Studies in Tractate Eruvin of the Talmud Bavli: Structure, Language, Redaction, and Halakha 9781644691427

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STUDIES IN TRACTATE ERUVIN OF THE TALMUD BAVLI Str u c ture , L a n g u a g e , Re d a c ti o n , a n d Ha l a k ha

STUDIES IN TRACTATE ERUVIN OF THE TALMUD BAVLI Str u c ture , L a n g u a g e , Re d a c ti o n , a n d Ha l a k ha URI ZUR

BOSTON 2020

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Zur, Uri, author. | Kessel, Rachel, translator, editor. Title: Studies in Tractate Eruvin of the Talmud Bavli : structure,   language, redaction, and halakha / Uri Zur; with additional translation   and editing by Rachel Kessel. Description: Boston : Academic Studies Press, 2020 | Includes   bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019028700 (print) | LCCN 2019028701 (ebook) | ISBN   9781644691410 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781644691427 (adobe pdf) Subjects: LCSH: Talmud. Eruvin—Criticism, interpretation, etc. Classification: LCC BM506.E9 Z877 2020 (print) | LCC BM506.E9 (ebook) |   DDC 296.1/252—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019028700 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019028701 Copyright © 2020 Academic Studies Press All rights reserved. ISBN 978-1-64469-141-0 (hardcover) ISBN 978-1-64469-142-7 (adobe pdf) Book design by PHi Business Solutions Limited. Cover design by Ivan Grave. Published by Academic Studies Press. 1577 Beacon Street Brookline, MA 02446, USA press@academicstudiespress.com www.academicstudiespress.com

This book is dedicated to my beloved mother Sarah Medinah.

Contents

Acknowledgementsix Prefacexi PART ONE Structure   1.  Chaining as a Shaping Feature of Tannaitic Source Text 3   2. Chaining as a Structuring Means of the Sugya in the Talmud Bavli 9   3. The Tripartite Structure in Sugyot from Tractate Eruvin of the Talmud Bavli 18 PART TWO Language   4. Different Readings, Different Meanings: A Dialogue between R. Jose the Galilean and Beruriah the Leader 37   5. Ancient Aramaic and Its Use in the Biblical Translation, Targum Onqelos50   6. Towards a Talmudic Lexicon: The Aramaic Root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y in the Light of a Story from the Talmud Bavli 63 PART THREE Redaction   7. An Opposing School of Redaction in the Talmud Bavli Suggested75   8. Objectives of Sugyot—A Study of the Redaction of the Talmud Bavli as Reflected in Three Sugyot of Tractate Eruvin 86   9. The Methodology Utilized in the Redaction of the Tripartite Structure of Sugyot from Tractate Eruvin in the Talmud Bavli 99

viii

Contents

PART FOUR Halakha 10.  Land Surveying Tube in Early Judaism 125 11.  Applying General Rules of Halakha in Halakhic Exegesis 139 12. R. Joh.anan’s Attitude towards His Principles of Halakhic Arbitration161 PART FIVE Appendix: Peace and Judaism 13.  Revisiting Contemporary Judaism in Modern Israel 14. The Argumentation for Contemporary Peacemaking Efforts According to Jewish Tradition 15.  The Concept of Peace in the Pentateuch Selected Bibliography Index of Subjects Index of Sources List of First Publications

187 206 215 228 234 235 242

Acknowledgements

T

he book was published with the assistance of the Ariel University Press. I would like to express my thanks to Rachel Kessel for her assistance in the translation and editing of the chapters. I thank the editorial boards of the books and journals for their permission to publish the articles in this volume. Last but not least, I am grateful to my wife Ilana for her support and to my daughters Yaʻarit, Liron, Inbar, and Saʻar and grandchildren Nitay, Roʻei, Yael, Roni-li, and Barak.

Preface

T

his book consists of a collection of articles and chapters I have authored that were published in several journals and books. It deals with five important topics in the field of Jewish studies. The first part contains chapters discussing different types of structure in Talmudic texts from a literary point of view, including form and style. Two chapters refer to chaining in tannaitic sources and chaining as a design tool within a sugya, and two others are on the tripartite structure of a sugya and of tannaitic sources. The second part deals with the study of the Aramaic language utilized in the Bible and the Talmud from a linguistic and interpretive perspective, as evident from two chapters on these topics. Another chapter presents different readings that generate varied interpretations of a certain story. Yet another discusses the linguistic root of a unique Aramaic word that appears in another story. The third part discusses redaction of sugyot in the Talmud Bavli from a textual point of view, as demonstrated in one chapter. Another chapter to an opposing school with regard to redaction of a sugya, while the third deals with the methodology of redacting a sugya. The fourth part deals with matters of halakha. One chapter refers to the land surveying tube and its implications for measuring the two thousand cubit limit. A second chapter is on halakhic rules, and a third is on R. Joh. anan’s attitude to halakhic rules. The fifth part is a collection of subjects in contemporary Jewish studies. One chapter is on contemporary Judaism in Israel and two others are on the topic of peace. Of these, one is on the concept of peace in the Pentateuch and the other portrays peacemaking efforts according to Jewish tradition.

CHAPTER 1

Chaining as a Shaping Feature of Tannaitic Source Text DESCRIPTION OF THE TANNAITIC SOURCE TEXT The tannaitic source1 states as follows: Our Rabbis learned: Three things deprive a man of his senses and of a knowledge of  his creator, idolaters, an evil spirit, and oppressive poverty. … Three kinds of person do not see the face of Gehenna, [one who suffers from] oppressive poverty, one who is afflicted with bowel diseases, and [one who is in the hands of] the [Roman] government. … Three [classes of person] die even while they are conversing, one who suffers from bowel diseases, a woman in confinement, and one afflicted with dropsy. [Epstein edition.]

The tannaitic text consists of three sections, the first of which opens with: “Our Rabbis learned: Three things2 deprive a man of his senses and of a knowledge of his creator,3 idolaters,4 an evil spirit, and oppressive poverty.”5 The initial part of our text thus groups together “three things” which “deprive a man of his senses and of a knowledge of his creator,” and then goes on to itemize, detailing that these are “idolaters, an evil spirit, and oppressive poverty.” The discussion in this section of the text leads to the question “In what respect could this matter?” and a brief presentation of the rabbis’ way of solving the problem.

  1 B. Eruvin 41b.   2 MS Munich 95, MS Vatican 109, MS Oxford 366 are missing the word “thing”; Raphaelo Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, Eruvin ( Jerusalem: Maʻayan ha-hokhma 1960), 156, n. 5.   3 MS Munich 95: “… of a knowledge of his creator and of his senses”; cf. Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, n. 6; ʻOlat Aharon, Eruvin 41b.   4 Cf. MS Munich 95, MS Vatican 109, MS Oxford 366: “Gentile”; R. Hananel ben Hushiel, Eruvin 41b: “Alien.”   5 R. Hananel, Eruvin 41b; the order of this part (baraita) is different.

4

Structure

The second part of the tannaitic source text goes on to state that “Three kinds of person do not see the face of Gehenna, [one who suffers from] oppressive poverty, one who is afflicted with bowel diseases,6 and [one who is in the hands of] the [Roman] government.”7 The middle section thus also groups its subject in a form of “three,” following this with an itemized list of “[One who suffers from] oppressive poverty, one who is afflicted with bowel diseases, and [one who is in the hands of] the [Roman] government.” The subsequent discussion of this passage also concludes with the question of “In what practical respect does this matter?,” followed by a brief consideration of the rabbis’ way of solving the problem, similar to the question and resolution in the preceding part of the text. There is no content link that could unite the second part with the first; they are held together only by formal-stylistic design. This comes to the fore in that the second part opens with a list of a group of “three” (“Three kinds of person do not see the face of Gehenna”), in parallel with the opening of the first part (“Three things deprive a man of his senses and of a knowledge of his creator”), followed by a listing of three items. The third part of the same tannaitic text concludes with this: “Three [classes of person] die even while they are conversing, one who suffers from bowel diseases,8 a woman in confinement,9 and one afflicted with dropsy.” The third section thus also opens with a reference to a threesome, and then goes on to itemize the three instances: “one who suffers from bowel diseases, a woman in confinement, and one afflicted with dropsy.” The discussion in this part of the text also concludes with the question of “In what10 respect can this information matter?”—thus echoing the conclusion of the two preceding sections; this, in turn, is also followed by a brief statement of the rabbis’ approach to solving the problem. In terms of content, the third section—similar to the first two—has no connection to what precedes it. The only link holding the three different sections of the text together is the formal-stylistic design evident in the language used to introduce the contents. Like the first two parts, the third opens with an   6 Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, 156, n. 7; the order of the two items is reversed.   7 Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, 156, n. 7; indicates different word for the third item.   8 Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, 156, n. 8; the first item is missing in old printed versions except Venice.   9 MS Munich 95, MS Vatican 109, MS Oxford 366; the order of the two items is reversed; Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, 156, n. 8. 10 MS Oxford 366 is missing the word.

Chaining as a Shaping Feature of Tannaitic Source Text

invocation of a threesome, and then goes on to itemize three cases—in exactly the same way as the two parts that precede it.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE TANNAITIC SOURCE A commentator previously noted the element of formal design and structure in the tannaitic text, writing that: The Rabbis have taught: Three things, etc. A great many passages listing “three things” appear in the Talmud, which have not been brought together here, for here the principle was to make the second threesome include one taken from the first, and among the third group of three to have one from the second.11

As per his words, there are many instances of “three things” in a variety of textual sources, which could have been made part of the tannaitic text we are considering. However, they were not included in our text, which is built in such a way as to include in the second section one of the instances cited in the first, and among the three instances cited in the third section—one of those appearing in the second. True enough, there is no detailed elaboration or extensive exemplification in these commentarial remarks (most likely, the author meant to appeal to the reader’s own understanding). But what these comments spell out is enough to suggest that the three parts comprising our tannaitic source text can be characterized by a shared line that runs through the three of them like a single thread, basting the first part with the second, and the second with the third by means of recurrent instances. The existence of a case common to all three sections of the source text makes it clear why these three instances in particular were chosen for explicit mention in this passage, to the exclusion of all other possible passages where “three things” are mentioned. (Once again, it is especially telling that the commentator cites no examples of such possible passages to clinch his argument.) Applying the argument in practice, we find that “oppressive poverty” threads its way from the first section of the text into the second, appearing as an element common to both. From the second section, the instance of one suffering from “bowel diseases” makes its way into the third section, becoming 11 Mitzur ha-devash, Eruvin 41b.

5

6

Structure

an element shared by both. The sequencing conveyed by the printed version follows a graphic pattern: Part A

Part B

Part C

Three things deprive a man of his senses and knowledge of his Creator,

Three kinds of person do not see the face of Gehenna,

Three [classes of person] die even while they are conversing,

idolaters,

[one who suffers from] oppressive poverty,

one who suffers from bowel diseases,

an evil spirit,

one who is afflicted with bowel diseases,

a woman in confinement,

and oppressive poverty.

and [one who is in the hands the [Roman] government.

and one afflicted with dropsy.

The graphic sketch demonstrates in the most obvious way how chaining operates from a formal-stylistic point of view.12 The tannaitic source text is characterized by shifts or by the transfer of a single example, which is passed on from the first to the second section, and then another one from the second section to the third.13 Elaborating on this verbally, we can point out that the phrase “oppressive poverty,” which had been third in the first part of the text, becomes the first listed in the second part of our source text. The phrase “one who is afflicted with bowel disease,” which had been the second listed in the second part, moves to being the first in the third text section. This is chaining14 at work, the formal-stylistic device that binds together the first part with the second, and the second with the third, like links in a chain, by means of reiterating a word or a phrase in two adjacent trios. Chaining as a structuring element in the tannaitic text, as this text has been preserved in the printed version, is borne out by a comparison with the other extant versions. Chaining is evident in the various other versions of the text as 12 See Shamma Friedman, A Critical Study of Yevamot X with a Methodological Introduction (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1978), 39–40, on the use of graphic description to demonstrate the order and arrangement of the Talmudic sugya. 13 For another example that shows the formal-stylistic point of view (in B. Pesah. im 119a), see Louis Jacobs, “The Numbered Sequence as a Literary Device in the Babylonian Talmud,” Hebrew Annual Review 7 (1983): 142: “There are thus three sets of four and, moreover, David is the first in the first set, the second in the second set and the third in the third set.” 14 Asher E. Rivlin, Munah.on le-sifrut [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1998), 64.

Chaining as a Shaping Feature of Tannaitic Source Text

well, but the shifts follow a different geometric pattern vis-à-vis the instance reiterated from one part to the next in the tannaitic source, as follows: Part A

Part B

Part C

Three things deprive a man of his senses and knowledge of his Creator,

Three kinds of person do not see the face of Gehenna,

Three [classes of person] die even while they are conversing,

idolaters,

one who is afflicted with bowel diseases,

a woman in confinement,

an evil spirit,

[one who suffers from] oppressive poverty,

one who suffers from bowel diseases,

and oppressive poverty.

and [one who is in the hands the [Roman] government.

and one afflicted with dropsy.

A sketch of these versions shows that the movement of the phrase, which chains from the first to the second section, is unlike the shift of the phrase that chains the second section to the third. Itemizing verbally, the phrase “oppressive poverty,” which appears third in the first part of the text, moves to second place in the second part. The phrase “one who is afflicted with bowel diseases,” which is the first in the second part, makes its way to second place in the third. There is no correlation or consistency in the order of the chaining among the two cited instances in these version of the text, as opposed to the printed version. The printed version preserves the relativity and consistency in chaining, as each phrase it moves from its place in an earlier section of the text to occupying first place in the next section. Considering the lack of balance or consistency in the chaining instantiated in the other versions as opposed to the printed version, it becomes a reasonable argument that the chaining in the tannaitic source, as it has reached us in the printed version, was modified and reworked from earlier versions, until it eventually took its current form.

ANOTHER STYLISTIC-FORMAL ELEMENT IN LIGHT OF STUDYING THE THREE SECTIONS OF THE TANNAITIC SOURCE TEXT The deliberation in each of the three parts of the tannaitic source text is an outgrowth of the same basic question, “In what respect could this matter?,” and a brief reply citing no more than a single example. The same question, reiterated in each of the three parts of the tannaitic source, along with the different replies

7

8

Structure

which always include a single instance as an example, together create a unified formal-stylistic context which brings the three parts of the text into one. This makes for another formal-stylistic feature: a tripartite structure,15 in the following way (this in addition to the use of “three” as a key opening word which recurs at the beginning of each part): The first part (“Our Rabbis learned: Three things deprive a man …”) includes the question of “In what respect could this matter?” and a brief answer citing a single instance (“In respect of invoking heavenly mercy to be delivered from them”). The second part (“Three kinds of person do not see the face of Gehenna”) includes the question of “In what practical respect does this matter?,” as well as a short answer with the mention of a single instance (“In respect of receiving [these afflictions] lovingly”). The third part (“Three [classes of person] die even while they are conversing”) includes the question of “In what respect can this information matter?,” and a short answer with a single instance (“In that of making arrangements for their shrouds to be ready”). The result is a tripartite structure of the cursory give-and-take about the tannaitic source. It may be that originally all three sections of the source text were part of a single whole but were later separated from each other and divided into three groups by the redactors of the text so as to achieve the tripartite composition. A possible reason for this may be that the style and content of the tannaitic source text in each of its three parts, such as the identical opening in all three cases, which begins by listing some “Three …,” as well as the detailed listing of three examples in each section, influenced the redactors of the text, leading them to divide the tannaitic source text into three, and to treat each part as an independent textual unit. This would explain the emergence of the tripartite structure of the original tannaitic source.

15 August Wünsche, “Die Zahlensprüche in Talmud und Midrasch,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 65 (1911): 72–73; Uri Zur, The Tripartite Structure of the Sugyot: Studies in Tractate Eruvin of the Babylonian Talmud [Hebrew] (Ariel: Ariel University Press, 2016), 129–135.

CHAPTER 2

Chaining as a Structuring Means of the Sugya in the Talmud Bavli

T

he study of the following three stories from the Talmud Bavli (B. Eruvin 62b–63a) was undertaken based on the identifiable presence in the text of the formal-stylistic narrative feature known as chaining. To date, the literary phenomenon of chaining has never yet been analyzed in any of the research devoted to the texts of the Bavli or the Yerushalmi. It may well be the case that the same narrative feature is to be found in other texts, as well; however, in the present chapter we will focus on the phenomenon of chaining as it appears only in the particular texts under consideration. We will then proceed to consider the formal consequences that this ultimately spells out, and which in turn lead to another formal stylistic phenomenon: the tripartite structure as an organizing principle in the evolution of text. This is why we have refrained from touching upon any other issues, such as the existing rabbinic traditions, the historical reality of Babylonian rabbinic academies, and the like. The textual feature of chaining is indicative of a novelty in the formal stylistic aspect of Bavli research. This forms a substantial contribution to research dealing with other formal stylistic aspects of how the Bavli was redacted or written. The novelty of the emergent need for formal stylistic analysis runs refreshingly counter to the assumption that the Bavli is nothing but a record of the give-and-take conducted in the Babylonian rabbinic academies, untainted by any trace of formal stylistic arranging in the composition of its texts.

THE FIRST STORY Said R. Joseph: Even on the question of the permissibility of eating an egg with kuth.a, which I have been asking him throughout the lifetime of R. Huna, R. H.isda gave me no decision. R. H.isda decided legal questions at Kafri in the lifetime of R. Huna. R. Hamnuna decided legal points at H.arta di Argiz during the lifetime of R. H.isda.

10

Structure Rabina examined the slaughterer’s knife in Babylon. Said R. Ashi to him, “Why does the Master act in this manner?”—“Did not”, the other replied, “R. Hamnuna decide legal points at H.arta di Argiz during the lifetime of R. H.isda?”—“It was stated”, the first retorted, “that he did not decide legal points”. “The fact is”, the other replied, “that one statement was made that he did decide legal points while another was that he did not do so, and the explanation is that only during the lifetime of his Master R. Huna did he decide no legal points but during the lifetime of R. H.isda, who was both his colleague and disciple, he did decide legal points, and I too am the Master’s colleague as well as disciple”. Raba said: A young scholar may examine his own knife.1 [Epstein edition.]

The first story describes Rabina, a student who performed the checking of a ritual slaughtering knife in the presence of his teacher, R. Ashi, in Babylon. A student ascertaining the kosher fitness of a knife in the presence of his teacher rather than deferring to the teacher himself is considered having thrust his own authority before that of his teacher’s; he is thus guilty of belittling the teacher’s dignity and competence. Such an act is inappropriate conduct for a student visà-vis his mentor. The first story comes after (or concludes2) two brief narratives presented in a similar style and dealing with the same topic. The two serve as an introduction (or two introductions) to the first story. They both describe different situations in which sages refrained from propounding halakhic decisions in the presence of their teachers (that is, in the area of their teachers’ permanent residence). The first introductory narrative deals with R. Hisda and R. Huna (“Said R. Joseph … R. H.isda decided legal questions at Kafri in the lifetime of R. Huna”). It notes briefly that R. Hisda refrained from making halakhic pronouncements in the lifetime of his teacher R. Huna. However, he did not refrain from doing so in a locale known as Kafri, a place which was not R. Huna’s permanent abode.3 The second introductory narrative (“R. Hamnuna decided legal points at H.arta di Argiz during the lifetime of R. H.isda”) similarly notes in brief the 1 2

B. Eruvin 62b–63a. In Petersburg Genizah Fragment Evr. II A 293/1 = (SP RNL Evr. II A 293/1): ‫ ורבינא‬appears with the added conjunction vav (henceforth Genizah Fragment A). 3 Rashi, Eruvin 62b, s.v. be-Kafri: “[Toponym] the name of a place which was not R. Huna’s permanent abode; his abode was really in Pombeditha. Both places are located in Babylon”; see Jacob Obermeyer, Die Landschaft Babylonien im Zeitalter des Talmuds und des Gaonats (Frankfurt am Main: I. Kauffmann Verlag, 1929), 316–317.

Chaining as a Structuring Means of the Sugya in the Talmud Bavli

lack of restraint on the part of R. Hamnuna, who did not refrain from making halakhic pronouncements in the town of Harta di Argiz4 in his teacher’s lifetime, insofar as this was not the permanent abode of his teacher, R. Hisda.5 Following these two narrative introductions, the first story is integrated into the sequence; Rabina and his examination of the ritual slaughtering knife are at the center of the plot. The story concludes the sequence of short narratives centering on the student (in this case Rabina) who proceeds without any qualms to propound halakhic injunctions (here in connection with the checking of the knife) in the presence of his teacher (R. Ashi). On one hand, the first story serves to contrast the preceding narratives. On the other, the first story provides a link and an introduction to the two subsequent narratives, both of them somewhat more detailed. Besides the similarity in content, there is a stylistic continuity among the stories in the way the narrating style provides detail to flesh out the account. Below we will consider some of the other narrative features which also work to bind the three stories into a single chain. Some of these elements in the last two stories are identical to the common strain observed in the first one. The account in the first story explicitly refers to the halakhic injunction stated by the student: the matter of examining the ritual slaughtering knife. The dialogue between Rabina, the student, and R. Ashi, the teacher, on the subject of propounding halakhic decisions—the examination of the knife providing a particular instance—in the presence of one’s teacher is given in detail. In this connection, the words of Raba are cited (“Raba said: A young scholar may examine his own knife”) in conclusion, at the end of the first story. According to Raba, a student may check the knife on his own prior to performing ritual slaughter; there is no requirement that his teacher complete an authorized checking of the knife as well. The reason is that this conduct is not considered an instance of issuing halakhic injunctions in the presence of one’s teacher, and so it does not impinge on the dignity or respect one owes one’s mentor. This ruling of Raba in the first story serves as a means of chaining utilized by the redactors. The chaining unites the first story with the two following narratives. Later, Raba’s statement is also used as a chaining method providing for the transition from the first story to the second, and from the second to the third. 4 5

Rashi, Eruvin 63a, s.v. Harta and s.v. di Argez; Otzar ha-Gaonim, Shabbath Tractate [Hebrew], vol. 2, ed. Binyamin M. Levin (Haifa: Warhaftig Press, 1930), para. 49, 19; Obermeyer, Die Landschaft, 318–319. Rashi, Eruvin 63a, s.v. de-ha Rav Hamnuna.

11

12

Structure

THE SECOND STORY Rabina once visited Mah.uza when his host brought to him a slaughtering knife for examination. “Go”, he said to him, “take it to Raba”. “Does not the Master”, the other asked, “uphold the ruling laid down by Raba that a young scholar may examine his own knife?”—“I”, he replied, “am only buying the meat”.6 [Epstein edition.]

The second story also has Rabina—the same Rabina we referred to earlier—as its key protagonist. Rabina finds himself in the town of Mah.uza in Babylon, the same town where Raba was living. His host shows him a ritual slaughtering knife, asking him to check its fitness for use. Rabina refuses, arguing that a prohibition forbids him to examine the knife: agreeing to do the checking would be tantamount to assuming the status and treatment due to the local sage and rabbinic leader; that is, Raba. His host replies by asking whether he does not concur with the dictum promulgated by Raba who says that the student (himself a sage) is permitted to check a knife on his own for the purpose of using it for ritual slaughter, and that he need not hand it over to his teacher to perform the examination. It follows that Rabina is permitted to check the knife himself. Rabina responds to his host that since he is buying from him (from the host) the meat that he is eating, examining the knife in order to do the ritual slaughtering would not be considered an act performed for the needs of the student (Rabina), but for the needs of the host. It is therefore forbidden for him (Rabina) to check the knife, insofar as this would be tantamount to encroaching upon the respect and veneration due to Raba, the local sage. Here, in the second story, we encounter once again Raba’s pronouncement, “a young scholar may examine his own knife,” just as it appeared in the first narrative.

THE THIRD STORY R. Eleazar of Hagronia and R. Abba b. Tah.lifa once visited R. Ah.a son of R. Ik.a’s house in the district that was subject to the jurisdiction of R. Ah.a b. Jacob. R. Ah.a son of R. Ik.a, desiring to prepare for them a third-grown calf, presented to them the slaughtering knife for examination. “Should no consideration be shown for the old man?” R. Ah.a b. Tah.lifa asked. “Thus”,

6

B. Eruvin 63a.

Chaining as a Structuring Means of the Sugya in the Talmud Bavli R. Eleazar of Hagronia replied, “said Raba: A young scholar may examine his own knife”.7 [Epstein edition.]

The third story focuses on two sages—here, R. Eleazar of Hagronia and R. Abba8 b. Tah.lifa; the two find themselves in the home of R. Ah.a son of R. Ika in the locale which served as the permanent residence of R. Ah.a b. Jacob, the local sage. R. Ah.a son of R. Ika, the host, wants to slaughter a young calf (a delicacy) to honor his guests, and brings them a ritual slaughtering knife to examine. R. Abba b. Tah.lifa, one of the guests, is puzzled: should we not refrain from checking the knife, considering that doing so would involve assuming as our own the honor due to the local sage, R. Ah.a b. Jacob? The second guest, R. Eleazar of Hagronia, resorts to Raba’s pronouncement as an answer, saying “Said Raba: A young scholar may examine his own knife.” That is, a student (himself a sage) may check a slaughtering knife for his own needs, without having to appeal to the local sage to do the checking. Here in the third story, too, Raba’s pronouncement is interwoven, just as it was earlier in the first and second stories. A single message derives from all the three narratives sequenced as a single whole: the question of whether and when may a student, himself a junior Sage, determine the ritual fitness of a slaughtering knife for his own needs—without being obligated to show the knife to his teacher?9

TAKING A GLANCE AT NARRATIVE FEATURES: CHAINING AS A MEANS OF STRUCTURING Four different narrative features can be traced in these three stories. Not all these features can be pinpointed in each episode, but at least two of the four are present in all the stories. Chaining provides the means by which these different elements are woven in, like a single thread running through the stories, thus creating a unifying common ground for all three. The different features in the stories join the element common to all three—the theme of examining the ritual slaughtering knife—and thus combine the three stories into a single tripartite whole in terms of form and style. 7 B. Eruvin 63a. 8 MS Munich 95, MS Vatican 109, MS Vatican 127: “Ah.a”; Raphaelo Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, Eruvin 63a ( Jerusalem: Maʻayan ha-hokhma, 1960), 252, n. 30; similarly in Genizah Fragment A; New York Genizah Fragment, [ JTS] ENA 2070; Cambridge Genizah Fragment Or.1080, 13. 9 Rashi, Eruvin 63a, s.v. le-nafsheh.

13

14

Structure

The following is an itemized list of these narrative elements in the stories. 1. Examining the knife: this is the only characteristic element which appears in all three stories and the primary feature that combines the three narrative episodes in a unified tripartite structure.10 In the first story, Rabina examines the knife; apparently, this involves encroaching upon the expression of respect and honor due to the (local) sage, R. Ashi.11 In the second story, Rabina’s host brings a knife, which he presents to Rabina for the guest to examine, but Rabina refuses to do this, referring his host to Raba, a resident of Mah. uza, so as not to encroach upon the honor due to Raba. In the third narrative, R. Ah. a son of R. Ika brings a slaughtering knife, which he presents to R. Eleazar of Hagronia and R. Abba b. Tah. lifa to perform the ritual examining. R. Eleazar of Hagronia examines the knife, thus encroaching upon the honor and respect due to R. Ah. a b. Jacob, a local resident; he is ultimately punished for this. 2. Only two of the three stories use Rabina’s name (not necessarily his personal identity)12 as a central axis in the narrative. Thus, these two stories share a special bond. 3. The incidental arrival (“he found himself ”)13 of the sage—or two ­sages— in a locale which is not his—or their—permanent place of ­ residence. 10 For the ceremonial meaning of presenting the knife for the sage to examine, see Ruhama Weiss, Okhelim la-daʿat, tafqidan ha-tarbuti shel ha-seʿudot be-sifrut hazal [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2010), 178–180. 11 Rashi, Eruvin 63a, s.v. sar sakkina: “so that it turns out that Rabina is assuming the crown of honor in the town”; Tosafot ha-Rosh, Eruvin 63a, s.v. R. Hisda: “… while Rabina, who examined the knife in Babylon, did not thereby commit an act of making a halakhic pronouncement, but on account of the honor due to the sage”; Beit Yosef, Tur Yore Deʿah 242:12, s.v. ve-asur: “For had R. Ashi been his leading teacher, he would not have been permitted to examine the knife in his presence.” 12 Haggahot Mohariavetz, Eruvin 63a: “… not since Rabina of earlier for he is later … and this Rabina was in the days of Raba”; cf. Chanoch Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud, Babli and Yerushalmi [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1969), 420–421: “Rabina sat before Raba … and said (in his modesty?) to R. Ashi that he (Rabina) was his ‘Fellow Student’” (B. Eruvin 63a); Avinoam Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages: Studies in the Chronology of Late Babylonian Amoraim [Hebrew] (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University, 2001), 95–100, distinguishes between Rabina, a student of Raba, and Rabina who was a student of R. Ashi. 13 Torat Haim, Eruvin 61[62b], s.v. R. Hisda: “Since it says that he found himself in a place, this means that he came in an unpremeditated fashion.” The verb “to find oneself ” appears in both the second and third stories but not in the first one. However, it becomes evident that in the first story Rabina, too, found himself in the area in an accidental manner.

Chaining as a Structuring Means of the Sugya in the Talmud Bavli

In the second story, Rabina14 arrives (‫איקלע‬, “finds himself ”) in Mah. uza, an area which is not his permanent place of residence, as becomes clear from the narrative itself. So, too, in the third story R. Eleazar of Hagronia and R. Abba b. Tah. lifa arrive (‫איקלעו‬, “find themselves”) in the locale where R. Ah. a b. Jacob lives, as this is clearly mentioned in the story. The narrative element bound up with incidental arrival in the second and third stories establishes a bond between these two narratives. In the first story it does, indeed, follow from the narrative that Rabina makes his way incidentally to Babylon (a specific town name is indicated).15 Babylon is not Rabina’s permanent place of residence,16 but the Aramaic verb ‫איקלע‬, meaning “to arrive” or “to find oneself incidentally,” does not appear in the first story. 4. Raba’s statement, worded as: “Raba said: A young scholar may examine his own knife,”17 which appears in both18 the second and third stories19 as part of the dialogue reported in the narrative. In the second story, Rabina’s host addresses Rabina with these words after Rabina refuses to perform the ritual examining of the knife (deferring instead to Raba, a resident of the town). In the third story, R. Eleazar of Hagronia resorts 14 See above, note 12 (Haggahot Mohariavetz). 15 Rashi, Eruvin 63a, s.v. sar sakkina: “… so it becomes clear that Rabina … and R. Ashi, his teacher, were in Mata-Mah.asia, which is in Babylon.” Rashi takes Bavel to be a geographical region, while there was in fact a city in Babylon known as Bavel; this, perhaps, is where Rabina actually went. See Obermeyer, Die Landschaft, 304–305; Encyclopaedia Biblica, 3rd edition, s.v. “Bavel (city),” 10–11. 16 Aaron Hyman, Toldoth Tannaim ve-Amoraim [Hebrew], vol. 3 ( Jerusalem: Kirya Neʾemana, 1964), p. 1087, s.v. “Rabina”: “And this is known already that Rabina resided permanently in Mata-Mah.asia”; cf. Cohen, Ravina and Contemporary Sages, 95, who states that Rabina, the student of Raba, lived outside Mah.uza but in the immediate vicinity, in a place whose name is unknown (98); and ibid., 96, that Rabina, the comrade of R. Ashi, lived in Mata-Mah.asia. 17 The version of R. Hananel, Eruvin 63a, reads as follows: “and a scholar sees [checks] for himself ”; Cambridge Genizah fragment, 27. T-S F2 (2), the following has been added in the margin: “Said Raba, and a scholar sees [checks] for himself.” 18 For the second story: MS Munich 95 has no ‫ ;דאמר רבא‬MS Vatican 109 has no ‫הא דאמר רבא‬. For the third story, MS Munich 95 has no ‫ הכי אמר רבא‬in contrast to the printed version. These words may appear in the printed version for reasons of stylistic unity. 19 Magen Shaul, Eruvin 63a, s.v. tzorva me-Rabbanan: “For a young scholar may examine a knife for himself [at the end of the first story] … a young scholar may examine the knife as was the case with Rabina [the second story], about whom we read that his host brought him a knife for examining, and he said to him, go bring it to Raba. But then it follows in the episode with R. Eleazar of Hagronia [the third story], which says that he brought them a knife for examining.”

15

16

Structure

to this wording in response to R. Abba bar Tah. lifa when the latter raises the question of the honor of R. Ah. a b. Jacob (the Sava, Grandfather), a resident of the area; would R. Eleazar of Hagronia perform the ritual checking of the knife?20 This element of the narrative provides for an additional link between the second story and the third. In the first story, Raba’s statement couched in these words comes as part of the conclusion of the story, adumbrating the topic with which the second and third stories are about to be concerned, rather than as a part of the story in the form of a dialogue, as is the case in the subsequent stories. To sum up: two important elements appear in the first story—Rabina’s name and the checking of the ritual slaughtering knife. The second story features all four of the elements we have considered: Rabina’s name (which also appears in the first story), the unpremeditated incidental arrival at a certain location (‫ איקלע‬or “once visited”), the checking of the knife (also mentioned in the first story and in the third), and the use of the statement “Raba said: A young scholar may examine his own knife” as part of the dialogue conducted by the sages featured in the story. Three of the narrative elements we have listed appear in the third story: the incidental arrival at a certain location (‫איקלעו‬, the same verb as in the second story, but this time in plural, “they found themselves there”), checking of the ritual slaughtering knife (mentioned in the first story and in the second), and the phrase “Raba said: A young scholar may examine his own knife” (which is also invoked in the second story) as part of the dialogue among the sages featured in the story.

SUMMARY The connection binding these three stories together finds its expression in the formal-stylistic element known as chaining.21 This involves the preservation and reiteration of the same features—or some of them—from one story to the next. Chaining among the stories manifests itself in the way the different features (Rabina’s name and the checking of the ritual slaughtering knife) are transferred from the first to the second story. Chaining also finds its expression 20 For the limited scope of the permissibility of a student’s issuing of halakhic injunctions in the presence of his teacher, see Justin Hofmann, “The Student in Classical Judaism,” Journal of Jewish Education 38 (1968): 56–58. 21 Asher E. Rivlin, Munah.on le-sifrut [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1998), 64, s.v. shirshur, 32, s.v. motiv. Reiteration involves providing a link connecting stories to each other by means of repeating a single word, expression, idea, topic, or pattern.

Chaining as a Structuring Means of the Sugya in the Talmud Bavli

in other features which provide for the transition from the second to the third story, such as incidental arrival at a particular location (‫)איקלעו‬, the checking of the knife, and the appeal to the coined phrase: “Raba said: A young scholar may examine his own knife,” either reiterated22 or mentioned in a slightly different manner. These features unite the three stories, integrating them into a single whole held together by formal-stylistic elements. Textually, a tripartite structure results. Focusing on the third story can provide additional evidence of chaining which binds the three stories together. Prima facie, the third story appears superfluous, since the first and the second story already deal with the same topic: they both have Rabina as the central axis of the narrative and describe the examination of the ritual slaughtering knife. This makes it unclear why there should be a third story, one associated with the names of other sages, R. Eleazar of Hagronia and R. Abba b. Tah.lifa, but also dealing with the same topic. However, as we have noted, some of the elements comprising the first and second story make their way into the third story as well (the incidental arrival of some sages at a location which is not their regular place of abode, the dialogue concerning the checking of the ritual slaughtering knife, and the repetition of the statement worded to the effect23 that “Raba said: A young scholar may examine his own knife”). These elements join the third story to the two earlier narratives, a development which, as we have observed, provides for the emergence of a tripartite structure within the text.

22 See Rivlin, Munah.on le-sifrut, 32. 23 Similarly, in organizing the text, the Tanna tends to join together elements with shared wording. See Sheʾerit Yosef, Netiv ha-mishna, 22, rule 26: “There are three reasons why the Tanna tends to join together things which are not actually alike … because of the similarity in their wording.” This inclination is also evident among later sugyot redactors.

17

CHAPTER 3

The Tripartite Structure in Sugyot from Tractate Eruvin of the Talmud Bavli THE TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

T

his chapter is a development and expansion of an issue discussed in a recent study, Orr Israel, dealing with several sugyot in the first three chapters of Tractate Eruvin.1 It will also take into account another study, The Tripartite Structure of the Sugyot, which has served as the basis for additional research on the tripartite structure in other sugyot in various tractates of the Babylonian Talmud.2 One of the conclusions arising from Orr Israel is that the most common and admired structure in the sugyot of Tractate Eruvin is the tripartite structure.3 The second study focused on portraying the tripartite structure and demonstrating it in sugyot of Tractate Eruvin, and as a consequence implying its relative value and high prevalence among the tractate’s forty sugyot. The tripartite structure appears in various sugyot in diverse ways, evident formatively on the plane of content (for example, a repeated expression, an giveand-take between two sages, or other parallel statements) or as a way of arranging three items together (for example, a list of three statements by a certain sage in one place in the sugya, sometimes even with no content-related connection between the statements,4 or three statements by different sages).

1 Uri Zur, Orr Israel, Sugyot in Tractate Eruvin (Lod: The Haberman Institute for Literary Research, 1999), 17. 2 Uri Zur, The Tripartite Structure of the Sugyot: Studies in Tractate Eruvin of the Babylonian Talmud [Hebrew] (Ariel: Ariel University Press, 2016), 383. 3 Shamma Friedman, A Critical Study of Yevamot X with a Methodological Introduction [Hebrew] (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1978), 41; Louis Jacobs, “The Numbered Sequence as a Literary Device in the Babylonian Talmud,” Hebrew Annual Review 7 (1983): 138–142. 4 Halikhot ʻolam, 31; Kelalei Shmuel, 127; Abraham Weiss, ‘Al ha-yetzira ha-sifrutit shel ha-Amoraim (New York: Horeb, 1962), 204.

The Tripartite Structure in Sugyot from Tractate Eruvin of the Talmud Bavli

The necessity of research on the tripartite structure in the sugyot in general stems from the fact that very few studies have examined the sugyot from the perspective of their stylistic form, evident in the Babylonian Talmud as an array of formative devices and as part of the redactors’ considerations when redacting the contents of the Babylonian Talmud.5 The customary conception perceives the content-related or halakhic message as the decisive factor in redaction of the sugyot with no room for other motives, certainly not formative-stylistic considerations such as utilizing a tripartite structure. However, a study of the sugyot in tractate Eruvin shows that many of them make use of different designs, of which the tripartite structure is the major one. The functions of the tripartite structure include emphasising something by repeating it three times,6 representing wholeness (integrity) and importance,7 or directing the readers’ attention towards crucial sacred matters. Rhythmically, it is also considered the perfect stylistic structure, one that has a beginning, a middle, and an end. An additional reason for the significance of the tripartite structure is that sometimes this stylistic form is the best way of solving problems or difficulties that arise in interpreting the sugyot. In many cases the commentators who encountered such difficulties solved them by using casuistry rather than by recognizing the formative-stylistic dimension of shaping the Talmudic contents in a tripartite structure, although some commentators notably hinted at the tripartite structure or insinuated this “between the lines.”

BACKGROUND OF THE TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE Tractate Eruvin brings a statement in the name of R Hisda, who stated: “The Torah can only be acquired with [the aid of] mnemonic signs, for it is said, Put it in their mouths (Deut. 31:19); read not ‘put it’ but ‘its mnemonic sign’” [here and henceforth, Epstein edition].8 Rashi explains: “Signs of traditions—one

5 Shulamit Valler, “The Number Fourteen as a Literary Device in the Babylonian Talmud,” Journal for the Study of Judaism 26, no. 2 (1995): 169–184; Valler, Women and Womanhood in the Talmud (Atlanta GA: Scholars Press, 1999), 10. 6 Marvin H. Pope, “Number, Numbering, Numbers,” in The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, ed. George A. Buttrick (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962), 564. 7 Friedman, Critical Study, 41. 8 B. Eruvin 54b.

19

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Structure

after the other, and signs of the sages[’ names]—as in the Talmud, and you shall place the denoted version in their mouths.”9 The expression “signs of traditions” can be interpreted in many ways, not only as signs that head each issue,10 but, for example, also as indicating the numbering of the traditions, as evident from the following: “In any matter or homily, you must inquire into its roots and branches and mark them with signs and rules such that they will be remembered … just as signs were given in the Talmud for traditions, and to these numbering should be added as it is said: ‘A woman is acquired [in marriage] in three ways’11 … and the like.”12 Accordingly, we can further say that other topics, such as statements by the sages, were also collected in certain sugyot in the Talmud Bavli as threefold structures (in folklore, there is a common “rule of three” utilized in various folk tales),13 where the redactors found this possible or appropriate. In other words, when it is possible to link certain matters in Talmudic sugyot by numbering them, for instance by citing three items, then we have a fundamental tripartite structure that should be studied and better established, as it is normally not explicitly mentioned,14 but rather assimilated naturally within the sugyot. As a subjective definition,15 it is possible to call the tripartite structure as a form of expression that links together three elements within a sugya. This structure may embrace a part of a sugya, or else the whole text of a sugya may be repeated three times, each time with variations.

THE TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE IN THE VARIOUS TRACTATES As stated, only few researchers have dealt with the tripartite structure in sugyot within the tractates of the Babylonian Talmud. Some expanded on this subject and some only referred to it in short, as an aside. Regarding the tripartite   9 Rashi, Eruvin 54b, s.v. simanin. 10 Chaim Horowitz, Toratan shel Rishonim [Hebrew] (Frankfurt am Main: Slobotzky, 1881), 51; Otzar ha-Gaonim, Eruvin Tractate [Hebrew], vol. 3, ed. Binyamin M. Levin ( Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Press, 1930), 46; David Rosenthal, “ʿAl ha-kitzur ve-hashlamato: Perek be-ʿarichat ha-Talmud ha-Bavli,” Mehqerei Talmud 3, no. 2 (2005): 844. 11 B. Kiddushin 2a. 12 Darkhei ha-Talmud le-R. Yitzhak Kanfanton, Lange edition, 25. 13 Axel Olrik, “Epic Laws of Folk Narrative,” in The Study of Folklore, ed. Alan Dundes (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 133–140; Dov Noy, “The Jewish Versions of the ‘Animal Languages’ Folktale (AT 670),” Scripta Hierosolymitana 22 (1971): 198. 14 Jacobs, “Numbered Sequence,” 138–142. 15 Friedman, Critical Study, 40.

The Tripartite Structure in Sugyot from Tractate Eruvin of the Talmud Bavli

structure of sugyot in the Babylonian Talmud, researchers have discussed, for example, threefold sugyot in Tractate Yevamot, in the tenth chapter, and also in Tractate Bava Metziʿa, first and second chapter.16 Other tripartite structures are evident in sugyot of the first three chapters from Tractate Eruvin of the Babylonian Talmud17 and in other chapters of this tractate,18 as well as elsewhere.19 Some of the researchers mentioned in their studies various phenomena related to the tripartite structure within sugyot or as an entire sugya constructed in a tripartite format; but not all of them dealt with this issue through the systematic study of a single tractate from beginning to end. As we have stated above, these researchers only discussed several chapters from the tractates of Babylonian Talmud. We shall now present select examples of the researchers’ different attitudes to the tripartite structure in Talmudic sugyot comprised of three parts. One of the notable examples of reference to the tripartite structure is the contention that “the structure of the sugyot in several chapters of the gemara [Babylonian Talmud] implies that the sugyot, as well as their parts, are based on numerical harmony … three, seven, and ten … that a sugya that covers several pages is in essence actually three statements made by amoraim [sages] and the debates surrounding these statements.”20 Another example of a reference to the tripartite structure states that the foundation of some of the Babylonian Talmud’s sugyot is based entirely on a tripartite structure, meaning that an entire sugya can be composed of three big

16 Shamma Friedman, “Some Structural Patterns of Talmudic Sugyot,” Sixth World Congress of Jewish Studies 3 (1977): 389–402; Friedman, Talmudic Studies, Investigating the Sugya, Variant Readings and Aggada [Hebrew] (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 2010), 10. 17 Zur, Orr Israel, 368, 393. 18 Zur, Tripartite Structure, 23–366. 19 August Wünsche, “Die Zahlensprüche in Talmud und Midrasch,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 65 (1911): 72–73; Ezra Z. Melamed, “Nossah. mispar u-mishkal be-massekhet avot,” Sinai 50 (1962): 157–161; Georg Nádor, “Some Numerical Categories in Ancient Rabbinical Literature: The Numbers Ten, Seven and Four,” Acta Orientalia 14 (1962): 301–303, 313, 315. 20 Friedman, Critical Study, 40; David Weiner, “Shamma Friedman’s Methodological Principles,” Semeia 27 (1983): 47–51; Aryeh Cohen, Rereading Talmud: Gender, Law and the Poetics of Sugyot (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1998), 34 n. 89; Jeffrey L. Rubenstein, “Criteria of Stammaitic Intervention in Aggada,” in Creation and Composition: The Contribution of the Bavli Redactors (Stammaim) to the Aggada, ed. Jeffrey N. Rubenstein (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 417.

21

22

Structure

parts (some researchers call the result “a threefold sugya”—sugya meshuleshet).21 Such structure can comprise three statements that relate to the sugya of the Mishna or three matters (for example, halakhic issues) that deal with one subject or refer to one subject,22 or “a statement by an early amora that serves as the basis for three later amoraim.”23 Another example of a reference to the tripartite structure is evident with regard to the anonymous sugya (stam sugya) with its threefold form such as: “Ilema … ve-ei … ella …” or the triple form that is also manifested by conjunctions. Thus, parts of the sugya are “also triple,” and sometimes the structure of the sugya is “threesomes within threesomes.”24 Yet another example of a reference to the tripartite structure can be seen in sugyot from Tractate Eruvin of the Babylonian Talmud. Some sugyot contain triple topics, rules, names of sages, statements by sages, instances of give-andtake, or linguistic expressions.25

THE TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE IN TRACTATE ERUVIN AS INTERPRETED BY THE COMMENTATORS Some commentators mentioned the tripartite structure indirectly or implicitly. The following are select examples of indirect references to the tripartite structure by the commentators. 1. One sugya includes a question from R. Hisda to Mari son of R. Huna as to the justification they [the people] use for coming on the Sabbath from Barnish [name of a city]26 to Daniel’s synagogue, a distance of more than two thousand cubits, which therefore exceeds the Sabbath limits. Mari replies in practical terms and shows R. Hisda that they base their practice on the claim that 21 Friedman, “Some Structural Patterns,” 391; José Faur, Golden Doves with Silver Dots Semiotics and Textuality in Rabbinic Tradition (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1999), 180. 22 Weiss, ‘Al ha-yetzira ha-sifrutit, 202; Friedman, Critical Study, 42. 23 Friedman, “Some Structural Patterns,” 391. 24 Friedman, Critical Study, 42. 25 Zur, Orr Israel, 368, 393; Zur, Tripartite Structure, 367–383. 26 Raphaelo Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, Eruvin ( Jerusalem: Maʻayan ha-hokhma, 1960), 72; Shragah Abramson, R. Nissim Gaon, ( Jerusalem: Mekitzei Nirdamim, 1965), 123; Jacob Obermeyer, Die Landschaft Babylonian im Zeitalter des Talmuds und Gaonates (Frankfurt am Main: Kauffmann, 1929), 296; Ben-Zion Eshel, Jewish Settlements in Babylonia during Talmudic Times [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Magnes, 1979), 63; Aharon Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica in the Talmudic Period (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1983), 63.

The Tripartite Structure in Sugyot from Tractate Eruvin of the Talmud Bavli

ruined towns that form a connection between these two places, which gives them halakhic justification to walk from Barnish to Daniel’s synagogue, because the city limit of Barnish is extended for purposes of the Sabbath limits by virtue of those ruined towns.27 Then two other statements are brought in the sugya in the name of “R. H.isda who cited Mari b. Mar” on aggadic matters that are completely unrelated to the previous issue but their inclusion creates a tripartite structure consisting of statements brought in the name of “R. H.isda, [who cited] Mari b. Mar.” The redactor’s decision to place these three statements together in the sugya was interpreted in light of the two additional aggadic statements cited merely because “R. H.isda cited Mari b. Mar” as saying them. However, this justification for their inclusion involves a process of elimination: if we say that the two additional aggadic statements were only joined to the first statement due to the identical name of the sage, R. Hisda who cited Mari b. Mar, then what do these two statements have to say about the previous halakhic matter?28 That a connection was even perceived, implies an implicit recognition of the tripartite structure, based as it is on the names of the sages mentioned above. Other commentators said the same thing, although slightly differently: “R. H.isda cited Mari b. Mar. Because the name of Mari son of R. Huna was already mentioned previously, the matter was adjoined [to the name of the sage].” 29 In other words, the two statements were added here to the sugya in light of the recurring names of the sages in these two statements, which repeat the names of the sages mentioned in the previous matter. Other commentators explained the redactor’s decision to join these three statements in the sugya in a similar manner, and their clarification resembled that stated in the previous paragraph (these two statements were brought in this sugya only because “R. H.isda cited Mari b. Mar” as saying them). The question remains: what connection do these two statements have to this sugya unless we say that they were included due to the identical names of the sages mentioned in the first halakhic issue that preceded them?30 In light of all this, it is clear that the commentators noticed the stylistic design of the sugya and indirectly indicated the tripartite structure, although they did not mention it explicitly. 27 B. Eruvin 21a. 28 Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, Eruvin, 72. 29 Mitzur ha-devash, Eruvin 21a. 30 Minh.at zikaron, Eruvin 21a.

23

24

Structure

2. In another sugya, three proofs were brought in support of the opinion of R. Shesheth, who ruled: “In respect of the one as in that of the other [the law of the Torah and the law of the Scribes] there is a legal presumption that an agent carries out his mission.”31 The cohesiveness of the three proofs brought in support of R. Shesheth’s opinion is manifested in formative-stylistic form as a tripartite structure through the opening words: “Said R. Shesheth, do I derive this?” One of the commentators discerned and indicated this cohesiveness pointing to a formative-stylistic difficulty that he mentioned in this context: “And it is necessary to specify that in the other cases the expression ‘And said R. Shesheth, do I derive this?’ … should have been utilized, but [what was used instead is] this [expression] ‘R. Shesheth again said, Whence do I derive this? … Go out and gather for yourself some figs from my fig tree’ is difficult.”32. This implies that R. Shesheth’s two following proofs in the sugya (according to the same commentator: “The other [=R. Shesheth’s other statements that begin with the expression:] ‘Do I derive this?’”)—the second proof and the third proof, or at least the third—should have begun, in light of his conclusion, with the words “And R. Shesheth said” with the addition of the conjunctive vav to show that they are added to the first proof. It is also evident from the scholar’s words that he sees these three proofs as one group created in order to bring together three statements that support R. Shesheth’s opinion. To show their unity, the second and the third proof would require the addition of the conjunctive vav at the beginning. In light of his arguments, it appears that he perceived the three proofs of R. Shesheth’s opinion as a single unit with a tripartite structure, manifested in the sugya in the words “Said R. Shesheth, do I derive this?”33 although he did not specifically mention the tripartite structure in his commentary. 3. In another sugya dealing with a person who went out deliberately beyond the Sabbath limits,34 three statements were brought in the name of “R. Nah.man stated in the name of Samuel.” Some scholars are of the opinion that the third statement was included in the sugya only because “the controversy between ‘R. Nah.man stated in the name of Samuel’ and R. Huna was written here [in the 31 B. Eruvin 32a. 32 Pnei Shlomo, Eruvin 32a. 33 Aaron Hyman, Toldoth Tannaim ve-Amoraim [Hebrew], vol. 3 ( Jerusalem: Kirya Neʾemana, 1964), 1232. 34 B. Eruvin 41b–42a.

The Tripartite Structure in Sugyot from Tractate Eruvin of the Talmud Bavli

sugya] for several reasons, first of all because ‘R. Nah.man stated in the name of Samuel’ was already quoted [previously] above.”35 This interpretation clearly implies that the first “reason for including the third statement in the sugya is because the name of this sage was mentioned previously, in the second statement (and maybe even in the first statement): ‘R. Nah.man stated in the name of Samuel,’ as it was in the third statement ‘R. Nah.man further stated in the name of Samuel.’” Consequently, if the name of a certain sage was mentioned previously in a sugya and there exists another statement (or statements) ascribed to him— there is definitely room to include them in the same sugya, if the redactors see fit. This approach also implies that the three statements attributed to “R. Nah.man [who] stated in the name of Samuel” became parts of the same sugya due to the identical name of the sage. This name linked these three statements together and made a tripartite structure possible. In light of this, it is clear that the commentator, too, is referring indirectly to the tripartite structure, although he does not mention this term explicitly. 4. Finally, in another sugya three attempts were made to prove a single halakhic rule: “In a dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah.”36 All three attempts are presented in the form of one and the same problem: “Who is it that differs from him [R. Simeon]? Evidently R. Judah; and since [this cannot be reconciled with what] has been laid down that ‘In a dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah’?” The solution to each of them is also similar: “But is this really a difficulty? Is it not possible that the rules37 are disregarded only where a ruling to the contrary has been stated, but that where no such ruling is stated the rules remain in force?”38 Hence, at least two of the arguments appear to be redundant, as they are based on a recurring difficulty stemming from the same principle, and the 35 Yosef Z. Dinner, Hagahot ʻal Massekhet Eruvin, Beitza ve-Sukkah, Bavli ve-Yerushalmi [Hebrew], vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Slobotzky, 1896), 40. 36 B. Eruvin 46b–47a. 37 In this case, “In a dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah.” 38 Isidore Epstein, The Babylonian Talmud, Seder Moʿed, Erubin (London: Soncino Press, 1935), 324–325.

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solution to the difficulty is also based on the same recurring phrase. If so, there is no reason to repeat them thrice,39 unless we are to say that they were brought for other reasons, such as to form a tripartite structure within the sugya. One of the commentators referred to the tripartite structure indirectly but positively.40 According to him, it appears that the purpose was to object to the practice evident in the other halakhic rules cited in the sugya, based as they are on three items [=three proof attempts] in which R. Simeon’s opinion was accepted as halakha, which were questioned as one and refuted as one. Rather “[the redactors of the Talmud] set each proof separately, accompanied by its refutation; this seems clear to me.” This implies that, to begin with, the sugya was formed differently. In his opinion, the redactors of the Talmud had before them the three proof attempts in which R. Simeon’s opinion was accepted as halakha—and these were stated “all at once” and all refuted at once, but the redactors of the Talmud chose to change that and present each of these three proof attempts separately, each with its own refutation. The commentary includes no explanation of the redactors’ action, but it is clear that this was done for a certain reason, and from the commentator’s words it seems that he discerned that setting each of the three proof attempts separately, and adding the same refutation beside each of them, was based on considerations pertaining to the tripartite structure, although he does not say so explicitly.

THE TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE IN TRACTATE ERUVIN IN LIGHT OF THE RESEARCH A small number of researchers who studied the sugyot of Tractate Eruvin referred minimally (when at all) to the tripartite structure in some of the sugyot. Moreover, this was not done directly, but rather at random and unsystematically. Here are select examples of references to the tripartite structure, expressed indirectly by the researchers.

39 Beʾer Sheva, Eruvin 46b; David Halivni, Sources and Traditions: A Source Critical Commentary on the Talmud Tractates Erubin and Pesah.im [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982), 138; Louis Newman, “The Work of David Weiss Halivni, A Source-Critical Commentary to b. Yebamot 87b,” Semeia 27 (1983): 93–101; Cohen, Rereading Talmud, 25. 40 Beʾer Sheva, Eruvin 46b.

The Tripartite Structure in Sugyot from Tractate Eruvin of the Talmud Bavli

1. In a sugya dealing with the “shape of a doorway,”41 two statements and one baraita were brought as three parts that comprise a tripartite structure, based on the expression “shape of a doorway.” Some of the researchers mentioned only the expression “shape of a doorway” that recurs three times,42 but did not explicitly emphasize that this is in fact a tripartite structure in the sugya, did not ascribe special significance to this, and certainly did not discuss the issue.43 2. In another sugya, three questions (eibaʿaya) that Rabbah asked R. Huna were joined in one place in the sugya in tripartite form in light of the identical opening term and the names of the sages: “Rabbah stated: When we were at R. Huna’s we raised the following question,”44 and each question concluded with a double ending in order to form an external unity between all three, evven though there is no connection between their contents. A few researchers noticed that the three questions Rabbah asked R. Huna were brought together in one place in the sugya due to the above-stated linguistic form, and said that the first statement is linked to the topic, the second statement is a shift of focus, but the third statement is an entirely different matter and it was joined to the two previous statements only in light of the similar linguistic style. Apparently, there had been no separation between the three statements45 until the redactors drew borders between them to shape a tripartite structure within the sugya. Nonetheless, the researchers did not state that this sugya has a tripartite structure, and neither did they ascribe any significance to the tripartite structure nor discuss it.

TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE OF SUGYOT FROM A VISUAL ANGLE Sometimes the tripartite structure is evident in sugyot of Tractate Eruvin only from a visual perspective, with no possibility of proving this. Here are some examples of a tripartite structure in sugyot from the visual angle.

41 B. Eruvin 11b. 42 Abraham Weiss, Le-korot hithavut ha-Bavli [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Makor, 1970), 56. 43 Friedman, “Some Structural Patterns,” 396; Roger Brooks and Joseph Davis, “Abraham Weiss as Exegete and Text Critic, The Case of b. Berakot 35a,” Semeia 27 (1983): 105–116; Cohen, Rereading Talmud, 8. 44 B. Eruvin 40a–41b. 45 Weiss, ‘Al ha-yetzira ha-sifrutit, 209.

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1. B. Eruvin 8a–b a. “If from there it might have been assumed … but … also …” b. “If from there it might have been assumed … but not …” c. “If from there it might have been assumed … but not … hence …” 2. B. Eruvin 14a–b a. “The sea that Solomon made … but consider how much is …” b. “The sea that Solomon made was round. But consider: By how much does …” c. “The sea that Solomon made was square … how much is …” 3. B. Eruvin 16b–17a a. “It was taught … one individual is allowed two beth se’ah, so are two individuals also allowed two beth se’ah, but three become a caravan and are allowed six beth se’ah …” b. “R. Nah.man in the name of our Master Samuel … one individual is allowed two beth se’ah, two individuals are also allowed two beth se’ah, but three become a caravan and are allowed six beth se’ah …” c. “Thereupon R. Nah.man appointed an Amora on the subject … an individual is allowed two beth se’ah, two are also allowed two beth se’ah, but three become a caravan and are allowed …” 4. B. Eruvin 26b a. “Rabbah replied … in respect of five persons who lived in one courtyard and one of them forgot to join in the ‘erub. According to the ruling of R. Eliezer this man, when he renounces his right, need not renounce it in favour of every one of the tenants.” b. “In accordance with whose view … if five persons live in one courtyard and one of them forgot to join in the ‘erub he, when renouncing his right, need not do it in favour of every one of the tenants … in accordance … with that of R. Eliezer.” c. “R. Tabyomi taught … in accordance with whose view … if five persons live in one courtyard and one of them forgot to join in the ‘erub he, when renouncing his rights, need not do it in favour of every one individually? … in accordance with that of R. Eliezer.” 5. B. Eruvin 28b a. “An ‘erub may be prepared from cuscuta … with what quantity …? as R. Yeh.iel said, ‘a handful’ …”

The Tripartite Structure in Sugyot from Tractate Eruvin of the Talmud Bavli

6.

7.

8.

9.

b. “An ‘erub may be prepared from kalia … and what … quantity? … R. Yeh.iel replied: A handful.” c. “It is permitted to prepare an ‘erub from green beans. And what must be its quantity?—R. Yeh.iel replied: A handful.” B. Eruvin 29a–b a. “Samuel stated, this was taught in respect of the leaves only, but … there can be no objection.” b. “And even regarding the leaves this has been said only … but … there can be no objection.” c. “R. Papa said: This has been said only … but … there can be no danger.” B. Eruvin 54a (1) a. “R. Ammi said … when are the words of the Torah …? When …” b. “And when wilt thou keep them within thee? When they will …” c. “R. Zera said … when ‘hath a man joy’? When he has …” B. Eruvin 54a (2) a. “Another version: ‘When hath a man joy …’? When the …” b. “R. Isaac said … when ‘is it very high unto thee’? When it is …” c. “Raba said … when ‘hast Thou given him his heart’s desire’? … when …” B. Eruvin 104a a. “Abaye pointed out an objection … ‘Liquids may be drawn …’ may it not then be inferred that the production of any sound is forbidden?” b. “He [Rabbah] pointed out … a further objection: If a man guards his fruit … is it not that the man produces sound and that the production of any sound is forbidden?” c. “Rab Judah citing Rab made that women who play with nuts … is it not that this produces sound and that the production of any sound is forbidden?”

THE TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE IN CONJUNCTIONS WITHIN THE SUGYOT There is an approach that sees tripartite consistencies in the “anonymous sugya” (sugya stamit) as well.46 Thus, in some sugyot the tripartite structure is also 46 Friedman, Critical Study, 42.

