Studies in the History of Tax Law Volume Volume 10 9781509939879, 9781509939909, 9781509939893

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STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF TAX LAW These are papers from the 10th Cambridge Tax Law History Conference, which took place in July 2020. The papers fall within the following basic themes: –– –– –– –– –– –– –– ––

UK tax administration issues UK tax reforms in the 20th century History of tax in the UK The UK’s first double tax treaty The 1982 Australia-US tax treaty The legacy of colonial influence Reform of Dutch excises, and Canadian tax avoidance.

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Studies in the History of Tax Law Volume 10

Edited by

Peter Harris and

Dominic de Cogan

HART PUBLISHING Bloomsbury Publishing Plc Kemp House, Chawley Park, Cumnor Hill, Oxford, OX2 9PH, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA 29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland HART PUBLISHING, the Hart/Stag logo, BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2021 Copyright © The editors and contributors severally 2021 The editors and contributors have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as Authors of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. While every care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of this work, no responsibility for loss or damage occasioned to any person acting or refraining from action as a result of any statement in it can be accepted by the authors, editors or publishers. All UK Government legislation and other public sector information used in the work is Crown Copyright ©. All House of Lords and House of Commons information used in the work is Parliamentary Copyright ©. This information is reused under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/ open-government-licence/version/3) except where otherwise stated. All Eur-lex material used in the work is © European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/, 1998–2021. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-50993-987-9 ePDF: 978-1-50993-989-3 ePub: 978-1-50993-988-6 Typeset by Compuscript Ltd, Shannon

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Preface

T

hese are the papers for the tenth Tax Law History Conference organised by the Centre for Tax Law, which is part of the Law Faculty of the University of Cambridge. The Conference was planned for July 2020, as usual, but in light of the global pandemic it was not possible to hold the conference in person. Many of the contributors presented their papers at a virtual conference held on 20 July 2020, which was very enjoyable although also very different from what the presenters and regular attendees are used to. Despite the difficulties, we are happy that the tradition of making the papers available in this form continues, maintaining the high standards our publishers set themselves. We thank those who contributed papers and also those who participated in other ways. This was another successful conference, despite the circumstances. The contributions are again to a high academic standard and it was particularly pleasing to welcome some new contributors who can hold their heads up with those of the faithful. The conference continues as an important part of academic tax law life in both the UK and the many other jurisdictions again represented. The ongoing success has been such that there are plans for a Tax Law History XI, scheduled for July 2022. We usually use this part of the Preface to acknowledge the ongoing legacy of our founder, the late Professor John Tiley. That influence is as strong as ever, but this year we would also like to acknowledge the passing in January 2020 of one of our original participants, Jeremy Sims. Jeremy served as a General Commissioner of Income Tax for many years, and combined his interest in tax and in history in his loyal participation in the Cambridge conference. He was one of the few colleagues to have attended every conference since its inception in 2002, and in 2008 he contributed a piece on seventeenth-century poll taxes. His gentle good humour and support for the cause of the history of taxation will be greatly missed. Again, we owe sincere thanks to Sally Lanham at the Faculty of Law for her ongoing assistance in running the conference. Thanks also to Lucy Cavendish College, who were very flexible when we needed to adjust the arrangements at a late stage. We hope to be back with them ‘as usual’ for the 2022 rendition. Cambridge February 2021

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Contents Preface�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������v List of Contributors������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ix 1. The Revolt of Boudica and the Iceni – A Roman Tax Revolt (or not)?��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1 Jane Frecknall-Hughes 2. The Lead Ore Tithe and the ‘Poor Miners of the Peak’: The Lead Ore Tithe in Derbyshire in the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries�����������������������������������������������������������������������������25 Barbara A Abraham 3. Receivers-General of Taxes in the Initial Income Tax Period: Illustrated by Henry Austen, Receiver-General for Oxfordshire���������������53 John Avery Jones 4. An Innovation in Tax Administration: The Licensing of Dogs�����������������81 Chantal Stebbings 5. Forms and Formalities������������������������������������������������������������������������� 105 Richard Thomas 6. The Impact of the Two World Wars on the UK’s Tax Law��������������������� 137 John HN Pearce 7. Hole and Plug�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 167 Philip Ridd 8. 1988 and All that: The Fundamentals of UK Capital Gains Tax are Changed���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 199 David Collison 9. The 1926 Double Income Tax Agreement between Great Britain and the Irish Free State������������������������������������������������������������������������ 227 Sunita Jogarajan 10. Much Ado about Non-discrimination in Negotiating and Drafting of the 1982 Australia–US Taxation Treaty�������������������������������������������� 253 C John Taylor 11. Tax Reform for Innovation: Dutch Tax Policy in the Thorbecke Era (1850–72)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 287 Henk Vording

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Contents

12. Lex Aotearoa: A Moment of Intersection, the 1952 Commission of Inquiry into the Taxation of Maori Authorities������������������������������������ 313 Shelley Griffiths 13. Countering Tax Avoidance in Canada before the General Anti-Avoidance Rule��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 333 Colin Campbell and Robert Raizenne 14. The Colonial Taxation Policy, Income Tax and the Modern Japanese Empire���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 363 Shunsuke Nakaoka 15. The British Colonial Income Tax Model: Lessons from Cyprus������������� 389 Ntemis Ioannou 16. ‘An Embarrassing Precedent’: The British India–Mysore Double Tax Arrangement of 1919��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 407 Christopher L Jenkins

List of Contributors Barbara Abraham, Past Master of the Worshipful Company of Tax Advisers John Avery Jones CBE, Retired Judge of the Upper Tribunal Tax and Chancery Chamber, former Visiting Professor, London School of Economics Colin Campbell, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Western University David Collison, Chartered Tax Adviser, former Chairman of CIOT Education Committee and Vice-President of Eura-Audit International Jane Frecknall-Hughes, Professor of Accounting and Taxation, Nottingham University Business School Shelley Griffiths, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Otago Ntemis Ioannou, Tax Partner, Cyprus, Oxford MSc in Taxation Christopher Jenkins, Research Fellow, Clare Hall, Cambridge, Special Adviser to the Attorney General Sunita Jogarajan, Professor, University of Melbourne Shunsuke Nakaoka, Professor, Kokushikan University John HN Pearce, ex HMRC, Associate of the Institute of Taxation, PhD, University of Exeter Robert Raizenne, Adjunct Professor of Law, McGill University Philip Ridd, Law Reporter, formerly Solicitor of Inland Revenue Chantal Stebbings, Professor of Law and Legal History, Law School, University of Exeter C John Taylor, Emeritus Professor, UNSW Richard Thomas, Retired Judge of the First Tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber), formerly Inspector of Taxes Henk Vording, Professor of Tax Law, Leiden University

