If we take into account the absolute whole we must admit that also primarily individual objects (not built upon some summative whole – not composed) are wholes. Phases of process can be considered as its temporal parts but only when the word “part” is conceived as a correlate of “absolute whole”. Phases are stages of development of process, of successive complement of its qualitative make-up. Becoming consists in the incompleteness of constitution while it belongs to the essence of endurance that an object exists as already fully constituted.¹⁴ Finally, occurring is a sudden coming-into-being of a state of affairs. The latter consists in that that a property¹⁵ belongs to an object. If “this man’s being sad” is a state of affairs, then the very beginning of this state is an event. An event is momentary – it does not persist in any way, but takes place only in one “now”. Ingarden emphasizes that processes need substantial bearers in order to take place. Among all phases of process always only one is actual and the rest is past (postactual) or future (merely empirically possible). Thus there must exist something what is actual when each phase is actual, something which does not lose its actuality when new phases are successively coming. Events also needs substances. For an event is coming-into-being of some state of affairs and states of affairs are inseparable from substances because properties are inseparable from them.

14 I think Ingarden’s ontology can be a basis of different formulation of controversy between substantialism and processualism than that which we find in analytic metaphysics (endurantism vs. perdurantism). Perdurantism is understood by analytics as a conception of persistence: according to it persistence consists in having different temporal parts in different moments, and a persisting object is simply a mereological sum of such parts. In the case of extreme version of perdurantism (so called exdurantism) objects are unextended stages and persistence consists in having temporal counterparts in different moments (analogically to having modal counterparts in Lewisian worlds). In turn according to endurantists an object persists in this way that it is wholly (completely) present in each moment of its existence. The wholly presence is conceived negatively as not having temporal parts. Philosophers who try to reformulate the controversy without the term “temporal part” are Thomas Hofweber and J. David Velleman. Their intuitions are close in some respects to those of Ingarden; see Hofweber and Velleman (2013). I describe varieties of endurantism and perdurantism in Piwowarczyk (2010). Various concepts of “being wholly present” are presented in Grygianiec (2011). 15 Ingarden uses the word “property” in very narrow sense. A property is an individual (it does not mean: qualitatively unique!) characteristic of object which does not determine its individual identity (is not its constitutive nature). In other words a property does not give “whatness” to an object but makes it such and such. The distinction between constitutive nature and properties is not modal. There are possible necessary (essential) properties. One can easily notice strong similarities of Inardenian properties to Aristotelian accidents, Lowe’s modes or Heil’s modes.

72 | Marek Piwowarczyk The first experience of time makes us treat ourselves as substances, the second one as processes or series of events. But that is not all. In the description of the first experience some concept of identity is entangled. Identity is connected here with some kind of passivity, or even insensitivity to changes taking place in time. It suggests a static vision of entity which contains in itself some solid core (essence) unaffected by time. In that case a change seems to be merely a replacement of extrinsic (with respect to the core) qualities (accidents in the strict sense). However in the essay Man and Time Ingarden tried to reconcile two experiences of time, and made efforts (more intensively than in Ingarden (1987) when we can find elements of such static vision of being) to activate substance – and at least human substance. It was possible due to different understanding of the core and especially due to different understanding of its solidity. I think that from the ontological point of view the metaphor of force was used in this purpose. In the ontological dimension “I am a force” is the answer to the question: “Am I substance or process (or series of events)”. “I am a force” means: I am specifically conceived substance. What does this specific substantiality consist in? In Ingarden (1987) Ingarden claimed that a factor determining individual identity of object, what was called constitutive nature, is unchangeable merely in the sense it cannot be removed from the object. But it can develop itself. This development is something strange: it is not typical change consisting in acquirement and loss of properties nor it is continuous process of its own constitution. It is as Ingarden says continual embodiment or disembodiment of some quality which is present in object in an embryonic form. This is the basis of Ingardenian distinction between static and dynamic identity. The latter consists in remaining of constitutive nature undergoing the aforementioned development. But is it the only modification of the concept of solid core? I think the metaphor of force expresses something more. It is worth to have in mind that the last part of the essay was written already after Ingarden’s deep and extensive research on time.¹⁶ The metaphor of force – if it can be interpreted ontologically – must be somehow rooted in this research, and must contain some motifs already present in Ingarden (1987), but maybe not fully developed and just because of this reason expressible only in the form of metaphor. I think these motifs allow to interpret the metaphor of force in terms of philosophical concept of force which we know from history of philosophy. We must remember that concurrence of names is accidental. In other words: there is no doubt that “force” in the essay is a metaphor for Ingarden. But it is a metaphor well rooted in his ontological considerations, which, if they will be consistently

16 Ingarden (2001), 60, note 7.

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taken up to the end, lead to such understanding of substance which is based on philosophical concept of force.

2 The philosophical concept of force The most synthetic statement concerning the role and place of the concept of force in the context of substantialism can be found in Immanuel Kant’s Critic of Pure Reason: “causality leads to concept of action (Handlung), that to the concept of force, and lastly to the concept of substance“.¹⁷ This is an explanatory sequence: in order to explain the nature of causal relationship one has to appeal to the concept of action, in order to explain what the action is we must appeal to the concept of force and explanation of the last needs the concept of substance. Kant himself conceives the relationship between referents of these concepts in the light of his transcendental philosophy, where category of substance and category of cause are a priori concepts of reason and where substance is understood as a solid substratum of these elements of appearance which can be replaced (accidents). He distinguishes replacement and change: accidents can be replaced but do not change, while substance changes but cannot be replaced. Because Kant considers substance only as a permanent (non-replaceable) substratum of accidents, he treats the concept of force with some neglect, and when he shows the way from causality to substance he simply ignores it, proceeding immediately from action to substance: Action itself implies the relation of the subject of the causality to the effect. As all effect consists in that which happens, that is, in the changeable, indicated by time in succession, the last subject of it is the permanent, as the substratum of all that is replaced, that is substance. For, according to the principle of causality, actions are always the first ground of all change of phenomena, and cannot exist therefore in a subject that itself is replaced, because in that case other actions and another subject would be required to determine that change. (...) That the first subject of the causality of all arising and perishing cannot itself (in the field of phenomena) arise and perish, is a safe conclusion, resting in the end on empirical necessity and permanency in existence, that is on the concept of a substance as a phenomenon.¹⁸

Like a replacement of some accident by other presupposes the existence of one and the same subject of both accidents (of course they belong to the subject successively in time), actions leading to the replacement presuppose the existence of

17 Kant (1881), vol. 2, 178. 18 Kant (1881), vol. 2, 179 – 180.

74 | Marek Piwowarczyk one and the same subject of them. So Kant accepts a version of specifically understood actiones sunt suppositorum principle and focuses on the necessity of existence of actions in a subject and does not specify the relation between actions and subject. But this is what the concept of force served for before Kant. The aforementioned explanatory scheme was borrowed by Kant from traditional metaphysics of his time. Especially we can find here an allusion to Christian Wolff – “the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers” who “called forth, in Germany, that spirit of thoroughness, which is not yet extinct”.¹⁹ Let us see how the concept of force functioned on the ground of his system and let us unfold the scheme: cause – action – force – substance. According to Wolff a cause is a principle which the existence or actuality of some other being depends on.²⁰ In other words a cause is a being containing reason (something due to which one can understand why something other exists) of other being.²¹ Actuality is for Wolff a fulfillment (realization) of possibility and it happens due to action.²² Action is such modification which has its reason in a being which is a subject to this modification. It is somewhat imprecise, but we learn more when Wolff compares the concept of action with the concept of undergoing a change. The latter is such modification which has its reason in some entity different from that which is being modified. Wolff gives two examples: writing is an action because it has its reason in a writing being (person), who is also a subject to this change (writing) while squeezing a sponge is in the sponge an undergoing the change because this modification has its reason not in the sponge but in a being which is squeezing it. Of course an undergoing a change must be correlated with some action. Moreover, note that the entity which is squeezing also undergoes some change connected with the squeezing.²³ Modification is defined by Wolff as a change of limits of being,²⁴ where a limit should be conceived as definiteness, determinateness (de-terminatio – cutting off). Despite this intricate terminology, the matter is simple: modification is a change of some characteristics of being, a replacement of its modi – accidents. Wolff maintains that a being undergoing a change must also contain a reason because of which it can undergo the change – there must be something in the sponge due to which it can be squeezed – let us say: the microstructure and the

19 Kant (1881), vol. 1, 384. 20 Wolff (1736), §881. 21 Wolff (1736), §866; and Wolff (1751), §29. 22 Wolff (1751), §120. 23 Wolff (1751), §104. 24 Wolff (1751), §107.

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material of the sponge. But the reason of possibility is not the possibility itself. The possibility of undergoing some change is called by Wolff “natural disposition” or “passive potency” (potentia passiva).²⁵ The possibility of action is named “active potency” (potentia activa).²⁶ Passive potency always corresponds to some active potency. Even in a being undergoing some modification which contains in itself the source of this modification, there must exist the potency of reception of this modification. Turn back to the example of writing: when I am writing, I am a subject to some modification, so I must be in potency to receive new determinations implied by the writing (its different phases). Thus I am both the source of the action (writing) and a subject receiving effects of this action – of course different than for example a sheet which I am writing on. The latter contains only potency to undergo the modification, but not its source. This situation was foreseen by Aristotle. He defines active potency as a source of change in another thing or in itself as another, and passive potency as a principle of being changed by another thing or by itself qua another.²⁷ This addition “as another” refers to the situation when a being acts on itself. The mere existence of active potency and passive potency is not sufficient to start an action, as well as to start an undergoing a change, which is the reverse of action.²⁸ Potencies are just only potencies – facts that a being can act or be acted upon. And what is the reason due to which a being is actually acting? Just in this context the concept of force goes on a stage: “this what contains in itself a sufficient reason of action we called force (vis).”²⁹ Thus a force is a principle (source) of action.³⁰ A force activates the potency of action. The propagator of Wolffian philosophy Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten says this way: If not faculty nor receptivity explain some action or reception, they happen due to some force in the strict meaning. It is something what will induce the faculty to act, i.e. it is something what will affect the faculty in such a way that the action starts to happen.³¹

25 Wolff (1736), §§715–716; and Wolff (1751), §105. 26 Wolff (1736), §716. 27 See Met., Θ 1, 1046a, 10–15. When Aristotle says that active potency and passive potency are principles (archai) of change and undergoing a change, he does not mean, as Wolff does, mere possibility of bringing about the change or of undergoing the change, but rather something what Wolff would call the reason of possibility of change and being changed (this what makes action and being acted on possible). 28 Wolff (1736), §§717–719. 29 Wolff (1736), §722. 30 Wolff (1736), §869; and Wolff (1751), §115. 31 Baumgarten (1739), §220.

76 | Marek Piwowarczyk At the first sight, given Wolff’s claim that action completes some possibility, it seems that we can infer a conclusion that a force is simply some other action which actualizes the action which is merely possible. One can proceed this way in infinity or stop on some Aristotelian First Mover. Yet a force is not an action. A force is something more fundamental than an action. With the concept of force we reach the boundaries of conceptual understanding of dynamism of being. In such situation it is very easy to conceive the basis of dynamism statically: if it explains all dynamism, it cannot be grasp in categories describing dynamism. We can only use less or more risky expressions evoking some intuitions: a force is an active principle, a force is pure activity, a force is something by which an action is brought about (even we are tempted to say: something by which an action acts), a force is a principle of ongoingness of action. Secondly, a force cannot be an action in normal meaning because as an actualizer of an action it cannot ultimately be only a manifestation of some active potency. If I have active potency of writing, a force is something which actualizes that potency, what activates it. But I cannot be in potency to actualize the force itself because all my actions presuppose the force. Moreover it would mean that I have passive potency to receive the force – and finally it would mean that I do not act on my own, but a being endowing me with the force acts in me. This last statement implies that a force must be permanently present in a being. Because, for Wolff, substance is an entity which in itself contains a principle of modification,³² so forces must be permanently present in substances. Yet permanently present means – always active. Of course a force does not always “acts” but contains a tendency for acting. It is very difficult to say something more about this tendency. Surely due to a tendency a force is not merely a disposition to act (active potency). Wolff gives an example: We must not confuse a force with mere faculty; for a faculty is only a possibility of doing something. Instead if a force is the source of modification, it must contain tendency to act. For example when I am sitting I have the faculty to stand up. Yet when I actually want stand up and someone prevents me against my will, the force manifests in myself. Due to the faculty modification is only possible; due to the force it becomes actual. Thus due to a substance something which was merely possible can become actual.³³

Yet the example is somewhat misleading to the extent that it suggests that an entity can gain a force – but we know a force is permanently present in substance.

32 Wolff (1736), §872; and Wolff (1751), §§115–116. 33 Wolff (1751), §117.

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Due to a force a substance always aims at change of its characteristics (modi),³⁴ or in other words: at change of its state. But if a force is still active why are not all actions actual? And here the quotation is apt: the force is still active, but action cannot be completed because of external obstacles. Removal of these obstacles leads to actualization of the action.³⁵ But saying that, do not we deny our earlier considerations? For it seems that some external action (removing of obstacles) actualizes the action which was prevented by obstacles. Yes, but saying that we do not mean that the force itself is in this case actualized – it is active all the time. After removing the obstacle the force actualizes the action although not in the same way (and not in the same sense) as the action removal of obstacle actualizes it. Of course the action removing obstacles contributes to beginning of some action. And sometimes such an action removing obstacles must be continuous process parallel to the action made possible this way. But removal of the obstacle merely lets the force develop its activity. As Wolff sometimes says, the force passes onto the action if nothing prevents it. Let us sum up Wolff’s considerations: speaking colloquially: in a causal relationship an effect is effected by action of some substance, but the action must be activated by force. A substance acts and brings about some effect only due to the force. Moreover every substance is active. Some substances seem to be static and unchanged only because they are in such conditions which are obstacles for the force’s passing on to an action. In my opinion these considerations must be completed. For we can ask: is a force a blind activity? Why does force enable an exchange of some modi well defined with respect to their species on some others, also well defined with respect to their species? We can answer these questions having a look at some motifs of thought of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz – the great predecessor of Wolff. Leibniz treated the concept of force as a key concept of understanding substance: the concept of forces or powers, which the Germans call Kraft and the French la force, and for whose explanation I have set up a distinct science of dynamics, brings the strongest light to bear upon our understanding of the true concept of substance. ³⁶

Working out his theory of force Leibniz maintained that he reinterpreted and consequently developed scholastic substantialism. It is especially apparent in his dis-

34 Wolff (1736), §725; and Wolff (1751), §118. 35 Wolff (1736), §§728–729; and Wolff (1751), §119. 36 Leibniz (1875–90a), vol. 4, 469; quoted by Garber (2009), 128.

78 | Marek Piwowarczyk sertation Specimen dynamicum, where Leibniz makes the famous distinction of forces: Active force (which might not inappropriately be called power [virtus], as some do) is twofold, that is, either primitive, which is inherent in every corporeal substance per se ... or derivative, which, resulting from a limitation of primitive force through the collision of bodies with one another, for example, is found in different degrees. Indeed, primitive force (which is nothing but the first entelechy) corresponds to the soul or substantial form. ... Similarly, passive force is also twofold, either primitive or derivative. And indeed, the primitive force of being acted upon [vis primitiva patiendi] or of resisting constitutes that which is called primary matter in the schools, if correctly interpreted. This force is that by virtue of which it happens that a body cannot be penetrated by another body, but presents an obstacle to it, and at the same time is endowed with a certain laziness, so to speak, that is, an opposition to motion, nor, further, does it allow itself to be put into motion without somewhat diminishing the force of the body acting on it. As a result, the derivative force of being acted upon later shows itself to different degrees in secondary matter. ³⁷

It is important how Leibniz conceives a force. In the following quotation we can find some motifs used later by Wolff: Yet by force or power I do not mean potency or simple faculty, which is only the closest possibility of action and being somehow dead, without an external stimulus will never lead to action, but I mean by it something between potency and action, something containing effort, act, entelechy, because force passes onto action, if nothing prevents it.³⁸

What is interesting here is the motif of identification of primitive active force with form (in scholastic sense). It allows Leibniz to say that primitive active force is an essence of substance and even to identify a substance with primitive active force. Yet the most interesting is identification of primitive active force with the law of series – i.e. a principle organizing and unifying all properties of substance and determining its new states on the basis of a present state:³⁹ the essence of substance consists in the primitive force of action, or in the law of sequence of changes a soul or a form analogous to the soul – a first entelechy, that is, or a kind of nisus or primitive force of action which is itself that inherent law impressed upon it by the divine command

37 Leibniz (1849–63), vol. 6, 236–237; quoted by Garber (2009), 133. 38 Leibniz (1875-90b), vol. 4, 472 39 Gut (2004), 81–82.

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I recognize, in the active force (...) the primitive entelechy whose nature consists in a certain perpetual law of the same series of changes through which it runs unhindered.⁴⁰

I am aware of various problems connected with interpretation of Leibnizian concept of force, change and action in the context of his superessentialism, the thesis that monads are windowless and the theory of pre-established harmony. I am also aware of number of interpretations offered by Leibnizian scholars. Therefore I want to restrict my considerations only to presentation of a hypothesis (not mine!) explaining reasons of identification of primitive active force with the law of series. As I said the law of series is a principle determining successive states of substance on the basis of present states. Due to the law of series Leibniz can say that present is pregnant with the future or that a substance contains in itself all its states: past, present and future. Nowadays by the word “law” or “principle” one usually means some proposition, often in the form “if..., then...” or a denotation of this proposition. It denotes some complex state of affairs, namely the relation of necessitation of one states of affairs by another (denoted by, respectively, a consequent and an antecedent of a conditional). Thus it is hard to understand how the law conceived this way can be an essence of thing. Yet we can apply different interpretative model to the law of series, model which discloses its specificity better. The law of series can be treated as analogical to a mathematical function.⁴¹ To the essence of function belongs that it relates some inputs (arguments) to some outputs (values). Similarly the law of series relates some states of substance to other states. It should be understood this way that the law of series “transforms” some states into others. It is an active principle of transformation of present states into future ones, according to some order. Due to the law of series a substance can properly react on given conditions and change its state. But the analogy to mathematical function is restricted. The law of series is not mere correlation nor can be expressed in terms of series of ordered pairs. Moreover a many-variables function would be a better model. Thus the law of series is an active principle of transition from some states of substance to others. The force as identical with the law of series (let us use the term “law-force” from now) is not a blind striving but it is in itself a principle of such and such necessary correlation of states. Therefore primitive active forces differ from each other. They are different ways of transformation of states and differences among substances cannot be reduced to differences among their

40 Leibniz (1875–90c), vol. 1, 374; Leibniz (1875–90d), vol. 4, 512; Leibniz (1875–90e), vol. 2, 171; quoted by Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1999), 222–223. 41 Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1999), 174, 182, 227–242, 284–285.

80 | Marek Piwowarczyk properties. The difference of essences (laws-forces) is more basic. Specificity of a law-force implies what kind of states it can have as its arguments and what kind of states can be values of it. Again we can use our analogy with function: function y = x2 and function y = log2 x differ primarily as different principles of correlation of some arguments and values. This primal difference implies further dissimilarities: an argument of the quadratic function can be any number from the set of real numbers but this function cannot have negative values whereas the logarithmic function is defined only for positive arguments but its codomain is R. Similarity of law-force to Aristotelian form is evident if we remember that for Aristotelians form is also a factor determining possible ways of substance’s behavior. In this context it is easy to interpret prime matter. Substance is endowed not only with the law-force transforming some own states into others but also with potency to receive new states. This potency is prime matter. It is determined primarily by the law-force, because of which is its potency to receive only states of some specific kinds (and not any states). Moreover it is determined by concrete states which together with given law-force determines possible successive states of substance. This first determination corresponds to informing prime matter by substantial form, the second one corresponds to informing a substance by accidental forms. For in this second case the law-force is also limited in the sense that each new state of substance is a part of set of conditions-arguments, which “bound” it. Now let us see whether the philosophical concept of force conceived this way can be useful in interpretation of Ingardenian substantialism and finally in ontological interpretation of the metaphor “I am a force”.⁴²

3 The possibility of application of the concept of force to Ingarden’s ontology Ingarden began his ontological career with the work Essentiale Fragen (Ingarden (1925)) which was his Habilitationschrift. As he said it was an extended introduc-

42 It is worth to investigate how far the concept of primitive active force is similar to Aristotelian concept of nature. I mean not only obvious contexts: that nature is an immanent principle of change and rest. More interesting texts are these where Aristotle says that nature belongs to the same genus as potency and is the principle of change not in another being (nor in the same being qua another) but in a given being as itself (Met., Θ 8, 1049b 9–10). Of course this is a topic for distinct article. See Gill (2004) and Johansen (2012), 85–92.

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tion to the unfinished dissertation about identity of object.⁴³ He admits he was conducting historical research, but urged by the will of completing the Habilitationschrift he left it in order to develop introductory issues concerning identity more systematically. Thus in Ingarden (1925) we can find his first statements about concepts of constitutive nature of object, subject-properties structure, essence, ideas, individuation etc. In other words: topics which later in Ingarden (1987) will be developed (and sometimes modified) and analyzed in details. In Ingarden (1925) we can notice the great impact pressed upon Ingarden by two phenomenologists: Jean Hering with his dissertation Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee (Hering (1921)) and Alexander Pfänder with his Logik (Pfänder (1921)). This is the reason why the issue of identity, essence, constitutive nature, subject-property structure were set in the context of problems concerning ontological grounds of predication, known since Aristotelian Categories. Thus Ingarden (1925) and Ingarden (1987) contain in fact very extensive interpretation of Aristotelian ontological square. Ingarden analyzes mutual relationships among primary substances (Ingardenian autonomous individual objects), individual accidents and relations (properties and relations), secondary substances (ideas of autonomous individual objects) and accidental or relational universals (ideas of properties and relations). In consequence we have an impression of static character of this model of substance and it seems that Ingarden gives us something what Półtawski calls static cross-sections of object, expressed in categories of qualities, non-qualitative form (in Ingardenian, not Aristotelian meaning!) and mode of existence. Ingarden maintains the essence of the world is being an objective domain organized by causal relationships. Thus the third volume of The Controversy (Ingarden (1987)) is devoted to the analyses of such relationships. In the first volume he analyzes modes of existence in time. Hence we cannot say he neglects issues of dynamism of object or its interactions with other objects. However we can feel unsatisfied because Ingarden does not connect these considerations with the analyses of ontological ground of predication directly. He gives only some small clues concerning the role a constitutive nature (analyzed in the context of problem of predication) plays in mutual interactions of substances or the role absolutely proper properties play. Ingarden describes only formal characteristic of constitutive nature (i.e. characteristic via formal functions of nature) and he claims that nature is such a quality which determines individual (but also generic) identity of object and that nature immediately characterizes the object considered as subject of properties – all his considerations are devoted to this aspects of nature while

43 See Ingarden (1999).

82 | Marek Piwowarczyk we know almost nothing about its role in the causal relationship or in object’s interactions with the environment. Thus we need to develop and maybe partially modify Ingardenian thought into the coherent theory of substance taking into account not only the context of ontological ground of predication but also the context of change and mutual interaction. I think clues he left allow to develop his ontology using the concept of law-force. Let us start with the analysis of causality. We know Ingarden regards arguments of causal relationship (causes and results) as events (some of them are beginnings or ends of processes). As we know they are comings-into-being of some states of affairs so due to events some properties or relations start to belong to substances. Thus a causal relationship is a relationship between comings-into-being of states of substances. They can obtain in one and the same substance (intrasubstantial causal relationship) or among different substances (intersubstantial causal relationship). According to Ingarden a cause is temporally last element joining to (composed of many factors) active sufficient condition of an event, an element which supplements all these factors to the sufficient condition and activate them.⁴⁴

A cause is a kind of impulse which complements given conditions and activate them this way that they bring about some result. But how events can be brought about? Ingarden says they are beginnings or ends of processes. But how a process is activated? As we see we can ask questions similar to those we found when we were considering Wolff’s conception. I do not want to provide broader analyses but I would like only to present an example which shows that we need some modification of Ingarden’s scheme of causal relationship – the modification in the spirit of Leibniz-Wolffian scheme. Let us imagine I am pressing a balloon and I stop in a moment. The balloon gained some specific shape which is its property. The change of the state of the balloon was also attained. The new state started to exist in the moment of the end of the pressing process (movement of my arms) but it still remains due to another process: my putting constant pressure on the balloon. The state exists due to mutual interactions between two processes: expansion of gas and my putting constant pressure. The state was brought about because these two actions were balanced and its continuous existence is possible only due to the existence of the balance.