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evident in the conjunctions. The following are select examples of the tripartite structure in conjunctions within the sugyot. 1. B. Eruvin 2a a. “But is not this text (Lev. 3:2) written in connection with the Tabernacle?” b. “We find that the Tabernacle … for, should you not concede this …” c. “The fact, then … we find that the Sanctuary was called Tabernacle …” 2. B. Eruvin 2a–b a. “If it be suggested: From the Scriptural text, And the Kohathites … set forward (Num. 10:21) …” b. “That was written in respect of the ark.” c. “Rather it is from the following text … And let them make me a sanctuary (Ex. 25:8) …” 3. B. Eruvin 6a a. “If it be suggested … with wider than ten cubits …” b. “Consequently … within … ten cubits …” c. “From which it definitely follows that … a breach in a side … of an alley …” 4. B. Eruvin 49a a. “Could Samuel have said, ‘If a man divides his ‘erub …’” b. “Seeing that he [Samuel] has laid down, ‘The house in which an ‘erub is deposited …’” c. “The other [Rab Judah] replied: There the ‘erub is valid even …” 5. B. Eruvin 59b–60a a. “Could R. Nah.man, however, have made such a statement?” b. “Did not R. Nah.man in fact lay down in the name of Samuel …” c. “Here we are dealing with the case where the balcony …” 6. B. Eruvin 85a (1) a. “From which ruling of Samuel, however, could this be derived?” b. “If it be suggested: From the following which R. Nah.man reported in the name of Samuel … might be in agreement with the opinion of R. Papa?” c. “It is rather from this ruling: ‘Each owner …’” 7. B. Eruvin 85a (2) a. “From which ruling of Rab, however, was the view here attributed to him derived? If it be suggested from this: ‘If two balconies …’”

The Tripartite Structure in Sugyot from Tractate Eruvin of the Talmud Bavli

b. “Could it not be retorted that the case here comes under a different category …” c. “It is rather from this ruling: which R. Nah.man cited in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha who had it from Rab …” 8. B. Eruvin 95b a. “Must it be assumed that they differ on the principle of R. Samuel son of R. Isaac …” b. “No, all may hold the view of R. Samuel son of R. Isaac …” c. “But the point at issue between them is whether the Sabbath is a time for teffilin [phylacteries] …”

SUMMARY The tripartite structure appears in the sugyot in a varied and changing form, according to the content of each sugya. This structure is more prevalent as a formative-stylistic phenomenon within the sugya, framing one part of it, and less as a complete sugya. One possible explanation is the considerable complexity involved in designing a tripartite structure as a single unit. Sugyot that consist of only a tripartite structure are more complex and complicated, and the redactors must employ judgment and care when connecting the different parts. Tractate Eruvin has forty sugyot that include a tripartite structure. A possible explanation for the relative prevalence of the tripartite structure as evident in statements, linguistic forms, and give-and-take, may be that the redactors were familiar with a variety of statements ascribed to different sages and therefore it was relatively easy for them to connect these statements in a tripartite structure. A tripartite structure based on common language is even easier to form. Even establishing a tripartite form consisting of one part of the give-andtake (dilemmas, problems, proofs, and so forth) must have been relatively easy for the redactors. In some of the texts, problems were stated that eventually led to indication of a tripartite structure. In others, the existence of a tripartite structure could be proved using constructive evidence or by a process of elimination. In some of the texts it was possible to find the tripartite structure based on comparisons between Genizah fragments or binding fragments, alternative versions provided by early and later commentators to the printed version, or by using comparisons between the printed version and parallel sources of the Babylonian Talmud and Yerushalmi Talmud, the literature of the Geonim, and other texts.

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In some of the texts the evidence for the tripartite structure is based on textual surplus, omissions, or additions that distinguish between manuscripts and the printed version, or various (textual) options that could have been added to the text or that were not included in the text in order to form the tripartite structure. Some of the evidence for the tripartite structure relies on the words of the commentators (some of the commentators imply between the lines of their commentaries that they were aware of the tripartite structure), and some builds on the research literature. Notably, the existence of a tripartite structure within the text was brought as the best possible explanation for difficulties in a given text or as a formative explanation linking three elements of a text. The distribution of the tripartite structure among the sugyot takes a variety of forms, as follows. In twelve sugyot the tripartite structure is based on three statements that appear in the sugya three times. Of these, five sugyot are based on three statements brought in the name of a certain sage (Amora); four sugyot are based on three statements brought in the name of a sage who cited another sage; two sugyot are brought in the name of sages in a homiletic style, with one consisting of three homilies in the name of one sage and the other comprising a halakhic inquiry together with two homilies in the name of a sage who cited another sage; and one sugya is brought in the name of elder sages. In nine sugyot, the tripartite structure is based on a form of expression that recurs three times. Of these, four sugyot have a form of expression that recurs in the sugya three times; three sugyot have the same form of expression that recurs three times within the sugya; one sugya has an identical linguistic reply that recurs three times; and one sugya has an identical form of expression in a give-and-take that is repeated three times. In eight sugyot, the tripartite structure comprises part of the general giveand-take. Of these, three sugyot are based on three questions or three problems; two sugyot are based on three premises; two sugyot are based on three proofs; and one sugya is based on three controversies between two sages (Amoraim). In three sugyot the tripartite structure constitutes a general give-and-take (identical, compatible, or short) that appears in the sugya three times. Two sugyot have a tripartite structure consisting of three different halakhic rulings that follow the opinion of a certain sage. Two sugyot have a tripartite structure that is based on content that recurs three times in the sugya. Of these, – one sugya has a tripartite structure of similar content or an identical opening, and one sugya has a tripartite structure consisting of contents that discuss a single question.

The Tripartite Structure in Sugyot from Tractate Eruvin of the Talmud Bavli

There are four single sugyot, in each one of which the tripartite structure takes a different form. In one sugya the tripartite structure is based on a certain rule in the name of the sage R. Joh.anan that recurs three times in the sugya. One sugya has a tripartite structure of “three by three.” One sugya has a tripartite structure based on a story that is repeated three times in the sugya. One sugya has a tripartite structure based on three different examples of a certain occurence. Some of the sugyot possess unique features. Three sugyot have alternative options for a different composition of the tripartite structure. In two sugyot the tripartite structure appears sequentially as a double tripartite structure. In another sugya, each of the three instances of give-and-take in the tripartite structure has a double ending. In another sugya, the tripartite structure is not only brought in the name of the same sage but also united by an identical linguistic form. In another text, the tripartite structure is comprised of three premises, each proposed by two sages (Amoraim).47

47 Zur, Tripartite Structure, 367–369.

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CHAPTER 4

Different Readings, Different Meanings: A Dialogue between R. Jose the Galilean and Beruriah the Leader

E

very verbal composition in writing creates a textual expression. Each text1 will have a unique meaning and interpretation depending on the type of reading applied. Texts may be read out of context, may be a function of their context, or may have a connection with other external texts. No single reading is essential or obligatory; each reading type is justified in its own right, and does not subsume or constitute an alternative for another. The significance of various types of reading is reflected in the distinct analyses, interpretations, and meanings each of them attributes to the text in view of their different boundaries. The distinction and separation of these modes of reading fills an important role in understanding the text and its implications. Our purpose is to attempt to “understand in the present what was created in the past.”2 A textual reading limits our interpretation of what can be gleaned from a given text. A contextual reading interprets the given text according to its context and place in relation to other texts appearing together. An intertextual reading uses additional sources to interpret the text. Each type of reading has its shortcomings and advantages. For example, the textual reading isolates the given text and focuses on it as a closed, self-contained story. The contextual reading views the given text as one component in a sequence of texts that appear together. The intertextual reading views the text as part of a whole, comprising sections that may appear in different places, connected by some common denominator. 1 Zeʾev Levy, Hermeneutics [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1986), 162–166. 2 Jonah Fraenkel, “Hermeneutic Problems in the Study of the Aggadic Narrative,” Tarbiz. 47, no. 3–4 (1978): 140.

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These readings can be applied to texts from the Babylonian Talmud, as we shall see below.

THE CASE OF BERURIAH AND R. JOSE THE GALILEAN The Bavli Talmud contains an account of an incident involving R. Jose the Galilean (R. Jose, a sage who lived in in the late first century CE) and Beruriah. R. Jose asks Beruriah to tell him the way to Lydda: R. Jose the Galilean was once on a journey when he met Beruriah. “By what road”, he asked her, “do we go to Lydda?”—“Foolish Galilean”, she replied, “did not the Sages say this: Engage not in much talk with women? You should have asked: By which to Lydda?”3

In this brief dialogue, Beruriah calls R. Jose a “foolish Galilean,” although he is a known sage, and reprimands him for the wording of his question. In her view, the question was unnecessarily wordy and required that he converse with her at length, in contrast to the instructions of the sages: “Engage not in too much conversation with women.”4 He thus ignores the grave consequences of conducting an unnecessarily lengthy conversation with a woman, such as causing “evil to himself, [for] going idle from [the study of] the words of the Torah, so that his end will be that he inherits Gehinnom.”5 Beruriah does not answer his question. This account raises problems on different levels, including the following: What was Beruriah doing on the road by herself? Why did she call R. Jose, known to be a wise man,6 a “foolish Galilean,” particularly as she herself was the daughter of R. Hananiah ben Teradyon from Sikhnei, in the Lower G ­ alilee?7 Did she intend to include all the Galileans in this derogatory term or only R. Jose? Did she add any implied meaning in quoting the phrase “Engage not in much talk with women?” Why is there no response on the part of R. Jose? In 3 Isidore Epstein, The Babylonian Talmud, Seder Moʿed, Eruvin 53b (London: The Soncino Press, 1935). All citations from Talmud Bavli are from the Epstein edition. 4 M. Avot 1:5. 5 M. Avot 1:5. 6 Aaron Hyman, Toldoth Tannaim ve-Amoraim [Hebrew], vol. 1 ( Jerusalem: Kirya Neʾemana, 1964), 738. 7 Aharon Oppenheimer, Galilee in the Mishnaic Period [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1991), 119.

A Dialogue between R. Jose the Galilean and Beruriah the Leader

his silence, did he concur with her statement, or not? What does this passage indicate about Beruriah’s education and knowledge? What is the significance of this story? These problems raise doubts as to whether the story involving Beruriah and R. Jose describes an event that actually occurred. However, the scope of this chapter does not allow me to address this issue.8 Not all of these questions can be answered because the passage lacks many details. In this chapter, I will address the following five issues arising from the passage: the epithet “foolish Galilean,” the extent of Beruriah’s education and knowledge, the potential implication in her statement, R. Jose’s silence and finally, the significance of the account. These issues and the various meanings that emerge concerning the character of Beruriah will be explored in view of two types of reading, textual and contextual.9

A TEXTUAL READING “Foolish Galilean” In this reading, I address the text per se, and I begin with the epithet “foolish Galilean.” This epithet has been understood as an expression of literary competi­­tiveness, sarcasm, local patriotism, or routine wittiness. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether Beruriah indeed intended to say that R. Jose was a fool. In other words, no literal significance should be attributed to the word “foolish” that was hurled at R. Jose, and all Galileans should certainly not be included in it, because Beruriah herself was the daughter of R. Hananiah ben Teradyon from Sikhnei, and herself of Galilean origin.10 Consequently, the term “foolish” should be understood as having a less general meaning that conveys a type of local Galilean camaraderie, an epithet that only another Galilean may use without its being considered an insult. If used as a retort by someone other than a Galilean, the term would be considered a barbed insult.   8 Daniel Boyarin, Carnal Israel Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 182.   9 Intertextual readings of this passage have been discussed by other scholars, including David Goodblatt, “The Beruriah Traditions,” Journal of Jewish Studies 26, no. 1–2 (1975): 68–85; Rachel Adler, “The Brothel and Other Anomalies: Character and Context in the Legend of Beruriah,” Tikkun 3, no. 6 (1988): 28–32, 102–105; Boyarin, Carnal Israel, 181–196; Elizabeth Sarah, “Beruriah: A Suitable Case for Mistreatment … Or Why We Haven’t Got the Sayings of Our Mothers,” European Judaism 26, no. 2 (1993): 14–23. 10 Oppenheimer, Galilee in the Mishnaic Period, 119.

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Additionally, the term “foolish” may have been used to ridicule a person who has erred by making a silly mistake,11 in this case violating the well known rule: “Engage not in too much conversation with women?”

Beruriah’s education Based on Beruriah’s response, “Did not the Sages say this: Engage not in much talk with women?” we may infer the extent of her education and knowledge. She knows the simple meaning of this phrase, that which is evident from its content. Had she known that there were other, more complex interpretations of this phrase, such as, we can assume, were familiar to R. Jose and other scholars, Beruriah would have avoided her simplistic retort to R. Jose. The following passages explain why. Avot de-Rabbi Nathan brings four examples of engaging in “much talk with women.” The profusion of examples indicates that the instruction had been discussed and various interpretations had been developed in ancient periods, and the phrase had more than a mere literal meaning. All or most of these examples were undoubtedly known to the learned R. Jose. The two most relevant are: Whoever tells his wife “I was at the head of the Beit Midrash” and takes pride in his statement, that is, describes in details and at length about his appointment as the head of a Beit Midrash, including all the details of the preceding procedures—this is considered engaging in “much talk with women.”12 Whoever argues with his friend at the Beit Midrash should not tell his wife what he said to his friend, and what his friend responded. That is, he should not describe the details of the argument—that is engaging in “much talk with women.”13

These illustrations portray a very different description of conduct considered engaging in “much talk with women” than that implied by Beruriah. R. Jose’s question to Beruriah does not resemble any of these examples, since R. Jose only requested information about the way to Lydda. Therefore, R. Jose 11 Avraham Even-Shoshan, Ha-milon he-hadash [Hebrew], vol. 4 ( Jerusalem: Kiriat Sefer, 1993), s.v. shote, Sub-entry: shote she-ba-ʿolam. 12 Avot de-Rabbi Nathan, Schechter edition, B, 16. 13 Avot de-Rabbi Nathan, A, 7.

A Dialogue between R. Jose the Galilean and Beruriah the Leader

clearly does not consider his question to Beruriah either a conversation or “much talk.” He has no intention of engaging in any dialogue or debate with her, and his question conceals no ulterior motive concerning engagement in “much talk with women,” such as adultery.14 In my opinion, it is clear from Beruriah’s remark that her interpretive perspective on this phrase was limited to its literal meaning. She was unaware of interpretations other than those emerging from the simple content, based on a first reading or rote learning of the words of the sages,15 and did not appreciate that R. Jose, being a wise man, may have known of other interpretations of this phrase, such as the above examples. In fact, had she been aware or had she been thinking of alternative, less literal interpretations, her remark to R. Jose would have been inappropriate. Since she did not hold her tongue, we may infer that the level of her education and the extent of her Talmudic knowledge are limited and simplistic, at least with regard to the lessons of the sages in Tractate Avot and their interpretation. The pshat, the literal interpretation of this phrase, is known to her as she heard it in her father’s home, in the kitchen, as associated with topics relevant for women.16 Moreover, when Beruriah quotes the sages, her attribution of the words is inaccurate. She attributed the phrase “engage not in much conversation with women?” to “sages” in general rather than to Jose ben Johanan of Jerusalem, who appears as the author of this instruction in Tractate Avot. In fact, a phrase attributed to the sages appears in Tractate Avot immediately following Jose ben Johanan’s statement: “Hence have the Sages said: As long as a man engages in too much conversation with women, he causes evil to himself, [for] he goes idle from [the study of] the words of the Torah, so that his end will be that he will inherit Gehinnom.”17 Furthermore, her quote was also incomplete as she failed to include the conclusion of the phrase: “They said this with regard to one’s own wife, how much more [does the rule apply] with regard to another man’s wife.”18 Therefore, we may conclude that Beruriah is not as knowledgeable as she may appear to be at first glance, at least with regard to Tractate Avot. In fact, it has been suggested that the Bavli improved on the tradition regarding Beruriah’s biography by upgrading her level of education.19 It remains to be 14 B. Nedarim 20a. 15 Cf. Sarah, “Beruriah,” 18. Her approach to biblical interpretation is also a literal method of interpreting the text. 16 Goodblatt, “The Beruriah Traditions,” 83. 17 M. Avot 1:5. 18 M. Avot 1:5. 19 Goodblatt, “The Beruriah Traditions,” 84.

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discovered, what did she know, how much did she study, in what occupations did she engage, and what was the nature of her knowledge?20

Beruriah’s implications Beruriah’s statements do not necessarily contain any developed implications. Beruriah responds to R. Jose’s question with a question that means: Is this not as the Sages said: do not engage in much talk with women? That is: Did not the Sages intend to discourage lengthiness such as evident in your question when they said “Engage not in much talk with women?” By her question, Beruriah implies that they obviously did. She immediately goes on to tell R. Jose how he should have worded his question to her: “You should have asked: By which to Lydda?” From the fact that she does not pause to hear his response, we conclude that this interpretation of the sages’ instruction was self-evident to her. A literal interpretation of Beruriah’s statements does not indicate that she intended to make any other implications.

R. Jose’s silence Now it becomes easy to explain R. Jose’s silence. His understanding of the quoted words differs from Beruriah’s literal interpretation. His interpretation is consistent with the illustrations from Avot de-Rabbi Nathan, and certainly not in accord with Beruriah’s simplistic understanding of this instruction. R. Jose is silent because he does not wish to extend the conversation or to explain the interpretation of this phrase according to his view. Therefore he chooses not to respond or acknowledge her statements. That is, R. Jose is silent because he recognizes that Beruriah is making inappropriate use of this aphorism of Jose ben Johanan of Jerusalem. Even for those who assume that Beruriah’s question was rhetorical,21 the reason for R. Jose’s silence is clear. On his part, R. Jose does not consider that he transgresses the words of the sages, who said: “As long as a man engages in too much conversation with women, he causes evil to himself …” He simply wished to learn the road to Lydda. Her response created an unbridgeable discrepancy between them, and therefore, no response or acknowledgement was possible. R. Jose decided to 20 Goodblatt, “The Beruriah Traditions,” 83, on education and knowledge related to the kitchen and the home; cf. Boyarin, Carnal Israel, 183, n. 16. 21 Jonah Fraenkel, The Aggadic Narrative Harmony of Form and Content [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2001), 15.

A Dialogue between R. Jose the Galilean and Beruriah the Leader

completely ignore Beruriah’s attempt to exhibit her knowledge. His silence and lack of response to her statement effectively reject her literal interpretation of the phrase. Thus, R. Jose expresses his absolute superiority over Beruriah in this story: his thundering silence effectively puts her in her place. She comes across as someone who unsuccessfully attempts to impress R. Jose, but he does not respond to her or acknowledge her.

Significance of the story In light of all the above, the dialogue between R. Jose and Beruriah in this account appears to be a random encounter, an isolated incident that is, perhaps, irregular, did not develop in any direction, and in which nothing was produced. R. Jose posed a question, and Beruriah offered a reply. At this point, the dialogue was truncated: there were no further developments in the story. Therefore, no special importance should be attributed to this account.

CONTEXTUAL READING In this section we address the texts that precede and follow the account of R. Jose and Beruriah in a contextual reading, with reference to the same five issues. Three groups of stories, in the following order, precede the dialogue between R. Jose and Beruriah: • an account describing the linguistic inaccuracies of the Galileans compared to the Judeans, and two additional brief stories similarly concerning linguistic inaccuracies; • three short accounts that describe the language of wisdom as a succinct and suggestive, or esoteric language; • three stories attributed to R. Joshua ben Hanania, who admits, “No one has ever had the better of me except a woman, a little boy and a little girl.” Our account of R. Jose and Beruriah immediately follows these three groups of stories, and is followed by another account of Beruriah rebuking a student who was studying in an undertone.22 This is the context: in a contextual reading, we address our story as framed by these accounts.

22 B. Eruvin 53b–54a.

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“Foolish Galilean” The term “foolish Galilean” may not have been used by Beruriah at all. It may have been added to the story by the redactors under the influence of the first of the three preceding groups of stories, which also featured a Galilean man. This character was called a “foolish Galilean” because of his imprecise verbal expressions. On the other hand, the epithet may have been uttered by Beruriah, as in the preceding story, a little girl similarly called R. Joshua ben Hanania “a robber.” The story following our account tells about Beruriah kicking a student who was studying in an undertone. If she did not hesitate to commit this grave act, Beruriah may also not have hesitated to call R. Jose a “foolish Galilean.”

Beruriah’s education We may learn of Beruriah’s education and the extent of her knowledge from one of the stories, concerning eating, which precedes the account of Beruriah and R. Jose. R. Joshua ben Hanania said: I was once staying at an inn where the hostess served me with beans. On the first day I ate all of them leaving nothing... “My Master”, she continued, “is it possible that you left23 [the dish to-day] as compensation for the former meals, for have not the Sages laid down: Nothing is to be left in the pot but something must be left in the plate?”24

Based on this account, we may conclude that women were familiar with halakhic laws concerning the affairs of the home and the kitchen.25 Women also had knowledge and education in halakhic issues or in the words of the sages regarding female affairs, including the prohibition of engaging in “too much talk with women.” Beruriah undoubtedly had this knowledge, as did other women, and she was no exception in this regard. From the account of R. Joshua ben Hanania and the little girl, we may infer her ability to make precise distinctions and her sharpness of tongue. Perhaps not everyone was like her, but Beruriah also apparently had these traits. From 23 Epstein, The Babylonian Talmud, 373, n. 11: “You did not leave … in the first.” 24 Epstein, The Babylonian Talmud, 373, n. 16; cf. Tractate Derekh Eretz Rabbah 6. In the reading, one is to leave something of pastry but not of a boiled dish. 25 Goodblatt, “The Beruriah Traditions,” 83.

A Dialogue between R. Jose the Galilean and Beruriah the Leader

another account, “When Rabbi’s maid indulges in enigmatic speech,” it seems clear that in a wise scholar’s house, such as that of a Rabbi’s, even a woman with the status of a servant might learn to speak the language of wisdom. Similarly, Beruriah, who was the wife of R. Meir and the daughter of R. Hananiah ben Teradyon, both famous and important sages, certainly could have learned to speak the language of wisdom. The subsequent account of Beruriah, who kicked a young student who was studying in an undertone, implies that her knowledge was greater than that of other women. She was familiar with didactics and knew that Torah study should not be performed in an undertone. She had knowledge of the Bible, as she was able to quote the verse: “Ordered in all things, and sure” (2 Samuel 23:5). Furthermore, she had knowledge of the midrashic26 (from Midrash Aggada) interpretation of this verse: “If it [Torah learning] is ordered in your two hundred and forty-eight limbs it will be sure, otherwise it will not be sure.” Beruriah’s dialogue with R. Jose may also be interpreted as a demonstration of her knowledge. Beruriah proves herself familiar with the sages’ methods of teaching: she employs a technique of posing a question in the negative—“Did not the Sages say this?”—immediately followed by an affirmative conclusion. Finally, Beruriah’s knowledge is also attested to by her application of the principle of giving preference to the literal meaning of a verse. In view of the above, we see that Beruriah had knowledge and education in various topics that exceeded the knowledge typical of women, as was appropriate for one who lived in the house of her father R. Hananiah ben Teradyon and her husband R. Meir.

Implications The third issue that we address concerns the possible implications of Beruriah’s question. When her question is studied in context, we may conclude that no malevolent implication was intended when Beruriah asked: “Did not the Sages say this: Engage not in much talk with women?” Her question is similar to that of the hostess who served food to her guest R. Joshua ben Hanania and asked him, in the same style: “For have not the Sages laid down: Nothing is to be left in the pot but something must be left on the plate?” The hostess posed the question in order to receive a reply, because it appeared to her that the guest was transgressing rabbinical laws, and she wished to know whether R. Joshua 26 Goodblatt, “The Beruriah Traditions,” 83–84.

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ben Hanania had any explanation for his conduct that was unknown to her. No insinuation is intended in this sentence.27 Similarly, in the second account pertaining to R. Joshua ben Hanania, a little girl asks him a question and anticipates a reply. Beruriah’s question to R. Jose should also be understood as a request for an explanation because it appears in the same style as the questions in the previous stories. Therefore, Beruriah’s question to R. Jose can be understood as lacking any insinuation. Moreover, Beruriah’s question can be understood as a question about wisdom rather than an insult based on its connection to the preceding accounts that describe the language of wisdom as succinct and brief. In this context, Beruriah questions his use of lengthy speech, which is not considered the language of wisdom; she would have expected him, a wise man, to use a briefer utterance. On the other hand, in the account of Beruriah and a student, which follows her dialogue with R. Jose, no answer is expected from the student. This may allow us to conclude that Beruriah’s question to R. Jose also requires no answer. However, this conclusion should be ruled out due to significant differences between these two accounts. Beruriah asks the student in the subsequent story, “Is it not written, Ordered in all things, and sure?” She does not expect an answer from him, as he is a mere student, and Beruriah feels superior in knowledge to him. In contrast, when she poses a question to R. Jose, considered a wise and learned individual, she expects an answer. Furthermore, we should not infer from her approach to the student (from whom she did not expect an answer) a link to her question to R. Jose (from whom she did expect an answer), because the account of Beruriah and R. Jose shares more in common with the preceding accounts than with the account of the student. Like the account of Beruriah and R. Jose, the preceding accounts involve a dialogue, while the account of the student lacks any interaction or dialogue between Beruriah and the student.

R. Jose’s silence In view of R. Joshua ben Hanania’s opening statement, “No one has ever had the better of me except a woman, a little boy and a little girl,” R. Jose’s silence in this context may be understood as an admission of his failure to comply with 27 Hidushei ha-Meiri, Eruvin 53b, s.v. meshayrin peʿah ba-keʿara. It is reasonable to assume that the woman intended to remind him of things that he had forgotten. He did not similarly regarding Beruriah’s question to R. Jose.

A Dialogue between R. Jose the Galilean and Beruriah the Leader

the prohibition against engaging in “too much talk” with women. Beruriah was correct and she “triumphed” in their dialogue. The similarities between the story of R. Joshua ben Hanania and the hostess and that of R. Jose and Beruriah are clear. In both accounts, a dialogue takes place between the parties, who use an identical stylistic form of question: “Have not the Sages laid down …?”28 “Did not the Sages say this …?” Therefore, as R. Joshua ben Hanania admits that the hostess defeated him, in view of the context we may conclude that Beruriah similarly defeated R. Jose. His silence is the admission of defeat, although this defeat is not explicitly noted. That is, in contrast to R. Joshua ben Hanania who explicitly admits that three classes of people have had the better of him, R. Jose does not express such an admission.

Significance of the account This entire story should be treated as an anecdote; a brief, amusing tale, possibly fictitious (in part), redacted here in view of the context of the previous accounts concerning R. Joshua ben Hanania. The account of R. Joshua ben Hanania and the little boy, immediately preceding our story, opens with the following: “I [R. Joshua ben Hanania] was once on a journey when I noticed a little boy sitting at a cross-road. ‘By what road,’ I asked him, ‘do we go to the town?’” The story of R. Jose and Beruriah opens in a similar manner: “R. Jose the Galilean was once on a journey when he met Beruriah. ‘By what road,’ he asked her, ‘do we go to Lydda?’” The story of R. Joshua ben Hanania and the little girl also opens: “I [R. Joshua ben Hanania] was once on a journey. …” The contextual elements from the preceding stories about a Galilean who was called a “foolish Galilean,” and the hostess’s question to R. Joshua ben Hanania phrased as “Have not the Sages laid down?” are repeated in our story as Beruriah’s epithet for R. Jose, “foolish Galilean,” and her similarly phrased question: “Did not the Sages say this?” Thus, a contextual analysis of the dialogue between R. Jose and Beruriah reflects a redaction driven by contextual associations.

SUMMARY We have seen that different readings of the same story create throw very different light on Beruriah’s image. Moreover, these different readings have interesting implications for the theme of Jewish leadership throughout the ages. 28 Cf. Tractate Derekh Eretz Rabbah 6. This sentence is missing.

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The method of textual reading purports to understand the text solely on the basis of its own internal connections, and no presumptions are applied when examining each textual component.29 According to the textual reading, Beruriah is proactive: she is apparently trying to make an impression, and perhaps even to prove her superiority over R. Jose, by exhibiting the confidence necessary to argue with him. R. Jose is very passive: he does not even respond to her. His behavior stems from his superior status as a halakhic authority relative to Beruriah. His silence is interpreted as invalidation of the statements made by someone who dares speak against him and patronize him. In his perspective, Beruriah is trying to lead an action that could generate a breakthrough—arguing and debating with sages—but R. Jose does not support this direction and wishes to avoid this issue by refusing to respond to her argument. From Beruriah’s perspective, R. Jose’s question is a gross error and contradicts the sages’ teachings, which compels her to correct him immediately by posing a sober question. She does so because she does not see herself as inferior in status but rather as an equal of R. Jose. In Beruriah’s opinion, a woman who is learned and well-versed in the words of the sages is therefore entitled or even obliged to comment or correct anyone who errs, even if he is a wise scholar. Beruriah is not afraid of seeming arrogant, rather the opposite: she is assertive and forceful to the extent that she does not even allow R. Jose the opportunity to respond—she corrects his statement promptly. Beruriah’s conduct can be attributed only to a woman with self-confidence, who sees in her own behavior a model for others, for other women; in a word, a leader. Beruriah is saying to all women: if you have the required knowledge in any area, including the words of the sages, and your argument is well-based— speak out with no fear of anyone. The contextual reading method30 aims to understand the text in its context, due to the significance attributed to the aspects of context.31 According to the contextual reading, Beruriah does not hesitate to express her opinion, and even more so, she triumphs over R. Jose in this argument. The implied message is clear and unambiguous: Beruriah presents an idea that is important for all, not only for women. It is possible not only to state an argument against the words of wise scholars, but also to triumph and surpass them. This, however, requires 29 Levy, Hermeneutics, 103, 167, 229. 30 Dan Ben-Amos, “Context in Context,” Western Folklore 52 (1993): 209–226. 31 Levy, Hermeneutics, 167, 234.

A Dialogue between R. Jose the Galilean and Beruriah the Leader

knowledge and mastery in a specific field, and internal courage of the kind Beruriah exhibited. In Beruriah’s time, women, apparently, lacked these two traits. To rectify this, Beruriah acts as a role model for other women. By triumphing over R. Jose, Beruriah is, effectively, waving a banner, calling upon all women to change their behavior, and attitude. Beruriah behaves and is seen as the leader of women who were voiceless at that time—just as R. Jose’s voice is not heard in response to Beruriah’s argument. Beruriah wishes to serve as a model that undermines the paradigm of voiceless women who silently accept everything that comes from the world of the sages as wise and true, even if they believe otherwise. Beruriah shows them another way, her way, and her triumph over R. Jose should encourage them to adopt her method. In summary, as a conclusion of the textual reading, we may say that Beruriah has emerged from obscurity, confronted R. Jose the Galilean—and failed. From a contextual perspective, Beruriah was a significant, successful female model of a leader in her time. However, we must ask: just how successful was Beruriah? Apparently, not very much. In retrospect, we do not hear of other women like her.

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CHAPTER 5

Ancient Aramaic and Its Use in the Biblical Translation, Targum Onqelos ARAMAIC AS AN ANCIENT SEMITIC LANGUAGE OF ASIA

A

ramaic has a very early origin, with its name based on the Aramaean tribes in Syria,1 although use of this Semitic language became widespread in the tenth century BCE, when Aramaeans settled in Mesopotamia, Babylonia, and Syria, in an area extending to the Canaanite border. Gradually, Aramaic became the lingua franca replacing Hebrew2 in everyday life and in the intellectual life of Jews in the Mesopotamia region, and in Syria and Israel in the following centuries. Aramaic was also used as the language of diplomacy, as implied by 2 Kings 18:26 and Isaiah 36:11, when the servants of King Hezekiah ask Rabshakeh, emissary of the King of Assyria, to speak to them in Aramaic.3 Aramaic is a northern Semitic language with many dialects, a development that stems from differences of time and place. Aramaic had a significant influence on Hebrew.4 They are similar in syntax, grammar, vocabulary, and vowels and consonants, but differ in their phonology and structure.5

Yehuda Komlosh, The Bible in Light of the Aramaic Translations [Hebrew], (Tel-Aviv: Bar Ilan University, Dvir, 1973), 14. 2 Komlosh, The Bible, 15; Dov Rappel, Targum Onqelos ke-perush la-Torah [Hebrew], (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1985), 7. 3 Eduard Y. Kutscher, Hebrew and Aramaic Studies [Hebrew], vol. 1, ed. Zeev Ben-Hayyim, Aharon Dotan, Gad Sarfatti ( Jerusalem: Magnes, 1977), 306. 4 Encyclopaedia Biblica, 3rd edition, s.v. Hashpaʿat ha-Aramit ʿal ha-ʻIvrit, 593–595; Encyclopaedia Hebraica, s.v. Aramit, 961, 963, 966, 968–969; Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd edition, s.v. “Aramaic,” 282–283, on the influence of Aramaic on the Hebrew of the Mishna and contemporary vernacular Hebrew. 5 Kutscher, Hebrew and Aramaic Studies, 90–155, on the Aramaic language; Encyclopaedia Judaica, s.v. “Aramaic,” 263–264 on features of Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic and 266–267 on the impact of Aramaic on Biblical Hebrew. 1

Ancient Aramaic and Its Use in the Biblical Translation, Targum Onqelos

Aramaic served as an international language for all countries of the East from the eighth century BCE until the reign of Alexander the Great,6 and as the administrative language of the Persian Empire.7 Between the fifth and seventh centuries BCE,8 Aramaic functioned as the lingua franca connecting people in Central Asia and the Middle East.9

ARAMAIC IN THE BIBLE The first occurrence of Aramaic in the Bible is in a speech by Laban the Aramaean, who uses two Aramaic words ‫ יגר שהדותא‬for the monument Jacob erected (Gen. 31:47). Other verses in Aramaic are found in the Bible, for example, Jer. 10:11, while other sections were influenced by Aramaic, such as verses from the story of Bilam (Num. 23:8), Proverbs (31:2), and prophecies in the Book of Ezekiel (16:33).10 Translations of the Bible such as the Pseudo-Jonathan ben Uziel translation, the Yerushalmi translation, and the Onqelos translation, were written in Aramaic. Other documentation in Aramaic has also been discovered, including the Bar Kokhba letters and the Elephantine documents. Finally, a large portion of the legalistic rabbinical literature was written in Aramaic, including collections of legends (midreshei aggada), and the Bavli and Yerushalmi Talmuds.

DEVELOPMENT OF ARAMAIC Aramaic can be divided into five types:11 (1) Ancient Aramaic (925–700 BCE). Several inscriptions in ancient Aramaic have been found in various archaeological excavations, especially in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt (the Elephantine

  6 Encyclopaedia Hebraica, s.v. Aram Naharaim, 952.   7 Komlosh, The Bible, 15.   8 Until the mid-eleventh century, according to Jacob N. Epstein, A Grammar of Babylonian Aramaic [Hebrew], ed. Ezra Z. Melamed ( Jerusalem: Magnes, 1960), 16.   9 Encyclopaedia Judaica, s.v. “Aramaic,” 260, 266. 10 Encyclopaedia Judaica, s.v. “Aramaic,” 267, notes additional biblical passages that were influenced by Aramaic. 11 Eduard Y. Kutscher, A History of Aramaic [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Akademon, 1972), 4; Encyclopaedia Judaica, s.v. “Aramaic,” 259–283, lists all types of Aramaic dialects and languages; Elisha Qimron, Biblical Aramaic [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1993), 1–3.

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Documents). Early letters from the ninth century BCE12 were found in Assyria, Aram-Naharaim, and Syria. (2) Official Aramaic (700–200 BCE). This is known as the language used to draft official documents and deeds, or to inscribe weights in Assyria and Persia,13 as well as for contracts, seals, etc. In Persia it was also used as the language of official conversations and the language of diplomacy.14 Examples of this type of Aramaic also appear in the Bible, for example in the Books of Daniel (2:4–7:28) and Ezra (4:8–6:18, 7:12–26). (3) Middle Aramaic (200 BCE–200 CE). The Onqelos Translation of the Bible was apparently written in this form in Israel and transmitted to Babylonia.15 It has also been found in numerous texts, scrolls, and inscriptions.16 (4) Late Aramaic (200–700 CE). Late Aramaic is divided into Eastern and Western Aramaic. The Babylonian Talmud, for example, was written in the Babylonian-Aramaic dialect of Eastern Aramaic, whose additional dialects include Syriac and Mandaic.17 The Yerushalmi Talmud was written in the Aramaic-Galilean dialect of Western Aramaic, whose additional dialects include Samaritan Aramaic and Christian Aramaic (or Syriac-Israeli Aramaic).18 (5) Modern Aramaic (700 CE to the present) is spoken to this day in various parts of Asia. For example, the Maʿalula dialect is named after the village in the vicinity of Damascus where the dialect is spoken, as it is in two adjacent villages.19 Various dialects of Aramaic are still spoken today in certain regions of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, several former Soviet republics, Kurdistan, and Syria.

12 Epstein, A Grammar, 9–10. 13 Epstein, A Grammar, 9–10. 14 Encyclopaedia Judaica, s.v. “Aramaic,” 261–266. 15 Encyclopaedia Judaica, s.v. “Aramaic,” 267; Epstein, A Grammar, 14, discusses the development of Targum Onqelos. 16 Encyclopaedia Judaica, s.v. “Aramaic,” 267–269. 17 Epstein, A Grammar, 13. 18 Kutscher, Hebrew and Aramaic Studies, 169–175; Michael Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic of the Byzantine Period (Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2002), 3. 19 Encyclopaedia Hebraica, s.v. Aramit, 959.

Ancient Aramaic and Its Use in the Biblical Translation, Targum Onqelos

AN INTRODUCTION TO ONQELOS AND HIS TRANSLATION Targum Onqelos is the translation of the Pentateuch (Torah) into Aramaic. According to research, the identity, time, and place of this translation are not definite, but the Bavli Talmud20 attributes this translation to Onqelos (or Akylas) the Convert, a nephew of the Roman Emperor Hadrian (or Titus) who converted to Judaism in the early second century CE. Researchers are divided on whether Onqelos’s translation of the Pentateuch into Aramaic and Akylas’s translation of the Bible into Greek were created by the same person or by two different people. While the majority of scholars believe that these translations were made by two different individuals, a minority claims that a single individual was responsible for both translations. Possible dates of this work range from the first century CE to the fifth century CE, yet most scholars believe that the Targum was created in the third century CE, based on an earlier translation. The Targum was created in Israel and written down as “[transcribed] from R. Eliezer and R. Yehoshua”21 that is, under their supervision. The translation of the Pentateuch into Aramaic was intended to enable Diaspora Jews to understand the Pentateuch in their spoken language. Targum Onqelos is a literal-semantic translation of the majority of the Pentateuch’s verses, which generally adheres closely to the Hebrew text with no deviations, additions, or omissions. The term “Targum Onqelos” emerges in the works of the Geonim (seventh to tenth century CE) and thereafter appears in medieval writings.

TARGUM ONQELOS FEATURES THREE MAIN TYPES OF DEVIATIONS FROM THE BIBLICAL SOURCE Typically, Targum Onqelos leans toward literal translation. This section discusses Onqelos’s translations that deviate from the literal mode. These deviations can be classified into three categories: (1) translations of anthropomorphisms; (2) legalistic verses; and (3) translations of special speeches or poetry.

A. Translations of anthropomorphisms The first category is the translation of anthropomorphisms. In such cases, Targum Onqelos uses non-literal translation to avoid referring to God in terms that 20 B. Megillah 3a. 21 B. Megillah 3a.

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usually describe ways in which humans look or act. The following five examples are illustrative of this category. The first example is from Genesis. In the story of the Tower of Babel (Gen. 11:5) the text reads “‫“( ”וירד ה’ לראות את העיר ואת המגדל אשר בנו בני האדם‬And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men built”). Onqelos’s translation for this verse reads as follows: Weʾitgali yy al ovad karta umigdla dibno bnei anasha, meaning, “The Lord was revealed on the actions of the city and the tower that the people had built.” The verbs “come down” and “see” in the original verse were not translated by Onqelos, to avoid anthropomorphism. The second example is from the story of the Garden of Eden. When the snake persuades Eve to eat from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, he rationalizes God’s reason for the prohibition in Gen. 3:5: “‫כי יודע אלוקים כי ביום אכלכם ממנו‬ ‫“( ”ונפקחו עיניכם והייתם כאלוקים יודעי טוב ורע‬for God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil”). In Targum Onqelos, the beginning of this phrase is translated as “‘‫”ארי גלי קדם ה‬. The word “know” is not rendered literally, as its corresponding Aramaic term “‫למידע‬.” Onqelos modifies this, by adding the phrase “‘‫”ארי גלי קדם ה‬ (“disclosed before God”), to prevent Aramaic readers from believing that God acquires knowledge in the way a man does. For this reason, Onqelos offers a translation that is interpretative and abstract. Onqelos writes: “It is [known and] disclosed to God that when they eat from it [the fruit of the tree], … they will … understand the difference between good and evil.” Merely for the sake of comparison, Rashi, who does not follow Onqelos’s translation, offers a literal interpretation of this verse: According to Rashi, the verse means: “You will be able to create worlds, as God is; and God does not wish you to become similar to him.” The third example is taken from a scene described immediately after the sin of eating the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge in Gen. 3:8: “’‫וישמעו את קול ה‬ ‫“( ”אלוקים מתהלך בגן‬And they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in the garden”). In Targum Onqelos the following phrase has been added: “‫קול מימרא‬ ‫“( ”של ה’ אלוקים‬the words of God”). Specifically, Onqelos added the word “‫מימרא‬,” which means [God’s] “words,” to stress that what Adam and Eve heard in the Garden of Eden were God’s words, rather than God’s physical voice. In his Aramaic translation, Onqelos wished to prevent any misunderstanding of the verse by emphasizing that God is no mortal who has a voice or generates sounds in a manner similar to human beings. Again, for the sake of comparison, Rashi’s literal interpretation of the verse is: “They heard God’s voice in the Garden.”

Ancient Aramaic and Its Use in the Biblical Translation, Targum Onqelos

The fourth example is from the episode where God informs Abraham of his desire to punish the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, whom Abraham then attempts to defend. In Gen. 18:22 it says: “’‫“( ”ואברהם עודנו עומד לפני ה‬but Abraham stood yet before the Lord”), and Targum Onqelos has rendered this verse as follows: “’‫ואברהם עד כען משמש בצלו קדם ה‬,” which means, “Abraham is still praying to God.” According to Rashi, the text of this verse contains a scribal emendation, and should be read: “As God was still standing before Abraham.” In his volume on Targum Onqelos, Komlosh22 states that even after the scribal emendation, this verse, “‘‫“( ”ואברהם עודנו עומד לפני ה‬but Abraham stood yet before the Lord”) is inappropriate with regard to God. Onqelos, who undoubtedly shared this view, sought to convey that it is impossible for any human, including Abraham, to physically stand before God. The only possibility that seemed feasible to the translator, in his efforts to evade anthropomorphism, was to interpret the word “stood” (“‫ )”עומד‬as “prayed.” A similar choice is made by the late ninth-century sage R. Saʿadya Gaon in his Tafsir, a translation of the Pentateuch into Arabic. Indeed, an individual in prayer may be seated or standing. The latter is exemplified in the Shemoneh-Esre prayer, also known as Amida, which means “standing.” The fifth example illustrating this category is taken from the story of Noah and the Flood, when Noah performs a sacrifice after leaving the Ark. The verse in Gen. 8:21 says: “‫“( ”וירח ה’ את ריח הניחוח ויאמר ה’ אל לבו‬And the Lord smelled the sweet savour and the Lord said in His heart”). The Targum Onqelos of this verse is different: “‫“( ”וקביל ה’ ברעווא ית קורבניה ואמר ה’ במימריה‬And God accepted his sacrifice willingly and God said in his words”). All the verbs typically used to describe human action—see, smell, say—were translated into Aramaic in a manner that prevented any risk of anthropomorphism. Non-literal translations were chosen to create a new meaning. For example, the phrase “‫“( ”וירח ה’ את ריח הניחוח‬And the Lord smelled the sweet savour”) was rendered in translation as “God willingly accepted [Noah’s] sacrifice.” The second half of the verse, “and the Lord said in His heart” was rendered as “God said in his words.” The Tafsir (ad loc.) follows Onqelos’s version to prevent anthropomorphism, as does the commentary by R. Abraham Ibn Ezra (early eleventh century). According to Ibn Ezra, it is inappropriate to say that “God smells.” For Ibn Ezra, this verb actually means that God accepts and is pleased by a sacrifice, as a person is pleased when smelling a fragrant scent: 22 Komlosh, The Bible, 170.

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‫ רק הטעם [ה’] שקיבל את הקרבן וישרה לפניו‬:‫ והוא מבאר‬...‫וחלילה חלילה להיות ה’ מריח‬ ‫כאדם שמריח ריח טוב והוא ערב‬.” These are only a small number of examples from this category of biblical verses that were not translated literally in order to prevent anthropomorphism and to enhance the readers’ comprehension. To achieve these goals, when the text mentions God, Onqelos often substitutes the divine name with extended combinations in Aramaic. He uses the words such as “God’s divine presence,” “God’s honor,” “fear of God,” “before God,” or “God’s words” instead of “God” in the text. Furthermore, Komlosh23 distinguishes between Onqelos’s differentiated uses of these terms. For example, the combination “God’s divine presence” appears when Onqelos’s intention is to note that the spirit of God is present in the Temple or with the People of Israel; and “fear of God” is used when speaking about a person who follows God’s commandments. Despite Onqelos’s desire to avoid anthropomorphism, he apparently translated a number of problematic verses with no such concerns, although these translations are rare. For example, Gen. 1:27: “‫”ויברא א’ את האדם בצלם א’ ברא אותו‬ (“And God created man in His own image”) was translated literally into Aramaic, as was the verse in Deut. 9:10: “‘‫”ויתן ה’ אלי את שני לוחות האבנים כתובים באצבע א‬ (“And the Lord delivered unto me two tables of stone written with the finger of God”). One explanation for these exceptions is that in these verses Onqelos relies on the readers to reject a literal understanding of the verse because the use of anthropomorphism here sounds so blatantly far from reality.

B. Legalistic verses The second category of verses that were treated by Onqelos in a special way comprises verses of a legalistic nature. In these verses, for various reasons, Targum Onqelos intended to emphasize a specific law (halakha), as the following five examples illustrate. The first example reflects an approach against those who believe exclusively in the written Torah and do not believe in the Oral Torah handed down through the traditions of the sages. Lev. 23:11: “‫“( ”ממחרת השבת‬on the morrow after the Sabbath”) was translated by Onqelos as mibatar yama tava meaning from the day after the holiday.24 The implication of this translation is that the 23 Komlosh, The Bible, 106–116. 24 B. Menah.ot 65b.

Ancient Aramaic and Its Use in the Biblical Translation, Targum Onqelos

Omer (which is the forty-nine days between the second day of Passover and Pentecost) should be counted from the second day of Passover. The Targum Onqelos does not contain the word “Sabbath” which appears in the original biblical text to emphasize that the Omer should not be counted from the day after the first Sabbath following Passover, as customary among various sects (Karaites) that did not believe in the sages’ Oral Law. The second example, designed to emphasize an early or customary legal tradition, is Ex. 23:19: “‫“( ”לא תבשל גדי בחלב אמו‬Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother’s milk”). Onqelos translated this verse as Lo teichalun bassar ba-halav, meaning “Do not eat meat with milk.” The prohibition to eat meat and milk together is the halakhic tradition derived from this verse, rather than its literal meaning, which is to not cook a kid together with its mother’s milk. Although there are three related halakhic prohibitions involving meat and milk (cooking, enjoying, and eating, according to B. Hullin 115b), Onqelos consistently chooses the prohibition of eating as the translation for the three appearances of this phrase in Exodus (Ex. 34:26, 23:19). Several modifications of legal rules in Targum Onqelos were designed to emphasize the conventional behavior associated with biblical commandments. Our third example is based on the daily commandment to wear phylacteries (tefillin) on the forehead during the Shacharit morning prayers. According to Ex. 13:16: “‫“( ”ולטוטפות בין עיניך‬and for frontlets between thine eyes”). Onqelos might have used the Aramaic word “‫לטוטפון‬,” which appears in Targum Yonathan ben Uziel (an Aramaic translation of the Prophets and the Writings, the second and the third sections of the Jewish Bible): “‫טוטפתך יהון עלך‬,” which was used to translate Ez. 24:17: “‫“( ”פארך חבוש עליך‬bind thy headtire upon thee”). Instead, Onqelos’s translation for the verse in Exodus is “‫“( ”ולתפילין בין עינך‬and the Tefillin between your eyes”), referring to the well-known and commonly practiced commandment of tefillin that were tied to the forehead. Rashi follows this interpretation and notes the etymology of the Hebrew word “‫לטוטפות‬,” which appears in the Bavli Talmud.25 Another example of Onqelos’s translation of a verse based on a known and commonly performed commandment involves the commandment of the Four Species related to the Feast of Tabernacles. According to Lev. 23:40, “‫“( ”ולקחתם לכם ביום הראשון פרי עץ הדר כפת תמרים וענף עץ עבות וערבי נחל‬And ye shall take you on the first day the fruit of goodly trees, branches of palm-trees, and boughs of thick trees”). Instead of a literal rendering, the Aramaic translation 25 B. Sanhedrin 4b.

57

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mentions specific types of plants chosen in accordance with the well-known interpretation of the sages for this commandment, following the oral tradition: the goodly tree is identified as the etrog, the palm trees are the lulav, and the thick trees are the myrtle.26 In the Tafsir, R. Saʿadya Gaon followed Onqelos and applied the common interpretation of the commandment in his translation of the list of plants in this verse into Arabic. The final example in this category comprises two brief illustrations relating to law and justice. The first is based on Gen. 9:6: “‫”שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך‬ (“Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed”). Onqelos translated the phrase “‫“( ”באדם דמו ישפך‬by man shall his blood be shed”) into Aramaic according to Jewish law: “‫“( ”בסהדין ממימר דייניא דמיה יתאשד‬According to the judges, he will be sentenced to death, according to witnesses”). In other words, a murderer will be sentenced to death only if there are witnesses to the act, and the judges so decide. This law appears as early as the collection of laws compiled by the Tannaim.27 The second example is taken from Ex. 23:7: “‫“( ”ונקי וצדיק אל תהרוג‬and the innocent and righteous slay thou not”). Onqelos did not translate the term ‫ צדיק‬literally as “righteous,” but rendered in accordance with the oral tradition of the sages: “Whoever is found innocent in court, is not put to death”28: “‫( ”ודינפק דכי מן דינא לא תקטול‬with a broader meaning of “Whoever was found innocent in a court of law, is not returned to the court, even if someone says that he wishes to make a statement that undermines the verdict”). However, Onqelos does not always conform in his translations to the oral traditions of the legal commandments, which were the accepted interpretations of those verses. Occasionally, he retains the original wording and makes a literal translation. As a result, his translation might be misunderstood by readers as representing a view contrary to halakha. For example, the phrase “an eye for an eye” (Ex. 21:24, Lev. 24:20, Deut. 19:21) was translated literally by Onqelos “‫“( ”עינא חלף עינא‬Whoever injures his friend’s eye, shall have his own eye injured by the friend in retaliation”). This is not, however, the interpretation that the sages ascribed to this phrase. According to the sages, “an eye for an eye” meant that the injured party should receive monetary compensation of an amount specific to the injury, not perform a retaliatory injury.29 26 27 28 29

B. Sukkah 32a–b, 33b, 35a. Sifrei, Shoftim, Ish Shalom edition, para. 160. B. Sanhedrin 33b. B. Sanhedrin 84a.

Ancient Aramaic and Its Use in the Biblical Translation, Targum Onqelos

The Karaites did not accept the sages’ interpretation of this verse and supported a literal interpretation of this legal rule, while the sages believed that monetary compensation was required in the case of a physical injury. Although Onqelos might have been expected to render a translation according to the sages’ tradition, his translation for this phrase is, in fact, a literal one. All this leads us to state the following as a summary of this category. We have no way of knowing whether the translator had a principled approach that guided him in choosing whether to translate legal rules literally or according to the halakha. Based on the nature of Onqelos’s translation, it seems that there was no special system or principle guiding him, and his decision was based on various considerations. One consideration was convenience and simplicity of the translation to ensure readers’ comprehension. Another was the desire to emphasize specific legal rulings in the face of contrary interpretations. It is possible that Onqelos’s own idiosyncrasies also came into play.

C. Special speeches or poetry The third category involves the translation of special speeches or poetry. In these cases, Onqelos expands on the translation by introducing additional information (in the form of glosses or commentaries such as Midrash Aggada, a collection of legends in classical rabbinical literature). This is illustrated by the following five examples. The first example is taken from Jacob’s blessing to his sons. Jacob’s blessing to Naftali in Gen. (49:21) is “‫“( ”נפתלי איילה שלוחה‬Naphtali is a hind let loose”). Onqelos translates this as “‫”נפתלי בארע טבא יתרמיה עדביה ואחסנתיה תהי מעבדא פירין‬ (“Naphtali in good soil shall his destiny be planted, and his estate shall produce fruit”). Onqelos’s translation is based on a collection of legends,30 which notes the geographical location of Naftali’s inherited estate and its fertility: “This is the Genosar Valley which hastens as a deer to produce its fruit.” Onqelos’s translation of the blessing to Joseph (Gen. 49:24) “‫”ותשב באיתן קשתו‬ (“But his bow abode firm”) is, similarly, based on a midrash aggada, and is completely different from the source. Onqelos’s translation is “‫ותבת בהון נביותיה על דקיים‬ ‫אורייתא בסתרא‬,” meaning that Joseph’s dreams were fulfilled through his brothers because he maintained the Torah in secret. His translation is based on R. Simeon Hassida’s saying in the Bavli Talmud,31 “‫“( ”יוסף שקידש שם שמים בסתר‬Joseph sanctified God in secret”). 30 Bereshit Rabba, Va-yechi 99:12, Mirkin edition. 31 B. Sotah 10b.

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Benjamin’s blessing (Gen. 49:27), “‫“( ”בנימין זאב יטרף‬Benjamin32 is a wolf that raveneth”) is translated by Onqelos as “‫בנימין בארעיה תשרי שכינתא ובאחסנתיה יתבני‬ ‫“( ”מקדשא‬God’s spirit shall rest in Benjamin’s estate, and the Temple shall be built in his portion”), according to the legend33 which states that “‫“( ”שרתה השכינה בחלקו‬God’s spirit rested in his estate”), and the legend34 stating that “‫מלמד שבית המקדש היה בנוי בחלקו של בנימין‬,” which shows that the Temple was built on Benjamin’s estate. The second example involves two verses from the Song of the Sea. The first verse (Ex. 15:1), “ ‫”אז ישיר משה ובני ישראל את השירה הזאת לה’ לאמר אשירה לה’ כי גאה גאה‬ (“Then sang Moses and the children of Israel this song unto the Lord, and spoke, saying: I will sing unto the Lord, for He is highly exalted”), is translated by Onqelos as “‫( ”נשבח ונודה לה’ כי התגאה על גאים‬We will praise and thank God because he has more pride than those who are arrogant). In the Hebrew text, the word “‫“( ”אשירה‬I will sing”) appears in the singular, but Onqelos only uses the plural forms of the verbs in the Aramaic translation. His choice is closely aligned to an interpretation given by R. Akiba, who was quoted as saying, “This shows that the People of Israel would repeat in song after Moses.”35 The translation “‫“( ”כי התגאה על גאים‬he has more pride than those who are arrogant”) is based on a legend stating that the sage Reish Lakish interpreted “I will sing” as “‫שירה למי שמתגאה על הגאים‬,” “song to God, he who has more pride than those who are arrogant.”36 Rashi follows Onqelos’s translation of this section of the verse. The second verse from the Song of the Sea is “‫“( ”זה אלי ואנוהו‬This is my God and I will glorify him”) (Ex. 15:2). Targum Onqelos for this verse reads: Den Alohi veʾevne leh makdash, meaning “This is my God and I will build him a temple,” even though the original verse makes no mention of building a temple. The Targum adds this information on the basis of a legend,37 which states: “‫–שחורה אני בשור … ונאוה אני במשכן‬ʻ‫‘“( ”’זה אלי ואנוהו‬This is my God and I will glorify him’ means “I was in error in committing the sin of the Golden Calf, … and I acted properly in building the tabernacle”). 32 See Kutscher, Hebrew and Aramaic Studies, 322–323 on the origin of the name Benjamin: “person of my oath, ally.” 33 Mechilta D’Rabbi Ismael, Beshalah., Horovitz-Rabin edition, para. 5, 105; Mekhilta D’Rabbi Šimeʿon b. Jochai, Beshalah. 14:22, Epstein Melamed edition, 63. 34 Sifrei, Ve-zot ha-berakha, Ish Shalom edition, para. 352. 35 B. Sotah 27b. 36 B. Hagigah 13b. 37 Shemot Rabba, Va-yakhel 49:2, Mirkin edition.

Ancient Aramaic and Its Use in the Biblical Translation, Targum Onqelos

The third example is taken from two verses in Bilam’s speech. In the first (Num. 24:17), “‫“( ”דרך כוכב מיעקב וקם שבט מישראל‬There shall step forth a star38 (kokhav) out of Jacob, and a scepter shall rise out of Israel”), Onqelos renders an eschatological translation that refers to the days of the Messiah (“‫ ויתרבא משיחא מישראל‬,‫“—”כד יקום מלכא מיעקב‬When a king from Jacob appears, and the Messiah will come from Israel”). Onqelos is not alone. R. Akiba attributed the verse “There shall step forth a star out of Jacob” to Bar Kochva, leader of the rebellion against Rome in 135 CE, whom R. Akiba considered to be the Messiah. The Midrash Lekah Tov39 also contains a legend that describes the days of the Messiah and states: “there shall step forth a star out of Jacob.” In the Yerushalmi Talmud,40 R. Ah.a concluded from this verse that the Messiah will be from the house of Jacob. Although Rashi instructed to follow Targum Onqelos (“‫)”כתרגומו‬, his own interpretation is unrelated to Onqelos’s version. The second verse from Bilam’s speech (Num. 24:23) is “‫”אוי מי יחיה משומו אל‬ (“Alas, who shall live after God hath appointed him?”). Onqelos translated this as “Woe to the nations who live when God does all these things.” Onqelos applied an eschatological interpretation to this verse as well, based on a legend relating to this verse that was also known to R. Joh.anan. It states: “‫”אוי לה לאומה שתימצא בשעה שהקב”ה עושה פדיון לבניו‬41—“Woe to the nation that may be found [attempting to hinder], when The Holy One, blessed be He, accomplishes the redemption of his children.” The fourth example is from Moses’s blessing to the nation before his death. Moses says (Deut. 33:2): “‫(אׁש ָדת) לָ מֹו‬ ֵ ‫”מ ִימינו אשדת‬ ִ (“His right hand was a fiery law unto them”), which Onqelos renders differently as “‫”כתב   ימינה   מגו   אישתא   אוריתא   ויהב   לנא‬ meaning that God wrote the Torah in fire with his right hand and gave it to us. Onqelos’s translation is based on a legend42 relating to this verse, which states: “‫ אף דברי תורה ניתנו מן השמים‬,‫ מה אש ניתנה משמיים‬,‫—”דברי תורה נמשלו לאש‬ “The words of the Torah were likened to fire: just as fire was given from the heaven, so the words of the Torah were handed down from heaven.” Onqelos’s translation is identical in both Targum Yerushalmi A and Targum Yerushalmi B; Rashi’s interpretation follows Onqelos as a second interpretation for this verse, while R. Saʿadya Gaon translates this verse into Arabic in a similar manner (here 38 39 40 41 42

See Kutscher, Hebrew and Aramaic Studies, 331–333 on the interpretation of this verse. Midrash Lekah. Tov, Balak 24:17, p. 258. Y. Nedarim 4:12, 38a. B. Sanhedrin 106a. Sifrei, Ve-zot ha-berakha, Ish Shalom edition, para. 343.

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given in back-to-Hebrew translation): “‫ [ונתן] להם‬,‫ אש מימינו‬,‫תורה‬.” (“Torah [is a] fire from His right hand, and He gave it to us”). The fifth example is from the same chapter (Deut. 33:21), and refers to Moses’s blessing to the tribe of Gad: “‫“( ”כי שם חלקת מחֹקק ספון‬for there a portion of a ruler was reserved”), which Onqelos translates as “‫“(—”ארי תמן באחסנתיה משה ספרא רבא דישראל קביר‬because Moses, who is Israel’s great author, is buried there”), according to the legend43 that Moses was buried in Gad’s territory. The legend also addresses the contradiction arising from the assertion that Moses apparently died while on Reuven’s territory, on Mount Nevo (Num. 32:49), and states: “He was transferred on the wings of God’s spirit to Gad’s territory.” Rashi follows the Targum Onqelos, but R. Saʿadya Gaon offers a slightly different interpretation in his Arabic translation: “‫“( ”אן ג’ווקה אל רסמין הינאק מכנוזה‬Because the flock of legislators is buried there”), which implies that Moses, Miriam, and Aaron were all buried on the east bank of the Jordan. Only R. Abraham Ibn Ezra gives a literal interpretation of the verse concerning the Tribe of Gad, who asked for land on the east bank of the Jordan, before the Israelites entered Israel. To sum up this category, Onqelos, apparently, viewed this type of verses as allegories whose morals he allowed himself to interpret according to legends, to which he sometimes added his own expansions. Another possibility is that since this type of verse is linguistically complex and difficult to translate into Aramaic as well as for readers to understand, Onqelos avoids translation-related issues by relying on the meaning of the verses as they appear in the legends.