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1 The Revolt of Boudica and the Iceni – A Roman Tax Revolt (or not)? JANE FRECKNALL-HUGHES

ABSTRACT

B

oudica (or Boudicca, also Boadicea and Boudicea) is famed as a queen of the Celtic Iceni tribe, who in 60–61 AD led an uprising against the forces of the Roman Empire occupying Britain. Boudica was the wife of the Icenian leader, Prasutagus, who on his death divided his wealth between his two daughters and the Emperor Nero. Decianus Catus, the local provincial finance officer, considered that all the property should belong to Rome, although a levy on death of one-twentieth might more usually apply (admittedly, arguable). The outcome was that Roman forces seized the Icenian kingdom, stripped and flogged Boudica and raped her two daughters – a brutal outrage even by the standard of the times, precipitating the uprising, in which she was joined by the Trinovantes, a neighbouring tribe. Two main Roman historians wrote accounts of the rebellion: Tacitus (in the Agricola and the Annals) and Dio Cassius (in his Roman History), with the latter referring also to the general severity of Roman taxation as an underlying cause of rebellion. Particularly resented, it seems, was a tax on cattle by reference to the number of head (the scriptura), but the British tribes were subject to other taxes, like customs, land and property duties, and also had their grain requisitioned to feed the occupying Roman troops. Indeed, it is suggested that Decianus may have been sent to Britain to implement a new taxation system. This chapter will examine the revolt of Boudica in the light of the Roman taxation prevailing at the time. Other revolts against Roman taxation will be considered to provide a wider context for these events, as will the writings of Tacitus and Dio Cassius. However, the chapter will also consider the existence of Icenian wealth in more detail as a possible underlying cause of the Romans’ seizure of Prasutagus’ property.

2  Jane Frecknall-Hughes INTRODUCTION

‘Taxes appear to have formed one of the causes of the revolt of the Iceni, and are mentioned as oppressive in the harangue of Boadicea to her forces before the battle with Suetonius.’1 Burg2 also attributes the revolt in part to resentment against taxes imposed by the Romans – land and property taxes, customs duties, requisitions of grain to feed Roman troops and the scriptura, a tax levied on cattle by number of head. If a cattle owner could not pay this tax, he had to sell his cattle or borrow money at exorbitant rates to enable him to do so. Burg3 also comments that the provincial finance officer (procurator) was ‘greatly hated’ as he had been sent to Britain ‘initially to establish and supervise a new system of taxation’. While much of the foregoing may be true, evidence for it is, at best, scanty. Studies on Roman taxation and finances in general are: rather scattered … primarily due to the lack of broad evidence, which causes a fragmentation into several research fields that cannot be easily combined … where the exiguous literary evidence has to be compared with epigraphical, papyrological, and numismatic sources, using the full range of methods of analysis.4

The relevant materials for this chapter are extensive, in that they include all of the above sources, and the various secondary histories of the Roman Empire, Roman Britain, the Boudican revolt5 and studies on Roman provincial administration. However, this chapter is mostly concerned with the ‘exiguous literary evidence’ in regard to Boudica6 and the revolt of the Iceni, concentrating on the causes of the revolt. There are three main Roman sources for the revolt – Tacitus’ Agricola 14.3–16.2 and Annals 14.29–38 (both concise, but the second account is longer), and Dio Cassius’s Roman History 62.1–12.7 Tropes therefore 1 S Dowell, A History of Taxation and Taxes in England From the Earliest Times to the Present Day, vol 1 (New York, August M Kelly, 1965) 4. 2 DF Burg, A World History of Tax Rebellions (London, Routledge, 2004) 30–32. 3 ibid 30. 4 S Günther, Taxation in the Greco-Roman World: The Roman Principate (Oxford Handbooks Online) 2, www.oxfordhandbooks.com. 5 See, eg variously and recently: S Baker, Ancient Rome: The Rise and Fall of an Empire (London, BBC Books, 2007); M Beard, SPQR: A History of Ancient Rome (London, Profile Books, 2015); G de la Bédoyère, The Real Lives of Roman Britain (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2016); G de la Bédoyère, Roman Britain: A New History (London, Thames & Hudson, 2013); A Goldsworthy, Pax Romana: War, Peace and Conquest in the Roman World (London, Weidenfield & Nicolson, 2017); SP Kershaw, A Brief History of the Roman Empire (London, Robinson, 2013); D Mattingley, An Imperial Possession: Britain in the Roman Empire 54 BC–AD 409 (London, Penguin Books, 2006); P Salway, A History of Roman Britain (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993); P Salway, Roman Britain: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000); 6 The generally accepted version of her name is now ‘Boudica’: see PR Sealey, The Boudican Revolt Against Rome (Princes Risborough, Shire Publications, 1997) 13; K Jackson, ‘Queen Boudicca?’ (1979) 10 Britannia 255. 7 The texts used in this chapter are Tacitus, Agricola, trans M Hutton, rev RM Ogilvie (Loeb Classical Library, 1970) – hereafter Agricola; Tacitus, Annals 1–3, trans J Jackson (Loeb Classical Library, 1931), Annals 4–6 and 11–12, trans J Jackson (Loeb Classical Library, 1937), Annals 13–16, trans J Jackson (Loeb Classical Library, 1937) – hereafter Annals; Dio Cassius, Roman History 61–70,

The Revolt of Boudica and the Iceni – A Roman Tax Revolt (or not)?  3 associated with Roman and Greek historiography, such as the inclusion of indirect and direct speeches by leading protagonists (which the authors could never have heard), different source materials, different views of women in power,8 of ‘barbarian tribes’ and client kings,9 etc, must also be taken into account, as well as the damnatio memoriae10 of the Emperor Nero after his reign – and also the possibility, often mooted, that Tacitus, who wrote during the reign of Domitian, interpreted events through a ‘Domitian-tinted’ lens, coloured by the terrors associated with his reign.11 Assuming that taxation had a part to play in the events of 60–61 AD, it was not unusual for there to be revolts against Roman taxation, even if taxation was not always an explicit cause. One of the underlying causes of the Pannonian– Dalmatian War12 of 6–9 AD, for instance, was the tension resulting from the ‘transformation from native to colonial rule and specific abuses in the system of colonial administration’, with tribute being mentioned as a ‘specific irritant’.13 Dyson comments that while these provinces may have been too underdeveloped

