Studia Patristica - Papers Presented at the Eighteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies Held in Oxford 2019: Augustine the Theologian and Polemicist 9789042947665, 9789042947672, 9042947667

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STUDIA PATRISTICA VOL. CXIX

Papers presented at the Eighteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 2019 Edited by MARKUS VINZENT Volume 16:

Augustine the Theologian and Polemicist

PEETERS LEUVEN – PARIS – BRISTOL, CT

2021

STUDIA PATRISTICA VOL. CXIX

STUDIA PATRISTICA Editor: Markus VINZENT, King’s College London, UK and Max Weber Centre, University of Erfurt, Germany

Board of Directors (2019): Carol HARRISON, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, Faculty of Theology and Religion, University of Oxford, UK Mark EDWARDS, Professor of Early Christian Studies, Faculty of Theology and Religion, University of Oxford, UK Neil MCLYNN, University Lecturer in Later Roman History, Faculty of Classics, University of Oxford, UK Philip BOOTH, A.G. Leventis Associate Professor in Eastern Christianity, Faculty of Theology and Religion, University of Oxford, UK Sophie LUNN-ROCKLIFFE, Lecturer in Patristics, Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge, UK Morwenna LUDLOW, Professor, Theology and Religion, University of Exeter, UK Ioannis PAPADOGIANNAKIS, Senior Lecturer in Patristics, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, King’s College London, UK Markus VINZENT, Professor of the History of Theology, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, King’s College London, UK Josef LÖSSL, Professor of Historical Theology and Intellectual History, School of History, Archaeology and Religion, Cardiff University, UK Lewis AYRES, Professor of Catholic and Historical Theology, Department of Theology and Religion, Durham University, UK John BEHR, Regius Chair in Humanity, The School of Divinity, History, Philosophy & Art History, University of Aberdeen, UK Anthony DUPONT, Research Professor in Christian Antiquity, Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, KU Leuven, Belgium Patricia CINER (as president of AIEP), Professor, Universidad de San Juan-Universidad Católica de Cuyo, Argentina Clayton JEFFORD (as president of NAPS), Professor of Scripture, Seminary and School of Theology, Saint Meinrad, IN, USA

STUDIA PATRISTICA VOL. CXIX

Papers presented at the Eighteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 2019 Edited by MARKUS VINZENT Volume 16:

Augustine the Theologian and Polemicist

PEETERS LEUVEN – PARIS – BRISTOL, CT

2021

© Peeters Publishers — Louvain — Belgium 2021 All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form. D/2021/0602/153 ISBN: 978-90-429-4766-5 eISBN: 978-90-429-4767-2 A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. Printed in Belgium by Peeters, Leuven

Table of Contents Thomas CLEMMONS Sol and Fons: Trinitarian and Christological Sequencing in Augustine’s Writings from Cassiciacum and Thagaste ................................

1

Isabelle BOCHET Credere in Christum: The Development of the Augustinian Notion of Fides ................................................................................................

13

Marie PAULIAT Tradi pro Christo, tradere Christum: Mt. 10:20 dans le De doctrina christiana, une interprétation isolée ? ................................................

33

Gregory M. CRUESS The Challenge of Augustine’s Biblical Christology: Re-reading the In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus ......................................................

43

Enrique A. EGUIARTE Christological Insights in Augustine’s Expositio Epistulae ad Galatas

51

Kimberly F. BAKER A Preached Theology: Augustine’s Doctrine of the Totus Christus ..

59

Teng HE Rethinking the Relationship between Grace and Free Will in Ad Simplicianum I 2 .......................................................................................

67

Gábor KENDEFFY The Theme of the Nothingness of Man in the Works of Saint Augustine .......................................................................................................

77

Amanda KNIGHT The Intermediary of Light in Augustine’s Theory of Vision and Divine Illumination .........................................................................................

87

Joseph L. GRABAU Jn. 1:17 and Gal. 4:4-5 in Augustine of Hippo’s Anti-Donatist Polemics and Preaching: Johannine and Pauline Perspectives on Grace ..........

97

Carles BUENACASA Augustine and the Vituperation of Donatists: The Strategy of Criminalizing the Opponent ........................................................................ 109

VI

Table of Contents

Samuel CARDWELL Augustine, Prosper, and the Stirrings of Missionary Consciousness ... 117 Ranko WATANABE Augustine’s Perspectives on Practical Healing of Concupiscence .... 129 Aäron VANSPAUWEN Between a Free Will and a Divine Grace: The Treatise Aduersus Manichaeos of Evodius of Uzalis and its Anti-Pelagian Context ..... 141 Kenneth WILSON Augustine of Hippo’s Tenuous Tension between Stoic Providence and Christian Free Will .............................................................................. 153 Adam TRETTEL God as Rhetorician: Divine ‘Showing’ in De ciuitate Dei 14.26-7 .. 169 Morten Kock MØLLER The Example of the Twins: Rom. 9:10-3 as a Proof-Text in Augustine’s Polemics against Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians ................................ 177 David Burkhart JANSSEN Inimici gratiae Christi: The Development of Augustine’s Construction of Pelagianism ca. 418 ........................................................................ 187 Joshua PAPSDORF More than Just a Foil? Julian of Eclanum on Marriage, Sexuality, and Concupiscence .............................................................................. 199

Abbreviations AA.SS AAWG.PH AB AC ACL ACO ACW AHDLMA AJAH AJP AKK AKPAW ALMA ALW AnalBoll ANCL ANF ANRW AnSt AnThA APOT AR ARW ASS AThANT Aug AugSt AW AZ BA BAC BASOR BDAG BEHE BETL BGL BHG BHL

see ASS. Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen Philologisch-historische Klasse, Göttingen. Analecta Bollandiana, Brussels. Antike und Christentum, ed. F.J. Dölger, Münster. Antiquité classique, Louvain. Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum, ed. E. Schwartz, Berlin. Ancient Christian Writers, ed. J. Quasten and J.C. Plumpe, Westminster (Md.)/London. Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, Paris. American Journal of Ancient History, Cambridge, Mass. American Journal of Philology, Baltimore. Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht, Mainz. Abhandlungen der königlichen Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin. Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi (Bulletin du Cange), Paris/Brussels. Archiv für Liturgiewissenschaft, Regensburg. Analecta Bollandiana, Brussels. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Edinburgh. Ante-Nicene Fathers, Buffalo/New York. Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, ed H. Temporini et al., Berlin. Anatolian Studies, London. Année théologique augustinienne, Paris. Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English, ed. R.E. Charles, Oxford. Archivum Romanicum, Florence. Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, Berlin/Leipzig. Acta Sanctorum, ed. the Bollandists, Brussels. Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments, Zürich. Augustinianum, Rome. Augustinian Studies, Villanova (USA). Athanasius Werke, ed. H.-G. Opitz et al., Berlin. Archäologische Zeitung, Berlin. Bibliothèque augustinienne, Paris. Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid. Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, New Haven, Conn. A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 3rd edn F.W. Danker, Chicago. Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études, Paris. Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, Louvain. Benediktinisches Geistesleben, St. Ottilien. Bibliotheca Hagiographica Graeca, Brussels. Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina Antiquae et Mediae Aetatis, Brussels.

VIII BHO BHTh BJ BJRULM BKV BKV2 BKV3 BLE BoJ BS BSL BWAT Byz BZ BZNW CAr CBQ CChr.CM CChr.SA CChr.SG CChr.SL CH CIL CP(h) CPG CPL CQ CR CSCO

CSEL CSHB CTh CUF CW DAC

Abbreviations

Bibliotheca Hagiographica Orientalis, Brussels. Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, Tübingen. Bursians Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, Leipzig. Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester. Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, ed. F.X. Reithmayr and V. Thalhofer, Kempten. Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, ed. O. Bardenhewer, Th. Schermann, and C. Weyman, Kempten/Munich. Bibliothek der Kirchenväter. Zweite Reihe, ed. O. Bardenhewer, J. Zellinger, and J. Martin, Munich. Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique, Toulouse. Bonner Jahrbücher, Bonn. Bibliotheca sacra, London. Bolletino di studi latini, Naples. Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten Testament, Leipzig/Stuttgart. Byzantion, Leuven. Byzantinische Zeitschrift, Leipzig. Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, Berlin. Cahiers Archéologique, Paris. Catholic Biblical Quarterly, Washington. Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis, Turnhout/Paris. Corpus Christianorum, Series Apocryphorum, Turnhout/Paris. Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, Turnhout/Paris. Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, Turnhout/Paris. Church History, Chicago. Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, Berlin. Classical Philology, Chicago. Clavis Patrum Graecorum, ed. M. Geerard, vols. I-VI, Turnhout. Clavis Patrum Latinorum (SE 3), ed. E. Dekkers and A. Gaar, Turnhout. Classical Quarterly, London/Oxford. The Classical Review, London/Oxford. Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Louvain. Aeth = Scriptores Aethiopici Ar = Scriptores Arabici Arm = Scriptores Armeniaci Copt = Scriptores Coptici Iber = Scriptores Iberici Syr = Scriptores Syri Subs = Subsidia Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, Vienna. Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, Bonn. Collectanea Theologica, Lvov. Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l’Association Guillaume Budé, Paris. Catholic World, New York. Dictionary of the Apostolic Church, ed. J. Hastings, Edinburgh.

Abbreviations

DACL DAL DB DBS DCB DHGE Did DOP DOS DR DS DSp DTC EA ECatt ECQ EE EECh EKK EH EO EtByz ETL EWNT ExpT FC FGH FKDG FRL FS FThSt FTS FZThPh GCS GDV GLNT GNO GRBS

IX

see DAL Dictionnaire d’archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie, ed. F. Cabrol, H. Leclercq, Paris. Dictionnaire de la Bible, Paris. Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplément, Paris. Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, Sects, and Doctrines, ed. W. Smith and H. Wace, 4 vols, London. Dictionnaire d’histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique, ed. A. Baudrillart, Paris. Didaskalia, Lisbon. Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Cambridge, Mass., subsequently Washington, D.C. Dumbarton Oaks Studies, Cambridge, Mass., subsequently Washington, D.C. Downside Review, Stratton on the Fosse, Bath. H.J. Denzinger and A. Schönmetzer, ed., Enchiridion Symbolorum, Barcelona/Freiburg i.B./Rome. Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, ed. M. Viller, S.J., and others, Paris. Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, ed. A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, and E. Amann, Paris. Études augustiniennes, Paris. Enciclopedia Cattolica, Rome. Eastern Churches Quarterly, Ramsgate. Estudios eclesiasticos, Madrid. Encyclopedia of the Early Church, ed. A. Di Berardino, Cambridge. Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, Neukirchen. Enchiridion Fontium Historiae Ecclesiasticae Antiquae, ed. Ueding-Kirch, 6th ed., Barcelona. Échos d’Orient, Paris. Études Byzantines, Paris. Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, Louvain. Exegetisches Wörterbuch zum NT, ed. H.R. Balz et al., Stuttgart. The Expository Times, Edinburgh. The Fathers of the Church, New York. Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, Berlin. Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Göttingen. Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, Göttingen. Festschrift. Freiburger theologische Studien, Freiburg i.B. Frankfurter theologische Studien, Frankfurt a.M. Freiburger Zeitschrift für Theologie und Philosophie, Freiburg/Switzerland. Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller, Leipzig/Berlin. Geschichtsschreiber der deutschen Vorzeit, Stuttgart. Grande Lessico del Nuovo Testamento, Genoa. Gregorii Nysseni Opera, Leiden. Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, Mass.

X GWV HbNT HDR HJG HKG HNT HO HSCP HTR HTS HZ ICC ILCV ILS J(b)AC JBL JdI JECS JEH JJS JLH JPTh JQR JRS JSJ JSOR JTS KAV KeTh KJ(b) LCL LNPF L(O)F LSJ LThK LXX MA MAMA Mansi MBTh

Abbreviations

Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, Offenburg. Handbuch zum Neuen Testament. Tübingen. Harvard Dissertations in Religion, Missoula. Historisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft, successively Munich, Cologne and Munich/Freiburg i.B. Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte, Tübingen. Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, Tübingen. Handbuch der Orientalistik, Leiden. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard Theological Studies, Cambridge, Mass. Historische Zeitschrift, Munich/Berlin. The International Critical Commentary of the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, Edinburgh. Inscriptiones Latinae Christianae Veteres, ed. E. Diehl, Berlin. Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae, ed. H. Dessau, Berlin. Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Münster. Journal of Biblical Literature, Philadelphia, Pa., then various places. Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Berlin. Journal of Early Christian Studies, Baltimore. The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, London. Journal of Jewish Studies, London. Jahrbuch für Liturgik und Hymnologie, Kassel. Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie, Leipzig/Freiburg i.B. Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia. Journal of Roman Studies, London. Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic and Roman Period, Leiden. Journal of the Society of Oriental Research, Chicago. Journal of Theological Studies, Oxford. Kommentar zu den apostolischen Vätern, Göttingen. Kerk en Theologie, ’s Gravenhage. Kirchliches Jahrbuch für die evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, Gütersloh. The Loeb Classical Library, London/Cambridge, Mass. A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. P. Schaff and H. Wace, Buffalo/New York. Library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church, Oxford. H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, new (9th) edn H.S. Jones, Oxford. Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, Freiburg i.B. Septuagint. Moyen-Âge, Brussels. Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua, London. J.D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, Florence, 1759-1798. Reprint and continuation: Paris/Leipzig, 1901-1927. Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie, Münster.

Abbreviations

MCom MGH ML MPG MSR MThZ Mus NA28 NGWG NH(M)S NIV NKJV NovTest NPNF NRSV NRTh NTA NT.S NTS NTTSD OBO OCA OCP OECS OLA OLP Or OrChr OrSyr PG PGL PL PLRE PLS PO PRE PS PTA PThR PTS PW QLP QuLi RAC RACh

XI

Miscelanea Comillas, Comillas/Santander. Monumenta germaniae historica. Hanover/Berlin. Mediaevalia Lovaniensia, Louvain. See PG. Mélanges de science religieuse, Lille. Münchener theologische Zeitschrift, Munich. Le Muséon, Louvain. Nestle-Aland, Novum Testamentum Graece, 28th edition, Stuttgart. Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Nag Hammadi (and Manichaean) Studies, Leiden. New International Version. New King James Version. Novum Testamentum, Leiden. See LNPF. New Revised Standard Version. Nouvelle Revue Théologique, Tournai/Louvain/Paris. Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen, Münster. Novum Testamentum Supplements, Leiden. New Testament Studies, Cambridge/Washington. New Testament Tools, Studies and Documents, Leiden/Boston. Orbis biblicus et orientalis, Freiburg, Switz., then Louvain. Orientalia Christiana Analecta, Rome. Orientalia Christiana Periodica, Rome. Oxford Early Christian Studies, Oxford. Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, Louvain. Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica, Louvain. Orientalia. Commentarii editi a Pontificio Instituto Biblico, Rome. Oriens Christianus, Leipzig, then Wiesbaden. L’Orient Syrien, Paris. Migne, Patrologia, series graeca. A Patristic Greek Lexicon, ed. G.L. Lampe, Oxford. Migne, Patrologia, series latina. The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, ed. A.H.M. Jones et al., Cambridge. Migne, Patrologia, series latina. Supplementum ed. A. Hamman. Patrologia Orientalis, Paris. Paulys Realenzyklopädie der classischen Alterthumswissenschaft, Stuttgart. Patrologia Syriaca, Paris. Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen, Bonn. Princeton Theological Review, Princeton. Patristische Texte und Studien, Berlin. Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. G. Wissowa, Stuttgart. Questions liturgiques et paroissiales, Louvain. Questions liturgiques, Louvain. Rivista di Archeologia Cristiana, Rome. Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum, Stuttgart.

XII RAM RAug RBen RB(ibl) RE

Abbreviations

Revue d’ascétique et de mystique, Paris. Recherches Augustiniennes, Paris. Revue Bénédictine, Maredsous. Revue biblique, Paris. Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, founded by J.J. Herzog, 3e ed. A. Hauck, Leipzig. REA(ug) Revue des études Augustiniennes, Paris. REB Revue des études byzantines, Paris. RED Rerum ecclesiasticarum documenta, Rome. RÉL Revue des études latines, Paris. REG Revue des études grecques, Paris. RevSR Revue des sciences religieuses, Strasbourg. RevThom Revue thomiste, Toulouse. RFIC Rivista di filologia e d’istruzione classica, Turin. RGG Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, ed. Gunkel-Zscharnack, Tübingen RHE Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique, Louvain. RhMus Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, Bonn. RHR Revue de l’histoire des religions, Paris. RHT Revue d’Histoire des Textes, Paris. RMAL Revue du Moyen-Âge Latin, Paris. ROC Revue de l’Orient chrétien, Paris. RPh Revue de philologie, Paris. RQ Römische Quartalschrift, Freiburg i.B. RQH Revue des questions historiques, Paris. RSLR Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa, Florence. RSPT, RSPh Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, Paris. RSR Recherches de science religieuse, Paris. RTAM Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, Louvain. RthL Revue théologique de Louvain, Louvain. RTM Rivista di teologia morale, Bologna. Sal Salesianum, Roma. SBA Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, Basel. SBS Stuttgarter Bibelstudien, Stuttgart. ScEc Sciences ecclésiastiques, Bruges. SCh, SC Sources chrétiennes, Paris. SD Studies and Documents, ed. K. Lake and S. Lake. London/Philadelphia. SE Sacris Erudiri, Bruges. SDHI Studia et documenta historiae et iuris, Roma. SH Subsidia Hagiographica, Brussels. SHA Scriptores Historiae Augustae. SJMS Speculum. Journal of Mediaeval Studies, Cambridge, Mass. SM Studien und Mitteilungen zur Geschichte des Benediktinerordens und seiner Zweige, Munich. SO Symbolae Osloenses, Oslo. SP Studia Patristica, successively Berlin, Kalamazoo, Leuven. SPM Stromata Patristica et Mediaevalia, ed. C. Mohrmann and J. Quasten, Utrecht.

Abbreviations

SQ SQAW SSL StudMed SVigChr SVF TDNT TE ThGl ThJ ThLZ ThPh ThQ ThR ThWAT ThWNT ThZ TLG TP TRE TS TThZ TU USQR VC VetChr VT WBC WUNT WZKM YUP ZAC ZAM ZAW ZDPV ZKG ZKTh ZNW ZRG ZThK

XIII

Sammlung ausgewählter Quellenschriften zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Tübingen. Schriften und Quellen der Alten Welt, Berlin. Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Louvain. Studi Medievali, Turin. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, Leiden. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. J. von Arnim, Leipzig. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Grand Rapids, Mich. Teologia espiritual, Valencia. Theologie und Glaube, Paderborn. Theologische Jahrbücher, Leipzig. Theologische Literaturzeitung, Leipzig. Theologie und Philosophie, Freiburg i.B. Theologische Quartalschrift, Tübingen. Theologische Rundschau, Tübingen. Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament, Stuttgart. Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, Stuttgart. Theologische Zeitschrift, Basel. Thesaurus Linguae Graecae. Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Lancaster, Pa. Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Berlin. Theological Studies, New York and various places; now Washington, DC. Trierer theologische Zeitschrift, Trier. Texte und Untersuchungen, Leipzig/Berlin. Union Seminary Quarterly Review, New York. Vigiliae Christianae, Amsterdam. Vetera Christianorum, Bari (Italy). Vetus Testamentum, Leiden. Word Biblical Commentary, Waco. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament, Tübingen. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Vienna. Yale University Press, New Haven. Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum, Berlin. Zeitschrift für Aszese und Mystik, Innsbruck, then Würzburg. Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, Giessen, then Berlin. Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins, Leipzig. Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, Gotha, then Stuttgart. Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Vienna. Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche, Giessen, then Berlin. Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte, Weimar. Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Tübingen.

Sol and Fons: Trinitarian and Christological Sequencing in Augustine’s Writings from Cassiciacum and Thagaste Thomas CLEMMONS, The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, USA

ABSTRACT In this article, I focus on two images Augustine frequently used in his writings before his ordination: the fount (fons) and the sun (sol). He deploys these images in almost exclusively trinitarian and Christological contexts. However, the sequences within which these images are found often vary. The approach I have taken considers these images and their broader sequencing in his writings from Cassiciacum and Thagaste to examine Augustine’s early trinitarian theology and Christology. Drawing from scholarship, which has identified potential sources for Augustine’s early theology, particularly its pro-Nicene formulations, I consider these images as both expressions of this theological framework and as situated within the aims of specific writings. For example, De beata uita and Soliloquia, the fons and sol are used by Augustine to depict the Trinity, though both accounts are framed Christologically. In De ordine and writings from Thagaste, he expands the sequence around these images to emphasize the Incarnation, authority, and the church. The variation of the sequencing of sol and fons in his early writings does not, however, appear to indicate sharp points of contrast between periods. In part, I suggest that the flexible deployment of these images by Augustine points to Ambrosian hymns as a potential source.

Sol and Fons: Trinitarian and Christological Sequencing in Augustine’s writings from Cassiciacum and Thagaste The influences and sources for Augustine’s early writings before his ordination as a priest have rightly been the focus of significant scholarly attention over the past century. Augustine’s early writings are bold endeavors that seem to possess suggestive philosophical and theological sources. Important studies have identified Augustine’s potential sources, his likely use of specific pro-Nicene terminology, and possible vestigia of Plotinian phrases and philosophy.1 These 1

See for example, Lewis Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity (Cambridge, 2010), 13-41. Nello Cipriani, ‘Le fonti Cristiane della dottrina trinitaria nel primi dialoghi di S. Agostino’, Augustinianum 34 (1994), 253-312; Martine Dulaey, ‘L’apprentissage de l’exégèse biblique par Augustin:

Studia Patristica CXIX, 1-11. © Peeters Publishers, 2021.

2

T. CLEMMONS

studies have been extremely fruitful in establishing both many potential points of contact in Augustine’s early theology as well as the depth of his reliance on and understanding of pro-Nicene theology. In this essay, I consider Augustine’s early Christological and trinitarian discussions through an examination of the sequencing and patterns of several of the more extended expositions in the Cassiciacum Dialogues and Thagastan writings, composed before his ordination. The reason for this approach is twofold. First, Augustine at times appears to use particular organization for his theological presentation and exposition in regards to the Trinity and Christ. On the one hand, these patterns reveal the relation Augustine sees between, for example, Christ, the Trinity, the church, and the place of reason. On the other hand, the differing sequences of theological articulation may also indicate development within Augustine’s early writings or simply that Augustine’s articulation reflects a specific emphasis. The second reason for this approach is that attentiveness to Augustine’s sequencing of imagery and descriptions of Christ, the Trinity, and the church, may illumine how Augustine uses sources, such as Ambrose. The focus is not on doctrinal topoi as isolated or randomly cast about in works that may appear at times as ad hoc and structureless. Rather, the sequences themselves may indicate Augustine’s intentional deployment of imagery and nested descriptions within a particular work. The present approach also allows comparison of patterns between works that remains attentive to the broader use of sequencing in individual works. Augustine’s writings from Cassiciacum have an abundance of Christological and trinitarian terminology and imagery. Far from being works that exclude Christ or the Trinity, the Dialogues possess many associated images and terms that he will use in other early writings.2 To wade through and limit this sea of imagery and nomenclature in the Cassiciacum Dialogues, I have focused on two trinitarian images, the fount (fons) and the sun (sol). These two images are perhaps drawn from or influenced by Ambrosian hymns and recur in the writings from both Cassiciacum and Thagaste.3 Première partie dans les années 386-389’, Revue des Études Augustiniennes 48 (2002), 267-95; Olivier Du Roy, L’Intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin: Genèse de sa Théologie Trinitaire jusqu’en 391 (Paris, 1966), 109-71. For potential Plotinian references in Augustine’s early writings, see Robert O’Connell, St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386-391 (Cambridge, MA, 1968). 2 While appellations of Son, Word, Wisdom, Truth, Beauty, medicus, intellectus, Door, Way, and even Food are found in the early dialogues, ‘Christ’ is used sparingly. Augustine may have done this intentionally as he states in Confessions 9.4.7 (CChr.SL 27, 137) for the rhetorical purpose of leading the reader to the conclusion. Other references to ‘Christ’ are found at Acad. 3.20.43 (CChr.SL 29, 60-1); ord. 1.8.21 (CChr.SL 29, 99); 1.10.29 (CChr.SL 29, 103); and 1.11.32 (CChr.SL 29, 106). 3 Augustine himself attests to four Ambrosian hymns: Aeterne Rerum Conditor, Iam Surgit, Deus Creator Omnium, and Intende Qui Regis Israel. See Brian Dunkle, Enchantment and Creed

Sol and Fons

3

The first sequence is found in De beata uita (beata u.), after Augustine has worked through a series of suggestive Christological images.4 When Monica in her wisdom outdoes even Cicero, Augustine comments that her words have come from a divine fount (diuino fonte manarent). In this veiled trinitarian reference, which Augustine returns to explicitly as a trinitarian image in the same section of beata u., the fount is an image of the Father and mano refers to the Spirit.5 Yet, before providing the full image, Augustine turns to discuss how the Wisdom and Truth of God relates to the Father. Perhaps alluding to the pro-Nicene notion of trinitarian reciprocity, Augustine observes that perfect and complete Truth proceeds from and returns to some summus modus,6 and that this Truth and Wisdom is the Son who is truly God.7 Augustine immediately advances this discussion to treat a different trinitarian dimension. The Father is not simply the summus modus, but also a uerus modus from whom ueritas is born. One thus comes to the modus through the Truth, that is, to the Father through the Son.8 The Truth, however, has never been without the modus, and the modus without ueritas. Ueritas is the Filius dei, and the summus modus, who has no father, is the Father.9 Augustine is thus roughly in the Hymns of Ambrose of Milan (Oxford, 2016), 11 n. 30. For example, Aeterne rerum conditor refers to the lux lucis and fons luminis. Aeterne rerum conditor in B. Dunkle, Enchantment (2016), 221. Because of the similarity in imagery used by Augustine in his early writing, it is possible that he was also aware of the hymn, Splendor Paternae Gloriae. See footnote 15 below. By no means does this indicate that every use of a term is drawn from Ambrose or another source. For example, Augustine refers to the Platonic fonts (platonis fontibus) at Acad. 3.18.40 (CChr.SL 29, 59). Rather, specific uses of these images suggests perhaps Ambrosian influence, of which the hymns are a strong candidate. See also the use of ‘fons’ at Ambrose’s De sacramentis 1.4.12 (SC 25bis, 66), which Augustine may have encountered through his catechesis in Milan. See William Harmless, Augustine and the Catechumenate (Collegeville, MN, 1990), 79-106. 4 For example, the interlude at beata u. 2.9 on the feasts offered by the host who provides truly satiating food centers on the Wisdom of God, Christ, whom the participants all seek. 5 See beata u. 4.34-5 (CChr.SL 29, 84-5). 6 Beata u. 4.34 (CChr.SL 29, 84). Gerber contends that Augustine’s use of ‘modus’ as a hypostatic appellation is most similar to Plotinus in Ennead 1.8.2 or 1.2.2. Chad Gerber, The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Theology (Burlington, 2012), 41. In addition to Gerber’s observation, Augustine’s use of ‘modus’ may also be considered in a more specifically trinitarian and Christological context. If considered from this vantage, Augustine’s use of ‘modus’ may also be similar to Marius Victorinus. See Victorinus, Aduersus Arianum 4.14 (SC 68, 538-42); 4.33 (SC 68, 598-602); De homoousio recipiendo 4 (SC 68, 614-6). 7 Augustine, citing 1Cor. 1:24, states that the Son of God is the Sapientia dei, and the Filius dei is profecto deus. beata u. 4.34 (CChr.SL 29, 84: Quae est autem dicenda sapientia, nisi quae dei Sapientia est? Accepimus autem etiam auctoritate diuina dei Filium nihil esse aliud quam dei Sapientiam: et est dei Filius profecto deus). For a different reading of Augustine’s early Christology as Photinian, see Brian Dobell, Augustine’s Intellectual Conversion: The Journey from Platonism to Christianity (Cambridge, 2009), 20-7. 8 The use of per aliquem summum modum in this section may refer to the ‘unknowability’ of the Father, save through the Son, who says clearly ‘Ego sum ueritas’ (Jn. 14:6) so that ‘ut igitur ueritas modo gignitur, ita modus ueritate cognoscitur’, beata u. 4.34 (CChr.SL 29, 84). 9 Ibid.

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sketching the personal attributes of the divine Persons through an application of what is later called relative opposition. The Father is not ‘generated’ as the Son and Spirit. Augustine is also outlining an order cognoscendi: one comes to the Father, summus modus, through the Truth, the Son.10 Augustine completes this trinitarian image by referring to a certain (quaedam) admonitio, who works with the human so that one remembers, seeks, and thirsts for God. This admonitio, the Spirit, flows to humanity from the Fount of Truth.11 Hence Augustine has returned to and qualified his initial phrase concerning Monica’s inspired possession of Wisdom. He has discussed the relation of the Father and the Son in deo, while also connecting the trinitarian processions to the economic activity of the Trinity, specifically the Spirit. Augustine’s presentation moves from the activity of the Spirit ‘flowing from the divine fount’ to a discussion of the relation of the Father and the Son. A full understanding of this relation, that the sapientia dei is the Filius dei, is received through divine authority.12 It is not solely an ascent through reason. Augustine’s subtle, though dense, treatment of the trinitarian relations also reveals an understanding of pro-Nicene theology, which connects the transcendent relations with the economic activity of the Spirit. Augustine does not yet conclude his discussion of the Trinity. He couples the pattern of fons, mano, and ueritas with a parallel image of the hidden sun (sol secretus) pouring forth (infundit) its radiance (iubar) to the mind’s interior eyes.13 The sun is the Father,14 the pouring forth, the Spirit, and the iubar, the Son.15 In this image, the Spirit presents the Son, which indicates that the Spirit is truly God just as the Father and the Son. 16 Thus, Augustine writes that the fullness of the happy life is to know ‘by whom you are led to the Truth, the Truth which you enjoy, and through whom you are joined to the Highest 10 Beata u. 4.34 (CChr.SL 29, 84). See also Victorinus, Aduersus Arianum 1.42 (SC 68, 312-4); 3.17 (SC 68, 492-6). 11 Beata u. 4.35 (CChr.SL 29, 84). This trinitarian image shows, in an oblique way, the activity of the Spirit such that the Spirit leads the soul to the Son and through the Son to the Father. 12 Ibid. 4.34 (CChr.SL 29, 84). 13 Beata u. 4.35 (CChr.SL 29, 84). Concerning secretus, Augustine appears to use the term to describe something as ‘hidden’, deeper than the surface meaning, or not corporeal but spiritual or intellectual. See ord. 2.9.27 (CChr.SL 29, 122); Acad. 1.1.1 (CChr.SL 29, 3); 1.8.22 (CChr.SL 29, 15); sol. 1.14.25 (CSEL 89, 37-9); Gn. adu. Man. 2.12.16-7 (CSEL 91, 137-9); 2.15.23 (CSEL 91, 144); an. quant. 28.55 (CSEL 89, 201); 33.74 (CSEL 89, 222); 34.77 (CSEL 89, 226); and most similar to this reference f. et symb. 3.3 (CSEL 41, 7). 14 Another use of the image of the sun at sol. 1.8.15 will be discussed below. 15 Augustine’s use of iubar as a Christological and trinitarian image is perhaps drawn from Ambrose. See Ambrose, De paradiso 3.23 (CSEL 32.1, 280) and the Ambrosian hymn Splendor Paternae Gloriae in B. Dunkle, Enchantment (2016), 221-2. See also ibid. 101-5. While Augustine’s use of iubar is limited, beginning at sol. 2.20.35 (CSEL 89, 95-6), he will frequently use the image of the splendor of ueritas to refer to Christ. 16 The Admonitio is also completely and perfectly omnipotent God. Beata u. 4.35 (CChr.SL 29, 84).

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Limit’.17 One is thus led by the Spirit to the Truth, one enjoys this Truth, and through the Spirit is joined to the Summus Modus. These Three, Augustine states, are one God and one substance.18 Hence, Augustine completes the trinitarian aim of the work with Monica leading the Ambrosian hymn ‘Fove, precantes, trinitas’ and a laudation of God the Father and the Son, the dominus liberator animarum.19 In this compact discussion from beata u., Augustine’s pro-Nicene theology is evident. Augustine’s exposition does not seem haphazard. He uses two sets of images, which rely both upon auctoritas as an important hinge to reject the diminution of the Son and Spirit, and the Ambrosian hymn to realize the full trinitarian conclusion. However, the place of Christ and the church is underdetermined, and is only inferred from the Ambrosian hymn that concludes the dialogue, the closing laudation to Christ as the dominus liberator animarum, and the reference to diuina auctoritas that discloses sapientia dei to be Filius dei. Although the sequence of Augustine’s discussion in beata u. is suggestive, De ordine (ord.) appears to offer clarification. At ord. 2.5.16, Augustine writes that reason, which frees only very few, must be bound with true philosophy. True philosophy does not, however, contemn the sacred mysteries, but teaches the First Principle of all things, God, who is without beginning. It also instructs how great an Intellectus dwells therein, and what (quid) has proceeded therefrom for humanity’s sake without deterioration.20 Reason in pursuit of true philosophy perceives loosely the Trinity: the Principium, as the Father, the Intellectus as the Son, and the Spirit as the quid manauerit.21 This very God is affirmed by the sacred mysteries as unum Deum omnipotentem cum quo tripotentem, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum.22 17 Beata u. 4.35 (CChr.SL 29, 84: Illa est igitur plena satietas animorum, hoc est beata uita, pie perfecteque cognoscere a quo inducaris in ueritatem, qua ueritate perfruaris, per quid conectaris summo modo). Translation is my own. 18 Beata u. 4.35 (CChr.SL 29, 84). Cipriani identifies parallels with Victorinus. N. Cipriani, ‘Le fonti Cristiane’ (1994), 285. See Victorinus, Aduersus Arianum 1.47 (SC 68, 328-32); 1.12-3 (SC 68, 212-6). 19 Beata u. 4.35-6 (CChr.SL 29, 85). 20 Ord. 2.5.16 (CChr.SL 29, 115-6). For the economic effects of the Holy Spirit, see C. Gerber, Spirit (2012), 104-5. 21 N. Cipriani interestingly contends that this passage refers to the Incarnation of the Son and not the Spirit. He argues that the shift from the present subjunctive of maneo to the perfect subjunctive of mano signals a distinction in the eternal and economic activity of the Son. N. Cipriani, ‘Le Fonte Cristiani’ (1994), 266-7. See also G. Madec’s claim that these differences in Augustine’s use of tense may be for rhetorical reasons. Goulven Madec, ‘À propos d’une traduction de De ordine II.v.16’, RÉA 16 (1970), 181-5. 22 For a parallel use of tripotens, see Victorinus, Aduersus Arium 1.50 (SC 68, 344); 1.56 (SC 68, 362); 4.21 (SC 68, 564). L. Ayres states that perhaps Augustine uses the adjective, tripotens, and not tripotentia as Victorinus had, because of his awareness of the pro-Nicene una potentia. L. Ayres, The Trinity (2010), 29. At ord. 2.5.16 (CChr.SL 29, 115-6), Augustine may also be drawing from Ambrose in his use of confuse, nec contumeliose. He, like Ambrose, may have

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The sequence presented here in ord. is more expansive than beata u. The mysteries liberate persons of faith and teach of the Trinity.23 It is in connection with the liberation provided through the mysteries of the church that Augustine discusses the Incarnate Christ, whom he only perhaps praised with the title ‘dominus liberator’ at the very conclusion of beata u. For the sake of humanity, God deigned to take up (assumere) and dwell (agere) in a human body (nostri generis corpus). The very lowliness of the Incarnation offers a more replete clemency to humanity in contrast to ‘intellectuals’, who are in truth far removed from God through their pride.24 In the following sections Augustine suggests that such intellectuals are not able to properly understand questions such as the origin and immortality of the soul or how the soul differs from God, save as prideful distortions, without the liberation of Christ.25 Augustine’s elaboration in ord. advances from a lengthy discourse of Wisdom and Truth as the Son of God to the Trinity and supreme knowledge of God. Augustine has added to his discussion from beata u., however, the overt place of the Incarnation, which follows the Trinity suggested to reason (though in complete concert with what is revealed in the divine mysteries). In the shift from the Trinity in deo to the Incarnation, Augustine situates the place of authority and the church.26 Authority is not presented as simply an alternative path in competition with reason. As suggested in beata u., divine authority exceeds human power and shows to what extent God has acted for humanity.27 The revelation that and why God acts is delivered to the human through the authority of the sacred mysteries, not through the ambiguity of disputation.28 The sequence here, which is even more emphatic in the final book of Contra Academicos (Acad.), advances to indicate the limit of ratio, and the significance Arian or Sabellian descriptions of the Trinity in mind. For some examples see Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto 2.12.142 (CSEL 79, 142); 3.16.116-7 (CSEL 79, 199-200). For later uses by Augustine, see mor. 1.30.62 (CSEL 90, 65-6) and an. quan. 34.77 (CSEL 89, 225-6). 23 Ord. 2.5.16 (CChr.SL 29, 115-6). The strong dependence of these sections on other Latin theologians has been noted by several scholars, N. Cipriani, ‘Le Fonte Cristiani’ (1994), 264-5; Jean Doignon, ‘Points litigieux dans la tradition du texte du “De ordine”’, RÉA 25 (1979), 230-44; and L. Ayres, The Trinity (2010), 29 n. 59. See also G. Madec’s argument for the translation of this section against O. Du Roy. G. Madec, ‘À propos’ (1970), 179-80. 24 Ord. 2.5.16 (CChr.SL 29, 115-6). 25 Ord. 2.5.17 (CChr.SL 29, 116). As Augustine has woven together authority and reason in his appeal to the Trinity, it seems that the solution to these other questions likewise depend on faith. See G. Madec, ‘À propos’ (1970), 179-80. 26 Ord. 2.9.26. O. Du Roy ties together Augustine’s personification of ‘ratio’ in ord. 2.9.26 with ord. 2.5.16 and 2.11.31. Du Roy argues that ratio in these sections is the Plotinian third hypostasis, ‘Soul’. O. Du Roy, L’Intelligence (1966), 127-33. 27 For example, see ord. 2.9.27 (CChr.SL 29, 122-3). 28 Ibid. In addition, divine authority reveals its power as well as why God acts; for by deeds God shows his power, by humility, clemency, by commandment, God’s nature. True knowledge of God begins from and is grounded in the merciful and humble act of Christ, who constitutes the church that presents this authority.

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of authority, the church, and centrally the Incarnation.29 The Incarnation and the mysteries of the church provide greater perspicuity. However, even with the tension in place between understanding through reason without authority and a philosophy that begins from authority and the Incarnation, Augustine concludes the treatise by returning again to the trinitarian image of the fount. God is the very source or fount (fontem) from which every Truth flows (manat), the Spirit, and the very Father of Truth (patrem ueritatis), the Son. Therefore, the Spirit and Son disclose the Father and the individual human will come to see God, this very fount, through the Wisdom of God and the flowing out of the Spirit.30 Augustine’s discussion of the Trinity in ord., as with the other Cassiciacum Dialogues, is strongly in line with pro-Nicene language. However, beyond the particular facets exhibited in his trinitarian theology, Augustine appears to structure his treatment within a larger theological framework. In both ord. and Acad., the sequence builds from a discussion of the Word to the Trinity to authority and the sacred mysteries concluding with the Incarnation. Yet, in other writings, Augustine appears to shift his emphasis by employing a different sequence, while using the same images such as the fount or sun. One example of this is found in the Soliloquia (sol.). Augustine begins sol., also written at Cassiciacum, with an extensive trinitarian prayer. He proclaims God the Father of truth, wisdom, and intelligible light, all of which are references to the Son. God the Father is also the father of the human’s awakening, illumination, and pledge, which admonishes (admonemur) the human to return to God.31 These descriptions all depict the Spirit, as is suggested through the reference to ‘admonishment’, which Augustine used as a title for the Spirit in the Dialogues. As the prayer continues, Augustine weaves together the operation of the Son and Spirit by coupling verbal actions, which likely refer to the Spirit and biblical appellations of Christ. For example, the God who recalls us unto the ‘way’ or the God who gives to the human the ‘bread of life’ (John 6:35/48).32 Following the prayer, Augustine proceeds through a discussion of the pursuit of wisdom to the bondage in the shadows through consuetudo, which keeps one from seeing the light of God and rejecting the medicus, Christ.33 When Augustine admits his own failure, Ratio, his interlocutor, offers an image of the sun that is very similar to beata u. Like the sun, which is, shines, and illumines, the hidden God (secretissmus deus) is, is understood, and makes other things to be known.34 In this instance, the image of the sun is joined with descriptions which Augustine often employs for the Son (radiance) and Spirit (illumination). 29 30 31 32 33 34

Acad. 3.19.42 (CChr.SL 29, 60). Ord. 2.19.51 (CChr.SL 29, 135). Sol. 1.1.2 (CSEL 89, 5). Ibid. 1.1.3 (CSEL 89, 6-7). Ibid. 1.4.9-1.6.12. Ibid. 1.8.15 (CSEL 89, 23-4).

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However, the goal of the image of the sun is to provide an analogy with an intelligible description of God, which is trinitarian, though less descriptive than the prayer of the prologue. Augustine’s use of the image of sun is not followed by a discussion of the Trinity or the Incarnation. However, he bookends the analogy of the sun with overtly Christological imagery such as the medicus, sapientia, and beauty, and the Spirit as admonitio.35 To gaze upon the very splendor of Wisdom some only need an ‘admonitio’, others need an instructor or, as with Augustine himself, the secretissimus medicus.36 Therefore, while Augustine has used in other works from Cassiciacum a sequence that moves from the Son to the Trinity to Christ and divine authority in the sacred mysteries, the form of his discussion here does not so clearly expand. In his writings completed at Thagaste, Augustine alters his use of the images of the sun and fount. In the second book of De Genesi contra Manichaeos (Gn. adu. Man.), Augustine comments on Gen. 2:6: ‘A spring was coming up from the earth and watering the whole face of the earth’. He states that before sin the human was ‘irrigated’ from within by the very fount pouring forth Truth (manante ueritate).37 The use of fons here is more ambiguous, while the place of ueritas and the use of mano is similar to the Cassiciacum Dialogues, appearing to represent the Spirit (mano) and the Son (ueritas). The reference to fons seems similar to the contemporaneous use in De musica (mus.). In mus. Augustine glosses his reference to the eternal fons, which seems to be the divine Godhead, with Christ who is the light whereby the human sees God. The immediate pattern in mus. is similar to beata u. However, the sequence in mus. begins from the unsurpassable authority of the Scriptures and works through a string of biblical verses to conclude that to see God, the light (lumen), the human will only see in lumine, in Christ, who is the very sapientia dei and often called the ‘Light’.38 Just as in mus., Augustine’s use of the imagery of fons, mano, and ueritas in Gn. adu. Man., is immediately framed in a discussion of the Incarnation.39 The Incarnation poured out the rain of the Gospel for the human to drink externally what Adam refused internally.40 Therefore, while the trinitarian image does not 35

Ibid. 1.13.22-3. Ibid. 1.13.23-14.25 (CSEL 89, 35-8). 37 Gn. adu. Man. 2.4.5 (CSEL 91, 123-4). Augustine does not wholly abandon the image of the fount. With explicit qualification, Augustine uses the image of the fons with fluuia and potio in f. et symb. to provide an example of the one and same substance of the Trinity. f. et symb. 9.17 (CSEL 41, 18-20). 38 Mus. 6.16.52 (CSEL 102, 229). 39 Augustine also briefly mentions how the divine fount bestows universal benefit on the invisible creation as well as the human. Gn. adu. Man. 2.7.8 (CSEL 91, 127). 40 Ibid. 2.5.6 (CSEL 91, 124-6). For Augustine’s nearly identical use of similar imagery and the same structure, see De sermone domini in monte (s. dom. m.) 1.23.79 (CChr.SL 35, 88-9). 36

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receive elaboration in this section of Gn. adu. Man. as it did in the Cassiciacum Dialogues, the sequence here moves from the transcendent and focuses extensively on the economic.41 The economic focus is more overt in Augustine’s second interpretation of Gen. 2:6 later in Gn. adu. Man. He brings together Gen. 2:24, Eph. 5:31-2, and John 16:28, to express that the Son both remained truly God with the Father and ‘departed’ to become truly human. Through the Incarnation, the church is both joined to Christ and drawn from his side. This union was effected through Christ’s birth and death. The fount, then, is not simply taken to refer to God the Father, but in this treatment, to the work of the Holy Spirit. He interprets Gen. 2:6 as also depicting the ‘earth’ as the Virgin Mary ‘watered’ by the Holy Spirit, whom, Augustine observes, is often given the name of fount and water in the gospel of John.42 Hence, in Gn. adu. Man. both uses of fons discussed here are structured, not primarily as trinitarian images, which appeal to reason and suggest authority (as in the works from Cassiciacum). Rather the pattern is shifted to center more overtly on economic imagery drawn from Scripture, specifically surrounding the Incarnation, the Spirit, and the church. In De moribus ecclesiae catholicae (mor.) Augustine’s focus is similar to Gn. adu. Man. For example, Augustine begins the work by emphasizing the Word incarnate, the church, and the scriptura Christi.43 The introduction proceeds from Christ to the authority of the church and the Scriptures. Put simply, Augustine frames mor. Christologically and consequently ecclesiologically. When the two images, the sun and fount, which have been the focus of this paper are considered, the structure is noticeably different from early works such as sol.44 When Augustine uses the image of the sun, he in fact employs it only as a parallel for his discussion of Christ the Truth who is the splendor Patris.45 The sun provides an analogy for the equality of the Father and the Son, as the sun generates its splendor without diminution. From this analogy, Augustine orders his treatment to move from the Trinity to the unity of the two Testaments to the ‘holy bosom’ of the ‘Catholic church’.46 41

At Gn. adu. Man. 2.14.20 (CSEL 91, 142), Augustine cites Cant. 4:12 to refer to the church as an enclosed fount. 42 Gn. adu. Man. 2.24.37 (CSEL 91, 160-2). 43 Mor. 1.1.2-2.3 (CSEL 90, 4-6). 44 Augustine’s use of ‘fons’ is limited to two references which assert that God is the source of all things. Mor. 1.11.19 (CSEL 90, 23); 1.26.51 (CSEL 90, 55). The context is more explicitly anti-Manichaean, though Manichaeism is also an apologetical focus in his writings from Cassiciacum. The reduction of the importance for Augustine of the image of ‘fons’ is realized in later early writings where the image is always framed Christologically. For example, see De duabus animabus 1.1 (CSEL 25.1, 51-2); uera rel. 11.21 (CChr.SL 32, 200-1); De libero arbitrio 2.13.35 (CSEL 29, 261); and s. dom. m. 1.23.79 (CChr.SL 35, 88-9). 45 Mor. 1.16.28 (CSEL 90, 33). Augustine draws from John 14:16, Heb. 1:3, and Ps. 89:9. 46 Ibid. 1.16.28-17.32 (CSEL 90, 33-7).

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The larger sequence of Augustine’s discussion indicates certain parallels with the Cassiciacum Dialogues, especially ord. and Acad. After beginning with the Incarnation, the Scriptures, and the church, Augustine undertakes an extensive treatment of Christ through various appellations, sapientia, uirtus, ueritas, and the Son as the ‘way’ to the Father. He then turns to the Trinity and the relation of the Son to the Father and the Spirit.47 Indeed, Augustine’s extensive and overt treatment of the Spirit moves from the trinitarian (trinam quamdam unitatem), to the economic activity of the Spirit.48 From this Augustine again returns to the church and the catholica disciplina that leads through love to the highest peak and enjoyment of Wisdom and Truth.49 Hence, Augustine’s use of ‘sol’ in mor. is situated in a broad sequence that emphasizes how his trinitarian discourse is framed and drawn from the unity of Christ found in the Scriptures and the authority of the church.50 When Augustine composed De uera religione (uera rel.) around 390 AD, he did not rely on the images of the fount and the sun, which he had frequently used in his previous writings.51 This is not to say that Augustine abandons these images. Rather he clearly frames and limits the function of these images. His writings, then, from Cassiciacum and Thagaste reveal a period wherein Augustine frequently sequenced these images as part of his larger treatment of Christ, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the church, and ascent through reason and authority. In the writings from Cassiciacum, Augustine varies how he uses ‘fons’ and ‘sol’, though the sequence of this imagery is always trinitarian and framed Christologically. As noted in works like beata u. and especially sol., he does not structure the sequences to include overtly the Incarnation and the church (though beata u. is more suggestive). In other writings, such as ord., similar patterns are situated amidst a more developed treatment of the Incarnation and authority. In the works from Thagaste, Augustine proceeds to discuss in sequence Christ, the church, and Scriptures, followed by the Trinity, before he transitions to economic discussions of the Spirit and concludes with the church. The images of ‘sol’ and ‘fons’ are nested within much more expansive theological sequences. The significance of ‘sol’ and ‘fons’ in Augustine’s early writings is perhaps witnessed in the frequency and flexibility with which these images are used. 47 Ibid. 1.6.9-13.22. Concerning Augustine’s Christology in mor., see J. Kevin Coyle, ‘De moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae: Augustin chrétien à Rome’, in J. Kevin Coyle et al. (eds), Lectio Augustini Settimana Agostiniana Pavese VII: De moribus ecclesiae et de moribus Manichaeorum, de quantitate animae di Agostino d’Ippona (Palermo, 1991), 37-8. Similar to his Christology, Augustine’s treatment of the Holy Spirit in mor. is the most extensive of his early writings and relies heavily on scriptural verses and allusions. Mor. 1.13.23-1.16.23. 48 Ibid. 1.14.24 (CSEL 90, 28-9). 49 Ibid. 1.17.31-18.33 (CSEL 90, 35-8). 50 Ibid. 1.18.33-4 (CSEL 90, 38-9). 51 Uera rel. possesses only one brief use of ‘fons’ as noted above. Likewise, ‘sol’ is used in a brief contrast with the true light, Christ. Uera rel. 39.73 (CChr.SL 32, 235).

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Augustine’s varied uses of ‘sol’ and ‘fons’ do not so clearly mark stark differences between Cassiciacum and Thagaste. The expansive re-sequencing of these images within a range of Christological and trinitarian accounts may be in part because Augustine draws from Latin Christian sources, such as Ambrosian hymns, which grant him the liberty to adapt to his specific emphases in a particular work. Scholars have rightly pointed to Augustine’s reliance on and use of specific pro-Nicene theological language. It may be that imagery such as ‘sol’ and ‘fons’ indicate a different source, which is no less pro-Nicene, but much more poetic and hence adaptable for complex and situational sequencing.

Credere in Christum: The Development of the Augustinian Notion of Fides Isabelle BOCHET, Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, Paris, France

ABSTRACT The discovery of Dolbeau Sermon 19 established the Augustinian origin of the distinction credere Christum / credere Christo / credere in Christum: it is the result of Augustine’s progressive doctrinal elaboration. The expression credere in became customary early on to designate the Christian act of faith, but without clear differentiation from other constructions of credere. According to Augustine, no minister dares to say, ‘Believe in me’, only Christ can say it. Augustine uses this argument against the Donatists and shows that the faith proper to the Christian involves combining love with faith, but without then differentiating credere in Christum from credere Christo. In 412, in De spiritu et littera, he establishes that faith ‘in Him who justifies the ungodly’ presupposes a close union of man with God, for it is both of God and of man. This doctrinal clarification is not immediately accompanied by a concern for terminology. Commenting on the Gospel of John, Augustine discovered in 414 the specificity of the Johannine credere in Christum, which he distinguished from the credere Christo; credere in Christum requires incorporation into Christ. The ternary distinction which Augustine introduces in Dolbeau Sermon 19, commenting on Jn. 6:29, is secondary; what he affirms, on the other hand, with increasing force, is the reality of incorporation into Christ, which takes place through faith in Christ. What defines the faith of the Christian is not only a specific content, but also an act which is the work of Christ in the believer.

The distinction between three constructions of credere: credere Deum, credere Deo, credere in Deum, is a commonplace of medieval theology, which Bede attributes to Augustine:1 Thomas Camelot,2 then Christine Mohrmann,3 sought its origin without finding any attestation of the triple distinction in Augustine himself. The discovery of Dolbeau Sermon 19 solved the enigma: 1

Bede, In ep. Iacobi 2, 19, ed. D. Hurst, CChr.SL 121 (Turnhout, 1983), 197-8. For further references to medieval theologians, see François Dolbeau (ed.), Augustin d’Hippone. Vingt-six sermons au peuple d’Afrique, Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 147 (Paris, 1996; 20092), 148-9. 2 Thomas Camelot, ‘Credere Deo, credere Deum, credere in Deum. Pour l’histoire d’une formule traditionnelle’, RSPT 30 (1941-1942), 149-55. 3 Christine Mohrmann, ‘Credere in Deum. Sur l’interprétation théologique d’un fait de langue’, in ead., Études sur le latin des chrétiens, t. 1. Le latin des chrétiens (Roma, 1958), 195-203.

Studia Patristica CXIX, 13-32. © Peeters Publishers, 2021.

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here, indeed, Augustine explains at length the difference between Christum credere, Christo credere and credere in Christum.4 This distinction between the three constructions of the verb credere has no grammatical basis and does not derive directly from the New Testament.5 The question then is: how did Augustine come to make this distinction? More precisely, how did he gradually develop it to highlight the specificity of the Christian faith that he identifies with credere in Christum? The distinction introduced by Augustine between credere Christum, credere Christo and credere in Christum is the result of a progressive doctrinal elaboration, motivated mainly, on the one hand, by the anti-Pelagian controversy, and on the other hand, by Augustine’s preaching on the Gospel of John. After briefly discussing what Augustine receives from Scripture and Tradition, I will first examine Augustine’s reflections, prior to 412, on the expression credere in Christum and on the specificity of the Christian faith, which he often differentiates from the faith of demons. Secondly, I will show how the anti-Pelagian controversy led Augustine to ponder, in De spiritu et littera, in 412, on the origin of fides: is faith in our power? is it a gift of grace? This requires that he distinguish in advance the various meanings of the verb credere, in order to determine which is the Christian’s own fides. The commentary on the Johannine gospel that Augustine probably took up again in 414 plays a decisive role in the genesis of the distinction between credere Christo and credere in Christum: the particular attention paid to John’s vocabulary and especially to his conception of faith enriches the Augustinian understanding of the Faith. Thirdly, I will study Dolbeau Sermon 19, which sets out the three possible constructions of the verb credere and specifies their meaning in a systematic way; subsequent texts confirm and deepen the specificity of credere in Christum.

1. First reflections on credere in Christum (before 412) What Augustine receives from Scripture and Tradition I cannot, within the limits of this lecture, revisit the questions raised by the translation of πιστεύειν into Latin, the constructions and meanings of the Latin verb credere, the evolution of the concepts of πίστις and fides, or to specify the conception of ‘believing’ in the New Testament and in the work of early Christian writers.6 I will limit myself here to a few important remarks which 4

Sermo Dolbeau 19, 2-5, ed. F. Dolbeau, 156-60. See Th. Camelot, ‘Credere Deo, credere Deum, credere in Deum’ (1941-1942), 149-51. 6 See ThLL, s.v. credere. For general studies on the concepts of πίστις and fides, see in particular Gérard Freyburger, Fides. Étude sémantique et religieuse depuis les origines jusqu’à l’époque augustéenne, Collection d’études anciennes 69, série latine (Paris, 1986); Teresa Morgan, Roman 5

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must be taken into account when studying the meaning given by Augustine to the expression: credere in Christum. The threefold distinction introduced by Augustine does not have its source directly in the texts of the New Testament. It is difficult to see, for example, the difference in meaning between the two constructions of πιστεύειν in Romans 4:3 and 5: ἐπίστευσεν Ἀβραὰμ τῷ θεῷ and πιστεύοντι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἀσεβῆ.7 Nor does the difference appear in the Latin translation of these verses: credidit Abraham deo et credenti autem in eum qui iustificat impium; Augustine deals with the two expressions as equivalent in De spiritu et littera.8 There are various uses of πιστεύειν in the Gospel of John: the verb can be used with the dative, with ὅτι, with εἰς or with εἰς τὸ ὄνομα; it is sometimes used absolutely.9 There are certainly distinctions to be made between these uses: according to Charles Harold Dodd, ‘while πιστεύειν with the dative means to give credence to the words which Jesus speaks, πιστεύειν εἰς αὐτόν means to have a confidence in Him based upon an intellectual acceptance of the claims made for His person’;10 Ignace de la Potterie underlines rather that the construction with εἰς, which is characteristic of John, implies a movement of adherence to the person of Jesus, a gift of self in full confidence.11 Augustine, however, does not rely, in his Homilies on the Gospel of John, on the Latin text of John to introduce or justify the difference to be established between the different constructions of credere.12 His attention to the letter of the Gospel text nevertheless makes him sensitive to the strength of the Johannine credere in (πιστεύειν εἰς). In fact, for John, ‘believing in’ means ‘coming to’ (Jn. 6:35.44-7), ‘welcoming’ (Jn. 5:43-4; 1:12), ‘following’ (Jn. 10:25-7) or ‘eating’.13 As Jean Zumstein notes, about John 1:12 Faith and Christian Faith: Pistis and Fides in the Early Roman Empire and Early Churches (Oxford, 2015); Dieter Lührmann, ‘Glaube’, RAC 11 (1981), 48-122; Christophe Grellard, Philippe Hoffmann and Laurent Lavaud (eds), Genèses antiques et médiévales de la foi, Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 206 (Paris, 2020). 7 See Th. Camelot, ‘Credere Deo, credere Deum, credere in Deum’ (1941-1942), 151. On Paul’s vocabulary of faith, see for example Jean-Noël Aletti, Comment Dieu est-il juste  ? Clefs pour interpréter l’épître aux Romains, Parole de Dieu 29 (Paris, 1991), 88-111. 8 De spiritu et littera 31, 54, ed. Carolus F. Urba and Iosephus Zycha, CSEL 60 (Vienna, 1913), 211. 9 For these various uses, see for example Charles Harold Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge, 19652 ), 179-86. 10 Ibid. 184-5. T. Morgan points out that there is little difference in meaning between these various constructions (Roman Faith [2015], 425-6, n. 143). 11 ‘L’emploi dynamique de εἰς dans saint Jean et ses incidences théologiques’, Biblica 43 (1962), 366-87; see here 376. 12 See for example In Iohannis euangelium tractatus 11, 2, ed. Radbodus Willems, CChr.SL 36 (Turnhout, 1954), 110-1 (with regards to Jn. 2:24-5); 29, 6, 287. The distinction introduced by Augustine between credere ei and credere in eum is not based on John’s text. On Augustine’s Latin text, see Hugh A.G. Houghton, Augustine’s Text of John. Patristic Citations and Latin Gospel Manuscripts, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford, 2008). 13 See Donatien Mollat, Saint Jean maître spirituel (Paris, 1976), 107.

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– ‘to those who received Him, He gave the power to become children of God, to those who believe in His name’ – there is a close link between the acceptance of the Logos and the theme of faith: ‘To accept the Logos means to rely on it, to discern in it the only true light and the source of eternal life. […] The decision of faith and the gift of divine filiality, or in other words, faith and salvation, are one and the same thing’.14 Augustine notes some of these equivalences in his Homilies on the Gospel of John, for example, in 25:14: ‘qui uenit ad me’, hoc is quod ait: ‘et qui credit in me’; or in 26:4: credere enim in eum, hoc est manducare panem uiuum. Qui credit, manducat. Even more strongly, as we will see, he associates credere in Christum with participation in divine life. The formulas of the Apostle’s Creed are also to be taken into account if we want to understand the genesis of the Augustinian credere in Christum. If we put aside the De fide et symbolo which does not literally quote the Creed,15 we can use as witnesses, on the one hand, Sermon 213 and the De symbolo ad catechumenos whose quoted text is similar to the Roman-Milanese Creed, and on the other hand, Sermon 215, which quotes the African Creed.16 In these texts, the introduction of the articles relating to the Father, the Son and the Spirit by the formula: credo in (or credimus in) is well attested,17 but there is disagreement as to whether or not the preposition in is used for the articles at the end of the Creed.18 It is quite different in the Expositio symboli of Rufinus of Aquileia, which insists on the need to reserve the mention of in exclusively for the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, in order to clearly distinguish the Creator from creatures.19 14 Jean Zumstein, L’Évangile selon saint Jean (1-12), Commentaire du Nouveau Testament 4a (Genève, 2014), 64. See in the same way Yves Simoens, ‘La relation au Père dans l’acte de croire au Fils. De Sychar (Jn 4,3b-45) à Capharnaüm (Jn 6)’, in Massimo Grilli, †Jacek Oniszczuk and André Wenin (eds), Filiation, entre Bible et cultures. Hommage à Roland Meynet (Leuven, Paris, Bristol, CT, 2019), 197-219, 197. 15 Retractationes 1, 17 (16), ed. Almut Mutzenbecher, CChr.SL 57 (Turnhout, 1999), 52: In quo de rebus ipsis ita disseritur, ut tamen non fiat uerborum illa contextio, quae tenenda memoriter competentibus traditur. 16 See François Dolbeau, ‘Symbolo ad catechumenos (De –)’; Wolfram Kinzig, ‘Symbolum’, Augustinus-Lexikon 5, to be published. 17 See for example Sermo 213, 3, ed. Germanus Morin, Miscellanea Agostiniana, I. Sancti Augustini Sermones post Maurinos reperti (Roma, 1930), 443: Credo, dicis, in deum patrem omnipotentem, et in Iesum Christum filium eius unicum dominum nostrum. 18 The use of in for articles at the end of the symbol is found, in Sermo 213, 8-9, ed. G. Morin, MA I, 447-8: in sanctam ecclesiam … in remissionem peccatorum; and in De symbolo ad catechumenos 17, ed. Roland Vander Plaetse, CChrSL 46 (Turnhout, 1969), 199: in uitam aeternam. On these issues, see Caelestis Eichenseer, Das Symbolum apostolicum beim heiligen Augustinus (Sankt Ottilien, 1960); Liuwe H. Westra, The Apostles’ Creed. Origin, History, and Some Early Commentaries (Turnhout, 2002); Wolfram Kinzig, Faith in Formulae. A Collection of Creeds and Creed-related Texts (Oxford, 2017). 19 Expositio symboli 34, ed. Manlius Simonetti, CChr.SL 20 (Turnhout, 1961), 169-70: Non dixit: In sanctam ecclesiam, nec: In remissionem peccatorum, nec: In carnis resurrectionem. Si enim

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It is necessary to continue the investigation of the use of the various constructions of credere in Latin patristics prior to Augustine: I will simply note here, with Christine Mohrmann,20 that, if we can identify among the Latins ‘a tendency to differentiate between the various expressions, especially between the formulation with the dative and that with in’, the use was not established, in a clear and explicit way, before Augustine. First elements of reflection in the anti-Donatist controversy Let us now turn to Augustine’s texts. Before 412, there are some elements that lay the ground for the later distinction between the various credere constructions. In the context of the anti-Donatist controversy, Augustine relies on the habit of reserving the expression credere in for God, in order to denounce the illegitimate claims of Donatist ministers. The argument appears in Sermon 292, delivered before 405,21 on the occasion of the feast of the birth of John the Baptist; featuring a minister who claims not only to baptize, but also to ‘justify’, that is, ‘to make just’, Augustine takes him to task: Tu ergo iustificas, tu iustum facis? Ergo, inquit, credat in te quem iustificas. Dic, aude dicere, crede in me; qui non dubitas dicere, iustificaris a me. Turbatur, fluctuat, excusat. Quid enim opus est, inquit, ut dicam illi, crede in me? crede in Christum, dico.22 The argument presupposes an already well-established use, that of the creed, which reserves for God the expression credere in. It is also based on the essential link between faith and justification, a link that Augustine proves by quoting Romans 4:5: credenti in eum qui iustificat impium deputatur fides eius ad iustitiam.23 If the minister does not dare to say: crede in me, let him not claim to justify the baptized person either.24 Augustine uses the same argument in the Contra Cresconium, in 406-407: addidisset In praepositionem, una cum superioribus eademque uis fuerat. Nunc autem in illis quidem uocabulis ubi de diuinitate fides ordinatur, In deo patre dicitur, et In Iesu Christo filio eius, et: In spiritu sancto. In ceteris uero, ubi non de diuinitate sed de creaturis et de mysteriis sermo est, In praepositio non additur, ut dicatur: In sancta ecclesia, sed sanctam ecclesiam credendam esse, non ut deum, sed ut ecclesiam deo congregatam. Et remissionem peccatorum credendum esse, non in remissionem peccatorum, et resurrectionem carnis, non in resurrectionem carnis. Hac itaque praepositionis syllaba creator a creaturis secernitur et diuina separantur ab humanis. See Liuwe H. Westra, ‘Creating a Theological Difference: the Myth of Two Grammatical Constructions with Latin Credo’, SP 92 (2017), 3-14. 20 See ‘Credere in Deum’ (1958), 196-7. 21 See Pierre-Marie Hombert, Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne, Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 163 (Paris, 2000), 578, n. 69. 22 Sermo 292, 6, PL 38, 1324. 23 Ibid.: Audi ergo non apostolum, sed Christum per apostolum. Quid dicit apostolus? ‘credenti in eum qui iustificat impium, deputatur fides eius ad iustitiam’ (Rom. 4:5). 24 Ibid.: Imo si non audes dicere, crede in me: caue iam ne dicas, iustifico te.

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Et nemo fidem christianam sumit ab homine nec perfido nec fideli, sed ab illo, de quo scriptum est: ‘ fide mundans corda eorum’ (Acts 15:9). Qui si per fidelem audit quid credendum sit, eum quidem imitatur, non tamen ab eo iustificatur. Nam si minister iustificat impium, consequens est, ut etiam in ministrum recte credatur; apostolica quippe clara et certa sententia est: ‘credenti in eum qui iustificat impium deputatur fides eius ad iustitiam’ (Rom. 4:5). Proinde si minister non audet dicere: ‘crede in me’, non audeat dicere: ‘iustificaris a me’.25

In Book 3 of the Contra litteras Petiliani in 405, Augustine had already quoted Romans 4:526 three times with the same aim: to show that it is Christ, and not the minister, who justifies the one who believes in Him, regardless of the holiness of the minister. Semper enim Christus iustificat impium faciendo ex impio christianum, semper a Christo percipitur fides…27 A second element contributes to the preparation of the definition of credere in Christum: the distinction introduced by Augustine between the faith of demons and that of the disciples, relying on James 2:19 – ‘You believe that there is only one God, you do well; demons also believe and tremble with fear’ – in order to establish that faith without good works cannot be enough; Donatists certainly have the only faith, the only baptism, but they do not possess them for salvation, because they lack charity and belong to the unity of the Church.28 In the 10th Homily on the first epistle of John, in 407, Augustine also asked himself what makes the specificity of the Christian faith: it is, he explained, to add love to faith. Multi enim dicunt: credo; sed fides sine operibus non saluat. Opus autem fidei ipsa dilectio est, dicente Paulo apostolo, ‘et fides quae per dilectionem operatur’ (Gal. 5:6). […] Hoc est credere quia Iesus Christus est, quomodo credunt christiani, qui non solo nomine christiani sunt, sed et factis et uita: non quomodo credunt daemones. ‘Nam et daemones credunt, et contremiscunt’ (Jas. 2:19), sicut dixit scriptura. Quid potuerunt plus credere daemones, quam ut dicerent, ‘scimus qui sis, filius Dei’ (Mk. 1:24)? Quod dixerunt daemones, hoc dixit et Petrus. […] Hoc Petrus, hoc et daemones: eadem uerba, non idem animus. Et unde constat quia hoc Petrus cum dilectione dicebat? Quia fides christiani cum dilectione est; daemonis autem sine dilectione. Quomodo sine dilectione? hoc dicebat Petrus, ut Christum amplecteretur: hoc dicebant daemones, ut Christus ab eis recederet. […] Ergo uidetis quia quomodo hic dicit ‘qui credit’ (1Jn. 5:1), propria quaedam fides est, non quomodo cum multis.29 25 Contra Cresconium grammaticum et Donatistam 3, 11, 12, ed. Michael Petschenig, CSEL 52 (Vienna, 1909), 419-20. 26 Contra litteras Petiliani 3, 36, 42; 43, 52; 54, 66; ed. M. Petschenig, CSEL 52, 196, 205, 220. 27 Ibid. 3, 43, 52, ed. M. Petschenig, CSEL 52, 205 (quoting 1, 7, 8, CSEL 52, 8). 28 Contra Cresconium 1, 29, 34, ed. M. Petschenig, CSEL 52, 354; Liber de unico baptismo 17, ed. M. Petschenig, CSEL 53 (Vienna, 1910), 18; In Iohannis euangelium 6, 21, ed. R. Willems, CChr.SL 36, 64-65; In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus 10, 1, ed. John William Mountain, Bibliothèque Augustinienne 76 (Paris, 2008), 397-401; Sermo Denis 19, 4, ed. G. Morin, MA I, 101. 29 In Iohannis epistulam 10, 1, ed. J.W. Mountain, BA 76, 397-401.

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This is the first text in which Augustine uses Galatians 5:6b – fides quae per dilectionem operatur – to reveal the specificity of the Christian faith:30 fides christiani cum dilectione est. Love is ‘the work of faith’, that is, the manifestation of the grace that acts in him;31 it is also the very purpose of Peter’s confession of faith that he wants to ‘adhere to Christ’, in contrast to the demons’confession of faith which seeks to reject Christ. The Christian faith is therefore already well characterized, but this clarification is not yet accompanied by a terminological distinction. Augustine introduced, shortly afterwards, the expression credere in Christum, but applied it to Peter as much as to the one who hates Christ: Nescio quis non uult credere in Christum; adhuc nec daemones imitatur. Iam credit in Christum, sed odit Christum; habet confessionem fidei in timore poenae, non in amore coronae: nam et illi puniri timebant. Adde huic fidei dilectionem, ut fiat fides qualem dicit apostolus Paulus, ‘fides quae per dilectionem operatur’ (Gal. 5:6); inuenisti christianum, inuenisti ciuem Ierusalem, inuenisti ciuem angelorum, inuenisti in uia suspirantem peregrinum…32

Therefore, the expression credere in Christum does not yet refer to the Christian’s faith in its specificity: one can ‘add’ love to it or not. Yet, in the Commentary on Psalm 130, which probably predates the 10th Homily on John’s first epistle,33 Augustine already sketches a definition of credere in Christum that essentially includes the love of Christ: hoc est enim credere in Christum, diligere Christum; he invites his listeners, not only to believe, but to believe in Christ: Nos autem sic credamus, ut in ipsum credamus, diligentes eum, et non dicamus: ‘quid nobis et tibi est?’ (Matt. 8:29) sed dicamus potius: ad te pertinemus, tu nos redemisti. Omnes ergo qui sic credunt, tamquam lapides sunt uiui, de quibus templum dei aedificatur.34 The expression credere in Christum here refers to the Christian’s faith in its specificity: a faith that implies the love of Christ, belonging to Christ and incorporation into Christ.35 30 See Isabelle Bochet, ‘Fides quae per dilectionem operatur: l’originalité de l’exégèse augustinienne de Galates 5, 6’, in Isabelle Bochet and Michel Fédou (eds), L’exégèse patristique de l’épître aux Galates, Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 197 (Paris, 2014), 155-80. 31 De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, qu. 76, 1, ed. A. Mutzenbecher, CChr.SL 44A (Vienna, 1975), 219: Nam iustificatus per fidem quomodo potest nisi iuste deinceps operari, quamuis antea nihil iuste operatus ad fidei iustificationem peruenerit non merito bonorum operum sed gratia Dei, quae uacare in illo non potest, cum iam per dilectionem bene operatur? 32 In Iohannis epistulam 10, 2, ed. J.W. Mountain, BA 76, 403. 33 See Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, Recherches de chronologie augustinienne, Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 23 (Paris, 1965), 52-3. 34 Enarratio in Psalmum 130, 1, ed. Eligius Dekkers and Johannes Fraipont, CChr.SL 40 (Turnhout, 1956), 1898. 35 Ibid.: Et quia in illius corpore sunt omnes, tamquam unus homo loquitur; et ipse est unus qui et multi sunt. Multi enim sunt in seipsis, unus sunt in illo qui unus est. Ipsum est autem etiam templum dei, de quo dicit apostolus: ‘templum enim dei sanctum est, quod estis uos’ (1Cor. 3:17);

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The anti-Donatist controversy therefore gave Augustine the opportunity to gradually specify what is characteristic of the Christian’s faith: it is faith ‘in Him who justifies the sinner’ (Rom. 4:5); it is ‘faith working through love’ (Gal. 5:6), in other words faith that does not stem from fear, but is accompanied by the love of Christ. It goes without saying, for Augustine, that the expression credere in cannot be used to designate trust in a man: it is to be reserved for faith in God. On the other hand, before 412, he did not seek to characterize by this expression what is characteristic of the Christian’s fides, except in Enarratio in Psalmum 130, but the remark was isolated and Augustine did not draw any conclusions from it. 2. The elaboration of the specific meaning of credere in Christum at the beginning of the anti-Pelagian controversy De spiritu et littera, written in 412 at the beginning of the anti-Pelagian controversy, marks a decisive turning point in Augustine’s reflection on what makes the Christian faith specific. The distinction between credere Christo / credere in Christum does not yet appear in it, but the concern to distinguish the Christian’s faith from other forms of belief and to clarify the source of the faith by which the Christian is justified lays the foundations for the terminological distinction to be established. Attention to Johannine vocabulary, when preaching on the Gospel of John, leads Augustine to formulate it explicitly. Reflection on the various meanings of credere in De spiritu et littera At the end of De spiritu et littera, after having shown how grace gives man his free will, by making him capable of loving good and accomplishing it, Augustine asks himself ‘whether faith itself, which seems to be the beginning of salvation […] lies in our power’.36 Answering this question presupposes determining beforehand what faith we are talking about: it is ‘this faith which we use when we believe something, not the faith which we pledge when we make a promise’.37 Illa itaque fide quaerimus, utrum in potestate sit, qua credimus deo uel credimus in deum. Hinc enim scriptum est: ‘credidit Abraham deo et deputatum est illi ad iustitiam’ (Rom. 4:3; Gen. 15:6), et: ‘credenti in eum qui iustificat impium deputatur fides eius ad iustitiam’ (Rom. 4:5).38 Credere omnes qui credunt in Christum, et sic credunt ut diligant. Hoc est enim credere in Christum, diligere Christum. 36 De spiritu et littera 31, 53, ed. C.F. Urba and I. Zycha, CSEL 60, 209: Quaeret aliquis, utrum fides ipsa, in qua salutis […] esse uidetur exordium, in nostra constituta sit potestate. 37 Ibid. 31, 54, CSEL 60, 210-1: De hac enim fide nunc loquimur, quam adhibemus, cum aliquid credimus, non quam damus, cum aliquid pollicemur. 38 Ibid., CSEL 60, 211.

