Struve, Vol 2 - Liberal on Right, 1905-1944 0674846001

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STRUVE Liberal on the Right, 1905-1944

Richard Pipes

Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England 1980

The photographer's lens will never again find these trustful beards, these friendly eyes, these unhurried, unegotistical expressions. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, August 1914

Russian Research Center Studies, 80 Struve: Liberal on the Right, 1905-1944

Copyright© 1980 by Richard Pipes All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Pipes, Richard. Struve, liberal on the right, 1905-1944. ( Russian Research Center Studies; 80) Bibliography: p. 1. Struve, Petr Berngardovich, 1870-1944. 2. Intellectuals - Russia - Biography. 3. Politicians - Russia - Biography. 4. Economists - Russia - Biography. 5. Emigres - Biography. I. Title. II. Series: Harvard University. Russian Research Center. Studies; 80. DK254.S597P52 947.08 [B] 79-16145 ISBN 0-674-84600-1

And so God evens age with youth, Tormenting youth with lies, and age with truth. -Author unknown

PREFACE

I first became interested in Struve in 19.58, when, on a lovely August afternoon in New Hampshire, with Silver Lake spread out below me, I read S. L. Frank's reminiscences of him. Frank's summary of Stmve's ideas on Russian history and on events of his own time at once struck responsive chords in me: it was as if Struve was articulating ideas which I also held but in a shapeless, indistinct form, more as presentiments than as clear perceptions, and speaking for me with an authority derived from a learning and an experience that I did not possess. Since I was at that time also looking for the subject of a new book in a projected series on Russian Conservatism to follow on my recently completed study of Karamzin, I decided then and there to write a full-dress in­ tellectual biography of Struve. I had no doubt that I was in the presence of one of those authors who over the years had exerted a profoundly transforming influence on my thinking. Judging by my correspondence from that time, I felt confident that the book would take me no more than three or four years to complete. I was sadly deceived: as it turned out, I was to work on the biography, intermittently, for twenty long years. For this delay there were a number of reasons. For one, when I launched on the undertaking I had no idea of the sheer bulk of Struve's writings. His literary activity extended over half a century, during which time it seems that hardly a day went by without his sitting down at his desk to write at least a few hundred words for publication. There was virtually no bib­ liographic guidance to assist me in my searches. In the end, I had no choice but to wade through hundreds of periodicals and thou­ sands of newspapers scattered in American, European, and Rus­ sian collections in order to assemble the corpus of Struve's pub­ lished writings. In 1970 I brought out in a small edition Struve's

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PREFACE

Collected Works in Fifteen Volumes ( Ann Arbor, Michigan) which reproduced xerographically nearly all his writings that had appeared during his lifetime in books and periodicals - 663 items in all. In addition, I collected for my personal use hundreds of newspaper articles and unpublished writings, including his cor­ respondence. Assembling this vast, scattered material took an ex­ traordinary amount of time. Secondly, and perhaps more important, as soon as I began to delve into the subject and address myself to the earliest period in Struve's life, the years when he headed the Social Democratic movement in Russia, I became aware, to my dismay, of a large discrepancy between what I had learned from the secondary lit­ erature and what the primary sources before me seemed to be say­ ing. On closer scrutiny such standard concepts of modern Russian historiography as "Populism" and "Legal Marxism" turned out to be political labels, quite unsuited for use in a scholarly work. I further discovered that many events which occurred in Struve's youth, especially those that had any bearing on Lenin, had been grossly and, in some cases, deliberately misconstrued by histo­ rians. To redefine these concepts and to reconstmct these events required much time and effort, and diverted me from the biog­ raphy proper. Nor did things become easier for me as I proceeded to Struve's post-Social Democratic activities. Since Struve was by profession an economist and devoted the bulk of his academic ca­ reer to the study and teaching of economic theory and history, I could not very well avoid addressing myself to his views on these subjects. But as I had no training in economic theory, I had to acquire it: at any rate, sufficiently to be able to discuss his eco­ nomic scholarship. This, too, took time: suffice it to say that I spent nearly a whole year on chapter 3 of the present volume. Later on, when dealing with his years of exile, I found myself in largely uncharted waters and had to carry out much research on the general history of the Russian emigration in the life of which Struve played so prominent a role. There were other diversions as well, including commitments to write other books. When in 1968 I reh1rnecl to Struve it became obvious that I still had many years of work ahead of me. In 1970, the centenary of his birth, I therefore decided to publish sepa­ rately the first half of the biography under the title Struve: Lib­

eral on the Le�, 1870-1905.