43 Sifrei, Ve-zot ha-berakha, Ish Shalom edition, para. 355.

CHAPTER 6

Towards a Talmudic Lexicon: The Aramaic Root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y in the Light of a Story from the Talmud Bavli THE STORY IN THE TALMUD BAVLI

T

he story in the sugya appears in Tractate Eruvin 53b of the Talmud Bavli as follows:1 8 ‫ עלת נקפת בכד ידאון‬:‫ הכי‬7‫ אמרה‬,‫ חכמה‬6‫ בלשון‬5‫ משתעיא‬4‫ כי הוה‬3‫ רבי‬2‫אמהתא דבי‬ ‫ יעדי בתר חברתה מינה‬:‫ הוה אמרה להו‬11‫ הוה בעי דליתבון‬10‫ וכד‬9.‫נישריא לקיניהון‬ .‫ בימא‬14‫ כאילפא דאזלא‬13‫ עלת בכד‬12‫ותתקפי‬

  1 The Hebrew text is based on the Vilna edition (nineteenth century AD), and the annotated variants in the footnotes pertain to MS Munich 95 (France, fourteenth century AD), MS Oxford 366 (Spain, fourteenth century AD), MS Vatican 109 (Italy, twelfth–thirteenth century AD) and the Genizah Fragment, Cambridge, Or. 1080, 13,5 C192908.   2 MS Munich 95 and MS Oxford 366 the word ‫ דבי‬/ dvey is missing.   3 MS Munich 95: ’‫ דר‬/ de-R.; MS Oxford 366: ‫ דרבי‬/ de-Rabbi.   4 MS Munich 95: ‫ כי הוו‬/ ki havo.   5 MS Munich 95, MS Vatican 109: ‫ משתעיין‬/ mishtaʿayan; MS Oxford 366: ‫ משתעי‬/ mishtaʿey; Genizah Fragment: ‫ משתעיא‬/ mishtaʿaya; ʿEn Yaʿakov, Eruvin 53b: ‫ משתעיא‬/ mishtaʿaya.   6 Genizah Fragment: ‫ בלישן‬/ be-lishan; MS Vatican 109, MS Oxford 366 missed the letter: ‫ ב‬/ be- (from the word leshon).   7 MS Munich 95: ‫ אמרו‬/ amru; MS Vatican 109: ‫ אמרן‬/ amran; ʿEn Yaʿakov, Eruvin 53b: ‫ אמרה‬/ amrah.   8 R. Hananel, Eruvin 53b: ‫ יבעון‬/ yivʿon; Aruch ha-shalem, vol. 6, 210–211, s.v. ‫ עלת‬/ ʿalat: ‫יבעון‬ / yivʿon; Genizah Fragment:‫ יבעון‬/ yivʿon; Hidushei ha-Meiri, Eruvin 53b:‫ יבעון‬/ yivʿon.   9 R. Hananel, Eruvin 53b, adds: ‫ אתערו בתר חברתא מינה‬/ eitaʿaru batar havirtah minah; ʿEn Yaʿakov, Eruvin 53b, adds: ‫ או יעדי בתר חברתה מינה כי הוה ניחא לה דליזלון אמרה להון ידאון נשריא לקיניהון‬/ o yiʿede batar havirtah minah ki hava nih.a lah delizelun amrah lehon yid’on nishraya lekinehon; Rashi, Eruvin 53b: ‫ )או) יעדי‬/ (o) yiʿede; Binding Fragment of Bologna, Archive State 15: ‫ או יעדי‬/ o yiʿede. 10 ʿEn Yaʿakov, Eruvin 53b: ‫ כי בעי‬/ ki baʿey. 11 Raphaelo Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim ( Jerusalem: Maʻayan ha-hokhma, 1960), 204, n. 60, notes that ‫ דליתבון‬/ delitevun is missing in a few versions.

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Translated, it would read as: “When the maidservant in the household of Rabbi would engage in language of wisdom [enigmatic speech], she would speak in this way: ‘The ladle strikes against the jar; let the eagles fly to their nests.’ And when she would want them to stay at the table, she would say to them: ‘Let it [the cover] of her friend [the adjacent jar] be removed from her [it],’ and let the ladle float in the jar like a vessel that sails in the sea.” [All translations hereinafter are mine]. 121314 According to this account, the maidservant (or maidservants) in the house of Rabbi (= R . Yehudah ha-Nasi—Rabbi Judah the Prince), when speaking (‫ משתעיא‬/ mishtaʿaya)15 in “the idiom of wisdom” (that is, resorting to veiled forms of expression to keep outsiders from understanding),16 would say her piece in this way: The ladle17 strikes the jar [of wine],18 let the eagles fly to their nests. And when she wanted (the students of Rabbi’s house) to sit (meaning ‘to remain’19), she would say to them: Let [the lid (=the cover) of the wine barrel20] be removed from her [it], after her friend [the adjacent jar], and let the ladle float (or remain still) in the jar like a vessel plowing the sea. The first part of the story suggests that the maidservant would hint21 to the students that they should go home, while the second part indicates that 12 See the discussion below on the words: ‫ ותתקפי‬/ ve-titqfey and ‫ ותתכפי‬/ ve-titkfey. 13 The word is unclear in MS Munich 95; MS Oxford 366: (ba-kad[a]) the word was apparently formed as a consequence of joining two last letters together. 14 Rashi, Eruvin 53b: ‫ כאילפא בימא‬/ ke-ʾilfa be-yama, missing the word: ‫ דאזלא‬/ de-ʾazelah; cf. Binding Fragment of Bologna, Archive State 15: ‫ כאוניה בים‬/ ke-oniya ba-yam. 15 Onqelos’ Translation, Num. 13:27: ‫ ואשתעיאו‬/ veʾishtaʿiu; Dina Stein, “A Maidservant and her Master’s Voice: Discourse, Identity, and Eros in Rabbinic Texts,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 10, no. 3–4 (2001): 390–391 on R. Yehuda ha-Nasi’s maidservant. 16 Rashi, Eruvin 53b, s.v. ‫ בלשון חכמה‬/ be-leshon hokhmah. 17 2 Ch. 24:14. There is a different interpretation of the word ‫ עלת‬/ ʿalat; see Dov Kimchi, Commentary, 2 Ch. 24:14, apud Mikraot Gedolot edition (Tel Aviv: Pardes, 1954); Metzudat Zion—Commentary to Chronicles, 2 Ch. 24:14, apud Mikraot Gedolot edition; R. Hananel, Eruvin 53b; Rashi, Eruvin 53b, s.v. ‫ עלת‬/ ʿalat; Tosafot, Eruvin 53b, s.v. ‫ עלת‬/ ʿalat; Aruch ha-shalem, vol. 6, 210–211, s.v. ‫ עלת‬/ ʿalat; cf. Yehoshua Brand, Ceramics in Talmudic Literature [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kuk, 1953), 402–404, on the commentary of the Aruch ha-shalem on ‫ עלת‬/ ʿalat; Michael Gross, Yair Barkai, Yosi Melamed, Different Readings of the Aggada [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Makhon Mofet, 2008), 31–32. 18 Rashi, Eruvin 53b, s.v. ‫ נקפת בכד‬/ naqafat ba-kad; Binding Fragment of Bologna, Archive State 15, misses a few words of Rashi’s explanation. 19 R. Hananel, Eruvin 53b. 20 R. Hananel, Eruvin 53b; Rashi, Eruvin 53b, s.v. ‫ )או) יעדי‬/ (o) yiʿede. 21 Hidushei Maharsha, Eruvin 53b, s.v. ‫ בלשון‬/ be-leshon. It is impolite for the maidservant to tell the students outright to go home.

Towards a Talmudic Lexicon

she would hint to them that they could remain, continuing to sit22 in Rabbi’s house. Researchers23 have offered conflicting interpretations of the hints in this story, as well as of the identity of the person speaking to the students—whether Rabbi24 or the maidservant—as we shall see. Moreover, the story in the printed version is somewhat different from the versions of the same narrative preserved in various sources; some of these are significant for understanding the story’s plot.

THE DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF THE STORY IN VARIOUS SOURCES According to the version preserved in the Genizah Fragment, when speaking in the idiom of wisdom (as noted, this means resorting to veiled language), the Rabbi’s maidservant would say this: ““Let the ladle strike the jar, let the eagles seek25 their nests, and let the crown [cover] of her friend [the adjacent jar] be removed from her [it].” At times she would say to them: ‘Let the eagles seek their nests’; and at others [times] she would say: ‘Let the crown [cover] of her friend [the adjacent jar] be removed from her [it], and let the ladle strike the jar like a vessel plowing the sea.’” The wording in the Genizah version leaves it unclear whether the students would go home (“let the eagles fly to their nests”) or not, i.e. why the lid should be removed from another wine barrel or jar (“let the crown [cover] of her friend [the adjacent jar] be removed from her [it]”). The only way out of the unanswered question seems to be that this version of the text notes an introduction of sorts to the two alternative possibilities in the maidservant’s speech, which are spelled out in what she goes on to say later: “At times she would say to them: Let the eagles fly to their nests, and at others [times] she would say to them: Let the crown [cover] of her friend [the adjacent jar] be removed from 22 The meaning of the word ‫ ליתבון‬/ litevun should be interpreted as “and sit” as in the Onqelos Translation, Gen. 34:23 or as R. Hananel, Eruvin 53b: “and stay” rather than “and return” as read by Shulamit Valler and Shalom Razabi, Sih.ot hullin ba-talmud ha-bavli (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2007), 121. 23 Valler and Razabi, Sih.ot hullin, 121; Shulamit Valler, “Megamot be-ʿarikha sifrutit shel sugya talmudit, sugyat ʿEruvin daf 53b–54a—ossef ʿarukh shel sih.ot h.ullin,” Dapim le-meh.kar be-sifrut 14–15 (2006): 21, n. 10; Valler, “Women’s Talk—Men’s Talk: Babylonian Talmud Erubin 53a–54a,” Revue des Études Juives 162, no. 3–4 (2003): 421–445. 24 R. Hananel, Eruvin 53b. 25 Targum Onqelos, Gen. 37:15: ‫ מא את בעי‬/ ma at baʿe.

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her [it]).” The possibility also remains that the conjunction “or” was omitted in the Genizah version, but it still forms part of the text in ʿEn Yaʿakov and the version in MS Oxford 366. In addition, according to the Genizah version, the second time the text notes that the maidservant spoke (“and at others [times] she would say …”) there is no mention of whom she addressed, while in the first instance this is specifically indicated: “at times she would say to them,” meaning the students. The text variants in MS Munich 95 and MS Vatican 109 are incomplete as compared to the text in ʿEn Yaʿakov and MS Oxford 366. In the opinion of some scholars, the version in MS Oxford 366 is what some of the commentators had before them initially;26 the idea that MS Oxford 366 is the “correct version,”27 based on the argument that this version is the “more convenient” one, has also found much support.28 Yet, the same argument should yield support for the version of the text in ʿEn Yaʿakov, which is also the more convenient and detailed variant. Beside all the versions already mentioned, we should also compare the extant variants with the version preserved in R. Hananel ben Hushiel (= RH), which reads: “Let the students go to their tents, or let the lid be removed from another barrel, so that they may remain at the wine banquet.” That is, “At times he would reply to them: ‘Let the eagles seek their nests’; that is, let them go home. And at other times, he would say to them: ‘Let the lid be removed from another barrel and float … in the barrel like a vessel in the heart of the sea,’29 so that they may remain at the wine banquet.” RH, too, seems to be commenting on a version which included the word “or,” similar to what we have seen in ʿEn Yaʿakov and the variant in MS Oxford 366. The version in RH corresponds in part to the text in MS Oxford 366. The two coincide completely in this sentence: “or let the crown [cover] of her friend [the adjacent jar] be removed from her [it]; at [other] times he would say to them … and when he would need, he would say to her …” The version in RH also notes the option of “or” (like the version in ʿEn Yaʿakov). According to the text in RH, the Rabbi is the speaker, rather than the maidservant, as opposed to the version in ʿEn Yaʿakov, where the maidservant speaks.

26 Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei Sofrim, Eruvin 53b, 204, n. 60: “Apparently that was the version of Rashi and ha-Aruch.” 27 Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei Sofrim, 204. 28 Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei Sofrim, 204. 29 R. Hananel, Eruvin 53b.

Towards a Talmudic Lexicon

Similarly, according to the version in RH, the Rabbi would resort to veiled hints in addressing his students in the two opposite situations—and not the maidservant.30 The first: when he “would reply to them” (reply to their question?) that they should go home. The second: when he would “say to them” that they should stay “at the wine banquet.” In light of everything said thus far, it becomes evident that there is a difference between the text in RH and that in ʿEn Yaʿakov with regard to the identity of the speaker. In the text in RH, Rabbi and not the maidservant is the speaker, while in the version in ʿEn Yaʿakov the maidservant, not Rabbi, is the one who speaks. A further difference appears between the version in RH and that in MS Oxford 366. According to the RH version, Rabbi would speak directly to the students (“at times he would reply to them … and at other [times] he would say to them …”) and not to the maidservant. According to the version in MS Oxford 366, it appears that Rabbi would speak to the maidservant (“At times he would say to her … and when he would need, he would say to her”), rather than directly to the students. Rashi had before him yet another version of the text, which should be considered in addition to the versions mentioned above. Rashi’s version clearly included the word “or” as well.31 As noted, this word appears only in the ʿEn Yaʿakov and in MS Oxford 366. Some scholars are of the opinion that Rashi used the same version as the one in MS Oxford 366, but this is not necessarily true, considering that passages are missing in Rashi’s commentary which could have been compared to the version in ʿEn Yaʿakov and the one in MS Oxford 366. In addition, there are certain differences between Rashi’s version and the one in MS Oxford 366.32 Rashi possibly had before him a version of the text identical to the one in ʿEn Yaʿakov,33 or a different version similar to the one in ʿEn Yaʿakov or that in MS Oxford 366.34

30 See above, n. 21. 31 Rashi, Eruvin 53b, s.v. ‫)או) יעדי‬/ (o) yiʿede. 32 Rashi’s version: ‫ ותתקפי עלת‬/ ve-titqfey ʿalat, compared to MS Oxford 366: ‫ תתקפי עלת‬/ titqfey ʿalat. Rashi’s version: ‫ בכד‬/ ba-kad, compared to MS Oxford 366: (‫ בכד(א‬/ ba-kad(a); see above, n. 13. 33 ʿEn Yaʿakov, Eruvin 53b version: ‫ ותתקפי עלת‬/ ve-titqfey ʿalat is the same as Rashi’s version. 34 Rashi’s version (and Binding Fragment of Bologna, Archive State 15): ‫ כאילפא בימא‬/ ke-ʾilfa be-yama contrast to MS Oxford 366 and ʿEn Yaʿakov versions: ‫ כאילפא דאזלא בימא‬/ ke-ʾilfa de-azelah be-yama.

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EXPLAINING THE ARAMAIC ROOT ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y IN LIGHT OF THE WORD ‫ ותתקפי‬/ VE-TITQFEY Rashi explains the word ‫ ותתקפי‬/ ve-titqfey in this way: “let the ladle float in the jar freely.”35 The meaning to be associated with the Aramaic root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y is then connected to floating. But this interpretation is doubtful; in fact, it may be an addition made to Rashi’s own words by copyists—a suggestion further borne out by the fact that in a passage of the binding fragment of Bologna36 only the single word “freely” appears. Even so, later Rashi explains the word ‫ ותתקפי‬/ ve-titqfey by saying:37 “‫ ”תתקפי כמו אקפו ידייכו‬/ titqfey kemo aqafu yadaikho [titqfey being similar to ‘join hands up’]38 … ‫ וכמו קפא תהומא‬/ ve-kemo qafa tehoma [and to ‘the abyss frozen’] … ‫ צף התהום ועלה‬/ tsaf ha-tehom ve-ʿalah [‘the abyss float and come upward’].”39 Rashi’s comments indicate that the meaning of the root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y derives from the notion of floating, to the exclusion of all other possibilities. But there are three other feasible interpretations to be considered. The lexicon Aruch ha-shalem does, indeed, interpret the root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y in the sense of “floating” (from the same origin as ‫ קפא‬/ qafa—and similar to Rashi’s interpretation),40 but he also notes that another explanation is possible (hailing from ‫ נקף‬/ naqaf ), with the meaning of “connecting and cleaving,” thus indicating that the ladle should be joined to (that is, anchored in) the barrel.41 The same is suggested by Sabar’s Aramaic dictionary in connection with the root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y: “to surface at a river’s bank … to anchor.”42 An alternative possibility emerges if we compare the text to the way it is translated into Arabic in the commentary by R. Saʿadya Gaon (=RSG) on the verse “Stand by your burnt-offering” (Num. 23:3), where the word for “stand by” is rendered by the Arabic ‫قف‬, cognate to the Hebrew ‫ קף‬/ qaf. In Arabic, this word forms the imperative of the verb ‫وقف‬, with the associated meaning of “stopping” or “standing.” This would, accordingly, imply that the ladle should stay in one place in the barrel. 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

Rashi, Eruvin 53b, s.v. ‫ ותתקפי‬/ ve-titqfey. Binding Fragment of Bologna, Archive State 15. Rashi, Eruvin 53b, s.v. ‫ כאילפא בימא‬/ ke-ʾilfa be-yama. Rashi, Hagigah 16b, s.v. ‫ אקפו‬/ aqafu. Rashi, Sukkah 53a, s.v. ‫ קפא תהומא‬/ qafa tehoma. Aruch ha-shalem, vol. 7, 153–155, s.v. ‫ קף‬/ qaf. Aruch ha-shalem, vol. 7, 157, s.v. *‫ קף‬/ *qaf. Yona Sabar, A Jewish Neo-Aramaic Dictionary (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2002), 281, s.v., 2 ‫י‬-‫פ‬-‫ ק‬/2 q-f-y.

Towards a Talmudic Lexicon

There is a difference between the interpretations put forth in the Aruch ha-shalem dictionary and in the commentary by RSG. According to the Aruch ha-shalem, the ladle should be joined to the barrel by means of any joining apparatus whatsoever, while according to RSG, the ladle should remain in a single place in the barrel without joining. A third possibility, similar to the one in the commentary by RSG, is implied by the Targum Onqelos’s version of the Biblical passage: ‫ קפאו תהומות‬/ qafu tehomot [Ex. 15:8 “the waters of the deep have stood still”]. Onqelos renders this as ‫ קפו תהומי‬/ qafo tehome, relating the verb to “freezing” as used to describe ice.43 That is, the waters of the deep froze, turning into a motionless block of ice. In the same way, too, the ladle should remain motionless (frozen) in the barrel, like a vessel in the sea which from a distance appears to be motionless. According to the interpretation in the Aruch ha-shalem, which we brought above, there is a connection between the roots ‫א‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ qafa and ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y. The root ‫א‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ qafa is also encountered in Aramaic.44 Even-Shoshan’s dictionary offers two interpretations of the meaning of the root: ‫א‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ qafa in para. 3 is defined as meaning “to turn to stone, remain motionless,” while in para. 4 it is defined as meaning “to float and rise upward.” Yet another link between the Aramaic word ‫ קפא‬/ qafa and the Aramaic root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y finds its expression in a different lexicon, which cites as an example the story mentioned at the beginning of the present chapter and quotes these words from the story: ‫ ותקפי עלת‬/ ve-tiqfey ʿalat [and let the ladle remain]45 (exactly the same as the version in MS Munich 95, which has ‫ ותקפי עלת‬/ ve-tiqfey ʿalat), as an example of the connection between the Aramaic word ‫ קפא‬/ qafa and the Aramaic root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y. In light of everything said thus far, we can summarize that these three interpretations of the meaning of the root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y are all different from the interpretation given by Rashi. Rashi favors “floating” as the correct interpretation to the exclusion of any other possibility, in contrast to the three other options: “joining (anchoring),” “standing,” or “standing motionless.” 43 Michael Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic of the Byzantine Period (RamatGan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2002), 266, s.v. ‫ קפי‬/ q.f.y “to congeal.” 44 Avraham Even-Shoshan, Ha-milon he-hadash [Hebrew], vol. 3 ( Jerusalem: Kiriat Sefer, 1993), 1208, s.v. ‫ קפא‬/ qafa. 45 Marcus Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli, and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature, vol. 2 (Brooklyn, NY: Shalom, 1967), 1400, s.v. ‫ קפי‬,‫ קפא‬/ qafa, qfy; cf. Aruch ha-shalem, vol. 7, 155, s.v. ‫ קף‬/ qaf, ‫ קפא‬/ qafu: “like floating, what [something that] is floating upward.”

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To explain the Aramaic root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y, all definitions should be combined: the interpretation of Rashi, who resorts exclusively to the meaning of “floating,” as well as the interpretations in the Aruch ha-shalem, RSG, and Onqelos, which offer the meanings of “floating,” “joining or anchoring, remaining in place,” and “standing motionless.” According to this integrated definition, the meaning of the word ‫ ותתקפי‬/ ve-titqfey (or ‫ ותקפי‬/ ve-tiqfey) in the story is that the ladle should float upward in the barrel while being joined and anchored to the container, remaining thereafter motionless in place.

EXPLAINING THE ARAMAIC ROOT ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ כ‬/ k.f.y IN LIGHT OF THE ARAMAIC WORD ‫ ותתכפי‬/ VE-TITKFEY AS PRESERVED IN THE GENIZAH FRAGMENT In the version of the story preserved in the Genizah fragment, this word appears in a somewhat different form: ‫ ותתכפי‬/ ve-titkfey (spelled with a ‫ כ‬/ k – rather than a ‫ ק‬/ q). Possibly, no difference in meaning exists between the two words, but only a difference in their graphic written representation. It may be that the scribe (who produced the version in the Genizah fragment) wrote the word as he had heard the sound, audiographically, thus yielding the word ‫ ותתכפי‬/ ve-titkfey. But if we assume a difference between these two words, then the meaning of the root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ כ‬/ k.f.y may be explained based on the Aramaic ‫ ּכְ ָפא‬/ kefa, which has the meaning of overturning and placing on top, identical to the meaning of the Hebrew ‫ כפה‬/ kafah, which, according to Even-Shoshan’s dictionary,46 is also to be understood as “overturning, placing a vessel or the like with its opening facing downwards and its nether part turned upwards.” Whether based on the Aramaic ‫ כְ ָפא‬/ kefa or on the Hebrew ‫ כפה‬/ kafah, in our story the word ‫ ותתכפי‬/ ve-titkfey as deriving from the root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ כ‬/ k.f.y means “to turn over47 the ladle and place it over the barrel.” Alternately, as per the interpretation in the lexicon of Aruch ha-shalem: “it is ‫ כפה‬/ kafah [as in the language of the Mishna], meaning, turning an object over so that its front or top side faces downward.”48 According to both dictionaries, the Aruch ha-shalem and Even-Shoshan, the meaning is the same in Hebrew and in Aramaic: to turn over, to place an object in an overturned position. 46 Even-Shoshan, Ha-milon he-hadash, vol. 2, 558, n. 3, s.v. ‫ כפה‬/ kafah. 47 Even-Shoshan, Ha-milon he-hadash, 558, n. 2, s.v. ‫ כפוי‬/ kafui. 48 Aruch ha-shalem, vol. 4, 287, s.v. ‫ כף‬/ kaf; Sokoloff, A Dictionary, 266, s.v. ‫ כפי‬/ kfi: “to overturn.”

Towards a Talmudic Lexicon

Numerous examples may be cited to demonstrate that the word ‫ כפה‬/ kafah in Hebrew has this meaning of turning an object over so that it faces downwards and placing it on top of something else, such as “placing an overturned vessel over it,”49 “placed an overturned mug,”50 “and Rav admits that if he has overturned it, placing it opening downwards … but he has turned the vessel over in order to coat it with pitch. …”51 Similarly, R. Hananel has the wording “and Rav admits that it’s turning the vessel upside down in order to cover it with pitch.”52 All definitions considered thus far clarifies that the meaning of the Aramaic root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ כ‬/ k.f.y forms a single whole: “to overturn an object, placing it upside down.” Based on this root, the meaning of the word ‫ ותתכפי‬/ ve-titkfey in the story comes down to simply this: to turn the ladle over and place it over the barrel. The meaning of the word then has no connection whatsoever to floating, joining or anchoring, or staying motionless in a single place, as suggested by the interpretations of the Aramaic root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y for the word ‫ ותתקפי‬/ ve-titq  fey, as mentioned above.

SUMMARY Tractate Eruvin 53b of the Talmud Bavli records three stories which together comprise a single whole, the unifying characteristic of which is the way all three narratives resort to the “idiom of wisdom,” or enigmatic language associated with the speech of each of the story’s characters. The present chapter has focused exclusively on the first story, taking it up in connection with our study of the Aramaic word ‫ ותתקפי‬/ ve-titqfey and the root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y. We provided a lexicographic analysis of the root of the word, as well as considering another possibility, the root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ כ‬/ k.f.y, in tandem with the different interpretations offered by the commentators and researchers who have studied these words in the past. The possibilities line up as follows. 49 B. Shabbat 42b. 50 B. Eruvin 77a; as per the exchange between the words: ‫ ספל‬/ sefel (“mug”) or ‫ ספסל‬/ safsal; cf. Aruch ha-shalem, vol. 6, 103, s.v. ‫ ספל‬/ sefel (“mug”): ‫ הספלין‬/ sefalin, this is a scribal error and it should be as in the printed versions: ‫ הספסלין‬/ ha-safsalin; Tur Orah. Haim, Hilkhot Eruvin 372:10: ‫ ספסל‬/ safsal and n. 35; Gustaf H. Dalman, Aramäisch-neuhebräisches Handwörterbuch zu Targum, Talmud und Midrasch (Hildesheim: Gg. Olms, 1967), 297, s.v. ‫ ספל‬/ sefel, 2. 1. ‫ ספסל‬/ safsal; Jastrow, A Dictionary, vol. 2, 1014, s.v. ‫ ספל‬/ sefel; on the connection between the words ‫ ספל‬/ sefel and ‫ ספסל‬/ safsal, see Brand, Ceramics in Talmudic Literature, 388, 392, and 395, nts. 46 and 55. 51 B. Eruvin 90b. 52 R. Hananel, Eruvin 90b.

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1. RSG interprets the root of the word differently than “staying in place”; the same is suggested by the Targum Onqelos’s translation of the verse ‫ קפאו תהומות‬/ qafu tehomot, “the waters of the deep have stood still”—“standing still” means the same as “freezing,” as can be said of ice which remains in a single place without moving. 2. R. Nathan ben Yeh.iel, compiler of the Aruch ha-shalem dictionary, interprets the root of the word as meaning something different; the meaning derives from notions of “joining or cleaving.” 3. Rashi interprets the meaning of the root of the word as associated exclusively with floating. The various interpretations are quite distinct from each other. We suggest understanding the root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y—as well as the word ‫ ותתקפי‬/ ve-titqfey itself—in a way that integrates all the earlier interpretations: the one offered by Rashi, on the one hand, and those put forth by his predecessors, on the other. That is, the meaning of the word ‫ ותתקפי‬/ ve-titqfey is that the ladle should float upward and remain motionless over the barrel, while being joined and anchored to the barrel’s side—and perhaps also while the ladle itself is overturned, its concavity facing downward, considering that noted in connection with the root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ כ‬/ k.f.y. This harmonizing interpretation which we propose contributes to the project of an overarching Talmudic lexicon by explaining the Aramaic word ‫ ותתקפי‬/ ve-titqfey, as well as the root of the word ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ q.f.y.

CHAPTER 7

An Opposing School of Redaction in the Talmud Bavli Suggested

I

t is commonly assumed in the traditional view that the current form of the Babylonian Talmud represents the results of the agreements between its redactors. For sugyot that touched on halakhic subjects, such agreements reflected the current or traditional halakhic perception, and redactors were united in their opinion when they deciphered the various controversies of the Tannaim and the Amoraim. However, matters are not as simple as they seem. In this chapter I shall try to show than consent was not unanimous: not all the redactors agreed, for example, in the matter of ‫“[ עירובי תחומין‬ʿerub of boundaries”], as it appears from B. Eruvin 17b. This sugya raises critical questions that require the best explanation attainable. This explanation shall be made possible by using the theme of the chapter as an essential concept.

PRESENTATION OF THE SUGYA The sugya in B. Eruvin 17b states: ‫ אבל עירובי תחומין חייבין‬,‫ לא שנו אלא עירובי חצירות‬:‫ אמרי דבי רבי ינאי‬.‫ומלערב‬ .‫ לוקין על עירובי תחומין דבר תורה‬:‫דתני רבי חייא‬ ?'‫ וכי לוקין על לאו שב'אל‬:‫מתקיף לה רבי יונתן‬ ,‫ אל תפנו אל האובות ואל הידעונים‬:‫ דכתיב‬,‫ אלא מעתה‬:‫מתקיף רב אחא בר יעקב‬ ?‫ה"נ [=הכי נמי] דלא לקי‬ ‫ וכל לאו שניתן‬,]‫דין‬-‫ לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד [=בית‬:‫רבי יונתן הכי קשיא ליה‬ .‫לאזהרת מיתת בית דין אין לוקין עליו‬ .‫ מי כתיב אל יוציא? אל יצא כתיב‬:‫אמר רב אשי‬ In translation: And from the duty of preparing an ʿerub. It was stated at the schoolhouse of R. Jannai: [This ruling] was taught only in regard to an ʿerub of courtyards

76

Redaction but their obligation to an ʿerub of boundaries remains unaffected, since R. H.iyya taught: For [transgressing the laws of] ʿerub of boundaries flogging is incurred [in accordance with] Pentateuchal Law. R. Jonathan demurred: Is flogging incurred on account of a prohibition implied in [the word] Al? R. Ah.a b. Jacob demurred: Now then, since it is written in Scripture “Turn ye not unto them that have familiar spirits, nor unto the wizards” [Lev. 19:31], should no flogging be incurred in that case also?— It was this difficulty that R. Jonathan felt: [Is not this] a prohibition that was given to [authorize] a warning of death at the hands of Beth din and for any prohibition given to [authorize] a warning of death no flogging is incurred?—R. Ashi replied: Is it written in Scripture, “Let no man carry out”? It is [in fact] written, “Let no man go out.” [Epstein edition, expanded for this publication]

CRITICAL QUESTIONS This sugya raises various questions regarding types of ʿerub and authority of the sages who taught about it. A brief discussion of the most important questions follows. 1. The Mishna (B. Eruvin 17a) states four things from which the military camp preparing for war was exempt: the fourth item is ‫עירוב‬ (ʿerub)1. The Mishna uses a general term ‫“( ומלערב‬And from the duty of 1 According to Sabbath law, walking is restricted to 2000 cubits beyond town borders. To enable freer movement, pious Jews, before a Sabbath, string a wire around an area or deposit food elsewhere until the conclusion of the next day, thereby extending the boundaries of their abode. His movements on Sabbath are thus measured from the place of deposit. The resulting temporary boundary is called ʿerub. Listed below are various types of ʿerub.  ʿErub h.atzerot (“ʿerub of courtyards”) unites the occupants of a building with a common court (‫ חצירות‬/ h.atzerot), who contribute their share towards a deposit in one of the apartments. All apartments are then deemed common property and objects may be carried from one to the other on the Sabbath.  ʿErub teh.umin (“ʿerub of boundaries”) permits movement beyond the Sabbath limits defined above.  Teh.umin de-oraita is an ʿerub of boundaries constructed in accordance with the biblical verses Ex. 16:29; Jes. 58:13; and Jer. 17:22 (as is the opinion of R. Akiba in Shabbat 69a and Sotah 27b).  Teh.umin de-rabbanan is an ʿerub of boundaries prescribed by the sages, in accordance with the lenient positions mentioned in M. Eruvin 5:4.

An Opposing School of Redaction in the Talmud Bavli Suggested

preparing ʿerub”), without specifying which type of ʿerub is meant. Hence the exemption from ʿerub in a camp relates to all types of ʿerub, and the question arises as to why ‫“( דבי‬at the schoolhouse of”) R. Jannai the exemption was limited to ‫“( עירובי חצירות‬ʿerub of courtyards”). Was it just because of “‫ לוקין על עירובי תחומין דבר תורה‬:2‫”דתני רבי חייא‬3 (“Since R. H.iyya taught: For (transgressing the laws of) ʿerub of boundaries flogging is incurred (in accordance with) Pentateuchal Law”)? 2. (a)  In Tractate Sotah,4 there is a debate between R. Akiba and R. Eliezer the son of R. Jose the Galilean, placed in M. Sotah.5 Why was the sugya from Eruvin not mentioned there, together with the statement of R. Akiba, the source of the view that ʿerub of boundaries is from the Torah? Moreover, the mishna in Eruvin does not mention that the Tanna of our mishna has the same view as R. Akiba.6 (b) On the other hand, if the Tanna of our mishna is of the opinion that ʿerub of boundaries is from the sages—as is R. Eliezer son of R. Jose the Galilean, why was the present sugya in Eruvin not redacted according to his view?7 3. Differences exist between the versions of this sugya in the Yerushalmi and in the Bavli. (a) The Yerushalmi8 states: ,‫ רב חייה בר אשי אמר הדא דאת אמר בעירובי חצירות‬.‫ומלערב‬ .‫אבל בעירובי תחומין דבר תורה הן‬ ‫ויש חצירות במחנה לסתור אוהלים שבמחנה‬ ‫כהדה דתני אוהלים שבמחנה צריכין עירוב‬ ‫אהלים שבשיירה אינן צריכין עירוב‬ 2 Hidushei ha-Ritva, Eruvin 17b, s.v. de-thane, who agrees with one of these opinions. 3 Compare Sheeltot de Rab Ah.ai Gaon, Exodus, vol. 3, sheelta 51, Mirsky edition, 89: “‫”מלקין‬ (“lashing”) instead of “‫“( ”לוקין‬flogging”); MS Oxford 366 added: “‫”דכתי[ב] אל יצא איש ממקומו‬ (“let no man go out of his place”); Compare Rashi, Eruvin 17b, s.v. lokin ʿal ʿeruvei teh.umin; Rambam, Sefer ha-mitzvot, mitzvat lo taʿasse 321; Raphaelo Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, Eruvin 17b ( Jerusalem: Maʻayan ha-hokhma, 1960), 27, n. 9. 4 B. Sotah 30b. 5 B. Sotah 27b. 6 Jacob N. Epstein, Introduction to Tannaitic Literature [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Magnes, 1957), 300. 7 Leshon ha-zahav, Eruvin 17b, 24, s.v. ba-gemara. 8 Y. Eruvin 1:10, 19d.

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In translation: And from the duty of preparing an ʿerub. R. H.iyya bar Ashi said, “That which you have said applies to meals of commingling for courtyards. But as to meals of commingling covering the Sabbath boundaries [establishing the Sabbath boundary as two thousand cubits, the location of the symbolic meal], that constitutes a requirement based upon the law of Torah.” And is there a consideration of courtyards in a camp? … That is in line with the following, which has been taught: Tents located in a camp require a meal of commingling, while tents located in a caravan do not require a meal of commingling. [Neusner edition]

Although the sugya in the Yerushalmi begins, as does the sugya in the Bavli: “‫“( ”עירובי תחומין דבר תורה‬ʿerub of boundaries: flogging is incurred [in accordance with] the Pentateuchal Law”), the ending in the Yerushalmi is different from the sugya in the Bavli. According to the Yerushalmi sugya, “‫“( ”אהלים שבמחנה צריכין עירוב‬Tents located in a camp require a meal of commingling”), which means that the camps are joined in an ʿerub of courtyards,9 while the Bavli sugya exempts the camps from the ʿerub of courtyards.10 (b) In two additional places the Yerushalmi11 states: ‫ רבי יונתן אמר קומי רבי חייה רובה בשם רבי שמעון‬.‫ועירוב דבר תורה‬ .‫בי רבי יוסי בן לקוניא לוקין על תחומי שבת דבר תורה‬ ‫א"ל [= אמר ליה] רבי חייה רובה והלא אין בשבת אלא סקילה וכרת‬ ‫אמ'[ר] ליה והכתיב אל תאכלו ממנו נא‬ ‫א"ל [= אמר ליה] מה כתיב לא אל כתיב‬ ‫אמר ליה והכתיב שבו איש תחתיו אל יצא איש ממקומו ביו'[ם] השביעי‬ ‫אמר ליה מה כתיב לא אל כתיב‬ ‫אמר רבי יוסי בי רבי בון אף על פי כן זה עומד בשמועתו וזה עומד בשמועתו‬

  9 Korban ha-ʻeda, Y. Eruvin 1:10, s.v. u-meshane listor ohalim she-ba-mah.ane. 10 Rashi, Eruvin 17a, s.v. u-mi-leʿarev; Compare Tosefta, Eruvin 2:5, Lieberman edition; Saul Lieberman, Tosefta ki-fshut.ah [Hebrew] (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1962), 323f. 11 Y. Eruvin 3:4, 21a; Y. Pesah.im 6:1, 33d; L. Ginzberg, Seridei ha-yerushalmi [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Makor, 1969), 97–98.

An Opposing School of Redaction in the Talmud Bavli Suggested

In translation: The meal of commingling is based upon a rule of Torah: R. Jonathan said before R. Hiyya the Elder in the name of R. Simeon b. Yose b. Laqonia, “People are flogged for violating the Sabbath boundaries [going beyond them], and that is on the authority of the Torah.” Said R. Hiyya the Elder, “And is it not the case that the only penalties applicable to the Sabbath are either stoning or extirpation?” … He said to him, “And is it written, ‘Do not eat any of it raw’?” [He said to him, “Is ‘not’ written here? Is it not written, ‘Let no …’?”] He said to him, “And is it not written, … ‘Remain every man of you in his place, let no man go out of his place on the seventh day’… .” He said to him, “Is ‘not’ written here? Is it not written, ‘Let no man …’?” Said R. Yose b. R. Bun, “Even so, this one remained firm in accord with the tradition he had received, and that one remained firm in accord with the tradition he had received.” [Neusner edition]

This sugya in the Yerushalmi is contrary to our sugya in the Bavli. The contradiction is expressed in the views of R. Hiyya and R. Jonathan.12 According to the sugya in the Yerushalmi, R. Jonathan is of the opinion that ʿerub of boundaries is from the Torah, in contrast to the Bavli, where R. Hiyya is of the opinion that ʿerub of boundaries is from the sages, and each of them insists on his own tradition. Why then does each insist on his tradition? The Yerushalmi quotes an additional Biblical verse as well: “‫( ”אל תאכלו ממנו נא‬Ex. 12:9) (“Do not eat any of it raw”), which is not in the Bavli.13 4. Is the explanation of the one who maintains “‫“( ”הכי קשיא ליה‬It was this difficulty that R. Jonathan felt”) relevant to the question of R. Jonathan? Is R. Jonathan’s question really incidental in the explanation implied by this phrase? Possibly, these may be two completely different questions.14 5. From the question of R. Ashi15 at the end of the sugya, it appears that ʿerub of boundaries is from the Torah: “‫( ”אל יצא כתיב‬Ex. 16:29) 12 Yefe ʻeinayim, Eruvin 17b, s.v. de-thane R. H.iyya. 13 Rambam, Sefer ha-mitzvot, mitzvat lo taʿasse 10, who cited another verse: “‫”אל תפנו אל האלילים‬ (“Do not serve idols”) (Lev. 19:4). 14 Messilot ha-Barzel, Eruvin 17b, s.v. she-nitna; Hagahot Maharsham, Eruvin 17b, s.v. de-khativ; Bet Levi, Eruvin 17b. 15 R. Hananel, Eruvin 17b: Matkif leh R. Ashi.

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(“It is (in fact) written, ‘Let no man go out’”), while Rabina is of the opinion that ʿerub of boundaries is from the sages.16 If this is so, why was Rabina’s statement not included in the sugya at all, and no mention is made of a debate between him and R. Ashi? 6. There is a tannaitic debate between R. Meir and R. Jose. According to R. Meir, ʿerub of boundaries is from the Torah,17 and according to R. Jose, ʿerub of boundaries is from the sages.18 According to the rules of halakha, in a debate between R. Meir and R. Jose, halakha is determined according to R. Jose.19 The question arises: Why was their debate and the rule of halakha, according to which they were to follow R. Jose in that ʿerub of boundaries is from the sages, not included here in the sugya?

ASSESSMENT OF THE SUGYA In the sugya, the sayings of R. Hiyya were redacted and the sayings of R. Akiba from Mishna Sotah were not,20 since the former are more interpretive and are styled or phrased briefly and clearly21 (an answer to question 2[a]). The redaction of the sayings of R. Hiyya in the sugya reinforces the tendency determining that ʿerub of boundaries is from the Torah, since the impression obtained is that—in addition to R. Akiba, who views ʿerub of boundaries as from the Torah, as mentioned in Mishna Sotah—R. Hiyya and R. Ashi also share that opinion and decide the same way in this sugya. So did R. Meir and R. Judah in the sugya below22 (and perhaps also R. Eliezer beR. Jose23). R. Akiba is not the only one holding that opinion.24 It may also be that Rabbi in 16 17 18 19 20 21

B. Eruvin 59a. B. Eruvin 35b. B. Eruvin 36a. B. Eruvin 46b. See above, n. 5f. Hidushei ha-Ramban, Eruvin, Yofeh’n edition, 543; Piskei ha-Rid, Eruvin, Wertheimer edition, 37, n. 363; compare ʿAmudei or, Eruvin 14:6, s.v. ve-yessod. We cannot say that R. H.iyya retracted his opinion. 22 B. Eruvin 55a–56b; Y. Eruvin 3:4, 21a, etc.; compare Hokhmat Shelomo, Orah. Haim, Hilkhot Teh.umin, 405:1, who noted that R. Meir is of the opinion that ʿeruvei teh.umin are from the sages; compare Shoʾel u-meshiv Responsa, vol. 4, 27, s.v. ve-hineh. 23 B. Eruvin 56b; Hidushei ha-Meiri, Eruvin, Broida edition, 238; Bet ha-beh.ira, Eruvin, 138. 24 Hidushei ha-Ramban, Eruvin, 543; Hidushei ha-Rashba, Eruvin, Ilan edition, 128–130, in the name of the Ramban; Hidushei ha-Ritva, Eruvin, 144, s.v. de-thane; Hidushei ha-Ran, Eruvin, Pines edition, 63.

An Opposing School of Redaction in the Talmud Bavli Suggested

the mishna has the same opinion as R. Akiba, since R. Hiyya cited the baraita on the mishna—the mishna of the students of R. Akiba.25 Moreover, the students “‫“( ”דבי רבי ינאי‬It was stated at the schoolhouse of R. Jannai”), who formulated their statements according to the view of their master, follow the opinion of R. Akiba.26 This is the reason that the schoolhouse of R. Jannai limited the exemption in the camp to ʿerub of courtyards only, and did not exempt the camp from ʿerub of boundaries (an answer to question 1). Therefore, their sayings were redacted as an explanation to the mishna. A consideration of the Yerushalmi27 reveals a tradition of a sugya from the Land of Israel on our mishna in Eruvin, which arrived in Babylonia in a different form and in a conflicting version28 (an answer to questions 3[a] and 3[b]). Regarding R. Jonathan’s question on the sugya, there is an assumption that the explanation is from R. Jonathan himself,29 and the explanation of the question is from R. Ah.a b. Jacob.30 However, the proposed explanation of R. Jonathan’s question is unreasonable, as it diverges from his original question, which is not even alluded to. This, and the expression “‫“( ”הכי קשיא ליה‬It was this difficulty that R. Jonathan felt”)—all show that the redactors of the sugya were commenting on the question of R. Jonathan and redacted the explanation in the sugya in response to the question of R. Ah.a b. Jacob, despite the weakness of that response (an answer to question 4). The sayings of R. Ashi at the end of the sugya are not sufficiently clear in the general context of the sugya. The verse “‫”אל יצא‬31 (“Let no man go out”) includes two subjects: carrying an object from the private to the public domain and passing outside the limits. The debate between the schoolhouse of R. Jannai and R. Jonathan is primarily about the focus of the verse. Is it carrying an object from one domain to another, or passing outside the limits? The students of R. Jannai, according to R. Ashi, are of the opinion that the main attention of this 25 See above, n. 11. 26 Hidushei talmid ha-Rashba, Eruvin, 55; Piskei ha-Rid, Eruvin, 37, n. 363; Hidushei ha-Meiri, Eruvin, 238; Bet ha-beh.ira, Eruvin, 138, etc. 27 See above, n. 13. 28 Hidushei ha-Ritva, Eruvin, 137, s.v. arbaʿa; Hidushei ha-Ran, Eruvin, 61, s.v. amar; Geʾon Yaʿakov, Eruvin, 48, s.v. ba-yerushalmi. 29 Yalkut Shelomo, Eruvin 17b. 30 David Halivni, Sources and Traditions: A Source Critical Commentary on the Talmud Tractates Erubin and Pesah.im [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982), 41, n. 3. 31 Ex. 16:29.

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verse is on passing outside the limits and carrying an object from one domain to another is only a secondary concern.32 R. Jonathan, according to R. Ashi, views the main focus of this verse as carrying an object from one domain to another and suggests that going outside the limits is only a secondary action, resulting from the carrying. In this debate, R. Ashi shares the opinion of the schoolhouse of R. Jannai33—that ʿerub of boundaries is from the Torah. On the other hand, it may be maintained that R. Ashi is only responding to or interpreting the sayings of R. Jonathan34 and does not view ʿerub of boundaries as from the Torah. From the words of the sugya: “‫“( ”אמר רב אשי‬R. Ashi replied”)—it appears that R. Ashi determines that ʿerub of boundaries is from the Torah, as do R. Akiba, the schoolhouse of R. Jannai, and R. Hiyya.35 Also, according to R. Hananel ben Hushiel, in the phrase “‫”מתקיף ליה רב אשי‬36 (“R. Ashi demurred”), the meaning of ‫“( מתקיף‬demurred”) in the context of the sugya shows that R. Ashi shares the opinion that ʿerub of boundaries is from the Torah. Nonetheless, this may be a routine term, repeated in order to create a unity37 between various pieces at the beginning of the sugya: we have the parallel phrases “‫”מתקיף לה רבי יונתן‬38 (“R. Jonathan demurred”), and “‫”מתקיף רב אחא בר יעקב‬ (“R. Ah.a b. Jacob demurred”).

SUMMARY In the mishna, a camp was exempted from ʿerub, and in the sugya that exemption was limited to ʿerub of courtyards.39 Ours is a mishna of R. Akiba’s students,40 and the sugya is redacted following R. Akiba, who is of the opinion 32 Hidushei ha-Ramban, Eruvin, 534; Hidushei ha-Rashba, Eruvin, 126; Tosafot, Eruvin 17b, s.v. lav; Hidushei talmid ha-Rashba, Eruvin, 54; Hidushei ha-Ritva, Eruvin, 146; Hidushei ha-Ran, Eruvin, 62, s.v. R. Jonathan. 33 Hidushei ha-Rashba, Eruvin, 130; Hidushei talmid ha-Rashba, Eruvin, 55; Hidushei ha-Ritva, Eruvin, 147; Hidushei ha-Ran, Eruvin, 64. 34 Piskei ha-Rid, Eruvin, 37, read: “Joh..[anan]”; Geʾon Yaʿakov, Eruvin, 49. 35 Hidushei ha-Rashba, Eruvin, 126–127, s.v. amar, stated in the name of ha-Raʾavad that the entire sugya follows the opinion of R. Akiba who states that ʿeruvei teh.umin are from the Torah. 36 Halivni, Sources and Traditions, 41, n. 3, about the necessity of R. Hananel’s version. 37 See below, n. 38. It could be that the term metiv was changed following the term matkif for reasons of stylistic uniformity. 38 Cf. the version of MS Vatican 127: “metiv”. 39 B. Eruvin 17a–b. 40 Epstein, Introduction to Tannaitic Literature, 300, n. 3.

An Opposing School of Redaction in the Talmud Bavli Suggested

that ʿerub of boundaries is from the Torah,41 and not following R. Eliezer son of R. Jose the Galilean, who maintains that ʿerub of boundaries is from the sages, and in accordance with the halakhic rule “‫“( ”הלכה כרבי עקיבא מחברו‬The halakha is always in agreement with R. Akiba when he differs from a colleague of his”).42 It appears that the redactors of this sugya tended towards halakha as following R. Akiba, insisted on their opinion, and maintained this tradition, as stated in the Yerushalmi:‫“אמר ר’ יוסי בי רבי בון אף על פי כן זה עומד בשמועתו וזה עומד‬ ”‫“( בשמועתו‬Said R. Yose b. R. Bun, ‘Even so, this one remained firm in accord with the tradition he had received, and that one remained firm in accord with the tradition he had received.’”)43 Therefore, the redactors ignored a later debate between R. Meir and R. Jose.44 Had they not done so, they would have had to redact the entire sugya in another way, guided by another halakhic rule: “‫”ר”מ [ר’ מאיר] ור’ יוסי הלכה כרבי יוסי‬ (“In a dispute between R. Meir and R. Jose the halakha is in agreement with R. Jose”).45 But since the view of R. Jose, who is of the opinion that ʿerub of boundaries is from the sages, opposes their own, they did not include his statements in the sugya and did not take them into consideration (an answer to question 6). Since the redactors of the sugya objected to R. Jose’s view, they did not refer to it, nor did they include the arguments of Rabina,46 since he, too, was of the opinion that ʿerub of boundaries is from the sages (an answer to question 5). In other words, any source or view that contradicted the halakhic opinion of the redactors of the sugya—that ʿerub of boundaries is from the Torah— and which they had no reasonable way of refuting, was not redacted by them or included in the sugya, but rather was completely disregarded (an answer to question 2[b]). Hence, it appears that if the redactors of this sugya had decided on ʿerub of boundaries following R. Jose, who views ʿerub of boundaries as from the sages, they would definitely have redacted the present sugya differently, and would have used other sources.47 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

B. Sotah 27b, 30b. B. Eruvin 46b. Y. Eruvin 3:4, 21a. B. Eruvin 35b–36a. B. Eruvin 46b. B. Eruvin 59a. Messilot ha-barzel, Eruvin 36a, s.v. Rava, who said that Eruvei Teh.umin is from the sages because this is the method in the majority of the sugyot.

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In any case, the sugya in its present form follows R. Akiba and not R. Jose, although it would in fact have been appropriate to ignore R. Akiba’s view and redact the sugya according to R. Jose.48 In light of the above, may one conclude that the sugya we are discussing serves as an evidence of an opposing school of redactors, perhaps a minor school which opposed the central school of redactors who accepted ʿerub of boundaries as from the sages—as expressed in other sugyot in the Talmud Bavli.49 Each of these two schools of redaction insisted on its traditions and maintained its opinions—as expressed in the Yerushalmi50—and did not renounce its views. So the school under discussion, because it was in the minority, was confined in scope to one sugya only, where it could demonstrate its characterizing opinion, namely, that ʿerub of boundaries is from the Torah. They did so in the present sugya. This is the reason why this sugya is not regarded as material for making conclusion about the halakhic law or the general consensus. Comparing this sugya with others dealing with the same subject and representing the other views, it seems appropriate to examine whether there are additional sugyot that oppose traditional or prevalent halakha.51 Such additional sugyot would strengthen the presumption of an opposing school of redactors, as well as of an absence of unanimity on all sugyot in the Talmud Bavli. This would make it easier for us to explain those sugyot that contradict one another from a halakhic standpoint. The lack of halakhic consistency in this sugya compared to others regarding ʿerub of boundaries resulted in a lack of clarity52 and in controversy among the Poskim. Although most Poskim ruled that ʿerub of boundaries is from the

48 Teshuvot ha-Rid, Eruvin, 406, which states that since we found a later tannaitic debate on this subject, we must set aside the first one and adopt the later debate of the Tannaim. 49 See above, n. 44, n. 46f.; Daniel Boyarin, “Internal Opposition in Talmudic Literature: The Case of the Married Monk,” Representations 36 (1991): 87–113. 50 See above, n. 43. 51 See above, for example n. 49. 52 B. Eruvin 51a, 59a; Y. Eruvin 3:4, 21a; Y. Pesah.im. 6:1, 33d; Otzar ha-Gaonim, Eruvin Tractate [Hebrew], vol. 3, ed. Binyamin M. Levin ( Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Press, 1930), 6f., n. 11; Tosafot, Hagigah 17b, s.v. de-khativ. Compare Rashi, Hagigah 17b, s.v. u-fanita; compare also Mekhilta D’Rabbi Šimʿon b. Jochai, Epstein-Melamed edition, Beshalah. 16:26–31, p. 114, 21:13–14, p. 170; Halakhot Gedolot, Eruvin, Venice edition, 26; Halakhot Pesukot, Sasoon edition, 1; Shaʿare teshubah—Responsa of the Geonim, Leiter edition, 5; Teshuvot ha-Geonim, Mussafia (Lik), Mussafia edition, 26; Teshuvot Rav Sar Shalom Gaʾon, Weinberg edition, 76; Louis Ginzberg, Genizah Studies, vol. 2, 345; Ve-hizhir, Freimann edition, Ex. 20.

An Opposing School of Redaction in the Talmud Bavli Suggested

sages,53 the halakhic method utilized by the redactors of the present sugya did not affect the majority of the Poskim and was not accepted as the halakha.54 Despite this, some Poskim differed and determined that ʿerub of boundaries is from the Torah.55

53 Ha-Rif, Eruvin 17b; Rambam, Hilkhot Shabbat 27:1; cf. below, n. 55, Rambam, Sefer ha-mitzvot (See below, n. 55); Ha-Rosh, Eruvin 17b; Or Zaruʿa, vol. 2, sect. 128, p. 64 (See below, n. 55); Sefer ha-makhriʿa, 29; (Sefer Ravye, Hilkhot Eruvin, vol. 1, sect. 380, p. 407, s.v. ve-omer); Ha-agur, Hilkhot Eruvin, sect. 571; Piskei ha-Rid, Eruvin, 36f.; Piskei Riʾaz, Eruvin, 28; Mordekhai, Eruvin 17b; Hidushei ha-Ramban, Eruvin, 536; Hidushei ha-Rashba, Eruvin, 127; Hidushei ha-Meiri, Eruvin, 127; Bet ha-beh.ira, Eruvin, 80, s.v. kevar; Geʾon Yaʿakov, Eruvin, 49, etc. 54 Uri Zur, “Hashpaʿat shikul ha-daʿat ha-hilkhati be-ʿarikhat sugyot ha-bavli ʿal pessikat ha-halakha,” Dine Israel 19 (1998): 217–240. 55 Rambam, Sefer ha-mitzvot, mitzvat lo taʿasse, sect. 321. See also Zikhron Yosef Responsa, sect. 29. Compare Rambam, Hilkhot Shabbat 27:1; R. Moshe ben Maimon, Responsa, Blau edition, sect. 310; Teshuvot ha-Rambam, Hilkhot Shabbat, Freimann edition, 6f; Teshuvot R. Avraham b. ha-Rambam, Hilkhot Shabbat, Freimann edition, 23; Ha-manhig, Hilkhot Shabbat, vol. 2, Rafael edition, 127; Hidushei ha-Ramban, Eruvin, 530, in the name of ha-Raʾavad; Sefer Ravye, Hilkhot Eruvin, sect. 407, 464; (compare idem, 407, s.v. ve-omer, and 445); Or Zaruʿa, Hilkhot Shabbat, 22; Kaftor va-perach, 44, etc.

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CHAPTER 8

Objectives of Sugyot—A Study of the Redaction of the Talmud Bavli as Reflected in Three Sugyot of Tractate Eruvin

V

arious methods exist for analyzing the redaction of the sugyot of the Talmud Bavli.1 However, neither the purposeful and definitive criticism of this redaction, nor the objectives of sugyot (as they appear in print—with no intent of justifying the printed version), has been sufficiently researched.2 Existing studies on sugyot are usually random and inconsistent.3 The contribution of this chapter is the method proposed: The central and interpretive question to be studied in researching sugyot is the purpose and the objective—the why and wherefore of the redactors. 1 See, for instance, Julius Kaplan, The Redaction of the Babylonian Talmud (New York: Bloch Pub. Co. 1933); Hyman Klein, “Gemara and Sebara,” JQR 38 (1947): 67–91; Klein,”Gemara Quotation in Sebara,” JQR 43 (1953): 341–363; Klein, “Some Methods of Sebara,” JQR 50 (1959): 124–146; Jacob N. Epstein, Introduction to Tannaitic Literature [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Magnes, 1957); Epstein, Introduction to Amoraitic Literature [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Magnes, 1962); Noah Aminoah, The Redaction of the Tractate Qiddushin in the Babylonian Talmud [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: E. Levin-Epstein-Modan, 1977); David Halivni, Sources and Traditions: A Source Critical Commentary on the Talmud Tractates Erubin and Pesah.im [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982); Noah Aminoah, The Redaction of the Tractate Betza, Rosh ha-Shana and Taʿanith in the Babylonian Talmud [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1986); Aminoah, The Redaction of the Tractate Sukkah and Moʿed Katan in the Babylonian Talmud [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1989). 2 See Shamma Friedman, A Critical Study of Yevamot X with a Methodological Introduction [Hebrew] (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1978); Friedman, Talmud Arukh BT Bava Mez. iʿa VI. Commentary [Hebrew] (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1990); Friedman, Talmud Arukh BT Bava Mez. iʿa VI. Text [Hebrew] (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1996). 3 See Halivni, Sources and Traditions.

Objectives of Sugyot

This study examines the reasoning behind a sugya’s manifestation in its present printed version and contrasts it with different versions and additional sources. The chapter emphasizes the central theme or themes of the sugya, above and beyond the legal, theoretical message. The central objective of this study is to clarify that, in addition to the halakhic message, when redacting the sugya the redactors were guided by further considerations, regardless of their identity or historical period. We shall examine the following sugyot with the above questions in mind, and present significant implications of our method as a critical tool for the further analysis of how the redaction of the sugyot of the Babylonian Talmud transpired.

1. FIRST SUGYA—MEANING OF THE WORD ‫דיומדין‬ (B. ERUVIN 18A–19A) This sugya opens with the words of R. Jeremiah b. Eleazar4 (hereafter RJbE) and contains ten of his statements: .‫ דיו עמודין‬:‫ א”ר ירמיה בן אלעזר‬.1 .‫ דיו פרצוף פנים‬:‫ א”ר ירמיה בן אלעזר‬.2 .‫ כל אותן השנים‬:‫ ואמר ר’ ירמיה בן אלעזר‬.3 .‫ מקצת שבחו‬:‫ אמר רבי ירמיה בן אלעזר‬.4 .‫ מאי דכתיב‬:‫ וא”ר ירמיה בן אלעזר‬.5 .‫ כל בית‬:‫ וא”ר ירמיה בן אלעזר‬.6 .‫ ואמר רבי ירמיה בן אלעזר מיום שחרב‬.7 .‫ נתקללה בבל‬:‫ ואמר רבי ירמיה בן אלעזר‬.8 .‫ בא וראה‬:‫ וא”ר ירמיה בן אלעזר‬.9 .‫ שלשה פתחים‬:‫ ואמר רבי ירמיה (בר) אלעזר‬.10 The following is based upon the Soncino Press [Epstein edition]: 1. 2. 3. 4.

R. Jeremiah b. Eleazar replied: Deyo ʿamudin. R. Jeremiah b. Eleazar said: The first man had two full faces. R. Jeremiah b. Eleazar further stated: In all those years. R. Jeremiah b. Eleazar further stated: Only a part of a man’s praise.

4 See Ch. Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud, Babli and Yerushalmi [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1969), 342.

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5. R. Jeremiah b. Eleazar further stated: What [was signified] when it was written. 6. R. Jeremiah b. Eleazar further stated: Any house. 7. R. Jeremiah b. Eleazar further stated: Since the Sanctuary was destroyed. 8. R. Jeremiah b. Eleazar further stated: When Babylon was cursed. 9. R. Jeremiah b. Eleazar further stated: Come and see. 10. R. Jeremiah b. Eleazar further stated: Gehenna has three gates. First, we shall present the principal difficulties of this sugya. 1. At the beginning of the sugya the mnemonic ‫ סימן‬...‫ ד”יו למ”נודה‬appears, supposedly indicating all statements by RJbE in the sugya.5 However, in fact, indications of two of his pronouncements are omitted: The sixth phrase has ‫ כל בית‬:‫וא”ר ירמיה בן אלעזר‬, and the seventh—‫ מיום שחרב‬:‫ואמר רבי ירמיה בן אלעזר‬. The question arises as to why the indications of these statements6 are absent, or why are there ten statements in his name with only eight indications. 2. There is a further statement in the name of RJbE in B. Sanhedrin.7 Why was it not cited in the passage in B. Eruvin? 3. With regards to the second statement, ‫ דיו פרצוף‬:‫א”ר ירמיה בן אלעזר‬ ‫פנים‬, why is there a different version in the parallel passage found in B. Berakhot?8 In B. Berakhot, two independent declarations appear in his name, whereas in this sugya only one statement appears, combining both statements found in Berakhot. 4. The fourth statement, ‫ מקצת שבחו‬:‫ אמר רבי ירמיה בן אלעזר‬is found in some midrash collections.9 But in these collections, this pronouncement is always presented in the name of R. Elazar ben Azaria and not in the name of RJbE. Why is the passage from B. Eruvin different?