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deo and credere in deum are considered equivalent here, due to the Pauline use in Romans 4, 3 and 5. To clarify which faith is recommended by Paul, Augustine begins by excluding false interpretations of 1Corinthians 13:7 – [caritas] omnia credit –, relying on 1John 4:1: Fratres, nolite omni spiritui credere, sed probate spiritum qui ex deo est. If we consider the object of belief, it is excluded to ‘believe anything’ (quodlibet credere):39 for example, to believe lightly in the harm that would have been committed by someone. If we consider the person we rely on to accept this or that proposal, it goes without saying that we cannot believe everyone (omnibus credere). The faith recommended by Paul is the faith by which God is believed (qua creditur deo).40 But a distinction must still be made: between the faith of those who, being under the Law, live as slaves in fear of condemnation, and the faith of those who serve God, in charity, freely as sons, knowing that they receive all good from Him.41 The faith that Paul recommends cannot be one that is accompanied by servile fear. Haec est ‘fides, ex qua iustus uiuit’ (Rom. 1:17); haec est fides, qua ‘creditur in eum qui iustificat impium’ (Rom. 4:5); haec est fides, per quam ‘excluditur gloriatio’ (Rom. 3:27), siue ut abscedat qua in nobis inflamur siue ut emineat qua in Domino gloriamur; haec est fides, qua inpetratur largitas spiritus, de quo dicitur: ‘nos enim spiritu ex fide spem iustitiae expectamus’ (Gal. 5:5). […] Haec est fides, qua salui fiunt, quibus dicitur: ‘gratia salui facti estis per fidem et hoc non ex uobis, sed Dei donum est, non ex operibus, ne forte quis extollatur; ipsius enim sumus figmentum creati in Christo Iesu in operibus bonis, quae praeparauit Deus ut in illis ambulemus’ (Eph. 2:8-10). Postremo haec est ‘fides, quae per dilectionem operatur’ (Gal. 5:6), non per timorem, non formidando poenam, sed amando iustitiam.42

The Pauline quotations that Augustine uses to characterize the faith recommended by Paul have one thing in common: they highlight, directly or indirectly, the gift of grace. Now the gift of grace is none other than the gift of the Spirit who pours into us the love for God, as Augustine explains immediately afterwards: Vnde ergo ista dilectio, id est caritas, per quam fides operatur, nisi unde illam fides ipsa impetrauit? Neque enim esset in nobis, quantacumque sit in nobis, nisi diffunderetur ‘in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis’ (Rom. 5:5). Caritas quippe 39

Ibid. 32, 55, CSEL 60, 212: Non enim quodlibet credere bonum est. Ibid.: Postremo ipsa caritas, quae ‘omnia credit’ (1Cor. 13:7), non omni spiritui credit ac per hoc omnia quidem credit, sed deo, quia non dictum est: omnibus credit. Nulli itaque dubium est eam fidem ab apostolo commendari, qua creditur deo. 41 Ibid. 32, 56, CSEL 60, 213: Sed adhuc est aliquid discernendum, quoniam et illi qui sub lege sunt et timore poenae iustitiam suam facere conantur et ideo non faciunt dei iustitiam, quia caritas eam facit, quam non libet nisi quod licet, non timor, qui cogitur in opere habere quod licet, cum aliud habeat in uoluntate qua mallet, si fieri posset, licere quod non licet. Et illi ergo credunt deo; nam si omnino non crederent, nec poenam legis utique formidarent. 42 Ibid., CSEL 60, 214-5. 40

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Dei dicta est diffundi in cordibus nostris (Rom. 5:5), non qua nos ipse diligit, sed qua nos facit dilectores suos, sicut iustitia Dei, qua iusti eius munere efficimur, et Domini salus, qua nos saluos facit, et fides Iesu Christi, qua nos fideles facit.43

This text is the first in which Augustine explicitly brings together Galatians 5:6 and Romans 5:5, to think about the specificity of faith,44 in response to the thesis of the Pelagians, which he then does repeatedly. From De spiritu et littera, he makes a characteristic use of Galatians 5:6: ‘the faith working through love’ is no longer understood only as faith that is translated into action, but as the filial faith that is itself received from God, since it is the gift of the Spirit who places love for God in us.45 This long analysis of the faith recommended by Paul was intended to clarify the source of the faith by which the Christian is justified. If this is the Christian’s own fides, it is clear that it cannot only be in the power of free will; at the same time it must be a gift of grace. God’s gift is not limited to the gift of free will received at the time of creation; the will to believe implies, in fact, the action of God who calls man and incites him to believe, either externally, by the exhortations of the Gospel, or internally, by the thoughts that come to his mind. But it is part of man’s willingness to accept or refuse it, as Augustine explains: His ergo modis quando deus agit cum anima rationali, ut ei credat – neque enim credere potest quodlibet libero arbitrio, si nulla sit suasio uel uocatio cui credat – profecto et ipsum uelle credere deus operatur in homine et in omnibus misericordia eius praeuenit nos, consentire autem uocationi dei uel ab ea dissentire, sicut dixi, propriae uoluntatis est. Quae res non solum non infirmat quod dictum est: ‘quid enim habes quod non accepisti?’ (1Cor. 4:7) uerum etiam confirmat, accipere quippe et habere anima non potest dona, de quibus hoc audit, nisi consentiendo ac per hoc quid habeat et quid accipiat dei est, accipere autem et habere utique accipientis et habentis est.46

Quid habeat and quid accipiat Dei est, accipere autem et habere utique accipientis et habentis est: the formula sets out the essential relationship between the giver and the receiver in the act of faith. What would be a faculty of receiving that had nothing to receive? And, conversely, what would grace be, if there were no free will to receive it?47 However, there is still an enigma: 43 Ibid., CSEL 60, 215. On the difficulties of interpreting the Pauline expression πίστις Χριστοῦ, see Albert Vanhoye, ‘Πίστις Χριστοῦ: fede in Cristo o affidabilità di Cristo?’, Biblica 80 (1999), 1-21; Matthew C. Easter, ‘The Pistis Christou debate: Main Arguments and Responses in Summary’, Currents in Biblical Research 9 (2010), 33-47; Chris Kugler, ‘ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ: The Current State of Play and the Key Arguments’, Currents in Biblical Research 14 (2016), 244-55. 44 See Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, ‘Le verset paulinien Rom.,V. 5 dans l’œuvre de saint Augustin’, in Augustinus magister, t. 2, Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 2 (Paris, 1954), 657-65; see here 661, 4° and 662-5. 45 See I. Bochet, ‘Fides quae per dilectionem operatur’ (2014), 171-2. 46 De spiritu et littera 34, 60, CSEL 60, 220. 47 See Xavier Léon-Dufour, ‘Grâce et libre arbitre chez saint Augustin’, Recherches de Science Religieuse 33 (1946), 161.

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that of predestination, that persuades people to believe one thing and not another.48 The faith that justifies is therefore both of God and of man: it is the work of God in the believer. Augustine had understood the radical priority of grace, which is the beginning of the act of faith, from the Ad Simplicianum,49 but the anti-Pelagian controversy gave him the opportunity to explain all its consequences with regard to the nature and origin of the Christian’s own fides. The Homilies on the Gospel of John preached during the anti-Pelagian controversy, probably during the summer and autumn of 414,50 will be an opportunity to develop specific terminology to characterize it. The Homilies on the Gospel of John The distinction between credere Christo and credere in Christum appears in Homily 29 in connection with the quotation from John 6:29: hoc est opus Dei, ut credatis in eum quem misit ille, but not in the commentary on this verse in Homily 25. When he first commented on John 6:29, Augustine simply noted: Ideo noluit discernere ab opere fidem, sed ipsam fidem dixit esse opus. Ipsa est enim ‘ fides quae per dilectionem operatur’ (Gal. 5:6). Nec dixit: hoc est opus uestrum; sed: ‘hoc est opus Dei, ut credatis in eum quem misit ille’ (Jn. 6:29), ‘ut qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur’ (1Cor. 1:31).51 Faith is assimilated to a work, but it is a divine work.52 Galatians 5:6 plays a decisive role in this assimilation: if charity itself is a gift of the Spirit, ‘faith that acts through love’ is God’s work in man; then we understand why faith can be assimilated to a work. In the rest of the homily, commenting on John 6:38: ‘Because I have not come to do my will, but the will of the one who sent me’, Augustine twice invites his listeners to let themselves be incorporated into Christ: Qui ad me uenit, incorporatur mihi; Veniamus ad eum, intremus ad eum, incorporemur ei, ut nec nos faciamus uoluntatem nostram, sed uoluntatem dei.53 48

De spiritu et littera 34, 60, CSEL 60, 220-1: Iam si ad illam profunditatem scrutandam quisquam nos coartet, cur illi ita suadeatur ut persuadeatur, illi autem non ita, duo sola occurrunt interim quae respondere mihi placeat: ‘O altitudo diuitiarum!’ (Rom. 11:33) et: ‘Numquid iniquitas apud deum?’ (Rom. 9:14). 49 De diuersis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum 1, 2, 21, ed. A. Mutzenbecher, CChr.SL 44 (Turnhout, 1970), 53-4. 50 Marie-François Berrouard proposes this date for the homilies 17-9 et 23-54 (‘Introduction’, in Augustin, Homélies sur l’Évangile de saint Jean XVII-XXXIII, Bibliothèque Augustinienne 72 [Paris, 1977], 38-41). 51 In Iohannis euangelium 25, 12, ed. R. Willems, CChr.SL 36, 254. 52 See M.-F. Berrouard, ‘L’exégèse de Io. 6, 29’, in Augustin, Homélies, BA 72 (1977), Note complémentaire 46, 791. 53 In Iohannis euangelium 25, 16.18, ed. R. Willems, CChr.SL 36, 257-8.

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Homily 26 returns to the question of faith in commenting on John 6:44, ‘No one comes to me if the Father who sent me does not draw him’:54 must we conclude that we believe ‘against our will’? But we can only believe if we want to, because faith is an act of the heart. How can we maintain both truths? Augustine raises the difficulty, by explaining that ‘one is drawn, not by necessity, but by pleasure, not by obligation, but by delight’, because Christ Himself attracts ‘the man who finds his delight in truth, who finds his delight in justice, who finds his delight in eternal life, for all this is Christ.’55 By introducing the notion of delectatio, Augustine seeks to make his listeners understand, in a concrete way, how the act of believing can be both a gift of grace and an expression of free will, as he had shown, in a more theoretical way, in De spiritu et littera. Shortly afterwards in the homily, John 6:47, ‘he who believes in me (qui credit in me) has eternal life’, gives him the opportunity to deepen his understanding of the implications of the credere in Christum: ‘He who believes in me comes into me, and he who comes into me owns me.’56 It is by commenting on John 7:16-7 that Augustine introduces the distinction between Christo credere and Christum credere. Why? John 7:16, ‘My teaching is not mine, but of Him who sent me’, raises a difficulty; Augustine then invites his listeners to believe in order to understand, quoting Isaiah 7:9 (LXX), ‘If you do not believe, you will not understand’, suggesting that the same means is proposed in John 7:17: ‘If someone wants to do the will of God, he will recognize if my teaching comes from God, or if I speak of myself.’57 This equivalence assumes that ‘believing’ is precisely the same as ‘doing God’s will’, which Augustine justifies by John 6:29: Quis nesciat hoc esse facere uoluntatem dei, operari opus eius, id est, quod illi placet? Ipse autem dominus aperte alio loco dicit: ‘Hoc est opus dei, ut credatis in eum quem ille misit’. ‘Vt credatis in eum’ (Jn. 6:29), non, ut credatis ei. Sed si creditis in eum, creditis ei; non autem continuo qui credit ei, credit in eum. Nam et daemones credebant ei, et non credebant in eum. Rursus etiam de apostolis ipsius possumus dicere: credimus Paulo, sed non: credimus in Paulum; credimus Petro, sed non: credimus in Petrum. ‘Credenti enim in eum qui iustificat impium, deputatur fides eius ad iustitiam’ (Rom. 4:5). Quid est ergo credere in eum? Credendo amare, credendo diligere, credendo in eum ire, et eius membris incorporari. Ipsa est ergo fides quam de nobis exigit deus; et non 54 In Iohannis euangelium 26, 2-7, ed. R. Willems, CChr.SL 36, 260-3. See Isabelle Bochet, ‘L’exégèse de Jn 6, 44 et la théologie augustinienne de la grâce: la 26e Homélie sur l’Évangile de Jean et le Sermon 131’, in Anthony Dupont, Gert Partoëns and Mathijs Lamberigts (eds), Tractatio scripturarum. Philological, exegetical, rhetorical and theological studies on Augustine’s Sermons, Ministerium sermonis 2 (Turnhout, 2012), 117-52. 55 In Iohannis euangelium 26, 4, ed. R. Willems, CChr.SL 36, 261: Porro si poetae dicere licuit: ‘trahit sua quemque uoluptas’, non necessitas, sed uoluptas; non obligatio, sed delectatio, quanto fortius nos dicere debemus trahi hominem ad Christum, qui delectatur ueritate, delectatur beatitudine, delectatur iustitia, delectatur sempiterna uita, quod totum Christus est? 56 Ibid. 26, 10, CChr.SL 36, 264: Qui ergo credit in me, inquit, it in me; et qui it in me, habet me. 57 Ibid. 29, 6, CChr.SL 36, 287.

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inuenit quod exigat, nisi donauerit quod inueniat. Quae fides, nisi quam definiuit alio loco apostolus plenissime dicens: ‘Neque circumcisio aliquid ualet, neque praeputium, sed fides quae per dilectionem operatur’ (Gal. 5:6)? Non qualiscumque fides, sed ‘fides quae per dilectionem operatur’ (Gal. 5:6).58

It is as if the continuous commentary on the Gospel has gradually made Augustine sensitive to the richness of the Johannine credere in eum and its equivalents. ‘To believe in Christ is to ‘come into Him’, to ‘possess Him’; it is also to ‘do the will of God’ like Him, and therefore to ‘become a member of His body’, to let oneself ‘be incorporated into it’. The discovery of the specific meaning of the Johannine credere in eum led Augustine to dissociate it expressly from the credere ei, whose meaning is much less strong: ‘to believe in Him’ implies to ‘believe Him’, but the opposite is not true, because one can ‘believe Him’, without ‘believing in Him’, like demons. The recourse to Galatians 5:6, already often quoted by Augustine, then allows him to identify credere in Christum with ‘the faith working through love’, specifying that it is not ‘any faith’. He expressly defines credere in Christum as follows: credendo amare, credendo diligere, credendo in eum ire et eius membris incorporari. This definition is similar to what Augustine has already given, briefly and as if in passing, in Enarratio in Psalmum 130,59 but the distinction between credere in Christum and credere Christo is now formally established and constructed as such by Augustine: it will be completed and systematized in Dolbeau Sermon 19 and repeated in subsequent preaching. It can be seen that, in Homily 23, Augustine still assimilated credere ei and credere in eum and moves, as if naturally, from the construction with the dative to the construction with in + accusative: Quia ‘qui uerbum meum audit, et credit ei qui misit me (Jn. 5:24), ex patre ‘habet uitam aeternam’ (Jn. 5:24), credendo in eum qui misit illum. Et ‘in iudicium non ueniet, sed transiit a morte ad uitam’ (Jn. 5:24); sed ex patre uiuificatur, cui credit.60 In Homily 29, on the contrary, the distinction between the two constructions is clearly stated and explained: it was therefore at this precise moment that Augustine drew up the distinction that he exploited in the rest of his work. 3. The completion of the terminological distinction in Dolbeau Sermon 19 Dolbeau Sermon 19, which comments at length on John 6:29, is probably a little later than the 29th Homily on the Gospel of John: the similarity of the developments invites us to bring the two texts together chronologically and we 58 Ibid. On this text, see the remarks of M.-F. Berrouard, ‘Credere Christo, credere in Christum’, in Augustin, Homélies, BA 72 (1977), note complémentaire 80, 842-5. 59 Enarratio in Psalmum 130, 1, ed. E. Dekkers and J. Fraipont, CChr.SL 40, 1898. 60 In Iohannis euangelium 23, 14, ed. R. Willems, CChr.SL 36, 243.

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can presumably assume that Dolbeau Sermon 19 exploits and develops the discovery of the Homily 29.61 I will now examine some of Augustine’s later texts, which help to clarify the doctrinal content of the expression credere in Christum. Dolbeau Sermon 19 Explicit indications of the day’s readings62 can be found in Dolbeau Sermon 19. The gospel is taken from the discourse on the bread of life in John 6; verse 29, ‘The work of God is that you believe in Him whom He has sent’, plays a central role in the sermon, the whole purpose of which is, as far as possible, ‘to explain what it means to believe in Christ’.63 The commentary on the other two readings is linked to this central theme, in a tenuous way for Psalm 84 ; in a clearer way for Philippians 3:6-16. Augustine introduces a fictional dialogue with an opponent in order to make his listeners understand the power of the expression credere in Christum. According to the first objection, all those who participate in the liturgy already believe in Christ: so there is no need to talk more about it.64 In other words, it would be sufficient to state one’s faith; believing in Christ would not affect the believer’s actions. The second objection also takes faith in Christ for granted: why then demand more, if this is God’s work?65 The third objection concerns the love to be given to the apostles: if one really has to believe in Christ, but not in Paul, and believing in Christ is the same as loving Him, should one not conclude that ‘we must not love Paul’?66 To the first objection, Augustine first responded by once again opposing the faith of demons to that of Peter and by playing on the opposition credere Christum/credere in Christum: Crediderunt et daemones Christum esse et filium Dei esse. Crediderunt Christum, sed non crediderunt in Christum.67 He differentiates, 61

See the arguments given by P.-M. Hombert, in Nouvelles recherches (2000), 528-31; according to him, the Dolbeau Sermon 19 ‘would be after August 414, but not too far from that date’, since the 27th Homily on the Gospel of John is from the previous August 10, the feast day of St Lawrence (531, with n. 6). 62 See F. Dolbeau (ed.), Vingt-six sermons (1996), 151-3. 63 Sermo Dolbeau 19, 2, ed. F. Dolbeau, 157: Iam tota intentio nostri sermonis innititur, in quantum possumus, si Domino adiuvante possumus, explicare quid sit credere in Christum; ibid. 19, 4, ed. F. Dolbeau, 158: Intellegamus ergo, si possumus – quod nos, ut possumus, explicaturos esse promisimus –, quid sit credere in Christum. 64 Ibid. 19, 2, ed. F. Dolbeau, 156: Ait mihi aliquis de tam magna multitudine circumstantium, ait: ‘Quis est nostrum qui in Christum non credidit?’. Si ergo omnes in Christum credidimus, iam quod moneatur non invenimus. 65 Ibid. 19, 4, ed. F. Dolbeau, 158: ‘Sufficit ergo mihi’, ait aliquis; ‘credidi in Christum: quid me ultra admones? ‘Hoc est opus Dei’: nihil aliud de me exigat qui mercedem promisit’. 66 Ibid. 19, 6, ed. F. Dolbeau, 160: Potest enim aliquis mihi respondere et monere ut cautius loquar: ‘dixisti hoc esse credere in Christum, diligere Christum, et dixisti credere nos debere in Christum, non autem credere in Paulum; non ergo debemus diligere Paulum?’ 67 Ibid. 19, 2, ed. F. Dolbeau, 157.

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a second time, between credere followed by the dative and credere followed by in + accusative: Audivimus eloquia prophetarum: credimus eis, sed non credimus in eos; likewise, non credimus in Paulum, sed credimus Paulo.68 To justify the distinction introduced, Augustine uses common language: whereas one does not hesitate to say to someone: crede mihi, who would dare to say to him: crede in me?69 But the main argument is taken from Romans 4:5: it is only possible to believe ‘in Him who justifies the ungodly’, in other words, in none other than Christ, for neither Paul, nor Elijah, nor any angel justifies the ungodly.70 Augustine can then conclude by condensing into a single formula John 6:29 and Romans 4:5: Ecce in quem credamus, ut opus Dei faciamus, quia hoc ipsum est opus Dei, credere in eum qui iustificat impius.71 To answer the second objection, Augustine returns to the triple distinction he has just made: Et quoniam paulo ante distinximus aliud esse credere illi, credere illum et credere in illum – credere illi est credere vera esse illa quae loquitur, credere illum est credere quod ipse sit Christus, credere in illum diligere illum…72 To deepen the distinction, he introduces a gradation: many can believe in the truth of Christ’s words, even the wicked, but without putting them into practice; even demons could believe that He is Christ; only those who love Christ believe in Christ. There is therefore no credere in Christum without Christum credere and without Christo credere: Cum ergo audis: ‘crede in Christum’, parum sit tibi credere Christo, id est vera esse quae loquitur Christus, parum sit tibi credere Christum, id est ipsum esse quem Deus per prophetas praenuntiavit, sed crede in Christum, id est dilige Christum.73 Believing in Christ therefore implies action : one must fulfill his commandments. The perfection of action is a function of the perfection of love. Augustine then introduces the idea that one cannot believe in Christ without passing through Him, without being incorporated into Him.74 This theme makes it possible to overcome the last objection: if one cannot believe in Paul, it is precisely because one cannot, by loving him, pass through him; that is why the way of loving Christ is not comparable to the way 68

Ibid. 19, 3, ed. F. Dolbeau, 157. Ibid.: Denique non solum apostoli doctoresque sancti, sed etiam nos ipsi, minimis vestigiis non comparandi, cottidie dicimus: ‘crede mihi’, numquam audemus dicere: crede in me’. ‘Crede mihi’: quis non dicit? ‘Crede in me’: quis dicit aut quis non insanit qui dicit? 70 Ibid. 19, 3, ed. F. Dolbeau, 157-8: Cum enim in eum non credis – non enim iustificat impium Paulus, non Elias, non quisquam angelus, sed iustus iustorum, sanctus sanctorum de quo dictum est: ‘ut sit ipse iustus et iustificans eum qui ex fide est’ (Rom. 3:26). 71 Ibid. 19, 3, ed. F. Dolbeau, 158. 72 Ibid. 19, 5, ed. F. Dolbeau, 159. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 19, 5, ed. F. Dolbeau, 159-60: In quantum diligis, in tantum facis; in quantum minus feceris, minus diligis. Imple dilectionem, et perficis operationem. Ecce quam verum dictum est: ‘Hoc est opus Dei, ut credatis in eum quem ille misit’ (Jn. 6:29), hoc est ut diligendo eatis in eum, id est incorporemini ei. 69

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of loving Paul or any other man. We can only desire, by loving Him, to pass into Christ and be incorporated into Him because He is not only man, but God: it is through his incarnation that He justifies us. ‘Believing in Him’ means ‘loving Him as God’.75 The sermon therefore proposes a progressive deepening of what is meant by: credere in Christum. We can only believe in Christ because He is the one who justifies us; which excludes believing in anyone else. Believing in Christ is loving Him, which implies acting accordingly, in other words, fulfilling his commandments. Believing in Christ, finally, is by loving Him to pass through Him and be incorporated into Him, which is only possible because He is also God. The theme of incorporation into Christ plays a central role. It is present from the beginning of the sermon, when Augustine comments John 6:27: ‘Work for the food that does not perish, but remains in eternal life. ‘Identifying ‘food’ as bread, and therefore as Christ Himself, Augustine does not hesitate to conclude in a bold shortcut: Operemur Christum, in other words, let us work to make Christ.76 The second objection introduced obviates any other requirement, if the work of God is really to believe in Christ: nihil aliud de me exigat!77 In his answer, Augustine explains that believing in Christ is the program of a lifetime: it implies daily progress until we reach the end.78 He adds shortly after: Crede in Christum, id est dilige Christum. hoc cum impleveris, nihil a te amplius exigetur, quoniam ‘plenitudo legis caritas’ (Rom. 13:10).79 To love Christ, to the point of not being able to be separated from Him, requires passing through Him and being incorporated into Him.80 Augustine completes his exposition of John 6:29 by exhorting his listeners to find in Christ ‘both where to go and where to arrive’ and to pass through love in Him;81 as he explains again in Dolbeau 75 Ibid. 19, 6, ed. F. Dolbeau, 160: Ergo credamus in eum, diligamus eum, sed diligendo incorporemur ei. […] Nunc vero quia Deus noster est et propter naturam homo factus est quod non erat, propter possessionem mansit quod erat, ut simul in illo haberemus et qua iremus et quo veniremus. Credamus in eum, hoc est tamquam Deum diligamus eum, ut diligendo in illum eamus, a quo neglegendo recesseramus. 76 Ibid. 19, 1, ed. F. Dolbeau, 156: ‘Operamini ergo escam quae non perit’, inquit, ‘sed quae permanet in vitam aeternam’ (Jn. 6:27). Hanc escam panem appellavit et panem seipsum esse monstravit. Quid autem est operari hanc escam, nisi manducare hanc escam? Si enim panis est haec esca [est panis], item Christus est. Qui nostrum operatur Christum, qui nostrum facit Christum, nisi faciens quae praecepit Christus? ‘Vos estis’, ait apostolus, ‘corpus Christi et membra’ (1Cor. 12:27). Operemur Christum, id est operemur hanc escam. 77 Ibid. 19, 4, ed. F. Dolbeau, 158, quoted supra, n. 65. 78 Ibid.: … et id agamus, hoc operemur, in hoc cottidie proficiamus, huc de die in diem accedamus, donec accedendo perveniamus. Hoc enim et initio fidei nostrae polliciti sumus, ut ex parte aliqua coeperimus, et, cum perfecerimus, nihil de nobis amplius exigetur. ‘Hoc enim est opus Dei’, nec est aliud quicquam opus Dei, nisi ‘ut’ credamus ‘in eum quem ille misit’ (Jn 6:29). 79 Ibid. 19, 5, ed. F. Dolbeau, 159. 80 Ibid. 19, 5, ed. F. Dolbeau, 159-60, quoted supra, n. 74. 81 Ibid. 19, 6, ed. F. Dolbeau, 160, quoted supra, n. 75.

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Sermon 20, Christ Himself is the end in which we wish to rest.82 Credere in Christum therefore amounts to becoming more and more a member of his body and thus to ‘making Christ’. In later texts, Augustine returns to the close union with Christ implied by credere in Christum. Moreover, in none of the extant texts, not even in Dolbeau Sermon 20 preached the next day, is there any distinction between the three possible constructions of the verb credere: to differentiate between credere Christum and credere Christo is in reality secondary; what is important for Augustine is to make the specificity of credere in Christum understood. The specificity of the credere in Christum Augustine returns to the distinction between credere Christo and credere in Christum in the 54th Homily on the Gospel of John in the autumn of 414. The preceding homily again addresses the question of grace and free will, attacking the Pelagians: it is impossible for those who claim not to need God’s help to live well, to believe in Christ,83 because ‘to believe in Him who justifies the ungodly’ (Rom. 4:5) is to experience the grace that transforms inwardly; as De spiritu et littera already explained, it is fides Iesu Christi, qua nos fideles facit.84 Augustine explains it as follows in Homily 53: Fides autem Christi est, credere ‘in eum qui iustificat impium’ (Rom. 4:5); credere in mediatorem, sine quo interposito non reconciliamur deo; credere in saluatorem, qui uenit quod perierat quaerere atque saluare; credere in eum qui dixit: ‘sine me nihil potestis facere’ (Jn. 15:15). Quia ergo ‘ignorans dei iustitiam’ (Rom. 10:3) qua iustificatur impius, suam uult constituere qua conuincatur superbus, in hunc non potest credere. Hinc et illi ‘non poterant credere’ (Jn. 12:39), non quia mutari in melius homines non possunt; sed quamdiu talia sapiunt, non possunt credere.85

In Homily 54, recollection of the distinction between credere + dative and credere in + accusative is prompted by the commentary on John 12:44: ‘He who believes in me does not believe in me but in Him who sent me’. Augustine explains that none of the apostles would dare to say such a thing: Credimus enim apostolo, sed non credimus in apostolum; non enim apostolus iustificat 82 Ibid. 20, 3, ed. F. Dolbeau, 161: Totum autem opus dei in eo definiuit filius dei, ut diceret: ‘Hoc est opus dei, ut credatis in eum quem ille misit’. Quo fine, nisi ipso? Noli finem quaerere praeter ipsum, ne quaerendo finem praeter ipsum consumaris, non consummeris. Quid est enim finis, nisi quo uelimus peruenire, stare et nihil ultra quaerere? Nam si uenis, sed adhuc quaeris, nondum ad finem peruenisti. Ergo peruenire ad finem est eo peruenire ubi dicas: ‘sufficit’. 83 In Iohannis euangelium 53, 10, ed. R. Willems, CChr.SL 36, 456: Ecce dico et ego, quod qui tam superbe sapiunt, ut suae uoluntatis uiribus tantum existiment esse tribuendum, ut negent sibi esse necessarium diuinum adiutorium ad bene uiuendum, non possunt credere in Christum. 84 De spiritu et littera 32, 56, ed. C.F. Urba and I. Zycha, CSEL 60, 215. 85 In Iohannis euangelium 53, 10, ed. R. Willems, CChr.SL 36, 456.

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impium.86 This is not the case with Christ. His words do not therefore mean that He ‘has put far from Him the faith of the one who believes’; it is an invitation not to remain with Christ in the ‘form of a servant’ but to recognize his equality with the Father.87 The same distinction is recalled in relation to John 12:46: ‘I, the light, have come into the world so that he who believes in me may not dwell in darkness’. As Augustine remarks, Christ, saying to his disciples: ‘You are the light of the world…’ (Matt. 5:14), did not invite anyone to believe in them. Certainly, the disciples are also ‘lights’, but ‘it is because they believe that they are enlightened’ by Christ.88 Credimus ergo lumini illuminato, sicut prophetae, sicut apostolo; sed ideo illi credimus, ut non in ipsum credamus quod illuminatur, sed cum illo credamus in illud lumen a quo illuminatur, ut et nos illuminemur, non ab illo, sed cum illo a quo ille.89 Such insistence shows how much the distinction between the two credere constructions is now obvious for Augustine. It is presented in a slightly different way in Enarratio in Psalmum 77, which was written before Easter 415.90 The end of verse 8 of Psalm 77: non est creditus cum deo spiritus eius, which applies to the generation of fathers who were not faithful to God, gives rise to the following comment: id est, quia non habebat fidem, quae impetrat quod lex imperat. Quando enim cum spiritu dei operante spiritus hominis cooperatur, tunc quod deus iussit impletur; et hoc non fit, nisi credendo ‘in eum qui iustificat impium’ (Rom. 4:5).91 Augustine compares the unusual turn of the verse: non est creditus cum deo, with the expression one would expect: non credidit deo, to emphasize its strength and to insist on the cooperation with God it suggests. He finally assimilates credere cum deo to credere in deum: Hoc est enim habere cum deo creditum spiritum, non credere spiritum suum posse facere sine deo iustitiam, sed cum deo. Hoc est etiam credere in deum, quod utique plus est quam credere deo. Nam et homini cuilibet plerumque credendum est, quamuis in eum non sit credendum. Hoc est ergo credere in deum, credendo adhaerere ad bene cooperandum bona operanti deo: quia ‘sine me, inquit, nihil potestis facere’ (Jn. 15:5). Quid autem plus hinc apostolus dicere potuit, quam quod ait: ‘Qui autem adhaeret domino, unus spiritus est’ (1Cor. 6:17)?92 86

Ibid. 54, 3, CChr.SL 36, 460. Ibid.: Et quod nunc ait: ‘Qui credit in me, non credit in me, sed in eum qui misit me’ (Jn. 12:44). Non a se abstulit fidem credentis, sed noluit in forma serui remanere credentem; quoniam cum quisque credit in patrem qui eum misit, profecto credit in filium, sine quo patrem non esse cognoscit; et ita credit ut credat aequalem. 88 Ibid. 54, 4, CChr.SL 36, 460: Non tamen eis dixit: ‘Vos lux uenistis in mundum, ut omnis qui credit in uos, in tenebris non maneat’. Nusquam hoc legi posse confirmo. Lumina ergo sunt omnes sancti; sed credendo ab eo illuminantur, a quo si quis recesserit tenebrabitur. Lumen autem illud quo illuminantur, a se recedere non potest, quia incommutabile omnino est. 89 Ibid. 54, 4, CChr.SL 36, 460-1. 90 See Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, ‘Recherches sur les grandes Enarrationes in Psalmos dictées d’Augustin’, AEPHE 87 (1978), 319-24, 319. 91 Enarratio in Psalmum 77, 8, ed. Eligius Dekkers and Johannes Fraipont, CChr.SL 39 (Turnhout, 1956), 1072-3. 92 Ibid. 77, 8, CChr.SL 39, 1073. 87

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Identification with credere cum deo enriches the scope of the expression credere in deum: it expresses the union of man with God and the way in which he lets God act in him to do good. Sermon 144 (around 416)93 also insists on the union with Christ that believing in Him implies, unlike the faith of demons: Ille enim credit in Christum, qui et sperat in Christum et diligit Christum. Nam si fidem habet sine spe ac sine dilectione, Christum esse credit, non in Christum credit. Qui ergo in Christum credit, credendo in Christum, uenit in eum Christus, et quodam modo unitur in eum, et membrum in corpore eius efficitur. Quod fieri non potest, nisi et spes accedat et caritas.94

In the 72nd Homily on the Gospel of John, which is later than 419,95 Augustine does not hesitate to draw very strong conclusions from the union with Christ that faith in Christ implies. Commenting on John 14:12: ‘He who believes in me will also do the works that I do and he will do greater works than these’, he says: Si ergo qui credit faciet, non credit utique qui non faciet.96 Such an assertion seems unacceptable, if it is not well understood: it does not mean that the disciple would somehow be superior to the master, but that Christ achieves these works in illo, sed non sine illo. In hoc opere faciamus opera Christi, quia et ipsum credere in Christum, opus est Christi. Hoc operatur in nobis, non utique sine nobis. Audi ergo iam, et intellege: ‘qui credit in me, opera quae ego facio, et ipse faciet’ (Jn. 14:12); prius ego facio, deinde et ipse faciet, quia facio ut faciat. Quae opera, nisi ut ex impio iustus fiat?97 The greater work that Christ works in the believer, but not without him – and therefore in such a way that the believer also works –, is his justification.98 It was in 414, in his 29th Homily on the Gospel of John, that Augustine first formalized the distinction between credere in Christum and credere Christo, which he would often repeat later. The ternary distinction he proposed, probably shortly afterwards, in Dolbeau Sermon 19 exploits and systematizes the achievements of the 29th Homily. In reaction to the claims of the Donatists’ ministers, Augustine had already stressed, before 412, that one can only believe ‘in Him who justifies the ungodly’ (Rom. 5:4); he had also explained that the Christian’s faith is that ‘which works through love’ (Gal. 5:6) and that it therefore requires adding love to faith, but he had not yet given a specific meaning to the credere in Christum, which he did not distinguish from the credere Christo. 93 According to Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, Biblia augustiniana, A.T. – Le livre des Proverbes, Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 67 (Paris, 1975), 203. 94 Sermo 144, 2, PL 38, 788. 95 See Marie-François Berrouard, ‘Introduction’, in Augustin, Homélies sur l’Évangile de Jean LV-LXXIX, Bibliothèque Augustinienne 74A (Paris, 1993), 49. 96 In Iohannis euangelium 72, 2, ed. R. Willems, CChr.SL 36, 508. 97 Ibid. 72, 3, CChr.SL 36, 508. 98 Ibid.: Et utique minus est uerba iustitiae praedicare, quod fecit praeter nos, quam impios iustificare, quod ita facit in nobis, ut faciamus et nos.

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In 412, the reflection of De spiritu et littera on the origin of fides, in the debate with the Pelagians, led Augustine to differentiate, in a more refined way, the strictly Christian fides from other forms of belief. Fides Iesu Christi is ‘the one that makes us believers’:99 in other words, the characteristic of Christian faith is to be both of God and of man, of grace and of free will; it is the filial faith that is a gift of the Spirit that places love for God in us. The attention to Johannine vocabulary, whilst preaching on the Gospel of John, allowed Augustine to discover all the resonances of the evangelical credere in Christum and to elaborate a specific terminology to distinguish the various forms of belief. John 6:29, which clearly states that faith in the Father’s envoy is the work of God, played the role of a catalyst: believing in Christ is credendo amare, credendo diligere, credendo in eum ire, et eius membris incorporari;100 such faith is a gift from God, but it requires the free adherence of man. It is again John 6:29 that gives Augustine the opportunity to deepen the specificity of the credere in Christum, in Dolbeau Sermon 19. The ternary distinction he then introduces has only a relative importance, even if, through Bede, it had a great influence in the Middle Ages. What Augustine affirms, on the other hand, with increasing force, in this sermon, as in subsequent texts, is the reality of incorporation into Christ which takes place through faith in Christ; it is union with God and cooperation with Him which it makes possible. It is then impossible to think of the Christian’s faith as one belief among others: what defines it, in fact, is not only a specific content, it is also an act that is the work of Christ in the believer.101

99

De spiritu et littera 32, 56, ed. C.F. Urba and I. Zycha, CSEL 60, 215. In Iohannis euangelium 29, 6, ed. R. Willems, CChr.SL 36, 287. 101 Olivier Riaudel has clearly shown that the distinction between an objective and a subjective pole is not adequate to understand the Christian faith and that the distinction between the fides qua creditur and the fides quae creditur, as we understand it today, does not have its source in Augustine, contrary to a widespread opinion, ‘Fides qua creditur et Fides quae creditur. Retour sur une distinction qui n’est pas chez Augustin’, RThL 43 (2012), 169-94; see in particular 174-6 and 186-9. Paul Tillich, in Dynamique de la foi (Genève, 2012), 20, notes: ‘Dieu ne peut jamais être objet sans être en même temps sujet. Même une prière ne peut être efficace, selon Paul (Rom 8), que si Dieu, en tant qu’Esprit, prie en nous. Dans un langage abstrait, on dira que dans l’expérience de l’ultime ou de l’inconditionné, la structure ordinaire ‘sujet-objet’ disparaît. Dans l’acte de foi, la source de cet acte est présente au-delà de la scission sujet-objet’. 100

Tradi pro Christo, tradere Christum: Mt. 10:20 dans le De doctrina christiana, une interprétation isolée ? Marie PAULIAT, ENS de Lyon, France

ABSTRACT In its biblical context, Matt. 10:20 par. concerns the martyrs: they should not worry about their words since the Holy Spirit will speak in them. In De doctrina christiana 4, 32, Augustine of Hippo applies this verse to preachers in a seemingly easy play on words: ‘It is not you who speak, it is the Spirit of your Father speaking in you (Matt. 10:20). If, then, the Holy Spirit speaks in those who are delivered up to the persecutors for Christ’s sake, why would He not also speak in those who deliver Christ to those who learn?’ Our purpose is to clarify the scope of this unexpected comment. An examination of the 30 or so other Augustinian quotations from Matt. 10:20 shows that, with a few exceptions, its interpretations fall into four broad sets. In the literal sense, the verse often explains the strength of the martyrs. Mention of the Father’s Spirit can also stimulate Trinitarian reflection. The need for the assistance of the Holy Spirit is regularly opposed to the Pelagians. Finally, especially (but not exclusively) in the anti-donatist controversy, Matt. 10:20 supports the Augustinian understanding of ministries to clarify the respective roles of God and man in the case of the sacraments, biblical inspiration and preaching – a current to which doctr. chr. 4, 32 relates. We also place these Augustinian comments in the patristic tradition of Matt. 10:20.

Dans le De doctrina christiana 4, 32, Augustin cherche à articuler deux nécessités qui, estime-t-il, s’imposent au prédicateur: d’une part, apprendre à commenter l’Écriture et à prêcher; d’autre part, prier pour dire ce qui convient à des auditeurs précis, dans des circonstances données1. ‘Que celui qui veut et savoir et enseigner apprenne donc tout ce qui doit être enseigné, et acquière le talent de la parole, comme il convient à un homme d’Église. Mais quand l’heure est venue de parler, qu’il songe qu’à une âme droite convient particulièrement 1 Dans cette section du De doctrina christiana, Augustin met l’accent sur l’action de Dieu qui, seule, peut selon lui donner une efficacité à l’action des hommes les uns sur les autres. Dans le Prologue, il insistait davantage sur la nécessité de la médiation humaine. D’après Isabelle Bochet, la différence d’orientation proviendrait d’une volonté de répondre, explicitement ou implicitement, à des contradicteurs différents: des personnes qui entendent être enseignées directement par Dieu en 397; les moins d’Adrumète en 426-7 (‘Grâce et médiations humaines’, BA 11/2 [Paris, 1997], 433-8).

Studia Patristica CXIX, 33-42. © Peeters Publishers, 2021.

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cette parole du Seigneur: “N’ayez souci ni de la manière de parler ni de ce que vous direz car vous sera donné en temps voulu ce que vous devez dire. Car ce n’est pas vous qui parlez, c’est l’Esprit de votre Père qui parle en vous” [Mt. 10:19-20]. Si donc l’Esprit Saint parle en ceux qui sont livrés aux persécuteurs pour le Christ, pourquoi ne parlerait-il pas aussi en ceux qui livrent le Christ à ceux qui apprennent ?’2

La nécessité de prier avant de prêcher est ici justifiée par une citation de Mt. 10:19-20,3 dont Augustin paraît détourner le sens originel.4 Alors que, dans le corpus biblique, ces versets concernent la parole des martyrs accusés devant un tribunal,5 l’évêque d’Hippone les applique ici au sermon prononcé par un prédicateur. Dans un raisonnement a fortiori, il synthétise sa pensée par un jeu de mots entre ‘qui persequentibus traduntur’ et ‘qui tradunt discentibus Christum’. Fondé sur un changement de voix (‘traduntur’ et ‘tradunt’), un parallélisme entre deux relatives introduites par ‘qui’ et deux participes présents au datif (‘persequentibus’ et ‘discentibus’), le jeu de mots qui paraît presque trop facile.6 La phrase est pourtant centrale pour préciser le statut qu’Augustin assigne au prédicateur. Fidelis Schniztler en avait déjà perçu l’importance.7 Notre objectif est d’en préciser la portée, à partir de l’examen de la trentaine d’autres interprétations augustiniennes de Matt 10:19-20,8 replacées à l’intérieur 2 Aug., doctr. chr. 4, 32, trad. Madeleine Moreau adaptée (Paris, 1997), BA 11/2, 368-9: Per hoc discat quidem omnia quae docenda sunt, qui et nosse uult et docere, facultatemque dicendi, ut decet uirum ecclesiasticum, comparet; ad horam uero ipsius dictionis, illud potius bonae menti cogitet conuenire quod dominus ait: Nolite cogitare, quomodo aut quid loquamini; dabitur enim uobis in illa hora quid loquamini; non enim uos estis qui loquimini, sed spiritus patris uestri, qui loquitur in uobis [Mt. 10:19-20]. Si ergo loquitur in eis sanctus spiritus qui persequentibus traduntur pro Christo, cur non et in eis qui tradunt discentibus Christum? 3 La forme de cette citation de Mt. 10:19-20 n’a rien de remarquable: elle est conforme à la quasi-totalité des Vieilles Latines, dont le texte est d’ailleurs identique à la Vulgate. 4 Nous rejoingnons l’affirmation de Manlio Simonetti, Sant’Agostino, L’Istruzione cristiana (Rome, 1994), 554: ‘Agostino è solito servirsi di questo passo evangelico, anche sganciato dall’originario contexto martiriale’. Néanmoins, nous élargissons le nombre de passages augustiniens cités à l’appui de cette thèse et en affinons le classement. 5 Sur l’exégèse contemporaine de ce verset, voir William Davies et Dale C. Allison, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to Saint Matthew, 3 vol. (Édimbourg, 1991), II 184-6. 6 Sur les jeux de mots, voir Christine Mohrmann, ‘Das Wortspiel in den augustinischen Sermones’, Mnemosyne 3 (1935-1936), 33-61 (repris dans Études sur le latin des chrétiens I [Rome, 1961], 323-49). 7 Fidelis Schnitzler, Zur Theologie der Verkündigung in den Predigten des hl. Augustinus (Fribourg, 1968), 107-13. Il met doctr. chr. 4, 32 en perspective non avec les autres commentaires augustiniens du verset, mais avec des passages qui soulignent également le rôle de l’Esprit Saint lors de la prédication, spécialement Io. eu. tr. 12, 5, trad. Marie-François Berrouard, BA 71, 640. 8 Pour relever les citations, nous avons eu recours au CAG3 (https://cag3.net), à la Vetus Latina Database (consultée en ligne sur BREPOLiS) et aux fiches manuscrites d’Anne-Marie La Bonnardière conservées à Lyon à l’Institut des Sources chrétiennes (HiSoMA, UMR 5189). Nous avons naturellement tenu compte des versets parallèles à Mt. 10:20. Mark 13:11 (Quand on vous conduira pour vous livrer, ne soyez pas inquiets à l’avance de ce que vous direz; mais ce qui

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de la tradition patristique. À de rares exceptions près,9 celles-ci se répartissent en quatre ensembles: théologie trinitaire,10 prédication sur les martyrs, nécessité de la grâce et conception des ministères – courant auquel se rattache le De doctrina christiana 4, 32. 1. Réflexion trinitaire La mention de l’Esprit du Père en Mt. 10:20 a nourri la réflexion d’Irénée de Lyon sur la Personne de l’Esprit Saint;11 le verset a été cité durant les controverses trinitaires, à l’appui de la divinité de l’Esprit Saint.12 Augustin l’emploie pour montrer que l’Esprit procède du Père et du Fils – bien que l’Écriture n’affirme pas le second point.13 À cet effet, dans quatre textes des années 417-20, Mt. 10:20 est associé à Gal. 4:6, qui parle pour sa part de l’Esprit du Fils.14 Dans des réflexions sur les relations entre les Personnes divines et sur la procession de l’Esprit Saint, Mt. 10:20 est également cité vous sera donné à cette heure-là, dites-le; car ce n’est pas vous qui parlerez, mais l’Esprit Saint) est très proche de Mt. 10:20: dans les deux cas, il est indiqué que l’Esprit lui-même parlera. Les versets lucaniens insistent quant à eux sur le don fait par l’Esprit: Luc 21:14-5 (Mettez-vous en tête que vous n’avez pas à préparer votre défense. Car, moi, je vous donnerai un langage et une sagesse que ne pourra contrarier ni contredire aucun de ceux qui seront contre vous); Luc 12:11-2 (Lorsqu’on vous amènera devant les synagogues, les chefs et les autorités, ne vous inquiétez pas de savoir comment vous défendre et que dire. Car le Saint Esprit vous enseignera à l’heure même ce qu’il faut dire). D’autres textes bibliques indiquent que le Seigneur accompagne ceux qui parlent en son nom ; leurs commentaires mériteraient d’être explorés: Exod. 4:12, Ps. 119:41-6, Jer. 1:6-10, Eph. 6:19. 9 Aug., op. mon. 3, trad. Jules Saint-Martin, BA 3 (Paris, 1949), 320-2 (de 405-6): pour défendre le travail des moines, Augustin oppose Mt. 10:19-20 (qui selon lui concerne la sagesse spirituelle) à 2Thess. 3:10 (qui s’appliquerait à un travail manuel). 10 Robert Louis Wilken a montré que, à l’instar de celui de ses prédécesseurs Hilaire, Didyme et Ambroise, l’enseignement d’Augustin sur l’Esprit Saint était tout entier fondé sur l’Écriture, spécialement sur un commentaire conjoint de Rom. 5:5 et de 1Jean 4:13; il ne mentionne pas Mt. 10:19-20 (‘Spiritus sanctus secundum scripturas sanctas. Exegetical Considerations of Augustine on the Holy Spirit’, AugStud. 31 [2000], 1-18). 11 Iren., haer. 3, 17, 1, éd. Adelin Rousseau et Louis Doutreleau, SC 211 (Paris, 2002), 328. 12 Basil., spir. 24, 55; 26, 61, éd. Benoît Pruche, SC 17bis (Paris, 2002), 450; 468; Didym., spir. 86 [19], éd. Louis Doutreleau, SC 386 (Paris, 1992), 224; Ambr., in Luc. 7, 119, éd. Gabriel Tissot, SC 52bis (Paris, 1976), 50; spir. 1, 4, 60, éd. Otto Faller, CSEL 79 (Vienne, 1964), 40; Ps. Aug., s. 234, 5, PL 39, 2178; Faust. Rei., rat. fid. 1, 7, éd. Augustus Engelbrecht, CSEL 21 (Vienne, 1891), 111. 13 Marie-François Berrouard, ‘La procession du Saint-Esprit’, BA 74B (Paris, 1998), 476-7. 14 Aug., s. 71, 29, éd. Pierre-Patrick Verbraken, RBén 75 (1965), 97 (de 417-20); Io. eu. tr. 99, 6, trad. Marie-François Berrouard, BA 74B, 360 (nov. 419 - juill. 420); trin. 15, 45, trad. Paul Agaësse, BA 16 (Paris, 1955), 544-6 (après 420). Sur les enseignements sur l’Esprit Saint, fréquents, voir BA 74B, 36064. En ep. 194, 16-7, éd. Aloisius Goldbacher, CSEL 57 (Vienne, 1911), 188-9 (à Sixte, prêtre de Rome, 418), les deux citations sont associées pour montrer le rôle de l’Esprit dans la prière. Trin. 4, 29; 5, 12, trad. Marcellin Mellet et Pierre-Thomas Camelot, BA 15 (Paris, 1955), 414; 452 évoquent ‘l’Esprit du Père et du Fils’.

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avec Jean 15:26, verset stipulant que l’Esprit de vérité qui procède du Père, rendra témoignage au Christ.15 2. Enseignement sur les martyrs Conformément au sens littéral, Augustin mentionne surtout Mt. 10:19-20, dans des contextes renvoyant à la force des confesseurs16 et des martyrs, Paul,17 Vincent18 ou Cyprien,19 ainsi que de personnages dont le nom n’a pas été conservé.20 L’interprétation est très fréquente dans la tradition,21 spécialement dans les actes de martyrs,22 mais on la trouve aussi, notamment à partir du IVe siècle, à propos de l’aide apportée par Dieu dans les tribulations en général.23 15 Mt. 10:20 est cité avec Jean 15:26 en trin. 15, 45, BA 16, 546; s. 71, 29, RBén 75 (1965), 97; voir aussi Quodu., symb. 1, 9, éd. René Braun, CChr.SL 60 (Turnhout, 1976), 326. Jean 15:26 apparaît fréquemment dans des réflexions trinitaires, par exemple: trin. 2, 5; 4, 28-9; 5, 12; 5, 15, trad. Marcellin Mellet et Pierre-Thomas Camelot, BA 15 (Paris, 1955), 192; 414; 452; 458; trin. 15, 48 (qui cite Io. eu. tr. 99, 8-9, BA 74B, 364-8); 15, 51, BA 16, 554-6; 564; c. Max. 2, 14, 1; 2, 22, 3, éd. Pierre-Marie Hombert, CChr.SL 87A (Turnhout, 2009), 568; 638; en. Ps. 102, 10, éd. Eligius Dekkers et al., CChr.SL 40 (Turnhout, 1956), 1461. 16 Augustin renvoie explicitement aux confesseurs en s. 313, 2, PL 38, 1423 (14/09/406, avec Luc 21:15); s. 299, 3, PL 38, 1368 (26/06/413). S. 361, 15 (PL 39, 1607) met en scène un chrétien attaqué sur sa foi en la résurrection, qui ne sera pas à court de réponse car ce n’est pas lui qui parlera. 17 Aug., s. 299, 3, PL 38, 1368 (26/06/413). 18 Aug., s. 275, 1, PL 38, 1254 (410-2); s. 276, 2, PL 38, 1256 (authenticité discutée, centon?); s. Caillau 1, 47 = 277A, 2, éd. Armand-Benjamin Caillau, Miscellanea Agostiniana 1 (Rome, 1931), 244 (22/01/415-20). 19 Aug., s. 313, 2, PL 38, 1423 (14/09/406); en. Ps. 32, en. 2, s. 2, 8, trad. Martine Dulaey, BA 58B (Paris, 2014), 90. 20 Sur ce phénomène, fréquent dans les manuscrits liturgiques puisque les sermons prononcés en l’honneur de martyrs dont l’histoire était oubliée ont été versés au commun des martyrs, voir François Dolbeau, ‘Bède, lecteur des sermons d’Augustin’, dans François Dolbeau (éd.), Augustin et la prédication en Afrique. Recherches sur divers sermons authentiques, apocryphes ou anonymes (Paris, 2005), [495]-[523], ici [514]. 21 Tert., fug., 14, 3, éd. Philippe Borleffs, CSEL 76 (Vienne, 1957), 43; Cypr., epist. 10, 3; 57, 4; 58, 5; 76, 5, éd. Gerardus Frederik Diercks, CChr.SL 3B-C (Turnhout, 1994), 50; 306; 326-7; 613; Fort. 10, éd. Robert Weber, CChr.SL 3 (Turnhout, 1972), 200; testim. 3, 16, CChr.SL 3, 108; Juuenc., euang. 2, 466, éd. Jean Huemer, CSEL 24 (Vienne, 1891), 63; Hil., in Matth. 10, 14, éd. Jean Doignon, SC 254 (Paris, 1978), 232; Hier., in Matth. 1 (10, 19.17.18), éd. Émile Bonnard, SC 242 (Paris, 1977), 198; Quodu. (?), tr. 2, 5, PLS 3, 305; Anon., op. imperf. in Matth. 24 (10, 19-20), PG 56, 759: le martyr ne doit pas se préoccuper de ce qu’il dira et l’Esprit parlera en lui, car c’est le diable qui parle dans les juges. Orig., in Matth. ser. 114, éd. Erich Klostermann, GCS 38 (Berlin, 1976), 237 excuse le reniement de Pierre avec ce verset: il ne pouvait alors confesser le Christ puisque l’Esprit n’avait pas encore été donné. 22 Ps. Ambr., act. Seb. 45, PL 17, 1041C; voir d’autres références dans la Vetus Latina Database. 23 Euseb. Caes., in Psalm. 83, 5, PG 23, 1009; Hil., in psalm. 118, iod, 14, éd. Marc Milhau, SC 347 (Paris, 1988), 46; Ambr., in Psalm. 118, 10, 37, éd. Michael Petschenig, CSEL 67

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Ces versets furent d’ailleurs souvent proclamés comme lectures liturgiques lors de fêtes de martyrs.24 Dans le Sermon Mai 20, l’interprétation se situe sur un plan psychologique: associant Mt. 10:20 à Mt. 28:20, Augustin insiste sur le caractère rassurant de la présence du Christ.25 Plus souvent, les commentaires se focalisent sur l’action de Dieu qui parle dans les martyrs;26 Mt. 10:20 est notamment associé à Ps. 115:11 (Tout homme est menteur, mais le martyr est véridique car parle en lui l’Esprit de Celui qui est véridique)27 et à Mt. 5:3 (Heureux les pauvres de cœur, pour insister sur la nécessaire humilité du martyr)28. Enfin, la citation du verset dans le Sermo 13 de l’Enarratio in Psalmum 118, dictée, est particulièrement intéressante pour nous. S’y trouve en effet, comme dans le De doctrina christiana 4, 32, une mention du Verbe construit transitivement après un verbe de parole, nous y reviendrons: ‘Il ne suffit donc pas d’avoir le Christ dans son cœur, en refusant de le confesser par crainte de l’opprobre, il faut répondre le Verbe à ceux qui nous le reprochent [cf. Ps. 118:42]. Mais pour en être capables, les martyrs ont reçu cette promesse: Ce n’est pas vous qui parlez, mais l’Esprit de mon Père qui parle en vous [Mt. 10:20].’29 (en. Ps. 118, s. 13, 2)

(Vienne, 1913, 19992), 226; Hier., in Is. 14, 12 (51, 12-6), éd. Roger Gryson et al., Vetus Latina 35 (Fribourg, 1998), 1480. 24 Michael Margoni-Kögler, Die Perikopen im Gottesdienst bei Augustinus. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der liturgischen Schriftlesung in der frühen Kirche (Vienne, 2010), 145-9 et 151429; Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, ‘Les Enarrationes in Psalmos prêchées par saint Augustin à l’occasion de fêtes de martyrs’, RecAug 7 (1971), 73-104, ici 100. 25 Aug., s. Mai 20 = 64A, 2, éd. Bertrand Coppieters ’t Wallant, Luc De Coninck et Roland Demeulenaere, CChr.SL 41Aa (Turnhout, 2008), 366-7. Sur l’insertion rhétorique du passage dans le sermon, voir Joost van Neer, ‘Cunning as Serpents, Simple as Doves. Serm. 64 auct. (Lambot 12) and 64A (Mai 20). Two Sermons by Augustine on Mat 10:16’, CrSt 38 (2017), 785812, ici 800-3. Une autre mention des effets psychologiques de la présence de l’Esprit, le don de force, se trouve en s. 276, 2, PL 38, 1256/54-6 et en en. Ps. 32, en. 2, s. 2, 8, BA 58B, 90. 26 Sur l’action de Dieu dans les martyrs, voir Pierre-Marie Hombert, Gloria gratiae. Se glorifier en Dieu, principe et fin de la théologie augustinienne de la grâce (Paris, 1996), 137-40. 27 Aug., en. Ps. 115, 4, éd. Martine Dulaey, BA 66 (Paris, 2013), 370 (datable du 17-24/04/404); s. Lambot 13 = 328, 3, RBén 51 (1939), 16 (de 400-5); s. Lambot 7 = 335E, 5, PLS 2, 784 (18/08/ ca. 415, Massa Candida). Le thème de la véracité du martyr revient, sans citation de Ps. 115:11, en s. Caillau 1, 47 = 277A, 2, MA 1, 244/11 (22/01/415-420). Voir Martine Dulaey, ‘Tout homme est menteur (In Ps. 115, 3-4)’, BA 66, 451-3. 28 Aug., en. Ps. 103, s. 4, 14, CChr.SL 40, 1532-3 (Carthage, ca. 403), où est commenté emittes spiritum tuum, et creabuntur (Ps. 103:30: le martyr pauvre de son esprit reçoit l’Esprit de Dieu à la place de son propre esprit); en. Ps. 141, 5, CChr.SL 40, 2048-9 (la pointe est la même : le martyr doit être pauvre de son esprit pour recevoir celui de Dieu). Sur ce dernier texte, voir A.-M. La Bonnardière, ‘Les Enarrationes pour les fêtes de martyrs’, (1971), 93-5; elle le date d’avant 411. 29 Aug., en. Ps. 118, s. 13, 2, trad. Martine Dulaey adaptée, BA 67A (Paris, 2016), 346-7 (418-9): Parum est ergo in corde habere Christum, et nolle confiteri dum timetur opprobrium: sed exprobrantibus respondendum est uerbum [cf. Ps. 118:42]. Vt autem hoc martyres possent, promissum est eis, et dictum: Non enim uos estis qui loquimini, sed spiritus patris uestri, qui loquitur in uobis [Mt. 10:20].

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3. Durant la controverse pélagienne: la nécessité de la grâce Puisque Mt. 10:20 indique que l’Esprit agit en l’homme, il était logique que le verset prenne place durant la controverse avec les pélagiens. De fait, Augustin leur oppose à plusieurs reprises la nécessité de l’adiutorium de Dieu en la fondant sur ce verset; il est alors décontextualisé de toute référence au martyre.30 Il prouve par exemple que l’homme ne peut dompter sa langue (cf. Jc. 3:8) sans l’aide de Dieu.31 Celui-ci, contrairement à ce que soutenait Pélage, ne donne pas simplement la possibilité (ici, de parler), mais accompagne également de sa grâce la volonté et l’action (de bien parler).32 Sans le secours de Dieu, l’homme ne peut accomplir le bien33, même si cette présence ne le dispense pas d’agir.34 Jean Chrysostome chercha de son côté à articuler les parts respectives de l’action de Dieu et de l’homme dans les apôtres et les martyrs qui leur ont succédé.35 Dans le De doctrina christiana 4, 32, immédiatement avant Mt. 10:20, Augustin a cité Sg. 7:16 (Se trouvent dans sa main et nos personnes et nos discours). Dans ce verset, qu’il mentionne presque uniquement durant la controverse pélagienne, Augustin voyait une admonition destinée à rappeler aux prédicateurs que ‘l’efficacité de leur parole est soumise à l’adiutorium Domini, qui est premier’.36 Bien que, dans le De doctrina christiana 4, 32, la citation de Mt. 10:20 ne soit pas directement dirigée contre les pélagiens, il est probable que les questions soulevées par cette controverse se situent en arrière-fond de ce passage.37 4. Conception des ministères Néanmoins, Mt. 10:20 a été utilisé par Augustin bien plus tôt: spécialement (mais non exclusivement) lors de la controverse donatiste, le verset soutient la conception augustinienne des ministères pour préciser le rôle respectif de Dieu 30

Voir déjà conf. 13, 46, éd. Martin Skutella, BA 14 (Paris, 1996), 512 (de 403). Aug., nat. et gr. 16, trad. Jeanne de La Tullaye et Georges de Plinval, BA 21 (Paris, 1994), 270 (déc. 414 - mai 415). 32 Aug., gr. et pecc. or. 1, 17; 1, 26, trad. Jean Plagnieux et François-Joseph Thonnard, BA 22 (Paris, 1975), 88; 106 (de 418). 33 Aug., gest. Pel. 31, éd. Carl Franz Urba et Joseph Zycha, CSEL 42 (Vienne, 1902), 85 (de 416-7); c. Iul. imp. 3, 120 (A), éd. Michaela Zelzer, CSEL 85.1 (Vienne, 1974), 438 (de 428-30). 34 Aug., ep. 194, 16-7, CSEL 57, 188-9 (à Sixte, prêtre de Rome, 418) : l’homme ne peut prier sans le secours de l’Esprit qui le fait prier. 35 Chrysost., homMt 33, 4, PG 57, 393. 36 Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, Biblia Augustiniana. A.T. Le livre de la Sagesse (Paris, 1970), 103, réf. 281-2. 37 Alessandra Pollastri, ‘Nota sul De doctrina christiana. Un riferimento biblico per l’intellegere e per il proferre’, Augustinianum 35 (1995), 527-36, ici 530-6. 31

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et de l’homme dans le cas des sacrements, de l’inspiration biblique et de la prédication. C’est le cas notamment dans le Contra epistulam Parmeniani, datable de 403-4. Mt. 10:20 y est mis en parallèle avec Jean 20:21-3. ‘“Comme le Père m’a envoyé, moi aussi, je vous envoie”. Alors qu’il avait dit cela, il souffla sur eux et leur dit: “Recevez l’Esprit Saint. Celui à qui vous remettrez les péchés, ils leur seront remis, et ceux à qui vous maintiendrez les péchés, ils leur seront maintenus.” [Jean 20:21]. Ces paroles seraient contre nous, au point de nous forcer à reconnaître que cela s’accomplit par les hommes (ab hominibus) et non par le ministère des hommes (per homines) si, après avoir dit: “Et moi je vous envoie” [Jean 20:21], il avait ajouté aussitôt: “Celui à qui vous remettrez les péchés, ils leur seront remis, et ceux à qui vous maintiendrez les péchés, ils leur seront maintenus”. Mais parce qu’entre ces deux phrases se trouve ceci: Alors qu’il avait dit cela, il souffla sur eux et leur dit: “Recevez l’Esprit Saint” et qu’ensuite on ajoute que soit la rémission, soit la rétention des péchés se fait par leur ministère (per eos), on montre suffisamment qu’ils ne font pas eux-mêmes cette œuvre, mais que l’Esprit Saint la fait par leur ministère (per eos), comme il est dit dans un autre passage: “Ce n’est pas vous qui parlez, mais l’Esprit saint qui est en vous” [Mt. 10:20]. Mais l’Esprit Saint habite dans le prélat ou dans le ministre de l’Église de sorte que, s’il n’est pas hypocrite, l’Esprit opère par son ministère (per eum) à la fois sa récompense en vue du salut éternel et la régénération ou l’édification de ceux qui, par son ministère (per eum), sont consacrés ou évangélisés (siue consecrantur siue euangelizantur)…’38 (c. ep. Parm. 2, 24)

Il s’agit, à notre connaissance, du seul emploi de Mt. 10:20 par lequel Augustin distingue l’action de Dieu de celle de l’homme dans le cas des sacrements, pour prouver qu’ils sont valides et apportent le salut, que le ministre soit ‘hypocrite’ ou non. Sans doute du fait du verbe loquor, Augustin étend immédiatement l’emploi du verset à l’annonce de l’Évangile par l’alternative siue consecrantur siue euangelizantur, annonce de l’Évangile qui inclut à notre avis la prédication. Peu après, en 404 ou 405 probablement, le Sermon 2 cite Mt. 10:20 pour résoudre une quaestio sur l’inspiration des Écritures. Comment comprendre que Paul, et les chrétiens à sa suite, disent tout aussi justement à propos de textes 38 Aug., c. ep. Parm. 2, 24, trad. Guy Finaert adaptée, BA 28 (Paris, 1963), 328-30: Sicut misit me pater, et ego mitto uos. haec cum dixisset, insufflauit et ait illis: accipite spiritum sanctum. Si cui dimiseritis peccata dimittentur et si cui tenueritis tenebuntur [Jean 20:21-3] contra nos esset, ut cogeremur fateri ab hominibus hoc, non per homines fieri, si, posteaquam dixit: et ego mitto uos [Jean 20:21], continuo subiecisset: si cui dimiseritis peccata dimittentur et si cui tenueritis tenebuntur [Jean 20:23]. Cum uero interpositum est: haec cum dixisset, insufflauit et ait illis: accipite spiritum sanctum [Jean 20:22] et deinde inlatum per eos uel remissionem uel retentionem fieri peccatorum, satis ostenditur non ipsos id agere, sed per eos utique spiritum sanctum, sicut alio loco dicit: Non enim uos estis qui loquimini, sed spiritus sanctus qui in uobis est [Mt. 10:20]. Spiritus autem sanctus in ecclesiae praeposito uel ministro sic inest, ut, si fictus non est, operetur per eum spiritus et eius mercedem in salutem sempiternam et eorum regenerationem uel aedificationem, qui per eum siue consecrantur siue euangelizantur…

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scripturaires: ‘Dieu a dit’ [2Cor. 6:10] et ‘Isaïe a dit’ [Rom. 10:20] ? ‘Parce que, répond Augustin, ce que dit l’homme par un don de Dieu, c’est Dieu qui le dit, d’après ce passage: “Ce n’est pas vous qui parlez” [Mt. 10:20] et la suite; et encore: “Voici que moi, Paul, je vous parle” [Gal. 5:2]; et encore: “le Christ parle en moi” [2Cor. 13:3].’39 Le lien entre la confession de foi du martyr devant les autorités et l’inspiration de l’Esprit, bien attesté dans le corpus biblique, est fréquente dans les trois premiers siècles40 et perdure ensuite, par exemple chez Jean Chrysostome.41 Ambroise cite lui aussi Mt. 10:20 à propos de l’inspiration des Écritures.42 Prolongeant cette interprétation, certains emploient le verset à propos d’une prise de parole qu’ils considèrent comme inspirée,43 notamment des décisions de pères conciliaires.44 Mais a priori seul Augustin et son épigone Quodvultdeus45 appliquent le verset à la prédication, souvent sans référence au contexte biblique de la citation, le témoignage des martyrs au tribunal.46 Cependant, comme le De doctrina christiana, le Sermon Lambot 9 (prêché un 17 juillet pour les martyrs scillitains) renvoie au contexte du tribunal: ‘Le jour de cette solennité nous exhorte à parler des martyrs du Christ, c’est-à-dire des témoins du Christ qui n’ont pas eu honte de confesser son nom devant les hommes. 39 Aug., s. 2, 5, éd. Cyrille Lambot, CChr.SL 41 (Turnhout, 1961), 13/143-7 (404-5): Quomodo? Quia quod dicit homo de dono dei deus dicit, secundum illud: non enim uos estis qui loquimini [Mt. 10:20], et cetera; et iterum: ecce ego Paulus loquor uobis [Gal. 5:2]; et iterum: Christus qui in me loquitur [2Cor. 13:3]. 40 Par exemple Ac. 4:8, 5:32, 1P 4:12-4, Ap. 19:10, Euseb., hist. eccl. 5, 1, 10, éd. Gustave Bardy, SC 41 (Paris, 1955), 8-9; parallèles juifs en Is. 42:1, 43:10. Voir G.W.H. Lampe, ‘Martyrdom and Inspiration’, dans Suffering and Martyrdom in the New Testament, éd. William Horbury et Brian McNeil (Cambridge, 1981), 118-35 (122-4 sur l’Ancien Testament, 124-35 sur le Nouveau, 126-9 sur les premiers siècles, notamment sur la Lettre de Lyon et de Vienne, Cyprien et Tertullien). 41 Chrysost., homMt 33, 3, PG 57, 392: par Mt. 10:20, les martyrs sont égalés aux prophètes. 42 Ambr., epist. 55, 10, éd. Michaela Zelzer, CSEL 82.2 (Vienne, 1990), 81; spir. 1, 2, 29, CSEL 79, 28. 43 Ambrosiast., 1 Cor. 13, 1, éd. Heinrich Joseph Vogels, CSEL 81.2 (Vienne, 1968), 144-5 (l’ânesse de Balaam a parlé la langue des hommes [Nb. 22:28] et les enfants en bas âge ont acclamé le Christ [Mt. 21:16]; sous l’inspiration de l’Esprit, les hommes pourraient parler la langue des anges [1Cor. 13:1]) ; Hier., epist. 120, 9, éd. Jérôme Labourt (Paris, 1958), 145 (de manière progressive, l’Esprit Saint a revêtu les apôtres de force pour qu’ils annoncent le Christ) ; Anon., serm. arian. frg. 13, éd. Roger Gryson, CChr.SL 87 (Turnhout, 1982), 249. Voir aussi Cassian., conl. 1, 19, 2, trad. Eugène Pichery, SC 42bis (Paris, 2008), 132: il prouve par Mt. 10:20 que certaines pensées de l’homme viennent de Dieu (d’autres viennent de l’homme ou du démon). 44 Arnob. Iun., confl. 2, 14, éd. Klaus-Detlef Daur, CChr.SL 25A (Turnhout, 1992), 116, qui cite un texte attribué à Cyrille d’Alexandrie. 45 Quodu., uirtut. carit. 1, 10, CChr.SL 60, 367. 46 Aug., Io. eu. tr. 100, 1, BA 74B, 372 (nov. 419 - juill. 420): ce qui est opéré par les hommes sous l’action de l’Esprit est attribué à l’Esprit. Voir aussi, sur le rôle de l’Esprit Saint dans la prédication apostolique, Io. eu. tr. 92, 1-2; 93, 1, BA 74B, 216-20; 226-8, où sont expliqués Jean 15:26-7. Sur un mode allusif, Jean 15:26 est aussi associé à la prédication apostolique en s. Mai 26 = 60A, 2, CChr.SL 41Aa, 254-5 (de 394-5?).