44 Ingarden (1987), vol. 3, 65.

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Because the shape exists thanks to continuous action it is, in Ingarden’s terminology, an externally conditioned property. Thus a cause seems to be a factor leading to the balance which was earlier disturbed in some way – Ingarden even says similar words in one place. This disturbance is in our example simply the beginning of my pressure-process on the balloon which is of course associated with the process of increasing of the gas’s pressure inside the balloon and the balance is nothing more than adjustment of the reaction of the balloon to my action upon it – and vice versa – adjustment of my action upon the balloon to its reaction (in this case it is possible because I stopped increasing the strength of pressure). Such balancing of actions could be better understood if I did not press the balloon but put a steel bar on it. The bar would start moving down and of course it would stop in a moment. The balloon will gain some new property (mode) – the particular shape. But the property is an effect, inter alia, of balance between physical forces: of gravity and of, let us say, the force resulting from the gas’s pressure inside the balloon. In fact the balance is also balance between two actions: the bar’s falling down and squeezing the balloon and on the other side the balloon’s pushing the bar up. These two forces and two actions in the state of equilibrium are obstacles to each other. Thus reception of modification cannot be reduced to passive receptivity but is strictly connected with a proper reaction of a substance which is a subject to modification. Moreover the disturbance of the balance consists in removing one of the obstacles. The balloon can gain the specific shape because it has some other properties which make it possible. In searching of such properties we finally reach absolutely proper properties. The sole example of such properties in the case of real object (existing in time) given by Ingarden (and this is one of valuable clues!) is “regularly normalized increasing of metal’s volume when the temperature increases”.⁴⁵ We can name it thermal expansibility. Ingarden named properties of this kind “abilities”. At the first glance it seems that abilities are dispositions so broadly discussed today by analytic philosophers. They usually conceive dispositions via so called conditional analysis – as an ability to proper reaction in given circumstances. Let us consider fragility. That a cup is fragile means that when it would be hit it would be broken (it is an application of conditional analysis). I do not want to discuss issues connected with this account. Yet it seems Ingardenian disposition is not a disposition conceived this way but is similar to Leibnizian law of series. In the given example thermal expansibility is simply the function determining dependence between some values of volume and some values of temperature. In the case of disposition, conceived as in analytic philosophy, manifestation of dispo-

45 Ingarden (1987), vol. 2, part 1, 394.

84 | Marek Piwowarczyk sition is not actual while in the case of Ingardenian ability there is always some actual value of volume associated with some actual value of temperature. Disposition seems to be merely Wolffian potency (active or passive). In the case of our balloon one of its absolutely proper properties is for example dependence (understood as a law-function) between pressure of gas and external pressure on the sides of balloon. Other example is dependence of shape on a value of external pressure, place and area of its application. Even if I gave wrong examples I think the idea of absolutely proper property of real object is simple: it is a law-function defining the way of reaction of object to the actions flowing from its environment. Ingarden claims absolutely proper properties are conditioned solely by a constitutive nature. How is this conditioning conceived? Ingarden does not answer this question satisfactorily.⁴⁶ Yet we must admit this is one of the most difficult problems on substantialism, not only of its Ingardenian version. On the ground of classical substantialism (and Ingardenian one is its variety) the distinction between essence (Ingardenian constitutive nature) and accidents (Ingardenian properties) is not modal but formal (in Ingardenian meaning of the word). The difference between essence (nature) and accidents (properties) cannot be reduced to difference between necessary and contingent characteristics. Classical substantialists have always postulated the existence of necessary accidents which do not belong to the essence of thing. In Aristotle’s metaphysics and scholasticism they were called proper accidents (propria), in Wolff’s ontology – attributes. Essence was said to be a factor making object something (for example horse, cow, wolf, man) and properties were said to be factors making object such and such (strong, big, bloodthirsty, creative). These are statements given in the context of ontic grounds of predication and they are almost non-informative. For example Thomas Aquinas used to express the relation of propria to essence in terms of emanation or natural implication: propria emanate from the essence of substance.⁴⁷ I think that with respect to the problem of relation of absolutely proper properties to a constitutive nature we can choose one of two general strategies: Platonic and Aristotelian. Why these names? Plato and Platonists thought powers of soul were in a sense its inseparable parts: there was rational soul, sensitive soul etc. while Aristotelians thought powers of soul were not parts or aspects of it but they were accidental forms naturally implied (emanated) from the soul.⁴⁸ Of course we

46 See Piwowarczyk (2011). 47 STh., I q. 77, a. 6, corpus and ad. 3; and Brown (1985), 104–109. 48 STh., I q. 77, a.1; Field (1984) and Pasnau (2002)

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can generalize these strategies and apply them not only to soul and its powers but generally to the relation of proper accidents to the essence (absolutely proper properties to nature). From the perspective of Platonic strategy, constitutive nature would be a lawforce which is the synthesis of some other law-forces (absolutely proper properties). From the perspective of Aristotelian strategy (I admit I am inclined to it) the relation of nature to absolutely proper properties cannot be so simply conceived. The best solution would be that the nature is a law-force which arguments are absolutely proper properties and its value is the coordination of them. Absolutely proper properties are conditioned by nature in this manner that they together cannot be arguments of the law-force of some other type: the law-force as something analogical to function determines the specificity of its arguments. Moreover the absolutely basic activity due to which partial laws-forces (absolutely proper properties) can transform given conditions into new states of substance (into a new state of equilibrium disturbed earlier) would be properly directed activity of the nature. It corresponds to old scholastic dictum that accidental forms act by the power of the substantial form. This is a topic for another text – much larger. Yet one thing must be emphasized: in any strategy the constitutive nature grasped in the context of action and causality is just the law-force. I think this conception can be easily reconciled with Ingarden’s intention contained in the following quotation: Although it is true that the close connection and irreversible order of the changes that take effect in every living individuum and in human beings especially, make this object temporally determined in a special sense, particularly a historical one, nevertheless it is just the connection and this order, this system of typical changes, that point to the existence of a constant, and therefore enduring, and for a given individuum characteristic essence, which constitutes the ground for the processes taking place in it. We are not concerned here merely with the processes of development and dissolution that are characteristic of a given biological species, and which are constantly repeated. A much greater role is played here by a certain typical trait of all vitally important – and for a given personal individuum, essential – modes of behavior. It is in this trait that a determinate personality, the same throughout a lifetime, and the manner, always one and the same over and over, in which the given individual resolves the great variety of problems in his life (often in quite antithetic situations) come to expression and to prevail despite all obstacles and catastrophes. This is the best evidence that a living individuum, man and the human person in particular, is something more than and something different form the sum of events and processes taking place in it. And this more is not the kind of derivative product that the process as an object is in relation to the phases constituting its ground, on which its individual endowment wholly depends, but is, on the contrary, the basis and in part the only source of both the generically determined developmental processes and the characteristic individual way in which the vital discourse

86 | Marek Piwowarczyk between the living individuum (a human being especially) and its environing world is conducted.⁴⁹

Ultimately this constant core is a constitutive nature of substance, something which determines its individual identity. As we can see statements present in the above quotation allow to think Ingarden treated constitutive nature similarly to Leibnizian essence – resemblance (probably unintentional at all) is striking here. The nature is a principle not only of changes of generic characteristics but also of strictly individual ones. And in this respect Ingarden would agree with Leibniz who treated the law of series as haecceitas: strictly individual way of organization of monad’s perceptions. Yet this is a distinct problem. However it is worth to emphasize that Ingarden speaks here in the spirit of the essay Man and Time: tells about vital discourse conducted among obstacles and catastrophes, discourse in which one personality wins. In another place we can find even better suggestion allowing to interpret the concept of constitutive nature in terms of the philosophical concept of force: the ascendancy of the constant in a living individuum over the changes in its states that are co-conditioned externally is evidenced in this same meaningful unity of what is actual in a living entity and its whole temporally extensive being, in its creatively resourceful defense against threats from changing states and processes in the external world. He defect, fragility in the living individuum’s being is not eliminated or diminished by this, but proves to be frangibility of something which is in itself autonomous, the basis and the source of active resistance center, and the center of force form which it constructively struggles against being overcome by externally conditioned disturbances of its existence and the threat to that existence from time itself.⁵⁰

Ingarden maintained than only living individuals are endowed with such forces, but I am inclined to assumption that it concerns all types of substances. But I do not want to discuss this issue here – for ontological interpretation of metaphor “I am a force” it is of no importance. Now I want to point at and briefly discuss three problems which seem to be worth of more elaborated considerations. Firstly, the application of the concept of law-force allows to elucidate the concept of dynamic identity. It turns out that this kind of identity is dynamic not only in the sense that constitutive nature can continually “materialize” or “dematerialize” (given the assumption that nature is a law-force we should check this statement or at least modify it properly). More important is that identity is not connected with passive undergoing changes or

49 Ingarden (1987), vol. I, 222–223. Cited translation: Ingarden (1964), 142–143. 50 Ingarden (1987), vol. I, 231. Cited translation: Ingarden (1964), 153–154.

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with some insensitivity to changes. Quite the contrary: maintenance of identity requires the proper sensitivity to changes, namely it consists in active responses to changes. An essence enables a substance to endure not because it is unchangeable solid core of a substance but that it is a principle of restoration of equilibrium which was disturbed by changes. It is well expressed by a contemporary Thomist W. N. Clark: The notion of self-identity does not signify something static and self enclosed, but open and flexible within the limits characteristic of its nature. Thus every living thing maintains its self-identity by active interchange with the outside world (...). Self identity is not immutability but the active power of self-maintenance in exchange with others.⁵¹

Secondly, if a constitutive nature of substance is the most fundamental law-force then a substance as subject of properties cannot be conceived as bare substratum. It is not bare as a subject (in abstraction from its properties). Although laws-forces are not qualities in the same sense as for example sensible qualities are, they are distinguishable as we noticed. So they are qualities in the deep Aristotelian sense: for Aristotle a quality is primarily a difference of essence. Moreover it is not a subject in the sense of sub-object hidden behind its properties.⁵² The law-force itself is a subject. Characterization of a subject by properties should be understood as a limitation or determination of the law-force. Some properties are values of the law-force, and every property is its argument in the sense that together with external conditions co-determines possible states of substance – new values of the law-force. In this sense every property of substance is causally engaged. Thirdly, the concept of law-force can be fruitfully used in the defense of substantialism. Roughly speaking the law-force cannot be merely in statu nascendi but is a condition of becoming (process). Typical troubles connected with the attempt of reconciliation of the concept of law-force with processualism can be found in philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Whitehead as a Leibnizian in spirit maintained the concept of law-force but in the same time he postulated a form of radical processualism. Eventually he had to accept the thesis that lawforces (named by him initial aims) are sent by God in some mysterious way to concrete situations (complexes of events – in his terminology actual occasions or actual entities). This solution generate many serious problems which I considered in other text.⁵³

51 Clarke (2001), 129. 52 Rosiak (2006). 53 Piwowarczyk (2008) and Rosiak (2003).

88 | Marek Piwowarczyk I think all what was said above is an evidence that the metaphor “I am a force” can be interpreted in terms of philosophical concept of force. Human being is very specific law-force, able to transform specific arguments into specific, proper only for him, values. I especially mean answers to appeal of moral, aesthetic and other axiological values, reactions on existential situations, answers to encounter with other persons and with the completely unique Person – God.

Bibliography Aristotle (1831), Opera omnia, I. Bekker (ed.), Berlin. Baumgarten, A. G. (1739), Metaphysica, Halle. Brown, B. F. (1985), Accidental Being. A Study in the Metaphysics of. St. Thomas Aquinas, Lanham/New York/London. Clarke, W. N. (2001), The One and the Many. A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics, Notre Dame. Cover J. A. and O’Leary-Hawthorne J. (1999), Substance and Individuation in Leibniz, Cambridge. Field, R. W. (1984), “St. Thomas on Properties and the Powers of the Soul”, in Laval Theologique et Philosophique: 40, 203–215. Garber, D. (2009), Leibniz, Body, Substance, Monad, Oxford–New York. Gerhardt, C. I. (ed.) (1875–90), in “Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz”, Berlin; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1978. Gill, M. L. (2011), “Aristotle’s Distinction Between Change and Activity”, in Axiomathes: 14, 3–22. Grygianiec, M. (2011), “Trwanie w czasie”, in Przewodnik po metafizyce, edited by S. T. Kołodziejczyk, Kraków: 211–276. Gut, P. (2004), Leibniz. Myśl filozoficzna w XVII wieku, Wrocław. Hering, J. (1921), “Bemerkungen uber das Wesen, die Wahrheit and die Idee”, in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung: 4. Hofweber, T. and Velleman, J. D. (2013), “How to Endure”, in Philosophical Quarterly: 61, 37–57. Ingarden, R. (1925), ”Essentiale Fragen. Ein Beitrag zum Wessenproblem”, in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung: 7, 125–304. Ingarden, R. (1964), Time and Modes of Being, translated by H. Michejda, Springfield. Ingarden, R. (1987), Spór o istnienie świata. [The Controversy Over the Existence of the World], Vol. I – III, Warszawa: PWN. Ingarden, R. (1999), ”Dzieje mojej ‘kariery uniwersyteckiej’ ”, in Kwartalnik Filozoficzny: 27, 183–201. Ingarden, R. (2001), ”Człowiek i czas” [“Man and Time”], in R. Ingarden.: Książeczka o człowieku [Little Book About Man], Sixth Edition, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie. Johansen, T. K. (2012), The Powers Of Aristotle’s Soul, Oxford. Kant, I. (1881), Critique of Pure Reason, translated by F. M. Müller, London: Macmillan.

“I am a Force” – An Attempt of Ontological Interpretation | 89 Kobiela, F. (2011), Filozofia czasu Romana Ingardena wobec sporów o zmienność świata, Kraków. Leibniz, G. W. (1849–63), Specimen dynamicum, in Leibnizens mathematische Schriften, edited by C. I. Gerhardt, Berlin. Leibniz, G. W. (1875–90), De primae philosophiae emendatione, et de notione substantiae, in Gerhardt (1875–90). Leibniz, G. W. (1875–90), Systeme nouveau pour expliquer la nature des substances et leur communication entre elles, aussi bien que l’union de l’ame avec le corps, in Gerhardt (1875–90). Leibniz, G. W. (1875–90), Leibniz an Foucher, in Gerhardt (1875–90). Leibniz, G. W. (1875–90), De ipsa natura, in Gerhardt (1875–90). Leibniz, G. W. (1875–90), Leibniz an de Volder, in Gerhardt (1875–90). Pasnau, R. (2002), Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, Cambridge. Pfänder, A. (1921), Logik, Tübingen. Piwowarczyk, M. (2008), Bóg i stawanie się. Problem relacji świat-Bóg w filozofii Alfreda Northa Whiteheada, Lublin. Piwowarczyk, M. (2010), “Paradoks tożsamości w czasie. Uwagi metaontologiczne”, in Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia: 5, 137–151. Piwowarczyk, M. (2011), “Natura przedmiotu a jego własności istotne”, in W kręgu myśli Romana Ingardena, edited by A. Węgrzecki, Kraków, 61–76. Piwowarczyk, M. (2013a), “Próba ontologicznej interpretacji Ingardenowskiej metafory”, in Świadomość, świat, wartości. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Andrzejowi Półtawskiemu w 90. rocznicę urodziń, edited by D. Leszczyński and M. Rosiak, Wrocław, 291–313. Piwowarczyk, M. (2013b), “Przedmiot trwający w czasie a proces”, in Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia: 8, 25–35. Półtawski, A. (2011), Po co filozofować?, Wydawnictwo Oficyna Naukowa, 19–39. Rosiak, M. (2003), Spór o substancjalizm. Studium z ontologii Ingardena i metafizyki Whiteheada, Łódź. Rosiak, M. (2006), “Formal and Existential Analysis of Subject and Properties”, in Essays in Logic and Ontology, edited by J. Malinowski and A. Pietruszczak, Amsterdam–New York, 285–299. Rosiak, M. (2013) Studia z problematyki realizmu-idealizmu, Wrocław. Stróżewski, W. (2004) “Romana Ingardena filozofia czasu”, in Nauka–Religia–Dzieje, XII Seminarium w Castel Gandolfo, edited by J. A. Janik, Kraków. Thomas Aquinas (1882-1972), Opera omnia, Rome. Wolff, Ch. (1736), Philosophia prima sive ontologia, Frankfurt–Leipzig. Wolff, Ch. (1751), Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt, Halle.

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Part III: Substantialistic Background of Causation

Filip Kobiela

The Causal Structure of the World in Ingarden’s Ontology* In this paper I would like to begin with a brief reconstruction of Ingarden’s considerations structure, while in some issues, especially in the notation of events, I slightly deviate from what Ingarden strictly wrote. To be able to model certain events I introduce some additional markings as well. Subsequently, I move on to some more detailed issues concerning the causal structure of the real world, monads’ causal life, chance events and freedom.

1 The causal typology of events and their notation Almost half of the considerations contained in Volume III of The Controversy... is filled up with Chapter XIX, devoted to the essence of the causal relationship, including quite extensively discussed issue of simultaneousness of cause and effect. The remaining part¹ of the work is filled up with Chapter XX. Events as functions of range of their causes and effects. The problem of determinism; the following discussion is based mainly, though not exclusively, on issues taken in the last chapter. Within the Ingarden’s rich ontology, real being, i.e. being defined in time is the region of being where cause-effect relationships may occur. Mathematical objects, as well as purely intentional ones, as devoid of the moment of the existential actuality may not be elements of cause-effect relationships. Objects enduring in time that are centres of ongoing processes and occurrence of events are the basic building material of the real world. An important property of events is that they may have their causes (whether they must have causes – that’s another thing resolved by Ingarden in the positive way as the so-called principle of cause), they may also cause effects (whether they must cause effects – it is another thing again resolved by Ingarden in the negative way as the so-called principle of effects). These are

* In this text – sections 2, 3 and 5 – are slightly based on Chapter VII of my work on Ingarden’s philosophy of time, cf. Kobiela (2011). 1 Ingarden (1981). This work also includes two short chapters considered as introduction and conclusion.

94 | Filip Kobiela not trivial properties of events – e.g. objects enduring in time, as such, are not elements of these relationships, negative states of affairs may not be causes either. Causal, dynamic aspect of being involves then processes and events, but Ingarden restricts considerations to causal events, i.e. ‘to the causal relationships of being in the form of event, and composed of events’². Apart from these, causal processes exist as well, i.e. causal relationships of being in the form of the process, they however can be interconnected between pairs of events which are in the causal relationship of being. Ingarden’s considerations on causation ultimately come down to examining events. Objects enduring in time, which are the basic building material of the real world, are however characterised indirectly by events and their causal relations – in this way Ingarden obtains causal-event ‘portraits’ of various types of objects enduring in time. The real world turns out to be multiplicity of objects causally related and enduring in time. A key tool used by Ingarden is an analysis of relationships between sets of possible and actual effects resp. causes of events. For each event E, Ingarden defines a set of its possible causes³: these are all events not later from it, except for its simultaneous (direct or indirect) effects. Let us denote this set by MRC. A set of possible effects of the given event is defined similarly (MRE). On the other hand, a set of all of events that are the effects of the given event, is called by Ingarden a range of the effects of this event (RE); he similarly defines a range of its causes (RC). Subsequently Ingarden makes a comparison of possible and actual sets of causes resp. effects: A range – set of real causes (resp. effects) of the given event is a maximum set (M), if it includes the entire set of its possible causes (resp. effects): Maximum (M): RC = MRC (resp. RE = MRE); If an event has no effect (resp. cause), then the corresponding range is an empty set (o): Empty (o): RC = ∅ (resp. RE = ∅); 2 Ingarden (1981), 45. 3 From the purely ontologically point of view much more ‘possible’ sets of causes of the given E event could be defined; starting with the most comprehensive: 1. All events in general of the world, 2. All events excluding E (elimination of self-determination), 3. All events not later than E (elimination of causes later than the effect), 4. The above Ingarden’s meaning, allowing for simultaneousness of causes and effects, 5. All events earlier than E (elimination of the simultaneousness of the cause and the effect), 6. All events from the inside of the E light cone (restriction related to the speed of light).

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In other cases, a range of causes (resp. effects) is a partial set (n): Partial: RC ⊆ MRC (resp. RE ⊆ MRE). In this way, to each event two parameters are assigned – sets of its causes and effects, which may take three values. In addition, Ingarden assigns events to objects enduring in time, which are carriers of events. Therefore sets of causes resp. effects are still divided into subsets of internal and external causes/effects, depending on whether they occur inside or outside the object enduring in time, which is a carrier of the event. An internal event of the given object is a change of some of its absolutely proper or acquired property, while an external event is a change of its externally conditioned property or relative, or finally an event, whose carrier is some other object.⁴ So ultimately Ingarden assigns four sets (ranges) to each event: – set of its causes, which occur inside its carrier, – set of its causes, which occur outside its carrier, – set of its effects, which occur inside its carrier, – set of its effects, which occur outside its carrier. Each of these sets may take 3 ‘values’ (o, n, M), which gives a total of 34 = 81 possible types of events. Ingarden’s notation of events takes, for example, the following form: En (tk )Mn/M0 – E denotes an event, superscript n – number of the event, (tk ) – time variable, subscripts respectively: external range of causes (maximum), external range of effects (partial), internal range of causes (maximum), internal range of effects (empty); slash dividing the two two-element groups of subscripts is the limit between the exterior and the interior of the object, which is a carrier of the event E. Moreover, when it is important to determine whether the given event belongs to the interior of its carrier, Ingarden claims: IntE(O) – internal event for the object O, and E(O) – external event for the object O. Let us note that Ingarden does not use the temporal and spatial coordinate of the event, but he uses the time coordinate and its number, which may result from a belief that there is no, at least there is no explicit, spatial location of (mental) events.

4 The inside/outside distinction is thus an ontological distinction that should not be restricted to the spatial understanding.

96 | Filip Kobiela Later on I will use the Ingarden’s notation, usually in a simplified version, in which skipping the temporal variable or the event number will not raise any doubts. In addition, for greater clarity, (perhaps such modification also has other advantages) I would like to suggest a slightly different way of notation of events, first of all – a causal matrix of the event E, instead of representation with a double subscript Eab/cd . The causal matrix of the event E. X may take values from (0,n,M)

External Internal

Range of Causes

Range of Effects

XEC XIC

XEE XIE

I assume that other important parameters of the given event are explicitly defined by the context. Then, the first line of this matrix contains information on the exterior of the object, the second line – the interior of the object; the first column – values of the range of causes, the second column – values of the range of effects. Other suggestions to modify the notation include: – 0 (zero digit) instead of o (letter o); – X (with subscripts indicating location of X within the given causal matrix) instead of a question mark (?) sometimes used by Ingarden, and where the value of the given range is unknown/unimportant. In addition, in some considerations it may be useful to enrich the values of causes/effects ranges with two further fuzzy values: 1) − M – event with partial, (n) but significant range of causes resp. effects; 2) 0+ – event with partial (n) but insignificant range of causes resp. effects. Then the variable X could finally take values from (0,0+ ,n, M, − M). Having been equipped with these instruments, we can now proceed to the analysis of certain Ingarden’s considerations.

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2 Determinism and the poles of the real world Ingarden shows all possible causal types of events as follows:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

MM 00 MM 0n n0 0M M0 nM Mn

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

MM MM/MM MM/00 MM/nn MM/0n MM/n0 MM/0M MM/M0 MM/nM MM/Mn

00 00/MM 00/00 00/nn 00/0n 00/n0 00/0M 00/M0 00/nM 00/Mn

nn nn/MM nn/00 nn/nn nn/0n nn/n0 nn/0M nn/M0 nn/nM nn/Mn

0n 0n/MM 0n/00 0n/nn 0n/0n 0n/n0 0n/0M 0n/M0 0n/nM 0n/Mn

n0 n0/MM n0/00 n0/nn n0/0n n0/n0 n0/0M n0/M0 n0/nM n0/Mn

0M 0M/MM 0M/00 0M/nn 0M/0n 0M/n0 0M/0M 0M/M0 0M/nM 0M/Mn

M0 M0/MM M0/00 M0/nn M0/0n M0/n0 M0/0M M0/M0 M0/nM M0/Mn

nM nM/MM nM/00 nM/nn nM/0n nM/n0 nM/0M nM/M0 nM/nM nM/Mn

Mn Mn/MM Mn/00 Mn/nn Mn/0n Mn/n0 Mn/0M Mn/M0 Mn/nM Mn/Mn

From among the multitude of 81 types of events constructed this way, Ingarden is trying to gradually eliminate those that can not occur in the world is for various reasons. The key moment of this negative part of Ingarden’s study is a proof of contradiction of the so-called radical determinism, i.e. the view, according to which, tersely formulated, everything is related to everything, and according to terminology developed by Ingarden – all events in the world at any time of its existence are the events of EMM/MM -type. I can not consider here this part of Ingarden’s work, but a significant positive result is to determine the consistency of different form of determinism, i.e. the so-called moderate determinism: causal structure of the world, in which all events are of the Enn/nn -type. To prevent the danger of the world disintegration into causally unrelated parts of the world (‘milky ways’) which is permitted by such a structure, Ingarden imposes some additional conditions on it, of which the most interesting for us is the following: ‘in the world history there must be two events that can not be the general Enn/nn -type. The initial event in world history needs to be of the E?M/?M -type, while the final event of the whole world causal network needs to be of the EM0/M0 -type’⁵. Let us examine these two peculiar events.

5 Ingarden (1981), 308.

98 | Filip Kobiela Event A – The Creation of the World:

E I

C

E

XEC (?) XIC (?)

M M

Let us note that a certain existentially-dependent event is discussed here, that requires a carrier in the form of an object enduring in time. So this is not literally the creation of the world, but rather setting it in motion. This however may be associated with the creation of such a carrier.⁶ Ingarden provides a postulate of such an event occurrence with the following comment: ‘Question marks in place of the two ranges of RC in the initial event only mean that we should not settle here the issue whether the initial event has just to be accepted as a fact that does not meet the principle of causes (so that this principle would be allowed to be applied only to events that occur «inside» the history of the world), or that a question should be asked here for the basis of being of the initial event, «basis of being» that although transcends entirely a causal relationship, in a different, non-causal terms, it must be considered as basis for the existence of the initial event, and thereby it carries the out-of-the-world, metaphysical relationship of being (Seinsbeziehung) between the existence of the world (then existentially-dependent) and the existence of «the basis for the world», which is primary in terms of existence’⁷. Is any outline of the proof for the existence of God emerging from Ingarden’s reasoning? Ingarden immediately adds that this issue has emerged as the sole consequence of considering in-the-world causal structure, without any additives of metaphysical or theological ‘speculation’. This however does not change the fact that its result can be interpreted just in those terms. Since the assumption concerning the out-of-the-world (divine?) source of event A has emerged from considerations concerning the global causal structure of the world, it is natural to suggest that we are dealing with some kind of cosmological proof for the existence of God. Since the key concept here is the concept of unity, you would like to call it a henological argument – this name however is being used to describe St. Thomas Aquinas’s Fourth Way. But remember that we are still within the field of ontology, which – as understood by Ingarden – does not assume the existence of the world, after all. 6 Concerning creation of autonomous objects on the grounds of Ingarden’s ontology, cf. Piwowarczyk (2009), 59 – 71. 7 Ingarden (1981), 308.

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This argument can therefore be considered as included in the group of reasoning, which, according to Kant’s definition, ‘abstraction is made of all experience, and the existence of a supreme cause is concluded from a priori conceptions alone’⁸, and therefore ontological proofs. Then, bearing in mind the fact that ontology – as defined by Ingarden – is divided into existential, formal and material ontology, while considerations on the causal structure of the world are part of formal ontology, we could define this proof as a formal-ontological. Having made this metaphysical interlude let us now turn to the second pole of the world. Event Q – The End of the World:

E I

C

E

M M

0 0

Of course, the end of the world understood this way is only the end of causal activity of the given world, which may possibly continue to exist, but in the frozen form (following the heat death). Let us now consider whether these poles can meet? Ingarden mentions the issue of ‘the return of worlds’, which was first mentioned by Heraclitus – is it possible ‘that the event, which is «the final» common cause and is an initial element of the whole causal network of the world, is itself the final element of another, previous causal network of the world, so that «prior to» period of development of «our» world different history of the world was stretched’⁹. In this cyclical model of the world (e.g. Stoic) both poles are in fact the same event, what you only need is to enter the indexes to number the next worlds. Let the subscript with α range of M numbers the world, and α represents ‘our’ world. Let us consider now a pole A of the world, i.e. its initial event: if it had come from a previous world, then question marks (in Ingarden’s notation) should be replaced with maximum ranges of effects within the previous (α-1) world.

8 Kant (2010). 9 Ingarden (1981), 309.

100 | Filip Kobiela Fire of the World – Stoics’ ε´ κπ υ´ ρωσις ¹⁰:

E I

C

E

Mα−1 Mα−1

Mα Mα

This kind of event can also be described as a ‘node of the world’, because all causal chains meet (are intertwined) in it. According to Ingarden’s substantialistic concept, an object enduring in time, which is a carrier of this event, would have to be the link between the worlds – the existential basis of the node. Another interesting issue that emerges from considerations on the moderate determinism and poles the world is the question of the uniqueness of events, with at least one maximum range (of the so-called M-events). Ingarden claims that in a consistent, moderately deterministic world, there are only two M-events. Exclusion of other M-events allows him to make – because of the elimination of a large number of cases – the quick progress in the study of the following, individual cases of causal relationships. The fact that events can not occur occasionally on any of the branches of the causal network in the world is an important property of M-events. Justification given by Ingarden (for the maximum range of effects) can be summarized as follows¹¹: Let us consider such M-event lying on one of the causal branches of the world (so this is not a node event). Then, the postulate of the maximum range of its effects is impossible to fulfil because the event resp. the events that are its effects may not together have a maximum range of effects. It results from the assumption that they lie on not the only causal branch, so therefore parallel, on other branches other causal relationships are taking place, with other events-effects, so the effects of our M-event can not exhaust the whole of the set possible effects. Thus, the M-event can not occur occasionally in moderately deterministic world. It seems that this reasoning justifies only the impossibility of occasional interconnection of M-events with a maximum external range of effects (similar theorem can be mutatis mutandis demonstrated in the case of external range of causes). Thus, it neither excludes the maximum internal ranges of effects (resp. causes) of certain events, nor the sequence of M-events near the poles. Ingarden elsewhere, when justifying contradictions of radical determinism, excludes such

10 Of course, the fire of the world is understood here not only as the destruction of the given cycle, but time as a creation of a new, subsequent cycle as well. 11 Ingarden (1981), 320 – 322.

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cases as well, but this is reasoning independent of the above, and in view of certain doubts which it raises¹², it seems appropriate to re-examine all these possibilities. Let us now discuss causal portraits of some objects that are interesting in ontological terms.

