Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy [1, 1 ed.] 9780813231129

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Studies in Philosophy and the History 0,/ Philosophy

Volume 1

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Edited by

JOHN K. RYAN

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA PRESS

Washington, D. C. 1961

Paperback Edition Copyright © 2018 The Catholic University of America Press All rights reserved The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standards for Information Science – Permanence of paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. ∞ Cataloging-in-Publication Data available from the Library of Congress ISBN 978-0-8132-3112-9 (pbk)

Nihil obstat: ROBERT P. MOHAN, S.S. Censor Deputatus

Imprimatur: PATRICK A. O'BOYLE Archbishop of Washington

August !II, 1961 The nihil obstat and imprimatur are official declarations that a book or pam­ phlet is free of doctrinal or moral error. No implication is contained therein that those who have granted the nihil obstat and the imprimatur agree with the content, opinions or statements expressed.

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS Page

FOREWORD

___________________________________________________________________________

vii

1. THE IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE _________

1

by Bernardine M. Bonansea, O.F.M. 2.

GABRIEL MARCEL AND PROOF FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD ____

35

by Sister M. Aloysius Schaldenbrand, S.S.J. 3.

BERKELEY AND THE PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD ______

57

by Sister Angelita Myerscough, Ad.PP.S. 4.

A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF CERTAIN PSYCHIATRIC THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF PSYCHOSIS ___________________

96

by Marius G. Schneider, O.F.M. 5.

ULRICH OF STRASBOURG AND THE ARIsTOTELIAN CAUSES ________

139

by Mother Carol Putnam, R.S.C.J. 6.

DE MAGISTRO: THE CONCEPT OF TEACHING ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS _____________________________

160

by Robert S. Sokolowski \

7.

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IN A DISCOURSE BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE INCARNATION AND CHRIST THE KING

194

by John K. Ryan 8.

THE AUTHENTICITY OF A HOMILY ATTRIBUTED TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS __________________________________________________

216

by John K. Ryan 221

INDEX

v

FOREWORD The character of this work is perhaps sufficiently indicated by its title. However, it must be noted that the term "philosophy" is not used so strictly as to exclude material from other disciplines connected with philosophy or helpful to it and to an understanding of its history. It is hoped that this will be the first of a series of similar volumes. Correspondence from those interested in supporting the projected series, whether by submitting articles for editorial consideration or by extending other forms of help, may be addressed to the editor. Charges for printing are extremely high, and scholarly publications, with their limited circulations and restricted resources, are badly affected by these costs and by other expenses. To provide financial help for a work such as this is to have part in the indispensable but increasingly difficult task of preserving and advancing traditional Western thought and culture. Publication of this volume has been made possible by assistance received from various donors and from "The Very Rev. Ignatius Smith, O.P., Fund." This fund was established by the Rev. James P. Counahan, O.P., M.A. (School of Philosophy, 1953), from a bequest left by his uncle, Mr. Charles A. Counahan of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, "to publish works and subsidize studies which" will "produce a greater knowledge and appreciation of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas in America." Of the articles here published, four are by former students in the School of Philosophy of The Catholic University of America and four are by members of its faculty. JOHN K. RYAN Washington, D. C., June 1,1961

vii

1

THE IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE by BERNARDINE

M.

BONANSEA,

O.F.M.

The ideological argument for the existence of God has been the object of so many studies that a further discussion of it might seem to be of little advantage to the philosopher. Yet the fact that ever since the argument was proposed by St. Augustine, thinkers of different trends and attitudes have felt the need of expressing their opinions on this highly controversial topic, and have reached conclusions that are often far apart from one another, is an indication that the issue is far from being closed to objective investigation. Perhaps one may go even a step further and affirm without fear of contradiction that the many conflicting comments on the argument have somewhat contributed to obscure the original issue. What for St. Augustine and his followers was a valid rational proof of God's existence became for others a purely logical device that provides no help to the philosopher in his ascent to God. Furthermore, even among those who stand for the validity of the argument, no agreement has been reached as to the actual basis of its demonstrative value. Whereas for some the ideological argument is a typically distinct Augustinian theistic proof, others prefer to view it within the general scheme of St. Thomas's five ways. Cases are likewise known in which commentators have shifted from one position to another and have repudiated at later times what they first considered to be a sound philosophical proof of God's existence. In view of this state of things, the present writer has decided to re-examine the entire issue of the ideological argument. This will be done, first, by stating the real meaning of the argument; secondly, by studying the original Augustinian texts where the argument is presented; and thirdly, by submitting to careful consideration the pertinent views and opinions expressed by some leading philoso1

2

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

phers throughout the centuries both in the scholastic and the nonscholastic field. The inquiry will be followed by a discussion and personal evaluation of the argument on the basis of sound philosophical principles. STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT

The ideological argument has been proposed under different forms. Although the authors of scholastic manuals are not of one opinion as to its exact meaning, they all seem to agree that the argument is an attempt to prove the existence of God from the nature of the intelligibles, i.e., those realities which are solely attained to by our mind and mayor may not exist. 1 The argument takes its starting point either from possible essences of things, viz., the argument from the possibles; or from eternal truths, i.e., those statements which express necessary relations among the possibles or the first principles of reason, viz., the argument from eternal truths. Thus possible essences and eternal truths are what in scholastic terminology may be called the terminus a quo of the ideological argument.2 An explanation of each is in order. A thing is said to be possible insofar as it can exist, either because a power can bring it into existence, or because the elements by which it is constituted are such that they can be conceived as existing together without contradiction. In the first case, there is extrinsic possibility; in the second case, there is intrinsic possibility. It is with this latter type of possibles that the ideological argument is concerned.s An essence that is intrinsically possible has a potential but objective reality which of itself is intelligible. It can not only be the object of my knowledge, but it also determines my intellect to know. A circle, for example, must be known in its essential notes as a circle, and anything that does not belong to it must be excluded from the notion of a circle. The intrinsic reality of the possibles is therefore something that is necessary, unchangeable, and eternal. From this we may conclude that necessity, immutability, and eternity are the three characteristics of the possibles. They are also the notes on which the ideological argument is built. lPedro Descoqs, s.l., Praelectiones theologiae fJtIturalis (Paris: Beauchesne, 1935), II, 77. 2Claudius Mindorff, O.F.M., "De argumento ideologico exsistentiae Dei," Antonianum, III (1928), 269-70. SIosephus Hontheim, S.l., Institutiones theodicaeae sive theologiae naturalis (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1893), p. 757.

IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE

3

Etern~l

truths, as previously stated, include both the necessary relations among the possibles and the first principles of reason. That mutual relations among the possibles exist is beyond doubt. The possibles in the quantitative order are ruled by geometrical and mathematical laws; the possibles of a rational nature are subject to logical and ethical laws; finally, all possibles, no matter what their nature may be, are governed by the same universal metaphysical principles, such as the principle of identity, the principle of contradiction, the principle of sufficient reason, etc. 4 Hence there are truths which are absolutely necessary and universally valid in the logical, metaphysical, mathematical, geometrical, and ethical order. It is not merely the question, as has well been observed,1i of a universal and necessary affirmation of such truths, but rather of the affirmation of truths which are absolutely universal and necessary. Furthermore, the ideological argument is concerned with objective, ontological truth, which is the conformity of reality with the mind, and not merely with logical and formal truth, or the conformity of the mind with reality.6 Just as the starting point of the argument is a being in the order of intelligibility and not an actually existing being, as in the traditional five ways, so the principle used for the demonstration is the principle of sufficient reason alone and not the principle of causality. This is another feature that distinguishes the ideological argument from St. Thomas's five ways and makes it a typically distinct proof of God's existence. Possibles and eternal truths, the upholders of the argument maintain, demand God as their ultimate foundation. The question of the ultimate foundation of the beings in the ideal order (possibles and eternal truths) is also discussed in ontology. But here we approach the problem from a different point of view. We try to discover whether possibles and eternal truths are such 4Wenceslaus Pohl, De vera religione quaestiones selectae (Freiburg i. Br.: Her· der, 1928), pp. 56-57. lilbid., p. 59. 6Descoqs, op. cit., II, p. 77. See also ibid., n. 1, where the author takes excep. tion to Father Mindorff's criticism of the ideological argument (cf. n. 2 above) on the ground that the argument does not proceed, as Father Mindorff claims, from a being in the purely logical order but rather from the metaphysical reality of possible essences. Yet it is questionable, remarks Descoqs, whether a possible essence could be called a metaphysical reality.

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

that by their very nature they demand God as their ultimate reason. If a positive answer is given to this question, then we have in the ideological argument a real metaphysical proof of God's existence. In effect we would have a proof that is even more metaphysical in character than the five ways. The five ways take as their starting point a contingent reality, whereas the ideological argument argues to God from an ideal being that shares in the same characteristics of necessity and universality as God himself. It must be made clear that the ideological argument, as proposed by its defenders, is completely different from St. Anselm's ontological argument, where it is argued to God's existence from the idea of God in the purely logical order. The ideological argument is an attempt to reach God from an objective reality, be it in the ideal order, which is obtained by abstraction from, or reflection upon, the world of existing things. To this extent it is an argument a posteriori, and no faulty passage is here involved from the ideal to the real order. This is one case in which the ideal is also real: it belongs to the realm of the intelligibles.7 On these premises, we proceed now to state the argument in syllogistic form. It may be put as follows. There are intrinsically possible beings whose essence and essential principles are necessary, immutable, and eternal. But such beings demand as their ultimate foundation an actually existing being that is absolutely necessary, immutable, and eternal. Therefore such a being exists, and it is what we call God. The middle term of the syllogism includes all intrinsically possible essences as well as their necessary relations and essential principles. These latter are better known as "eternal truths." If proved valid, the argument concludes directly and per se only to an eternal, necessary, and immutable intellect. But since such an intellect is only possible in an infinite being with which it is to be identified, so the argument leads actually to the existence of God. We shall return upon the argument and make it the object of a thorough study; but first let us review briefly its historical background. 7We disagree, therefore, with Father Mindorff's position that the ideological argument involves, as in the case of the ontological argument, an illegitimate transition from the ideal to the real order. Cf. Mindorff, 4f't. cit., p. 27!1.

IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE

5

THE ARGUMENT IN ST. AUGUSTINE

The ideological argument has been so closely associated with St. Augustine, that sometimes it is called the Augustinian argument. To a certain extent this appellation is correct. For even though St. Augustine did not propose the argument explicitly and in as complete a form as it is presented today, he suggested all the elements with which the ideological argument may be constructed. There are many passages in St. Augustine's works which show him working his way out to God through the doctrine of eternal truths. s It is not that he considers this as the only rational approach to God,9 or, for that matter, as an indispensable means to attain the knowledge of God's existence. 10 However, he places great emphasis on the mind's ascent to God through the consideration of the unchangeable and eternal character of truth. He does so particularly in his treatise De libero arbitrio, Bk. II, chaps. 2-15, where his approach to God through eternal truth is fully developed. He establishes first as absolutely certain the fact of one's own existence. No one could possibly doubt about his own existence if he did not exist. He next discusses the nature of man and distinguishes three orders of being in him: existence, life, and understanding. Just as life is above existence, since to live is better than merely to exist, so understanding is above life. To understand is SCf. De libero arbitrio, Bk. II, chaps. 2-15; Confessiones, Bk. VII, chap. 17; Bk. XI, chap. 25; Soliloquia, Bk. II, chap. 11, n. 21; De vera religione, chap. 31; De magistro, chap. 11. 9St. Augustine makes use of other traditional proofs of God's existence. Thus in Confessiones, Bk. XI, chap. 4, n. 6, he argues to God from the world order and desigu; in De civitate Dei, Bk. XI, chap. 6, he builds up a theistic argument on the basis of the change noticeable in the realm of perishable beings; in De immortalitate animae, chap. 8, n. 14, and in Sermo CXLI, chap. 5, he makes explicit use of the principle of efficient causality as a rational means for his ascent to God. See also Enarrationes in psalmum LXXXIII, n. 25, where he argues against those who refuse to acknowledge the existence of a creator simply because they do not see him. For more information about St. Augustine's use of the traditional arguments for God's existence cf. Martin Grabmann, Die Grundgedanken des heiligen Augustinus fiber Seele und Gott (2nd ed.; Cologne: Bachem, 1929), pp. 89-98. 10 For St. Augustine the idea of God is so natural to man that no one can ignore it: "Haec est enim vis verae divinitatis, ut creaturae rationali iam ratione utenti, non omnino ac penitus possit abscondi." In Joannis evangelium, tract. 106, chap. 17, n. 14. Furthermore, belief in God is a necessary condition for a good understanding of God's existence: " ... neque quisquam inveniendo Deo fit idoneus, nisi antea crediderit quod est postea cogniturus." De libero arbitrio, Bk. II, chap. 2, n. 6.

6

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

a further perfection that presupposes both existence and life. This leads to the question of man's knowledge. Man knows first through his external senses. which he has in common with animals. Each external sense has its proper object to which it is necessarily confined. Over and above external senses there is an inner sense. which distinguishes what is proper and what is common to the external senses. The inner sense. also shared by brutes and animals. is superior to the other senses in virtue of the principles that "whatever judges is better than that which is judged."l1 But since the inner sense is in tum subject to reason. this. St. Augustine concludes. is the highest and most noble faculty of man. Having thus proved the supremacy of reason. St. Augustine proposes to Evodius. with whom he is engaged in a dialogue. the problem of God's existence. "1£ we can find something which you are certain not only exists but also is nobler than our reason. will you hesitate to call this, whatever it is. God?"12 To Evodius's observation that only that which is above everything else. not merely that which is above reason may be called God. Augustine replies: "That is plainly right. . . . But I ask you: if you find there is nothing above our reason except the eternal and unchangeable, will you hesitate to call this God?" Evodius accepts the challenge and says: "I will confess clearly that to be God. which all agree to be higher than anything else." St. Augustine answers: "Very well. All I need do is to show that there is a being of such a kind, and you will admit this being to be God, or if there is anything higher, you will grant that the higher being is God. So, whether there is something higher or whether there is not, it will be clear that God exists. when, with his help, I shall show. as I promised. that there exists something higher than reason."18 In his search for something higher than reason. St. Augustine meets first the law and truth of number, i.e.• mathematical truths. These truths. being independent of the senses and the sensible world, are eternal and immutable. In fact, whatever we perceive through our senses is contingent; as such. it may cease to exist at any time. But there has never been a time. nor will there ever be, llDe libero arbitrio, Bk. II. chap. 5. n. 12. For the English translation d. Dom Mark Pontifex. The Problem of Free Choice (Westminster. Md.: The New· man Press. 1955). 121bid., chap. 6, n. 14. 181bid.

IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GoD'S EXISTENCE

7

when seven and three do not make ten.14 Thus mathematical truths are not only above the senses, but also above intellect and reason. We discover them; we do not make them. Turning to wisdom, St. Augustine describes it as "the truth in which we distinguish and grasp the supreme goOd."I11 Since the supreme good is the same for all, wisdom must also be shared in common by everyone. How is wisdom related to number? This, he says, is not an easy problem. However, one thing is plain, namely, that both wisdom and number are unchangeably true. Therefore unchangeable truth exists. Something has thus been discovered that is higher than our minds and reason: truth. While our minds are subject to change, truth does not change. Moreover, we do not judge truth; we only judge in accordance with truth. Having attained the end of his painstaking search, St. Augustine turns again to Evodius and says to him with evident satisfaction: If I showed there was something above our minds, you admitted you would confess it to be God, provided there was nothing else higher. I accepted your admission, and said it was enough that I should show this. For if there is anything more excellent, it is this which is God, but, if there is nothing more excellent, then truth itself is God. Whichever is the fact, you cannot deny that God exists, and this was the question we set ourselves to debate. 16 THE ARGUMENT IN MEDIEVAL SCHOLASTICS

St. Augustine's argument from eternal truths has been the source of endless discussion among philosophers. The nature of this article does not permit us to go into a detailed exposition of all the views and opinions expressed by scholars in this connection. We shall therefore confine ourselves to a brief presentation of the main attitudes towards the argument from the time of early scholasticism up to the present timeP 14Ibid., chap. 8, n. 21. 15Ibid., chap. 9, n. 26. 16Ibid., chap. 15, n. 39. 17In this survey we shall make use of the following studies, even though we might occasionally depart from their point of view in the interpretation of the thought of some thinkers therein mentioned: Martin Grabmann, op. cit., pp. 84-98; Claudius Mindorff, art cit., pp.278-98; 407-419; F. Van Steenbergen, 'La philosophie de St. Augustin d'apres 1es travaux du centenaire," Revue neo·scho'l· astique de philo5ophie, XXXV (1933), 240-52; Michele F. Sciacca, S. Agostino (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1949) , Vol. I; F. Cayre. Dieu present dans la vie de l'esprit (Bmges·Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1951).

8

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

The first in the line· of great thinkers to utilize the Augustinian argument for God's existence is St. Anselm, the initiator of the scholastic movement whose penetrating genius and Augustinian tendencies earned him the title of alter Augustinus. 18 St. Anselm had already outlined his theistic proof from the nature of eternal truth in the Monologium,19 but he fully developed it in his dialogue De veritate. 20 Briefly stated, the argument runs like this: Truth is eternal, for one cannot think of a moment in which truth did not or will not exist. If at one time truth did not exist, then it was always true that truth did not exist. Likewise, if at some future time truth will not exist, it will always be true that truth will not exist. In either case truth must be eternal, and so is the supreme being with which eternal truth is to be identified.21 Whether St. Anselm considered this argument as a strict metaphysical demonstration of God's existence, or wished simply to show that the supreme truth is eternal, is not agreed upon by his interpreters and commentators.22 In his Summa theologica, Alexander of Hales presents the argument from eternal truth in three different forms. The first two 18 Commenting on the title, Alexander Koyre says: "C'est Ie nom que lui donnait Ie moyen dge et c'est celui qui Ie desigue Ie mieux. Partout, dans I'oeuvre de Saint Anselme se montre I'influence profonde de Saint Augustin." L'idee de Dieu dans la philosophie de St. Anselme (Paris: Leroux, 1928), p. 8. 19Chap. 18, al. 17; Migue, PL vol. 158, cols. 167 f. 20Chap. 1; Migue, PL vol. 158, cols. 468 f.: "QUOd veritas non habet pnn. cipium vel finem." 21St. Anselm concludes his argument in the Monologium, chap. 18, aI. 17, with the following statements: "si veritas habuit principium, vel habebit finem, antequam ipsa inciperet, verum erat tunc, quia non erat veritas; et postquam finita erit, quia non erit. Atqui verum non potest esse sine veri tate: erat igitur veritas, antequam esset veritas; et erit veritas postquam finita erit veritas; quod inconvenientissimum est. Sive igitur dicatur veritas habere, sive intelligatur non habere principium vel finem, nullo claudi potest veritas principio vel fine: quare idem sequitur de summa natura, quia ipsa summa veritas est." 22Mindorff calls St. Anselm's demonstration from eternal truth neither an ideological argument nor a proof of God's existence. See art. cit., pp. 278-80. Koyre, on the contrary, sees in it a new demonstration of God's existence and eternity. op. cit., p. 58. He adds: "L'origine augustinienne de cette preuve est indubitable. Elle est expo see longement par St. Augustin, qui lui-m~me la tient de Plotin. Nous ne pouvons exposer ici les theories de St. Anselme sur la verite; il distingue la verite d'enonciation, la verite d'af!innation, la verite d'action et la verite de l'~tre. Toutes se reduisent en dernii~re analyse a la rectitude, a la conformite au but essentiel, au maximum de perfection possible. La verite est reaIisee quand tout est tel qu'il doit ~tre, confonne a la perfection intrin~ue, a la volonte divine." Ibid., n. 2.

IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GoD'S EXISTENCE

9

forms are taken from St. Anselm's De veritate, while the third form is from St. Augustine's Soliloquia. 23 It is not clear whether his statement of the argument amounts also to approval of it. At any rate, the argument, as stated in the Alexandrian Summa theologica. seems to rest on man's internal experience of truth rather than on the nature and existence of truth as such. 24 Richard of St. Victor argues to God from the potentiality of existing things. His way of proving God's existence may be considered as an anticipation of the argument from the possibles. Yet the vehicle of his ascent to God is not so much the principle of sufficient reason as it is the principle of causality.25 For St. Bonaventure the existence of eternal truth in the human mind is an undeniable fact that he partially explains through the doctrine of divine illumination. However, his illumination theory does not so much propose a proof for God's existence as it calls upon God to aid us to attain certitude in knowledge. The eternal reason, of which our mind has some sort of intuition, is a norm that moves and directs the intellect in the understanding of truth; 23 Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa theologica (Quaracchi: Typographia Col· legii S. Bonaventurae, 1924-30), I, n. 25, pp. 41-42, where he refers to St. Anselm's De veritate, chap. I, and St. Augustine's Soliloquia, Bk. II, chap. 15, n. 28, and chaps. 2 and 4. The authenticity of the Summa theologica of Alexander of Hales is discussed by Father Victorinus Doucet, O.F.M., in Prolegomena in libTUm III necnon in libros I et II "Summae Fratris Alexandri" (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1948), where he reaches the foflowing con· clusion: "Quapropter, omnibus consideratis atque perpensis, nos ita concluden· ,dum esse censemus, ut nempe dicatur quod ipse Alexander quodammodo Summam fecit, sed collaborantibus aliis et maxime Ioanne de Rupella; . . . item, ex propriis maxime scriptis sed etiam ex alienis. Unde et authentica et halesiana Summa quodammodo dici potest, non autem simpliciter nisi forte quoad Librum II." Ibid., p. 369. :l4Cf. };frem Bettoni, Il problema della conoscibilitli di Dio nella scuola francescana (Padova: Cedam, 1950), p. 81. :lOCf. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, Bk. I, chap. 12; Migne, PL vol. 196, col. 896: "Ilium autem certissimum est quod in tota rerum universitate nihil t:sse potest, nisi possibilitatem essendi vel de seipso habuerit, vel aliunde acceperit. QUOd enim esse non potest, omino non est; ut igitur aliquid exsistat, oportet ut ab essendi potentia posse esse accipiat. Ex essendi itaque potentia esse accipit omne, quod in rerum universitate subsistit. Sed si ex ipsa sunt omnia, nec ipsa quidem est nisi a semetipsa, nee aliquid habet hisi a semetipsa. Siex ipsa sunt omnia, ergo omnis essentia, omnis potentia, omnis sapientia. Si omne esse ab illa est, ipsa summa essentia est. Si ab illa omne posse, summe potens. Si omne sapere, summe sapiens. Est enim impossible maius aliquid dare quam habere."

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it does not give us truth as such, or at least not the complete truth.26 When the theistic argument from truth is stated, then it is to the principle of causality that St. Bonaventure appeals to establish on metaphysical grounds the existence of God as the eternal and absolute truth. 27 This does not prevent him from pursuing a form of reasoning that has close resemblances to the ideological argument. Actually, his reasoning ends in what may seem to be a paradoxical statement: "If God does not exist, {then] He exists."28 For every proposition, whether it is affirmative or negative, contains some truth, and no truth is possible if God, the cause of all truth, does not exist. 29 Yet, as has been observed, it is not just by pure dialectical analysis of the abstract concept of truth that St. Bonaventure proceeds to infer the existence of God; nor is it simply a logical repugnance that makes it impossible for him to deny the existence of the supreme truth. "This repugnance is but a sign of a metaphysical impossibility with which we are in conflict. . . . This radical impossibility of denying God is . . . the effect left upon the face of our soul by the divine light."30 Thus far one thing is clear: the scholastics whose opinion has been presented show in general a favorable attitude towards the ideological argument, even though their way of stating it may differ from its original formulation in St. Augustine. This may be due, at least partially, to the great influence that the Bishop of Hippo exerted upon Catholic thinkers up to the thirteenth century. Be that as it may, none of the schoolmen we have examined dares to challenge the ideological argument, let alone to reject it. Can we 26Cf. St. Bonaventure, Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi, q. 4, in Opera omnia (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882·1902), V, p. 2!1: " ••• ad certitudinalem cognitionem necessario requiritur ratio aetema ut regulans et ratio motiva, non quidem ut sola et in sua omnimoda claritate, sed cum ratione creata, et ut ex parte a nobis contuita secundum statum viae." 27Cf. I Sent., in Opera omnia, I, p. 155: "Probat iterum ipsam [existentiam Dei] et concludit omnis propositio affirmativa; omnis enim talis aliquid ponit; et aliquo posito ponitur vemm; et vero posito ponitur veritas quae est causa omnis veri." See also De mysterio Trinitatis, in Opera omnia, V, p. 50. 28 Here is the full text: "Deum esse primuni, manifestissimum est quia ex omni propositione, tam affirmativa quam negativa, sequitur, Deum esse; etiam si dicas: Deus non est, sequitur: si Deus non est, Deus est." In Hexaemeron Collatio X, in Opera omnia, V, p. !l78. 29 Ibid. See also n. 27 above. 30Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, trans. by Dom Illtyd Trethowan (London: Sheed Be Ward, 1940), pp. l!Il-1I2.

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say the same thing of St. Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, the leaders of the two largest schools of philosophy in the middle ages, who have played such an important role in the shaping of Catholic thought throughout succeeding centuries? As far as the Angelic Doctor is concerned, we would look in vain in his works either for an explicit approval of the Augustinian argument or for an outright condemnation of it. Because he did not take any definite stand on the problem at issue, and because statements are to be found in his works both in favor of and against the argument, it is little wonder that his commentators are not of one opinion as to Aquinar,'s exact position in the present controversy. Some would have it that the Angelic Doctor constantly presupposes the Augustinian proof from eternal truths in his system.81 Others believe that the ideological argument is implicitly included in St. Thomas's fourth way of which it would be but an application.82 Members of a third group of interpreters flatly disagree with the preceding views and take a negative attitude in regard to Aquinas's use of the argument. In the words of one of its best exponents: "St. Thomas treats the problem of God's existence in several places 81 This is the opinion of P. B. Romeyer, S.J., who writes: "Bien que S. Thomas ne se soit nulle part attache it developper, de dessein forme, la preuve augustinienne de la verite subsistante it partir des verites qui determinent nos jugements certains, il la suppose toujours." Reference is also made by the writer to his article, "La doctrine de s. Thomas sur la verite," Archives de philosophie, Vol. III, cahier 2, pp. 46-51. See Descoqs, op. cit., II, pp. 93-95 for a critical appraisal of Romeyer's viewpoint. 82This is the teaching of R. Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Nature, trans. by Dom Bede Rose (St. Louis: Herder, 1949), I, 324-31. He states: "Why did St. Thomas not develop this Augustinian argument [from eternal truths] in the article which he set aside for a special diseussion of the proofs of God's existence? The reason is because this proof can be referred back to the fourth, which establishes the presence not only of a Primary Intelligence and of a Primary Being, but also of a Primary Truth (maxime verum)." Ibid., pp. 329-30. The same view had been previously expressed by Father A. Lepidi, in his Elementa philosophiae christianae (Paris-Louvain, 1875-79), I, Logica, p. 382, and by P. De Munnynck in his Praelectiones de Dei existentia (Louvain, 1904), p. 23. Cf. Descoqs, op. cit., II, pp. 91-92, for the criticism of this opinion and a discussion of the text from the Contra gentes, II, Chap. 84, which runs as fol· lows: "Ex hoc quod veritates intellectae sint aeternae quantum ad id quod in· telligitur, non potest concludi quod anima sit aeterna, sed quod veritates intellectae fundantur in aliquo aeterno. Fundantur enim in ipsa prima Veritate, sieut in causa universali contentiva omnis veritatis. Ad hoc autem aeternum comparatur anima non sieut subiectum ad formam, sed sieut res ad proprium finem; nam verum est bonum intellectus et finis ipsius." According to Descoqs this text, rather than be an argument for God's existence, it already presupposes that Ute existence of God has been previously demonstrated.

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of his works, and in none of them does he mention the argument from eternal truths. This is because the Angelic Master knew very well that we cannot demonstrate [that] God [exists] except as a cause, and consequently, by taking as a starting point some real, existing effects."33 Sertillanges34, Cardinal Mercier,35 Descoqs,36 and Mindorff37 have the same viewpoint. Their position can be summarized as follows: (1) St. Thomas does not admit the ideological argument in the purely analytical order; rather he denies that truth, considered in itself and independently of God otherwise known to us, is eternal and immutable; (2) the ideological argument can perhaps be reduced to the fourth way, but St. Thomas never attempts to do it. 38 More recently, a Thomistic scholar claims that the Angelic Doctor acknowledges the value of the theistic argument from eternal truths, but he does not include it among his famous ways because of its complexity. Unlike the Thomistic ways, which proceed analytically by taking up one aspect of reality at a time, the Augustinian proof considers the various aspects of truth and of the mind that knows it simultaneously. However, if one analyzes carefully the complexity of the Augustinian proof, he will discover that it can be easily reduced to the scheme of several among the Thomistic ways.39 John Duns Scotus, like Aquinas, does not make explicit use of the ideological argument. Neither in the Ordinatio, Bk. I, dist. 2, Part I, qq. 1-3,40 nor in the De primo principio,41 where the proof of God's existence is worked out with a painstaking logic and a constructive reasoning that have no parallel in scholastic philosophy, is found a trace of the argument from eternal truths. He approaches the problem from the three points of view of efficiency, finality, and 33 Fr. M. Cuervo, O.P., "EI argumento de 'Las Verdades Eternas' segUn Santo Tomas," La ciencia tomista, XXXVII (Jan.-June, 1928), 33. 84La philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin (new ed. rev.; Paris: Aubier, 1940), 1,45-48. 35 Cours de philosoph ie, Vol. II, Metaphysique gent!rale (5th ed. rev.; Lou· vain: Institut superieur de philosophie, 1910), pp. 40 ff. 360p. cit., II, pp. 91-97. 37 Art. cit., pp. 407-412. 38Emmanuel Gisquiere, Deus Dominus (Paris: Beauchesne, 1940), I, 215. 39Cf. Marcolino Daffara, O.P., Dio. Esposizione e valutazione delle prove (2nd ed. rev.; Turin: Societa Editrice Internazionale, 1952), pp. 127-30. ~ODuns Scotus, Opera omnia (Civitas Vaticana, 1950), II, pp. 125-243. 41 The "De Primo Principia" of Duns Scotus. A revised text and translation by E. Roche, O.F.M. (St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1949).

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Goo's

EXISTENCE

13

eminence, and concludes to the existence of an infinite being which is most perfect, as well as the supreme efficient and final cause. 'In effect, for Duns Scotus infinity is the radical attribute of God which, more than any other attribute, characterizes the supreme being in his absolute unicity and perfection.42 It is true that the starting point of Scotus's ascent to God is not, as with St. Thomas, the actual existence of things but rather their possibility; for the possibility that things exist is a necessary truth, whereas their actual existence is only a contingent fact. However, the possibility in question is not intrinsic possibility, as is the case with ideological argument, but extrinsic possibility. Hence the principle on which his proof is based is the principle of causality and not merely the principle of sufficient reason, as the ideological argument demands. Moreover, when Duns Scotus describes eternal truth with its characteristics of necessity and immutability, he affirms that strictly speaking such truth exists only in God. 43 Statements to the effect that Scotus admits the existence of eternal and necessary truths apart from God have been proved to be without foundation and contrary to his mind. 44 Thus the ideological argument based on eternal truths has no place in Scotus's philosophy, even though, in common with St. Thomas, he never takes upon himself the task of rejecting it as an invalid theistic proof. MODERN FORMULATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT

In modern times we find that the ideological argument has been favorably received and defended by various outstanding philosophers, both scholastic and nonscholastic. Among nonscholastics, Leibniz and Kant deserve special consideration. Leibniz takes up the argument in his New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. I, chap. 11, where he discusses the value and foundation of purely essential propositions, that is, propositions about a subject that does not exist, and shows against John 420rdinatio, I, d. 3, q. 2, n. 17. 43Ibid., I, d. 8, q. 5, n. 22: "Dioo . . . quod nihil aliud a Deo est immutabile . . . quia nihil aliud est formaliter necessarium." Ibid., III, d. 32, n. 3: "Nihil aliud a Deo in quocumque esse est ex se necessarium." Ibid., I, d. 35, n." 12: "Quidquid autem est in Deo secundum quodcumque esse, sive rei sive rationis per actum intellectus divini, est aetemum." 44Allusion is made here to certain erroneous statements by D. Banez and A. Goudin, which Cuervo repeats but does not correct (cf. La ciencia tomista, art. cit., p. 22). For a full discussion of this subject cf. Mindorff, art. cit., pp. 413-15.

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Locke that the truth of such propositions must have its ultimate foundation in a supreme and universal mind. He writes: The Scholastics have hotly disputed de constantia subjecti, as they called it, i.e., how the proposition made upon a subject can have a real truth, if this subject does not exist. The fact is that the truth is only conditional, and says, that in case the subject ever exists, it will be found such. But it will be further demanded, in what is this connection founded, since there is in it some reality which does not deceive. The reply will be, that it is in the connection of ideas. But it will be asked in reply, where would these ideas be if no mind existed, and what then would become of the real ground of this certainty of the eternal truths? This leads us finally to the ultimate ground of truths, viz., to that Supreme and Universal Mind, which cannot fail to exist, whose understanding, to speak truly, is the region of eternal truths, as St. Augustine has recognized and expressed in a sufficiently vivid way.411 To emphasize his point, Leibniz states that eternal truths are the regulating principles of all existences, and as such they must preexist in a necessary substance from which all truth is derived. And in order not to think that it is unnecessary to recur to this [the Supreme and Universal Mind), we must consider that these necessary truths contain the determIning reason and the regulating principle of existences themselves, and, in a word, the laws of the universe. Thus these necessary truths being anterior to the exist· ence of contingent beings, must be grounded in the existence of a necessary substance. Here it is that I find the original of the ideas and truths which are graven in our souls, not in the form of propositions, but as the sources out of which application and occasion will cause actual judgments to arise. 46 From these statements it is clear that, although the starting point of Leibniz' ideological argument is found in the essential propositions that have no direct relation to existence, the eternal truths which such propositions contain are something real, since they are the determining reason and regulating principle of all existing things, as well as the source of our mind's judgments. Thus Leibniz is able to avoid the illicit transition from the ideal order to the order of reality, which is the main defect of the ontological argument, and his proof becomes an a posteriori argument for God's existence. 411Cf. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, New Essays Concerning Human Understand· ing, trans. by Alfred Gideon Langley (!lrd ed.; La Salle, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1949), p. 516. 461bid., pp. 516-17.

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The ideological argument did not escape the attention of Immanuel Kant. In his early work, The Only Possible Ground for a Demonstration of God's Existence,47 Kant reduces the arguments for the existence of God to four. Of these four arguments, two take as their starting point the idea of the possible, while the two others rest on the empirical idea of the existent. The idea of the possible may be considered as a ground from which God's existence is derived as consequence, in which case we have the so-called ontological argument proposed by St. Anselm and restated in their own ways by Descartes and Leibniz. Kant rejects such an argument because, he says, it is based on the false presupposition that existence is a predicate to be derived by analysis from essential possibility. Likewise, the third and fourth proofs, which Kant calls the cosmological and the teleological arguments, must be rejected as invalid demonstrations of God's existence. On the one hand, we cannot prove that a first cause must be what we call God, as the upholders of the cosmological argument maintain; on the other hand, order and design in the universe may lead to a being endowed with an extremely great intelligence but not to a creator in the strict sense of the term, as the defenders of the teleological argument proclaim. By excluding the first and the last two proofs, Kant is left with the second argument, which starts from the possible as consequence and argues to the existence of God as its foundation. This is exactly what we mean by ideological argument from the possibles. It is also what Kant reckons as the only possible basis for a demonstration of God's existence. Kant has not just one way of stating the argument, but the essential features of his reasoning are as follows. There is no contradiction in saying that nothing whatsoever exists. But it is contradictory to say that nothing exists and affirm at the same time the real intrinsic possibility of things. For in real possibility the constitutive elements are always taken from an actually existing thing. We must admit such a possibility. To deny it is to think, and to think is to affirm implicitly the realm of possibility. Hence, given the intrinsic possibility of things, a being must exist which is its foundation and principle. This being is the absolutely necessary, existing God. 47The original title is Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund %u einer Demonstration Daseins Gottes (Konigsberg, 1763). The treatise can be found in Immanuel Kants Werke (ed. E. Cassirer; Berlin, 1912-18), II, pp. 67-172.

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Kant arrives at the same conclusion by pursuing the following line of reasoning: All [intrinsicl possibility supposes something real in which and by means of wruch all thinkable is given. Hence a reality exists whose very destruction would entail the absolute destruction of all intrinsic possibility. But that whose destruction or denial destroys all possibility is absolutely necessary. Therefore something that is absolutely necessary exists. 48 In other words, a being exists with real, absolute necessity, if its nonexistence entails a real contradiction by removing the very ground on which intrinsic possibility of things is founded. But such a being is God. Therefore God exists. Kant does not consider his argument as an absolutely cogent proof of God's existence, or such a proof that would give us the certainty of a mathematical demonstration. However this kind of demonstration, he observes, is not really necessary. All we need to do is to convince ourselves that God exists. Nevertheless he believes that the line of thought suggested above is the only possible ground on which a demonstration of God's existence must rest.49 Another forceful presentation of the ideological argument is offered by a thinker of a cast of mind very different from that of Leibniz or Kant. This is Jaime Balmes, the greatest Spanish philosopher of the nineteenth century and one of the forerunners of the scholastic revival in Europe. Since Balmes's formulation of the ideological argument is so logical and complete that it serves as a pattern for many later thinkers, we summarize it here in its essential points.5o Balmes considers the order of truth and the order of possibility as two separate ways of arriving at God. In the order of truth, he distinguishes between universal and particular truth. The former 481bid., p. 87 f. 49For a more complete exposition and criticism of Kant's ideological argument cf. James Collins, God in Modern Philosophy (Chicago: Regnery, 1959), pp. 169-7IJ. See also Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy (London: Bums and Oates, 195~), VI, 187-89; Mindorff, art cit., pp. 285-88. It is well known that the ideological argument, as well as all other theistic proofs, was later disposed of by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. However, that was due to his new approach to philosophy which made all metaphysical speculation impossible. 50The argument runs through chaps. 24-26 of Balmes' Fundamental Philosophy, trans. by Henry F. Brownson (new ed. rev.; New York: Kenedy, 190IJ) , II, 96-104.

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is the truth of a proposition in which the subject is universal, e.g., all the diameters of a circle are equal; the latter is the truth of a proposition in which the subject is particular, e.g., this circle has all its diameters equal. While agreement exists between these two kinds of truth, universal truth cannot depend on the truth of particular facts but only on a being that is superior to them. This can be proved in the following manner. From a particular fact we cannot infer universal truth, but from universal truth we can infer the truth of all actual and possible facts. This is due to the necessary connection existing between subject and predicate in a proposition containing universal truth. Such necessity is not to be found in particular facts, since these facts are in themselves only of a contingent nature. Nor can it be found in our mind, for everyone perceives a necessary truth without giving even a thought to himself or others. Truth existed before us, and it will exist when we are no more without thereby losing anything of its nature. Hence, since there are necessary truths which are perceived by all independently of any previous agreement or understanding, there must be a universal reason (ratio universalis) from which all minds derive their knowledge as from their common source. 51 This universal reason, Balmes goes on to say, cannot be a simple idea, as an abstraction from individual reason, for an idea has no existence apart from our mind. The universal reason must be an existing reality, a reality that is greater and more perfect than our mind. This reality cannot be but God. A real fact must have a real principle; a universal phenomenon must have a universal cause; a phenomenon independent of all finite intelligence must spring from some cause independent of all finite intelligence. There is, then, a universal reason, the origin of all finite reason, the source of all truth, the light of all intelligences, the bond of all beings. There is, then, above all phenomena, above all finite individuals, a being, in which is found the reason of all beings, a great unity, in which is found the bond of all order, and of all the community of other beings. The unity, therefore, of all human reason affords a complete demonstration of the existence of God. The universal reason is; but universal reason is an unmeaning word, unless it denote an intelligent, active being, a being by essence, the producer of all beings, of all intelligences, the cause of all, and the light of all. 52 511bid., pp. 96-99. 52 Ibid., p. 100.

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Having established the existence of God from eternal truths, Balmes proposes to do the same thing from the standpoint of the possibles. Our mind, he says, does not understand existing things alone; its range of knowledge extends also to the realm of the possibles and their necessary relations. But if no reality existed in which such possibility were grounded, possibility itself would be an absurdity. If nothing existed, nothing would be possible. Moreover, a foundation must be something real; a foundation that is nothing is no foundation at all, nor can it serve as a ground for the possibles. The same holds true of the necessary relations existing among the possibles. They demand real models and exemplars. Hence necessary truths exist prior to human reason and must be related to a being that is the source of all reality and the foundation of all possibility, as well as the principle from which we receive the power to perceive such truths. This being is God. 53 Thus Balmes defends the ideological proof in its twofold aspect of argument from eternal truths and argument from the possibles. 5Slbid., pp. 100-101. This same line of thought is more fully developed by Balmes in chap. 26 of his Fundamental Philosophy, where he illustrates his viewpoint by analyzing the truth of the proposition "Two circles of equal diameters are equal." The proposition, Balmes says, is evidently true. It refers to the possible order, and abstracts absolutely from the existence of the circles and of the diameters. The truth of the proposition does not refer to our mode of understanding; on the contrary, we conceive it as independent of our thought. Nor does it depend on the corporeal world, for even if no body existed, the proposition would still be true, necessary, and universal. "What would happen, if, withdrawing all bodies, all sensible representations, and even all intelligences, we should imagine absolute and universal nothing? We see the truth of the proposition even on this supposition; for it is impossible for us to hold it to be false. On every supposition, our understanding sees a connection which it cannot destroy: the condition once established, the result will infallibly follow. "An absolutely necessary connection, founded neither on us, nor on the external world, which exists before any thing we can imagine, and subsists after we have annihilated all by an effort of our understanding, must be based upon something, it cannot have nothing for its origin: to say this, would be to assert a necessary fact without a sufficient reason . . . . In pure nothing, nothing is possible; there are no relations, no connections of any kind; in nothing there are no combinations, it is a ground upon which nothing can be pictured. "The objectivity of our ideas and the perception of necessary relations in a possible order, reveal a communication of our understanding with a being on which is founded all possibility. This possibility can be explained on no supposition except that which makes the communication consist in the action of God giving to our mind faculties perceptive of the necessary relation of certain ideas, based upon necessary being, and representative of his infinite essence." Ibid., pp. 102-104.

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IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE VIEWS OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS

In recent times the ideological argument has again been the object of study by many thinkers, especially among scholastics. As it would be outside the scope of this article to make a survey of all the opinions expressed in this connection in scholastic manuals or in special studies, we shall limit our exposition to some among the most original and authoritative views, beginning with those favoring the argument.

Defenders of the Argument I~ his lengthy and valuable article on St. Augustine, E. Portalie takes a stand against Jules Martin,54 and says that it is wrong to see in the Augustinian proof from eternal truths a prelude to St. Anselm's ontological argument. St. Augustine does not argue from the idea of God to his existence. Rather he analyzes the characteristics of truth and finds that their only explanation lies in the admission of an actually existing being which is above truth and the source of all truth. 55 This, Portalie says, is confirmed by St. Augustine's profound observation56 that all our theistic proofs show that God exists, not that he must exist. In other words, they are not a priori proofs from the idea of God but proofs a posteriori. Grabmann calls the Augustinian argument for God's existence a psychological-metaphysical proof, in which facts of consciousness constitute the premises of a metaphysical train of thought. 57 While recognizing the proof as the work of a powerful mind, 58 he says that it is not without its dark spots and difficulties. 59 Grabmann rejects the opinion of Malebranche and other ontologists who interpret St. Augustine's doctrine of illumination in such wise as to imply man's direct knowledge of God. 60 He also points out the important role that the principle of causality-exemplary causality more than efficient causality-plays in St. Augustine's argument for God's existence. 61

54Saint Augustin (Paris: Alcan, 1901), pp. 101-188. Portalie, "Augustin (saint) ," Dictionnaire de theologie catholique, col. 2345. 56 Quoted ibid., col. 2344. 57 Grabmann, op. cit., p. 76. 58lbid., p. 7759lbid., p. 83. 60lbid. 61lbid., pp. 88-89. 55E.

I,

2,

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According to Etienne Gilson, the proof of God's existence is not for St. Augustine so great a problem as it is for modem philosophy. For him the idea of God is something like a universal knowledge that cannot be separated from the human soul.62 Hence, rather than attempt to prove to an unbeliever that God exists, St. Augustine tries to show the rational character of our faith. The formula credo ut intelligam is at the basis of the Augustinian proof of God's existence, just as it is at the basis of the entire Augustinian philosophy.63 In Gilson's view, the Augustinian argument from eternal truths must be interpreted in the light of the doctrine of illumination. No matter how this doctrine is understood, the fact remains that for St. Augustine the problem of God's existence is strictly bound up with the problem of knowledge. "To know how we conceive truth and to know the existence of truth is one and the same question."64 The Augustinian proof is completed entirely within our thought, and no consideration of the sensible order has a necessary part in it.65 While St. Thomas's five ways take their lead from the data of sense experience, St. Augustine's proof from eternal truths, along with his other theistic arguments, has as its starting point certain modes of being for which an ultimate reason is sought in a being of a different order, which alone can be the reason for those modes and limited perfections. Briefly, while the Thomistic five ways move in the order of existence, St. Augustine's proofs are developed basically, although not exclusively, in the order of essence. 66 In a profound study of the Augustinian argument, J. Hessen stresses the point that in it there is no transition from the ideal to the real order, since for St. Augustine the intelligibles are true realities, the necessary ontological foundation of truth. Basically, the proof consists in showing that the multitude of intelligibles demands as their ultimate foundation a unity that transcends them, namely, eternal truth. In this respect, the Augustinian proof is equally distant from both the Anselmian argument and the Aristotelian argument. Just as it does not imply a passage from the ideal to the real 62Etienne Gilson, Introduction d l'etude de saint A.ugustin (2nd ed. rev.; Paris: Vrin, 1945), p. 11. 63Ibid., p. IS. 64Ibid., p. 22. 6llIbid. 66Ibid., pp. 26-27.

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order, so the proof does not have recourse, in the real order, to the principle of causality. It merely affirms a norm of truth without which the characteristics of our knowledge would remain unexplained. 67 Yet, Hessen remarks, the dialectic process whereby St. Augustine argues from what is incommutably true (incommutabiliter verum) to incommutable truth (veritas incommutabilis) as something self-existing and personal, cannot satisfy our modern critical mind. The process must be completed and integrated with the consideration that the ideal order is not something isolated from, but related to, the real. Thus interpreted and implemented, the Augustinian argument for God's existence may be considered, if not a proof in the strict sense of the term, at least a rational justification of our faith in God. This, affirms Hessen with Gilson, is precisely what St. Augustine wanted his argument to be. 68 Charles Boyer does not quite agree with Hessen's viewpoint that the principle of causality has no part in the Augustinian proof; nor does he accept the distinction that Gilson introduces between an essential and an existential approach to the problem of God's existence, as though, in contrast with the existential character of the Thomistic ways, St. Augustine would have developed his proof on a purely essential plane. After a careful study of all the pertinent texts, which he lines up and interprets in what he believes to be a logical sequence, Boyer concludes that St. Augustine's theistic arguments constitute various stages of a unique demonstration, in which the sensible world is the starting point and the nature of our ideas a further step in our mind's ascent to God. Hence no clear-cut distinction can be made in St. Augustine's system between the so-called cosmological and ideological argument. The two arguments are but two different stages of a unique demonstrative process that rests ultimately on the principle of causality.69 One of the strongest supporters of the apodictic value of the Augustinian argument is Prof. Ioachim Sestili. In an extensive and well-documented study,70 he contends that this proof of God's exist67 J. Hessen, Augustins Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (Berlin: Diimmler, 1931), pp.138-46. 681bid., pp. 189-91. 69Charles Boyer, "La preuve de Dieu augustinienne," Archives de philosophie, VII, 2 (1930), 105-141. 7oCf. Prof. Ioachim Sestili, "Argumentum augustinianum de existentia Dei," Acta hebdomadae augustinianae-thomisticae (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1931), pp. 241-05. The study is followed by a very interesting and enlightening discussion, pp.265-70.

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ence is truly metaphysical, inasmuch as our mind has a direct intuition of the ideal properties and principles of truth which are like the norm and regulating principles of our knowledge and judgments.71 For Sestili the special characteristic of the proof consists in this: the incommutabilis ratio of the intelligible, such as the concept of a square body, expresses an absolute truth of the ideal order which serves as a basis for our ascent to self-existing truth. 72 The Augustinian proof is an argument a posteriori, for it is grounded in the e~sence of things that exist outside our mind. 73 Moreover, we arrive at the knowledge of God as the source of all truth by means of the principle of both efficient and exemplary causality.74 To this extent the proof is similar to the Thomistic ways, especially the fourth way, which argues to God from the various degrees of being. 75 However, unlike the Thomistic fourth way, the Augustinian proof rests exclusively on knowledge of the pure intelligible through the eternal forms or ideas that are impressed, as it were, in the very core of reality and assist our mind as illuminating principles in its attainment of truth. 78 If we wish, observes Prof. Sestili, we may speak of abstraction and separation in the attainment of the intelligible; but in St. Augustine's system the intellect does not rest ultimately on a logical and subjective universal whose characteristics of necessity and eternity are purely negative. The universal in question is a universal of an· ideal order, but an objective and positive universal. It is not a pure abstraction, since it manifests in its objective notion an absolute, simple, and definite mode in the order of an eternal possibility of an essence with· regard to its existence. This mode, it is worth noting, will be easily identified with those Augustinian ideas or forms which lead necessarily to the exemplary idea of participability of the divine essence and conclude to the divine essence itself as to their ultimate foundation. 77 Thus understood, he concludes, the Augustinian proof is the best and most effective argument for God's existence, for, rather than rest on the judgments derived from the 711bid., 721bid., 781bid., 741bid., 751bid., 781bid., 771bid.,

p. 242. pp. 242; 251. p. 243. See also Prof. Sestili's answer to P. Blasius Romeyer, p. 266. pp. 251; 252. p. 243. See also Prof. Sestili's answer to P. Bemardus Jansen, p. 269. p. 243. pp. 243·44.

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principles of truth, it rests on the direct contemplation of truth itself in the ideal order. 78 Besides, all other theistic arguments, including St. Thomas's five ways, are somehow grounded in the Augustinian proof. 79 An enthusiastic defense of the argument from eternal truths can be found in another contemporary thinker, an informed and devoted advocate of> St. Augustine, Prof. Michele Federico Sciacca. 8o In his opinion, the problem of God's existence is essentially the problem of the truth or existence of every finite being; it is the problem of the metaphysical intelligibility of the real. To inquire whether God exists is to search for the truth of the truth of my own being and that of every other existing being, as well as for the truth that is within mysel£.81 Hence all demonstration of God's existence must begin with truth. 82 Even the theistic argument from the existence of the external world rests ultimately on the objective validity of the principle of causality. This, too, is a truth. 83 To affirm that the human mind can attain to absolute truth, but to deny the existence of a transcending truth, is to contradict oneself. One denies truth in the very moment that he makes truth the product of his finite and changeable mind. 84 In an attempt to give the argument from truth its concrete and precise formulation, Prof. Sciacca reduces it to the following syllogism. An intelligent being has the intuition of truths that are necessary, immutable, absolute. [But] a contingent and finite intelligible being can neither create nor receive from things, through the senses, the absolute truths that it knows intuitively. 78Ibid., p. 246: "Hinc concludimus, augustinianum argumentum omnium rei demonstrandae argumentum praestantissimum extare et ilIo neque maius neque praestabilius inveniri. Illud namque dicimus quasi mathesim puram ceteris applicandam. De bonitate enim argumentorum ceterorum iudicare debemus ex principiis incommutabilis veritatis; iamvero, Augustinus ad argumentum conficiendum, contemplatur directe hanc ipsam incommutabilem veritatem in ordine ideali. Et excellentia ipsius thomistici argumenti, quo ex rebus mobilibus ad ens immobile devenitur, ad ilIud Augustini reduci debet." 7gef. Prof. Sestili's answer to Father Jer6me of Paris: "Teneo cetera argu· menta in ilIo fundari, non autem ad ilIud reduci." Ibid., p. 266. 80We refer especially to his work, Filosofia e metafisica (Brescia: MorceIliana. 1950), pp. 146-68. 81Ibid., p. 147. 82Ibid., p. 148. 88 Ibid. 84Ibid., p. 149.

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Therefore, there exists a necessary, immutable, absolute truth, which is God. 811 In a fairly recent reappraisal of St. Augustine's ideological argument, Father Marcolino Daffara affirms its unquestionable value, provided, he says, the argument is properly understood. 86 He holds that the innatistic trend of St. Augustine's gnoseology, according to which truth is possessed by our mind even prior to the mind's activity, in no way prejudices the value of the argument. The ideological argument is only accidentally related to the primary origin of our ideas. Whatever this origin may be, it is absolutely necessary that the truths which we know and the activity itself of our mind that knows them, find their ultimate explanation in a first mind and first truth that makes them intelligible. 8T As to the argument from the possibles, which Daffara presents in the light of St. Thomas's De veritate, q. 1, arts. 2-6, we find this penetrating observation: Uust as] things exist because they are possible, and they are not possible because they exist, [so] they are known to us because they are knowable, and not vice versa, [i.e.] knowable because they are known. Possibility and the truth that concerns it are something above things and our mind; they transcend both. But the possibility and intelligibility of things are inferred from their relation to an efficient power which is capable of bringing them to existence and from their relation to an intellect that is capable of understanding them. According to this relationship, the truth of things is eternal. rI'herefore] the foundation [of the truth of things] is to be found in an intellect that eternally comprehends them, and in a power that can eternally draw them from nothing. 88 Obviously, this intellect and power is God. Therefore God exists.8D 811Ibid., p. 16l1. 86Cf. Marcolino Daffara, op. cit., p. IlO. The entire discussion of the argu· ment runs from p. IlO to p. 1!16. 8Tlbid., p. 125. 88Ibid., p. 1!12, continuation and conclusion of n. II from p. Il10. 8DOther defenders of the ideological argument in modern and contemporary times are: a) A.mong scholastics: R. Arnou, S.J., Theologia naturalis (Rome: Gregorian University, 1942), pp. 92-94; P. De Munnynck, O.P., "L'idee de l'~tre," Revue neo.scholastique de philosoph ie, XXXI (1929), 182-20ll; 415-lI7; L. De Raeymaeker, Metaphysica generalis (Louvain: Institut superieur de philosophie (19l11), pp. 58 ff.; T. de Diego Diez, S.J., Theologia naturalis (Santander: "Sal Terrae," 1955), p. Il4; I. Di Napoli, Manuale philosophiae (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1951) , III, pp. lI6-57; J. Donat, S.J., Theodicea (6th ed. rev.; Innsbruck: F. Rauch, 1929), pp. 60-6l1; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., God: His Existence and His Nature, trans. by Dom Bede Rose from 5th French ed. (St. Louis: Herder, 1948),

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Opponents of the Argument Despite the seemingly strong line of reasoning offered by the supporters of the ideological argument, the argument does not go unchallenged. Its validity has been seriously questioned by several influential neoscholastics who, following the lead of Cardinal Mercier and the Louvain School, subject the argument to a severe criticism.90 Their position can be summarized in the following statements. l. The possibles may be considered in the purely ideal or analytical order, inasmuch as the formal elements by which they are constituted imply no contradiction (negative intrinsic possibility). In this case, they can be explained by the operation of our mind withI, pp. 324-31; I. Gredt, O.S.B., E1ementa philo50phiae aristotelico-thomisticae (9th ed. rev.; Barcelona: Herder, 1951), II, pp. 201-202; Ch. V. Heris, O.P., "La preuve de l'existence de Dieu par les verites eternelles," Revue thomiste, XXXI (1926), 330-41; J. H. Hickey, O. Cist., Summula philosophiae scholasticae (4th ed.; Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son, 1919), III, p. 33; I. Hontheim, S.J., Institutiones theodicaeae (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1893), pp. 128-39; J. Kleutgen, S.J., Die Philosophie der Vorzeit (Innsbruck, 1878), I, pp. 767 ff.; F. M. Maquart, Elementa philosophiae (Paris: Blot, 1938), 111-2, pp. 316-20; W. Pohl, De vera religione quaestiones selectae (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1928), pp. 53-69; Bl. Romeyer, S.J., "S. Augustin," La philosophie chretienne, II (1936), pp. 146-77; Idem, "La doctrine de S. Thomas sur la verite," Archives de philosophie, III, ca. 2 (1925), pp. 46-50; Idem, "Dieu," Dictionnaire pratique des connaissances religieuses, Vol. II, cols. 845-46; A. D. Sertillanges, O.P., Les sources de 1a era,ance en Dieu (Paris: Perrin et Cie., 1908), pp. 202-238. Later the author rejected the argument. Other scholastics who favor the argument: Bossuet, Boedder, Chossat, De Broglie, Del Campo, Farges, Fenelon, Janssens, Jolivet, Kwant, Lacordaire, Lehmen, Lepidi, Liberatore, Marechal, Monaco, Pesch, Piat, Reinstadler, Schaaf, Schiffini, Van der Aa, Willems, Zacchi. b) Among nonscholastics: Blondel, Cousin, Malebranche, Parodi, Rosmini, Ruyssen. This latter wrote: "rai toujours pense que, s'il est possible de sauver des assauts de la critique quelqu'une des preuves traditionnelles de l'existence de Dieu, c'est surtout celIe dite des 'verites eternelles'." Th. Ruyssen, "Le Dieu lointain et Ie Dieu proche," Revue de metaphysique et de morale, XXXVII (1930), 349. 90Cardinal Desire Mercier discusses the ideological argument in connection with the problem of the ultimate foundation of the possibles in his Metaphysique genera Ie, pp. 29-48. A summary of the discussion can be found in N. Balthasar's article, "Le metaphysicien," Revue neo-scholastique de philasophie, XXVIII (1926), 163-66. Descoqs reproduces substantially' Card. Mercier's argumentation with some additional reflections of his own in his Prae1ectiones thealogiae naturalis, II, 80-87. The works of both Mercier and ~coqs served as a basis for Gisquiere's treatment of the question in his work, Deus Dominus, I, 215-20. The author, however, does not fail to express some personal views on the matter. For a presentation in English of Card. Mercier's standpoint d. Peter Coffey, Ontology (New York: Smith, 1938), pp. 91-95.