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Que celui qui a dit: “N’ayez pas souci de ce que vous direz [Mt. 10:19] car l’Esprit Saint vous enseignera ce qu’il vous faudra dire” [Luc 12:12], nous donne de vous dire ce qui vous est utile.’47 (s. Lambot 9)

Dans ce sermon, même s’il est possible que Luc 12:11-2 ait été lu,48 la citation biblique est faite de mémoire: il s’agit d’un amalgame de Mt. 10:19 (Nolite cogitare quid loquamini), lui-même simplifié par rapport au texte biblique (Nolite cogitare quomodo aut quid loquamini), et de Luc 12:12 (Spiritus enim sanctus docebit uos quid oporteat loqui).49 Indépendamment de ces questions philologiques, le raisonnement a fortiori est similaire à celui du De doctrina christiana 4, 32: puisque l’Esprit Saint a parlé (ou donné de parler) aux martyrs, il donnera au prédicateur ce qui sera utile aux auditeurs. Une légère nuance dans le De doctrina christiana mérite néanmoins d’être soulignée: la construction transitive directe tradere Christum, que nous avons aussi croisée dans l’Enarratio in Psalmum 118. Sans doute sous l’influence de 1Cor. 1:23 (nos enim praedicamus Christum crucifixum), Augustin semble indiquer que le Christ n’est pas tant le sujet de la prédication que son contenu. Cela invite, comme plusieurs critiques l’ont déjà fait, à situer la prédication dans le prolongement de l’Écriture, premier lieu de la kénose du Verbe,50 et ce pour deux raisons: parce que, dans les deux cas, le même Esprit s’exprimerait (mutatis mutandis naturellement, car Augustin distingue toujours ses propos de la Parole de Dieu51), et que le contenu serait le même, à savoir le Christ.52 Conclusion Mt. 10:20 dans le De doctrina christiana, une interprétation isolée? Isolée dans la tradition patristique, oui : le verset a été utilisé à propos de l’inspiration 47 Aug., s. Lambot 9 = 299F, PLS 2, 788/44-789/3: De martyribus Christi, hoc est de testibus Christi, qui non sunt confusi confiteri nomen eius coram hominibus, dies huius sollemnitatis hortatur. Qui eis dixit: Nolite cogitare quid loquamini [Mt. 10:19], spiritus enim sanctus docebit uos quid oporteat loqui [Luc 12:12], det nobis ut loquamur ad uos quod expedit uobis. 48 Luc 12:4-12? pourrait avoir été lu lors du Sermon Lambot 9 car la lecture serait caractéristique de la fête des martyrs scillitains (il est cité dans les Sermones Guelf. 30 = 299E et Guelf. 31 = 335B), d’après Margoni-Kögler, Die Perikopen im Gottesdienst, 158447. 49 Sur les procédés de simplification (flattening) et d’amalgame (conflation), caractéristiques des citations faites de mémoire, voir Hugh A.G. Houghton, Augustine’s Text of John. Patristic Citations and Latin Gospel Manuscripts (Oxford, New York, 2008), 68-77. 50 Par exemple Desiderio Pirovano, ‘La parola di Dio come “Incarnazione” del Verbo in Sant’Agostino’, Augustinianum 4 (1964), 77-104. 51 Aug., ep. 147, 39; 148, 15, éd. Aloisius Goldbacher, CSEL 44 (Vienne, 1904), 313-4; 345: Augustin distingue l’autorité des Écritures canoniques de celle des auteurs ecclésiastiques; la question fut débattue aux Conciles d’Hippone en 393 et de Carthage en 397. 52 Fidelis Schnitzler, Zur Theologie der Verkündigung in den Predigten des hl. Augustinus (Fribourg, 1968), 51-70.

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des Écritures, mais son application à la prédication est a priori limitée à Augustin et à Quodvultdeus. Isolée dans l’œuvre augustinienne, non: d’abord, il est employé de manière similaire dans le Sermon Lambot 9; ensuite, la controverse pélagienne se situe très probablement en arrière-fond de cette citation, et Mt. 10:20 a été plusieurs fois opposé à ces adversaires; enfin, et surtout, le Contra epistulam Parmeniani contribue à dessiner un parallèle entre les enjeux du ministerium sacramentorum et ceux du ministerium sermonis. Parce qu’Augustin distingue toujours sa parole de la Parole de Dieu, et le ministère de la parole de celui des sacrements, et qu’il suggère pourtant un continuum entre ces différents éléments, la citation de Mt. 10:20 commentée par un jeu de mots dans le De doctrina christiana 4, 32 nous semble donc inviter à articuler à nouveaux frais Écriture, prédication et sacrements.

The Challenge of Augustine’s Biblical Christology: Re-reading the In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus Gregory M. CRUESS, University of Dallas, Dallas, TX, USA

ABSTRACT The challenge of Augustine’s mature Christology is intrinsically linked to its irreducibly biblical character, and his preaching in the Tractates on the Gospel of John illustrates well its complexity and coherence. Although relatively neglected as a source for studying Augustine’s Christology, his sermon series on the Fourth Gospel presents a sophisticated episodic meditation upon the framework of the Johannine prologue. His use of the notion of the totus Christus in this context (referring here to Christ’s humanity and divinity, instead of to Christ’s unity with the Church) provides a lens for examining the complexity of reading the Gospel according to Christ’s identity as both God co-equal with the Father and as the Word incarnate who remains God but is at the same time a true human being co-equal with us. For Augustine’s Christology, this concept helps to adequately address the incarnational scope and structure of the biblical narrative, while at the same time providing an important manner of integrating the great diversity of scriptural and traditional language concerning Christ. As traced throughout the Tractates on John, this hermeneutic serves as a framework for respecting the scope of Augustine’s Christology and integrating his particular exegesis of the episodes of the Gospel narrative itself with one another and with that narrative as a whole.

Augustine’s mature Christology is a challenging field of study.1 It is challenging, in large part, because it defies easy classification. With regard to the history of dogma (Dogmengeschichte) developed in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, Augustine appears to stand outside of the progression of fierce theological and exegetical debates that led to the councils of Ephesus (431), 1 There have been relatively few full-length studies of Augustine’s Christology in the past two centuries. The most notable are those of O. Scheel, T. van Bavel, and G. Madec; see Otto Scheel, Die Anschauung Augustins über Christi Person und Werk (Tübingen, 1901), Tarsicius van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de Saint Augustin, Paradosis 10 (Fribourg, 1954), and Goulven Madec, Le Christ de Saint Augustin: La Patrie et la Voie (Paris, 1989). Other groundbreaking investigations related to particular issues in Augustine’s Christology include the detailed studies of W. Geerlings and H. Drobner; see Wilhelm Geerlings, Christus Exemplum: Studien zur Christologie und Christusverkündigung Augustins (Mainz, 1978), and Hubertus Drobner, Person-Exegese und Christologie bei Augustinus: Zur Herkunft der Formel Una Persona (Leiden, 1986).

Studia Patristica CXIX, 43-50. © Peeters Publishers, 2021.

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Chalcedon (451), and beyond.2 Within his own Latin, North African milieu, Augustine’s Christology seems to fit no more easily. It is anti-Manichaean, anti-Donatist, anti-Pagan, and anti-Pelagian, while at the same time never really being the main topic of disagreement in any of these polemics that consumed so much of Augustine’s life.3 His meditations on the Incarnation crop up everywhere, but in no place does Augustine devote an entire treatise to Christ or develop what modern theologians might desire with regard to a systematic Christology.4 As Brian Daley has argued, this speaks to both the limitations of the modern delineation of Christology as a theological sub-discipline and to the character of Augustine’s thinking about Christ as more than simply another topic in a list of disputed questions. To quote Daley’s conclusion: It is not simply the person of the Word made flesh, who achieves and embodies God’s victorious grace, that enables us to reach the goal of our being; it is also our confession of his person, in moving, scripturally anchored language which is itself the work of grace. We are drawn into the power of that grace precisely by realizing and acknowledging who Christ really is – by accepting for ourselves, in faith, the lowly narrative, the humiliating paradox, of a humble God.5

The challenge of Augustine’s Christology, it would seem, is its complexity as an ongoing confession of Christ that, as Daley puts it, seeks to realize and acknowledge more deeply ‘who Christ really is’. 2 This judgement is expressed already by Isaak Dorner, who concluded that ‘neither Augustine nor Ambrose … developed any productiveness worthy of mention’ with regard to Christological dogma (Isaak Dorner, History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, div. 2, vol. 1, trans. D.W. Simon [Edinburgh, 1890], 77). Ferdinand Christian Baur (History of Christian Dogma [Oxford, 2014] = translation of his Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, 2nd ed., 1858) does not mention Augustine at all in his reconstruction of the development of Christological doctrine, while among later historians of Dogmengeschichte, Adolf von Harnack’s judgement that Augustine ‘was able to say little concerning the work of Christ in connection with his system of doctrine’ remained influential (Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, vol. 5, trans. James Millar [Eugene, 1997], 10). 3 Recent studies have elucidated Augustine’s Christology in regard to each of these various polemics. With regard to its anti-Manichean focus, see the recent dissertation of Thomas Clemmons, ‘The development of Augustine’s Christology in the early anti-Manichean works’, Ph.D. diss. (University of Notre Dame, 2016). For a study of his Christology in the anti-Pelagian works, see Dominic Keech, The Anti-Pelagian Christology of Augustine of Hippo, 396-430 (Oxford, 2012). For certain aspects of his Christology with regard to Donatism, see Adam Ployd, Augustine, the Trinity, and the Church: A Reading of the Anti-Donatist Sermons (Oxford, 2015). Finally, with regard to the anti-Pagan character of his Christological exegesis, see Brian Dunkle, ‘Humility, Prophecy, and Augustine’s Harmony of the Gospels’, AugStud 44 (2013), 207-25. 4 Such passages in Augustine’s mature works include Trin. 4 and 13, Civ. 10, Conf. 7, and Ep. 137, among others. For an overview of this ubiquitous character of Augustine’s Christological meditations, see Brian Daley, ‘Christology’, in Allan D. Fitzgerald (ed.), Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids, 1999), 163-9. 5 Brian Daley, God Visible: Patristic Christology Reconsidered (Oxford, 2018), 173. Emphasis original.

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This ongoing confession weaves in and out of Augustine’s major works, letters, and sermons, but one primary locus of its articulation that has been generally neglected in the study of his Christology is his sequential exegetical preaching on the Gospel of John, known since Possidius’s Indiculus as the In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus.6 This series of 124 sermons was composed over the course of 15 years, beginning in the winter of 406/407 and finished as a series of dictated homilies (sent to Carthage) around the year 420.7 Our knowledge of this timeline owes much to the careful scholarship of 20th century historical theologians, whose work significantly revised the prior assumption that Augustine had preached all of these sermons together around the year 416.8 As J. Patout Burns highlights, this particular series of studies is an exemplary model for future research into the context and content of Augustine’s sermons, precisely because the collaborative effort at ‘questioning assumptions and noticing oversights’ displays both the promise and the limits of determining a more precise chronology.9 In the case of the Tractates on John, two things stand out as the fruits of this particular scholarly effort. The first is the recognition that the series was composed over the course of perhaps the two most prolific decades of Augustine’s theological and literary maturity (406-420). The second is the confirmation that Augustine’s homilies on John do appear to have been preached in sequence over this time period.10 Consequently, we can affirm that Augustine was consciously preaching his way through the Gospel of John (with starts and stops) at the same time during which he was composing the De Trinitate and the De civitate Dei. This highlights the uniqueness of these particular sermons, especially if we recognize that such a distinction cannot be made for that other herculean task of preaching that Augustine undertook in his Enarrationes in Psalmos. In those homilies, Augustine develops a complex prosopological Christological exegesis of the Psalms that has rightly drawn the attention of scholars.11 But consideration of the unity of the Tractates as a series has been 6 The particular entry in the Indiculus reads: ‘Item tractatus de evangelio Iohannis a capite usque in finem in codicibus sex’ (Possidius, Operum sancti Augustini elenchus, in A. Wilmart [ed.], Miscellanea Agostiniana, vol. 2 [Rome, 1931], X/4). 7 For a careful summary of this likely compositional timeline, see Allan D. Fitzgerald, ‘Introduction’, in Homilies on the Gospel of John 1-40, The Works of Saint Augustine I/12 (Hyde Park, 2009), 13-38. 8 For a recent overview of the development of this scholarship, see J. Patout Burns, ‘Situating and Studying Augustine’s Sermons’, JECS 26 (2018), 307-22. 9 Ibid. 313. 10 The one major exception to this sequential development is the apparent interpolation of Trs. 20-2. For the manuscript evidence of this case, see David F. Wright, ‘Tractatus 20-22 of St. Augustine’s In Iohannem’, JTS 15 (1964), 317-30. For a consideration of the contents of these sermons within the context of the surrounding tractates, see Marie-François Berrouard, ‘La date des Tractatus I-LIV In Iohannis Evangelium de saint Augustin’, Recherches augustiniennes 7 (1971), 119-21. 11 The most influential studies in this regard are those of Fiedrowicz and Cameron. See Michael Fiedrowicz, Psalmus vox totius Christi: Studien zu Augustins ‘Enarrationes in Psalmos’

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significantly underappreciated, even in the light of the comparatively more welldeveloped scholarly understanding of its sequential composition and delivery.12 Augustine was crafting an episodic meditation upon what he considered the premier Christological text of sacred scripture, and his ongoing attempt to wrestle with the Evangelist’s own confession of Christ significantly shapes his own. With regard to Daley’s conclusion referenced previously, the Tractates thus provide a unique window onto Augustine’s own ongoing and ‘scripturally anchored’ confession of Christ’s identity. The coherence and interconnection of this series of sermons warrants sustained investigation, but the unity of the biblical Christology that Augustine develops in them is evident from even a small sample of his preaching. Fundamentally, it is the unity of the Gospel’s own witness and narrative structure that establishes their unity. Consequently, it is sufficient here to investigate three major sub-series in Augustine’s exposition of the Gospel that demonstrate his common concern for tracing out the complete scriptural implications of Christ’s identity as the fully human and fully divine incarnate Word. The first series contains Augustine’s preaching on the prologue to John’s Gospel, developed in the three interconnected sermons that begin the series as a whole (Tr. 1-3). The second series focuses on his wrestling with the meaning of the Son’s ‘seeing’ the things which the Father does as recorded in John 5:19 and developed over the course of Trs. 17-9, 23. The third is the careful exegesis of John 14:6 – ‘I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life’ – that Augustine crafts in the later (and likely dictated) Trs. 67-70. In each series, Augustine leads his listeners (and readers) to consider what a truly biblical Christology entails and invites them too to wrestle with its implications for Christian faith. I. ‘In the beginning was the Word…’ (Jn. 1:1-18) Augustine begins his homiletic commentary in a very carefully structured manner. Tractates 1-3 develop together a unified treatment of the Johannine prologue that is connected by mutual cross-references, thematic development, (Freiburg, 1997), and Michael Cameron, Christ Meets Me Everywhere: Augustine’s Early Figurative Exegesis (Oxford, 2012). 12 Among the few studies devoted to the Tractates themselves, those of Comeau (writing before the re-dating of the series), Hardy, and Norris approach the text in a thematic or synchronic manner. See Marie Comeau, Saint Augustin, Exégète du quatrième Évangile (Paris, 1930), Richard P. Hardy, Actualité de la révélation divine, Une étude des Tractatus in Iohannis Euangelium de Saint Augustin (Paris, 1974), and John M. Norris, ‘The Theological Structure of Augustine’s Exegesis in his Tractatus in Iohannis Euangelium’, Ph.D. diss (Marquette University, 1990). For a study that does investigate the diachronic (or sequential) importance of the series in some regard, see Frances Stefano, ‘Lordship Over Weakness: Christ’s Graced Humanity as Locus of Divine Power in Augustine’s Tractates on the Gospel of John’, AugStud 16 (1984), 1-19.

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and recapitulation of argument. More importantly, however, it clearly delineates the scope of the mystery to which it bears witness. The first homily is dedicated almost completely to an extended meditation upon the reality of the Word’s transcendence, while the second is characterized by a marked (and almost jarring) introduction of Christ’s cross and passion as the only sure means of being conveyed to that transcendence. As Allan Fitzgerald has pointed out with regard to the series as a whole, ‘Augustine repeatedly asks his listeners to pay attention to [this] framework’ of the Word who was ‘in the beginning’ and who has now become ‘flesh’, in order that by doing so ‘they might grow in knowledge and understanding’.13 This invitation to growth in understanding is clearly represented in the final homily of the series (Tr. 3), which consciously builds upon the exegesis of the prior homilies in a manner that marks an important exegetical development. Augustine there reminds his listeners of Christ’s role as Healer (Medicus) and argues that this healing is carried out only through the lowliness of Christ’s passion and death on the cross. Nevertheless, he challenges his congregation to again keep in mind the full reality of this lowliness when understood in the light of Christ’s complete identity as both God and man. He asks his congregation to consider the difficulty of understanding this according to its full implications: ‘And yet is it our Lord Jesus Christ, himself, the whole of him, who was seen and held and crucified? This isn’t his whole self, is it? He himself it certainly is, but the whole is not that which the Jews saw. This is not the whole Christ (totus Christus). And what is? “In the beginning was the Word”’.14 At this point, Augustine retraces the whole argument of the previous two homilies in order to clarify what this particular usage of totus Christus means. Here (in contrast to his more common use of the phrase) the formula indicates the whole scope of John’s prologue and its meditation upon the height of Christ’s divinity, the lowliness of his assumed humanity, and the connection between them. This ‘wholeness’ is a guiding exegetical principle of the Gospel, and here, at the beginning of his preaching on that Gospel, Augustine highlights it in a unique way. He does so in order to clarify the depth of the mystery that confronts the reader and to indicate the full contours of a Christology that might adequately grapple with such a reality. In the sermons that follow in the series, Augustine traces out the implications of reading the Gospel with this vision of the totus Christus as a guiding exegetical framework.

13

A. Fitzgerald, ‘Introduction’ (2009), 13-4. Tract. Ev. Jo. 3.4. Citations are from the translation by John W. Rettig, Tractates on the Gospel of John, Fathers of the Church 78, 79, 88, 90, 92 (Washington, DC, 1988-1995). 14

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II. ‘The Son cannot do anything on his own, but only what he sees his Father doing…’ (Jn. 5:19-30) When Augustine resumed his sequential preaching on the Gospel of John, likely around the year 414, he did not abandon this guiding principle.15 His exegesis of John 5:19, developed over the course of four interlinked homilies (Tr. 17-9, 23), again demonstrates the struggle that he identified in adequately expounding the full reality of Christ. This particular verse – ‘The Son cannot do anything on his own…’ – was central to the Trinitarian debates of the 4th century, and Augustine does here develop its meaning in relation to the inseparable operation of the Father, Son, and Spirit.16 From this inseparable working, however, he develops an integrated reading of the passage that links it particularly with Christ’s discussion of the resurrection in John 5:29. The ‘seeing’ of the Son and the ‘showing’ of the Father, Augustine argues, can be interpreted as the act of creation and re-creation that God carries out in the economy of salvation. Again, however, the mystery of Christ’s incarnate presence is the key issue, since it is the same one ‘through whom all things were made’ who also makes possible the resurrection (and thus re-creation) of both body and soul. When Augustine reaches the final sermon in this series (Tr. 23), he purposely reminds his congregation that they are now reflecting on and wrestling with this question for ‘the third day’. His dissatisfaction with his previous exegesis is evident, but he here presses forward in order to clarify that the ‘seeing’ of the Son cannot be truly understood unless interpreted in the full context of Christ’s incarnate wholeness. The action of the Father and the Son is an inseparable creation and re-creation of the whole human being, body and soul, but this can only be effected through the One who offers resurrection to both through his full humanity and undiminished divinity. Consequently, Christ’s incarnate person is the locus of this resurrection, and Augustine here exhorts his people that ‘there you have something in view of your weakness; there you have something else in view of your perfection. Let Christ raise you up through that which is man, let him lead you (ducat) through that which is God-man; let him bring you (perducat) to that which is God’.17 The rhetorical crafting of the exhortation here clarifies Augustine’s point that John’s Christology challenges its interpreter to understand this ‘seeing’ of the Son in the light of the resurrection and Christ’s fullness as both divine and human. Indeed, this re-creation effected through Christ allows one to say, as Augustine does, that ‘souls are restored to 15

M.-F. Berrouard, ‘La date des Tractatus I-LIV’ (1971), 164-8. For a study of these homilies with regard to the question of the inseparable operations of the Trinitarian persons, see Lewis Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity (New York, 2010), 233-50. 17 Tract. Ev. Jo. 23.6. The Latin text is found in In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus CXXIV, CChr.SL 36, ed. R. Willems (Turnhout, 1954). 16

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life if they can see that bond of unity, the Father showing, the Son seeing’.18 To understand that ‘seeing’ is to encounter the full contours of the saving mystery of Christ, who is the transcendent principle of creation and yet offers himself in the flesh to bring about the re-creation of the whole human being. In the final homilies of the series, Augustine develops further the way in which these significant and perplexing details of the Gospel narrative invite an ever deeper meditation upon what it means to confess Christ adequately according to his integral wholeness. III. ‘I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life’ (Jn. 14:6) When Augustine sets about the completion of his homiletic exegesis of John’s Gospel in 419 (in homilies that were likely dictated rather than preached), he finds that the scriptural text continues to challenge its interpreter in quite profound ways. This is particularly well illustrated in his discussion of John 14:6, a favorite scriptural lection that here receives a fresh reading (Tr. 67-70). As Marie-François Berrouard notes, Augustine’s interpretation of the verse in these sermons is ‘absolutely unique’, precisely because it ‘situates the word of the Lord in its context’ and finds in that context the ground to ‘explore the new sense that it has in that context’.19 In particular, the new context of these tractates is the extended dialogue between Christ and his disciples about ‘going’ and ‘coming’ to the Father. For Augustine, the question of Christ’s going and coming considered together with his identity as Way begs the question of how and to where Christ goes. Augustine’s answer is again articulated within the complexity of Christ’s identity as fully divine and fully human. He postulates that: ‘Therefore, [Christ] himself was going to himself by way of himself (ibat ergo ad seipsum, per seipsum). And where do we go except to him? And by what way do we go except through him? He himself, therefore, [goes] to himself through himself; we to him through him, and indeed also to the Father, both he and we’.20 This paradoxical affirmation, so Augustine argues, is what arises if we take seriously both the immutable transcendence of the divine nature and the essential createdness of Christ’s humanity. This true human nature is the ‘way’ for both him and us because this humanity is the means of God’s personal condescension through which Christ accomplishes his own mission. It is again Christ’s incarnate person that becomes the focus and confirms for Augustine that the Gospel narrative is consistently challenging its readers to 18

Tract. Ev. Jo. 23.7. Marie-François Berrouard, ‘Saint Augustin et le mystère du Christ. Chemin, Vérité et Vie’, in B. Bruning, M. Lamberigts and J. Van Houtem (eds), Collectanea Augustiniana: Mélanges T.J. Van Bavel (Leuven, 1991), 431-49, 431, 434. Translation mine. 20 Tract. Ev. Jo. 69.2. 19

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interpret Christ’s words and deeds in reference to the full confession of both his divinity and humanity. The totus Christus, in this sense, is again the exegetical key that requires the careful interpreter to develop a Christology that can do justice to the complexity and nuance of the biblical narrative. Conclusion The ‘scripturally anchored’ quality of Augustine’s ongoing exegesis in his Tractates on John establishes their unique status as a means of studying the complexity of his mature Christology. Although preached over the course of fifteen years, the sequential nature of the composition of the homilies within a key period of Augustine’s theological maturity reveals a close attention to the difficulty of entering into a deeper understanding of the reality of Christ’s wholeness as fully divine and fully human. United by the narrative coherence of the Gospel itself, Augustine’s sequential working through the text grapples with its details while finding in them the revelation of both the height of Christ’s divinity and the lowliness of his humanity. The Christology that results from Augustine’s interpretation of the Gospel is thus irreducibly biblical, because it takes the complexity of the Gospel narrative as its fundamental starting point. This Christology is also irreducibly exegetical, but it is so, in Daley’s words, as an ongoing ‘confession of [Christ’s] person’ that grows with a deeper understanding of ‘who Christ really is’. Consequently, the challenge of Augustine’s mature Christology is intrinsically related to its biblical character, because it is constantly grappling, in new contexts and new discussions, with the saving paradox of Christ’s revelation of the ‘humble God’.

Christological Insights in Augustine’s Expositio Epistulae ad Galatas Enrique A. EGUIARTE, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Rome, Italy

ABSTRACT The article deals with the Christological insights that Augustine presents in his Expositio Epistulae ad Galatas. This Work has been considered by scholars mainly as an exegetical work, and the theological and Christological insights have been neglected, since it has been considered as one of Augustine’s early works. The article focuses on Augustine’s interpretation of the Latin term proscriptus, as applied to Christ, stressing the influence of other authors on Augustine, namely Marius Victorinus and Ambrosiaster, and also the Christological ideas that are there in Augustine. The article also deals with the Christological interpretation of Num. 21:9 (aeneus serpens), and the role of Christ as mediator.

When Augustine was still a young priest, he went to a local Council in Carthage in June 394. There, since some of the monks of Carthage were reading Paul’s Letter to the Romans, he answered to some of theirs questions about that letter, which was the origin of his work Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula ad Romanos, and later he explained to them the whole Letter to the Galatians, as he asserts in the Retractationes: ‘After this book (sc. the Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula ad Romanos), I explained the same Apostle’s Letter to the Galatians, not in part, that is, omitting some portions, but in a continuous fashion and in its entirety’.1 In fact, this explanation became his Expositio epistulae ad Galatas, which is the first and only complete commentary of Augustine to the letters of Paul. Nevertheless scholarship has neglected this work for a long time, and the attention that it has received was limited only to footnotes, if we leave apart the rich and interesting articles of Maria Grazia Mara,2 the excellent translation and

1 Retr. 1.24 (23), CChr.SL 57, 71.2-4: Post hunc librum exposui eiusdem Apostoli Epistolam ad Galatas non carptim, id est aliqua praetermittens, sed continuanter et totam. 2 Maria Grazia Mara, ‘L’influsso di Paolo in Agostino’, in Julien Ries, François Décret, William Hugh Clifford Frend and Maria Grazia Mara (eds), Le epistole paoline nei Manichei, i Donatisti e il primo Agostino, Sussidi Patristici 5 (Roma, 2000), 125-62, 135.

Studia Patristica CXIX, 51-58. © Peeters Publishers, 2021.

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commentary in English made by Eric Plummer in 2003,3 and some articles by Francesca Cocchini,4 Nello Cipriani5 and other scholars. My purpose in this article is to present the Christological insights of Augustine’s Expositio epistulae ad Galatas, to stress how the young Augustine presents some of his main Christological topics in this commentary, and I would like to argue that Augustine’s Expositio epistulae ad Galatas is an important Work in the development of Augustine’s Christology. And following the order of the explanation of the Letter, I would like to focus on the text of Gal. 1:1-2 and Augustine’s commentary. The Pauline text says, according to Augustine’s Biblical version: ‘Paul an apostle, neither from human beings nor through a human being, but through Jesus Christ and God the Father, who raised him from the dead- and all the brethren who are with me, to the Churches of Galatia’. Augustine comments that Paul despite being the last apostle (nouissimus apostolus),6 was sent by Jesus Christ and received his mission not as the other Apostles from the Lord while he was still mortal, but after his resurrection, and he adds a phrase that he will have to review in the Retractationes, because he says, that Jesus Christ after his resurrection, became wholly God: ‘Thus the earlier apostles, who were sent not from human beings but by God through a human being – that is, through Jesus Christ while he was still mortal – were truthful. And the last apostle, who was sent by Jesus Christ now wholly God after his resurrection is also truthful’.7 In fact, in the Retractationes Augustine almost thirty years later, goes back to this text and explains that he said that Jesus Christ became ‘wholly God after his resurrection’, not to say that the Lord only received the divine nature after his resurrection, since he is always God, but to underline that he meant that after his resurrection his human nature possessed immortality: ‘The expression “now wholly God” (totum iam deum post resurrectionem) was used because of the immortality He began to possess after the Resurrection, not because of his divinity, ever immortal, from which he was never separated, and in which he was wholly God even though he was still destined to die’.8 We can see clearly that Augustine in his Expositio epistulae ad Galatas is in a first step of 3

Eric Plummer, Augustine’s Commentary on Galatians (Oxford, 2006). Francesca Cocchini, Agostino, Commento alla lettera ai Galati. Introduzione, traduzione e note, Primi Secoli 6 (Bologna, 2012). 5 Nello Cipriani, ‘La Expositio epistolae ad Galatas di S. Agostino’, in Giancarlo Ceriotti, Agostino Lettore e Interprete di Paolo. Lectio Augustini XX. Settimana Agostiniana Pavese 2004, Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum 107 (Roma, 2008), 41-62. 6 Exp. Gal. 2, CSEL 84, 57.21. 7 Exp. Gal. 2, CSEL 84, 57.18-22: Priores ergo Apostoli ueraces, qui non ab hominibus sed a Deo per hominem missi sunt, per Iesum Christum scilicet adhuc mortalem. Verax etiam nouissimus Apostolus, qui per Iesum Christum totum iam Deum post resurrectionem eius missus est. 8 Retr. 1.24 (23), CChr.SL 57, 71.10-3: propter immortalitatem dictum est totum iam Deum, quam post resurrectionem habere coepit, non propter diuinitatem semper immortalem, a qua numquam recessit, in qua totus Deus erat, et cum moriturus adhuc erat. 4

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his Christological development, and he still has a long way to go, until he arrives to one of his main Christological ideas expressed in Letter 137,9 where he presents Jesus Christ as one person, in which there are two natures, which would be also the Chalcedonian solution in 451, where we can hear the voice of Augustine in the words of Pope Leo the Great.10 Going back to the Expositio epistulae ad Galatas, when Augustine arrives to the third chapter of the letter, he would find a text where Paul says that Christ has become somebody proscribed (proscriptus) after being crucified. According to Roman Law, the proscriptus was a person publicly condemned to banishment with confiscation of one’s property. Ambrosiaster underlines in his commentary to Galatians, that Christ has been proscribed since he has been despoiled or condemned, but what really has been condemned is death by the saving action of his cross.11 Pelagius in his commentary takes ‘proscribed’ as a reference to Christ’s execution, and he does not discuss the idea of confiscation of property.12 At this point, as Eric Plumer has underlined, Augustine follows Marius Victorinus’ commentary on Galatians,13 since both affirm that it is not Christ who looses his possession, since he is always God and everything belongs to him, but the Galatians are the ones who lost Christ, his possessions and the care of grace: ‘But when Christ is also proscribed, what he was holding is taken away. However, this proscription does not harm Christ (who by his divinity is Lord of all), but the possession itself, which is deprived of the care of his grace’.14 What has passed unnoticed to Eric Plumer’s commentary is that Augustine is not only following Marius Victorinus’ commentary, but he is adding some other ideas. Christ is presented by Augustine as proscribed, not only because of all those who reject him, lost all his possessions, but also they lost the action 9 Ep. 137.3.9, CSEL 44, 108.13-6: Nunc vero ita inter Deum et homines mediator apparuit, ut in unitate personae copulans utramque naturam, et solita sublimaret insolitis, et insolita solitis temperaret. See Lewis Ayres, ‘Christology as Contemplative Practice. Understanding the Union of Natures in Augustine’s Letter 137’, in Peter Martens (ed.), In the Shadow of the Incarnation. Essays on Jesus Christ in the Early Church in Honour of Brian E. Daley, S.J. (Notre Dame, 2008), 190-211; Hubertus Drobner, ‘Outlines of the Christology of St. Augustine’, Melita theologica 40 (1989), 45-58, 143-54; 41 (1990), 53-68. 10 See Hubertus Drobner, ‘Fonti teologiche e analisi della formula calcedoniana’, in Antonio Ducay (ed.), Il Concilio di Calcedonia 1550 anni dopo (Città del Vaticano, 2003), 43. 11 See Ambrosiaster, CSEL 81.3, 30.5-9. 12 See Pelagius, Pelagius’ Expositions of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul, Texts and Studies 9 (Cambridge, 1926), ii.317.12-8. 13 Marius Victorinus, Marii Victorini Opera Pars 2: Opera Exegetica, CSEL 83.2, 126.10-3; 21-2: Ergo proscriptus Christus est, id est bona eius distracta et uendita sunt, quae utique in nobis erant, Iudaismi persuasione proscripta sunt, uendita et perdita … Stulti ergo uos, Galatae: perdistis ex uestris animis Christum et eius bona. 14 Exp. Gal. 18, CSEL 84, 76.4-8: Proscripto autem etiam, quae tenebat, aufertur, sed haec proscriptio non obest Christo, qui etiam sic per diuinitatem Dominus est omnium, sed ipsi possessioni, quae huius gratiae cultura caret.

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of grace, literally they lost the ‘cultivation of grace’ (gratiae cultura caret).15 Augustine presents in his commentary an interesting image of the action of grace, which is like a farmer who cultivates the heart of a human being, and those who reject Christ as somebody proscribed, loose the harvesting action of grace. On this same chapter three of the Letter to the Galatians, Augustine finds a text where Paul asserts that Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the Law, namely Gal. 3:13: ‘Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by being made a curse for us, for it is written: “Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree” (Dt. 21:23)’.16 Augustine’s first commentary is to assert that this text needs a spiritual interpretation to enable an understanding of its meaning, so that it may become a sacrament or a sign of freedom, since human beings have been liberated from the curse of the law because of the redeeming death of Christ on the cross. But for those who turn to a literal interpretation of the text, this words become a yoke of slavery, namely for the Jews, or it becomes a veil of blindness, referring to the pagans and heretics. Here Augustine makes an interesting remark, since he affirms that some of the believers, and also some Manichaeans like Faustus,17 who were less learned in interpreting Scriptures, thought that this text refered not to the Lord, but to Judas the betrayer, who hanged himself, because it says: ‘Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree’. Augustine wants to stress that the text refers to the Lord, who was nailed to the tree of the Cross.18 Something important that we can notice in this text is that Augustine does not comment on the concept, or the word Redemptor (Redeemer) applied to Christ. In fact, within Augustine’s Commentary on Galatians we only find twice the verb redemit,19 and not in the words of Augustine, but in him quoting Gal. 3:13. We know that the first time that Augustine uses the word Redemptio as his own word comes comes three years before writing his Expositio epistulae ad Galatas, in the year 391, and can be found in his work De vera religione.20 Before he became a priest, Augustine never used Tertullian’s Latin neologism Redemptor, and only after his ordination as priest at Hippo, and especially after 15

Exp. Gal. 18, CSEL 84, 76.8. Exp. Gal. 22, CSEL 84, 81.23-82.1: Christus nos redemit de maledicto legis factus pro nobis maledictum, quia scriptum est: Maledictus omnis, qui pendet in ligno. 17 Cf. c. Faust. 14.1, CSEL 25.1, 404.2-4: Itaque fatemur ab imperitis dici, aliud esse affigi ligno, aliud in ligno pendere. Sic enim quidam putant soluendam esse istam quaestionem, ut Iudam dicant a Moyse maledictum qui laqueo se suspendit; quasi primo nouerint utrum ex ligno an ex lapide se ille suspenderit. 18 Exp. Gal. 22, CSEL 84, 82.5-12: Nam quod quidam nostri minus in Scripturis eruditi sententiam istam nimis timentes et Scripturas ueteres debita pietate approbantes non putant hoc de Domino esse dictum, sed de Iuda traditore eius, aiunt enim propterea non esse dictum: Maledictus omnis, qui figitur in ligno, sed: qui pendet in ligno, quia non hic Dominus significatus est, sed ille, qui se laqueo suspendit, nimis errant nec attendunt se contra Apostolum disputare. 19 Exp. Gal 22, CSEL 84, 81.23; exp. Gal. 22, CSEL 84, 82.13. 20 Uera rel. 42, CChr.SL 32, 213.16-9: Habebit enim etiam consequentem redemptionem corporis sui, quod iam non corrumpetur. Nunc vero corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem. 16

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his ordination as bishop, little by little he begins to use this word in his works. In fact, it is a strange thing that he does not use or explain the concept of Redeemer in his Expositio epistulae ad Galatas, since Augustine uses for the very first time in his work the word Redemptor not in a Biblical quotation, in this very same year, 394, in the work written before the Expositio epistulae ad Galatas, which is the Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula ad Romanos,21 where he discusses the text of Rom. 7:14, and explains that Christ is called the Redeemer since the human kind was sold to the devil because of sin, and Christ had bought all human beings paying the price of his own blood: ‘“I have being sold (as a slave) to sin” (Rom. 7:14), this words should be understood, that everyone committing sin sells his soul to the Devil, accepting as price the sweetness of the temporal pleasure. From this reason our Lord is called Redeemer (Redemptor) since in this way, as I have said, we have been sold’.22 Augustine continues his commentary on Gal. 3:13, establishing a relationship between this text, and the text of Num. 21:9, where Moses lifted up a serpent on a tree, so that all those bitten by the serpents could be healed and survive. Augustine comments that Moses had lifted up the serpent in the desert as a sign of death and sin, but also as a prefiguration of the death of the Lord on the cross, and his salvation, since he himself had said in the Gospel: ‘Just as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of Man be lifted up above the earth’ (Jn. 3:14). Furthermore, Augustine asserts that like in the Old Testament, those bitten by the serpents looked up to the serpent made of bronze by Moses and were healed, in the same way those in need of salvation have to look up to the Cross of the Redeemer with faith to be saved: ‘For no one can say that Moses did this, too, as an insult to the Lord, since Moses knew how great the salvation was that lay in the cross. So the only reason he had the serpent raised up as a sign was in order that those who had been bitten by serpents and were going to die might look upon it and immediately be healed’.23 But Augustine’s commentary goes beyond this allegorical reading, to present something new and not mentioned in any other Father of the Church, since he notices that the serpent was made of bronze, so he ask himself why the serpent was made of this metal. And he answers saying that the serpent was made of bronze because people commonly call things of an enduring kind, as made of bronze. Then, if the bronze serpent is the figure of Christ’s passion, that means, 21

Exp. prop. Rm. 42, CSEL 84, 18.19. Exp. prop. Rm. 42: Quod autem ait: Venumdatus sum sub peccato, intellegendum est, quod unusquisque peccando animam suam diabolo uendit, accepta tamquam pretio dulcedine temporalis uoluptatis. Unde et Dominus noster Redemptor dictum est, quia hoc modo, quo dictum est, uenditi eramus. 23 Exp. Gal. 22, CSEL 84, 84.1-5: Non enim et hoc in contumeliam Domini Moysen fecisse aliquis dixerit, cum tantam in ea cruce salutem hominum esse cognosceret, ut non ob aliud ad eius iudicium serpentem illum erigere iuberet, nisi ut eum intuentes, qui morsi a serpentibus morituri erant, continuo sanarentur. 22

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according to Augustine, that the faith in Christ’s passion is an enduring thing, that goes beyond time and space, and if every human being forgets Christ’s Passion they will be truly dead: ‘Indeed we commonly call things of an enduring kind bronze. For if people had forgotten that Christ died for humanity and it was erased from the history of the time, they truly would be dying. But now, like bronze, the faith of the cross endures so that, although some die and others are born, they still find this lofty faith enduring, by whose contemplation they are healed’.24 The conclusion of his commentary on Gal. 3:13 and the words ‘cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree’, is that Christ justifies all those who believe in him, not because the works of the Law, but by faith, the fear caused by the curse of the cross is taken away, and ‘the love inspired by the blessing of Abraham remains for the Gentiles’.25 Another important topic in his Expositio epistulae ad Galatas is the one regarding Christ as Mediator, when he comments on Gal. 3:19-20, where Jesus Christ is called ‘Mediator’. In fact, Augustine, as the vast majority of the patristics commentators of the text, including Origen, Marius Victorinus, Ambrosiaster, Jerome and Chrysostom, think that Paul in Gal. 3:19-20 is talking about Christ and not about Moses as Mediator. In fact this is the very first time that Augustine presents the topic of Christ as Mediator in the whole of his work. The word mediatorem appears within the quotation of Rom. 11:36 in Augustine’s work De fide et symbolo,26 but he does not explain what it means that Jesus Christ is the Mediator. Hence, this is the first time that he discusses this important Christological topic in his works, and it is also the very first time that Augustine quotes 1Tim. 2:527 (‘For there is one God, and there is one mediator between God and humans beings, Jesus Christ, himself a human being’), a text that will become a central Christological quotation. He first asserts that there could not be a Mediator between God and God, since God is one, and the angels who did not fall, do not need a Mediator, since they do not have to be reconciled with God. So human beings are the ones who need a Mediator. Only Christ can be the Mediator, because he has the forma 24

Exp. Gal. 22, CSEL 84, 84.5-13: Nec propter aliud ille serpens aeneus factus erat, nisi ut permansurae passionis Domini fidem significaret. Etiam uulgo quippe dicuntur aenea, quorum numerus manet. Si enim obliti essent homines et obliteratum esset de memoria temporis, quod Christus pro hominibus mortuus est, uere morerentur. Nunc autem tamquam aenea permanet crucis fides, ut, cum alii moriantur, alii nascantur, ipsam tamen sublimem permanere inueniant, quam intuendo sanentur. 25 Exp. Gal. 22, CSEL 84, 84.19-21: timor maledictionis crucis ablatus est, caritas benedictionis Abrahae propter exemplum fidei permanet ad Gentes. 26 F. et symb. 19, CSEL 41, 25.19-22: Ex ipso, tamquam ex eo qui nulli debet quod est; per ipsum, tamquam per mediatorem; in ipso, tamquam in eo qui continet, id est, copulatione coniungit. 27 He will repeat the whole text within the commentary in exp. Gal. 63, CSEL 84, 140.6-9: Non ab hominibus neque per hominem, sed per Iesum Christum, alicubi autem hominem, sicut illo loco ubi ait: Unus enim Deus, unus et mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus.

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dei and the forma serui. In fact, in this text of his Expositio epistulae ad Galatas St. Augustine uses for the very first time this Christological Pauline expression of forma serui28 (Phil. 2:6-8), taken from this Biblical quotation,29 an expression that he will use a lot of times in his work to explain many Christological issues. Afterwards, Augustine presents the topic of the two Mediators, the Proud and False Mediator, which is the Devil, and the Humble Mediator who is Christ: ‘It remains, therefore, that anyone who was cast down with the proud mediator – the Devil – urging him to pride, is raised up with the humble mediator – Christ – urging him to humility’.30 In this work Augustine presents an anticipation of the main Christological argument of his longest sermon, which is sermon Dolbeau 26 (= s. 148 augm.),31 which is an exposition of who is the true Mediator, Jesus Christ, or the false Mediator, the Devil. Augustine affirms that through this humble Mediator human beings are healed of the impiety of pride, and are reconciled with God, which is a grace not given by merits, but on account of God’s mercy. This is also the first time that Augustine calls Jesus Christ ‘the humble Mediator’. He will use this expression again only seven years after, in Sermo Dolbeau 26, where it is used four times.32 Conclusion As we have seen Augustine’s Expositio epistulae ad Galatas is an important work in the development of Augustine Christology. We have in this commentary, for the very first time, the presentation of some of the main topics on 28 Exp. Gal. 24, CSEL 84, 87.1-3: Nam si Filius Dei in naturali aequalitate Patris manere vellet nec se exinaniret formam serui accipiens, non esset mediator Dei et hominum. 29 He uses the expression before the Expositio epistulae ad Galatas in the quotation of Phil. 2:6-8 in prou. dei 29,11 (= s. Dolbeau 29, 11), REAug 41 (1995), 287.46: ipsum scilicet Christum Iesum Dominum nostrum qui, cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo, sed semetipsum exinaniuit formam serui accipiens, in similitudine hominum factus et habitu inuentus ut homo; humiliauit semetipsum factus oboediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis. 30 Exp. Gal. 24, CSEL 84, 86.23-87.1: Restat ergo, ut qui mediatore superbo diabolo superbiam persuadente deiectus est, mediatore humili Christo humilitatem persuadente erigatur. 31 The same topic is dealed in trin. 4,15. CChr.SL 50, 180.1-6: Nequaquam igitur per sacrilegas similitudines et impias curiositates et magicas consecrationes animae purgantur et reconciliantur Deo; quia falsus mediator non traicit ad superiora, sed potius obsidens intercludit viam per affectus quos tanto maligniores quanto superbiores suae societatis inspirat; ciu. 9, 9, CChr.SL 47, 258.15-21: Quaenam tandem istos mediatores falsos atque fallaces quasi capite deorsum nequitia uel poena suspendit, ut inferiorem animalis partem, id est corpus, cum superioribus, superiorem uero, id est animum, cum inferioribus habeant, et cum diis caelestibus in parte seruiente coniuncti, cum hominibus autem terrestribus in parte dominante sint miseri? 32 S. Dolbeau 26, 39 (= s. 148 augm., 439). Dolbeau 396/929: Mediator humilis; s. 148 augm., 40 (= s. Dolbeau 26, 40). Dolbeau 397/964: humilis Mediator; s. 148 augm., 44 (= s. Dolbeau 26, 44). Dolbeau 400/62: Mediator humilis.

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which Augustine will be meditating and reflecting through the years. First of all, the topic of the two natures in Christ and how both are united in the Person of Christ, as reflected in the beginning of the commentary with a very early approach to the topic that he will have to correct in the Retractationes. In this Expositio epistulae ad Galatas we can notice that Augustine is still reflecting on the topic of Jesus Christ as Redeemer, since he does not make any comment on this topic, despite having begun to use this word in his work in the very same year in which he wrote this Expositio epistulae ad Galatas. The passion of Christ with the soteriological importance of the cross is something that Augustine underlines in his commentary on Galatians, making the allegorical interpretation of the serpent made of bronze, to assert that the passion of Christ is an event that endures forever, and that human beings could only live and survive the dangers of this world, if they look up with faith to the Cross, as happened with the people of Israel and the serpent made of bronze in the desert. But maybe the most important of the Christological insights in Augustine’s Expositio epistulae ad Galatas is the presentation of Christ as Mediator. In this commentary, for the very first time in his work, Augustine presents this idea, and for the first time quotes the text of 1Tim. 2:5, which will become an important Bibical text to talk about Christ as Mediator. Again, for the first time, he presents the Pauline idea of the forma serui applied to Christ to explain the human nature of Christ together with the other part of divine nature or forma dei. Finally he stresses the importance of the humility of Christ because, for the very first time, he calls Christ the ‘humble Mediator’, an expression he will repeat in his longest sermon, namely sermon Dolbeau 26. Augustine was right, when he invited us to read him, advancing with him and noticing how he makes progress through the years in his theological concepts and ideas.

A Preached Theology: Augustine’s Doctrine of the Totus Christus Kimberly F. BAKER, Saint Meinrad Seminary and School of Theology, St Meinrad, IN, USA

ABSTRACT Preaching is the crucible for Augustine’s doctrine of the totus Christus, the whole Christ with Christ as Head and the Church as Body. When preaching about the totus Christus, Augustine does more than teach and apply theology. Rather, he discovers and refines his theological insights in his study in preparation to preach and in the moment of preaching itself. Thus, Augustine’s doctrine of the totus Christus can be called a preached theology. This preached nature of the doctrine of the totus Christus shows that Augustine did the work of theology not only at his worktable but also at the church in his pastoral relationship with the Christian community. Recognizing this context of preaching for this core Augustinian doctrine underscores the importance of studying sermons as part of patristic research, not with a side glance for some added flavor to our study, but as theological, pastoral works central to the scholarly enterprise.

Preaching is the crucible for Augustine’s doctrine of the totus Christus, the whole Christ with Christ as Head and the Church as Body. In his study and reflection in preparing to preach and in the act of preaching itself, Augustine’s striking insight into the deep, enduring union of Christ and the Church comes to light. In its richest sense, the totus Christus expresses Augustine’s conviction that Christ and the Church cannot be understood apart from one another. They share a voice, an identity, a life. In this article, I consider the doctrine of the totus Christus as a preached theology, asking first how it developed in preaching and then what the preached nature of the doctrine has to teach about Augustine’s theological endeavors, particularly in his ministry of preaching. I show that Augustine does much more than apply theology when preaching on the totus Christus. Rather, he discovers and refines his theological insights in the art of preaching. Thus, I argue that the doctrine of the totus Christus makes manifest the theological nature of Augustine’s preaching, pointing to the value of sermons for patristic studies.1 1

Early stages of this research developed with the support of the Augustinian Institute of Villanova University through the Patricia H. Imbesi St. Augustine Fellowship, for which I am very grateful.

Studia Patristica CXIX, 59-66. © Peeters Publishers, 2021.

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The Roots of the Doctrine of the Totus Christus in Preaching Pastoral ministry provides fertile ground for Augustine’s doctrine of the totus Christus as it emerges as a fruit of his study of Scripture as a newly-ordained presbyter. Soon after his priestly ordination in 391, which came in response to the demands of the people of Hippo, Augustine pleads with Bishop Valerius for an opportunity for an intense time of Scripture study before undertaking his new ministry. Augustine explains that he had already been planning a study retreat even before his surprise ordination and that study holds even more importance in light of his ordination because although he does know the essentials of faith, he believes he needed a stronger foundation in Scripture to minister well to the community in Hippo. He asks for a time of study up until Easter.2 Augustine leaves no record of whether Valerius granted his request for a study retreat or what he studied in the early months of his ordained ministry.3 His writing and preaching in the early 390s reflect a strong Pauline influence, however, suggesting focused study of Paul’s epistles at this time. Likewise, the Psalms already held a privileged place in his prayer life and served as a natural point of reflection.4 In these early years of his ministry, Augustine began his exegetical work on the Psalms, which would become his Enarrationes in Psalmos, the Expositions of the Psalms.5 It is in the Enarrationes that the first concrete signs of the doctrine of the totus Christus begin to appear, under the influence of St Paul.6 The challenge of dating the individual enarrationes and other sermons limits efforts to trace with complete confidence the exact chronology of stages of development of Augustine’s thought on the totus Christus, however. I recognize this constraint as I describe the early development of the doctrine in Augustine’s preaching based on the clues we do have about the possible date and order of his sermons and other exegetical works.7 2

Epistulae 21. During the discussion of this paper at the XVIIIth International Conference on Patristic Studies, held at the University of Oxford, Volker Henning Drecoll offered this observation that we have no record of Valerius’ response to Augustine’s request. 4 In Confessiones (conf.), Augustine tells of discovering the beauty of the Psalms during his time of study retreat at Cassiciacum in 386-7 in the months leading up to his baptism: conf. 9.4.8-12. 5 Augustine began with the goal of writing on each of the Psalms. By 421 or 422, he had reached this goal (Michael Fiedrowicz, Introduction to Expositions of the Psalms [en. Ps.], trans. Maria Boulding, ed. John E. Rotelle, Works of Saint Augustine [WSA] 3.15 [New York, 2000], 14-5). For a fuller study of the Enarrationes in Psalmos see M. Fiedrowicz, Psalmos Vox Totius Christi: Studien zu Augustins ‘Enarrationes in Psalmos’ (Freiburg, 1997). 6 Michael Cameron notes an even earlier trace of the doctrine in Augustine’s De Genesi adversus Manicheos 2.24.37, written in the late 380s (M. Cameron, Christ Meets Me Everywhere: Augustine’s Early Figurative Exegesis [Oxford, 2012], 328 n. 16). 7 For the chronology of the Enarrationes in Psalmos, I am following the chronological table developed by Fiedrowicz which outlines the viewpoint of several scholars on the dating of the individual enarrationes (M. Fiedrowicz, Psalmos Vox Totius Christi [1997], 430-9). 3

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Augustine hones his exegetical method in the early enarrationes. Most scholars date the first 32 enarrationes to 392, his first year of ordained ministry, and consider them for the most part to be written exercises, with perhaps a few representing his preaching, while the vast majority of the enarrationes that follow would have been preached.8 In the early, exploratory stage of this work, the doctrine of the totus Christus begins to emerge as Augustine uses prosopological exegesis to identify the speaker of a particular passage and then interprets the passage in light of that voice.9 Like other patristic writers, Augustine reads the Psalms as prophecy of Christ and the New Testament. The fact that the Psalms were written before Christ’s historical life on earth does not trouble Augustine, but instead, he sees it giving the Psalms a prophetic nature as the Word of God is heard speaking through the Psalms well in advance of the Incarnation. The answer to the question about the Psalms, ‘Who speaks here?’ would be clear to Augustine. Christ speaks here.10 His conviction was challenged, though, by Psalms that speak of suffering, alienation from God, and particularly, by passages that speak of sin. Augustine can read the words of suffering as prophecy of the passion that will await Christ in the Incarnation. But what of the Psalms that speak of sin? This is where Augustine draws from Pauline theology of the Church as the Body of Christ with Christ as its Head to answer the question of who speaks in those passages. Augustine says that Christ can speak such words in union with the Church. At times, Christ speaks as Head; at other times, as the Church, his Body; or sometimes, the two speak as one. Thus, Christ in his entirety is Head and Body, together. Augustine will name this union of Christ and the Church, the totus Christus, the whole Christ. While hints of the doctrine begin to emerge in the 8 Scholars tend to presume the first thirty-two enarrationes would have been written in the order of the first thirty-two Psalms and that he would not have strictly followed the biblical order in preaching the others. At times, he indicates that he is continuing a theme begun the day before, which helps in putting selected enarrationes in order in relation to each other. As for the setting for the preached enarrationes, Fiedrowicz suggests that they were preached in liturgical settings other than Eucharist, perhaps at Vespers or Matins (M. Fiedrowicz, Introduction to Expositions of the Psalms [2000], 16-8). 9 Cameron explains that prosopological exegesis offered the reader a strategy for making sense of the words on a page since ancient manuscripts did not have cues such as line breaks, punctuation, or even spaces between words. Prosopological exegesis helped the reader to recognize the shifts in the text, particularly the shift between speakers (M. Cameron, Christ Meets Me Everywhere [2012], 171-2). 10 Augustine even instructs Christians to look for Christ in the Psalms. He finds in the gospels a mandate for reading the Psalms as the words of Christ, saying that Christ chooses to speak the words of the Psalms in order to teach that he himself is the speaker in the Psalms: ‘He [Christ] had good reason for making the words of the psalm his own, for he wanted to teach you that in the psalm he is speaking. Look for him in it’, en. Ps. 30[2].11 (Enarrationes in Psalmos, trans. Maria Boulding, ed. John E. Rotelle, WSA 3.15 [New York, 2000-4], 330-1); Non sine causa uoluit uerba huius psalmi sua esse, nisi ut te admoneret se locutum esse in hoc psalmo. Ipsum hic quaere (Enarrationes in Psalmos, ed. D. Eligius Dekkers and Johannes Fraipont, CChr.SL 38 [Turnhout, 1990], 199).

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Enarratio on Psalm 3,11 the full phrase appears for the first time, at least in the manuscripts that are known to us and according to the dates typically assigned to them, in his Enarratio on Psalm 17, probably in 392. There, after a brief introduction, Augustine quickly refers to the two-in-one speaker of Christ: ‘Christ and the Church, the whole Christ [totus Christus], Head and body, [speaks] here when the Psalm begins, I will love you Lord.’12 Much of the reflection that follows, however, focuses on distinguishing what applies to the Church and what to Christ to such a degree that their voices seem separated. As he concludes, though, he cues his readers once more to recognize that when the Church is heard speaking in the Psalm, ‘Here the whole Christ [Totus enim Christus] is speaking, and all his members are contained in him.’13 Augustine now has the vocabulary of the totus Christus to name the union even as hints of separation remain when he speaks of the voices of Christ and the Church. Within three years, what could be called a robust doctrine of the totus Christus develops from what began as a bit of an exercise in prosopology, and the development continues over the next 10-15 years. For example, in the Enarratio on Psalm 100, possibly preached in 395, Augustine proclaims: If Christ is a whole [totus Christus], head and body, you must be among his members and cleave to him by faith and hope and charity … Having put on Christ we, with our head, are Christ. [Christus sumus cum capite nostro.] … It is quite clear from this that we are part of Christ; and since we are his limbs and his members, we form one single person with our head.14 11

Psalm 3 describes itself as a psalm of David as he fled from Absalom, yet Augustine identifies the speaker as Christ. Since the psalm speaks from the perspective of one who suffers at the hands of others while finding strength from the Lord, Augustine reads it through the lens of Christ’s passion and resurrection (en. Ps. 3.1) As he nears the conclusion of the enarratio, he expands the reflection on Christ’s voice to include the Church. He says Christ speaks in totus, as the whole or ‘in his totality’. He draws from the writings of the apostle Paul to explain that Christ and the Church, Head and Body, can speak together. Thus, the psalm can also be heard as Christ speaking with the Church who finds strength in the Lord (en. Ps. 3.9). In the final chapter, Augustine will speak of each individual Christian crying out in the words of the Psalms during times of challenge (en. Ps. 3.10). Thus, in this enarratio, Augustine has recognized the multi-layered voice of the totus Christus: Christ in Himself, Christ speaking together with the Church, and the individual members of Christ’s Body. 12 En. Ps. 17.2. WSA 3.15, 189. Dicit ergo hic Christus et ecclesia, id est, totus Christus, caput et corpus (CChr.SL 38, 94). I have modified the verb form in the English translation from ‘are speaking,’ as in WSA, to ‘speaks’, to reflect the impact of the singular form of the Latin verb, dicit. This singular form is significant in expressing the union of voices of Head and Body in the totus Christus. The two voices speak as one. 13 En. Ps. 17.51. WSA 3.15, 198. Totus enim Christus hic loquitur, in quo sunt omnia membra eius (CChr.SL 38, 102). 14 En. Ps. 100.3. WSA 3.19, 32-3. Si autem totus Christus, id est caput et corpus eius, esto in membris eius, adhaere illi per fidem, et per spem, et per caritatem … Christum enim induti Christus sumus cum capite nostro … Manifestum quia ad Christum pertinemus; et quia membra eius et corpus eius sumus, cum capite nostro unus homo sumus (CChr.SL 39, 1408).

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This pivotal declaration, ‘Christus sumus; we are Christ,’ signals the maturing of the doctrine. Here in the Enarratio on Psalm 100, Augustine does not focus on distinguishing voices but on showing the unity of Christ and the Church.15 More than an image, the totus Christus expresses a reality. Christ and the Church can, and do, speak as one, and live as one.16 In fact, much of this sermon focuses on living a righteous life, including being merciful to others, just as God has been merciful to the Church. The unity of Christ and the Church involves more than speaking the words of the Psalms. Now, Augustine can speak of the union flowing out into the Christian life as the Church lives as Christ in the world. Christ and the Church can share a voice because they share a life. Augustine uses the phrase, totus Christus, a relatively few number of times: forty-seven times in the nominative case, for example.17 Out of the estimated 5.4 million words that make up the surviving works of Augustine,18 a count of forty-seven words hardly seems worth mentioning. The full accounting for the doctrine of the totus Christus comes not from a word count, however, because the theme runs throughout much of Augustine’s preaching often without being explicitly named, particularly as he seeks to help Christians understand who 15 This unity of Christ and the Church lies at the heart of the doctrine of the totus Christus. Cameron considers this interplay of voices to be an important distinction between Augustine’s doctrine and that of Tyconius’ Book of Rules, which some scholars credit for Augustine’s two-fold reading of the voice of Christ as Head and Body. While I once followed this popular tendency, I now agree with Cameron that the Tyconian influence is overstated. Even if Augustine did draw inspiration from Tyconius, he uses the method in a different way. Cameron astutely explains that Tyconius focuses on distinguishing the voices of Christ and the Church while Augustine seeks to relate the voices to one another (M. Cameron, Christ Meets Me Everywhere [2012], 328 n. 16). 16 My insight here has been shaped by the work of Tarsicius van Bavel. See, for example, T. van Bavel, ‘The “Christus Totus” Idea: A Forgotten Aspect of Augustine’s Spirituality’, in Studies of Patristic Christology: Proceedings of the Third Maynooth Patristic Conference, ed. Thomas Finan and Vincent Twomey (Portland, OR, 1998), 84-94. 17 A word search of Augustine’s works for the words totus and Christus within five words of each other turns up fifty hits. Of those hits, three are not relevant for this study because the two words are used independently of one another (Jo. ev. tr. 47.9.9, s. 375B.7, c. Faust. 12.32). Eleven other hits relate to the union of Christ’s divine and human natures, a related theme but not itself the doctrine of the totus Christus which speaks of the union of Christ and the Church (Jo. ev. tr. 3.4.1 [2 hits], 47.9.9; en. Ps. 90[2].1; s. 53A.13, 92.3, 245.5, 261.7 [3 hits], 375B.6). What remains are thirty-six examples of the phrase totus Christus or Christus totus in Augustine’s works (Jo. ev. tr. 28.1.17; ep. Jo. 1.2; en. Ps. 17.2, 17.51, 26[2].2, 29[1].2, 30[2].3, 30[3].1, 30[4].5 [2 hits], 54.3, 56.1 [2 hits], 56.6, 58[1].2, 58[1].5, 68[1].1, 74.4, 74.5, 100.3, 118[6].2, 132.7, 138.2, 140.4, 142.5; s. 22.10, 72A.7, 116.6, 133.8, 137.1, 299C.2, 22D.2, 22D.19, Trin. 3.9, cath. 4.7, persev. 7.14 [Library of Latin Texts, searched April 28, 2017]). There are a handful of hits for the phrase in other grammatical cases. A search for tot* within five words of Christ* returned 368 hits, nine of which are relevant for this study: six related to the doctrine and three related to the fullness the union of two natures in Christ (Library of Latin Texts, searched May 15, 2017). 18 David Vincent Meconi, The One Christ: St. Augustine’s Theology of Deification (Washington, DC, 2013), 82

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they have become in Christ and how they are to live as Christ in the world.19 Several of his mystagogical sermons give powerful examples of Augustine putting the doctrine of the totus Christus to work in spiritual formation, without actually naming the doctrine. Consider Sermon 229A.20 There, Augustine explains to the newly baptized the meaning of the Eucharist, which they had first received the night before at the Easter vigil following their baptism. He explains that the bread and wine bear a new reality, and so do they.21 Of the Eucharist, he says: ‘Come the consecration, and that bread will be the body of Christ, and that wine will be the blood of Christ.’22 Then, a few lines later he shifts the focus to the community of the baptized, saying: ‘This is the body of Christ, about which the apostle says, while addressing the Church, But you are the body of Christ and his members (1Cor. 12:27). What you receive is what you yourselves are, thanks to the grace by which you have been redeemed.’23 By virtue of their baptism, these new Christians can look at the altar and see there themselves because together, with one another, they are Christ’s Body. Augustine’s reflection on the relation of Christ and the Church has grown into an organic, integrated vision of the reality of a shared life of Christ and the Church. And it has developed in his preaching. Of those forty-seven hits for totus Christus in the nominative, forty-four hits appear in preaching and related works, with twenty-four of those occurring in the Enarrationes, and the others in the Tractates and Sermons.24 Augustine’s doctrine of the totus 19 Cameron has suggested that the theme occurs more than two hundred times alone in the Enarrationnes in Psalmos (Michael Cameron, ‘Augustine’s Construction of Figurative Exegesis Against the Donatists in the Enarrationes in Psalmos’, PhD diss. [University of Chicago, 1996], 273). 20 See also s. 227 and 272. 21 ‘What you can see on the Lord’s table, as far as the appearance of the things goes, you are also used to seeing on your own tables; they have the same aspect, but not the same value. I mean, you yourselves are the same people as you used to be; you haven’t brought us along new faces, after all. And yet you’re new; the same old people in bodily appearance, completely new ones by the grace of holiness – just as this too is new.’ Sermones (s.) 229A.1. Sermons, trans. Edmund Hill, ed. John E. Rotelle, WSA 3.6 (New York, 1993-7), 269. Quod videtis in mensa domini, quantum pertinet ad ipsarum rerum speciem, et in vestris mensis videre consuestis: ipse est visus, sed non ipsa virtus. Nam et vos idem ipsi estis homines, qui eratis: neque enim ad nos novas facies attulistis. Et tamen novi estis: veteres corporis specie, novi gratia sanctitatis, sicut et hoc novum est (Sermones Post Maurinos Reperti, ed. D. Germani Morin [Rome, 1930], 462). 22 S. 229A.1. WSA 3.6, 269. Accedit sanctificatio, et panis ille erit corpus Christi, et vinum illud erit sanguis Christi (Sermones [1930], 462). 23 S. 229A.1. WSA 3.6, 270. Hoc panis corpus Christi, de quo dicit apostolus, alloquens ecclesiam: vos autem estis corpus Christi et membra. Quod accipitis, vos estis, gratia qua redempti estis (Sermones [1930], 463). Augustine continues, ‘You add your signature to this, when you answer Amen. What you see here is the sacrament of unity (WSA 3.6, 270). Subscribitis, quando Amen respondetis. Hoc quod videtis, sacramentum est unitatis (Sermones [1930], 463). 24 The other three references come in treatises after the doctrine has already developed. De Trinitate 3.9 (begun in 399), Ad catholicos de secta Donatistarum 4.7 (402/405), De dono perseverantiae 7.14 (428/429).

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Christus clearly is a preached theology. By that I mean not simply a theology about which he preached, or that he applied in preaching. Rather, it is theology that develops in preaching, coming to life and maturing in the preaching moment itself. Significance of the Preaching Context The preached nature of the doctrine of the totus Christus sheds light on Augustine as preacher and theologian.25 It shows that preaching was a theological endeavor for Augustine. Preaching becomes crucial to his theological exploration on the relationship of Christ and the Church. Surely that is no mere coincidence. He preached several times a week, so it is in preaching that most of his teaching and exposition on Scripture took place. And consider the genre of preaching. Preaching breaks open Scripture to facilitate the dialogue, the relationship, of God and the church community. Likewise, the doctrine of the totus Christus emerges from Scripture to announce the union of Christ and the Church and to shape Christians’ understanding of their life in and with Christ.26 Where better to explore and refine the implications of that union than in preaching within a community gathered to learn to live and speak as one with Christ.27 Augustine is not alone in approaching preaching as theological exploration and discourse. Brian Daley has spoken of patristic theology as having its beginning ‘in the pulpit rather than in a classroom.’ Daley observes that sharing and reflecting on the Word of God in the patristic era was primarily an oral discourse, what Gregory of Nazianzus would describe as the ‘art of arts and the science of sciences,’ when in preaching, one leads others with carefully chosen words.28 Augustine’s doctrine of the totus Christus, then, signals the value of the study of preaching as theological, pastoral work. While it is Augustine’s treatises that are often better known to his readers today, his theological reflection was taking 25 The study of Augustine’s preaching also offers a more well-rounded view of Augustine and the North African Church, reflecting the day-to-day joys and challenges of the preacher and his community. Frederick van der Meer takes note of the personal view into Augustine’s life given by his preaching and letters in the work, F. van der Meer, Augustine the Bishop: The Life and Work of a Father of the Church, trans. B. Battershaw and G.R. Lamb (London, 1961), xv-xxiii. 26 Cameron describes Scripture as the ‘seedbed’ of the totus Christus. M. Cameron, Christ Meets Me Everywhere (2012), 328 n. 16. 27 Not only was his preaching theological, but his theology had a pastoral nature. Van der Meer observes that with the exception of De Trinitate, all of Augustine’s writing directly addresses practical needs. F. van der Meer, Augustine the Bishop (1961), xvii. 28 Brian E. Daley, ‘Using “The Art of Arts”: Preaching as Spiritual Leadership in the Early Church’, keynote lecture, The 2019 Notre Dame Preaching Conference, The University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, June 26, 2019. Daley quotes Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 2 (Apologetic Discourse) 16, ed. Jean Bernardi, SC 287 (Paris, 1978), 110.

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place in his daily pastoral ministry. Tracing the development of the doctrine of the totus Christus shows also the theologian and pastor developing as he explores Scripture in the context of ministry, seeks the deeper meaning, and speaks to the very real challenges and struggles of the community. At times, Augustine’s preaching on the totus Christus takes a polemical edge, such as during the Donatist controversy.29 At other times, such as in the mystagogical sermons, it inspires and evokes a sacramental vision of the Church. Sermons serve as a vital theological source for Augustine’s perceptive insight as his Christology expands to include ecclesiology in his signature doctrine of the totus Christus. Perhaps one reason the doctrine of the totus Christus had become what Tarcisius van Bavel once called ‘a forgotten aspect of Augustine’s spirituality’30 is because Augustine’s treatises were privileged over his preaching. Without the study of his preaching, the brief references to the totus Christus found outside of his preaching could sound simply like citations of St Paul speaking of Head and Body rather than a profound theological reflection on the shared life and identity of Christ and the Church. Thanks to scholars such as van Bavel, the doctrine of the totus Christus has come more fully into the view of Augustine studies today. I sometimes wonder what other theological insights may have become overlooked and forgotten over the centuries because they rest in preaching. With the increasing interest in the study of patristic preaching, we may well hear more of ‘forgotten’ insights coming to scholarly attention. Studying the development of the doctrine of the totus Christus offers a fuller view of Augustine’s theological endeavors because it shows that he did the work of theology not only at his worktable but also at the church, perhaps especially at the church, in his pastoral relationship with the Christian community. Recognizing this context of preaching for this core Augustinian doctrine underscores the importance of studying sermons as theology as part of patristic research, not with a side glance for some added flavor to our study, but as works central to the scholarly enterprise.

29 See, for example, s. 238.3, 268.1, en. Ps. 54.20, 65.2, 146.19. There and elsewhere, Augustine describes the Catholic Church as Christ’s Body spread throughout the world and suggests that to join groups such as the Donatists would be to divide Christ. 30 T. van Bavel, ‘The “Christus Totus” Idea: A Forgotten Aspect of Augustine’s Spirituality’ (1998), 84-94.

Rethinking the Relationship between Grace and Free Will in Ad Simplicianum I 21 Teng HE, Bonn University, Bonn, Germany

ABSTRACT The topic of this article is the relationship between grace and free will in Augustine’s Simpl. I 2 (396/397). The development of Augustine confronts its interpreters with a crucial difficulty, whether Augustine changes his mind on will based on his comments in Retractationes 2.1.1. In regards to Simpl. I 2, there are essentially two interpretative options available: separate reading and continuous reading. Following the first option, there are two distinctive ‘Augustines’. After the year of 396/397 AD, Augustine changes his mind on human will. According to the second reading, there is no difference between the young and old Augustine. I would like to start by presenting the special characteristic of Simpl. I 2. Then I will focus on the distinction between will (uoluntas) and free choice (liberum arbitrium). Lastly, I will analyze Augustine’s efforts to defend the autonomy of humanity under grace in Simpl. I 2.