trans E Cary (Loeb Classical Library, 1925) – hereafter Roman History. Dio’s text is in Greek, which language was used by some Roman historians. The Roman historian, Suetonius (who lived 69–130 AD – not to be confused with the governor of Britain at the time of Boudica’s revolt) mentions in ch 39 of his Life of Nero the sacking of two important towns in Britain, and a great slaughter of citizens and allies, which would also appear to relate to Boudica’s revolt, but no further details are given. The text of the Life of Nero used is in Suetonius, Lives of the Caesars, vol 2, trans JC Rolfe (Loeb Classical Library, 1914). 8 See F Santoro L’Hoir, ‘Tacitus and Women’s Usurpation of Power’ (1994) 88(1) Classical World 5, 7, where it is suggested that for Tacitus, Boudica ‘exemplifies the barbarian dux femina’. 9 Tacitus’ views on the system of client kings is expressed in Agricola 14.3: they existed so that the Roman people haberet instrumenta servitutis (‘should have instruments of servitude’). However, K Hopkins, ‘Élite Mobility in the Roman Empire’ (1965) 32 Past and Present 12, 23 makes the point that the Romans generally promoted the integration of provincial peoples into Roman society, allowing them over time to ‘climb the ranks’, although society was structurally differentiated. Leading provincials were ‘gradually assimilated to the Roman aristocracy’, with 3% of the Senate being of provincial origin by the time of Domitian, at the end of the first century AD. Claudius particularly elevated the Gauls. Hopkins comments (22) that tax-gathering was a method used to control the aristocracy. 10 The condemnation of the memory of a Roman emperor, usually by the Senate. Domitian was also subject to this. 11 R Niblett, ‘Review Article: Images of Boudicca’ (2006) 37 Britannia 489, 491, reviewing R Hingley and C Unwin, Boudica: Iron Age Warrior Queen (London, Hambledon Continuum, 2005); MJ Trow and T Trow, Boudicca: The Warrior Queen (Stroud, Sutton, 2003); R Hunt, Queen Boudicca’s Battle of Britain (Staplehurst, Spellmount, 2003). 12 Also referred to variously as the Pannonian–Dalmatian uprising, the Great Illyrian Revolt, the Bato uprising and the Bellum Batonnianum. 13 SL Dyson, ‘Native Revolts in the Roman Empire’ (1971)20 (2/3) Historia: Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte 239, 251, citing Roman History, 55.29.1 and 56.16.3. Dyson also comments (239) that revolts against Rome were not always part of ‘the initial resistance to the Roman advance, but [occurred] among people who [were] regarded as conquered and in the process of Romanization’. Burg, above n 2, 453, lists 11 revolts against Roman taxation prior to that of Boudica. PA Brunt, ‘The Revenues of Rome’ (1981) 71(1) Journal of Roman Studies 161, 170 also comments on taxation as a cause of revolts against Rome, ‘though we cannot tell how far it was resented as a mark of subjection, or because assessment or exaction was unjust and brutal … rather than because it was intrinsically onerous’.

4  Jane Frecknall-Hughes to allow the imposition of taxation, ‘it seems by no means impossible that the Romans thought the time had come to attempt some form of financial impositions’.14 The same may have been true of Britain. This chapter, then, sets out to investigate the clues in the literary sources and what they can tell us specifically about taxation and its possible role in the Boudican revolt. The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section looks at the underlying reasons for the revolt as offered by Tacitus and Dio Cassius. The chapter continues by examining Roman taxation generally before considering various portrayals of Boudica herself, and then looking at issues of Icenian wealth. The final section offers concluding remarks. WHY DID THE REVOLT OCCUR?

Very little may be confidently known about Boudica. It is sometimes difficult too to trace statements made about the revolt to specific evidence.15 As stated above, the main classical sources are the Agricola and Annals of Tacitus and the Roman History of Dio Cassius. Tacitus (c 56–c 120 AD) is regarded as a more authoritative source and one close in time to the events that occurred. He was married to the daughter of Julius Agricola, who was responsible for much of the Roman conquest of Britain – and Agricola began his military career as a tribune, serving from 58 to 62 AD under Suetonius Paulinus, the Roman governor of Britain at the time of Boudica’s revolt (see below). As a member of Suetonius’s staff, Agricola would almost certainly have taken part in crushing Boudica’s uprising.16 Dio Cassius (c 155–235 AD) lived at a greater remove from the rebellion, living and serving under the Nerva-Antonine and Severan dynasties. Moreover, much of his work survives courtesy of one or more epitomators. The rebellion occurred nearly 20 years after the initial conquest of south-east Britain under the Emperor Claudius in 43 AD. There had been failed invasion attempts by Julius Caesar in 55 and 54 BC, but prior to that the Britons had

14 Dyson, above n 13, 251. 15 This is often evident in major works about Boudica and the revolt, eg DR Dudley and G Webster, The Rebellion of Boudicca (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962); G Webster, Boudica: The British Revolt Against Rome AD 60 (London, BT Batsford, 1978); JM Scott, Boadicea (London, Constable, 1975); V Collingridge, Boudica (London, Ebury Press, 2005). CG Gillespie, Boudica: Warrior Woman of Roman Britain (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018) is more ­extensively referenced to original source materials. 16 For details of the academic debates on the sources for Tacitus’ and Dio’s accounts, see E Adler, ‘Boudica’s Speeches in Tacitus and Dio’ (2008) 101(2) Classical World 173, 194, fn 56. The precise year(s) and thus the duration of the revolt are debated – see KK Carroll, ‘The Date of Boudicca’s Revolt’ (1979) 10 Britannia 197. Adler also suggests (194, fn 56) that Tacitus ‘may have had access to Suetonius Paulinus’ memoirs’. J Overbeck, ‘Tacitus and Dio on Boudicca’s Rebellion’ (1969) 90(2) American Journal of Philology 129, 142 specifically suggests that Agricola would have been Tacitus’ source for the rebellion – with a pro-Suetonius bias.