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out having recourse to God. They may also be considered as essences or realities abstracted from actually existing things, and then they may constitute the basis for a theistic proof. However, this will not be the ideological argument in question, but either the third or fourth way of St. Thomas, depending on whether we look upon them from the viewpoint of their contingency or of their limited perfection. 91 2. The reason why the possibles considered in the purely ideal order-the only order in which an ideological argument can be built -do not constitute a basis for an ascent to God is that they can be sufficiently explained without God both as to their formal elements and as to their characteristics. 92 The elements that make up possible essences are those abstracted from concretely existing things, even though their association may be the construct of our mind, e.g., a golden mountain. The possibility of those essences, considered formally as the truth of essences in the order of intelligibility, involves necessarily a relation to an intellect, either human or divine, provided that such an intellect exist. But since in our hypothesis the existence of God has not yet been demonstrated, the formal reason of that possibility can and must be found in the thing itself, from which the essence is abstracted, and in the human mind, which is responsible for the process of abstraction. Hence the so-called independence of the possibles from any contingent reality is but an apparent independence. Furthermore, the characteristics of necessity, eternity, and immutability of the possibles are only hypothetic and relative. These characteristics find their explanation in the nature of our intellect and its abstractive process, whereby the essences of finite things, 91ef. Descoqs. op. cit., II. p. 80. Gisqui~re. 01'. cit., I. pp. 219-20. believes that the ideological argument cannot be reduced to St. Thomas's fourth way. because no degrees of perfection are to be found in beings or essences of a purely ideal order. with which the ideological argument is concerned. 92This is substantially the first part of the thesis that Cardinal Mercier defends in his discussion of the possibles. He writes: "Les objects abstraits de l'experience et analyzes par la pensee sont, dans l'ordre analytique, la raison suffisante derni~re des possibles et de. leurs proprietes." Meta1'hysique generale, p. B7. The second part of the thesis is an atteinpt to prove that the theory that makes God the necessary foundation of the possibles leads directly to ontologism. Ibid., pp. 45-46. This conclusion has been disavowed by many scholastics. including some who reject the value of the ideological argument. See. for example. Gisqui~e. op. cit., I, p. 219, where it is stated: "mam tamen Ontologismi accusationem non 1'utamus esse legitimam, saltem ut a Mercier proponitur."

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which exist in reality as contingent, mutable, and temporary, become in the ideal order necessary, immutable, and eterna1.93 In conclusion, the object and the human mind, both of which are contingent realities, furnish us with the explanation of all possibles in the pure ideal order. 3. The observations that have been made about the nature and foundation of the possibles can also be applied to the question of eternal truths and first principles. These truths and principles are all based on the nature of being as such, with which they are coextensive. They may help us attain to the supreme being, but unless we want to fall into a perfect petitio principii, they have a value of their own even prior to the demonstration of God's existence. 94 Their characteristics of necessity, eternity, and immutability, which they share in common with the possibles, are likewise hypothetical and relative. They become absolute only when the existence of an intellect endowed with those properties has been demonstrated. But this is precisely the point at issue. 95 To speak of truth as something absolute and eternal is to forget that truth is essentially a relation. In themselves, things are neither true nor false; they become true only when they are related to an intellect. If there were no intellect, there would be no truth; if there were no being, there would be no truth either. 96 Evidently, a being does not have to exist in act to be true; it can be potentially true as regards its future existence even as it exists in its cause. Hence if an eternal cause exists, the truth of things 93 Cardinal Mercier sums up his discussion of the possibles and their charac· teristics by saying: "Les possibles et leurs characteres trouvent une explication suffisante dans les choses d'experience: L'intelligence a Ie pouvoir de concevoir les choses abstraitement, et de reflechir ensuit sur ces types abstraits; cette an· alyse reflexive fait surgir devant la pensee des rapports universels, necessaires, superieurs aux conditions particulieres de l'espace et du temps, qui deviennent alors, pour nous, les normes des choses et des jugements." Ibid., pp. 44-45. 94See Descoqs, op. cit., II, p. 86. 95Ibid. 96"La verite n'est pas chose absolue, c'est une proportion: la proportion de l'etre It l'intelligence. Si donc il n'y a point d'intelligence, il n'y a point de verite; s'il n'y a point d'etre, il n'y a point de verite davantage, et la fiction que la verite se precede elle·meme en tant que future, ou se survit It elle·meme en tant que passee n'est qU'une imagination creuse, si l'on ne presuppose, d'une part, un sujet qui puisse concevoir la verite et, de l'autre, un objet qui la fonde." Sertillanges, La philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin, I, p. 46. See also Card. Desire Mercier, Crittiriologie generale (8th ed.; Louvain: Institut superieur de philosophie, 1923, pp. 20 ff., and commentary on Mercier's statements by Mindorff, art. cit., pp. 440 ff.

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may be called eternal, inasmuch as it is grounded in an eternal creative power and will. However, the existence of such a cause must first be demonstrated. To argue to the existence of that cause from the existence of eternal truth is to invert the order of ideas and reali ties. 97 The foregoing considerations, the opponents of the ideological argument have care to observe, have the sole purpose of showing that no valid proof of God's existence can be drawn from the nature of possibles and eternal truths considered in the ideal or analytical order. But once the existence of God has been demonstrated, the doctrine of possibles and eternal truths retains its full value in the ontological or synthetic order. The whole controversy therefore is not about the foundation of possibles and eternal truths as such, which all admit to be God" but about the question whether possibles and eternal truths may be considered as a valid terminus a quo for a demonstration of God's existence. o8 CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE ARGUMENT

It is our contention that the ideological argument is a valid theistic proof, provided it is correctly understood. In this section we will present some of the reasons on which we base our conviction, and answer the objections that have been raised against the argument. But first some clarifications are needed. We do not take the ideological argument in the sense that its opponents have sometimes given to it, namely, that it is an argument 97Sertillanges, La philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin, I, pp. 46-47. 98Cf. Mercier, Metaphysique genera Ie, pp. 46-47; Descoqs, op. cit., II, p. 81; Gisqui~re, op. cit., I, p. 215. Other opponents of the ideological argument, besides Mercier, Descoqs, Gisqui~re, Mindorff, Coffey, and Sertillanges (this last at least in his work, La philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin) , are: N. Balthasar, "Deux theodicees," Annales de l'Institut superieur de philosophie de Louvain (1912),486-47; L. Billot, De Deo uno et trino (6th ed. rev.; Rome: The Gregorian University, 1920), pp. 86-88; M. Cuervo, O.P., "El argumento de 'Las Verdades eternas' segUn Santo Tomas," La ciencia tomista, XXXVII (Jan.-June, 1928), 18-84 (the author maintains that St. Thomas denies the value of the argument); I. Hellin, S.J., Cursus philosophicus, Vol. V, Theologia naturalis (Madrid: B.A.C., 1950), pp. 229-85; G. Manser, Das Wesen des Thomismus (Fribourg, 1932), pp. 267-98; 407-450; Van der Meersch, De Deo uno et trino (Bruges, 1917), pp. 74-75; Z. Van de Woestyne, O.F.M., Cursus philosophicus (Malines: Typographia S. Francisci, 1925), II, p. 680, n. 1; J. Webert, Essai de metaphysique thomiste (Paris: tditions de la revue des jeunes, DescIee et Cie., 1927), p. 151. To these we must add all the nominalists.

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based on ideas considered only in their logical or analytical order. Rather, as already stated in the beginning of this study, we consider ideas from the point of view of mental concepts with a foundation in reality; not inasmuch as they represent an actually existing thing or the truth of an actually existing object, but in the sense that their content reflects a being or truth in the essential and metaphysical order.99 Thus understood, the argument will keep its distinctive feature as an argument from the ideal order, and at the same time it will obviate the evident inconsistency of involving an illicit passage from the ideal to the real order. In our case, the ideal is also real, and the transition is simply from one order of reality to another order of reality. It must also be made clear that although the ideological argument originated with St. Augustine, we shall not attempt to evaluate it in the light of St. Augustine's works. Nor is it our concern to investigate the exact attitude of St. Thomas or any other scholastic towards it. The reason is simple. Ours is not an exegetical study of the thought of any particular philosopher but only an effort to evaluate the argument on its own merit, that is, on a purely objective basis. While this will render our task less difficult, it will also save us the trouble of putting the argument in relation to any particular system of philosophy. This is in itself a very complex problem, especially in the case of St. Augustine, where the argument is closely connected with his illumination theory and the doctrine of eternal reasons. Keeping this in mind, we shall proceed to a critical evaluation of the proof, beginning with the argument from the possibles.

Argument from the Possibles There is no doubt that our mind can conceive intrinsically possible beings whose reality and essential principles are altogether independent of any contingent factor. In fact, the intrinsic reality of the possibles does not and cannot depend on their existence, since 99 As has been observed, the possibles are neither actual beings nor nothing. They are not actual beings, because as such, i.e., inasmuch as they are possibles, they do not exist; they are not nothing, because nothing cannot exist, nor can it be the object of our understanding, whereas the possibles can exist and are intelligible. The possibles have therefore a reality of their own which is properly called a potential reality. This reality is not physical but metaphysical; it is not false but true, for the possibles can truly exist. Hontheim, InstitutiO'f1lls theodicaeae, pp. 35-!\6.

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of their very nature they are indifferent to exist or not to exist. On the contrary, the existence of things depends on their intrinsic possibility. Nor does the intrinsic reality of the possibles depend on our intellect. The intellect discovers but does not make the possibility of things. It is true that the proximate reason of the possibles as such is to be found in the compatibility of their notes. But, we may ask, where does this compatibility come from? What is the ultimate foundation of these notes? Since, on the one hand, the possibles are not the reason for their own reality,1°o and, on the other hand, the human intellect cannot be held responsible for their intrinsic possibility, the answer must be that a being exists which is their ultimate ontological reason and possesses in itself the characteristics of necessity, immutability, and eternity proper to the possibles. This being cannot be a contingent reality whose internal possibility depends on another, for in this case we would only have displaced the problem, not solved it. It must be a necessary being, a being that has within itself the reason for its own existence; a being, in other words, whose essence is to exist. That being is God. Thus, in our search for the ultimate foundation of the possibles, we arrive, by the aid of the principle of sufficient reason alone, at the existence of an a.bsolutely necessary being, which is also immutable, eternal, and infinite: God. Since the demonstration fulfills all the requirements set down for a genuine theistic proof, we conclude that the ideological argument is a valid demonstration of God's existence. To the objection that the possibles and their characteristics of necessity, immutability, and eternity can be sufficiently explained through an abstractive intellect and the object, the answer will be that the human mind and the object are the proximate causes and foundation of the possibles, but not their ultimate reason. Indeed, by their very nature, the possibles transcend all created mind and reality; they are such even if no contingent being or human intellOOCf. J. Donat, Theodicea, p. 63: "Si possibilia a se realitatem possibilitatis haberent, etiam exsistentiam haberent. Nam possibilitas nihil est nisi ordo ad exsistendum; ideo inter utramque concordantia est. Si igitur a se extra purum nihil per possibilitatem ponuntur, ad suam exsistentiam vero se actuare non possunt, disharmonia est inter eorum gressum primum in ordine realitatis et ultimum; quae concipi nequit." This doctrine, the author remarks. is better grasped by intuition than by a lengthy demonstration. Ibid.

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lect ever existed. Far from being the ultimate foundation of the possibles, the human mind and all created beings would not exist at all, were they not intrinsically possible. Another objection that is often being raised against the argument from the possibles is this. The possibles are eternal and immutable negatively, not positively; they prescind from time but are not above time. Hence they do not demand as their foundation a being that is positively eternal and immutable. In answer to this objection it must be said that even if the possibles were only negatively eternal and immutable, their ultimate foundation would still have to be something positive. To hold the contrary is to fall into nominalism, which maintains that the nature and essence of things, considered as such, is only a fiction of the mind and needs no other foundation than the mind itself. A further objection, which has already been answered implicitly in the course of our discussion but which we wish to mention here again for the sake of completeness, takes the form of a dilemma. It reads: the possibles are considered either as mere ideas, and then we have essentially the same procedure as in St. Anselm's ontological argument where from the idea of God it is argued to God's existence; or they are considered as contingent and limited entities, in which case the argument is but another version of the third or fourth way of St. Thomas. Our answer to the dilemma is that neither alternative is true. The possibles are not considered as mere ideas, but as ideas of a possible or potential essence for which an ultimate reason is sought in a necessary and eternal being. Thus, whereas in the ontological argument one argues to God from the very concept of God, in the ideological argument we argue to God as the ultimate reason of a possible entity. Consequently, ours is not an argument a priori or a simultaneo, as is the case with the Anselmian proof, but an argument a posteriori. On the other hand, the proof should not be identified with any of St. Thomas's five ways. It is worth repeating: in the ideological argument the vehicle of our ascent to God is not the principle of causalty but the principle of sufficient reason. On this account the argument from the possibles stands as an altogether independent and distinct theistic proof.

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Argument from Eternal Truths The argument from eternal truths has many points in common with the argument from the possibles. In both cases the terminus a quo is a being in the ideal order, the means of demonstration is the principle of sufficient reason, and the terminus ad quem is God. But whereas in the argument from the possibles the ideal being is an intrinsically possible reality, in the argument from eternal truths the ideal being is those eternal and immutable principles and relations which lie at the basis of all thought and reality. Here is how the argument runs. The mutual relations existing among the possibles are governed by certain principles, such as the principle of identity, contradiction, and sufficient reason, that are absolutely necessary and universal not only in the order of knowledge but also in the order of reality. These relations and principles find their ultimate explanation neither in the existing things of this world nor in our mind. Not in the things of this world, for even if all things ceased to exist, these. relations and principles would still be intelligible and therefore true. Thus, even if no man ever came into existence, it would ,still be true that in order to exist a man would have to possess rationality and animality as his essential principles. Likewise, even if no circle ever existed, the geometrical laws about the circle would still be true and valid. Obviously, these truths are grasped by our mind in the study of reality. But in so doing our mind also understands that such truths are neither its own product nor the product of any existing being. Briefly, they are independent of all contingent reality; they are necessary and universal, and as such they demand a necessary being as their ultimate ground and foundation. That being is God. Thus, by examining the nature and characteristics of eternal truths and following the same line of reasoning we used in the argumerit from the possibles, we argue by the aid of the principle of sufficient reason to God, who alone can furnish us with the ultimate explanation of truth. While these truths are fundamentally in the divine essence, they are formally in the divine mind, the source of all truth and intelligibility. It becomes clear, then, that our search for the ultimate foundation of eternal truths is a quest for the ultimate source of intelligibility of the laws and principles that govern all reality.

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The objections that have been raised against the argument from the possibles have also been put forward against the argument from eternal truths. To avoid repetition, we shall mention here only those objections which are directed primarily against truth as such. Truth, it is said, is essentially a relation; it is a conformity of mind with reality. Therefore, it is wrong to speak of truth as something absolute, independent of all contingent being, and from such a notion of truth argue to God as its ultimate foundation. God is of course the cause of all truth, but this cannot be known from the mere notion of truth as such. To arrive at God as the source of all truth from the truth of our judgment-for it is in judgment that truth consists properly-is to use the term "truth" equivocally. This objection would have a certain value if by truth we meant purely logical truth, or truth as it is in our mind apart from reality. This is not our contention. The starting point of our argument is ontological or metaphysical truth, that is, the conformity of reality with the mind. If defenders of the argument sometimes speak of truth in the logical order along with truth in the mathematical and metaphysical orders, they do not intend to oppose one kind of truth to another. They want only to emphasize the different order of reality from which truth is taken. Hence truth in the logical order is truth in the order of thought, not inasmuch as thought is divorced from reality, but in the sense that it expresses those necessary and eternal principles that are at the basis of all knowledge. Such is the truth of the first principles. These, let us always remember, are not merely logical principles but also metaphysical principles, i.e., principles of reality. It is with the ultimate objective foundation of these principles that the ideological argument is concerned.lOl The opponents of the ideological argument insist further that if there were no contingent being, then prior to the demonstration of God's exisence we could hardly speak of truth, since there would be no truth. Hence truth and its properties of eternity and necessity are purely hypothetical, and cannot serve as a springboard for our ascent to God. 10IIt is true that some authors try to justify the ideological argument from the nature and characteristics of logical truth rather than from ontological truth. However, they would never consider truth as a pure product of our mind, but rather as the relationship of conformity between mind and reality in the order of possibility and intelligibility. Thus the intelligibles and their metaphysical principles and relations are in effect the real basis of the ideological argument.

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

Here again we must disagree with critics of the argument. Before knowing that God exists, I perceive truth, such as the truth of the first principles, as something that is absolutely independent of any contingent reality, and from it I argue to God as its ultimate foundation. The existence of continent things, or of any intelligible reality for that matter, is the immediate cause of my knowledge of truth, but it is not the ultimate foundation of the truth, which prescinds from both contingent reality and my mind. Certainly, if nothing ever existed there would be no truth; but there is truth, and so there must be an eternal and necessary foundation without which truth is impossible.

• • •

Before concluding this discussion, we wish to make the following observation: the ideological argument is and remains a debatable philosophical issue. It has been the purpose of this article to present the argument in its historical background from its first appearance in St. Augustine up to the present time, and to evaluate it on the basis of a sound criticism. The positions of both defenders and opponents have been stated with fairness and objectivity. Some obscure points have been clarified, so as to pave the way for an impartial discussion of the two opposing views. This led us to accept the argument as a valid proof of God's existence and to reject as groundless the objections raised against it. Owing to the inherent difficulty of the problem and the reigning confusion of the issue in some philosophical manuals and treatises, the writer is more than willing to admit that the task has not been an easy one. It was only after a great deal of thinking and a· serious balancing of the arguments pro and con that he has decided for the positive side in the controversy. Was he justified in doing so? The answer is left to the reader. Meanwhile, if the present article succeeds in arousing some interest in a fascinating, although often neglected and discarded, theistic proof that has challenged the abilities of many great philosophical minds, the writer will feel that his efforts have been sufficiently rewarded.

2 GABRIEL MARCEL and PROOF FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD by SISTER

M.

ALOYSIUS SCHALDENBRAND, S.S.J.

Among existentialist philosophers, Gabriel Marcel holds a prominent place as one explicitly, even primarily, concerned with the quest of the absolute.1 His Metaphysical Journal records a personal life so intensely religious that it is aptly summarized as a "progressive discovery of God."2 Not content with an interior assurance of the validity of the Christian faith, he assumed that faith in an objective and fully practical manner when he became a Catholic in the spring of 1929.3 Convinced that a hidden identity obtains between the way of the saint and the way of the metaphysician, he refused from the first to permit a divorce of religious and philosophical reflection. 4 Yet, despite the sincerity reflected in his spiritual lit is true that Marcel objects to being classified as an existentialist. His distaste for this categorization is occasioned by the atheism and vulgarity popularly associated with the movement through the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre. In Marcel's own eyes, his philosophy appears as a neo-Socratism rather than an existentialism. Cf. Introduction to the English Translation of the Metaphysical Journal. tr. Bernard Wall (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952); L'homme problematique (Paris: Aubier, 1955), p. 72. However, since Marcel does philosophize on existential themes, he is consistently numbered among existential philosophers: L. M. Bochenski, Contemporary European Philosophy. tr. Donald Nicholl and Karl Aschenbrenner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, Regnery Co., 1952); Frederick Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy: Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1956); Regis Jolivet, Les doctrines existentialistes de Kierkegaard Ii J.-P. Sartre (Abbaye Saint-Wandrille: Editions de Fontenelle, 1948). 2Roger Troisfontaines, De l'existence Ii l'etre: La philosophie de Gabriel Marcel (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), Vol. II, p. 207. 3 Gabriel, Marcel, L'etre et avoir (Paris: Aubier, 1935), p. 30. 41bid., p. 123.

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odyssey, he has incurred the reproaches of certain Christian theologians and scholastic philosophers who see a depreciation of human reason in his rejection of the demonstrability of the existence of God. According to Pere Troisfontaines, this "regrettable misunderstanding" has arisen because differences of perspective and terminology have not been recognized and respected. Ii An able commentator upon Marcellian themes, the French Jesuit is persuaded that the reproaches of scholastic critics are here "happily unmerited."6 It is the purpose of this paper to determine whether such a conciliatory . attitude is altogether justified. What is sought above all is an answer to the question: are the differences between the respective positions of Gabriel Marcel and the scholastics wholly reducible to variations of vocabulary and viewpoint? Given such an objective, it is clear that a preliminary examination is imposed. Its task is that of determining as precisely as possible the stand which Marcel takes toward proof for the existence of God. Essential to this task is an underlining of differences of terminology and perspective with respect to the terminology and perspective of scholastic philosophy. Upon the accuracy of these initial • findings, the pertinence of the subsequent argument obviously depends. A first precision requires the recognition that Marcel's thought in this matter includes a positive as well as a negative aspect. He does not merely reject proof of the existence of God based upon rational demonstration. At the same time that he deplores what appears to him as the "scandal" of all such attempts, he proposes an approach which provides, to his mind at least, a privileged way of access to the transcendent being. Although neither of these aspects can be neglected if Marcel's position is to be adequately represented, it may be less confusing to consider them successively rather than simultaneously. Accordingly, it is toward the rejection of the traditional rational proof that attention is first directed. Exception may be taken to the term "rejection." It can be pointed out that unqualified opposition to the demonstrability of an absolute being characterizes only the first volume of the Metaphysical L'existence Ii l'~tre, p. 208. 61bid., " ..• 1a divergence des vocabulaires et des perspectives, •.• ont oc-

Ii De

casionne parfois . . . des meprises regrettables et des reproches heureusement immentes."

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Journal. 7 More specifically, it can be argued that this categorical denial of the very possibility of demonstration where a transcendent existence is concerned hinges upon a highly restricted usage of the word "existence" no longer observed by Marcel. There is no denying that early declarations regarding the indemonstrability of the existence of God are traceable to a rigorous correlation between existence and the spatio-temporal defended during a first phase of development. Having equated existence with the reality encountered in sense experience, Marcel found it impossible to escape the conclusion that existence cannot be a demonstrandum. Existence is immediately known. It is the ineluctable point of departure for all thought, but in no sense the term of logical inference. By his own route, the youthful French philosopher thus found his way to the position of his Danish predecessor, S~ren Kierkegaard: God is, but he does not exist. Those who regard the term "rejection" as too negative a designation for the attitude of Marcel toward rational demonstrability of the existence of God point immediately, however, to the undeniable fact of his progression beyond this initial, thoroughgoing refusal. Upon clarifying the notion of existence, they insist, Marcel does admit the logical validity of the rational proofs. What he denies or rejects is simply their power to convince those who lack certain necessary predispositions. Such a qualified denial, these defenders conclude, can in no sense be construed as a simple rejection. Certainly it must be acknowledged that the position reflected in the Metaphysical Journal has been surpassed. Gradually Marcel has enlarged the notion of existence. 8 Although he has never determined precisely its relation to being, he now not only refuses to dissociate it from. being but admits its merging with being in and 7 Journal metaphysique (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1935), p. 32: " ... c'est que par une demarche contradictoire que la pensee pose Ie probleme de l'existence de Dieu." p. 255: "On voit des lors pourquoi aucune demonstration de l'existence de Dieu n'est possible: il ny a pas de passage logique qui permette de s'elever a Dieu en partant de ce qui n'est pas lui." 8This simply means that Marcel no longer restricts existence to spatio-temporal reality but allows for the latter's transmutation into being through the human subject'S act of loving recognition. It does not mean that Marcel has resolved the problem of the relation beween existence and being. In the Gifford lectures of 1949-50, he concludes that their true relation is "enve1oppee d'ambignite": Le mystere de l'~tre (Paris: Aubier, 1951), Vol. II, pp. 29--35.

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through the activity of spirit.9 When existence is embraced in the act of loving awareness proper to spirit, it is raised to the level of being and becomes indistinguishable from it. Once drawn into the orbit of spirit, existence loses its incompatibility with the absolute beng. Hence, Marcel no longer hesitates to speak of the existence of God nor even to acknowledge the logical validity of rational demonstrations of his existence.1o Up to this point the argument of those intent upon conciliation must be allowed. Yet, despite the d~velopment outlined here, the term "rejection" retains its appropriateness as descriptive of the abiding attitude of Marcel toward rational proof of an absolute existence. Examination of the latest texts available leaves the matter in little doubt. If Marcel admits the logical validity of the rational proofs, he is quick to add that they are useless. l l For the task of convincing the unbeliever, they are scandalously inadequate. Only the believer, he for whom they are eminently unnecessary, acknowledges their cogency. Those who are inclined to see in this forcefully remarked uselessness merely the mark of an indifferent or neutral attitude should read further. Not only are the classical proofs useless, Marcel continues, but they are worse than useless. To the sincere believer they may well appear as an affront to the faith that he holds as a sacred evidence.12 What is more, these demonstrations degrade the absolute One upon whom faith bears. Do they not, each and all, treat the transcendent being as if he were an empirical object?13 9The merging of existence and being through an intellective-volitional participative act is the dominant theme of Marcel's philosophy_ The human task lies precisely in the passage "de l'existence a l'~tre." Borrowing a phrase of the poet, Rilke, Marcel defines man as a "bee of the invisible." In this task of extracting the precious invisible. being. from existential reality. the liberty of man exercises a crucial role. By virtue of his liberty, man is able to resist the bias which inclines him toward the level of existence-as-thing and accede to the superior level of existence-as-being: Ibid., p. 31. 10Du refus a Z'invocation (Paris: Gallimard, 1940), pp. 229-32. Le mystere de Z'~tre, p. 175. llLe mystere de l'~tre. p. 177. "On s'achemine donc vers ce paradoxe que ces preuves sont sans efficacite la precisement OU elles seraient necessaires, c'est-adire 10rsqu'il s'agit de convaincre un incroyant; mais inversement. la ou la croyance existe deja • • . elles apparaissent a tout Ie moins comme inutiles." 12Ibid. "Celui qui fait l'experience de la presence de Dieu, non seulement n'a pas besoin de preuves, mais ira peut-~tre jusqu'a regarder l'idee d'une demonstration comme attentatoire a ce qui est pour lui une evidence sacree." 13Troisfontaines. op. cit., Vol. II. pp. 2111-14. "Or, Ie Dieu de Za foi n'est pas un 'objet' empirique, il ne tombe pas comme tel dans Ie champ de l'experieuce ordinaire ou 'scientifique:"

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39

Texts such as these can hardly be interpreted as reflecting a simple disinterest in the logical or cosmological approach to the existence of God. In order to support the claim that what is reflected here is indeed a rejection of the rational proofs, it suffices to regard these texts more closely. Whoever carefully considers the classical proofs, Marcel asserts, finds himself in presence of a paradoxical fact.14 Here are arguments which claim for themselves universality since they deck themselves out as being grounded upon being itself. Yet these privileged arguments give much the same appearance as a magician or a medium who has lost his power. They yield to hidden but inexorable obstacles. Only two possibilities present themselves to Marcel as plausible explanations of this "scandalous situation."15 Either the arguments fail because they rest on a sophism, or they fail because hardened in evil. they encounter a That the first alternative, namely, that which posits the presence of a sophism, is rejected by Marcel is the fact underlined by those intent upon conciliating his position with scholastic philosophy. Of greater significance than the fact, however, are the reasons for the fact. These have every appearance of being somewhat peripheral to the proofs themselves. Marcel first points out that these demonstrations have a way of recurring periodically.16 Whatever Kant may say, it seems impossible to destroy them definitively. To this remarkable fact of their continuous renewal there must be added another and far from negligible point in their favor, namely, their power to satisfy the truly great minds of the past. Rather than believe that the present historical situation places minds far in advance of past intellectual giants, Marcel thinks it preferable to hold that these latter put into the arguments something that has not completely passed over into their formulation. Although he is not certain that contemporary minds are capable of the task, he believes that an explicitation of this "something more" may be precisely

will

14Du refus tl l'invocation, pp. 229-30.

15 Marcel uses the expression "scandalous situation" in order to express the contrast between the claim to universal validity and the obviously limited persuasive powers of the traditional proofs. That this hardly constitutes a "scandalous situation" is easily seen when it is observed that validity is one thing and persuasive power another. Discussion of this point occurs in the concluding section of this paper. 16Du refus a l'invocation, p. 229.

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what is needed in order to render the proofs truly convincing. 17 Ingenious as these reasons are, they do not advance to the interior of the proofs. Not once does Marcel suggest that the reason for their validity is to be found in the universal principles of being upon which they are based, for example: a being which becomes cannot have its raison d'~tre in itself; whatever is caused, is caused by another; every agent necessarily acts for an end. Toward such principles, formulated as they are in abstract language, the "philosopher of the concrete" is not simply indifferent. is Far from being an accidental omission occasioned by a certain temperamental disinterest, his failure to remark them as sources of validity is rooted in a militant, perhaps hostile, distrust. It is enough to review a passage contained in a recent publication, L' homrne problematique. Apropos of the Nietzschean dictum that God is dead, Marcel 19 observes: ... it seems to me that we must finish with the idea of a God Cause, of a god concentrating in himself all causality, or even, in more precise language, with every theological usage of the notion of causality. It is here that Kant has shown us the way, although he himself, perhaps, has not seen all the consequences of his discovery. . . . The God whose death Nietzsche has announced is the god of the aristotelian-thomist tradition, the first mover. . . . If we pretend to give the causal idea a transcendent range, we arrive at an impasse, or, what comes to the same thing, we lose ourselves in a labyrinth. To attack thus the principle of causality is to strike at the heart of the rational proofs. In presence of this fundamental rejection, it becomes clear that, whatever the validity which Marcel acknowl171bid., pp. 229-30. "N'y a-toil pas lieu de pr~umer bien plutot qu'ils mettaient dans leur argument quelque chose d'essential qui n'arrivait pas a passer compU~tement dans les formules et qu'il s'agirait pour nous d'expliciter au prix d'un effort dont il n'est m~me pas certain que nous soyons tout a fait capables?" 18Marcel approves this designation, although he adds that it is not the concrete of pure immediacy which he seeks but an ontological concrete grasped reflectively. 19L'homme problematique, p. 63. " ... il me semble qu'il faudrait en finir avec l'idee d'un Dieu Cause, d'un dieu concentrant en soi toute causalite, ou encore, en un langage plus rigoureux, avec tout usage theologique de la notion de causalite. C'est justement ice que Kant nous a montre Ie chemin sans peut~tre aller lue-m~me jus qu'au bout des consequences de sa decouverte ... Ie Dieu dont Nietzsche a annonce veridiquement la mort £6t Ie dieu de la tradition artistotelo-thomiste, Ie dieu premier moteur ... si nous pretendons faire de l'idee de cause un usage transcendant, nous arrivons a une impasse, ou, ce qui revient au m~e, nous perdons dans un labyrinthe."

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edges in the traditional proofs, it is not the traditional proofs themselves whose validity he acknowledges. Those intent upon conciliation may find this a hard saying. They will rightly point out that the MarcelIian denunciation of causality rests upon a physical interpretation which caricatures the philosophical notion, but which is regrettably widespread at the present time. 2o That Marcel has accepted the caricature uncritically is unfortunate, they will grant, but not inexplicable. He is, let it be remembered, untrained in scholastic philosophy. Temperamentally, too, he is little inclined to the highly abstract speculations prerequisite to an understanding of this basic principle of being. Yet, despite the correctness of these observations taken in themselves, they do not affect the thesis proposed here: The attitude of Gabriel Marcel toward the classical proofs of the existence of God is negative and not merely neutral. Whatever its source, there is present in his thought a militant distrust of a rational or scientific approach to the fact of an absolute being. In the last of the Gifford lectures delivered in 1951, it is again made clear that the traditional proofs based upon reason are not simply objects of indifference in the MarcelIian universe, but objects of opprobrium. 21 They are worse than useless rather than only useless. Instead of being merely superfluous to the man who has experienced the presence of God, they are an affront to the "sacred evidence" of faith. 22 What these proofs ignore is the hidden interior presence that is precisely the glory of faith. To "reason about" God is to act as if he were not present.23 It is to treat the absolute as if 20Evidence that Marcel does identify all causality with physical causality is not lacking: Ibid., pp. 63-64. "II est it craindre en effet que l'idee de causalite, quelque effort qu'aient tente les philosophes modernes pour la spiritualiser, pour la delier, pour la detacher de ses ancres primitives, est inseparable de l'existence d'un etre pourvu de pouvoirs instrumentaux: elle est en somme bio-teIrologique." A criticism of such an identification is reserved to the concluding section of this paper. 21Le mystere de l'etre. Vol. II, p. 177. 22Ibid., "Celui qui fait l'experience de la presence de Dieu, non seulement n'a pas besoin de preuves, mais ira peut-etre jusqu'it regarder l'idee d'une demonstration comme attentatoire it ce qui est pour lui une evidence sacree." 23 According to Marcel, judgments ought not to be made about God, for he is not a third person. He is the absolute thou fittingly addressed only in prayer: Troisfontaines, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 287; Marcel, L'homme problt!matique, p. 65.,

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he were an object.u For a concrete philosophy intent upon reconquering a primal unity inclusive of subject and object, the supreme degradation of a philosophical datum is a fall to the status of object.- Once objectified, it is, indeed, no longer a philosophical datum, for, having lost its relation to the subject, it is denatured.26 Given that scientific or rational proofs of necessity proceed objectively, it is easy to see why Marcel finds them more than slightly distasteful.2'l Examination of the rejected first alternative envisioned as possible cause of the persuasive failure of the classical proofs, namely, the presence within them of a sophism, reveals a paradoxical situation. The validity of the proofs is apparently acknowledged at the same time that the basis of their validity is directly repudiated. In a sense there is here an ambiguity. It is precisely this ambiguity which makes possible the conciliatory attitude. From Marcel's declaration that it would be rash to attribute the inefficacy of the rational proofs to the presence of a sophism. it is easy to conclude that he acknowledges their validity but concentrates his attention on their U The notion of the object is of great importance in the philosophy of Marcel. The object is here regarded as that which does not take the subject into account. Although Marcel admits the propriety and usefulness of sciences that do leave the subject out of account, he regards a slighting of the subject in philosophical research as the worst of perversions. To "objectify'~ is thus the gravest philO. sophical sin. It is to treat the reality in which the subject is personally engaged as a "problem," i.e., as something which is manipulated rather than as something which ii participated. 2IIOntoiogicai participation, transmutation of existence into being, recovery of a primal existential unity through a unifying reftection-these are equivalent ex· preseions for Marcel. All of them indicate the goal of the human task: the recovery of the ielf by the self at the level of being or, what comes to the same thing, at the level of loving awareness. 26Io the theses of traditional natural theolOgy, Marcel sees a like denaturing of the divine being. Since God is the absolute thou, he is inevitably denatured by scientific judgments which reduce him to the status of an "it." To interpret his creative ability in terms of caUSality, for example, is to indulge in an anthropomorphism whose evil effects are incalculable. If religious reftection is to surpass this inferior level, it must, it is claimed, give up these pretensions to scientific objectivity, put aside the conceptual equipment borrowed from an outmoded epistemology and cosmology, and forge new categories that are in better accord with the exigencies of "religious experience." L'homm'tJ probUmatiqlJ'tJ, pp. 62, 69. Although the question of Marcel's negative attitude toward a scientific natural theology is not examined in detail here, it is plain that it springs from the same source as does. his rejectioia of the rational proofs for the existence of God. sl1Whether the Marcellian notion of Objectivity is accurate, however, remains to be seen.

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persuasive power in concrete situations. On this assumption, the difference between the scholastic perspective of validity and the Marcellian perspective of persuasion accounts, in large measure, for the "regrettable misunderstanding" remarked by Pere Troisfontaines. This is an attractive conclusion, for there is something to be gained by a rapprochement between the two modes of philosophizing. Yet it is impossible to ignore two facts: 1) The reasons which incline Marcel to accord validity do not reach to the proofs themselves, but only to certain circumstances that accompany them. That the proofs recur periodically and that they persuade giant intellects are extrinsic, dialectical considerations yielding probability rather than unassailable truth. Are not basic errors, those of materialism and agnosticism, for example, also renewed continuously and do they not often persuade acute minds? 2) When Marcel does discuss the principle upon which the traditional proofs ultimately depend, that of causality, he rejects its transcendental validity with a forcefulness tinged with hostility. In the light of these facts, it seems more reasonable to conclude that rejection rather than acceptance characterizes his basic attitude toward rational proof for the existence of God. When the second alternative, namely, a will hardened in evil, is discussed and dismissed as a possible cause of the persuasive inefficacy of the rational proofs, another difficulty arises. It concerns the nature of proof itself. On the one hand, Marcel gives an accurate phenomenological report of the act of proving together with an indication of the traditionally acknowledged ontological base of proof as such. On the other hand, the indicated ontological basis of proof as such is nowhere in evidence when the rational act of proving is analyzed. The result is a denial or rejection, this time implicit rather than explicit, of the traditional notion of the nature of proof. Characteristically, the attention of Marcel centers on the act of proving rather than on the nature of proof.28• Characteristically, too, his descriptive report of the dynamics of proof is rewarding.29 28Regis Jolivet remarks perceptively that the philosophy of Marcel is concerned with de montrer rather than with demontrer: Les doctrines existentialistes de Kierkegaard a l.-P. Sartre, p. 308. Marcel himself asserts that philosophy is more heuristic than demonstrative: Le mystere de l'~tre, Vol. I. p. 8. 29 This ingenious phenomenological report is merely summarized here. For the full account, see: Du refus a l'invocation, pp. 226-28.

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To prove implies first of all the existence of another to whom something is to be proved. With respect to this other, the demonstrator assumes a position of superiority, not absolutely, but in the area of the matter to be proved. The totality of propositions held as certain might be designated as a field of apperception. If any proving is to be done, similarity must obtain between the fields of apperception both of him who proves and of him to whom proof is given. Only on such a common ground may proof be established. Yet the similarity in question is not without difference. It· is assumed that he who undertakes to prove has a broader field of apperception than he who receives proof. For the latter, the proposition to be proved is in a darkened zone, as it were, and the whole task of the demonstrator consists in bringing attention to bear on the field of apperception in such a way that this darkened region is illuminated. Interpretation of the metaphor of the darkened zone can occur at two levels. It is possible to see in it an illustration of the psychological process of argumentation. In the individual who comes to understand a proof, something happens that is analogous to entry into the light. At a deeper level, however, the metaphor points to the ontological base of proof itself. Nor does Marcel fail to remark it.30 If to prove implies a certain consciousness of superiority on the part of him who undertakes proof, suc:;h a consciousness does not arise, ideally at least, from pride. What the prover recognizes is an "ontological unity which cannot not appear to the mind that realizes a certain degree of interior concentration."31 The possibility of proof rests precisely upon this ontological unity. By discursive reasoning, a "this" is seen to be implied in a "that." A series of apparently disconnected propositions is seen to be a closely knit whole. From the seemingly disparate, thought thus proceeds to unity, but an ontological unity, i.e., a unity founded upon being. IIi the application of these general considerations to the rational proofs for the existence of God, the indicated ontological base drops mysteriously out of sight or, more accurately, is strangely transformed. Proof is declared to be altogether dependent upon an inva30The term "ontological" in Marcel's usage, however, does not refer to being as such. See footnote 60. 31Du refus Ii /'invocation, p. 228: "si donc l'acte de prouver implique une pr~tention, ... il faut ajouter que cette pretention s'apparatt a elle·m~me comme fond~, non pas sur la conscience orgueilleuse d'un pouvoilr que je me reconnaitrais, mais ontologiquement sur une unit~ qui ne peut pas ne pas apparaitre a une pens~ rblisant un certain degre de concentration int~ieure."

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riant, but the invariant is no longer an ontological unity which thought, by a discursive process, is able to recognize. The invariant has now every appearance of being a willed invariant. The invariant becomes a "system of values." If there is not a preliminary agreement upon the system of values presupposed by the proof, Marcel argues, no proof is possible.32 To him who refuses consent to the presupposed value system, every proof based upon it is bound to appear as a begging of the question or a play upon words. To be noted especially is the fact that Marcel does not here distinguish between the individual's assent to the value system in question and the ontological base of such a system. He simply asserts that when the system is contested, weakened, or refused, proof based upon it is impossible. To those accustomed to the traditional usage of the term "ontological," this transformation of the "ontological unity" at the base of proof into an invariant so brittle as a system of values appears, at the very least, as remarkable. 33 What is even more remarkable, however, is the added fact that Marcel's own elucidation of the invariant in question reveals this invariant to be essentially a variable. The gravest error of a certain current of thomistic thought, he claims, is precisely its posing of a natural man who is a "transhistoric invariant."34 Such a homo naturalis simply does not exist. On the contrary, man is essentially a homo historicus. He evolves in time and grasps himself only in relation to a conception of the universe which evolves in time. At the root of the inefficacy of the rational proofs is a neglect of the historical dimension. The fundament, the system of values presupposed by the proofs, is no longer accessible. To be noted here again is the fact that Marcel does not distinguish between the proofs themselves and a condition of their recognition. They are outmoded and, as such, ought to be renounced. To attribute their failure to an evil will is naive. Homo historicus is deaf to their appeal; their death knell has rung. 35 32Ibid., p. 231. "La preuve est un moment dans une certaine eristique interieure qui demeure malgre tout subordonne a la position d'un invariant, ou, si l'on veut, d'un systeme de valeurs incontestees en tant que valueurs." 33 That Marcel uses the term "ontolOgical" in a quite personal way will appear in the expose of his proof of the existence of God. 34Du refus Ii l'invocation, p. 232: "Vne des plus graves erreurs d'une certaine philosophie, qui n'est sans doute Ie thomisme dans son essence, mais qui en est en tout cas l'expression courante, me parait consister a poser un homme naturel qui serait un invariant transhistorique." 35Ibid., pp. 232-33.

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Upon examining the negative pole of Marcel's position with respect to proof for the existence of God, it appears that his thought differs from scholastic thought at the fundamental level of principle and essence rather than the superficial level of vocabulary and perspective. What he denies is the ontological base of the rational proofs: the transcendental validity of the principle of causality. What he ignores is the unvarying nature of proof as such. If the position of Marcel is to be adequately represented, however, a consideration of its negative side is not enough. An effort must be made to understand its positive side, namely, the Marcellian proof of the existence of God. Important intimations of the object and method 'of the proof are already given in the negative precisions made previously. If God is not an empirical object that is before man as a problem, it is because he is an enveloping presence, a thou, encountered within man as a mystery.86 If God is not to be discovered by an objectifying reflection that leaves the thinking subject out of account, it is because he is accessible only to a unifying reflection recuperative of the "1."87 In a word, the Marcellian proof moves within an interrubjective structure: that of the I-Thou. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the entire philosophy of Marcel moves within the intersubjective sphere. To engage in dialogue is, according to the philosopher of the concrete, essential to the human structure. Only by engaging in dialogue is it possible for man to conquer the subjectivity for which he longs, to which he is destined, but with which he is not provided at birth.88 A dialogue always involves two. On the side of the absolute thou, the form is invitational. Through the thousand voices of his creation, he solicits the subject yet to be born. On the side of the human creature, the 86The distinction between a problem and a mystery is fundamental in Marcel's philosophy. A problem is to be understood in terms of its Greek root: problema, i.e., as something that confronts the self as an obstacle. In contrast, a mystery envelops man as a reality that is within him as well as outside him. The chemist or technician deals with problems, but the philosopher who con· siders such realities as evil, being, and freedom deals with mysteries. Position et approches concretes du mystere ontologique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1949), pp. 57·62. 87The objectifying reflection which abstracts from the subject is proper to the sciences, i.e., the realm of the problematic. The recuperative reflection which refuses to abstract from the engaged subject is proper to philosophy, i.e., the realm of the metaproblematic: Ibid., pp. 611·66. 88Du refus d l'invocation, p. 2116: " ••• l'illusion mortelle d'un certain idCll· isme consiste en eifet it ne pas voir qu'~tre sujet n'est pas un fait ou un point de depart, mais une conqu~te et un but."

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form is responsive. Sensitive to the exigence rising from the deep levels of his being, the exigence to be, the human existent engages in the quest of being. On every side, he is solicited, urged on: The existential reality into which sensuous experience plunges him calls out to him for the loving recognition that will transmute it into being. The wayfarer, the hidden thou journeying at his side. invites him to the personal communion that will discover to him the thou hidden in his own subjectivity.39 Whenever he responds. the human existent takes a further step, often a giant step. toward the fulness of that personal stature, that true selfhood. for which he is. as it were, a living exigence. Although the affirmation of being at any level advances the growth of personal subjectivity, the measure of the advance varies according to the degree to which the subject is eng~ged. Intersubjective communion at the human level, for example. touches the subject more deeply and discovers him to himself more fully than do his responses to infrapersonal beings. In positive human relations, in fact, Marcel sees a privileged approach to the mystery of the personal subject.4o To the faithful man, to the man who loves and hopes, the darkness that surrounds personal identity is increasingly lightened and the exigence of being increasingly filled. Yet, because the exigence of being in the human subject is an aspiration for the absolute, it can be fully satisfied only by a total engagement, an engagement without eclipse. No communion that is merely human can calm such an exigence. Only communion with the absolute thou brings to the human subject the "peace that passes understanding." In the absolute character of the exigence of being that stirs in man, Marcel sees the seal of the divine. Upon this seal, he bases his proof for the existence of God. Certainly it is not a proof in the ordinary sense of the word. Yet Marcel feels justified in presenting it as a proof, for it yields, he claims, incontrovertible certitude. As point of departure, a question is posed. It is the basic. the all important human question: Who am I?41 Through second re89 Marcel maintains that the subject discovers itself as subject only through the essentially spiritual mediation of a thou: L'm,stere de l'~tre. Vol. I, p. 185. 40Gabriei Marcel is often described as a "man of communion." Certainly his philosophy reflects this disposition. 41 Reflection on this question constitutes a dominant theme of Marcel', phil. osophy: L'm,stere de l'~tre, Vol. I, pp. 163·211. The summary of the proof given here is based upon that of P~re Troisfontaines: op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 276-313.

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flection, the self discovers that he is for himself a mystery.42 At the same time, he understands the reason of the boredom and the stifling sadness engendered in him by the contemporary mentality of scientism that equates him with his function, evaluates him in monetary terms, and suppresses the ontological meaning of things. He grasps, too, the impossibility of attaining an answer to the question of his identity from some other who stands outside him, whether that other be an individual, a group, or a political party. It is true that the beings whom he loves do not stand outside. To a degree they do penetrate to secret places of his being and thereby discover him to himself. Yet they do so only to a degree and then not always. . In a final reflective effort, he recognizes that the mystery of his selfidentity is not essentially a question, but essentially an appeal to the transcendent being who knows him wholly and loves him without fail. In invoking with faith and in prayer this transcendent thou, the self comprehends his true being at last. Then, his partial communions surpassed but not denied, the self knows not only his own identity but the identity of the one who awakened him and who preceded him on the journey "du refus a l'invocation." If the passage from refusal to invocation constitutes a valid proof, it is obviously not the usual kind of proof. Progression is not from one proposition to another rigorously implicated proposition. On the contrary, the entire passage is initiated and sustained by a free option. Neither reflection on the personal datum nor invocation of the absolute thou is conceivable apart from an exercise of liberty. In the matter of evidence, the proof is mute to all but the engaged subject. He alone can know whether he meets himself in 'the encounter with the absolute. Nor can anyone else tell him whether he does or does not experience the presence of the absolute. Outside the context of logical implication and deprived of accessible evidence, the Marcellian proof, if it is a proof, addresses the one rather than the many. . That his proof is neither objective nor universally valid Marcel acknowledges without apology. What he will not acknowledge is ,that his proof is fideistically or pragmatically subjective. It is precisely, the twin errors of objectivity and subjectivity that he intends . to avoid. To his mind, it will be remembered, objectivity suppresses transcendence. The objective appears to him as a series of 42"Second reflection" is the usual term used by Marcel to indicate the recuperative type of reflection which refuses to abstract from the thinking subject.

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universally valid rational propositions bearing upon an empirical object and susceptible of empirical verification. Since God is obviously not an empirical object, Marcel concludes that he cannot be the object of rational proof. But if objectivity suppresses transcendence, subjectivity suppresses reality. Early in his career, Marcel repudiated a "philosophy of the dream."43 In the present instance, he insists that God is known in personal engagement as an absolute reality independent of the engaged subject. Indeed, the subject here knows himself precisely as dependent. Thus, belief and invocation, although inseparable from the reality upon which they bear, yet presuppose that reality's transcendence. Not an emotion only, not a mere sentiment, the experience of presence in authentic invocation is a reflective awareness of God in his transcendent being. The note of reflectivity within this experience is heavily underlined by Marcel. Understanding is not absent from invocation. Invocation is neither the Kierkegaardian leap into the void nor the credo quia absurdum of Tertullian ..44 What occurs in the encounter with the absolute is a recognition, a loving recognition, and recognition· presupposes an exercise of intelligence. That intelligence can be exercised in a manner transcending both subjectivity and objectivity is the presupposition, not of this proof only, but of all the philosophical analyses of Marcel. 45 In hope, in fidelity, in love, there is knowledge, not verifiable or objective knowledge, but knowledge nonetheless. To Marcel's mind, the real bearing of the interiorly experienced knowledge awakened in encounter with the absolute is as indubitable as is the principle of identity to the scholastic philosopher. Whether or not his conviction is justified is one of the questions to be taken up in the concluding critical remarks of this paper. Upon analysis, the position of Gabriel Marcel toward proof for 43An early drama, Le palais de sable, shows the falsity and untenability of the subjectivist's adherence to the dream: Le seuil invisible (Paris: Grasset, 1914). 44The role of reflection in the recognition of the absolute is evident in the religious dramas: Un homme de Dieu (Paris: La table ronde, 1950); Le monde casse (Paris: Desdee de Brouwer, 1933). 45Marcel uses the terms "subjective" and "objective" less broadly than the scholastics. For him the subject is the "I," and the object is then defined as "ce qui est en face de moi et qui ne tient pas compte de moi." Troisfontaines, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 78. For scholastic philosophers, the subject is whatever subsists and the object is whatever terminates an operation or tendency, e.g., whatever knowledge attains in any way whatsoever. Robert o. Johann, "Subjectivity," Review ot Metaphysics, Vol. XII, No.2 (1958), pp. 202·203.

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the existence of God reduces to four major propositions: 1) Rational or scientific judgments are inapplicable to the transcendent because they objectify him and thereby suppress his transcendence. 2) Because causality is a bio-teleological notion only, any application of it to the divine being inevitably involves anthropomorphism. 3) Since the rational proofs depend upon a system of values no longer .acknowledged, they are outmoded and ought to be renounced. 4) Adequate proof of the absolute being is provided, not by logical argumentation, but by the experience of presence that attends the encounter of faith. Merely to state these claims is, in a sense, to answer the question posed at the beginning. Since scholastic philosophy does assert the possibility and actuality of a science of natural theology, the metaphysical character of the principle of causality, and the continued timeliness of the rational proof, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the differences between its stand and that of Marcel are not reducible to simple variations of vocabulary and viewpoint. Some commentators minimize these differences.46 In no case, they argue, does the objection of Marcel touch the true scholastic doctrine. What he denies is not the metaphysical principle of causality, but a physicalized conception of it. The objectivity to which he objects is that of Hegelian rationalism rather than that of authentic scholasticism. Although he asserts that the rational proofs are outmoded, he explicity affirms their validity. If validity does not interest him, it is because he has his eye on the practical aim of apologetics. In a sense, these arguments are admissible. The objections raised by Marcel to scholastic teaching do miss the mark. Yet the differences remain, and they are not slight. When examined, the acknowledged validity is seen to be ambiguous, if not illusory. However inaccurate his reason for attacking the causal notion, the fact remains that Marcel does explicitly and repeatedly denounce it.47 Unfortunate and unfounded as his prejudice against objectiv46Pere Troisfontaines does not seem to mark them sufficiently: op. cit., Vol. II. pp. 207-208. Others are Edgard Sottiaux: Gabriel Marcel: philosophe et dramaturge (Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1956); Kevin T. Gallagher: The Philosophical Method of Gabriel Marcel, Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Fordham University, 1958. 47 More often than not, this denunciation has reference to the use of causal language in the interpretation of freedom: L'homme problematique, p. 71. "L'important est seulement de reconnattre que la liberte pas plus que la grAce ne se laissent traduire en un langage de causalite."

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ity may be, the prejudice is there and leads to the renunciation of a science of natural theology. Whatever their source, these claims oppose scholastic teaching, and it seems preferable to admit frankly the fact of their opposition. This is not to say that opposition is to be preferred to conciliation. Without doubt conciliation is highly desirable. The cause of conciliation is best served, however, by an honest confrontation of differences. In the present instance, a reciprocal benefit could result from such a confrontation. On the side of Marcel, there is little question that his position suffers a lack of philosophical breadth and soundness because of erroneous or restricted notions of objectivity, causality, and proof. If, moreover, the experience of presence engendered by encounter with the absolute thou is to acquire the status of a philosophical proof, it must be provided with an ontological ground. Scholastic philosophy, on its side, is challenged by the fact that, not Marcel only, but a number of contemporary philosophers misconceive its position with regard to such basic nations as proof, causality, objectivity, essence, and substance. If scholasticism is to be a living philosophy, it must meet the urgent need of rethinking and reinterpreting these concepts in language appropriate to the world of today. For many reasons, the task of confrontation with a view to conciliation must be a cooperative venture. In the case of Gabriel Marcel, the venture is well begun. He has attracted a number of disciples, interpreters and commentators.48 Yet, until now, much of the work done has tended to fall into the opposed categories of uncritical approval or hearty disapprova1. 49 There is need of an approach that would combine sensitivity to differences with sensitivity to points of contact. 50 What follows is intended as a small indication of the nature and possibilities of such an approach. 51 48The names of Pere Troisfontaines, Gustave Thibon, Pietro Prini, and Marcel de Corte come immediately to mind. 49 An unfortunate example of uncritical disapproval is Marjorie Grene's presentation in Dreadful Freedom: A Critique of Existentialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). Examples of the opposed category are given in footnote 46. 50This is not to imply that balanced critical estimates have not appeared. It is enough to cite Regis Jolivet, op. cit.; Frederick Copleton, op. cit.; James Collins, op. cit. 111 The fact of opposition at a deeper level than that of terminology and perspective constitutes a negative response to the question posed earlier: are the differences between the respective positions of Marcel and the scholastics wholly

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According to Marcel, a "transcendent usage" cannot be made of the causal principle. 52 In its proper sense, it refers to the "domain of instrumentality" where man exercises his mastery. Hence, any application of it beyond the bio-teleological sphere is an anthropomorphism resulting only in a confusion of orders. Since scholastic philosophy understands causality in its formal significance, it is able to show that the principle is in no sense anthropomorphic. 53 What it signifies essentially is a realizing action. As such, a realizing action is neither accidental, nor temporal, nor transitory, nor transitive. Not at all restricted to the bio-teleological order, this principle is related to being in its transcendental amplitude. Whatever is, no matter what it is, must have a reason for being. If it does not have it in itself, then it must receive it from another. To deny this is to fall into the absurd. That many philosophers, under the spell of agnosticism and positivism, are willing to plunge into the absurd rather than admit the causal principle argues a pressing need. The gradual eclipse of causality as a metaphysic~l principle and its progressive degeneration to the status of a statistical correlation calls for much historical study and clarification. In particular, the formal character of causality must again be brought into the light and sharply distinguished from accidentalities inherent in created modes. If the attack of Gabriel Marcel stimulates efforts in this direction, it will have done scholastic philosophy a service. Just as he fails to see the relatedness of causality to being, so does Marcel fail to grap the true bearing of objectivity. For him, apart from occasional admissions of its worth within the limited range of useful sciences, objectivity has primarily a pejorative sense. It is abstractive of the subject and unconcerned with the subject. Reasoning along these same lines, he finds the "universally valid" reducible to variations of vocabulary and viewpoint? Since an enlightened conciliation of these two positions depends upon an accurate answer to this preliminary question, its resolution has been taken as the primary objective of this paper. Hence, the following pages are supplementary in character. They are intended as an indication of the necessity and fruitfulness of a forthright confrontation of oppositions and are not proposed as either an adequate appraisal of Marcel's view or a thorough statement of the scholastic position. 52L'homme problematique, pp. 63-64. For the text in question, see footnote 20, 58 For a thorough defense of the transcendence and ontological validity of this principle, see: Reginald Garrigou.Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Nature, trans. Dom Bede Rose, O.S.B. (St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co., 1945), Vol. I, pp. 84·106.