1. Introduction Augustine’s discussion on the relationship between free will and grace confronts the interpreters with several serious challenges. On the one hand, its elements are scattered throughout a number of writings. Hence, his thoughts on free will might be contradictory in different phases of his development. On the other hand, the text Simpl. I 2 is a quite obscure text written by Augustine from 396 to 397 AD, vividly discussed by scholars.2 The most relevant challenge to any Augustine researcher on this topic is whether Augustine had a consistent understanding of free will, or whether this conception changed in Simpl. I 2. 1 The following English translations are based on Boniface Ramsey (trans.), Responses to Miscellaneous Questions, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century I/12 (New York, 2008). The Latin quotations are based on Kurt Flasch and Walter Schäfer (eds. and trans.), Logik des Schreckens: De diuersis quaestionibus Simpl. I 2 (Mainz, 1992). Abbreviations will be used as Simpl. I 2. 2 K. Flasch, Logik des Schreckens (1992); Thomas Gerhard Ring, ‘Bruch oder Entwicklung im Gnadenbegriff Augustins? Kritische Anmerkungen zu K. Flasch, Logik des Schreckens. Augustinus von Hippo, Die Gnadenlehre von 397’, Augustiniana 44 (1994), 31-113; Volker Henning Drecoll, Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins (Tübingen, 1999); Paula Fredriksen, Augustine’s early interpretation of Paul (Princeton, 1980); James Partout Burns, The development of Augustine’s doctrine of operative grace (New Haven, 1974).

Studia Patristica CXIX, 67-75. © Peeters Publishers, 2021.

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As known there are basically two interpretative options available: the more traditional separate reading and the continuous reading. Following the first option, the text Simpl. 1.2 is regarded as a breaking point. This analysis stresses the discontinuity in Augustine’s theory on free will, by completely denying it.3 According to this interpretation, humans can only rely on the grace of God, have lost control over themselves and have ‘lost their future’, as Peter Brown later stated.4 Kurt Flasch claims that Augustine destroyed the values of antiquity. Furthermore, separationists claim this work was accompanied by Augustine’s second conversion: from Neoplatonism to Paulism. According to the second reading, Augustine does not change his viewpoint in this work. Carol Harrison and Josef Lössl try to defend the continuity of Augustine’s viewpoint by two approaches. While Harrison attempts to show that the early Augustine has already concentrated on the concept of grace, Lössl rather claims that Augustine has an intellectual understanding on will, including Simpl. I 2.5 Recently there have been some continuous works opposing the traditional separate reading. I would like to summarize them here. Tianyue Wu has analyzed the beginning of faith (initium fidei) throughout Augustine’s works and defends the existence of free will under grace.6 Wilson meticulously compared Augustine’s writings. Between the years 397 and 412 AD, there was no substantial change to be found.7 Even though there are already many contributions on this subject, I would like to come back to this work, in order to analyze Augustine’s thoughts on free choice. In this essay, I would like to start by presenting the special characteristic of Simpl. I 2. Then I will focus on the distinction between will (uoluntas) and free choice (liberum arbitrium). Lastly, I will analyze Augustine’s efforts to defend the autonomy of humanity under the grace in Simpl. I 2.

2. The specific characteristic of Simpl. I 2 Simpl. was the first work written by Augustine, after he was appointed as the bishop of Hippo in the year 396 AD. It was a response to Simplician, who succeeded Ambrose of Milan as bishop.

3

K. Flasch, Logik des Schreckens (1992), 19-30, 48-51. Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: a biography. A New Edition with an Epilogue (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 2000), 149. 5 Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity (Oxford, 2006); Josef Lössl, Intellectus gratiae. Die erkenntnistheoretische und hermeneutische Dimension der Gnadenlehre Augustins von Hippo (Leiden, 1997). 6 Tianyue Wu, ‘Augustine on initium fidei: A case study of the coexistence of operative grace and free decision of the will’, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 79 (2012), 1-38. 7 Kenneth M. Wilson, Augustine’s conversion from traditional free choice to ‘non-free free will’: a comprehensive methodology (Tübingen, 2018), 3-4, 7-8. 4

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Since the 360s there was a trend, initiated by Marius Victorinus, concentrating on comments on Paul’s epistles. Ambrose, Simplician and Augustine followed this tradition and focused on this question: faith alone (sola fide) or grace alone (sola gratia). The literature form of these discussions were texts like De diuersis quaestionibus, aiming to solve certain problems. In Simpl. I 2, Augustine mainly discussed the election between Jacob and Esau. As for the development of Augustine’s thoughts, Augustine was baptized in the year of 386. After that, he tried to turn his back on Manichaeism and composed several anti-Manichaean works. Since the year 391, Augustine had intensively commented on Paul’s letters and had finished a series of works: Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula Apostoli ad Romanos (394-395);8 Epistolae ad Romanos inchoata Expositio (394-395); De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus (388-396) and De diuersis quaestioibus Simpl. (396-397). Simpl. I 2 is usually seen as the highlight of this early period. The reason why this text receives so much attention is the review of Augustine in his later works, such as De praedestinatione sanctorum 4.8; De dono perseverantiae 20.52 and Retractationes 2.1. Augustine reflected: ‘I, indeed, labored in defense of the free choice of human will; but the grace of God conquered’.9 Apart from the development of Augustine’s viewpoint, some scholars have already mentioned the historical and theological background of this text Simpl. For example, Friedricksen has researched the influence of the Donatist bishop Ticonius, who has given a criterion of bible exegesis: the gratuitous grace of God.10 I would like to start by listing to the special characteristics of Simpl. I 2 in the following. 2.1. The whole indebtedness to God In Simpl. I 2, Augustine always emphasizes that grace is not based on faith (fides) and works (opera) of humanity, but solely on the mercy of God (misericordia dei). It could be labeled as an entire indebtedness to God. In contrast to his earlier work, e.g. ex prop. Rm., Augustine claimed in Simpl. I 2 that grace is neither based on works, nor on faith into the future (futuram fidem).11 In ex prop. Rm. 60.2, Augustine explicitly said that Paul does not deny free choice (liberum arbitrium). We observe that Jacob received grace, because God foresaw him using free choice to believe. If Augustine’s previous understanding of grace was a synergism between God and free choice, he had a view of monism in Simpl. I 2. Faith is no longer seen as a merit (meritum), rather it is depended on the will of God and would be described as a gift of God (donum dei). 8

In this article its abbreviation will be ex prop. Rm. Retract. II 1.1: laboratum est quidem pro libero arbitrio uoluntatis humanae, sed uicit dei gratia. 10 P. Friedricksen, The early Interpretation (1979), 215; Kenneth M. Wilson, Augustine’s conversion (2018), 104-7. 11 In ex prop. Rm. 60.2 Augustine claims that grace is based on the prescience of faith of the future. 9

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By that, Augustine had established a new understanding of the sovereignty of God, opposed to the idea of grace as a reward of obedience of law, commonly shared in Judaism. 2.2. Justice of God and original sin The election of Jacob and Esau brings the question of theodicy: why did God choose Jacob and not Esau? Augustine attempts to solve this question by starting to analyze original sin. According to Augustine, the post-lapsarian has inherited sin from Adam and Eve. As the descendants, Jacob and Esau are also born to be sinful, even though they had not done or even willed anything. In contrast to his previous work, e.g. in De libero arbitrio12 III Augustine regarded the ignorance (ignorantia) and difficulty (difficultas) as the punishment (poena) for humanity. However, the punishment does not necessarily lead to human sin. The post-lapsarian still possesses the ability to seek a happy life, e.g. through praying, even though they suffer from mortality. Only when humans reject the grace of Jesus do they commit sin (peccatum). However, as Augustine writes in Simpl. I 2, Jacob and Esau could not do anything to change their situation. Researchers would also like to combine the discussion on original sin here to Augustine’s theory of the weakness of the will, which is articulated in Conf. VIII. The self-binding of free choice results in the condition of being unfree to will the good. Humans have only the freedom to sin. Only the grace of God could change it by giving a new will. After the clarification of original sin, we can see that the relationship between post-lapsarian with God is just like the relationship between a debtor and creditor, as Augustine describes the relation. They do not have the right to ask for justice from God. In the name of justice God punished Esau, while God had saved Jacob. 2.3. The incomprehensibility/inscrutability of Grace Obviously, Augustine tries in his earlier dialogs to establish an intellectual understanding of God by identifying him with truth (ueritas). To ascend to God or achieve the vision of the truth, humans should lead an intellectual way of life. However, in order to argue for his theory of election and justice, Augustine introduces the concept of incomprehensibility through quoting: ‘Inscrutable are his judgments and unfathomable his ways’.13 By admitting the incomprehensibility of grace, Augustine turns his back to the intellectual efforts to understand God.

12 13

In this article its abbreviation will be lib. arb. Simpl. I 2.22: sed inscrutabilia sunt iudicia eius et inuestigabiles uiae eius; see Rom. 11:33.

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Flasch regards it as an evidence for Augustine’s mysticism. 14 Augustine strengthens his opinion on predestination in combination with mysticism. The postlapsarian could not understand God and falls into the condition of fear. Paul van Geest has shown that the discussion on the incomprehensibility of God was about discouraging pride rather than explaining the doctrine of predestination.15 Based on these ‘new characteristics’, we can see Augustine’s new opinion on election, original sin and even a negative approach toward God. By that we would claim that continuous reading is not that proper, for it could not grasp the development of the change in Augustine’s thought. However, we shall not rush to accept the view of traditional separation reading that Augustine has eliminated free choice under the grace. Now we will analyze the topic of free choice in Simpl. I 2. 3. Discussion on free choice (liberum arbitrium) in Simpl. I 2 In order to clarify the relationship between free will and grace in this text, I will begin to analyze the concept of will and free choice. 3.1. Free choice (liberum arbitrium) and Will (uoluntas) In Simpl. I 2 the expression of free choice of will (liberum arbitrium uoluntatis) appears once.16 The concept of will (uoluntas) appears multiple times.17 As we know, Augustine introduces the concept of free choice (liberum arbitrium) and (propria uoluntas) in response to the question of theodicy: where does evil come from (unde malum).18 Even though Augustine uses these two concepts interchangeably, they both have different meanings. Based on the work of Den Bock from the year 1994, we can briefly introduce the difference between will and free choice here.19 The Latin term ‘uoluntas’ is a translation of ‘boulêsis’, which appears in Plato’s Gorgias (466a9-467e5) and is later introduced to Roman literature through Cicero in Tusculanae Disputationes (IV 6.12). ‘Boulêsis’ means rational desire, oriented to a real good. 14

K. Flasch, Logik des Schreckens (1992), 65-71. Paul van Geest, The Incomprehensibility of God: Augustine as a Negative Theologian (Leuven, 2011), 64-7. 16 Simpl. I 2.21: Liberum uoluntatis arbitrium plurimum ualet, immo uero est quidem, sed in uenundatis sub peccato quid ualet? 17 Simpl. I 2.12; 2.18; 2.21; 2.22. 18 Lib. arb. I 11.21: nulla res alia mentem cupiditatis comitem faciat quam propria uoluntas et liberum arbitrium. 19 Nico W. Den Bok, ‘Freedom of the Will: A systematic and biographical sounding of Augustine’s thoughts on human willing’, Augustiniana 44 (1994), 237-70. 15

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Actually, ‘will’ is not a suitable translation of ‘boulêsis’ or ‘uoluntas’, which means a desire, an inclination or an appetitive tendency. In contrast, free choice is a faculty of decision. Free choice (liberum arbitrium) can be traced back to the discussion on eph’hemin/in potestate in ancient philosophy. By opposing reason and free choice Augustine distances himself from the ancient intellectual understanding on will. Free choice describes the autonomy of humans in the sense of arbitrariness. We can still find such distinction in Simpl. I 2: ‘For in one way God bestows so that we may will, and in another he bestows what we have willed’.20 It shows that the acts of our will belongs to God and to us. God determines the disposition or tendency of will. As Augustine shows in lib. arb., human will as a mediate good (medium bonum) is forced neither by God nor by desire (cupiditas). Human sin is only based on its own will (propria uoluntas) or free choice (liberum arbitrium).21 By that, Augustine establishes the conception of voluntary sin. In order to lead a righteous life, Augustine states that humans have free choice to pray and search for grace, as we have mentioned beforehand in the section 2.1. In Simpl. I 2, when it comes to sin, Augustine defines it as ‘a disorder and a perversion of the human being – that is, a turning away from the creator, who is more excellent, and a turning to created things, which are inferior’.22 Obviously, the definition here corresponds to the conception of involuntary sin. It is no doubt that Augustine’s thought on sin has its continuity. However, the key point, which we have to deal with, is the relationship between grace and faith. Even though we have beforehand mentioned the whole indebtedness to God in section 2.1, we can still ask whether the human will contributes to faith. For Augustine indeed mentions two aspects when he discusses right and righteous life: the mercy of God (misericordia dei) and the consent of our will (consensus nostrae uoluntatis). To begin with, it is at first glance clear that the will is not sufficient to lead a happy life without the mercy of God. But we can still ask whether humans have freedom to consent or reject the mercy of God. The answer is no and Augustine denies the possibility to reject the mercy of God. If the will could reject mercy, it would follow that grace of God is not sufficient. From this standpoint, it follows that the grace of God would be ineffective and God would no longer be omnipotent. In order to avoid this result, Augustine states that mercy brings the consent of the will. Now we come to the concept of congruous vocation (congruens uocatio).

20

Simpl. I 2.10: Aliter enim Deus praestat ut uelimus, aliter praestat quod uoluerimus. Simpl. I 2.18: Idem tamen ipsi et homines et peccatores, sed homines dei conditione, peccatores propria uoluntate. 22 Simpl. I 2.18: Est autem peccatum hominis inordinatio atque peruersitas, id est a praestantiore conditore auersio et ad condita inferiora conuersio. 21

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3.2. Congruous vocation (congruens uocatio) As we mentioned above, Augustine states that the human will still exists when God gives mercy. In order to explain it, Augustine introduces the concept of congruous vocation (congruens uocatio). ‘He could call the will in such a way as would be appropriate for them, so that they would be moved and would understand and would follow’.23 The quote refers to the vocation in an appropriate manner, which determines the effectiveness of responses. For those whom God wills to give mercy to, God gives his vocation and simultaneously brings the consent of the will and humans begin to believe. Those whom God will punish He will not call and bring the resistance of will (obstinatio uoluntatis). By giving the congruous vocation, God has initiated the consent of the will to affirm the faith. Flasch has used congruous vocation as an evidence for the overcoming of grace on free choice.24 In this case the human will is similar to a puppet of God and humans do not have freedom. Opposing this, Burns has interpreted that the vocation would be only adapted to actual dispositions of the will.25 As he comments: ‘The congruous vocation does not necessitate man’s choice, but it always wins his consent’.26 Burns has seen the distinction between will and free choice, which we have pointed out beforehand. God has only an influence on the tendency or disposition of the will, rather than removing the autonomy of free choice. Similar to Burns, Ring has stated that God knows each human being and does not abolish free choice.27 As I can see, even though God has brought the consent of the will, Augustine has never explicitly claimed that grace has eliminated free choice. Augustine defends the compatibility between grace and human will in congruous vocation. Augustine’s view of freedom is not the ability for another alternative, rather an affirmation of grace. In order to elaborate it, we have to analyze the concrete process of the beginning of faith, which is the main topic of the next step. 3.3. Delight (delectatio) ‘But the will itself, unless it comes into contact with something that attracts and beckons the soul, can by no means be moved. But that it may come into contact with this is not in a person’s power’.28 23

Simpl. I 2.13: posset ita uocare, quomodo illis aptum esset, ut et mouerentur et intellegerent et sequerentur. 24 K. Flasch, Logik des Schreckens (1992), 267. 25 J.P. Burns, The development (1974), 28-9. 26 Ibid. 29. 27 T.G. Ring, ‘Bruch oder Entwicklung’ (1994), 51. 28 Simpl. I 2.22: Sed uoluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid occurrerit quod delectet atque inuitet animum, moueri nullo modo potest.

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Augustine regarded the emotion of ‘delight’ as an important motivation for the beginning of faith. The delight here could be regarded as a motivation to believe. We have to ask whether humanity is still free in delight, which is caused by God. This quote has been heatedly discussed, splitting the interpreters into two parties. Brown and Flasch would claim that Augustine admitted that humanity has lost its own power over itself. Burns, as we have mentioned before, may interpret that delight is only related to a change of disposition. The compatibility between God and the human will is still possible. Just as G. Ring accurately states: for the beginning of faith, God is the last and principal cause, the human will is the second and actual cause.29 I would like to introduce the comparison with the theory of emotion in the Stoics, which had a great influence on Augustine. The Stoics’ discussion on emotion is always related to their epistemology, in which appearances (phantasia/visum) and the assent (sunkatathesis/consensus) are always discussed. The former is related to sensory, the latter is determined by reason. What is always discussed is the three-movement theory on interpreting anger by Seneca: 1) preparation for a passion (involuntary); 2) combination with a wish; 3) overriding the reason.30 For Seneca, only when humans consent to the emotion of anger in step 3, he would be regarded as being angry. The first two steps are not in the power of humans and humans should not be responsible for them. We can also find the same structure in the earlier works of Augustine, e.g. De sermone domini in monte (394). Regarding the explanation of original sin, we can also find the three-step structure: suggestion (suggestio) – delight (delectatio) – consent (consentio).31 When it comes to the consent of Adam to the temptation of the snake, Adam would be regarded as sinful. When we apply this model to the quoted text in Simpl. I 2, grace has the influence in the first two steps. Indeed, it does not lie in the power of humans. However, the will has at least the ability to consent, even though there is no alternative, for God has already foreseen everything. Even though God has initiated the delight and brings the consent of will, humanity could still be regarded as free.

29 T.G. Ring, ‘Bruch oder Entwicklung’ (1994), 50: ‘Der nächste, faktische Grund für Glaube ist menschliche Wollen; der letzte und prinzipielle – Willensratschluss Gottes’. 30 De ira. II 4: Et ut scias quemadmodum incipiant adfectus aut crescant aut efferantur, est primus motus non uoluntarius, quasi praeparatio adfectus et quaedam comminatio; alter cum uoluntate non contumaci, tamquam oporteat me uindicari cum laesus sim, aut oporteat hunc poenas dare cum scelus fecerit; tertius motus est iam inpotens, qui non si oportet ulcisci uult sed utique, qui rationem euicit. 31 S. dom.mon. I 12.34: Nam tria sunt quibus impletur peccatum: suggestione, delectatione, consensione.

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Conclusion On the one hand, we have shown Augustine’s innovation in Simpl. I 2. It could be seen as a development of his earlier thoughts. Augustine’s conception of faith, merit and original sin has changed, but not substantially. On the other hand, we have observed that Augustine has not denied free choice of the will (liberum arbitrium uoluntatis). There is not such a radical change by Augustine in the year of 396/397.

The Theme of the Nothingness of Man in the Works of Saint Augustine Gábor KENDEFFY, Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary, Budapest, Hungary

ABSTRACT This article aims to shed some light on two important traits of Saint Augustine’s anthropology, the second one arising from the first. First, for Augustine, the ability of man to turn away from God follows from the fact that he had been created out of nothing. The second trait in question is directly implied by the first one: the bishop of Hippo systematically tends to qualify what is really, distinctively human, including ‘humanistic’ moral reflection, as diametrically opposed to whatever belonging to God.

1. Creation out of nothing as the cause of the ability to commit sin In book 14 of his work On the City of God Augustine puts forward a doctrine regarding the origin of the Fall. According to it right volition is the work of God, which He bestowed upon man by creating him. As to the first perverted human volition, it is not the work of God, but the defect and at the same time a defection of man (defectus). Namely, a defect in terms of being and a defection from God’s works to those of his own. The evil will, on the one hand, being a vice (vitium) is opposed to nature (natura) – Augustine certainly meaning here both universal nature and the particular nature of the individual whose vice it is. On the other hand, vice obviously belongs to the nature of the vicious entity, given that it can occur only in a nature which God has created out of nothing and not begotten from Himself. Therefore the ability of man to commit sin follows from his being created out of nothing.1 Reading these passages hereby referred to one may immediately notice that the church father removes the perverted will from created nature or substance of man. The latter is made by God, the former comes exclusively from the human being as created out of nothing. Therefore, as entities of a particular nature, to be sure, we are creatures of God, receiving from Him all the good we have. On the other hand, the vice, however, is peculiar to us. As we can read in a famous passage of book 5 of the same work, ‘as God is the creator of 1 Civ. 14, 11; 14, 13, 1. See L.N.J. Torchia, ‘Implications of the Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo in St. Augustine’s Theology’, SP 33 (1997), 266-73, esp. 271.

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all natures, so also is He the bestower of all powers, not of all wills; for wicked decisions are not from Him, being contrary to nature, which is from Him’.2 Augustine considers sin as both defect and defection in several other writings, including On the immortality of the Soul, On the Free choice of the will, On Continence.3 He expounds that turning away from God by its perverted will the soul suffers a defect in terms of being. This defect, being a privation of form (in the neo-platonic sense of the word)4 tending towards but never quite attaining nothing, also tends from wisdom to folly, from virtue to depravity. This neo-platonic type of thinking might have inspired its own completion with the idea that the source of our capacity to commit a sin is our being created out of nothing. Nevertheless, the latter idea owes a lot to Augustine’s increasing insistence on the anthropological consequences of the Fall. The vice, thus, as indicated, is somehow connected to the nature of the sinner. It can not however belong to the nature of the sinner, given that all created substances, that is, all natures are good.5 In book 12 of the City of God, Augustine claims that there is no nature to be opposed to God, whereas human vice, being evil, is certainly opposed to Him, who is the supreme good.6 From all this follows, so at least as it seems to me, the paradoxical idea that what can be regarded in the human being as the feature most peculiarly human, is outside the nature of man. It is this outside-of its own nature character of the human being that I refer to in the title of my article as the nothingness of man. We can draw parallels between the passages so far referred to and the famous story about the theft of a pear in the Confessions. In these chapters, inviting the reader to associate to the story of the Fall, Augustine qualifies this sin of his youth as a defection and defect (defectus) in terms of being. He argues that the object of his perverted love was not the fruit itself, neither the end his defect tended toward. The latter, we can guess, is nothing else, than nothing.7 Later he affirms that the theft itself is not ‘something’ (aliquid) and does not have any quiddity (species).8 This means, as it seems to me, that sin, even though it is not nothing, is very close to being nothing. After adding that that he was motivated to commit this sin not only by the charm of the sin itself but by the attraction of the complicity with his fellows (consortium peccati), the author, as I interpret him, concludes his argumentation by playing with the phrase nihil aliud. First he affirms: at that moment he did not love anything else 2

Civ. 5, 9. Immort. an. 7, 12; lib. arb. 2, 17, 46; 2, 20, 54; cont. 4, 10. 4 See Plotinus, Enn. V. 1, 1; IV. 8, 4. 5 See civ. 12, 2. 6 Civ. 12, 3: Natura igitur contraria non est Deo, sed vitium quia malum est, contrarium est bono. Quis autem neget Deum summe bonum? Vitium ergo contrarium est Deo, tamquam malum bono. 7 Conf. 2, 4, 9: … defectum ipsum amavi… 8 Conf. 6, 12. 3

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(nihil aliud) except the theft itself. Then he corrects himself and admits that he loved, as a matter of fact, the complicity with his fellows as well. ‘It is not true that I loved nothing else except the theft [Non ergo nihil aliud quam furtum amavi]’ – he concludes –. ‘Rather I loved an other nothing [that is, the complicity], for the theft itself is a nothing as well [immo vero nihil aliud, quia et illud nihil est]’.9 As we could see previously, Augustine made a clear distinction between the defect and the end toward which it tends. Further, it is hard to admit the plurality of nothing. Therefore, the proposition I just quoted is hard to be taken literally. This means that sin, the product of a capacity which originates from our being created out of nothing, can be qualified if not as nothing but a movement which bears and displays the legacy of our humble origin. Let us now examine what Augustine means by saying that man is created by God out of nothing and what he means by saying that this fact is the ultimate cause of our capacity to sin. According to Augustine’s Incomplete work against Julian, Julian of Eclanum reads Augustine’s position as if the bishop of Hippo had claimed that ’nothing’ had a coercive power for the bad will to arise. This reading leads Julian to identify Augustine’s nothing with the Darkness of the Manicheans.10 He likewise blames Augustine for contradicting his own definition of the will as a function of the soul, which is not compelled by anything.11 Julian also criticizes Augustine for dividing the free choice of the will, an element of our createdness in the image of God, into two capacities: one to use the will properly, and another to use it improperly. As a response to this strand of criticism, Augustine denies that from the fact that thing A originates from thing B it necessarily follows that thing B compels thing A to arise.12 He first makes it clear that he is not concerned with the cause of sin but rather with the cause of the capacity to sin, and second, that he traces even this capacity back not to ‘nothing’ itself as its cause, but to the primordial fact that man was created out of nothing. The controversy between Augustine and Julian highlights the anthropological stake of the question concerning creation out of nothing. Augustine does indeed claim that there are two separate faculties to use the will, and traces each back to a different aspect of the event of creation, one to 9 Conf. 2, 8, 16: Quem fructum habui miser aliquando in his, quae nunc recolens erubesco, maxime in illo furto, in quo ipsum furtum amavi, nihil aliud, cum et ipsum esset nihil et eo ipso ego miserior? Et tamen solus id non fecissem (sic recordor animum tunc meum) solus omnino id non fecissem. Ergo amavi ibi etiam consortium eorum, cum quibus id feci. Non ergo nihil aliud quam furtum amavi; immo vero nihil aliud, quia et illud nihil est. As it seems to me, Augustine’s linguistic proceeding is similar to that of Heidegger in his Was ist Metaphysik?, criticized by Rudolf Carnap in his ‘Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache’, Erkenntnis 2 (1932), 60-81. 10 C. Iul. imp. 5, 42. 11 C. Iul. imp. 5, 40-1. 12 C. Iul. imp. 5, 42.

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the ‘by whom’ aspect, the other to the ‘out of which’ aspect. The faculty to use the will properly is due to the fact that man is created by God, whereas the faculty to use the will improperly originates from the fact that man was created out of nothing. For Julian, as I mentioned, it perfectly behoves God’s goodness to bestow freedom of choice upon the first couple, regardless of the risk. Augustine, in contrast, in his attempt to shift the responsibility from God to man, considers it necessary to trace the faculty to commit the original sin back to the material side of creation. To my mind, it would have been much easier to reach his goal had he been a Manichean as Julian supposed him to be and if he had conceived of a nothing which may compel evil will to arise in the human being. Debating with Julian, Augustine also points out that in this context man’s having been created out of nothing has a double implication. First, it implies that man’s existence has no other cause than God, since God needs nothing to create him, man therefore remains exclusively dependent upon God. Second, and more importantly, having been created out of nothing implies that the human being has not come into being from God, either in the sense of having been begotten by God, like the Son, or of proceeding from God, like the Holy Spirit.13 Which means that man has not the same nature as God has. The most important element of this substantial difference is that the human being, in contrast to God, is changeable. As a part of his response to Julian’s objection that, if the capacity to sin does indeed originate in our being created out of nothing, why then human beings are the only ones capable of committing sin. Augustine argues that in man as a rational being the capacity to change manifests itself, among other things, in the corruption of the will.14 Augustine sometimes traces this element back to the distance between man and God in the great chain of beings: only God exists in the proper sense of the term, all other beings only participate in His existence on a lower or higher level.15 On other occasions he also highlights the contrast between the perfect goodness of God with the relative goodness of man as an important component of the radical difference between the divine and the human nature. That is why God is capable of making something good from the evil works of Satan and from those of man, unlike man, who makes bad from the good works of God.16 In the treatise on the Nature of the good Augustine accounts for this radical difference between human and divine nature in legal terms. According to his argumentation it simply would not have been just for God to make what he had created out of nothing equal to what he had begotten from Himself.17 According to N.J. Torchia 13

Nupt. et concup. 28, 48; 2, 29, 50. C. Iul imp. 5, 39. 15 Conf. 11, 17; civ. 12, 12; nat. b. 1, 10. See L.N.J. Torchia, ‘Implications of the Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo’ (1997), 270. 16 Nupt. et concup. 2, 28, 48. 17 De natura boni 1. 14

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Augustine’s theory on the absolute dependence of man upon divine Grace is based on his doctrine of creation.18 To some extent I would take issue with this proposition. On the one hand, by the time Augustine’s doctrine of creation assumed its final form, his teaching of grace had also considerably changed. On the other hand, the radicalization of Augustine’s doctrine of grace was primarily due to his reflection on the epistles of Paul. I would rather say that in the course of time Augustine tended to draw more and more far reaching conclusions from the fact of man’s being created out of nothing. 2. The contrast of the divine and the human A passage in Sermon 32, probably dating from 401, treats this second theme as a conclusion of the first one. Here, Augustine concludes from his paradoxical view mentioned earlier, namely that the really distinctive characteristic of the human being, the capacity to commit sin, is outside the limits of his very nature in the proper sense of the word, that what particularly belongs to man (proprium), is sin. Apart from sin everything else in man belongs to God (Dei est).19 As early as in his first Commentary on the Book of Genesis (388-389) Augustine draws a sharp distinction between what belongs to us, human beings, and what belongs to God. He claims that the first sin of man lay in deciding what is right and what is wrong by his own deliberation (utentes propria providentia) rather than following the divine illumination within his mind (illius interno lumine). According to the church father’s interpretation, after eating the fruit of the forbidden tree the first couple was displeased with its own simplicity (simplicitas), that is, with the fact that it had nothing which belonged exclusively to itself (proprium). Augustine regards the nakedness, which Adam wanted to hide after the Fall, as the symbol of this simplicity.20 In his commentary on Psalm 91:6 (around 412) he declares that all lying comes from ourselves, whereas all of our true words and thoughts originate from God, given that God is the Truth and that one can not tell or think anything true but by participating in the Truth.21 The commentary on Psalm 131 supplements the premise missing here that the turning away from Truth is voluntary.22 In book 14 of the City of God the bishop of Hippo, transforming the terms of the Epistle to the Romans 8:13-5 makes the distinction between two ways of life: one according to God and one according to oneself, or as he also puts it: 18

L.N.J. Torchia, ‘Implications of the Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo’ (1997), 271-2. Sermo 32, 10: Quaere quid sit hominis proprium, peccatum invenies. Quaere quid sit hominis proprium, mendacium invenies. Tolle peccatum, et quidquid consideraveris in homine, Dei est. Non ergo amet homo quod proprium est. 20 Gn. c. Man. 2, 15, 22. 21 Enarr. ps. 91, 6. 22 Enarr. ps. 131, 6. 19

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according to man (secundum Deum vivere - secundum se ipsum / hominem / vivere). For man living according to oneself means realizing one’s own will rather than the will of God.23 Augustine identifies this way of life with lying in the broadest sense of the word, that is to say, with speaking – either with the bodily mouth or with the mouth of the heart – from his own and not from what belongs to God He goes as far as to say that as from God nothing can come but truth, from man nothing can come but lying.24. The opposition between human and divine plays an important role in Augustine’s theory of the so-called inner word as well. The church father defines the inner word as a kind of thinking (cogitatio) given form and shaped by knowledge (scientia, notitia).25 An inner word is true when it bears as great a likeness as possible to what one knows, or, in other words, when it contains everything that knowledge contains and does not contain anything that knowledge does not contain, that is to say, nothing which is its own.26 Our inner word should get the closest possible to the likeness between the Son and the Father, given that the Divine Word speaks nothing from his own resources, but he derives all his speech from the Father as his source. The knowing subject who forms a false inner-word is to be regarded as the imitator of the Devil, described in the Gospel of John 8:44, a passage our author interpreted time and time again, as a liar who speaks of his own resources (Cum loquitur mendacium, ex propriis loquitur…).27 The human and the divine are contrasted in a similar way in the treatise Against lying. Here Augustine, qualifies the so-called white lie as a sin, given that it contradicts a divine commandment. On the other hand, he does not deny that feeling inclined to lie for the good of somebody else is something absolutely human. What he actually maintains is that it is a temptation peculiar to the fallen human nature to tell a lie when by doing so one may hope to save somebody from greater harm. He claims that a believer is only momentaneously capable of elevating his spiritual glance to the contemplation of the intelligible truth, and can glimpse, if only for a fleeting moment how it is justified to tell the truth even under such circumstances. But after this moment of insight he is bound to fall back on the human perspective again. This suggests that the word human carries in this context a morally ambivalent and a theologically negative meaning.

23

Enarr. ps. 41, 12. Civ. 14, 4, 1. See also conf. 4, 10, tract. Iov. ev. 25, 16, 2; Sermo 96, 2. 25 Trin. 8, 5, 7; 14, 7, 10; 15, 10, 19; 15, 12, 21; 15, 15, 25. 26 Trin. 15, 10, 19: Necesse est enim cum verum loquimur, id est, quod scimus loquimur, ex ipsa scientia quam memoria tenemus, nascatur verbum quod eiusmodi sit omnino, cuiusmodi est illa scientia de qua nascitur; 15, 11, 20: Quando ergo quod in notitia est, hoc est in verbo, tunc est verum verbum, et veritas, qualis exspectatur ab homine, ut quod est in ista, hoc sit et in illo; quod non est in ista, non sit et in illo. 27 Io. ev. tr. 42, 11-2; See also civ. 11, 13, 5. 24

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Augustine, thus, sharply contrasts the human and the divine both in the moral and the epistemological sense. In book 14 of the City of God we can find that he expresses his low esteem for everything human by sarcastically saying that as a punishment of the first couple’s intention to primarily please themselves rather than God, God ‘gave man over to himself’ (sibi donaretur; donatus est sibi).28 The antagonism between self-love and love of God can be regarded as an aspect of the opposition of the human and the divine in Augustine’s works at large. As O’Donovan and Markus have pointed out, Augustine did constantly consider the love for God as the most rational kind of self-love for a while, but at a certain point of his career he came to lay greater accent on the opposition between them.29 O’Donovan also noticed that from the years around 400 on, in the context of the relationship between God and man, Augustine tends to use the possessive and the reflexive pronouns in a derogatory sense.30 Finally, let me say a few words about the relationship between two distinctions, the one between the human and the divine, and another one also crucial in Augustine’ writings, namely the opposition between private and common things. This topic has been examined with great scrutiny by several scholars.31 According to Augustine’s terminology, private things are those which can be acquired only in zero-sum games, through jealous competition. On the other hand, the so-called common things include those the acquisition and possession of which necessarily issue from win-win situations and friendly cooperation. All sensible and changeable things belong to the private category, whereas intelligible things, like the objects of mathematics and, eminently, God, constitute the realm of common things. As we could see earlier, Augustine often refers to 28

Civ. 14, 15; 14, 24, 1. E.g. in Sermo 32, 10: Quaere quid sit hominis proprium, peccatum invenies. Quaere quid sit hominis proprium, mendacium invenies. Tolle peccatum, et quidquid consideraveris in homine, Dei est. Non ergo amet homo quod proprium est. See also Enarr. ps. 131, 6: Securus opta amicitiam Christi: hospitari apud te vult; fac illi locum. Quid est, fac illi locum? Noli amare teipsum, illum ama. Si te amaveris, claudis contra illum; si ipsum amaveris, aperis illi: si autem aperueris et intraverit, non peries amando te, sed invenieris cum amante te. See Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine (New Haven, London, 1980), 99-100; Robert A. Markus, ‘De civitate dei: Augustine on Pride and the Common Good’, in Fr. van Fleteren and J.C. Schnaubelt (eds), Augustine: ‘Second Founder of the Faith’ (New York a.o., 1990), 245-59, esp. 248-52. 30 O. O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine (1981), 104. 31 See especially Luc Verheijen, ‘Comme des amants de la beauté spirituelle dans les œuvres du jeun Augustin’, in id., Nouvelle approche de la Règle de saint Augustin. 2. Chemin vers la vie heureuse (Louvain, 1988), 194-219 (= Augustiniana 33 [1983], 86-111), esp. 204-6; id., ‘La charité ne cherche pas ses propres intérêts’, in id., Nouvelle approche de la Règle de saint Augustin (1988), 220-89 (= Augustiniana 34 [1984], 94-100), esp. 225; Goulven Madec, ‘Le communisme spirituel’, in Cornelius Petrus Mayer (ed.), Homo spiritualis. Festgabe für Luc Verheijen zu seinem 70. Geburtstag (Würzburg, 1987), 225-39; N. Joseph Torchia, ‘The Commune/Proprium Distinction in St Augustine’s Early Moral Theology’, SP 22 (1989), 356-63; R.A. Markus, ‘De civitate dei’ (1990), 250-4; Raymond Canning, ‘St. Augustine’s Vocabulary of the Common Good and the Place of Love for Neighbour’, SP 33 (1997), 48-54. 29

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what belongs to man by using the suus reflexive possessive pronoun and the se reflexive pronoun. By this way of speaking he indicates that what is peculiar to man rather than originating from God, has a necessarily individual character. In other words, the trait which characterizes human beings most distinctively in contrast to God, also, by the same token, isolates one individual man from the other. On the other hand, Augustine holds that only what we have received from God by participation can be really common and constitutes a real community between man and his fellow-men. The interference of these two oppositions is quite clear in a passage of Augustine’s commentary on Psalm 103, where, in the context of lying as speaking from one’s own resources, Augustine sets this kind of speech against ‘speaking from what is public’ (loqui de medio). Using this phrase he does not contradict his more usual definition of truthfulness as speaking from the resources of God. As we could see, for Augustine, Truth, which is God himself, is accessible to all of us, and lying is but to willingly turn away from that truth.32 The two oppositions are clearly overlapping in a famous passage of the treatise on the Trinity.33 According to this text, pride, the root of all other sins, eminently lies in the unwillingness of the soul to accept its creaturely condition and in its consequent reluctance to settle for what the universal law allots to it as its common gift. Contrariwise, rejoicing in its own power the soul intends to operate on what is, or seems to be, exclusively its own (aliquid proprium … agere nititur). In a similar train of thought, in Question 79 of the work on Eighty-three Different Questions he suggests that the love for God is primarily the love for the universal law itself, and that, consequently, the love for God implies the love for the very principle of sharing and collaboration.34 In book 11 of his running commentary of Genesis the church father expounds that both in the case of the Devil and in that of human beings the desire for excellence manifests itself first in one’s relationship with God, and only then, as a consequence, in one’s relationship with one’s fellow human beings.35 One’s love for oneself and for what belongs to oneself first overcomes the love for God, and then, as a consequence, may even destroy the love for one’s neighbour.36 This means that he who will please himself rather than God, will also inevitably prefer private things to common ones. Historically, it is more or less at the same time that these two oppositions first emerged in the works of the church-father, but in the course of time, as it is obvious from the texts here referred to, the private-common opposition comes to be subsumed under the more general distinction between the human and the divine.

32 33 34 35 36

Enarr. ps. 103. s. 2, 11. Trin. 12, 9, 14. Div. qu. 79, 1. Gn. litt. 1, 14, 18 - 15, 19. Gn. litt. 11, 14, 18.

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Conclusion Augustine regards man’s capacity to commit sin not as a result of man’s having been created by the all-good God, but rather as a consequence of his having been created out of nothing by his creator. As I have tried to point out, for Augustine man’s ability to voluntarily turn away from God and towards himself and temporal things has always resided in him without being a part of his creaturely nature, given that man as a substantive entity (natura) exists only in so far as he reflects the divine forms and the divine volition. Consequently, the bishop of Hippo teaches us in a paradoxical way that what can be regarded in the human being as the feature most distinctively human beyond the divine gift of his nature, is outside the nature of man in the strict sense of the word nature. Further, Augustin brakes away from the traditional anthropological position defended by Julian to the effect that the free choice of the will is a divine gift and an element of man’s creaturely nature in the image of God, regardless of the cost of this freedom. He therefore considers separately the capacity to decide properly and the capacity to decide improperly, tracing the former back to the agent, the latter to the matter of the act of creation. The real meaning of the creation of man out of nothing is double for our author: it first implies man’s exclusive dependence upon God, and second, the radical difference of nature between man and God. From these reflexions on the legacy of man’s being created out of nothing results Augustine’s strong inclination to qualify what is really human, including ‘humanistic’ moral reflection, as opposed to what eminently pertains to God. This derogatory understanding of what merely belongs to man applies not only to Augustine’s moral theology, including his theory of lying, but also to his epistemology, including his theory of the inner word.

The Intermediary of Light in Augustine’s Theory of Vision and Divine Illumination Amanda KNIGHT, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

ABSTRACT Scholars remain divided over the interpretation of Augustine’s metaphorical schema of divine illumination, the pivotal question being whether Augustine means that God merely establishes conditions in which the mind can acquire knowledge or whether he means also that God bestows mental content – something like a theory of innate ideas. This article argues that divine illumination entails mental content for Augustine on the basis of an analogy between the role of two lights in Augustine’s conception of illumination and the role of two lights in his theory of vision. The analogy suggests that rationality functions as an intermediary, and that in the following way: like the internal light of the eyes which mediates between the incorporeal soul and the corporeal sensibles it encounters by bearing a likeness to both, rationality mediates between the mutable mind and the immutable truth by mutably possessing innate notions patterned after the eternal reasons.

The scholarly controversy over how to interpret Augustine on divine illumination – which refers to his construal of both God and the mind as lights – has a long history, and entire books have been written to simply review that scholarship and provide categories of interpretation in the hope of streamlining it.1 The pivotal interpretive question which continues to divide contemporary scholars is whether, by his account of illumination, Augustine means that God merely establishes conditions in which the mind can acquire knowledge or whether he means also that God bestows mental content – something like a theory of innate ideas. In the present paper, I will argue in favor of the latter – that divine illumination for Augustine entails mental content. I will do so by appealing to an analogy between the metaphorical schema we call Augustine’s theory of divine illumination and his theory of sense-perception, specifically vision. In short, my argument is that, in Augustine’s account of illumination, 1 For reviews of and attempts to categorize past scholarship, see Dominique Doucet, ‘La problématique de la lumière chez Augustin’, Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique 100 (1999), 31-58; Ronald H. Nash, The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Lexington, 1969), 95-123; C.E. Schuetzinger, The German Controversy on Saint Augustine’s Illumination Theory (New York, 1960).

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the power of thought that results in knowledge, or ‘rationality’, for short, occupies a role analogous to that of the pneumatic light of the eyes in Augustine’s understanding of sense-perception. This analogous relationship suggests that rationality functions as an intermediary, which is in turn suggestive of its nature. Specifically, like the internal light of the eyes which mediates between the incorporeal soul and the corporeal sensibles it encounters by bearing a likeness to both, rationality mediates between the mutable mind and the immutable truth by mutably possessing innate notions patterned after the eternal reasons. This interpretation is not new. Ronald Nash argued for it in his 1969 monograph, and he also argued on the basis of Augustine’s likening the mind to a light, derived from the divine light.2 This article supports both Nash’s position and the impulse of his argument, though my appeal to the analogous relationship between rationality and the pneumatic light of the eyes as intermediaries is, as far as I know, a new argument. In what follows, I’ll begin with an explanation of Augustine’s theory of vision, showing how the pneumatic light of the eyes mediates between corporeal sensibles and the incorporeal soul, and then turn to Augustine’s account of illumination to demonstrate the analogous relationship between rationality and the pneumatic light of the eyes. Concerning sense-perception, Augustine indicates in several places that, due to the axiom that like perceives like, the incorporeal soul cannot perceive something corporeal without the aid of a corporeal tool, which is the sense organ.3 The sense-organ therefore functions as a mediating mechanism between the incorporeal soul and corporeal sensibles, and this mediation is possible specifically by the pneumatic material that animates each sense-organ, as Augustine’s 2

That monograph is: R.H. Nash, The Light of the Mind (1969). Augustine indicates his assumption of the premise that an incorporeal substance cannot per se perceive a corporeal substance and vice versa throughout his corpus. Speaking about incorporeal objects like true lines and points (as in mathematics), he writes in the early work, an. quant. 13.22, for example: ‘If corporeal things are seen by means of the eyes of the body, in accordance with certain marvelous affinity of natures, should not the soul by which we see these incorporeal things be itself neither a body nor in any way like a body?’ (FC 2, 83; CSEL 89, 157) Assuming that corporeal eyes are required for seeing corporeal things, which assumes the need for like natures, Augustine is able to argue that, if the soul is able to see incorporeal things, the soul must be incorporeal. Augustine affirms the same idea in his mature work, Gn. litt. 12.4.13 (WSA I/13, 469; CSEL 28.1, 385-6): ‘After all, it is obvious that a thing of a non-bodily nature (incorpoream naturam) could not have been seen by him through the body (per corpus). As for bodies though, even if they can be seen without the body (sine corpore), they are certainly not thus seen by means of the body but in a manner that is very, very dissimilar – if indeed there is such a manner’. Again, incorporeal things, like the objects of Paul’s enraptured vision, cannot be seen by means of a body. While Augustine considers the possibility that corporeal things may be seen without the use of a body, he expresses significant doubt over this possibility. Thus Augustine often calls the sense-organ the ‘instrument’ of the soul (examples include trin. 11.2.2; Gn. litt. 7.18.24), and Plotinus offers a clear parallel for this language and general argument in Enn. IV.4.23. See Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine (New York, 1988), 56; R.H. Nash, The Light of the Mind (1969), 53. 3

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theory of sense-perception, and specifically sight, makes clear. On the one hand, Augustine says that this pneumatic substance, though it is corporeal, is most like the soul because it is the most rarified corporeal substance.4 Yet, on the other hand, it also assumes different properties depending on which senseorgan it animates: in De musica, Augustine describes it as ‘something having to do with light in the eyes, something having to do with a very clear and quick air in ears, something misty in the nostrils, something humid in the mouth, and something earthy and almost muddy say in the touch’.5 In this way. the substance by which the soul animates the sense-organ bears a likeness both to the incorporeal soul and to various sensibles. For vision to take place, the soul must cast forth this pneumatic material, which is again like light in the eyes, in a diffusion of rays which ‘touch’ the objects of vision, so to speak, ‘as with a rod’.6 Vision thus operates by touching or having direct contact with sensibles. Augustine makes clear in Gn. litt. 1.16.31, however, that pneumatic light can only touch sensibles that are already illuminated by an external light,7 which suggests his presumption of a basic version of Plato’s theory of vision, in which the light of the eyes coalesces with external light when forming a corporeal stream to touch objects of vision.8 That pneumatic light must always be assisted by an external light and so can only touch illuminated sensibles means that, to be more precise, pneumatic light always touches or mediates corporeal light, by means of which it mediates illuminated sensibles. Altogether, then, according to Augustine’s theory, we have an apprehending subject, the incorporeal soul; an object to be apprehended, some corporeal sensible; and two lights that enable this process of apprehension. A supreme corporeal light illuminates the object, and another light mediates between the incorporeal soul and the illuminated sensible, allowing contact between them, by bringing together the properties of each that are otherwise incommensurate. 4

See Gn. litt. 7.15.21. Mus. 6.5.10 (FC 2, 336; CSEL 102, 201): Agit porro, ut opinor, luminosum aliquid in oculis, aerium serenissimum et mobilissimum in auribus, caliginosum in naribus, in ore humidum, in tactu terreum et quasi lutulentum. 6 An. quant. 23.44 (FC 2, 108; CSEL 89, 186). See also mus. 6.8.21; conf. 10.5.9, Gn. litt. 12.16.32, and trin. 9.3.3. For more on this ray-theory of vision, see D. Hahm, ‘Early Hellenistic theories of vision and the perception of color’, in P. Machamer and R. Turnbull (eds), Studies in Perception (Columbus, 1978), 60-95. 7 Gn. litt. 1.16.31 (WSA I/13, 182; CSEL 28.1, 23): ‘But still, the light which is in the sense of the seeing subject is so slight, we are informed, that unless it was assisted by the light outside, we would be able to see nothing; and since it cannot be distinguished from that external light, it is hard, as I said, to find an example by which the emission of light into day and its contraction into night could be demonstrated’ (Sed tamen ea lux quae in sensu uidentis est, tam exigua docetur, ut nisi adiuuemur extranea luce, nihil uidere possimus; et quoniam discerni ab ea non potest, quo exemplo demonstrari possit emissio in diem, et contractio lucis in noctem, sicut dixi, reperire difficile est). 8 For Plato on vision, see Tim. 45b-d, see D. Hahm, ‘Early Hellenistic theories’ (1978), 71. 5

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Augustine’s metaphorical schema of divine illumination operates analogously. First, God is the supreme, external light that illumines all things and makes them knowable. Augustine writes, for example, in the Soliloquiorum that ‘The mind has, as it were, eyes of its own, analogous to the soul’s senses. The certain truths of science are analogous to the objects which the sun’s rays make visible, such as the earth and earthly things. And it is God himself who illumines all’.9 In other words, God makes it possible for scientific truths – by which Augustine means truths about the created order – to be known in the same way that the sun makes it possible for things to be seen.10 To be more specific, the eternal reasons in the mind of God function as this external light that makes all things knowable. So much is clear in Augustine’s mature work on Genesis, in which he specifically identifies the Son as the divine light, calling him ‘the unchangeable light of Wisdom, the Word of God’.11 His later description of angelic knowledge indicates that the Son functions as the divine light inasmuch as the Son contains the eternal reasons according to which all things were created, and the eternal reasons make the created order intelligible. Augustine writes that the angels can either know creation by looking upon the Word, in whom are the eternal reasons, or by looking upon the created order itself, illumined by the Word: For this reason, since the holy angels with whom we shall be equated after the resurrection, if we keep to the way (which Christ has become for us, right to the end), always see the face of God, and enjoy the Word of God, his only begotten Son in his equality with the Father, and since in them wisdom was created first of all things, there can be no doubt that they have first come to know the universal creation, in which they themselves 9 Sol. 1.6.12 (LCC 6, 30; CSEL 89, 19): Nam mentis quasi sui sunt oculi sensus animae; disciplinarum autem quaeque certissima talia sunt, qualia illa quae sole illustrantur, ut uideri possint, ueluti terra est atque terrena omnia: Deus autem est ipse qui illustrat. See also Plato’s analogy of the sun in Rep. 6.507b-509c. 10 Augustine describes scientific knowledge in this way trin. 14.8.11 (FC 45, 426-7; CChr.SL 50a, 436-7): ‘What is learned from science (unde quae sciuntur) is, as it were, adventitious to the mind, and was either brought in to it in historical knowledge, as are deeds and words which are performed in time and pass away, or are established in the nature of things in their own places and regions, or whether they arise in the man himself, since they were not there previously, either through the teaching of others or through his own reflections, such as the faith which we commended at length in the thirteenth book, or as the virtues by which, if they are genuine, we, therefore, live well in this mortality in order that we may live blessedly in that immortality that is divinely promised’ (nec sicut fiebat uel apparebat, quando de illa scientia disserebamus, iam in hominis interioris operibus constituta, quae distinguenda fuit a sapientia]; unde quae sciuntur uelut aduenticia sunt in animo, siue cognitione historica inlata ut sunt facta et dicta quae tempore peraguntur et transeunt uel in natura rerum suis locis et regionibus constituta sunt, siue in ipso homine quae non erant oriuntur aut aliis docentibus aut cogitationibus propriis sicut fides quam plurimum in libro tertio decimo commendauimus, sicut uirtutes quibus si uerae sunt in hac mortalitate ideo bene uiuitur ut beate in illa quae diuinitus promittitur immortalitate uiuatur). 11 Gn. litt. 1.5.10 (WSA I/13, 172; CSEL 28.1, 9): incommutabile lumen sapientiae, uerbum dei.

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were the first to be established, in the Word of God himself, in whom are the eternal ideas (aeternae rationes) even of things which were made in time, as in the one though whom all things were made. Only after that do they know creation in itself (in ipsa creatura), by glancing down below (infra despicientes), as it were, and then referring it to the praise of the one in whose unchangeable Truth they originally see the ideas (rationes) according to which it was made. So then they see it there as it were in daylight ... while here they see it as if in the evening twilight (Ibi ergo tanquam per diem ... hic autem tanquam per uesperam); but then straightaway morning is made (this can be observed in all six days) because angelic knowledge (angelica scientia) does not linger in what has been created without straightaway referring it to the praise and love of the one in whom it is known ... by staying in this Truth it is day (in qua ueritate stando dies est).12

Augustine’s use of light in this description is telling: he asserts that the angels can know the created order by looking upon the eternal ideas in the Word, and that this apprehension is like seeing in daylight. Thus he implies that the source of light is comprised by those eternal reasons. Further, by asserting that the angels can also know the created order by looking down at it, resulting in ‘dim’ knowledge, Augustine implies that the divine light of the Word illumines the creation below.13 Augustine’s schema of illumination also offers a second, internal light, analogous to the pneumatic light of the eyes, in the power of rationality itself. This second light is clear in contra Faustum, as Augustine contrasts it with the divine light. He writes, State if you can, then, what sort of light this act of thinking is by which we know with trustworthy clarity that all those things, which are not this light, are distinguished from one another and by which we know how much they differ from it. And yet even this light is not the light which is God, for this light is a creature, whereas that light is the creator. This light was made, whereas that light is its maker. This light, finally, is mutable, since it wills what it used not to will and knows what it used not to know and 12 Gn. litt. 4.24.41 (WSA I/13, 265; CSEL 28.1, 123-4): Quapropter cum sancti angeli, quibus post resurrectionem coaequabimur, si uiam (quod nobis christus factus est) usque in finem tenuerimus, semper uideant faciem dei, uerboque eius unigenito filio sicut patri aequalis est perfruantur, in quibus prima omnium creata est sapientia; procul dubio uniuersam creaturam, in qua ipsi sunt principaliter conditi, in ipso uerbo dei prius nouerunt, in quo sunt omnium, etiam quae temporaliter facta sunt, aeternae rationes, tanquam in eo per quod facta sunt omnia: ac deinde in ipsa creatura, quam sic nouerunt tanquam infra despicientes, eamque referentes ad illius laudem, in cuius incommutabili ueritate rationes secundum quas facta est, principaliter uident. Ibi ergo tanquam per diem … hic autem tanquam per uesperam: sed continuo fit mane (quod in omnibus sex diebus animaduerti potest), quia non remanet angelica scientia in eo quod creatum est, quin hoc continuo referat ad ejus laudem atque charitatem … cognoscitur; in qua ueritate stando dies est. 13 The interchangeability in Augustine’s corpus between divine light and immutable truth, as well as the immutable truth and the eternal reasons, also operates on the basis of this equivalence between the divine light and the eternal reasons. For a clear example of Augustine’s identification of divine light and truth, see conf. IV.15.24; VII.10.16. For the divine reasons as constitutive of truth, see diu. qu. 46.

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remembers what was forgotten, but that light remains with an immutable will, truth, and eternity...14

In other words, the act of thinking by which we come to have certain knowledge is itself also a light distinguishable from the divine light insofar as it is created and therefore mutable, unlike God. In addition, just as the pneumatic light of the eyes is capable of contact with corporeal objects, the light that is rationality is capable of contact with intelligible objects. Augustine makes this point in De trinitate: The conclusion we should rather draw is that the nature of the intellectual mind has been so established by the disposition of its Creator that it is subjoined to intelligible things in the order of nature, and so it sees such truths in a kind of non-bodily light that is of its own kind, just as our eyes of flesh see all these things that lie around us in this bodily light, a light they were created to be receptive of and to match.15

Addressing the problem of learning as proposed in Plato’s Meno, Augustine’s explanation is that rational minds can apprehend an intelligible object, by which Augustine means some scientific truth, because the rational mind can see these intelligible objects by means of its own light. Augustine explicitly compares this operation to that of physical eyes, which can see things illuminated by corporeal light by virtue of possessing some congruence to that light. By the notion of congruence, Augustine has in mind the eye’s pneumatic light which touches illuminated corporeal sensibles. This premise is evident in his appeal to the idea of contact, which is inherent in his language of the mind’s being ‘subjoined’ to intelligible things. The point is that both corporeal eyes and the mind can see their respective objects by their ability to touch them via a certain kind of light. So far, then, in Augustine’s schema of illumination, we have both a supreme, external light, comprised by the eternal reasons, and an internal light, the power of rationality, which is capable of contact with intelligible objects. To continue with the analogy, as in the case of physical vision, we also have incommensurate properties between the apprehending subject and object to be apprehended that require a mediating mechanism. As Augustine often points 14 C. faust. 20.7 (WSA I/20, 265-6; CSEL 25.1, 541-2) : quae cogitatio dicite, si potestis, quale lumen sit, quo illa omnia quae hoc non sunt, et inter se discernuntur, et quantum ab hoc distent, fida manifestatione cognoscitur: et tamen etiam hoc lumen, non est lumen illud quod Deus est; hoc enim creatura est, creator est ille; hoc factum, ille qui fecit; hoc denique mutabile, dum uult quod nolebat, et scit quod nesciebat, et reminiscitur quod oblitum erat, illud autem incommutabili uoluntate, ueritate, aeternitate persistit… See also ep. 120.2.11. 15 Trin. 12.15.24 (WSA I/5, 336; CChr.SL 50, 378): Sed potius credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam, ut rebus intelligibilibus naturali ordine, disponente Conditore, subiuncta sic ista uideat in quadam luce sui generis incorporea, quemadmodum oculus carnis uidet quae in hac corporea luce circumadiacent, cuius lucis capax eique congruens est creatus.

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out, truth is immutable, but the human mind is mutable. Augustine assumes that this creates a problem for contact between the two: how can a mutable mind have access to immutable truth? Augustine answers this question again in De trinitate like this: It is the province of the superior reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal reasons which, if they were not above the human mind, would certainly not be unchangeable; and yet unless something of our own were subjoined to them, we should not be able to employ them as standards by which to judge of corporeal things. But we judge of corporeal things according to the standard of dimensions and figures which, as the mind knows, remain unchangeable.16

When Augustine speaks of evaluating corporeal things, he asserts that human minds do in fact somehow apprehend immutable truth. His explanation is that there is something that belongs to the human mind which can also touch immutable truth. This something is the light internal to the mind, as the passage cited just before shows.17 And this light that belongs to the mind is the power of thinking or rationality itself, as the passage from contra Faustum shows. Taken together, then, rationality is that which mediates between substances whose properties are incommensurate, the mutable mind and the immutable truth. In this way, rationality functions in an analogous manner to the pneumatic light of the eyes. I will turn now to the significance of this analogous relationship which is also the question with which I began – again, whether Augustine intends his account of illumination, specifically the internal light of the mind, to mean that the mind possesses innate mental content. In answering this question, we should note that, aside from the analogy I have discussed, the evidence that Augustine accepts a theory of innate ideas is plentiful. He variously mentions notions like the good,18 happiness,19 beauty,20 or unity21 having been somehow ‘impressed’ upon the human mind,22 and he moreover associates these innate ideas with ‘light’. For example, commenting on people who cannot help loving truth – which is the happy life – yet are not happy, Augustine says in Confessions, 16

Trin. 12.2.2 (FC 45, 344; CChr.SL 50, 357): Sed sublimioris rationis est iudicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporales et sempiternas: quae nisi supra mentem humanam essent, incommutabiles profecto non essent; atque his nisi subiungeretur aliquid nostrum, non secundum eas possemus iudicare de corporalibus. Iudicamus autem de corporalibus ex ratione dimensionum atque figurarum, quam incommutabiliter manere mens nouit. 17 I.e. trin. 12.15.2. 18 See trin. 8.3.4. See also mag. 12. 19 See conf. 10.23.33. 20 See ciu. d. 8.6. 21 See uer. rel. 31.58. 22 See, again, trin. 8.3.4 (CChr.SL 50, 272): Neque enim in his omnibus bonis, uel quae commemoraui, uel quae alia cernuntur siue cogitantur, diceremus aliud alio melius cum uere iudicamus, nisi esset nobis impressa notio ipsius boni.

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‘Still, there is a vestige of light in such people’.23 That ‘light’, the context suggests, is the innate idea of happiness that even those who are not happy nevertheless have. In another passage in De trinitate, Augustine equates possessing an innate idea of justice, even if one is not just, with the state of being touched by light.24 Although some scholars have argued that such passages ought not be interpreted to mean that the mind possesses innate ideas,25 the analogy between the mind’s light and the eyes’ pneumatic light strongly supports interpreting Augustine’s notion of the mind’s light as possessing innate ideas.26 The analogy shows that rationality is an intermediary after the manner of pneumatic light, which brings together otherwise incommensurate properties of the subject – again, the incorporeal soul – and object – the corporeal light that illumines corporeal sensibles.27 Rationality, therefore, must somehow combine the characteristics of the respective subject and object it mediates, and mutably possessing innate ideas patterned after the eternal reasons fits the bill. One the one hand, the mind’s light is mutable, as Augustine says in contra Faustum, and is in this way like the apprehending subject who is a mutable creature. On the other hand, if rationality has, innately, a system of ideas patterned after the eternal reasons, it is like the divine light that illumines all intelligible objects. To be sure, rationality does not 23

Conf. 10.22.33 (LCL 27, 129; CChr.SL 27, 173): adhuc enim modicum lumen est in homi-

nibus. 24

Trin. 14.15.21. For examples, see Gioia, who follows Gilson in contending that divine illumination merely guarantees the certitude of epistemological judgments (Luigi Gioia, The Theological Epistemology of Augustine’s De Trinitate [Oxford, 2008], 196, 200; and E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy [1988], 81-92). See also Schumacher, who seems to argue that divine illumination only refers to the cognitive ability to engage in abstraction, Lydia Schumacher, Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Chichester, 2011), 36. 26 Augustine also associates illumination with participation in the Word of God, which further supports interpreting rationality as possessing innate concepts patterned after the reasons. He writes in trin. 4.2.4, ‘For this enlightenment (illuminatio) is indeed our participation in the Word, namely, of that life which is the light of men’ (FC 45, 133; CChr.SL 50, 163). For Augustine, participation entails the participant’s possession of some quality that whatever it participates in has by nature, as is clear in passages like mor. 2.4.6 and Gn. litt. inp. 16.57. In other words, the participant has some quality mutably by participating in something that has this quality immutably. Participation in the Word of God, who contains the eternal reasons, could therefore imply possessing, mutably, something like a system of reasons. This view is similar to that of Plotinus, who seems to think that because human minds are images of Intellect, they innately possess derivative forms – i.e. images of the Forms in Intellect – which are used in mundane cognitive activity. Only with the proper training and attention can human minds ascend to the contemplation of Forms in Intellect above them. See Eyjolfur Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, 1988), 126-40 and Plotinus, Enn. IV 3.30. 27 This is how intermediaries operate broadly speaking, as Augustine indicates in his discussion of healing in De trinitate, which must always mediate between the state of health and the effects of some disease. See trin. 4.18.24. 25

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possess the eternal reasons themselves, just as pneumatic light is not exactly the same thing as the corporeal light that illumines sensibles, but it is like it enough to make contact. This account of rationality thus allows Augustine to hold both that the mind possesses innate ideas and that the eternal reasons are distinct from the mind – premises that are evident from the passages discussed in this paper. To sum up and state the analogy again briefly, the mind’s light, or rationality, is an intermediary that operates in an analogous manner to the pneumatic light of the eyes in vision. Pneumatic light possesses a likeness both to the incorporeal soul and to corporeal light and thus enables contact between the soul and illuminated sensibles. So too, the light of the mind, by mutably possessing a system of innate ideas, possesses a likeness both to the mutable subject and the divine light, the immutable truth, and in this way enables contact between them.

Jn. 1:17 and Gal. 4:4-5 in Augustine of Hippo’s Anti-Donatist Polemics and Preaching: Johannine and Pauline Perspectives on Grace Joseph L. GRABAU, Leuven, Belgium

ABSTRACT Augustine of Hippo makes broad appeal in various contexts to gratia where Pauline texts figure prominently. In fact, his later appeals against Pelagian theology and exegesis arose from his earliest commentaries on the letters to the Romans and Galatians (394/395), as well as – in part – the treatise Ad Simplicianum (396/398). On these occasions, Augustine explains salvation history in four parts: ante legem, sub lege, sub gratia, in pace, which continue to appear throughout his corpus. For example, in subsequent anti-Donatist works such as c. litt. Pet. (400), c. ep. Parm. (400), and bapt. (400/401), where the Pauline corpus again figured prominently, Augustine continued to refine his teachings on the law and grace – in particular in view of the relation between covenants and prophetic interpretation of the Bible. The focus of this contribution will be upon the earliest tractates on John, Io. eu. tr. 1-16 (407), for here Augustine performs a still later attempt to bring together these concerns in a new, antiDonatist synthesis, bridging the Pauline and Johannine. This paper will explore how Augustine makes use of Jn. 1:17 and Gal. 4:4-5 (with reference to Rom. 6:14) on law and grace, in particular in the anti-Donatist period leading up to 411. With Io. eu. tr. 3.2 as a reference point, I aim to address how Augustine draws upon the Johannine antithesis of ‘grace and truth through Jesus Christ’ and ‘the law given through Moses’, in conjunction with the Pauline language of sub lege and related gratia-terminology. My purpose in doing so is to suggest forms of continuity in Augustine’s practice of exegesis and theology, both between periods and two prominent biblical authors. While the circumstantial context involves Donatism in significant ways, I aim to question how Augustine combines the biblical authors, especially in view of the limited selection of verses brought forward here, in order to establish a doctrinal, exegetical, and even polemical context for subsequent tractates.

The conjunction of law and grace (or lex et gratia) appears throughout Augustine of Hippo’s corpus. As early as his commentaries on Paul’s Letter to the Romans and Galatians, he developed an important four-fold schema tracing the arc of salvation. A text from the Gospel of John’s Prologue, which speaks of ‘the law given through Moses, grace and truth through Jesus Christ’ also presented opportunities for polemical exegesis.1 This article considers how a 1

See Augustine, Io. eu. tr. 3.2, in In Iohannis evangelium tractatus CXXIV, ed. Radbodus Willems, CChr.SL 36 (Turnhout, 1954 [1990]), 21, lex per Moysen data est, gratia autem et ueritas per Iesum Christum facta est.

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Pauline point of departure stimulated Augustine’s reading of this verse, conditioned also by his encounter with Donatism. Augustine applies key verses from Romans and especially Galatians to the text of John, with implications for his anti-Donatist argumentation. Patout Burns points out the philosophical foundations of Augustine’s thought on grace, in particular how the Neoplatonic theory of emanation helped to frame his ontology.2 Perhaps the most telling biblical example of this view for Augustine, which links the Holy Spirit and grace as Christian analogues to the Plotinian energeia, is a text from Letter to the Romans: ‘for the love of God has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit’ (Rom. 5:5).3 Grace fills creation. Additional textual support for Augustine also came from the First Letter of John, which indicates that ‘love is of God’ (1Jn. 4:7), and that through the Holy Spirit human beings receive this same love.4 As Burns explains, ‘Grace is fundamentally the illumination of the mind by divine Truth, the Word of God, and the movement of the will by divine Love, the Holy Spirit’.5 Decret tends to emphasize Roman law in his discussions of late antique North Africa. Imperial legislation often dealt with religious matters, especially in relation to Donatism. He also points out how Augustine distanced himself from using the terms Iudaeus or Israelita, applied to Christians in any but a spiritual sense. Moreover, he points out that Augustine felt Christians ‘should absolutely avoid returning to the ritual practices and dietary laws of the Old Testament’.6 Augustine’s rivals in the Donatist party have been characterized by identification with the Old Testament. Yet Decret does not link Donatists with other contemporaneous groups known for Judaizing tendencies in North Africa.7 2 James Patout Burns, ‘Grace’, in Augustine through the Ages, ed. Allan Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, MI, 1999), 392-9, 392. On this view, Burns writes, ‘“grace” must be conceptualized not as a created disposition or accident but rather as the operation and indwelling of the divine being within the created spirit’. 3 See, for example, exp. Gal. 20, CSEL 84, 78; doctr.chr. 4.11, Green, 266; trin. 8.10, CChr.SL 50, 284; Io. eu. tr. 9.8, CChr.SL 36, 95; ep. Io. tr. 6.8, PL 35, 2024; en. Ps. 103.1.10, CChr.SL 40, 1483; s. 23.8, CChr.SL 41, 313: quoniam caritas dei diffusa est, inquit, in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis (Rom. 5:5). Although not all citations include the final clause referencing the Holy Spirit, the link is evidently implied. 4 See ep. Io. tr. 7.6, in Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Latina, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, vol. 35 (Paris, 1864), 2031-2, where the link between Rom. 5:5 and 1Jn. 4:7 is Trinitarian, with the love of God as the middle term found in both New Testament texts, which Augustine refers to the Holy Spirit: intellegamus in dilectione spiritum sanctum esse. He further stipulates, ipse est enim spiritus sanctus, quem non possunt accipere mali … omnes enim qui non diligent deum, alieni sunt, antichristi sunt. 5 J.P. Burns, ‘Grace’ (1999), 398. 6 François Decret, Early Christianity in North Africa, trans. E. Smithers (Eugene, OR, 2009), 150, cf. Augustine, ep. 196, CSEL 57, 216-30. 7 F. Decret, Early Christianity in North Africa (2009), 148-51 discusses several of these, recalling the long-standing role of the Diaspora in the earliest development of Christianity in the region. He insists that the church and synagogue were separated by the time of Tertullian.

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Nevertheless, in her work on biblical interpretation in the Donatist world, Maureen Tilley identifies four principles of Donatist exegesis, two of which promote the Old Testament link. These include: a turn from the future as a source of hope to the past as a model for coping; a change in typological models from biblical figures who promoted a martyr’s death to those who provided support in the struggle against assimilation; the adoption of the collecta or assembly of Israel as the model for the Church faithful to the observance of the Law of God; and the adoption of commands of separation as the essence of the Law of God and the sine qua non of survival of the church.8

The third and fourth of these areas identify importance of the Law for Donatists by adding both ideological identification with the nation set apart and practical means for doing so. Yet earlier North African authors, such as Tertullian, had looked to the Mosaic covenant ‘as a temporary manifestation of the Eternal Law’, which, ‘the Jews proved unworthy custodians of … by their failure to understand both [its] temporary nature and the divine requirement for … nonliteral interpretation’.9 This continuity between the Old and the New covenants was held by other early Christian authors, such as Irenaeus, who also promoted a Christological reading of the entire bible. For the Donatists, however, engaging with the entire scope of Scripture meant, according to Tilley, a self-concept driven by the image of Israel, ‘surrounded by infidels’ combined with New Testament commands for separation and purity.10 Of the latter, Christ’s sayings and parables on the world in the Gospel of John served a prominent role.11 ‘Divine law’, writes another scholar, ‘was the heart of traditional African Christianity. The law was given to Adam by God and passed down generation to generation by the righteous until it was recorded as Scripture’.12 The Donatist 8

Maureen Tilley, The Bible in Christian North Africa: The Donatist World (Minneapolis, MN, 1997), 16. 9 M. Tilley, Bible in Christian Africa (1997), 24-5. See, also, Richard Hanson, ‘Notes on Tertullian’s Interpretation of Scripture’, Journal of Theological Studies, n.s. 12 (1961), 273-9. For evidence of Tertullian’s position, Tilley highlights Adu. Marc. 4.17.2, CChr.SL 1, 585 and Mon. 7.4, 8.1, 9.1, and 13.3, CChr.SL 2, 1238, 1239, 1240, 1248-9. 10 M. Tilley, Bible in Christian North Africa (1997), 195, n. 35, introduces a number of Old Testament legal texts favoured by the Donatist authors. The Pauline, New Testament sense of the law of God written on ‘tablets of human hearts’ (2Cor. 3:3), she indicates, was reflected in many Old Testament passages which Donatists gravitated towards, including: Josh. 22:5, 2Kgs. 10:31, Ps. 36:31, Ps. 118:34, and – most importantly – Isa. 51:7 and Jer. 31:33. 11 M. Tilley, Bible in Christian North Africa (1997), 91. 12 Alden Bass, ‘Ecclesiological Controversies’, in Augustine in Context, ed. Tarmo Toom (Cambridge, 2017), 145-52, 148, where the author continues: ‘Like ancient Israel, called to be a “holy nation and a kingdom of priests,” the church has been entrusted with the law (Acta Saturnini 17) … Crucially, it is faithfulness in the to the law in the face of the world’s opposition that defines God’s people’. See also c. litt. Pet. 1.20, CSEL 52, 15, where Augustine quotes the Donatist Petilian contrasting the Catholic traditores with his own fold, identified as ‘us who

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bishop Petilian described his communion as those ‘who observe the law’, yet received persecution at the hands of the traditores.13 In this way, the concerns of ‘sin and assimilation’ which Donatists faced, ‘were the same ones that faced not Jesus but Paul’s Christians at Corinth and the people of post-exilic Israel’.14 For several reasons, then, Augustine had good reason in his earliest tractates on John, written in 406 and 407, to incorporate Pauline texts, when crafting his anti-Donatist polemics on topics of Christology, sacraments and the Church. I suggest that the availability of Johannine sources for Augustine’s thought on law and grace also bears consideration. In the Gospel of John, the Prologue’s interest in Christ and Moses carries forward throughout the text. In Chapter 5, a group of Jews explain to a man healed by Jesus that he may not carry his mat on the Sabbath, according to the law. Elsewhere, Christ himself speaks positively of the law of Moses, yet complains that his audience does not respect it (Jn. 7:19). Perhaps the most poignant example, however, occurs in the story of the woman caught in adultery, a later insertion found primarily in Old Latin translations, which scholars today tend to describe as Lucan rather than Johannine. In his comments on one key verse of the Prologue, which distinguishes the law and grace, I suggest that Augustine paves the way for his subsequent tractates, with their significant anti-Donatist elements. Though his own prior teaching of a four-fold schema for law and grace, as well as the special North African concern for the law, remain implicit, these are nevertheless useful considerations that account for Augustine’s practice of polemics. In other words, Augustine’s mediation on the Christological Prologue of John stands in line with his earlier biblical commentaries, yet it also serves to lay the groundwork for polemical asides in his explanation of the Gospel. In his early Pauline commentaries in the mid-390s, Augustine meditated on the history of salvation, viewed in large part through a progression defined by law and grace, culminating in the eschatological peace. According to the four-fold schema, creation begins ante legem, until the subsequent giving of the law, sub lege, followed by grace, sub gratia, and finally eternal peace, in pace. Augustine identifies these in commentaries on the Letters to the Romans and Galatians, and explores further implications in his work Ad Simplicianum.15 Paula Fredriksen indicates that, ‘These stages, Augustine argues, correspond observe the law’; trans. Maureen Tilley and Boniface Ramsey, The Donatist Controversy I, ed. Boniface Ramsey and David Hunter, WSA I/21 (Hyde Park, NY, 2019), 66. 13 C. litt. Pet. 1.20, CSEL 52, 15, nequissimus, inquit, traditor nobis legem seruantibus persecutor et carnifex extitisti, trans. M. Tilley and B. Ramsey, The Donatist Controversy (2019), 66. 14 M. Tilley, Bible in Christian North Africa (1997), 92. 15 The four stages are defined most succinctly at exp. prop. Rm. 13-8, CSEL 84, 6-9. Elsewhere, Augustine identifies the language as distinctly Pauline (cf. Rom. 6:14) at exp. prop. Rm. 35, CSEL 84, 14. See also exp. Gal. 46, CSEL 84, 120-2; diu. qu. 66-8, CChr.SL 44A, 15083; and Simpl. 1.1.7, CChr.SL 44, 12-3.