The Revolt of Boudica and the Iceni – A Roman Tax Revolt (or not)?  5 been exposed to Roman influence and culture via trade, especially with Europe. The Claudian invasion was achieved partly by military action, partly by taking advantage of tribal disunity and encouraging certain tribal leaders to become client kings, including, apparently, the Icenian leader, Prasutagus, who retained control of his kingdom until his death. Tacitus describes him as longa opulentia clarus (‘renowned for his long-standing wealth’), which Dyson interprets as meaning that he prospered under Roman overlordship.17 In terms of these source materials, there are discrepancies, noted by many academic authors. Adler, for instance, in regard to the revolt’s origins, notes Tacitus commenting on Prasutagus naming his two daughters and the Emperor Nero as his heirs, ‘presumably as a way to protect his descendants’.18 However, upon Prasutagus’s death: Roman centurions pillaged his realm; slaves laid waste to his household; his widow Boudicca was whipped; and his daughters were raped … [T]he praecipui (‘chief men’) among the Iceni had their ancestral estates confiscated. As a result of these actions, Tacitus informs us, Boudicca led a revolt against the Romans.19

Gowing20 makes the point that Tacitus often ‘exposes the emperors’ inadequate or occasionally fraudulent handling of client kings’, suggesting that Nero dealt deceitfully with Prasutagus, and had he dealt with him ‘fairly and sensibly’, the implication is that ‘the revolt of Boudicca would never have occurred’.21 Bulst22 suggests that Prasutagus excluding his wife from rule might indicate that she, and possibly her relatives, were anti-Roman, and that his daughters (no longer children23) might become wives of client kings appointed by the Romans. Braund,24 however, considers the will of Prasutagus in the context of legacies left to Rome by client kings: it was not always entirely clear what was being

17 Dyson, above n 13, 258, citing Annals 14.31.1. 18 Adler, above n 16, 176. Annals 14.31.1 uses the phrase tali obsequio ratus regnumque et doumum suam procul inuria fore (‘thinking by such deference his kingdom and household would be beyond injury’). 19 Adler, above n 16, 176, summarising Annals 14.31.1. CM Bulst, ‘The Revolt of Queen Boudicca in A.D. 60’ (1961) 10(4) Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 496 comments that the death of Prasutagus must have been quite sudden, or otherwise Suetonius Paulinus, the Roman governor, would not have left to campaign against the Druids on the other side of the country. 20 AM Gowing, ‘Tacitus and the Client Kings’ (1990) 120 Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974–2014) 315, 327. ‘The term “client kings” denotes a range of monarchs and quasi-monarchs of non-Roman peoples who enjoyed a relationship with Rome that was essentially harmonious but unequal. These were rulers under the patronage of the Roman state, but the less abrasive language of friendship … was the norm. The Roman state called such kings “king and ally and friend”, in a formal recognition by the senate. Grand ceremony seems often to have accompanied such recognitions, under republic and Principate alike’ (Oxford Reference, ‘Client Kings’, www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095617744). 21 Gowing, above n 20, 120. 22 Bulst, above n 19, 498. 23 Annals 14.31.1, 14.35.1. 24 D Braund, ‘Royal Wills and Rome’ (1983) 51 Papers of the British School at Rome 16.

6  Jane Frecknall-Hughes bequeathed, or how. He draws a distinction between wills during the Republican era (with the populus Romanus as the legatee) and those under the Empire (with the emperor as legatee). There are two particularly telling examples. Herod the Great of Judaea, in the rule of Augustus, was specifically granted permission to designate his own successor in a situation ‘dogged by palace intrigue in which the succession to the ageing king was the dominant issue’,25 as he had numerous potential male heirs. The very granting of such permission is itself an indication of the extent to which royal successions were controlled by the emperor in the Early Empire. Such a grant is unparalleled and, although no king is as well-attested as Herod, it seems to have been at least unusual.26

The intrigues continued and it seems that several wills were made, with Augustus ultimately being left a legacy, as was his wife, the imperial children, Roman friends and freedmen.27 Also relevant are the circumstances surrounding the death of Massinissa of Numidia, who died in 148 BC. Before he died, he asked Scipio Aemilianus to visit him to discuss the succession, although he had died before Scipio arrived. Scipio was then serving in Africa as a military tribune in the Third Punic War. He was the adoptive grandson of the Roman general, Scipio Africanus, who had installed Massinissa as king of Numidia following Rome’s victory at the end of the Second Punic War (218–201 BC), which had convulsed the whole region, so was an ideal arbiter. While Massinissa did not bequeath anything to Rome, he had several sons and was involved in an ongoing conflict with Carthage. It seems that Scipio’s decisions on the succession were followed, although the extent to which he was allowed individual choice is unknown.28 Intervention by or permission from Rome as regards client king succession might have been expected under the Principate. Braund points out that we do not know how Nero and Prasutagus’s d ­ aughters were to divide their inheritance as Tacitus is silent on this. It could be that the king envisaged the succession of his daughters (or one of them) to the throne, as is often assumed. But it is equally possible that, like Nicomedes IV of Bithynia, Prasutagus had bequeathed his kingdom to Nero and provided for his daughters in legacies. There seems to be no way around this problem, but one point deserves attention. In Tacitus’ account of the revolt of Boudica and its origins, Tacitus does not say that Nero’s agents were wrong to take the kingdom: this is not made an issue. Rather, Tacitus attacks the brutal manner of the annexation. Tacitus’ line of attack must be some slight indication that Prasutagus had bequeathed his kingdom to Nero and that annexation was in itself justified.29

25 ibid 38. 26 ibid. 27 ibid 39. 28 ibid 35–37. 29 ibid 43–44. Nicomedes of Bithynia died in 74 BC and left his kingdom to Rome, but no more than this is known.

The Revolt of Boudica and the Iceni – A Roman Tax Revolt (or not)?  7 Webster30 takes the view that, following the example of Herod,31 the estates of a client king would become imperial property on death, so Decianus Catus was operating with approval, if not direct instruction, in taking over the entire estate. He certainly would have needed to take a full inventory – and probably ‘considered himself and his staff free to help themselves to any juicy pickings’.32 The immediate occasion for the treatment of Boudica and her daughters is unclear. Webster suggests a possible resistance, and the fact that the Romans would still have considered the Iceni as barbarians and would have disregarded the client king status, which Webster regards as ‘an odd arrangement, made only, one presumes, in return for notable services at the time of the invasion’.33 The treatment of Boudica’s daughters was that meted out to women as spoils of war. Tacitus also comments on the Trinovantes joining the revolt, being particularly enraged by the treatment meted out to the local population by Roman veterans, recently settled near Colchester, who drove them from their homes, and the money raised locally to build a temple to the deified Claudius and fund its priests’ extravagance. Rome apparently had decided to change tack administratively in terms of the Icenian kingdom, although no apparent reason is provided for this. Dyson suggests that, perhaps after their experience with Cartimandua, Queen of the Brigantes, ‘the Romans had had their fill of female rulers’.34 However, the Roman relationship with the Iceni had not been altogether smooth as, under the governorship of Ostorius Scapula (47–52 AD), they had been involved in a planned revolt. As Prasutagus continued to rule, he was clearly held not to be responsible.35 Dyson also notes36 the view that the continued Roman antipathy to the Druids may have contributed towards the revolt. The absence of the Roman army under the Roman governor, Suetonius Paulinus, conducting a campaign against the Druids on Anglesey, perhaps determined the time of the revolt, but nothing more. Bulst37 opines that, on the death of Prasutagus, the