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equally repugnant. It, too, is a repudiation of the subject. What is true for everybody requires no elan, no engagement of the person as such.54 Objectivity and universality are thus synonyms for depersonalization. Since Marcel is deeply persuaded that personal subjectivity is the supreme value, it is not surprising that he wages constant war against what he regards as modes of suppressing the subject. Although it is probably true that an increasingly technocratic civilization threatens the development of authentic subjectivity, it is false to attach this evil to objectivity in its proper sense. Properly speaking, objectivity signifies the grasping of reality purely and as it is. Far from being the suppression of the subject, it is his liberation. Precisely because he is able to assimilate the real without violation in the cognitive act, the human subject is the glory of the visible creation. Of him Aristotle long ago observed that his privilege is to be "in a way all things."55 Indeed, upon the extent and accuracy of his assimilation of objective reality, man's status as subject directly depends. No less than objectivity, the universally valid truth is a true friend of subjectivity. "Man's happiness," Nietzsche rightly declares, "is based upon there being for him an indisputable truth."56 To wage war against objectivity as such is to miss the mark by a very wide margin. If the indifference of objectivity is something positive inasmuch as it assures the knowing subject'S assimilation of reality as it is, it cannot be concluded that subjectivity is thereby excluded from philosophical discourse. In denigrating the object unduly, Marcel makes a mistake. But in emphasizing the importance of the subject, he performs a service. Scholastic philosophy might profit from this em54L'mystere de l'etre, Vol. I, pp. 16-17. Marcel evidently thinks of the universally valid as a kind of "pensee en general" peculiar to rationalist systems. This generality he conceives statistically. Not that Marcel wishes to affirm a subjectivistic view of truth. What he wants to emphasize is the necessity of the subject's inner preparedness to receive truth. Thus, the work of art, although possessed of intrinsic excellence, does not speak to "n'importe qui," but only to him who is sensitive to its message. In this Marcel is correct. But the example, perhaps by reason of its very correctness, obscures the issue. In aesthetic appreciation, the subject's disposition is the decisive point. In order to achieve objective truth, the subject must, of course, also surmount barriers. Yet here his preparedness neither adds to nor subtracts from the excellence of the objective, universally valid truth. 55De Anima, Bk. III, c. 8, 431°. 56Cited by Josef Pieper in Happiness and Contemplation. Tr. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Pantheon, 1958), p. 100.

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phasis. Negatively, it might be put on guard against the temptation to make abstraction an end rather than a means to understanding reality. For a philosophy as technically elaborated as scholasticism is, the temptation is permanent, perhaps, to become the prisoner of definition and category and in this way to stop short of the unanalyzable totality which definition and category aim to represent. Positively, scholasticism might find in this emphasis an invitation to submit the subjective structure itself to analysis. As a structure of being, subjectivity is certainly open to ontological inquiry. Here Marcel indicates a direction of thought that promises to broaden considerably the scope of philosophical discussion. 57 Yet, because Marcel is not content with emphasizing the importance of subjectivity but insists upon its exaltation above all else, he ends by weakening the position of the subject. This has been seen to be the case with objectivity. In refusing the positive bearing of objective reasoning, he obscures the aim of all true subjective growth and development: accord with the order of reason.IIS Thus, the needle of the subjective compass loses something of its point. It is again the case with proof. By depreciating the objective basis of proof, he deprives the subject of a nourishment that he craves: a universally valid truth founded upon principles unaffected by historical variations because they are eternal. Only the truth indubitably assured as beyond the shifting of epochal patterns fully satisfies the subject. 59 When was it not true, when will it not be true, that a changing, caused, and imperfect being argues to the existence of an immutable, uncaused, and perfect being? Founded upon principles of being and not upon the system of values that happens to be acknowledged at a given time, these proofs are invulnerable and. 57Bochenski, op. cit., p. 199. 5SIn the scholastic perspective "accord with reason" has the broad sense of "accord with the reality of things." 59 Of course, it can be argued that Marcel denies neither the need of such a truth nor the unchangeableness of truth. Here, as is so often the case, the assertions of Marcel are beyond reproach. It is precisely the appropriateness of hi, assertions that makes criticism of his position difficult. Yet assertions are not enough. What Marcel fails to do in the present instance, for example, is to as· sure the fulfillment of this need and the indubitability of this truth at the human level. So intent is he upon the engaged subject that he leaps too quickly to the inner assurance of faith. True, he acknowledges an intellectual awareness within the experience of faith and refuses a confusion of the subject's response with the divine initiative. But he does not give the objective exercise of human reason the scope and significance that belong to it in the preparation of the sub· ject for the gift of faith.

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as such, the firm support of subjectivity in its quest for abiding truth. That Marcel does not grasp the supratemporal character of the classical proofs derives from the failure that undermines his entire philosophy: the failure to reach being as being.6o When Marcel rejects the transcendental validity of the causal principle, it is because he does not see its relation to being in its transcendentality. When he refuses a positive value to the objective mode of philosophical reasoning, it is because he does not see the essential ordination of such reasoning to reality. When he asserts that rational proofs are outmoded, it is because he does not see their relation to supratemporal principles of being. In these instances of blindness to being, the Achilles' heel of this philosophy is touched. 61 With reason it may be wondered whether it is proper to speak of the "concrete philosophy" as a philosophy. If it is not founded upon transhistoric and universal principles of being, what is left of the science of philosophy?62 In the end, it seems, the difference between scholasticism and the thought of Marcel is the difference between a solidly grounded metaphysic of being and an especially insightful phenomenology of human experience. A phenomenology is not a philosophy. Descriptions of individual experience do not, of themselves, yield philosophical truth. Of this Marcel is not unaware. He admits that the problem of passage from phenomenology to hyperphenomenology troubled him for some time. 63 However strong his present personal conviction that "it is the individual who holds up the mirror to infinity," personal conviction does not resolve the problem at a philosophical level. What is needed is a valid metaphysical reason. Precisely because the phenomenological reports of Marcel are so rich, so varied, and so perceptive, it is to be hoped that he will soon find the ontological base that will assure their solidity. If he were to overcome his repugnance to think according to the category of being and his distrust of schol60For Marcel, "being" seems to mean the existence of spatio-temporal reality drawn up to the supratemporal level of loving awareness by a subject positively exercising his intellective-volitional powers. Thus, the "ontological unity" at the base of proof does not refer, as it first appears, to being as such, but to the acting subject. 61Another indication of this weakness is to be found in Marcel's difficulty, still unresolved, of the relation between existence and being. 62 Significantly, Marcel is skeptical of the scientific nature of philosophy. L'mystere de l'~tre, Vol. I, pp. 7-9. 68Du refus a l'invocation, p. 192.

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astic method generally, he would find this needed fundament in the scholastic metaphysic of being. 64 Then a fully satisfying conciliation would occur, for it would be effected at the originary point of all lesser oppositions. It is unlikely, however, that Marcel will take such a step.65 If conciliation is to be ~chieved at this profound level, it appears that its accomplishment waits upon the initiative and understanding of scholastic philosophers themselves. BIBLIOGRAPHY Aristotle. De Anima. Version of William Moerbeke and Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by Kenelm Foster and Sylvester Humphries. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954. Collins, James. The Existentialists: A Critical Study. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952. - - - - . God in Modern Philosophy. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959. Copleston, Frederick. Contemporary Philosophy: Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism. Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1956. Gallagher, Kevin. The Philosophical Method of Gabrier Marcel. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Fordham University, 1958. Garrigou.Lagrange, Reginald. God: His Existence and His Nature. Translated from the fifth French edition by Dom Bede Rose, O.S.B. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co., 1945. Grene, Marjorie: Dreadful Freedom: A Critique of Existentialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Johann, Robert, "Subjectivity," Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XII, No.2, 1958. Jolivet, Regis. Les doctrines existentialistes de Kierkegaard a J.·P. Sartre. Abbaye Saint-Wandrille: Editions de Fontenelle, 1948. Marcel, Gabriel. Du refus a l'invocation. Paris: Gallimard, 1940. - - - - , . £tre et avoir. Paris: Aubier, 1935. - - - - , . L'homme problematique. Paris: Aubier, 1955. - - - - , . Un homme de Dieu. Paris: La table ronde, 1950. - - - - , . Journal mt!taphysique. Paris: Gallimard, 1935. English translation: Metaphysical Journal. Translated by Bernard Wall. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952. - - - - , . Le monde casst!. Paris: La table ronde, 1933. - - - - . L'mystere de l'~tre. 2 Vols. Paris: Aubier, 1951. - - - - . Position et approches concretes du mystere ontologique. Paris: J. Vrin, 1949. - - - - . Le seuil invisible. Paris: Grasset, 1914. Sottiaux, Edgard. Gabriel Marcel: philosophe et dramaturge. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1956. Troisfontaines, Roger. De l'existence a Utre: La philosophie de Gabriel Marcel. 2 Vols. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1953. 64The fact of this repugnance and distrust is undeniable: L'mystere de l'~tre, Vol. II, pp. 8-9. 65In the end, the temperament of Marcel is probably the decisive obstacle. He is simply not at home within a rigorous logical framework nor is he inclined to abstract speculation.

3

BERKELEY AND THE PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD by

SISTER ANGELITA MYERSCOUGH, An.PP.S. Introduction Late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England witnessed a growing agnosticism, deism, and atheism. It is not surprising, then, that a philosopher of such deep religious convictions as was George Berkeley should turn his attention to one of the most fundamental problems of philosophical inquiry, the possibility of proving the existence of God. Berkeley was well aware that man has means other than reason to come to a knowledge of God: he was a man of deep faith who accepted the testimony of the Scriptures and was a firm adherent of revealed religion. Yet he knew that men who attacked the existence of God in their philosophical writings, and those influenced by them, could be induced to recognize the truth only through philosophical reasoning. At the same time Berkeley was concerned with the "generality of men" to whom he wanted to communicate "all that conviction and evidence of the being of God, which might be expected in reasonable creatures."l In this study of Berkeley's attitude toward the proofs for the existence of God, we shall first consider the importance that Berkeley assigns to this problem in his total philosophical endeavor. Secondly, we shall essay an analysis of the kind of proof he requires, and, negatively, the kind of proof he rejects. Our principal effort will be an exposition of Berkeley's proofs for God's exisence, chiefly as lA Treatise concerning The Principles 0/ Human Knowledge, section 154, in The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of elayne, edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1948·1957), Vol. II, p. 112. Unless otherwise noted, all citations of Berkeley's works in this paper will be taken from this edition. Volume and page number of this edition will be given in parentheses following the title of the work, with section number added for those works of Berkeley's so numbered. Titles will be shortened aft~r first citation.

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he sets them forth in the works of the earlier and more fruitful period of his philosophical writings: The Principles of Human Knowledge, the Essay towards A New Theory of Vision, the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, and Alciphron, 01' The Minute Philosopher.· Attention will also be paid to Berkeley's notes, edited under the title Philosophical Commentaries. Finally, a Criticism of Berkeley's concept of the proofs of God's existence and the proofs he offers, will be made in the light of the realistic philosophly to which the author adheres. I. IMPORTANCE ASSIGNED BY BERKELEY TO THE PROBLEM OF PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD If a simple recollection of the biographical data of George Berkeley's life leads one to expect a concern for theistic problems to be prominent in his writings, an examination of his philosophical works convinces one that theism is the central problem of his philosophy, even though, quanttitativey, much of what he writes is not concerned immediately with this problem, and his contributions in other areas are significant. Berkeley seems convinced that the problem of God's existence should be of primary concern to the philosopher, especially in an 2Since the place of Siris in Berkeley's philosophy and its relative value are disputed by leading Berkeley scholars (Luce, Jessop, Sillem, G. Dawes Hicks, Hedenius, Warnock, Wild and others) , we judge it legitimate to leave unexplOred in this study the problem of whether or not what the aged Bishop of Cloyne says in Siris is consistent with his whole system, and in particular, with his earlier expositions of the proofs of God's existence. Hedenius, writing specifically of Berkeley's theism, says: "Although the doctrine set forth in Siris is not unconnected with the ingenious and subtly formulated system which was Berkeley's first contribution to philosophy and to which he owes his fame, we have thought it possible to carry out this inquiry into Berkeley's early philosophy without taking into consideration the development it underwent in his old age." Ingemar Hedenius, Sensationalism and Theology in Berkeley's Philosophy (Uppsala, Sweden: Almqvist &: Wikse11s Boktryckeri-A-B., 19116) , p. 15. A. A. Luce has judged: "I certainly wish he had not spent all that time on Siris; the part on tarwater justified itself; the rest is scaffolding, and never should have seen the light of day as such," in "Berkeley's Search for Truth," Hermathena, No. 82 (November, 19511) , 22. Edward A. Sillem says in his full length study, George Berkeley and the Proofs for the Existence of God (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), p. Ill, that he feels justified in making the study without reference to Sins. However, John Wild, in George Berkeley, A. Study of His Life and Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), discusses Sins at length, and judges it to be Berkeley's "definitive philosophical work." p. 40. John J. Laky, in A. Study of George Berkeley's Philosophy in the Light of the Philosophy of St. Thomas A.quinas (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1950), assigns considerable importance to Siris.

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age like his own, in which there were so many aberrations from truth in the name of reason. In the final section of the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley makes a clear statement of his conviction that genuine philosophy ultimately has a religious value: For after all, what deserves the first place in our studies, is the consideration of God, and our duty; which to promote, as it was the main drift and designs of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual, if by what I have said I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the presence of God. 1 Earlier in the same work, Berkeley asserts that "it is the searching after, and endeavouring to understand those signs instituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment of the natural philosopher."2 As a religious leader devoted to the welfare of his fellow man, Berkeley was concerned with the usefulness of philosophy's positive contribution to the religious and moral welfare of the common man. However, the direction his theism assumed was towards apologetics. It was primarily against the skeptics, the free-thinkers, the deists, the atheists and the "minute philosophers," that he wrote. 3 The full titles of some of Berkeley's works indicate clearly his apologetic purpose. The title page of the first edition of A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) has the following subheading: "Wherein the chief causes of error and difficulty in the sciences, with the grounds of scepticism, atheism, and irreligion, are inquired into."4 The first edition of Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713), bears the subtitle: "The design of which is plainly to demonstrate the reality and perfection of human knowledge, the incorporeal nature of the soul, and the immediate providence of a Deity: in opposition to sceptics and atheists."11 Alciphron is patently a religious work, "containing an lPrinciples of Human Knowledge, 156 (Works, II, 113). Berkeley's spelling, punctuation, and emphasis will be adhered to in all quotations, following the Luce and Jessop edition of the Works. 2Ibid., 66 (Works, II, 69-70). Cf. Theory of Vision Vindicated, 8 (Works, I, 255). 3T. E. Jessop gives a summary on the men Berkeley meant to refute, in his introduction to Alciphron (Works, III, 6·7). 4Printed in The Works of George Berkeley, D.D., ed. by Alexander C. Fraser (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1871), I, 131. II Ibid., p. 255.

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apology for the Christian religion against those who are called free-thinkers." 6 In the works themselves, Berkeley consistently adheres to the apologetic theistic goal stated in the titles. Prof. Luce points out that The Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained is genuinely theistic and its purpose is to prove and explain the immediate presence and providence of a God who interests himself in the affairs of men. 7 Berkeley himself says: And being persuaded that the Theory of Vision, annexed to the Minute Philosopher, affords to thinking men a new and unaswerable proof of the existence and immediate operation of God, and the constant condescending care of his providence, I think my self concerned, as well as I am able, to defend and explain it, at a time when atheism hath made greater progress than some are willing to own, or others to believe.8 Similarly, Berkeley's firm conviction that the proof of God's existence is of prime importance is illustrated in the Principles, sections 92 to 96, in which he claims the refutation of atheism as the chief benefit of his asserted demonstration of the nonexistence of matter: How great a friend material substance hath been to atheism in all ages, were needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on it, that when this cornerstone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuch that it is no longer worth while, to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect of atheists. 9 In at least two places in the Three Dialogues, Berkeley insists that his immaterialist philosophy provides a proof of God's exisence that will answer the free-thinking atheists. In the second dialogue, Philonous asserts that the immaterialist principle furnishes "a direct and immediate demonstration ... of the being of a God." 10 61bid., II, lB. Frontispiece of the third edition, 1752, bearing the same wording, is reproduced in the Luce-Jessop edition of Works, III, 21. '1"L'Essai sur la vision de Berkeley et sa defense et explication de la throrie de la vision," Revue philosophique de la france et de l't!tranger, 14B (I95B), 165-80. 8Theory of Vision Vindicated, I (Works, I, 251). Cf. ibid.• 7 and 8 (Works, 1.255) • 9Principles, 92 (Works, 11,81). 10Dialogues, ii, (Works, II, 212-13). Cf. ibid., iii (Works, II. 257). In reference to the two books in dialogue form. the small roman numerals will refer to the dialogue number. Alciphron citations will indicate the section number in arabic numbers.

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These citations make it clear that from the outset Berkeley considered the theistic problem of the proof of God's existence to be in the forefront of his philosophical endeavors, and that he intended to describe our knowledge of the sensible world in such wise as to lead "directly and necessarily to the existence of a providential God or infinite mind," by showing "that certain insoluble difficulties are encountered in the analysis of knowledge unless God's existence is allowed." 11 II. BERKELEY'S CONCEPT OF THE NATURE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROOF OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 1. The Positive Nature

of the Proof

When we examine the nature of the proof for the existence of God that Berkeley demands and which he attempts to formulate, we find him insisting on a proof that is short, succinct, and as direct as possible, so as to make the existence of God obvious to the ordinary man as well as to the philosopher. Further, it must be a reasoned proof, proceeding by a posteriori demonstration from the facts of human experience. Finally, Berkeley demands of the proof that it demonstrate at one and the same time, both the fact of God's existence and the reality of the divine attributes. a. A direct proof, convincing to the ordinary man In the fourth dialogue of Alciphron, in which the minute philosopher challenges Euphranor to prove the existence of God, Berkeley allows Alciphron to set forth a description of the kind of proof that he expects: Perhaps I may not expect it, but I will tell you what sort of proof I would have-and that is, in short, such proof as every man of sense requires of a matter of fact, or the existence of any other particular thing. For instance, should a man ask why I believe there is a king of Great Britain, I might answer-Because I had seen him. Or a king of Spain,-Because I had seen those who saw him. But as for this King of kings, I neither saw Him myself, nor 11James Collins, God in Modern Philosophy (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959), p. no. Among other authors whose work on Berkeley was examined for this study, these men assign a central place to theism in Berkeley's philosophy: Grey, Hedenius, Hurlbutt, Laky, Luce, Olgiati, Rotta, and Sillem. J. A. Brunton belongs to the group of interpreters who claim that Berkeley's "introduction of God is intended ... to get rid of the paradox which his phenomenalism has created." Brunton, "Berkeley and the External World," Philosophy, 28 (1953), 337.

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~~~~~~~~~~il~~~a~

as God, it is very strange that He should leave Himself without a witness; that men should still dispute His being; and that there should be no one evident, sensible, plain proof of it, without recourse to philosophy or metaphysics. 1 Berkeley is here speaking his own mind through the minute philosopher insofar as he claims that the proof should be such that ordinary men,. can grasp it easily. Earlier, Alciphron has voiced a rejection of arguments that are not clear and simple: "Let me tell you I am not to be persuaded by metaphysical arguments. . . . This sort of arguments I have always found dry and jejune. . . . they may perhaps puzzle, but never will convince me."2 Because Berkeley is concerned with the practical effects of his philosophy in the efforts to nullify the evils of atheism he wants his proof to be evident to all. Berkeley is convinced that his immaterialism gives him the possibility of setting forth such a proof. In the Dialogues Berkeley calls his new proof "a direct and immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the being of a God."s Berkeley has Philonous assure Hylas that by using this "easy reflection" he may "now, without any laborious search into the sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or tedious length of discourse, oppose and baffle the most strenuous advocate for atheism."4 Berkeley has convinced himself of his success in offering men a proof that ordinary men will accept because it is based on the obvious, and agrees with man's "prelogical natural belief in God."11 b. An a posteriori demonstrative proof based on facts of human experience The aspect of Berkeley's proof for God's existence that is most discussed at present is whether or not Berkeley argues for an immediate apprehension of God, or for an inferential deduction by a process of reasoning from sense perceptions and the connections between them observable by man's intellect. Many of Berkeley's expressions, such as those concerning the immediacy of the evidence lAlciphron, iv, S (Works, III, 144). 21bid., 2 (Works, III, 142) . 3Dialogues, ii, (Works, II, 212). 41bid., (Works, II. 213) . liD. J. B. Hawkins, "What do the Proofs of the Existence of God Purport to Do?" Clergy Review, 37 (June, 1952), 331.

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of God's being, his immediate presence to us, and the argument based on nature as the language of God, seem to give some basis for Dom Illtyd Trethowan's contention that Berkeley argues for an apprehension of God, rather than a demonstratble proof of his existence. S On the other hand, Berkeley insists repeatedly that he is giving a reasoned proof, one at which he arrives by a process of demonstration. In the Principles, for example, he explains that man comes to know God in the same way as he knows finite persons; man knows them not intuitively but by a process of inference. The same process of knowing, Berkeley says, applies to our knowledge of God. A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea; when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited· in our own minds: and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like our selves. Hence it is plain, we do not see a man . . . but only such a certain collection of ideas, as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion like. to ourselves. . . . And after the same manner we see God.' Again, in the Dialogues, Philonous argues that man's knowledge of God is inferential, this time from the point of departure of knowledge of the self: My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of; and by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas. Farther, from my own being, and from the dependency I find in my self and my ideas, I do by an act of reason, necessarily infer the existence of God.s Berkeley says clearly that we need "a direct and immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the being of a God."9 He says explicitly, in a long speech by Crito in the seventh dialogue of Alciphron: "The being of a God is capable of clear proof, and a proper object of human reason." 10 Besides these positive declarations that his concept of the proof S"Christian Atheism," The Downside Review, 75 (Autumn, 1957), lI~5.-lI7. 7 Principles, 148 (Works, II, 109). Cf. Dialogues, ii (Works, II, 22l1) for a statement of Berkeley's on the proper use of inference. SDialogues, iii (Works, II, 232). 9lbid. (Works, II, 212). 10Alciphron, vii, lIO (Works, m. lI27).

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of God's existence is inferential, Berkeley denies the opposite view. In the Principles he disclaims the possibility of our seeing God "by a direct and immediate view" 11 and in his notebook he writes: "I am certain there is a God, tho I do not perceive him, have no intuition of him." 12 Berkeley's own words thus make it clear that he thinks in terms of a demonstrable proof of God's existence, at least insofar as he speaks directly of the nature of the proof. Although he claims that God's nearness to man is evident and that God produces our ideas directly without secondary causes, Berkeley nowhere asserts that man has an immediate intuition of God. One student of Berkeley,13 who claims that the Bishop of Cloyne is inconsistent in his discussion of man's knowledge of God, says that Berkeley has both a direct and an indirect view of God. "So the direct and indirect views of God," he writes, "play peep-bo with one another round the metaphysical obstacles."14 Father Edward Sillem, while admitting that he finds in Berkeley's work a defense of the view "that God's existence is known both inferentially and by. natural apprehension," 111 nevertheless maintains that Berkeley's consistent demand is for an a posteriori proof that is founded on man's experience of sensible things and the spiritual nature of ihan as perceiving subject. . Actually Berkeley, like St. Thomas Aquinas, recognizes the fact that "there is a common and confused knowledge of God which is found in practically all men."18 Nonetheless, he maintains that philosophy can give a strong rational support to this "common and confused knowledge" by an inferential demonstration based on facts of experience. c. A demonstration of both God's existence and his attributes The combination in Berkeley of what looks like both a direct and an indirect approach may well derive from another fact. Berkeley 11Principles, 148 (Works, II, 108) . 12Philosophical Commentaries,8U (Works, I, 97). Number references for the Commentaries here refer to the entry number assigned in the Luce-Jessop edition. lSD. Grey, "Berkeley on Other Selves," The Philosophical Quarterly, 4 (1954). 28·44. 141bid., p. 37. ll1Edward Sillem. in a series of exchanges with Victor White and Dam Illtyd Trethowan, "The Knowledge of God," The Downside Review, 76 (1958).41-63. The quotation appears on p. 46. 18 On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. and ed. by Anton C. Pegis (Image Books. Doubleday Be Company: Garden City; N. Y.• 1955), Book III. Pt. I. Chap. 38.

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is not interested simply in proving the mere existence of God, any sort of God; it is the God of Christianity whose existence he wants to demonstrate from philosophy. This is frequently apparent when he writes about the proof. It appears in the brief unpolished forms of notebook jottings: "The cause of all natural things is only in God. Hence trifling to enquire after second Causes. This Doctrine gives a most suitable idea of the Divinity." 17 What is contained in germ in these few words Berkeley develops in the Principles, repeatedly stating or implying that what demonstrates God's existence likewise demonstrates something about his nature. For example, he writes: Besides, God seems to choose the convincing our reason of his attributes by the works of Nature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author. 18 If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant uni-

form method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the spirit who excites them in our minds. . . . To me,! say, it is evident that the being of a spirit infinitely wise, good and powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearance of Nature. 19 The significance for Berkeley of this aspect of the proof is emphasized inAlciphron when he has Lysicles state the difficulty: "You must know then that at bottom the being of God is a point in itself of small consequence, and a man may make this concession without yielding much. The great point is what sense the word God is to be taken in."w Lysicles points out how the free-thinker can without difficulty allow the being of God, if the word is given any other than the one significant meaning that Berkeley insists on, namely, "a Mind, which knows all things, and beholds human actions, like some judge or magistrate, with infinite observation and intelligence."21 Further in the same dialogue Crito speaks of the necessity of "the same arguments that prove a first cause proving an 17 Commentaries, 433 (Works, I, 54). In this early note Berkeley uses "idea" in the commonly accepted significance, not his own special meaning. 18Prindples, 63 (Works, II, 68). 19Ibid.,72 (Works, II, 72). 2oAlciphron, iv, 16 (Works, III, 163) . 21 Ibid. This passage is the beginning of a lengthy discussion on the nature of our knowledge of God and the important question of analogy in our predication of the attributes of God. Although it is outside the scope of this study to investigate this phase of Berkeley's theism, it is significant to point out Berkeley's concern with the problem, since it illustrates Berkeley's concept that the proof of God's existence should demonstrate the attributes.

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intelligent cause. . otherwise, it is evident that every syllogism brought to prove those attributes, or (which is the same thing) to prove the being of a God, will be found to consist of four terms, and consequently can conclude nothing." 22 William B. Piper emphasizes this aspect of Berkeley's proof, going so far as to claims that it is central to understanding the complexities of Berkeley's argument. Piper even asserts: "Berkeley claims to have shown not the existence of one God, but rather the one God's wisdom and benevolence." 23 Though such a conclusion appears exaggerated, Piper is ne.vertheless correct in pointing out that Berkeley, through his use of man's knowledge of other spirits and his reflective self-knowledge as an important part of the proof of God's existence, is thereby attempting to demonstrate in one and the same argument both the fact of God's existence and his attributes. We can agree with Sillem's conclusion that in the philosophy of Berkeley, the "proof of God's existence must also establish the reality of the divine attributes, so that we can be certain that the being whose existence we have proved is none other than the one, true God." 24

2. Kinds

of Proof Rejected by Berkeley

Having discussed the positive characteristics that Berkeley requires of a proof for the existence of God, there remains to be considered the negative side of the question, namely, the proofs that Berkeley explicitly rejects, because he judges them ineffective or useless. It is not difficult to determine what these are, since Berkeley allows Alciphron to express his own views on the matter in a succinct passage in the fourth dialogue. He rejects: (1) what he disparagingly calls metaphysical arguments, (2) the argument from authority, and (3) arguments based on utility or convenience. Unfortunately for our purposes, Berkeley does not analyze these proofs, nor does he elaborate his reasons for rejecting them. What he he writes elsewhere, however, throws some light on this subject. a.

Berkeley's rejection of the metaphysical argument

The first and most significant of the arguments that Berkeley rejects are what he calls metaphysical. Alciphron says: "First, then 22Alciphron, iv, 22 (Works, III, 171). Cf. also Dialogues, iii (Works, II, 257). 23"Berkeley's demonstration of God," Harvard Theological Review, 51 (1958). 275-87. Quotation, p. 279. 24 George Berkeley and the Proofs, p. 50.

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let me tell you I am not persuaded by metaphysical arguments; such, for instance, as are drawn from the idea of an all-perfect being, or the absurdity of an infinite progression of causes."211 The first of the two arguments here indicated is some form of the ontological argument proposed by St. Anselm and revived by Descartes, Leibniz and others. Though differing significantly in its formulation by philosophers, the ratio Anselmi, as it is more properly called, depends for its validity on man's having some idea of God. It is this point that Berkeley attacks: "Absurd to Argue the Existence of God from his Idea. we have no Idea of God. tis impossible."26 It is inevitable, given Berkeley's assumptions on the nature of ideas, that he should reject the possibility of man's having an idea of God. For Berkeley, the idea is the object perceived, mind-dependent for its very existence. Because Berkeley's theory of ideas and cognition is fundamentally empirical and involves a rejection of abstract ideas, he can never find it possible for man to have a Berkeleyan idea of God. In the Dialogues Berkeley writes: "I own I have properly no idea, either of God or of any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are."2'1 A further reason for Berkeley's rejection of the Anselmian argument derives from the fact that Berkeley begins from the idea of imperfect being and proceeds by way of remotion toward the notion of perfection.28 The ratio Anselmi, on the contrary, posits the notion of all-perfect being prior to the concept of imperfect being. Consequently Berkeley rejects the Anselmian reason also on this account. The second of the two rejected metaphysical arguments Alciphron describes as that drawn from "the absurdity of an infinite progression of causes." 29 Berkeley does not explain why he rejects this argument, satisfied merely to have Alciphron add that he had always found that sort of argument "dry and jejune" and never convincing. Though the latter note is a subjective one, Berkeley judges this sufficient for rejecting such an argument, since he holds that 25A.lc;phron, ii, 2 (Works, III, 142) . 26Commentaries, 782 (Works, I, 94). Cf. Principles, 27 (Works, II, 52). 27 Dialogues, iii, (Works, II, 231). Cf. also Principles, 8 (Works, II, 44). 28Cf. Dialogues, iii (Works, II, 231 and 232), and Principles, 148 (Works, II, 106) . While denying that man can have an idea of God, Berkeley admits that man can have some notion of God, some "idea in a large sense," which comes from man's reflection on his own soul. 29A.lciphron, iv, 2 (Works, III, 142).

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the proof for God's existence should be one that convinces ordinary men. Precisely which argument from causality Berkeley had in mind is not clear. Since he does not have a clear understanding of the full philosophical notion of causality, extrinsic and intrinsic, efficient, instrumental, exemplary and final causality, as it is understood in the Aristotelian tradition,80 it is probable that Berkeley simply intends to reject all arguments based on the impossibility of an infinite series of causes. It is not likely that Berkeley comprehends the important difference between an indefensible argument that attempts to prove the necessity of an original cause from a series of accidentally connected past causes, and the valid argument that rests on the ontological impossibility of an infinite series of existentially dependent causes without a first cause.81 Because Berkeley rejects the possibility of efficient causality in corporeal things, and limits causality to spiritual beings, he cannot see how a series of causes is possible.82 Furthermore, the kind of proof that Berkeley here rejects, epistemologically implies a process of abstration. Since Berkeley denies abstraction,88 he dismisses the metaphysical arguments for God's existence, which require abstraction. b. Berkeley's rejection of the argument from authority In the second place, Berkeley rejects the proof of God's existence drawn from authority. Alciphron asserts: "Secondly, I am not to be persuaded by the authority either of past or present ages, of mankind in general, or of particular wise men, all of which passeth for little or nothing with a man of sound argument and free thought. 84 The authorities rejected are both the general authority of the common belief of mankind, and the reasoned testimony of past thinkers. The basis for this rejection seems to be Alciphron's determination to work things out for himself, independently. "Disputes are not to be decided by the weight of authority, but by the force of reason," Alciphron insists. 811 As in the rest of this passage, Alciphron here expresses both the 80Cf. Commentaries, 780 (Works, I, 94). 81 R. Garrigou.Lagrange, God.: His Existence and His Nature (St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder, 1934), I, 71·84. 82Cf. Principles, 25, 64·66, 102·107 (Works, II, 51, 68·70, 85·88). 88 Commentaries, 497, 561, 564,779; Principles, Introduction and 97·98 (Works, I, 62, 70, 94; II, 27·40, 83). 84,A,lciphron, iv, 2 (Works, III, 142) . 8I1Ibid., i, 13 (Works, III, 54) .

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mind of the free-thinker and to some extent that of Berkeley. For the former, by reason of their professed tenets, any argument from authority of past philosophers or revelation is valueless. Berkeley himself does not reject the authority of other philosophers or of religion, but he rejects any appeal to religious authority as a point of departure for a philosophical demonstration of God's existence. It is somewhat difficult to explain Berkeley's rejection of the authority "of mankind in general" as a witness of God's existence. Berkeley is well aware of mankind's universal belief in the deity, and he knows that other thinkers use this fact as a telling argument. Furthermore, Berkeley often appeals to the common sense of mankind in behalf of his philosophical conclusions.36 Nevertheless, one passage in the Principles states that the universal acceptance of the notion of matter is but "a weak argument against its truth" 37 because the greater part of mankind simply accept the opinion without reflection. Berkeley seems inconsistent in his appeal to or rejection of common sense: where it strengthens his argument, he calls on the witness of mankind's beliefs and practices; where common sense runs counter to his theory, he rejects it as of small consequence, because most men do not reflect and think, but are simply led along as an "unthinking herd." 38 Berkeley's rejection of the argument from authority is also related to the apologetic nature of his work. He knows that the minute philosophers, instead of accepting such an argument, attribute the widespread belief of men in God to indoctrination by religious leaders.39 This is an additional reason why Berkeley allows Aldphron's rejection of all proofs of God's existence based on authority to stand. c. Berkeley's rejection of arguments based on utility or convenience The third type of proof which Berkeley rejects is the argument from utility. "Thirdly," Aldphron asserts, "all proofs drawn from utility or convenience are foreign to the purpose. They may prove indeed the usefulness of the notion, but not the existence of the thing. Whatever legislators or statesmen may think, truth and convenience are very different things to the rigorous eyes of a philoso86For example, Dialogues, iii (Works, II, 234, 237-238) . 87 Principles, 54-58 (Works, II, 64-65) • S8 Cf. Sillem, George Berkeley and the Proofs, p. 36. 3gef. Alciphron, i, 6 (Works, III, 41).

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pher."4o Since elsewhere in his writings Berkeley indicates his conviction that utility can be a test of truth value,41 it is evident that he allows this objection to stand also for apologetic reasons. The typical objections of the free-thinkers are set forth by Berkeley in the strong accusations he places on the lips of Alciphron against church and state officials who use religious and moral beliefs as "useful engines of government" by means of which they can render the people "tame, timorous, and slavish."42 Hence, though Berkeley may be convinced that the usefulness for mankind of the truth of God's existence is an attestation of the truth itself, he does not press the point. Of the three types of proofs, then, which Berkeley allows Alciphron to reject at the outset of the dialogue devoted to his own attempt at a formal proof of God's existence, the proofs from authority and utility are not to be developed for polemical reasons. Since the audience for whom Berkeley writes will not accept them, he does not insist on them, though he apparently does not consider them to be without validity. On the other hand, Berkeley seems to be in agreement with the minute philosopher in rejecting what he terms the metaphysical arguments, because he considers them unconvincing in the light of his own philosophical system. III. EXPOSITION OF BERKELEY'S PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD It is on his own terms, on principles that form the basis of his own philosophy, that Berkeley intends to prove the truth of God's existence, in order to benefit ordinary men misled by the sceptics, atheists, deists and free-thinkers. Commentators do not wholly agree on the number of proofs that Berkeley presents. 1 Those who admit 40lbid., iv, 2 (Works, III, 142). 41Cf. Dialogues, iii. and Alciphron, i, 16 (Works, II, 257-258; III, 60-64). 42Alciphron, i. 7 (Works, 111,42). 1Among those who assign one proof to Berkeley are: Hedenius. Laky, Luce Piper. in op. cit. supra; Frederick Copleston. A History of Philosophy, Vol. V, Hobbes to Hume (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1959); and T. E. Jessop. George Berkeley, Biographical Series of Supplements to "British Book News" on Writers and their Work. No. 118 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1959). Two proofs are discussed by J. A. Elbert, "Berkeley's Conception of God from the Standpoint of Perception and Causation," The New Scholasticism, 8 (19M). 154-58; Francesco Olgiati. L'idealismo di Giorgio Berkeley ed il suo Significato Storico (Milano: Vita e Pesiero, 1926); and Sillem, op. cit., who indicates two distinct arguments within each of the two proofs he assigns to Berkeley. The following

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only one proof usually find it a complicated argument, having different expressions. All agree that Berkeley's new principle enters into his proof and that all his arguments are interlocked with his immaterialist philosophy. Good reasons can be adduced for attributing to Berkeley only one or two proofs of God's existence. However, one can arrive best at the clearest analysis of Berkeley's thought, it seems, by discussing the proofs on a threefold basis. These three proofs may be called: (1) the proof from the necessity of an eternal mind that sustains all things by perceiving them; (2) the proof from the necessity of an adequate cause producing all things, and particularly, man's ideas; and (3) the proof based on the interpretation of the phenomena of the world as a divine visual language. The three proofs are expressed in more than one place in Berkeley's writings, with varying degrees of directness. The proof based on the necessity of a continuous omnipercipient mind is expressed most clearly in the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. The second proof appears in some form in all three major philosophical works. It is extensively discussed in the Principles, both under the form of God as cause of man's ideas and under the form of God as cause of things in the world. Under the latter aspect it appears in its most developed presentation in Alciphron. The proof from divine visual language is stated briefly in the Essay toward a New Theory of Vision, and is elaborated in Alciphron. All three proofs are interrelated, and all are based on Berkeleyan immaterialism. Hence, it is in order to recall briefly the Berkeleyan principles necessary to an understanding of the proofs. Berkeley's point of departure is the epistemological question emphasized by Locke. In agreement with Locke, Berkeley accepts the thesis that we perceive nothing but ideas. For Berkeley, however, ideas are not representations of things: they are the things themselves which we perceive directly.2 Berkeley's identification of idea and object of perception leads him to formulate what he enthusiastically terms "the obvious tho' amazing truth" 3 that the being of speak of Berkeley's three proofs: Collins, op cit; Robert H. Hurlbutt, "Berkeley's Theology," University of California Publications in Philosophy, 29 (1957), 106-21; I. T. Ramsey, "Sermon Preached at Festival Service in the Chapel of Trinity College, Dublin, 10th July, 1953," Hermathena, No. 82 (1953), 113-27. 2 A particularly succinct statement of Berkeley's noetic theory is found in Dialogues, iii (Works, II, 262). 3Commentaries, 279 (Works, I, 34).

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sensible things is their being perceived: esse est percipi. Ideas, or things, as Berkeley explains them, have no "absolute existence" apart from their being perceived, or at least, perceivable. This does not mean that Berkeley denies the objective reality of corporeal things. On this point, he is insistent. There are objectively real concrete things; but these are the ideas that we know when we perceive them. Material substance, Berkeley insists, is nonperceptible and therefore nonexistent. On the denial of matter as substantial reality Berkeley is more vigorously vocal than on almost any other point in his writings. Substantial being, in Berkeley's system, is spiritual being. Spirit is "an incorporeal active substance," 4 an "undivided, active being," II "an agent subsisting by itself," 6 which is the "cause of ideas." '1 The nature of spirit, though not clearly analyzed by Berkeley, seems to consist for him in the mind and the will. The being of spirit is to perceive, to think, to know, to will: for spirit, esse est percipere. Berkeley identifies three kinds of spirit: (1) the self, (2) other finite spirits, and (3) the infinite spirit. Man knows the self intuitively, and other spirits, finite and infinite alike, by inference. "My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of; and by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the possibility of the existence of other finite spirits and ideas." 8 In contrast to spirit, ideas are "inert, Heeting, perishable, passions, or dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances."9 Ideas are "visibly inactive-there is nothing of power or agency included in them." 10 They are "thoughtless and inactive," 11 and cannot "strictly speaking, be the cause of anything."12 For Berkeley, then, the universe is made up of two kinds of beings: active spirits, finite and infinite; and passive idea-things, whose existence is inconceivable apart from their being perceived. 4Principles, 26 (Works, II, 52). IIlbid., 2:1. 6Ibid., 137 (Works, II, 104). '1lbid., 36 (Works, II, 56) . 8Dialogues, iii (Works, II, 232); d. Principles, 89 (Works, II, 80), and A. A. Luce's analysis of Berkeley's meaning of mind in "Berkeley's Existence in the Mind," Mind, No. 199 (1941), 258·67. 9Principles, 89 (Works, II, 80). 10Ibid., 25 (Works, II, 51) • 11lbid., 39 (Works, II, 57). 12Ibid., 25 (Works, II, 52).

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1. Berkeley's new proof based on the necessity of an

eternal mind continually perceiving all things The most succinct statement of this proof appears in syllogistic form in the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous early in the second dialogue, in words that Berkeley prints in italics:

Sensible things do really exist; and if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite mind; therefore there is an infinite mind, or GOd. 13 Berkeley does not attempt to prove the major of this syllogism, the reality of sensible things, since he considers it a self-evident fact of experience. 14 A little later in the third dialogue, Philonous says to Hylas: To be plain, it is my opinion, that the real things are those very things I see and feel, and perceive by my senses. . . . What a jest it is for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things, till he hath it proved to him from the veracity of GOd. 111 It is the meaning of the existence of sensible things, rather than the fact of their existence, that Berkeley expounds at great length in both the Principles and the Dialogues. We have already recalled how Berkeley reduces sensible things to ideas having no substantial existence apart from mind. It is this new principle that Berkeley assumes in the minor of his syllogism, which is itself a foreshortened conclusion of the whole immaterialist philosophy set forth in the Principles. The following passage illustrates Berkeley's exposition and shows how he assumes the fact that his doctrine necessarily supposes the existence of the deity who secures the continuous existence of the corporeal world by his uninterrupted perception of it: According to us the unthinking beings perceived by sense, have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other substance, than those unextended, indivisible substances, or spirits, which act, and think, and perceive them: whereas philosophers vulgarly hold, that the sensible qualities exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving substance, which they call matter, to which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the Creator, wherein they suppose only 13Dialogues, ii (Works, II, 212). 14 Prior to the above quotation, Berkeley puts into the mouth of Philonous a two page peroration on the beauty and splendor of the really existing visible universe. Dialogues, ii (Works, II, 210-12) . 15Ibid., iii (Works, II, 229-30).

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ideas of the corporeal substances created by him: if indeed they allow them to be at all created. 16 Berkeley has already explained in the Principles that when he holds the objects of sense "to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived," he does not mean that they have no existence except when perceived by us, "sincere there may be some other spirit that perceives them, though we do not."17 This concept is examined more fully in the Dialogues. Philonous explains: "Things perceived by the senses are immediately perceived, and things immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore consists in being perceived." 18 To this reasoning Hylas objects: "Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible, that things perceivable by sense may still exist?" 19 In answer Philonous reiterates Berkeley's proof of God's existence: When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind, since I find them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore some other mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And as the same is true, with regard to all other finite created spirits; it necessarily follows, there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, which knows and comprehends all things. 20 This, then, is the new proof that Berkeley sets forth. Its intimate connection with immaterialism is obvious, since the validity of the conclusion depends on the truth of the minor, which is a statement of Berkeley's immaterialist prindple. 21 Although we do not find in Berkeley's writings a careful analysis of the extent to which this proof points to knowledge of God's nature and his attributes, there is evidence that Berkeley adverts to this problem. He judges that this proof points to an infinite mind 16Principles, 91 (Works, II, 80·81) .

17 Ibid., 48 (Works, II, 61). 18Dialogues, iii (Works, II, 230) . 19 Ibid.

20Ibid., iii (Works, 230·31). 21 Berkeley leaves unexamined the question of how God sustains external things in being by perceiving them. In one place in the Dialogues he adverts briefly to the problem when he writes: "God knows or hath ideas: but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are." (iii, Works, II, 241) .

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who knows all things in some way, and by his knowing is present to them and sustains them in existence. "As sure therefore," concludes Philonous at one point, "as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent spirit who contains and supports it." 22 The argument for the existence of an omnipresent deity is the proof that Berkeley claims to be new. "Men commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by God, because they believe the being of a God," Philonous avers, "whereas I, on the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God because all sensible things must be perceived by Him." 23 The novelty of the proof stems from the novelty of the premise on which it is based, Berkeley's esse est percipi principle. This Berkeleyan proof of God's existence is consistent with the whole of Berkeley's philosophy. Concluding his analysis of this proof, Ingemar Hedenius very aptly says: "Thus the final point of Berkeley's speculation, the proof of the existence of God, is based on his epistemological sensationalism. The sensationalistic view that the 'real' consists of passively received sensations coincides with the theological-metaphysical view that all real things must be the ideas of God." 24

2. Berkeley's proof based on the necessity of an adequate cause producing all things, particularly man's ideas There is a very close relationship between Berkeley's first and second proofs. In the first argument, Berkeley concludes that sensible things must have their esse in an infinite mind which perceives them; but if God's perception of things forms the basis of their reality, then the individual human percipient's sensations of things must have their cause in that same infinite mind. Human perception must consist in the infinite mind's affecting man with sensations. 25 The interrelation of the second proof with the new proof is indicated by Berkeley in the Three Dialogues in several places. One citation will illustrate: Nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived . . . exist independently of my mind, since I know myself not to be their 22Ibid., ii (Works, 11,212) . 2Slbid. 240p. cit .. p. 131. 25 Ct. ibid .. p. 125.

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author. . They must therefore exist in some other mind, whose will it is they should be exhibited to me. 26 Here, as elsewhere, Berkeley passes easily from the notion of God as omnipercipient mind sustaining things to God as infinite will causing man's ideas. In arguing to God's existence as a necessary cause of man's ideas, and in arguing in a somewhat looser fashion to God as the cause of things in the universe, Berkeley actually presents two different expressions of the same argument, since he identifies ideas and objects.27 The formulation of the proof from the necessity of God as cause of man's ideas is developed chiefly in the Principles; the same proof, in the form of an argument to God as first cause of things, is found especially in Alciphron. a. God as cause of man's ideas Berkeley's proof of God's existence derived from reasoning to God as the cause of man's ideas is never expressed in as neatly syllogistic fashion as is the proof of God as the eternal mind upholding things by his perceiving them. Yet it is clearly thought out by Berkeley, and appears in unpolished form in his notes: "Every sensation of mine weh happens in Consequence of the general, known Laws of nature &: is from without i.e. independent of my Will demonstrates the Being of a God. i.e. of an unextended incorporeal Spirit web is omniscient, omnipotent, etcc."28 Again, Berkeley notes: "Those things that happen from without we are not the Cause of therefore there is some other Cause of them i.e. there is a being that wills these perceptions in US."29 The more elaborate statement of this argument that appears in the Principles, reduced to syllogistic form, would be: Only spirit can cause ideas; finite spirits cannot fully account for all the ideas I perceive; therefore there must be an infinite spirit that causes them. Such a formulation makes evident Berkeley's basic assumption that only spiritual substances can exercise real causality. It also gives some indication of how Berkeley proceeds in this argument by way of a dialectical ascent to God, first, from the difference between self-willed ideas of imagination, and non-volitional 26Dialogues, ii (Works, II, 214·15). Cf. ibid., ii and iii (Works, II, 215, 281, 21$2, 21$6. 240) • 27Cf. Commentaries 799, 821$ (Works, I, 96, 98). 281bid., 81$8 (Works, I, 100). 29 Ibid, 499 (Works, I. 61$).

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sense perceptions;30 and, secondly by way of analogy between our manner of knowing the existence of other finite spirits and our manner of knowing the existence of the infinite spirit. Fundamental to this proof for God's existence is Berkeley's thesis that only spirit can be a genuine cause, because only spirit is active, in contrast with ideas, which are passive. Berkeley denies all material efficient causality. What men commonly call material effects and causes are simply the connections of certain things following one another in a sequence caused by the author of nature. When men observe how one thing always follows another, Berkeley says, they wrongly attribute to them a cause-effect relationship. Berkeley does not deny causality as such, but allows it only to what he calls spirits, those "active, indivisible, incorruptible substances," 31 which "act and think and perceive." 32 The nature of spiritual causality is not formally analyzed by Berkeley, but some indication of his notion that all cause is volitional appears in an early note: "What means Cause as distinguish'd from Occasion? nothing but a Being wch wills wn the Effect follows the volition." 33 Repeatedly, Berkeley implies that it is by its will that spirit produces ideas. In Berkeley's conception, causality is attributable to all three kinds of spirits: the self, other finite spirits, and the infinite spirit. Berkeley appeals to experience in witness of the power of the self and other finite spirits to cause ideas. In the Principles he writes: I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straitway this or that idea arises in my fancy: and by the same power is obliterated, and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. 34 Berkeley writes similarly concerning the power of other finite spirits to cause ideas in us, and points out that it is by the exercise of this power that we know of their existence: It is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits, otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas. that 30Cf. Collins, op. cit., p. 110. SlPrinciples, 89 (Works, II, 79). 321bid., 91 (Works, II, 80). SS Commentaries, 499 (Works, I, 63). Cf. ibid., 850 (Works, I, 101), Principles, 27-29, 147. and Dialogues ii (Works, II, 52·53, 108, 219). S4PritJ.ciples,28 (Works, II, 53) .

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inform me there are certain particular agents like my self, which accompany them, and concur in their production.811 From these facts of experience Berkeley argues to the existence of the infinite spirit who is the cause of all ideas. In the early part of the Prnciples and in the Dialogues his argument is based on a dialectical ascent from the self causing ideas of imagination to the infinite spirit causing ideas of sense. The former are dependent on the will of the self; the latter come from the will of another: When in broad day-light I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them. 56 That this other will or spirit is the infinite spirit, God, Berkeley deduces from the vividness of the ideas of sense and from their orderliness: The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. 8T In the Dialogues Berkeley follows the same line of arguments. Philonous enunciates the proof in a passage that forms part of a rejection of Hylas' contention that Berkeley's doctrine parallels the Malabranchian theory of seeing all things in God. But on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they [ideas or sensations] should exist in, and be produced by, a spirit; since this is no more than I daily experience in myself, inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas; and by an act of my Will can form a great variety of them, and raise them up in my imagination: though it must be confessed, these creatures of the fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, as those perceived by my senses, which latter are called real things. From all of which I conclude, there is a mind, which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive. ... I say, the things by me perceived are known by the understanding, and produced by the will, of an infinite spirit.88 8Glbid., 145 (Works, II, 107). 86Ibid., 29 (Works, II, 53) ; d. ibid., 33 (Works, II, 54) . 8Tlbid., 30 (Works, II, 53) • 88Dialogues, ii (Works, II, 215).

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In the latter part of the Principles Berkeley restates the proof for the existence of the infinite spirit as cause of our sensations, arguing from our knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits. These we know inferentially through the ideas they arouse in us. A fortiori, Berkeley reasons, we must admit the existence of a being who causes in us not merely some sensations, but a vast orderly array of them. Though there be some things which convince us, human agents are concerned in producing them; yet it is evident to everyone, that those things which are called the works of Nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on the wills of men. There is therefore some other spirit that causes them, since it is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves. s9 That this spirit is God, the author of nature, we can know "if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things."4o Berkeley asserts: Hence it is evident, that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever, distinct from our selves. We may even assert, that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of Nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There is not anyone mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which doth not more strongly evince the being of that spirit who is the Author of Nature. 41 Berkeley states clearly that our knowledge of God is patterned on our knowledge of other finite spirits. These latter we know, not by direct perception, but only by "such a certain collection of ideas, as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion like to our selves."42 Immediately Berkeley makes the dialectical ascent to our knowledge of God's existence: And after the same manner we see God; all the difference is, that whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human being, whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the divinity: every thing we see, hear, feel, or any wise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the Power of God. 4s 39Principles, 146 (Works, II, 107-108). 40 Ibid. 41Ibid., 147. 42Ibid., 148 (Works, II, 109). 43Ibid.

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The very power of one finite spirit to cause ideas in another Berkeley adduces as witness to the existence of the author of nature who "maintains that intercourse between spirits, whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other."44 Berkeley claims that his argument for the existence of the infinite spirit who causes "all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us" 411 leads to an affirmation of the attributes of God: his oneness, eternity, infinite wisdom, goodness, perfection, and power. It is the "steadiness, order, and coherence" and the "admirable connexion" of the ideas excited in us by the infinite spirit that lead us to recognize these attributes. 46 From "the variety, order, and manner" of the sensible impressions we receive, Philonous asserts, "I conclude the Author of them to be wise, powerful, and good, beyond comprehension."47 Berkeley devotes considerable attention to a refutation of the objections against this proof, all of which are based on the principle that material substance exists. In the Dialogues, Hylas voices these objections, arguing that matter may be at least "a subordinate and limited cause of our ideas,"48 or an instrumental cause that God uses in producing our sensations; or, according to the Cartesian doctrine, the occasion for God's causing our sensations. Voicing Berkeley's theory on the nonexistence of material substance, Philonous refutes the objections in turn by a reductio ad absurdum. It is "infinitely extravagant," he insists, "to say a thing which is inert, operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving, is the cause of our perceptions."49 Since the "all-perfect spirit, on whose will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence" does not need "an instrument for his operations," Philonous argues, it is evident that he will not use any.50 To admit that matter might be the occasion of God's causing man's sensations, Berkeley insists, would derogate from the acknowledged attributes of God, especially his wisdom and power. It is inconceivable for Berkeley to suppose God 44Ibid., 147 (Works, II, 108) . 41lIbid., 149 (Works, II, 109). 46Ibid., 30 (Works, II, 53) . 47 Dialogues, ii (Works, II, 215). Cf. also Principles, 31, 32, 57, 72, 146, 147, 148, 149 (Works, II, 53, 54, 65, 72, 108, 109) . 48Dialogues, ii (Works, II, 215) . 49Ibid., iii (Works, II, 236) . IlOlbid., ii (Works, II, 219). Cf. Principles, 61·66 (Works, II, 67-70) .

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"is influenced, directed, or put in mind, when and what He is to act, by any unthinking substance." 51 b. God as cause of the universe of things The formulation of the Berkeleyan causal proof in terms of the divine causation of all things appears in the first part of the fourth dialogue of Alciphron. In this work Berkeley deliberately makes no explicit appeal to his immaterialist principles, as he does in the Principles and the Dialogues, since he is aware that his writings have not had the acceptance he hoped for, and he does not wish the apologetic value of Alciphron to be weakened by appeal to unacceptable principles. Hence the proof as it appears in this later work is not framed in terms of God's causation of man's ideas, but in phrases resembling the traditional common sense reasoning to God's existence. Here Berkeley seems to restate what the psalmist sang: "The heavens proclaim the glory of the Lord and the firmament declareth the work of his hands." 52 However, since Berkeley identifies the phenomena of the external world with man's ideas, the two formulations of the proof have the same significance. Under one aspect Berkeley's presentation of the argument in Alciphron repeats the two earlier forms: as in the Principles and Dialogues, Berkeley draws the conclusion of our certainty of God's being from a parallel with our certainty of the being of other finite spirits. It is true that in Alciphron Berkeley does not speak so insistently of "spirit," which is his term antithetical to idea in the earlier works. Instead he speaks now of the "soul," of a "distinct thinking individual,"53 and of an "invisible thinking principle."54 Following the minute philosopher's specifications of the kind of proof he is willing to consider, Berkeley begins his presentation of the argument with a discussion of the way in which we know the existence of other reasonable beings. "I do not perceive them immediately by any of my senses," Alciphron agrees; "I am nevertheless persuaded of their existence, because I can collect it from their effects and operations." 55 Euphranor presses the concession, asking Alciphron whether from reasonable acts he infers "the existence of a reasonable soul," and whether "from reasonable motions (or such 51 Dialogues, ii (Works, II, 219-220). Cf. Principles, 67-72 (Works, II, 70-72). 52 Psalm

18, 1. 53Alciphron, iv, 4 (Works, III, 145) . 54 Ibid. (Works, III, 147). 55 Ibid. (Works, III, 145)_

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as appear calculated for a reasonable end) a rational cause, soul or spirit."116 With this question Berkeley introduces the concept of rational finality as witness to rational agent. Reasoning from our inference of man's rationality from the observed fact of his actions, Euphranor draws an a fortiori conclusion for the existence of an infinite mind to which the phenomena of nature witness: The soul of man actuates but a small body, an insignificant particle, in respect of the great masses of nature, the elements, and heavenly bodies, and the system of the world. . . . A man with his hand can make no machine so admirable as the hand itself; nor can any of those motions by which we trace out human reason approach the skill and contrivance of those wonderful motions of the heart, and brain, and other vital parts, which do not depend on the will of man. 1I7 When Alciphron admits the truth of these observations, Euphranor draws his conclusion: Doth it not follow, then, that from natural motions, independent of man's will, may be inferred both power and wisdom incomparably greater than that of the human SOUI?58 To the argument that the existence and activity of things observable in the cosmos point to a deity, Berkeley now adds the argument from the order and design in the world. He points out how there is evident in nature "a visible unity of counsel and design" with laws that are the same "in China and here, the same two thousand years ago and at this day." 59 Is there not also a connexion or relation between animals and vegetables, between both and the elements, between the elements and the heavenly bodies; so that, from their mutual respects, influences, subordinations, and uses, they may be collected to be parts of one whole, conspiring to one and the same end, and fulfilling the same design? 60 Immediately following Alciphron's querying response, "Supposing all this to be true?" Euphranor concludes that the unity and design in the universe point most certainly to the existence of one God, an intelligent being, infinitely wise and powerful: 116Ibid. (Works, III, 146) . 117 Ibid. lIS Ibid.

