Suárez’s Metaphysics in Its Historical and Systematic Context 9783110352634, 9783110354423

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Suárez’s Metaphysics in Its Historical and Systematic Context

Contemporary Scholasticism

Herausgegeben von/Edited by Edward Feser, Edmund Runggaldier Advisory Board Brian Davies, Fordham University, U.S.A., Christian Kanzian, University of Innsbruck, Austria, Gyula Klima, Fordham University, U.S.A., David S. Oderberg, University of Reading, U.K., Eleonore Stump, Saint Louis University, U.S.A.

Band/Volume 2

Suárez’s Metaphysics in Its Historical and Systematic Context Edited by Lukáš Novák

ISBN 978-3-11-035263-4 e-ISBN 978-3-11-035442-3 ISSN 2198-2503 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2014 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Printing: CPI books GmbH, Leck ♾ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com

CONTENTS Lukáš Novák Regaining the Context for Suárez. An Introduction to the Volume .............................. 1 Note on Editorial Policies. List of Abbreviations. .............................................................. 8

Part One GENERAL METAPHYSICS Marco Forlivesi In Search of the Roots of Suárez’s Conception of Metaphysics: Aquinas, Bonino, Hervaeus Natalis, Orbellis, Trombetta .............................................. 13 Rolf Darge Zum historischen Hintergrund der Transzendentalienlehre in den Disputationes metaphyicae ......................................................................................... 39 Giannina Burlando Suárez on Translatio vocis ‘Veritas’ ....................................................................................... 63 Victor Salas Francisco Suárez, the Analogy of Being, and its Tensions ............................................ 87 Marko J. Fuchs Univozität und Distinktion Metaphysische Grundstrukturen bei Duns Scotus, Suárez, Descartes und Spinoza .......................................................... 105 Costantino Esposito The Hidden Influence of Suárez on Kant’s Transcendental Conception of ‘Being’, ‘Essence’ and ‘Existence’ ............. 117 Marco Lamanna Ontology between Goclenius and Suárez ....................................................................... 135

Jorge Uscatescu Barrón Das Gedankending und der Gegenstand der Metaphysik Eine Untersuchung zum Problem der Analogie zwischen dem Realen Seienden und dem ens rationis in den Disputationes metaphysicae des Suárez ............................. 153 Daniel D. Novotný The Historical Non-Significance of Suárez’s Theory of Beings of Reason: A Lesson From Hurtado ..................................................................................................... 183

Part Two SPECIAL THEMES Jorge Secada Suárez’s Nominalist Master Argument: Metaphysical Disputations 5, 1 ...................... 211 Saverio Di Liso The Efficient Cause in Domingo de Soto ......................................................................... 237 Simo Knuuttila The Connexions between Vital Acts in Suárez’s Psychology ...................................... 259 Anna Tropia Scotus and Suárez on Sympathy: The Necessity of the “connexio potentiarum” in the Present State .............................. 275 Stephan Schmid Suárez and the Problem of Final Causation ................................................................... 293 Robert Fastiggi Suárez in Relation to Anselm, Aquinas and Scotus on Proving God’s existence ............................................................................................... 309 Author Profiles .................................................................................................................... 325

About the Editor.................................................................................................................. 329 General Index ...................................................................................................................... 331 Index of Persons .................................................................................................................. 345

Index of Greek Terms ......................................................................................................... 348

VI

REGAINING THE CONTEXT FOR SUÁREZ AN INTRODUCTION TO THE VOLUME Lukáš Novák The historical and philosophical personality of Francisco Suárez seems to be a  source of many paradoxes. Suárez may appear, as Benjamin Hill observes,1 as a unique and unclassifiable thinker: neither mediæval, nor Renaissance, nor early modern. On the other hand, one may wonder whether this impression of unclassifiability does not arise simply from our grave ignorance of an entire class to which he belongs – namely, the class of Renaissance and Baroque scholastic thinkers, which may have comprised dozens of thinkers of comparable brilliance, about whom, however, we know too little to be able to appreciate them. On the one hand, Suárez seems to be a pivotal figure in the development of early modern scholasticism: a synthesis of its Renaissance phase, and the source of its Baroque continuation. He reflects most of the preceding philosophical tradition, and conversely, virtually every schoolman of the 17th century knows and cites him, so that his influence seems omnipresent for several decades and scholars can speak about “pre-Suárezian” and “post-Suárezian” scholasticism.2 But then, when you go to the details, you find that as a matter of fact not very many of his specific doctrines were actually adopted by anyone, and virtually no-one embraced his philosophy as a whole. Suárez is generally considered to be the father of the last of the three great academic schools of thought of the 17th century, adopted by the Jesuits in a similar way the Dominicans (and Carmelites) embraced Thomism and the Franciscans Scotism. But a genuine Suárezian is hard to find in the 17th century even among the Jesuits (most of those who had been so labelled before, such as Hurtado or Arriaga, turned out to have been even less Suárezian than Suárez was a Thomist). As a matter of fact, it is even problematic to speak of a Suárezian school, in the sense of concentrated intellectual effort of many scholars over an extended period of time to develop further the philosophico-theological heritage of a given master. There was Thomism and many great Thomists, such as Cajetan, Bañez or Poinsot, whose intellectual achievements went far beyond what Aquinas had envisaged; likewise, there was Scotism and a number of brilliant Scotists. 1   B. Hill, “Introduction”, in The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez, ed. B. Hill and H. Lagerlund (New York: Oxford Universtity Press, 2012). 2   Cf. e.g. Daniel D. Novotný, “Prolegomena to a Study of Beings of Reason in post-Suárezian Scholasticism, 1600–1650”, Studia Neoaristotelica 3 (2006): 117–141.

INTRODUCTION

But was there ever a thinker who would do for Suárez what Cajetan did for Aquinas and Mastri for Scotus? Hardly. Suárez’s influence on posterity is undeniable, but not at all trivial to trace. There are other paradoxes and puzzles about Suárez. One can wonder whether Suárezian philosophy represents an original and organic whole, perhaps the ultimate synthesis of the scholastic tradition, or whether the systematic form of presentation harbours a rather eclectic content, the intrinsic tensions of which finally herald the looming decay and collapse of scholasticism. Suárez’s solutions to the traditional problems that have always troubled the scholastics tend to have the strange charm of appearing at once both obvious and inscrutable. It is often quite easy to spell out precisely what Suárez says on a certain question; but it is notoriously difficult to actually “get it”. Just for comparison: there is no serious controversy regarding the question of what kind of position Aquinas or Scotus hold concerning the problem of universals, the nature of being, the status of metaphysics etc. But in case of Suárez we suddenly are not sure whether at the bottom of things he is a realist or a nominalist, whether he does or does not endorse univocity of being, whether his metaphysics is about things or concepts, and so on. Suárez’s thought is elusive and difficult in its systematic clarity. And this is one of the reasons why he is extremely interesting. I would like to suggest that perhaps a significant deal of these difficulties stems from the fact that we are still very far from being able to see Suárez in proper context. No comprehensive history of Renaissance and Baroque scholasticism has been written yet; the standard textbooks in history of philosophy are just starting to become aware of the existence of the Renaissance and Baroque scholastic culture, not to speak of appreciating its importance. Why is it so? At the time Suárez died, philosophy was at the verge of a process it had not experienced ever before in its history: an intellectual movement originating among outsiders to the standard academic milieu would succeed in carrying through the idea that the entire hitherto philosophical tradition has to be discarded and philosophy must make a fresh start. The success of this intellectual programme was complete and (so far) permanent, even to the effect that there was not just one fresh start in the so-called modern thought. One after another modern thinkers came to the building of philosophy inherited from their sires and felt the urge to pull it down first, so that they could erect an entirely new construction on the site (perhaps making use of some of the bricks and beams that survived the bulldozing, at the best). Understandably, after several rounds of this practice the splendour and complexity of the original building, and eventually even its existence, fell into oblivion. We are the heirs of these thinkers. We are capable now of perceiving Suárez’s achitectonic vision, but we know very little about the building in which he was actually living and to which that vision was intended to apply – from within and without

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INTRODUCTION

bulldozers. We need to know the context, not only in order to appreciate, but to understand the vision in the first place. *** This volume is an attempt to contribute to the quest of putting Suárez’s metaphysics (a mere fragment of the whole of his intellectual legacy) into context, historical and systematic. It is the fruit of an international conference titled “Suárez’s Metaphysics. Disputationes Metaphysicae in their Historical and Systematic Context”, co-organized by the Faculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice, and the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, which was held in Prague on October 1–3, 2008.3 The conference was divided in three historically ordered sections: (A) Historical Inuences upon Suárez’s Metaphysics (B) Suárez’s Metaphysics as a Metaphysical System (C) The Impact of Suárez’s Metaphysics upon Early Modern Philosophy However, during the editing of the present volume it soon turned out that many of the contributed papers cannot be usefully squeezed into a single section, and moreover that an attempt to do so would result in dispersion of contributions treating similar systematic topics all over the volume. For that reason I eventually decided to organize the volume primarily on systematical and only secondarily on historical basis. This approach resulted naturally in dividing the entire volume in two parts. Part One, entitled “General Metaphysics”, collects in a certain historico-systematical order those contributions that tackle, in some way or other, the central topic of being as the subject of Suárezian metaphysics, with respect to closely connected topics such as the nature of metaphysics, the relation of being to other transcendentals, the problem of analogy and univocity of being, of essence and existence, and of the relationship between real being and being of reason. Part Two of the volume in turn comprises the remaining articles, devoted to more special metaphysical topics including universality and individuality, relations, causality, powers, and finally the existence of God, and has therefore received the title “Special Themes”. It should perhaps be noted that although this division inevitably reminds one of the two-volume organization of Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations, or even of Wolff ’s scheme of General vs. Special metaphysics, it is not intended necessarily to mirror either of these – as should be clear for example from the fact that papers discussing entia rationis (in Metaphysical Disputations treated in the last 54th disputation as a kind of appendix) have been located in Part One, whereas the treatment of universals (in Suárez treated in vol. 1 in connexion with transcendental unity) has been assigned to 3

  See the conference website at http://old.flu.cas.cz/suarezmetaphysics.

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INTRODUCTION

Part Two. And even less should this editorial approach be understood as an attempt of the editor to read any specific “system” of his own into Suárez. The systematic organization of the volume is of practical nature, a result of an attempt to order the given texts in a sensible way, with no intended implications regarding the overall systematic nature of Suárez’s philosophy, or philosophy in general. Part One of the book opens with a paper by Marco Forlivesi called “In Search of the Roots of Suárez’s Conception of Metaphysics: Aquinas, Bonino, Hervaeus Natalis, Orbellis, Trombetta”. Forlivesi defends the view that Suárez’s metaphysics should not be interpreted as essentially just “ontology”, or study of the transcendentals, but provides knowledge much deeper and richer than that. Forlivesi then traces this Suárezian conception to its sources, which are to be looked for both in the Thomist and the Scotist traditions. Rolf Darge continues in a similar vein. In his article entitled “Zum historischen Hintergrund der Transzendentalienlehre in den Disputationes Metaphysicae” he develops the argument that Suárez’s “Transcendentalienlehre” is not just an original re-development of essentially Scotistic principles, but should rather be seen as a synthesis of the Scotistic notion of scientia transcendens with an older, pre-Scotistic or mostly Thomistic tradition of transcendental thought. The next two articles turn to systematic analysis of Suárez’s “general-metaphysical” thought. Giannina Burlando in her paper “Suárez on Translatio vocis ‘Veritas’ ” focuses on just one of the transcendentals: the Truth, and shows how Suárez’s notion of transcendental or ontological truth is derived from his notion of logical truth, which is embedded within his theory of mental language and concepts as cognitive acts. Burlando argues that by linking truth (of any kind) more closely with mental concepts (and not just with judgements) Suárez paved the way for modern epistemological thought. In the next article, “Francisco Suárez, the Analogy of Being, and its Tensions”, Victor Salas sets out to explain the notorious tension within Suárez’s teaching on the nature of the concept of being, which, according to Suárez, is both perfectly one and analogical. Salas believes that the key ingredient to understanding Suárez’s conception of the analogy of being is his notion of aptitudinal being. The remaining five papers of Part One are in different ways concerned with the fates of Suárezian “general-metaphysical” themes in post-Suárezian philosophical thought. Marko J. Fuchs in his contribution “Univozität und Distinktion: Metaphysische Grundstrukturen bei Duns Scotus, Suárez, Descartes und Spinoza” attempts to draw an “alternative line” of history of philosophy to the one which according to Honnefelder and others reaches from Scotus via Suárez, Wolff, and Kant to Peirce. Fuchs’s line takes a bit different course: it starts with Scotus and Suárez, too, but then goes on to Descartes, Spinoza, and ultimately Schelling and Hegel, and its course encompasses the analyses of the differentiation of reality as they evolved in these thinkers.

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INTRODUCTION

Costantino Esposito continues on the theme of Suárezian impact on modern thinkers, devoting his paper to describing “The Hidden Influence of Suárez on Kant’s Transcendental Conception of ‘Being’, ‘Essence’ and ‘Existence’”. Esposito shows how the fundamental principles of Suárezian metaphysics, that is, in the first place the Suárezian understanding of being (ens) and existence, reemerge as determinig factors of Kantian transcendental philosophy, through the mediation of the Protestant “Schulmetaphysik”. This Protestant line of reception of the Suárezian legacy is further explored by Marco Lamanna, who in his paper “Ontology between Goclenius and Suárez” attempts to disentagle the complicated process of emergence of the notion and term of “ontology” within Reformed scholasticism and trace the decisive Jesuit influences on Reformed thinkers. These are shown to have used the traditional Suárezian understanding of metaphysics as a study of real being as an antidote against the “super transcendental” conception presented by Clemens Timpler, which however was itself inspired by the legacy of the Jesuit Fonseca. In Lamanna’s article, the complicated relation between real being and being of reason entered the stage. Although beings of reason (entia rationis) seem to function in Suárez’s metaphysics as that which determines its outer boundaries, so to speak, viz. that against which the object of metaphysics, ens reale, is distinguished, they are nevertheless, if only for that very reason, still treated by that science. The last two articles in Part One venture to explore the complicated nature and status of entia rationis in metaphysics. Jorge Uscatescu Barrón contributes an article entitled “Das Gedankending und der Gegenstand der Metaphysik: Eine Untersuchung zum Problem der Analogie zwischen dem Realen Seienden und dem ens rationis in den Disputationes metaphysicae des Suárez”, in which he defends the interpretation that entia rationis belong to the adequate object of Suárez’s metaphysics. This, however, Uscatescu explains, does not compromise the unity of this science, which is saved in virtue of a “minimal analogy”, viz. the improper analogy of proportionality, between ens reale and ens rationis. In his concluding chapter Uscatescu also offers an outlook on the reception of the Suárezian conception in post-Suárezian Jesuit tradition. Finally, Daniel D. Novotný in his paper provocativelly titled “The Historical Non-Significance of Suárez’s Theory of Beings of Reason: A Lesson From Hurtado”, which concludes Part One of the book, analyses two installments of Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza’s doctrine of beings of reasons and shows that despite initial appearances, Hurtado is absolutely original in his conception of entia rationis and in effect simply ignores Suárez. Novotný suspects that a similar surprising “historical non-signifiance” of Suárez’s legacy may surface once other issues discussed by Baroque authors are examined more closely. Part Two of the book contains only six contributions. It opens with an article by Jorge Secada titled “Suárez’s Nominalist Master Argument: Metaphysical Disputations 5, 1”. Secada uses “nominalist” in a broad sense, so that it extends to any theory maintaining that anything that can possibly exist is individual. Having presented

5

INTRODUCTION

certain interesting textual discoveries concerning Section 1 of Disputation 5, Secada provides an analysis of Suárez’s “Master Argument” for his position and shows that it presupposes a version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. Saverio Di Liso in his article “The Efficient Cause in Domingo de Soto” compares the understanding of efficient causality in Soto and Suárez, and arrives at the conclusion that unlike Soto, who understands efficient cause still in a “physical” way, i.e., as a principle of motion, Suárez develops a distinctly “metaphysical” conception of efficient cause, conceiving it as the principle of being. The next two papers deal with vital causality. Simo Knuuttila presents an article titled “The Connexions between Vital Acts in Suárez’s Psychology”. Knuuttila explains Suárez’s conception of vital causation, according to which vital acts can only be elicited internally, so that both external efficient causation and production of vital acts by other acts is excluded, and traces it to its sources in Averroës, Scotus and Buridan. Finally, Knuuttila explains the notion of “sympathy”, which is Suárez’s solution to the problem of operative connexions between vital acts, and likens this kind of connexion to the Humean conception of causality. The theme of “sympathy” is further elaborated in Anna Tropia’s paper “Scotus and Suárez on Sympathy: The Necessity of the ‘Connexio Potentiarum’ in the Present State”. Tropia analyses Suárez’s De anima treatment of the topic, compares it with the formulations of Scotus, and also reflects a criticism of Suárez by the famous 17th century Scotists, Mastri and Belluto. She shows how much Suárez owes to the Fransciscan tradition, but also where he departs from it. The series of papers exploring Suárez’s understanding of causality closes with a paper titled “Suárez and the Problem of Final Causation” contributed by Stephan Schmid. Schmid’s aim is to reconstruct Suárez’s theory of final causation and to show how final causality is indispensable in his philosophy: in particular, final causes play an important rôle in explaining the intelligibility of libertarian freedom, by providing an explanation of free actions which is both non-deterministic and ultimately satisfying. On the other hand, a final cause does not move the efficient cause whose operation it explains really but only “metaphorically”. Thus it appears that for Suárez final causation is supervenient or ontologically dependent on, though not reducible to, efficient causation. The very last article is devoted to a theme which traditionally crowns the expositions of the science of metaphysics – viz. the existence of God. It is titled “Suárez in Relation to Anselm, Aquinas and Scotus on Proving God’s existence”, and the author, Robert Fastiggi, provides a detailed analysis of Suárez’s demonstration of the existence of God, presented as a synthesis of motives adapted from his mediæval predecessors, originally developed and informed with later objections. Fastiggi does not shun the question of validity of Suárez’s argument, and ventures to give a positive answer to it. ***

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INTRODUCTION

I would like to use this opportunity to thank all the authors for their contributions to this volume, for their patience with the difficulties and delays of the editorial process, and for their most helpful cooperation. I also wish to thank dr. Daniel Heider, who managed the early phase of the project, and to the two institutions participating in organizing the conference, of which this volume is a late fruit: the Faculty of Theology of the University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice, and the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. My special thanks go to Světla Hanke Jarošová for valuable aid and advice in matters of language, and I am also grateful to Victor Salas for substantial help in this regard.4 Francisco Suárez is a prominent representant of an officially almost forgotten era of intellectual history. May it be that the collective effort of the scholars participating in compiling this book helps to regain the memory of Renaissance and Baroque scholasticism for us – not only as a glorious but antiquated part of the history of western philosophy, but also as an inspiration in our actual struggles with the perennial philosophical questions. Representing an exceptionally committed and diligent attempt to deal with these questions, I am sure that Suárez’s metaphysics can teach us a lot even today.

 I also thank Daniel D. Novotný, Daniel Heider and Světla Hanke Jarošová for comments on earlier drafts of this Introduction. 4

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NOTE ON EDITORIAL POLICIES The formal aspects of the individual contributions, like citation and quotation style, have been accomodated to the recommendations of the Chicago Manual of Style, as far as deemed practical and suitable – complete uniformity was by no means the goal. For frequently cited classical philosophical works a system of abbreviations has been adopted, as listed below; such works are cited in the standard way according to their structure; the edition, volume and page being given in parentheses. A special set of abbreviations was introduced for Suárez’s works. The volume and page of the standard Vivès edition of Suárez’s Opera omnia is indicated in parentheses (if the author chose to indicate it at all) by means of Roman (volume) and Arabic (page) numerals alone, the indication of the edition being left out for brevity. In a similar way, in citations of the Disputationes metaphysicae according to disputation, section and paragraph numbers, only the numbers are given. Otherwise mere arabic numbers always indicate pages; however, the abbreviation “p.” is sometimes used for clarity. Abbreviations of other works not listed below are explained when introduced. In quotations, square brackets [ ] are used for all sorts of editorial comments or words added for clarity which are not intended as part of the quoted text; for abridgement bracketed ellipsis […] is used. Additions intended as emendations of the quoted text are marked by angle brackets  .

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Suárez’s works

DM Disputationes metaphysicae. CQDA Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima. Edited by S. Castellote. Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1978–1991. DA De anima. In Opera omnia III. Paris: Vivès, 1856.

Other classical texts Cat. Anal. Post. Phys. Metaph. STh SCG In Sent. In De Trin. In Met. In Phys. De veritate Ord. Oxon. Super Met.

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Aristoteles. Categoriae. Aristoteles. Analytica Posteriora. Aristoteles. Physica. Aristoteles. Metaphysica. Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologiae. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles. Thomas Aquinas. Scriptum super Sententiis. Thomas Aquinas. In Boethium De Trinitate. Thomas Aquinas. In XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio. Thomas Aquinas. Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum. Thomas Aquinas. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate. Joannes Duns Scotus. Ordinatio. Joannes Duns Scotus. Opus Oxoniense. Joannes Duns Scotus. Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis.

Editions

ed. Leonina Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita. Romae, 1882—. ed. Wadding Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia. Edited by Luke Wadding. 12 vols. Lyon: Durand, 1639. Reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968. ed. Vivès Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia. 26 vols. Paris: Louis Vivès. 1891–1895. Reprint: Westmead, Franborough, and Hants: Gregg International Publishers, 1969. ed. Vaticana [= ed. Vat.] Joannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia. Edited by C. Balić et al. Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950—. ed. Bonaventuriana [= ed. Bonav.] B. Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Philosophica. St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1997–2006. AT Œuvres de Descartes. Edited by Charles Adam et Paul Tannery. Paris: Vrin, 1964–1974. CAG Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. Edita consilio et auctoritate academiae litterarum Regiae Borussicae. 23 vols. Berolini: typis et impensis G. Reimeri, 1882–1909.

Structural parts of works a. c. co. col. d. dist. l. lect.

articulus caput, capitulum, chapter corpus articuli; conclusio collumn disputatio distinctio liber, book lectio

lin. n. p. q. s. t. tract. un.

line numerus, number of paragraph page quaestio sectio tomus tractatus unica

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PART ONE

GENERAL METAPHYSICS

IN SEARCH OF THE ROOTS OF SUÁREZ’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS: AQUINAS, BONINO, HERVAEUS NATALIS, ORBELLIS, TROMBETTA Marco Forlivesi

ABSTRACT

The “anti-ontological” conception of metaphysics developed by Suárez is distinguished by two fundamental theses and two theses connected to the fundamental ones. First fundamental thesis: as concerns the depth of the investigation conducted by metaphysics about spiritual substances and material substances, this science proceeds asymmetrically. This thesis is connected to the following: metaphysics is not a science concerned only with transcendental rationes; in fact, it provides a knowledge deeper than that constituted by the attribution of transcendental rationes to a certain number of subjects. Second fundamental thesis: comprehending the subject of metaphysics involves the acknowledgement of the existence of spiritual beings. This thesis is connected to the following: metaphysics, to some extent, demonstrates the existence of its object. The sources from which Suárez may have drawn inspiration for his position are at least five. As to the first fundamental thesis and the thesis connected to it, the source of the Jesuit thinker is probably Thomas Aquinas. As to the second fundamental thesis, a source of Suárez’s position might be Alexander of Alessandria (also known as Alexander Bonensis and Alessandro Bonino). As to the thesis connected to the second fundamental one, Suárez might have drawn inspiration from Hervaeus Natalis (Nédellec) and Nicolaus de Orbellis (also known as Nicolaus Dorbellis, Nicolaus de Dorbellis, Nicholas of Orvaux and Nicolas de Orvaux). Lastly, as regards at least the two fundamental theses and the first secondary thesis, the nearest and probable source of Suárez’s thought is Antonio Trombetta.

1. SUÁREZ CRITICAL OF THE CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS AS AN ONTOLOGY

In past works of mine, I have argued that Francisco Suárez cannot be considered the father, nor yet a supporter, of a conception of metaphysics as ontology. On the contrary, he firmly opposed such a possibility, disputing Benet Perera’s position (even if he – as it was to be expected – never mentioned the latter explicitly) on the nature of the first philosophy.1 1   On Suárez’s position, let me refer to M. Forlivesi, “Impure Ontology. The Nature of Metaphysics and Its Object in Francisco Suárez’s Texts”, Quaestio 5 (2005): 559–586; Id.: “Ontologia impura. La natura della metafisica secondo Francisco Suárez”, in Francisco Suárez. “Der ist

MARCO FORLIVESI

My thesis rests on four reasons, corresponding to four constituents of Suárez’s doctrine. First of all, according to our author, being taken as the object of metaphysics does not include all the rationes that are inferior to the ratio of being, but only some of them. […] haec scientia non considerat omnes proprias rationes seu quidditates entium in particulari, seu ut talia sunt, sed solum eas quae sub propria ejus abstractione continentur, vel quatenus sunt cum illa necessario conjunctae.2 […] pertinere ad hanc scientiam tractare in particulari de omnibus entibus seu rationibus entium, quae non nisi in rebus immaterialibus inveniri possunt, ut est communis ratio substantiae immaterialis, ratio primae seu increatae substantiae, et spiritus etiam creati, et omnium specierum, seu intelligentiarum quae sub ipso continentur.3

In particular, the object of metaphysics includes the rationes relating to spiritual substances and the rationes relating to material substances in a nonsymmetrical way. Metaphysics deals with all that one can know about spiritual substances (and, according to Suárez, one can know more about them than the mere fact that they are ens, unum and aliquid); by contrast, it does not deal with all that one can know about material substances. […] substantiam immaterialem per se et directe considerat, omnia in universum tractando, quae de illa cognosci possunt; substantiam autem materialem non ita contemplatur, sed solum quatenus necesse est ad distinguendam illam a substantia immateriali, et ad cognoscendum de illa omnia metaphysica praedicata, quae illi ut materialis est, conveniunt, ut, verbi gratia, esse compositam ex actu et potentia, et modum hujus compositionis, et quod est quoddam ens per se unum, et similia.4

Beside this (and even before this) one should notice that, according to the Spanish Jesuit, being, taken as the object of metaphysics, includes more than transcendental rationes. As Suárez writes, metaphysics also deals with substance, accident,5 created der Mann”. Homenaje al prof. Salvador Castellote (Valencia: Facultad de Teología “San Vicente Ferrer”, 2004), 161–207. On Perera’s position, cf. M. Lamanna: “«De eo enim Metaphysicus agit logice». Un confronto tra Pererius e Goclenius”, Medioevo 34 (2009): 315–360. On Suárez’s “institutional working conditions”, let me refer to M. Forlivesi, “Francisco Suárez and the ‘rationes studiorum’ of the Society of Jesus”, in Francisco Suárez and His Legacy. The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy, ed. M. Sgarbi (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2010), 77–90. 2   DM 1, 2, 13. 3   DM 1, 2, 16. One should notice that the phrase ‘in particulari’ refers to ‘tractare’. 4   DM 1, 2, 27. 5   DM 1, 2, 14: “haec scientia sub ratione entis considerat rationem substantiae, ut sic, et rationem etiam accidentis.”

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THE ROOTS OF SUÁREZ’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS

or uncreated being, finite or infinite substance, absolute or relative accident, quality, action, operation or dependence,6 cause, each type of cause, and with the causes of the whole universe.7 Actually, according to Suárez, about all these rationes metaphysics discovers more than the attribution to them of transcendental rationes: it seizes them in their own nature. The third reason proving that Suárez’s conception of metaphysics and the conception of metaphysics as an ontology are poles apart is the following: according to Suárez, the ratio of being on which the ratio of being qua being is founded presupposes the existence of spiritual beings. Consequently, in Suárez’s view, the ratio of real being – at least insofar as it forms the foundation of the ratio of being qua being – is not the result of a mere generalization performed by the mind. In posteriori autem loco [Aristotelis] conditionalis illa (Si non esset alia substantia superior praeter materiales, naturalis philosophia esset prima, neque esset alia scientia necessaria) verissima est, non quia substantia immaterialis sit adaequatum obiectum primae philosophiae, sed quia hac substantia ablata, auferretur tam proprium quam adaequatum obiectum primae philosophiae, quia non solum auferretur immaterialis substantia, sed etiam omnes rationes entis vel substantiae communes rebus immaterialibus et materialibus, et data illa hypotesi, sicut nulla essent entia immaterialia, ita nullae etiam essent rationes entium abstrahentes a materia secundum esse, et ideo non esset necessaria alia scientia distincta [a naturali philosophia].8 […] nihil […] aliud est abstrahere a materia secundum esse, quam quod possit in rerum natura vere ac realiter existere absque materia; hoc autem verum est non tantum de substantia immateriali ut sic, sed etiam de quacumque ratione superiori, quae cum sufficienter existere possit in substantia ipsa immateriali, constat posse etiam in rebus existere sine materia.9 […] in eo casu [i.e.: Si non esset alia substantia superior praeter materiales] non fore necessariam scientiam metaphysicae specialem, et a naturali philosophiam distinctam. Ratio est, quia tunc philosophia ageret de omni substantia […] ad eamdem philosophiam spectaret omnium praedicamentorum divisio et consideratio […] omnium essentiarum, omniumque causarum realium consideratio […] eadem ageret de praedicatis communibus substantiae, et accidentibus, nec propter illa 6   DM 1, 2, 15: “[...] idem dicendum esse de omnibus rationibus communibus, quae sub ente, substantia et accidente ita abstrahi possunt, ut sint in rebus sine materia; hujusmodi sunt ratio entis creati vel increati, substantiae finitae aut infinitae, et similiter accidentis absoluti vel respectivi, qualitatis, actionis, operationis aut dependentiae, et similium.” 7   DM 1, 2, 17: “Tertio […] de communi ratione causae, et de singulis causarum generibus, ut sic, et de primis ac potissimis causis seu rationibus causandi totius universi.” 8   DM 1, 1, 16. 9   DM 1, 1, 16.

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sola oporteret specialem scientiam constituere, quia non abstraherent a materia sensibili, et conceptus entis non esset alius a conceptu entis materialis.10

Thus Suárez coherently states that metaphysics shows that its subject/object occurs (and this thesis is the last of the four constituents at issue of his doctrine). […] hanc scientiam in hoc superare reliquas, quod ipsa non solum supponit suum obiectum esse, sed etiam, si necesse sit, illud esse ostendit, propriis principiis utens, per se loquendo; nam per accidens interdum utitur alienis et extraneis propter excellentiam sui objecti, et defectum nostri intellectus, qui non potest illud perfecte attingere, ut in se est, sed ex inferioribus rebus. Cum autem dicitur scientiam supponere suum obiectum esse, intelligitur per se loquendo, ut notavit Cajetanus, prima parte, q. 2, art. 3; per accidens vero non inconvenit scientiam aliquam demonstrare quoad nos objectum suum. Quod si illa scientia suprema sit, non indiget ope alterius, sed in vi sua id praestare potest, et hujusmodi est metaphysica […].11

As a corollary of the previous observations, one may notice that in Suárez’s view the ratio of being qua being (i.e. the ratio that is the subject/object of metaphysics) is not formally identical with the ratio of being. There is no doubt that the former is founded on the latter; notwithstanding, the latter is a metaphysical notion, whereas the former is an epistemological notion.12 The latter embraces all beings and, according to Suárez, is included in each of them; the former expresses and recapitulates the network of links holding all that metaphysics deals with. In point of fact, what is somehow problematic in Suárez’s doctrine is not the unity of the science of rationes generalissimae (let us say “ontology”) with the science of spiritual substances (let us say “rational theology”); what is somehow problematic in his doctrine is that, on some occasions, he establishes an identity between transcendental being and being qua being, i.e. between transcendental being and the subject/object of metaphysics. I say “somehow” because one might think that he conceives of this identity as of a material one, not as a formal one; yet, Suárez is not explicit on this point. 2. A FIRST ATTEMPT TO TRACE THE SOURCES OF SUÁREZ’S POSITION: THOMAS AQUINAS One may ask whether the four theses that substantiate Suárez’s opposition to the conception of metaphysics as an ontology can be traced back to some previous author. Since Suárez sees and presents himself as a good follower of Thomas Aquinas, one may think that those theses can be found in the writings of the Italian Dominican.

  DM 2, 2, 31.   DM 1, 4, 14. 12   Here and hereafter I use the word ‘epistemology’ not in the general sense of ‘gnoseology’ but in the strict sense of ‘doctrine of scientific knowledge’. 10

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2.1 As regards the rst two theses: Thomas Aquinas as a possible source of Suárez’s position According to what Aquinas writes in his commentary on Boëthius’ De Trinitate and in the proem to his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the subiectum of a science is that whose attributes are demonstrated and whose principles are studied in that science; furthermore, what a science deals with is broader than its subiectum and yet can be referred to that subiectum; finally, the obiectum (one may note: the obiectum, not the subiectum) of a science is that ratio in which all the things considered in that science take part (communicant). If applied to metaphysics, this scheme involves the following results. The subiectum of metaphysics is common being. What this science deals with (considerat) is being, its attributes, and its principles (among which there are separate substances). The obiectum of metaphysics is that which is speculatively knowable (speculabile) and does not depend upon matter according to reason (secundum rationem) nor according to its being (secundum esse).13 This thesis raises several interpretative problems; nevertheless, there is no doubt that the kind of metaphysics Aquinas conceives of is, at least to some extent, asymmetrical. According to Thomas, metaphysics deals with material beings only insofar as these beings are included in common rationes; by contrast, it deals with spiritual substances both insofar as these substances are included in common rationes and as these substances are principles of transcendental being. Beside this, one may observe that ens commune, which for Aquinas is subject of metaphysics, is not conceptually identical with transcendental being. First of all, transcendental being includes all its inferiors whereas common being includes some inferiors of being (i.e., general rationes and rationes of immaterial substances as far as the latter are taken as principles of being), but not all of them (it excludes both particular rationes of material beings and the rationes of immaterial substances that are different from those characterizing these substances when the latter are taken as principles of being). In other words, in Aquinas’ view as well, transcendental being is an ontological/metaphysical notion, whereas common being is an epistemological notion. In the reality they are identical, but before the mind they are not completely identical.14 Thomas Aquinas’ position is not unprecedented. It can be considered as an attempt to follow the doctrine formulated by his master, Albert the Great, while making it more rigorous. Moreover, it relies heavily on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ position. Nevertheless, we may conclude that Thomas Aquinas can be the source, or one of   Thomas Aquinas, In De Trin., q. 5, a. 1, co.; and Id., In Met., Prol.   For a closer analysis of Aquinas’ position, let me refer to M. Forlivesi: “Approaching the Debate on the Subject of Metaphysics Between the Later Middle Ages and the Early Modern Age: The Ancient and Medieval Antecedents”, Medioevo 34 (2009): 9–59. 13 14

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the sources, of the first two of the four theses upon which Suárez’s opposition to the conception of metaphysics as an ontology is founded. 2.2 As regards the third and fourth theses: between a well-known statement by Aristotle and two problematic statements by Avicenna Here we shall examine the question of Aquinas’ position concerning the epistemological rôle of separate substances within metaphysics. Indeed, the statements the Italian Dominican expresses on this point are rather vague. In his commentary on Boëthius’ De Trinitate, he writes that the degree of abstraction that characterizes metaphysics – and only metaphysics – does not result from an act of abstraction but from an act of separation, i.e. from a judgement: metaphysics deals with “things” that can really be immaterial (for instance, with substance), and for this very reason it grasps these “things” not only by abstracting the universal from the particular, but also judging their separation from matter.15 This suggests that, according to Thomas, in order to distinguish metaphysics from physics it is necessary to acknowledge the existence of immaterial substances. A second clue can be found in Thomas’ proem to his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. […] secundum esse et rationem separari dicuntur, non solum illa quae nunquam in materia esse possunt, sicut Deus et intellectuales substantiae, sed etiam illa quae possunt sine materia esse, sicut ens commune. Hoc tamen non contingeret, si a materia secundum esse dependerent.16

What is the meaning of this statement? Indeed, a statement approaching Aquinas’ argument already appears in the Latin translation of Avicenna’s al-Ilāhiyyāt. […] consideratio de substantia inquantum est ens vel est substantia, vel de corpore inquantum est substantia, et de mensura et numero inquantum habent esse et quomodo habent esse, et de rebus formalibus quae non sunt in materia, vel, si sint in materia, non tamen corporea, et quomodo sunt illae, et quis modus est magis proprius illis, separatim per se debet haberi. Non enim potest esse subiectum alicuius scientiarum de sensibilibus nec alicuius scientiarum de eo quod habet esse in sensibilibus. Nam aestimatio est expoliatio a sensibilibus; haec autem sunt de universitate eorum quae habent esse separata a materia. Manifestum est enim quod esse substantiae, inquantum est substantia tantum, non pendet a materia; alioquin non esset substantia nisi sensibilis.17

The statement by Avicenna I have emphasized in italics had been noticed. Indeed, immediately before Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great had written:   Thomas Aquinas, In De Trin., q. 5, a. 3, co.   Thomas Aquinas, In Met., Prol. 17   Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive Scientia divina, tract. 1, cap. 2. My emphasis. 15 16

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Si quis […] diffinire velit substantiam in eo quod est substantia et esse eius considerare voluerit, nihil sensibilium vel mobilium ingredietur in esse et rationem suam, quia si talia in esse substantiae et rationem ingrederentur, oporteret, quod essent de esse et ratione omnis substantiae, et hoc patet non esse verum, cum nihil horum conveniat substantiis separatis.18

And about thirty years after Thomas, Alexander of Alessandria wrote: [H]aec scientia communiter dicitur Philosophia veritatis, Scientia divina, vel Metaphisica. Denominatio enim in habitibus potest fieri ab obiecto, et a fine. Нaeс ergo scientia potest denominari ab obiecto, et hoc duobus modis: quoddam enim est obiectum in hac scientia formale, ut ens, vel ratio entis: hic enim specialiter tractatur de rebus, inquantum in eis salvatur ratio entis: et secundum hanc rationem haec scientia dicitur Metaphysica, hoc est super naturam a Meta, quod est supra, et Physis natura: ens inquantum ens non est ens naturale; quia in suo esse, vel in suo diffiniri non concernit res motas, vel materiae [sic; legitur materiam]; quia si ens inquantum ens concerneret motum vel materiam in suo esse, omne ens esset in materia. Quia quando aliquid convenit alicui secundum rationem reduplicativam, convenit sibi universaliter: et sic ens inquantum ens, si in materia esset, omne ens esset materiale: nec etiam quantum ad diffiniri concernit materiam, si enim concerneret quantum ad diffiniri, nullum ens posset diffiniri sine materia: et similiter dicendum est de motu, sicut de materia: ergo ens inquantum ens est supra naturam motus, et ideo scientia considerans hoc obiectum Metaphysica dici potest. Secundo est aliquod obiectum in hac scientia, in quo maxime salvatur ratio entis […]: et ab hoc tali obiecto potest dici Scientia divina, quia de Deo, primo ente. Tertio potest dici scientia veritatis; quia denominatio rei fit a fine rei […].19

In the second half of the fifteenth century, Gabriele Zerbi, in his Questiones metaphysice (published in 1482), wrote that, according to Scotus’ doctrine,

18   Albertus Magnus, Physica, l. 1, tract. 1, cap. 1. On the conception and division of philosophy in the first book of Albert’s Physica, cf. A. Bertolacci: “La divisione della filosofia nel primo capitolo del Commento di Alberto Magno alla ‘Fisica’: le fonti avicenniane”, in La divisione della filosofia e le sue ragioni. Lettura di testi medievali (vi–xiii secolo), ed. G. d’Onofrio (Cava dei Tirreni: Avagliano Editore, 2001), 137–155. 19   Alexander de Ales (of Hales) [but: Alexander Bonensis de Alexandria], In duodecim Aristotelis Metaphysicae Libros dilucidissima expositio, l. 2, q. Utrum omnis habitus practicus sit propter perfectionem rei operatae, Venetiis: Apud Simonem Galignanum de Karera, 1572, f. 36rb. On the conception of the object of metaphysics according to Alexander of Alexandria, cf. F. Amerini: “Alessandro di Alessandia su natura e oggetto della metafisica”, Quaestio 5 (2005): 477–493. However, Amerini does not examine the theme discussed here.

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metaphisicus diffiniendo omnino abstrahit a materia, quia sicut ens quoad primo considerat ita quodlibet inquantum sub eius consideratione cadit non includit materiam secundum quod vult Avicenna primo metaphisice.20

A few years later, Jan of Głogów, in his commentary on the Metaphysics, wrote: Illud autem dicitur abstractum a materia secundum esse, quod non necessario reperitur in materia, nec cuius existere est in materia. Isto modo substantia, ens et alia praedicata universalia dicuntur abstracta a materia. Si enim ens necessario esset in materia, tunc omne ens esset in materia et omne ens esset materiale, quod est falsum. Principalis enim pars entis, ut causa prima est sine materia. Similiter formae divinae separatae non sunt in materia, sunt enim formae a foris manendo dictae, eo quod ex materia non sunt compositae.21

But what is the meaning of Avicenna’s statement? And in what sense should it be understood within Aquinas’ work? One may think that, by this observation, Avicenna precisely intends to introduce the aforementioned thesis, i.e., in order to distinguish metaphysics from physics it is necessary to acknowledge the existence of immaterial substances. But this hypothesis encounters two difficulties. According to Avicenna, the existence of separate substances is not known thanks to an original intuition, but is an object of demonstration. Moreover, this demonstration occurs within metaphysics. It would seem, therefore, that comprehending the nature of the subject of metaphysics involves a demonstration performed by metaphysics itself. Precisely here the first difficulty arises: apparently, Avicenna does not abandon the Aristotelian thesis that a science does not demonstrate the existence of its subject; then, how could he maintain that comprehending the nature of the subject of metaphysics involves a demonstration performed by metaphysics itself? An additional question can be formulated: what is the reason that enables the human intellect to grasp a ratio – the ratio of being – that it acknowledges as not necessarily tied to matter or movement? Does this reason lie in the mere fact that the human intellect simply abstracts that ratio from matter, i.e. thinks about the former without thinking about the latter? Or does it lie in the fact that the human intellect sees or demonstrates that spiritual substances and beings occur? Avicenna writes:

  Gabriel Zerbus, Questiones metaphysice, Circa lib. 6, q. 3, Propter tercium, Bononie: Per Johannem de Nordlingen et Henricum de Harlem socios, 1482, f. (unnumbered; identifiable by the signature of the gathering) B6ra. 21   Joannes de Glogovia, Commentarium in Metaphysicam, l. 6, n. 36, in Jan z Głogowa, Komentar do Metafizyky, ed. R. Tatarzyński, 2 vols (Warszawa: Akademia Teologii Katolickiej, 1984), vol. 2: 4–5. The commentary of Jan of Głogów was written in Kraków between 1482 and 1487 but was printed for the first time in 1984. 20

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res et ens et necesse talia sunt quod statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se.22

This might be an answer to our question: Avicenna seems to think that the reason why the human intellect grasps a ratio – the ratio of being – that it recognizes as not necessarily tied to matter or movement lies in the mere fact that the intellect in itself has the power to think about being without having to think about matter. This is a severe second difficulty against the hypothesis formulated above. Actually, Thomas seems to follow the Persian author on both preceding points. As to the first point, Aquinas never seems to doubt the well known Aristotelian thesis that a science cannot demonstrate the existence of its subject. As to the second point, suffice it to recall a famous passage from De veritate. Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens; ut Avicenna dicit in principio Metaphysicae suae.23

But how can this happen if, in order to conceive of being as separated from matter, one is actually expected to know that it can be separated from matter in actual fact, i.e., that spiritual beings do exist? This passage can be coupled with another, in which Thomas, like Scotus after him, distinguishes between the case of ens commune and the case of ens increatum. […] ens quod est primum per communitatem, cum sit idem per essentiam cuilibet rei, nullius proportionem excedit; et ideo in cognitione cuiuslibet rei ipsum cognoscitur. Sed ens quod primum est causalitate, excedit improportionaliter omnes alias res: unde per nullius alterius cognitionem sufficienter cognosci potest. Et ideo in statu viae, in quo per species a rebus abstractas intelligimus, cognoscimus ens commune sufficienter, non autem ens increatum.24

In conclusion, the clue that was considered above (“secundum esse et rationem separari dicuntur” etc.) seems to conflict with other statements formulated by Aquinas. Hence, Thomas can certainly be a source of Suárez’s position concerning the asymmetry in the metaphysical treatments of material and spiritual substances; by contrast, he can hardly be a source of Suárez’s doctrine concerning the epistemological rôle of spiritual substances.

  Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive Scientia divina, tract. 1, cap. 5.   Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, co. 24   Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 10, a. 11, ad 10. 22

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3. A SECOND ATTEMPT TO TRACE THE SOURCES OF SUÁREZ’S POSITION: BONINO, HERVAEUS NATALIS, NICOLAUS DE ORBELLIS, TOMMASO DE VIO (CAJETANUS) Is it possible to find a source of Suárez’s doctrine concerning the epistemological rôle of spiritual substances? Suárez formulates his position in relation to a precise passage of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In the first chapter of book VI, Aristotle states that were there no substances other than the natural ones, then physics would be the first science. If, on the other hand, there is an immobile substance, then the science of such a substance takes precedence over the other sciences and becomes first philosophy. In so far as it is first science, concludes Aristotle, this science is universal and its task is to study being qua being, that is to say what being is and which properties being qua being possesses. 25 Now, no matter what is the theoretical value of Suárez’s thesis, one may doubt that it constitutes a valid interpretation of that Aristotele’s text. Nevertheless, the Spanish Jesuit mentions no interpretations by other authors. And indeed, just to give some examples, neither Avicenna, nor Averroës, nor Aquinas, nor Scotus see in the debated Aristotelian passage what Suárez sees in it. In particular, none of these authors relates it with the Avicenna’s argument according to which “Manifestum est […] quod esse substantiae, inquantum est substantia tantum, non pendet a materia; alioquin non esset substantia nisi sensibilis”. But if Suárez is not the fi rst to establish this connexion – and, as we shall see below, he is not – who is the first to interpret the Aristotelian passage in the same way as our Jesuit does? And how does this idea come down to him? A second question can be formulated. In order for Suárez’s argument to be valid, it should involve – or at least one may think it should involve – that metaphysics can somehow prove the existence of its subject and elucidate the nature of the latter. This is a violation, or at least a weakening, of the Aristotelian principle according to which no science can demonstrate the existence of its subject. Suárez is not the first to violate – or at least to weaken – this Aristotelian principle: indeed, he even mentions Tommaso de Vio (Cajetanus). And yet, is it possible to find a more ancient source – and, as we shall see below, a sounder source – of his position? 3.1 Alexander of Alessandria: “si non esset alia substantia praeter substantiam physicam, scientiam Physicam esset scientia naturalis, et prima” The first quaestio known to me concerning the topic Utrum si non esset alia substantia praeter substantiam physicam, scientiam Physicam esset scientia naturalis, et prima is the work of the Minorite Alexander (Alessandro Bonino) of Alessandria.26 It is contained   Aristotle: Metaph. VI, 1, 1026a27–32.   Yet, it should be noted that Bonino is not the first author to deal with this topic: he himself mentions previous authors whom, however, he does not name. My knowledge of thirteenth-century authors and works is not deep enough to identify the quidam Bonino refers to. 25 26

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in his commentary on book VI of the Metaphysics, which is part of his In duodecim Aristotelis Metaphysicae libros dilucidissima expositio,27 a work written between the very end of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth. Quereret quis. Utrum si non esset alia substantia praeter substantiam physicam, scientiam Physicam esset scientia universalis, et prima?

In that quaestio Bonino first of all develops an argument in support of a negative answer to this question. What makes sciences different from one another, he writes, is the difference existing between the rationes they deal with. Now, even if material substance were the only existing substance, the ratio of being and the ratio of physical being would still be distinguishable. Hence, physics and metaphysics would be in any case distinct sciences. Videtur quod non, quia scientiae diversificantur poenes rationem, et non poenes rem; ut dictum est in principio huius libri: sic ergo circa unam, et eandem rem physicam poterit considerari ratio entis, et ratio entis physici; et ita circa unam rem erunt duae rationes. Ita quod differt considerare ens inquantum ens, et ens inquantum physicum: et secundum hoc alia erit scientia Metaphysica, quae erit de re secundum primam rationem: et alia scientia Physica, quae erit de eadem re secundum rationem secundam.

But, continues Bonino, “[a]d oppositum est Philosophus”. After this statement, he begins to answer the question. At first, in support of a positive answer to the question he develops an argument that he actually refutes. The argument is the following: if subject and property are coextensive, then the science dealing with the former must also deal with the latter, and conversely; but in the case of the hypothesis discussed here, being and motion would be coextensive; ergo. Respondeo. Ad hanc quaestionem dicunt quidam sic; quod quandocumque aliqua passio non excedit subiectum, illa eadem scientia, quae est circa passionem, erit circa subiectum. Verbi gratia, si rectum et curvum non excedunt lineam, nec e converso; illa eadem scientia, quae est circa rectum et curvum, erit circa lineam: ita quod scientia considerans de recto et curvo, considerare poterit de omni linea: cum ergo secundum istam suppositionem Philosophi; si non esset dare aliam substantiam, nisi substantiam mobilem; motus esset eiusdem ambitus cum toto ente: et ita scientia eadem, quae considerat motum; considerare posset ens inquantum ens, et universaliter totum ens: illa autem, quae de motu est, est Physica; ergo Physica esset de ente inquantum ens, et sic erit prima.

But Bonino contests the validity of this argument. In the first place, he writes, even if material substance were the only type of existing substance, the ratio of substance and the ratio of being would remain distinct: this happens because the latter   [Bonensis]: Expositio, l. 6, q. Utrum si non esset alia substantia praeter substantiam physicam, scientiam Physicam esset scientia naturalis, et prima, f. 172vb–173ra. 27

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would apply to accidents as well. Moreover, even if there were only mobile beings, the ratio of being a being and the ratio of being movable would remain distinct. Haec positio in duobus deficit, primo quia supponit, quod de intentione Philosophi est, quod si non esset dare aliam substantiam praeter physicam, quod substantia physica et mobilis converteretur cum toto ente; quod nunquam supposuit Philosophus: sed solum voluit dicere, quod facta hac suppositione, substantia physica esset prima substantia, et primum ens; non tamen totum ens: ita quod si esset dare solum substantiam physicam, adhuc differret considerare rationem substantiae, et totius entis: adhuc enim infra ambitum entis essent accidentia, quae haberent attributionem ad istam substantiam. Secundo deficit, quia adhuc stat argumentum: si enim totum ens esset mobile, adhuc est alia ratio entitatis, et mobilitatis, et per consequens alia scientia.

Bonino thus proposes a different interpretation of Aristotle’s words (which interpretation is also the argument held by him). It can be summarized as follows: when a ratio is in a relation of attribution with another ratio, then the two rationes are treated by a single science; now, if material substance were the only existing substance, then it would be first substance, all beings would therefore be in a relation of attribution with it; hence, assuming this hypothesis, physics would be the first and universal science. Dicatur ergo alia via, quae manifestat intentione Philosophi: hic supponit Philosophus primo, quod una et eadem scientia est primi entis, et illorum, quae habent attributionem ad primum ens; quia quae sunt infra unam attributionem, sunt unius scientiae. Secundo supponit, quod si non esset alia scientia praeter Physicam, substantia physica esset primum ens: quod patet ex hoc, quia primum ens non potest esse accidens; de ratione enim accidentis est, quod sit secundum ens, eo quod in alio; ergo primum ens substantia est; si igitur non esset alia substantia praeter physicam primum ens esset substantia physica. Ex his duabus suppositionibus patet intentio Philosophi: ex secunda enim suppositione substantia physica esset primum ens: ex prima suppositione illa eadem scientia, quae esset de substantia physica, esset de toto ente, quia totum ens attributionem haberet ad istam scientiam, eo quod ipsa esset ens primum: et ideo Philosophia naturalis considerans de substantia mobili, consideraret de toto ente: et ideo Antiqui non opinantes aliam substantiam, nisi naturalem et mobile; intromittentes se de ista substantia, credebant se intromisisse de natura totius entis. Intentio ergo Philosophi est in hoc, quod si non esset alia substantia praeter Physicam, eadem scientia esset prima, et universalis; sed differenti ratione: prima quidem eo quod esset de primo ente: universalis autem, quia omnis scientia, quae est de primo ente, est de toto ente propter vim attributionis: quae est de toto ente, est universalis; […]. Ad forma argumenti dicendum est, quod non omnes due rationes faciunt duas species: quando enim una ratio habet attributionem ad aliam, tunc non faciunt nisi unam scientiam: sicut nunc est in Metaphysica; quia ratio primi entis, et ratio entis est talia; et tamen cadunt infra unam scientiam: quia ens habet attributionem ad primum ens. Et a simili si esset

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sola substantia physica, alia esset ratio substantia mobilis, et alia ratio entis: tamen quia ratio entis haberet attributionem ad rationem substantiae mobilis, ideo una scientia esset de eis.

Alexander Bonino’s Expositio was printed in Venice in 1572 under the name of Alexander of Hales. Suárez mentions it several times in his Disputationes metaphysicae, citing it precisely as a work written by the latter; it is therefore an excellent candidate for constituting a source of the doctrine developed by the thinker from Granada. Still, two difficulties arise here. First, Suárez’s position seems different from Bonino’s. Rather, it approaches the position rejected by the Franciscan thinker at the beginning of his respondeo, where he ascribes it to some unidentified quidam: “quandocumque aliqua passio non excedit subiectum, illa eadem scientia, quae est circa passionem, erit circa subiectum”. Second, Bonino does not seem to reject Aristotle’s thesis according to which no science demonstrates the existence of its subject. Admittedly, he subjects this thesis to a considerable “interpretative pressure”. In the quaestio Utrum sit eiusdem rationis, si est, et quod quid est, manifestum facere, within his commentary on book VI of the Metaphysics, he states first of all that the aforementioned thesis must not be interpreted in the sense that each science presupposes the existence of its subject; rather, it must be interpreted in the sense that each science presupposes that this subject is a certain essence. […] cum loquitur Philosophus de si est subiecti, non potest loqui de si est existentiae; quia esse existentiae accidit scientiae; non enim requiritur ad rationem scibilis, quod sit in existentia: quando ergo dicit, quod oportet scientiam supponere ipsum subiectum esse, non potest intelligi de esse existentiae; quia de ratione scientiae est, quod supponat esse subiecti: cuius ratio est, quia omnis scientia super alio fabricat; oportet ergo illud, quod super subiectum aliquod fabricatur, praeesse; non autem in esse existentiae, ergo in alio esse scilicet esse essentiae: ita quod sensus est, omnis scientia supponit suum subiectum esse aliquam essentiam […]. 28

Moreover, he continues, when we say that each science presupposes its subject, we should mean that it presupposes it in an indistinct way. Indeed, the task of individual sciences, explains Bonino, is to elucidate the properties of their respective subjects and, by this means, understand the nature of these subjects more clearly. Sciendum tamen, quod licet supponatur quod quid est, et si est subiecti; tamen hoc si est, et quod quid est, quod supponitur, incompletum est: quia scientia semper distincte quaerit explicare subiectum per passiones: ita quod subiectum supponitur sub esse confuso; distincte autem quaeritur explicatio eius; explicato autem subiecto per passiones, explicatius, et distinctius videtur essentia subiecti,   [Bonensis]: Expositio, l. 6, q. Utrum sit eiusdem rationis, si est, et quod quid est, manifestum facere, f. 169ra. 28

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et quidditas; et per consequens essentia supponitur, et essentia quaeritur: quia sub esse confuso supponitur, et sub esse distincto quaeritur.29

Finally, following Averroës, our Franciscan distinguishes between demonstratio simpliciter and demonstratio ex posterioribus.30 Now, he applies this distinction precisely to the Aristotelian thesis under discussion. […] est notandum, quod secundum Commentatorem haec demonstratio simpliciter vocatur, quae reddendo esse demonstrati, reddit causam ipsius, ita quod reddit simul unum, et reliquum: causam autem ipsius esse credo esse quod quid est. […] Et hoc est, quod dixit Philosophus in litera, quod eiusdem rationis, idest demonstrationis est reddere quod quid est et esse; idest causam, et esse; illa ergo scientia, quae non reddit causam de quod quid est esse subiecti, non reddit rationem de esse eiusdem. Et hanc credo esse intentionem Philosophi: primo enim probavit, quod nulla scientia reddit rationem de quod quid est ipsius subiecti; ex hoc autem concludebat, quod non reddit rationem de eius esse.31

Nevertheless, Bonino does not seem to use the aforementioned distinction in order to maintain that although no science can simpliciter demonstrate its subject, yet it is not impossible that some science can demonstrate its subject ex posterioribus. Hence, he could not be the source of inspiration for Suárez’s statement according to which metaphysics “non solum supponit suum obiectum esse, sed etiam, si necesse sit, illud esse ostendit”. 3.2 Hervaeus Natalis and Nicolaus de Orbellis: “primum et per se subiectum alicuius scientiae non est primo notum in illa scientia cuius est subiectum” As we have seen, Suárez holds that metaphysics can demonstrate the existence of its object. He makes clear that metaphysics can do this even using principles of its own. The other sciences as well – explains somehow the Spanish thinker while referring to a passage by Tommaso de Vio – can demonstrate the existence of their subject per accidens, i.e., by using principles drawn from other sciences; metaphysics, however, can demonstrate the existence of its subject by relying exclusively on its own resources. The passage by de Vio mentioned by Suárez is the following. […] dubium statim occurrit ex I Poster. Nulla scientia probat subiectum suum: et, ut dicit Averroes in II Physic., comment. xxvi, nec a priori nec a posteriori: sed supponit illud esse aut per se notum ad sensum vel intellectum, vel accipit aliunde. Sed in hac scientia [i.e.: theologia] subiectum est Deus […]. Ergo non debet hic probari Deum esse. […] Ad hoc dicitur, quod nulla scientia per se loquendo probat subiectum suum   [Bonensis]: Expositio, l. 6, q. Utrum sit eiusdem rationis…, f. 169rb.   [Bonensis]: Expositio, l. 6, q. Utrum sit eiusdem rationis…, f. 169vb. 31   [Bonensis]: Expositio, l. 6, q. Utrum sit eiusdem rationis…, f. 169vb–170ra. 29

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esse: per accidens autem non inconvenit scientiam aliquam probare suum subiectum esse. Sic autem est in proposito: quoniam occurrit hic duplex accidens, propter quod scientia haec probat Deum esse. Primum est imperfecta illius partecipatio in nobis. Si enim lumen divinum plene parteciparemus, constaret statim Deum esse. Secundum est conditio medii, scilicet quod est quasi extraneum. Licet enim nulla scientia ex simpliciter propriis probet subiectum suum, ex extraneis tamen appropriatis probare potest, si notiora nobis sunt extranea illa quam esse illius subiecti. Sic autem contingit in proposito: quoniam theologia [etc.].32

As the reader can see, the Spanish Jesuit quotes the thesis held by the Italian Dominican with exactness. Clearly, however, Suárez contradicts Aristotle’s thesis more deeply than de Vio did, since he writes that metaphysics “in hoc superare reliquas, quod ipsa non solum supponit suum obiectum esse, sed etiam, si necesse sit, illud esse ostendit, propriis principiis utens, per se loquendo […]. Quod si illa scientia suprema sit, non indiget ope alterius, sed in vi sua id praestare potest, et hujusmodi est metaphysica”.33 Is it possible then to discover a source of Suárez’s position? As far as I know, the first to introduce a thesis close to Suárez’s was the Dominican Hervaeus Natalis. In his Liber de secundis intentionibus, he writes that the subject of a science is “first” not according to chronology, but according to intention. The subject of a science, writes Hervaeus, must satisfy three conditions. The first is the following: the object of a certain science must be that which, in the science, becomes known first. Here, explains Hervaeus (revolutionarily, I believe), “first” does not correspond to a temporal priority, since it is false that, among all the knowable “things” (intelligibilia) belonging to a certain science, the object of the science (illud quod est primum et per se obiectum) is known before any other thing. Rather, it corresponds to a priority within the realm of finality, i.e. as to intention, since any science tends to the knowledge of its object more than to the knowledge of any other thing. [C]um scientia habeat unitatem et determinationem, modo quo scientia habet specificari et determinari per subiectum ab illo de quo determinat ut de primo et per se subiecto, oportet primum et per se subiectum alicuius scientiae esse tale quod omnia alia considerata in scientia nata sint reduci ad ipsum et quod habeat connectionem in ordine ad ipsum, et hoc in sua cognoscibilitate; aliter non esset scientia de eis una. Sed illud ad quod alia habent reductionem isto modo, non semper primo occurrit intellectui, immo quandoque aliquid posterius eo et quod ad ipsum habet reduci est notius quoad nos et prius occurrit nostro intellectui, quia magis cadit sub sensu. Ergo non oportet quod primum et per se subiectum alicuius scientiae dicatur primo modo notum primo modo dicto. Ex ista ratione potest reddi ratio vel causa quare primum et per se subiectum alicuius scientiae non est primo notum modo praedicto [i.e.: quod inter omnia intelligibilia pertinentia ad illam 32

  Thomas de Vio Cajetanus: Commentarium to Thomas Aquinas: STh I, q. 2, a. 3, n. 1.   DM 1, 4, 14.

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scientiam, illud quod est primum et per se obiectum sit illud quod primo movet intellectum et quod inter omnia primo occurrit intellectui] in illa scientia cuius est subiectum, quia scilicet contingit quod illud ad quod alia omnia habent reduci et in quo habent connectionem, esse magis remotum a sensu et per consequens esse posterius notum quoad nos quam illa quae reducuntur ad ipsum, sicut ens in potentia ad aliquid non habitum ad quod habet reduci est magis remotum a sensu quam motus qui reducitur ad ipsummet. Ideo est posterius notum eo, unde in primo Physicorum Philosophus inquirit principia entis mobilis ex natura motus.34

This passage by Hervaeus is a good candidate for constituting a possible source of Suárez’s position. It precisely introduces the possibility that a science is capable of demonstrating the existence of its subject a posteriori. Further, the works of the Spaniard frequently refer to Hervaeus’ works; yet, Suárez never mentions Hervaeus’ Liber de secundis intentionibus. Our Jesuit might therefore have drawn inspiration from a different text. A second possible candidate for being a source of Suárez’s position is a short passage from the Expositio duodecim librorum Metaphysice Aristotelis by Nicolaus de Orbellis: Quod […] dicit Commentator quod nulla scientia potest probare suum subiectum esse falsum est: licet enim nulla scientia demonstret suum subiectum esse demonstratione propter quid et a priori, quia ipsum subiectum est prius notum

34   Herveus Brito, Liber de intentionibus, [q. 5:] Utrum [de secundis intentionibus] sit scientia et que scientia est de eis, [a. 1:] Utrum aliqua scientia sit de secundis intentionibus ut per se subiecto, respondeo, primum videndum. I have consulted both the edition entitled Tractatus de secundis intentionibus (Parisii: Per Georgium Mitelhus, 1489) (whose transcription was kindly made available for me by Judith Dys), where the passage at issue is on pp. 77a–b, and the edition entitled Liber de intentionibus (s.l. [but Venetiis]: s.e. s.d. The name of the printer and the date of print proposed – the former explicitly, the latter implicitly – by BMC, vol. V, 515, and accepted by all subsequent catalogues are mere conjectures; compare them with the information given by R. Proctor, An Index to the Early Printed Books in the British Museum. From the Invention of Printing to the Year 1500. With Notes of Those in the Bodleian Library (London: Kegan Paul, 1898), vol. 1: 379, n. 5711), where the passage at issue is on f. (unnumbered; identifiable by the signature of the gathering) g8r–v. Both editions offer a corrupt text, although in different manner. I read that passage relying also on the partly literal quotations contained in Franciscus de Prato: Logica, pars 1, tract. 4, a. 12, in Fabrizio Amerini: La logica di Francesco da Prato, con l’edizione critica della “Loyca” e del “Tractatus de voce univoca” (Firenze: sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2005), 363, and in Franciscus de Prato: Logica, ed. Chr. Rode (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2002), 112 (these two editions propose different readings of some points from the sole extant codex of the Logica by Francis of Prato). In John P. Doyle’s edition of Hervaeus’ Tractatus, the passage under examination does not substantially differ from the text quoted above: cf. J. P. Doyle, A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis […] on Second Intentions (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2008), vol. 2: 521–522.

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prioritate nature, potest tamen esse demonstratum subiectum demonstratione quia et a posteriori.35

This passage and the passage by Suárez are even more similar than the passage by Suárez and that by Hervaeus are. And yet, the Spanish thinker never mentions de Orbellis. Still, considering that the Jesuit author usually refers to the Scotists collectively, he might actually have known de Orbellis’ work, which enjoyed considerable renown during the second half of fifteenth century. 4. A FURTHER STEP TOWARDS SUÁREZ’S POSITION: ANTONIO TROMBETTA

The Questiones metaphysicales of the Conventual Franciscan Antonio Trombetta (a work whose first edition was published in 1493)36 represent an almost perfect source of Suárez’s conception of metaphysics. On the one hand, Suárez certainly knew this work and he even mentions it in his Disputationes metaphysicae. One might observe that the Jesuit thinker seldom mentions Trombetta, but it should also be considered that he usually refers to Scotist authors without naming them. On the other hand, in his Questiones, Trombetta supports at least three of the theses that, as already said, characterize Suárez’s position concerning the nature of metaphysics: metaphysics is an asymmetrical science; it is not a science concerned only with the transcendentals; comprehending the subject of metaphysics implies the acknowledgement of the existence of spiritual beings. To some extent, he also hints at the fourth thesis, since he does not seem to take for granted that, as regards human beings (quoad nos), the subject of metaphysics is perfectly known from the very beginning of the development of this science. 4.1 Metaphysics as an asymmetrical science The ninth quaestio of book I of Trombetta’s Questiones is devoted to the problem Utrum de mente Doctoris Subtilis sit quod metaphysicus consideret quiditates solum in universali.37 In actual fact, in this text Trombetta does not seem very concerned about the 35   Nycholaus de Dorbellis: Expositio duodecim librorum Metaphysice Aristotelis, [q. prooemialis: De subiecto methaphisice], ad. 4, ed. Petrus Almadianus Viterbensis (Bononie: Impensis Henrici de Haerlem et Mathei Crescentini Bononiensis sociorum, 1485), f. (unnumbered; identifiable by the signature of the gathering) A7ra–b. 36   Antonius Trombeta: Questiones metaphysicales, in Id.: Opus doctrine scotice Patavii in thomistas discussum sententiis Phylosophi maxime conveniens (Venetiis: Hyeronimus de Paganinis, 1493), f. 11ra–76rb. Second edition: Id.: Questiones metaphysicales, in Id.: Opus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis Padue in thomistas discussum (Venetiis: Sumptu ac expensis heredum Octaviani Scoti – Per Bonetum de Locatellis, 1502), f. 2ra–96vb. 37   Trombeta, Questiones, l. 1, q. 9 (Venetiis, 1502), f. 8vb–11ra. Reading through the text of l. 1, q. 9 and l. 6, q. 3 (about which cf. infra) contained in the 1493 edition of the Questiones meta-

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mens of the Subtle Doctor. His attention is focused on the problem itself: in what way metaphysics deals with the quiddities of things. Our author’s solution is structured around four points: 1) metaphysics considers each quiddity at least in a universal way; 2) metaphysics considers each quiddity in particular too, but only in a relative way (respective); 3) it considers material substances – with respect to their particular concepts – only in a relative way; 4) it considers separate substances also with respect to some proper concepts of them, but not with respect to their specific concepts.38 Let us focus on the third and fourth points. According to our author, metaphysics does deal with material substances in particulari, but only respective, i.e. only insofar as these substances and their principles can be related to being. For example, it belongs to metaphysics to study humanity as including matter and form, but not as a principle of operations. The case of immaterial substances is different: metaphysics deals with them not only in a universal way, but also “sub ratione particulari magis quam quiditates materiales”.39 In order to expound and justify the latter thesis (metaphysics deals with immaterial substances not only in a universal way etc.), Trombetta approaches the problem from two sides: on one side, he shows that the human mind can deal with these substances and how – i.e. within what limits – it can do so; on the other side, he proves that dealing with these substances falls within the tasks of metaphysics. As concerns the first side of the question, our author starts by explaining that immaterial substances are those which do not comprise matter nor a necessary link with it within their formal rationes.40 Of these substances, he continues, it is possible physicales, I found that it is identical with the text printed in the 1502 edition. Nevertheless, I decided to use the 1502 edition because it is a real second edition of this work. 38   Trombeta, Questiones, l. 1, q. 9, a. 2, f. 10ra–b. 39   In Trombetta’s text, this expression is contained in the exposition of a difficulty; nevertheless, it expresses precisely the position held by our author. Trombeta, Questiones, l. 1, q. 9, a. 2, f. 10rb: “Ultima conclusio. Metaphisica non considerat quiditates materiales in particulari: prout quiditas in se est particularis: et sub ratione particulari. […] Sed ex ista ultima conclusione insurgit una difficultas: propter quid est quod quiditates separate considerantur a metaphisica sub ratione particulari magis quam quiditates materiales. Videtur enim quod sit consimilis ratio de utraque: cum utraque secundum Scotum in esse quiditativo abstrahant a motu. Respondetur quod proprium esse scientie metaphisice considerare quiditatem abstrahendo a motu et a materia sensibili. ergo ad ipsam maxime pertinent illa que secundum se sunt sic abstracta: ergo cum modus proprius considerandi in metaphisica (qui est abstrahere secundum considerationem) conveniat istit quiditatibus separatis secundum esse: maxime videntur pertinere ad metaphisicam et non iste quiditates que precise abstrahunt secundum considerationem et non secundum esse que licet abstrahant secundum considerationem a motu et mobilitate (loquendo de earum esse quiditativo in particulari) non tamen ut sic abstrahunt a principijs motus et sensibilitatis: quia non abstrahunt a forma naturali que est principium motus et sensibilitatis: et sic patet ad quesitum.” 40   Trombeta, Questiones, l. 1, q. 9, a. 1, f. 9va–b.

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to have four types of concepts. First, these substances can be known by means of transcendental concepts, some of which (like the concept of being) are quidditative and some others (like the concepts of the properties – passiones – of being) are qualitative. Second and third, it is possible to have the concepts of “substance” and “spiritual substance” of them (while assuming that these quiddities are comprised within some predicament). And finally, is possible to have proper concepts of them. Of these four types of concepts, human beings can naturally (naturaliter) acquire only those that can be abstracted from what is sensible and imaginable. The concepts of the first three types can certainly be abstracted from what is sensible; hence human beings can acquire them naturally. As for the concepts of the fourth type, a distinction is needed. There may be two types of proper concepts of separate substances: those resulting from the aggregation of two concepts of the fi rst three types (for example, the concept of God as infinite being); and those that are simple and intuitive (for example, the specific concept of whatever separate intelligence). Now, by merely natural ways (ex naturalibus) human beings cannot have proper concepts of the second type, that is to say proper by intuition, i.e. specific; nonetheless, human beings can have proper concepts of the first type, that is to say proper by aggregation. […] de substantiis separatis natus est haberi duplex conceptus proprius. Unus mixtus et aggregatus: ut concipiendo deum sub ratione entis infi niti: qui est conceptus aggregans in se duos conceptus. et totus iste conceptus soli deo convenit: et non alij. Alius conceptus proprius de substantiis separatis: est simplex et intuitivus: ut est conceptus specificus cuiuscumque intelligentie. Primus est possibilis nobis ex naturalibus. secundus non.41

Resting on the preceding observations, Trombetta proves that the human mind has access to at least some proper concepts of immaterial substances; it is time to determine which science must deal with them. On this point he argues as follows. The quiddities conceived in reference to (sub) the ratio of being lie within the scope of metaphysics. Among these quiddities, let us mention the following: necessity, actuality, simplicity, independence, infinity, etc. Separate substances can be themselves conceived in reference to the aforementioned quiddities. Consequently, it belongs to metaphysics to deal with these substances taken precisely in reference to these quiddities. Now, although the concepts of these quiddities are not specific concepts of separate substances, yet they provide the possibility to conceive – also by aggregation – proper concepts of God and of separate substances, such as “infinite” and “pure act”. We may thus conclude that metaphysics has the task of dealing with separate substances even as regards concepts belonging exclusively to the latter. […] substantie separate si considerentur sub ratione generis: vel quasi generis subalterni et in conceptibus propriis mixtis et aggregatis scilicet sub rationes entis 41

  Trombeta, Questiones, l. 1, q. 9, a. 1, f. 9vb.

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infiniti quantum ad deum vel substantie imaterialis: quantum ad alias: et in quantum sunt nature intellectuales necesse esse actus puri: quantum ad istos conceptus proprios eis et aliis non competentes pertinent ad metaphisicum.42

4.2 The rôle of separate substances in comprehending the subject of metaphysics The third quaestio of book VI of Trombetta’s Questiones metaphysicales is devoted to the problem Utrum si esset tantum substantia natura consistens, physica esset prima philosophia.43 Here Trombetta explicitly approaches the question of the “rôle” performed by immaterial substances – and by the knowledge of them – in comprehending the subject of metaphysics. As in the case of Bonino’s Expositio, in Trombetta’s work the discussion is occasioned by the passage in which Aristotle states that if there were only natural, i.e. material, substances, then physics would be first philosophy. In the face of this passage, the Paduan Franciscan formulates the following problem. Even if there were only natural substances, the intellect could still abstract concepts such as “substance”, “being”, “unity”, etc, from them. Further, these concepts could be conceived without conceiving that from which they have been abstracted or without referring them to it. It follows that the study of them would not be the task of the physicist; hence they should be considered by the metaphysician. […] stante isto casu: intellectus a sensibilibus et materialibus posset abstrahere conceptum substantie: conceptum entis: et similiter conceptum unitatis: veritatis et bonitatis. Et isti conceptus abstracti non pertinerent ad naturalem: quia non haberent ordinem ad motum et ad materiam sensibilem. Deinde declaratur: quia licet nulla esset substantia nisi naturalis: non repugnaret tamen ex intellectu concipiente istis rationibus abstractis reperiri in aliquo alio quam in natura sensibili. Unde hec ratio potest reduci ad formam sic. Omnem rationem intellegibilem. et omnem conceptum inclusum in aliquo essentialiter vel virtualiter potest intellectus abstrahere: et ipsum concipere absque hoc quod concipiat illud a quo sit abstractio. Sed isti conceptus universales includuntur in substantia naturali. Ergo possunt concipi ab intellectu: non concepta substantia naturali. Ex quo sequitur quod quoniam abstrahantur ab omni habitudine ad substantiam naturalem: et ad motum: non erunt de consideratione philosophi naturalis. ergo considerabuntur a metaphisico.44

Our Scotist’s reply is clear and detailed. It is true, he writes, that even if there were no separate substances, the intellect could still abstract the concepts of being and substance from natural substance; nevertheless, insofar as these hypothesized   Trombeta, Questiones, l. 1, q. 9, a. 2, f. 9vb–10ra.   Trombeta, Questiones, l. 6, q. 3, f. 48va–b. 44   Trombeta, Questiones, l. 6, q. 3, f. 48va. 42 43

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concepts have to comply with reality,45 they cannot be attributed to a substance other than natural substance. It follows that these concepts would not be common to types of beings and substances other than material beings and substances; hence, they would not actually be more general than the concepts of “material being” and “material substance” (in other words, let me observe, they would have the same extension as the concepts of “material being” and “material substance”, respectively). Moreover, they would comprise an intrinsic and unremovable reference to material substance (in other words, let me observe, they would have the same intension as the concepts of “material being” and “material substance”, respectively).46 Now, what is no more general than the subject of a certain science – or else includes an intrinsic reference (ordo essentialis et habitudo) to the first subject of a certain science – cannot be considered by a science different from the science that considers that subject.47 Hence, assuming the hypothesis discussed here (i.e., if there were no separate substances etc.), it follows that a metaphysics distinct from physics could not exist. […] si (ex casu) essent tantum quiditates naturales substantiarum naturalium: non essent quiditates universales: et universaliter abstracte: que essent communes alijs a substantijs naturalibus: quia (ex posito) si nullum aliud ens esset: tunc physica haberet considerare omnium quiditates: et ita metaphysica non esset prior scientia naturali.48 […] licet intellectus possit abstrahere a substantia conceptum entis et substantie. semper tamen consideraret ista: ut sunt aliquid substantie naturalis: quia non possent convenire alijs a tali substantia. Ex quo sequitur quod essent semper de consideratione naturalis: cum non abstraherentur ab ordine essentiali: et attributione ad subiectum primum scientie naturalis.49

Trombetta thus formulates a lucid conclusion: one cannot assert that there is a metaphysics (which abstracts secundum considerationem) distinct from physics with  Trombeta, Questiones, l. 6, q. 3, f. 48vb: “et quum dicis: quod non repugnabit conceptibus abstractis reperiri in aliquo intellectu concipiente. Negatur hoc: quia intellectus concipiens si sit verus: habet conformari rei concepte.” 46   Trombetta infers the intensional equivalence from the extensional equivalence; this implies that he interprets the hypothetical ‘non-existence’ of immaterial substances not as a simple not-existing in fact, but as an impossibility of existing. In our author’s view, the centrality of the extensional aspect of the concepts discussed here is also confirmed by the following passage from Trombeta, Questiones, l. 6, q. 3, f. 48vb: “[si metaphysicus consideraret quiditates rerum in particulari:] consequentia Aristotelis non valeret scilicet si tantum esset substantia naturalis. igitur physica esset prima philosophia: quia posset dici: quod esset scientia distincta a naturali: que consideraret quiditates particulares: ut abstrahunt a motu et quantitate.” 47   Trombeta, Questiones, l. 6, q. 3, f. 48va. 48   Trombeta, Questiones, l. 6, q. 3, f. 48vb. 49   Trombeta, Questiones, l. 6, q. 3, f. 48vb. 45

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out asserting that separate substances (i.e. abstracted secundum esse) are possible; the existence of these substances and the knowledge of their existence are needed in order to conceive a metaphysics distinct from physics. […] abstractio secundum considerationem est propter abstractionem secundum esse aliquorum que [metaphysicus] considerat. Et consideratio de abstractis secundum considerationem in metaphysica est propter considerationem abstractorum secundum esse.50

It can thus be affirmed that, in Trombetta’s view, the determination of the nature of the subject of metaphysics somehow depends on a knowledge acquired by this science itself: the knowledge concerning the existence of separate substances. This might conflict with the thesis that a science can in no way demonstrate the existence of its subject; still, Trombetta seems to avoid this difficulty. Indeed, he denies that, quoad naturam, the subject of a science can be known through some other concept belonging to the science of which it is the subject; and yet he seems to hint at the possibility that, quoad nos, the concept of that first subject is introduced by some other concept. […] subiectum in scientia primum et adequatum est primo notum dupliciter in scientia scilicet quo ad naturam: et quo ad nos: vel quantum ad quod est: et quia est: ex primo posteriorum: et hoc est sententia Averrois in plerisque locis. in 2° physicorum in commento. 22. et in 2° de anima. commento. 27. que opinio est Avicenne licet Albertus et Doctor Subtilis aliter sentiant: quantum ad noticiam: quia in hoc tantum omnes conveniunt: quod subiectum primum est notissimum per se: et quo ad naturam: et non posset cognosci per aliquid proprius pertinens ad ipsam scientiam. 51

5. EPILOGUE The purpose of this article is not to provide a complete review of the positions held by the authors considered here. Instead, I have described their theses just insofar as they are needed to show that these theses can be the sources of one or more essential 50   Trombeta, Questiones, l. 6, q. 3, f. 48va. Let us give a further clarification. Trombetta adds that, if separate substances did not exist, metaphysics could not be distinguished from physics, nevertheless physics and mathematics would still be distinct sciences. Trombetta argues as follows. In case a concept prescinds (abstrahitur) from every reference (ordo essentialis et attributio) to a certain first subject, that concept falls within the competence of a science which is different from the one that deals with that fi rst subject. Well, even if separate substances do not exist, quantity can anyhow be considered apart from every reference to sensible matter. But mathematics deals precisely with quantity as considered in the way mentioned above. Ergo. Cf. Trombeta, Questiones, l. 6, q. 3, f. 48va. 51   Trombeta, Questiones, l. 1, q. 9, Ad oppositum, f. 9rb.

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constituents of Suárez’s conception of metaphysics. Likewise, my purpose is not to maintain that the authors examined here are the only sources of Suárez’s doctrine on the nature of metaphysics: actually, in order to accomplish a comprehensive search a number of other authors and texts should have been considered. Nor is it my intention to claim that the doctrines advanced by the examined authors are identical with those held by the Spanish thinker. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the analysis of the theses and the texts that have been considered in the present essay can effectively aid in understanding the historical bases of Suárez’s conception of metaphysics.52

  This study is part of a general investigation concerning the history of the debate on the subject of metaphysics from the later Middle Ages to the early Modern Age. So far, the following results of this investigation have been published, or are going to be published. M. Forlivesi, “Filippo Fabri (1564–1630) on the Nature of Metaphysics. A Paduan ScotisticAristotelian Counter-Attack on Rival Doctrinal Traditions”, in Direito e Natureza na primeira e na segunda escolástica – Derecho y Naturaleza en la primera y segunda escolástica – Right and Nature in the First and Second Scholasticism, ed. A. Culleton and R. Hofmeister Pich (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), forthcoming; Id., “‘Ut ex etymologia nominis patet?’. John Punch on the Nature and the Object of Metaphysics”, in ‘Hircocervi’ and Other Metaphysical Wonders. Essays in Honor of John P. Doyle, ed. V. M. Salas (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2013), 121–155; Id., “Filippo Fabri vs Patrizi, Suárez e Galilei: il valore della ‘Metafisica’ di Aristotele e la distinzione delle scienze speculative”, in Innovazione filosofica e università tra Cinquecento e primo Novecento - Philosophical Innovation and the University from the 16th Century to the Early 20th, ed. Gr. Piaia and M. Forlivesi (Padova: cleup, 2011), 95–116; Id., “Approaching the Debate on the Subject of Metaphysics Between Later Middle Ages and Early Modern Age: The Ancient and Medieval Antecedents”, Medioevo 34 (2009): 9–59; Id., “‘Ut illi non repugnet esse in materia’. La dottrina di Zaccaria Pasqualigo (1600–1664) sulla natura della metafisica e del suo oggetto”, Veritas 54, n. 3 (2009): 156-172; Id., “«Quae in hac quaestione tradit Doctor videntur humanum ingenium superare». Scotus, Andrés, Bonet, Zerbi, and Trombetta Confronting the Nature of Metaphysics”, Quaestio 8 (2008): 219–277; Id., “Impure Ontology. The Nature of Metaphysics and Its Object in Francisco Suárez’s Texts”, Quaestio 5 (2005): 559–586; Id., “Ontologia impura. La natura della metafisica secondo Francisco Suárez”, in Francisco Suárez. “Der ist der Mann”. Homenaje al prof. Salvador Castellote (Valencia: Facultad de Teología ‘San Vicente Ferrer’, 2004), 161–207. 52

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BIBLIOGRAPHY SOURCES Albertus Magnus. Physica. Aristotle. Metaphysics. Avicenna Latinus. Liber de philosophia prima sive Scientia divina. Alexander de Ales (of Hales) [but: Alexander Bonensis de Alexandria]. In duodecim Aristotelis Metaphysicae libros dilucidissima expositio, l. 2, q. Utrum omnis habitus practicus sit propter perfectionem rei operatae. Venetiis: Apud Simonem Galignanum de Karera, 1572. Aquinas, Thomas. In Boethium De Trinitate. [= In De Trin.] — In Metaphysicam. [= In Met.] — Quaestiones disputatae De veritate. [= De veritate] Cajetanus. Cf. de Vio, Thomas (Cajetanus). De Orbellis, Nicolaus. Cf. Dorbellis, Nycholaus de. De Vio, Thomas (Cajetanus). Commentarium to Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae. Dorbellis, Nycholaus de (Orbellis, Nicolaus de). Expositio duodecim librorum Metaphysice Aristotelis. Edited by Petrus Almadianus Viterbensis. Bononie: Impensis Henrici de Haerlem et Mathei Crescentini Bononiensis sociorum, 1485. Franciscus de Prato. Logica. In Fabrizio Amerini, La logica di Francesco da Prato, con l’edizione critica della “Loyca” e del “Tractatus de voce univoca”. Firenze: sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2005. — Logica. Edited by Christian Rode. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2002. Hervaeus [Natalis] Brito. Tractatus de secundis intentionibus. Parisii: Per Georgium Mitelhus, 1489. — Liber de intentionibus, s.l. [but Venetiis]: s.e., s.d. — Tractatus de secundis intentionibus. In John. P. Doyle, A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis […] on Second Intentions. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2008, vol. 2. Joannes de Glogovia. Commentarium in Metaphysicam. In Jan z Głogowa, Komentar do Metafizyky. Edited by Ryszard Tatarzyński, 2 vols. Warszawa: Akademia Teologii Katolickiej, 1984. Nicolaus de Orbellis. Cf. Dorbellis, Nycholaus de. Orbellis, Nicolaus de. Cf. Dorbellis, Nycholaus de. Suárez, Franciscus. Disputationes metaphysicae. Trombeta, Antonius. Questiones metaphysicales. In Opus doctrine scotice Patavii in thomistas discussum sententiis Phylosophi maxime conveniens, f. 11ra–76rb. Venetiis: Hyeronimus de Paganinis, 1493.

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— Questiones metaphysicales. In Opus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis Padue in thomistas discussum, f. 2ra–96vb. Venetiis: Sumptu ac expensis heredum Octaviani Scoti – Per Bonetum de Locatellis, 1502. Zerbus, Gabriel. Questiones metaphysice. Bononie: Per Johannem de Nordlingen et Henricum de Harlem socios, 1482.

SECONDARY WORKS Amerini, F. “Alessandro di Alessandia su natura e oggetto della metafisica”. Quaestio 5 (2005): 477–493. Bertolacci, A. “La divisione della filosofia nel primo capitolo del Commento di Alberto Magno alla ‘Fisica’: le fonti avicenniane”. In La divisione della filosofia e le sue ragioni. Lettura di testi medievali (vi–xiii secolo), ed. G. d’Onofrio, 137–155. Cava dei Tirreni: Avagliano Editore, 2001. Forlivesi, M. “Approaching the Debate on the Subject of Metaphysics Between the Later Middle Ages and the Early Modern Age: The Ancient and Medieval Antecedents”. Medioevo 34 (2009): 9–59. — “«Quae in hac quaestione tradit Doctor videntur humanum ingenium superare». Scotus, Andrés, Bonet, Zerbi, and Trombetta Confronting the Nature of Metaphysics”. Quaestio 8 (2008): 219–277. —  “Impure Ontology. The Nature of Metaphysics and Its Object in Francisco Suárez’s Texts”. Quaestio 5 (2005): 559–586. — “Ontologia impura. La natura della metafisica secondo Francisco Suárez”. In Francisco Suárez. “Der ist der Mann”. Homenaje al prof. Salvador Castellote, 161–207. Valencia: Facultad de Teología ‘San Vicente Ferrer’, 2004. Lamanna, M. “«De eo enim Metaphysicus agit logice». Un confronto tra Pererius e Goclenius”. Medioevo 34 (2009): 315–360.

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ZUM HISTORISCHEN HINTERGRUND DER TRANSZENDENTALIENLEHRE IN DEN DISPUTATIONES METAPHYSICAE Rolf Darge

ABSTRACT

Recent studies cancel the received view according to which Suárez practices a form of Thomistic eclecticism and replace it by the image of Suárez as an subtle analyst who traces back the Scotistic scientia transcendens to its basic principles, reconstructs it from the bottom up in a new systematic way and – just thereby – pioneers modern ontology. This new view seems in another respect onesided. Even if Suárez explains the meaning of “being” in accordance with Scotus, he does not adopt the Scotistic model of transcendental science but rather looks for a suitable alternative to it. In a close critical examination of the underlying principles and basic models of scotistic transcendental thought he develops the outlines of a new transcendental approach to being. It reverts to the pre-Scotistic tradition of transcendental thought and seeks to evolve it further on the basis of the new notion of being shared with Scotus. In this regard Suárez’s project may be inscribed in the history of impact of the scotistic scientia transcendens as well as in the history of influence of the pre-Scotistic – especially Thomistic – transcendental thought.

1. EINLEITUNG Kants Transzendentalphilosophie geht, wie Kant selbst auch weiß,1 eine in das Mittelalter zurückreichende Tradition des transzendentalen Denkens voran, in der Transzendentalphilosophie nicht oder jedenfalls nicht in erster Linie als Reflexion auf die apriorischen Bedingungen der Erfahrungserkenntnis verstanden wird, sondern als eine Wissenschaft von den Dingen selbst – nämlich vom Seienden im allgemeinen. Der transcensus (Überstieg) wird hier nicht wie bei Kant auf die sinnliche Erfahrung bezogen, sondern auf die Aristotelischen Kategorien: transcendens oder – wie es seit dem 16. Jahrhundert auch heißt – transcendentalis ist eine Bestimmung des Seienden, die nicht auf eine bestimmte Kategorie begrenzt ist. Metaphysik ist Transzendental1   Siehe dazu neuerdings F. Tommasi, Philosophia Transcendentalis. La questione antepredicativa e l’analogia tra la Scolastica e Kant. Le corrispondenze letterarie, scientifiche ed erudite dal Rinascimento all’età moderna, Subsidia 10 (Firenze: L. S. Olschki, 2008), bes. 1–60.

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theorie, weil sie von den transkategorialen Bestimmungen des Seienden handelt.2 Dieses Metaphysikverständnis bleibt bis in das 18. Jahrhundert hinein lebendig; wie Norbert Hinske gezeigt hat, setzt Kant noch in seinem frühen Sprachgebrauch metaphysica und philosopia transcendentalis gemäß dieser Tradition gleich.3 Welche Gestalten und Traditionslinien des transzendentalen Denkens lassen sich unterscheiden und welche davon bleibt in der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik führend? Lässt sich vielleicht eine Traditionslinie von der scholastischen scientia transcendens zu Kants Transzendentalphilosophie rekonstruieren? Diese Fragen waren neuerdings und sind weiterhin Gegenstand intensiver Forschungen. In ihnen trat das systematische und historische Gewicht der transzendentaltheoretischen Überlegungen in Suárez’ Disputationes metaphysicae immer deutlicher hervor; heute wird ihnen im Übergang vom mittelalterlichen zum neuzeitlichen Denken eine Schlüsselrolle zuerkannt.4 Auch innerhalb der Disputationes nehmen sie eine zentrale Stellung ein:5 Das Werk ist in seinem ersten und grundlegenden Teil Lehre von den Transzendentalien ‘Seiendes’, ‘Eines’, ‘Wahres’ und ‘Gutes’; denn diese sind, wie Suárez im Anschluss an die scholastische Lehrtradition annimmt, die allgemeinsten Sinngehalte des 2   Siehe dazu die Forschungs- und Diskussionsberichte von J. Aertsen, „The Medieval Doctrine of the Transcendentals. The current State of Research“, Bulletin de Philosophie médiévale 33 (1991): 130–147; Ders., „The Medieval Doctrine of the Transcendentals: New Literature“, Bulletin de Philosophie médiévale 41 (1999): 107–121; Ders., Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1996). Außerdem Ders., Art. „Transzendental“ (II. Die Anfänge bis Meister Eckhart), in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, hrsg. J. Ritter und K. Gründer, Bd. 10 (Darmstadt, 1998), Sp. 1360–1465; und Ders., „Transcendens – Transcendentalis. The Genealogy of a Philosophical Term“, in L’élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge. Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve et Leuven 12–14 septembre 1998 organisé par la S.I.E.P.M, ed. J. Hamesse und C. Steel (Turnhout, 2000), 241–255. Außerdem L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Hamburg, 1990). 3   N. Hinske „Verschiedenheit und Einheit der Transzendentalen Philosophien“, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 14 (1970): 41–68; Ders., Kants Weg zur Transzendentalphilosophie. Der dreißigjährige Kant (Stuttgart, 1970), bes. 40–77; Ders., „Die historischen Vorlagen der Kantischen Transzendentalphilosophie“, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 12 (1968): 86–113. 4   O. Boulnois, Être et représentation. Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l’époque de Duns Scot (XIIIe–XIVe siècle) (Paris, 1999); F. Volpi, „Suárez et le problème de la métaphysique“, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 3 (1993): 410: „La thèse qui peut être considerée comme acquise est qu’avec Suárez la métaphysique opère un tournant décisif en direction de l’ontologie moderne“; J.-F. Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphysique, Paris, 1990, bes. 325–457; L Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, bes. 200–213. 5   Die Disputationes nach der Vivès-Ausgabe: Opera omnia, ed. C. Berton, Bde. 25 und 26 (Paris, 1866; ND Hildesheim, 1965) zitiert.

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realen Seienden, die in jeglichem Verstehen von realem Seienden eingeschlossen und somit immer schon – wenigstens implizit – erfasst sind.6 Dies betriff t auch die Gotteserkenntnis, auf welche die Metaphysik im Sinne des Suárez letztlich abzielt; denn neben dem endlichen, geschaffenen Seienden fällt auch das unendliche Seiende in den Umfang der Transzendentalien. Deshalb findet auch die philosophische Gotteslehre ihr Fundament und ihren Rahmen in der Transzendentalienlehre. Indem diese das Göttliche in der ihm mit jeglichem anderen realen Wesen gemeinsamen seinsmäßigen Vollkommenheit erschließt, eröff net sie einen Horizont, innerhalb dessen die eigentümliche Seinsweise des Göttlichen philosophisch näher bestimmt werden kann.7 Nachdem die Natur der Ersten Philosophie und ihr eigentümlichen Gegenstand, das Seiende insoweit es reales Seiendes ist, bestimmt sind (DM 1) beginnt die Transzendentalienlehre in der zweiten Disputation mit der Erklärung des Begriffs des Seienden als solchen. Darauf folgt ab Disputation 3 eine Auslegung der Natur des Seienden als solchen durch Aufweis seiner transzendentalen Attribute (passiones entis); sie umfasst allgemeine Erwägungen zur Eigenart, Zahl und Ordnung dieser Eigenschaften (DM 3) sowie spezielle Betrachtungen zum transzendentalen Einen (DM 4–7), Wahren (DM 8–9) und Guten (DM 10–11). Die Darstellung erstreckt sich in der Berton-Ausgabe auf etwa 370 engbedruckte Seiten im Quartformat. Kein anderer Metaphysikentwurf besitzt eine so umfangreiche, und so eingehend vom Autor selbst in ihren historischen Grundlagen, ihrem inneren systematischen Zusammenhang und ihren philosophischen Konsequenzen reflektierte Transzendentalienlehre wie derjenige des Suárez. Sie beeinflusste maßgeblich die Entwicklung der Ersten Philosophie an katholischen, wie auch an den lutherischen und reformieren Universitäten des 17. Jahrhunderts;8 noch Christian Wolff benutzt sie in seiner Ontologia von 1728 6   DM 1, 2, 27: „rationes universales, quas metaphysica considerat transcendantales sunt, ita ut in propriis rationibus entium imbibantur“; – DM 1, 4, 20: „rationes […] transcendentales, sine quarum cognitione et adminiculo non potest aliqua ratio seu quidditas cuiuscunque rei in particulari explicari.“ Siehe dazu R. Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition (Leiden– Boston: Brill, 2004). 7   DM 1, 4, 34: „ut traditur lib. 10 Ethicor. haec felicitas in contemplatione Dei et substantiarum separatarum posita est; haec autem contemplatio proprius actus est, et praecipuus finis huius scientiae“; – DM 1, 3, 10: „Deus et intelligentiae […] prout in nostram considerationem cadunt, non possunt a consideratione transcendentium attributorum sejungi.“ 8   Siehe hierzu Ch. Lohr, Metaphysics, in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge, 1988), Kap. X, 537–638, bes. 611–638, und die älteren Studien von K. Eschweiler, „Die Philosophie der spanischen Spätscholastik auf den deutschen Universitäten des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts“, in Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft, ed. K. Beyerle, H. Finke, G. Schreiber, Bd. 1, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens, Erste Reihe (Münster, 1928), 251–325; E. Lewalter, Spanisch-jesuitische und deutsch-lutherische Metaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der iberisch-deutschen Kulturbeziehungen und zur

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als Ausgangspunkt für sein Projekt einer emendatio der scholastischen Seinswissenschaft, die das in dieser klar aber undeutlich Gedachte mit den Mitteln eines an der Mathematik orientierten demonstrativen Verfahrens zu deutlicher Bestimmtheit bringt; für ihn repräsentiert sie einfachhin die scholastische Auffassung über diesen Gegenstand.9 Dabei ist sich freilich Wolff der Vielfalt und Verschiedenartigkeit der scholastischen Transzendentalienlehren nicht bewusst. Diese Vielgestaltigkeit ist in den vergangenen Jahren in Erinnerung gebracht worden.10 Dabei stellte sich die Frage neu, welche Traditionslinie Suárez aufnimmt und an die neuzeitliche Hochschulmetaphysik vermittelt. Bereits Gilson hatte diese Frage in seiner berühmten Darstellung der Geschichte der Seinsfrage11 erwogen und entschieden beantwortet: er schloss Suárez aus der thomistischen Linie aus und stellte ihn in eine Denktradition, die von Avicenna zu Duns Scotus, von dort über Suárez zur deutschen Schulphilosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts – und durch diese zu Wolff und schließlich zu Kant führt. Kennzeichnend für diese Traditionslinie ist in der Sicht Gilsons, dass sie das Seiende auf seine Wesenheit mit dem ontischen Status eines possibile reduziert und seine Wirklichkeit, den Seinsakt, aus dem Blick verliert.12 Vorgeschichte des deutschen Idealismus (Hamburg, 1935); M. Wundt, Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen, 1939). 9   Im ersten Teil der Ontologia werden bei der Auslegung des Sinngehalts des Seienden als solchen und bei der Erörterung der Eigentümlichkeiten des Seienden als solchen systematisch die Teile der überkommenen Transzendentalienlehre aufgenommen und im Anschluß an Suàrez’ expliziert. Siehe dazu R. Darge, „Von Durandus zu Christian Wolff. Eine Entwicklungslinie der Theorie des Guten in der mittelalterlichen und neuzeitlichen Universitätsmetaphysik“, in Metaphysik als Wissenschaft. Festschrift für Klaus Düsing zum 65. Geburtstag, hrsg. Dirk Fonfara (Freiburg–München, 2006), 153–172. 10   Siehe dazu die in Anm. 2 genannten Studien und neuerdings: M. Pickavé (Hrsg.), Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag (Berlin, 2003); J. Uscatescu, „La teoría del bien transcendental en Pedro Auréolo en el contexto de su filosfía“, Faventia 26 (2004): 53–76; R. Darge, „Omne ens est conveniens. Ursprung und Entwicklung eines spätmittelalterlichen Neuansatzes der Theorie des ontischen Gutseins“, Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie 50 (2005): 9–27; J. Schmutz, La querelle des possibles. Recherches philosophiques et textuelles sur la métaphysique jésuite 1540–1767, (Thèse de doctorat), im Erscheinen. 11   É. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, Toronto, 1949, 2. überarb. Aufl. Toronto, 1952; frz. (neu überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung) L’être et l’essence, Paris, 1962; 2. durchgesehene und vermehrte Aufl. Paris, 1972. 12   Gilson, L’être et l’essence (1972), 151: „Pour Suárez, la notion d’essence est adéquate à la notion d’être, si bien qu’on peut exprimer tout ce qu’est l’être en termes d’essence, avec la certitude qu’il ne s’en perdra rien. Une telle proposition semblera d’ailleurs aller de soi pour tote mentalité essentialiste. […] Pour une telle ontologie [essentialiste] […] l’essence épuise toute la richesse de l’être.“ – Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (1952), 106: „And all this owing to Avicenna, who begot Scotus, who begot Suárez,

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Gilsons Deutung regte unabhängig von der mit ihr verbundenen Wertung, wonach die Seinslehre in dieser Denktradition zum bloßen „Essentialismus“ und zur „Possibilienspekulation“ verkommt, die Suárez-Forschung stark an; in ihrer Folge wurden die Disputationes genauer auf die Grundlinien der scotischen scientia transcendens hin analysiert13 Die Analyse setzte dabei besonders an zwei Elementen der Transzendentalienlehre an: (1) am Begriff des Seienden, den Suárez in der 2. Disputation erläutert – und (2) an der allgemeinen Theorie der passiones entis in der 3. Disputation. Zu (1): Wie Scotus versteht Suárez den metaphysisch maßgeblichen Begriff des Seienden als einen höchst einfachen Begriff, der in demselben Sinne von Gott und Geschöpf, Substanz und Akzidens aussagbar ist, weil er von jeder besonderen Seinsweise absieht. Er besagt – geradeso wie auch ‘res’ – formal nur die reale Wesenheit, konkret genommen: ein subjekthaftes Was, das innerlich auf die denkunabhängige Existenz hingeordnet ist14 – und kann daher von jedem realen Ding quidditativ ausgesagt werden;15 denn wenn auch das Sein nicht in jedem Falle zur Wesenheit des Dings gehört, so kommt es doch jedem realen Ding wesentlich zu, eine Wesenheit zu besitzen, die des denkunabhängigen Seins fähig ist, oder der – scotisch gesprochen – „das Sein [außerhalb des Verstandes] nicht widerstreitet (cui non repugnat esse)“.16 Suárez’ Metaphysikprojekt erscheint damit vom Ansatz her als Fortsetzung der scotischen who begot Kleutgen“; – Ibid., 112: „And then Suárez begot Wolff “; – Ibid. 120: „Wolff has been to Kant what Suárez had been to Wolff himself.“ 13   W. Hoeres, „Francis Suárez and the Teaching of John Duns Scotus on ‘univocatio entis’“, in John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965, ed. B. M. Bonansea und J. K. Ryan (Washington, 1965), 263–290; – Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, bes. 200–294; – Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphysique, bes. 137–321; – Boulnois, Être et représentation. 14   DM 2, 4, 5: „Si ens sumatur, prout est significatum huius vocis in vi nominis sumptae, eius ratio consistit in hoc, quod sit habens essentiam realem, id est non fictam, nec chymericam, sed veram et aptam ad realiter existendum“; – DM 2, 4, 15: „Unde obiter colligo, ens, in vi nominis sumptum, et rem, idem omnino esse seu significare, solumque differre in etymologia nominum; nam res dicitur a quidditate, quatenus est aliquid firmum et ratum, id est non fictum, qua ratione dicitur quidditas realis; ens vero in praedicta significatione dicit id, quod habet essentiam realem. Eamdem ergo omnino rem seu rationem realem important.“ – DM 2, 4, 14: „quod vero essentia aut quidditas realis sit, intelligi non potest sine ordine ad esse et realem entitatem actualem; non enim aliter concipimus essentiam aliquam, quae actu non existit, esse realem, nisi quia talis est, ut ei non repugnet esse entitatem actualem, quod habet per actualem existentiam; quamvis ergo actu esse non sit de essentia creaturae, tamen ordo ad esse, vel aptitudo essendi est de intrinseco et essentiali conceptu eius.“ 15   DM 2, 4, 13: „hinc obiter colligitur, rationem entis communissimam, quae significatur per eam vocem in vi nominis sumptam, esse essentialem, et praedicari quidditative de suis inferioribus.“ 16   Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 43, q. un., n. 7 (ed. Vat. VI, 354); Ord. IV, dist. 1, q. 1, n. 8, (ed. Vivès XVI, 109); Ord. IV, dist. 8, q. 1, n. 2 (ed. Vivès XVII, 7); sinngemäß: Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 2, q. un., n. 314 (ed. Vat. III, 191); Ord. I, dist. 36, q. un., n. 50 u. 52 (ed. Vat. VI, 291 sq.).

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scientia transcendens. In der Formulierung Ludger Honnefelders: „Metaphysik ist für beide Autoren [Scotus und Suárez] […] Transzendentalwissenschaft und nur das“.17 Zu (2): Einige Interpreten führen darüberhinaus Suárez’ Grundverständnis der transzendentalen Eigenschaften auf Scotus zurück. J.-F. Courtine zufolge übernimmt Suárez die scotische Lehre von den passiones entis18 und führt im Anschluß an Scotus eine Lehre von den disjunktiven Transzendentalien ein;19 im Blick stehen dabei vor allem die Überlegungen zur divisio entis am Anfang des zweiten Teils der Disputationes.20 Das überkommene Bild von Suárez als eines thomistisch inspirierten Eklektikers21 wird aufgelöst; an seine Stelle tritt in der neueren Forschung das Bild eines subtilen Analytikers, der die scotische scientia transcendens bis in ihre konzeptionelle Wurzel zurückverfolgt, sie von dort in neuer Weise systematisch entfaltet – und gerade so den Übergang zur neuzeitlichen Ontologie bahnt. Dieses neue Bild erscheint mir nun jedoch wiederum als einseitig: denn wenn Suárez auch den Begriff des Seienden durchaus im Anschluss an Scotus bestimmt, so übernimmt er doch nicht das scotische Modell der Transzendentalwissenschaft, sondern sucht vielmehr – diese These möchte ich im folgenden begründen – nach einer Alternative zu diesem; dazu knüpft er an die vorscotische Tradition des transzendentalen Denkens an und versucht, diese auf der Grundlage des neuen scotisch geprägten Seinsbegriffs weiterzuentwickeln. Das eigentümliche Profil einer Transzendentaltheorie hängt nicht allein von dem Seinsbegriff ab, den sie zugrundelegt, sondern auch davon, wie die transzendentale Aufgabe in ihr verstanden wird – also wesentlich auch von dem zugrundegelegten Transzendentalitätskonzept. Zur Begründung der These wird daher im Folgenden zunächst (I) Suárez’ Transzendentalitätskonzept vor seinem historischen Hintergrund bestimmt – dann (II) auf dieser Grundlage Suárez’ Auseinandersetzung mit der scotischen Transzendentalwissenschaft analysiert und schließlich (III) eine Folgerung zur ideengeschichtlichen Einordnung des transzendentaltheoretischen Programms gezogen, das Suárez in den Disputationes verfolgt.   Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, 209.   Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphysique, bes. 355–377; 376: „C’est en fait à cette doctrine scotiste [des passiones entis] que se range finalement Suárez.“ 19   Ibid.,96: „C’est l’évidence d’une telle latitudo entis qui permet à Suárez d’élaborer son étude des transcendantaux disjonctifs“; – 417: „[…] Suárez réintroduisait l’étude des transcendantaux disjonctifs.“ 20   DM 28, 1. 21   M. Grabmann, „Die Disputationes metaphysicae des Franz Suárez in ihrer methodischen Eigenart und Fortwirkung“, in Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik, München, 1926, 559: „Der von […] Suárez und, wir dürfen sagen auch von Thomas vertretene Eklektizismus, das große methodische Fundamentalprinzip der philosophia perennis, sieht gerade darin die volle Lebenskraft des metaphysischen Wahrheitsorganismus, daß dieser unbeschadet seiner Eigenart neue Stoffe sich assimilieren und sich so noch mehr ausgestalten und festigen kann.“ 17

18

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2. DAS TRANSZENDENTALITÄTSKONZEPT Seit dem 14. Jahrhundert konkurrieren in der scholastischen Denktradition zwei Auffassungen des im Begriff des Transzendentalen gedachten transcensus über die Kategorien miteinander. Nach der einen Auffassung werden die Kategorien in Richtung auf das allen prädikativ Gemeinsame hin überstiegen. Die Transzendentalien kommen also jedem Seienden zu und können deshalb – im Unterschied zu den Kategorien – von jedem Seienden in jeder Kategorie ausgesagt werden. Da sie denselben Umfang besitzen, also der Sache nach identisch sind, können sie wechselseitig voneinander ausgesagt werden: sie sind an Subjekt- und Prädikatsstelle in der Aussage miteinander vertauschbar (konvertibel) – ohne dass dabei sinnlose Wiederholungen entstehen; denn wenn sie auch der Sache nach identisch sind, so sind sie doch begrifflich verschieden. Historisch ist dies die ursprüngliche und für das 13. Jahrhundert maßgebliche Konzeption. Sie erscheint erstmals systematisch entfaltet bei Philipp dem Kanzler (um 1225), und bildet die gemeinsame Grundlage der nachfolgenden Ausarbeitungen der Transzendentalienlehre bis zu Heinrich von Gent. Auch die Transzendentalienlehre des Thomas steht in dieser Tradition.22 Nach der anderen Auffassung beschränkt sich der transcensus auf das negative Moment der kategorialen Unbestimmtheit: die transcendentia übersteigen die Kategorien gerade insofern, als sie nicht auf eine der obersten Gattungen, die den Bereich des endlichen Seienden ausmessen, beschränkt sind. Die Konzeption erscheint erstmals bei Duns Scotus.23 Für die Transzendentalität einer Bestimmung ist Scotus zufolge allein ausschlaggebend, dass von dieser außer dem Begriff des Seienden, der keinen generischen Charakter hat, kein übergeordnetes Prädikat ausgesagt werden kann. Ob sie vielen Subjekten gemeinsam ist, ist für die Frage ihrer Transzendentalität unerheblich.24 Diese Auffassung ermöglicht es Scotus, den Umfang der Transzendentalien auszudehnen und über die Gruppe der herkömmlichen, mit dem Seienden konvertiblen Transzendentalien Eines, Wahres und Gutes hinaus weitere 22   Siehe hierzu: J. Aertsen, Art. „Transzendentalien“, in Lexikon des Mittelalters, hrsg. N. Angermann et al., Bd. 8 (München, 1997), Sp. 953–955; – S. H. Pouillon, „Le premier traité des propriétés transcendentales. La ‘Summa de bono’ du Chancelier Philippe“, Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 42 (1939): 40–77; – J. Aertsen,“The Beginning of the Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Philip The Chancellor“, Mediævalia, Textos e Estudos 7–8 (1995): 269–286; – Ders., „Transcendental Thought in Henry of Ghent“, in Henry of Ghent. Studies in Commemoration of the 700 th Anniversary of his Death (1293) (Louvain, 1995), 1–18.. 23   Ord. I, dist. 8, pars. 1, q. 3, n. 113 (ed. Vat. IV, 206): „quaecumque conveniunt enti ut indifferens ad finitum et infinitum, vel ut est proprium enti infinito, conveniunt sibi non ut determinatur ad genus sed ut prius, et per consequens ut est transcendens et est extra omne genus.“ 24   Ibid., n. 114: „de ratione transcendentis est non habere praedicatum supraveniens nisi ens, sed quod ipsum sit commune ad multa inferiora, hoc accidit“; – n. 115: „Non oportet autem transcendens ut transcendens dici de quocumque ente nisi sit convertibile cum primo transcendente, scilicet ente.“

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transzendentale Bestimmungen anzusetzen, die nur einigen oder einem einzigen Seienden – nämlich Gott – zukommen; denn Gott ist außerhalb jeder Gattung. Die scotische Lehre von den disjunktiven Transzendentalien – wonach nicht nur das ganze Disjunktum (‘finitum : infinitum’, ‘actus : potentia’) sondern auch jedes der beiden Glieder des Gegensatzpaares für sich genommen transzendental ist,25 setzt dieses neue Transzendentalitätskonzept voraus – ebenso auch Scotus’ Verständnis von Transzendentalwissenschaft. Metaphysik konstituiert sich erstmals im ganzen und ausschließlich als transcendens scientia auf der Grundlage der scotischen Konzeption von Transzendentalität als kategorialer Unbegrenztheit. Nun übernimmt Suárez nicht das scotische Transzendentalitätskonzept. Vielmehr versteht er den transcensus im Anschluss an die vorscotische Tradition als Überstieg in Richtung auf das Gemeinsame, das alle Kategorien durchläuft: Die allgemeinsten Bestimmungen des Seienden „werden ‘transzendental’ genannt […] weil sie nicht zu irgendeiner bestimmten Kategorie gehören sondern alle [Kategorien] durchstreifen“.26 Transzendentalität bedeutet für ihn eine prädikative Gemeinsamkeit höchsten Grades, die sich auf alles erstreckt, das ist, und so die Konvertibilität der transzendentalen Bestimmungen untereinander zur Folge hat: „Die Transzendentalien sind untereinander alle umfangsgleich und werden mit dem Seienden vertauscht.“27 Dementsprechend weist Suárez die scotische Konzeption disjunktiver Transzendentalien ausdrücklich zurück28 – der zweite, mit den diversen Grundgestalten des Seienden im besonderen befasste Teil der Disputationes bedient sich zwar scotischer Überlegungen, wird aber formal – wie gegenüber dem Verständnis J.-F. Courtines hervorzuheben ist – nicht als Transzendentaltheorie und insbesondere nicht als Lehre von den disjunktiven Transzendentalien durchgeführt.

25   Duns Scotus, Reportatio (ed. Etzkorn–Wolter), dist. 19, pars 1, q. 3, n. 19: „non solum passio convertibilis cum ente est transcendens, ut bonum, unum, verum et huiusmodi, sed etiam passio disiuncta et utraque pars eius, ut actus et potentia […] omnia erunt transcendentia et prius enti convenientia quam ibi datur in decem genera.“ 26   DM 47, 3, 10: „Transcendentales dicuntur […] quia ad certum aliquod praedicamentum non pertinent, sed per omnia vagantur“ 27   DM 4, 8, 12: „transcendentia omnia aequalia sint inter se et cum ente convertantur.“ 28   DM 3, 2, 11: „De illis autem disiunctis, finitum vel infinitum, etc., dicendum est […] proprie non esse passiones entis in communi, sed potius esse divisiones eius […]“; – DM 4, 8, 2: „haec praedicata complexa seu disiuncta revera non sunt proprietates entis in quantum ens, quia essentialiter dividunt ipsum ens.“ – Allerdings kann das scotische Lehrstück von den disjunktiven passiones entis seiner Auffassung nach für die Analyse der Grundgestalten des Seienden im Rahmen der speziellen metaphysischen Betrachtung nutzbar gemacht werden. Zur Verwendung des Lehrstücks im zweiten Teil der Disputationes metaphysicae siehe J.-F. Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphysique, 381–401, 416–417.