30 Webster, above n 15, 86–89. 31 ibid, citing Josephus, Jewish Wars, 2.1–6 in endnote 1 to ch 5. 32 ibid 88. It is interesting to note that Burg, above n 2, 30, says that Decianus Catus had been sent to Britain ‘initially to establish and supervise a new system of taxation’. He cites as one of his sources Dudley and Webster, above n 15. However, Dudley and Webster only suggest that this was ‘possibly’ the case. 33 ibid 87. For Tacitus’ views on client kings, see also above n 9. 34 Dyson, above n 13, 259. Cartimandua, as a client ruler, had had to be defended against an uprising by her divorced husband. 35 Annals 12.31.1–2. 36 Dyson, above n 13, 260, citing Dudley and Webster, above n 15, 53. He also comments on the phrase Monam insulam ut vires rebellibus ministrantem (‘the island of Mona (Anglesey) as providing help to the rebels’) in Agricola 14. 5 as a possible basis for this, but thinks the rebels here are more likely to be the Welsh tribesmen who were opposing Suetonius, not the Iceni. Niblett, above n 11, comments that Hunt, above n 11, and Trow and Trow, above n 11, suggest that the Druids were actively involved in planning and executing Boudica’s revolt, although neither Tacitus nor Dio Cassius mentions them. 37 Above n 19, 506ff.

8  Jane Frecknall-Hughes Romans tried to expand the territory under their direct influence, and while the annexation of client kingdoms in this way was not unfamiliar, this did not necessarily mean that the rebellion was unavoidable. Dio Cassius gives three reasons for the revolt: (i) Decianus Catus’ confiscation of money that the Emperor Claudius had previously given to tribal leaders; (ii) the recall by the younger Seneca of 40 million sesterces he had loaned to the Britons; and (iii) the remarks made by Boudica herself. Both Tacitus and Dio have Boudica giving speeches, but at different points in the narrative. While the speeches themselves will not be historically accurate orations (see above), their content is, nonetheless, illuminating. In Tacitus, in an indirect speech, Boudica says that she is avenging libertatem amissam, confectum verberibus corpus, contrectatam filiarum pudicitiam (‘her liberty lost, her body tortured by the lash, the tarnished honour of her daughters)’.38 She continues: Eo provectas Romanorum cupidines, ut non corpora, nec senectam aut virginitatem inpollutam relinquant. Roman cupidity had progressed so far that not their very persons, not age itself, nor maidenhood, were left unpolluted.

Adler comments39 that ‘Boudica fashions her familial maltreatment at the hands of the Romans into a more general argument concerning the provincial misconduct of an imperial power’, reminiscent of a statement by Roman historian, Sallust, in the Epistula Mithridatis, which Adler cites:40 Namque Romanis cum nationibus populis regibus cunctis una et ea vetus causa bellandi est: cupido profunda imperi et divitiarum (EM5) For the Romans there is a single age-old cause for instigating war on all nations, peoples and kings: a deep-seated lust for empire and riches.

Greed is seen as the motivation for Roman expansion, which Adler suggests is a ‘damning indictment’41 by Tacitus, feeling that Boudica’s speech ‘All in all … is a complex, compact excoriation of Roman imperialism’.42 Some similar themes emerge from Dio’s version of Boudicca’s speech: For what of the most shameful, the most distressing sort have we not experienced since these people have taken themselves to Britain? Have we not been robbed entirely

38 Annals 14.35.1–2. 39 Adler, above n 16, 181. 40 ibid 181–82, citing Hist. 4.69M and stating at 181, fn 35 that the citation is from the text of A Kurfess (ed), C Sallusti Crispi Catilina, Iugurtha, fragmenta ampliora (Leipzig, 1976). 41 ibid 182. 42 ibid 183. Adler notes that elsewhere in Tacitus speeches are used to express dissatisfaction with Roman rule: unnamed Britons and Calgacus specifically in the Agricola (15 and 30–32 respectively); and the Batavian prince, Civilis, in Histories (4.14.17).

The Revolt of Boudica and the Iceni – A Roman Tax Revolt (or not)?  9 of most of our greatest possessions, and do we not pay taxes on the rest (telē kataballomen)? Besides pasturing and farming for them, do we not pay yearly tribute (dasmon etēsion) for our bodies? … By how much would it have been better to be slain and die than to endure while subject to a head tax (kephalas hupoteleis)? And yet why did I say this? For, among them not even dying is scot free, but you know how much we pay even for our dead; with other people, death frees even those who are enslaved, but with the Romans alone the dead live on for gain.43

Adler comments that Dio is casting Boudica as a ‘noble savage’, ‘unaccustomed to the slothful and effete ways of the civilised’,44 using the ‘indignities of Roman tax collection in its specificities, conjuring a picture of pre-Roman Britain as a Valhalla free from taxation’.45 The Romans have taken away everything. Bulst46 suggests that the treasures taken away were ‘considerable – if crude’, but this seems unlikely (see later). Boudica is described in Dio’s account: she has plentiful tawny hair and is wearing a twisted gold necklace (a torque).47 As indicated earlier, academic authors often comment on the discrepancies between Tacitus and Dio. Townend,48 for instance, notes that Dio’s version of the revolt contains few details that are the same as those of Tacitus,49 except for a list of omens, and the name of the procurator, Decianus Catus,50 with considerable divergence occurring in the description of the revolt, possibly because of the use of different source material. A particular difference is the recall of loans by Seneca. Townend comments: A noteworthy item in Dio is the attack on Seneca for lending forty million sesterces to the Britons and then demanding them back – a practice of which Tacitus was aware that Seneca was accused,51 although he makes no mention of it, nor of Seneca himself, in connection with Britain.

43 Roman History, 62.3. I have used here the translation in Adler, above n 16, 187. The phrases in regard to taxation are in italics, with the Greek words transliterated. Brunt, above n 13, 163 suggests that Dio Cassius is referring, in Boudica’s reference to paying for the dead, to the poll tax being payable ‘in full or in part on those who had died within the year’, as happened in Egypt. 44 Adler, above n 16, 190. 45 ibid 190–91. 46 Above n 19, 500. 47 Roman History, 62.2.4. Bulst, above n 19, 508 suggests that this means that Dio Cassius had ‘good sources’, but it might equally be the use of a ‘stock’ or stereotypical image for a barbarian queen. 48 GB Townend, ‘Some Rhetorical Battle-Pictures in Dio’ (1964) 92(4) Hermes 467, 468. 49 ibid, referring to Annals 14, 29–37. See also Overbeck, above n 16. 50 ibid, citing Roman History 62.2.1 and Annals 14.32.1–2, and Roman History 62.2.1 and Annals 14.32.3–7, respectively. 51 ibid, citing at fn 1 from Annals 13.42.4, in relation to Suillius’ attack in 58: provincias immense faenore hauriri (‘the provinces sucked dry by his limitless usury’). PF Bang, ‘Trade and Empire – in Search of Organizing Concepts for the Roman Economy’ (2007) 195 Past & Present 3, 44, fn 113 comments on evidence provided in Cicero’s correspondence ‘which document[s] Roman investment in private loans which underpinned provincial payment of taxes [which] could be exploited to twist the arm of victim communities and ensure their payment, if need be by military force’.