G9Ibid. 60 Ibid.

(Works, III, 146-147).

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Will it not then follow that this vastly great or infinite power and wisdom must be supposed in one and the same Agent, Spirit, or Mind; and that we have at least as clear, full, and immediate certainty of the being of this infinitely wise and powerful Spirit, as of anyone human soul whatsoever besides our own?61 Such then is the Alciphron statement of Berkeley's causal proof, with the teleological element introduced into it. The terms are not those of his immaterialism, although that philosophy is not contradicted in this presentation of the proof. Indeed, to one acquainted with the earlier works, the Berkeleyan immaterialism is felt to be just below the surface in this restatement of the proof. Euphranor's recapitulation of the argument is close to the terminology of the Principles and the Dialogues: Though I cannot with eyes of flesh behold the invisible God, yet I do in the strictest sense behold and perceive by all my senses such signs and tokens, such effects and operations, as suggest, indicate, and demonstrate an invisible God, as certainly, and with the same evidence, at least, as any other signs perceived by sense do suggest to me the existence of your soul, spirit, or thinking principle.62 In the elaboration of this proof, Berkeley argues not merely to the existence of God as cause of the perceived universe, but to an intelligent God who is one, wise, powerful and good. The harmony and unity that men perceive in the interrelationships of things in the universe must necessarily be attributed to an infinite being, who freely makes the world such as it is by his own will. His goodness to man is manifest in the orderly sequence of things and events, which men call the laws of nature. One unified universe calls for a single being who causes and designs it. Speaking of the law of gravity, and what men observe concerning it, Berkeley writes: "There is nothing necessary or essential in the case, but it depends entirely on the will of the governing spirit, who causes certain bodies to cleave together, or tend towards each other."6s This harmony and beauty in nature, Berkeley reasons, not only points to God's existence, but leads men to acknowledge God's attributes: 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. (Works, III, 147). 6SPrinciples, 106 (Works, II, 1!7).

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God seems to choose the convincing our reason of his attributes by the works of Nature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather than to astonish us into a belief of his being by anomalous and surprising events. 64 Discussing how it is possible for men to fail to realize that only spirit can be the cause of our ideas, Berkeley notes how men are ready to recognize God's presence when he works miracles, but when we see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any reflection; their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their Creator, is yet so constant and familiar to us, that we do not think them the immediate effects of a free spirit.6r; By calling attention to the harmony of the universe, and at the same time claiming that the concatenation of things and events is not due to any material secondary causality, Berkeley argues to the wisdom, knowledge, power, oneness, goodness, and perfection of the supreme spirit who is the designer and cause of all things. As already pointed out above, Berkeley feels justified in drawing similar conclusions from his epistemological fOTInulation of this same argument. Thus both fOTIns of Berkeley's causal proof, the argument to God as cause of man's ideas and the argument to God as cause of things, lead to the conclusion we find in the Theory of Vision Vindicated: "From our ideas of sense the inference of reason is good to a Power, Cause, Agent."66 Berkeley believes his demonstration proves that this supreme "Power, Cause, Agent" is none other than the God of scripture, "in whom we live, move and have our being," the "God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we do, whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing." 67

3. The divine visual language proof of God's existence In the Theory of Vision Vindicated Berkeley speaks of having expounded "a new argument of a singular nature in proof of the immediate care and providence of a God, present to our minds and 641bid., 63 (Works, II. 68) . 6Hbid., 57 (Works, II. 65). Cf. ibid., 146. 151-153 (Works, II. 108. 110-112). and Alciphron, iv. 4 (Works. III. 146-147) . 66Theory of Vision Vindicated, 11 (Works, 1.256). 67 Dialogues. iii (Works, II. 241).

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directing our actions." 68 Although he labels his argument to the omnipercipient deity a novel proof, it seems that in Vision Vindicated he has in mind the divine visual language argument. This is the proof in which Berkeley most explicitly seeks to demonstrate God's providence by the same argument that proves his existence. This proof appears in several places in Berkeley's writings. It is enunciated already in his first work, the Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, and appears again in the Principles of Human Knowledge with an extension beyond merely the visual phenomena as God's language. The Theory of Vision Vindicated emphasizes it. In Alciphron it is given its most extended form. There it appears as a second proof in answer to the minute philosopher's challenge. 69 The argument of the divine visual language proof is this: we know the existence of another person by his speaking to us; he speaks to us by means of words which constitute a language. But the visual phenomena of nature constitute a language which far exceeds the possibility of its being the language of a finite mind. Therefore, this visual language of nature evidences the existence of a divine person who speaks to men by means of it. Obviously this argument has in common with Berkeley's causal proof the procedure by way of analogy of finite spirit and infinite spirit. However, Berkeley intends to prove more cogently than in the other arguments that God is intimately present to man, and that he is the God of providence. In the fourth dialogue of Alciphron, Berkeley puts on the lips of the minute philosopher a challenge that forms a neat outline of the argument: I have found that nothing so much convinces me of the existence of another person as his speaking to me. It is my hearing you talk that, in strict and philosophical truth, is to me the best argument for your being. And this is a peculiar argument, inapplicable to your purpose; for you will not, I suppose, pretend that God speaks to man in the same clear and sensible manner as one man does to another. 70 In order to meet this challenge, Euphranor first enters into a discussion of the nature of language. Both men agree that language of Vision Vindicated, 8 (Works, I, 255). 69Sillem, op. cit., p. 169, considers the visual language proof as simply a development of the causal-teleological argument presented in the first part of the fourth dialogue of Alciphron. 70Alciphron, iv, 6 (Works, III, 148·49). 68 Theory

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means "the arbitrary use of sensible signs, which have no similitude or necessary connexion with the things signified" 71 and that is used by man to "suggest and exhibit" to his mind "an endless variety of things, differing in nature, time, and place," by which he will be informed, entertained, directed, and shown how to act.72 Berkeley immediately attempts to show that the visual phenomena of nature constitute a language, which meets the requirements of the descriptive definition the two men have agreed on.'18 In making this demonstration, Berkeley reiterates his theory that the proper objects of sight are "light and colours, with their several shades and degrees," '14 which are signs of the things that man sees with his mind. The arbitrary connection of these signs with the signified is stressed, and is paralleled with the arbitrary connection between words and the realities they signify. Berkeley notes how this language is learned, not by conscious study, but by experience, and that it is the same all over the world. Its indication of the existence of God is overlooked, because men pass over the signs of this visual language to the things signified, just as they pass quickly over words to their meaning. Berkeley has Euphranor explain that only visual phenomena form a language, though other sense perceptions may be signs.75 Convinced that he has given a demonstration of the fact of a real visual language in nature, Euphranor concludes the argument for the existence of God: You cannot deny that the great Mover and Author of Nature constantly explaineth Himself to the eyes of men by the sensible intervention of arbitrary signs, which have no similitude or connexion with the things signified; so as, by compounding and disposing them, to suggest and exhibit an endless variety of objects, differing in nature, time, and place; thereby informing and directing men how to act with respect to things distant and future, as well as near and present. In consequence, I say, of your own sentiments and concessions, you have as much reason to think the Universal Agent or God speaks to your eyes, as you can have for thinking any particular person speaks to your ears.76 l1Ibid., 7 (WoTks, III, 149) . 72Ibid. Berkeley also discusses the nature of language in New Theory of Vision, 147 (WoTks, I, 2!l1) , and Principles, 44 (WoTks, II, 59) . '18.4.1ciphTon, iv, 8-10 (WoTks, III. 150-56). '14Ibid., 10 (WoTks, III. 154) . '1ISIbid., 12 (Works, III. 157-58). '18Ibid.

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Thus Berkeley brings the argument that "Vision is the Language of the Author of Nature" 77 to the point of concluding to the existence of a divine person, the author of nature, who "speaks to our eyes." 78 After Euphranor has allowed Alciphron "to stare a little at his conclusions,"79 Berkeley proceeds to argue that "this Visual Language proves, not a Creator merely, but a provident Governor, actually and intimately present and attentive to all our interests and motions." 80 It is now Crito who voices Berkeley's exposition. He asserts that "this optic language hath a necessary connexion with knowledge, wisdom, and goodness . . . betokening an immediate act of power and providence," 81 because there is no other adequate explanation of the "instantaneous production and reproduction of so many signs, combined, dissolved, transposed, diversified, and adapted to such an endless variety of purposes." 82 He insists that all this is "utterly inexplicable and unaccountable by the laws of motion, by chance, by fate, or the like blind principles."8S Crito maintains that because this visual language points to far more than what can be inferred from laws of motion or gravitation, it points to "one, wise, good, and provident Spirit." 84 Berkeley develops a proof for a providence from the fact that the purpose of the divine visual language is man's benefit. Berkeley has both Crito and Euphanor dwell on this fact. He expresses the same concept in the New Theory of Vision: Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude that the proper objects of vision constitute an universal language of the Author of nature, whereby we are instructed how to regulate our actions in order to attain those things that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive to them. It is by their information that we are principally guided in all the transactions and concerns of life. 81l 77 Theory Of Vision Vindicated, 38 (Works, I, 264) . 78New Theory Of Vision, 152 (Works, I, 233). 79Alciphron, iv, 13 (Works, III, 159). 80Ibid., 14 (Works, III, 160). 81Ibid. (Works, III, 159). 82 Ibid. 8SIbid. (Works, III, 160). 84 Ibid. 8lSNew Theory of Vision, 147 (Works, I. 231).

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Both in Alciphron and the New Theory of Vision Berkeley uses the same illustration to clarify this point. 86 He pictures a country of men blind from infancy, among whom a stranger comes, the only man who can see in the whole country; naturally the stranger can tell beforehand the turns of the road ahead and similar facts, which amazes the blind men. For those who read the visual language of God in the universe and interpret the connections of things as God intends them, Berkeley claims, there is sight with all the consequent benefits for the guidance of men. Speaking of "perusing the volume of Nature" Berkeley emphasizes that this divine language is meant to serve not only man's practical needs, but also his aesthetic benefit; man should so peruse it "as to recreate and exalt the mind, with a prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural things." 87 Again, Berkeley says that we draw amusement and entertainment, "singular pleasure and delight," from this "divine and admirable Language, addressed to our eyes."88 These multiple benefits to man point to God's benevolent providence; they give us a fuller notion of "the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator."89 Berkeley feels justified in stating Crito's conclusion that the visual language proves the provident creator who "takes care of our minutest actions and designs throughout the whole course of our lives, informing, admonishing, and directing incessantly, in a most evident and sensible manner."90 A final word must be added. There is a notable similarity between Berkeley's theory and certain passages of St. Augustine's argument for the existence of God the eternal truth, based on facts of the visible universe. St. Augustine refers to natural things as the imprint of eternal Truth, by which God speaks to man through nature. In creation God has left his imprint, his invitations, his suggestions of himself, through which man is called to a knowledge of God who is eternal wisdom.91 The Augustinian proof, however, 86Ibid., 148 (Works, I, 231); and Alciphron, iv, 15 (Works, III, 161). The same argument for a benevolent divine providence is developed in the Principles, with this difference, that there Berkeley attributes the effects to all man's sensations, not only to his optic perceptions. Cf. 30, 31, 50, 62, 107, 109, 151, 153 (Works, II, 53, 54, 66, 67, 87, 89, 110, 11I). 87 Principles, 109 (Works, II, 89). 88Alciphron, iv, 15 (Works, III, I60). 89 Principles, 109 (Works, 11,89). 90Alciphron, iv, 14 (Works, III. 160). 91 Quoted in Marcolina Daffara, Dio, esposi%ione e valutadone delle yrove (Torino: Societa editrice internazionale. 1952), pp. 109-26.

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is quite different from Berkeley's divine visual language proof, since it argues from known truths to eternal truth. St. Augustine is obviously using the terminology of language in a metophorical sense, whereas Berkeley uses it in a strict sense. IV. CRITICISM OF BERKELEY'S CONCEPTION OF THE PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD In a general way it can be said that Berkeley has made a positive contribution by giving importance to the problem of God's existence, that he has offered a generally valid notion of the kind of proof that should be sought, and that he has used some correct principles in his proofs. However, evaluation of his proofs must be largely negative, because they are based on untenable assumptions of his immaterialist philosophy. 1. Positive contributions of Berkeley's on the

problem of proving God's existence George Berkeley attaches great significance to the philosophical problem of proving God's existence. He sees it as fundamentally important in any complete philosophical system, and particularly in the refutation of the irreligious attacks of his day. His twofold aim is, as Hedenius expresses it, "to conquer atheism and to annihilate scepticism," 1 and so the "proof of God's existence may be called the culmination of Berkeley's system."2 In this position, Berkeley walks in the company of St. Thomas Aquinas, who recognized the fundamental importance of the philosophical proofs of God's existence, and who aimed, particularly in the Summa Contra Gentiles, to present the truth for the benefit of unbelievers. It is a credit to Berkeley that he considers the proof of God's existence demonstrable by reason. Just as he realizes that faith and authority give man genuine nonphilosophical ways of knowing God, so also he recognizes both the possibility and the value of proving God's existence by reason. Berkeley accepts the validity of man's sensitive and intellectual processes as means of arriving at this truth. However, he fails to give an adequate explanation of how man proceeds from sense knowledge to the suprasensible, since he vigorously rejects any process of abstraction and simply states that lOp. cit., p. 131 and p. 142. 21bid., p. 142.

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man reasons and reflects and thereby infers the existence of spirits, finite and infinite. As to the kind of proof that philosophy ought to establish, Berkeley has made a contribution in insisting that it be a proof that is clear and evident. The role a proof is designed to serve, Sillem points out, is to give conviction of the point to be proved; and since the existence of God is a problem that concerns all men, philosophers oUght to seek for a proof that is convincing to all men. 8 This is what Berkeley attempts to do. Noting this Berkeleyan effort to make "philosophical theism continuous with ordinary thinking" Prof. Collins calls this "attempt to find a common footing for both informal and philosophic reasoning to God admirable." 4 It must always be remembered, however, that conviction is a personal matter, conditioned by subjective elements in addition to the objective value of carefully reasoned demonstrations. Nevertheless, Berkeley's underscoring of die problem is a positive contribution. Berkeley is correct in insisting a proof must be an a posteriori demonstration, and, consequently he is correct in rejecting the a priori proof. His reasons, however, for rejecting the a priori Anselmian argument and Malebranche's ontologism are not acceptable, since he bases his rejection on the esse est percipi axiom, and the denial of material substance. Berkeley is right in contending that to frame a proof of any kind or to deduce one truth from another, it is necessary that "we perceive the connexion of the terms in the premises, and the connexion of the premises with the conclusion."11 He attempts to do this in his proofs of God's existence, but he assigns meanings to terms that we cannot always accept. Again, he sometimes uses terms equivocally. However, Berkeley is logical to the extent that if we accept his meaning of a term in a given instance, and the thesis on which it is based, his conclusions follow. Berkeley correctly attributes genuine validity to the principle of efficient causality, at least in the spiritual order. Time and again, he argues from effect to cause, and from operation to operating agent. Furthermore, Berkeley sees the value of the principle of sufficient reason and makes use of it in all his arguments for God's existence. In each of the arguments, there is at least an implicit 8George Berkeley and the Proofs, pp. 185·90. 40p. cit., p. 11lI. IIAlciPhron, iv, 8 (Works, III, 151) .

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reasoning that proceeds by way of eliminating all possible explanations for a given inference other than the one of God's existence. There is a commendable insistence by Berkeley that the proof of God's existence should begin with facts of experience, from which man can make further inferences by reasoning. Here Berkeley allies himself with the Aristotelian tradition. He adheres to tradition in a further way in saying that the proof that demonstrates God's existence should prove his essential attributes, "the same arguments that prove a first cause proving an intelligent cause."6 Berkeley's emphasis on the desirability of discovering such an argument and his sincere efforts to find it, are commendable. If the arguments that prove God's existence do not also lead to a conclusion forming a basis at least for further reasoning to his nature and his attributes, they have small value. Berkeley's Lysicles is right in saying "that at bottom the being of God is a point in itself of small consequence" for the "great point is what sense the word God is to be taken in."1 The five ways of St. Thomas conclude to God's existence, and at the same time form the basis from which the subsequent demonstrations of God's nature and attributes is developed. Though Berkeley fails to achieve what he set out to do because he builds his proofs on invalid premises, he deserves credit for having pointed up the desirability of a proof that would be a means of coming to know God intimately present to man, revealing something of the divine perfections in the very facts of experience that form the point of departure of the proof.8 Although Berkeley's demonstration of God as eternal omnipercipient mind is invalid because of the inadequate immaterialist principle on which it is based, there is in it nevertheless some intuition of an important truth. Berkeley recognizes, as do St. Thomas Aquinas and certain other great philosophers, that things exist because they are creatively thought by God. Similarly, though he never sees it clearly, Berkeley has some insight into the exemplary causality of all things in the Word of God. Berkeley is to be commended, then, for emphasizing again for philosophy the importance of the problem of God's existence, and for setting forth an acceptable concept of the nature of the proof. His failure to provide the kind of proof he proposes is due chiefly 61bid., 22 (Works, III, 171). 11bid., 16 (Works, III, 163). 8Cf. Sillem, 01'. cit., pp. 195·96.

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to the fundamental fallacies of his immaterialist principles, which lead him to base his conclusions on invalid premises. Furthermore, there are dialectical weaknesses in his argumentation, and some inherent inconsistencies.

2. Negative criticism of Berkeley's proofs In the first place, all of the Berkeleyan proofs, exclusive of the causal argument in terms of God's causation of the universe, are based on unacceptable principles. These include in the metaphysical order his denial of material substance and of material causality, and his limitation of efficient causality to immaterial beings. Invalidly inferring the ontological order from the epistemological order, Berkeley identifies being and perceiving. &se est percipi is his axiom for sensible reality, and esse est percipere, for spiritual reality. In positing as a solution of the epistemological problem the identification of ideas and sensible phenomena, he confuses the quid of human knowledge with the quo. Berkeley denies man's power of abstraction, and attempts to replace universals by vague and inconsistently explained "general ideas" and "notions." Since Berkeley's proofs rest on these invalid premises, they fail to stand up as genuine proofs of God's existence. By taking as his point of departure the denial of the reality of material substance in the ontological order, Berkeley arrives only at a system of "theological idealism," 9 which fails to prove the real existence of the deity. In the second place, in setting forth his typical proofs, Berkeley always proceeds from the order of knowing to the order of being, thus inverting the interdependence of metaphysics and epistemology. He b~gins, not with the existence of objective being, but with his own perceptions. This procedure follows from his own fundamental theses, and is another significant failure of Berkeley in his approach to the proofs of God's existence. Unlike those who conclude to the certainty of the fact of God's existence by arguments that proceed from the fact of the real existence of material beings, Berkeley proceeds from the being of things known to an infinite knowing mind, and from man's perception of phenomena to an infinite spirit who causes those perceptions. Berkeley merely "proceeds from the mental to the mental."lO In contrast to scholastics for whom "epistemology was in function of metaphysics, Berkeley's metaphysics pro9G. Dawes Hicks, George Berkeley (London: Ernest Benn, 1932), p. 157. lOLaky. op. cit .• p. lll.

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ceeded from his theory of knowing." 11 Consequently, his proofs of God's existence, critically analyzed, yield conclusions only in the order of knowing, not in the ontological order of being, in which the truth to be proved, God's existence, properly belongs. A third basic criticism of the Berkeleyan proofs is that they proceed from some sort of self-God analogy, which again, is closely related to his error of confusing the order of being with the order of knowing. In one argument Berkeley shifts from his own volitional power to cause imaginary ideas to a God who causes the clear, well-defined ideas of his perception, not subject to his own will. Again, he proceeds from the certainty of our knowledge of other finite spirits as causes of some of our ideas, or as addressing us by language, to a certainty of the existence of the infinite intelligent being who causes all our ideas and addresses us constantly in the divine visual language. This analogical procedure lacks validity, because Berkeley fails to establish either the certainty or the closeness of the similitude.12 Berkeley even grants that the notion of God obtained by reflecting on one's own soul, "heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections," is after all, an "extremely inadequate" image. 13 Furthermore, in his dialectical ascent from human percipient and human cause of ideas to God the infinite perceiver and cause of ideas, Berkeley fails to identify the analogical nature of his use of perception and causality. He leaves his readers with the impression that he predicates both knowing and willing, perceiving and causing, in a univocal sense of God and man, of finite and infinite. 14 As it has been put, the "weakness of Berkeley's argumentation for arriving at God is found also in the fact that on this basis God is conceived 'ad similitudinem hominis' in contrast to the thesis 'Homo similitudo Dei'."15 Another negative criticism of Berkeley's proof is his assumption that God's causality is generically the same as finite human causality. In presenting the proof of God as cause of man's sensations both in the Principles and the Dialogues, Berkeley makes a direct dialectical ascent from the self causing imaginary ideas at will and 11Paolo Rotta, Berkeley (Brescia: Societa La Scuola, 1943), p. 96. 12Piper, op. eit., pp. 284-85. J. Wild makes a similar criticism, op. cit., pp. 159-162. 13Dialogues, iii (Works, II, 231). 14 Hicks criticizes Berkeley for failing to determine the precise significance of cause and agency as he uses them in the self-God analogy. Op. cit., p. 157. ll1Rotta, op. cit., p. 102.

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others causing our perception, to God as supreme cause of all sensations. The same invalid placing of God's causality in the genus of human causality is evident in the divine visual language proof. Besides these general criticisms of Berkeley's proofs, there are negative observations to be made concerning the individual arguments for God's existence. Besides the invalidity of the premises of the proof for the omnipercipient deity, there is a further weakness. Berkeley never makes clear the precise relation between his esse est percipi principle and the truth of God's existence. One is led to wonder whether Berkeley devised the principle to prove God's existence, or posited the existence of God to close a loophole in his principle. Collins expresses the criticism well when he writes: "There is an undeclared circular relation between the New Principle and the truth of God's existence, each serving as a foundation for the other at different stages in the analysis." 16 The proof of God's existence as the necessary cause of man's ideas, as already indicated, contains a fundamental contradiction within 'the Berkeleyan system. Berkeley has repeatedly asserted that spirit is wholly active, and ideas are wholly passive. Yet he makes God to be the cause of ideas passively received by man, not subject to man's own will. If the soul is passive, then the thesis that spirit is entirely active cannot be sustained. If the thesis that spirit is entirely active, and spirit only, is not valid, then Berkeley's rejection of material causality of sensations cannot be sustained. If that be true, then Berkeley's proof of God's existence as only possible cause of man's sensations obviously fails. On the other hand, if man is wholly active, then Berkeley leaves unexplained how he can be the passive recipient of ideas caused in him by God. This contradiction Hedenius maintains to be of fundamental importance for the Berkeleyan theological argument. "One may say," he writes, "that it is by making full use of this contradiction that Berkeley reaches the theological goal of his speculation." 1'1' Finally, the divine visual language argument must be criticized for equivocation in the use of the term "language." Though Berkeley attempts to make out a case for his theory that optic phenomena do really constitute a language, he leaves the reader unconvinced, since the accepted meaning of language is something altogether different from the sum total of man's visual perceptions. Because the 160p. cit.,

p. 113.

l'I'Op. cit., p. 121.

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argument rests on the possibility of using the language concept univocally in the common understanding of the word and in the special Berkeleyan sense, it fails to demonstrate the "strict and philosophical truth"18 Berkeley intended it should.

Conclusion Our criticism of Berkeley's proofs of God's existence forces us to conclude that Berkeley fails to give his promised "new and unanswerable proof of the existence and immediate operation of God." 19 The three arguments he offers, while they may be new, certainly do not unanswerably prove God's existence. The invalidity of the Berkeleyan immaterialism on which they are premised renders invalid the conclusion they attempt to make. Hence, as philosophical proofs of God's existence, they fail. There is some value in the form of the causal argument presented by Berkeley in the early part of the fourth dialogue of Alciphron. Nevertheless, the value it has is commensurate with the extent to which it is a restatement of elements of the traditional causal and teleological proofs. Hence, the value of this argument derives, not from anything new that Berkeley contributes, but to its own inherent validity. Nonetheless, Berkeley deserves commendation for having seen the value of the argument, and for having given it an appealing, though not always philosophically exact, English expression. Berkeley's divine visual language argument has a value even though it cannot be sustained as a valid philosophical proof of God's existence and his providence. If what Berkeley intends as strict philosophical truth is interpreted only metaphorically, then any reader of Berkeley's beautiful English prose will find it a fruitful meditation on the nearness of God's presence and his loving constant providence for his creatures. Even though Berkeley may have failed philosophically in producing the "new and unanswerable proof of the existence of God," that he set out to discover, he may nonetheless have achieved for at least some readers, what is "the main drift and design" of his labors: to inspire his readers "with a pious sense of the presence of God" and "the better to dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practice is the highest perfection of human nature." 20 18Alciphron, iv, 6 (Works, III, 148). of Vision Vindicated, 1 (Works, 20Principles, 156 (Works, II, 113). 19 Theory

I,

251) .

4

A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF CERTAIN PSYCHIATRIC THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF PSYCHOSIS by

MARIUS G.

SCHNEIDER}

O.F.M.

Disease scarcely occupies a place in philosophical anthropology. "Unless he is a pessimist, and for this reason searching for the dark aspects of human existence, the philosopher is not interested in a study of the sick human being. His questioning concerns that which is proper to man, his essence; he aims at the permanent behind the changing transitory."l The transitory is easily dismissed as accidental and unimportant. So also disease, which seems to share the character of the accidental and transitory, and certainly is not specific to homo sapiens} is excluded from the list of subject-matters discussed in the philosophy of man. Even in treatises on scholastic philosophy, which rightly stresses the substantial unity of the rational animal as one of its most distinctive and decisive teachings, sickness is seldom mentioned. In the case of the scholastic thinker, other reasons than those indicated above may be responsible for his aloofness from discussion of human disease. It may be that realization of the mystery behind human frailty and sickness prevents him, or it may be that the extensive task of establishing and defending the substantiality, spirituality, and immortality of the human soul does not allow him to deal with the nature, origin, and meaning of this oftentimes tragic phenomenon of human existence. Whatever the reasons are, the lack of a realistic philosophical appraisal of disease is regrettable, not only for understanding disease, which the physician and the psychiatrist strive to achieve, but also for a philosophical view of human nature itself. lGeorg Siegmund, Der Kranke Mensch (Fulda: Fuldaer Verlagsanstalt, 1951), p. 9. (Quotations from works published in foreign languages are my transla· tions.-M. G. 5.)

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The philosophical study of man, as presented, for instance, in courses of rational psychology, is necessarily abstract, and thus easily exposed to the danger of conveying a one-sided notion of existing human reality. Concentrating on a presentation of the specifically human, it naturally stresses the spiritual aspects of human nature and inculcates the intrinsic independence of intellectual and volitional operations from anatomical and physiological conditions and vegetative and sensitive functions. Certainly such insights into the spirituality of the human soul are true; they reflect existing aspects of the human being. However, they become misleading if conditions for the truth of abstract knowledge are disregarded,2 that is, if those spiritual aspects of the human being are taken as an expression of the whole concrete human existence; if the actual conditions of the realization of those spiritual properties in the existing person are neglected; if, while intrinsic independence is stressed, the universality and the extent of the extrinsic dependence of spiritual operations upon conditions and functions of vegetative and sensitive life during our earthly existence are not realized; in short, if only lip-service is paid to the substantial union of body and soul and man is presented as a spiritual being instead of a rational, animal. Under such circumstances Georg Siegmund's accusations that philosophical studies of man disregard the message of the sick human being would be justified: "The philosophical vision does not reach the real human being, but pursues a phantom; whereby the discrepancy between the ideal end and actual reality is not admitted openly but ignored as a nasty interference with one's own scientific endeavors." 3 A correct philosophical evaluation of human disease could certainly do much to destroy such a one-sided spiritualistic phantom, and also to visualize the limitations of our mode of existence and the dependence of its actualization upon the conditions of human vegetative and sensitive life. Moreover, a philosophical study of the sick man could be a great help for the understanding of disease itself. It could serve as a much-needed corrective of notions on human disease that are propagated in an increasing number of publications by physicians and psychiatrists in our day.4 Most of these publications are inspired 2Cf. for instance, St. Thomas Aquinas, S. Th. I, 85, 1 c, and ad 1. 3Siegmund, op. cit., pp. 9 f. • Cf. for instance, Hans Jorg Weitbrecht, Kritik der Psycho-somatik (Stuttgart: Georg Thieme Verlag, 1955) for a review of publications by German authors.

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by the best of intentions. Their authors do not choose the role of "physician of the soul" G that they play in our secularized society. This role has been imposed upon them by modem earth-created and earth-bound man, who, along with his faith in the Creator, has lost also the meaning and protection of a religious outlook for his life and ills. Because of this modem "be-true-to-this-earth" weltanschauung. not only are ever-new pathogenic life-problems created, but suffering, pain, and disease have likewise changed their former meaning and place in human life. They are surrounded by overtones of catastrophe and tragedy, are feared and avoided as the worst of evils, and demand fast, fastest relief when they attack. Is it surprising that physicians, when confronted with such demands and such changed conditions of life, seek new approaches to disease, and that they tum philosophers and prophets, search out the riddle of the sphinx, and propose cures for the ills of our time? Confrontation with a problem is not always identical with grasping the problem, still less with its satisfactory solution. As a study of the development in psychiatry and medicine since Freud's inauguration of his psychoanalytic concept of man shows, our century's countless, successive depth-psychological and psychosomatic revelations of human nature, its ideals and defects, express and create confusion no less than enlightenment. McDougall once characterized Freud's method of analyzing human nature as carried out for the most part "with such preparation only as medical education affords, that is to say, without having made himself acquainted with what has been said and thought on the problems of human nature by a long series of the most powerful intellects the human race has yet produced."6 Approaching the study of man in this fashion, the authors of such studies naturally face very great difficulties. They frequently seem unable to distinguish accidentals from essentials, identify effects with causes, and vice versa, take similarities for identities, and a description in their own terminology as a causal explanation of facts, present subjective interpretations and products of their imagination as existing or historical reality, hypostasize and generalize abstractly conceived normal and abnormal phenomena, and offer the results of thus elaborated single observations with apodictical conviction as the final word on human existence. Under GCf. Erich Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 65 if. 6William McDougall, Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology (London: Methuen & Co., 1937), pp. 97 f.

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such circumstances. a realistic and critical philosophical study of the diseased human being should scarcely appear useless and worthless. If paid attention to. it could serve as an antidote to confusion and as a means of clarification. Beyond mentioning the problem of a philosophy of human disease. the present work does not pursue any ambitions in this regard. It is concerned only with a reflection on certain aspects of the problem. namely. on the origin of psychosis. The question concerning the etiology of this type of mental disease represents one of the most discussed and disputed problems of modern psychiatry. Different answers that are given result in clearly opposed psychogenic and somatogenic explanations of psychosis. When consistently proposed. these explanations involve not only a completely different understanding of the meaning and treatment of psychosis. but also opposed evaluations of the difference between mental health and disease. and of the psychotic patient himself. It is especially this profound and far-reaching disagreement with regard to the understanding of psychosis that may affect the student of rational psychology as an invitation to a critical examination of the psychiatric views on the origin of the disease. An attempt at such an investigation is made on the following pages. After a presentation of the psychogenic and somatogenic concepts of psychosis. the arguments for a psychic and somatic etiology of the disease will be evaluated on the basis of a scholastic philosophy Of man. II

There is scarcely any disagreement concerning the phenomenology of psychosis in psychiatric circles. Psychosis is generally considered and described as the most severe type of mental disease. Its specific characteristics may be designated as extensive disintegration and even complete overthrow of the personality and total abandonment of reality "in the sense that all forms of adaptation (for example. social. intellectual. professional, religious, etc.) are disrupted." 7 The symptoms in which these interconnected essential features of the disease, that is, personality decay and lack of contact with reality, find their expression may vary in different types of 'psychosis and also in individual cases of the same disease. 7Hinsie and Shatzky quoted in John R. Cavanagh and James B. McGoldrick, Fundamental Psychiatry (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1958), p. 810. Hereafter referred to as Cavanagh-McGoldrick.

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However, all of them differ so greatly from normal human behavior that usually the general public easily recognizes them as an indication of an insane or "crazy" personality.8 With agreement on the character of this serious mental disorder, the end of the commonly accepted psychiatric understanding of psychosis is already reached. Divisions or classifications of psychoses immediately reveal the decisive point of disagreement in this regard: the question concerning the etiology of the disease. Opinions on the origin of psychosis divide the psychiatric camp. One may distinguish different groups of psychiatrists who, in conformity with their view on the etiology of psychosis, retain, modify, or reject the classical division of the disease into exogenous and endogenous psychoses.9 At the one extreme, the European continental, or at least German-speaking, psychiatrists prevailingly defend an exclusively somatic, while at the other Cavanagh-McGoldrick and their followers maintain a necessarily mental origin of the disease. The majority of American psychiatrists and psychologists seem to take a middle course. They consider exogenous psychoses as somatogenic, and endogenous psychoses as psychogenic, whereby some of them admit the possibility of a somatic causal factor also for the latter class of mental disease. VanderVeldt-Odenwald may be listed as representative of this central group in modem psychiatry. Their basic classification of the disease is identical with that presented in German-speaking countries. They "divide the psychoses into two major groups: the endogenous and the exogenous forms." 10 Together with Europeans they consider this latter group, which often is subdivided into brainorganic, symptomatic, and toxic psychoses,11 with the Europeans as organogenic or somatogenic.12 However, their remarks on the origin of endogenous psychoses, comprising schizophrenia, manicdepressive disorders, and psychotic processes of genuine epilepsywhich, for instance, in German textbooks are described as "inherSCf. James H. VanderVeldt and Robert P. Odenwald, Psychiatry and Catholo· cism (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1952), p. 241. Hereafter referred to as VanderVeldt-Odenwald. 9Cf. Emil Kraepelin, psychiatrie (Leipzig: Barth, 1909-1915), Vol. I, p. 17. 10VanderVeldt-Odenwald, p. 241. 11Symptomatic psychoses are considered as symptoms accompanying basic organic diseases other than brain-diseases, while toxic psychoses are said to be due to an infection of the organism by means of certain poisonous substances. 12Cf. VanderVeldt-Odenwald, p. 266; Gerhard Kloos, Grundriss der Psychiatrie und Neurologie (Milnchen: Muller Be Steinicke, 1953), p. 385.

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ited mental disorders the basic organic disease of which is unknown"13-reflect the climate prevailing in American psychiatry. "The general consensus of the modern psychiatric world," they write, identifying American psychiatry with the psychiatric world in general, "posits schizophrenic and manic-depressive illnesses as psychogenic."14 However, remembering the case of general paresis which "was regarded as psychogenic until the discovery of the causative organism of syphilis,"111 they are inclined to admit "the possibility that there is some organic factor productive of these diseases." 16 So the traditional classification of the various types of psychosis, which is still retained in its original form and meaning by modern European defenders of an organic etiology of this mental disease, undergoes a modification in the scientific conception of many American psychiatrists. While exogenous psychoses are still considered to be due to somatic disorders associated with them, endogenous or functional17 psychoses are held to be psychic in origin. The term "endogenous" loses its former somatogenic connotation and is either explicitly or implicitly identified with psychogenic. The somatogenic concept of psychosis is completely discarded and the psychogenic explanation of the disease extended to all forms of psychotic disorders by Cavanagh-McGoldrick. The classification of psychosis given by these authors reflects their extreme psychiatric position. The basic division mentioned before has disappeared. The term "endogenous" is replaced by "functional or psychogenic,"18 and instead of exogenous psychoses "somatopsychic and toxic psychoses" 19 are listed. The first group is, of course, held to be psychic in origin. "The psychoses commonly called functional are psychogenic in origin. The schizophrenias, the manic-depressive psychoses, true paranoia, and many paranoic states belong to this class."20 Somatopsychic and toxic psychoses are known to be associ18Kloos,op. cit., p. lI85. 14VanderVeldt-Odenwald, p. 241. 1I1VanderVeldt-Odenwald, p. 242. 16VanderVe1dt-Odenwald, p. 241. 17In German psychiatric literature the term "functional" is used synonymously with "endogenous," signifying a psychosis "without demonstrable pathological organic condition, without, however, being psychogenic." (Viktor E. Frankl, Der Undedingte Mensch Wien: Deuticke, 1949), p. 8. 18Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. lI8. 19Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 40. 20 Ibid.

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ated with determined organic disorders, the former being "characterized by definite changes in the substance of the brain or other nervous structures,"21 the latter being connected with the organism's absorption of certain exogenous poisons or with the production of endogenous poisons arising during the course of "acute infections or somatic diseases"22 other than disorders of the nervous system. The fact of this close connection of the mental disease with a determined somatic disorder, and the use of the terms "somatopsychic" and "toxic" for the distinction of the formerly so-called exogenous psychoses could be understood to indicate that Cavanagh-McGoldrick consider these mental diseases as somatogenic. There are, indeed, expressions in their work which seem to confirm this opinion, or at least, to admit the possibility of organogenic psychoses. "The majority of mental disorders are not of somatic but of psychogenic origin,"23 we read. Or with regard to the treatment of toxic psychoses it is asserted that it "is basically that of the underlying condition," or that it "is dependent upon their cause,"24 whereby this cause seems to be identical with the poison affecting the organism. However, we are also told that such a somatogenic understanding of even these somatopsychic and toxic psychoses is philosophically impossible. 211 Psychoses associated with toxic or somatic diseases "always remain mental disorders. Sufficient attention has not been given to this fact. The mental symptoms of a somatopsychic disorder are indistinguishable from those of a psychogenic derangement." Accordingly, it is maintained that in cases of exogenous psychoses "the mental disturbance is not caused by the somatic disorder, but that the somatic disorder serves either as an occasion or condition for its origin."26 Psychosis, whatever its underlying condition, is by nature psychogenic. Arguments offered for the psychic origin of psychosis correspond to extent and certitude ascribed to the psychogenic conception of the disease. Beyond mentioning psychiatric reasons for a mental etiology of exogenous and endogenous psychoses, defenders of a necessarily mental origin of the disease naturally are obliged to present a philosophical argumentation for their view, while repre21Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 446. 22Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 421. 28Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 37. 24 Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 443. 211Cf. Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 54. 28Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 54.

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sentatives of the psychiatric centre maintaining a psychogenic understanding of only functional psychoses may be satisfied with listing psychiatric reasons for this conviction. In conformity with their understanding of "the AristotelicoThomistic fusion of matter and spirit in man," which philosophical conception is declared to be the "point of view established and maintained" throughout their work,27 Cavanagh-McGoldrick give the following philosophical proof for their thesis: Basic cause of psychiatric disorders must be mental. Intellectual happenings and activities, the begetting of ideas, judging and reasoning, whether normal or psychotic, are psychic events. Ideas and judgments are of their very nature immaterial and immeasurable. They have neither length, breadth, thickness, weight, nor color. Psychoses can, therefore, be produced only by a cause that is itself immaterial and inextended. Ideas and judgments are functions ultimately of the soul and proximately of the mind, depending upon brain tissue as upon a condition, somewhat as the eye depends on light for its own activity. Psychiatric disorders, though actually existing in an individual, are themselves basically suprasensuous. They are, therefore begotten by the soul through its powers of willing, thinking, and feeling. Hence a psychic cause must be sought for the psychoses.28 As this philosophical argumentation reveals, Cavanagh-McGoldrick's psychogenic conception of psychosis is extreme not only with regard to its extension, but also with regard to its understanding of the psychic cause of psychosis. Not only is every form of psychosis necessarily psychogenic; it is also necessarily caused by immaterial, suprasensuous factors only. Forces made responsible for the origin of this mental disease are not conceived to be simply psychic, in the sense of either sensitive or sensitive and spiritual, as in other depth-psychological or psychiatric psychogenic explanations of mental disorders, but are identified with "immaterial and inextended" powers of the soul. Psychosis is considered to be necessarily spiritogenic. Psychiatric reasons offered for the psychogenic understanding of endogenous psychoses center around data of psychiatric experience. Facts usually maintained to be a proof or indication of a psychic etiology of functional psychoses concern "the complete absence of 27Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. VII. 28Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 54.

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any organic pathology that might serve as a basis for the disorder" on the one hand, and a "prolonged, often lifelong indulgence in undesirable mental, emotional, or volitional habits, and a slowly developing picture of introversion, and emotional apathy" on the other; and finally the psychotherapeutic cure of mental diseases. For many cases of this kind, both neurosis and psychosis, respond favorably to a psychological process of re-education . . . The treatment is especially applicable to neurosis . . . Re-education is essentially a psychological therapy. It has often been used successfully, and wherever it produces the desired results we may be certain that the defect was originally psychogenic in nature. For no amount of re-education, suggestion, or implanting of ideas can repair organic disease states.29 The defense of a psychic origin of even exogenous psychoses is obviously dictated primarily by the philosophical conviction that psychosis as a mental disease necessarily demands the admission of a mental cause of psychotic phenomena. However, psychiatrists and psychologists of this philosophical persuasion offer also a psychiatric reason for their denial of the pathogenic influence of; organic disorders in cases of somatopsychic and toxic psychoses: the difference between variable symptoms of the mental disease and constant physical signs of the corresponding somatic disorder. As mental diseases, these classes of psychosis have to be distinguished, or rather, they have an existence of their own independently of the underlying somatic disease. Accordingly, two groups of clinical manifestations of somatopsychic disorders "should be kept in mind: a) Symptoms. These are subjective manifestations of disease, experienced as such by the patient, and are not directly apparent to the observer. b) Signs. These are objective manifestations of disease, observable by the examiner and usually due to organic pathology."so These "physical signs" which are characteristic of the single toxic and somatopsychic psychosis "vary but slightly from one individual to another."Sl They are "usually due to physical or somatic factors,"32 "to characteristic organic changes in the tissues," and "are primarily the concern of the neurologist."sB However, the symp29 Cavanagh-McGoldrick, SO Cavanagh-McGoldrick,

pp. 45 f. p. 446.

Sllbid. 8.2Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 40. sSCavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 446.

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toms of these disorders are variable in different patients. There is "no typical mental picture" for most of these disorders, "although some such disturbance is usually though not invariably present.' It is this psychic disorder, which is apparent to the patient as a symptom, which is psychogenic." 84 A psychic cause has to be assigned for these psychotic symptoms. Obviously, this proper psychic cause cannot be sought in a prolonged, often lifelong indulgence in undesirable mental;, emotional, or volitional habits, which are considered as the sought-for mental cause of functional psychoses by the proponents of the spiritogenic concept of mental disease. Since exogenous psychoses set in and disappear with the somatic disturbance, which itself is usually of such a nature that it can scarcely be reduced to psychic causes, one could have difficulties in discovering such manifest pathogenic habits in each individual patient. For the onset of the bodily disorder is followed by psychotic phenomena in healthy personalities no less than in neurotics, so much so that the onset of such bad habits in "previously moral" individuals can be listed as a clinical manifestation "common to most somatopsychic disorders of the brain."81S Accordingly, "previously established, but latent neurotic thought patterns and defective personality traits" are assigned as 'the required mental cause of exogenous psychoses. These latent psychic forces are said to be activated by the fear and confusion with which the patient reacts to the "disturbance of the physical status" produced by "the presence of the tox'ic or somatic disease."86 However, such latent psychic factors do not seem to be considered as the only possible cause of exogenous psychoses. For with regard to general paresis the defenders of a mental origin of even this type of mental disorders merely declare that this somatopsychic psychosis is "caused by the individual's inadequate reaction to the invasion of the cerebral cortex by the spirochete of syphilis or its toxin."87 In the summary of their treatise on somatopsychic psychoses this inadequate response to the basic somatic disease is adduced as the psychic cause of somatopsychic mental disorders in general. It is related to the prepsychotic personality, but it is not connected with latent neurotic thought patterns.8S Whichever ,of 84Cavanagh.McGoldrick. pp. 446 f. 8ISCavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 448. 86Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 40. 37Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 456. 88Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 480.

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these two alternatives may be considered as the genuine cause of exogenous psychoses, in both cases the psychic origin of these mental disorders is maintained as demanded by the philosophical conclusion for a necessarily mental etiology of psychosis. Somatic diseases or disturbances associated with exogenous psychoses are not their cause; they serve only as an occasion or condition of their occurrence. The meaning and implications of the psychogenic explanation of psychosis are perhaps best seen when considered in its concrete application, and when confronted with the opposite psychiatric view. The assertion of a psychogenesis of psychosis intends to convey the idea that these mental diseases "owe their origin to psychological factors."89 According to the different philosophical and psychological backgrounds of psychiatrists, the nature, development, and pathogenic efficiency of these psychic factors may be conceived differently. Their acquisition and also their pathogenic influence may be considered to be due to involuntary, unconscious psychic mechanisms, like conditioning, fixation, repression, and projection, as many psychiatrists conceive origin and efficiency of pathogenic psychiC factors in general;40 or they may be said to be freely acquired and employed.4l The nature of these psychic factors may be described simply as psychic, meaning forces merely of sensitive or of sensitive and spiritual life,42 or as mental in the sense of spiritual.48 They may be held to be manifestly or latently neurotic or only inadequate and immature, and they may be said to produce psychotic phenomena suddenly on the occasion of toxic or somatic disorders, or slowly and gradually, as in the case of functional psychoses. Whatever their nature may be said to be, in a consistent 88Cavanagh.McGoldrick, p. 40. . 40Cf.. Albert Garres, "'Person, Psyche, Krankheit" in Jahrbuch filr Psychologie und Psychotherapie (Freiburg.Miinchen: Karl Alber) VI (1958), pp. 194, 200 f. Cf. also: Albert Garres. Methode und Erfahrungen der Psychoanalyse (MOnchen: KOsel, 1958) pp. 78 if. 4lCf. Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 60: "It is essential to remember that the development of habits, even of such disturbing, unhealthy types as projection and withdrawal are freely undertaken in their first act. Although this is a perverted use of such freedom, the will, nevertheless, remains free. The full implication of such unhealthy habits may not be foreseen or understood, but they are, nevertheless, freely and deliberately formed. Although habits may be so fixed as to be almost automatically performed, they are in each act subject to the command of the will." 42 Cf. G6rres, I.e. 48Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 54.

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psychogenic understanding of mental disease these pathogenic factors are explicitly or implicitly conceived as strictly psychic, excluding a disease-determining influence of organic factors. Philosophically, they can be rightly understood only as habits of psychic faculties that without any decisively causative influence of somatic conditions produce psychotic disease. In the frame of reference to a spiritogenic concept of psychosis, therefore, one can consequently declare that "mental diseases arise . . . from the employment of faulty habits of thinking, feeling, and willing."44 The development of such pathogenic habits is, at least in the more wide-spread psychogenic explanation of functional psychoses, generally held to start in the early years of childhood. These faulty methods of confronting reality are conceived gradually to increase in fixation and strength, and finally to end in producing psychotic disorders, unless their development is stopped in time. As a result of forming immature or "bad intellectual, emotional, and volitional habits,"40 the abnormal personality develops; the potential psychotic gradually lapses, for instance, into the unrealistic world of schizophrenia, out of contact with reality and with his own former sel£.46 In cases of functional psychosis, for example, the schizophrene may show all the forms of personality disintegration listed as distinctive for psychosis: a distorted or shattered personality, greatly impaired reality discrimination, uncritical or completely missing reality testing, abnormal delusional or dereistic thinking, impaired and distorted association, marked projection of trends and motives, largely disturbed conation, destroyed repression, extensive autonomy of complexes, greatly changed affectivity, extreme and uncontrolled regression, unsocial and antisocial behavior, and, in spite of it all, unawareness and non-recognition of his illness.47 Yet keeping in mind origin and meaning of this psychotic personality devastation, defenders of a psychogenic concept of psychosis feel themselves obliged to demand that "therapeutic measures with schizophrenic patients should be based on the general principle that the schizophrenic reaction is psychological rather than 44Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 60. 45Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 28. 46Cf. for instance, for a description of a psychogenic conception of the gradual development of schizophrenia: Cavanagh-McGoldrick. pp. 344 if. 47Cf. Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 246.

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biological."48 The greatest possible use of the "valuable psychological therapies of suggestion, encouragements, and re-education" is recommended, and re-education is considered as "the most difficult but by far the most effective method to be used in restoring him (the schizophrene) to reality."'9 The schizophrenic disintegration of personality is, after all, not a disease that attacks its victims against their will; it is rather a state of mind, which, corresponding to the personal convictions of the psychiatrist, is considered to be more or less freely desired, enjoyed, and "produced by a maladjusted personality."1iO It is merely the result of a "psychic machinery" employed here "because of the desire to avoid realistic situations or to compensate for real and imagined frustration."111 .AJ; "the manic-depressive psychotic . . . in the presence of his conflict becomes alternately excited and depressed," so "the schizophrene ... regresses to images when life's cares oppress him and weigh him down."1i2 This "explains why he wishes to remain with his images and complexes," and he will remain with them "so long as he finds them more pleasant than he does the world of reality." "The value of returning to the world of reality should be stressed," therefore, and "the value of an intellectually honest approach to life and to his problems" should be brought home to him."118 Finally, according to the view of many psychiatrists, the psychological explanation of psychosis leads to the denial of a qualitative difference between mental health and disease, and between neurosis and psychosis. These various mental states certainly differ one from another, and they can be clearly distinguished even if their origin is maintained to be purely psychic in nature, as a list of the decisive diagnostic differences between neuroses and psychoses shows.M However, it is obvious that with the assertion of a psychological etiology not only of neurosis which since the time when Freud inaugurated the modern trend of psycho-analysing personality disorders is usually considered to be primarily psychic in origin, but also of psychosis which, at least, in some of its forms not even Freud '8Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 556. '9Cavanagh.McGoldrick. p. 558. IIOCavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 546. 111 Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 558. 112Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 424. I18Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 558. II'Cf. for instance. Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 246.

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dared to reduce to psychic causesll6 an important element of the traditional distinction between such kinds of mental disorders disappears, and the danger of confusing them increases. To a consistent psychogenic understanding of mental abnormalities this confusion should actually be of little practical significance. Hence it is perhaps not completely surprising when occasionally a gradual and even necessary transition from neurosis and psychosis is defended explicitly. Psychic symptoms are assumed by individuals because they feel the need of escape from unsolved conflicts and problems. . . . To the neurotic his symptoms seem good, useful, desirable, and to be cherished. . . . They offer protection. But even these neurotic devices are sometimes inadequate. The unresolved conflict remains. Since the neurotic cannot face his problems in a rational way, further withdrawal from reality becomes necessary. And so, slowly, imperceptibily, he develops a philosophy of life, a feeling tone, wishful thinking, IIl1ef. Sigmund Freud, Trauer und Melancholie in Gesammelte Werke (London, Imago Publishing Co., 1949), Vol. X., pp. 428 ff. Actually, no consistent psychoanalytic explanation of mental disorders can be considered as psychogenic, this notion being conceived as excluding disease-determining somatic factors. A materialist who, like Freud, considers psychic and mental manifestations merely as epiphenomena of biochemical or physical forces must consequently also conceive psychic factors as well as psychotic symptoms as mere products of material conditions and processes. In spite of declarations to the opposite. his concept of mental disease is really not psychogenic. Nor is it somatogenic, as understood by modern European defenders of an organic origin of psychosis. The names of the representatives of almost every modem German-speaking psychiatric school, referred to in the following presentation of the somatogenic understanding of psychosis, guarantee that their defense of an organic basis of psychosis is not inspired by a materialistic concept of human nature. Some of these psychiatrists, as, for instance, Jaspers and Frankl, may maintain a onesided concept of the spiritual in man. However, all of them are convinced of the unique position of man in the universe, and they are well aware of the essential difference between constitutional conditions and physiological somatic processes on the one hand, and psychic powers and operations on the other. Their somatogenic concept of psychosis, therefore, cannot be identified with that defended by materialistic psychiatrists and psychologists, whose understanding of mental health and disease must be rejected together with their unrealistic philosophical convictions concerning human nature. Nor is their argumentation for a somatic foundation of psychosis directed against the so-called psychogenic explanation of the disease, as it is proposed by materialists, but against that psychogenic understanding of psychosis which explicitly or implicitly denies disease-determining somatic factors of this kind of mental disorders. Since this paper is not concerned with a refutation of a materialistic philosophy of man, nor consequently with its concepts of mental health and disease, the following explanations deal only with the genuine psychogenic and somatogenic understandings of psychosis, as they are defended by modem psychiatrists who at least admit an essential difference between physico-chemical forces and processes and psychic powers and operations.

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which facilitates further regression. He withdraws into a life of images, complexes, hallucinations, and delusions. This is psychosis. The transition from one state to the other is gradual. The two would seem to differ not essentially, but only in degree.156 No more than neurotic phenomena are normal functions and performances of the healthy personality considered to be basically different from psychotic symptoms; also their comparison reveals only a quantitative and not a qualitative difference. Cavanagh-McGoldrick, for instance, find in case studies "convincing proof that mental abnormality is frequently an exaggeration of a normal process. For example, the person who has developed into a schizophrene demonstrates excessive indulgence in introversion and fantasy. Properly and moderately used, both of these processes are not only good, but necessary; the schizophrene, however, uses them habitually to excess."57 "Outstanding authorities" are mentioned who confirm the authors' view "that abnormal mental conditions are merely exaggerations of the normal, are quantitative and not qualitative deviations."M To the representative of modem continental psychiatry this kind of psychogenic conception of psychosis is just an expression of that "far too comprehensive psycho-analytic world-view presented from across the ocean," against the claims of which "the revolt of the present-day European" is common. 59 To him this view of the psychotic patient is not only unrealistic and unjust; it is also, as Weitbrecht writes with regard to a similar psychoanalytic procedure of certain German proponents of psychosomatic medicine, "a manifestation of a peculiar, the. humane-endangering, hybris which believes itself entitled as a rule to conclude from the fact of disease to a preceding infringement upon the moral order, and excludes the existence of an inscrutable divine providence and of a mysterious fate. Everything occurs as it has to according to the insight of those priestly-psychological esoterics. . . . Nothing remains hidden before the boundlessness of such interpretation."60 This indignation of European psychiatrists becomes understand156Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. lH5. 156Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 315. 157Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 26. 158 Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 28. 159 Schulte. Gesundheit und Wohlfahrt, p. 72 quoted in Viktor ologie des Zeitgeistes (Wien: Deuticke, 1955), p. 8. 6oWeitbrecht, op. cit., p. 52.

E.

Frankl, Path-

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able in view of their convictions about the origin and nature of psychosis. To them "psychosis is a somatosis; for it is a phenopsychical but somatogenic disease."61 As such, it is not the gradually developing result of the employment of bad habits, nor an escape into a world of images, enjoyed by the psychotic personality and preferred to a realistic confrontation of problems and conflicts of human existence. "Whoever as a psychiatrist has year for year experienced the flaring up of psychosis and, in spite of all therapeutic efforts, the burning out of young promising human beings, truly has difficulties even to listen to such talk."62 In fact, "all attempts to explain endogenous psychoses with regard to their existence as psychologically meaningful have failed,"63 and "not even the most consistent analytic psychiatrist has up to now made even an attempt to render the psychic origin of the single alternating phases in the case of circular· psychoses understandable."M Certainly the possibility of, for instance, a reactive depression cannot be denied; obviously the contents of the psychotic's mental functions are related to experiences of the premorbid personality, and all psychoses will reveal differences in conformity with the degree of differentiation of psychic life, intelligence, and social and cultural background of the patient as well as with regard to the mode of confronting his disease. 65 Frightening hallucinations may be related to some kind of anxiety, and the prepsychotic's character, environment, and biography may help to understand the contents of delusionary ideas. "In all such cases we find understandable con~ nections. However, these teach us of a relation only between contents of delusion and preceding experience. They never explain how delusion, illusions, etc., as such could occur at all."68 The delusionary character of the psychotic experience, "its invincible delivery to error,"87 is the new element that makes its appearance. Psychologically to explain this element of experience, "to understand a genuine delusion in its genesis, is impossible."8s The exist81Frankl, DeT Unbedingte Mensch, p. 55. 62Weitbrecht, p. 83. 63Weitbrecht, p. 12. M Weitbrecht, p. 79. 85ef. Karl Jaspers, Allgemeine Psychopathologie (Berlin: Springer, 1953) p. 535. Cf. also Viktor E. Frankl, ATztliche Seelsorge (Wien: Deuticke, 1952). pp. 167 ft. 66 Jaspers, op. cit., p. 341. 67 Jaspers, op. cit., p. 342. 68 Jaspers, op. cit., p. 591.