5 See Hagahot ha-Gra, Eruvin 18a, n. 1. 6 The indication deyo / diu (‫ )דיו‬relates to the first and second statements; cf. Aaron Hyman, Toldoth Tannaim ve-Amoraim [Hebrew], vol. 1 ( Jerusalem: Kirya Neʾemana, 1964), 18; Moshe Millzeiner, Hakdama le-torat ha-parshanut ba-Talmud [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Millzeiner, 1986), 325. 7 B. Sanhedrin 109a; Minh.at zikaron, Eruvin 18a, s.v. ve-hineh, in Assifat zekenim, vol. 1. 8 B. Berakhot 61a. 9 See Sifrei, Behaʿalotekha, Horovitz edition, para. 102, 100–101; Bereshit Rabba, Noah, Theodor-Albeck edition, sect. 32, c, 290–291.

Objectives of Sugyot

To clarify the development of this sugya and to employ the method outlined in the introduction, the first step should be to examine and consider the ending of the previous sugya and compare it with the beginning of the present one. The previous sugya concludes with a very concise definition10 of the word ‫ ביראות‬/ bira’ot: ‫מאי ביראות? ביראות דעלמא‬. Thus, in a similar style, the present sugya opens with the definition of the word ‫ דיומדין‬/ deyomdin:11 ‫ דיו עמודין‬:‫מאי דיומדין? א”ר ירמיה בן אלעזר‬, which is, in effect, the first saying in the name of RJbE. The word ‫דיו‬, interpreted in and of itself, associatively suggests12 Ulla’s similar explanation:‫דיו פירות‬13 for the word ‫ דיופרא‬in M. Dmai.14 Moreover, any interpretation of this word should be in accordance with other deifnitions of the same word ‫דיו‬.15 Along these lines, the second statement of RJbE, ‫דיו פרצוף פנים‬, was taken from a parallel place in B. Berakhot 61a and added here to give another example similarly using the same word ‫דיו‬. Since two statements of RJbE were included here, the redactors of the sugya saw it as a suitable place to assemble most16 of his remaining statements into what eventually became a tenfold17 structure consisting of ten statements 10 See B. Eruvin 14b: ‫ לחיין דעלמא‬,‫מאי לחיין‬. For more examples, see Gilyone ha-shas, Eruvin 18a, s.v. sham mai. 11 See Halakhot Gedolot, Eruvin 18a, Traub edition, 56; Samuel Krauss, Kadmoniyot ha-Talmud [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1929) vol. 2, no. 1, 104, pointed out that the origin of the word is Greek. 12 See Noah Aminoah, “Ha-netiya le-ah.idut ha-signon ba-Talmud ha-Bavli ve-hashpaʿoteha ʿal girsaotav,” Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies 3 (1985): 15–21. 13 Abraham Weiss, Hithavut ha-Talmud bi-shlemuto [Hebrew] (New York: The Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1943), 140. 14 Demai 1:1; see Abraham Weiss, ʿAl ha-yetzira ha-sifrutit shel ha-Amoraim [Hebrew] (New York: Horeb, 1962), 63, n. 12. 15 See Hidushei ha-Meiri, Eruvin 18a, s.v. kol ha-shitin. 16 See MS Munich 95, MS Oxford 366, MS Vatican 127; they are in the same order as the sugya; See Halikhot ʿolam, gate 2, chapter 1, 31; Weiss, Hithavut ha-Talmud, 139–140; Weiss, ʿAl ha-yetzira, 3, 63, n. 12; Weiss, Le-h.eker ha-Talmud [Hebrew] (New York: Feldheim, 1954), 79, n. 138, 97, 149; Weiss, Heʿarot le-sugyot ha-shas ha-Bavli ve-ha-Yerushalmi [Hebrew] (Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan University, Bar-Oryan, 1970), 5, 75, 148, 240; Weiss, Meh. karim ba-Talmud [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1975), 121; Weiss, Le-korot hithavut ha-Bavli ( Jerusalem: Makor, 1970), 55–56; Saul Lieberman, Yevanit ve-yavnut be-eretz Israel [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1962), 301. 17 See Ezra Z. Melamed, Pirkei mavo le-sifrut ha-Talmud [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Galʾor, 1973), 454, sect. 8; Yitzhak Avishur, “Darkhe ha-hazarah be-misparei ha-shlemut (3, 7, 10) ba-mikrah u-va-sifrut ha-shemit ha-kedumah,” Beer-Sheva 1 (1973): 1–55; Shamma Friedman, “Eh.ui parashiyot semukhot be-sugyot ha-Bavli,” Seventh World Congress of Jewish Studies 3 (1977), 251–255; cf. Friedman, “Mivne sifruti be-sugyot ha-Bavli,” Sixth World

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in RJbE’s name18 on various issues.19 Apparently, the redaction of this passage was an ongoing process of assembling the statements by RJbE. As the number of statements grew, the idea of the tenfold structure arose. Next to each statement, the subsequent debate was included where appropriate,20 and thus, the present sugya was formulated in its printed version—a tenfold structure of ten statements including the mnemonic opening of the sugya. However, the mnemonic indications are missing21 in most22 manuscripts, although they were added to the printed edition to mark the statements in the name of RJbE.23 In light of all the above, we can infer that at one point in the development of the sugya the redactor or redactors, examining the list of indications, had only eight of them, and added the last two to complete the tenfold structure of ten statements in the name of RJbE. Support for this view may be seen in the version of MS Vatican 109, in which the eighth statement, ‫ נתקללה בבל‬:‫ואמר רבי ירמיה בן אלעזר‬, is missing, although it is included in the printed version. It appears to have been added to the sugya to complete the structure. Moreover, with regard to the fourth statement, the different name found in the midrash further supports the idea that the sugya was redacted and was, at one time, different from its present structure. The redactors changed the name to correspond with the structure. Accordingly, it is possible that the additional statement by RJbE in B. Sanhedrin 109a was omitted but not forgotten. Also, the two statements in his name from B. Berakhot 61a, which Congress of Jewish Studies 3 (1973), 400; Friedman, A Critical Study of Yevamot X with a Methodological Introduction [Hebrew] (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1978), 40, n. 120; Friedman, “Hosafot ve-kitʿei sevara be-ferek ha-hovel (Bava Kama 8),” Tarbiz. 40 (1971): 423, n. 19. 18 See Melamed, Pirkei mavo, 454, n. 643, 645, who relates to the statement of RJbE in B. Sanhedrin 109a; cf. Rafaelo Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, Berakhot ( Jerusalem: Maʻayan ha-hokhma, 1960), 176, n. 3; Weiss, Hithavut ha-Talmud, 139, n. 45; Weiss, ʿAl ha-yetzira, 215, n. 43. 19 Cf. Weiss, ʿAl ha-yetzira, 63, n. 12. 20 Weiss, ʿAl ha-yetzira, 218, n. 67. 21 See MS Munich 95, MS Oxford 366, MS Vatican 127; Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, Eruvin, 56. 22 Cf. MS Vatican 109, where the indication is different. 23 See Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, Eruvin, 56, n. 50; Jacob N. Epstein, Mavo le-nossah. ha-Mishna [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Magnes, 1964), 1005–1006, regarding the role of the indicators, see B. Kiddushin 6a. One should note that the indication in MS Vatican 109 contains errors. Moreover, all of the indicators only relate to seven or eight statements in the name of RJbE, with two or three indicators missing; see Lamenatze’ah. le-David, Maʾamar simanin de-rabbanan, Eruvin 18a; Minh.at zikaron, Eruvin 18a, s.v. ba-gemara; Ginze Yosef, Eruvin 18a, s.v. gemara zonit, in Assifat zekenim, vol. 2.

Objectives of Sugyot

were transformed into the single second statement in the B. Eruvin sugya, strengthen the possibility that this was the result of considerations involved in redacting the sugya in its present tenfold structure of ten statements in the name of RJbE.

2. SECOND SUGYA—CLARIFICATION OF THE NEED FOR THE WORD ‫( ועוד‬B. ERUVIN 23a) This sugya deals with clarification of the question: Why does the mishna state: ‫“( ועוד אמר ר’ יהודה בן בבא‬Further said R. Judah b. Baba,” hereafter RJbB)? The mishna with sugya is as follows:



‫ אין עושין פסין אלא לבאר הרבים‬:‫ רבי יהודה בן בבא אומר‬...‫(כב ע"ב) משנה‬ .‫ ולשאר עושין חגורה גבוה עשרה טפחים‬,‫בלבד‬ ‫ הגינה והקרפף שהן שבעים אמה‬:‫ ועוד אמר רבי יהודה בן בבא‬.‫(כג ע"א) משנה‬ ‫ המוקפות גדר גבוה עשרה טפחים—מטלטלין‬,‫ושיריים על שבעים אמה ושיריים‬ ‫ רבי עקיבא‬...‫ או שתהא סמוכה לעיר‬,‫ ובלבד שיהא בה שומירה או בית דירה‬,‫בתוכה‬ ‫ ובלבד שיהא בה שבעים אמה‬,‫ אפילו אין בה אחת מכל אלו מטלטלין בתוכה‬:‫אומר‬ .‫ושיריים על שבעים אמה ושיריים‬ ‫ מאי תנא דקתני ועוד? אילימא משום דתנא ליה חדא לחומרא וקתני אחריתי‬.‫גמרא‬ ,‫משום הכי קתני ועוד—והא רבי יהודה דתנא ליה חדא לחומרא וקתני אחריתי‬ ‫ וכל היכא דאפסקוה‬.‫ הכא לא אפסקוה רבנן‬,‫ולא קתני ועוד!—התם אפסקוה רבנן‬ ‫ דאפסקוה רבנן וקתני ועוד! – התם‬,‫רבנן לא קתני ועוד? והא רבי אליעזר דסוכה‬ ‫ רבי עקיבא אומר אפילו‬.‫ הכא במילתא אחריתי אפסקוה‬,‫במילתיה הוא דאפסקוה‬ ....‫אין בה אחד מכל אלו מטלטלין בתוכה‬

In translation: (22b) Mishna … R. Judah b. Baba ruled: strips [of wood] may be set up round a public well only while for the others a [rope] belt ten handbreadths in height must be provided. (23a) Mishna. R. Judah b. Baba further ruled: it is permitted to move objects in a garden or a karpaf whose [area does not exceed] seventy cubits and a fraction by seventy cubits and a fraction and which are surrounded by a wall ten handbreadths high, provided there is in it a watchman’s hut or a dwelling place or it is near to a town … R. Akiba ruled: even if it contained none of these it is permitted to move objects within it …

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Redaction What, did he already teach that, in consequence, he used the expression of “further”? If it be suggested: Because he taught one restrictive ruling and then he taught the other he therefore used the expression of “further,” surely [it could be retorted,] did not R. Judah teach one restrictive ruling and then he taught another one and yet he did not use the expression “further”?—There the Rabbis interrupted him but here the Rabbis did not interrupt him. [Is it then suggested] that where-ever the Rabbis interrupted one’s statements the expression of “further” is not used, surely [it may be objected], was not R. Eliezer, in the case of a law about sukkah, interrupted by the Rabbis and the expression “further” was nevertheless used? There they interrupted him with [a ruling on] his own subject but here they made the interruption with another subject. R. Akiba ruled: Even if it contained none of these it is permitted to move objects within it … [Epstein edition, adapted for this publication]

The following are some of the difficulties in this passage. 1. The question, ?‫ מאי תנא דקתני ועוד‬is strange. The previous mishna24 concludes with a statement by RJbB,25 and the present mishna26 begins with his words. Accordingly, the mishna opens with ’‫ועוד אמר ר‬ ‫יהודה בן בבא‬, and thus, the word ‫“( ועוד‬further”) appears to be quite appropriate. Why, then, is this word considered out of place? 2. On the other hand, if there is no connection between the two mishnayot nor is the order of the sages’ names the same,27 why is ‫ועוד‬ utilized in the mishna? Moreover, it would have been more appropriate for the opinion of RJbB to precede R. Akiba’s, since RJbB was the elder scholar.28

24 B. Eruvin 22b. 25 Cf. Tosefta, Eruvin 2:5, Zuckermandel edition; Tosefta, Eruvin 1: 16, Lieberman edition; the order of the sages’ names is not the same. See Abraham Goldberg, Perush la-mishna, Massekhet Eruvin [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Magnes, 1986), 45, s.v. R. Yehuda ben Bava. 26 B. Eruvin 23a. 27 Abraham Krochmal, Perushim ve-heʻarot la-Talmud ha-Bavli [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Makor, 1978), 113. 28 B. Sanhedrin 14a: “‫ סמכיה רבי יהודה בן בבא וקיבלו‬,‫”סמכיה ר’ עקיבא ולא קיבלו‬.

Objectives of Sugyot

Upon reviewing the passage and the variant readings, it becomes clear that the reading ‫ ועוד‬here is not at all certain.29 Was the word ‫ ועוד‬part of the original mishnaic text or was it added at a much later date? Furthermore, in all other mishnayot in which ‫ ועוד‬is found, the Talmud has an accompanying halakhic debate and not a stylistic one.30 Only this sugya deliberates on the methods of using the word ‫ועוד‬. Apparently, in this sugya the redactors had no halakhic debates and, hence, related to the stylistic issue involving the word ‫ ועוד‬in order not to leave the Talmud discussion of the beginning of the mishna devoid of any deliberation. Therefore, one may suggest that the redaction of the sugya was undertaken for one of two stylistic objectives. If the term was part of the original text of the mishna, the goal was to redact this sugya in accordance with the redaction of other sugyot that had utilized the term ‫ועוד‬, justifying its addition before the words of RJbB31 in the mishna. However, if the word ‫ ועוד‬was added to the mishna at a later date, it would have been for the purpose of redacting a sugya— and specifically at the beginning of the mishna. The objective was to begin the sugya at the earliest possible point—from the first word of the mishna (‫)ועוד‬. The redactors of the sugya wanted to avoid beginning the passage in such a way that it would only relate to the words of R. Akiba, in the middle of the mishna.

3. THIRD SUGYA—ʿERUB FOR PRIEST IN A CEMETERY (B. ERUVIN 30B–31A) The mishna32 mentions that an ʿerub made with wine is permissible for a Nazarite: ‫ מערבין לנזיר ביין‬:)‫)ערובי תחומין‬, despite the fact that wine is forbidden to a Nazarite. Since it is suitable for others as “food,” the sages permitted Nazarites to employ wine in an ʿerub, similar to another of their rulings, ‫—כהן בבית הפרס‬a priest in a doubtful cemetery. R. Judah (hereafter: RJ) adds, ‫אפי’ בין הקברות מפני שיכול לחוץ ולילך ולאכול‬. According to RJ, even though a priest is forbidden to enter a cemetery, it is possible to set up an ʿerub for him there, since he may enter the cemetery without being contaminated by means of being transported in a chest, box, or portable turret (‫)שידה תיבה ומגדל‬.33 Hence, 29 Halakhot Gedolot, 56, without the word ‫ועוד‬. 30 B. Shabbat 130a; B. Eruvin 39a–b, 95a; B. Pesah.im 13b; B. Yoma, 65a, 84a; B. Sukkah 27a; B. Betza 34a–b; B. Megilah 28a; B. Moed Qatan 8a; B. Nedarim 64b, 65b. 31 Krochmal, Perushim ve-heʻarot, 114. 32 B. Eruvin 26b–27a. 33 Rashi, Eruvin 27a, s.v. la-h.utz.

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an ʿerub could be set up for a cohen (priest) even among the graves, and the present sugya relates to this issue: .‫ אף בית הקברות תנא מפני שיכול לחוץ ולילך בשידה תיבה ומגדל‬:‫רבי יהודה אומר‬ ‫ הנכנס לארץ העמים בשידה‬:‫ דתניא‬,‫ אהל זרוק שמיה אהל ובפלוגתא דהני תנאי‬:‫קאי סבר‬ .‫תיבה ומגדל רבי מטמא רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה מטהר‬ ‫ אהל זרוק שמיה אהל‬:‫ אהל זרוק לאו שמיה אהל ומ"ס‬:‫ מ"ס‬,‫במאי קמיפלגי‬ .‫ מערבין לכהן טהור בתרומה טהורה בקבר‬:‫והא דתניא רבי יהודה אומר‬ .‫היכי אזיל? בשידה תיבה ומגדל‬ In translation: R. Judah ruled: Even in a graveyard. A Tanna taught: Because a man can put up a screen and pass [through it] in a chest, box, or portable turret. He is of the opinion that a movable tent has the status of a [fixed] tent. And [they differ on a principle which is the subject of] dispute among the following Tannas. For it was taught: If a man enters a heathen country [riding] in a chest, box, or portable turret he is, Rabbi ruled, levitically unclean, but R. Jose son of R. Judah declares him to be clean. On what principle do they differ? One Master is of the opinion that a movable tent has not the status of a valid tent and the other Master maintains that even a movable tent has the status of a valid tent. It was taught: R. Judah ruled, [31a] An ʿerub for a levitically clean priest may be prepared from levitically clean terumah [and deposited] on a grave. How does he get there?—In a chest, box, or portable turret. [Epstein edition, adapted for this publication]

Again, we will first present the principal difficulties of the sugya. 1. Why does the printed version differ in the words ‫ והא דתניא‬in contrast to the various manuscripts in which only the word ‫ תניא‬appears,34 without the additional ‫?והא‬ 2. Does the baraita, ‫והא דתניא רבי יהודה אומר‬, proposed in this sugya relate to certain previous statements? If so, what is the connection between them? 34 See MS Munich 95, MS Oxford 366, MS Vatican 109; R. Hananel, Eruvin 31a; Gilayon ha-Shas, Eruvin 30b, in the name of R. Sh. L; Epstein, Introduction to Tannaitic Literature, 309; cf. Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, Eruvin, 59, n. 3.

Objectives of Sugyot

3. With regards to the baraita, why was the question, ‫היכי אזיל‬, and the answer, ‫בשידה תיבה ומגדל‬, presented, since the beginning of the sugya had already taught this very principle: ‫ מפני שיכול לחוץ ולילך בשידה‬:‫תנא‬ ‫?תיבה ומגדל‬ To resolve all these difficulties, we suggest that this sugya is composed, in effect, of two sugyot.35 The first passage, including the mishna, deals with an ʿerub in a cemetery, and the second passage is comprised of the baraita in the name of RJ discussing an ʿerub on a grave and a discussion concerning it. Between these two sugyot, the connecting phrase ‫ והא דתניא‬appears in the printed version, and yet, the first sugya—according to its style—does not relate to the following one. However, some manuscripts have only the term ‫תניא‬, differentiating between the sugyot, whereas the reading ‫ והא דתניא‬links the two sugyot.36 The sugya could have actually begun37 with the baraita in the name of RJ, ‫ מערבין לכהן טהור בתרומה טהורה בקבר‬:‫ רבי יהודה אומר‬,‫תניא‬, followed by the controversy of the sages and RJ, and perhaps it was originally so. And all this was congruent with RJ’s words from the mishna. But at a certain stage, the subject of “‫ ”אהל זרוק‬was added and redacted38 at the beginning of the sugya39 as a basis of the halakha in the sugya, since the redactors of the sugya preferred the approach of the sages to that of RJ.40 How can we understand the passage on the basis of the halakha in the sugya? First, we will consider the first paragraph at the beginning of the sugya on the subject “‫אהל זרוק‬,” which includes the tannaitic controversy between Rabbi Judah the Patriarch and R. Jose son of R. Judah. In this type of controversies, the halakha is ‫( כרבי מחבירו‬with Rabbi when he differs from a colleague of

35 See Louis Ginzberg, Geonica (New York: Hermon, 1968), vol. 2, 142. 36 Friedman, Critical Study, 26 sect. 3, 30, sect. 11. 37 See ʿAvodat ha-kodesh le-ha-Rashba, ʿAvodat ʿAvoda, in ʻAvodat ha-kodesh le-ha-Rashba, Zembelist edition, vol. 2, gate 5, 15, pp. 248–249, n. 35, s.v. ve-hineh. 38 Ginzberg, Geonica, 138. 39 Simcha Assaf, Tekufat ha-Geonim ve-sifruta [Hebrew], ed. Mordechai Margalioth ( Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kuk, 1955), 135; Weiss, Meh.karim ba-Talmud, 227; Friedman, Critical Study, 48; Meyer S. Feldblum, Perushim u-meh.karim ba-Talmud. Tractate Gittin (New York: Yeshiva University, 1969), 74, n. 37. 40 Generally, the law follows the opinion of the majority, see B. Eruvin 16b: ’‫שבקת” רבנן ועבדת כר‬ ‫יוסי ברבי יהודה‬.”

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his)41 Therefore, the law in this controversy is in accordance with Rabbi Judah the Patriarch and not with R. Jose son of R. Judah. If the paragraph on the subject of “‫ ”אהל זרוק‬had not been redacted, the halakhic data on the controversy between the sages and RJ in relation to the baraita ‫ והא דתניא‬would have been pointed decisively to accepting the view of RJ and not the view of the sages. This is because ‫כל מקום ששנה רבי יהודה בעירובין הלכה‬ ‫“( כמותו‬the law is in accordance with RJ anywhere that he taught in Eruvin”),42 even where his solitary opinion is opposed to that of the majority,43 and ‫הלכה‬ ‫“( כדברי המיקל בעירוב‬the law follows the lenient opinion in matters of ʿerub”).44 Since the redactors tended to follow the majority opinion of the sages, prohibiting an ʿerub in a cemetery even for someone who is not a priest, it was necessary to neutralize the possible halakhic data that favored the view of the individual, RJ. Therefore, the paragraph on the subject “‫ ”אהל זרוק‬was added and redacted at the beginning of the sugya, from which it was inferred that in the controversy between Rabbi Judah the Patriarch and R. Jose son of R. Judah, the law follows Rabbi Judah the Patriarch and not his opponent. This rule served two purposes for the redactors: first, it was intended to offset45 the opinion of R. Jose son of R. Judah from being accepted as law. Moreover, since RJ, father of R. Jose son of R. Judah, shared his son’s opinion,46 ‫אהל זרוק שמיה אהל‬, RJ’s opinion was also not accepted in the first controversy on “‫אהל זרוק‬.” Secondly, it demonstrated that the sages agreed with Rabbi Judah the Patriarch, according to the halakhic rule, ‫ וכרבי מחבירו‬...‫( הלכה‬the halakha is in agreement with Rabbi when he differs from a colleague of his).47 Thus, by adding ‫“( והא ד‬and also”) to the term ‫“( תניא‬taught”), the redactors created a connection between the unaccepted view of R. Jose son of R. Judah which is, in fact, also the view of RJ on the subject of “‫אהל זרוק‬,” and the controversy between the sages and RJ in the baraita. As a result, these two separate controversies became one. This assumes that the reader understands that the rejection of the opinion of R. Jose son of R. Judah and RJ, his father, in “‫ ”אהל זרוק‬at the beginning of the sugya, necessarily 41 B. Eruvin 46b. 42 B. Eruvin 95a. 43 Rashi, Eruvin 31a, s.v. assur, who describes the law according to the power in the ruling of R. Judah. 44 B. Eruvin 46a. 45 See Maharam Bar Baruch, Teshuvot pesakim u-minhagim, vol. 1, Kahana edition, 261, sect. 22; Maharam, vol. 4, Klein edition, 21, sect. 58; Leshon Riʾaz, Eruvin 30b–31a, s.v. meʻarvin; Mordekhai, Eruvin 30b–31a; Aguda, Eruvin, 80, s.v. mipnei. 46 B. Eruvin 17a: “‫משום דקאי אבוהי בשיטתיה‬.” 47 B. Eruvin 46b.

Objectives of Sugyot

means rejecting the view of RJ himself and accepting the view of the sages— that there can be no ʿerub in a cemetery even for someone who is not a priest. In this way, the redactors neutralized the halakhic data that had given preference to the view of RJ, because this view opposed their halakhic predilection towards the sages’ opinion. Thus, the majority of the Poskim (adjudicators)48 accepted the sages’ opinion and ruled in accordance with the halakhic views of the redactors of the sugya. In conclusion, the different versions of the terms ‫ והא דתניא‬and ‫ ותניא‬linking or not linking the two controversies are significant, since they serve as evidence of redactive activity regarding the halakhic basis of the sugya and the redactors’ inclinations regarding the halakha.

SUMMARY Following the analysis by our proposed method, the first sugya appears to have the accepted tenfold structure of ten statements in the name of RJbE. This structure has been created by the redactors, who made efforts to achieve uniformity and to join ten phrases that focused on the statements given in the name of one and the same sage. Other sugyot may be found in the Talmud Bavli as having been redacted in different formats, or being given various structures for sundry purposes. Some of these are intended for the student, to provide emphasis, clarification, or simplification, while others are redacted for aesthetic purposes, including additions or omissions, or for stylistic variation. In many cases, the structure of the sugya provides a satisfactory solution to the problems that it raises, as shown above. It should be emphasized that the structure of the sugya does not reduce its principal halakhic message. The second sugya deals with a stylistic debate focusing on the word ‫ועוד‬ found in the mishna and employed differently than the way it is normally used in halakhic discussions of the same word in other sugyot. In redacting the sugya and for specific structural reasons, the redactors did not wish to abstain from addressing the first part of the mishna. Consequently, the debate had to focus on ‫ועוד‬, in as close a location as possible to the beginning of the mishna. The redactors preferred not to start their work with a word or a topic that was stated in the middle of the mishna. Following this method, there certainly may be other sugyot that do not have a definite structure or clear halakhic basis, similar to the first and third 48 Rambam, Ha-yad ha-hazaka, Hilkhot Eruvin 6:17; Shulh.an Arukh, Hilkhot Teh.umin, 409:1.

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sugyot analyzed above. Instead, they are characterized by one or several topics mentioned in that particular sugya. The redactors preferred to focus on these secondary issues, transforming them into principal issues in the sugya. From the third sugya it appears that two unrelated controversies were linked and became one sugya by the addition of ‫והא ד‬. From a halakhic perspective this suggests the following: Since the opinion of R. Jose son of R. Judah was rejected in the first controversy between Rabbi Judah the Patriarch and R. Jose son of R. Judah, so the opinion of his father, RJ, must be rejected in the second controversy, between his father RJ and the sages. Accordingly, there may be additional sugyot with a certain halakhic proclivity built in, as it were, by the redactors in the course of their work. It may certainly be possible that the content or the subjects of debates in the sugya were determined according to the redactors’ halakhic preconceptions in the matter discussed. Thus, it may be that phrases that did not support their conceptions were omitted from the sugya. According to this method, one must analyze the halakhic basis of the sugya in relationship to the redacting guidelines employed in the redaction of the sugya. Sometimes, the redactors added terms or phrases or debates, and sometimes they omitted them, all in accordance with their halakhic proclivity. It is very reasonable to assume that these changes in the sugya influenced the Poskim, thereby radically changing the course of Jewish law. Consequently, one should compare this type of analysis with the actual decisions by halakhic authorities in succeeding generations in order to determine the actual influence of the redactive activity upon the halakha.

CHAPTER 9

The Methodology Utilized in the Redaction of the Tripartite Structure of Sugyot from Tractate Eruvin in the Talmud Bavli 1. THE TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE IN SUGYOT OF THE TALMUD BAVLI

T

he most common and cherished stylistic-formative design utilized in sugyot in general, including in Tractate Eruvin, is the tripartite structure.1 An entire study focusing on presentation of the tripartite structure in the different texts of Tractate Eruvin as a whole has been devoted to this matter.2 The tripartite structure appears in many texts and in varied manners. Its main aspect is the formative-stylistic dimension, manifested in the content (for example, a repetition of a phrase, a give-and-take, etc.) or as an arrangement of three similar things together, for example, an alignment of three statements by a certain sage in one place in the text, sometimes despite the absence of any content-based connection between the statements,3 or three statements by different Amoraim.4

Shamma Friedman, A Critical Study of Yevamot X with a Methodological Introduction [Hebrew] (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1978); Uri Zur, Orr Israel, Sugyot in Tractate Eruvin [Hebrew] (Lod: The Habermann Institute for Literary Research, 1999); Louis Jacobs, “The Numbered Sequence as a Literary Device in the Babylonian Talmud,” Hebrew Annual Review 7 (1983): 138–142: “The use of this number as especially significant is widespread in the Rabbinic literature” (138). 2 Uri Zur, The Tripartite Structure of the Sugyot: Studies in Tractate Eruvin of the Babylonaian Talmud [Hebrew] (Ariel: Ariel University Press, 2016). 3 Halikhot ʿolam, 31; Kelalei Shmuel, 127; Abraham Weiss, ‘Al ha-yetzira ha-sifrutit shel haAmoraim [Hebrew] (New York: Horeb, 1962), 202–204. 4 Friedman, Critical Study, 40–41. 1

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The tripartite structure is present in various texts as a form- and stylematching unit. It also gives an opportunity to glimpse the redactors’ considerations in working with the content of the talmudic text.5 The study of different texts in Tractate Eruvin indicates that many texts show diverse modes of design, with the tripartite structure being one of the main types. The tripartite structure is considered a complete formative-stylistic grouping, as it has a beginning, a middle, and an end.6 At times, awareness and recognition of this stylistic form can solve many problems or various types of difficulties that arise from the talmudic text. In other words, if the commentators had been clearly aware of the formative-stylistic aspect of the sugyot and that a certain sugya may have been shaped in a tripartite structure, then they would not have had any difficulties in understanding, for example, why three citations are brought in the name of the same Amora despite the lack of a content-related association between the third citation and the two previous ones, for example in sugya B. Eruvin 40b–41b. They would have been aware of the possibility of style-based repetition and would have had no difficulty with it. In fact, all the different examples in this chapter suggest a method in which the tripartite structure of the text constitutes a form- and style-based solution for overcoming the difficulties caused by seemingly unnecessary repetitions in all the variations of those examples in the sugyot. Notably, the commentators who pondered over problems or difficulties that arose in certain texts usually explained these as they were wont, by using casuistry and with no regard for the formative-stylistic design, including the tripartite structure of the talmudic text. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that some of the commentators discerned the tripartite structure of the text and even alluded to it at times in their commentaries, or referred to the tripartite structure implicitly, “between the lines” of their exegesis.7 Their interpretations do not explain why the talmudic 5 Shulamit Valler, “The Number Fourteen as a Literary Device in the Babylonian Talmud,” Journal for the Study of Judaism 26 (1995): 169–184; Valler, Women and Womanhood in the Talmud (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1999). 6 Marvin H. Pope, “Number, Numbering, Numbers,” in The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, vol. 3, ed. George A. Buttrick (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962), 564: “Next to the number seven, the number most frequently used in connection with sacred matters is three. This number naturally suggests the idea of completeness—of beginning, middle, and end.” 7 Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 71–74, 94–99, 140 n. 30, 187 n. 46; David Halivni, Sources and Traditions: A Source Critical Commentary on the Talmud Tractates Erubin and Pesah.im [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982), 130 n. 1*. For a critique of Halivni’s method, see Louis Newman, “The Work of David Weiss Halivni, A

The Methodology Utilized in the Redaction of the Tripartite Structure of Sugyot

redactors acted thus, but it is clear that they saw a certain purpose in what the redactors had done, and they seem to have realized that the redactors’ work on various texts stemmed from their wish to maintain a tripartite structure, although they do not say so expressly. Some modern scholars also dwelt on the tripartite structure of various texts in several tractates of the Talmud Bavli. There were those who expanded on the topic while others discussed it concisely, in passing. The tripartite structure of sugyot in the Talmud Bavli8 is the topic of studies on the tenth chapter of Tractate Yevamot, and on the first and second chapters of Tractate Bava Mez. iʻa.9 Other studies focus on sugyot in the first three chapters of Tractate Eruvin10 and in other chapters of the tractate,11 as well as in other places.12 Some of the scholars who studied the sugyot of Tractate Eruvin paid very little attention (if at all) to the tripartite structure of some of the sugyot, and even this only indirectly, randomly, and unsystematically. They mentioned various phenomena related to the tripartite structure in texts or to whole sugyot bearing the tripartite format in Tractate Eruvin.13

Source-Critical Commentary to B. Yebamot 87b,” Semeia 27 (1983): 93–101; Aryeh Cohen, Rereading Talmud: Gender, Law and the Poetics of Sugyot (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, Brown Judaic Studies, 1998), 25–33.   8 Shamma Friedman, “Some Structural Patterns of Talmudic Sugiot,” Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of Jewish Studies 3 (1973): 389–402; Friedman, Talmudic Studies, Investigating the Sugya, Variant Readings and Aggada [Hebrew] (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 2010), 10.   9 Friedman, “Some Structural Patterns,” 391 n. 6; Friedman, Critical Study, 40–43, 47. 10 Zur, Orr Israel, 40 n. 6, 368, 392–393; Uri Zur, “‘Al ha-mivneh ha-meshulash be-sugyot ha-Bavli,” Te‘udah 16–17 (2000): 255–273; Zur, “Mivneh meshulash kaful be-sugya achat be-Bavli ʿEruvin (77a–78a),” Shaʾanan 19 (2013): 77–88; Zur, “‘Eitzuv kelalei halakha be-mivneh meshulash ba-Talmud ha-Bavli,” Netu‘eim 19 (2015): 122–130. 11 Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 23–366. 12 On the number three in various tractates of the Talmud Bavli (and Yerushalmi) and in the various midrashim, see August Wünsche, “Die Zahlensprüche in Talmud und Midrasch,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 65 (1911): 66–100; Ezra Z. Melamed, “Nossah. mispar u-mishkal be-Massekhet Avot,” Sinai 50 (1962): 157–161; Georg Nádor, “Some Numerical Categories in Ancient Rabbinical Literature: The Numbers Ten, Seven and Four,” Acta Orientalia 14 (1962): 301–303, 313, 315; Jacobs, “Numbered Sequence.” 13 Abraham Weiss, Le-korot hithavut ha-Bavli ( Jerusalem: Makor: 1970), 56 n. 5; Weiss, ‘Al ha-yetzira, 209; Friedman, “Some Structural Patterns”; Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 54–62; For a critique of Weiss’s method in general, see Roger Brooks and Joseph M. Davis, “Abraham Weiss as Exegete and Text Critic, The Case of b. Berakot 35a,” Semeia 27 (1983): 105–116; Cohen, Rereading Talmud.

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2. THE METHODOLOGY OF REDACTION OF A TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE The tripartite structure in sugyot of Tractate Eruvin appears conspicuously and clearly in forty sugyot and features a range of different stylistic forms. In these forty sugyot the tripartite structure can be proven. Some other sugyot have a visible tripartite structure, but this could not be proven. Presented below are select examples of different methodologies utilized in the redaction of the tripartite structure in various sugyot of Tractate Eruvin.

2.1 Distinction and separation The methodology of distinction and separation in the sugyot is manifested in various ways. In one sugya (Amar Abaye: … Amat sukkah),14 the sugya’s redactors had before them an array of difficulties and replies as a single sequence (or as one unit) on a certain topic (“Abaye stated in the name of R. Nah.man: The cubit [applicable to the measurements] of sukkah and that applicable to an ‘entrance’ is one of five [handbreadths]. The cubit [applicable to the laws] of kilʾayim is one of six [handbreadths]”) [here and henceforth from the Epstein edition]. The methodology employed by the redactors was to distinguish between the difficulties presented by this text and to separate it into three giveand-take relationships in order to establish a tripartite structure based on an identical style of negotiation: 1. In respect of what legal [restriction has it been ruled that] the cubit [applicable to the measurements] of an entrance is [only] one of five? … 2. In respect of what legal ... the cubit ... of a sukkah is one of five? … 3. In respect of what legal … ‘the cubit … of kilʾayim is one of six’? …15 Another example is evident in three questions of Rabbah from R. Huna, joined together in one place in the sugya Amar Rabbah: Ki havenan bei R. Huna … in light of the identical name of the sage in the phrase (“Rabbah stated: When we were at R. Huna’s we raised the following question …”). Modern scholars, too, reached a conclusion concerning the methodology utilized by the redactors: 14 B. Eruvin 3b. 15 Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 28–29.

The Methodology Utilized in the Redaction of the Tripartite Structure of Sugyot Statement A pertains to the framework mishna [the mishna that forms the setting of the issue]. Statement B is already to be considered [a transition] to another issue. But Statement C is from an entirely different issue, and it seems to have found its place here only by reason [in light] of the framework [of the phrase]: “When we were … he had no ruling on the subject. I appeared before Rab Judah” etc. And from this [we learn] that the three statements were supplied in a single instance.16

Namely, the redactors perceived these three questions as one unit, but they distinguished between them for methodological reasons and separated them into three disparate units in order to establish a tripartite structure in light of the identical name of the sage and the recurring phrase mentioned above. Such separation and distinction can be seen in a tannaitic source as well. The redactors of the sugya Tanu Rabbanan: Sheloshah devarim17 distinguished between the parts of the baraita methodologically and separated them into three parts. Next to each of the three parts of the baraita the redactors arranged a short give-and-take in a matching form of one identical difficulty and one short reply that illustrates only one example in each of the three parts. Together, these arrangements form a tripartite structure based on an adapted give-and-take.18 In another case, the redactors used the method of distinction and separation of three proofs brought together in order to establish a tripartite structure in the sugya Amar R. Mesharshiya: Litenaho lehanei klalei.19 This method is evident in the following commentary: It makes more sense to say that he who wished to prove that the halakhic rules [mentioned above (46b)] cannot be accepted based on the three sources in which the ruling followed R. Simeon. And he brought all these difficulties [concerning those three sources in which the ruling followed R. Simeon] at once and in one instance and rejected them all using the one rejection (“Is it not possible that the rules are disregarded only where a ruling to the contrary had been stated, but that where no such ruling is stated the rules remain in force?”). However, the redactors of the Talmud

16 Weiss, ‘Al ha-yetzira, 209. 17 B. Eruvin 41b. 18 Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 134–135. 19 B. Eruvin 46b.

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Redaction [who redacted the sugya] arranged for us each proof [each of the three sources mentioned above in which the ruling followed R. Simeon] separately, with the same rejection [that is repeated as a rejection of each of the three sources] by its side, this seems clear to me.20

This alludes to the method utilized in redacting a tripartite structure in the text. To begin with, the redactors had before them the entire body of text (the three proofs, or, to be precise, three mishnayot, in which the ruling followed R. Simeon)—and they were all said at once and all rejected at once in one rejection. But methodologically, the redactors distinguished between these three sources and separated them, arranging each of these three proofs as a separate problem, as though each problem had been presented separately to begin with, and added beside each of the three problems the same rejection, as though the rejection had been brought specifically for that difficulty. The interpretation of the commentator cited above does not explain why the redactors did this, but it may be said that they used this method in order to establish a tripartite structure.

2.2 Refraining from redaction of potential material (or things) The method of refraining from redaction of potential material in sugyot is manifested in various ways. It concerns the cases when the redactors had before them problems and replies that could be potentially included in the sugya. Sometimes, for various methodological considerations, for example, to establish a tripartite structure, the redactors refrained from including such potential matterial in the text. This is also the opinion voiced by commentators concerning the redactors’ decision not to include potential problems in a certain sugya (Amar Abaye: … Amat sukkah).21 As one commentator stated: “The talmudic [redactors] saw no need to present all [the problems and the replies].”22 The commentator did not give a reason for this, but it may be related to selection of material for a tripartite structure.23

20 Be’er sheva, Eruvin 46b, s.v. kashi. 21 B. Eruvin 3b. 22 Geon Yaʻakov, Eruvin 3b, s.v. ve-ha ika. 23 Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 27–29.

The Methodology Utilized in the Redaction of the Tripartite Structure of Sugyot

This methodology is evident in a give-and-take in another sugya (Amar R. Hiyya: Shiʻurin)24 as well. The redactors refrained from including various controversies or other individual problems in this give-and-take (on the topic of “[The laws relating to] standards”),25 for different reasons. Some of the commentators think so, too. According to them: “Whenever they [redactors] presented [this problem] in Tractate B. Sukkah [5b] and in B. Eruvin [4a] they brought all the words of R. Hanan.”26 These words imply an almost technical methodological approach with regard to redaction of any give-and-take that repeats itself in other places in the Talmud. According to them, from a methodological perspective, sometimes a give-and-take on a certain topic that recurs in another place in the Talmud includes only its basic details, while it is given in full elsewhere. One example is the give-and-take that includes the words of R. Hanan, brought to Tractate B. Eruvin [4a–b] from a parallel place in Tractate B. Sukkah [5b–6a] on its own, without any accompanying elemets. This is because in Tractate Eruvin, the give-and-take was only inserted from Tractate Sukkah to help establish a tripartite structure, and the redactors refrained from expanding it by also inserting additions from parallel sugyot to which it relates in Tractate Sukkah.27 In another case, when a certain premise or possibility in a sugya such as Dekulei ʻalma kassavrei mutar … lehishtamesh created an impasse,28 the methodology utilized by the redactors was to try and present another, improved and emended premise.29 For this reason, the text includes at times three premises, one after the other. Again, it would have been desirable (or possible) to add a fourth premise30 that would be better than the three previous ones, but the redactors refrained from adding it for different reasons, for example, to maintain a tripartite structure.31 In another example, two statements, each including three rules—one in the name of R. Jacob and R. Zerika and another in the name of R. Jacob b. Idi 24 B. Eruvin 4a–b. 25 Isidore Epstein, The Babylonian Talmud, ʻErubin, vol. 2 (London: The Soncino Press, 1935), 18, n. 9: “The minimum quantities, e.g., of forbidden foodstuffs the consumption of which constitutes the offence.” 26 Tosafot, Yoma 80a, s.v. ʿonshin; Tosafot, Sukkah 6b, s.v. ella. 27 B. Berakhot 41a–b; B. Sukkah 5b–6a. 28 B. Eruvin 5a. 29 Darkhei ha-Talmud le R. Yitzhak Kanfanton, Lange edition, 14, pp. 68–69; Yad Malʾakhi, 63, 10. 30 B. Eruvin 8b. 31 Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 45–48.

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ruling in the name of R. Joh.anan—appeared as two parts of a complex tripartite structure within the sugya R. Jacob ve-R. Zerika ʾamru: Halakha.32 The redactors avoided discussing each of these halakhic rules separately (although they could have done so) and did not dwell on any problems between these rules or with regard to them.33 Instead, they decided to maintain the stylistic consistency of the tripartite structure, where the two parts had in common three different halakhic rules encompassed by each of the two statements.34 Another example is a group of three stories with one topic, “A child whose warm water was spilled.”35 Here, the redactors refrained from noting fundamental differences between these stories. Therefore, in the absence of fundamental differences between these three stories, none of them can be seen as redundant. This is because, methodologically, the joining of these three stories together in the text is intended to establish a tripartite structure within a common topic36 (“A child whose warm water was spilled”).37

2.3. Language and style The methodology utilized in matters of language and style took various forms. One example is the method of redacting a double phrase as two identical replies, such as in the sugya Eibaʻaya leho le-Hananya aliba de-vet Hillel, where the replies are made in the name of R. Mattenah in the name of Samuel.38 This method is based on the consideration of establishing a tripartite structure with the same reply and the same phraseology. In this sugya, all three replies are modelled as “... Samuel: It is not necessary to lock it [the door],”39 and all three point to a certain question (“The question was raised: According to H.anania’s ruling in the name of Beth Hillel”) in the text. In other cases it is possible to discern a linguistic addition. For example, a certain source preserves a different version that does not include a certain phrase in the sugya. For the sugya Gufa, ʾamar R. Hisda: Zurat ha-petah. she-ʾamru 32 B. Eruvin 46b. 33 Shaʿar Yosef, Horayot 2a. 34 Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 177. 35 B. Eruvin 67b–68a. 36 David C. Kraemer, “Stylistic Characteristics of Amoraic Literature” (PhD diss., The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, New York, 1984), 308. 37 Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 265–267. 38 B. Eruvin 6b. 39 On the Tannaim’s method of joining phrases following a recurring manner of speech, see Sheʾerit Yosef, rule 26, 22; Weiss, ‘Al ha-yetzira, 204.

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we may assume that a version without the words zurat ha-petah (“the shape of a doorway”) was preserved in the words of R. Hananel.40 Therefore, it is possible that originally, the words “the shape of a doorway” existed neither in the baraita nor in the two41 statements that appear in the sugya. Hence, these words may have been added to the printed version at some (later) stage. This linguistic addition was intended to form a stylistic compatibility both within the baraita and between the two statements, which were originally separate and only came together due to redactors’ arrangement,42 in an effort to establish a tripartite structure based on the phrase “the shape of a doorway.”43 In other places, such as in the treatment of the three problems in the sugya Eitiveh, hatzer she-ha-rabim,44 the redaction stems from “literary grounds.”45 Here, the redactors arranged the three problems using the same formative style and the same lexical elements in order to establish an identical formative-stylistic tripartite structure with lexical repetitions based on these three problems: A private domain in respect of the Sabbath and that of a public domain in respect of Levitical defilement …46 whose view [is this]? If it be suggested [that it is that of] the Rabbis, it might be objected: If there, where the use [of the road] is easy, the Rabbis ruled that the public cannot come and impair the validity of the partition how much more would that be the case here where the use [of the paths] is not easy. Consequently [it must be, must it not, the view of] R. Judah?

Another sugya (Ve-R. Shesheth amar eh.ad zeh)47 demonstrates that the cohesiveness of three proofs (according to R. Shesheth) can also be manifested by the redactors in a formative-stylistic manner as a tripartite structure united by the opening words: “Said R. Shesheth, do I drive this?” One of the commentators noticed this repetition and alluded to it, noting a formative-stylistic impasse: “It should be noted, that he [the redactor] should 40 B. Eruvin 11b. 41 As further evidence that the words “the shape of a doorway” were originally absent in the baraita and the two statements of R. Hisda, see MS Munich 95 and MS Vatican 127 that do not include this form in the statement of Resh Lakish in the name of R. Jannai. 42 Hidushei Gur Arie, Eruvin 11b, s.v. zurat ha-petah.. 43 Weiss, Le-korot hithavut, 56 n. 5; Halivni, Sources and Traditions, 26 n. 12. 44 B. Eruvin 22b. 45 Halivni, Sources and Traditions, 52. 46 Mishkenot Yaʻakov, Eruvin, 120, p. 109, s.v. ve-ʿod reʾaya. 47 B. Eruvin 32a.

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have said [and added] ‘and Rav Sheshet said’ [with the conjunctive vav] in the other ‘Do I drive this?’ [two] phrases as well.”48 This indicates that two proofs in the text (the second and third or, at least, the third), accompanied by R. Shesheth’s phrase “Do I drive this?,” should have been preceded by the words “R. Shesheth again said” with a conjunctive vav as an addition to the first proof. Accordingly, this commentator sees these three proofs as one cohesive grouping that aims to denote three proofs supporting the opinion of R. Shesheth. Therefore, he has, undoubtedly, noticed the redactor’s decision to place these three proofs together and he sees them as a tripartite structure (even if he does not state so explicitly), based on the three proofs supporting the opinion of R. Shesheth, as evident in the phrase: “R. Shesheth, do I drive this?”49 In another place, it is possible to discern that the methodology utilized in grouping three stories in a sugya Amahatah de-vei Rav ki havo mishtaʿaya50 was aimed at establishing a tripartite structure based on the common phraseology of the three stories: “when indulging in enigmatic speech.” This phrase was added by the redactors51 deliberately52 and it is important and meaningful,53 because it creates a common link between the three stories that open with the same phrase “when indulging in enigmatic speech,”54 and portrays them together as a tripartite structure. Another example of the linguistic methodology aimed at establishing a tripartite structure is the selection and redaction process inspired by the common phrase “why were the words of Torah compared to …”55 that appears in three different homilies in the sugya Amar R. Hiyya b. Aba … mai de-khativ notzer teʾenah. Notably, although other homilies with the same phrase, “why were the 48 Pnei Shlomo, Eruvin 32a, s.v amar R. Shesheth. 49 Aaron Hyman, Toldoth Tannaim ve-Amoraim, vol. 3, ( Jerusalem: Kirya Neʾemana, 1964), 1232; Jacob N. Epstein, Introduction to Tannaitic Literature ( Jerusalem: Magnes, 1957), 302; Weiss, ‘Al ha-yetzira, 204; Halikhot ʻolam, 2:2, sect. 108, 31; Kelalei Shmuel, 343, p. 127. 50 B. Eruvin 53b. 51 Shulamit Valler and Shalom Razabi, Sih.ot hullin ba-Talmud ha-Bavli [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2007), 125; Valler, “Women’s Talk—Men’s Talk: Babylonian Talmud Erubin 53a–54a,” Revue des Études Juives 162, no. 3–4 (2003): 421–445. 52 For another instance of three stories arranged deliberately, see Louis Jacobs, Studies in Talmudic Logic and Methodology (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1961), 67:     “It is abundantly clear that these three stories, whatever their origin, have been placed together in this way in order to preserve the pattern of working up to a climax.” 53 In contrast to Valler and Razabi, Sih.ot hullin. 54 See above, n. 39. 55 B. Eruvin 54a–b.

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words of Torah compared to, …”56 could have been added to the homilies in the this text, they were not, because methodologically they were not compatible with another phrase found in the three homilies that were included in this sugya: “So it is the words of the Torah; the more one studies them the more relish he finds in them” (the second homily has some slight differences in this phrase, but the meaning is the same). Therefore, since from a linguistic perspective the content of the potential homilies was not compatible with the homilies in the text, they were not added to the text because the methodology utilized by the redactors was to establish a tripartite structure based on a common phrase in three homilies. In another illustration of the redactors’ selection, the method utilized in order to place a certain statement in a sugya (Amar R. Eliezer mai dekhativ ve-ʿanakim legargerotekha)57 was used by the redactors as an opportunity to add two other subsequent statements, with the aim of establishing a tripartite structure in the text. This interpretation necessarily derives from this homily’s unclear textual location (as the first in a series of homilies). This is because the first statement comes from a group of homilies on the topic of generating signs of traditions; however, the content of the first statement is different and deals with another topic—promoting the study of Torah. Thus, the topic of the first statement differs from the content of the preceding homilies on generating signs of traditions.58 Nevertheless, the redactors decided to position it as the first statement within the textual group59 (possibly due to its content as dealing indirectly with Torah—promoting the study of Torah), which explains the methodology utilized in arranging this structure so as to attach this first statement to the two following phrases, although the content of the two following statements (concerning the type of people in which Torah will not be found) differs from the content of the first one. Namely, despite the different content of the homilies, between the first statement and the second and third statements, all three statements have an identical basis: the phrase “It is not in heaven” (Deut. 30:12),60 intended to establish a tripartite structure stemming from these three statements, based on their common linguistic form. 56 Epstein, Introduction to Tannaitic Literature, 302; Weiss, ‘Al ha-yetzira, 204; Halikhot ʿolam, 2:2, sect. 108, 31; Kelalei Shmuel, sect. 343, 127. 57 B. Eruvin 54a. 58 Sheeltot de-Rab Ah.ai Gaon, Mirsky edition, vol. 1, 128. 59 Sheeltot de Rab Ah.ai Gaon, 128 60 See above, n. 39.

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In another case, the opinion of a certain sage (“Rab ruled, requires no transfer of possession”) was presented as one side of the first controversy (between Rab and Samuel) in the sugya Eitmar shitufei mevoʾot.61 Ostensibly, it should not have been presented at all, as Rab’s opinion contradicts the words of the mishna.62 Nonetheless, the redactors included his opinion, not only because of the rule “Rab is a Tanna and is privileged to differ”63 (meaning, Rab has the status of Tanna and can or may object to the mishna), but also for methodological reasons: from a formative-stylistic aspect, Rab’s arguments help maintain a linguistic balance between the various opinions (“Rab ruled, requires no transfer of possession and Samuel ruled: It does require transfer of possession”) presented in two controversies between Rab and Samuel, both in the first part (“Shituf of alleys”) and the second part (“ʻErub of Sabbath limits”) of a tripartite structure, which the redactors see as parallel. Another sugya, Baʿei R. Hamma: Shtei amot,64 contains three enquiries that are not only redundant to the text,65 but also create difficulties.66 However, the redactors decided to arrange all three enquiries in the text, because together they create a tripartite structure based on the common phrase67 “Is it permitted to move an object two cubits along a roof and two cubits along a … ?—What an enquiry,” as well as a particular hierarchy of content that links them. In our final example, in a sugya Ve-raminaho delet ha-nigreret68 three baraitot are joined together to form a tripartite structure based on the phrase “whenever they are fastened and suspended,” common to them all. In fact, this phrase69 was added to the first baraita for reasons of stylistic uniformity. Possibly, in the second baraita the phrase “whenever they are fastened and suspended” was added70 or replaced71 the phrase “[when they] have a hinge” for the same reason 61 B. Eruvin 80a. 62 M. Eruvin 7:6; Rashi, Eruvin 80a, s.v. R. Hiyya kaʾei; cf. Tosafot, Eruvin 80a, s.v. maʿasse; Judith Hauptman, “Nashim be-Massekhet Eruvin—mi-telut hevratit le-ʿatzmaut hukit,” Mada‘ei Ha-Yahadut 40 (2000): 152. 63 B. Eruvin 50b. 64 B. Eruvin 90a. 65 Geon Yaʿakov, Eruvin 90a, s.v. vehanakh. 66 Geon Yaʿakov, Eruvin 90a, s.v. baʿe i Rami bar Hamma. 67 See above, n. 39. 68 B. Eruvin 101a. 69 Saul Lieberman, Tosefta ki-fshut.a, vol. 3, 458; cf. Halivni, Sources and Traditions, 261. 70 Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 361–362 n. 90, 93. 71 Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 363 n. 104.

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of stylistic uniformity, in order to establish a tripartite structure based on the phrase “whenever they are fastened and suspended” in the three baraitot.72

2.4. The identity of the sages’ names A widespread method of redacting the sugyot is joining individual statements in a sugya based on the identity of the sages to whom these statements are attributed. For example, in the sugya Amar leh R. Hisda le-Mari breh de-R. Huna73 the second and the third homilies are both introduced as “R. H.isda stated, Mari b. Mar made the following exposition.” They are further joined to the words of the same sage in the first part of the text (“R. H.isda stated”) in order to establish a tripartite structure. Some of the commentators already discerned this phenomenon and described the redactors’ method in the following way: Where Mari b. Mar is mentioned here in the entire matter [in the text], and for this reason they brought [the redactors brought both homilies in his name] in this sugya—because R. Hisda said them in the name of Mari [b. Mar] … As if we do not say so, what is the role of these homilies within the text, that is, why were they brought in the text.74

Other commentators voiced similar suggestions: The words “R. Hisda stated, Mari b. Mar made the following exposition” [were brought in the text] due to the identity [of the names] to the name of Mari son of R. Huna [mentioned] previously above, [for this reason] his homily was brought next to [or joined to] that of the previous speaker.75 … And if we do not say so, these statements [of the second and third part] do not belong here [in the text], rather only if as we wrote [these statements] were brought incidentally by reason of the [previous] statement above of “Said R. Hisda to Mari son of R. Huna the son of R. Jeremiah b. Abba.”76 72 73 74 75 76

See above, n. 39. B. Eruvin 21a–b. Rafaelo Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei sofrim, Jerusalem: Maʻayan ha-hokhma, 1960), 72 n. 70. Mitzur ha-devash, Eruvin 21a. Minh.at zikaron, Eruvin 21a, s.v. amar R. Hisda.

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From a methodological perspective, the redactors sought to establish a tripartite structure based on the identity of the sages’ names in the phrases: “R. H.isda” and “R. H.isda stated, Mari b. Mar made the following exposition.” For this reason, they did not bring another, fourth homily (assuming that they knew of such a homily resembling the other homilies that they knew and brought here in the text) in the same name: “R. H.isda stated, Mari b. Mar made the following exposition.”77 In another example, the redactors added a third statement to the sugya Amar R. Nah.man amar Samuel: Yatza le-daʿat78 based on methodological considerations due to an identical name of the sage which appears in the two previous statements. The commentators agree with this interpretation, as evident from their words: “They copied [redacted in the text] the controversy of R. Nah.man in the name of Samuel and R. Huna for several reasons. One [the first] is because [the name of] R. Nah.man in the name of Samuel [had already been mentioned] previously.”79 The commentators clearly indicate that one of the reasons for joining the third statement to the two previous statements is that the name of that sage had been mentioned previously, in the second statement (or maybe the first statement), similar to the third statement that mentioned the name of the same sage: “R. Nah.man further stated in the name of Samuel.” In other words, methodologically, if the name of a certain sage was mentioned in the text previously, and there is another statement (or statements) in the name of that sage—the redactors will explore whether and how to join these statements together. For example, in our case, they joined the third statement to the first two following their decision to establish a tripartite structure based on the identical name of the sage.80 In another place, the identical name of the sage in the tripartite structure is manifested in the phrase used to present a question. A certain question (which is in fact the first of the three questions of Rabbah from R. Huna) was brought in the sugya Amar Rabbah ki havenan bei R. Huna81 due to its content-based association with the topic of the mishna. However, the second question brought in the name of Rabbah from R. Huna, and the third question, also 77 B. Sanhedrin 38a; Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 73 n. 31. 78 B. Eruvin 41b–42a. 79 Yosef Z. Dinner, Hagahot ʻal Massekhet Eruvin, Beitza ve-Sukkah, Bavli ve-Yerushalmi [Hebrew], vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Slobotzky, 1896), 40, s.v. ve-amar R. Nah.man. 80 See above, n. 56. 81 B. Eruvin 40a–41b.

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in the name of Rabbah from R. Huna, are redundant, because there is no content-based motive or any other evident reason for including them in the text. The redactors’ decision to join the two questions (the second and third) to the first question proclaims their intention to create a tripartite structure characterized by the identical name of the sage and the phrase used to present the question: “Rabbah stated: When we were at R. Huna’s we raised the following question.” This method is a customary technique utilized by redactors. No wonder that it was also noted by various commentators, for example: “[The redactors of] the Gemara [the Talmud] are accustomed [to utilize a methodology of] arranging together sayings [such as questions] by a single sage although they have no connection to each other,”82 and also: “The arrangement [redaction] in which the [redactor of] the Gemara [the Talmud] arranges [redacts] sayings [different matters, for instance questions] [said] by one amora, although they have no connection to each other … and also the [methodological technique] utilized in the entire Gemara [the Talmud].”83 This method has also been discussed by the modern scholars: “The phrase ‘And said R. so-and-so’ in the Babylonian Talmud, i.e., that the person learning linked here, as he was wont, several different things only as a result of the name of the speaker” (the words ‘name of the speaker’ are emphasized in the original).84 Meaning, the phrase “And said R. so-and-so” in the Babylonian Talmud, as presented in the sugya, takes this form because the person who learned it added other similar expressions in one location, despite their different contents, as a methodological technique, due to the identical name of the person who said them. Another scholar describes this method in the following words: “Three statements … bearing a stamp of a separate uniform literary unit by reason of the name.”85 In other words, three statements were brought in the sugya as a methodological technique only because they have a literary uniformity characterized by the identity of the speaking sage’s name. This method is also utilized with regard to the lexical expansion of explanations brought in the name of the same sage. For example, in the sugya Amar Rabbah mai taʿama de-Rav86 two explanations brought in the name of the same sage, “Rabbah said,” were joined with a third statement that included his words 82 Halikhot ʿolam, 2:2, sect. 108, 31. 83 Kelalei Shmuel, 343, p. 127. 84 Epstein, Introduction to Tannaitic Literature, 302. 85 Weiss, ‘Al ha-yetzira, 204. 86 B. Eruvin 50a.

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and the term gufa (meaning, “turning to the main text stated above”), as the redactors created a tripartite structure based on the identical name of the sage. The commentators noticed this phenomenon as well and alluded to it as follows: I have seen again in the commentary of the R. N. (R. Nissim Gerondi, fourteenth century AD, Spain] … who explains this expression [gufa] and said: “for what we term [bring or cite statements in the sugya using the term gufa,] and even when the words brought [under the term gufa] do not say anything new, [they were nonetheless brought] because seeing as [the redactors] needed to bring these [two] statements by Raba [brought previously], they brought this [third statement in the name of Raba] once again as well.”87

This commentary refers to a sugya in Tractate Hullin,88 where one of Raba’s statements was introduced with the term gufa, so that a formative-stylistic structure of seven statements was formed.89 The methodological rule mentioned by the commentators above led to the following rule cited subsequently: “And from this you shall learn—in any place that you shall find [the term] gufa, if it does not bring something new [with regard to the issue brought under the term gufa] then the [redactors’] intention is to group together all the laws [or statements] said by [that sage who is] the speaker of the statements.”90 According to this commentator, it is possible to apply this interpretation to the sugya in Tractate Eruvin as well. The words of the sage, “Rabbah said” introduced for the third time in the sugya in Tractate Eruvin using the term gufa constitute no innovation.91 They are, in fact, a verbal repetition of the previous explanation, also introduced by “Rabbah said.” Nonetheless, they were added to the sugya as a third statement, because this sugya already contained two explanations with the words “Rabbah said.” The redactors brought the words “Rabbah said” again, a third time, using the term gufa as a way of establishing a tripartite structure based on the identical name of the sage. 87 88 89 90 91

Halikhot ʿolam, 2:1, 19. B. Hullin 46b–47a. Kelalei Shmuel, sect. 77, p. 33. Kelalei Shmuel, p. 33. Chanoch Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud, Babli and Yerushalmi [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1969), 656; Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 213 n. 10.