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both to periods of human history and to steps in the spiritual development of the individual believer; [and yet] [h]e concentrates on the individual’s development here’.16 In his study on operative grace in the thought of Augustine, traced across the phases of his literary output, Burns indicates an important transformation during the height of the Donatist controversy: away from an individualistic account, towards a social view.17 Connecting the terms of law and grace, however, is that of concupiscence, by which Augustine links and defines each of the four phases of man.18 He writes, ‘Before the law, we follow the concupiscence of the flesh; under the law, we are compelled by it; under grace, we neither follow nor are compelled by it; in peace, concupiscence is no more’.19 Augustine’s early use of the scheme, therefore, was not polemical, but simply an axiom by which to explain both the bible and human nature. Composed more than a decade later, the first sixteen tractates on John have been grouped chronologically to the years 406-407 and identified as being particularly anti-Donatist in character. Introductions to scholarship of the past half century on this set of texts, however, often elides the first three tractates together with the entire set.20 Augustine begins his third tractate on John by commenting that his topic will be the ‘grace and truth of God’, which is a matter ‘to be distinguished from the Old Testament, since it pertains rather to the New Testament’.21 This marks a 16 Paula Fredriksen, ‘Expositio Quarundam Propositionum Ex Epistula Apostoli Ad Romanos’, Augustine through the Ages, ed. Allan Fitzgerald (1999), 346. The work Ad Simplicianum is described as a ‘watershed’, marking a decisive turn in Augustine’s reading of Romans, which he later viewed as the early development of his own teaching on grace: cf. James Wetzel, ‘Simplicianum, Ad’, in Augustine through the Ages (1999), 798. See, further, William Babcock, ‘Augustine’s Interpretation of Romans (A.D. 394–396)’, Augustinian Studies 10 (1979), 55-74; Maurice Wiles, The Divine Apostle: The Interpretation of St. Paul’s Epistles in the Early Church (Cambridge, 1967); and Thomas Martin, ‘Pauline Commentaries in Augustine’s Time’, in Augustine through the Ages, ed. Allan Fitzgerald (1999), 625-8. 17 James Patout Burns, The Development of Augustine’s Doctrine of Operative Grace (Paris, 1980). 18 In this case, though the noun hominis is singular, it seems to clearly indicate humankind as a whole, and not four stages of an individual’s lifespan or spiritual progress. 19 See exp. prop. Rm. 13-18, CSEL 84, 6-7, itaque quattuor istos gradus hominis distinguamus: ante legem, sub lege, sub gratia, in pace. ante legem sequimur concupiscentiam carnis, sub lege trahimur ab ea, sub gratia nec sequimur eam nec trahimur ab ea, in pace nulla est concupiscentia carnis. 20 Marie- François Berrouard, Homélies sur l’Évangile de saint Jean: Tractatus in evangelium Iohannes I-XVI (Paris, 1969) provides extensive comments on the anti-Donatist insights of Augustine in this set of tractates. See, further, ‘Introduction’, in Homilies on the Gospel of John 1-40, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, WSA III/12 (Hyde Park, NY, 2009), 13-35 for a concise summary of the scholarship on the tractates (Io. eu. tr.), especially efforts to ascertain their date of origin. 21 Io. eu. tr. 3.1, CChr.SL 36, 20-1: gratiam et ueritatem dei, qua plenus sanctis apparuit unigenitus filius dominus et saluator noster Iesus Christus, distinguendam a ueteri testamento, quoniam res est noui testamenti, suscepimus in nomine domini, et uestrae caritati promisimus.

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turn in Augustine’s previous two tractates on John. For though he speaks of the Incarnation, linking the Word made flesh with the eternal Word with God, Augustine does not meditate on the sequence of covenants explicitly in either preceding tractate on the Prologue of John’s Gospel.22 When discussing the grace and truth of God, in the opening of his Io. eu. tr. 3, Augustine remarks that he intends to discuss these concepts with the New Testament as his point of reference, since ‘this subject must be considered apart from the Old’. In my opinion, this remark seems to be at once a statement of biblical truth, and a polemical statement against the Donatists. In the first tractate, Augustine had observed a harmony with the books of Moses, as he points to the creation in Genesis to explain the first verses of John.23 Similarly, in the ninth tractate, speaking of the water which Christ transforms into wine at the Wedding of Cana, Augustine expounds his vision of prophecy at greater length. Rather than four stages of law and grace in salvation history, Augustine identifies six patriarchs who typify a similar development.24 Here, Augustine also specifies that the beginning of the law was not given strictly by Moses, but with the first moment of creation: ‘Now we know from what time he sets forth the Law, that is, from the beginning of the world: “In the beginning God made heaven and earth” (Gen. 1:1)’.25 Augustine distinguishes the law and prophets as anticipating the Gospel, making use of the Pauline dictum on veiled hearts, in order to indicate that there was a time without prophecy.26 In fulfilling the Old Testament Law (cf. Matt. 5:17),

Fitzgerald and Hill, Homilies 1-40, 68 rightly point out that the Latin term testamentum refers more broadly to the old and new covenants. Yet in this context, the distinction does not impact Augustine’s point profoundly; since the old (covenant or testament) anticipates the new, the new fulfills the old – amid continuity, there is development. Augustine on Romans: Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, Unfinished Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, ed. Paula Fredriksen Landes (Chico, 1982) in a discussion of the four stages of grace in Augustine’s thought, refers to this movement as ‘progressive realization of the plan of God’. 22 The pair of terms appear throughout Augustine’s exegetical writings, including the commentary on John and his personal letters, though not necessarily with explicit reference to the Johannine prologue. In his dogmatic writings, the terms also occur. For example, in De trinitate, Augustine proposes that grace refers to knowledge, while truth instead leads to wisdom. In this way, the highest grace joins a person to God in history, while the highest truth is “rightly attributed to the Word of God.” As the Incarnate son of the Father, Christ is full of grace and truth: he shares in our temporality, so that ‘we may contemplate Him steadfastly in eternal things. […] Through Him we travel to Him; through science we proceed to wisdom’. See trin. 13.24, CChr. SL 50A, 417, per ipsum pergimus ad ipsum, tendimus per scientiam ad sapientiam. 23 Io. eu. tr. 1.11, CChr.SL 36, 6. 24 Io. eu. tr. 9.6, CChr.SL 36, 93-4. 25 Tractates on the Gospel of John 1-10, trans. John W. Rettig, FC 78 (Washington, DC, 1988), 199; Io. eu. tr. 9.6, CChr.SL 36, 93: intendite autem quod ipse ait: “quae scripta sunt in lege, et prophetis, et Psalmis de me” (Lk. 24:44). nouimus autem legem ex quibus temporibus narret, id est, ab exordio mundi: “in principio fecit deus caelum et terram” (Gen. 1:1). 26 Io. eu. tr. 9.3, CChr.SL 36, 91-2.

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however, Christ himself gives two new precepts to be obeyed, love of God and neighbor.27 In turning to the text of John on law and grace, Augustine draws upon legal terminology which aided him elsewhere in his teachings on grace and human sin. ‘The law, given through Moses’, Augustine explains, is what ‘makes humans guilty’. The reference to guilt here captures a major element in Augustine’s eventual doctrine of original sin.28 The transmission of sin, which Augustine takes up later in the tractate provides another. As he opens the tractate, Augustine explores the meanings of sub lege in order to express his intent in what follows. He immediately introduces the concept from Rom. 6:14 and Gal. 4:4-5, in order to understand the text of John theologically and within the economy of salvation. Therefore, we belong to the Gospel; we belong to the New Testament. ‘The Law was given through Moses, but grace and truth came through Jesus Christ’ (Jn. 1:17). We question the Apostle and he tells us that we are ‘not under the Law but under grace’ (Rom. 6:14). In this way, ‘God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the Law, so that he might redeem those who were under the Law, that we might receive the adoption of son’ (Gal. 4:4-5). Behold, Christ came for this purpose, that he might redeem those who were under the Law: that we might not be under the Law, but under grace (cf. Rom. 6:14).29

Moreover, just as he will frequently explain that Christ is the sole agent of baptism in subsequent tractates, and not the human minister, Augustine’s Christological emphasis recalls how God alone gave both the law and grace. Moses was a human minister; Christ is the author of salvation. This, too, has implied anti-Donatist intent, as Augustine frequently corrects a Donatist account of priestly ministry. In addition, Augustine counters a view of human perfection which abandons reference to grace. Building upon a distinction between being ‘with the Law’ and ‘under the Law’, Augustine remarks that, ‘he who satisfies the Law is not under the Law, but with the Law; he who is under the Law, however, is not lifted up by the Law, but is overwhelmed by it’. In this way, ‘since by their own strength they were not able to fulfill the Law, having been made guilty under the Law, they sought the help of a Saviour’.30

27 See Io. eu. tr. 7.10, 11, 17; Io. eu. tr. 15.33; and Io. eu. tr. 16.3, CChr.SL 36, 165-6: ibi facto biduo – quo numero dierum mystice commendatus est duorum numerus praeceptorum, in quibus duobus praeceptis tota lex pendet et prophetae, sicut hesterno die nos commendasse meministis –, pergit in Galilaeam, et uenit in ciuitatem Canam Galilaeae, ubi aquam uinum fecit. 28 James Wetzel, ‘Simplicianum, Ad’ (1999), 799, defines these as: ‘inheritance of sin (tradux peccati) and original guilt (originalis reatus)’. See further, for example, Mathijs Lamberigts, ‘Peccatum originale’, in Augustinus-Lexikon, vol. 4, fasc. 3/4, ed. Robert Dodaro, Cornelius Mayer et al. (Basel, 2014), 599-614. 29 Io. eu. tr. 3.2, CChr.SL 36, 20. 30 Io. eu. tr. 3.2, CChr.SL 36, 20-1.

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In order to expound Jn. 1:17 here, midway his third tractate, Augustine calls once more upon Paul: ‘For what does the Apostle say? “the Law entered in, that sin might abound”’.31 On this approach, God gave the law as a kind of impossible challenge to the pride of human beings: ‘wishing to tame their pride, [God] gave the Law, as if saying, Look, fulfill’. Explaining this principle, and the underlying doctrines of sin and guilt, nature and grace, brings Augustine into a familiar synthesis of Pauline biblical sources and his own anthropological insights. A human being cannot fulfill the law, Augustine says, ‘because he has been born with the transmission of sin and death’. Born of Adam, he came bringing with him what was conceived there. The first man fell; and all who were born of him came bringing from him the concupiscence of the flesh. It was necessary that another man be born who came bringing no concupiscence. A man, and a man; a man for death, and a man for life. So says the Apostle, ‘For indeed by a man [came] death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead’ (1Cor. 15:21).32

As evidence for Augustine’s doctrine of original sin and guilt, the passage follows typical Augustinian lines. All human beings have been born of Adam, who contracted the guilt of sin. ‘All who are from Adam are sinners with sin’.33 Augustine, furthermore, links death with sin, as the ‘poena peccatorum’.34 Following the Pauline typological contrast of death through Adam, life and rebirth through Christ, Augustine remarks, ‘One man and another. Yet the one, only a man: the other God made man. The one, a man of sin; the other of justice. You died in Adam: rise again in Christ’.35 This persistent contrast parallels the contrast between Moses and Christ, and solidifies the foundation for continued rejection of the need for purity or holiness in the human minister of the sacrament – found both in the following set of tractates, and in Augustine’s anti-Donatist corpus. 31

Io. eu. tr. 3.11, CChr.SL 36, 25; Tractates 1-10, trans. J. Rettig (1988), 84, citing Rom. 5:20. Io. eu. tr. 3.12, CChr.SL 36, 25-6: si ergo deest qui impleat, unde non implet? quia natus cum traduce peccati et mortis. de Adam natus, traxit secum quod sibi conceptum est. cecidit primus homo; et omnes qui de illo nati sunt, de illo traxerunt concupiscentiam carnis. oportebat ut nasceretur alius homo qui nullam traxit concupiscentiam. homo, et homo: homo ad mortem, et homo ad uitam. sic dicit apostolus: quoniam quidem per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum [1Cor. 15:21]. per quem hominem mors, et per quem hominem resurrectio mortuorum? noli festinare: sequitur, et dicit: sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes uiuificabuntur. On the trasmission of sin, in particular following the formulations of Augustine’s Latin, see: Pier Franco Beatrice, Tradux peccati: alle fonti della dottrina agostiniana del peccatooriginale, Studia Patristica Mediolanensia 8 (Milan, 1978). 33 Io. eu. tr. 3.12, CChr.SL 36, 25-6: omnes tamen qui ex Adam, cum peccato peccatores; omnes qui per Christum, iustificati et iusti, non in se, sed in illo. 34 Io. eu. tr. 3.13, CChr.SL 36, 26. See also Io. eu. tr. 3.19, CChr.SL 36, 26: mors peccatorum poena erat. 35 Io. eu. tr. 3.19, CChr.SL 36, 26: homo, et homo; sed ille, nonnisi homo; iste deus homo. ille homo peccati, iste iustitiae. mortuus es in Adam, resurge in Christo. 32

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Linking the truth and grace of achieved through the death and resurrection of Christ, Augustine remarks, that ‘this [grace] was not in the Old Testament because the Law threatened, it did not succour; it ordered, it did not cure; it exposed weakness, it did not take it away. But it made ready for that physician who was to come with grace and truth (cum gratia et ueritate)’.36 Augustine distinguishes further between the Old and New Testament, reflecting the shift from the law of Moses to the grace of Christ: ‘Therefore, drive carnal thought from your hearts’, he writes, so ‘that you may truly be under grace (sub gratia), that you may belong to the New Testament’.37 This idea echoes the opening of his tractate, where Augustine reminds his audience how the grace and truth spoken of in Jn. 1:17 are proper to the New Testament. In what follows, he clarifies how, on the one hand, the law can be viewed in a purely literal or ‘carnal’ way. The fullness of the law, on the other hand, looks to the spiritual realities: ‘Thus eternal life is promised in the New Testament’, he writes. ‘Read the Old Testament, and see that the very things which are commanded for us were, indeed, commanded for a people still carnal’.38 In turning to the Mosaic decalogue, Augustine explains how each commandment is to be kept spiritually, by a spiritual people. For example, ‘“Keep the day of the sabbath” is commanded even more for us because it is commanded that that be kept spiritually’, Augustine explains.39 For each of the other commands, Augustine stipulates, ‘Are not all those things commanded for us too?’40 Yet, following the Johannine teaching on eternal life as knowledge of God, Augustine demonstrates how the New Testament promises differ from the Old. The rewards of grace are not physical, Augustine insists. For, ‘if you desire physical rewards from God, you are still under the Law and therefore you will not fulfill the Law itself’.41 In his eleventh tractate on John, Augustine repeats aspects of this analysis, drawing upon the distinction between the literal or carnal and spiritual, yet for the purpose of discussing prophecy. He writes, ‘in 36 Io. eu. tr. 3.14; CChr.SL 36, 26: non erat ista in ueteri testamento, quia lex minabatur, non opitulabatur; iubebat, non sanabat; languorem ostendebat, non auferebat; sed illi praeparabat medico uenturo cum gratia et ueritate. 37 Tractates 1-10, trans. J. Rettig (1988), 89. See Io. eu. tr. 3.19; CChr.SL 36, 28: expellite ergo de cordibus uestris carnales cogitationes, ut uere sitis sub gratia, ut ad nouum testamentum pertineatis. 38 Tractates 1-10, trans. J. Rettig (1988), 89. See Io. eu. tr. 3.19; CChr.SL 36, 28: ideo uita aeterna promittitur in nouo testamento. legite uetus testamentum, et uidete, quia carnali adhuc populo ea quidem praecipiebantur quae nobis. 39 Tractates 1-10, trans. J. Rettig (1988), 89-90. See Io. eu. tr. 3.19; CChr.SL 36, 29: obserua diem sabbati [Ex. 20:8], magis nobis praecipitur: quia spiritaliter obseruandum praecipitur. 40 Tractates 1-10, trans. J. Rettig (1988), 90. See Io. eu. tr. 3.19; CChr.SL 36, 29: nonne ista omnia et nobis praecipiuntur? Below, in the following section, Augustine restates his claim: ‘The same things are ordered there in the decalogue of the Law as [are ordered] also for us’. Tractates 1-10, trans. J. Rettig (1988), 91; Io. eu. tr. 3.20; CChr.SL 36, 29. 41 Tractates 1-10, trans. J. Rettig (1988), 92. See Io. eu. tr. 3.19, CChr.SL 36, 29.

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the people of the Jews the people of the Christians was prefigured. There a figure, here the truth’.42 This idea is distinctively Pauline, which Augustine applies to a text from John on the conversation between Jesus and Nicodemus.43 Explaining the need for rebirth Jesus describes, Augustine uses a typology for the two testaments. The first pertains to those who love temporal things of this world; while those who love eternal life pertain to the second.44 The two sons of Abraham provide Augustine, as for the Apostle Paul in the Letter to the Galatians, with paradigms for spiritual realities (Gal. 4:21-31). Contrasting the earthly and the heavenly Jerusalem, Augustine remarks simply, ‘these are the words of the Apostle’.45 In this instance, Augustine’s meditation on the Old and New Testaments, conditioned especially by a Pauline typology, thus leads directly to counterDonatist argumentation. The text of John itself introduces a distinction between the literal and the spiritual, in the misunderstanding of Nicodemus concerning birth and rebirth. Even on this point, however, Augustine identifies a precise point of contention regarding re-baptism. One can be reborn, Augustine infers, neither in Adam, nor in Christ.46 Although this discussion is not so much about law and grace, explicitly, it nonetheless builds upon essential Augustinian doctrines of human nature, sin, and the grace of baptism. In this way, Augustine’s thoughts on the patriarchs of Israel arise directly from his practice of prophetic interpretation. Although the law and the prophets of the Old Testament anticipate Christ, Augustine at times sharply contrasts them with the New.47 Conclusion In my view, it is insufficient to regard the frequent anti-Donatist asides in Io. eu. tr. 4-16 in precisely the same light as Io. eu. tr. 1-3. As the first three texts discuss the Prologue to the Gospel of John, and afford Augustine the 42 Tractates 1-10, trans. J. Rettig (1988), 17. See Io. eu. tr. 11.8; CChr.SL 36, 114: in populo enim Iudaeorum figuratus est populus christianorum. ibi figura, hic ueritas. 43 In this tractate, Augustine discusses John 3:3 most extensively, which states, nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu, non uidebit regnum dei. See Io. eu. tr. 11.1; CChr.SL 36, 109. 44 See Io. eu. tr. 11.8; CChr.SL 36, 115: apostolus hoc commemorat; et in illis duobus filiis Abrahae dicit apostolus fuisse figuram duorum testamentorum, ueteris et noui. ad uetus testamentum pertinent dilectores temporalium, dilectores saeculi; ad nouum testamentum dilectores uitae aeternae. 45 See Io. eu. tr. 11.8; CChr.SL 36, 115: et haec apostoli uerba sunt. 46 Tractates 1-10, trans. J. Rettig (1988), 16; see Io. eu. tr. 11.6; CChr.SL 36: iam natus sum de Adam, non me potest iterum generare Adam; iam natus sum de Christo, non me potest iterum generare Christus. quomodo uterus non potest repeti, sic nec baptismus. 47 On the Old and the New Testaments in the commentary on John, see also Io. eu. tr. 30.7, CChr.SL 36, 292-3.

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opportunity to set the tone for his commentary on the Fourth Gospel, attention should be given to their exact exegetical agenda and theological tone. Nowhere, for example, in these three sermons does Augustine overtly mention Donatism. Rather, his interest is on Christology and salvation, reading the Johannine Prologue in light of other biblical texts in order to understand and convey Christ’s role in leading humankind to God. With its account of the Word made flesh, bringing light into the world, full of grace and truth, Augustine frames his basic approach to the Gospel. Although polemical concerns do not permeate the surface of the text, Io. eu. tr. 1-3 create a theological space in which Augustine does launch meditations on the efficacy of baptism, the nature of human ministry, and the ultimate agency of Christ in administering the sacrament. Berrouard, in his commentary on the tractates, identifies the significance of Augustine’s thought on law and grace, linking Io. eu. tr. 3 with the antiManichaean text, Contra Felicem (404).48 Berrouard remarks that due to his earlier comments on Romans and Galatians, perhaps no one in Christian antiquity understood the Apostle Paul as well as Augustine.49 In holding up parallel passages in the works of Augustine, however, Berrouard does not explore the four-fold schema of law and grace directly. Neither does he anticipate how this theological frame supports elements of Augustine’s polemical remarks which propose to counter Donatist views of the Church and the sacraments, especially baptism and the forgiveness of sins. In the earliest contributions of his Tractatus in Iohannis euangelium, Augustine does not make explicit use of his four-fold schema of ante legem, sub lege, sub gratia and in pace. Instead, he tends to use a parallel scheme of the six ages of humankind, when discussing the chronology of salvation history. Nevertheless, the theology and history of salvation captured by the deeply Pauline scheme from Romans and Galatians supports much of Augustine’s preaching in these texts, which merits further attention. Aware of the Donatist party in the 390s when he developed this form of explaining the texts of Paul, Augustine conceived his hermeneutic of salvation with primary reference to explaining the bible, yet often with polemical implications. The four-fold scheme of law and grace provided both a biblical framework by which to 48 See c. Fel. 2.11, CSEL 25/2, 839-41, where Augustine draws from Rom. 5:20, lex subintrauit, ut abundaret delictum, in accounting for the role of the Law in salvation economy, as well as supplementary texts from Romans and Galatians, in particular. See also M.-F. Berrouard, ‘Le ministère de la Loi’, in Homélies sur l’Évangile de saint Jean (1969), 856-8, where the author also identifies en. Ps. 102.15, PL 37, 1329-30 and ep. 145.3, PL 33, 593 in this light, writing ‘Les longues réflexions d’Augustin sur les Épîtres aux Galates et aux Romains l’ont éclairé sur le rôle mystérieux de la Loi dans l’économie du salut, et personne sans doute, dans l’antiquité chrétienne, n’a compris aussi bien que lui cet enseignement de l’Apôtre’. 49 M.-F. Berrouard, ‘Le ministère de la Loi’ (1969), 856, writes: ‘Les longues réflexions d’Augustin sur les Épîtres aux Galates et aux Romains l’ont éclairé sur le rôle mystérieux de la Loi dans l’économie du salut, et personne sans doute, dans l’antiquité chrétienne, n’a compris aussi bien que lui cet enseignement de l’Apôtre’.

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understand the Old and New Testaments, and theology of history, as well as the moral structure, capabilities and limitations of human nature. In light of the Donatist views of priestly holiness, obligation to the law, and understanding of the Church and the world, the four stages are an implied and persistent assumption Augustine brings to the text of John. Io. eu. tr. 3 develops trends from the earlier period and anticipates later teaching and polemics against Pelagian authors. In terms of the doctrines of original sin and guilt, in particular, Io. eu. tr. 3 offers compelling evidence. Augustine’s Pauline citations help to direct and sustain his argument concerning human nature, the transmission of sin and concupiscence, and the Adam-Christ typology. Yet even without mentioning Donatism, he prepares his audience for sustained attacks that build upon these considerations.

Augustine and the Vituperation of Donatists: The Strategy of Criminalizing the Opponent Carles BUENACASA, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain

ABSTRACT Donatism was nothing but a schism, and its theology was not so different from Catholicism. The Catholic Church had to demonstrate to the emperors that Donatism was a heresy. Augustine played a significant role in this process, and the arguments he used were multiple. And so, besides historical, theological and ecclesiological concepts, Augustine gave great importance to the denunciation of the ‘crimes’ of the Donatists, specially the violence of the Donatists. The vituperation of the Donatists made it easy to convert them into animals, and this strategy made it easier to ask the emperor for the turning of the Donatist schism into heresy. That is why, around 400, he begins to use a specific vocabulary chosen to show the criminal (and animal) character of adhering to Donatism: haeresis, error, sacrilegium, crimen or furor.

As evidenced by one of his latest treaties, De haeresibus (428), a complete catalogue of heterodox deviations from Catholic faith, Augustine dedicated his life to the detection and combat of heresies, being Donatism the controversy to which he consecrated more intellectual and strategic efforts than to any other. In the early fourth century, the Donatist cause divided the Church of North Africa in two, using as excuse a disciplinary discrepancy without theological basis. It is well known that the Donatists accused Caecilianus and the rest of the Catholics of maintaining the communion with some bishops, traditores, notably Mensurius of Carthage and Felix of Abthugni. Despite the failed attempts made by the African episcopacy and Constantine I to restore religious unity, the conflict spread because of personal oppositions and especially of a concealed fight for control over the North-African plebs to such an extent that, under the Theodosian emperors, opposition between the two factions had become a true civil war which the sovereigns could not obviate. Certainly, we must add the close relation of interests of the Church and of the Roman State which resulted in the Edict of Thessalonica promulgated by Theodosius I (380). It was this same emperor who, aiming to enforce the repression of heresy, who published a very strict law (June 15th 392) punishing heretical clergymen with a fine of ten pounds of gold. Likewise, Donatist bishops elude payment

Studia Patristica CXIX, 109-116. © Peeters Publishers, 2021.

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adducing that Donatism was not legally a heresy.1 Although all the previous attempts of conciliation with Donatists had turned out to be fruitless, in the time of Theodosius, legislation only punished the Donatists if they rebaptized – as evidenced in the case of Crispinus of Calama –,2 but do not castigated the simple adherance to this schism.

1. Why a heresy? The criminalization of Donatism Augustine’s works against Donatism can be studied in order to obtain an accurate portrait of the process that turned Donatism from schism to heresy. From the point of view of the followers of Donatus, their faith did not differ too much from that of their rivals for both had a common belief founded on the same Gospels, expressed through the same symbol and shared authentic Christian elements such as the Scriptures, the faith in Christ and the Trinity, the celebration of Easter, the sacraments, the recitation of psalms, the cult of saints, the episcopal ordination and the ecclesiastical ranks, etc.3 Moreover, they used to pray identically and their rituals were acted in a very close way. For all these reasons, Donatism could consider itself a schismatic movement, but not a heresy.4 In earlier Christian literature, the terms ‘schism’ and ‘heresy’ were used synonymously, although they did not have the same meaning: the former (schism) had connotations of ‘rupture’ of the ecclesiastic communion; the latter (heresy) of ‘doctrinal error’, that is, ‘divergence of thought’.5 From a theological point 1 Cod. Theod. 16.5.21 (392). See also Augustine, C. ep. Parm. 1.12.19; C. Cresc. 3.47.51; Ep. 88.7; Ep. 185.7.25. 2 Augustine, Ep. 66.1-2. 3 Adam Ployd, Augustine, the Trinity, and the Church: A Reading of the Anti-Donatist Sermons (New York, 2015). 4 In that respect, Augustine’s quotation of the Donatist grammarian Cresconius is highly revealing who clarifies the difference between schism and heresy: Apud Augustine, C. Cresc. 2.3.4: Quid sibi uult – inquis – quod ais haereticorum sacrilegum errorem? Nam haereses non nisi inter diuersa sequentes fieri solent, nec haereticus nisi contrariae uel aliter interpretatae religionis est cultor, ut sunt Manichaei, Ariani, Marcionitae, Nouatiani, ceterique quorum inter se contra fidem christianam diuersa sententia stat. Inter nos, quibus idem Christus natus, mortuus et resurgens, una religio, eadem sacramenta, nihil in christiana obseruatione diuersum, schisma factum, non haeresis dicitur. Siquidem haeresis est diuersa sequentium secta, schisma uero idem sequentium separatio. Quare et in hoc, studio criminandi, quantum incurreris uides errorem, cum quod schisma est haeresem uocas. 5 Alfred Schindler, ‘Die Unterscheidung von Schisma und Häresie in Gesetzgebung und Polemik gegen den Donatismus (mit einer Bemerkung zur Datierung von Augustins Schrift: Contra epistulam Parmeniani)’, in Ernst Dassmann and Karl Suso Frank (eds), Pietas. Festschrift für Bernhard Kötting (Münster, 1980), 228-36; Hartmut Zinser, ‘Religio, secta, haeresis in den Häresiegesetzen des Codex Theodosianus (16, 5, 1/66) von 438’, in Manfred Hutter, Wassilios Klein and Ulrich Vollmer (eds), Hairesis. Festschrift für Karl Hoheisel zum 65. Geburtstag (Münster,

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of view, the distinction between schism and heresy was only slightly interesting since schismatics and heretics were both excluded from the true Church. It was not the same, however, on juridical grounds, which only criminalized heresy.6 So, from a legal point of view, only heresy was considered punishable. That is why, Augustine’s literary production made a huge effort for underlining the heretical condition of the Donatist schism.7 The aim of this article, therefore, is to show how the heretical condition of Donatism was an artificial creation necessary for political convenience. Donatist bishops didn’t really claim to be a different otherness inside the Christian Church and they always aspired to maintain communion with the universal church.8 The heretical condition of the Donatist faith was a political plot of their Catholic rivals in order to underline the criminal condition of Donatism and describe their followers as dangerous and mistaken people. Thus, through the last decade of fourth century, the main interest of the North-African Catholic Church has been to show to the emperors – certainly worried about the problems of coexistence among Catholics and Donatists in North Africa – the disciplinary and dogmatic rupture that Donatism entailed and to justify its change from being a schism to something worse, namely heresy. Aurelius, primate of Carthage, and Augustine, bishop of Hippo, were the theologians to assume this work. Some friends and collaborators of the Augustinian circle joined them: Alypius of Thagaste, Possidius of Calama, Evodius of Uzali, and so on. The whole group played a significant role in this process, whose first period ended with the Edict of Union (405), which sanctioned the definition of heresy of Donatism and decreed the persecution of its faithful.9 At first, in order to demonstrate the fact of heresy, Augustine exposed theological and ecclesiological arguments: the non-canonical nature of rebaptism, 2002), 215-19; Geoffrey D. Dunn, ‘Heresy and Schism According to Cyprian of Carthage’, JThS 55 (2004), 551-74; Tullio Spagnuolo Vigorita, ‘Legislazione antidonatista e cronologia agostiniana’, in Cosimo Cascione and Carla Masi Doria (eds), Fides humanitas ius. Studii in onore di Luigi Labruna (Naples, 2007), V 351-70; Mark Edwards, Catholicity and Heresy in the Early Church (Farnham, 2009). 6 In Roman imperial legislation, heresy had already been defined as crimen since 381: Cod. Theod. 16.5.6 (10th January 381). See also H.H. Anton, ‘Kaiserliches Selbsvertändnis in der Religiongesetzgebung der Spätantike und päpstliche Herrschaftsinterpretation im 5. Jahrhundert’, ZKG 88 (1977), 38-84, 55. 7 See Geoffrey G. Willis, Saint Augustine and the Donatist Controversy (London, 1950); Émilien Lamirande, La situation ecclésiologique des Donatistes d’après saint Augustin. Contribution à l’histoire doctrinale de l’œcuménisme (Ottawa, 1972), 21-50; Serge Lancel, Saint Augustin (Paris, 1999), 388-403; Frederick H. Russell, ‘Persuading the Donatists: Augustine’s Coercion by Words’, in William E. Klingshirn and Mark Vessey (eds), The Limits of Ancient Christianity: Essays on Late Antique Thought and Culture in Honor of Robert A. Markus (Ann Arbor, 1999), 115-30. 8 Maureen A. Tilley, ‘When Schism Becomes Heresy in Late Antiquity: Developing Doctrinal Deviance in the Wounded Body of Christ’, JECS 15 (2007), 1-21, 4-11. 9 Cod. Theod. 16.6.3 (405); 16.6.4 (405) [= Edict of Union]; 16.6.5 (405); 16.5.38 (405).

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the lack of universal communion, the sin of pride that has originated the elevation of altar against altar, the unusefulness of the sacraments offered out of the Church even if they were the same than the Catholic ones, etc.10 In parallel with the theological discussion, Augustine designed a strategy to fight Donatism based on historical grounds for, according to his opinion, the contemporary North-African plebs did not perceive the objective causes of schism. Augustine attempted to save from oblivion and to make public the historical events which gave origin to the schism and how it has been condemned since its beginning. Neither did Augustine forget to denounce other more recent events which showed Donatists’ vileness and cruelty: its treason crime towards the Roman State, the orgies in which the assemblies of Donatist faithful degenerated, the attacks of the circumcelliones on schismatic bishops passed to the Catholic Church, the reinstatement of the Maximianists without rebaptism, the denial of the Donatist hierarchy to discuss in public, etc.11 On the other hand, Aurelius of Carthage – as primate of the North-African Church – spared no effort to fight Donatism by means of summoning councils in which rebaptism and other Donatist practices – such as the cult of the Donatist martyrs at the false memoria martyrum – were condemned again and again.12 Between 397 and 411, the involvement of Augustine in this controversy redounded, firstly, in many epistles ad populum and, then, in some historical treatises (and specially in the period between 400 and 405).13 As Alberto Pincherle already noted, in C. ep. Parm. (400), Augustine uses twenty-nine times the terms ‘schism’ and ‘schismatic’ regarding Donatists, while ‘heresy’ and ‘heretic’ appear only seven times. On the contrary, ten years later, ‘heresy’ and ‘heretic’ 10 Carles Buenacasa, ‘La persécution du donatisme et l’imposition de l’orthodoxie en Afrique du Nord (IVe-Ve siècles): comment effacer la mémoire des hérétiques?’, in Stéphane Benoist and Anne Daguet-Gagey (eds), Mémoire et histoire: les procédures de condamnation dans l’Antiquité romaine (Metz, 2007), 225-41, 228-33. 11 On the diversity of historical arguments of Augustine, see Pierre Vanderlinden, L’affaire Cécilien. Étude sur la méthode de Saint Augustin dans son argumentation anti-Donatiste (Louvain, 1959), 106-71; Alan Dearn, The Polemical Use of the Past in the Catholic/Donatist Schism (Oxford, 2003). Most of the sources of the conflict have been convened by Jean-Louis Maier, Le dossier du donatisme, 2 vol. (Berlin, 1987-1989). 12 Ferrandus, Breu. c. 171. 13 Thanks to Paul Monceaux’ studies it has been clearly stated that it was between the years 400 and 405 when Augustine designed and deployed a systematic campaign of assimilation of Donatism with heresy: Paul Monceaux, Histoire littéraire de l’Afrique chrétienne depuis les origines jusqu’à l’invasion arabe, VII: Saint Augustin et le donatisme (Paris, 1923), 220-1. The anti-Donatist treatises written between 400 and 405 are the following: C. ep. Parm.; De bapt.; C. litt. Petil.; Ad cathol. fratr.; and C. Cresc. After the Conference of Cartaghe (411), Augustine will deal again with the anti-Donatist controversy, but he will only devote a letter to this affair (Ep. 185). As regards the role of Aurelius and Augustin in the anti-Donatist polemic, see Peter Brown, The Donatist Church: A Movement of Protest in Roman North Africa (Oxford, 1952), 249-261; P. Vanderlinden, L’affaire Cécilien (1959), specially 106-71; S. Lancel, Saint Augustin (1999), 243-8 and 404-29; Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo. A Biography (London, 2000), 183-239.

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are very much used to refer to Donatism and Donatists.14 We find the justification of this thought in C. Cresc. (405), where Augustine wrote that the Donatist heresy was ‘a lasting schism, an increasing dissension’.15 The similarity must be noted between the expression used by Augustine in this work (schisma inueteratum) and the sentence of the Edict of Union of 405 (inueteratum malum).16 Although the publication of C. Cresc. has been dated a few months later than the promulgation of the law, in my opinion, there is little doubt that these books should have been almost finished shortly before February 405 and it would not be strange if Augustine himself had coined and offered this phrase to an imperial Court accustomed to entrust its bishops the task of defining dogma. Besides, it would be logical that the imperial constitution avoided using the term schisma – not legally punishable – and preferred malum, for the aim of every legislator is to eradicate evil. In his sermons and treaties previous to 405, Augustine increasingly used the term ‘heretic’ to refer to the Donatists,17 and his words sparked the protests of Petilianus,18 Donatist bishop of Cirta, and Cresconius, a Donatist lay person, who accused Augustine of using this term with perverse intentions.19

2. The dehumanization and the animalization of Donatists Aurelius of Carthage and Augustine found a pretext to justify the heretical condition of the schismatics in the reiteration of baptism that Donatists justified 14 Alberto Pincherle, ‘L’ecclesiologia nella controversia donatista’, Ricerche Religiose 1 (1925), 35-55, specially 53, n. 3. Equally, Optatus of Milevi uses schism (sixty times) rather than heresy (thirty-three times) to refer to the Donatists. 15 Augustine, C. Cresc. 2.7.9: Proinde quamuis inter schisma et haeresim magis eam distinctionem approbem, qua dicitur schisma esse recens congregationis ex aliqua sententiarum diuersitate dissensio – neque enim et schisma fieri potest, nisi diuersum aliquid sequantur qui faciunt –. Haeresis autem, schisma inueteratum. As well as in many other passages, Augustine considered that the heretical condition of Donatism was originated by the extended lenght of the schism: neque enim uobis obicimus nisi schismatis crimen, quam etiam haeresem male perseuerando fecistis (Augustine, Ep. 87.4); pertinaci dissensione firmata, in haeresim schisma uerterunt (Augustine, De haer. 69.1). 16 Cod. Theod. 16.6.4 (405). 17 For example: Augustine, Ad cathol. fratr. 7.17; 8.21; 10.24; 11.28; 19.49; 20.55; De bapt. 1.4.5; 3.11.16; C. litt. Petil. 1.1.1; 2.36.84; 2.39.93; 2.43.102; 2.74.166; 2.98.226; C. ep. Parm. 1.10.16. As regards sermons, an eloquent example in: Enarr. in Psalm. 147.16. 18 See Augustine, C. litt. Petil. 2.95.218: Petilianus dixit: quae autem ratio est quaeue inconstantia uanitatis, quod, cum nos falso uocabulo dicatis haereticos, communionem nostram magnopere cupiatis? 19 Apud Augustine, C. Cresc. 2.3.4: quaere et in hoc studio criminandi quantum incurreris uides errorem, cum quod schisma est haeresem uocas. See Carles Buenacasa and Raúl Villegas, ‘Agustín, autor intelectual del texto del edicto de unión de 405’, in «Lex et religio». XL Incontro di studiosi dell’antichità cristiana (Rome, 2013), 617-45.

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relying on the authority of Cyprian of Carthage.20 In order to refute this conviction, Augustine wrote his transcendental De baptismo (400-401), where haeresis, error21 and sacrilegium are the most used terms to underline the criminal nature of the Donatist schism.22 The breakdown of unity was a sacrilege, a sin in Deum in the person of the Holy Spirit.23 That is why Donatists were sacrilegi,24 and responsible for the sacrilegium schismatis,25 the sacrilegium separationis,26 the sacrilega praecisio,27 and the immanissimum sacrilegium.28 In other of his works, Augustine also uses words like crimen29 or scelus.30 From that moment on, Donatist rebaptism could be used by imperial laws to clearly identify the crime of which Donatists were the defendant.31 In this way, the imperial court only raised to the rank of civil law what had already been condemned in a Carthaginian council in 345/348 under the presidency of Primate Gratus.32 The identification of rebaptism as the error and sacrilegium that turned the Donatists into deserving of punishment also facilitated the procedure for the civil persecution of the Donatists. The emperor, who recognized himself unable to legislate in matters of orthodoxy, could punish an easily identifiable practice: the rebaptizing (specially since, in African territory, rebaptism was practiced almost exclusively by Donatists).33 In addition to convincing the Roman authorities that Donatists acted as criminals, Augustine described its adherents with a number of attitudes that dehumanized and animalized them. That is why Augustine used to refer to 20

Carlos García Mac Gaw, Le problème du baptême dans le schisme donatiste (Bordeaux, 2008). Augustine, De bapt. 3.11.16; C. litt. Petil. 1.1.1; 3.5.6. 22 See also Augustine, C. ep. Parm. 1.8.14. 23 Augustine, C. Cresc. 4.8.10: in spiritu sancto seruatur unitas dilectionis et pacis. 24 Augustine, Ad cathol. fratr. 20.55; C. litt. Petil. 2.23.52; 2.39.93. 25 Augustine, De bapt. 1.1.2; 1.5.6; 2.6.9; 2.7.11; 5.1.1; 6.37.72; C. litt. Petil. 2.23.55; 2.30.69; 2.65.146; 2.83.184; C. ep. Parm. 1.4.7; 1.8.13; 2.11.25; 2.17.36; 3.1.1. 26 Augustine, De bapt. 1.10.14; C. litt. Petil. 3.50.62. 27 Augustine, De bapt. 5.2.2. 28 Augustine, C. litt. Petil. 2.96.221. 29 Crimen atrocissimum diuisionis: Augustine, C. litt. Petil. 3.59.72. See also: Ad cathol. fratr. 2.3; C. litt. Petil. 1.21.23; 2.96.221; 2.100.230. 30 Augustine, Ad cathol. fratr. 2.3; De bapt. 1.13.21; 5.3.3; C. litt. Petil. 2.8.20; 2.23.55; 2.81.180; 3.5.6; C. ep. Parm. 1.8.13. 31 On the terminology used in the imperial legislation to criminalize Christian heresy, see the introduction of Roland Delmaire in Les lois religieuses des empereurs romains de Constantin à Théodose II (312-438). I: Code Théodosien, livre XVI (Paris, 2005), 73; H. Zinser, ‘Religio, secta, haeresis’ (2002), 217. See also Giuliano Crifò, ‘Considerazioni sul linguaggio religioso nelle fonti giuridiche tardo-occidentali’, Cassiodorus 5 (1999), 123-42. 32 Conc. Carthag. sub Grato (345-348), c. 1. 33 Donatist bishops had reiterated their acceptance of rebaptism in various of their own councils: in 336 and between 386 and 392: Augustine, Ep. 44.5.12; Paul Monceaux, Histoire littéraire de l’Afrique chrétienne depuis les origines jusqu’à l’invasion arabe, IV: Le donatisme (Paris, 1912), 334 and 338. 21

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Donatists with a denigratory vocabulary much similar to that which legal texts used to portray heretics: error, insania, furor, dementia. In this way, Augustine, transferring to Donatist schismatics the same attitudes defining a heretic, confirmed the total equalization between schism and heresy, and added a new and ultimate argument for justifying the extension to Donatists of the legal persecution against heretics that will be reached in 405. Firstly, Augustine noticed in the Donatist faithful a perverse obstinacy derived from the absence of caritas, a lack of love for God and for the neighbour who pushed him towards the breakdown of unity.34 Therefore, in his opinion, heretics pursued the dissensio and the diuisio with pertinax animositas,35 while a faithful Catholic could be recognized for his love for pax and unitas.36 Furthermore, in De unic. bapt. 5.7 and 6.8, Augustine stressed the iniquitas diuisionis and the sacrilega separatio from the unity of the Church as the main reasons to persevere in the schism. But, above all, the main quality that identified the faithful Donatist and differentiated him from the Catholic faithful was his furor, described by Augustine as sacrilegae animositatis furor,37 and caecus furor.38 In the political and historical language, furor and other derivative terms served to disqualify the evil citizen, the one who sowed the division of society into factions and caused civil conflicts.39 In addition, Augustine specially uses the term furor (adding the qualifier haereticus) to refer to the violent actions of circumcelliones.40 The denunciation of the furor haereticus that inspired his excesses to describe the circumcisions served Augustine to demonstrate the threat posed by Donatism 34 Augustine, C. Cresc. 2.13.16: caritatem uero sanctam […] nemo qui habet potest esse uel schismaticus uel haereticus. 35 Augustine, Ep. 43.1.1. In addition, its breakdown of the unity is disastrous: nefaria diremptio (Augustine, C. litt. Petil. 1.25.27); nefaria diuisio (ibid. 3.3.4). 36 Augustine, C. litt. Petil. 2.95.219. See, on this subject, C. litt. Petil. 2.66.148: esurit quidem uos et sitit unitas Christi, quae utinam uos absorbeat! haeretici non eritis. See also Augustine, Ep. 93.46: non sacramenta Christiana te faciunt haereticum sed praua dissensio. 37 Augustine, Ad cathol. fratr. 2.3. 38 Ibid. 11.28. A preliminary study on the vocabulary used in Augustinian letters to expose the criminal nature of the profession of the Donatism faith in Carles Buenacasa, ‘Les lettres antidonatistes d’Augustin: le vocabulaire employé pour dénoncer les crimes des donatistes’, in Janine Desmulliez, Christine Hoët-van Cauwenberghe and Jean-Christophe Jolivet (eds), L’étude des correspondances dans le monde romain de l’Antiquité classique à l’Antiquité tardive: permanences et mutations (Villeneuve d’Ascq, 2010), 393-410. 39 See Maria Victoria Escribano, ‘La construction de l’image de l’hérétique dans le Code Théodosien XVI’, in Jean-Noël Guinot and François Richard (eds), Empire chrétien et Église aux IVe et Ve siècles. Intégration ou « concordat »? Le témoignage du Code Théodosien (Paris, 2008), 389-412, 395. 40 Augustine, C. litt. Petil. 2.88.195. On violence that Catholics attributed to Donatists, see Michael Gaddis, There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ: Religious Violence in the Christian Roman Empire (Berkeley, 2005); Brent D. Shaw, Sacred Violence: African Christians and Sectarian Hatred in the Age of Augustine (Cambridge, 2011).

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both in the religious and civil spheres. It should be also noted that, in imperial constitutions since 377, furor and error were already being associated with the habitual behaviour of the Donatists.41 All these traits contributed to dehumanize the Donatists attributing to them savage attitudes common with animals. When Augustine described Donatists as a furiosus et inutilis genus,42 he was showing his opponents to be very far from being in a human condition. And if Donatists were not considered as humans they could be heavily – and easily – pursued without a moment of remorse. 3. Conclusions Once bishops had proved beyond any doubt the heretical nature of Donatism, imperial power could then promulgate several edicts for its repression: prohibition of rituals, deprivation of fiscal privileges, confiscation of patrimonies and places of cult, and penalties for clergymen who assumed heresy. As already indicated, the first law to condemn Donatists as heretics dates from 405 and allowed Honorius to impose an Edict of Union. Although certain historical circumstances urged the Court of Ravenna to temporarily suspend the Edict in the following years, this law was never formally abrogated and so lead the way to the Conference of Carthage of 411, which meant the final defeat of Donatism from a legal point of view. If the Donatist schism had remained just a simple rupture of communion without more consequences, the Roman State would have shown some mercy, but the enlargement of the conflict and especially the violence exerted by circumcelliones and the alliance with the usurpers Firmus and Gildo finally convinced the Court of Ravenna of the necessity to promote the Donatist from schism to the category of heresy. The lack of legal means appeared then clear, and the State did support and accept the assimilation of schismatics to heretics. This assimilation permitted the emperors to use religious legislation to persecute Donatists as political enemies and impose on to them the same treatment that a heretic had received since Theodosius I and the Edict of Thessalonica (380) – or, at least, intimidated the recalcitrant heretics with the threat of the implementation of punishments prescribed by laws. That is why, in the Edict of Union of 405 and in the anti-Donatist laws published thereafter, all the terms will frequently appear that Augustine had used in the period 400-405 to denigrate, criminalize and animalize the Donatists.43 41

Cod. Theod. 16.6.2 (17th October 377). Augustine, Ep. 185.3.14. 43 In Cod. Theod. 16.6.4 (405) the terms sacrilegium, error, scelus and crimen have a strong presence. In Cod. Theod. 16.5.38 (405) it is stated that Donatists furere non desistunt. Other examples in Cod. Theod. 16.5.43 (407): scaeua religio; and in 16.5.52 (415): sacrilege desciuere. 42

Augustine, Prosper, and the Stirrings of Missionary Consciousness Samuel CARDWELL, University of Toronto, Canada

ABSTRACT In the early fifth century, numerous Christian intellectuals (including Ambrose, Jerome, and Prudentius) believed that the task of spreading the gospel was already complete. Jerome, for instance, wrote that he did not think that ‘any nation remained which did not know the name of Christ’. The emperors Constantine and Theodosius had ushered in tempora christiana, leading to a widespread belief that the end of the world was imminent, in fulfilment of Christ’s promise in Matt. 24:14. However, Augustine of Hippo and his follower Prosper of Aquitaine knew better. Augustine, in a letter dated to 418-420, noted there were tribes outside of the Empire who had no knowledge whatsoever of Christ; he argued that Christ’s commission to be his witnesses ‘to the ends of the earth’ (Acts 1:8) applied not only to the Apostles but to all Christians. Prosper expanded on this in De vocatione omnium gentium, asserting that ‘the gospel of the Cross of Christ was sent to all people’, whether or not they happened to dwell within the limits of the Empire. This article will argue that, in these texts, Augustine and Prosper began to develop a ‘theology of mission’, which ran counter to the theological mainstream of their era, but which would have a profound and far-reaching impact both theologically and historically.

In the early fifth century AD, Hesychius, Bishop of Salona in Dalmatia (modern-day Split in Croatia) wrote to Augustine of Hippo, expressing with great confidence that the end of the world was imminent.1 Hesychius’ conviction was based on, among other things, Christ’s prophecy in Matt. 24:14 that the apocalypse would occur shortly after the gospel had been preached throughout

1 The correspondence between Hesychius and Augustine is preserved in Aug., Epp. 197-9 (S. Augustini Epistulae, ed. Alois Goldbacher, CSEL 57 [Vienna, Leipzig, 1911], 231-92). The initial set of questions from Hesychius is lost; Ep. 197 is Augustine’s initial reply, followed by Hesychius’ ‘pushback’ in Ep. 198, and Augustine’s extremely lengthy further reply in Ep. 199. This exchange has been dated to between 19 July 418 (the solar eclipse on this date is mentioned by Hesychius as a recent event) and 420, see Jean-Paul Bouhot, ‘Hesychius de Salone et Augustin’, in Anne-Marie la Bonnardière (ed.), Saint Augustin et la Bible (Paris, 1986), 229-50. Bouhot gives a terminus ante quem of 20 October 420 on the basis that Jerome, who died on that date, is referred to as if he were still alive; of course, it would have taken some time for this news to reach Hippo, so it is possible that Ep. 199 was completed a little while after that date.

Studia Patristica CXIX, 117-128. © Peeters Publishers, 2021.

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the entire world.2 Surely, he argued, the gospel had already spread throughout the world – at least throughout the part of the world that really mattered, the Roman Empire – for, ‘after the Emperors became Christian, the gospel of Christ broke through everywhere in a short time’.3 In writing this, the bishop was not betraying himself as a backwater jingoist. On the contrary, he was simply expressing the mainstream Christian opinion of the fourth and early fifth centuries. Jerome, commenting on Matt. 24:14, writes: Signum aduentus dominici est euangelium in toto orbe praedicari ut nullus sit excusabilis, quod aut iam completum aut in breui cernimus esse complendum. Non enim puto aliquam remansisse gentem quae Christi nomen ignoret et quamquam non habuerit praedicatorem, tamen ex uicinis nationibus opnionem fidei non potest ignorare. A sign of the Lord’s coming is that the gospel will be preached in the whole world, so that no one may be excused. We believe that this sign is either fulfilled now or is shortly to be fulfilled. For I do not think any nation remains which is ignorant of the name of Christ, and although they might not have a preacher, nevertheless they are not able to ignore the report of the faith from their neighbouring nations.4

Meanwhile Ambrose, commenting on the ‘signs of the times’ in Luke, writes: ‘Let the Gospel be preached, so that the age may end!’5 But lest we take this as a strident call to mission, he goes on: ‘For the preaching of the gospel in the world has preceded us, by which now the Goths and Armenians have believed, and so we are seeing the end of the world’.6 Jerome and Ambrose understand that Christ called for the Gospel to be preached to the nations; they simply think this need has already been met, although unlike Hesychius they do not overtly credit the Roman Empire with meeting it.7 2 Matt. 24:14, as quoted in Aug., Ep. 198.6 (CSEL 57, 240): et praedicabitur hoc euangelium in uniuerso mundo et tunc ueniet finis (‘And this gospel will be preached in all the world, and then the end will come’). All translations mine unless otherwise stated. 3 Aug., Ep. 198 (CSEL 57, 241): factis regibus Christianis ubique in paruo tempore euangelium Christi penetrauit. 4 Jer., Comm. in Matt. 24:14 (S. Hieronymi Presbyteri Commentariorum in Matheum Libri IV, ed. David Hurst and Marc Adriaen, CChr.SL 77 [Turnhout, 1969], 225). A similarly terse expression of this, referring to the same verse, can be found in Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechetical Lecture 15.8 (PG 33, 880): ‘Καὶ σχεδὸν, ὡς ὁρῶμεν, ὁ κόσμος ἁπας τῆς περὶ Χριστοῦ διδασκαλίας πεπλήρωται’ (‘And, as we can see, nearly the whole world has been filled with the teachings about Christ’). 5 Ambrose, Expositio sec. Luc. 10.14 (on Luke 21:9) (Ambrosius: Expositio Evangelii Secundum Lucam, ed. Marc Adriaen, CChr.SL 14 [Turnhout, 1957], 349): praedicetur euangelium, ut saeculum destruatur. 6 … enim praecessit in orbem terrae euangelii praedicatio, cui iam et Gothi et Armenii crediderunt, et ideo mundi finem uidemus… (CChr.SL 14, 350). 7 Elsewhere Ambrose does afford a unique place for Rome as the ‘head of the nations’, where ‘the people of heaven come together’ (Ambrose, Hymn 12.29-32) (Ambroise de Milan: Hymnes, ed. Jacques Fontaine et al. [Paris, 1992]). Cf. Brian Dunkle, Enchantment and Creed in the Hymns

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Other late fourth- and early fifth-century authors more explicitly bind together the spread of the Church and the spread of the Empire. Optatus of Milevis, in his book against the Donatists, writes: ‘The Republic is not in the Church, but the Church is in the Republic, that is in the Roman Empire … where there are also the holy offices of priesthood, and modesty and virginity, which are not to be found in barbarian nations, and if they are to be found, they are not able to be protected’.8 The poet Prudentius was no less sceptical about ‘barbarian’ Christianity, and even more strident about the imperium Christianum. In the Contra Symmachum, he transfers the old Virgilian promise of imperium sine fine onto the Emperor Theodosius, promising that Roman dominion would extend (in its new Christian form) even unto the stars.9 As for the barbarians outside the limits of the Empire, they are scarcely worthy of a Roman Christian’s concern. The barbarian is ‘as different [from the Roman] as the quadruped is from the biped’; according to Prudentius, the heathen gods, abandoned by the Romans, should be left to the barbarians, who hold things of Ambrose of Milan (Oxford, 2016), ch. 5. In his oration on the death of the Emperor Theodosius, he refers to the Roman Empire ‘qui totum regit orbem’, and says that the emperors have been transformed from persecutores into praedicatores (Ambrose, De obitu Theodosii, 48) (Sancti Ambrosii Oratio de obitu Theodosii: Text, Translation, Introduction and Commentary, ed. Mary Dolorosa Mannix [Washington, DC, 1925], 61). 8 Optatus 3.3 (S. Optati Mileuitani Libri VII, ed. Carolus Ziwsa, CSEL 26 [Prague, Vienna, Leipzig, 1893], 73-4): Non enim respublica est in ecclesia, sed ecclesia in republica, id est in imperio Romano … ubi et sacerdotia sancta sunt et pudicitia et uirginitas, quae in barbaris gentibus non sunt et, si essent, tuta esse non possent. 9 Prudentius, Contra Symmachum, 1.538-43; 1.587-90, cf. Virg., Aen. 1.279 (Aurelii Prudentii Clementis Carmina, ed. Johannes Bergman, CSEL 61 [Vienna, Leipzig, 1926], 239-41), trans. H.J. Thomson, Prudentius, vol. 1, LCL (Cambridge, MA, 1949), 391, 395: Denique nec metas statuit nec tempora ponit: imperium sine fine docet, ne Romula virtus iam sit anus, norit ne gloria parta senectam… Et dubitamus adhuc Romam tibi, Christe, dicatam in leges transisse tuas omnique volentem cum populo et summis cum civibus ardua magni iam super astra poli terrenum extendere regnum? Unending sway he taught, so that the valour of Rome should never grow old nor the glory she had won know age… And do we still hesitate to believe that Rome, O Christ, has devoted herself to Thee and placed herself under thy governance, and that with all her people and her greatest citizens she is now eagerly extending her earthly realm beyond the lofty stars of the great firmament? Paschoud sees Prudentius as representative of the plein développement of the accommodation of Roman and Christian political theology (François Paschoud, Roma Aeterna: Études sur le patriotisme romain dans l’Occident latin à l’époque des grandes invasions [Rome, 1967]); Markus sees this as among the ‘most disturbing symptoms of Theodosian Christianity’ (Robert A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St Augustine [Cambridge, 1970], 27-8). This view of Prudentius has been nuanced by Pietsch, who argues that in these passages Prudentius is rather ‘binding’ Rome to a transzendenten Himmelreich (Christian Pietsch, ‘Aeternas temptare vias: Zur Romidee im Werk des Prudentius’, Hermes 129 [2001], 259-75, 274).

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sacred simply because they fear them.10 We can see, then, that Hesychius’ belief that the Gospel had already spread to the entire ‘civilised’ world was by no means unusual in the early fifth century. Augustine’s response to Hesychius’ questions about the end of the world (which are broader than the topic of this paper) can be found in Epistulae 197 and 199. Ep. 197 responds to an earlier set of questions from Hesychius which does not survive. Augustine notes, with reference to Matt. 24, that the end of the world will not occur before the Gospel has been preached to all nations. It is unclear whether this had been raised in Hesychius’ initial letter, but, given that Augustine seems to see this as a perfectly unambiguous verse (apertissima sententia), it is possible that he was broaching the topic of ‘mission’ for the first time. He rather playfully suggests that if those ‘servants of God’ who took up the task of preaching to the nations could only make an accurate report of ‘what nations remained where the gospel had not yet been preached’, we might be able to gauge accurately how soon the end might come.11 Furthermore, he attempts – unsuccessfully as it happens – to pre-empt Hesychius’ argument from the success of the Roman Empire: ‘Perhaps someone might reply that the Roman peoples and many barbarians have been seized by the preaching of the Gospel with such rapidity, and that many of them have been converted to the faith of Christ, not slowly but suddenly, that it is not incredible that in a few years … all the remaining nations can have the Gospel preached to them’.12 He accepts this as a possibility, but suggests that it will be easier to ‘prove this from experience’ after the fact, than to predict it from scripture beforehand.13 This first letter evidently was not sufficient for Hesychius, who wrote back in Ep. 198, including the suggestion I quoted above that the conversion of the Roman emperors had marked a vital turning point on the way to the fulfilment of the promise in Matt. 24. Augustine’s response in Ep. 199 is lengthy and circulated as a opusculus in its own right under the title De fine saeculi.14 The letter as a whole establishes Augustine’s ‘agnostic’ position on the Second Coming – he 10 Prudentius, Contra Symmachum, 2.819-20 (CSEL 61, 276: sed tantum distant Romana et barbara, quantum | quadrupes abiuncta est bipedi…); ibid., 1.449-54 (CSEL 61, 236). 11 Aug., Ep. 197 (CSEL 57, 233-4): si ergo susciperent hunc laborem dei serui, ut peragrato orbe terrarum, quantum possent, colligerent, quid remansit gentium, ubi nondum est euangelium praedictum, hinc aduertere utcumque possemus, quantum hoc tempus longe sit a saeculi fine. 12 Ibid.: quis forte respondeat tanta celeritate praedicato euangelio Romanas gentes et plerasque barbaras occupatas atque ita nonnullas non paulatim sed subito ad fidem Christi fuisse conuersas, ut non sit incredibile paucis annis … uniuersas omnino residuas gentes euangelio posse compleri. 13 Ibid.: sed si ita erit, facilius, cum factum fuerit, probari experiendo quam legendo, antequam fiat, inueniri potest. 14 Aug., De civ. Dei, 20.5 (Sancti Aurelii Augustini De Civitate Dei Libri XI-XXII, ed. Bernhard Dombart and Alphons Kalb, CChr.SL 48 [Turnhout, 1955], 705): quod facere utcumque curaui in quadam epistula, quam rescripsi ad beatae memoriae uirum Hesychium, Salonitanae urbis episcopum, cuius epistulae titulus est: De fine saeculi (‘I have taken care to do so in a

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is hopeful that Christ will come soon but prepared to wait patiently, since Christ himself warned that ‘concerning that day and hour no one knows’ (Matt. 24:36: De die autem illa et hora nemo scit).15 Augustine comes to the question of ‘preaching to the nations’ towards the end of the letter, when he says that Hesychius’ optimistic (or perhaps triumphalist) view is mistaken: Quod enim putat uenerabilitas tua iam hoc per ipsos apostolos factum, non ita esse certis documentis probaui. sunt enim apud nos, hoc est in Africa, barbarae innumerabiles gentes, in quibus nondum esse praedicatum euangelium … interiores autem, qui sub nulla sunt potestate Romana, prorsus nec religione Christiana in suorum aliquibus detinentur neque ullo modo recte dici potest istos ad promissionem Dei non pertinere. Non enim Romanos sed omnes gentes dominus semini Abrahae media quoque juratione promisit. For I have established by certain proofs that what Your Reverence thinks was already accomplished by the apostles is not the case. For there are among us, that is, in Africa, countless barbarian nations where the gospel has not yet been preached… Those who are further inland and are not under Roman power have no contact with the Christian religion in any of their people, and yet it is by no means correct to say that God’s promise does not pertain to them. It was not only the Romans but all nations that the Lord promised to Abraham by means of an oath (cf. Gen. 22:16-8; Heb. 6:13-8).16

What Augustine says here is quietly revolutionary. He challenges the idea that the Roman Empire and the Christian Church were coterminous. He challenges the idea, found in Jerome and Ambrose, that virtually the whole world had heard the Gospel. And he challenges the idea that the apostolic task of preaching to the nations had been fulfilled by the apostles themselves, an idea which had largely been taken for granted throughout the second, third and fourth centuries.17 In Augustine’s own time, John Chrysostom stated that the certain letter, which I wrote back to Hesychius, a man of blessed memory, Bishop of Salona, which is titled “On the End of the Age”’). 15 See esp. Aug., Ep. 199.52-54, in which Augustine summarises his position with a parable of three servants, who are entrusted with their master’s estate while he is on a long journey. All three manage the estate diligently and ardently desire his return; but one says the master will come sooner, another later, while the third admits his ignorance of the matter. All three are commendable – the first for his desire (though he is ‘in danger if mistaken’), the second for his patience, but the third (in whom we might identify Augustine himself) ‘hopes for the former, endures the latter, and is mistaken in neither’ (CSEL 57, 292: illud optat, hoc tolerat, in nullo eorum errat). For the eschatological context of the letter, see Johannes van Oort, ‘The End is Now: Augustine on History and Eschatology’, HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 68 (2002) [online at: https://hts.org.za/index.php/HTS/article/view/1188]. 16 Aug., Ep. 199.46 (CSEL 57, 284-5), trans. Roland Teske, The Works of Saint Augustine. A Translation for the 21st Century, 2/3 (New York, 1990), 350. Cf. Jacques Chocheyras, ‘Fin de terres et fin des temps d’Hésychius (Ve siècle) à Béatus (VIIIe siècle)’, in Werner Verbeke, Daniel Verhelst and Andries Welkenhuysen (eds), The Use and Abuse of Eschatology in the Middle Ages (Leuven, 1988), 72-81, 73-4. 17 Reidar Hvalvik, ‘In Word and Deed: The Expansion of the Church in the Pre-Constantinian Era’, in Jostein Ådna and Hans Kvalbein (eds), The Mission of the Early Church to Jews and Gentiles (Tübingen, 2000), 265-87.

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entire world had been evangelised before the Sack of Jerusalem in 70 AD.18 Incidentally, this belief retained some force even after the discovery of unevangelised peoples in the New World – some seventeenth-century Christians suggested that St Thomas must have travelled on from India to the Americas!19 In case there was any doubt, Augustine makes it quite clear that the apostolic commission was not confined to the apostles: Quo pacto igitur ab apostolis est praedicatio ista completa, quando adhuc usque sunt gentes, quod certissimum est nobis, in quibus modo coepit et in quibus nondum coepit impleri? non itaque sit dictum est apostolis: ‘Eritis mihi testes in Hierusalem et in tota Iudaea et Samaria et usque ad extremum terrae’, tamquam ipsi soli … tantum munus fuerint impleturi, sed sicut eis solis uidetur dixisse, quod dixit: ‘Ecce ego uobiscum sum usque in consummationem saeculi’, quod tamen eum universae ecclesiae promisisse, quae aliis morientibus, aliis nascentibus hic usque in saeculi consummationem futura est, quis non intelligat? How, then, was this preaching completed by the apostles, when there are still nations – as is most certainly the case – in which it is only now beginning, and in which it has not yet begun to be fulfilled? It was not said to the apostles, ‘You will be my witnesses in Jerusalem and in all Judaea and Samaria and even unto the ends of the earth’ (Acts 1:8), as if it was up to them alone … to complete so great a task. But who does not understand that – just as he seems to have said to them alone, ‘Behold, I am with you even unto the end of the age’ (Matt. 28:20) – he in fact promised this to the whole Church, which will last here ‘even unto the end of the age’, while some die and some are born.20

As far as I am aware, this is the very first time that an author interprets the so-called ‘Great Commission’ as a call to ‘mission’ for contemporary Christians.21 We are still some way away from the first post-apostolic mission per se to an 18 John Chrysostom, Homilia in Matt. 75.2 (PG 58, 688-9): Διὸ καὶ ἑπήγαγε· Καὶ κηρυχθήσεται τὸ Εὐαγγέλιον τοῦτο ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ εἰς μαρτύριον πᾶσι τοῖς ἔθνεσι· καὶ τότε ἤξει τὸ τέλος· τῆς συντελείας τῶν Ἰεροσολύμων… Ὃ καὶ μέγιστον σημεῖον τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ δυνάμεως, ὅτι ἐν εἴκοσι ἢ καὶ τριάκοντα ὅλοις ἔτεσι τὰ πέρατα τῆς οἰκουμένης κατέλαβεν ὁ λόγος (‘So he added “And this Gospel will be preached in the whole world as a witness to all nations, and then the end will come” about the fall of Jerusalem… And it is a great sign of the power of Christ, that in twenty or at most thirty years the ends of the earth received the word’). 19 Anthony Grant, The past and prospective extension of the Gospel by missions to the heathen: considered in eight lectures delivered before the University of Oxford in the year MDCCCXLIII at the lecture founded by John Bampton, M.A., Canon of Salisbury, 2nd ed. (London, 1845), 10, noting that this notion was ‘stated and refuted’ by Hermann Witsius (1636-1708) in a treatise De evangelium in America praedicando. 20 Aug., Ep. 199.49 (CSEL 57, 287). As ‘proofs’, Augustine offers the testimony of people who had been taken as slaves from among these peoples. 21 Cf. R. Hvalvik, ‘In Word and Deed’ (2000), 275-8. ‘The Great Commission’ is a modern term – as a set phrase it seems to have been popularised by James Hudson Tyler (e.g. James Hudson Taylor, A Retrospect, 3rd ed. [Toronto, 1902], 40); the use of the passage, especially in its Matthean form (Matt. 28:18-20), as a call to mission is often traced to the late eighteenthcentury Baptist missionary William Carey, An Enquiry into the Obligations of Christians to Use

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unreached people – I agree with Richard Fletcher and E.A. Thompson that it is difficult to see anything like a Church-sponsored mission before Gregory the Great, and that Patrick was most likely the first person after the apostles who explicitly took on an ‘apostolic’ role as a missionary to a group outside the current or former Roman Empire.22 However, this was still an important, yet neglected, moment in the history of Christianity: the Western Church was beginning to look beyond the security of Romanitas. There is not time here to fully explore why Augustine broke away from earlier tradition. He himself may not have been conscious of the break – he gives every impression in these letters that he saw his own reading as apertissimus and certissimus, as simply the most natural way to understand scripture. However, his own thoughts on ‘preaching the Gospel to the nations’ changed over the course of his career, along with his views on the intersection of ecclesia and imperium. Robert Markus, following Bernhard Lohse, recognised a distinct shift in Augustine’s view of the Roman Empire from at least 410 onwards.23 A number of his works from the 390s and early 400s had been somewhat open to the Theodosian rhetoric of tempora Christiana (the idea that the Christianisation of the Empire had ushered in ‘Christian times’, when the Church would triumph rapidly over paganism).24 Augustine famously lost his confidence in the Empire, as is evident both from his immediate response to the Sack of Means for the Conversion of the Heathens (Leicester, 1792). However, one can find early medieval uses of the text in a ‘missionary’ context: e.g. Bede, HE 2.8; Alcuin, Ep. 110, 111. 22 Edward A. Thompson, ‘Christianity and the Northern Barbarians’, Nottingham Medieval Studies 1 (1957), 3-21; Richard Fletcher, The Conversion of Europe From Paganism to Christianity, 371-1386 (London, 1997), 25, 86. Thompson does note examples of local bishops reaching out to barbarian groups who had already settled within the Empire – however, these seem to have been local and ad hoc efforts. The conversions of the Ethiopians, the Georgians, and the Armenians all appear to have been catalysed by Christian prisoners and slaves. Finally, the bishops Ulfilas and Palladius, who were sent to the Goths and the Irish respectively, were both explicitly commissioned to minister to people within those groups who were already Christian. 23 R.A. Markus, Saeculum (1970), ch. 2, following Bernhard Lohse, ‘Augustins Wandlung in seiner Beurteilung des Staates’, SP 6 (1962), 447-75; cf. Peter Brown, ‘St. Augustine’s Attitude to Religious Coercion’, Journal of Roman Studies 54 (1964), 107-16, repr. in Peter Brown, Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine (London, 1972), 260-78, 267. After criticism by Goulven Madec, ‘Tempora Christiana: expression du triomphalisme chrétien ou recrimination païenne?’, in C.P. Mayer and W. Eckermann (eds), Scientia Augustiniana: Studien über Augustinus, den Augustinismus und den Augustinerorden (Würzburg, 1975), 112-36, Markus ‘revisited’ but largely reaffirmed the arguments he made in Saeculum: R.A. Markus, ‘Tempora Christiana Revisited’, in Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (eds), Augustine and his Critics: Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner (London, 2000), 199-211. 24 This is perhaps most clear in De consensu evangelistarum 1.14.21 (Sancti Aureli Augustini De Consensu Evangelistarum Libri Quattuor, ed. Franciscus Weihrich, CSEL 43 [Vienna, Leipzig, 1904], 20-1): … et Romanum imperium … per Christum regum suo nomini subiugauit … [et] christianae fidei robore ac deuotione conuertit (‘And he has subjected the Roman Empire to his name through Christ the King … and converted it with the strength and devotion of the Christian faith’).