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ence of psychosis is psychologically inexplicable. The reactive depression is not identical with a genuine melancholia which takes its characteristic course independently of psychological motivations and conditions. Such endogenous psychoses do not and cannot have a cause in the sense of a psychological motivation; for "melancholia, at least, what the expert, the psychiatrist, considers as such, sets in only where all reasons are missing, where no external or internal motive is available which could render the sadness of the melancholic comprehensible," 69 "where a psychogenesis can no longer be discovered." TO Psychosis is one of the worst tragedies that can befall a human being; it is a genuine disease that breaks into the life of a human being "exactly at the point where its hour has struck, and it recedes, unless treated, only when it pleases to go,"Tl independently of will and wishes of the patient or the psychotherapist. This fatelike attack of psychosis, as well as its tragic effects, the sudden "crack-up and transformation of the life-history,"T2 is due to its organic orig~n. Not 'only exogenous psychoses. the somatic etiology of which is obvious. but all "the mental diseases of our textbooks have a somatic. biological, or biopsychical foundation, and, therefore, do not represent mental diseases from the point of view of etiology at all."T8 Long sections of these textbooks are dedicated to the description of nature, origin, and methods of treatment of functional or endogenous psychoses. The fact that the vegetative disorders underlying these diseases are not yet known is openly admitted. However, continental psychiatrists believe that they have sufficient reasons to consider the existence of genuine endogenous psychoses as "one of the most fundamental and most certain recognitions of the science of psychiatry."T4 Schizophrenia is not merely the sum-total of exaggerated performances of some normal psychic functions, an excessive indulg,ence in introversion and fantasy, or an exaggerated day-dreaming. It is something completely different. Schizophrenia, like every psychosis or illness, is essentially a disease of the psychosomatic human 69Franki, Pathologie des Zeitgeistes, p. lOll. 70Franki, Arztliche Seelsorge, p. 167.

Tl Hermann Dobbelstein. Der normale Mensch im Urteil der P!rJchiatrie (Zllrich.Koln: Benziger. 1955) .p. 21. 72 Jaspers. op. cit., p. 59l1. 78V. E. Freiherr von Gebsattel. Prolegomena dner Medizinischen Anthropologie (Berlin: Springer. 1954). p. Il1l. 74 Jllrg Zutt. quoted in Weitbrecht. op. cit., p. 84.

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organism as a whole. It is due to a change in lower strata of the personality and it manifests itself in derangements of psychic life. The characteristic symptom of schizophrenia, for example, its autism, is "not a variation of a personality-trait but the symptom of a disease."75 The schizophrene's withdrawal from reality is a psychotic "day-dreaming" or "phantasy;" as such it differs qualitatively from a merely excessive exercise of the normal function of imagination. However much a healthy person may indulge in fantasies, however excessive his day-dreaming may be, he is able to distinguish his phantasies from reality, and he can leave his dreamworld at will, or, at least, he can be convinced of the unrealistic nature of his imaginations. The schizophrene, on the contrary, is without will and helpless in front of the functioning and the products of his phantasy which seem to oppress him like a physical force. His images turn into hallucinations which impress him with the evidence of sense-perception, or into delusions with their invincible delivery unto error. The patient may struggle against the overwhelming force of imperative hallucinations or delusionary ideas; he may finally, with a feeling of impotence and hopelessness, passively suffer the torture of his phantasies;76 but he does not reveal any interest in maintaining or enjoying the manifestations of his disease. Moreover, in spite of the frequency of premorbid abnormal character-traits and of similar personalities among the relatives of the schizophrene, it cannot rightly be asserted that such kinds of personality-structures would dispose, still less necessitate, the origin of psychosis. "Not infrequently completely healthy personalities are attacked by processes."77 Nor are the manic-depressive psychoses explainable psychologically as alternating states enjoyed as an escape-mechanism in face of a conflict. The exact duration 78 and the nature of these phases seem clearly to indicate an organic foundation of the disease. Further, the patient can scarcely enjoy the hell-like existence of his melancholic condition. The cause of the disease is hypothetically sought in a vegetative disturbance of the organism,79 or in a change 711H. Luxenburger, quoted in Jaspers, op. cit., p. 549. 76 Jaspers, op. cit., p. 347. 77 Jaspers, op. cit., p. 549. 78Cf. Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 384: "The manic phase, untreated, usually lasts six months and the depressed phase about nine months." 79Cf. Ludwig Binswanger, Ausgewiihlte Vortriige und Aufsiitze (Bern: Francke, 1955) , Vol. II., pp. 262, 275 f.

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or retardation of the basic processes of the psychosomatic composite.so The understanding of psychosis as a genuine disease, as distinguished from the result of a psychic machinery, involves also a corresponding evaluation of psychosis, when compared with mental health and neurosis. Psychosis is a tragic disaster befalling a human being and devastating his personality against his will and without his responsibility. It is a disease that means a break of his lifehistory, a crack-up and transformation of and a "leap" from the premorbid healthy or neurotic personality rather than a gradual transition from healthy to neurotic, and finally to psychotic conditions. 81 A psychiatrist who fails to discover a qualitative difference between these various psychic states seems, as Jaspers writes in relation to a similar view once maintained by Kretschmer, "to have lost the sense for the abysmal difference between personality and process-psychosis."82 "Neurosis as well as psychosis are sharply distinct from the healthy."88 Consistent with his somatogenic explanation of psychosis the European psychiatrist has no doubt about the value of the proper somatic therapy, even in cases of functional psychoses. With modern methods of treatment by the use of insulin, metrazol, and similar drugs, and by electroshock "a new era of psychiatry has set in, and with it schizophrenia has ceased to elicit its former bad prognosis."84 This trust in the efficiency of medical means, however, does not imply a denial of the importance of psychotherapy in the treatment of psychotic disorders or a neglect of it. Considering the origin and nature of the disease, "it should be evident that psychotherapy in cases of psychosis must be aim-directed differently than in neurosis."811 It has to concentrate on what remains still sane in the patient, not on unsolved conflicts or on a repressed unconscious, in order to fight the disease together with him. Selfconfidence in new adjustments to the physical and social environment from which he was separated by psychosis should be the main end. Since psychosis is a disease, "not a moral or characterological 80V. Gebsattel, op. cit., p. 137. 81Kurt Schneider, Psychopathen (4 ed.) , p. 43 quoted in Jaspers. op. cit., p.548. 821bid. 88 Jaspers. op. cit., p. 482. 84Frankl. Pathologie des Zeitgeistes, p. 111. 811 Frankl. op. cit., p. 112.

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problem," 86 moralistic advice and adhortations are obviously out of question. Even, as in the case of melancholia, they are simply contraindicated "as pure poison."87 Nevertheless, interested in the cure of his patient and, "faithful to an advice of Rudolf Allers, acting as if there were no inherited disposition and as if the possibilities of psychological treatment were unlimited," the psychiatrist will not refrain from using every advisable psychotherapeutic means. Only then can he be certain truly to have exhausted all. existing possibilities.88 So the psychogenic and somatogenic explanations of psychosi8 represent two clearly opposed concepts of the disease. According to the one, psychosis is the manifestation of a psychic machinery or of an escape-mechanism in cases of functional psychosis, and the result of latent neurotic thought-patterns and defective personality traits or of an inadequate psychic response to somatic disturbances in cases of exogenous psychosis. In all its forms, it is a genuine disease, due to organic disorders in lower levels of the psychosomatic unity, according to the other. Psychiatric arguments that are convincing enough to establish one of the views as the only satisfactory answer to all observed data do not seem to be available, or at least they do not seem to be able to prevail against the influence of psychiatric background and training. Fortunately for the benefit of the poor psychotic patient, the practicing psychiatrist is, generally speaking, not as dogmatic as his theoretical explanations seem to sound. He studies with an open mind the psychiatric literature of the opposite camp, is eager to use every promising therapeutic means, and trusts that further development of psychiatry will endorse the correct answer to the still disputed questions concerning psychosis.89 The student of philosophical anthropology who is aware of the complexity of the problem as well as of the possible variety of bodysoul-relations might be inclined to consider this active wait-andsee-policy as the only reasonable procedure open to psychiatry. He might also be tempted to seek the definite answer concerning the etiology of psychosis by ways and means not accessible to psychiatry as such. As was shown before, this latter route of approach is chosen by Cavanagh-McGoldrick. Philosophical argumentation is 86Frankl, op. cit., p. 100. 87Frankl, op. cit., p. 104. 88Frankl, op. cit., p. 112. 89Cf. Weitbrecht, op. cit., p. 80.

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used to establish the psychogenic understanding of psychosis as the only possible answer to this problem of mental disease. A similar approach is taken in the following critical examination of psychiatric observations and assertions concerning the etiology of psychosis, whereby the scholastic philosophy of man is to serve as the standard of evaluation. This attempt is greatly facilitated by the fact that proponents of the extreme psychogenic concept of psychosis declare that they use the same philosophy as the basis of their arguments. In conformity with the different psychiatric positions on the problem, an investigation of the afore-mentioned philosophical proof for the mental origin of psychosis in general precedes the discussion of psychiatric reasons offered for opinions on the origin of exogenous psychoses, and the discussion of those listed for the opposed views on the origin or endogenous psychoses. An explicit or implicit denial of the possibility of a somatic origin of psychosis on the basis of the Aristotelico-Thomistic philosophy of the human person must certainly surprise the student of metaphysical psychology. After all, he cannot help remembering the seemingly opposite view on mental disorders expressed in the writings of St. Thomas. Obviously, Aquinas did not see any philosophical difficulty in a somatogenic concept of mental disease when he determined, for instance, a lesion of the brain as the cause of defective intellectual operations in insanity,90 or a constitutional factor as cause for the preoccupation with memories in melancholia.9l It may be that the bodily factors assigned by the Angelic Doctor as causes of mental disorders are actually not pathogenic or not even existing. Nobody who is aware of the different possibilities of methods and means of scientific research at the time of Aristotle, whose biology St. Thomas made his own, and in the twentieth 90S. tho I, 84, 7: ... videmus enim, quod impedito actu virtu tis imaginativae per laesionem organi, ut in phreneticis, et similiter impedito actu memorativae virtu tis, ut in lethargicis, impeditur homo ab intelligendo in actu etiam ea, quorum scientiam praeaccepit. 9l1n de memoria et reminiscentia, Lectio VIII: ... inquietudo ilIa cogitationis remanet in eis: et hoc maxime contingit in melancholicis, qui maxime moventur a phantasmatibus: quia, propter terrestrem naturam, impressiones phantasmatum magis firmantur in eis.•.• Et dicit quod maxime turbantur, id est commoventur in reminiscendo illi, quibus humiditas abundat circa locum ubi sunt organa sensuum, puta circa cerebrum, et circa cor: quia humiditas mota non de facili quiescit. . . . Nec est contrarium quod supra dixit, hoc maxime accidere melancholicis, qui sunt siccae naturae: quia in ilIis contingit propter violentam impressionem, in his autem propter facilem commotionem.

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century can expect a full agreement of ancient and modem physiology and theory of somatic constitution. However, the problem in question does not concern the exact determination of physiological data but rather the justification of a philosophical conclusion. In this regard, Aquinas's explanations seem to reveal a different opinion from that proposed by defenders of a necessarily mental origin of psychosis. St. Thomas does not consider the somatogenic concept of mental disease as a metaphysical impossibility. On the contrary, he defends the actual existence of somatogenic mental disorders. On the basis of the scholastic philosophy of man there cannot be the least doubt about the possibility of such types of mental disease. The substantial union of body and soul constitutes one of the most characteristic and commonly defended theses of this philosophy. According to this doctrine, body and soul do not represent two separate entities existing and operating independently one from the other. Human nature does not consist of bodily tissue with its "characteristic physical signs" on the one hand, and on the other of a spirit dwelling in a lofty sphere of its own and producing all operations, "whether normal or psychotic," according to the sole laws of its spiritual entity in complete freedom and independence using a part of that physical tissue, the brain, only as a rider uses his horse. Such departmentalization within the human being is rejected by scholastic philosophy as not corresponding to existing human reality. According to its view of the body-soul-relationship, these two constitutive parts of human nature represent two incomplete substances. By their nature they are destined one for the other in the manner of the relation between matter and form in order to realize one complete substance, one human nature, one unified principle of activity. The body is not merely a mass of corporeal tissue determined by the properties and ruled by the laws of physico-chemical compounds. That tissue is rather a living part of the human body, determined in its constitution and enlivened and directed in its performance by the human soul. It is an organ that enters as a causal factor into the performance of vegetative functions of the psychosomatic organism. To concentrate on a study of the constitution and reaction of this tissue and to consider vegetative functions as chain-reactions of physico-chemical compounds are recognized as justified approaches in scientific endeavors. However, to identify these physico-chemical

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aspects of vegetative processes with the vital processes as such, represents an identification of a part with the whole and a hypostasation of an abstraction. For a vegetative function, for instance, the process of nutrition is not merely a chemical chain-reaction disintegrating certain chemical compounds and assimilating some of their components to other chemical structures; it is rather the process of digestion of an organism, a vital process possible only in, performed by, and for the benefit of the organism as a whole. Actually, therefore, bodily tissue is not a dead physical entity but a living organ of the human composite. Like the entire body, its structure, position, and function in the organism are developed out of the informed germ cell, determined and used by the vital principle, and ultimately by the person himself, according to the ideal plan inherent in his soul. Together with the vegetative power of the soul, it constitutes one unified principle of vegetative functions. The entire vegetative life, that is, the organized whole of all vegetative processes, constitutes the vital basis of all levels of human life in the state of the union of body and soul. Its conditions determine health and disease and normal and abnormal growth and development of our body. They are considered as the basic determinants of our temperament, comprising the degree of susceptibility to emotional stimulation, the customary strength and speed of response, the quality of the prevailing mood, and all peculiarities of its fluctuation and intensity.92 They decide about possibility or impossibility of the use of our higher psychic faculties. They influence the mode of the performances of even the highest intellectual operations, and they may also determine the contents of sensations and decisions. There is no need to exemplify those different assertions; for probably everybody has been ill or certainly has been asleep, and knows from his own experience or from observation of others, the importance that vegetative functions have for the entire life of the human person. Bodily factors have a decisive share in the vital operations of vegetative life. Since the vegetative potencies of the soul constitute together with the corresponding somatic structures and processes unified principles of operation, somatic factors do not represent only a condition but also a causal principle of vegetative functions. What was asserted before with regard to the importance of the con92Cf. Gordon W. Allport. Personality (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1948). p. 54.

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ditions of vegetative life as a whole, holds equally true of the conditions of its somatic foundation. In order to appreciate the extent of the influence that bodily conditions exercise upon our entire life, mere mention of inheritance and mutation, and of nervous and glandular systems will suffice. Even relatively insignificant alterations of these structures and their functions may change a genius into a mentally incapacitated patient or may decide between life and death for a human being. But, as has been pointed out, these somatic structures and their physiological processes are not existing separately from vegetative functions of the organism; they are actually identical with vegetative processes or with parts of them; for life is going on in the entire living body, down to the last component of the living cell of the human composite. This organic life is the foundation of the higher human life. Possessing one substantial human nature, a rational being cannot but react to disturbances in his vital foundation by feelings of uneasiness and anxiety, by sensations of pain, by intellectual investigations about the causes of the disturbance, and by activities intended to alleviate or to remove them. Beyond such indirect influences upon psychic functions, bodily processes exercise also a direct influence upon the performance of psychic operations, inasmuch as the entire sensitive life too is intrinsically dependent upon somatic structures. Sense-organs and sensitive powers of the soul constitute unified principles of sensory psychic operations, determined in their existence and nature by the constitution and function of both.DS For instance, the fact that and the extent of what a sentient being is able to see are not only dependent upon its endowment with the psychic power of vision but equally also upon the constitution of its somatic organ of vision, as cases of color-blindness in man, or comparative studies of color vision in animals show.94 It may be difficult, especially with regard to the internal senses, to determine the existence of a similar relationship between nature and possible extent of sensation and the constitution of the sense-organ, or even the exact nature of the sense-organ itself, that is, to distinguish 93S. Th. I, 75, 3: ... anima sensitiva non habet aliquam operationem propriam per seipsam; sed omnis operatio sensitivae animae est conjuncti. s. Th. I-II, 17, 7: ... omnis autem actus virtutis utentis organa corporali dependet non solum ex potentia animae, sed etiam ex corporalis organi dispositione. 94Cf. for instance, Die Augen der Bienen in K. V. Frisch, Aus dem Leben der Bienen (Wien: Springer. 1948). pp. 54 fl.

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physiological conditions from somatic causal factors of sensation. Still, the existence of sense-organs for all sensory powers is commonly held by scholastic thinkers,911 and these differentiated bodily structures, together with the corresponding psychic potency of the soul, constitute composed principles of sensations. Sense-organs are not only conditions, but causal factors of sensation. Sense-organs themselves are living parts of the composite. Development, maintenance, and functioning of these somatic structures are dependent upon all those physiological processes that contrib· ute to their vegetative life. As the sense-organ informed by the sensitive power of the soul constitutes the principle of sensation, these vegetative functions operating in and upon it represent the proximate cause of its structure and its life and render it a living organ of the person. Disturbances of these vegetative processes infringing upon its constitution and function, and consequently also somatic factors implied in vital processes, may thus constitute the cause also of its defective psychic operations. Human sensitive functions are intimately connected with the activities of intellectual life. It is true that intellectual faculties are supraorganic powers that do not reside, like vegetative and sensitive potencies, in the human composite but proceed from the spiritual soul alone. Intellectual operations are intrinsically independent of vegetative and sensitive functions; organic conditions do not constitute a causal factor of suprasensuous activities. However, intellectual life's intrinsic independence of lower levels of the psychosomatic unity does not exclude extrinsic dependence upon them. And the fact that intellectual activities, inasmuch as they are intellectual, necessarily proceed from an immaterial principle, does not exclude the possibility that other aspects of such operations may have their cause in corporeal conditions. In the state of the bodysoul union during this earthly life of ours, the exercise of immaterial faculties demands, first of all, the functioning of sensitive powers, and consequently of all those vegetative processes that represent a requisite of sensitive functions. In this regard, reference usually is made to phantasm and brain as to necessary conditions of intellectual operations.98 Since intellectual activities are necessarily intentional, and since the object of human knowledge is primarily the existing reality of the universe directly accessible only 911S. Th. I, 84, 7: ... utuntur autem organa corporali sensus, et imaginatio, et aliae vires pertinentes ad partem sensitivam.

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through the senses, intellectual operations are necessarily dependent upon sensory presentations and representations of facts and events of our world, and therewith upon vegetative conditions of the sense-organs required for the performance of such sensory activity. The functioning of sensitive life, at least, of the power of imagination, and the corresponding somatic factors are not only a necessary condition for the possibility of intellectual operations; elements of sensitive and vegetative life also exercise a causal influence upon intellectual activities. As material cause, representations of imagination determine the contents of intellectual knowledge,D7 and because of this type of dependence of intellectual life upon organic faculties, anatomical conditions and physiological functions may determine the mode of intellectual operations also as efficient causes.DB The fact that a human being is able to perform an immaterial act depends upon the functioning of the senses and upon the performance of all those organic vegetative processes which are required for the constitution and operation of the corresponding bodily sense-organs as upon a necessary condition. According to the metaphysical principle of proportionate causality applied to psychic faculties and their operations, the immaterial nature of intellectual activity, that is, the immaterial intentional presentation of its object, is causally related to the spiritual nature of the intellectual faculty. The content of an intellectual intentional act, that is, what is known intellectually, has the phantasm as its material cause. Defects or degrees of perfection of intellectual operations, that is, the way they are performed, are not caused by the 96Cf. s. Th. I, 84, 7. 97 De verit., q. 18, a. 8, ad 3: . . . species intelligibilis id quod in ea formale est, per quod est intelligibilis actu, habet ab intellectu agente ... quamvis id quod in ea materiale est, a phantasmatibus abstrahur. 8. Th. I. 84, 6: Secundum hoc ergo ex parte phantasmatum intellec· tualis operatio a sensu causatur. Sed ... non potest dici, quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis, et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae. 988. Th. I, 76, 5: . . . inter ipsos homines, qui sunt melioris tactus, sunt melioris intellectus. Cujus signum est, quod molles carne bene aptos mente videmus. S. Th. I, 85, 7: Manifestum est enim, quod quanto corpus est melius dispositum, tanto meliorem sortitur animam ..• unde, cum etiam in hominibus quidam habeant corpus melius dispositum, sortiuntur animam majoris virtu tis in intelligendo.

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immaterial principle as such; they are due to the dispositions under which the immaterial faculty is used by the human person. After all, it is not an isolated faculty that goes into action, but the human supposite as a whole that uses innate and acquired powers to act. The actual conditions of the concretely existing person who uses his intellectual faculties may be favorable or unfavorable to the performance of determined intellectual operations. The person may be responsible for those conditions directly or indirectly, for instance, in cases of carelessness or of bad habits, and he may be able to influence them or not. Nevertheless, they exercise their influence upon the intellect in action and effect various degrees of perfection of intellectual operations. Sensitive life and consequently somatic factors represent necessary conditions of immaterial human activities. The actual constitution of organic sensory faculties and of the corresponding vital processes may not only prevent, but also affect the mode of, suprasensuous operations. Somatic factors may be the cause of defective performances of intellectual life.99 The "invincible delivery to error" in delusionary reasoning may well be caused by organic conditions. Psychotic defective suprasensuous phenomena can be somatic in origin. The possible organic origin which, on the basis of the scholastic philosophy of man, cannot be denied with regard to psychotic disorders of intellectual life can obviously still less be rightly rejected with regard to psychotic sensory symptoms. Powers of sensitive life are essentially organic faculties. Living somatic structures enter as causal factors into the actualization of such potencies of the composite. Defects in the constitution of these bodily organs, and disturbances of vital processes necessary for the normal function of those specialized somatic structures, necessarily affect the performance of sensitive operations of the person, and may thus be the cause of psychotic disorders of sensitive life. Psychotic mental phenomena both of intellectual and sensitive life may be somatic in origin. According to the scholastic understanding of the body-soul relationship in man, the somatogenic concept of psychosis is not philosophically impossible. After these explanations of the influence of bodily conditions upon the mental life of the human person, and after the establishment of the corresponding possibility of a somatogenic understand99S. Th. 1-11.72.2 ad 1: ... omnis rationis humanae defectus ex sensu carnaH aHquo modo initium habet.

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ing of psychosis, it should seem to be evident that the philosophical arguments proposed by representatives of the extreme psychiatric position on the psychic origin of psychosis for a necessarily spiritogenic concept of mental disease does not correspond to the realistic scholastic view of existing human nature. Nor does it actually take a full consideration of the existing reality of psychosis as a basis for its conclusion. The assertion concerning the basically suprasensuous character of psychiatric disorders, as it is conceived and used as major premise in the second section of that philosophical proof, does not hold true. Psychiatric disorders, that is, psychotic symptoms are basically not suprasensuous, but are to a great extent characterized by the absence of suprasensory activities. Instead of copying the long list of psychotic disturbances of sensitive life. which may be found in any comprehensive textbook of psychiatry, let us simply turn to another chapter of Cavanagh-McGoldrick's work for a confirmation of this view. For instance, schizophrenia, a psychosis that one could perhaps most easily be tempted to explain psychologically, is defined to be "basically a disorder characterized by regression from intellect to levels of instinct, memory, imagination, feelings, emotions, and complexes."loo What here is declared to be characteristic of the schizophrenic disorder, is probably not sufficient to differentiate schizophrenic psychic phenomena. As is implicitly admitted by the authors in other places of their work, where schizophrenia is said to be a "pathological regression,"101 this type of mental disease is not a disorder characterized simply by the use of lower faculties instead of the intellect. The psychotic nature of the "regression," that is, the psychotic use of the psychic functions mentioned is characteristic of schizophrenia, and distinguishes it from a similar normal regression realized, for instance, in the dream of the healthy person. However, CavanaghMcGoldrick's description of schizophrenia certainly endorses the opinion that the assertion of a basically suprasensuous nature of psychotic disorders in the premise of their philosophical argumentation does not hold true. There is no need explicitly to declare that consequently the conclusion of the argument for a necessarily immaterial origin of psychosis does not follow. Even if the premise concerning the immaterial, suprasensuous character of psychotic phenomena were true, and there certainly are 1OoCavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 358. 101 Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 346.

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also psychotic disturbances of intellectual and volitional operations, it would not necessarily follow that "psychoses can, therefore, be produced only by a cause that is itself immaterial and inextended." This would be the case only if the psychotic nature of symptoms of intellectual life could be explained only by a spiritual cause. There is no doubt that manifestations of intellectual powers, "whether normal or psychotic, are psychic events," and that they necessarily have a spiritual principle as their cause. This holds true necessarily only inasmuch as psychotic phenomena are spiritual, not inasmuch as they are psychotic. As has been shown, the psychotic character of intellectual operations can at least equally be due to somatic conditions as to spiritual factors. Whether the psychotic nature of such disorders of intellectual life, and especially whether psychosis as a whole, are of a somatic or psychic origin, constitutes just the disputed psychiatric problem which was to be solved by way of the philosophical argumentation in question. This philosophical proof does not decide it; it does not even touch upon it. It may be used to establish only that psychotic suprasensuous operations, inasmuch as they are suprasensuous, must proceed from a spiritual principle. It does not prove that the psychotic nature of such an operation is of a psychic or spiritual origin. Still less does it prove that it and psychosis as a whole must necessarily be, of a psychic or spiritual origin. The philosophical argumentation presented for the necessarily spiritogenic understanding of psychosis leaves the dispute about the etiology of this kind of mental disease undecided. The justification of the somatogenic concept of psychosis cannot be denied on philosophical grounds. On the basis of the substantial union of body and soul in human nature, a mental disease due to organic disturbances is possible. Is this possibility actually realized? Before the publication of Cavanagh-McGoldrick's view on the origin of psychosis modern psychiatrists scarcely doubted the existence of such types of mental disorders. As was explained before, continental psychiatrists even insist upon the somatic origin of the so-called endogenous or functional psychoses, where till now an underlying organic pathological condition could not be discovered. The causes of exogenous psychoses known to be associated with determined anatomical or physiological disorders were commonly sought in these vegetative disturbances accompanying mental disease. Hence after the refutation of the philosophical argumenta-

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tion for a necesslJI"ily mental origin of all forms of psychosis, the psychiatric reasons offered for the psychogenic and somatogenic understanding of exogenous psychoses must be evaluated. Is the traditional, almost common psychiatric view concerning the somatic origin of this group of mental disorders justified? Or does the difference between variable psychotic symptoms and fairly constant physical signs in cases of somatopsychic and toxic psychoses demand the admission of a psychic cause of these classes of mental disease? Concretely, can latent neurotic thought patterns and defective personality traits of the pre-psychotic patient, or the individual inade· quate psychic response to the underlying organic disorder, be considered sufficient cause of psychotic phenomena in such cases of mental disease? Realistic psychologists and psychiatrists will scarcely be more convinced by the psychiatric argumentation for the actual psychic origin of exogenous psychoses than the student of rational psychology is by the philosophical argumentation for the necessarily psychogenic character of all mental diseases. It is not only that they feel uneasy at this dissection of the psychotic patient into a bodily and a mentally diseased person. As stated by the proponents of this psychiatric reasoning, "man is a unit and the belief that he could be mentally ill in one part of his personality would not be acceptable to the psychiatrist."lo2 "The distortion is not of the will," or of any other single human faculty, "but of the whole person."103 But psychiatrists and psychologists are also aware of the existence of normal and abnormal mental phenomena which with or without variations in all individuals affected, are evidently the result of basically somatic conditions of the person and cannot reasonably be explained as caused by latent neurotic trends or by an inadequate psychic response to organic conditions. The various stages of the intellectual development of a healthy child are an instance of such a normal mental phenomenon; the congenital feeble-mindedness of Mongolian idiocy or of the cretin child are examples of abnormal psychic functions. Certainly nobody would try to reduce such defective mental phenomena which are common to every hu· man being living under the normal or abnormal conditions mentioned to latent neurotic thought patterns or to an inadequate psychic reaction to the existing organic conditions. The ability of l02Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 583. l03Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. 563.

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thinking, and the possibility of an adequate psychic response, are in such cases yet to be developed. The determined state of mental life in those individuals is obviously due to the person's internal conditions, that is, due to the undeveloped state of his organic vegetative and sensitive faculties, not to his spiritual powers as such. Another mental phenomenon experienced by every human being, the dream, may serve to illustrate the meaning of the distinction continental psychiatrists make between the existence and the contents of psychosis, and to give a satisfactory answer to objections which are raised against the somatogenic concept of psychosis on the basis of the relationship between premorbid and psychotic personality. The dream is certainly not caused by the physical properties of brain-tissue, or even by vegetative functions of the sentient organism. As a mental phenomenon, it presupposes the exercise of psychic faculties. As such it is primarily the product of imagination. The contents of the dream, that is, what is dreamt of and what is happening during the dream are naturally dependent upon the personality structure and former experiences of the dreaming person. For imagination as such is not creative, but only conservatory and reproductive. Thus experiences and unsolved problems of the past, desires, hopes and fears of everyday life, as well as healthy and neurotic patterns of behavior and complexes of the person. ality, may find manifestation in the dream. In this regard the indiVidual dream may show differences such as those of age, sex, temperament, personality structure, profession, and culture. However, the existence of the dream itself - that is, the fact that this product of imagination is a dream, and not daydreaming, or the artistic or scientific product of the so-called creative imagination is not the effect of imagination as such. It is due to the conditions< in which imagination and the dreaming person as a whole exist and operate during sleep. The physiological conditions of sleep and the corresponding changed constitution of the sleeping person's psychic faculties are the cause of the dream-character of this product of human imagination. In a similar way, the existence and contents of psychosis may be explained. As a human disease, psychosis is necessarily found in an individual endowed with sensory and intellectual life. Mental phenomena observed in patients are as such essentially produced by psychic powers corresponding to their nature. The determined mental faculties and their dispositions that are used and manifest

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themselves prevailingly, and the intentional objects that preoccupy the patient may be dependent upon development, experience, and attitude of the premorbid personality, and thus explain differences of individual cases of the same mental disease. However, the fact that there is a psychosis at all, that is, that human psychic powers and their dispositions are used, and that those contents occupy the patient, in a psychotic manner, is not due to these conditions of the premorbid individual. Psychosis is rather the result of a change of the internal conditions of the prepsychotic person. Psychotic phenomena as such are not caused by psychic powers and their premorbid formation as such; they are due to the changed internal conditions under which the patient and his psychic powers exist in cases of mental disease. The origin of psychosis, th~t is, the factors responsible for the actualization and maintenance of such psychotic internal conditions of the person cannot rightly be identified with conditions of the premorbid personality as such. Psychotic phenomena as such cannot be caused by bad habits of thinking, feeling, or willing, nor by latent neurotic patterns of behavior, nor by an inadequate psychic response to the somatic disorder. For even if these psychic factors were actually given in every case of psychosis, they could as such not explain the existence of even one psychotic phenomenon. Those bad habits of intellectual life are said to be operative in the premorbid personality for many years without producing psychotic symptoms; they are, therefore, not psychotic by nature, and accordingly, operations proceeding from them can as such not be psychotic. However exaggerated the use of daydreaming, however frequent and extreme the unrealistic decisions of a premorbid personality may be, they are always operations of a premorbid personality. As such they art not psychotic phenomena and do not possess the quality of psychotic daydreaming with its illusions and hallucinations, or the character of the psychotic unrealistic decision with its horrifying, inexplicable irresponsibility. A new factor beyond these bad habits of the prepsychotic personality is required in order to render their operations psychotic phenomena. The same holds true, mutatis mutandis, of manifest or latent neurotic patterns of behavior. Neurotic symptoms are clearly distinguished from psychotic phenomena, as the list of the main differences of these mental disorders offered by psychiatrists evidently

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reveals. 104 Neurotic phenomena corresponding to neurotic personality patterns remain simply neurotic. A change of neurotic symptoms into psychotic symptoms demands a corresponding modification of the underlying pattern of the personality. The factors responsible for this change have to be assigned also in regard to the other pathogenic psychic factor mentioned by the defenders of a psychogenic explanation of exogenous psychoses, that is, with regard to the inadequate psychic response to the s0matic disease associated with the brain-devastation in general paresis or with other disorders of the nervous system. One might identify the psychotic symptoms of such diseases with the inadequate psychic response declared to be the cause of the psychosis. But in both cases, a sufficient cause of this inadequate character of the psychic reaction is to be sought. This cause cannot be seen in any psychic or moral deficiency of the person afflicted with the somatic disorder mentioned, as the term "inadequate response" seems to indicate. Such a deficiency or an inadequate reaction to the organic disease could rightly be assigned as the proper cause of ~e psychosis only, if a human being suffering the extensive anatomical and physiological brain-damage characteristic of general paresis were also able to show an adequate, healthy psychic response to his disease, thus avoiding the appearance of psychotic symptoms. This latter possibility is generally denied by psychiatrists. They assert that psychotic phenomena constantly accompany general paresis.10~ As explained before, variations of this necessarily inadequate psychic reaction to the somatic disease may be due to the constitution of the premorbid personality. The cause of the psychotic character of these different psychic reactions, however, cannot be found in the conditions of the prepsychotic person. As conditions of the premorbid human being they are by nature either healthy or neurotic, but not psychotic. So a pathogenic factor beyond the psychic causes listed for the mental origin of exogenous psychoses has to be assigned as the cause of such mental disorders. It must be of such a nature as to fully explain the existence of psychotic personality defects. The psychosomatic constitution of the healthy or neurotic person must be modified in a way that his mental powers suffer a "pathological l04Cf. for instance, Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 246. lO~ Jaspers. op. cit., p. !l8I.

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regression," and thus operate under such conditions that psychotic symptoms result. At least in cases of exogenous psychoses, this causal factor cannot rightly be identified with a pathogenic conflict. Exogenous psychoses certainly are what modem defenders of the somatogenic concept of psychosis consider every psychosis to be: a disaster that breaks into the life of a human being exactly at the moment when its hour has struck, and recedes, unless treated, only when it pleases to go, independently of the healthy or neurotic constitution of the premorbid personality. An exogenous mental disease can in no way be considered as the result of an escape-mechanism of an immature personality. It is by definition associated with a somatic disease, and makes its appearance in a person suffering determined organic disorders, whether or not he tries to escape facing his problems. Since psychic forces made responsible for the origin of exogenous psychoses as such therefore are not a sufficient cause for the existence of psychotic symptoms, and since there is no philosophical nor psychiatric reason whatever against considering the bodily disorders connected with exogenous psychoses as causal factors of mental disease, it seems to be completely justified to endorse the traditional view of psychiatrists who assign the underlying somatic disease as the cause of the corresponding psychosis. The somatic factors accompanying these types of mental disorders are of such a nature as to involve the modification of the psychosomatic organism, required as a principle of psychotic phenomena. They affect the anatomical structure and the physiological conditions of the nervous system, which constitutes the organic substratum of the faculties of sensitive life. Determined changes of these organic factors, however, necessarily result in disfunctions of the external and internal senses, and, because of the dependence of intellectual life upon the functioning of sensory powers in the condition of the body-soul union, also in defects of higher mental operations. The actual existence of somatogenic mental diseases can, at least in the case of exogenous psychoses, not reasonably be denied. lo6 106The description which the defenders of a necessarily spiritogenic concept of psychosis give of somatopsychic and toxic psychoses in their psychiatric textbook actually agrees with the view held by most psychiatrists. Wherever in the book the influence of the onesided application of the philosophical principle: operari sequitur esse is overcome and the 'psychiatrist' looks at existing reality as it is, the psychosomatic unity of the human person asserts itself and organic

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When turning to a consideration of the psychiatric views on the etiology of endogenous psychoses, it should be kept in mind that the preceding evaluation of the argument concerning the variability of psychotic symptoms in different patients holds true with regard to every type of genuine psychosis. Contents of psychosis, that is, variations of psychotic phenomena may be due to differences of the premorbid personality. However, the existence of psychosis as such is not sufficiently explained by the existence of such personality variations in prepsychotic individuals. Psychic forces effective in the healthy or neurotic personality as such cannot rightly be considered as the cause of psychotic disorders. A pathogenic factor that makes possible the psychotic use of such premorbid psychic forces has to be assigned. In spite of the fact that organic defects underlying endogenous psychoses are not known, the modem defender of the somatic origin of psychosis believes himself entitled to seek also this factor in an organic disorder. He believes this especially because exogenous psychoses, which obviously are due to their somatic foundation, manifest similar psychotic phenomena as functional psychoses, and because the proponent of the opposite psychiatric view is unable to offer any convincing proof for the validity of the psychogenic concept of endogenous psychoses, while he himself is in a position to point to characteristics of these diseases that cannot sufficiently be explained psychologically. Psychiatric arguments for the psychic origin of functional psychoses do not achieve their end. None of the assertions about facts of psychiatric experience which usually are mentioned as psychiatric reasons for a psychogenic explanation of mental disorders is unqualifiedly true when applied to functional psychosis. With refactors. that is. the vital foundations of human existence are not only seen as an occasion or condition of mental operations but also as factors determining the mode and. accordingly. the psychotic character of mental phenomena. Thus. for instance. a defective brain is said to lead to a defective intellect and conse· quently to an enfeeblement of will and character (d. Cavanagh-McGoldrick. p. 527); clarity of ideas is declared to be dependent upon the antecedent clarity of the imagination (p. 236); exhaustion of the organism is made responsible for "clouding of consciousness. disorientation. or delirium" (p. 442); finally. the underlying somatic disorder is implicitly or explicitly admitted as the cause of psychosis. when as the proper treatment of somatopsychic and toxic psychoses not psychotherapy. as demanded by the psychogenic concept of these mental diseases. but the medical treatment of the basic. somatic disturbances is recommended (pp. 443. 479) .

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gard to the first reason, concerning the "complete absence of any organic pathology that might serve as a basis for the disorder" on the one hand, and "prolonged, often lifelong indulgence in undesirable mental, emotional, or volitional habits, and a slowly developing picture of introversion, and emotional apathy" on the other, it should be pointed out that nescience of an organic pathology is not identical with its absence. The cause of cancer, for instance, is certainly a pathological organic factor in spite of the fact that it is not yet known. No physician would conclude from our ignorance of this organic factor to its absence. In a similar way, the fact that a somatic basis of functional psychosis is not known does not allow us simply to assert its absence. This is especially true since exogenous psychoses, which evidently have a somatic disorder as their cause, manifest the same mental symptoms as functional psychoses, and since the psychic factors listed as causes of endogenous psychoses do not as such represent a sufficient explanation of the disease, even if their existence could be shown to be realized in every case of functional psychosis. As was pointed out before, a prolonged, even lifelong indulgence in bad habits does not as such constitute a sufficient cause of mental disease. Even according to explanations of the defenders of the extreme psychogenic position, it at least cannot rightly be considered as the sole cause of functional psychosis since with regard to manic-depressive psychoses the aforementioned picture of the premorbid personality is said to be the case only in "some cases."107 However, it does not seem to be realized even in the prepsychotic personality of the schizophrene. Other psychiatrists, who deny a connection between such allegedly pathogenic habits and schizophrenia, attest to the existence of cases where the disease attacked completely healthy personalities. Nor do the explanations concerning the psychotherapeutic cure of functional psychoses keep what they promise. First of all, proponents of a psychogenic concept of functional psychosis do not display too much confidence in the value of psychotherapy of psychosis when they cautiously state: "This treatment is especially applicable to neurosis." More to the point, however, is the fact that it is a fallacy to believe that "wherever it produces the desired results we may be certain that the defect was originally psychogenic in nature." Actually, we cannot be certain at all in cases of a cure 107 Cavanagh-McGoldrick,

p. 46.

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of functional psychoses. It is a. well-known fact among psychiatrists that functional psychoses show frequent cases of automatic remission. So Cavanagh-McGoldrick can write with regard to manicdepressive disorders: "Recovery from the single attacks is the rule. Recovery from manic-depressive psychoses is automatic, the disorder is self-limited and ultimate recovery frequent," 108 and, with regard to schizophrenia, automatic remission occurs in about twenty percent of the cases. 109 Accordingly, the cure of a functional psychosis treated psychotherapeutically is no proof of the effects of psychotherapy, nor consequently of the psychic origin of the disease. A psychotherapist considering the cure of his psychotic patient as a sure sign of the psychic cause of the psychosis may deceive himself; for while he ascribes the recovery to his psychotherapeutic efforts, it may actually be the effect of an automatic remission. However, when stressing the fact of the psychotherapeutic cure of a disease as an indication of its psychic origin, because "no amount of re·education, suggestion, or implanting of ideas can repair organic disease states," the psychiatrist must be equally interested in explaining the cure of a supposedly psychogenic disease by methods of somatic therapy. For a truly psychogenic disease is, at least, no more curable by the application of medical means than a somatogenic disorder is by psychotherapeutic treatment. Indeed, it should raise questions if functional psychoses as conceived by representatives of the psychogenic understanding of the disease should show any response to injections or shock-treatment. A schizophrenic personality disintegration gradually developing because of a lifelong practice of bad habits can scarcely be expected to improve or even to be cured because of the medical use of electric currents. A psychic escape-mechanism which is the result of a constant refusal of a realistic, mature confrontation of reality, or the alleged preference of the seemingly endless despair of melancholia to the apparently unbearable problematic of earthly life are not simply frightened away by a series of injections. And yet it is a fact that endogenous psychoses which admittedly put up so much resistance against psychotherapeutic efforts respond to a vast degree to medical treatment. In cases of endogenous melancholia for example, "sixty percent 108Cavanagh-McGoldrick, p. lI84. l09Kloos, op. cit., p. 410.

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complete remission and twenty percent marked improvement· may be expected" from electric convulsion therapy (E.C.T.).l1O Kloos lists fifty percent complete recovery and thirty percent improvement for treatments of schizophrenias with insulin and E.C.T. during the first year of the disease, and twenty-five percent recovery in the second. ll1 Such effects of somatic therapy represent undisputed facts that are rightly considered by defenders of a somatogenic concept of functional psychoses as an indication of an organic basis of such diseases, especially since they cannot be sufficiently explained on the ground of the opposite view. Cures achieved by the application of medical means cannot, like the rare cases of a recovery after psychotherapy treatment only, be regarded as the result of an automatic remission of the disease, since their percentage lies far above the possible percentage of such a remission in cases of schizophrenia, and since in manic-depressive psychoses the duration of the single phase is known to be fairly constant. As was indicated in the description of the somatogenic view of psychosis, this exact duration and also the alternating character of manic-depressive phases are adduced as further indication of a somatic foundation of these mental disorders. One certainly has difficulties even to imagine that a person "in the presence of his conflict becomes alternately excited and depressed," preferring the hell-like melancholia to the exuberant state of mania, and as a rule escaping his conflict by maintaining exactly nine months of depression and six months of manic excitement. The self-limited character and the automatic recovery of manic-depressive phases at an almost predictable time simply do not make sense, when these mental diseases are conceived as psychic escape-mechanisms in the presence of a conflict, performed by an immature personality. Still less does the fact that completely healthy personalities fall victims of this psychosis fit into this psychiatric picture of the disease. However, all these characteristics are easily understood, when manicdepressive psychoses are explained as the result of periodic disturbances of vegetative life, especially since these mental diseases seem to be basically disorders of the mood (Gemiitsleiden) rather than of the mind. For the basic mood of a person and his entire temperament is usually connected with somatic constitution or with vegetative life. llOCf. Cavanagh.McGoldrick, p. 388. I11Kloos. op. cit., p. 411.

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Other somatic aspects of psychosis which occasionally are listed112 as indications of an organic origin of functional psychoses, especially the possibility of their inheritance, are disputed and will not be stressed. However, the facts mentioned seem to be impressive enough to suggest a somatic foundation of even this type of mental disease. The fact that these indications do not offer the psychiatric certainty which the knowledge of the still unknown organic factors responsible for the psychotic character of mental phenomena of functional psychoses could give cannot be denied. However, the defenders of the opposite view are not even able to offer equally strong indications of a psychic origin of these mental disorders, still less a convincing proof for the validity of the psychogenic understanding of psychosis. The listed aspects speaking for the justification of the somatogenic concept of functional psychoses do not make sense on tlte basis of the opposite interpretation of the disease. On the other hand, the existing relations between premorbid and psychotic personality, adduced by the proponents of the psychogenic understanding of mental disorders as an indication of a psychic etiology of psychosis, seem to find a satisfactory explanation in the continental psychiatrist's distinction between existence and contents of psychosis. The psychotic character of mental phenomena, that is, the origin of psychosis, cannot sufficiently be explained psychologically. The critical evaluation of arguments offered by psychiatrists for a psychic or somatic etiology of psychosis results in the endorsement of the somatogenic concept of this kind of mental disease. The somatogenic understanding of psychosis is philosophically justified; somatogenic mental diseases are possible. Psychiatric reasons attest to the actual existence of psychoses that are somatic in origin. Exogenous psychoses are obviously caused by organic disorders associated with them. Endogenous psychoses reveal characteristics that can fully be explained only on the ground of a change of the psychosomatic human organism due to organic disturbances. There is no reason whatever, either philosophical or psychiatric, that would allow us to consider psychic forces as such to be a sufficient cause of psychosis. Is a psychogenic understanding of psychosis therefore impossible? Philosophically speaking, a student of scholastic philosophy would scarcely dare simply to assert such an impossibility. On the basis 112Florin Laubenthal, Him und Seele (Salzburg: Muller. 1953). pp. 151 ft.

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of his understanding of human nature, there does not seem to exist any difficulty in conceiving the possible psychic origin of psychotic disorders. The philosophical conception of a possible psychogenic mental disease would have to start with a consideration of the psychosomatic unity of human nature. The dependence of the higher upon the lower levels of being in this complex unity would have to make room for a reversed dependence. That is, the influence of the higher faculties of human nature upon the constitution and operation of its lower powers would have to be demonstrated. Thus it would become evident that the change which seems to be required in a person and his faculties in order to explain the psychotic character of his operations may be effected by way of defective intellectual, volitional, and especially emotional habits or attitudes. The psychosis would in this case be psychic in origin. However, these habits would not constitute the proximate but only the remote cause of the disease. As explained before, it does not seem justifiable to consider mental forces as such a sufficient cause of the psychotic defects of mental operations. A transformation of the internal conditions of the person and of his organic faculties seems to be unavoidable in order to render psychotic phenomena fully understandable. This is in essence the conclusion at which Carl Gustav lung arrived a few years ago, not on the basis of the scholastic philosophy of man, but on the ground of a lifelong psychiatric study of mental disease. The following account of lung's return to the camp of the defenders of a somatogenic concept of schizophrenia has been given: After more than half a century of brilliant research into the emotional causes of schizophrema, Zurich's famed Psychiatrist Carl Gustav lung, 81, maae a startling switch last week, conceded, that perhaps the causes of schizophrenia should be sought in biochemical poisoning. (Research based on this idea is already well started at many U. S. centers.) Said lung in a Voice of America broadcast: "Inasmuch as we have been unable to discover any psychologically understandable process to account for the schizophrenic complex, I draw the conclusion that there might be a toxic cause. That is, a physiological change has taken place, because the brain cells were subjected to emotional stress beyond their capacity. . . . I suggest that there is an almost unexplained region ready for pioneering research work."113 113 Time, Dec. 31, 1956, p. 33.

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Jung's statement expresses his agreement with the preceding evaluation of the psychogenic concept of psychosis, that is, with the view that there is not any convincing psychiatric reason for maintaining a psychic origin of psychosis in the sense that psychic forces as such are the sufficient cause of psychotic phenomena. It also indicates how the philosophical possibility of a psychogenetic psychosis could be conceived on the basis of the psychosomatic unity of human nature. The mental disease would also in this case be essentially somatogenic. No "psychologically understandable process to account for the schizophrenic complex" can be assigned. A change of the psychosomatic organism and of its organic faculties must take place in order to produce in the organism the principles of psychotic mental operations. Such a "physiological change" could be the result not only of endogenic processes, or of exogenous toxic infections of the organism, but also of an abnormal affection of organic life due to influences of unhealthy psychic behavior. Enduring infringement upon the normal order of the psychosomatic unity by way of habitual disregard of the demands of human nature may create disorders on that organic level of the composite which constitutes the basis of all healthy and diseased manifestations of the human person during this life. When reduced beyond the minimum of normal conditions, constitution and functioning of organic life will effect disruptions and defects of higher mental performances. On the ground of this possibility, conflicting assertions of psychiatrists, for instance, concerning inheritance and the influence of the premorbid personality upon psychotic phenomena in cases of functional psychoses, especially of schizophrenia, the origin of which represents the primary object of the international psychiatric dispute concerning the etiology of psychosis, could be reconciled. The organic conditions demanded as a cause of the psychotic nature of mental phenomena could be considered to arise on the basis of inherited disposition, or also spontaneously, and thus explain cases of functional psychoses where the disease seems suddenly to attack a healthy personality. They may also be due to a prolonged lifelong, indulgence in bad habits, since in the psychosomatic organism psychic operations may also affect bodily processes and structures. Thus cases of functional psychoses where no trace of a corresponding inheritance can be established, while prolonged practice of

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unhealthy habits seems gradually to end in psychosis, could be explained. Indeed, when consistently and realistically conceived, the psychogenic explanation seems necessarily to demand such a "physiological change" as the proximate cause of the disease. Because of the aforementioned picture of the prepsychotic personality in cases of functional psychoses, especially of schizophrenia, certain psychiatrists consider endogenous psychoses as psychogenic and speak of "fixation" and "pathological regression" to levels of instinct and complexes as the result of a continuous indulgence in bad habits. However such fixations and pathological regressions seem necessarily to involve a change of the normal organic conditions, since organic sensitive faculties are affected by them. This change may be gradually effected by way of a constant actualization of unhealthy patterns of behavior. But it must be established, if such pathological regression and fixation to levels of sensitive life are to be realized, and psychosis which is identified with such mechanisms is thus to result. The psychotic use of sensitive faculties, and consequently also psychotic symptoms of intellectual life, would set in as soon as the pathological regression, that is, the modification of the prepsychotic's internal conditions, required as a principle of psychotic manifestations, is achieved. Psychosis which, according to psychogenic explanations of the origin of the disease, is to develop gradually would actually begin suddenly after the completion of the required physiological change. This modified understanding of the psychic origin of functional psychoses would explain the decisive differences between immature or neurotic and psychotic personality. Properties of psychosis that were found to speak against the usual psychogenic conception of the disease, that is, the characteristic course psychotic disorders generally take independently of the will and wishes of patient and psychotherapist, as well as their response to somatic treatment, would find their explanation. The admission of a pathogenic organic factor, demanded in the preceding examination of psychiatric observations and assertions concerning the etiology of psychosis beyond the psychic forces usually listed as causes of psychosis by defenders of a psychogenic understanding of the disease, seems thus to be a logical consequence of the psychogenic conception itself. The "toxic cause" of psychosis, that is, the pathogenic organic factor responsible for the required physiological change in the

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psychosomatic unity in cases of psychosis, may naturally be different in cases of inherited dispositions, spontaneous origin, and gradual production by way of unhealthy behavior, and thus perhaps explain characteristic somatic and psychic differences of especially various types of schizophrenic disorders. 114 Accordingly, questions concerning the prevention of mental· disease and personal responsibility for it, as well as those concerning proper methods of therapeutic treatment, would have to be answered differently in each case of functional psychosis. Attention to such possible differences of origin and types of functional psychoses, especially of schizophrenia, and research in this direction, could perhaps unite the divided camp of psychiatry and finally end with a solution of the disputed question. Representatives of the somatogenic explanation of psychosis would have to change their notion of spontaneously arising pathological organic processes as the only cause of every psychotic disorder by admitting the justification of a modified psychogenic understanding of cases of functional psychosis. Defenders of the psychogenic concept of the disease would have to acknowledge the possibility and actual existence of truly organogenic psychoses, not only with regard to exogenous psychoses, which are rightly considered as due to organic disorders associated with them by almost every psychiatrist and psychologist, but also with regard to functional psychoses. They would also have to admit a modification of organic conditions of the prepsychotic person as proximate cause of the disease in cases of ultimately psychogenic functional psychoses. The student of the scholastic philosophy of man is as such not in a position to determine the actual realization of this philosophically possible and, viewed psychologically, most probable solution of the psychiatric dispute in question. Determination of this is the task of the anthropological sciences. However, convinced of the truth of traditional philosophical principles that force him to admit the possibility and allow him to assert the actual existence of somatogenic mental diseases, he will recognize in such an eventual outcome of psychiatric discussions about the origin of psychosis a further confirmation of the scholastic understanding of the deep psychosomatic unity of human nature. 114Cf. Ernst Kretschmer, Moglichkeiten unel Grenzen eler Psychotherapie im Aufbau eler Schizophrenie in Ernst Speer (ed.) , Aktuelle Psychotherapie (Miinchen: Lehmanns Verlag. 1958), pp. 108 if.

5 ULRICH OF STRASBOURG AND THE ARISTOTELIAN CAUSES by

MOTHER CAROL PUTNAM, R.S.C.J. Ulrich of Strasbourg is a model of docility. The training which he received at Cologne from Albertus Magnus still marked him twenty years later when he assembled his Summa de Bono. At Cologne as a young Dominican he had attended the Studium Generale under Albert's direction, from 1248 until 1252. There, he and his fellow student, Thomas Aquinas, listened to Albert's exposition of the Ethics of Aristotle and the entire corpus of Denis the Areopagite. Perhaps they also heard lectures on the Physics and the De Anima, or made the acquaintance of Avicenna's Metaphysics and the commentary of Chalcidius on the Timaeus of Plato. In any case, apart from the Scriptures, which he quotes fluently, the chief authorities to whom Ulrich refers are Aristotle, Avicenna, Denis, Boethius, and Augustine, while the whole temper of his unfinished Summa is Platonic and Neoplatonic. However, his remarkable docility lies not so much in fidelity to these sources as in loyalty to the explanation of them given by his master. For Ulrich, Albert is a man "so godlike in every sphere of knowledge that he can rightly be called the wonder and marvel of our time."1 The younger Dominican feels bound to him "as a son to his father, as a disciple to his master, as a servant to his lord, as a 1 Aliter autem ab omnibus praemissis sentit doctor meus dominus Albertus, episcopus quondam Ratisponensis. vir in omni scientia adeo divinus ut nostri temporis stupor et miraculum congrue vocari possit et in magicis expertus ex quibus multum dependet huius materiae scientia. S.B. (Summa de Bono), Lib. IV, tract 3, cap. IX; cited by Jeanne Daguillon, La Somme d'Ulrich de Strasbourg, Livre I (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930), p. 30·

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little child to his guardian." 2 His love, his trust, the very comers of his mind belong to his greater teacher and friend. Yet the reader who is unaware of their open-hearted exchange of letters, or of the general content of Albert's writings, will be tempted to call Ulrich an impassive pupil, for, aside from the brief tribute in the tract on the angels, there seems to be little or no reference to Albert or his works in the entire Summa de Bono. Howver, the absence of specific references serves rather to emphasize the fact that the Summa as a whole is a synthesis of the Albertine commentaries. Far more than the "magnum ducem divinum Dionysium" whom he professes to imitate,8 and whose Divine Names provides a pattern for the first two books of the Summa,4 it is Albert, with his ideas and very terminology, whom Ulrich reflects therein. In fact, recent studies of hitherto unedited portions of the text seem to prove that Ulrich's knowledge of early philosophers is for the most part indirect; that it is almost entirely channelled through the commentaries of Albertus Magnus. Francis Collingwood in particular has presented an array of parallel passages in connection with his edition and analysis of the second and third tracts of Book II of the Summa de Bono./) The amalgam of Albertine doctrine which Ulrich furnishes there and elsewhere is one of the most significant features of his work. It enables scholars to return to the lengthier expositions of his master with more certainty as to what Albert really held, fortified by the interpretation of a favorite student who had listened to his lectures and was familiar with his writings. Acquaintance with the metaphysical and theological views of his teacher did not end with Ulrich's years of study in the Rhineland. 2Quid autem minus debet patri filius, magistro discipulus, domino famulus, curatori parvulus, quam se totum. Heinrich Finke, Ungedruckte Dominikaner· briefe des 1J Jahrhunderts (Paderbom: 1891), letter 50; cited by Martin Grab· mann, "Studien ueber Ulrich von Strassburg," Mittelalterliches Geitesleben (Munich Max Hueber, 1926), Bd. I, p. 165. 8S. B~, I, 1. I. ed. Daguillon, pp. 4-5. 4 Gabriel Thery, O. P., "Originalite du plan de la 'Summa de Bono' d'Ulrich de Strasbourg," Revue thomiste, XXVII (1922), pp. 876-597. II The Theory of Being in the 'Summa de Bono' (Book II) of Ulrich of Strasbourg: Philosophical Study and Text, unpublished doctoral dissertation (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1952). Cf. Part I, Ch. 3, "Sources," pp. (llJ) - (71); Part III, Ch. 2, "Conclusion," pp. (122) - (155). A more recent but less complete text edited by F. Collingwood, "Summa De Bono of Ulrich of Strasbourg. Liber II: Tractatu8 2 Cap. I, II, III; Tractatus 5, Cap. I, II," is in Nine Mediaeval Thinken: A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texas [Studies and Texts:] I. edited by J. Reginald O'Donnell, C.S.B., Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1955). pp. 29!HI07.