10  Jane Frecknall-Hughes Bulst suggests that the recall of loans by Seneca is feasible if Nero had developed a plan, albeit temporary, to abandon Britain entirely.52 Overbeck53 notes that Tacitus attributes the revolt to the Iceni’s resentment at the treatment of their leaders after the death of Prasutagus, with the Trinovantes54 (and others) making common cause owing to their ill treatment by Roman veterans who were settled amongst them, whereas Dio blames primarily the financial exactions of Decianus Catus and Seneca. Overbeck acknowledges that there must have been financial extortions, but feels that the role of Seneca should be played down as Dio was ‘unremittingly hostile’55 to him, though he feels the story about Decianus Catus has a ‘convincing ring’56 and is supported by Tacitus, citing Annals 14.32: qua clade et odiis provinciae quam avaritia eius in bellum egerat trepidus procurator Catus in Galliam transit. Unnerved by the disaster which his rapacity had goaded into war, the procurator Catus crossed to Gaul.

Dio Cassius57 says that Catus had reclaimed grants that Claudius had made to the tribal leaders which the Senate had formally confirmed. Overbeck feels that Tacitus was guilty of ‘inexcusable sloppiness’ in not including more about Catus and Dio in his hostility to Seneca and for not giving more detail about the way in which the death of Prasutagus was handled.58 During the course of the revolt, Boudica and her army destroyed Camulodunum (Colchester) and its people, both Roman and British, burning the town to the ground. Again there is debate about the sequence of events. Lawson comments on the following item59 in Dio Cassius’s account: One of the most disturbing elements of the classical accounts, however, is the behaviour of Boudicca’s army with respect to women on the other side – both Roman and Briton. Stories of their breasts being sliced off and s[e]wn into their mouths and of their bodies being skewered, if true, would rank among the most horrific of atrocities committed against female victims of war.

Ultimately Boudica’s army was totally defeated by Suetonius, who had returned with his troops from Anglesey. The fate of Boudica herself is unknown, with Tacitus saying she took poison and Dio that she died of a disease. Likewise, it is unknown where she was buried and what happened to her daughters. 52 Above, n 19, following CE Stevens, ‘The Will of Q. Veranius’ (1951) 1(1) Classical Review 4; Suetonius, Life of Nero, 18. 53 Above n 16, 139–41. 54 See also Bulst, above n 19, 502. 55 Above n 16, 140. 56 ibid. 57 Roman History 60.23 and 62.2. 58 Above n 16, 141. 59 S Lawson, ‘Nationalism and Biographical Transformation: The Case of Boudicca’ (2013) 19(1) Humanities Research 101, 106.

The Revolt of Boudica and the Iceni – A Roman Tax Revolt (or not)?  11 ROMAN TAXATION GENERALLY

There seem to have been several systems of tax collection in the late Republic and early Empire, which ran concurrently and/or overlapped: tax farming, local tax farming and lump sum payments (see later). Rathbone60 comments on a revolt in the area of Thebes (which seems to have been caused by the imposition of a poll tax), also saying that ‘Roman taxation under the Republic is another topic which requires thorough re-investigation’.61 While there was a structured system of taxation, it was not uniform or coherent: ‘diversity, not consistency’ seemed to prevail.62 As Clark63 says, prior to the major administrative and financial reforms introduced by the Emperor Diocletian in the third century AD, ‘the tax system of the Principate was a patchwork of rules, privileges, and structures … supported by three main sources of revenue: tributum soli, tributum capitis, both regular taxes, and a host of irregular taxes’,64 which built on the ‘piecemeal incorporation of established polities with their own institutional frameworks into the Republican empire’65 as provinces were absorbed during Rome’s expansion (chiefly borne by the peasant farmer66), with ‘State expenditure … [being] determined more by how much the state could collect than its needs’.67 As Günther comments,68 ‘A main characteristic of Roman rule in the provinces was letting traditional systems continue as long as they worked and were adaptable to Roman necessities’. It is therefore difficult to be definitive about specific taxes collected in Britain, or the means by which they were collected. The way in which monies came into Rome cannot be ascertained with any certainty.69 Taxes, in cash and kind,70 did find their way to the city, and cash was 60 D Rathbone, ‘Egypt, Augustus and Roman Taxation’ (1993) 4 Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz 81, 88. 61 ibid 94. 62 R Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990) 85. See also JA Boek, Taxation in the Later Roman Empire: A Study on the Character of the Later Antique Economy (MPhil Thesis, University of Leiden) 42ff. Brunt, above n 13, 161–62 likewise attests to diversity of taxation methods under both Republic and Empire. 63 PE Clark, Taxation and the Formation of the Late Roman Social Contract (PhD Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2017) 4. See also RI Frank, ‘Ammianus on Roman Taxation’ (1972) 93(1) American Journal of Philology 69. 64 See later for a more detailed discussion of prevailing taxes. The tributum soli was a tax on land (but could be more wide-ranging – see Brunt, above n 13, 166) and the tributum capitis was at root a poll tax. 65 Clark, above n 63, 6. 66 CD Delorm Jr, S Isom and DR Kamerschen, ‘Rent Seeking and Taxation in the Ancient Roman Empire’ (2005) 37(6) Applied Economics 705. 67 Clark, above n 63, 14. 68 Günther, above n 4, 3. 69 See F Millar, ‘Italy and the Roman Empire: Augustus to Constantine’ (1986) 40(3) Phoenix 295, 298. 70 Boek, above n 62, 45 comments that taxes could be paid in cash and kind. For instance, the tributum soli was paid in money by Spain, (most of) Africa, Syria, Cilicia, Judaea and Messene, but in kind by Egypt, Sicily, Sardinia, Asia Minor, Phrygia, Thrace, Cyrene, Pontus, and the lands of the Frisii and Batavi (citing Duncan-Jones, above n 62, 188–93, especially fn 52), although the categories