PREFACE

ix

I state these facts not to justify my slowness in completing this biography, which, after all, is no one's concern but my own, but to shed light on my attitude toward my protagonist. It is not un­ common for authors who have worked on a book much longer than they originally intended to develop toward its subject a keen aversion: and if the subject happens to be a historic person­ ality to harbor toward him some kind of concealed antipathy. I cannot deny that there were times, especially when I would re­ vert to the book after, a long interval, when I experienced irrita­ tion and was desperately anxious to be done with it. Yet every time this happened it required only a brief immersion in the ma­ terial for my enthusiasm to be rekindled and my admiration to be reawakened. That Struve succeeded in holding my attention and affection for so long is in itself powerful testimony to his intel­ lectual and spiritual greatness. I can say that in retrospect I feel no regret at having dedicated so many years of my life to a figure who in his native land is today dismissed as a minor and thor­ oughly disreputable episode in Lenin's early life, and of whom an anonymous reviewer in the Times Literary Supplement has written, "nothing that he did or said remains memorable." Struve possessed to an uncommon degree that kind of virtue which the Greeks called arete and defined to mean the most com­ pJete fulfillment of one's true self. In their view, arete was a qual­ ity unique to humans and attainable only by those among them who enjoyed both physical and spiritual freedom. To be true to oneself meant being ready to stand up to reality for the sake of truth as one saw it. Kowtowing to facts - faktopoklonstvo, as Struve was wont to call it - was entirely incompatible with virtue as thus conceived. Arete must always have been difficult to attain, but never more so than in Struve's own time when the monstrous growth of political claims on the individual caused intellectual and moral independence increasingly to be punished with ostra­ cism, confinement, exile, and death. That deep understanding of the trend of events, combined, when necessary, with defiance of these trends, that determination of the intelligent being to be himself no matter what, has always exerted on me the greatest fascination, and impressed me much more than either intelligence or courage separated from the other. It seems to me nothing short of miraculous for a man to have spent seventy-four years of his life in one of the most turbulent eras of recorded history without once

X

PREFACE

yielding to the temptation to deny himself in order to gain se­ curity, comforts, or even life itself, and without committing, in­ sofar as it can be established, a single sordid act. This kind of morality surely places man on a level all his own. It defies what we know from experience to be man's natural inclination, and it dazzles us as much as the appearance of a giant new comet or the discovery of a living species thought to have been long extinct. Richard Pipes Cambridge, Massachusetts

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe a debt to those numerous friends and colleagues who, aware of my interest in Struve, communicated to me information about him which most likely I would never have located myself. I am also obliged to those of Struve's contemporaries, most of them no longer alive today, who generously shared with me their recollections of him. But my greatest obligation is to Peter Struve's eldest son, Professor Gleb Struve. From the beginning of my work on his father's biography he helped me with biblio­ graphic advice, shared with me materials from his rich archive, and stood ready to advise, comment, and criticize. His help was invaluable and I gratefully acknowledge it.

CONTENTS

Part One: Great Russia 1. Parliamentary Politics 1905-1907 2. Break with the Intelligentsia 3. Economic Theory 4. Russian Thought

3 66 115 169

Part Two: The Time of Troubles 5. 6. 7. 8.

World War Revolution Civil War What Happened?

201 231 269 297

Part Three: In Emigration 9. Emigre Politics 10. Last Years

323 394

Struve: An Assessment

445

A Chronology of Struve's Life

459

Bibliography

467

Index

511

ILLUSTRATIONS

frontispiece P. B. Struve Courtesy of Mr. Alexis P. Struve 22 Simon Frank, Munich, c. 1904 Courtesy of Mrs. S. L. Frank The Constitutional Democrats elected to the 50 Second Duma from St. Petersburg Courtesy of Mr. Alexis P. Struve 62 V. A. Maklakov From Polveka dlia knigi (Moscow, 1916) Caricature of Struve and Maklakov as Stolypin's supplicants 64 From Rus': llliustrirovannye Prilozhenie, no. 23, June 18, 1907 71 Caricature· of Struve, "Struve's National Visage" From Rudin, no. 3, December 1915 247 Grigorii Trubetskoi From Pamiati kn. Gr. N. Trubetskogo (Paris, 1930) Struve in Stockholm, 1919 272 Courtesy Pressens Bild AB, Stockholm 346 Struve, Nina Struve, and son Arkadii, Prague, 1920s Courtesy of Mrs. S. L. Frank 347 Family scenes, Prague, 1920s Courtesy of Mr. Alexis P. Struve Mock chess game between Paul Miliukov and Struve 349 From Illiustrirovannaia Rossiia, no. 16/153, April 14, 1928 365 Nicholas Berdiaev, 1934 From Alexis Klimov, Nicolas Berdiaeff ou la revolte contre l'ob;ectivation (Paris, Editions Seghers, 1967) Struve in Belgrade, 1930s 399 Courtesy of Mr. Alexis P. Struve Struve in Paris, J942 436 Courtesy of Mr. Alexis P. Struve Struve' s grave at Ste. Genevieve de Bois 443 Photograph by Richard Pipes