3 Causal life of monads and other systems Monads (as understood by Leibniz) have no doors (ontological motif – causal isolation from the rest of the world) and windows (epistemological motif – epistemic isolation from the rest of the world). Total isolation of monads (which, moreover, is rejected by Ingarden as impossible) is expressed in emptiness of external ranges of causes and effects of all events in the life of a monad. Events that fill the history of a monad must therefore be looked for in column II of the table of events. Two extreme events may be exceptions. The birth of a monad:

E I

C

E

XEC 0

0 M

The creation of a monad is the creation of the object enduring in time. In its contemporary time the event discussed takes place as well. It may not have internal causes (of course, when it comes to the interior of a monad), but as an event that initiates all its history it has a maximum range of internal effects. The external cause of the creation of the monad is a similar riddle as the cause of the event A. The birth of the monad – an entirely isolated system – may be compared with the standard conception of the relatively isolated system. Creation of the Relatively Isolated System:

E I

C

E

n 0

n M

12 Błaszczyk (2001), 241 – 242.

102 | Filip Kobiela If you assume that the internal life of monad occurs in (radically) deterministic terms, then all events, carried by a monad, would have the following parameters: Causal Life of a Monad:

E I

C

E

0 M

0 M

Let us now make a list of events that describe a monad with events that affect an atom in terms of Democritus. Life of an atom of Democritus:

E I

C

E

M 0

M 0

What’s interesting, we may see here that an atom in terms of Democritus is a causal inverse of a monad. An empty range of internal causes and effects means that the interior of an object, which is a centre of events we discuss, remains absolutely invariable. For the sake of symmetry, let us now consider the end of life of entirely and relatively isolated systems. Death of a Monad:

E I

C

E

XEC 0

0 0

Once the monad (or any other object) is destructed, as it ends its existence, the external and internal border between events (for it) ceases to exist as well. Therefore, in the context of the interior and exterior of this object, we may legitimately express opinions only about causes of its death. Strictly speaking, the effects of death are no longer either external or internal to this object. As far as they are concerned, the inside/outside distinction therefore loses its original meaning. I believe, however, that it is still reasonable to maintain that effects of death are

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‘external’ for it, but in a modified meaning – in which everything that happens, happens ‘outside’ this object. If, however, this understanding of exterior would arouse controversy, then the simplest way to modify the matrix relating to the death of different objects is to remove in the effects column the line that symbolises the inside/outside border.¹³ External interference that causes death is as puzzling as in the case of the creation of a monad. The internal range of causes may raise some doubts here. External interference that puts an end to the existence of the monad is independent of what is happening inside the monad. However, the monad itself does not exist ‘towards-death’ and therefore the events that occur inside it do not contribute to its destruction. Here’s an event that ends a life of the relatively isolated system. Death of a Relatively Isolated System:

E I

C

E

n n

n 0

The partial range of the internal causes of such event may arouse doubts here. Therefore, it may turn out that three different types of death should be adopted – with the internal zero cause (‘accident’), internal partial cause and the maximum cause (‘terminal illness’). In the context of issues related to entirely and relatively isolated systems, let us now consider a specific half-monad, i.e., a unilaterally fully isolated system that refers beyond itself no causal chain. An object like this can be called a black hole, bearing in mind that we are discussing a certain ontological construct, whose confrontation with the results of exact sciences is a separate issue. Apart from the inner life of black holes conceived this way, there are two types of black holes, depending on which type of events determines their causal characteristic. Causal life of black hole:

E I

C

E

n XIC

0 XIE

13 These remarks apply also to the diagram ‘Event Ω’ (see above), and diagrams displaying ‘Death of a Relatively Isolated System’ and ‘End of the world inside the black hole’ (see below).

104 | Filip Kobiela Unilateral isolation makes that nothing can escape outside such an object – beyond the event horizon (zero range of external effects). At the same time some stories that initially take place outside the black hole, ultimately ends up in its interior (partial range of external causes). Causal life of the black hole that will consume the whole universe:

E I

C

E

M XIC

0 XIE

As opposed to the previous object, the range of external causes here is not partial, but maximum. Ingarden’s event which closes the natural history (Event Ω) may occur right inside such a black hole. Let us note that even after the events from its exterior are exhausted, this does not mean end of the world – this will only occur when the processes that unfolds inside it cease. After all, the processes may last even after the rest of the world is completely consumed. In this case (keeping in mind the reservation relating to differentiating our strictly ontological considerations from cosmology), we may say: End of the world inside the black hole.

E I

C

E

M M

0 0

4 The problem of chance The problem of chance was taken by Ingarden in 1948 in his lecture delivered for Polish Academy of Learning.¹⁴ He focused his considerations around three questions: a) what is a chance? b) under what conditions it may occur? c) are there chance events in the real world indeed?

14 Ingarden (1948), 195–200.

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Questions a and b are of ontological nature, while question c, as concerning facts, is of metaphysical and/or empirical nature. Ingarden takes mainly question a, along with some comments concerning question b. A negative answer to the question c entails subjectivist theories, i.e. indicating the fact that some subjective reasons, especially epistemological ones, create an appearance that a chance occurs. It however does not occur in objective terms. Next with will be focused on objective theories associated with a positive response to the question c. Having outlined the problem Ingarden begins with using his distinctions developed in ontological studies on the form of real objects. He finds that only events may be the ontological ‘place’ for a chance to occur in the real world: ‘When speaking on chance we keep an eye on an event i.e. occurrence of an object or interobject state of affairs that occur at a certain moment within the real world.’¹⁵ Ingarden adds that clarification like this is not common, since references on chance, ‘it is not usually clearly noted that certain events are always concerned.’¹⁶ In relation to the concept of causation based on an analysis of events, which was outlined above, taking up the problem of chance as part of this concept seems quite natural. Ingarden however, apart from the issue of chance related to possible places of indeterminacy of micro-objects (in the context of the uncertainty principle), did not return to this issue in a consistent way in the Volume III of The Controversy... (Ingarden (1981)). Let us now see how useful may be applying typology of events to theories of chance as exemplified by four (out of eight discussed by Ingarden) objectivistic theories of chance. In the first (I) meaning, all that is not necessary is chance; chance is something that exists and at the same time is possible, but is not necessary.¹⁷ This meaning of chance assumes correlative meaning of necessity. Can the relevant concepts of chance and necessity be developed in the context of the causal structure of the world? The simplest proposal would be linking ontological modalities with ranges of causes of events, thereby obtaining causal-ontological modalities. An event necessary in these terms is an event that has a maximum range of causes. This can be interpreted as everything that occurred so far (the whole history of the world), made up its coming into being. Do we have any linguistic intuitions? Let us examine some expressions in this context: ‘all roads lead to Rome’, ‘one way or another/anyway/ in any case’. If all stories taking place in the world lead to occurrence of an event, this event is necessary in the sense that its not-cominginto-being would involve not-coming-into-being of the whole world – because all

15 Ingarden (1948), 195. 16 Ingarden (1948), 195. 17 Ingarden (1948), 196.

106 | Filip Kobiela the stories that make up this world would have to be ‘cancelled’. Therefore this is necessity within the given real world (its causal structure), but not necessarily within the other possible worlds – since their particular shapes would allow nonoccurrence of the event. As we remember, Ingarden considers only one event that features necessity defined this way: ‘pole of the world’ Ω, which was discussed above, as belonging in the sphere of the distinguished moderately deterministic structure (with the domination of events Enn/nn ). If this intuition is correct, the only necessary event in this sense within the real world is, according to the popular belief, the end of the world, while the contents of the world interior is contingent. By denying necessity conceived this way you obtain possibility, i.e. chance in the considered sense, i.e. a partial range of causes of the given event. Such events would not occur in the radically deterministic world at all (built solely out of EMM/MM events), in which everything would be necessary in causal terms. Finally, the zero range of causes would indicate the impossibility of the given event occurrence in the world. In the second (II) objective meaning a chance event is not determined by nothing else at all (the absolute meaning of chance) or is only determined by a special kind of object or fact (the relative meaning of chance). Pure chance (chance in Absolute Terms):

E I

C

E

0 0

XEE XIE

The above-mentioned Ingarden’s principle of causes excludes these types of events from the causal structure of the real world. Now the fifth (V) objective meaning involves occurrence and intersection of different causal chains; it’s a coincidence. Ingarden follows Cournot in defining this type of chance as events that are a combination or a meeting of two events that belong to independent causal chains.¹⁸ Importantly, according to Ingarden, given the certain meaning of independence, all causal events in the real world are coincidental in these terms as a result of the definition of the essence of cause. Now causation involves disturbance of the state of equilibrium, transition to an-

18 Ingarden (1948), 197.

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other state, which occurs due to externally originated disturbance, i.e. in most cases intersection of two (or more) processes. The fifth (V) meaning of chance takes on the specific sense which is important in humanities, especially in history, if one intersecting cause-effect chain involves human activity. Ingarden quotes here P. Souriau’s term, according to which chance is intersection d’une causalité externe et d’une finalité interne. This meaning, along with another, related one, according to which chance involves obtaining the unintended effect of activity, caused by various causes meeting separately, involves the issue of final causation, not analysed by Ingarden. For our purposes eighth (VIII) objective meaning of chance is interesting as well: ‘chance occurs where there is a specific disproportion of causes and effects: relatively minor causes result in significant (major) effect or slight differences among the causes lead to significant differences among the effects’.¹⁹ Cleopatra’s nose recalled by Pascal or a grain of sand in the Cromwell’s urinary duct were objects associated with such phenomena in the context of history; Ingarden writes about the death of Gustaf Adolf at Lutzen: ‘a slight change of bullet’s direction caused the death of an eminent statesman with all the great «moral» consequences’.²⁰ Similar phenomena in the context of the theory of deterministic chaos are usually illustrated by ‘the butterfly effect’. Can these phenomena be modelled in Ingarden’s terms? With only quantitative criterion – the value of range of causes and effects one might suggest to understand ‘minor causes’ as the range of causes which is quantitatively much smaller than the range of effects – ‘a significant effect’. The Butterfly Effect (assuming the free (see below) nature of butterfly’s wings flapping):

E I

C

E

0 0+

−M

0+

Interestingly, the opposite situations – ‘the whole thing amounts to nothing’²¹ (relatively major causes result in insignificant (minor) effect) are normally not considered as a chance events. We are more likely to regard this type of events as unexpected (or occurring against certain expectations) rather than as a chance events. 19 Ingarden (1948), 199. 20 Ingarden (1948), 199. 21 There are more similar expressions, e.g. ‘the mountains have brought forth a mouse’.

108 | Filip Kobiela The Whole Thing Amounts to Nothing:

E I

C

E

0+

0+ 0+

M−

5 Freedom in relatively isolated systems Vol. III of The Controversy...(Ingarden (1981)) is a treatise on the dynamics of substances (as seen from the perspective of events), and freedom is a manifestation of this dynamics; hence the ethical meaning of this work. According to Ingarden, consciousness ‘occurs within the world as its peculiar component and it can not be torn out of the whole network of global causal relationships’.²² The same is true with free will – free decisions are certain events that are also interwoven with the causal networks. The phenomenon of consciousness and freedom must therefore be looked for in the real world – and more specifically in relatively isolated systems.²³ Ingarden is opposing theories where possibility of freedom occurrence in the real world is based on the concept of the chance. The theory of Epicurus is a classic example of this. Epicurean παρ´ε γκλισις (Lucretius’ clinamen):

E I

C

E

0 0

n n

According to this theory, indeterministic, i.e. devoid of causes, deviation from the trajectory (fall) of the atom is interwoven with the sphere of strictly deterministic, Democritean structure; therefore this is an event based on a sudden change of the ongoing process. Having established the basic type of causal events that may commonly ‘populate’ the real world (Enn/nn ), Ingarden sets about examining the possibility of 22 Ingarden (1948), 233. 23 You can clearly see here that Ingarden acts as a fully autonomous (independent from Husserl) thinker.

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including yet more types of events in the event tissue. Apart from a variety of Ingarden’s considerations here I would like to focus on only one type of relationship, of major, according to Ingarden, anthropological meaning. This particularly interesting connection is the causal relationship, in which the IntE10n/nn -type event is the cause, while IntE20n/nn -type as well the E30n/nn -type events are its effects (digit following the E symbol is to number the events). Free Decision of Will According to Ingarden:

E I

C

E

0 n

n n

Such an event is replicated both inside the object and outside it. The case here is a one-sided isolator, which protects the interior of the object from the impact from the outside, but at the same time lets the effects of the IntE10n/nn event out onto the outside of the object. Such events are points of departure for processes, ‘which are in fact causally dependent in their origin (...) but, in precisely this point of departure are independent of any action unfolding outside the given object’.²⁴ If relationships of this type may occur in the world, ‘then the issue of the so-called. «free decisions of will» could be based on a new basis, which would not raise, like a ghost, the danger of invalidating the principle of causes’.²⁵ Ingarden therefore suggests a solution to the problem of free will which does not imply indeterminism (only radical determinism is rejected). Freedom is subject’s independence from external factors. To put it another way: free decisions are ‘one’s own’ decisions (originating from the interior of the system), the opposite of them are ‘alien’, ‘forced’ decisions. But a binary opposition is not the case here (which according to Ingarden prevails in the philosophical tradition), because this freedom can take a variety of levels, depending on the distribution of internal and external circumstances of the given action.²⁶ The most free actions are at the same time the most one’s own actions – ‘emanating from the inside of one’s deepest «self»’.²⁷ Freedom conceived this way is a peculiar autonomy (self-government, sovereignty, self-steering, independence from the environment, etc.), which may take various levels. 24 25 26 27

Ingarden (1981), 408. Ingarden (1981), 409. Ingarden (1987a), 64. Ingarden (1987c), 156.

110 | Filip Kobiela It seems that Ingarden’s optimism associated with the detection of such events is somewhat premature. Although the type of causal relationships invoked here sets the framework for the occurrence of free acts of will, Ingarden’s conceptual apparatus is too sparse to define its peculiarity. After all we can consider a variety of systems where deep inside – thanks to isolation – certain cause and effect chains unfold, which later find a vent outside of the object, but such discharge by its nature does not have to have the character of free will. Ingarden’s discovery of this causal relationship can therefore be handled as outlining only a genus proximum for events that would be the events of a free will. Further clarification of what their differentia specifica is, requires further studies.

6 Conclusion Ingarden’s studies on causation carried out in Volume III of The Controversy... (Ingarden (1981)) are still not fully appreciated, and above all, not fully utilised source of inspiration for further studies of philosophy. Ingarden’s Volume III of The Controversy... (Ingarden (1981)) is the treatise where issues of formal and ontological substantiality and causation are directly interwoven which has important ethical and anthropological implications. Due to the original approach of causation, it allows to see the older issues from the new perspective, and to put forward new issues.

Acknowledgments The original version of this paper was presented at the conference called ‘2nd International Ontological Workshop: Substantiality and Causality’ which took place in February 2013 in Łódź, Poland. I would like to thank all its participants, especially Professor Marek Rosiak, who – together with Professor Mirosław Szatkowski – organised the conference, for their deep remarks which contributed to text improvements.

Bibliography Błaszczyk, P. (2001), “Przyczynowa struktura świata” [“Causal Structure of the World”], in Słownik pojęć filozoficznych Romana Ingardena [A Dictionary of Roman Ingarden’s Philosophy], edited by A. J. Nowak and L. Sosnowski, Kraków: Universitas, 241–242.

The Causal Structure of the World in Ingarden’s Ontology | 111 Czarnik, T. (2003), “Causality and freedom in Roman Ingarden”, in Analecta Husserliana: 79, 603–610. Ingarden, R. (1987a), ”Człowiek i czas” [“Man and Time”], in R. Ingarden: Książeczka o człowieku [Little Book About Man], Sixth Edition, Kraków: WL. Ingarden, R. (1987b), “O odpowiedzialności i jej podstawach ontycznych” [“On Responsibility and its Ontic Foundations”], translated by A. Węgrzecki, in R. Ingarden: Książeczka o człowieku, [Little Book About Man], Kraków: WL. Ingarden, R. (1987c), Spór o istnienie świata. [The Controversy Over the Existence of the World], Vol.I and Vol II, Warszawa: PWN. Ingarden, R. (1981), Spór o istnienie świata. O strukturze przyczynowej świata realnego [The Controversy Over the Existence of the World. On the Causal Structure of the Real World], Vol. III, translated by D. Gierulanka, Warszawa: PWN. Ingarden, R. (1964), Time and Modes of Being, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield Ill. Ingarden, R. (1948), “Zagadnienie przypadku” [“The Problem of Chance”], in Sprawozdania PAU [Reports of PAL], XLIX. Kant, I. (2010), The Critique of Pure Reason, translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, A Penn State Electronic Classics Series Publication. Kobiela, F. (2011), Filozofia czasu Romana Ingardena wobec sporów o zmienność świata [Roman Ingarden’s Philosophy of Time in Comparison to the Controversies Over the Changeability of the World], Kraków: Universitas. Piwowarczyk, M. (2009), “Creatio ex nihilo a samoistność świata” [“Creatio ex nihilo and autonomy of the world”], in Ontologia współczesna. 60 lat Sporu o istnienie świata Romana Ingardena [Contemporary Ontology. 60 Years of Roman Ingarden’s The Controversy Over the Existence of the World], edited by M. Rosiak, ‘Acta Universitatis Lodziensis’, ‘Folia Philosophica’: 22, 59–71. Rosiak, M. (2003), Spór o substancjalizm. Studia z ontologii Ingardena i metafizyki Whiteheada [The Controversy over Substantialism. Studies in the Ontology of Ingarden and the Metaphysics of Whitehead], Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego. Urchs, M. (1994), “On Causality. Ingarden’s analysis vs. Jaśkowski’s logic”, in Logic and Logical Philosophy: 2, 55–68. von Wachter, D. (2010), “Roman Ingarden’s Theory of Causation Revised”, in Polish Journal of Philosophy: 4, 183–196.

Uwe Meixner

The Case for Agent-Causation There is a crack, a crack in everything. That’s how the light gets in. Leonard Cohen

1 Symbols event-causation:  (understood as sufficient or almost sufficient event-causation, that is: causation that consists in the fact that event X is ne-cessarily, or almost necessarily, followed by another event Y). narrow agent-causation: ⇓ (causation that consists in the fact that agent X makes an event Y actual, without there being an event that causes Y).¹ (actual) physical event:  (actual) agent:  X has experience Y: X → Y, or: Y ← X, or: X →→ Y, or: Y ←← X (X, in contrast to Y, is not temporally located; X has Y at the time represented by the tip of the arrow – or by the time that is represented by tip of the second arrow)

2 Conventions If the symbol of an event is further to the left on the page than the symbol of another event, then this is taken to signify that the first event occurs earlier than the second. “X causes Y” is taken to be a synonym of “X is a sufficient or almost sufficient cause of Y”. 1 Concerning the phrase “X causes Y”, see the second convention in Sect. 2 below.

114 | Uwe Meixner The complete lack of -arrows (black, horizontal arrows) pointing to an item signifies lack of being -caused (event-causally caused); but the complete lack of -arrows pointing from an item does not necessarily signify lack of -causing (event-causal causing). The complete lack of ⇓-arrows (white, vertical arrows) pointing to an item signifies lack of being ⇓-caused (agent-causally caused); but the complete lack of ⇓-arrows pointing from an item does not necessarily signify lack of ⇓-causing (agent-causal causing).

3 A picture of the causation of physical events as viewed in 19th-century physics ∞......∞ ∞......∞ ∞......∞ ∞......∞

4 Three alternative pictures of the causation of physical events as viewed in 20th-century physics Picture 1: ... ... ... ...

Picture 2:  ⇓

...

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 ⇓

...  ⇓

...  ⇓

...

Picture 3:  ⇓

... ... ...  ⇓

...

5 Central agent-causal concepts Narrow agent-causation (of a physical event):  ⇓

 Note that narrow agent-causation excludes the “simultaneous” event-causation of the agent-caused event (as is suggested by the picture). Broad agent-causation (of physical events):  ⇓

1 2 3 4

116 | Uwe Meixner Agent-causation (simpliciter) is here identified with broad agent-causation; it can be defined on the basis of narrow agent-causation and event-causation: df

X (simpliciter) agent-causes Y = X narrowly agent-causes Y, or X narrowly agentcauses some event Z and a chain of event-causation runs from Z to Y. If an event Y is agent-caused (as defined) and event-causally traceable to, or identical to, exactly one event Z that is narrowly agent-caused, then the time of the agent-causation of Y is the time of (the occurrence of) Z.

It is assumed that each agent-caused event is event-causally traceable to, or identical to, exactly one narrowly agent-caused event. This is a plausible, yet a contingent assumption: there are unusual possible worlds in which that assumption is not true. But, plausibly, the actual world is not among those possible worlds.

An event that is agent-caused by X is an action of X. An event that is narrowly agent-caused by X is a direct action of X. An event that is agent-caused by X, but not narrowly agent-caused, is an indirect action of X. An event that is agent-caused by X and that after its time of agent-causation is not experienced by X as being willed by X is an implicit action of X. An event that is agent-caused by X and that after its time of agent-causation is experienced by X as being willed² by X is an explicit action of X. Comment: It is obvious that the above-defined concept of action (see, above, the first definition) is a very wide, a very inclusive concept of action. For example, it allows events to be actions of X that are far removed, temporally and spatially, from X, or rather, from the relevant direct action (of X): the event which is the

2 The willing that is experienced with respect to an explicit action has the phenomenology of “imperativeness”; it also has the phenomenology of personal effectiveness. It is utterly different from wishing.

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“original action” that starts an event-causal chain.³ It does seem natural to add further necessary conditions for being an action (for example, the condition that only macroscopic bodily movements – behaviours – of X are actions of X).⁴ I have nothing in principle against replacing the concept of action I propose by a more demanding concept. What I insist on, however, is this: being agent-caused is a necessary condition for being an action. Thus, the above-defined concept of action is the minimal concept of action.

6 A sufficient and agent-causal analysis of an action – of raising one’s arm That is: an analysis that provides a truly sufficient condition for being an action (in the particular case considered), and which is agent-causal in nature. Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein (2009), § 621): Let us not forget this: when ‘I raise my arm’, my arm goes up. And the problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm? ((Are the kinaesthetic sensations my willing?))

There is a perfect solution to Wittgenstein’s problem. But first a preliminary remark: In what follows P is the subject of consciousness and agency of a (let’s assume: female) human being. Phenomenologically speaking, every one of us is the subject of consciousness and agency of a human being – a human being that encompasses that subject but is not identical to it. One cannot identify the subject of consciousness and agency of a human being with the human being in its entirety, since every one of us can truthfully say the following: “My eyes are much closer to me than my feet”. It is to a large extent unproblematic – and common linguistic practice – to ascribe parts and properties of the entire human being analogically also to the human being’s subject of consciousness and agency.

3 What is – relative to a direct action α of an agent – the spatial, temporal, spatiotemporal distance δ such that any event that is further away than δ from α cannot count as an action of that agent, although it be connected to α by an event-causal chain? (Cf. the second illustration in Sect. 10, (a).) 4 This may, in fact, be too strict a requirement.

118 | Uwe Meixner Now, it is often true that someone’s arm goes up. Consider a particular case: the arm of P goes up between t1 and t2 . The going-up of the arm of P between t1 and t2 is a physical event, call it “R”. R is an event that actually happens; it is an actual event (not a merely possible event). (But actuality is not an intrinsic trait of events.) P raises her arm between t1 and t2 if, and only if, R is (not merely an actual event but also) an action of P. In other words (according to the definition of action): P raises her arm between t1 and t2 if, and only if, P agent-causes R (which entails – but is not entailed by – the fact that R is an actual event). In fact, if P is a normal human subject in a normal situation and raises her arm between t1 and t2 , then R is an explicit indirect action of P, in other words: (1) P agent-causes, but does not narrowly agent-cause, R, and (2) P experiences R as being willed by her after the time of the agent-causation of R.

7 Nine insufficient analyses of raising one’s arm It is not (conceptually) sufficient for the fact that R is an action of P (i.e., that P raises her arm between t1 and t2 ) that R (the going up of P’s arm between t1 and t2 ) is an actual event. It is not sufficient for the fact that R is an action of P that R is an actual event and that P experiences R before it happens as being willed by her (i.e., that P experiences that she is – imperatively [cf. footnote 2] – willing R to happen). It is not sufficient for the fact that R is an action of P that P experiences R before it comes about as being willed by her and that this experience event-causes R (via an event-causal chain). It is not sufficient for the fact that R is an action of P that there is a physical event in the brain of P that event-causes R (via an event-causal chain). It is not sufficient for the fact that R is an action of P that there is a physically causeless physical event in the brain of P that event-causes R. It is not sufficient for the fact that R is an action of P that there is a causeless physical event in the brain of P that event-causes R.

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It is not sufficient for the fact that R is an action of P that some event that intrinsically involves P, or is in any other non-causal way related to P, event-causes R. It is not sufficient for the fact that R is an action of P that the combined desires and beliefs of P event-cause R. It is not sufficient for the fact that R is an action of P that R is a rational (mediate or ultimate) goal with respect to the combined desires and beliefs of P and that the combined desires and beliefs of P event-cause R.

8 Deviant causal chains? The agent-causal account of action is not subject to the problem of deviant causal chains, which besets the standard purely event-causal theory of action, forcing its proponents to accept as actions events that, intuitively, one does not want to accept as actions: A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it might be the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it intentionally. (Davidson (1980), 79)

As long as the climber’s loosening his hold is not agent-caused by him, it is not an action of his (not even if it is caused – in a deviant, non-normal way – by the climber’s belief and desire). And Davidson’s scenario indicates that it is precisely the case that the climber does not agent-cause his loosening his hold.

9 Causal responsibility and moral responsibility Let X be an agent and Y a certain event: X is causally responsible for Y iff Y is an action of X [that is: iff Y is agent-caused by X]. X is morally responsible for Y iff X is causally responsible for Y and ... [here further conditions need to be added].

120 | Uwe Meixner Principle of responsibility A person is morally responsible only for those events that she is causally responsible for. Query: But often a person is morally responsible for an event that she is not causally responsible for. For example, for an event that she could have prevented, but did not. Answer: The best reaction to this query is to widen the concept of causal responsibility. Above we have what is in fact only the definition of narrow causal responsibility. A wider concept of causal responsibility – which allows to speak of causal responsibility also in cases where one cannot speak of it so far – can be defined in the following way: X is causally responsible* for Y iff either Y is an action of X, or Y is an actual event without being an action of X, but some event Z which is incompatible with Y would have been an action of X if only X had willed Z. The definiens of this definition is taken to be entailed by the state of affairs that X could have prevented Y, but did not. Replace “causally responsible” in the Principle of responsibility by “causally responsible*”.

10 Illustrations Let me illustrate the value of the concept of agent-causation for action analysis a little bit further: (a) Two “chains of command” (one fairly short, the other somewhat longer):  ⇓

...

 ⇓

...

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(b) Combined “chains of command”:  ←2  ⇓ ... ...

1 ⇓

(c) The agent-causal interpretation of the result of the Libet-experiment: →→ ! ⇓  ...