12  Jane Frecknall-Hughes certainly stored in the treasuries.71 Millar comments that in Rome money was spent on public buildings and aqueducts (new buildings and repairs), on a small number of state officials’ salaries and on the emperors’ occasional liberalitates (instances of generosity), but most recurrently on the military units stationed in Rome (Praetorian and Urban Cohorts and the Vigiles – firefighters and ‘police’): hence regular and steady supplies from taxes would be needed.72 Boek73 notes that the tributum soli in kind from the provinces provided ‘the army, the plebs frumentaria [plebs in receipt of the state grain dole] of Rome, the bureaucracy and the imperial court with cereals’ (some of the latter possibly being sold in the free market), with the tributum soli in cash expended on buying ‘military equipment, the provisioning of the army (if stationed in a province with poor agricultural resources), donativa [gifts of money] for the army and people of Rome [and] the construction of public buildings for the capital’, with occasional material assistance to specific communities if a particular crisis arose. Hopkins74 sees the early Empire as comprising three spheres: (i) the outer ring of provinces where defensive armies were stationed (which undoubtedly included Britain at the time of Boudica);75 (ii) an inner ring of relatively rich taxexporting provinces (like Spain, southern Gaul, northern Africa, Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt); and (iii) the centre – Italy, Rome, the seat of the Court and the central government, which, like the frontier armies, ‘consumed a large volume of taxes’.76 Hopkins proposed a view of the Roman economy whereby gradually, from 200 BC onwards, ‘the imposition of money taxes and of money rents, and their expenditure at a distance from their source, contributed to the gradual creation of complex networks of trade’, with the whole economy becoming integrated in the first two centuries AD.77 He suggests that significant growth in long-distance seaborne trade in the Western Mediterranean occurred from 200 BC, accompanied by a similar growth in the distribution of coinage, in support of an underlying proposition that taxation was important for the

were not mutually exclusive. ‘Baetica in Spain, for example, sent (tax-)grain to the soldiers who were serving in Mauretania during the reign of Claudius, whilst, on the other hand, the tributum soli on vine and olive yards in Egypt was assessed in money.’ Clark, above n 63, 10, comments that there was ‘no single form of tributum soli’. 71 See Millar, above n 69; on the logistics of tax collection and transportation for Egypt, see also Boek, above n 62, 57ff. 72 Millar, above n 69, 299. 73 Above n 62, 54. 74 K Hopkins, ‘Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire (200 BC–400 AD)’ (1980) 70 Journal of Roman Studies 101. 75 Requiring financial resources, from taxes: see R Pulliam, ‘Taxation in the Roman State’ (1924) 19(9) Classical Journal 545. 76 Above n 74, 101. 77 ibid 112. It must be noted that there is considerable contention about how the Roman economy actually worked. See also MI Finley, The Ancient Economy (London, Penguin, 1985); Duncan-Jones, above n 62; R Duncan-Jones, Money and Government in the Roman Empire (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994); Bang, above n 51.

The Revolt of Boudica and the Iceni – A Roman Tax Revolt (or not)?  13 Roman economy and that ‘exacting taxes in money stimulated trade’.78 Transferring surplus taxes from richer provinces to poorer ones (for example, to pay troops there) meant that ‘tax-exporting’ provinces had to export goods to obtain the cash needed to pay taxes. He comments that there is ‘no exact evidence’79 of general tax rates in this period, with estimates of total state revenue being difficult to calculate and unreliable. Discussing various scholars’ views on the size of the population, he suggests that the population was in the region of 54 million (accepting the estimate of KJ Beloch80) and that the effective tax rate was less than 10 per cent of gross product, working out at a rate of 33 kg of wheat equivalent per person (or 15 sesterces, in monetary terms), which Hopkins suggests is a low rate, although Brunt would disagree, drawing particular attention as well to the ‘extraordinary levies, with which Nero is said to have exhausted the provinces’.81 Hopkins comments that Roman taxes had been levied in the early phase of imperial expansion to pay for expenses, usually military, with there being myriad small contributions. Fulford comments that the ‘acquisition of Egypt, the control of the Mediterranean and the other fertile areas which bordered it’ provided the means for Augustus and his successors to expand into Europe.82 Combined with the use of cost-efficient and logical transport routes (especially by sea and river), goods could be relatively easily transported, including grain from the Mediterranean region, which ensured a guaranteed supply, in case other, cereal-producing but less politically stable, provinces failed to deliver. Fulford also comments that collecting food locally was expensive, taking time, manpower and resources such as vehicles and traction animals, and did not allow for troop concentration. However, maintaining a supply route to the northern frontier must have been extremely costly – and ‘the retreat from northern Britain after Agricola, in order for Domitian (AD 84–96) to prosecute his campaigns on the Danube’83 demonstrated this. He concludes that Rome’s ability to control

78 Above n 74, 116. 79 ibid. 80 ibid 118, citing Die Bevölkerung der Griechisch-Römischen Welt (1886). No publisher is given, but WorldCat.org indicates that this work was originally published in Leipzig. 81 Above n 13, 170, citing Suetonius, Life of Nero, 38. MEK Thornton, ‘Nero’s New Deal’ (1971) 102 Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 621, 624, however, on the basis of coinage issue, makes a case for Nero being ‘faced with a severe economic crisis, taking strong measures to restore prosperity to an economy plagued by a painful and long-lasting economic depression’, interpreting Nero’s early attempts to abolish portoria and the later lavish entertainments and spectacles (chariot races, games, gladiatorial shows and presents to the people) described by Suetonius, Life of Nero, ch 11 as actions by a ruler concerned to provide food and jobs in an economic depression, rather than attempts to curry support. 82 M Fulford, ‘Territorial Expansion and the Roman Empire’ (1992) 23(3) World Archaeology 294, 301. 83 ibid 302. The corn supply to Rome was often referred to as the annona. It is likely that grain collected in Britain was used there, rather than exported, owing to the difficulties of crossing either the North Sea or the Channel.

14  Jane Frecknall-Hughes and manipulate subsistence resources from the core of the Empire to the borderlands was significant and: enabled a relatively mild exploitative regime to persist overall and to provide an important means of accommodation with native societies. Without the necessity of plundering local resources to excess, Rome was able to win over native élites and use them and the resources under their control to promote Romanization and the construction of a provincial urban network.84