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Rome in 410 as witnessed by his sermons,25 as well as in De civitate Dei.26 It is possible that this new ambivalence towards the Empire inspired Augustine to look anew at the peoples living beyond its frontiers. Alongside this, we might consider Augustine’s long-running battle with the Donatist schism. In text after text, over the course of twenty years or more, Augustine stresses the universality of the catholic Church, in contrast with the narrowness of the schismatics ‘in one corner of Africa’.27 At times, this leads him to an overemphasis of the Church’s reach – ecclesia toto orbe diffusa est becomes a kind of catchphrase for Augustine in these discussions.28 Even as late as 414, we find him placing the apostolic commission in the past tense, telling his congregation in an anti-Donatist sermon that ‘we know … where [Christ] sent his disciples from … where he commanded them to evangelise throughout the whole world; and they obeyed him, and the whole earth is filled with the Gospel’.29 However, it would appear that the language of ‘the church spread throughout the whole world’ occurs less often later in Augustine’s career. As the Donatist controversy recedes, so the emphasis shifts towards the work that remains to be done in furthering the spread of the Church before the end of the world.30 At the end of Ep. 199, Augustine offers an interpretation of biblical passages such as Rom. 10:18, where Paul quotes Ps. 18(19):5: ‘Their voice has gone out through the whole earth, and their words have reached the ends of the earth’.31 He writes that in such statements (also citing 1Tim. 3:15-6 25 Aug., Serm. 33A (CChr.SL 41, 417-22); Serm. 15A (CChr.SL 41, 202-11); Serm. 113A (Miscellanea Agostiniana 1 [1930-1], 141-55); Serm. 81 (PL 38, 499-506); Serm. 296 (Miscellanea Agostiniana 1 [1930-1], 401-12); Serm. 105 (PL 38, 618-25); De excidio urbis (CChr.SL 46, 243-62); Serm. 25 (CChr.SL 41, 334-9). Cf. Rudolph Arbesmann, ‘The Idea of Rome in the Sermons of St. Augustine’, Augustiniana 4 (1954), 305-24; Theodore S. De Bruyn, ‘Ambivalence within a “Totalizing Discourse”: Augustine’s Sermons on the Sack of Rome’, Journal of Early Christian Studies 1 (1993), 405-21. 26 E.g. Aug., De civ. Dei, 2.29, 5.17. 27 E.g. Aug., Epp. 44.3-6, 49.2, 53.1, 66.1, 93.20-3, 140.43, 144.3, 173.7, 185.3, 208.6. Considering how often Augustine uses this argument, it has perhaps been underappreciated in modern scholarship – for instance, it garners only a couple of pages in Bonner’s discussion of the theology of the Donatist controversy (Gerald Bonner, St Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies [London, 1963], 285-6). 28 Daniel E. Doyle, ‘Spread Throughout the World: Hints on Augustine’s Understanding of Petrine Ministry’, Journal of Early Christian Studies 13 (2005), 233-45. 29 Aug., Sermo 46.38 (PL 38, 293): Novimus … unde discipulos miserit … ubi per totum mundum evangelizare jusserit: et obtemperarunt ei, et impletus orbis terrarum Evangelio. Augustine’s discourse here, which carries through to Sermo 47 is perhaps his most vehement defence of the ecclesia orbe diffusa est motif; cf. D. Doyle, ‘Spread Throughout the World’ (2005), 238-9. 30 We can perhaps see early signs of this shift in En. in Ps. 71 (Sancti Aurelii Augustini Enarrationes in Psalmos LI-C, ed. D. Eligius Dekkers and Johannes Fraipont, CChr.SL 39 [Turnhout, 1956], 971-85) which is framed around the idea of the extension of the kingdom of Christ (as the true Solomon) a mari usque ad mare, et a flumine usque ad terminos orbis terrae (Ps. 71[72]:8). 31 Aug., Ep. 199.50 (CSEL 57, 288): Numquid non audierunt? ‘in omnem terram exiit sonus eorum et in fines orbis terrae uerba eorum’.

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and Col. 1:5-6), Paul used past and present tenses with a future sense – their future fulfilment was certain, but work remained to be done.32 Perhaps Augustine would have reinterpreted his own previous statements in the same way – in the battle against the Donatists, when he proclaimed ‘the Church spread throughout the whole world’, he was expressing something which was true in principle but which had not yet been completely realised. He could not maintain a belief in the universality of the Church without acknowledging the very real needs of unreached peoples ‘among us, that is in Africa’. Prosper of Aquitaine, writing about thirty years after Augustine’s correspondence with Hesychius, would cover similar ground in his De vocatione omnium gentium (‘On the Call of All Nations’).33 A great deal of modern discussion of this text, following the work of Maïeul Cappuyns in the 1920s, revolves around the extent to which this text represents a departure from Prosper’s earlier strident Augustinianism. In short, Cappuyns, Roland Teske and Alexander Hwang have argued that De voc. is a significant and original departure from the strictest Augustinian doctrine of predestination, while Lionello Pelland, Georges de Plinval (who questioned Prosper’s authorship of De voc.) and Rudolf Lorenz suggested that Prosper departed from Augustine only in presentation, not in substance.34 I make no intervention in that debate here. However, it strikes me that much of the discussion of De voc. has neglected what Prosper 32

Aug., Ep. 199.50-1. Prosper: De vocatione omnium gentium, ed. Roland J. Teske and Dorothea Weber, CSEL 97 (Vienna, 2009). The authorship of De voc. has long been a matter of debate, however, in the last fifty years the critical consensus has strongly favoured Prosper’s authorship, see ibid., 23-33, following Arturo Elberti, Prospero d’Aquitania: Teologo e Discepolo (Rome, 1999), 146-8. The question of dating is also vexed, hanging on a long-running debate over the extent and timing of Prosper’s relationship with Pope Leo I (r. 440-461). Teske and Weber suggest a date of ca. 450, on the assumption that it was written under Leo’s influence, after Prosper moved to Rome to act as the Pope’s secretary. This move was traditionally thought to have occurred in 435, see M. Cappuyns, ‘Le premier représentant de l’Augustinisme médiéval, Prosper d’Aquitaine’, Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 1 (1929), 309-37, 326, n. 47; Markus convincingly rejected this date, see R.A. Markus, ‘Chronicle and Theology: Prosper of Aquitaine’, in Christopher Holdsworth and T.P. Wiseman (eds), The Inheritance of Historiography, 350-900 (Exeter, 1986), 31-43. A date of 440 for Prosper’s move to Rome is suggested in Alexander Y. Hwang, Intrepid Lover of Perfect Grace: The Life and Thought of Prosper of Aquitaine (Washington, DC, 2009), 187-98. However, the whole premise of Leo and Prosper’s close relationship has recently been challenged by Salzman, who notes that the evidence for Prosper moving to Rome at all is decidedly flimsy, see Michele Renee Salzman, ‘Reconsidering a Relationship: Pope Leo of Rome and Prosper of Aquitaine’, in Geoffrey D. Dunn (ed.), The Bishop of Rome in Late Antiquity (Farnham, 2015), 109-26. That said, Salzman perhaps underplays the verbal links between Prosper and Leo’s writings, which are summarised in N.W. James, ‘Leo the Great and Prosper of Aquitaine: A Fifth Century Pope and his Adviser’, Journal of Theological Studies, NS 44 (1993), 554-84. 34 M. Cappuyns, ‘Le premier représentant’ (1929), 329; Roland J. Teske, ‘The Augustinianism of Prosper of Aquitaine Revisited’, SP 43 (2003), 491-504; A. Hwang, Intrepid Lover of Perfect Grace (2009), 208-20; Lionello Pelland, S. Prosperi Aquitani: Doctrina de predestinatione et uoluntate Dei salvifica (Montreal, 1936); Georges de Plinval, ‘Prosper d’Aquitaine interprète de 33

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has to say about the conversion of peoples outside the Roman Empire – it has fallen to early medievalists like Thomas Charles-Edwards and Richard Fletcher to ask these questions.35 When it comes to the spread of the Gospel, Prosper is perhaps the first person to follow in the footsteps of Augustine’s letter to Hesychius.36 For Prosper, although not all people are saved, it is nevertheless true that God both desires and is actively working for the salvation of all people and all peoples (following 1Tim. 2:4).37 This has been seen as a key point of departure from strict Augustinian predestination.38 However, it leads Prosper to very similar territory to where Augustine’s meditation on the end of the world had led him. Both Augustine and Prosper look back to God’s promise to Abraham in Gen. 22 (that his descendants would be as numerous as the stars) as proof that salvation is offered to all peoples, not only to the Jews or the Romans.39 Both authors stress that salvation is offered to people of all nations, but not to all individual members of all nations.40 Most significantly, Prosper follows Augustine in applying Christ’s preaching commission to contemporary Christians. He writes: Proinde vigilanter consideremus, praedicatoribus evangelii quid a domino iubeatur. Secundum Matthaeum quippe sic ait … ‘Euntes ergo docete omnes gentes baptizantes eos in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti’ … Secundum Marcum vero iisdem apostolis ita dicitur: ‘Ite in orbem universum et praedicate evangelium universae creaturae’ … Numquid in hac praeceptione ullarum nationum ullorumve hominum facta discretio est? … ad omnes prorsus homines missum est evangelium crucis Christi. Et ne praedicantium ministeria humano tantum viderentur opera peragenda, ‘Ecce, ego’, inquit, ‘vobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem saeculi’, id est … de mea potestate confidite, qui vos usque ad consummationem saeculi in omni hoc opera non derelinquam … Let us carefully consider what the Lord commands to preachers of the Gospel. According to Matthew, he says … “Go and preach the Gospel to all nations, baptising them saint Augustin’, Recherches Augustiniennes 1 (1958), 339-55; Rudolf Lorenz, ‘Der Augustinismus Prospers von Aquitanien’, Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 73 (1962), 217-52. 35 T.M. Charles-Edwards, ‘Palladius, Prosper, and Leo the Great: Mission and Primatial Authority’, in David N. Dumville (ed.), Saint Patrick, A.D. 493-1993 (Woodbridge, 1993), 1-12; R. Fletcher, The Conversion of Europe (1997), 31-2. 36 I cannot prove that Prosper had read Aug., Ep. 199. However, we know that he was himself a correspondent with Augustine in the late 420s (Aug., Epp. 225-6); that Ep. 199 circulated as a separate opusculus (n. 14 above); and that Augustine’s letters often circulated widely, with or without Augustine’s permission, as is evident from the letters themselves. See, for example, his wry statement to Valerius that, given he has so greatly enjoyed reading his letters, ‘even those which we had addressed to other people’ (etiam quae ad alios conscripsimus), he would have no problem reading a letter that was actually addressed to him (Aug., Ep. 200.3 [CSEL 57, 295]). 37 Prosper, De voc., 1.20.38. 38 R. Teske, ‘The Augustinianism of Prosper’ (2003), 496-7. 39 Prosper, De voc., 1.20.38, cf. Aug., Ep. 199.47. 40 Prosper, De voc., 1.20.22-3, cf. Aug., Ep. 199.48.

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in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit” (Matt. 28:19) … According to Mark he says thus to the same disciples: “Go into the whole world and preach the Gospel to every creature” (Mark 16:15) … Is there any distinction made in this commandment between any nations or any individuals? … The Gospel of the cross of Christ was sent to all people. And lest the ministry of preaching seem to be a work to be accomplished by human beings, he said “Behold, I am with you all days even unto the end of the world” (Matt. 28:20), that is … be confident in my power, for I will not desert you in all this work even unto the end of the world.41

Here Prosper almost seems to take it for granted that the preaching aspect of Matt. 28 and Mark 16 apply usque ad consummationem saeculi; yet, as we have seen, this had by no means been assumed prior to Augustine. Taken together, and alongside Prosper’s near-contemporary St Patrick (who very clearly read these texts as a call to ‘apostolic’ mission), we can begin to locate a genuine shift in Western Christian thinking: a shift away from seeing the preaching commission as applicable to the apostles only, and towards seeing this as a lasting commandment.42 We should not overstate the extent to which Augustine and Prosper offered any kind of ‘missionary theology’ in these texts. Both authors are caught in two minds about how much further the Gospel has to extend. At the end of De voc., Prosper can be found exclaiming ‘No part of the world is left empty of the Gospel of Christ’; and in a later chapter of De civitate Dei, while affirming that the preaching commission was not carried out by the apostles alone, Augustine nevertheless casts the preaching of the Gospel into the past tense: praedicatum est toto orbe euangelium.43 Despite Augustine quoting Rom. 10:14-5 at Hesychius – ‘How will they hear without a preacher? And how will they preach unless they be sent?’ – neither he nor Prosper actively considered how this ‘sending’ might come about.44 Prosper is also decidedly unambitious in how he sees the spread of the Gospel happening in practice. Writing at a time of considerable conflict, perhaps even with Attila was poised to cross the Rhine, he suggests that the warfare which was ‘wearing out the world’ (ipsa quibus mundus atteritur arma) was actually serving to evangelise the ‘barbarian’ invaders: Christian prisoners and slaves were preaching to the barbarians, while barbarian auxiliaries serving in the Roman army were returning with the faith.45 41

Prosper, De voc., 2.2.3 (CSEL 97, 142-3). Patrick, Confessio, 40. Patrick’s dates are infamously vexed, but the evidence surveyed in D. Dumville, Saint Patrick, A.D. 493-1993 (1993) largely points to the second half of the fifth century. 43 Prosper, De voc., 2.33.53 (CSEL 97, 193): nulla pars mundi ab evangelio vacat Christi; Aug, De civ. Dei, 18.50. 44 Aug., Ep. 199.48 (CSEL 97, 286): quo modo autem audient sine praedicante? aut quo modo praedicabunt, nisi mittantur? 45 Prosper, De voc., 2.33.53 (CSEL 97, 193-4). The effectiveness of such means of conversion was assessed in E.A. Thompson, ‘Christianity and the Northern Barbarians’ (1957). 42

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Fletcher was correct to suggest that these two authors reached the ‘threshold’ of mission, but ‘hesitated’.46 Yet we can see in these texts the first stirrings, after the time of the apostles, of a missionary consciousness in Western Europe. We know, of course, that the next centuries would see a flourishing of missionary activity in Ireland, Britain, Germany and beyond. More work needs to be done to see how these ideas developed as ideas – did Prosper and Augustine have a direct or indirect influence on the likes of Gregory, Willibrord, and Boniface? If not, what else underpinned their missionary endeavours?

46

R. Fletcher, The Conversion of Europe (1997), 30-1, 86.

Augustine’s Perspectives on Practical Healing of Concupiscence* Ranko WATANABE, Kyoto, Japan

ABSTRACT In the Pelagian controversy, though Julian insisted that concupiscence is a part of human nature and is naturally good in and of itself, Augustine claimed that concupiscence remains evil in this life. Therefore, according to Augustine, the body is not yet saved in this life but awaits its salvation in a future life. Most studies have considered this notion of Augustine’s extreme. However, by strictly analyzing his later works, especially Contra Julianum, we find that he insists on the healing of concupiscence. Human beings receive the grace of God so that evil concupiscence, which is the resistance of the corporeal will against the spiritual will, is overcome through conquering the corporeal will by the spiritual will. And, the body is made holy by not serving the corporeal will day in and day out, which leads to solutions for concrete ethical problems concerning marriage and sexuality. His conclusion is derived from his conception of the radical origin of evil concupiscence in an evil will rather than in the body, which is a Christian conception distinct from both Platonism and Manichaeism. This aspect of his thinking is emphasized more heavily in his later works, which were not written against Pelagianism, for example, De continentia, Enchiridion, and De correptione et gratia. In them, Augustine claimed that the grace of God heals evil concupiscence by bringing about good desire. And, it is the recognition of one’s own weakness that enables to connect the persistence of evil concupiscence with the healing of it. By recognizing it and praying to God, human beings are aided in healing evil concupiscence. In conclusion, Augustine asserts that human beings can experience not only remission of sins but also practical healing in their ability to avoid sins in this life.

Introduction Part of the Pelagian controversy was Julian’s insistence that concupiscence is naturally good in and of itself; Augustine claimed, however, that concupiscence remains evil in this life. Most studies have considered Augustine’s position extreme. Some estimated that human beings attain only limited salvation in this life due to the persistence of evil concupiscence.1 Hence, Augustine’s thought * This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 18J11836. 1 For example, see James Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue (Cambridge, 1992), 169-87; Margaret R. Miles, ‘The Body and Human Values in Augustine of Hippo’, in H.A. Meynell (ed.), Grace, Politics and Desire: Essays on Augustine (Calgary, 1990), 55-67.

Studia Patristica CXIX, 129-139. © Peeters Publishers, 2021.

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has been criticized for being influenced by Neo-Platonism, Manichaeism, and Stoicism, which have an excessive hatred of the body, sexuality, and desire.2 However, some studies show appreciation for his ideas. David G. Hunter pointed out that Augustine’s views of sexuality and marriage are more moderate than those of other contemporaneous fathers.3 Referring to Hunter’s research, Peter Brown insisted (in an epilogue added to the new edition of his biography of Augustine) that we should not imprudently criticize Augustine’s thoughts on sexuality and marriage but should instead try to understand his essential ideas.4 According to J. Patout Burns, Augustine believed that Christian couples could use evil of concupiscence for good not only as an end to prosperity, but also as an end to bearing the weakness of evil concupiscence for each another.5 Yet, there has been little investigation of the practical healing of concupiscence itself. We should consider Augustine’s conception of deification, which, for example, Gerald Bonner considers significant. According to Bonner, Augustine believed in a human renewal of the image of God through a gradual progress starting in baptism, as well as the remission of sins.6 In this respect, Emile Schmitt mentioned Augustine’s claims regarding the progressive sanctification of married couples by decreasing of evil concupiscence through baptism.7 This point must be researched through a more inclusive analysis of Augustine’s later works, which address not only Pelagians but also Semi-Pelagians and nonPelagian Christians. Augustine claimed that, in this life, evil concupiscence continues to be evil and, hence, human beings cannot be perfected. Nevertheless, he also claimed that the condition of concupiscence can be healed by the grace of God. Through the manifestation of grace, human beings can experience not only remission from their sins but also the possibility of healing from their sins.

2 For example, see Uta Ranke-Heinemann, Eunuchen für das Himmelreich, Katholische Kirche und Sexualität (Munchen, 1990); Elizabeth A. Clark, ‘Adam’s Only Companion: Augustine and the Early Christian Debate on Marriage’, in Robert Edwards and Stephen Spector (eds), The Olde Daunce: Love, Friendship, Sex, and Marriage in the Medieval World (New York, 1991), 139-62; Elizabeth A. Clark, Ascetic Piety and Women’s Faith: Essays on Late Ancient Christianity (New York, 1986), 291-349, 353-85. 3 David G. Hunter, ‘Augustinian Pessimism? A New Look at Augustine’s Teaching on Sex, Marriage and Celibacy’, in Everett Ferguson (ed.), Christianity and Society: The Social World of Early Christianity (New York, London, 1999), 153-77. 4 Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (Revised Edition with a New Epilogue) (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 2000), 500-2. 5 J. Patout Burns, ‘Marital Fidelity as a remedium concupiscentiae: An Augustinian Proposal’, Augustinian Studies 44 (2013), 1-35. 6 Gerald Bonner, ‘Augustine’s Conception of Deification’, The Journal of Theological Studies 37 (1986), 369-86. 7 Emile Schmitt, Le marriage chrétien dans l’œuvre de saint Augustin: une théologie baptismale de la vie conjugale (Paris, 1983), 173-212.

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What is evil concupiscence? Concupiscentia is a near synonym of libido as well as of desiderium, cupiditas, infirmitas, and others. Although concupiscentia originally meant, neutrally, a ‘strong desire’, Augustine often used the word in the negative sense of a disturbed passion resulting from original sin. In Book 14 of the City of God, Augustine listed various kinds of concupiscence: for revenge, money, victory at any cost, glory, and others.8 Augustine distinguished between the concupiscence of the flesh, such as adultery or intemperance, and concupiscence as a mental vice, such as hostility or anger.9 In the context of the Pelagian controversy, Augustine was inclined to discuss concupiscence in the form of sexual desire, which is the focus of this article, as well. Augustine further described concupiscence as the desire of caro against spiritus based on Galatians 5:17: Caro enim concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem (see also Rom. 7:14-24). This state is the result of the first human beings’ disobedience to God. In Book 13 of the City of God, he claimed the following: For the soul, now rejoicing in its own freedom for perversity and disdaining to serve God, was itself stripped of the body’s former service to it, and, because it had by its own will deserted its Lord above, it no longer controlled its servant below by its own will. Nor did it have the flesh fully submissive to it, as it could always have had if it had itself remained submissive to God. It was at the point, then, that the concupiscence of the flesh began to oppose the spirit.10

It is said that the penalty for the soul’s disobedience to God was the loss of power over the body and the death of the body. Thus, the rebellious, dying body made part of the soul ‘corporeal’, and as a result, the soul was divided, creating an opposition between spiritual and corporeal wills. The corporeal will’s resistance to the spiritual will is what Augustine means by evil concupiscence. Retention of evil concupiscence Augustine insisted that, even after baptism, Christians retain evil concupiscence and that the opposition between spiritual and corporeal wills remain in them. Baptism extinguishes guilt but not desire: 8

Avrelii Avgvstini opera XIV, 2. De civitate dei, ed. B. Dombart and A. Kalb, CChr.SL 48 (Turnhout, 1955), 14.15. 9 Ibid. 14.2.2. 10 Ibid. 13.13: Iam quippe anima libertate in peruersum propria delectata et Deo dedignata seruire pristino corporis seruitio destituebatur, et quia superiorem dominum suo arbitrio deseruerat, inferiorem famulum ad suum arbitrium non tenebat, nec omni modo habebat subditam carnem, sicut semper habere potuisset, si Deo subdita ipsa mansisset. Tunc ergo coepit caro concupiscere aduersus spiritum. In this article, I have translated Augustine’s Latin text to English with reference to the series A Translation for the 21st Century (New York).

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This law of sin which is in the members of the body of this death was born forgiven in spiritual rebirth and yet remains in the mortal flesh. It is forgiven, because its guilt has been removed by the sacrament through which believers are reborn, but it remains because desires work against which even believers struggle.11

Though human beings are forgiven their guilt through baptism, they have desires with which they struggle in their body.12 In this life, even baptized Christians ‘are hoping to be sons of God’ (Rom. 8:23). They will be free from evil concupiscence in their future life after the apocalypse.13 Though Julian insisted that evil concupiscence is erased by baptism even if it is evil, Augustine asked why the saints, then, were fighting against evil concupiscence: We fight against concupiscence, and we do this so that it does not conceive and bring forth sin. If concupiscence itself was destroyed in it for the reason that all sins have been forgiven in baptism, that is, all the offspring of concupiscence, why do the saints fight against it so that it does not conceive, ‘by the bruising of their bodies, the filth of its members, and the ill treatment of the flesh’? These are your words. Why, I ask, do the saints wage war against it by bruises, by filth, and by the ill treatment of the temple of God, if it was itself removed by baptism? It remains, then, nor did we lose it in the bath of rebirth unless in that bath we lost the awareness by which we perceive that it remains.14

In this life, Christians continue to have malum even after their guilt of malum is removed.15 Hence, even after baptism, Christians should continue to pray to God to be forgiven for their malum.16 Consequently, human beings have limited opportunities to attain salvation in this life. In this life, the body is not saved even when the soul is, which is based on Paul’s claim that ‘if Christ is in you, the body is indeed dead on account of sin, but the spirit is life on account of righteousness’ (Rom. 8:10). According 11 Sancti Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia, Contra Julianum, PL 44, 2.3.5: Lex quippe ista peccati, quae in membris est corporis mortis hujus, et remissa est regeneratione spirituali, et manet in carne mortali: remissa scilicet, quia reatus ejus solutus est Sacramento, quo renascuntur fideles; manet autem, quia operatur desideria, contra quae dimicant et fideles. 12 His thought on this matter appears clearly in his exegesis of the latter half of Rom. 7. In this exegesis, a person is described as suffering from a conflict between spiritus and caro. Just like Julian, Augustine thought this person to be under the law (sub lege) before the grace of God (394-6 AD). Later in the text (about 412 AD), Augustine came to think of this person as under grace (sub gratia). Thus, he reached the conclusion that even baptized Christians can be tortured by several desires and face the difficulty of opposing spiritual and corporeal wills. 13 Contra Julianum. 6.15.46-7. 14 Ibid. 6.15.47: Quod ergo adversus eam dimicatur, hoc agitur, ne concipiat pariatque peccatum. Dimissis itaque in Baptismo peccatis omnibus, id est omnibus concupiscentiae fetibus, si illic etiam ipsa consumpta est, quomodo contra eam ne concipiat, dimicant sancti quae verba tua sunt. Quomodo, inquam, livore, paedore, contritione templi Dei contra eam belligeratur a sanctis, si et ipsa est ablata Baptismate? Manet igitur: nec ea regenerationis lavacro caruimus, si non ibi caruimus sensu, quo eam manere sentimus. 15 Ibid. 6.16.49. 16 Ibid. 4.3.28-9; 6.15.46-7.

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to Augustine, on the one hand, the soul comes alive through baptism; but on the other hand, the body is dying and burdened by the opposition of wills. The body will be reborn in a future life. In reference to 2Cor. 4:16, ‘though our exterior human being is being corrupted, the interior human being is being renewed from day to day’, Augustine also insisted on the following: A total and complete forgiveness of sins is brought about in baptism. But even if a total and complete change of the human being were immediately realized, I do not say that it occurs in the body. The body, which it is said, clearly still tends toward its old corruption and death, must be renewed in the end when there will truly be a new condition. A completely new condition was brought about in baptism in the mind itself, apart from the body.17

According to Paul, in this life it is only the soul (rendered ‘mind’ in the quotation above) that is saved, not the body.18 Since Christians are forced to manage the evil of concupiscence in this life, Christian married couples, who ordinarily cannot avoid sexual intercourse with evil concupiscence, require the remission of Christ through the sacrament of marriage. Hence, celibacy, which does not involve sexual intercourse and evil concupiscence, is superior to marriage. This assertion is an inevitable outcome of the Pelagian controversy. Pelagians denied original sin and insisted that infants of baptized parents did not need to be baptized, due to the innocence of their parents. In contrast, Augustine stressed the transmission of original sin to all humans and argued that infants of the baptized also needed to be baptized, because they had inherited the original sin through the evil concupiscence of their parents. It was in order to stress to his opponents the necessity of salvation in Christ for all humanity that he made this declaration of the baptized believers’ retention of evil concupiscence. Healing of evil concupiscence A stricter analysis reveals that Augustine believed that the condition of concupiscence would gradually be healed in this life. For example, in Contra Julianum, he shows not only the retention of evil concupiscence but also methods to counter the opposition between the spiritual and corporeal wills. This is 17 Sancti Avreli Avgvstini opera 8,1. De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptism parvulorum, ed. Karl F. Urba and Joseph Zycha, CSEL 60 (Vienna, 1913), 2.7.9: nam in baptismo quamuis tota et plena fiat remissio peccatorum, tamen, si continuo tota et plena etiam hominis in aeternam nouitatem mutatio fieret – non dico et in corpore, quod certe manifestum est adhuc in ueterem corruptionem atque in mortem tendere in fine postea renouandum, quando uere tota nouitas erit, sed excepto corpore si in ipso animo, qui est homo interior, perfecta in baptismo nouitas fieret. 18 Margaret R. Miles criticized Agustine’s negative views on the body as it reduces people’s motivation for ‘the familial, social, and political arrangements of this life’. See Margaret R. Miles, ‘Corpus’, Augustinus-Lexikon 2 (1996), 6-20.

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realized by the grace of God through Christ, that is, through the love of God: ‘[Grace does] help the prevention of sins and the conquering of carnal desires by pouring out love in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us by him’.19 Receiving love from God, the spiritual will is enabled to overcome the corporeal will. As explained above, the disobedience to God led to the disobedience of the body to the soul and to the soul’s division. God approaches disobedient human beings and gives them his love through salvation in Christ. This enables human beings to turn toward God and overcome this opposition of wills within them. The conquering of the corporeal will by the spiritual will allows human beings to not consent to evil concupiscence. According to Augustine, an action is performed only if one consents to temptation or impulse. Thus, committing a sin occurs by the following process: First, a temptation or an impulse to sin occurs. Second, one consents to it. Third, one actually commits a sin. The conquering of the corporeal will by the spiritual will encourages human beings to not consent even to a temptation or an impulse, that is, encourages them to avoid the second step in the process. In this manner, human beings can avoid committing the sin in the third step.20 Then, the resistance of the corporeal will to the spiritual will, that is, evil concupiscence, decreases, and good desire increases: Is not the concupiscence of the flesh daily diminished more and more by the concupiscence of chastity and continence? ... Moreover, if by the growth of good concupiscence, by which one conquers the evil concupiscence of fornication and drinking, one becomes the sort of person one had not been at his conversion, the desires for those sins then are aroused in such persons less and less, so that they do not have to wage battle as heavily as they did before.21

Here, Augustine approves good concupiscence since it facilitates chastity and continence.22 Chastity, in the sense that it is meant above, means that married couples must not commit adultery, and continence means having no sexual intercourse. With respect to marriage, Augustine insists that grace urges married couples to not commit adultery (or lust after it) and to strive to maintain chastity. 19 Contra Julianum, 6.23.72: adjuvet ad vitanda peccata et desideria vincenda carnalia, diffundendo charitatem in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum, qui ab illo datus est nobis. 20 Ibid. 3.26.62. 21 Ibid. 6.18.56: Annon per concupiscentiam castitatis et continentiae quotidie carnis concupiscentia magis magisque minuitur? ... si provectu concupiscentiae bonae, qua concupiscentias malas fornicandi potandique debellat, talis efficitur, qualis recenti conversione nondum fuit, ut illorum in eo desideria peccatorum minus minusque moveantur, ut adversus ea mala non tanta quanta prius exerceat. 22 Pelagians blamed Augustine for claiming that sexual desire did not originally exist. He discussed this matter in Letter 6 which was discovered by Johannes Divjak. He insisted on the distinction between concupiscentia carnis and concupiscentia nuptiarum and claimed the former might have existed in Paradise.

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The gradual dissolution of the insubordinate corporeal will implies that the body becomes submissive and sanctified: It [the body] is made holy in the sense that, through the forgiveness of sins, it is no longer subject not only to all past sins, but also to the concupiscence of the flesh that is present in it.23

The body is no longer condemned by past sins because the justification of the body occurs through the body of Christ who destroyed sins through his death on the cross. However, that is not all. From the justification as the starting point, the body is proceeding to holiness and is ceasing to be the servant of evil concupiscence. Augustine claimed, in reference to Basil, that the body becomes the temple of God: At present, the body is corruptible and weighs down the soul, but it was not originally created and placed in paradise in such a condition and will not always be such. For it is destined to be made incorruptible and immortal, and it has already begun to be the temple of God clothed in the chastity of marriage, or widowhood, or even virginity. Now, though the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, the spirit, nonetheless, has desires in opposition to the flesh so that it does not present the members of the body to sin as weapons of iniquity.24

When the corporeal will resists the spiritual will through the body, the body is used as the servant of the corporeal will. However, when the spiritual will conquers and controls the corporeal will, the body is no longer a servant and becomes the temple of God. Moreover, this occurs not only in the state of virginity or widowhood but also among couples who strive to protect the chastity of marriage. Therefore, Augustine insisted on not only the remission of sins but also the practical healing of evil concupiscence. In fact, he presents three stages of salvation. The first stage is the remission of the guilt of sin. The second stage occurs when vice is denied victory, that is, when the corporeal will does not overwhelm the spiritual will and the spiritual will gradually conquers the corporeal. The final stage is future life, in which human beings are healed completely, and evil impulses and temptations vanish.25 In other words, salvation in this life includes both the first stage of the remission of sins and the second stage of overcoming evil concupiscence. Augustine’s conclusion that the dissolution of the opposition of wills within the soul influences changes in the body is attributed to his notion that the soul, 23 Contra Julianum, 6.14.44: ad hoc tamen sanctificatur, ut per remissionem peccatorum non solum praeteritis peccatis omnibus, verum etiam ipsi quae inest carnis concupiscentiae non sit obnoxium. 24 Ibid. 1.5.17: nunc quidem corruptibile esse corpus, et aggravare animam confitentur sed nec tale primitus conditum atque in paradiso constitutum, nec tale semper futurum, sed incorruptione atque immortalitate mutandum, et nunc jam esse incipere templum Dei ... quando eisi caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, sic tamen spiritus concupiscit adversus carnem, ut nec ipsius corporis membra exhibeat iniquitatis arma peccato. 25 Ibid. 5.7.28.

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not the body, is the radical cause of this opposition. Augustine asserts that the cause of the Fall was the resistance of the soul to God, not that of the body. He developed this argument against the views of Manicheans and Platonists in Book 14 of the City of God. According to Augustine, before Adam and Eve committed the first sin, they first began to be evil in secret, and as a consequence they subsequently slipped into open disobedience. The corrupted will of pride (superbia) is the beginning of all sins (Sir. 10:13). Pride can be defined as the soul casting off what it originally adhered to and relying on its own. If the first human beings had adhered to God, they were eternally good and such corruption as evil concupiscence would not occur. However, once they started adhering to and relying on themselves, they started suffering punishment.26 Therefore, Augustine believed that the cause of the Fall of the first human beings was the prideful will in their souls. To serve as an example of his point, he discusses the Devil, who is evil without having a body. The Devil is evil because he has a prideful will. Thus, human beings become like the Devil when they become proud, live according to their own rules and cast God aside and not because they have a body.27 Augustine believed that what Paul wrote about the life ‘according to the flesh [secundum carnem]’ meant life according to the human will, rather than life as a body; and when Paul wrote about life ‘according to the spirit [secundum spiritum]’, he meant life according to God’s will.28 For Augustine, the human passions themselves are neutral in nature. Passion in accordance with the human will is evil, and passion in accordance with God’s will is good. Augustine did not consider the body or the passions evil. He emphasized the state of the will in the soul, out of which good and evil comes forth. Augustine claimed that this was specifically Christian thinking and not derived from Plato. Plato taught that passions are the origin of all vice and come from the body, whereas the Christian belief is that ‘it was not the corruptible flesh that made the soul sinful but the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible’.29 The disturbance of will in the soul is the root of evil concupiscence; hence, once the soul is changed by the grace of God, the body ceases to become a servant of evil concupiscence. Augustine’s claims in other works Augustine’s thought about healing of evil concupiscence can be clarified by examining his later works, such as De continentia. This work is said to be a 26 27 28 29

De civitate dei, 14.13.1. Ibid. 14.3.2. Ibid. 14.4.1-2. Ibid. 14.3.2.

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sermon written for Christians in general, rather than one for Pelagians. The date of writing this work was controversial. It was once thought to be one of Augustine’s earlier works (approximately 395-396 AD) because it devotes so much space to the criticism of Manichaeism. However, in 1959, through an analysis of the contents of and quotations from the Bible (some of which are found in works against Pelagians, as well), A.M. La Bonnardière revealed that it was written sometime after 412 AD, that is, much later than the previously considerated date. In 1995, studies by D.G. Hunter and M.R. Rackett made it clear that the conventional theory was wrong.30 They separately reached the same conclusion that it was written between 418 and 420 AD. Therefore, the thoughts expressed in this work should be considered as having originated during the later periods of his life.31 In De continentia, Augustine insisted that by the grace of God, evil concupiscence can be healed, as he did in Contra Julianum: It is unthinkable … that there should be any defect in those who reign in that peace that is to come, especially when for those making progress in this battle not only do their sins daily grow fewer, but so too do concupiscence. The fight consists in not consenting to them [concupiscence], and sin is the result of consenting to them.32

Moreover, in this work, Augustine emphasized a more progressive Christian life by changing the quality of concupiscence: To the harmful sweetness with which concupiscence prevailed, the Lord gives a sweetness that is beneficial, making continence more pleasurable; and so our land produces its harvest, providing food for the soldier who conquers sins with God’s help.33

The grace of God heals evil concupiscence by good desire. Therefore, one desires goodness in exchange of evilness. The same idea is mentioned in another later work, The Enchiridion (421 AD): If God cares about us, so that we can believe that he helps us to obey his commandments, and a person begins to be led by the Spirit of God, he begins to desire against the flesh with the stronger love of charity. As a result, although the struggle of man against himself continues, since his sickness has not yet been entirely cured, one rightly 30 D.G. Hunter, ‘The Date and Purpose of Augustine’s De Continentia’, Augustinian Studies 26 (1995), 7-24; M.R. Rackett, ‘Anti-Pelagian Polemic in Augustine’s De continentia’, Augustinian Studies 26 (1995), 25-50. 31 Yoshihiro Kon, Commentary on De continentia, Collection of the Works of Augustine 27 (Tokyo, 2003), 359-60. 32 Sancti Avreli Avgvstini 5,3. De continentia, ed. Joseph Zycha, CSEL 41 (Vienna, 1900), 8.20: absit autem, ut insint ulla vitia in illa quae futura est pace regnantibus, quandoquidem in isto bello cotidie minuuntur in proficientibus non peccata solum, sed ipsae quoque concupiscentiae, cum quibus non consentiendo confligitur, et quibus consentiendo peccatur. 33 Ibid. 3.7: contra suauitatem noxiam, qua uincebat concupiscentia, dominus dat suauitatem beneficam, qua delectetur amplius continentia, et terra nostra dat fructum suum, quo pascitur miles, qui debellat deo iuuante peccatum.

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lives as a righteous person by faith insofar as he does not give in to the evil of concupiscence, because that is conquered by delight in justice.34

Augustine wrote this work to summarize his thoughts on theology, responding to the queries of Laurentius, who was a pious Christian. The same notion is found in De correptione et gratia, written between 426-427 AD, for Semi-Pelagians. While discussing the presence of grace in this life, Augustine wrote : ‘It makes one to will so strongly and to love [rightness] with such ardor that, by the will of the spirit, one conquers the will of the flesh with its contrary desires’.35 As we discussed above, he could more strongly claim the healing of evil concupiscence apart from the context of the Pelagian controversy, where he should emphasize human powerlessness. However, to Christians in general, he probably wanted to encourage to overcome their evil desires. To Semi-Pelagians, who demand more concrete explanations for the relationship between human free will and the grace of God, Augustine wanted to insist that human weakness is aided by the power of the grace of God. Therefore, it is clear that Augustine, in his later works, did not insist merely on the negative aspects of original sin and the persistence of evil concupiscence. God acting in weakness How can two apparently opposing states, that is, the persistence and the healing of evil concupiscence be connected? Though this is a difficult question to address, the passage ‘virtue is brought about in weakness’ (2Cor. 12:9) provides an indication of the answer.36 In De gratia et libero arbitrio (426-427 AD), a work on the Semi-Pelagian controversy, Augustine repeatedly emphasized the importance of praying to God in overcoming evil concupiscence: Each one, then, in fighting against his own concupiscence, prays in order that he may not enter into temptation, that is, in order that he may not be pulled and enticed by it. One does not enter into temptation if he conquers evil concupiscence by good will.37 34

Aurelii Augustini opera XIII, 2. Enchiridion ad Lavrentivm de fide, spe, et caritate, ed. E. Evans, CChr.SL 46 (Turnhout, 1969), 31.118: Si autem respexerit deus ut ad implenda quae mandat ipse adiuuare credatur, et agi homo coeperit dei spiritu, concupiscitur aduersus carnem fortiore robore caritatis, ut quamuis adhuc sit quod homini repugnet ex homine, nondum tota infirmitate sanata, ex fide tamen iustus uiuat, iusteque uiuat in quantum non cedit malae concupiscentiae, uincente delectatione iustitiae. 35 Œuvres de Saint Augustin 24, 3e série. De correptione et gratia, ed. Jean Chéné and Jacques Pintard, Bibliothèque Augustinienne 24 (Paris, 1962), 11.31: secunda ergo plus potest, qua etiam fit ut velit, et tantum velit, tantoque ardore diligat, ut carnis voluntatem contraria concupiscentem voluntate spiritus vincat. 36 Contra Julianum, 2.4.8. 37 Œuvres de Saint Augustin 24, 3e série. De gratia et libero arbitrio, ed. Jean Chéné and Jacques Pintard, Bibliothèque Augustinienne 24 (Paris, 1962), 4.9: Ergo unusquisque contra suam

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If we rely on our own power alone, evil concupiscence will conquer us; hence, we should pray to God. Concupiscence encourages one to sin; however, when we rely on, believe in, and pray to God, the grace of love is poured over us and we can conquer evil concupiscence. In this context, it is important to recognize one’s own weakness. Though the grace of God always works on human beings, by recognizing one’s sins and, then, praying to God, the grace of God aids human beings in conquering the corporeal will. By writing that human beings should recognize and confess their weaknesses to God, he meant that these actions ensure not only the remission of sins but also the God actual acting on humans. When human beings pray and hope for God’s grace, God works on human beings and makes them good (a possible interpretation of 2Cor. 12:9). Augustine did discuss dynamic salvation in this life, including deification. However, his discussion on human weakness as a starting point is distinct from the views of even the Eastern Fathers, let alone Pelagians. Conclusion Augustine’s thoughts expressed in his later works have been criticised for his position on concupiscence, since he seemed to despair that human beings cannot be perfected and can be saved only partly because of the persistence of evil concupiscence in this life. This article encourages scholars to reconsider Augustine’s thoughts in his later works. Augustine did not believe that evil concupiscence can be never changed. He claimed that evil concupiscence could be continually healed through the grace of God. In addition, he did not insist that a person is forced to restrain his or her feelings of evil concupiscence. A person overcomes evil concupiscence by desires for the good. This claim was done especially in his later works addressed to non-Pelagian Christians and Semi-Pelagians. In these works, it was probably easier for him to emphasize the power of grace in this life than in the works against Pelagians. Further, Augustine said that the healing of the soul influences the healing of body in this life and human beings can gradually be saved as a whole, both soul and body. This thought resulted from the Christian interpretation of Paul’s words that the origin of evil is the evil will within the soul, rather than the body. This idea presents the possibility of solving the ethical problems pertaining to marriage and sexuality. A person can desire good aspects such as chastity instead of desiring adultery. Hence, even in his later period, Augustine expresses some positive thoughts on solving actual problems in this life.

concupiscentiam dimicans oret, ne intret in tentationem, id est, ne sit ab illa abstractus et illectus. Non autem intrat in tentationem, si voluntate bona vincat concupiscentiam malam.

Between a Free Will and a Divine Grace: The Treatise Aduersus Manichaeos of Evodius of Uzalis and its Anti-Pelagian Context Aäron VANSPAUWEN, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

ABSTRACT Aduersus Manichaeos is a treatise of anti-Manichaean polemics attributed to Evodius of Uzalis. A friend of Augustine of Hippo, Evodius was ordained bishop of Uzalis (present El Alia, Tunisia) at the end of the fourth century. Against Manichaean teaching, the author of Aduersus Manichaeos posits that evil does not exist as a substance or principle within a dualistic cosmology, but only as the consequence of the human will, which can freely choose for good or evil. In essence, such an argumentation was common in anti-Manichaean polemics. This contribution presents a thematic analysis of Aduersus Manichaeos, with a particular focus on human will, grace, and original sin. The choice for these topics is motivated by the historical circumstances of the treatise. In all likeliness, Aduersus Manichaeos was written after the first stages of the so-called Pelagian controversies, in which the African church (including Evodius and Augustine) had condemned the teachings of Pelagius and his sympathizers. Its author being familiar with the issues raised during these controversies, the argumentation of Aduersus Manichaeos, with its insistence on the free choice of will, nevertheless gives quite a ‘Pelagian’ impression. This paper will address whether the typically anti-Pelagian teachings on original sin, grace and infant baptism had any influence on Aduersus Manichaeos, a treatise contemporary to the Pelagian controversies, with an entirely different polemical intent. The thematic focus will also shed a light on Augustine’s theological development, and Augustine’s regional context. During the Pelagian controversies, Augustine developed his views on original sin, free will and infant baptism, which would in turn shape the development of Western Christianity. Recent scholarship has raised questions regarding the potentially innovative character of Augustine’s teachings on grace and original sin. Since Aduersus Manichaeos was written by a contemporary of Augustine, well acquainted with the writings of the bishop of Hippo, a comparative study of the anti-Manichaean treatise and Augustine’s anti-Pelagian thought can also contribute to a better understanding of Augustine’s theology in context.

1. Introduction To interpret any author in a historically adequate manner requires one to consider the manner in which said author resonates with his contemporaries.

Studia Patristica CXIX, 141-152. © Peeters Publishers, 2021.

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Augustine of Hippo continues to attract scholarly attention because his views on original sin, free will and infant baptism shaped the development of Western Christianity. With regard to the aforementioned theological themes, which Augustine most articulately formulated during the Pelagian controversies, recent studies have pointed to the specificity of these polemical circumstances on the one hand, and Augustine’s belonging to the Latin North African church on the other. An important question these studies raise concerns the potentially innovative character of Augustine’s views on inherited sin, predeterminism, and infant baptism.1 This article provides a thematic analysis on free will and grace in the treatise Aduersus Manichaeos, also known as De fide contra Manichaeos.2 The anti-Manichaean treatise is attributed to Evodius of Uzalis, a contemporary of Augustine. As a friend and fellow-bishop of Augustine, Evodius contributed to the condemnation of Pelagius’ and Caelestius’ thinking by the African episcopate in 416, and was also involved in the so-called semiPelagian controversy one decade later.3 Since Aduersus Manichaeos was written by a contemporary of Augustine, well acquainted with the writings of the bishop of Hippo, a comparative study of the anti-Manichaean treatise and Augustine’s anti-Pelagian thought could be instructive. The presence of specific anti-Pelagian ideas (or lack thereof) in a treatise with no explicit anti-Pelagian 1 It is impossible to provide an exhaustive bibliography on Augustine and his theology of grace, sin, and the will. On the development of Augustine’s thinking on these themes, see Lenka Karfíková, Grace and the Will According to Augustine, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 115 (Leiden, Boston, 2012); Mathijs Lamberigts, ‘Peccatum originale’, Augustinus-Lexikon 4/3 (2014), 599-615 on the topic of original sin in particular. On the context of the Pelagian controversies, see Anthony Dupont, Gratia in Augustine’s Sermones ad populum During the Pelagian Controversy: Do Different Contexts Furnish Different Insights?, Brill’s Series in Church History 59 (Leiden, Boston, 2013); Ali Bonner, The Myth of Pelagianism (Oxford, 2018). On the regional specificity of the North African church, see, for example, Gerald Bonner, ‘Les origines africaines de la doctrine augustinienne sur la chute et le péché originel’, Augustinus 12 (1967), 97-116; Anthony Dupont, ‘Was There an Africitas Theologica? Preliminary Inquiry into the Regional Specificity of the North African and Augustinian Theology of Original Sin and Grace (ca. 200450 CE)’, Eirene 50 (2014), 317-32. 2 See also the preliminary study Aäron Vanspauwen and Anthony Dupont, ‘The Doctrine of Original Sin Amongst Augustine’s African Contemporaries: The case of Evodius of Uzalis’ De fide contra Manichaeos’, ZAC 21 (2017), 459-71. 3 Evodius was one of the co-authors of Augustine’s ep. 177, written in 416 and addressed to pope Innocent I. Its authors were Aurelius of Carthage, Alypius of Thagaste, Augustine of Hippo, Evodius of Uzalis and Possidius of Calama. On this letter, see Mathijs Lamberigts, ‘Was Innocent Familiar with the Content of the Pelagian Controversy? A Study of His Answers to the Letters Sent by the African Episcopacy’, in Przemysław Nehring, Mateusz Stróżyński and Rafał Toczko (eds), Scrinium Augustini: The World of Augustine’s Letters, Instrumenta Patristica et Mediaevalia 76 (Turnhout, 2017), 203-23. In the 420s, brothers from a monastic community in Hadrumetum had discovered Augustine’s anti-Pelagian ep. 194 in Evodius’ library at Uzalis. When abbot Valerius reached out to Evodius for an explanation on the contents of this letter, Evodius responded with his Epistula ad Valentinum. On this epistle, see Yves-Marie Duval, ‘Note sur la lettre d’Evodius à l’abbé Valentin d’Hadrumète (CPL 389)’, REA 49 (2003), 123-30.

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objective can illustrate the extent to which the issues raised in the anti-Pelagian campaigns of Augustine and his allies were important to Christian authors at that time. 2. Content and circumstances of Aduersus Manichaeos It is not evident to reconstruct the circumstances in which Aduersus Manichaeos was written. The treatise does not reference any contemporary person or historical event. In addition, its earliest sources are the manuscripts in which the treatise has been preserved – the oldest exemplar dating from the ninth century.4 A convincing majority of the treatise’s earliest manuscripts contain the following introductory note on the authorship: ‘Whether this book is written by saint Augustine or by saint Evodius, is not known’.5 Despite this cautionary note, ever since the Maurist edition of Aduersus Manichaeos in 1688, scholars usually see no reason to doubt Evodius’ authorship of the treatise.6 In terms of dating, most scholars (who accept Evodian authorship) conjecture that Aduersus Manichaeos was written at the very least after Evodius’ correspondence with Augustine in 414-415.7 Such a date implies, at minimum, that Evodius knew who Pelagius was, and knew Augustine’s criticism of Pelagius.8 4 On the attribution of authorship in the manuscripts, see Aäron Vanspauwen, ‘“Contra Domini uel Apostoli auctoritatem”: La autoridad de Pablo en el tratado polémico “De fide contra Manichæos” de Evodio de Uzala’, Augustinus 61 (2016), 395-411, 398-9; for additional details on the manuscript evidence of Aduersus Manichaeos, see Aäron Vanspauwen, ‘The anti-Manichaean Treatise De fide contra Manichaeos, Attributed to Evodius of Uzalis: Critical Edition and Translation’, Sacris Erudiri 57 (2018), 7-116, 35, 44. 5 A. Vanspauwen, ‘The anti-Manichaean Treatise De fide contra Manichaeos’ (2018), 44-5. 6 Such is the case for Jeanne-Huberte Féliers, ‘L’utilisation de la Bible dans l’œuvre d’Evodius’, REA 12 (1966), 41-64; François Decret, ‘Le traité d’Evodius contre les Manichéens: Un compendium à l’usage du parfait controversiste’, Augustinianum 31 (1991), 387-409; François Decret, ‘Exégèse et polémique chez Evodius d’Uzalis’, in L’Esegesi dei padri latini: Dalle origini a Gregorio Magno, Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum 68 (Rome, 2000), I 383-9. See, however, ‘Evodius 1’, in André Mandouze et al., Prosopographie de l’Afrique chrétienne (303533), Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire 1 (Paris, 1982), 366-73, for a more reserved position. 7 See Jeanne-Huberte Féliers, ‘Evodius d’Uzalis: Contribution à l’étude de l’église chrétienne d’Afrique du Nord au Ve siècle’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, 1964), 83-4; F. Decret, ‘Le traité d’Evodius contre les Manichéens’ (1991), 390, n. 17. 8 Augustine, ep. 169,IV,13: scripsi etiam grandem quendam librum aduersus Pelagii haeresim cogentibus nonnulis fratribus, quibus contra gratiam Christi opinionem perniciosam ille persuaserat: ‘I also wrote a large book against the heresy of Pelagius at the urging of some brothers whom he had convinced of a destructive opinion opposed to the grace of Christ’; ed. Alois Goldbacher, S. Aureli Augustini operum sectio II: S. Augustini epistulae, pars III: ep. CXXIV-CLXXXIV A, CSEL 44 (Vienna, Leipzig, 1904), 621.20-3; trans. Roland Teske, Letters (156-210), The Works of Saint Augustine II/3 (New York, 2004), 113. See also Y.-M. Duval, ‘Note sur la lettre d’Evodius’ (2003), 127-9.

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A possible dependence on Augustine’s Contra aduersarium legis et prophetarum (written 419-420) would establish an even later terminus post quem. In that case, Aduersus Manichaeos would have been written after the height of the Pelagian controversy. The remainder of this contribution will rely on the reasoned assumption that Evodius is – indeed – author of Aduersus Manichaeos. In any case, the anti-Manichaean treatise represents the theological views of a Latin North African author, who was acquainted with Augustine’s antiManichaean and anti-Pelagian thinking. The theological content of Aduersus Manichaeos will be compared to the evidence of Evodius’ Epistula ad Valentinum. The latter work functioned in a more or less anti-Pelagian context. In the letter, Evodius defends the theology of grace of his friend Augustine (whom he does not mention by name), and admonishes the community to piety and prayer. The comparison of Aduersus Manichaeos and the letter to Valentinus can help assess whether Augustine was innovative when he formulated his doctrine of original sin, or whether he simply disseminated theological doctrines which were broadly shared among his North African colleagues. Because both Aduersus Manichaeos and the Epistula ad Valentinum were written by a contemporary of Augustine in two different polemical circumstances, it will be possible to discern the extent to which the polemical context of a writing influences its (presentation of) theology. 3. Grace and will in Aduersus Manichaeos In a previous study, which did not have at its disposal either a secure dating for Aduersus Manichaeos nor an assessment of whether Evodius knew Augustine’s fully developed anti-Pelagian thinking, Anthony Dupont and I concluded that Evodius’ thought resembles that of Augustine’s Pelagian opponents, who ‘rejected the notion of original sin based on their belief in a just God and in the ethical capacities and moral liberty of humanity’.9 Against the Manichaean belief in two natures – the claim that reality consists of light and darkness, or good and evil – Evodius rejects the idea of a natural evil. Evodius maintains that evil only exists in the form of sin, which has the human will as its cause. Such an anti-Manichaean insistence on the free will gives quite a ‘Pelagian’ impression. In Aduersus Manichaeos, Evodius states there is no natural evil nor corrupted human nature.10 He emphasises individual responsibility for 9

A. Vanspauwen and A. Dupont, ‘The Doctrine of Original Sin’ (2017), 471. For the Latin text and English translation of Aduersus Manichaeos, I make use of A. Vanspauwen, ‘The anti-Manichaean Treatise De fide contra Manichaeos’ (2018). On natural evil, see Evodius, adu. Man. 9: Malum enim non potest esse natura nec substantia nec uita: ‘For evil cannot be either nature nor substance nor life’; ed. and trans. A. Vanspauwen, ‘The anti-Manichaean Treatise De fide contra Manichaeos’ (2018), 52-3, l. 3-4. 10

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misconduct.11 Evodius considers Christ an example first and foremost. No mention is made of the sacrament of baptism. The theology of grace and the typology Adam-Christ play almost no role in the treatise.12 Evodius depicts God as a judge, who judges humans based on their merits. On the other hand, within the treatise Aduersus Manichaeos, the image of God as saviour or liberator is mostly attested in Manichaean citations.13 The argumentation of anti-Manichaean polemicists frequently centred on a defence of the free will against the deterministic implications of a dualistic system.14 Most of Augustine’s anti-Manichaean writings follow the same approach. Since Evodius was so clearly influenced by the bishop of Hippo, a brief comparison between Evodius’ and Augustine’s anti-Manichaean argument is in order. In her survey of Augustine’s theology of grace, Lenka Karfíková pointed out that Augustine employed the phrase peccatum originalis (original sin) for the first time in his Ad Simplicianum (written 397 CE).15 In other words, before this date, Augustine’s did not use this expression before when formulating his thoughts on grace and the will. Neither does the term peccatum originalis appear in his anti-Manichaean works after 397, even though related concepts, such as the inheritance of Adam’s sin and the liberation through grace, can be discerned in his Contra Felicem (404 CE).16 One could argue that for Augustine 11 Evodius, adu. Man. 8: Malefacti sui ergo per cupiditatem quisque auctor est: ‘To conclude, through desire everyone, no matter who, is the author of his or her own misdeed’; ed. and trans. A. Vanspauwen, ‘The anti-Manichaean Treatise De fide contra Manichaeos’ (2018), 52-3, l. 7-8. 12 The term gratia only appears three times in Aduersus Manichaeos, twice as part of the expression uerbi gratia (‘for example’). See A. Vanspauwen and A. Dupont, ‘The Doctrine of Original Sin’ (2017), 467. For a rare example of the typology Adam-Christ, see Evodius, adu. Man. 21 (ed. and trans. A. Vanspauwen, ‘The anti-Manichaean Treatise De fide contra Manichaeos’ [2018], 64-7, l. 3-12). In this passage, Evodius contrasts Adam’s superbia with Christ, characterized by the virtues of humilitas and patientia. 13 See A. Vanspauwen and A. Dupont, ‘The Doctrine of Original Sin’ (2017), 465. 14 Apart from Augustine, other examples of such anti-Manichaean polemicists in the Roman Empire were the bishop Titus of Bostra or the Platonist philosopher Alexander of Lycopolis. See Nils Arne Pedersen, Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos, the Work’s Sources, Aims and Relation to Its Contemporary Theology, Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies 56 (Leiden, Boston, 2004), 5-6; Johannes van Oort, ‘Alexander of Lycopolis, Manichaeism and Neoplatonism’, in Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World: Essays in Honour of John Turner, Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies 82 (Leiden, Boston, 2013), 275-83, 281. 15 L. Karfíková, Grace and the Will According to Augustine (2012), 72-87. 16 Augustine, c. Fel. II,11: quia enim Adam peccauerat et omnis illa massa et propago peccati maledicta erat, dominus autem carnem de ipsa massa suscipere uoluit, ut suscipiendo mortalitatem. quae de poena uenerat, solueret mortem, quod de gratia ueniebat: ‘For Adam had sinned and all that mass and progeny of sin was cursed. But the Lord chose to take up flesh from that mass in order that by taking up mortality, which had come from punishment, he might bring about the destruction of death, which comes from grace’; ed. Josephus Zycha, S. Aurelii Augustini de utilitate credendi, de duabus animabus, contra Fortunatum, contra Adimantum, contra epistulam fundamenti, contra Faustum, contra Felicem, de natura boni, epistula Secundini, contra Secundinum, accedunt Euodii de fide contra Manichaeos et commonitorium Augustini quod fertur, CSEL

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the concept of original sin would not have been helpful in an anti-Manichaean argumentation. His presentation of theology, and his emphasis on certain theological concepts, is thus to a large degree adjusted to the polemical circumstances of his writings. Augustine introduced the term ‘original sin’ in 397, and this concept plays a most defining role in his particularly anti-Pelagian writings. Considering the anti-Manichaean context of Aduersus Manichaeos, it is somewhat of a surprise, then, to discover that the term peccatum originale does appear in this treatise.17 Aduersus Manichaeos thus represents a more nuanced view on the human condition, grace and the will than indicated before. Apparently some of Augustine’s more anti-Pelagian views had influenced Evodius’ anti-Manichaean treatise.18 Compared to Evodius’ Augustinian anti-Manichaean sources, perhaps a more pessimistic view of the human condition can be discerned in Aduersus Manichaeos. For example, Evodius’ usage of Matt. 12:33 is indebted to Augustine’s citation and exegesis of that verse in Contra Felicem.19 Both agree that this biblical passage proves the capability of the free will to choose between good or evil conduct. However, when Evodius argues that people can choose good or evil, he focuses on the latter option. After all, 25/2 (Prague, Vienna, Leipzig, 1892), 840.12-6; trans. Roland Teske, The Manichaean Debate, WSA I/19 (New York, 2006), 307. 17 Namely in Evodius, adu. Man. 40: infirmitatem praesentis corruptionis, quae de peccati originalis poena descendit: ‘the weakness of its [of the flesh] corruption, which descended from the punishment of the original sin’; ed. and trans. A. Vanspauwen, ‘The anti-Manichaean Treatise De fide contra Manichaeos’ (2018), 92-3, l. 8-9. 18 For the specific occurrence of the term peccatum originale, Evodius could have encountered the term in one of Augustine’s letters addressed to him. Augustine, ep. 164,VII,19: si autem animae non ex illa una propagantur, et sola ex Adam caro trahit originale peccatum, ita sibi creauit animam dei filius, ut ceteris creat, quam non tamen carni peccati miscuit, sed similitudini carnis peccati: ‘But if souls are not propagated from that one, and only the flesh contracts original sin from Adam, the Son of God created a soul for himself as he creates souls for the others, yet he did not unite it with sinful flesh but with the likeness of sinful flesh (Rom. 8:3)’; ed. A. Goldbacher, CSEL 44 (1904), 538.20-4; trans. R. Teske, Letters (156-210) (2004), 71. Alternatively, Evodius could have also encountered the phrase in Augustine’s Nat. grat., which Augustine recommended to Evodius in his ep. 169. See n. 8. 19 Compare Evodius, adu. Man. 5: Nam et Dominus ostendens quod in hominis potestate sit, ait: aut facite arborem bonam et fructum eius bonum, aut facite arborem malam et fructum eius malum; ed. A. Vanspauwen, ‘The anti-Manichaean Treatise De fide contra Manichaeos’ (2018), 46-8, l. 3-5. Augustine, c. Fel. II,4: Audi ergo de libero arbitrio primo ipsum dominum, ubi duas arbores commemorat, quarum mentionem ipse fecisti, audi dicentem: aut facite arborem bonam et fructum eius bonum aut facite arborem malam et fructum eius malum … hoc ergo dominus dicens ‘aut facite illud aut facite illud’ ostendit esse in potestate quid facerent: ‘Listen first, then, to the Lord himself concerning free choice, where he speaks of the two trees, of which you yourself made mention. Listen to him as he says, Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree bad and its fruit bad (Matt. 12:33) … And so, when the Lord said, ‘Either do this or do that’, he showed that what they would do was in their power’; ed. J. Zycha, CSEL 25/2 (1892), 831.26-832.13; trans. R. Teske, The Manichaean Debate (206), 301.

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the polemical context required first and foremost that he refute the Manichaean view of evil. Whereas Evodius only wanted to corroborate the statement that man has a free choice of will, Augustine further explored the extent of this free will. Whoever chooses the good, will receive a reward (praemium); whoever chooses evil, punishment.20 The idea that a prize could be attained by pursuing the good is absent from Aduersus Manichaeos. In addition, the terminology of merit in Aduersus Manichaeos is quite pessimistic: the words meritum (‘merit’) and merere (‘to merit’) are always used in conjunction with the words sin (peccatum) or judgement (iudicium or iudicare).21 This usage indicates that people can have merits only in so far as they can be held accountable and justly punished for personal mistakes. In this regard, Evodius’ thinking on human free will is somewhat more pessimistic than Augustine’s in his c. Fel., and perhaps influenced by Augustine’s later anti-Pelagian stance on these matters. Similarly, when explaining Christ’s role as moral teacher, Evodius does not make clear what people can achieve on their own ability. The central purpose of Christ’s incarnation was to teach humanity the virtue of patience by example.22 Evodius does seem convinced that people can pursue good deeds on their own power,23 yet it appears that any achievement is only partial. For instance, when he states that Christ’s example would enable humanity to overcome their fallen state, Evodius uses the verb ualeret: ‘[a person] will be able’. The immediately following expression, however, contains a passive verb (ad aeternam uitam 20 See Augustine, c. Fel. II,4: et quia si bonum eligerent, praemium eius acciperent, si malum eligerent, poenam eius sentirent : semper autem ille iustus est aut remunerator aut damnator: ‘And that, if they chose the good, they would receive a reward from him, while if they chose evil, they would feel punishment from him. But God is always just, whether he rewards or condemns’; ed. J. Zycha, CSEL 25/2 (1892), 832.14-6; trans. R. Teske, The Manichaean Debate (2006), 301. 21 Such is the case in adu. Man. 8 (merito iudicari), adu. Man. 27 (merito peccati), adu. Man. 40 (peccato meruimus), adu. Man. 42 (damnationem ... mereamini). See also A. Vanspauwen & A. Dupont, ‘The Doctrine of Original Sin’ (2017), 467. 22 Evodius, adu. Man. 21: quid sit misericordiae benignissimum officium, quod sapientia et uirtus Dei Dominus Iesus Christus uoluntate et ineffabili potestate per hominem quem suscepit ex uirgine, generi humano exhibere dignatus est, ut hominibus per hominem patientiae demonstraret exemplum!: ‘the most benign work of mercy, that the wisdom and virtue of God, Jesus Christ, realised: of his own will and of his ineffable power, through the human nature he took up from a virgin, he deemed it worthy to appear before the human race, so he could demonstrate to humans as a human an example of patience!’; ed. and trans. A. Vanspauwen, ‘The anti-Manichaean Treatise De fide contra Manichaeos’ (2018), 64-5, l. 5-9. 23 See Evodius, adu. Man. 44: rationalem autem (quia potest recte factorum rationabilia praecepta percipere et recte factis ad aeternam beatitudinem peruenire): ‘finally, the rational soul (because it can perceive the reasonable precepts of correct conduct and can through correct conduct reach eternal beatitude)…’; ed. and trans. A. Vanspauwen, ‘The anti-Manichaean Treatise De fide contra Manichaeos’ (2018), 96-9, l. 12-4; Evodius, adu. Man. 46: praeceptis demonstratis, quibus consurgere ualeret atque ad aeternam uitam renouaretur: ‘fulfilled commandments, by which the creature is able to take rise and become renewed for eternal life’; ed. and trans. A. Vanspauwen, ‘The anti-Manichaean Treatise De fide contra Manichaeos’ (2018), 98-9, l. 14-5.

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renouaretur: ‘to become renewed for eternal life’). True eternal salvation, it seems, cannot be achieved by humans alone, but must be granted by God. Throughout the treatise, the claims of Evodius to the effect that people can do good mostly pertain to the eschatological future or to biblical precedent; rarely do they refer to the moral ability of people living in this present age. 4. Aduersus Manichaeos and the Epistula ad Valentinum The circumstances of Epistula ad Valentinum and those of Aduersus Manichaeos are entirely different. Aduersus Manichaeos had an explicitly polemical purpose. It was addressed against Manichaeans (or Manichaean Christians), whose views were refuted in favour of Evodius’ own Catholic Christian views. The Epistula ad Valentinum, though situated within the so-called semi-Pelagian controversies, constituted a brotherly admonition to a nearby ascetic community.24 At no point does the bishop of Uzalis refer to the views of Pelagius. Florus, a monk of an ascetic community in Hadrumetum, had discovered Augustine’s anti-Pelagian ep. 194 at Evodius’ library in Uzalis. Troubled by the contents of this Augustinian letter – the brothers feared that the letter’s insistence on an all-compassing grace undermined their ascetical project – the community asked for clarification from Evodius.25 This address to the bishop of Uzalis, the letter by abbot Valentinus, has not been preserved. Evodius’ response, the Epistula ad Valentinum, has. The Epistula ad Valentinum and Aduersus Manichaeos clearly differ in content, even though Evodius’ announcement of subject matter (‘free choice and the justice of God’) in the Epistula ad Valentinum may be somewhat reminiscent of his terminology of Aduersus Manichaeos.26 Such reminiscences could suggest that the letter to Valentinus follows Aduersus Manichaeos, and complements his previous exposition on sin, free will, and God’s judgement. If Evodius previously put full emphasis on human will, he now underlines the fallen nature of man, and the ‘impaired’ (sauciatum) choice of will.27 Much more than 24

On the problematic term ‘semi-Pelagian’, see also A. Dupont, Gratia in Augustine’s Sermones ad populum (2013), 64-5. 25 See Augustine, ep. 216,3; ed. Alois Goldbacher, S. Aureli Augustini operum sectio II: S. Augustini epistulae, pars IV: ep. CLXXXV-CCLXX, CSEL 57 (Vienna, Leipzig, 1911), 398.14-7. 26 Evodius, ep. ad Val.: Retulerunt nobis sancti fratres, quia nescio quae ibi quaestiones inter uos natae sunt de libero arbitrio et de iustitia Dei: ‘The holy brothers reported to us that certain questions have arisen among you in your community about free choice and the justice of God’; ed. Germain Morin, ‘Lettres inédites de S. Augustin et du prêtre Januarien dans l’affaire des moines d’Adrumète’, RBen 18 (1901), 241-56, 254, l. 9-11; trans. Roland Teske, Answer to the Pelagians IV, WSA I/26 (New York, 1999), 42. 27 Evodius, ep. ad Val.: Est ergo in homine nunc liberum arbitrium, sed sauciatum: ‘Now man has free choice, but an injured choice’; ed. Morin, ‘Lettres inédites’ (1901), 254, l. 16; trans. R. Teske, Answer to the Pelagians IV (1999), 42. Compare the Latin syntax to Evodius, adu. Man.

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in Aduersus Manichaeos does Evodius portray Christ as saviour and physician. Some influence of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings can be discerned in the letter.28 Evodius frequently invokes the aid of God, and admonishes the community to obedience, prayer and study of authoritative ecclesiastical writers.29 Throughout the letter Evodius describes himself as sinful or ‘sinner’ (peccator).30 This self-identification is rhetorically significant for three reasons. First, Evodius’ sinful state illustrates the implications of the doctrine of original sin. No one is exempt from Adam’s sin. Each person shares in the sin, and is unable to overcome the state of sinfulness, or to overcome his/her own corrupted human nature, without the aid of God. Second, as a sinner himself he too should heed the admonition to prayer. He characterizes himself as humble and repentant. Thus, in his address to Valentinus and the community of Hadrumetum, he wants to lead by example. Third, his self-identification holds consequences for the relation between him and his addressees. He wants to address the community not as an authoritative leader but as a coreligionist. In what is a not an uncommon epistolary procedure, he praises the virtues of his addressees while diminishing those of his own. Implicitly, however, the self-identification as sinner could have functioned as an argument from authority: If their nearby bishop considers himself a sinner in need of God’s grace, the community should do so as well. 9: Est ergo in potestate ut sit cupiditas, et ideo tamen malum in potestate est; ed. A. Vanspauwen, ‘The anti-Manichaean Treatise De fide contra Manichaeos’ (2018), 52, l. 1-2. 28 Cf. the terminology of Evodius, ep. ad Val.: Est ergo in homine nunc liberum arbitrium, sed sauciatum ... Ad hoc recuperandum missus est medicus Saluator Christus, ut saluaret quod perierat, et curaret quod uitiatum fuerat ... Ex quo enim uitiatum est ipsud liberum arbitrium, ad pereundum sibi tantummodo sufficit; ut autem curetur et ad pristinum statum reuocetur, necessarium habet peritissimum medicum; ed. G. Morin, ‘Lettres inédites’ (1901), 254, l. 16-23; Augustine, nat. grat. XIX,21: quid sanatur, si nihil est uulneratum, nihil sauciatum, nihil debilitatum atque uitiatum?; ed. Carolus F. Urba and Josephus Zycha, Sancti Aureli Augustini de peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum ad Marcellinum libri tres, de spiritu et littera liber unus, de natura et gratia liber unus, de natura et origine animae libri quattuor, contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum libri quattuor, CSEL 60 (Vienna, Leipzig, 1913), 246.21-3. Evodius, ep. ad Val.: si a Deo acceperit, a quo cotidie nullis meritis praecedentibus eius gratia liberatur omnis homo. Ipse est enim Deus noster, qui “cui uult miseretur” per gratiae bonitatem; ed. G. Morin, ‘Lettres inédites’ (1901), 255, l. 55-7; Augustine, ep. 194,II,4: Quod autem personarum acceptorem Deum se credere existimant, si credant quod sine ullis praecedentibus meritis, cuius uult miseretur; ed. A. Goldbacher, CSEL 57 (1911), 178.14-6. 29 See also Y.-M. Duval, ‘Note sur la lettre d’Evodius’ (2003), 127. 30 Evodius, ep. ad Val.: Dominis sanctis honorabilibus dilectissimis et desideratissimis, sanctis fratribus abbati Valentino et sanctae congregationi, Euodius peccator et omnes mecum conserui in Domino salutem: ‘To the holy, honorable, beloved, and dear lords, the holy brothers of abbot Valentine, and to the whole community with him, Evodius, a sinner, and all the fellow servants with me, send their greetings in the Lord’; ed. G. Morin, ‘Lettres inédites’ (1901), 254, l. 3-5; trans. R. Teske, Answer to the Pelagians IV (1999), 42. Evodius, ep. ad Val.: Vae mihi nimis peccatori, cui etiam adhuc dolores et lacrimae necessariae sunt, et non dantur: ‘Woe to me, a great sinner, who still needs sorrow and tears and does not receive them’; ed. G. Morin, ‘Lettres inédites’ (1901), 255, l. 40-2; trans. R. Teske, Answer to the Pelagians IV (1999), 43.