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In another place, in the sugya De-amar Samuel lo shanu,92 the expression “Samuel stated” (or “Samuel further stated”) appears three times in three statements in the name of the Amora Samuel (although the second and the third statement have a different order of words).93 The linguistic lengthiness of the expressions “Samuel stated” (or “Samuel further stated”) and the difficulties with regard to the three statements in the name of Samuel, derive from the redactors’ decision to nonetheless establish a tripartite structure for the phrase “This was learnt only in respect of a … but … acquire possession”94 in the three statements in light of the identical name of the sage.95 The method of joining statements with identical sages’ names to form a tripartite structure is also used for a group of sages, as in the following example. A first statement brought in the name of the Elders of Pumbeditha in the sugya Amar Rava hanei tartei milei96 methodologically led to the joining of two additional statements in the name of the Elders of Pumbeditha.97 Lexically, the joining is marked by the phrase “The following ruling also was given by the elders of Pumbeditha,”98 which appears in the last two statements, although they have no actual association with the first statement and no connection to matters of ʿeruvin. The redactors only used this method to establish a tripartite structure based on the identical names of the group of sages called “the Elders of Pumbeditha.” In fact, if the redactors had seen this specific text as a general place for gathering all the statements said in the name of the Elders of Pumbeditha, they would have had to mention other instances as well.99 But they did not do so because their intention was to present only three statements together in a tripartite structure joined by the identical name of the Elders of Pumbeditha.

2.5. Inessential material The consideration of establishing a tripartite structure sometimes led to inclusion of inessential material in the sugyot. At times, this is the sole explanation for the existence of such material in some sugyot. 92 B. Eruvin 81b. 93 Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 325 n. 11. 94 See above, n. 39. 95 See above, n. 56. 96 B. Eruvin 79b–80a. 97 See above, n. 56. 98 See above, n. 39. 99 B. Pesah.im 117b; Yad Eliahu, Eruvin 79b.

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As an example of this method of redaction, consider the sugya Ve-amai, hu bemakom eh.ad.100 This sugya encompasses two explanations. The first and second explanations were not accepted as responses to the opening question “But why? Is not this a case where he101 is in one place and his ʻerub is in another?” due to the difficulties they entailed. Assumedly, they were inessential for the text and the redactors had no reason to bring them to (or leave them in) the text. But nonetheless, they remained and joined the third explanation that was accepted as a response to the opening question. All this, because the redactors added the two explanations that were not accepted as responses to the third explanation that was accepted, in order to establish a tripartite structure based on these three explanations. The scholarly explanation is that “the approach of the Talmuds—[the Babylonian Talmud] is different [than that of the Yerushalmi Talmud].”102 To give another illustration, in the sugya Hekhei damei tefissat yad, three examples are given on the issue of “a holding” (related to the matter of “an object that may be handled on the Sabbath [and to which] the tenant imposes restrictions”).103 The third example is of a general nature and in fact it also encompasses the two preceding individual examples of “a holding.” Therefore, the two first examples are inessential in the text and the two individual examples preceding the third general example were not necessary,104 as the redactors could have made do with only the third, general example. Corroborating evidence is that in a parallel sugya in another place only this one example is cited: “What is one to understand by a holding? [An] object that may not be handled on the Sabbath the tenant imposes no restrictions.”105 But although not essential, the two previous individual examples remained in the text, because the redactors did not make do with the one general example as they wished to establish a tripartite structure based on three examples of “a holding.” Similarly, three controversies between Rab and Samuel on various topics were brought in the sugya Gagin hashavin le-R. Meir,106 although they are not essential for the text due to the general difficulties involved in each. In the 100 B. Eruvin 34b–35a. 101 Epstein, The Babylonian Talmud, ʻErubin, 236 n. 8: “The man for whom the ʻerub was prepared.” 102 Abraham Goldberg, The Mishna Treatise Eruvin [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Magnes, 1986), 75. 103 B. Eruvin 85b–86a. 104 Shem mi-Shimeon, Eruvin 86a; Beʾer Yitzh.ak, sect. 21, 43. 105 Alfassi zuta, Eruvin 86a. 106 B. Eruvin 90a–b.

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first controversy, there are doubts and uncertainty regarding Rab and Samuel’s halakhic rulings on the topic under discussion.107 The second controversy is unnecessary or fictitious (because Samuel concedes that the halakha is in agreement with the opinion of Rab108 and retracts his words,109 so that there is, in fact, no controversy between Rab and Samuel at all). Concerning the third controversy, its place does not suit the topic discussed in the text.110 Moreover, according to the words of R. Ah.a son of Raba in the sugya, here Samuel also says that the halakha follows Rab and invalidates this third controversy as well. Nonetheless, although these three controversies are not essential, they were brought in the text for methodological reasons in order to establish a tripartite structure based on Rab and Samuel’s consistent halakhic approach: “Rab ruled: It is permissible to move objects about throughout its area and Samuel ruled: Objects may be moved only within four cubits.”

2.6. Some unique redactions This section will cover some interesting and very specific phenomena. For example, it is possible to discern a unique redaction in the sugya Amar Rabbah ki havenan bei R. Huna111 (“Rabbah stated: When we were at R. Huna’s we raised the following question”), where three questions transmitted in the name of Rabbah from R. Huna conclude with a double ending on the same issue at the end of each of the three instances of give-and-take. The double ending in the first question is: “R. H.isda replied: [The mention of] one ‘memorial’ suffices for both. So also ruled Rabbah: [The mention of] one ‘memorial’ is sufficient for both.”112 The double ending in the second question is: “And the law is that the benediction on the season is to be recited both on the New Year festival and the Day of Atonement. And the law, furthermore, is that the benediction on the season may be said even in the street.”113 The double ending in the third question is: “In view of Mar Zut.ra’s exposition in the name of R. Huna that the halachah is that one fasting [on Sabbath eve] must complete the fast … Mar Zut.ra made the following exposition in the name of 107 Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 345–347. 108 B. Eruvin 90b; Alfassi zuta, Eruvin, 102. 109 Tosafot, Eruvin 43a, s.v. ki pligei; Hidushei ha-Rashba, Eruvin, 561. 110 R. Hananel ben Samuel, Eruvin, 550. 111 B. Eruvin 40a–41b. 112 B. Eruvin 40b. 113 B. Eruvin 40b

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R. Huna: The halacha is [that those] fasting [on a Sabbath eve] must complete the fast.”114 This double ending, designed by the redactors, is unique. It stems from considerations of formative-stylistic uniformity aimed at establishing a tripartite structure based on these three questions. To give another example, the sugya R. Jacob ve-R. Zerika ʾamru: Halakha115 presents three statements. Each statement encompasses three halakhic rules (aside from the third statement, in which the third rule is missing, and although its lack was presented as a difficulty in the sugya it may have originally existed) in tripartite structure with a unique “three of three” form.116 From a methodological perspective, the redactors established a tripartite structure with the unique “three of three” form, meaning that each of the three statements includes three halakhic rules (with the exception of one rule in the third statement, as stated). To give yet another example, the sugya Amar Rabbah … Kotel she-bein shtei hatzerot117 contains three statements in the name of Abaye and then another three statements introduced as “R. Nah.man citing Rabbah b. Abbuha” (or “R. Nah.man further stated in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha”). The redactors made a unique decision here: within one sugya, they established a second tripartite structure immediately following the first triad. The consecutive first and second tripartite structures are intended to emphasize the content of the first triad. The importance of this tripartite structure is proven by the fact that this triad comes first, even though it includes a certain statement in the name of Abaye, an Amora from a later period than R. Nah.man, whose name appears in the second tripartite structure and who preceded Abaye chronologically.118 The unique methodology utilized by the redactors in this case was giving priority to establishing a second tripartite structure in the name of R. Nah.man, and maintaining continuity and consistency as the more ancient sage’s name was repeated within the second tripartite structure, over maintaining the chronological order. The redactors brought the statement of Abaye before that of the older sage (“R. Nah.man further stated in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha”)— even if this created chronological disorder.

114 B. Eruvin 41b. 115 B. Eruvin 46b. 116 Friedman, Critical Study, 42–43; Zur, “‘Eitzuv kelalei.” 117 B. Eruvin 77a–b. 118 Zur, “Mivneh meshulash.”

The Methodology Utilized in the Redaction of the Tripartite Structure of Sugyot

In other words, the redactors gave preference to establishing a second tripartite structure based on the name of a sage from an earlier period, even though his words are arranged in the text after the statement of a later sage, over maintaining the chronological order—arranging statements in the name of Amoraim by their chronological period (as stated, bringing the words of the later Abaye before the words of R. Nah.man, who preceded Abaye in time). As a consequence, the second tripartite structure (Ve-amar R. Nah.man: Sulam sheshlivotav porh.ot)119 comes as an addition after the first tripartite structure that appears previously120 in the same text. Here, the unique method utilized by the redactors is the establishment of a double tripartite structure or one structure with a “three after three” form. For another sugya (Amar R. Joh.anan: Halon ʻagol) from Tractate Eruvin,121 a similar give-and-take is found in Tractate Sukkah.122 It appears that three problems in the give-and-take in Tractate Eruvin are a later addition brought from Tractate Sukkah.123 The unique decision to transfer these three problems from Tractate Sukkah to Tractate Eruvin is aimed at establishing a tripartite structure in the give-and-take that notes those “manners of calculation.”124 This is in regard to the statement of R. Joh.anan in Eruvin by later redactors who, “in a Talmudic style of give-and-take,”125 transferred those “manners of calculation” from the give-and-take concerning “Sukkah [of round shape] like a furnace” in Tractate Sukkah to Tractate Eruvin so as to establish a tripartite structure based on these three difficulties. Another sugya (Rabina sar sakina be-Bavel)126 portrays the special methodological phenomenon of chaining between three stories.127 Chaining is manifested here as various features that link one story to the other or as similarities between certain features in the first and the second stories (for example, the name of Rabina and issue of checking the knife) and between the second and the third stories (random arrival in a certain place—“once visited,” the issue of checking the knife, and use of the phrase “Raba said: A young scholar may 119 B. Eruvin 77b–78a. 120 B. Eruvin 77a–b. 121 B. Eruvin 76a–b. 122 B. Sukkah 7b–8b. 123 Noah Aminoah, The Redaction of the Tractate Sukkah and Moed-Katan in the Babylonian Talmud [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1988), 175–176. 124 Aminoah, The Redaction of the Tractate Sukkah, 176. 125 Ibid. 126 B. Eruvin 63a. 127 Zur, The Tripartite Structure, 250–255.

119

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Redaction

examine his own knife”). Chaining works by repetition128 of some of these features or the existence of the same features in the three stories. This unique chaining methodology unites several stories as having a formative-stylistic connection, and together they form a tripartite structure. A final example that can be noted in the sugya Amar R. Judah amar Samuel: Halakha ke-R. Eliezer b. Jacob is the redaction of three rulings (“halakha,” “custom,” or “the public act”)129 that are parallel130 (or have a level of validity graded from the most strict—“halakha” to the most lenient—“the public act”),131 are utilized as a unique base for the establishment of a tripartite structure aimed at indicating that in each case (whether “halakha,” or “custom,” or “the public act”) the ruling must follow the opinion of the sage mentioned through all these three terms. In this sugya, the ruling follows R. Eliezer b. Jacob who contradicts R. Meir. The redactors here used a unique technique intended to prevent the possibility that the halakhic ruling would follow the other sage—R. Meir, as could have happened if the redactors had not used this unique methodology, because R. Meir is a sage ranked higher than R. Eliezer b. Jacob, the sage with whom the redactors sided halakhically.132 Notably, in this sugya, the combination of the three terms (“halakha,” “custom,” and “the public act”), indeed, influenced the Poskim to make the halakhic decision following the opinion of R. Eliezer B. Jacob. But in two other sugyot133 this technique was not effective for various reasons.134

3. SUMMARY Tractate Eruvin includes forty sugyot that utilize a proven tripartite structure, while other sugyot in the tractate have a visible tripartite structure that cannot be proven. In other words, the tripartite structure in the latter sugyot is externally evident, for instance, in the following example from B. Eruvin 14a–b. 128 Asher E. Rivlin, Munah.on le-sifrut [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1998), 64. 129 B. Eruvin 62b. 130 Noah Aminoah, The Redaction of the Tractate Betza Rosh-Hashana and Taʿanith in the Babylonian Talmud [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University), 309. 131 Rashi, Eruvin 62b, s.v. halakha. 132 Uri Zur, “Haz. eruf ʻhalakha,’ ʻminhag,’ ʻnahagu ha-ʿam’ ke-derech le-kviʿat halakha,” Shaʾanan 12 (2007): 83–110. 133 B. Eruvin 72a; B. Taʻanit 26b. 134 Zur, “Haz. eruf.”

The Methodology Utilized in the Redaction of the Tripartite Structure of Sugyot

1. R. H.iyya taught: The sea that Solomon made … but consider: How much is the ritual bath. 2. The sea that Solomon made … but consider: By how much does a square exceed that of a circle. 3. Rami b. Ezekiel learned that the sea that Solomon made … now how much is a bath. The words used in the sugya emphasize the recurring similarities, but methodically, this format finds no support in different versions, in the commentaries, or in scholarly research. Research on the tripartite structure in Tractate Eruvin is not unique, and this tractate was chosen without specific concern for the occurrence of the tripartite structure specifically here as opposed to other tractates—it was simply selected as a choice of what to analyze. No similar research has been systematically carried out in entire tractates, with the exception of Tractate Eruvin, and only selected chapters have been subjected to such inquiries. In this respect, research of the tripartite structure could focus on other tractates as well. This would make it possible to examine the prevalence of the tripartite structure in other tractates in comparison to Tractate Eruvin and to check whether the amount or characteristics of the tripartite structures in Tractate Eruvin are different from other tractates. In this chapter, we presented six methods used to redact the tripartite structures in sugyot from Tractate Eruvin in the Babylonian Talmud. The first part deals with the methodology of distinction and separation and includes various examples of this method with regard to problems and replies, statements or questions, proofs, and tannaitic sources. The second part deals with the methodology of avoiding inclusion of material that could have potentially been added to the sugyot but were not, for various reasons. This method is demonstrated by analyzing problems and replies, controversies, various additions, premises or possibilities, discussions of halakhic rules, which were not included in the sugyot, and noting significant differences. The third part deals with the questions of language and style. In this part, we offered various examples pertaining to linguistic issues, such as linguistic glosses, lexical and grammatical repetitions, formative-stylistic design, identical or shared phrases, and linguistic balance. The fourth part deals with the methodology of identical names of the sages. To explain this method, we presented various examples that refer to

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Redaction

joining sugyot with the identical name of the sage and one example that refers to the repetition of the name of a group of sages. The fifth part deals with inessential material in the sugyot. We demonstrated how this method works by presenting examples of statements and phrases that are not essential to the logic of the sugyot as well as possibilities and controversies that are not essential. The sixth part deals with some unique redactions in the sugyot. In this part, we explored a double ending, the “three of three” style, a double or a “three after three” tripartite structure, transferring the same “manners of calculation” from a sugya in Tractate Sukkah to a sugya in Tractate Eruvin, the chaining of components that link three stories, and the redaction of three parallel rulings or rulings that have a graded significance, in order to ensure that the ruling follows a certain sage. Notably, other methodological techniques are also used in the redaction of sugyot in Tractate Eruvin. Various examples that illustrate these techniques may be given. There are also other varied phenomena in the sugyot of Tractate Eruvin that should be explored and studied.

CHAPTER 10

Land Surveying Tube in Early Judaism* 1. RABBAN GAMALIEL’S TUBE B. Eruvin 41b states: Once [on a Sabbath eve] they did not enter the harbor until dusk.1 “May we disembark?”2 they asked R. Gamaliel. “You may”, he told them, “for I3 have carefully observed [the distance from the shore and have ascertained] that before dusk we were already within the Sabbath limit”.4 [Epstein edition]

B. Eruvin 43b addresses this account and offers the following baraita: A Tanna taught: R. Gamaliel had a tube through which he could see at a distance of two thousand cubits across the land and a corresponding distance across the sea. If a man desires to ascertain the depth of a ravine let him use a tube and by looking through it be in a position to ascertain the depth of a ravine. [Epstein edition]

The Yerushalmi also refers to Rabban Gamaliel’s tube in the following passage: Rabban Gamaliel had a tube for measuring distances, through which he could take a visual citing of the distance on a plane. [Neusner edition]

* 1 2 3 4

This chapter was written together with Dr. Yehudah Ashkenazi, Department of Mathematics, Ariel University. When the Sabbath had already set in. Lit. “what (about) us to go down.” By means of a certain instrument. Of the harbor.

126

Halakha

According to Bavli, Eruvin 43b the Baraita describes a special tube belonging to Rabban Gamaliel, which he used to measure distances of up to two thousand cubits on a plane and the depth of ravines. With this tube, he could also measure angles, or at least set the tube at a specific angle to measure distances using congruent triangles. Notably, in Rabban Gamaliel’s period, optical lenses were not in use. Instead, a hollow tube was adapted to allow the measurement of a fixed distance. There are diverse opinions on how this tube was used to measure distance, depth, and height.5 Although the method of measurement presented in the Bavli is not clear, very few sages have conducted a thorough study or interpretation of this measurement method. Some have understood the method on the basis of their own contemporary mathematical knowledge, while others just laconically quoted their predecessors without understanding the earlier sages’ explanations. In the following we address the measurement methods of the geonic sages and their subsequent interpreters and assess the methods they propose.

2. THE GEONIC METHOD OF MEASUREMENT The first method we address dates from the geonic period and is attributed to R. Haye Gaon, a tenth-century scholar. This method appears in the volume Otzar ha-Gaonim on Tractate Eruvin: “… what one deducts from the slope is added to the measure that is viewed …”6 [author’s translation]. This account begins with an explanation of how to measure distances on a plane using a tube. The principle is that the closer the tube is pointed towards the earth, the shorter the distance the tube commands. R. Haye Gaon continues: And if one wishes to retain that slope, to ensure that one does not err when using it, one should make a round tablet of copper or wood using the conventional manner used … by those called stargazers, who make an astrolabe out of a round tablet, and one nails the tube to the center using a nail, and rotates the tube on its axis … and one marks the place indicated by the tube, and when viewing this place, one will not err.

5 See Mauricio Bubis, “Medidat ha-merh.akim be-tkufat ha-Mishna ve-ha-Talmud,” Korot 7 (1980): 816–839, on how the tube was made or constructed. 6 Otzar ha-Gaonim, Eruvin Tractate [Hebrew], vol. 3, ed. Binyamin M. Levin ( Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Press, 1930), 38–41; see Responses of the Geonim [Hebrew], ed. Abraham E. Harkavy (Berlin: Itzkowski, 1887), sect. 58, 10–11.

Land Surveying Tube in Early Judaism

Figure 1.  The tube commands a shorter distance as the angle relative to the horizon increases.

The geonic method proposes to use a shaft to fix the tube to a round disc which is marked with the distances that the tube commands (see Figure 1). Such a disc of angles had already featured in much earlier measurement methods, in an instrument known as the astrolabe.7 This instrument, invented by astronomers around 200 BCE, was originally used to observe the position of celestial bodies by pointing the instrument to the horizon at a predetermined angle. The astrolabe was later used for sea navigation. Navigators determined their latitudinal position by measuring the angle between the horizon and a known star. R. Haye Gaon emphasizes that the main objective of the tube was to measure the Sabbath limit, which is 2000 cubits, by the majority of opinions.8 He elaborated: And indeed, we apply this method to Sabbath limits; we elevate the tube to the height of a person who is four cubits high and use it to view a distance of two thousand cubits; then how does he do this? [He calculates] that four cubits are equal to one five hundredth of two thousand cubits. So, on the earth or on paper, he marks a khir which is called a khot,9 whose height is one finger, and he draws a line underneath it as a base,10 the width of which is five hundred fingers.   7 See Kli nechoshet le-ha-Rabaʻa, ( Jerusalem: Makor, 1970), 7–47; Perush ha-mishnayot le-ha-Rambam, M. Eruvin 4:2. Note on the tool and the method of its use, see Tony Lévy and Charles Burnett, “Sefer ha-Middot: A Mid-Twelfth Century Text on Arithmetic and Geometry Attributed to Abraham ibn Ezra,” Aleph 6 (2006): 57–238, sect. 7. On the geonic ability to understand the use of the astrolabe for measurement purposes see Solomon Gandz, “The Astrolabe in Jewish Literature,” HUCA 4 (1927): 469–486.   8 B. Sotah 27b.   9 Otzar ha-Gaonim, 40 n. 3: “line”; Gad B. Sarfatti, Mathematical Terminology in Hebrew Scientific Literature of the Middle Ages [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Magnes, 1968), 47–48: “chot” (“notches”). On 49, he notes that the words khir and hayil were innovations of the geonim and were used for a brief period only. 10 Otzar ha-Gaonim, 40 n. 2: “base”; Sarfatti, Mathematical Terminology, 45–46: “[Kan]—the biblical word that is also used in the Mishna—means the base of a triangle.”

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Halakha α α

4 cubits 2000 cubits

1 cubit

500

Figure 2.  Measuring 2000 cubits using congruent triangles.

The geonim used the principle of congruent triangles to measure 2000 cubits. Since the average height of a man is approximately 4 cubits, and the aim was to measure a distance of 2000 cubits, the ratio between the height of the measuring individual and the distance to be measured was 1:500. If we draw a right-angled triangle where the ratio of its sides is 1:500, the angle we obtain is the angle at which observers of average height should hold the tube to the ground, if they wish to measure a distance of 2000 cubits (see Figure 2). R. Haye Gaon further states: One makes a round tablet... divides it into 360 notches11 like the spokes on a wheel; one divides the same tablet into 2000 parts12 corresponding to the [distance of] 2000 cubits one wishes to view.

According to the geonic method, a “pie chart” can be prepared in advance, marking different angles, similar to the astrolabe used by stargazers. They used a disc that was divided into 360 equal portions, each representing one degree. The geonim suggested dividing the plate into 2000 parts, corresponding to the 2000 cubits they wished to measure. This suggestion is not very suitable, because dividing the circle into 2000 equal parts, similar to dividing a circle into 360 degrees, will not create the required effect. The geonim may have intended to mark 2000 lines that were not necessarily of equal distance from each other, allowing the observer to measure the distance of an object by measuring the angle at which he holds the tube to the ground (see Figure 3). It is also clear that all the marks would be in one quarter of the circle, that is, either the right or left bottom quarter. 11 Otzar ha-Gaonim, 41 n. 2: maʿalah, see n. 9 above on hayil. 12 Sarfatti, Mathematical Terminology, 49: “not necessarily meaning ‘up’ but rather some type of division.”

Land Surveying Tube in Early Judaism

2000 cubits

500 cubits

4 cubits

500cubits

Figure 3.

2000

R. Haye Gaon comments: And in the matter of the individual who wishes to ascertain the depth of a ravine … it is not the same as the method proposed by the sages who taught us to bring a tube and view the land and know the depth of a ravine. It is impossible to infer the depth of a ravine in this manner. But, when the ravine has a correct slope [90°] and when the individual stands at the brink of the ravine and tilts and turns his head toward the slope, without moving from his position, and looks through the tube to see how many measures of distance extend to the bottom of the ravine and how many extend to the bottom of the slope, he calculates and ascertains the depth.

The geonim express some reservations about the simplicity of the sages’ argument in B. Eruvin 43b that depth of ravines can be measured using exactly the same method as above. The geonim note that the former method may be applied to the case of a ravine only if the ravine has a specific incline; otherwise, it is impossible to use this method. According to our understanding, the geonim are referring to a vertical incline. In this case, the observer holds the tube horizontally (when he stands at a distance from the brink of the ravine that is equal to the height at which he holds the tube from the ground). Then, the observer focuses on a point at the bottom of the ravine on the slope that is directly beneath the brink near which he is standing. The measurement of the depth is then exactly identical to the measurement of a distance on a plane (see Figure 4).

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Halakha

E A

C D

B

Ravine slope

B Figure 4.  Ravine depth CB is equal to the distance DB if angle DEB equals angle CAB.

In conclusion, R. Haye Gaon addresses an additional matter: However, to ascertain the width of a ravine using a tube … [one] tilts the tube from this bank of the ravine until one sees the other bank, and one returns one’s face to the land, all the while retaining the same angle of the tube, and one views the site that appears in the tube, and another person walks and marks that site, and then returns and measures the distance of the site on the land which is equivalent to the width of the ravine or the river.

The geonim proposed the following method to measure the width of a ravine: while standing at the brink of the ravine, looking towards the opposite brink, the tube remains at the same angle while the observer swivels around so that the tube commands a distance on a plane. A second individual marks this point on the ground, assisted by the measurer’s instructions. Now all that remains is to measure the distance between the observer and this marked distance on the plane, which is relatively simple (especially if a tube is attached to the disc). This distance is the width of the ravine. The text also notes that the same method can be used to measure the width of rivers. This method of measuring a ravine width is dependent on the assumption that both brinks are of identical height.

3. R. HANANEL’S METHOD R. Hananel13 argues that Rabban Gamaliel actually knew how to estimate distances on land and at sea using the tube. R. Hananel does not specify how 13 B. Eruvin 43b.

Land Surveying Tube in Early Judaism

Rabban Gamaliel did this. He believes that Rabban Gamaliel used the same method for measuring distances on land as for measuring distances at sea. The principle underlying R. Hananel’s method is that once a distance of 2000 cubits on land is measured using any method, and this distance is marked on a tube, then the tube can simply be turned in the direction of the sea, and this mark can be used to identify a distance of 2000 cubits. Apparently, R. Hananel recalls the geonic method, in other words, marking the angle to the horizon at which the object (which is at the required distance) is observed. He suggests measuring the depth of a ravine using a similar technique, but in the reverse order. First, the tube is pointed at the bottom of the ravine (preferably when lying down at the edge of the ravine and pointing it at the bottom of the ravine wall closest to the measurer (see Figure 4). Then the individual measures this distance on a plane, maintaining the angle to the horizon and measuring the distance from his own position to that point on the plane that is indicated by the mark on the tube. R. Hananel assumes that this distance can be measured easily, and it represents the depth of the ravine. In effect, R. Hananel’s method supports the geonic method.

4. RASHI’S METHOD According to Rashi,14 different fixed distances can be measured using a tube that can be extended and contracted, or several tubes of varying fixed lengths. The shorter the tube, the greater the distance it commands. Rabban Gamaliel had a tube of fixed length that commanded a distance of 2000 cubits. According to Rashi, if, for example, a certain tube is suitable for measuring a distance of 500 cubits, we can measure this distance (of 500 cubits) from a specific object in the following manner: as we focus on this object and walk away from it, we will be at a distance of 500 cubits from the object when we can no longer view the object in the tube. To measure the depth of a ravine, Rashi suggests to first measure a specific distance on a plane by focusing the tube on this point in the distance. Rashi apparently meant that the individual could prepare a large number of tubes in advance, with each appropriate for measuring a different, fixed distance (or the individual could mark numerous distances on a tube that could be extended and contracted). Then the observer stands on the edge of the ravine and points the tube to the bottom of the ravine. If the individual had prepared a large number of tubes 14 Rashi, Eruvin 43b, s.v, kama omko.

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Halakha

in advance, Rashi assumes that one of these tubes would be suitable for measuring the depth of the ravine. The observer may be required to take several steps backwards to adapt the tubes to the conditions of the site. Rashi argues that, at that point, the depth of the ravine plus the distance the observer stepped from the brink equals the previously measured distance on the plane, allowing the observer to calculate the depth of the ravine. Rashi’s conclusion is not mathematically accurate. Still, since he assumed that the steps taken backwards would be limited in number (otherwise, the edge of the ravine would obstruct the view of the ravine bottom), the method should provide a good approximation of the ravine’s depth. The imprecision of this method, which also stems from the imprecision of the instrument used, results in an approximation rather than an exact measurement of the distance. Rashi’s method for measuring distance was based on the principle that the shorter the tube, the longer the distances that can be measured, in contrast to the geonim who argued that, in principle, the tube could be used to look toward infinity when held horizontally, had human limitations of sight not existed.

5. TORAT HAIM (INTERPRETATION OF RASHI) R. Abraham H. Schor, the author of Torat Haim,15 directs our attention to the fact that according to the text Rabban Gamaliel could use the tube equally to measure 2000 cubits on land or 2000 cubits on sea. However, on land, he could measure 2000 cubits by a number of means, and he could use the measurement results on land to measure at sea, where other methods could not be used (see above, the section on R. Hananel). R. Schor infers from this method to the method used to measure the depth of a ravine. The tube should first be focused on the bottom of the ravine by extending or contracting it to allow a view of a distance that equals the depth of the valley, and only then should the distance on the plane be measured using this focus. This would be the depth of the ravine. R. Schor rejects Rashi’s reverse order of measurements. His sequence is preferable in the event that Rabban Gamaliel used a tube that can be extended and contracted. However, Rashi’s order is preferable if Rabban Gamaliel used tubes of fixed lengths, with which fixed distances could be measured. The author of Torat Haim points to a problem that exists, in his opinion, in Rashi’s method: If the observer takes several steps backwards, he will not be 15 Torat Haim, Eruvin 43b, s.v. u-kenegda.

Land Surveying Tube in Early Judaism

able to view the bottom of the ravine, because the edge of the ravine wall will obstruct his view. In other words, according to Torat Haim, the problem with Rashi’s method is that the depth of the ravine must be rather precisely estimated in advance, otherwise this method will fail. He also comments on the mathematical imprecision of Rashi’s method. Although he is correct, it should be noted that Rashi’s mathematical imprecision leads to less of a deviation from the correct distance than that which is caused by the imprecise instruments Rashi uses.

6. BEN YEHOYADAʿ (ON TORAT HAIM AND RASHI) Ben Yehoyadaʿ16 offered a different interpretation of Rashi’s explanation. An individual can stand on the brink of a ravine and look at a fixed point on the bottom of the ravine using the tube. The tube should be adapted to measure a distance that is known in advance and exceeds the depth of the ravine. At that point, the individual walks backwards along the brink, all the while continuing to look at that point, until the point is no longer in sight. At this point, the distance between the observer’s location and the point of observation at the bottom of the ravine is equal to the distance measured by the tube. Ben Yehoyadaʿ, however, adds a remark that is mathematically incorrect. He says that if the individual subtracts the distance he walked on the brink from the measured distance, he will obtain the depth of the ravine. In this case, the error is not as significant as it is in the case of Rashi’s method. Ben Yehoyadaʿ’s mathematical insights are imprecise, yet he expresses a fine concept, which is explained with the help of Figure 5: 2nd observaon Legend

y

Ravine walls

x

Brink z

Figure 5. 16 Ben Yehoyadaʿ, Eruvin 43b, s.v. mevi shefoferet.

1st observaon h

133

134

Halakha

Let us mark the ravine depth as h, the aerial distance between the first observation point and the fixed point at the bottom of the ravine as z, the distance between the second observation point and the first observation point on the brink as y, and the aerial distance between the second observation point and the fixed point at the bottom of the ravine as x. The triangle whose sides are x, y, and z is a right-angled triangle, with a right angle between y and z. According to the Pythagorean theorem, z2 = x2 – y2. If the fixed point is very close to the brink on which the observer is located, z is a very good approximation of h. Ben Yehoyadaʿ concludes by repeating his description in order to persuade his readers that this was Rashi’s intention. He notes that the reason he elaborates on his interpretation of Rashi is because even a genius such as R. Schor misconstrued Rashi.

7. R. ISHMAʿEL BEN HAKHMON’S METHOD According to R. Ishmaʿel ben Hakhmon,17 the basic recurring assumption is that the ravine is rectangular and that both brinks are the same height. In principle, his suggestion is that the observer should stand on one brink and point the tube at the bottom of the opposite slope and then, while holding the tube at the same angle, swivel around to point it at a plane. Now, the depth of the ravine can be calculated using congruent triangles, assuming that the ravine width is known (in order to demonstrate that the ravine’s width could be measured, the following is a suggestion of a method for measuring distance on a plane, according to Maimonides), and assuming that the height of the individual is approximately 4 cubits. A 4

2 O

D

16 B

10

C

Figure 6.

17 Perush R. Ishmaʿel ben Hakhmon ʻal Hilkhot ha-Rif, Eruvin 43b, Steinberg edition.

Land Surveying Tube in Early Judaism

On Figure 6, right-angled triangle ABC is similar to right-angled triangle AOD since ∠CAB = ∠OAD. Therefore, the ratio AO:OD equals the ratio AC:BC. The lengths of AO (height of the individual), OD (distance on the plane from the individual’s feet), and BC (width of the ravine) are known. Thus, it is possible to calculate the depth of the ravine, which is equal to OC. R. Ishmaʿel ben Hakhmon begins with the example described in Figure 6. If the ravine width is 10 cubits and D is at a distance of 2 cubits from the observer’s feet, then the depth of the ravine is 16 cubits. This is because we subtract the height of the individual (4 cubits) from AC, which is 20 cubits, to obtain the depth of the ravine. He notes that the ratio between the ravine’s width and depth is 10:16 or 5:8. That is, if we know that the width of the ravine is 25 cubits, for example, its depth will be 40 cubits, which is not correct because the ratio between BC and OC is not maintained. R. Ishmaʿel ben Hakhmon appears to have copied the calculations from another individual who knew the correct calculation method, but he failed to gain a genuine understanding of the mathematics behind the method. Another irrelevant point that he makes concerns the ratio between the diagonal and the perpendiculars in the square. He points out that the diagonal in a square is 1.4 times longer than its perpendiculars. This is approximately correct, but it is irrelevant to the topic at hand because, in reality, we are typically dealing with a rectangle rather than a square. According to the Pythagorean theorem, which was known as early as the fifth century BCE, the length of a diagonal in a square is √2 = 1.41 times longer than the length of its side. √2 is indeed an approximation of 1.4. R. Ishmaʿel ben Hakhmon further notes a method for measuring a distance of 2000 cubits on a plane. According to Maimonides, you take two beams, one 4 cubits in length and the second 3.99 cubits in length. You place the beams at a distance of 5 cubits from each other. When you place the tube on the longer beam and use it to look at the upper end of the smaller beam, the continuation of the line of sight meets the ground at a distance of 2000 cubits (see Figure 7).

4 cubits

3.99 cubits

2000 cubits

5 cubits

Figure 7.  Maimonides’s method for measuring distance on a plane.

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This method is correct, albeit awkward. It is useful for measuring a predetermined distance, but in order to measure a distance that is not known in advance we must modify the distance between the beams or the ratio of their lengths, until the line of sight aligns with the point at a distance we wish to measure, and we then use the new data to calculate the distance. According to R. Ishmaʿel ben Hakhmon, it is possible to determine the depth of a ravine using a combination of Maimonides’s method for calculating the ravine’s width as a distance on a plane and the method he himself describes at the beginning of his words.

8. SUMMARY The method of the geonim, also embraced by R. Hananel mainly addresses measuring a distance on a plane using a tube fixed on a shaft to a circular disc, so that the distance is measured according to the angle of the tube to the ground. This method could also be used to explain how to measure the depth of a ravine in the event that the ravine walls are vertical. This method is very useful for measuring distances on a plane and remains in use today. It is rather awkward for measuring the depth of a ravine, but considering the means that were available during Rabban Gamaliel’s times, it was the best and most accurate method. Rashi’s method is mathematically problematic. It is based on adapting tubes to various fixed lengths and using them to measure different distances or, alternatively, using a tube that can be contracted and extended. It is interesting to follow the efforts invested by various sages who identify problems in Rashi’s explanations and give Rashi’s statements different interpretations (which are sometimes mathematically correct but are clearly inconsistent with Rashi’s statements), in an attempt to justify Rashi’s interpretation, even at the expense of rejecting Torat Haim’s explanation. For example, Ben Yehoyadaʿ18 interprets “backward walking” as a walk along the ravine’s edge, while another sage19 interprets it as walking upwards using a ladder (the latter is mathematically correct but impractical and clearly inconsistent with Rashi’s statements). The method propounded by R. Schor (the author of Torat Haim) relies on the observer’s ability to adapt the tube to measure a specific distance, such 18 See section 6 above on Ben Yehoyadaʿ’s method. 19 See Melo ha-roʿim, Eruvin 43b; Menachem meshiv nefesh, Eruvin 43b, relates to Melo ha-roʿim.

Land Surveying Tube in Early Judaism

that when the object is observed precisely at this distance it is seen clearly but it becomes blurry as we (holding the tube) move away from our point of origin. He suggests focusing the tube on the ravine bottom, at a point close to the brink on which the observer is standing. Then, the distance at which the tube is focused can be measured on a plane. This method is practical and brilliant in its simplicity. While during R. Schor’s lifetime lenses were in use and could be focused, this was not a practical option in either Rashi’s or Rabban Gamaliel’s lifetime. Ben Yehoyadaʿ’s method attempts to explain Rashi’s commentary. He claims that the author of Torat Haim and the other sages above failed to understand Rashi. Ben Yehoyadaʿ explains that when Rashi suggests walking backwards, he meant walking along the brink of the ravine. According to this view, the observer focuses the tube on a predetermined distance, looks at a fixed point at the bottom of the ravine, and then walks along the brink until the tube focuses on this fixed point. Ben Yehoyadaʿ claims that, in such a case, the predetermined distance is equal to the sum of the ravine depth and the distance traversed along the brink. This claim is mathematically incorrect. R. Ishmaʿel ben Hakhmon’s method is based on congruent triangles. First, the width of the ravine is measured, similar to measuring distance on a plane. Two methods are offered for this, the superior method being based on setting the tube close to the shaft of the disc, similar to the use of an astrolabe. After measuring the ravine width, the tube is pointed to the far (opposite) slope of the ravine bottom. The tube is rotated while retaining its angle, to a focused point on the plane. The distance to this point is measured (the marked disc provides this information, according to the geonim).20 Now, using congruent triangles, the depth of the ravine can be determined. This method is superior and more accurate than the previous methods. Furthermore, this method is based on more advanced mathematical knowledge than the other methods. Maimonides’s method for measuring distances on a plane (as presented by R. Ishmaʿel ben Hakhmon) entailed placing two beams of different lengths (4 cubits and 3.99 cubits) at a distance of 5 cubits from each other. If we look from the longer beam to the shorter beam, and we continue this line of sight until it meets the earth, this point will be at a distance of 2000 cubits (see Figure 7). This method can be used to measure various distances by modifying the lengths of the beams and the distance between them. 20 See section 2 above on the geonic method.

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To summarize, the methods used to measure distances on a plane can be divided into two main groups; both can be used to measure the depth of ravines: a. measuring the angle under the horizon and applying the congruent triangle method (geonim, R. Hananel, Maimonides, R. Ishmaʿel ben Hakhmon); b. directly measuring the distance using the limits of focus (Rashi, Torat Haim, Ben Yehoyadaʿ).

9. CONTEMPORARY METHODS OF MEASUREMENT Today, the depth of ravines is measured much more accurately using diverse methods. Nonetheless, most contemporary methods are based on principles that are similar to the principles used in the above methods. If we are standing at the edge of a brink and seek to measure the depth of a ravine without climbing to its bottom, we could do this in the following manner: First, we place and level a tripod on the edge of the brink (in contrast to the above sages, we do not assume that the brink edge is exactly horizontal). We then affix the measuring instruments to the tripod. Using a tape measure, we measure the height of the tripod. Then we measure the distance from our location to any specific point on the bottom of the ravine (which we will mark as d), for example, using a laser range-finder. Finally, we measure the angle of depth at which the point on the ravine bottom is observed (which we mark α), for example, using an instrument known as the theodolite, which is much more accurate than an astrolabe. The theodolite contains binoculars that can revolve around a vertical shaft, in order to measure depth angles, and around a horizontal shaft to measure azimuth. The theodolite is directed at a point on the ravine bottom, and it displays the angle of depth at this point. Marking the ravine depth as h, h=d sin α, and the precise result is obtained using a simple calculator.

CHAPTER 11

Applying General Rules of Halakha in Halakhic Exegesis

T

he Talmud Bavli and Yerushalmi contain a number of general halakhic rules pertaining to resolution of halakhic issues, cited in the name of R. Joh.anan.1 These principles are supposed to indicate the relative weight of the views propounded by the different Tannaim. In situations in which a difference of opinion crystallizes between two Tannaim, the maxims of halakhic arbitration dictate whose view should prevail and according to whose approach the halakha is determined. A number of rules of halakhic arbitration are cited in the name of R. Joh.anan in B. Eruvin:2 R. Jacob b. Idi rule in the name of R. Joh.anan: In a dispute between R. Meir and R. Judah, the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah, in one between R. Judah and R. Jose the halachah is in agreement with R. Jose; and there is no need to state that in a dispute between R. Meir and R. Jose the halachah is in agreement with R. Jose. [Epstein edition]

In addition, “… For R. Abba has laid down on the authority of R. Joh.anan that in a dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah.” [Epstein edition] The discussion which follows this suggests that two Amoraim, R. Joh.anan and Rav, dispute whether the halakhic rules of arbitration that were formulated with reference to the Tannaim are binding upon everyone, including the Amoraim.3 This would make it obligatory for all authorities to issue halakhic 1 B. Eruvin 46b; Y. Terumot 3:1, 42b. 2 B. Eruvin 46b. 3 Ephraim B. Halivni, The Rules for Deciding Halakha in the Talmud [Hebrew], (Lod: The Habermann Institute for Literary Research, 1998); Yehuda Brandes, “The Beginning of the Rules of Halakhic Adjudication” [Hebrew] (PhD diss., Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 2002); Richard Hidary, Dispute for the Sake of Heaven: Legal Pluralism in the Talmud (Providence, RI: Brown Judaic Studies, 2010), 43–62; Yitzhak D. Gilat, “Lo Titgodedu,” Bar-Ilan 18–19 (1981): 84, n. 26; Paul Heger, The Pluralistic Halakhah (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003),

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rulings in accordance with the maxims in all cases. Ultimately, discussion of the topic concludes with an elucidatory comment to the effect that the general rules are not “universally accepted.” Not all authorities agree with them. For instance, Rav maintains a different view, and so he is not obligated to issue halakhic rulings in accord with the specified rules of arbitration. By contrast, R. Joh.anan’s view suggests that halakhic rulings must always follow the general principles of halakhic arbitration cited in his name.4 According to the Talmud Bavli,5 in disputes between Rav and R. Joh.anan, R. Joh.anan’s position is the decisive one. Different commentators acknowledge this approach and follow it.6 This makes it a logical assumption that the halakhic principles established by R. Joh.anan are obligatory and binding upon commentators throughout the ages: in disputes involving the Tannaim whose names appear in the maxims, the halakha should always be arbitrated in accordance with the principles of halakhic resolution set forth by R. Joh.anan. The present chapter examines different commentators’ approaches to applying the principles we have mentioned: as valid and compulsory principles of halakha or as non-binding ones. And if the latter, what are the arguments given in support of deviating from these halakhic principles?

THE APPROACH THAT DEEMS THE RULES OF HALAKHIC ARBITRATION OBLIGATORY According to this view, R. Joh.anan meant to articulate the halakhic arbitration rules with reference to any matter whatsoever, in all cases and all situations.7 The approach is based on establishing the halakhic precedence of one sage’s view over that of another. Thus, as has already been noted: “[In a dispute between] Rav and R. Joh.anan, the halakha follows R. Joh.anan.” In the same way that the proponents of this approach rule in accordance with R. Joh.anan, who holds that the rules of halakhic arbitration are obligatory, contrary to Rav, who maintains that they are not,8 the approach also presupposes

4 5 6 7 8

195; Yehuda Brandes, “Mah.pekhat ha-pessika shel R. Yoh.anan: klalei ha-pessika,” in BeDarkhei Shalom: Studies in Jewish Thought Presented to Shalom Rosenberg [Hebrew], ed. Benjamin Ish-Shalom, ( Jerusalem: Bet Morasha, 2007), 515–535. B. Eruvin 47b. B. Betza 4a, 4b. R. Hananel, Eruvin 47b; Rashi, B. Eruvin 47a, s.v., Rav leit leh. Nah.al ha-ʿarevim, Eruvin 46b, s.v. ve-amar R. Hama. R. Hananel, Eruvin 47b; Rashi, Eruvin 47a, s.v. Rav leit leh.

Applying General Rules of Halakha in Halakhic Exegesis

that the content of each of the other rules of halakhic arbitration should be maintained whenever it comes to resolving disputes among the Tannaim; that is, this same attitude should be maintained vis-à-vis all the other rules of halakhic arbitration. The same attitude, albeit slightly modified, comes to the fore in the words of the commentators who believe that the rules of halakhic arbitration are valid and binding except for those cases where the Talmud makes it explicitly clear that the halakha is in opposition to a particular rule.9 This includes instances such as: “R. Judah and R. Simeon: The halakha follows R. Judah,” and “R. Meir and R. Judah: The halakha follows R. Judah,” as well as some others. It should be noted that the term halakha, when used with reference to rules of halakhic arbitration (in addition to the way it is used in general), connotes a set of imperatives both normative and compulsory.10 This means that, should someone perform a ritual act in a manner contrary to the view that determines the halakha—whether concerning a rule of halakhic arbitration or in general—this person is required to perform the ritual action once again, this time in accordance with the authoritative halakhic view.11

ARGUMENTS FOR MAKING THE RULES OF HALAKHIC ARBITRATION OBLIGATORY No halakha to be learned in opposition to a rule of halakhic arbitration All this makes it clear that the approach that deems the rules of halakhic arbitration obligatory nullifies any halakhic decision that runs counter to a rule of halakhic arbitration specified in the Talmud. An example of such a definitionally incorrect ruling would be a case in which a decision is articulated in accordance with the position of a single individual rather than with that held by the majority. Such a ruling opposes the principle that in a dispute between “an individual and the majority: The halakha accords with the majority.”12 The approach that would nullify any such decision is based on the general rules established by the Amoraim (rather than the Tannaim). The core principle according to the Amoraim is that there must be a definitive answer to the question of when the rules Rashbam, Bava Batra 133b, s.v. ta shma; see below the section: “Rulings in the Talmdud that explicitly go against the maxim.” 10 Hidushei ha-Meiri, Eruvin 46b, s.v. ve-kayotze be-divrei klalim. 11 Tosafot, Eruvin 46b, s.v. Rabbi. 12 B. Berakhot 37a.

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of halakhic arbitration should apply; otherwise, “the matter will have no end.” (That is, no principle of halakhic arbitration will ever actually be binding.) But the Talmud as it has reached us is largely compiled in the form of general rules, rather than detailed instructions for applying the general principles in individual cases.13 We are thus left without an unequivocal set of directives to be read directly from the Talmud itself.

The compromise approach to applying the rules of halakhic arbitration The compromise approach applies the rules of halakhic arbitration wherever possible, admitting that they cannot apply universally. Arbitration must at times go beyond the framework of general rules.14 As seen by commentators who take this view, R. Joh.anan established his general principles only for dealing with cases in which no other explicit halakhic ruling is available to resolve the tannaitic dispute. In cases where the halakha has been arbitrated in accordance with one of the sages’ views, R. Joh.anan’s maxims of halakhic arbitration should not be invoked.15

ARGUMENTS FOR SEEING THE RULES OF HALAKHIC ARBITRATION AS NON-ABSOLUTE The talmudic dictum: “Where it was said, it was said, but where nothing was said, nothing was said” Tractate Eruvin preserves three instances of deviation from the rules of halakhic arbitration specified by R. Joh.anan. All three are justified using the same Aramaic formula: “Where it was said, it was said, but where nothing was said, nothing was said.”16 That is, wherever it is explicitly stated (or else demonstrated on the basis of the talmudic sugya’s text)17 that the halakha follows a sage whose view it is not supposed to conform to as per the rules of halakhic arbitration, it nevertheless remains in accord with this sage’s position. The rules of halakhic arbitration do not apply in instances of this kind or else are not fully binding.18 13 14 15 16 17 18

Kitzur kelalei ha-Talmud, 6, s.v. ein lemedin. Sheʾerit Yosef, Netiv ha-halakha, sect. 8, 86; Rashba Responsa, vol. 1, 251. Shaʿar Yosef, Horayot 3a. B. Eruvin 46b–47a. Halikhot ʿolam, 5:2, 105. Sefat Emet, Eruvin 46a, s.v. amar R. Zera.

Applying General Rules of Halakha in Halakhic Exegesis

This is the case in the three instances mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph.19 The rule of thumb then becomes that any particular maxim of halakhic arbitration remains in effect so long as no contrary statement is explicitly made in the Talmud. Halakhic decisions must then be dictated by the position of the sage named in the rule of arbitration as the authority whose view determines the halakha. Some commentators maintain that this may have been R. Joh.anan’s original intention, as he did not mean to establish arbitrary universal rules.20 The maxims of halakhic arbitration are thus in force only when no definitive halakhic ruling has been made explicit for the case at hand. If it has, then it appears that sometimes the halakha is determined contrary to a rule of halakhic arbitration, a point that makes for a contradiction. But this talmudic argument is not considered a source of contradiction vis-à-vis the maxims of halakhic arbitration with which we are concerned.21 Limiting the rules of halakhic arbitration to situations in which no final halakhic decision has been explicitly articulated is not seen as contradicting or abrogating the rules. The following example illustrates this. A common rule in the Talmud is: “An individual and the majority: The halakha accords with the majority.”22 Yet occasionally, the halakha follows an individual sage’s opinion rather than the position of the majority. This is not seen as contradicting this maxim of halakhic arbitration. Other maxims of halakhic arbitration mentioned above should be treated similarly. That is to say, the applicability of halakhic maxims is not universal; they were formulated as general, not universal, rules to begin with.23 Occasional specific deviations24 pose no obstacle to the general rules. The general rules remain in effect.

R. Joh. anan issues halakhic decisions contrary to the maxims of halakhic arbitration he has established When R. Joh.anan rules counter to his own maxims of halakhic arbitration, the maxims he deviates from should be understood as not applying to the particular instance in question. An example can be taken from the three cases mentioned at the beginning of this chapter in connection with Rav, who ruled that 19 20 21 22 23 24

B. Eruvin 46b–47a. R. Hananel, Eruvin 46b. Hidushei ha-Rashba, Eruvin 47b, s.v. ela. B. Berakhot 9a. Hidushei ha-Ritva, Eruvin 47b, s.v. ve-shamʿeinan. B. Eruvin 46b–47a.

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the halakha should follow the view of R. Simeon,25 contrary to R. Joh.anan’s halakhic arbitration maxim: “R. Judah and R. Simeon: The halakha follows R. Judah.” Some scholars are of the opinion that R. Joh.anan issued halakhic rulings in opposition to this maxim of halakhic arbitration in all three of these cases, thus in effect accepting the view of Rav who ruled according to R. Simeon’s position.26 Elsewhere, another ruling by R. Joh.anan runs counter to the same arbitration maxim, “R. Judah and R. Simeon: The halakha follows R. Judah.” This is in a dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon about muktzeh (items one is prohibited from moving from place to place) on the Sabbath.27 We know that R. Joh.anan, like R. Judah, holds that the category of muktzeh applies on the Sabbath,28 thus taking a stance against R. Simeon’s view that the category does not pertain (except in the case of dried figs and raisins).29 Yet we read, “But R. Joh.anan said: We have no allowance for moving any lighting implement on the Sabbath except for a lamp in use, in accordance with the view of R. Simeon.”30 This makes it clear that according to R. Joh.anan, there is no muktzeh on the Sabbath by dint of repugnance, as would be the case with an old lamp. Such a stance accords with the position of R. Simeon, who permits moving an old lamp while, according to the view generally espoused by R. Joh.anan, an old lamp is muktzeh by dint of repugnance.31 (The idea is that an old and used object becomes muktzeh and so cannot be moved on the Sabbath because of its soiled or unappealing condition.) The specification given by R. Joh.anan in this case, which tallies with the view of R. Simeon, runs counter to R. Joh.anan’s own maxim of halakhic arbitration, cited above.32 Yet another example comes up in the dispute of R. Meir, R. Judah, and R. Jose concerning the question, “From which point on in the Megillah must one read in order to fulfill one’s obligation [of reading the Scroll of Esther on Purim]?” Rav held that the Megillah must be read in full, in accordance with the view of R. Meir33 and as opposed to the maxims of halakhic arbitration men-

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

B. Eruvin 46b–47a. Hidushei ha-Rashba, Eruvin 47b, s.v. ela. B. Shabbat 44b. R. Hananel, Shabbat 45b. B. Shabbat 45a. B. Shabbat 45b. Rashi, Shabbat 45b, s.v. ela be-ner. Tosafot, Berakhot 49b, s.v. R. Meir. B. Megillah 19a.

Applying General Rules of Halakha in Halakhic Exegesis

tioned above, which specify that the halakha follows R. Jose in his disputes with R. Meir or with R. Judah. On this, too, there are those who take R. Joh.anan to be ruling against his own maxims of halakhic arbitration with reference to these Tannaim. If this is the case, then R. Joh.anan here accepts the view of Rav, who ruled in accordance with the opinion of R. Meir and contrary to the halakhic arbitration maxims.34 It follows that, if R. Joh.anan adopts R. Meir’s approach in disputes between R. Meir and R. Judah, then the rule “R. Meir and R. Judah: The halakha follows R. Judah” can no longer be accepted as valid.35 A few commentators have generalized, albeit without citing any examples, and said that in some places R. Joh.anan rules contrary to maxims of halakhic arbitration that he himself formulated.36 There is also a debate as to how to treat statements made in R. Joh.anan’s name by his students: should they be considered as if R. Joh.anan had made them, or should the students’ words not be taken into account so long as the same point has not been made explicitly clear by R. Joh.anan himself?37

No conclusions to be drawn on the basis of general maxims: the changing applicability of rules of halakhic arbitration Though similar to the previous argument, this one is based on a “Great General Rule.”38 This makes it particularly deserving of detailed consideration. An overall principle articulated in the name of R. Joh.anan in the Talmud states that “R. Joh.anan said: We cannot learn from general rules, even where wording using ‘except’ appears.”39 It follows that no definitively itemized conclusions can be reached on the basis of general principles. A general rule always remains in effect, without there being any exceptions that can impinge on its validity. Even when a general rule is formulated in such a way as to indicate the possibility of special cases (by using expressions that include phrases with “except …”), this does not mean that all the exceptions have been listed in the “except” clause included as part of the general principle.40 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Shaʻar Yosef, Horayot 3a. Responsa Havat Yair, sect. 94, 278. ʻEn zokher, hei, rule 43, 47b, s.v. heikha. Yad Malakhi, kelalei ha-reish, 558. Hidushei ha-Meiri, Eruvin 46b, 325. B. Eruvin 27a. Rashi, Kiddushin 34a, s.v. ein lemedin, disagrees, arguing that if an exception has been specified as a part of the general rule, this means that it is the only possible exceptional case, and nothing else may constitute an exception.

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Therefore, there will always be halakhic rules that will qualify as unforeseen exceptions even among general maxims of halakha.41 General principles of halakhic arbitration, not being all-encompassing obligatory rules, will always leave room for unanticipated instances not made explicit by the wording of the maxims. That is why in some cases where the halakhic arbitration maxims can apply, they are in effect brought to bear upon the issue being debated, and in some cases where applying them is deemed impossible they are not invoked. Exceptions inevitably continue to proliferate in time, forming a natural outgrowth of generalizations worded using “except” clauses that do not and cannot contain an exhaustive itemization of all the outstanding possibilities. In the absence of a general maxim of halakhic arbitration with clear relevance to a given case, there is no requirement to determine the halakha to accord with any one particular halakhic arbitration maxim. However here, too, not everyone is in agreement, considering that if a general rule does not run counter to a principle specified in the Talmud, why should any inferences or appropriate conclusions not be drawn on its basis?42 The following test may be proposed: when an issue unconnected to any particular maxim of halakhic arbitration is at stake, the maxims do not apply. For instance, the rule that “Rav and Samuel in matters of prohibitory law: The halakha follows Rav”43 will be in effect only when the dispute between these two sages concerns their own views. But when the dispute between them concerns a difference of opinion between other sages, without reflecting the views held by these two, the halakhic arbitration maxim does not apply. The same will be true with regard to all other halakhic arbitration maxims.44 A different way of explaining the argument that there is no drawing of inferences or conclusions on the basis of halakhic arbitration maxims is that if there is a dispute among Tannaim that does not fully fit the scenario outlined in a halakhic maxim, the maxim in question does not apply. For instance, there is a dispute among R. Meir, R. Judah, and R. Jose about who is to be considered another’s teacher.45 R. Joh.anan ruled in accordance with the view of R. Judah: “the one from whom one learned the majority of one’s wisdom.” But issuing an explicit halakhic ruling in accord with R. Judah should have been superfluous, considering that R. Joh.anan himself was the one who 41 42 43 44 45

Knesset ha-gedolah, sect. 101, 18. Rashba Responsa, vol. 1, 335. B. Bekhorot 49b. Hidushei ha-Meiri, Eruvin 46b, 326. B. Bava Metziʿa 33a.

Applying General Rules of Halakha in Halakhic Exegesis

established rules of halakhic arbitration about these Tannaim (as noted at the beginning of the present chapter). According to R. Joh.anan’s maxims of halakhic arbitration, the halakha follows R. Jose both against R. Judah and against R. Meir; so there was no need for R. Joh.anan to arbitrate the halakha explicitly in connection with this debate: he could have simply relied on the general maxims of arbitration which he himself had established. However, since R. Joh.anan did, nonetheless, articulate the halakha explicitly in this case as being in accord with R. Judah and contrary to his own maxims of halakhic arbitration, there are those who conclude that if the structure of a dispute among Tannaim (both R. Meir and R. Judah arguing against R. Jose) does not correspond to any one of the known halakhic arbitration maxims, then no halakhic arbitration maxim will be fully in effect. This approach explains why in the dispute we are considering, R. Joh.anan needs to articulate an explicit halakhic ruling to accord with the view of R. Judah: since the dispute involves three Tannaim, the situation does not fit either the maxim of “R. Judah and R. Jose: The halakha follows R. Jose,” nor “R. Meir and R. Jose: The halakha follows R. Jose.”46

The argument that seems most reasonable or likely This argument explains deviation from the maxims of halakhic arbitration by appealing to the principle of opting for the “most reasonable in accordance with that particular sage.”47 This means that when a particular sage has a convincing argument for his view, or one that is logically sound, the argument should be accepted, without taking rules of halakhic arbitration into account. An approach of this kind will render the maxims of halakhic arbitration not binding in all cases, rather only when “it seems reasonable” to base a halakhic ruling on the view of the sage indicated in the maxim most pertinent to the case. Then the halakha will follow the opinion of the sage cited, and when in a different situation “it seems reasonable” to resolve a halakhic dispute to the contrary, following the opinion of the sage not endorsed in the same maxim of halakhic arbitration, then the halakha will be arbitrated as per the opposite view.48 Some commentators extend this argument to include a notion along the lines of “his reasoning seems convincing.”49 Following this approach, the 46 47 48 49

Shaʿar Yosef, Horayot 2a. Rashi, Eruvin 46b, s.v. lehanei kelalei. Rashi, Eruvin 46b, s.v. lehanei kelalei. Rashba Responsa, vol. 1, sect. 114, 49.

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opinion of a particular sage should be opted for because his reasoning is the more convincing of the two in a dispute, even if a halakhic ruling in accord with his view would run counter to some maxim of halakhic arbitration.50 But there is no general consensus about this; some understand the maxims of halakhic arbitration as having preference over the reasoning which appears to be the most logical and likely.51

The harmonious argument: avoiding disputes and contradictions At times, the halakha is arbitrated according to the view of a sage whose position is not normally supposed to override any maxim of halakhic arbitration. Cases of this kind must be explained in order to resolve discrepancies between halakha-contrary-to-norm and general principles.52 For instance, in three disputes between R. Judah and R. Simeon, Rav issued halakhic rulings in accordance with the view of R. Simeon,53 thus going against R. Joh.anan’s principle: “R. Judah and R. Simeon: The halakha follows R. Judah.”54 But in disputes between Rav and R. Joh.anan, the halakha follows the view of R. Joh.anan.55 A situation thus emerges in which mutually exclusive halakhic rulings obtain. Rav ruled in accord with R. Simeon, while R. Joh.anan opined that the halakha is to be arbitrated in accordance with R. Judah, as per the maxim of halakhic arbitration that he himself had specified. The resolution of the debate between Rav and R. Joh.anan should follow R. Joh.anan, as per the familiar principle: “Rav and R. Joh.anan: The halakha follows R. Joh.anan.” But the harmonious argument dictates that whenever possible, disputes and contradictions among the sages should be avoided.56 This is why, in the three cases mentioned, there was an attempt to resolve the dispute between Rav and R. Joh.anan, which led to the claim that R. Joh.anan may have accepted the opinion of Rav,57 even though we have no clear evidence of such a thing. Besides, the argument that R. Joh.anan accepts Rav’s opinion in these three cases makes for a contradiction with R. Joh.anan’s own maxim of halakhic arbitration.

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

Kessef mishneh, Hilkhot ʿArakhin 1:6. Hassagot ha-Raʾavad, Hilkhot ʿArakhin 1:6. Hidushei ha-Rashba, Eruvin 47b, s.v. ela. B. Eruvin 46b–47a. B. Eruvin 46b. B. Betza 4a, 4b. Hidushei ha-Ritva, Eruvin 47a, s.v. u-mai kushya. Hidushei ha-Rashba, Eruvin 47b, s.v. ela.