NOTE ON DATING AND ABBREVIATIONS

Unless two dates are provided, all dates until December 31, 1917, are Old Style, or thirteen days behind the Western calendar; after that, they are New Style, that is, in conformance with the calendar used in the West. All numbered references ( for example #548 or 25/9-13) ap­ ply to Struve's own writings. The first kind refers to Struve's books and articles in periodical publications as reproduced in P. B. Struve, Collected Works in Fifteen Volumes, brought out under my editorship by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, in 1970: a complete list of these is given in the Bibliography. The second kind of abbreviation is used for Struve's newspaper ar­ ticles, which the Collected Works did not include. The first num­ ber gives the year the article appeared, the second the month, the third the day. \1/henever a given newspaper issue carried more than one of Struve's articles, they are numbered consecutively, "a," "b," and so forth. Thus, for example, the entry 33/6-la means that the article appeared on June 6, 1933, and that it was Struve's first article in that day's issue of the relevant newspaper. A list of the newspaper articles to which reference is made, ar­ ranged in chronological order, is provided in the Bibliography.

ABBREVIATIONS

ARR Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii ASEER American Slavic and East European Review ASGS Archiv fiir Soziale Gesetzgebttng und Statistik ASS Archiv fiir Sozialwissenscha� und Sozialpolitik BD Beloe dvizhenie B&E Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' Ob-a Brokgauz i Efron Belokonsky I. P. Belokonsky, Zemskoe dvizhenie ( Moscow, 1914) BK Bor'ba klassov BSE Boishaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia BV Birzhevye vedomosti EV Ekonomicheskii vestnik Frank S. Frank, Biografiia P. B. Struve (New York, 1956) GM Golas minuvshego IsSSSR Istoriia SSSR KA Krasnyi arkhiv KhiTs Khoziaistvo i tsena KL Krasnaia letopis' KrKh P. B. Struve, Krepostnoe Khoziaistvo ( St. Petersburg, 1913) KS Katorga i ssylka Lenin V. I. Lenin, Sochineniia, 3rd ed., 30 vols. (Moscow, 1926-1937) Lenin PSS V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th ed., 55 vols. (Moscow, 1958-1965) LisOsv Listok Osvobozhdeniia LA Literaturnyi arkhiv LM Letopisi marksizma LN Literaturnoe nasledstvo LR Letopis' revoliutsii

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ABBREVIATIONS

LS Leninskii sbornik MB Mir Bozhii MERR K. Marks, F. Engel's revoliutsionnaia Rossiia ( Moscow, 1967 ) MG Minuvshie gody MV M oskovskie vedomosti N Nachalo NaS N arodnaia svoboda NO Nauchnoe obozrenie NRS Novae russkoe slovo Nrt P. B. Struve, Na raznye temy ( 1893-1901 gg. ) -Sbornik statei ( St. Petersburg, 1902 ) NS Novoe slovo NV Novoe vremia NZ Die Neue Zeit NZh N ovyi zhurnal Obzory or Obzor Obzory [ Obzor] vazhneishikh doznanii o gosu­ darstvennykh prestupleniiakh proizvodivshikhsia v Imperii ObD Obshchee delo OD L. Martov et al. , Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX veka, 4 vols. ( St. Petersburg, 1909-1914 ) Osv Osvobozhdenie PN Poslednie novosti Potresov B. I. Nikolaevskii, Introduction to A. N. Potresov: Posmertnyi sbornik proizvedenii ( Paris, 1937 ) , 9-90 PR Proletarskaia revoliutsiia RB Russkoe bogatstvo RBS Russkii biograficheskii slovar' RiSl Rossiia i Slavianstvo RM Russkaia mysl' RMo Russkaia molva Ros Rossiia RR Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia RS Russkaia starina RSv Russkaia svoboda RuR Russian Review RV Russkii vestnik RVed Russkie vedomosti S Slovo SaV Samarskii vestnik