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3. DIE TRANSZENDENTALE SEINSAUSLEGUNG Diese Beobachtungen betreffen nicht nur terminologische Fragen: Die Differenz der Transzendentalitätskonzepte entspricht einem fundamentalen Unterschied im Verständnis der von der Ersten Philosophie zu leistenden Seinsauslegung. Jeder Begriff, der Dinge näher bestimmt, besagt mehr als nur ‘Seiendes’; er fügt zum Sinngehalt des Seienden als solchen begrifflich etwas hinzu: einen bestimmten Modus oder eine Differenz, wodurch das Ding nicht nur Seiendes, sondern So-und-so-Seiendes, dieses oder jenes Seiende ist. Schließt nun dieses Hinzugefügte in jedem Fall den Sinngehalt des Seienden wesenhaft ein oder nicht? Ist der Sinngehalt des Seienden in den inneren Modi und letzten Differenzen des Seienden wesenhaft enthalten – und ist er in den Eigentümlichkeiten des Seienden als solchen (passiones entis) wesenhaft enthalten, so dass von einer Art inneren Auslegung (explicatio) des Seienden als Seienden gesprochen werden kann? In der Antwort auf diese grundlegenden Fragen der Seinsauslegung gehen die Stellungnahmen auseinander und folgen unterschiedlichen Modellen. 3.1 Duns Scotus Scotus zufolge schließt das Hinzugefügte den Sinngehalt des Seienden nicht innerlich und wesenhaft ein. Seine Begründung folgt (a) im Hinblick auf die letzten Differenzen und inneren Modi einem Kompositionsmodell, (b) im Hinblick auf die passiones entis dem Modell des wesenhaften Akzidens (Proprium, Proprietas, Eigentümlichkeit). Beide Modelle sind aristotelischen Ursprungs und orientieren sich an kategorialen Strukturen. (a) Zwischen dem komplexen Begriff der Wesenheit eines Seienden und einem zusammengesetzten Ding besteht seiner Auffassung nach eine strukturelle Ähnlichkeit: Wie das Ding aus Potenz und Akt zusammengesetzt ist, so der washeitliche Begriff aus begrifflichen Teilen, die sich zueinander wie Materie und Form, Bestimmbares und Bestimmendes verhalten.29 Die jeweiligen Bestandteile können dabei ihrerseits wiederum auf ähnliche Weise zusammengesetzt sein, so dass ein Fortschritt der Analyse in Richtung auf jeweils einfachere Komponenten möglich ist. Die Dekomposition kann jedoch nicht endlos fortgesetzt werden. Sie endet bei schlechthin einfachen Komponenten, einem rein Bestimmbaren und einem rein Bestimmenden. Bei der begrifflichen Analyse ist das rein Bestimmbare gerade der Begriff des Seienden, das nur Bestimmende hingegen eine „letzte Differenz“ die als Unterscheidendes rein qualifizierend (nicht washeitlich) ausgesagt wird.30 Demgegenüber wird das rein be  Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 133 (ed. Vat. III, 82 f.): „sicut ens compositum componitur ex actu et potentia in re, ita conceptus compositus per se unus componitur ex conceptu potentiali et actuali, sive ex conceptu determinabili et determinante.“ 30   Zum Begriff der ‘letzten Differenz’ und zu deren Prädikationsweise siehe A. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (Lancaster, 1946), 82–87; und 29

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stimmbare Element washeitlich, ‘in quid’ prädiziert; ‘Seiendes’ bildet den Endpunkt der Analyse in der Linie der bestimmbaren jeweils gemeinsamen Begriffe, die washeitlich prädiziert werden. Es ist also in jedem spezielleren washeitlich aussagbaren Begriff enthalten. Von den letzten Differenzen und inneren Modi kann es daher nicht mehr washeitlich ausgesagt werden, da diese – als rein qualifi zierende Bestimmungen – nicht unter einen washeitlichen Begriff fallen.31 Das bedeutet: es gibt (rein) qualifizierende Bestimmungen, in denen der Sinngehalt des Seienden nicht innerlich und wesenhaft eingeschlossen ist. Nach Scotus muss die Differenz zwischen dem letzten washeitlich aussagbaren Begriff und den rein qualifizierenden Bestimmungen ontologisch fundiert sein; er nimmt deshalb an, dass ‘Seiendes’ nicht nur begrifflich, sondern in der Sache selbst vorgängig zum Intellekt – real-modal – von den letzten Differenzen und inneren Modi verschieden ist;32 nur so lässt sich seiner Ansicht nach ‘Seiendes’ als transkategorialunivok aussagbarer Begriff verstehen und rechtfertigen. (b) In ähnlicher Weise bestimmt Scotus das Verhältnis zwischen dem Seienden als solchen und seinen passiones. Die Konzeption orientiert sich am Aristotelischen Modell des Per-se-Akzidens oder der Eigentümlichkeit (proprium). Solche Bestimmungen werden Aristoteles zufolge in Prädikatsbegriffen ausgesagt, die kein inhaltliches Merkmal des Subjektbegriffs ausdrücken und auch ihrerseits den Subjektsbegriff nicht einschließen. Ihr Subjekt wird zwar notwendig in ihrer Definition mit angeführt, aber nur „durch Hinzufügung“ (ἐκ πϱοϑέσεως) – und nicht wie ein inneres Moment des Definierten selbst.33 Die scholastischen Kommentatoren illustrieren das Verhältnis regelmäßig im Anschluss an Porphyrius (Isagoge cap. 6 u. 15) durch das Beispiel der Fähigkeit zu lachen, die als ein proprium des Menschen gedeutet wird, das notwendig aus dessen Wesen folgt. Scotus zufolge verhalten sich nun die passiones entis zum Seienden als solchen, wie ein proprium zu seinem Träger; das bedeutet: Sie sind im Seienden als ihrem quasi-Subjekt nicht wesenhaft enthalten – und sie enthalten selbst den Sinngehalt des Seienden nicht innerlich und wesenhaft; ‘Seiendes’ gehört nur ut additum – wie ein

L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus (Münster, 1979), 315–319. 31   Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 131, (ed. Vat. III, 81): „Ens non est univocum dictum in ‘quid’ de omnibus per se intelligibilibus, quia non de differentiis ultimis.“ 32   Cf. Ord. I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 139 (ed. Vat. IV, 222 sq.): „non ut distinctio realitatis et realitatis, sed ut distinctio realitatis et modi proprii et intrinseci eiusdem“ Siehe dazu L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens, bes. 365–390; A. Wolter, „The formal Distinction“, in John Duns Scotus 1265–1965, ed. J. K. Ryan B. M. Bonansea (Washington, 1965), 45–60. 33   Cf. Anal. Post. I, cap. 4, 73a34–73b5; Metaph. VII, cap. 5, 1031a2–5.

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Hinzugefügtes – in ihre Definition.34 Dementsprechend muss die Differenz zwischen dem Seienden und seinen passiones eine mehr als nur begriffliche sein; denn die distinkten Begriffe des Seienden als solchen und der verschiedenen passiones sind ja Realbegriffe; durch sie bezieht sich der Intellekt auf die denkunabhängig gegebene res. Einem Unterschied von Realbegriffen aber, von denen keiner den anderen – es sei denn im Sinne eines Hinzugefügten – einschließt, muss Scotus zufolge eine reale Nicht-Identität auf Seiten der Sache, zumindest ein realer Unterschied der Sachbestimmungen (formalitates) oder Sachgehalte (realitates), auf die jene Begriffe bezogen sind, entsprechen. 35 Die passiones entis unterscheiden sich voneinander und vom Seienden als solchen in dieser Weise: real-formal (differentia realis minor).36 Nur auf der Grundlage dieser Auffassung lässt sich im Sinne des Scotus vor dem Hintergrund der aristotelischen Wissenschaftslehre – wonach eine Wissenschaft die notwendigen Eigenschaften von ihrem eigentümlichen Gegenstand oder „Subiectum“ zu beweisen hat – der Anspruch der Metaphysik auf den Rang einer Realwissenschaft aufrechterhalten.37 3.2 Suárez Suárez betrachtet die scotische Erklärung nicht als Vorlage; vielmehr versteht er sie – auf dem Boden der mit Scotus geteilten Überzeugung vom quidditativen und höchst einfachen Charakter der ratio entis – als die stärkste konkurrierende Position. Sie fordert in seiner Sicht durch eine prinzipielle Schwierigkeit, die sich aus ihren Erklärungsmodellen ergibt, zu einer Auseinandersetzung heraus. Ihre Schwierigkeit liegt darin, dass sie die radikale innere Transzendentalität des Seienden aus dem Blick verliert: „Das Seiende transzendiert alle [Naturen] innerlich“;38 außerhalb des Seienden gibt es nichts. ‘Seiendes’ ist transzendental, weil es alles, was denkunabhängig 34   Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 134–136 (ed. Vat. III, 83–85): „passio ‘per se secundo modo’ praedicatur de subiecto, I Posteriorum, – ergo subiectum ponitur in definitione passionis sicut additum, ex eodem I, et VII Metaphysicae. Ens ergo in ratione suae passionis cadit ut additum. Habet enim passiones proprias, ut patet per Philosophum IV Metaphysicae cap. 3.“. S. dazu Honnefelder, Ens in quantum ens, 75–78, 323–326. 35   Ord. I, dist. 2, pars 2, q. 1–4, n. 404–406 (ed. Vat. II, 357): „Melius est uti ista negative ‘hoc non est formaliter idem’, quam, hoc est sic et sic ‘distinctum’“; – n. 409 (a. a. O. 359): „Ista distinctio sive non-identitas formalis.“ Siehe hierzu M. J. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus (Washington D.C., 1944); – Wolter, „The Formal Distinction“. 36   Super Met. IV, q. 2, n. 143 (ed. Bonav. III, 354–355) : „[…] alietate, inquam, non causata ab intellectu, nec tamen tanta quantam intelligimus cum dicimus ‘diversae res’; sed differentia reali minori, si vocetur differentia realis omnis non causata ab intellectu.“ 37   Ord. II, dist. 16, q. un., n. 17 (ed. Vivès XIII, 43a): „[…] aliter Metaphysica concludens tales passiones de ente, et illas considerans, non esset scientia realis.“ 38   DM 2, 4, 14: „ens […] non dicit determinatam naturam, sed intime transcendit omnia.“

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(real) ist oder sein kann ‘innerlich übersteigt’. Das bedeutet, dass der Sinngehalt des Seienden „in der ganzen Seiendheit als ganzer“ – also auch in jedem inneren Modus und jeder realen Differenz des Seienden und in jeder passio entis – auf gleiche Weise, nämlich innerlich und wesenhaft, enthalten ist.39 Deshalb unterzieht Suárez die scotische Konzeption einer umfassenden Revision. Sie beginnt in der zweiten Disputation mit einer Kritik, die sich überhaupt gegen das scotische Modell der transzendentalen Analyse richtet: Sektion 2.3 weist unter der Leitfrage, „ob der Sinngehalt oder Begriff des Seienden in der Sache selbst und vorgängig zum Intellekt irgendwie von den untergeordneten Formen getrennt sei“40 die Scotische Lehre von der realen Modaldistinktion zurück und ersetzt sie durch eine Konzeption, wonach der Sinngehalt des Seienden in der Sache sämtliche realen Modi mitumfasst, insoweit er hier (in re) eben nichts anderes ist als die Mannigfaltigkeit der Seienden in ihrer eigentümlichen Bestimmtheit.41 Die Begründung geht davon aus, dass ‘Seiendes’ innerlich und wesenhaft in jedem realen Modus und jeglicher realen Bestimmung, durch die sich Dinge voneinander unterscheiden, enthalten ist. Diese Annahme wird in den folgenden Sektionen – 2.4, und besonders 2.5 – begründet. Nach der Erläuterung der ratio entis in Sektion 2.4 fragt Sektion 2.5 ausdrücklich „ob der Sinngehalt des Seienden alle Sinngehalte und Differenzen der untergeordneten Seienden transzendiert, so dass er in ihnen innerlich und wesenhaft enthalten ist“;42 im Blick steht hier direkt Scotus’ Lehre von den letzten Differenzen und inneren Modi; die einschlägigen Textstellen der Ordinatio werden explizit herangezogen.43 Suárez verwirft diese Lehre und begründet ausführlich, warum auch die letzte Differenz und jeder innere Modus des Seienden selbst real und insofern wesenhaft Seiendes ist. Die unmittelbar vorangehende Erläuterung des metaphysisch maßgeblichen Begriffs des Seienden (Sektion 2.4), steht dieser Auffassung nicht entgegen, sondern impliziert sie gerade: denn „darin ist nicht eingeschlossen, dass jene Wesenheit unvollkommen oder vollkommen, vollständig oder nur partiell ist, sondern nur, dass sie real ist. Dies aber ist notwendig in allen Dingen und Modi oder realen Differenzen eingeschlossen“.44   DM 2, 6, 10: „continentia in qua fundatur eius [entis] conceptus, aeque est in tota entitate secundum se totam.“ 40   DM 2, 3: „Utrum ratio seu conceptus entis in re ipsa et ante intellectum sit aliquo modo praecisus ab inferioribus.“ 41   DM 2, 3, 7: „dicendum est, conceptum entis obiectivum prout in re ipsa existit non esse aliquid ex natura rei distinctum ac praecisum ab inferioribus in quibus existit“; – DM 2, 3, 13: „non recte infertur, quod etiam in re ipsa ratio entis prout est in singulis entibus non includat proprias rationes seu modos eorum […] est enim [ratio entis in re quae mente concipitur] eadem realiter.“ 42   DM 2, 4: „Utrum ratio entis transcendat omnes rationes et differentias inferiorum entium, ita ut in eis intime et essentialiter includatur.“ 43   Cf. DM 2, 5, 2. 44   DM 2, 5, 17: „in quo non includitur, quod illa essentia sit perfecta vel imperfecta, integra vel partialis, sed solum quod realis sit; hoc autem necesse est includi in omnibus rebus et modis, seu differentiis 39

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In der Folge verwirft Suárez die scotische transzendentale Analyse: Ein Verfahren, das sich am Aristotelischen Schema der Potenz-Akt- oder Materie-Form-Komposition orientiert, erscheint sinnvoll bei einer kategorialbegrifflichen Analyse, die von komplexen Artbegriffen zu den obersten Gattungen führt; der Artbegriff lässt sich ja in der Tat verstehen als ein Kompositum aus einem bestimmbaren materialen Element: dem Gattungsbegriff – und einem bestimmenden formalen Element: der artbildenden Differenz – die einander wechselseitig nicht einschließen. Dieses Denkschema erscheint aber nicht sinnvoll bei einer Analyse, die den kategorialen Bereich in Richtung auf das Seiende als solches überschreitet, da jede reale Bestimmung wesenhaft Seiendes ist. Die scotische Analyse verfehlt ihr Ziel, indem sie transzendentale Bestimmungen nach Maßgabe eines kategorialen Denkmusters zu erklären versucht. 45 An ihre Stelle setzt Suárez daher ein anderes Verfahren, bei dem der Begriff des Seienden als solchen durch eine Abstraktion in Form einer ‘Einschmelzung’ (confusio) des Begriffs gewonnen wird (Section 2.6). Die kategoriale Bestimmung, bei der das Verfahren ansetzt (z.B. ‘Substanz’) wird dabei nicht in Begriffe zerlegt, von denen der eine den anderen nicht einschließt; sie wird vielmehr durch ein ganzheitliches begriffliches Absehen und Zusammenschauen – auf den unbestimmteren (konfuseren) Begriff derselben Sache zurückgeführt. Die auf diese Weise gesonderten Begriffe verhalten sich deshalb zueinander nicht wie die Form und Materie, Bestimmendes und Bestimmbares, sondern als das, was die Sache distinkt – in ihrer besonderen Seinsweise – repräsentiert zu dem, was dieselbe ganze Sache unbestimmt (confuse) – also gemäß dem, worin sie mit allem anderen übereinstimmt, sofern sie überhaupt Seiendes ist – repräsentiert. Der Weg der transzendentalen Analyse von den obersten Gattungen zu ‘Seiendes’ hin beginnt und endet deshalb mit einem schlechthin einfachen Begriff.46 realibus“; – DM 2, 5, 16: „Dicendum est ergo, ens inquantum ens intrinsece includi in omni ente, et in omni conceptu positivae differentiae, aut modi entis realis.“ 45   DM 2, 5, 18: „tenet [proportio inter compositionem metaphysicam et physicam] in hoc quod nec genus differentiam, nec differentiam genus includit, sicut nec materia formam, nec formam materiam; si autem resolvendo metaphysicam compositionem pervenitur ad simplices conceptus non compositos ex genere et differentia, iam in illis respectu praedicatorum superiorum transcendentium non oportet servari praedictam proportionem, quia in eis iam non reperitur ille determinationis modus.“ Siehe dazu R. Darge, „‘Ens intime transcendit omnia’. Suárez’ Modell der transzendentalen Analyse und die mittelalterlichen Transzendentalienlehren“, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 47 (2000): 150–172, bes. 159–167. 46   DM 2, 6, 10: „possit […] abstrahi conceptus entis per solam praecisionem intellectus, quae non consistat quasi in separatione unius ab alio, scilicet formalis a materiali, vel materialis a formali, ut fit in abstractione generis a differentiis; sed quae consistat in cognitione aliquo modo confusa, qua consideratur objectum non distincte et determinate prout est in re, sed secundum aliquam similitudinem vel convenientiam quam cum aliis habet, quae convenientia in ordine ad conceptum entis est in rebus secundum totas entitates et modos reales earum, et ideo confusio seu praecisio talis conceptus non est

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Dementsprechend wird umgekehrt ‘Seiendes’ zu den ihm untergeordneten Begriffen nicht durch Komposition näher bestimmt – also so, dass dem Ausgangsbegriff ‘Seiendes’ etwas „von außen“ nach Art einer „additio quasi partis ad partem“ (2.6.7) hinzugefügt würde – sondern durch eine innere begriffliche Ausfaltung, d. h. durch ein ganzheitliches, je bestimmteres, ausdrücklicheres Begreifen derselben Sache47 In jedem Moment dieser Auslegung ist der Sinngehalt von ‘Seiendes’ innerlich und wesenhaft gegenwärtig. In dieser Auffassung beruft sich Suárez auf die vorscotische Tradition der Transzendentalienlehre, die exemplarisch durch eine Ausführung des Thomas in De veritate q. 1, a. 1 repräsentiert wird, Suárez zitiert diese Stelle zur Bestätigung seiner eigenen Position vollständig: Das erste, was der Intellekt gewissermaßen als das Bekannteste begreift, und wohinein er alle Begriffe auflöst, ist ‘Seiendes’; daher müssen alle anderen Begriffe des Verstandes aus einer Hinzufügung zum Seienden (ex additione ad ens) aufgefasst werden. Zu ‘Seiendes’ kann aber nichts wie eine außerhalb befi ndliche Natur hinzugefügt werden – in der Weise, in der die Differenz zur Gattung hinzugefügt wird; denn jede Natur ist wesenhaft Seiendes. Vielmehr sagt man von manchem, es füge etwas zum Seienden hinzu, insoweit es einen Modus desselben ausdrückt, der durch das Wort ‘Seiendes’ nicht ausgedrückt wird.48

Suárez’ Verständnis der transzendentalen Seinsauslegung nimmt dieses vorscotische Modell der inneren modalen Explikation des Seienden auf. Vor diesem Hintergrund diskutiert Suárez schließlich in der 3. Disputation Scotus’ allgemeine Theorie der passiones entis. Den ontologischen Status dieser Bestimmungen problematisiert die erste Sektion unter der Leitfrage „Hat das Seiende als Seiendes irgendwelche Eigenschaften und (falls ja) wie sind diese beschaffen?“49 Sofort rückt Suárez dabei die Frage nach dem Erklärungsmodell in den Vordergrund. Die einleitenden dubitativem Erwägungen (3.1.1) rufen das Modell des Per-se-Akzidens oder der realen Eigentümlichkeit in Erinnerung, an dem sich die scotische Erklärung per separationem praecisivam unius gradus ab alio, sed solum per cognitionem praecisivam conceptus confusi a distincto et determinato.“ 47   DM 2, 6, 7: „hanc contractionem […] non esse intelligendam per modum compositionis, sed solum per modum expressioris conceptionis alicuius entis contenti sub ente“. Ibid., „differunt […] [conceptus formales] solum quia per unum expressius concipitur res, prout est in se quam per alium, quo solum confuse concipitur.“ 48   DM 2, 6, 8: „Talem modum explicandi hanc rem indicavit D. Thomas, quaest. 1 de Verit, a. 1 dicens: ‘quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens, unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens; sed enti nihil potest addi quasi extranea natura per modum quo differentia additur generi, quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens; sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere supra ens, in quantum exprimunt ipsius modum, qui nomine ipsius entis non exprimitur.“ 49   DM 3, 1: „Utrum ens in quantum ens habeat aliquas passiones, et quales illae sint.“

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orientiert und zeigen, worin das Problem besteht: (1) die passiones entis sind nicht wie jede reale Eigentümlichkeit von ihrem Träger real verschieden; (2) sie schließen in ihrer Wesensbestimmung den Sinngehalt ihres Trägers – des Seienden als Seienden – nicht nur „wie ein Hinzugefügtes“ ein, sondern innerlich und wesenhaft.50 Wenn sie aber keine realen Eigenschaften sind, sind sie dann nicht bloße Gedankendinge – und muss die Wissenschaft vom Seienden als solchen dann nicht ihren Anspruch aufgeben, strenge Realwissenschaft zu sein? Die Aufgabe einer solchen Wissenschaft besteht doch eben darin, die realen Eigentümlichkeiten ihres Subjekts aufzuzeigen. Um diesem Anspruch zu genügen hatte Scotus die passiones entis nach dem Modell des kategorialen propriums gedeutet. In seiner Lösung führt Suárez den in der zweiten Disputation begründeten transzendentaltheoretischen Ansatz konsequent weiter. Unter Berufung auf Thomas wird zunächst die unmittelbare Konsequenz aus der radikalen inneren Transzendenz des Seienden gezogen: „das Seiende als solches kann keine wahren und gänzlich realen Eigenschaften haben, die von ihm real (ex natura rei) unterschieden sind“, weil jede reale Eigenschaft innerlich und wesenhaft Seiendes ist. 51 Damit fällt das scotische Erklärungsmodell. Dann sucht Suárez einen Weg, der über die von Scotus gestellte Alternative hinausführt. Diese Alternative ist: Entweder werden die passiones entis als voneinander und vom Seienden als solchen real (formal) unterschiedene positive Sachbestimmungen gedacht – oder aber sie müssen als bloße Gedankenerzeugnisse gelten, so dass Metaphysik nicht Realwissenschaft sein kann. Zur Überwindung dieser Alternative trennt Suárez zwei Fragen, die für Scotus unmittelbar zusammenhängen: (1) die Frage, ob die passiones entis real Seiendes oder bloße Gedankendinge sind – und (2) die Frage ob sie nur begrifflich oder auch real voneinander und vom Seienden als solchen unterschieden sind.52 Diese Unterscheidung bildet die Konsequenz der in Sektion 2.3 ausgeführten Kritik am erkenntnis-metaphysischen Fundament der scotischen transzendentalen Analyse. Für Scotus sind die beiden Fragen nicht trennbar; denn eine Differenz zwischen einfachen distinkten Begriffen verweist seiner Ansicht nach immer auf einen realen Unterschied der betreffenden Sachgehalte im Ding. Dementsprechend kann 50   DM 3, 1, 1: „Repugnat ergo esse proprietatem realem entis realis ut sic, quia si est proprietas realis, ergo ens est de essentia eius; si autem ipsa est proprietas entis, ens non potest esse de essentia eius, quia, ut dicebamus, subiectum non potest esse de essentia passionis. Rursus id, quod est essentialiter ens, non potest ex natura rei distingui ab ente, ut supra generaliter probatum est; ergo nec potest esse passio entis […]“ 51   DM 3, 1, 8: „Dico primo ens ut ens non posse habere veras et omnino reales passiones positivas ex natura rei ab ipso distinctas.“ 52   DM 3, 1, 6: „observandum est, in huiusmodi attributis formaliter sumptis aliud esse, quod ipsa sint entia realia, vel rationis; aliud quod distinguantur re vel ratione.“

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eine distinkt begriffene Eigenschaft nicht real sein, wenn sie nicht von dem, was in anderen distinkten Begriffen erfasst wird, zumindest in der Weise einer formalen Nicht-Identität verschieden ist. Nun sind aber gemäß der scotischen Prädikationsanalyse die Begriffe des Seienden als solchen und die Begriffe seiner passiones distinkte Begriffe, von denen der eine nicht im anderen eingeschlossen ist. Soll Metaphysik Realwissenschaft sein, muss daher die reale (formale) Verschiedenheit der passiones entis gegenüber dem Seienden als solchen anerkannt werden.53 Suárez akzeptiert weder Scotus’ erkenntnismetaphysische Grundannahme eines noetisch-noematischen Parallelismus noch seine begriffliche Analyse, wonach die passiones entis den Sinngehalt des Seienden nicht wesenhaft einschließen; damit fällt auch die scotische Annahme ihrer realen (formalen) Differenz gegenüber dem Seienden. Der Fall wird denkbar – und so verhält es sich gemäß Suárez tatsächlich – dass die passiones entis reale Attribute bilden, auch wenn sie sich nur begrifflich vom Seienden als solchen unterscheiden.54 Denn auch in diesem Fall beruht die begriffliche Unterscheidung ja nicht auf einer bloßen Fiktion; sie beruht vielmehr auf einer Abstraktion des Verstandes, in der das wirkliche Ding auf inadäquate Weise erfasst wird. Seiendes aber ist unabhängig von unserem Verstand durch seine Seiendheit und in dieser im ontologischen Sinne Eines, Wahres und Gutes: „auch wenn der Geist nichts von den Dingen denkt, ist Gold wahres Gold, und eine bestimmte Sache, die von anderem unterschieden ist [d.h. transzendental Eines; R.D.]; und ähnlich ist Gott einer und gut.“55 Damit bleibt auch bei Annahme eines bloß begrifflichen Unterschieds56 der Charakter der Metaphysik als Realwissenschaft gewahrt.   Ord. II, dist. 16, q. un., n. 17 (ed. Vivès XIII, 43a–b): „distinguuntur tamen [passiones entis] ab invicem formaliter et quidditative, et etiam ab ente, formalitate dico reali et quidditativa; aliter Metaphysica concludens tales passiones de ente et illas considerans, non esset scientia realis.“ 54   Die zweite Vorbemerkug in DM 3, 1 erweist diesen Standpunkt im allgemeinen als widerspruchsfrei und aus Gründen vertretbar; DM 3, 1, 6: „optime […] fieri potest ut sint realia, quamvis non re, sed ratione distinguantur.“ Die Annahme der nur begrifflichen Differenz einer Bestimmung von ihrem realen Träger schließt die Realität dieser Bestimmung nicht nur nicht aus – sie impliziert diese sogar; denn was in keiner Weise real ist, ist entweder Nichts oder ein bloßes ens rationis – und der Unterschied zwischen diesem und dem real Seienden wird vom Verstand nicht konstituiert, sondern vorgefunden, ist also kein bloß begrifflicher, sondern ein realer. Cf. Ibid., „ut attributum sit sola ratione distinctum a reali subiecto, oportet quod sit attributum reale et non rationis tantum vel privativum; alioqui […] plus quam ratione distingueretur, scilicet ut non ens ab ente, vel ut ab ente vero ens fictum.“ Die Unterscheidung erscheint in der an späterer Stelle ausgeführten Systematik der Unterscheidungstypen (DM 7, 1) als eine Unterform der distinctio realis negativa; cf. DM 7, 1, 2. 55   DM 3, 1, 10: „quamvis enim mens nihil de rebus cogitet, aurum est verum aurum, et est una determinata res distincta ab aliis; et similiter Deus est unus et bonus etc.“ 56   DM 3, 1, 12: „sola ratione ab ipso ente distinguerentur.“ 53

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Aber worin unterscheiden sich die passiones entis dann vom Seienden als solchen – was besagen sie über diesen Sinngehalt, den sie wesenhaft einschließen, hinaus? Und was ist schließlich ihr philosophischer Sinn? In Suárez Antwort auf diese Fragen wird der historische Hintergrund seiner Position direkt greifbar. Das, was die passiones entis zum Seienden als solchen hinzufügen kann – nach dem Gesagten weder eine bloße Fiktion noch eine positive Realität des Dings sein, die als solche ja wiederum Seiendes wäre. Nun gibt es aber nur zwei Klassen von realen Prädikaten, die keine positive Realität im Ding selbst ausdrücken: negative Bestimmungen und äußere Benennungen (denominationes extrinsecae); letztere bestimmen das Subjekt in Bezug auf anderes, das sich zu ihm verhält, ohne daß aber dadurch ein dem Subjekt innerliches Sein begründet wird – so heißt beispielsweise Gott von den Geschöpfen her ‘Schöpfer’, oder eine Wand wird von dem, was sich durch den Gesichtssinn erkennend auf sie bezieht, ‘gesehen’ oder ‘sichtbar’ genannt.57 Solche Bestimmungen bilden die transzendentalen Attribute in dem, was sie zu Seiendem hinzufügen: Sie drücken darin entweder – wie unum, das formal die Ungeteiltheit des Seienden besagt – eine negative Bestimmung aus – oder aber – wie verum und bonum – eine Benennung von etwas anderem her.58 Die Negation oder äußere Benennung, welche sie jeweils hinzufügen, drückt einen nur begrifflich unterscheidbaren Aspekt des Seienden aus, der jedem Seienden zukommt, im Begriff des Seienden als solchen aber noch nicht ausgedrückt wird. Die Konzeption knüpft bewußt und gezielt nicht an Scotus an; sie nimmt vielmehr die vorscotische Tradition der Transzendentalienlehre auf. Dies zeigt sich zunächst an dem Erklärungsmodell, das sie zugrundelegt. Suárez verweist auf eine berühmte Aussage im vierten Buch der Metaphysik zum Verhältnis des Seienden und des Einen, die von mittelalterlichen Autoren regelmäßig als Ausgangspunkt der Erläuterung des allgemeinen Verhältnisses unter den Transzendentalien verwendet wurde: „Das Seiende und das Eine sind dasselbe und eine einzige Natur (φύσις), indem sie einander folgen […], jedoch nicht so, dass sie beide durch einen einzigen Wesensbegriff (λόγος) bestimmt würden“.59 Das Verhältnis ist also durch zwei Momente charakterisiert: (1) die sachliche Identität des Seienden und des Einen und (2) ihre begriffliche Verschiedenheit. Sie werden in der vorscotischen Deutungstradition im Sinne einer 57   Cf. DM 3, 1, 7: „huiusmodi autem praedicata seu attributa videntur posse ad duo capita revocari. Unum est eorum, quae in negatione vel privatione consistunt […] aliud est eorum quae consistunt in denominationibus extrinsecis sumptis ex rebus ipsis, quomodo dicitur Deus creator ex tempore, vel paries visus , etc.“ 58   Ibid., „nihil aliud dicere possunt, nisi aut negationem, aut privationem, vel aliquam habitudinem seu denominationem extrinsecam.“ 59   Aristoteles, Metaph. IV, 2, 1003b22–24; siehe dazu auch J. Aertsen, „Die Lehre von den Transzendentalien und die Metaphysik“, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 35 (1988): 304–307.

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begrifflichen Auslegung des Seienden durch das Eine ohne reale Differenz aufeinander bezogen. Repräsentativ für diese Tradition ist die Auslegung des Thomas, auf die Suárez in diesem Zusammenhang ausdrücklich verweist. 60 Danach fügt das Eine dem Seienden nur ein begriffliches Moment – die Negation des Geteiltseins – hinzu. 61 Wenn nun die Negation auch ein bloßes ens rationis ist,62 so ist doch das Eine als solches kein ens rationis; denn es bringt nicht nur das Ungeteiltsein zum Ausdruck, sondern bezeichnet auch das Seiende selbst. ‘Eines’ besagt gerade das ungeteilte Seiende, oder das Seiende, insofern es ungeteilt ist.63 Ähnlich verhält es sich nach Auffassung des Thomas mit den anderen transzendentalen Bestimmungen des Seienden. Jede von ihnen bezeichnet das Seiende selbst und zwar so, dass über den Sinngehalt des Seienden hinaus ein bestimmter begrifflich unterscheidbarer Aspekt des Seienden im allgemeinen ausgedrückt wird. 64 Auf diese Weise leistet jede passio entis unmittelbar eine Art Auslegung – Explikation – der Natur des Seienden als solchen. Den Ausdruck ‘explicatio entis’ oder ‘explicatio naturae entis’ verwendet Thomas allerdings nicht. Er erscheint im vorliegenden Zusammenhang bei Suárez, der den aristotelischen Text in diesem Sinne deutet.65 Diese Deutung unterscheidet Suárez später bei der Erörterung des transzendentalen Einen (Sektion 4.1) ausdrücklich von der scotischen Position. Scotus zufolge drückt das Eine zwar eine Negation aus – es besagt die innere Ungeteiltheit des Seienden und seine Abteilung von anderem – bezeichnet dabei aber eine reale Vollkommenheit, die vom Seienden als solchen nicht nur begrifflich, sondern auch real verschieden ist; es fügt dem Seienden auf reale Weise eine Vollkommenheit hinzu.66 Danach kann nicht gesagt werden, die transzendentalen Attribute explizierten unmittelbar das Seiende als solches. Suárez sucht keine Vermittlung mit dieser Auffassung; sie sei,   DM 3, 1, 11: „ita videtur rem hanc plane exponere D. Thomas […]“.   Thomas von Aquin, In Met. VI, lect. 2, n. 560 (ed. Marietti): „[…] superaddens indivisionis rationem, quae cum sit negatio vel privatio, non ponit aliquam naturam enti additum“. 62   Ibid., „negatio vel privatio non est ens naturae sed rationis.“ 63   Ibid., „unum […] ipsum ens designat, superaddens indivisionis rationem“; n. 553: „est enim unum ens indivisum“. 64   Ibid., n. 553: „[…] significant omnino idem, sed secundum diversas rationes.“ 65   DM 3, 1, 11: „Hanc conclusionem indicasse mihi videtur Arist., 4 Metaph., cap. 2, simul dicens, ens et unum eamdem dicere naturam, et nihilominus non idem formaliter significare; quia nimirum unum de formali addit negationem, quam non dicit ens; per eam vero nihil aliud explicatur, quam ipsamet natura entis.“ 66   Duns Scotus, Super Met. IV, q. 2, n. 80 (ed. Bonav. III, 339): „privatio nullam perfectionem ponit; unitas ponit.“ Ibid. n. 143 (S. 355): „[…] non tamen realiter differens [ab ente] quod sit alia natura, sed […] differentia reali minori, si vocetur differentia realis omnis non causata ab intellectu.“ Siehe dazu J. Aertsen, „Being and One: The Doctrine of the Convertible Transcendentals in Duns Scotus“, Franciscan Studies 56 (1998): 47–64. 60 61

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wie er kurz bemerkt, durch die Ausführungen in Sektion 3.1 – die gerade betrachtet wurden – „hinreichend zurückgewiesen“.67 Wie Thomas versteht Suárez das Verhältnis ‘Seiendes’ : ‘Eines’ als repräsentativ auch für das Wahre und das Gute. Der begriffliche Aspekt unter dem diese das Seiende im allgemeinen darstellen ist aber keine Negation, sondern jeweils ein positives Verhältnis zu etwas anderem: ‘Wahres’ bezeichnet das Seiende im Verhältnis zum Verstand, der es als das erkennt oder erkennen kann, was es ist – ‘Gutes’ bezeichnet das Seiende im Verhältnis zum Willen; es meint das Seiende, insofern es etwas an sich hat, aufgrund dessen es geliebt werden kann.68 Die Erläuterungen knüpfen an das überkommene Lehrstück von den ‘relationalen’ Transzendentalien an, das in der neueren Forschung als ein innovativer Beitrag des Thomas zur Transzendentalienlehre des 13. Jahrhunderts gilt.69 Im Sinne dieser Konzeption, die Thomas am ausführlichsten in De veritate q. 1, a. 1 und q. 21, a. 1 entfaltet, drücken ‘Wahres’ und ‘Gutes’ jeweils eine allgemeine Seinsweise aus, die Seiendes in seiner positiven Hinordnung auf ein anderes – nach seiner zumindest möglichen Übereinstimmung mit einer der rationalen Grundkräfte der menschlichen Seele betriff t. Die Übereinstimmung mit dem Verstand bringt ‘Wahres’ zum Ausdruck, die Übereinstimmung mit dem entsprechenden Strebevermögen ‘Gutes’.70 Suárez’ Erklärung setzt den ontischen Grund der Bestimmungen nicht speziell in Beziehung zur menschlichen Seele und entspricht insofern dem thomasischen Verständnis nicht genau; zudem kommen die Konzeptionen im Verständnis jenes ontischen Grundes nicht genau überein. An die Stelle des Seinsaktes setzt Suárez die reale Wesenheit mit ihrer Hinordnung auf die denkunabhängige Existenz. Die Unterschiede in der speziellen Ausführung lassen die Gemeinsamkeit des Kerngedankens jedoch nicht übersehen. Suárez selbst verweist auf das Lehrstück des Thomas71 und versteht seine Erklärung im Ganzen ausdrücklich als dessen Erläuterung.72 Vor diesem Hintergrund versteht und erklärt Suárez schließlich den philosophischen Sinn dieser transzendental-begrifflichen Hinzufügung. Durch sie wird die   DM 4, 1, 1: „[…] Scotus […] qui docet unum addere supra ens aliquid positivum ex natura rei distinctum ab ente. Sed haec sententia quantum ad distinctionem ex natura rei inter ens et id, quod unum addit supra ens rejecta sufficienter est praecedente disputatione et plane repugnat Aristoteli, 4 Metaph., cap. 2 […]“. 68   DM 3, 1, 11: „significant […] ens sub quadam habitudine ad aliud, scilicet quatenus in se habet unde ametur aut vere cognoscatur.“ 69   S. hierzu J. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 102–105, 243–334. 70   Thomas von Aquin, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1: „[…] convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum […] convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum.“ 71   DM 3, 1, 11: „videtur rem hanc plane exponere divus Thomas citatis locis“. 72   DM 3, 1, 4: „Haec est sententia D. Thomae, dict. q. 1 de Verit., a. 1 et q. 21, a. 1 […] et in rigore est vera, indiget tamen explicatione“. 67

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Vollkommenheit, die dem Seienden als solchen von sich her – in seiner Natur oder Seiendheit – immer schon eignet, expliziert.73 Die Explikation geschieht dabei nicht mit Bezug auf etwas Reales, das dem Seienden als solchen hinzugefügt würde, sondern „gemäß eben dem formalen oder wesenhaften Sinngehalt des Seienden selbst“.74 Das bedeutet: Die als Vollkommenheit gedachte Natur des Seienden als solchen bildet den unmittelbaren Gegenstand der transzendentalen Explikation und ihren inneren Ausgangspunkt, der in der Explikation immer gegenwärtig bleibt. Dieses unmittelbare und innere Verhältnis des explicans zum explicatum ist für die transzendentale Seinsauslegung charakteristisch. Dadurch unterscheidet sie sich von jener anderen Form der Seinserschließung, welche die Vollkommenheit eines bestimmten Wesens indirekt anhand seiner realen Eigenschaften und wesentlichen Akzidenzien oder Eigentümlichkeiten (propria, proprietates) erklärt. Erkannt wird auf diesem letzteren Weg zunächst diese Eigenschaft und nur dadurch, indirekt, die zugrunde liegende Natur, insoweit sie in ihr Ausdruck findet. Ein solches Verfahren erscheint sinnvoll im Bereich der kategorialen Formen, nicht aber in Rücksicht auf die Natur des Seienden als solchen, da es nichts gibt, das nicht innerlich und wesenhaft Seiendes ist. Daraus erhellt im Sinne des Suárez schließlich die Bedeutung der transzendentalen Attribute für die Metaphysik. Gänzlich einfache Formen – und dazu gehört in gewisser Weise auch die Natur des Seienden als solchen – erschließen sich unserem Verstand nicht völlig aus sich und in sich selbst. Zu ihrem Verständnis führt nur eine Untersuchung, die ihre Natur durch Verneinung oder im Verhältnis zu anderem auslegt. Auf diese Weise legt die Wissenschaft vom Seienden als solchen ihren Gegenstand in den transzendentalen Attributen aus. Jeglicher Sinngehalt, den diese dem Seienden als solchen hinzufügen, dient unserer rationalen Einsicht in die Natur oder wesenhafte Vollkommenheit des Seienden als Seienden. In dieser Funktion haben die transzendentalen Eigenschaften für die Metaphysik eine eminente Bedeutung; und sie haben für diese Wissenschaft überhaupt nur diese Bedeutung.75 4. FOLGERUNGEN Das durch die neuere Forschung etablierte Bild, wonach Suárez den Grundlinien der scotischen scientia transcendens folgt und diese an die neuzeitliche Ontologie vermittelt, erscheint aufgrund dieser Beobachtungen korrekturbedürftig. Suárez übernimmt zwar den scotischen Begriff des Seienden, knüpft aber in der Ausführung der Transzendentaltheorie nicht an den scotischen Entwurf an. Sein Begriff der Tran73   DM 3, 1, 11: „per ea […] explicatur realis positiva perfectio entis, non secundum aliquid reale superadditum ipsi enti, sed secundum ipsammet formam seu essentialem rationem entis.“ 74   Ibid., „secundum ipsammet formam seu essentialem rationem entis.“ 75   Ibid., „omnis haec attributorum ratio eo tendit, ut perfectius a nobis cognoscatur et explicatur entis natura; alioqui frustra esset et impertinens ad scientiam entis.“

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szendentalität des Seienden, sein Verständnis der transzendentalen Methode bei der begrifflichen Analyse und Determination des Seienden und schließlich seine Deutung der transzendentalen Attribute und ihrer ontologischen Funktion unterscheiden sich grundlegend vom scotischen Verständnis. Und Suárez ist sich der Differenz bis in die Details bewusst. Im Gegenzug gegen die scotische Position entwirft er in einer kontinuierlichen, planvoll und systematisch geführten Auseinandersetzung einen neuen transzendentalphilosophischen Ansatz. Er enthält das Programm einer inneren transzendental-begrifflichen Explikation der Natur des Seienden als solchen. Dieses ist aus scotischer Sicht nicht nachvollziehbar; denn es fordert die Überwindung der elementaren Denkmodelle, an denen sich die scotische scientia transcendens orientiert: des Kompositionsmodells bei der transzendental-begrifflichen Analyse und des Modells der realen Eigentümlichkeit (proprium/Per-se-Akzidens) bei der Deutung der transzendentalen Attribute; beide Modelle sind dem kategorialen Denken entnommen; sie lassen daher den Kerngedanken der transzendentalen Seinsexplikation – die Annahme, dass die ratio entis im Explizierenden innerlich und wesenhaft enthalten ist – nicht zu. Die Konzeption einer durch die passiones entis unmittelbar geleisteten Seinsauslegung bildet gemäß Suárez einen mittleren Weg, auf dem einerseits gegen Scotus die innere Transzendenz und Unbegrenztheit des Seienden radikal auch in Hinsicht auf diese „Eigenschaften“ des Seienden als solchen gedacht werden kann – und andererseits, obwohl die Hinzufügungen dann nur noch als begriffliche in Betracht kommen, Metaphysik als Realwissenschaft bewahrt werden kann. Im Aufweis der nur begrifflich unterscheidbaren transzendentalen Bestimmungen leistet die Metaphysik eine wahrhafte Explikation der Natur des Seienden als solchen. In ganz ähnlicher Weise bestimmte aber die vorscotische Transzendentalienlehre, als deren Exponent in den Erörterungen Thomas erscheint, die Aufgabe und den Weg der transzendentalen Seinsauslegung. Wie sich zeigte, nimmt Suárez bewusst diese Lehrtradition auf. Es scheint somit, dass er auf eine konkurrierende Alternative zur scotischen scientia transcendens zielt, welche von dem neuen – mit Scotus geteilten – Grund der Annahme der Einheit und des washeitlichen Charakters der ratio entis aus an die vorscotische Transzendentalienlehre anknüpft und diese in einer dem neuen Seinsbegriff angepassten Gestalt fortführt. Suárez Entwurf lässt sich unter dieser Hinsicht sowohl in die Wirkungsgeschichte der scotischen wie auch die der vorscotischen, thomasischen Transzendentalwissenschaft einschreiben.

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BIBLIOGRAPHIE QUELLEN Aristoteles. Analytica Posteriora. [= Anal. Post.] — Metaphysica [= Metaph.] Duns Scotus, Joannes. Ordinatio I. Editio Vaticana. [= Ord. I] — Ordinatio II. Editio Vivès. [= Ord. II] — Reportatio. Editio Etzkorn–Wolter. — Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis. Editio Bonaventuriana. [= Super Met.] Suárez, Franciscus. Disputationes metaphysicae. Vols. 25–26 of R. P. Francisci Suárez e Societate Jesu, Opera omnia, editio nova, edited by C. Berton, Paris: L. Vivès, 1866. Reprint, Hildesheim – Zürich – New York: G. Olms Verlag, 1998. [= DM] Thomas von Aquin. In XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio. Editio Marietti. [= In Met.] — Quaestiones disputatae De veritate. [= De veritate]

STUDIEN Aertsen, Jan. „The Beginning of the Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Philip The Chancellor“, Mediævalia, Textos e Estudos 7–8 (1995): 269–286. — „Being and One: The Doctrine of the Convertible Transcendentals in Duns Scotus“, Franciscan Studies 56 (1998): 47–64. — „Die Lehre von den Transzendentalien und die Metaphysik“. Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 35 (1988): 304–307. — „The Medieval Doctrine of the Transcendentals. The current State of Research“. Bulletin de Philosophie médiévale 33 (1991): 130–147. — „The Medieval Doctrine of the Transcendentals: New Literature“. Bulletin de Philosophie médiévale 41 (1999): 107–121. — Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas. Leiden: Brill, 1996. — „Transzendental“ (II. Die Anfänge bis Meister Eckhart). In Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, hrsg. J. Ritter und K. Gründer, Bd. 10, Sp. 1360–1465. Darmstadt, 1998. — „Transzendentalien“. In Lexikon des Mittelalters, hrsg. N. Angermann et al., Bd. 8, Sp. 953–955. München, 1997. — „Transcendental Thought in Henry of Ghent“. In Henry of Ghent. Studies in Commemoration of the 700th Anniversary of his Death (1293), 1–18. Louvain, 1995. — „Transcendens – Transcendentalis. The Genealogy of a Philosophical Term“. In L’élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge. Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve et Leuven 12–14 septembre 1998 organisé par la S.I.E.P.M, ed. J. Hamesse und C. Steel, 241–255. Turnhout, 2000.

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Boulnois, O. Être et représentation. Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l’époque de Duns Scot (XIIIe–XIVe siècle). Paris, 1999. Courtine, J.-F. Suárez et le système de la métaphysique. Paris, 1990. Darge, Rolf. „‘Ens intime transcendit omnia’. Suárez’ Modell der transzendentalen Analyse und die mittelalterlichen Transzendentalienlehren“. Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 47 (2000): 150–172. — „Omne ens est conveniens. Ursprung und Entwicklung eines spätmittelalterlichen Neuansatzes der Theorie des ontischen Gutseins“. Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie 50 (2005): 9–27. — Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition. Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2004. — „Von Durandus zu Christian Wolff. Eine Entwicklungslinie der Theorie des Guten in der mittelalterlichen und neuzeitlichen Universitätsmetaphysik“. In Metaphysik als Wissenschaft. Festschrift für Klaus Düsing zum 65. Geburtstag, hrsg. Dirk Fonfara, 153–172. Freiburg–München, 2006. Eschweiler, Karl. „Die Philosophie der spanischen Spätscholastik auf den deutschen Universitäten des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts“. In Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft, ed. K. Beyerle, H. Finke, G. Schreiber, Bd. 1, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens, Erste Reihe, 251–325. Münster, 1928. Gilson, Étienne. Being and Some Philosophers. Toronto, 1949. 2. überarb. Aufl. Toronto, 1952. Französisch L’être et l’essence. Neu überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung. Paris, 1962. 2. durchgesehene und vermehrte Aufl. Paris, 1972. Grabmann, M. „Die Disputationes metaphysicae des Franz Suárez in ihrer methodischen Eigenart und Fortwirkung“. In Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik, 525–560. München, 1926. Grajewski, M. J. The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus. Washington D.C., 1944. Hinske, N. „Verschiedenheit und Einheit der Transzendentalen Philosophien“. Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 14 (1970): 41–68. — Kants Weg zur Transzendentalphilosophie. Der dreißigjährige Kant. Stuttgart, 1970. — „Die historischen Vorlagen der Kantischen Transzendentalphilosophie“. Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 12 (1968): 86–113. Hoeres, W. „Francis Suárez and the Teaching of John Duns Scotus on ‘univocatio entis’“. In John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965, Studies in philosophy and the history of philosophy 3, ed. B. M. Bonansea und J. K. Ryan, 263–290. Washington, 1965. Honnefelder, Ludger. Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus. Münster, 1979. — Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit. Hamburg, 1990. Lewalter, E. Spanisch-jesuitische und deutsch-lutherische Metaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der iberisch-deutschen Kulturbeziehungen und zur Vorgeschichte des deutschen Idealismus. Hamburg, 1935

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Lohr, Charles. Metaphysics. In The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy. Cambridge, 1988. Pickavé, M. (Hrsg.). Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag. Berlin, 2003. Pouillon, S. H. „Le premier traité des propriétés transcendentales. La ‘Summa de bono’ du Chancelier Philippe“. Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 42 (1939): 40–77. Schmutz, J. La querelle des possibles. Recherches philosophiques et textuelles sur la métaphysique jésuite 1540–1767. Thèse de doctorat. Im Erscheinen. Tommasi, F. Philosophia Transcendentalis. La questione antepredicativa e l’analogia tra la Scolastica e Kant. Le corrispondenze letterarie, scientifiche ed erudite dal Rinascimento all’età moderna. Subsidia 10. Firenze: L. S. Olschki, 2008. Uscatescu Barrón, J. „La teoría del bien transcendental en Pedro Auréolo en el contexto de su filosfía“. Faventia 26 (2004): 53–76. Volpi, F. „Suárez et le problème de la métaphysique“. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 3 (1993): 395–411. Wolter, A. The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. Lancaster, 1946. — „The Formal Distinction“. In John Duns Scotus 1265–1965, Studies in philosophy and the history of philosophy 3, ed. B. M. Bonansea und J. K. Ryan, 45–60. Washington, 1965. Reprinted in The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, ed. M. McCord Adams, 27–53. Ithaca and London, 1990. Wundt, M. Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts. Tübingen, 1939.

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SUÁREZ ON TRANSLATIO VOCIS ‘VERITAS’ Giannina Burlando

A concept is a true being, in the sense that we ascribe to it.

H. G. Gadamer

ABSTRACT

I shall attempt to present Suárez’s doctrine of truth as he unfolds it in the context of Disputation 8 of the Disputationes Metaphysicae, where he presents the most complete exposition of the topic and claims that for Aristotle “truth belongs eminently to metaphysics”. It shall be important to notice that here Suárez mainly understands truth in actu exercito, although he also addresses truth in actu signato. I will defend the view that Suárez locates truth eminently in basic cognitive acts, on which the complex sentential level ultimately depends. According to Suárez, these cognitive acts of non-judicative kind are called ‘simple cognition’, ‘simple apprehension’, ‘simple concepts’ or ‘ideas’. All this vocabulary expresses cognitive entities that Suárez describes linguistically, where the concept is the verbum mentis: an intentional representation, rather than a pictorial image. Suárez’s mental language theory involves the following theses: (A) Concepts represent objects; (B) Concepts have semantic value as well, namely: they may be true or (metaphorically) false; (C) Names signify things through concepts. My study falls into two sections. First, I give a description of Suárez’s account on truth as he outlines Disputation 8, particularly s. 1–4, of the Disputationes Metaphysicae. In this first part I also address other questions that bring together semantic and epistemological themes of Suárez’s philosophy of mind, which imply theses (A) (B) and (C). These theses are obviously natural corollaries of Suárez’s theory of mental language, and of his more general representational theory of knowledge. In the present study we see that for Suárez concepts played a crucial rôle in the representational/signifying/truth process. Moreover, attention will be given to the sort of principle of conformity that Suárez formulates in representational terms. In the second part, I return to Suárez’s texts, chiefly DM 8, 7–8, to examine aspects of his account on ontological truth, where the issue on the denomination becomes his central preoccupation. An important part of Suárez’s innovations concerning the scholastic doctrine of truth involves the discussion on whether truth is found in judgements or simple concepts, and the contention on the status of ontological truth. In both accounts Suárez makes a theoretical shift, which locates truth in a new place.

GIANNINA BURLANDO

1. INTRODUCTION At the very end of Disputation 8 entitled De veritate seu vero, quod est passio entis, Suárez resolutely remarks: I think that the word ‘truth’ was transferred from the truth of knowledge to mean the property of every real entity to be in conformity with the intellect which conceives the thing in act or in potency as a real entity […] Thus, as knowledge or judgement is true because it is or is not in conformity with the being or non-being of the thing, it is not denominated as true by the truth of the thing, but by its being, because it connotes the being of the object as it is represented in the judgement; thus in this case it is said that the thing is true because its being conforms or is conformable to such a concept, and the denomination is not taken extrinsically from the truth of the concept, but from the intrinsic entity as affected by a relation or quasi-relation to another.1

How are we to understand the central notions implied in this passage, which are ‘truth’, ‘true’, ‘truth of the thing’, ‘truth of knowledge’, ‘truth of the concept’, ‘judgement is true’, ‘it is represented’, ‘the being of the thing conforms or is conformable to a concept’, ‘conformity’, ‘intrinsic’, ‘extrinsic’, ‘quasi-relation to’? In order to answer this query, we must address the question of how Suárez construed ‘truth’; the question of how he construed the transfer of the word truth (“translatio vocis veritatis”) from the realm of knowledge to the ontological realm; and the question of how he construed (the scope of) human knowledge (certainly a dominant intellectual assent in the late sixteenth century) to be related to truth through the linguistic medium of concepts. Thus, the aim of this paper is to explore what Suárez intended to convey when he insistently repeats that “truth does not add anything really distinct to knowledge”;2 that “truth is found only in intellectual composition and division or in simple concepts”;3 or that “the primaevus meaning of the word truth refers to logical

1   DM 8, 8, 11: „Tertio itaque censeo ab hac veritate cognitionis translatum esse hoc nomen veri ad significandam hanc proprietatem cuislibet entis realis, quae est conformitas cum intellectu, actu vel potentia concipiente rem sub tali ratione entis realis […] Itaque, sicut cognitio vel iudicium dicitur verum, quia conforme est ipsi esse vel non esse rei, tamen non denominatur verum a veritate ipsius rei sed a suo esse, connotando simul esse ipsius obiecti tale quale per iudicium repraesentarur, ita in praesenti res dicitur vera quia habet esse conforme seu conformabile tali conceptui, quae denominatio non sumitur extrinsece a veritate conceptus, sed ab intrinseca entitate, ut est sub habitudine vel quasi habitudine ad aliud.“ All references to DM are to the Latin/Spanish edition of the Disputationes Metaphysicae, ed. and transl. Sergio Rábade, Salvador Caballero, and Antonio Puigcerver (Madrid: Ed. Gredos, 1960). References to Suárez’s primary texts are given in the standard format for the work in question. All translations are mine. 2   DM 8, 2, 5–8. 3   DM 8, 3, 2–6.

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truth, and is found in composition and division of the intellect”;4 that “truth is not found in words but just analogically, […] because words are true in the manner in which they signify a true knowledge (veram cognitionem)”.5 I shall attempt to present Suárez’s doctrine of truth as he develops it in the metaphysical context of Disputation 8, where he presents the most complete exposition of the topic and claims that for Aristotle “truth pertains eminently to metaphysics”. It will be important to notice that Suárez mainly understands truth here in actu exercito, although he also addresses it in actu signato.6 I will defend the view that Suárez places truth eminently in basic cognitive acts, though on a complex sentential level as well. According to Suárez these cognitive acts of a non-judicative kind are called ‘simple cognition’, ‘simple apprehension’, ‘simple concepts’ or ‘ideas’.7 All these words express cognitive entities which Suárez describes linguistically, where the concept is the verbum mentis: an intentional representation, rather than a pictorial image.8 Suárez’s mental language theory involves the following theses: (A) Concepts represent objects; (B) Concepts have semantic value as well, namely: they may be true or false;9 (C) Names signify things through concepts. An important part of Suárez’s innovative approach to the scholastic doctrine of truth involves discussion of whether truth is found in judgements or simple concepts and contention of the status of ontological truth. My paper is divided into two sections. First, I shall outline Suárez’s account of truth presented in Disputation 8, particularly sections 1–4, of the Disputationes metaphysicae. I shall also address other questions concerning semantic and epistemological aspects of Suárez’s philosophy of mind, which imply the theses (A), (B), and (C). These theses are natural corollaries of Suárez’s theory of mental language and of his more   DM 8, 8, 7–9.   DM 8, 8, 2. 6   Cf. DM 8, Intro. 7   Suárez departs from the majority view in identifying “ideas” (also in the sense of exemplars in God’s mind) as a formal concepts, i.e. the conceiving acts, not as objective concepts, i.e. the conceived objects, rejecting both the Thomistic view that divine ideas are divine essence conceived qua imitable in various ways, and the Scotistic view that they are the things-to-beproduced themselves preconceived. 8   DM 8, 1, 7; DM 8, 2, 12; DM 8, 5, 3; CQDA, d. 5, q. 1, n. 3. All references to De anima are to the Latin/Spanish edition of Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima, 3 vols., ed. S. Castellote, transl. C. Baciero and L. Baciero (Madrid: Editorial Labor), 1971–1991. 9   With regard to God’s mind Suárez speaks of ‘maximally true idea’: “etiam idea artifice sit propria et adaequata rei efficiendae per artem est maxime vera” (DM 8, 5, 1). However, concepts of the created mind are capable of truth and of a quasi material falsity, which consists in the apprehension of a formally false proposition. This metaphorical falsity, in Suárez’s words, certainly does not concern a wrong or mistaken representation of an object. (DM 9, 1, 16.22) Cf. C. Garcia, “Descartes y Suárez: Sobre la Falsedad No Judicativa”, in Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) Tradição e Modernidade, ed. A. Cardoso, et al. (Lisboa: Ed. Colibri, 1999), 187–206. 4 5

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general representational theory of knowledge, as it is paradigmatically laid out in De anima V, 5.10 In the present study we shall see that for Suárez concepts played a crucial part in the representational/signifying process.11 Moreover, attention is drawn to the principle of conformity which Suárez formulates.12 In the second part, I shall return to Suárez’s texts, chiefly to s. 7–8 of Disputation 8, to examine aspects of his account of ontological truth, where the issue of the essence’s denomination becomes his central preoccupation. 2. SUÁREZ ON THE SEMANTIC NOTION OF TRUTH

In order to understand what Suárez’s doctrine of truth involves, we must firstly sketch the plan of Disputation 8 and then address the content and meaning given by Suárez to the crucial terms. Disputation 8 encompasses a detailed introduction and eight rather lengthy sections. Suárez’s introductory remarks have to do with: (i) the place in which he locates truth: immediately after unity, and in turn, followed by the good (according to the order of transcendental properties of being within the framework of the Disputationes metaphysicae);13 (ii) the acceptance of the place of   The topic of representational knowledge is addressed in G. Burlando, “Suárez on Intrinsic Representationalism”, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 60 (2004): 31–46. 11   In the manner of late mediæval logicians, such as Ph. Du Trieu (1580–1645), R. Sanderson (1664), or F. Burgersdijck (1590–1632). Cf. E. J. Ashworth, “Locke on Language”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14, n. 1 (1984): 45–73. 12   I have defended the view that Suárez’s formulae avoid Arthur Danto’s sophisticated version of the classical argument against representationalism (cf. Burlando, “Suárez on Intrinsic Representation”). To see the so-called “Problem of the external world”, cf. A. Danto, “The Representational Character of Ideas and the Problem of the External World”, in Descartes: Critical and Interpretative Essays, ed. M. Hooker (The John Hopkinns University Press: Baltimore and London): 1978. 13   As J. Gracia has observed, Disputations 2–11 deal explicitly with the transcendentals and the ways in which one may distinguish among them. For Suárez ‘thing’ and ‘something’ are not true properties of being, but rather different names for the same thing. Like Duns Scotus, Suárez admits only three properties of being: the one, the true and the good, which are all in fact properties or attributes of being in the sense of “transcendental” properties. “Suárez used the term ‘transcendens’ and/or ‘transcendentalis’, meaning literally ‘climbing-beyond’ or ‘climbingacross’, to refer to the fact that these properties, just like being, with which they were coextensive, were not restricted to any one category or group of categories but extended to all of them.” – J. Gracia, and D. Davis, The Metaphysics of Good and Evil according to Suárez (München: Philosophia Verlag, 1989), 65–6; Also cf. J. F. Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphysique (Paris: PUF, 1990), 377. A slightly different emphasis introduced by Suárez can be seen in the very titles of disputations 6, 8, and 10, where he deals, respectively, with the one, the true, and the good as passiones transcendentales: “De Unitate Formali et Universali”; “De Veritate seu vero”, “Quod est Passio Entis”; “De Bono seu Bonitate Transcendentali”. Suárez has announced clearly that “tres tantum esse proprias 10

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truth as the principal subject of the metaphysical speculative theoretical science (as Suárez understands Aristotle’s teachings),14 and therefore, within the same subject of study of the Disputationes metaphysicae; (iii) the late mediæval distinction of a double respect of truth: one, in actu exercito (called quasi material); another, in actu signato (called ‘quasi formal’). The former is carried out by “knowing the things and their properties as they are found in reality”. In this sense, “truth is contemplated and demonstrated by every science, practical or speculative. However, with the speculative sciences, this is done in a direct and essential manner, […] in order to ascertain the knowledge of truth”.15 The latter “proceeds enquiring what truth is in things, how many kinds of truth there are, and in what cases truth admits comparison with being”. Interestingly enough under this quasi formal sense of truth, Suárez introduces a further triple distinction: truth of signification or meaning (in significando), truth of knowledge (in cognoscendo), and truth of being (in essendo). Truth of signification concerns the logician and is found in linguistic signs as spoken and written words in coherence with the mental language of concepts “which are non-ultimate”.16 Truth of knowledge concerns the physicist insofar as he studies the soul and its functions, and “dwells on understanding that knows things, or in knowledge and conception of things themselves”. Truth of being concerns the metaphysician insofar as he investigates being qua being and the properties of being, where truth “is found in the passiones entis, scilet unum, verum et bonum” (DM 3, 2, 3). Ontological truth is, as we shall see, convertible, coextensive with being, and like being it is “metaphysically abstracted”. 14   For the significant difference on the question of the subject of metaphysics in Aristotle and Suárez, cf. J. Doyle, “Supertrascendental Being: On the Verge of Modern Philosophy”, in Meetings of the Minds (Brepols, 1999), 297–299. 15   DM 8, Intro. 16   According to mediæval logicians, spoken and written words “had conventional meaning, and were in fact, though not necessarily so, different for different groups of people. Mental language on the other hand was thought to be necessarily common to all men because it had natural meaning.” Cf. Ashworth, “Locke on Language”, 58. Mental terms signify by virtue of their very nature. Among mental terms different kinds of concepts are classified, such as: reflexive, direct, ultimate, and non-ultimate. It was commonly accepted that the ultimate concerned signified things and the non- ultimate concerned signifying words. This distinction was thought to mark the object of logic which does not deal with things qua things, like physics does, but with the instruments by which things are known. Besides, the object of reflexive knowledge was thought to concern all the things found in the soul. This means that by way of representation, the intellect knows not only the concept and the act, but also the habit, the species, the potencies, and the nature of the soul. The basic idea was that due to the reflexive character of concepts, other concepts can be reached from them. The direct concept, however, is construed as the similitude of the object, while the reflexive one is construed as the similitude of the concept, act, or power itself. Cf. Juan de Santo Tomás, De los signos y los conceptos, intr. and transl. M. Beuchot (México: UNAM, 1989), 205–209.

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things themselves, for in virtue of it they receive the denomination of true”.17 Truth of being, ontological truth, or transcendental truth encompasses all other truths, if they are, as Suárez says, real truths; if they are just truths of reason, they are anyway proportionally related to transcendental truth. Given this structured order of language, the mind and things, all permeated by transcendental truth, Suárez expresses two further aims: (iv) that he will study simultaneously all these kinds of truth to explain the differences among them better and, thereby, it will be evident to us what truth as a property of being is; (v) that he is endorsing that if truth is real, then it consists in a certain conformitas between the thing and the intellect or a conformitas of the intellect with the thing; but if truth is of reason (or of signification), then it consists in an adaequatio between a signifying proposition and the signified thing. Distinction (v) will be Suárez’s base to establish a kind of analogia proportionalitatis between logical and ontological ‘truth’.18 In what follows attention is preferentially paid to points (i–iii). Prima facie, Suárez’s enquiry into truth follows Aristotle’s conception of truth, i.e., that truth is not found in the actual things but in the mind,19 and Aquinas’ aim  DM 8, Intro.   The first part of Disputation 8 (the largest and most important one in terms of philosophical significance) corresponds to Suárez’s investigation of semantic truth (or, in his words, logical truth), its existence (s. 1) and nature (s. 2). It deals with the belief that truth is found in the intellect; with the notions of complex truth and truth of meaning, also with the doctrine of conformity of the judgement with the thing known. S. 3 aims to justify that logical truth is uniquely found in intellectual composition and division, and here Suárez ascribes truth to simple concepts. Suárez also deals with difficulties in Thomas Aquinas’ account of truth (s. 3, 9, 12–17), and ponders what he means when he states that truth is said to belong to composition and division in a special way; Suárez argues that there is no sufficient ground for holding that truth is found just in composition; he also defends the view that the intellect knows in actu excercito the ‘truth’ (s. 3, 18). In s. 4 he holds that logical truth exists essentially in the intellect which cognizes in act; s. 5 discusses whether truth is found more properly in the act of simple apprehension or of judgement, and in what function: speculative or practical; s. 6 deals with the question whether truth is found in composition and division in the same manner. The second part corresponds to section 7, where he deals with the notion of transcendental truth: its existence, its essence, and the sense in which it is attributed to being. In the third part (s. 8) Suárez analyses the original place of the word ‘truth’, the real meaning of the word, the issue of the translatio of the word, and the kind of analogy that he proposes for the word ‘truth’ ascribed to things and to the intellect. 19   According to Aristotle’s doctrine, truth is a relation of correspondence between the operation of the intellect and the thing. Truth and cognition of the thing seem to share the same order. However, on the one hand, knowledge of the thing is said to be true if the statement, i. e., “whereby we say that there is a man is true, there is a man” (Cat. 12, 14b6–15). On the other hand, truth is grounded neither in statement nor in judgement, but rather in the things themselves as they are given to us. Therefore, things are the cause which brings about true 17

18

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at De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, which ends in the doctrine of transcendentals.20 However, from the very beginning of s. 1 he locates truth in the concept. In his characteristic reconciling discourse he writes: Certainly truth is found in the intellect through composition and division. Nonetheless, it is most complicated to explain what truth consist in, and in what manner it is found in the concept, on which there is disagreement.21

After comparing the different views of Thomas Aquinas, Durandus, Hervaeus, and in order to state more precisely Thomas’ position, Suárez sets up the distinction between truth of judgement (or of complex knowledge) and truth of signification, whereby the image understood as representation and the coherence of language enter the interpretation.22 Suárez claims, then: Knowledge is not denominated true with respect to the conformity or truth of the object, but rather with respect to the truth or conformity of the judgement on the object; thus its truth consists in such conformity. [Thomas’ view] becomes clearer also by the truth of signification which is found in the verbal proposition; in fact, truth does not consist in the conformity of the thing – insofar as signified – in itself – insofar as existent in itself -, but in the immediate conformity of the signifying word with the signified thing. Even more, in any image that is denominated true we find something of the kind; because, for instance, Peter’s image is said to be a true image when it represents Peter as he is; thereby its truth does not consist in the statements. Aristotle expresses it thus: “whereas the true statement is no way the cause of the actual thing’s existence, the actual thing does seem in some way the cause of the statement’s being true: it is because the actual thing exists or does not that the statement is called true or false.” (Cat. 12 14b15–20) 20   According to Aquinas’ interpretation, truth is found in the cognitive realm of judgement, but considering its grounding, it is found in the things themselves. In fact, there are two ways to consider “truth”: first, the truth of a judgement, second, “according to what is prior to the reasons of truth, and to what grounds truth, i.e., reality.” (De veritate, q. 1, a. 12, co.) In Aquinas’ view, the nature of truth is expressed in its relational character of ‘adaequatio’, where adaequatio implies a relation of measure or proportion between the thing and the intellect, and it is the res that comes to measure the intellect’s judgement. Furthermore, res and judgement are respectively related as cause and effect. The thing is the cause of the truth of the intellect’s judgement. 21   DM 1, 1 22   Regarding the notion of truth-of-signification, Suárez’s textual account is: “[…it is] found in the verbal proposition (propositone vocali) […] it is not in conformity with the thing – as it is signified – with itself – as an existent in itself – but in immediate conformity of the signifying word with the signified thing (vocis significantis ad rem significatam). Even more: in any image that is denominated true we find something of the kind; because Peter’s image, for instance, is said to be a true image when it represents Peter – considered as some represented being that is objective regarding the image – with himself as he exists in himself, but in immediate conformity between the image’s representation and the thing represented.” (DM 8, 1, 4, my emphasis)

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conformity between Peter […] with himself as he is, but rather in the immediate conformity between the representation of the image and the represented thing.23

Thus, softly but firmly, Suárez replaces the strict talk of truth as ‘adaequatio’ with the talk of ‘conformity’ and transfers it to the level of signification by means of his intentional representation structure.24 Suárez, in fact, formulates a sort of conformity principle in terms of the representational vocabulary, and asserts that there needs to be conformity between the representing and the represented.25 In Suárez’s opening discussion, Conformity consists in a certain intentional representation in virtue of which the intellect, by means of an act of judgement, perceives the thing as it is in itself. In this sense, conformity is a certain due proportion or relation between the intellectual perception and the perceived thing; a proportion that is correctly expressed by the words “the thing known is represented or judged as it is in itself”; in which […] it is compared to the knowledge or intellect’s judgement – insofar as it represents –, and the thing known – insofar as it is represented, thereby, in such a comparison there is no falsity.26   DM 8, 1, 3   For Suárez ‘intentional representations’ also belong to the identity of exemplars or ideas. Thus, he claims, “Ideae, prout in Deo sunt, non concurrunt ad cognitionem creaturarum per modum objecti proximi, sed per modum actus intellectualis quo intentionaliter representantur creaturae ipsae […].” (Opusc. Theol. II, l. 1, c. 4, n. 8) Moreover, Suárez describes divine ideas as follows: (1) they guide the intellectual agent’s action so they can point (tendat) to a certain end; (2) this pointing or direction is accomplished by an actual representation of the mind, which is a kind of light that precedes showing the way, and terminus of the operation (all this is done formally by the same formal concept of the mind); (3) they are the measure or rule of truth, and a property of the thing done; (4) they are principles of knowledge, or the same formal concepts are principles of knowledge, and not the objects as they are known, because this object as it is known is the end and terminus of knowledge (DM 25, 1, 29, my italics). In his account Suárez not only refers to Aquinas’ STh I, q. 15, a. 1, and De veritate, q. 3, but also and frequently to Augustine for conceptions of ‘true divine idea’, ‘truth’, and mental language in particular (cf. DM 8, 5, 5; DM 8, 7, 2; DM 8, 7, 21; DM 8, 7, 34) – namely to his Soliloquia 2, c. 5, where Augustine defines: “Verum est quod ita se habet ut cognitori videtur, si velit possitque cognoscere.” (Obras de San Agustín, ed. Victorino Capanaga (Madrid: BAC, 1950), vol. I: 556–558) and to De vera religione, c. 36. 25   Regarding transcendental truth, Suárez also states: “Hoc autem maxime verum habet si conformitas haec sumatur solum in ratione cognoscentis et cogniti, […] Ergo verum transcendentale […] non potest dicere conformitatem ad intellectum ut ad causam vel ad mensuram, sed tantum ut ad repraesentantem seu cognoscentem.” (DM 8, 7, 30) 26   DM 8, 1, 6: “Consistit ergo in quandam repraesentatione intentionali, qua, scilicet, fit ut intellectus per actum vel iudicium ita percipiat rem, sicut in se est. Atque ita haec conformitas est debita quaedam proportion et habitude inter perceptionem intellectus et rem perceptam. Quae proportio recte explicatur illis verbis, quod res cognitaita repraesentatursei iudicatur sicut in se est; quibus […] comparatur cognitio ipsa seu iudicum intellectus ad rem cognitam in ratione repraesentantis et repraesentati, et ideo nulla est 23 24

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In the following s. 2 the nature of semantic-logical truth is addressed. Suárez’s concern here is to define whether the place of conformity is the act of knowledge, and what the ontological status of this act is: something absolute or relative, a real property or something of reason. Regarding this issue, he carefully reviews the scholastic and ancient positions of authors such as Soncinas, Capreolus, Durandus, Hervaeus, Javellus, Flandrias, Ammonius. To settle their difficulties and contentions, Suárez warns that the investigation of what is added by truth to the act that is denominated ‘true’ is one thing, and another very different thing is the enquiry about the content of that totality designated by the name ‘truth’. In the former sense, Suárez claims that truth does not add anything intrinsic, really distinct, to the essence or to the being’s true act, neither a predicamental relation nor a relation of reason. Nonetheless, Suárez requires two necessary conditions for truth, namely, that “it adds a connotation of the object to the act of knowledge”, and that this addition is to be done in a specific manner or way, i.e., the “intentional representation of the object”. Regarding the first condition for truth, Suárez’s argument is stated as follows: It must be asserted that logical truth does not add anything real and intrinsic to the act itself, but just connotes that the object behaves as it is represented by the act. […] that the act is true expresses something more than the existence of the act, and it does not signify anything real, whether absolute or relative, besides the act itself, neither does it signify a proper and strict relation of reason. Therefore, it cannot add anything but the forementioned connotation or arising denomination, which springs up from the union or connexion between the act and its object.27 falsitas in illa comparatione” It should be noted that Suárez does not understand ‘conformity’ in the sense of Thomas’ adaequatio, measure or commensuratio. In metaphysical and psychological contexts, Suárez talks of ‘conformity’ and ‘proportion’ indistinctly. Conformity is not a oneto-one relation between a concept and a thing-cause, since “they do not share the same nature or the same order of perfection”. The ontological status of concepts, incidentally, is that of qualities (modes, modifications of the mind, dispositions, or representing dispositions, in the sense of ‘formal similitudo of objects’ (CQDA, d. 5, q. 2, n. 21)). This is a kind of formal similitudo that intentionally represents objects ex se. Suárez distinguishes the cause-effect relation from the similitudines relation, which is founded in formal unity. (DM 8, 7, 14) The terms of Suárez’s ‘conformity’ are not, broadly speaking, the intellect and the thing (res extra causa suas), but strictly the cognitive act, i.e., the formal concept, and the object. Concerning the objectum – which is neither necessarily physical nor actual – Suárez appeals to his classical distinction between the formal and objective concept, and holds that these terms of cognition need not be posited as absolutely real things different from the cognitive act (as a product or actus in fieri) (CQDA, d. 3, q. 5, n. 13). In Suárez’s psychological investigations, the mental act by which things are conceived (mentaliter concepire) is also called ‘formal conceiving’, or is said to ‘vitaliter assimilari’ as a ‘similidudo formaliter’ of the thing. 27   DM 8, 2, 9 (my italics): “Veritas addit cognitioni connotationem objecti, […] nam actum esse verum plus aliquid dicit quam actum esse, et non dicit aliquid reale absolutum vel relativum ultra ipsum

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As a proof for defending this particular condition, Suárez repeatedly invokes the doctrine of mental language. He holds that logical prior-to-spoken sentences are only meaningful if they are subordinated to mental sentences. In Suárez’s view, mental language implies a theory of signification. This is because the mental proposition has a causal connexion with the spoken proposition on the one hand,28 and on the other it has a distinct truth (also called truth of signification) which precisely connotes the concomitance of the object. According to the advanced argument, then:

actum, nec etiam dicit propriam et rigorosam relationem rationis; ergo nihil aliud addere potest praeter dictam connotationem seu denominationem consurgentem ex connexione seu coniunctione talis actus et obiecti.” 28   For a reconstruction of Suárez’s theory of language the following arguments need to be taken into account: When interpreting Aristotle, for instance, Suárez writes: “with regard to words […] we use terms instead of things, and because of this when we assert one thing of another we do not do it externally, but by means of a signifying word, and as signifying, so when we mentally assert one thing of another, if, in fact, our main intention is to assert one thing of another, we do not do it except by means of concepts, inasmuch as they are natural representations of things for us.” (DM 8, 3, 18) Other arguments have to do either with the signifying process itself, or with the central metaphysical issue of the unity of the concept of being. Concerning the former he says, “although names arbitrarily signify things, nevertheless they signify them through our concepts or in accordance with concepts that we have formed of things once we have heard those definite names. That is the reason why they cannot be arbitrarily imposed to mean a different thing than the one that we can conceive”. (DM 30, 13, 9) But most important, concerning the latter, Suárez describes our access to being by appealing to an empirical moment (concerning the unity of the formal concept which is known in experience) and a transcendental moment (concerning the unity of the objective concept – a real being – which is thinkable by reason). The empirical moment involves an argument from experience which concerns the spoken language; more exactly, the perceptive experience of hearing. The unity of the objective conception of being “is primarily proved by experience; actually, by hearing the word being, we notice that our mind does not become dispersed or divided into many concepts, but rather becomes drawn into one”. (DM 2, 2, 9) In addition, describing our ways of acquiring scientific knowledge, by learning and enquiring, Suárez reflects: “In order to learn, hearing is very useful, since spoken words are the signs of concepts, and hearing is the only sense that perceives words, and although it is not it, but rather the mind, that perceives the significations, it is enough for it to be the proper organ through which the sign arrives in the mind. […] the written word is also a sign of the concepts, and it is perceived by vision, which seems to be the explanation of why many more things are learned through reading. Be that as it may, there is a difference which is almost wholly useful; for writing also can be perceived by hearing, but not the other way round, since the energy, firmness, and distinctness which the word has for expressing its own concepts cannot be supplied only with writing or vision.” (DM 1, 6, 11) Cf. G. Burlando, “Suárez and Heidegger on the transcendental moment in the cognitio trascendentalis”, in New Essays on Metaphysics as Scientia Transcendens. Proceedings of the Second International Conference of Medieval Philosophy, ed. R. H. Pich (Porto Alegre, Brazil: Louvain-la-Neuve, 2007), 343–362.

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A proof can be taken from spoken or mental propositions which are said to be found in the mind and have not reached full knowledge; because in the case of those propositions, there is no doubt that it is the same proposition that was before true and now is false due to a change in the signified thing, but without any change in the sign or its signification; therefore, besides all that holds of the signifying proposition, the truth of signification that pertains to these propositions connotes such a concomitance of the object.29

Truth is connected with, and persists in, the signifying act of knowledge, or naturally significant concepts, or as Suárez prefers to say, representational signs. In fact, there is enough textual evidence in Suárez’s discussion on truth to show that his theory of signification was a natural corollary of his doctrine of mental language. It is evident that Suárez is using ‘significare’ and ‘intentional representation’ as synonymous. Thus, stating his second condition of truth, he claims: Following the above, I establish this conclusion: logical truth implies a cognitive representation which carries with it the concomitance of an object which behaves as if it is represented by knowledge. 30

From the quoted passages we see at least two main characteristics in Suárez’s semantic account on signification and truth, i.e.,: (i) The significatum of a proposition is a mental entity; a mental entity of the kind of a concept, called by Suárez ‘intentional representation’, which has been conceived through spoken sounds;31 however, (ii) a sufficient condition for truth is neither only the forementioned significatum nor 29   DM 8, 2, 10: “Sumi potest argumentum a propositionibus vocalibus seu mentalibus, quae dicuntur esse in mente non ultimata; nam in eis dubitare non potest quin sit eadem omnino propositio quae antea erat vera et nunc est falsa per mutationem rei significatae absque ulla mutatione signi vel significationis eius; ergo veritas illa in significando quae convenit his propositionibus, praeter totum id quod se tenet ex parte propositionis significantis, connotat talem concomitantiam obiecti. Sic ergo intelligi potest in veritate ipsius iudicii seu veritatis existentis in mente ultimata saltem imperfecta et abstractiva.” As Ashworth has noticed, Locke still remaks on the difficulty of discussing “Truth of thought and Truth of words distinctly one from another” (Essay, IV, 5, 3, 574: 14–15; Cf. Ashwort, Locke on Language, 60). 30   DM 8, 2, 12. 31   There seems to be a tension between this contention and Suárez’s conceptual innatism. It needs to be studied whether mental terms (absolute, connotative) for Suárez may differ in their mode of acquisition. Can Suárez, like Ockham, be considered a conceptual empiricist? Consider for instance that for Suárez: “[…] quamquam nomina significent res ad placitum, significare tamen illas mediis conceptubus nostris seu in ordine ad conceptus, quos auditis talibus nominibus de rebus formare debemus; et ideo non possunt etiam voluntarie imponi ad significanda rem aliter quam a nobis concipi possit.” (“[…] even if names signify things arbitrarily, nevertheless, they signify them through our concepts or in an ordering to concepts which, having heard such names of things, we must form, and because of that they cannot be imposed arbitrarily to signify a different thing than the one which can be conceived by us.”) (DM 30, 13, 9, see also n. 27)

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representation nor only the concomitance of the object, but it also involves “an intrinsic relation to the act whose end is the object that behaves in a certain way”.32 Thus, the significatum is what is signified by a spoken or written word, and what is true, as well. However, regarding the controversial status, Suárez’s answer is that logical truth is not a real intrinsic property of the act. His reasoning is that considering the intrinsic perfection of the act, rather than being a denomination of truth, it is a denomination of certainty or of evident assertion, (which is the same as judgement), which corresponds to a real absolute denomination.33 Now, considering the formal denomination of truth (or the actual conformity with the object), it is indeed found in the thing, but it is not a complete intrinsic denomination, since it proceeds partially from an intrinsic form, but also connotes a partial objective coexistence of the object which behaves as judged by the intellect. In this sense, the judgement itself receives, from the forementioned conformity, essentially, and primarily, the denomination of true.34 Concerning s. 3, “whether truth is found only in judgements or in simple apprehension as well”, Suárez shows that his answer to such a question leads to significative innovations on the topic. According to Suárez, there were at the time two different accounts of this debate. On the one hand, Cajetan, Hervaeus, and Aquinas thought that logical truth is found strictly in judgements and not in the intellect’s simple acts (their views were based mainly on Aristotle’s De interpretatione I and Metaphysics IX, 10). On the other hand, Ferrariensis, Capreolus, Soncinas, Giles of Rome, and Fonseca defended the idea that logical truth is found not only in judgements, but also in simple concepts (their views were based on Aristotle’s De anima III, 6). According to Suárez’s analysis, the great difficulty the first group of commentators face is to explain in what sense truth can be found in “a special manner in composition”. In fact, Suárez finds no sufficient grounds for this view. Suárez goes on to explain and discuss Aquinas’ doctrine on this point. The bottom line of his complaint here is that it is held that “when the intellect composes it does not only compare the thing with the thing’s being, but it also grasps the truth”. Suárez thinks that to argue that “it is the case that composition is the way to grasp truth” is a fallacy, since “[composition] only knows the being of thing which is the ground of truth, according to Aristotle’s assertion: it is because the actual thing exists or does not exist that the statement (belief) is called true or false; and this thing is not formally truth, even though it is the cause of truth in the intellect”.35 But Suárez finds even more difficulty with 32   DM 8, 2, 12. In that case the object behaves “as if it were represented or judged by the intellect; namely, that its being is such as it is known; but this being is not always of existence” (DM 8, 2, 16). 33   DM 8, 2, 14. 34   DM 8, 2, 14. 35   DM 8, 3, 18. In the preceding passage, Suárez had proposed a reduction of the intellect to concepts: “Ego autem existimo, si proprie loquamur, intelligere formaliter fieri per ipsum verbum seu conceptum ut informante intellectum, et ideo non posse verbum ut verbum esse conforme in reprae-

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Aquinas’ notion of adaequatio. Firstly, Suárez’s criticism relies on “how there may be an adaequatio between an intellectual operation and the thing, particularly if such operation is understood as composition”.36 If mental composition only means complex truth, he finds no sufficient grounds to attribute truth to the mental operation of composition alone. Secondly, Suárez thinks that Aquinas’ argument for adaequatio is also vague: Aquinas thinks of truth as an adaequatio between the operation of the intellect (intellection) and the thing, but “in a particular way he attributes to that operation composition and division”, since he assumes that truth is found in that operation alone rather than in a subject that knows truth in itself. According to Suárez, Aquinas’ notion of compostion and division should be rather understood as carried out by direct knowledge.37 Suárez’s positive proposal is to interpret Aquinas’ view on the manner in which the intellect knows truth not in actu signato as composing and dividing formally in the manner that Cajetan thought of, but knowing it in actu exercito. In explaning what it is to know or assert truth in actu exercito, Suárez again comes to acknowledge the relevance of mental terms as concepts: while intellection is not representing, concepts do represent things, and know truth. 38 Appealing to Ferrarensis’ notions, and to a literally “Cartesian” criterion-of-truth vocabulary, though distinguishing divine and human cognition, Suárez claims, then, By means of just a simple concept, our intellect neither conceives adequately nor exhausts in a clear and distinct way (neque exhaurit distincte et clare) the thing that is conceived, in the manner that God and angels do. Thereby, once our intellect has conceived the thing in a certain confused and inadequate way, to be able to know it distinctly and adequately one must attribute to it many predicates, which are to be distinguished either by real distinction or just by distinction of reason. Now, as a matter of fact, Aristotle, regarding words, expressed: [… that] we use terms instead of things, and because of this when we assert one thing about another we do not do it externally, but by means of a signifying word, and as signifying, so when we mentally assert a thing of another, if in fact our main intention is to assert a thing of another, we do not do it except by means of concepts, in that they are natural representations of things for us. Consequently, when we compose one thing conceived with another or conceived in a distinct way from itself, at the same time that we compare the same thing, we compare our concept in actu exercito which represents that thing. For instance, when the intellect says, composing, that man is white, it knows formally and directly the identity or union that exists between sentando rei cuius est verbum, quin etiam intellectus, quaetenus per verbum formaliter intelligit, fiat eidem rei conformis.” (DM 8, 3, 16) 36   DM 8, 3, 9. 37   “Responderi potest doctrinam D. Thomae intelligendam esse de compositione et divisone quae fit per directam cognitionem, nam certum est in omni tali compositione propiam veritatem et falsitatem reperiri.” (DM 8, 3, 15) 38   DM 8, 3, 16.

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‘white’ and ‘man’; but at the same time it knows in the same exercised act that the concept white involves man and represents it in a certain way, and therefore, is in conformity with it in a certain way. Thus, when the mind asserts that man is white, it asserts “in actu exercito” the truth, namely, that it is certain, since in asserting that white is in man it is also asserting that the concept white has some true conformity with man. 39

Suárez seems to be underlining that we have a non-relative but rather reflexive objective consciousness of our own psychical/logical acts. There is a difference in asserting ‘that man is white’ and asserting that ‘the concept «white» implies man as a concept, represents it and informs me or my own intellect’. But the act does not become reflexively conscious just for the signal of a concept or of a word, as Suárez also understands it,40 since, as we have seen, according to him, the act is always already an act that connotes an object. Summing up this point, Suárez’s answer to the question whether truth is found in judgement or in simple concepts proceeds in two steps. First, he argues that in fact the intellect knows nothing truly except in the moment when it judges; thereby its knowledge cannot be true or false until the moment of judgement; thus, truth of cognition can only exist with judgement. Suárez’s second step states his notorious contention, fully argued in s. 4, that logical truth also exists in simple apprehension.41 Accordingly, there are certain cognitive acts that are more basic and are prior to judgement.42 These acts consist in the simple apprehension of an object, in the object’s 39   DM 8, 3, 18 (my italics): “Nam intellectus noster per unum simplicem conceptum non concipit adaequate, neque exhaurit distincte et clare rem conceptam, sicut faciunt Deus vel angeli, et ideo postquam aliquo modo confuse et inadaequate illam concepit ut illam distincte et adaequate cognoscat, illi attribuit plura praedicata sive re sive ratione tantum distincta. Sicut autem de vocibus Arist. dixit […] utimur terminis pro rebus, ideoque quando affirmamus unam rem de alia, id exterius non facimus, nisi mediante voce significante et quatenus significans est, ita quando mente unum de alio affirmamus, quamvis praecipue intendamus rem de re affirmare, id tamen non facimus nisi per conceptus quatenus naturaliter nobis repraesentant res .Atque hinc fit ut, dum componimus unam rem conceptam cum alia vel cum ipsamet aliomodo concepta, comparando rem ipsam simul in actu exercito comparemus conceptum nostrum ut repraesentantem illam rem. Ut, v. g., quando intellectus componendo dicit hominem esse album, formaliter et directe cognoscit identitatem vel coniunctionem quam album habet cum homine ; simul tamen in actu exercito ipso cognoscit conceptum albi aliquo modo continere sub se hominem et repraesentare illum et consequenter esse illi aliquomodo conformem. Atque ita dum mens affirmat hominem esse album, in actu exercito affirmat veritatem seu hoc esse verum, quia dum affirmat album inesse homini affirmat conceptum albi veram aliquam conformitatem habere cum homine.” 40   Suárez states that “we should talk of words in the same manner as of concepts; because in a simple incomplex word the truth of a sign is found, as in something that has that truth in the manner of transcendental truth”. (DM 8, 3, 19) 41   DM 8, 4, 7. 42   When discussing objections to the thesis that simple concepts are prior to non-judicative acts of knowing, Suárez holds that “those mental compositions that do not involve judgements are

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representation,43 and are capable of actual knowledge and of logical truth. In Suárez’s account: Since knowledge absolutely means actual knowledge, logical truth is found simply and absolutely in the concept or verb, or in the intellectual act already accomplished, since all these things are identical and designate the form in virtue of which the intellect becomes knowing in act.44

The central place that Suárez gives to simple concepts as capable of truth brings in a deconstruction of the strict positions held by Aristotle and Aquinas. Hence, it can be seen as an important innovation in modern epistemology.45 According to Suárez’s analysis, Aristotle’s views are not always true, doctrines have been imprecise, and scholastic explanations have been insufficient. Regarding, for instance, Aquinas’ account of truth and knowledge at STh I, q. 16, a. 2 where Thomas asserts that “truth is attributed in a special way to composition and division, because only through this operation is truth found in the intellect as in the subject that knows truth itself”, Suárez notes that from this reading it is gathered that truth is found in the intellect in virtue of the simple concept. However, for Suárez, the description does not explain whether Aquinas is referring to direct or reflexive concepts. If Aquinas is taken to refer to direct concepts, Suárez shows that the reasoning seems fallacious. If the description is taken to involve reflexive knowledge, then, as Suárez explicitly remarks, “it follows that it is not always the case what Aristotle asserts, i.e., that truth and falsity are found in composition and division”.46 For Suárez’s new point of view, truth is found not only in the act of composition and division of spoken or mental complex statements, neither only subjectively in simple concepts in general, but as he states, “it is also possible to conceive truth formally and truly by means of a simple reflexive carried out typically by means of word-concepts rather than by thing-concepts, since the union between subject and predicate in reality is not known, there is not an apprehension that conforms to reality, but instead it conforms to a word or a link that signifies that union.” (DM 8, 4, 8) 43   “Ante iudicum intelligi possunt in intellectu vis ipsa intelligendi, species intelligibilis, sub qua reliquos habitus comprehendo, ipse actus cognitionis prout est in fieri et apprehensio ipsa.” (DM 8, 4, 1) 44   DM 8, 4, 2 (my italics). Simple apprehension is also a kind of “simple notion (notitia simplex) which is commonly called simple apprehension as it is capable of truth since it is knowledge, and somehow participates in the judgement’s nature, it is called simple apprehension to note that the cognitive potency in itself forms the similitude of the thing, and in a certain manner, draws the thing towards itself […] with regard to such apprehension there is certain knowledge of a thing, it is also certain judgement in virtue of which the thing is implicitly judged that the thing is that which we know.” (DM 8, 4, 6, my emphasis) 45   For Descartes the central place of truth is the same cognitive order, though predicative truth implies the pre-predicative truth of the idea. In other words, it may be said that predicative truth depends on the pre-predicative truth of the idea, and not the other way around. 46   DM 8, 3, 14.

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concept”.47 This view is strengthened by the idea that truth is known objectively in simple reflexive concepts. Related reasons given by Suárez in the same context are that simple apprehension is considered quasi reflexiva in ipso exercitio,48 and that “when an objective concept is compared with another, the conformity between the thing and the concept is somehow known in actu exercito”.49 It certainly seems correct that for Suárez a sufficient condition for truth of knowledge is the concomitantia of the object, but this entails signification or representation. However, to know logical truth or truth of reason, Suárez seems to be underlining the idea that rather than knowing it in actu signato, i.e., as something external to my act of cognition (through a judicative proposition), and in this sense, as an object which externally seals my own act, we know truth in actu exercito, meaning that we know it in the execution of an internal act, in this sense from within the act through its own exercise; thus, signifying or representing itself (a prejudicative but objective content of thought, instead of an image) is the kind of translucent act of a subject where truth does not become an object but it becomes objectively known to us. Turning to the nature of the relevant mental simple concepts, Suárez holds that, like notitii,50 they are qualities, dispositions, modes of the mind, but of the representing kind (see n. 24), their proper being is real cognitive being, and as such, their   DM 8, 3, 14.   DM 8, 3, 18 49   DM 8, 7, 3. For Suárez the objective concept is not the thing itself. According to Courtine, the objective concept is the champion for all situations of truth. Accordingly, truth is found in a relation that unites three terms: the formal concept, the objective concept, and the thing itself. It is clear that for Suárez the objective concept is the most important, it can be the limit of the thing or it can even surpass it. It is an objective representation that has the object as its objectivity, real and objective content of thought. (Cf. J. F. Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphysique, 182) Thus, according to this interpretation, for Suárez a sufficient condition for truth (sufficit ad veritatem) is concomitantia objecti. The objective concept reduced to its objectivity would be the primary ground for truth. 50   In Suárez’s psychological enquiries the cause of the formal concept is a notitia or an object. (See n. 41) A notion is the thing itself as found in the mind spiritually. Simple notions are of colours, figures, and any other primary or secondary qualities. Complex notions are of tables, chairs, or roses. To say that notions are spiritually found in the mind means that they are signs of things. Notions, like concepts, refer to things. For instance, when I smell a red rose I scent a material thing, and I have the notion of red. One has the notion of a red thing, thus our notions involve things, and as Suárez says, all our notions are “different parts of the thing”. Notions are qualitative terms of knowledge, since the thing qua thing (whose qualitative potential cannot be grasped by us) is never the object of our knowledge. Notions and concepts are simple apprehensions of a non-propositional kind which have metaphysical truth. (Cf. CQDA, d. 5, q. 5, n. 23) 47

48

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truth is a cognitive or logical truth, but transcendental truth is adjusted to them as qualities.51 3. SUÁREZ’S DENOMINATION OF TRANSCENDENTAL TRUTH: ON WHAT IT EXPRESSES AND WHAT IT CONNOTES

In s. 7–8 Suárez takes up the discussion of “whether in things there is some truth that is a property of being” and “whether and in what sense, logical truth is prior to ontological truth”. Certainly for Suárez, his whole analysis of truth has the final aim of explaining the truth of being. “It is difficult, though,” he admonishes us, “to express an adequate judgement of truth”.52 One of the main motivations for Suárez’s confessed feeling of difficulty at this far-reaching point in the enquiry seems to be that Aristotle’s authority on the matter was still being seriously pondered. Thus, as Suárez remarks, it seemed impossible to admit truth as a property of being, since according to (selective) Aristotelian texts truth and falsity are in the mind alone and not in things. On the other hand, there is much disagreement among scholastic interpretations which, having initially transferred truth to the ontological level, thought of ontological truth in terms of an attribute of being. Nevertheless, there was dispute concerning its essence. While some philosophers posited truth as a property (either intrinsic, real, or of reason), respect, order, or relation (Augustine, Avicenna, Anselm, Aquinas, Javellus, Scotus, Capreolus, Durandus, et al.), others posited it as a sort of extrinsic denomination of the thing (Cajetan). Of course, in agreement with most scholastic theologians, for Suárez the existence of ontological truth is evident, no question about that: “truth, in some respect, is an attribute of being, and is convertible with it”.53 Suárez explains this is the same as ‘transcendental truth’ and is found in God in the highest degree of perfection.54 Furthermore, Suárez remarks, “it should be considered maxime in ordine ad divinum intellectum, because in God’s intellect we find the summa et infallibilis veritas and a complete concept or representation of everything”.55 It seems, then, that transcendental truth is not only found in God’s mind but also along with or in a complete representational concept of every individual thing. The true controversy on the matter, thus, consists in establishing not the extension but the intension or the essence of ‘ontological truth’: what kind of denomination, as Suárez prefers to say, is most convenient. Suárez’s enquiry into ontological-transcendental truth preserved the traditional scholastic sense in which ‘truth’, as ‘unity’ and ‘good’, signifies a property of being   DM 8, 3, 8.   DM 8, 7, 24. 53   DM 8, 7, 4. 54   DM 8, 2, 17. 55   DM 8, 7, 28. 51

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beyond the universal.56 The question, however, of how to name the kind of property that Suárez endorses for ontological truth is still being discussed. It seems to me that Jorge Gracia is correct in thinking that, for Suárez, ontological truth described as a relation cannot be taken seriously.57 In fact, Suárez’s emphasis on the whole reasoning for rejecting strict properties and relations lies on the cognitive level. In the analysis of Aquinas’ interpretation of relation, Suárez’s own wording reveals subtle modifications at this point.58 He claims: “The thing understood (res intellecta) may have a double order of the intellect: essential and accidental; the essential order concerns the intellect on which it depends and the accidental order concerns the intellect on which it does not depend, though by which it is exclusively known”.59 In fact, Suárez is not speaking here of ontological truth “that expresses a relation”, since he explicitly denies that transcendental truth is strictly per se a relation, whether a real one or one of reason. For Suárez it is evidently not a real relation, because “God does not have any real relation with things that are external or internal to Him […]”;60 and it is not a relation of reason, because “a property of a real being cannot consist in a such mentioned relation nor can it formally enclose it”;61 a relation of reason, he adds, “exists just while they are thought of, and the truth of things cannot require such consideration”.62 Professor Gracia also seems correct in finely distinguishing between ‘relations’ and ‘denominations’. However, the inference that for Suárez the ontological status of transcendental truth is best described by “a real extrinsic denomination based on real relations” is not evident. Firstly, Suárez connects the ground of the transcendental property with the intellectual capacity to perform metaphysical abstraction, a different variety of abstraction to the physical and mathematical one.63 Metaphysical abstrac  Cf. DM VI; 8, 12. For a cogent interpretation of Suárez’s notion of ‘transcendentality’, and his doctrine of the transcendental properties of being, cf. J. E. Gracia, “Suárez and the Doctrine of the Transcendentals”, Topoi 11 (1992): 121–133. In this study Gracia analyses Suárez’s notion of ‘relation’ and the distinction between ‘relation’ and ‘denomination’. 57   Cf. Ibid., 128. 58   As J. Aertsen states, according to Thomas Aquinas “ontological truth expresses a relation to an intellect but the relation to the human intellect is accidental for the truth of things. Essential for their truth can only be a practical intellect that causes things”, cf. J. Aertsen, “Truth as Transcendental in Thomas Aquinas”, Topoi 11 (1992): 159. 59   DM 8, 5, 1. 60   DM 8, 7, 11–12. 61   DM 8, 7, 11. 62   DM 8, 7, 11. 63   A third grade of abstraction which allows for transcendental access to the entities’ being. It abstracts from individuality, universality, and ultimately, formal actuality. For a description of the three types of abstractions cf. DM I, 2, 13. Cf. J. Hellín, “Abstracción de 56

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tion is an operation of the intellect “that abstracts from sensible and intelligible matter, not only according to reason, but according to being, since the considered rationes of being are found in reality without matter and, therefore, in its proper and objective concept by itself does not exclude matter”.64 It is worth noticing that on Suárez’s account, what transcendental truth intrinsically expresses is the real being of the thing that is denominated true. Thus, if Suárez thinks that the name ‘transcendental truth’ is a second intention in a broad sense, then it is clear that “transcendental truth really signifies the thing’s being connoting the knowledge or intellectual concept to which such being adjusts itself, or in which that thing is or can be represented as it is”.65 Secondly, it needs to be recalled that, on the one hand, logical truth (also called by Suárez, ‘special’, ‘accidental’, ‘truth of knowledge’, ‘vera propositio’, truth of composition and division, or truth of reason) is not (the same as) transcendental truth, “because, in its order, transcendental truth is an immutable, inseparable, proper property of being; but the truth of composition is separable from it insofar as it depends on it”.66 And what is most important for this point is that the word ‘transcendental truth’ connotes, at the same time as it expresses/signifies the being of the thing, the knowledge or intellectual concept in which that thing is or can be represented as it is. Through this mental concept of true being (veri entis conceptum), Suárez intends to establish what he calls a virtual comparison (virtualiter comparativum) between a thing or nature and tercer grado y objeto de la metafísica”, Pensamiento 4 (1948): 433–450; Cf. J. Gracia, Suárez on Individuation (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982), 244–246, where he discusses the ‘praecisio’ concept. Cf. J. Söchting, “Perfecto en Humanidad: El misterio de la encarnación como problema ontológico en las Disputationes Metaphisicae de Francisco Suárez” (Unpublished M. A. Dissertation, Faculty of Theology, Catholic University of Chile, 2007), ch. 2.3.3, 118 f. J. Söchting argues that von Balthasar’s charge of “ontological indifference and neutrality” regarding Suárez’s conception of being is confused: it is as if he is thinking that the unity of the objective concept is performed by mere sensible or mere ideal abstraction, rather than by metaphysical abstraction. This latter determines the creature’s actual essence with respect to its cause, i.e., God. So Suárez’s distinction avoids von Balthasar’s charges of ‘ontological neutrality’, and incidentally, that of ‘scholastic ingenuity’. 64   “Metaphysica vero dicitur abstrahere a materia sensibili et intelligibili, et non solum secundum rationem, sed etiam secundum esse, quia rationes entis quas considerat, in re ipsa inveniuntur sine materia; et ideo in proprio et obiectivo conceptu suo per se non includit materiam. […] Nunc nobis sufficiat hactenus non esse inventam aptiorem rationem distinguendi has scientias, et aliunde hanc videri satis convenientem; nam cum hae scientiae sint de rebus ipse, sintque maxime speculativae, ideoque abstractione utantur ut constituant obiectum scibile de quo possint demonstrationes fieri, recte ex diverso modo abstractionis intelligitur variari obiectum scibile ut sic; et ideo solet dici haec abstraction, quatenus in ipso obiectofundamentum habet, ratio formalis sub qua talis obiecti in rationes scibilis.” (DM 1, 2, 13) 65   DM 8, 7, 25. 66   DM 8, 8, 7–8.

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the proper concept of the thing that is called true.67 From this virtual comparison or proportion, then, the kind of naming or denominating for transcendental truth should follow. Thirdly, given the distinction between truth of signification and transcendental truth, Suárez’s resolution to the questions posed in sections 7 and 8 is that the word ‘truth’ has an earlier meaning which refers to logical truth found in the intellect, in the sense given to it by Aristotle; thus, a judgement that has this kind of truth is called simply true, and if a judgement lacks it, it is called simply false, even if it retains transcendental truth. Besides, for Suárez, truth in this earlier mental meaning “can extrinsically denominate either real beings or beings of reason”.68 And, as we have seen, this is also a real and absolute denomination of truth. A further point to consider in this same semantic-metaphysical context is that Suárez explicitly rejects extrinsic denomination for describing transcendental truth; positing a clear analogy he asserts: “I think that things known can be called true with this logical truth by an analogy and extrinsic denomination, but truth is not taken according to this ratio or denomination when it is said to be a property of being.”69 Lastly, Suárez thinks that the best explanation of the conformity principle is not the one defended by Hervaeus and Durandus, namely, between the thing and the objective concept, but rather the conformity between the thing and the idea or formal concept.70 By all these considerations Suárez wants to explain that if Aquinas says that ontological truth expresses a relation to the intellect, the relation must be understood not as an actual relation “but rather as a mutual connexion between the thing and the concept, and to the connotation of one regarding the correspondent other; things that in virtue of being conceived by us, are usually called relations of reason”.71 On the other hand, Suárez deems partially right Cajetan’s choice, in the sense that Suárez 67   One of the theological examples brought up by Suárez is: “ad profitendum Eucharistiae mysterium dicere solemus hostiam consecratam esse verum corpus Christi Domini, ubi per ‘verum corpus’ nihil aliud significamus quam illud idem corpus quod per proprium ac verum conceptum corporis Christi repraesentatur.” (DM 8, 7, 25) 68   DM 8, 8, 9. For Suárez real being and entia ficta may have mental truth, but not ontological truth. They are not true beings and are intelligible in a different manner than true beings. True beings have an aptitude for being grasped as they are; fictitious beings, on the contrary, do not have that aptitude, so the intellect, by its virtual artifice, represents them with some shadow of reality. (DM 8, 7, 34) 69   DM 8, 8, 10. 70   “Sed ipsi declarant per conceptum obiectivum quod nos per formalem; tamen quia conceptus obiectivus nihil praeter rem addit nisi denominationem termini conceptus formalis, ideo non recte explicator conformitas inter rem et conceptum obiectibum, sed inter rem potius et conceptum formalem seu ideam.” (DM 8, 7, 25) 71   DM 8, 7, 25.

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believes that “transcendental truth is not a mere extrinsic denomination”, although it connotes union with another thing. However, in Suárez’s own resolution “ontological truth involves intrinsically the being of the thing; therefore, it is not a mere extrinsic denomination”.72 According to this textual evidence, truth of signification can be denominated by a “real extrinsic denomination”, but ontological truth can only be denominated by a “real intrinsic denomination”, never by a “real extrinsic denomination”, and this former comes about not as a relation as such, but as a quasi-relation in Suárez’s vocabulary. 4. CONCLUSION

I hope to have shown that the ontological eminence of the concept became increasingly clear within the focus, content, and meaning of Suárez’s enquiry into “truth and true, quod est passio entis” and that Suárez maintained the oldest theory of truth in Western philosophy in the sense of defending a version of the correspondence theory of truth. However, his defence involved a formulation of a principle of conformity that was entangled with philosophical semantics and the language of representation. In general agreement with Aristotle, Suárez clearly argued that truth belongs to knowledge, but most definitely, in the path of Augustine’s genuine source for the impetus of mental language, he was convinced that the eminent linguistic terms of knowledge were concepts or ideas. Concepts acquired the qualitative status of real intelligible being (distinctly understood either as formal concepts in the human mind’s cognitive process or as objective concepts related to the mind, language and things). For Suárez, concepts bore a double signifying/representational relation to words (conventional, mediate) and to things (immediate, natural). The phenomenon of objective truth came about not primarily in sentential words, since words were just analogical signs of concepts, but in the language of concept. Concepts, according to Suárez, intentionally represent, point out (vera tendentia at rei)73 and even drag things into the mind’s act of knowledge. Concepts are made to play a paradigmatic rôle in Suárez’s semantics of signification and truth. They were indeed considered by Suárez as real mental terms, the significatum of words and propositions: that which is signified by them; that which is conceived by spoken words; that which has semantic value: they are true or (metaphorically) false; that which is known; that which is perceived by the mind alone; that which is grasped by the mind; that which is clear and distinct; that which informs intellect; that which is translucent to a subject; that on which judgements depend; that which is expressed by words; that which connotes either other: things, objects, or concepts. Thus, the doctrine of mental language, as 72

  DM 8, 7, 34.   DM 8, 4, 2.

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developed in Disputation 8, reveals Suárez’s awareness of the diverse epistemological, logical, and semantic concerns in late scholasticism. The innovations of Suárez’s enquiry on the notion of truth include: (i) the location to which he transferred the so called primaeva signification of ‘truth’, and (ii) the kind of logical expression he used for designating ontological truth. Aristotle thought truth to be primarily located in the mind within the judicative level of language. Thomas Aquinas followed by favouring the intellect in its judging formal operations as the proper location of truth, but as the majority of mediæval theologians he also extended the locus of truth to every being, whereby the general name ‘veritas’, like other terms coextensive with being, acquired (in an imposed transferred sense, as Suárez insistently noted) the name ‘transcendental’ by which both signs and things were signified. Though Suárez also followed the knowledge-directed concerns of Aristotle and Aquinas, he placed truth right with mental concepts. Suárez certainly required judgements for formal cognition. However, judgements were shown to be causally dependent on the more basic representative intentional apprehensions. To avoid mere psychological certainty derived from simple apprehensions, Suárez introduced the concept of formal/objective distinction, and added cognition in actu exercito to it.74 Hence, by combining the intentional/representative/signifying character of concepts with their reflexive character to reach out to other concepts, objectivity of truth was to be preserved. Indeed, Suárez’s transfer of truth to concepts set a new direction for modern epistemologies which still seems meaningful for contemporary questioning on the location of truth in propositions, no matter what form they take. On the content of truth as transcendental, Suárez seemed to be concerned with the imprecise uses of language. The form of his discourse involves dialectic objects such as “terms”, “names”, “signification”, “connotation”, “denotations”, “expressions”, “impositions”, certainly, “words”, “propositions”, different “concepts”, “analogy”, and especially, the modi significandi of “non ultimate” and “reflexive” concepts, and “denominations”. He begins by stating the question of the essence of transcendental truth in terms of what is its most convenient designation. The framework of sections 7 and 8 is whether transcendental truth ontologically belongs to properties and relations or to a kind of denomination. Suárez’s solution involves the verbs ‘expressing’ and ‘connoting’, so he formulated that the name ‘transcendental truth’ “intrinsically expresses the real being of the thing that is denominated true”, and “signifies the being of the thing connoting the knowledge or intellectual concept to which the being 74   Wittgenstein talks of linguistic games to establish the functional sense of words. Thus, language is language if it is just actus exercitus, namely, when it performs the task of making visible what has been said, a task by which language somehow disappears. Cf. H. G. Gadamer, “Los fundamentos filosóficos del Siglo XX”, in La secularización de la filosofía, ed. G. Vattimo (Barcelona, Gedisa Ed., 2001), 110.

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conforms or in which such a thing is or can be represented as it is”.75 For Suárez, truth as a “real intrinsic denomination”, a quasi-relation,76 has expressed and connoted another transferred location which goes from the transcendental level of being to a supra-transcendent level of being-known in general. Therefore, in Suárez’s view First Philosophy connoted the ascent of Epistemology. Indeed, prima philosophia is the central focal point of philosophy.77

BIBLIOGRAPHY ANCIENT SOURCES Obras de San Augustine. Vol. I. Latin–Spanish edition by Victorino Capanaga, O. R. S. A. Madrid: BAC, 1950. Barnes, Jonathan, ed. The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. 2 vols. Fourth Printing. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.

SCHOLASTIC SOURCES Juan de Santo Tomás, De los signos y los conceptos, introduced and translated by Beuchot, M., México, UNAM, 1989. Suárez, Francisco. Disputationes Metaphysicae. 7 vols. Edited and translated by Sergio Rábade, Salvador Caballero, and Antonio Puigcerver. Madrid: Ed. Gredos, 1960–1996. — Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima. Vol. I–III. Edited by Salvador Castellote. Translated by Carlos Baciero and Luis Baciero. Madrid: Editorial Labor, 1971–1991. — Opusculum Secundum, De Scientia Dei Futurorum Contingentium. In Opera Omnia XXI. Paris: Vivès, 1858.

MODERN WORKS Aertsen. J.,“Truth as Transcendental in Thomas Aquinas”, Topoi 11 (1992): 159–171. Ashworth, E. J., “Locke on Language”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. XIV, Number 1, 1984. Burlando, G. “Suárez on Intrinsic Representationalism”. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofía (Facultade de Filosofia de Braga da Universidade Católica Portuguesa) 60 (2004): 31–46.

  DM 8, 7, 24–25.   DM 8, 8, 11. 77   The actual version of this paper is a byproduct of the Fondecyt project Nº 1071054. 75 76

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— “Suárez and Heidegger on the Transcendental moment in the cognitio trascendentalis”. In New Essays on Metaphysics as Scientia Transcendens, Proceedings of the Second International Conference of Medieval Philosophy, edited by. R. H. Pich. Porto Alegre: Brazil, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2007. Courtine, J.-F. Suárez et le système de la métaphysique. Paris: PUF, 1990. Doyle, J. “Supertrascendental Being: On the Verge of Modern Philosophy”. In Meeting of the Minds: The Relations between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy, edited by S. F. Brown, 297–316. Turnhout: Brepols, 1999. Gadamer, H. G. “Los fundamentos filosóficos del Siglo XX”. In La secularización de la filosofía, edited by G. Vattimo. Barcelona: Gedisa ed., 2001. — Verdad y Método II. Salamanca: Ed. Sígueme, 1994. Garcia, C. “Descartes y  Suárez: Sobre la Falsedad No Judicativa”. In Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) Tradição e Modernidade, edited by A. Cardoso et al. Lisboa: ed. Colibri, 1999. Gracia, J. E. Suárez on Individuation. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982. Gracia, J. E. and D. Davis. The Metaphysics of Good and Evil according to Suárez. München: Philosophia Verlag, 1989. Söchting, J. “Perfecto en Humanidad: El misterio de la encarnación como problema ontológico en las Disputationes Metaphisicae de Francisco Suárez”. Unpublished Dissertation. Faculty of Theology, Catholic University of Chile, 2007.