11 Seven objections to agent-causation answered Objection 1: Each instance of agent-causation must be either a causing of a physical event or of a non-physical event. Since the existence of non-physical events is rather questionable, agent-causation of non-physical events is rather questionable, too. Therefore, agent-causation can be a philosophically interesting option only if at least some physical events are agent-caused. But every physical event is already caused by a physical event. Hence: if one assumes that some physical events are agent-caused, one is making a superfluous assumption. There is, therefore, no good reason to assume the existence of agent-causation. Response to Objection 1: Leaving entirely aside the question of the existence of non-physical events and their causation, it is still very likely true that some physical events are not caused (sufficiently or almost sufficiently) by any physical event. This much is strongly suggested by modern physics. There is, therefore, room for agent-causation; for agents may cause (may make actual) some of the physical events that are not caused by any physical event. Objection 2: If there are in fact some physical events that are not caused – that is, not caused sufficiently or almost sufficiently – by any physical event, then the only reasonable conclusion regarding such events is this: that they – all of them – are not caused by anything at all, in other words: that their coming about is to a significant extent mere chance. Response to Objection 2: Why is this supposed to be the only reasonable conclusion? No sufficient reason for this supposition is apparent. In fact, the very reasonable Principle of Sufficient Cause requires that all physical events that are not caused by any physical event still have some sufficient cause. And even if we may

122 | Uwe Meixner not wish to appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Cause, lest we seem dogmatic, it also seems dogmatic to assert that all physical events that are not caused by any physical event have no sufficient cause. How could one be justified in excluding that at least some of those events have a sufficient cause? Objection 3: But if some physical event that is not caused by any physical event had a sufficient cause, then this would constitute a violation of the Principle of Causal Closure of the Physical World, whether one identifies that principle with the proposition that every sufficient cause of a physical event is itself a physical event, or with the logically weaker proposition that every physical event that has a sufficient cause also has a physical event as sufficient cause. The Principle of Causal Closure of the Physical World, especially its logically weaker version, just cannot be violated. Response to Objection 3: Wouldn’t you agree, on reflection, that this, your last assertion, is a piece of sheer metaphysical dogmatism? Objection 4: Well, not just metaphysics, also physics itself speaks against sufficient causes of physical events that are not caused by any physical event. For if some physical event that is not caused by any physical event had a sufficient cause, then the conservation principles of physics would be violated, because causation must manifest itself in the physical world by a change of energy and momentum. Response to Objection 4: It is true that causation must manifest itself in the physical world by a change of energy and momentum. But if every such change violated the conservation laws, then these laws would be violated all the time, since changes of energy and momentum occur all the time. What is true is this: presupposing that the physical world is a physically closed system – that is, a system exchanging no energy or momentum with an outside –, the conservation laws forbid changes of energy and momentum which are such that they involve an increase or decrease in the sum total of energy, respectively, momentum; the principle of the conservation of momentum also forbids changes of momentum which are such that they involve a modification in the total direction of momentum. But it cannot be established – at least not given today’s physics – that causing a physical event that is not caused by any physical event must involve a modification in the sum total of energy, or of momentum, or a modification in the total direction of momentum. One need not invoke here a physics-compatible causation of physical events by non-physical events; one can do better than this. Causing an event that is not caused by any physical event is best regarded as consisting in the active resolution of a situation of physical indetermination, that is, in choosing and actualizing one of several possible but, on the basis of the laws of physics, incompatible physical

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events, each of which is compatible, on the basis of the laws of physics, with the given physical past. That situations of physical indetermination occur is allowed by present-day physics. And the combination of choosing and actualizing which resolves such a situation of physical indetermination must be regarded as the active work of an agent. This causal work does certainly not hurt the conservation laws, as little as the resolution of a situation of physical indetermination by sheer chance hurts those laws (as is admitted on all sides). Objection 5: If this is what agent-causation consists in – narrow agent-causation, I suppose, according to your conceptual scheme –, then agent-causation does not seem to differ from fixed predetermination or, alternatively, from the workings of chance. Let me explain, along the lines of a thought-experiment which is due to Peter van Inwagen.⁵ Let the situation of physical indetermination recur in exactly the same way an indefinite number of times. If the agent always does the same thing (chooses and actualizes the same physical event), then the agent appears to be predetermined. If, however, the agent does not always do the same thing, then the agent appears to be subject to chance, and subject to chance in the highest degree if the agent actualizes each possibility that is open to her in the (recurring, and recurring) situation of indetermination with the same frequency. How can you assure, as you surely wish to, that the agent is neither subject to predetermination nor to chance? Response to Objection 5: If it is always the same event which is chosen and actualized in each recurrence of the same situation of physical indetermination, then this does not necessarily mean that the agent is somehow predetermined to choose and actualize that event. It may simply mean that rationality always tells the agent that she ought to actualize that particular event, and that the agent always decides to follow this constant advice of rationality. If it is not always the same event which is chosen and actualized in each recurrence of the same situation of physical indetermination, then this does not necessarily mean that the agent is subject to chance. It may simply mean that the agent in one recurrence of the situation decides to follow the constant advice of rationality to actualize a certain event, but in another recurrence decides to be irrational and to choose and actualize quite another event. I concede that, in an analysis of action that is based on agent-causation, there is in the causal explanation of action no going beyond the decision of the agent, that is: no going beyond the agent’s initiating step of causation. In an analysis of action that is based on agent-causation, the causal explanation of action must stop with the agent’s initiating step of causation. But

5 Van Inwagen (2002), 175–177.

124 | Uwe Meixner this, in itself, does certainly not make the agent subject to chance. The agent is not subject to chance in her decision if, in her decision, instead of throwing dice she is following the advice of rationality (which, properly speaking, is her own advice: the advice that she is giving herself from the rational point of view). In turn, the agent’s following the advice of rationality is, in itself, certainly not an instance of predetermination: rationality – since it is essentially normative, yielding, at best, only ought to and ought not to (relative to the agent’s beliefs and desires) – is not a sort of prolongation of event-causal determination. Objection 6: In order to be relevant for the physical world, agent-causation requires situations of physical indetermination. But while such situations may perhaps occur in the physical micro-world, they certainly do not occur in the human sphere. Agent-causation, therefore, is irrelevant for the analysis of physical human action. Response to Objection 6: Suppose you were right and situations of physical indetermination did not occur in the human sphere. Then, indeed, agent-causation would be irrelevant for the analysis of physical human action – for the simple reason that there would be no physical human actions. There would be plenty of human outward behaviour, of course, but no physical human actions. No part of the physical history of the world would be made by us; the parts of that history in which we are involved would be made merely through us, with our assent or without, and very likely we would not even have a choice regarding assenting or not assenting to what is going on physically. You assert it as a certainty that there are no situations of physical indetermination in the human sphere. I do not believe that this is a certainty; I believe it is far from a certainty. But I am ready to admit: perhaps there are indeed no situations of physical indetermination in the human sphere. If this turns out to be true, then, I submit, philosophers should quit playing around with words; then they should have the intellectual honesty to admit that there are no human physical actions and that therefore nobody is truly responsible for anything in the physical world. Objection 7: Well, that seems a bit panicky. Let’s not panic here. I, in any case, won’t panic. Though my entire physical behaviour is executed by a deterministic automaton, as I firmly believe, parts of that behaviour are actions of mine, for which I am indeed truly, truly responsible. I could not be more truly responsible for them: because they agree with what I consider, after careful deliberation, to be my most important goals and needs; because they agree with my essence, so to speak. I am free, see. I could not be any freer. – But be that as it may, returning to agent-causation, I would finally like to point out that agent-causation is a completely obscure idea. I have no idea what you mean when you say that an agent

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causes a physical event without an event causing it, in other words, when you allegedly refer to an instance of narrow agent-causation, as you call it. Response to Objection 7: The heart of causation is that the cause makes a possible event actual. Concepts of causation must at least come near to this idea. If a concept called “causation of this or that type” does not come near to that idea, then that concept has nothing to do with causation conceptually, but pays mere lip service to it. Having considered the various concepts of event-causation, I do not believe that any extant concept of event-causation comes nearer to the making actual of possible events than narrow agent-causation does. If you are telling me that you do not understand narrow agent-causation, you are in effect telling me that you do not understand the making actual of possible events. But then, how can you understand any proper concept of causation, any concept of causation that does not pay mere lip service to causation? I concede that in narrow agentcausation we are confronted with just the agent-causal relation, and that there is nothing that fits between the agent-cause and its effect. Event-causation does not have this kind of immediacy: it is founded on laws and mechanisms, and usually in event-causation, an event-causal chain fits in between cause and effect. All of this creates the illusion that event-causation is better understood than narrow agent-causation. But in fact, to the extent that event-causation really deserves the name “causation”, it is no better understood than narrow agent-causation.

12 Agent-causation and freedom of the will In his influential book Das Handwerk der Freiheit, the Swiss philosopher Peter Bieri writes that the freedom of the will consists in the will being determined in a rather specific way: by our thinking and judging.⁶ Many philosophers find this definition of the freedom of the will entirely satisfactory, and all the more so because it is compatible with determinism. I do not believe that Bieri’s idea of the freedom of the will is correct. Would my will be still free if, indeed, it were sometimes determined by my thinking and judging, but my thinking and judging, in turn, were always determined by causes that have nothing to do with my thinking and judging? Contrary to what Bieri and other compatibilist philosophers are satisfied to believe, I do not think that my will would be free under the condition just envisaged. But I concede that that condition comprises all that my rationality

6 Bieri (2001), 80: “Die Freiheit des Willens liegt darin, dass er auf ganz bestimmte Weise bedingt ist: durch unser Denken und Urteilen”.

126 | Uwe Meixner could at most amount to if human beings were in fact deterministic automata, as many brain-scientists believe and do not hesitate to proclaim with the full weight of their presumed scientific authority. A fortiori, that condition comprises all that my rationality could at most amount to if determinism ruled the world. If I am a deterministic automaton, which under determinism I must be, then my rationality could at most amount to this: though my thinking and judging are always determined by causes that have nothing to do with my thinking and judging, my will is sometimes determined by my thinking and judging. – Well, great. Am I then truly rational, even free? I do not think so. How, in the world, could my will, if it is ultimately determined by external factors that have nothing to do with my thinking or judging, be truly rational or free? But perhaps human beings are not deterministic automata. There is room for reasonable doubt. And if human beings are not deterministic automata, then there is room for agent-causation, and room for free will, properly speaking. Specifically, an indirect explicit physical action Y of mine, event-causally traceable to a direct implicit physical action Z of mine, is certain to be an act of my free will if all of the following conditions are fulfilled: (i) no agent other than me causes Z; (ii) my causing of Z is not somehow determined, and it resolves a situation of physical indetermination; (iii) Y is rationally intended by me at least from the time shortly before my agentcausing Y (= the time of my agent-causing Z) to the time shortly after my coming to experience that Y is willed by me, and (iv) Y would not have happened without Z having happened.

13 The way from freely willed behaviour to agent-causation 1. 2.

An arm rises: the event Y takes place, and the subject of the human being whose (right) arm rose, P, declares that she freely raised her arm. Suppose she is right. Then, either Y has an event-cause (2.1), or Y has no eventcause (2.2).

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3.

I opt for 2.1. Then, either there is a complete and stopping chain of eventcauses⁷ for Y (3.1), or there is none (3.2). 4. I opt for 3.1. Then, either there is a complete and stopping chain of eventcauses for Y which is such that the first event of it is temporally close to Y and located in the brain of P (4.1), or there is no such chain (4.2). 5. I opt for 4.1. Then, either there is exactly one complete and stopping chain of event-causes for Y which is such as described in 4. (5.1), or there is not exactly one such chain (5.2). 6. I opt for 5.1. Then, let Φ be the complete and stopping chain of event-causes for Y which is such that the first element of it, 1(Φ), is temporally close to Y and located in the brain of P; either there is a sufficient cause of 1(Φ) (6.1), or there is none (6.2). 7. I opt for 6.1. Then, either there is exactly one sufficient cause of 1(Φ) (7.1), or there is not exactly one such cause of 1(Φ) (7.2). 8. I opt for 7.1. Then, either the sufficient cause of 1(Φ) is P (8.1), or not (8.2). 9. I opt for 8.1.

Bibliography Bieri, P. (2001), Das Handwerk der Freiheit, München: Hanser. Davidson, D. (1980), “Freedom to Act”, in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 63–81. Van Inwagen, P. (2002), “Free Will Remain a Mystery”, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by R. Kane, Oxford: OUP, 158–177. Wittgenstein, L. (2009), Philosophical Investigations, the German text with an English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte, revised 4th edition by P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte, Oxford: Blackwell.

7 A chain of event-causes for Y is complete if, and only if, it can neither be prolonged nor filled up. A chain of event-causes for Y is stopping if, and only if, it has a first element.

Jeff Mitscherling

Consciousness, Intentionality, and Causality 1 The problem(s) Over the past hundred years, an ever-increasing number of physicists and cosmologists have been exclaiming ever more urgently that our view of the universe as exclusively materialist and strictly mechanistic is woefully inadequate. This view, it is claimed – a view that was conceived in the late Renaissance and continued to be further articulated over the following centuries – proves entirely incapable of accommodating the results of twentieth-century research in physics and cosmology. This complaint continues to be voiced – it’s now being heard from researchers in biology, psychology, and the neurosciences as well¹ – and it’s being directed at philosophy. The general query seems to be, “Why haven’t our philosophers provided us with that conceptual analysis and clarification they claim to be able to supply? And why have they so dogmatically refused to abandon their theoretical allegiance to a materialistic, mechanistic worldview that has been proven to be obsolete?” As Henry P. Stapp, the well-known physicist (now a member of the Scientific Staff at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory at U.C. Berkeley), wrote in 2007: Influential philosophers, pretending to speak for science, claim, on the basis of a grotesquely inadequate old scientific theory, that the (empirically manifest) influence of our conscious efforts upon our bodily actions, which constitutes both the rational and the intuitive basis of our functioning in this world, is an illusion. As a consequence of this widely disseminated misinformation the ‘well-informed’ officials, administrators, legislators, judges, and educators who actually guide the development of our society tend to direct the structure of our lives in ways predicated on false premises about ‘nature and nature’s laws’.²

Stapp does appear to have a point: In refusing to abandon this “grotes-quely inadequate old scientific theory”, we philosophers have failed to supply our colleagues in the sciences with precisely that clarification of concepts and critical analysis of hypotheses which it is our job to provide. And as a result of this failure on our part, we now find even our most prestigious colleagues in the sciences

1 See, for example, Kelly (Kelly). 2 Stapp (2007), 87.

130 | Jeff Mitscherling seeking for philosophical foundations in what we should be warning them are very questionable quarters. For example, turning away from “the misrepresentations of contemporary scientific knowledge that continue to hold sway, particularly in the minds of our most highly educated and influential thinkers”,³ Stapp asserts that The conflating of Nature herself with the impoverished mechanical conception of it invented by scientists during the seventeenth century has derailed the philosophies of science and of mind for more than three centuries, by effectively eliminating the causal link between the psychological and physical aspects of nature that contemporary physics restores. But the now-falsified classical conception of the world still exerts a blinding effect.⁴

Stapp posits what he calls a “framework of practical rules” in order to account for human behaviour, and he maintains that We need to be able to see this pragmatic anthropocentric theory as a useful distillation from an underlying non-anthropocentric ontological structure that places the evolution of our conscious species within the broader context of the structure of nature herself. We need a fundamentally non-anthropocentric ontology within which the anthropocentric pragmatic theory is naturally embedded.⁵

Stapp finds this theory in the process philosophy of Whitehead, and he has attempted to ground his application of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics to neuropsychology in what he calls a “Whiteheadian Quantum Ontology”. He concludes that “Contemporary physical theory allows, and its orthodox von Neumann form entails, an interactive dualism that is fully in accord with all the laws of physics”.⁶ It remains unclear, however, how the process philosophy of Whitehead, who so vehemently rejected Cartesian interactionism, may be employed consistently in establishing the legitimacy of such an “interactive dualism”.⁷ 3 Stapp (2007), viii (I think he’s referring to us philosophers here). 4 Stapp (2007), 2. 5 Stapp (2007), 85–86. 6 Stapp (2007), 81; the emphasis is Stapp’s. 7 A more subtle reading of Whitehead that might develop his thought as a form of “immanent dualism” might do the trick, but that’s not at all what Stapp has suggested. He doubtless finds Whitehead’s rejection of “scientific materialism” attractive. As Whitehead writes in Whitehead (1926), 22: There persists [a] fixed scientific cosmology which presupposes the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute matter, or material, spread through space in a flux of configurations. In itself such a material is senseless, valueless, purposeless. It just does what it does do, following a

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We find a second example in Sir John Eccles, the Australian neurophysiologist who won the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine in 1963 (sharing it with Alan Lloyd Hodgkin and Andrew Huxley). In his Eccles (1989), after 235 pages of discussing recent decades of research in neurophysiology, Eccles offers a twopage concluding section entitled “The creation of the self or the soul”, in which he writes: Problems relating to the experienced uniqueness of each self are neglected in contemporary philosophy. Presumably this arises from the pervasive materialism, which is blind to the fundamental problems arising in spiritual experience. ... It is not in doubt that each human person recognizes its own uniqueness, and this is accepted as the basis of social life and law. When we enquire into the grounds for this belief, modern neuroscience eliminates an explanation in terms of the body. There remain two possible alternatives – the brain and the Psyche. Materialists must subscribe to the former, but dualist-interactionists have to regard the Self or World 2 as being the entity with the experienced uniqueness.⁸

Since materialist solutions fail to account for our experienced uniqueness, I am constrained to attribute the uniqueness of the Self or Soul to a supernatural spiritual creation. To give the explanation in theological terms: each Soul is a new Divine creation which is implanted into the growing foetus at some time between conception and birth. It is the certainty of the inner core of unique individuality that necessitates the ‘Divine creation’. I submit that no other explanation is tenable; neither the genetic uniqueness with its fantastically impossible lottery, nor the environmental differentiations which do not determine one’s uniqueness, but merely modify it.⁹

fixed routine imposed by external relations which do not spring from the nature of its being. It is this assumption that I call ‘scientific materialism’. Also it is an assumption which I shall challenge as being entirely unsuited to the scientific situation at which we have now arrived. 8 Eccles, Eccles (1989), 236. The reference to “World 2” indicates the extent to which Eccles remained committed to some version of the Popperian three-world theory. Twelve years before he wrote the present book, Sir John [1903–1997] had co-authored with Sir Karl Popper [1902–1994] The Self and Its Brain (Eccles and Popper (1977)). 9 Eccles (1989), 237. Regarding the “fantastically impossible lottery” of genetic uniqueness, see p. 236: If one’s experienced uniqueness derives directly from the uniqueness of one’s brain, we have to enquire into the levels of uniqueness of human brains. It could not be the uniqueness of all the infinity of detailed connectivities of the 10,000 million cells of the human cerebral cortex. Such connectivities are constantly changing in plasticity and degeneration. The most usual materialist statement is that the experienced uniqueness derives from the genetic unique-

132 | Jeff Mitscherling While Eccles’s radical dualism may turn out to be the only metaphysically viable option, this metaphysical/theological position is regarded with suspicion by most contemporary philosophers, including those of us who reject the materialistic, mechanistic view of the universe. So we now find ourselves in a difficult situation indeed: We face not only the problem of how the mind relates to the body, and/or how consciousness relates to the world, but also the problem posed on the one hand by scientists who think that they’ve solved this problem by taking recourse to philosophy that philosophers themselves find dubious, and on the other hand by philosophers who think that they’ve solved this problem by relying on science that the scientists themselves find “grotesquely inadequate”. Pace Stapp, I don’t believe that contemporary physics, even when buttressed by Whitehead, restores “the causal link between the psychological and physical aspects of nature” – it may establish the possibility in principle of such a link, and it may even point to something like such a link, but it certainly doesn’t “restore” or explain it. For that we have to turn to philosophy, as in fact both Stapp and Eccles explicitly acknowledge. Stapp mentions in this regard the inevitable failure of Daniel Dennett’s 1991 book, Consciousness Explained (Dennett (1991)), to fulfill its promise, and he quotes Francis Crick and Christof Koch’s suggestion that “Radically new concepts may be needed” to deal with the question of how the mind and the brain are related.¹⁰ The extremely interesting discussions of quantum theory that Stapp offers throughout his book certainly underscore this need, and he has placed the task clearly before us. Crick and Koch’s call for “radically new concepts”, however, may seem to Stapp and others to be more desperate than it in fact is, for these may already be at hand. As it happens, the realist phenomenology that developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century already provides us with an invaluable arsenal of such “new concepts” that have remained largely neglected for the past hundred years, and not just a few of these concepts were fashioned to deal with precisely those problems that have recently become of interest to researchers in mainstream cognitive science.¹¹ The concept of intentionality is probably the most conspicuous

ness. No attempt is made to examine critically the implications of this statement. In the first place, in line with arguments by Jennings (Jennings (1930)), Eccles (Eccles (1970), Eccles (1979)), and Thorpe (Thorpe (1966) and Thorpe (1978)), the unique genome that is alleged to be the basis of the experienced uniqueness is the consequence of an infinitely improbable genetic lottery (even 1015,000 against) on the conservative estimate of 50, 000 human genes. 10 These references to Dennett, Crick and Koch, and Chalmers are found in Stapp (2007), 3–4. 11 This early period of phenomenological research is only now coming to be fully explored, and critical studies of the works of these phenomenologists are finally beginning to appear. For a brief

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and familiar of these. In what follows I’ll suggest a manner in which to rethink this concept, along with that of formal causality, along realist phenomenological lines that may be able to deliver us from the dead end of dualism. This new approach to the concept of intentionality and causality might also provide a common ground for scientists in search of a philosophy and philosophers in search of a science. As Barry Smith observes with regard to the often quoted “intentionality passage” from Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint: The thesis here formulated has proved to be one of the most influential in all of contemporary philosophy. It gave rise to Husserlian phenomenology, but it also lies at the root of much of the thinking of analytic philosophers on meaning and reference and on the relations of language and mind. In addition, the notion of intentionality, and Brentano’s use of this notion as a criterion for the demarcation of the psychological realm, pervades much contemporary philosophizing within the realm of cognitive science.¹²

Given its centrality, it is curious that the concept of intentionality has remained insufficiently analyzed. To be sure, there have been countless articles and books published on consciousness and intentionality, but all of the authors assume without question that intentionality is something possessed solely by the mind or consciousness, or exclusively characterizing mental acts or operations of consciousness. Pierre Jacob, for example, opens his entry on ‘Intentionality’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy with the sentence: “Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs”.¹³

overview of the period and the literature, see Baltzer-Jaray and Mitscherling (2012), Baltzer-Jaray (2012), Rollinger (1999) and Smith (1994). 12 Smith (1994), 35. The passage referred to Brentano is found at Brentano (1924), 124 and Brentano (1973), 88. 13 See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ (revised 31 August 2012; accessed 1 January 2013). See also David Woodruff Smith, ‘Phenomenology’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/ (accessed 1 January 2013): Phenomenology is the study of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object. An experience is directed toward an object by virtue of its content meaning (which represents the object) together with appropriate enabling conditions.

134 | Jeff Mitscherling In this paper I challenge that assumption by proposing what I have elsewhere referred to as a “new Copernican hypothesis” for phenomenology.¹⁴ This hypothesis reverses the traditional order of the intentionality thesis of phenomenology, i.e., that all consciousness is intentional (that is, directed toward an object). I suggest, rather, that intentionality gives rise to consciousness. My discussion of this hypothesis draws heavily from its origin in the Aristotelian philosophy, focusing especially on the concepts of formal causality and the Aristotelian model of cognition. I demonstrate how the relation between the cognizing subject and the cognized object – that is, the relation between consciousness and the world – may be analyzed as an intentional structure originating in large part in the object and proceeding by way of formal causality. I conclude with a further elaboration of the view of intentionality and consciousness that I am suggesting.

2 Intentionality I came to formulate this “new Copernican hypothesis” as a result of the examination of the scholastic origin of Brentano’s concept of intentionality. Further investigation of the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century sources led me to conclude that Brentano’s own conception of intentionality was quite different from that of his medieval predecessors, and in fact not nearly as metaphysically rich and provocative. Tracing these discussions to their own origin in the works of still earlier Aristotelian commentators (e.g. Boethius, Porphyry) and finally to the Aristotelian writings themselves, I became absolutely convinced that Brentano passed on to us a conception of intentionality that was not only impoverished, but impoverished chiefly by its exclusion of the intentional character of the natural world that lies beyond the sphere of the human mind and what we’ve come to call “consciousness.” For the scholastic thinkers to whom Brentano claimed to be indebted for this concept, the concept of intentionality played a central role in the discussion of the manner in which the entities designated by logical terms actually functioned in both logical discourse and the world. This discussion gave rise to the theory of “second intentions”. As I explain in Aesthetic Genesis, this theory was elaborated differently by different authors in the thirteenth century, so we in fact have numerous “doctrines” of second intentions. Sometimes, as in Aquinas (who wrote not of second intentions, but simply of “intentions”), these intentions are concepts that represent other concepts. According to other authors,

14 Mitscherling (2010), 5.

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however, the second intentions are concepts that represent extramental entities, and sometimes, particularly, extramental entities as related to other entities (both mental and extramental).¹⁵ No one was able to figure out how the representational function of our concepts was ultimately determined. How is it that our logical terms mean what they do? How is it that they function to represent, designate or indicate a given entity or relation? The famous medieval “controversy over universals” revolves around a related question: Do the concepts or entities represented by our general logical terms actually exist, or do they exist only as conceptualized (i.e., as mental entities), or are these logical terms merely words? This question was intimated, probably around 270 CE, by Porphyry in a notorious passage of his Introduction (Isagoge) to Aristotle’s Categories that he wrote for his student Chrysaorius: I shall make for you a concise review of this traditional teaching as befits an introduction and try to recount what our predecessors said. I shall avoid the deeper issues and in a few words try to explain the simpler notions. For example, I shall put aside the investigation of certain profound questions concerning genera and species, since such an undertaking requires more detailed examination: (1) whether genera or species exist in themselves or reside in mere concepts alone; (2) whether, if they exist, they are corporeal or incorporeal; and (3) whether they exist apart or in sense objects and in dependence on them. Instead, I shall try to make clear to you how in logic the ancients, and especially the Peripatetics, dealt with genus, difference, and the rest.¹⁶

Concentrating on the logical interpretation of Categories, then, Porphyry set aside examination of questions arising from the metaphysical interpretation, but it was precisely these questions that the scholastics revived (after the “rediscovery” of the Aristotelian corpus in the late eleventh century) and which entered into their analysis of intentionality. In insisting that the objects of mental phenomena – that is, the “intentional objects” – are themselves immanent to the consciousness of the cognizing subject, Brentano was clearly taking an interpretive stance with regard to both the problem of universals and the doctrine of second intentions. And in doing so he bequeathed to subsequent psychologists – and to phenomenologists, to philosophers of mind and, now, to cognitive scientists – a one-sided concept of intentionality that has misdirected research into the nature of consciousness for over a century. Proceeding on the basis of Brentano’s view of the intentionality of consciousness, and employing the standard modern conception of the universe as exclu-

15 Mitscherling (2010), 49. 16 Porphyry (1975).

136 | Jeff Mitscherling sively material and mechanistic in nature, we have now constructed a model of the mind and its relation to that “external world” that proves incapable of even accommodating, let alone accounting for, the possibility of human freedom and deliberate, purposeful action. In short, this model of mind and its relation to the world is incapable of explaining how we can be the causes of our own actions. In assuming that intentionality is something possessed solely by the mind or consciousness, or exclusively characterizing mental acts or operations of consciousness, current researchers in cognitive science also commit themselves to the view that consciousness is to be radically distinguished from the world. This radical distinction between the mind and the world remains a fundamental tenet of modern philosophy and science, even though it has been discounted by the last century of research in physics. The distinction is also to be found quite commonly in phenomenological research, at least to the extent that consciousness is located exclusively in the experiencing subject. Ingarden challenged Husserl on this point, suggesting that the distinction between the real world and pure consciousness be called into question.¹⁷ As I’ve pointed out elsewhere,¹⁸ in extending the epoch¯e this far, the position that Ingarden came to adopt regarding this distinction in Controversy over the Existence of the World has a distinctively Aristotelian character. However, Ingarden explicitly stated that it was not his intention to offer an “historical interpretation of Aristotelian ontology”,¹⁹ and it would be totally misleading to say that his own ontology is constructed on the model of the Aristotelian. If we take a few elements from that Aristotelian account and add them to Ingarden’s incomplete “considerations” [Erwägungen], we can, however, construct a general picture of the sort of causality that obtains in the relation of consciousness to both the body and the world.

17 Ingarden (1964), 15: “Als Folge dieser Sachlage wird vorerst die Scheidung zwischen der realen Welt und dem reinen Bewußtsein ... in Frage gestellt.” 18 Mitscherling (2010a). 19 Ingarden (1965), II/1, 3: Es ist zu hoffen, daß sich diese verschiedenen Begriffe bei Aristoteles – obwohl in einem nicht deutlich abgegrenzten Zustande – werden finden lassen. Wir beabsichtigen aber hier, keine historischen Interpretation der aristotelischen Ontologie zu geben. Die Anknüpfung an Aristoteles dient uns hier lediglich als ein bequemes Hilfsmittel zur Einführung in unsere eigenen Erwägungen.