This sits somewhat awkwardly with the more traditional view of provincial administration and is at odds with what happened in terms of the Iceni, given the accounts of both Tacitus and Dio. Provincial administration was relatively simple in concept: provinces had been regarded as areas for exploitation following military conquest, with provincial governors using their governorships to recoup prior expense on developing their political careers and to get rich. Taxes could be low because services provided were ‘rudimentary’,85 with less able individuals allocated to these governorships (the most élite governors being generally reserved for areas of Italy), resulting in a ‘low penetration by central government’ and ‘local autonomy’.86 While the system was efficient and effective in terms of costs, tax-raising capacity was not easily expanded, and taxes were not well distributed. Rathbone87 refers to the ‘settlement of 27 BC’, under Augustus, whereby the Empire ‘was divided into “senatorial” and “imperial” provinces’, with the governors of the latter (mostly from the Senate) being appointed by the emperor. Senatorial provincial governors had quaestors to supervise financial matters, but imperial provinces shared financial administration between the governor and an equestrian procurator Augusti. Imperial provinces were most commonly border provinces, considered important strategically. Britain was an imperial province. It was the most northerly of Rome’s provinces, with fighting regularly occurring, and, indeed, was never fully conquered, with a force of 50,000 men in place after the first phase of the conquest.88 The procurator was not subordinate to the governor, but was generally appointed separately, with a brief to look after the emperor’s private fortune (patrimonium). As a result, though, as Hopkins remarks: Because the central government had few representatives of its own in the provinces, it devolved the collection of taxes and the distribution of the tax-load on to intermediaries, who were typically prosperous land-owners and local town-councillors (decuriones). The central government in the High Empire [70–192 AD] had no direct relationship with individual tax-payers. As I understand it, the central government

84 ibid. 85 Hopkins, above n 74, 120. 86 ibid 121. 87 Above n 60, 99. 88 See R Hingley, ‘The Romans in Britain: Colonization of an Imperial Frontier’ in CD Beaule (ed), Frontiers of Colonialism (Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2017) 89, who also argues for a more intermittent process of Romanisation.

The Revolt of Boudica and the Iceni – A Roman Tax Revolt (or not)?  15 simply fixed the total amount of tax which each town and its surrounding area should pay; local town-councillors then arranged who should pay what, on the basis of a public declaration of the value of each property. There was ample room for abuse, since political power was concentrated in the hands of those who could benefit most from a maldistribution of the tax-load.89

Hopkins goes on to say that those financially oppressed by the tax load could appeal, sometimes successfully, to the emperor to achieve justice, citing the appeal of tenants of an imperial estate in North Africa.90 Bribery and corruption were systemic. Hopkins further notes: As a consequence, there was little to stop poorer peasants from paying a disproportionate share of taxes; taxation was regressive. And we should expect there to have been substantial differences between (a) what peasants paid in tax and (b) what rich land-owners paid on similar land, and between (c) what tax-collectors collected and (d) what they transmitted to the central government.91

His argument is that if taxes were increased, this would threaten the status of the intermediaries, so the lower the rate of tax, the more individuals were able to make high profits and the less effective was any state oversight of individual profiteering. While this appears to relate to the High Empire, there is no clear start date for such a system. However, Hopkins cites tax farming as a special case of individuals making profits, and this worked very similarly (and probably coexisted, to a degree). The Roman government had in the past auctioned the rights to provincial tax collection, so securing its revenue in advance and transferring associated risks to individuals, although this tendency decreased at the end of the Republic and in the early Principate. A tax farmer would pay a ruler a fixed amount for the right to collect taxes in a given area/district, and would then keep any profit made if more than the fixed amount were collected – and would likewise bear any loss if less were collected. It was a system ripe for abuse (collectors had more incentive to maximise profits than if they were paid fixed salaries)92 and not admissible of much oversight: development in administrative capacity lagged behind the growth of the size of the state, and

89 Above n 74, 121. 90 ibid fn 61. Per Hopkins: ‘A famous plea survives from the tenants of an imperial estate in North Africa; they had already appealed to the emperor’s local agent (procurator), but he was in cahoots with the administrator or lessor (conductor) of the estate: “… a collusion which he has practised uninterruptedly not only with Allius Maximus, our oppressor, but also with almost all the lessors, against the law, to the detriment of your treasury. The result is that he has refrained from investigating, for many years, our petitions, supplications and our appeals to your divine rescript; more than that he has yielded to the wiles of the said Allius Maximus, lessor, … to such an extent that he has sent soldiers into (our estate) and given orders that some of us be seized and tortured, and others … be beaten with rods and cudgels although they are Roman citizens” (ESAR iv, 98 = CIL VIII.IQ570, c. 25902 and 25943)’. 91 ibid 121. 92 E Kiser and D Kane, ‘The Perils of Privatization: How the Characteristics of Principals Affected Tax Farming in the Roman Republic and Empire’ (2007) 31(2) Social Science History 191, 193.

16  Jane Frecknall-Hughes communication and travel were poor.93 Moreover, there was an expansion in the Roman élite holding land in the provinces. Hopkins comments, in line with his earlier argument: It was a symptom of the integration of the imperial economy that rents, mostly money rents, were transmitted long distances from provinces, principally to the imperial capital where the élite consumed most. Transmitted rents and taxes had a similar impact on trade, but they were competing for a limited surplus. The higher rents were, the lower taxes had to be.94

Tax farming meant that profits were made by intermediaries who belonged to the Roman élite, but who were not soldiers involved in conquest or senators.95 It was a system which disintegrated in the later Empire, which saw a ­predominance of taxes paid in kind.96 Kiser and Kane97 point out that the fact that tax farming was exploitative in the late Republic led to it being abolished for certain taxes in the Empire, with other taxes being more centrally controlled. They also make clear that it was more useful for some taxes than for others. They outline the following as the main types of taxes in the Republic:98 • Tributum soli (property tax), levied on all Italian citizens until 167 BC, assessed on all forms of property, land, houses, slaves and personal effects, as declared in the census taken every five years. After 167 BC, Italians no longer paid direct taxes but paid indirect ones. • Tributum capitis (poll tax). • Customs levied in Italian ports. By the end of the Republic, the provinces were the source of most Roman revenue, and different taxes applied: • Stipendium, a lump sum levy on cities. • Decumae, a tithe on crops. • Scriptura, pasture dues. Millar99 also notes in addition: • Regional tolls. • A five per cent tax on the value of slaves at manumission (collected by publicani (tax farmers/collectors)).

93 ibid 194. 94 Above n 74, 122. 95 ibid. 96 ibid 122–23. 97 Above n 92, 191. 98 ibid 194–95, citing GH Stevenson, Roman Provincial Administration (Westport, CT, Greenwood, 1975); and AHM Jones, The Roman Economy (Totowa, NJ, Rowman & Littlefield, 1974). 99 Above n 69, 302.

The Revolt of Boudica and the Iceni – A Roman Tax Revolt (or not)?  17 • A five per cent tax on inheritances (introduced by Augustus). (This was collected by publicani up until the second century AD, but in the second and third centuries, in different Italian regions, procuratores also seem to have been involved.) • A one or half per cent tax on sales (abolished by Caligula). • A four per cent tax on the sale of slaves (only for the first century). Millar further notes, very significantly, the pressure to leave part of one’s estate to the emperor, mentioned specifically in Petronius’s Satyricon, which was written in the reign of Nero:100 Qui