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ABSTRACT

This paper addresses an apparent tension present in Francisco Suárez’s doctrine of analogy. Because of his emphasis upon the unity of the conceptus obiectivus entis, some have levelled the charge that Suárez’s position on analogy ultimately boils down to a kind of subtle univocity. Furthermore, the reasons Suárez gives for analogy, namely, the unequal possession of being, would seem to conflict with the demands that the unitary concept of being – to which Suárez is committed – imposes. Our paper argues that, despite the apparent tensions in Suárez’s account, the Doctor Eximius does in fact offer a coherent theory of analogy, one that meets the demands of the unitary concept of being. We suggest that the key to untangling the apparent tensions in Suárez’s account is his notion of the confused concept of aptitudinal being. This confused objective concept of aptitudinal being affords Suárez the means to preserve the simplicity or unity that the concept of being demands, all the while leaving room for the dissimilarity and inequality that analogy requires.

1. INTRODUCTION Francisco Suárez’s teaching on the analogy of being has been the locus of not a little controversy in recent scholarly literature. Some suggest that, at heart, Suárez’s doctrine of analogy is really a sublimated or repressed univocity. Walter Hoeres, for instance, writes, “Although Suárez would not admit it, his investigations largely appear not so much as a refutation of Scotistic teaching [on the univocatio entis] as a defence of it.”1 More recently, this same interpretation is found – albeit articulated from a different angle and drawing negative conclusions – among certain postmodern thinkers, most notably, Jean-Luc Marion.2 Marion claims that Suárez’s notion of   Walter Hoeres, “Francis Suárez and the Teaching of John Duns Scotus on Univocatio Entis”, in John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965, ed. John K. Ryan et al. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1965), 263–290, quote from 263. 2   See Jean-Luc Marion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981), esp. 70–109. In a similar vein, Philipp W. Rosemann takes Marion’s thesis to heart and argues that Suárez’s closet doctrine of univocity actually functions to bring the Scholastic “ἐπιστήμη” to its end and inaugurates modernity; cf. Rosemann, Understanding 1

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analogy functions at the level of terminology only, retaining a subtle commitment to univocity vis-à-vis the conceptus objectivus entis.3 The classic text cited frequently in support of Suárez’s univocity is from the Second Disputation in which he states: But if one of the two [viz. univocity or analogy] is to be denied, more preferably should analogy, which is uncertain, be denied than the unity of the concept [of being], which is seen to be demonstrated by certain reasons [certis rationibus].4

A damning text for the prospect of analogy so it would seem, however, as José Pereira notes, the situation is nowhere near as obvious as this text might suggest, 5 for immediately succeeding the passage just quoted, Suárez adds: However, in true reality neither [analogy nor univocity] needs to be denied, since according to univocity it is not sufficient that the concept in itself would be one in some mode, but it is necessary that it respects many in an equal relation and order, which the concept of being does not have.6

Consciously and deliberately departing from the Scotistic position, Suárez, while at times appearing to countenance univocity because of his insistence upon the unity of the objective concept of being, wants all the while to retain an intrinsic order of relations and inequality within the very concept of being itself. As he says, “even though the common concept [of being] as abstracted is in itself one, nevertheless, the features which constitute individual beings are diverse, and through them as such each thing is constituted in an absolute way in the reality of being (in esse entis). […] Scholastic Thought with Foucault (Palgrave MacMillan, 1999), 175–176. Others who view Suárez’s doctrine of analogy similarly include Pierre Aubenque, “Suárez et l’avènment du concept de l’être”, in Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) Tradição e Modernidade, ed. Adelino Cardoso et al. (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 1999), 11–20; Jean-François Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphysique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), esp. 521–538. Others, however, have sought to defend Suárez from those postmoderns who would like to tar Suárez with the same brush that those suspected of onto-theology are smeared. For such a defence, see Richard Cross, “Duns Scotus and Suárez at the Origins of Modernity”, in Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric, and Truth, ed. W. Hankey et al. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 65–80; cf. also Daniel Heider, “Is Suárez’s Concept of Being Analogical or Univocal?”, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81, n. 1 (2007): 21–41, wherein a defence of the analogicity of the Suárezian concept of being is offered. 3   See Marion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, 82. 4   DM 2, 2, 36: “[…] sed si alterum negandum esset, potius analogia, quae incerta est, quam unitas conceptus, quae certis rationibus videtur demonstrari, esset neganda.” 5   See José Pereira, Suárez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2007), 134–135. 6   DM 2, 2, 36: “Re tamen vera neutram negari necesse est, quia ad univocitatem non sufficit quod conceptus in se sit aliquot modo unus, sed necesse est aequali habitudine et ordine respiciat multa, quod non habet conceptus entis.”

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[T]he common concept [of being] itself of itself demands […] determination within an order and relation to one […].”7 In short, the Doctor Eximius insists upon an analogia entis and is not simply Scotus redivivus. Yet Suárez’s position is not without its own set of difficulties for, prima facie, there seems to be a tension between, on the one hand, the demands of the absolute simplicity and precision from all modes and limitations that the unitary concept of being requires and, on the other, the intrinsic ordering of prius and posterius proper to analogy, as is especially the case between God and creature, infinite and finite being. No doubt part of the difficulty Suárez is facing here is his attempt to straddle the incommensurable intersection of two opposed traditions (viz., the Thomistic and Scotistic) with their competing solutions to the problem of the one and the many.8 In what follows, I submit, even if only tentatively,9 that a possible solution to the tension in Suárez’s teaching on analogy may be found in his notion of aptitudinal being as expressed through the confused concept of being.10

7   Cf. DM 28, 3, 21: “Quod si dicas his verbis non explicari rationem accommodatam enti ut sic, sed proprias rationes talis et talis entis, respondetur imprimis rationem entis esse transcendentem et intime inclusam in omnibus propriis ac determinatis rationibus entium et in ipsis modis determinantibus ipsum ens, ideoque licet ratio communis ut abstracta sit in se una, tamen rationes constituentes singula entia esse diversas, et per illas ut sic constitui unumquodque absolute in esse entis. Deinde (quod ad rem maxime spectat), ipsamet ratio communis ex se postulat talem determinationem cum ordine et habitudine ad unum, et ideo, licet secundum confusam rationem sit eadem sicut est una, nihilominus non est omnino eadem, quia non est ex se omnino uniformis, quam uniformitatem et identitatem requirunt univoca in ratione sua, et ita debet definitio univocorum exponi.” Transl. John P. Doyle, The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God: Metaphysical Disputations 28–29 (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2004), 49 (hereafter, all English translations from the Twenty-Eighth Disputation will be taken from Doyle). Cf. also John P. Doyle, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being”, The Modern Schoolman 46 (1969): 219–249; 323–341. 8   Heider notes this same oscillation, “Is Suárez’s Concept Univocal?”, 22. For a helpful comparison of the fundamental, but opposing theses proper Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy and that of Suárez, see Courtine, Suárez, 521–538. For a comparison of Scotus and Suárez, see Hoeres, “Francis Suárez and the Teaching of John Duns Scotus”. 9   I say “tentatively” because, as I shall explain, a large portion of the proposed solution depends upon Suárez’s notion of aptitudinal being, the efficacy of which has been questioned by some scholars, e.g., Doyle, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being”, 335–341. 10   Some argue that the notion of aptitudinal being, beyond offering a solution to the problem of the one and the many, represents Suárez’s original contribution to metaphysics. See Pereira, Suárez, 109.

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2. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS Suárez’s argument for analogy takes the standard approach of first juxtaposing analogy against the two other competing sententiae or “opinions” of equivocity and univocity. Quickly touching upon equivocity, the Doctor Eximius pauses only long enough to dismiss it as a viable philosophical option. The classical proponent of equivocity, Moses Maimonides, Suárez judges to have been sufficiently refuted by St. Thomas. The Angelic Doctor argues that Maimonides, among other things, ultimately failed to take into account the metaphysical axiom: omne agens agit sibi simile.11 In short, Suárez agrees with Thomas that creatures, insofar as they are effects of the divine causality, must bear some likeness or similitude to God in virtue of which pure equivocity is overcome.12 In contrast to his brief treatment of equivocity, however, Suárez’s description of univocity is much more sustained and, at certain points, even sympathetic. The Scotists argue that “being immediately signifies one concept, common to God and creatures; therefore, it is said of them not analogically but rather univocally”.13 While Suárez disputes the Scotist conclusion of univocity, he agrees with their antecedent: their insistence upon the unity of the concept of being, which, as Suárez reports, he himself establishes much earlier in the course of his First Disputation.14 Indeed, Suárez’s overarching and, at times, quasi-frenetic desire to preserve the unitary concept of being permeates the remaining fifty-three disputations that follow upon the critically decisive opening one.15 And the Twenty-Eighth Disputation – which signals the beginning of the second division of the Disputationes metaphysicae and is the site of one of Suárez’s most sustained treatments of analogy – is certainly

  For those passages in which Thomas treats Maimonides explicitly, see, e.g., STh I, q. 13, a. 5, co.; De potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 7, co. Suárez does not explicitly mention this axiom, nor does he need to since it was a familiar metaphysical truism with a history stretching back to Parmenides. Cf. Philipp Rosemann, Omne Agens Agit Sibi Simile: A “Repetition” of Scholastic Metaphysics (Leuven University Press), 1997. 12   DM 28, 3, n. 1: “[…] eam opinionem tenuisse Rabbi Moysen, quia, cum ens finitum distet a Deo infinite, nulla potest inter ea esse proportio quae fundet analogiam. Merito tamen ibidem multis rationibus sententiam hanc D. Thom. improbat. […] Item quia inter Deum et creaturam est aliqua similitudo, cum se habeant ut causatum et causa; ergo maxime in ratione entis, quae est prima omnium.” 13   DM 28, 3, 2: “Et probatur, quia ens immediate significat conceptum unum communem Deo et creaturis; ergo non dicitur de illis analogice, sed univoce.” Transl. Doyle, 30. For Scotus’ position on univocity, see his Ordinatio I, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1–2, n. 26–29 (ed. Vat. III, 18). 14   Ibid., “Et probatur, quia ens immediate significat conceptum unum communem Deo et creaturis; ergo non dicitur de illis analogice, sed univoce. Antecedens probatum a nobis est in disputatione prima huius operis.” 15   Cf. Courtine, Suárez, 528. 11

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no exception.16 What is more, while Suárez argues in support of analogy, he never does so at the expense of the unitary concept of being. In fact, he positively rejects any account of analogy that would undermine that unity. It comes as no surprise, then, that Suárez finds himself at odds with the Thomists17 since they go so far – too far, really – in their accounts of analogy that they compromise the unity of the concept of being. Suárez complains: “[T]here remains in [the Thomist arguments for analogy] the problem that either they prove too much or they are not effective. For they would doubtless prove not only that being is not univocal, but also that it does not have one objective concept common to God and creatures […].”18 If Scotists go too far in concluding univocity, Thomists miss the mark because they abandon the unitary concept of being, which seems to be, at least to Suárez’s mind, by far the greater sin.19 But why is the Doctor Eximius so beholden to this unitary concept of being? A full answer to this question would exceed the parameters of this paper;20 suffice it to say, however, that Suárez’s commitment to the unitary concept of being stems chiefly from his theory of human cognition and, in particular, his take on the manner in which various objects, including being itself, are conceived.21 To explain his account of this cognitive process, Suárez has recourse to the by-then commonplace distinction between formal and objective concepts. As had already been made clear over two and a quarter centuries prior, the relationship between formal and objective concepts is fundamentally a matter of intentionality (intentionalitas); such is clear most notably

  DM 28, Prologus: “Haec est secunda principalis pars hujus operis, in qua postquam in priori de communi conceptu entis, illiusque proprietatibus, quae de illo reciproce dicuntur, tractatum est, ad definitas rationes entium descendere, quantum formale objectum, et abstractio hujus scientiae permittit, necessarium est.” 17   Among the Thomists who maintain analogy, Suárez mentions: Cajetan, John Capreolus, Sylvester Ferrara, and Domingo de Soto. 18   DM 28, 3, 9: “Hae quidem rationes et similes, graves sunt et acutae; illud tamen semper in eis difficile superest, quia vel nimium probant, vel efficaces non sunt, quia nimirum non solum probarent ens non esse univocum, sed etiam non habere unum communem conceptum obiectivum Deo et creaturis […]” Transl. Doyle, 35. 19   It would seem to be the “greater sin” since the unitary objective concept of being is precisely what, to Suárez’s understanding, makes metaphysics as a science possible, of which we shall have more to say in what follows. 20   The interested reader may profitably consult e.g. Timothy Cronin, S.J., Objective Being in Descartes and in Suárez (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1966); José Hellín, S.J., “Obtenación del concepto del ente, objecto de la metafísica”, Espiritu 17 (1961): 135–154. 21   For a critical treatment of Suárez’s epistemological commitments in relation to his doctrine of analogy, see Francisco L. Peccorini, “Suárez’s Struggle with the Problem of the One and the Many”, The Thomist 36 (1972): 433–471. 16

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in Hervaeus Natalis’ Tractatus de secundis intentionibus22 as well as in Petrus Aureoli’s treatments of objective being.23 As is well known, for Suárez, a formal concept is the act itself of the intellect intending towards some object in virtue of which the intellect conceives some thing or some common feature.24 In contrast, that which terminates the intellect’s intending is the objective concept – the thing itself or character known or represented through the formal concept.25 Furthermore, whereas a formal concept is always a singular or individual thing – as a concept of the mind, it possesses the positive reality of a quality inhering in the intellect26 – in contrast, an objective concept can be an individual thing (e.g., the man Peter), a universal (e.g., ‘man’ taken as a species),27 or even something that lacks any positive reality altogether (e.g., a privation or being of reason).28 The relationship between formal and objective concepts, as well as the latter’s plasticity in expressing either a particular or a universal, is crucial for Suárez’s   Cf. Tractatus Magistri Hervaei Doctoris Perspicacissimi de secundis intentionibus, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. Doyle, 333): “Ex parte […] intellectus dicitur intentio dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur intentio ex parte intelligentis, omne illud, scilicet, quod per modum repraesentationis ducit intellectum in cognitionem alicuius rei, sive illud sit species intelligibilis, sive sit actus intelligendi, sive conceptus mentis quando format perfectum conceptum de re. Et isto etiam modo posset extendi nomen intentionis ad quamlibet similitudinem sive exemplar ducens in cognitionem rei. Alio modo dicitur intentio illud quod se tenet ex parte rei intellectae. Et hoc modo dicitur intentio res ipsa quae intelligitur in quantum in ipsam tenditur intellectus sicut in quoddam cognitum per actum intelligendi. Et intentio sic dicta formaliter et in abstracto dicitur terminum tantum ipsius tendentiae, sive ipsammet tendentiam quae est quaedam habitude rei intellectae ad intellectum sive ad actum intelligendi. In concreto autem et materialiter dicit illud quod intelligitur quicquid sit illud” For a treatment of Hervaeus Natalis’ view on intentionality, see John P. Doyle, “Hervaeus Natalis, O.P. (d. 1323) on Intentionality: Its Direction, Context, and Some Aftermath”, The Modern Schoolman 83.2 (2006): 85–123. 23   See, e.g., Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, dist. 3, s. 14, a. 1, n. 35 (ed. Buytaert, p.700): “[I]ntelligentia potest dupliciter accipi, quia vel pro actu formali quo res constituuntur in esse apparenti, quia vel pro illa apparentia obiectali.” Cf. Lauge Olaf Nielsen, “Peter Auriol”, in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge Gracia et al. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 495–498. 24   DM 2, 1, 1: “Conceptus formalis dicitur actus ipse, seu (quod idem est) verbum quo intellectus rem aliquam seu communem rationem concipit […].” Cf. Doyle, “Suárez on Analogy”, 226. 25   Ibid., “Conceptus objectivus dicitur res illa, vel ratio, quae proprie et immediate per conceptum formalem cognoscitur seu repraesentatur […].” Cf. Doyle, “Suárez on Analogy”, 226. 26   Ibid., “[…] formalis semper est vera ac positiva res et in creaturis qualitas menti inhaerens […].” 27   Ibid., “Item conceptus formalis semper est res singularis et individua, quia est res producta per intellectum, eique inhaerens; conceptus autem objectivus interdum quidem esse potest res singularis, et individua, quatenus mentis objici potest, et per actum formalum concipi, saepe vero est res universalis vel confusa vel communis, ut est homo, substantia et similia.” Cf. Doyle, “Suárez on Analogy”, 226. 28   Ibid., “[…] objectivus vero non semper est vera res positiva; concipimus enim interdum privationes, et alia, quae vocantur entia rationis, quia solum habent esse objective in intellectu.” 22

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construction of a science of being insofar as it is being. The objective concept of being, prescinding from all particular, limiting, and contingent conditions of certain kinds of being, fulfils the requirements of an Aristotelian science since it (the objective concept) attains a consideration of being as such in its universally necessary features.29 Through one and the same objective concept, all beings – infi nite and finite, uncreated and created, actual and even merely possible beings – are considered simply from the perspective of that which they share in common, namely, the fact of their standing outside of nothing: their existence. Finally, since to one formal concept there pertains only one objective concept, the ontological status of one’s formal concept – its contingent and particular character – does not, thanks to the objective concept, impede one’s ability to reach knowledge that is of itself both universal and necessary.30 Furthermore, precisely because it prescinds from all determining conditions, the objective concept of being makes possible for Suárez a consideration of created or finite being in its agreement with the divine being inasmuch as both are – not insofar as each is a certain kind of being, but simply insofar as each is. The agreement that obtains between God and creatures insofar as they are or agree in being (in essendo) can be known through a single formal concept to which corresponds the unitary objective concept of being. Were there no such agreement, being could not be known through one formal and objective concept. The obvious result would be equivocity between God and creature. Suárez warns that: “[I]f the character of being insofar as it is in God includes something essentially other than it does in a creature, that character then cannot be one in such a way that it is represented by one formal concept and that it constitutes one objective concept. For it cannot be understood that in one concept as such there is an essential variety.”31 Even in the case of God and creature there arises, according to the Doctor Eximius, only one formal and objective concept of being, denuded, as it were, of all the essential differences and determinations proper to each. 29   DM 6, 5, 3: “Et hoc modo dicitur esse scientia de universalibus, et non de singularibus, non quia sit de nominibus et non singularibus, sed quia est de conceptibus objectivus, qui, licet in re ipsa non distinguuntur a singularibus, distinguuntur tamen ratione […] Quod non satis adverterunt Nominales, et ideo aliter locuti sunt, quamvis in re non multum a nobis differant, ut diximus.” For Aristotle’s account of a science, see Posterior Analytics I, 18, 81a37–81b9. Cf. Doyle, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being”, 229. 30   Cf. DM 2, 2, 8: “Dico ergo primo, conceptui formali entis respondere unum conceptum objectivum adaequatum, et immediatum, qui expresse non dicit substantiam, neque accidens, neque Deum, nec creaturam, sed haec omnia per modum unius, scilicet quatenus sunt inter se aliquo modo similia, et convenient in essendo.” Cf. Doyle, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being”, 227. 31   DM 28, 3, 9: “[S]i ratio entis, prout est in Deo, aliud essentialiter includit quam ut in creatura, ergo non potest illa ratio ita esse una ut uno conceptu formali repraesentetur et unum conceptum obiectivum constituit; nam intelligi non potest quod in conceptu uno ut sic sit varietas essentialis.” Transl. Doyle, 35.

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In answer to our earlier question, then, we see that Suárez is beholden to the unitary concept of being – through which a multitude of beings are grasped in virtue of that in which they are common or agree – because without it metaphysics understood as a science would be impossible. Yet, here the difficulties for maintaining an analogy of being come to fore: are not essential variation, difference, otherness, and the like precisely that which is at stake in analogy? Things are called analogous because, despite whatever similarity they may share, there presumably remains an even greater dissimilarity or difference, whence analogy may be described as a “dissimilar similarity.” The question for Suárez is: how can one reconcile the absolute simplicity of the unitary concept of being with the dissimilarity of analogy? 3. DOCTRINAL TENSIONS Before we can answer this question, we must answer a prior one: what exactly does analogy mean for Suárez? The history of analogy prior to and around the time of the Doctor Eximius is a well-documented one that we need not rehearse in detail here.32 Suffice it to say, that at the time of its late mediæval reception, and certainly by the time it came into Suárez’s hands, the basic structure of analogy roughly fell into one of two divisions: that of proper proportionality and attribution.33   The interested reader may consult E. J. Ashworth’s many articles on the subject, especially “Suárez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background”, Vivarium 33, n. 1 (1995): 50–75. This article helpfully paints the historical backdrop on the question of analogy with reference to Suárez, but it fails to probe deeply into Suárez’s own understanding of analogy in terms of his doctrine of being. Slightly more helpful with respect to the development of the history of analogy vis-à-vis Suárez is Alain Guy, “L’analogie de l’être selon Suárez”, Archives de Philosophie 42 (1979): 275–294. Guy’s account suffers, however, from a lack of critical appraisal. Finally, for a much more detailed account of the historical development of the question of analogy at least up to the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, with some reference to Suárez, see both Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World: An Investigation of its Background and Interpretation of its Use by Thomas of Aquino (Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksells Boktryckeri, 1952); and J.-F. Courtine, Inventio analogiae: métaphysique et ontothéologie (Paris: J. Vrin, 2005). 33   Each of these forms of analogy has its antecedent in ancient Greek thought. The Greek term ἀναλογία has a mathematic origin which designates a relation of two proportions, giving rise to what the mediævals referred to as proper proportionalitas – a four-term proportional relationship. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, 6, 1096b27–30; Poetics 21, 1457b17–35. It should be noted, however, that the Stagirite himself never made use of ἀναλογία when articulating his doctrine of being. Rather, he described the relation of reference that many instances of being have to substance – the primary instance of being – in terms of a πϱὸς ἕν equivocal relation. Cf. Metaphysics IV, 2, 1003a32–1003b18. This πϱὸς ἕν equivocal relation, so central to Aristotle’s metaphysics, became the structure of what is often referred to as the analogy of attribution. Of course, one cannot overlook the Boëthius’ contribution to the evolution of the understanding of analogy through a sorting out of various kinds of equivocals. In his In Categorias Aristotelis (PL 64, col. 166b ff.) famously schematizes the different kinds of equivocals into aequivoca 32

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As is also well known the major proponents of analogy were the Thomists, chief among whom was Cardinal Cajetan. Taking his cue from the Greek meaning of the term ‘ἀναλογία’ Cajetan famously argued that only an analogy of proper proportionality is analogy in the truest sense, 34 since, as he saw it, proper proportionality alone – when not used in a metaphorical sense – pertains to the intrinsic formal perfections inherent in each analogate. Attribution, however, simply denotes an extrinsic relationship in which only one of the analogates possesses the perfection intrinsically.35 Cajetan’s interpretation of analogy eventually received the support of yet another significant Thomist, John of St. Thomas, who regarded Cajetan as having spoken defi nitively on the issue of analogy, in effect, bestowing a kind of quasicanonical status upon the Cajetanian position.36 In stark contrast, Suárez deliberately places himself at odds with Cajetan in arguing that proper proportionality functions only extrinsically, involving metaphor or impropriety.37 Such an extrinsic character cannot accommodate the ontological exigencies of being, for there is certainly nothing metaphorical or improper about predicating ‘being’ of a creature.38 a casu, aequivoca a consilio and the four subdivisions of proportio (analogia), similitudo, ab uno, and ad unum. Finally, by the time of Thomas Aquinas, both what was referred to by ἀναλογία and πϱὸς ἕν equivocals were placed under the rubric of analogia or proportio and equally considered as forms of analogy; cf. De principiis naturae, c. 6 for the equal employment of both proper proportionality and attribution. 34   See De nominum analogia, c. 1, n. 3: “Ad tres ergo modos analogiæ omnia analoga reducuntur: scilicet ad analogiam inaequalitatis, et analogiam attributionis, et analogiam proportionalitatis. Quamvis secundum veram vocabuli proprietatem et usum Aristotelis, ultimus modus tantum analogiam constituat, primus autem alienus ab analogia omnino sit.” 35   Ibid., c. 3, nn. 23, 27: “Ex abusive igitur analogis ad proprie analogiam ascendendo, dicimus: analoga secundum proportionalitatem dici, quorum nomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est proportionaliter eadem. Vel sic: Analoga secundum proportionalitatem dicuntur, quorum nomen commune est, et ratio secundum illud nomen est similis secundum proportionem. […] Praeponitur autem analogia haec caeteris antedictis dignitate et nomine. Dignitate quidem, quia haec fit secundum genus causae formalis inhaerentis: quoniam praedicat ea, quae singulis inhaerent. Altera vero secundum extrinsecam denominationem fit.” 36   Cf. Johannes a Sancto Thoma, Cursus philosophicus Thomisticus I, Ars Logica, nov. ed., II. P., q. 13, a. 3; 481. See also H. Lyttkens, 215; George Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis (Chicago, IL: Loyola University Press, 1960), 9–10. 37   We might point out that even certain Thomists sympathetic to Cajetan find the Cardinal’s account of the difference between proper proportionality in its proper and metaphorical senses to be hazy and poorly established. See, e.g., Ralph McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 22–24. 38   See DM 28, 3, 11: “Ad hanc ergo analogiam necesse et ut unum membrum sit absolute tale per suam formam, aliud vero non absolute, sed ut substat tali proportioni vel comparationi ad aliud. […] Creatura enim est ens ratione sui esse absolute et sine tali proportionalitate considerata, quia nimirum per illud est extra nihil et aliquid actualitatis habet […]. Denique omnis vera analogia proportionalitatis

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Not a matter of proper proportionality, the analogical relationship between God and creatures must be one of attribution, Suárez concludes. But even then further qualification must be added, for attribution can consist of a relation of ‘many to one’ (plures ad unum) or of a relation of ‘one to another’ (unius ad alium). It cannot be the case that God and creature are ordered to some prior third thing (i.e., in terms of plures ad unum) in virtue of which they form an analogous community of being, for then something would be ontologically prior (or at least conceptually prior) to the first being. 39 Rather, the attribution between creatures and God must be that of one to another (unius ad alium), wherein a creature refers directly to God as its cause,40 more precisely, it must be an intrinsic analogy of attribution. Such an intrinsic analogy of attribution has the much-desired benefit of allowing Suárez to preserve intact the unitary concept of being. Again, insofar as each entity – whether finite or infinite – possesses its own being, every entity agrees with another in that it stands “outside nothing”.41 Accordingly, Suárez argues that: [I]n attribution […] there exists one common formal and objective concept, because the analogates properly and intrinsically are such and they truly agree in a certain character which the mind can conceive abstractly and precisely in one concept common to all.42

And so, if one were to consider God and creature simply insofar as each is a being, rather than the kind of being each is, one’s attention will only be drawn to their being or existence, leaving aside all the determining modes of that existence. Once again, Suárez’s commitment to the unitary concept of being makes itself manifest. Still, if Suárez has told us that analogy must be one of intrinsic attribution wherein the exigencies of the unitary concept of being are respected, he has not yet told us whether or how such an analogy actually obtains. In the final resolution of includit aliquid metaphorae et improprietatis, sicut ridere dicitur de prato per translationem metaphoricam; at vero in hac analogia entis nulla est metaphora aut improprietas, nam creatura vere, proprie ac simpliciter est ens.” 39   Ibid., 12: “[N]ihil potest excogitari prius Deo et creatura, ut per ordinem ad illud tam Deus quam creatura entia nominentur.” 40   Ibid., “Est ergo attributio unius ad alium. De qua rursus est certum hanc attributionem non nosse esse Dei ad creaturam, sed e converso creaturae ad Deum, quia non nendet Deus a creatura, sed creatura a Deo; neque ens dicitur principalius de creatura quam de Deo, sed e converso.” 41   Ibid., 15: “[C]onstat creaturam ut ens est non definiri per creatorem aut per esse Dei, sed per esse ut sic et quia est extra nihil.” 42   Ibid., 14: “[I]n priori attributione non datur unus conceptus communis omnibus analogatis, quia forma unde sumitur in uno tantum est intrinsece ac proprie, in aliis per tropum et extrinsecam denominationem; at vero in posteriori attributione datur unus conceptus communis formalis et obiectivus, quia analogata proprie et intrinsece talia sunt vereque in tali ratione conveniunt, quam potest mens abstracte seu praecise concipere uno conceptu omnibus communi.” Transl. Doyle, 41.

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the question at the end of the Twenty-Eighth Disputation, Suárez develops his own positive construction of analogy. There, the Doctor Eximius explains that analogy is established as a kind of ontological relationship of dependence – spelled out in terms of participation – between creatures and God, such that the former are sustained in their existence through their participation in the latter, who is being per se.43 Having already seen to establishing the community or similarity between God and creatures as a necessary move to preserve the unity of the concept of being, Suárez now finds himself having to balance similarity with the no less necessary other dimension of analogy: dissimilarity or difference. By introducing the issue of participation, Suárez achieves such a balance. Creatures are established as ‘other’, that is, other than God, insofar as they are being per participationem, whereas God is being per essentiam. Yet, creatures’ otherness is not absolute, for that on account of which a creature is other is, at the same time, also the reason for its similarity: causal participation. A creature is not only kept in being through its participation in God, but it also imitates the divine being to the degree that it participates in Him, thereby establishing a community of similarity. Here Suárez is caught up in the midst of a balancing act, and it is one with which every thinker who has wrestled with the problem of the one and the many is familiar: success being determined by maintaining that balance. Yet Suárez’s equilibrium seems to be threatened by his commitment to the unitary concept of being. Paradoxically, that which initially makes metaphysics possible for Suárez, the unitary concept of being, would also seem to impede its full resolution, for how can ‘difference’, ‘relation’, or ‘participation’ – each of which pertains to analogy – enter into harmony with the neutrality and indifference to all essential variation required by the unitary concept of being? Participatory being and being per essentiam do not signify being in itself prescinded from all determining modes and limitations, but rather definite kinds of being.44 As Suárez tells us earlier in the Twenty-Eighth Disputation, the difference between being per participationem and per essentiam is simply the difference between finite and infinite being, the inferiora of the conceptus entis.45 But 43   Ibid., 16: “[…] quia creatura essentialiter est ens per participationem eius esse quod in Deo est per essentiam et ut in primo et universali fonte, ex quo ad omnia alia derivatur aliqua eius participatio; omnis ergo creatura est ens per aliquam habitudinem ad Deum, quatenus scilicet participat vel aliquo modo imitatur esse Dei; et quatenus habet esse, essentialiter pendet a Deo multo magis quam pendeat accidens a substantia.” Cf. Pereira, Suárez,76. 44   Cf. Hoeres, 269: “[Suárez…] proves […] that analogy sets in only when I regard beings in their diversity, i.e. when I look to tale ens and not to ens qua tale.” 45   DM 28, 1, 13: “Praeterea solet eadem divisio sub his terminis tradi, ens aliud esse per essentiam, aliud per participationem, qui reipsa superioribus aequivalent; nam ens per essentiam illud dicitur quod per sese et ex vi suae essentiae essentialiter habet esse non receptum nec participatum ab alio; ens autem per participationem e contrario dicitur illud quod non habet esse nisi communicatum et participatum ab alio.”

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the introduction of the couplet participation–essential or finite–infinite within being moves well beyond the unitary concept of being, for, as Suárez says, “being, insofar as it includes its inferiors according to their proper features, is not being alone, but it is finite and infinite being […], which just as they cannot be conceived by us according to their proper features in one concept, so also they cannot be signified by one name”.46 Again, tension in Suárez’s doctrine of analogy becomes clear, and it is not one of which the Doctor Eximius is himself unaware. Immediately after noting that analogy is established through creatures’ participating in and achieving similarity to God, Suárez shifts weight to maintain his delicate metaphysical balance. He says: This [matter of participation] must not be understood in such a way that a creature, conceived under the most abstract and most confused concept of being as such, is thought to express a relationship to God. For that is plainly impossible […] since under that concept a creature is not conceived as a finite being and as it is limited, but rather as it is completely abstracted and is conceived only confusedly under the character of existing outside nothing.47

How then can one consider the difference between participatory being to essential being, which lies at the heart of analogy, without simultaneously acknowledging the relation that obtains between them? Suárez seems to confound the matter all the more when he tells us that the unitary concept of being itself demands an order of priority and posteriority.48 Yet, how can Suárez attend to the demands of the unitary concept of being, which admits of no essential variations or differences, and simultaneously insist that this same concept of itself involves an ordering of priority? How can one think difference in the self-same simplicity of the concept of being? John Doyle sums up the present difficulty succinctly when he writes: On the one hand, [Suárez] tells us that the most abstract and confused concept of being as such does not entail a relationship to God. On the other hand, he tells us that the most abstract and confused concept of being of itself (ex vi sua) demands

46   Ibid., 18: “Nam ens, prout includens inferiora secundum proprias rationes, non est ens tantum, sed est ens finitum et infinitum, substantia et accidens, et caetera, quae, sicut non possunt secundum proprias rationes uno conceptu a nobis concipi, ita nec uno nomine significari […].” Transl. Doyle, 47. 47   DM 28, 3, 16: “Quod non est ita intelligendum, ut existimetur creatura, concepta sub abstractissima et confusissima ratione entis ut sic, dicere habitudinem ad Deum; id enim est plane impossibile, ut recte probant argumenta superius facta, cum sub eo conceptu non concipiatur creatura ut ens finitum et limitatum est, sed omnino abstrahatur et solum confuse concipiatur sub ratione existentis extra nihil.”; Transl. Doyle, 43. 48   DM 28, 3, 17: “ipsum ens, quantumvis abstracte et confuse conceptum, ex vi sua postulat hunc ordinem, ut primo ac per se et quasi complete competat Deo, et ver illud descendat ad reliqua, quibus non insit nisi cum habitudine et dependentia a Deo […].”

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that it belong primarily to one analogate, in this instance God, and only secondarily and through this to other analogates.49

Will Suárez’s account admit of any resolution? 4. RESOLUTION OF THE TENSION Doyle suggests, albeit only eventually to find difficulty with it, that Suárez’s notion of aptitudinal being may serve as a solution to the tensions we have noted.50 To appreciate the salutary character of aptitudinal being proposed here, we should first point out that Suárez makes a distinction between ‘being’ as either a participle or a noun. Taken as a participle, ‘being’ signifies that which exercises actual – as opposed to merely possible – existence.51 As a noun, however, ‘being’ signifies not only an actually existent being but also being in potency inasmuch as it is apt to exist.52 Here, I might point out that, with respect to being taken as a noun, there is some dispute whether Suárez identifies possible being with aptitudinal being.53 For our purposes, it will be sufficient to note that, as Suárez sees it and whatever its relation to possible being, there can be no doubt that aptitudinal being pertains to that which is apt to exist and as such implies a certain relationship or order to existence.54 As Suárez puts it, “[T]he significance of being is transcendent, and intimately enclosed in all the particular and determinate types of being, and in the very modes determining being itself.”55 Under the perspective of aptitudinal being, an entity’s intrinsic relationship to the order of existence is always preserved such that, while its particular   Doyle, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being”, 323.   Ibid., 323 ff. 51   DM 2, 4, 3: “Ens ergo, ut dictum est, interdum sumitur ut participium verbi sum, et ut sic significant actum essendi, ut exercitum, estque idem quod existens in actu […].” 52   Ibid., “[…] interdum vero sumitur ut nomen significans de formali essentiam ejus rei, quae habet vel potest habere esse, non ut exercitum actu, sed in potentia vel aptitudine […].” Given that being as a noun (ens ut nomen) signifies actual, potential, and aptitudinal being, it has greater extension than does participial being and becomes the object of Suárez’s metaphysics, the science of all being whether actual or only possible. Cf. Doyle, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being”, 228. 53   Cf. Pereira, Suárez, 120–121; John P. Doyle, “Suárez on the Reality of the Possibles”, The Modern Schoolman 44 (1967): 29–40; Ludger Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens Die Formale Bestimmung Der Seiendheit Und Realitat in Der Metaphysik Des Mittelalters Und Der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus, Suárez, Wolff, Kant, Peirce) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990), 264–265, 293. 54   DM 2, 3, 14: “[Q]uamvis ergo actu esse non sit de essentia creaturae, tamen ordo ad esse, vel aptitudo essendi est de intrinseco et essentiali conceptu ejus; atque hoc modo ens praedicatum est essentiae […].” Cf. Doyle, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being”, 326–327. 55   DM 26, 3, 21: “[…] rationem entis esse transcendentem, et intime inclusam in omnibus propriis ac determinatis rationibus entium, et in ipsis modis dterminantibus ipsum ens […]”; transl. from Pereira, Suárez, 74. 49

50

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mode of existence may be prescinded from, that mode is never excluded or denied.56 Moreover, as some have pointed out, the mode is never really distinguished, at least not after the manner of a distinctio in re, from being, as Scotus would have it.57 In fact, Suárez positively rejects Scotus’ transcendental analysis,58 which, on the basis of a modal distinction, breaks down the conception of specific beings into a determining and determinable element, that is, between differences or modes of being, on the one hand, and being itself on the other.59 According to Suárez, however, there is only, what he describes as a distinctio rationis ratiocinatae between an intrinsic mode of being and being itself. This kind of distinction, Suárez tells us,3 [...] is formed through inadequate concepts of the same thing. For although the same thing is conceived by either of the two concepts, by neither is all that is in the thing conceived exactly, nor is its entire essence and its objective significance exhausted, which (process) is often realized through conceiving that thing through a relationship to various other things, or according to their way of being – and so such a distinction always has a basis in reality, but is formally said to come about through inadequate concepts of the same thing.60

The distinction between an entity’s being and its modes, while having some basis in reality, is more a function of our conceptualization.61 At one time we conceive something more confusely and in a less determined or inadequate way; at other times, focusing our conception, we conceive the very same thing in a more determined and particular fashion. As there is not a distinction ex natura rei between being and its modes, so there is not such a distinction between the objective concept of being and its inferiors. Rather, according to Suárez, the objective concept of (aptitudinal) being must be understood as including within itself all the determinations and differences

  Cf. Pereira, Suárez, 120.   Cf., e.g., Heider, “Suárez’s Concept of Being”, 31–32; cf. also Allan Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1946), 24. 58   See DM 2, 3, 8–9; cf. Heider, “Suárez’s Concept of Being”, 32. 59   See Oxon. I, dist. 8, q. 3, nn. 27–29; cf. Wolter, Transcendentals, 26, n. 40. See also Heider, “Suárez’s Concept of Being”, 32. 60   DM 7, 1, 5: “[…] fit per conceptus inadequatos eiusdem rei; nam, licet per utruque eadem res concipiatur, per neutrum tamen exacte concipitur totum id quod est in re, neque exhauritur tota quidditas et ratio obiectiva eius, quod saepe fit concipiendo rem illam per habitudinem ad res diversas, vel ad modum earum, et ideo talis distinctio semper habet fundamentum in re, formaliter autem dicetur fieri per conceptus inadequatos eiusdem rei.” Transl. Pereira, 71. 61   Cf. DM 2, 4, 12: “[C]avendum est ne modum concipiendi nostrum transferamus ad res ipsas, et propter diversum loquendi modum existimemus esse distinctionem in rebus, ubi vere non est.” 56 57

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of its inferiors.62 Furthermore, the relation or order to existence that aptitudinal being carries with it is preserved in its conceptual expression. In a passage that deserves quoting at length Suárez says: [A]lthough the common concept [of being as such], as abstract, is one in itself, however, the reasons constituting the particular beings are diverse, and by them, as such, each is constituted absolutely in the existence of being. Then […] the common concept of itself postulates such a determination with the order and relationship to one [or to a single Being]; and therefore, just as this concept is one, it is not altogether the same, because it is not of itself altogether uniform – a uniformity and identity which the univocal concepts require in their meaning – and it is in this manner that the definition of univocal concepts ought to be explained.

As we see here, unlike the Scotistic conceptus simpliciter simplex,63 the Suárezian concept of being confusedly expresses diverse aptitudes to existence.64 And, again, this confused conceptus entis is nothing other than its inferiors, for while it transcends them prescisively as one in itself, it is also intrinsic to each mode of being and indeed constitutive of its very being. Yet, in its intrinsic descent, being does not descend equally to its inferiors, which is simply to say that being is not univocal since that which is univocal descends equally to its inferiors without an order of priority or posteriority.65 The Doctor Eximius maintains, “[B]eing itself, howsoever confusedly conceived, by its nature demands this order, that it firstly, by itself and as though completely, apply to God, and by that [relationship] descend to other things, in which it is not contained, except with a relationship to and dependence on God.”66 Suárez’s position on the confused objective concept of aptitudinal being affords him the means to preserve the simplicity or unity that the concept of being demands, all the while leaving room for the dissimilarity and inequality, which is simply to say that the   Cf. Doyle, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being”, 327. In this regard, Heider rightly says, “[W]e can understand the inferiora both as the very objective concepts of being, and also as inferiora of the objective concept of being” (Ibid., 36). 63   See, e.g., Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1–2, n. 71 (ed. Vat. III, 49); Lectura I, dist. 2, p. 1, q. 1–2, n. 24 (ed. Vat. XVI, 118–119); cf. Étienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot: introduction a ses positiones fondamentales (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), 95–96 and 96, note 2; cf. Richard Cross, Duns Scotus: Great Medieval Thinkers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 38–39. 64   Cf. DM 26, 3, 21; DM 2, 6, 7: “Sic igitur his conceptibus formalibus intelliguntur correspondere duo obiectivi simplices et irresolubiles in plures conceptus, quorum unus dicitur superior vel abstractior alio, solum quia respondet confusiori conceptui formali, per quem non concipitur res secundum determinatum modum quo est in se, sed confuse et praecise.” 65   DM 28, 3, 17: “[…] nam univocum ex se ita est indifferens ut aequaliter et sine ullo ordine vel habitudine unius ad alterum ad inferiora descendat […]” 66   DM 28, 3, 17; for text see note 45 above. 62

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concept of aptitudinal being is intrinsically analogous. Suárez sums up his position neatly when he writes: [T]he present analogy of being is entirely founded in and arises from things themselves, which things are subordinated in such a way that, insofar as they are beings, they are necessarily referred to one. And, therefore, the name being could not be imposed to confusedly signify that which has being, without consequently having to signify many things with a relation to one. And in this way it will be analogous not by transference but by a true and proper signification.67

Whether or not the confused concept of aptitudinal being constitutes a completely satisfactory answer to the problem of the one and the many depends obviously upon the coherence of Suárez’s full understanding of aptitudinal being considered in its own right. As mentioned earlier, some have pointed out certain difficulties involved in Suárez’s account, claiming that it goes too far in granting a kind of quasipositive reality to merely possible beings, apart even from God’s creative causality.68 I cannot, at present, pursue further the subject of aptitudinal being itself but must content myself only with having touched upon it insofar as it pertains to Suárez’s teaching on analogy. Nonetheless, I think it safe to say that this Suárezian notion of aptitudinal being does make an original contribution to the solution of the problem of the one and the many, a solution that signals his unique metaphysical approach to the question of being.

BIBLIOGRAPHY ANCIENT AND SCHOLASTIC SOURCES Aquinas, Thomas. De principiis naturae. — Summa theologiae. — De potentia Dei. Aristotle. Metaphysics. — Nicomachean Ethics. — Posterior Analytics.

67   DM 28, 3, 22: “At vero haec analogia entis omnino fundatur et oritur ex rebus ipsis, quae ita sunt subordinatae ut necessario ad unum referantur quatenus entia sunt, ideoque non potuit nomen entis imponi ad significandum confuse id quod habet esse, quin consequenter habuerit significare multa cum habitudine ad unum, atque ita fuerit analogum non per translationem, sed per veram et propriam significationem”; Transl. Doyle, 49–50. 68   Cf. Doyle, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being”, 335–341.

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Aureoli, Petrus. Scriptum super primum Sententiarum. Edited by E. M. Buytaert. Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series no. 3. St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1956. Boëthius. In Categorias Aristotelis. Cajetan (Thomas de Vio). De nominum analogia. Duns Scotus, John. Ordinatio. — Lectura. Johannes a Sancto Thoma (João Poinsot). Cursus philosophicus Thomisticus I. Ars Logica. Edited by B. Reiser, O.S.B. Taurin: Marietti, 1930. Hervaeus Natalis. Tractatus Magistri Hervaei Doctoris Perspicacissimi de secundis intentionibus, ed. John Doyle, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2008. Suárez, Francisco . Disputationes metaphysicae. Vols. 25–26 of R. P. Francisci Suárez e Societate Jesu, Opera omnia, editio nova, edited by C. Berton, Paris: L. Vivès, 1866. [= DM]

MODERN WORKS Ashworth, E. Jennifer. “Suárez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background”. Vivarium 33, n. 1 (1995): 50–75. Aubenque, Pierre. “Suárez et l’avènment du concept de l’être”. In: Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) Tradição e Modernidade, edited by Adelino Cardoso et al. Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 1999, 11–20. Courtine, Jean-François. Inventio analogiae: métaphysique et ontothéologie. Paris: J. Vrin, 2005. — Suárez et le système de la métaphysique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990. Cronin, Timothy, S.J. Objective Being in Descartes and in Suárez. Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1966. Cross, Richard. “Duns Scotus and Suárez at the Origins of Modernity”. In Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric, and Truth, edited by Wayne Hankey et al. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005, 65–80. — Duns Scotus: Great Medieval Thinkers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Doyle, John P. “Hervaeus Natalis, O.P. (d. 1323) on Intentionality: Its Direction, Context, and Some Aftermath”. The Modern Schoolman 83, n. 2 (2006): 85–123. — The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God: Metaphysical Disputations 28–29. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2004. — “Suárez on the Analogy of Being”. The Modern Schoolman 46 (1969): 219–249; 323–341. — “Suárez on the Reality of the Possibles”. The Modern Schoolman 44 (1967): 29–40. Gilson, Étienne. Jean Duns Scot: introduction a ses positiones fondamentales. Paris: J. Vrin, 1952. Guy, Alain. “L’analogie de l’être selon Suárez”. Archives de Philosophie 42 (1979): 275–294.

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Heider, Daniel. “Is Suárez’s Concept of Being Analogical or Univocal?”. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81, n. 1 (2007): 21–41. Hellín, José, S.J. “Obtenación del concepto del ente, objecto de la metafísica”. Espiritu 17 (1961): 135–154. Hoeres Walter. “Francis Suárez and the Teaching of John Duns Scotus on Univocatio Entis”. In John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965, ed. John K. Ryan et al., Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1965, p., 263–290. Honnefelder, Ludger. Scientia transcendens Die Formale Bestimmung Der Seiendheit Und Realitat in Der Metaphysik Des Mittelalters Und Der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus, Suárez, Wolff, Kant, Peirce). Hamburg: Meiner, 1990. Klubertanz, George, S.J. St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis. Chicago, IL: Loyola University Press, 1960. Lyttkens, Hampus. The Analogy Between God and the World: An Investigation of its Background and Interpretation of its Use by Thomas of Aquino. Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksells Boktryckeri, 1952. Marion, Jean-Luc. Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981. McInerny, Ralph . Aquinas and Analogy. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996. Nielsen, Lauge Olaf. “Peter Auriol”. In A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, edited by Jorge Gracia et al., 495–498. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. Peccorini, Francisco L. “Suárez’s Stuggle with the Problem of the One and the Many”. The Thomist 36 (1972): 433–471. Pereira, José. Suárez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2007. Rosemann, Philipp W. Understanding Scholastic Thought with Foucault. Palgrave MacMillan, 1999. — Omne Agens Agit Sibi Simile: A “Repetition” of Scholastic Metaphysics. Leuven University Press, 1997. Wolter, Allan. The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1946.

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METAPHYSISCHE GRUNDSTRUKTUREN BEI DUNS SCOTUS, SUÁREZ, DESCARTES UND SPINOZA Marko J. Fuchs ABSTRACT

It is generally agreed in today’s mediæval research that within the history of metaphysics as transcendental philosophy a line can be drawn which reaches from Duns Scotus via Suárez and Wolff to Kant and Peirce. One problem with this interpretation of the history of metaphysics, however, is the fact that non-trancendental metaphysical approaches, such as Spinoza’s or Schelling’ and Hegel’s, cannot be considered under this perspective. The paper therefore sketches the idea of a complementary history of metaphysics which also starts with Duns Scotus, namely his theory of the univocity of being and the formal distinction. The investigation of how Suárez and Descartes discuss these scotist concepts, most of all the formal distinction, elicits the way Spinoza modifies the ideas of the univocity of being and the formal distinction as real distinction and uses them to establish his immanentist monist metaphysics which became a basis for the systems of the post-kantian classical German philosophers.

1. EINLEITUNG In der neueren und neuesten Forschung zur Geschichte der Metaphysik hat sich, grundlegend beeinflusst von den einschlägigen Arbeiten L. Honnefelders, die Auffassung durchgesetzt, dass unter dem Topos der Metaphysik als einer scientia transcendens, also einer Transzendentalwissenschaft der allgemeinsten, die Kategorien nochmals übersteigenden Bestimmungen des Seienden als solchem, eine Entwicklungslinie gezogen werden kann, die (ausgehend von Philipp dem Kanzler über Thomas von Aquin) in Duns Scotus ihren ersten Höhepunkt fi ndet und sich sodann über Suárez und Wolff bis hin zu Kant und Peirce fortzeichnen lässt.1 Ist diese Auffassung einerseits unstrittig im Recht, so ist indes andererseits zu bemerken, dass gerade aufgrund des grundlegenden Topos von Metaphysik als Transzendentalwissenschaft andere durchaus einschlägige neuzeitliche Metaphysikentwürfe – vor allem Spinoza und die nachkantische klassische deutsche Philosophie – aus einer so 1   Ludger Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus – Suárez – Wolff – Kant – Peirce) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990).

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verstandenen Geschichte der Metaphysik geradezu herauszufallen scheinen. Dies ist umso auffallender, als in der neuesten Forschung zur klassischen deutschen Philosophie nicht nur unterdessen erkannt worden ist, dass gerade der immer wieder neu ansetzende kritische Rückgriff auf Grundfiguren des spinozischen Systementwurfs als wesentliche Anregung und Hintergrundfolie für die Überwindung oder kritische Hinterfangung derjenigen Momente des kantischen Entwurfs fungiert, die von den nachkantischen Philosophen (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) als defizitär empfunden worden sind.2 Überdies hat G. Deleuze in einer – übrigens zu wenig beachteten – Studie zu Spinoza herausgestellt, wie stark dieser seinerseits im Entwurf seiner Metaphysik von Grundfiguren beeinflusst war, die einigen der scotischen Überlegungen geschuldet sind, die ihrerseits einen ersten Höhepunkt der Metaphysik als Transzendentalphilosophie ermöglichten.3 Es scheint sich somit in anderen Worten mit Blick auf die Metaphysikgeschichtsschreibung die Lage dergestalt darzustellen, dass derselbe Duns Scotus, der einerseits eine grundlegende Rolle für die Entwicklung und damit Geschichte der Metaphysik als Transzendentalphilosophie spielt, zugleich andererseits eine andere Tradition von Metaphysik ermöglicht, die ihrerseits zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt im kritischen Bezug auf die Transzendentalphilosophie Kants diese zu integrieren und zugleich zu überwinden versucht. Noch erstaunlicher ist der Umstand, dass es beide Male dasselbe Grundmoment in Duns Scotus ist, das ihn an den jeweiligen Anfang einer metaphysikgeschichtlichen Entwicklung zu setzen erlaubt, nämlich seine These von der Univozität des Seienden. Unterschiede scheinen sich dann eher in einer unterschiedlichen Haltung gegenüber der von Duns Scotus komplementär zur Univozitätsthese entwickelten Formaldistinktion zu ergeben. Von Suárez, aber auch von Descartes, der indessen anders als jener nicht in der Tradition der Univozität steht, strikt abgelehnt, wird die Formaldistinktion hingegen von Spinoza in modifizierter Form aufgegriffen und dient darin als Grundlage seiner monistischen Immanenzmetaphysik, womit Spinoza sich zugleich kritisch gegen die Distinktionstheorie Descartes’ und die damit verbundene Metaphysik wendet. Die folgenden Ausführungen werden eine Grundlinie der genannten Entwicklung von Duns Scotus zu Spinoza verfolgen. Hierbei fungieren die Überlegungen von Suárez und Descartes, der hinsichtlich seiner eigenen Distinktionslehre stark von jenem beeinflusst wurde, als innovative Diskussionsfolie und Hintergrund der spinozischen Modifikationen scotischer Grundfiguren. Das Ziel des Nachvollzugs dieser Entwicklung besteht darin, eine die Perspektive Honnefelders ergänzende Auffassung der Geschichte der Metaphysik in ihren Grundzügen zu skizzieren. 2   Einschlägig Birgit Sandkaulen, Grund und Ursache. Die Vernunftkritik Jacobis (München: Fink, 2000). 3   Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza und das Problem des Ausdrucks in der Philosophie (München: Fink, 1993). Dieser Text stellt im Weiteren den Ausgangspunkt meiner Überlegungen dar.

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2. DUNS SCOTUS Duns Scotus entwickelt seine Theorie der Univozität des Seienden und der Formaldistinktion vor dem Hintergrund des Bestrebens, dem menschlichen endlichen Intellekt eine metaphysisch gegründete Welt- und Gotteserkenntnis zu ermöglichen.4 Das bis dahin – auf Aristoteles’ Hervorhebung der Mehrsinnigkeit des Seinsbegriffs fußende – Konzept einer Analogie des Seienden lehnt Duns Scotus hierbei mit der Begründung ab, dass ein solches Grundverständnis zur einer Äquivozität im Begriff des Seienden führe, wodurch jede Möglichkeit zu einer Erkenntnis Gottes ausgeschlossen würde (Lect. I, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1–2, n. 22 (ed. Vat. XVI, 232–233)). Daher insistiert Duns Scotus auf dem Univozitätskonzept: Das Seiende, so die These, wird vom Endlichen wie vom Unendlichen, den Geschöpfen wie Gott in demselben Sinne ausgesagt (ibid., n. 98 (ed. Vat. XVI, 261)); die disjunkte Modifikation des Seins (unendlich–endlich) ändert somit nichts an dessen identischer Natur. Wird vielmehr das Sein betrachtet, sofern es endlich oder unendlich ist, ist der Seinsbegriff nicht mehr als univok aufzufassen. Vor diesem Hintergrund gilt weiterhin, dass ein formales oder washeitliches (quidditatives) reales Attribut, sofern es eben in seiner formalen oder quidditativen Bestimmtheit aufgefasst wird, Gott und den Geschöpfen im univoken Sinne zukommt; so ist etwa göttliche und menschliche Weisheit, betrachtet als Weisheit (und nicht insofern, als sie göttlich oder menschlich ist), ein und dasselbe (ibid., n. 21 (ed. Vat. XVI, 323)). Nun scheint dieser Entwurf es allerdings mit sich zu bringen, dass aufgrund der Realität der quidditativen Attribute und der Univozität des in ihnen beinhalteten Seins nunmehr eine reale Pluralität nicht nur in das endliche, sondern auch in das unendliche Seiende eingetragen wird, so, als wäre Gott aus seinen numerisch verschiedenen realen Quidditäten gleichsam summativ zusammengesetzt (ibid., n. 121 f. (ed. Vat. XVI, 270 f.)). Zur Lösung dieses Problems entwickelt Scotus seine Theorie der Formaldistinktion. Im Endlichen sind Quidditäten, die ein Seiendes konstituieren, formal und damit ‘minimal real’ geschieden, sind indes in einem Dritten, einem suppositum, dem sie attribuiert werden, identisch. Dieselben Quidditäten oder Attribute bewahren diese ihre formale und damit ‘minimal reale’ Disjunktheit, wenn sie ins Unendliche erhoben und also als göttliche Attribute aufgefasst werden, aber sie sind im Unendlichen gewissermaßen ontologisch identisch, da das Unendliche nicht seinerseits Attribut, sondern eine Modalität des univoken Seins ist, die als solche auch in univoker Weise den unendlichen Attributen zukommt. Damit wird zugleich klar, dass die Formaldistinktion, als minimal reale, jedenfalls im Unendlichen in keinem Fall eine numerische Distinktion impliziert und somit in Gott keine numerische

4   Als Textgrundlage für das Folgende dient die Zusammenstellung aus dem ersten Sentenzenkommentar des Duns Scotus (Lectura) von Tobias Hoff mann (Hg.), Johannes Duns Scotus: Die Univozität des Seienden. Texte zur Metaphysik (Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 2002).

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Distinktion und keine Pluralität zur Folge hat. Für die weiteren Betrachtungen sind aus dem hier kurz und umrisshaft Gesagten folgende Aspekte herauszuheben: 1. Die Formaldistinktion ist eine Realdistinktion. 2. Sie impliziert keine numerische Distinktion. 3. Sie impliziert Identität bzw. Univozität der attribuierten Quiddität, nicht aber des Wesens im Blick auf das Unendliche und das Endliche. 4. In dieser Weise ermöglicht sie die Verwendung eines univoken Seinsbegriffs, in dem dennoch Differenzen eingeschrieben werden können. 3. SUÁREZ

Im Folgenden ist auf Suárez kurz und in Blick auf seine Bedeutung für Descartes einzugehen. Suárez spielt hierbei insofern eine wichtige Rolle, als er zwar nicht das Univozitätskonzept als solches verwirft – wie L. Honnefelder und in anderer Weise neuerdings R. Darge5 nachgewiesen haben –, wohl aber die scotische Formaldistinktion. In seiner kritischen Haltung wie in der von ihm entwickelten Distinktionslehre wird Suárez hierin für Descartes wichtig. Suárez bekämpft das Konzept einer Formaldistinktion entschieden. Er stellt dagegen als einzige Distinktionstypen, die er in der siebenten Disputation6 im Zusammenhang mit der Transzendentalie bzw. der passio entis des unum entwickelt, die modale, reale und rationale Distinktion, welche dann Descartes – wenngleich in substanzontologischer Perspektive – von Suárez übernehmen wird (DM 7, 1, n. 1, 4 und 16). Was die Formaldistinktion betriff t, so sagt diese Suárez zufolge zugleich zuviel und zuwenig, was letztlich an ihrem äquivoken Charakter liege (ibid., n. 16). Denn oftmals werde die Bezeichnung Formaldistinktion verwendet, um real, d. h. essentiell oder aktuell aufgrund ihrer formalen Einheit geschiedene Dinge zu bezeichnen – dann handle es sich bei dieser sogenannten Formaldistinktion um nichts weiter als eine durchaus numerisch aufzufassende Realdistinktion, d. h. eine solche zwischen zwei res. Oder sie wird auf formale Sinngehalte (rationes formales) angewandt, d. h. auf verschiedene Konzepte in unserem Intellekt, und auf diese Weise handelt es sich um eine bloße rationale Distinktion (ibid.). Oder aber die Formaldistinktion bezeichnet die Relation zwischen einer Sache und ihrem Modus und ist daher als Modaldistinktion, die zwar ein fundamentum in re aufweist, aber keine reale Distinktion ist, zu bestimmen (ibid.). So sind etwa die göttliche Gerechtigkeit und Barmherzigkeit, so wie wir sie erfassen, von einander nicht deshalb geschieden, weil es sich hierbei wie bei Scotus um reale quidditative Bestimmungen handelte, sondern weil wir Gott vermittels eines inadäquaten Konzepts betrachten (ibid., n. 5). Genauer ist dies wie   Rolf Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2004). 6   Francisco Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae (Hildesheim: Olms, 1965). 5

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folgt zu beschreiben: Eine distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, die im genannten Falle vorliegt, entsteht dann, wenn ein und dasselbe Objekt durch zwei inadäquate Konzepte erfasst wird dergestalt, dass weder das, was in diesem Objekt ist, exakt begriffen, noch dessen Quiddität und objektiver Sinngehalt (ratio obiectiva) erschöpft wird. Dies ist der Fall, wenn die fragliche Sache in ihren Verhältnis zu anderen Dingen oder deren Modi konzipiert wird, weshalb gesagt werden kann, dass eine solche hieraus resultierende distinctio ein fundamentum in re aufweist, in formaler Weise jedoch durch ein inadäquates Konzept zustande kommt. Auf diese Weise also wird in Gott dessen Barmherzigkeit von seiner Gerechtigkeit geschieden, da wir nicht in der Lage sind, Gottes höchst einfache Macht zu begreifen, wie diese in sich und hinsichtlich ihrer selbst ist, sondern diese Macht entweder mit Blick auf diverse Wirkungen teilen, deren Prinzip jene eminente Macht darstellt, oder mit Blick auf ihr Verhältnis zu im Menschen getrennte Tugenden auffassen (ibid.). Man sieht an diesem Beispiel, dass Suárez in Bezug auf die genannten transzendentalen Quidditäten – wenngleich nicht im Blick auf den Begriff des ens inquantum ens – im Gegensatz zu Scotus durchaus eher ein Analogiekonzept vertritt, welches mit der Idee der Eminenz arbeitet,7 also der Vorstellung, dass uns bekannte Bestimmungen in Gott in wesentlich vollkommener, damit aber für uns nicht mehr erkennbarer Gestalt existieren. Dass übrigens, wie ausdrücklich hervorzuheben ist, der Begriff des Seienden für Suárez ein univoker Begriff ist, liegt an dessen Inhaltsarmut, sofern er gerade, als vom endlichen Intellekt abstraktiv gewonnener, von jeglicher Bestimmtheit qualitativer Art absieht. Dies ist deshalb festzuhalten, um bereits im Vorfeld zu verdeutlichen, weshalb es für Spinoza gerade nicht der Begriff des Seienden ist, der hinsichtlich der Univozitätsproblematik interessiert. Denn als Abstraktum, welcher in Spinozas Auffassung zudem zur imaginatio, d. h. zur Vorstellungskraft (anstelle der ratio oder dem intellectus, cf. E II, prop. 40, schol. 1)8 gehört, ist dieser Begriff Spinoza zufolge zu keiner Erkenntnis tauglich. Für ihn sind vielmehr, wie sich zeigen wird, reine Qualitäten wie Ausdehnung und Denken Adressanten der Univozitätsthese. 4. DESCARTES Vor diesem Hintergrund ist nun etwas ausführlicher auf Descartes’ Konzeption einzugehen. Wie bereits eingangs erwähnt, stellt der Metaphysikentwurf des Descartes ebenso wenig wie der des Spinoza einen transzendentalphilosophischen Entwurf dar, sondern wendet sich zurück auf die Ontologie der Substanz. Hierbei aber übernimmt Descartes die wesentlichen Distinktionstypen von Suárez sowie dessen kritische Haltung gegenüber der scotischen Formaldistinktion.9   Am Ende von DM 7, 1, 5 spricht Suárez explizit von der Eminenz göttlicher Bestimmungen.   Zur Zitationsweise bei Spinoza cf. unten Anmerkung 11. 9   Textgrundlage bilden bei Descartes die Meditationes sowie die Principia philosophiae: René Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia,(AT VII), und René Descartes, Principia philosophiae, 7

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Für Descartes ist zunächst vordergründig klar, dass in rerum natura nichts existiert als Substanzen und deren Modifi kationen. Indessen sind die Substanzen in wesentlicher Hinsicht nicht nur dahingehend zu unterscheiden, dass ihnen ein unterschiedenes Wesen im Sinne einer diversen essentiellen Qualifikation im Bereich des Endlichen zukommt, sondern zudem dahingehend, dass unter dem Ausdruck ‘Substanz’ selbst grundlegend unterschiedene Weisen des Existierens aufzufassen sind. So stellt Descartes fest, dass unter Substanz nur ein Ding verstanden werden könne, das so existiert, dass es zu seiner Existenz keines anderen Dinges bedarf, und eine Substanz, die durchaus keines anderen Dinges bedarf, nur als eine einzige denkbar sei, d. h. als Gott (PP I, 51–52). Alle anderen aber können nur mit Gottes Beistand existieren. Substanz im strengen Sinne existiert Descartes zufolge nicht nur für sich (per se), sondern durch sich (a se) (M III, 33); Substanz im eigentlichen Sinne ist als causa sui aufzufassen, und dieser Bestimmung kann Descartes zufolge nur Gott genügen (Resp. I, 108 f.). ‘Den anderen Substanzen’ und Gott kommt der Ausdruck ‘Substanz’ somit nicht im univoken, sondern lediglich im äquivoken Sinne zu dergestalt, dass es keine klare und deutliche Bedeutung des Wortes gibt, welche Gott und den Geschöpfen gemeinsam wäre (PP I, 51). Bereits hieran wird erkennbar, dass Descartes in gewissem Sinne hinter den in den Metaphysiken von Scotus und Suárez erreichten Stand der Univozität gleichsam zurückfällt in das Konzept der analogia entis, wobei auch hier wie schon in vorscotischen Entwürfen der Begriff der Eminenz eine wesentliche Rolle spielt. Was aber ist über die ‘anderen Substanzen’ zu sagen? Descartes’ Antwort hierauf lautet bekanntermaßen zunächst, dass er nur zwei oberste Gattungen von geschaffenen Dingen anerkenne, nämlich diejenigen, welche zum Geist oder zur denkenden Substanz (res oder substantia cogitans), und die, die als körperliche Dinge zur ausgedehnten Substanz gehören (res oder substantia extensa – PP I, 48). Diesen beiden Arten von geschaffener Substanz eigne, obgleich nicht göttliche Aseität, so doch immerhin, dass sie bloß Gottes Beistand (concursus Dei) zu ihrer Existenz bedürfen (PP I, 51–52). Gott selbst hingegen wird ebenfalls als eine denkende Substanz aufgefasst, da Descartes zufolge die Ausdehnung eine Unvollkommenheit beinhalte (PP I, 54). Aufgrund des äquivoken Status des Substanzbegriffs ist diese wesentliche Bestimmtheit Gottes ebenfalls nur im äquivoken bzw. eminenten Sinne zu fassen. (AT VIII-1). Im Text abgekürzt mit M (für Meditationes), römische Nummer für Nummer der meditatio und arabische Nummer für Abschnitt, sowie PP (für Principia philosophiae), römische Nummer für Buch und arabische Nummer für Abschnitt. Des Weiteren stehen Resp. und Obi. für die in Bd. VII der Œuvres enthaltenen Erwiderungen (Responsiones) und Einwände (Obiectiones) verschiedener Autoren auf die Meditationes; die arabische Zahl dahinter bezeichnet die Seite in Bd. VII. Cf. zu den folgenden Ausführungen auch Marko J. Fuchs, Sum und cogito. Grundfiguren endlichen Selbstseins bei Augustinus und Descartes (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010)

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Weiterhin ist Descartes zufolge mit Blick auf die Ontologie der Substanzen zwischen Attributen und Modi zu unterscheiden. Unter modus versteht Descartes dasjenige an der Substanz, wodurch die Substanz erregt oder verändert wird. Ein attributum wird in einer Substanz aufgefasst, wenn wir nur im Allgemeinen beachten, dass es der Substanz innewohnt. Diese letzte Bestimmung kann dahingehend konkretisiert werden, dass auch die essentielle Bestimmtheit einer Substanz attributiv aufzufassen ist. So stellen das Denken (cogitatio) sowie die Ausdehnung (extensio) wesentliche Attribute der denkenden und ausgedehnten Substanz dar (PP, I 56). Innerhalb des begrifflich-ontologischen Gefüges von Substanz, Attribut und Modus eröff net Descartes ein Feld aus drei Typen von Unterscheidungen oder distinctiones, die er unmittelbar aus Suárez übernimmt: distinctio realis, modalis und rationis (PP I, 60–62). Die Formaldistinktion des Duns Scotus zieht Descartes hierbei nicht in Betracht; sie stellt für ihn, wie er an anderer Stelle erläutert, lediglich eine modale Distinktion dar (Resp. I, 120). Eine distinctio realis besteht für Descartes eigentlich nur bei zwei oder mehreren Substanzen. Dabei kann es sich sowohl um Substanzen verschiedener Attribute im Sinne von essentiellen Bestimmtheiten – also Körper und Geist – als auch um Substanzen desselben Attributs wie z. B. zwei Körper handeln (PP I, 60). Das Kriterium der Erkennbarkeit einer realen Distinktion besteht hierbei darin, dass wir die eine ohne die andere klar und deutlich einsehen können und zudem erkennen, dass Gott kein Betrüger ist und daher das, was wir klar und deutlich (clare et distincte) einsehen, auch wirklich distinkt erschaffen kann (M IV, 17). Es gibt somit, soviel wird hieraus schon deutlich, Descartes zufolge mindestens im Fall real geschiedener Substanzen desselben Attributs reale Distinktionen, die zugleich numerisch sind, wie umgekehrt numerische Unterscheidungen, die real sind. Der zweite Unterscheidungstyp bzw. Unterschied, die distinctio modalis, ist zweifach. Der eine ist der Unterschied zwischen dem Modus im eigentlichen Sinne und der Substanz, deren Modus er ist; der andere zwischen zwei Modi derselben Substanz. Eine distinctio modalis im ersten Sinne wird daraus erkannt, dass wir die Substanz klar ohne den Modus, von dem wir sagen, er sei von ihr unterschieden, erfassen, aber nicht umgekehrt diesen Modus ohne jene einsehen können. In dieser Weise liegt eine modale Unterscheidung ersten Typs z. B. zwischen Gestalt und Bewegung bei der körperlichen, zwischen Bejahung und Erinnern bei der denkenden Substanz vor. Die distinctio modalis im zweiten Sinne wird daraus erkannt, dass wir einen Modus ohne einen anderen erkennen können und umgekehrt, keinen von beiden aber ohne die Substanz, in der sie sind (PP I, 61). Die distinctio rationis (Vernunftunterschied) schließlich, die wiederum zwiefach ist, besteht zwischen der Substanz und einem ihrer Attribute, ohne das sie selbst nicht eingesehen werden kann, oder zwischen zwei derartigen Attributen ein und derselben Substanz (also wenn man z. B. versuchte, die denkende Substanz ohne das Attribut des Denkens zu erfassen). Erkannt wird diese distinctio daraus, dass wir keine

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klare und deutliche Idee dieser Substanz bilden können, wenn wir von dieser jenes Attribut ausschließen, bzw. dass wir nicht das eine der so beschaffenen Attribute klar erfassen können, wenn wir dieses von dem anderen ausschließen (PP I, 62). Grundlegend problematisch ist an dieser Konzeption nun gerade die Auffassung, dass reale Distinktionen zugleich numerisch sein sollen und numerische zugleich real.10 Was das Erste betriff t, so stellt Descartes wie schon gesagt fest, dass die klare und deutliche Erkenntnis nicht nur von Substanzen verschiedener Attribute, sondern auch desselben Attributs unter Rückbezug auf die Wahrhaftigkeit Gottes deren reale Unterschiedenheit in rerum natura zur Folge haben kann. Mit Blick auf das Zweite ist festzuhalten, dass Descartes davon ausgeht, dass verschiedene Ausdehnungen oder Gedanken auf real geschiedene Körper oder Seelen bzw. ‘Geister’ zu verweisen in der Lage sind. Im ersten Fall besteht die Schwierigkeit darin, woran sich die klare und deutliche Erkenntnis eigentlich halten soll, um die Realdistinktion zweier Substanzen desselben Attributs zu erfassen. Denn offenbar kann es sich bei dem Unterscheidungskriterium nicht um das Attribut selbst handeln, welches ja gerade als für beide Substanzen identisch gesetzt ist. Es bleibt übrig, dass es die Modi sein müssen, die die Substanzen desselben Attributs real diversifizieren – eine reale numerische Distinktion zwischen zwei Substanzen wäre somit eine Modaldistinktion. Auf die absurden Konsequenzen dieser Überlegung ist gleich weiter einzugehen. Im zweiten Fall besteht die Schwierigkeit darin, dass im Grunde nicht nur eine reale mit einer modalen Unterscheidung gleichgesetzt wird, indem die verschiedenen Ausdehnungen oder Gedanken – wie Descartes selbst einräumt (PP I 64) – eben nur als Modifikationen ein und desselben Attributs aufzufassen sind, sondern zudem mit einer rationalen, da nämlich, um verschiedene Substanzen desselben Attributs aufzufassen, diese von eben diesem Attribut verschieden sein müssten – was Descartes’ eigener Konzeption zufolge eben bloß im Rahmen einer distinctio rationis möglich wäre. 5. SPINOZA Spinoza übt aufgrund der Verworrenheit der Distinktionstypen an Descartes’ Konzeption, vor allem an der Auffassung, dass numerische Distinktionen real und reale numerisch sein könnten, eine fundamentale Kritik, die zugleich die Grundlage für seinen Entwurf einer monistischen Immanenzphilosophie darstellt.11 Auch Spinozas Grundbegriffe sind die der Substanz, des Attributs und des Modus. Die Deutung, 10   Hier und im Folgenden schließe ich mich den Darstellungen von Deleuze an. Cf. Deleuze, Spinoza und das Problem des Ausdrucks, bes. 17–61. 11   Textgrundlage: Baruch de Spinoza, Ethik in geometrischer Ordnung dargestellt. LateinischDeutsch, Hg. Wolfgang Bartuschat (Hamburg: Meiner, 1999). Im Text zitiert als E; die römische Nummer bezeichnet das Buch, sodann bedeutet def. = definitio, prop. = propositio, dem. = demonstratio, cor. = corollarium, schol. = scholium.

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die diesen Begriffen hierbei gegeben wird, ist dabei jedoch grundlegend verschieden von der, die Descartes ihnen beilegt. Spinozas Vorgehen am Beginn seiner Ethica more geometrico demonstrata besteht darin, zunächst die Vorstellung zurückzuweisen, dass es zwei numerisch verschiedene Substanzen desselben wesentlichen Attributs geben könne; danach destruiert er die Idee, dass zwei essentiell bzw. qualitativ verschiedene Attribute auf numerisch verschiedene Substanzen als deren Träger verwiesen, sondern zeigt, dass alle essentiellen Attribute vielmehr ein und derselben unendlichen Substanz zukommen, welche mit Gott identisch ist. 1. Die Vorstellung, eine numerische Distinktion könne real sein, oder anders: dass es mehrere Substanzen desselben Attributs geben könne, weist Spinoza dadurch zurück, indem er argumentiert, dass mehrere Substanzen desselben Attributs bzw. derselben Essenz nicht durch dieses Attribut, sondern lediglich durch ihre Modi unterschieden sein könnten. Dies indes ist absurd, weil umgekehrt die Modi einer Substanz nur durch diese Substanz bzw. das Attribut, der bzw. dem sie zugehören, sein und begriffen werden können. Insofern also, als die Substanz sowie das essentielle Attribut ontologisch wie epistemologisch den Modi vorausgeht, können diese umgekehrt nicht von sich her die Substanzen real diversifizieren (E I prop. 5 dem.). Eine numerische Unterscheidung, so ergibt sich hieraus, kann sich nicht auf eine Substanz desselben Attributs beziehen, sondern lediglich auf die unter einem essentiellen Attribut begriffenen Modi; eine numerische Unterscheidung ist mithin nicht quidditativ und in diesem Sinne real, sondern bloß modal. Hieraus ergibt sich weiterhin, dass eine Substanz keine äußere Ursache haben kann, die sie hervorbrächte. Denn wäre dies der Fall, so müsste es eine andere Substanz desselben Attributs geben. Da nun erwiesen ist, dass es keine numerisch verschiedenen Substanzen desselben Attributs geben kann, ergibt sich, dass eine Substanz notwendigerweise unendlich ist (E I, prop. 6–8). 2. Eine zweite Überlegungskette Spinozas zielt darauf, zurückzuweisen, dass eine reale Distinktion numerisch sein könne. Hierfür argumentiert Spinoza, dass eine numerische Distinktion auf eine äußere, von der Essenz einer Sache verschiedene Ursache als ihren Grund verweist. Denn Dinge derselben Essenz, welche in ihrer Definition zum Ausdruck kommt, können nicht hinsichtlich ihrer Zahl durch diese Definition unterschieden werden, da keine Definition eine bestimmte Anzahl von Individuen impliziert; vielmehr ist hierzu der Verweis auf eine der Definition äußerliche Ursache notwendig (E I prop. 8 schol. 2). Die Substanz indes ist, wie oben gesehen, bestimmt worden als dasjenige, was durch sich (a se) existiert und eben insoweit keiner äußerlichen Ursache bedarf, um zu existieren. Hieraus ergibt sich, dass eine Realdistinktion nicht numerisch sein kann – was weitreichende Konsequenzen hat. Denn hieraus schließt Spinoza, dass eine reale Differenz zwischen real geschiedenen Attributen nicht auf eine Realdifferenz zwischen Substanzen verweisen kann; vielmehr verweisen alle Attribute, die ein positives Wesen ausdrücken, auf ein

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und dieselbe Substanz, der sie zukommen und deren ewiges Wesen sie ausdrücken. Überdies erhellt hieraus, dass eine Realdistinktion nicht numerisch sein kann, und weiterhin, dass es nicht nur zwei oder drei Attribute geben kann, sondern unendlich viele geben muss (E I, prop. 9–10). Man erkennt in diesen Ausführungen wesentliche Übernahmen scotischer Grundfiguren wieder, die hierbei zugleich grundlegend modifiziert werden. Die Formaldistinktion des Scotus ist erstens nicht mehr eine bloß minimale Realdistinktion, sie ist vielmehr die ganze und einzige Realdistinktion; für die endlichen, numerisch verschiedenen Modi, die unter einem der voneinander real geschiedenen Attribute stehen bzw. in diesen impliziert sind, heißt dies, dass diese voneinander und der Substanz lediglich modal unterschieden sind; ein einzelner Mensch etwa, um dies in seiner ganzen Konsequenz zu explizieren, ist Spinoza zufolge keine selbstständige Substanz, die von anderen Substanzen real und numerisch geschieden wäre, sondern ein endlicher Modus der absoluten und einzigen Substanz (E II, prop. 10).12 Weiterhin ist festzuhalten, dass als Attribute von Spinoza nunmehr nicht mehr Bestimmungen wie Gerechtigkeit oder Weisheit usw. aufgefasst werden. Vielmehr handelt es sich hierbei ihm zufolge um bloße propria, die Gott nicht einmal realiter zukommen, sondern lediglich imaginative Momente sind, die wir fälschlich Gott zusprechen (E I, Appendix). Reale Bestimmungen hingegen sind für Spinoza die unendlichen formalen Attribute oder Quidditäten wie etwa die Ausdehnung oder das Denken (E II, prop. 1–2). Diese implizieren je für sich eine unendliche Essenz in Form ihrer Quiddität oder Formalität; gleichzeitig attribuieren sie diese Essenz einer unendlichen Substanz, d. h. sie werden nicht etwa von einem endlichen Intellekt attribuiert, obgleich sie auf einen – unendlichen – Intellekt verweisen, sondern sind an ihnen selbst Ausdrücke oder, mit dem Ausdruck von G. Deleuze, ‘Attributeure’13 (E I, def. 4; prop. 19, dem.). Da nun die Realdistinktion nicht numerisch ist, kann aus der Erfassung verschiedener, absolut real geschiedener Attribute nicht auf das Vorhandensein ebenso real geschiedener Substanzen geschlossen werden; vielmehr ergibt sich, dass alle Attribute nur einer einzigen, nunmehr absolut unendlichen Substanz zukommen, welche mit Gott identisch ist. Die Univozität dieser Attribute im Blick auf Gott als unendlicher Substanz und die in den Attributen eingeschlossenen endlichen Modi – die übrigens, wie schon bei Duns Scotus, keineswegs eine Wesensidentität zwischen Gott und Geschöpf 12   Im Übrigen würde Spinoza die Ansicht vertreten, dass es nur in dieser von ihm vorgeschlagenen Weise möglich ist, das, was wir gemeinhin damit meinen, wenn wir endlichen Einzeldingen Substantialität zusprechen, nämlich ein gewisses Vermögen, entgegen äußeren Einflüssen sich im Sein zu erhalten, erst wahrhaft philosophisch zu denken, indem unter spinozischen Prämissen nämlich deutlich wird, dass der Trieb zur Selbsterhaltung, der das Wesen eines endlichen Einzeldinges ausmacht, nichts anderes ist als eine bestimmte Weise Gottes zu wirken oder anders: seine unendliche Seinsmacht in bestimmter Weise auszudrücken. 13   Deleuze, Spinoza und das Problem des Ausdrucks, 42.

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impliziert (E I, prop. 28, dem.) –, wird dabei von Spinoza als Immanenz aufgefasst: Gott als die absolut unendliche Substanz, welche Ursache aller Dinge ist, ist dies als allen Dingen immanente Ursache (E I, prop. 18). In diesem Sinne ist Spinozas Feststellung zu verstehen, dass Gott in demselben Sinne causa sui ist, wie er causa rerum ist (E I, prop. 25, schol.). 6. SCHLUSSBEMERKUNGEN Um das Gesagte kurz zusammenzufassen, ist festzuhalten: Es hat sich gezeigt, dass im Ausgang von der scotischen Univozitätsthese nicht nur metaphysische Figuren, die unter dem Topos der scientia transcendens thematisiert werden können, sondern auch eine philosophiehistorisch äußerst wirkmächtige Gestalt der Metaphysik, nämlich die spinozische, dann in den Blick genommen werden können, wenn zusammen mit der Univozitätsthese die Problematik der Distinktionen und hier vor allem der Formaldistinktion betrachtet wird. Wie bei Suárez und dann vor allem bei Descartes deutlich wurde, schien die Ablehnung der Formal- als einer Realdistinktion stets mit einem Rückgriff auf das Eminenzkonzept in der Erkenntnis Gottes verbunden zu sein, was Spinoza seinerseits in einer Modifikation und Radikalisierung scotischer Überlegungen vehement zurückweist. Das Resultat dieser Diskussionen am Beginn der neuzeitlichen Philosophie ist Spinozas immanentistischer Monismus, der gerade in dieser Gestalt den Anspruch erheben kann, das erste in sich geschlossene System in der Geschichte der Philosophie darzustellen, das konsequent vom Absoluten her zu denken versucht. Gerade hierin ist Spinozas Entwurf für die nachkantische klassische deutsche Philosophie von nicht zu unterschätzender Bedeutung; weder Schellings noch Hegels, aber auch nicht Fichtes Systementwürfe sind ohne diesen Rückbezug auf Spinoza, dabei stets ihrerseits um eine Überbietung bemüht, adäquat zu beschreiben. Die spezifische Auffassung der Univozität sowie der Realdistinktion als einer rein qualitativen oder ‘formalen’ spielen hierbei eine entscheidende Rolle und gipfeln in je spezifischer Gestalt in einer monistischen und immanentistischen Gesamtkonzeption.

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BIBLIOGRAPHIE Darge, Rolf. Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition. Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2004. Deleuze, Gilles. Spinoza und das Problem des Ausdrucks in der Philosophie. München: Fink, 1993. Descartes, René. Meditationes de prima philosophia. [= M] In Œuvres de Descartes, edited by Charles Adam et Paul Tannery, vol. VII. Paris: Vrin, 1964. [= AT VII] — Principia philosophiae. [= PP] In Œuvres de Descartes, edited by Charles Adam et Paul Tannery, vol. VIII-1. Paris: Vrin, 1982. [= AT VIII-1] Duns Scotus, Johannes. Lectura I. In Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia. Studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae ad fidem codicum edita, tom. XVI. Civitas Vaticana, 1960. Fuchs, Marko J. Sum und cogito. Grundfiguren endlichen Selbstseins bei Augustinus und Descartes. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010. Hoffmann, Tobias, Hg. Johannes Duns Scotus: Die Univozität des Seienden. Texte zur Metaphysik. Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 2002. Honnefelder, Ludger. Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus – Suárez – Wolff – Kant – Peirce). Hamburg: Meiner, 1990. Sandkaulen, Birgit. Grund und Ursache. Die Vernunftkritik Jacobis. München: Fink, 2000. Spinoza, Baruch de. Ethik in geometrischer Ordnung dargestellt. Lateinisch-Deutsch. Herausgegeben von Wolfgang Bartuschat. Hamburg: Meiner, 1999. Suárez, Francisco. Disputationes metaphysicae. Vols. 25–26 of R. P. Francisci Suárez e Societate Jesu, Opera omnia, editio nova, edited by C. Berton, Paris: L. Vivès, 1866. Reprint, Hildesheim – Zürich – New York: G. Olms Verlag, 1965.

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THE HIDDEN INFLUENCE OF SUÁREZ ON KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL CONCEPTION OF ‘BEING’, ‘ESSENCE’ AND ‘EXISTENCE’ Costantino Esposito

ABSTRACT

Critical philosophy has been presented by Kant as an overcoming of the 18th century Schulmetaphysik’s schemes; yet, it is also true that the metaphysics of the “Schools” has provided Kant with the essential framework of transcendental philosophy. In these perspectives the Kantian change can be seen as a profound rethinking of the meaning and function of some basic notions of modern ontology, starting from the Jesuit scholasticism and expecially from the Disputationes metaphysicae of Suárez: “ens” and “essentia”, “possibilis” and “realis”, “objectum” and “causa”, “efficiens” and “transcendens”. Such notions are reinterpreted by Kant in order to form the new structures of critical metaphysics, but at the same time they keep the essential core of their original meaning: in fact, within the Kantian system they explicitly realize their meaning.

1. A FUNDAMENTAL DECISION ABOUT BEING

The aim of this paper is quite simple, “rudimentary” one might even say: I would like to reread some well-known texts by Kant in an attempt to demonstrate that in them some fundamental concepts of Suárez’s metaphysics are at work. This is naturally not a matter either of presenting Suárez as a precursor of Kant nor of considering Kant as an effect of Suárez. I shall instead attempt to focus on, in the “long distance” relation between the two authors, one of the fundamental decisions in the history of modern Metaphysics. I use the term “decision” deliberately, in order to indicate a mental attitude common to both thinkers, who, albeit in widely differing contexts, shared the same basic choice: to determine the meaning of existence on the basis of its ontological difference from a thing or an actual being. Existence is not a thing, but the mode of being of a thing. Herein arise the ambivalence and the aporetic character of this decision, since it can be understood in two different ways. In Suárez, existence, in the sense of actuality, is different from essence, taken as mere possibility, just as the actus essendi differs from the fact that we can think of a thing as non-contradictory in a logical sense; that is, we can think of the necessary

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connexion between predicates and the qualities that inhere in a thing. But if we wanted to determine in a specific way the nature or sense of existence (ratio existentiae) as different from essence, for Suárez – and later for Kant too – we would find ourselves faced with an impossible task. Indeed, at least for us mortals, existence is never pure or absolute, but is always the existence of something, hence, of an essence. In other words, existence only “says” the fact that a thing – as it is, in itself – is or is not. Hence, the difference between existence and essence (the fact that the former is not a thing, while the latter is) leads back almost inevitably to identity; that is, to essence (even though, for Suárez, the term essence indicates the ontological determination of a being, while for Kant it is only the empirical and categorical determination of a phenomenon). Precisely because being is not one res amongst others, we can never think of it in “real” terms, except by starting from what exists. In other words, the datum of existence tends to be identified with what exists; more precisely, with the fact that something is produced by a cause (Suárez) or in the fact that something is part of our category of causality (Kant). The first thing to consider is that, in both Suárez and Kant, this decision concerning the sense of “existing” is made to safeguard the surplus of being, the mystery of provenance and the fact of existing as different from what we think a priori by way of concepts alone. Existence is not at our disposal, so to speak. In both cases “existence” is a coming-out or an exit: from causes for the Catholic theologian, who knows, through his faith, the order of Creation, and from concepts for the rationalist philosopher. Yet in both cases the price to pay is high. Let’s now look at the question in more detail. 2. SUÁREZ: FROM THE CATHOLIC TO THE REFORMED CONTEXT

It is well known that the name of Suárez reached the 18th century German philosophical context through the teaching of Metaphysics in the reformed universities, where the Disputationes metaphysicae quickly became a reference manual. Suffice it to mention the Calvinist, Clemens Timpler, in the early decades of the 17th century, who taught at Steinfurt Gymnasium and who took up in a grand manner the metaphysics of the Jesuits Fonseca, Perera and Suárez in his Metaphysicae systema methodicum (1604); or Rudolph Göckel (Goclenius), who quotes Suárez, especially in his Conciliator philosophicus (1609) and, on the theme of possibilitas, in his Lexicon philosophicum (1613).1 1   C. Timpler, Metaphysicae systema methodicum (Steinfurti: Caesar, 1604); R. Goclenius, Conciliator Philosophicus (Casselis: Ex officina typographica Mauritiana, opera Wilhelmi Wesselii, 1609); R. Goclenius, “Possibilitas, poßibile”, in Lexicon philosophicum quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur (Francofurti: Typis viduae Matthiae Beckeri, impensis Petri Musculi & Ruperi Pistorij, 1613), 833 sqq.

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Shortly after, Suárez was to become part of a Lutheran context, with two important writers: Henning Arnisaeus, working at the University of Frankfurt am Oder and author of De constitutione et partibus Metaphysicae (1606), and Jakob Martini, working at the University of Wittenberg and author of a work entitled Metaphysicae Exercitationes (1608).2 In both these texts Suárez’s Disputationes constitute an important reference. After the research carried out by Lewalter, Leinsle and Courtine (to name but a few) the historical frame of reference is now clear and there is no need for me to examine it in detail here. 3 But how can we explain the paradox that one of the most important theologians in the Roman Catholic world, a Spanish Jesuit, became an authority in the teaching of German, Protestant metaphysics? With the fact, naturally, that the Disputationes is the first manual of “metaphysics” that does not appear together with a commentary on Aristotle, but instead uses his opus as a source, or as a series of materials, for a new discipline and in view of possible new syntheses. Another fact, too, must be taken in account: the metaphysical discourse elaborated by Suárez is a tool for theology; that is, it provides the basis for a discourse on supernatural revelation. The way in which Suárez founds and develops metaphysics in a “ministerial” sense ([prima philosophia] sacrae ac supernaturali theologiae praecipue ministrat)4 is represented by his choice to consider it in a rigorously “neutral” way as distinct from theology. Obviously this does not mean that a “natural” discourse can leave aside any discourse on God as the creator of all beings. Nevertheless, the latter is not thematized as such at the beginning of the Metaphysics – that is, prior to the 2   Henning Arnisaeus, De constitutione et partibus Metaphysicae, tractatus in quo pleraque ad hanc materiam pertinentia discutiuntur (Francofurti ad Oderam: Impensis Iohannis Thimen Bibliopolae, 1606); see also Henning Arnisaeus, Epitome mepahysices, In qua fundamenta Aristotelica ordine scientifico explicantur, Francofurti ad Moenum: Sigism. Latomus, 1606); Jakob Martini, Exercitationum metaphysicarum libri duo ([Leipzig]: Sumptibus Zachariae Schureri Bibliopolae, 1608). 3   On the first reception of Disputationes metaphysicae in Lutheran context, see E. Lewalter, Spanisch-jesuitische und deutsche-luterische Metaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der iberisch-deutschen Kulturbeziehung und zur Vorgeschichte des deutschen Idealismus (Hamburg: Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut, 1935; Second edition: Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967), esp. 63–69; U. G. Leinsle, Das Ding und die Methode. Methodische Konstitution und Gegenstand der frühen protestantischen Metaphysik, Maro Verlag, Augsburg, 1985, esp. 221–254; J.-F. Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphysique, puf, Paris, 1990, esp. Part IV. 4   Let’s recall the famous opening of the Metaphysical disputations: “Divina et supernaturalis theologia, quanquam divino lumine principiisque a Deo revelatis nitatur, quia vero humano discursu et ratiocinatione perficitur, veritatibus etiam naturae lumine notis juvatur, eisque ad suos discursus perficiendos, et divinas veritates illustrandas, tanquam ministris et quasi instrumentis utitur. Inter omnes autem naturales scientias, ea, quae prima omnium est, et nomen primae philosophiae obtinuit, sacrae ac supernaturali theologiae praecipue ministrat.” – DM Prooem.

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“natural” discourse – nor is it simply added afterwards, at the end of the discourse, as the goal it was preparing to achieve. In order to develop a pure metaphysics, the sole condition required is the minimum concept of being qua being (as real being), and all reference to the origin of being can be left aside. Nota bene, however: Suárez does not say that we must leave aside such a reference, but only that we can; and this is sufficient for a natural foundation of the order of being. On the other hand, the preparatory character (praeambulum) of metaphysics as distinct from theology is not to be understood in the sense that metaphysics lacks the definitive basis theology alone can give it, but only in the sense that metaphysics must first provide the basic concepts needed to develop the discourse on supernatural revelation. The solution chosen by Suárez is unusual: to think adequately about the supernatural order of creation, revelation and redemption, this order must be recognized as already present within the purely natural order, even if it is hidden, in the form of pure concepts. This is a position we could undoubtedly call “baroque”, which arose after the decrees of the Council of Trent, and which in some authors generated the idea of reuniting those elements that the Reformation had dramatically separated (natural and supernatural, ratio naturalis and gratia supernaturalis) and, even more radically, of assimilating them. In order to understand the mystery of creation and redemption, we must no longer weaken the natural order, but instead emphasize it. However, the opposite is also true: the metaphysician can grasp the nature of being qua being (that is, leaving aside the fact of being or not being created) because the theologian already knows (through revelation and faith) the fact that every thing can “be” only in relation to the source of being. This is what Hans Urs von Balthasar once called the “vicious circle” of neo-scholasticism:5 the theologian already knows, thanks to revelation, the source and significance of things, yet precisely because of this knowledge, paradoxically, he is no longer able to grasp the philosophical mystery of being, which is now perfectly conceivable by the human intellect, not in the sense that we know being as God knows it, but in the sense that, due to the imperfection of our intellect, we can know everything in the most common and abstract way, that is, as being (ens inquantum ens).   “Der neuscholastische Zirkel ist beinah ausweglos: da die biblische Eröff nung der Tiefen Gottes, die mit dem ‚heiligen Geist‘ zusammen auch der Geistbegabte ‚durchforscht‘ (1 Kor 2, 10–12), das philosophische Mysterium des Seins scheinbar zu überspringen einladet, und mit dem Schwund des philosophischen Geheimnisbewußtseins auch das theologische dahinschwindet, das doch nach dem Axiom ‚gratia supponit, non destruit, elevat naturam‘ ein gesteigertes und vertieftes Gefühl für das Herrlichkeitmysterium sein müßte. Von einem solchen Gefühl aber strahlen die klerikalen neuscholastischen Lehrmittel mit ihrem apologetischen Bescheidwissen über Alles und Jedes überhaupt nichts mehr aus” – H. U. von Balthasar, Herrlichkeit, Bd. III.1: Im Raum der Metaphysik, Teil 2: Neuzeit (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1965), 386–387. 5

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Indeed, in a Calvinist and Lutheran context, the approach of Jesuit authors, such as Perera, Fonseca and Suárez, is victorious even over Aquinas’ metaphysics.6 For Suárez, we must not start with beings existing in the world in order to seek their principles and causes, leading to the existence of God as First Cause. Instead, we must elaborate the concept of being qua being (leaving aside all the possible determinations it can have and therefore also leaving aside the difference between the being of the infinite Creator and finite, created being) as a single, unified concept, which includes all that is or can be, and is based on the simple principle of non-contradiction. The minimum requirement, by which “something” can be conceived without contradiction, is all that is needed for the foundations of the whole metaphysical discourse, which will then, but only then, proceed through an analysis of the different ways of being of an entity. From this perspective, metaphysics comes to be articulated in a new way as different from the great Aristotelean tradition, and the two themes which in the latter were always structurally linked – the investigation of being qua being and of the properties inherent in it, on the one hand, and the investigation of the most elevated form of being, the Divine, on the other – are definitively separated. A few years after the publication of the Disputationes Metaphysicae, a new discipline would be dedicated to the investigation of being; it would receive the technical name of Ontology. According to the latest research, the fi rst occurrence of this term is in the Ogdoas scolastica (1606) by the Calvinist theologian and metaphysician Jakob Lorhard, or Lorhardus.7 A century later, this discipline would constitute the “Metaphysica universalis” of which Baumgarten speaks in his manual, distinguishing it from the “special” branch of metaphysics dedicated to the different determinations of being, which would include a rational cosmology, psychology and theology. 3. K ANT AND THE SCHOLASTIC TRADITION Considering the way in which Suárez entered German philosophy, it is hardly surprising to find his influence in the doctrines of the Schulmetaphysik. Indeed, in this case, we can see a mirroring, or symmetrical phenomenon, with regard to Suá6   Cf. K. Eschweiler, “Die Philosophie der spanische Spätscholastik auf den deutschen Universitäten des Siebzehnten Jahrhunderts”, in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens, ed. H. Finke (Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchandlung, 1928), 275–283, 289–302; E. Lewalter, Spanisch-jesuitische und deutsche-luterische Metaphysik, 27–29; ibid. 60–76; P. Di Vona, Studi sulla scolastica della Controriforma. L’esistenza e la sua distinzione metafisica dall’essenza (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1968); J.-F. Courtine, “Ontologie ou métaphysique?”, Giornale di metafisica 7 (1985): 3–24; Courtine, Suárez et le système. 7   On the latest findings about the first occurrences of the term “ontology” see M. Lamanna, “Sulla prima occorrenza del termine «ontologia». Una nota bibliografica”, Quaestio 6 (2006): 557–570. See also the website http://www.formalontology.it.

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rez’s Jesuit metaphysics: rationalist scholasticism, while starting from a doctrinal and theological position which was very different from Suárez’s (like Reformation Pietism with regard to Roman Catholicism), constitutes the rigorous attempt to found metaphysics in the deductive capacities of the human mind, not in opposition to a theological or ecclesiastical context, but as one of its constitutive elements. It is precisely this type of metaphysics that Kant would call “dogmatic” when speaking of Wolff or when reading the compendia by Eberhard and Baumgarten during his lessons.8 Although it is true that the Kantian new critical thought arose precisely from a redefinition of the transcendental character of “dogmatic” ontology, one might think that for Kant the metaphysics originating in Jesuit Aristotelianism was for ever relegated to the past. Actually, the picture can be seen from another perspective. If Kant’s thought represents a contestation of the late scholastic conception of metaphysics and its claims to think of the being of reality, at the same time it also represents a clamorous confirmation of Suárez’s conception of ens, considered both as essentia and existentia. The starting point can be identified in Kant’s famous thesis concerning ontology: Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e. a concept of something that could add to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in themselves. In the logical use it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition “God is omnipotent” contains two concepts that have their objects: God and omnipotence; the little word “is” is not a predicate in it, but only that which posits the predicate in relation to the subject. Now if I take the subject (God) together with all his predicates (among which omnipotence belongs), and say “God is”, or “There is a God”, then I add no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit the object in relation to my concept. Both must contain exactly the same, and hence when I think this object as given absolutely (through the expression “it is”), nothing is thereby added to the concept, which expresses merely its possibility. Thus the actual contains nothing more than the merely possible.9 8   Cf. I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 35–36. See also Kritik der Urteilskraft, § 74; Vorlesungen über die philosophischen Religionslehre, Akademie-Ausgabe XXVIII.2.2: 1003–1007; Logik. Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen, Akademie-Ausgabe IX: 83–84. 9   I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 626–627: “Sein ist offenbar kein reales Prädikat, d. i. ein Begriff von irgend etwas, was zu dem Begriffe eines Dinges hinzukommen könne. Esi ist bloß die Position eines Dinges. Oder gewisser Bestimmungen an sich selbst. Im logischen Gebrauche ist es lediglich die Kopula eines Urteils. Der Satz: G ot t i s t a ll mä cht i g , enthält zwei Begriffe, die ihre Objekte haben: Gott und Allmacht; das Wörtchen i s t , ist nicht noch ein Prädikat oben ein, sondern nur das, was das Prädikat bez i ehu n g s we i s e aufs Subjekt setzt. Nehme ich nun das Subjekt (Gott) mit allen seinen Prädikaten (worunter auch die Allmacht gehöret) zusammen, und sage: G ot t i s t , oder es ist ein Gott, so setze ich kein neues Prädikat zum Begriffe von Gott, sondern nur das Subjekt an sich selbst mit allen seinen Prädikaten,

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Already in The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763) Kant had stated that existence (Dasein) could not be a predicate. Indeed, when I say “God is an existing thing” it seems that I express the relation of a predicate to a subject, but this is not the case. In order to be precise I should say “Something existing is God”; that is, to an “existing thing” belong those predicates which, when taken together, we indicate with the word “God”. Therefore those predicates are posited in relation to this subject (God), while the thing which exists, with all its predicates, is simply “posited”. Thus existence cannot be a predicate. When I say “God is an existing thing”, it seems that I express the relation of a predicate to its subject. Whereas, in actual fact, there is an inaccuracy in this expression. In order to be precise, I should say “Something existing is God”; that is, to an existing thing belong those predicates which, when taken together, we indicate with the expression “God”. These predicates are posited in relation to this subject; but the thing itself, together with all its predicates, is simply posited.10

Kant’s polemical target here is clearly the dogmatic philosophers’ concept of “existence”. Let us recall briefly the standard definitions of existence in Baumgarten’s Metaphysica (1739): § 40. The whole of the essential elements in what is possible, i.e. its internal possibility, is the essence (the being of something, the formal reason, the nature, the quidditas […] the substance, the primary concept of being). § 55. existence (act, actuality) is the whole of the affections which are co-possible in something, i.e. the completion of the essence or internal possibility, as much as it is inherent to the whole of its determinations.11 und zwar den G e g e n s t a n d in Beziehung auf meinen B e g r if f. […] Und so enthält das Wirkliche nichts mehr als das bloß Mögliche.” – Critique of Pure Reason, transl. P. Guyer and A. W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 567. 10   I. Kant, Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, AkademieAusgabe II: 74: “Das Dasein kann daher selber kein Prädikat sein. Sage ich: Gott ist ein existirend Ding, so scheint es, als wenn ich die Beziehung eines Prädikats zum Subjecte ausdrückte. Allein es liegt auch eine Unrichtigkeit in diesem Ausdruck. Genau gesagt, sollte es heißen: Etwas Existierendes ist Gott, das ist, einem existierenden Dinge kommen diejenigen Prädikate zu, die wir zusammen genommen durch den Ausdruck: Gott, bezeichnen. Diese Prädikate sind beziehungsweise auf dieses Subjecte gesetzt, allein das Ding selber samt allen Prädikaten ist schlechthin gesetzt.” 11   A. G. Baumgarten, Metaphysica [first ed. 1739], editio 7. (Halae Magdeburgica, 1779); anastatic reprint (Hildesheim: Olms, 1963), § 40, p. 13: “Complexus essentialium in possibili, seu possibilitas eius interna est essentia (esse rei, ratio formalis, natura, quidditas […], substantia, conceptus entis primus).” – § 55, p. 15–16: “existentia (actus, actualitas) est complexus affectionum in aliquo composibilium i.e. complementum essentiae sive possibilitatis internae, quatenus haec tantum, ut complexus determinationum spectatur.”

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Essence coincides, therefore, with the possibility that in a thing its specific attributes coexist, while existence is the completion of such a “whole”; that is, the fact that something missing is added to the simple possibility of a thing. Ten years earlier, in Philosophia prima sive Ontologia, Wolff had spoken of the essential characteristics of being, defining them as “those which do not contradict one another”, and had defined existence as the completion of possibility (complementum possibilitatis): § 143. The elements of a being which do not contradict each other and do not effect each other are called essential elements (essentialia) and determine the essence of a being. § 174. For this reason I define existence as the completion of the possibility. […] We will explain later what has to be added in order to complete the possibility and let a being pass to actuality. Indeed, in natural theology we will demonstrate what is the reason for the existence of divinity and the actuality of the universe; in cosmology we will demonstrate the way the existence of contingent beings is determined in the material world; in psychology the conditions for the actualization of possible beings in the human mind.12

Existence is therefore the “completion” of essence; that is, of the possibilities within the concept of a thing. This means that “possibility” – as logical non-contradiction, hence as the noetic essence of a thing – is the primum and the focal meaning of ontology, only with respect to which can we think (hence in second place!) of existence. That which is onto-logically possible exists, and not vice versa. As we read in Wolff ’s Ontologia: “that which is possible is that which can exist”, in the sense that there is no reason to exclude existence, hence the possibility of existing is not something “extrinsic” to essence, but rather is logically “intrinsic” to it. Herein derives Wolff ’s notion of ens as “that which can exist”; in other words, “that which does not reject existence”. In this way, Wolff can conclude that “the notion of being implies only a minimum level of existence” (minime involvit). § 132. The impossible cannot exist. The impossible is such that it implies contradictions. 12   C. Wolff, Philosophia prima sive Ontologia, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua omnis cognitionis humanae principia continentur [first ed. 1729], editio nova (Francofurti et Lipsiae, 1736); anastatic reprint in Gesammelte Werke, ed. J. École, Abt. II, Bd. 3 (Hildesheim: Olms, 1962), § 143, p. 120: “Quae in ente sibi mutuo non repugnant, nec tamen per se invicem determinantur, essentialia appelantur atque essentiam entis constituunt” – § 174, p. 143: “Hinc Existentiam definio per complementum possibilitatis […] Dicitur existentia etiam Actualitas. Quidnam istud sit, quod accedere debeat, ut possibilitas compleatur & ens ex statu possibilitatis in statum actualitatis traducatur, suo ostendemus loco. In Theologia nimirum naturali demonstrabimus, quaenam sit ratio existentiae Numinis atque actualitatis universi; in Cosmologia, quomodo existentia contingentium in mundo materiali determinetur; in Psychologia denique, quo pacto in mente humana possibilia ad actum deducantur.”

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§ 133. Only the possible can exist. […] In the notion of possible there is nothing that shows why it could not exist and thus there is no sufficient reason for its nonexistence. […] This non-repugnance to existing or the possibility of existing is for intrinsic and not for extrinsic reasons. § 134. I call being that which can exist and has no repugnance to existing. […] In general the notion of being does not imply existence at all; it implies only the non-repugnance to existence, i.e. the possibility of existing.13

That which we first conceive of being is its essence. (“Essence can be defined as that which is first conceived of being and in which is contained the sufficient reason why the other [components] actually inhere or can inhere [to being].”)14 And it is here that Wolff adduces “Franciscus Suárez, of the Company of Jesus, who amongst the scholastics seems to us the one who has pondered most deeply questions of metaphysics” (Franciscus Suárez e Societate Jesu, quem inter Scholasticos res metaphysicas profundius meditatum esse constat).15 In the Disputationes metaphysicae Suárez writes that “the essence of a thing is the first principle, radical and intimate, of all actions and properties that suit a thing, and for this reason it is called the nature of each thing”, as both Aristotle and Aquinas maintain. In a secondary sense, “in the order of our way of conceiving and speaking, the essence of a thing is that which is expressed by a definition, as Saint Thomas says […] and in this sense we usually also say that the essence of a thing is that which is first conceived of it”.16 After this, Suárez defines in what sense this essence is called   Wolff, Philosophia prima sive ontologia, § 132, p. 113: “Quod impossibile est, existere nequit. Quod impossibile est, id contradictionem involvit.” – § 133, p. 114–115: “Quod possibile est, illud existere potest […]. Nihil igitur in notione possibilis continetur, unde intelligatur, cur existere nequeat, adeoque ratio sufficiens nulla est, cur quod possibile existere nequeat. […] Illa igitur non repugnantia ad existendum, seu existendi possibilitas est quidpiam intrinsecum, minime autem extrinsecum.” – § 134, p. 115–116: “Ens dicitur, quod existere potest, consequenter cui existentia non repugnat. […] Notio entis in genere existentiam minime involvit, sed saltem non repugnantiam ad existendum, seu, quod perinde est, existendi possibilitatem.” 14   “[E]ssentia definiri potest per id, quod primum de ente concipitur, & in quo ratio continetur sufficiens, cur cetera vel actu insint, vel inesse possunt” (Wolff, Philosophia prima sive ontologia, § 168, p. 137). 15   Wolff, Philosophia prima sive ontologia, § 169, p. 138. 16   “Primo modo [= in ordine ad effectus vel passiones rei] dicimus, essentiam rei esse id, quod est primum et radicale, ac intimum principium omnium actionum ac proprietatum, quae rei conveniunt, et sub hac ratione dicitur natura uniuscujusque rei, ut constat ex Aristot., 5 Metaph., text. 5; et notat D. Thomas, de Ente et Essentia, c. 1, et Quodlib. 1, a. 4, et saepe alias. Secundo autem modo [= in ordine ad nostrum modum concipiendi et loquendi] dicimus essentiam rei esse, quae per definitionem explicatur, ut dicit etiam D. Thomas, dicto opusculo de Ente et Essentia, c. 2, et sic etiam dici solet, illud esse essentiam rei, quod primo concipitur de re; primo (inquam) non ordine originis (sic enim potius solemus conceptionem rei inchoare ab his quae sunt extra essentiam rei), sed ordine nobilitatis potius et primitatis 13

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“real”: 1) in a negative sense, a “real essence is one that does not imply any contradiction in itself, nor is it a mere invention of the intellect”; 2) in a positive sense, it is (a posteriori) “the principle, or root, of actual operations and effects”, while (a priori) “real essence is that which can actually be produced by God and can be constituted in the being of a real entity”.17 The last property is not adduced by Wolff, who instead immediately associates the other properties (that is, not implying contradiction and being the intrinsic principle, or root, of its other properties and consequent actions) with the modern, and specifically Cartesian, notion of “substance”. “Descartes,” writes Wolff, “has maintained the notion of essence that he took from scholastic philosophy [as practised] in the School of the Fathers of the Company of Jesus. Indeed, in Principia Philosophiae (part I, § 53), he says that one is the main property of every substance, that which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all the others refer.” Suárez therefore conceives being in all determined entities as a praedicatum essentiale, or real predicate, to use Kant’s formula. This is, however, on the condition of not taking the term ens in its participial sense (as a participle of the verb sum), hence in reference to its actuality, since in this case it can never be an essential predicate, except in God. If we confine ourselves instead to considering – as metaphysics does – the term ens as a noun, in other words, as that which indicates its essence, we can predicate it intrinsically of every determined being (creatures as well as the Creator), leaving aside the fact that the being of which it is predicated does or does not actually exist.18 Hence Suárez affirms that, as an essential predicate, ens is the perfect synonym of res and quidditas. Being is an essential predicate, like actual quiddity, which in turn is objecti; nam id est de essentia rei, quod concipimus primo illi convenire, et primo constitui intrinsece in esse rei, vel talis rei, et hoc modo etiam vocatur essentia quidditas in ordine ad locutiones nostras, quia est id, per quod respondemus ad quaestionem, quid sit res. Ac denique appellatur essentia, quia est id, quod per actum essendi primo esse intelligitur in unaquaque re. Ratio ergo essentiae his modis potest a nobis declarari” (DM 2, 4, 6). 17   “Quid autem sit essentiam esse realem, possumus aut per negationem, aut per affirmationem exponere. Priori modo dicimus essentiam realem esse, quae in sese nullam involvit repugnantiam, neque est mere conficta per intellectum. Posteriori autem modo explicari potest, vel a posteriori, per hoc quod sit principium vel radix realium operationum, vel effectuum, sive sit in genere causae efficientis, sive formalis, sive materialis; sic enim nulla est essentia realis quae non possit habere aliquem effectum vel proprietatem realem. A priori vero potest explicari per causam extrinsecam (quamvis hoc non simpliciter de essentia, sed de essentia creata verum habeat), et sic dicimus essentiam esse realem, quae a Deo realiter produci potest, et constitui in esse entis actualis” (DM 2, 4, 7). 18   “Cartesius notionem essentiae, quam in Scholis Patrum Societatis Jesu ex philosophia scholastica hauferat, retinuit. Etenim in Principiis Philosophiae part. I. §. 53. una, inquit, est cujusque substantiae praecipua proprietas, quae ipsius naturam essentiamque constituit, & ad quam aliae omnes referuntur” (C. Wolff, Philosophia prima sive ontologia, § 169, p. 138–139).