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The mention of Aristotelian works explained by Albert after 1252 and the use of his method and expressions with regard to them are indicative of this. In the section from Book IV which we shall deal with, Ulrich refers to the Physics, the De Anima, and the Metaphysics of Aristotle. The commentary of Albert on the Physics was probably written between 1260 and 1270,6 while that on the Metaphysics could not have been finished until after 1270.'1 This information helps us to place Ulrich's own master work more exactly. It has already been confined to the period between 1262 and 1272.8 Now that we know it includes, even in its early sections, references to the Albertine exposition of Book A of the Metaphysics and to the explanation of the Liber de Causis written about the same time, we can safely place it after 1270. Whatever be the date of its composition, there is no doubt that it looks at Aristotle through the eyes of Albert and Avicenna. Convinced that "scire solum est per causam,"9 Ulrich is thoroughly at home with the Aristotelian doctrine of the four causes. OCf. M. Grabmann, Guglielmo di Moerbeke, OP., il traduttore delle opere di Aristotele [Miscellanea historiae pontificiae, vol. XI] Rome: Univ. Greg., 1946). pp. 87-97. Grabmann refers to the work of A. Mansion, De jongste Geschiedenis van de middeleegwsche Aristotelesvertalingen naar eigen Bevindingen getoetest [Med. van de Koninkl. Vlaamsche Acad. Voor Weteschappen, III, n 2] (Brus· sels, 1941). '1 Franz Pelster, S. J. believes that it was finished possibly between 1274 and 1276. Cf. "Zur Datierung einiger Schriften Alberts des Grossen," Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie, XLVII (1923), pp. 475-482. Grabmann places it earlier. Cf. Guglielmo, pp. 80ff. He refers to W. Kiibel, Die lateinishchen Metaphysikilbersetzungen in den Frilhwerken Alberts des Grossen (Fribourg, Switzerland: 1933). Like Albert, Ulrich uses a text which does not include Book K. for he constantly refers to the "eleventh book" and means by it Book A. He is un· aware of the Metaphysica nova, and hence consults either the vetus, arabica. or media as Albert does, or relies solely on the commentaries of Albert and Avicenna for assurance. 8Daguillon, La Somme, p. !II·. Book IV was written when Albert no longer governed the diocese of Ratisbon, as he had done from 1260 to 1262. (Cf. note 1.) Ulrich probably abandoned the entire project when he was named provincial of Germany in 1272. He could hardly have taken it up again in the few months that intervened between his release from office and his death in 1277. 9S. B., IV, 2, IV, cited by Grabmann, "Studien," p. 210, n. 36. Although Grab· mann's Latin rendering can hardly be called an edition, he bases his version on nineteen mss. of which he considers Cod. Vat. Lat. !Ill to be the best. Cf. his "Des Ulrich Engelberti von Strassburg, O. Pro Abhandlung De Pulchro: Untersuchungen und Texte," Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissen· schaften, 1925, pp. 24-25. Collingwood finds the Vatican and Paris codices (of which Mlle. Daguillon prefers the latter) to be of two distinct families and the best in each, so that "it is impossible to declare one as more basic than the other." Nine Med. Thinkers, P. 294. For his list of mss., d. pp. 29!1-94.

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In his opening chapter, he defines in causal fashion the project ahead of him.10 The material cause is God himself, and "on account of this matter we gladly call this book On the Highest Good." The efficient cause is "the Spirit of the Father who speaks in us." The final cause is "to shed light on the true faith for the glory of God." The formal cause or plan of the work is the objective presentation of the truth after the manner of the Church fathers, in logical order and without polemic.l l This forma tractandi is to be developed in eight books: the first will deal with the mode of knowing God, or theology; the second with the essence of the highest good and what follows from it; the third with what pertains to the divine persons in common; the fourth with God the Father and the work of creation; the fifth with the Son and the mysteries which surround the Incarnation; the sixth with the Holy Spirit, his gifts and grace; the seventh with the sacraments; the eighth with beatitude.12 Although the metaphysical groundwork of the doctrine of causality is found in the notions of being and goodness in Book II, the nature and interrelation of the causes is handled in Book IV. The first tract of this book treats of God the Father as the first prin· ciple, the necesse esse> in whom there is no distinction of essence and existence and from whom proceed finite existences. The second tract considers creation and its consequent relations of the one and the many, potency and act, the cause and what is caused. 10 Materia autem huius libri est ipse qui dicit (Jer.• IX. 24): "In hoc gloriatur. qui gloriaturs scire et nosse me," et ab hac material libenter hunc librum "De Summo Bono" intitulamus. Efliciens quoque causa est Spiritus Patris qui loquitur in nobis. . . . Finis huius operis est illuminatio orthodoxae fidei ad gloriam Dei. • • • Forma vero sive modus huius operis est tenere consilium sapientis dicentis: "Ne transgrediaris terminos quos exposuerunt patres tui" (Prov., XXII. 28). S.B., I. 2. I. Daguillon. pp. 4-5 11 In defence of his novel presentation of the truth without the usual scholastic hedge of objections and answers. Ulrich cites the seventh letter of Denis. Ad Polycaf'pum: "Sufficere arbitror sanctis viris si verum ipsum in se ipso possint cognoscere et dicere. secundum quod vere habet . . • etc. Diooysiaca: recueil donnant l'ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribu& au Denys I'Areopagite. et synopse marquant la valeur des citations. ed. Philippe Chevalier. O.8.B., et aI. (Bruges: Desclee, Vol. I, 1937: Vol. 2. 1950), pp. 14822-14851. All references to Denis will be given according to Diooysiaca since the translation of John Sarracen. which Ulrich follows. is included there and not in the Migne edition. 12 The text is interrupted at the outset of Tract 5 of Book VI.

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Of its twenty-four chapters, ten pertain specifically to causality. IS The very need for positing any type of causality arises from the passage of creatures from potency to act, from imperfection to perfection. To draw forth potency into act, there must be a perfect agent or efficient cause. Moreover, such a producer does not act by chance or fortune, but intentionally. The intention of the agent serves as the end of the action. It is the final cause. Likewise, because the drawing forth is a dynamic process, there must be an "inflow" of a nature or form. It is received into a kind of flux of substance or matter which exists beforehand only in potency and afterwards, when conjoined with the formal cause, exists in act.14 These are the traditional Aristotelian causes coupled with the Neoplatonic notion of flux. Together they give Ulrich's doctrine of causality a dynamic cast. In imitation of Albert, he rejects the suggestion of a fifth cause, a non-moving efficient cause, on the ground that the efficiency he has already described applies equally to a cause which moves and to one which does not. Hi On the other hand, he develops the concept of an exemplar cause in an earlier chapter, De pulchro. This chapter occurs in the third tract of Book II as part of his quasicommentary on the Divine Names of Dionysius. What is pertinent 18 Cap. 3, De forma substantiali prout est quidditas et totum esse eorum quo· rum est quidditas. 4, De forma prout ipsa est definitio rei. 5, De forma prout ipsa est altera pars compositi. 7, De prima materia, prout de ipsa in philosophia est sermo. 9, De causa efficiente et de ordine universi et de causis primariis. 10, De fine et de causa finali et de uno dominatu summi boni, et quo· modo ipsum movet immobile. 11, De causis in communi, et de finitate earum. et de sufficientia generum earum. et qualiter omnium principia sunt eadem vel diversa. 12. De hiis in quibus in communi diversa genera causarum comprehendentur, scilicet de potentia et actu. 13. De causis in communi, prout sumitur nomine elementi vel naturae. 14. De causis secundum quod habent rationem mensurae per rationem unius. et de multo. et de oppositione unius et multi. et de aliis generibus oppositionis. S.B., IV. 2. Cf. Daguillon. pp. 19--20-. 14Ad hoc (sc. exitum de potentia ad actum) requiruntur quatuor quae etiam sufficiunt, scilicet aliquod perfectum educens potentiam ad actum, et hoc est efficiens; et cum illud non agat a casu vel fortuna sed ex intentione alicuius. illius intentio est finis. Oportet etiam in tali emanatione esse aliquam naturam fluentum. et hoc est forma; et oportet esse aliquod substantiae fluxus. quod primo existens in potentia postea fiat in actual. S.B., IV, 2, XI, Ms. Louvain, Bibliotheque Universitaire, D 320, 200va. This manuscript will be used where edited portions of the text are lacking. No attempt has been made to coUate it with other mss. 15Causa efficiens comprehendit omne faciens esse quod non est quocumque modo. sive per motum sive sine motu. Ibid. Cf. Albertus Magnus. In Xl metaphysicorum, tract. I, cap. II. Opera omnia, ed. Etienne Borgnet (Paris: Vives. 1895), Vol. 6, p. 602.

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from it will be included in the discussion of the formal cause. Ulrich considers form as substance, as definition, and as part of the hylemorphic composite. As substance, it is the cause of a thing's existence. It is no purely accidental mode of matter, but the entire being of a thing, since it is not in anything as in a subject but only as an essential component. 16 Whether it be viewed as the principle of substance or as the substance itself, it is immanent in the individual thing. 17 It is simple, immaterial, universal, intelligible. These characteristics derive from the fact that it- is a light from the first form, the divine intellect which is the source of the intelligibility of every form, and thus, of every individual first substance which receives a form. IS The form as definition indicates both the quiddity or universal and the particular thing which possesses the quiddity. This is true 16Forma non est ens imperfectum ut modus quidam accidentalis materiae, S.B., IV, 2, V, "Studien," p. 212, n. 42. Forma substantialis est substantia, quamvis sit in alio, quia est in ipso ut pars et causa sui esse sed non est in ipso ut in subiecto. Ibid., IV, 2, II, "Studien," p. 206, n. 17. In this connection, Albert holds that the form is only "substantial": "quae non est substantia • . . substantiale medium est inter substantiam et accidens." In II physicoTum, tract. II, cap. 2, Borgnet, Vol. 3, p. 121. Later in the same passage he adds: "duplex est forma, scilicet quae est ut pars essentiae et quae est ut totum." Ibid., p. 123. The forma totius would appear to be the same as substance. However. it has a special connotation with Albert. It can mean either the formal essence (what Ulrich calls the quiddity) , or the whole composite upon which it bestows existence. This is the same division that Ulrich has made. Neither philosopher considers the form to be the entire composite or total substance, since both refer to it as an essential component. As further Albertine references, d. In de praedicamentis, II, 8, Borgnet, I, pp. 181-82, and De praedicabilius, II, 8, Borgnet, I, p. 38. 17Quidditas ista substantia dupliciter consideratur, prout est in substantia, cuius est quidditas et prout est principium illius substantiae, quo ipsa substantia prima est id quod est et quo' cognoscitur ante ipsum existens ordine naturae sicut principium est ante principiatum et neutro modo est per se existens separata extra res sensibiles, sicut dicit Plato, sed est intra eas. S.B., IV, 2, III, "Studien," p. 209, n. 33. Here, as Grabmann notes, Ulrich runs counter to his Platonic tendencies. 18Quidditas primae substantiae conducit ad notitiam causae primae secundum quod causa est forma prima et ultimus finis. Sic enim quaelibet forma hoc, quod ipsa per se et in sua natura est simplex et immaterialis et invariabilis et per se intelligibilis, habet ex hoc, quod ipsa est radius et lumen primae formae, quae est inte1lectus divinus, et ideo per eius notitiam fit in nostro intellectu similitudo illius primae formae, per quam cognoscatur. Ibid., "Studien," p. 208. n. 52. 19 Considerandum ergo est, quod nomen cuiuslibet naturae dupliciter potest sumi . • . uno modo, secundum quod significat ipsam quidditatem secundum se sumptam, quam Aristoteles vocat universale, quia est id, quod est universale, id est, universum esse rei, id est, quod de essentialibus nihil est extra ipsum • • • Secundo modo sumitur, prout dicit banc quidditatem in habente ipsam, id est, in singulari aliquo. IV, 2, IV, "Studien," p. 209, n. 34.

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because the universal element provides intelligibility in either case, since the material element in the individual cannot be known directly. The form is called "universal" for the reason that it includes all that essentially pertains to the existence of a being. The particular thing, in its imperfection and individuality, is not identical with its existence. It is merely one of the many determinations of the general being (esse commune) which is the first and direct creation of the first cause.20 This primary being which is indeterminate and incomplete in itself is specified into distinct natures, not through a direct creative act on the part of God, but through a series of emanations.21 These diffusions of form are ultimately derived, of course, from God; and in this sense he is c,alled the causa forma lis omnium.22 Just as the act of light is to illuminate, so it is the task of the first cause to produce things through a formal hitellectual light. This formal light must be the effect of the first cause and its diffusion must be the formal being of all things. In this manner, the intellect of the first cause is the first form of all forms. It includes virtually every form and, therefore, all that is caused.2s God is not only the dator formarum,24 he is the mundus arche2oCf. Collingwood, Theory of Being, pp. (106)-(108). 21Ibid., pp. (73), (97), (114) - (117). It is Collingwood's purpose to show that Ulrich provides against pantheism and protects the transcendence of God by introducing the notion of prime created! being (esse) which is not God and in which all creatures share. Within creation itself, there is scope for emanation and diffusion by which creatures receive their specific forms. 22Grabmann mentions Augustine, Boethius, Denis, Avicenna, Ibn Gabirol, Scotus Eriugena, and William of Auvergue as some of the sources of this doctrine. He refers to the study made by Schindele, Beitriige sur Metaphysik des Wilhelm von Auvergne (Munich: 1901), pp. 57-69. However, the Scholastics reject all notions of pantheism. Grabmann points to the distinction made by St. Thomas: esse creatum non est per aliquid aliud, si Iy per dicat causam formalem intrinsecam; immo ipso formaliter est creatura; si autem dicat causam formalem extra rem, vel causam eflectivam, sic est per divinum esse et non per se. I Sent., d. VIII, q. I, a. 2. ad 2, Cf. "Studien," p. 211, n. 40. 2SPatet quod intellectus primae causae est forma omnium. S.B., IV, 2, V, "Studien," p. 212, n. 43. 24Fons autem huius fluxus est ipse quem Plato vocat dator formarum. IV, I, V, ed. F. Lescoe, The Theory of the First Principle in the Summa de Bono of Ulrich of Strasbourg, Philosophical Study and Text, unpublished doctoral dissertation (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1949), p. 55, cited by Collingwood, Theory of Being, p. 218, n. 1. The latter refers to A.-M. Goichon, Lexique de la langue philosophique d'lbn Sina (Paris: 1948), p. 440, no. 784, for the Avicennian notion of dator formarum which Ulrich has adopted, We may refer here also to another relevant work of A.-M. Goichon, La philosophie d'Avicenne et son influence en Europe medievale (Paris: Librairie d'Amerique et d'Orient, Adrien-Maisonneuve, 2nd ed., 1951), Ch. III, esp. pp. 1l0-130.

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typus or model of all created forms. He is their exemplar cause. He fulfills this function by means of the ideas, or more properly, the unique but infinitely imitable idea he has of created things. 211 The divine exemplars are practical and dynamic. 26 They reside in the practical rather than in the speculative intellect of God. 27 These, of course, differ only intentionally, yet the inference which follows is that there can be no divine idea of anything which is not actual. "The divine causality actually extends only to those things which God will create according to His own manner of causing." 28 There would be no need for any divine idea were there no creature to be modelled upon it. This concept of the causal efficiency of the idea derives, as far as Ulrich is concerned, from the Areopagite. A large portion of the fifth chapter of the latter's Divine Names is given over to the exemplars as producers of the chief participations of creatures: good211 Sed tamen cum hoc primum sit causa totius ordinis et ordinatorum et causa virtute habeat in se omnia causata, haec idea virtute est omnis forma. Ideo Plato quandoque pluraliter hanc primam formam vocat ideas et mundum archetypum, id est, principale exemplar omnium formarum mundi. S.B., IV, 2, V, "Studien," p. 212, n. 4l1. Non sunt formae plures realiter quia ilia dicta lux divini intellectus quae est idea omnium est ipsa essentia divina.•.. Quamvis ergo haec p1uralitas sit per respectum ad res, tamen non est dicendum quod pluralitas rerum sit causa pluraIitas idearum, cum tempora1e non sit causa aeterni, sed potius e converso. PluraIitas idearum est causa pluralitas rerum, quia ex hoc causatur p1uralitas naturarum quod essentia divina multis modis est imitabilis, et ideae nihil aliud dicunt quam essentiam divinam sub ratione imitabilis diversimode. II, 5. X, Louvain. 59vb-6Ora. Cf. A1bertus Magnus. Liber de natura et arigine animae, tract. II. cap. 8. ed. Bernhard Geyer [Opera omnia. XII] (Munster i. W: Aschendorfl. 1955). p. lIi. 26Idea est species efficientis quam eflectus imitatur secundum quod potest. S.B .• 11.5. XI. Louvain.61va. 27 Tamen ideae non dicuntur proprie in ipso nisi secundum practicum cogni. tionem. • . . Ideae secundum rem sunt rationes rerum practicae quae sunt in intellectu divino [59va] . . . . Sunt in Deo secundum rationem intellectus practici qui includit vo1untatem . . . sunt causa rerum productiva. II. 5, X. Louvain, 59va, 6lrb. 28Levian Thomas. F.S.C. (C. J. Fagin). "Ulrich of Strasbourg: His Doctrine of the Divine Ideas," The Modem Schoolman, XX (November. 1952). p. 2l1. This article (pp. 21-lI2) maintains convincingly that Ulrich's doctrine of the practicality of ideas relieves him of the stigma of Neoplatonic emanation as an explanation of the origin of creatures. For a longer study of Ulrich's teaching on the matter. d. C. J. Fagin (now Bro. Levian Thomas. F.S.C.). The Doctrine of the Divine Ideas in the "Summa de Bono" of Ulrich of Strasbourg. Text and Philosophical Introduction. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1948). This work has not been consulted.

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ness, being, life, wisdom, beauty, peace.29 Whatever other interpretation they encounter, these Dionysian models are dynamic principles whose main function is the transmission of the divine attributes to creatures. To explain the relation of the recipients to the exemplar cause, Ulrich resorts again to the comparison of light.30 Corporeal light, he affirms is not only one nature, it is the whole beauty of all colors. The more luminous they are, the more beautiful they are. The more overcast they become, the more ugly and formless they appear. Moreover, their diversity is not due to the light but to the variety of surfaces which absorb the light. The same is true for the divine radiance, that unique nature which contains uniformly and simply whatever beauty there is in created forms. In itself, it is not diverse or manifold. Therefore, the distinction and peculiarity which we observe among the recipients arise from the creatures themselves. Their different potentialities make the form they receive more or less distant from .the first intellectual light. The closer to it they are in essence or form, the more they reflect it and become similar to it, for the form is the principle of likeness by which things are images of the divine beauty. On the other hand, things may obscure its splendors by their unlikeness to it.31 Matter is the principle of this unlikeness. The farther a thing recedes from the nature of light and the more material it becomes, the less it resembles the first light. 32 This is because matter, as potency, is related to being and non-being. It cannot call itself into 29Exemplaria autem esse dicimus in Deo exsistentium rationes substantificas et singulariter praeexsistentes, quas theologia praedefinitiones vocat, et divinas et bonas voluntates exsistentium determinativas et effectivas. secundum quas supersubstantiales essentia omnia praedefinivit et produxit. De div. nom., V, 8; Dionysiaca, 3601-3611. Cf. also, XI, 6; Dionysiaca, 5214-5271. 30This too is derived from Denis, from the passages on beauty and light in the Divine Names, IV, 5-7; Dionysiaca, 1722-1893. 31Exemplaris etiam causa est, quia sicut lux corporalis est una natura, quae tamen est omne id quod pu1chritudinis est in omnibus coloribus, qui quanta plus habent luminis tanto plus sunt pu1chriores et diversitas eorum est ex diversitas superficierum recipientium lumen et quanto plus deficit lumen, tanto magis sunt tetri et deformes. Ita lux divina una est natura, quae habet in se uniformiter et simpliciter quidquid est pu1chritudinis in omnibus formis creatis, quia diversitas earum ex recipientibus causatur, ex quibis etiam forma plus vel minus elongatur per dissimitudinem a prima luce intellectuali et obumbratur. S.B., II, 3, IV, ed. Grabmann, "Abhandlung De Pu1chro," p. 75. 32Et quanto plus recedit ab hac natura et materialis efficitur, tanto minus habet pu1chritudinis et est primae Iuci dissimilior. Ibid., "AbhandIung," pp. 75-76.

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existence, nor can it elicit the form which will endow it with actuality. It cannot cause form. To do so would contradict its character as a principle of potency, for potency cannot cause act. 88 Every nature or natural being presupposes an essential cause. Matter, as an essence, requires something prior and more perfect than itself to be its cause. This must be an essence whose essential act is to be. As part of the composite, form has this intrinsic causal relation to matter, for matter has no real existence save in the composite in which it coexists with form. s4 Thus, even though we may speak of a divine idea of prime matter as such, since the very potency which it is must be an effect produced by God, and since it has an essence distinct from form, it is still more fitting to speak of an idea of matter as existing in the composite rather than as existing in itself.sCi In relation to the first form it receives, a sort of general form shared equally by all bodies, prime matter is foundational. It is the substrate which underlies this form of corporeity.s6 Once it exists, it is inseparable from this form which, by the same token, is incapable of being apart from matter.ST In its character as substrate, matter is not caused by form, but insofar as it is, it is caused 88Natura etiam sive esse naturale rerum non potest esse sine aliqua rationali causa eius. Haec autem causa non potest esse materia, cum ipsa potentia se habet contingenter ad esse et ad non esse. IV, 2, V, "Studien," p. 210, n. S7. 84 Materia esse reale habet in composito et non sine forma nisi secundum esse rationis. II, 5, XI, Louvain, 61 va. Oportet quod haec causa sit aliqua essentia, cuius actus essentialis sit esse ... et hoc est quod vocamus formam. IV,2, V, "Studien," p. 210, n. S7. Ergo forma . . . est prior et perfectior quam sit materia sicut causa prior est causato. Ibid., "Studien," p. 212, n. 42. SCi Quia idea est species efficientis quam effectus imitatur secundum quod potest, et materia sic effectus Dei habet ideam in Deo duplici ratione. Uno modo secundum quod est essentia distincta contra formam et sic habet esse in potentia solum, et sic imperfecte imitatur actum primum. . . . Secundo modo inquantum est in composito essentiali compositione • . . et sic perfecte habet ideam in Deo, quia sic est in actu et non secundum distinctam rationem a toto composito. II, 5, XI, Louvain, 6lva. S6Non est nisi propter hoc quod ipsa sit fundamentum formae. IV, 2. II. "Studien," p. 207, n. 25. ST Haec etiam forma corporeitatis in se non differt in aliquo corpore et sec. undum ipsum esse corpus est aequaliter corpus omni corpori. . . • Prima mao teria non est separabilis ab hac prima forma, quae est corporeitas. Similiter autem e converso nulla forma corporis potest esse sine materia. IV, 2, II, "Studien," pp. 206-07. nn. 2S. 25.

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by form or formal light, absolutely.3S Since its existence derives from the form, its knowableness must depend on the same relationship, for being, formality, and intelligibility are interchangeable designations of the first creation. Hence, matter, which is unintelligible in itself, can be grasped by the mind only in the composite when it is conjoined with form. Moreover, the knowledge always remains indirect, because the form or universal is the proper and direct channel of intellectual awareness. 31l How the form is brought to matter is a problem which involves a third type of cause. This must be some extrinsic agent or efficient cause, since neither form itself, nor matter, nor the resultant composite is able to actualize the form from within. The extrinsic agent either possesses its own actuality in itself or receives that actuality from another. If the actuality is transmitted by another, this raises the question whether the actuality received is bestowed by a created efficient cause or whether it is granted directly by the first cause. According to the presentation which Ulrich gives at the start of the chapter De causa efficiente,40 existence appears to descend in hierarchic fashion from the first through mediating causes to its ultimate objects. He describes a successive emanation of intelligences from the prime uncreated intellect. The first produced intelligence, because of its relation to the uncaused intellect, is the vehicle of light. As such, it produces a second and less perfect in38Sequitur, quod forma simpliciter sit causa materiae. Non quidem est causa, quod materia sit materia, quia hoc habet ex sua natura, nec etiam est causa quod materia sit substantia, ... sed simpliciter quare sit. IV, 2, V, "Studien," p. 211,

n.

41.

39Similiter non cognoscitur (sc. individuum) nisi ratione praedicti universalis, qui cum materia de se incognita sit nee sit cognoscibilis nisi per analogiam ad formam, quae est principium omnis cognitionis, ipsa materia nuIli potest esse principium, quo ipsum cognoscatur. Ibid., "Studien," pp. 209-10, n. 35. 40In full, the title reads: De causa efficiente et de ordine universi et de causis primariis, IV, 2, IX. Ulrich's sources for this chapter are the Divine Names and Albert's commentary on the Liber de causis. Only after William of Moerbeke had worked on his own version of the Greek text did the mediaeval scholastics come to realize that this latter work did not belong to Aristotle. It is actually of Neoplatonic origin, perhaps written by a Syrian disciple of Proclus. Two recent editions of St. Thomas's commentary provide abundant information on the subject: Sancti Thomae de Aquino super librum de causis expositio, ed. H. D. Saffrey, O. P. (Fribourg: Socil~t~ philosophique, 1954) and S. Thomae Aquinatis in librum de causis expositio, ed. Ceslas Pera, O.P. (Rome-Turin: Marietti, 1955) with historical introduction by Pietro Caramello.

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telligence.41 Because of its relation to itself, the first intelligence is also able to extend its own light to any lesser being. This it does when it causes the noble sou1. 42 Finally, this same first intelligence, insofar as it is from nothing, is related to potency. This relationship empowers it to cause that substance first among things existing in potency, the primum mobile.43 In like manner, the second intelligence produces a third intelligence, a second soul and a second heavenly body, and so on through all the orders of intelligences. In this way, the whole movement of the universe seems to evolve. Here Ulrich stops abruptly. The doctrine which he has just outlined "sounds erroneous."" Therefore, he rightly rejects this progressive emanatism in favor of a direct creation by the first cause. There may be an esse ab alia transmitted by creatures to each other, but it is not effective of existence. If an intelligence is spoken of as coming "effectively" from another intelligence, this is solely with respect to its formation and determination in a definite nature and species, while intelligence itself and soul are constituted in their entirety by the first cause.45 In other words, as we have noted earlier, being or existence in a general and indeterminate manner is the effect of the first cause alone, while being as specified by distinct forms is in some fashion the effect of other created forms. These forms reach things through the circles of movers which have 41Haec autem intelligentia ex hoc quod est ab alio, triplicem habet comparationem. Unam ad primum a quo est et secundum quod sic intelligit se ••. quod lumen a primo fiuit in ipsam secundum copiam redundantiae • . . et dum sic se intelligit constituit aliam substantiam . . . quae etiam est lumen intellectuale sed tamen propter distantiam a primo non est adeo perfecta sicut prima intelligentia. Ipsa ergo est intelligentia secundi ordinis. S.B., IV, 2, IX, Louvain, 195va. Cf. Albertus Magnus, Liber II de causis et processu universitatis, tract. I, cap. 2; Borgnet, Vol. 10, pp. 4116-117. 42 Secundam comparationem habet ad se ipsam secundum id quod est, et sic occumbit in ea lumen intellectus primi, et ideo lumen suum extendit ad quiddam aliud esse quod est inferius sub ipsa; et sic causat animam nobilen. S.B., IV, 2, IX, Louvain, 195va. 48Tertiam comparationem habet ad hoc quod ipsa in potentia est inquantum ex nihilo est, quia omne quod est ab alia erat in potentia antequam fieret; et . . . sic sausat substantiam primam in potentia existentium quae est unum ens sub prima forma et sub corporalitate, et hoc est primum mobile. Ibid. Cf. Albertus Magnus, II de causis, I, 12; Borgnet, vol. 10, pp. 453-54. 44Hoc autem quod ab una intelligentia dicunt (sc. Peripatetici) esse aliam intelligentiam et animam et corpus caelestis Iucis videatur sonare errorem. S.B., IV, 2, IX, Louvain, 195vb. 45Constat enim ista exivisse in esse per creationem quae actus est solius primae causae...• Ergo tota intelligentia et anima a sola prima causa efficiente constituuntur. Ibid.

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instrumental power. They are informed by the light of the first cause from which they derive their existence and causality; for the power of all the forms of lower beings is included in the light of the first cause. 46 In fact, this first true cause diffuses every formal light which is the beauty of each thing. 47 If secondary causes have a causality, it in no way detracts from the power of the primary cause. In his study of the angels, which comes next in the Summa, Ulrich sketches their proper causality. It is the same as that which he here bestows on the intelligences, since "intelligence" and "angel" are interchangeable terms in the Dionysian context from which much of this doctrine is drawn. Angels are not causes on account of any imperfection in the first cause. Indeed, the latter produces in a perfect manner every effect of secondary causes. However, lest creatures should not mirror in themselves this divine causal power, God has made the angels his agents. They are called "cooperators with God," since they cause through his omnipotence. 48 Their angelic causality is a diffusion of the divine light which they have received. This explanation of efficiency, involving as it does the passage of light and intelligence from the first form to lesser forms, is Neoplatonic in tone. Throughout his exposition, Ulrich relies heavily 46Prima causa est pura lux formalis et intellectualis et cum ipsa causet per suam essentiam, aliter enim non esset prima causa, sequitur necessario, quod effectus eius diffusion huius lucis et formalitatis. . . . Talis autem diffusio est formale esse omnium. IV, 2, V, "Studien," p. 211, n. 38. Cf. nn. 22 and 23. 47 Efficiens quidem causa est sicut lux solis diffundendo et causando lumen et colores est efficiens omnem pulchritudinem corporalem. Sic enim lux vera et prima a se diffundit omne lumen formale, quod est pulchritudo omnium rerum. II, 3, IV, "Abhandlung," p. 75. 48 Recepti luminis diffusio est actio hierarchia, sed diffusio eiusdem lucis inquantum lumen divinum quidem unitate divina communicatur; et sic angelus sit instrumentum divinum et Dei cooperator. IV, 3, X, Louvain. 281rb. Elsewhere he says: Nec tamen sunt illae causae propter imperfectionem causae primae, quia ipsa omnes effectus secundarum causarum per se operatur perfecta causalitate; sed sunt per hoc ut divinissima nobilitas non deesset creaturae, sed esset e converso. Sicut enim dicit Dionysius: Divinissimum est Dei cooperatorem fieri scilicet in causando sua virtute. Sine hoc, ens creatum non esset perfectum; quia deeset eit nobilior differentia dividens ens, cum ipsum dividitur in causam et causatum. II, 5, XII, Louvain, 63rb. The Dionysian text to which Ulrich refers is in the Celestial Hierarchy: Est enim unicuique hierarchiam sortitorum perfectio secundum propriam proportionem ad Dei imitativum esse reductum; et quod omnibus est divinius (ut eloquia dicunt) Dei cooperatorem fieri, et monstrare divinam operationem in se ipso (secundum quo est possible) manifestatam. II, 2; Dionysiaca, 7911·4 and I Cor., III, 9.

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upon Albert's commentary on the Liber de Causis. Since the Liber de Causis depends largely upon the Elements of Theology of ProcIus, it is not difficult to account for Ulrich's Neoplatonism. In the use he makes of it, he follows the order and emphasis of the second book of Albert's commentary. The few deviations are solely on the side of orthodoxy. For instance, both Albert and Ulrich recognize that there can be an esse ab aUo which is not derived directly from the prime cause. A later form can be said to flow from or be caused by all prior forms whose nature it has in itself. Both hold that there is not only a gradation of forms in the universe but an interrelation of these forms, so that the lesser strive to imitate the higher and the higher in tum shed light on the forms beneath them. 49' Both rely upon Denis as a source for this doctrine. However, each chooses a different Dionysian text in support of his view. Albert refers to a passage in the Celestial Hierarchy50 which emphasizes the role of the angelic intermediaries. Ulrich turns to the Divine Names,51 to a section which stresses the action of the first cause as source and 49Formae autem quae in superioribus sunt universales, in inferioribus efIi· ciuntur, per hoc quod inferiores visus suos, intelligibles dirigunt et projiciunt ad superiores. Omne enim inferius superiori se appetit assimilari, et appetitu naturali dirigitur ad ipsum: et si cognitivum est et intellectivum cognitionem et intellectum extendit ad ipsum, ut per cognitionem et intellectum accipiat formam qua superiori secundum analogiam suae possibilitatis assimiletur: et haec quidem susceptio non est intelIectus possibilis sed intellectus agentis inferioris ad agentum intellectum superiorem, sicut actus lucis inferioris potentior effiicitur per receptionem lucis superioris: et iste est processus de actu in actum, non de potentia in actum. Quad Dionysius vocat purgationem dissimilitudinis inferioris ad superius per immissionem altioris lumnis, et per reductionem inferioris ad formam luminis superioris, quantum possibile est inferiori secundum analogiam. Albert, II De causis, II, 2l1; Borgnet, p. 51l1. Sed sumunt (sc. Philosophi) esse ab alia sive causari ab alia essentialiter, sieut forma posterior dicitur fluere et causari ab omnibus formis prioribus quarum natura in se habet secundum hunc modum; cum Deus propter fines priorum coniungat principiis rerum, veram omnis conspirationem et harmoniam pulchre operans, ut dicit Dionysius. S.B., IV, 2, IX, Louvain 195vb. 50Ipsae enim cognoscentes primae Denm, et divinam virtutem superposite desiderantes, et primi operatores fieri (sicut est possible) Dei imitativae virtutis et operationis dignae sunt habitae, et quae sunt post ipsas substantias ipsae ad concertationem (secundum virtutem) boniformiter extendunt, copiose ipsis tradentes de illa quae in ipsas est superveniens claritate; et rursus illae subjectis; et secundum unamquamque prima illa quae post ipsam tradit de dato et ad omnes juxta proportionem providentia transeunte divino lumine. VIII, lI; Dionysiaca, 95!18-9552. 51Ipsa enim est, secundum eloquium, quae est omnium effectiva et semper omnia concordans et indissolubilis omnium concordationis et ordinis causa et semper fines primorum coniungens principiis secundorum et unam omnium conspirationem et harmoniam pu1chre operans. VII, lI; Dionysicaca, 4071-4081.

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end. God, as divine wisdom, works out in beautiful fashion a true sympathy and harmony among participated beings. The choice of such a passage indicates again that Ulrich disclaims any creative power on the part of the intelligences. 1£ he draws chiefly from Neoplatonic authors for his explanation of efficiency, Ulrich seeks his knowledge of finality from Aristotle. This time he employs Avicenna's Metaphysics and Albert's commentaries on the Physics and the Metaphysics. As usual, he presents a synthesis of Albertine views and provides little that is new. The final cause is a terminus. Because of it, a thing is brought to completion. 52 1£ it is taken as an end achieved in actual existence, as rest is the end of motion, it is not a true cause. Its causality lies in its power to elicit action. Therefore, only when it is considered as existing in the mind of an agent who is prompted to move because of it, may it be called a cause and the cause of causes. Its special character is its desirability which stirs the efficient cause to action. Hence, strictly speaking, the final cause has only an intentional existence. 53 The end which moves the agent may be fulfilled in the agent itself or in another. The end within the being itself is its essential action, its act of existing. This end is never reached in another. It is the primary end in all spiritual beings: in God, in angels, and in souls. In other beings in which the act of existence is not divided but is corruptible, the primary end is the end in another. By bestowing themselves upon something else, these beings are ennobled. For them, the end of conferring existence is more perfect than the state of conceived existence. This end in another is always generation of some sort, such as the production of one plant from another or the generation of one man by another. To be able to generate in this manner, the being which generates must be perfect in its nature. Thus, the end of the work (finis operis), which is ordi52 (Terminus considerandus est) secundum rationem terminantis. et sic est tertius modus. scilicet quo finis sive causa finalis vocatur terminus, quia ideo terminatur quod fit. S. B., IV, 2. X. Louvain. 199ra. 58 Finis prout de ipso loquimur dupliciter consideratur. scilicet vel secundum esse reale vel secundum esse quod habet intentio efficientis quem movet. Primo est ipse quidem finis. Quies est terminus motus. sed non est causa finalis; sed potius secundo. Nam finis non solum est causa rei ... sed etiam secundum Philosophum (sc. Aristotelem) est causa causarum. quia movet efficientem ad causandum sicut desideratum. . .. Constat autem quod sic movere non habet ... nisi inquantum est in intentione efficientis. Ibid. Cf. Albertus Magnus. In II physicorum, II. 4; Borgnet. Vol. 3. p. 127. and In V. metaphysicorum. I, 3; Borgnet, Vol. 6, p. 271.

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narily considered a secondary end, may, as in the case of generation, be a primary end.1I4 The end of the intention may also be appraised from the point of view of its extension, that is, according to the amount of power exercised by the agent who fulfills it. It may be universal, specific, or individual. If it be taken generally, it is the intention of the first mover and is the end of nature as a whole. If it be examined specifically, that is, according to the species which it foreshadows, it is the intention of the first produced nature in the movement of generation, and is the end of spiritual nature. If it be viewed individually, it is the intention of this particular thing in inducing its form in the thing generated and is the end of a particular nature.1WI The end which the first cause intends in creation is all-inclusive. It is the overflowing largesse of diverse goods, for the good, chiefly and universally found in God, is also sharable. The whole universe can share it potentially and each thing more or less perfectly according to the proportion of each one.56 1l4Si enim dividamus finem per comparationem ad ea quorum est, sic est duplex scilicet finis in se et finis in alio. Finis in se cuicumlibet rei est essentialis actio ipsius quae est esse. Hoc enim est actus entium et haec est semper actio quae in nullo alio est recepta...• Finis autem in alio est actio entis recepta in proprio passivo et iste finis est efliciens essentialiter . . . aliud cui • • • largitur esse suum prout ipsum capax est. . . . Et ex hiis sequitur quod in perpetuis, finis operis qui est finis in alia: est finis secundarius et finis in se est finis in se est finis principalis, sicut esse divinum nobilius est quam esse corporale.•.• In corruptibilibus vero est e converso. Ibi enim finis in se secundum esse individui est actus suae existentiae, non divisum sed corruptibile. Propter hoc enim hic homo accipit formam hominis ut agat actum esse hominis. Finis autem in alio est finis eius inquantum perfectum est in sua natura ac per hoc potest generare aliud sibi simile. Unde iste finis est finis operis generationis secundum esse diversum sive perpetuum, quod confertur per generationem, cum in se ipso non habeat; et patet quod iste finis est nobilior praedicto fine. S. B., IV, 2, X. Lou vain, 199rb-l99va. 511 Ultimus autem finis qui est finis intentionis est triplex, quia vel est finis universalis natural:, scilicet quem in omni motu intendit primus motor, vel est finis spiritualis naturae, scilicet esse diversum huius naturae secundum speciem (hoc enim intendit illa prima natura in omni motu generationis), vel est finis particularis naturae, scilicet quem intendit hoc particulare in uni suo opere (intendit enim formam suam inducere in hoc generato). Ibid., 199va. Cf. AIbertus Magnus, 11 phys., II, 4; Borgnet, p. 127. 56 Finis vero quem primus motor in omni motu intendit, et ipse Deus qui est motor videlicet coniunctus actui mobili, est superflua largitas boni diversi; quod bonum principaliter est in ipso . . • ut est potentiale a toto universo et ab utroque perfectius vel imperfectius secundum quod est propinquum primo vel remotum ab ipso. . . . Eet ideo est bonum et optimum et est in una prima causa et est bonum uniuscuiusque sibi proportionatum et est bonum utroque modo inquantum secundum proportionem uniuscuiusque bona omnia ordinan· tur ad primm. S. B., IV, 2, X. Louvain, 199va.

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It is to be expected that Ulrich should develop the relationship of finality and goodness. Although he considers the rule of the good to be both efficient and final, it is only in connection with the final cause that he discusses the unus dominatus summi boni and how it moves while remaining motionless. This implies that the efficiency of the good plays a secondary role, while its attractiveness is paramount.1I7 From the aspect of efficiency, it is the first principle of existence. Ulrich bases his argument on the notion of perfection:1!S The imperfect cannot be first but must be reduced to the perfect which is its cause. Since imperfection is a state of being which is mixed with privation and evil, it follows that the one best and perfect good which is in no way associated with evil must be the cause of all good. From the fact that it causes through its essence, its essential act must be to do good, and it must be good essentially. 59 Everything that exists, insofar as it exists, is good through participation in and likeness to this first and best of peings. Therefore, this first cause from which all things have their being must be the most attractive thing in the universe. All things desire it and are moved by this intention in each of their works. Thl\s, the dominion of the highest good has two facets: the dominion of the first principle from which proceed the goods of all, and the dominion of the last end drawing each thing to it by its power. GO 57 Julien Peghaire, C.S.Sp., points to the same emphasis in the teaching of Albertus Magnus. In the distinction which he makes between bonum per se and bonum per accidens, Albert appears to relegate efficiency to the latter form of goodness and to make it purely ancillary to finality. Cf. "La causalite du bien selon Albert Ie Grand," Publications de L'lnstitut d'etudes medievales d'Ottawa, II (Paris: J. Vrin, 1932), pp. 59-89, esp. pp. 701f. 58The stress upon perfection is probably derived from the Areopagite. Jean Durantel holds that the "principle of perfection" is a central element in Dionysian thought, "La caussalite n'est que la perfection, qui se communique, qui se degrade ou qui se releve, de la perfection qu~ se cherche et se realise. Car Ie principe de perfection fonde Ie principe de finalite en mfune temps que de causalite • . . meme la matiere est tourmentee de finalite, laquelle est la pensee creatrice imprimee dans les choses." Saint Thomas et Ie Pseudo-Denis (Paris: F. Alcan, 1919), p. 239. 59Dominatus autem est iste quia cum imperfectum non possit esse primum sed reducatur ad perfectum quod est eius causa, et nos videamus uniuscuiusque bonum esse imperfectum uia est privationi et malitiae permixtum; oportet haec omnia reduci ad unum optimum quod omnino sic malitia impermixtum sicut ad primam causam omnis boni. Prima autem causa necessario per suam essentiam causat, ergo oportet illud optimum esse bonum essentialiter cuius essentialis actus sit facere bonum. S. B., IV, 2, X, Louvain, 199vb. 600mne quod est inquantum est est bonum per participationem et similitudi nem (ad) primum optimum; quia inquantum sunt a prima causa quae sola est causa esse et cum imperfecta similitudo sit causa perfectionis et motus, ad ipsum sequitur quad omnia ex hoc ipso quod ab ipso sunt, desideront ipsum et inten-

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The perfect mode of moving by desire pertains only to the highest good. What is lovable in itself moves more fully that which is incidentally lovable. The former is good in itself, while the latter is desired merely for some use or sensible pleasure derived from it.61 Intellectual goods are superior in this respect to other goods, for they are pure and permanent. Among such goods, those are higher which are intelligible directly, as opposed to those which are made intelligible by abstraction from matter. 62 The highest intellectual good is the summum bonum itself. Because of its perfection, this supreme good excludes any holding back on the part of desire, for there is nothing in it that is unattractive: no imperfection, priva. tion or evil. Therefore, it moves not only sufficiently but efficaciously, "conquering every desire by the sheer force of its attractiveness."68 As an intellectual good, it extends to the whole of nature and draws things universally. Each responds in the manner which befits it: intellectual things intellectually, rational things rationally, things of sense in sense fashion, living things vitally, and even inanimate things according to the law within their being.64 tione huius appetitus omnibus operibus suis moventur ad ipsum et in hiis duobus est dominatus summi boni. scilicet dominatus primi principii a quo Bunt omnia bona et dominatus ultimi finis sua potestate omnia moventis ad se. Ibid. 61 Magis· ergo movet per se amabile. scilicet quod per se bonum est. quam amabile per accidens. scilicet quod hic et nunc affert aliquam utilitatem veJ delectationem in sensu (et) propter quam amatur. Ibid .• 200ra. 62 (Habetur) inter per se amabilia magis modum bonum intellectuale quod sua puritatea mixtione contrarii quod non habet et firmitate permanentiae admirabiles facit deJectationes quam (quod) quodammodo non est intellectuale. Item inter bona intellectualia magis modum illud quod sua natura connaturale est intellectui quam quod intellectus facit intelligible sicut sunt omnia quae abstrahendo a materia facit inte1ligibilia. Ibid. 68 Inquantum vero est summum vincens vehementia suae amabalitatis omne desiderium sic movet efficaciter et non solum suflicienter..•. Inquantum est perfectum et amabile. quia nihil imperfectionis et privationis vel malitiae vel alterius naturae habet admixtum. sic exc1udit a desiderio omnem detentionem. Ibid . .64 lnquantum vero est bonum intellectuale ••. expandit se per omnem vultum. naturae. ut dicit Dionysius. (et) sic movet universaliter omnia •.. inte1uectualia intellectualiter et rationalia rationaliter et sensibilia sensibiliter et viventia animaliter et naturalia naturaliter moventur ad ipsum. Ibid. The reference is to theDivine Names of Denis: Et bonum est . . . ad quod omnia convertuntur. quaemadmodum ad proprium singula finem; et quod desiderant omnia. intellectualia quidem rationalia cognitive; sensibilia autem sensibiliter; expertia vero sensus. naturali motu vivifici desiderii; carentia autem vita et tantUm exsistentia. aptitudine ad solam substantiae participationem. IV. 4; Dionysiaca, 1682-16!18.

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As they seek the fulness of the form which belongs to them and strive to become their perfect selves, creatures in reality yearn after the divine being of whom they are but images. They are drawn to him easily and without labor, in a natural fashion which brings delight, because they bear within themselves the impression of his likeness. 65 Their likeness to him is their beauty. The form sought out and desired is not only the good but the beautiful, so that it is equally true to say that divine beauty, in itself or in its created likeness, is the end of all desire. 66 This notion of the image as a return to the divine intentio is a special feature of Ulrich's development of finality. As such it amplifies the teaching of his master, for it adds to Albert's doctrine that the good is inseparable from the end and is specifically the perfection of a thing according to its ultimate fulfilment,67 an indication of what that fulfilment is. The causes, as Ulrich has interpreted them, are inseparable from each other. The succeeding chapters of Tract II carry out the relationships between them which are implied in their nature. Ulrich excuses his lengthy development on the ground that the causes account in great part for the being of caused things. 68 His examination of them reveals a clear, profound, if not too original, mind and a distinctly Neoplatonic tum of thought. In sum, his doctrine shows a dynamic quality, a preoccupation with form as light and likeness, and with finality as a return through desire to the image in its fulness. BIBLIOGRAPHY Albertus Magnus. In de praedicamentis. Ed. Etienne Borgnet. Opera omnia: I. Paris: Vives, 1895. - - - - , . De praedicabilibus. Ed. Etienne Borgnet. Opera omnia: I. Paris: Vives, 1895. 65Inquantum vero movet per impressionem suae similitudinis sic non movet violenter nec cum labore sed naturaliter et cum delectatione. S.B., IV. 2. X. Louvain, 2OOrab. 66Est etiam causa finalis, quia cum forma a perfectibili desideretur inquantum est perfectio et haec perfectionis natura non est in forma nisi similitudo lucis increatae quae similitudo est pulchritudo rerum, patet quod forma desideratur et intenditur non solum inquantum est bonum, set etiam inquantum est pulchrum et sic divina pulchritudo in se vel in sua similitudine est finis alii· ciens omne desiderium. II. 3. IV, "Abhandlung." p. 76. 67 Bonum autem resolvere est in ens relatum ad finem. Albertus Magnus, De bono, tract. I, quaest. 1, art, 2; ed. Heinrich KUhle [Opera omnia: XXVIII] (Miinster i. W.: Aschendorff. 1951), p. 7. Cum vero bonum dicat indivisionem a fine, ... patet quod bonum dicit per· fectionem rei secundum ultimum complementum. Ibid., q. 2, a. 2; Kiihle, p. 26. 68 Ideo causas diffuse et diligenter prosecuti sumus, quia in hoc constitit magna parse rerum causatarum. S.B., IV, 2, Xl, Louvain, 203rb.

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- - - - , . In libris physicorum. Ed. Etienne Borgnet. OPera omnia: III. Paris:

Viv~,

1895.

- - - - , . In libm metaphysicorum. Ed. Etienne Borgnet. Opera omnia: VI. Paris: Vivbl, 1895.

- - - - . Liber de cawis et processu universitatis. Ed. Etienne Borgnet. Opera omnia: X. Paris: Vives, 1895. - - - - , . De bono. Ed. Heinrich Kiihle. Opera omnia: XXVIII MUnster i. W.: Aschendorff, 1951-

- - - - , . Liber de natura et origine animae. Ed. Bernhard Geyer. Opera omnia: XII. Miinster i. W.: Aschendorff, 1955. Collingwood, Francis. The Theory of Being in the 'Summa de Bono' (Book 11) of Ulrich of Strasbours: Philosophical Study and Text. Unpublished doc· toral dissertation. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1958. - - - - . "Summa De Bono of Ulrich of Strasbourg. Liber II: Tractus 2, Cap. I, II, III: Tractatus 8, Cap. I, II:' Nine Mediaeval Thinkers.: A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts. Studies and Texts: I. Edited by J. Reginald O'Donnell, C.S.B. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1955. Pp. 298-807. Dionysius Areopagita. Dionysiaco,: recueil donnant l'ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribU/!s au Denys l'Areopagite, et synopse marquant la valeur des citations. Ed. Philippe Chevalier, O.S.B. et al. Bruges: Desc1ee, I, 1987; II, 1959. Durantel, Jean. Saint Thomas et Ie Pseudo·Denis. Paris: F. A1can, 1919. Goichon, A.-M. La philosophie d'Avicenne et son influence en Europe medievale. 2nd ed. Paris: Librairie d' Ammque et d'Orient, Adrien-Maisonneuve. 1951Grabmann. Martin. "Studien Uber Ulrich von Strassburg. BUder wissenschaftlichen Iebens und Strebends aus der Schule Alberts des Grossen." Mittel· alterliches Geistesleben. Bd. I. Munich: Max HUber Verlag. 1926. Pp. 147-221- - - - , . "Des Ulrich Enge1berti von Strassburg O. Pro Abhandlung De Pul· chro: Untersuchungen und Texte." Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Ahad· , emie der Wissenschaften, 1925. Pp. 1-84. - - - - , . Guglielmo di Moerbehe, O.P .• il traduttore delle opere di Aristotele Miscellanea historiae ponti/iciae: XI. Rome: Gregorian University, 1946. Levian Thomas. F.S.C. (C. J. Fagin). "Ulrich of Strasbourg: His Doctrine of the Divine Ideas. The Modem Schoolman: XXX. November. 1952. Pp. 21-82. peghaire. Julien. C.s.Sp. "La causali~ du bien seIon Albert Ie Grand." Publica· tions de l'Institut d'etudes medievales d'Ottawa: II. Paris: J. Vrin. 1982. Pp.59-89. Pelster. Franz, S. J. Kritische Studien zum Leben und zu den Schiften Alberts des Grossen. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1920. - - - - . "Zur Datierung einiger Schriften Alberts des Grossen." Zeitschrift filr katholische Theologie: XLVII, 1928. Pp. 475-482. Thery, Gabriel. O.P. "Originalite du plan de la 'Summa de Bono' d'Ulrich de Strasbourg." Revue thomist~: XXVII, 1922. Pp.876-897. Thomas Aquinas. Sancti Thomae de Aquino super librum de causis expositio. Ed. H. D. Saffrey,O.P. Fribourg. Switzerland: Societe philosophique. 1954. - - - - . S. Thomae Aquinatis in librum de cawis expositio. Ed. C. Pera, O.P. Rome-Turin: Marietti, 1955. Ulrich Engelberti of Strasbourg. Summa de bono. Ms. Louvain. Bibliotheque universitaire, D 820.

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- - - - . La Somme d'Ulrich de Strasbourg, Livre I. Ed. Jeanne Daguillon. Paris: J. Vrin, 1930. - - - - . Summa de bono. Book II, tract. 2, cap. I, III, IV; tract. 3, cap. I, II. Ed. Francis Collingwood. Nine Mediaeval Thinkers: A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts: I. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1955. Pp. 293-307. - - - - , . Summa de bono. Book II, tract. 3, cap. IV. Ed. Martin Grabmann. "Des Ulrich Engelberti von Strassburg O. Pro Abhandlung De Pulchro: Unterschungen und Texte." Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1925. Pp. 73-84. - - - - , . Summa de bono. Book IV, tract. 2, cap. I-V. Version of M. Grabmann. "Studien uber Ulrich von Strassburg." Mittelalterliches Geistelleben. Bd. I Munich: Max Huber Verlag, 1926. Py. 147-221.

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DE MAGISTRO: THE CONCEPT OF TEACHING ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS by ROBERT S. SOKOLOWSKI

In his Quaestiones quodlibetales,l St. Thomas states that there are three ways in which the human mind progresses in its knowledge of. being: by divine revelation, by personal discovery, and by teaching. We propose to discuss St. Thomas's doctrine on teaching, or systematic communication. Because of the close relationship that St. Thomas sees between teaching and discovery, our study will also offer an extensive treatment of the process of personal discovery. In his philosophical system, the activity of teaching is simply guidance to personal discovery. To teach someone a set of truths is equivalent to leading him to discover these truths himself; both processes make use of the same mental mechanisms in the student. Hence an understanding of the Thomistic concept of teaching can be achieved only after a study of certain relevant elements contained in the concept of personal discovery. This discussion will not enter directly into the philosophical problem of divine relation, which St. Thomas lists as the third method of growth in knowledge of being. However, what is said may have reference to revelation, since it will describe the human person to whom revelation is made. When God speaks to man, he does so in a manner appropriate to the structure of man's being. Nature is not destroyed by grace, but elevated, and human understanding is elevated, not replaced, by revelation. Thus when the mind grows in knowledge of being through revelation, it does so 1 VIII. 2.2. c. (Unless otherwise indicated. the Leonine edition is used through· out this essay.) Insunt enim nobis naturaliter quaedam principia complexa ab omnibus nota. ex quibus ratio procedit ad cognoscendum in actu conclusiones quae in praedictis principiis potentialiter continentur. sive per inventionem propriam. sive per doctrinam alienam, sive per revelationem divinam. . • .

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in a manner that is in harmony with its natural structure. Since we shall describe this natural structure, what is said about human communication will indirectly be relevant to the question of revelation.2 St. Thomas's doctrine on teaching is important because of its relation to other philosophical problems besides that of revelation. It provides a framework in terms of which such problems can be expressed and studied. Thus, since St. Thomas bases his concept of teaching on the process of discovery, it is possible that a study of teaching will shed light on the problem of new discovery of truth. Teaching, which St. Thomas calls an art,S is more subject to human control than is discovery, and can therefore be more easily understood. Hence a study of teaching may be a fruitful way of approaching the persistently difficult philosophical problem of discovery. Another problem in which his discussion of teaching may be of assistance is that of the function of words in human discourse. St. Thomas's doctrine on teaching provides the essentials of what can be called his general theory of communication. For him, teaching is not limited to work in a classroom, but is present whenever one person systematically imparts knowledge to another. "For teaching and learning are not considered here only insofar as they refer to the acquisition of science, but in regard to the acquisition of any knowledge at a11."4 Thus St. Thomas's concept of teaching can be considered a description of the structure of human communication. In this way, it provides a frame of reference for the study of words as factors in the acquisition, retention, and expression of knowl2 In many cases, including that of revelation, philosophical conclusions cannot be applied without qualification to theological problems. The philosopher can describe the personal relationship involved in human communication, but revelation transcends the human sphere. The person speaking in this type of communication is the absolute person, God, and the truths communicated are such as to be beyond the power of unaided reason to discover or understand. The question of the relationship between philosophical knowledge and theology has been brought into relief by the recent work of Henry Dumery. Cf. G. Van Riet, "Philosophie de la religion et tMologie. A propos d'un nouvel ouvrage de M. Henry Dumery," Revue philosophique de Louvain, v. 57 (1959),415-437. S Summa contra gentiles II, 75: Magister vero causat scientiam in discipulo per modum artis. 4ln posteriorum analyticorum 1, lect. 1. Non autem accipitur hic doctrina et disciplina secundum quod se habent ad acquisitionem scientiae tantum, sed ad acquisitionem cognitionis cuiuscumque. In St. Thomas's usage, the term doctrina refers to the activity of the teacher presenting the material, while disciplina refers to the activity of the student learning it.

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edge. The extensive philosophical treatment that these functions currently receive, both in British linguistic philosophy and in phe- . nomenological research, makes apparent the relevance of such a study for contemporary philosophical thought. The application of St. Thomas's doctrine on teaching to these problems, worthy of consideration as they are, would lie beyond the scope of a single article.1i We propose, in the present essay, to describe the philosophical structure St. Thomas finds in the process of teaching and to investigate the relationship that exists between teaching and personal discovery. The study of systematic communication has a value in itself, even apart from its application to other philosophical problems, because it helps us to understand an activity that plays an irreplaceable role in human life. It will not be out of place to locate the role of teaching within the human situation in general. All specifically human activity is guided by intelligence. A man can consciously act, he can determine himself, only in response to what he knows, whether explicitly or only confusedly. Human acts are by definition those which flow from the free will of man, and the will can react only to what is presented to it hy the intellect. Human liberty, and consequently human activity, is rooted in the knowledge possessed by the intellect. The possibility of liberty, of self-determination is given breadth and depth by knowledge and grows with the growth of knowledge; it also derives its limitations from the restrictions of knowledge. When I am totally unaware of a truth, I cannot consciously and freely choose or reject the good contained in that truth. Only when I learn the truth in question, does it become possible for me to determine myself in regard to it. It is possible for a man to enrich his store of knowledge himself, and consequently to enlarge the possibilities of his freedom by his own efforts, for the intellectual life is one that grows in response to the shock of experience. But this is a slow process, one in which. the accumulated achievements of generations and even of centuries must be required before substantial progress can be made in a given Ii Several problems have been treated with principles taken from St. Thomas's doctrine on teaching. An application of this doctrine to pedagogical methodology can be found in M. Linnenbom. Das Problem des Lehrens und Lernens bei S. Thomas von Aquin. (Freiburg i. Br.: Lambertus Verlag. 1956.) Applications of the same doctrine to the Thomistic notion of theology may be found in G. Van Ackeren. Sacra doctrina (Rome: Catholic Book Agency. 1952). and V. White. Holy Teaching (London: Blackfriars Publications. 1958).