Applying General Rules of Halakha in Halakhic Exegesis

The approach that objects to applying maxims of halakhic arbitration This approach refuses to acknowledge the maxims of halakhic arbitration; it may be based on a number of considerations. One possibility is that R. Joh.anan abandoned the halakhic arbitration maxims he had established earlier; this is the impression formed by a statement of his preserved elsewhere.58 In one passage, it seems that R. Joh.anan may have intended to limit the application of his halakhic arbitration maxims. In this connection it is helpful to remember that R. Joh.anan himself taught: “R. Joh.anan said: We cannot learn from general rules, even where ‘except’ is said.”59 As we have already seen, according to R. Joh.anan, there is no drawing of conclusions based on a general principle, as if the principle must always be valid without exception. Even if the general rule articulates the possibility of exceptions (when phrasing with “except …” is used), this is not to say that all the cases which can qualify as exceptions are in fact listed in it. Additional cases may well arise in the future, in which the general rules of halakhic arbitration will not apply. Such cases will then be considered exceptional, a situation taken to be perfectly legitimate.60 A further possibility is that it was not R. Joh.anan himself, but rather his students (the Amoraim who cite the principles of halakhic arbitration in his name), who had heard his rulings concerning the sages mentioned in the halakhic arbitration maxims, are those who articulated the maxims on the basis of what they had heard. R. Joh.anan, then, was not the one who put forth the general rules, and it is not necessarily true that he himself would have endorsed them.61 In addition, there are some interpreters who limit the applicability of the maxims of halakhic arbitration, depending on particular details of time and place.62

58 David Halivni, Sources and Traditions, A Source Critical Commentary on Seder Nashim [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1968), Yevamot 42b: “R. Hiyya bar Abba said: R. Joh.anan retracted [his ruling]”; David Halivni, Sources and Traditions: A Source Critical Commentary on the Talmud Tractates Erubin and Pesah.im [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982), 138–139. 59 B. Eruvin 27a. 60 See above section: “No conclusions to be drawn on the basis of general maxims.” 61 Rashi, Eruvin 47a, s.v. ve-lamah leih. 62 Tosafot yom tov, Kelim 3:2 (Maharik); Hazon ish, Orah. Haim, Hilkhot Eruvin 4:10.

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ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE HALAKHIC ARBITRATION MAXIMS Individual against majority: one against many As per this argument, even if, in keeping with the halakhic maxim quoted a number of times above: “Rav and R. Joh.anan: The halakha follows R. Joh.anan,” we assume that the halakha should follow R. Joh.anan rather than Rav, the halakhic arbitration maxims specified by R. Joh.anan may still be inappropriate. This would be the case if the majority of the sages uphold a view opposed to R. Joh.anan’s, so that he remains alone in maintaining that the halakhic arbitration rules apply.63 Then, the position of the majority should be opted for in preference to R. Joh.anan’s. This has an important upshot: The sages who dispute R. Joh.anan’s view and reject the halakhic arbitration maxims prevail, disqualifying the maxims from applying in those disputes preserved in the Talmud that feature any of the sages that are mentioned in the general rules of halakhic arbitration which we have been discussing.64 This is all the more true if some of the sages in disagreement with R. Joh.anan are older than him (such as R. Joshua ben Levi). Based on the approach that objects to the maxims, the view of the older sage disputing R. Joh.anan’s position should definitely have the upper hand.65

A general principle prevails against the maxims of halakhic arbitration When a more all-encompassing halakhic rule is known, it overrides the principles of halakhic arbitration. For instance, the general rule that “the halakha follows the opinion of the one who rules leniently in issues of ʿerub”66 is more inclusive and deals with a multitude of issues connected with ʿerub; it takes precedence over the maxims of halakhic arbitration specified above, because they pertain only to the particular sages named in each. (Some commentators maintain the opposite view, claiming that the principles of halakhic arbitration take precedence insofar as they are to be found throughout the Talmud, unlike the principle just mentioned, which pertains only to the topic of ʿerub.)67 Whenever a more general and inclusive rule of halakhic arbitration is opposed to the maxims discussed above, the halakha must be determined in accordance 63 64 65 66 67

Hidushei ha-Ritva, Eruvin 47b, s.v. ela. Shnei luh.ot ha-brit, Torah she-beʿal peh, 19c, s.v. ʿinyan pesak halakha. Hidushei ha-Ritva, Eruvin 47b, s.v. ela. B. Eruvin 46a. Zoharei ha-Shas, Eruvin 46b.

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with the more general rule because it is more all-encompassing in scope.68 But a different consideration leads to some disagreement concerning this argument. According to some authorities, the more general and inclusive maxim (the “mega-maxim”) is valid only when it is not in opposition to any other rule of halakhic arbitration.69 An example can be taken from the halakhic arbitration super-maxim (“mega-maxim”) specified by R. Joh.anan: “the halakha follows the anonymous Mishna.”70 In the dispute mentioned above,71 where the Tannaim R. Meir, R. Judah, and R. Jose differ on the question of who is to be considered another’s teacher, R. Joh.anan was compelled to explicitly determine that the halakha follows R. Judah.72 This led some readers to the conclusion that R. Joh.anan ruled this way because, according to his own approach, the more inclusive super-maxim of halakhic arbitration which dictates that “the halakha follows the anonymous Mishna,” takes precedence over the more particular maxim which specifies, “R. Judah and R. Jose: The halakha follows R. Jose.” From R. Joh.anan’s standpoint, this maxim has a secondary status compared to the inclusive rule about the halakha’s following the anonymous mishna. This is why R. Joh.anan needed to explicitly specify that the halakha is in accord with R. Judah, contrary to a rule of halakhic arbitration which he had himself formulated.73 It follows that all of the halakhic arbitration maxims considered above lose their applicability if they are contrary to maxims of a more inclusive nature, which are to be found in other places in the Talmud.

The “rule of tenure” against maxims of halakhic arbitration When halakhic rulings that go against a particular maxim of halakhic arbitration appear in at least two or three places, the “rule of tenure” begins to apply, meaning that the maxim in question should not be obeyed.74 In practice, the maxim is annulled; the halakha is consistently arbitrated in a contrary way. For instance, in Tractate Eruvin,75 three objections are raised vis-à-vis the validity 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75

Maharsha, Eruvin 46b. Korban Netanel, Eruvin 46b. B. Shabbat 46a. See above at the end of the section: “No conclusions to be drawn on the basis of general maxims.” B. Bava Metziʿa 33a. Shaʿar Yosef, Horayot 2a. Hidushei ha-Ritva, Eruvin 47a, s.v. u-mai kushyah. B. Eruvin 46b–47a.

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of the principle of halakhic arbitration which specifies that in a dispute between “R. Judah and R. Simeon: The halakha follows R. Judah.” Prima facie, it would seem that a single objection should have been enough to cast doubt on the principle’s validity. There is no obvious need to raise three objections, all based on the same principle and even designed in the same style, against a single rule. But the three objections involved are meant together to establish a “rule of tenure” against the validity of this particular maxim of halakhic arbitration. This suggests that when objections have been raised against the same rule three times, the rule does not stand the test of reality and so is not valid. Perhaps it should be annulled and even deleted from the list of rules of halakhic arbitration altogether. All the other maxims of halakhic arbitration mentioned at the beginning of this chapter should be approached in the same way.

A sage whom the halakha follows according to a halakhic arbitration maxim admits that the sage cited in the same maxim as opposing him is right When a sage whom the halakha follows according to the rules of halakhic arbitration agrees with the opinion of the sage opposing him, there is no need to apply the halakhic rule of arbitration, since agreement between the two sages has been reached.76 For example, as has already been noted,77 when R. Joh.anan accepts Rav’s halakhic rulings in various disputes involving the maxim of halakhic arbitration which specifies that “R. Judah and R. Simeon: The halakha follows R. Judah,” there is no need to apply the maxim “Rav and R. Joh.anan: The halakha follows R. Joh.anan.” The latter maxim becomes irrelevant to the discussion and so loses its force.

An eminent sage endorses the view of a sage whose opinion the halakha does not follow When an eminent sage lends his support to a view overruled by the resolution in an arbitration maxim, the particular maxim in question will not apply. Rather than obey R. Joh.anan’s arbitration maxims, in cases of this kind the halakha may follow other sages’ opinions. For instance, consider the principle of halakhic arbitration “R. Jose and R. Simeon: The halakha is as R. Jose.” In one case, the halakha was arbitrated in accordance with R. Simeon’s view because a 76 Hidushei ha-Rashba, Eruvin 47b, s.v. ela. 77 See above section: “The harmonious argument.”

Applying General Rules of Halakha in Halakhic Exegesis

different sage, R. Judah, who is an important halakhic authority, was of the same opinion as R. Simeon (as far as part of the halakhic content is concerned), and not as R. Jose, as should have been the case in accordance with the halakhic principle cited.78 In a situation of this kind, the halakhic arbitration maxim in question has no force. Another example can be cited in connection with the rule “R. Meir and R. Judah: The halakha follows R. Judah.” In the dispute between these two sages concerning “the minimum amount required for joining in the Zimun,” according to the view of one sage (Abaye), the halakhic ruling should follow the view of R. Meir (“the volume of an egg”), rather than the view of R. Judah (“the volume of an olive”), because R. Joh.anan endorses the approach taken by R. Meir.79 Thus, here the general halakhic rule also becomes invalid, because R. Joh.anan, a leading sage, shares the view of R. Meir, and thus rejects the view of R. Judah. Besides, R. Joh.anan himself ruled against the principle which he had specified. There are also some readers who are of the opinion that when a number of Amoraim maintain a position opposed to that set forth in a given maxim of halakhic arbitration, the maxim does not apply. They further maintain that the same is true if later Amoraim discuss the approach taken by the sage whose opinion is not supposed to dictate the halakha: in such a case, too, the principle of halakhic arbitration loses its force.80

Rulings in the Talmud that explicitly go against the maxim No maxim of halakhic arbitration can apply if an explicit halakhic ruling in the Talmud goes against it.81 Similarly, when an Amora rules in contrast to a maxim of halakhic arbitration, the maxim is eliminated.82 However, a maxim of halakhic arbitration can reemerge and subsist elsewhere. For instance, in connection with the rule that “R. Judah and R. Jose: The halakha follows R. Jose,” if we find an Amora in the Talmud who rules that the halakha in a particular situation follows R. Judah, thus going against the maxim, then that Amora’s decision is understood to apply only in its immediate context, while everywhere else the force of the maxim remains unshaken.83 78 79 80 81 82 83

See below section: “R. Jose and R. Simeon: The halakha is as R. Jose.” Tosafot, Berakhot 49b, s.v. R. Meir. Sefer kritut, Yemot ʿolam, 4:3, 184–185 n. 42. Halikhot ʿolam, 5:2, 105. Shnei Luh.ot ha-brit, Torah she-beʿal peh, 19a–b, s.v. nah.zor. Sheʾerit Yosef, Netiv ha-halakha, sect. 3, 85.

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Similarly, the maxims of halakhic arbitration lose their force when the opposite of a point in the maxims is demonstrated in the Talmud, or when the Talmud follows a sage whose view is ruled out by the maxims.84 The same is the case when a rabbinic court undertakes some action and rules contrary to one of the maxims. In such a situation, the maxim in question will not be valid.85

A received tradition (“tradition in their hands”) This argument is based on the premise that the sages have an orally received or “accepted tradition”86 vis-à-vis certain passages in the Talmud. According to this tradition, the essential principles underlying the familiar maxims of halakhic arbitration are not to be adhered to specifically in the cases dealt with in these passages. The need to deviate from the maxims in certain cases was known and accepted a priori by the sages, transmitted from one generation to the next by means of an oral tradition.

Later Amoraim oppose a general rule of halakhic arbitration When at least two Amoraim belonging to a later period in the Talmud maintain that the halakha should follow an opinion disqualified by an arbitration maxim, the maxim will no longer remain valid.87 A maxim’s force remains unimpinged upon when no amoraim issue rulings in opposition to it.88

The validity of the maxims of halakhic arbitration is limited This argument limits the applicability of the maxims of halakhic arbitration by claiming that the maxims were formulated vis-à-vis the contemporary circumstances of the talmudic sages. They have no force with respect to practices not applied since earlier days, such as the laws of leprosy, or laws not in effect in talmudic times,89 such as the “laws for the Messiah”90 (a reference to matters not practicable at the present time, but which will have a practical impact in the future, after the arrival of the Messiah). Since these maxims of halakhic arbitra84 85 86 87 88 89 90

Knesset ha-gedolah, sect. 101, 18. Sheyarei knesset ha-gedolah, kelalei ha-talmud, sect. 75, 16. Hoq Moshe, Eruvin 46b, s.v. ela. Kitzur kelalei ha-talmud, 8, s.v. af ʿal pi. Knesset ha-gedolah, sect. 101, 18. Knesset ha-gedolah, sect. 99, 18. Maharik, root 165.

Applying General Rules of Halakha in Halakhic Exegesis

tion do not apply universally, the rabbis of every generation have the authority to introduce corrections (including limitations) as they see right.91 But some commentators reject the view that these maxims of halakhic arbitration pertain to everything except for the “laws for the Messiah,” because no limiting specification along these lines is to be found in the Talmud.92

DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO APPLYING CERTAIN MAXIMS OF HALAKHIC ARBITRATION Rav and R. Joh. anan: the halakha follows R. Joh. anan Most commentators acknowledge the halakhic arbitration maxim mentioned a number of times above: “Rav and R. Joh.anan: The halakha follows R. Joh.anan.” Some of them are consistent in observing this rule, while others are not. For example, some interpreters apply this halakhic arbitration maxim in all cases, always deciding the halakha according to the view of R. Joh.anan, even against Rav and Samuel, and even in order to reach the more lenient of the possible options.93 By contrast, some interpreters reach halakhic decisions based on this maxim in one case,94 but then disregard it in a different situation.95

R. Judah and R. Jose: the halakha Follows R. Jose Some of the commentators apply this halakhic arbitration maxim only partially. For instance, they resort to it in addressing the topic of eating on Passover Eve and on the Eve of the Sabbath close to the time of the afternoon service. Commentators have determined the halakha by dividing the matter in two: “R. Jeremiah has said in the name of R. Joh.anan …: The halakha accords with R. Judah regarding Passover Eve, and with R. Jose regarding the Eve of the Sabbath.”96 This is in accordance with the halakha in the talmudic sugya,97 but such a resolution is partly opposed to the maxim of halakhic arbitration with which we are concerned.

91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Responsa sofer ha-melekh, vol. 2, Biʾat ha-miqdash, sect. 10, 265, s.v. ʻod. Responsa sofer ha-melekh, vol. 2, Biʾat ha-miqdash, sect. 9. Sefer Ravye, Eruvin, 371, p. 400–401. Rashi, Eruvin 47a, s.v. Rav leit leih. Tosafot, Hullin 32a, s.v. u-Shmuel. Rashbam, Pesah.im 100a, s.v. amar lo. B. Pesah.im 100a.

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In fact, in their decision, the same commentators rely on the ruling issued by R. Joh.anan himself, who decided concerning part of the question (eating on Sabbath Eve) in accordance with R. Jose, thus following his own maxim of halakhic arbitration. Yet concerning the second part of the question (about eating on Passover Eve), R. Joh.anan ruled in accordance with the view of R. Judah, thus going against the halakhic arbitration maxim he himself had put forth. The possibility of issuing halakhic rulings in accordance with the view of sages who are in dispute with each other on different issues, not necessarily with regard to this particular halakhic arbitration maxim, comes to the fore at a juncture described in Bavli Yevamot.98

R. Jose and R. Simeon: the halakha is as R. Jose Occasionally, commentators make halakhic decisions that contradict this ­maxim of halakhic arbitration. For instance, on the topic of lighting candles in a mourner’s house or in a celebrant’s house, there is a dispute between R. Judah, R. Jose, R. Meir, and R. Simeon.99 Most commentators resolve the halakhic question by ruling that candles may be lit in a celebrant’s house and in a mourner’s house, as per the opinion of R. Simeon,100 a ruling that is contrary to the maxim.

R. Meir and R. Judah: the halakha follows R. Judah This is another maxim of halakhic arbitration that is not always applied in a consistent manner. Some commentators issued halakhic rulings in accord with R. Meir and against R. Judah, thus going against the maxim. For instance, consider the dispute mentioned above between R. Meir and R. Judah101 concerning the issue of the amount required for a zimun.102 Some commentators decided the halakha in accordance with the view of R. Meir103 rather than R. Judah; the decision runs counter to this rule of halakhic arbitration. It should be noted   98 B. Yevamot 64b: “Said R. Joseph son of Raba said to Raba: ‘I enquired of R. Joseph whether the halachah is in agreement with Rabbi, and he replied in the affirmative. [I asked] whether the halachah is in agreement with R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, and he again replied in the affirmative… .’” [Epstein edition]..   99 M. Terumot 11:10. 100 R. ʿOvadia Mibartenura, Terumot 11:10. 101 See above section: “An eminent sage endorses the view of a sage.” 102 B. Berakhot 49b. 103 Tosafot, Yoma 79a, s.v. ve-lo beirakh.

Applying General Rules of Halakha in Halakhic Exegesis

that even when the halakha generally follows the position assumed by R. Meir, some authorities rule in accordance with the view of R. Judah, thus obeying this maxim of halakhic arbitration, while others voice disagreement.104 Similarly, some are of the opinion that this maxim of halakhic arbitration was not intended to be universally adhered to, but only meant to apply in situations that include a difference of opinion between these two sages and no explicit statement in the sugya as to how the halakha is to be decided. But once the halakha has been articulated in accordance with the sage that it is not supposed to follow as per this very rule of halakhic arbitration (R. Meir), the ruling will remain in effect,105 thus rendering the maxim invalid. Some commentators maintain that the validity of this maxim of halakhic arbitration is limited exclusively to matters having to do with ʿeruvin. This is a conclusion drawn in light of a principle cited in the name of Samuel: “Everywhere that R. Judah taught concerning ʿerub, the halakha follows his opinion,”106 and with a view to the maxim of halakhic arbitration: “R. Judah and R. Simeon: The halakha follows R. Judah.”107 In matters which do not pertain to ʿerub, this principle does not apply, and it may well be that the halakha in such cases is decided in accordance with the view of R. Meir. A different opinion is that only in a dispute between R. Meir and R. Judah is it the case that the halakha does not follow R. Meir, as per the Halakhic arbitration maxim: “R. Meir and R. Judah: The halakha follows R. Judah,” while in disputes between R. Meir and other Tannaim, the halakha may well accord with R. Meir.108 Occasionally, halakhic decisions turn out to be the opposite of that stated in a maxim of halakhic arbitration, due to name transposition. That is, “R. Meir” may appear in some cases instead of “R. Judah,” and “R. Judah” instead of “R. Meir.”109

R. Judah and R. Simeon: the halakha is in accordance with R. Judah An explanation can shed some light on the crystallization of this general rule: R. Judah was a greater sage than R. Simeon, and it became an established rule of halakhic arbitration that the halakha is in accordance with R. Judah in cases 104 105 106 107 108 109

Knesset ha-gedolah, sect. 2, 14, s.v. mi-divrei ha-Mordekhai (Rif). Sheyarei knesset ha-gedolah, sect. 5, 14. B. Eruvin 81b. Responsa devar Yehoshua, vol. 3, sect. 19, 347, s.v. akh. Yad Malakhi, kelalei ha-reish, sect. 580, 146. Knesset ha-gedolah, sect. 1, 14.

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of disputes with R. Simeon. Hence, this maxim of halakhic arbitration may be annulled, if it somehow becomes apparent that R. Judah was not a greater sage than R. Simeon.110 There are instances of deviation from this maxim of halakhic arbitration as well. For example, consider the issue of quantity with respect to impurity of foods.111 The halakha accepted by all the Tannaim is the view of R. Simeon, who maintains that the size of an egg is sufficient to transmit ritual impurity of foods, rather than the view of R. Meir or R. Judah;112 the halakha is thus contrary to this maxim of halakhic arbitration. A different example of deviation from this maxim of halakhic arbitration is the dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon concerning the issue of fruits taken up to the roof to dry. If R. Judah prohibits them because they are muktzeh, while R. Simeon proclaims them permissible, because in his view, there is no muktzeh “except dried figs and raisins”;113 muktzeh does not apply to other types of fruit. The halakha was resolved in accordance with R. Simeon’s opinion,114 thus going against the maxim. Yet another instance of deviation from this general halakhic rule is the dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon on the issue of “All who are examined are examined by women. R. Judah says: Before the period and after the period, women examine them. R. Simeon says: Also during the period, women examine them.” Some commentators are of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the view of R. Simeon,115 contrary to this maxim of halakhic arbitration. Some are of the opinion that this halakhic arbitration maxim is no maxim at all. This has to do with R. Mesharshiya’s opinion that principles of halakhic arbitration do not apply when a sage such as Rav, a halakhic authority of outstanding importance, does not agree with them.116

R. Meir and R. Jose: the halakha is in accordance with R. Jose Some readers are of the opinion that it can only be in a dispute between R. Meir and R. Jose that the halakha is not in accordance with R. Meir, as per 110 111 112 113 114 115 116

Hidushei gur Arieh, Eruvin 46b, s.v. ve-ha-amarta. B. Eruvin 83a. Tosafot, Eruvin 80b, s.v. agav. B. Shabbat 45a. B. Shabbat 157a; Ve-hizh.ir, Va-yakhel, 121. Tosafot ha-Rosh, Niddah 48b (R. Hananel); Sefer ha-ʻeitur, vol. 1, sect. 3, 14. Sefer ha-ʻeitur, vol. 1, sect. 85, 72a.

Applying General Rules of Halakha in Halakhic Exegesis

the halakhic arbitration rule: “R. Meir and R. Jose: The halakha follows R. Jose.” In a dispute with any other tanna, the halakha may well follow R. Meir. For instance: “the halakha follows R. Meir in his precautionary decrees,”117 and “an anonymous Mishna [is according to the opinion or the approach of] R. Meir.”118 Elsewhere, too, some halakhic decisions are made in accordance with R. Meir’s view.119 Other instances of deviation from this general rule are when R. Abbahu agrees with R. Meir. Then the halakha follows R. Meir and not R. Jose, leaving the general rule of halakhic arbitration devoid of force.120 Yet another instance of deviation from this general rule is when the anonymous (or general) halakha in the mishna follows the approach of R. Meir and not that of R. Jose: in cases of this kind, the general rule does not apply.121 For example, in the dispute between R. Meir and R. Jose on the question of contriving false witnesses, the halakha is decided in accordance with R. Meir as per the approach of Abaye, even though it has been claimed that the halakha should be in accordance with R. Jose as per the general rule: “R. Meir and R. Jose: The halakha follows R. Jose.” Even so, this rule of halakhic arbitration is dismissed as “the general formulation of the Tanna is in accordance with R. Meir.”122

SUMMARY How general principles are dismissed or adhered to in different situations may—depending on the overall context—itself be governed by rules of a higher order, meta-principles that can in turn become the object of theoretical research leading to revelatory findings. In summing up the present chapter, it should be noted that general principles for resolving halakhic disputes among the Tannaim are a significant element of talmudic discourse. Rather than a sequence of indeterminate differences of legal opinion, the halakhic texts in the Talmud Bavli as it has reached us incorporate a series of meta-principles stated as general rules for resolving the debates of the Tannaim; the principles associated with the name of R. Joh.anan are an outstanding instance of prescriptions 117 118 119 120 121 122

B. Eruvin 47a. B. Sanhedrin 86a. Yad Malakhi, kelalei ha-reish, sect. 580, 146. Sheyarei knesset ha-gedolah, sect. 2, 14. ʿEn zokher, hei, rule 45, 48b. B. Sanhedrin 27a.

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for resolution which themselves become subject to conflicting interpretations when it comes to applying them to particular cases of tannaitic debate. Can these divergent approaches to the question of the applicability of R. Joh.anan’s principles be systematically presented? Can new light be shed on the nature of halakhic thought in the Bavli by lining up the differences among these approaches in methodical contrast? The present chapter has undertaken a detailed look at the Bavli’s texts, drawing some initial conclusions on the basis of their similarities and differences.

CHAPTER 12

R. Joh.anan’s Attitude towards His Principles of Halakhic Arbitration

B

oth the Talmud Bavli and Talmud Yerushalmi record a number of general rules in the name of R. Joh. anan that pertain to the resolution of halakhic disputes.1 These principles of halakhic arbitration are intended to mark the power relations among a number of different Tannaim, determining whose view is to prevail and according to whose approach the halakha should be determined in any case of dispute. The Bavli in Tractate Eruvin cites a number of these general halakhic principles in the name of R. Joh.anan:2 R. Jacob b. Idi rule in the name of R. Joh.anan: In a dispute between R. Meir and R. Judah the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah, in one between R. Judah and R. Jose the halachah is in agreement with R. Jose; and there is no need to state that in a dispute between R. Meir and R. Jose the halachah is in agreement with R. Jose … for R. Abba has laid down on the authority of R. Joh.anan that in a dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah. [Epstein edition]

In the talmudic discussion that follows it is evident that the Amoraim R. Joh.anan and Rav debate the question of whether these general halakhic principles are absolutely binding upon other Amoraim, who must therefore resolve halakhic disputes based on these principles alone. The talmudic discussion closes with the explanatory note that the general halakhic principles under discussion “are not the universal view,” meaning that not everyone is in agreement with these principles. Rav, for instance, is not, and for this reason he is not obligated to issue halakhic rulings in accordance with these general principles. The 1 2

B. Eruvin 46b; Y. Terumot 3:1, 42a. B. Eruvin 46b.

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words of R. Joh.anan, by contrast, indicate that in his view, halakhic rulings must be issued in accordance with the general principles specified.3 In the opinion of the commentators, R. Joh.anan’s approach is the determining one, given that in cases of dispute between R. Joh.anan and Rav, the halakha is determined in accordance with the view of R. Joh.anan.4 It can therefore be assumed that R. Joh.anan resolves halakhic questions in accordance with the general rules of halakhic arbitration that he himself specified vis-à-vis the Tannaim listed above. Indeed, in many cases R. Joh.anan does resolve issues following the halakhic principles he himself established.5 But there are also cases in which R. Joh.anan does not appear to abide by his own general rules. The purpose of the present chapter is to assess whether R. Joh.anan does, in fact, follow his own halakhic principles in an absolute and unswerving manner. What is R. Joh.anan’s approach to these principles of halakha? A number of studies have addressed R. Joh.anan’s halakhic arbitration principles in the Bavli and have demonstrated that R. Joh.anan was not always consistent vis-à-vis the different halakhic rules that he established.6 This is true not only regarding the rules presented in Tractate Eruvin but also regarding other general halakhic rules, such as, “The halachah is [always] as an anonymous Mishnah” [Epstein edition].7 The present study reaches the same conclusion, thus endorsing the view presented in earlier studies: R. Joh.anan is not consistent and does not always rule in accordance with the general halakhic principles that he himself established. This chapter is a focused attempt to trace instances in which R. Joh.anan deviates from the various halakhic arbitration principles that he dictated. We

3 4 5 6

7

B. Eruvin 47b. B. Betza 4a, 4b. See, for example, B. Berakhot 52b; B. Yoma 12b–13a. See Yehuda Brandes, “The Beginning of the Rules of Halakhic Adjudication” [Hebrew] (PhD diss., Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 2002); Paul Heger, The Pluralistic Halakhah (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003), 256, n. 89; Brandes, “Mahpekhat ha-pessika shel R. Yoh.anan: klalei ha-pessika,” in BeDarkhei Shalom: Studies in Jewish Thought Presented to Shalom Rosenberg [Hebrew], ed. Benjamin Ish-Shalom ( Jerusalem: Bet Morasha, 2007), 515–535; Yitzhak D. Gilat, “Lo Titgodedu,” Bar-Ilan 18–19 (1981): 84, n. 26; Ephraim B. Halivni, The Rules for Deciding Halakha in the Talmud [Hebrew] (Lod: The Habermann Institute for Literary Research, 1998), 99–100; Richard Hidary, Dispute for the Sake of Heaven: Legal Pluralism in the Talmud (Providence, RI: Brown Judaic Studies, 2010), 61. See, for example, B. Shabbat 46a.

R. Joh.anan’s Attitude towards His Principles of Halakhic Arbitration

will analyze R. Joh.anan’s approach to a variety of different passages, some of which have not been cited in previous literature on the topic. We will examine this question through discussion of the cases of deviation, comparison with parallel sources in the Bavli, Yerushalmi, and other texts, and review of the opinions of commentators regarding R. Joh.anan’s deviation from the general principles. Based on this analysis, we will see that R. Joh.anan does ultimately deviate from the rules that he established, and we will attempt to adduce a reason for his doing so.8 ʿEn zokher, hei, rule 43, 47b; Halivni, Rules for Deciding Halakha, 39, 47; Hidary, Dispute for the Sake of Heaven, 53.   As noted, R. Joh.anan’s principles of halakhic arbitration are also found in the Talmud Yerushalmi. Although the focus of the present chapter is R. Joh.anan’s attitude toward his halakhic principles in the Bavli, as a backdrop to our study we will note two examples of R. Joh.anan’s deviation from those principles in the Yerushalmi.   The first case regards a dispute regarding the halakhic definition of one’s master (teacher): 8

Who is one’s master, having taught him wisdom? Anyone who first introduced him [to learning]; these are the words of R. Meir. R. Judan [cf. Y. Horayot 3:4, 48b: Judah. In the Talmud Yerushalmi, R. Judah is sometimes called R. Judan and sometimes R. Judah] says: Anyone from whom one learned most of his learning. R. Jose says: Anyone who has lit up his eye in his learning. Rav [says] as R. Meir; R. Joh.anan [says] as R. Judah. Samuel [says] as R. Jose (Y. Bava Mez. iʿa 2:12, 8d; cf. Y. Horayot 3:4, 48b). [Author translation]   According to R. Joh.anan’s halakhic arbitration rules, in cases of dispute between R. Judah and R. Jose, the halakha is decided in agreement with R. Jose, just as in debates between R. Meir and R. Jose, the halakha is determined in agreement with R. Jose. We would therefore expect that in this debate between R. Meir, R. Judah [= R. Judan], and R. Jose, R. Joh.anan would issue a halakhic decision in accordance with R. Jose. Instead, in this case, R. Joh.anan determines that the halakha follows the view of R. Judah, not that of R. Jose, going against the halakhic principles he himself established.   The second case involves the question of the permissibility of a basket of leeks found during the seventh year (shemitta): A certain man brought a basket of leek heads to R. Isaac bar Tablai. [R. Isaac] asked R. Yohanan [about the status of the produce]. He replied, “Go, ask Hananiah b. Samuel, who studies [or ‘memorizes,’ tannaitic] traditions.” He went and asked him. He replied, “I have not seen a [tannaitic] tradition [on this matter], but I have heard a [later] tradition, namely, that R. Yosé in the name of R. Yohanan [said], ‘Rabbi and R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon were divided [on this matter]: one held that we follow [the status of] the place origin [of the produce]; the other held that we follow [the status of] the location of sale.’” R. Abahu explains [that] Rabbi [is the one who] holds that we follow [the status of] the place of origin, and R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon [is the one who] holds that we follow [the status of] the location of

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“R. MEIR AND R. JUDAH—THE HALAKHA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH R. JUDAH” Ke-zayit vs. ke-betza The mishna in Berakhot cites a dispute regarding the obligation of zimmun, the summons to participate in reciting birkat ha-mazon (the blessing after the meal): How much [must one have eaten]9 to count? As much as an olive;10 R. Judah says, as much as an egg11.12 [Epstein edition]

While the mishna does not identify the opponent of R. Judah’s view,13 the subsequent talmudic discussion clarifies that it is R. Meir who maintains that sale. R. Abahu said, “Rabbi holds that we follow [the status of] the place origin, but he [Yohanan] [nonetheless] instructed him [R. Isaac bar Tablai] according to the opinion of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, that we follow [the status of] the location of sale!” … R. [Ab]ba bar Kahan[a] inquired of R. Yosé, “Did not R. Hiyya [bar (Ab)ba] state in the name of R. Yohanan that whenever there is a dispute between Rabbi and one of his colleagues, the law follow [the opinion of] Rabbi? And R. Jonah said [that this is the case] even when [the dispute is] between Rabbi and R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon?” He [R. Yosé] replied, “What do you expect from R. Yohanan? R. Yohanan is consistent with his own opinion, for R. Yohanan said, “They [the sages] ruled leniently in the case of the seventh year, since it, [that is, its regulations and their application,] derives from them [in any case].” Some wish to explain [Yohanan’s teaching rather as follows]: R. Yohanan’s opinion was added to [that of] R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon and [the two together] formed a majority over Rabbi [and the law follows the ruling of the majority] (Y. Demai 2:1, 22d) [Nuesner edition]   Rabbi and R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon dispute whether the permissibility of the leek is determined by the place from where the item is brought (“the place of origin”) or by the place where it is found (“the location of sale”). (According to Penei Moshe, R. Eleazar’s view is the more stringent approach; according to the Gaon of Vilna, cited in Gilyon Efrayim, this position reflects the more lenient attitude.) R. Joh.anan rules in accordance with R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, against Rabbi and against a general principle of his own: “Rabbi and his associates—the halakha follows Rabbi.” In the ensuing talmudic discussion, bewilderment is expressed regarding R. Joh.anan’s ruling in opposition to his own general principle, and the sugya provides an explanation of this perplexity. 9 Beginning from what quantity of food eaten is participation in a zimmun required. 10 Beginning from a quantity equivalent to an olive—ke-zayit. 11 From the equivalent of an egg—ke-betza. 12 M. Berakhot 3:1 (45a). See Rashi, Berakhot 45a, s.v. ʻad kammah. 13 See also Y. Pesah.im 3:8, 30b.

R. Joh.anan’s Attitude towards His Principles of Halakhic Arbitration

eating the quantity of a ke-zayit obligates one to participate in a zimmun.14 The sugya raises a question based on a mishna in Tractate Berakhot that indicates that R. Judah attributes significance to the measurement of a ke-zayit, whereas R. Meir emphasizes the measurement of a ke-betza. To resolve this apparent contradiction, the sugya states, “R. Joh.anan said: The names must be reversed” [Epstein edition]. In the view of R. Joh.anan, the mishna in Berakhot mistakenly attributes the views to the Tannaim; the views of R. Judah and R. Meir recorded there should be switched. In fact, R. Judah maintains that the minimum quantity is a ke-zayit, while R. Meir claims that it is a ke-betza. Tosafot explain: The halakha follows the view [that one must join the zimmun upon eating the equivalent] of a ke-zayit, for according to R. Joh.anan’s reversal, R. Judah maintained a ke-zayit,15 and [the rule is that in a dispute between] R. Meir and R. Judah—the halakha is in agreement with the view of R. Judah.16

The final halakha is that it is only necessary to eat a ke-zayit. Accordingly, R. Joh.anan reverses the approaches of the sages in order to make them correspond to the general rule that he specified: “R. Meir and R. Judah—the halakha is in agreement with R. Judah.”17 Abaye, however, insists that the views are attributed properly: “Abaye said: There is no need to reverse” [Epstein edition]. He offers another explanation for the discrepancy between the views presented in Berakhot. In Abaye’s view, R. Joh.anan rules in accordance with R. Meir in this case. Tosafot explain: And similarly, for Abaye, who does not reverse [the approaches of R. Meir and R. Judah, as does R. Joh.anan], R. Meir thus maintains a ke-zayit, and it seems that the halakha follows R. Meir that it is the amount of a ke-zayit. Even though generally in a dispute between R. Meir and R. Judah, the halakha is in agreement with R. Judah, in this case the halakha is in accordance with R. Meir. For R. Joh.anan maintains his approach above that one cannot exempt others from their obligation unless he has eaten a ke-zayit, and we also find above that he [say a blessing when he] ate salted olives [ke-zayit].18 14 15 16 17 18

B. Berakhot 49b. Y. Berakhot 7:2, 11b. Tosafot, Berakhot 49b, s.v. R. Meir. Midrash Tannaim on Deuteronomy, Hoffmann edition, 188, n. 400. Tosafot, Berakhot 49b, s.v. R. Meir.

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It is clear from elsewhere in the Talmud Bavli that R. Joh.anan himself follows the view that a ke-zayit is the significant measurement;19 it is similarly clear that there is no debate concerning the fact that only a ke-zayit in necessary to require a blessing.20 In the view of Abaye, given that it is R. Meir who maintains that a ke-zayit is necessary, R. Joh.anan follows a position in accordance with the view of R. Meir. This means that R. Joh.anan goes against the general rule that he himself established: “R. Meir and R. Judah—the halakha is in agreement with the view of R. Judah.” A concurring view emerges from a different passage of Tosafot as well: It seems to Rabbi that the halakha is not in accordance with R. Judah,21 who requires below (B. Yoma 79b and B. Berakhot 45a) that a ke-betza is required in the context of reciting a blessing. The view of R. Zadok22 in the conclusion (B. Yoma 79a–b and B. Sukkah 26b) is similar. Rather, we follow the view of R. Meir, who said: With an amount of a ke-zayit. Although it is said: R. Meir and R. Judah—the halakha is in agreement with R. Judah, in this case, the halakha is in accordance with R. Meir, as R. Joh.anan upholds his approach, as is noted in Berakhot (38b): “Moreover R. H.iyya b. Abba said: I have seen R. Joh.anan eat salted olives and say a blessing both before and after” [Epstein edition].23 And it is also said there: “A man cannot say grace on behalf of others until he has eaten at least the size of an olive of corn food with them” (B. Berakhot 48a) [Epstein edition]. In B. Pesah.im (49b), there are those who say that “the discussion24 must be reversed… .”25 [Epstein edition]

R. Joh.anan himself adopts the approach of R. Meir, and the halakha therefore follows that view, despite the fact that according to the principle that R. Joh.anan established he should have followed the approach of R. Judah.26

19 B. Berakhot 38b (cited in Tosafot, Berakhot 49b); cf. Y. Berakhot 6:1. 20 Marʾeh ha-panim, Berakhot 6:1, s.v. mah ʻavad. 21 Hence, it follows that Rabbi is also not necessarily required to rule in accordance with these general principles of halakha. 22 Halakhot Gedolot, Hildesheimer edition, vol. 1, Hilkhot Sukkah, 338–339. 23 B. Berakhot 38b; Tosafot, Yoma 79a, s.v. ve-lo. 24 That is, the opinions. 25 Tosafot Yeshanim, Yoma 79a, s.v. pah.ot. 26 Cf. Responsa havat Yair, vol. 1, sect. 94, 278, s.v. R. Meir.

R. Joh.anan’s Attitude towards His Principles of Halakhic Arbitration

Thus, according to Abaye (“There is no need to reverse”), R. Joh.anan’s ruling contradicts his own principle. R. Joh.anan (“the names must be reversed”) adheres to his principle, personally adopting R. Judah’s ruling. Indeed, his resolution indicates how far one can go in order to arbitrate halakhic issues in accordance with the general principles that he established. The debate in Tractate Berakhot also appears in the Sheʾiltot: How much is one obligated to recite a blessing afterwards, and how much entails an obligation of zimmun—the quantity of a ke-zayit or a ke-betza? A debate ensued concerning this between R. Meir and R. Judah, as we learn from tannaitic sources: From what quantity is a zimmun called for? R. Meir says: a ke-zayit; R. Judah says: a ke-betza … And the halakha is in accordance with R. Judah, for we maintain the rule that in cases of dispute between R. Meir and R. Judah, the halakha is in agreement with R. Judah. Or is it that R. Meir’s argument is reasonable in this case, seeing that this is comparable to all the situations of eating as described in the Torah? Come and hear, for R. Hiyya b. Abba said: I have seen R. Joh.anan eat salted olives and say a blessing both before and after. And it is also stated: Said R. Hinena b. Judah in the name of Rava: The halakha is that if one has drunk a cup of wine or eaten a single kernel, let him join the quorum of ten, while as for performing a recitation so as to exempt the obligation of a group, this cannot be done unless he has eaten a ke-zayit of grain. This reasoning is as per R. Meir.27

According to the version in the Sheʾiltot, there is some hesitation as to the right way to proceed in practice. Should we follow the general halakhic principle specifying that in cases of dispute between R. Meir and R. Judah, the halakha is in accordance with R. Judah? Or should we rule in accordance with R. Meir’s view, insofar as his argument is compelling and reasonable? According to R. Hiyya b. Abba, R. Joh.anan ate salted olives, which is to say that R. Joh.anan went against the general rule. Considering that the halakha has been stated in the name of Rava, “A quantity of grain equivalent to a ke-zayit,” the author of the Sheʾiltot is of the opinion that it is correct to act in accordance with R. Meir and against the general principle of halakhic arbitration. The wording used by the author of the Halakhot Gedolot also makes it apparent that R. Joh.anan goes against the principle that he himself established: 27 Sheʾiltot de-Rav Ah.ai Gaon, Mirsky edition, vol. 2, 125–126; See Biʾurim ve-heʿarot, on site.

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Halakha From what amount of food is a zimmun required? From a ke-zayit. R. Judah says: From a ke-betza … Even though “R. Meir and R. Judah— the halakha is in agreement with R. Judah,” in this case, the halakha is in accordance with R. Meir, since R. Joh.anan upheld his approach, R. H.iyya b. Abba said: I have seen R. Joh.anan eat salted olives and say a blessing both before and after.28

It should be noted that both the text of the Sheʿiltot and that of Halakhot Gedolot omit the words of R. Joh.anan, “the approach is reversed,” according to which R. Joh.anan indeed followed the view of R. Judah. According to both sources, it follows that R. Joh.anan followed R. Meir’s approach, in opposition to the rule he enacted to follow R. Judah.

An heir’s exchange of sacrifices The approach of R. Joh.anan to this rule is also relevant in the discussion of whether one who has received an inheritance can make substitutions for a sacrificial animal designated by his father. R. Meir and R. Judah dispute this question: For it has been taught: An heir can lay hands [on the head of a sacrifice]; an heir can effect exchange [with his father’s dedication]. This is the teaching of R. Meir; whereas R. Judah says: An heir cannot lay hands [on the head of a sacrifice] nor can an heir effect exchange [with his father’s dedication].29 [Epstein edition]

According to R. Meir, an heir who substitutes a different animal for one originally designated for sacrificial purposes by his father while his father was still living has performed a valid action.30 R. Judah maintains that such a substitution is invalid. Similarly, according to R. Meir, an heir can lay his hands on an animal originally designated as a sacrifice by his father, who was not able himself to offer the sacrifice at the Temple before his death.31 R. Judah, in contrast, argues that he cannot do so. 28 Halakhot Gedolot, Traub edition, Hilkhot Berakhot, sect. 7, 22; see also Halakhot Gedolot, Hildesheimer edition, vol. 1, Hilkhot Birkat ha-Mazon, 129–130. 29 B. Temurah 2a. 30 Rashi, Temurah 2a, s.v. yoresh. 31 Rashi, Temurah 2a, s.v. yoresh somekh.

R. Joh.anan’s Attitude towards His Principles of Halakhic Arbitration

A text cited in the sugya and elsewhere reads: “All persons can exchange; [and it was asked]: What does hakkol [all] include? [And the answer was that] it includes the case of an heir, not in accordance with R. Judah!” [Epstein edition].32 R. Joh.anan similarly rules elsewhere: Surely R. Joh.anan said: If one leaves an animal [dedicated for a sacrifice] to his two sons, and dies, it is offered, but they cannot effect substitutions with it … because Scripture saith, ‘And if he change it at all,’ which is to include the heir; and [the same verse teaches,] one can change, but not two.33 [Epstein edition]

In other words, R. Joh.anan rules according to the view of R. Meir that heirs may generally execute exchanges of sacrifices. Tosafot express puzzlement regarding this point: This amounts to saying that according to R. Joh.anan, an heir can make substitutions, and that is puzzling, as “R. Joh.anan said: R. Meir and R. Judah—the halakha follows R. Judah.”34

R. Joh.anan proceeds contrary to a general halakhic principle that he himself established. In light of this question, the author of the responsa Sofer ha-melekh writes: But what is the difficulty? Here, R. Joh.anan is for his own part evidently of an opinion tallying with R. Meir’s over that of R. Judah, even though the halakha does not correspond to this view, since the arbitrated normative halakha is “R. Meir and R. Judah–the halakha is in agreement with R. Judah.” … In any case, it is generally problematic to say that R. Joh.anan expresses an opinion contrary to his own halakhic statements.35

The Sofer ha-melekh attempts to resolve the question raised by Tosafot by resorting to the argument that R. Joh.anan’s personal opinion was identical to R. Meir’s view, and not to R. Judah’s against the general halakhic rule that he 32 33 34 35

B. Temurah 3a; B. Arakhin 2a. B. Zevah.im 5b–6a. Tosafot, Zevah.im 6a, s.v. eh.ad. Sofer ha-melekh, vol. 2, Hilkhot Biʾat Ha-Mikdash, sect. 4, 265, s.v. ba-derekh.

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himself established. Nevertheless, the author of the responsum admits that it is problematic to claim that R. Joh.anan maintains a view that runs counter to his own halakhic enactment.

A relative who became distant Another instance is found in the debate between the unnamed tanna kamma (R. Meir, since “R. Joh.anan said: [The author of] an anonymous Mishnah is R. Meir” [B. Sanhedrin 86a, Epstein edition]) and R. Judah on the topic of “a relative who became distant”—“If one had been related, but subsequently ceased to be so”36 [Epstein edition].37 The discussion revolves around the case of a witness who was a relative of one of the litigants—such as his daughter’s husband—and then became “distant” (that is, no longer related) because the daughter died before the event was witnessed. According to R. Meir, such a person is not considered a relative; he is therefore a valid witness and is permitted to testify. According to R. Judah, however, if the daughter who passed away left children that she had borne to the son-in-law, the erstwhile son-in-law is still considered a relative of her father and is not a valid witness.38 The ensuing discussion of the issue in the Talmud involves a dispute about arbitrating the halakha in practice. According to the position reported in the name of Rav, “The halachah rests with R. Judah” [Epstein edition], while according to Rava in the name of R. Nah.man and Rabbah b. Bar Hana in the name of R. Joh.anan, “The halachah does not rest with R. Judah” [Epstein edition].39 Accordingly, R. Joh.anan rules in accordance with R. Meir and against R. Judah, thus going against the general halakhic principle articulated in his name: “R. Meir and R. Judah—the halakha is in agreement with R. Judah.” The further discussion clarifies that Rabbah b. Bar Hana’s statement in the name of R. Joh.anan may possibly not refer directly to the dispute between R. Meir and R. Judah regarding a relative who becomes “distant,” but rather to a statement of R. Jose the Galilean: Some refer this dictum of Rabbah b. Bar H.ana to the following: R. Jose the Galilean gave the following exposition: And thou shalt come unto the Priests, the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days (Deut. 17: 9). 36 37 38 39

Lit., ‘became estranged.’ B. Sanhedrin 27b. Rashi, Sanhedrin 27b, s.v. hayah karov, s.v. ve-nitrah.ek. B. Sanhedrin 28b.

R. Joh.anan’s Attitude towards His Principles of Halakhic Arbitration Is it then conceivable that, one could go to a judge who does not exist in his lifetime? But the text refers to a judge who was formerly a relative but who subsequently ceased to be one. [Whereon] Rabba40 b. Bar H.ana said:41 The halachah rests with R. Jose the Galilean.42 [Epstein edition]

According to this baraita, R. Joh. anan ruled in accordance with the position of R. Jose the Galilean that a judge who was once a relative of one of the litigants but is no longer related to him is considered fit to judge. Thus, even if R. Joh. anan does not say so explicitly, he rules against the view of R. Judah and in accordance with the view of R. Meir—against his own principle of arbitration.

“R. JUDAH AND R. JOSE–THE HALAKHA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH R. JOSE”43 Rabbo In the course of elucidating the question of who is considered rabbo, one’s teacher, Tractate Bava Mez. iʿa cites a baraita: Our Rabbis taught: The teacher referred to is he who instructed him in wisdom, not he who taught him Bible and Mishnah: this is R. Meir’s view. R. Judah said: He from whom one has derived the greater part of his knowledge. R. Jose said: Even if he enlightened his eyes in a single Mishnah only, he is his teacher … It has been stated: R. Isaac b. Joseph said in R. Joh.anan’s name: The halachah is as R. Judah. R. Ah.a son of R. Huna said in R. Shesheth’s name: The halachah is as R. Jose. Now, did R. Joh.anan really say this? But R. Joh.anan said, The halachah rests with an anonymous Mishnah, and we have learnt, HIS TEACHER, WHO INSTRUCTED HIM IN WISDOM! – What is meant by WISDOM? The greater part of one’s knowledge.44 [Epstein edition]

40 41 42 43

Should be “Rabbah.” Should be “In the name of R. Joh.anan.” B. Sanhedrin 28b. This general halakhic principle is accepted by the Yerushalmi as well; see Y. Terumot 11:7, 48b. 44 B. Bava Mez. iʿa 33a.

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According to R. Isaac b. Joseph, R. Joh.anan rules in accordance with R. Judah and not in accordance with R. Jose, contrary to the general halakhic principle that he had established: “R. Judah and R. Jose—the halakha is in agreement with R. Jose.”45

Eating on Passover Eve The Talmud Bavli records a debate between R. Judah and R. Jose regarding the prohibition against eating in the late afternoon on the eves of the Sabbath and holidays: Surely it was taught: A man must not eat on the eve of the Sabbath or Festivals from nine hours46 and onwards, in order that he may enter the Sabbath with an appetite:47 [these are] the words of R. Judah. R. Jose said: He may go on eating until nightfall? … Yet is it satisfactory according to R. Huna? Surely R. Jeremiah said in R. Joh.anan’s name—others state, R. Abbahu said in the name of R. Jose b. R. H.anina—: The halachah is as R. Judah in respect to the eve of Passover, and the halachah is as R. Jose in respect to the eve of the Sabbath.48 [Epstein edition]

According to the view that it was indeed R. Joh.anan who issued a ruling in this case,49 R. Joh.anan rules in accordance with R. Judah with regard to eating on Passover Eve, against R. Jose,50 thereby ruling contrary to the halakhic rule that he had established: “R. Judah and R. Jose—the halakha is in agreement with R. Jose.”

Twilight Another example, found in Tractate Shabbat, involves a debate between R. Judah, R. Neh.emiah, and R. Jose regarding the time when twilight (bein ha-shemashot) begins and ends:

45 Maharam me-Rutenberg, Teshuvot, pesakim u-minhagim, Cahana edition, vol. 3, sect. 104, 109; Shaʿar Yosef, Horayot 2a. 46 Beginning with the time of minh.ah, late afternoon. 47 For food. 48 B. Pesah.im 99b–100a. 49 See Hidary, Dispute for the Sake of Heaven, 57, ns. 37, 59. 50 Shaʿar Yosef, Horayot 2a.

R. Joh.anan’s Attitude towards His Principles of Halakhic Arbitration Our Rabbis taught: As to twilight [period] it is doubtful whether it is partly day and partly night … And what is twilight? From sunset as long as the face of the east has a reddish glow: when the lower [horizon] is pale but not the upper, it is twilight; [but] when the upper [horizon] is pale and the same as the lower, it is night: this is the opinion of R. Judah. R. Nehemiah said: For as long as it takes a man to walk half a mil from sunset. R. Jose said: Twilight is as the twinkling of an eye, one entering and the other departing, and it is impossible to determine it … Rabbah b. Bar H.anah said in R. Joh.anan’s name: The halachah is as R. Judah in respect to the Sabbath, and the halachah is as R. Jose in respect to terumah.51 [Epstein edition]

The discussion makes it clear that R. Joh.anan rules in accordance with the view of R. Judah with regard to the Sabbath as a matter of stringency.52 However, this resolution runs counter to his general principle.

“R. MEIR AND R. JOSE—THE HALAKHA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH R. JOSE”53 R. Joh.anan contradicts his halakhic principle regarding disputes between R. Meir and R. Jose several times.54

Mistaken blessings The Mishna states: If he says55 “By whose word all things exist”56 over any of them,57 he has performed his obligation.58 [Epstein edition] 51 B. Shabbat 34b–35a; See Hidary, Disputes for the Sake of Heaven, 50, n. 13. 52 Rashi, Shabbat 35a, s.v. bishlama halakha. 53 The Yerushalmi agrees concerning this general rule that the halakha is in agreement with R. Jose over R. Meir; See Y. Terumot 3:1, 42a; cf. Louis Ginzberg, Genizah Studies (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1929), vol. 2, 518. 54 See Louis Ginzberg, On Jewish Law and Lore (New York: Atheneum, 1977), 163; Menachem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988), vol. 2, 729. 55 The blessing. 56 She-hakol nihyah bi-devaro. 57 For all the fruits and vegetables. 58 M. Berakhot 6:2.

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The subsequent talmudic discussion includes a debate between R. Huna and R. Joh.anan that was understood to parallel a tannaitic dispute: It has been stated: R. Huna said: Except over bread and wine. R. Joh.anan, however, said: Even over bread and wine. May we say that the same difference of opinion is found between Tannaim? [For it was taught:] “If a man sees a loaf of bread and says, What a fine loaf this is! Blessed be the Omnipresent that has created it! he has performed his obligation … So R. Meir. R. Jose says: If one alters the formula laid down by the Sages in benedictions, he has not performed his obligation”. May we say that R. Huna concurs with R. Jose and R. Joh.anan with R. Meir?59 [Epstein edition]

Thus, R. Joh.anan adopts the position of R. Meir that a generic blessing is sufficient, and he therefore rules that she-ha-kol is acceptable even for bread and wine. “It can be seen that R. Huna thinks as R. Judah does, and R. Joh.anan—as R. Meir.”60 By ruling against R. Jose, R. Joh.anan goes against his own halakhic principle: “R. Meir and R. Jose—the halakha is in agreement with R. Jose.” Indeed, the Poskim who issue practical rulings in accordance with R. Meir rely on the fact that R. Joh.anan rules in accordance with R. Meir’s position.61 However, in the subsequent talmudic discussion, the difficulty that arises in connection with R. Joh.anan’s ruling in favor of R. Meir contrary to the general rule he had himself established is resolved with the words: “And R. Joh.anan can reply to you: I may claim R. Jose also as a supporter of my view” [Epstein edition].62 In other words, R. Joh.anan may have said that his statement is compatible with the view of R. Jose so that R. Joh.anan would not be disputing the general halakhic rule that he had established. The Yerushalmi also records the debate among R. Jose, R. Yudah [=R. Judah], and R. Meir, including an unambiguous halakhic ruling in agreement with R. Meir:

59 B. Berakhot 40b. 60 Perush sefer haredim, Berakhot 6:2, s.v. R. Meir. 61 See Rambam, Hilkhot Berakhot 8:6; Kessef mishneh, Hilkhot Berakhot 8:6, s.v. ve-mah sheamar. This is the understanding of Beit Yosef, Tur Orah. Haim 167:10; Perush sefer haredim, Berakhot 6:2, s.v. R. Meir; Marʾeh ha-panim, Berakhot 6:2, s.v. halakha. 62 B. Berakhot 40b; Beit Yosef, Tur Orah. Haim 167:10, s.v. de-talmuda dah.ei.

R. Joh.anan’s Attitude towards His Principles of Halakhic Arbitration R. Huna said: “Excluding [from …] wine and bread …” It was taught: R. Yose says, “Anyone who alters the formula [for blessings] established by the sages does not fulfill his obligation.” R. Judah says, “[If one ate] any food which was changed from its natural state [through any processing], and … [var.: he did not change] [the formula of] the blessing, he … [var.: did not fulfill] his obligation.” R. Meir says, “Even if one said, ‘Blessed be He who created this object. How beautiful it is,’ he fulfilled his obligation.” R. Jacob bar Ah.a in the name of Samuel, “The law accords with the view of R. Meir.” A tradition concerning Rab support this [conclusion].63 [Nuesner edition]

According to R. Jacob bar Ah.a, both Samuel and Rav issue halakhic rulings in accordance with R. Meir and contrary to the general halakhic principle that R. Joh.anan had established: “R. Meir and R. Jose—the halakha is in agreement with R. Jose.” It is clear from elsewhere in the Bavli that Rav does not abide by the principles of halakhic arbitration transmitted in the name of R. Joh.anan. This passage from the Yerushalmi indicates that Samuel likewise does not seem to be beholden to those principles.

Prohibitions on days specified in Megillat Taʿanit A further instance involves a dispute between the tanna kamma (= R. Meir— see B. Sanhedrin 86a) and R. Jose with regard to the prohibition of fasting and eulogizing on days indicated in Megillat Taʿanit (the Scroll of Fasts): The restriction against mourning on the days enumerated in the scroll of fasts applies equally to the preceding day but not to the day following. R. Jose says: It is forbidden [to mourn] both on the preceding day and the day following. As for fasting, it is permitted on the preceding day and on the day following. R. Jose says: It is forbidden on the preceding day but permitted on the day following.64 [Epstein edition]

According to R. Meir (tanna kamma), it is forbidden to eulogize on the day preceding any of the holidays listed in Megillat Taʿanit lest one carry on the 63 Y. Berakhot 6:2, 10b; See Baer Ratner, Ahawath Zion we-Jeruscholaim, Berakhot (Vilna: Romm, 1901), 151–152. 64 B. Taʿanit 15b.

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same activity on the holiday itself as well, but one may eulogize on the day following, since by then the holiday is over and there is no concern that people will eulogize on the holiday itself.65 R. Jose argues against this, maintaining that it is forbidden to eulogize both on the day preceding the holiday and on the day following it. According to the tanna kamma, fasting is permitted on the day preceding and on the day following a holiday. R. Jose disputes this, maintaining that fasting is prohibited on the day preceding a holiday, while it is permitted on the following day. In the talmudic discussion that follows, R. Hiyya states: “R. Joh.anan said: The halakha follows R. Jose, that one is not to fast.” In other words, R. Joh.anan issues his ruling in accordance with the position of R. Jose concerning the days when fasting is forbidden (the day before a holiday), but he follows the ruling of R. Meir with regard to the days when eulogizing is forbidden (only the day before a holiday). Accordingly, R. Joh.anan issues a halakhic ruling concerning the days when eulogizing is forbidden in accordance with the view of R. Meir, and not that of R. Jose, contrary to his halakhic principle: “R. Meir and R. Jose—the halakha is in agreement with R. Jose.”

Reading the megillah (Scroll of Esther) The mishna in Tractate Megillah discusses the question of the point in the Scroll of Esther at which one must begin reading in order to fulfill his obligation: R. Meir says, [he must read] the whole of it: Rabbi Judah says, [he must read] from “there was a Jew” (Esth. 2:5); R. Jose says, from “After these things” (Esth. 3:1). … It has been taught: R. Simeon b. Yoh.ai says, from “On that night” (Esth. 6:1).66 [Epstein edition]

The talmudic discussion states: “R. H.elbo said in the name of R. H.ama b. Guria, who said it in the name of Rab: The halachah follows the view of him who says that the whole of it must be read” [Epstein edition]. In other words, the halakha according to Rav follows the view of R. Meir. Rav’s ruling is contrary to the general principles of halakha articulated by R. Joh.anan. However, one commentator maintains that R. Joh.anan rules in accordance with the position of Rav, that is, R. Joh.anan agrees that the halakha 65 Rashi, Taʿanit 15b, s.v. kol ha-katuv. 66 B. Megillah 19a.

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follows R. Meir, as opposed to R. Jose.67 His basic argument is ex silentio. Rav was the foremost authority in Babylonia, and R. Joh.anan the foremost authority in the Land of Israel. Therefore, he argues that R. Joh.anan could not fail to somehow convey, whether explicitly or by implication, his opinion on Rav’s view. Since R. Joh.anan remained silent, he must have accepted Rav’s ruling— contrary to his principle that we follow R. Jose against R. Meir. Why would he do so? This commentator suggests that R. Joh.anan ruled in accordance with R. Meir because he felt impelled to join the general opinion that dominated in his day. In the case of reading the megillah (Scroll of Esther), the dominant opinion was that of Rav. The commentator raises the further question of whether the legal prescription in the case of megillah is exceptional, and states (without examples) that “there are many like it.”68 In any event, for this commentator, use of the “silence” principle to determine R. Joh.anan’s view applies to the case of reading the megillah. In contrast, others maintain that if a dictum cited by the Talmud Bavli anonymously accords with the view of R. Meir, then the halakha follows R. Meir and not R. Jose.69 This limits R. Joh.anan’s application of his rule to cases in which R. Meir’s opinion is quoted in his name.

“R. JUDAH AND R. SIMEON–THE HALAKHA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH R. JUDAH” Tractate Shabbat records a dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon concerning items that it is forbidden to move on the Sabbath (muktzeh).70 R. Judah maintains that there is muktzeh, while R. Simeon maintains that there is not. Ulla, Rav, and Levi maintain that the halakha follows the position of R. Judah, while Samuel, R. Joh.anan, and Zeʿiri maintain as per R. Simeon: “R. Joh.anan too said, The halachah is as R. Simeon” [Epstein edition].71 There are a number of instances in this context in which R. Joh.anan ruled in accordance with 67 See Shaʿar Yosef, Horayot 3a. 68 Shaʿar Yosef, Horayot 3a. 69 See B. Sanhedrin 27a: “For the Tanna has taught R. Meir’s view anonymously” [Epstein edition]; ʻEn zokher, rule 45, 48b, s.v. halakha. R. Joh.anan must follow his rule of halakha ke-stam mishna (B. Shabbat 46a: “R. Joh.anan said: The halachah is [always] as an anonymous Mishnah” [Epstein edition]). 70 B. Shabbat 156b–157a. 71 B. Shabbat 156b–157a; R. Hananel, Shabbat 157a; Tosafot, Shabbat 156b, s.v. ve-ha (1). The Talmud Bavli indicates that R. Joh.anan ruled in accordance with the view of R. Simeon because Beit Hillel did so.