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either an existing being in act or else “can” simply be such. The actuality, or existence, of ens is absorbed into its aptitudo essendi. But the fact that an essence or quidditas is real cannot be understood without a relation to being or to the real entity in act; indeed, we can conceive as real an essence that does not exist in act only because being an actual entity is consistent (non-contradictory) with it: that is exactly what happens when it passes to actual existence. Therefore, even though being in act does not belong to the essence of the creature, the relation to being, or the aptitude to exist intrinsically and essentially, belongs to its concept. In this way being is an essential predicate.19

4. THE PROBLEM OF ONTO-THEOLOGY

But let’s return to Kant. In the Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion (Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre) of 1783–1784, published posthumously by Pölitz in 1817, Kant proposes a rigid comparison between the ontological concepts typical of the Schulmetaphysik, in particular looking at Eberhard’s Preparation for Natural Theology (Vorbereitung zur natürlichen Theologie, 1781) and Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. Kant’s purpose in these lectures is to justify the concept of religion as “the application of theology to morality” (Anwendung der Theologie auf Moralität). But in order to speak of a “moral theology” even for Kant – and here he is in line with tradition – we must begin with the concept of God. In order to do so, Kant no longer uses the classic demonstrations of the existence of God provided by onto-theology, which considers the highest being as ens realissimum or omnitudo realitatis. Ontological proof, as well as cosmological and physico-theological proof are all rejected precisely because “being is not a real predicate”. Nevertheless, in order to think of a God that is only moral – that is, as the postulate of practical reason – we must first necessarily think of him as a possible being, in other words, as a simple “thing”. Thus Kant proposes to reformulate speculative, or transcendental, theology, especially “onto-theology”. In other words: In onto-theology we consider God as the highest being, or at least we make this concept our foundation. But how will I be able to think of a highest being through pure reason, merely as a thing? […] A highest thing, therefore, would have to be one which has all reality.20   “Quod vero essentia aut quidditas realis sit, intelligi non potest sine ordine ad esse et realem entitatem actualem; non enim aliter concipimus essentiam aliquam, quae actu non existit, esse realem, nisi quia talis est, ut ei non repugnet esse entitatem actualem, quod habet per actualem existentiam; quamvis ergo actu esse non sit de essentia creaturae, tamen ordo ad esse, vel aptitudo essendi est de intrinseco et essentiali conceptus ejus; atque hoc modo ens praedicatum est essentiale” (DM 2, 4, 14). 20   I. Kant, Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre, 1013–1014: “Hier [in der Ontotheologie] betrachten wir Gott als das höchste Wesen, wenigstens legen wir zuerst diesen Begriff hier 19

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Nevertheless, the intellectual concept of God as a thing possessing every reality and as the foundation for the possibility of all things (since without a total reality we could not think of negations), does not mean that it indicates an actual object. In this case, essential reality (Realität) is completely autonomous and neutral with respect to actual reality (Wirklichkeit). In this regard, Kant speaks of a minimum of theology (minimum der Theologie), which is based only on the fact that “my concept of God is possible and does not contradict the laws of understanding” (daß mein Begriff von Gott möglich ist, und daß er den Verstandesgesetzen nicht widerstreitet).21 This minimum concept of God is enough to allow for a moral religion, even though we will never be able to achieve a “maximum of theology”, in other words, we will never know whether or not such a being necessarily exists. Once again, the principle of Suárez’s metaphysics is affirmed, according to which the primary notion of being is thingness, or essential quiddity, leaving aside actual existence. Essence is understood as a possibility of existence (aptitudo ad existendum), a kind of neutral virtuality, the significance of which lies in the mere fact that a concept is thinkable without contradiction. In Kant’s case, therefore, the tradition begun by Suárez continues to act, only it curves in a new direction: 1. The ontological discourse on being qua being, which is preliminary to the actual determination of the different species of beings, conserves intact its value as a transcendental discipline. Here the ontological meaning of “transcendental” coexists with a new critical meaning. 2. The metaphysical discourse – in the sense of a natural theology – is no longer developed in relation to sacred doctrine or theologia supernaturalis, but in relation to morality. And so theological metaphysics continues to be understood as a praeambulum fidei, in which faith means pure rational faith. 5. SAFEGUARDING EXISTENCE

There is one final point, however, which attracts our attention. With his theory of being, Kant a) moves away decisively from the conception of being as an essential predicate, a conception which ran from Suárez directly to the Schulmetaphysik, but at the same time b) he conserves Suárez’s concept of being as transcendental possibility, a minimum “thing” that does not necessarily exist, but that can simply exist as nonzum Grunde. Wie werde ich mir nun ein höchstes Wesen b l o s a l s D i n g durch die reine Vernunft denken können? […] Ein höchstes Ding wird also ein solches seyn müssen, das a ll e Realität hat”. Transl. A. W. Wood and G. M. Clark, under the title Lectures on Philosophical Theology (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1982), 44. 21   I. Kant, Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre, 998 (Eng. transl. 27).

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contradictory. Paradoxically, Kant uses this concept in reference to the only being that for Suárez necessarily exists: God. Now we still have to touch on the fact that the meaning of existence typically expounded by Suárez seems to survive in Kant’s thought. For Suárez, being possesses the primary meaning of actual essence; that is, a possibility which is not a mere “potency” that needs to be realized thanks to the intervention of an “act”; but rather, it is an aptitudo to exist, a virtual tendency within essence itself. In a physical (or theological) sense, the aptitude which is proper to essence would be nothing if it were not created ex nihilo – that is, from a nihil absolutum – while in a metaphysical, or better ontological, sense, essence is a principle in itself, simply in virtue of the fact that it is the opposite of a nihil negativum; that is, of a logical impossibility: a kind of self-certification, we might say, of being with regard to its essence. In the face of an essence thus conceived and self-certified, what does “existence” (that is, coming into and enduring in being) mean? It is well known that Suárez decisively rejects the distinctio realis between essence and existence formulated by the Thomist School (for instance, in Giles of Rome and John Capreolus), according to which created being would be the result of the composition of two distinct realities. Yet he also distances himself from the distinctio modalis of Duns Scotus, according to which existence would be distinguished from essence only because of the latter’s finite nature (ex natura rei), hence, not as one reality is distinguished from another, but as a “modality” of essence is distinct from essence itself. In a radical rereading of Scotus’ position, Suárez formulates a sola distinctio rationis not only between essence and existence, but also between an “actually existing essence” and an “actual existence” (often called esse in actu exercito). An actually constituted essence means that it can exist, and in order to do so, it does not need anything other than its own intrinsic possibility. Suárez writes: Certum est apud omnes existentiam esse id quo formaliter et intrinsece res est actu existens; quamquam enim existentia non sit proprie et in rigore causa formalis, sicut neque subsistentia aut personalitas, est tamen intrinsecum et formale constitutivum sui constituti, sicut personalitas est intrinsecum et formale constitutivum personae […]; hoc autem constitutum per existentiam […] nihil aliud est quam existens ut sic […]; hoc tamen non excludit quin aliis modis vel in aliis generibus causarum pendeat res existens ab aliis rebus in sua actuali existentia.22 Everyone admits with certainty that existence is that whereby a thing exists in act, in a formal and intrinsic sense. Although existence is not properly and rigorously a formal cause – just as neither subsistence nor personality are [formal causes] – it is nevertheless the intrinsic and formal constituent of that which is constituted by it, in the same way that personality is the intrinsic and formal constituent of 22

  DM 31, 5, 1.

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the person […]; but that which is constituted by existence […] is none other than the existent as such, while what we mean by this term remains obscure, before clarifying the concept or the more general reason of existence in itself. Nevertheless, whatever this concept is, it is certain that the existent as such is formally constituted by existence alone, and that it depends on the latter almost as if this were its formal cause. This does not exclude, however, [the fact that] an existing thing can depend, in its actual existence, on other things in other ways and with other kinds of causes.

“That which is” therefore does not exist primarily in virtue of something external, but in virtue of its intrinsic constitution. In it resides the most profound sense of the created being of essence. Hence “the being of existence is none other than that being through which an entity is formally and immediately constituted outside its causes (extra causas suas), ceasing to be nothing and beginning to be something”.23 In other words, existence does not refer primarily to an act of being that comes or happens to a thing from outside, but is already founded in its own thingness, as a virtual order. Existence, in other words, is not distinct from essence. When Suárez affirms that the actual essence of a thing is not really, but only conceptually, distinct from its existence, he probably means that the order of Creation is already within it, immanent in the ontological constitution of that creature, and therefore essence cannot be conceived without an ordo ad existentiam or an aptitudo ad existendum. Naturally this conception must have a fundamentum in re (a foundation in reality) in order not to fall into the error of thinking that existence belongs per se not only to the Creator’s essence but also to that of His creatures. Indeed, we must retain as an acquired datum (oportet supponere) that “no entity outside God possesses in itself its being, as a true entity”.24 On the one hand, therefore, existence is the intrinsic constituent of the actual essence of a thing, of its being; on the other, this feature of intrinsic-ness can never be understood as a being ex se of created, existing essence, but, on the contrary, as “the condition, limitation and imperfection of that being” (conditio, limitatio et imperfectio talis entitatis), which necessarily exists “starting from the influence of another thing” 23   “[E]sse existentiae nihil aliud est quam illud esse, quo formaliter et immediate entitas aliqua constituitur extra causas suas, et desinit esse nihil, ac incipit esse aliquid; sed hujusmodi est hoc esse, quo formaliter et immediate constituitur res in actualitate essentiae; ergo est verum esse existentiae.” (DM 31, 4, 6). 24   “Dico tertio in creaturis existentiam et essentiam distingui, aut tamquam ens in actu et in potentia, aut si utraque actu sumatur, solum distingui ratione cum aliquo fundamento in re, quae distinctio satis erit ut absolute dicamus non esse de essentia creaturae actu existere. Ad intelligendam hanc distinctionem, et locutiones quae in illa fundantur, oportet supponere (id quod certisimum est), nullum ens praeter Deum habere ex se entitatem suam, prout vera entitas est” (DM 31, 6, 13, my emphasis).

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(ex influxu alterius).25 This provenance from something “other” no longer represents for Suárez the trace of a relation with the Creator, but rather the imperfection and limitation of ens. When Kant says that being is not a real predicate, but simply the position of a thing, he intends this “position” as the reference of the object to the perceiving subject, without adding anything to the essence or to the possibility of the concept of that object. Often this theory of Kant’s is taken, and rightly so, as the safeguarding of existentiality; that is, of that which effectively exists in space and time, outside its concept. But perhaps this theory can also be taken to mean the exact opposite. It is well known that for Kant existence is determined as a category belonging to the class of modality, as opposed to non-existence, and midway between possibility (as opposed to impossibility) and necessity (as opposed to contingency). Considered as the existence of phenomena, it can never, for Kant, be known a priori. In other words, we can never “foresee” what distinguishes the empirical intuition of one existence from that of another. The only existence we can know is the existence, the temporal conditions of which we can determine a priori, through “Analogies of experience” and the “Postulates of empirical thought in general”. According to Kant, no one has ever managed to explain existence – nor possibility, nor necessity – and obtain an acceptable defi nition based on pure intellect alone. Every time this has been attempted, in reality, we have not gone beyond a simple tautology. Only in empirical synthesis can we become aware of this “excess” of existence with respect to the concept. Yet such a synthesis, in turn, is made possible only by the unity of the a priori synthesis of apperception. Existence is an absolute position, and is not reducible to the intellect; but at the same time it is only the a priori of our intellectual forms that can safeguard its irreducible nature. If this is the case, however, then existence will not bring anything new or different to what is possible a priori. In Suárez, as in Kant, existence “says” the fact that a thing is, with all its determinations – but it says only this and nothing more. Here the dramatic consequence of this metaphysical position becomes manifest: existence can no longer be thought, but only “posited”. Whether it is a God that “posits” it, presupposed through faith, 25   “Atque hinc colligitur, quo sensu verissime dicatur, actu existere esse de essentia Dei, et non de essentia creaturae. Quia, nimirum, solus Deus, ex vi suae naturae, habet existere absque alterius efficientia; creatura vero ex vi suae naturae, non habet actu existere absque efficientia alterius. […] Ex quo manifeste fit ut ad veritatem hujus locutionis non sit necessaria distinctio ex natura rei inter esse et rem cujus dicitur esse, sed sufficere ut illa res non habeat entitatem suam, vel potius ut non sit, neque esse possit illa entitas, nisi ab alio fiat, quia per illam locutionem non significatur distinctio unius ab alio, sed solum conditio, limitatio, et imperfectio talis entitatis, quae non habet ex se necessitatem, ut sit id quod est, sed solum id habet ex influxu alterius” (DM 31, 6, 14).

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or a subject, presupposed in order to found knowledge, existence in itself no longer gives us pause for thought. (Translated by Lisa Adams)

BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES Arnisaeus, Henning. De constitutione et partibus Metaphysicae, tractatus in quo pleraque ad hanc materiam pertinentia discutiuntur. Francofurti ad Oderam: Impensis Iohannis Thimen Bibliopolae, 1606. — Epitome mepahysices, In qua fundamenta Aristotelica ordine scientifico explicantur. Francofurti ad Moenum: Sigism. Latomus, 1606. Baumgarten, A. G. Metaphysica [First ed. 1739]. Editio 7. Halae Magdeburgica, 1779. Anastatic reprint. Hildesheim: Olms, 1963. Goclenius, Rudolf. Conciliator Philosophicus. Casselis: Ex officina typographica Mauritiana, opera Wilhelmi Wesselii, 1609. — Lexicon philosophicum quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur. Francofurti: Typis viduae Matthiae Beckeri, impensis Petri Musculi & Ruperi Pistorij, 1613. Martini, Jakob. Exercitationum metaphysicarum libri duo. [Leipzig]: Sumptibus Zachariae Schureri Bibliopolae, 1608. Kant, Immanuel. Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes. Akademie-Ausgabe II: 65–163. — Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Akademie-Ausgabe III. [English translation: Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by P. Guyer and A. W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. — Kritik der Urteilskraft. Akademie-Ausgabe V. — Logik. Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen. Akademie-Ausgabe IX: 1–150. — Vorlesungen über die philosophischen Religionslehre. Akademie-Ausgabe XXVIII.2.2: 991–1126. [English translation by A. W. Wood and G. M. Clark, under the title Lectures on Philosophical Theology. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1982.] Suárez, Francisco. Disputationes metaphysicae universam doctrinam duodecim librorum Aristotelis comprehendentes. In Opera omnia, editio nova, edited by C. Berton, Paris, 1866, vols XXV–XXVI. Anastatic reprint: Georg Olms: Hildesheim – Zürich – New York, 19982, vols I–II. Timpler, Clemens. Metaphysicae systema methodicum. Steinfurti: Caesar, 1604. Wolff, Christian. Philosophia prima sive Ontologia, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua omnis cognitionis humanae principia continentur [First ed. 1729]. Editio nova. Francofurti et Lipsiae, 1736. Anastatic reprint in Gesammelte Werke, edited by J. École, Abt. II, Bd. 3. Hildesheim: Olms, 1962.

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MODERN WORKS CITED Balthasar, H. U. von , Herrlichkeit. Eine theologische Ästhetik. Band III/1: Im Raum der Metaphysik. Teil 2: Neuzeit [1965]. Second edition. Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 19752. Courtine, J.-F. “Ontologie ou métaphysique?”. Giornale di metafisica 7 (1985): 3–24. — Suárez et le système de la métaphysique. Paris: puf, 1990. [Italian translation by C. Esposito and P. Porro: Il sistema della metafisica. Tradizione aristotelica e svolta di Suárez. A cura di C. Esposito. Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1999]. Di Vona, P. Studi sulla scolastica della Controriforma. L’esistenza e la sua distinzione metafisica dall’essenza. Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1968. Eschweiler, K. “Die Philosophie der spanische Spätscholastik auf den deutschen Universitäten des Siebzehnten Jahrhunderts”, in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens, ed. H. Finke, 251–325. Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1928. Lamanna, M. “Sulla prima occorrenza del termine «ontologia». Una nota bibliografica”. Quaestio: Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics 6 (2006): 557–570. Leinsle, U. G. Das Ding und die Methode. Methodische Konstitution und Gegenstand der frühen protestantischen Metaphysik. Augsburg: Maro Verlag, 1985. Lewalter, E. Spanisch-jesuitische und deutsche-luterische Metaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der iberisch-deutschen Kulturbeziehung und zur Vorgeschichte des deutschen Idealismus. Hamburg: Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut, 1935. Second editon, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967.

ADDITIONAL SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Darge, R. Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 80. Leiden–Boston–Köln: Brill, 2004. Esposito, C. “Das Seiende und das Gute. Francisco Suárez zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Martin Heidegger”. In Vom Rätsel des Begriffs, Festschrift für F.-W. von Herrmann zum 65. Geburtstag, edited by P.-L. Coriando, 341–356. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999. — The Concept of Time in the Metaphysics of Suárez. In The Medieval Concept of Time. Studies on the Scholastic Debate and its Influence on Early Modern Philosophy, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 75, edited by P. Porro, 383–398. Leiden–Boston–Köln: Brill, 2001. — “Existence, relation, efficience. Le nœud Suárez entre métaphysique et théologie”. In L’existence, edited by V. Carraud and C. Esposito. A monographic issue of Quaestio: Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics 3 (2003): 139–161. — “Kant: von der Moral zur Religion (und zurück). In Kants Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie, edited by N. Fischer, 265–291. Hamburg: Meiner, 2004. — Le «Disputationes metaphysicae» nella critica contemporanea. Appendix to F. Suárez, Disputazioni metafisiche I–III, traduzione italiana con il testo latino a fronte, a cura di C. Esposito. Second edition, Milano: Bompiani, 2007. Gilson, É. L’être et l’essence. Paris: Vrin, 2002.

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Gracia, J. J. E. “The Ontological Status of the Transcendental Attributes of Being in Scholasticism and Modernity: Suárez and Kant”. In Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?, edited by J. A. Aertsen and A. Speer, 213–225. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1998. Heidegger, M. Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. Marburger Vorlesung SS 1927. Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 24. Edited by F.-W. v. Herrmann. Frankfurt a. M: Klostermann, 1975. Honnefelder, L. Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters un der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus – Suárez – Wolff – Kant – Peirce). Hamburg: Meiner, 1990. Seigfried, H. “Kant’s Thesis about Being Anticipated by Suárez”. In Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, edited by L. W. Beck, 510–520. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972. Siewerth, G. Das Schiksal der Metaphysik von Thomas zu Heidegger [1959]. Third edition. Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 2003.

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ABSTRACT

From latest fi ndings the “birth of ontology” has emerged as a debate in which three Reformed authors originally participated: Rudolph Goclenius, Clemens Timpler and Jakob Lorhard. Under this new label (“ontologia”), the Calvinist Goclenius aims to make the model of science of being first proposed by the Jesuit Benet Perera standard within Reformed scholastic philosophy. This paper focuses on the dispute between Goclenius and Timpler concerning the status of metaphysics and its subject-matter (ens). According to Timpler the subject of the universal part of metaphysics is not being qua being but the purely intelligible (intelligibile), a concept even more general than that of being. In this solution Timpler drew upon the Jesuit Pedro da Fonseca, who seemed to approve of the hypothesis that the concept of ens might be subordinated to aliquid, in a single passage of his Commentarii in libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis. Unlike Timpler, Goclenius adopts the more traditional thesis according to which each noetic definition, however abstract and universal, has to be conceived “sub specie entis”. Still, Goclenius’ point of view is only seemingly “traditional”, just like the doctrine of being on which he builds his metaphysics – or rather his “ontology” –, which is based on a new elaboration of the concept of being and that of other transcendentals. In particular, Goclenius removes the concepts of res and aliquid from the list of transcendentals, and he puts them into extensional identity with the concept of ens. This philosophical choice of Goclenius is not new, but draws upon the doctrine of “synonymia entis”, proposed also by Suárez in the Disputationes metaphysicae (DM 3.2.5).

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper aims to analyse the influence of the doctrine of synonymy between ens, aliquid and res, as explained by Suárez in DM 3, on the debate in the early German Schulmetaphysik concerning the status and subject of metaphysics. Several scholastic philosophers of the Reformation context participated in this debate during the 16th and 17th centuries, including Rudolph Göckel known in Latin as Goclenius (1547–1628), Jakob Lorhard (1561–1609) and Clemens Timpler (1563/4–1624). Recent studies have already brought to light the relationships among these three authors. It was among them that the label “ontology” for the general part of metaphysics first arose. Suárez had rethought Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of transcendental terms. Aquinas in his De veritate (q. 1, a. 1) asserts that there are five transcendentals (res, unum,

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aliquid, bonum, verum) representing the general modes that affect ens. The special modes of being, on the other hand, correspond to the ten categories. These modes, both special and general, are to be understood as additions to the notion of ens. Thomas Aquinas states that some of these transcendentals differ secundum rationem and not in re.1 In fact, although ens is the trans-generic universal that “encompasses all the genera”,2 according to the doctrine of De veritate it is not simply identical with the other transcendentals, because only ens primarily “sumitur ab actu essendi”.3 This understanding enables Aquinas to maintain the existentialist nature of his conception of being, in contrast to any immediate coincidence and identification between being and essence, that would be the result, for instance, of identifying ens and res, i.e., ens and quidditas. Hence, when it comes to the transcendental nature of truth (verum) in Summa theologiae, Aquinas confirms that, paradoxically, it is possible to know being without knowing its intelligibility.4 The context in which Suárez explains his doctrine of transcendentals differs from Aquinas’. As Jean-François Courtine5 and Rolf Darge6 have shown, Suárez was influenced by Duns Scotus and Henry of Ghent, through their significant impact on his Jesuit elder brethen, Benet Perera (thus in Valencian, Benedictus Pererius in Latin, hispanized as Benito Pereira) and Pedro da Fonseca. Citing q. 21 of De veritate and qq. 11 and 16 of the first part of Summa theologiae, Suárez upholds the thesis that there are only three transcendentals: unum, verum and bonum. They are attached to ens as “an adjective to a noun”. What is significant here, however, is Suárez’s view on the two “ex-transcendentals”, res and aliquid, both understood by him as “synonyma entis”. According to Suárez, res is commonly referred 1   For instance the transcendentals “truth” and “good”: “Quamvis posset dici quod etiam ens est in rebus et in intellectu, sicut et verum; licet verum principaliter in intellectu, ens vero principaliter in rebus. Et hoc accidit propter hoc, quod verum et ens differunt ratione.” – Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 16, a. 3. “Et ideo oportet quod [bonum] vel nihil addat super ens vel addat aliquid quod sit in ratione tantum; si enim adderet aliquid reale oporteret quod per rationem boni contraheretur ens ad aliquod speciale genus.” – Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae De veritate, q. 21, a. 1. 2   “quod circuit omnia genera” – STh I, q. 11, a. 1. 3   De veritate, q. 1, a. 1 4   “Sed verum non potest apprehendi, nisi apprehendatur ratio entis: quia ens cadit in ratione veri. Et est simile sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile: sed tamen potest intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitas. Et similiter ens intellectum est verum: non tamen intelligendo ens, intelligitur verum.” – STh I, q. 16, a. 3. 5   Jean-François Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphysique (Paris: PUF, 1990), 320–321. 6   Rolph Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition (Leiden– Boston: Brill, 2004), 138–183.

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to as a synonym for ens,7 wherefore predicating the former of the latter is tautologous. It is then impossible to distinguish between the two concepts: res as quidditas is not conceivable as distinct from ens actualiter existens, and moreover “ens non poterit dici passio rei” (DM 3, 2, 4), as existence does not derive from the intrinsic principles of res. The identity of ens and res leads, as Rolf Darge8 has demonstrated, to the conclusions of DM 2, and to the notion of quidditas realis, i.e., to what is distinguished from the essences of the ficta (entia rationis) by having the aptitudo ad existendum. Regarding the link between ens and aliquid, Suárez’s arguments invoke the common usage of the two terms. Aliquid is something that has a certain quiddity; thus, it is a res. Having stated the identity of aliquid and res, Suárez aims to establish the synonymy of aliquid and ens by means of a syllogism. In the major premise, Suárez states that nihil and aliquid are mutually exclusive. In the minor premise, Suárez states that nihil is the same as non-ens, i.e., that which has no entity. In conclusion, it can be said that aliquid is “idem quod habens aliquam entitatem vel quidditatem”.9 This is how Doctor Eximius achieved the perfect synonymy of aliquid, ens and quidditas. It is a solution that, as he puts it,10 had already been approved by Fonseca in book IV of his Commentaries on Metaphysics,11 Suárez then reproduced and rejected Aquinas’ solution from De veritate (q. 1, a. 1), in which aliquid is distinguished from ens.

  “[…] nam res et ens juxta communem usum tanquam synonima usurpantur; et interdum de ente actu existente dicuntur, interdum vero ab actuali existentia praescindunt, quare neutrum est passio alterius.” – DM 3, 2, 4. 8   Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung, 142, 155–156. 9   DM 3, 2, 5. 10   “In hac ergo significatione constat aliquid non esse passionem, sed synonymum entis; idemque censetur etiam secundum formalem rationem et conceptum, dicere de aliquo esse aliquid, et dicere ens, et ita opinatur de hoc attributo Fonsec., 4 Metaph., c. 2, q. 5, sect. 2.” – DM 3, 2, 5. 11   “Dicendum est igitur, Ens, Aliquid, & Rem, idem prorsus esse, nec ullo pacto distingui inter se, nisi quod nomina Entis & alicuius saepe sumuntur in commune, ut dicuntur de entibus realibus et rationis.” Afterwards also “Itaque cum sermo est de enti reali, de quo primo Philosophus disputat, quemadmodum apud nos hoc loco, in quo Entis, ut subiectum est huius scientiae, proprias affectiones quęrimus: perspicuum est, nullum esse discrimen inter Ens, Aliquid, & Rem, quod saltem praesentem disputationem attineat, nisi verbum Aliquid valde improprie pro Diverso accipias.” – Pedro da Fonseca, Commentarii in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae (Francofurti: Typis Ioannis Saurij, impensis Ioannis Theobaldi Schonvvetteri, 1599), t. I, l. 4, c. 2, q. 5, s. 2, col. 764–765. 7

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2. THE REFORMATION CONTEXT We shall now turn to the Reformation context. Joseph S. Freedman12 has found that the European Protestant academies between 1520 and 1580 witnessed a decline in metaphysical teaching, which in some instances led to the exclusion of the First Philosophy from the encyclopaedia of disciplines’. The reasons for that development include: (i) the anti-metaphysical orientation of the Lutheran school of thought at the end of 16th century; (ii) the turmoil caused by the various theological Reformation movements; (iii) the wide diff usion of such philosophical schools as Ramism in universities and grammar schools that were associated with anti-scholastic and anti-metaphysical positions. Reformed scholars took a renewed interest in metaphysics at the end of the 16th century. This involved, in many cases, the metaphysical paradigm of “second scholasticism”. Prior to Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae, Perera’s and Fonseca’s texts were read and studied in Protestant academies. 2.1 Rudolph Goclenius’ reception of Perera and Suárez As we know, the Isagoge in peripateticorum et scholasticorum primam philosophiam by Rudolph Goclenius, published in 1598 in Frankfurt a. M., is the first work in Calvinist context to resemble some Jesuit metaphysical models. Goclenius was a scholastic philosopher of Calvinist faith who taught at Philipps-Universität in Marburg from 1581 to 1627. As a Calvinist, Goclenius had fewer ideological problems with the Jesuit Fathers’ metaphysical works than his Lutheran colleagues. Jean-François Moreau labelled Goclenius as “le fondateur de la métaphysique calviniste”.13 This is because he was the fi rst to propose a type of metaphysics consistent with Jean Calvin’s theology to Calvinist scholars. His first attempt represents his Isagoge in primam philosophiam.14 Goclenius refers to Benet Perera’s division of metaphysics in De commnunibus principijs et affectionibus 12   See Joseph S. Freedman, “Philosophy Instruction within the Institutional Framework of Central European Schools and Universities during the Reformation Era”, History of the Universities 5 (1985): 120–121; Joseph S. Freedman, “Aristotle and the Context of Philosophy Instruction at Central European Schools and Universities during the Reformation Era (1500–1650)”, in Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500–1700. Teaching and Texts at Schools and Universities (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 1999), V: 216; Joseph S. Freedman, “Encyclopaedic Philosophical Writings in Central Europe during the High and Late Renaissance (ca. 1500 – ca. 1700)”, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 37 (1994): 220, 224, 234; Joseph S. Freedman, “Classifications of Philosophy, the Sciences, and the Arts in Sixteenth-and Seventeenth-Century Europe”, The Modern Schoolman 72 (1994): 46–47. 13   See P.-F. Moreau, “Wolff et Goclenius”, Archives de philosophie 65 (2002): 8. 14   It must be noted that in 1598 Goclenius published also the work Isagoge in Organum Aristotelis. In this paper we will refer only to Isagoge in primam philosophiam.

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(l. 1, c. 8).15 Following Perera, Goclenius divides metaphysics in two parts: a universal one, called prima philosophia, and a special one, called metaphysica.16 Prima philosophia deals with ens universale and the transcendentals as well as the grades of ens, restricting the analysis by only taking into consideration the logical intention, i.e., the second intention (secunda intentio) represented by the genus. Metaphysica concerns God and mentes, it deals with particular or special beings, thus constituting itself as theology and angelology. Goclenius thus adopts a model of metaphysics built on the strict distinction between “genus” and “species” typical of the thinking during the Reformation, according to which God is the cause of ens only within the “special” part of science and not in the “general” one. The transcendental or general part of the science represents a “universal grammar of reality”. This grammar of reality begins with ens universale, i.e., its own subject-matter. Then it proceeds to the so-called affectiones, according to Goclenius, or passiones, according to Perera and Suárez. They correspond to the transcendental notions that, according to Goclenius and Perera, are unum, verum, bonum, actus, potentia. To these concepts Goclenius adds the notion of proportio, plus an even more complicated list of affectiones conjunctae (unum × multa; idem × diversum; prius × posterius etc.). The notions of aliquid and res are thus removed from the list of transcendental concepts. In the course of the text Goclenius supports this thesis, attributing the same extension to the three notions of ens, res and aliquid. They differ only from   Benet Perera, De communibus omnium rerum naturalium principijs et affectionibus (Romae: Impensis Venturini Tramezini, apud Franciscum Zanettum, & Bartholomaeum Tosium socios, 1576). – Max Wundt was the first to point out the continuity between the metaphysical model by Goclenius and Perera. See Max Wundt, Die deutsche Schulmetaphyisik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen: Mohr, 1939), 58–59. See also E. Vollrath, “Die Gliederung der Metaphysik in eine Metaphysica generalis und eine Metaphysica specialis”, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 16 (1962): 265–270; E. M. Rompe, Die Trennung von Ontologie und Metaphysik. Der Ablösungsprozeß und seine Motivierung bei Benedictus Pererius und anderen Denkern des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts (Bonn: Druck im Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1968), 203–218; J. F. Courtine, “Ontologie ou métaphysique?”, Giornale di metafisica 7 (1985): 15–24. 16   “Scientia est vel Universalis vel Particularis. / Scientia universalis est, quae explicat de universalissimis, hoc est, quae sparsa sunt per omnes disciplinas. / Haec vocatur prima Philosophia. Est itaque prima Philosophia scientia de Ente qua ens, hoc est, universaliter sumto. / Particularis scientia est quae explicat de parte aliqua entis. / Ex iis una est Metaphysica seu Transnaturalis seu supranaturalis. / Metaphysica, a parte praestantiore dicta Theologia, est quae explicat de Entibus seu formis a materia secundum rem & rationem seiunctis. Alias divina scientia. / Partes eius sunt duae: Deus & Mentes.” – Rudolph Goclenius, Praefatio ad lectorem, in Isagoge in peripateticorum et scholasticorum primam philosophiam quae dici consuevit metaphysica (Francofurti: Ex Officina M. Zachariae Palthenii, 1598; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1976), §§ 6–9; 19–22, p. 8–9. 15

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the intensional point of view, i.e., as different logical intentions, but not from the extensional one: Haec, ut & ipsum Ens seu Res, solent vocari Transcendentia, quod per omnes res fusa sint, quod omnibus rebus (veris) tribuantur vel absolute, ut unum, vel comparate spectata, ut verum, bonum. Ens est unum, & unum est ens. Ens est verum, & verum est ens. Hic convertitur verum cum ente sine adiunctione alterius, seu sine disiunctione per oppositionem. Porro Ens interdum dicitur Aliquid. Dico, interdum: quia Aliquid nonnunquam non est transcendens, ut cum significat idem quod particulare ens seu res aliqua.17

This brief exposition of the structure of Goclenius’ prima philosophia will be completed by adding a further subdivision of the transcendentals: the ens universale is also divided into different grades or modes, which constitute its “quasi-species”. These quasi-species consequently divide being into substance and accident, which opens the way for the categories. The last section of Goclenius’ first philosophy represents a usiology. After that would follow the treatment of specific differences that further determine the notion of being, which would constitute the “second philosophy” or scientia particularis. It should be noted that in Lexicon philosophicum Goclenius calls his prima philosophia by the Greek neologism “ὀντολογία”, with the aim of defining exclusively the “scientia de ente seu transcendentibus”.18 2.2 Clemens Timpler’s Fonseca-inspired departure from Suárez In 1604 the Calvinist Clemens Timpler’s Metaphysicae systema methodicum was published. According to Joseph S. Freedman, Timpler’s works represents the standard of scholastic philosophy as it was practised in grammar schools and Reformed academies at the beginning of the 17th century.19 When Metaphysicae systema methodicum was published, Timpler had been teaching in Steinfurt for several years. He asked Goclenius, whose authority was widespread in the Calvinist universities,20 to write a preface and some commentaries on the most   Goclenius, Isagoge, c. 2, pp. 23–24.   Rudolph Goclenius, “Abstractio”, in Lexicon philosophicum quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur (Francofurti: Typis viduae Matthiae Beckeri, impensis Petri Musculi & Ruperi Pistorij, 1613), 16. 19   “Clemens Timpler not only exemplifies the highest standards of late sixteenth and early seventeenth century European academic philosophy, but his works also provide an excellent survey of its scope and content.” – Joseph S. Freedman, “Foreword”, in European Academic Philosophy in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries. The Life, Significance, and Philosophy of Clemens Timpler (1563/4–1624) (Hildesheim – Zürich – New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1988), ii–iii. 20   The reason Timpler asked Goclenius to write the Preface and commentary to the text had something to do with the latter’s authority and prestige in the Gymnasium Illustre Arnoldinum in Steinfurt where Timpler held a position. Otto Casmann (1562–1607) and Heinrich 17

18

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important passages of the text. Starting from the non-authorized edition in Lich (1604), Goclenius’ notes appeared in all of the following editions of the work. Timpler’s metaphysics is the first work in Calvinist context that cites Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae. Unlike the works of other Jesuit authors, the German edition of Disputationes metaphysicae (1600) became a “Trojan horse” by means of which “second scholasticism” was introduced into Lutheran academies. Henning Arnisaeus’ De constitutione et partibus Metaphysicae tractatus (1606)21 and Jakob Martini’s Metaphysicae exercitationes (1608)22 initiated the reception of Suárez’s metaphysics in the Lutheran context.23 Timpler questions Suárez’s views. As mentioned above, Timpler reproposes the real distinction between essence and existence for the realm of creatures, rejecting Suárez’s arguments in DM 31.24 In general or universal metaphysics, there is an unexpected convergence between Timpler and Suárez. In order to maintain that the subject of metaphysics is “omne intelligibile quatenus ab homine naturali rationis lumine sine ullo materiae conceptu est intelligibile”,25 Timpler first cites Fonseca, according to whom metaphysics does not have to contain “ullam materiam” in its ratio fomalis, and then Suárez, who asserts in DM 1, 1, 17 that in its objective concept “the object of metaphysics does not include either sensitive or intelligible matter”.26 In fact, Timpler invokes Nollius (?–1619), Goclenius’ disciples in Marburg, would later hold prestigious positions in the Reformed Gymnasium. See Freedman, European Academic, I: 54. 21   Henning Arnisaeus, De constitutione et partibus Metaphysicae, tractatus in quo pleraque ad hanc materiam pertinentia discutiuntur (Francofurti ad Oderam: Impensis Iohannis Thimen Bibliopolae, 1606). 22   Jakob Martini, Exercitationum metaphysicarum libri duo (Leipzig: Sumptibus Zachariae Schureri Bibliopolae, 1608). 23   On the first reception of Suárez’s metaphysics in Lutheran context, in particular with Henning Arnisaeus and Jakob Martini, see E. Lewalter, Spanisch-jesuitische und deutsch-luterische Metaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967²), 63–69; see also U. G. Leinsle, Das Ding und die Methode. Methodische Konstitution und Gegenstand der frühen protestantischen Metaphysik (Augsburg: Maro Verlag, 1985), 221–254. 24   “Caeterum ulterius quaeritur, quomodo existentia, ab essentia differat, realiter an sola ratione? Respondeo distinguendum esse inter existentiam entis increati & creati. Illa enim realiter non differt ab essentia discernitur, quemadmodum patet ex rationibus antea allatis. Proinde graviter errat cum Scholasticis Fr. Suárez disput. 31 sect. 6 context. I quando asserit, Essentiam creatam in actu extra causas constitutam non distingui realiter ab existentia. Item sect. 13 context. 18 Existentiam nihil aliud esse, quam essentiam in actu constitutam.” – Clemens Timpler, Metaphysicae systema methodicum (Francoforti: Prelo Richteriano, impensa vero Conradi Nebenii, 1607), l. 1, c. 4, q. 2, p. 87. 25   Timpler, Metaphysicae systema, l. 1, c. 1, theor. 1, p. 38; l. 1, c. 1, q. 5, p. 45–46. 26   “Quocirca ad objectum hujus scientiae satis est quod in conceptu objectivo suo materiam non includat, neque sensibilem, neque intelligibilem.” – DM 1, 1, 17.

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these two philosophers to support his distinction between the “pure intelligible” and every limitation by matter. On the other hand, Timpler moves further away from Suárez when, speaking of the subject of metaphysics, he rejects the identification between the notion of intelligibile and that of ens.27 According to Timpler, the identity of intelligibile and ens would reduce the subject of metaphysics solely to entity, thus excluding non-entia represented by privationes and negationes. Therefore, to think of metaphysics as of “scientia entis quatenus entis” would mean to unduly narrow its scope. According to Timpler, the proper scope of metaphysics can be achieved by expanding the ratio formalis of the subject of metaphysics. This expansion leads Timpler to conclude that there is no identity between “intelligible” and “being”, the extension of the concept omne intelligibile becomes broader than that of ens. In contrast to Aquinas, Timpler argued that the link between intelligibile and ens is to be rejected, and his description of the first notions of his universal metaphysics is shaped accordingly. The “intelligible” is divided into nihil and aliquid, mutually exclusive by contradiction. In the positive meaning of aliquid, i.e. “aliquid positivum”, “something” constitutes the notions of essentia and ens, while the negative meaning, as aliquid negativum, is interpreted as privation (privatio); the concept of aliquid negativum must not be confused with that of nihil which represents a purely negative concept, distinct also from that of non-ens. Therefore, if the two notions of nihil and aliquid play the role of species of the concept of intelligibile, the concept of aliquid itself becomes, in the following step of Timpler’s metaphysics, the genus for the further species of ens and essentia. This is, probably, the first case in the history of metaphysics in which the relationship between intelligibile, aliquid and ens is included within the context of the Porphyrian tree with the scope of determining the subject-matter of metaphysics.28 In Suárez’s DM 3, nihil and aliquid are mutually exclusive. Yet, as Doctor Eximius explains, given the coincidence of nihil and non-ens, and of aliquid and ens, aliquid turns out to be “what has some entity or quiddity”.29 In this way, Doctor Eximius achieves perfect identity of aliquid, ens and quidditas, in continuity with Fonseca. Interestingly, Fonseca had proposed another meaning of aliquid, which Suárez does not mention in DM 3:   In this regard see what Suárez affirms in his De anima “[...] quidquid enim est intelligibile, potest intellectu nostro cognosci, nam intelligibile et intellectus sibi mutuo respondent atque adaequantur; sed aliquid habet entitatem est intelligibile: ergo idipsum potest intellectus noster cognoscere aliquo modo.”– De anima, l. 4, c. 1, n. 3. 28   “Supra ens enim adhuc alia genera sunt collocata, nimirum Intelligibile, aliquid, aliquid positivum, ideoque illud non est summum genus, sed species aliis generibus subiecta.” – Timpler, Metaphysicae systema, l. 1, c. 3, q. 2. 29   “[Q]uod habens aliquam entitatem vel quidditatem.” DM 3, 2, 5. 27

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Verbum, aliquid, (quod etsi non est in Graeco, subauditur tamen necessario) sumendum & ipsum est, quam latissime ut entia, & non entia comprehendat. Namque ut non ens principium esse potest; ut patet in privatione, ita & principatum, veluti inane spatium, quod extra coelum est; ut inferius patebit, incipit enim ubi coelum definit.30

The passage demonstrates why the doctrine of synonymia entis is in a critical state, despite the apparent agreement between the two Jesuit philosophers. Fonseca’s position allows him to broaden the ratio formalis of aliquid not only to being, but also to non-being: aliquid is now the genus of being. Hence, being as aliquid scibile or essentia realis is not to be conceived as the measure of the intellect. Consequently, the concept of aliquid receives a higher degree of generality than ens. However, Fonseca did not follow all the possible radical implications of this assumption, confirming, instead, the doctrine of synonymy. Indeed, the Jesuit philosopher would reaffirm the subject of general metaphysics to be the concept of real being, and not just pure “something” or the pure “intelligible”.31 The synonymy of ens and aliquid in Perera and Suárez creates the borders for metaphysics which is, in the first place, a science of reality and not of pure intelligibility. In Fonseca, on the other hand, we observe a first break, or perhaps a real disruption, of that transcendental and doctrinal bound. In his Metaphysics, Timpler mentions the passage by Fonseca quoted above. 32 Evidently, he intends to take the idea of the Jesuit philosopher to its radical consequences: firstly, by making the intelligibile, and not ens any more, the subject of metaphysics; secondly, by providing a genealogy of the notion of aliquid that emphasises the structural dependence – a logical dependence – of aliquid on the notion of nihil. According to Timpler, aliquid precedes being and founds it. As Courtine notes, Timpler’s universal metaphysics is conceived as a “tinology” rather than ontology, or better yet, as the science of aliquid and not of ens. The break within the doctrine of synonymy between ens, aliquid and res allows Timpler to obtain the “noetization” of the subject of metaphysics. Metaphysics becomes, as Courtine puts it, the science of “intelligibile inquantum intelligibile”.33

30

  Fonseca, In Metaph., t. II, l. 5, c. 1, q. 1, s. 2, col. 12.   “Unde collige subiectum Metaphysicae esse ens per se, ac reale, quatenus dicitur non

31

modo de entibus vere unius essentiae, sed etiam alio modo per se ordinatis.”; “igitur ens commune Deo, & creaturis constituendum est hujus scientiae subiectum.” – Fonseca, In Metaph., t. II, l. 4, c. 1, q. 1, s. 2, col. 642; t. II, l. 4, c. 1, q. 1, s. 3, col. 648.

  “Hinc etiam Fonseca lib. 5 Metaph. cap. 1 ait, aliquid comprehendere ens, & non-ens.” – Timpler, Metaphysicae systema, l. 1, c. 2, q. 3, p. 63. 33   See Courtine, Le système, 266. 32

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2.3 Goclenius’ criticism of Timpler In his commentary on book 1, chapter 2 of Timpler’s Metaphysics, Goclenius does not accept the innovations introduced by Timpler. Replying to the question “Intelligibile quod?”, Goclenius on the one hand adopts Timpler’s fundamental thesis about the wider extension of the concept of intelligible: “Intelligibile est ens, Graece τὸ ὄν, vel non ens, μὴ ὄν. [...] Discedo hic a doctissimo Timplero, qui νοητὸν dividit in nihil et aliquid”;34 but on the other hand rejects Timpler’s programme of extending the field of universal metaphysics beyond being.35 This initial and most traditional assumption determines Goclenius’ subsequent reasoning. Consequently, the distinction between aliquid and nihil is seen as similar to that between ens and non-ens; Goclenius explains the synonymy of aliquid and ens in close connexion to and continuity with Suárez. Being, now considered as something, is presented as the primary object and a measure of every negation or privation, in accordance with the scholastic principle “prior 34   Rudolph Goclenius, In Clementis Timpleri Metaphysicam Notae Praefatio, in Timpler, Metaphysicae systema, 8. 35   It must be added that in the same year (1604) when Timpler’s Metaphysicae systema methodicum was published, one of Goclenius’ pupils in Marburg, Reinhard Cottwitz, discussed – in his dissertation Zητήματα Philosophica – some theses taken from Timpler’s work. Therefore, already in 1604, Goclenius encouraged his students in Marburg to study Timpler’s metaphysics, thus initiating the success that brought it to be considered to represent – as Joseph S. Freedman noted – “the highest standards of late sixteenth and early seventeenth century European academic philosophy” (see footnote 19). In his dissertation, Cottwitz discussed the relationship between the notion of intelligibile, aliquid and ens, starting from the definition of intelligible as “everything that can be conceived by the imagination regardless of the fact whether it exists or not” and combining Fonseca and Timpler. His exposition continues with the division of intelligibile into the concepts of nihil and aliquid. Immediately after, however, Cottwitz’s exposition commits a sort of inversion in the order of notions. Due to an erroneous quotation of Metaphysicae systema methodicum, it is asserted that being “suo ambitu comprehendit tam Nihil, quam Aliquid.” This creates a circular system laden with self-contradiction, where aliquid is the genus of ens, while in turn ens becomes the genus of aliquid (and nihil). Cottwitz’s inconsistency was probably caused by his incapability to think the radical innovations concerning the relationship between ens and aliquid introduced by Timpler through thoroughly: “I. Intelligibile est omne id, quod est & non est, dummodo imaginatione concipi potest, quatenus est aptum per mentem comprehendi. pic. de. rer. defin. f. 40. Intelligibile dividitur in Nihil vel Aliquid: Aliquid enim comprehendit in se tam Ens, quam non Ens Fons. 5 Metaphys. Cap. I quia Ens suo ambitu comprehendit tam Nihil, quam Aliquid Timpl. In Metaph. Cap. 2, quaest. 3.” Reinhard Cottwitz, Zητήματα Philosophica Quorum Defensionem S.S. T.P. Sub Praesidio Clarissimi Excellentissimique Viri, Dn. M. Rodolphi Goclenii (Marpurgi Cattorum: Typis Rodolphi Hutwelckeri, 1604), f. a2. On Reinhard Cottwitz see W. Falckenheiner (ed.), Personen und Ortsregister zu der Matrikel und den Annnalen der Universität Marburg 1527–1652 (Marburg, 1904, repr. Nendeln (Liechtenstein): Kraus, 1980), 32.

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est affirmatio quam negatio”.36 Hence, according to the analytical order of knowledge, the place of aliquid must necessarily precede that of nihil.37 The theme of aliquid marks the furthest distance between Goclenius and Timpler. By claiming the identity of aliquid and ens, Goclenius denies to “something” the status of the genus of “being” confered on it by Timpler. Yet, Goclenius understood that a thoroughgoing delimitation against Timpler’s system would commit him to follow the problem of the intelligibility of nihil further. The publishing of Goclenius’ Conciliator philosophicus (1609) granted the two philosophers an opportunity to compare their views. In q. 12 (An verum: Non entis nulla est notitia?), Goclenius deals with both Timpler’s thesis that affirms the intelligibility of non-ens,38 and Plato’s opposite view in the Sophist39 that denies it.40 Goclenius denies that non-ens has intelligibility per se and concedes only a secondary type of intelligibility, per detractionem seu remotionem, derived from ens. It is always and only the participation, albeit negative, on the nature of being that allows the bunch of non-entia (privationes, negationes) to gain their own intelligibility.41 While Timpler maintained that “Primae philosophiae subjicitur etiam Non ens”; Goclenius asserts: Prima igitur philosophia primo per se non instituit cognitionem non Entis, sed Entis. Subjicitur ei Ens directe: Non ens ex obliquo.42   “Profecto affirmatio est mensura negationis, ut inquiunt omnes Philosophi, quemadmodum rectum est mensura obliqui.” Goclenius, In Clementis Timpleri, p. 8; see also Wolfgang Hübener, Zum Geist der Prämoderne (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1985), 84–86. 37   “Itaque aliquid prius est nihilo, et nihili intelligentia et explicatio pendet ab intelligentia et explicatione alicuius. Illius doctrina est primaria, huius secundaria; ordo igitur doctrinae postulat, ut tractetur de nihilo post aliquid.” – Goclenius, In Clementiis Timpleri, p. 8. 38   “Non Ens est νοητὸν, id est, cadit sub intelligentiam. Timplerus in Metaphys. vel, phantasiam aut hominis ὑπόληψιν & opinionem. Schegk. in comm. in Organum Aristotelis.” – R. Goclenius, Conciliator Philosophicus (Casselis: Ex officina typographica Mauritiana, opera Wilhelmi Wesselii, 1609), pars 1, c. 2, q. 12, p. 18. 39   Plato, Sophist, 260d. 40   “Non Ens est ἀδιανόητον Plato. Et est ἀνέμφατον, inexplicabile. Idem. Quia non habet entitatem aliquam, nec accidentia.” Goclenius, Conciliator Philosophicus, pars 1, c. 2, q. 12, p. 18. 41   See Goclenius, “Nihil, Nihilum, Non Ens”, in Lexicon philosophicum, 753–755. 42   Goclenius, Conciliator philosophicus, pars 1, c. 2, q. 1, pp. 9–10; Johann Heinrich Alsted draws upon the same opinion, probably from Conciliator philosophicus by Goclenius: “Non-entis nullam esse disciplinam, Philosophi uno affirmant ore. Cujus sententiae hic est sensus; Non debet tradi aliqua scientia de non ente: quia disciplina nihil est aliud quam repraesentatio & veluti pictura rerum in mundo existentium. Sed hinc non efficitur, Metaphysicam non debet tractare de non-ente in genere. Non enim hic explicatur natura non-entis, quae nulla est, sed directe traditur natura entis, cui opponitur nonens; quod ideo dicitur hic considerari ex obliquo & opposite. Quando igitur Plato dicit, Sophistam versari in non-ente, per non-ens debet intelligi falsa opinio.” – Johann Heinrich Alsted, Cursus Philosophici 36

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By the concession of secondary intelligibility to non-ens, Goclenius awards non ens the status of a secondary object of metaphysics. Unlike Timpler but like Suárez, Goclenius establishes correspondence between aliquid and ens as well as between nihil and non-ens. It is not something that derives noetically from contrast with nothing (as non-nihil), but it is nihil which is thinkable only as the negation of aliquid, i.e., of ens. By bringing aliquid back into synonymy with ens, Goclenius seeks to obtain a twofold result: fi rst, to emphasize the primacy of ens as the trans-generic universal in relation to every other level of intelligibility; second, to confirm the status of the general science of ens for prima philosophia, i.e., according to Goclenius, for ontology. 2.4. On the origin of the term “ontology” Before conclusion, we must mention that historians have for a long time given Goclenius credit for coining the term “ontology”: it can be found, in the Greek version, in his Lexicon philosophicum (1613). However, in 2003 we learnt that the term had already appeared in Jakob Lorhard’s work, Ogdoas Scholastica, published in 1606. Lorhard was a Calvinist scholar who taught at St. Gallen Grammar High School. In 1607, Lorhard moved to Marburg after Prince Moritz von Hessen’s invitation to take up the chair of Reformed theology at the Philipps-Universität. Goclenius had been teaching in Marburg for years and it is a likely assumption that he took the new name for metaphysics from Lorhard.43 From a discovery in 2006,44 we learn that the chapter Lorhard dedicated to metaphysics in Ogdoas Scholastica is not an original work but a restatement of every theorem of Timpler’s Metaphysicae systema methodicum. The only originality displayed by Lorhard is his invention of the term ontologia, by which he meant metaphysics as a whole, including both its general and special parts.

Encyclopaedia Libris XXVII (Herbornae Nassoviorum: Typis Christophori Corvini, 1620), l. 5, c. 1, n. 8, col. 153. 43   “It seems to be a likely assumption that Lorhard and Göckel met one or several times during 1607 and that they shared some their findings with each other. In this way the sources suggest that Göckel during 1607 may have learned about Lorhard’s new term «ontologia» not only from reading Ogdoas scholastica but also from personal conversations with Lorhard.” – P. Ørstrøm, J. Andersen and E. Schärfe, “What has happened to Ontology”, in Conceptual Structures: common Semantics

for Sharing Knowledge, ed. F. Dau, M.-L. Mugnier and G. Stumme (Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2005), 425–438, esp. 429. 44   M. Lamanna, “Sulla prima occorrenza del termine «Ontologia». Una nota bibliografica”, Quaestio 6 (2006): 557–570; and M. Devaux, M. Lamanna, “The Rise and Early History of the Term Ontology (1606–1730)”, Quaestio 9 (2009): 173–208.

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Goclenius, however, took the term from Lorhard and re-used it in a new, more precise way. According to Goclenius, “ontology” must stand for the science of universal being and not for metaphysics as a whole. Therefore, ontology in Goclenius’ intention is solely the science of ens in general and of transcendental notions. It is prima philosophia, the science that has as its own subject the notion of ens, synonymous with res and aliquid. The doctrine of synonymia entis, as outlined in Suárez’s DM 3. 2.5 The reception of Suárez-Goclenius doctrine in the Schulmetaphysik of the 17th century Without doubt, the Schulmetphysik of the 17th century willingly endorsed the doctrine of aliquid re-proposed by Goclenius45 in continuity with Suárez. This position contrasts both with the solution proposed by Timpler and with that of Aquinas’ De veritate. Johann Heinrich Alsted, in his Cursus philosophici Encyclopaedia (1620), claims that there is an aequipollentia between these three notions. According to Alsted,46 being is necessarily res or aliquid, which means that the three names of ens, aliquid and res are equivalent with regard to their logical extension, but distinct as different logical intentions. In the Lexicon philosophicum (1653) by Johann Micraelius (Lütkeschwager), the synonymy of ens, aliquid and res is acquired on the one hand by asserting that something “non est genus entis, ut censuit Timplerus”, and on the other hand by arguing that something “non sit per modum rei”47 as Thomas Aquinas claimed.   In Lexicon philosophicum, Goclenius distinguished two different meanings of aliquid: it can be taken either “pro ente”, i.e., as a synonym of ens, or “ut modus entis”, i.e., as a property of being distinct from it. See Goclenius, “Aliquid”, in Lexicon philosophicum, 82. 46   “Vulgò numerant cum Arabibus sex transcendentia, ens, rem, aliquid, unum, verum, bonum, quorum symbolum memoriale faciunt reubav. Sed Perperam. Ens quippe, res & aliquid sunt synonyma: quod ita patet. Si haec tria principia sunt ἰσοδυναμοῦντα, aequipollentia, Impossibile est idem esse & non esse, Impossibile est idem esse aliquid & nihil, Impossibile est idem esse rem & non-rem, etiam tria ista vocabula, ens, aliquid, & res sunt synonyma.” – Alsted, Cursus, l. 5, c. 1, n. 7, col. 153; See also Johann Heinrich Alsted, Encyclopaedia Septem tomis distincta (Herbornae Nassoviorum, 1630), t. III, l. 11, c. 1, p. 575, repr. ed. W. Schmidt-Biggemann (Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt: FrommannHolzboog, 1989), Bd. 2: 575. On the origin of the syntagm “reubav”, see Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition, 149. 47   “Aliquid est illud quod non est nihil, sed habet aliquam quidditatem, seu essentiam. Aliquid aequipollet Enti. Et propterea Ens, Res & Aliquid sunt synonyma. Aliquid igitur non est genus entis, ut censuit Timplerus […]. Aliquid non sit per modum rei.” – Johannes Micraelius, “Aliquid, aliud”, in Lexicon philosophicum terminorum philosophis usitatorum ordine alphabetico sic digestorum (Jenae: impensis Jeremiae Mamphrasii, typis Casparis Freyschmidii, 1653), coll. 77–78. 45

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In the end, the doctrine of synonymy comes to Christian Wolff48 after a long period of thriving and success apud scholasticos, i.e., during the development of the 16th and 17th century protestant Schulmetaphysik. 3. CONCLUSION

I have discussed some significant similarities between Suárez and Goclenius in their doctrines of synonymia entis, identity of ens and intelligibile, and being as the subject of metaphysics. Furthermore, I have pointed out some important differences between the two authors. As mentioned above, Goclenius’ ontology is founded on that of the Jesuit Benet Perera. It can be said, therefore, that the main differences between the ontology of Goclenius and Suárez are originally the differences between the ontologies of Perera and Suárez. While in Suárez’s metaphysics the elaboration of the theme of synonymy of being with res and aliquid leads to the objective concept of ens reale, the subject of Suárez’s metaphysics, in the case of Perera, and even more so of Goclenius, the synonymy between ens, aliquid and res yields different results. According to Goclenius, these three concepts are the conceptual basis that brings universal being (ens universaliter sumptum) into the subject of ontology. Universal being is a more general concept than that of the real being of Suárez, because it is extended to both real being and being of reason by means of an analogical structure of primarium–secundarium: Dici & sic potest subjectum primae philosophiae primarium est Ens reale sub ratione universali. Secundarium est Ens rationis.49

Goclenius’ ontology can, in this way, achieve a greater degree of universality than Suárez’s, without abandoning the confines of entity, as in Timpler. Therefore, in the Conciliator philosophicus, Goclenius presents his own view of ontology as a solution mediating between those of Suárez and Timpler. The comparison between Goclenius and Suárez demonstrates that the “birth” of ontology during the 16th and 17th centuries does not occur as a simple and linear response to Suárez’s metaphysical paradigm. There are great differences between the models of the Jesuits Perera, Fonseca and Suárez. Referring just to one Jesuit rather than the others, authors like Goclenius, Timpler and Martini succeed in obtaining   “Quicquid est vel esse posse concipitur, dicitur Res, quatenus est aliquid: ut adeo Res definiri possit per id, quod est aliquid. Unde & realitas & quidditas apud scholasticos synonyma sunt. E. gr. Arbor & ens dicitur, & res: ens scilicet, si existentiam respicis; res vero, si quidditatem, sive quod sit aliquid, aut determinata quaedam notio eidem respondeat.” –Christian Wolff, Philosophia prima sive ontologia, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua omnis cognitionis humanae principia continentur (1730) (ed. Francofurti et Lipsiae: Prostat in Officina Libraria Rengeriana, 1736), § 243, p. 196. 49   Goclenius, Conciliator philosophicus, pars 1, c. 2, q. 1, p. 9–10. 48

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different results in metaphysics. Suárez began to be used in a “conservative” sense, primarily by the Lutherans, in order to fight the innovations brought about by Timpler’s interpretation of Fonseca; innovations that were designed to challenge the traditional way of understanding metaphysics, and in particular, ontology. Making real being the subject of ontology, in line with Suárez, was intedend to keep, at least de jure, ontology in the confines of reality and to avoid trespassing into the realm of pure intelligibility. In this way, the comparison between Goclenius and Suárez opens up the possibility of new and better ways of understanding one of the key moments in modern continental philosophy: the birth of ontology. Nevertheless, much remains to be done before this work is completed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY ANCIENT AND SCHOLASTIC SOURCES Alsted, Johann Heinrich. Cursus Philosophici Encyclopaedia Libris XXVII. Herbornae Nassoviorum: Typis Christophori Corvini, 1620. — Encyclopaedia Septem tomis distincta. Herbornae Nassoviorum, 1630. Reprint. Edited by W. Schmidt-Biggemann. Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1989. Aquinas, Thomas. Summa theologiae. — Quaestiones disputatae De veritate. Arnisaeus, Henning. De constitutione et partibus Metaphysicae, tractatus in quo pleraque ad hanc materiam pertinentia discutiuntur. Francofurti ad Oderam: Impensis Iohannis Thimen Bibliopolae, 1606. Cottwitz, Reinard. Zητήματα Philosophica Quorum Defensionem S.S. T.P. Sub Praesidio Clarissimi Excellentissimique Viri, Dn. M. Rodolphi Goclenii. Marpurgi Cattorum: Typis Rodolphi Hutwelckeri, 1604. Fonseca, Petrus. Commentarii in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae. Francofurti: Typis Ioannis Saurij, impensis Ioannis Theobaldi Schonvvetteri, 1599. Göckel, Rudolph (Goclenius). Conciliator Philosophicus. Casselis: Ex officina typographica Mauritiana, opera Wilhelmi Wesselii, 1609. — In Clementis Timpleri Metaphysicam Notae, Praefatio. In Clemens Timpler, Metaphysicae systema methodicum. Francoforti: Prelo Richteriano, impensa vero Conradi Nebenii, 1607. — Isagoge in peripateticorum et scholasticorum primam philosophiam quae dici consuevit metaphysica. Francofurti: Ex Officina M. Zachariae Palthenii, 1598. Reprint, Hildesheim: Olms, 1976. — Lexicon philosophicum quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur. Francofurti: Typis viduae Matthiae Beckeri, impensis Petri Musculi & Ruperi Pistorij, 1613.

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Martini, Jakob. Exercitationum metaphysicarum libri duo. Leipzig: Sumptibus Zachariae Schureri Bibliopolae, 1608. Micraelius, Johannes. Lexicon philosophicum terminorum philosophis usitatorum ordine alphabetico sic digestorum. Jenae: impensis Jeremiae Mamphrasii, typis Casparis Freyschmidii, 1653. Perera, Benet. De communibus omnium rerum naturalium Principijs et Affectionibus. Romae: Impensis Venturini Tramezini, apud Franciscum Zanettum, & Bartholomaeum Tosium socios, 1576. Plato. Sophist. Timpler, Clemens. Metaphysicae systema methodicum. Francoforti: Prelo Richteriano, impensa vero Conradi Nebenii, 1607. Wolff, Christian. Philosophia prima sive ontologia, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua omnis cognitionis humanae principia continentur. Francofurti et Lipsiae: Prostat in Officina Libraria Rengeriana, 1736.

MODERN WORKS Courtine, Jean-François. “Ontologie ou métaphysique?”, Giornale di metafisica 7 (1985): 3–24. — Suárez et le système de la métaphysique. Paris: PUF, 1990. Darge, Rolph. Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition. Leiden– Boston: Brill, 2004. Devaux, M. and M. Lamanna. “The Rise and Early History of the Term Ontology (1606– 1730)”. Quaestio 9 (2009): 173–208. Falckenheiner, W., ed. Personen- und Ortsregister zu der Matrikel und den Annalen der Universität Marburg, 1527–1652. Marburg, 1904. Reprint, Nendeln (Liechtenstein): Kraus, 1980. Freedman, Joseph S. “Aristotle and the Context of Philosophy Instruction at Central European Schools and Universities during the Reformation Era (1500–1650)”. In Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500–1700. Teaching and Texts at Schools and Universities, V: 213–253. Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 1999. — “Classifications of Philosophy, the Sciences, and the Arts in Sixteenth-and Seventeenth-Century Europe”. The Modern Schoolman 72 (1994): 37–65. — “Encyclopaedic Philosophical Writings in Central Europe during the High and Late Renaissance (ca. 1500 – ca. 1700)”. Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 37 (1994): 212–256. — European Academic Philosophy in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries. The Life, Significance, and Philosophy of Clemens Timpler (1563/4–1624). Hildesheim – Zürich – New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1988. — “Philosophy Instruction within the Institutional Framework of Central European Schools and Universities during the Reformation Era”. History of the Universities 5 (1985): 117–166. Hübener, Wolfgang. Zum Geist der Prämoderne. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1985.

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Lamanna, M. “Sulla prima occorrenza del termine «Ontologia». Una nota bibliografica”. Quaestio 6 (2006): 557–570. Leinsle, Ulrich G. Das Ding und die Methode. Methodische Konstitution und Gegenstand der frühen protestantischen Metaphysik. Augsburg: Maro Verlag, 1985. Lewalter, E. Spanisch-jesuitische und deutsch-luterische Metaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts. 2nd edition. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967. Moreau, P.-F. “Wolff et Goclenius”. Archives de philosophie 65 (2002): 7–14. Ørstrøm P., J. Andersen and E. Schärfe. “What has happened to Ontology”. In Conceptual

Structures: Common Semantics for Sharing Knowledge, edited by F. Dau, M.-L. Mugnier and G. Stumme, 425–438. Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2005.

Rompe, E. M. Die Trennung von Ontologie und Metaphysik. Der Ablösungsprozeß und seine Motivierung bei Benedictus Pererius und anderen Denkern des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts. Bonn: Druck im Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1968. Vollrath, E. “Die Gliederung der Metaphysik in eine Metaphysica generalis und eine Metaphysica Specialis”. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 16 (1962): 258–284. Wundt, Max. Die deutsche Schulmetaphyisik des 17. Jahrhunderts. Tübingen: Mohr, 1939.

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DAS GEDANKENDING UND DER GEGENSTAND DER METAPHYSIK EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUM PROBLEM DER ANALOGIE ZWISCHEN DEM REALEN SEIENDEN UND DEM ENS RATIONIS IN DEN DISPUTATIONES METAPHYSICAE DES SUÁREZ Jorge Uscatescu Barrón ABSTRACT

In the 1st and the 54th of the Disputationes metaphysicae Suárez includes the being of reason into the adequate object of metaphysics, but this poses a serious objection to the unity of this science. How does he solve the problem? First of all this paper shows how Suárez argues in favour of the being of reason as an object that should be treated by metaphysics instead by other sciences like dialectics and physics, which deal basically with real beings. Then he proceeds to explain the similarity between real beings and beings of reason and presents a type of analogy which could bridge the gap. Finally, he pleads for an improper analogy of proportionality and rejects the analogy of intrinsic and extrinsic attribution. This minimal analogy is enough for the metaphysics and its object, the concept of real being, to maintain their unity.

1. EINLEITUNG Am Ende einer langen, im Mittelalter einsetzenden Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik führt Suárez die gesamte Diskussion nochmal vor Augen, und zieht eine endgültige zusammenfassende Bilanz: Der adäquate Gegenstand der Metaphysik sei das ens reale samt seinen Eigenschaften und Ursachen unter Ausschluß vom ens rationis und ens per accidens.1 Zur Metaphysik, die sich als Entfaltung und 1   DM 1, 1, 26 (XXV, 11a): „Dicendum est ergo, ens in quantum ens reale esse obiectum adaequatum huius scientiae […]. Ostensum est enim, obiectum adaequatum huius scientiae debere comprehendere Deum, et alias substantias immateriales, non tamen solas illas. Iterum debere comprehendere non tantum substantias, sed etiam accidentia realia, non tamen entia rationis, et omnino per accidens; sed huiusmodi obiectum nullum aliud esse potest praeter ens ut sic; ergo illud est obiectum adaequatum“. Zu diesem Sachverhalt und seiner Begründung bei Suárez vgl. meinen Aufsatz „El concepto de metafísica en Suárez: su objeto y su dominio“, Revista Pensamiento 51 (1995): 215–236. In bezug auf diese Frage aber mit anderen Schwerpunkten ist inzwischen eine umfangreiche Literatur entstanden. Eine ausführliche Bibliographie ist bei Jacob Schmutz, „Science divine et métaphysique chez Francisco Suárez“, in Francisco Suárez „Der ist der Mann“. Homenaje al

JORGE USCATESCU BARRÓN

Aufklärung des objektiven Begriffs vom Seienden (vom realen Seienden) herausstellt,2 gehört auch die Einteilung des Seienden in Unendliches (Gott) und Endliches sowie die Behandlung von beiden Seinsarten einschließlich der zehn Kategorien des endlichen Seienden. Damit ist der Umfang des realen Seins abgesteckt. Deshalb scheint an dieser Stelle in der 53. disputatio die Behandlung der Metaphysik zum Abschluß gekommen zu sein. Warum hängt Suárez nun die 54. disputatio an, in der das Gedankending oder ens rationis behandelt wird? Diese Frage läßt sich in drei weiteren Fragen ausgliedern, die ich in diesem Beitrag zu behandeln vorhabe. 1. Welcher Wissenschaft kommt die Behandlung des Gedankendinges zu? 2. Wenn das ens reale allein Gegenstand der Metaphysik ist, wie kann das ens rationis trotzdem zur Metaphysik gerechnet werden? 3. Wenn der Gegenstand der Metaphysik ein einheitlicher sein soll, ist eine Einheit von ens rationis und ens reale erforderlich, und wenn schon, wie ist diese beschaffen? 2. DAS ENS RATIONIS ALS GEGENSTAND DER METAPHYSIK

Wenngleich die Arten des Gedankendings in verschiedenen Wissenschaften abgehandelt wurden, haben die Scholastiker oft die Frage aufgeworfen, ob das ens rationis der eigene Gegenstand der Logik sei. An eine langwierige Diskussion anknüpfend gibt Suárez seine Antwort in zwei Schritten. Zunächst einmal wird in einem positiven Teil die Metaphysik als Behandlungsort des ens rationis und seine Bedeutung für die Metaphysik, Philosophie, Theologie und Logik unterstrichen.3 Warum es in bezug auf die Metaphysik so ist, wird an dieser Stelle nicht gesagt, im Laufe der metaphysischen Besinnungen wurde jedoch allmählich deutlicher, daß die Aufklärung des realen Seienden ohne eine Lehre des Gedankendinges nicht auskommen kann. Schon am Anfang der Disputationes metaphysicae zeigt Suárez, warum das ens rationis in der Metaphysik behandelt werden soll, obwohl es nicht ihr adäquater Gegenstand ist.4 Zunächst ist es der Umgrenzung des objektiven Seinsbegriffs insofern dienlich, als der Begriff vom realen Seienden erst in Abgrenzung gegen das ihm entgegengesetzte ens rationis festere Konturen erhält. Die transzendentalen

Prof. Salvador Castellote (Valencia: Facultad de Teología „San Vicente Ferrer” 2004), Anm. 9 auf S. 350–351 zu finden. Hinzu kommt: Daniel Heider, „The Unity of Suárez’ Metaphysics“, Medioevo 35 (2009): 475–505; Rolf Darge, “Der suarezianische Ansatz der Ersten Philosophie und die Metaphysik tradition”, in Bohemia jesutica 1556-12006, hrsg. Petronilla Cemus (Praha: Karolinum, 2010), Band I: 497–508. 2   DM 2, 1, 1 (XXV, 64b–65a). In diesem Band sind weitere Beiträge zum Thema abgedruckt. 3   DM 54, prol., n. 1 (XXVI, 1014b–1015a). 4   DM 1, 1, 6–7 (XXV, 3b–4b).

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„Eigenschaften“ oder Dimensionen des Seins werden allein mittels der entia rationis erkannt.5 Drittens haben einige gedankliche Seiende ein reales Fundament. Diese drei Argumente lassen sich im Laufe der folgenden metaphysischen Reflexionen um weitere vermehren. In der Universalienfrage wird zudem deutlich, daß das Allgemeine als solches in seiner Allgemeinheit als Werk der Vernunft nur ein ens rationis ist, das jedoch ein reales Fundament hat.6 Der Vernunftunterschied, der eine wichtige Rolle in der Metaphysik spielt, gilt auch für das Gedankending, etwa für den Selbstbezug jedes gedanklichen Dinges mit sich selbst.7 In seiner Lehre der Relationen werden einerseits die kategoriale bzw. reale Relation und die transzendentale Relation, die mehrere kategoriale Akzidenzien durchzieht, von der Vernunftrelation (etwa der Identität eines Dinges mit sich selbst oder der Ähnlichkeit zwischen zwei Dingen) grundsätzlich unterschieden.8 Auch die vernunftgemäßen Relationen sollen in der Analyse der realen Relationen zur Sprache kommen. Im zweiten Schritt werden die Wissenschaften betrachtet, die irgendwie das Gedankending als Gegenstand haben könnten. Die Dialektik dürfte wohl als diejenige Disziplin gekennzeichnet werden, die das Gedankending zum Gegenstand macht.   Vgl. auch DM 3, 1, 11 (XXV, 106b): „[O]portet ergo ut de formali significent aliquid praeter ens; non possunt autem de formali significare entitatem aliquam superadditam enti, ab ipsoque ex natura rei distinctam, ut ostensum est; neque etiam significare possunt entia rationis in rigore sumpta, ut dixi; ergo nihil aliud dicere possunt, nisi aut negationem, aut privationem, vel aliquam habitudinem seu denominationem extrinsecam.“ Zur ontologischen Verfassung der transzendentalen Eigenschaften vgl. meinen Aufsatz „Acerca de la unidad. Un estudio sobre las Disputationes Metaphysicae de Suárez“, Endoxa 3 (1994): 195–223, wo ich erläutere, welcher Art diese entia rationis sind, obwohl sie es nicht de formali sind. Vgl. dagegen Rolf Darge, Suárez’ ranszendentale Auslegung und die Metaphysiktradition, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 80 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 103–138. Vgl. meine Rezension zum Buch in Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía 33 (2006): 555–559, in der meine Ansicht nochmal begründend bekräftigt wird. 6   DM 6, 7, 2 (XXV, 229): „Et ideo dicimus, permissive seu indefinite universalia esse entia realia, non tamen necessario, et omnino universaliter. Quia vero cognitio intellectus incipit necessario a realibus entibus, tum quia operatio reflexa supponit directam, tum etiam quia ficta entia non concipiuntur, nisi per aliquam habitudinem, vel proportionem ad vera entia, ideo recte etiam dicitur, ea universalia esse entia realia, quae per directam operationem intellectus abstrahi possunt. Si autem sit sermo de universalitate ipsa, seu de intentione universalitatis, sic communiter dici solet non esse ens reale, sed rationis, quod in hoc sensu verum est, scilicet, quod non est proprietas aliqua, neque aliquid intrinsece et realiter inhaerens naturae, qua denominatur universalis, iuxta ea quae diximus.“ 7   DM 7, 1, 6 (XXV, 251b–252a). 8   DM 47, 9, 6 (XXVI, 820). Zur vernunftgemäßen Relation vgl. Salvador Castellote Cubells, Grundzüge der Disputationes metaphysicae des Suárez unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Rezeption des aristotelischen prosti (relationes praedicamentales et transcendentales) und der Kategorien actio und passio (online, url = http://www.suarez-society.eu/pdf/Relationstheorie%20des%20Suarez.pdf), 97ff. 5

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Nach Suárez beschäftigt sie sich als Kunst der geistigen Akte allerdings mit dem realen Sein, insofern diese geistigen Akte allerdings real sind,9 und muß deshalb vom Gedankending an sich absehen. Diese Ansicht scheint in die philosophischen Anfänge des Suárez zurückzureichen, wie es sich in seinem während seiner Lehrtätigkeit in Segovia 1571–1575 entstandenen Kommentar zu De anima des Aristoteles zeigt.10 In seiner Auseinandersetzung mit den drei Arten des Allgemeinen bestimmt Suárez das logische Allgemeine als den wahren Gegenstand der Dialektik. Da dieses ein ens rationis ist, glaubt man, daß die Dialektiker es behandeln müßten, was nach Suárez nicht zutreffend ist.11 Der Grund liegt für den Ausschluß des ens rationis aus der Logik wiederum darin, daß dieses kein reales Seiendes ist. 9   DM 1, 1, 3 (XXV, 3a); 1, 4, 26–30 (XXV, 34–35). Die oratio, die Pedro da Fonseca als den Gegenstand der Dialektik ausmacht, ist ein reales Seiendes. Vgl. Institutionum dialecticorum libri octo [1564], introduçao, establecimiento de texto, traduçao e notas par Joaquim Ferreira Gomes (Universidade de Coimbra, 1964), hier l. I, c. 3, (I, 22). 10   Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima, editado por Salvador Castellote, traducido por Luis y Carlos Baciero, 3 Bände (Barcelona: Editorial Labor – Madrid: Fundación Xavier Zubiri, 1978–1991). 11   CQDA, d. 9, q. 3, n. 22, (ed. Cast. III, 144, 1226–1228). Diese Lehre findet sich bei einem von Suárez ansonsten oft benutzten, aber in dieser Frage nirgends erwähnten Autor: Domingo de Soto (1494–1560), der auch das Gedankending nicht als subiectum dialecticae sive logicae angesehen hatte. In seinem In Porphyrii Isagoge (Venetiis, 1587), q. 5. proemialis, f. 20b, bringt er vier Argumente gegen die Inklusion des Gedankendinges in den Gegenstand der Logik vor: 1. ens rationis wird auch von der Grammatik und Rhetorik behandelt. 2. Die Logik handelt vom Satz und Syllogismus, welche alle conceptus formales und keine entia rationis sind. 3. Da Dialektik und Logik dasselbe sind, und der Gegenstand der Dialektik die argumentatio ist, kann das ens rationis nicht Gegenstand der Logik sein. 4. Da die Wissenschaft auf die Wahrheit ausgerichtet ist und das ens rationis nicht wahr ist, kann dieses kein Gegenstand der Dialektik sein. Vgl. Saverio Di Liso, „Domingo de Soto sulla questione Utrum subiectum logicae sit ens rationis“, Rivista di storia della filosofia 3 (1998): 567–598 mit einem Kommentar und einer Ausgabe des Textes gemäß einer Handschrift und der Venedig-Ausgabe von 1587). In der Tat scheint Suárez diese Lehre nicht von Domingo de Soto entlehnt zu haben, sondern von anderen Jesuiten, wie Francisco de Toledo und Pedro de Fonseca (vgl. Anm. 9), welche Soto gründlich studiert haben. Jedenfalls ist die Lehrmeinung, daß die entia rationis nicht Gegenstand der Logik sind, eine den Jesuiten des 17. Jahrhunderts gemeinsame Position. Gegenüber den Thomisten, die etwa ab Hervaeus Natalis († 1323), De secundis intentionibus, q. 5, art. 2, jetzt in: The Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323) the Doctor Perspicacissimus on Second Intentions, vol. I: English Translation, vol. II: A Latin Edition by John P. Doyle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2008) S. 556, bis Juan de Santo Tomás, Cursus philosophicus thomisticus, editio nova, 3 Bände, ed. Beatus Reiser (Turin: Marietti, 1948), hier Ars Logica, Band I: 265a, hingegen das ens rationis zum Gegenstand der Logik erklärt haben, obwohl es Ausnahmen gegeben hat, wie Domingo de Soto selbst, Dominikaner und Thomist jedoch mit einer nominalistisch geprägten Ausbildung in Alcalá und Paris. Sven K. Knebel, Suarezismus. Erkenntnistheoretisches aus dem Nachlass

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Die Physik, insofern sie sich mit den Beraubungen in der Wirklichkeit auseinandersetzt, behandelt die Gedankendinge, aber nur insoweit diese mit einem realen Subjekt oder einer realen Materie verknüpft sind, die allgemeine Frage nach dem Wesen des ens rationis sowie seine Vielfalt bleiben jedoch in dieser Wissenschaft außer acht. Damit aber ist nur für den Ausschluß des Gedankendinges aus dem Bereich der genannten Disziplinen argumentiert worden. Suárez schließt sich der seit Aristoteles vertretenen Auffassung an, wonach die entia rationis in die Metaphysik hineingehörten.12 Im allgemeinen ist das Gedankending das, was keine essentia realis hat und demnach zur wahren Existenz (existentia realis) unbefähigt ist.13 Ihm kommt jedoch eine des Jesuitengenerals Tirso González de Santalla (1624–1705), Abhandlung und Edition, Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 51 (Amsterdam–Philadephia: B. R. Grüner, 2011), 39–49, weist mit dem Aufgebot einer reichen Quellensammlung darauf hin, daß die Jesuiten vom 16. bis ins 18. Jahrhundert hinein die Logik als Wissenschaft von den Verstandeshandlungen bestimmten, nicht aber von den entia rationis, und daß diese als jesuitisches Gedankengut zu betrachtende Lehre auch von den Cartesianern übernommen worden ist. Diese Lehre läßt sich etwa bis Luis de Lossada: Cursus philosophici regalis Collegii Salmanticensis (1724–1735), in: Logica, l. 1, disp. 2, cap. 4–5 (Barcelona: Subirana, 1883), Band I: 204–254, mühelos verfolgen. An dieser Stelle wird die ganze Debatte aufgerollt und die jesuitische Meinung nochmals bekräftigt, die auch von den Skotisten übernommen wird, und so bilden beide Orden eine gemeinsame Front gegen die Thomisten (vgl. ibid., cap. 4, n. 7–8, t. 1: 207–208). Eine Geschichte des Verhältnisses von Logik und Metaphysik bezüglich des ens rationis liegt nicht vor; Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, 2 Bände, (Stuttgart – Bad Canstatt: Frommann, 1970), hat allerdings die Geschichte der Abgrenzung der Logik gegen die Metaphysik in beeindruckender Weise thematisiert, insbesondere zum jesuitischen Logikverständnis siehe Band I: 381–439, und II: 315–333. 12   Metaph. IV, 1, 1003b8–11. Hier verficht Aristoteles ein Verhältnis des μὴ ὄν zur οὐσία πϱὸς ἕν-Verhältnis). Zum wahrheitsgemäßen Seienden vgl. Metaph. VI, 4, 1027b18 ff., wo dieses Seiende von der ersten Philosophie ausgeschlossen wird. Vgl. Alexander von Aphrodisias, In Metaphysicam, CAG I: 458 und 666. Thomas scheint aufgrund einer anderen Aristoteles-Stelle diese Ansicht zurückgewiesen zu haben. Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis, ed. M.-R. Cathala et R. M. Spiazzi (Taurini–Romae: Marietti, 1964), l. 6, c. 3, lect. 4, n. 1241–1244, S. 311–312. 13   DM 54, 1, 4 (XXVI, 1016a). Zum ens rationis bei Suárez sind seit 1948 einige Arbeiten enstanden, in denen, soweit ich sie überblicken kann, die hier zu behandelnde Problematik bestenfalls nur erwähnt wird. Als letzte Publikation verweise ich auf Daniel D. Novotný: Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel: A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), insbesondere 36–116, mit einer vollständigen Bibliographie zum Thema bei Suárez, Hurtado de Mendoza und Caramuel 271–289. Auf S. 54–57 wird die im vorliegenden Beitrag analysierte Problematik kurz besprochen und mit einer hilfreichen Zeichnung veranschaulicht. Für weitere bibliographische Angaben vgl. Jean-Paul Coujou, Bibliografía suareciana, Cuadernos de pesamiento español 41 (Pamplona: eunsa, 2010).

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gewisse Wirklichkeit im Sinne der Vorgegebenheit für einen Verstand überhaupt zu. Wie die Bezeichnung ens rationis auch nahelegt, bringt der Verstand durch eine Art realer Wirkung dieses Seiende hervor, aber so daß das hervorgebrachte Gedankending objektiv nur im Verstande ist. Das reale Seiende ist zwar im Erkanntwerden auch dem Verstand vorgegeben,14 aber während das Gedankending allein die Seinsweise des Vorgegebenseins für den Verstand kennt, kann das reale Seiende auch außerhalb des 14   DM 6, 7, 2 (XXV, 229a): „esse autem obiective in intellectu, non solum veris entibus, sed etiam fictis convenire potest“. Ihm folgen Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa philosophia, nova editio (Lugduni: sumptibus Ludovici Prost, 1624), Metaphysica, disp. 19, sect. 2, subsect. 2, § 29, S. 946b; ibid., sect. 3, § 65, S. 952b; Hurtado de Mendoza will aber auch esse obiective in intellectu tantum mit cognosci gleichsetzen (disp. 19, s. 3, n. 64–65, 952b: “habere se obiective in intellectu est cognosci per intellectum” (n. 65), und sogar in Suárez den Ahnherrn dieser Gleichsetzung sehen, ohne dabei zu bemerken, daß Suárez selbst dies nie ausgedrückt hat, weil er ja das Erkanntwerden für eine denominatio extrinseca gehalten hat, die nicht unbedingt ein ens rationis sein muß. Daniel D. Novotný, Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel, 128, sieht dagegen nicht namentlich genannte Anhaltspunkte für die Gleichsetzung bei Suárez, aber die Textstellen belegen das Gegenteil (vgl. unten). An Hurtado de Mendoza schließt sich sein Schüler Rodrigo de Arriaga an, Cursus philosophicus, editio quarta (Lugduni: sumptibus Claudii Prost, 1653), t. II, Metaphysica, disp. 6, sect. 1, n. 6, S. 632, wo er esse obiective und esse cognitum synonymisch gebraucht und dann die reale Erkenntnis von der Erkenntnis gedanklicher Dinge unterscheidet. Francisco de Oviedo, Cursus philosophicus ad unum corpus redactus (Lugduni: sumptibus Philippi Borde, Laurentii Arnoud, Claudi Rigaud, 1651), t. II, metaphysicae controversia 12, punctus 1, n. 2, S. 354b. Eigentlich handelt es sich bei dieser Wesensbestimmung des ens rationis um eine Lehre aus dem Mittelalter. Bereits Hervaeus Natalis unterschied einerseits das esse reale in rerum natura, das den wirklich außer der menschlichen Seele existierenden Dingen zukommt, von dem esse obiective in intellectu, das eben dem Gedankending zukommt, andererseits hielt er das esse obiective in intellectu und das esse subiective in intellectu, welches den wirklichen in der Seele existierenden Dingen zukommt, auseinander. Vgl. De secundis intentionibus, q. 3, a. 1, ibid., S. 420. In Hervaeus’ Definition vom esse des ens rationis als esse obiective in intellectu vermißt man jedoch den wichtigen, ja entscheidenden Zusatz tantum, denn das Verstandene schlechthin ist nicht eo ipso ein ens rationis, sondern ens rationis ist allein das, was bloß im Intellekt gegenständlich sein kann. Die Diskussion um den Zusatz tantum wurde von den Jesuiten fortgeführt. Lynceus, Universa philosophia scholastica (Lugduni: sumptibus Philippi Borde, Laurentii Arnaud et Claudii Rigaud, 1653), hier: Metaphysica, l. 4, tract. 1, § 27, t. 3: S. 236 versteht das tantum im formalen Sinne als Ausschluß von irgendeinem Prädikat außer dem esse obiective. González de Santalla: Cursus philosophicus (ein an dem Jesuitenkolleg von Santiago de Compostela vom 3. 7. 1653 bis zum 7. 7. 1655 diktierter Kurs), in Metaphysica, disp. 3, sect. 3, n. 61–62, ed. Sven K. Knebel, ibid., S. 403–404, interpretiert den durch das tantum ausgedrückten Ausschluß als nur in einem wesentlich falschen oder trügerischen Erkenntnisakt: „Unde particula ‘tantum’ posita in definitione entis rationis […] sed solum excludit quod illud habeat aut habere possit eo modo, quo repraesentatur per cognitionem fingentem […] ac per consequens, denotat illud esse obiective situm esse in cognitione essentialiter falsa et commentitia (n. 62, S. 403). Vgl. zum Sachverhalt Sven K. Knebel, Suarezismus, S. 358–359 in Anm. 227–228.

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Verstandes bestehen. Die Vorgegebenheit für den Verstand ist dem realen Seienden dagegen etwas Äußerliches. Aus diesen Überlegungen ergibt sich die zweite Definition des Gedankendinges als etwas, dessen Sein nur dem Verstand gegenständlich ist oder dessen Sein vom Verstand erfaßt wird, auch wenn es in sich keine Wirklichkeit hat.15 Die reine Vorgegebenheit besagt, daß die Gedankendinge entweder unmittelbar durch einen Verstandesakt oder mittelbar durch eine Reflexion des Verstandes entstanden sind. Durch das esse obiective tantum grenzt sich das Gedankending auch strikt gegen das Nichts ab, insofern dieses Objektivsein (esse obiectivum) dem Hervorgebrachtwerden durch den Verstand gleichkommt und einem Produkt des Verstandes gleichsam zu sein angefangen hat.16 Andererseits wird das ens rationis vom esse subiective in intellectu unterschieden, das die Seinsart der Begriffe und der species intelligibiles ist, welche wahrlich dem Intellekt anhaften.17 3. DAS VERHÄLTNIS DER ENTIA RATIONIS ZUM ESSE REALE: DIE ANALOGIE ALS VERKNÜPFUNG VON REALEM UND GEDANKLICHEM SEIENDEN

Wenn das ens rationis als dasjenige Seiende, das keineswegs existieren und deshalb keine essentia realis haben kann, definiert wird, wie kann es mit dem adäquaten Gegenstand der Metaphysik, dem ens reale zusammenhängen? Die Meinungen, die das ens rationis als Gegenstand der Metaphysik ansehen wollen, haben dies auf unterschiedliche Weise nachzuweisen versucht. Suárez referiert zunächst zwei Ansichten: die der Univozität eines Seinsbegriffes und die von seiner Supertranszendentalität, und schlägt am Schluß seine eigene Lösung vor. Hier soll nur die erste Ansicht behandelt werden. Ungenannte Autoren sollen eine Univozität zwischen entia realia und entia rationis vorgeschlagen, nämlich einen dem ens reale und dem ens rationis univoken gemeinsamen Begriff,18 und die Ansicht vertreten haben, daß der adäquate Gegenstand der

  DM 54, 1, 6 (XXVI, 1016b): „Et ideo recte definiri solet, ens rationis, esse illud, quod habet esse obiective tantum in intellectu, seu esse quod a ratione cogitatur ut ens, cum tamen in se entitatem non habeat.“ 16   DM 54, 2, 3 (XXVI, 1019a): „[…] quamvis ens rationis non habeat esse reale, habet tamen esse obiectivum quod tamen non semper habet; ergo quod nunc illud habeat, et non antea.“ 17   Zu diesem besonderen Problem der Lehre von den entia rationis vgl. Theo Kobusch, Sprache und Sein: Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache, Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken und mittelalterlichen Philosophie 11 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987), 196–201. 18   In DM 54, 1, 3 (XXVI, 1015b–1016a) wird offensichtlich auf DM 47, 3, 3 (XXVI, 794b): „Ostendimus enim ens non solum non esse univocum ad ens reale et rationis, verum etiam non habere unum conceptum communem illis, etiam analogum, sed vel aequivocum“, verwiesen. 15

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Metaphysik das Seiende in der höchsten Abstraktion sei, das alle realen Seienden (per se et per accidens) und die gedanklichen Seienden mit einschließt.19 Welche sind diese Autoren? Bereits Duns Scotus hatte den Begriff zurückgewiesen, der einerseits dem realen und der vernunftgemäßen Relation und andererseits dem realen Seienden und dem Gedankending gemeinsam ist. 20 Trotzdem legt er die Grundlagen für einen solchen univoken Begriff, wenn er in einem anderen Passus von der Äquivozität des Terminus res spricht. Dieser Umstand erfordert eine Aufklärung des Terminus „Ding“ und eine entsprechende dreifache Unterscheidung seiner Betrachtungsweise. Hier soll uns nur die Auffassung der Betrachtungsweise beschäftigen. Wenn man erstens res communissime nimmt, dann erstreckt sich res oder ens auf alles bis auf das Nichts („nihil“). Dieser Dingbegriff läßt sich auf zweierlei Weisen erklären. Wenn man das Nichts als das auffaßt, was einen Widerspruch enthält, dann ist das Ding alles, was keinen Widerspruch in sich birgt und deshalb sowohl außerhalb des Intellekts als auch innerhalb desselben sein kann. Das Seiende oder Ding umfaßt in diesem letzten Sinne sowohl das ens rationis als auch das ens reale, insofern das Gedankending kein Nichts ist und ein gewisses Sein im betrachtenden Intellekt besitzt.21 Scotus läßt mit Rücksicht auf die Logik und Dialektik, die von den intentiones logicae sprechen, sowie auf die relationes rationis diese allgemeinste Betrachtungsweise des ens als eines widerspruchsfreien gelten.22 Hier wird ens oder res als quodlibet conceptibile quod non includit contradictionem gedeutet. Aber in bezug auf diesen allgemeinen Begriff, der so Verschiedenes umfaßt, läßt Scotus selbst die Frage, ob die Univozität oder Analogie hier walte, unentschieden und erwägt auch die Möglichkeit einer solchen Wissenschaft. Obwohl Scotus die Möglichkeit eines solchen Seinsbegriffs, der reales Seiendes und ens rationis umgreift, offenläßt, macht er zugleich deutlich, daß das ens rationis 19   DM 1, 1, 2 (XXV, 2b): „Prima igitur sententia est ens abstractissime sumptum, quatenus sub se complectitur non solum universa entia realia, tam per se quam per accidens, sed etiam rationis entia, esse obiectum adaequatum huius scientiae“. DM 47, 3, 3 (XXVI, 794b): „Et hac ratione etiam diximus, obiectum adaequatum et directum metaphysicae non esse ens commune ad reale et rationis, sed ad reale tantum.“ 20   Reportata Parisiensia I, dist. 29, n. 10 (ed. Vivès XXII, 369); Super praedicamenta, q. 25 (ed. Bonav. I, 423f). Vgl. dazu Theo Kobusch, „Das Seiende als transzendentaler oder supertranszendentaler Begriff. Deutungen der Univozität des Begriffs bei Scotus und den Scotisten“, in John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics, ed. Ludwig Honnefelder, Rega Wood, Mechthild Dreyer (Leiden – New York – Köln: E. J. Brill, 1996), 352. 21   Quodlibet 3, a. 1, n. 8, in Obras del Doctor Sutil: Cuestiones cuodlibetales, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos 277, ed. Félix Alluntis (Madrid: Editorial Católica, 1968), 93: „Ens ergo vel res isto primo modo accipitur omnino communissime, et extendit se ad quodcumque quod non includit contradictionem, sive sit ens rationis, hoc est praecise habens esse in intellectu considerante, sive sit ens reale, habens aliquam entitatem extra considerationem intellectus.“ 22   Ibid., n. 9 (ed. Alluntis 93–94 ).

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vielmehr von Widerspruchsvollem, Unmöglichem, als vom Nichts unterschieden werden muß. Anderseits hält er diesen weiten Seinsbegriff und den in der zweiten Auffassung der allgemeinsten Betrachtungsweise herausgearbeiteten Begriff von ens oder res, das als „quod habere potest entitatem extra animam“ gedeutet wird, deutlich auseinander. Damit wird auch die Wissenschaft von diesem weiten Seinsbegriff gegen die avicennische Metaphysik, deren Objekt das ens reale ist, entschieden abgegrenzt.23 In der Zurückweisung eines solchen weiten Seinsbegriffs und der entsprechenden Wissenschaft folgt ihm Wilhelm von Ockham (1285/90–1348).24 Einen solchen univoken Begriff zieht auch Walter Burleigh (1274/75–1344) in Betracht, der ihn jetzt maxime transcendens nennt.25 Noch ausführlicher wurde ein solcher Begriff von Franziskus de Marchia (1290–1341) diskutiert.26 Der Scotist Nikolaus Bonetus (1280–1343) ist wohl der erste gewesen, der einen dem ens reale und dem ens rationis gemeinsamen, allgemeinen27 Seinsbegriff (ens in quantum ens) ernsthaft verfochten hat, der sich gerade zu dem ens reale und dem ens rationis durch die entsprechenden Modi kon  Ibid., n. 10 (ed. Alluntis 94).   Ohne Namensnennung (wohl Scotus) weist Ockham eine solche Möglichkeit in Ordinatio I, dist. 3, q. 8 zurück (Opera Theologica II, ed. Stephanus Brown, adlaborante Gedeone Gál, New York: Saint Bonaventure, 1970), 530–531): „Quod non habeat primitatem communitatis patet, quia nihil est univocum enti reali et enti rationis.“ 25   John P. Doyle, „Supertranszendent“, in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, hrsg. von Joachim Ritter und Karlfried Gründer (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 1998), Band 10, Sp. 648. Er verweist auf De puritate artis logicae, hrsg. von Ph. Boehner (St. Bonaventure, 1955), 59; De ente, hrg. von H. Saphiro, Manuscripta 7 (1963): 103–108. 26   Vgl. Sabine Folger-Fonfara, Das „Supertranszendentale“ und die Spaltung der Metaphysik. Der Entwurf des Franziskus von Marchia. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 96 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2008). Die Autorin sieht bei Franciscus de Marchia zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts einen metaphysischen Entwurf herausgearbeitet, der „die Möglichkeit einer Ausweitung des Bezugsbereiches der ‚Transzendentalien des 13. Jahrhunderts‘ “ (p. 17) ins Auge gefaßt hat. Der Text ist die dritte quaestio des Quodlibet Utrum intentio entis sit primo rei intentio (Quodlibet cum quaestionibus selectis ex commentario in librum Sententiarum, Specilegium Bonaventurianum 29, ed. Nazareno Mariani (Roma: Grottaferrata, 1997), 71–104), geschrieben nach Mariani (p. 18) um 1323. Da spricht der Autor von den intentiones neutrae, ein solcher neutraler Begriff aber wird als Gegenstand der Metaphysik abgelehnt (Folger-Fonfara, ibid., 168). 27   Habes Nicholai Bonetti quattuor volumina: metaphysicam, naturalem philosophiam, praedicamenta necnon theologiam naturalem comprehendunt, ed. Laurentius Venerius (Venetiis: Scotus, 1505), vol. I, c. 6, fol 8vb: „ens autem inquantum ens est quiditas unica enti reali et enti rationis […]“ Text bei Theo Kobusch, „Das Seiende als transzendentaler“, S. 361, Anm. 54. Insgesamt behandelt Bonetus das Thema auf fol. 7ra–11rb. Vgl. Anm. 36. Jetzt ausführlicher zum skotistischen Metaphysikansatz des Nicolaus Bonetus Isabelle Mandrella: „Metaphysik als Super transzendenta lienwissenschaft? Zum skotistischen Metaphysikentwurf des Nicolaus Bonetus“, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médièvales 75 (2008): 161–193; dieselbe: „Sujet de la métaphysique et étant surtranscendental“, Medioevo 34 (2009): 123–140. 23 24

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trahiert. Im Grunde aber ist die Lehre eines univoken Seinsbegriffs für ens reale und ens rationis eher eine Ausnahme im mittelalterlichen Denken, sogar in scotistischen Kreisen, wo statt dessen die Univozität des Seinsbegriffs für ens infinitum und ens finitum verfochten wurde.28 Gegen die Annahme eines univoken Seinsbegriffs und eines supertranszendentalen Begriffes überhaupt entschied sich Suárez, wenn er an einer Stelle in den Disputationes metaphysicae einem Vorschlag, der einen supertranszendentalen Begriff für die transzendentale Relation und die reale Relation vorsieht, entgegentrat29. Der Grund für diese Meinung liegt nach ihm darin, daß das Bezogensein auf etwas, das Wesen aller Relationen sowohl von den realen als auch von den vernunftgemäßen Relationen ausgesagt wird. Dieser den realen und den vernunftgemäßen Relationen gemeinsame supertranszendentale Relationsbegriff scheitert an der Wirklichkeit des Bezogenseins der realen Relation.30 Suárez benutzt indirekt ein weiteres Argument gegen einen dem ens reale und dem ens rationis gemeinsamen superstranszendentalen Begriff.31 In seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Durandus’ Bestimmung des ens rationis als denominatio extrinseca avant la lettre hatte er ein bedeutendes Argument gegen diejenige Position zu Feld geführt, die erkennbar, intelligibles oder sonstige extrinsische Benennungen zum supertrans28   Etwa Joannes Poncius, Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer (Lugduni: Sumptibus Ioannis Antonii Hugetan et Mari Antonii Ravaud, 1659), Metaphysica, disp. 2, q. 1, concl. 1, S. 879: „Nullus est conceptus obiectivus ipsis communis […] sed conceptus communis enti reali, et rationis non deberet esse formaliter reale aut ratione, sed deberet abstrahere ab utroque, sicut conceptus animalis abstrahit a rationali et irrationali […].“ Ein solcher Begriff müßte vom Wesen des Wirklichseins und vom Wesen des Gedankendinges absehen, was an sich unmöglich sei. Poncius hatte nun mehr das Supertranszendentale als den univoken Begriff im Sinne von Bonetus im Auge, was sich aus den Diskussionen des 16. und des 17. Jahrhunderts erklärt, in denen dieser neue Streitpunkt zum Durchbruch kam. Die Schule des Scotus im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert ist offensichtlich ihrem Ahnherrn in diesem Punkt nicht gefolgt. Vgl. die Verweise auf die Textstellen bei Sven K. Knebel, Suarezianismus, S. 377, Anm. 292. 29   DM 47, 3, 2 (XXVI, 794). 30   DM 47, 3, 3: „Cum ergo relationes rationis non sint entia realia, et consequenter nec vera entia, non possunt ad praedicamentum “ad aliquid”, quod reale est, pertinere. Addo praetera, non posse habere univocam convenientiam cum relationibus realibus, si supponamus illas esse vera entia realia“. Auf die Frage, welche Wissenschaft sich dieses supertranszendentalen Begriffs annähme, findet sich bei Suárez keine Antwort. 31   John P. Doyle, „Supertranscendental Being: On the Verge of Modern Philosophy“, in The Relation between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy, hrsg. Stephen F. Brown (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 299, legt nahe, daß Suárez diesen supertranszendentalen Begriff gebraucht, die angeführten Texte aber sprechen dagegen. Vielmehr handelt es sich um eine erdachte Möglichkeit, um die zu behandelnde These, nämlich, die Einheit des objektiven Seinsbegriffs, besser zu umgrenzen.

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zendentalen Begriff erhebt.32 Die denominatio extrinseca oder äußere Bezeichnung oder Benennung ist eine, die von einem Seienden genommen und auf ein anderes angewandt wird. Etwa das Erkanntsein ist eine für jedes Ding äußere Bezeichunung, insofern sein Sein vom menschlichen Erkennen als menschlichem Verhalten hergenommen wird, das an sich real ist. Da die denominatio extrinseca selbst eine reale Form ist, kann sie kein Gedankending konstituieren. 33 Man könnte dagegen einwenden, daß diese vom Erkennen hergenommene denominatio extrinseca darin bestünde, nur im Verstand zu sein (esse obiective in intellectu), und damit hätte man die Definition des Gedankendings. Ist esse obiective in intellectu eine denominatio extrinseca? Erkanntsein und alle diese aus dem Verstehen hergenommene Bezeichnungen setzen nichts Reales in die Sache selbst. Dagegen führt Suárez zwei Argumente auf, von welchem das zweite hier zu entfalten gilt. Das Erkanntsein ist zwar nicht etwas, was real zur Sache gehört, nämlich eine reale Eigenschaft des Dinges, aber es ist an sich selbst als Form etwas Reales und hat nicht nur ein esse obiective in intellectu.34 Deshalb könnte eine solche reale Form (Erkanntsein) kein supertranszendentaler Begriff sein, der vom ens reale und ens rationis absähe.35 Trotz dieser Einwände gegen einen supertranszendentalen Seinsbegriff basiert die Ansicht, daß das Sein sowohl dem realen Seienden als auch dem Gedankending zugewiesen werde,36 auf der ansonsten richtigen Einsicht in die Seinsverfassung des ens rationis als Wirkung des Verstandes. Daran ist nur richtig, daß das ens rationis zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt durch die Einwirkung einer Ursache (Verstand) zu sein   DM 54, 2, 6–16.   DM 54, 2, 10 (XXVI, 1020b): „Nam si denominatio sumitur a forma reali, hoc ipso in rebus existit; et consecuenter non pertinet ad entia rationis. Antecedens patet, quia illa forma habet verum esse reale sine dependentia a ratione; ergo etiam denominatio ab illa proveniens, quamvis extrinseca, realis tamen est, et non est tantum obiective in intellectu.“ 34   DM 54, 2, 13 (XXVI, 1021b): „Secundo, deficit illa evasio, quia in rigore falsum est denominationem sumptam ab actu directo intellectus habere tantum esse obiective in intellectu, nam proprie potius habet esse formale in intellectu quam obiectum.“ 35   DM 54, 2, 14 (XXVI, 1021b): „Quocirca, si praecise sistamus in denominatione extrinseca proveniente a forma reali, et ab aliqua eius habitudine non ficta, sed vera, et in re ipsa existente, non existimo pertinere ad ens rationis, sed comprehendendi sub latitudine entis realis, saltem ex parte formae denominantis.“ 36   DM 54, 1, 3 (XXVI, 1015b): „Nec etiam desunt qui entibus rationis attribuant entitatem independentem ab actuali cognitione intellectus, quorum opinio attingit quaestionem de modo quo consurgunt, vel suo modo causantur entia rationis“. Dann wird auf die folgende Sektion verwiesen, wo diese Frage behandelt wird. Bonetus gibt auch diesen Grund an (ibid.): „[…] et per ens rationis non intelligo ens in anima, sed esse quod habet cognitum in cognoscente, vel aliquid derelictum et sequela talis esse: hoc probatur quia primum principium ita verificatur sub disiunctione de ente rationis sicut de ente reali: ergo subiectum primi principii: quod est ens in quantum ens uniformiter reperitur in ente reali et rationis.“ (Text bei Theo Kobusch, „Das Seiende als transzendentaler“, S. 361, Anm. 54). 32

33

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anfängt, aber Suárez unterstreicht den Unterschied zwischen der Wirksamkeit einer Wirkursache und der des Verstandes.37 Da die Wirkung des Verstandes nur in einem esse obiective tantum endet, kann die Wirkursächlichkeit des Verstandes mit einer physischen nicht gleichgesetzt werden, die wesensgemäß zum realen Sein führt. Wenn es sich so verhält, kann ein Vergleich zwischen dem gedanklichen und dem realen Ding hergestellt werden, so daß jenes auch in der Metaphysik mit behandelt werden kann? Da das Gedankending nur im Vergleich mit dem realen Sein, dem Gegenstand der Metaphysik, analysiert werden kann, vermag die Metaphysik allein unter Anwendung einer Art Analogie des realen Seienden, seines wahren Objektes, das Gedankending zum Gegenstand einer Sonderbetrachtung zu machen.38 Aus all den oben genannten Bestimmungen und Reflexionen über die Natur des Gedankendings ging seine gewisse Ähnlichkeit mit dem realen Seienden hervor. Die verstandesmäßige Vorgegebenheit etwa ist zwar nicht die Wirklichkeit selbst, sie verhält sich jedoch zu dieser auf eine gewisse Weise, insofern sie als Bestehen außerhalb des Verstandesaktes der Wirklichkeit dem Bestehen außerhalb der Ursachen vergleichbar ist. Wie faßt Suárez diese Ähnlichkeit oder Analogie auf? Suárez unterscheidet zwei Arten von Analogie: analogia attributionis und analogia proportionalitatis.39 In der analogia attributionis verhalten sich ein erstes Bezugsding oder primum analogatum und ein sekundäres oder secundum analogatum auf zwei Weisen zueinander. Gemäß der analogia attributionis intrinsecae findet sich die Form im primären Bezugsding und im sekundären. Ein Beispiel dafür ist das Sein (Form), das sowohl der Substanz als auch den kategorialen Akzidenzien intrinsisch zukommt, insofern alle realen Seienden vom Sein partizipiert werden. Die analogia attributionis extrinsecae dagegen zeichnet sich dadurch aus, daß die Form nur dem primären Bezugsding intrinsisch zukommt, dem sekundären aber nur extrinsisch. Als Beispiel für diese letzte Analogie führt Suárez Aristoteles’ Beispiel für das πϱὸς ἕν-Verhältnis oder Einheit der mannigfachen Bedeutungen des Seienden überhaupt an. In der Entfaltung dieser Lehre präsentiert Aristoteles seine Ansicht über das Verhältnis von ens reale und ens rationis und fängt mit dem Hinweis an: „τὸ δὲ ὂν 37   DM 54, 2, 3 (XXVI, 1018b–1019a): „dari aliquam causam efficientem, a qua habet ens rationis ut suo modo sit, quamquam efficientia eius, ut est realis productio, ad illud non terminetur, ut ad terminum effectionis, sed tantum ut ad obiectum ipsius termini producti“. 38   DM 54, prol., 2 (XXVI, 1015): „[M]etaphysicae proprium est agere de ente rationis ut sic, et de communi ratione, proprietatibus et divisionibus eius, quia hae rationes suo modo sunt quasi transcendentales, et intelligi non possunt nisi per comparationem ad veras et reales rationes entium […].“ 39   Zur Analogie bei Suárez immer noch grundlegend José Hellín, „De la analogía del ser según Suárez“, Pensamiento 2 (1946): 267–294; derselbe: La analogía del ser y el conocimiento de Dios en Suárez (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1947). Hellín bringt jedoch eine andere Einteilung der Analogie und macht die analogia proportionalitatis zu einer Unterart der analogia attributionis extrinsecae.