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3 Formal causality in cognition For the Aristotelian, the world as a whole – or physis, ‘nature’ – does not consist essentially of inert, lifeless ‘matter’. The word physis derives from the verb phu¯o, which means ‘to grow’, and the Aristotelian did indeed view the world as a living, growing, constantly evolving organism. The individual human being was an integral part of this organism, and human behaviour, including cognitive behaviour, was analyzed as an organic process. The organism, however, was more than merely ‘matter’: For the Aristotelian, matter is always combined with form; neither exists without the other. So the human being, and nature as a whole, “possesses” necessarily both matter and form; in other words, nature and the human being are both materially and formally. Accordingly, the behaviour of nature and of any of its constituent parts allows itself to be described with regard to either its matter or its form, but neither of these accounts alone will be sufficient to explain the behaviour of the organism as a whole. Indeed, a truly complete account may well have to include consideration of more than just the matter and the form – it may have also to consider the agent that initiated the behaviour, as well as the goal toward which it was directed or its inherently purposive character. We are speaking now of the Aristotelian doctrine of causality, or of the material, formal, efficient, and final causes. There’s no need to examine this entire doctrine in detail here, but we do have to describe the Aristotelian account of how formal causality operates in cognition, for this supplies us with an essential piece of our solution to the problem of how mind and brain interact, and how consciousness is related to the world. The Aristotelian account of cognition has received a good deal of attention in the recent literature in philosophy of mind and cognitive science – one suspects because the researchers recognize that something extremely important is being said in that account. But reference to this account invariably proves unsatisfying due to the extremely puzzling nature of some of the central passages of the Aristotelian text, and these have particularly to do with form and matter. The most notorious of these doubtless have to do with the identity of the cognizing subject and the cognized object, which is discussed, for example, in the opening paragraph of the last chapter (12) of Book II of De Anima (424a17–24): Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter [ ], in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold; what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but not qua bronze or gold: in a similar way the sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding

138 | Jeff Mitscherling not insofar as each is what it is, but insofar as it is of such and such a sort and according to its form [ ].²⁰

The last several decades of interpretation and critical commentary on the Aristotelian assertion of this identity of the subject and the object of cognition is filled with tortured and sometimes downright bizarre attempts to render this claim comprehensible in terms of the materialism that currently remains fashionable in mainstream philosophy of mind. But in fact no such hermeneutic contortions are called for. What’s needed is simply familiarity with the metaphysical context of this claim, along with the willingness to interpret that Aristotelian passage faithfully, without any desire to interpret it in such a way as to lend the Stagirite’s support to whatever position one may be attempting to promote. I believe the most faithful of his recent commentators has been Joseph Owens, who in 1991 published a superb little essay, entitled “Aristotle and Aquinas on Cognition”,²¹ in which he succinctly describes the Aristotelian view: With the basis of reasoning located firmly in the thing that is other than the cognitive act, Aristotle is able to offer his explanation of what knowing or perceiving a thing means. It means that the percipient or knower becomes and is that thing in the actuality of the cognition. This is not a case of having a thing in a material way. In material possession the possessor remains distinct from the thing he has, in the way you possess a house or a car. On the other hand, cognition means thoroughgoing identity with the thing insofar as it is perceived or known. Aristotle repeats this assertion of identity of knower and known too often to leave any doubt about its important role. To know a thing is to be it in a distinctive way of being.

This Aristotelian position regarding cognition, and more generally the relation of consciousness to the world, is consistently misunderstood and misrepresented in the modern and contemporary secondary literature, even in the quite recent scholarship on De Anima.²² The key to understanding this position is, again, to understand cognition as the enactment of a specific type of causality – namely, formal causality. For the Aristotelian, in the act of cognition the cognizing subject takes on the form ‘without the matter’ of the object of cognition; that is to say, the cognizing subject becomes identical with the object with respect to their form. The form of the activity of the cognizing on the part of the subject is one and the same

20 Aristotle (1984), 674. 21 Owens (1991), 113–114. 22 The interpretations suggested over the past thirty-five or so years should be contrasted to the account I offer here. See, for example, Sorabji (1974); Bynum (1987); Burnyeat (1992); Andriopoulos (1993); Everson (1997); Burnyeat (2002); and Bolton (2005).

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as the form of the activity of the being on the part of the object. These statements are not metaphorical: In cognition, the subject does indeed become the object in so far as the form of the subject’s act of cognition is the same as the form of the object’s act of being. Yet the central term here employed – i.e. ‘form’ – is indeed employed as metaphor: It is employed metaphorically to designate the complex structural integrity belonging to both the subject and the object of cognition, an integrity that we can only very simplistically describe by speaking of cognition as embodying the form of logical judgment consisting of discrete acts of predication, and by speaking of the being of a particular object as ‘possessing’ attributes and embodying the form of the species to which we say it ‘belongs’. The word for form, , is in fact the ontological equivalent of the logical and linguistic term , which is most properly translated as ‘reason’, ‘account’, ‘explanation’, or ‘definition’, but which is sometimes translated as ‘form’ – as it is in the last line of the passage from De Anima quoted just above. This metaphorical sense of the ‘form’ of cognition may also be approached through analysis of the Hegelian concepts of mediation and immediacy and the functional sense of ‘conceptuality’ itself. Like Kant before him, Hegel too argued forcefully against the possibility of intellectual intuition. Whereas Kant, however, had found the fault to lie in the sensible nature of all intuition itself, Hegel located the problem in the immediacy that would have to characterize intellectual intuition. Jacobi, for example, maintained that the subject ‘knew’ the object – for example, God – in this intuitive, unmediated manner, while remaining epistemologically and ontologically distinct from the object. But Hegel maintained that such a distinction cannot be preserved, for the absence of mediation can only establish the identity of subject and object. Hegel denies such immediacy in cognition, and he thereby denies intellectual intuition – but he does not deny the identity of subject and object. This identity, however, is achieved, according to Hegel, in the movement of the Absolute, a movement that consists in the mediation of the subject and the object through the ope-ration of the Idea qua concept. Hegel is here adopting and adapting the terms ‘idea’ and ‘concept’ as they are employed by Kant, who maintained that the ‘ideas of reason’ perform a regulative function, while the concepts of understanding operate as constitutive. For both Kant and Hegel, concepts are ‘rules of cognition’: concepts are, that is, rules in accordance with which the subject and the predicate(s) are related in the act(s) of cognition of an object – for example, the table with its brownness, its six-footedness, its threefoot highness, and so on. A single, discrete act of cognition, for Kant and Hegel, always embodies the logical structure of the categorical proposition, and a concept is a rule that guides the understanding in its combination of predicate with

140 | Jeff Mitscherling subject.²³ The ‘idea’, on the other hand, for both Kant and Hegel, continues to perform a regulative, not a constitutive, task. That is, the idea does not constitute the judgment (or cognition) regarding the object being ‘judged’ (or cognized); it does not, like the concept, tell the understanding how to combine the subject with its predicate(s) in such a way as to constitute the object. The idea ‘merely’ provides the motivation that leads reason to attempt to make further sense of these discrete acts of cognition. The idea, in other words, operates at a ‘higher’ level to coordinate these discrete operations of cognition. This higher level operation of reason is sometimes referred to as ‘reflection’. In his third Critique, Kant speaks at length of this operation of reflective judgment, which the imagination performs in pursuit of the achievement of the goals or ideals that such ideas of reason provide. We might summarize this entire discussion of the form of cognition by simply describing how the terms ‘form’ and ‘concept’ both designate the structurally identical operation of the combination of subject with predicate, the former operating ontologically, ‘in the world’, and the latter operating logically (or cognitively, and mutatis mutandis linguistically), ‘in consciousness’.²⁴ Until very recently, the complexity of the ‘structural integrity’ I’m speaking of was typically overlooked in our analyses of cognition in psychology and the philosophy of mind. The cognitive sciences that have so quickly developed over the past thirty or so years have now become quite sophisticated, but even now, with so much consideration being given both to the staggering insights afforded by the neurosciences and to the fruitful new perspective granted by the acknowledgement of the ‘embodiment’ of cognition, we still fail to appreciate the extent of the complexity of this activity. And we fail to do so because we fail to acknowledge a truth that the Aristotelians could presuppose, and that Hegel attempted systematically to articulate for modern philosophy – the truth, namely, that we are organisms, and that neither the nature and functioning of our consciousness nor the relation of our conscious-

23 In fact, Hegel explicitly points to the etymological sense of the German word Begriff, which reveals its essentially metaphorical sense. It’s derived from the verb begreifen, which is built off the verb greifen, which means to grasp physically, or to physically take hold of or hold together. The Begriff, by metaphorical extension, is thus the rule in accordance which consciousness ‘holds together’ the subject with the predicate. 24 Organisms may be said to ‘embody’ forms at many different levels, but such embodiment will always take the form of habit. The most basic, essential habits will obtain, ‘as a rule’, in every healthy member of a species – e.g., horses will habitually gallop, and birds will habitually fly (although some breeds of horse may find it difficult even to walk at a brisk pace, and it’s unwise to throw a turkey out of a helicopter). At the other extreme we can locate what we might call the most ‘accidental’ habits, i.e., particular behavioural tendencies idiosyncratically acquired by individuals – e.g., some people will bite their fingernails, and others will whistle while they work.

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ness to the ‘external world’ can be explained in purely mechanical terms. We are speaking here not of mechanical or intellectual operations – or even of the activity of ‘embodied minds’ – but of the natural behaviour of organisms. The subjects and predicates being ‘grasped’ in discrete acts of cognition are in fact ‘parts’ that function as organs comprising the organic unity of a living whole; the ‘form’ of that thing is the manner in which these parts are ‘organized’ in one whole. The crucial point now to be stressed is that both the form and the concept – the two sides of the same ‘structuring’ coin, so to speak – operate not merely in ‘material entities’ on the one hand and in ‘minds’ on the other, but also, and always, in organisms.

4 Consciousness and the world I have claimed above that the ontological structure of an object – i.e. its ‘form’ – is identical with the logical structure of the cognition of that object – i.e. its ‘concept’, which operates as the ‘rule’ in accordance with which the act of cognition proceeds as the combination of subject with predicate, and which act we (subsequently) express linguistically as what we commonly speak of as the ‘concept’ of this or the ‘concept’ of that. I understand that my description of ‘an act of cognition’ as the act of the formulation of categorical propositions is painfully simplistic, but I hope I can be granted this simplification for the sake of the general picture that I’m drawing of the sort of relation that obtains between consciousness and the world. Many philosophers, and by no means phenomenologists alone, have attempted to describe this relation with reference to the intentionality of consciousness, as I mentioned in my earlier discussion of Brentano and current descriptions of phenomenology. And although both Brentano and Husserl failed, I believe, to do justice to the medieval account of intentionality, they did both emphasize a feature of that account that provides us with an essential insight into the nature of cognition. Husserl actually elaborated this insight in more detail than Brentano in his analysis of what he regarded as a central task performed by the intentionality of consciousness – namely, the task of objectivation. As I want now to explain it, this objectivation is the cognitive counterpart of predication, which is the logical counterpart of the ontological configuration of parts in an organic whole. As this objectivation proceeds in accordance, ultimately, with the organic structure of the object of cognition itself, the doctrine of formal causality as I have introduced it above might now be called into service in the construction of a new model of the relation between consciousness and the world, a relation that consists in the ongoing operation of formal causality.

142 | Jeff Mitscherling In The Phenomenological Movement, Herbert Spiegelberg offers a clear (if not unproblematic) description of the concept of objectivation: (1) Intention “objectivates”: This means that it refers the data which are integral parts of the stream of consciousness (reell) to the “intentional objects”. These intentional objects are given normally only through such data, mostly characterized as sense-data (Empfindungen) and later by the name of hyletic data. It is the function of the intention to “interpret” these data, i.e. to relate them to an object which is itself not part of the act, but “transcendent” to it. Thus Husserl, in this respect not unlike Brentano, sees in intentional reference by no means a simple relationship, but a complex structure in which data are used as raw materials, as it were, and integrated into the total object which forms the pole of all these references. Identity of this object is compatible with various ways of referring to it, such as perception, thought, doubt (which Husserl called the “qualities” of the intention, as opposed to its “matter”).²⁵

I argue that Husserl was incorrect in identifying objectivation as an operation performed by the intentionality of the cognizing subject’s consciousness. I maintain, rather, that this objectivation operates as a process of formal causality, and that this operation of objectivation, proceeding in accordance with the (formal) structure of the cognized object, informs the structure of the intentional act of the cognizing subject. This is simply another way of reformulating what I called above the “new Copernican hypothesis for phenomenology”. My concern in this paper clearly cannot be to elaborate a full theory of consciousness. I want merely to demonstrate how many of the problems encountered by current theories of the relation between consciousness and the world, or mind and reality, appear in an entirely different light when we simply reverse the currently received view of the relation between consciousness and intentionality. And such a ‘reversal’ is by no means unreasonable – indeed, it is only a deeply rooted assumption of a radical distinction and separation between our minds and the world around us that speaks against considering this reversal. Despite his insistence that suspending all such prejudicial assumptions must be the starting point for all phenomenological research, Husserl himself failed to challenge this assumption of an essential and radical dissimilarity between mind and

25 Spiegelberg (1984), 98. The paragraph immediately following adds: The whole idea of intentional consciousness as an objectivation of raw materials implies and presupposes a view of perception as well as of other acts, which is by no means uncontested. It should be added that it is far from generally accepted among phenomenologists. Certainly it is in need of careful re-examination and re-evaluation. The present paper is intended, in part, to offer precisely such a “re-examination and reevaluation”.

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world. His failure to challenge this assumed distinction clearly played a major role in Husserl’s conception of the theoretical foundation of phenomenology, which demands that we assume the unique, distinctive nature of transcendental consciousness. As Tymieniecka observed over fifty years ago, describing the circularity of the theoretical foundation of Husserlian phenomenology: On Husserl’s theory we have to assume the specific nature of the transcendental consciousness in order to conduct the phenomenological reductions leading to the attainment of the level of self-evident cognition, while it is precisely first through the proper practice of the phenomenological reductions that the transcendental consciousness can be revealed in its nature. Every critical-theoretical foundation – as opposed to a spontaneous insight of genius – concludes Ingarden, is necessarily moving in a circle. It seems particularly difficult to break out of this circle in Husserl’s case. For it is precisely the notion of the exclusively intentional character of all conscious acts that is instrumental in the theoretical establishment of the phenomenological method and, at the same time, it is this notion which results in a conception of consciousness as a self-sufficient, closed sphere “which receives nothing and from which nothing can escape”.²⁶

Recalling the remark I made above concerning the “Aristotelian character” of his Controversy over the Existence of the World, it comes as no surprise that Ingarden did not hesitate to challenge this assumption of a radical dissimilarity between mind and world. If we refuse to assume this dissimilarity and proceed instead by granting the possibility that essential similarities and perhaps even some kind of identity might obtain between consciousness and reality, mind and world, then the reversal of the relation between consciousness and intentionality I have suggested suddenly appears not only reasonable but necessary. Why, after all, should the human mind be so privileged over all of nature? This sort of privilege was called into question repeatedly over the course of the twentieth century. Logical Positivism provides an obvious instance of such a challenge, as do most of the attempts to naturalize epistemology that became popular following Quine’s publication, in 1969, of his influential paper, “Epistemology Naturalized”.²⁷ It is imperative that we note that both of these movements were committed not only to the view that the natural sciences provide us with a methodological model for attaining certainty, but also to certain metaphysical assumptions which they believed themselves to share with the sciences, the most basic of which was what Jaegwon Kim has referred to as “universal physical reductionism (what the early emergentists called ‘mechanism’)”, which he describes as “the view that all things and phenomena are physical, and are explainable and

26 Tymieniecka (1959), 2–3. 27 Quine (1969).

144 | Jeff Mitscherling predictable ultimately in terms of fundamental physical laws”.²⁸ It is precisely this commitment to physicalism and mechanism that scientists such as Stapp and Eccles have found most dissatisfying in recent philosophy. “The idea of emergence”, Kim writes, “which goes back to the 19th century, saw its first flourishing in the early 20th century in the works of British emergentists”, but its popularity and influence were cut short in the middle of the century by analytic philosophy, which “was dominated by logical positivists and hyper-empiricists”.²⁹ But emergentism returned stronger than ever immediately after that period; as Kim further observes: “It is no undue exaggeration to say that we have been under the reign of emergentism since the early 1970s”.³⁰ As emergentism generally rejects reductive materialism, or “physicalist reductionism”, it might at first seem as if some variety of emergentism would prove attractive to a scientist in search of a non-materialist philosophy. Yet this is unlikely to be the case, for the concepts employed in the formulation of emergentist views remain essentially the same as those employed in the construction of materialist (and dualist) views, and the same problems, mutatis mutandis, remain. Let us consider this statement of the emergentist position recently offered by Galen Strawson: Experiential phenomena are emergent phenomena. Consciousness properties, experience properties, are emergent properties of wholly and utterly non-conscious, non-experiential phenomena. Physical stuff in itself, in its basic nature, is indeed a wholly non-conscious, non-experiential phenomenon. Nevertheless when parts of it combine in certain ways, experiential phenomena ‘emerge’. Ultimates in themselves are wholly non-conscious, nonexperiential phenomena. Nevertheless, when they combine in certain ways, experiential phenomena ‘emerge’.³¹

Although Strawson argues against emergentism, and he might therefore be expected to characterize the position unfavourably, his brief statement of the position is accurate and fair. His own position is a ‘realistic monism’, or ‘physicalism’, which he formulates as a version of panpsychism, and which he regards as the only viable alternative to materialism, dualism, and emergentism. According to Strawson, materialism is untenable because it denies the reality of our experience and consciousness; dualism is untenable because it posits a gap between mind and body that can never be bridged; and emergentism is untenable because, quite simply, “S phenomena ... can’t be emergent properties of non-S phe-

28 Kim (2010), 27. 29 Kim (2010), 1. 30 Kim (2010), 10. 31 Strawson (2006), 12.

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nomena”³² – that is, “experiential phenomena cannot be emergent from wholly non-experiential phenomena”.³³ The phenomenon of experience/consciousness, then, must already be present in the material, or “physical”, substance from which emergentism supposes it to emerge. In short: Assuming, then, that there is a plurality of physical ultimates, some of them at least must be intrinsically experiential, intrinsically experience-involving. Otherwise we’re back at brutality, magic passage across the experiential/non-experiential divide, something that, ex hypothesi, not even God can understand, something for which there is no reason at all as a matter of ultimate metaphysical fact, something that is, therefore, objectively a matter of pure chance every time it occurs, although it is at the same time perfectly lawlike.³⁴

Numerous problems with this position have been pointed out by Strawson’s critics, and we need not rehearse them all here.³⁵ There are two problems, however, that we should consider: First, Strawson claims that at least “some of” the physical ultimates must be intrinsically experiential. This implies that some of these ultimates may not be intrinsically experiential, and with this implication we have returned to the very “experiential/non-experiential divide” of dualism that Strawson wants to reject. And second, to claim that “physical ultimates” – presumably “atoms” of some sort – are “experiential,” or conscious, broadens the sense of the term “experience” so far as to render it meaningless. Does it really make any sense to say that a physical atom might consciously experience the world in any way similar to a human being? Strawson’s thinking remains bound to the same conceptual restraints as materialism, dualism, and emergentism, restraints that are exhibited in a pair of assumptions shared by all of these positions regarding the nature of consciousness –namely: (1) that consciousness is either magical or mundane, either something that’s seemingly supernatural or something that’s not really anything special at all, the importance of which has been vastly overrated; and (2) that the possession of consciousness is like an on/off switch: either you have it or you don’t. I call attention to my use of the word “have” in that last sentence. All of the possibilities we have just considered regard consciousness as possessed by nothing (materialism), possessed by everything (realistic monism), or possessed by one

32 Strawson (2006), 17. 33 Strawson (2006), 24. 34 Strawson (2006), 24–25. 35 See Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism? (cf., Strawson (2006)), which contains replies by seventeen authors.

146 | Jeff Mitscherling thing but not another (dualism, emergentism). But in the end, none of these four possibilities is tenable. I have suggested a fifth possibility, which we may formulate using familiar concepts drawn from the Aristotelian lexicon and the realist phenomenological response to Husserlian idealism. My suggestion, again, is that we reverse the relation between consciousness and intentionality as it is currently conceived: When we locate intentionality not in some magical organ called ‘human consciousness’ but in the world that we inhabit, it takes no great leap of imagination to recognize that what we have been calling consciousness is an entirely natural feature of the human organism, and that other organisms share to varying degrees this very same feature. The basic insight of emergentism in this regard remains sound: Consciousness does seem like a ‘property’ that rises up magically out of – and floats above and reflects upon – brute material existence. But this is mere appearance. The reality is that the ‘stuff’ of consciousness, i.e. intentionality, permeates all of nature: Intentionality is the thread of the fabric of the world. Here we can recognize also that panpsychism catches a glimpse of this truth – it is not, however, consciousness per se that belongs to what Strawson has called the “physical ultimates”, but intentionality, the ‘stuff’ of which consciousness is made. In Aesthetic Genesis I have described this concept of intentionality at considerable length, and I will hopefully be forgiven for quoting the following passage from that work: The material body is the center of the various intentional relations engaged in by the organism, and consciousness arises out of these intentional relations. As the complexity of these relations increases, so does the “level” of consciousness. The natural intentionality that gives rise to consciousness seems always to be relational. The concept of intentionality that I am suggesting may be helpfully understood with regard to the etymology of the word. Our English term is derived from the Latin tendere, which is derived in turn from the Greek (tein¯o). The basic meaning of the Latin and Greek terms is “to stretch, extend”, and this meaning is preserved in the English terms, “extend”, “tend”. This is also the basic sense of “intend” as I use the term, To intend is, quite simply, to tend towards, or away, or with. The verb indicates an activity of “directionally” relating. This tells us something not only about intention, but also about relation: All relations are actual instances of intention, and all instances of intention are relations, either potentially or actually.³⁶ Again, as I have been maintaining above, it is misleading to say that consciousness is always intentional. Consciousness doesn’t really “intend” at all. The word “intention” as we commonly employ it has a futural, purposive or anticipatory connotation, but the act that is consciousness is always now. Consciousness consists in the relation, the tension, between entities, so we might better say that consciousness is always “tending” to this or that. Out of the living structure of organic intention, consciousness emerges.

36 Intentions can be frustrated; they may be constrained to mere potentiality still “in search of” actualization, and they may be actively thwarted.

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On this view, neither consciousness nor intentionality is unique to humans. The behaviour of dogs, cats, insects, plants, and even single-celled organisms must be described as intentional. But does this indicate consciousness, or mere sentience? It seems that a rather high degree of bodily complexity (many tendings, or tensions) is a condition for the emergence of what we recognize as consciousness. But there must certainly be a spectrum, or graduated scale, here, so it would perhaps be more precise to regard and locate what we call consciousness as at the “higher” end of the spectrum of complexity of sentience. It might seem odd to say that a paramecium is “conscious”, or that the behaviour of a slug or an African Violet is “intentional”, but this language usage is entirely in keeping with the concepts of intentionality and consciousness that I am here suggesting.³⁷ The view of consciousness here presented captures what I believe to be the most valuable features of both emergentism and panpsychism while avoiding their most obvious logical and metaphysical shortcomings. Serious questions about my own view have still to be answered – for example: Does this view of consciousness preserve the phenomenological sense of ‘lived experience’? If intentionality is ‘reduced’ to tendency, and tendency is described in material terms, will consciousness not then be explicable as some kind of strictly material relation? I remain optimistic that such questions as these can be answered without altering this view of consciousness to any significant extent,³⁸ but this is not the place to pursue this inquiry. To conclude, I hope it has become clear how the “new Copernican hypothesis for phenomenology” leads us to a radically new manner in which to conceive both of the nature of human cognition and of the relation of consciousness to the world. This new conception of cognition and the mind/world relation entails the rehabilitation of a similarly revised and rehabilitated concept of formal causality, which in turn entails the rejection of exclusively materialist and mechanistic accounts of the mind and the universe. The further elaboration of the metaphysics that will comprehend these new conceptions remains a much larger work in progress.

37 Mitscherling (2010), 50–51. 38 For example, answering the first question will require further explication of the concepts of nature and organism, and answering the second question will demand an analysis of the metaphysics of relations and relationality. I have already provided some provisional analyses of these matters in Mitscherling (2010).

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Bibliography Andriopoulos, D. Z. (1993), Aristotle on Perception, in Philosophical Inquiry: International Quarterly: 15, 85–98. Aristotle (1984), The Complete Works of Aristotle, translated by J. A. Smith; edited by J. Barnes, Princeton: Princeton University Press, vol. I. Baltzer-Jaray, K. (ed.) (2012), “Selected Papers on the Early Phenomenology of Munich and Göttingen”, in Quaestiones Disputatae: A Journal of Philosophical Inquiry and Discussion from Franciscan University of Steubenville: 3. Baltzer-Jaray, K. and Mitscherling, J. (2012), “The Phenomenological Spring: Husserl and the Göttingen Circle”, in Symposium: 16, 1–19. Bolton, R. (2005), “Perception Naturalized in Aristotle’s ‘De Anima’ ”, in Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji, edited by R. Salles. London: Oxford University Press. Brentano, F. (1924), Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, edited – with introduction and notes – by O. Kraus, Leipzig: Meiner. Brentano, F. (1973), Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, edited by L. L. McAlister, London: Routledge. Burnyeat, M. F. (1992), “Is An Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible (a draft)?”, in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, edited by M. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Burnyeat, M. F. (2002), “De Anima II 5”, in Phronesis: A Journal of Ancient Philosophy: 47(1), 28–90. Bynum, T. W. (1987), “A New Look at Aristotle’s Theory of Perception”, in History of Philosophy Quarterly: 4, 163–178. Dennett, D. (1991), Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown & Co.. Eccles, J. C. (1970), Facing Reality: Philosophical Adventures by a Brain Scientist, New York: Springer–Verlag. Eccles, J. C. (1979), The Human Mystery, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer. Eccles, J. C. (1989), Evolution of the Brain: Creation of the Self , London: Routledge. Eccles J. and Popper, K. (1977), The Self and Its Brain, Berlin: Springer. Everson, S. (1997), Aristotle on Perception, London: Oxford University Press. Greek – English Lexicon (1940), H. G. Liddell’s and R. Scott’s Greek – English Lexicon, Oxford: Clarendon Press, [9th ed.]. Ingarden, R. (1964), Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, Vol. I, Existentialontologie, Tübingen: Niemeyer. Ingarden, R. (1965), Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, Vol. II/1, Formalontologie, Teil 1, Tübingen: Niemeyer. Jennings, H. S. (1930), The Biological Basis of Human Nature, New York: W. W. Norton. Kelly, E. F., Kelly, E. W., Crabtree, A., Gauld, A., Grosso, M. and Greyson, B. (2007), Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Kim, J. (2010), “Making Sense of Emergence“, in Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind, edited by J. Kim, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 8–40. Mitscherling, J. (2010), Aesthetic Genesis. The Origin of Consciousness in the Intentional Being of Nature, Lanham, MD: University Press of America [Rowman and Littlefield].

Consciousness, Intentionality, and Causality | 149 Mitscherling, J. (2010a), “Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Distinction between Consciousness and the Real World in Husserl and Ingarden”, in Polish Journal of Philosophy: 4, 137–156. Owens, J. (1991), “Aristotle and Aquinas on Cognition”, in Aristotle and His Medieval Interpreters, Calgary: The University of Calgary Press, 103–123. Porphyry (1975), Porphyry the Phoenician, Isagoge, translated by E. W. Warren, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Quine, W. V. O. (1969), “Epistemology Naturalized”, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, edited by W. V. O. Quine, New York: Columbia University Press, 69–90. Rollinger, R. (1999), Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano, Dordrecht: Kluwer. Smith, B. (1994), Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court. Sorabji, R.(1974), “Body and Soul in Aristotle”, in Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy: 49, 63–89. Spiegelberg, H. (1984), The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, [3rd edition], The Hague: Martinus Nijoff. Stapp, H. P. (2007), Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics and the Participating Observer, Berlin / Heidelberg /New York: Springer. Strawson, G. (2006), “Realistic Monism. Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism”, in Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?, edited by A. Freeman, Exeter: Imprint Academic, 3–31. Thorpe, W. H. (1966), “Ethology and Consciousness“, in Brain and Conscious Experience, edited by J. C. Eccles, New York: Springer–Verlag, 470–505. Thorpe, W. H. (1978), Purpose in a World of Chance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tymieniecka, A. T. (1959), “Editorial: The Second Phenomenology”, in For Roman Ingarden: Nine Essays in Phenomenology, edited by A. T. Tymieniecka. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1–5. Whitehead, A. N. (1926), Science and the Modern World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leszek Wroński

The Common Cause Principle as a special case of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 1 Introduction Informal principles are typically easier to justify and defend than formal ones. This is mostly because in such cases the notion of counterexample is fuzzy at best. However, once a previously informal principle receives a more rigorous formulation, the prospects of conclusively disproving it look brighter. If the informal version met with a contentious “informal counterexample”, we could now hope to arrive at a rigorous proof of its falsity. It would seem to be unreasonable to predict the opposite: that a contentious informal principle will upon a rigorous reformulation reach the status of a theorem. In this paper I will argue that this is precisely what happened with the well-known “Common Cause Principle”. I believe the case to be interesting even if persuasive arguments can be made to the conclusion that the principle lost some philosophical content in the process. What is the “Common Cause Principle”, then? In one of its most basic and informal shapes, it states that any surprising correlation between two factors which do not directly influence one another is due to their (possibly hidden) common cause. It is not difficult to find examples of similar reasoning throughout the history of philosophy; one needs to look no further than the mind-body problem. There is a truly surprising correlation between our thoughts of the “I want to wave my hand” sort and the movements of our hands of the waving sort. A venerable solution (proposed e.g. by Malebranche) to this quandary is that of invoking God as the common cause. Similar causal intuitions can arguably be found in Mill’s System of Logic. It follows from his “fifth Canon of Induction” that a concomitant variation in two phenomena of which none is a cause of the other is a sign of a connection between the two by “some fact of causation”. Mill refers to the case in which this fact is the phenomena being two effects of a common cause (Vol. I, Book III, Chapter VIII of Mill (1868)). Bertrand Russell describes a similar phenomenon when he writes of “identity of structure” leading to “the assumption of a common causal origin” (Russell (2009), 409). Soon, though – around the time of birth of a philosophical field called “probabilistic causality” – the idea gained on at least partially rigor-

152 | Leszek Wroński ous, mathematical formulation, in the form of a general principle introduced by Hans Reichenbach in his posthumously published book The Direction of Time. The central notion in Reichenbach’s formulation is that of screening off: two correlated events are screened off by a third event if conditioning on the third event makes them probabilistically independent. It is this formulation and its variants that we will be mostly concerned with. We will see how apparent counterexamples fail to disprove the most refined reformulation of Reichenbach’s principle and how a mathematical theorem can be proposed to show its universal validity.