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5. Conclusion The two writings under consideration here have revealed that Evodius was a pragmatic author, whose argumentation addresses specific needs. Evodius does not indulge in theological scrutiny, neither in Aduersus Manichaeos nor in the Epistula ad Valentinum. His letters to Augustine, on the other hand, reveal that Evodius could certainly engage in nuanced and technical theological and philosophical discussions with Augustine.31 Evodius’ anti-Manichaean treatise and his letter to Valentinus had a different purpose. There, Evodius wanted to convince his addressees, and persuasiveness was prioritized over theological subtlety. Both Aduersus Manichaeos and the Epistula ad Valentinum were written in different circumstances, and, accordingly, emphasized different anthropological and theological issues. In fact, one could argue that the two writings focused each on one of twee complementary notions. In the co-authored letter 177 written in 416, the African bishops (among whom Augustine and Evodius) stressed the complimentary functions of law and grace.32 Against the Manichaeans, Evodius focusses on the ‘law’: God gave ethical precepts to humanity, which possesses a free will, in order to fulfil God’s commandments, and God, as a judge, can punish the sinner. In his response to Valentinus, Evodius focusses instead on grace. Whereas the Manichaeans threatened to undermine the law, the Pelagian controversies concerned the belief in grace’s efficacy. In both cases, whether he defended the ‘law’ or ‘grace’, Evodius’ presentation is quite one-sided and stereotypical. These two factors, namely Evodius’ pragmatic intent, and the different challenges to which he responded in the two works under consideration, can explain how it was possible that Evodius could sound so ‘Pelagian’ in his aduersus Manichaeos, even though he opposed the Pelagians in the same period. It is opportune to return to the opening questions of this contribution. The thematic study of Evodius’ writings helps to understand Augustine’s theology in its context. This paper focussed on Augustine’s thinking on original sin. In particular, two contextual factors were considered. These factors were, on the one hand, the question of innovativeness: Were Augustine’s formulations on original sin during the Pelagian controversies an innovation on Christian 31 See, for example, Shanzer’s analysis of Evodius’ Epistula 158. Danuta Shanzer, ‘Evodius’ Strange Encounters with the Dead: Questions and Answers in Augustine, Epp. 158-159’, in Przemysław Nehring, Mateusz Stróżyński and Rafał Toczko (eds), Scrinium Augustini: The World of Augustine’s Letters, Instrumenta Patristica et Mediaevalia 76 (Turnhout, 2017), 273-304. 32 Augustine, ep. 177,5: Distinguenda est lex, et gratia. lex iubere nouit, gratia iuuare. nec lex iuberet, nisi esset uoluntas; nec gratia iuuaret, si sat esset uoluntas: ‘We must distinguish the law and grace. The law is able to command; grace is able to help. The law would not command if there were no will. Nor would grace help if the will were enough’; ed. A. Goldbacher, CSEL 44 (1904), 673.15-7; trans. R. Teske, Letters (156-210) (2004), 143.

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thinking? On the other hand, a second factor that was taken into consideration, was Augustine’s belonging to an African tradition: Was the doctrine of original sin particularly popular or widespread among African theologians? Written by an African contemporary of Augustine, the texts of Evodius served as comparative sources in this study. Unfortunately, the comparative study with Evodius cannot offer conclusive answers to the questions addressed above. After all, any similarity between Evodius’ and Augustine’s theology can be attributed, first and foremost, to Augustine’s direct influence on Evodius. For both Evodius’ Aduersus Manichaeos and his letter to Valentinus, Augustine’s writings were a source of inspiration. In other words, instead of representing an independent African theologian, the two Evodian works primarily reveal how a contemporary of Augustine made use of the writings and thinking of the bishop of Hippo. The treatise Aduersus Manichaeos was primarily inspired by the anti-Manichaean writings of Augustine. Neither these sources nor the polemical context of Aduersus Manichaeos encourage an elaboration of the doctrines of grace and original sin. Nevertheless, compared to Augustine anti-Manichaica, it is striking that the doctrine of original sin, though not prevalent, is certainly present in Aduersus Manichaeos. If not an essential notion to the argumentation, its presence nevertheless gives the impression that even in not specifically anti-Pelagian contexts, Augustine’s contemporaries accepted the doctrine. Likewise, in terms of anthropology, perhaps Aduersus Manichaeos reflects contemporary, so-called ‘pessimistic, anti-Pelagian’ views. Especially when it comes to the question whether the human will is capable to do the good, the treatise Aduersus Manichaeos seems more ambiguous than Augustine’s anti-Manichaean works, which put more emphasis on human merit and on reward for good conduct. Nevertheless, it should be made clear that Evodius certainly does not elaborate on the concept of original sin in Aduersus Manichaeos, and that his ‘pessimism’ actually only becomes apparent when comparing his work with its Augustinian anti-Manichaean sources, which predate the Pelagian controversies. Accepting the doctrine of original sin of his colleague of Hippo, Evodius certainly does not put any particular emphasis on the doctrine, and he avoids extreme anti-Pelagian sentiments. In the Epistula ad Valentinum, the circumstances are entirely different. There, Evodius is perfectly comfortable with the anti-Pelagian emphasis on the corrupted human nature and the necessity of Christ’s grace, even though the letter in itself should not be considered antiPelagian (nor polemic at all, for that matter), and neither does the letter reference original sin. A final note concerns the chronology of Evodius’ works. Contrary to his epistles to Augustine (414-415 CE), the co-authored ep. 177 (416) and the Epistula ad Valentinum (425), the treatise Aduersus Manichaeos contains no evidence which would firmly situate it within a specific point in time. Instead, it was argued that the treatise’s posteriority vis-à-vis his correspondence with

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Augustine and possible dependence on Augustine’s Contra aduersarium legis et prophetarum (419-420) would situate the treatise, at the earliest, in the second half of the second decade of the fifth century, or after 420. If one would accept Evodian authorship of Aduersus Manichaeos, then a relative chronology of the treatise and the letter to Valentinus can offer additional indications regarding the circumstances of the anti-Manichaean treatise. I am inclined to believe Aduersus Manichaeos predates the letter. Based on the thematic study of Evodius’ theology and anthropology of grace, the will, and sin, it would appear that the Epistula ad Valentinum represents a later stage in the development in Evodius’ thinking. The Epistula then adds to Aduersus Manichaeos, which focussed on the capacity of the human will and God’s role as a judge, a more profound belief in the corrupted human condition, God as a saviour, and on divine grace. Admittedly, this reasoning risks being a circular argument. At the very least, the case of Evodius demonstrates how two different theological and historical circumstances resulted in two quite distinct presentations of theology and anthropology. Although Evodius was somewhat familiar with Augustine’s anti-Pelagian thinking when he wrote Aduersus Manichaeos, he certainly took the liberty to utilize those theological, biblical and philosophical arguments which would have been most productive for his particular treatise.

Augustine of Hippo’s Tenuous Tension between Stoic Providence and Christian Free Will Kenneth WILSON, Montgomery, TX, USA

ABSTRACT Ancient Stoicism, Neoplatonism, Gnosticism, and Manichaeism all propagated an ardently deterministic view of divine Providence. In contrast, beginning with the earliest apologists, Christians unanimously rejected this fatalistic view of micromanaging dictatorial sovereignty, holding that God foreordained only some things, not every detailed event in the universe. These early Christians taught divine foreknowledge of human choices was non-causative – including free will to exercise faith unto salvation – and was considered essential in identifying evil’s origin and explaining divine-human interactions. However, this unanimous Christian defense against pagan fatalism fell when Augustine of Hippo broke rank and championed his Stoic, Neoplatonic, and Gnostic-Manichaean deterministic views to combat the Pelagians in 412 CE. This article proposes that Augustine held in tenuous tension his Stoic view of meticulous divine Providence together with his new Christian view of freedom of the will until 412 when pagan Providence triumphed over Christian free will when writing his polemics on paedobaptism against the Pelagians.

Ancient Pagans Taught Divine Determinism Numerous ancient philosophies and religions taught a rigid determinism wherein every detail of the universe was controlled by divine beings.1 The ancient Mesopotamians believed the gods assembled yearly to determine the fate of each person and event (Ŝīmtu).2 The Greek poetry of Pindar (Pythian 2; Nemean 6.1-7) and Zeus’ inability to change the fate of Hector expose a rigid determinism. Later Platonists like Plutarch (Is. et Os. 1) and Maximus of Tyre (Orat. 5) viewed prayer as dialogue that could not alter God’s predetermined intentions. For Stoics, Fate was synonymous with Providence. Fate was god’s foreordained movement of every minuscule event in the cosmos through the πνευμα. Chrysippus taught responsibility and culpability derived solely from assent, yet 1 Kenneth Wilson, Augustine’s Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to ‘Non-free Free Will’: A Comprehensive Methodology (Tübingen, 2018), 11-39. 2 Jack Lawson, The Concept of Fate in Ancient Mesopotamia of the First Millennium: Toward an Understanding of Ŝīmtu (Wiesbaden, 1994), 1-3, 19-22.

Studia Patristica CXIX, 153-167. © Peeters Publishers, 2021.

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assent does not require that the soul be free to chose otherwise. Epictetus made god responsible for every detailed cosmic event (Disc. 1.12.15-7) in ‘an inflexible eternal cycle where the minutest predetermined detail repeats itself (ἀποκατάστασις)’.3 The Stoic Seneca references Cicero in concluding that since Jupiter through Fate determines and actuates every minuscule event for good, we should welcome our orders (excipiamus imperia) without resistance (Ep. 107.10-2; cf. Nat. 34.3-38.4). Seneca also recorded Cleanthes’ famous maxim: Volentem fata ducunt, nolentem trahunt (‘The fates lead the willing [but] drag the unwilling’; Ep. 107.12). Stoics invented a ‘non-free free will’ trying to achieve compatibilism within their meticulous divine determinism. This resulted in a facade of human free will tacked onto their rigid divine determinism (pseudo-compatibilism).4 Likewise, the Gnostic Valentinus taught the message of salvation was theoretically offered to all, but God empowered only the elect (πνευματικοί possessing Light particles) to accept that invitation and receive salvation (Ev. Ver. 11, 30-1; Corp. Herm. 1.26).5 As Edwards stated: ‘All works are predestined, discipline and abstinence effect nothing, and the elect are saved by knowing that they are saved’.6 Plotinus confirmed this fatalistic view of the Gnostics (Enn. 2.9.9). Rigid determinism pervaded Gnosticism. Neoplatonists attempted to reconcile determinism with human freedom (De provid. 15 on De anima 1.1, 403a 10-2) by making a distinction between the enmattered soul (suffering corporeal realities) and unenmattered soul (free to reason correctly).7 Mimicking Stoicism, a person only achieves true freedom of will when (by renouncing pleasures and actions) the αὐτεξούσιον becomes totally dependent upon the Intellect (Enn. 3.3.19-21). Providence controls every infinitesimal cosmic detail; nevertheless, God allegedly provides limited freedom for a few persons due to τὸ ἐφ ‘ ἡ μῖν (what depends upon us). But this exception can only be made possible by the indwelling Reason-Principle producing good within a few elect persons (Enn. 3.3.4-5; 3.2.9.1, 2.3.1.1).8 Because Plotinus and Proclus restricted the term ‘determinism’ to astrology, they allegedly preserved 3 Anthony Long, ‘Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action’, in Problems in Stoicism, ed. Anthony A. Long (London, 1996), 173-99, 182-3. 4 David Winston, ‘Chapter 13: Philo of Alexandria’, in The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson (Cambridge, 2010), 235-57, 248, n. 13. Pseudo-compatibilism offers a mere semblance/facade of compatibility when compatibility cannot exist. 5 Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley, CA, 1982), 151-4. 6 Mark Edwards, Culture and Philosophy in the Age of Plotinus (London, 2006), 152. See also Gedaliahu Stroumsa, Another Seed: Studies in Gnostic Mythology, NHS 24 (Leiden, 1984), 100-1; Francis Fallon, The Enthronement of Sabaoth: Jewish Elements in Gnostic Creation Myths, NHS 10 (Leiden, 1978), 8-80. 7 Carlos G.Steel, Proclus: On Providence (London, 2007), 6-7; Cf. De provid. 56-7 and 63. 8 Charles H. Kahn, ‘Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine’, in The Question of Eclecticism: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, ed. J. Dillon and A.A. Long (Berkeley, CA, 1988), 234-60, 251 where ‘to autexousion’ and ‘to eleutheron’ are equivalents.

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αὐτεξούσιον while still demanding a strict determinism in every aspect of life. So like Stoicism, Neoplatonism taught ‘non-free free will’. A totally incapacitating fall produced an ‘evil willer’ requiring the unilateral divinely infused gift of love to restore free choice. Yet, by definition, the One’s essential goodness exculpates the One from charges of ‘unfairness’ in this divine discriminatory predetermination.9 Absolute micromanaging determinism prevailed. We find this same determinism in Manichaeism. Mani borrowed the concept of humanity’s total inability to respond to God from the ancient Indo-Mesopotamian Maitrāyana Upanishad IV, which describes humans as robbed of freedom, imprisoned, drugged by delusion, and in deepest darkness.10 Stroumsa summarized the Platonist Alexander of Lycopolis’ response to Manichaean divine grace: ‘Alexander is shocked by Manichaean limitation of the path to salvation to the elect. For him, this directly contradicts the idea of a Providence, by definition equally caring for all’.11 Mani’s syncretistic religion also taught a totally incapacitating fall which destroyed free will, which – like Gnosticism and Neoplatonism via Stoicism – demanded a strict unilateral predetermination of eternal destinies by the spiritual god. Determinism rendered free will impotent. Therefore, ancient Stoicism’s all-encompassing micromanaging determinism was assimilated by Gnosticism, Neoplatonism, and Manichaeism. Within Stoicism’s meticulous determinism, their move to salvage free will by ‘non-free free will’ carried over into the ‘dead will’ of other highly deterministic religions and philosophies. Pseudo-compatibilistic determinism was still alive and well in the ancient world long after the death of Marcus Aurelius. Christians Rejected Pagan Determinism Opposing the micromanaging specific sovereignty of pagans, the earliest Christian authors championed a general sovereignty. The Christian God did not foreordain all events but only some events. The human will was not incapacitated from Adam’s ‘fall’ but was merely weakened, thereby remaining capable of responding to God without a divine infusion of grace or faith. Divine election unto the beatific vision was based upon God’s foreknowledge of ‘future’ human choices in divine-human interaction, not a unilateral non-relational decree. In the Epistle of Barnabas (ca. 110 CE), God’s foreknowledge of human belief and acts affects God’s actions in salvation (Barn. 3.6, 5.4). Meecham 9 Anthony Long and David Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1-2 (Cambridge, 1987), 342, 392. 10 Geo Widengren, Der Manichäismus (Darmstadt, 1977), 63-5. 11 Gedaliahu Stroumsa, ‘Titus of Bostra and Alexander of Lycopolis: A Christian and a Platonic Refutation of Manichaean Dualism’, in Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, ed. Richard T. Wallis (New York, NY, 1992), 337-49, 344.

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writes of the Epistle to Diognetus 10.1-11.8, ‘Free-will is implied in his capacity to become ‘a new man’ (ii, 1), and in God’s attitude of appeal rather than compulsion (vii, 4)’.12 Justin Martyr (d. 165 CE) fought against Stoic pseudo-compatibilism by insisting upon the Christian God’s foreknowledge of human choices: So that what we say [things about to be which have been prophesied] about future events being foretold, we do not say it as if they came about by a fatal necessity; but God foreknowing all that is about to be done by all men, and it being the decree from Him that according to the future actions of each person shall will be recompensed according to their several value. (1Apol. 44)

Similar passages in 1Apol. 28, 43, 61.9-10, 2Apol. 7.3-8, and Dial. 103, 140.4, 141.2 repeat this emphasis. Goodenough concluded: ‘The Stoic determinism he indignantly rejects. Unless man is himself responsible for his ethical conduct, the entire ethical scheme of the universe collapses, and with it the very existence of God himself’.13 Chadwick explained: ‘Justin’s insistence on freedom and responsibility as God’s gift to man and his criticism of Stoic fatalism and of all moral relativism are so frequently repeated that it is safe to assume that here he saw a distinctively Christian emphasis requiring special stress’.14 Tatian (d. ca. 173 CE) rejected fate as a demonic invention. He defended free will as essential in explaining evil against pagan fatalism (Or. Graec. 8-9). Reward and punishment depended upon free choice decisions (Or. Graec. 7.1-2), not divine unilateral predeterminism.15 Melito’s (d. ca. 180 CE) Peri Pascha exhibits a cause and effect relationship between human free choice and God’s response (P.P. 739-44). Human free choice and moral responsibility were inseparable (P.P. 537-43) as secondcentury apologists fought pagan determinism.16 Theophilus (ca. 180 CE) taught Christians could overcome sin through residual free choice (Autol. 1.2, 1.7). Athenagoras (d. 190 CE) explained God created both angels and persons with free choice for the purpose of assuming responsibility for their actions (De resurr. 24.4-5). Irenaeus (ca. 180 CE) denied that any event could ever occur outside of God’s sovereignty (Haer. 2.5.4). However, this was a general sovereignty like a king rules a country, not a Stoic micromanaging sovereignty. God predetermined which persons would receive eternal life based upon his foreknowledge of their

12

Henry Meecham, The Epistle to Diognetus: The Greek Text (Manchester, 1949), 29-30. Erwin Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr (Jena, 1923), 68. 14 Henry Chadwick, ‘Justin Martyr’s Defence of Christianity’, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 47 (1965), 275-97, 284; cf. 291-2. 15 Emily Hunt, Christianity in the Second Century: The Case of Tatian (New York, NY, 2003), ‘Notes’, 197, n. 66. 16 Charles Munier, L’Apologie de Saint Justin philosophe et martyr (Fribourg, 1994), 115. 13

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free will decisions to accept God’s grace (Haer. 4.39.3-4; 2.33.5).17 Irenaeus refuted the Gnostic predetermined salvific spiritual nature (φύσει σώζεσθαι; Exc. Theod. 56 and 61; Haer. 1.1.14) and compared Gnostic non-relational predetermination to Stoic determinism (Haer. 1.6.2; 2.29.1-31; 2.14.4). He attacked both Stoicism and Gnostic heresies because their divine unilateral predetermination made salvation by faith superfluous, and Christ’s incarnation unnecessary.18 Irenaeus contended that God elects persons based upon his foreknowledge of their choices (Haer. 3.12.2,5,11; 3.32.1; 4.14, 4.34.1, 4.61.2). In his mind, Stoics and Gnostics had a puny god who was not capable of controlling the universe if humans were allowed free choice.19 Tertullian (ca. 200 CE) followed Irenaeus (e.g., Haer. 4.37) in teaching the imago Dei was humanity’s retained free will (Marc. 2.6, 8).20 God only hardened Pharaoh’s heart after Pharaoh repeatedly rejected God’s appeals (Marc. 2.7 and 2.14). Tertullian rejected determinism. Origen (d. ca. 254 CE) in Comm. Rom. 7 argues that God acts based upon foreknowledge of future actions but that this foreknowledge itself is not causal. He refutes the Gnostic use of Rom. 9:16-21 as unilateral determination of eternal destines (Princ. 3.1.5, 18-21). Following the lead of Clement of Alexandria (fl. ca. 200CE), however, they interpreted proorizo as depending upon proginosko (foreknow) – those whom God foreknew would believe he decided upon beforehand to save. Their chief concern was to combat the concept of fatalism and affirm that humans are free to do what is righteous. Thus Origin fought the Gnostic toward the middle of the third century.21

Ambrose (d. 397 CE) taught God’s predestination of individuals was based upon his omniscient foreknowledge of future choices and acts (Ep. 57; De fide 5.6). This correlates with his view of residual human free will (De fide 2.11). John Chrysostom (d. 407 CE) affirmed divine actions were based upon God’s foreknowledge and his responsiveness to human free choice acts: foreknowledge was non-causal (Homily 59.1 on Matthew 18:7). Jerome (d. 420 CE) concurred, refuting Gnostic heretics like the Marcionites who made foreknowledge causal in promoting determinism:

17 F. Montgomery Hithcock, Irenaeus of Lugdunum: A Study of His Teaching (Cambridge, 1914), 216. 18 E.P. Meijering, ‘Irenaeus’ relation to philosophy in the light of his concept of free will’, in God Being History: Studies in Patristic Philosophy, ed. E.P. Meijering (Amsterdam, 1975), 19-30, 23. 19 Gustaf Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, trans. Ross Mackenzie (Lund, 1947; repr., London, 1959), 35-6. 20 Mary Ann Donovan, ‘Alive to the Glory of God: A Key Insight in St. Irenaeus’, TS 49 (1988), 283-98, 291. 21 C.T. McIntire, ‘Free Will and Predestination: Christian Concepts’, in The Encyclopedia of Religion, 2nd ed., ed. Lindsay Jones (Farmington Hills, MI, 2005), V 3206-9.

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Either God knew that man, placed in Paradise, would transgress His command, or He did not know. If He knew, man is not to blame, who could not avoid God’s foreknowledge, but He Who created him such that he could not escape the knowledge of God. If He did not know, in stripping Him of foreknowledge you also take away His divinity. … For Adam did not sin because God knew that he would do so; but God inasmuch as He is God, foreknew what Adam would do of his own free choice’. (c. Pel. 3.6; cf. Comm. Ezech. 2.5).

Jerome rejected both extremes – the all-sufficient free will of the Pelagians and the latter Augustine’s total loss of free will to even desire good and respond to God (Pelag. 3.10; Ep. 133.6, 10). In addition to these twelve Christians, a total of fifty Christian authors with extant works from 95 CE to 412 CE taught humanity retained a free will to respond to God who did not control every infinitesimal detail of the universe by a foreordained plan or decree.22 It was unanimous: Not a single Christian author disagreed until 412 CE. Any type of non-relational (unilateral) divine determinism was declared a pagan heresy. Chadwick summarized the Christian response to pagan determinism: ‘For in rejecting the Gnostic way the Christians thereby rejected as inauthentic adulteration and corruption any theology of pure revelation teaching salvation by an arbitrary predestination of the elect and the total depravity of the lost, and possessing no criteria of rational judgment’.23 Burns introduced a litotes: ‘Most Christians also limited the kind of rule that God exercises’.24 Augustine in 412 CE was the first exception to ‘most Christians’.

The Early Augustine Taught Free Will (386-411 CE) After his baptism in 386 CE by Ambrose in Milan, Augustine taught this traditional Christian free will theology for twenty-five years: 1) Humans retained the ability to respond to God without an individual divine gift of faith or grace; 2) God’s election unto salvation was based upon foreknowledge; 3) The Christian God desires the salvation of all humanity with every person equally receiving the same opportunity to respond. His Christian free will position persisted until 412 CE. When writing against his prior Manichaean sect, Augustine wrote in Fel.2.4 and 8, humans can choose to do good for reward, or refuse and be punished 22 K. Wilson, Augustine’s Conversion (2018), Appendix III, 307-9; See also Kenneth Wilson, The Foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism (Montgomery, TX, 2019), 120 (chart). 23 Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition (Oxford, 1966), 9. 24 J. Patout Burns, ‘From Persuasion to Predestination: Augustine on Freedom in Rational Creatures’, in In Dominico Eloquio, in Lordly Eloquence: Essays on Patristic Exegesis in Honour of Robert Louis Wilken, ed. Paul M. Blowers et al. (Cambridge, 2002), 294-316, 295.

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by God. In Fel. 2.5, Augustine accused Felix and Manichaeism of abusing the phrase ‘free will’ because those who were ‘not willing’ were not even capable of willing good. Augustine exposes the Manichaean’s shockingly cruel god who damns persons by necessity (without their choice) in nonrelational abandonment (Faust. 22.22). Every person retained the capacity to respond to God: no divine infusion of grace or faith was required because the human will remained capable (Faust. 12.4; 13.5; 15.11; Secund. 12 and 19; Quaest. Matt. 14.2). For the early Augustine, faith is human faith of which all persons are capable without God giving a divine gift of faith (Doctr. chr. 1.18; Fid. 6-10). Divine foreknowledge of human choices was the basis for predestination (Catech. 30; Unit. eccl. 15; Quaest. c. pag. 15 [Ep. 102]; Don. 23, 39; Unit. eccl. 23, 34, 39, 52). Only some persons were not worthy of God’s redemptive love through Christ – the ones God’s foreknowledge had identified as rejecting his grace (Ep. 102.14-5). Humanity’s residual ability to respond in faith to God’s revealed truth without God’s intervention pervades Ep. 102. Erik de Boer accurately characterizes Augustine’s early view of predestination based upon God’s foreknowledge: ‘The concept of God’s foreknowledge of man’s future acts is Augustine’s key to understand how election, (effectual) calling and justification are linked’.25 For example, in Augustine’s early reading of Romans 11, Paul does not refer to predestination to eternal life or damnation as Gnostics and Manichaeans teach, but individual degrees of temporal punishment (Nat. bon. 31). Augustine expounds a laudatory exegesis of Rom. 9:22-3, refuting the interpretation of the Manichaeans who claimed divine unilateral predetermination of individuals’ eternal destinies (Gen. litt. 11.10-2). Augustine refuted this heretical eternal predetermination by carefully examining both the immediate context and other passages contextually. Refuting Gnostic and Manichaean teachings, the early Augustine defended the Christian axiom that God loved all humans, Christ died for all humans, and God desired every human to be saved (Nat. bon. 48; Quaest. ev. 2.45; Conf. 6.7-8). God does not act unilaterally but responds to human choices (Mus. 6.41, 43, 54). Personal faith in Christ can even negate the need for water baptism for salvation as in the case of the thief on the cross (Bapt. 4.29-30; Div. quaest. 62; Enarrat. Ps. 35.11). Augustine taught traditional Christian free will for over two decades. The Bishop of Hippo even became known as a defender of the faith against heresies. That would change.

25

Erik de Boer, ‘Augustine on Election: The Birth of an Article of Faith’, Acta Theologica 32 (2012), 54-73, 61 commenting on Exp. quaest. Rom. (CSEL 84, 30) where Augustine explains Rom 8:28-30.

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When and Why Did Augustine Alter Traditional Christian Doctrine? But the storm clouds begin to gather in the winter of 411-412 CE. This is when Pelagius and Caelestius fled the invasion of Rome and arrived in North Africa, bringing with them different understandings of Christian doctrine. Caelestius taught infants were not baptized for salvation but rather to enter the kingdom.26 Augustine must answer this difficult problem of why infants are being baptized in response to the Pelagians. How can infants be saved in baptism when they are incognizant, have no ‘will,’ and therefore cannot believe in Christ? Augustine flounders attempting to answer the Numidian Bishop Boniface’s question on this North African tradition of paedobaptism. Can the ‘proxy faith’ of the parents legitimately be salvific for infants? (Ep. 98.2). The inimitable rhetorician struggles unsuccessfully attempting an explanation (Ep. 98.8-10). During the same period, Valentinian (the primate of Numidia) was appropriately disturbed over the paedobaptismal practice in which parents (or other persons) speaking for the infant confessed future sins for an innocent non-cognizant infant (Ep. 5*.2) So even in Augustine’s North Africa, there was no unified doctrine on infant baptism. Ramsey correctly concluded, ‘early baptismal practice was not uniform everywhere’.27 This paedobaptismal obstacle defined Augustine’s new theology in 412 CE as will be discussed subsequently. Nevertheless, scholars have ubiquitously claimed Ad Simplicianum in 396 CE was Augustine’s transition because the second section promotes ideas belonging to his later theology.28 But there is a fifteen-year glaring gap wherein he continued to teach traditional Christian free will before the ideas of his late theology appear again. How is this possible? The answer can be found in that Augustine revised numerous works even decades after writing them.29 One of those revised works is Ad Simplicianum 1.2, which has been re-dated to 412 CE. There are a dozen indicators and discrepancies exposing Augustine himself revised the original Ad Simplicianum between 26 The Manichaean Hieracas taught infants could not enter the kingdom of god (Panarion 47.2.7; 4.4-5.5); K. Wilson, Augustine’s Conversion (2018), 265-8; Liber de Fide 37-48; Augustine, Ep. 186.27. 27 Boniface Ramsey, Ambrose (New York, NY, 1997), 146. 28 E.g., James Wetzel, ‘Simplicianum, Ad’, in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, MI, 1999), 798-9; Pierre Batiffol, ‘Saint Augustin, Pélage et le Siège apostolique (411-417)’, Revue Biblique 27 (1918), 5-58; Torgny Bohlin, Die Theologie des Pelagius und ihre Genesis (Uppsala, 1957), 46-56; Charles Baumgartner, ‘Théologie dogmatique’, RSR 51 (1963), 614-35; Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity (Oxford, 2006), 6; Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (London, 1967; rev. ed. Berkeley, CA, 2000), 147-8; Lenka Karfíková, Grace and Will according to Augustine, trans. Markéta Janebová (Leiden, 2012), 71-87. 29 These known revised works include Mus. 6, Doctr. chr. 3.36-4.46, Pecc. merit. 3, Gen. litt. 1.3b-12.37, and Trin. 13-5. In addition, we can add De libero arbitrio 3.47-54 and Ad Simplicianum 2.5-22.

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411 and 412 CE in order to conform this work to his latter theology.30 From 386 through 411 CE, Augustine continued to utilize the foreknowledge defense, portraying the Christian God as relational and responding to human choices made by a retained freedom of choice to decide for the good. Augustine’s Perennial Stoic Sovereignty But despite these Christian theological views about free will, the early Augustine maintained his Stoic view of divine sovereignty. For twenty-five years he held in tension the relational Christian God (allowing his creation free choice) with Stoic micromanaging Providence. His very first work as a Christian in 386 CE was De providentia, revealing a deep and early concern for the pervasive providence of God in his philosophical system. Every minuscule individual event in the universe was purposefully designed by God for a desired order and result (Ord. 1.11). Providential control even included such trivialities as the precise motions of the neck muscles as roosters fight (Ord. 1.25). Augustine taught it is impossible for a person to be killed unjustly (he deserved to die) even if sentenced by an unjust judge. Why? Because micromanaging Providence and God’s justice are perfect – things could not be better than they are (Quant. an. 73). His God experiences absolutely nothing against His desires, which are absolute, and all God’s desires will be fulfilled (Gen. Man. 2.29).31 Two decades after his baptism into Christianity Augustine persists in his meticulous Stoic view promulgated in De providentia from 386 CE, including every falling leaf and seed: ‘not a single leaf falling, not a single seed sprouting unprovided for by him’ (Serm.D 29.12; ca. 408 CE). ‘And not deny that the God who taught the bee to arrange its honey cells in such marvelous order does not put order into human affairs’. (Serm.D 29.10). ‘If it is their observation of human affairs are disordered and messy that drives them to deny that they are driven by divine providence…’ (Serm.D 29.3). ‘Let us therefore have no hesitation in believing that what seems to be messy and disordered in human affairs is governed, not by no plan at all, but by an altogether loftier one, and by a more all-embracing divine order’ (Serm.D 29.7). ‘Whatever occurs by chance occurs accidentally; whatever occurs accidentally does not occur by providence. If, then, some things occur by chance in the world, the universe is not governed by providence’. (Div. quaest. 24). ‘The Wisdom who governs the whole world, even to the fluttering leaves on the 30 K. Wilson, Augustine’s Conversion (2018), 139-56; Kenneth Wilson, ‘Redating Augustine’s Ad Simplicianum 1.2 to the Pelagian Controversy’, SP 98 (2017), 431-50. 31 Robert O’Connell, ‘The De Genesi contra Manichaeos and the Origin of the Soul’, REAug 39 (1993), 129-41.

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trees’ (Conf. 7.8). This ‘Wisdom’ he derives from Wisd. 11:20 where God has ‘arranged all things in measure and number and weight’. His residual Stoic micromanagement appears in his tedious numerologies wherein his god is operating (Div. quaest. 57-8, 81; cf. 53, 62, 79). Providence presides over the corporate ‘will’ of Christian councils for them to gather (Cresc. 4.12) and controls their every decision (Cresc. 3.28, 59, 68). Direct retribution theology appears as divine providence. ‘For when someone says, ‘Why does he make souls for those he knows will soon die?’ we can reply that the sins of their parents are revealed or punished by this. We can also rightly leave this to the governance of him who we know makes most beautiful and well-ordered the arrangement of all transitory things’ (Ep. 166.13). ‘We must, therefore show how they [infants] suffer these things [physical maladies] justly without any evil cause on their part. For it is not permissible to say that these come about without God’s knowledge and that he cannot resist those who cause them or that he either causes or permits them unjustly’ (Ep. 166.16). Augustine believed God’s providential ‘will’ included choosing his own successor at Hippo (Ep. 213.1). He taught ‘this absolutely obvious truth by which we see that so many are not saved because God does not will this, though human beings do’ (Ep. 217.19). When he wrote his famous Confessions (397-403 CE) Augustine’s Stoic Providence caused him to interpret the child’s voice in the garden as a sign directing him to read the first passage of scripture he will open (Conf. 8.29; cf., divination through using Virgil’s works). Augustine was so powerfully drawn to pagan determinism as a youth that even his good friend Nebridius could not dissuade him from divination and astrology (Conf. 4.6). By eventually believing in his own responsibility for sin through the Christian view of free will, Augustine was freed from viewing God as punishing unjustly. This is how he embraced the Christian faith (Conf. 7.3-5). Although Augustine rejected Manichaeism, it must be noted that he never rejected it because of its rigid determinism. He rejected Manichaeism because of its implication of God as a creator of evil. Augustine even resorts to ad hominem arguments to intimidate persons who do not believe in his ‘ordines’ – i.e., Stoic Providential micromanagement (Gen. litt. 3.25) – ‘For as the most high God disposes well everything that he has made, there is nothing in the universe that is disordered and nothing that is unjust’ (Div. quaest. 27). Yet interestingly, despite his micromanaging Providence view, Augustine sometimes clings to the early Christian view of God acting by permission or allowing things to happen instead of actively ordaining everything. He can distinguish between God’s will (voluntas) as actively causing (faciendo) or in merely allowing an event (sinendo). This permission is found in contexts where he defends God when evil is addressed, as prior Christians had argued. ‘God commanded them – or rather allowed them’ (Div. quaest. 53.2; 388-395 CE). ‘From this it is to be gathered that God may both, as just, disapprove of something and yet, as omnipotent, permit its being done’ (De divinatione daemonum 5;

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406 CE). ‘So nothing happens unless the Almighty wills it, either by allowing it to happen or by doing it himself’ (Enchir. 24, 95; 422 CE). Augustine may have intuitively realized that his Stoic Providence and Christian views were not compatible and required at least some allowance for permission by God as earlier Christians had taught. So Augustine teaches an extremely ardent view of Stoic Providence not evident in any Christian author in the prior three centuries. His view reflects Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophies with ‘the One’s’ will controlling and determining all things by omnipotent ordination, even to a single hair being white or black (Serm. Dom. 1.52).

The Later Augustine Baptized Stoic Determinism (412-430 CE) Augustine’s tightly held tension between Christian free will and Stoic Providence ripped apart in 412 CE. Caelestius arrived in Carthage advocating his Christian theological views resulting in a trial in late 411 CE.32 After struggling to explain paedobaptism to fellow clergymen (Ep. 98; Ep. 5*.2), Augustine develops a novel theory and attacks the Pelagian’s most vulnerable argument – the purpose of paedobaptism (Pecc. merit. and Spir. et litt., 412 CE). His logic is simple. The church baptizes for the forgiveness of sins yet infants have no personal sin. Therefore, the church must be baptizing them for Adam’s primal sin. Without baptism, infants are damned due to Adam’s inherited reatus (guilt; Pecc. merit. 1.62). Infants have no ‘will’ or faith (Pecc. merit. 2.6) so God must decide which infants reach the baptismal font and which infants are divinely prevented from being baptized (Serm.D 29.10, 11; Persev. 31). If God unilaterally decides the salvation of infants then God must unilaterally decide salvation for adults (Sp. et litt. 53-9). God changes the ‘will’ of those he wants to save and leaves most of his creation for damnation. ‘But ‘he [God] could have changed even their will’, he persists, ‘for the better, since he is all-powerful’. He could have done, certainly. ‘So why didn’t he, then?’ Because he didn’t want to’ (Gen. litt. 11.13). In line with this conclusion, in 412 CE Augustine abandons his Christian view of free will and reverts to his pagan unilateral deterministic positions learned in his Stoic, Neoplatonic, and Manichaean training. His view of (the Stoic gods’) micromanagement and retributive justice theodicy (all suffering is deserved) created consternation (Civ. 18.41). The neighboring Hadrumetum monks were appalled (Corrept. 2).33 His Christianized divine providence was pagan at its core.

32

Gerald Bonner, Augustine and Modern Research on Pelagians, The Saint Augustine Lecture 1970 (Villanova, PA, 1972), 13-5, 35. 33 John Rist, Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge, 1994), 273-4, 310.

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Augustine utilized Gnostic and Manichaean interpretations of scripture defending his novel syncretized determinism. His deterministic interpretations of scripture after 411 CE were not the Christian interpretations he had previously used to fight the Manichaeans. Augustine now reverts to prior Manichaean interpretations he had embraced for a decade (and then refuted after being baptized into orthodox Christianity). These Manichaean interpretations include his post-411 CE deterministic views of Romans 9-11 (Pecc. merit. 29-31, Spir. et litt. 50, 60, 66; Nupt. 2.31-2, C. du ep. Pelag. 2.15, Enchir. 98, C. Jul. 3.37, 4.15, Corrept. 28), Eph. 2:8-10 (Spir. et litt. 56, C. du ep. Pelag., Enchir. 31, Praed. 12), Jn. 14:6 and 6:44, 65 (C. du ep. Pelag. 1.7, Grat. 3-4, 10), and Phil. 2:13 (Spir. et litt. 42, Grat. Chr. 1.6, C. Jul. 3.37, 4.15, Grat. 32, 38).34 Gnostics and Manichaeans had used these Christian scriptures for centuries to promote their determinism. Some scholars refuse to accept that Augustine taught a variation of pagan determinism.35 Rosenberg rejects that Augustine’s divine providence is equivalent to Stoic micromanagement, and attempts to defend Augustine’s providential views as compatible with modern evolutionary theories: ‘All are subject to God’s providence exercised through natural means. ‘It is thus that God unfolds the generations which he laid up in creation [saecula] when first He founded it’. [Gen. litt. 5.20.41] … it operates according to a structure imposed and maintained by an external Creator’.36 Since Augustine was trained in Stoicism from his youth, it should not surprise us that he takes this Stoic view of a divine meticulous design inherent within creation (as Rosenberg identifies). Yes, the Christian Augustine does modify Stoicism by rejecting the repetitious cycle of the earth’s conflagration and regeneration with every detail and event repeating itself eternally. But one should not limit Augustinian Providence to naturalistic causation: that proposal cannot sustain scrutiny. Perhaps the falling of a leaf or a seed to its location could be relegated to divine ‘pre-design’ within nature (Serm.D. 29.11). But divine control of living beings should not be so easily dismissed as inherent design. When the precise muscle movements in the necks of roosters fighting are controlled by Providence then we are at a lower level (Ord. 1.25). When Providence punishes Christian virgins for being proud of their virginity by having them raped by Vandals in 34

K. Wilson, Augustine’s Conversion (2018), 369. E.g., Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine (London, 1961; repr. New York, NY, 1967), 143-64; Goulven Madec, Saint Augustin et la philosophie: notes critiques (Paris, 1996), 5, 146. 36 Stanley Rosenberg, ‘Can Nature Be “Red Tooth and Claw” in the Thought of Augustine’, in Stanley Rosenberg (ed.), Finding Ourselves After Darwin (Grand Rapids, MI, 2018), 226-43, 236. Also note his public communication ‘Between organic and mechanistic views of nature: Creation ex nihilo and Augustine’s reworking of Genesis’ at the 18th International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, August 22, 2019. 35

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Rome ca. 410, then we are at a very low level (Civ. 1.28). When Providence arbitrarily eternally damns some innocent newborns for being born as Adam’s descendants by blocking their access to paedobaptism, we are the lowest level (Serm.D 29.10, 11; Persev. 31). Appealing to natural causation cannot rescue the later Augustine’s pagan micromanaging Providence. So if Augustine’s Providence does not allow free choice in eternal destinies to his rational human creation (post-412 CE), but assigns each person to heaven or hell by unilaterally giving or withholding baptism and his ‘gift of faith,’ why should we expect a different approach for less rational or even inanimate creation? Augustine espouses the typical dictatorial Stoic view of god micromanaging every infinitesimal event, not the traditional Christian general sovereignty view with God responding to human choices. When accused of returning to his Manichaean theology after 411 CE, Augustine mounted a defense by creating a fine distinction by modifying Gnostic/Manichaean ‘created human corrupt nature’ (producing damnation) into a Christianized ‘fallen human corrupt nature’ (producing damnation). Both produced a total human inability to respond to God thereby requiring a unilateral divine infusion of faith to avoid damnation in a deterministic model. This subtlety was not difficult for Christians at the time to expose as non-traditional doctrine. It was pagan fatalism. Conclusion Fergusson accurately summarized the Christian response to pagan determinism: Throughout the early centuries of the church, theology was marked by an emphasis upon the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom largely to combat Stoic determinism and astrological fatalism … God’s control over the future is determined by a foreknowledge of human choices. Divine election is in part a function of this foreknowledge. The manner in which God will determine and govern a human life is fixed by an awareness of the ways in which freedom will be exercised.37

The Christian opposition to Manichaean determinism was pervasive and intense, with the authors comparing it to the rigid determinism of Gnostics and Stoics.38 When Augustine boldly taught his pagan specific sovereignty after 411 CE, he abandoned the 300-year-old Christian defense of free will as the current cause of evil in the world. God became more Stoic and Manichaean than Christian. ‘God so loved the world’ no longer: God only loved the elect, as in 37 David Fergusson, ‘Predestination’, in The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, ed. Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason and Hugh Piper (Oxford, 2000). 38 Wassilios W. Klein, Die Argumentation in den griechisch-christlichen Antimanichaica, Studies in Oriental Religions 19 (Wiesbaden, 1991), 113-32. Klein evaluates sixteen Christian authors’ responses to Manichaeism; Nils Arne Pedersen, Demonstrative Proof in Defence of God: A Study of Titus of Bostra’s Contra Manichaeos (Leiden, Boston, 2004), 171-6, 321-30.

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Manichaeism. His unprecedented creation of salvific paedobaptism viewed within Stoic determinism and Manichaean total inability was determinative in forging his later theology. Near the end of his life, Augustine finally admitted he had killed traditional Christian free will: ‘In the solution of this question I struggled in behalf of free choice of the will, but the grace of God won out’ (Retr. 2.1). But this grace was not the inviting grace of the Christian God but the forced grace of the Manichaean god that ‘won out’. The grace that won out was Manichaean unilateral radical grace, not Christianity’s responsive grace. As Rist identified, when God decided to save a person that person’s salvation was inevitable (Ench. 27.103; ‘quia necesse est fieri si voluerit’), so that ‘Though Gilson does not say it, his Augustine is a moral determinist: fallen men are puppets’.39 Of course, Rist exaggerates since humans are free to sin and do evil independently of God’s providential strings. Perhaps. Augustine finds himself trapped between his Stoic providence that micromanages everything including evil and his Christian God who cannot be charged with causing evil. Augustine’s reversion to pagan specific sovereignty created a dilemma he was never able to resolve: ‘why, of these two [babies], the one should have been chosen rather than the other, is to us an insoluble problem’ (Enchir. 95). Even at the end of his life he confessed, ‘and if you ask me why, I confess that it is because I haven’t discovered what I should say’ (Persev. 18; cf. Serm. 294.7). The dilemma persists to modern times. Either God foreordains all or he does not. If God foreordains everything then he foreordains evil, including rapes, genocide, all atrocities, and sending innocent newborns to hell. Since (according to Augustine) omnipotence guarantees God experiences nothing he does not desire, then God desires everything that happens. Therefore, God desires and foreordains all evil. If God does not desire and foreordain all evil, then God is not the omnipotent God in Stoic, Gnostic, Neoplatonic, and Manichaean specific sovereignty (micromanaging determinism). Tatian had argued this very point over two-hundred years prior to Augustine’s theological departure. After 1600 years, Christian theologians still have no answer to this dilemma – if they adhere to the pagan specific sovereignty view of Augustinian-Calvinism. All must be mysteriously relegated to Augustine’s ‘inscrutible secret counsel of God’. When Augustine abandoned the Christian free will defense in 412 CE after holding in tension his Stoic providence and Christian free will for twentyfive years, Christianity lost its unanimous rejection of pagan sovereignty while defending Christianity’s relational God of general sovereignty. Suddenly within Augustine’s Christianity, the cause of all current evil in the world became mysterious – the privation of good from a caricature of God who desires and foreordains evil. Rist cogently commented, ‘His conviction about the unredeemed condition of large parts of the human race combines with a murky account of 39

John Rist, ‘Augustine on Free Will and Predestination’, JTS 20 (1969), 420-47, 435.

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God’s omnipotence to produce a theology which fails to do justice to his own theory of God’s love’.40 Augustine’s tenuous tension between Christian free will and Stoic micromanaging Providence ripped apart in 412 CE. His final syncretism of Christian free will and Stoic micromanaging sovereignty resulted in the commonplace pagan pseudo-compatibilism (Stoic ‘non-free free will’). Nevertheless, some modern theologians continue attempting to defend Augustine’s pagan pseudocompatiblism as a Christian theology. Why? Possibly because Augustine has been adoringly outfitted in impenetrable armor by his devoted followers. However, the time has come to admit that Augustine rejected the unanimous Christian theology of Providence in 412 CE when his pagan meticulous divine providence triumphed.

40

J. Rist, Ancient Thought Baptized (1994), 307.

God as Rhetorician: Divine ‘Showing’ in De ciuitate Dei 14.26-7 Adam TRETTEL, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

ABSTRACT Near the end of book 14 of De ciuitate Dei, Augustine makes a series of striking statements concerning divine providence. Specifically, while declining to answer the question of God’s ultimate motives, he suggests repeatedly that God wished to ‘show’ something to human beings and angels in the event of the Fall. This essay attempts to interpret these statements using three different approaches. First, it considers what Augustine says in light of Rom. 9:22-3. Recognizing the limitations of using this verse alone, it then proposes an alternative reading that explores the rhetorical connotation of the words ostendo and demonstrare, which Augustine uses to talk about God’s showing in ciu. 14.26-7. Finally, it connects this to Augustine’s Manichean past, and how Augustine uses rhetoric to magnify God’s acts of ‘showing’, or to rhetorically counter those who would doubt them. Together, these three approaches clarify the oratorical nature of ciu. They also contribute to a picture of God who is, like a rhetorician, attempting to rationally persuade his subjects, but may also fail to be believed by them, due to their free wills.

At the end of De ciuitate Dei 14 (hereafter ciu. 14),1 Augustine makes a series of striking statements concerning God’s providence. First, he says that God selects people in his grace and shows (ostendens) both to those whom he rescues, and those whom he does not, what he is giving them (quid eis largiatur).2 He then asks a question: why would God not have created people he knew would sin, when in this he could show (posset ostendere) both what their sin earned and what his grace gave?3 It came about, Augustine says, both that God was not unaware of future events, and yet did not force anyone to sin; and God was able to show (demonstraret) humans and angels, by what happened (consequenti experientia), the difference between their presumption and his protection.4 Yes, God could have taken the power of falling away from humans

1 Here and elsewhere I follow the abbreviations of the Corpus Augustinianum Gissense 3 (CAG 3). 2 Ciu. 14.26 (CChr.SL 48, 450.52-3). 3 Ciu. 14.26 (CChr.SL 48, 450.56-9). 4 Ciu. 14.27 (CChr.SL 48, 451.28-32).

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and angels; he preferred not to do so, however, and to show (maluit … ostendere) how much their pride was a force for evil, and his grace a force for good.5 These statements concerning God’s showing can be difficult to interpret. They make theological assumptions that could be challenging to accept, and a reader might find it hard to relate them to the argument of ciu. 14.25-8, or to ciu. as a whole. My goal here, building on my doctoral thesis,6 is to carry out three brief attempts to explore these statements. First, I relate ciu. 14.26-7 to Augustine’s text of Rom. 9:22-3. Next, I show how Augustine uses the words ostendo and demonstro repeatedly in context of rhetoric; I argue that this alternative reading is designed to underline the persuasive character of God’s activity. Building on this, I finally relate ciu. 14.26-7 to Augustine’s discussion of Jesus’ display of his scars (cicatrices), as an instance in which divine showing fails to persuade the Manicheans. In doing so, I highlight how Augustine characterizes God in his providential actions as inviting, but not compelling, a response, from either humans or angels. 1. Ostendo and demonstro in Rom. 9:22-3 A first option is to examine ciu. 14.26-7 in light of Rom. 9:22-3. Though Augustine cites this passage nowhere in ciu., he does so in a work that is nearly contemporary with ciu. 14, ep. 186: si autem uolens deus ostendere iram et demonstrare potentiam suam pertulit in multa patientia uasa irae, quae perfecta sunt in perditionem, et ut notas faceret diuitias gloriae suae in uasa misericordiae (‘What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience the vessels of wrath made for destruction, in order to make known the riches of his glory for the vessels of mercy…?’, RSV).7 Similar statements about divine providence, including references to Rom. 9:22-3, appear starting in the mid 390s AD, and continue up to the end of Augustine’s life.8 True, the vessels of wrath and mercy language is missing in ciu. 14.26-7, and ‘make known’ expression (notas faceret diuitias); but the verse has ostendo and demonstro with God as the subject, in the context of God saving and condemning people. While there are other Pauline passages that 5

Ciu. 14.27 (CChr.SL 48, 451.34-6). See Adam Trettel, Desires in Paradise: An Interpretative Study of Augustine’s City of God 14 (Paderborn, 2019), 199-201. 7 Ep. 186.24 (CSEL 57, 64.5-9). For dating and circumstances of this letter, see Winrich Löhr, ‘Der Streit um die Rechtgläubigkeit des Pelagius 414-418’, in Augustinus Handbuch (Tübingen, 2007), 188. For dating of ciu. 14, see Volker Drecoll, ‘Kommentar zu Augustin, Epistula 184A’, Revue des études augustiniennes 62 (2016), 67-94, 86-7. 8 See, for example, Simp. 1.2.18 (396/398 AD), Gn. litt. 11.8.10 (around 412-415 AD), c. ep. Pel. 2.15 (420-Winter 421 AD), praed. Sanct. 14 (after retr., close to 430 AD). These dates are from the chronology by Volker Drecoll in the Augustinus Handbuch (Tübingen, 2007), 253-61. 6

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may be behind the statements in ciu. 14.26-7, such as Eph. 1:9 (ut ostenderet mysterium uoluntatis suae; ‘… has made known to us the mystery of his will’, RSV),9 the ostendo-demonstro pairing makes Rom. 9:22-3 particularly significant. At the same time, there are limits to using this verse as the sole means to explain ciu. 14.26-7. While the linguistic parallels make it an obvious lens through which to view the passage, it is not clear that Augustine himself intended us to go down this path, as there are no scriptural citation markers for the ostendo or demonstro passages in ciu. 14.26-7. While he was capable of citing scripture without such markers, it is striking how often he employs them, as in ciu. 14.2 with the inspiciamus diligenter illum locum epistulae Pauli apostoli quam scripsit ad Galatas, ubi ait (‘let us look carefully at the passage of the apostle Paul which he wrote to the Galatians, where he says’), or in the repeated markers in ciu. 14.9 (for example, members of the city of God audiunt [Matthew 24:12], audiunt quod scriptum est [1John 1:18], etc.).10 While it would be wrong to discount the importance of this text on this ground alone, Augustine certainly could have made a Pauline, or Rom. 9:22-3 connection in particular, more explicit, had he wanted to. The lack of a scriptural citation marker invites us to consider alternatives. 2. An alternative approach: God as rhetorician This brings us to a second approach. In the wider usage, a pattern that is impossible to ignore is how often Augustine uses ostendo or demonstro in the context of rhetorical persuasion. There are manifold examples of both Augustine and other speakers saying these words to mean something like ‘I argue’, ‘I show’, or ‘I set forth’. For example, at ciu. 5.12, Augustine says that he quoted Aeneid 1.279-85 in order to show (ut ostenderem) how highly the Romans valued domination;11 Cicero’s Philus in De re publica is described in ciu. 2.21 as trying to show (conaretur ostendere) that justice was useless, and injustice useful, for the Roman republic;12 the philosopher Porphyry is said to show in ciu. 10.30 that what Virgil seems to have said in Aeneid, in a Platonic way, about the souls being sent to Elysium and then back to Lethe, is false (falsum esse ostendit quod Platonice uidetur dixisse Vergilius).13 Scriptural and Christian authors also ‘show’ in rhetorical contexts. Thus, in ciu. 10.5, Augustine 9

Cited at perseu. 15 (PL 45, 1002.19-20). See ciu. 14.2 and 14.9 (CChr.SL 48, 415.37-44, 426.4-32). An example of a verse without a clear marker is Wisdom 9:15, introduced by a ‘nam’ at ciu. 14.3 (CChr.SL 48, 416.4). For a summary of Augustine’s technique when citing this verse in other passages, see Anne Marie LaBonnardière, Biblia Augustiniana: Le Livre de la Sagesse (Paris, 1970), 269-70. 11 CChr.SL 47, 144.67-9. 12 CChr.SL 47, 53.39-42. 13 CChr.SL 47, 307.30-6. 10

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seeks to explain how the speaker in Psalm 50(51):18 shows (ostendit) that God wishes sacrifices, and yet says that he does not wish them, in the same verse.14 In doctr. Chr. 4.46, Augustine talks about Ambrose speaking about the weighty subject of the holy spirit (cum agat rem magnam de spiritu sancto), showing that it is equal to the father and the son (ut eum patri et filio demonstret aequalem).15 It is important to note that instances of ostendo or demonstro involve not just speech, but action as well. In ciu. 19.14, Augustine says that animate beings wordlessly show (ostendunt) they love the peace of the body whenever they flee pain, and the peace of the soul when they seek out pleasure;16 and at ciu. 15.5, the quarrel between Remus and Romulus is said to show how the terrestrial city is divided against itself (quem ad modum aduersus se ipsam terrena ciuitas diuidatur ostendit).17 Significantly, God or other members of the Trinity can also show things through action. In ep. 55.28, Augustine says that Jesus fasted for 40 days to show that the Gospel did not dissent from the teaching of law and the prophets (dominus ieiunauit demonstrans euangelium non dissentire a lege et propheti);18 in conf. 7.13, Augustine says that God in his great mercy shows the way of humility in the fact that the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us (cf. John 1:14);19 in a remarkable sermon, he says that Jesus in his crucifixion and resurrection ‘showed the journey, and made the way’ (iter ostendit, et viam fecit), that is, the journey and way for Christians who must undergo suffering but who can look forward to the resurrection.20 We might be tempted to see a difference between acts of showing that involve words, or are wordless, but the linguistic usage patterns with ostendo and demonstro do not invite this. As with the animals fleeing pain, a human or divine being may choose to show something without speaking. Moreover, given the importance of gesture in ancient rhetoric, it is unlikely Augustine would have seen such a distinction as crucial. Repeatedly in the wider works, he pairs demonstro with digitus, to make the expression ‘I show with my finger’.21 With this in mind, we can draw a connection to the first approach here, in considering God’s elective activity in the Fall as carrying rhetorical force. God’s actions, as described in Rom. 9:22-3, or in ciu. 14.26-7, indeed can be interpreted not singular acts of showing, referring only to themselves, but as also pointing to other acts of showing that together aim to persuade, as a group. History, for Augustine, can add up to an ‘argument’. The argument of ciu. as a whole, particularly in books 11-22, make it clear that God’s love and grace 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

CChr.SL 47, 277.18-22. Simonetti 330.40-1. CChr.SL 48, 680.11-681.15. CChr.SL 48, 458.33-4. CSEL 34, 200.19-22. CChr.SL 27, 101.1-4. S. 273.1 (PL 38, 1247.28-9). See, for example, mag. 5, trin. 7.11, c. ep. Pel. 3.11, etc.

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is revealed in a series of providential actions that together have a coherent, logical structure. Divine ‘showing’ through history could indeed be said to be analogous to Augustine’s own attempts, at multiple points, to signal the rational structure and inter-connections in the argument of ciu. with ‘showing’ words. At multiple points, he uses ostendo or demonstro to connect his books, or review a past point: at ciu. 19, he looks back at the argument in book 2, and says that he promised he would show (me demonstraturum esse promisi) that according to the definitions of Scipio in Cicero’s De re publica the Roman republic never existed;22 at ciu. 14.9, he says he showed (ostendentes) in ciu. 9 that the philosophers were more desirous of strife about words than truth about things.23 These usages invite us to consider how divine actions might be like a rhetorical account. We could say: just as the actions of God point to each other in order to communicate a greater message – the Fall points to the cross and resurrection, for instance – so do the books of Augustine’s ciu. point to each other as well, in order to cooperate towards making a particular emotional impression on the reader. The ‘rhetorical’ nature of God’s activity, and the way this is intended to be logical or appealing, may be the reason why Augustine takes time to point out, in the midst of making his showing statements in ciu. 14.26-7, that humans and angels are ‘rational’.24 That is, they are ‘rational’ in that they are capable of responding to an argument.

3. Divine rhetoric breaks down: an example with the Manicheans While Augustine’s passages about God invite comparisons to rhetorical speech or action, and help us to understand the various ‘showing’ actions of providence in ciu. 14.26-7, it is important that he also believes that rhetoric, even divine rhetoric or acts of display, can fail. This is clear with the case of Faustus the Manichean bishop in a specific instance of divine showing.25 In his wider writings, outside of ciu. 14, Augustine repeatedly records Faustus or other Manicheans as attacking the genuineness of Jesus’ scars (cicatrices) that he showed to his followers after the resurrection.26 This is grounds for Faustus being ‘insane’ (insanus) in Augustine’s view;27 but it is also a way for Augustine to

22

CChr.SL 48, 687.1-5. CChr.SL 47, 184.26-33. 24 ‘angelicae et humanae rationali creaturae’, ciu. 14.27, CChr.SL 48, 451/31. 25 On Faustus and the Contra Faustum, see Gregor Wurst, ‘Contra Faustum Manichaeum’, in Augustinus Handbuch (Tübingen, 2007), 312-6. 26 See, for example, c. Faust. 11.3, 14.2, 16.33; c. Sec. 25; ciu. 22.19; en. Ps. 49.5; s. 37.17; s. Denis 19.10, etc. 27 C. Faust. 6.9 (CSEL 25/1, 302.16-22). 23

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show how divine persuading, even by the plainest display of divine actions, can fail to be accepted. The situation is as follows. Faustus does not attack the integrity of the scriptural text describing what happens with Thomas, but he argues that Christ showed the Thomas a set of fake body scars (Christus falsas cicatrices dubitanti discipulo demonstrauit) in order to heal the wound of Thomas’ mind, that is, the wound of his doubt.28 Augustine’s response to this rejection of divine showing, that is, Jesus displaying his scars, is his own effort to persuade, to show Faustus why he is wrong. With the multiple connotations of ostendo in mind, we might say: a rejection of Jesus’ ‘showing’ thus becomes an occasion for a ‘counter-showing’. Augustine charges that if Faustus is right, then he thinks Christ teaches by trickery, and that he himself desires as a learner to be tricked (ipsum fallacem dicis ita docentem et te falli cupis ita discentem).29 Augustine points out also that Jesus repeatedly took food and drink to show that he had a real body and was not just appearing as a phantom (imaginaliter).30 Moreover, he says, some brave man who could have his scars removed by a skilled doctor (peritissimo medico) might want to keep traces of his scars as advertisements of his glory (uestigia uulnerum tamquam tituli gloriarum); analogously, Augustine suggests it was a display of Christ’s power, not biological necessity (potestate, non necessitate) that he decided to keep the scars, and show them to the disciples, even though he could have had them erased.31 Augustine’s efforts in all this are to try to persuade Faustus of the truthfulness and lack of guile in Jesus’ act of ostendere. Though we might be feel we are far from the themes of ciu. 14.26-7 in exploring such a text, this passage about the Manicheans is significant for three reasons. First, it helps us to understand the rhetorical dynamic that motivated the writing ciu.32 In the anti-Manichean works and in ciu., Augustine sees the need to magnify instances of divine ‘showing’, or simply insist on their reality against doubters.33 Second, this passage about Faustus helps us connect ciu. to Augustine’s Manichean past, and how it shaped his apologetic project. According to the account of the conf., Manicheans could be powerful precisely in their rhetoric; Augustine calls Faustus a ‘great trap of the devil’ (magnus laqueus diaboli) who snares many through the allure of his sweet speech (per inlecebram 28

C. Faust 16.33, CSEL 25/1, 482.10-21. C. Faust 16.33, CSEL 25/1, 482.19-21. 30 Ep. 102.7, CSEL 34/2, 550.15ff. 31 Ep. 95.7, CSEL 34/2, 512.11-3. 32 For Augustine’s reasons for writing ciu., see Johannes van Oort, Jerusalem and Babylon: A Study into Augustine’s City of God and the Sources of his Doctrine of the Two Cities (Leiden, 1991), 57-62. For Manichean influences on his argument, see ibid. 199-234. 33 For the threefold plan of ciu. 11-22, see Christian Tornau, Zwischen Rhetorik und Philosophie. Augustins Argumentationstechnik in De Civitate Dei und ihr bildungsgeschichtlicher Hintergrund (Berlin, New York, 2006), 6 n. 12. 29

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suaviloquentiae),34 in addition to having a winning personality.35 As with the situation in the anti-Manichean works, Augustine in ciu. sees himself faced with many opponents, who he needs to beat at their own game, that is, at least potentially, through rhetoric. Third, the display of Christ’s power theme accords specifically with what Augustine says about Jesus’ emotions in ciu. 14.9. Just as Jesus had a true mind and body, in his life, death, and resurrection, Augustine says he decided to have real emotions at certain points in his life, when he thought it was fitting (adhibuit eas [=affectiones], ubi adhibendas esse iudicauit).36 Jesus’ displaying of his wounds post-resurrection is another episode in the divine salvation history, along with what God hoped to accomplish in the events of the Fall, as described in ciu. 14.26-7. Specifically, Jesus’ taking on of human emotions show that they are a normal part of the fallen condition, and are capable of coming from someone who has a ‘right love’ (rectus amor).37 Conclusion There are many approaches we might take to understanding the statements about God’s ‘showing’ in ciu. 14.26-7. In this article, I have given three distinct methods for exploring them: through Rom. 9:22-3, through the rhetorical usages in ciu. and elsewhere, and through Augustine’s anti-Manichean past. Each of the three approaches opens new avenues for understanding ciu. 14.26-7 and its wider context. Together, they invite us to consider God as a rhetorician, who is aiming to persuade his subjects of his love for them and the goodness of his grace, but also is dealing with rational creatures who may fail to believe him.

34 35 36 37

CChr.SL 27, 58.2-4. Conf. 5.12, CChr.SL 27, 63.15-21. CChr.SL 48, 427.66. Ciu. 14.9, CChr.SL 48, 426.8.

The Example of the Twins: Rom. 9:10-3 as a Proof-Text in Augustine’s Polemics against Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians Morten Kock MØLLER, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

ABSTRACT This article examines the treatise De correptione et gratia (426/27 AD) with a view to Augustine’s exegesis of the controversial Pauline passages Rom. 8:28-30 and 9:10-3. The Bishop of Hippo himself viewed this work as his perhaps clearest exposition of the ‘grace of perseverance’ (gratia perseuerantiae), a divine gift which ensures that the recipient will persevere in the faith until the end of his life. The article explores how Augustine defends the compatibility of the Christian practice of ‘admonition’ (correptio) with his doctrine of grace. Furthermore, it documents how in De correptione et gratia Paul’s phrase ‘according to the purpose’ (secundum propositum, Rom. 8:28) becomes an important shorthand for Augustine’s doctrine. Only those human beings who are called according to God’s ‘purpose’ receive the divine gifts of faith and perseverance until the end. Augustine’s interpretation of secundum propositum was by no means uncontested among the patristic commentators on Romans, many of whom would prefer to ascribe this ‘purpose’ to human beings. In order to demonstrate the correctness of his interpretation, Augustine employs one of his favourite proof-texts for the doctrine of grace, Paul’s example of Jacob and Esau (Rom. 9:10-3). Augustine contends that this text decisively refutes the secundum propositum hominis interpretation which he sees as a subtle attempt at undermining the gratuitousness of grace.

1. Introduction Augustine’s late work De correptione et gratia (426/427 AD) presents us with a clear exposition of his mature understanding of grace.1 The treatise is also a testimony to the controversy which his views sparked among his contemporaries.2 Furthermore, the work shows how the Bishop of Hippo sought to define the notion of human ‘free choice’ (liberum arbitrium) in a manner that 1 A couple of years later (428/29 AD), Augustine would himself commend De correptione et gratia as his perhaps most lucid explanation of the grace of perseverance, see perseu. 21,55. See also Adolar Zumkeller, ‘Correptione et gratia, (De -)’, in Cornelius Mayer (ed.), AugustinusLexicon, vol. 2 (Basel, 1996-2002), 39-47, 45. 2 Josef Lössl, ‘De correptione et gratia (Über Zurechtweisung und Gnade)’, in Volker Henning Drecoll (ed.), Augustin Handbuch (Tübingen, 2007), 340-44, 340-1.

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would demonstrate its compatibility with a strong view of divine grace and election. The aim of the present article is to examine Augustine’s resolution of this problem using his appropriation of Paul’s phrase ‘according to the purpose’ (secundum propositum) in Rom. 8:28 as the Leitmotif. In De correptione et gratia, this phrase plays an important role as a shorthand for Augustine’s doctrine of unmerited grace.3 Interestingly, we encounter an attempt on the part of Augustine to refute an influential interpretation of secundum propositum encountered in several patristic sources, namely that this ‘purpose’ should actually be attributed to human beings and not to God. The Pauline example of the twins Jacob and Esau (Rom. 9:10-3), one of Augustine’s favourite proof-texts, plays a crucial role in his refutation of this rival interpretation. 2. Background: Augustine’s Epistle 194 to Sixtus Augustine’s Epistle 194 to the priest Sixtus (the future Pope Sixtus III of Rome) from 418 provides the background for the exchange between the elderly bishop and the abbot Valentinus from the monastery of Hadrumetum. Approximately seven years later, this epistle came in the possession of a travelling brother (by the name of Florus) from the monastery who brought it home with him.4 The content of Augustine’s letter sparked a heated discussion which greatly disturbed the peace of the monastic community. In his treaties De gratia et libero arbitrio (426/27 AD) and De correptione et gratia, Augustine attempts to mediate in the dispute and to answer objections to the doctrine of grace which he set forth in Epistle 194. In order to provide some context for Augustine’s reply in De correptione, it would be useful to briefly go through the most relevant points of this letter. His anti-Pelagian polemic in Epistle 194 takes the form of a detailed exposition of Rom. 9:10-29. At the beginning of the letter, Augustine mentions that he had been anxious upon hearing rumours that Sixtus was a supporter of the Pelagian cause.5 To Augustine’s relief, these rumours were subsequently shown to be incorrect. According to Augustine, the Pelagians are mistaken in their insistence on the complete autonomy of the human will.6 They think that they are actually defending the freedom of the will when they claim that the will does not receive 3 We encounter a total of fifty-eight citations of Rom. 8:28 in the Augustinian corpus, eighteen of which are found in De correptione et gratia, see corrept. 7,13; 7,14 (four times); 7,16; 9,20 (twice); 9,21; 9,23 (twice); 9,24; 9,25; 12,34; 12,35; 13,39. See Georges Folliet, ‘Introduction’, in Max Josef Suda and Georges Folliet (eds), Sancti Augustini Opera: Contra sermonem Arrianorum et De correptione et gratia, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 92 (Vienna, 2000), 129-215, 188. 4 A. Zumkeller, ‘Correptione’, 40. 5 Ep. 194, 1,1. 6 Ep. 194, 2,3.

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divine ‘support’ (adiutorium) in the pursuit of righteousness.7 This notion is a serious mistake, Augustine contends, since the will can only achieve true freedom and stability when it is anchored in God. The Pelagians refuse to believe that God does not take antecedent merits into account when bestowing his grace. They are reluctant to accept the veracity of Paul’s statement in Rom. 9:18 (cuius uult, miseretur) since it could seem to imply arbitrariness in the divine counsel.8 Augustine, unsurprisingly, denies that this is the case. He employs his parable of the creditor (which he first employed in Ad Simplicianum) to show that God is perfectly within his rights to bestow his grace on some sinners while withholding it from others.9 Augustine’s answer to critical inquiries into the reasoning behind the divine counsel consists of a repetition of Paul’s words in Rom. 9:14 (numquid iniquitas apud Deum? Absit!).10 Augustine admits that he is at a loss to explain predestination in a rational manner. Despite this confession of ignorance, he does claim that God’s withholding of grace from the reprobate has the positive effect of teaching the elect which fate would have been theirs without the gift of grace. In his letter to Sixtus, Augustine contends that divine election does not take human merits into account. He also specifically denies that ‘future works’ (futura opera) only foreseen by God play any role whatsoever.11 If Paul had actually believed that God chose Jacob over Esau in view of the former’s foreseen merits, then the Apostle would surely have stated this openly in the context of his argument in Rom. 9:10-29. Likewise, Jacob was not elected by God while still in his mother’s womb because he later would freely choose faith. The patriarchal twins (Rom. 9:10-3) and the church’s practice of infant baptism are presented by Augustine as paradigmatic examples of the gratuitousness of grace.12 Having ruled out every possibility of obtaining autonomous merit, Augustine arrives at the conclusion that even faith should be viewed as a gift from God and not as our own doing: It remains, then, that faith itself, from which all justice derives its origin – and that is why these words of the Song of Songs are addressed to the Church: ‘You shall come and shall pass over from the beginning of faith’ (Cant. 4:8 LXX) – it remains, I repeat, that faith itself is not to be attributed to the human choice which these men extol, nor to any antecedent merits, since any good merits, such as they are, come from faith; but we must confess it as a free gift of God, if we are thinking of true grace without merit, because we read in the same Epistle: ‘God has dealt to each one a measure of faith’. (Rom. 12:3)13 7

Ibid. Ep. 194, 2,4. 9 Ep. 194, 2,5. See Simpl. I 2,16. 10 Ep. 194, 6,23. 11 Ep. 194, 8,35. 12 Ep. 194, 10,43. 13 Restat igitur, ut ipsam fidem, unde omnis iustitia sumit initium, propter quod dicitur ad ecclesiam in Cantico Canticorum: Venies et pertransies ab initio fidei, restat, inquam, ut ipsam fidem 8

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Here Augustine states outrightly that even the very ‘beginning of faith’ (initio fidei) is not a matter of ‘human choice’ (ipsam fidem non humano, quod isti extollunt, tribuamus arbitrio). This initial faith should rather be understood as a ‘free gift from God’ (gratuitum Dei donum), as Paul testifies in Rom. 12:3.