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λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς“,40 diese Mannigfaltigkeit von Bedeutungen läßt jedoch eine gewisse Einheit zu, die von der zu unterscheiden ist, aufgrund deren die Seienden denselben Namen tragen (Homonymie bzw. Äquivozität) und welche die generische und die spezifische Einheit (Univozität) anzeigt: „ἀλλὰ πϱὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ οὺχ ὁμωνύμως“. Das Seiende wird nun mit dem Gesunden verglichen und dadurch wird das πϱὸς ἕν-Verhältnis im Seienden erläutert.41 Das Seiende verhält sich wie das Gesunde (τὸ ὑγιενόν), weil sich alle Abwandlungen des Gesunden auf die Gesundheit (πϱὸς ὑγίειαν) beziehen: Bewahren des Gesunden, Bewirken des Gesunden, Anzeichen für das Gesunde und Aufnehmen des Gesunden.42 Die entsprechenden Beispiele sind aus anderen Texten des Aristoteles und von dessen Kommentatoren zu entnehmen: gute Luft, Heilmittel, Farbe und Körper. Dann werden weitere Abwandlungen des Seienden erwähnt: Zerstörungen, Beraubungen, Qualitäten, Wirkungen und Ursprünge, die sich alle auf die οὐσία zurückführen lassen. An dieser Stelle ist der Umfang des aristotelischen Nichtseienden ersichtlich: Verderbnisse (φϑοϱαί ) der οὐσίαihre Beraubungen und Verneinungen (ἀποφάσεις). In dieser Beschreibung wird zugleich das Grundverhältnis des μὴ ὄν zur οὐσία selbst genannt und dann die Einreihung des μὴ ὄν in die mannigfachen Bedeutungen des Seienden implizit vollzogen. Denn in allen Fällen bezieht sich das μὴ ὄν auf dieοὐσία. Aristoteles hält offensichtlich das πϱὸς ἕν-Verhältnis für adäquat, um das Verhältnis vonὄν und μὴ ὄν zu beschreiben.43 Aber in der völlig ausgebildeten Analogielehre der Scholastik, die das πϱὸς ἕν-Verhältnis nur im Sinne der Analogie interpretiert hat, stellt sich erst die Frage, welche Art von Analogie zwischen dem realen Seienden und dem Gedankending waltet. Im Anschluß an die eben besprochene Stelle des Aristoteles erläutert Suárez die Analogielehre wiederum anhand des Beispiels „gesund“, setzt aber andere Schwer  Metaph. IV, 2, 1003a33–34.   Zur „Seinsanalogie“ bei Aristoteles entbrannte eine heftige Diskussion mit Franz Brentanos Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (Freiburg: Herder, 1862). Diese „scholastische“ Interpretation wurde von Pierre Aubenque, Le problème de l’être chez Aristote (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962) und vielen anderen kritisiert. 42   Metaph. IV, 2, 1003a35–b1. 43   Ibid., 1003b10: „διὸ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι μὴ ὄν φαμεν“ Zum Begriff des μὴ ὄν bei Aristoteles vgl. Enrico Berti, „Quelques remarques sur la conception aristotélicienne du non-être“, Revue de philosophie ancienne 1 (1983): 115–142; und „Être et non-être chez Aristote: contraires ou contradictoires?“, Revue de théologie et de philosophie 122 (1990): 365–373. Berti betont in diesen wichtigen Aufsätzen zum Thema, daß das aristotelische Nichtseiende weder dem reinen Nichts des Parmenides (μὴ ἁπλῶς εἶναι: Phys. I, 3, 187a5–6) noch der absoluten Andersheit des Platon (Metaph. X, 3, 1054b18–22) gleichzusetzen ist, und hält das Nichtseiende im aristotelischen Sinne zu Recht für eine der mannigfachen Bedeutungen des Seienden. André de Muralt, „L’être du non-être en perspective aristotelicienne“, Revue de théologie et de philosophie 122 (1990): 375–388 wendet sich gegen die Interpretation des μὴ ὄν bei Aristoteles als esse obiectivum. 40 41

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punkte in der Darstellung und modifiziert die These des Aristoteles hinsichtlich der „Seinsanalogie“. Das Gesunde als Form kommt dem Lebewesen allein intrinsisch, den Medikamenten oder den Lebensmitteln bzw. der Luft insofern nur extrinsisch zu, als sie alle die Gesundheit im Lebewesen hervorrufen.44 Damit wird de facto Aristoteles „Seinsanalogie“ als eine attributio extrinseca gekennzeichnet, die das Nichtseiende umfaßt.45 Ist die von Aristoteles vorgeschlagene attributio extrinseca auch die gesuchte Analogie für ens reale und ens rationis? Zunächst steht der Ausschluß einer der Analogiearten kaum zur Debatte. Die analogia attributionis intrinsecae zwischen dem ens rationis und dem ens reale kommt deshalb nicht in Frage, weil, wie die Gründe für eine Zurückweisung des univoken Begriffes für ens rationis und ens reale gezeigt haben, dem esse obiective in intellectu des Gedankendinges keine Wirklichkeit entspricht, die eine Gemeinsamkeit mit dem realen Sein teilen könnte. In seinem frühen Werk De anima46 wird bereits eine dem ens reale und dem ens rationis gemeinsame ratio formalis verneint und nur eine unitas vocis anerkannt: Beide werden nur aufgrund einer proportio zusammengedacht. Erst in seinen Disputationes metaphysicae wird die Frage nach einer Gemeinsamkeit im Rahmen der Analogiefrage gestellt und die Entscheidung zuerst für quaedam attributio   DM 2, 1, 14 (XXV, 69b–70a). Daher ist es klar, daß die Einheit des objektiven Seinsbegriffs durch die analogia attributionis intrinsecae gewährleistet wird. Vgl. DM 2, 2, 14 (XXV, 75a): „[…] quod analogia entis non est in aliqua forma, quae intrinsece tantum sit in uno analogato et extrinsece in aliis, sed in esse seu entitate quae intrinsece participantur ab omnibus“. Suárez verweist auf Thomas Aquinas, In Sent. I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1. Thomas unterscheidet eine dreifache Analogie: 1. analogia secundum intentionem tantum et non secundum esse, in der die logische Intention sich auf mehreres bezieht, so daß ein Erstes das Sein hat und die anderen auf dieses nur verweisen (Beispiel: Gesund wird zuerst von den Lebewesen ausgesagt, sekundär von den Heilmitteln, Lüften etc. als denjenigen, die im Lebewesen das Gesundsein hervorbringen; dies entspricht der analogia attributionis extrinsecae des Suárez); 2. analogia secundum esse et non secundum intentionem, gemäß der mehrere etwas Seinsmäßiges gemeinsam haben, aber ohne einen allgemeinen Begriff (intentio); 3. analogia secundum intentionem et secundum esse, die der analogia attributionis intrinsecae des Suárez entspricht, gilt für das Verhältnis zwischen Substanz und Akzidens und zwischen Gott und Geschöpf. 45   In seinem Kommentar zur Stelle in der Metaphysik (In duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis, l. IV, lect. 1, n. 535) interpretiert Thomas von Aquin diese habitudo ad unum (πϱὸς ἕν) im Sinne der analogia oder proportio: „Quandoque vero secundum rationes quae partim sunt diversae et partim non vera […] et illud dicitur ‚analogice praedicari‘, id est proportionaliter, prout unumquodque secundum suam habitudinem ad illum unum refertur“. Vgl. Pierre Aubenque, „Les origines de la doctrine de l’analogie de l’être. Sur l’historie d’un contrasens“, Les études philosophiques 103, n. 1 (1978): 3–12. Jean-François Courtine, Inventio analogiae (Paris: Vrin, 2005), 244–247. 46   CQDA, d. 9, q. 1, n. 4 (ed. Cast. III, 70, 126–128): „[…] sed ens reale et rationis non habent in re aliquam rationem formalem unam; ergo ens, ut illis commune, non potest esse obiectum adaequatum intellectus, nam fere non habent aliam unitatem, nisi unitatem vocis“. 44

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extrinseca getroffen,47 dann aber für quaedam imperfecta analogia proportionalitatis,48 zumal das Gedankending „fere nomine tantum“ Seiendes ist. Später präzisiert Suárez seine Position, indem er sagt, das Gedankending sei gleichsam einem Seienden aufzufassen, und ihm sei das reale Sein nicht per analogiam attributionis intrinsecae, sondern per aliquam analogiam, saltem proportionalitatis zuzuweisen.49 Denn es bestehe weder   DM , Index locupletissimus 4, cap. 2, q. 2 (XXV, xv).   DM 1, 1, 5 (XXV, 3b): „Et ratio est, quia talia neque vere sunt entia, sed fere nomine tantum, neque cum entibus realibus conveniunt in eodem conceptu entis, sed solum per quamdam imperfectam analogiam proportionalitatis, ut infra videbimus; obiectum autem adaequatum scientiae requirit unitatem aliquam obiectivam“. 49   DM 54, 1, 10 (XXVI, 1018a). Suárez verweist auf Thomas von Aquin, De veritate, q. 2, a. 11 ad 5. Cajetan spricht von einer analogia proportionalitatis in bezug auf das Verhältnis zwischen Gott und dem Geschöpf (St. Thomae A. Opusculum de ente et essentia et commentariis Caietani illustratum accedit eiusdem Caietani tractatus de nominum analogiae, ed. M. de Maria (Romae, 1907), cap. 2, q. 3, concl. 2, S. 38), aber dieses ist in unserem Kontext nicht gemeint, und zweitens hält Suárez dieses Verhältnis für analogia attributionis intrinsecae. Vgl. DM 32, 2, 14 (XXVI, 323). Keineswegs mehrheitlich haben die Thomisten am Analogieverhältnis zwischen ens rationis und ens reale festgehalten. Bereits Thomas drückt sich dementsprechend aus: De veritate, q. 2, a. 2, ad 7; In Met. IV, cap. 1, lect. 1, n. 535. Johannes Capreolus (1380–1444), Defensiones theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis I, dist. 2, q. 1, t. 1: 143–144, drückt sich viel genauer aus: „ens in quantum ens ad omme intelligibile conceptus entis talis habet unitatem attributionis“. Thomas- Kommentator Thomas de Vio, genannt Caietanus (1469–1534): De nominum analogia, cap. 8, n. 94, in Scripta philosophica, ed. Zammit, iterum recognovit P. H. Hering (Roma: Angelicum 1954), S. 71, spricht sich 1498 auch für die Attributionsanalogie aus: „Dicimus enim quod ens reale est magis et perfectius ens ente rationis, quod per attributionem ad illud ens dicitur.“ Darin ist Diego Mas (1553–1608), Disputación metafísica sobre el ente y sus propiedades (1587), ed. Jordán Gallego Salvadores (Pamplona: eunsa, 2003), l. I, cap. 8, n. 86–89, S. 441–442, gefolgt, wenn er darüber hinaus die analogia proportionalitatis ausschloß, nachdem er das ens rationis als eine denominatio intrinseca et secundum essentiam bestimmt hatte (n. 89, S. 442). Bereits zuvor war Paulus Soncinas († 1494) von der im übrigen nicht eindeutig zu bestimmenden Position des Thomas deutlich abgewichen, wenn er in seinen Quaestiones metaphysicales acuttissimae (Venetiis, 1588; Nachdruck: Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), l. 4, q. 5: utrum ens sit analogum enti reali et enti rationis, S. 10–11, angesichts der fehlenden similitudo zwischen dem ens reale und dem ens rationis explizit sagte: „Ex praedictis infero quod ens non ens commune enti reali et enti rationis nisi tantum communitate vocis, qualis communitas reperitur in terminis aequivocis, et ideo dicitur mere aequivoce de utrisque […]“ (S. 10a) und erklärte für unmöglich einen dem ens reale und dem ens rationis gemeinsamen Seinsbegriff (S. 11a). Ebenfalls Javelli (1470–1538), Tractatus de transcendentibus, c. 1, in Chrysostomi Iavelli [...] omnia [...] opera, ea sunt in tres tomos digesta (Lugduni: apud Carolum Pesnot, 1580), 460–461, sprach sich eindeutig für die Äquivozität aus. Auch der Mercedarier Francisco Zúmel (1540–1607), selbst Thomas-Anhänger: In primam D. Thomae partem commentaria (Venetiis: apud Floravantem Pratum: 1597) [1. Ausgabe von 1587], I, q. 13, a. 5, disp. 1, concl. 3, S. 246a hat im ausdrücklichen Anschluß an Paulus Soncinas an der Äquivozität-Deutung festgehalten. 47

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ein beiden gemeinsamer Begriff noch eine ihnen zugrunde liegende Ähnlichkeit (convenientia).50 Auch anfangs wurde das ens per accidens vom realen Seienden ausgeschlossen, weil jenem als bloßem Aggregat einzelner Seienden die transzendentale Einheit wesensgemäß fehlt. Es wurde zudem gesagt, daß das beiläufige Seiende nur per quamdam imperfectam analogiam proportionalitatis mit dem Seinsbegriff übereinstimmt. Das gilt auch für das gedankliche Seiende.51 Im Unterschied zur analogia attributionis extrinsecae, in der die seinsmäßige Form nur in einem Bezugselement eigentlich (proprie) gegeben ist und in dem anderen nur uneigentlich (improprie), geht die analogia proportionalitatis aufgrund eines Vergleichs vonstatten, so daß das erste Bezugselement (lachendes Wesen: Mensch) die Form an sich hat und das andere Bezugselement diese Form (lachende Wiese) erst aufgrund eines Vergleichs mit dem ersten erhält.52 Die eigentliche analogia proportionalitatis findet erst statt, wenn ein Bezugselement tatsächlich die Form erhält. Deshalb impliziert jede analogia proportionalitatis zugleich eine Metapher53 und ein bestimmtes reales Fundament.54 Aber das Verhältnis zwischen realem und gedanklichem Seienden weist keine propria analogia proportionalitatis auf, weil das Gedankending im Unterschied zur „lachenden Wiese“ nicht einmal existiert oder existieren kann. Wie erklärt Suárez den Ausdruck „einem realen Seienden gleichsam“? Zunächst wird auf den vergleichenden Charakter des Verstandesaktes, der die entia rationis hervorbringt, hingewiesen.55 Die entia rationis werden als apparentia entium beschrieben, deren Erkenntnis die Wirklichkeit voraussetzt;56 sie werden als Seiendes aufgrund 50   DM 4, 1, 19 (XXV, 120b): (Äquivozität des unum in bezug auf die entia rationis); DM 4, 8, 4 (XXV, 138b): „[…] nam ens rationis […] non habet communem conceptum, nec realem convenientiam cum ente reali […]“. 51   DM 1, 1, 6 (XXV, 4a): „Nam imprimis entia rationis considerantur aliquo modo in hac scientia non tamen per se, sed propter quandam proportionalitatem quam habent cum entibus realibus.“ Siehe Abt. 4 für weitere Diskussion zu dieser Frage. 52   DM 28, 3, 4 (XXVI, 13b–14a). 53   DM 28, 3, 11 (XXVI, 16b). Das Metaphorische selbst gehört nicht zum Wesen der Analogie, sondern nur zur analogia proportionalitatis und der analogia attributionis extrinsecae. Vgl. José Hellín, „Necesidad de la analogía del ser según Suárez“, Pensamiento 1 (1945): 160, Anm. 1 gegen Santiago Ramírez. 54   DM 28, 3, 22 (XXVI, 21a): „Unde attente considerandum est, illam analogiam translativam seu metaphoricam, quamvis aliquod habeat in rebus fundamentum, non tamen omnino ex illis oriri, sed ex impositione et usu hominum.“ 55   DM 54, 2, 16 (XXVI, 1022b): „Dico secundo: actus intellectus, quo ens rationis consurgit, est aliquo modo comparativus, vel reflexivus, praesertim quando ens rationis fundatur in actu intellectus. Probatur et declaratur, quia ille actus, quo ens rationis suo modo fabricatur et consurgit, natura sua supponit alium conceptum realis entis, ad cuius proportionem seu imitationem concipitur seu formatur ens rationis“. 56   CQDA, d. 9, q. 1, n. 4 (ed. Cast. III, 71).

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ihres Bezugs auf die entia realia bezeichnet, zu denen sie sich verhalten. 57 Die Hingeordnetheit der entia rationis in bezug auf das reale Seiende soll sowohl für ihre Erkenntnis als auch für die analogia proportionalitatis zwischen beiden „Seinsarten“ ausreichend sein. Gelegentlich scheint sich Suárez für die Äquivozität Terminus ens in ens reale und ens rationis58 oder sogar für eine Äquivozität und eine denominatio extrinseca zugleich ausgesprochen zu haben,59 aber überwiegend geschehen die Äußerungen zugunsten einer Analogie oder convenientia, weshalb seine verstreuten Bekenntnisse zur Äquivozität eher als Hinweise darauf zu verstehen sind, daß die bevorzugte Weise der Analogie, die analogia proportionalitatis, eine metaphorische oder unvollkommene ist. Wenn nämlich der Terminus ens in ens reale und ens rationis in der Tat äquivok wäre, gäbe es überhaupt keine Analogie. Denn zwei Dinge, denen ein Terminus äquivok gemeinsam ist (sowohl Wahnsinniger als auch Bauteil werden in der deutschen Sprache „Tor“ genannt), erfordern jeweils einen unterschiedlichen Begriff.60 Dies hätte zur Folge, daß die entia rationis nicht von der Metaphysik, behandelt würden, deren adäquater Gegenstand der Begriff vom realen Seienden wäre. Gerade die schwächste Form der Analogie zwischen ens reale und ens rationis ermöglicht dessen Inklusion in die Metaphysik, wenn auch sie von deren adäquatem Gegenstand ausgeschlossen sind. Daher zeigen diese Schwankungen und anderslautende Aussagen vielmehr, daß die anempfohlene Analogie eine an die Äquivozität angrenzende ist: ein Grenzfall der Analogie. Läßt sich diese Analogie auch in den einzelnen Arten von ens rationis: Verneinungen, Beraubungen und vernunftgemäße Relationen,61 bewahrheiten? Suárez führt diese Analyse nicht durch, aber im Text fi nden sich Hinweise darauf, die es nun zusammenzustellen und darauf hin zu untersuchen gilt.   DM 6, 7, 2 (XXV, 229).   DM 4, 3, 2 (XXV, 126a):“[…] nam entia rationis, sicut aequivoce tantum sunt entia, ita non nisi aequivoce has denominationes recipiunt.“ DM 4, 1, 19 (XXV, 120b), wo das unum vom Gedankending und realen Seienden aequivoce gesagt wird. DM 3, 2, 4 (XXV, 108b), wo res, das mit ens Synonym ist, von ens fictum aequivoce ausgesagt wird. 59   DM 4, 9, 12 (XXV, 144b). 60   Aristoteles, Cat.1, 1a1–15. DM 32, 2, 1 (XXVI, 319b): „[…] nam nomen aequivocum subordinatur distinctis conceptibus. Item sequitur ex dictis de obiecto huius scientiae; non enim posset ens in communi esse obiectum metaphysicae, si esset mere aequivocum.“ José Hellín, „De la analogía del ser“, 277–279 sieht in der Äquivozität keine Ähnlichkeit vernichtet. 61   DM 54, 3, 1 (XXVI, 1026a). Damit Suárez knüpft bloß an eine Tradition an, die zu Aristoteles und Thomas von Aquin (De veritate, q. 21, a. 1; In Sent. I, dist. 2, q. 1, a. 3 etc.) führt, bemüht sich aber um die Rechtfertigung der Einteilung (DM 54, 4, 4). Zu diesem nicht unwichtigen, hier nicht zu behandelnden Thema und der kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit Suárez’ Lösung innerhalb der Jesuitenschule und bei Caramuel vgl. Novotný, ibid., S. 80–110, der sich gegen die Argumente des Suárez wendet. 57

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Die Verneinung teilt sich in wahre und falsche. Die wahren Verneinungen sind diejenigen, die ein Fundament in der Wirklichkeit haben, insofern sie ausdrücken, wie es sich verhält: Nichtrotsein der Rose etc.62 Formal gesehen ist die wahre Verneinung sowie der ihr zugrundeliegende Sachverhalt ein Nichtseiendes, aber der gemeinte negative Sachverhalt bezeichnet etwas Reales. Daher gleicht die wahre Verneinung im Sinne des verneinten Sachverhalts einem Sosein oder Qualität, die einem Subjekt anhaftet. Das Nichtsein haftet dem Ding an, wobei diese Inhärenz des Akzidens im Falle der wahren Verneinung nicht wirklich sein kann. Suárez versteht die falschen Verneinungen dagegen als Erfindungen vom Seienden, dessen Vorhandensein unmöglich ist: entia ficta (die mythischen Wesen wie die Chimäre) und entia impossibilia (rundes Viereck), und haben deshalb esse obiective in intellectu tantum.63 Das ens impossibile ist nämlich etwas, was gleichsam ein ens ist: ein rundes Viereck etwa, welches eine essentia hat, die sich etwa von der essentia eines hölzernen Eisens unterscheidet. Dem ens fictum kommen gleichsam eine existentia in intellectu tantum, und keine vera et realis existentia und dementsprechend eine nur erdachte essentia zu.64 In Anlehnung an die Tradition bestimmt Suárez die Beraubung als das, was das Fehlen von einem Seienden bedeutet, das einem anderen wesensgemäß zukommen sollte. Während die Verneinung das Fehlen von etwas an einem Subjekt ohne Berücksichtigung der Natur dieses Subjekts darstellt, ist die von der Beraubung angezeigte Abwesenheit das Fehlen einer Eigenschaft, die dem Subjekt eigen ist.65 Im Unterschied zur Beraubung, die ein Subjekt mit bezeichnet, das dieser Eigenschaft fähig ist, betriff t die Verneinung das Subjekt jedoch ungeachtet der Art des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Subjekt und dem von ihm Verneinten. Daher kommt die Beraubung einer realen Qualität des Seienden fast gleich, die einem realen Subjekt anhaftet, aber eigentlich ist sie nur eine negative, die im Subjekt liegende positive Fähigkeit mit bezeichnet, die nun beraubte Qualität zu besitzen.66 62   DM 54, 5, 2 (XXVI, 1031b): „Si vera sit negatio, nulla est fictio intellectus; sed dum intellectus concipit praecise hominem non esse equum, illud vere concipit quod in re est, eo modo quo esse potest, scilicet, vel positive ac fundamentaliter in entitatibus extremorum, vel remotive tantum secundum propriam rationem negationis.“ 63   DM 54, 5, 2 (XXVI, 1031b): „[…] quia si negatio falsa sit, ut si quis concipiat hominem, qui non sit animal, tunc illa negatio etiam sub ratione negationis est mere conficta per intellectum, solumque habet esse obiective in illo […].“ 64   DM 54, 1, 4 „(XXVI, 1016a): […] dari aliqua entia rationis, quae neque sunt vera entia realia, quia non sunt capacia verae et realis existentiae.“ Vgl. auch Anm. 71. 65   DM 54, 3, 8 (XXVI, 1028a): „[…] nam privatio dicit carentiam in subiecto apto nato, negatio vero dicit carentiam in subiecto absolute et simpliciter.“ Diese Definition geht auf Aristoteles zurück: „στέϱησις λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τϱόπον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ τι τῶν πεφυκότων ἔχεσϑαι“ (Metaph V, 22, 1022b22–23). 66   DM 54, 5, 21 (XXVI, 1037a): „Privatio enim formae substantialis non apprehenditur in materia ad modum substantialis formae, sed per modum dispositionis accidentalis, quae potest inesse et abesse, et ita etiam illa qualitatem imitatur.“

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Sowohl die wahre Verneinung als auch die Beraubung sind nicht etwas Negatives, sondern werden als non entia aufgefaßt, die aber den realen Dingen zukommen, insofern jene diesen etwas Reales nehmen.67 Der Vergleich mit dem realen Seienden ist auch in beiden Fällen unleugbar, und dies rechtfertigt die analogia proportionalitatis, wenn sie auch unvollkommen ist. Mit der realen Relation teilt die vernunftgemäße Relation das Wesen, nämlich das esse ad aliud, welches bei diesem nur erdacht ist.68 Nicht alle Voraussetzungen der realen Relation kann die vernunftgemäße haben: das Subjekt, das einer solchen Relation oder eines solches Bezugs auf ein anderes fähig ist, und den real existierenden Bezugspunkt. In der vernunftgemäßen Relation fehlt eine dieser Voraussetzungen, sie muß aber andererseits in einer von diesen realen Voraussetzungen unmittelbar oder mittelbar fundiert sein. Im Gegensatz zu den Verneinungen und den Beraubungen, die als Wegnahme eines Seienden (remotio entitatis) gedacht werden, ist die vernunftgemäße Relation ein positives Seiendes, das aber nur als etwas Relatives von uns erfaßt wird.69 In allen drei Fällen wird das ens rationis als reales Seiendes vorgestellt, obwohl diese drei Arten formaliter keine realen Seienden sind. Eine analogia proportionalitatis im strengen Sinne zwischen Gedankending und realem Ding kann deswegen nicht walten, weil das Gedankending an sich nur im Verstande gegenständlich ist. Deshalb spricht Suárez von einer unvoll kommenen analogia proportionalitatis, die jedenfalls höher steht als die reine Äquivozität. Die wahre Ähnlichkeit des ens rationis mit dem ens reale zerbricht an dem Tatbestand, daß jenem die essentia realis und die existentia fehlen.70 Da aber das Objektivsein des Gedankendinges als eine Seiendheit charakterisiert wurde, die gleichsam aus dem Nichts entsteht und sich gegen dieses abzeichnet, besitzt das Gedankending nur eine essentia ficta71 und ein gegen die existentia realis abgegrenztes esse obiective in intellectu. 67   DM 54, 3, 3 (XXVI, 1027a): „Sic igitur tam negatio quam privatio, si considerentur praecise quatenus non entia sunt, ut sic, nec sunt entia realia, nec rationis, quia non sunt entia nec consideratur ut entia, sed ut non entia, et hoc modo non sunt aliquid fi ctum, et dicuntur convenire rebus ipsis, non ponendo in eis aliquid, sed tollendo.“ 68   DM 54, 3, 3 (XXVI, 1026b):“[…] et has posteriores diximus non habere in re verum esse ad aliud, sed cogitari ut habentes esse ad aliud.“ 69   DM 54, 3, 5 (XXVI, 1027b): „Quod vero relatio sit in illo ordine et latitudine diversum ens rationis ab aliis duobus, constat primo ex diversitate fundamenti; nam fundamentum, quod habet intellectus ad concipiendam relationem rationis, non est negatio aliqua vel remotio entitatis, sed potius est aliqua positiva entitas, quae a nobis non perfecte concipitur nisi per modum respectus.“ 70   DM 54, 1, 4 (XXV, 1016a): „Dicendum vero est, dari aliqua entia rationis, quae neque sunt vera entia realia, quia non sunt capacia verae et realis existentiae, neque etiam habent veram aliquam similitudinem cum entibus realibus.“ 71   DM 2, 4, 5 (XXV, 89a ): „Dico secundo: si ens sumatur prout est significatum huius vocis in vi nominis sumptae, eius ratio consistit in hoc, quod sit habens essentiam realem, id est non fictam, nec

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Auch die Transzendentalien des Seins lassen sich gleichsam in der Seinsverfassung der Gedankendinge wieder erkennen.72 Diesen kommt eine Einheit zu, die ihre Einteilung in Gattungen, Arten etc. ermöglicht, wobei diese nur per solam extrinsecam denominationem auf sie angewandt wird.73 Das unum wird nämlich äquivok vom ens rationis ausgesagt.74 Die Wahrheit kommt ihnen zu, solange sie nur als Erkanntsein aufgefaßt wird. Das Erkanntsein, eine denominatio extrinseca aufgrund des Erkenntnisaktes, triff t für das rein objektive Sein der entia rationis zu.75 Dies liegt daran, daß sie keine reale entitas ist, die eine solche Übereinstimmung von seiten der res fundieren könnte.76 Wie die entia realia können die entia rationis ein wahrheitsmäßiges Sein (esse veritativum) in sich tragen, insofern sie Gegenstand eines wahren Urteils sein können.77 Aber sowohl im Falle der Wahrheit als Erkanntsein im Sinne der denominatio extrinseca als auch der Wahrheit als esse veritativum handelt es sich um keine „reale Wahrheit“. In einem Fall ist die Wahrheit zwar eine reale Form als Erkanntsein, aber nicht der Sache nach, in dem anderen ist die Wahrheit nur im Verstande, und daher nichts Reales. Diese doppelte Wahrheit, die dem ens rationis tatsächlich zukommt, hat nur den Anschein der „wahren“ Wahrheit“. Den entia rationis kommt wiederum drittens die Gutheit nicht zu, obwohl sie in irgendeinem Sinne zuträglich sind. Aber weder die Beraubung von etwas noch die Verneinung sind an sich gut, sie sind nicht-gut. Die Gedankendinge können zuträglich chymericam, sed veram et aptam ad realiter existendum.“ 72   Diese Einsicht ist in das gemeinsame Gedankengut der spanischen Jesuitenmetaphysik eingegangen. Bereits Pedro de Fonseca hatte die transzendentalen Eigenschaften: unum, verum, bonum und dergleichen dem ens reale, ens per accidens und dem ens rationis zugesprochen und eine Interpretation dieser convenientia im Sinne der Analogie nahegelegt (Institutionum dialecticorum libri octo, l. 4, c. 1, q. 1, sect. 3, n. 4, t. I: 645 DF). Nach Suárez bekannte sich Hurtado de Mendoza zu dieser Überzeugung, indem er sie am Beispiel der Chimäre veranschaulicht. Denn sie, sofern sie sich von anderen Chimären unterscheidet, ist eine, und sie erhält zudem eine veritas obiectiva, d. h. eine essentia mendacii, zumal sie in dicendo falsitas hat. Insofern die Chimäre eine perfectio in sich hat, ist sie amabilis und wird wegen jeweils eines bestimmten Zwecks erdacht (Universa philosophia, Metaphysica, disp. 1, proem., sect. 1, subsect. 2, § 57, S. 702a). 73   DM 4, 9, 12 (XXV, 144b); DM 4, 3, 2 (XXV, 126a):“[…] nam entia rationis, sicut aequivoce tantum sunt entia, ita non nisi aequivoce has denominationes recipiunt.“ 74   DM 4, 9, 12 : XXV, 144b : „Quamvis enim ens rationis possit dici unum numero, et sic distinguantur a dialecticis genera, species et individua in ipsis entibus rationis, tamen illud est quasi aequivoce per solam extrinsecam denominationem.“ 75   DM 8, 8, 10 (XXV, 310b–311a). 76   DM 8, 7, 36 (XXV, 307): „[L]icet entia rationis, eo modo quo cognoscuntur, dici possint habere conformitatem cum intellectu, tamen, quia ex se non habent intelligibilitatem, neque entitatem in qua fundetur illa conformitas, ideo neque veritatem habent, quae est passio entis.“ 77   DM 31, 2, 11 (XXVI, 232b): „[…] quod esse in veritate propositionis, non solum habet locum in essentiis realibus, sed etiam in entibus rationis et fictitiis.“

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sein, aber auch nicht gut sein, wobei die convenientia, die in diesem weiten Sinne des Guten und Nicht-Guten umfaßt, mit der convenientia der bonitas nicht identisch ist.78 In allen drei Fällen handelt es sich um drei supertranszendentale Begriffe von Einheit, Wahrheit und Gutheit, die Suárez als solche anerkennt und deren Anwendung er auf reales Seiendes und Gedankending in Erwägung zieht; er trennt sie gleichzeitig scharf von den wesentlich mit dem realen Sein verknüpften Transzendentalien. Ebenfalls könnten auch die 10 Kategorien vom ens rationis gleichsam ausgesagt werden, wie hier nur teilweise (Substanz, Relation) bei Suárez nachgewiesen worden ist, aber diese supertranszendentalen Begriffe wären wiederum in der Wirklichkeit nicht verankert. Aufgrund dieser geringen Gemeinsamkeit des ens rationis mit dem realen Seienden, welche die Als-ob-Transzendentalien und die Als-ob-Kategorien selbst ermöglicht, kann das Gedankending in der Metaphysik mit behandelt werden, ohne daß die Einheit des objektiven Seinsbegriffs, des wahren, adäquaten Gegenstandes der Metaphysik, dabei gefährdet wäre.

4. DIE REZEPTION DER SUÁREZSCHEN LÖSUNG IN DER NACHFOLGENDEN JESUITENMETAPHYSIK In der Nachfolge von Suárez wurde die von ihm angezeigte Problematik in den Blick genommen und weiter durchgesprochen, wobei die jeweils vorgeschlagene Lösung nicht immer gänzlich mit der des Suárez identisch ist. Gerade Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641) polemisiert implizit gegen Suárez, indem er die auf die skotistische Tradition zurückgehende These der Univozität des Seins für ens reale und ens rationis verwiesen hat.79 Tandem deduco ens esse nomen pure aequivocum: quia ad existendum sunt primo diversa, neque convenient in ullo praedicato ex parte obiecti: cum autem ens rationis non habet nisi esse fictum, non potest convenire cum esse vero. Imo neque habet ullam analogiam etiam impropriam qualem in risu habent pratum et homo: pratum enim intrinsecam habet viriditatem, per quam hilarescere et ridere videtur: ens autem rationis nihil habet ex parte obiecti quo realia imitetur. Apprehenditur quidem a nobis ac si esset, non tamen propterea est […]80   DM 10, 3, 3 (XXV, 347b): „Tertio, quia ea, quae reputantur convenientia alicui, cum tamen non sint entia, sed potius privationes aut negationes entium, revera non sunt bona […]. Quocirca, si convenientia in hac amplitudine sumatur, non est idem bonitas et convenientia, etiam prout bonitas dicitur de eo quod est bonum alteri; sed bonitas dicit entitatem seu perfectionem ut convenientem alicui, et ideo, quod est conveniens solum per modum privationis, revera non est bonum.“ Kurz davor hatte Suárez die Supertranszendentalität eines solchen Begriffs des Guten bemerkt – DM 10, 3, 2 (XXV, 347a): “[…] qui consequenter sentiunt, bonum sub posteriori acceptione esse plus quam transcendens, eo quod non solum entia, sed etiam non entia transcendat.“ 79   Universa metaphysica, disp. 1, sect. 2, n. 66, 703. 80   Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa philosophia, Metaphysica, disp. 19, sect. 4, § 77, S. 954. 78

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Hurtado sieht demnach nicht einmal die Möglichkeit für eine impropria analogia proportionalitatis gegeben, dennoch rechnet er das ens rationis wie Suárez zur Metaphysik81 und spricht darüber hinaus von einer nicht näher bestimmten oppositio zwischen dem ens reale und dem ens rationis82. Der Grund für die Äquivozität liegt darin, daß Hurtado de Mendoza das dem ens rationis eigentümliche esse obiective tantum im impliziten Gegensatz zu Suárez in ein reines, aufgrund der falschen Aussage entstandenes esse fictum umgewandelt hat.83 Diese Auffassung führt zu einem hier nicht näher zu erläuternden Umdenken über die Abgrenzung des so gefaßten ens rationis gegen das neu gefaßte ens reale und das Nichts sowie über die Einteilung der entia rationis. Erstaunlicherweise hat sich der Dominikaner Francisco de Araújo (1580–1664) im Anschluß an Suárez mit dem Thema beschäftigt und nach der Art der von ihm selbst verfochtenen analogia proportionalitatis gefragt: Respondet Suárez ad hoc argumentum quod est analogia proportionalitatis inter ens reale et ens rationis; quae autem sit, an metaphorica, an potius propria, hoc non explicat; sed tamen existimo esse metaphoricam, quia ens rationis valde improprie participat rationem entis, sicut homo pictus participat improprie rationem hominis; et licet homo pictus in ratione entis, aut substantiae, magis conveniat cum homine vivo: tamen in ratione hominis, in qua analogatur, non magis convenit cum illo, quam ens rationis cum ente reali in ratione entis: ex quo patet solutio ad argumentum.84

Araújo sind allerdings die zitierten Texte entgangen, in denen Suárez tatsächlich die impropria analogia proportionalitatis befürwortet.85 In der Nachfolge von Suárez und Hurtado de Mendoza kritisiert Thomas Compton Carleton (1591–1666) diejenigen, die eine von der perseitas realis und der perseitas rationis absehende perseitas und demzufolge einen dem ens reale und dem ens rationis gemeinsamen Seinsbegriff verfechten. Wenngleich Carleton mit Hurtado de Mendoza darin übereinstimmt, daß keine vera ratio entis in den entia rationis anzutreffen ist, nimmt er wie Araújo, jedoch ohne ihn zu nennen, nur eine dem ens reale und dem ens rationis gemeinsame ratio metaphorica an.86 Erst Richard Lynch (Lynceus: 1610–1676) ist eine ausführliche Behandlung des Sachkomplexes zu verdanken, die hier nur teilweise und zudem sehr kursorisch   Universa metaphysica, disp. 1, sect. 2, n. 50–51, 701a.   Universa metaphysica, disp. 19, intr., n. 2, 742b. 83   Universa metaphysica, disp. 19, sect. 5, n. 79, 754b. 84   Francisco de Araújo, Commentarium in universam Aristotelis metaphysicam, tomus I (Burgis et Salmanticae, 1617), l. 3, q. 1, a. 2, 329b–330a 85   Vgl. dazu José Luis Fernández-Rodríguez, El ente de razón en Francisco de Araújo (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1972), 135–138. 86   Thomas Compton Carleton, Philosophia universa, 3 Bände (Antverpiae: apud Jacobum Meuersium, 1649), Logica, disp. 40, sect. 4, § 4, S. 153; Metaphysica, disp. 4, sect. 1, § 2, S. 579a. 81

82

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behandelt werden soll. Er stellt drei Grundpositionen hinsichtlich eines dem ens reale und rationis gemeinsamen Seinsbegriffs fest. Eine erste Position, die er Bonetus in seiner Metaphysik-Abhandlung zuschreibt,87 begünstigt einen univoken Seinsbegriff für das ens reale und ens rationis,88 Lynch aber erläutert diesen univoken Seinsbegriff, wie bereits Suárez, im Sinne einer denominatio extrinseca: Porro ens in communi sic sumptum esse univocum respectu entis realis et rationis arbitror. Id enim nihil aliud est quam a cognoscibili reali et rationis sive fictitio abstrahi posse unam secundam quandam rationem univocam cognoscibilis… 89

und verweist auf seine Dialectica: [A]t utrumque obiectum, chimaericum scilicet et reale, est proprie et simpliciter obiectum seu cognoscibile, et neutrum cum alio non convenit in ratione obiecti, idque non analogice, sed univoce […]90

Da diese erste Meinung von ihm selbst zurückgewiesen wird, kann er sich nicht für einen “wahren” supertranszendentalen Seinsbegriff ausgesprochen haben.91 Eine zweite Meinung, die Lynch Arriaga (1592–1667)92 ausdrücklich zuschreibt, für die aber auch Hurtado de Mendoza im oben zitierten Passus letztlich verantwortlich   Vgl. Anm. 27 und 36.   R. Lynceus, Universa philosophia scholastica, 3 Bände (Lugduni: sumptibus Philippi Borde, Laurentii Arnaud et Claudii Rigaud, 1654), l. 5, tract. 2, cap. 6, § 40, t. III: 281a. 89   Ibid., § 43, S. 281b. 90   Dialectica, l. 9, tract. 1, cap. 7, § 63–64, hier § 63, t. I: 296b; vgl. Metaphysica, tract. 3, cap. 7, § 75, t. III: 287. 91 Lynceus, ibidem: “ens ea significatione imbutum est improprie ens”. Vgl. Piero Di Vona, La ontologia dimenticata. Dall’ontologia spagnola alla Critica della ragion pura, Prefazione di Giuseppe Cacciatore, postfazione di Giuseppe D’Anna (Neapel: La Città del Sole, 2008), 31–32. Zu dieser Position soll auch Antonio Bernaldo de Quirós (1613–1668) in seinem Opus philosophicum (Lugduni: sumptibus Philippi Borde, Laurentii Arnaud, Petri Borde et Guill. Barbier, 1666), Logica, tract. 2, pars 4 (De praedicamentis), disp. 26, sect. 5, § 48, p. 183b: “Non ideo tamen nego aliquem conceptum univocum enti reali et rationis”, gezählt werden. Die zitierte Doppelnegation läßt keinen Zweifel darüber aufkommen, daß es einen solchen Begriff geben kann, aber zuvor hatte er einen univoken Begriff des ens simpliciter dictum für das ens reale und das ens rationis verneint (§45, 183a) und danach wird er implizit diesen univoken Begriff keineswegs als Gegenstand der Metaphysik ansehen wollen, die ja nur vom ens reale handeln kann (Metaphysica, tract. 7, disp. 102, § 3, 714a). Quirós beschränkt sich daher nur darauf, die Möglichkeit der Bildung eines solchen univoken Begriffs offenzuhalten: ratio praescindens ab existenti et non existenti, aber es handelt sich nicht um das ens simpliciter (Logica, tract. 2, pars 4, disp. 26, sect. 4, § 29, 179b). 92   Rodrigo Arriaga, Cursus philosophicus (Parisiis, 1653), Logica, disp. 11, prol., § 1, S. 106a: „Ante quod adverto non esse sermonem de ente, prout extenditur ad ens reale et rationis, quia ut sic fortasse est aequivocum, nam enti et non enti simpliciter nulla potest esse convenientia“; in der Ausgabe von Lyon, 1669, betont Arriaga ausdrücklich gegen Lynch seine eigene Position, ebenda, 172b. 87

88

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gemacht werden kann, favorisiert die Äquivozität des Seinsbegriffes hinsichtlich des ens reale und des ens rationis. Ein weiterer Anhänger dieser Position ist Ignacio Peinado (1633–1696) in seinen Disputationes in universam Aristotelis logicam.93 Die dritte Position, zu der Lynch selbst sich bekennt, favorisiert hingegen einen analogen Seinsbegriff, der ens reale und ens rationis umspannt. Pedro de Fonseca,94 Diego Mas (1553–1608),95 Suárez96 und Baltazar Téllez (1596–1675)97 werden als Verfechter dieser Meinung angeführt, wobei sich die Liste vermehren läßt.98 Lynch selbst spricht von einem analogen Seinsbegriff (hier vox entis), der unmittelbar ens reale meint (analogatum proprium), von welchem die vox entis dann auf das ens rationis (analogatum improprium) übertragen wird;99 er übernimmt Suárez’s Auslegung (analogia impropria), einen supertranzendentalen Begriff vom Sein, wie Kobusch behauptet,100 hat er aber nicht vorgeschlagen. Kobusch’ Mißverständnis liegt darin, daß er nur den Anfang dieses Abschnittes zitiert, in dem Lynch Bonetus’ Position zu erläutern versucht. Lynch’s eigene Deutung wird aber im folgenden dargelegt. Zu einer weiteren von Lynch nicht erwähnten Variante dieser dritten Position sollen die zuvor erwähnten Araújo und Carleton gemäß den zitierten Textstellen angeführt werden, weil sie offensichtlich eine analogia proportionalitatis befürwortet haben, welche die metaphorische Übertragung des Seinsbegriffes auf ens rationis ermöglicht. Ein solcher analoger Seinsbegriff läuft aber der These Suárez’ wesentlich zuwider. Sowohl eine ausführliche Behandlung der hier diskutierten Frage in der spanischen Scholastik des 16. und des 17. Jahrhunderts als auch die Entfaltung des 93   Ignacio Peinado, Disputationes in universam Aristotelis logicam (Compluti, 1721 [1. Ausgabe von 1671]), tract. 5, disp. 2, sect. 3 passim, insbesondere § 47, S. 409–410. Vgl. Piero Di Vona, „Trascendenza e univocità dell’ente secondo Ignacio Peinado“, in Sicut lumen pax tua. Studi in onore del cardinale Michele Giordano, hrsg. Antonio Ascione und Mario Gioia (Neapel: D’Auria, 1997): 499. 94   Pedro de Fonseca, Commentarii in metaphysicorum Aristotelis libros (Francofurti: impensis Ioannis Theobaldi Schonvvetteri, 1599 [1. Aufl. Rom, 1577–1589]), l. 4, c. 2, q. 1, sect. 3, n. 4, t. I: col. 695 CD. Schließlich entscheidet er sich für eine analogia secundum proportionem in seinem Metaphysikkommentar, l. 4, c. 2, q. 1, sect. 7, t. I, col. 705 CD und fügt gleich hinzu: „qua denique ratione entia realia eadem quoque entia rationis, est enim in omnibus aequalis proportio [...] igitur omnia entia, quatenus entia sunt, conveniunt secundum analogiam proportionis“ (E). Auch der Thomist Matthias Aquarius († 1591), Dilucidationes in XII libros primae philosophiae Aristotelis (Romae, 1584), Text apud Isabelle Mandrella, „Sujet“, S. 132, Anm. 30, steht für die analogia proportionalitatis ein. 95   Diego Mas, Metaphysica disputatio de ente et eius proprietatibus […], l. 1, c. 7–9, 442b. 96   Vgl. die in dem Haupttext besprochenen Stellen. 97   Baltazar Téllez, Summa universae philosophiae (Parisiis: sumptibus Antonii Bertiez, 1644), t. 2, pars 3, in Met., disp. 51, sect. 1, S. 49–54. 98   Vgl. Anm. 49. 99   Lynceus, Ibid., § 70, p. 287. 100   Kobusch, „Arriagas Lehre vom Gedankending“, 130, Anm. 19.

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Problems des supertranscendens selbst, wie es John Doyle getan hat,101 mögen hier aus Platzgründen ausgespart bleiben, ihre Bedeutsamkeit aber steht außer Zweifel.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE QUELLEN Aquarius, Matthias. Dilucidationes in XII libros primae philosophiae Aristotelis. Romae,1584. Arriaga, Rodrigo de. Cursus philosophicus. Lugduni: sumptibus Claudi Prost, 1653. Weitere Ausgabe, Lugduni: sumptibus Philippi Borde, Laurentii Arnaud et Petri Borde, 1669. Araújo, Francisco de. Commentarium in universam Aristotelis metaphysicam. 2 Bände. Burgis et Salmanticae: typis Ioannis Baptistae Varesii et Antoniae Ramitae, 1617. Alexander von Aphrodisias. Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria. In Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (CAG), t. I, ed. Michael Hayduck. Berlin: Reimer, 1891. Aristoteles. Metaphysica. Recognivit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit W. Jaeger. Oxonii: Clarendon Press, 1957. — Categoriae et Liber de interpretatione, Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit L. Minio-Paluello, Oxonii: Clarendon Press, 1986. [= Cat.] Bonetus, Nicolaus. Habes Nicholai Bonetti quattuor volumina: metaphysicam, naturalem philosophiam, praedicamenta necnon theologiam naturalem comprehendunt. Edidit Laurentius Venerius. Venetiis: Scotus, 1505. Cajetanus, Thomas de Vio. Scripta philosophica: De nominum analogia. Edidit Zammit, iterum recognovit P. H. Hering. Roma: Angelicum, 1954. — St. Thomae A. Opusculum de ente et essentia et commentariis Caietani illustratum. Accedit eiusdem Caietani tractatus de nominum analogiae. Edited by M. de Maria. Romae: Propaganda Fidei, 1907. Capreolus, Johannes. Defensiones theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis. 7 vols. Edited by C. Pabar – Th. Pèguesz. Turonibus: Sumptibus Alfred Cattier, 1900–1908.

  J. Doyle, „Between Transcendental and Transcendental: the Missing Link“, The Review of metaphysics 50 (1997): 783–815. Aber im Grunde vertritt keiner der von Doyle in seinen Arbeiten angeführten Autoren den supertranszendentalen Seinsbegriff als Gegenstand der Metaphysik, denn die vom ihm angeführten Textstellen stammen alle aus dem Logik-Teil der Traktate, wo nur die Tragweite eines solchen Begriffes ausgelotet wird. In einigen Fällen (etwa bei Quirós, vgl. Anm. 91) wird zwar die Möglichkeit eines supertranszendentalen Begriffes zugegeben, die betreffenden Überlegungen werden jedoch nicht der Metaphysik zugewiesen. Zu untersuchen bleibt allerdings, inwiefern Clemens Timpler, wohl der einzige Vertreter dieser extremen Auffassung in der Neuzeit neben Bonetus im Mittelalter, das intelligible als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nicht zuletzt im Vollzug seines Metaphysikentwurfs selbst verstanden hat. Vgl. dazu Lamannas Aufsatz im vorliegenden Band, S. 140–143. 101

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Compton Carleton, Thomas. Philosophia universa. 3 Bände. Antverpiae: apud Jacobum Meuersium, 1649. Duns Scotus, Johannes. Obras del Doctor Sutil: Cuestiones cuodlibetales. Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos 277. Edited by Félix Alluntis. Madrid: Editorial Católica, 1968. — Opera omnia- 26 Bände. Parisiis: Vivès, 1891–1895. — Opera philosophica. New York: The Franciscan Institute S. Bonaventure, 1997–2006 Franciscus de Marchia. Quodlibet cum quaestionibus selectis ex commentario in librum Sententiarum. Specilegium Bonaventurianum 29. Edited by Nazareno Mariani. Roma: Grottaferrata, 1997. Fonseca, Pedro de. Institutionum dialecticorum libri octo [1564]. Introduçao, establecimiento de texto, traduçao e notas par Joaquim Ferreira Gomes. Universidade de Coimbra, 1964. — Commentarii in metaphysicorum Aristotelis libros. Coloniae: Zentzer 1615–1629. Hervaeus Natalis. The Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323) the Doctor Perspicacissimus on Second Intentions. Vol. I: English Translation. Vol. II: A Latin Edition by John P. Doyle. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2008.

Hurtado de Mendoza, Pedro. Universa philosophia. Lugduni: sumptibus Ludovici Prost, 1624.

Javelli, Chrysostomus. Omnia [...] opera, ea sunt in tres tomos digesta. Lugduni: Apud Carolum Pesnot, 1580. Juan de Santo Tomás. Cursus philosophicus thomisticus. Editio nova. 3 vols. Ed. Beatus Reiser. Turin: Marietti, 1948. Lynceus, Ricardus (Richard Lynch). Universa philosophia scholastica. 3 Bände. Lugduni: sumptibus Philippi Borde, Laurentii Arnaud et Claudii Rigaud, 1654. Lossada, Luis de. Cursus philosophici regalis Collegii Salmanticensis [1. Auflage in drei Bänden, 1724–1735]. 10 Bände. Barcelona: Subirana, 1883. Mas, Diego. Metaphysica disputatio de ente et eius proprietatibus […]. In Disputación metafísica sobre el ente y sus propiedades transcendentales [1587], Parte I: Traducción castellana; Parte II: Original latino, Introducción de Jordán Gallego Salvadores. Pamplona: eunsa, 2003. Ockham, Wilhelm von. Opera theologica. 10 Bände. New York: The Franciscan Institute S. Bonaventure, 1974–1988. — Opera philosophica. 7 Bände. New York: The Franciscan Institute S. Bonaventure, 1967–1986. Peinado, Ignacio. Disputationes in universam Aristotelis logicam. Compluti, 1721. Poncius, Joannes. Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer. Lugduni: Sumptibus Ioannis Antonii Hugetan et Mari Antonii Ravaud, 1659. Quirós, Antonio Bernaldo de. Opus philosophicum. Lugduni: sumptibus Philippi Borde, Laurentii Arnaud, Petri Borde et Guill. Barbier, 1666.

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Soncinas, Paulus. Quaestiones metaphysicales acuttissimae. Venetiis, 1588. Nachdruck, Minerva: Frankfurt am Main, 1967. Soto, Domingo de. Dominici Soto Segobiensis In Porphyrii Isagogen Aristotelis Categorias libroque de demonstratione absolutissima commmentaria. Venetiis: ex Officina Dominici Guerraei et Io. Baptistae fratrum, 1587. Nachdruck, Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967. Suárez, Francisco. R.P. Francisci Suárez e societate Jesu opera omnia. 26 in 28 Bände. Edita nova a Carolo Berton. Parisiis: Vivès, 1856–1878. — Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima. 3 Bände. Editado por Salvador Castellote. Traducido por Luis y Carlos Baciero. Barcelona: Editorial Labor – Madrid: Fundación Xavier Zubiri, 1978–1991. Téllez, Baltazar. Summa universae philosophiae [1. Ausgabe: Lisabone, 1641]. Parisiis: sumptibus Antonii Bertiez, 1644. Thomas von Aquin. De veritate. In Quaestiones disputatae, tomus I, ed. Raymunud Spiazzi. Editio IX revisa. Romae: Marietti, 1953. — In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio. Edidit P. M. Maggiòlo. Romae: Marietti, 1954. — In duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio. Edidit M. R. Cathala et Raimundus M. Spiazzi. Romae: Marietti, 1964. — Commentum in quattuor libros Sententiarum. In Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia. Studio ac labore Stanislai Eduardi Fretté et Pauli Maré. Vol. 7–11. Parisiis: apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1873–1874. Vázquez, Gabriel. Commentariorum ac disputationum in primam partem Sancti Thomae. Antverpiae: apud Petrum et Ioannem Belleros, 1621. — Disputationes metaphysicae desumptae ex variis locis suorum operum. Antverpiae: apud Ioannem Keerbergium, 1617. Zúmel, Francisco. In primam D. Thomae partem commentaria. [1. Aufl. Salamanaca, 1587]. Venetiis: apud Floravantem Pratum, 1597.

STUDIEN Aubenque, Pierre. Le problème de l’être chez Aristote. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962.

— „Les origines de la doctrine de l’analogie de l’être. Sur l’historie d’un contrasens“. Les études philosophiques 1 (1980): 3–12. Berti, Enrico. „Quelques remarques sur la conception aristotelicienne du non-être”. Revue de philosophie ancienne 1 (1983): 115–142. — „Être et non-être chez Aristote: contraires ou contradictoires?“ Revue de théologie et de philosophie 122 (1990): 365–373. Brentano, Franz. Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles. Freiburg: Herder, 1862.

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Castellote Cubells, Salvador, Grundzüge der Disputationes metaphysicae des Suárez unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Rezeption des aristotelischen prosti (relationes praedicamentales et transcendentales) und der Kategorien actio und passio. Online, url = http://www.suarez-society.eu/pdf/Relationstheorie%20des%20Suarez.pdf. Cemus, Petronilla, hrsg. Bohemia jesuitica 1556-2006. Praha: Karolinum, 2010. Coujou, Jean-Paul. Bibliografía suareciana. Cuadernos de pensamiento español 41. Pamplona: eunsa, 2010. Courtine, Jean-François. Inventio analogiae. Paris: Vrin, 2005. Darge, Rolf. Suárez’ transzendentale Auslegung und die Metaphysiktradition. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 80. Leiden: Brill, 2004. — „Der suarezianische Ansatz der Ersten Philosophie und die Metaphysiktradition“. In Bohemia jesuitica 1556–2006, herausgegeben von Petronilla Cemus, Band 1: 497–508. Praha: Karolinum, 2010. Di Liso, Saverio. „Domingo de Soto sulla questione Utrum subiectum logicae sit ens rationis“. Rivista di storia della filosofia 3 (1998): 567–598 Di Vona, Piero. „Trascendenza e univocità dell’ente secondo Ignacio Peinado“. In Sicut lumen pax tua. Studi in onore del cardinale Michele Giordano, ed. Antonio Ascione und Mario Gioia, 475–500. Neapel: D’Auria, 1997. — La ontologia dimenticata. Dall’ontologia spagnola alla Critica della ragion pura. Prefazione di Giuseppe Cacciatore, postfazione di Giuseppe D’Anna. Neapel: La Città del Sole,  2008. Doyle, John P. „Between Transcendental and Transcendental: the Missing Link“. The Review of Metaphysics 50 (1997): 783–815. — „Supertranszendent“. In Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, herausgegeben von Joachim Ritter und Karlfried Gründer, Band 10: Sp. 644–649. Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 1998. — „Supertranscendental Being: On the Verge of Modern Philosophy“. In The Relation between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy, herausgegeben von Stephen F. Brown, 297–315. Turnhout: Brepols, 1998. Fernández-Rodríguez, José Luis. El ente de razón en Francisco de Araújo. Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1972. Folger-Fonfara, Sabine . Das „Supertranszendentale“ und die Spaltung der Metaphysik. Der Entwurf des Franziskus von Marchia. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 96. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2008. Hellín, José. „Necesidad de la analogía del ser según Suárez”. Pensamiento 1 (1945): 147–180. — „De la analogía del ser según Suárez“. Pensamiento 2 (1946): 267–294. — La analogía del ser y el conocimiento de Dios en Suárez. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1947. Knebel, Sven K. Suarezismus. Erkenntnistheoretisches aus dem Nachlass des Jesuitengenerals Tirso González de Santalla (1624–1705). Abhandlung und Edition. Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 51. Amsterdam–Philadephia: B. R. Grüner, 2011.

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Kobusch, Theo. Sprache und Sein. Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache. Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken und mittelalterlichen Philosophie 11. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987. — „Das Seiende als transzendentaler oder supertranszendentaler Begriff. Deutungen der Univozität des Begriffs bei Scotus und den Scotisten“. In John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics, herausgegeben von Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood und Mechthild Dreyer, 345–366. Leiden – New York – Köln: E.J. Brill, 1996. — „Arriagas Lehre vom Gedankending“. In Rodrigo de Arriaga († 1667): Philosoph und Theologe, herausgegeben von Tereza Saxlová und Stanislav Sousedík, 123–140. Praha: Karolinum, 1998, Mandrella, Isabelle. „Metaphysik als Supertranszentalienwissenschaft? Zum skotistischen Metaphysikentwurf des Nicolaus Bonetus“. Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médièvales 75 (2008): 161–193. — „Sujet de la métaphysique et étant surtranscendental“. Medioevo 34 (2009): 123–140. Muralt, André de. „L’être du non-être en perspective aristotelicienne“. Revue de théologie et de philosophie 122 (1990): 375–388. Novotný, Daniel D. Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel. A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era. New York: Fordham University Press, 2013. Risse, Wilhelm. Die Logik der Neuzeit. 2 Bände. Stuttgart – Bad Canstatt: Frommann, 1970. Schmutz, Jacob. „Science divine et métaphysique chez Francisco Suárez“. In Francisco Suárez „Der ist der Mann“, Homenaje al Prof. Salvador Castellote, 350–351. Valencia: Facultad de Teología „San Vicente Ferrer“, 2004. Uscatescu Barrón, Jorge. „Acerca de la unidad. Un estudio sobre las Disputationes Metaphysicae de Suárez“. Endoxa 3 (1994): 195–223. — „El concepto de metafísica en Suárez: su objeto y su dominio“. Revista Pensamiento 51 (1995): 215–236.

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THE HISTORICAL NON-SIGNIFICANCE OF SUÁREZ’S THEORY OF BEINGS OF REASON: A LESSON FROM HURTADO Daniel D. Novotný

ABSTRACT

The present paper deals with the theory of beings of reason of the Basque Jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641) who was a younger colleague of Francisco Suárez at the Salamanca College. Hurtado takes up beings of reason in Metaphysical Disputation 19, published in two versions: fi rst in his Disputations in Entire Philosophy (1615/19) and later in his Entire Philosophy (1624). Although the two versions overlap, they also differ significantly. The paper analyzes both the earlier and the later expression of his theory in order to determine the development of his thinking. The final section of the paper summarizes the results of these comparative analyses and shows that Hurtado’s theory essentially differs from that of Suárez.

1. INTRODUCTION The expression ‘being of reason’ (ens rationis) refers in scholastic jargon to impossible intentional objects. The belief in the existence and importance of beings of reason was part of scholastic sententia communis throughout the sixteenth century and also in the first half of the seventeenth century. The fi rst comprehensive theory of these beings was formulated by Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). The aim of my paper is to explore whether and in which sense Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641), who was a younger, Basque Jesuit colleague of Suárez from the Salamanca College, accepted Suárez’s theory. Traditionally, Hurtado is considered to be a Suárezian.1 I show, however, that Hurtado held a theory radically different from Suárez’s.2 I focus 1   K. Eschweiler, “Die Philosophie der spanischen Spätscholastik auf den deutschen Universitäten des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts”, in Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft I (Münster: Aschendorff, 1928), 307; J. Pereira and R. Fastiggi, The Mystical Theology of the Catholic Reformation: An Overview of Baroque Spirituality (Lanham, MA: University Press of America, Inc., 2006), 19–20. 2   The hypothesis that Hurtado is not a Suárezian with respect to the theory of beings of reason was first proposed in D. D. Novotný, “Prolegomena to a Study of Beings of Reason in Post-Suárezian Scholasticism, 1600–1650”, Studia Neoaristotelica 3, no. 2 (2006): 126. The author, however, mistakenly attributed to Hurtado the Impossibilist View according to which all beings of reason are self-contradictory.

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in this paper on Hurtado’s writings which has been so far neglected by historians of philosophy, assuming that the reader is familiar with Suárez’s views on the subject expressed in Metaphysical Disputation 54 (On Beings of Reason). 3 The paper is divided into three parts: First, I analyse Hurtado’s earlier views (2), then, his later views (3), finally, I determine the differences between the two views and indicate where Hurtado’s theory essentially differs from that of Suárez (4). 2. HURTADO’S EARLIER VIEWS

Hurtado takes up beings of reason at two occasions. First in his Disputations in Entire Philosophy, published five times between 1615 and 1619, and then in his Entire Philosophy, published first in 1624.4 Although the two works overlap they also differ. The main discussion of beings of reason is contained in the Metaphysical Disputation 19 (On Beings of Reason) (henceforth Disputation 19).5 The original version of the Disputation 19 is not very long, it has only about five thousand words. With thirteen thousand words the revised version of the Disputation 19 is much longer. Hurtado’s original version of the disputation has three sections. In the first he deals with the nature and the causes of beings of reason, in the second with the   See Doyle’s translation of F. Suárez, On Beings of Reason. (De Entibus Rationis): Metaphysical Disputation LIV, transl., introd. and notes John P. Doyle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995). From the secondary literature see, for instance, B. Canteñs, Suárez and Meinong on Beings of Reason and Non-existent Objects (Coral Gables, FL, 1999); B. Canteñs, “Suárez on Beings of Reason: What Kind of Being (entia) are Beings of Reason, and What Kind of Being (esse) Do they Have?”, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2003): 171–187; J. P. Doyle, “Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (First part)”, Vivarium 25 (1987): 47–75; J. P. Doyle, “Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (Second part)”, Vivarium 26 (1988): 51–72; and Millán-Puelles, Antonio, The Theory of the Pure Object, transl. and ed. Jorge García-Gómez (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996). 4   The full title of the former work is Disputationes in universam philosophiam a summulis ad metaphysicam [Disputations in Entire Philosophy from the Elementary Logic to Metaphysics] (Moguntiae: Typis et Sumptibus Ioannis Albini, 1619); the (almost) full title of the latter work is Universa philosophia: Nova editio quinque anterioribus tertia fere parte auctior, ab ipso authore ita recognita […] ut novum opus merito videri queat [Entire Philosophy: The New Edition […] Expanded and Enriched by almost One Third so that it is Fair to See it as the New Work] (Lugduni: Sumptibus Ludovici Prost. Haeredis Roville, 1624). I will abbreviate the treatise on Metaphysics from the former work as DUP-M, the one from the latter as UP-M. We see that already in the title Hurtado indicates that the latter work is substantially revised. 5   Hurtado also discusses beings of reason in section 4 of the Logical Disputation 1 (On the Object of Logic). The original 1615 version of this section brings nothing noteworthy. The revised version of the section is already more substantive. Hurtado briefly summarizes the results of this analysis at the beginning of the revised Metaphysical Disputation 19; below I shall only discuss this summary. 3

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question whether God knows beings of reason, and in the third with some corollaries of his view, such as the division of beings of reason. Given the limited extent of this article I do not discuss the question of whether God knows beings of reason.6 2.1 Nature and causes of beings of reason In section 1 Hurtado discusses several issues concerning the nature and causes of beings of reason.7 The section is arranged somewhat ad hoc. At the centre of the section stand Hurtado’s Five Theses (conclusiones), preceded by the discussion of extrinsic denominations and of the concept of “merely objectively in the intellect”, and followed by the discussion of simple apprehension and the question whether the senses and the will make up beings of reason. The core idea of Hurtado’s view is that beings of reason are errors. Before taking up this core idea (2.1.3) I discuss extrinsic denominations (2.1.1) and objective being (2.1.2). Although Hurtado’s later views will be the primary subject of the next part of my paper for the sake of conveniency I discuss Hurtado’s later views about the extrinsic denominations already in this part. 2.1.1 Extrinsic denominations The discussion of denominations goes back at least to Plato and Aristotle. In Categories Aristotle states that “When things get their name from something, with a difference of ending, they are called paronymous. Thus, for example, the grammarian gets his name from grammar, the brave get theirs from bravery”. (1a13). The Greek adjective ‘παϱώνυμον’ was translated into Latin as ‘denominativum’ (sc. name or word). It was often considered as a special kind of analogy. Stated simply, ‘to denominate’ means “to name a thing derivatively”. More precisely, a denomination is the substitution of the name N2 of a thing T2 for the name N1 of another thing T1 to which T1 is somehow related. Denominations are intrinsic and extrinsic. For instance, Socrates (T1) is denominated as ‘the white’ (N2) – instead of ‘Socrates’ (N1) – for he is intrinsically related to whiteness (T2). In contrast, Socrates (T1) is denominated as ‘the seen’ 6   Just the summary: there was “a great controversy between Fr. Francisco Suárez and Fr. Gabriel Vázquez” about the question of whether God knows beings of reason as made by us (DUP-M, d. 19, s. 3, n. 21, p. 603). Suárez (DM 54, 2, 23) affirms that God knows beings of reason as made by us, whereas Vázquez denies this. Hurtado sides here with Suárez (DUP-M, d. 19, s. 3, n. 21, p. 603). Concerning another question whether God makes up his own beings of reason, all three authors agree in denying this (DUP-M, ibid., n. 20). 7   Concerning “methodology” Hurtado agrees with Suárez that beings of reason belong to metaphysics rather than logic: “[C]ontrariorum eamdem esse disciplinam, quapropter […] ens rationis spectare ad metaphysicum, quia opponitur enti reali, cum quo habet veram oppositionem et fictam aliquam affinitatem, de quo late disputat Pater Suárez [DM 54], in cuius initio ait esse dialecticum errorem opinari illius considerationem ad Dialecticam pertinere. Unaquaeque facultas [= disciplina] […] considerat entia rationis in particulari, suis obiectis […] opposita: at vero considerare naturam et essentiam [et causas et divisio] entis rationis proprium est metaphysici instituti.” – DUP-M, d. 19, Intr., n. 1, p. 599.

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(N2) – instead of ‘Socrates’ (N1) – for he is merely extrinsically related to being seen (T2), which is the form derived from the founding relation of sight (P) that somebody has towards Socrates (T1). Hence, we may say that an extrinsic denomination involves four basic elements: denomination (N2: ‘the seen’), thing denominated (T1: Socrates), denominating form (T2: being seen) and the relation founding the denomination (P: somebody’s seeing Socrates).8 Since beings of reason are according to Suárez “that which has objective being merely in the intellect” (DM 54, 1, 6), which means that a being of reason is a “pure” object for the intellect, it would be tempting to think that the extrinsic denomination being merely thought about is not just a necessary but a sufficient condition for something to be a being of reason. Suárez, however, rejects such view (DM 54, 2, 6–14). As we shall see, Hurtado also does, although for different reasons than Suárez. Hurtado’s opens his discussion of the extrinsic denominations by an attack on the Thomistic definition of beings of reason as “that which does not posit anything intrinsic into the object”. Hurtado finds this view as totally unjustified: The Thomists generally claim that a being of reason is that which does not posit anything intrinsic into the denominated object. Hence second intensions, such as genus, species, subject, predicate, etc. are beings of reason […]. [S]imilarly all other extrinsic denominations will be beings of reason. I have never seen any argument for this claim but they propose it as a metaphysical principle. I argue against them: everything which has physical being from the side of reality is a real being, not a being of reason […] [and] an extrinsic denomination is a real concept physically existing at some place; hence it has physical being in reality. I prove the latter premise: knowing [cognitio] is an extrinsic denomination of the object but an intrinsic of the intellect; hence the extrinsic denomination has intrinsic being somewhere.9

8   Similarly as the notion of beings of reason so the notion of extrinsic denominations was applied in various contexts, see J. P. Doyle, “Prolegomena to a study of extrinsic denomination in the work of Francis Suárez S.J.”, Vivarium 22 (1984): 121–160. For an application to Suárez’s theory of transcendentals, see J. J. E. Gracia, “Suárez and the Doctrine of the Transcendentals”, Topoi 11, n. 2 (1992): 121–133. Sven K. Knebel, “The Early Modern Rollback of Merely Extrinsic Denomination”, in Meeting of the Minds: The Relations between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy, ed. S. F. Brown (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 317–331, argues that the rejection of the notion of (merely) extrinsic denominations is one of the major ontological disagreements between modern and scholastic authors. 9   “Commune est Thomistis universis ens rationis esse, quod nihil intrinsecum ponit in rebus. Unde deducunt secundas intentiones generis, et speciei, subiecti, et praedicati esse ens rationis, quia nihil ponunt in obiecto: item omnes extrinsecae denominationes erunt entia rationis. Huius asserti nullam eorum vidi rationem, sed illud ponunt ut Metaphysicum principium. Quos ita primum arguo: Id, quod a parte rei habet esse physicum, est ens reale, et non rationis […] [et] extrinseca denominatio est aliquid conceptus realis physice alicubi existens: ergo habet esse physicum a parte rei: probo antecedens, cognitio

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Hurtado argues that even extrinsic denominations do exist somewhere intrinsically, namely in the intellect, and hence they are real. Given this, Hurtado concludes that the definition “a being of reason is that which posits nothing intrinsic into the thing” is wrong. In the revised edition Hurtado offers a more charitable reading of the Thomistic definition: [A] Thomists generally hold that every extrinsic denomination is a being of reason. […] I have shown, however, […] that they do not speak about beings of reason as they are opposed to real beings as such, but about beings extrinsic to some objects, intrinsic to others. […] [B] For instance, they say that the object known is a being of reason [= ‘known’ said of an object expreses a being of reason] because to be known is not intrinsic to the known object […] But the act of knowing in virtue of which the object is said to be known, although it is not intrinsic to the [known] object, is intrinsic to the intellect. […] [C] These authors define a being of reason as that which posits nothing intrinsic into things. This definition, if it is understood about every thing, is true; if, however, [it is understood] only about some thing, is false, for the being intrinsic to one thing can be extrinsic to others.10

Here we see that Hurtado admits that the Thomists may be using the expression ‘being of reason’ in a sense compatible with real being [A]. Hence, although it is true that in order for something to be a being of reason in the proper sense it is not sufficient that it is an extrinsic denomination, there may be other senses of ‘being of reason’ (namely the denominative and fundamental) in which it is true that for a being of reason it is sufficient to be an extrinsic denomination. In these senses, however, we speak about beings of reason that are just a sort of real beings. (See 3.1.1. below). Hurtado also points out that if something is extrinsic to one object it does not mean that it is extrinsic to every object. For instance, if an object x is known by Peter, then being known is extrinsic to x but intrinsic to Peter’s intellect. And this sufficies to make the form being known real [C]. The only way to save the truth of the Thomistic claim that every extrinsic being is a beings of reason, i.e. a being of reason posits nothing intrinsic into a thing, is [C]: v.g. est denominatio extrinseca obiecto, intrinseca autem intellectui: ergo extrinseca denominatio habet esse intrinsecum alicubi.” − DUP-M, d. 19, s. 1, n. 2, p. 599. The discussion continues in n. 3–8. 10   “[A] Communis est inter Thomistas opinio omnem extrinsecam denominationem esse ens rationis. […] Ostendi tamen […] eos non esse locutos de ente rationis ut opponitur enti reali ut sic, sed de uno ente extrinseco alicui obiecto, intrinseco tamen aliis. […] [B] Exempli gratia obiectum esse cognitum dicunt esse ens rationis, quia esse cognitum non est intrinsecum obiecto cognito […] at vero cognitio qua obiectum dicitur cognitum, quamvis non est intrinseca obiecto, est tamen intrinseca intellectui. […] [C] Definiunt autem hi authores ens rationis quod nihil intrinsecum ponit in rebus. Quae definitio si intelligatur de omnibus rebus est vera; si autem intelligatur de aliquibus rebus solum, est falsa, quia ens intrinsecum alicui rei potest esse aliis extrinsecum.” UP-M, d. 19, s. 1, n. 4, p. 943.

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A being of reason is that which posits nothing intrinsic into any one thing. If, however, the Thomistic claim is interpreted in the (usual Thomistic) sense: “A being of reason is that which posits nothing intrinsic into a given thing”, then it is false. As I have already said, in rejecting extrinsic denomination view on beings of reason Hurtado remains a Suárezian. True, his reasoning against it seems independently worked out and it is also greatly expanded beyond what Suárez says in the Metaphysical Disputations but so far no radical discrepancies between Suárez and Hurtado emerge.11 2.1.2 Objective being Having rejected the extrinsic denomination view, Hurtado proposes a definition of beings of reason as “that which has merely objective being in the intellect”. Prima facie this is exactly the same definition as the one proposed by Suárez (see above 1.1). However, Hurtado explains it as follows: [A] A being of reason is that which has merely objective being in the intellect. […] [B] Thus, two aspects can be distinguished, namely the [act of ] knowing which denominates the thing as known and as objectively existing in the mind, and the thing itself or the object, which is extrinsically denominated from this [act of] knowing. [C] If the [act of] knowing denominates the thing so that it has the being as [sicut] it is known and denominated, then the thing does not have merely objective being in the intellect […] In this situation no being of reason is made up. [D] For instance, if somebody [e.g. Paul] mentally affirms Peter is a human being, the identity between Peter and a human being has objective being in the intellect that affirms this […] [but] beside this objective being there is also a real identity because Peter has the identity with a human being also outside of Paul’s intellect. […] [Hence] Peter is a human being does not have objective being merely in the intellect. [E] But if the   In the revised edition Hurtado greatly expands his discussion of extrinsic denominations. In fact this discussion takes up the whole two thirds of the disputation (sections 1 and 2). Section 1 deals with the view that identifies beings of reason with extrinsic denominations. Section 2 deals with a new version of the extrinsic denomination view according to which beings of reason cannot be reduced to extrinsic denominations but they somehow (necessarily) result from them. It is hard to say why Hurtado discusses extrinsic denominations so extensively, especially since, as he himself acknowledged, some versions of the extrinsic denomination view were held by nobody. One possible explanation might be psycholinguistic: Hurtado was born in the Basque region and unlike all other European languages, which are nominative-accusative, the Basque language is ergative-absolutive. In such languages arguments (= logical subjects) of intransitive verbs behave grammatically like objects of transitive verbs. Both arguments of intransitive verbs and objects of transitive verbs are in the absolutive case, whereas agents (= logical subjects) of transitive verbs must be inflected into the ergative case. It seems likely that the speakers of ergative-absolutive languages would find the intuition that extrinsic denominations were beings of reason highly implausible: in ergative-absolutive languages all sentences with transitive verbs appear to involve extrinsic denominations. 11

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[act of] knowing does not terminate at the thing as it is or no object corresponds to it […] then a being of reason emerges: for the object is not in reality but merely in [the act of] knowing. Such object is called ‘being of reason’ for it has no other being beside the one apprehended by reason. [F] For instance, [suppose] I affirm Quantity is a substance, when in reality it is an accident. Hence it is, i.e. is judged to be, a substance in my intellect and [in my act of] knowing. But it is not a substance in reality. Hence the identity of the quantity and the substance has no being other than objective being in the intellect.12

Hurtado first distinguishes between the act of knowing in virtue of which a thing is denominated as “the known thing” and the denominated thing [B]. Then he describes two possible scenarios: (1) The denominated thing has being as it is known [C]. This ‘as’ (sicut) is understood by Hurtado propositionally: Paul’s knowledge of Peter as a human being simply means that Paul makes a judgement that Peter is a human being. This situation involves the proposition “Peter is a human being” judged by Paul and an extra-mental fact that Peter is a human being.13 Since there is the fact corresponding to Paul’s judgement, the latter is not merely objectively in Paul’s intellect and no being of reason arises [D]. 12   “[A] Est ergo ens rationis, quod tantum habet esse obiective in intellectu. […] [B] Ubi duo reperiuntur, et cognitio, quae rem denominat cognitam et obiective in mente existentem, et res ipsa sive obiectum, quod extrinsece a tali cognitione denominatur. [C] Quando cognitio denominat rem, quae habet illud esse sicut cognoscitur et denominatur, tunc talis res non habet esse obiective tantum in intellectu: sed praeter illam extrinsecam denominationem et existentiam obiectivam in intellectu [...]. In quo eventu nullum fit ens rationis. [D] Ut cum quis mente affirmat Petrus est homo, identitas inter Petrum et hominem habet esse obiective in intellectu id affirmante […] [sed] praeter illud esse obiective, habet etiam esse reale identitatis, quia Petrus habet identitatem cum homine etiam extra intellectum Pauli. [Ergo] […] Petrus est homo non habet esse obiective tantum in intellectu. [E] Quando autem cognitio non terminatur ad rem sicuti est, neque illi respondet obiectum […] tunc fit ens rationis: quia obiectum non est in re, sed tantum in cognitione; tale autem obiectum vocatur ens rationis, quia non habet esse nisi a ratione apprehensum, [F] exempli gratia, ego affirmo quantitas est substantia, quae tamen a parte rei est accidens, ecce in meo intellectu et cognitione quantitas est substantia, idest, iudicatur esse substantia: at vero in se non est substantia; ecce identitas substantiae et quantitatis nullum habet esse nisi obiective in intellectu.” – DUP-M, d. 19, s. 1, n. 9, p. 600. 13   Scholastics accounted for judging (predication) in terms of “identity”. In their view predication is the identification of the predicate and the subject by means of the copula ‘is’. A non-Hurtadian version of this traditional scholastic view has been rigorously formulated and defended within the tradition of contemporary analytic philosophy by S. Sousedík, Identitní teorie predikace [Identity theory of predication] (Praha: ΟΙΚΟΥΜΝΗ, 2007), the gist of which is outlined in S. Sousedík, “Towards a Thomistic Theory of Predication”, in L. Novák, D. Novotný, P. Sousedík, D. Svoboda, Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic” (Ontos Verlag in cooperation with Studia Neoaristotelica, 2012), 247–256.

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(2) The act of knowing does not terminate at the thing as it is [E]. For instance, Paul makes a judgement that quantity is a substance. This situation involves the proposition “Quantity is a substance” and the lack of the corresponding extra-mental fact in reality. Since there is no fact corresponding to the (false) proposition, judged to be true by Paul, the latter is merely objectively in Paul’s intellect and a being of reason arises [F]. We see that although Hurtado verbally agrees with Suárez that “a being of reason is that which has objective being merely in the intellect“ he radically alters the interpretation of this scholastic shibboleth to mean “a being of reason is a false proposition which is judged to be true”.14 We now turn to Hurtado’s explanation of this completely non-Suárezian view. 2.1.3 Beings of reason as errors From the definition of being of reason as a false proposition which is judged to be true, Hurtado infers several concequences, of which I mention the first, the second and the fifth. First, there are beings of reason. This is justified by the trivial appeal to the existence of errors: Hence first you can infer that Valles and with him not a few others were hallucinating when they denied beings of reason: for [the fact] that there are beings of reason is so clear as it is obvious that they have been deceived. For there are many things that we affirm or deny which have no being except in our affi rmations and negations. The objects are thus denominated or represented in a different manner than they are […] in the proposition Peter is a stone, we represent Peter, a stone, and their union, the latter, however, has being nowhere, except in the cognition.15

Second, beings of reason are made only by false mental acts. Against the background of Hurtado’s assumptions the justification of this claim is also obvious: Secondly […] because a being of reason has objective being merely in the intellect […] necessarily, the act which makes beings of reason is false. The implication is clear for there is nothing from the side of the object that is represented by the act …hence this act is inadequate (difformis) to the object and hence it is false. […] This explana14   I use the term ‘propositio’ for a lack of better term. Hurtado’s being of reason is not a mental act (event) but a result or product of such an act. It is an object of thought in the sense of what we think, not in the sense of what we think about. 15   “Unde colliges primo, halucinatum esse Vallesium, et cum illo non paucos, negantes entia rationis: nam tam est clarum esse entia rationis, quam apertum eos fuisse deceptos: multa enim affir mamus et negamus, quae non habent esse praeter nostram affirmationem et negationem. Obiecta igitur quae sic denominatur et repraesentatur diverso modo, quo sunt […] propositione Petrus est lapis, repraesentantur Petrus, lapis, et unio, ea autem unio nullibi habet esse, nisi in cognitione.” – DUP-M, d. 19, s. 1, n. 10, p. 601.

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tion I take not only from Aristotle and St. Thomas […] but also from Father Suárez himself and from Vázquez, Fonseca and others that deal with beings of reason.16

Note Hurtado’s strange claim that he has taken over this view from Suárez. From the view that beings of reason are false propositions and that beings of reason are made by false acts Hurtado then draws some surprising consequences. So far Hurtado’s examples of beings of reason included only necessarily false judgements (Peter is a stone, Quantity is a substance, etc.) but now he considers contingently false judgements [B] and judgements about self-contradictory beings [C]: [A] Fifthly I claim that in order to form a being of reason, it is not necessary that the object of the act is impossible; what is required is that the object is not as it is represented by the act for only in this case it has merely objective being in the intellect. For instance, [B] [suppose that] Peter is not running and I affirm Peter is running; the [actually] exercised existence has no being except objectively in my intellect; for although [Peter is running as such] has possible being, the act represents it as [having] actually actual being – but this actuality is only objectively in my intellect. [C] Contrariwise, if the act conforms to the object, even if the object at stake is a chimera, with respect to this act there is no being of reason for this [object] has another being than the being from the act whereby somebody, e.g. I, think of it.17

We see (in [B]) that Hurtado openly acknowledges that beings of reason are made both by necessarily and contingently false judgements. Hence, some beings of reason can be actualized in reality. The claim that not every being is “impossible to exist in reality” contradicts Suárez and is another radical departure from the standard scholastic views of the time; but Hurtado is even more radical: if a self-contradictory object is the subject of a true judgement, it is not a being of reason [C]. This means that the traditional paradigms of being of reason, namely chimeras and square circles, are not beings of reason. This prima facie shocking claim is further explained: 16   “Colligo secundo […] quia ens rationis tantum habet esse obiective in intellectu […] actus, qui facit ens rationis, est falsus necessario: patet consequentia: quia ex parte obiecti non est quod actus repraesentat […] ergo talis actus est difformis obiecto: ergo falsus […] Quam explicationem colligo non modo ex Aristotele et D. Thoma […] verum et ex eodem Patre Suárez, Vazquez, Fonseca, et caeteris agentibus de ente rationis.” – DUP-M, d. 19, s. 1, n. 11, p. 601. 17   “[A] Colligo quinto, ad efformandum ens rationis, non requiri ut obiectum actus sit impossible; sed requiri, ut obiectum non sit sicut repraesentatur per actum; quia in eo solo casu habet esse obiective tantum in intellectu, [B] v.g. Petro non currente ego affirmo Petrus currit; existentia exercita Petri non habet esse nisi obiective in meo intellectu: quia licet habeat esse possibile, id tamen non representatur per illum actum, sed solum esse actuale, ut actuale: actualitas autem illa solum est in meo intelectu. [C] E contra vero si actus conformatur cum obiecto, licet obiectum in se sit chimaera, tamen comparatione illius actus, non est ens rationis, quia habet aliud esse, quam esse per illum actum, verbi gratia, cognosco ego.” DUP-M, d. 19, s. 1, n. 14, p. 602.

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[T]his act [of truly thinking of a self-contradictory object] does not make up anything because its object is not merely objectively in the intellect in virtue of (per) this [same] act. For besides the objective being in virtue of this act, the [self-contradictory object] has another being, namely the merely objective being in the intellect of somebody else or the [merely objective being] it had in another act of the same intellect.18

Hurtado’s idea seems to be that judging truly about self-contradictory beings necessarily presupposes judging falsely about them. It is the latter act where they get their being from. For instance, when I make a true judgement about a square circle, my mental act conforms to the already “existing” square circle, which is made up by some false judgement (my own in the past or of other people); the square circle does not receive any being from the true judgement of mine. True judgements about self-contradictory beings necessarily presuppose false judgements in virtue of which they are made up. There is another reason why self-contradictory beings cannot be being of reason. They are objects, whereas the latter are in Hurtado’s view propositions. Hence simple apprehension (the mental power responsible for forming concepts) is incapable of making them: You ask whether beings of reason are made by simple apprehension. [A] I answer that mere apprehension of the subject or the predicate is not sufficient because […] there is no falsity in them. [B] You say that when a chimera is apprehended as the subject of the proposition A chimera is a being of reason, then a being of reason is made, for chimeras have merely objective being in the intellect. [C] I answer that no being of reason is made here since […] the object of this act has not merely objective being in the intellect in virtue of this act but it has another being to which the act conforms. [D] No [real] being is attributed to a chimera but rather denied: to say A chimera is a being of reason is the same as to say A chimera is some fictum. And since [true] being is denied of it, the claim is true. Hence this is a proposition about the object as it is. [E] (The expression ‘as it is’ does not indicate […] real being but fictitious being, which indeed, chimeras have).19 18   “Petrum decipi meus actus est verus, quia conformatur cum obiecto; et quia ille actus nihil fingit, quare eius obiectum non est obiective tantum in intellectu per illum, sed praeter esse obiectivum per illum, habet aliud esse: nempe esse obiective tantum in intellectu alterius, vel fuisse obiective in eodem intellectu per alium actum.” – DUP-M, d. 19, s. 1, n. 14, p. 602. 19   “Rogas, utrum per simplicem apprehensionem fiat ens rationis? [A] Respondeo, per solam apprehensionem subiecti vel praedicati non fieri, quia […] in illis non reperiri falsitatem. [B] Dices, quando apprehenditur chimaera ut subiectum huius propositionis, Chimaera est ens rationis: tunc fit ens rationis, quia chimaera non habet esse nisi obiective in intellectu. [C] Respondeo, ibi nullum fieri ens rationis […] quia obiectum illius actus non habet esse obiective tantum in intellectu per illum, sed potius habet aliud esse, cui conformatur actus: [D] nec tunc chimaerae tribuitur esse, sed potius negatur: idem est enim dicere, Chimaera est ens rationis, ac Chimaera est aliquid fictum, cui quia negatur esse, actus est verus.

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Simple apprehension is not sufficient for making up a being of reason since truth/ falsity does not apply to concepts. To the objection that there are true statements about chimeras and hence about non-propositional beings of reason [B] Hurtado replies in two different ways. First, he says that within true statements chimeras do have some being to which the statement conforms [C]. This being is called ‘fictitious’ but it must be in some sense real although it is not real in the narrower sense [E]. Secondly, Hurtado says that to predicate ‘being of reason’ or ‘fiction’ of a chimera is the same as to deny ‘(real) being’ of it [D]. This could, perhaps, be understood to mean that we speak about nothing – as we can see in this series of paraphrases: ‘A chimera is a being of reason’, i.e. ‘A chimera is not a real being’, i.e. ‘There is no such thing as a chimera’. Thus Hurtado’s text seems to leave us with two possible interpretation: (1) Self-contradictory beings are pure nothing. (2) Self-contradictory beings have a peculiar sort of real being, namely fictitious being.20 There are two more consequences of Hurtado’s theory that should be mentioned. First, human intellect may not only create but also destroy beings of reason: [A] In order for something to be a being of reason it needs to have objective being in the intellect so that it is not known as it is. For if it is known as it is it is […] destroyed by this act. [B] For instance, when I say Quantity is a substance, I give objective being to the identity of these two things which they do not have in fact; hence I make up a chimera.21 [C] However, if I say Chimera is to say that quantity is a substance, […] I do not make up a being of reason but rather destroy […] [the being of reason] made up in the prior act; the latter act is true, for it conforms to the object (which [already] has being in itself, distinct from the objective being of the latter act).22 Est ergo illa propositio de obiecti sicuti est, [E] ly sicuti est sumpto non pro esse reali, sed pro esse ficto, quod vere convenit chimerae.” DUP-M, d. 19, s. 1, n. 15, p. 602–3. 20   If it seems counter-intuitive to consider fictitious being as a sort of real being, consider this: Mental acts are real; hence, the objects that are immanent (= “staying within”) to these acts are also real. Hence, the fictitious objects created by our minds are also real for they are proper parts of real mental acts and every proper part of a real whole is real. 21   We see that ‘chimera’ means here not a fictional animal but a (necessarily) false proposition. This is Hurtado’s peculiar terminology, which seems to be, however, adopted by subsequent (esp. Jesuit) scholastics. 22   “[A] Itaque ut aliquid sit ens rationis, ita debet esse obiective in intellectu ut per illum non cognoscatur sicuti est: nam si cognoscitur sicuti est, non sit, sed destruitur per intellectum: [B] exempli gratia, ego dico quantitas est substantia. Do esse obiectivum identitati illarum rerum, quod non habent a parte rei et sic facio chimaeram. [C] Cum autem dico chimaera est dicere quantitatem esse substantiam, iste secundus actus non facit ens rationis sed potius destruit et negat iam factum actu priori et hic secundus est verus, quia conformatur obiecto, quod habet esse in se distinctum ab esse obiectivo, quod habet in intellectum per secundum actum.” – DUP-M, d. 19, s. 1, n. 16, p. 602.

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Every true judgement about a chimera presupposes another false judgement about it – this we know already. Now Hurtado adds that whereas the latter gives it some fictitious being [B], the former “destroys” it [C]. Second, if beings of reason are false propositions, it is to be expected that the senses and the will cannot make up beings of reason. The justification of this claim is that neither senses nor the will are directed to something which could be evaluated in terms of truth/falsity.23 2.2 Division of beings of reason Concerning the division of beings of reason, Hurtado is quite brief. He simply defers to Suárez: Beings of reason are divided into privations, negations, and relations, i.e. second intentions. [Of course] this needs to be understood [only] when they are apprehended otherwise than they are […] Beings of reason are divided on account of the ubiquity of falsehoods […] How they are “detained” within certain “enclosed places”, see Fr. Suárez [DM d54s4].24

Unlike Suárez, however, Hurtado says nothing about how exactly and why beings of reason are divided in this three-fold way. In fact, as we shall see, on Hurtado’s theory this division makes no good sense, and so it is not surprising that he drops this claim in the revised edition. 3. HURTADO’S LATER VIEWS

The revised version of the Disputation 19 is divided into six sections: whether extrinsic denominations are beings of reason (s. 1); whether beings of reason result from extrinsic denominations (s. 2); what a being of reason is (s. 3); some corollaries (s. 4); causes and division of beings of reason (s. 5); and whether God knows beings of reason (s. 6). When we compare the revised and the original editions only section 6 (originally section 2 on God and beings of reason) remains verbatim the same in both. The Introduction and sections 1 and 2 on extrinsic denominations are completely new, except for the first paragraph, stating that the treatment of beings of reason belongs to metaphysics (UP-M, d. 19, Intr., n. 1, p. 942); sections 3–5 contain substantially reworked and expanded material of the original sections 1 and 3. 23   “Multo minus fit ens rationis […] per sensus, quia hi neque affirmant aliquid neque negant. […] [V]oluntas non efficit entia rationis, sed efficta amat aut odit.” DUP-M, d. 19, s. 1, n. 18, p. 603. 24   “[D]ividitur ens rationis in privationem, negationem, et relationem, id est secundam intentionem. Quod intellige quando haec apprehenduntur diverso modo, quo sunt […] Ens rationis dividitur pro universitate mendaciorum […] quo pacto certis carceribus teneatur, consule Patrem Suárez [DM 54, 4]” – DUP-M, d. 19, s. 3, n. 33, p. 606.

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This part of my paper is divided into two main parts: (1) the nature of beings of reason, (2) the causes and the division of beings of reason. 3.1. Nature of beings of reason We discuss here three issues: intension of ‘being of reason’, a revised version of Hurtado’s theory of beings of reason as errors, and some consequences of this theory. In all three areas Hurtado makes substantial additions and subtractions to his earlier views. 3.1.1 Intension of ‘being of reason’ The Introduction of the Disputation 19 opens with an analysis of what the term ‘being of reason’ means. This analysis markedly differs from that of Suárez: [A] ‘Being of reason’ in the effective and subjective sense refers to the acts of the intellect that the reason produces in itself. [B] In the denominative sense it refers to the passive denominations through which the objects are called ‘known’. [C] In the foundational sense it refers to those extrinsic denominations which provide a foundation so that they can be conceived by us as intrinsic. [D] In the most proper sense it is that which is not from the side of reality but is contrived by us as that which is [from the side of reality].25

Suárez also discusses various meanings of ‘being of reason’ but Hurtado offers another analysis (DM 54, 1, 5–6). Suárez’s two meanings (effective and subjective) are integrated by Hurtado into one [A]. Then, two new meanings appear, namely denominative, which includes extrinsic denominations (usually made by grammatically passive verbforms) [B] and foundational, which includes extrinsic denominations with a foundation in reality [C]. In its most proper sense being of reason is something which is not in reality but is conceived as if it were in reality [D] – Hurtado interprets this formula, as we know already from the original edition, as “a false proposition judged to be true”. Conspicuously, the objective sense of ‘being of reason’ disappeared, although it is likely that Hurtado would say that the “most proper sense” of ‘being of reason’ means “merely objective”. Hurtado continues: [A] Hence it is clear that the name ‘being of reason’ is ambiguous: it signifies many things as many things and these […] have nothing in common for the fictitious beings have nothing in common with the true beings. What would the acts of the intellect have in common with the fictitious beings? [B] In the present disputation we do not intend to explicate beings of reason in the first sense, for the acts of the 25   “Recognosce quatuor significationes entis rationis […]. [A] Est enim ens rationis effective et subiective pro actu intellectus quem ratio producit in se. [B] Denominative pro passiva denominatione per quam obiecta dicitur cognita. [C] Fundamentaliter pro denominatione extrinseca praebente fundamentum ut a nobis concipiatur ut intrinseca. [D] Propriissime pro ente quod non est a parte rei fingitur tamen esse.” UP-M, d. 19, Intr., n. 2, p. 942.

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intellect are dealt with […] by the “soul-scholar”. Neither have we dealt with beings of reason in the second sense for these are studied by the logician. The third sense is partially relevant for the metaphysicians, [C] the fourth sense, however, is what really matters: we are treating of beings of reason as they are opposed to real beings […] For in the first three senses the being of reason is not distinguished from the real being as such.26

We see that according to Hurtado the four senses are quite unrelated [A] and dealt with by different sciences [B]. Only beings of reason in the proper sense are non-real [C]. Beings of reason in other senses, i.e. extrinsic denominations and beings of reason with a foundation in reality are real. Broadly speaking we may call them beings of reason but properly speaking they are not. 3.1.2 Beings of reason as errors revisited In section 3 of the revised edition, Hurtado draws again an outline of his theory of beings of reason. The part of the theory depicted in this section remains the same although it is explained in somewhat greater detail. Hurtado begins with what he sees as the standard definition of beings of reason: It is not possible to effectively discuss whether a being of reason is possible unless we [first] explain its definition […] Philosophers and theologians have stated that a being of reason is distinct from every real being both actual and possible, both positive and negative. They have determined the following defi nition: A being of reason is [A] that of which total being consists in being known, or [B] that which does not have other being than objective in the intellect. This definition was proposed as standard by Fr. Suárez.27

Although Hurtado did not use the first part of the definition [A] in his first edition it was implicit in it. Intrerestingly, contrary to what Hurtado says, Suárez in fact did not explicitly state [A], although there are indications that he would probably agree with it. Hurtado proceeds with an explanation of [B]. The explanation may be divided into three steps:   “[A] E quibus constat ens rationis esse nomen aequivocum: significat enim plura ut plura, quae […] in nullo conveniunt: ens enim fictum in nullo convenit cum vero: actus intellectus quid habent commune cum ente ficto? [B] Praesens disputatio non est ad explicandum ens rationis in prima significatione: nam de actibus rationis […] agit animasticus. Neque agimus de ente rationis in secunda significatione: illa enim spectat ad logicum: tertia autem significatio ex parte spectat ad metaphysicum. [C] Quarta autem propriissime: agimus enim de ente rationis ut opponitur enti reali […]. In tribus autem primis significationibus non distinguitur ens rationis ab ente reali ut sic.” – UP-M, d. 19, Intr., n. 2, p. 942. 27   “Non potest commode disputari an sit possible ens rationis nisi eius definitionem explanemus. […] Philosophi atque theologi asseruerunt ens rationis distinctum ab omni esse reali tam actuali quam possibili, positivo et negativo. Eius autem definitionem adstruxerunt: Ens rationis est [A] cuius totum esse consistit in cognosci, sive [B] quod non habet esse nisi obiective in intellectu. Quam definitionem communem proponit P. Suárez [DM 54, 1, 6]” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 3, n. 64–65, p. 952. 26

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Step 1: All that we directly know are the objects of our minds. These mental objects may represent extra-mental objects similarly as a statue represents a person: I explain [the definition] as follows: to have objective being in the intellect means to be known by the intellect. Objects are said to be in the intellect for the cognitions/ images of these objects are in it […] in fact usually we [even] say that the image is the thing which it represents. For instance, when we see the statue of Caesar, we say This is Caesar: Caesar is intentionally or representatively […] in the cognition similarly as he is in the image [e.g. in the statue] […] [However] the object is not in its image properly speaking but only metaphorically for the images are images of the objects. Hence I conclude that all the objects of our acts of knowing are objectively in the intellect, i.e. they are represented as objects of their images.28

Step 2: Now it turns out that Hurtado’s mental objects are not in fact objects (in the usual sense) but propositions. Some such mental “objects”/propositions represent mind-independent facts: But there is this difference: many objects have another being in themselves which is distinct from their intentional being […] and representation […] For instance I say Peter is a human being: this object has [not only] the intentional and objective being in my intellect but also (beside this being-represented) it has that which it is claimed to have in itself …: for Peter is a human being both inside and outside of my intellect. Thus it is a real being and does not have merely objective being in the intellect. For this reason the proposition Peter is a human being is true because Peter is a human being. The same I have stated about the privation and negation. (For the objects Antonius is blind, The stone does not see […] are not just objectively in the intellect but also outside of it […] for […] they obtain independently of our intellect).29

Step 3: Other mental “objects”/propositions do not represent mind-independent facts: these and only these are beings of reason: 28   “[Q]uam [definitionem] sic explico: habere se obiective in intellectu est cognosci per intellectum: in quo obiecta dicuntur esse quia in illo sunt cognitiones imagines obiectorum […] immo imago solet dici esse res quam repraesentat: ut cum videmus Caesaris effigiem, dicimus, hic est Caesar: est Caesar intentionaliter sive repraesentative […] in sui cognitione ut in imagine […] obiectum enim non est proprie in sua imagine, sed per metaphoram, dum imago est repraesentatio rei. Unde concludo omnia obiecta quae cognoscuntur habere in intellectu esse obiective, id est, repraesentari ut obiecta suarum imaginum.” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 3, n. 65, p. 952. 29   “Est tamen hoc discrimen: multa obiecta habent in se aliud esse distinctum ab esse intentionali […] et repraesentatione sui: […] exempli gratia dico Petrus est homo: hoc obiectum et habet esse intentionaliter et obiective in meo intellectu, et praeterquam representari habet etiam in se id quod dicitur […]: Petrus enim homo est intra et extra meum intellectum: ac propterea est ens reale […] neque habet obiective tantum esse in intellectu. Quapropter ea propositio Petrus est homo ideo est vera, quia Petrus est homo. Idem dixerim de privatione et negatione. Haec enim obiecta Antonius est caecus, lapis non est videns […] non solum sunt obiective intra intellectum, sed etiam extra illum […] perinde […] contingunt independenter a nostro intellectu.” UP-M, d. 19, s. 3, n. 66, p. 953.

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Other objects are not outside the proposition through which they are affirmed or negated, for instance, God is not the Trinity, Human being is a brute: these objects are not in themselves as they are conceived by the intellect. The lack of being-the-Trinity is not in God […] nor irrationality in human beings. Behold these objects have objective being in the intellect through these propositions but nowhere else some other being; hence they are merely objectively in the intellect. These propositions do not just represent real “extremes” that have some being outside of the intellect […] for the one who says Human being is a brute conceives not just a human being and a brute but also their real identity, which is nowhere but in the representation. The proposition is false for it represents in the object what is not in it.30

We see that Hurtado explained a bit more his original claim that a being of reason is a false proposition which is judged to be true, without modifying it. Note also that the quotes clearly show Hurtado’s mentalism. 31 Now we look at some of the consequences that Hurtado infers from his theory. 3.1.3 Some Consequences In section 4 Hurtado draws six consequences of his view. The second, fourth and fifth consequences corresponds to those mentioned in the original edition: • •

Extrinsic denominations (derived from real extrinsic forms) are not beings of reason.32 This is just an upshot of the long discussions in sections 1 and 2. Not every mental act about a “chimera” (= false proposition) makes it. Suppose I make the “chimera” by judging “human being is a brute”. The reflexive judgement “I have judged that a human being is a brute” is true and hence

30   “Alia vero obiecta non sunt extra illam propositionem per quam affirmantur aut negantur, exempli gratia Deus non est trinus, homo est brutum: haec obiecta non sunt in se sicut intellectu concipiuntur. Carentia enim Trinitatis non est in Deo […] nec irrationalitas est in homine. […] Ecce haec obiecta habent esse obiective in intellectu per illas propositiones; at nullibi habent aliud esse: habent ergo esse obiective tantum in intellectu. Neque vero illae propositiones repraesentant solum extrema realia quae habent esse extra intellectum […].Qui enim dicit, homo est brutum non solum concipit hominem et brutum sed etiam utriusque identitatem realem: quae nullibi est nisi in illa representatione. Quae ideo est falsa, quia repraesentat in obiecto esse quod vere non est.” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 3, n. 67, p. 953. 31   Whereas Suárez has been charged/praised for being a mentalist but the evidence is that he is not, Hurtado clearly is one: all we know directly are images and only indirectly we know what they represent (similarly as we directly see the statue of Caesar but only derivatively the real Caesar). 32   “Secundo deduces […] denominationes extrinsecas a forma reali extrinseca non esse ens rationis: quia illae nihil sunt fictum, sed existunt a parte rei. […] [I]llae denominationes sunt sicut affirmantur: quae omnia aliena sunt ab ente rationis, quod est chymaera reddens actum falsum.” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 4, n. 71, p. 953.

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•

it does not make the “chimera”. The reflexive act “I have falsely judged that a human being is a brute” not only does not make it but it even “destroys” it.33 There are beings of reason (dari).34

The first, third and sixth consequences, however, bring up something new: •

• •

Beings of reason are not correctly divided into “actually formal” and foundational. By ‘actually formal’ Hurtado seems to mean “without a foundation in reality”, for otherwise he would not contrast it with ‘foundational’. The foundational beings of reason are not beings of reason in the proper sense for they are real and they “pop up into existence” mindindependently – at least this is what their proponents say, according to Hurtado.35 Privations and negations are mind-independent “foundations of true propositions” and all beings of reason are supposed to be (according to Hurtado) without any proximate or remote foundation in reality. 36 The term ‘being’ is purely ambiguous when applied to beings of reason and real beings – not even Suárez’s weakest analogy of proportionality applies. Hurtado holds that for this analogy to obtain the referents of the analogical terms must exist. But this is not the case with beings of reason for they are

33   “Deduces non effici ens rationis per omnem actum ad illum terminatum […]: exempli gratia fingitur directe chimaera: possum ego habere duos alios actus reflexos: alterum quo reflexe cognosco a me iudicari hominem esse brutum, praescindendo a veritate et falsitate illius iudicii directi. Iste actus reflexus non facit ens rationis: quia licet terminatur ad chimaeram, non tamen illam affirmando: iudicium enim reflexum verum est affirmans rem sicuti est: ego enim iudicavi hominem esse brutum, ergo actus quo reflexe cognosco me iudicasse, verus est. […] Secundus actus reflexus potest esse quo affirmetur fictam esse chimaeram per actum directum: hunc actum non dare esse, sed potius adimere.” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 4, n. 74, p. 954. 34   “Quinto deduces contra Durandum, Valesium, et alios non paucos dari entia rationis. Etenim negari non potest posse a nobis affirmari aliquid impossibile. […] Praeterea dices non respondere in obiecto praeter ens reale. Respondeo […] respondere etiam aliquid quod non est in obiecto: alioquin iudicium non esset falsum.” UP-M, d. 19, s. 4, n. 75–6, p. 954. 35   “Ex hac doctrina haec deducuntur corollaria. Primum, non recte dividi ens rationis in formale actuale et in fundamentale. Nam ens fundamentale non est chimaera neque fingitur, sed in sententia suorum authorum pullulate ex denominationibus extrinsecis independenter ab operatione intellectus.” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 4, n. 70, p. 953. 36   “Tertio deduces privationem et negationem non esse proprie species entis rationis. Quia omne ens rationis est fictum sine fundamento in rebus proximo vel remoto. […] [P]rivationes et negationes non sunt aliquid fictum […]. Conveniunt item cum ente reali positivo in independentia a cognosci et in non habere esse obiective tantum in intellectu et in fundanda propositione vera, eius veritati praebito fundamento.” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 4, n. 72, p. 953.

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“just nothing”. Beings of reason are thought to exist but for this reason they do not exist.37 Let us proceed now to Hurtado’s views on the causes and the division of beings of reason. 3.2 Causes and division of beings of reason Hurtado deals with several issues in the context of the causes of beings of reason. First, he claims that beings of reason have all four types of causes; second, that beings of reason are made up by false mental acts (whether contingently or necessarily false acts is according to him a matter of definitional fiat). Third, Hurtado discusses simple apprehension and a few other special questions. Concerning the division of beings of reason, Hurtado is only very brief and merely revokes his support of the traditional three-member division expressed in the first edition of his book. What sort of causes do beings of reason have? Since beings of reason are not physical entities, Hurtado says, they cannot have causes in the usual, physical, sense.38 Nevertheless, since beings of reason are intentional entities, there are various other senses in which beings of reason do have causes: • • •

Beings of reason may have material and formal causes in the fictitious sense. The intentional efficient cause of beings of reason is the intellect. Beings of reason have a non-direct final cause.

The term ‘fictitious’ occurs here again. Hurtado probably means here something like “non-existing but mistakenly thought to be existing” (but see above for the difficulties with interpreting ‘fictitious’). By ‘non-direct’ Hurtado probably means “somehow directed” but “not naturally”, for neither nature nor any person as such 37   “Tandem deduco ens esse nomen pure aequivocum: quia aptitudo ad existendum et repugnantia ad existendum sunt primo diversa […]: cum autem ens rationis non habet nisi esse fictum, non potest convenire cum esse vero. Imo neque habet ullam analogiam etiam impropriam qualem in risu habent pratum et homo: pratum enim intrinsecam habet viriditatem per quam hilarescere et ridere videtur: ens autem rationis nihil habet ex parte obiecti quo realis imitetur. Apprehenditur quidem a nobis ac si esset, non tamen propterea est.” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 4, n. 77, p. 954. 38   “Causas physicas nullas habet quia cum nihil physicum sit, nullam habet physicam dependentiam. Causam materialem fictam potest habere, ut cum apprehenditur habere subiectum aliquod praedicatum accidentarium […]. Potest item habere causam formalem fictum ut si concipiamus effectum aliquem formalem impossibilem ortum ex aliqua forma. Efficientem habet intellectum ut quod, ut quo vero actum fingentem: haec efficientia est intentionalis et non physica, quia dum cognitio repraesentat quod non est dicitur facere ens rationis. Causam finalem potest habere non quidem directam: nec enim natura per se inclinat ad actum falsum: neque aliquis potest assentiri obiecto nisi appareat esse verum: habet ergo eam causam finalem quam habet actus falsus. Hac de re consule P. Suárez [DM 54, 2].” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 5, n. 78, p. 954.

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intend to fall into error. This is all that Hurtado says, relating his readers to Suárez for further elaboration (who holds, however, different views and not very clear either, see DM 54, 2, 15–18). What about the mental acts in virtue of which beings of reason are produced? First Hurtado says: The greater controversy concerns the acts whereby beings of reason are made up. First I say that beings of reason are made up by the false acts whereby we judge that something exists or can exist which in fact cannot exist: for instance, A human being is brute. Similarly when we say that something is impossible what in fact is possible.39

From the example Hurtado uses (“A human being is a brute”) we gather that he applies his view of beings of reason as errors to necessarily false judgements. But the question is: “Do contingently false acts make up beings of reason?” We know that Hurtado’s original answer was affirmative in spite of the radical consequences that he drew from it. But now he says: [A] The question, however, may be raised whether being of reason happens in virtue of a false judgement representing a possible thing as existing when in fact this thing does not exist. For instance, given that Peter is not running and somebody says Peter is running, is this Peter’s running a being of reason or a real being? I answer that this is a verbal dispute. [B] That this being (esse) is not a being of reason seems to be apparent from [the fact] that this running has possible being: hence it is not a being of reason (for a being of reason is a chimera and Peter’s running is not a chimera). [C] Against this, the support for considering it to be a being of reason is [the fact] that the existence [of Peter’s running] as actually exercised has being nowhere but objectively in the intellect […] [D] The reply to the fi rst argument [see B] is that beings of reason are more commonly chimeras but that it does not follow from this that no other beings of reason happen – [e.g.] when something does not have what it is claimed to have, although it could have it. [E] The reply to the second argument [see C] is that the object [such as in our example] lacks the condition of [actually] exercised existence only accidentally and hence the extension of ‘being of reason’ does not have to be extended – for beings of reason require absolute impossibility to exist.40 39   “De actibus, quibus fit ens rationis, maior est controversia. Dico primo, ens rationis fieri per actum falsum quo iudicamus existere aut existere posse id quod reipsa repugnat esse: ut hominem esse brutum. Item cum diximus esse aliquid impossibile quod re ipsa possible est.” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 5, n. 79, p. 954. 40   “[A] Dubium potest esse, utrum per iudicium falsum repraesentans rem possibilem ut existentem fiat ens rationis quando talis res non existit. Exempli gratia non currente Petro dicat aliquis Petrus currit an ille cursus Petri sit ens rationis vel reale? Respondeo quaestionem esse de nomine. [B] Illud non esse ens rationis videtur ostendi inde, quod ille cursus habet esse possible: ergo non est ens rationis: quia hoc est chymaera; existentia autem cursus Petri non est chymaera. [C] Contra vero illud esse ens rationis suadetur, quia illa existentia ut exercita nullibi habet esse nisi obiective in intellectu […] [D] Ad argumentum pro prima sententia respondetur, frequentiora entia rationis esse chymaeras: quo non

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Hurtado claims here that the issue of contingently false propositions is just a verbal matter [A]. He proposes two arguments to the contrary positions [B] and [C] with replies ([D] and [E]) so that in the end he does not take up a position of his own. We may say, however, that Hurtado’s agnosticism is illegitimate at this point. For based on his claim that beings of reason are objectively merely in the intellect, he should insist that contingently false propositions judged to be true are also beings of reason in the proper sense. The addition that beings of reason require “absolute impossibility to exist” [E] is not warranted by what Hurtado had said before.41 Hurtado presents four more theses about the act whereby beings of reason are made: (a) they are not made by ‘precisive intellection’ (this means, roughly, that they are not made by abstraction);42 (b) they are not made by the simple apprehension of the subject and predicate;43 (c) they may be made by the apprehension of the union of something incompatible (for instance quantity and substance) – which results in a simple (incomplex) being of reason;44 (d) they are not made by the internal or external senses.45 The second and the fourth theses amount to Hurtado’s earlier views. Hence only the first and the third thesis adds something new. With the division of beings of reason Hurtado deals in only one brief paragraph. The standard three-member division applies only to foundational beings of reason (which are not in fact beings of reason opposed to real beings). The proper (“formal”) beings of reason are divided into “whatever figments the created intellect may take

tollitur fieri alia entia rationis, quando non habent illud esse quod de illis praedicatur, licet illud possint habere. In qua sententia ens rationis ut sic est quod ut affirmatur vel negatur, non habet esse nisi obiective in intellectu. [E] Ad argumentum pro secunda sententia respondetur per accidens esse obiectis carere statu existentiae exercitae: nec enim ex hac suppositione expendenda sunt entia rationi, sed praecise ex absoluta repugnantia ad existendum.” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 5, n. 80, p. 954. 41   Hurtado could arbitrarily decide not to call contingently false propositions, judged to be true, by the term ‘being of reason’, but then we may ask, “What are they?” – they can hardly be classified as real beings. 42   “Dico secundo. Intellectio praecisiva non efficit ens rationis.” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 5, n. 81, p. 955. 43   “Dico tertio per simplicem apprehensionem subiecti et predicati non fieri ens rationis. Probatur aperte quia in illa apprehensione nullam reperiri falsitatem.” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 5, n. 82, p. 955. 44   “Dico quarto. Apprehensione unionis potest fieri ens rationis incomplexum, sicut falsitas incomplexa. Si enim apprehenditur identitas quantitatis et substantiae, illa tantum habet esse obiective in intellectu per illam apprehensionem.” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 5, n. 83, p. 955. 45   “Dico quinto. Neque sensus externi neque interni efficiunt ens rationis etiam incomplexum. […] [Q]uia sensus interni aut externi neque affirmant aliquid neque negant. […] Obiicit P. Suárez facultatem imaginatricem habere vim componendi species obiectorum incompossibilium. […] Ad argumentum ergo respondeo imaginationem non habere vim ad percipiendam unionem obiectorum incompossibilium.” UP-M, d. 19, s. 5, n. 84–5, p. 955.

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the trouble to make”.46 In other words, beings of reason can be divided arbitrarily. This is a natural consequence of Hurtado’s view of beings of reason as mistakes: it makes no sense to divide beings of reason, understood as false propositions, into negations, privations and relations. 4. HURTADO AND SUÁREZ ON BEINGS OF REASON

After providing a  comprehensive exegesis of Hurtado’s treatise on beings of reason,47 let me give an overview of his theory and indicate its relation to Suárez’s theory. Hurtado’s core teaching about the nature and the causes of beings of reason is preserved across the two editions: • • • • • • • • •

In order for something to be a being of reason it is not sufficient that it is an extrinsic denomination. A being of reason is that which has merely objective being in the intellect. A being of reason is a false proposition which is judged to be true. Beings of reason are totally dependent on actual mental acts. Self-contradictory beings are not beings of reason. True judgements about self-contradictory beings necessarily presuppose false judgements in virtue of which they are made up. Beings of reason can be destroyed by true judgement. Beings of reason are made only by false mental acts. The senses and the will cannot make up beings of reason.

The revised edition of his work differs from the original in two respects. First, Hurtado adds several claims. Second, he modifies several claims. He adds the following: • • •

The expression ‘being of reason’ can be used in four senses (a) effective and subjective; (b) denominative; (c) foundational; and (d) proper. Only beings of reason in the proper sense are non-real. There are no beings of reason with a foundation in reality. There is no analogy between real being and being of reason.

46   “Ens rationis frequenter dividitur in privationem, negationem, et relationem (haec relatio usurpatur pro denominatione extrinseca secundae intentionis; ab aliis forte usurpabitur pro omni denominatione extrinseca). Haec autem divisio non est entis rationis formaliter, sed fundamentaliter tantum […]. Ens autem rationis proprie usurpatum dividitur in omnia figmenta, quae intellectus creatus potest moliri.” – UP-M, d. 19, s. 5, n. 87, p. 955. 47   Although it is comprehensive I have left out some off-hand issues briefly raised but not discussed. For instance, Hurtado points out that two people can think the same being of reason: “Adverte, posse duos homines decipi circa idem obiectum, quod habet esse obiective tantum ab illorum intellectibus […] nihil enim prohibet duos hominess simul decipi circa idem obiectum.” – DUP-M, d. 19, s. 3, n. 25, p. 604.

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•

Beings of reason have no causes in the physical sense. Beings of reason may have material and formal causes in the fictitious sense. The intentional efficient cause of beings of reason is the intellect. Beings of reason have a nondirect final cause.

More importantly, however, there are claims that Hurtado made in the original edition but modified in the revised one. In the original edition he claimed that • •

Some beings of reason can be actualized in reality. Beings of reason are made both by necessarily and contingently false judgements.

In the revised edition he denied that beings of reason can be actualizable and he argued that properly speaking only necessarily false mental acts can make beings of reason. Hurtado also modified his earlier views about the division of beings of reason. Whereas in the original edition he claimed that beings of reason are divided into negations, privations, and relations of reason, in the revised edition he acknowledged (more in line with his view of beings of reason as errors) that negations and privations are not beings of reason, and that they can be divided arbitrarily. The inner development of Hurtado’s views seems to reflect the changing framework of sententia communis between 1615 and 1624. Whereas the view that beings of reason are divided into negations, privations, and relations of reason became passé by 1624 so that Hurtado could openly abandon it, the view that beings of reason are made by contingently false acts and hence actualizable was so controversial that Hurtado did not dare to restate it again in the revised edition in spite of the fact that it clearly follows from the fundamental principles of his view. It will be interesting to see the transformation of Hurtadism in the younger colleague Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592–1667) whose views seem to be inspired by Hurtado. But let us return to our initial question about the relation of Hurtado’s theory to that of Suárez. Hurtado’s theory essentially differs from it: only propositional beings of reason are admitted and there are no beings of reason with a foundation in reality. Although Hurtado uses Suárez’s defi nition of being of reason as that which has merely objective being in the intellect, he gives it a very different meaning. It is only by mistakes and errors that a being of reason is produced. Its existence is an unfortunate by-product of our fallibility. In contrast, Suárez considers merely objective beings in the intellect to be something useful, because in virtue of these beings we can think of non-beings (privations and negations) and we can think of logical relations. Hurtado holds that beings of reason are false propositions judged to be true. For Suárezians such claim is quite unacceptable. Even though Hurtado occasionally indicates that he has taken over his theory from Suárez, in reality his theory radically differs from it. It is hard to believe that Hurtado would overlook this radical difference, so he might be

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simply hiding his novel views behind the authority of Suárez.48 True, there are some claims with which both Hurtado and Suárez agree, such as the intellect as the the efficient cause of beings of reason (leaving aside the imagination) and the rejection of the extrinsic denominations view, but these superficial agreements do not help to build the bridge between radically different theories. The general lesson of the result of this study for historians of Baroque scholasticism is that Suárez’s significance for the Baroque scholasticism (and hence also early modern non-scholastic philosophy) should not be overestimated. Although it is undeniable that Suárez served as a rôle model for his Jesuit colleagues and that his purely systematic approach to metaphysics was truly revolutional,49 the actual influence of his arguments and theories may not be great. We cannot rely on what some historians say about the influence of Suárez, for the deep and detailed investigation of Baroque scholasticism is in its infancy. 50 We cannot rely on what later Jesuit authors say about Suárez either. For Suárez seems to have become an official authority for them so that they do not criticize him openly. In the instance of Hurtado we have seen that at least some post-Suárezian Jesuit authors hold radically different views from his. Unless we truly know what a given author teaches we cannot call post-Suárezian authors “Suárezians” in spite of their verbal deference to Suárez.51 Hurtado does not even seem to engage Suárez, he simply ignores him: he attempts to create a different system of philosophy, not so much as a reaction to Suárez but quite independently of him. I suspect that similar surprising results will yield investigation into other issues

48   Although it must be acknowledged that there is an element in Suárez’s theory that might be an “inspiration” for Hurtado, namely Suárez’s claim that a being of reason is that which has no being in itself but is conceived in the manner of a being. Based on such definition we could say that a being of reason is thought otherwise than it is and hence that it is a false proposition which is judged to be true. 49   See J. Pereira, Suárez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2007). 50  See above, n. 1. Hurtado’s theory of universals and its difference from Suárez’s was noted and explored by Ester Caruso, Pedro Hurtado de Mednoza e la rinascita del nominalismo nella scolastica del seicento (Firenze: La Nuova Italia editrice, 1979). See also, Daniel Heider, “Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza’s (Mis)interpretation of Aquinas”, in Francisco Suárez and his legacy. The impact of Suárezian metaphysics and epistemology on modern philosophy, ed. Marco Sgarbi (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2010), 105–140. 51  For the discussion of the meanings and appropriateness of “Suarezianism” or “Suarezismus”, see. Sven K. Knebel, Suarezismus. Erkenntnistheoretisches aus dem Nachlass des Jesuitengenerals Tirso González de Santalla (1624–1705) (Amsterdam–Philadelphia: B. R. Grüner, 2011), esp. 207–224 and 235–238.

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discussed by Baroque authors.52 This means that Baroque scholasticism is much more adventurous and exciting field for historians to study than previously thought.53

BIBLIOGRAPHY SCHOLASTIC SOURCES Hurtado de Mendoza, Pedro. Disputationes in universam philosophiam a summulis ad metaphysicam. Moguntiae: Typis et Sumptibus Ioannis Albini, 1619. [= DUP-M] — Universa philosophia: Nova editio quinque anterioribus tertia fere parte auctior, ab ipso authore ita recognita […] ut novum opus merito videri queat. Lugduni: Sumptibus Ludovici Prost. Haeredis Roville, 1624. [= UP-M] Suárez, Francisco. On Beings of Reason. (De Entibus Rationis): Metaphysical Disputation LIV, translated from Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995.

MODERN WORKS Caruso, Ester. Pedro Hurtado de Mednoza e la rinascita del nominalismo nella scolastica del seicento. Firenze: La Nuova Italia editrice, 1979.