2 Reichenbach’s formulation and its variants The literature on various formulations of the Principle is big and filled with technical concepts. Throughout this short article we will keep the formal machinery down to a minimum, suppressing many definitions. The Reader may find all the required information in Wroński (2010). One bit of notation: “A⊥ ” means “the complement of A”. We can set aside the informal phrasing of the Principle as “Informal PCC” and put it here for future reference: PCC1, Informal PCC: Suppose there is a correlation between two events, which are not directly causally related. Then there exists a common cause of the correlated events. What was Reichenbach’s formulation, though? Before we state it, it has to be said that even though it mentions probability, Reichenbach did not use the now standard Kolmogorovian approach to probability spaces, using his own, original system instead. In fact his formulation uses expressions like “P(A)” with no definition of “P” whatsoever. Since we believe no harm is done to the content of the principle, we will eventually state it in the modern parlance. PCC2, Reichenbach’s PCC: (The Direction of Time, p. 163) For any correlated events A, B there exists their common cause C such that P(AB | C)

=

P(A | C)P(B | C);

P(AB | C )

=

P(A | C⊥ )P(B | C⊥ );

P(A | C)

>

P(A | C ⊥ );

P(B | C)

>

P(B | C ⊥ ).

⊥

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This formulation seems to be missing a few important features. First, it is evident from the context of the whole book that Reichenbach would not want to claim the existence of a common cause in the case in which A is a cause of B or vice versa. Second, we do not know what P is; modern readers would like to have at least an assumption that a probability space is given. Third, it is not clear whether the probabilistic conditions are to serve as a definition of a common cause. The quoted formulation all by itself seems to imply that it is not so; that among the common causes of the two correlated events there should simply be one satisfying the four conditions. In the wider context of Reichenbach’s book it seems that the reading of the four conditions as constituting a definition of a common cause for two correlated events should not be ruled out. It is, in fact, a route taken by many researchers, and we will also pursue it here¹. In order to improve on Reichenbach’s formulation in these three respects, we can strive towards a fully rigorous statement of the principle. To fix the second problem, we simply assume a probability space is given. To fix the first one, we assume the two correlated events belong to a certain independence relation. A good set-theoretically maximal candidate (from which in particular cases we can remove some pairs of events given our knowledge of the causal structure of the particular situation) is the relation of logical independence L ind ; two events are logically independent if the occurrence or non-occurrence of one implies neither the occurrence or non-occurrence of the other. To resolve the third issue, we will dispense with the expression “common cause” in the formulation; however, for the result to count as a formulation of the Common Cause Principle, we repeat that we follow the frequently taken route of taking the four probabilistic conditions as defining a common cause in the Reichenbachian sense². The outcome is the following formulation: PCC3, Reichenbach’s PCC, mathematical: Let Ω, F, P be a probability space. For any A, B ∈ F (such that A, B belongs to a relation of independence L ind ), if P(AB) > P(A)P(B), then there exists an event C ∈ F (different from both A and B)

1 Noting just that it is entirely evident that something needs to be added should we aim for such a “definition” to properly explicate the meaning of a philosophical concept from the realm of causality; for starters – barring some controversial backward-causation phenomena – C should arguably occur no later than any of its two effects. 2 In a more extensive treatment of these issues it would be prudent to use a different term, e.g. “Statistical Common Cause”. We have chosen this route in Wroński (2010).

154 | Leszek Wroński such that P(AB | C)

=

P(A | C)P(B | C);

P(AB | C )

=

P(A | C⊥ )P(B | C⊥ );

P(A | C)

>

P(A | C ⊥ );

P(B | C)

>

P(B | C ⊥ ).

⊥

The first two conditions are called “screening off”, the latter two “statistical relevance”. PCC3 enjoys the benefit of formal rigor; unfortunately, it suffers from the disadvantage of being false. It is extremely easy to find a probability space which provides a counterexample. Any finite probability space whose algebra of events does not have exactly 5 atoms and whose measure is not uniform contains two logically independent, correlated events³ for which no event satisfying the four Reichenbachian conditions exists. There have been a few variations on Reichenbach’s ideas in the literature. One of them replaces the binary “yes”/“no” events with the so called “common cause systems”, more akin to random variables. It is worth noting that this move by itself does not suffice to save the (properly modified) version of PCC3: there still are probability spaces serving as counterexamples. A different direction, however, will be of greater importance to us. Its crucial notion is that of “extension of a probability space” and the guiding idea is that there are numerous probability spaces compatible with some given empirical data. Suppose an experiment is conducted and data regarding the occurrence and nonoccurrence of some events on different runs of the experiment are gathered. Suppose there is a probability space P which is empirically adequate with regard to the experiment, that is, all events we care about during the experiment are represented in the probability space and the measure of the space assigns to their representation a probability consistent with the outcomes of the experiment and our background theory. Suppose, then, that P contains two correlated, logically independent events but does not contain any event satisfying the conditions of screening off and statistical relevance with respect to them. That is, P is a counterexample to PCC3. Is that it? Is this the end of story and we should conclude that the Common Cause Principle does not hold? Not so fast! We might not be taking all relevant variables into consideration. It is at least a priori possible that there is a factor which plays the role of a com-

3 To be precise: the event algebra needs to have at least 4 atoms. But we may consider “smaller” spaces as uninteresting.

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mon cause, but which has so far not been an element of our description of the experiment. We can therefore consider a “bigger” probability space P′ , which contains all the events from P, but also in addition new event(s) corresponding to that previously unconsidered factor. It might very well happen that in P′ events corresponding to the “new” factor satisfy Reichenbach’s requirements; that is, they meet the conditions of screening off and statistical relevance with respect to the correlated events in question. It is also a priori possible that this procedure of “patching up” the initial probability space may end in total success, that is, a probability space which contains common causes for all the initially unexplained correlations. This rough outline is explicated in PCC4. We need to define extension of probability spaces: Definition 2.1. Let P = Ω, F, P be a probability space. A space P′ = Ω′ , F′ , P′  is called an extension of P if there is a Boolean algebra embedding h : F → F′ which preserves the measure, that is, ∀A ∈ F, P′ (h(A)) = P(A). Armed with this notion, we can now state PCC4: PCC 4, Extendability: Let A = Ω, F, P be a probability space. Suppose that there is a family R ⊂ F 2 of pairs of correlated and logically independent events, such that for any pair A, B ∈ R there exists no C ∈ F (different from both A and B) such that P(AB | C)

=

P(A | C)P(B | C);

P(AB | C )

=

P(A | C⊥ )P(B | C⊥ );

P(A | C)

>

P(A | C ⊥ );

P(B | C)

>

P(B | C⊥ ).

⊥

Then there exists a space A′ = Ω′ , F′ , P′  such that A′ is an extension of A by means of a homomorphism h and for any pair A, B ∈ R there exists an event C′ ∈ F′ such that P′ (h(A)h(B) | C′ )

=

P′ (h(A) | C′ )P′ (h(B) | C′ );

P′ (h(A)h(B) | C ⊥ )

=

P′ (h(A) | C ⊥ )P′ (h(B) | C ⊥ );

P′ (h(A) | C′ )

>

P′ (h(A) | C ⊥ );

P′ (h(B) | C′ )

>

P′ (h(B) | C ⊥ ).

′

′

′

′

′

That is, all unexplained correlations from P are explained in P′ by means of events satisfying the Reichenbachian requirements on common causes. PCC4, like PCC3, is a fully rigorous mathematical statement, concerning the existence of mathematical objects. And unlike in the case of PCC3, it turns out

156 | Leszek Wroński that it is a theorem! It is indeed the case that given any probability space with unexplained correlations between logically independent events there exists a more “fine-grained” space which contains Reichenbach-style common causes for these correlations. What’s more, it is always possible to extend the initial space so that the target space contains no correlations unexplained in this sense⁴. What this means, at least if we consider PCC4 as a new reformulation of the Common Cause Principle, is that there is no possible counterexample to the Common Cause Principle. Suppose one tries to refute the Principle by presenting a situation which involves an unexplained correlation between causally (and logically) independent events. We now know there always is a more fine-grained description of the same situation which contains common causes (in the Reichenbachian sense) of all the correlations involved. The Principle thus holds with no exceptions. What about the apparent counterexamples to the Principle frequently discussed in the literature? We will briefly consider the most prominent of these in the next section. Let us just point to the fact that the explanatory informativeness and universal validity of the Principle has to be taken with some reservations. We now know there will always be a Reichenbach-style common cause C for a given surprising correlation. But do we have any guarantee that the C will be truly explanatory? Not at all. Some can respond to this that God, or other supremely knowledgeable being, may know that C features in a plan of which we are totally oblivious, and which clearly spells out the relationship of C and the “surprisingly” correlated events. Others may more carefully claim that the lack of explanatory value of C may be due to our current lack of knowledge. To all this others could respond, though, that all the above-mentioned theorems show is that we can always “cook up” a bogus hidden variable with potentially no explanatory value at all. It is not evident who would have the upper hand in this discussion. E.g. to the last point one can indirectly respond by pointing out that the Principle is basically a working assumption in the field of Causal Bayesian Networks⁵. Let us, however, examine one case which should cast doubt on the level of informativeness of the

4 A simple proof of this fact is given in Wroński (2010). A crucial result for proving this was obtained in Gyenis and Rédei (2004). A different proof is given by Gyenis and Rédei (2011). Variants of the result are investigated in Marczyk and Wroński (2013). 5 Reichenbach’s Principle is a consequence of the Causal Markov Condition, a basic assumption in that field.

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universally valid Principle⁶. It is the first of the apparent counterexamples discussed in the next section, concerning conservation principles.

3 Apparent counterexamples 3.1 Arguments from conservation principles The literature of the subject contains numerous supposed counterexamples to the Common Cause Principle, in which it is the case that some correlation arises due to some conservation principle and no explanation by a screening-off factor can be provided. Here is a formulation from Arntzenius (1992):⁷ Suppose that a particle decays into 2 parts, that conservation of total momentum obtains, and that it is not determined by the prior state of the particle what the momentum of each part will be after the decay. By conservation, the momentum of one part will be determined by the momentum of the other part. By indeterminism, the prior state of the particle will not determine what the momenta of each part will be after the decay. Thus there is no prior screener off. (Arntzenius (1992), p. 227-8.)

If we truly want to invoke PCC4 in response to this, we would have to first introduce a probability space describing the decay event, and then flatly claim that despite everything our “more fine grained” probability space will contain an explanation of the correlation by means of a screening-off factor. Could such a factor have anything to do with what we would naturally accept as a common cause of the properties of the two particles? It is debatable at best. There is a better way to respond to this problem, though. The most important thing is that in such cases the correlation does not seem to need any explanation besides the reference to the conservation principle in play! In fact, given the conservation principle, the fact that one part of the particle has a certain momentum logically implies that the other particle has precisely the momentum it has. Neither PCC3 nor PCC4 will then even “fire” in response to such a correlation. Therefore we do not have here a counterexample to the Principle. We are not troubled by such correlations by reasons similar to due to which we are not puzzled by the

6 For the Hegelians among us, it would seem the situation was to be expected: the more universal the Principle, the less content it should have... 7 It is labeled “Indeterministic Decay with Conservation of Momentum” and attributed to Van Fraassen (1980).

158 | Leszek Wroński anti-correlation between “heads up” and “face down” when repeatedly tossing a coin.

3.2 The “sea levels vs. bread prices” arguments In the previous subsection we were dealing with not ultimately surprising correlations. What about “cosmic coincidences” arising by pure chances? And since “coincidence” is not the right word in this context, what about correlations arising for no reason whatsoever? Perhaps the most influential form of this type of “counterexample” appeared first in Sober (1988) and was elaborated upon in Sober (2001). In a nutshell: not all correlations between events such that one is not a cause of the other demand a common causal explanation. By reductio: otherwise a correlation between Venetian sea levels and British bread prices would demand such an explanation, while it surely does not. In detail: Consider the fact that the sea level in Venice and the cost of bread in Britain have both been on the rise in the past two centuries. Both, let us suppose, have monotonically increased. Imagine that we put this data in the form of a chronological list; for each date, we list the Venetian sea level and the going price of British bread. Because both quantities have increased steadily with time, it is true that higher than average sea levels tend to be associated with higher than average bread prices. The two quantities are very strongly positively correlated. I take it that we do not feel driven to explain this correlation by postulating a common cause. Rather, we regard Venetian sea levels and British bread prices as both increasing for somewhat isolated endogenous reasons. (Sober (1988), p. 215.)

Most philosophers not working on probabilistic causality seem to take this as the conclusive argument against the Common Cause Principle. They should notice that it does not explicitly contradict it: the common cause may exist, it’s just that we are not driven to search for it. But even taking this into account, this argument makes the Principle look unreasonable and superfluous. It is one of the cases in which the move from informal to formal statements seems to genuinely clarify some issues. If we keep the discussion on the informal level, we could respond with something like “well, of course global warming is the common cause” and the resulting discussion will not be fruitful at all. If, however, Sober’s example is considered in detail, it turns out the “counterexample” is completely dissolved. I will recapitulate here that recent strand of the literature in the hope that more philosophers will become familiar with the fact that the “sea levels vs. bread prices” argument can no longer be considered a true counterexample to the Common Cause Principle.

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First doubts regarding Sober’s example were shed by Forster (1988), who noticed that, even though sea levels and bread prices are correlated, their changes are not: each year both the former and the latter increases. The import of this observation is not evident; perhaps it may eventually even strengthen Sober’s point. In any case, Sober (2001) presented an example from evolutionary biology, where the correlation persists on the level of changes of the values of two attributes, and in which also no common causal explanation is expected. The most important observation, though, is due to Hoover (2003): the point is that in Sober’s cases talk about correlation is unwarranted due to certain features of the data. The samples given by Sober allow us to infer that there is a correlation on the level of frequencies, but it does not necessarily follow from that that there is a correlation on the level of probabilities. “(...) most statistical inference and most of our own probabilistic intuitions are based on stationary probability distributions” (p. 532). The data given by Sober contain two monotonically increasing time series’, which are not “stationary”. We have to suppress here the definitions of the statistical concepts. Hoover (2003) and Reiss (2007) provide a detailed discussion of causal reasoning based on stationary and non-stationary time series and also two series in which the differences between two consecutive values of the two series form themselves a stationary time series. The upshot is, to quote Reiss, that “inferring from a sample correlation to a probabilistic dependence means that one takes the most likely data-generating process to be stationary”, which is not something we would assume in Sober’s cases. And so Sober’s counterarguments to the PCC dissolve: after everything is made rigorous, there seems to be no correlation to consider.

3.3 The EPR correlations Another common belief among philosophers not actively involved in the research on probabilistic causality is that the Common Cause Principle fails in quantum contexts. Supposedly it has been refuted by Bell’s theorem and the EPR correlations constitute a counterexample to the Principle. This line of reasoning originates from Van Fraassen (1982), which may also serve as a gentle introduction to the issue. Roughly speaking: the Principle would have us believe that in the case of the EPR correlations (just like in all other cases) there is a screening-off factor. However, Bell’s theorem says that the existence of a “hidden variable” satisfying screening-off together with two other intuitive assumptions (consult Shimony (2009) for a detailed discussion) is impossible. The culprit is commonly assumed to be screening-off, and we will not dispute this here. The conclusion would seem

160 | Leszek Wroński to be that the EPR correlations constitute a clear counterexample to the Common Cause Principle. However, the situation is different. Already Belnap and Szabó (1996) observed that there is a crucial mistake in van Fraassen’s reasoning: in the EPR context we are dealing with various correlations for various detector settings. What Bell’s Theorem excludes is the existence of a screening factor common to all these correlations; that is, a common common cause. As for the issue of the existence of separate “common causes” for the various correlations at different detector settings, the jury is still out! Many partial results have been obtained; see chapter 4 of Wroński (2010) for a summary. The existence of such “separate common causes” is excluded for many types of correlations (the most recent results are by HoferSzabó (2012)), but the general question is still open.

4 Conclusion: Principle of Sufficient Reason revisited So far, the Principle stands unrefuted. To repeat some observations from 2, its PCC4 formulation is simply a mathematical theorem. This means that if there is a situation which seems to threaten the Principle, that is, which seems to provide a surprising correlation without a common cause of the two events, we know that there is a probability space empirically adequate to that situation, which is fine-grained enough to contain an event satisfying Reichenbach’s conditions for a common cause. That is, falsification of the Common Cause Principle is a priori impossible.⁸ The Principle is universally valid! We can now see the connection with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which says that whatever happens has a cause, or that all contingent facts must have explanations⁹. The Common Cause Principle restricts the range of phenomena to which it is applicable: not everything is of interest to it, but just correlations; also, it makes the nature of explanation more specific: it is to be given by referring to a common cause, described in mathematical terms. We believe it is interesting to find a twenty-first century counterpart to an old philosophical principle and

8 Remarks in a similar vein have been made e.g. in Hofer-Szabó et al. (2000), but this was before the theorems referred to in section 2 were discovered. 9 Both of these formulations, different as they may look, appear right at the beginning of the monograph Pruss (2006).

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investigate how the change of the philosophical language which happened in the meantime influences the nature of the controversies involved.

Acknowledgments Warm thanks go to Marek Rosiak and Mirosław Szatkowski, the organizers of the 2013 “Substantiality and Causality” workshop in Łódź (February 2013). The research is funded by the Foundations for Polish Science “START” Fellowship and by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education research grant 668/N-RNPESF/2010/0.

Bibliography Arntzenius, F. (1992), “The Common Cause Principle”, in PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers. Belnap, N. and Szabó, L. E. (1996), “Branching Space-Time Analysis of the GHZ Theorem”, in Foundations of Physics: 26(8), 989–1002. Cushing, J. T. and McMullin, E. (eds) (1989), Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory. Reflections on Bell’s Theorem, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana. Forster, M. R. (1988), “Sober’s Principle of Common Cause and the Problem of Comparing Incomplete Hypotheses”, in Philosophy of Science: 55(4), 538–559. Gyenis, B. and Rédei, M. (2004), “When Can Statistical Theories be Causally Closed?”, in Foundations of Physics: 34(9), 1284–1303. Gyenis, Z. and Rédei, M. (2011), Characterizing common cause closed probability spaces, in Philosophy of Science: 78(3). Preprint archived at the PhilSci archive, http://philsciarchive.pitt.edu/5390/. Hofer-Szabó, G. (2012), “Separate common causal explanation and the Bell inequalities”, in International Journal of Theoretical Physics: 51, 110–123. Hofer-Szabó, G., Rédei, M. and Szabó, L. E. (2000), “Reichenbach’s Common Cause Principle: Recent Results and Open Questions”, in Reports on Philosophy: 20, 85–107. Hoover, K. D. (2003). “Nonstationary Time Series, Cointegration, and the Principle of the Common Cause”, in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science: 54, 527–551. Marczyk, M. and Wroński, L. (2013), “A Completion of the Causal Completability Problem”, in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, to appear. Mill, J. S. (1868), A System of Logic, Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer. Pruss, A. R. (2006), The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment, Cambridge University Press. Reiss, J. (2007), “Time Series, Nonsense Correlations and the Principle of the Common Cause”, in Causality and Probability in the Sciences, edited by F. Russo and J. Williamson, College Publications.

162 | Leszek Wroński Russell, B. (2009), Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, Routledge Classics. Taylor & Francis Routledge, London and New York. Reprint of the 1948 edition. Shimony, A. (2009), “Bell’s Theorem”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , (Summer 2009 Edition), edited by E. Zalta. URL = . Sober, E. (1988), “The Principle of the Common Cause”, in Probability and Causality, edited by J. H. Fetzer, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 211–228. Sober, E. (2001), “Venetian Sea Levels, British Bread Prices, and the Principle of the Common Cause”, in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science: 52, 331–346. Van Fraassen, B. C. (1980), The Scientific Image, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Van Fraassen, B. C. (1982), “The Charybdis of Realism: Epistemological Implications of Bell’s Inequality”, in Synthese: 52, 25–38. Reprinted with additions in Cushing and McMullin (1989). Wroński, L. (2010), The Common Cause Principle. Explanation via screening off , PhD thesis, Jagiellonian University, Kraków. Archived at http://jagiellonian. academia.edu/LeszekWroński, Forthcoming as a book from Versita Publishing.

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Part IV: Extension as a Constituent of Substance and Causality

Damian Leszczyński

Causality and Time. Some Remarks on Bergson’s Metaphysics 1 Introduction Cartesian dualism which introduced substantial dichotomy of the extensional and mental, enabled in this way – paradoxically – a spatial or geometrical treatment of mind (consciousness, self). This spatial apprehension was in addition based on mechanistic intuitions and led to a very inaccurate concept of mind or consciousness. What was the cause? The main point was that these analysis in most of the cases ignored the temporal nature of consciousness, treating time as the subsequent parameter of space. In modern philosophy the ultimate example of this attitude was the associationism of David Hume that had a strong influence on the 20th century psychology and psychological philosophy. According to this standpoint, the relations occuring in consciousness between impressions and ideas (that is representations) have analogical nature as the relations between objects in space and are ruled by analogical principles: resemblance, contiguity and cause and effect. We can say that Hume proposed real Newtonian mechanics of mind and its consequence was the elimination of the self as a substantial subject and the center that could organize phenomena revolving in an empty space of mind. Immanuel Kant recognized the essence of this issue. According to him, the concept or intuition of space (extension) is not a feature of things but one of the forms of our cognition – forms that we impose on the things or in which we grasp them. These forms are – as Kant said – subjective and structural conditions of all possible knowledge. Kant knows that consciousness itself – as the source of spatiality – has a different character and is connected with temporality. Nevertheless, Kant did not develop temporal analysis of mind because in his project he needed intuition of time as some kind of parameter or specific dimension that would constitute the framework of possible experience. Therefore he treated it mainly as a form of an object rather than a feature of subject and did not explicate the essential difference between time as the form of intuition (time as parameter analogical to space) and time as the distinctive feature of a subject. On the basis of his system of categories lies a typical modern conception of spatialised time and categories

166 | Damian Leszczyński that have in fact associationistic character. In a general form Kant’s idea of mind is close to Hume.

2 Causality and space This kind of spatial and mechanistic idea of consciousness – its internal and external relations – was generally accepted in modern philosophy. One of its prominent critics was Henri Bergson. In his first two books and early articles we can find interesting analysis of modern connection between mind and space. His starting point is Kant’s idea of causality and its relation to the spatial form of cognition. In Bergson’s view, our idea of causality, similar to other concepts or categories describing relations, is based on some spatial geometrical scheme in which every phenomenon is presented as extensive. This scheme may be regarded as some kind of an apriorical form of cognition in the Kantian sense, although it is rather closer to Cassirer’s or Poincaré’s modified version where these apriorical schemes or structures are treated as operational or functional. This spatial cognitive structure is a condition of possibility (in a transcendental sense) to perceive or rather construct some relationships between these phenomena. Those relationships may be understood in Hume’s manner, as causality, resemblance and contiguity, or in Kant’s manner – as inherence and subsistence (substance and accident), causality and dependence (cause and effect) and community (reciprocity). This structure also makes individuation of the objects possible. Bergson suggests that it is also a condition of possibility to use other categories, especially of quantity. Our common sense and scientific cognition is based on that spatial scheme or structure. Our basic cognitive processes consist of representing things in spatial extension which makes a description of our world (e.g. Kantian’s “nature”), using categories of relation and quantity, possible. It is important to emphasize that an epistemological view of these processes needs to avoid dualism of a conceptual scheme and pure material facts – a third dogma of empiricism, as Davidson says. In reality, the facts are presented as already interpreted and embraced in a spatial form. Bergson in many ways agrees with Kant that our cognition is a process in which we embrace the matter of experience in some subjective forms, but he modifies this proposition by making a significant point. In opposition to Kant, who said that all our cognitive processes depend on this subjective, spatial structure, Bergson insists that not all cognitive processes are relative and we have some nonrelative and non-spatial cognition, for example intuitive cognition. The spatial

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subjective form is not a necessary condition for all knowledge. It is necessary only on the level of everyday experience, in our natural attitude and scientific knowledge which is relative to our practical, social and vital demands. This form can be regarded as some kind of convention in Henri Poincaré’s sense, similar to a type of geometry which we choose to describe our world (we commonly choose Euclidean geometry but we can choose also non-Euclidean geometry, for example elliptical or hyperbolical). The structure that Kant reconstructed is not the only form of knowledge but one of many forms among which we can find also other forms – as Ernst Cassirer pointed out. Bergson thinks that the alternative way of cognition is the intuitive and immediate knowledge. It is problematic whether that intuitive knowledge is pure and free from subjective conditions or based on some alternative structure. I think this is an issue to be discussed. Kant, as we know, describing our structure of knowledge says that there is not only a spatial form of cognition but also a temporal one. It means that our cognition is based on some fourth-dimensional structure or subjective form which allows us to localize each thing in some point of space-time continuum. Here Bergson once more agrees with Kant but also modifies his ideas. In Bergson’s opinion, the time Kant talks about is not a real time but some geometrical time modelled on space and treated as an additional dimension of space. The symbolic image of that geometrical time is a straight line with points which illustrates passing instants (moments). In short, our image of temporality and our temporal structure of cognition has a fundamentally spatial character. Time is a subsequent parameter of space and it is measured in the same way as space. In the light of Poincaré’s interpretation of Kantian philosophy, we can say that spatio-temporal structure has in its basis a topological nature and uses a mathematical induction to create synthetic a priori propositions and reasoning.

3 Non-spatiality and temporality of consciousness The issues discussed above – the unnecessary character of spatial cognitive structure and spatial nature of our typical perception of time – are connected. Now we should ask a question: if not all cognition needs a spatial form, what kind of experience can be performed without this form? Bergson’s answer is that this kind of experience is being performed when we direct our reflection to our consciousness and precisely to the duration of our consciousness. This duration – durée reele – is a real, non-spatial time, which Bergson calls pure creativity, quality and continuity.