3. The challenge posed to Augustine’s doctrine of grace In De correptione et gratia, Augustine faces the challenge of reconciling his own mature view of ‘free choice’ (liberum arbitrium) with the Christian practice of ‘admonition’ (correptio). The latter term refers to practice of reprimanding fellow members of the faith who are believed to have violated the norms of Christian behaviour in one way or another.14 Given Augustine’s strong assertion of divine grace and his view that God chose the patriarch Jacob over his twin Esau without any reference to their merits (Rom. 9:10-3), it could seem that human activity plays absolutely no role. If God ultimately decides and takes care of all matters concerning human salvation, the practice of admonishing a wayward brother in the faith would seem to be superfluous. If the human will is indeed ‘prepared by the Lord’ (uoluntas a Domino praeparetur, Prov. 8:35 LXX), as Augustine maintains, it would arguably be wiser simply to pray for the person in the hope that God would lead him back to the right path, without using a human agent to achieve this goal.15

4. The scriptural basis for the practice of correptio Augustine begins his treatise by demonstrating that the practice of correptio has a firm basis in the biblical scriptures. In particular, he sets forth the Apostle Paul as an example to be imitated in this regard. Paul was constantly engaged in teaching his fellow Christians and he would not refrain from admonishing them when this was deemed necessary.16 Paul was conscious of the fact that any spiritual benefit resulting from his correptio should not be ascribed to him but rather to God who effects the person’s inward change from sin to virtue. non humano, quod isti extollunt, tribuamus arbitrio nec ullis praecedentibus meritis, quoniam inde incipiunt bona, quaecumque sunt, merita, sed gratuitum Dei donum esse fateamur, si gratiam ueram, id est sine meritis cogitemus, quia, sicut in eadem epistula legitur, Deus unicuique partitur mensuram fidei (Ep. 194, III 9: CSEL 57, 183). English translation from Wilfrid Parsons, Saint Augustine: Letters vol. 4 (165-203), Writings of Saint Augustine vol. 12 (Washington, DC, 1981), 307. Translation modified by MKM. 14 Tarsicius J. van Bavel, ‘Correptio, corripere’, in Cornelius Mayer (ed.), Augustinus-Lexicon, vol. 2 (Basel, 1996-2002), 35-9, 37-8. 15 Corrept. 4,6: CSEL 92, 223. 16 Corrept. 1,3.

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In Augustine’s view, this is evident from Paul’s habit of praying for his spiritual children that they should flee from evil and pursue the good (2Cor. 13:7).17 Paul’s prayers are a witness to his conviction that only God can effect such a transformation. Paul’s ministry of ‘planting’ and ‘watering’ (1Cor. 3:7) through his spoken word would have been to no avail without the ‘hidden’ (in occulto), inner work of divine grace.18 5. The compatibility of admonition and grace Augustine insists that his doctrine of grace is perfectly compatible with the practice of admonition. In addition to presenting biblical evidence for his claim, he also attempts to give a rational justification. Augustine’s first line of argument is, as we have already seen, that God might employ the ‘external’ admonition given through a human being (in casu a superior in the monastic community) as the means to effect a beneficial ‘internal’ change in the person in question. It would therefore be wrong to abstain from giving an admonition if one observes that someone is doing spiritual harm to himself.19 Augustine grants that admonition might be to no avail if the wayward brother does not belong to the group of the elect who are predestined to salvation. In that case, the admonition will only be unto ‘judgement’ (iudicium).20 Even though the exact number of the elect has already been decided by God, only he knows their identity.21 We, however, do not know who have been granted ‘perseverance until the end’ (perseuerantia usque in finem) of their life by God and who have not. Human ignorance is thus a second reason why admonition should be applied indiscriminately according to Augustine. God intentionally keeps the identity of the elect a secret since it serves as a ‘check on pride’, as R.H. Weaver has stated.22 6. The necessity of being called secundum propositum The grace of perseverance, Augustine holds, has only been granted to those ‘who are called according to the purpose’ (secundum propositum uocati sunt, cf. Rom. 8:28). This special calling is to be distinguished from the more general calling which all human beings receive (Augustine repeatedly cites Matt. 22:14 17

Ibid. Corrept. 1,3: CSEL 92, 221. 19 Corrept. 5,7. 20 Corrept. 9,25: CSEL 92, 249. 21 Corrept. 13,39-40: CSEL 92, 267-8. 22 Rebecca Harden Weaver, Divine Grace and Human Agency: A Study of the Semi-Pelagian Controversy, North American Patristic Society Patristic Monograph Series 15 (Macon, 1998), 26. 18

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in support of this distinction). The calling secundum propositum confers upon the recipient the ‘gift’ (donum or munus) of perseverance which guarantees that he or she ultimately will attain salvation despite the struggles and temptations encountered in this world. Augustine claims that it is impossible for someone who has received this divine ‘support’ (adiutorium) to lose his faith and remain in this state until the end of his life.23 He finds it perplexing that God brings some people to faith only to allow them to lose it again later in life. That is to say, such people have not received the grace of perseverance. They are rightly called ‘sons of God’ (filii Dei) as long as they remain in a state of grace, i.e. temporarily, but they are not viewed as such from the perspective of God’s ‘foreknowledge’ (praescientia).24 7. Augustine’s insistence on the secundum propositum Dei interpretation It might be asked why it is necessary for God to grant the elect a special calling secundum propositum. Augustine’s answer is that they would not have been able to attain salvation otherwise. Our human nature has received a mortal wound owing to the Fall of Adam and therefore we no longer possess the same freedom as our forefather to will what is good and righteous. We are hopelessly trapped in the inner conflict which Paul so poignantly describes in Rom. 7:23-5.25 Adam had the freedom to avoid sin (posse non peccare) by using his liberum arbitrium correctly, even though he, too, would have been dependent upon the aid of divine grace to achieve this.26 In our current fallen condition, however, we need a different and even more powerful kind of grace. Augustine describes this divine ‘support’ as an adiutorium quo aliquid fit, i.e., something which necessarily brings about perseverance.27 Adam, on the other hand, was supported by an adiutorium sine quo aliquid non fit which did not guarantee his perseverance but only made it possible, insofar he freely would choose the good using his liberum arbitrium. Given Augustine’s view of Christian anthropology and his understanding of election and perseverance, it is not surprising that his exegesis of Rom. 8:28 only allows for one possible explanation of Paul’s phrase secundum propositum. This phrase, taken by itself, is somewhat ambiguous in that the Apostle does not explicitly state to whom this ‘purpose’ belongs by attaching a noun or a possessive pronoun to it. Nonetheless, Augustine is absolutely convinced that Paul here must be referring to the divine purpose and that it denotes God’s will 23 24 25 26 27

Corrept. Corrept. Corrept. Corrept. Corrept.

12,34: CSEL 92, 260. 9,20: CSEL 92, 241. 11,29. 12,33: CSEL 92, 259. 12,34: CSEL 92, 259.

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to save those human beings whom he chooses. As we shall see, Augustine’s view was opposed to a widespread interpretation among patristic commentators on Romans that this propositum should actually be attributed to human beings.

8. Augustine’s refutation of the secundum propositum hominis interpretation Augustine censures the secundum propositum hominis interpretation in the course of his argument for the perseverance of the elect. Commenting on the passage Rom. 8:28-30, he insists that it is impossible for those who have been ‘called according to the purpose’ to lose their salvation: Of these no one perishes, because all are elected. And they are elected because they were called according to the purpose – the purpose, however, not their own, but God’s; of which he elsewhere says, ‘That the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calls, it was said unto her that the elder shall serve the younger’ (Rom. 9:11). And in another place he says, ‘Not according to our works, but according to His own purpose and grace’ (2Tim. 1:9). When, therefore, we hear, ‘Moreover, whom He did predestinate, them He also called’ (Rom. 8:29), we ought to acknowledge that they were called according to His purpose (…).28

Here Augustine categorically denies that the ‘purpose’ mentioned in Rom. 8:28 could possibly belong to human beings but rather should be attributed to God (propositum autem, non suum, sed Dei). His refutation of the secundum propositum hominis interpretation consists of two scriptural quotations from the Pauline corpus, Rom. 9:11 and 2Tim. 1:9. The former of these quotations concerns the famous example of Jacob and Esau which played a central role in Augustine’s argument against the Pelagians in his Epistle 194 to Sixtus. In De correptione et gratia, God’s election of Jacob over Esau even prior to the birth again serves to demonstrate the gratuitousness of divine grace. More specifically, it refutes the interpretation that propositum should be attributed to human beings. Such a wrongheaded interpretation could seem to suggest that God takes human merit, i.e., our good ‘purpose’, into account when deciding whom to elect for salvation and grant ‘perseverance until the end’. By using Rom. 9:11 as a hermeneutical key, Augustine manages to remove the ambiguity found in Paul’s language in Rom. 8:28. In Rom. 9:11, the Apostle clearly 28

Ex istis nullus perit, quia omnes electi sunt. Electi sunt autem, quia secundum propositum uocati sunt: propositum autem, non suum, sed Dei; de quo alibi dicit: Ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex uocante dictum est ei: quia maior serviet minori; et alibi: Non secundum opera nostra, inquit, sed secundum suum propositum et gratiam. Cum ergo audimus: Quos autem praedestinavit, illos et uocavit, secundum propositum uocatos debemus agnoscere (…) (Corrept. 7,14: CSEL 92, 234). English translation from Robert Ernest Wallis, Saint Augustine: Anti-Pelagian Writings, The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. 5 (New York, 1887), 477.

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reveals to whom this purpose belongs with the crucial addition of the word Dei. Augustine cites 2Tim. 1:9 to the same effect. The central notion of propositum is here qualified by the possessive pronoun suum, clearly pointing to the fact that the divine purpose is referred to. We encounter a very similar treatment of the secundum propositum hominis interpretation in Augustine’s earlier treatise Contra duas epistolas pelagianorum (420/421 AD).29 In that work, he sought to refute a doctrinal statement set forth by Julian of Eclanum and eighteen likeminded bishops according to which ‘grace (…) assists the good purpose (propositum) of each one; but yet that it does not infuse the love of virtue into a reluctant one, because there is no acceptance of persons with God’.30 Augustine likewise employs Rom. 9:11 and 2Tim. 1:9 to demonstrate that secundum propositum in Rom. 8:28 should be attributed to God. Interestingly, Augustine already rejected the secundum propositum hominis interpretation in his much earlier exegetical work Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos (394/395 AD), written prior to the Pelagian controversy and even before his watershed work Ad Simplicianum (ca. 396-398 AD). In Expositio, he says that this ‘purpose, it must be understood, is God’s, not theirs’ (propositum autem Dei accipiendum est, non ipsorum).31 It is somewhat surprising to encounter this interpretation at a stage in Augustine’s intellectual development where he still claimed that human beings can obtain ‘merit’ (meritum) with God by using their liberum arbitrium rightly (i.e., to believe).32 9. Interpretations of secundum propositum in other patristic authors In his classic survey of patristic exegesis of Rom. 1-11, K.H. Schelkle documented the popularity of the secundum propositum hominis interpretation among the ancient commentators.33 According to Schelkle, this understanding of Rom. 8:28 was motivated by a desire to weaken the implications of Paul’s teaching on predestination and an attempt to defend human freedom.34 The arguably 29

Cf. Contra ep. Pel. II 10,22. (…) gratiam quoque adiuuare uniuscuiusque bonum propositum, non tamen reluctanti studium uirtutis inmittere, quia personarum acceptio non est apud Deum (Contra ep. Pel. II 5,10: CSEL 60, 469). English translation from R.E. Wallis, Saint Augustine’s Anti-Pelagian Writings (1887), 395. Translation modified by MKM. 31 Expos. 55. 32 Expos. 62. 33 Karl Hermann Schelkle, Paulus – Lehrer der Väter (Düsseldorf, 1956), 308-12. Among the Greek proponents of the secundum propositum hominis interpretation are Cyril of Jerusalem, Isidore of Pelusium, Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, John Chrysostom and Theodoret of Cyrus. Among the Latin authors we encounter this interpretation in Ambrosiaster and in the anonymous work known as De induratione cordis Pharaonis. 34 Ibid. 309. 30

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most interesting discussion of the controversial phrase is found in Origen’s Commentary on Romans.35 Unfortunately, the relevant portion of the Commentary only survives in Rufinus’ Latin translation (about 405-406 AD), the reliability of which has been much disputed among scholars.36 In the seventh Book of the Latin translation, Origen-Rufinus discusses whether the propositum in Rom. 8:28 should be ascribed to the ‘good purpose and good will’ (secundum propositum bonum et bonam uoluntatem) of humans beings or whether this purpose actually belongs to God.37 While both options are presented as exegetically defensible, one detects a certain uneasiness with the secundum propositum Dei interpretation.38 Origen-Rufinus goes out of his way to show that even if the latter option proves to be correct, the divine purpose would still take foreseen human choices into account when deciding whom to elect for salvation. 10. Conclusion Augustine was not reluctant to challenge traditional solutions to exegetical problems and this fact is perhaps most evident in his approach to the Epistle to the Romans. His radically new understanding of Rom. 9:10-3, first set forth in Ad Simplicianum, continued to inspire his doctrine of grace throughout his life. With time the example of Jacob and Esau became an effective polemical weapon that would serve to gainsay notions of grace and human freedom that differed from Augustine’s own. This article has shown how in De correptione et gratia the elderly bishop of Hippo employed this Pauline example to combat an influential interpretation of Rom. 8:28 among other patristic authors, namely that the phrase secundum propositum refers to the ‘good purpose’ of human beings. Given such an interpretation, predestination to salvation would seem to be contingent upon one’s own liberum arbitrium and God’s foreknowledge of our free choices. Thus making human ‘merit’ logically prior to divine election is absolutely unacceptable to the doctrinal sensibilities of Augustine. His firm rejection of the traditional secundum propositum hominis interpretation, a seemingly small exegetical detail in his exposition of Romans, leads us to the very core of Augustine’s doctrine of grace. His widespread use of the phrase secundum propositum in De correptione et gratia gives evidence of the fact that Paul’s expression at this time had become a useful shorthand for the essence of this doctrine. 35

In Rom. comm. VII 6,3-4. See e.g., Jean Scherer, Le commentaire d’Origène sur Rom. III.5-V.7 (Cairo, 1957); Henry Chadwick, ‘Rufinus and the Tura Papyrus of Origen’s Commentary on Romans’, The Journal of Theological Studies 10/1 (1959), 10-42. 37 In Rom. comm. VII 6,3: SC 543, 316. 38 In a Greek excerpt from the Commentary on Romans preserved in the Philocalia, Origen only discusses the option of attributing κατὰ πρόθεσιν to God. See Philoc. 25,3. 36

Inimici gratiae Christi: The Development of Augustine’s Construction of Pelagianism ca. 418 David Burkhart JANSSEN, Tübingen, Germany

ABSTRACT ‘Pelagianism’ as a heresy emerged out of Augustine’s confronting and refuting the errors which he ascribed to the theology of Pelagius. Whereas scholars have been tempted to ascribe Augustine’s issue with Pelagius to sociological or ecclesiopolitical differences, the bishop of Hippo in fact saw ‘Pelagianism’ as a sincere christologicalsoteriological error. This becomes especially clear during the time of the Council of Carthage (418 AD): Augustine constructed ‘Pelagianism’ as a specific heresy by promulgating and systematizing precise definitions and key phrases of the errors of the Pelagiani, a heresiological label which was first used in this period (416-421 AD) when Augustine developed different argumentative strategies to characterise ‘Pelagianism’. Since the beginning of the so-called Pelagian controversy, Augustine characterized his opponents as enemies of grace (inimici gratiae) and accused them of evading the soteriological significance of the cross and blood of Christ. This serious accusation should be understood as intertwining theology, heresiology and a rhetorical strategy. Thereby, Augustine attacks the Pelagiani both as advocates of anti-soteriology and as prototypical sinners. During the Pelagian controversy, Augustine reinforced this argumentation by linking his christocentrical soteriology with anti-Pelagian allegations. Especially in Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum Augustine further systematized his anti-Pelagianism, whereby he intensified his accusation of inimici gratiae against the Pelagiani and introduced the specification of them being inimici crucis Christi while focusing on the soteriological significance of Christ’ blood. Therefore, Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum can be regarded as an important step within the construction of ‘Pelagianism’ as a definable heresy.

Introduction: How to construct a heresy? Inimici gratiae, enemies of grace, is only the most common label with which Augustine denominated a group of heretics known as ‘Pelagians’ – Pelagianism, however, is a rather Augustinian construction. It could, in fact, well be argued that without Augustine Pelagianism would not exist. The term Pelagiani only occurs after the Council of Carthage 418 AD, especially in Augustine’s writings from 421 AD, De nuptiis et concupiscentia 2 and Contra duas epistulas

Studia Patristica CXIX, 187-198. © Peeters Publishers, 2021.

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Pelagianorum.1 The same could be said about Augustine’s naming his opponents (noui) heretici.2 In short, these writings could be called the birthplace of Pelagianism – and therefore, the years between 418 and 421 AD should be given close attention.3 How we deal with these anti-Pelagian writings, however, is determined by what we conceive as constructing a heresy. In talking about constructing a heresy, one must be aware of two misunderstandings: The first one which can be encountered throughout the earlier history of Patristics, was to assume that Augustine’s construction of Pelagianism could be easily equated with Pelagius’s own teaching. This neither does justice to Pelagius nor to Augustine himself. Small wonder, therefore, that it was and continues to be an important task to distinguish Pelagius and his theology from Augustine’s polemics and refutations.4 The second misunderstanding, however, is to regard the construction of Pelagianism merely an invention by Augustine: To portray his polemics simply as the work of a power-conscious bishop who hatefully vilified Pelagius and his supporters with no interest in their theology without understanding their doctrines whatsoever – and thus to regard the entire Pelagian controversy as nothing but a sociological or ecclesio-political issue, with Augustine’s antiPelagian heresiology as mere polemic.5 The theological discourse is then voided and so is Augustine as a conscious theologian and heresiologist. 1 The noun Pelagiani first occurs in Iul. Aec., Turb. fr. 1 (Iuliani Aeclanensis, ed. Lucas DeConinck, CChr.SL 88 [Turnhout, 1977], 340.11): Thereby, Julian criticises the anti-Pelagian politic and agitations in Italy. Therefore, the term Pelagiani seems to originate in Italy after the condemnation of Pelagius. However, the adjective pelagianus/a can be found already in Aug., Ep. 4*,4,3 (Sancti Aureli Augustini opera: Epistolae ex duobus codicibus nuper in lucem prolatae, ed. Johannes Divjak, CSEL 88 [Wien, 1981], 23.2) and an. et or. 2,12,17 (Sancti Aureli Augustini opera 8,1, ed. Karl Urba and Josef Zycha, CSEL 60 [Wien, 1913], 351.20). In c. ep. Pel. Augustine uses the term more than sixty times, in nupt. et conc. 2 seventeen times, see Volker Drecoll, ‘Pelagius/ Pelagiani’, Augustinus-Lexikon 4 (2012-8), 624-66, 657-8. 2 Augustine uses the term noui heretici for the ‘Pelagians’ in Ep. 193,1 (Sancti Aureli Augustini Epistulae 4, ed. Alois Goldbacher, CSEL 57 [Wien, 1911], 168.8); nupt. et conc. 1,1,1 (Sancti Aureli Augustini opera 8,2, ed. Karl Urba and Josef Zycha, CSEL 42 [Wien, 1902], 211.5) and c. ep. Pel. 1,1,2; 1,5,9; 2,6,11 (CSEL 60, 424.1; 430.25; 470.18-9 Urba/Zycha); noua heresis already in Ep. 176,2 (Sancti Aureli Augustini Epistulae 3, ed. Alois Goldbacher, CSEL 44 [Wien, 1904], 664.15) and implicated in gest. Pel. 35,61 (CSEL 42, 115.21-116.2 Urba/Zycha). 3 The years after the Council of Carthage have received little scholarly attention. While most books about Pelagius stop with his conviction (see Winrich Löhr, Pélage et le Pélagianisme, Les Conférences de l’École pratique des hautes études 8 [Paris, 2015], with further bibliography), those about Julian mainly concentrate on c. Iul. and c. Iul. op. impf. (see Josef Lössl, Julian von Aeclanum. Studien zu seinem Leben, seinem Werk, seiner Lehre und ihrer Überlieferung, VCS 60 [Leiden, 2001]). 4 For the history of research and the huge amount of literature see Gerald Bonner, Augustine and Modern Research on Pelagianism (Villanova, 1972) and Mathijs Lamberigts, ‘Recent Research into Pelagianism with Particular Emphasis on the Role of Julian of Aeclanum’, Aug(L) 52 (2002), 175-98. 5 For the sociological approach towards Pelagianism see for example: Peter Brown, ‘Pelagius and his Supporters. Aims and Environment’, JThS 19 (1968), 93-114 and Jean Salamito, Les

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Rather than going astray by pursuing one of these ways exclusively, I want to consider Augustine’s construction of Pelagianism as a theological construction primarily resulting from theological controversies. This reflects Augustine’s own approach:6 He was not interested in simply reiterating the theology of his opponents since the heretical character of the arguments put forth by Pelagius and his associates would not be found at the surface of their texts. Rather, the bishop of Hippo tried to detect the implications, intentions and final consequences of his opponent’s doctrine examining their texts almost like an exegete. Based on what he found he constructed Pelagianism by systematizing precise definitions and key phrases of the errors of the Pelagiani. In this progress, ‘Pelagianism’ as a heresy arouse, intertwining Church politics, heresiology and theological discourse. The anti-Pelagian argument: Why the Pelagiani imply that the death of Christ was unnecessary? (c. ep. Pel. 1,21,39) When talking about Pelagianism, we are accustomed to primarily focus on sin, sexuality, free will and grace. In Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum, however, Augustine negotiates the question for which reason Christ has suffered and died. This might come as a surprise, because in the letter Julian of Aeclanum wrote to the Roman clergy and Augustine replied with Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum 1, Christology is not assigned a central role.7 Instead, Julian focusses on human abilities given by the grace of creation. He especially uses the example of the sancti ueteris testamenti to demonstrate that humans have the ability to live with perfect justice (with the help of the law or the Spirit).8 Otherwise, he argued, Augustine would have to admit that the just of the Old Testament were sinful, a heretical idea associated with Manichaeism. Augustine believed in the reality of the just of the Old Testament, he even defended them against Manichaeism.9 However, in his eyes Julian’s approach opened the theological box of Pandora by suggesting the possibility to live virtuously by the grace of creation and law alone. Instead of discussing virtuoses et la multitude. Aspects sociaux de la controverse entre Augustin et les pélagians (Grenoble, 2005); Ali Bonner, Myth of Pelagianism (Oxford, 2018). 6 See Georg Wurst, ‘Haeresis/haeretici’, Augustinus-Lexikon 3 (2004-10), 290-302, 291-3. 7 Except for Iul. Aec., Ep. Rom. fr. 6 (CChr.SL 88, 397.27-9 C.); see Mathijs Lamberigts, ‘Competing Christologies. Julian and Augustine on Jesus Christ’, AugStud 36 (2005), 159-94, 168-9. 8 Iul. Aec., Ep. Rom. fr. 12 (397.53-398.57 C.): Dicimus, inquit, sanctos Ueteris Testamenti perfecta hinc iustitia ad aeternam transisse uitam, id est, studio uirtutis ab omnibus recessisse peccatis, quia et illi, quos legimus aliquid peccasse, postea tamen eos emendasse cognouimus; Iul. Aec., Ep. Ruf. fr. 5; 7-8; 20-2; 24-25 (337.33-5,41-338.50; 339.89-102,106-340.112 C.). 9 See Volker Drecoll and Mirjam Kudella, Augustin und der Manichäismus (Tübingen, 2011), 119-22.

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anthropological issues, Augustine replies with a focus on Christ by interpreting Julian’s argument with a sentence of Pelagius who distinguishes three epochs of salvation: ante legem, per legem and per Christum.10 This intertextual exegesis of Julian’s argument allows Augustine to make two strikes: First, he draws a direct line between Pelagius and Julian so that they belong to one homogenous heresy which Augustine calls Pelagiani, thus demonstrating that Julian and his supporters are teaching according to Pelagius (secundum Pelagium).11 Secondly, the Pelagian quotation gives Augustine a hard proof for his thesis that Julian and all Pelagiani believe in a variety of ways of salvation besides Christ. Such variety, however, would render the death of Christ unnecessary, because necessity, according to Augustine, means exclusivity. The Pelagiani, thus, are found to stand in a radical antithesis to Augustine’s own soteriology, the centre of which being the gratia Christi (e.g. Acts 15:11) or the gratia Dei per Iesum Christum (Rom. 7:25).12 This grace is only effected by the blood of Christ. Augustine, therefore, presents the sentence sanguis Christi non fuerit necessarius13 as the key error of the Pelagiani claiming that this very sentence represented the final consequence of Pelagian doctrine. Consequently, the Pelagiani were heretics as they lack the fides mediatoris which is the faith in Christ as saluator (see Acts 15:11).14 An emptied faith in Christ as saviour consequently leads to neglect the exceptional role of Christ as mediator (1Tim. 2:5)15 – elsewhere Augustine pursued this argument to claim that Pelagius or the Pelagiani erroneously teach about the human nature of Christ.16 Hence, the Pelagiani negate both the exclusivity of both grace and faith. Augustine feels empowered to denounce them as enemies of grace, inimici gratiae Christi.17 10 Aug., c. ep. Pel. 1,21,39 (457.7-10 U./Z.); see also gr. et pecc. or. 2,26,30 (CSEL 42, 190.416 Urba/Zycha). Winrich Löhr, ‘Pelagius’ Schrift De natura. Rekonstruktion und Analyse’, REAug 31 (1999), 235-94, 247-9 pleads for the authenticity of the Pelagian authorship of this sentence. 11 Aug., c. ep. Pel. 1,21,39 (457.7 U./Z.). 12 Aug., c. ep. Pel. 1,7,12 (432.22-4 U./Z.); 1,21,39 (457.1-6 U./Z.). 13 Aug., c. ep. Pel. 1,21,39 (457.10-1 U./Z.); see the definition of Pelagianism in nupt. et conc. 2,3,8 (260.1-7 U./Z.). 14 Aug., c. ep. Pel. 1,21,39 (456.18-9; 457.1-13 U./Z.). 15 See Gerard Remy, Le Christ Médiateur dans l’œuvre de Saint Augustin 1 (Lille, Paris, 1979), 399-456; 695-731. 16 See Aug., c. ep. Pel. 2,2,3; 3,6,16 (462.28-463.6; 504.17-505.24 U./Z.): In c. ep. Pel. 3,6,16 he interprets Rom. 8:3 in its entirety, thereby, focussing on the functional-soteriological aspects of Christology. For further argumentation about Christology in the Pelagian controversy, see Robert Dodaro, ‘Omnes haeretici negant Christum in carne venisse (Aug. serm. 183.9.13). Augustine on the incarnation as criterion of orthodoxy’, AugStud 38 (2007), 163-74; Anthony Dupont and Geert van Reyn, ‘Why Donatists and Pelagians really deny that Christ has come in the Flesh. An argumentative Reading of Augustine’s sermo 183’, Aug(L) 65 (2015), 115-40, 132-9, and M. Lamberigts, ‘Competing Christologies’ (2005), 168-94, especially 169-70. 17 Aug., c. ep. Pel. 1,21,39 (457.5-6 U./Z.): Hoc uos non uultis, inimici huic gratiae, ut eadem gratia Iesu Christi salui facti credantur antiqui.

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Augustine, thus, characterizes the Pelagiani as inimici gratiae Christi accusing them of negating the soteriological significance of the cross and the blood of Christ. He thereby constructs an antithesis between the Pelagiani as enemies of grace and himself as defender and teacher of grace especially defined by Rom. 7:25 or in this context Acts 15:11. Polemics thus became a rhetorical instrument in order to propagate Augustinian’s soteriology, as the term inimicia shows: by being accused of inimicia – the antithesis to friendship (amicitia) which was the fundament of ancient Roman society – the Pelagiani are defamed as destructive force implicated with the danger of political and ecclesio-political disruption.18 The term, no wonder, proved useful in isolating heretics.19 However, hostility against the grace of God is the sign of a sinner: When the Pelagiani oppose Augustine’s soteriology they, in his view, show the same characteristic as sinners, and thus enable him to identify Anti-Pelagianism and hamartiology. Pelagianism, for Augustine, became a kind of anti-soteriology luring Christians into damnation.20 Fighting against Pelagianism thus is promoting the grace of Christ. Church historical context 418-421 AD Not only due to Augustine’s first use of the term Pelagiani, his Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum can be ascribed a central role within the Pelagian controversy. Beforehand, Augustine had fought against Caelestius or Pelagius and their unnamed supporters, around 420 AD he finalized a process which led to the construction of Pelagianism.21 Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum thus stands both at the end of this process and at the beginning of (new) controversies 18 See Aug., c. ep. Pel. 1,1,1-2 (423.1-424.16 U./Z.); Stefan Rebenich, ‘Freund und Feind bei Augustin und in der christlichen Spätantike’, in Therese Fuhrer (ed.), Die christlich-philosophischen Diskurse der Spätantike. Texte, Personen, Institutionen, Philosophie der Antike 28 (Freiburg, 2008), 11-31, 25. 19 Ilona Opelt, Die Polemik in der christlichen lateinischen Literatur von Tertullian bis Augustin (Heidelberg, 1980), 30-3; 117-20; 232; Robert Dodaro, ‘Inimicitia/ Inimicus’, AugustinusLexikon 3 (2004-10), 601-5, 601-2. 20 Aug., c. ep. Pel. 1,1,2-3 (424.1-425.10 U./Z.). Thus, the bishop of Hippo urges the Roman bishop, Bonifatius, that fighting against Pelagianism is a pastoral duty to preserve the congregation (grex dominica) from danger of losing eternal salvation. 21 Otto Wermelinger, Rom und Pelagius. Die theologische Position der römischen Bischöfe im pelagianischen Streit in den Jahren 411-432, Päpste und Papstum 7 (Stuttgart, 1975), outlines this process in detail, however, he mostly focuses on the time between 411 and 418 and on ecclesio-political questions. Augustine’s c. ep. Pel. is only mentioned as completion of the definition of Pelagianism, especially the so-called ‘Dreierschema’ (O. Wermelinger, Rom und Pelagius [1975], 279). However, Wermelinger neither examines that Augustine developed in c. ep. Pel. a new perspective on Pelagius as the heresiarch of Pelagianism (Pelagiani) (see Aug. c. ep. Pel. 4,8,21 [543.8 U./Z.]) nor the intertwining of theological and heresiological argumentation in c. ep. Pel., exemplarily the anti-Pelagian charge of being inimici gratiae. Moreover, Rafał Toczko has examined

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during which Augustine had to defend both his soteriology and his notion of Pelagianism. The major circumstance which led Augustine to construct Pelagianism was that despite the condemnation of Pelagius and his supporters by the Council of Carthage in 418 AD, the Tractoria of Zosimus and the imperial decree, the controversy did not come to an end. In promulgating his soteriology, Augustine faced difficulties convincing a majority of western Christians. Julian of Aeclanum who protested against the decisions of 418 AD and charged Augustine with Manichaeism22 was not the only problem for Augustine. The canons of the Council of Carthage were neither universally accepted nor precise enough so that a lot of theological problems remained controversial:23 Especially in Italy, many theologians and clerics who were not Pelagians in stricto sensu were sceptical against Augustine’s teachings: their quarrels with Augustine’s theology were quite comparable to those whom we later come to call ‘Semi-Pelagian’.24 In short, Augustine had to fear that even if Pelagius himself was silenced his errors and heresy might flourish again, even on the face of orthodoxy. To fight against a huge imperceptible mass instead against one or two opponents and their known books was another difficulty. In this regard, the elimination of Pelagius from the discourse thus presented Augustine with a severe tactical problem, and Julian of Aeclanum’s entering the stage after 421 AD25 might even have been a happy coincidence for Augustine’s heresiological strategy. In other words: not Julian of Aeclanum but the lack of acceptance for Augustine’s soteriology throughout the West was the main reason why the Council of Carthage 418 AD did not end the controversy. Without a prominent opponent Augustine started to construct Pelagianism as a new heresy in his Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum by depicting them as inimici gratiae who rendered the blood of Christ meaningless.

Augustine’s anti-Pelagian rhetoric and strategy until 418: Rafał Toczko, Jak zostać heretykiem: Przypadek Pelagiusza (Torún, 2012). 22 See J. Lössl, Julian von Aeclanum (2001), 273-92, and V. Drecoll and M. Kudella, Augustin (2011), 199-206. 23 See Volker Drecoll, ‘Innerkirchlicher Diskurs und Meinungsführerschaft. Augustins Gnadenlehre in synodalen Texten aus dem pelagianischen Streit’, in T. Fuhrer (ed.), Diskurse der Spätantike (2008), 205-20, 214-20. 24 For the ‘Semi-Pelagians’ (and a problematisation of this term) see Donato Ogliari, Gratia et Certamen. The relationship between grace and free will in the discussion of Augustine with the so-called Semipelagians, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 169 (Leuven, 2003). 25 In c. Iul. Augustine initially begins to focus on Julian as autonomous theologian. Beforehand Julian is only portrayed as speaker of a group of Pelagiani. According to a CLCLT-research the proportion of naming Pelagius and Julian in c. ep. Pel. is 9:1, in c. Iul. 2:1, only in c. Iul. op. impf. it is nearly 1:1.

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Development of the Christological-soteriological argument In this endeavour Augustine could refer to a term which was already established in the theological discourse. He first characterised inimici gratiae in the conclusion of De spiritu et littera (412/3 AD) as being those who claim that humans can righteously live by themselves.26 When Hilarius, a Sicilian Christian, asked him questions about some theses of radical ascetics who claimed that humans have the ability to live without sin Augustine attacked them as inimici gratiae (414/5 AD). Augustine combined this charge with Rom. 10:3 which he had already established as an anti-Pelagian proof in De peccatorum meritis and De spiritu et littera.27 Since De natura et gratia (414/5 AD), he had charged Pelagius himself with teaching against grace. Although this motive started to develop into Augustine’s central anti-Pelagian accusation, the phrase inimici gratiae does not frequently occur before the Councils of Carthage and Mileve in 416 AD.28 As the African episcopate tried to convince the Roman bishop to condemn Pelagius as a heretic, they employed the phrase inimici gratiae Christi in the prologue of their letters. It seems most plausible that this phrase was chosen as a precise heresiological term for the ‘new heresy’ of Pelagius.29 The anti-Pelagian argumentative strategy of 416 AD seems to focus on the grace of Christ and the redeeming power of his blood in opposition to a Pelagian soteriology 26 Aug., spir. et litt. 35,63 (CSEL 60, 222.21-6 Urba/Zycha): Sed quia dici potest illa opera esse diuina, iuste autem uiuere ad nostra opera pertinere, suscepi estendere etiam hoc opus esse diuinum et hoc egi libro isto loquacius forte quam sat est; sed contra inimicos gratiae Dei etiam parum mihi dixisse uideor nihilque me tam multam dicere delectat quam ubi mihi et scriptura eius plurimum suffragatur. Cf. b. uid. 17,21 (Augustini opera 5,3, ed. Josef Zycha, CSEL 41 [Wien, 1900], 329.1) which was also written 413 AD. Augustine attacks those inimici gratiae Christi because they defend the liberum arbitrium. 27 Aug., Ep. 157,6 (CSEL 44, 453.1-2 G.): Cui gratiae si fuerunt inimici Iudaei ignorantes Dei iustitiam et suam uolentes constituere (Rom. 10:3), quare sunt et isti, si in eum crediderunt, quem illi occiderunt? See pecc. mer. 1,27,43 (41.7-9 U./Z.) and spir. et litt. 13,22; 29,50 (176.46; 206.10-2 U./Z.). 28 Aug., nat. et gr. 6,6 (CSEL 60, 236.18 Urba/Zycha); Aug., Ep. 169,13 (CSEL 44, 621.20-3 G.) describes the aim of nat. et gr. following: Scripsi … librum [= Aug., nat. et gr.] aduersus Pelagii haeresim, cogentibus nonnullis fratribus, quibus contra gratiam Christi opinionem perniciosissimam ille persuaserat. 29 Aug., ep. 177,1 (CSEL 44, 669.5-11 G.): De conciliis duobus prouinciae Carthaginensis atque Numidiae ad tuam sanctitatem a non paruo episcoporum numero subscriptas litteras misimus contra inimicos gratiae Christi, qui confidunt in uirtute sua et creatori nostro quodam modo dicunt: tu nos fecisti homines, iustos autem ipsi nos fecimus, qui naturam humanam ideo dicunt liberam, ne quaerant liberatorem, ideo saluam, ut superfluum iudicent saluatorem; Aug., Ep. 178,1 (689.14-20 G.): Noua quaedam haeresis inimica gratiae Christi contra ecclesiam Christi conatur exsurgere … hominum scilicet, qui tantum audent infirmitati humanae tribuere potestatis, ut hoc solum ad Dei gratiam pertinere contendant, quod cum libero arbitrio et non peccandi possibilitate creati sumus et Dei mandata, quae a nobis implerentur, accepimus; see also Aug., epp. 176,2; 178,2; 179,10 (CSEL 44, 664.15-6; 690.6-7; 697.14 G.).

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depicted as seeking for God’s grace in the gifts of creation and of the law and thereby rendering Christ’s role as saviour and liberator superfluous. The Councils’ letters refer back to Augustine’s christocentrical soteriology, for example the use of Gal. 2:21 in De natura et gratia and in Ep. 17730 or the argument of the necessity of the sanguis Christi in De peccatorum meritis and Ep. 175,6.31 In both cases orthodox teaching on salvation is defended with the Pelagian soteriology styled as its antipode. Most likely, Augustine himself was responsible for this central use of the term inimici gratiae Christi not only due to his earlier use of this phrase but also because the letter of the Council of Carthage where Augustine was absent, omits the term.32 By this christocentric focus, the anti-Pelagian strategy of 416 AD differs a lot from the one in Diospolis.33 After 416 AD, Augustine charges Pelagius (and his supporters) of being hostile towards the grace (of Christ) and tries to establish this charge, but does not employ the phrase inimici gratiae.34 The only exception is a sermon from 417 where he defends his soteriology against the idea of grace according to merits.35 Pelagius himself rejected the charge of inimicia gratiae 30 Aug., nat. et gr. 1,1; 2,2; 9,10 (233.20-1; 234.28-235.1; 239.4 U./Z.); Ep. 177,2.8.9 (671.3-4; 677.8-9; 678.11-2 G.). 31 See Aug., pecc. mer. 1,23,33; 1,29,57 (32.23-33.16; 56.23-57.5 U./Z.); Ep. 175,6 (661.3-10 G.). 32 See however, Aug., ep. 175,6 (662.7-8 G.): gratiae Dei … aduersarius. 33 In Diospolis most charges against Pelagius concentrate on the human abilities to live without sin (see O. Wermelinger, Rom und Pelagius [1975], 70-87). The twenty-first, twenty-second, twenty-fourth, twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth charge (Aug., gest. Pel. 14,30; 14,32; 18,42 [84.3-6; 86.14-5; 98.3-17 U./Z.]) attack Pelagius’s soteriology as insufficient, however, without focussing on Christ. Michael Rackett, ‘What’s wrong with Pelagianism? Augustine and Jerome on the Dangers of Pelagius and his Followers’, AugStud. 33 (2002), 223-37, 234, regards the Council of Diospolis: ‘From this moment forward Augustine intensified his attack on the Pelagian concept of grace’. Rackett rightly states that the focus of the controversy shifted after 415 towards a fight for the right understanding of grace (ibid. 231-4). However, on the one side a significant increase of the use of inimici gratiae can only be observed after 420 although the Councils of Carthage and Mileve 416 AD focus on the charge inimici gratiae (see the table). On the other side, one can detect a continuity of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian argumentation from pecc. mer. to his later works. Already in pecc. mer. Augustine’s main-argument is the universal necessity of Christ’ death (see for example the exegesis of Rom. 5:12-21 in Aug., pecc. mer. 1,9,9-16,21 [10.8-21.23 U./Z.]). Augustine even states in pecc. mer. that one should not overemphasise the liberum arbitirum, ut superba impietate ingrati Dei gratiae iudicemur (pecc. mer. 2,18,28 [100.25-6 U./Z.]). Although this phrase is not polemically directed against his opponents it contains two major charges which Augustine often employs against the Pelagiani: their wrong understanding and ungratefulness towards grace (see Rafał Toczko, Jak zostać heretykiem [2012], 155-66) and their pride (ibid. 201-6). 34 Aug., gest. Pel. 3,5; 10,22 (56.17-8; 75.9 U./Z.); 35,61 (116.2-4 U./Z.): contra Dei gratiam, quae nobis est per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum (see Rom. 7:25), tamquam defendendo liberum arbitrium disputaret; ep. 186,1 (CSEL 57, 45.16 G.): inimica et aduersa gratiae Dei; 186,3 (47.17-8 G.): per … errorem gratiae Dei … obsistere. 35 Aug., s. 131,9 (PL 38, 734): Quid, Christiani? Quare inimici gratiae Christi? Quare de uobis praesumentes? Quare ingrati? Quare enim Christus uenit? Numquid natura hic non erat?

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as unjustified,36 which moved the Pelagian controversy more and more towards a controversy about the notion of grace. Although the term inimici gratiae is absent in the decrees of the Council of Carthage 418 AD as well as obvious polemic generally, the Canons 4-6 determine Rom. 7:25 as the correct understanding of the grace of Christ, which is a reference to Augustine’s soteriological emphasis, for example in De natura et gratia. The Canons condemn any disdain of grace whatsoever but, interestingly, focus on the practice of piety.37 While defending and legitimizing the decisions of the Council of Carthage in Italy Augustine reused the phrase inimici gratiae for the first time combining it with Rom. 7:2538 which seems to be an allusion to the Council of Carthage. The phrase inimici gratiae is used for the purpose of constructing a radical opposition between the grace of Christ and the grace according to merits. In this context Augustine amalgamates the heresiological term inimici gratiae with a further anti-Pelagian phrase: Gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari,39 defining enmity towards grace with a sentence Pelagius himself had taught.40 The denial of the exclusive need for Christ as saviour, in Augustine’s view, shows Pelagius as an inimicus gratiae Dei attacking the very essence of Christianity.41

Natura non erat, quam multum laudando decipitis? Numquid lex hic non erat? Sed ait apostolus: Si per legem iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est; see Anthony Dupont, Gratia in Augustine’s Sermones ad populum during the Pelagian controversy. Do different contexts furnish different insights?, Brill’s Series in Church History and Religious Culture 29 (Leiden, 2013), 140-1. 36 Pel., lib. arb. = Aug., gr. et pecc. or. 1,7,8 (130.31-131.2 U./Z.): Hic nos imperitissimi hominum putant iniuriam diuinae gratiae facere, quia dicimus eam sine uoluntate nostra nequaquam in nobis perficere sanctitatem; see also Pel., ep. ad Innocentium = Aug., gr. et pecc. or. 1,41,45 (158.7-11 U./Z.). 37 Conc. Carth. a. 418 (Concilia Africae: a. 345 – a. 525, ed. Charles Munier, CChr.SL 149 [Turnhout, 1974], 69-73), especially c. 4-6 (70-1 M.); see V. Drecoll, ‘Innerkirchlicher Diskurs’ (2008), 205-20, and O. Wermelinger, Rom und Pelagius (1975), 165-96. 38 Aug., gr. et pecc. or. 2,23,26 (184.16-9 U./Z.): Quapropter post multa, quae aduersus istum errorem inimicum gratiae Dei, quam per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum pusillis magnis que largitur, scribendo disputare potuimus. 39 Aug., ep. 194,7 (CSEL 57, 181.14-7 G.): Cum igitur huic gratiae inimici infesti que sint isti, Pelagius tamen in ecclesiastico iudicio palaestino … anathematizauit eos, qui dicunt gratiam dei secundum merita nostra dari. 40 The anti-Pelagian phrase gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari appears as the twentysecond charge of Diospolis (Aug., gest. Pel. 14,30; 17,40 [84.5-6; 96.21 U./Z.]; for its origin see O. Wermelinger, Rom und Pelagius [1975], 77). Moreover, Augustine employs it in the collection of anti-Pelagian sentences in gest. Pel. 35,65 (120.5-121.12 U./Z.) and ep. 186,32-3 (70.20-73.23 G.). After 418 AD Augustine especially uses this sentence to summarize the Pelagian doctrine as anti-soteriology (see ep. 194,7-8 [181.14-182.19 G.] and gr. et pecc. or. 1,3,3 [126.23-127.9 U./Z.]). 41 Aug., gr. et pecc. or. 2,29,34 (193.13-7 U./Z.): Quapropter quisquis humanam contendit in qualibet aetate naturam non indigere medico secundo Adam, quia non est uitiata in primo Adam, non in aliqua quaestione, in qua dubitari uel errari salua fide potest, sed in ipsa regula fidei, qua Christiani sumus, gratiae Dei conuincitur inimicus.

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When with Julian of Aeclanum a new and brilliant opponent arouse, Augustine could enhance this strategy: In Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum, he uses inimici gratiae more often and more flexible than in any other anti-Pelagian work before and after, assigning this phrase a central role in the anthesis between two theological systems he tries to establish, with his own soteriology as a teaching of a gratia gratuita achieved by Christ on the cross, and the Pelagian anti-soteriology on the other side, which he defines as a grace conditionally subordinated to merits (gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari) and whose advocators he calls inimici gratiae.42 Frequently quoting Rom. 11:6, he denies that the Pelagiani are speaking of true grace.43 Thus, the Pelagian system, characterized by the boasting in the intrinsic value of creation, free will and law (five laudes)44 is presented as the exact counter-image of his own soteriology which he gradually developed since the late 4th century. While presenting Pelagianism as a counter-image of his soteriology, he at the same time demonstrates the priority of theological thoughts over heresiological and polemical ones. Augustine could flexibly use inimici gratiae with both a christocentric and a theocentric focus because, from his perspective, various arguments of the Pelagiani endangered the role of Christ as the only saviour as well as the role of God as creator and saviour.45 Thus, by now, the term inimici gratiae has become a synonym for the newly created heresiological term Pelagiani. In this context, Augustine re-focuses on the blood of Christ. In De peccatorum meritis (411/2 AD) Augustine had already substantiated his soteriology with a focus on Christ’s death on the cross.46 The blood of Christ, he argued, 42 Aug., c. ep. Pel. 1,24,42 (458.25-459.6 U./Z.): Pelagianis non inmerito anathema dicimus, qui tam sunt inimici gratiae Dei, quae uenit per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum (Rom. 7:25), ut eam dicant non gratis, sed secundum merita nostra dari ac sic gratia iam non sit gratia (Rom. 11:6), tantum que constituunt in libero arbitrio, quo in profundum demersus est homo, ut eo bene utendo dicant hominem mereri gratiam, cum bene illo uti nemo possit nisi per gratiam, quae non secundum debitum redditur, sed Deo gratis miserante donatur, paruulos autem ita contendunt esse iam saluos, ut a saluatore audeant negare saluandos. 43 Aug., c. ep. Pel. 1,1,3; 1,24,42 (425.5; 458.25-8 U./Z.); see also 2,6,11 (470.18-21 U./Z.): Inimici gratiae Dei … quisquis dicit gratia Dei omnia hominis bona merita praeueniri nec gratiam Dei meritis dari, ne non sit gratia, si non gratis datur. 44 Aug., c. ep. Pel. 3,8,24 (516.1-517.8 U./Z.). 45 Inimici gratiae Christi in Aug., c. ep. Pel. 1,5,9 (430.25 U./Z.), see 1,21,39 (457.5-6 U./Z.); inimici gratiae Dei with Rom. 7:25 in c. ep. Pel. 1,1,2; 1,7,12 (424.1-2; 432.22-3 U./Z.); see c. ep. Pel. 3,7,21 (512.11-2 U./Z.): resistens inimicis gratiae Dei pro qua largienda crucifixus est Christus; see c. ep. Pel. 2,2,2 (461.12-3 U./Z.): Pelagiani dicunt Deum non esse omnium aetatum in hominibus mundatorem, saluatorem, liberatorem. 46 Aug., pecc. mer. 1,23,33 (33.5-11 U./Z.): Trahunt tamen originale peccatum, non liberat nisi agnus Dei qui tollit peccata mundi, non nisi medicus qui non uenit propter sanos, sed propter aegrotos, non nisi saluator, de quo dictum est generi humano: natus est uobis hodie saluator, non nisi redemptor, cuius sanguine deletur debitum nostrum. nam quis audeat dicere non esse Christum infantium saluatorem nec redemptorem? See pecc. mer. 1,29,57 (56.25-57.1 U./Z.): aduersus carnem et sanguinem redemptoris extollunt.

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was the only way towards salvation; anyone who denied this, thus, for Augustine neglected the necessity of Christ’s crucifixion.47 Moreover, as he continued, without the necessity of the blood of Christ even the eucharist would be futile.48 With this soteriological focus on Christ’ death, Augustine could amplify the charge of being inimici gratiae with a quotation from Phil. 3:18, labelling the Pelagiani as inimici crucis Christi.49 Thus, in Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum Augustine developed and extended the charge of inimici gratiae both in quality and quantity. Moreover, Augustine equated the antithesis between catholic faith and Pelagian heresy with an antithesis between Pelagius (who gives wrong promises) and Christ (who is the saviour of mankind).50 As inimici gratiae the Pelagiani do not simply oppose Augustine but rather Christ himself, and, Pelagianism is just as all the other heresies, teaching erroneous about Christ. While constructing a new heresy, Augustine presents Pelagianism as violating fundamental Christological doctrines. Moreover, he conflates anti-Pelagianism and hamartiology, because both the sinner and the Pelagianus lack the grace of Christ, both believe in their own merits and both boast instead of glorifying God. This gives Augustine the possibility to polemize against his opponents and at the same time to promote his own soteriology and hamartiology as being without any alternative. Mentioning of inimici gratiae in Augustine’s Anti-Pelagian writing 413-5

416/7

418/9

420/1

After 421

Inimici gratiae

4

6

5

13

15

Undefined

2

–

1

2

6

47

See Aug., c. ep. Pel. 1,21,39 (456.17-9; 457.10-1 U./Z.). In trin. 13,11,15-19,24 (Sancti Aureli Augustini Opera 14,2, ed. William Mountain, CChr.SL 50A [Turnhout, 1968], 401-17) Augustine pursued this argument while answering the question why God became man (see G. Remy, Le Christ Mediateur [1979], 503-41). Thus 420/1 AD, Augustine used the same soteriological argument, on the one hand in an anti-Pelagian context and on the other hand while discussing Trinitarian questions. 48 See Aug., c. ep. Pel. 1,22,40 (458.1-9 U./Z.). This argument is frequently employed in pecc. mer (see for example pecc. mer. 1,20,26-7.24,34 [26.3-27.4; 33.27-34.21 U./Z.]). 49 Aug., c. ep. Pel. 4,4,4 (524.1-12 U./Z.): His ita se habentibus quid prodest nouellis hereticis, inimicis crucis Christi et diuinae obpugnatoribus gratiae, quod a Manicheorum errore sani uidentur et alia sua pestilentia moriuntur? […] Utrique [Manichei et Pelagiani] enim nolunt eam Christi carne et sanguine liberari: illi, quia ipsam carnem et sanguinem Christi, tamquam haec omnino in homine uel ex homine non susceperit, destruunt, isti autem, quia nullum malum inesse infantibus asserunt, unde per sacramentum carnis huius et sanguinis liberentur. With the charge of being inimici crucis Augustine defames Julian’s anti-Manichean argumentation as deceitful: Although the Pelagiani reject the Manichean dualism both oppose a Christocentric soteriology. 50 See the antithesis in c. ep. Pel. 1,1,3 (425.8-10 U./Z.): Quibus me pro paruulis ne fallaci laudatori Pelagio perditi relinquantur, sed ueraci saluatori Christo liberandi offerantur, oppono.

D.B. JANSSEN

198 … Dei

1

1

2

4

4

… Christi

1

5

1

2

4

+ Rom. 7:25

–

–

1

5

1

Inimici crucis Christi

–

–

–

4

2

Conclusion This short investigation into the development of Pelagianism as a heresy constructed by Augustine which needs further studies allows us to conclude: 1. Within the construction of Pelagianism theological approaches to Augustine would seem to often take a priority over heresiological ones because (a) Augustine recurs to his own soteriology which he developed before or in the beginning of the Pelagian controversy and (b) Pelagianism is characterized as anti-soteriology whereby Augustine intertwines his own hamartiology and anti-Pelagianism. Therefore, we should take seriously that Augustine’s major interest was to convince his auditorium of his own soteriology, not to condemn or invent Pelagianism. 2. In this regard, Augustine defines Pelagianism as a christological and soteriological heresy which leads to the polemical charge of them being inimici gratiae. This phrase summarizes and sharpens the theological charges against the Pelagiani. This intensity is caused by the fact that the Pelagiani were a major threat for Augustine’s understanding of the grace of Christ. Furthermore, in focusing on Christology, Pelagianism becomes comparable to other heresies. 3. The construction of Pelagianism, moreover, would appear to be the result of a theological discourse, in which Augustine,51 in refuting writings by his opponents, began to systematize their theological system which he debunked as a homogenous heresy by pointing out that they share common errors such as a wrong soteriology, i.e. inimicia gratiae. 4. The process of constructing Pelagianism shows no complete break but a continuous development and extension of arguments with many small and some major steps. It intensified, however, after 418 AD, especially with the work Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum, where Augustine presented the newly created name Pelagiani and faced them with the charge of being inimici gratiae. 51

This article focuses on Augustine’s construction of Pelagianism. It should not be forgotten that other theologians such as Hieronymus, Marius Mercator or African bishops participated within this construction or developed their own anti-Pelagian strategies.

More than Just a Foil? Julian of Eclanum on Marriage, Sexuality, and Concupiscence Joshua PAPSDORF, Newman University, Wichita, KS, USA

ABSTRACT Julian of Eclanum’s clash with Augustine has been the subject of numerous works, and recent years have seen several efforts to reassess Julian and his side of the debate. Still, while Augustine’s views on marriage, sexuality, and concupiscence have been explored in great depth, there is very little scholarly work regarding Julian’s understanding of those issues. This article is one attempt to fill that gap and offer a systematic account of Julian’s views on sexuality, marriage, and concupiscence to the extent that they can be reconstructed from the polemical material we possess. The article draws primarily from Augustine’s works, which contain many references to Julian’s views as well as extensive quotations from Julian. Augustine’s On Marriage and Concupiscence and Answer to Julian are referenced, while the primary source is Augustine’s Unfinished Work in Answer to Julian, which contains extensive quotations from Julian’s To Florus on those topics. Based on those sources, the article argues that Julian’s views on marriage have greater merit than is typically acknowledged and seem to reflect deep personal conviction regarding both the goodness of marriage and divine justice. Additionally, his views are shown to be more compatible with modern science and contemporary readings of Genesis than Augustine’s. And, ultimately, the article proposes that Julian’s views on the damnation of infants and the goodness of marriage and sexuality anticipate modern developments in Catholic doctrine with the result that Julian’s heretical status within Catholic tradition might need to be reassessed.

In his work, ‘Sexuality and Society in the Fifth Century A.D.: Augustine and Julian of Eclanum’, the inestimable Peter Brown offers a compelling evaluation of Julian. He explains that modern scholars tend to be irritated by Julian, in part for painting an unfair picture of Augustine, but, he goes on: ‘Much of this irritation, however, originates in disappointment. We expect too much of Julian. We wish to see in his thought a foreshadowing of a later, post-scholastic theory of the function of natural instinct in the human person. We are annoyed when his “naturalism” turns out, on closer acquaintance, to be less modern and less coherent than we would wish; and so we tend to treat it as a superficial, polemical stance’.1 1

Peter Brown, ‘Sexuality and Society in the Fifth Century A.D.: Augustine and Julian of Eclanum’, in Emilio Gabba (ed.), Tria Corda: scritti in onore di Arnaldo Momigliano (Como, 1983), 49-70, 59.

Studia Patristica CXIX, 199-206. © Peeters Publishers, 2021.

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I must confess that early on I was guilty of this myself. I began studying Julian out of a desire to find a historical precursor to some of the recent developments in Catholic thinking regarding sexuality and marriage, which, as readers undoubtedly know, has taken a very non-Augustinian turn in recent decades. And, as Brown predicted, I was disappointed to find a viewpoint that is non-Augustinian, true, but it is certainly not a beta version of John Paul II’s Theology of the Body. On further reflection, however, I’ve come to believe Brown’s assessment, while insightful, does not give Julian sufficient credit. He depicts him primarily as an educated churchman simply defending the traditional Roman views and the science of the day. Those are indeed aspects of Julian’s position, but there is more to it than that. I should note here that I am certainly not original in arguing for a bit more credit for Julian. A number of other scholars, including Elizabeth Clark and Josef Lössl, have highlighted important challenges that Julian’s thought still poses for followers of Augustine.2 Others, like Mathjis Lamberigts, have highlighted positive aspects of Julian’s thinking, such as his emphasis on the goodness of material creation.3 What I would like to do in this article is to build on the insights of those scholars and call for a reevaluation of Julian on several key points. In particular, I think insufficient attention has been given to the role of justice in his critique of Augustine’s view. And, I would argue that his motivation seems much more personal, and even ‘modern’ than many scholars, like Brown, have given him credit for in his defense of marriage and sexuality. Additionally, I would propose that Julian’s thought has potential value in being more amenable to modern scientific developments in our understanding of creation than the Augustinian tradition. And finally, at the end of the day, I believe that, at least within the context of Catholic theology, Julian would no longer be a heretic if he were presented with the post-Vatican II teaching on sexuality, grace, and the fate of the unbaptized. But, before I get to those specific proposals, let me offer a brief overview of Julian’s views on concupiscence, sex, and marriage, as promised in my title. In a nutshell, Julian sees all of the above as good parts of creation and God’s plan, and he believes that concupiscence, sexuality, and marriage are essentially the same today as they were in Eden. That basic affirmation is found repeated

2

See Elizabeth Clark, ‘Generation, Degeneration, Regeneration: Original Sin and the Conception of Jesus in the Polemic between Augustine and Julian of Eclanum’, in Velaria Finucci and Kevin Brownlee (eds), Generation and Degeneration: Tropes of Reproduction in Literature and History from Antiquity through Early Modern Europe (Durham, 2001), 17-40. See also Josef Lössl, ‘Augustine, “Pelagianism”, Julian of Aeclanum and Modern Scholarship’, ZAC 11 (2007), 129-50. 3 See Mathjis Lamberigts, ‘Julian of Aeclanum: A Plea for a Good Creator’, Aug(L) 38 (1988), 5-24.

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almost ad infinitum in Augustine’s quotations of Julian within his Contra Julianum Opus Imperfectum.4 In one particularly succinct statement, Julian contends: ‘the union of the sexes which God instituted and blessed, along with the pleasure involved, belongs to the attraction of marriage and to its function and means’ (II 39). He then adds a bit later, ‘before the sin God instituted and implanted in bodies the pleasure of those who engage in intercourse and the desire which affects the mind and arouses the members and which, as that wise man understood, longs to become one flesh’ (II 59). Rather than spelling out all of the details of Julian’s view on each aspect of sexuality, let me simply highlight a few particularly relevant points. In regard to the physical functions involved, Julian and Augustine do not disagree, at least not significantly. The disagreement centers on the affective compliment to, or motivation of, the biology. In Augustine’s view, intercourse without sin would have been entirely without passion. The appropriate members would simply have responded to the dictates of the will much like tendons, muscles and fingers respond to the directive to shake hands with a friend. Julian finds this preposterous on both scientific and theological grounds. In regard to the science, Julian followed the consensus of his day that the ‘heating’ of the body via desire and pleasure was necessary for the formation of the seeds that led to conception. Without Augustine’s Platonic framework, Julian sees nothing intrinsically problematic about the intellect and will responding to the promptings of bodily desire or those higher functions ‘handing the reins’ to the desire and passion, within the proper marital limits. As Julian describes concupiscence: ‘its genus lies in the fire of life, its species in the movement of the genitals, its moderation in the marital act, and its excess in the intemperance of fornication’ (Answer to Julian III 26). The bodily desire that Augustine sees as the epitome of human sinfulness is seen as a good, even blessed, thing by Julian. Augustine’s incredulity is palpable when he quotes Julian’s statements about concupiscence, which Augustine mockingly calls Julian’s ‘fair serving girl’. He finds it shocking when Julian states that, ‘concupiscence becomes more esteemed because the other parts of the body also serve her to arouse her with greater passion … For example, the eyes look to arouse desire, or the other members engage in kisses and embraces’ (Answer to Julian V 23). Or, as he puts it elsewhere: ‘This union of bodies which involves heat, pleasure, and seed was established by God, and in its proper moderation it is recognized as praiseworthy; at times it even becomes 4 All quotations of Augustine and Julian are taken from Answer to the Pelagians, III: Unfinished Work in Answer to Julian, trans. Roland Teske, WSA I.25 (Hyde Park, 1999). Passage are cited in-text by UWAJ, then book and paragraph numbers. And, Answer to the Pelagians, III: Marriage and Desire, Answer to the Two Letters of the Pelagians, Answer to Julian, trans. Roland Teske, WSA I.24 (Hyde Park, 1998). Passage are cited in-text by title, book, and paragraph numbers.

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a great reward for a pious couple’ (Marriage and Desire II 25). It would have been difficult to formulate a statement more likely to provoke Augustine than the claim that sexual desire and experience can be ‘a great reward for a pious couple’. In the end, this disagreement about concupiscence is indicative of a fundamental disagreement about the nature of the human person. In his discussion of how this impacts Julian’s Christology, Dominic Keech sums up the situation well: ‘Augustine and Julian begin from different theological-anthropological assumptions. Julian, wishing to defend the continuity of the goodness of human nature throughout history, cannot accept a Christology that depends on a belief in the radical discontinuity in human nature brought about through sin’.5 Julian sees the nature of sexuality as we experience it as part of a good human nature that was created by God in essentially the same form that we possess today. Augustine, on the other hand, sees our current nature as one that has been horribly corrupted, and he sees our sexual nature as both the clearest example of that corruption and the means of its perpetuation through the species. Now, for most modern readers, Julian’s defense of desire and pleasure are going to be unproblematic, and even a point in his favor. His treatment of marriage is another story. The problem is clear enough when he states ‘the essence of marriage – insofar as our dispute is concerned – is found only in this coupling’ (I 65). While that is his most succinct expression of the idea, in numerous passages Julian states that the essence of marriage is procreative intercourse, seemingly dismissing any spiritual, emotional, or sacramental aspects (and proving Peter Brown’s assessment correct to boot). This is doubly problematic when we consider that even Augustine acknowledges other goods of marriage, though he may not have developed them much in his own work. It must be acknowledged that this is a shortcoming in Julian’s thought even if we speculate that he held back from affirming Augustine’s insights on marriage due to his antipathy for their author. Nonetheless, I would venture an argument in defense of Julian against some of his scholarly critics on a couple of other grounds. First, in that seemingly damning quote, his qualifying phrase offers a glimmer of hope. He states that the essence of marriage is found only in coupling but that is qualified ‘insofar as our dispute is concerned’. It is true that in his discussion of Mary and Joseph, Julian denies that they have a true marriage since he sees intercourse as a necessary condition of marriage. And, he focuses his attention on it sexual aspect of marriage given Augustine’s attack on its goodness, but he never denies that there are other facets to the relationship. They are simply not the focus of the debate. I am led to read his admittedly ambiguous qualification expansively by my experiencing of reading Julian at some length. While Augustine provokes Julian’s ire on any 5 Dominic Keech, The Anti-Pelagian Christology of Augustine of Hippo, 396-430 (Oxford, 2012), 103.

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number of points, I see a clear righteous indignation in Julian’s prose when he sees marriage under attack. When you add that the activity of marriage is a disease, one can listen to this calmly, if you are saying this of your parents alone. For you could perhaps know of some hidden disease of your mother, for in the books of your Confessions you indicated that she was called – to use your word – a tippler. But in the marriage of holy people and of all decent people there is absolutely no disease. Nor did the apostle offer a disease instead of a remedy when protected men of the Church from the disease of fornication by a respect of marriage. (I 68)

Yes, he is defending the scientific consensus of his day, but the way he responds to Augustine’s attack on marriage seems much more like a man defending something that lies near the heart of his own experience, than it does someone simply defending a biological theory or a pragmatic social institution (I should note though that the insult of Augustine’s mother is not unique. There are a number of crass insults in Julian’s text, but Augustine gladly repays the favor). I will admit that my argument for something more to Julian’s understanding of marriage is hopeful extrapolation based on circumstantial evidence. However, his impassioned defense of concupiscence, sexuality, and the innocence of newborns (generated by an incorrupt sexuality) requires no reading between the lines. Many scholars have analyzed Julian’s arguments regarding the corruption of sexuality and original sin, and, as they have noted, he has some powerful points. He very astutely questions how a choice of the will can generate a fundamental change in human nature that could be passed along to offspring. The fact that Augustine uses the dark complexion of Africans as an example of an ‘accidental choice’ being transmitted to children only makes Julian’s position that much stronger. Similarly, Julian’s argument regarding the injustice of holding children guilty for the sins of their parents would strike the vast majority of modern readers as clearly correct. However, it is also true, as noted by scholars, that Julian seems to radically underestimate the challenge of avoiding sin. While he does recognize that there can be limits on the free exercise of will, he sees moral choices as typically straightforward and easily manageable. We can well imagine Augustine’s disbelief when the author of the Confessions read Julian’s assertion that ‘you know that the power of the mind can confine [concupiscence] within permissible limits’ (Answer to Julian V 61). Still, granting those weaknesses, I would propose that the existing scholarship does not give Julian sufficient credit for the power of his argument rooting nature as we experience it in the goodness and justice of the Creator. And, his argument against the goodness and justice of a Creator that would allow an Augustinian system to unfold is striking and worth quoting at some length: There is absolutely no doubt that the nature of Adam himself was made completely evil if it was formed in such a condition that it had the necessity for evil, but not for good,

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that is, so that, even if sin was conceived by the will, it, nonetheless, became something natural in that condition in which goodness would not become natural … For what can I find worse than that substance which was made so that it could fall into iniquity, but could not pull back from iniquity? … When such dominion is located on the side of evil, it brings an accusation against no one more than the very creator of man … he is proved the closest of friends to malice by the foulness of his creation. For who could be persuaded that the first man was not predestined for sins if God deprived him of the ability to correct himself, if he endowed him with so evil a mind that his own error could not be displeasing to him, that he would have no path back to moral goodness, that he could not become better through experience? And in order that he would never perhaps feel the desire to recover his goodness, he took from him the very possibility of correcting himself … The state of the first man, then, was utterly atrocious from the very beginning if he was created by God so miserably that he was destined to fall into sin and would be bound by the perpetual necessity of sinning. (VI 10)

While Augustine will respond that sinning was not ‘necessary’, only possible, the foreknowledge of the Creator and Augustine’s repeated explanation that contingent beings are intrinsically corruptible sap much of the strength from his response. Julian’s argument that Augustine remains a Manichee has a similar power. To be fair, Augustine does defend the goodness of marriage and explicitly rejects the dualism of Mani. Yet, Julian offers a persuasive argument that Augustine’s views on sexuality and procreation make him a functional Manichee: You declare praiseworthy that marriage which, as you claim, could exist without concupiscence, without movement of the body, and without the need of the sexes, but you claim that marriage as it now exists was invented by the devil. You, therefore, consider good the marriage which you dream could have been instituted, but you declare this marriage to be diabolically evil and claim that it ultimately ought to be called a disease, not a marriage, though scripture says of it, A man will leave father and mother and will cling to his wife, and they will be two in one flesh (Gn. 2:24). (Marriage and Desire II 53)

Here we can see an example of Julian being a bit unfair in his depiction of Augustine (as Brown complained of). Augustine did not reject movement of the body or the existence of the sexes as part of God’s original plan in his mature thought. That being said, defending the goodness of hypothetical bodies while condemning the concrete historical bodies we see around us does seem like a fairly anemic affirmation of the goodness of creation. Of course, Augustine would respond that none of this is hypothetical. We have an account of this cataclysmic shift in Genesis 3 and Romans 5:12. Prior to the Fall, our natures would have been very different, but, here too Julian disagrees, which brings us to a point where I believe Julian holds some intriguing potential for modern theological reflection. Both Julian and Augustine affirm that humanity is situated between the angels and animals. For Augustine, prior to the Fall human beings were much closer to the angels, and after the Fall Christians

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are called to resist the sinful shift toward the animals as much as we can. Julian, on the contrary, sees men and women as initially created in much greater continuity with other animals, and our ontological status has remained more or less unchanged since creation. One of his key defenses of the goodness of bodily desire is noting that we share this desire with animals (with the key difference that we can control that desire with our intellect and will). Since the animals, obviously, did not acquire concupiscence as a result of sin, Julian contends that the same is true for us. He also argues that this clearly supported by the Genesis account itself: We teach by the testimony of the whole world that the pleasure of all the senses is natural. But that this pleasure existed in paradise before the sin is shown by the fact that the path to sin lay through concupiscence. For when it tempted the eyes with the beauty of the fruit, it also aroused the hope of a pleasant taste. When this concupiscence does not hold to the proper limit, it is sinful, but when it is held within the boundary of what is permitted, it is a natural and innocent longing. This concupiscence could not; it could not, I say, be the result of sin, for we are taught that it was the occasion of sin, not by reason of its own defect, but by reason of a defect of the will. (I 71)

Concupiscence is a good thing, given to us by a good Creator. If we study the debate between Julian and Augustine with the intention of gaining insights that could benefit theology today, this presents an interesting wrinkle in Julian’s favor. With the exception of those who would insist on a literal reading of Genesis 1-3, it is clear that biological evolution was a key component in the creation of human beings. And, if one accepts this, it also becomes clear that bodily desires, unruly ‘members’ and all the other aspects of sexuality that Augustine finds so troubling were part of human nature from the beginning. While it is unfair to hold Augustine responsible for a scientific development that post-dates him by roughly a millennium and a half, in the debate between Augustine and Julian on the nature of human sexuality, the Galapagos finches seems to clearly favor Julian. So, I have argued that it is at least possible that Julian held a broader view of the goods of marriage, even if he doesn’t explicitly affirm or develop it. Also, I have argued that power of Julian’s arguments for the injustice of Augustine’s view of human nature and his functional Manicheanism should receive more recognition from scholars. And, I would contend that if we come to the debate as part of an ongoing theological conversation, Julian’s affirmation of the continuity and goodness of creation as we experience it fits with a modern understanding of creation, much more than Augustine’s take on creation and the Fall. I want to conclude by proposing a broader reassessment of Julian as a heretic. It is true that he follows Pelagius in a seemingly naïve affirmation of human goodness and the ease of virtue. And, Julian explicitly rejected the ecumenical Council of Ephesus. Granting those historical realities, I would

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argue that Julian may well have been saved from heresy if he had had access to post-Vatican II theology as an alternative to Augustine’s stark system. In reading through this literature, which, admittedly, is often as tedious and caustic as scholars have noted, it is clear that two primary factors inflame Julian in his rejection of Augustine: the damnation of infants and the denigration of bodily desire and sexuality. Interestingly, two of the most significant developments in Catholic theology since Vatican II deal with precisely those issues. The possibility of salvation outside of reception of the sacraments, proposed by Karl Rahner and affirmed by Gaudium et Spes, means that Catholics no longer need to conclude that unbaptized infants are damned for their share in Adam’s guilt. While Julian might well still object to the idea of generational or corporate guilt, he would not have to countenance the prospect of infants damned simply for being born or having been corrupted by the bodily desire of their parents. And, in regard to that desire, John Paul II’s Theology of the Body not only affirms the natural goodness of sexuality and sexual desire, it goes well beyond Julian in that regard. Sexuality is no longer something tolerated as a procreative necessity; within marriage, it is truly sacramental and a source of blessing. I certainly would not claim that Julian was a source for these developments, but he did give expression to some of the perennial concerns and viewpoints that ultimately culminated in those developments. And, after a space of some 1600 years, Julian’s protest against Augustine has received something of a vindication within the Catholic tradition. While a number of scholars who have worked on Julian have noted certain points of value in his thought, I would argue that Julian’s work deserves reconsideration more broadly by theologians.