  Some authors held views similar to those of Suárez, such as his Jesuit contemporary Antonio Rubio (1548–1615) – cf. D. D. Novotný, “Rubio and Suárez: A Comparative Study on the Nature of Entia Rationis”. In Proceedings of the International Conference Bohemia Jesuitica, edited by Petra Čemusová (Praha: Karolinum, 2010), 477–490. Other authors held views close to Suárez but substantially revised, such as the Franciscan Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) – cf. D. D. Novotný, “Forty-Two Years after Suárez: Mastri and Belluto’s Development of the ‘Classical’ Theory of Entia Rationis”, Quaestio: The Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics 8 (2008): 473–498. Still other authors were not even aware of Suárez’s views, such as the Cistercian Juan Caramuel y Lowkowitz (1606–1681) – cf. D. D. Novotný, “Ens Rationis in Caramuel’s Leptotatos (1681), in Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, the Last Scholastic Polymath, ed. P. Dvořák and Jacob Schmutz (Praha: Filosofia, 2008): 71–84. In neither of these cases there is any traceable dependence on Suárez’s writings, which confirms my hypothesis that in Baroque scholasticism Suárez’s actual views were not that significant and influential. 53 The work on this paper was supported by the Czech Science Foundation (no. P401/11/ P020). The first version of this paper was presented under the title “Is there a Suarezian Theory of Beings of Reason? A Lesson from Hurtado and Mastri” at the conference Suárez’s Metaphysics: Disputationes Metaphysicae in their Historical and Systematic Context (Prague, 03/10/2008). I thank several participants for their comments: Paul Richard Blum, Lukáš Novák, Daniel Heider, Christopher Schields, Jorge Uscatescu Barrón, and others. An expanded version of this paper appears as chapter 6 in my book Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel: A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013).  52

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Canteñs, Bernardo. Suárez and Meinong on Beings of Reason and Non-existent Objects. Coral Gables, FL, 1999. — “Suárez on Beings of Reason: What Kind of Being (entia) are Beings of Reason, and What Kind of Being (esse) Do they Have?”. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2003): 171–187. Doyle, John P. “Prolegomena to a study of extrinsic denomination in the work of Francis Suárez S.J.”. Vivarium 22 (1984): 121–160. — “Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (First part)”. Vivarium 25 (1987): 47–75. — “Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (Second part)”. Vivarium 26 (1988): 51–72. Eschweiler, Karl. “Die Philosophie der spanischen Spätscholastik auf den deutschen Universitäten des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts”. In: Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft I, 251–325. Münster: Aschendorff, 1928. Gracia, Jorge J. E.“Suárez and the Doctrine of the Transcendentals”. Topoi 11, n. 2 (1992): 121–133. Heider, Daniel. “Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza’s (Mis)interpretation of Aquinas”. In Francisco Suárez and his legacy. The impact of Suárezian metaphysics and epistemology on modern philosophy, edited by Marco Sgarbi, 105–140. Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2010. Knebel, Sven K.“The Early Modern Rollback of Merely Extrinsic Denomination”. In Meeting of the Minds: The Relations between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy, edited by S. F. Brown, 317–331. Turnhout: Brepols, 1998. — Suarezismus. Erkenntnistheoretisches aus dem Nachlass des Jesuitengenerals Tirso González de Santalla (1624–1705). Amsterdam–Philadelphia: B. R. Grüner, 2011. Millán-Puelles, Antonio. Teoría del objeto puro – Colección Cuestiones Fundamentales. Madrid: Ediciones RIALP, 1990. Translated and edited by Jorge García-Gómez as The Theory of the Pure Object. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996. Novotný, Daniel D.“Ens Rationis in Caramuel’s Leptotatos (1681)”. In Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, the Last Scholastic Polymath, edited by Petr Dvořák and Jacob Schmutz, 71–84. Praha: Filosofia, 2008. — “Forty-Two Years after Suárez: Mastri and Belluto’s Development of the ‘Classical’ Theory of Entia Rationis”. Quaestio: The Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics 8 (2008): 473–498. — “Prolegomena to a Study of Beings of Reason in Post-Suárezian Scholasticism, 1600–1650”. Studia Neoaristotelica 3, no. 2 (2006): 117–141. — “Rubio and Suárez: A Comparative Study on the Nature of Entia Rationis”. In Proceedings of the International Conference Bohemia Jesuitica, edited by Petra Čemusová, 477–490. Praha: Karolinum, 2010. — Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel: A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era. New York: Fordham University Press, 2013. Pereira, José. Suárez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2007.

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Pereira, José, and Robert Fastiggi. The Mystical Theology of the Catholic Reformation: An Overview of Baroque Spirituality. Lanham, MA: University Press of America, Inc., 2006. Sousedík, S. Identitní teorie predikace [Identity theory of predication]. Praha: ΟΙΚΟΥΜΝΗ, 2007. — “Towards a Thomistic Theory of Predication”, in L. Novák, D. Novotný, P. Sousedík, D. Svoboda, Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic”, 247–256. Ontos Verlag in cooperation with Studia Neoaristotelica, 2012.

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SUÁREZ’S NOMINALIST MASTER ARGUMENT: METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS 5, 1. Jorge Secada

ABSTRACT

This paper offers a close reading of Disputationes metaphysicae 5, 1. After examining the composition and structure of that text, it considers and discusses its main argument for the nominalist thesis that all possibly existing entities are singular and individual. It also examines Suárez’s critique of Platonism. In the course of these discussions, it places Suárez’s nominalism in the context of principles for the identity of indiscernibles.

1. INTRODUCTION The fifth of Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations1 is devoted to the individuation of existing things. There he argues for the doctrine, taken up by the young Leibniz, that it is the whole entity that individuates (see DM 5, 6, 1).2 Along the way to that conclusion he opposes Scotus and maintains that while it is true that “an individual 1   Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations are cited by disputation, section, and paragraph. I have consulted the texts of the Vivès edition (Paris, 1856–1866), vol. 25; the edition by Sergio Rábade et al. (Madrid: Gredos, 1960–1966), vol. 1; by Rainer Specht (following Vivès and Rábade with a facing German translation), in Über die Individualität und das Individuationsprinzip. Fünfte metaphysicshe Disputation. Text und Übersetzung (Hamburg, Meiner, 1976), vol. 1; and the Cologne 1614 and Paris 1619 editions. When a reference would repeat the last given one, it is omitted. Translations are my own. 2   See Leibniz’s doctoral dissertation Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui, in Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. by C. Gerhardt (Berlin: Wildmannsche Buchandlung, 1880), vol. 4: 15–26. Also see Specht, op. cit., vol. 2: 11; J. A. Cover and John O’Leary-Hawthorne, Substance and Individuation in Leibniz, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, 26–50; Lawrence B. McCullogh, Leibniz on Individuals and Individuation (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996); Ignacio Angelelli, “The Scholastic Background to Modern Philosophy: Entitas and Individuation in Leibniz”, in Individuation in Scholasticism theLater Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150–1650, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 535–542; and Roger Ariew’s “Descartes and Leibniz Readers of Suárez ” read at the “Suárez: Last Medieval or First Modern?” Conference at the University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario in September 2008.

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adds something real to a common nature, in virtue of which it is that individual”, it is not the case that in the existing individual there is a real composition between what is added and the common nature, as between two separate entities or even just, as Scotus himself maintained, between an entity and a mode or way of being of that entity (DM 5, 2, 8; see DM 5, 2, 9). The individual difference and the common nature are merely conceptually distinct, though the distinction has a foundation in reality (see DM 5, 2, 16 and 21). Suárez then argues by elimination, in turn rejecting the views that matter, substantial form, or existence are individuating principles of existing entities. But he points out that if existence is taken to be “the actual entity of each thing”, then the latter view “coincides with the opinion […] that each thing individuates itself, and needs no other principle of individuation besides its entity”. (DM 5, 5, 2; cf. DM 5, 5, 3–5.) Here we will not discuss any of these theses in detail. Instead, we will examine the claim made at the very start of the Disputation, that everything that exists is singular and individual (see DM 5, 1, 1 and 4). The first section of Disputation 5 is interesting for various reasons. On the one hand, the articulation of this nominalist claim and the argument offered in support of it are philosophically rich and suggestive. On the other, a careful examination of the text itself reveals features which are significant historically, aiding our understanding of Suárez’s intellectual development, our appreciation of the stylistic originality of his metaphysical masterpiece, and our grasp of his place of the history of the manner and method of metaphysical enquiry.3 In what follows I advance an interpretation of that argument which uncovers its assumption of a version of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. And I propose that the final text of this section is the result of adding to a much earlier and briefer one which was probably part of a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, initially prepared for his own benefit and later revised for pedagogical purposes. I will start with the latter suggestion. Readers interested only in the philosophical discussion can skip the following, first section. 2. THE TEXT OF METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS 5, 1. The section’s title, like that of the articles of quaestiones in traditional commentaries and disputations, is a question which fi xes its subject: whether every existing or possibly existing thing is singular and individual. Immediately following this question there is a list of four considerations which support contradictory answers to it: the first three are arguments for the claim that not every existing thing is singular and individual; the fourth invokes the authority of Aristotle who held, against Plato, 3   See Charles H. Lohr, “Metaphysics” and Charles B. Schmitt, “The rise of the philosophical textbook”, in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 537–638 (in particular 605–620) and 792–804.

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that every real thing is singular and individual. Four words introduce the list as providing a motive for raising the question of the title. Setting these words aside, the section’s title and its first paragraph are clearly and straightforwardly the beginning of an article in a traditional quaestio, listing arguments for mistaken answers, and then citing an authority in support of the correct answer: Whether every existing or possibly existing thing is singular and individual [F]irst, […] divine nature […] is not singular and individual […]. Second, each angel […] does not have this numerical and individual unity […]. Third, […] not everything that exists in reality has this unity. On the contrary, there is what Aristotle most often teaches against Plato, that everything in reality is individual and singular. Utrum omnes res quae existunt vel existere possunt singulares sint et individuae [P]rimo, […] natura divina […] non est singularis et individua […]. Secundo,4 unusquisque angelus […] non habet hanc unitatem numericam et individualem […]. Tertio, […] non quidquid existit in rerum natura habet hanc unitatem. In contrarium est quod Aristoteles saepissime contra Platonem docet, quidquid est in rebus esse individuum et singulare. (DM 5, 1, 1.)

But Suárez does not arrange this material in the traditional manner in which I have just put it. Instead he places the four considerations all together in a single paragraph, introducing the first with the words “The reason for doubting can be […]” (Ratio dubitandi esse potest […]) . So now there are four considerations motivating an enquiry into the right answer to the proposed question, instead of a listing of arguments to be refuted followed by a statement of the right answer supported by an appeal to authority. Still, the original form is easy to perceive and marks this text apart, particularly when compared to those at the start of the other sections of Disputation 5, none of which so evidently bear the imprint of a former draft. I suggest that this first paragraph, as well as the title of the Section, were taken by Suárez from an earlier text of an article which he might have initially prepared for his own use when studying Aristotle’s Metaphysics, perhaps as early as 1568, and which would have made its way into his own commentaries of Aristotle for teaching in later years.5 He now recast that text and put it in the service of the new, freer dialectical style of the Disputations. 4   Vivès has “Secundo” but Rábade et al. read “Secundum”; see Specht, op. cit., vol. 1: xii, xlii, liii, and 2. 5   See P. Raoul de Scorraile, SJ, François Suárez de la Compagnie de Jésus (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1912), vol. 1a: 96 and vol. 2b: 412–416; and the reference in note 15 below.

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That this first paragraph redrafts an earlier text is the most plausible account of its style and form.6 I propose that the immediately following text, n. 2 and 3 of Section 1, which is a preliminary discussion of the exact meaning of the issue at hand, that is, of the terms “singular and individual”, is new material, added over the years as he prepared courses and in particular when he undertook the composition of the Metaphysical Disputations in the mid-1590s. Departing from the form of a traditional article, where the “In Contrarium” statement is followed by an articulation and defence of the author’s answer, which may also contain conceptual analysis, Suárez places the terminological discussion before stating his own view, explaining its import, and offering an argument in its favor in the “Resolution of the Issue (Quaestionis resolutio)” in n. 4 and 5. The conceptual clarification is properly placed together with the initial opposing arguments and the reference to the authority of Aristotle as part of the setting up and motivating of the issue of the section, before the matter is resolved. The section ends with three final paragraphs, n. 6–8, where Suárez in turn responds to each of the initial three arguments for the contradictory assertion. As in a traditional article, each paragraph starts with the words: “To the first […]. To the second […]. To the third one responds […]. (Ad primum […]. ad secundum […]. Ad tertium responditur […].)” Let us now look more closely at the text of n. 2–5, for here the process of reworking the earlier text appears to have involved a more complex procedure than the mere cutting and pasting with a few added words and minor stylistic changes we have found in n. 1.7 Some commentators have questioned the placing of the title “Resolution of the Issue” between n. 3 and 4.8 But this misses precisely the transit from the traditional 6   Commentators have noted the traditional style and form of the paragraph, but have not drawn this further conclusion. See Specht, vol. 2: 3; see also J. J. E. Gracia, Suárez On Individuation (Milwaukee: Marquette, 1982), 35–36. Gracia fails to notice the striking difference in the language between this and other sections of the Disputations: of course they generally follow, either in a part or in the whole, an order of fi rst presenting and discussing diverse views, eventually arriving at the correct one, and then finally refuting the earlier opposing views and tying up the loose threads. But they do not all incorporate the rigid language we see in this section; in fact, in this respect Section 1 is unique within Disputation 5. In what follows I will refer to an earlier text and to the final draft of the Disputations when in fact what we should envision here is an initial fi rst draft as a student of theology, gradually changed, added to, and redrafted in the course of preparing philosophical and theological courses, until the final drafting of his metaphysical masterpiece. 7   I do not wish to commit myself to the claim that the text of the three opposing arguments in n. 1, as well as, and especially so, that of the responses to them in n. 6–8, were not partially reworked over the years and finally for inclusion in the Disputations. In fact I suspect they all were. Here I do not examine those texts in detail to resolve this matter. 8   See Gracia, Suárez On Individuation, 35–36. Also see Specht, op. cit., vol. 2: 3, but contrast pp. 6 and 10.

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form of an article, which left no room between the opposing arguments and the statement of the author’s own view, to the freer order of the Disputations. It is unwarranted to maintain that the placing of this heading, though consistent since the earliest printed editions, many of them issued during Suárez’s lifetime, must have been the work of some editor who “did not follow very well the thread of the argument”.9 The fact is that before n. 4 there is no statement of Suárez’s view in propia persona; what one finds in n. 2 and 3 is a discussion of how the issue should be properly understood by all parts, and is therefore well placed as a continuation and explication of the four considerations listed in n. 1. In n. 1 it is Aristotle who states the Suárezian position, not Suárez himself. Further, the two objections and replies at the end of n. 3 do not suppose either the nominalist (i.e., Suárez’s) or the realist (i.e., Platonic) views. Instead they address the adequacy of the proposed understanding of individuality. The placing of that heading is therefore correct, and it coheres well with the suggestion that n. 2 and 3 are a later addition to a traditional article, inserted between the “In Contrarium” and the statement and defence of Suárez’s own view.10 In an earlier text, Suárez’s answer to the initial question probably followed immediately after the appeal to the authority of Aristotle. It is basically that found at the beginning of n. 4, with some minor changes and the deletion of some sentences, which are later additions required by its use in the new section. It read as follows: [O]ne should hold that all things which are actual entities or which exist or can exist […] are singular and individual […]. [T]his claim is self-evident as Aristotle shows against Plato in Metaphysics I, 6 and in VII, texts 26 and 27, and often in other places. However, there are many who consider that Aristotle interpreted Plato’s opinion regarding the Forms improperly, since Plato either placed them in God’s mind, or separated them from individuals surely not in reality but merely on formal grounds […]. [D]icendum est res omnes, quae sunt actualia entia seu quae existunt vel existere possunt […], esse singulares ac individuas […]. [A]ssertio est per se evidens, quam contra Platonem probat Aristoteles, 1 lib. Metaphys., c. 6, et l. 7, text. 26 et 27, et saepe alias. Quanquam multi existimant, Aristotelem sinistre fuisse interpretatum Platonis sententiam de ideis, quod vel illas posuerit in mente divina, vel certe non reipsa, sed ratione tantum formali ab individuis separatas […].

Perhaps an indication that this is taken from an earlier text is that having stated that the proposed answer is self-evident, a few lines later Suárez proceeds to offer   Gracia, Suárez On Individuation, 35.   Again, I do not wish to commit to the claim that all of the text in n. 2 and 3 is new, though I do believe most of it is, relative to a first draft. On the other hand, the citation from Aristotle’s Metaphysics III in n. 2, for instance, may have been contained in the earliest versions. Whether the new material existed whole or in part by the time that Suárez started working on the Metaphysical Disputations is not something on which I am taking any position. 9

10

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a syllogistic demonstration of it, and to argue in some detail for its premises. Of course, Suárez could be using “per se evidens” loosely.11 This possibility might be strengthened by noting that immediately after writing that the proposed reply is evident on its own Suárez adds “as Aristotle proved (probat, my emphasis; translated above as “shows”) against Plato”; though this could be stating merely that Aristotle used the self-evident truth in criticizing Plato. If what we have here is an earlier article used for teaching purposes and later reworked for use in the new Disputations, it is natural to suppose that it came from a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. But on the occasion of which passage from Aristotle’s work was the question of the title posed? I am inclined to suggest that it was Book I, 6. Support for this suggestion can be found in the “Detailed Index to Aristotle’s Metaphysics” which Suárez included at the start of the Disputations and intended as a guide to “all the questions that can be or are usually raised” about the Aristotelian text (first paragraph of the Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis in MD).12 In the Index he indicated where in the Disputations these questions are addressed. Disputation 5 is mentioned in the context of Book I, 6, when bringing up the issue of whether Aristotle correctly interpreted Plato regarding the separability of Forms.13 It is also possible that this article was part of a question arising from the text of Book III, 1, where issues regarding non-material substances, and the ontological status of genera, species, and unity, as well as the dispute with Plato, are raised, and in connexion to which Disputation 5 is repeatedly mentioned in the Index.14 When placed in the context of a discussion of Plato’s Forms, the passage cited above is naturally seen to continue with the second consideration brought up in n. 5. As we shall see below, that passage contains a self-standing argument for the claim   For this suggestion, see Gracia, Suárez On Individuation, p. 39, note 27, and pp. 241–242.   Jean-Paul Coujou, Suárez et la refondation de la métaphysique comme otologie. Étude et traduction de l’Index détaillé de la Métaphysique d’Aristote de F. Suárez (Louvain: Peeters, 1999), 5. References to the Index are given by indicating the appropriate place in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, but in notes I will also provide a page reference to Coujou’s excellent translation. 13   Coujou, Suárez, 14–15. The reference is somewhat perplexing since it refers to Disputation 5 as dealing with universals; though universals do arise there, even if only in opposition to individuals. See the reference to Disputation 5 in Book III, 1, q. 7 (Coujou, 31). Note also the reference to Aristotle’s argument that by making them immutable Plato deprived Ideas of efficiency; evidently, here Suárez intended to point to Disputations 25 and 35, which are also mentioned. 14   See Coujou, Suárez, 30–35. The reference to Disputation 5 in the Index in Book VII, 6, q. 2 is clearly not to Section 1 (Coujou, 98). Aristotle’s confrontation with Plato on Ideas has many sides beyond that which would be germane to the text we are considering. Also, some texts of the Metaphysics, though touching on criticisms of Plato, are explicitly discarded as adding nothing new which would give rise to questions; see for instance Book III, 6: “For this reason, new questions are usually not formulated here.” (Coujou, 42). 11

12

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that “universals cannot exist separated from individuals” (DM 5, 1, 5). It appears to be a natural continuation of the discussion of separate Ideas, perhaps originally introduced with some phrase, deleted in the redrafting, to the effect that whatever Plato actually thought about the Forms, it is certain that there are no separated universals. The argument requires no mention of the distinctions and points made in n. 2 and 3, nor in the latter half of n. 4 or the earlier part of n. 5. Now, why suppose that these other passages are later additions to an early article? Why, that is, beyond the formal reasons already given? The overriding consideration is that in these texts we find a discussion of individuality, and an argument for the nominalist claim that everything that exists or could exist is individual, which embody sophisticated philosophical thinking, and are subtly placed in the context of diverse Scholastic views, particularly those of Ockham, Scotus and their followers, seemingly beyond that of a student and a starting instructor, while at the same time we come across passages embodying a straightforward presentation of Aristotle’s dictum against Platonic realism that everything real is individual, cast in the style of a traditional quaestio. That passages of this section were originally drafted in the form of a traditional article is undeniable; and a natural hypothesis to put forward is that they come from an earlier piece which in all likelihood was originally prepared in the course of first studying and then teaching Aristotle’s Metaphsyics.15 The first section of Disputation 5 naturally divides into two segments: on the one hand, one which contains a statement of the nominalist thesis, references to pertinent texts from Aristotle, and a rather common argument against separate universals, and on the other, another containing an insightful discussion of individuality, and proposing an interesting argument in favor of the doctrine that everything that is, is individual.16 We know Suárez started work on the Disputations believing that it would take him much less time to compose than it actually did (see Ad lectorem in Ratio et discursus totius operis at the start of MD).17 We also know that he had come to the conclusion that the traditional commentary, following the order of issues as they arose in Aristotle’s text, “incidentally and by chance”, was not the best way to study metaphysics. It may be plausibly supposed that he undertook the composition of the Disputations already   See Salvador Castellote’s discussion of the drafting of Suárez’s De anima in Francisco Suárez, De anima, vol. 1, Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, Madrid, 1978, xxxvii–lxxiii, and in particular xxxviii–xxxix. 16   Let me remind the reader that I am simplifying and that there was most probably a gradual process of redrafting, starting with a brief and simple summary of Aristotle written as a student in the late 1560s, turned into a successively reworked commentary with quaestiones, eventually leading to the drafting of the Metaphysical Disputations in the early 1590s. See notes 5, 6, and 15 above. 17   See p. 7–12 of Costantino Esposito’s “Introduzione” to his edition and translation of the first three disputations in Francisco Suárez, Disputazioni metafisiche (Milan: Bompiani, 2007). 15

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equipped with manuscripts originally prepared when he was a student of theology and a beginning teacher of philosophy in the late 1560s and early 1570s, closely following Aristotle’s text. Initially, he may have thought that a significant part of the labour ahead of him would consist in properly ordering this material. If so, he soon found out that much more work was needed, that when casting his views in the new systematic and dialectical style, he had to reformulate issues, rethink doctrines, and articulate concepts and arguments anew. It should not be surprising that one of the passages of the Disputations which most evidently bear the imprint of its origins would be one arising in connexion to Book I of the Metaphysics. Following earlier developments, Suárez wrote a systematic essay on the whole of metaphysics freed from the order of Aristotle’s text; and he is rightly recognized for having done so.18 But he also developed a unique dialectical style, where the philosophical treatment of an issue, entirely guided by the internal logic of the subject and free from the formal constraints of the traditional ordering of Scholastic discussions, was articulated in close conversation with the history of philosophy as viewed from the Scholastic tradition. The layered text of Metaphysical Disputation 5, 1 can help us appreciate this Suárezian development. 3. NOMINALISM AND PLATONISM Before examining Suárez’s argument in favor of the doctrine that “all things which are actual entities or which exist or can exist […] are singular and individual” some conceptual and terminological elucidations are in order (DM 5, 1, 4). Earlier I characterized this thesis as “nominalist” and placed it in opposition to the Platonic “realist” view. Let us start by refining this contrast a little. In order to do so we will make use of the well-known Scholastic doctrine of distinctions (which I sketch loosely following Suárez’s articulation of it in DM 7, 1). Things are distinct in reality when they can exist separately. An absolute real distinction holds between things which can exist independently of each other: a and b are fully really distinct if they can exist one without the other and vice-versa. A lesser real distinction holds between things which can exist one without the other but not vice-versa. So a and b are really distinct if it is possible that a exist and b not exist, or vice versa; they are completely so if both terms of the disjunction are true and only incompletely so if only one disjuct is true. The modality in question is logical. It may be that really distinct things are always actually found together and cannot naturally exist one without the other, requiring supernatural intervention to be separated. Things can also be distinct not in reality but merely conceptually, relative 18   For a relatively proximate precedent, compare with Agostino Nifo’s Expositiones in Aristotelis Libros Metaphysices (Venetiis: apud Hieronymum Scotum, 1559; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967) and Dilucidarium Metaphysicarum disputationum (Venetiis: apud Hieronymum Scotum, 1559; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967).

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to a mind or reason which considers the two terms separately. Again, this conceptual distinction admits of two kinds: one with a foundation in reality and one without. The latter is merely terminological, as between a and b in a = b. The former has some real grounds, though in reality there be nothing distinct prior to a mental operation. This is Suárez’s account: the real grounds for a conceptual distinction “must be either something eminent in the thing itself […], so many call this a virtual distinction, or a certain disposition (habitudo) to other things which are truly and really distinct and relative to which the distinction is thought or conceived” (DM 7, 1, 4). Admittedly, this account is far from transparent, particularly in its first disjunct. However, as we shall see in a moment, its obscurity reflects the obscurity of the positions we will characterize using it. (Perhaps there is something to this moderate, anti-Platonist and anti-extreme nominalist, thought: that regarding the metaphysical and ontological matters we will address shortly, obscurity is a symptom of proximity to the truth, rather than a defect to be avoided at any cost.) Suárez’s doctrine of distinctions is a development upon his views on individuality and consequently identity. Different “modes of distinction” correspond to different “modes of unity” or individuality (DM 4 and 7, introductory paragraphs). An absolute real distinction holds “between thing and thing, [and it] consists in that one thing is not another nor vice-versa”, it being evident that “there are many things such that one is completely not the other” (DM 7, 1, 1). Similarly, while a conceptual distinction does not presuppose two real self-identical individuals, a lesser real distinction does presuppose two such entities which are however logically dependent one on the other even if not vice-versa.Rather than the simple distinction between realist and nominalist views which I suggested earlier, let us now introduce a spectrum of doctrines.19 A realist position claims that universal entities exist in reality. It claims, that is, that universals are really distinct from their instances. Now, no realist need hold that universals and particulars are really distinct absolutely; that is, no realist need hold that a given individual can exist without there existing any common natures. Platonists uphold the dependence of instances on properties and not the other way round; and for Plato himself, the phenomenal world depends on the Forms not the Forms on it. So an extreme realist will hold instead only that a common nature can exist without any individuals existing. A weaker realist will hold that though no universal would exist if there were no instances of it, a universal can exist without any given instance existing, though it does need some instance or other in order to exist. That is, he will hold that one and the same universal entity exists in reality when two or 19   The ensuing discussion is intended as general and preliminary. There is considerable work to be done here, developing and refining the different realist and nominalist doctrines, including articulating them along axes other than the one I am using here. For instance, in what follows I will use “universal”, “Form”, “common nature”, and even “property” as if they were synonyms. Interesting as it is, that work clearly escapes the scope of this paper.

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more individuals of the same kind exist; the extreme realist will hold that such entity will exist regardless of any individuals existing while the lesser realist requires some individual of the kind to exist in order for the universal entity to exist, but will hold that the very same entity persists even if the individual perishes, so long as some other individual of the kind is still in existence. A nominalist, in turn, holds that there are no universal entities in reality and that everything real is individual; in individuals there is at most a mere conceptual distinction between the individual and any universal which it instantiates. Again, we can distinguish between an extreme and a more moderate nominalism. The extreme nominalist maintains that universality is wholly conceptual or mind-dependent, there being nothing in the thing itself to ground it beyond perhaps a capacity to bring about a mental act which it does not determine. The moderate nominalist will hold that though there is no universality in the thing itself, there is in it a foundation for the mental act which brings it about. The foundation is not universal, but it is not either a merely external and non-determining occasion; rather it is a true grounding of the universal concept, perhaps a certain pre-conceptual intelligibility.20 Going from the realist to the nominalist extremes, this spectrum corresponds, roughly, to the views of Plato and some contemporary Platonists like James Cargile; Duns Scotus and David Armstrong at some point in his thinking about universals; Suárez, Descartes or Leibniz; and Hobbes, Gassendi, Rorty or Ockham. (For Scotus see DM 5, 2, 2–4; for Ockham, n. 5; and for Suárez’s own position n. 8, 9, 16, and 21.)21 I place Aquinas in the middle, uncomfortably sitting between the inclination to grant the reality of common natures and the intuition that only individuals exist, and further complicating matters by offering relevantly different accounts of the individuality of purely spiritual creatures and of material entities (see DM 5, 2, 6). Suárez takes the extreme realist view to be so implausible that he seems to prefer to put Plato himself in, at worst, the more moderate realist camp (see DM 5, 1, 4 and 2, 2). Suárez’s focus is metaphysical: in Disputation 5 he is interested primarily in ontology, and only derivatively in epistemology or semantics. We should read his investigation into individuation as a development of his nominalist views in opposition to those of others along this spectrum. Much of this disputation is directed   See my Cartesian Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117–126.   See James Cargile, Paradoxes. A study in form and predication (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 103: “[T]he pure doctrine of universals […] is a doctrine about properties, that they exist independently of the mind and their instances. This doctrine is […] one of many that have been called «platonism»”; and David Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), vol. 1: xiii: “[T]here are universals […], which exist independently of the classifying mind. Realism is thus accepted, Nominalism rejected. […] [N]o [universal] is found except as a property of some particular, [… or] as a relation holding between particulars. Transcendent or Platonic Realism is thus rejected.” 20 21

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at criticizing moderate realist positions, while himself articulating and defending a version of moderate nominalism. To assess the ultimate success or failure of this latter enterprise, we would have to consider the discussion in Disputation 6, in search of Suárez’s account of the real singular and individual foundation which grounds the mental operation whereby a true universal comes about. Not surprisingly, one’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction with his account will, in some measure, depend on the willingness to rest content with the obscurity inherent in the notion of such intelligible individual foundation of universality intrinsic to particulars. 4. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS Suárez offers a single account of the individuation of all possibly existing things, siding on this issue with Scotus against those who propose differing accounts of the individuality of spiritual and material creatures, or of substances and accidents (see DM 5, 2, 6 and 21–30; and DM 5, 7, 1–2). Suárez’s principle of individuation is intrinsic to the individual thing, indeed it is the whole entity of the individual itself: “every singular substance […] needs no other principle of individuation apart from its entity, or apart from the intrinsic principles of which its entity is composed”, which are, in the case of composite substances, “matter, form, and their union” and in the case of a simple substance “itself and its own entity” (DM 5, 6, 1) .22 And: “accidents have their individuation and numerical distinction […] from their proper entities” (DM 5, 7, 4). This doctrine is not our subject. Our focus is on the claim that every possibly existing thing is individual: “all things which are actual entities, or which exist or can exist […] are […] singular and individual” (DM 5, 1, 4). How are we to understand this? In particular, what does “singular and individual” mean in this claim? Suárez distinguished between two sorts of beings, entia per se and entia per accidens: what “is constituted from different things without a physical and real union binding each to the others, is strictly an entity per accidens and not per se” (DM 4, 3, 13).23 The lack of a “physical and real union” is the lack of a form (or some such, like a quantitatively continuous coalescing of homogeneous material parts) which would bring together the different things to constitute a single new entity beyond them (see DM 4, 3, 6–14). Suárez explains that “in an entity which is one per accidens there is variety, and in this variety there is more or less” (DM 4, 3, 14). The clearest case of 22   There is some dispute amongst commentators regarding the inclusion within the cited text, in the place indicated by the elision (between “singular substance” and “needs”), of the following phrase: “se ipsa, seu per entitatem suam, esse singularem [ne]que”. See Rábade et al.’s edition, vol. 1: 644–645, and 645, n. 1. Also see the enlightening discussion in Gracia, Suárez On Individuation, 137, note 3. 23   Also see Aristotle’s Metaphysics V, 6–7, 1015b16–1017a23, and Peter Fonseca’s exposition of this passage in Petri Fonsecae Commentarii in Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae (Cologne, 1615 and 1619; repr. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1964), V, VI, and VII, explanatio.

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an ens per accidens is a mere congeries “in which many entities complete and perfect per se are put together without any union and without any order” as in “a heap of wheat or stones”. Though herds, nations, orchestras, and houses and other artefacts may possess “a certain order” in the grouping of their constituents, they lack a true metaphysical or physical unity and are strictly entia per accidens. Even an accidental being has some unity and individuality, though not “in iself (in ipso)” but, as Suárez puts it, “relative to itself (a se ipso)” (DM 4, 1, 13). This relative unity requires something external to the thing, for instance a certain convention, or purpose, or mental act. So a heap is one heap and not just many pebbles relative to how we consider it or define it, as, perhaps, the proximate grouping of these pebbles, give or take a few; and a hammer is one thing, and not many which just happen to stick together, relative to its purpose and use. Independently of such external references, in reality there is no heap and no hammer, while there still are the per se entities which make up these accidental beings. Suárez’s nominalist claim does not refer to relative or extrinsic individuality but to the intrinsic unity of things in themselves. Most generally put, unity or individuality is the negation of multiplicity or plurality: “one as such just means that the thing is in itself whole and undivided (unum ut sic solum significat quod res sit in se integra et indivisa)” (DM 3, 2, 3). There is a certain “transcendental unity” which applies to all entia per se and which is not extrinsic nor accidental, since it is a unity convertible or co-extensive with real being: all that is real is one in this sense, and vice-versa (see DM 3, 2, 3 and, e.g., DM 2, 2, 28 and DM 4, 9, 4). In Disputation 4, Suárez discusses this oneness found in “any real entity or in the formal nature or account (ratione) of a real entity” (DM 4, 9, 14). This individuality belongs to each “real being or objective concept […] considered according to its own nature (rationem) […]; indeed the unity of each thing is adequate to the thing, and belongs to it per se”. Suárez distinguishes individuality from uniqueness, which, as he puts it, “denies community with another” rather than division from itself or into many (DM 4, 1, 15). If a is a unique individual of a certain kind, it would still remain one individual thing even if a second individual of the kind, b, were to come about and a were to cease being unique; and vice versa, for if a were to become unique again, that would add nothing to its individuality. Suárez also distinguishes between unity or indivisibility in itself, and divisibility or distinction from others: “[B]efore creatures existed, God was perfectly and completely one […]. [E]ven if per impossibile nothing were possible but God, He would still truly and perfectly be one, for He is essentially undivided, even if He could not be divided from others.” (DM 4, 1, 16) More generally, if a were the only thing there could be, a would still be one individual thing. Strictly, distinction or divisibility from others does not pertain to the nature of unity or individuality, though it does belong to all entities in so far as they are one, since it follows from their unity or individuality, given that there is or can be more than one entity (see DM 4, 1, 17).

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Without prejudging the issue raised in the first Section of Disputation 5, whether there can exist something which is not singular and individual, we can acknowledge that there is, for instance, one human being and also one humanity or human nature. Human nature, though common or universal, is not divided into many “according to its own adequate reason or character (rationem)”; it is one and indivisible when taken as the essential nature it is (“essentialiter”) but “is divided entitatively” into many individual human beings (DM 4, 9, 14). Suárez will maintain that in reality there exists only this and that humanity; not humanity as such. But still there is one human nature which is transcendentally one in virtue of a certain formal unity. This unity is not relative but is found in the “objective concept” of any existing human nature, that is, is found in the individual when considered as a human being. The individual human has an individual form of humanity which is intelligibly identical to other individual humanities, and is in this sense one with them. Still, we may discover with Suárez that the one universal humanity exists as such only in the mind, that it is an ens rationis and not a possible entity. So what is the difference between the relative individuality of one ens per accidens and the transcendental individuality of one common nature? Are they not both relative to an account of some sort? We could say that the latter is an ens per se and not per accidens, but our question is, what does this amount to when the unity of these supposed entia per se is said to be relative to a mental act? (See DM 4, 9, 14.) Indeed, it is the unity and individuality of an “objective concept”, of something qua object of a mental act (see DM 2, 1, 1). Here once more, we have come across that obscurity inherent to Suárezian moderate nominalism and which I have pointed out before: we are facing “the difficult issue of transcendental and numerical unity, how they differ and whether both are real unities existing in things, and therefore, whether universal unity is found in things” (DM 4, 9, 14).24 For Suárez, the difference between a common nature, the non-merely nominal universal, and an ens per accidens is that there is a foundation in things for the unity and individuality of the former which is lacking in the case of the latter. A natural kind arises out of the formal similarity or identity of the possible individuals which constitute its extension. If there are any members of the kind, then this intelligible, pre-conceptual formal unity exists in reality, and it ensures the formal identity of any two members of the kind, independently of the existence of any minds, while there is nothing in the pebbles themselves which binds them all into one unity or individual, so that without reference to some mind there is no heap. (See DM 6, 1–3 and 11.) 24   Some editions have “formali (formal)” instead of “transcendenti (transcendental)”; see Rábade et al.’s edition, vol. 1: 559, n. 1. Either version makes sense, since the question arises on account of the transcendental unity of common natures or universals, which is grounded on the formal unity of their instances.

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In this transcendental sense, human nature is one essentially, while the human being is one entitatively. The issue Suárez will be addressing in this section is whether there exists in reality anything which is not entitatively or numerically individual, or as he puts it, “singular and individual” (title of DM 5, 1, my emphasis; see DM 4, 9, 1 and 12–14). He will deny there is. That is, Suárez will hold that everything that could possibly exist cannot be divided into many such as it it in itself, or, such as it is transcendentally one. So if human nature is divisible into many such as it is itself, the question which Suárez is posing is whether human nature as such could exist in reality. If the answer is no, as in fact it is for him, then one might ask what is it that exists in the individual human being if not human nature. Suárez’s answer is that what exists in reality is an indivisible singular human being with a certain individual humanity, this particular humanity, the humanity of, say, Jim or Jimmy which as such cannot exist one and the same in many things. The one humanity they share arises in the mind when it considers this and that humanity. The individuality of Suárez’s nominalist thesis is the individuality of things which are indivisibile and incommunicable according to their nature or to that account which captures what they are in themselves. When we say that human nature is one transcendentally according to that account which constitutes its entity, we do not deny that it is divisible into many, for precisely, what will be found in many is one and the same entity relative to that account: a universal “is that which according to one nature or account (rationem) is […] found in many” (DM 5, 1, 2). A singular and individual entity, on the other hand, cannot be distinguished or divided into many entities wholly as it is; it “is not communicable to many according to that entitative nature (entis rationem) relative to which it is said to be one”. As Suárez puts it, numerical individuality expresses “a negation of division or divisibility […] [such that] its whole nature (rationem) not be communicable to many similar entities, or (what is the same) that it not be divisible into many entities such as it is itself” (DM 5, 1, 3). To conclude: “[T]he character ([r]atio) of individual and singular unity per se will consist in being by its nature per se one (entitate sua natura per se una) and […] indivisible or incommunicable.” It is this individuality which, Suárez maintains, belongs to any possible existent. He asks whether everything that could exist is individual in the sense that it cannot be one and the same in many numerically distinct things. Suárez took himself to be asking whether some form of nominalism must be true. As we shall see below, however, the spectrum of views which we have outlined earlier does not allow for a kind of Platonist nominalism, which holds that independently of any instances there are properties, Forms, common natures, or universals, but that they are numerically individual things themselves, that is, that they are not strictly one and the same in many numerically different individuals.

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5. SUÁREZ’S NOMINALIST MASTER ARGUMENT The claim put forward and defended in Section 1 of Disputation 5 is, then, that every existing or possibly existing thing is individual, an entity which cannot be found, such as it is in itself, whole in many. This is intended to be universal: it applies to any and all existing or possibly existing things. And it holds that such things are individual not merely relatively, but as indivisible or incommunicable entities in themselves. Suárez offers a demonstration of this claim. Here it is: [1.] whatever exists has a fixed and determinate entity… [2.] every such entity necessarily has an added negation; [3.] therefore [whatever exists has] […] singular and individual unity. [1.] quidquid existit habet certam et determinatam entitatem… [2.] omnis talis entitas necessario habet adiunctam negationem; [3.] ergo [quidquid existit habet] […] singularitatem individuamque unitatem. (DM 5, 1, 4.)

This is a syllogism of the first mood in the first figure. The middle term is “a being with a fixed and determinate entity”. The subject term of the conclusion is “whatever exists” and the predicate term is “an entity with singular and individual unity”. So the minor premise is “whatever exists is a being with a fi xed and determinate entity” and the major premise is “a being with a fi xed and determinate entity is an entity with singular and individual unity”. The “added negation” in the cited text is the denial of divisibility or communicability characteristic of entitative or numerical unity. From the determinacy of any possibly existing entity, this straightforwardly valid argument seeks to establish its individuality. I point out the formal structure of the syllogistic demonstration because, given some of the secondary literature, at this point the correct interpretation of the text requires some care.25 Immediately after stating the proof, Suárez argues for the premises. Here is the argument: The minor premise is manifest since no entity can be divided or distinguished from itself, precisely on account of being a determinate entity. Therefore, it cannot be divided either into many which are such as it itself is. Otherwise, all that entity would be in each one of them and, consequently, as it is in one it would be distinguished or divided from itself in so far as it is in another, which involves a manifest contradiction. Minor patet, quia omnis entitas, hoc ipso quod determinata entitas est, non potest dividi a seipsa; ergo nec potest dividi in plures quae tales sint, qualis ipsa est, alioqui total illa entitas esset in singulis, et consequenter, ut est in una, divideretur a seipsa prout est in alia, quod manifestam involvit repugnantiam. (DM 5, 1, 4.) 25   Contrast with J. J. E. Gracia’s unwarranted and confusing translation and interpretation of this passage in Gracia, Suárez On Individuation, 32. Also see Specht, op. cit., vol 2: 11. Compare with Rábade et al.’s straightforward rendering.

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The first sentence argues for the minor premise. It assumes the transcendental unity of any possibly existing entity: it cannot be divided from itself (non potest dividi a seipsa), according to that nature or account relative to which it is one per se entity. Suárez then indicates that this is precisely on account of its having the particular, fixed, determinate entity it has. From the determinacy of all possibly existing entities, Suárez argues to their numerical individuality. The argument is straightforward and immediate. No possibly existing entity could “be divided […] into many which are such as it itself is”. If it were “all that entity would be in each one of them and, consequently, as it is in one it would be distinguished or divided from itself in so far as it is in another, which involves a manifest contradiction”. Consider an existing thing a and suppose there is another numerically distinct thing b, wholly such as a is. Since a is an existing entity, all its identity relations are fi xed and determined. Now a and b are two, so ~(a = b) and b has the property of not being identical to a. But amongst the properties a has is being identical to itself, a, so this too is a property of b which is wholly such as a.26 It follows that b has the contradictory property of being and not being identical to a. The point of this reflection is to bring to light and focus on the truth that any existing entity is a fully determinate entity, in virtue of which it is the one thing it is. Suárez is arguing that, in the case of any possibly existing thing, transcendental individuality entails numerical and entitative individuality. He will in fact conclude that, properly and strictly, common natures or universals are entia rationis, impossible entities which can exist only in the mind. They are one only relative to a mental act, even if that act has a foundation in the intelligible formal unity existing in the thing itself. Why does the division of a universal into many instances not involve a “manifest contradiction”? The transcendental unity of a common nature is the unity of an “objective concept”. So its being the determinate thing that it is does not entail determinacy with respect to any properties or features which would have to both be and not be were the nature to exist one and the same in many: it is just being human, not being this human and also this other human. Otherwise, whatever is human would both be and not be the determinate human it is. But any existing entity is one trascendentally on account of being the “certain and determinate” entity that it is. Of course, a universal is also the one determinate thing it is. However, it is indeterminate precisely in that it can be one and the same in many individuals. What we have in the demonstration, then, is a determinacy proper to possible existents and not found in universals, from which numerical identity follows. To reach the desired conclusion, one can argue that existing things are fully and completely determinate, 26   Though Suárez denies that self-dentity is a real relation, being a construction of the mind when it compares something to itself, still this argument goes through purely in Suárezian terms, since he did not wish to deny that the relation of reason indicated by x = x fails to apply to anything possible.

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but all that is needed is determination with respect to a minimal set of properties or of metaphysical parts which fixes numerical individuality and hence identity. In fact, for Suárez, there could actually exist a material substance which lacked accidents naturally present in other bodies, as in the Eucharist. But the point is merely one of principle: all that is required in this argument is the minimal determinacy sufficient to establish the individuality and identity of a possibly existing entity. Indeed, one question to raise regarding the proof is how to understand the invoked determinacy. What is it “to have a […] determinate entity”? To require only that given any predicate, either it be true that the entity has it or it be true that it does not have it, (F)[(Fa)  ~(Fa)], is too weak. This is compatible with the entity having no properties at all! What we want is determinacy regarding a set of features or parts which fi xes the one individual entity which it is. But the question then arises as to exactly what is to be included in this determinacy requirement. Now, Suárez argues for individuality from determinacy. From individuality, identity and self-identity follow. In other words, he is committed to a principle of the identity of equally determinate entities. Let us call it a Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. The question we are asking is what is the scope of the determinacy within the principle? That is, what predicates or properties or parts must be indiscernible to ensure identity? This is an interesting issue on its own merits. Taken as including all identity relations, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is analytically trivial.27 The principle becomes philosophically interesting as the range of items it takes into account to establish indiscernibility is restricted. Unfortunately, this topic has not been discussed in a general, principled manner. When examined in the context of Leibniz’s philosophy, as it tends to be, his peculiar doctrines (for instance, regarding the nature of space and the reducibility of spatial properties to qualitative ones) inform the discussion. What we would need, however, is a preliminary, untainted discussion of the principle itself and of the diverse restrictions on the range of indiscernible items required to establish numerical identity. This is of course not the place to undertake such an enterprise. But here we can sketch the beginning of that discussion, placed as we are in the particular context of Suárez’s nominalist argument.

27   One should be careful how one renders the principle formally. The correct rendering is (x)(y)[(F)(Fx ≡ Fy) → (x = y)] and not (x)(y)(F)[(Fx ≡ Fy) → (x = y)] which has undesirable consequences. The point raised in the body of the text is a different one having to do with the range of Fs over which the principle quantifies.

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6. SUÁREZ’S CRITIQUE OF PLATONISM Before going on to that, however, we should consider whether Suárez’s nominalist master argument is effective. I will briefly suggest that it is not. Here is how a Platonist could respond. Consider the property of being red. Suppose we take it to be indeterminate with respect to being crimson or being burgundy which, for the sake of this example, we suppose to exhaust the possible shades of red. What does this mean, that red is indeterminate with respect to some shade of it? Surely not that it exists and is neither one nor the other, for the property of being red presumably is not even red! Nor that an instance of it may exist which is neither, for any instance can be supposed to be one or the other. The Platonist need not suppose that an entity exists which is red and neither crimson nor burgundy. All he supposes is that the property of being red exists regardless of whether any instances of it exist. And that property will be an existing individual which need not be supposed to have two or more existences, so to say, and to be divided from itself into many. There are many instances of it, but it itself is one self-identical thing. In other words, the Platonist need not claim that the universal or property exists one and the same in many. Rather she will claim that many things, particulars, stand in a relation of being instances to one thing, the universal. She will also claim that this universal entity does not require any of these relata in order to exist. Neither the common nature or Form nor any of its instances need be supposed to have incompatible properties, for instance, the property of being both crimson and not crimson but burgundy, or three square inches and also five square miles, or of being identical to a and also not identical to a. An extreme realist or Platonist should not maintain the self-predication of properties or common natures. This is a reasonable and indeed welcome requirement. More importantly, she will need to distinguish between the existence of common natures and their instantiation by particulars. This is, after all, what separates her from her reputedly more moderate realist companion, who has one and the same universal entity exist in many numerically different particular entities, either as a metaphysical part of each or as an accident or property. Instead, this version of extreme Platonism just has one and the same individual be a universal entity in virtue of its possibly standing in the relation of being instantiated to many different particulars. In a way, this is not a surprising result, for Suárez was more concerned with refuting Scotists and other moderate realists, than he was with the Platonists. He seems to have thought that Platonism was so implausible that the real danger came from more moderate forms of realism. Still, in the latter part of n. 5 he does offer an argument against separate universal entities. The argument is a disjunctive reductio. The first horn argues that if universals are entirely separate from their instances, then they are individual and not universal. Further, to explain the particular having

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the character in question, the universal would have to be in the particular. Here is that first part of the argument: Universals cannot be separated from particulars. For if the universal man existed apart from Peter and Paul, etc. either it would also exist in Peter and Paul or it would remain entirely separate outside them. If the latter, then man as such would be singular, and distinct from Peter and Paul, and so falsely said to be universal. And further, it would follow from this that neither Peter nor Paul are men, since for an essential predicate to apply to something it must not be separated from it. For, how could it be truly predicated of it if it is not in it? Or, how can it constitute essentially that in which it is not? [U]niversalia non posse esse a singularibus separata, quia si homo universalis existeret extra Petrum et Paulum, etc., vel ille esset etiam in Petro et Paulo vel omnino maneret separatus extra illos; si dicatur hoc posterius, iam homo ut sic esset quaedam res singularis condivisa a Pedro et Paulo; falso ergo dicebatur universalis. Et praetera sequitur nec Petrum nec Paulum esse hominem, quia, ut praedicatum essentiale alicui conveniat, necesse est ut non sit separatum ab illo. Quomodo enim de illo vere dici poterit, si non sit in illo? Aut quomodo intelligi potest essentialiter constitueri eum in quo non est? (DM 5, 1, 5.)

As we have seen, a Platonist who maintains that there exist properties, Forms, or common natures whether there are any instances of them or not, could hold that to be instantiated is to stand in a certain relation to a particular. So though the Platonic entity is a separate existent, it need not become many in its many instances. If the issue then is that it is one more individual and not a universal, the answer is that to be a universal is precisely to be able to have relations of instantiation with particulars, something the particulars cannot have with other particulars. Granted, the Platonist does claim that the separate property is in a sense one more individual. But why should that be a criticism? Suárez adds a further point. He maintains that to be truly predicated of something the property must be in its subject: for a to be human the property of being human, or the form of humanity, must be in a. This point requires reference to Suárez’s hylomorphic conception of particular substances.28 But why should the Platonist be bound to that account of particulars, particularly since it was designed to articulate a non-Platonist ontology?! Succinctly put, she will simply retort that what accounts for a being human is precisely that it stands in the relation of being an instance to the property of being human or to the Form of humanity. The second horn of the reduction need not concern the extreme realist since it argues from the presupposition that the universal entity is separate but also in its 28   See John Simmons’ Ph.D. dissertation Francis Suárez on the Ontological Status of Individual Unity vis-à-vis the Aristotelian Doctrine of Primary Substance, submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School at Marquette University, Milwaukee, May 2004, particularly Chapters 2 and 3. I thank Brian Pinkston for this reference.

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instances, depending crucially on the latter and adding nothing which would be effective against only the former. So where do things stand? That there is a way of making Platonism coherent is not necessarily sufficient to establish it, even if the alternative proposals suffer from irremediable obscurity (though not, of course, from inconsistency). One can try and argue to the best explanation, but whether it is the best or not will have to bring in other considerations such that perhaps the obscurity is not found to be so damming. The issue becomes more complicated when we take into account that moderate nominalism is compatible with theism and the doctrine that Forms exist eternally in God. One might see this moderate nominalism as a kind of moderate realism, one which does not require particulars to instantiate Forms, but still introduces a particular, an eternal and necessary one, to possess or have them in Him in some way. Suárez himself would not have objected to such a realism, where the common natures are not granted separated existence, and the thesis that all that exists or could possibly exist is entitatively individual is preserved. After all, he does suggest that if “Plato […] placed [the Forms] in God’s mind,” then he would have been stating the truth (DM 5, 1, 4; also see DM 25, passim). Further, the history of Middle and Late Platonism can justify calling this theistic realist nominalism a form of Platonism.29 Of course, particulars are not instances of God, nor do they bear Him (or any part of Him, since after all He has no parts!) as a property. But they do “participate in” God and are made to His image, so perhaps they are instances of Forms in some way within Him. 7. SUÁREZ’S IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES Let us now return to the main thread of our discussion. One way to understand Suárez’s master argument is as unpacking a logically tight set of claims around the notions of individuality, determinacy, and identity when applied to existing or possibly existing entities. When viewed in this way, the determinacy in question is absolute covering all true predications with a given entity as subject, and the associated version of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is obviously analytic, as it includes all the entity’s identity relations. All Suárez would be doing is laying out the trivial claim that every existing thing is one in so far as all true predications with it as subject are taken into account. Indeed, if the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is taken as the strict converse of Leibniz’s Law, the indiscernibility of identicals, it is equally unexceptionable and analytic, since if all predicates truly attributable to an entity are considered, including all its identity relations (perhaps construed as monadic predicates of the form “= α”), then the identity of indiscernibles immediately follows from the identity of strictly co-extensive sets of predicates. 29

230

  See my Cartesian Metaphysics, 55–63, and the references in p. 281, note 16.

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This reading of the argument helps to make sense of the assertion in n. 4 that it is evident per se that all possibly existing things are individual, as the demonstration would consist of making explicit rather immediate and obvious entailments. It could also be argued that it goes well with the claim that the nominalist thesis is logically necessary. At the start of n. 5 Suárez explicitly claims that “to be an entity and to be divisible into many entities such as itself” are “contradictory” (DM 5, 1, 5). To be both at the same time and “entitatively or according to the same real entity” is to be both one and the same entity and many different entities, which is an open contradiction. That every existing entity is individual is a logical truth which Suárez repeats in other places of the Disputations. In Disputation 7 we find this passage: [I]t is impossible for the same thing to be altogether disjointed and separated from itself in the real order; an open contradiction is involved, since no greater union can be thought of than total identity in nature. This is not merely union, but unity…. [I]t is impossible for what is wholly the same to be separated from itself. (DM 7, 2, 3)

Nonetheless, there are reasons to reject this catholic reading. To start with, it makes for a philosophically less interesting argument; and granted the historical and textual facts, charity recommends richer readings. Further, Suárez himself would not have included any relations in the minimal demand for determinacy required for the argument to go through. Once all the monadic non-relational properties of an entity are given, all its possible real relations are also given (see DM 47, 6–9).30 Moreover, relations between a subject and itself are the product of reason; they are nothing in the thing itself beyond the other properties of the thing, which once given, fix all relational ones. Though these monadic foundations do not fix the actual real relational properties of the entity, for these might depend also on the existence of other, separate entities which are the termini of the relations, they do fi x all possible real relations of the entity, by fi xing the available monadic grounds. One could go even further and exclude predications in all categories except substance, quantity, and quality, on the grounds that all categories beyond these include some relational element (see DM 47, introductory paragraph). The general issue concerns the conformation of the minimal set of items (be they predicates or properties or metaphysical parts) sufficient to secure the unity of the respective entity. From being one entity, an entity defined through the specified minimal set, it would follow that the entity could not be divided into many such as it is itself. The issue is not whether the point is logical or not, but rather whether the entailment is trivial and immediate, from a set including all predicates true of the entity to its individuality, or instead from a smaller set. In other words, however we fill out the Suárezian Principle of the 30   These claims about relations come from MD 47. See my “Suárez on the ontology of relations”, in Interpreting Suárez: Critical Essays, ed. Daniel Schwartz and James B. South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 62–88.

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Identity of Indiscernibles, whether we reduce it to an unobjectionable but trivially analytic one, or make it more philosophically substantial, it remains either vacuously analytic or a metaphysically derivative analytic principle, parasitic on the entitative individuality of any possibly existing thing. Furthermore, merely to argue that transcendental unity entails numerical unity since the transcendental unity of a possibly existing thing is the unity of something fully and completely determined, where this is taken to include all true predications which have the thing in question as subject, misses the essentialism of Suárez’s Aristotelian account of substances and their properties.31 And it detaches the argument from a properly metaphysical account of the numerical individuality of possibly existing things. This does not appear to be Suárez’s intention generally in this Disputation, nor specifically in its first section. Let us, then, continue and point out that if we are looking at substances, we should also exclude their accidents from this minimal indiscernibility set. That is, the entitative individuality of a Suárezian substance is not the result of its having these or those accidents: the unity of substance is not the result of the determinacy of any or all of its accidents.32 In fact, Suárez maintains that the composite of substance and accident is a mere ens per accidens (see DM 4, 3, 14). From the point of view of our present interests, the important conclusion to draw is that for Suárez accidents are not entailed by the entity’s minimal individuating set. We should note, however, that things are considerably more complicated than we can expound here, and not just on account of the metaphysical distinction between various sorts of accidents, but because some accidents “have their own entities which are really distinct from the subjects” and these accidents can exist on their own, at least logically and supernaturally, even if not naturally (DM 37, 2, 7; on the possible separate existence of accidents of quantity and quality see DM 37, 2, 4; regarding accidents generally see DM 32, and 37–39, passim). If and when they do, they will exist as singular and individual entities and will fall under the nominalist thesis we are considering. We will not consider separately existing accidents any further in the remainder of this paper, and our discussion should be read as having an implicit caveat to the effect that it applies to the indiscernibility, identity and individuality only of substances. To establish the extent of the minimal indiscernibilty necessarily present amongst identicals, one must establish the extent of the entitative determinacy of any existent. What is sufficient to constitute the entity as one entity? From that minimal in31   See Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne, Substance and Individuation in Leibniz, as referenced in note 32 below. 32   Neither is it for Leibniz, by the way, though for different reasons; see Cover and O’LearyHawthorne, Substance and Individuation in Leibniz, 4–5, 172ff, 180–183. For Suárez, see Teresa Rinaldi, Francisco Suárez. Cognitio singularis materialis: De Anima (Bari: Levante Editori, 1998); 176–200.

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discernibility set of items all identity relations are fi xed and the entity is determined as one individual thing. We may grant that there is such a thing as a complete listing of all its properties which fully fi xes its identity and individuality, though, since miracles like the Eucharist are logically possible, this listing might have gaps in what is otherwise a naturally determined series. But, granted such infinite listings, this follows from the requirement that the entity be an actually existing thing possessed of whatever properties or parts such entities must naturally or logically have, and the requirement that for any given property, the entity either have it or not have it (thus also setting aside any issues regarding vagueness and indeterminacy of properties).33 The Suárezian minimal indiscernibility set, on the other hand, neither entails nor in any other way fi xes this listing. Evidently, no necessitarian dangers arise here, even of the perhaps merely apparent Leibnizian kind: there is no claim being made as to, in some way, the individuating set entailing the various accidents of a thing; on the contrary, such entailment is explicitly denied. What is that minimal set? For Suárez, it is the set consisting of the metaphysical parts which make up the whole entity of the thing. In the case of material substances it includes its matter, its substantial form, the mode of their union, and whatever other modes essentially come with these items; in the case of purely spiritual substances, no matter would be present. Those predications which are not fixed (perhaps disjunctively) by these items are not in any way included or referred to in the Suárezian Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. What is included, then, is the substantial form with its generic, specific, and individual nature; if present, the matter and the properties that define it; and then whatever other physical and metaphysical inherent properties such substantial compound has. Expounding the exact contents of this set would lead us into a discussion of the rest of Disputation 5, well beyond the confines of Section 1 and of this paper. When placed under this light, one significant difference that emerges between Suárez and later early modern rationalist philosophers is that for him there are inherent accidents which are logically independent of the essence and entity of their substance, while for them inhering properties of a substance are logically related to its essence or nature. In fact, Descartes and Leibniz both held that the possible accidents of a substance are fixed by its nature (though only disjunctively, according to Descartes, and through a murky infinite entailment, according to Leibniz). Suárez follows Aristotle and most in the Scholastic tradition in setting the accidental properties of a substance free from such constraints. Moreover, unlike some other 33   The cogency of a complete and infi nite list of all the properties of an entity is not evident. In fact, I am inclined to believe that the notion of such exhaustive description is misguided and ultimately could not be made clear. Here I do not pursue this issue (on the contrary, in the text I grant the notion for the sake of simplicity); though I will mention that it is unclear to me that Leibniz committed himself to the viability of such notion.

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Aristotelians, Suárez was prepared to state that it is logically possible both that a substance could exist through extraordinary supernatural intervention without any accidents of a certain type which it naturally would have to have, and, even more extraordinarily, that certain accidents could exist without inhering in any substance. While modern empiricists generally did not conceive of substances as unified by an underlying essence or nature, they did share with their rationalist contemporaries the abandonment of the Aristotelian hylomorphic conception of substance. Metaphysically, they too tended to make accidents constitutive of the entities that bear them. After Suárez, together with corpuscularian assumptions, varieties of empiricist idealism and phenomenalism, on the one hand, and intellectualist essentialism, on the other, will paint an ontological landscape which redefines the terms in which issues concerning the unity of real entities, and the associated dialectic of realism versus nominalism, will play themselves out. Standing, both temporally and philosophically, at this decisive turning point, Suárez argues that all that exists is determinate, and that all that is determinate is individual. His Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is obtained from the identity of identically determined entities, which in turn presupposes an account of the unity or oneness of existing entities. Suárez’s concise master argument for nominalism encapsulates his doctrines regarding individual unity and the identity of real entities, serving as an introduction to his treatment of individuality and identity, and repaying close reading.34

BIBLIOGRAPHY SCHOLASTIC AND EARLY MODERN SOURCES Fonseca, Petrus. Commentarii in Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae libros. Cologne, 1615 and 1619. Reprint, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1964. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui. In Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. by C. Gerhardt, vol. 4: 15–26. Berlin: Wildmannsche Buchandlung, 1880. Nifo, Agostino. Expositiones in Aristotelis Libros Metaphysices. Venetiis: apud Hieronymum Scotum, 1559. Reprint, Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967. — Dilucidarium Metaphysicarum disputationum. Venetiis: apud Hieronymum Scotum, 1559. Reprint, Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967. 34   A version of this paper was read at the conference on Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations at Villa Lanna in Prague in October 2008. I thank participants at the conference for the discussion following the paper. I also thank my fellow students at several seminars on Suárez offered at the University of Virginia over the last decade, where we enquired into the unity of real things, guided by the rich text of Disputation 5.

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Suárez, Francisco. Disputationes metaphysicae. Coloniae, 1614. — Disputationes metaphysicae. Parisiis, 1619. — Disputationes metaphysicae. Vols. 25–26 of R. P. Francisci Suárez e Societate Jesu, Opera omnia, editio nova, edited by C. Berton, Paris: L. Vivès, 1866. — Disputationes metaphysicae. Edited and translated by Sergio Rábade, Salvador Caballero, and Antonio Puigcerver. Madrid, Ed. Gredos, 1960. — Über die Individualität und das Individuationsprinzip. Fünfte metaphysicshe Disputation. Text und Übersetzung. Translated by Rainer Specht . Hamburg: Meiner, 1976. — Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima. Edited by Salvador Castellote. Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1978–1991.

MODERN WORKS Angelelli, Ignacio. “The Scholastic Background to Modern Philosophy: Entitas and Individuation in Leibniz”. In Individuation in Scholasticism theLater Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150–1650, edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia, 535–542. Albany: State University of New York Press,  1994. Ariew, Roger. “Descartes and Leibniz Readers of Suárez ”. Paper read at the conference Suárez: Last Medieval or First Modern?. University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, September 2008. Armstrong, David. Universals and Scientific Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1978. Cargile, James. Paradoxes. A study in form and predication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Cover, J. A. and John O’Leary-Hawthorne. Substance and Individuation in Leibniz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Coujou, Jean-Paul. Suárez et la refondation de la métaphysique comme otologie. Étude et traduction de l’Index détaillé de la Métaphysique d’Aristote de F. Suárez. Louvain: Peeters, 1999. Esposito, Costantino. “Introduzione” to Francisco Suárez, Disputazioni metafisiche, Latin text and Italian translation of Disputationes Metaphysicae 1–3 by C. Esposito Milan: Bompiani, 2007. Gracia, Jorge J. E. Suárez On Individuation. Milwaukee: Marquette, 1982. Lohr, Charles H. “Metaphysics”. In The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner, 537–638. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. McCullogh, Lawrence B. Leibniz on Individuals and Individuation. Dordrecht: Kluwer,  1996. Raoul de Scorraile, P., SJ. François Suárez de la Compagnie de Jésus. Paris: P. Lethielleux,  1912. Rinaldi, Teresa. Francisco Suárez. Cognitio Singularis Materialis: De Anima. Bari: Levante Editori, 1998.

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Schmitt, Charles B. “The rise of the philosophical textbook”. In The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner, 792–804. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Secada, Jorge. Cartesian Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. — “Suárez on the ontology of relations”. In Interpreting Suárez: Critical Essays, edited by Daniel Schwartz and James B. South, 62–88. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Simmons, John. Francis Suárez on the Ontological Status of Individual Unity vis-à-vis the Aristotelian Doctrine of Primary Substance. Ph.D. dissertation. Faculty of the Graduate School at Marquette University, Milwaukee, May 2004.

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THE EFFICIENT CAUSE IN DOMINGO DE SOTO Saverio Di Liso

ABSTRACT

Recent studies have emphasized Francisco Suárez’s use of Domingo de Soto’s logical and metaphysical theses, especially on the doctrines of the categories and of the analogy of being. The intention of this paper is to contribute to fi nding parallels or relationships in the works of these two great Spaniards, with regard to the doctrine of causes. I consider, in particular, Soto’s Quaestiones super octo libros physicorum, Book II, question 3 and 4, and Suárez’s Metaphysicae Disputationes, especially DM 12 and 17. If the Suárezian conception has a fundamentally metaphysical significance, Soto’s principal interest is still physical: he perceives the function of cause in the Aristotelian way, as the introduction of a form in matter or “principium movendi”; to the contrary, Suárez prefers the Stoic, Avicennian and Albertist tradition, according to which efficiency is the “impulse” to being or “principium essendi”.

1. INTRODUCTION Recent studies have emphasized Francisco Suárez’s use of Domingo de Soto’s logical and metaphysical theses, especially on the doctrines of the categories and of the analogy of being.1 According to E. J. Ashworth, it is useful to have “a more precise account of how Suárez made use of Soto’s arguments, and how Soto ranks in comparison to Suárez’s other sources”.2 Apart from this, my modest intention in this paper is to contribute to finding parallels or relationships in the works of these two great Spaniards. Efficient causality3 is the fundamental notion of the Suárezian account of causes in the Disputationes metaphysicae (1597).4 Suárez reduces the four causes to that of   See E. J. Ashworth, “Domingo de Soto (1494–1560) on Analogy and Equivocation”, in Studies on the History of Logic. Proceedings of the III. Symposium on the History of Logic, ed. I. Angelelli et al. (Berlin – New York: W. de Gruyter), 1996, 117–131. 2   Ashworth, “Domingo de Soto”, 127. 3   On the Thomistic view, physics is a “real science” (scientia realis), which studies the motion of bodies or the “movable qua movable” (ens mobile). In the natural world, all changes are actualisations of what exists potentially, and that is produced by two intrinsic principles, form and matter, and by two extrinsic principles, the efficient cause and the final cause. See J. A. Weisheipl, “The Interpretation of Aristotle’s Physics and the Science of Motion”, in History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1

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efficiency and establishes that efficiency is the principle that ‘pours’ or essentially imports being into the effect (quasi fons et principium per se influens esse in effectum).5 In his Quaestiones super octo libros physicorum (first complete edition 1551), Domingo de Soto discusses the rôle of efficient causality and its relationship with the other Aristotelian causes. First of all, he defines the action of efficient causes as a concurrent influence on the effects (modus agendi causae efficientis est concurrere influendo in effectum). Then, he sets forth the twelve principal divisions of efficient causes. Finally, he discusses the question whether the substantial form is the principle of the efficient cause, and he dwells on the concurrence of God in the physical world. While the Suárezian view is fundamentally metaphysical, the main focus of Soto’s treatise is physical. For example, when he talks about the efficient cause, he compares it to the execution of a movement begun by an agent (executio motus incipit ab agente). This indicates a certain distance from the Avicennian concept of agent or efficient cause, which corresponds to the production of being (principium essendi) or an act of creation, rather than a motion or production of movement (principium movendi).6 Furthermore, in Soto’s work the final cause maintains priority over the other causes (primus concursus est causae finalis), and this constitutes a great difference to the above-mentioned Suárezian idea. On the other hand, following the philosophical and theological tradition of the general concurrence of causes (influentia generalis) that Luis de Molina (1536–1600) and Suárez develop in late 16th century, Soto says that God concurs with natural causality for all the actions and movements in the world.7 However, in spite of the different approaches to causality, in his physical texts the Dominican friar of Salamanca presents interesting points of comparison with Suárez’s doctrine of causes, just in connexion with: (1) the general definition of cause; (2) the notion of efficient cause; (3) the question of God’s general concurrence with secondary causes.

1100–1600, ed. N. Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 521–536. See also William A. Wallace, Causality and Scientific Explanation. I. Medieval and Early Classical Science (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1972), 18–21. 4   Francisco Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae, vols 25–26 of R. P. Francisci Suárez e Societate Jesu, Opera omnia, editio nova, ed. C. Berton (Paris: L. Vivès, 1866; repr. Hildesheim – Zürich – New York: G. Olms Verlag, 1998). See Vincent Carraud, Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause de Suárez à Leibniz (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002). 5   DM 12, 3, 3 (XXV, 389). 6   See E. Gilson, “Notes pour l’histoire de la cause efficiente”, Archive d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Age 37 (1962): 7–31. 7   See J. Schmutz, “La doctrine médiévale des causes et la théologie de la nature pure (XIII−XVII siècles)”, Revue thomiste 101 (2001): 217–264.

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2. SOTO’S DOCTRINE OF CAUSES Within the Quaestiones super octo libros physicorum8 Domingo de Soto discusses the doctrine of causes in Book II, q. 3 (Utrum quatuor sint tantum causarum genera, ff. 35vb– 39va), and dedicates the entirety of q. 4 to the relationship between the formal cause and efficient cause (Utrum forma sit principium quo causa efficiens agit, ff. 39va–42rb). Naturally, the ultimate purpose of the Salmantine Master is to illustrate the theory of Aristotelian physics, referring here and there to the logico-semantic rules of the Summulae, and highlighting the principal traditions of philosophical Scholasticism, with particular attention to Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine.9 The Salmantine Master initially tackles a number of general objections and then proposes a general definition for “cause”, which he uses as a starting-point to look into the single species of cause. Above all, the theme of causality,10 he says, provides a legitimate answer to the demands of physics, although it has been mostly a constituent of logic and metaphysics since Aristotle.11 Moreover, while the metaphysician looks into cause in its capacity as a property of the entity (dividitur enim ens in illud quod se habet, ut alterius causa, et illud quod se habet ut effectus)12 – and this, for Suárez, ought to 8   Domingo de Soto, Reverendi Patris Dominici Soto […] super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Commentaria […] (Salmanticae: in aedibus Dominici a Portonariis, 1572) [= In Phys. Comm.]; Domingo de Soto: Reverendi Patris Dominici Soto […] super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Quaestiones […] (Salmanticae: in aedibus Dominici a Portonariis, 1572) [= In Phys. Quaest.]. For an introduction, see my Domingo de Soto: ciencia y filosofía de la naturaleza (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 2006). On the theme of causality in Soto, see also my “La causalidad eficiente en Domingo de Soto, Francisco Suárez and Galileo Galilei”, in Causalidad y Libertad y otras cuestiones filosóficas del Siglo de Oro, ed. Ma Idoya Zorroza (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 2011), 13–41. 9   Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum [= In Phys.] II, lect. 5, nn. 3–6: “Dicit ergo primo quod uno modo dicitur causa ‘ex quo fit aliquid cum insit’, sicut aes dicitur causa statuae et argentum causa phialae […]. Secundo modo dicitur causa ‘species et exemplum’: et hoc dicitur causa inquantum est ratio quidditativa rei; hoc enim est per quod scimus de unoquoque quid est. Et sicut dictum est circa materiam quod etiam genera materiae dicuntur causa, ita et genera speciei dicuntur causa. Et ponit exemplum in quadam consonantia musicae quae vocatur diapason, cuius forma est proportio dupla, quae est duorum ad unum. […] Ulterius autem dicit quod alio modo dicitur causa ‘a quo est principium motus vel quietis’; sicut consilians dicitur causa, et pater filii, et omne commutans commutati. […] Quartum autem modum causae ponit, quod aliquid dicitur causa ut ‘finis’; et hoc est ‘cuius causa’ aliquid fit, sicut sanitas dicitur ambulationis.” 10   I will use the term “causality” as synonymous with “cause”, not in the modern or “Kantian” meaning of Prinzip or Gesetz der Kausalität: see V. Carraud, Causa sive ratio, 95–97. 11   Aristotle, Anal. Post. II, 11, 94a20–24 ; Metaph. V, 2, 1013a24–1013b30. See W. A. Wallace, Causality and Scientific Explanation, 11–18 ; R. J. Hankinson, “Causation and Explanation in Aristotle”, Quaestio 2 (2002): 33–56. 12   In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 36ra.

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be the most appropriate way to tackle the question13 – according to Soto it is the natural philosopher who should enquire into causes according to their relationship with effects, to the extent that they “introduce” forms into matter (negotium physicum est de causis disserere, ea ratione qua applicantur ad suos effectus, inducendo formas in materiam).14 In other words, while according to Soto the function of a cause is to introduce a form into matter, or to be a “principium movendi”, Suárez insists on the active contribution of a cause which is that it gives esse to an entity (principium essendi).15 Soto, nonetheless, avoids pursuing such a course of investigation for a time, as it will prove useful when analysing the individual types of cause. Here he prefers to adhere to a traditional, universally accepted formulation. Indeed, he does not use an Aristotelian definition, since in Aristotle’s works there is no confirmation of a univocal, explicit notion of “cause”.16 Rather he finds it in the Liber de causis – “a cause is that from which something else follows” (causa est id ad quod aliud sequitur).17 Such a broad definition – used, moreover, by two of Soto’s influential sources,18 namely Peter of Spain and Thomas Aquinas – allows us to understand all the sequential relationships involved in it, but also to exclude what cannot be associated with cause-effect in the strict sense of the term, as is the case with the theological, intra-Trinitarian set of dynamics, since the Father neither causes nor produces the Son.19 Indeed, the verbal expression sequitur is meant to denote not only a propositional consequence (sequitur dialectice: ‘dies est, ergo sol lucet’), but also an intrinsic and current dependence (consequentia debet intelligi de causa et effectu in actu) of what follows upon something else 13   DM 12, intro. (XXV, 372): “[L]icet physicus de causis disputet, id tamen est nimis contracte et imperfecte […] ; et ideo propria ejus consideratio ad metaphysicum pertinet. […] quia ipsa causalitas est veluti proprietas quaedam entis, ut sic; nullum enim est ens, quod aliquam rationem causae non participet.” 14   Soto, In Phys. Quaest., 2, q. 3, f. 36ra. 15   DM 12, 2, 4 (XXV, 384): “Causa est principium per se influens esse in aliud.” 16   Aristotle, Phys. II, 3, 194b23–195a5. See C. Natali, “Problemi della nozione di causa in Aristotele, con particolare attenzione alla causalità finale”, Quaestio 2 (2002): 61–69. 17   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 36ra. 18   See J. Spruyt, “Peter of Spain”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2007 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, online, url = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/ peter-spain/; Petrus Hispanus, Tractatus called afterwards Summule logicales, ed. L. M. de Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), 67: “Causa est ad cuius esse sequitur aliud secundum naturam”; Thomas Aquinas, In Met. V, lect. 1, n. 1: “[C]ausa est ad quam de necessitate sequitur aliud.” Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 67, n. 4: “Sicut ex causa necessaria certitudinaliter sequitur effectus, ita ex causa contingenti completa si non impediatur.” See S. L. Brock, “Causality and Necessity in Thomas Aquinas”, Quaestio 2 (2002): 217–240. 19   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 36ra: “[I]n personis divinis ad intra nulla est ratio causae et effectus.”

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(‘sequitur’ dicit intrinsecam consequentiam et dependentiam illius quod sequitur ab alio”).20 It’s worth noting Soto’s reference to the concepts of “consequence” and “dependence”, as the presumed absence of such connotations of the term sequitur will make Suárez contest the definition (satis confuse and valde obscura) and suggest a more appropriate one (Causa est id a quo aliquid per se pendet or Causa est principium per se influens esse in aliud).21 The proposed definition, moreover, requires further clarification in order to confute an objection extracted from the Aristotelian text.22 It has to do with verifying whether cause and effect co-exist in the causal relationship,23 or whether the cause (in particular the efficient one) vanishes when the effect comes into play and vice-versa, the effect is not there when the cause is present, and therefore the relationship between cause and effect is not symmetrical.24 Well, the objection against simultaneity does not stand up to reasoning since the guarantee of the cause-effect correlation hinges on the “formal” (i.e., “natural” and logical) priority of the cause, on the basis of which, given certain conditions, even the effect is defined.25 This correlation does not   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 36ra.   DM 12, 2, 3 (XXV, 384): “Prima igitur definitio haec tradi solet: Causa est id, per quod satisfit interrogationi, qua inquiritur propter quid aliquid sit, seu fiat. […] Secunda definitio, et valde communis: Causa est id ad quod aliud sequitur […] quod Aristoteles sub disjunctione dixit, est, aut fit, aut cognoscitur, satis confuse comprehenditur sub unico verbo sequitur; […] oportet ergo ut generatim quamcumque connexionem vel consecutionem significet. […] illa definitio non tam est causae quam principii; unde etiam convenit privationi […] definitio erit tamen valde obscura […]. Tertia definitio est, quam potissime asserunt aliqui moderni: Causa est id a quo aliquid per se pendet. Quae quidem, quod ad rem spectat, mihi probatur; libentius tamen eam sic describerem: Causa est principium per se influens esse in aliud.” 22   Aristotle, Phys. II, 3, 195b15; Soto, In Phys. Comm., 1572, 2, cap. 3, text. 37, f. 28vb: “[…] omnes [causae] aut actu existentes, aut secundum potentiam. […] Differunt autem tantum, quod actu quidem existentes et singulares, et ea quorum sunt causae, simul sunt et non sunt ; ut hic medens cum hoc qui sanatur, et hic aedificator cum hoc quod aedificatur. Quae autem sunt secundum potentiam, non semper: corrumpitur enim non simul domus et aedificator.” 23   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 36ra: “Causa enim et effectus relative dicuntur; et per consequens simul se inferunt et perimunt.” 24   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 36ra: “[…] arguitur, quod nulla sit causa efficiens. Causa enim et effectus relative dicuntur: et per consequens simul se et inferunt et perimunt, […] maxime si sit causa in actu. […] Tunc sic arguitur. Si aliqua esset causa efficiens, maxime essent illae quarum point exempla Aristotelis […] [sed] quando pater generat, tunc non est filius qui gignitur; et quando filius genitus est, iam non est semen unde genitus est […] ergo istae non sunt causae efficientes.” 25   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 39ra–b: “Causa est qua posita secundum rationem causae, ponitur effectus. Poni autem secundum rationem causae est quod omnia requisita ad agendum, vel causandum […] sint debite applicata ad opus.” We find a similar sentence (posita causa, ponitur effectum, remota causa, removetur effectus) in a long tradition and also in Galilei and Hobbes, where it is viewed as the whole of conditions of a phenomenon; see M. O. Helbing, “La ragione prodotta per causa 20 21

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hinge on a nominal or “material” value, nor even on an action-passion relationship (ratio causae praecedit actionem), which is precisely what establishes a simultaneous correlation (actio et passio in actu dicuntur correlative).26 Cause and effect, once the relation is established, do not vanish, but continue to exist by virtue of their respective rationes. The ratio causae requires some conditions to be respected – that the cause should be “total”, not “partial” (quia posito sole non generabitur nonnisi ponatur etiam homo ut causa), “per se”, not “by chance” (quia posita fossione sepulchri non sequitur necessario inventio thesauri), “natural”, not arbitrary or vague (ponitur effectum in tempore statuto sive destinato”), “duly applied” (quia ignis nihil agit nisi intra sphaeram suae activitatis) and “not impeded”. The effect, for its part, once put in fieri, preserves its requisites unless some impediment comes into play.27 Moving on to the main divisions of the notion of cause, even if he recognizes the value of different traditions (e.g. the unique material principle of the naturalists and the six causes of Plato’s Timaeus),28 Domingo de Soto intends to approve of the Aristotelian division – the material cause is that out of which (ex quo) something is generated, the formal cause is the shape, the form or pattern, the ratio or definition (per quid), the efficient cause is the primary source of change or coming to rest (a quo), the final cause, lastly, is the purpose or end for which a thing is done (propter quid).29 vera dell’effetto. Note sulla teoria della causalità negli scritti galileiani”, Quaestio, 2 (2002): 383–410, esp. 394–395, and V. Carraud, Causa sive ratio, 78–85. 26   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 39rb: “[I]lla diffinitio intelligenda est nec simpliciter materialiter de re quae est causa, nec rursus in alio extremo, ut includat actionem; sed medio modo de causa formaliter secundum rationem causae.” 27   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 39rb: “satis est poni effectum in fieri: cum enim semen deciditur, filius est in fieri […]. Unde ad hoc, quod vere pater sit causa filii, satis est quod modo faciat id unde post novem menses nascetur filius, nisi aliqua causa impediatur animatio embrionis.” For some logical examples, see D. Soto, Summulae (Reverendi Patris Dominici Soto Segobiensis […] Summulae. Summularum aeditio secunda, Salmanticae: excudebat Andreas a Portonariis, 1554; repr. Hildesheim – New York: G. Olms, 1980) [= Sum.], 2, cap. 13, ff. 43va–48ra. On ampliatio and restrictio, see Alfonso Maierù, Terminologia logica della tarda scolastica (Roma: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1972), 139–193. 28   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 36rb: “Plato in Timeo posuit sex genera causarum, scilicet materiam, et finem, et efficiens principale, et instrumentum, et formam extrinsecam et separatam, scilicet, ideam (quam vocabat causam exemplarem) et praeterea formam intrinsecam particularem.” See M. Frede, “Les origines de la notion de cause”, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (1989): 483–511 [= “The Original Notion of Cause”, in Doubt and Dogmatism – Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology, ed. M. Schofield et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 217–249]; O. Boulnois, “Liberté, causalité, modalité. Y a-t-il une préhistoire du principe de raison?”, Quaestio 2 (2002): 291–336. 29   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 36rb. Cf. Soto, In Phys. Comm. II, cap. 3, text. 28–29, f. 27ra–b: “Uno igitur modo causa dicitur ex quo sit aliquid cum insit […]. Alio autem modo, species et exemplum, haec autem est ratio ipsius quod quid erat esse […] unum principium mutationi primum, aut quietis […]. Praeterea, ut finis; hic autem est id cuius gratia[…]. Causae igitur fere tot modis dicuntur.”

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Try as he might to maintain, even terminologically, an equidistance in the hierarchy between the causes,30 and despite the fact that more space is devoted to the efficient cause, at this point he assigns primacy to the final cause, 31 which hearkens back to Sotian thoughts on the Aristotelian and Thomistic vision.32 Even if the latter has a purely “intentional” value (non agit per contactum realem), nonetheless it is by virtue of the end/goal that the agent actually achieves its effect (secundum esse reale movet in ratione finis).33 Matter and form, for their part, contribute to the causal process – the former as the subject from out of whose potentiality the form is “educed” (concurrit in   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 35vb, 36va: “Illo namque argumento [scil. Causare idem significare videtur quod agere; sed materia nullius est activitatis ; ergo materia non est causa] convincuntur iuniores quidam dicentes materiam improprie esse causam : nempe quia causare est agere. At vero profecto non solum Aristoteli, sed physicae veritati aperte contradicunt, cum enim compositum suapte natura pendeat ex materia, non solum in fieri, sed in conservari: negari neutiquam potest materiam esse causam. Et praeterea arguitur: quia eadem ratione nulla proprie esset causa, nisi sola efficiens. Nam forma quae generatur non concurrit ad esse geniti efficiendo, sed informando. Si ergo idem est causare quod agere, forma non esset causa. Neque finis proprie esset causa. Dicendum ergo imprimis quod causare non est verbum latinum in hac significatione ad significandum hoc quod est efficere; sed quia philosophi latini (sicut neque Graeci) non habent unum verbum generale quo comprehendant diversos modos concurrendi, ideo a ‘causa’ usurpant hoc verbum, ut sit commune ad ‘efficere’ et ‘finalizare’ et ‘materializare’ (ut sic loquamur) et ‘informare’.” But see DM 12, 2, 7, (XXV, 385): “omnis enim res, quae influit esse in aliud per modum principii per se et extrinseci […] dat illud, efficiendo ipsummet esse quod communicat; et ideo semper dat esse distinctum ab esse proprio quod in se habet; et hoc est proprie causare et efficere.” See V. Carraud, Causa sive ratio, 133. 31   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 39ra: “Ordo autem harum causarum est hic. Primus concursus est causae finalis, quem sequitur actio agentis; mox ad actionem agentis sequitur forma in materia praesupposita.” 32   Thomas Aquinas, In Met. V, lect. 3, n.6: “Sciendum autem est, quod licet finis sit ultimus in esse in quibusdam, in causalitate tamen est prior semper. Unde dicitur causa causarum, quia est causa causalitatis in omnibus causis. Est enim causa causalitatis efficientis, ut iam dictum est. Efficiens autem est causa causalitatis et materiae et formae. Nam facit per suum motum materiam esse susceptivam formae, et formam inesse materiae. Et per consequens etiam finis est causa causalitatis et materiae et formae; et ideo potissimae demonstrationes sumuntur a fine, in illis in quibus agitur aliquid propter finem, sicut in naturalibus, in moralibus et artificialibus. Concludit igitur, quod praedicta sunt causae, et quod causae secundum tot species distinguuntur.” 33   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 39ra: “illud optimum et ultimum cuius gratia omnia fiunt est finis secundum esse reale.” See Thomas Aquinas, In Met. V, lect. 2, n. 9: “Unde patet quod finis est causa. Non solum autem ultimum, propter quod efficiens operatur, dicitur finis respectu praecedentium; sed etiam omnia intermedia quae sunt inter primum agens et ultimum finem, dicuntur finis respectu praecedentium”; Thomas Aquinas, In Phys. II, lect. 5, n. 6: “Ideo autem potius probat de fine quod sit causa quam de aliis, quia hoc minus videbatur propterea quia finis est ultimum in generatione. Et ulterius addit quod omnia quae sunt intermedia inter primum movens et ultimum finem, omnia sunt quodammodo fines.” 30

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genere subiecti, de cuius potentia educitur forma),34 the latter as the terminating actuality of the generative process by means of which that which is generated has being (actum et terminum quo generationis, per quem, id quod fit, habet esse).35 Now while the Sotian discussion approves the general lines of the non-univocal Aristotelian definition of cause, Suárez’s account intends to focus on a univocal and common ratio of cause, i.e., the concept of “dependence” or “influx”, which Suárez develops in the disputations 17 and 18 on the efficient cause.36 On this ground, in the next paragraph, I will proceed to present Soto’s notion of efficient cause and to discuss God’s general concurrence with secondary causes. 3. SOTO’S UNDERSTANDING OF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE

In the scholastic mediæval tradition, the notion of efficient cause – id quod facit, the appropriate way of referring to a cause, according to what Seneca relates regarding the doctrine of the Stoics37 – owes its success to the Avicennian interpretation of Aristotle, who conferred on the agent cause (causa agens) no longer just the “natural” meaning of a starting-point initiating the movement (principium unde incipit motus, or rather principium motionis), but also and above all the “metaphysical” one belonging to principium essendi.38 The lexical “splitting” (for Étienne Gilson “dédoublement”) of the traditional causa movens into motor cause and efficient cause (causa efficiens), codified by Peter of Auvergne (died 1304), had already been made by Albert the Great (approx. 1200–1280), when he established in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics not only the difference between motor cause and efficient cause, but the priority – according to the metaphysical and logical order – of the latter over the former: “causa efficiens est ante causam moventem secundum naturae et intellectus ordinem”.39 However, Thomas Aquinas had not shown an equally explicit interest in this same point, mak  Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 36va.   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 36vb. 36   DM 12, 2, 13 (XXV, 387): “hoc [scil. causatio vel causalitas in communi] autem nil aliud est quam influxus ille, seu concursus quo unaquaque causa in suo genere actu influit esse in effectum”; DM 12, 2, 14 (XXV, 387): “nomen causae non esse mere aequivocum, cum non tantum nomen, sed etiam ratio nominis communis sit.” 37   See E. Gilson, “Notes pour l’histoire de la cause efficiente”, 9; M. Frede, “Les origines de la notion de cause”, 485–486 ; V. Carraud, Causa sive ratio, 68–78. 38   Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina. V–X, éd. critique par S. Van Riet (Leuven: Peeters – Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980), VI, cap. 1, 292, in Avicenna, Metafisica. La scienza delle cose divine, a cura di O. Lizzini, P. Porro (Milano: Bompiani, 2002), 573: “[D]ivini philosophi non intelligunt per agentem principium motionis tantum, sicut intelligunt naturales, sed principium essendi et datorem eius, sicut creator mundi.” 39   Albertus Magnus, In V Metaphysicorum, tract. 1, cap. 3 (ed. Borgnet VI, 269), quoted by E. Gilson, “Notes pour l’histoire de la cause efficiente”, p. 20, note 13. 34 35

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ing indiscriminate use of the term causa efficiens to indicate both the principle of motion and that of being. Despite this, in the Thomistic corpus the efficient cause not only acts in such a way so as not to be included in a pure physics of causes, but it seems to prefigure a sort of “theologization” of the motor causality, considered as the first efficient creative cause.40 From the first lines of his treatment, Domingo de Soto often confines himself to a logico-linguistic level, on the basis of which he outlines a suitable physical doctrine. He takes up the Aristotelian expression (primum principium unde incipit motum), the terms of which he proceeds to clarify: (a) The particle unde should be understood as a distinctive, proper sign of the efficient cause. It is meant to denote “the agent which generates or draws the form from the passive power of the matter” (agens est qui formam de potentia passiva materiae educit); (b) the term primum is designed to exclude both accidental and instrumental causes; (c) principium cannot be understood as a “natural” condition (natura et principium impertinenter se habent), in that even the matter is, in certain sense, nature, but should be understood in the “efficient” sense, i.e., as “an active principle of change” (principium activum movendi).41 Thus the efficient cause, seeing as it “flows into the effect”42 (concurrere influendo in effectum), is actually the primary principle of production of an effect, however much the final cause may conserve primacy in the intentional sense (quamvis finis sit primum in intentione, tamen exequutio motus incipi ab agente).43 In all truth, the metaphysical root of efficiency understood as influentia (and already identified by Albert the Great as “power of the primary cause (that) proceeds into the effect”44) barely manages to emerge plainly from Soto’s words. And even the continuation of the treatise, focused the division of the causes, seems to present a mere juxtaposition of the different aspects of efficient causality, rather than an   V. Carraud, Causa sive ratio, 75–77; E. Gilson, “Notes pour l’histoire de la cause efficiente”, 23–31. 41   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 37ra. 42   Albertus Magnus, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, in Opera omnia, ed. W. Fauser, t. 17/2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1993) I, tract. 4, cap. 2, quoted by J. Schmutz, “La doctrine médiévale des causes et la théologie de la nature pure”, 224, note 19. 43   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 37ra. Here is the Sotian division of efficient causes: 1. per se × per accidens; 2. accidens quod accidit causae per se × accidens quod accidit effectui per se; 3. remota, × proxima; 4. universalis × particularis; 5. essentialiter subordinata × accidentaliter subordinata; 6. univoca × aequivoca; 7. in fieri tantum × in fieri et conservari; 8. prima × secunda; 9. consulens × disponens × adiuvans; 10. principalis × instrumentalis; 11. in potentia, × in actu; 12. positiva × privativa. 44   Albertus Magnus, De causis II, tract. 1, cap. 14, quoted by J. Schmutz, 229, note 36: “‘Processum’ autem et ‘influxum’ idem dicimus, quia id quod Arabes ‘influentiam’ vocant, Graeci philosophi vocant ‘processionem’. In hoc enim virtus causae primariae procedit in effectum.” 40

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articulated, coherent development of fundamental characteristics around a precise defining nucleus (quid in communi), as will be the case for Suárez.45 Soto reserves an in-depth study for the distinction between the causes of becoming (in fieri tantum) and the cause of preserving oneself in being (in fieri et conservari). Here we recognize an interesting theological and metaphysical inclination towards the theme, its principal textual cross-reference being in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologiae.46 According to the Salmantine Master, when the agent impresses on (imprimit) and leaves in (secum) the effect a form of the same species (eiusdem rationis), then the effect depends (dependet) on the cause in becoming and not in preserving itself, since it will be able to preserve itself by virtue of the form it acquires (as when man generates another man); when, on the other hand (as happens with sunlight in the human 45   See DM 12, 3, 3, (XXV, 389): “[…] efficiens est quasi fons et principium per se influens esse in effectum; […] ergo tota definitio causae propriissime convenit efficienti”, see also DM 17, 1 (XXV, 580–582). In the same disputation, Suárez presents the following division of the efficient cause (DM 17, 2 (XXV, 583–592): 1. per se × per accidens; 2. physica × moralis; 3. principalis × instrumentalis; 4. prima × secunda; 5. univoca × aequivoca; 6. conjuncta × separata. 46   Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 104, a. 1: “aliquid conservatur ab altero dupliciter. Uno modo, indirecte et per accidens, sicut ille dicitur rem conservare, qui removet corrumpens; puta si aliquis puerum custodiat ne cadat in ignem, dicitur eum conservare. Et sic etiam Deus dicitur aliqua conservare, sed non omnia, quia quaedam sunt quae non habent corrumpentia, quae necesse sit removere ad rei conservationem. Alio modo dicitur aliquid rem aliquam conservare per se et directe, inquantum scilicet illud quod conservatur, dependet a conservante, ut sine eo esse non possit. Et hoc modo omnes creaturae indigent divina conservatione. Dependet enim esse cuiuslibet creaturae a Deo, ita quod nec ad momentum subsistere possent, sed in nihilum redigerentur, nisi operatione divinae virtutis conservarentur in esse, sicut Gregorius dicit. Et hoc sic perspici potest. Omnis enim effectus dependet a sua causa, secundum quod est causa eius. Sed considerandum est quod aliquod agens est causa sui effectus secundum fieri tantum, et non directe secundum esse eius. […] Et ideo quandocumque naturalis effectus est natus impressionem agentis recipere secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in agente, tunc fieri effectus dependet ab agente, non autem esse ipsius. Sed aliquando effectus non est natus recipere impressionem agentis secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in agente, sicut patet in omnibus agentibus quae non agunt simile secundum speciem; sicut caelestia corpora sunt causa generationis inferiorum corporum dissimilium secundum speciem. Et tale agens potest esse causa formae secundum rationem talis formae, et non solum secundum quod acquiritur in hac materia, et ideo est causa non solum fiendi, sed essendi. Sicut igitur fieri rei non potest remanere, cessante actione agentis quod est causa effectus secundum fieri; ita nec esse rei potest remanere, cessante actione agentis quod est causa effectus non solum secundum fieri, sed etiam secundum esse. Et haec est ratio quare aqua calefacta retinet calorem, cessante actione ignis; non autem remanet aer illuminatus, nec ad momentum, cessante actione solis. […] Sic autem se habet omnis creatura ad Deum, sicut aer ad solem illuminantem. Sicut enim sol est lucens per suam naturam, aer autem fit luminosus participando lumen a sole, non tamen participando naturam solis; ita solus Deus est ens per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est suum esse; omnis autem creatura est ens participative, non quod sua essentia sit eius esse.”

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generation), the agent does not transmit to (communicat) and leave in (secum) the effect the form of the same species, then the effect depends on the cause both in preservation (in conservari) and in being (in esse). And it is precisely this relationship that God establishes with his creatures (semper omnia in esse dependent a Deo), in the same way in which light propagated in the air depends on the sun (lumen aeris dependet a sole). Thus, if God removed his concurrence, the entire universe would in that same instant dissolve into nothingness (subtrahente Deo suum concursum, eodem momento universum in nihilum evanesceret).47 The above-mentioned principle also holds true on the level of natural secondary causes: if a particular cause perfectly produces (perfecte producit) a form similar to itself (similem sibi formam), then the effect will not depend in its existence (in esse) on the cause (as in the case of natural substances, plants, animals, etc.), whereas if a cause produces in the effect something like itself in an imperfect way (imperfecte), then the effect will depend in its existence on its cause, even if it could prolong its existence (durare) for some time (tantisper) in the absence of the cause (in absentia causae) – e.g. water heated over a fire remains hot even after it is removed from the flame. This is unlike the instance of artificial beings that depend on the author (pendet ab artifice) who creates them in the phase of realization (in fieri), but in preserving themselves they depend on their consistency and on the characteristics of their natural causes (a subiecto naturali), i.e., on the materials from which they are made.48 In light of this distinction we also understand the successive classification between first cause and second cause. The first cause, strictly speaking, is only the one that does not depend on another, i.e., God (solus Deus), who, by virtue of his infinite essence cannot be limited by any known species (ad nullum genus entium coartatur), but is the most eminent one of all; on the other hand, the secondary causes – all the others – depend on the first one in being and in causation (a prima dependente non solum in essendo, sed in causando).49 The line of reasoning above is developed in an interesting way in the theme of the “concurrence” or “influx” that God exercises on secondary causes, suggesting various interpretative hypotheses which, for the sake of convenience, can be summed up as follows: (1) creatures, or rather secondary causes, can act autonomously without the “participation” of God; (2) they cannot act except with the “participation” of God; (3) they cannot act at all with any efficacy of their own but only through that of divine power.50   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 38rb.   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 38rb. 49   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 38va. 50   See J. Schmutz, “La doctrine médiévale des causes”, 219, who quotes a passage of Nicolas Malebranche’s Réponse au livre I des Réflexions philosophiques e théologiques de M. Arnauld (1686). 47

48

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Soto tackles the issue asking himself “whether the form is the principle through which the efficient cause acts” (utrum forma sit principium quo causa efficiens agit), when he treats the third question of the second book of the Physics. Soto presents the various theories – above all by using once again the support of Aquinas’ writings51 – and goes on to offer his own solution to the problem. The first opinio comes from those who support the inefficacy of the secondary causes, both of a universal and particular nature (causas secundas neque universales, nec particulares quicquid agere), as the nominalists attest – in particular, the Salmantine Master mentions Gabriel Biel (d. 1495) and his commentary on the fourth book of Sentences, first distinction – when they say that God established from the moment of creation that he was always and immediately (statim) an “agent” in what is created and before all creatures (Deus in ipsa statim rerum creatione pepigit ad praesentiam creaturarum se statim agere). Thus when a wick was set alight, it would not be the flame that made it catch fire, but God himself (Deus ad praesentiam ignis, ex lege quam statuit, calefacit stuppam et tandem comburit). Soto, naturally, agrees with Thomas Aquinas in 51   Thomas Aquinas, In Sent. II, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4: “[C]irca hanc quaestionem sunt tres positiones. Quarum una est, quod Deus immediate operetur omnia, ita quod nihil aliud est causa alicujus rei; adeo quod dicunt quod ignis non calefacit, sed Deus; nec manus movetur, sed Deus causat ejus motum, et sic de aliis. Sed haec positio stulta est: quia ordinem tollit universi, et propriam operationem a rebus, et destruit judicium sensus. Secunda positio est quorumdam philosophorum, qui ut proprias operationes rerum sustineant, Deum immediate omnia creare negant; sed dicunt, quod immediate est causa primi creati, et illud est causa alterius, et sic deinceps. Sed haec opinio erronea est: quia secundum fidem non ponimus Angelos creatores, sed solum Deum creatorem omnium visibilium et invisibilium. Tertia positio est, quod Deus immediate omnia operatur, et quod res singulae proprias operationes habent, per quas causae proximae rerum sunt, non tamen omnium, sed quorumdam: quia enim, ut dictum est, secundum fidem non ponitur creatura aliqua aliam in esse producere per creationem, nec virtute propria nec aliena; ideo omnium illorum quae per creationem in esse exeunt, solus Deus immediate causa est. Hujusmodi autem sunt quae per motum in esse exire non possunt, nec per generationem. […] Aliorum vero quae per motum et generationem producuntur, creatura causa esse potest, vel ita quod habeat causalitatem supra totam speciem, sicut sol est causa in generatione hominis vel leonis; vel ita quod habeat causalitatem ad unum individuum speciei tantum, sicut homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. Horum tamen causa etiam Deus est, magis intime in eis operans quam aliae causae moventes: quia ipse est dans esse rebus. Causae autem aliae sunt quasi determinantes illud esse. Nullius enim rei totum esse ab aliqua creatura principium sumit, cum materia a Deo solum sit; esse autem est magis intimum cuilibet rei quam ea per quae esse determinatur; unde et remanet, illis remotis, ut in libro de causis dicitur. Unde operatio creatoris magis pertingit ad intima rei quam operatio causarum secundarum: et ideo hoc quod creatum est causa alii creaturae, non excludit quin Deus immediate in rebus omnibus operetur, inquantum virtus sua est sicut medium conjungens virtutem cujuslibet causae secundae cum suo effectu: non enim virtus alicujus creaturae posset in suum effectum, nisi per virtutem creatoris, a quo est omnis virtus, et virtutis conservatio, et ordo ad effectum; quia, ut in libro de causis dicitur, causalitas causae secundae firmatur per causalitatem causae primae.”

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considering this foolish and unworthy of philosophy (indigna est quae opinionibus philosophorum annumeretur), as it denies the order of the universe (ordinem tollit universi).52 The second opinion at the other extreme is that of the Avicennian tradition, 53 according to which God does not act immediately (immediate), but transfers creative capacity to secondary causes, first creating a first being, i.e. the first angel (primum angelum) who, by virtue of power received from God (per virtutem receptam a Deo), is said in turn to create the second being, and so on, proceeding towards inferior beings. But even this solution would not enable us to explain how God and the secondary causes could immediately participate on achieving the same effect (immediate concurrunt ad eundem effectum), especially since God alone would suffice (ipse solus videretur sufficere).54Faced with these two theses, the second of which is erroneous and dangerous for the Christian faith (derogat religioni Christianae), Domingo de Soto proposes his conclusion, a solemn profession of “concurrentism”, faithful to the intent of Thomas Aquinas, for whom God participates intimately (intime) in the action of every agent, leaving the creature to act according to the causality which is peculiar to it (secundum illud quod est sibi proprium);55 for the realization of every change and every natural action, not solely God’s action is necessary, nor only the action of the creature, but a cooperative action involving God together (simul) with secondary causes.56

52   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 4, f. 39vb. See Guillelmus de Ockham, Reportatio II, q. 3–4, in Opera Theologica, t. 5 (St. Bonaventure, 1981), quoted by J. Schmutz, “La doctrine médiévale des causes”, 238: “[Deus] non vult solus totum producere, sed coagit cum causis secundis tamquam causa partialis, licet sit principalior. Ita quod ipse est causa immediata omnium quando agit cum causis secundis sicut quando agit sine illis. Nec propter hoc superfluunt causae secundae, quia Deus non agit in qualibet actione secundum totam potentiam suam.” 53   Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 45, a. 5: “Et secundum hoc, aliqui opinati sunt quod, licet creatio sit propria actio universalis causae, tamen aliqua inferiorum causarum inquantum agit in virtute primae causae, potest creare. Et sic posuit Avicenna quod prima substantia separata, creata a Deo, creat aliam post se, et substantiam orbis, et animam eius; et quod substantia orbis creat materiam inferiorum corporum.” 54   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 4, f. 39vb. See J. Schmutz, “La doctrine médiévale des causes”, 224–227 and 246–250. 55   Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 45, a. 5: “causa secunda instrumentalis non participat actionem causae superioris, nisi inquantum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad effectum principalis agentis. Si igitur nihil ibi ageret secundum illud quod est sibi proprium, frustra adhiberetur ad agendum”; STh I, q. 105, a. 5: “ipse Deus est proprie causa ipsius esse universalis in rebus omnibus, quod inter omnia est magis intimum rebus; sequitur quod Deus in omnibus intime operetur.” 56   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 4, f. 39vb: “Ad motum omnem et actionem naturalem, nec Deus solus, nec creatura, sed Deus simul et causae universales et particulares concurrunt.”

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That God’s participation (nec Deus solus) alone is insufficient is clear for at least five reasons (as well as on the basis of the sacred texts):57 (1) if God were the only one to be at work in nature, all the secondary causes would be degraded to the level of conditio sine qua non, i.e., to a causa per accidens, casually drawing on reality (ad rem) in the same way in which “the artist” who is the cause of a statue is only this by chance;58 (2) if God had not created things in order that they act autonomously (propter suas operationes), then He would have created useless and superfluous things (otiosas illas fecit, atque adeo superfluas), but this is contrary to divine wisdom (sapientiae divinae maxime derogat);59 (3) if God acted alone, there would be no reason why He should illuminate in the presence of the Sun and not in that of any other thing instead. But it would be stupid not to recognize the specific nature of every thing.60 And if someone objected that it is God’s established will for the creation of the world (si quis dicat hanc censeri esse naturam rerum propter solum pactum in earum creatione factum a Deo), he would need to ask himself if such a decision (dispositio Dei) is to be understood as something added to the nature of things (superadditum naturae rerum) or if it is intrinsic to the essence of things (de intrinseca ratione et essentia). Supporters of the first thesis would deny the very nature of things (tunc certe negant illam esse naturam rerum) instituted at a time by God – thus, according to these authors, it would not be exact to say that the words of consecration are the natural cause of the transsubstantiatio (as established at the time by God ) but rather that they are only an instrumental cause of a supernatural kind.61 According to the second thesis, which Soto endorses, once God has established the 57   Genesis 1, 11 ff., especially 1, 28: “Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram.” And Soto adds: “[…] nempe per propriam actionem. Ut quid necessarius esset concursus utriusque sexus, decisioque seminis, et tam multae eius transmutationes, nisi causae secundae aliquid agerent?” (In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 4, f. 40rb). 58   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 4, f. 39vb; ibid., q. 3, f. 37rb–va: “Causa ergo per se dicitur illa quae explicat rationem formalem qua est causa eius effectus”; ibid. q. 4, f. 37va: “Nec sufficit praedicatum convenire rei significatae per subiectum, ut propositio sit per se; sed requiritur (quo ad propositum attinet) ut effectus importatus per praedicatum conveniat subiecto ratione significati formalis, ut ‘aedificator aedificat.” See also A. Maierù, Terminologia logica, 62–66, 243–250 (on Ockham). 59   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 4, f. 39vb: “[…] nam si sol non est qui illuminat, sine sole illuminasset nos Deus eo modo quo secundum istos nunc illuminat, quid ergo opus fuit solem creare, ut ad eius praesentiam Deus illuminaret?” 60   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 40ra: “Atque quis adeo sit stupidus qui non palam videat naturam solis esse illuminare, non autem naturam ligni et naturam ignis esse calefacere, et naturam propriam animalium esse nutrire.” 61   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 40ra: “Si primo modo, ut isti se exponunt, iam tunc certe negant illam esse naturam rerum. Nam quo non pertinet ad essentiam, non pertinet ad naturam; dicere enim nemo potest naturam verborum consecrationi esse transubstantiare panem in corpus, cum potius supernaturaliter ad hoc fuerint instituta, ratione cuius institutionis sunt quidam causa, sed tamen supernaturaliter tamquam instrumentum Dei.”

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nature of things, they act for an intrinsic reason grounded in their essence, so that God cannot create things in a different way;62 (4) moreover, this thesis is confirmed very clearly by the power of the natural light of reason (lumine naturali) and finally, (5) also for reasons of moral theology, as otherwise one would be obliged to attribute man’s sinful behaviour to God.63 On the other hand, the fact that a creature alone (nec sola creatura) is insufficient is equally evident for other reasons, and fundamentally due to the fact that God participates immediately in producing the effect (immediate attingit effectum) – and so the possibility of suspending the participation of the secondary causes by means of his omnipotence is ensured, as happens in the case of miracles.64 His intervention, however, is not definable as immediate as regards the supposit (or concrete being) which acts (immediatus immediatione suppositi), but rather as regards the power of production (immediatus immediatione virtutis).65 In fact, a principal cause (in this case, God) is immediate to the effect as a power (virtus) giving and conserving esse or action in the absence of which that effect or entity would instantaneously be reduced   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 40ra: “Si vero secundum dicatur, hoc illud est quod nos venari contendimus, nempe quod de intrinseca ratione et essentia solis esse luminosum, et animalis nutrire se et generare sibi simile, etc., quod hod hoc est illis naturale, non potuit Deus aliter res condere. […] Enimvero, ut ait Augustinus, ante mundi creationem quatuor et tria erant septem, nec Deus potuisset aliud facere. Et pari modo nec Deus potuit facere quin causae istae naturales suapte natura essent causae, propterea nanque dicuntur causae naturales.” On the question of “eternal truths” in Soto, see S. Orrego Sánchez, “Fundamentación metafísica de la inmutabilidad de la ley natural en Domingo de Soto”, in La ley natural como fundamento moral y jurídico en Domingo de Soto, ed. J. Cruz Cruz (Pamplona: eunsa, 2007), 67–93 ; on “eternal truths” created by God “ut efficiens causa et totalis” in Descartes, see G. Olivo, “L’efficience en cause: Suárez, Descartes et la question de la causalité”, in Descartes et le Moyen Age, ed. J. Biard et al. (Paris: Vrin, 1997), 91–105, esp. 101; and V. Carraud, Causa sive ratio, 141. 63   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 4, f. 40ra: “[…] in actionibus liberis, quomodo homo meretur, si ipse non est qui studiose agit, aut quomodo peccat, si ipse non est qui occidit hominem. Quin etiam, quomodo concedendum est quod non homo, sed Deus ad praesentiam passionis pravae elicit odium sui in homine.” 64   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 40rb: “[T]heologi recte sentientes probant Deum esse praesentem omnibus rebus per essentiam, nempe quia immediate attingit effectum. […] Et confirmatur haec ratio […] si Deus non concurreret in quacumque actione, tunc suspendendo concursum non impediret actionem causae particularis. Hoc tamen derogat suae omnipotentiae.” 65   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 40va: “dupliciter aliqua causa sit immediata. Uno modo immediatione virtutis, et alio modo immediatione suppositi. Illa causa est immediata immediatione virtutis, quae agit per propriam virtutem et illa dicitur hoc modo mediata, quae agit per virtutem quam recepit ab alio. Sed illa causa est immediata immediatione suppositi, quae attingit effectum per hoc quod movetur ab alio, et illa est hoc modo mediata, quae movet aliud suppositum: ut in sectione ligni artifex est causa immediata immediatione virtutis, et serra mediata; sed immediatione suppositi contrario modo serra est causa immediata, et artifex mediata. Hoc modo dicunt Deum concurrere immediatum immediatione virtutis, et ita solent homines dicere se aliquid facere mediante Deo, quia agunt per virtutem quam recipiunt a Deo.” 62

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to nothingness; on the contrary, an instrumental cause (the secondary causes) is conjoined to the effect and operates by virtue of the power of the principal cause.66 It is clear, nonetheless, how one should interpret the simultaneity of the multiple-cause intervention (i.e., of the primary cause, which is God, and of the secondary causes) in the production of the effects: the immediacy of the prime cause does not come across by means of an intervention of the secondary cause, nor does the immediacy of the secondary cause come across by means of God’s participation, but rather each of these two causes act equally immediately (aeque immediate), like two people pushing together against a column to make it fall over (duo impellentes columnam quam volunt prosternere).67 The chapter on the efficient causes, far from supplying a coherent, systematic treatise on the question, at least allows one to get access to a number of results of certain interest, such as (a) the confi rmation of the “spirit” of the “realist” doctrine of Aquinas’ works, (b) the distance taken from the theses of the terminists and nominalists (nominales),68 (c) the outlining of some terms and concepts that will find a more coherently “metaphysical” place in the Suárezian works. In particular, about the first point of comparison, while Soto’s definition of cause is linked to an analogical scheme, Suárez prefers to develop his account on the ground of a univocal sense; regarding the second point, even if both Soto and Suárez intend the efficient cause as “it flows into the effect”, nonetheless, while Soto confirms the Aristotelian and Thomistic primacy of the formal and final cause, Suárez brings to perfection the focal and univocal position of the efficient cause on the ground of the concept of “dependence” or “influx”; 66   See A. J. Freddoso, “God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is not Enough”, Philosophical perspectives 5 (1991): 553–585, in particular 558–559. 67   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 40va–b: “[…] concurrunt aeque immediate, sicuti duo impellents columnam quam volunt prosternere […]. Hoc modo dicunt Deum concurrere immediatum immediatione virtutis et ita solent homines dicere se aliquid facere mediante Deo, quia agunt per virtutem quam recipient a Deo. Sed immediatione suppositi causae particulares immediatius attingunt: nam mediantibus illis, scilicet per virtutes quas eis communicat, conservat haec inferior.” This example became widely known since Luis de Molina used it to illustrate the cooperation of two “partial” causes, God and men, especially in moral actions: “[…] non secus ac cum duo trahunt navim totus motus proficiscitur ab unoquoque trahentium, sed non tanquam a tota causa motus, siquidem quivis eorum simul efficit cum altero omnes ac singulas partes ejusdem motus.” – Luis de Molina, Concordia II, disp. 26, n. 15, quoted by J. Schmutz, 251, note 106. 68  See, for example, the Sotian discussion on the causa per se and the causa per accidens, where Soto distinguishes in the causation between the universal form, which is the cause per se (statuarius in communi est causa statuae), and the individual or particular condition, which is the cause “by chance” (hic statuarius). See Ockham’s opinion reported by Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 4, f. 37va: “Actiones […] sunt singularium: non enim homo in communi, sed hic homo agit; ergo non statuarius, sed hic statuarius est causa per se.” See A. Ghisalberti, Introduzione a Ockham (Roma– Bari: Laterza, 2000), 71–75.