168 | Damian Leszczyński It does not mean that our consciousness is always perceived without mediation of a spatial structure. Bergson says that in everyday and practical life we must use a spatial form of cognition which is necessary to survive (his interpretation has a biological and evolutional character). So we usually see our consciousness in a spatial form and also our duration is presented to us in this spatial way as a linear time. But we can transcend this form of cognition and make some kind of reduction of our natural attitude, we can put demands of everyday life in brackets and make some epoche in Husserlian sense. By doing that, we can descend to the level of immediate and non-spatial experience. Bergson claims that this immediate experience of duration of consciousness is something common, although rather temporary and usually we do not pay attention to that kind of experience. There are some examples which show that this experience is possible – the most extreme examples are that of people who are on their death bed and in one moment they see images of their whole life. But there are also some more conventional examples showing the insufficiency of a typical spatial vision of consciousness and the necessity of an alternative, non-spatial view. They are connected with two kinds of multiplicity and two kinds of quantity described by Bergson. Let us present some examples. (a) Permeation. In Essai sur les donnés immédiates (English translation: Time and Free Will) Bergson writes that we usually imagine permeation as a process in which one body penetrates another and molecules of one body squeeze into another. Therefore, we usually use a spatial scheme to imagine that kind of situation. But if we reflect on our present state of consciousness we can see that, in fact, permeation has a very different nature. The good example is the permeation of various sounds in one instant – the sounds that are very close to us and the sounds of background that play a role of “soundtrack” to our mental activity. Another example is the permeation of different qualities – images, sounds, smells and experiences of touch. Yet another example is the permeation of present sensations, images and thoughts and some images of future and memories – we know that all of them permeate one another but we also feel that this permeation cannot be expressed in spatial, extensive and geometrical terms.¹

1 Conf. Bergson (2001), 88–90. “As a matter of fact, each of us makes a distinction between these two kinds of multiplicity whenever he speaks of the impenetrability of matter. We sometimes set up impenetrability as a fundamental property of bodies, known in the same way and put on the same level as e.g. weight or resistance. But a purely negative property of this kind cannot be revealed by our senses; indeed, certain experiments in mixing and combining things might lead us to call it in question if our minds were not already made up on the point. Try to picture one body penetrating another: you will at once assume that there are empty spaces in the one which

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(b) Multiplicity and unity – again, it is usually imagined in a spatial form, but we can think about some other kind of multiplicity which is simultaneously a unity, that is a musical chord. According to Bergson, it is a very typical example of a temporal, qualitative and non-spatial phenomenon. Our sense of difference between two kinds of chords – for example, D-major and d-minor – is that kind of non-spatial phenomenon. (c) Sequence and continuity – a good example would be another musical phenomenon, that is melody. Melody is usually illustrated as a sequence of notes coming one after another, but, according to Bergson, it is a continuity of a very different kind. We can say that melody has some extension from moment a to moment b, but in fact it is not spatial or quasi-spatial extension – it is a temporal duration and our experience of specific melody is pure temporal (it would be interesting to study Strawson’s analysis of the world of sound from this perspective and also the problem of the possibility to construct spatial image of the world without visual experiences, only on the basis of auditory sensations).

will be occupied by the particles of the other; these particles in their turn cannot penetrate one another unless one of them divides in order to fill up the interstices of the other; and our thought will prolong this operation indefinitely in preference to picturing two bodies in the same place. Now, if impenetrability were really a quality of matter which was known by the senses, it is not at all clear why we should experience more difficulty in conceiving two bodies merging into one another than a surface devoid of resistance or a weightless fluid. In reality, it is not a physical but a logical necessity which attaches to the proposition: Two bodies cannot occupy the same place at the same time. The contrary assertion involves an absurdity which no conceivable experience could succeed in dispelling. In a word, it implies a contradiction. But does not this amount to recognizing that the very idea of the number 2, or, more generally, of any number whatever, involves the idea of juxtaposition in space? If impenetrability is generally regarded as a quality of matter, the reason is that the idea of number is thought to be independent of the idea of space. We thus believe that we are adding something to the idea of two or more objects by saying that they cannot occupy the same place: as if the idea of the number 2, even the abstract number, were not already, as we have shown, that of two different positions in space! Hence to assert the impenetrability of matter is simply to recognize the inter-connexion between the notions of number and space, it is to state a property of number rather than of matter. Yet, it will be said, do we not count feelings, sensations, ideas, all of which permeate one another, and each of which, for its part, takes up the whole of the soul? Yes, undoubtedly; but, just because they permeate one another, we cannot count them unless we represent them by homogeneous units which occupy separate positions in space and consequently no longer permeate one another. Impenetrability thus makes its appearance at the same time as number; and when we attribute this quality to matter in order to distinguish it from everything which is not matter, we simply state under another form the distinction established above between extended objects, to which the conception of number is immediately applicable, and states of consciousness, which have first of all to be represented symbolically in space”.

170 | Damian Leszczyński (d) Difficulties with imagining and comparing some conventional units of time (spatialised time). Let us try to image one minute which has to come or next hour or year – future, past or present. Again, we usually do it by using spatial scheme and putting under our images some measure based on some eventspoints or thoughts-points, which are ordered in a straight line. When I try to imagine today’s time between 9 and 10 am I automatically think about some activities or actions but those actions are not identical with the past duration of my consciousness. We can refer here to examples of dreams or lucid dreams and specific dream-time characterizing the world of dreams. In Bergson’s view, the nature of those experiences consists of their qualitative intensity and not quantitative extensity. (e) A similar example – division of present duration, e.g. distinguishing borders of instants. According to Bergson, duration has a continuous nature, not discrete, but it is not a spatial continuity which can be freely divisible. (f) A problem of identicalness and uniqueness. When we try to describe states of our consciousness we usually create some conventional units, relations and categories using a spatial scheme. But they cannot capture a creative character of duration which makes each moment unique and incomparable with one another – because their nature consists in their intensity (it is hard to compare, for example, our morning boredom with evening melancholy). To summarize, we can say that Bergson’s aim is to show that the relations we establish between phenomena, measures and divisions we make (in Humean or Kantian style) are incommensurable or incongruent with our immediate experiences concerning the duration of our consciousness. In other words, the spatial scheme of cognition, which is useful and comfortable in everyday life and in scientific research, is not appropriate when we want to grasp the real nature of consciousness or mind. If we cannot correctly grasp the states of our consciousness with the use of spatial structure of cognition, we cannot describe them with the categories which are based on this spatial structure – also the category of causality. If the relation of causality may only apply to spatial and extensive phenomena, we can attribute it to consciousness only metaphorically. In our consciousness there are some, other than causal, relations or processes – these are some temporal processes and relations which characterize, as Bergson says, “creativity”. The essential feature of consciousness is, according to Bergson, free will. This freedom describes a situation in which a conscious subject is a sovereign author of his actions. We can say that this is some kind of causality but not mechanical, acting in spatial environ-

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ment, but causality of a different kind. In this point Bergson seems to be closer to Aristotle and classical philosophy than to Galileo, Newton and modern thought.

4 The problem of causal relation between the world and mind The first discussed problem was linked with the possibility of a spatial approach to consciousness and, in consequence, a possibility of its casual description (and precisely – this kind of causation that we deal with in relation to phenomena of the so called external world or material phenomena). The second problem refers to a possibility of an adequate description of the relationship between consciousness and the world in terms of causality. The essential question is associated with traditional views on the relation between the world and mind described by the concepts of “externality” or “transcendence”. A relationship between a subject (consciousness, mind) and an object (reality, world) is usually viewed as a relation between the “internal” and the “external” (especially in epistemology we have the idea of a cognitive relation as some act “transcending” the “immanent” subject or some kind of presence of a “transcendent” object in a “immanent” subject). In Bergson’s views, the immanencetranscendence, the internal-external opposition can only be metaphorical and not descriptive. If the world is “external”, the mind cannot be “internal”, except the materialistic view which identifies mind with brain – brain is “internal” in the world but also is a part of “external” world. Both terms are concerned with relations in space – if the mind was internal, it would be in space and, in consequence, have an extension. But if the mind has no extension, there is nothing “external” or “transcendent” to it in a spatial sense (although we may understand the term “transcendent” in a non-spatial way, as Roman Ingarden pointed out). In short, if we do not accept materialistic and reductive views (and there are many reasons to reject them), we cannot describe the relationship between consciousness and reality in spatial terms and we cannot simply explain the mind-body problem. That was of course an old difficulty connected with traditional Cartesian dualism, but in Bergson’s version it has a new dimension. If we cannot describe the relationship between the mind and the world in spatial terms, we also cannot describe it using traditional categories because they are based on spatial forms of cognition and make sense only in connection with them. From this perspective, a traditional statement about a causal relation between neuronal states of brain and states of mind are doubtful. The brain as an extensive object (that is the image of brain as extensive) is part of the world and is situated in space (even if the space

172 | Damian Leszczyński is only a transcendental form of sensibility). But consciousness is not situated in space. And because only spatial and extensive things can be part of a causal relation, so that relation cannot exist between the brain (as spatial and extensive) and the mind (as non-spatial and only intensive). Another of Bergson’s argument sounds like this: our brain is only an extensive image among other images appearing in consciousness. Similarly, our nervous system is only the extensive image in space presented to our mind. So we cannot treat those images as the causes of our consciousness in which those images are presented. Subjective images cannot create subject that has that images. Bergson wrote about it in Matière et Mémoire: The afferent nerves are images, the brain is an image, the disturbance travelling through the sensory nerves and propagated in the brain is an image too. If the image which I term cerebral disturbance really begot external images, it would contain them in one way or another, and the representation of the whole material universe would be implied in that of this molecular movement. Now to state this proposition is enough to show its absurdity. The brain is part of the material world; the material world is not part of the brain. Eliminate the image which bears the name material world, and you destroy at the same time the brain and the cerebral disturbance which are parts of it. Suppose, on the contrary, that these two images, the brain and the cerebral disturbance, vanish: ex hypothesi you efface only these, that is to say very little, an insignificant detail from an immense picture. The picture in its totality, that is to say the whole universe, remains. To make of the brain the condition on which the whole image depends is in truth a contradiction in terms, since the brain is by hypothesis a part of this image. Neither nerves nor nerve centres can, then, condition the image of the universe.²

It is interesting that this mistake is widely present in contemporary philosophy of mind in which a concept of representation plays a central and important role.

5 Conclusion This is only an outline of some interesting issues that arise when we carefully analyze Bergson’s ideas. It is important to notice that Bergson’s vision of mind is opposite not only to traditional modern philosophy (from Descartes to Kant) but also to the contemporary (that is 20th century) philosophy – from Husserl and Carnap to the newest conceptions of philosophy inspired by cognitive sciences. Contemporary philosophy of mind, especially its widely used concept of representation, is in fact some kind of intellectual regress and return to simplistic ideas of Locke,

2 See, Bergson (2007), 3–4.

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Hume and the philosophers of French Enlightenment. This philosophy proposes somewhat naive image of mind as a kind of a bucket (in Popper’s words) in which representations are moving like Newtonians masses ruled by elementary laws of association. From this perspective, I think, studying Bergsonian’s idea can be intellectually refreshing. Summary: The modern concept of mind or consciousness, deeply rooted in Cartesian division between thinking mind and extensional world, paradoxically has in many respects spatial and geometric character. The most typical examples of it can be found in Hume’s associationism as well as in Kant’s theory of the form of cognition. In this article I presented some critical remarks on that concept which were inspired by the early works of Henri Bergson, especially his analysis of the connection between ideas of causality and space.

Bibliography Bergson, H. (2001), Time and Free Will. An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, translated by F.L. Pogson, New York: Dover Publications. Bergson, H. (2007), Matter and Memory, translated by N. M. Paul and S. Palmer, New York: Cosimo Classics.

Bartłomiej Skowron

The Forms of Extension*

The nature of corporeal substance is extension in length, breadth and depth; and any other property a body has presupposes extension as merely a special case of it. For example, we can’t make sense of shape except in an extended thing, or of motion except in an extended space. The nature of thinking substance is thought; and anything else that is true of a mind is merely a special case of that, a way of thinking. Principles of Philosophy René Descartes

1 The extension as ontological difference Res extensa is extensive but res cogitans is not. The extension as such in Principia philosophiae becomes this, what differs thoughts and things. Thus, it is not unimportant whether a particular object is extensive, whether it extends somehow and between something or whether it is not extensive and there is no way of attributing the formal character of “being between” to its entity. For “extending” is the essential diversifying property within bi-categorial ontology of that what extends and what cannot extend; though not only in this ontology it diversifies substantially. The answer to the question, what is the extension itself, is not obvious. In this article, we take up this question and suggest some direction for research on the issue of extension as such. We should add that the extension as such appears in many other philosophical contexts, in the context of part-whole theory, in the issue of perceptual objects, in research on time, and even in problem of stretching of literary work, from its beginning to the end. But in this article we are dealing with extension as such, not with a special kind of extension of this or that object. On the basis of considerations presented in this article, we obtain a sketch of infinitely-categorial formal ontology. We claim that bi-categorial ontology is not adequate. The reality is much more complex. The complexity of reality is based on the various kinds of extensionality.

* This text is a bit changed and extended translation of Skowron (2013).

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2 Ontological explanation of extension There are scarcely any systematic studies on extension. Philosophical tradition had left some, scattered here and there, remarks on it. Even if they are systematic, they are often intertwined with particular metaphysics. Further on we will try to gather the basic ontological intuitions with reference to the formal characteristic of extension, so as to enclose them in some formal frames. What occupies space is extensive for it extends between the parts of some space. In this meaning, solids in 3-dimensional space, temporal intervals in space of time and colourful blots spreading on sheet of paper are extensive. In each of those meanings the extension differs in some aspects; for solids, 2-dimensional surfaces are limitations for extending objects, for colourful blots there are curves, and for a length of time – spot moments (instants). The problem concerns the differences regarding the dimension of extending objects. Therefore, we suspect that the prerequisite for an object to be able to extend is its having positive dimension. Time modelled linearly can extend from left to right, from the past to the future or from right to left, i.e. from future to past. Yet, regardless of the turn, it extends in one direction, remaining in linear model. In case of extending colourful blots, apart from left-right extension, we have extending upwards and downwards and sets “left top”, “right bottom”, etc. In case of solids, additional dimension, usually called the depth, appears. Philosophical tradition rather does not single out objects with more dimensions than these mentioned above.¹ It is a kind of limitation, especially as in contemporary scientific-cognitive practice multidimensional objects are successfully considered. Some complexity, consisting in possibility of division, is associated with extension. What extends between its ends can be, for example, halved or divided in n parts. What the division is depends on structure of divided object. This remark will gain more clarity in further parts of this work, where we will define precisely the notion of space. The possibility of division is often enhanced to infinite possibility of division, that is to claim that we can divide an extending object infinitely. So, let’s assume that the extending object can be divided infinitely, not specifying, for the time being, what the division is. Another characteristic of what is extending is impenetrability or impermeability, that is one extending object cannot penetrate the other. Extending objects

1 In our other work we showed that the notion of possible world is related to infinite dimensionality. Also other notions of combination ontology, such as element (monad), complex or situation, are related to the characteristic of dimensionality. See Skowron (2014).

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can at most be similar in some respect, one can be a part of the other, they can touch each other, border each other, they can be separated by such and such space, but they cannot penetrate each other. However, the thoughts that reportedly are not extending can permeate each other. Impermeability is the formal moment of what Ingarden called “closedness”. From etymological point of view, the extension is that, what spreads, extends (from Latin ex- “out” + tendere “to stretch”) between one thing and another. The extending is what is “between” this and that, what from its nature must be between some ends. Moreover, being Paderborn between Münster and Göttingen does not prove that Paderborn extends between Münster and Göttingen. Therefore, being between is being from – to, what is from Münster to Göttingen is in proper sense that, what extends from Münster to Göttingen. Thus, being between is being everywhere (or almost everywhere) between. In other case we do not deal with extension sensu stricto. All mentioned moments of extension, i.e. spatial dimension (immersing in space), divisibility, impenetrability, being everywhere “between” in specific sets, determine various kinds of extension but do not consist of its definitional perspective, for we do not know yet, what is the very extension. M. Rosiak described it as the possibility of co-existence of a multitude of objects, abundance of differences between places.² Extension is, so to speak, medium which enables to diversify the location. This statement is very general, and it has to be general. We should notice that this characterization is given in spatial stylization, i.e. when defining the space as a set of places and their differences it is said that the possibility of co-existing of a multitude of objects in this space is exactly its extension. As we suspect, every extending object is just the part (e.g. subspace) of such extending space. Further on we will act similarly, but not identically. We will propose a general notion of space, while extending objects will be the spaces having certain special properties. The way of extending, and we assume there are many, depends on kind of objects being extended or extending, and on the forms of their connections. The general question appears: whether we attribute the extension to the objects immersed in some space or to the spaces itself. N. Hartmann³ claims that what is in space is extending, the space enables appearing of extension, it is the plasma of extension, though it itself is not extending. In this sense the space as such is a principle. Our understanding of space differs from Hartmann’s under-

2 Cf. Rosiak (2013), 382. 3 See Poli (2013). Hartmann probably would say that our study on extension is based on categorical error, but we would respond that his ontology and our ontology are fundamentally different.

178 | Bartłomiej Skowron standing, it is more general and in our approach space is not just a principle. Our understanding allows us to distinguish many (many more than Hartmann could) kinds of space, however, it does not distinct one, precisely indicated – and thereby to distinguish many of its parts as well as the entities consisting of it. Still, such an approach enables us to speak almost interchangeably both about space and the objects of that space, that is about the extension of objects in space and of spaces themselves. Not all formal moments of extension described here were attributed to it. Ingarden attributed some extension to the primary individual object, though it was impenetrable, that is, in a way indivisible.⁴ Another problem is, whether one can show the example of extension having the property of being between but not having the property of spatiality; or not having the property of divisibility but having the property of impermeability; similarly in other cases. One can claim that those properties are mutually definable or co-definable in a specific way; one can say that they are, in a sense, independent from each other. It is impossible to resolve this question here, for we do not know yet what we precisely mean by space, divisibility, being “between”, etc. Below, we will define some of these notions with mathematical preciseness – and only on that basis one can try to settle anything.

3 A new direction for discussion on extension We should note that appearing characteristics of extension often concerned pure geometrical notions, such as space, distance, solid (and its shape). In a natural way, when we want to give an example of extending structure, we quote continuum, 3-dimensional Euclidean space or plane. It makes sense, because in philosophy space was conceptualized by geometrical notions. But, on the other hand, Bergson and Ingarden warn against geometrization of philosophical issues, and especially against geometrization of extension of time. In this context, it seems that geometry lost its explanatory power in philosophy, and especially in metaphysics. And it is so, indeed. Nowadays, however, geometry, being after all ancilla philosophiae, is replaced by another mathematical science – topology.⁵ It is a farreaching generalization of geometry, and thus it is suitable for conceptualization of generally understood spaces and various types of extension. Topology is also called – and it is extremely meaningful in the context of definition of extension

4 Cf. Rosiak (2003), 89. 5 See Mormann (2013).

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assumed in this article – Analysis Situs. Topology is the analysis of situating and forms of location of specific objects in specific spaces. Incompletely and imprecisely speaking, length of line segment, size of angle or area of the plane play an important role in geometry. In general topology, however, those characteristics are not substantial. From a topological point of view, the triangle is identical to square, straight line to line segment without ends, and plane to sphere without one point. Thanks to its generality, topology can study abstract spaces, exceeding highly Euclidean/non-Euclidean paradigm, used often in philosophical argumentation. The topological space will be then the medium in which we will discuss the extension. It is a set of points together with a certain structure called topology. In this context, a point means the final building material of specific space. The points can be geometrical ones as well as sequences, functions, thoughts, desires, cognitive subjects, Wittgenstein’s objects (then, states of affairs could be open sets, and topology could be the form of states of affairs, i.e. the possibility of structure of states of affairs), etc. Over the points we build the structure in which those points show and reveal. It is also possible, and maybe even better in some ontological cases, to express some fields a bit differently, for example with the use of pointless topology.⁶ However, we will not discuss this matter here. Topology consists of families of sets of points. However, not all families of those sets are topologies. We call the family of subsets of a set X closed under finite intersections and arbitrary unions, also including X and the empty set, a topology on the set X. Sets belonging to the topology are called open sets, and their complements – closed sets. Topology may also be introduced through other notions, not only the open sets. One can insert topology by providing its basis or by giving the basis of points’ neighborhood (e.g. the topology of thought of any subject can be inserted by giving the set of thoughts being “in the vicinity” to every thought of that subject; that set is, so to say, the neighborhood of initial thought), or by axiomatic approach to closure and giving the sets equal to their closure (then, the complements of closed sets are the open sets), or in any other way. We can define many topologies on the set X, though not all of them are of the same importance. In the sense of inclusion, the biggest topology is the family of all subsets of X, and the smallest one is the family consisting of X and the empty set. Let’s take the following example: the set of real numbers together with the family consisting of any unions and finite intersections of open intervals (the interval is open in this case if it does not include its end points) is the topological space.

6 See Picardo and Pultr (2012).

180 | Bartłomiej Skowron This topology is Euclidean topology. However, there are other topologies, far from Euclidean, that give various structures to the set of real numbers. In the context of our goal, we speak not about formalization but about conceptualization of some philosophical issues. The aim of formalization is to build the closed deductive system (or theory) and to examine it appropriately; and it was practiced – often ineffectively – in philosophy. Mathematical conceptualization or just mathematical modelling does not lead in the first place to building the theory but to building some analogies between conceptualized structure and certain mathematical structure. Such efforts are often used in natural sciences. We are dealing not only with theories; we are dealing with the structures of objects and essential properties of these structures.

4 An attempt at clarification of extension We propose to discuss the extension in topological spaces. Below we will present an attempt to convey formal-ontological characteristics of extension mentioned earlier in topological disguise. We listed occupy space or being the part of some space as the first condition for extension of the object. The easiest solution would be that the object taking some part of topological space is extending just because it takes part of that space. Such a resolution cannot last, because 3-element set with the biggest topology is the topological space, and its randomly chosen point is, in a sense, its part. However, this point is not extending. We would also rather not call certain open set, consisting of two points, the extending one. Therefore, one should lay on initial space some conditions excluding absurdities – at least the blatant ones. Then, the space should consist of endless and at best uncountable number of points – then we can reasonably examine the extension of objects existing in it. The condition of an endless number of points must be supplemented by some conditions regarding the properties of the space itself. Cantor set – to give another bad example – is an uncountable set. It is hard to talk about extension within its range, mainly because it is a nowhere dense subset of line segment. The Cantor set is a 0-dimensional set. It means that it has no non-empty and not-single point connected subsets. The mentioned properties rather show the critical point of lack of extension than having some extension. This point is not unambiguous since adding one point to the Cantor set so that so-called Kuratowski-Knaster fan came into being leads to connected space and connectedness is one of the desired formal-ontological properties of extension. Maybe the structure of the Cantor set allows us to model some – certainly weak – kind of extension. After all, the Cantor set is compact,

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there is its continuous transformation to unit interval (moreover, every compact metric space is its continuous image), and it has additional interesting property of invariance on Cartesian product. Strictly speaking, the Cantor set is in topological sense identical (homeomorphic) with any countable Cartesian product of itself. Therefore, to examine the extension, we should assume some form of connectedness of space, even such that the given space contains random connected non-trivial subspaces. However, since the connectedness can take on undesired forms in topology, we should impose stronger limitations on it, such as containing path-connected subspaces or simple conectedness.⁷ Being between is, as we wrote, being everywhere between. Elaborating on this characteristic of formal extension can assume various forms. One of them is such a possibility that the object extending in a given space is a dense subset of certain, selected suitably subspace of that space. Being the subspace of any given topological space is being its part with topology remained. In this sense, the set of irrational numbers from the line segment (0, 1) extends between 0 and 1, since it is the dense subset of (0, 1). And this range is the subspace of the real line. Yet, as we can easily spot, being between in this case is not being everywhere between in the meaning of quantity; there are no other rational numbers there. But the density of irrational numbers within this range should suffice. All points are not necessary, the density of those points is enough. Being dense is formal-ontological characteristic of the way of location as well as the way of extending between. Mereological relations in topological spaces can be modelled in many different ways, not only in the sense of being subspace, e.g. as being the compact subspace of entity or connected components, or else. If we did not speak about the density of subspace but about density of initial space, the extending would be limited to extreme cases where extending objects (and to be precise, their closure) occupy the whole space. As we mentioned above, the possibility of endless division of object is a part (in Husserl’s sense) of its extension. The problem of division can be also modelled in many ways. One of them is imposing stronger and stronger separation axiom on space. We present two of such axioms as example: axiom T2 (the space fulfilling this condition is called Hausdorff space), according to which every two points of space can be divided/separated from one another by open sets. Strictly speaking, for every two points there are such two disjoint open sets that one point belongs to one open set and the second – to the other one. If every two disjoint closed sets can be divided/separated by disjoint open sets, we say that the space is normal or

7 It was Dr. Roland Zarzycki who directed our attention to simply connected spaces in context of extension.

182 | Bartłomiej Skowron that it is T4 space. When modelling division by separation axioms, we discuss the problem of division not in light of cutting or slicing but rather paying attention to carrying out possible differences in the found structure. If any two open objects in space can be separated by closed objects with the use of T4 axiom, it means that every two structural and not coinciding parts of space can be distinguished from each other by two other (being parts in other way) elements of space. In this case closed sets are the diversifying objects or just the differences. Let’s notice that in this meaning our proposition harmonizes with M. Rosiak’s perspective, in which the extension is the possibility of the co-occurrence of multitude of objects, the multitude of differences of places – the structure, that is topology, constitutes this possibility. And successive separation axioms determine the strength of possible co-occurrence of objects and possible differences of objects’ places. Other ways by which division of space can be carried out are division into connected components of space, division into subspaces or division into subobjects in the meaning of category theory. The next formal-ontological characteristic of extension is mutual impermeability or impenetrability of extending objects. Topological characteristic of this moment is difficult. The impermeability consists of the following moments: (a) impossibility of taking the same place (in chosen space) in the same time by two objects extending in the same way, (b) having the limit or boundary or restriction, (c) having separate sets of properties, individual difference of extending objects.⁸ The conditions (a) and (b) are easy to fulfill, while condition (c) falls outside purely formal tools. In the case of (a) it is enough to say that in topological spaces we generally do not allow points to overlap, though, especially in algebraic topology, identifying of points is often used. In the case of point (b) – while narrowing attention only to the property of being bounded – it is sufficient when e.g. we add on extending object the condition of limitation, i.e. the condition of being included in some ball in given metric; at the same time we must assume that the space is metrizable. Condition (c) cannot be expressed in full generality with help of hitherto used tools, though, after right preparation, some fragments can be expressed.⁹ It is possibile that impermeability is a material moment and in general should be studied in material ontology. It is worth noting that this moment is studied in many areas in contemporary physics and mathematics. One of the examples of that research is percolation theory.¹⁰

8 Cf. Rosiak (2003), 89. 9 See Mormann (1996) and Smith (1996). 10 Cf. Śniady (2013).

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When Descartes considered extending substance, he had in mind extension in length, breadth and depth. We mentioned that those characteristics involve having positive dimension. However, speaking about those dimensions (or in those dimensions) one uses a coordinate system – actually the Cartesian one – which is just a tool for describing Euclidean spaces. In topology, metrics play a similar role to the role played by coordinate systems in Euclidean spaces. We can think of metrics as consisting of distance functions. A topological space X is called metrizable if there exists such a metric on it that the topology induced by this metric coincides with the original topology on X. Metrizable spaces, metaphorically speaking, are spaces in which distance function coincides with original topological structure. In metrizable spaces we can examine “distances” (those coincident with structure) between objects, but we are also able to measure the objects themselves. One of those measures is the diameter of the considered object, i.e. the least upper bound of the set of all distances of this object’s points. In this context, object is extending if it surely has non-zero diameter, though not every object having non-zero diameter is extending. Thus, having non-zero diameter is one of prerequisites of extending. However, to speak about objects’ diameter we should have a metric, and at best metrizable space – then it is possible to take the object’s diameter “in accordance” with structure. The category of metrizable spaces is probably the category of immense significance for our main issue. In this context, the theorem of universality of Hilbert’s cube for metrizable, separable and compact separable metric spaces acquires metaphysical significance.

5 Toward topological categorial ontology Ontology which appears here is a topological ontology. Topology becomes a formal ontology. If one chooses an appropriate class of properties of extension, then one will receive the extension types. Types of extension simply are categories of formal ontology. In other words, different topological spaces create different categories of formal ontology. We are interested in all categories. However, for the fully-fledged ontology, we should additionally consider relationships between them, that is preferably continuous transformation between the spaces. Then we would obtain a category (in the sense of category theory) of all topological spaces. Perhaps the category of all topological spaces is the formal structure of what there is and what is possible. One may ask: why topology? There are many areas of mathematics. Perhaps some of these areas are also suitable for ontology. Topology is probably not the only one. Topology, however, is the closest (or very close to) the phenomena of on-

184 | Bartłomiej Skowron tology. Being a whole or a part, being a boundary of some objects, being connected – these are the basic topological properties (in broad sense, not in the strict sense). Topological properties in the strict sense are the invariants under some transformations, under homeomorphisms, which are bicontinuous one-to-one functions. These transformations are good tools to describe the objects’ natural change over time (but not only over time) while preserving the identity of these objects. It is often thought that mathematics is the science of quantities (length, number, etc.). Contemporary research in mathematics, however, considers also quality. Topology is an example of quality thinking in mathematics. Angles and lengths are not very important, qualities such as connectedness or denseness are only important. In the first half of the twentieth century, Polish philosopher Benedykt Bornstein¹¹ noticed that and as a result has built a mathematical metaphysics. He relied, inter alia, on Plato and Leibniz. He used projective geometry in his system. But the truth is that he had in mind what we today call topological spaces. Our proposal of topological ontology is more general than Bornstein’s metaphysics, but it remains in the same spirit. More recently Thomas Mormann in many of his papers¹² develops ontological issues with topology. For example, in his Topological Aspects of Combinatorial Possibility¹³ T. Mormann considered combinatorial worlds as mappings from individuals to properties. He draws a line between possible and impossible combinations by imposing structural constraints on the relation between a set of individuals and a set of properties, namely he forced on that relation to be a function. He also proposed to treat the complex individuals and complex properties as open sets. On that basis he could define possible worlds as continuous functions. Our discussion about the extension is applicable to T. Mormann’s approach to possibility. More precisely speaking, our considerations concern the features of imposed topology on the set of individuals and the set of properties. In the concluding remarks of the above mentioned paper, T. Mormann writes as follows: A world is, so to speak, a topologically structured totality of states of affairs, or, to express somewhat more generally, it is a structural gestalt.