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field of thought. If left entirely to his own individual efforts, one man alone could not discover all the truth that he needs to enable him to exercise his freedom properly in a civilized society.6 It is for this reason that communication is necessary. The heritage of thousands of years is presented to a man in the education he receives. He must be brought from a state similar to that of his prehistoric forebears all the way to the frontier of civilization, that is, to the border of knowledge that marks the advance made thus far by the common efforts of men. It is then that his power of original discovery comes into full play. Up to this point his power of discovery has been operative, but under the guidance of other men who already possess this store of knowledge and attempt to communicate it to him. It is repetition of this activity of communication among countless men, in the network of the fields of thought we call ethics, esthetics, religion, history, science, philosophy, and other disciplines,7 that constitutes the continuity, the historicity, of a civilization. All the richness of a civilization is based on this relationship of communication that exists between the individual seeking growth in knowledge and thereby expansion of the possibilities of personal development, and the other persons helping him in this growth. Human communication, although a spiritual activity, is necessarily associated with material things that serve as vehicles for the transfer of thought. This is the consequence of the spiritual-material nature of man. The material things commonly used in com6 The rarity of original discovery and the unusual power of insight it requires are well expressed by August Brunner in Die Religion (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1956), p. 48: Die meisten iibernehmen die Ueberlieferung ohne grosse Aende· rung, lassen sich von ihr die Art und Weise ihrer Begegnung mit der Wirklich· keit vorzeichnen und iindern sie im Laufe ihres Lebens unter der Einwirkung ihrer Erfahrung nur unwesentlich abo Nur wenigen ist eine verhiiltnismassig urspriingliche Begegnung mit der Wirklichkeit gegeben. Noch geringer ist die Zahl der Grossen, die ausserdem noch imstande sind, dieser Begegnung einen solchen Ausdruck zu verleihen, dass er fiir ihre Mitmenschen wegweisend wird, sie zu Tiefen hinfiihrt, die sie allein nie erreichen wiirden, und ihrem Erlebnis das Wort bereitzustellen, wodurch es erst voll und lebendig wirksam wird. Diese Grossen haben zu keiner Zeit gefehlt, auch nicht in jenen langen Zeitrliumen der menschlichen Geschichte, iiber die uns keine schriftliche Kunde aufklart, sondern hi:ichstens stumme Bilder und Symbole. 7 Besides such formalized sciences, the vaguely defined collection of truths referred to as common-sense judgments also exercises an important effect upon the everyday activity of members of a civilization. Fr. Bernard Lonergan, S.]., describes these judgments and their effect in life in Insight, A. Study of Human Understanding (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), pp. 289-299.

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munication are words, the pulses of sound or the marks on paper that have what is called meaning. "Words . . . hold the foremost place among the signs by which a man signifies something to another,"8 The profound role that words play in the structure of human communication cannot be minimized. They enter so intimately in the composition of a dialogue between persons, and thus into the formation of thought itself, that we can understand in more than a purely metaphorical sense Wittgenstein's statement, "To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life,"9 But words are material things, and like all material things pressed into the service of man, they are ambiguous, to use the apt term of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.lo Ambiguity here signifies that a material thing is at once a help and a hindrance in regard to human activity. It makes some sort of action possible for man. At the same time, it restricts this possibility, since, because of its material limitations, it imposes curbs on the human act. Thus human spiritual love can be expressed only by actions involving material things such as words, gifts, physical gestures, and the like. Without them, human love cannot find its expression. At the same time, they are never capa:t>le of expressing the fullness of this spiritual love, and they may even ruin it by detracting attention from the love to the thing in which the love is expressed. The same is true of words and human knowledge. Words are our best means of communication and tools in reasoning. They make it possible for a man to communicate to another truth that he has learned. Apart from interpersonal relationships, words function also in the individual intellectual life by making it possible for a person to carry on reasoned thought, which cannot take place except in dependence upon phantasms. Thus both communication and reasoning are made possible by words. At the same time, words are mischievous. They bring along with themselves implications and meanings that we do not wish to convey. They may suggest to those who hear them things that the speaker does not want to ex8S.Th. II-II. 55. 4. ad 2m. Verba ... praecipuum locum tenent inter signa, quibus homo significat aliquid alteri_ 9Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. Anscombe. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958). n. 19. lOThe concept of ambiguity is used by several contemporary-philosophers. but it is of' central importance in the thought of Merleau-Ponty. Thus the title of A. De Waehlens' book describing Merleau-Ponty's work is Une philosophie de l'ambiguite, (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1951). Ferdinand Alquie had used the same title for an article on Merleau-Ponty in Fontaines, n. 59 (1947).

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press. The verbal formulation that a problem or a truth receives tends to fix a certain determined pattern of thought in regard to that problem or truth. As recent British linguistic analysis has emphatically pointed out, such a pattern of thought may contain unwarranted assumptions or misleading, inaccurate use of ideas, but its verbal expression may be such as to make it difficult to discover and criticize them. The inaccuracies and assumptions may be accepted uncritically because of the manner in which the problems or judgments are expressed in words. Thus, paradoxically, the words upon which communication and reasoning depend for their possibility may act as an obstacle to clear, critical thought. Men train their fellows to live in a civilization by a network of ·influences that show wide variety in method and intensity. Besides teaching, or the direct communication of knowledge, there are influences of art and customs, attitudes that are taken for granted by members of a civilization, and the pressure of values that the culture recognizes and attempts to impose. Teaching, whether in formal education or in ordinary communication, is unique among these interpersonal relationships in that it aims to influence the consciously accepted knowledge of the person being taught. It leads the person to know something, and thus to be able to act consciously and freely in regard to it. The other influences assimilated by a person may exert a powerful force upon his activity, but they do so while remaining unknown to him. For if they are consciously acquired, they give rise to knowledge. Such transfer of knowledge would, by definition, constitute teaching. 11 11 It is always possible that the person, through his own reflection and discovery or through the teaching of others, wiIl become conscious of the subconscious effects men and institutions have had upon him. The unconscious influences of a civilization or culture upon men living within it are not limited to areas of moral behavior, such as acceptance of values or performance of customs. They may also enter into strictly intellectual activities, if they constitute a certain methodology which is operative in thought or research, but which no one has yet reflectively analyzed. Thus I. Bochenski writes, in Die Zeitgenossischen Denkmethoden (Munich: Lehnen Verlag, 1959), p. 20: Des ist aber nicht so aufzufassen, als ob der Forscher die formale Logik bezw. die Methodologie erlernen miisste, bevor er an die Forschung geht. Vielmehr wissen wir, dass in den Anfangstadien einer Wissenschaft die Kenntnis keiner der beiden unentbehrlich ist-es geniigen die natiirlichen Anlagen. Es ist auch eine Tatsache, dass die Prinzipien der Logik erst aus den Wissenschaften abstrahiert und formuliert werden, wenn diese ziemlich weit fortgeschritten sind.

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In the act of teaching, St. Thomas makes a fundamental distinction between two principles which operate together to produce growth in knowledge.12 The structure of systematic communication involves a natural principle and a principle due to the activity of man. The natural principle is that elan or dynamism of mind which St. Thomas calls the processus naturalis rationis or the appetitus naturalis rationis. 1s By its nature, the intellect is inclined to the acquisition of truth. Even when isolated from the influence of other persons, it will, to a certain degree, work out a personal discovery of truth.. The artificial principle in teaching consists in the guidance given this dynamism by the teacher, who, by the use of words, directs it to a specific truth. St. Thomas gives a comparison to illustrate the functions exercised by art and nature in teaching: In things that are done both by art and nature, art works in the same way and through the same means as nature does. Thus nature brings health to one who is suffering from cold by warming him, and the doctor does the same. Therefore art is said to imitate nature. The same happens in the acquisition of science, in that one who teaches another leads him to knowledge of things yet unknown in the same way as someone making a discovery leads himself to knowledge of what is not known. 14 The natural process of human discovery which the art of teaching imitates aDd develops is described by St. Thomas as an evolution of the basic insight that man possesses connaturally, the knowledge 12S. Th. I, 117, 1, c.: Aliquis autem effectus est quandoque quidem ab exteriori principio, quandoque autem ab interiori; sicut sanitas causatur in infirmo quandoque ab exteriori principio, scilicet ab arte medicinae; quandoque autem ab interiori principio, ut cum aliquis sanatur per virtutem naturae. . . . Scientia autem acquiritur in homine et ab interiori principio, ut patest in co qui per inventionem scientiam acquirit; et a principio exteriori, ut patet in co qui addiscit. 13Cf. De veritate, Xl, 1, c. This question in the De veritate contains St. Thomas's most complete exposition of his doctrine on teaching. The two terms mentioned, processus naturalis and appetitus naturalis, are Dot synonymous. Appetitus expresses simply the inclination, the elan of the intellect. while processus brings out the structure of this elan. Our concern will be with the latter. 141dem. In his autem quae fiunt a natura et arte, eodem modo operatur ars, et per eadem media. quibus et natura. Sicut enim natura in eo qui ex frigida causa laborat, calefaciendo induceret sanitatem, ita et medicus; unde et ars dicitur imitari naturam. Similiter etiam contingit in scientiae acquisitione, quod eodem modo docens alium ad scientiam ignotorum deducit sicuti aliquis inveniendo deducit seipsum in cognitionem ignoti.

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of being and its first principles. 15 Knowledge of being and its first principles is the seed of all further knowledge. It is the necessary condition and foundation of human knowledge and is operative in every act of cognition that takes place in a man's life. Man's knowledge of being and its self-evident principles may not be known reflectively by everyone - the metaphysician specializes in such science-but it is present as a constituent factor in every act of knowing. In the process of discovery, every new act of cognition is a penetration into being and a deeper realization of its richness. Each new cognition reveals to us some aspect of being that we did not previously know, and thus develops our knowledge of being. Because all knowledge is somehow a development of knowledge of being, it can be said that every new thing we come to know is in some way already familiar to us, at least under its aspect of being. "Thus if we are taught what a man is, it is necessary that we previously know something about him; that is, his aspect of animality, or of substantiality, or at least of being, which cannot be unknown to US."16 This produces a sort of tension or apparent contradiction in the growth of knowledge, for every acquisition is both new and old. St. Thomas expresses this in terms of the doctrine of act and potency. He says that newly acquired knowledge is present in the mind potentially even before its acquisition in a given act of cognition. The manner in which concepts and propositions yet unknown are potentially present in the mind must be qualified. "Science therefore preexists in a potency which is not purely passive, but active; otherwise man could not acquire science by himself." 17 When something exists in purely passive potency in a given being, an ex115Cf. S. Th. I, 117, I, c.: Inest enim unicuique homini quoddam principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia principia omnium scientiarum. Cum autern aliquis huiusmodi universalia principia applicat ad aliqua particularia, quorum memoriam et experimentum per sensum accipit; per inventionem propriam acquirit scientiam eorum quae nesciebat, ex notis ad ignota procedens. Although knowledge of being and its first principles is connatural to man, it is not actualized except in connection with sensory experience. Cf. D. M. De Petter, "De oorsprong van de zijnskennis," Tijdschrift voor Philosoph ie, v. 17 (1955), pp. 219-224. 16De veritate XI, 1, ad 11m. Utpote si docemur quid est homo, oportet quod de eo praesciamus aliquid: scilicet rationem animalis, vel substantiae, aut saltern ipsius entis, quae nobis ignota esse non potest. 17 De veritate Xl, I, c. Scientia ergo praeexistit in addiscente in potentia non pure passiva, sed activa; alias homo non posset per seipsum acquirere scientiam.

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terna! efficient cause is needed as the principal agent in reducing the potency to act. When something exists in active potency, as in the case of concepts and propositions we are yet to acquire, the external efficient cause is not the principal agent in the reduction of the potency to act, but serves merely to help the active potency develop itself into act. The active, internal potency itself is an agent. "Then the extrinsic agent acts only by helping the intrinsic agent and by furnishing it what it needs to be able to move into act."18 These observations clearly indicate St. Thomas's conception of the function of the teacher. His part in the activity of teaching is adiuvare et ministrare, to help the natural dynamism of the mind of the student and to furnish it with the things it needs to develop into act. The things that the teacher is able to furnish to the mind of the student are words, which stimulate the phantasms that enable the mind to abstract knowledge. The teacher presents an arrangement of material signs which make it possible for potential cognition to become actual. By his words, he stimulates and directs the natural discourse of reason in the student. "This teaching is not by way of illumination, but by way of speech." 19 The role played by the teacher in the process of communication is thus a subservient one. In the last analysis, what is essential is that the mind of the student or listener grasp the truth. The activity of the intellect of the listener is irreplaceable. The function of the teacher is limited to making it possible for the intellect to act. On the other hand, it would be erroneous to minimize the value of the teacher's role. His activity is subservient in the sense that it is directed to no more than making possible an act that someone else has to carry out, but it is the teacher who does make this act possible. Without his assistance, it may be concretely impossible for the student to learn the truth in question. Without the words, the particular arrangement of signs presented by the teacher, the listener would perhaps be unable to acquire the knowledge that he learns as a result of perceiving these signs. There is always the abstract possibility that the student would discover the same truth by his own efforts, but given the difficulty of such discovery and the elaborate preparation and background that it requires, it is no 18 Idem. Tunc agens extrinsecum non agit nisi adiuvando agens intrinsecum, et ministrando ei ea quibus possit in actum exire. 19In 11 sententiarum 9, I, 2, ad 4m. Et haec doctrina est non per modum illuminationis, sed per modum locutionis.

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exaggeration to say that in most cases the acquisition of a given truth is impossible without the aid of someone who communicates it. It is true that the mind of the listener would be active without the help of the speaker, and that it would therefore arrive at a cer· tain truth. But would this be the same truth as that taught him? Would it not rather be the case that other interests, or his own way of seeing things, would lead him to other aspects of the matter studied? Even if he did reach more or less the same aspect, he would certainly not attain the clarity and precision to which teach· ing leads him, especially if the truth in question is the result of a long process of research.oo The process by which the mind develops its knowledge of being, the processus naturalis rationis, is described by St. Thomas in the following way: "The process of reason arriving at the knowledge of the unknown by means of discovery is that it applies the com· mon self·evident principles to determined matter and thence pro· ceeds to certain particular conclusions, and from these to others.u 2l' Thus it is a process that begins with application of self·evident principles to some determinate matter and extends itself by draw· ing out more and more particular conclusions from those that result from the first application. If the development along a given line of inquiry can be rigorously formulated, it can be expressed as a series of syllogisms, each depending on the one prior to itself. The self·evident first principles are found at the beginning of this series of syllogisms. Thus the entire chain of reasoning goes back to the self·evident principles which the intellect knows connaturally. The first principles of being do not need to be discovered before they can be incorporated into knowledge. 22 They are there from the OOIt is less improbable that the student will arrive at the truth himself when one deals with certain very obvious truths which can easily be seen as conse· quences of the student's prior store of knowledge. 21De veTitate Xl. I. c.: Processus autem rationis pervenientis ad cognitionem ignoti in inveniendo est ut principia communia per se nota applicet ad deter· minatas materias. et inde procedat in aliquas particulares conclusiones.et ex his in alias. 22Cf. In librum Boethii de trinitate, q. VI. 4, c. (Edited by P. Wyser. Fribourg: Societe Philosophique, 1948). Unde omnis consideratio scientiarum specuIativarum reducitur in aliqua prima, quae quidem homo non habet necesse addiscere aut invenire. ne oporteat in infinitum procedere, sed eorum notitia natu· raliter habet. Et huiusmodi sunt principia demonstrantium indemonstrabilia. ut "omne totum est maius sua parte," et similia, in quae omnes demonstratione$. scientiarum reducuntur. et etiam primae conceptiones intellectus. ut ends et unius et huiusmodi. . . .

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beginning. If it were not for the self-evidence of ~ese propositions, the series of syllogisms would go on in an infinite regress. According to Thomistic principles, this would leave thought unintelligible. The categorical syllogism, which expresses the result of discovery, will be used as the frame of reference for our exploration of the processes of personal discovery and systematic communication. This is done primarily for the purpose of facilitating our exposition. The syllogism furnishes a convenient structure on which we can fasten what we wish to say about discovery and teaching. This convenience of exposition, however, brings with it the possibility of some misinterpretations. It may be thought that use of the syllogism as a frame of reference implies that all human knowledge is strictly deductive reasoning, and that growth in knowledge involves no more than drawing conclusions from truths we already know. This is not the case. There is more to knowledge than deduction. The example of the syllogism will be used to show which areas of teaching, discovery, and reasoning do consist in deductive thought processes and which areas do not. Furthermore, it should not be presumed that the mind de facto follows the steps indicated in the chain of syllogisms when it first discovers the propositions contained in them. The syllogism is a product of reflection on what has already been discovered, and does not necessarily describe how the discoveries have been made. Once they have been made, the syllogism expresses them in a concise and orderly form and makes it possible to communicate them easily. But in trial and error, in the uncertainty that accompanies all progress into the unknown, the original process of discovery may have follo\"ed a somewhat different course. In our use of the syllogistic form as a reference frame for study of discovery and communication, we shall examine three ways in which the syllo~sm illustrates how growth in knowledge can take place. In each of the three cases we shall first study this growth as it occurs in personal discovery, and then as it occurs through teaching.

• The syllogism can be considered to have two functions. On one hand, it serves to show which propositions can be drawn out of the premises. In this respect, the syllogism exhibits a logical movement that proceeds from the premises towards the conclusion. On

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the other hand, the syllogism serves to explain the truth of the conclusion. The logical movement begins this time with the conclusion and terminates in the premises which explain it. The conclusion is taken as a proposition that is to be proved or explained, and the premises are introduced as the explanation. The direction which the reasoning process follows is different in each case. In the first it begins with the premises and moves towards the conclusion; in the second it starts with the conclusion and moves towards the premises. Thus the syllogism can be considered in two directions when the rational process expressed in it is examined. When the movement from premises towards conclusion is considered, the syllogism can be said to lead to a new proposition, for it expresses the result one obtains from knowledge of the premises. There is a form of investigation of the processus naturalis rationis which corresponds to this direction of the syllogism, namely, the unfolding or the making explicit of truth that is implied iI1; knowledge already possessed. The shock of experience upon the original store of knowledge may result in new insights which are strictly deductible from that knowledge, but which were not realized before the experiences took place. It is one thing to know a truth and another thing to know all that it implies. It may require much experience to work out the implications of a single proposition, to see what this proposition entails in the world of being. Many of the implications may be entirely unknown to the person involved until the experience takes place. An abundance of examples of this process, on the level not of personal but of institutional or community consciousness, may be found in the writings of theologians who attempt to explain the development of dogma by stating that the initial deposit of revelation required the controversy and experience of centuries to make explicit the truth that it implicitly contained. In the case of certain dogmas, when the implications have been brought out, it is possible to relate them to the deposit of revelation by a strict deductive process.23 St. Thomas says that truth which has not yet been discovered possesses a certain potential preexistence in the mind of one who is capable of discovering it. The newly learned truth is a determi23 Marin-Sola holds that all dogmas later defined by the Church can be shown to be contained in the deposit of revelation by the strict bond of "metaphysical inclusion." Cf. L'Evolution homogene du dogme catholique. Fribourg: Oeuvre de St. Paul, 1924) .

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nation of a truth known previously. It is a specification of a more general truth already known, and in this way can be considered to have been potentially present even before it was brought to actual presence by experience. For example, a person may know and admit the moral principle that other men are never to be treated as means to an end. We may suppose that, up to a certain point in his life, he has not had much experience in the domain of labormanagement relations, and consequently has never learned what this principle implies in that social context. He has discovered the implications of the principle in family relationships, school associations, and other areas of society which he has experienced. He knows and is able to state what propositions the principle implies in regard to his manner of behavior and his obligations in these areas of human relationships. However, his lack of experience in labor-management means that for it the implications of this prinpIe are still only potential in his mind. He does not yet know what they are, nor is he able to state them. If he then enters into a labor-management relationship, and if he tries to see what the principle implies in his new condition of life, he will acquire new, more specific principles that must guide his conduct. New propositions will become actualized in his knowledge. If he is in the employment of another person, the principle that men must not be treated as means to an end will be found to imply that he cannot treat his employer only as a source of revenue, only as a means to remedying his material wants. The employer is a human person and must be respected as such. Concrete circumstances determine more precisely how this should be done. If, on the other hand, someone enters the management side of this relationship, the principle will be found to imply certain specific obligations in regard to his employees. In either case, implications that are at first only potential become actual as a result of new experience. They are discovered. The function of the teacher in regard to this type of personal discovery is easy to see. By hypothesis, he already sees the implications of a given truth and attempts to communicate them to another person. It is taken for granted that in this case the student himself also knows the truth the implications of which are to be taught to him. In terms of the example given, it is presumed that the student knows and accepts the principle that men are not to be treated as means to an end. It remains for the teacher to draw out

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its implications. The student is saved the trouble, and unfortunately the value as well, of going through his own experiences to discover for himself the implications of truth that he knows. St. Thomas makes a distinction as to the manner in which the speaker must communicate these new truths to the listener. In some cases, it is enough if the teacher simply presents the new truth to the student. Because of his prior training and his power of insight, and because he already has the habitus of the science in question, the student will immediately see the connection between the propositions he already knows and the new truth taught him. He will see that the store of propositions he already admits implies the new proposition. Similarly the intelligible is twofold. There is one for whose understanding the intellect of a given man suffices as soon as it (the intelligible) is presented for its consideration. Thus he who presents it is said to teach as though by leading to knowledge in the way that one shows a thing to the sense of vision by putting it before someone's eyes.24 In such a case, St. Thomas observes, the teacher acts only as an accidental mover, motor accidentalis. He sets the proposition before the mind of the student, who thereupon deduces its truth. The teacher presents the truth in a manner analogous to the way that he might bring an object before a person's vision. Nothing more than this is required, for the student possesses the necessary collative strength of intellect.25 He will see that what he already knows implies the new proposition, and, with a little reflection perhaps, he will be able to explain how his prior knowledge implies it. In other cases, it may not be enough for the teacher simply to present the new proposition to the student. It may also be necessary for him to explain how the new truth is related to, and implied by, what the student already knows. The student's background and ability, his collative power of intellect, are not complete and capable enough to see the relationship between what he already knows 241n 11 sententiarum, 9, 1, 2, ad 4m. Similiter etiam intelligibile duplex: est. Unum ad quod intelligendum sufficit intellectus alicuius hominis, dummodo sibi considerandum proponatur; unde et ipse proponens docere dicitur quasi in cognitionem ducens, sicut in visu corporali monstrat rem qui eam coram oculis ponit. 25The virtus collativa is the ability to relate correctly two or more proposi· tions in a continuous chain of thought. Cf. S. Th. 1, 118, 1, c.: Sed ... proponit discipulo ordinem principorum ad conciusiones, qui forte per seipsum non hab· eret tantam virtutem collativam, ut ex principiis posset conclusiones deducere.

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and what the teacher is trying to communicate to him. "There is another (intelligible) for the knowledge of which the student's intellect does not suffice, unless it be led to it through something better known to itself."26 In terms of our syllogistic schema, the speaker would have to supply the explanatory middle term that connects the new proposition with the prior state of knowledge. If the material is especially difficult for the listener to understand it may require a breakdown into a number of such middle terms until the mind of the student is "led by the hand" (manuducitur) to see the new truth. The activity of the teacher is more extensive in this case than in the prior instance, where he only presents the new truth to the student. Here he serves as the motor essentialis of the student's process of reasoning. The difference between these two types of teaching depends on whether the student is able to see the relationship between the truths he already knows and the new proposition taught him. The grasp of this connection between acquired knowledge and new truth is important in discovery also. In order to discover the implications of our knowledge, it is not enough simply to have experiences. One must also be able to see that truths previously acquired apply to the experiences, and be able to state, at least vaguely, why they do apply. A person who enters into a labor-management situation may not realize that the moral principles he has hitherto accepted, such as the prohibition of treating other men as means, apply to this situation also. He may, for example, be convinced that all class distinctions are wrong, and that his relationship to an employer is therefore unnatural and unjust. This conviction may lead him to think that his moral principles do not apply to such a relationship. As a result, he will not try to discover what the principles imply in it. Because he does not see the connection between his prior knowledge and the new situation, he will not discover the new truths that should result from the reaction of his knowledge with new experience. In other cases, simple inadvertence may keep someone from seeing that truths he already accepts have implications in a given experience or situation. Some primitive Indian tribes of the Oaxaca region of Mexico never used the wheel as an instrument of transportation, even though it seems to have been 261n II sententiarum 9, I, 2, ad 4m. Aliud est ad cuius cognitionem non sufficit intellectus discipuli, nisi in hoc manuducatur per aliquid sibi magis notum.

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used in their children's toYS.27 They did not see that what they knew about wheels could have had useful implications in the work of transportation. In such cases of failure to make discoveries, and in the case of the student who cannot see the connection between his acquired knowledge and new truths taught him, what is lacking is the ability to see the new experience, situation, or subject matter under the proper aspect. 28 There are many aspects of an experience or situation that can be considered, but one particular aspect must be perceived if a person is to realize that certain principles or truths apply. The formal aspect (ratio forma lis) to which the principle pertains must be abstrated from the experience before the application of the principle will be realized. Thus the employer-employee relation can be considered under several aspects: as an economic relationship, as a relationship of communication, the efficiency of which can be studied, or as a psychological relationship in which certain human attitudes can be observed. Many other aspects of the relation can be found, depending on the purpose for which we wish to study it. However, only when someone sees it as a relationship between two persons, each of whom retains the right to be treated as a person, will he realize that his principles of moral conduct have implications in it. This is the formal aspect of the situation that must be perceived. It is the ratio by which the situation can be subsumed within the general moral principle, and by reason of which it can be taken as a case in which the principle has applications. In the case of that type of teaching in which the teacher acts as motor essentialis, it is part of his function to show the student the formal aspect that must be considered if the connection between the new material and acquired knowledge is to be seen. He must tell him the middle terms which serve to connect them. When the teacher serves as accidental mover, this is not necessary. The student is able to see the correct formal aspect himself. The teacher 27Cf. W. H. Holmes, Handbook of Aboriginal American Antiquities, Part I. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), p. 20. It is conceivable, however, that the wheeled toys came from a later period, perhaps after the discovery of the Americas by the Europeans, even though they were found together with remnants from the prediscovery period. 28The term "aspect" is used as equivalent to the Latin term "ratio." It expresses well enough the meaning and the indeterminacy of the Latin word to be serviceable in this essay.

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needs only to present the new truth to him for him to see that it is implied by what he already knows. The connection between knowledge and its implications, once the latter have been discovered, can be expressd in a syllogism. The major premise is the proposition that pertained to the original store of knowledge. Thus, "No person should be treated as means to an end," is the proposition originally admitted and the major premise of the syllogism. The conclusion is its implication in the new situation or experience, the new truth that has been discovered. "Employers (or employees) should not be treated as means to an end," is the conclusion. The connection between the mst premise and the conclusion is based on the fact that employers and employees are considered as persons, and this fact is expressed in what becomes the minor premise of the syllogism, "Employers (or employees) are human persons, with all the rights belonging to persons." The syllogism takes the form: No person should be treated as means to an end. But employers are persons. Therefore employers should not be treated as means to an end. The middle term of the syllogism is "person." It states the formal ~pect under which employers or employees must be considered if the applications of the principle to their case is to be seen. The fact that they can be thus considered, that they do possess such an aspect, is expressed in the minor premise, where that aspect is predicated of them. Thus grasping the connection between prior knowledge and new material is equivalent to grasping the truth of the minor premise. In speaking of discovery and the syllogism, St. Thomas says that the major premise is known before its implication, the conclusion, is learned. Thus the major premise forms part of the original store of knowledge. "The major proposition is known before the conclusion, not only by priority of nature, but also by priority of time."29 Discovery takes place when further experience is had and it is seen that new material can be included under the major premise. The first step is to see that the new material can be subsumed under the original proposition, the major premise. It must be seen that there is a formal aspect in the new material by which it can be related to the major premise. "If, in the minor proposition, 291ft posteriOTUm analyticOTUm, I. leet. 2. n. 2-. Maior ergo propositio praecognoscitur conclusioni non solum natura. sed tempore.

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there is introduced a term which, it is determined, is contained under the universal in the major proposition, then the truth of the minor proposition is shown." so If it is determined that the new material can be subsumed under the major premise, the truth of the minor premise is immediately shown, because the minor premise does no more than state the fact that the new material can be included under the major premise. It states that there is a ratioexpressed as the predicate of the minor premise-by which the new material can be connected to the major premise. Once the truth of the minor premise is thus determined, the conclusion follows immediately: "And thus knowledge of the conclusion is immediately had."s1 St. Thomas's presentation makes it clear that the central point of discovery lies in determining the truth of the minor premise, for once this is done, knowledge of the conclusion follows immediately. But the minor premise does no more than state that the new material experienced or learned possesses an aspect by reason of which it can be subsumed under the major premise. Therefore, to ascertain the truth of the minor premise is equivalent to perceiving such an aspect in the new material. Thus the crucial part of discovery lies in perceiving the correct aspect of the new material experienced. When the natural process of reasoning takes place under the guidance of a teacher, it is still necessary for the inquirer to see the correct aspect of the new truth taught to him. In some cases the student can do this himself, in other cases the teacher must help him to do it. In the latter instance, says St. Thomas, the teacher is the essential mover of the growth in knowledge. These are the elements in what can be called deductive discovery or teaching of new truths. We should not minimize the effect that such subsequent discovery has upon the original propositions and concepts that served as its basis. The discovery serves to enrich the content of the original concepts, for it changes their actual, explicit content. It is true that the first concept or proposition contained potentially the deducible elements, but there is a difference between potential and actual presence. The actual content of a mathematician's knowledge of Euclid's axioms is different from the 30 Idem. Si autem in minori propositione assumatur terminus. de quo manifestum sit quod continetur sub universali in maiori propositione. patet veritas minoris propositionis. 311dem. Et sic statim habetur. conclusionis cognitio.

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explicit content of the knowledge he had of them when he began to study geometry. It is true that, at both stages in his life, he can make absolute statements about Euclid's axioms, and that these statements will express the essence of the axioms. It is also true that if he learned his lessons well from the beginning, none of his later statements will contradict the ones he then made. Still, as a professional mathematician he will be able to make more statements about the axioms than he could when he was going through his first geometry text, and as a professional he will probably qualify many of the statements that he expressed unconditionally as a beginner. The original concepts have become richer because of the experiences and lessons that have taken place.

• The syllogism can be considered to express a logical movement of thought that proceeds in another direction, one that begins with the conclusion as its starting point. The premises then serve as an explanation of the conclusion. By means of the middle term of the syllogism, they tell why the predicate of the conclusion is attributed to its subject. The premises thus give the reason for the truth of the conclusion. Corresponding to this function of the syllogism, there is a movement of the natural process of reasoning which moves in the logical direction opposite to that of the process of deductive discovery. This is the process of justifying something we already know. Something still has to be discovered in this process, for the correct explanation must be found to explain the statement that is questioned. This is still a growth in knowledge of being, for it looks for the causes of beings. The result of the quest for explanation, if a solution has been found, will be capable of being expressed in a syllogism. The conclusion of the syllogism will be the proposition that was to be explained, and the premises will be the explanation reached, provided a propter quid justification of the problematic statement has been attained. The major premise must express a truth that had been contained in our prior store of knowledge, if the explanation is to be satisfactory. The problematic statement will be satisfactorily explained only when it has been logically connected with other statements that are already known to be true. The discovery required in this process is that of seeing how a given unexplained proposition can be related to propositions accepted as true. In order to discover the explanation of a problematic experience

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or proposition, it is necessary to see a certain formal aspect, a ratio formalis, in the experience or statement. This requirement is the same as that made in deductive discovery, where it is necessary to perceive a certain formal aspect of an experience or situation before the applications of a principle to it can be realized. In the case of explanation, there may be several aspects of the problematic experience that are open to consideration, but only one of them will yield the correct explanation of why the fact is as it is. Only one aspect, from the many that are present, will be the ratio by means of which the problematic experience or statement can be subsumed under a general proposition already known to be true. The discoverer must find the formal aspect that serves to connect the problem to some known truth. What occurs in this process, is that the problematic experience or statement is suddenly seen to be an instance of a more universal law, which is expressed in the explanatory proposition. But in order to see the problem as an instance of this law, the investigator must see, within the problematic experience itself, the ratio or aspect by means of which the problem can be subsumed under the law.32 To take a simple example, a person may observe that two wheels roll at different speeds. If he wishes to find the explanation of this phenomenon, he must concentrate his attention on the correct aspect of it and neglect other irrelevant aspects. If the two wheels happen to be of unequal diameter, their color and material may be neglected, but their geometry must be considered. The mathematical aspect is the one to be studied: it is the ratio in the problem that relates it to propositions that can explain the different speeds. Once geometrical propositions are connected to the problem, its explanation is obtained; but one must first see that the geometrical aspect of the problem is the one that can furnish the answer. In another case, the investigator may have to consider the material from which the wheels are made, since one material may give better traction than another. The geometrical properties can be neglected this time. In still another instance, the explanation may come only if the relative weights of the wheels are considered. 32M. L. Roure gives an account of this notion of the power of invention. Cf.

Logique et metalogique. (Paris: E. Vitte, 1957), p. 12 n. I: C'est dire qu'il y a une sorte de "technique de l'invention," et il semble que ce soient les Topiques qui exposent, chez Aristote, cette technique, it savoir Ie repertoire ou l'inventaire des "lieux" ou ron pouna trouver les moyens d'aniver aux premises utiles pour construire un syllogisme.

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Finding an explanation thus demands grasping which aspect of the problematic experience furnishes the key to the solution by connecting the problem to explanatory premises. When such obviously different aspects as color, weight, material, and shape are involved, it is usually easy to see which of them holds the key to the solution of a problem. However, since appeal to such properties can furnish only a very general explanation, further discovery is required for better precision. This entails greater difficulty in discovery. For example, it may be clear that in a given case a geometrical explanation can solve a problem. Mathematical propositions contain the answer. But to which geometrical statements must the investigator appeal? Not all of them are relevant to the problem. The investigator must not only see that the geometrical aspect of his problem is the one relevant to its solution; he must also perceive what sort of a geometrical figure he is dealing with. In the example of the two wheels, he must see that his subject matter contains the ratio of circle.88 This insight is required for the necessary precision in his explanation, for only those geometrical propositions that deal with circles are capable of giving the explanation of the problematic experience. The subject matter must be perceived as a circle before it can be connected to propositions that can explain it. It is easy to see that wheels are circular figures. In other cases, however, it may be very difficult to discover the precise type of figure involved in the problem. Kepler's discovery of the elliptical path as the explanation for planetary motion is an example of this.84 Kepler was faced with a set of experiences that constituted a problem. He could not explain the measurements which Tycho Brache and others had made of the motion of planets. In logical terms, he was in possession of several propositions - those expressing the measurements of planetary positions - which neither he nor anyone else could explain. It was clear that the problem dealt with geometrical explanations, but which geometrical propositions could 33St. Thomas uses the example of a triangle. Cf. In posteriorum analyticorum, I, lect. 2, n. 21: Ut si sic demonstraret aliquis, omnis triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, ista cognita, nondum habetur conclusionis cognitio: sed cum postea assumitur, haec figura descripta in semicirculo est trianguIus, statim scitur quod habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Si autem non esset manifestum quod haec figura in semicircula descripta est triangulus, nondum statim inducta assumptione sciretur conclusio. 84A philosophical account of Kepler's discovery may be found in N. R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: The University Press, 1958), pp. 70-85.

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provide the exact answer? Some investigators had tried to consider planetary motion as a circular path, but this did not succeed in explaining the data. When the measurements were connected with geometrical propositions that describe circular figures, they were not correctly explained. Kepler first tried the ovoid, but also without success. Only when he considered planetary motion as an elliptical path did he find an explanation for the measurements. The geometrical properties of the ellipse were such as to be able to explain the data of measurement. When Kepler connected his data to propositions that describe the ellipse, the data were no longer problematic. They were explained, since they could be logically deduced from the properties of the ellipse. Analysis of Kepler's discovery shows that he is given two things to work with. He has the problematic statements or experiences, which have not been explained. He also has a certain store of scientific and mathematical propositions which are accepted as true, and among which are included propositions describing the ellipse and its properties. The problem is to connect the unexplained statements to the known propositions in such a way that the former can be deduced from the latter. This will explain the problematic statements. The discovery consists in seeing how this connection can be made. It can be made by finding, in the problematic data, a certain formal aspect under which the data can be logically related to propositions known to be true. Thus the discovery consists in abstracting a ratio from the unexplained experience. In Kepler's case, the formal aspect he had to see in the data was that of an ellipse. He had to perceive that the motion of planets could be seen as an ellipse. Once he experienced this insight into his problem, he found the explanation to it. After the discovery has been made, the explanation can be expressed in a syllogism, if a propter quid solution has been found. The conclusion of the syllogism, which was the problematic statement that Kepler began with, is "The path of the planets has the characteristics X, Y, Z, ..." The explanation he found is expressed in the major premise, "The ellipse has the characteristics X, Y, Z, ..." The minor premise expresses the connection between the two, "The path of the panets is an ellipse." The syllogism takes the form: The ellipse has the characteristics X, Y, Z, But the path of the planets is an ellipse.

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Therefore the path of the planets has the characteristics X, Y,Z, ... Planetary motion is thus explained. The ability to experience the correct insight into a problematic statement or experience, and thus to discover an explanation of it, depends on a subjective factor, the advance in knowledge already made by the person who is trying to explain the proposition.31i This in turn depends on the state of human knowledge in general. In order to discover the explanation of his problem, Kepler had to have at his disposal a knowledge of what an ellipse is and what its properties are. He did have these necessary concepts, and was able to make his discovery. In other cases, a deficiency in the necessary store of knowledge may make it impossible for someone to solve a problem. A man who is totally ignorant of biology may know, from his own experience or from having been told so, that oranges are a cure for the disease called scurvy. He accepts the proposition as true, but cannot explain why it is true. Since he knows nothing about biology, he does not have scientific principles to which he can appeal for an explanation of the statement. If he does attempt to furnish an explanation, it will probably be incorrect, because his store of knowledge does not contain propositions capable of giving the correct one. He can appeal to no other concepts and propositions except those he knows, and these are inadequate. He may, for example, venture that oranges heat the body, and thus cause the cure. Such an explanatory middle term certainly does not give the real reason for the truth of the proposition, but the person in question is incapable of giving anything better. He would have to be trained in biology and learn a number of biological propositions before he would have the concepts and propositions needed to explain the proposition correctly. In Western civilization, the explanation that oranges heat the body and thus cure a disease would be considered inadequate, because we have other explanaations which are far more satisfactory. Development in science has furnished concepts and propositions that are capable of giving better reasons for the problem in question. However, in a civilization that by Western standards could be called scientifically primitive, the explanation that oranges heat the 3liSt. Thomas says that before discovery of conclusions can be had. there must be a grasp of certain concepts and a knowledge of the truth of certain propositions. Cf. In posteriorum anaZyticorum, 1, lect. 2. nn. 13-16.

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body might be satisfactory. The members of such a civilization would have only very rudimentary knowledge of biological and medical truths, and thus would not have the standards to measure this answer as inadequate. It would be the best possible explanation for that civilization, and no one in it would question it or attempt to go further beyond it. This does not mean that the truth known by persons of that culture is different from that known by a scientist. It simply means that they are content with an explanation that does not satisfy the scientist. Their interests and abilities lead them to a less refined grasp of the truth than that reflched by a person in a scientifically more advanced culture. The positive sciences are not the only type of knowledge to use this process of explanation. The search for explanation goes on, with methods appropriate to each, in other fields of thought. An example in the history of religions can be found in the SumerianAkkadian attempt to explain the world and man's place in it by appeal to the activity of certain mythological figures, and especially to a primitive struggle between two called Tiamat and Marduk. This was not the correct, objective explanation of the existential situation of the world and man, but it did serve as a solution for this problem in that particular culture. It provided a set of middle terms which could explain, to the members of the Sumerian civilization, certain problems in human and cosmic existence, among them the problem of evil. Some of the questions which the Sumerians attempted to solve with their mythology have since been answered by scientific explanation, while others were of such a nature that human reason needed the assistance of revelation to obtain the true solution, a solution that can be had only in faith. Whatever the field of thought, the structure of this process of explanation retains the same general lines. Someone is confronted with an experience or situation which he cannot explain. He has a certain store of acquired knowledge, which he holds to be true. The problem of discovery in this case consists in relating the problematic experience to the known propositions in such a way that the former can be deduced logically from the latter. This is done by perceiving, in the problematic experience, a certain aspect under which the experience can be logically related to a universal proposition already known. 36 36Mythological explanation also follows this process, and mixes the creativity of imagination with it. The problems it tries to solve are those of cosmic dimen-

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Once the structure of this second process of the natural discourse of reasoning has been grasped, the teacher's part in assisting another person to discover the explanation of a given problem may easily be seen. The teacher has to point out the fact that a certain proposition contained in the student's store of knowledge is capable of explaining another which presents a problem to him. If the collative strength of the student's intellect is powerful enough, it will be enough if the teacher simply points out the proposition that can explain the problem. The student will see the connection himself. In such a case, the teacher acts as the accidental mover, according to the terminology of St. Thomas. If more is needed, the teacher may have to explain the relation between the explanatory proposition and the problem. In doing so, he acts as the essential mover of the learning process. He may need to build up a number of middle terms before the explanatory relationship is apparent to the student. A teacher explaining certain principles of justice may have to take his student through several steps of explanation before the principles are connected to propositions the student already knows concerning the nature of man. The distinctions made between deductive and explanatory teaching and reasoning should not be taken to be mutually exclusive in the concrete activity of communication or discovery. They express two general directions of inquiry that the process of reasoning may follow, but the presence of one need not exclude the other. They may, and usually do, work together. For example, we may have a proposition of whose truth we are not certain. We hold it for some extrinsic reason, perhaps on authority. Then we suddenly are taught, or see for ourselves, an objective explanation of the proposition. The explanatory aspect of reasoning is thus realized. At the same time, we come into possession of a new truth, for the problematic proposition is now seen under a new aspect as a result of the explanation. In this way, there is a newness discovered about the old proposition. We had never seen it that way before. The sions: the cycle of days and seasons, life and death, good and evil, and so forth. The explanatory propositions are often statements that express personal activity. It is experienced that personal activity in the human sphere results in certain situations and states of affairs. The cosmic order is considered to be itself the result of some such personal cause. Statements describing personal activity, such as those expressing the struggle between the figures of Tiamat and Marduk, are held to be the explanation of certain elements in the situation of man and the universe. Ordinary human activity could not produce such cosmic effects, however, so the personal figures in myths are given extraordinary stature and power, and may even be considered as divinities.

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man who comes to realize that certain moral principles apply in a situation in which he thought they did not apply, learns something new about this situation. Thus both functions of syllogistic thought, the explanatory and the inventive, are realized in one concrete process. The two forms of discovery are not necessarily exclusive, although in a given case one may predominate over the other.

... The discovery that looks for the explanation of a problematic proposition is considered achieved when the proposition is logically related to others which are known to be true. The truth of the former proposition is shown to be derivable from the truth of the latter. The inquiry may go another step further and ask for an explanation of the explanatory proposition itself, which thereupon must be related to still another explanatory statement. However, this process cannot go on indefinitely. Explanations come to an end somewhere. According to St. Thomas, they terminate in propositions which are self-evident and need no further explanation. "Just as, in demonstrations, there must be reduction to some principles which are self-evident to the intellect, so also in determining what a thing is; otherwise in both cases there would be an infinite regress, and all science and knowledge of things would be 10st."37 Thus sooner or later explanations must appeal to self-evident propositions. The process of deductive discovery, in which the implications of truths already known are sought, also involves self-evident propositions. But unlike explanation, it does not terminate in them. Instead, it begins with them. The teacher begins to teach in the same way as the discoverer begins to discover, that is, by proposing, to the student's consideration, principles known to him; for all learning and all science is achieved from preexistent knowledge; and by leading these principles to their conclusions. . . .38 37 De veritate, I, a. 1, c. Sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est unumquod. que; alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cog· nitio rerum. 38SCG. II, 75. Docens igitur hoc modo incipit docere sieut inveniens incipit invenire, offerendo scilicet considerationi discipuli principia ab eo nota; quia omnis disciplina et omnis scientia ex praeexistenti fit cognitione, et illa principia in conclusiones deducendo . . . . Cf. De veritate, XI, a. 1, c., and In librum Boethii de trinitate, VI, 4, c.

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The question arises concerning the discovery and communication of these self-evident propositions, which seem to play such a central role both in deductive and in explanatory thinking. Where do they come from, if they are not deduced from other propositions? How can they be explained, if someone claims he does not understand why they are true? Since deductive discovery begins with such self-evident propositions, and explanations find their ultimate reasons in them, these questions are of great importance in the study of discovery and teaching. A distinction may be made between two types of self-evident propositions. There are a number of them which follow directly from the notion of being and which are therefore admitted by everyone, such as the principle of noncontradiction. They are involved in every act of knowledge and process of reasoning and thus are known, at least implicitly, by everyone. They express truths which apply to the entire realm of being. There are other self-evident propositions that are used only in a limited area of knowledge. They are propositions relevant only within sciences besides metaphysics, and hence do not apply formally to all beings nor to all the aspects of being. The self-evident propositions of geometry, for instance, apply only to material beings, and only to one aspect of such beings, that is, to their quantitative aspect. Other aspects of material beings, such as their qualitative determinations, are not formally treated in geometry and geometrical self-evident propositions do not formally apply to them. All problems within such a restricted science find their ultimate explanation in the self-evident propositions that are proper to that science. Thus any theorem in Euclidian geometry finds the ultimate reasons for its truth in one or several of Euclid's axioms. In pushing the quest for explanation further and further back, one would come sooner or later to one of the self-evident axioms which bear the explanation of their truth in themselves. They need be explained by no geometrical proposition prior to them. Analysis of such fundamental self-evident propositions shows that their subject is itself a concept that is fundamental and irreducible in the science in question. Just as the propositions cannot be explained by any prior proposition, so their subject cannot be broken down into a more basic concept. As St. Thomas says, In these (mathematical) sciences are supposed those things which are first in the genus of quantity; as unity and line and

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"surface and others of this sort. When these are supposed, certain others are sought through demonstration; such as equilateral triangles and quadrilaterals in geometry, and others of this sort.59 Thus the first concepts of line, unity, surface, and so forth, are the point of departure for demonstration of truths concerning other concepts, such as those of different types of geometrical figures. But in order that such concepts can be used in a reasoning process, they must be incorporated into propositions. Reasoning works with propositions, not with simple concepts. The primary, irreducible concepts thus become the subjects of self-evident propositions in which they are used. 40 In order that such propositions be self-evident, it is necessary that they be analytically true. The predicate of the proposition must express an attribute that necessarily belongs to the subject. Such an attribute must therefore be either part of the definition of the subject or one of its properties. If this is the case, anyone who fully understands the meaning of the subject term will realize that the predicate must be attributed to it, and the proposition will be selfevident. "The immediate principles themselves are not known through any extrinsic middle term, but through knowledge of their own terms."41 There is no need to explain, by means of other propositions, why the self-evident proposition is true. Thus the discovery of such self-evident propositions will consist in apprehension of the concepts that serve as their subjects. This apprehension includes insight into what the properties of the concepts are. Teaching such propositions will involve helping someone to experience insight into these concepts and properties. It will involve helping the student to see the meaning behind the words used in the selfevident propositions. When Aristotle speaks of inductio, e7r~Y(,)Y~' he refers to this intellectual insight into an analytical statement that will be the foundation for further deduction and explanation. 39In posteriorum analyticorum, 1, lect. 2, n. 17. Supponuntur enim in his scientiis ea quae sunt prima in genere quantitatis: sicut unitas, et linea, et superficies et alia huiusmodi. Quibus suppositis, per demonstrationem quaeruntur quaedam alia. sicut triangulus aequilaterus, quadratum in geometricis et alia huiusmodi. 4oCf. In posteriorum analyticorum, 1. lect. 2, n. 18. 41In posteriorum analyticorum, lib. 1, lect. 7. n. 67. Ipsa autem pnnclpla immediata non per aliquod medium extrinsecum cognoscuntur. sed per cognitionem propriorum tenninorum.

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Aristotle calls the formation of analytically true judgments i7T(%"f(Ui~' which is termed inductio in Latin (from in-duco, I introduce). Aristotelian induction (not to be confused with the induction of Bacon or Mill, which was also known to Aristotle) is a cognitive process composed of the two first intellectual operations: the formation of concepts by abstraction and the enunciation of judgments; this process "introduces" the first judgments into our intellect. . . . The analytically evident judgments serve as a point of departure for deductive science.42 The analytical proposition can serve as the starting point of a chain of thought or of an entire science, but one must first arrive at the analytical proposition. By the intellectual act of induction, Aristotle accounts for the grasp of the analytical statement. By its power of simple apprehension, the intellect knows an essence. It is then able to express the content of this essence by means of a judgment which forms the analytical statement. Having reached this point, it can go on to formulate syllogisms that will either unfold the implications of this proposition or will serve to explain others. 43 The analytical propositions reached by such induction are sel£evident. Anyone who fully understands the meaning of the terms used in them should assent to the truth of the propositions. "Any proposition whose predicate is in the ratio of the subject, is known immediately and per se. . . . "44 However, a difficulty exists in the understanding of the terms. Mere ability to repeat the words does not mean that one has experienced insight into the concepts they express. The difficulty does not appear when the proposition is composed of terms like "whole" and "part," whose meanings have been learned by everyone. "The terms of certain propositions are 42G. Kalinowski, "La theorie aristotelicienne des habitus intellectuels," Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, v. 43 (1959), p. 252. Aristote appelle Ie processus de la formation des judgments analytiquement evidents ,111"a'Y"''Y7/ nomme en latin inductio (de in-duco, j'introduis). L'induction aristotelicienne (qu'il ne faut pas confondre avec l'induction dit baconienne ou millienneconnue d'ailleurs aussi par Aristote) est un processus cognitif compose des deux premieres operations intellectuelles: la formation des concepts par l'abstraction et l'enonciation des jugements; il "introduit" dans notre intellect les premiers jugements. . . . Les jugements analytiquement evidents servent de point de depart a la science deductive. 48The presence of the act of induction as the source of analytical judgments shows that these judgments are not, properly speaking, deduced from the first principles of being. 44ln posteriorum analyticorum, I, lect. 5, n. 50. Quaelibet propositio, cuius praedicatum est in ratione subiect!, est immediata et per se nota, quantum est in se.

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such as to be known by all, such as 'being' and 'one' and others which pertain to being.... Thus, such propositions much be held as self-evident not only in themselves, but also in regard to all."45 The concepts behind such words are known to all, and everyone can see that the propositions they form are self-evident and analytically true. The problem appears, however, when we consider some esoteric insights, such as those which are at the basis of certain theories in science or mathematics. The basic propositions of relativity physics may be self-evident to one who has gone through the mathematical and scientific training required to understand them, but they are hardly that to a person untrained in science. There are some immediate propositions, the terms of which are not known to all. Therefore, even though the predicate is in the ratio of the subject, because the definition of the subject is not known to all, it is not necessary that such propositions be admitted by all. 46 Until he acquires a training in physics and mathematics, a person will find it impossible to experience insight into the meaning of the terms used in relativity or quantum theory. He must be brought through extensive instruction before his mind is capable of being taught the essences expressed in the basic propositions of these branches of science. In the original discovery of such self-evident propositions, preparation is also required. There must exist a certain development of knowledge to bring a thinker to the threshold of new discoveries. The self-evident propositions at the base of wave mechanics could be discovered only after quantum theory had prepared the way for them. Development in one theory or field of knowledge anticipates a breakthrough into a new theory or science, and is necessary for it. Discoveries of new methods of explanation, and insight into the self-evident propositions at the base of such explanation, are not made in an intellectual vacuum. They take their point of departure from knowledge and especially from problems which pre45Idem. Sed quarundam propositionum termini sllnt tales, quod sunt in notitia omnium, sieut ens, et unum, et alia quae sunt en tis, in quantum ens . . . . Unde oportet quod tales propositiones non solum in se, sed etiam quoad omnes, quasi per se notae habeantur. 46Idem. Quaedam vero propositiones sunt immediatae, qua rum termini non sunt apud omnes noti. Unde, licet praedicatum sit de ratione subiecti, tamen quia definitio subiecti non est omnibus nota, non est necessarium quod tales propositiones ab omnibus concedantur.

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cede them. Thus the doctrine of the potential intellectual preexistence of truth yet unknown still holds. In the present instance, the new truths are not contained potentially as implications in statements they are to be derived from, as in the case of deductive discovery of truth. In f.'l':ajCUj;', prior knowledge contains potentially the matter to be discovered by showing the need for a new principle of explanation. In its inability to answer questions that arise, knowledge already possessed anticipates discovery of new selfevident propositions, new explanatory principles. In this type of induction, as Aristotle calls it, the genius of discovery plays its most important role in the advance of human knowledge. It is one thing to draw out the implications of a truth already possessed, or to see the explanatory relationship between two propositions, but it is quite a different and much more a difficult thing to see a new way of explaining things, to have the insight that furnishes the basis of a new branch of science. This is the work of a truly creative thinker, in the strongest sense of the expression. Just as this type of discovery is difficult but most important, so the communication or teaching of such an original insight is at once fraught with difficulties and possessed of preeminent importance in human communication. In the case of knowledge previously discussed, the teacher draws out the implications of what the student already knows, or shows the explanatory relationships between propositions the student is already acquainted with. In the present case, the teacher or speaker has to communicate something more radically new to the student. He has to help the student experience the insight that will serve as the key to a given set of propositions or to an entire science. Thus, in the case of the teacher of metaphysics, the problem is to communicate an explicit knowledge of the notion of being. Mathematics requires that the teacher communicate such concepts as limit, rate of change, and infinite sequence, which serves as the basis for the calculus. In teaching ethics, a certain concept of the .nature of man must be communiated if the ethical rules presented are to appear reasonable to the student. In communicating a given philosophical system, certain fundamental notions must be transmitted if the system is to have logical consistency. Bergson has said that every philosopher worthy of the name has really said. only one thing; his whole system depends on

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one central insight. 47 If this is true, then communication of the philosopher's entire system depends primarily on communication of this central insight. An entire set of logically related propositions, be it a science, a philosophical system, or simply a logical chain of thought, has meaning to the student only if he understands certain fundamental concepts and self-evident propositions that are at the base of such a structure of thought. When the problem is taken out of the context of formal education and the entire field of human communication and argument is considered, it may be seen that in countless cases the same difficulty arises. Often the process by which one person tries to explain something or tell something systematically to another, is simply the process of trying to get the listener to see something that the speaker sees. Deduction and application follow easily enough after this is done. There can be no argument or difference of opinion, or if there is it can be quickly settled, in regard to whether a given chain of reasoning is logically consistent or not. Real arguments do not arise about whether or not a person is logical in what he says. If someone persists in not being logical, there can be no argument. The difficulty in real arguments, and the source of authentic differences of opinion, lies in the first premises of a chain of thought.48- In order to convince another of his point of view, a person must bring him to appreciate the truth of the analytical proposition that is the foundation of his argument. This demands in tum that he bring his listener to grasp the key concept, to experience insight into the essence that serves as the subject of the analytical, self-evident proposition. The proposition will not be selfevident to the listener until he has this insight. Thus two men may argue about the morality of birth control. The root of their disagreement will not be found in the logic of their steps of reasoning, but in the definition of man that lies behind their reasoning. The way one person understands the nature of man will determine the ethical rules he derives from human nature. To convince another person of these rules requires first that he bring his adversary to 47Cf. La pensee et Ie mouvant. (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1934), p. 141. 48 Certain publications in recent British linguistic philosophy have treated the structure of argument and have stressed the fact that logical consistency is only one factor in determining the value of an argument. More important are the understanding of and agreement upon the material to which the logical rules are applied. Cf. R. Crawshay-Williams, Methods and Criteria of Reasoning. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 174-178.