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regarding the third point, Soto maintains, as afterwards Suárez and Molina will do, the Thomistic view on God’s general concurrence with secondary causes. 4. CONCLUSION

The pages that Soto dedicates to the efficient cause show a certain interest in this question, even if it is still linked to reasons issuing from logical and physical concerns, more than to metaphysical ones, and it is not yet supported by theoretically innovative results. For example, while Soto clearly manifests an inclination to “terminism”, which he develops in his summulist treatise (one need only think of the cross-reference to the rules of the appellatio),69 Suárez gives a new perspective to the logical-linguistic lexicon of the tradition in the metaphysical sense.70 In short, if the Suárezian conception has a fundamentally metaphysical significance, Soto’s principal interest is still physical. For example, when discussing efficient cause or agent, he perceives its function in the execution of the movement (executio motus incipit ab agente),71 or in the introduction of a form in matter, thus maintaining a certain distance from

  To reply to Ockham’s argument (In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 37rb: “Primum est propter Ocham, 1 sent., quaestion. 2, quaest. 10, ubi ait non esse magis per se istam ‘calidum calefacit’, aut ‘aedificator aedificat’, quam istam ‘album calefacit’, et ‘musicus aedificat’ ”), Soto refers to appellatio: In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 3, f. 37va: “‘per se’ appellat propriam rationem subiecti. Idest quod iste homo ratione artis aedificatoriae aedificat […]. Nec sufficit praedicatum convenire rei significatae per subiectum, ut propositio sit per se; sed requiritur (quo ad propositum attinet) ut effectus importatus per praedicatum conveniat subiecto ratione significati formalis, ut ‘aedificator aedificat’.” See also Soto, Sum. II, cap. ult., f. 48ra–b: “Appellatio est applicatio formalis unius termini ad significatum formale alterius.” Ibid., f. 48va: “[…] terminus connotativus quando tenetur substantive, ut ‘album’, significat quidam suum formale per modum adiacentis suo materiali; non tamen appellat, sed connotat. Appellatio enim non est nisi inter duos terminos; quae quidam variat aliquando veritatem propositionis;” Ibid., f. 58vb–49ra: “Quando adiectivum ponitur a parte praedicati tunc adiectivum non appellat supra formale substantivi, sed solum applicat suum significatum ad suppositum substantive.” 70   DM 17, 2, 3 (XXV, 583): “Respondeo primum actionem per se esse a supposito, quatenus affectum est tali forma, non vero necessario secundum se […]. Addo vero deinde tunc actionem per accidens tribui supposito, quando vis agendi per accidens etiam illi inest […]. At vero si vis agendi per se insit supposito, etiam si suppositum ipsum nude proferatur, non dicetur causa per accidens, sed per se actionis, et ita censeo has esse per se: Sol illuminat, ignis calefacit […] illa vero: Homo facit statuam, magis est per accidens, quia etsi ars illa non possit esse, nisi in homine (intelligentias omitto), tamen simpliciter accidit homini, unde homo simpliciter dictus non includit artem illam, nisi in potentia valde remota.” 71   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 4, f. 37ra: “[…] efficiens autem est principium solum activum movendi, aut proprium suppositum aut alienum. […] principium unde motus, intelligitur quantum ad exequutionem. Et quamvis finis sit primum in intentione, tamen exequutio motus incipit ab agente. Modus ergo agendi causae efficientis omnium est compertissimus : est enim concurrere influendo in effectum.” 69

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the causal doctrine of stoics (id quod facit)72 and from the Avicennian and Albertist tradition, according to which, as we said, efficiency is the principium essendi. In line with the Aristotelian and Thomistic intent, Soto confi rms the pivotal rôle of formal cause73 and the priority of final cause as the end and the aim in causation (primus concursus est causae finalis).74 However, he defines the action of the efficient cause as an “influx” that is not self-sufficient or perfect, but rather “participatory”, in the effect (modus agendi causae efficientis est concurrere influendo in effectum), whereas Suárez insists on the primacy of the efficient cause, anticipating the “causa efficiens et totalis” of Descartes.75 In this way, Suárez accelerates the process that marks the “decadence” of the theory of the plurality of causes and of the primacy of the final cause76 and decidedly accentuates the unrenounceability of the concept of “action” and of that of “dependence” on which, according to some scholars, causality is centred for Galilei.77 On the other hand, resorting to the term influendo doubtlessly places Soto in a lexical continuity both with the Neoplatonic tradition, also embraced by Thomas Aquinas, and with the innovative approach attempted by Suárez, although he will in fact express a more radical concept (influere esse) adapting the verb, which is originally intransitive, to a transitive, and therefore “metaphysical” function. In the context of the principal divisions of the efficient cause there are both analogies and differences of a conceptual and terminological nature that come out, the 72   I am very grateful to Prof. Alejandro Vigo (Universidad de Navarra) for his suggestion on this issue. See also note 37. In the future I would like to focus on the relationship between formal cause and efficient cause in Soto’s Quaestiones. 73   Soto, In Phys. Quaest. II, q. 4, f. 40vb: “Forma substantialis est principium formale principale quo agens agit; et forma accidentalis est principium quo minus principale quodammodo instrumentale”; ff. 41vb–42ra: “Activitas agentis attenditur penes multitudinem formae tam substantialis, quam accidentalis.” 74   See note 31. 75   Cf René Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, in Meditazioni metafisiche, a cura di L. Urbani Ulivi, (Milano: Rusconi, 1998), 192 [ = AT VII, 40, lin. 21–23]: “Jam vero lumine naturali manifestum est tantumdem ad minimum esse debere in causa efficienti et totali, quantum in ejusdem causae effectu.” See V. Carraud, Causa sive ratio 179: “il n’y a pas d’autre(s) genre(s) de causes, la production de l’effet relève de la seule efficience, l’expression ‘cause efficiente’ est désormais une redondance.” 76   Cf. G. Olivo, “L’efficience en cause”, 102. 77   Cf. R. Schnepf, “Zum kausalen Vokabular am Vorabend der ‘wissenschaftlichen Revolution’ des 17. Jahrhunderts – Der Ursachenbegriff bei Galilei und die „aristotelische“ causa efficiens im System der Ursachen bei Suárez”, in Kausalität und Naturgesetz in der frühen Neuzeit, ed. A. Hüttemann (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001), 42: “Der Begriff der Handlung wird hier [scil. DM 18] dadurch als eine Art Relationbegriff analysiert, dass diejenigen Eigenschaften der Relata benannt werden, welchen die Relation fundieren, nämlich einerseits die Tendenz zur Wirkung und andererseits die Abhängigkeit der Wirkung vom Grund.”

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most interesting of which concerns the relationship between primary and secondary cause. One has but to recall the question of “concurrence” (concursus influxus) of the primary cause (God) with the action of the secondary causes. Well, Soto embraces “concurrentism” and takes refuge both from “conservationism” (or the conservation, in secondary causes, of the efficacy conferred by God with creation, and its total “imputability” to it in terms of effect), and from “immediatism” or “occasionalism” (the direct, immediate intervention of God in the actions of creatures), prefiguring, in such a way, the developments of the Jesuit school,78 and particularly of Suárez and of Luis de Molina.79

BIBLIOGRAPHY SOURCES Aquinas, Thomas. In XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio. [= In Met.] — Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum. [= In Phys.] — Scriptum super Sententiis. [= In Sent.] — Summa contra gentiles. [= SCG] — Summa theologiae. [= STh] Aristotle. Metaphysics. [= Metaph.] — Posterior Analytics. [= Anal. Post.] — Physics. [= Phys.] Avicenna Latinus. Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina. V–X. Édition critique par S. Van Riet. Leuven: Peeters – Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980. Reproduced in Avicenna, Metafisica. La scienza delle cose divine, a cura di O. Lizzini e P. Porro, Milano: Bompiani, 2002. Descartes, René. Meditationes de prima philosophia. In Œuvres de Descartes, publiée par Ch. Adams et P. Tannery, Paris: Léopold Cerf, 1904 [= AT], vol. VII. Reproduced in Meditazioni metafisiche, a cura di L. Urbani Ulivi, Milano: Rusconi, 1998.   Cf. J. Schmutz, “La doctrine médiévale des causes”, 253–254.   See A. J. Freddoso, “God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is not Enough”, Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 553–585, esp. 553–556; A. J. Freddoso, “Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case against Secondary Causation in Nature”, in Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, ed. T. V. Morris, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 74–118. I am very grateful to Prof. Daniel Heider and the Organizing Committee for having me at the Conference. I would like to thank Prof. Costantino Esposito (University of Bari, Italy) and Prof. Michele De Palma (Director of Liceo “C. Sylos”, Bitonto, Italy) for their encouragement, and Professors Robert Fastiggi, Jorge Uscatescu Barrón, Giannina Burlando, and Simo Knuuttila for their suggestions on my report. I would like to thank Dr. James Hart too for his translation and Isabella Milillo for her kindly help. 78

79

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Petrus Hispanus. Tractatus called afterwards Summule logicales. Ed. L. M. de Rijk. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972. Soto, Domingo. Reverendi Patris Dominici Soto Segobiensis […] Summulae. Summularum aeditio secunda […]. Salmanticae: excudebat Andreas a Portonariis, 1554. Reprinted as Summulae. Hildesheim – New York: G. Olms, 1980. [= Sum.] — Reverendi Patris Dominici Soto […] Super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Commentaria […]. Salmanticae: in aedibus Dominici a Portonariis, 1572. [= In Phys. Comm.] — Reverendi Patris Dominici Soto […] Super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Quaestiones […]. Salmanticae: in aedibus Dominici a Portonariis, 1572. [= In Phys. Quaest.] Suárez, Francisco. Disputationes metaphysicae. Vols. 25–26 of R. P. Francisci Suárez e Societate Jesu, Opera omnia, editio nova, edited by C. Berton, Paris: L. Vivès, 1866. Reprint, Hildesheim – Zürich – New York: G. Olms Verlag, 1998. [= DM]

SECONDARY WORKS Ashworth, E. J. “Domingo de Soto (1494–1560) on Analogy and Equivocation”. In Studies on the History of Logic. Proceedings of the III. Symposium on the History of Logic, edited by I. Angelelli et al., 117–131. Berlin – New York: W. de Gruyter, 1996. Boulnois, O. “Liberté, causalité, modalité. Y a-t-il une préhistoire du principe de raison?”. Quaestio 2 (2002): 291–336. Brock, S.  L. “Causality and Necessity in Thomas Aquinas”. Quaestio 2 (2002): 217–240. Vincent Carraud, Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause de Suárez à Leibniz, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002. Di Liso, Saverio. Domingo de Soto: ciencia y filosofía de la naturaleza. Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 2006. — “La causalidad eficiente en Domingo de Soto, Francisco Suárez and Galileo Galilei”. In Causalidad y Libertad y otras cuestiones filosóficas del Siglo de Oro, edited by Ma Idoya Zorroza, 13–41. Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 2011. Frede, M. “Les origines de la notion de cause”. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (1989): 483–511. — “The Original Notion of Cause”. In Doubt and Dogmatism – Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology, edited by M. Schofield et al., 217–249. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Freddoso, A. J. “God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is not Enough”. Philosophical perspectives 5 (1991): 553–585. — “Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case against Secondary Causation in Nature”. In Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, edited by T. V. Morris, 74–118. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988. Ghisalberti, Alessandro. Introduzione a Ockham. Roma–Bari: Laterza, 2000. Gilson, Étienne. “Notes pour l’histoire de la cause efficiente”.Archive d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Age 37 (1962): 7–31. Hankinson, R. J. “Causation and Explanation in Aristotle”. Quaestio 2 (2002): 33–56.

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Helbing, M. O. “La ragione prodotta per causa vera dell’effetto. Note sulla teoria della causalità negli scritti galileiani”. Quaestio 2 (2002): 383–410. Maierù, Alfonso. Terminologia logica della tarda scolastica. Roma: Edizioni dell’Ateneo. Natali, C. “Problemi della nozione di causa in Aristotele, con particolare attenzione alla causalità finale”. Quaestio 2 (2002): 57–75. Olivo, G. “L’efficience en cause: Suárez, Descartes et la question de la causalité”. In Descartes et le Moyen Age, edited by J. Biard et al., 91–105. Paris: Vrin, 1997. Orrego Sánchez, S. “Fundamentación metafísica de la inmutabilidad de la ley natural en Domingo de Soto”. In La ley natural como fundamento moral y jurídico en Domingo de Soto, edited by. J. Cruz Cruz, 67–93. Pamplona: eunsa, 2007. Schmutz, J. “La doctrine médiévale des causes et la théologie de la nature pure (XIII–XVII siècles)”. Revue thomiste 101 (2001): 217–264. Schnepf, R. “Zum kausalen Vokabular am Vorabend der ‚wissenschaftlichen Revolution‘ des 17. Jahrhunderts – Der Ursachenbegriff bei Galilei und die ‚aristotelische‘ causa efficiens im System der Ursachen bei Suárez”. In Kausalität und Naturgesetz in der frühen Neuzeit, edited by A. Hüttemann, 15–46. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001. Spruyt, J. “Peter of Spain”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2007 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta. Online, url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries /peter-spain/. Wallace, William A. Causality and Scientific Explanation. I. Medieval and Early Classical Science. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1972. Weisheipl, J. A. “The Interpretation of Aristotle’s Physics and the Science of Motion”. In History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600, edited by Anthony Kenny, Jan Pinborg and Norman Kretzmann, 521–536. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

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THE CONNEXIONS BETWEEN VITAL ACTS IN SUÁREZ’S PSYCHOLOGY Simo Knuuttila

ABSTRACT

In his metaphysical psychology, Francisco Suárez argues that vital acts are immanent and cannot be produced by other acts. The faculties of the soul form a centralized network in which the actualization of one part is joined by the actuality of other parts without an external efficient causation. The connections between vital acts are understood in terms of co-ordination (co-ordinatio), harmony (harmonia, consonantia), concord (consensus, consensio) or sympathy (sympathia). My aim is to make some remarks on the historical background of Suárez’s view and also comment on the doctrine itself which opens up the possibility for speculative metaphysical psychology about law-like invariances between the acts of the soul.

1. INTRODUCTION Suárez’s metaphysical psychology has interested many historians over the last century. One of influential studies has been Josef Ludwig’s German doctoral dissertation from 1929, which dealt with the allegedly non-causal connexions between the acts of the faculties of the soul.1 Recent works have not added much to the question which Ludwig took up in his monograph. My aim is to make some remarks on the historical background of Suárez’s view, which was only touched on by Ludwig and is still largely unexplored. I shall also comment on the doctrine itself, arguing that the received interpretative concept of ‘non-causal co-operation’ derived from Ludwig’s work, while understandable, is not quite happy. Suárez discusses an Aristotelian efficient cause or its absence – many of the connexions which in his view do not involve efficient causes as active sources of effects could be characterized as causal in the Humean sense.

1   J. Ludwig, Das akausale Zusammenwirken (sympathia) der Seelenvermögen in der Erkenntnislehre des Suárez (Munich: Karl Ludwig, 1929).

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2. ARE THERE PASSIONS OF THE WILL? Apart from his theory of free will, John Duns Scotus introduced also another influential idea related to will, namely that of the passions of the will such as pleasure and distress; this was new in comparison to the traditional view that emotional passions were restricted to the motions of the sensory soul.2 Scotus’ theory of the passions of the will was discussed by many sixteenth-century writers, and it was also applied by Cardinal Cajetan in his commentary on Aquinas’ Summa theologiae.3 Suárez, who was always eager to criticize Cajetan, wrote a longer analysis of this topic. He was sympathetic with Scotus’ considerations about the pleasures and distresses of the will, except that in his view these mental phenomena were not passions but acts of the will. Suárez argues that speaking about pleasure and distress as the passions of the will is misleading, since all occurrences of the will are vital acts and all acts of this kind proceed from an internal principle. Assuming, like Suárez, that pleasures and distresses are acts, though not free acts, one might ask whether there is any great difference between this view and the Scotist position that the passions of the will are actualized when pleasant or unpleasant things are perceived to take place, which conditions appear to determine the so-called passions of the will in Suárez as well. In his view there is a big difference since, if the pleasures or distresses of the will were passions, they would have an external efficient cause, which is impossible. Instead of employing the conception of efficient cause in this context, Suárez explains that the phenomena of pleasure or distress may be necessary with respect to certain external things even though these are not their causes. The will itself as a vital power is the source of these reactions in certain circumstances: But one might ask whether [joy] is an act produced by the will or whether it is merely a passion, for Scotus, in speaking about joy above, states that it is merely a passion and that fruition as an act is in the intellect and as a passion in the will. The basis of Scotus’ view is that all acts of the will are under its control, but this is not the case with joy and distress […] However, I say that fruition is an act which is effectively produced by the will […] The strongest reason for this is the common principle that the acts of life proceed from an intrinsic principle, and joy is most manifestly an act of life […]. It is possible that it is a certain act of the will, which is vital, a certain rest or suavity and sweetness, which is born from the appetite itself through the presence of the good which is loved.4 2   For Scotus’ view, see Ordinatio III, dist. 15, n. 47–60 (ed. Vat. IX, 498–505); see also S. Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 265–271. 3   Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia iussu Leonis XII P.M. edita cum commentariis Thomae de Vio Caietani, vol. 6: 218; see also John Mair, In primum Sententiarum (Paris, 1510), I, dist. 1, q. 6, 44ra. 4   F. Suárez, De voluntario et involuntario, disp. 7, s. 1, n. 8–10 (IV, 252); joy is characterized as an action necessitated by achieving the object of one’s desire; Ibid. n. 10. See also CQDA, d. 11,

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In criticizing Scotus’ terminology, Suárez did not mean to shed new light on the phenomenology of emotions; his points derived from the metaphysical conception of vital acts which he systematically applied to all psychological phenomena. In this approach, the vital acts which included the cognitive and motive acts of the intellectual or sensory level of the soul as well as the vegetative acts were active and consequently could have neither an external efficient cause nor a corresponding passive element – on the contrary, their general hallmark was proceeding from an active intrinsic principle.5 The notion of vital act, which referred to various functions of living beings, was not uncommon in mediæval times. Some writers associated this with the view that the soul is the principle of life and more or less directly the principle of the activities of living beings.6 I shall next give some further examples of Suárez’s attempt to develop of a general theory on the basis of the assumption that all vital acts proceed from an active intrinsic principle. The idea that vital acts are not externally caused was particularly stressed by Peter John Olivi whom Duns Scotus followed. Suárez was well acquainted with Scotus’ formulations. 3. ACTS OF PERCEPTION

Let us take a brief look at the mediæval background of Suárez’s view of perception.7 Thirteenth-century commentators on Aristotle’s De anima argued that perceptions are actualizations of passive potencies – the senses are actualized by their objects q. 2, n. 3; DA l. 5, c. 5, n. 3; DM 23, 3, 15. 5   CQDA d. 5, q. 3, n. 3 and q. 4, n. 4; DA l. 3, c. 3, n. 3 and c. 4, n. 5. 6   Thomas Aquinas writes in his Sentencia libri De anima II, c. 4, 197–203 (ed. Leonina 45.1, 85b): “The soul is the first through which we live, sense, are moved and understand, these four referring to the four kinds of life already mentioned, for living is traced back to the vegetative principle, since he said earlier that it is on account of this principle that living is common to all living things.” The acts associated with these types of vitality were called the acts of life or vital acts by Peter John Olivi and many others after him. See Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, 3 vols, ed. B. Jansen (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1922–1926), q. 71 (II: 644); q. 72 (III: 24–25). One of the controversial questions was whether a vital act can be an act of a passive power or whether all vital acts are active, i.e., whether there are passive powers of the soul or whether all such powers are active. In dealing with cognitive vital acts, Olivi argues for their activity (q. 74, III: 124–127). For an Augustinian version of active cognitions, see Robert Kilwardby, De spiritu fantastico, ed. P. O. Lewry, in Robert Kilwardby, O. P., On Time and Imagination, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 9.1 (Oxford: The British Academy and Oxford University Press, 1987). For sixteenth-century philosophy of life, see also D. Des Chene, Life’s Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univrsity Press, 2000). 7   For Suárez’s theory of perception, see also J. B. South, “Suárez and the Problem of External Perception”, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 10 (2001): 217–240; T. Aho, “Suárez on Cognitive Intentions”, in Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, ed. P. Bakker and J. Thijssen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 179–203.

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through the sensible forms, which are received by the sense-organs in a special manner and make the senses to perceive their objects. Most Latin writers assumed, like Aristotle and Averroës, that a perception requires that the medium between the sensible object and the sensory faculty be changed in a non-perceivable manner by the sensible quality of the object and that there is a similar change in the sense organ when it receives the form without matter. According to Averroës, these changes consist in the sensible species’ having “spiritual” existence in the medium and senseorgan. This became prevailing thirteenth-century terminology. The background of the doctrine of spiritual change was the axiom of Aristotelian physics that a passive power was activated by a separate active power when these powers were in contact. As the objects of sensory powers were regarded as their activators, the spiritual change was needed to bring the sensible forms into activating contact with the sensory power.8 Averroës suggested that perceptions might be associated with an agent sense which is analogous to the agent intellect. Some Latin commentators followed Averroës, and it became usual to ask whether some active factors should be added to the Aristotelian theory. Many fourteenth-century philosophers explained that while the reception of the form in the organ is merely passive, this is necessary but not sufficient for activating the sensory power, which place by the operation of the faculty itself. This was John of Jandun’s interpretation of Averroës’ active sense, and related ideas, also supported by Augustine’s psychology, became increasingly popular.9 John Buridan describes the activation of a sensory power as follows: The soul is the principal formative cause of perception below God, but it is not sufficiently actual for this without the sensory species; however, the composition of the soul and the sensory species is already sufficiently actual for this […] for when

  S. Knuuttila, “Aristotle’s Theory of Perception and Medieval Aristotelianism”, in Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. S. Knuuttila and P. Kärkkäinen, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 1–22. 9   For the discussions of the Averroistic active sense in mediæval and early modern thought, see the texts by John of Jandun and others edited in A. Pattin, Pour l’histoire du sens agent. Le controverse entre Barthélemy de Bruges et Jean Jandun. Ses antécédents et son évolution (Leuven: Peeters, 1988); for Kilwardby’s Augustinian active sense theory, see J. F. Silva, “Robert Kilwardby on Sense Perception”, in Theories of Perception, 97–99; for eclectic active sense theories, see L. Spruit, “Renaissance Views of Active Perception”, Theories of Perception, 203–224; C. Leijenhorst, “Cajetan and Suárez on Agent Sense: Metaphysics and Epistemology in Late Aristotelian Thought ”, in Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment, ed. H. Lagerlund (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 237–262. 8

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having the first act with proper dispositions it can bring itself to the second act, provided that there is no hindrance.10

Buridan’s formulation is close to that of Suárez who argued that while the causal influence from the object to the bodily organ is a necessary condition of perception, this causation does not provide an efficient cause of perception. Suárez assumes, as many mediæval thinkers did, that the species multiplied in the medium are corporeal and that the efficient causality from the object to the sense-organ through the medium is a real corporeal influence.11 He then explains that the soul perceives through an instrument which includes a received sensible species and a higher part which is the faculty of perceiving. The actualization of the higher part requires the presence of the sensible species, but is not caused by this presence: The cognitive power and the species form an integral instrument which immediately produces the act … Since there are two parts in this instrument, one which is most perfect but not representative of an object and another which is less noble but representative of an object, the act takes the perfection of its being from the former part and its capacity of representing from the latter one, in which it does not exceed the perfection of the species.12

Like Scotus, Buridan, and some other late mediæval thinkers, Suárez maintains that the presence of the representing sensible species transforms a sensory faculty into a higher level of actuality, after which the faculty may proceed to a second act, 10   Quaestiones in De anima II, q. 10 (ed. P. G. Sobol, in John Buridan on the Soul and Sensation. An Edition of Book II of His Commentary on Aristotle’s Book De anima (Third Redaction), with and Introduction and a Translation of Question 18 on Sensible Species (Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1989), 158–159); for a similar statement in John Duns Scotus, see his Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima, q. 12 (ed. Bonav. V, 106). Peter John Olivi wrote before Scotus as follows: “However much the cognitive power is informed by a habit and a species, which differ from the cognitive act, it cannot proceed to a cognitive act if it does not first actually tend towards the object, so that the gaze of its intention is actually turned and directed to the object” – Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 72 (III: 9). According to Olivi, cognitive vital acts must have a vital intrinsic principle (III: 25). Following Olivi, Scotus states in Quaestiones super De anima, q. 12, n. 24 (ed. Bonav. V, 104): “Vital operations are effective from a vital and intrinsic principle”. He also follows Olivi in describing the active attention: “For the cognitive power must not only receive the species of the object, but also tend through its act toward the object. This second is more essential to the power since the first is required because of the imperfection of the power. And the object is the object because the power tends to it rather than because it impresses a species” (Duns Scotus, Super Met. VII, q. 14, n. 29 (ed. Bonav. IV, 290). 11   South, “Suárez and the Problem of External Perception”, 226–227. South assumes that this holds of Aquinas’ theory as well, but in his view the changes associated with the spiritual species are incorporeal (Quaestio disputata de anima 13; Quaestio disputata de potentia 5, a. 8, in Quaestiones disputatae II, ed. P. Bazzi et al. (Turin: Marietti, 1965). 12   CQDA, d. 5, q. 4, n. 16; cf. DA, l. 3, c. 4, n. 14.

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the actual sensation.13 Scotus writes that “a cognition as a vital operation does not proceed from a non-vital thing as a total cause, but that which is not vital can be a partial cause of a vital thing or effect.”14 Suárez refers to Scotus in arguing that the actualization of a sense does not simply follow when it is made possible by the species; “the activity does not proceed from the species alone but rather from the power and the soul”. If the lower part of the faculty is the physically changeable organ and the higher part derives from the soul as the vital principle, the faculty is brought into a first actuality when the bodily instrument is changed through a material emanation from the object. When the power is brought into this state, no external influence is needed for the second actuality which is not caused by the fi rst, as it seems to be in Aristotle, but by the soul through its faculty.15 The presence of a species and the accompanying attention of the soul are the preliminary requirements for perception. (See section 6 below.) Being ultimately actualized in this way, a sensory act has no external efficient cause, whether a material event or another vital act. The second actuality, which is made possible by a species impressa, is described as the production of a species expressa, but this is understood as the vision itself, an act directed to an external sensible quality which is grasped just as it is.16 Even though Suárez’s theory was influenced by Augustinian and other Neoplatonic ideas, he did not operate with the inner pictures which Augustine and, say, Robert Kilwardby postulated as the immediate intentional objects, not distinguishable from the external perceptual qualities.17 4. ACTS OF IMAGINATION Related ideas were traditionally applied in comments on imagination, which in mediæval theory was one of the so-called internal senses of the sensory soul. Avicenna’s influential taxonomy of five internal senses continued the late ancient approach in which Aristotle’s conception of the first sensory power was associated with new functions and divided into separate faculties. In Avicenna’s classification, common sense as an internal faculty contributed to perceiving by differentiating and synthesizing simultaneous perceptions by several senses.18 Latin writers considered   CQDA, d. 5, q. 4, n. 14; DA, l. 3, c. 4, n. 12.   Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 509 (ed. Vat. III, 301) 15   CQDA, d. 5, q. 4, n. 5, 7, 14; DA, l. 3, c. 4, n. 5, 6, 12. 16   CQDA, d. 5, q. 5, n. 15–16; DA, l. 3, c. 5, n. 9–11; cf. South, “Suárez and the Problem of External Perception”, 233–240. 17   Augustine, De Trinitate XI, c. 2, n. 3; Kilwardby, De spiritu fantastico 103. See also J. F. Silva and J. Toivanen, “The active nature of the soul in sense perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter Olivi”, Vivarium 48 (2010): 245–278. 18   See D. Black, “Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations”, Topoi 19 (2000): 59–75. 13 14

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these as the Aristotelian functions of the common sense, together with perceiving that one perceives.19 Whereas Avicenna distinguished between retaining the representations of common sense and acting upon these as the functions of two separate imaginational faculties, many later Aristotelians ascribed these activities to one faculty which was called imagination or fantasy.20 In this tradition, it was usually assumed that the intentional or spiritual species which first contribute to the actualization of external senses is transmitted to the internal sense of imagination and plays an analogous rôle with respect to the phantasms.21 Suárez did not find this a convincing theory and his criticism was based on similar metaphysical reasons to which he appealed in discussing sense-perceptions.22 Suárez thinks that non-complex internal sense acts are actualizations of the likenesses of sensory contents which are created in connexion with external sensations and then conserved by the internal sense. The presence of these species in the internal sense is called its first actuality, the second actuality being the actual attention to these contents. After having presented various reasons against the view that the first actuality of the internal sense could be caused by an external species, he asks whether it might derive from the sensory act itself. As one problem Suárez mentions that the internal sense is more perfect than the external senses, apparently because its acts do not require the simultaneous causal influence from corporeal objects.23 Although the relation of dependence usually goes downward in hierarchical contexts, one might think that since the second actuality of the lower the external sense is nobler than the first actuality of the internal sense, it could be causally responsible for this. Considering this possibility, Suárez explains how the causal influence might take place: “An external perception would produce in the internal sense a species as   See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 2.   Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 78, a. 4; the estimative and memorative faculties, two further Avicennian inner senses, are discussed in the same place. Aquinas argued that Avicenna’s estimative faculty as an instinctual power of grasping harmful or agreeable aspects of things basically belongs to animals other than humans, who understand the intentions by means of the cogitative power of the sensory soul. Some mediæval writers wanted to qualify the Avicennian classification by postulating only one or two faculties with various functions; for one inner sense, see, e.g., Anonymi Magistri Artium (c. 1245–1250) Lectura in Librum De anima, ed. R.-A. Gauthier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 24 (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1985), II, l. 26, q. 2, p. 441; for two powers (cognitive and retentive), see John Buridan, Quaestiones in De anima Aristotelis II, q. 23 (ed. Sobol 373–389). Suárez follows the tradition of one internal sense; see CQDA d. 8, q. 1; DA l. 3, c. 30. 21   See Aquinas, STh I, q. 78, a. 4. 22   For Suárez’s theory of the internal sense, see J. B. South, “Francisco Suárez on Imagination”, Vivarium 39 (2001): 119–158. 23   CQDA, d. 6, q. 2, n. 9–11; DA, l. 3, c. 9, n. 5–8. 19

20

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if imprinting there a perfect similitude of itself which the internal sense can very well conserve due to its natural disposition”.24 While it is taken for granted in this approach that the second actuality is not externally caused, is it meant that the first actuality of the internal sense could be externally caused? That this was not point is clear from how Suárez continues: When the soul perceives something by sight, a similitude of this is immediately repeated in imagination, not through a potency distinct from imagination but by the power of imagination, so that when there is an external sensation, a species naturally results in the internal sense, not because of the activity of perception but because of the activity of the soul itself through imagination.25

Even the first retaining act of imagination is a vital act and consequently cannot be externally caused.26 The production of the species in the internal sense is dependent on a sensory act, but this connexion is not that of efficient causality. It remains somewhat unclear why the possibility of the causal connexion between an external act of second actuality and an internal act of first actuality is discussed at all. Suárez seems to think that the external causation could be considered in this case, even though the causal mechanism remains problematic; however, he believes that it is reasonable to stick to the general explanatory model that “the vital powers which are rooted in the same soul” are sympathetically activated so that “one immediately operates when another operates”.27 5. HIGHER ACTS

The main topic of Ludwig’s book is Suárez’s view of the activity of the intellect and its relation to the acts of imagination, i.e., the traditional Aristotelian and Thomist doctrine of the conversio ad phantasmata as the core of concept formation and the condition of using concepts as signifying units. A well-known part of Suárez’s philosophy is his criticism of the theories of agent intellect, which postulate some communication between the strictly immaterial intellect and the lower faculties which function with extensional and corporeal organs, whether in the form of il  CQDA, d. 6, q. 2, n. 12; DA, l. 3, c. 9, n. 9.   CQDA, d. 6, q. 2, n. 13; cf. DA, l. 3, c. 9, n. 10. 26   CQDA, d. 6, q. 5, n. 8; DA, l. 3, c. 12, n. 7. 27   CQDA, d. 6, q. 2, n. 13; DA, l. 3, c. 9, n. 10. In his Disputationes metaphysicae Suárez returns to the traditional view that the species are transmitted from the eye to the inner sense through the optic nerve (DM 18, 8, 40). For the relation of the internal sense to the external senses, see also South, “Francisco Suárez on Imagination”, 138–143; M. Rozemond, “Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez’s Soul”, in The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez, ed. B. Hill and H. Lagerlund (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 159–161. 24

25

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lumination from up to down or some sort of causation from the side of phantasms.28 This was based on his metaphysical theory of the vital acts described above and the distinction between determination and efficient causation: The agent intellect never brings about an intelligible species unless it is determined by the cognition of the fantasy […]. This determination does not arise from any efficacy of the phantasm itself but only because it provides matter and a kind of example to the intellect, by reason of the union which it has in the same soul.29

Suárez thinks that whenever the intellect forms a simple intellection about intelligible things, the imagination is actual. The phantasm determines the content of intellection by providing an example of what is understood as a universal.30 The idea of an example naturally suggests itself in the Aristotelian tradition. Aquinas says that phantasms are “examples in which as it were one examines that which one desires to understand”. They show which kinds of things occur under the universal concept one has in mind.31 The determination between the agent intellect and the imagination is said to show how “the act of one power has a necessary connexion with the act of another”.32 The efficient causation is excluded by the principle that there cannot be any real influence between the faculties belonging to different ontological levels in the hierarchical order. The remarks on thinking and willing quoted above show that there is no efficient causation between the faculties of the same level either. Vital powers are immune to external causal influence.33 While the pleasure and distress of the will may be necessitated by the acts of cognitive powers, there is no such determination with respect to the free acts of the will.34 6. SYMPATHY AND CAUSATION

Following the traditional classification, Suárez distinguishes between the vegetative, sensory and intellective potencies of the soul. These main classes of vital powers are associated with various sub-divisions. Whereas the intellective faculties operate without an intrinsic connexion with bodily organs, the vegetative faculties guide the corporeal activities of living bodies; the activities of the external and internal sense 28   Ludwig, Das akausale Zusammenwirken, 35–61; L. Spruit, Species intelligibilis: From Prception to Knowledge, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 294–307. 29   CQDA, d. 9, q. 2, n. 11–12; DA, l. 3, c. 2, n. 11–12. See also South, “Francisco Suárez on Imagination”, 146–147. 30   CQDA, d. 9, q. 2, n. 13; DA, IV.2.13. 31   Aquinas, STh I, q. 84, a. 7. 32   CQDA, d. 9, q. 2, n. 13; DA, IV.2.13. For a necessary connection between mental acts, see also note 4 above. 33   Ludwig, Das akausale Zusammenwirken, 27. 34   DM 19, 6, 7.

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faculties need bodily organs, but their acts are subtler than those of the vegetative faculties.35 According to Suárez, there is a real distinction between the faculties of the soul as well between the soul and the faculties.36 The faculties are not wholly autonomous factors which would be dependent on the soul only for their existence; as for the cognitive faculties, the soul itself is actively involved in their acts through attention. Discussing the sensory acts Suárez writes: These vital acts arise in such an intimate manner that they seem to proceed from the very first principle of life, which is the soul. Therefore it happens that when the eye receives a species from a picture which is present to it, the picture is not seen if the soul does not attend.37

The attention which is mentioned here was a central theme in Augustinian and other active sense theories; it was regarded as noticing changes in corporeal organs, a necessary precondition of perception, and grasping perceptual content.38 Suárez argues in the same direction that a sensory act does not take place if the soul does not pay attention to the relevant sense-power, and its continued actuality is also dependent on the attention of the soul.39 Attention is not merely an aspect of senseperception, which is the lowest cognitive function; in fact it is part of all cognitive acts.40 Suárez sometimes describes attention as a consciously intended attitude, but it has a more common pre-reflexive rôle in the dynamics of the cognitive powers

  DA, l. 1, c. 7, n. 3–5.   CQDA, d. 3, q. 1, n. 4–7; DA, l. 2, c. 1, n. 4. 37   DM 18, 5, 2. This attention is said to be an example of the proximate influence of the soul through its substance. 38   See, e.g., Robert Kilwardby, De spiritu fantastico 112: “Two motions come together as if from opposite sides in sensing, for one proceeds from a sensible thing which actually causes an alteration and through the medium reaches the sense organ, coming to its innermost part where it is united with the sensory soul. The other proceeds from the sensory soul so as to meet the affect produced in the sense organ, and in the meeting of these motions, by the action of the sensory soul attending to its sense organ, there is formed in the sensory soul an image of a sensible thing by means of which this is sensed”; Nicole Oresme, De causis mirabilium, ed. and transl. B. Hansen, in Nicole Oresme and the Marvels of Nature (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1985), c. 3, p. 174, lin. 109–114: “No sensation occurs by an external sense alone; rather it is always more fundamentally the soul or its internal faculty. And so, neither colour nor sound nor local motion nor heat nor any other sensible is perceived unless the internal faculty actually attends and considers. Consequently, in a trance, or when the mind or internal faculty is ill, you see that neither heat nor etc. [is perceived] […]. I repeat this idea often because it is the basis of all.” 39   See, e.g., CQDA, d. 5, q. 3, n. 1, ibid. n. 4–5; CQDA, d. 5, q. 4, n. 5; CQDA, d. 6, q. 6, n. 10; DA, l. 3, c. 3, n. 1 and 4; ibid., c. 4, n. 5; ibid. c. 13, n. 7. 40   CQDA, d. 6, q. 4, n. 7; DA, l. 3, c. 11, n. 5. 35

36

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of the soul.41 While his approach was influenced by Augustinian and related traditional ideas, Suárez stressed, following the thesis of the distinction between the soul and its powers, that vital attention is not the same as a cognitive act, but one of its constituents.42 In the above passage in which Suárez argues for his view that the soul is attentive in cognitive acts, he discusses a counter-argument according to which perception takes place in the faculties through the neural spirits and the absence of the proper concurrence of these spirits would constitute the reason for not perceiving something which influences the organ. You may say that the reason for the lack of the co-operation is not that it does not co-operate through its substance but that it does not co-operate through the animal spirits which are necessary for sensation and motion. However, even if it is true that these spirits are necessary, this fact only confirms the argument and experience, since these vital acts require not merely the proximate faculty but also the concursus of the spirits. These do not gather there by an accident but in virtue of a faculty which guides the spirits to this act. Therefore it is necessary that there is a common principle which uses these two faculties and through a natural inclination or sympathy ordinates the act of one to the act of another.43 The two faculties which should co-operate seem to be the faculty of moving the animal spirits and the faculty of sight. Whereas Suárez and his critic agreed that the mere presence of the sensible species in the eye was not sufficient to the actualization of sight, the critic’s point was that the concurrence of the spirits was a sufficient further requirement. But it could then be asked why such a concurrence took place? Suárez believes that the faculty of moving the spirits is not actualized by the sensible species in the eye. He does not specify the order of the acts in his example, but perhaps he thought that the act associated with the spirits follows the act of attention directed to the faculty of sight; the attention and the presence of the species lead to the full act of perception, provided that the spirits have reacted in a proper way.44 Instead of explaining the details, he maintains that these acts arise in the vital faculties which as instruments of a common principle are co-ordinated and may react to the acts of each other. The activity of the substance through various faculties unites them in a centre, which helps to understand the co-ordination between the acts: 41   See Ludwig, Das akausale Zusammenwirken, 32; S. Castellote Cubells, Die Anthropologie des Suárez. Beiträge zur spanischen Anthrolopogie des XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderts (Freiburg–München: Karl Alber, 1962), 123–125; C. Leijenhorst, “Suárez on Self-Awareness”, in The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez, ed. B. Hill and H. Lagerlund (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 142–144. 42   CQDA, d. 5, q. 3, n. 4; DA, l. 3, c. 3, n. 4. 43   DM 18, 5, 2. 44   Suárez suggests elsewhere that the movement of the spirits from the brain is associated with the attention of the soul through the imagination; CQDA, d. 6, q. 6, n. 10; DA, l. 3, c. 13, n. 7.

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[…] for when the intellect knows, the will is activated to love, etc. The reason for this is that one and the same soul is active through both faculties, since a merely habitual rootedness or mediate emanation of these from the same soul would not be sufficient for this actual causality or motion and activation, each operation proceeding from its potency alone without a connexion in a common principle.45

The union of the vital faculties is a central idea which Suárez puts forward in various formulations. The operations of the vital powers associated with the liver, heart, and brain are not independent of each other, this concord deriving from the unifying soul. There are similar links between the sensory operations, as is evident, for example, from the fact that they sometimes hinder each other. These facts from experience greatly add to the probability [of the thesis that the soul of higher animals is non-extensive and indivisible] since the identity of a principle cannot be better concluded from anything else than from the concord and harmony between its potencies.46

The same point is repeated with respect to the co-ordination (co-ordinatio), harmony (harmonia, consonantia), concord (consensus, consensio) or sympathy (sympathia) of the acts of external and internal senses, the imagination and the intellect, and the cognitive and motive powers.47 Suárez invokes this terminology to explain the connexions between vital acts which are seemingly caused by efficient causality. The faculties form a centralized network in which the actualization of one part is joined by the actuality of other parts without an external efficient causation.48 The notion of sympathy and related terms, partly derived from Neoplatonic sources, were not unusual in Renaissance natural philosophy. However, it has been argued that Suárez’s employment of this terminology in eliminating efficient causality was an original innovation.49 As for the rôle of unifying attention in this context, one of the background ideas was the position described in Pseudo-Philoponus’ commentary on De anima: For in their view the rational soul does not have only the powers of intellect, thought, opinion, will, and choice, but they add a faculty of the rational soul which they call “attentive” […]. This attentive part of the rational soul goes through all rational, non-rational and vegetative or natural faculties, and if it goes through all,   DM 18, 5, 3.   CQDA, d. 2, q. 7, n. 11; DA, l. 1, c. 13, n. 11. 47   CQDA, d. 6, q. 2, n. 10; 9.2.12; DA, l. 3, c. 9, n. 7; DA l. 4, c. 2, n. 12; DM 23, 1, 11, DM 23, 4, 4, DM 23, 5, 14, DM 23, 7, 2. 48   Ludwig, Das akausale Zusammenwirken, 23–34. 49   Ludwig, Das akausale Zusammenwirken, 86: “eine geniale Leistung philosophischen Denkens, eine Theorie von einzigartiger Originalität”. 45

46

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it goes through the senses and says: “I saw” or “I heard” […]. For there ought to be one thing which apprehends all since the human being is one. 50

Suárez refers to this passage when discussing the awareness about cognitive acts.51 The attentive part (τὸ πϱοσεκτικόν) attends to everything that takes place in the soul and functions as the unifying centre of its activities. In human beings this awareness partially overlaps to self-awareness, but it extends to irrational movements as well. Suárez employs a similar view of the central control which extends to conscious and non-conscious phenomena, but he does not call it attention. Since the activities of living organisms are largely involuntary, their being teleologically guided by by a common principle means that the faculties and the dispositional sympathetic connexions are rooted in the soul as a structuring substantial form.52 The natural harmony and concord of the faculties belong to the determinants of the functioning of the soul as an active principle: The interior and exterior senses are rooted in the same soul, and thus it is the same soul which sees by sight and imagines by imagination. There is consequently such a natural concord among these powers that when the soul perceives something by sight, a similitude of this is immediately repeated in imagination […] there are many other similar concords between vital powers which are rooted in the same soul, for when one operates, the other immediately operates. 53

Suárez’s considerations open up the possibility for speculative metaphysical psychology for finding law-like invariances between the acts of the soul. The absence of external efficient causation in this context does not mean that the connexions should be non-causal simpliciter; according to Suárez, one activation can be called the partial cause of another.54 A partial cause is not sufficient, to be sure, but it is an identifiable cause, and if one does not require that there should be some sort of influx from the cause to the effect, a partial cause fulfils the requirements of the Humean cause as an event-type precedent and contiguous to another in a regular 50   Ioannis Alexandrei Philosophi in tres libros De anima Aristotelis breves annotationes (Venice, 1547), 76va–b. In the same place he also mentions Simplicius’ commentary. He probably means the somewhat different discussion in Commentaria Simplicii in tres libros De anima Aristotelis (Venice, 1564), 50ra. 51   CQDA, d. 6, q. 4, n. 6; DA, l. 3, c. 11, n. 4. 52   Cf. CQDA, d. 3, q. 2, n. 8; DA, l. 2, c. 2, n. 9. The details of the attention and substantial influence of the soul remain sketchy in Suárez; see the discussions in Ludwig, Das akausale Zusammenwirken, 40–61, Castellote Cubells, Die Anthropologie des Suárez, 104–107, and South, “Francisco Suárez on Imagination”, 143–156; Rozemond , “Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez’s Soul”, 157-164. 53   CQDA, d. 6, q. 2, n. 13; DA, l. 3, c. 9, n. 10. 54   For the Scotist conception of partial cause in Suárez, see CQDA, d. 5, q. 4, n. 7, 14; DA, l. 3, c. 4, n. 6, 12.

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succession of events. According to Suárez, there is an order of precedence between sympathetic vital acts, which are psychologically contiguous in so far as they involve the substantial influence of the soul. The connexion between the acts of fantasy and appetite is explained as follows: We can more easily avoid these problems by denying the active concurrence of cognition to the act of appetite, maintaining that through representing an object it merely provides a condition, after which the appetite produces its act through the natural sympathy between these powers, to which these powers’ being rooted in the same soul fits very well. The soul or the subject through the soul is that which principally operates and uses these faculties and thus, when it perceives an object agreeable to it by one faculty, it strives for it by the other, not through effecting on one by another but because when it perceives the object through one faculty, it is excited to operate through the other. This excitement does not result from a real and effective immutation, but from a metaphorical or fi nal one, thus not requiring a local propinquity but merely that of life (animalis), so to say.55

As far as the sympathetic reactions of the soul are necessary sequences with respect to the various presuppositional requirements, they could be called causal, the qualification of the absence of an external efficient mover being part of Suárez’s background metaphysics.56

BIBLIOGRAPHY SOURCES [Anonymus]. Anonymi Magistri Artium (c. 1245–1250) Lectura in Librum De anima. Edited by R.-A. Gauthier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 24, Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1985. Aquinas, Thomas. Quaestiones disputatae II. Edited by P. Bazzi et al. Turin: Marietti, 1965. — Sententia libri De anima. Edited by R.-A. Gauthier. In Sancti Thomae de Aquino doctoris angelici Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, 45.1. Rome: Commissio Leonina – Paris: Vrin, 1984. — Summa theologiae. Edited by P. Caramello. Turin: Marietti, 1948–1950. Augustinus. De Trinitate. Edited by W. J. Mountain. Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 50–50A. Turnhout: Brepols, 1968.   DM 18, 8, 40.   Some parts of this chapter are included in S. Knuuttila, “Suárez’s Psychology” , forthcoming in V. Salas and R. Fastiggi (eds.), A companion to Francisco Suárez ( Leiden: Brill), and “Sixteenth-Century Discussions of the Passions of the Will”, in Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and early Modern Philosophy, ed. M. Pickavé and L. Shapiro, 116-132 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 55

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Buridan, John. Quaestiones in tres libros De anima. Edited by P. G. Sobol. In John Buridan on the Soul and Sensation. An Edition of Book II of His Commentary on Aristotle’s Book De anima (Third Redaction), with and Introduction and a Translation of Question 18 on Sensible Species. Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1989. Cajetan, Thomas de Vio. Commentary on Summa theologiae II-I. In Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia iussu Leonis XII P.M. edita cum commentariis Thomae de Vio Caietani, vol. VI. Commissio Leonina: Rome, 1891. Duns Scotus, John. Opera Omnia. Edited by C. Balić et al. Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950–. [= ed. Vat.] — Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis. Edited by R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn et al. B. Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Philosophica III–IV. St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1997. — Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima. Edited by C. Bazán et al. B. Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Philosophica V. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press – St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure University, 2006. Kilwardby, Robert. De spiritu fantastico. Edited by P. O. Lewry. In Robert Kilwardby, O.P., On Time and Imagination, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 9.1, Oxford: The British Academy and Oxford University Press, 1987. Mair, John. In primum Sententiarum. Paris, 1510. Olivi, Peter John. Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum. 3 vols. Edited by B. Jansen. Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1922–1926. Oresme, Nicole. De causis mirabilium. Edited and transl. by B. Hansen. In Nicole Oresme and the Marvels of Nature, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1985. Philoponus, Ioannes. Ioannis Alexandrei Philosophi in tres libros De anima Aristotelis breves annotationes. Venice, 1554.  Simplicius. Commentaria Simplicii in tres libros De anima Aristotelis. Venice, 1564. Suárez, Francisco. De voluntario et involuntario. In Opera omnia IV. Paris: Vivès, 1856. — Disputationes Metaphysicae. In Opera omnia XXV. Paris: Vivès, 1866. Reprint, Hildesheim: Olms, 1965. — Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima. Edited by S. Castellote. Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1978–1991. [= CQDA] — De anima. In Opera omnia III. Paris: Vivès, 1856. [= DA]

SECONDARY LITERATURE Aho, T. “Suárez on Cognitive Intentions”. In Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, edited by P. Bakker and J. Thijssen, 179–203. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. Black, D. “Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations”. Topoi 19 (2000): 59–75.

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Castellote Cubells, S. Die Anthropologie des Suárez. Beiträge zur spanischen Anthrolopogie des XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderts. Freiburg–München: Karl Alber, 1962. Des Chene, D. Life’s Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univrsity Press, 2000. Knuuttila, S. “Aristotle’s Theory of Perception and Medieval Aristotelianism”. In Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, edited by S. Knuuttila and P. Kärkkäinen, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 1–22. Dordrecht: Springer, 2008. — Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. — “Sixteenth-Century Discussions of the Passions of the Will”. In Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and early Modern Philosophy, edited by M. Pickavé and L. Shapiro, 116–132. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. — “Suárez’s Psychology”. In A Companion to Francisco Suárez, edited by V. Salas and R. Fastiggi. Leiden: Brill, forthcoming. Leijenhorst, C. “Cajetan and Suárez on Agent Sense: Metaphysics and Epistemology in Late Aristotelian Thought”. In Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment, edited by H. Lagerlund, 237–262. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007. — “Suárez on Self-Awareness”. In The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez, edited by B. Hill and H. Lagerlund, 137-153. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Ludwig, J. Das akausale Zusammenwirken (sympathia) der Seelenvermögen in der Erkenntnislehre des Suárez. Munich: Karl Ludwig, 1929. Pattin, A. Pour l’histoire du sens agent. Le controverse entre Barthélemy de Bruges et Jean Jandun. Ses antécédents et son évolution. Leuven: Peeters, 1988. Rozemond, M. “Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez’s Soul”. In The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez, edited by B. Hill and H. Lagerlund, 152–172. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Silva, J. F. “Robert Kilwardby on Sense Perception”. In Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, edited by S. Knuuttila and P. Kärkkäinen, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 97–99. Dordrecht: Springer, 2008. Silva, J. F. and J. Toivanen. “The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter Olivi”, Vivarium 48 (2010), 245–278. South, J. B., “Francisco Suárez on Imagination”. Vivarium 39 (2001): 119–158. — “Suárez and the Problem of External Perception”. Medieval Philosophy and Theology 10 (2001): 217–240. Spruit, L. “Renaissance Views of Active Perception”. In Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, edited by S. Knuuttila and P. Kärkkäinen, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 203–224. Dordrecht: Springer, 2008. — Species intelligibilis: From Prception to Knowledge. 2 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1995.

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SCOTUS AND SUÁREZ ON SYMPATHY: THE NECESSITY OF THE “CONNEXIO POTENTIARUM” IN THE PRESENT STATE Anna Tropia

ABSTRACT

I investigate the concept of “sympathy”, “colligantia virtutum” or “connexio potentiarum” as it is used by Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) in his De anima (1572). This concept, employed by the Spanish philosopher to distinguish the operation of the human intellect from the sensitive faculties, originates in a Franciscan context; I show in particular that Suárez’s source is John Duns Scotus. Both philosophers use this concept in the same way, namely, to describe the human intellect’s functioning in the present state (pro statu isto). By comparing these texts with the additional support of texts by the Italian Franciscans Mastri and Belluto, I retrace the lines of the dialogue between Suárez and Scotus showing the Scotist roots of Suárez’s commentary.

SECTION 1 In his early De anima (1572), Suárez seldom refers to Scotus.1 In the chapter devoted to the intelligible species, the philosopher does not present his theory as indebted to the doctor Subtilis. Nor does he even mention Scotus within the discussion of his predecessors’ positions. Nonetheless, it is possible to trace the path of a “dialogue” in which Suárez enters with Scotus simply by following the index of the treatise. In the first question, which treats of the proper object of the intellect (CQDA, d. 9, q. 1), Suárez starts off with the Scotist division between the intellect’s capacity pro statu isto and the intellect’s capacity secundum se. He then moves on to analyse how (quomodo) the intellect and the phantasm cooperate in producing the intelligible species (CQDA, d. 9, q. 2): just as Scotus does, Suárez emphasises that the intellect is superior to the phantasm, and thereby chooses a similar solution to account for the derivation of 1   The quotations from John Duns Scotus are made from the Wadding edition. The citation of volume and page will be given in parentheses, like this: (ed. Wadding X, 200). For Suárez’s De anima, I follow Salvador Castellote’s edition, abbreviated CQDA and followed by the number of the disputation, of the number of paragraph and of the lines quoted. The volume and page of the Castellote edition is given in parentheses, like this: CQDA, d. 8, q. 2, n. 5, lin. 586–587 (ed. Cast. III, 50).

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the species. In the third question of the same chapter, the philosopher claims that the intellect knows the singulars “specie propria”, a thesis that every Scotist of his age would have subscribed to.2 If the philosopher does not profess his “Scotism” himself, his posterity will: the commentators of the Wadding edition (1639), Mastri and Belluto (1643), Poinsot (1644), and, later, Luis de Lossada (1735) acknowledged the presence of Scotist elements within Suárez’s theory of knowledge. Here we shall focus on the concept of sympathy as used by Suárez and on the influence of Duns Scotus on his intelligible species theory. The mechanism of sympathy – which Suárez adopts as his own solution to derive the species – originates from the Scotist use of the “colligantia virtutum”: the common root of the soul’s powers explains, according to both philosophers, the functioning of human cognitive acts. SECTION 2

In his Cursus philosophicus thomisticus (1644), Poinsot attributes to Scotus the mechanism of sympathy, that he describes in these words: [Q]uando duae potentiae in eadem anima existentes, ita se habent, quod una subordinatur alteri, et movetur ab illa, non requiritur aliqua motio physica, et realis 2   See for example Mastri and Belluto, who counted Suárez among those choosing the Scotist theory of direct intellection of singulars: Bartholomaei Mastri de Meldola et Bonaventurae Belluti tomus tertius…continens disputationes ad mentem Scoti in Aristotelis Stagiritae libros de Anima (Venetiis, apud Nicolaum Pezzana, 1678), disp. 6, q. 7, p. 213: “Quantum vero ad cognitionem abstractivam ingens est controversia inter Thomistas, et Scotistas, illi namque docent obiectum nostri intellectus inter res materiales esse universalia a singularibus abstracta, ipsa vero singularia cognosci per sensum internum ab intellectu vero non nisi indirecte, ac per quandam reflexionem attingi, ita significavit D. Thom. p. p. q. 86, a. I […] quem omnes Thomistae sequuntur […] oppositum docet Scot. pluribus in locis, scilicet in lib.de Anim. q. 22. 7, Met. q. 15, et in 2 d. 3 q. 11 et d. 9 q. 2 et 4 d. 45 q. 3 et quol. 13 a. 2 ac alibi frequenter, et cum eo Scotistae omnes […] ac ceteri omnes recentiores […] Suárez lib. 4 de Anim. cap. 3, Tolet. 3.de anim. q. 13, Ruvius Ibid. trac. de intellectu possib., Aversa q. 58 sec. 4, Pereir. lib. 3 cap. 17, Onuph. trac. 2 disp. q. 2. dub. p. qui alios citant, quae etiam est communis opinio apud Nominal. Greg. p. p. d. 3. q. 1. a. 2, Ocham q. 5. Burl. […] Et hi omnes consequenter sustinent dari in intellectu nostro species directe, et per se singularia materialia reprasentantes […].” In the Wadding edition (1639), Antonius Hiquaeus, Cavellus and Wadding himself refer in many occasions to Suárez’s tendency towards Scotism for what concerns singulars: see ed. Wadding X (= In IV Sententiarum), 209; II (= in De anima), 573, Ibid., 656–657. It is actually with a certain satisfaction that Wadding announces that Scotus’ direct intellection of the singulars was the most common opinion of schools in his day: see ed. Wadding III (= De rerum principio), 114: “Relata, et clarius explicata opinione Sancti Thomae, quam Aegidius, Aureolus, Capreolus, et alii sequuntur, suam statuit Scotus, quae etiam est Richardi, Durandi, Gregorii, aliorumque veterum Theologorum, necnon recentiorum Fonseca, Suárez, Conimbricensium, et quae communior est in scholis, nimirum intellectum coniunctum, et pro statu ipso non solum per reflexionem, et per conversionem ad phantasmata, sed directe, et immediate cognoscere singularia actualiter existentia.”

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impressa a potentia movente in mota, sed sufficere radicationem, et coniunctionem in eadem anima, ratione cuius per naturalem sympathiam, una potentia operante, aut appetente, alia ei subordinata operatur et exequitur. Hanc sententiam, aut tenent, aut probabilem etiam ex Thomistis, Conimbricenses 7 Physic. cap. 2, q. 1, a. 7. Idque dicunt esse multorum Philosophorum huius temporis.3

From this brief sketch it is possible to derive essential information. The first piece concerns sympathy in itself: what is called sympathy is nothing else but the simultaneous action of two separated powers that are, nonetheless, rooted in the same soul. Another important detail concerns the origin of this theory: Poinsot punctually acknowledges that even (etiam) among the Thomists of his age, sympathy was retained as a probable solution (sententia probabilis). The “etiam” refers to the fact that the concept of sympathy had extended from a Franciscan context, and that only recent Thomists started to make use of it in their own accounts.4 It is to Scotus, in fact, that Poinsot attributes the concept of sympathy: Fuit autem haec sententia olim Scoti in 2. [libro Sententiarum] dist. 42. quaest. uni. concl. 3. Imo influxum Dei in causas secundas vult Scotus esse per sympathiam, non per qualitatem impressam, sed ex mera subordinatione causae secundae ad ipsum.5

Here Poinsot refers to the relation between the will and the other powers of the soul, and not to the usage of sympathy within the abstractive process; nonetheless, he attributes to Scotus and to his school the mechanism of sympathy. To sketch the history of sympathy would lead us too far astray: but Poinsot is indeed right in pointing to the Franciscan origin of the concept. In the thirteenth century William of Mare, Bonaventure and many others started to count the relation   João Poinsot (John of Saint Thomas), Cursus philosophicus thomisticus (Lugduni: sumptibus Philippi Borde, Laurenti Arnaud, Petri Borde, et Guillielmi Barbier, 1663), Philosophia naturalis, pars 3, q. 12, a. 6, p. 973. 4   Like Capreolus (Jean de la Capréole) or Franciscus Silvestri, both mentioned by Suárez. See CQDA, d. 9, q. 2, n. 8, lin. 435–443 (ed. Cast. III, p. 90): “Praeterea, inter phantasma et intellectum agentem non potest fingi alia unio, nisi quod radicantur in eadem anima et eodem supposito tamquam instrumenta illius. Quod quidem Capreolus et Ferrariensis, supra, coacti concedunt, nam illud quod dicitur uniri intellectum agentem phantasmati per assistentiam et contactum virtualem verba tantum sunt, et iure nullam aliam unionem concipit intellectus praeter dictam.” But the list of the Jesuits adopting the system of sympathy is longer and includes Toletus, Fonseca, or the Conimbricenses. On the fortune of sympathy in the sixteenth century, see Josef Ludwig, Das akausale Zusammenwirken (sympathia) der Seelenvermögen in der Erkenntnislehre des Suárez (München: Karl Ludwig-Verlag, 1929), 69–71. On the Jesuits’ “method of inclusion” of non-orthodox Thomist theories, see A. Simmons: “Jesuit Aristotelian Education: the De anima Commentaries”, in The Jesuits. Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts. 1540–1773, ed. J. W. O’Malley (Toronto–Buffalo–London: University of Toronto Press, 1999), vol 1: 522–537. 5   Poinsot, Cursus philosophicus thomisticus, Philosophia naturalis, pars 3, q. 12, a. 6, p. 973. 3

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among the powers of the soul –and among the body and the soul itself– by invoking the natural relation (colligantia naturalis) between them. In the famous Correctorium “Quare”, William of Mare describes the junction of soul and body through their natural connexion: the body is able to affect the soul (and vice versa) because they are linked and they are parts of the same whole. The theory of the soul as forma substantialis seemed somehow insufficient to those who, like William of Mare, strongly emphasized that the soul, in virtue of its nobler nature, is united to the body “ut perfectio perfectibili”.6 According to Bonaventure for example, sympathy is actually needed to account for the interaction between the spiritual soul and the material body, namely to account for the action of the body on the soul.7 The same scheme can also be transposed to the general functioning of the soul’s faculties: it is in this sense that Matthew of Aquasparta, Roger Marston and Peter John Olivi refer to the colligantia virtutum.8 Generally speaking, sympathy enables to account for the junction between powers that are not of the same kind: the soul is indeed superior to the body, as the intellect 6   The Thesaurus Linguae Latinae gives some examples of the usage of the term “colligantia” (together with “colligare” and “colligatio”) which often illustrate (already in ancient Christian sources) the connexion among the parts of an whole. Cf. P. Glorieux, Les premières polémiques thomistes. Le “Correctorium corruptorii ‘Quare’” de Guillaume de la Mare (Paris: Bibliothèque thomiste, 1927), a. 31, p. 133–134: “Ad quartum, scilicet quod actio unius potentiae intensa non impediret aliam nisi essent fundatae in una essentia, dico quod non oportet, sed potius quod illae tres essentiae naturalem et essentialem habent colligantiam. Ideo potentiae illis correspondentes impedire sese possunt in actionibus suis. Exemplum huius est in corpore et anima: anima enim impeditur in actionibus suis a passionibus corporis, et corpus compatitur animae et sequitur animam in suis actionibus. Quod quidem convenit non propter fundationem in eadem essentia, sed propter unionem ad invicem ut perfectio et perfectibile; et sic de anima vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva in homine. Aliud exemplum etiam est hoc: si lignum grave ad leve ligatur, videbis quod grave, cuius est motus deorsum, impedit operationem levis sursum. Multo magis autem hoc fieret, si unum esset alteri naturaliter colligatum,[...]” 7   See Bonaventure, In II Sent. dist. 31, a. 2, q. 2 co.: “Naturalis autem colligantia non est nisi per appetitum ipsius animae ad corpus, per quem anima adeo alligatur carni, ut […], nisi virtutem habeat, per quam carnem regat, necesse habet deorsum ferri cum carne et per hoc captivari in servitute peccati.” Cf. J.-P. Muller, “Colligantia naturalis. La psychophysique humaine d’après saint Bonaventure et son école”, in: L’homme et son destin d’après les penseurs du Moyen Age (Paris–Louvain: éditions Nauwelaerts, 1960), 495–503. 8   See Matthew Aquasparta: Quaestiones de fide et de cognitione, q. 10; Roger Marston, Quaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 8–9; Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones in Secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 50. Cf. Bernard Jansen, Die Erkenntnislehre Olivis (Berlin: 1921); B. Perez Argos, “La actividad cognoscitiva en los escolasticos del primer periodo post-tomista”, Pensamiento 14 (1948): 167–202; F. Prezioso, “L’attività del soggetto pensante nella gnoseologia di Matteo d’Acquasparta e di Ruggiero Marston”, Antonianum 25 (1950): 259–326; H. M. Beha, “Matthew of Aquasparta’s theory of cognition”, Franciscan Studies 20 (1960): 164–204, ibid. 21 (1961): 1–79, ibid. 383–465; S. P. Marrone, “Matthew of Aquasparta, Henry of Ghent and Augustinian Epistemology after Bonaventure”, Franziskanische Studien 65 (1983): 252–290.

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is superior to the other “essences” of the soul (the vegetative and the sensitive soul). Thus, the only manner to guarantee the communication between the soul’s powers is the natural and essential relation between them. In his theory of knowledge, Duns Scotus reserves an important rôle for what he calls the “connexio potentiarum”. Far from admitting a plurality of forms in the soul, as the aforementioned Franciscan philosophers, Scotus re-adapts the colligantia virtutum only to the context of human cognition. According to the philosopher, every cognitive act stems from the concomitant actions of intellect and fantasy. This simultaneity (concomitantia) arises from the sympathy, or “concordia” among the soul’s powers. In the wake of his predecessors, Scotus uses sympathy to explain the interaction of a superior power (the intellect) with an inferior one (the phantasm); in the present life, the intellect actually has to rely on phantasms. In a famous passage of the Ordinatio Scotus hypothesises that this state of things probably arises from original sin: Si quaeritur quae est ratio istius status: Respondeo, status non videtur esse nisi stabilis permanentia legibus divinae sapientiae firmata. Stabilitum est autem illis legibus sapientiae, quod intellectus noster non intelligat pro statu isto, nisi illa, quorum species relucent in phantasmate, et hoc sive propter poenam originalis peccati, sive propter naturalem concordiam potentiarum animae in operando, secundum quod videmus quod potentia superior operatur circa idem, circa quod inferior, si utraque habeat operationem perfectam et de facto ita est in nobis, quod quodcunque universale intelligimus, eius singulare in actu phantasiamur.9

Scotus does not decide whether original sin or the natural order of the soul’s powers itself determined the present state’s conditions. The “concordia potentiarum” is mentioned here as something actual, which describes the way the human intellect acquires cognition.10 The harmony among the faculties establishes a necessary relation between them: for every sensible species produced by the fantasy, the intellect 9   Duns Scotus: Ord. I, dist. 3, q. 1, n. 24 (ed. Wadding V-1, 466). The original sin is also prospected as the cause of the necessary connexio potentiarum in Bonaventure’s account. The normal state of the intellect is not one of dependence on the inferior faculties, but as the soul is united to the body, the relation between them is orchestrated by their naturalis colligantia. In Bonaventure it is quite clear that this state of things has been determined by the original sin and is not natural: see Bonaventure: in II Sent. dist. 31, a. 2, q. 2, co., and in II Sent. dist. 18, a. 2, q. 1, ad 6. 10   Probably inspired by the Prologue of the Ordinatio, Mastri and Belluto call this the “philosophical reason” that Scotus provides to explain the intellect’s dependence on phantasms in the present state: see Mastri–Belluto, In Aristotelis Stagiritae libros de Anima, disp. 6, q. 1, n. 12, p. 167–168: “Assignat Doctor duplicem causam, unam pro Theologis, unam pro Philosophis, prima est originalis culpa, in cuius poenam datus est nobis hic infimus, et adeo modo intelligendi phantasmati alligatus […]. Altera causa pro Philosophis est naturalis ordo istarum potentiarum, adeo enim connexae sunt intellectus, et phantasia pro statu isto in operationibus, ut superior operari nequeat absque famulatu inferioris; […] .”

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produces an intelligible species. There is therefore a one-to-one relation between the sensitive faculty’s operation (which produces a phantasm of the sensible object) and the intellect’s (which produces an intelligible species of the object displayed in the phantasm); both operations take place at the same time. Moreover, the simultaneity of the powers’ operations redefines the meaning of the so-called “conversio ad phantasmata”: according to Scotus the intellect cannot think if it is not accompanied by phantasms. Dico quod talis est connexio istarum potentiarum phantasiae et intellectus, pro statu isto, quod nihil intelligimus in universali nisi cujus singulare phantasiamur, nec est alia conversio ad phantasmata nisi quod intelligens universale imaginatur eius singulare: nec intellectus videt “quod quid est” in phantasmatibus sicut in ratione videndi, sed intelligens “quod quid est” relucens in specie intelligibili, ut relucens in specie intelligibili, videt in suo singulari, viso per virtutem phantasticam in phantasmate.11

The operation defined here by Scotus is quite different from the one conceived by Aquinas. By “conversio”, Aquinas had in mind the second turn of the intellect towards phantasms. In his account, the intellect first abstracts the universals from the phantasms; to recuperate a (partial) cognition of the singulars, the intellect has to turn back towards them.12 According to Aquinas, the intellect does not achieve, in fact, the cognition of the singulars: as they are material, they cannot be known directly by the (immaterial) intellect. Scotus’ conversio wholly relies on the cooperation of the soul’s powers: when the fantasy produces a singular phantasm of an external object, at the same time the intellect produces an intelligible, universal species. In addition, Scotus does not exclude that singulars are intelligible: it was actually a common statement   Duns Scotus, Ord. I dist. 3 q. 6 n. 19 (ed. Wadding V-1, 538).   For the turn towards phantasms, see Thomas Aquinas: STh I, q. 84, a. 7; q. 85 a. 1. On the cognition of singulars, cf. STh I, q. 86, a. 1, co: “[S]ingulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia principium singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia individualis: intellectum autem noster intelligit abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem ab huiusmodi materia. Unde intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium. Indirecte autem, et quasi per quondam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare: quia etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit […] sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit, indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc modo format hanc propositionem, Socrates est homo.” See also Thomas Aquinas: Summa contra gentes II, c. 64; De veritate, q. 2, a. 5–6; In Sent. II, dist. 3, q. 3, a. 3, ad 1. On the “conversio ad phantasmata”, see Camille Bérubé, La connaissance de l’individuel au Moyen Age (Paris-Montréal: Presses universitaires de France, 1964), 42–64; see also Germaine Cromp, Le phantasme dans l’abstraction de l’intellect agent dans la Somme de théologie de Thomas d’Aquin (Montréal: Institut d’Etudes Médiévales, 1980); Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on human nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 284–295 (this volume in particular presents an extended bibliography on the topic). 11

12

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in the Franciscan school that the intellect knows directly – and primo – the singulars, and not only the universals.13 The primacy of singulars furnished Scotus with the occasion to confute Aquinas’ account of cognition. In his De anima, Scotus examines the passage of the turn towards phantasms: his criticism towards Aquinas concerns, in particular, the fact that the philosopher does not understand how the intellect can abstract from phantasms, which are singular, if singulars are out of the intellect’s range.14 According to Scotus, Aquinas’ abstractive process is inconsistent and “ex ignoto”. As Lychetus observed, the cognitive process described by Scotus simply follows another order: the cognition of the singulars takes place together with (in eodem instanti) the one of the universals.15 Paradoxically, another function of the connexio potentiarum is the one of separating their acts within the cognitive process. Following his Franciscans predecessors, Scotus employs sympathy to separate the intellect from the phantasms. The philosopher is very emphatic on this score: the intellect has a nobler nature than the other faculties and it is generally independent from the sensitive powers. That is why Scotus claims that “it does not fit the proper nature of the intellect to rely on the harmony (of the soul’s powers)”.16 Therefore, the “connexio potentiarum” is merely something contingent, as the union of the soul with the body: the need for phantasms is only   See Camille Bérubé, La connaissance de l’individuel, 69–91.   See Duns Scotus, In De anima, q. 22, a. 1 (ed. Wadding II, 574): “Ad istam quaestionem dicunt quidam, scilicet Thomas, et Themistius, quod intellectus noster pro statu viae, non potest cognoscere singulare […] Praeterea, contra modum abstrahendi, quem ipsi ponunt, arguitur sic: abstractio universalis a singulari, fit ab intellectu possibili, non autem ab agente, cuius est abstrahere speciem, a phantasmate tantum; sed impossibile est abstrahere universalia a singulari, non cognito singulari, aliter enim abstraheret ignorando a quo abstraheret. Praeterea, secundum ipsos intellectus noster non potest intelligere, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata; sed sic se convertendo, intelligit singulare; non ergo tantum per reflexionem.” 15   See Franciscus Lychetus in ed. Wadding V-1, 540: “Haec responsio debet sic intelligi, quod talis est ordo inter intellectum, et virtutem phantasticam, quod numquam intellectus primo cognoscit universale, nisi virtus phantastica prius phantasiata singulare illius universalis repraesentatum per phantasma illius singulari: semper enim quando intellectus intelligit universale, vel in eodem instanti virtus phantastica speculatur singulare, vel ante speculata fuit.” See also Mastri–Belluto: In Aristotelis Stagiritae libros de Anima, disp. 4, q. 7, a. 1, n. 213, p. 216: “Deinde adhuc specialius probatur singulare sensibile sicut propriam imprimit sui speciem in sensu, ita quoque facere in intellectu possibili ope intellectus agentis, et haec immediate abstracta adaequare debet totum eius obiectum, adeo ut non ex obiectis repraesentatis, sed tantum ex modum essendi different, quia una specie est corporea, alia spiritualis; […] duplex est abstractio, alia est species intelligibilis a phantasmate, et alia universalis a singulari, prima fit ab intellectu agente, altera ab intellectu possibili.” 16   See Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 24 (ed. Wadding V-1, 466): “Ista tamen concordia, quae est de facto pro statu isto, non est ex natura nostri intellectus, unde intellectus est, nec etiam unde in corpore est: tunc enim in corpore glorioso necessario haberet similem concordiam, quod 13 14

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incidental.17 Thus, sympathy arises as a comfortable solution to keep the rôle of the intellect separated from the rôle of the inferior faculties and to preserve its dignity. Within the cognitive process, there are in fact two principles for the operations: the phantasm is only required as the principle which allows the operation of the fantasy (ut principium operationis virtutis phantasticae). Si species intelligibilis in coniuncto non sufficit sine phantasmate, hoc non est quod phantasma requiratur ibi tamquam principium aliquod actus intelligendi, sed praecise requiritur ut principium operationis virtutis phantasticae: et illa operatio requiritur ad intellectionem propter connexionem potentiarum superiorum et inferiorum in agendo; siquidem superior, non perfecte operatur circa aliquod obiectum, nisi inferiores quae possunt operari, operentur circa idem. Et haec est ratio quare distractio potentiarum animae circa diversa obiecta impediunt operationes earum.18

Scotus explains that, in the present state, the superior part of the soul cannot operate on one object without the simultaneous action of the inferior part (of the same soul) on the same object. As we have already seen, this situation does not stem from the intellect’s nature. If in the present state the intelligible species is accompanied by a concomitant phantasm, the reason for this must not be misunderstood.19 It is not because the phantasm is required as a principle of intellection: the species alone is sufficient for this. The intellect only needs phantasms in the way Scotus describes, namely as a concomitant stimulus to its own operation. The soul’s powers are therefore connected (they belong to the same soul) and at the same time separated (they originate different operations within the same cognitive process). These two independent powers are both required for thinking. As Scotus explains, they contend for the soul’s attention. If, for example, fantasy receives a strong impression from one object, it “distracts” the other power and obstacles the accomplishment of its operation. From his predecessors, Scotus inherits the language of sympathy and of falsum est. Utcunque igitur sit iste status, sive ex mera voluntate Dei, sive ex mera iustitia punitiva, sive ex infirmitate, etc.” 17   See Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 14, q. 3, n. 9 (ed. Wadding VII-1, 306): “Pro statu isto intellectus noster nihil cognoscit nisi quod potest gignere phantasma, quia non immutatur immediate nisi a phantasmate vel a phantasiabili; entitas autem singularis non est propria ratio gignendi phantasma, sed tantum entitas naturae praecedens illam entitatem singularem. Ipsa autem entitas singularis non est nata movere immediate aliquam potentia cognitivam nisi intellectum; et quod nostrum nunc non moveat, est propter connexionem eius ad phantasiam; in patria vero non est talis connexio, ideo ibi hoc ut hoc intelligetur.” 18   Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 1, n. 7 (ed. Wadding X, 163). The importance of this passage has been underlined by R. E. Dumont, “The role of phantasm in the psychology of Duns Scotus”, The Monist 49 (1965): 617–633. 19   See note 15.

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“attention”: the soul is actually at the very centre of all the operations of its powers.20 In Scotus’ account sympathy has a central rôle: it orchestrates the operations of the powers and, at the same time, it transposes into a theological context Aristotle’s well known sentence that “nihil speculamus sine phantasmate”.21 SECTION 3 Thus, Scotus develops a theory of sympathy conceived for human cognition. In his theory of knowledge, Suárez proceeds in the same direction. In his intellectual cognition’s account, the philosopher actually makes use of the concept of sympathy to explain the interaction between the intellect and the phantasms. Suárez aims at separating the intellect’s operation from the sensitive faculty: phantasms only furnish “the matter and the exemplar” from which the agent intellect proceeds to form its own species. Haec determinatio non fit per efficientiam aliquam ipsius phantasmatis, sed per hoc solum quod materiam praebet et quasi exemplar intellectui agenti, idque propter unionem quam habet in eadem anima.22

  The theme of “attentio” is at the base of sympathy’s account. Many historians, after Bernard Jansen, accounted for the presence of Augustinians elements in Suárez by postulating that Peter John Olivi might have influenced the philosopher’s theory of knowledge . Nonetheless, it seems to me that there is no evidence for that: Suárez never refers explicitly to Peter John Olivi, whose fortune has been compromised by the condemnation he received after his death. Perhaps it is more probable to hypothesize an influence of Peter John Olivi on Duns Scotus, during his years in Paris. For the supposed Olivi’s influence on Suárez see Jansen, Die Erkenntnislehre Olivis, 64–71; Ludwig, Das akausale Zusammenwirken, 79–81; Leen Spruit, Species Intelligibilis. From Perception to knowledge (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 2: 302. About Olivi’s fortune, see for example the recent works of D. Burr, “The persecution of Peter John Olivi”, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 66 (1976): 3–98; François-Xavier Putallaz, Insolente liberté. Controverses et condamnations au XIII siècle (Paris: Cerf, 1991); L. Bianchi, “Censure, liberté et progrès intellectuel à l’Université de Paris au XIII siècle”, A. H. D. L. M. A. 63 (1996): 45–93. 21   See Aristotle, De anima III, 7, 431a16–17; 431b2; 432a8–9; 432a13–14; De memoria 450a1. 22   CQDA, d. 9, q. 2, n. 12, lin. 519–522 (ed. Cast. III, 94). This passage has been compared by Faustino Prezioso to a sentence of Gerardus of Abbeville. See F. Prezioso: “L’attività del soggetto pensante”, p. 306, n. 2; cf. Gerardus of Abbeville: Quodl. 18, q. 6, co. (Cod. Vat. Lat. 1015, f. 131a): “Unde certum est quod habet virtutem formativam intellectus, quia formantur et trasformantur in ipso incorporeae similitudines corporum, ad instar similitudinum praecedentium et praeacceptarum a virtutibus sensibilibus…ergo illa imago simillima, quae est in acie cogitantis, transformatur ab illis similitudinibus, non quod illae similitudines sint causa effectiva, sed tantum ratio exemplaris.” About Gerardus, see now the work of Adriaan Pattin, L’anthropologie de Gérard d’Abbeville. Etude préliminaire et édition critique de plusieurs Questiones quodlibétiques concernant le sujet, avec l’édition complète du De cogitationibus (Leuven: Leuven University Press), 1993. 20

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Against the Thomists he mentions, Suárez holds that phantasms do not have any active rôle in the production of the species.23 The philosopher is rather emphatic on this point: abstraction is something that only concerns the intellect. Namely, the agent intellect, as it produces entirely on its own the intelligible species, and the possible intellect, which receives the species and generates the cognitive act itself.24 The production of the intelligible species is a process that wholly originates and develops within the intellective faculty. Nevertheless, the connexion between the soul’s powers also furnishes the base and the link between intellective cognition and the sensible world: the relation among the powers and their concomitant operations guarantee the correspondence between the intelligible species and the sensible phantasm.25 Though they only furnish the “matter and the exemplar” within the abstractive process, phantasms are always necessary to the soul. As we do not have phantasms of the Angels, the intellect cannot form proper species of them: our cognition of spiritual beings derives from the combination of the phantasms at the intellect’s disposal.26 Just like in Scotus’ account, the fantasy and the agent intellect have to work in tandem: the species are produced by the intellect at the same time (statim) in which the phantasms are produced by the fantasy.27   In particular, Suárez criticizes the opinion that phantasms are involved within the species production as instrumental causes: see CQDA, d. 9, q. 2, n. 8, lin. 418 ff. (ed. Cast. III, 88–91). 24   Suárez attributes to the possible intellect an active rôle within the cognitive process: see CQDA, d. 9, q. 8, n. 14, lin. 2320–2325 (ed. Cast. III, 230): “[I]ntellectus agens solum ponitur ad producendas species, et si propter hanc actionem non esset necessarius, non poneretur, ergo ad actus cognoscendi non aliter deservit. Tandem, intellectus possibilis de se est sufficiens ad asserentium primis principiis, sicut voluntas ad amandum ultimum finem.” Moreover, the possible intellect has a major perfection than the agent one: see CQDA, d. 9, q. 8, n. 15, lin. 2340–2342 (ed. Cast. III, 232): “Possibilis simpliciter est perfectior. Et probatur quia eius actus est nobilissimus, qui est intelligere; et est potentia cognoscitiva, qualis non est intellectus agens.” The only task (munus) Suárez actually ascribes to the agent intellect is abstracting the intelligible species, which does not correspond to the cognition of the object: see CQDA d. 9, q. 8, n. 14, lin. 2305–2309 and 2312–2314 (ed. Cast. III, 228–230): “Nihilominus respondetur quod intellectus agens circa prima principia nullam aliam actionem habet nisi producere species repraesentantes terminos eorum; manifestare autem et ostendere necessariam connexionem illorum extremorum est munus intellectus possibilis […] ipse enim est qui efficit actum cognitionis; intellectus autem agens non concurrit, nisi remote, producendo species.” 25   See Francisco Suárez: CQDA, d. 9, q. 2, n. 11, lin. 512–513 (ed. Cast. III, 94): “Intellectus agens numquam efficit species nisi a phantasiae cognitione determinetur.” 26   See Francisco Suárez: CQDA, d. 9, q. 7, n. 9, lin. 2032–2035 (ed. Cast. III, 208): “Quando intellectus versatur circa spiritualia, imaginatio versatur circa aliquid ex quo possint intelligi spiritualia, nam intellectus semper intelligit vel quae repraesentantur in phantasmate, vel quae ex illo deduci possunt.” 27   Suárez describes in the same way the external senses’ action on the internal one. The cognitive object actually produces a double impression on the sensitive faculties: a material 23

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Ad hunc ergo modum arbitror intellectum possibilem esse nudum speciebus, habere tamen animam virtutem spiritualem ad efficiendas species earum rerum, quas sensus cognoscit, in intellectu possibili, ipsa imaginatione sensibili non concurrente effective ad eam actionem, sed habente se quasi materia, aut per modum excitantis animam, aut sane per modum exemplaris. Et ita fit quod statim ac anima per phantasiam cognoscit aliquid, per virtutem suam spiritualem quasi depingit rem illam in intellectu possibili.28

The point here is: phantasms do not participate as the agent intellect does on the species-productive process, though they are necessary in order for the process to take place. The philosopher agrees with Scotus that such a state of things only belongs to the embodied soul: there is no way that separate souls, or the intellect in the state of glory needs phantasms.29 Thus, sympathy furnishes a mechanism that only describes human cognition. Suárez finally mentions Scotus when he comes to discuss the delicate passage of the turn towards phantasms. At this occasion, the philosopher discusses the rôle and the meaning that the conversio has within the cognitive process. Contrarily to Aquinas, Suárez holds that the singulars are known by the intellect without mediation (directe).30 Thus, by “conversio” he means something very different from Aquinas, namely the simultaneous, concomitant acts of intellect and fantasy. That is why, according to Suárez (and to Scotus as well), Aquinas’ cognitive account is misleading, since the philosopher excluded that the intellect can known the singulars directly. According to Suárez , the concomitancy of the operations of the soul’s powers is the only way to account for human cognition. one (in the exterior senses) and a more spiritual one (in the internal sense). See CQDA, d. 6, q. 2, n. 13, lin. 251–260 (ed. Cast. II, 486): “Sensus interior et exterior in eadem anima radicantur, unde eadem est anima quae videt per visum, et per imaginationem imaginatur; est ergo haec naturalis consensio inter has potentias, quod eo ipso quod anima aliquid visu percipit, statim format similitudinem illius rei in imaginatione sua, non mediante potentia ab imaginatione distincta, sed per virtutem eiusdem imaginationis, ita ut posita sensatione extrinseca, naturaliter resultet species in interiori sensu, non ex activitate sensationis, sed ex activitate ipsius animae per imaginationem, ad praesentiam tamen rei sensatae.” 28   CQDA, d. 9, q. 2, n. 12, lin. 531–539, (ed. Cast. III, 96). 29   See Duns Scotus: Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 24 (ed. Wadding V-1, 466): “Ista tamen concordia, quae est de facto pro statu isto, non est ex natura nostri intellectus, unde intellectus est, nec etiam unde in corpore est: tunc enim in corpore glorioso necessario haberet similem concordiam, quod falsum est. Utcunque igitur sit iste status, sive ex mera voluntate Dei, sive ex mera iustitia punitiva, sive ex infirmitate, etc.” Cf. CQDA, d. 9, q. 7, n. 8, lin. 2023–2027 (ed. Cast. III, 208): “Et hinc ergo oritur concomitantia harum potentiarum, quae non est essentialis, sed ex statu provenit, nam in anima separata et in corporibus resurgentibus non erit haec dependentia intellectus a phantasmate.” 30   See CQDA, d. 9, q. 3, n. 7, lin. 827–828 (ed. Cast. III, 114): “Intellectus noster cognoscit directe singularia materiali absque reflexione ulla.”

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Doctor Thomas rationem reddit, quia obiectum intellectus nostri est quidditas rei materialis; haec autem non potest ab intellectu nostro cognosci secundum modum quem in singularibus habet, nisi per iuvamen sensus; et ideo ad perfectam rei cognitionem necessariam est concomitantia operationis sensitivae. Quae ratio multis impugnatur ab Scoto. Et mihi etiam displicet, nam potissimum fundatur in hoc quod intellectus non cognoscit singularia directe. 31

Thus, Suárez acknowledges Scotus as an ally against Aquinas and those denying the direct intellection of the singulars. Scotus and Suárez actually share the opinion that the singulars are known by the intellect before the universals.32 Still, they both hold that sympathy regulates the relation between the faculties. Consequently, they also agree on the meaning of the so called “conversio ad phantasmata”: Anima dum est in corpore habet intrisecam dependentiam a phantasia, id est, non potest per intellectum operari nisi simul actu operetur per phantasma […] Non quod ipsa phantasmata intelligantur, id est, cognoscantur, sed quod per illa phantasia simul operetur cum intellectu.33

Suárez agrees that the soul never thinks without phantasms. We have already seen that Scotus and Suárez employ the relation between the soul’s powers to face their interaction, as they both aim at separating the intellect from the inferior faculties of the soul. But when he examines the reasons that determined this status quo, namely the dependence on phantasms, Suárez comes to different conclusions than Scotus. Suárez rejects both the “theological” and the “philosophical” reasons Scotus furnished to motivate the soul’s dependence on phantasms. The fi rst reason is not philosophical, as it relies on the original sin. The second contains a “petitio principii”: the connexion among the powers of the soul would be established by the natural order between them. Et ideo Scotus alias rationes adinvenit: prima, quia in poenam peccati datum est homini ut intelligere non possit sine dependentia; sed hoc non est philosophicum,   CQDA d. 9, q. 7, n. 6, lin. 1981–1989 (ed. Cast. III, 204).   As far as I am concerned there is not a specific work on Suárez’s and Scotus’ account of singulars: the Suárezian studies are mainly focused on Suárez ‘s nominalism and on his relation with Ockhamism. See: G. Picard, “L’intelligible infraspécifique d’après saint Thomas et Suárez ”, Archives de philosophie 1 (1923): 63–80; J. M. Alejandro, “Gnoseología de lo singúlar según Suárez”, Pensamiento 3 (1947): 403–425, 4 (1948): 131–152; Idem: La gnoseología del Doctor Esimio y la acusación nominalista (Santander: Pontifica Universitas Comillensis, 1948); J. de Vries, “Die Erkenntnislehre des Franz Suárez und der Nominalismus”, Scholastik 32 (1949): 321–344; F. Peccorini, “Knowledge of the Singular: Aquinas, Suárez and Recent Interpreters”, Thomist 38 (1974): 606–655; C. Noreña, “Ockham and Suárez on the Ontological Status of Universal Concepts”, New Scholasticism 55 (1981): 159–174; J. South, “Singular and Universal in Suárez’s account of cognition”, Review of Metaphysics 55, n. 4 (2002): 785–823. 33   CQDA, d. 9, q. 7, n. 6, lin. 1961–1963, 1965–1966 (ed. Cast. III, 202). 31

32

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quia hoc naturale est. Secunda ratio, quia ista dependentia tantum oritur ex ordine potentiarum animae, ratione cuius habent hanc necessariam connexionem, quod operante una potentia circa aliquod obiectum, statim operentur aliae quae illud obiectum possunt attingere.34

According to Suárez, in Scotus’ account there is not enough evidence to prove the dependence on phantasms.35 The accusation of Suárez is rather unjust. Against Scotus, he holds that both dependence and connexion among the faculties are derived by the natural imperfection of the human intellect. On the one hand, the philosopher aims at conferring to the intellect a superior rôle within the cognitive process; on the other hand, he merely follows Aristotle by stating that the dependence on phantasms is deeply natural and characterizes human knowledge. Scotus emphasized the intellect’s independence from sensory experience by stating that in principle it does not require phantasms, and the connexion among the soul’s powers merely furnishes a solution “pro statu isto”. Both philosophers hold that sympathy accounts for the human soul only, as they exclude that in the afterlife the intellect has to rely on phantasms. Suárez ’s real mark of originality resides in the elimination of the theological context evoked by Scotus: sympathy and connexion among the soul’s powers are the human intellect’s normal channel to acquire information about the world. [H]aec dependentia provenit ex imperfectione status, nam intellectus nunc non recipit species, nisi dum actu operetatur phantasia; phantasia autem et intellectus radicantur in eadem anima et ideo sibi invicem deserviunt et sese impediunt; et ideo dum phantasia laeditur et insanit secum trahit attentionem animae, atque adeo intellectum; et ideo laesio redundat in intellectum.36

In their De anima, Mastri and Belluto analysed this passage into its ultimate consequences.37 Suárez states that the concomitantia virtutum is always necessary for deriving the species. According to Mastri, this means that Suárez is excluding the intellect’s capacity of conserving the species after intellection: the derivation of the species would be, in this case, always dependent on phantasms. When he considered the intellect’s dependence on phantasms, Scotus confuted this thesis, traditionally   CQDA, d. 9, q. 7, n. 7, lin. 1999–2005 (ed. Cast. III, 206).   CQDA, d. 9, q. 7, n. 7, lin. 2009–2014 (ed. Cast. III, 206): “Praecipue, nam ex hoc ut plurimum haberi posset quod intellectus operans excitat imaginationem ut simul cum illa operetur; non tamen habetur quod intellectus pendeat in sua operatione ab imaginatione, ut dependere videmus; nec etiam rationem reddit cur laesio unius redundet in aliam.” 36   CQDA, d. 9, q. 7, n. 8, lin. 2014–2020 (ed. Cast. III, 206–208). 37   See Mastri–Belluto, In Aristotelis Stagiritae libros de Anima, disp. 4, q. 1, n. 11, p. 167: “Suárez lib. 4 de anima c. 7 aliam assignat rationem, quia nimirum intellectus pro statu isto non recipit species, nisi dum phantasia actu operatur quare cum nequeat intelligere sine speciebus, consequenter nequeat intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata.” 34 35

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attributed to Avicenna, by establishing that the human intellect can conserve the intelligible species after intellection. In the so called “second intellection” (secunda intellectione, or secunda motione), Scotus held that the human intellect can bypass phantasms.38 Thus, Mastri’s criticism focuses on Suárez ’s use of sympathy. Instead of separating the intellect from the inferior faculties, the philosopher would have linked the intellect to them in an indissoluble way. Hic dicendi modus coincidit cum illo, quem refert, et reijcit Doctor q. 18 cit. quorundam dicentium transeunte actu intelligendi non manere speciem, atque ideo semper necessarium esse novum recursum ad phantasmata in quolibet actu intelligendi; at species intelligibiles non remanere transacto actu intelligendi, est paenitus falsum […] quamvis ergo ab initio, et ut aiunt in prima motione species non acquirat, nisi phantasia actu operante, tamen deinceps illis acquisitis, et retentis non amplius ex hoc capite indigent phantasia, unde vana prorsus est ratio Suárez allata.39

Be this as it may, if Suárez’s criticism towards Scotus is unjust, so is Mastri’s. Whenever and wherever Suárez comes to discuss the intellect’s restrictions, he always aims at defending its independence and its superiority with respect to the sensitive faculties. That is why the philosopher agrees with Scotus that in the “second intellection” there is no need to deny the intellect of its capacity to conserve the intelligible species. This is the only case in which the intellect can bypass phantasms – and sympathy’s mechanism as well: Species intelligibiles conservantur in anima, transacto actu intelligendi. […] et ratio a priori est, quia species intelligibiles non pendent in conservari a praesentia alicuius obiecti neque ab actu intelligendi, quia nulla est ratio talis dependentiae neque in nnullo genere causae pendent, et non habent contrarium, et sunt spirituales et subiectum etiam sum. Item, intellectus angelicus conservat species. Et pars sensitiva interior similiter. Cur ergo non intellectus noster qui in suo genere debet habere virtutem completam cognoscendi, quae magna ex parte completur ex perfectione hac conservandi species?40

  Mastri is referring to Duns Scotus, De anima, q. 18, n. 2 (ed. Wadding II, 554): “Avicennam autem ponit, quod in prima intellectione respectu cuiuslibet, necessarium est phantasma, ut ab ipso quodammodo species imprimatur […]; sed quando est impressa, et homo vult postea illud intelligere, non est necessarium phantasma, sed magis est intellectui in onus. Exemplum ponit de iumento quod est homini necessarium in itinere, sed in termino sibi in onus. Hoc etiam probatur sic: habitis omnibus necessariis ad operationem, statim sequitur operatio; sed actus intelligendi solum dependet, essentialiter loquendo, ab intellectu, et obiecto […] per speciem autem intelligibilem obiectum sit praesens intellectui; igitur non est necessarium recurrere ad phantasmata propter actum intelligendi.” 39   Mastri-Belluto, In Aristotelis Stagiritae libros de Anima, disp. 4, q. 1, n. 11, p. 167. 40   CQDA q. 10, n. 2, lin. 2749–2750, 2763–2771 (ed. Cast. III, 262–264). 38

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The real rupture with Scotus concerns the elimination of the theological context from his account of cognition. Suárez is very consistent on this point: sympathy and phantasms are required by the human intellect because they belong to its natural way of acquiring knowledge. This position is strongly underlined by Suárez in his commentary on Aquinas’ Summa theologiae. In the book devoted to the state of innocence, the philosopher claims that even before the original sin Adam knew through phantasms, namely through the conversio ad phantasmata. […] talem fuisse illam scientiam, ut in usu ejus habuerit Adam dependentiam a phantasmatibus. Probatur, quia hic modus cognoscendi speculando phantasmata, naturalis est animae conjunctae: ergo eamdem dependentiam a phantasmatibus habuit primis homo in suo naturali modo intelligendi, quam nos habemus.41

In this occasion the philosopher does not recall what he specifically means by “conversio”, and he does not mention sympathy either. But the result of his statement is clear: not even in the state of innocence did Adam have a different cognition than the viator pro statu isto.42 As in the De anima, Suárez repeats again that it belongs to the natural imperfection of the human intellect to think through phantasms: Quia necessitas discursus non provenit ex corporis corruptibilitatem sed vel ex sola intrinseca limitatione intellectus hominis, vel ex dependentia ab phantasmatibus: sed Adam in statu innocentiae, et habebat eamdem limitationem intellectus, et   Francisco Suárez, De opere sex dierum III, c. 9, n. 7 (III, 230).   The same position was shared by Aquinas. Nonetheless, Suárez reproaches him for ambiguity, as he states that somehow Adam’s cognition of the spiritual substances was superior to the viator’s in the present state. It is impossible, according to Scotus, to state that before the sin Adam’s cognition was larger than the present man’s, if one agrees that Adam knew through phantasms. Suárez prefers to talk of the major “comfort” Adam had in knowing, as he possessed the “species infusae” of all the material things. Suárez only concedes that Adam was more “spiritual” than the viator: he had a better control on his body and on his passions. See Suárez, De opere sex dierum III,c. 9, n. 21 (III, 236): “[…] actus intelligendi, quos Adam per hanc scientiam habere potuit, eiusdem speciei fuisse cum actibus, quos nos exercemus. […] Nihilominus tamen in modo, seu perfectione accidentali usus illius scientiae, et actus eius multis rationibus caetererorum hominum actus excedere potuerunt. Primo propter excellentiam ingenii, quam in Adamo fuisse diximus. Secundo propter optimum corporis temperamentum et magnam perfectionem internorum et externorum sensuum, quae ad munus intelligendi multum iuvat. […] Denique habuit Adam in illo statu, ut infra dicemus, quamdam naturae integritatem per subordinationem appetitus inferioris ad superiorem, quae omnem animae perturbationem et involuntariam distractionem auferebat: quae animi compositio ad perfectam intelligentiam et considerationem multum juvat. Igitur ex his principiis et circumstantiis facile intelligitur, actus hujus scientiae fuisse longe majoris perfectionis, quam in caeteri homines esse soleant.” Cf. Aquinas, STh I, q. 94, a. 1, ad 1: “Ad primum dicendum quod homo in Paradiso beatus fuit, non illa perfecta beatitudine in quam transferendum erat, quae in divinae essentiae visione consistit: habebat tamen beatam vitam secundum quendam modum, ut Augustinus dicit XI super Gen. ad litt., inquantum habebat integritatem et perfectionem quandam naturalem.” 41

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dependebat ab phantasmatibus: ergo eamdem difficultatem discurrendi habebat. Item Adam intelligebat componendo et dividendo: ergo etiam discurrendo.43

Thus, Scotus’ hypothesis of the phantasms as the consequence of original sin is definitely excluded by Suárez. The union with the body is sufficient to determine the necessity of phantasms within the cognitive acts. Although Suárez eliminates the theological set within Scotus’ description of the question, he maintains the same ambivalence for what concerns the intellect’s capacity: on the one hand, phantasms are necessary; on the other one, as the intellect is superior to phantasms, sympathy is the only way to account for their “virtual” relation.44

BIBLIOGRAPHY SOURCES Aquasparta, Matthaeus de. Quaestiones de fide et de cognitione. Editio secunda. Cura pp. Collegii S. Bonaventurae. Florentiae: Ad claras aquas (Quaracchi), ex typ. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1957. Aquinas, Thomas. Summa theologiae. — Summa contra gentes. — Quaestiones disputatae De veritate. — Scriptum super Sententiis. Aristotle. De anima. — De memoria. Bonaventura. In secundium librum Sententiarum. In Opera Omnia, vol. II, Florentiae: Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi), 1885. Duns Scotus, Johannes. Opera Omnia. Reprografischer Nackdruck der Ausgabe Lyon: 1639. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968. Glorieux, Palémon. Les premières polémiques thomistes. Le “Correctorium corruptorii ‘Quare’” de Guillaume de la Mare. Paris: Bibliothèque thomiste, 1927. Marston, Roger. Quaestiones disputatae de anima. In Quaestiones disputatae de emanatione aeterna, de statu naturae lapsae et de anima. Florentiae: Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi), 1932. Mastrius, Bartholomaeus and Bonaventua Bellutus. Bartholomaei Mastri de Meldola et Bonaventurae Belluti tomus tertius…continens disputationes ad mentem Scoti in Aristotelis Stagiritae libros de Anima. Venetiis, apud Nicolaum Pezzana, 1678. Olivi, Peter John. Quaestiones in Secundum librum Sententiarum.

43

  Suárez, De opere sex dierum III, c. 9, n. 25 (III, 237).  I wish to express here my gratitude to Miss Ada Bronowski for revising my English.

44

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Poinsot, João (John of Saint Thomas). Cursus philosophicus thomisticus. Lugduni: sumptibus Philippi Borde, Laurenti Arnaud, Petri Borde, et Guillielmi Barbier, 1663. Suárez, Francisco. Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima. Madrid: Fundaciòn Xavier Zubiri, 1991. [= CQDA] — Opera Omnia. Parisiis: apud L. Vivès, 1856–1878.

SECONDARY LITERATURE Alejandro, J. M. “Gnoseología de lo singúlar según Suárez”. Pensamiento 3 (1947): 403– 425, 4 (1948): 131–152. — La gnoseología del Doctor Esimio y la acusación nominalista. Santander: Pontifica Universitas Comillensis, 1948. Beha, H. M. “Matthew of Aquasparta’s theory of cognition”, Franciscan Studies 20 (1960): 164–204, Ibid. 21 (1961): 1–79, ibid. 383–465. Bérubé,Camille. La connaissance de l’individuel au Moyen Age. Paris-Montréal: Presses universitaires de France, 1964. Bianchi, L. “Censure, liberté et progrès intellectuel à l’Université de Paris au XIII siècle”. A. H. D. L. M. A. 63 (1996): 45–93. Burr, D. “The persecution of Peter John Olivi”. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 66 (1976): 3–98. Cromp, Germaine. Le phantasme dans l’abstraction de l’intellect agent dans la Somme de théologie de Thomas d’Aquin. Montréal: Institut d’Etudes Médiévales, 1980. De Vries, Josef. “Die Erkenntnislehre des Franz Suárez und der Nominalismus”. Scholastik 32 (1949): 321–344. Dumont, R. E. “The role of phantasm in the psychology of Duns Scotus”. The Monist 49 (1965): 617–633. Jansen, Bernard. Die Erkenntnislehre Olivis. Berlin: 1921 Ludwig, Josef. Das akausale Zusammenwirken (sympathia) der Seelenvermögen in der Erkenntnislehre des Suárez. München: Karl Ludwig-Verlag, 1929. Marrone, S. P. “Matthew of Aquasparta, Henry of Ghent and Augustinian Epistemology after Bonaventure”. Franziskanische Studien 65 (1983): 252–290. Muller, J.-P. “Colligantia naturalis. La psychophysique humaine d’après saint Bonaventure et son école”. In: L’homme et son destin d’après les penseurs du Moyen Age, 495–503. Paris–Louvain: éditions Nauwelaerts, 1960. Noreña, C. “Ockham and Suárez on the Ontological Status of Universal Concepts”. New Scholasticism 55 (1981): 159–174. Pasnau, Robert. Thomas Aquinas on human nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pattin, Adriaan. L’anthropologie de Gérard d’Abbeville. Etude préliminaire et édition critique de plusieurs Questiones quodlibétiques concernant le sujet, avec l’édition complète du De cogitationibus. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1993.

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Peccorini, F. “Knowledge of the Singular: Aquinas, Suárez and Recent Interpreters”. Thomist 38 (1974): 606–655. Perez Argos, B. “La actividad cognoscitiva en los escolasticos del primer periodo posttomista”. Pensamiento 14 (1948): 167–202. Picard, G. “L’intelligible infraspécifique d’après saint Thomas et Suárez ”. Archives de philosophie 1 (1923): 63–80. Prezioso, F. “L’attività del soggetto pensante nella gnoseologia di Matteo d’Acquasparta e di Ruggiero Marston”. Antonianum 25 (1950): 259–326. Putallaz, François-Xavier. Insolente liberté. Controverses et condamnations au XIII siècle. Paris: Cerf, 1991. Simmons, A. “Jesuit Aristotelian Education: the De anima Commentaries”. In The Jesuits. Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts. 1540–1773, edited by J. W. O’Malley, vol 1: 522–537. Toronto– Buffalo–London: University of Toronto Press, 1999. South, J. “Singular and Universal in Suárez’s account of cognition”. Review of Metaphysics 55, n. 4 (2002): 785–823. Spruit, Leen. Species Intelligibilis. From Perception to knowledge. 2 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1994.

292

SUÁREZ AND THE PROBLEM OF FINAL CAUSATION Stephan Schmid

ABSTRACT

Suárez maintains that efficient causes are paradigmatic causes because they comply best with his criterion of causality according to which a cause is something which imparts being to something. This view puts some pressure on him to account for the causal status of the other three Aristotelian causes like matter, form and the end of a thing. In explaining the specific causality of final causes Suárez argues that this kind of cause is paradigmatically found in the range of finite rational agents, as humans, which align their will with certain ends. In this paper I reconstruct Suárez’s theory about the specific and genuine influence an end exerts on a finite rational agent, and I defend Suárez from the recently made objection that he de facto reduced final causes to efficient causes, and thus abolished final causality as a proper genus of causality. For this purpose I show that final causes play an explanatory rôle in his theory of actions which cannot be fulfilled by efficient causes.

SECTION 1 A tremendous part of Francisco Suárez’s Disputationes Metaphysicae is devoted to the investigation of the notion of cause and to a thorough examination of the four Aristotelian causes. Already in the beginning of his account of causes Suárez develops his influxus theory of causation according to which there is a core-concept of a cause, i.e. something which all causes qua causes have in common. In a famous passage of the 12th Disputation Suárez summarizes his enquiry after a core-concept of cause as follows: A cause is a principle that essentially imparts being in another thing. […] By the term “essentially imparting” privation and all accidental causes, which do not transfer or impart being to something else per se, are excluded. The word “imparting” however, has not to be understood strictly, as it is particularly used to be attributed to the efficient cause, but more general, so that it is synonymous with “giving or communicating being to another thing”.1 1   „Causa est principium per se influens esse in aliud; […] Per illam autem particulam, per se influens, excluditur privatio, et omnis causa per accidens, quae per se non conferunt aut influunt esse in aliud. Sumendum est autem verbum illud influit non stricte, ut attribui specialiter solet causae efficienti, sed generalius prout aequivalet verbo dandi vel communicandi esse alteri.“ – DM 12, 2, 4 (XXV, 384).

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Causes are characterized by their ability to impart or transfer being to something. Of course, this ability of transferring or imparting being need not be understood in the same way as when one says that the sculptor imparts being in a statue when she builds it. For in this case only the efficient cause would qualify as a genuine cause, and the other Aristotelian causes, i.e. the material, formal and final cause, could no longer be conceived of as genuine causes. In this case Suárez’s influxus-criterion would then not reveal a common feature of all Aristotelian causes, but rather show that most of the Aristotelian causes are not causes after all. In order to avoid this undesirable result, Suárez is eager to point out that the talk of “imparting being” is not to be understood in a strict sense, according to which only efficient causes conform to this general criterion of causality. According to this broader notion of ‘imparting’ or ‘transferring being’, Suárez explains, one can also conceive of the material or formal cause as causes. Matter and form impart being to things in the broad sense, to the extent they constitute these things. Nonetheless, material and formal causes do not as neatly comply with Suárez’s influxus-criterion of causation as efficient causes do. Even Suárez concedes that efficient causes prove to be causes in the strictest sense of the term: For the efficient cause imparts being most properly. Matter and form, however, rather than properly imparting being, compose it by themselves, and therefore it seems – according to this reasoning – that the term “cause” is primarily predicated of the efficient cause, but it is transferred to matter or form by analogy. Hence, it seems, although those two causes are properly essential parts and intrinsic principles of natural things, that those are called causes only in an analogical way, even though they have to be called causes because of the general use of this term.2

The priority of efficient causes immediately casts into doubt the causal status of final causes. If material and formal causes are only causes in an analogical sense, how then do we have to understand final causes? As an author writing after the Council of Trent (1546–1563), which has confi rmed the authority of Thomas Aquinas, Suárez is very much concerned to present his views as conforming to the philosophical doctrines of Aquinas. And even though Suárez develops highly subtle and original philosophical views, he is strikingly often concerned to keep his claims in agreement with the Thomist doctrine – and might this agreement be only verbal (as it is in fact for most of the times). In line with his general attempt to display his views as conforming with those of Aquinas, Suárez is also eager to accommodate Aquinas’s famous 2   „Nam efficiens propriissime influit esse; materia autem et forma non tam proprie influunt esse quam componunt illud per seipsas, et ideo secundum hanc rationem videtur nomen causae primo dictum de efficienti; ad materiam autem vel formam esse translatum per quamdam proportionalitatem. Unde, licet illae duae causae sint proprie partes essentiales et principia intrinseca rei naturalis, causae vero dictae videntur per dictam analogiam, licet iam secundum communem usum simpliciter sit illis tribuendum nomen causae.“ – DM 27, 1, 10 (XXV, 952).

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thesis of the primacy of the final cause. As is well known, Aquinas has famously argued that the end is the cause of all causes,3 and Suárez leaves no doubt that he agrees with Aquinas on this matter, at least, if his doctrine of the primacy of the final cause is interpreted in the right way: The end is an essential and extrinsic principle and its causation is prior to that of the efficient cause; for the efficient cause is not active, if it is not moved by an aim, and therefore one is used to say that the fi nal cause is the first of all causes. Since the influence of the final cause is very obscure, however, – especially with respect to real and physical change –, it is thus briefly said that even though the fi nal cause might be prior in the order of intention, in the execution the efficient cause is first; indeed that is even that [cause] alone which really influences or moves in an essential and extrinsic way.4

Althoug Suárez is willing to agree that the final cause can be called the first of all causes, he is equally clear that this primacy of the fi nal cause cannot be understood in an ontological sense since it is only the efficient cause, “which really influences or moves”. Thus, Aquinas’ thesis of the primacy of final causes is only to be conceded if it is read it as a statement about the explanatory hierarchy of causes, and not about their ontological priority. What is meant by this distinction can best be brought out by an example: If we want to explain why my neighbour goes jogging every Saturday or why he sweats when he runs his weekly laps, we are perfectly justified to look for final causes, since there are ends which account for all these things going on. My neighbour goes jogging every Saturday for the sake of his health. And his body begins to sweat in order to cool him. So, with respect to certain explanatory needs, Aquinas’s thesis of the primacy of the final cause is perfectly adequate. However, if we are interested in ontological questions, that is, if we want to know which of the four Aristotelian causes is in reality most accountable for a thing’s change, we have to turn to efficient causes. We then must concede that there are particularly these causes which have a real impact on other things and consequently impart being to them in the most eminent sense, therefore proving to be the paradigmatic causes. Suárez’s inclination to accept only efficient causes as causes in the strict sense bears directly on the causal status of final causes. This is also evident from the just quoted passage, where Suárez maintains that “the influence of the final cause is very obscure”. Compare this to the causal status of matter and form, which can be traced   This doctrine can be found in Aquinas’ early writing De principiis naturae, § 4 (ed. Leonina 43, p. 44). 4   „[E]st enim finis principium per se et extrinsecum et est prius in causando quam efficiens; nam efficiens non agit nisi motum a fine, et ideo causa finalis solet dici prima inter omnes causas. Sed quia influxus causae finalis valde obscurus est, maxime respectu physicae et realis mutationis, ideo breviter dicitur, etsi ordine intentionis causa finalis prior sit, tamen in exsecutione efficientem causam esse primam; immo illam solam esse quae per se et extrinsece realiter influit seu movet.“ – DM 17, 1, 3 (XXV, 581). 3

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back to their ability to constitute things and hence their ability to impart being to the things by making these up. In contrast to this, the causality of ends cannot be understood as a capacity for constitution because final causes are extrinsic causes, as Suárez calls them, and not intrinsic causes like matter and form that are inside the object they cause.5 But if it is no longer clear how final causes impart being to something, it becomes equally unclear to what extent fi nal causes can still count as causes at all. What is more, the causal status of ends or final causes is additionally problematic, since Suárez holds that causes must exist in order to be active and hence be a cause. Yet, usually ends do not exist at the time they elicit actions, and sometimes – if actions fail – they never come to exist at all. When I am playing soccer, for example, I would often kick the ball in order to score. Scoring is the end that causes me to kick the ball. Yet, this end is unfortunately only very rarely realized by my kicking the ball. Hence, there is even more reason to doubt whether an end can be a real cause, “for in it there is no real being presupposed, by means of which it can cause”.6 It seems, therefore, that Suárez’s influxus theory of causation undermines the causal status of ends by requiring that causes must exert some distinctive causal influx and thus have to exist by the time of their causation. On account of this, Suárez’s influxus theory imposes a great challenge to his project of abiding by his Aristotelian heritage and and the doctrine of the four causes. It is exactly this challenge that Suárez addresses in his 23rd Disputation. SECTION 2

Against the backdrop of the influxus theory of causation, it is rather unclear to what extent and for what reasons there can be fi nal causes at all. What exactly does the causality of final causes consist in? To answer this question Suárez adopts a divide-and-conquer-strategy. He distinguishes three types of agents whose actions we explain by referring to ends and aims, and investigates the question concerning the causal status of ends with respect to each of these types separately. He writes: We want to distinguish three agencies for the sake of an end. First and preeminently, the uncreated intellectual agent who is God alone. Second and in the middle position, there are the created intellectual agents, from which we know men better on account of which we will always talk about them, although the same theory holds for [all] intelligent agents. Third and last, there are the natural agents or those which do not have an intellect, even though there are lots of differences between those who have senses and endeavour and the rest, which we will discuss in due course.7 5   For Suárez’s distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic causes see especially DM 27, 1, 2, (XXV, 950). 6   „De fine vero potest esse nonulla dubitandi ratio, quia nullum esse reale in eo praesupponitur, quo causare possit“ DM 12, 3, 3 (XXV, 389).