This quotation could also be the motto of our paper.

11 See Bornstein (1948). In the footnotes listed at the end of the book are references to other works (also in English) of Bornstein. 12 See e.g. Mormann (1995) or Mormann (2000). 13 Mormann (1997).

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Summary The extension as such is an important ontological property. However, its precise description is not obvious. We proposed to carry out the formal research on extension in the context of topological considerations and to model extending objects with help of topological spaces.¹⁴ There are some properties of various formal types of objects’ extension: uncountably infinite number of elements, density, connectedness, compactness, metrizability, having positive diameter and fulfilling suitable separation axioms. We repeat Descartes words as a motto of this work: The nature of corporeal substance is extension in length, breadth and depth; and any other property a body has presupposes extension as merely a special case of it. For example, we can’t make sense of shape except in an extended thing, or of motion except in an extended space. The nature of thinking substance is thought; and anything else that is true of a mind is merely a special case of that, a way of thinking.

Corporeal substance is extending, and all other attributes of it are in a way immersed in extension; hence the extension is constitutive for corporeality. From our perspective, one should then clarify the type of corporeal substance extension and answer the question whether the thought is non-extending in same way in which the corporeal substance is. Then the mind-body issue becomes a bit more subtle, at least from a formal point of view. Let’s experiment on such a case: the extension of corporeal substance is the one type of 3-dimensional open ball, with suitable dents and bumps, but without holes through. It is actually highly probable that Descartes meant just such a structure. To simplify the problem, let’s assume that the space of thought¹⁵ is the whole 3-dimensional Euclidean space. The scope of thought is unlimited; therefore this space should be unlimited (of course, this is a big simplification). Prima facie both these structures are fundamentally different, even because the first is bounded and the latter is not. One can also claim that the first is a small part of the latter, and this exceeds the first in its size. What are other relations between those two structures? As it turns out, both are identical in topological sense. Despite differences found, there is a strong resemblance between them. In this case, it will be the identity of extension types, what would surely be

14 One should add that quite a big part of present ontological and formal-ontological studies uses topological tools. Moreover, the new subfield of ontological research appeared – mereotopology (also called spatial logic) – joining philosophical and formal part-whole theories with topological tools. To learn more about it, see Pratt-Hartmann (2007), Smith (1996) and Fine (1995). 15 Space of thought could be interpreted as a subspace of life space in the sense of topological psychology of K. Lewin. Cf. Lewin (1936).

186 | Bartłomiej Skowron undesirable for Descartes. This example – though not the best one and chosen ad hoc – shows that the extension is not what diversifies thoughts and bodies.

Acknowledgments This article was presented at the 2nd International Ontological Workshop Substantiality and Causality which took place in Łódź (Poland) on 11-12 February 2013. I would to thank the organizers: Prof. Marek Rosiak and Prof. Mirosław Szatkowski for the opportunity to deliver a paper during the workshop.

Bibliography Bornstein, B. (1948), Teoria Absolutu. Metafizyka jako nauka ścisła [Theory of Absolute. Metaphysics as an Exact Science], Łódź: Societas Scientiarum Lodziensis. Fine, K. (1995), “Part-Whole”, in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, edited by B. Smith and D. W. Smith, New York: 436–485. Lewin, K. (1936), Principles of Topological Psychology, translated by F. Heider and G. Heider, New York and London. Mormann, T. (1995), “Trope Sheaves. A Topological Ontology of Tropes”, in Logic and Logical Philosophy: 3, 129–150. Mormann, T. (1996), “Similarity and Countinous Quality Distributions”, in The Monist: 79, 76–88. Mormann, T. (1997), “Topological Aspects of Combinatorial Possibility”, in Logic and Logical Philosophy: 5, 75–92. Mormann, T. (2000), “Topological Representation of Mereological Systems”, in Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities: 76, 463–486. Mormann, T. (2013), “Topology as an Issue for History of Philosophy of Science”, in New Challenges to Philosophy of Science, The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective 4, edited by H. Andersen et al., Dordrecht, 423–434. Picardo, J. and Pultr, A. (2012) Frames and Locales. Topology without points, Basel: Springer. Poli, R. (2013), “Nicolai Hartmann”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. N. Zalta, URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/nicolai-hartmann/. Pratt-Hartmann, I. (2007), “First-Order Mereotopology”, in Handbook of Spatial Logic, edited by M. Aiello, I. Pratt-Hartmann and J. Benthem, Springer, 13–97. Rosiak, M. (2003), Spór o substancjalizm. Studia z ontologii Ingardena i metafizyki Whiteheada, [The Controversy over the Substantialism. Studies on Ingarden’s Ontology and Whitehead’s Metaphysics], Łódź. Rosiak, M. (2013), “Realizm i czas [Realism and Time]”, in Świadomość, Świat, Wartości. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Andrzejowi Półtawskiemu w 90. rocznicę urodzin [Consciousness, World, Values. Works Dedicated to Professor Andrzej Półtawski on his 90th Anniversary], edited by D. Leszczyński and M. Rosiak, Wrocław, 375–389.

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Skowron, B. (2013), “O formach rozciągłości” [“The Forms of Extension”], in Świadomość, Świat, Wartości. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Andrzejowi Półtawskiemu w 90. rocznicę urodzin [Consciousness, World, Values. Works Dedicated to Professor Andrzej Półtawski on his 90th Anniversary], edited by D. Leszczyński and M. Rosiak, Wrocław, 351–360. Skowron, B. (2014), “O kombinacyjnej topo-ontologii” [“Combination Topo-Ontology”] in Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, to appear. Smith, B. (1996), “Mereotopology: A theory of parts and boundaries”, in Data and Knowledge Engineering: 20, 287–303. Śniady, P. (2013), “Between Excess and Deficiency: Critical Percolation”, in Excess and Deficiency, edited by Ł. Huculak, B. Skowron, K. Dąbrowska, J. Jernajczyk, M. Zakrzewska and R. Zarzycki, Wrocław, 155–160.

Authors of Contributed Papers Thomas Buchheim is Professor of Philosophy (esp. Metaphysics and Ontology) at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich, Germany. Co-Editor of The historic-critical Edition of Schelling’s Work, Editor of the Philosophisches Jahrbuch. Books: Die Sophistik als Avantgarde normalen Lebens (1986), Eins von Allem. Die Selbstbescheidung des Idealismus in Schellings Spätphilosophie (1992), Die Vorsokratiker. Ein philosophi-sches Porträt (1994), Aristoteles (1999), Unser Verlangen nach Freiheit (2006). Editions of classical texts: Gorgias von Leontinoi: Reden, Fragmente und Testimonien. Mit Übersetzung, Einleitung und Anmerkungen (1989), Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, mit Einleitung und Kommentar (1997 and 2011), Aristoteles: Vom Werden und Vergehen. Übersetzung und Kommentar (2010). Markku Keinänen (PhD in philosophy, University of Helsinki) is currently working at the Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University of Turku. His main areas of research are metaphysics and formal ontology. He has recently developed a trope-bundle theory of simple substances (powerful particulars). Moreover, he has applied the theory and developed it further in joint research articles with J. Hakkarainen. Keinänen has published also articles in metaphysics of modality and metho-dology of metaphysics. He has been an editor of the anthology Problems from Armstrong (Acta Philosophica Fennica 84, Helsinki 2008) on the philosophy of David Armstrong. As a Visiting Fellow to the University of Durham (2012-2013), Keinänen started to develop a trope-nominalist theory of natural kinds, to which his current research is focused. Together with J. Hakkarainen and T. Tahko, Keinänen has founded Dynamis – the Finnish Network for Metaphysics to promote the academic study of metaphysics and related philosophical sub-disciplines in Finland. Filip Kobiela (PhD in Philosophy, Jagiellonian University) currently works in Institute of Social Sciences in University School of Physical Education, Cracow, Poland. His scientific interests encompass ontology, philosophical antropology and philosophical theory of games. He published a book on Roman Ingarden’s philosophy of time (in Polish). His recent research concentrates on such topics as time, causality, identity, and chance events in relation to human being. Srećko Kovač (PhD in Philosophy, University of Zagreb) is affiliated to the Institute of Philosophy (Zagreb, Croatia), doing research in philosophical logic (Logical Structures and Intentionality; Logic, Language and Modalities). Teaches basic

190 | Authors of Contributed Papers and advanced courses in logic at the University of Zagreb. He is the author of Logical Questions and Procedures (with B. Žarnić, 2008), Logical-Philosophical Papers (2005), Logic (1994, 2nd ed. 2004), and Logic as a “Demonstrated Doctrine” (1992), in Croatian. He has published about 40 papers in international and Croatian journals and collections of papers. His current interests include logic of belief and knowledge, logic and ontology, logic of group decision-making, and history of logic. Damian Leszczyński (Ph.D., University of Wrocław). He works mainly in epistemology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. He is the author of Continuity and Break in the History of Knowledge (2008), Cognitive Structure and the Image of the World. The Question of Subjective Condition of Knowledge in Modern Philosophy (2010), Realism and Skepticism. Analytical Studies (2012) (all books in polish). He is founder and V-ce Editor-in-Chief Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia (in polish and english) and Editor-in-Chief Lectiones & Acroases Philosophicae. Uwe Meixner is a professor of philosophy at the University of Augsburg, Germany. He previously was bound up with the University of Regensburg (till 2010) and earned his PhD from that University in 1986, under the direction of Franz von Kutschera. His main fields of research are Theoretical Philosophy (especially, Logic, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Mind) and the History of Philosophy. The places of his visiting professorships or research projects are: Innsbruck, Mainz, München, Münster in Westfalen, Notre Dame (USA), Osnabrück, Regensburg, Saarbrücken, and Salzburg. Uwe Meixner is the author of eleven books: Handlung, Zeit, Notwendigkeit: Eine ontologisch-semantische Untersuchung (1987), Ereignis und Substanz: Die Metaphysik von Realität und Realisation (1997), Axiomatic Formal Ontology (1997), Theorie der Kausalität: Ein Leitfaden zum Kausalbegriff in zwei Teilen (2001), The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism (2004), Einführung in die Ontologie (2004), David Lewis (2006), The Theory of Ontic Modalities (2006), Modalität: Möglichkeit, Notwendigkeit, Essenzialismus (2008), Philosophische Anfangsgründe der Quantenphysik (2009), Modelling Metaphysics: The Metaphysics of a Model (2010). He has published over 100 articles, and is a co-editor of two journals: Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy and Metaphysica. Jeff Mitscherling is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Guelph (Ontario, Canada). He is the author of Roman Ingarden’s Ontology and Aesthetics (University of Ottawa Press, 1997), The Author’s Intention (with Tanya Di Tommaso and Aref Nayed; Lexington Books, 2004), The Image of a Second Sun: Plato on Poetry, Rhetoric, and the Techn¯e of Mim¯esis (Humanity Books, 2009), Aesthetic Genesis.

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The Origin of Consciousness in the Intentional Being of Nature (University Press of America, 2010), and numerous articles in aesthetics, classical philology and philosophy, hermeneutics, the history of philosophy, and phenomenology. Marek Piwowarczyk is an associate professor at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy. His main area of interest is metaphysics/ontology, especially problems of subject-attributes structure, persistence in time, dispositions and ontological dependence. He explores four metaphysical/ontological traditions: realistic eidetic phenomenology (Ingarden, early Husserl, Reinach), classical philosophy (Aristotle, Aquinas), analytic philosophy (Lowe, Loux, Wiggins, Simons, Armstrong, Bird) and process philosophy (Whitehead, Hartshorne). Sometimes he takes trips to philosophy of religion (divine aseity, simplicity and eternity) and to modern philosophers (Leibniz, Wolff). Marek Rosiak works at the Department of Logic, Łódz University, Poland. His scientific interests encompass ontology and phenomenology. His Dissertationsschrift was an advanced study of Ingarden’s ontology as well as Whitehead’s process metaphysics. He also published an extremely critical study of Hegel’s dialectic which caused a hysteria in local establishment. His study of the realismidealism controversy, written from the point of view of the transcendental phenomenology (Husserl-Ingarden line), has been published in 2013. At present he is continuing investigations on the constitution of an object of sense experience – a fragment of this study has been included in this volume. All his books are in Polish. Bartłomiej Skowron is philosopher and mathematician. He defended his Ph.D. thesis, on Mereotopological aspects of philosophical part-whole theory, at University of Wrocław. He received also BA in Mathematics from the University of Wrocław, Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science. He was elected as Fellow of the Academy of Young Scholars and Artists in 2012. Interests: formal ontology (part-whole theory, mereotopology), phenomenology, philosophy of morality, axiology, philosophical anthropology, the basis and philosophy of mathematics, applied logic, abstract algebra, topology. Mirosław Szatkowski was affiliated as a professor of philosophy at the Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz, Poland, until 1 October 2011. At present he is associated with the Department of Philosophy, Theory of Science and Religious Studies at the Ludwig-Maximilians University in Munich, Germany. He earned his PhD in philosophy from the Jagiellonian University in Cracow under the direction of Andrzej Wroński, and was habilitated at the Ludwig-Maximilians University in

192 | Authors of Contributed Papers Munich. Szatkowski’s main fields of research are: logic, the foundations of mathematics, and formal ontology. In logic, he has specialized in non-classical logics and published papers in Studia Logica, Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik (Mathematical Logic Quarterly), Archiv für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung (Archive for Mathematical Logic), and Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. In formal ontology, his works concerning ontological proofs for the existence of God have been published in Studia Logica, Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics and Journal of Logic, Language and Information. He is currently working on a book about Gödel-type proofs for the existence of God. Leszek Wroński is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. He has published papers on probabilistic causality and branching space-time theories. He is currently mainly interested in philosophical issues surrounding the notion of probability, preparing also a monograph on Reichenbach’s Common Cause Principle.

Author Index Accles J. 144 Achim S. 34 Achourioti T. 54, 66 Andriopoulos D. Z. 138, 148 Anscombe G. E. M. 127 Aristotle 3, 5–7, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 30, 33, 75, 80, 81, 84, 88, 134–138, 140, 143, 146, 148, 171 Armstrong D. M. 41, 43, 48 Arntzenius F. 157, 161 Baltzer-Jaray K. 133, 148 Baumgarten A. G. 75 Belnap N. 160, 161 Bennett M. 23, 33 Bergson H. 69, 166–173, 178 Bigelow J. 39, 48 Bird A. 36, 42, 48 Błaszczyk P. 100 Bolton R. 138, 148 Bornstein B. 184, 186 Brentano F. 133–135, 141, 142, 148 Brown B. F. 84 Buchheim Th. 22, 26, 34 Burnyeat M. F. 138, 148 Bynum T. W. 138, 148 Cacioppo J. T. 34 Campbell K. K. 36, 37, 39, 48 Cantor G. 180 Carmena J. M. 28, 34 Carnap R. 172 Cassirer E. 166, 167 Clark W. N. 87 Correia F. 39, 49 Cover J. A. 79 Crabtree A. 129, 148 Crick F. 132 Cushing J. T. 161 Czarnik T. 110 Davidson D. 34, 119, 166 Democritus 102

Denkel A. 36, 48 Dennett D. 33, 132, 148 Descartes R. 8–10, 171, 172, 183 Eccles J. C. 131, 132, 148 Ehring D. 37, 48 Ellis B. 35, 41, 43, 44, 48 Epicurus 108 Everson S. 138, 148 Field R. W. 84 Fine K. 185, 186 Forster M. R. 159, 161 Frege G. 62 Galileo G. 171 Gauld A. 129, 148 Gill M. L. 80 Gödel K. 51–53, 65, 66 Greyson B. 129, 148 Griffiths D. 44, 48 Grosso M. 129, 148 Grygianiec M. 71 Gut P. 78 Gyenis B. 156, 161 Hacker P. 23, 33, 127 Hakkarainen J. 37, 46, 49 Handfield T. 45, 48 Hartmann N. 177 Hájek P. 51, 66 Hegel G. W. F. 139, 140 Hendry R. 35, 48 Henkin L. 51 Heraclitus 4, 99 Herbert Z. 69 Hering J. 81 Hodgkin A. L. 131 Hofer-Szabó G. 160, 161 Hofweber T. 71 Hoover K. D. 159, 161 Hume D. 10, 165, 166, 173 Husserl E. 53, 136, 141, 142, 146, 168, 172 Huxley A. 131

194 | Author Index Ingarden R. 11, 14, 18, 67, 69, 70, 72, 80–82, 84, 86, 88, 93, 95–99, 104, 105, 107–110, 136, 143, 148, 171, 177, 178 Jackson F. 34 Jacob P. 133 Jennings H. S. 132, 148 Johansen T. K. 80 Kane R. 127 Kant I. 9, 10, 53–61, 63, 65, 66, 73, 74, 98, 111, 139, 140, 165, 166, 172 Keinänen M. 36–38, 46, 49 Keller P. 39, 49 Kelly E. F. 129, 148 Kelly E. W. 129, 148 Kim J. 34, 143, 148 Knaster B. 180 Kobiela F. 68, 111 Koch Ch. 132 Kolmogorov A. 152 Kovač S. 53, 59, 60, 66 Kuratowski K. 180 Kurthen M. 24, 34 Laplace S. 9 Leibniz G. 9, 18, 67, 77, 78, 82, 86, 87, 101 Leszczyński D. 18 Lewin K. 185, 186 Lierse C. 36, 45, 48 Locke J. 172 Longuenesse B. 66 Lowe E. J. 37, 49 Marczyk M. 156, 161 Marmodoro A. 48 Massin O. 49 Maurin A. S. 39, 49 McMullin E. 161 Mill J. S. 151, 161 Mitscherling J. 133–136, 147, 148 Morganti M. 45, 49 Mormann T. 178, 182, 184, 186 Mulligan K. 39, 41, 49 Mumford S. 35, 36, 41, 46, 49 Newton I. 171, 173

Nicolelis M. A. L. 28, 34 O’Leary-Hawthorne J. 79 Owens J. 138, 149 Pargetter R. 39, 48 Parmenides 3–5 Pasnau R. 84 Pauen M. 34 Pfänder A. 81 Picardo J. 179, 186 Piwowarczyk M. 12, 18, 67, 87, 111 Plato 4, 5, 84 Poincaré H. 166, 167 Poli R. 177, 186 Popper K. 131, 148, 173 Porphyry 135, 149 Półtawski A. 67, 81 Pratt-Hartmann I. 185, 186 Pruss A. R. 160, 161 Pultr A. 179, 186 Quine W. V. O. 143, 149 Reich K. 54, 59, 62, 63, 66 Reichenbach H. 152–154, 160 Reiss J. 159, 161 Rédei M. 156, 161 Rollinger R. 133, 149 Rosiak M. xi, 18, 68, 87, 110, 111, 177, 182, 186 Rowbottom D. 35, 48 Russell B. 62, 151, 162 Schaffer J. 37, 49 Schulte J. 127 Searle J. 33 Shelley E. T. 34 Shimony A. 159, 162 Simons P. 37, 39, 41, 49 Skowron B. 175, 176, 187 Smith B. 39, 41, 49, 133, 149, 182, 185, 187 Smith D. W. 133 Sober E. 158, 159, 162 Socrates 12 Sorabji R. 138, 149 Spiegelberg H. 142, 149

Author Index Staff L. 69 Stapp H. P. 129, 130, 132, 144, 149 Stich S. 34 Strawson G. 144, 145, 149 Strawson P. F. 25, 34 Stróżewski W. 69, 89 Szabó L. E. 160, 161 Szatkowski M. xi, 18, 110, 186 Śniady P. 182, 187 Thomas Aquinas 84, 98, 134 Thorpe W. H. 132, 149 Tymieniecka A. T. 143, 149 Urchs M. 111

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Van Fraassen B. C. 157, 159, 162 Van Heijenoort J. 66 Van Inwagen P. 123 Van Lambalgen M. 54, 66 Velleman J. D. 71 Von Wachter D. 111 Wang H. 52, 65, 66 Whitehead A. N. 16, 87, 130, 132, 149 Williams D. C. 36, 49 Wittgenstein L. 117, 179 Wolff Ch. 67, 74, 76–78, 82, 84 Wolff M. 54, 66 Wroński L. 156, 161, 162 Yates D. 35, 36, 42, 49

Subject Index abstraction 57 accident 10, 64, 72, 73, 81, 84, 166 action 7, 52, 74, 76–79, 85, 116, 118 – direct 116 – explicit 116 – implicit 116 – indirect 116 – explicit 118 – original 117 activity 76, 77 actuality 69, 71 agency 117 agent 7, 113 agent-causation 118, 121, 123–125 – narrow 115 arithmetic – elementary 51 – Peano 51 atom 102 bearer 71 becoming 70 beginning 82 being 3, 4, 6, 8–10, 14, 15, 42, 139 – accidental 5 – human 67, 69, 85, 137 – negative 3 – non-fundametal 5 black hole 103, 104 body 22, 25, 132 brain 172 Brain-Machine Interface 28 categoricalism 36 category 10, 165 causal – psychophysical 32 Causal Bayesian Networks 156 Causal Markov Condition 156 causal of responsibility 119, 120 causality 51, 73, 82, 85, 137, 138, 166, 170 – formal 133, 134, 147 – mental 33

– probabilistic 151 – psychophysical 30, 33 cause 10, 51–53, 64, 82, 113, 165, 166 – common 153, 160 – effective 7 – final 7 – transcendent 7 chain – causal 99, 106 chance 104–107 change 69, 74, 79, 86, 87 chaos 107 chorismos 5, 6 closedness 177 cognition 166, 168, 170 – intuitive 166 Common Cause Principle 151, 153, 156, 160 community 166 comparison 57 completeness 63 – Kant’s 56 component 6 concept 139–141 conceptuality 139 consciousness 133–135, 137, 138, 140, 142–144, 146, 147, 165, 167, 170 consistency 51 continuity 169 correlate – neuronal 28 determinism 93, 96, 97, 100, 109 disposition 7 – mental 31, 33 – natural 75 dispositionalism 36 divisibility 177 domain – higher-order 52 dualism – Cartesian 165 – metaphysical 4 durée reele 167

Subject Index duration 170 dynamism 67 effect 10, 64, 166 – butterfly 107 emergentism 144, 145, 147 endurance 70 endurantism 71 EPR correlation 159 essence 8, 72, 78, 81, 84–86, 165 event 70, 82, 94 – actual 118 – physical 113, 114, 118, 121 – causeless 118 – possible 118 event-causation 113, 115, 125 existence 6 experience 168 – time 69 explanandum 3 extension 166, 169, 175–177, 179, 180, 182 extensionality 175 external 171 fact – general 42 – negative 3 favor 32 force 52, 67, 68, 72, 76, 77, 86, 88 – active 78, 79 – passive 78 – primitive 78 form 6, 7, 11, 78, 80, 140, 168 – accidental 85 – substantial 6, 8, 78, 85 freedom 93, 108, 109, 170 freedom of the will 125 fulfillment 25 function – governing 47 – guaranteeing 46, 47 haecceitas 86 hierarchy of ideas 4 hylemorphism 5 hypothesis – part-wholistic 5

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idea 139, 140 identicalness 170 identity 70, 72, 86 – individual 7 immanent 171 impenetrability 177 individual 6, 22, 37 – basic 6 – primary 7 inference 63 intention 146 intentionality 132–135, 141, 146 internal 171 judgment 58, 62–64 – categorical 59 – disjunctive 61 – hypothetical 60 kinds of properties 11 knowledge 5, 9, 17, 52, 54–56, 61–63, 65, 130, 153, 156, 167 law – determinate 40 – functional 40, 42, 46 law of series 78, 83 law-force 85–87 level of properties 11 logic – transcendental 60, 61 logos – Heraclitean 4 man 67, 68 materialism – syntactic 51 matrix – causal 96 matter 7 – primary 78 – prime 80 – secondary 78 method – phenomenological 53 mind 132, 136, 165, 171, 173 mode of existence 67, 69, 81

198 | Subject Index model – Henkin 51 monad 93, 101, 102 monadology 10 multiplicity 169 nature – constitutive 70, 72, 85, 86 – constructive 81 necessity 52 neuro-symptom 28 non-being 3, 4 object 6, 37, 81, 138, 139, 141 – cognized 142 – extending 176 – intentional 142 – part-individual 5 – particular 5 – perceptual 175 object enduring in time 70, 94, 95, 98, 100, 101 objectivation 141, 142 obstacle 77 occurring 70, 71 ontology – bi-categorial 175 – formal 175 – topological 183 panpsychism 144, 146, 147 part – temporal 70 participation 4 – platonic 5 particular 4, 36 – powerful 35, 36, 38 passion 7 passivity 72 perdurantism 71 permeation 168 persistence 71 philosophy – transcendental 53 physicalism 144 potency 78, 84 – active 75

– passive 75 power 78 – causal 35, 44 predication – formal ontological 40 principiatum 3 principium 3 principle 3 principle of responsibility 120 principle of sufficient cause 122 Principle of Sufficient Reason 160 process 70–72, 82, 85, 87, 94, 104, 106, 108, 109, 170 – bodily 23 – causal 36, 44–46, 48 – cognitive 166 – neuronal 28 – psychic 23 – somatic 21 processualism 87 property 68, 71, 72, 81, 87 – dispositional 35, 36, 41, 44–46 – fundamental 35 – intrinsic 35 – natural 35 – particular 37 propria 84 quality 7, 11, 58 – particular 8 quantity 7, 166 – physical 35, 39 reason 52 reductionism 143 reflection 57 relation 4, 7, 81 – formal 40 – mereological 40, 181 – ontological 39 – part-whole 4, 6 – similarity 4 – spatio-temporal 38 relation of exemplification 4 res cogitans 8, 175 res extensa 8, 175

Subject Index self 165 self-accomplishment 25 self-consciousness 54–56, 58, 62–64 sequence 169 serendipity 32 set – Cantor 180 simplicity – absolute 3 situation 7 solvability 51 soul 22, 24 space 12, 14, 165, 178, 181 – 3-dimensional 176 – Euclidean 183 – metrizable 183 – topological 179, 180 state – bodily 21, 32 – corporeal 27 – mental 21, 22, 28 – neuronal 31, 32 – operative 27 – physical 22 – psychic 21–23, 26–28, 30 – somatic 22 state of affairs 71 states of substance 80, 82 structure – causal 97, 98, 105 – cognitive 167 – spatial 166, 168, 170 – substantial 11 subject 74, 138, 139 – causal 93 – substantial 165 subject of consciousness 117 subject of properties 11 substance 10, 12, 37, 38, 51–53, 64, 70–73, 76, 77, 87, 166 – primary 7, 8 – secondary 7, 81 substantialism 70, 73, 77, 80, 84, 87 substantiality 3, 51, 65, 68, 72, 110, 161, 186

substratum 73 superessentialism 79 system – common cause 154 – Gödel’s ontological 51 – relatively isolated 101–103, 108 theorem – Gödel’s incompleteness 51 theory – dualistic 10 – Kant’s 58 – ontological 51 – part-whole 175 – percolation 182 – pragmatic anthropocentric 130 – quantum 132 thing – individual 4 – material 4 time 12, 14, 67–69, 165, 167, 176 – spatialised 170 topology 179, 182, 183 transcendent 142, 171 trope 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 45 – dispositional 42, 47 – nuclear 38 truthmaker 36, 40, 41, 43, 46 uniqueness 170 – absolute 3 unity 169 universal 6, 12, 36, 81 – determinable 43 virtus 78 whole – absolute 70 – summative 70 will – free 170 world 171, 173 – actual 116 – external 136, 141

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