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agree to the concept of human nature that is behind such ethical norms. There is a special difficulty that accompanies the attempt to communicate these fundamental and original concepts, stemming from the fact that words must be used as the tools of communication. The speaker must make use of terminology which the listener already understands, and at the same time he must communicate something new to him. The teacher cannot simply name the new essence and thus communicate it to the student, for ex hypothesi the student does not know what the name means. The problem is to bring the student to understand the meaning of the words used. It cannot be shown whether a thing is thus, before it is understood what is signified by the name. Therefore the Philosopher, in IV Metaphysics, in his argument against those who deny principles, teaches to begin with the meaning of names.'9

It would seem that the best way of transmitting the concept or the meaning of the word!;, would be to stir up in the mind of the student or listener a problem that will lead him to have the insight himself. The student will not perceive the essence in an intellectual vacuum, any more than the discoverer will. Formulating a problem in his mind is the way to lead him to grasp the concept that is to be communicated. Since the teacher already knows the meaning of the terms, he should be able to organize the problem context in a manner that leads the student most efficiently and accurately to see the truth himself. "For teaching," as Fr. Bernard Lonergan says, "is the communication of insight." 50 We cannot overestimate the value of this third aspect of teaching, both in the classroom and in communication and attempts at persuasion that go on in the current of life's affairs. Once the key concept is understood and accepted, all the deductions follow easily enough. The rules of logical deduction may be known and agreed upon by all, but the source of misunderstanding and disagreement is the material to which the rules of logic are applied, namely, the key concepts in a chain of reasoning. This is true not only in formal systems, like mathematics, but also in all fields of human knowledge that make use of deductive thought in any way. 49In posteriorum analyticorum, I, leet. 2, n. 17. Sed non potest ostendi de aliquo an sit, nisi prius intelligatur quid signifiearetur per nomen. Proper quod etiam Philosophus in IV Metaphysicae, in disputatione contra negantes principia docet incipere a signifieatione nominum. GOlnsight, p. 174.

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Basing our study on the logical structure of the syllogism, we have discussed three general processes of discovery and teaching or communication. The first is a movement towards the discovery of truth implied in knowledge we already possess. The second is the discovery of explanatory relationships between a problematic statement and propositions already acquired in our store of knowledge. The third is the discovery and communication of new insights that may serve as the material for analytical propositions, which in turn become the points of departure for chains of deductive reasoning or explanation. We have simply described the philosophical structure of these activities and have not gone into the many related problems which could have been treated. It must be stated that our three distinctions do not represent three absolutely independent processes of the mind. Rather, the three are closely mingled in the one concrete reality that is the mind seeking new knowledge, discovering new essences, and forming new concepts. They interact with and complement one another in the concrete activity of discovery and communication.

7

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IN A DISCOURSE OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE INCARNATION AND THE KINGSHIP OF CHRIST by JOHN

K.

RYAN

In the thirty years of his life as a member of the Order of Preachers St. Thomas Aquinas must have preached on countless occasions and on many subjects. Certain sermons and conferences are known to be his. Many more have been attributed to him, but the task of proving or disproving their authorship remains to be done. Of the authentic sermons, that entitled Sermo in prima dominica Adventus Domini /ratris Thomae de Aquino has an especial value from every point of view, theological, philosophical, literary, and even biographical. It has been edited by Dom Jean Leclercq, O.S.B., who also sums up the evidence for its authenticity and describes the oldest manuscript in which it is found. 1 It is Dom Leclercq's conclusion that the sermon was preached during St. Thomas's second period of teaching in Paris, which lasted from 1269 to 1272. Manuscript evidence indicates that this sermon, together with sermons by other preachers in the collection in which it is found, Was delivered about the year 1270. There is a piece of internal evidence as to its date that Dom Leclercq does not mention. This discourse on the Incarnation and Christ the King was preached on the first Sunday in Advent, which in 1270 fell on November 80. Confirmation of this date may be found in the fact that November 80 is the feast of St. Andrew the Apostle. It is doubtless because of this coincidence of feast and Sunday that the preacher appropriately makes reference to St. Andrew's character and martyrdom in his closing words. 1 "Un sermon in~t de saint Thomas sur la royaute du Christ," Revue thomiste, XLVI Uanvier-Mars, 1946}, 152-66.

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It is therefore concluded that the sermon was delivered on November 30, 1270. As becomes evident to its reader, the sermon is a detailed and penetrating exegesis of the words of the prophet Zacharias, Ecce, rex tuus venit tibi, mansuetus, "Behold, your King comes to you, meek," as quoted in St. Matthew's Gospel. The operative word is venit, "comes," for the entire text is a prophecy of the coming of the Savior. More precisely, since he can come in four ways, it is a prophecy of his coming in the flesh. Each of the other five words in the Latin text necessarily contributes to this prophecy. The word ecce, "behold," has a probative function, and here again St. Thomas finds a quadriad of meanings. The Savior comes in a certain state or condition, as is indicated by the title of rex, "King," and there are four things to be discussed under that heading. The word tuus, "your," further specifies Christ's status as a king, and here also St. Thomas offers a quadriad of considerations. The purpose of the Incarnation, which is fourfold, is indicated by the word tibi, "to you." Since mansuetus, "meek," tells of the manner in which Christ came, there is a final quadriad: Christ's meekness before men is displayed in four ways. It may be said that St. Thomas has devised and put to use in this sermon a quadriatic formula. 2 It will also be noticed that in some of these quadriads he quotes four Scriptural texts in support or explanation of what he says. The architecture of the sermon is therefore extraordinarily symmetrical, as may be seen in the following outline of it. Introduction: Statement of text: Ecce rex tuus venit tibi, mansuetus: "Behold your king comes to you, meek." The Incarnation is God's greatest work; prayer for light. I. A. Christ's advent: exegesis of venit. l. In the flesh. 2. By grace. 3. At death. 4. In judgment. B. Transition: preliminary exegesis of other words in text. l. Indication.

2. Condition. 3. Utility. 4. Manner. 2This phrase is obviously fashioned and used with no implication that there is any analogy to the triadic formula found in the Hegelian dialectic.

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II. Indication: exegesis of ecce. 1. Certification. 2. Time. 3. Manifestation. 4. Comfort. III. A. Condition: exegesis of rex. 1. Unity. 2. Power. 3. Jurisdiction. 4. Equity. Recapitulation of what has been said thus far. IV. Condition: exegesis of tuus. 1. Likeness of man. 2. Love of man. 3. Care for man. 4. Association with man. V. Utility or Purpose: exegesis of tibi. 1. Manifestation of divinity. 2. Reconciliation. 3. Liberation. 4. Grace. VI. Manner: exegesis of mansuetus. 1. Conduct. 2. Patience. 3. Graciousness. 4. Passion. Conclusion: Prayer. In the beginning of the sermon there is something akin to what is found in an article in the Summa theologica. As in the tripartite method, there is at the outset an apparent conflict of texts. None of God's works is entirely comprehensible, and the greatest of them is completely beyond human reason. This is confirmed by Job and Malachias. On the other hand, a passage in St. Paul indicates that it is possible to discuss the Incarnation. This can be done only with God's grace, for which the preacher prays before entering upon his subject. If this opening passage is compared to the utrum, the videtur quod, and the sed contra of a Thomistic article, the rest of the sermon is a most thorough corpus and answer to possible objections. It may be noted at this place that twice in the course of the sermon St. Thomas anticipates errors or objections with regard to particular points that he is making. Thus, with regard to the Incarnation he writes that "it must not be thought that he came in the flesh by

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a change of place." Again, with reference to man's condition before the Redemption he writes: "You could say: God was an enemy to man because of sin; therefore it was better for me to be ignorant of him than to know him." Both of these difficulties are cleared up in a compact way. In accordance with the principles that theology "is based especially upon arguments from authority" and that "the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the most effective,"S St. Thomas makes very great use of Sacred Scripture in the sermon. Of New Testament books, the four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, nine of St. Paul's epistles, I and 2 Peter, James, I John, and Jude are quoted or used. The Psalms and seventeen other Old Testament books are cited. In all, there are 90 direct quotations from these 37 books in addition to various references to incidents or facts recorded in Scripture. The only human authority quoted by name is St. Augustine. Although he makes use of Aristotle, including the famous statement that all men by nature desire to know, he does not mention the Philosopher's name. St. Thomas makes use also of deeds described in Sacred Scripture, especially episodes in the life of Christ. His entire way of life, his obedience to his mother and to St. Joseph, his mode of entrance into Jerusalem, his patience before his enemies, and the gracious way in which he receives others-in which he is a pattern to superiorsare all instanced by Aquinas in the development of his theme. As should be, there is application of the truths that he finds in his meditation upon Scripture. Everything is summed up in a powerful maxim: "Let us imitate Christ. In this consists the perfection of Christian life." Not only does the preacher recall to his hearers Christ's character and deeds, he likewise describes a man who imitated Christ in his death. Since the example of our fellow men is usually a persuasive argument with us, St. Thomas tells the story of the martyrdom of St. Andrew the Apostle. Like everything in this sermon, it is carefully placed. After his account of Christ's meekness, he shows how the Apostle fulfilled that perfect Christian life about which he had spoken earlier. The types of logical argument that St. Thomas employs are varied and interesting. As elsewhere in his writings, he has effective analogies, especially those based on things familiar to his audience. Thus he uses a king's standard bearer to illustrate man's likeness S Cf.

s.

Th .. I. 1. 8. ad 2.

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to God. The degree of solemnity that should accompany a visitor is indicated by that which attends a kind or a papal legate. The special favor that a bishop shows to certain subjects illustrates another point of doctrine. The gratitude, or ingratitude, of a beggar to a king who has befriended him is a paradigm of our own attitude towards almighty God. The greatness of God's love for man, as shown by the Incarnation, is made clear by an a minori argument. God does not transfer beings from a lower to a higher level; stars are not changed into the sun, nor is an angel of a lower rank changed into one of a higher order. In the Incarnation God has done something far greater. Characteristic of St. Thomas Aquinas, as a thinker and writer, is his concern for careful and precise distinctions· and clear and accurate definitions. The sermon is so striking an instance of his method in this regard that it may almost be called a demonstration of defining and dividing. At the very outset he points out that ambiguity must be avoided. Since it is possible to assign four meanings to the term "coming" with reference to Christ, it is necessary to state these four verbal definitions and to state which one will be used by the speaker. Again, he distinguishes four uses of the word "behold." However, St. Thomas is even more concerned with real definitions than he is with nominal definitions, although both kinds necessarily go together. Thus he gives a careful explanation of what the Incarnation truly is. His statement that "body and soul are one man" amounts to an essential definition of man. When he takes up Christ's meekness, he offers an adaptation of Aristotle's statement that mildness holds a mean place between an excess and a defect of anger. G But the definitions which St. Thomas is most concerned with are those having to do with kingship. How is the term "king" to be use?6 What is a true king? Both theologically and philosophically, his answers to these questions constitute the most distinctive part of the sermon. It cannot with correctness be called solely a sermon on the kingship of Christ, for Christ's coming as a king is only a part, although a most important and interesting part, of this long discourse on the Incarnation. At the same time, this section is unique in the whole body of St. Thomas's works. It is the only for4In very clear application of the maxim. Qui bene distinguit bene docet. GCf. p. 2111. n. 101. 6Cf. pp. 206-11.

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mal and extended discussion by St. Thomas of a subject that is of special interest and importance in our own time. St. Thomas holds that four things are required that a man be correctly called a king. He must have unity of authority: there cannot be a plurality of kings in a realm. He must have fulness of power: he is not subject to a higher authority in the realm; he is not a viceroy or the delegate of another. He must have wide jurisdiction. He must be just; otherwise he is a tyrant, ruling not for the common good but for his own private interest.T Christ fulfills these four requirements. Moreover, he is shown to be king of all men in four ways. The concise statement of the theology of the kingship of Christ found in these passages is both original and profound. This is in itself sufficient to make the sermon a lasting contribution to theology and an important item in the great body of St. Thomas's writing. Any work of consequence throws some light upon its author, even if he writes with the austerity and absence of self-assertion that are part of St. Thomas's practice. It may be said that this sermon reveals St. Thomas in a somewhat different way from that of his other works. The discourse was delivered at the very height of his powers. In· his few remaining years many things were to be done by him, but the intellect and will that were still engaged on the Summa theologica, and that had already produced the Summa contra gentiles, the Quaestiones disputatae, the Scriptum super IV libros sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, the commentaries on Scripture and on Aristotle and other philosophers, and so much else, were at their best in composing this sermon. In it the vast knowledge, the mastery of both theology and philosophy, the ability to analyze, the power of synthesis, and the searching thought that were his are everywhere apparent. There is mastery in its total form and content as well as in every part of it. If there were a question of authorship with regard to this sermon on the Incarnation and the kingship of Christ, the work itself would provide an answer. It is either by St. Thomas Aquinas or by someone who for a brief time was miraculously endowed with the stupendous gifts of grace, nature, and learning that were his. The sermon provides evidence of what must have been St. Thomas's control over the spoken as well as over the written word. Of necessity, there would be many variations of delivery within so long TCf. p. 208. n. 58.

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a discourse. The introduction and expository parts would be handled differently from other places. Elaborately worked out as the sermon is, to a certain extent it may be looked upon as a most care· ful outline or set of notes. Hence it is likely that the speaker filled in and smoothed out some of the transitions from one subject to another, and that the Scriptural texts were introduced with skill and grace. It is hardly probable that he refrained from amplifying certain things as he went along. In a great saint who was likewise a teacher of unique genius and long experience there must have been a great understanding of the nature and needs of his audience and a deep love for them. The congregation to whom St. Thomas preached this sermon undoubtedly included men in positions of authority, along with many more who were subject to them in one way or another. Hence he points out how superiors ought to conduct themselves. Christ, who is king of angels and of all else in creation, gives us a model of meekness. One of the ways in which this meekness is shown is by his attitude towards men. Whereas some men cannot receive others with meekness, Christ received even sinners in a friendly way, visited with them, and ate with them. "Therefore, those who have to rule over others must be meek." As an analogy of God's love for men, he makes use of something familiar to his hearers, the particular regard that a bishop will have for certain members of his clergy and people. It may be conjectured that in St. Thomas there was a vigorous eloquence that would adapt itself both to the audience before him and to the particular topic at hand. In view of the many uses that a modem Italian· can make of the word ecco and the eloquence that he can put into it, it may be thought that a medieval Italian, as much at home in Latin as in his native tongue, must have given many variations of sound and emphasis to his repeated use of ecce in this sermon. Finally, it is impossible to avoid feeling an added power and ardor when he spoke such words as these: "And how do they hope? I say that not only spiritual goods, yea, even eternal goods are prepared by God for those whom he leads to life everlasting." To sum up, there are important things for the philosopher, and especially the student and adherent of Thomistic philosophy, and for the theologian in this masterly discourse. It is as well a striking illustration of the medieval sermon as given by a preacher of un-

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rivalled powers. Finally, there are as well certain pieces of biographical information to be found in it. To restrict ourselves to the philosophical aspects of the sermon, it may be said that it provides one of the best summaries of St. Thomas's doctrine on the nature and function of kingship, an instance of his use of philosophy in the service of theology, a demonstration of his powers of dividing and defining, with illustrations of both nominal and real definitions, a minor exercise in semantics, certain material on the virtues, and an example of his complete method in which philosophy and theology go together in a discussion that is akin to but far more elaborate than the instances of the tripartite method found in the Summa theologica and elsewhere in the corpus thomisticum. In the following translation I have tried to give a strictly literal rendering of St. Thomas's sermon, or, if one chooses to call it such, his sermon outline and notes. It would be an easy thing to fill out and dress up what he says in the sermon, but to do so would be to falsify it. Hence I have refrained from introducing a literary grace that is not present in the Latin text, although it could well have been present in the sermon as it was actually delivered in Paris seven centuries ago. SERMON BY BROTHER THOMAS OF AQUIN ON THE FIRST SUNDAY OF THE LORD'S ADVENT, "BEHOLD YOUR KING COMES TO YOU, MEEK."8

Many are the wonders of the divine works: the Psalm, "Wonderful are your works."9 But no work of God is as marvelous as the coming of Christ in the fiesh,1° and the reason is because in God's other works God has impressed his likeness upon the creature, but in the work of the Incarnation God has impressed himself and united himself to human nature in a personal unity, or he has united our nature to himself.ll Therefore, while the other works of God are not perfectly searchable, this work, namely, the Incarnation, is 8 Matt. 21 :5, quoting Zacharias 9:9, although not exactly. Cf. also John 12: 15. The Scriptural quotations in this translation are adaptations of the RheimsDouay version. lips. 138:14. IOC£. S. Th. 1, 57,5, 1. For St. Thomas's teaching on the Incarnation, d. esp. 111, QQ I-59; 3 Dist. 1, 1, 2; Summa contra gentiles, Book 4, chs. 27-49; Compendium theologiae, I, chs. 199-246; De rationibus fidei contra Saracenos, Graecos, et Armenos, ad cantorem Antiochiae, chs. 5-6; In 3 Dist. 1, 1, 2. llCf. S. Th. III, 2, 2, c: "Si ergo humana natura Verbo Dei non unitur in persona, nullo modo ei unitur ... unio sit facta in Verbi persona, non in natura."

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wholly beyond reason. 12. Hence Job: "Who does great and wonderful and unsearchable things without number."18 There is one work that I am not able to see: "If he shall come to roe, I shall not see him."14 And in Malachias: "Behold the Lord of hosts comes, and who shall be able to think of the day of his coming?"It1 as if he would say that this exceeds all human knowledge. But the Apostle teaches us who shall be able to think of the day of his coming, when he says: "We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but all our sufficiency is of God."18 Therefore, in the beginning we will pray the Lord that he may grant me to say something, etc. • • .

I "Behold your King comes, etc. • .." These words are taken from the gospel that is read among us today,lT and there they are taken from Zacharias, although there they may be recited in words a little different. IS But, in these words Christ's coming is plainly announced to us. Lest we should proceed in an ambiguous manner, you must know that the coming of Christ is interpreted in a fourfold way. The first is that by which he comes in the flesh. His second coming is that by which he comes into our mind. Christ's third coming is that in which he comes in the death of just men. Christ's fourth coming is that in which he comes to judge. First, I speak of Christ's coming in the flesh. It must not be 12 Cf. e.g.: "Qui ergo secundum quantitatem virtu tis, quam Deus exercet in creaturam magis et minus dicitur creaturae uniri, patet quod cum efficacia divinae virtutis humano intellectu comprehendi non ponit, aublimiori modo Deus potest creaturae uniri quam intellectus humanus capere possit. Quodam ergo incomprehensibili et ineffabili modo dicimus Deum unitum esse humanae naturae in Christo non solum per inhabitationem. sieut in aliia sanetis. sed quodam modo singulari. ita quod humana natura esset quaedam Filii Dei natura. ut Filius Dei qui ab aetemo habet naturam divinam a Patre, ex tempore per assumptionem mirabilem habeat humanam naturam ex genere nostro, et sic quaelibet partes humanae naturae ipsius Filii Dei dici possunt Deus. et quidquid agit, vel patitur quaelibet pars naturae humanae in Filio Dei. potest attribui unigenito Dei Verbo." De rationibus fidei, ch. 6. 18Job 5:9 and 9:10. 14Job 9:11. 111 Mal. 8:2. 1112 Cor. 8:5. ITThe gospel read was Matt. 21:1-9. In the Roman Missal as reformed by Pope St. Pius V in 1570, the gospel for the first Sunday in Advent is Luke 21: 25-84. Describing the last judgment; it is less appropriate for the first Sunday in Advent than Matt. 21:1-9. ISZach.9:9: "Behold your King will come to you, the just and savior."

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thought that he came in the flesh by a change of place, for he says in Jeremias, "I fill heaven and earth."19 How, then, has he come in the flesh? I say that he comes in the flesh when he descends from heaven, not by leaving heaven behind, but by assuming our nature. Hence in John: "He came unto his own."20 How do I say that he was in the world? It was when "the Word was made flesh."21 Observe that this coming leads on to another coming of Christ, which is into our mind. It would profit us nothing for Christ to come in the flesh, unless together with this he would come into our mind, namely, by sanctifying us. Hence in John: "1£ anyone love me, let him keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him, and make our abode with him."22 In the first coming only the Son comes. In the second coming the Son comes together with the Father to dwell within the soul. By this coming, which is by justifying grace, the soul is set free from sin, but not from all punishment. Grace is conferred, but glory is not yet conferred. For this reason Christ's third coming is necessary, in which he comes in the death of the saints, namely, when he receives them to himself. Hence in John: "If I go," in my passion, and "prepare a place for you," by removing what stands in the way, "I will come again to you," namely, in death, "and I will take you to myself," namely, in glory, "so that where I am you also may be."28 Again in John he says: "I am come that they may have life," namely, my presence in their souls, "and may have it more abundantIy,"24 namely, by participation in glory. Christ's fourth coming will be as a judge, namely, when the Lord will come for the judgment, and then the glory of the saints will extend even to the body, and the dead will arise. Hence in John: "The hour comes, and now is, when all who are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that have done good things shall come forth unto the resurrection of life."211 Perhaps it is on account of these four comings of Christ that the Church celebrates the four Sundays of Christ's advent. However, on this Sunday it celebrates the first coming of Christ. In the words 19Jer. 23:24. 2OJohn 1:3. 21John 1:14. 22John 14:23. 82John 14:2,3. 24 John 10:10. 211 Cf. John 5:25-29.

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set forth we can see four things: first, a proof of Christ's coming, in the word, "behold;" second, the condition of him who comes, in the words, "your King;" third, the utility of him who comes: "he comes to you;" fourth, the manner of the coming, in the word "meek." II

First, I say that we can see a proof of Christ's coming in the word "behold."26 It must be noted that by the word "behold" we are accustomed to understand four things: first, making a thing certain: of things that are evident to us we say, "Behold;" secondly, by "behold" we understand a determination of time; thirdly, the manifestation of a thing; and fourthly, a comforting of men. First, I say that by "behold" we are accustomed to understand making a thing certain. When anyone wishes to certify something, he says, "Behold." Hence in Genesis the Lord says: "Behold, I will establish my covenant with you, and with your seed after you. I will set my bow between me and you,"27 namely, as a sign of peace. By this bow is signified the Son of God, for just as the bow is produced by the sun striking on a watery cloud, so is Christ begotten out of the Word of God and out of human nature, which is like a cloud. Just as soul and body are one man,28 so God and man are the one Christ. It is said of Christ that he ascended upon a light cloud,29 that is, upon human nature by uniting it to himself. Christ has come to us as a sign of peace. It was necessary that it be done thus, for now there are some who doubt of the second coming of Christ. Hence the Apostle: "In the last days there shall come deceitful scoffers, falling away from the faith, walking after their own lusts, and saying: Where now is his promise and his coming?"30 For 26In the Catena aurea, in reference to Matt. 21:5, St. Thomas quotes Pseudo Chrysostom: .. 'Behold' is a word use by one who points to something: that is, look at the works of his power, not with bodily vision but with spiritual understanding. Indeed beforetimes he often said, 'Behold,' that he might show that he of whom he spoke before he was born was even then your king." (Parma ed., XI, p. 237.) 27Gen. 9:9, 13. 28Cf. s. Th. I, 75, 4, c.: But this man, namely, Socrates, is nota soul, but a composite made up of body and soul. . . . It is manifest that a man is not merely a soul, but that he is something composed of body and soul." 29Cf. Acts 1:9. 3OCf. 2 Peter 3:3, 4; Jude 18,19; 1 Tim. 4:1; 2 Tim. 3:1. St. Thomas may refer not only to certain contemporary heretics but also to contemporary Averroists and others whose doctrine would assert or imply that there is no persona} immortality.

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such men will say that there is no soul after the body, and because of this, to give certainty of Christ's coming, the Prophet says: "Be hold, etc. . . . " And in Habacuc: "The Lord will appear at the end, and shall not lie."31 And Isaias: "The Lord of hosts shall come."32 Secondly, by "behold" we are accustomed to understand a determination of time. The time of Christ's coming in judgment has not yet been determined for us. Hence Job: "I do not know how long I shall continue, and when my Maker shall take me away."38 And in Luke: "The kingdom of God does not come with observation."84 Why has not the time of this coming been set for us? Perhaps because the Lord wished us always to be watchful.35 But for Christ's coming in the flesh the time was determined for us. Hence Jeremias: "Behold the days come, and I will raise up to David a just branch, and he shall reign, and shall be wise." 86 Thirdly, by "behold" we are accustomed to understand the manifestation of a thing. One of God's comings to us is in secret, namely the coming by which he comes into our mind, and this cannot be known with certainty.37 Hence in Job: "If he come to me, I shall not see him, and if he depart, I shall not understand."3s But in his coming in the flesh Christ came in a manifest and visible way. Hence Isaias: "Therefore my people shall know my name, for I myself who spoke, behold I am here."39 And John with his finger points to him as present, saying: "Behold the Lamb of God."40 31 Habac. 2:3. 82 Cf. Isa. 40: 10. 88 Job 32:22. 84Luke 17:20. 311Cf. Matt. 24:42; Mark 13:35; Luke 21:36. 36 Jer. 23:5. 87 In answer to the question whether a man can know if he is in the state of grace, St. Thomas says that a thing can be known in three ways. The first way is by divine revelation, and certain men like St. Paul (cf. 2 Cor. 12:1.12) have received such a revelation as to their state of grace. A second way is by man's own natural powers of mind whereby he knows a thing with absolute certitude (sic enim certitudo de conclusionibus demonstrativis per indemonstrabilia universalia principia) . No man can have such certain natural knowledge as to his stateof grace. There is a third way: Cogniscitur aliquid conjecturaliter per aliqua signa. In this third way, which we may call probable knowledge acquired inductively, a man may know that he is in the state of grace. Cf. S. Th., I-II, 112, 5, c. 3SJoh 9-11. 891sa. 52.6_ 4OJohn 1:36_

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Zacharias, indeed, by the word "behold" points to him as to come in the future. Fourth, by "behold" we are accustomed to understand the comforting of man, and this in two matters. If a man suffers attacks from his enemies, and his enemies are made subject to him, he says, "Behold." Hence in Lamentations: "My enemies have opened their mouths, 10 the day that I have desired has come."4l In like manner, when a man attains some good thing that he has long desired, he says, "Beholdl" Hence the Psalm: "Behold how good and pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity, etc."42 These two things we attain in Christ's coming, because man has been liberated from the insults of demons and he rejoices in the hope that he has gained. Isaias: "Say, Be comforted, ye fainthearted; fear not; behold your God will bring you vengeance over your enemies: he himself will come and save yoU."48

III Let us now look to the condition of him who comes. The coming of a person is sought for, awaited, or announced with solemnity because of the person's greatness, if he is a king or the legate of the Lord Pope, or because of friendship and kinship. He who comes is a king44 and our kinsman and friend, and for this fact we ought to await him with solemnity. You know that a king commands with the authority of dominion, but not everyone who has the authority of dominion is called a king. That anyone may be called a king, four things are required, and if any of these is lacking, he is not called a king. A king must have, first unity; secondly, plenary power; thirdly, wide jurisdiction; and fourthly, equity of justice. First, I say that a king must have unity, for if there were many lording it over the realm, and dominion did not belong to the one 4lCf. Lamentations 2:16. 42 Ps. 1!I2: 1. 48Isa.35:4. 44St. Thomas's doctrine on kingly rule is given its most extended treatment in De regimine principum, where he arrives at the following definition: "a king is one who rules over a single city or province and rules over them for the com· mon good." Cf. R. M. Spiazzi, ed., opuscula. philosophica (Taurini: Marietti, 1954), p. 259. Other relevant passages in his works are: S. tho I·n. 95, 4: n·II, 50, I. ad Ij II·II, 47. 10. Cj III. 59. Scripta super IV libros sententiarum, IV. 48, 1. 1 and 2j In libros politicorum expositio. Liber II, Lectiones 12-16j In Matthae· um evangeiistam eXfJositio. ch. 21 (Parma ed., X, 191) .

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man, he is not called a king. Hence his kingdom is a certain kind of monarchy, and Christ has unity. Hence in Ezechiel: "There shall be one king of all of US."411 He says "one king" to signify that no alien, no other lord, but the one Lord, the Son together with the Father, will be our king. Hence Christ says: "I and the Father are one."46 This is against Arius,47 who said that the Father would be one and the Son another. The Apostle: "And if there be gods many, and lords many, to us there is one God and Lord."48 Secondly, a king necessitates fullness of power. Whoever would hold first place, without fullness of power but according to laws imposed upon him, should not be called a king but a consul or magistrate. With Christ's advent, it was to come about that the Law would be changed by God as to ceremonial laws. Hence it is Christ himself who can make a law. Hence he says: "It was said of them of old, You shall not kill, but I say," as if to say, "I have the power, and I can make laws."49 Hence Isaias: "The Lord is our judge, our lawgiver, he will come and he will save US."IIO We read that "the Father has given all power to the Son,"51 and the Lord is our lawgiver and consequently our King. Hence in Esther: "0 Lord, almighty King, all things are placed in your power."112 Hence the Son says: "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth." 118 Thirdly, a king must have wide jurisdiction. The father of a family has fullness of power within his own house, yet he is not called a king. Likewise, a man who has a single farm is not for that reason called a king. But if man has lordship over many domains and over a great city, such a man is called a king. We perceive this in him who has come to us, because all creation is subject to him, for "God is king of all the earth."114 It was proper that such a One, having such power, should come, for formerly the Law was given only to the Jews, and the Jews were called God's "peculiar people."1111 But it was proper that all men should be brought to salva4IIEzech. 87:22. 46John 10:80.

47Fr. St. Thomas on Arius. d. Summa contra gentiles, IV. chs. 6·8; 82; St. Ill, 16. 8. c; 6. 2 ad 1; 5. 8. c; Compendium theologiae, I. 204. 481 Cor. 8:8. 49Matt. 5:21. IIOlsa. 88:22. 111 John 5:22. 112Esther 18:9. I13Matt. 18:18.

114 Pa. 46.8. III1Deut. 14:2; Titus 2:14.

tho

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tion, and therefore it was proper that there should be a king of all men who would be able to save all men. Such was he who came to us. Hence the Psalm: "Ask of me, for I will give you the Gentiles for your inheritance, and the utmost bounds of the earth for your possession." 116 Fourthly, it is necessary that a king have equity,1I1 because otherwise he would be a tyrant. For a tyrant turns all the things that are in the kingdom to his own advantage, whereas a king orders his kingdom for the common good. 1I8 Hence in Proverbs: "A just king sets up the land; a covetous man will destroy it."119 But he came seeking not his own advantage, but yours, for "The Son of Man came not to be administered unto, but to minister."60 He who came to minister assuredly came to give his life for the redemption of many,61 and so that he might lead those redeemed to everlasting glory, to which may he lead us, etc. . . .

Recapitulation: "Behold your king comes, etc. . . ." It was said that in these words we can see a proof of the coming when it is said, "Behold;" secondly, the utility of the coming in the word "comes;" thirdly imd fourthly, the manner of his coming in the word "meek." It was also said that by this word "behold" which I say, we are wont to understand four things: first, making a thing certain; secondly, a determination of time; thirdly, the manifestation of something; fourthly, a comforting. Concerning the condition of him who comes, two things are noted when the text says, "your KiIJ.g." It was said that a person's coming is sought for, await116Ps.2:8. 1I1Commenting on Ps. 44:5. "proceed prosp«:rously. and reign." St. Thomas writes: "For a king to prosper in his undertakings. he must have three things. namely. truth. meekness. and justice. These three made Christ prosper. for he is true in his teaChing. meek in his suffering. and just in his deeds." In psalmos Davidis expositio (Parma ed.• XIV. 521.) 118 St. Thomas saw clearly the danger of royal power degenerating into tyranny and the evils that result from tyranny. Cf. In Matthaeum, 1. c.: "But sometimes kings degenerate into tyrants because they seek their own advantage. and this is contrary to the character of a king." He writes on this subject in S. tho 1-2. 105. I. 2; 2-2.42. ad 1I. 118. 8. ad 5. and also in the commentary on Aristotle's Politics (L. IV. lectiones 4 and 11. and L. V. lectiones I-Ill. His best discussion of the tyrant is in De regimine principum. Cf. John K. Ryan. "The Technique of Tyranny." Columbia, February (2:20) 1940. 6-24. where it is shown that St. Thomas's analysis of the tyrant and his methods may be substantiated by modem instances. 1i9Prov. 29:4. 60 Matt. 20:18. 61 Cf. Matt. 20:28.

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ed, or announced with solemnity because of his high rank, if he is a king or a legate, or because of the person's friendship and kinship, and that there things were in him who comes.

IV It is to be considered, moreover, that he is the King of all creation. Hence in Judith: "Creator of the waters and king of the whole creation."62 Especially, however, is called "your King," namely, of man, for four reasons: first, because of the likeness of his image; secondly, because of a special love; thirdly, because of a special care and solicitude; and fourthly, because of association in human nature. First, I say that Christ is called "your King," that is, of man, on account of the likeness of his image. You know that those who carry the king's insignia, like his image as it were, are said to belong in an especial way to the king. Although every creature belong~ to God, yet in a more especial way is he who bears God's image said to be God's creature, and this is man. Hence in Genesis: "Let u~ make man to our image and likeness." 63 In what does this image consist? I say that it is not attained to according to a bodily likeness, but according to the intelligible light of the mind. Moreovel, in God is the source of intelligible light, and we possess a sign of that light. Hence the Psalm: "The light of your countenance, 0 Lord, is sighed upon us." 64 Man possesses a seal of this light. Hence this image is created in man, but it happens that it has been lessened and darkened by sin. The Psalm: "You shall bring their images to nothing." 65 Wherefore, God sent his own Son so that he might reform that image which was deformed by sin. Let us strive, then, to be reformed, according to the Apostle, who says: "Stripping yourselves of the old man, put on the new man who is created according to God, and who is renewed in the image of him who created him."66 How are we renewed? Certainly when we imitate Christ. But that image which is in us has been deformed; in Christ it is perfect. We must therefore bear Christ's image. Hence the Apostle says to the 62Judith 9:17. 63Gen. 1:26. 64Ps.4:7. 65 Ps. 72:20. 66Col. 3:10.

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Corinthians: "As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us bear the image of the heavenly,"61 and in today's epistle, "Put you on Christ." 6S That is, let us imitate Christ. In this consists the perfection of the Christian life. Secondly. Christ is called "your King," that is, man's, on account of a special love. When a bishop likes certain members in a college in a more special way than others, it is customary for him to be called their bishop. God loves all things that exist, but in a more especial manner he loves men. Hence Isaias: "Where is your zeal and your strength, the multitude of your mercies over me?" 69 See how God loves man's nature in a special way. We find diverse grades of nature, but we do not find that God transfers the rank of a lower nature into the rank of a higher nature, as the rank of a star into the rank of a sun, or the ranks of lower angels into the ranks of the higher angels. Yet God transfers man to the rank of the angels and to equality with them. Hence in Luke: "The chil. dren of the resurrection, the saints, they will be equal to the angels." 10 Therefore, we should not be ungrateful for so great a love, but we should transfer our love totally to him. If he [a king] loved a certain poor man, that poor man should consider himself a wretch if he did not return his own love to the king according to his abilities. Out of the infinity of his love the Lord has said to man: "My delights are to be with the children of men."'11 Therefore, we ought to return this love to him. Thirdly, Christ is called "your King," that is, man's, on account of a singular care and solicitude. There is nothing so small that it can be removed from divine providence,12 for just as the thing is from God, so also is order from God, and providence is the same as order. Moreover, men are especi.ally subject to divine providence. Hence the Psalm: "Men and beasts you will preserve, 0 Lord," namely, in bodily safety, "the sons of men will hope in the covering of your wings."'l8 And how do they hope? I say that. not onloy spiritual goods, yea, even eternal goods are prepared by God for them whom he leads to life everlasting. In comparison with this, 611 Cor. 15:49. 6SRom. 1lI:14. 68lsa. 65:15. 10Luke 20:56. '11 Prov. 8:51. T2Cf. Wis. 12:15. 'laps. 55:7.

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God has no care for other things. Hence the Apostle: "God has no care for oxen."74 God lets no act of man remain unjudged. Hence in the Book of Wisdom: "But you being master judge sin with great tranquillity." 75 Fourthly, Christ is called "your King," namely, man's, on account of association in human nature. 76 Hence in Deuteronomy: "You may not make a man of another nation king, that is not your brother."77 In this prophecy concerning Christ, the Lord decreed that he would establish a king over men. He did not will that he would be of another race, that is, of another nature, and one who would not be our brother. Hence the Apostle says of Christ: "Never does he take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham."78 In this fact man is seen to have a privilege above the angels. Christ is King of the angels, and he is a man, not an angel. The angels also serve man. Hence the Apostle: "They are all ministering spirits." 79 It was fitting also that Christ be a man, to this end, that he would be a savior, for the Apostle says to the Hebrews: "He that sanctifies and he who is sanctifid are of one," 80 on account of which he is joined81 to us as brothers, saying, "I will proclaim my name to my brethren."82 It is now plain concerning the indication of the coming and the condition of him who comes.

v The next thing to consider is the profitableness of the one who comes. This is indicated when it says: "He comes to you," namely, not impelled because of his own advantage but because of ours. Moreover, he comes for four reasons: first, he comes to manifest the divine majesty; secondly, to reconcile us to God; thirdly, to set us free from sin; and fourthly, to give us the gift of everlasting life. 741 Cor. 9:9. 75Wis. 12:18. 'j6Cf. In Matthaeum, I.c.: "He states four things that add to the dignity of a king, and consequently four things that are found in tyrants. The first is affinity, because a man is more attached to those to whom he is more closely joined. Hence he says, 'Behold your King,' that is, the king of your nation." 77Deut. 17:15. 78 Heb. 2:16. The Latin text has numquam instead of the Vulgate nusquam. 79Heb. 1:14. SOHeb.2:11. 81 The text reads, compungitur nos fratres, which I have emended to read conjungitur ad nos fratres. 82ps. 21:28.

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First, I say that Christ comes to manifest to us his divine majesty. Man desires exceedingly to have knowledge of the truth,88 and above all the truth about God is inquired into. But men were in such great ignorance that they did not know there is a God. Some said that he was a body. Others said that he had no care for individual things. Therefore, the Son of God came to teach us the truth. Hence he says: "For this I was born, and for this came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth." 84 And in John: "No man has seen God at any time."811 Because of this the Son of God comes, that you should know the truth. Our ancestors were in such great error that they were ignorant of divine truth. But we, by the coming of the Son of God, have been led to the truth of faith. Secondly, Christ came to reconcile us to God. 86 You could say: God was an enemy to me because of sin; therefore, it was better for me to be ignorant of him than to know him. It is for this reason that Christ came not only to manifest to us the divine majesty but to reconcile us to God. Hence the Apostle to the Ephesians: "And coming he preached peace to them that were nigh and to them that were afar off."87 And in another place the Apostle says: "We were reconciled to God through the death of his Son."88 And for this reason at the nativity of Christ angels sang: "Glory to God in the highest,"89 and after the resurrection he spoke to his disciples: "Peace to yoU."90 Thirdly, he came that he might set us free from slavery to sin. Hence the Apostle: "Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners."91 "Whosoever commits sin is the servant of sin."92 Therefore, he needs to be set free. It is said: "1£ therefore the Son shall 88Repeating Aristotle's maxim that all men by nature desire to know, d.: "Proponit igitur primo quod omnibus hominibus naturaliter inest ad sciendum." In XII libf"oS metaphysicorum, I, i. 84 John 18:57. 85 John 1:16. 86Cf. Pseudo·Chrysostrom as quoted by St. Thomas: .. 'He comes to you,' if you will accept him, that he may save you; if you will not accept him, he comes against you." Catena aUf"ea in Matthaeum, I.c. 87Eph. 2:17. 88Rom. 5:10. 89Cf. Luke 2:14. 9OJohn 10:21. 911 Tim. 1:9. 92 John 8:54.

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make you free, you shall be free indeed."93 And: "The Son of man has come to seek and to save that which was lost."94 Fourthly, Christ came so that he might give us the life of grace in the present world and the life of glory in the world to come. Hence in John: "I came that they may have life,"95 namely, the life of grace in the present world, and, because "the just man lives by faith,"96 that "they may have it more abundantly,"91 namely, the life of glory by charity in the world to come. Hence in John: "We know that we have passed from death to life because we love the brethren,"98 and we shall live through good works. 99 Also in John: "This is eternal life: That they may know you, the only true God, and him whom you have sent, Jesus Christ."lOO It is now clear concerning the profitableness of him who comes. But in what manner did he come? I say that he comes "meekly,"lOl that is, most meekly. Hence in Proverbs: "As the roaring of a lion, so also is the wrath of a king, and his cheerfulness as the dew on the grass."102 Meekness is wrath made gentle. lOS God comes now with meekness, but in the future he will come with wrath. Hence Isaias: "Behold the name of the Lord comes from afar, as if his wrath burns."104 Job: "For he does not now bring on his fury, neither does he revenge wickedness exceedingly."105 Christ comes now with meekness, and we must receive him with meekness. 93 John 8:36. 94Matt. 18:11. 95John 10:10. 96Heb. 10:38. 91John 10:10. 981 John 3:14. 99Cf. Eph. 2:10: "For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God has prepared that we should walk in them." lOOJohn 17:3. 101 Cf. "'Mansuetus.' Mansuetudo pertinet ad regemffi quia infigere poenam ferocitatis est.... Ideo David a populo dilectus fuit, quia mansuetus fuit. Item requirit humilitas, quia Dominus superbos respuit." In Matthaeum evangelistam expositio, ch. xxi (Parma ed., X, p. 191). 102Prov. 18:12. l08The Latin is, Mansuetudo est ira mitigata. In his commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics St. Thomas writes: Dicit ergo primo quod mansuetudo est quaedam medietas circa iras.... Dicitur aliquis mansuetus qualitercumque non irascatur, sive bene sive male." In X libros ethicorum ad Nicomachum expositio, IV, xiii, 800. Ed. R. M. Spiazzi, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1949), pp. 222-3. Cf. also S. tho II-II, 157, 1, c.: Mansuetudo autem proprie diminuit passionem irae. In his definition St. Thomas is reminiscent of Ps. 84.4: Mitigasti omnem iram tuam: You have mitigated all your anger. 104 Isa. 30:27. 105Job 35:15.

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Hence the Blessed James: "In meekness receive the ingrafted Word, which is able to save your sOUIS."106 Note that we consider the meekness of Christ in four ways: first, in his conduct; secondly, in his patience; thirdly, in his gracious reception of men; and fourthly, in his passion. First, I say that we can see Christ's meekness in his conduct, for his whole conduct was peaceful. He did not look for occasions of quarrel, but shunned all that could lead to strife. Hence he said: "Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart." 107 In this we ought to imitate him. Going up to Jerusalem, Christ sat upon an ass, which is a meek animal, not upon a horse. He was an obedient son. Therefore, we ought to be meek. Hence in Ecclesiasticus: "Son, do your work in meekness and you shall be raised above the glory of man." 108 Again, the meekness of Christ appears in his patience. He bore many opprobrious things from his persecutors, and yet he did not answer them with anger or quarrels. Upon the verse, "Because of truth and meekness, etc. . . ."109 Augustine says in his commentary, "When Christ spoke, the truth was acknowledged. When he answered patiently to his enemies, his meekness was praised." 110 The Psalm: "For meekness is come upon us, and we shall be corrected."lll Isaias: "He did not struggle, nor did he cry out."1l2 Thirdly, the meekness of Christ appears in his gracious reception of men. Some men cannot receive others with meekness. But Christ received sinners with kindness, and ate with them, and admitted them to his banquets, and went to their banquets, so that the Pharisees wondered and said: "Why does your Master eat with publicans?" 113 Therefore, he was meek. Hence the Church can apply to him that verse in 2 Kings: "Your meekness has multiplied me." 114 Therefore, those who have to rule over others must be meek. 106 Jas. 1:2. 107Matt. 11:29. 108Eccli. 3:19. 109ps. 44:5. 110Dom Leclercq states that this passage cannot be found in St. Augustine's commentary on the psalm cited, Enarrationes in Ps. 44:5 (P.L. 36, cc. 502) or in the glossa ordinaria on the psalm. Cf. Glossa ordinaria, Venice, 1588, ed. lll, 149.

l1lPs. 89:10. 112Isa. 53:17. 113 Matt. 9:11. 1142 Kings 22:36.

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Fourthly, Christ's meekness appears in his passion, because "he went like a lamb to his passion, and when he was reviled did not revile."115 Yet he was able to deliver all men to death. Hence it is said in Jerusalem: "I was as a lamb that is carried to be a victim."116 In truth, the Blessed Andrew well imitated him in meekness, for when he was put on a cross, and the people wished to take him down from the cross, he held firm in prayer and he begged that they would not take him down from the cross, but that they should follow him in his passion. ll7 Hence in him118 was fulfilled the text: "A most meek man has appeared among the people."119 Meekness causes the blessed to inherit the earth. Hence in Matthew: "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth." 120 May he vouchsafe to grant this to us, he who together with the Father, and the Holy Spirit, etc. 1151 Peter 2:28. 116 Jer. 11:9. 117The account given by St. Thomas conforms to that in the life of St. Andrew by Jacobus a Voragine, Legenda aurea, recensuit T. Graesse, editio secunda (Lipsiae: Impensis Librariae Amoldianae, 1850). Cf. also Jacobus de Voragine, The Golden Legend or Lives of the Saints, as Englished by William Caxton, 8 vols. (London: J. M. Dent and Company, 1900), ii, 102-104. 118That is, in St. Andrew. 119 Num. 12:3: "For Moses was a man exceeding meek above all men that dwelt upon the earth." 120 Matt. 5:4.

8 THE AUTHENTICITY OF A HOMILY ATTRIBUTED TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS by JOHN

K.

RYAN

In addition to the many values that may be discerned in the authentic sermon on the Incarnation and kingship of Christ, preached by St. Thomas Aquinas in Paris on November 30, 1270, the first Sunday in Advent and the feast of St. Andrew the Apostle, a further value may be assigned to it. This is its use as a norm by which to judge a short homily on the same text found among the sermons traditionally ascribed to St. Thomas. Far more skeletal in character than is the Paris sermon, the homily likewise begins with the statement that the text is a prophecy of the coming of the Savior. The speaker discusses three things, Christ's dignity, the utility of his coming, and the manner of his coming. Under the first heading he puts seven points: as a king Christ is merciful, just, good, wise, powerful, terrible, and eternal. This exegesis, or one should say outline of an exegesis, is neither as compact nor as strong as that of the Paris sermon. The quadriad given there, viz., unity, power, jurisdiction, and equity, includes these seven attributes along with much else besides. Whereas the Paris sermon is a formal presentation of the theology and philosophy of Christ's kingship, the homily merely lists his attributes as a king. The homily finds that the utility of the Incarnation includes seven things. Here too it may be said that the quadriad in the Paris sermon is a much more effective statement. In its exegesis of mansuetus the homily notes four reasons for Christ's meekness and four benefits that the virtue of meekness brings to us. Twenty-nine texts are quoted from 17 books of the Bible in support of these various points. Only eight of these are found among the 90 texts cited in the Paris sermon. St. Bernard and the Pseudo-Areopagite are quoted but not St. Augustine or Aristotle. Because of its restricted 216

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theology and almost complete lack of philosophy, it would seem that the homily was given to a less learned audience and in a less important place than was the Paris sermon. If consideration is given solely to the similarities between the two works, it is permissible to conclude that the homily is an earlier, less formal, and less thorough treatment of this subject by St. Thomas. Or it is possible that it is an adaptation of St. Thomas's work by another preacher to suit his own ideas and the needs of his hearers. The following outline shows both the character of the homily and the relation that it bears to the Paris sermon. The translation is based on the text given in the Musurgia reprint of the Parma edition of St. Thomas's opera omnia, vol. XV, pp. 127-28. The Scriptural quotations are based on the Rheims-Douay version. Outline Introduction: A threefold prophecy: 1. Dignity for Christ. 2. Utility of his coming. 3. Manner of his coming. I. Christ's Dignity as a King: Exegesis of "your king." 1. A merciful king. 2. A just king. 3. A good rewarder. 4. A wise king. 5. An almighty king. 6. A terrible king. 7. An eternal king. II. Christ Comes for Our Profit: Exegesis of "to you." 1. Light of the world. 2. Despoiler of hell. 3. Restoration of heaven. 4. Destruction of sin. 5. Conquest of Satan. 6. Reconciliation with God. 7. Salvation of men. III. Manner of Christ's Coming: Exegesis of "meek." A. Reasons for the meekness are to 1. Correct the wicked. 2. Show his love. 3. Draw men to him. 4. Teach.

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B. Motives for meekness: it 1. Delivers from evil. 2. Obtains grace. 3. Guards the soul. 4. Merits heaven. Concluding Prayer. HOMILY FOR THE FIRST SUNDAY IN ADVENT "Behold your king comes to you, meek." Matt. 21:5. This is a prophecy of the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. In it note three things concerning his coming: first, the dignity of him who comes; second, the utility of his coming; third, the manner in which he comes. The first is in the words, "your king:" a merciful king; a just king; a wise king; a terrible king; an almighty king; an eternal king. This king is merciful in sparing; just in judging; good in rewarding; wise in governing; almighty in defending the good; terrible in punishing the wicked; eternal in ruling eternally and in establishing an eternal kingdom. Of the first, Isa. 16:5: "And his throne shall be prepared in mercy." Of the second, Isa. 32:1: "And behold, a king shall reign in justice." Isa. 6:5: "And one shall sit upon it in truth in the tabernacle of David." Of the third, Ps. 72:1: "How good is God to Israel, to them that are of a right heart." Dionysius: "It is the part of the best to produce the best." 1 Hence his perfection is apparent because he has produced the best. Of the fourth, Jer. 23:5: "I will raise up to David a just branch; and a king shall reign, and shall be wise." Of the fifth, Esther 13:9: "0 Lord God, the almighty king, for all things are in your power." Of the sixth, Wis. 11: 11: "The others as a severe king you did examine and condemn." Of the seventh, Jer. 10: 10: "But the Lord God is the living God and the everlasting king." Luke 1:88 "And of his kingdom there shall be no end." Therefore, it is best to be subject to such a king. Of the seven, II Mace. 1:24: "0 Lord God, creator of all things, dreadful and merciful, who alone are good, the just king, ICf. In librum Beati Dionysii de divinis nominibus, Ch. IV, Lectio XIV (Parma edition, Vol. XV, p. 232): .•• neque ad bonum pertinet producere ea quae non aunt bona; sed unumquodque producere sibi simile. John Scotus Eriugena's translation of Pseudo.Dionysius has the words, neque optimi non optima adducere, which parallel the optimi optima adducere of the homily. Cf. Philippe Chevalier, O.S.B., et aI., Dionysiaca (Bruges and Paris: Descl6e de Brouwer, 1937), pp. 233·5. I am indebted to Mother Carol Putnam, R.S.C.]. for this reference.

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almighty and eternal." Wisdom in the creator; mercy in the merciful; goodness in the good; justice in the just; severity in the terrible; power in the powerful; eternity in the eternal. This king is he who comes "to you," that is, for your profit. The utility of his coming is noted in the words, "He comes to you." For this utility is sevenfold up to the present time. First, the enlightenment of the world; second, the despoiling of hell; third, the restoration of heaven; fourth, the destruction of sin; fifth, the conquest of the devil; sixth, the reconciliation of men with God; seventh, the beautification of men . .Of the first, John 8:12: "I am the light of the world." John 1:9: "That was the true light that enlightens every man that cometh into the world." Of the second, Osee 13: 14: "0 hell, I will be your destruction." Zach. 9:11: "You also, by the blood of your testament, have led forth your prisoners out of the pit wherein there is no water." Of the third, Eph. 1:10: On whom he has proposed "to re-establish all things that are in the heaven and on the earth." Of the fourth, Hb. 2: 14, 15: "That he might destroy him that had the empire of death, that is to say, the devil; and might deliver them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to servitude." Of the fifth, Rom. 6:6: "Our old man is crucified with him, that the body of sin may be destroyed, etc." Of the sixth, Rom. 5: 10: "For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall' be saved by his life, etc." Of the seventh, John 3: 16: "God so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son, that whosoever believes in him may not perish, but may have life everlasting." Because of these good things which the holy fathers saw were to be at his coming, they cried out with so great a desire: "0 that you would rend the heavens, and would come downl" Isa. 64: 1. Concerning these seven things, Isa. 61:1: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me . . . he has sent me to preach." Behold the enlightenment of the world, for by preaching he has enlightened the world for us. "To heal the contrite of heart," by destroying sin, for by destroying sins, he heals the contrite. "To preach a release to the captives." Behold the despoiling of hell, for by despoiling hell, he led captivity captive. "Opening to them that are shut up." Behold the restoration of heaven, namely, to preach the opening of heaven. "To proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord." Behold the reconciliation of man with God. "The day of vengeance." Behold the

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STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

destruction of the devil, for so he has taken vengeance for all the injuries that the devil had done to the saints. "To give a crown."2 Behold the beatification of men. The manner of his coming is noted in the word "meek." For the Lord Jesus Christ willed to come in meekness. He willed to come in meekness for four reasons. First, that he might more easily correct the wicked. Ps. 89: 10: "For mildness is come upon us, and we shall be corrected." Second, that he might show himself lovable to all. Eccl.3:19: "My son, do thy works in meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men." Third, that he might draw all men to himself, and that he might multiply to himself a people. 2 Sam. 22:36: "And thy mildness hath multiplied me." Bernard: "Most of all do we run after thee, 0 good Jesus, on account of thy meekness."8 Fourth, that he might teach meekness. Matt. 11:29: "Learn of me, for I am meek and humble of heart." There are four things that ought especially to persuade us to meekness. The first is because it delivers us from evil; the second, because it obtains grace; the third, because it safeguards the soul; and the fourth, because it merits the land of the living. Of the first Wis. 8:16: "He is meek who feels no bitterness of mind."4 Of the second, ProVo 3:34: "To the meek he will give grace." Of the third, Eccl. 10:31: "Keep your soul in meekness." Of the fourth, Matt. 5: 14: "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth." Let us, therefore, pray that the Lord, etc. 2The complete text used in the foregoing passage is Isa. 61:1-!!: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because the Lord hath anointed me: he has sent me to preach to the meek, to heal the contrite of heart, and to preach a release to captives, and deliverance to them that are shut up. "To proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord, and the day of vengeance of our God: to comfort all that mourn. "To appoint to the mourners of Sion, and to give them a crown for ashes." 80mnino propter mansuetudinem quae in te praedicatur, currimus post te, Domine Jesu, audientes quod non spernas pauperem, peccatorem non horreas." St. Bernard, Sermones in cantica canticorum, MPL. 18!!, col. 881, n. 1!I!!6. 4The homily quotes the book of Wisdom as saying, Mansuetus est qui non sentit amaritudinem, words that are not found there. The closest passage is Wis. 8:16: ••• non enim habet amaritudinem cOfl'IJersatio ejus: "For her [Wisdom's] conversation has no bitterness."

INDEX Albertus Magnus, St., 139, 140, HI, 143, 150, 152, 153 Alexander of Hales, 8 Allers, R., 97 Andrew, St., 194, 197, 215 Anselm, St., 4, 8, 9, 15, 19, 31, 67 Aristotle, 91, II6, 139·159, 179, 187, 188, 190, 197, 198,212 Augustine, St., 1, 5·10, 19·24, 29, 34, 88, 89, 91,216 Avicenna, 139, 141, 153 Balmes, J., 16-18 Bergson, H., 190 Berkeley, G., 57-95 Bernard, St., 216 Boethius, 139 Bonaventure, St., 9, 10 Boyer, C., 21 Cavanaugh, J. R.,-McGoldrick, J. B., IIO-132 passim Cayre, F., 7 Chalcidius, 139 Christ, Jesus, 194-220 Collingwood, F., 140-145 Cuervo, M., 12 Daffara, M., 12, 24 De Corte, M., 51 De Munnynck, M., II Descartes, R., 67, 80 Descoqs, P., 2, 3, II, 12, 26-27 Donat, J., 30 Duns Scotus, J., II-13 Evodius, 6, 7 Freud, S., 98, 108, 109 Garrigou-Lagrange, M., II Gilson, E., 20, 21 Gisquiere, E., 12, 26, 28 Grabmann, M., 12, 26, 28 Hedenius, I., 75, 89, 94 Hegel, G.W.F., 50, 195 Hessen, M., 5, 7, 19 Jaspers, K., 111, II4 JoIivet, R., 43 Joseph, St., 197 Jung, K. G., 135 Kant, I., 13, 15, 16 Kepler, J., 180-181

Kierkegaard, S., 37 Kloos, G., 100-103 Kretschmer, E., II4 Leclercq, J., 194 Leibniz, G. W., 13-16, 67 Lepidi, A" II Locke, J., 71 Malebranche, N., 19 Marcel, Gabriel, 35-36 Marin-Sola, 171 Martin, J., 19 MCDougall, W., 98 McGoldrick, J. B., see Cavanaugh, J. R. Mercier, D., 12, 25-28 Merleau-Pontry, M., 164 Mindorff, C., 2-4, 8, 12, 13, 16, 27 Nietzsche, F., 53 Odenwald, R. P., 100 Piper, W. B., 66 Pohl, W., 3 Portalie, E., 19 Proclus, 149 Prini, P., 51 Pseudo-Chrysostom, 204, 212 Pseudo-Areopagite, 216, 218, 139-159 Richard of St. Victor, 9 Romeyer, P. B., 11 Roure, M. L., 179 Ruyssen, T., 25 Sartre, J.-P., 35 Sciacca, M. F., 7, 23 Sertillanges, A. D., 12,27,28 SestiIi, I., 21-23 Siegmund, G., 96-97 Sillem, E., 64-66 TertuIlian, 49 Thibon, G., 51 Thomas Aquinas, St., 1, 3, 11-13, 20, 23, 24,26, 29, 64,89, 91, 116, II7, 139, 149, 160·215 passim, 216, 217 Trethowan, I., 63 Troisfontaines, Roger, 35, 36, 47, 51 Ulrich of Strasbourg, 139·159 VanderVeldt, J. H., 100 Van Steenberghen, F., 7 Weitbrecht, H. J., 97, IIO

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