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The class of agents whose activities can be explained by referring to final causes is divided into three groups: (1) God, (2) finite rational, and (3) natural agents. As Suárez’s enquiry of final causation proceeds, it turns out that a genuine operation of ends can only be found among the group (2) of finite rational agents.8 Before I examine more closely what final causation with respect to finite rational agents consists in, I want to sketch why Suárez thinks that there is no genuine final causation in the range of natural and divine agency. In the realm of natural agents there cannot be any final causation because natural agents do not have an intellect and are therefore unable to recognize any ends for the sake of which they could act. And as Suárez points out, it is a necessary precondition of final causation that the end is recognized.9 On account of this, performances of natural agents cannot be caused by ends. It is important to note, however, that this lack of final causation in the range of natural agents does not exclude that many acts natural agents perform are for the sake of certain ends. So, it is perfectly true to say that frogs snap in order to catch flies or that fire burns in order to cause more fire. But the phrase “being for the sake of” or “in order to” here is not due to the fact that these performances are caused by their ends. Rather, that performances of natural agents are for the sake of something is due to the fact that God has arranged his creation and concurs with these performances in a purposeful way. And it is due to this purposeful arrangement of the creation and God’s concurrence that frogs snap if they see flies and need not starve in consequence, and that fire has the disposition to engender fire. This explanation of our teleological way of talking with regard to natural agents and their performances immediately leads to the question concerning final causa  „[D]istinguamus tria agentia propter finem. Primum et supremum est intellectuale agens increatum, quod est solus Deus. In secundo ac medio ordine sunt agentia intellectualia creata, inter quae nobis notiores sunt homines, et ideo de illis semper loquemur, quamvis eadem ratio sit de intelligentiis creatis. In tertio et infimo ordine sunt agentia naturalia seu intellectu carentia, quamvis inter ea nonnulla sit differentia eorum quae sensum et appetitum habent et reliquorum, quam etiam suo loco indicabimus.“ – DM 23, 1, 8 (XXV, 845). 8   Dennis des Chene: Physiologia, Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), 169, has pointed out that the late Aristotelians had come “increasingly to restrict final causation to the actions of rational agents.” In spite of their rejection of final causation, however, they were not willing to abandon the view that nature abounds in finality: “Though the ends to which natural changes tend might not be proper causes of those changes, it was inconceivable that natural change should not have ends.” – Ibid. 9   „[U]t finis causet, necessarium omnino est ut praecognitus sit.“ – DM 23, 7, 2 (XXV, 875). Most of the authors from the middle ages up to the early modern period accepted that the recognition of the end is a necessary condition for an end being a cause, although it was explicitly denied by Aristotle in his Physics II, 199b27–29. An early and very influential formulation of this requirement is found in Avicenna’s Metaphysics, Text 15. 7

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tion with respect to God. It seems that although our entitlement to describe natural processes teleologically is not provided for by final causes, which are operative in the realm of natural agents, the teleology of natural processes is due to final causation in God. For, unlike natural substances, God has an intellect and thus can recognize the ends of natural processes. We can therefore legitimately say that natural agents act for the sake of certain ends because God recognized these ends and was subsequently caused by these ends to create natural agents in a way that enables them to act for the sake of these ends. Interestingly, however, Suárez rejects this line of reasoning. For theological reasons he denies that ends are causally operative with respect to God. Suárez argues that God is a perfect being by definition. As a perfect being he does not have any privations and accordingly any un-actualized potentialities either. Hence, God is eternally immutable and cannot change for every change is a transition from a potential to an actual state. In particular, God’s being pure act (actus purus) brings it about that His will is always actualized, and therefore cannot be caused by an end. As Suárez puts it, “the act of the divine will – with regard to its essential and necessary existence – cannot have a genuine cause of any kind, for as such he is an essential being and fully independent”.10 But how, one wants to know, can we reasonably say that God’s actions are for the sake of certain ends, if one denies that God is caused to act by these ends? As it was the case with respect to natural teleology, Suárez argues that we are perfectly justified in describing God’s actions teleologically. We only must be careful not to think that our teleological description of God’s actions is grounded in causal operative ends which somehow act upon God. Rather, our teleological discourse concerning God’s purposeful actions is grounded in the fact that God acts only out of an abundant love of himself such that his actions inherit a sort of reflexive structure, by virtue of which these actions and everything that is brought about by them are ultimately directed towards God.11 On Suárez’s view, this also explains why the world exhibits a purposeful order in which everthing is directed towards God as its ultimate aim. It is important to note, however, that this explanation of the teleological structure of God’s actions and his creation does not refer to final causes in the strict sense of the term, as they are characterized by the influxus theory. There is nothing, and there even cannot be anything, which literally exerts a causal influence on God. Moreover, God’s individual actions are structured (and can thus be described teleologically) since they are guided by his ideas of things. In guiding God’s actions these ideas figure as what Suárez calls exemplar causes (causae exemplares).12 As Suárez argues, these 10   „[Secundo declaratur amplius,] quia actus divinae voluntatis, quoad entitatem sibi essentialem ac necessariam, non potest habere ullam veram causam in aliquo genere, quia ut sic est ens per essentiam et omnino independens.“ – DM 23, 9, 4 (XXV, 883). 11   Cf. DM 23, 9, 9 (XXV, 884). 12   Cf. DM 25, 1, 28 (XXV, 907).

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exemplar causes form a sub-class of efficient causes: they represent an intellectual agent’s ends of action and cause his or her actions in an efficient causal way.13 It is clear therefore that there are no genuine instances of final causes among actions performed by natural agents and those performed by God. Natural agents do not have an intellect which would allow them to recognize the ends for the sake of which they could act, and with regard to God, final causation is ruled out due to his perfection. The only realm, then, which is left, and in which there could be something like genuine final causation, which conforms to Suárez influxus theory of causation, is the realm of finite rational agents. We will now have a closer look on how Suárez tries to account for final causation within that realm. SECTION 3 What could final causation, at least in the realm of fi nite rational agents, consist in? Knowing about the existence of exemplar causes which are operative in God’s case, we might become suspicious of the need for an own kind of final causes with respect to actions performed by finite rational agents. Could one not equally account for our teleological discourse about human actions by referring to the ideas we have and that cause our actions in an efficient causal way? In this spirit, we could simply say that my neighbour goes jogging for the sake of his health, because he has the idea of health, and knows that regular jogging is an appropriate means to be or remain healthy. So, it seems to be my neighbour’s idea of health and his knowledge of how health can be attained that cause him (in an efficient causal way) to go jogging. At a first glance then, it seems that the recourse to fi nal causes is dispensable in the realm of finite rational agents as well. Exemplar causes seem to be all we need in order to explain human actions, and consequently we are not committed to introduce another, quite obscure, kind of causation in addition to efficient causes, and material and formal causes. A closer examination of our example, however, reveals that only referring to exemplar causes, does not explain everything yet. For my neighbour surely has many ideas in addition to his idea of health and his knowledge of how to attain it. For example, he has also the idea of a cake and the knowledge of how to make one. Or he knows that on Saturday afternoons soccer games are shown on TV, that it is fun to watch them, and that these games can be watched just by switching on the TV. Why, then, given all these ideas representing potential outcomes of actions, does my neighbour still go jogging? Why doesn’t he rather bake a cake, or watch football on TV, or do something else? The answer to these questions is obvious: my neighbour’s 13   That exemplar causes for Suárez do not form a kind of their own but a mere sub-class of efficient causes, is made plain by the fact that Suárez maintains that he prefers the view of those, “who neglect that the exemplar cause constitutes a genuine kind of cause, but say that they belong to he efficient cause [qui negant exemplarem causam constituere proprium genus causae, sed illam pertinere dicunt ad causam efficientem]” – DM 25, 2, 8 (XXV, 913).

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capacities are limited, and so he cannot do all things simultaneously on a Saturday’s afternoon. He must decide and choose one of his several options. Coming to a decision, however, is nothing but aligning one’s own will with a certain end. So, what my neighbour actually does, when or shortly before he goes jogging on Saturday afternoon, is aligning his will with the end of remaining healthy, rather than with the end of having a relaxed afternoon. He prefers going jogging to watching TV, since watching TV might be an appropriate means for having a relaxed afternoon, but it is probably not as conducive to health as jogging is. In order to explain why my neighbour goes jogging on Saturday, it is thus not sufficient, to only refer to my neighbour’s ideas, for my neighbour might have many ideas about what one could do on Saturdays. What is decisive to explain my neighbour’s behaviour is to recognize that he wants to do something for his health, rather than doing something else. Here, of course, one could immediately dig a little deeper and ask: Why, after all, does my neighbour want to be healthy rather than to have a relaxed afternoon? It is in addressing this question that Suárez turns to causally operative ends or final causes.14 And indeed, it seems quite reasonable to say that my neighbour just feels more attracted by the prospect of remaining healthy than spending a relaxed afternoon, and that it is in this sense that the end of remaining healthy causes my neighbour in a genuine final manner to want to do something for his health. This is, at least, what Suárez suggests in line with his theory of metaphorical motion that he characterizes as follows: There is a third view which also declares that the causality of the end consists in a metaphorical motion. However, it is added that such a motion is not in the second act, unless the will is moving in the second act, and when it is put in reality, it is nothing different from the act of will itself. But, as we stated above, such as one and the same action is the causality of the agent, insofar it arises from it, and the causality towards its form, insofar the action takes place in matter, so [exponents of this view] say that one and the same act of will is caused by the end and by the will itself. And insofar it arises [i] from the will, it is an efficient cause, and insofar it arises [ii] from the end, it is a final cause. And in the first way [i] it is a real and proper motion, because such an action stems from a power as a proper physical

14   Note that in addition to these different explanatory roles of fi nal and exemplar causes (final causes explain why an agent intends this aim rather than that aim, while exemplar causes explain why the agent can control her action to attain this aim), Suárez also holds that fi nal and exemplar causes differ ontologically: While it is the intentional content of a thought that brings an agent to choose this rather than that aim (Suárez sais that the end causes according to its esse obiectivum), it is the thought itself, which directs the execution of an agent’s action (Suárez sais that the exemplar causes according to its conceptus formalis). Cf. DM 25, 1, 9 (XXV, 902) and DM 25, 1, 40 (XXV, 910). (I am grateful to Michael Renemann for having pressed me on this point).

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principle. In the second way [ii], however, it is a metaphorical motion, since it stems from an object which allures the will and attracts it.15

This passage is very dense and imbued with scholastic terminology. It is clear though, that Suárez suggests a view according to which the causality or influence of an end does not consist in a “real motion”, as elicited by efficient causes, but rather in a “metaphorical motion”. Suárez tries to elucidate this contrast between these two kinds of motion by comparing them with two aspects of an action or the process of efficient causation in general.16 According to Suárez’s Aristotelian conception of actions of material substances, such an action is but an actualization of the agent’s form in a suitable material patient, in which this form exists only potentially and has to be “educed” or brought into actuality by the operative agent.17 Moreover, the actualization of the agent’s form in the material patient is the natural end or terminus of the agent’s operation.18 On account of this, one can conceive of an action as (i) arising from the agent that efficiently causes that action, or as (ii) tending towards the agent’s form, which the agent tends to realize in his material patient and which constitutes the terminus of its operation. In close analogy to this, the will’s actualization and alignment with an end can be given a similar two-fold description. On the one hand, the will’s alignement with an end can be described as arising from its own causal power, and in this respect the will’s actualization is conceived of as a real motion. On the other hand, this very process of the will’s alignment with an end can also be described as tending towards this end, which is then said to allure or entice the will. In this respect, the will’s actualization is conceived of as arising from the end and described as a metaphorical motion.19 15   „Est ergo tertia sententia, quae constituit etiam hanc finis causalitatem in motione metaphorica. Addit vero huiusmodi motionem non poni in actu secundo nisi quando voluntas in actu secundo movetur, et quando sic ponitur in re, non esse aliquid distinctum ab ipsomet actu voluntatis. Sed sicut supra dicebamus unam et eamdem actionem, prout fluit ab agente, esse causalitatem eius, ut vero inest materiae, esse etiam causalitatem eius circa formam, ita aiunt unam et eamdem actionem voluntatis causari a fine et a voluntate ipsa, et [i] prout est a voluntate esse causalitatem effectivam, [ii] prout vero est a fine esse causalitatem finalem, et priori ratione [i] esse motionem realem ac propriam, quia talis actio manat a potentia ut a proprio principio physico, posteriori autem ratione [ii] esse motionem metaphoricam, quia manat ab obiecto alliciente et trahente ad se voluntatem.“ – DM 23, 4, 8 (XXV, 861). 16   As Suárez explains in DM 18, 10, 5 (XXV, 681), the process of efficient causation is nothing but the action by which an efficient cause gives rise to its effect. 17   Cf. DM 18, 9, 7-8 (XXV, 670). In line with this, Suárez explains that “the substantial form has its proper and principal efficiency towards the eduction of a similar form from the potency of matter [forma substantialis suam habet propriam et principalem efficientiam circa eductionem similis formae de potentia materiae]” – DM 18, 2, 22 (XXV, 606). 18   Cf. DM 48, 4, 13 (XXVI, 891). 19   It is important to note that by calling the fi nal causal aspect of the will’s alignment with its end a “metaphorical motion”, Suárez did not intend to suggest that this aspect is in itself

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In any case, however, this special type of action, which is caused by a final and an efficient cause, that is, the alignment of the will with an end, is a classical motion (motio), namely a transition from a state of mere potentiality to a state of actuality. This can easily be seen in our previous example. If my neighbour decides to do something for his health, my neighbour passes from the state of only potentially wanting to do something for his health, to the state of actually wanting so. As seen, this motion can be conceived of in two ways: as a “real motion”, which originates from the power of will that causes the act of will to obtain in an efficient way, or as a  “metaphorical motion”, which originates from the end which entices or allures the will, and thereby causes the will to align with that specific end in a final way. Suárez’s explication of final causation as a sort of enticing or alluring, immediately evokes the objection that “enticing” and “alluring” denote actions, and as such they must be performed by causally efficient agents. Accordingly, an end capable of enticing or alluring the will of a rational agent must be conceived as an efficient cause and Suárez did not succeed in establishing a genuine form of final causation after all.20 Unfortunately, Suárez does not address this objection directly, but he is concerned with the similar problem whether the will is efficiently caused to choose a certain end by the intellect which judges this end to be good or desirable. A short look on the way Suárez deals with this problem can help to discharge him from the objection above. With regard to the question whether the intellect causes the will to act, Suárez is quite decisive: The intellect does not cause the will to act, for this would deprive the will of its freedom.21 Similarly it is wrong to say that the end itself causes the will to choose it in an efficient way by means of being judged as desirable by the not-real. As Suárez explains in DM 23, 1, 14 (XXV, 847), “Its motion, however, is called metaphorical, not because it is not real, but because it does not happen through effective influx nor through physical motion but through intentional and animal motion. And therefore nothing prevents it from being the case that its causality is true and proper. [Eius autem motio dicitur metaphorica, non quia non sit realis, sed quia non fit per influxum effectivum, nec per motionem physicam, sed per motionem intentionalem et animalem: et ideo nihil obstat, quominus vera ac propria sit eius causalitas]“ (Note that the Vivès edition fatally omits the words in angle brackets, which can be found in the older Salamanca edition, and thus severely affects the sense of this key passage. For more on this see Sydney Penner, “Suárez on the Priority of Final Causation” in For Suárezian Causes, ed. Jakob Leth Fink (forthcoming)). As we will see below, however, I think that Suárez takes the will’s metaphorical motion somehow less real than its real motion since the will’s being actually drawn to its end ontologically depends on his spontaneous alignment with this end. 20   I am grateful to Jorge Secada and Christopher Shields for this objection. Alternatively, they argued that one ought to understand final causes as forms of the human will, which – by informing it in a certain way – align the will with a specific end. I doubt, however, that this suggestion provides a solution. In this case fi nal causality would not be a distinct sort of causality either, but just an instance of formal causality. 21   Cf. DM 19, 6, 1–6 (XXV, 719–721).

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intellect. Nonetheless, Suárez wants to abide by the thesis, that the will’s choice is not totally independent from what the intellect judges to be good. As he makes clear, however, this dependence must not be understood as an efficient causal dependence which would conflict with the will’s freedom. Rather he states: Yet even if an object does not determine the will in this way [i.e. in an efficent causal way], it can still be sufficient to excite and allure it to such an extent that the will is determined or led towards that object by its own freedom. For if any aspect of goodness is represented in the object, that aspect is of itself enough to move the will. Therefore, the sort of determination described above is not required in order for the will to be moved.22

The will is an active faculty, which is able to actualize spontaneously, and therefore does not require an external efficient cause that somehow triggers its alignment with a certain end.23 Indeed, it must not be determined efficiently to its operation for this would conflict with its freedom. Accordingly, an end or a desirable object, which attracts, excites or entices the will, does not literally act upon the will such that it would figure as an agent or efficient cause. Likewise, the specific influence an end exerts on the will must not be understood as an efficient causal influence, and the end’s attracting and alluring the will is no proper action. Rather, an end determines the will simply by being good.24 And it just in virtue of being (conceived to be) good – and not in virtue of doing something – that an end is attracting the will and operates as a final cause of the will’s alignment with a certain aim. Thus, the objection above can be refuted as being misled by the grammatical surface of the verbs by means of which Suárez describes the genuine influence of final causes. Although verbs like “to entice”, “to attract”, and “to allure”, can be – and surely usually are – employed as causative verbs which denote actions, this is obviously not the way Suárez uses them, when he describes the genuine influence of final causes: that a final cause “entices” or “allures” the will does not mean that it somehow pulls or yanks at the will, but rather that it motivates it simply by being (taken to be) good. 25   “Quamvis autem obiectum non sic determinet voluntatem, potest esse ita sufficiens ad excitandam et alliciendam illam ut ipsa sua libertate determinetur aut feratur in illud, quia si in obiecto repraesentatur aliqua ratio boni, illa est de se sufficiens ad movendam voluntatem; ergo illa determinatio necessaria non est ut voluntas moveatur.” – DM 19, 6, 9 (XXV, 722). 23   Cf. DM 19, 2, 18 (XXV, 698 f.). 24   Suárez agrees with “all doctors” that “goodness is the proximal aspect under which an end moves” – DM 23, 5, 2 (XXV, 864). 25   I think the difference Suárez is aiming at by distinguishing between a final causal and an efficient causal influence is similar to the difference present day philosophers try to spell out when they distinguish between the normative constraint of reasons and the causal necessity of causes. 22

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Suárez’s theory of metaphorical motion explains what final causation consists in and what the specific feature of this kind of causality is. Final causality takes place whenever the will aligns itself with a particular end, for it can then be described as enticed or allured by the end. The specific way of influence ends exhibit is therefore a sort of attraction they exert on the will, by means of which they cause a person to actually want to obtain this particular end, as opposed to another end the person could equally want. To be sure, this process of final causation does not take place, unless the will aligns itself with an end by means of its own efficient power, which causes in an efficient way that the person actually wants to obtain that end. In this respect, the process of final causation is ontologically dependent from the process of efficient causation. This asymmetric ontological dependence of operative ends from a causally efficient will is also made plain by the fact that Suárez calls the motion elicited by an end “metaphorical”, and motions triggered by efficient causes “real”. Hence, the metaphorical motion arising from the end could not take place unless the real motion caused by the efficient power of will takes place, although the reverse could possibly be true.26 It seems that his theory of metaphorical motion immediately involves Suárez in a paradox. On the one hand, by means of this theory, he fi nally manages to reveal a genuine influence of ends in the process of the direction of the will. This allows him to continue abiding by final causes as causes sui generis and defend their ontological right against the imminence of efficient causes. On the other hand, it is particularly this ontological status of ends as causes which becomes questionable, within the theory metaphorical motion. As seen, final causes do not really move our will, but only do so in a metaphorical way, and the process of final causation is ontologically dependent or supervenient on the efficiently causal process – the alignment of the will by the power of will. Hence, it seems that in reality there are no final causes after all. And although Suárez takes great pains to redeem final causes, ultimately they turn out to be mere epiphenomena. So, we seem to have to declare – as many Suárez scholars did before – that in the end for Suárez there are no causally operative ends, but only efficient causes.27 Accordingly, his talk of final causes is of no explanatory 26   This issue of course, is quite speculative for Suárez does not discuss it explicitly. Nonetheless, it is not too implausible to assume that there are cases, in which people want something (thus, are driven to want it by their power of will), although they do not fi nd very appealing what they want (thus, do not feel attracted by their ends). Consider an addict, for example, or common cases of akrasia, in which ends one takes to be appealing remain inert. 27   This (pessimistic) assessment has recently been suggested by Vincent Carraud, Causa sive Ratio, La raison de la cause de Suárez à Leibniz, (Paris: PUF, 2003), and Gilles Olivo, “L’efficience en cause: Suárez, Descartes et la question de la causalité”, in Descartes et le Moyen Âge, ed. Joël Biard & Roshdi Rashed (Paris: Vrin, 1997), 91–105. Carraud, op. cit., 161, talks about a “réduction de la finalité à l’efficience”. Olivo, op. cit., 102, thinks „que l’univocité des causes efficiente et finale […] en fait éclate[r] à l’unité“.

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value, and his abiding to final causes has to be understood as a residue from a bygone philosophical tradition he had better gotten over as many philosophers did after him. In the remainder of this chapter I want to address this pessimistic assessment and show that for Suárez final causes play an important explanatory rôle which cannot be taken over by efficient causes. In order to see the distinctive explanatory task performed by final causes, it will be worthwile to come back to my athletic neighbour. We already know that he usually goes jogging on Saturday afternoons and that he could also do many other things instead, such as watching TV or baking a cake. Moreover we know the reason for his decision to go jogging instead of watching TV. It is because he wants to do something for his health, rather than just have a relaxed afternoon. But an insistent thinker might not be satisfied by this answer yet. Why, she could keep on asking, does my neighbour actually want to do something for his health rather than something else? After all, it seems equally possible that my neighbour decides to have a relaxed afternoon. It is not so easy to give a satisfying answer here. To do so, one could say something about my neighbour’s beliefs, his attitudes or about his character. One could also go into further detail here, and report some facts about his personal history or about the values and ideals he acquired during his life. All the things we could mention here – and there are certainly a lot of them – might serve to make it more intelligible why my neighbour decides to do something for his health, rather than do something else. However, if we want to abide by a strong or libertarian conception of freedom, we have to admit that all the factors we have enumerated in order to make my neighbour’s free decision more intelligible did not make his decision follow necessarily. For in the very end, it was simply up to my neighbour whether he wanted to do something for his health or spend his time more relaxingly. According to the agent-causal variant of a libertarian conception of freedom, which Suárez endorses,28 this “being up to my neighbour” is spelled out in effeicient causal terms. That it was ultimately up to him to do something for his health rather   Suárez characterises a free faculty – like the will – by two conditions: “The first is that it is an active faculty that of itself and by its internal ability has the power to exercise and to withhold its action. The other is that when this faculty exercises its act, it is so disposed and (so to speak) proximately prepared for its work that with all the things required for acting having beeing posited, it is able to act and not to act. [Unum est quod illa sit potentia activa, ex se et ex sua interna facultate habens vim ad exercendam et suspendendam actionem suam. Aliud est quod illa facultas, dum exercet actum, ita sit disposita et proxime (ut ita dicam) praeparata ad opus ut, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, possit agere et non agere.]” – DM 19, 4, 8 (XXV, 708). I take this as an endorsement of a libertarian account of freedom similar to the one put forward by Roderick Chisholm in his “Human Freedom and the Self”, in Free Will, ed. by G. Watson (Oxford – New York: OUP 1982), 24–35. According to the first condition, free actions are spontaneously (or, as Chisholm would call it, “immanently”) caused by an active faculty, such that Suárez endorses an agent-causal account of freedom. According to the second condition the will is able – under the same conditions – to do both: to act or to withhold his action (this makes Suárez’s account incompatible with determinism 28

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than doing something else is due to the fact that my neighbour was the ultimate cause of his wanting to do so. In virtue of efficiently causing this act of will, rather than a different one, my neighbour is an free cause, as Suárez calls it. That is, he is the spontaneous efficient cause of his doing, and his causing is not necessitated by anything. Of course such libertarian accounts of free will have come under attack from various considerations. One manifest objection against such conceptions of freedom is the charge of unintelligibility.29 According to this objection, free actions conceived of as caused by unmoved movers remain completely mysterious, for there is nothing which accounts for the person’s having come to this, rather than to another decision. Ultimately, it was the person who simply wanted this rather than that. Why she wanted the things she actually wanted, is nothing we could explain any further. It is a bare fact. Consequently, on such libertarian accounts free actions remain unintelligible. It as against such charges of unintelligibility of free actions conceived in a libertarian way that Suárez’s final causes come back onto the scene. Free actions, or more properly: free decisions, need not be unintelligible, just because they arise spontaneously from the power of will which caused the will to align with a certain end. For that the will is not caused to perform its orientation towards a certain end in an efficient way, does not mean that the will is not caused to do so at all. On the contrary, as seen above, according to Suárez’s theory of metaphorical motion the will is very well caused to align itself to this rather than that end. It is just caused to to do so in a final causal way by the end which entices or allures it more strongly. This causal influence of an end, however, is contrary to the efficient causal influence, compatible with the freedom of will. Even if one is attracted by a certain option, one is not forced or necessitated thereby to choose it. Moreover, it is an interesting feature of ends that they can provide satisfying answers without provoking further questions. It can be quite satisfying to answer the question of why my neighbour wants to do something for his health, by stressing that he just takes health to be a valuable good, and that he therefore wants to do something for it. In this respect, ends or final causes can function as explanatory regress stoppers.30 This makes them particularly apt for explaining free decisions performed by persons which are not and thus a libertarian one, for he insists on the fact that humans are free; cf. DM 19, 2, 12–22 (XXV, 696–700). 29   For a discussion of this and similar problems see Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (Oxford – New York: OUP 2003). 30   This claim would deserve further justification which I cannot offer here. See however Alexander Pruss: The Principle of Sufficient Reason (New York: CUP 1996), 135 f., who argues that “propositions of the form x freely does A for [reason; S.S.] R are almost self-explanatory: they explain everything that calls out for an explanation in the proposition that x freely does A for R other than the existence and freedom of x and x’s taking R to be a reason.”

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efficiently forced to do so. Suárez points out this feature of ends or final causes by himself, and he is eager to exploit this insight to accommodate his view about final causes with the one of Aquinas: In moral affairs, the end is in certain respect the total cause of actions or effects. Not because the other causes are excluded, insofar they are physically necessary, but because all other [causes] receive a first reason from the end. Therefore in certain respect the end can be called the only cause, for it is a cause in such a way that it does not have any prior cause nor any prior reason of causing.31

Ends or final causes have an extraordinary causal status insofar as they can be self-explanatory and in this respect not need any further causes such that they can figure as “first causes” – or particularly as the “causes of all causes”, as Aquinas has maintained. In virtue of this extraordinary feature, final causes provide also a theoretical possibility for defending his libertarian account of freedom from charges of unintelligibility. For this reason, final causes cannot be reduced to effeicent causes, even though they might ontologically depend on them. Final causes render free actions or decisions intelligible in a way efficient causes by themselves could not. Hence, final causes play an explanatory rôle that cannot be taken over by efficient causes. In order to explain free actions final causes turn out to be indispensable and thus not reducible to efficient causes.32

31   „In moralibus enim finis est quodammodo tota causa actionum seu effectuum, non quod aliae causae excludantur quatenus physice necesariae sunt, sed quod omnes aliae ex fine sumant quasi primam rationem causandi. Unde finis potest quodammodo dici sola causa, quia ita est causa ut non priorem causam vel saltem priorem rationem causandi[.]“ – DM 12, 3, 8 (XXV, 300) 32   I am grateful to Anat Schechtman, Lukáš Novák and Paolo Rubini for their helpful suggestions and comments on earlier versions of this chapter.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Aquinas, Thomas. De principiis naturae. Editio Leonina 43. Romae, 1976. Aristotle. Physics. A revised text with introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Avicenna. Metaphysics. Translated by Parviz Morewedge. London: Routledge, 1973. Carraud, Vincent. Causa sive Ratio. La raison de la cause de Suárez à Leibniz. Paris: PUF, 2003. Chisholm, Roderick. “Human Freedom and the Self”. In Free Will, edited by G. Watson, 24–35. Oxford – New York: OUP 1982. Clarke, Randolph. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford – New York: OUP 2003. Des Chene, Dennis. Physiologia, Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought. New York: Cornell University Press, 1996. Olivo, Giles. “L’efficience en cause: Suárez, Descartes et la question de la causalité”. In Descartes et le Moyen Âge, Joël edited by Biard & Roshdi Rashed, 91–105. Paris: Vrin, 1997. Penner, Sydney. “Suárez on the Priority of Final Causation”. In For Suárezian Causes, edited by Jakob Leth Fink (forthcoming). Pruss, Alexander. The Principle of Sufficient Reason. New York: CUP, 1996. Suárez, Francisco. Disputationes Metaphysicae. Hildesheim: Olms, 1965. — Disputationes Metaphysicæ. Salmanticæ: apud Ioannem et Andream Renaut fratres, 1597.

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SUÁREZ IN RELATION TO ANSELM, AQUINAS AND SCOTUS ON PROVING GOD’S EXISTENCE Robert Fastiggi

ABSTRACT

Although the argument for God’s existence of the Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) can stand on its own, it is instructive to view his argument in relation to those of earlier scholastic thinkers. This essay tries to do so with respect to Anselm (1033–1109), Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274) and John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308). The essay shows that Suárez rejects the ontological argument of Anselm, partially rejects and partially modifies the arguments of Aquinas, and moves beyond the argument of Scotus by distinguishing between objective and formal concepts. By way of conclusion, the essay argues that Suárez represents a mature phase of scholastic philosophy. He did not hesitate to develop and sometimes reject the arguments of his predecessors. An appendix supplies a summary of Suárez’s arguments for the existence of a single, necessary and unproduced being, i.e. God.

1. INTRODUCTION

In Disputatio 29 of his Disputationes Metaphysicae the Jesuit philosopher, Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), provides a rational proof for the existence of God. Though not as well known as the “ontological argument” or the “five ways” of Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274), there are signs of a renewed interest in this proof.1 This essay seeks to understand Suárez’s argument for God’s existence in relation to earlier proofs, specifically those of Anselm (1033–1109), Aquinas and John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308). In the process, we will see that Suárez is a creative and independent metaphysician. He appreciates the contributions of his predecessors, but he is willing to criticize, develop and strengthen their arguments when needed. 2. SUÁREZ ON ST. ANSELM Suárez mentions Anselm in two key passages in Disputatio  29. The fi rst is in DM 29, 2, 3, where he examines the Benedictine monk’s a priori ontological argument that tries to establish the necessity of God’s existence from the concept of God as the   See, for example, Francisco Suárez, S.J., The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God: Metaphysical Disputations 28–29, transl. and ed. John P. Doyle (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2004) [henceforth, Doyle]. 1

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most perfect being. Suárez does not think this is the best way to proceed because, as he notes, there are some people who believe that only the material world exists and that man or heaven represent the most noble of all beings.2 For such people, the concept of the most perfect being would not include simplicity and eternity, attributes that are essential to the true concept of God.3 There are likewise other people who understand God merely as the prime mover of the heavens, a concept that also falls short of God as the necessary and uncaused being.4 Suárez later mentions Anselm in DM 29, 3, 36, which is the final part of his enquiry into whether an a priori demonstration of God is possible. Here he mentions Anselm’s premise that the name of God signifies an essentially necessary being “than whom a greater cannot be thought,” and he notes that Anselm took this notion from Book 1, Chapter 7 of Augustine’s De doctrina Christiana libri quatuor. According to Suárez, we cannot demonstrate God’s existence simply from the evidence of the terms. As he writes: For, even if we grant that by the name of God there is signified an essentially necessary being, than whom a greater cannot be thought […] it is still not immediately evident whether what is signified by that name is some true thing or is only something contrived or imagined by us.5

Suárez goes on to note that there are many things, which are “not only metaphysical or physical, but also moral, not only external, but also internal” that “immediately incline one to the acceptance of that truth”6 [i.e. of God’s existence]. Even though all of these things incline human beings to believe in God, they do not support Anselm’s claim that God’s existence is immediately evident by the meaning of the terms [my emphasis]. For Suárez, God’s existence seems immediately consonant with reason, but “it does not appear to be immediately evident”.7 Furthermore, the general notion of God seems to be something “founded on the education and education of [our] predecessors, both [the education] of children by parents and of ignorant persons by those more learned”.8 Such factors have contributed to “a general notion among all the nations that God exists”.9 This general notion of God, however, is more grounded   DM 29, 2, 5 from Suárez, Opera Omnia 25–26 (Paris: Ludovicus Vivès, 1856–1861).   DM 29, 2, 4–5. 4   DM 29, 2, 5. 5   DM 29, 3, 36; translation from Doyle, 143–144. All translations from the DM are either my own or those of Doyle. When they are not referenced as those of Doyle, they are my own. 6   Ibid., Doyle, 144. 7   Ibid. 8   DM 29, 3, 37: Doyle, 144. 9   Ibid. 2 3

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in faith among the common people than “from the evidence of the matter,” though “it does seem to have come with a certain practical and moral evidence”.10 Suárez, therefore, does not believe that an a priori demonstration of God, like that of Anselm, is a convincing way to prove God’s existence. Instead, an a posteriori argument from causality is the better approach. In favoring this modus procedendi, he follows the example set forth by his two great scholastic predecessors, Aquinas and Scotus, both of whom drew heavily from Aristotle. 3. SUÁREZ IN RELATION TO AQUINAS’ PROOFS FOR GOD’S EXISTENCE The five ways of Aquinas can serve as a good historical point of reference.11 The first way is based on the premise that “whatever is moved is moved by another”. Since there cannot be an infinite regress of beings, there must be an unmoved mover who is God. The second way is based on efficient causality. Since the chain of beings caused by other beings cannot go on to infinity, there must be an uncaused cause which is God. The third way is based on contingency and necessity. Since it is impossible to continue into infinity with beings, which are not necessary but only contingent, there must be a necessary being, which is God. The fourth way is based on degrees of perfection. When we recognize beings as more or less good, true, noble and the like, it is because they more or less resemble the maximum of goodness, truth, nobility and the like, and this maximum standard of goodness, truth, nobility is God Himself. The fifth way is taken from the observation of the intelligent governance of the world. Since things that lack knowledge act according to an intelligent design, there must be an intelligent being directing them to their ends. This intelligent being, of course, is God. Suárez does not accept the first way of Aquinas, the argument from motion. As he sees it, the principle that “whatever is moved is moved by another” (omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur) is, “indeed, correctly understood as quite probable” (est enim revera probabilius, recte intellectum).12 It is not, however, certain for he observes that “there are many things which, through a virtual act, are seen to move themselves and reduce themselves to a formal act, as can be seen with appetite and will” (multa sunt quae per actum virtualem videntur sese movere et reducere ad actum formalem, ut in appetitu seu voluntate videre licet).13 Therefore, the premise that “whatever is moved is moved by another” does not apply universally according to Suárez.   Ibid.   See Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 2, a. 3. 12   DM 29, 1, 8. 13   DM 29, 1, 7. For Aquinas, motion is understood as the change from potentiality to actuality. For Suárez, the more precise distinction is between virtual and formal act. 10

11

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Having rejected the first way of Aquinas, Suárez joins the second and third ways into a singular argument. Since whatever is caused is by defi nition dependent, the second way includes the third. As Suárez writes: “Whatever is produced is produced by another; and this likewise means: whatever depends, depends on another” (Omne quod producitur ab alio producitur; nam perinde est dicere: omne quod dependet, ab alio dependet).14 Suárez does not seem explicitly to address the fourth way of Aquinas as found in the Summa theologica. He does, however, touch on Aquinas’ similar argument from the Summa contra gentiles, Book 2, Chapter 15 in DM 29, III, 26. In this context, Suárez points to God’s perfection not so much as the measure or standard of all other perfections (as in the fourth way) but as “the perfection of the First Being” that “virtually or eminently contains all entity […]” and, because it exists of itself, “is able efficiently to cause every other entity which is distinct from itself”.15 Here we see that Suárez uses an argument of Aquinas from the Summa contra gentiles rather than the Summa theologica, but he does not use it as an argument for God’s existence per se. Instead, he employs it as one in a series of confirmatory arguments to demonstrate there is only one essentially necessary being rather than several or many such beings Suárez examines the fifth way of Aquinas (the argument from governance) in section II of Disputatio 29, which is concerned with the question: “Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists by showing that there is only one uncreated being.”16 Suárez believes the argument from governance is an elaboration of the biblical insight of Wisdom 13:5: “For from the greatness and beauty of created things, their original author, by analogy, is seen.”17 Suárez refers to Aquinas’ treatment of this argument in the Summa contra gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 13 rather than the Summa theologica I, q. 2, a. 3, (where the five ways are articulated).18 Suárez does not use the argument from governance (sometimes called the argument from design) as an autonomous proof for the existence of God. Instead, he examines this argument as one of several possible a posteriori reasons for why there can only be one necessary being rather than several. He fi rst considers the thesis of Pierre d’Ailly/Petrus de Aliaco (1350–1420) that there might be multiple uncaused beings.19 By way of response, Suárez makes it clear that the name God refers to “the most sublime being who is above all things and who is the being upon which all   DM 29, 1, 26.   DM 29, 3, 26: Doyle, 135. 16   DM 29, 2, 1; Doyle, 81. 17   I am using here the translation from the New American Bible (1970); Suárez only cites the passage in part. 18   See DM 29, 2, 7. Suárez also mentions others besides Aquinas who support the argument from design, viz., Saints Gregory I, St. John Damascene, [Pseudo-]Dionysius the Areopagite and St. Augustine. 19   DM 29, 2, 2. 14

15

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other beings depend”.20 He then goes on to formulate an a posteriori argument in the following manner: For although singular effects, taken and considered by themselves, do not demonstrate one and the same being as the maker of all things; nevertheless, the beauty of the entire universe, and the marvellous connexion and order of all that is within it, sufficiently declare that there is one primal being by whom all things are governed and from whom all things derive their origin. Nam licet singuli effectus per se sumpti et considerati, non ostendant unum et eumdem esse omnium factorem, tamen totius universi pulchritudo, omniumque rerum, quae in eo sunt, mirabilis connexio et ordo, satis declarant esse unum primum ens, a quo omnia gubernatur et originem ducunt.21

Suárez goes on to explain that the designer of the universe must be its Creator.22 He also insists that the designer must be a single individual and not a consortium of individuals. Moreover, since the universe operates according to an intelligent design, the designer must be intelligent.23 Could there be several intelligent designers instead of one? Suárez argues for the singularity of the intelligent designer by an appeal to the systematic unity of the produced effect, namely, the universe, which in its totality, seems to operate “in a unified manner to achieve a suitable singular effect” (per modum unius ad unum effectum adaequatum efficiendum).24 The unity of the produced effect could not be achieved unless the other causes of the design were subordinate to some higher cause using them as organs or instruments (nisi alcui superiori causae subordinentur, cujus sint veluti organa aut instrumenta).25 At this point, Suárez raises the possibility of universes other than our own. He believes that if these other universes did exist, they also would be subject to the designer of our universe. He admits, however, that this is not absolutely certain since it is not possible to know whether the material proper to our universe is the same as the material present in other universes. Here he concedes that, “there is no way of demonstrating that the entire material of corporeal things, which is found in reality, exists in this universe [alone]” (nullum est medium ad demonstrandum totam materiam rerum corporalium, quae est in rerum natura, esse in hoc universo).26   DM 29, 2, 5.   DM 29, 2, 7. 22   DM 29, 2, 9. 23   DM 29, 2, 21. 24   Ibid. 25   Ibid. 26   DM 29, 2, 37. 20 21

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Although the concept of other universes seems to be beyond the force of reason and the boundaries of faith, nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out completely on the basis of natural reason. From this, Suárez concedes that one cannot conclude in an absolute manner that there exists only one necessary being by the use of a posteriori arguments alone.27 In order to show that there is only one necessary and unproduced being, a priori reasons must be given. Thus, we see that Suárez believes the fifth way of Aquinas (the argument from governance or design) is a strong argument for the singularity of the one Creator of the universe. He cannot, however, rule out the possibility of other universes on the basis of a posteriori arguments alone. 4. SUÁREZ IN RELATION TO SCOTUS There are several points in Disputatio 29 where Suárez refers to John Duns Scotus. In DM 29, 1, 3, he mentions Scotus, along with Avicenna, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Albert the Great, as supporting the position that the task of proving the existence of God belongs to the metaphysician rather than the natural philosopher. In DM 29, 1, 9, he cites Scotus in rejecting the idea that the motion of heaven is eternal. In DM 29, 1, 29, he points to Scotus as upholding the key insight: that the whole collection of causes cannot be dependent. In DM 29, 2, 32, Suárez includes Scotus in the list of philosophers (Aquinas, Aristotle, Soncinas, Javellus et. al.) who knew that the “Intelligences” could only be from God rather than as having their origin in themselves. In all these references, Suárez clearly sees Scotus as an ally. Where then do they disagree? In DM 29, 3, 34, Suárez opposes Scotus’ belief that any proposition selfevident in itself is also self-evident to us. For Suárez, there are numerous truths that are immediate in themselves but are only known to us through medium. He gives as an example the truth that quantity is an accidental entity. Although this is immediately true in itself, “it is not known by us except through media and even extremely extrinsic [media]”.28 Suárez also replies to the possible objection of Scotus that he is speaking here of propositions and not about things. In a very subtle passage, he shows that the position of Scotus fails to adequately appreciate the distinction between formal and objective concepts: But if Scotus and others say that they are not speaking about things but rather about propositions, which intrinsically entail an order to our concepts which [concepts] cannot be distinguished as according to themselves and with respect to us, we will reply that they are laboring over something equivocal, because we are not dealing with signs themselves, but with the thing signified, nor with formal concepts, but rather with objective [concepts], and the given distinction falls very well on 27

  Ibid.   DM 29, 3, 34: Doyle, 141–142.

28

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these. For often those things which are objected to in our formal concepts have an immediate and therefore self-evident connexion, even though, as they are objected to our formal concepts and are denominated from those, their connexion is not immediately known to us. Therefore, that distinction is very good and most fittingly applied to the present question, as has been well explained adequately.29

Here Suárez shows himself to be more a realist than Scotus (who is still holding on to Anselm’s notion of God’s existence as self-evident from the terms themselves). Because God is an objective reality and not a formal concept of the mind, we cannot argue that God’s existence is self-evident to us just because the formal concept of God entails existence. 5. SUÁREZ IN RELATION TO HIS PREDECESSORS: THREE PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT As we have seen, Suárez rejects Anselm’s ontological argument. With regard to Aquinas’ five ways, he rejects the first, combines the second and third, and re-appropriates aspects of the fourth and fifth as supporting arguments for the singularity of the necessary being (rather than as autonomous proof for God’s existence). We have also seen that Suárez cites Scotus as an ally for many particular points, but he rejects Scotus’ belief in the self-evidence of God’s existence from the concept of God by invoking the distinction between formal and objective concepts. In more general terms, it might be possible to highlight three phases of historical development from Aquinas to Suárez with respect to the causal argument for God’s existence. Phase one may be called the Thomist or the necessity phase since the thrust of the argument is to prove the necessity of some uncaused being. The operating principle is “whatever is caused is caused by another”. Since an infinite regress in efficient causes is impossible, there must be a fi rst efficient cause, which everyone knows as God. The Thomist proof from efficient causality understands the infinite regress as a dynamic sequence of caused beings. However, as the Ockhamist philosopher Pierre d’Ailly will later argue, necessity does not imply unicity.30 Phase two of the causal argument can be called the Scotist or the infinity phase. The main concern of this phase is to show the infinity of the first cause. The Subtle Doctor seems to have anticipated some of the objections of the Ockhamists. Instead of conceiving God as a necessary being, he conceives of Him as an infinite being with a triple primacy as the first efficient cause, the most eminent being and the last end of all things. Not only does Scotus attempt to prove God’s infinity, he also tries to 29   Ibid. Doyle, 142. For more on Suárez’s distinction between formal and objective concepts, see José Pereira, Suárez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 28–30. 30   See DM 29, 2, 2 for Suárez’s citation of D’Ailly.

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prove his uniqueness. Like Aquinas, though, Scotus continues to conceive an infinite regress as a dynamic sequence.31 Phase three of the causal argument may be called the Suárezian or unicity phase. Here the major focus is on the singularity or uniqueness of the first efficient cause. Suárez’s treatment can also be called the critical synthesis phase since he attempts to synthesize, in a critical manner, the key insights of his predecessors. According to the Doctor Eximius,32 God is the unique, necessary being. To demonstrate the existence of God, it must fi rst be shown that there is some being whose existence is necessary and that an infinite regress of dependent beings is impossible. For Suárez, however, the infinite regress is understood as the comprehensive simultaneity of caused beings and not simply a dynamic sequence. Once it can be shown that some necessary being must exist, the next task is to prove that there can only exist one such necessary being. This Suárez pursues by means of both a posteriori and a priori reasons. 6. CONCLUSION The Disputationes Metaphysicae manifest a mature phase of scholastic philosophy. In proving God’s existence, Suárez builds upon the insights of his mediæval predecessors, but his analysis of the issues is far more sophisticated and subtle. Part of this is due to his awareness of the objections of thinkers such as Ockham (ca. 1285–1349) and Pierre d’Ailly (1350–1420), who came after the times of Anselm, Aquinas and Scotus. Students of scholastic philosophy should not be content with trying to judge how thinkers such as Suárez compare with earlier authors such as Aquinas or Scotus. Rather, they should understand and appreciate the more mature scholasticism of thinkers like Suárez who did not hesitate to develop and refine (and sometimes reject) the insights of the mediævals.

APPENDIX SUÁREZ’S PROOF FOR GOD’S EXISTENCE33 Suárez’s proof for God’s existence has three parts. First, there is an a posteriori argument for the existence of some necessary being based on the principle of causality; second, there is an a posteriori demonstration of the necessary being from the order 31   John Duns Scotus, De primo principio, in A Treatise on God as First Principle, transl. and ed. Allan B.Wolter, O.F.M. (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1966). 32   “Doctor Eximius”(the Uncommon or Exceptional Doctor) was a title bestowed upon Suárez by Pope Paul V (r. 1605–1621). 33   This is taken largely from my article. “The Proof for the Existence of God in Suárez”, in Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) Tradição e Modernidade, ed. A. Cardoso, A. Manuel Martins and

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of the universe; and third, there are a priori reasons for the unicity of the necessary being, based on the very concept of necessary being itself. A. The existence of a necessary being In section I of Disputatio 29, Suárez begins by reviewing various opinions as to whether one should demonstrate the existence of an uncreated being by reasons taken from physics or metaphysics. He supports the view that one should proceed according to metaphysical arguments rather than physical ones, and he finds support for this opinion from Avicenna, Albertus Magnus and Duns Scotus. Suárez also believes that it is plausible to follow the method of Soncinas, 34 Aristotle and Aquinas who begin with physical arguments and try to perfect them by metaphysical ones. He is convinced, however, that “all physical means in and of themselves are insufficient to demonstrate the existence of some first uncreated being” (Omnia media physica per se esse insufficientia ad demonstrandum esse aliquod primum ens increatum).35Following this, Suárez (as we have seen) rejects the premise of Aristotle and Aquinas) that “whatever is moved is moved by another”. Instead, he begins with the metaphysical premise that “whatever is made, is made by another” (Omne quod fit, ab alio fit) which is also expressed by the premise that “whatever is produced is produced by another” (Omne quod producitur, ab alio producitur).36 His argument is presented in syllogistic form as follows: (Major): “Every being is either made or not made, i.e. uncreated” (Omne ens aut est factum, aut non factum, seu increatum). (Minor): “But it is impossible for all beings which exist in the universe to be made” (Sed non possunt omnia entia, quae sunt in universo, esse facta). (Concl.): “Therefore, there must be some being which is not made, i.e. uncreated” (Ergo necessarium est aliquod ens non factum, seu increatum).37

The Doctor Eximius states that the major premise is self-evident because of the principle of non-contradiction. The minor premise is proved by the principle that “every being which is made is made by another” (omne ens factum ab alio est factum).38 Either a being is made or it is not made. But if it is not made, than there is at least one uncreated being (which is precisely what the argument is trying to prove). The point of the argument is that sooner or later one must admit the existence of at least L. Ribeiro dos Santos (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, 1999), 81–92. 34   This is Paulus Soncinas, who is also known as Paolo Barbo da Soncino, O.P. († 1494). 35   DM 29, 1, 19. 36   DM 29, 1, 20. 37   DM 29, 1, 21. 38   Ibid.

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one uncreated being; otherwise, one must posit beings that are self-caused, which is an absurdity. Suárez believes that it is impossible to proceed into infinity with beings that are made by others. Likewise, it is impossible to fall into a vicious circle of produced beings. He concludes that one must ultimately arrive or stop at a being that is not made (sistendum ergo necessario est in ente non facto).39 Suárez reinforces this conclusion by examining what it means to be made. If a being is made, it has been made or produced by another, either immediately or mediately. But even if one continued tracing the chain of causality back many generations, the fundamental principle would still apply that whatever is made is made by another.40 And if something is made or produced, it must have been made or produced by some being which already existed. Thus, it is clear that nothing could be the efficient cause of its own existence. In the discussion that follows,41 Suárez refers to the classic scholastic distinction between causes that are intrinsically subordinate (causae per se subordinatae) and causes that are only accidentally subordinate (causae per accidens subordinatae). However, even if there could be an infinite regress in the case of causae per accidens subordinatae, this would not affect the force of the argument. In such a case, the total collection of all beings (totam collectionem entium) would still be dependent and yet have no explanation for its existence! This strikes Suárez as a complete absurdity since the hypothesis that all beings, singularly or collectively, are dependent, that is, caused by other beings, can be justified only on the nonsensical assumption that some beings are self-caused (i.e. that they caused themselves to be produced, either immediately or mediately). Suárez tries to prove this minor premise (i.e. that it is impossible for all beings to be made by another) by means of a logical enthymeme:42 (First antecedent): “Since it is impossible that the entire collection of beings or efficient causes be dependent in its being and operation” (Quia impossible est totam collectionem entium, vel causarum efficientium, esse dependentem in suo esse et operari); (First consequent): “It is, therefore, necessary that there be in that [collection] something independent” (ergo necesse est esse in illius aliquod independens);   Ibid.   In his 1948 debate with Betrand Russell, Fr. Frederick Copleston, S.J., discussed the possibility of an infinite series of contingent beings in this manner: “If you add up chocolates you get chocolates after all and not sheep. If you add up chocolates to infinity, you presumably get an infinite number of chocolates. So if you add up contingent beings to infinity, you still get contingent beings, not a necessary being.” See John Hick, ed. The Existence of God (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1964), 174. 41   DM 29, 1, 25–40. 42   DM 29, 1, 26. 39

40

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(Second consequent): “It is, therefore, impossible in that regress to proceed into infinity, but it is necessary to stop at an unproduced being, that is independent even in its causation” (Ergo non potest in illu progressu in infinitum procedi, sed sistendem est in ente improductio, quod etiam in causando sit independens).

Suárez then goes on to explain the logic behind these assertions: 43 The fi rst antecedent is evident from the above-mentioned principle: all that is produced is produced by another (omne qud producitur, ab alio producitur). For this is the same as saying that all that depends, depends on another (omne quod dependet, ab alio dependet). If, therefore, the total collection of beings were dependent, it would necessarily have to be dependent on another. But that is impossible, since there is nothing outside of that collection. And if the entire collection were to depend on any being comprehended within the collection, that being would depend on itself, which is impossible. Thus, in consequence, it is impossible that the entire collection of causes be dependent in their activity in regard to dependence in the proper sense in which the subsequent cause depends on the antecedent one.

B. The singularity of the unproduced being In DM 29, 3 Suárez examines a total of seven a priori reasons for the unicity of the necessary being. The first reason is from Soncinas. It argues that existence primarily belongs to unproduced being, but it cannot belong primarily to two unproduced beings. Since existence, by its nature, does not have being per accidens but rather essentially, it follows that necessary being must be singular. Suárez believes that this argument is valid only if reformulated. In its present form, it seems to beg the question since it assumes that singularity is intrinsic to unproduced being.44 The second reason is from Aquinas.45 If there were two necessary beings, they would need to be differentiated by something added to either one or both of them. Thus, either one or both would be composite. But no composite thing can exist necessarily. Therefore, necessary being must be singular. Suárez rejects this argument. If indeed plurality necessarily implies composition, it would be impossible to distinguish between the three persons of the Trinity without composition in the divine essence.46 Since, however, the divine essence is not composite, and the three divine persons are indeed distinct, it must be possible to have plurality without composition.

  Ibid.   DM 29, 3, 7. 45   Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles I, c. 42, n. 8. 46   Suárez discusses this point in DM 29, 3, 8. 43

44

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The third reason is also from Aquinas:47 Suárez summarizes it as follows: “A being which, by its very nature, is necessary, has its necessity of existence inasmuch as it is this singular being; therefore, it is impossible that beings, which are necessary by their nature, to be plural” (Ens, quod per se est necessarium, habet necessitatem essendi in quantum est hoc singulare; ergo impossibile est entia per se necessaria esse plura).48 Suárez admits that this argument “is certainly notable and subtle” (est sane ratio egregia et subtilis).49 He believes, however, that it must be reformulated. Since angels, according to Suárez, exist as singular beings, they could also be said to exist necessarily if this third reason were followed. Thus, there would still be the possibility of multiple necessary beings. The fourth reason is that of Suárez himself. If there were more than one necessary being, diverse beings would have to be distinguished by something outside of their nature. But it is impossible for an unproduced necessary being to have its principle of individuation outside of its nature. Thus, there could only be one such being.50 This argument wil be examined in more detail momentarily. The fifth reason is also that of Suárez himself. What is abstract cannot be multiplied numerically, and, a nature that is singular cannot be multiplied numerically. This reason can also be explained by the realization that two uncaused beings cannot be of the same or of diverse species at the same time. 51 The sixth reason (likewise of Suárez himself) begins with the recognition that unproduced being is of the highest perfection and is also infinite. As a consequence, it can produce all of the things that participate in being. Since it is endowed with this creative omnipotence, it is incapable of being conditioned by any other cause, and hence, it is uniquely singular.52 The seventh and final a priori reason for the singularity of necessary being is based on final causality. As the ens perfectissimum, the unproduced being is “the final end of all things (finis ultimus omnium aliorum).53 Since the final end cannot be multiple, the ens perfectisssimum must be singular.54

  Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles I, c. 42, n. 13.   DM 29, 3, 9. 49   DM 29, 3, 10. 50   This fourth argument is discussed in DM 29, 3, 11–14. 51   This reason is presented and discussed in DM 29, 3, 15–23. 52   This reason is presented and discussed in DM 29, 3, 24–26. 53   DM 29, 3, 27. 54   This reason is that of Suárez himself, but it is based in part on what is said by Aquinas in STh I, q. 44, a. 4 (as Suárez himself acknowledges in DM 29, 3, 31). 47

48

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If one were to choose which of the seven a priori reasons is the most persuasive, a good choice might be the fourth, which tries to show that singularity is essential to the nature of an unproduced being. Suárez argues in the following manner:55 (Major premise): Since wherever the common nature is multipliable according to diverse singular natures, it is not necessary for the singularity to be distinguished from the common nature in objective fact; it needs, however, to be in some manner outside the essence of such a nature; for if singularity were essential to it, then, in fact, such a nature would not be multipliable, as was treated above in the treatise on the principle of individuation. (Quia ubique ratio communis est multiplicabilis secundum diversas naturas singulares, esto non sit necesse singularitatem in re ipsa distingui a natura communi, oportet tamen, ut aliquo modo sit extra essentiam talis naturae; nam si esset illi essentialis, revera talis non sit esset multiplicabilis, ut supra dictum est, tractado de principio individuationis).

(Minor premise): But in unproduced being, singularity cannot be understood as outside the essence of its nature (in ente autem improducto intelligi non potest, quod singularitas sit extra essentiam naturae ejus). (Conclusion): Therefore, it is impossible that such a nature be multipliable (ergo impossible est, ut talis natura sit multiplicabilis).

The major premise is thought to be self-evident. The minor premise (that singularity is essential to the nature of an unproduced being) is demonstrated in the following way:56 (Major premise): In the uncaused being, it is necessary that existence itself be included in its essence (in ente improducto necesse est, ut ipsum esse existentiae sit essentia ejus). (Minor premise): But there is no existence that is not that of a singular as singular (sed esse non est, nisi rei singularis, ut singularis est). (Conclusion): Therefore, it is necessary that the singularity of such a nature also belong to its essence, and, as a consequence, that such a nature not be multipliable (ergo necesse est ut singularitas talis naturae sit etiam de essentia ejus, ut talis natura non sit multiplicabilis).

The main thrust of this argument is that an unproduced being must exist, and existence must be essential to its nature. To assert the possibility of multiple necessary beings, though, would require that singularity or uncity not be essential to the nature of necessary being. But a being that exists necessarily must possess the complete essence of what is necessary for existing (ut habens totam essentiam necessariam ad essendum).57 Since singularity is essential to an existing being, the necessary being   DM 29, 3, 11.   Ibid. DM 29, 3, 11: Suárez treats the “Unity of the Individual and its Origin” (De unitate individuali, eiusque principio) in Disputatio 5. Much of the logical force of a priori reason 4 in DM 29, 3, 11 depends on the foundation in Disputatio 5 where Suárez argues that existence by its nature must involve a singular being as singular. 57   DM 29, 3, 11. 55

56

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must possess singularity as essential to its essence (and not as something external to its essence). Thus, the necessary being must be singular.58 C. Conclusion Suárez believes that the reality of an unproduced, necessary being is first established by the principle of causality. An unproduced being must exist; otherwise, the total collection of beings would be dependent, ex hypothesi, and yet dependent on nothing (which is impossible). The singularity of this unproduced being can be supported by a posteriori argumentation. The more certain reasons, though, for the singularity of the unproduced being are a priori in nature. The strongest such argument is that existence belongs to the very essence of necessary being, and existence, by definition, is singular. Is the proof of Suárez still coherent in the light of modern science and cosmology? I would answer in the affirmative because his arguments are not based on empirical science but metaphysics. As the physicist and theologian, Fr. Stanley Jaki, has observed: “The question about the strict totality of things is philosophical though not in disparagement of the science of quantities.”59 Nothing in contemporary science or cosmology shows that the universe is the cause of itself, and there is much support in science for the concept of intelligent design.60 Moreover, a scientist as notable as Einstein once spoke of “the miracle” of “a high degree of order in an objective world which we are in no way entitled to expect a priori”.61 The validity of Suárez’s argument seems to turn on one question: Is the universe, composed of produced and dependent beings, intelligible apart from a being that is unproduced and necessary? To assert that: “the universe is just there, and that’s all”62 is a refusal to take seriously the metaphysical question of the cause of the universe. Moreover, such an assertion is not scientific at all since the question of the cause of the universe is not scientific but metaphysical in nature. If there is no unproduced necessary being, we are left adrift in a universe of produced and contingent beings that just exist and that’s all. Since both science and metaphysics are based on reason, why should we accept the irrational proposi  DM 29, 3, 12.   Stanley L. Jaki, Is There a Universe? (New York: Wethersfield Institute, 1993), 124. 60   See Stanley L. Jaki, The Purpose of It All (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1990). The discussion of the complexity of the living cell on pp. 81–87 is perhaps the most illuminating. 61   See Jaki, God and the Cosmologists (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1989), 22. On the same page, Fr. Jaki notes that Einstein found it curious that we must be resigned to acknowledge “the miracle” of the world “without having any legitimate way of getting any further”. 62   This was the famous reply of Bertrand Russell to Fr. Frederick Copleston when asked: “Why shouldn’t one raise the question of the cause of existence of all possible objects?” See Hick,. The Existence of God, 174–175. 58 59

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tion that the universe is made up of multiple dependent beings, which, as a totality, depend on nothing at all? In fact, it is the very nature of the universe’s contingency that points us to God. As Fr. Jaki notes: The move towards God, if it is to be a safe one, must not be a separation from the universe. The move rather consists in sensing the pulse of a cosmic contingency, the relentless pointing of the universe beyond itself.63

In the late 16th century, the Jesuit Suárez sensed the radical dependence of the universe on a being who was unproduced and, therefore, independent. This being, necessary and singular, is, I maintain, the same God towards whom the pulse of cosmic contingency relentlessly points.

BIBLIOGRAPHY SCHOLASTIC SOURCES Aquinas, Thomas. Summa theologiae. [= STh] — Summa contra gentiles. Duns Scotus, John. De primo principio. In A Treatise on God as First Principle, translated and edited by Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1966. Suárez, Francisco. Disputationes metaphysicae. Vols. 25–26 of R. P. Francisci Suárez e Societate Jesu, Opera omnia, editio nova, edited by C. Berton, Paris: L. Vivès, 1861. [= DM] — The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God: Metaphysical Disputations 28–29. Translated and edited by John P. Doyle. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2004.

MODERN WORKS Fastiggi, Robert. “The Proof for the Existence of God in Suárez”. In Francisco Suárez (1548– 1617) Tradição e Modernidade, edited by A. Cardoso, A. Manuel Martins and L. Ribeiro dos Santos, 81–92. Lisbon: Edições Colibri, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, 1999. Hick, John, ed. The Existence of God. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1964. Jaki, Stanley L. God and the Cosmologists. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1989. — Is There a Universe? New York: Wethersfield Institute, 1993. — The Purpose of It All. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1990. Pereira, José. Suárez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007.

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  Jaki, God and the Cosmologists, 213.

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AUTHOR PROFILES Giannina Burlando is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. She earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from The Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio (USA). She teaches ancient and mediæval philosophy at Seminario Pontificio Mayor de Santiago and currently works in research on “Giro hacia el contextualismo histórico: tratados políticos de F. Suárez y el origen del republicanismo democrático ibérico”. She has published numerous articles on the 17th century history of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. She is co-editor of Filosofía medieval 24; Enciclopedia Iberoamericana de Filosofía (Madrid: Trotta, 2002), and editor of De las pasiones en la filosofía medieval (Santiago de Chile: LOM, 2009). E-mail: [email protected] Rolf Darge (Ph.D. 1995, Habilitation in Philosophy 2002, University of Cologne) is Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Salzburg. His primary research interests are in mediæval and early modern philosophy. His recent publications include Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition (2003), Der Aristotelismus an den europäischen Universitäten der frühen Neuzeit (2007), Die Grenze der Philosophie nach Bonaventura und Thomas von Aquin (2007), Die religiöse Wurzel der mittelalterlichen Transzendentalienlehre (2011) and Suárez and Medieval Transcendental Thought (2013). E-mail: [email protected] Saverio Di Liso (born 1969) is Professor of History of Philosophy at the Theological Institute “Regina Apuliae” of the Theological Faculty of Puglia (Facoltà Teologica Pugliese), Molfetta (Bari, Italy), and he teaches History and Philosophy at the Liceo Scientifico “Galileo Galilei”, Bitonto (Bari, Italy). His main publications are Domingo de Soto. Dalla logica alla scienza (Bari: Levante Editori, 2000); “Domingo de Soto: ciencia y filosofía de la naturaleza”, in Cuadernos de Pensamento Español 29 (2006) (Pamplona: Servicio de publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra S. A., 2006); B. de Las Casas – J. G. de Sepúlveda, La controversia sugli indios, a cura e con un’Introduzione di S. Di Liso, Biblioteca filosofica di Quaestio 4 (Bari: Edizioni di Pagina, 2007). E-mail: [email protected]

AUTHOR PROFILES

Costantino Esposito (born 1954) is full professor of History of Philosophy at the University of Bari «Aldo Moro». His main research interests are: 1) The thought of Martin Heidegger, in particular the phenomenology-ontology link, the problem of history, nihilism, the reading of Kant, Schelling and Augustine; 2) The philosophy of Immanuel Kant, especially the relationship between criticism, metaphysics and religion; 3) The metaphysical works of Francisco Suárez, as a transition from the scholastic tradition to the modern ontology. He has published numerous monographies, essays and articles both in Italy and abroad and edited the italian translation, with commentary, of works of Suárez, Kant and Heidegger. With Pasquale Porro is editor of Quaestio: International Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics. E-mail: [email protected] Robert Fastiggi earned a Ph.D. in historical theology from Fordham University in New York in 1987. From 1985 to 1999, he taught at St. Edward’s University, Austin, Texas, USA. Since 1999, he has been on the faculty of Sacred Heart Major Seminary Detroit, MI 48206 USA where he is currently professor of systematic theology. He is the co-editor of the English translation of the 43rd edition of the Denzinger-Hünermann Enchirdion symbolorum (Ignatius Press, 2012) and the executive editor of the 2009–2013 supplements to the New Catholic Encyclopedia (Gale Cengage in cooperation with The Catholic University of America Press). E-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] Marco Forlivesi (born 1967) is tenured assistant professor of History of Philosophy at Chieti University (Università degli Studi ‘Gabriele d’Annunzio’ di Chieti e Pescara). His studies span the period from the 13th to the 17th century, principally focusing on the History of University Philosophy, both in the context of public studia and in the context of the studia of religious orders. He has published three major books and a number of articles in Italian, English and French. He is also the editor of six collective volumes and of two websites. He is a member of several scholarly societies and research teams. E-mail: [email protected]. Web: http://unich.academia.edu/MarcoForlivesi Marko J. Fuchs studied philosophy at the Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena where he focused on Descartes, Spinoza, classical German philosophy (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), phenomenology and Existentialism (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre), and Critical theory (Adorno). He graduated with a dissertation Grundfiguren endlichen Selbstseins bei Augustinus und Descartes. From 2008 to 2009 he was working at the Martin Grabmann Institute for Mediæval Theology and Philosophy at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Since 2009 he has been working at the Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg where he works on a habilitation treatise about the reception of the Aristotelian theory of justice in the Middle Ages. E-mail: [email protected]

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AUTHOR PROFILES

Simo Knuuttila, ThD (Helsinki 1976), MA, is Academy Professor in the Academy of Finland (1994—) and Professor of Theological Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion at the Department of Systematic Theology, University of Helsinki. He has published several works on the history of logic, semantics and the philosophy of mind. He is the managing editor of the New Synthese Historical Library, member of the editorial boards of many series and journals and chair of the committee for Finnish translation of Aristotle’s works. E-mail: [email protected] Marco Lamanna (Ph.D. Bari, 2008) is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Scuola Normale Superiore (Pisa). His studies focus on the rise of the modern philosophical lexicon, the Jesuit and Reformed scholasticism and the “birth” of ontology and psychology as independent sciences during the Early Modern Age. Recently, his research activity has been concerned with the scholastic elements within the Humanistic and Renaissance philosophies and the impact of early modern ontologies in modern natural law (Hugo de Groot, S. Pufendorf). E-mail: [email protected] Daniel D. Novotný is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice, Czech Republic. His interests include history of philosophy, metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, comparative philosophy, and teaching philosophy. His current research focuses on the history of the controversies about entia rationis in post-mediæval scholasticism. He is the author of Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel. A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era (Fordham University Press, 2013), co-editor of Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic (Ontos, 2012), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics (Routledge, 2014) and Editor-in-Chief of Studia Neoaristotelica: A Journal of Analytical Scho lasticism. E-mail: [email protected] Victor Salas, Jr. is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Sacred Heart Major Seminary, Detroit, Michigan (USA). He earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from Saint Louis University, and his current research pertains to mediæval doctrines of analogy, especially that of Thomas Aquinas. E-mail: [email protected] Stephan Schmid works as a Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter at the Chair for Theoretical Philosophy at the Humboldt-University in Berlin, Germany. He has worked on the conception and transformation of teleological explanations in the early modern period and he currently focuses on Francisco Suárez’s Metaphysics of Modalities. He is the author of Finalursachen in der Frühen Neuzeit (De Gruyter, 2011) and of a range of articles about early modern philosophy of mind in Arnauld, Spinoza, Malebrache and Hume. E-mail: [email protected]

327

AUTHOR PROFILES

Jorge Secada is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia. He also holds regular visiting appointments at the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. He has published many articles on early modern philosophy, the historiography of philosophy and applied ethics, and is the author of Cartesian Metaphysics (2000). He has a weekly column in the Peruvian national daily Diario16; these articles will be collected in the forthcoming Meditaciones peruanas. He is currently working on books on philosophy as meditation and on Suárez’s metaphysics. He publishes both in Spanish and in English. E-mail: [email protected] Anna Tropia (born 1983) is Associated Member of the Laboratoire d’Études sur le Monothéisme, “LEM” (ÉPHE/CNRS, Paris). She is working in research on the history of Parisian colleges (1550-1650). E-mail: [email protected] Jorge Uscatescu Barrón studied philosophy, classical philology and Romanic philology at the Alberts-Ludwig-Universität in Freiburg (Dr. phil. 1991); he achieved MA in Indology (Freiburg 2008), habilitated in philosophy (Freiburg 2012); received research fellowship at the Instituto de Filosofía (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas in Madrid), and Humboldt scholarship (2000–2001). Since 2005 he is Research Fellow at the Raimundus-Lullus-Institut in Freiburg, working on a critical edition of Lullus’ Latin works. His main research fields are metaphysics and phenomenology (Die Grundartikulation des Seins. Eine Untersuchung auf dem Boden der Fundamentalontologie, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1992); ethics and theory of feelings (La teoría aristotélica de los temples de ánimo. Una investigación sobre la afectividad en la Antigüedad, Madrid: Sociedad Iberoamericana de Filosofía, 1998); philosophy of religion (several papers on the Holy) and æsthetics (Paseo estético por una pinacoteca, Barcelona: Ediciones del Serbal, 2008). Historically he focuses on Antiquity (Aristotle), Middle Ages (Lullus), second scholasticism (Suárez), and phenomenology (Heidegger). Presently he is working on the history of the concept of good from Antiquity to the contemporary philosophy. E-mail: [email protected]

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ABOUT THE EDITOR Lukáš Novák is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, Charles University, Prague, and at the Faculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice, Czech Republic. He is interested in the philosophical legacy of Duns Scotus and its later development especially in the 17th century; his systematic work aims at a synthesis of traditional scholastic and contemporary analytic approach in areas such as metaphysics, philosophy of logic and epistemology. He is co-editor of Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic (Ontos, 2012), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics (Routledge, 2014) and has been editor of the journal Studia Neoaristotelica since its foundation in 2004. His book Scire Deum esse (first published in Czech, now being translated into English) aims to show Scotus’s proof of God’s existence as a principal and genuine achievement of his metaphysics conceived as an Aristotelian science of being qua being. E-mail: [email protected]

GENERAL INDEX The index does not comprise the abstracts and the descriptions of individual articles in the Introduction; the coverage of footnotes is selective. References to occurences in footnotes only are in parentheses, bold numbers imply substantial discussion in the text or relative importancy of the reference. N-dash – marks sub-entries, double and single arrows ⇒  stand for cross-references (“see” and “see also”, respectively). Saltire × is a shorthand for “versus”. Entries are only given in English or Latin form as a rule, but the references given include equivalent occurrences in German prose as well. German equivalents are nevertheless provided wherever deemed helpful. Homonyms or remote shades of meaning are distinguished by means of superscript numbers. a priori × a posteriori1 (Kantian sense) 118, 131 a priori × a posteriori2 (scholastic sense) 26, 28–29, 126 – demonstration of God 309–311, 312–322 abstraction – from matter 18, 20, 33 – from phantasms 267, 277, 280–281, 284 – metaphysical 18–21, 31–34, (67), 80–81, 160 – of being 51, 88, 96, 98, 101, 109, 120 – of transcendentals 54 – of universals ⇒ universal: its abstraction – × separation 18 accident – absolute × relative 15 – and individuation 221, 232–233 – negative 170 – object of metaphysics 14–15, 24 – per se (proper; wesenhaft) ⇒ proprium – × substance 14, 23–24, 43, 140, 164, (166), 221, 227, 232–234 accidental – being ⇒ being1: ens per se × per accidens – cause ⇒ cause: accidental – order ⇒ order: essential × accidental – truth ⇒ truth: logical

act  actuality – actus exercitus × actus signatus ⇒ in actu exercito × in actu signato – cognitive 65, (67)–(68), 71–78, 83, 92, 187–203, 261–270, 276, 279, 284–285, 290 – false ⇒ false: propositions or judgements – first × second 263–266, 300 – formal × virtual 311 – mental (geistig) 156, 190, 192, 198–204, 220–223, 226, 281;  act: cognitive – of appetite 272 – of being (actus essendi; Seinsakt) 42, 57, 117, 130 – of imagination (fantasy) 264–266, 272, 285 – of perception (sensory) 261–266, 268–270 – of will ⇒ will: its activation and operation – pure 31–32, 298 – reflexive 199;  reflexive concepts and cognition – vegetative 261 – vital (vital operation) 260–272, 280–285 – – its principle 260–264, 268–271, 282 – × object 92, 189–193, 197, 223

GENERAL INDEX ACTION

– × potency 47, 51, 64, 123, 129;  actuality action, causal 245, 247–252, 297–300, 302–303, (305)–306, 311;  causality actuality (Wirklichkeit) 42, 128, 123, 127, 129, 158–159, 164, 166, 168;  act adaequatio (defines truth) 68–71, 75;  conformity affirmation, priority of 144–145 akrasia (304) aliquid 14, 135–148 analogy – and denomination 185 – of attribution (analogia attributionis) 94–96, 164–168;  attribution – of being (analogia entis) 87–102, 107, 110, 166, 237 – of cause 252, 294 – of experience 131 – of God and creatures 89–101, 312 – of proportionality (analogia proportionalitatis) 68, 94–95, 164–176, 199 – of supertranscendentals 148, 159, 164–169, 176, 199, 203 – of truth 65, (68), 82–83 – × univocity 87–91, 106–110, 114–115, 159–162, 165, 173 angelology 139;  substance spiritual, immaterial, or separate aptitudo ad existendum (aptitudo essendi)  99–101, 127–128, 130, 137, (200) attention (active) of the soul (263)–265, 268–271, 282–283, 287 attribute  passio2;  proprium – Cartesian and Spinozan 111–114 – divine ⇒ God: his attributes – of being (transcendental) 17, 41, 54–59, (66), 79, 107;  passio2 entis attribution 24–25, 33, 94–96 – analogy of ⇒ analogy: of attribution being1 (ens) – aptitudinal (89) 99–102

332

– ens commune 17–18, 21 – ens fictum (54), (169), 170 – ens impossibile (125), 170;  entity: impossible;  ens rationis – ens increatum 15, 93, 21, 312, 317–318 – ens per essentiam 97, (246), (298) – ens per participationem 97 – ens rationis ⇒ ens rationis – ens universale (universal being) 39, 56–57, 139–140, 147–148 – ens, per se × per accidens 222, 232 – its concept ⇒ concept: of being – of reason ⇒ ens rationis – passiones entis ⇒ passio2 entis – possible 42, 93, 99, 102, 117, 122–129, 177, 212–213, 221–226, 230–233 – qua being 15–16, 22, 67, 120–121 – ratio entis 14–16, 19–25, 31, 49–50, 59, (93), (136), 174;  concept: of being – transcendental 16–17 – uncaused 310–312, 315, 320–321 – universal ⇒ being1: ens universale – ut nomen × ut participium 99 being2 (esse)  existence – actus essendi (Seinsakt) 117, 130, 42, 57 – esse cognitum (being known) (158), (187) – esse obiective (obiectivum; objective being) 92, (158)–159, 163–166, 170–171, 174, 186–193, 197–204, (300) – esse subiective (158)–159 – esse veritativum 172 Calvinism 118, 121, 138, 140–141, 146 Cartesianism 75, 126, (157) categories 39, 45–46, 105, 136, 140, 154, 173, 231 Catholicism 41, 118–119, 122 causa sui 110, 115, (246), 322 causality (causation) ⇒ cause – matter of physics × metaphysics 15, 239 – and reality 118 – divine ⇒ God: his causality – in Spinoza 113, 115

GENERAL INDEX

– influx theory of 131, 238, 245, 252, 254, 293–295 – means of proving God’s existence 121, 311–320 – of intellect 163–164 – principle of 316, 322 cause  causality – accidentally × essentially ordered; causae per se × per accidens subordinatae  (245), 318 – causa sui 110, 115, (246), 322 – definition or notion of 238–244, 252, 293–294 – efficient 237–255, 259, 263, 294–295, 299–303, 306, 311–312, 315–316, 318 – – denied 266, 270 – exemplar (242), 298–(300) – extrinsic 113, (237) – final (237)–238, 242–243, 252, 254, 293–307, 320 – formal 129–130, (237), 239, 242, 252, 254, 294 – free 302, 306;  freedom of will – instrumental × principal 245–(246), (249)–252, (284) – intrinsic 115, (237) – kinds of (237), 239–240, 242, (245)–(246) – material (237), 242–243, 294 – motor × efficient 244 – of entia rationis 163–164, 200–205 – of formal concept (78) – of the universe 322 – of truth (68)–(71), 75 – of vital acts 260–267, 271, 302–306 – partial × total 242, 264, 271, 307 – per accidens (accidental) 242, 245, 250, 293 – per se 242 – prior to effect in which way 241 – uncaused (first) 311, 315–316 – universal × particular 248, (252) certainty, psychological 84

CONCEPT

chimera (43), (171–172), 191–194, 198–199, 201 cognition  act: cognitive;  knowledge – clear and distinct 77, 85, 112 – formal 84 – human (× divine) 75, 91, 163, 287–289 – true ⇒ truth: of knowledge colligantia (virtutum) 276–279;  sympathy common nature (natura communis) 212, 219–231, 321 composition – and division 64–81 – (in God) not implied by plurality 319 – of common nature and individuation 212 – of essence and existence 129 concept – complete individual 79 – formal × objective (65), (70)–(72), (78), (81)–83, 91–93, 222–223, (300), 314–315;  distinction: between formal and objective concepts – of being 31, 44, 107, 72, 88–101, 120–121, 123, 128;  being1 – – confused 51, 89, 98, 101–102 – – formal 93, 96 – – objective 88, (91), 93, 100, 148, 154, 173 – – Sinngegalt des Seienden 40, 42, 47–58;  being1: ratio entis – – supertranscendental 160–163, (167), 174–(177) – – unitary and univocal 59, 72, 89–98, 107–108, 159–160, 162;  univocity: of being;  unity: of the concept of being – quidditative (× qualitative) 31, 43, 49;  quidditative: attribute;  quidditative: predication – reflexive ⇒ reflexive concepts and cognition – simple1 (not a judgement) ⇒ simple apprehension – simple2 (incomposite) 31 – – simpliciter simplex 101

333

GENERAL INDEX CONCOMITANTIA

– universal (166), 220, 267;  universal concomitantia – obiecti 73–74, 78 – virtutum 279, (285)–286, 287;  sympathy concordia (potentiarum) 279, (281), (285);  sympathy concurrence – of causes 238, (243), 244, 254 – of God (concursus divinus) ⇒ God: his causality: concursus divinus – of neural spirits 269 conformity (of intellect and thing) 64–83;  truth;  adaequatio confusio 51 connexio (potentiarum) 266–272, 279–287;  sympathy connotation – and truth 64, 71–74, 76, 81–85 – × appellation (253) consequence (propositional and causal)  240–241 consonantia (potentiarum) 270;  sympathy containment, virtual or eminent 219, 312 contingency – of beings and universe 124, 322–323 – of formal concept 93 – × necessity ⇒ necessity × contingency conversio ad phantasmata 266, (276), 280, 285–(287), 289 cosmology – modern 322 – rational 121, 124 Council of Trent 120, 294 creation 118, 120, 130, 238, 248–(239), 250–(251), 255, 297–298 Creator (Schöpfer) 55, (96), 119, 121, 126, 130–131, (248), 313–314 creature (Geschöpf) 43, 55, 81, 89–98, 107, 110, 114, 126–127, 130, 131, 141, 222, 247–251, 255

334

demonstration a priori × a posteriori ⇒ a priori × a posteriori demonstration denomination (denominatio) 185–186 – extrinsic 55, 64, 79–83, (158), 162–163, 169, 172, 175, 185–188, 194–198, 203, 205 – intrinsic 64, 74, 83, 85, (167) dependence – among cognitive acts/faculties 265, (279), 287–288 – causal 240–241, 244, 252, 254, 303, 319 – logical 143 – of instances on properties 219, 224 – of will on reason 303 – on God 97, 101, 323 – on phantasms (279), 286–288 – ontological 97, 304 determinacy, proves individuality  225–227, 230–233 dialectic 155–156, 160 difference (dissimilarity) 94, 97–98 – ontological 117 differentia1 (predicable) 47–52, 93, 100, 108 – individualis 113, 212 – ultima (letzte Differenz) 47–50 differentia2 (= distinctio) realis minor 49, 56;  distinction: distinctio in re distinction – between essence and existence 117–118, 129–(131), 141 – between faculties of soul 268–269 – between formal and objective concept (71), 91–96, 314–315 – disticntio in re (in rerum natura; ex natura rei) 49–54, (57), 75, 100, 112, 114, 129 – formal (distinctio formalis) 49, 54, 106–111, 114–115;  distinctio in re;  differentia2 realis minor – modal (distinctio modalis) 48, 50, 100, 108, 111–112, 114, 122 – numerical 107–108, 112–114, 221–222

GENERAL INDEX

– of reason (distinctio rationis; Vernunftunterschied; Begriffliche Differenz; conceptual distinction) 45, 49, 53–56, 75, 108–112, 129, 155, 218–219 – – distinctio rationis ratiocinatae (cum fundamento in re) 100, 109, 130, 212, 219, 220 – quidditative (54), 113 – real (distinctio realis) 49, 53–56, 108, 111–115, 129, 141, 218–219, 268 – virtual (distinctio virtualis) 219 distress ⇒ pleasure × distress effect 126, 238–255, 259, 271–272, 313 efficacy, of secondary causes 247–248, 255 efficiency 238, 245, 254;  cause: efficient empiricism 234 ens ⇒ being1 ens rationis – can be an objective concept 92 – comprises negation 56 – its causes ⇒ cause: of entia rationis – its definition 157–159, 163, 183, 186–188, 195–196 – its division 169, 173, 194, 199, 202–204 – not object of logic 156 – object of metpahysics? 148, 153–177 – qua error according to Hurtado 183–206 – × real being 82, 148, 153–154, 159–177, 199, 203–204;  analogy: of supertranscendentals entity1 (of a thing) 64, 172, 211–212, 221, 225–227, 232, (282) – whole of a thing 211, 221, 233 entity2 (= a thing) – (possibly) existing 212, 225–231 – impossible 124, 161–(162), 170, 183, 191, 223, 226;  ens rationis – universal 219–220, 228–229 equivocity 90, 93, (94)–(95), 107–110, 160, 165–174, 314 error 185, 190, 195–196, 201, 204;  false: propositions or judgements

EXISTENCE

essence 117–131 – and individuality 321–322 – divine ⇒ God: his essence – its definition or notion 118, 123–126, 128–129, 142 – of entia rationis (essentia ficta) 170–171 – real (essentia realis) 57, 126–127, 143, 157, 159, 171 – subject of science 25–26 – × existence 43, 57, 99, 117–118, 122–124, 127–131, 136, 141, 321;  distinction: between essence and existence eternity – of Forms 230 – of God ⇒ God: his eternity – of the motion of heaven 314 Eucharist (82), 227, 233 exemplar – cause ⇒ cause: exemplar – divine (65), (70), 298 – for intelect (92), 283–285 existence (Dasein);  being 2 – act of ⇒ act: of existence – actual × possible 99, 127–128 – aptitudo ad existendum ⇒ aptitudo ad existendum – existentia realis 157, 170–171 – exrcised (existentia exercita) 99, 129, 191, 201–202 – in intellect 170;  being2: esse obiective – independent form intellect ⇒ independence from intellect – its definition, notion or ratio 93, 117–118, 123–124, 129, 131 – not a predicate 123 – of God ⇒ God: existence of – of spiritual beings 15, 18, 20, 29, 33–34 – of the subject of a science 20–26, 28, 34 – ordo ad existentiam ⇒ aptitudo ad existendum – qua principle of individuation 212 – spiritual 262

335

GENERAL INDEX EXPERIENCE

– × essence ⇒ essence × existence experience 39, (72), 287, 289;  senses: their operation;  perception: sensory – analogies of 131 faith 118, 120, 128, 131, 311, 314 false – concepts 65, 83, 192 – propositions or judgements 65, (69), 73, 75, 76, 82, 190–195, 198–(205) falsity, metaphorical (65), 83 fantasy ⇒ imagination finality ⇒ teleology finite – intellect ⇒ intelect: fi nite × infinite – modes 114 – rational agents 297, 299 – × infinite 15, 31, 41, 45, 89, 93, 96–98, 107–108, 121, 154 form  cause: formal – absolutely simple 58 – and analogy 164–168 – and causation 238, 240, 243–248, 253, 294–296, 300–301 – and matter 30, 112, 221, 233, (237), 240, 243–245, 253, 294–296, 300–301 – – of concept 47, 51 – individual 223 – intrinsic × extrinsic 74, 163–166, 172, 186–187 – its reception in sense organ 262 – real if denominatio extrinseca 163, 172 – separate ⇒ substance: spiritual, immaterial, or separate – substantial 212, 233, 238, 271 – unifying 221 formalitas 49 Forms, Platonic (Ideas) 215–219, 224, 228–230;  universal: separate;  universal: really existing freedom of will 260, 267, 302–307

336

– intelligibility of 306–307 – libertarian conception of 305 God – and creature ⇒ analogy: of God and creatures – cognition of 41, 107, 109, 115, 117 – concept of 31, 123, 127–128 – demonstration of 127–128, 309–323 – – a priori × a posteriori 309–311, 314 – – criticized by Kant 123, 127–128 – his attributes 107, 310 – his causality (81), 90, 96, 102, 115, 131, 238, 244–255, 297–299, 312 – – concursus divinus or causal participation  110, 238, 244, 247–255, 297 – his eternity 298, 310 – his essence 41, 114, 130, (246)–247, 319, 321–322 – his existence 121–123, 126–129, 309–325 – his ideas (65), (70), 298 – his independence 323 – his infinity 31, 113–115, 154, 247, 315, 320;  finite × infinite – his intellect 79, 215, 298, 230 – his necessity 129–130, 230, 298, 309–323 – his simplicity 310, 319 – his unicity or singularity 213, 313, 319–322 – his unity 222 – his will 298 – minimum concept of 128 – participation in Him 97–98, 230 good – created × divine 54, 311 – qua object of love, desire or choice 260, 302–303 – transcendental 40–41, 45, 54, 57, 66, 80, (136), 172–173 grammar (156) – universal of reality 139 harmonia (potentiarum) 270;  sympathy

GENERAL INDEX

hylomorphism 229, 234;  form × matter idea  exemplar – divine (65), (70), 298 – Platonic ⇒ Forms, Platonic – qua simple concept 65, (77), 82–83;  concept;  simple apprehension idealism 234 idem × diversum 139 identity – formal 223;  unity: formal – identity relations 226–227, 230, 233 – numerical 226–227, 230–234 – of indiscernibles 212, 227, 230–234 – real 45, 55, 198 – × distinction 219 imagination (fantasy) – as criterion of possibility (144) – does not produce entia rationis 205 – in Spinoza 109 – its function and connexion with other faculties 264–272, 279–285, 287 immanentism 106, 112, 115 impossible entity ⇒ entity: impossible in actu exercito × in actu signato 65, 67, 75–78, 84, 129 incommunicability 224–225 independence 31 – demonstrated 318–319 – from intellect or mind (Denkunabhängigkeit) 43, 49, 54, 57, 197, 199, (220), 223 – in existence 218 – of accidents from substance 233 – of divine will 298 – of God ⇒ God: his independence – of intellect from senses 281–282, 287–288 – of properties from instances 224 indiscernibility 227, 230, 232–233 – of identicals 230 individual – and common nature 212, 219–220

INTELLECT

– concept 79, 92 – difference 113, 212 – form ⇒ form: individual – its constitution 88, 211–212;  individuality – nature or essence 233 – unity 213, 225 individuality (individuation) 211–227, 320–321 – implied by existence 212–221, 225 – its notion and definition 221–222, 224 – modes of 219 – numerical or entitative 224, 226–227, 230, 232;  unity: numerical – of entia per accidens 222–223 – of formal and objective concepts 92 – of material × spiritual creatures 220–221 – principle of individuation 211–212, 221, 320–321 – transcendental ⇒ transcendental individuality – × uniqueness 222 – × universality (81), 218–221, 224, 228–229, 231–232 indivisibility 222–225 – of soul 270 inferior infinity 31 – of attributes 114 – of God ⇒ God: infinity of – of intelect ⇒ intelect: finite × infinite – of regress or causal series 311, 315–319 – of substance ⇒ substance: finite × infinite – × finitude ⇒ finite × infinite influx ⇒ causality: influx theory of intellect – agent 266–267, 284–285 – and acts of will 270, 302–303 – and other vital potencies 266–267, 270, 275–290

337

GENERAL INDEX

INTELLIGENT DESIGN

– divine ⇒ God: his intellect – finite × infinite 107, 109, 114 – human or created 20–21, (80), 120, 193, 202, 279, 288 – its conformity with the thing 64–83 – place of objective being ⇒ being2, esse obiective – possible 284 – source of entia rationis 188–198, 200 – source of extrinsic denominations 185–188 intelligent design 311, 313, 322 intelligibile (136), 141–144, 148, (167) Jesuit – Aristotelianism 122 – conception of logic (156)–(157) – metaphysics 121–122, 138, (172)–173 – thought – – adopting sympathy theory (277) – – in protestant context 121–122, 138 – – influenced by Soto 255 – – influenced by Suárez 205 judgement – false ⇒ false: propositions or judgements – × simple apprehension (concept) 18, 65, (68)–69, 74–77, 83–84 – its truth ⇒ truth: logical knowledge  cognition – human  cognition: human – of immaterial substances 13–35 – propositional 189 – Scotus’s × Suárez’s theory of 276, 279, 286 – through revelation ⇒ revelation – true ⇒ truth: of knowledge – universal and necessary 93 libertarianism 305–307 logic (67), 154, 156–(157), 160, (185), 239 Lutheranism 41, 119, 121, 138, 141, 149 matter – (in)dependence upon; abstraction from 17–21, 30, (34), 81, 141–142, 262

338

– as a cause ⇒ cause: material – and individuation 221, 233 – intelligible 81, 141 – × form ⇒ form and matter metaphor (as proportionality) 95, (168)–169, 174, 176 metaphorical – community 174 – falsity (65), 83 – motion ⇒ motion: metaphorical – presence of object in image 197 metaphysics – deals with entia rationis 148, 153–177 – deals with truth 65 – dogmatic 122–123 – general or universal 135, 139, 143, 146;  ontology – its possibility (91)–94, 97 – its subject/object 13–35, 67, 94, 97, (99), 135, 139–148, 153–161, 164, 169, 173–177 – its unity 16, 154 – Protestant 118–119, 121–122, 125–126, 138–149;  Schulmetaphysik – proves God 20, 22, 26–27, 317, 322 – special 139, 146 – × empirical science 322 – × physics 18–25, 32–34, 239, 317 – × theology 119–121 mode (Modifikation) – Cartesian and Spinozian 107, 111–114 – intrinsic 50, 100 – modus unionis 221, 233 – of being (entis or essendi) 47, 50, 52, 89, 96–100–101, 117, (147), 140, 212;  passio entis;  transcendental properties – – general × special 136 – of mind (71), 78 – of unity 219 – substantial 233 – × thing (res) 108 monism 106, 112, 115

GENERAL INDEX

motion (causal) – metaphorical 272, 300–306 – real 276, 301–304 movement (change) 20–21, 111, 238, 244, 253 natura communis ⇒ common nature necessity – its notion 31, 131 – of God ⇒ God: his necessity – of God’s concurrence 249 – of phantasms to the soul 284–287, 290 – physical of causes in moral affairs 307 – × contingency 131, 311 – × contingency, of falsity of judgements 191–204 negation1 (ontological) 55–58, 128, 165, 169–171, 142–146, 194, 197, 199, 203–204, 224–225 – of division 56, 224–225 negation2 (negative judgement) 190 neo-scholasticism, vicious circle of 120 nominalism × realism 2, 211–234, 248, 252, (286) non-being (Nichtseiendes) 137, 142–146, 165–166, 170 nothing (nihil) 193, 200 – meaning explicated 160–161 – nihil absolutum × negativum 129 – nihil × aliquid 137, 142–147 – standing outside of (extra nihil) 93, (95)–96, 98 notitia (notion) (78)–(79) object – of a science ⇒ science: its subject/object – × act ⇒ act: × object occasionalism 255 ontology 13–16, 18, 121–122, 124, 143, 146–149, 220 – dogmatic 122 – modern 44, 58 – of substance 109, 111

PHYSICS

onto-theology (88), 127 operation 126, 301;  action, causal – dealt with by metpahysics 15 – dependent × independent 318 – intellectual or mental 75, 77, 84, 219, 221, 270, 280, 282–283;  act: cognitive;  act: mental – of end 297 – of phantasy 282;  act: of imagination – of will ⇒ will: its activation and operation – sensory 270, 280;  act: of perception – vital of the soul ⇒ act: vital order, essential × accidental 80 ordo ad existentiam ⇒ aptitudo ad existendum original sin 279, 286, 289–290 – and dependence on phantasms 279, 286, 289–290 participation 97–98, 228, 230, 254 – of God, causal ⇒ God: his causality: concursus divinus – on being 145, 164 particulars ⇒ universals × particulars passio1 (passion) 242 – of will 260 passio2 (attribute) 23, 25, 125;  attribute;  proprium – entis 31, 41–56, 59, 64, (66)–(67), 83, 108, 137, 139;  transcendental: properties;  mode: of being – – disiuncta ⇒ transcendental: disjunctive perception – intellectual 70 – sensory 131, 261–266, 268–269;  experience,  senses: their operation phantasm 265–267, 275–290;  species: sensibilis phenomenalism 234 physics (67), 157, (237), 245 – × metaphysics 18–25, 32–34, 239, 317

339

GENERAL INDEX PLEASURE

pleasure × distress 260, 267 possibile ⇒ being1: possible possibility  being1: possible – internal (= essence) 123–127, 129 – logical of separation of substance and accidents 233–234 – of all things, founded in God 128 – of metaphysics ⇒ metaphysics: its possibility – of separate substances 34 – onto-logical 124 – transcendental 128 potency – vital 259–272, 275–290;  act: vital – – union of 267, 270, (277)–(278), 283 – × act ⇒ act × potency praeambulum fidei 120, 128 principle1 (ontological) – extrinsic 237, 295 – individuating ⇒ individuality: principle of individuation – intrinsic 137, 221, (237), 260–261, (263), 294 – material 242 – of actions and properties 125–126 – of being (ens) 17, 30 – of being (esse) 238, 245, 293 – of knowledge (70) – of motion or change 245, 301–302, 311 – of vital acts ⇒ act: vital: its principle principle2 (scientific) – of non-contradiction 121, 317 – of causality 316, 322 – – various formulations 311, 315, 317–319 – of conformity 66, 70, 82–83 – of the Identity of Indiscernibles ⇒ identity: of indiscernibles – quod movetur ab alio movetur 311 priority – formal (i.e. natural and logical) 241, 244 – of affirmation 144–145

340

– of efficient over motor cause 244 – of final cause 238, 254, 294–295 – of simple apprehension ⇒ simple apprehension: priority of – × posteriority 89, 98, 101, 139 privation (Beraubung) (55) – a being of reason 169 – a cause? (241), 293 – not a being of reason 194, 197, 199, 203–204 – not found in God 298 – notion of 170–172 – object of metaphysics? 142–145 – object of physics 157 – qua objective concept 92 – reduced to substance 165 proposition – false ⇒ false: propositions or judgements – self-evident 314 proprium (per se accident) 47–48, 52–53, 58–59;  attribute;  passio2 psychology – Augustine’s 262 – rational (metaphysical) 121, 124, 259, 271 pure act ⇒ act: pure quality 15, 231–232, 165 – in Spinoza 109 – sensible 262, 264 – × privation 170 quidditative – attribute 107–108, 114 – concept 31, 43, 49 – distinction (54), 113 – predication 43 quiddity – conceived inadequately 108–109 – dealt with in metaphysics 14, 26, 30–31 – defined 123 – material object of our intellect 286 – synonym of ens and res 126–128, 136–137, 142

GENERAL INDEX

ratio – entis ⇒ being1: ratio entis – formalis (of the subject of metaphysics, being etc.) 141–143, 166 – metaphorica 174 – obiectiva 109;  concept: formal × objective rational cosmology 121, 124 rational theology 16 realism ⇒ nominalism × realism realitas (formalitas) 49 reflexive, concepts and cognition (67), 76–78, 84, 198–199, 268 Reformation1 (broad sense) 120, 135, 138–139;  metaphysics: Protestant Reformation2 (narrow sense) ⇒ Calvinism relation – of reason (Vernunftrelation) 71, 80, 83, 155, 160, 171, 204, (226) – predicamental 71 – quasi-relation 64, 83–84 – real 80, 155, 160, 162, 171 – transcendental 155, 162 – virtual 290 res 43, 49, 126, 135–140, 143, 147–148, 160–161, 172 – cogitans × extensa 110 – × existence 118 reubav (147) rhetorics (156) scholastic – ἐπιστήμη (87) – ingenuity (81) scholasticism – criticised by Kant 121–125, 127–135 – early modern (second, Renaissance and Baroque) 1–2, 7, 121–125, 205-206, 316 – end of 2, (87) – mature 316 – neo-scholasticism, vicious circle of 120 – Protestant ⇒ metaphysics: Protestant

SOUL

science – and its subject/object 17, 20–28 – Aristotelian 49, 93;  science: scholastic interpretations of – first 22–24, 27 – modern empirical 322 – practical × speculative 67 – real 39, 49, 53–54, 59 – scholastic interpretations of 17–34 – transcendental ⇒ transcendental: philosophy or science semantics 65, 73, 83–84, 220, 239 sense – active 262, 268 – common 264–265 senses (sensory powers) – do not make up entia rationis 185, 194, 202–203;  cause: of entia rationis – external × internal 202, 264–266, 270–271, (284)–(285) – their operation 260–272, 280–(284);  perception: sensory;  experience Schulmetaphysik 42, 121, 127–128, 135, 147;  metaphysics: Protestant signification – and truth ⇒ truth: of signification – its explication 72–73 simple apprehension (concept, cognition)  64–65, (68), 74–79 – priority of 77, 185, 192–193, 200–202, 262 simplicity – of concept ⇒ simple apprehension; ⇒ concept: simple; – – of being 43, 47–53, 58, 89–102;  unity: of the concept of being;  univocity: of being – of God and immaterial beings 31, 310, 319 soul – and body 278–(279), 281, 285 – forma substantialis 278

341

GENERAL INDEX SPECIES

– its potencies and operations 57, 259–272, 277–287 – its union with potencies ⇒ potency: vital: union of – sensory (sensitive) 260–261, (265), (268), 279;  senses – vegetative  vegetative species – impressa × expressa 264 – infusa (289) – intelligibilis 21, (167), (77), (92), 159, 267, 275–288 – sensibilis 262–269, 279;  phantasm Suárezianism 1–2, (119), 121, 138, 141, 147, 183, 205 subject, of a science ⇒ science: its subject/object substance – and individuation 221, 232–234 – as a category 164, 231 – as a supertranscendental 173 – Cartesian notion of 110–112 – finite × infinite 15, 113–115 – material or natural 14, 22–24, 30–33, 220–221, 227, 229, 233, 247, 298, 301 – meaning “essence” 123, 126 – of soul (268)–269 – ontology of 108–111 – primary analogue of being (94) – Spinoza’s notion of 112–114 – spiritual, immaterial, or separate 14–22, 30–34, 216, 220–221, 233, (289) – × accident ⇒ accident × substance – × modus and attribute 110–114 – × quantity 189–193, 202, 231 supertranscendentality 85, 143, 159–(161), 162–163, 173–177;  univocity: between real beings and entia rationis;  analogy: of supertranscendentals;  concept of being: supertranscendental;  substance: as a supertranscendental;  unity: supertranscendental

342

sympathy 266–272, 276–290 synonymia entis 126, 135–137, 143–148, (169) teleology (finality)  cause: final – finality × final causation (297) – of science 27 – of various agents 297–299 – of vital potencies 271 theology – Calvin’s × metaphysics 138 – in Kant 127–128 – moral 129, 251 – rational or natural 16, 121, 124, 128, 139 – × metaphysics 119–121 tinology 143 transcendental (transcendetnals) – analysis or explication of 47–53, 58–59 – being 16–17, 49, 53, 55, 85, 128 – disjunctive 44, 46, 107 – extension of 41 – good ⇒ good: transcendental – individuality 223, 226;  unity: individual;  unity: transcendental – list of transcendentals 40–41, 135–137, 139–140, (172)–173 – moment of cognition (72) – notion or meaning of 39, 45–47, (80), 100, 122, 128, 136 – object of metaphysics 14–16, 29 – philosophy or science 39–44, 46, 58–59, 105–106, 115, 128, 139 – philosophy, of Kant 39–40 – properties of being 40–41, 44, 46, 55–56, 58–59, 66, (80), 135–136, 154–155, 172;  passio2: entis – rationes, concepts, or terms 13–15, 31, 135–137, 139–140, 147 – relative 57 – relation ⇒ relation: transcendental – theology 127 – theory or doctrine 41–46, 52–55, 57–59, 69, 135–136

GENERAL INDEX

– truth ⇒ truth: transcendental – unity ⇒ unity: transcendental – × universal or categorial (41), 51–52, 80 transsubstantiation 250 Trinity 319 truth – in significando × in cognoscendo × in essendo 67–83 – logical (special, accidental) 64–85 – object of science (156) – of being 67, 68, 79;  truth: transcendental – of knowledge 64, 67, 78, 81;  truth: logical – of signification 67, 69, 73, 82–84;  truth: logical – place of (68), (77), 84–85 – transcendental or ontological 40–41, 45, 54, 57, 64–68, (70), (76), 79–84, 136, 172–173;  truth: of of being unicity of God ⇒ God: unicity of union – among soul and vital potencies ⇒ potency: vital: union of – between act and object 72 – characteristic of being per se 221–222 – of incompatibles 190, 202 – of matter and form 221, 233;  form and matter – of soul and body 278, 281, 290;  soul and body – of subject and predicate 76–(77) – × unity 231 unity  individuality – as abstract concept 32 – essential × entitative 224 – extrinsc × intrinsic 222 – formal (71), 108, 223, 226 – individual, singular, numerical, or entitative 213, 224–225, 231–234;  individuality – merely verbal 166 –(167)

UNIVERSAL

– metaphysical or physical × relative 222 – modes of 219–224 – notion of 222 – of a concept (72), 81, 223 – of a science 27, 167 – of apperception 131 – of ens rationis and ens reale 154, 172;  ens rationis × real being – of metaphysics ⇒ metaphysics: its unity – of the concept of being 59, (72), 88, 90–91, 97, 101, (162), 164–(167), 173;  concept of being: unitary – of universe 313 – per se × per accidens 222–224 – supertranscendental 172–173 – transcendental 32, 40–41, 54–57, 80, 108, 168, 222–224, 226, 232 – universal 223 – generic and specific 165 universal (universality) – being (ens universale) ⇒ being1: ens universale – causes ⇒ cause: universal × particular – consideration 29–30, 160 – dependent on phantasms 267, 279–280 – grammar of reality 139 – its abstraction 18, 32–33, 220–221, 267, 279–(281) – its definiton 224 – its foundation in reality 219–221, 223 – knowledge 93 – logical 156 – metaphysics 121, 139, 141–144 – mind-dependent 220–221 – qua such an ens rationis 155, 223, 226 – really existing 219–220, 228;  Forms: Platonic – science 22–24 – separate 217, 228–229;  Forms, Platonic – species 280;  species: intelligibilis – trans-generic 136, 146

343

GENERAL INDEX UNIVERSE

– unity 223 – × transcendental ⇒ transcendental × universal – × particular or individual 18, (81), 92, 217, 219–229, 281, 286 universe – intelligently designed ⇒ intelligent design – its causes 15, 124, 313–314, 322 – its dependence on God 247, 323 – its order and beauty 249, 313, 316–317 – not the cause of itself 322 – plurality of them 313 univocity – and character of metaphysics 115 – between real beings and entia rationis 159–160, 166, 173, 175;  analogy: of supertranscendentals – of attributes 107, 114

344

– of being 48, 106–109, 159–162, 165;  concept of being: unitary unum × multa 139 vegetative (soul, potency, act) 261, 267–268, 270, 279 will – and other powers 260, 270, 277 – and transcendental truth 57 – divine 298 – does not make up entia rationis 185, 194, 203 – freedom of ⇒ freedom of will;  – its activation and operation – its activation and operation 260–261, 267, 270, 298, 299–306, 311 – not externally caused upon 267 – passions of 260

INDEX OF PERSONS The index does not comprise the abstracts and the descriptions of individual articles in the Introduction. Persons not discussed but merely cited in the footnotes and bibliography are usually omitted, as well as the authors of the articles themselves (unless significantly mentioned by someone else) and persons mentioned merely in titles of written works. References to occurences in footnotes only are in parentheses, bold numbers imply substantial discussion in the text. N-dash marks subentries, double arrow ⇒ stands for cross-reference (“see”). For obvious reasons, Francisco Suárez is not included in the index. Aegidius Romanus ⇒ Giles of Rome Albert the Great (Albertus Magnus)  17–19, 34, 244–245, 314, 317 – albertism 254 Alexander Bonensis of Alessandria 19, 22–26, 32 Alexander of Aphrodisias 17, 157, 314 Alexander of Hales 19, 25 Alsted, Johann Heinrich (145), 147 Ammonius 71 Anselm of Canterbury 79, 309–311, 315–316 Aquarius, Matthias (176) Aquinas, Thomas  – founder of a school 1–2 – less popular than the Jesuits in the reformed context  121 – on entia rationis (157) – on essence cited by Suárez 125 – on transcendentals in relation to Suárez and Timpler 135–137, 142, 147 – source of Suárez’s conception of metaphysics 16–22 – source of Suárez’s conception of truth 68–84 passim – on analogy (166) – on causality 239–254 passim

– on finality 294–295, 307 – on individuation 220 – on soul and cognitive faculties (261), (265), 267, 280–281, 285–286, 289 – reception of his theistic proofs by Suárez 311–312, 315–320 – what kind of authority for Suárez 294 Araújo, Francisco de 174–176 Aristotle – on analogy (94) – on causality 239–241, 244 – on cognition 261–262, 264, 283, 287 – on denominations 185 – on entia rationis cited by Hurtado 191 – on essence cited by Suárez 125 – on finality 297 – on Intelligences cited by Suárez 314 – on substance and accident vs. Descartes and Leibniz  223 – on the nature of metaphysics variously interpreted 17–32 passim – on truth interpreted by Suárez and others 65–(69), (72), 74–75, 77, 79, 82–84 – rejecting Platonism, cited by Suárez 212–218 – source of theistic proofs 311, 317 Armstrong, David 220 Arnisaeus, Henning 119, 141

INDEX OF PERSONS

Arriaga, Rodrigo de 1, (158), 175, 204 Ashworth, E. Jennifer (67), (73), 237 Augustine (70), 79, (251), 264, (289) Aureoli, Petrus (Peter Auriol, Aureolus) 92, (276) Averroës 22, 26, 34, 262 Avicenna 18–22, 34, 42, 79, 161, 238, 244, 249, 254, 264–265, 288, (297), 314, 317 Balthasar, Hans Urs von (81), 120 Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb 121–123 Belluto, Bonaventura 276, (279), (281), 287–288 Berti, Enrico (165) Biel, Gabriel 248 Boëthius, Anicius Manlius Severinus 17–18, 94 Bonaventure 277–(279) Bonetus, Nicolaus 161–(163), 175–176 Bonino, Alessandro ⇒ Alexander Bonensis Brentano, Franz (165) Buridan, John 262–263 Burleigh, Walter 161 Cajetan ⇒ Thomas de Vio Capreolus, Joannes (Jean de la Capréole) 71, 74, 79, (91), 129, (167), (276)–(277) Cargile, James 220 Cavellus, Hugo (Aodh Mac Cathmhaoil, Hugh McCaghwell) (276) Chisholm, Roderick (305) Compton Carleton, Thomas 174, 176 Conimbricenses (276)–277 Courtine, Jean–François 44, 46, (78), (88), 119, 136, 143 D’Ailly, Pierre (Petrus de Aliaco) 312, 315–316 Darge, Rolf 108, 136–137, (155) Des Chene, Dennis (297) Descartes, René (77), 106, 108–113, 115, 126, 220. 223, 254 Domingo de Soto ⇒ Soto, Domingo de

346

Dominic of Flanders (Flandrias, Dominicus de Flandria) 71 Doyle, John P. (89), 98–99, 177 Duns Scotus, John – and the history of metaphysics 42–45, 55, 59, 89, 105–106 – founder of a school 2 – his proof of God’s existence 314–316 – on being and transcendentals vs. Suárez 21, 42–49, 50–56, 59, (66), 107, 136 – on distinctions 49, 53–54, 100, 107–108, 111, 114, 129, 212 – on entia rationis 160–162 – on existence 129 – on the nature of metaphysics 20, 22, 42–46, 105, 136 – on truth 79 – on universals and individuation 211–212, 217, 220–221 – on univocity 89, 106–107, 109–110, 115, 160–(162) – on vital acts, also discussed by Suárez 260–261, 263–264, 275–290 Durandus of Saint–Pourçain (Durandus de Sancto Porciano) 69, 71, 79, 82, 162, (199), (276) Eberhard, Johann August 122, 127 Ferrariensis ⇒ Sylvester of Ferrara Fichte, Johann Gottlieb  106, 115 Flandrias, Dominicus ⇒ Dominic of Flanders Folger-Fonfara, Sabine (161) Fonseca, Pedro da 74, 118, 121, 136–138, 140–144, 148–149, (156), 172, 176, 191, (221), (276)–(277) Francis of Prato (Francisco de Prato) (28) Francisco de Araújo ⇒ Araújo, Francisco de Francisco de Toledo (Franciscus Toletus) 156, (276)–(277) Franciscus de Marchia 161 Freedman, Joseph F. 138, 140–(141), 144

INDEX OF PERSONS

Gadamer, Georg 63, (84) Galilei, Galileo (241), 254 Gassendi, Pierre 220 Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus) 129, (276) Gilson, Étienne 42–43, 244 Göckel, Rudolph (Goclenius) 118, 138–141, 144–149 Gracia, J. (66), 80–(81), 214–216, (225) Guy, Alain  (94) Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 106, 115 Heider, Daniel (88)–(89), (101) Henry of Ghent (Henricus de Gandavo) 45, 136 Hervaeus Natalis Brito (Hervaeus Nédellec) 27–29, 71, 74, 82, 92, (156), (158) Hiquaeus, Antonius (Anthony Hickey) (276) Hispanus, Petrus 240 Hobbes, Thomas 220, (241) Hoeres, Walter 87 Honnefelder, Ludger 44, 105–106, 108 Hume, David 259, 271 Hurtado de Mendoza, Pedro 1, 157–(158), 172–175, 176, 183–205 Javellus, Chrysostomus 71, 79, (167), 314 Jan of Głogów (Joannes de Glogovia) 20 Joannes a Sancto Thoma  ⇒ Poinsot, João John of Jandun 262 Kant, Immanuel 39–40, 42, 105–106, 115, 117–118, 121–123, 126–131 Kilwardby, Robert (261)–(262), 264, (268) Kobusch, Theo 176 Lebniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 211, 220, 227, (232)–233 Leinsle, Ulrich G. 119 Lewalter, Ernst 119 Locke, John (73) Lorhard, Jakob 121, 146–147 Lossada, Luis de (157), 276

Ludwig, Josef 259, 266 Lychetus, Franciscus 281 Lynch, Richard (Lynceus) 174–176 Maimonides, Moses 90 Marion, Jean–Luc 87–88 Marston, Roger 278 Martini, Jakob 119, 141, 148 Mas, Diego (167), 176 Mastri, Bartolomeo 2, (205), 276, (279), 281, 287–288 Matthew of Aquasparta 278 McInerny, Ralph (95) Micraelius, Johannes 147 Molina, Luis de 238, (252)–253, 255 Nicholas of Orvaux ⇒ Orbellis, Nicolaus de Ockham, William (73), 161, 217, 220, (249)–(253), (286), 316 Olivi, Peter John 261, (263), 278, (283) Olivo, Giles (304) Orbellis, Nicolaus de (Nicholas of Orvaux) 28–29 Peirce, Charles S. 105 Pereira, José (89) Perera, Benet (Benedictus Pererius, Benito Pereira) 13–(14), 118, 121, 136, 138–139, 143, 148 Peter Auriol ⇒ Aureoli, Petrus Peter of Auvergne 244 Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus) 240 Petrus de Aliaco ⇒ D’Ailly, Pierre Philip the Chancellor (Philipp der Kanzler) 105 Plato  – on denominations 185 – on non–being 145, (165) – on universals, interpreted by Suárez 212–213, 215–220 – Platonism 217–220, 224, 228–230, 254, 264 Poinsot, João (Joannes a Sancto Thoma) 1, (95), 276–277

347

INDEX OF GREEK TERMS

Poncius, Joannes (John Punch) (162) Porphyry 48 Pruss, Alexander (306) Pseudo-Philoponus 270 Punch, John (Joannes Poncius) (162) Rorty, Richard 220 Rosemann, Philipp W. (87), (90) Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Josef 106, 115 Silvestri, Franciscus (277) Söchting, J. (81) Soncinas, Paulus (Paolo Barbo da Soncino)  71, 74, (167)–(168), 314, 317, 319 Soto, Domingo de (91), (156), 237–255 Spinoza, Baruch de 105–106, 109, 112–115 Sylvester of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) 74–75, (91), (277)

Téllez, Baltazar 176 Thomas de Vio (Tommaso de Vio; Cajetanus; Cajetan) 1–2, 16, 22, 26–27, 74–75, 79, 83, (91), 95, (167), 260, 262 Timpler, Clemens 118, 140–149, 177 Toletus, Franciscus ⇒ Francisco de Toledo Tommaso de Vio ⇒ Thomas de Vio Trombetta, Antonio 29–(35) Wadding, Luke 276 William of Mare 277–278 Wolff, Christian 3, 41–(43), 105, 122–126, 148 Zerbi, Gabriele 19 Zúmel, Francisco (167)

INDEX OF GREEK TERMS References to occurences in footnotes only are in parentheses, bold numbers imply substantial discussion in the text. ἀδιανόητον (145) ἀναλογία (94)–95 ἀνέμφατον (145) ἀπόφασις 165 ἐκ πϱοϑέσεως 48 ἐπιστήμη (87) ἔχειν 170 ἰσοδυναμοῦντα 147 λόγος 55 μὴ ὄν 144, (157), 165 μὴ ἁπλῶς εἶναι (165) νοητόν 144, (145) ὁμωνύμως 165

348

ὄν 144, 164–165 ὀντολογία 140 οὐσία (157), 165 παϱώνυμον 185 πολλαχῶς 165 πϱοσεκτικόν 271 πϱὸς ἕν (94)–(95), (157), 164–(166) πϱὸς μίαν φύσιν 165 στέϱησις 170 ὑγιενόν 165 ὑπόληψις (145) φϑοϱά 165 φύσις 55, 165