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the view of R. Simeon,72 contrary to the halakhic principle transmitted in his name: “R. Abba has laid down on the authority of R. Joh.anan that in a dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah.”73 [Epstein edition]

THE GENESIS OF R. JOH.ANAN’S PRINCIPLES The Talmud Bavli in Tractate Eruvin cites a dispute between R. Meir and R. Jose concerning a woman who must wait three months before remarrying, noting that R. Joh.anan rules in accordance with R. Jose.74 In his explanation of R. Joh.anan’s position, Rashi suggests a possibility of how the general halakhic principles of halakha transmitted in R. Joh.anan’s name evolved: Why should R. Joh.anan say that the halakha follows R. Jose, considering that he himself has already specified earlier: R. Meir and R. Jose—the halakha is in agreement with R. Jose? Apparently, R. Joh.anan did not formulate these general principles, but rather the Amoraim formulated them on their own.75

Given the statement transmitted in R. Joh.anan’s name (“R. Meir and R. Jose—the halakha is in agreement with R. Jose”), why did R. Joh.anan need to arbitrate the halakha in accordance with the view of R. Jose in this case? The fact that he did so indicates that R. Joh.anan did not formulate this general arbitration principle. Instead, the Amoraim formulated it on their own, in light of R. Joh.anan’s rulings. One commentator offers a more general description of the genesis of the halakhic arbitration principles. He writes that R. Joh.anan himself specified what the halakha is in a variety of disputes in the Mishna, clarifying whose view is adopted by the halakha in the various debates. His students, having heard his views in these debates, were the ones who consolidated them as general principles of halakha, and it was in this state that the principles reached Babylonia. The Babylonian Amoraim took these general principles of halakha to be 72 B. Shabbat 45b: “But R. Joh.anan said: In the matter of a lamp we accept no other view but R. Simeon’s” [Epstein edition]. R. Joh.anan maintains the same view as R. Simeon concerning what is considered muktzeh ma-hamat miʾus (muktzeh by dint of repugnance). 73 B. Eruvin 46b. 74 B. Eruvin 47a. 75 Rashi, Eruvin 47a, s.v. ve-lammah lei.

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statements explicitly made by R. Joh.anan, making it obligatory to abide with them.76 However, this is not the impression one gets from the text in the Yerushalmi, which discusses general halakhic principles that were indeed formulated by R. Joh.anan himself.77 It follows that these general rules follow R. Joh.anan’s view78 and that he is the one who formulated them.79

EXPLANATIONS OF R. JOH.ANAN’S APPROACH Some maintain that R. Joh.anan intended that his rules be applied only to certain disputes—those entailing de-oraita (biblical) laws, and perhaps some de-rabbanan disputes.80 Others suggest that these principles were formulated only in general,81 or that they were arbitrated as a statistical determination rather than a norm for ruling.82 Still others, however, are of the opinion that R. Joh.anan abided by the general principles of halakha that he established in an absolute manner, without changing his mind.83 R. Joh.anan was in need of general principles of halakha because he, unlike Rav, did not accept the rule that the halakha follows the more lenient position in all cases of ʿeruvin; he thus needed to create a system of rules for future cases.84 The Talmud Bavli in Tractate Eruvin raises an objection against R. Joh.anan based on the fact that his rulings seem to contradict the principles that he establishes.85 The sugya concludes: “Those rules were not unanimously approved, since Rab in fact did not accept them”86 [Epstein edition]. R. Hananel explains that the implication is: “But R. Joh.anan does adopt them.”87 According to 76 Yosef Z. Dinner, Haggahot ʻal Massekhet Eruvin, Betza ve-Sukkah, Bavli ve-Yerushalmi [Hebrew], vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Slobotzky, 1896), Eruvin 46b. 77 Y. Terumot 3:1, 42a. 78 Yavin shemuʿah 5:1, 98–99. 79 Rashi, Eruvin 47a, s.v. Rav let leih. 80 Shaʿar Yosef, Horayot 2a, 3a. 81 ʿEn zokher, rule 43, 47b, s.v. ve-daʻ. 82 Ephraim Urbach, The World of the Sages: Collected Studies [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988), 81. 83 Tosafot, Eruvin 65b, s.v. ikkelaʿu; Sefer mitzvot gadol, ʻAssin de-rabbanan, Hilkhot Eruvin, 244a–b; Nah.al ha-ʿarevim, Eruvin 46b, s.v. gemara ve-amar Rav Hama. 84 Maharsha, Eruvin 46b; Sefer mitzvot gadol, ʻAssin de-rabbanan, Hilkhot Eruvin, 244a–b; Beʾer Sheva, Eruvin 46b. 85 B. Eruvin 47a–b. See Hidushei ha-Ritva, Eruvin 47a, s.v. ella mi-ha. 86 B. Eruvin 47b. 87 R. Hananel, Eruvin 47b.

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R. Hananel, R. Joh.anan maintains the view that it is obligatory to abide by the general principles of halakha that he established. Some have argued that R. Joh.anan may have later given up the general rules of halakha that he established.88 This possibility finds support in a passage in B. Yevamot: “R. H.iyya b. Abba said: R. Joh.anan retracted” [changed his mind] [Epstein edition].89 However, that discussion then further suggests that this statement does not mean that R. Joh.anan repudiated his principles: “If he retracted [changed his mind], he did so on account of what has been taught at the Vineyard”—it is concerning the mishna of the vineyard that he changed his mind. As Rashi explains, R. Joh.anan changed his mind in the particular case of a mishna taught in the kerem [vineyard] in Yavneh—a reference to the Sanhedrin, which sat in Yavneh after the destruction of Jerusalem.90 R. Joh.anan changed his mind only in the specific instance discussed in the text; he never gave up any of the other general principles of halakhic arbitration. Indeed, the discussion in B. Yevamot (42b) goes on to suggest that R. Joh.anan tended to favor an approach to arbitration based on general principles: For R. Papa or, some say, R. Joh.anan stated: When a disputed ruling is followed by an anonymous one, the halachah is in agreement with the anonymous ruling; when, however, an anonymous ruling is followed by a dispute, the halachah is not in agreement with the anonymous ruling. [Epstein edition]

Similarly, among the principles quoted in R. Joh.anan’s name in Tractate Eruvin is the rule: “Wherever you come across a law which an individual authority relaxes and several authorities restrict, the halachah is in agreement with the majority who restrict it” [Epstein edition]. He further adopts some principles articulated by others: “In this respect he is of the same opinion as Samuel who laid down: The halachah is in agreement with the authority that relaxes the law in the case of a mourner” [Epstein edition].91 We also find R. Joh.anan’s important principle: “The halachah is [always] as an anonymous 88 David Halivni, Sources and Traditions: A Source Critical Commentary on the Talmud Tractates Erubin and Pesah.im [Hebrew] ( Jerusalem: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982), 138, n. 4. 89 B. Yevamot 42b. 90 Rashi, Yevamot 42b, s.v. mi-matni de-karmah. 91 B. Eruvin 46a; Rashi, Eruvin 46a, s.v. ve-savar lah.

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Mishnah” [Epstein edition].92 Nevertheless, it appears that R. Joh.anan may on occasion deviate from the general principles which he established, as seems to be the case in Eruvin 46a: Rabbah b. Bar H.ana stated in the name of R. Joh.anan: Wherever you come across a law which an individual authority relaxes and several authorities restrict, the halachah is in agreement with the majority who restrict it, except in this case where the halachah is in agreement with R. Akiba, though he relaxes the law and the Sages restrict it. [Epstein edition]

Even so, the words of Abaye in Eruvin suggest that these general principles of halakha as put forth by R. Joh.anan apply not only to the Mishna, but also to the Baraita.93 Accordingly, R. Joh.anan did not change his mind about the general principles of halakhic arbitration. Moreover, had R. Joh.anan given up the general rules of halakha, we would expect a clear statement of this in the talmudic discussion.94 Given that no such statement was formulated, it must be concluded that R. Joh.anan did not change his mind regarding the general rules that he established. Elsewhere, however, we find that “R. Joh.anan ruled: No inference may be drawn from general rulings” [Epstein edition].95 In other words, wherever a general rule is stated, there is no arguing specifically based upon the general rule, insofar as there may be a general rule that is stated inexactly or that does not include every instance pertaining to the rule.96 We cannot draw inferences from general rules because the rules are “not necessarily specifically pertinent” to particular cases.97 This source presents a very different view of R. Joh.anan’s rules, indicating that he does not feel bound by them at all. It is possible that when R. Joh.anan states that we do not draw inferences from general rules, he is referring only to the “general principles” found in the Mishna.98 Wherever 92 B. Shabbat 46a; Massoret ha-shas, Shabbat 46a. 93 B. Eruvin 47b. 94 For example, Shaʿar Yosef (Horayot, 1a) is of this view concerning Samuel: “For this is impossible, insofar as he [Samuel] does not have these general rules, for if he did, why was this not mentioned about Samuel along with Rav [in Eruvin 47b]?” 95 B. Eruvin 27a; B. Kiddushin 34a. 96 Rashi, Eruvin 27a, s.v. ein lemedin. 97 Rashi, Kiddushin 34a, s.v. ein lemedin. 98 R. Hananel, Eruvin 27a; Rashi, Eruvin 27a; Rashi, Kiddushin 34a, s.v. ein lemedin.

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the Mishna states, “With all …” or “Every, …” this is not meant literally. For instance: “With all [kind of food] may ʻerub or shittuf be effected, except water and salt” [Epstein edition].99 Even when the Mishna uses the term “except,” which ostensibly indicates that nothing else is excluded from the generalization,100 we cannot rely on this because there may be things that are not included in the general rule and not part of the exception made to the rule.101 Hence, the general rules of halakha apply, according to R. Joh.anan, in all areas except for the Mishna. In his commentary on the general rules of halakha at the beginning of the sugya in Eruvin, Rashi explains that these principles are not binding in all cases, but rather operate as per the notion of “the reasonably likely.”102 That is, when it is reasonable or makes sense to follow the view of the sage mentioned in these general rules, the ruling should be reached accordingly; if it is reasonable to follow the view of the other sage, then that other view is to be maintained. According to this explanation, R. Joh.anan indeed sometimes issued halakhic rulings that deviated from his general principles of halakha. A similar explanation can be reached based on the conclusion of the sugya: “Is it not possible that the rules are disregarded only where a ruling to the contrary had been stated, but that where no such ruling is stated the rules remain in force?” [Epstein edition]. (“Where it was said, it was said; where it was not said, it was not said.”)103 [The rules are disregarded only where a ruling to the contrary had been stated, but that where no such ruling is stated the rules remain in force.] The implication is that the general rules of halakha are only binding in general, when no special considerations are involved, and R. Joh.anan thus rules occasionally against the general principles of halakha that he established.104 According to a different perspective, whenever R. Joh.anan ruled contrary to the general principles of halakhic arbitration that he had established, this stems from the fact that the halakhot in question are not pertinent to the general principles or that a different general principle is in effect that is stronger than the principles of R. Joh.anan (such as “The halakha is [always] as an anonymous

  99 B. Eruvin 27a; B. Kiddushin 34a. 100 But in truth it does not (as in Eruvin 27a; Kiddushin 34a). See also Rashi, Eruvin 27a, s.v. ein lemedin and s.v. va-afilu be-makom, and Kiddushin 34a, s.v. ein lemedin. 101 See also Tosafot R. I. ha-zaken, Kiddushin 34a. 102 Rashi, Eruvin 46b, s.v. le-hanei kelalei. 103 B. Eruvin 46b–47a. 104 ʿEn zokher, rule 43, 47b, s.v. ve-heikha.

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Mishna”).105 This is the case, for example, in the dispute between R. Meir, R. Judah, and R. Jose about the question of the definition of one’s “master.” It is, further, reasonable to assume that R. Joh.anan’s occasional disregard for the principles that he established stems from the fact that the rules he enunciates in Eruvin are inductive (derived by his students from specific cases), while other rules were derived deductively from general sayings of R. Joh.anan. One prominent scholar suggests an additional possibility: that R. Joh.anan was an authority of great stature, and could thus permit himself to depart from his own principles in certain cases precisely to show his authority. Still another approach is that R. Joh.anan aimed to come up with a statistical halakhic assessment, not a normative prescription dictating how halakhic issues should be arbitrated.106

SUMMARY In light of the sources that we have seen, it is appropriate to conclude that R. Joh.anan is not consistent when it comes to issuing rulings in conformity with the halakhic principles of arbitration that he himself specifies in Tractate Eruvin.107 His reasons for deviating from his own principles of halakhic arbitration are not always specified in the talmudic text, and at times they remain unclear. I have explained here numerous ways of approaching this conundrum. The matter will likely remain a subject of controversy.

105 Shaʾar Yosef, Horayot 2a. 106 See Urbach, The World of the Sages, 81. 107 This same view is introduced in the works cited above in note 6.

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CHAPTER 13

Revisiting Contemporary Judaism in Modern Israel THE PROBLEM OF BEING JEWISH TODAY

S

etting aside the issue of defining who is a Jew, which is beyond the scope of the present discussion, leading a Jewish lifestyle requires the individual to address issues that involve many facets of life, including politics, military service, education, employment, and the public sphere. The main issue for Jews today who wish to find orientation and guidance in the world of Judaism is that modern Israeli society does not subscribe to a homogeneous worldview concerning this religion. Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) Jews typically form an isolated community characterized by halakhic extremism. Modern Orthodox1 Jews are also known as “crocheted yarmulka wearers,” a term used stigmatically by Haredi Jews to symbolize the supposedly more lax observance of Jewish laws by the former. While traditional Jews typically tend to “pick and choose” from the enormous range of practice-related options available in Judaism, secular Jews consciously reject a life based on Jewish traditions or laws almost completely. In this chapter I am not concerned with the two extremes: Haredi Jews and secular Jews conduct their lives within settings that provide for all their needs, and neither group finds any need to intervene in the other’s life. My main concern involves Modern Orthodox and traditional Jews. In many cases, the members of these groups are inclined to increasing strictness and extremism on all topics related to Judaism, as a result of ignorance. This stands in complete contrast to the situation in the distant past, and in glaring contradiction to the example set by Beit Hillel. In breaking down the main problem of Modern Orthodox and traditional Jews into more specific issues, let’s first focus on the absence of individual discretion. Today’s Modern Orthodox and traditional Jews tend to refrain from 1 Haim H. Cohn, Law and Religion [Hebrew] (Or Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Dvir, 2009), 710–716.

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applying unbiased objective reasoning to issues related to Judaism. They prefer to adopt one specific approach or adhere to the decisions of a single public figure almost exclusively, with absolute devotion, as if following the maxim: “Appoint for thyself a teacher” [Epstein edition]2 or “See [the moon] like this and then sanctify” [Epstein edition].3 However, these maxims, originally designed to guide individuals with regard to the determination of halakha, are not applicable to individual lifestyle choices. Nonetheless, a large number of observant Jews apply these maxims with fervor to their own individual lifestyle choices. We should not be surprised at this. It is a very convenient attitude because it removes any need for accountability. This approach allows one to rely on a figure of authority who directs the entire course of life of his Modern Orthodox or traditional followers. It thus releases the individual from the risk of an imposing sense of guilt. The problem is that individuals who rely on an authority in this manner also forgo the use of their own individual discretion in reasoning, which might lead them to different conclusions and an entirely different course of life. Another problem related to this major issue is that some Modern Orthodox and traditional Jews may also suffer from a lack of mastery and understanding of various Jewish source texts, texts that are not necessarily complex. Others, who have an appropriate level of understanding of the sources, prefer not to deviate from the normative Orthodox way of thinking. In other words, these individuals are not open-minded and are unwilling to consider other views, even if such views are not contrary to Judaism. An example of their inflexibility is their objection to the application of comparative analysis or literary criticism to Jewish source texts. The problem is that their approach leads to intellectual stagnation, has a paralyzing effect on the development and dynamics of Judaism, and is inconsistent with today’s reality. Another problem emerges when individuals accept interpretations or accounts that originate from the Aggada literature (third to twelfth century AD) as imperatives, or embrace various customs originating in the Kabbalah (twelfth to thirteenth century AD). Modern Orthodox and traditional Jews typically fail to distinguish between these two fields of Aggada and Kabbalah— which are not truly binding—and the codex of halakhic law grounded in the Talmud Bavli (third to sixth century AD) or Talmud Yerushalmi (third to 2 3

M. Avot 1:6. B. Rosh ha-Shana 20a.

Revisiting Contemporary Judaism in Modern Israel

fourth century AD), which is truly obligatory after having been perfected over centuries through the interpretive criticism of Mishna and Talmud scholars. A related issue concerns the adoption of new customs, or the transformation of customs originating in the numerous sects of the Jewish Diaspora. As is well known, contemporary Modern Orthodox Jewry in Israel is not homogeneous and comprises a broad range of sects, each of which maintains customs from various more or less recent historical periods. The problem is that some Modern Orthodox and traditional Jews do not recognize the unique significance of the traditions of their own sect. As a result, in Israel we see today a cross-sectarian adoption of customs, such as adopting prayers from other sects. In this way, the authentic customs and ancient traditions of each sect are lost. It is doubtful that they will ever be recovered. These issues prompt important questions. Jews in contemporary Israel who view these developments are justified in asking: what, then, is contemporary Judaism? What patterns of behavior should Modern Orthodox Jews in Israel follow? Is this relevant only for Modern Orthodox and traditional Jews? Should this contemporary modus vivendi be adopted by everyone?

A PROPOSED SOLUTION From an objective standpoint, the solution appears to be rather simple. What we need are persons of invigorating Jewish reasoning, persons of courage and critical thinking, able to eradicate any trace of behavior and customs that are not grounded in Jewish sources; impartial individuals who are not afraid to state the objective truth; individuals who will lead Judaism today as it was led in the past—as a tolerant lifestyle and no more; a Judaism that is free of any financial, political, social, or status interests. Only in this way will the majority of the Jewish people today be able to become close to Judaism, as they did in the past, when the majority of the nation followed the Jewish lifestyle advocated by Hillel. In fact, such a solution may have already evolved among us, for example, among Sephardic Jewry: By virtue of his extensive Torah-related knowledge, R. Ovadia Yosef of blessed memory successfully united all or most of the different Sephardic groups. One of his most decisive decisions was that halakha in contemporary Israel should follow the rules of the great Sephardic halakhist who lived in sixteenth century Safed, R. Yosef Karo, for two reasons: one, it is conventional that halakha follows the most recent Poskim, and two, R. Karo lived and operated in the Land of Israel. The entire Sephardic community

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accepted Yosef ’s view, on the basis of his halakhic authority. R. Yosef more or less conforms to the description in my proposal—an unbiased spiritual leader who fearlessly indicates the proper halakhic path even if it is not convenient. This is the reason that the members of the Sephardic community are his loyal followers, Sephardic Jews currently consider him to be the generation’s greatest halakhic Posek, and his rules are recognized as the supreme authority.

THE SOLUTION CHALLENGED However, what appears to be a solution to the problem discussed above has encountered an obstacle. R. Yosef ’s leadership and authority were challenged by what was reported on October 12, 2008 in Maʻariv, an Israeli daily, as a “Yemenite Rebellion.” The story under this headline opened as follows: “Eminent Yemenite rabbis challenge Yosef ’s halakhic leadership.” This challenge originated in a dispute on the following halakhic question: Should a blessing be recited over candles on Jewish festivals or not? R. Yosef ruled that reciting a blessing over candles on festivals is mandatory. One of the reasons he cited for his rule was his determination that everyone in Israel should follow R. Karo’s rules,4 by virtue of Karo’s eminence in halakha, because he was the last illustrious halakhic Posek in Israel, and because he lived and was active in the Land of Israel. For this reason, his rulings should supersede any customs that Jews brought to Israel from the Diaspora. In contrast, three of the most important rabbis of the Yemenite sect (R. Yitzh.ak Ratzab.i, R. Azaria Bassis, and R. Pinh.as Korah.) stated that the blessing on the candles should not be recited on festivals,5 thereby implying that it is not mandatory to follow R. Karo’s rulings. According to the three Yemenite rabbis, the original ancient tradition was that no blessing should be recited on the candles for festivals. They stated that this had been the custom in Yemen, and not only should this custom not be cancelled in Israel, but it should be retained. Moreover, these rabbis believed that by imposing R. Karo’s halakhic rulings, R. Ovadia Yosef was effectively eradicating all ancient customs of Yemenite Jews. This is a situation to which they remain strongly opposed. The dispute between R. Yosef and the three Yemenite rabbis makes our question even more pointed for all Jews of Yemenite origin born or raised in Israel: 4 5

Responsa Yabiʿa Omer, vol. 2, 58–59. Ha-Yad ha-hazakah, Hilkhot Shabbat 5:1.

Revisiting Contemporary Judaism in Modern Israel

Should they embrace the authority of the leader R. Yosef, adopt his decision, or follow the Yemenite rabbis? How can this crisis be resolved? The following proposal is pertinent for Jews of Yemenite descent, and is also relevant for Jews who deliberate whether to follow a Modern Orthodox or traditional Jewish lifestyle.

RESOLVING THE CRISIS A resolution of this crisis should be based on an understanding of the division of labor between rabbinical leaders and Modern Orthodox or traditional Jewish individuals. Current day Jews should accept the authority of the rabbis solely on halakhic issues and all Jews, whatever their descent or sect, Sephardic, Ashkenazi, or Yemenite, should follow the rabbis solely for their halakhic rulings. In terms of lifestyle, however, individual Jews should be fully accountable for their own actions. This does not imply that a rabbi cannot be consulted, but the final responsibility lies with the individual. This “relilogical” Jew is the new type that should develop in Israel today. Relilogical Jews should study diligently and become familiar with the Jewish sources. They should maintain an open mind and the ability to learn from other ways of reasoning, even if these are critical or oppose their own worldview, and they should learn to address them in a proper manner. They should be knowledgeable in halakha and creative. They should address contemporary issues independently before submitting any question to a rabbi for ruling, if they decide to do so. They should have the ability to distinguish between what is halakhically obligatory and what is not. They should distinguish between early and recent traditions and customs, and should be familiar with the customs of the various Jewish sects. They should strive to preserve ancient traditions and customs, and if they decide to deviate from these traditions, they should do so after an informed, reasoned decision making process based on their learning and historical knowledge. Most importantly, they should use their discretion in all matters, including matters of religion and Judaism.

THE CURRENT SITUATION Earlier, I stated that a new type of Jew should emerge in Israel today—the relilogical Jew. Although I originally thought that theory and practice were not proceeding at the same pace, I have come to the understanding that the first buds of a relilogical approach are already evident in current day Israel.

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What do I mean? I will illustrate. On December 4, 2008, morning radio host Ilana Dayan interviewed the late Uri Elitzur, a former leader of the Yesha Movement (which advocates Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria). Elitzur was questioned on the recent Supreme Court decision to evacuate a house purchased by Jews in Hebron (also known as Beit ha-meriva or, alternately, Beit ha-shalom, depending on the speaker’s perspective) and on the violent resistance to the evacuation by Jewish youngsters, acting against the police officers and soldiers who carried out the evacuation. Ilana Dayan posed the following question to the interviewee: “Would the youngsters in Hebron follow instructions given by their rabbis or leaders?”” Dayan wished to discover whether the youngsters would cease their actions if so instructed by their leaders or rabbis. Elitzur’s response was surprising. He said, “They follow their own conscience,” implying that on certain issues there is no justification for intervention by rabbis or leaders. Rather, each and every one of the youngsters considered the issue and decided to follow his or her own conscience, as relilogical Jews should. Parenthetically, I would like to emphasize that the new relilogical Jew, who does not rely on spiritual or political leaders but rather on his own judgment, may arrive at a decision that is right or a decision that has negative, illegal, or immoral repercussions.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE JEWISH INDIVIDUAL AND MODERN SOCIETY IN ISRAEL The relationship between the individual and modern society is a complicated and painful issue. I will not address Jewish society as a whole, but will concentrate on the relationship between the Jewish individual and modern Jewish society in Israel. Various proposals on this issue exist, but here I will discuss several of the more problematic aspects of this relationship, which encompasses many concerns, including whether the Jewish individual has a unique expression in modern society, and if so, what is this Jewish expression.6 How should relilogical Jews conduct themselves in today’s society? What kind of expression should be given to the positions of Jewish individuals on current religious issues? What is the attitude of the religious establishment to non-conforming individual approaches on issues pertaining to Judaism? 6 Moshe Halbertal, “Otonomya ve-samkhut ba-mah.shava ha-yehudit ha-modernit,” accessed May 2014, http://www.adifoundation.co.il/...%20articles/Moshe%20Halbertal.

Revisiting Contemporary Judaism in Modern Israel

The general answer to all these questions depends on the potential maximum degree of mutual tolerance between the individual and modern society in Israel. In other words, individuals can express themselves in modern society only in a state of mutual tolerance between the individual and modern society. This should also be the attitude of relilogical Jews to modern society: they must conduct themselves within the boundaries of the accepted norms of modern society in Israel, while modern society must allow them a proper and appropriate degree of freedom of action. This approach should also be applied to the worldview and judgments of relilogical Jews, as well as to current religious issues that emerge in various areas. Observant Jews need unlimited freedom of thought to allow them to use their own judgment. According to this approach, the religious establishment should also exhibit tolerance, openness, and progress by encouraging freedom of thought and by supporting individuals’ freedom of thought and ability to use their own judgment to express their opinions and realize their decisions or conclusions in practice, even if an individual’s perspective differs from the accepted norm, so long as it is within the extended boundaries that Judaism defines for individuals.

REDESIGNING THE IDENTITY OF THE RELILOGICAL JEW Resolution of the issue concerning the individual in modern society in Israel is a task relegated to various entities, including the government, society, and culture, but it is also an obligation of the individuals themselves. The individuals themselves must undergo a thorough, personal transformation to reshape their identity so that they ultimately attain the level of relilogical Jew. The process might be long and tiring, paved with internal conflicts and crises, but it is expedient and important, because it is the means for removing the various cognitive and practical “obstacles” and “subordinations” in various areas, mainly in issues pertaining to Judaism which, until now, were frequently dependent on a process of submitting questions to rabbis and receiving their answers. The new identity of the relilogical Jew on issues of Judaism7 should be manifest, first and foremost, in a more intense and thorough knowledge of the canonical sources of the Jewish people. The basic resources include the Bible, the various traditions of oral law in halakha and aggada, the Mussar literature, 7

Michael A. Meyer, Judaism Within Modernity: Essays on Jewish History and Religion [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2006), 127–128.

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Jewish law, and the traditions of prayer and liturgy,8 as well as Jewish traditions that serve as the basis of education in the home. Knowledge and application of all the above is the basic foundation for reshaping the individual’s identity in Israeli society to attain the level of relilogical that is necessary in Israel’s modern society.9 Failure to assimilate or apply this requirement to reshape individual identity according to the relilogical standard is currently perceived in Israeli society as a step backwards in a society that is quickly progressing in a different direction, immersion in an antiquated past, and something obsolete that should be abandoned entirely.

THE SOURCES OF THE NEW RELILOGICAL IDENTITY As early as the Middle Ages, Jewish philosophers expressed clear opinions concerning “thinking individuals,” or, in modern terms, “the thinking observant individual.” For example, in his volume Sefer Torat Hovot ha-levavot, R. Bah.ye ben R. Yosef ibn Paquda (Spain, 1050–1120) likens to blind men led by seeing men those individuals who do not think independently or form their own opinions but are rather dependent on the instructions of superior authorities. He describes people who believe in the singularity of God based merely on tradition without having arrived at such a conclusion on the basis of their own reasoning and understanding as: A group of blind men who each place their hand on the shoulder of the companion in front of them … until reaching the healthy leader … if he ignores them and does not warn them … an obstacle will hinder them all and they will lose their way, and may fall into a pit.10

He continues to ask: “Must we investigate the singularity in an academic manner or not?”11 His response is the foundation for the religious dimension of the new identity, and for the relilogical dimension, the “thinking” dimension

8 Eliezer Schweid, “Tarbut, kehilah ve-hemshekhiyut ha-ʿam ha-yehudi be-zmanenu,” in The President’s Study on World Jewish Affairs, eds. Sergio Della-Pergola & Amos Yovel ( Jerusalem: Hasifria ha-tziyonit, 2001–2002), 132–133. 9 Shay Ben-Yosef, “Restoring Jewish Communalism,” Akdamot 13 (2003): 110–113. 10 Sefer Torat Hovot ha-levavot, Kappah. edition, 49. 11 Sefer Torat Hovot ha-levavot, 50.

Revisiting Contemporary Judaism in Modern Israel

of that new identity, whose fields of reasoning and research might also encompass religious and theological matters, such as the singularity of God. He continues: Whoever is able to investigate this issue [the uniqueness of the divine] and everything else similar to it, through intellectual consideration … he is obligated to investigate it to the extent of his attainment and power of understanding … and anyone who does not investigate these issues and their truth, is penalized for acting faithlessly towards his Creator.12

From all this, the basis for the new relilogical identity can be clearly deduced. Any person endowed with mental capacities, with the ability of objective discernment, understanding, intellectual curiosity, and mental capability, is obliged to apply these to all of the subjects of this research. This is the obligatory aspect of the new identity’s “thinking” component. Exploration of all things religious and spiritual, and even concerning God’s existence and qualities, is an affirmation of the religious component of this identity. In other words, the fundamental essence of the new “relilogical” man was formulated as early as the Middle Ages, albeit using different words. The source and authority of this objective intellectual obligation stems from the same source, that is, God, who granted the individual his mental capabilities. Otherwise, for what purpose was his intelligence granted him? If God did not wish for humans to think or make use of their mental faculties, he would have limited them from the onset, from creation, just as He did not want humans to live forever and therefore limited their lifespan and decreed death for human beings at the end of their days (Gen. 3:19). In light of all the aforesaid, those who do not utilize their abilities and faculties granted them by God but instead rely upon the opinions of others to do their thinking for them, without bothering to learn and think for themselves in order to form or express their own opinions, are likened to a blind man and a blind man is comparable to a dead man.13 Jewish philosopher R. Yosef Albo (Spain, 1380–1444) wrote similarly in his book Sefer ha-ʿiqarim, as follows: And I was obligated to write all this as I saw that there were frivolous people … lacking knowledge or understanding. From this derives the 12 Sefer Torat Hovot ha-levavot, 50 13 B. Nedarim 64b.

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From Albo’s statements, the basis for the new identify of the relilogical man can also be deduced. He “permits” any “wise person” (that is to say, man’s “thinking” aspect) “to inquire into the principles of the religion” in all religious matters as research objectives or researchable subjects. This is the “religious” aspect of the new identity, which is permitted to investigate all aspects of the faith. That is to say, if a person “thinks” that a certain “religious topic” (Albo uses the coming of the messiah as an example) is not one of the principles of the faith (in contrast to the opinion of Maimonides, who believes that it is one of the Thirteen Principles of the Faith15), this individual is not to be considered an apostate. In light of all the above, one can also deduce the basis for perception of the new relilogical identity.

ARE THERE LIMITS TO TOPICS FOR CONTEMPLATION BY THE RELILOGICAL MAN? In principle, any subject on which the Torah has not forbidden reflection is permitted for thinking and meditating, even if such contemplation entails evil thoughts. We learn this from the Torah’s words, “You shall not hate your brother in your heart” (Lev. 19:17). The Torah forbids one to silently hate his brethren, that is to say, to think evil thoughts about your neighbor. From this we conclude that thinking evil thoughts is not a transgression of the Law and is certainly not subject to punishment, so long as the Torah does not forbid it (nonetheless, evil thoughts indicate that such a person should be more virtuous and study the ethical literature to correct his ways). Beit Hillel also thought so, as evident in their difference of opinion with Beit Shammai concerning the biblical verse, “to see whether he has put his 14 Sefer ha-ʿiqarim, Mah.barot le-sifrut edition, 53. 15 Ha-Yad ha-hazakah, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 10:1.

Revisiting Contemporary Judaism in Modern Israel

hand to his neighbor’s goods. For every word of trespass” (Ex. 22:7–8). Beit Shammai explains: “This is to intimate liability for [expressed] intention as for actual deed.” Beit Hillel explains: “He is not responsible unless he actually misappropriates it” [Epstein edition].16 Their disagreement concerns the boundaries of topics for contemplation. According to Beit Shammai, an evil thought is just like an evil act and it is forbidden. According to Beit Hillel, an evil thought is not an evil act until a person actually performs some action. The following discussion between the sages of the tannaitic period, found in the Talmud Bavli concerning the drafting of the final eight verses of the Torah (Deut. 34:5–12), relates to this issue of defining the limits of absolute freedom regarding topics of contemplation: The Master has said: Joshua wrote the book which bears his name and the last eight verses of the Pentateuch. This statement is in agreement with the authority who says that eight verses in the Torah were written by Joshua, as it has been taught: [It is written,] So Moses the servant of the Lord died there.17 Now is it possible that Moses being dead could have written the words, ‘Moses died there’? The truth is, however, that up to this point Moses wrote, from this point Joshua wrote. This is the opinion of R. Judah, or, according to others, of R. Nehemiah. Said R. Simeon to him: Can [we imagine the] scroll of the Law being short of one word, and is it not written, Take this book of the Law?18 No; what we must say is that up to this point the Holy One, blessed be He, dictated and Moses repeated and wrote, and from this point God dictated and Moses wrote with tears.19 [Epstein edition]

The disagreement between R. Judah and R. Simeon illustrates the point to which one can stretch the limits of topics of contemplation on religious matters. According to R. Judah, there are almost no limits. R. Judah entirely rules out the possibility that the final eight verses were written by Moses, based on the following rationale: How can one explain the fact that he wrote that he died if he had already died?! Since that is impossible, R. Judah concludes that Moses did not write the final eight verses of the Torah but rather it 16 17 18 19

B. Kiddushin 42b. Deut. 34: 5. Deut. 31: 26. B. Bava Batra 15a.

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was Joshua who completed the Torah’s final eight verses describing the death of Moses.20 At this point of the talmudic debate it does not record that anyone from among the sages vehemently protested against R. Judah’s statement. None of the sages admonished R. Judah for being a denier of the Torah; there were no provocations, sanctions, or violence of any kind. On the contrary, the discussion represents a legitimate difference of opinion between these sages, with each one holding a different opinion concerning the final eight verses of the Torah. Indeed, further along in the discussion, an opinion opposing R. Judah’s opinion is presented. According to R. Simeon, his opponent, the entire Torah, coming from God, was written by Moses, including the final eight verses.21 He is unwilling to accept the fact that the entire Torah was not written by Moses from God. On the other hand, he overcomes the impossible facts by developing his own description of the process: in this way he distinguishes between Moses’s state when writing the Torah (“Moses repeated and wrote”) and his state when he is requested by the Holy One Blessed be He to write about his death (“Moses wrote with tears”). This tolerance for differences of opinions between the sages without admonishing R. Judah for his unique opinion that so significantly differs from conventional thinking on such a sensitive topic as Moses’s writing of the Torah dictated to him by God, symbolizes the extent of the permitted limits of thought on any religious subject, which existed as early as the tannaitic period. Another example of stretching the limits of contemplation, linked to the text of the Torah, can be found in the Talmud Bavli where it states: “One taught: There was an assiduous student at Jamnia22 who by a hundred and fifty reasons proved that a [dead] creeping thing was clean”23 [Epstein edition]. The sages were puzzled: “It is puzzling, what was the sharp-mindedness it took to render the reptile pure when the Torah has already rendered impure.”24 That is to say, what was the sharp-mindedness, that is, what was the wisdom in striving to render a reptile pure using a hundred and fifty excuses when the Torah (force majeure) had already explicitly stated that this reptile was impure? Is it possible that a senior disciple disputed the Torah and none of Yavne’s sages even bothered to put him in his place? 20 21 22 23 24

B. Bava Batra 15a. B. Bava Batra 15a. Or Jabneh. B. Eruvin 13b. Tosafot, Eruvin 13b, s.v. she-yodeʿa.

Revisiting Contemporary Judaism in Modern Israel

This passage may be viewed as further evidence from tannaitic times of the limits of contemplation, including even subjects that openly appear in the Torah, which were ostensibly clear and should not have incited any differences of opinion, yet it is possible to stretch the limit of contemplation even if such contemplation is unconventional, such as the opinions of the above “assiduous learner.” However, one must note that in later times, for example in Maimonides’s time, the topics of thought permitted for the contemplative person were already limited, at least with regard to religious subjects, due to the fear of people’s limited capabilities. And so the Maimonides determines: Any thought that causes a person to uproot any one of the principles of the Torah, we are warned not to raise, and not to cogitate upon it, or follow the dictates of our hearts, because people’s minds are limited, and not all minds can perfectly encompass the truth, and thus enters into apostasy.25

Maimonides presents examples of prohibited thoughts, including thoughts about the Creator’s unity (“perhaps he is or perhaps he is not”), prophecy (“perhaps it is true or perhaps it is not”), and the Torah (“perhaps it is from Heaven or perhaps it is not”).26 However, as stated before, others including R. Albo in Sefer ha-ʿiqarim, did not accept Maimonides’s opinion on this point.

ILLEGITIMATE RELILOGICAL DECISIONS In the relilogical person’s decision-making system, it is not legitimate to oppose the commandments of the written or oral Torah or the rulings of previous sages. This is an accepted principle and so there is no reason to expand on this topic. However, there are other topics concerning which the relilogical individual may make illegitimate decisions, for instance, decisions on all universal issues. Let’s focus on ethics, for example. There is the universal, elementary field of ethics, which is a natural imperative and one that is accepted by the majority of intelligent people everywhere and in all times.27 Any decision by the relilogical person that goes against universal ethics would be an illegitimate one. The same 25 Ha-Yad ha-hazakah, Hilkhot Avodah Zara 2:4. 26 Ha-Yad ha-hazakah, Hilkhot Avodah Zara 2:5. 27 Avi Shafran, “Mussar ve-hevra ba-ʿidan ha-moderni,” in Hagut ʿivrit be-eyropa [Hebrew], ed. Menah.em Zohori and Arie Tartakover (Tel Aviv: Yavneh, 1969), 215.

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holds for universal justice, virtuous behavior, and so forth. It should be emphasized that all these tenets preceded the Torah, which underscores their universality as well their mandatory nature. Universal ethics and universal justice are known by the famous name, “the Seven Noahide Laws,”28 which predate the Torah. That good manners predate the Torah is concluded in the Mishna: “Where there is no good breeding there is no Torah,”29 which means that good manners existed before the Torah, and even existed in the prolonged period of the twenty-six generations before the Torah was given to Israel.30 Other issues are mandated by common sense. For example, if one borrows money or an object from a friend, he or she is obliged to return it. There are other topics that naturally obligate the individual, such as honoring one’s father and mother. This duty would exist even if it was not one of the Torah’s commandments. People naturally respect their parents. This is also true of other topics linked to mercy or compassion that a person performs naturally: even animals act in this manner, such as animal mothers who have compassion for their offspring. Therefore, any decision contrary to such principles would be considered illegitimate.

THE ESSENCE OF THE ARGUMENT UNDERLYING THE RELILOGICAL IDENTITY Everybody is required to study the Torah since that was the instruction given to Joshua, Moses’s successor: This Book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth; but you shall meditate on it day and night, that you may observe to do according to all that is written in it; for then you shall make your way prosperous, and then you shall have good success. ( Jos. 1:8)

The object of studying the Torah is for learning’s sake, as a commandment that must be observed and fulfilled, as stated in the verse. Those who study extensively and advance in their studies, “shall have good success,” or literally, become wise. They can then attain a higher level of skills in instructing and teaching others. And, naturally, they will be able to reach decisions on various religious matters by themselves and for themselves. 28 B. Sanhedrin 56a. 29 M. Avot 3:17. 30 Va-yiqra rabba, Tzav 9:3, Mirkin edition, 92.

Revisiting Contemporary Judaism in Modern Israel

Here is a simple example. A rabbi can decide on religious matters independently. He is not required to go to another rabbi to consult with him on the topic of his deliberation, although he may certainly do so if he wishes. His individual capacity to reach decisions on a specific topic stems from his extensive store of knowledge. Therefore, we can conclude that this also applies to the relilogical man, who is an intellectual and studies extensively and is knowledgeable on religious and Judaic matters. Similar to the rabbi he, too, can make decisions. He is likewise not obliged to consult with a rabbi if he does not feel any need to do so. This is a basic insight that Ezra the Scribe developed as early as the midfifth century BCE, when he came to the Land of Israel from Babylon and saw that the local Israelites were negligent in their observation of the commandments (Neh. 1:7; Ez. 9:2–3), they failed to observe the commandments relating to Temple service (Ez. 4:24) after the exile of “the carpenters and metal workers” (2 Kings 24:14). Ezra the Scribe hastened to rectify these digressions by transferring the authority to teach from the pedigreed theocratic elite (the priests) and the seers (the prophets), who had the authority to demand obedience, to the knowledgeable people (the wise men) who studied and knew the Torah. And so it is written: “ … and the Levites … helped the people to understand the Torah. … So they read in the book in the Torah of God clearly, and gave the interpretation, so that they understood the reading” (Neh. 8:7–8). The Levites who know the Torah are those who read and teach the Torah, based on their knowledge of the Torah and their ability to interpret and explain it to the people in an intelligent manner so that the people can understand the words of the Torah. Although Ezra learned from his rabbis, he was an autodidact. And so it is written about him: “For Ezra had set his heart to study the Torah of the Lord, and to do it, and to teach in Israel his statutes and judgments” (Ez. 7:10). Credentials or qualifications are insufficient because learning and knowledge are what confers upon a person the title of a learned sage. This was the case until the last student of Hillel the Elder: Beginning from Rabban Joh.anan ben Zakkai,31 all the renowned sages were called by their first names, such as Simeon the Righteous,32 Shemaiah, and Abtalion,33 without noting any 31 B. Sukkah 28a. 32 M. Avot 1:2. 33 M. Avot 1:10.

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rabbinical title whatsoever (“Rabbi is greater than Rav, Rabban is greater than Rabbi, and his name alone is greater than Rabban”34). At some stage it was even determined that a sage has precedence over a prophet. This is based upon the verse that we may gain “a heart of wisdom” [lit., a prophet is one who has a heart of wisdom] (Ps. 90:12, “‫)”ונבא לבב חכמה‬, which implies that knowledge gained through learning and study is more important than prophecy. In practice, since Ezra there have been no prophets, and the period of the sages, based on the importance of study that confers knowledge, began and has lasted until our own era. This was also what the sages determined: “Study is greater, for it leads to action” [Epstein edition].35 If people learn something, they will probably put it into practice, and thereby gain not only study but benefit from the action as well. But a person who merely performs the act does not profit from the study of the matter. All the aforesaid constitutes the foundation of the relilogical identity that should materialize in our times. With this higher level of the relilogical man’s stature, comes the obligation to utilize his abilities by inquiring into all matters, even those concerning the divine, as determined by R. Albo in Sefer ha-ʿiqarim, mentioned above.

ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF THE RELILOGICAL PRACTICAL METHOD From the Talmud Bavli we can also infer a practical technique for the relilogical man that applies to our own period as well. One of the accepted conventions of the Talmud’s rules is that no sage from the amoraitic period (third to sixth century СE) should contest sages from the previous tannaitic period. If such a situation nonetheless arises, the amoraitic sage is permitted to disagree only if he presents support for his opinion by referring to earlier sources or earlier sages from the tannaitic period who appear to agree with his opinion. Such a situation is described in the Talmud Bavli as tannaʾei hie36 or tania ke-vateih de-ploni.37 Borrowing from the field of logic, such circumstances are known as argumentum ad verecundiam or, in Hebrew (literally), “hanging from tall trees.” The analogy to this situation in our times is manifest in the relilogical man’s practical conduct, which is also based on an appeal to authority. One option is 34 35 36 37

Halikhot ʿolam, 9. B. Kiddushin 40b. Klalei Shmuel, 147. Klalei Shmuel, 145.

Revisiting Contemporary Judaism in Modern Israel

to pose a question to a rabbi, which is the easiest method, absolving one from learning the material or taking responsibility for his personal decisions. The second option is preferable, since it obliges one to thoroughly study the subject and assume personal responsibility for its implications. That is to say, in order to address any problem, one needs to thoroughly study the material on the topic, found in all the relevant and reliable sources, which will ultimately expand the learner’s knowledge base. In this manner, the inquisitive intellectual can independently make an appropriate decision on the topic of interest, without needing or relying on the decisions of others, and assume responsibility for the consequences of his decision. From his perspective, these reliable sources constitute an “authority.” As noted above, one example is the difference of opinion between the three Yemenite rabbis and R. Ovadia Yosef concerning the blessing over the festival candles, with their citing of tradition and Maimonides’s rulings. Another example of relilogical practice concerns topical questions on religion that emerge in a certain location, such as the construction of a synagogue in the heart of a residential neighborhood. To resolve the problem, two different and opposing points of view were presented. The first relies on “putting a question to the rabbi,” who determined that one cannot object to the construction of a synagogue in the heart of a residential neighborhood. The second position, representing the approach of the relilogical man, concluded, after having studied and examined the subject and the sources, that the community should be compelled to accept the construction of a synagogue only if no other synagogue exists there.38 The implication of this is that if other synagogues already exist in the area then another synagogue should not be built in the heart of a residential neighborhood. The relilogical man’s practical method can also rely upon a logical method or normative supposition, since they too were acceptable among the sages and can be applied today. A logical method that was already used by the sages in decision making was the a fortiori rule. One classic example from the sages is based on the story of Hillel and Bnei Beterah. They did not know whether bringing the Paschal sacrifice on the Sabbath overrides Sabbath prohibitions or not. Hillel answered them that the Paschal sacrifice defers the Sabbath, and based his statement on the learning method of analogy (gezerah shavah). This method requires knowledge of the theoretical study material—just as Hillel had learned from his teachers who were the great authorities in their generation, and application of this logical form of argument based on a fortiori reasoning (kal va-homer).39 38 Ha-Yad ha-hazakah, Hilkhot Tfilah 11:1. 39 B. Pesah.im 66a.

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An example of normative supposition about citations from the sages is a statement by R. Joh.anan (third century AD), who said: “If the Torah had not been given we could have learnt modesty from the cat, honesty40 from the ant, chastity41 from the dove, and good manners from the cock.”42 [Epstein edition] In light of all of the aforesaid, it is true today as it was in the past: a person may reach decisions on religious matters relying upon the logical method of a fortiori reasoning, on the condition that there are no contradicting statements, or decisions may be based on normative assumptions that meet a fixed logical standard and do not contradict statements that were discussed in the past and on which obligatory conclusions were reached. An example that is as relevant today as it was in the past is all matters related to the issue of whether life-saving defers or overrides the Sabbath.

SUMMARY This chapter opened with a short description of a problem within Israeli society, and its implications in terms of the halakhic radicalization that Judaism is currently experiencing in comparison with the past, focusing mainly on the Modern Orthodox and traditional sector, which accounts for a considerable portion of Israeli society. The source of the problem in these sectors is the loss of individual discretion; the absence of learning and the lack of learning ability; the failure to assume personal responsibility; and the unwillingness to bear the practical consequences of such responsibility. One solution proposed for all these problems is to encourage the public to designate an objective leader who would outline a proper course of action in Judaism, thereby resolving or avoiding some of the problems. Apparently, a practical opportunity for this course of action now exists, although the solution remains academic due to differences of opinion and lack of agreement on the path outlined concerning the issue of candle lighting on festivals, mentioned above, which illustrates the danger of a lack of consensus in the practice of Judaism. A second opportunity that has consequently emerged is based on the division between rabbinical authorities whose task is to teach Jewish law (halakha), and relilogical individuals who study, are calculated and

40 Lit., “[objection to] robbery.” 41 Lit., “[the understanding of] forbidden intercourse.” 42 B. Eruvin 100b.

Revisiting Contemporary Judaism in Modern Israel

responsible, and are able to reach decisions independently, even decisions on religious matters, based on their own knowledge. Thus, two distinct types of observant people have developed: The first, perhaps similar to the past, appeal to rabbinical authority on all matters, including matters that do not involve halakhic instruction; the second, the studious, rely on reason and are responsible and capable of making their own decisions even on religious matters, in light of their knowledge. These are whom we called the “relilogical Jews.” They appeal to rabbinical authority, but only on issues that they initiate and raise which are related to halakhic rulings.43 The first examples of this second type have already begun to emerge and they exist in certain places in Israel. The question is, will this trend continue to develop or not? Will there be sufficient tolerance between the solitary individual and the religious framework in Israel or will this phenomenon be terminated prematurely? Time will tell, since it depends on a restructuring of the relilogical identity and on the socio-religious framework that such people must confront. The second type of observant individual is not created ex nihilo. It is a legitimate concept: The sages have already referred to this type, as have Jewish philosophers in different periods who encouraged the perception of humans as “thinking” for themselves. It is impossible to prevent differences of opinion and deliberations on this concept, as well as on the topic of whether we should define limits or not, and if we do, what are the limits that should be defined. Still, all this is not new. Differences of opinion were common even among the sages, as they were among the commentators, on the limits of freedom of thought. Should these opinions also include theological matters or would this constitute evil thoughts or denial of the Torah? There are also related deliberations, such as whether some decisions are illegitimate, and if so, on what issues? Deliberations should not undermine the essence of the argument that speaks of the need for such a new identity today. This argument remains firm and indispensable. From a practical perspective, this concept is already in practice among quite a few observant people in Israel, who apply relilogical practices to various religious matters.

43 Eliezer Ben-Rafael, “Jewishness in a Multicultural Era,” in The Jewish People Today: Ingathering and Dispersion, Essays in Honor of Yosef Gorny [Hebrew], ed. Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Avi Bareli, Meir Chazan, and Ofer Shiff ( Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 2009), 430–431.

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CHAPTER 14

The Argumentation for Contemporary Peacemaking Efforts According to Jewish Tradition

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he Jewish concept of peace holds much relevance today. Israel is the only democratic state among all the neighboring Arab states in the Middle East, and since its declaration of independence in 1948, Israel has been repeatedly forced to defend its very existence and has consequently been involved in many wars with its neighbors. Israel aspires to live in a state of peace with all its neighbors, and to sign peace treaties to this end. As a secular sovereignty, state foreign policy should not be influenced by religious considerations, and similarly, contemporary Jewish conceptions should ideally not be influenced by political considerations. In practice, however, religion and politics are intertwined in Israel. Since there is no clearcut separation of church and state in Israel, any decision to sign a peace treaty which requires the support of all political parties including the country’s religious parties, necessarily demands prior determination of the issues involved from a religious perspective. Contemporary Judaism is characterized by challenging questions and numerous controversies concerning peace, viewed from various perspectives such as Jewish law, ethics, practical implications, and international implications. Although the opinions within Judaism are divided, they all support the concept of peace. Below, I will review the arguments that are presented in support of peace agreements grounded in the return or exchange of territories.

ARGUMENTS SANCTIONING THE EXCHANGE OF TERRITORIES FOR PEACE From a religious perspective, implementing peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors based on the exchange of territories for peace requires not only

The Argumentation for Contemporary Peacemaking Efforts

courage and open-mindedness, but also very persuasive arguments and reasoning that reconcile this formula with the belief system of religious Jews. Territorial exchange is a radical concept given the widespread opposition of religious Jews to any surrender of territories in exchange for peace. Nonetheless, the main supporter of this proposal was none other than the late R. Ovadia Yosef, patron of a religious party that is represented in the Knesset (Israeli Parliament), and considered a major Jewish judicial ruler by the Sephardic sector in Israel (constituting a major sector of Israel’s population) and in the Diaspora. He proposed various arguments and explanations for his support of the territories-for-peace formula. Below, I review his main arguments.1 The majority of Israel’s Jewish populace identifies as “secular,” meaning, having no connection to religion. As a result, this majority also does not see itself as obliged to follow religious rulings. Even so, a considerable part of society sees itself as “traditional,” that is, willing to treat with respect certain religious values that appeal to them on an individual basis. The “traditional” outlook also implies readiness to obey certain claims or positions based on an attitude of respect and appreciation for tradition. In addition, this attitude may involve recognition of the special status of an outstanding religious leader who has issued some particular religious imperative or instructions. This holds even when the particular religious ruling is opposed to the personal views of some individuals, who aim for objectivity. All this contributes to a situation in which, should a respected and generally appreciated religious authority, for instance Yosef in our case, raise religious arguments for the need to advance peace efforts in exchange for territory, the secular public in its entirety will not disregard this fact. And this will have the support of the traditionalists as well. For traditional society, the importance of the arguments raised cannot be measured by their logical content or their persuasion. The arguments derive their weight from the mere fact of having been put forth by an appreciated and authoritative religious figure. Hence, the idea of territories in exchange for peace may be accepted and may meet with the approval of a large part of the traditional public simply because of the appreciation and respect accorded to the religious figure in question. All this holds even though, when it comes to personal views held by individuals, different members of the public may oppose the position articulated by the religious leader. 1 Ovadia Yosef, “Messirat shetah.im me-eretz Israel bimkom pikuah nefesh,” Techumin 10 (1989): 11–28.

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Religious public opinion ascribes even greater importance to these arguments. Religious society in Israel most often resorts to these arguments to deny the possibility of returning land in exchange for peace. Bringing up arguments in support of the notion of territories in exchange for peace runs counter to the religious notions most commonly encountered among the religious population. The religious public’s consent with these arguments is bound to result in a shift of consciousness and profound changes in the thinking of many people who make up the religious population. That is to say, should the general public in the two sectors mentioned— the traditional and the religious—accept these arguments, each in view of the aspects most important to it, and offer general support for the idea of relinquishing territories in exchange for peace, such a development will suffice to advance attempts to achieve peace in the near future.

ETHICAL ORDER OF PRIORITIES: SETTLING THE LAND VS. PREVENTING LOSS OF LIFE Contemporary Jewish practice is based on the 613 religious commandments of the Torah. Various sages, such as R. Samlai,2 a third century sage who lived in the Land of Israel, considered this the total number of the Torah’s precepts, yet there is some disagreement regarding what is to be included among them. While all the sages concur that the commandment of pikuah. nefesh, or the saving of human life, takes precedence over all others (with the exception of idolatry, incest, and killing, which are forbidden even if complying with them entails the loss of life), it is disputed whether the precept of settling the Land of Israel is included among the 613 commandments. In fact, according to Maimonides, after the exile to Babylonia in 597 BCE the precept of settling the Land of Israel was not considered among the 613 commandments, and he did not include it in his book of commandments (Sefer ha-mitzvot). This was not included among the customary commandments in his days because it was only considered relevant for the time of the First Temple.3 However, according to Nachmanides, a thirteenth-century sage who lived in Spain, the commandment to settle the Land of Israel did exist his time, based on the verse “… when you have taken it over and are living there …” (Deut. 11:31).4 2 3 4

B. Makkot 23b. Yosef, “Messirat shetah.im,” 19–21. Ramban, Deut. 11:32.

The Argumentation for Contemporary Peacemaking Efforts

The issue of whether or not the instruction to settle the Land of Israel is a basic Jewish precept has implications for the possibility of leniency in relinquishing such settled lands. Obeying a commandment becomes a complicated issue when the practice of two or more commandments is contradictory. In such an event, the question of precedence arises. For example, establishing a Jewish settlement constitutes practice of the commandment to settle the Land of Israel. However, when a settlement is established within a predominantly Arab area, it entails danger to the settlers’ lives and, therefore, contradicts the pikuah. nefesh commandment which takes precedence over all other commandments. Both commandments are important, but the question is which takes precedence and for what reason. In the early 1990s, the majority of rabbinical opinions was that the commandment of settling the Land of Israel should be practiced at any cost. Following Yosef, a change occurred in the religious approach, giving priority to the commandment to preserve life. In his opinion, this latter commandment takes precedence over all other commandments, including the commandment to settle the Land of Israel.5

PREVENTING DANGER TO HUMAN LIFE The duty to preserve human life derives from the commandment of pikuah. nefesh, which is based on the verse “the man who obeys them will live by them” (Lev. 18:5) and not “will die by them” (Lev. 16:2, 13).6 For Yosef, the practical implication of this commandment in the contemporary context is this: If the refusal to return territories creates a danger to human life and an immediate risk of war instigated by the Arabs (which might otherwise be prevented if such territories are returned), then it is permitted to return territories belonging to the Land of Israel, in order to achieve peace.7

That is, it is more important to prevent an immediate risk of war (although this entails the return of lands) than to prevent a possible future war. According to the commandment to preserve life, if a war can be averted by returning land, then the land must be returned. 5 6 7

Yosef, “Messirat shetah.im,” 19, 25. Sifra, Ah.arei mot, Weiss edition, 86; B. Yoma 85b. Yosef, “Messirat shetah.im,” 16.

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The following points further reinforce the preference for relinquishing land in return for peace. (1) The commandment to preserve life also emphasizes the duty of caution—the duty to prevent endangerment to lives. Consequently, if the refusal to return land places settlers’ lives at risk, then land should be returned. (2) If the return of land does not endanger Jewish settlers, then the return of land creates no concern. The fact is, however, that it is dangerous to travel in today’s Judea and Samaria, territories that are expected to be subject to negotiations for return, and these territories are under military rather than civil rule. Travel and residence in these territories clearly pose a risk to human lives; and (3) There is no commandment that orders Jews to go to war and endanger themselves to maintain possession of territory.8 Therefore, there is no impediment to returning such territories.

“LO TEH.ANEM”—CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVING OTHER NATIONS So far I have discussed the issue of relinquishing land in order to obey the commandment to preserve life and prevent endangerment of life. Yet Maimonides also argues that land should not be relinquished because this seemingly contradicts another commandment, that of lo teh.anem (Deut. 7:2). The crux of this commandment is that it is necessary to prevent “other nations” from taking up residence in the Land of Israel. There are two interpretations that restrict the meaning of the phrase “other nations.” According to one interpretation, this commandment applies to other nations in the past, which no longer exist.9 The second interpretation limits the application of this commandment to nations who are idol worshippers (Deut. 18:14). According to both interpretations, Israel’s contemporary neighbors do not meet the definition of “other nations” and therefore this commandment does not apply to Arabs. That is, lo teh.anem creates no obligation to take active steps (including refusal to exchange territories for peace) to prevent settlement of the land by Arabs. Consequently, relinquishing territory to these nations in exchange for peace does not contradict the commandment of lo teh.anem.10 8 Yosef, “Messirat shetah.im,” 21–22, 24. 9 Ha-yad ha-hazakah, Hilkhot Avoda Zara 10:6. 10 Yosef, “Messirat shetah.im,” 14–15.

The Argumentation for Contemporary Peacemaking Efforts

Furthermore, another interpretation of the commandment lo teh.anem is “show them no mercy.”11 This does not imply that they should be killed, but rather that they should not be given any gifts and their beauty or grace should not be praised, in order to prevent assimilation.12 This commandment applies exclusively to the seven nations who populated Canaan when the Israelites entered the country in Moses’s time. Thus, this commandment does not apply to the nations currently living in this geographic region. If this interpretation is accepted, then no Torah commandment precludes the settlement of other nations in the Land of Israel. Consequently, there is no impediment to relinquishing land in exchange for peace. In other words, if the commandment lo teh.anem does not apply to the Land of Israel, and does not apply to the settlement of the Land of Israel by other nations, then there is no impediment to a territorial exchange with neighboring countries in order to achieve true peace.

THE COMMANDMENT OF CONQUEST The commandment of conquest was practiced in the era of Joshua and David, when the Israelites resided in Israel. However, although this commandment is sometimes invoked in support of the objection to relinquish territories, it has not been considered a practical commandment or part of the collective moral principles of the Israelites since the nation’s first exile in 586–538 BCE. It is believed that the commandment to conquer the land will again become applicable when the Messiah comes. But even if such a commandment existed, it could not be practiced today because of the absence of its prerequisites—ancient symbols of sovereignty, including a king. The king’s law requires that a king be anointed once the Israeli nation takes possession of and settles the land (Deut. 17:14–20), a Sanhedrin (a council of seventy-one members) be established as the supreme judicial instance for halakhic law, and divination be established using Urim and Tumim (Ex. 28:30), sacred implements carried by the High Priest that were used to convey God’s answers to queries (Num. 27:21). Furthermore, this commandment also requires that any such conquest of the land be absolute, that is, it should establish Israel’s complete, indisputable control. Since Israel does not have complete control over the occupied territories, 11 Yosef, “Messirat shetah.im,” 15. 12 B. Avoda Zara 20a.

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the settlers cannot be considered practitioners of this commandment. As a result, the return of settlements cannot be said to be a violation of the commandment to conquer the land.13 Contemporary application of the commandment to conquer the land is further refuted by the sages’ interpretation of the verse “that ye stir not up nor awake” (Song of Songs, 2:7). According to the sages, such as R. Judah (a Babylonian sage from the third century CE), this verse means that Jews should not initiate any actions that hasten the divine plan, or rush to perform any action that should not be performed in the present.14 Specifically, this implies that it is prohibited to return to the Land of Israel en masse, or in groups, and that it is prohibited to use force in order to return to the Land of Israel. In other words, any gathering of Jews designed to seize control of parts of the Land of Israel is prohibited, and therefore, no forcible action should be taken to occupy such areas.

ISRAEL’S INTERNATIONAL STATUS At present, the attitude to peace is motivated by one of the most important past and present Jewish considerations, which is the international dimension and the attitude of other nations toward Israel. One traditional argument against Jewish immigration and settlement of Israel is the international argument. In other words, global public opinion should be taken into consideration: what will the nations of the world say if all Jews demonstrate a desire to return to the Land of Israel? According to Jewish sources, “the Jews should not rebel against the nations of the world.”15 This statement has received numerous interpretations and meanings designed to justify the Jewish choice to remain in the Diaspora and refrain from immigrating to Israel, in order to appease other nations and prevent their anger. According to this interpretation, immigration to and settlement in Israel do not justify inciting the anger of other nations, and Jews should not use force to immigrate to or settle in Israel. This view implies that immigration to Israel and Jewish settlement should be performed only when such actions are sanctioned by the international community. Until this is possible, Jews should remain in the Diaspora. Today, such international consent exists with regard to those sections of Israel that the United Nations (UN) decided would be under Israeli sovereignty. 13 Yosef, “Messirat shetah.im,” 20–21. 14 B. Ketubot 111a. 15 B. Ketubot 111a.

The Argumentation for Contemporary Peacemaking Efforts

The State of Israel was established by a UN resolution in 1947 and the country abides by various international laws, including freedom of religious worship. International support in line with the UN resolution strengthens the religious justification for immigrating to Israel, since the UN resolution reflects international consent to partial Israeli sovereignty in the Land of Israel. The nations of the world have no complaints about those territories under Israeli sovereignty, and therefore there is no religious impediment that prevents Jews from immigrating to those parts of the Land of Israel (because it does not entail evoking the anger of the nations). At the same time, the assumption of international laws weakens the Jewish nation’s hold on the Land of Israel from a religious viewpoint, because any international intervention or subjugation to international law implies, from a religious viewpoint, incomplete control over the Land of Israel. Under such conditions of incomplete control, there is no impediment to return territories in exchange for peace. Furthermore, according to Yosef ’s explanations of Nachmanides’s writings concerning the commandment to conquer the Land of Israel, there is no obligation to occupy and maintain conquered territories if other nations oppose such action. According to this view, then, there is no impediment to exchanging territories for peace.16

PEACE FROM A SPIRITUAL VIEWPOINT One of the most important principles of the Jewish faith is belief in God and the requirement that all Jews should trust in God in all matters in order to be successful. Ostensibly, this also applies to the possession of land. However, the contrary view holds as well, whereby a person may place his trust in God only if he first practices all commandments. According to Yosef, the occupied territories cannot be held based on the belief that God will help the settlers prevail, because the current generation commits many sins against God and therefore, cannot and should not rely on God to ensure their success. A similar justification for maintaining a hold on territories is the argument that territories should not be returned, because ultimately God will perform a miracle and eliminate the need to relinquish territories. Here also, Yosef argued that it is impossible nowadays to rely on a divine miracle, because the nation’s spiritual condition is extremely deficient.17 16 Yosef, “Messirat shetah.im,” 14, 21–22. 17 Yosef, “Messirat shetah.im,” 17.

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COEXISTENCE AS A PRACTICAL NECESSITY IN CONTEMPORARY TIMES According to Yosef, contemporary reality dictates that Israel make peace with its neighbors because, in practical terms, it is impossible to expel the current residents of the territories, whatever faith they subscribe to. They are permanent residents of the country, and are protected by state laws. Therefore, peace is the only option, even if it entails the return of territories. Furthermore, he stated that it is inconceivable to use force to expel the nations living in the territories to other locations outside Israel and resettle Jews there in their stead, even if such resettlement is designed for the purpose of performing the commandments. To illustrate that there is no impediment to relinquishing territories in exchange for peace, he cited the precedent of several eighteenth-century rabbis who sold their homes to Arabs. This implies that there is no religious impediment to Arab residence in the Land of Israel, and therefore no prohibition on returning or exchanging territories for peace.18

SUMMARY It seems that the accepted worldview in Judaism has changed and a new attitude toward peace has assumed a significant, even critical place. According to the new attitude, peace is so essential that it is permissible to relinquish areas of Israel to neighboring countries in exchange for real peace and security for both sides. Also emerging from Yosef ’s statements concerning peace and the precedence of peace over settlement, is the fact that he calls to conform to his views by the sheer force of his personal authority as a scholar and judge. He stated that these views summarize what the Jewish nation should naturally practice.19 Historically, R. Ovadia Yosef, the spiritual leader of Israel’s foremost religious party, Shas, used his authority to instruct his representatives in the Israeli Knesset to vote in favor of the peace treaty with Jordan, which included a transfer of territories in exchange for peace. This peace treaty remains in effect to this very day, and continued to support peace based on a territorial exchange or surrender.

18 Yosef, “Messirat shetah.im,” 15, 21–22. 19 Yosef, “Messirat shetah.im,” 18–19, 28.

CHAPTER 15

The Concept of Peace in the Pentateuch

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his chapter argues that the concept of peace in early Jewish sources can be defined as existing on three levels. The first level encompasses the association between peace and God, between man and God, and between God and man, as well as the divine blessing of peace given by God to man. Next, I discuss peace as characterizing an individual’s state and a feature of one’s relationships with others, including one’s spouse and environment. I also discuss biblical Moses and Aaron as exemplars of peace. Finally, I examine the concepts of peace and war between nations, and the potential conflict between peace and truth. At present, although opinions within Judaism are divided on many issues, all Jewish denominations believe in the concept of peace, although each supports a concept of peace that is subject to different limitations or reservations.

THE JEWISH CONCEPT OF PEACE In Judaism, the concept of peace encompasses three main elements. First is the lexical meaning of the word “peace” which describes a condition—tranquility, serenity, quiet, that is, the opposite of the state of war. The second meaning stems from the correlation of the Hebrew word for peace, shalom, with other words that have the same root, and denotes completion, perfection, and reward.1 The third meaning of peace, which is based on Abravanel’s commentary, is universal harmony. Don Isaac Abravanel, a biblical philosopher and commentator who lived in fifteenth-century Portugal, interpreted the word “peace” as pertaining to the common good: “True peace [is] between opposing forces which [God] created in his world.”2 According to this interpretation, peace implies harmony and a 1 Baruch J. Schwartz, “Peace in Israel and the Nations—The Biblical Vision,” in Peace in the Jewish Heritage [Hebrew], ed. Baruch J. Schwartz and Moshe D. Herr ( Jerusalem: The Presidential Residence, 1997), 11–22. 2 Don Isaac Abravanel, Perush le-massekhet Avot, Golan edition, 49.

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reconciliation of different things, people, or opinions, with each element having its own unique contribution to the whole. Schwartz describes his approach to peace as follows: “Peace in an individual’s life is the state of harmony and serenity, goodness and tranquility, fecundity of the land and seed, physical health, and longevity.”3

PEACE PERTAINING TO GOD AND GODS ATTITUDE TOWARDS MAN The concept of peace is often used to describe God’s actions, and is reflected in several of God’s seventy (or, according to other sources, seventy-two) names.4 According to Rashi, peace is one of the names of God.5 Peace is immanent in God, or in God’s being, and has enormous universal significance. God grants worthy individuals a “covenant of peace” as a reward, a token of His appreciation of an individual’s commendable actions. In the book of Numbers, Pinh.as is awarded God’s covenant of peace (Num. 25:12–13). God treats Pinh.as as a perfect individual who demonstrated exemplary conduct during a crisis (Num. 25:6–8). Zimri ben Salu, president of the Tribe of Simeon, openly had intimate relations with a Midianite woman, and his actions became known to Moses and the entire nation. Everyone was distraught and no one knew what to do. Pinh.as was the first to regain his composure and put an end to the disgrace by killing them both. On the face of it, this is an absurd situation, in which Pinh.as killed two possibly innocent individuals who had not been convicted of a crime by any court, yet he is rewarded with a covenant of peace. The story, however, should be examined from a biblical perspective: Zimri’s actions were a blatant public expression of rebellion and protest against Moses, the God-appointed leader, and as such, were considered a sin in the eyes of God. When Zimri’s rebellious acts were initiated, the nation was smitten with a plague that killed 24,000 individuals. Pinh.as understood that if the sin was not cut short immediately, the plague would kill off the entire nation. Indeed, after he killed Zimri the plague stopped. As a result, God rewarded Pinh.as for his actions with a “covenant of peace”: God granted Pinh.as and his offspring special priestly status (“everlasting covenant of priesthood”) (Num. 25:12–13), which is the supreme status among the people of Israel. 3 4 5

Schwartz, “Peace in Israel,” 15. Bamidbar Rabba, vol. 2, Nasso 14:12, Mirkin edition. Tractate Derekh Eretz Zuta, Ha-shalom; Rashi, Makkot 23b, s.v. ve-sheʾelat shalom ba-shem.

The Concept of Peace in the Pentateuch

Rashi interprets the biblical phrase “covenant of peace” as indicating a relationship of amity between God and man. He uses the simile “… as a man who returns a favor”6 to illustrate the relationship with God in the story of Pinh. as: Pinh.as’s actions benefited God, and God rewarded Pinh.as for his actions. According to Rashi, the relationship between man and God is reciprocal, and a man’s actions can be rewarded in many ways, including a covenant of peace, as in the case of Pinh.as.

THE BLESSING OF PEACE God’s blessing is called “peace.” The majority of anonymous sages concluded this from Psalms (Ps. 29:11): “The Lord will bless his people with peace.”7 Peace is so important to God, and so significant an element in God’s attitude to man, that the word “peace” is used on a daily basis as a greeting whenever individuals meet each other, according to Jewish tradition. God greets his nation with peace every day through a special blessing conveyed by the nation’s supreme status holders, the priests. The priests greet the nation in the morning prayers, a greeting whose main message is peace, as we learn: “The Lord lift up His countenance on you, and give you peace” (Num. 6:26). As we see here, the blessing that God bestows is the blessing of peace. Another Biblical commentator, R. Abraham ibn Ezra, typically bases his interpretations on the specific linguistic character of biblical verses and oral traditions. He interprets this greeting as “no harm shall come to you, not from a stone or a wild beast, or an enemy.”8 According to Ibn Ezra, peace is the absence of harm or damage, a state of tranquility that surrounds the individual on all sides, as a result of which a person attains perfection, with no enemies and physical safety in daily life.

INDIVIDUAL “PEACE”—PERSONAL SAFETY AND WELL-BEING Genesis (Gen. 28:20–22) offers an account of Jacob’s vow during his journey from Beer Sheba to Haran. Jacob, the third of the three Hebrew forefathers, asks God to watch over him in his travels, to provide him with food to eat and clothes to wear, and to ensure that he returns “safely to his father’s house.” 6 7 8

Rashi, Num. 25:12. B. Megillah 18a. Ibn Ezra, Num. 6:26.

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Midrashim add interpretive details to Jacob’s request, such as avoidance of bloodshed,9 wholeness of the body,10 and absence of illness.11 These midrashim, which mainly rely on early aggadic sources from the second century CE onward, interpret Jacob’s request for peace as specific requests concerning his personal affairs, the realization of which is considered his own individual peace based on his personal interests: the request for a good livelihood, the request that he never be compelled to harm others, and the request that he himself not be harmed by disease or by others. These are all existential and commonplace requests that in being realized create peace for the individual, ensuring his concrete existence—in this case, that of Jacob. In contrast, another midrash interprets the verse “I return to my father’s house in safety” (Gen. 28:21) as a request for personal peace from a different perspective.12 According to this midrash, Jacob does not request all the elements noted above but rather asks for inner peace for himself, that is, to live in peace, with no inner conflict within himself and within others in general. Ibn Ezra also interprets the verse “Now Jacob came safely to the city of Shekhem” (Gen. 33:18) as “he comes in peace, so that no event should befall him,” or no harm be caused to him by anything.13 In this condition he is physically whole, meaning that he was not distracted, injured, or harmed by any adverse event, and he is content with himself and his environment. Rashi, however, rejects such a simplistic explanation of this verse and he interprets “returns safely” from a spiritual perspective as “perfect without sin, so that I should not learn [the ways of sin] in Laban’s house.”14 Laban was Jacob’s uncle (his mother’s brother) (Gen. 28:5). Jacob was sent at his father’s request to his mother’s family in Aram, to find a woman to marry (Gen. 28:1–2). Rav, an early third-century Babylonian sage, expresses a combination of these two approaches of Ibn Ezra and Rashi, the material and the spiritual. Rav interprets “return in safety” based on another verse that appears later in the story of Jacob: “And Jacob came safely (shalem)” (Gen. 33:18) and he says, “Bodily whole [sound], financially whole, and whole in his learning” [Epstein edition].15 On this verse, Rashi states, 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Bereshit Rabba, vol. 3, Va-yetze 70:4, Mirkin edition. Yalkut Shimʿoni, Job 908, Salonique edition, 173. Seforno, Gen. 28:21. Yalkut Shimʿoni, Job 908, Salonique edition, 173. Ibn Ezra, Gen. 33:18. Rashi, Gen. 28:21. B. Shabbat 33b.

The Concept of Peace in the Pentateuch Whole in his body [means] he was cured of his limp; whole in his money [means] he did not lose money despite the monetary value of his gift [to his brother Esau]; and whole in his learning [means] that he did not forget his learning while he was in Laban’s house.16

Rashi’s grandson, R. Samuel ben Meir (Rashbam), who lived in France in the twelfth century, uses a stylistic feature and logical argument to reject his grandfather’s interpretation. He stated: He who interprets [the word] whole (shalem) as a whole in his learning and in his money—is in error because this is not the typical style of the Bible, and in any case, what is the point—for such a small gift as was given to Esau, what was the need to write it in this way?17

Literally, Rashbam is right, because the Bible typically does not note whether an individual who granted a gift was reimbursed for the value of the gift he gave, especially in the specific case at hand in which Jacob gave a gift to his brother Esau in order to appease him and prevent him from harming Jacob or his family. Although the gift included a large number of animals and camels, it was considered a small gift compared to Jacob’s immense wealth. Therefore, Rashbam argues that Rashi’s explanation is not typical of the Bible. The Rashbam therefore rejects Rashi’s explanation and offers a new explanation of the word shalem. Rashbam is of the opinion that the word shalem (Gen. 33:18) signifies the town that Jacob had reached, which was Shekhem’s place of residence. In fact, the root of the dispute among the three commentators mentioned above focuses on whether the word shalem should be treated hermeneutically, as Ibn Ezra and Rashi argue, or literally, as Rashbam argues. In other words, these are two different perspectives, each with its own justifications. Jacob’s conduct and statements resonate with the Jewish tradition that fosters in each individual the ideal of perfection and the goal of becoming complete, because the individual is part of the whole. Thus, each person has an individual duty to aspire to wholeness and to attain inner peace with himself as a fundamental, material goal in life. In my opinion, Rashbam’s literal approach has greater merit than the exegetic approach, because the literal approach is 16 Rashi, Gen. 33:18. 17 Rashbam, Gen. 33:18.

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closer to the realistic meaning of the biblical text and does not impose any interpretations that diverge from the simple meaning of the text.

PEACE AMONG FRIENDS Peace among friends is commanded by the Pentateuch in the book of Leviticus (Lev. 19:18): “You shall love thy neighbor as yourself.” Of this verse R. Akiba says, “this is a major rule in the Bible.”18 Maimonides states that this is one of the 613 commandments that observant Jews are obligated to perform: “All persons are commanded to love each person in Israel as they love their own self.”19 The biblical verse entreats one to love every man, whichever nation he belongs to, as a human being. This also appears in the New Testament: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as they self” (Matthew 19:19; Mark 12:31; Paul, Romans 13:9). Still, with regard to members of the Hebrew nation, this verse is also a practical commandment. As Maimonides elaborates: “A person should love others just as he loves himself; a person should care for the property of others just as he cares for his own property; a person should aspire to things for his friends, just as he aspires to things for himself.”20 This is also true for all other things such as a friend’s dignity, his interests, retelling his good deeds, and treating him with affection and respect.21 This type of behavior leads to peace between companions in society because it prevents any possibility of improper conduct or infliction of harm.22 The following story about Shammai and Hillel, two first-century sages, shows a moral suitable for social relations, which is a classic example of peace among friends: A gentile once came to Shammai and wanted to convert to Judaism. But he insisted on learning the entire Torah while standing on one foot. Shammai rejected him, so he went to Hillel, who taught him: “What is hateful to you, do not to your neighbour: that is the whole Torah, while the rest is the commentary thereof; go and learn it.”23 [Epstein edition] Shammai rejected the gentile’s request to convert while standing on one foot because he considered it a snub that reflected contempt for the Torah (since it is not practically feasible to learn the entire Torah in this manner). 18 19 20 21 22 23

Sifra, Kedoshim, Weiss edition, 89. Ha-yad ha-hazakah, Hilkhot deʿot 6:3. Sefer ha-mitzvot, ʿAsse 206. Sefer haredim, 9, Deitsh edition, 43. Sefer ha-hinukh, 243, Chavel edition, 321–322. B. Shabbat 31a.

The Concept of Peace in the Pentateuch

Hillel reduced the entire Torah to the single facet of peace in society: “What is hateful to you, do not to your neighbour.”24 This short sentence can be recited while standing on one foot, and it is based on the biblical verse “Love thy neighbor as yourself ” (Lev. 19:18). But even more so, every individual is commanded by the majority of the anonymous sages to live in peace with his friends and neighbors, and always be first to enquire about their welfare.25 Judging by the actions of Boaz, they must even invoke the name of God when making such enquiries, as Boaz invoked the name of God when he greeted the laborers in the field: “Just then Boaz arrived from Beth Lehem and greeted the harvesters; ‘The Lord be with you!’ ‘The Lord bless you!’ they called back” (Ruth 2:4). R. Joh.anan ben Zakkai, a first-century sage, is applauded for always being the very first person to greet anyone.26 The significance of peace among friends is reflected in the Jewish attitude to the Day of Atonement, the holiest day of the year according to Jewish tradition, on which Jews pray to atone for the sins they committed against God. Similarly, to atone for sins against people, individuals must ask forgiveness directly from those they have sinned against.27 The attainment of peace therefore requires not only that the individual refrain from fighting, but also that individuals work proactively toward the attainment of peace, through actions that include compromise or concessions. Furthermore, the absence of peace between individuals is an intolerable situation that might lead to a collective punishment by God, which is what occurred to the 24,000 pupils of R. Akiba, who died because they did not treat each other with respect.28 According to this story, peace among friends is difficult to attain. When an individual is compelled to make peace with his friend, the effort takes a huge toll in terms of the personal resources required to overcome his own sense of pride. Jewish tradition acknowledges this challenge, and strongly emphasizes and encourages peace among friends.

BIBLICAL MEN OF PEACE: MOSES AND AARON Several figures in the Pentateuch were known as men of peace, including Moses and his brother Aaron. The book of Numbers (Num. 16:1–35) recounts the 24 25 26 27 28

B. Shabbat 31a. Tractate Derekh Eretz Zuta, Ha-shalom; M. Avot 1:12; M. Avot 4:14. B. Berakhot 17a. B. Yoma 85b. B. Yevamot 62b.

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story of Moses’s dispute with Korah., who was Moses’s cousin, and part of his entourage. Korah. challenged Moses’s leadership, because he was angered by the fact that he had not received an official appointment that suited what he believed was his high status, as an important person who was closely related to Moses’s family. He, therefore, accused both Moses and his brother Aaron of being inappropriately patronizing or condescending. Moses was shocked by the accusation and his initial reaction was to literally prostrate himself on the ground (Num. 16:4). But, in contrast to what could be expected of an ordinary person, Moses did not reply. The absence of any verbal response, in combination with his physical reaction, symbolize Moses’s attempt to avoid a confrontation with Korah. and his desire to achieve a peaceful resolution of the matter. The nation’s leader was willing to humiliate himself and to personally go to Korah. to settle the matter peacefully, rather than use his authority to put Korah. in his place. Moses tried to convince Korah. that God had chosen himself as the leader, and to take back his accusations, otherwise he would be punished. Rashi interprets Moses’s actions as implying that disputes should not be prolonged:29 Moses made a personal effort to persuade Korah. and his company to make peace with him. There were no grounds for Korah.’s accusations, and Moses emphasized that his leadership and his actions comply with God’s orders and instructions. Moses was a theocratic leader and he proved this to Korah. through a test: God must choose who is right, and God chose Moses (Num. 16:5–7). Aaron is described as a man of peace. We learn this from the account of his death, especially when it is compared to the biblical story of Moses’s death. When Aaron died, it is written: “When all the congregation saw that Aaron had died, all the house of Israel wept for Aaron thirty days” (Num. 20:29), and when Moses died, the verse says, “So the sons of Israel wept for Moses in the plains of Moab thirty days” (Deut. 34:8). Although the period of mourning for both leaders was identical, the participants were not the same. The entire house of Israel mourned Aaron, with an emphasis on the term “house,” yet for Moses the mourners were “the sons of Israel” only, with no reference to the word “house.”30 Rashi views this difference as a significant one, and interprets the phrase “house of Israel” to include “the men and the women, because Aaron advocated peace and imposed love between rivals and between a man and his wife.”31 In contrast, Moses was not mourned by the women. 29 Rashi, Num. 16:12. 30 Tractate Kallah Rabbati 3. 31 Rashi, Deut. 34:8.

The Concept of Peace in the Pentateuch

Aaron’s method of instilling peace between two people in an argument was to speak to each party separately and say that the other party was very sorry. When the parties next met, they reconciled.32 Aaron employed a similar method in reconciling spouses. He would turn to the husband and say, “I doubt that you could find another woman like her” and convince the husband to reconcile with his wife.33 The following summarizes Aaron’s characterization as a man of peace: Hillel, the first century sage, described Aaron as a person who “loving peace and pursuing peace, [be thou] one who loveth [one’s fellow-]creatures and bringeth them nigh to the Torah.”34 [Epstein edition]

DOMESTIC HARMONY Peace is a fundamental element of the family. Judaism emphasizes the need for harmony and cooperation between spouses in order to build a joint home on harmonious foundations. In the Bible, the significance of harmonious domestic relations is reflected in the ritual related to wives suspected of being unfaithful (Num. 5:11–31). The sotah is a woman whose husband suspects her of being unfaithful, even though he has no proof. During the time of the First Temple (mid-tenth century BCE to 586 BCE) and the Second Temple (516 BCE–70 CE) in Jerusalem, the priests would test the truth of the woman’s claim that she had been faithful by having her drink holy water from the Temple sink in a cup into which a crumb-sized piece of the text of the sotah portion had been immersed (Num. 5:23): “In order to make peace between man and wife the Torah decreed, Let my Name, written in sanctity, be blotted out in water.”35 [Epstein edition] Erasing the name of God from a scroll is strictly forbidden, according to Rashi’s explanation of the verse: “You shall not act like this toward the Lord your God.”36 Still, God allowed His name to be obliterated by this water37 to test whether the woman was telling the truth and to facilitate a reconciliation

32 Tractate Kallah Rabbati 3; Tractate Derekh Eretz Zuta, Ha-shalom; Yalkut Shimʿoni, Malachi 588, Salonique edition, 139. 33 Tractate Kallah Rabbati 3. 34 M. Avot 1:12. 35 See B. Shabbat 116a. 36 Rashi, Deut. 12:4. 37 Sifrei, Nasso 16, Ish Shalom edition; B. Sukkah 53b.

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between husband and wife.38 The purpose of this test was to prove whether the woman was innocent or whether she had been unfaithful to her husband with another man. The test was conducted only when the husband had no proof of his suspicions and when the wife did not admit her transgression. According to the commentators, God would determine the woman’s guilt and the outcome of the test (Num. 5:11–31). When the wife insisted on her innocence, there were two options. If the water test proved that she had cheated on her husband, her husband would divorce her without being required to pay her the amount stated in her ketubah, their prenuptial agreement. If the wife was telling the truth, they would continue to live in peace. Herr argues that the use of this test changed over time, and from a test applied to unfaithful women to prove their infidelity, it became a test applied to innocent women to prove their innocence.39 The water test was designed to convince the husband of his wife’s innocence, lest he continue to live in doubt and suspicion, a situation that could create incessant tension and mistrust in their marriage. Thus, we learn that “peace between husband and wife” implies a normal, harmonious relationship. The Bible contains no instructions to perform such a ceremony in the event that a wife suspects her husband of infidelity. As early as the first century, R. Joh.anan ben Zakkai, a first-century sage who lived in the Land of Israel, suspended the use of this test. Apparently, adultery by both sexes was more common in his era: He claimed that the water test could prove the wife’s unfaithfulness only if the husband was free of sin.40 However, the test may have been suspended because the sages were uncomfortable with the fact that it was not being used for its original purpose (there were attempts to use the test for women who were unable to conceive).41 God attributed such great significance to domestic harmony between husband and wife that He exempted women from the obligation to perform the positive, calendar-dependent commandments such as prayers, the study of the Bible, or using tefillin (phylacteries).42 The rationale was to facilitate domestic harmony by allowing the wife to perform all her many domestic duties, which 38 Rashi, Sukkah 53b, s.v. laʿassot. 39 Moshe D. Herr, “Peace in the Philosophy of the Sages,” in Peace in the Jewish Heritage [Hebrew], ed. Baruch J. Schwartz & Moshe D. Herr ( Jerusalem: The Presidential Residence, 1997), 26–27. 40 B. Sotah 47a–b. 41 Sifrei, Nasso 19, Ish Shalom edition; B. Berakhot 31b; B. Sotah 26a. 42 M. Kiddushin 1:7; B. Kiddushin 34a.

The Concept of Peace in the Pentateuch

she might otherwise neglected had she been obligated to follow these commandments.43 I stress: this does not imply that women are domestic servants. Rather, the term “domestic harmony” represents a coordinated division of labor between the spouses, without which harmony is unattainable. The understanding and agreement to consent to such a division of labor does not detract from the status of any partner, but rather enhances peace and harmony within the nuclear family.

PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE NATIONS Judaism views peace as the normative relations between Israel and other nations. Not only during times of peace but even, and perhaps most importantly, during war, there is an obligation to initiate a call for peace with all nations and to avoid warfare. As the Bible says, “When you approach a city to fight against it, you shall offer it terms of peace … However, if it does not make peace with you, but makes war against you, then you shall besiege it” (Deut. 20:10–12). Even if the city does not make peace, the nation of Israel is obligated to first impose a siege against it in order to win and only then to conquer the city.44 This is the reason that R. Jose the Galilean praises peace and says that peace is great: “In time of war, nothing should be initiated but peace.”45 Moses chose to follow the instruction on international relations (Deut. 20:10–12) and refused to follow God’s orders to battle against Sih.on the Amorite (Num. 21:21) without first offering peace. Instead, Moses sent messengers to Sih.on to offer him terms of peace. Ultimately, God agreed with Moses (Deut. 2:24–32; compare Num. 21:21–24). Therefore, Moses cautions the people of Israel and tells them to always offer terms of peace to the enemy46 before going to war against any city or nation,47 as natural law (jus naturale, the laws common to all beings based on a rationale that can be inferred from nature, which represents God’s wisdom) requires.48 If possible, war should be avoided entirely, just as Moses did with the Edomites, by sending messengers to the King of Edom to request right of passage through his kingdom. The Edomites 43 44 45 46 47 48

Abudarham ha-shalem, Kroyzer edition, 25. Schwartz, “Peace in Israel,” 16–17. Tractate Derekh Eretz Zuta, Ha-shalom. Tanh.uma, Shoftim 19. Yalkut Shimʿoni, Hukat 764, Salonique edition, 265b. Herr, “Peace in the Philosophy,” 34.

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refused to grant this request, and instead declared war against Israel. The Israelites, however, circumvented Edom in order to avoid a war (Num. 20:14–21). Joshua, Moses’s successor, behaved in a similar manner: he addressed a letter of peace to each city in Israel before going to war against it. The people of Hivi and of Gibeon made peace with Israel, while thirty-one other kings preferred war and were vanquished.49 We also see that the wise woman from Avel Beth-Maʿakha (2 Sam. 20:15–23) reproaches Joab, commander of David’s army, for his attempt to destroy the city’s walls without first offering peace. Then she spoke, saying, “They were wont to speak in those times, saying: They shall surely ask counsel at Abel; and so they ended the matter” (2 Sam. 20:18). By doing so, she reminded him of the words of the Bible to first offer terms of peace before waging war. Joab admits his mistake: “Far be it from me that I should swallow up or destroy!” (2 Sam. 20:20). Maimonides firmly states that the nation of Israel should call for peace before initiating war. God commands that when the people of Israel come to wage war against a city, they must first ask the city’s inhabitants for peace. That is, they are obligated to ask them to make peace with Israel before any war is initiated.50 Maimonides elaborates on this commandment and applies it to all individuals. He states unequivocally that war should not be waged without first calling to the enemy for peace.51 Maimonides’s approach leads naturally to the principle of universal peace among nations. Peace is a supreme value and one of the three foundations of the world.52 Peace is the means through which Israel is blessed in its relations with other nations,53 and peace is the model that describes ideal international relations that have a significant contribution to world peace. In summary, all Jewish individuals and the Jewish nation as a whole, are obliged to strive for peace. Individuals should strive to achieve inner peace and peaceful relations with others in their environment, including their spouses, neighbors, and acquaintances. This universal rule should also be applied vis-àvis all nations at all times, including our time, as exemplified by Israel’s contemporary peace efforts.

49 50 51 52 53

Y. Sheviʿit 6:1, 36c; Devarim Rabba, Shoftim 5:14, Mirkin edition; Ramban, Deut. 20: 10. Sefer ha-mitzvot, Lo taʿasse 56. Ha-yad ha-hazakah, Hilkhot Melakhim 6:1. M. Avot 1:18. M. ʻUktzin 3:12.

The Concept of Peace in the Pentateuch

SUMMARY The concept of peace in the Pentateuch has three essential elements. First is the lexical meaning of the word “peace,” which is the description of a condition— tranquility, serenity, and quiet. The second meaning stems from the correlation of the Hebrew word for peace, shalom, with other words that have the same root, and denotes completion, perfection, and reward. The third meaning of peace is harmony. The concept of peace in early Jewish sources was defined in this chapter as existing on three levels: The first level encompasses the relationship of peace with God and man and vice versa, including the blessing of peace given by God to man. Next is peace as a condition of an individual’s state and an individual’s relationships with others, including relationships with their spouses and their environment. Finally, the concepts of peace and war between nations, and the potential conflict between peace and truth. Today, all denominations within the Jewish tradition believe in the concept of peace established in the Pentateuch, although each supports a concept of peace that has different limitations or reservations.

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Selected Bibliography Abramson, Shraga. R. Nissim Gaon. Jerusalem: Mekitzei nirdamim, 1965. Adler, Rachel. “The Brothel and Other Anomalies: Character and Context in the Legend of Beruriah.” Tikkun 3, no. 6 (1988): 28–32, 102–105. Albeck, Chanoch. Introduction to the Talmud, Babli and Yerushalmi [Hebrew]. Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1969. Aminoah, Noah. “Ha-netiya le-ah.idut ha-signon ba-talmud ha-bavli ve-hashpaʿoteha ʿal girsaotav.” Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies 3 (1985): 15–21. ———. The Redaction of the Tractate Betza, Rosh ha-Shana and Taʻanith in the Babylonian Talmud [Hebrew]. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Publishing Projects, 1986. ———. The Redaction of the Tractate Qiddushin in the Babylonian Talmud [Hebrew]. Tel Aviv: Levin-Epstein—Modan, 1977. ———. The Redaction of the Tractate Sukkah and Moʿed Katan in the Babylonian Talmud [Hebrew]. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Publishing Projects, 1988. Avishur, Yitzhak. “Darkhe ha-hazarah be-misparei ha-shlemut (3, 7, 10) ba-mikrah u-va-sifrut ha-shemit ha-kedumah.” Beer-Sheva 1 (1973): 1–55. Ben-Amos, Dan. “Context in Context.” Western Folklore 52 (1993): 209–226. Ben-Rafael, Eliezer. “Jewishness in a Multicultural Era.” In The Jewish People Today: Ingathering and Dispersion, Essays in Honor of Yosef Gorny [Hebrew], edited by Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Avi Bareli, Meir Chazan, and Ofer Shiff, 430–431. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 2009. Ben-Yosef, Shay. “Restoring Jewish Communalism.” Akdamot 13 (2003): 110–113. Boyarin, Daniel. Carnal Israel Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. ———. “Internal Opposition in Talmudic Literature: The Case of the Married Monk.” Representations 36 (1991): 87–113. Brand, Yehoshua. Ceramics in Talmudic Literature [Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kuk, 1953. Brandes, Yehuda “Mahpekhat ha-pessika shel R. Yohanan: klalei ha-pessika.” In BeDarkhei Shalom: Studies in Jewish Thought Presented to Shalom Rosenberg [Hebrew], edited by Benjamin Ish-Shalom, 515–535. Jerusalem: Bet Morasha, 2007. ———. “The Beginning of the Rules of Halakhic Adjudication” [Hebrew]. PhD diss., Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 2002.

Selected Bibliography Brooks, Roger and Joseph M. Davis. “Abraham Weiss as Exegete and Text Critic, The Case of b. Berakot 35a.” Semeia 27 (1983): 105–116. Bubis, Mauricio. “Medidat ha-merh.akim be-tkufat ha-mishna ve-ha-talmud.” Korot 7 (1980): 816–839. Cohen, Aryeh. Rereading Talmud: Gender, Law and the Poetics of Sugyot. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1998. Cohen, Avinoam. Ravina and Contemporary Sages: Studies in the Chronology of Late Babylonian Amoraim [Hebrew]. Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 2001. Cohn, Haim H. Law and Religion [Hebrew]. Or Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Dvir, 2009. Dalman, Gustaf H. Aramäisch-Neuhebräishes Handwörterbuch zu Targum, Talmud und Midrasch. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1967. Dinner, Yosef Z. Haggahot ʻal massekhet eruvin, betza ve-sukkah, bavli ve-yerushalmi. Vol. 1. Frankfurt am Main: Slobotzky, 1896. Elon, Menachem. Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles [Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988. Epstein, Isidore. The Babylonian Talmud, Seder Moʻed, ‘Erubin. Vol. 2. London: The Soncino Press, 1935. Epstein, Jacob N. A Grammar of Babylonian Aramaic [Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1960. ———. Introduction to Amoraitic Literature [Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1962. ———. Introduction to Tannaitic Literature [Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1957. ———. Mavo le-nossah. ha-mishna [Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1964. Eshel, Ben-Zion. Jewish settlements in Babylonia during Talmudic times [Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1979. Faur, José. Golden Doves with Silver Dots Semiotics and Textuality in Rabbinic Tradition. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1999. Fraenkel, Jonah. “Hermeneutic Problems in the Study of the Aggadic Narrative.” Tarbiz. 47, no. 3–4 (1978): 140. Friedman, Shamma. A Critical Study of Yevamot X with a Methodological Introduction [Hebrew]. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1978. ———. “Eh.ui parashiyot semukhot be-sugyot ha-bavli.” Seventh World Congress of Jewish Studies 3 (1977): 251–255. ———. “Hosafot ve-kitʿei sevara be-ferek ha-hovel (Bava Kama 8).” Tarbiz. 40 (1971): 423. ———. “Mivne sifruti be-sugyot ha-bavli.” Sixth World Congress of Jewish Studies 3 (1973): 400. ———. “Some structural patterns of Talmudic sugiot.” Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of Jewish Studies 3 (1973): 389–402. ———. Talmud Arukh BT Bava Mez. i‘a VI. Commentary [Hebrew]. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1990. ———. Talmud Arukh BT Bava Mez. i‘a VI. Text [Hebrew]. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1996. ———. Talmudic Studies, Investigating the Sugya, Variant Readings and Aggada [Hebrew]. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 2010. Gandz, Solomon. “The Astrolabe in Jewish Literature.” HUCA 4 (1927): 469–486.

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Selected Bibliography Gilat, Yitzhak D. “Lo titgodedu.” In Annual of Bar-Ilan University: Studies in Judaica and the Humanities [Hebrew], vol. 18–19, edited by Menachem Z. Kaddari, Nathaniel Katzburg, and Daniel Sperber, 84. Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan University, 1981. Ginzberg, Louis. Genizah Studies. Vol. 2. Jerusalem: Makor, 1969. ———. Geonica. Vol. 2. New York: Hermon Press, 1968. ———. On Jewish Law and Lore. New York: Atheneum, 1970. Ginzberg, Louis. Seridei ha-yerushalmi. Jerusalem: Makor, 1969. Goodblatt, David. “The Beruriah Traditions.” Journal of Jewish Studies 26, no. 1–2 (1975): 68–85. Grintz, Jehoshua M. “Aram naharaim.” Encyclopedia Hebraica. Vol. 5. Jerusalem: Massada Press, 1953. Gross, Michael, Yair Barkai, and Yosi Melamed. Different Readings of the Aggada [Hebrew]. Tel Aviv: Makhon mofet, 2008. Halbertal, Moshe. “Otonomya ve-samkhut ba-mah.shava ha-yehudit ha-modernit” (May 2014). http://www.adifoundation.co.il/...%20articles/Moshe%20Halbertal. Halivni, David. Sources and Traditions, A Source Critical Commentary on the Talmud, Tractates Erubin and Pesah.im [Hebrew]. Jerusalem: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982. ———. Sources and Traditions, A Source Critical Commentary on Seder Nashim [Hebrew]. Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1968. Halivni, Ephraim B. The Rules for Deciding Halakha in the Talmud [Hebrew]. Lod: The Habermann Institute for Literary Research, 1998. Hauptman, Judith. “Nashim be-massekhet eruvin - miʾtelut hevratit le-‘atzmaut hukit.” Mada‘ei ha-yahadut 40 (2000): 152. Heger, Paul. The Pluralistic Halakhah. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003. Herr, Moshe D. “Peace in the Philosophy of the Sages.” In Peace in the Jewish Heritage [Hebrew], edited by Baruch J. Schwartz and Moshe D. Herr, 26–27, 34. Jerusalem: The Presidential Residence, 1997. Hidary, Richard. Dispute for the Sake of Heaven: Legal Pluralism in the Talmud. Providence, RI: Brown Judaic Studies, 2010. Hofmann, Justin. “The Student in Classical Judaism.” Journal of Jewish Education 38 (1968): 56–58. Horowitz, Chaim. Toratan shel rishonim. Frankfurt am Main: Slobotzky, 1881. Hyman, Aaron. Toldoth Tannaim ve-Amoraim. Jerusalem: Kirya Ne’emana, 1964. Jacobs, Louis. Studies in Talmudic Logic and Methodology. London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1961. ———. “The Numbered Sequence as a Literary Device in the Babylonian Talmud.” Hebrew Annual Review 7 (1983): 138–142. Jastrow, Marcus. A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli, and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature. Brooklyn, NY: Shalom, 1967. Kaplan, Julius. The Redaction of the Babylonian Talmud. New York: Bloch. Pub. Co., 1933. Klein, Hyman. “Gemara and Sebara.” JQR 38 (1947): 67–91. ———. “Gemara Quotation in Sebara.” JQR 43 (1953): 341–363. ———. “Some Methods of Sebara.” JQR 50 (1959): 124–146.

Selected Bibliography Kanfanton, Yitzhak. Darkhei ha-talmud le-R. Yitzhak Kanfanton. Jerusalem: Isaak Lange, 1980. Komlosh, Yehuda. The Bible in Light of the Aramaic Translations [Hebrew]. Tel-Aviv: Bar Ilan University, Dvir, 1973. Kraemer, David C. “Stylistic Characteristics of Amoraic Literature.” PhD Diss., The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1984. Krauss, Samuel. Kadmoniyot ha-talmud. Vol. 2, no. 1. Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1929. Kutscher, Eduard Y. A History of Aramaic. Jerusalem: Akademon, 1972. ———. “Aramaic.” Encyclopedia Judaica, 2nd ed. Vol. 3. Jerusalem: Keter, 1973. ———. “Aramit.” Encyclopedia Hebraica. Vol. 5. Jerusalem: Massada Press, 1953. ———. Hebrew and Aramaic Studies [Hebrew]. Vol. 1. Edited by Zeev Ben-Hayyim, Aharon Dotan, and Gad Sarfatti. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1977. Lévy, Tony and Charles Burnett, “Sefer ha-middot: A Mid-Twelfth Century Text on Arithmetic and Geometry Attributed to Abraham ibn Ezra.” Aleph 6 (2006): 57–238. Levy, Zeʾev. Hermeneutics. [Hebrew] Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1986. Lieberman, Saul. Tosefta ki-fshut.ah. Vol. 3. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1962. ———. Yevanit ve-yavnut be-eretz Israel. Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1962. Melamed, Ezra Z. “Nossah. mispar u-mishkal be-massekhet avot.” Sinai 50 (1962): 157–161. ———. Pirkei mavo le-sifrut ha-talmud. Jerusalem: Galʾor, 1973. Meyer, Michael A. Judaism within Modernity: Essays on Jewish History and Religion. Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2006. Millzeiner, Moshe. Hakdama le-torat ha-parshanut ba-talmud. Jerusalem: Millzeiner, 1986. Nádor, Georg. “Some Numerical Categories in Ancient Rabbinical Literature: The Numbers Ten, Seven and Four.” Acta Orientalia 14 (1962): 301–303, 313, 315. Newman, Louis. “The Work of David Weiss Halivni, A Source-Critical Commentary to B. Yebamot 87b.” Semeia 27 (1983): 93–101. Noy, Dov. “The Jewish Versions of the ‘Animal Languages’ Folktale (AT 670).” Scripta Hierosolymitana 22 (1971): 198. Obermeyer, Jacob. Die Landschaft Babylonien im Zeitalter des Talmuds und des Gaonats. Frankfurt am Main: I. Kauffmann Verlag, 1929. Olrik, Axel. “Epic Laws of Folk Narrative.” In The Study of Folklore, edited by Alan Dundes, 133–140. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965. Oppenheimer, Aharon. Babylonia Judaica in the Talmudic Period. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1983. ———. Galilee in the Mishnaic Period [Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1991. Pope, Marvin H. “Number, Numbering, Numbers.” In The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, vol. 3, edited by George A. Buttrick, 564. New York: Abingdon Press, 1962. Qimron, Elisha. Biblical Aramaic [Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1993. Rabbinovicz, Raphaelo. Dikdukei Sofrim, Eruvin Tractate. Jerusalem: Ma‘ayan ha-hokhma, 1960. Rappel, Dov. Targum onqelos ke-perush la-torah. Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1985. Ratner, B. Ahawath Zion we-Jeruscholaim, Berakhot. Vilna: Romm, 1901. Rivlin, Asher E. Munah.on le-sifrut. Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1998.

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Selected Bibliography Rosenthal, David. “ʿAl ha-kitzur ve-hashlamato: perek be-ʿarichat ha-talmud ha-bavli.” Mehqerei talmud 3, no. 2 (2005): 844. Rubenstein, Jeffrey. L. “Criteria of Stammaitic Intervention in Aggada.” In Creation and Composition: The Contribution of the Bavli Redactors (Stammaim) to the Aggada, edited by Jeffrey L. Rubenstein, 417–440. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005. Sabar, Yona. A Jewish Neo-Aramaic Dictionary. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2002. Sarah, Elizabeth. “Beruriah: A Suitable Case for Mistreatment … or Why We Haven’t Got the Sayings of Our Mothers.” European Judaism 26, no. 2 (1993): 14–23. Sarfatti, Gad B. Mathematical Terminology in Hebrew Scientific Literature of the Middle Ages [Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1968. Schiff, Wolf. Minh.at zikaron. Assifat zekenim. Rishon Le-zion: Yehuda Yechiel Institute, 1968. Schwartz, Baruch J. “Peace in Israel and the nations—The biblical vision.” In Peace in the Jewish Heritage [Hebrew], edited by Baruch J. Schwartz and Moshe D. Herr, 11–22. Jerusalem: The Presidential Residence, 1997. Schweid, Eliezer. “Tarbut, kehilah ve-hemshekhiyut ha-ʿam ha-yehudi be-zmanenu.” In The Presidentʾs Study on World Jewish Affairs [Hebrew], edited by Sergio Della-Pergola and Amos Yovel, 132–133. Jerusalem: Hasifria ha-tziyonit, 2001–2002. Shafran, Avi. “Mussar ve-hevra baʿidan ha-moderni.” In Hagut ʿivrit be-eyropa [Hebrew], edited by Menahem Zohori and Arie Tartakover, 215. Tel Aviv: Yavneh, 1969. Sirilio, S. Kelalei Shmuel. Jerusalem: Soefer, 1972. Sokoloff, Michal. A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic of the Byzantine Period. Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan University Press; Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2002. Stein, Dina. “A Maidservant and her Master’s Voice: Discourse, Identity, and Eros in Rabbinic Texts.” Journal of the History of Sexuality 10, no. 3–4 (2001): 390–391. Tur-Sinai (Torczyner), Naftali H. “Hashpaʿat ha-aramit ʿal ha-ʿivrit.” Encyclopaedia Biblica, 3rd ed. Vol. 1. Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1965. Urbach, Ephraim. The World of the Sages: Collected Studies [Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988. Valler, Shulamit. “Megamot be-ʿarikha sifrutit shel sugya talmudit, sugyat ʻEruvin daf 53b-54a– ossef ʿarukh shel sihot hullin.” Dapim le-meh.kar be-sifrut 14–15 (2006): 21. ———. “The Number Fourteen as a Literary Device in the Babylonian Talmud.” Journal for the Study of Judaism 26, no. 2 (1995): 169–184. ———. Women and Womanhood in the Talmud. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1999. ———. “Women’s Talk—Men’s Talk: Babylonian Talmud Erubin 53a-54a.” Revue des Études Juives 162, no. 3–4 (2003): 421–445. Valler, Shulamit and Shalom Razabi, Sih.ot hullin ba-talmud ha-bavli. Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2007. Weiner, David. “Shamma Friedman’s Methodological Principles.” Semeia 27 (1983): 47–51. Weiss, Abraham. ‘Al ha-yetzira ha-sifrutit shel ha-amoraim. New York: Horeb, 1962. ———. Heʻarot le-sugyot ha-shas ha-bavli ve-ha-yerushalmi. Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan University, Bar-Oryan, 1970. ———. Hithavut ha-talmud bi-shlemuto. New York: The Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1943.

Selected Bibliography ———. Le-heker ha-talmud. New York: Feldheim, 1954. ———. Le-korot hithavut ha-bavli. Jerusalem: Makor, 1970. ———. Mehkarim ba-talmud. Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1975. Weiss, Ruhama. Okhelim la-daʿat, tafkidan ha-tarbuti shel ha-seʿudot be-sifrut hazal. Jerusalem: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2010. Wünsche, August. “Die Zahlensprüche in Talmud und Midrasch.” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 65 (1911): 72–73. Yorborger, Shlomo. Be’er Sheva. Jerusalem: Ahavat Shalom, 1999. Yosef, Ovadia. “Messirat shetah.im me-eretz Israel bimkom pikuah nefesh.” Techumin 10 (1989): 11–28. Zur, Uri. “‘Al ha-mivneh ha-meshulash be-sugyot ha-bavli.” Te‘udah 16–17 (2000): 255–273. ———. “Chaining as a Structuring Means of the Sugya in the Bavli.” Revue des Études Juives 175 (2016): 415–423. ———. “‘Eitzuv kelalei halakha be-mivneh meshulash ba-talmud ha-bavli.” Netu‘eim 19 (2015): 122–130. ———. “Hashpaʿat shikul ha-daʿat ha-hilkhati be-ʻarikhat sugyot ha-bavli ʻal pessikat hahalakha.” Diné Israel 19 (1998): 217–240. ———. “Hatzeruf ‘halakha,’ ‘minhag,’ ‘nahagu ha-ʿam’ kederekh le-kviʿ at halakha.” Shaʾanan 12 (2007): 83–110. ———. “Mivneh meshulash kaful be-sugya ah.at be-bavli ʿeruvin (77a–78a).” Shaʾanan 19 (2013): 77–88. ———. Orr Israel, Sugyot in Tractate Eruvin [Hebrew]. Lod: The Habermann Institute for Literary Research, 1999. ———. The Tripartite Structure of the Sugyot: Studies in Tractate Eruvin of the Babylonian Talmud [Hebrew]. Ariel: Ariel University Press, 2016.

233

Index of Subjects Administrative language 51 Aesthetic purposes 97 Anonymous sugya 22, 29 Anthropomorphism/s 53–56 Aramaic 50–58, 60, 62–63, 68–72, 142 Astrolabe 126–128, 137–138 Astronomers 127 Azimuth 138 Beam/s 135–137 Binding fragment 31, 63–68 Binoculars 138 Chaining 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 16–17, 119–120, 122, 126 Congruent triangles 126, 128, 134, 137–138 Contextual reading 37, 43, 48 Diagonal 135 Double tripartite structure 119 Double–ending 117–118, 122 Erub of boundaries 75–85 Erub of courtyards 75–78, 81–82 Formal design 5 Formal stylistic 9 Genizah fragment 31, 63, 65, 70 Geometric pattern 7 Graphic pattern 6 Graphic sketch 6 Harmony (148), 215–216, 223–225, 227 Homily 109, 111–112 Horizon 127, (129), 131–(132), 138 Idiom of wisdom 64–65, 71 Intertextual reading 37, 39 Ius naturale 225 Knesset 207, 214

Land surveying 125 Laser range–finder 138 Lingua franca 50, 51 Mathematics 135 Methodology 99, 102, 105–106, 108–109, 113, 118, 120–121 Narrative 9–17 Onqelos 50–62, 64–70, 72 Opening question 116 Opposing school 75, 84 Optical lenses 126 Orthodox 187–189, 191, 204 Peace 206–227 Pythagorean theorem 134–135 Ratio 128, 135–136 Rectangle 135 Rectangular 134 Relilogical 191–205 Secular 187, 206–207 Stargazers 126, 128 Tenfold structure 90–91, 97 Textual reading 37, 39, 48–49 Theodolite 138 Three after three 119, 122 Three by three 33 Triangles 126, 128, 134–(135, 137–138) Tripartite structure 8–9, 14, 17–27, 29–33, 99–122 Tripod 138 Ultra–orthodox 187 Vertical incline 129, (138) Yavne’s sages 198 Zimun/Zimmun 153, 156, 164–165, 167–168

Index of Sources SCRIPTURES Gen. 1:27 56 3:5 54 3:8 54 3:19 195 8:21 55 9:6 58 11:5 54 18:22 55 28:1–2 218 28:5 218 28:20–22 217 31:47 51 33:18 218–219 34:23 65 37:15 65 49:21 59 49:24 59 49:27 60 Ex. 12:9 79 13:16 57 15:1 60 15:2 60 15:8 69 16:29 76, 79, 81 21:24 58 22:7–8 197 23:7 58 23:19 57 25:8 30

28:30 211 34:26 57 Lev. 3:2 30 16:2 209 16:13 209 18:5 209 19:4 79 19:17 196 19:18 220 23:11 56 23:40 57 24:20 58 Num. 5:11–31 223–224 5:23 223 6:26 217 10:21 30 13:27 64 16:1–35 221 16:4 222 16:5–7 222 20:14–21 226 20:29 222 21:21 225 23:3 68 23:8 51 24:17 61 24:23 61 25:6–8 216

236

Index of Sources 25:12–13 216 27:21 211 32:49 62 Deut. 2:24–32 225 7:2 210 9:10 56 11:31 208 12:4 223 17:9 170 17:14–20 211 19:21 58 20:10–12 225 30:12 109 31:19 19 31:26 197 33:2 61 33:21 62 34:5–12 197 34:8 222 Jos. 1:8 200

Ez. 16:33 51 Ps. 29:11 217 90:12 202 Prov. 31:2 51 Song of Songs 2:7 212 Ruth 2:4 221 Esth. 2:5 176 3:1 176 6:1 176 Dan. 2:4 52 7:28 52

2 Kings 18:26 50 24:14 201

Esr. 4:8 52 4:24 201 6:18 52 7:10 201 7:12 52 7:26 52 9:2–3 201 24:17 57

Jes. 36:11 50 58:13 76

Neh. 1:7 201 8:7–8 201

Jer. 17:22 76

2 Ch. 24:14 64

2 Sam. 20:15–23 226 20:18 226 20:20 226 23:5 45

Index of Sources

MISHNA Avot 1:2 201 1:5 38 1:6 188 1:10 201 1:12 221, 223 1:18 226 3:17 200 4:14 221

Berakhot 6:1 166 6:2 173 3:1 164 Terumot 11:10 156 Eruvin 5:4 76 7:6 110

ʻUktzin 3:12 226

Kiddushin 1:7 224

TOSEFTA Eruvin [Lieberman ed.] 1:16 92

Eruvin [Zuckermandel ed.] 2:5 92

MIDRESHEI HALAKHA Mechilta D’Rabbi Ismael [Horovitz-Rabin ed.] Beshalah. 5 60

Sifrei [Horovits ed.] Behaʻalotekha 102 88

Mekhilta D’Rabbi Šimeʻon b. Jochai [Epstein-Melamed ed.] Beshalah. 14:22 60, 84 Beshalah. 16:26–31 84

Sifrei [Ish Shalom ed.] Nasso 16 223 Nasso 19 224 Shoftim 160 58 Ve-zot ha-berakha 343 61 Ve-zot ha-berakha 352 60 Ve-zot ha-berakha 355 62

Sifra [Weiss ed.] Ah.arei mot, 86 209 Kedoshim, 89 220

MIDRESHEI AGGADA Bereshit Rabba [Theodor-Albeck ed.] Noah 32 88

Shemot Rabba [Mirkin ed.] Va-yakhel, vol. 2, 49:2 60

Bereshit Rabba [Mirkin ed.] Va-yetze, vol. 3, 70:4 218 Va-yechi, vol. 4, 99:12 59

Vayikra Rabba [Mirkin ed.] Tzav, vol. 1, 9:3 200

237

238

Index of Sources Bamidbar Rabba [Mirkin ed.] Nasso, vol. 2, 14:12 222 Devarim Rabba [Mirkin ed.] Shoftim 5:14 226 Tanh.uma Shoftim 19 225

Yalkut Shimʻoni [Salonique ed.] Hukat 764 225 Mal. 588 223 Job 908 218 Midrash Lekah. Tov Balak 24:17 61

TALMUD YERUSHALMI Berakhot 6:2, 10b 175 7:2, 11b 165

Pesah.im 3:8, 30b 164 6:1, 33d 78

Demai 2:1, 22d 164

Nedarim 4:12, 38a 61

Sheviʿit 6:1, 36c 226

Bava Mez. iʿa 2:12, 8d 163

Terumot 3:1, 42a 161, 173, 179 3:1, 42b 139 11:7, 48b 171

Horayot 3:4, 48b 163

Eruvin 1:10, 19d 77 3:4, 21a 78

TALMUD BAVLI Berakhot 9a 143 17a 221 31b 224 37a 141 38b 166 40b 174 41a–b 105 45a 164, 166 49b 146, 156, 165 52b 162 61a 88–90

Shabbat 31a 220 33b 218 34b–35a 173 42b 71 44b 144 45a 144, 158 45b 144, 178 46a 151, 162, 177, 181 69a 76 116a 223 130a 93 156b–157a 177 157a 158

Index of Sources Eruvin 2a 30 2a–b 30 3b 102, 104 4a 105 4a–b 105 5a 105 6a 30 6b 106 8a–b 28 8b 105 11b 27, 107 13b 198 14a–b 28, 120 14b 89 16b–17a 28 17a 76, 78, 96 17a–b 82 17b 75, 77 18a–19a 87 21a 23 21a–b 111 22b 91–92, 107 23a 91–92 26b 28 26b–27a 93 27a 93, 145, 149, 181–182 28b 28 29a–b 29 30b–31a 93 31a 94, 96 32a 24, 107 34b–35a 116 35b 80 35b–36a 83 36a 80 39a–b 93 40a–41b 27, 112, 117 40b 117 40b–41b 100 41b 3, 103, 118, 125 41b–42a 24, 112 43b 125–126, 129–131 46a 96, 150, 180–181

46b 80, 83, 96, 103, 106, 118, 139, 147–148, 161, 178, 182 46b–47a 25, 142–144, 148, 151, 182 47a 140, 149, 155, 159, 178–179 47a–b 179 47b 140, 162, 179, 181 49a 30 50a 113 50b 110 51a 84 53b 38, 71, 108 53b–54a 43 54a 29, 109 54a–b 108 54b 19 55a–56b 80 56b 80 59a 80, 83–84 59b–60a 30 62b 120 62b–63a 9 63a 119 67b–68a 106 72a 120 76a–b 119 77a 71 77a–b 118–119 77b–78a 119 79b–80a 115 80a 110 81b 115, 157 83a 158 85a 30 85b–86a 116 90a 110 90a–b 116 90b 71, 117 95a 96 95b 31 100b 204 101a 110 104a 29

239

240

Index of Sources Pesah.im 13b 93 49b 166 66a 203 99b–100a 172 100a 155 117b 115 119a 6 Yoma 12b–13a 162 65a 93 79a–b 166 79b 166 84a 93 85b 221 Sukkah 5b 105 5b–6a 105 26b 166 27a 93 28a 201 32a–b 58 33b 58 35a 58 53a 68 53b 223 Betza 4a 140, 148, 162 4b 140, 148, 162 34a–b 93 Rosh Ha-shanah 20a 188 Taʻanit 15b 175–176 26b 120

Megillah 3a 53 18a 217 19a 144, 176 28a 93 Moʻed Katan 8a 93 Hagigah 13b 60 16b 68 17b 84 Yevamot 42b 180 62b 221 64b 156 Ketubot 111a 212 Nedarim 20a 41 64b 93, 195 65b 93 Sotah 10b 59 26a 224 27b 60, 76–77, 83 30b 77, 83 47a–b 224 Kiddushin 2a 20 34a 145, 181–182, 224 40b 202 42b 197 Bava Mez. iʻa 33a 146, 151, 171 Bava Batra 15a 197–198

Index of Sources Zevah.im 5b–6a 169

Sanhedrin 4b 57 14a 92 27a 159, 177 27b 170 28b 170–171 33b 58 38a 112 56a 200 84a 58 86a 159, 170, 175 106a 61 109a 88, 90

Menah.ot 65b 56 Hullin 46b–47a 114 115b 57 Bekhorot 49b 146 Arakhin 2a 169

Makkot 23b 208

Temurah 2a 168 3a 169

Avodah Zara 20a 211

SMALL TRACTATES Avot De-Rabbi Nathan [Schechter ed.] A, 7 40 B, 16 40 Kallah Rabbati 3 222

Derekh Eretz Rabbah 6 44 Derekh Eretz Zuta Ha-shalom 216, 221, 223, 225

241

List of First Publications1  1. Zur, Uri. “An Opposing School of Redaction in the Babylonian Talmud Suggested.” Terumah 13 (2003): 175–183.   2. Zur, Uri, “Objectives of Sugyot—A Study of the Redaction of the Babylonian Talmud as Reflected in Three Sugyot of Tractate Eruvin.” Sefarad 66, no. 2 (2006): 251–264.  3. Zur, Uri, “Different Readings, Different Meanings: A Dialogue between R. Jose the Galilean and Beruriah the leader.” Australian Journal of Jewish Studies 21 (2007): 241–255.   4. Zur, Uri, and Yehuda Ashkenazi. “Land Surveying Tube in Early Judaism.” Review of Rabbinic Judaism 15, no. 2 (2012): 176–189.   5. Zur, Uri. “Ancient Aramaic and its Use in the Biblical Translation, Targum Onqelos.” In Burning Issues in Afro-Asiatic Linguistics, edited by Ghilʻad Zuckermann, 91–103. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012.  6. Zur, Uri. “Revisiting Contemporary Judaism in Modern Israel.” Journal of Literature and Art Studies 4, no. 5 (2014): 396–408.  7. Zur, Uri. “The Argumentation for Contemporary Peacemaking Efforts According to Jewish Tradition.” Sino-US English Teaching Journal 11, no. 5 (2014): 393–399.   8. Zur, Uri. “The Concept of Peace in the Pentateuch.” Journal of Literature and Art Studies 4, no. 10 (2014): 848–856.   9. Zur, Uri. “Applying General Rules of Halakha in Halakhic Exegesis.” Review of Rabbinic Judaism 18, no. 1 (2015): 1–22. 10. Zur, Uri. “R. Yoh.anan’s Attitude toward His Principles of Halakhic Arbitration.” The Torah u-Madda Journal 17 (2016-2017): 235–255. 11. Zur, Uri. “Chaining as a Shaping Feature of Tannaitic Source Text.” Arquivio Maaravi 10, no. 19 (2016): 1–8. 1

The chapters appear in order of their initial publication. For the present edition, the chapters were updated and adapted.

List of First Publications

12. Zur, Uri. “Towards a Talmudic Lexicon: The Aramaic Root ‫י‬.‫פ‬.‫ ק‬/ Q.F.Y. in the Light of a Story from the Babylonian Talmud.” Sefarad 76, no. 1 (2016): 197–209. 13. Zur, Uri. “Chaining as a Structuring Means of the Sugya in the Talmud Bavli.” Revue des Études Juives 175, no. 3-4 (2016): 415–­423. 14. Zur, Uri. “The Tripartite Structure in Sugyot from Tractate Eruvin of the Babylonian Talmud.” Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 16, no. 47 (2017): 3–18. 15. Zur, Uri. “The Methodology Utilized in the Redaction of the Tripartite Structure of Sugyot from Tractate Eruvin in the Babylonian Talmud.” Religions 126, no. 8 (2017): 1–16.

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