ABBREVIATIONS

SB

xix

Staryi Bal' shevik SC Socialpolitisches C entralblatt Shakhovskoi D. Shakhovskoi, "Soiuz Osvobozhdeniia," Zarnitsy, issue 2 ( St. Petersburg, 1909) , 81-171 SK Severnyi kur'er SoV Sotsialisticheskii vestnik SP Soziale Praxis SR Slavonic Review StPV Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti Struve Richard Pipes, Struve: Liberal on the Left ( Cambridge, Mass., 1970) SZ Sovremennye zapiski SZh Severnaia zhizn' Trudy IVEO Trudy Imperatorskogo Vol'rwgo Ekonomicheskogo Obshchestva VE Vestnik Evropy VFP Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii VI Voprosy lstorii VIKPSS Voprosy istorii KPSS Vaden A. M. Vaden, "Na zare 'legal'nogo marksizma,' " Letopisi marksizma, no. 3 ( 1927) , 67-82, and no. 4 ( 1927) , 87-96 Voz V ozrozhdenie VR V elikaia Rossiia Zh Zhizn'

PART ONE

GREAT RUSSIA

As concerns my past, it obliges me, above everything else, to be honest. -Struve, 1907

l.

PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS,

1905-1907

In the calendar of Russian politics, spring is usually followed at once by winter. The Revolution of 1905 was no exception. Less than two years after the victory which Russian "society" believed itself to have won over the bureaucratic establishment, its hopes of a new political order lay shattered. In the summer of 1907 the monarchy, having dissolved parliament for the second time in less than a year, brazenly violated its own constitution by promul­ gating a revised and much more restrictive electoral law. Re­ pressive policies, including summary execution by courts-martial of actual and suspected terrorists, continued unabated in all parts of the Empire. The bureaucracy, once again firmly in the saddle, behaved as if neither the October Manifesto nor the Fundamental Laws had ever been issued. There was general agreement in Rus­ sian intellectual circles by this time that the Revolution had been a failure: once again, as so often before, the monarchy had man­ aged to outwit its opponents. The new status quo was, if any­ thing, even worse than the situation before 1905, because the passions which had been aroused during the years of revolution­ ary violence continued to simmer and were ready to explode at the slightest provocation, and yet the monarchy no longer enjoyed among the people that awe which in the past had enabled it to neutralize mass discontent. vVhy events had taken such a turn became the subject of in­ tense debate among Russian intellectuals. This debate continued for several decades, subsiding only after its protagonists had died. One school of thought, whose leading spokesman was Paul Miliu­ kov, the chief and the principal strategist of the Constitutional Democratic Party during these decisive years, maintained that the failure of the Revolution was mostly caused by the duplicity of the monarchy. Having issued the October Manifesto under duress,

4

GREAT RUSSIA

it never intended to honor its promises and kept sabotaging the constitution all along. Miliukov's main opponent, Vasily Makla­ kov, who spoke for the right wing of the party and much of con­ servative opinion, perceived the monarchy as having been more forthcoming and placed most of the blame for what had happened on Miliukov and his followers. Maklakov accused the liberals of having shown themselves unwilling to meet the crown halfway and of pursuing an essentially revolutionary strategy which left the authorities no alternative but to fight back. Struve took a distinct position in this controversy. Despite some reservations, he was at first inclined to side with the Constitutional Democratic Party and to cooperate with its Miliukov-designed strategy. Later, after the dissolution of the Second Duma, he swung against the dominant faction of the Kadets and adopted a position rather close to Maklakov's. However, he was not content to confine himself to a critique of the political strategy and tactics pursued by the Kadets; he sought the roots of the trouble deeper, in the whole political culture of Russia. In the final analysis, in his opinion, the failure of the constitutional experiment lay in the absence, among both the masses and the educated classes of Rus­ sia, of all those cultural qualities which alone could have made constitutional statehood feasible. If one views the years 1905-1907 from within, erasing from one's consciousness what one knows to have happened subse­ quently, it becomes both easier to understand what had occurred and more difficult to judge. This period in Russian history has about it the quality of a genuine tragedy in the sense that, given their upbringing, perceptions, and goals, the protagonists had no choice but to act as they did and by so doing doom themselves to rush headlong into catastrophe. It is probably true to say that if in the 1930s by some miracle the leaders of the Imperial bureauc­ racy and their opponents could have returned to Russia from their places of exile in Paris or Belgrade, they would have behaved exactly as they had done before the Revolution and thus reen­ acted their tragedy in all its particulars. The Union of Liberation, that grand coalition of oppositional parties, owed its astounding successes of 1903-1905 to the al­ liance, which it had engineered, of the liberal, moderately con­ servative, and left-wing intelligentsia, and to the ability that al-

PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS, 1905-1907

5

liance gave it to gain for its campaign against the autocracy the support of the urban and rural "masses." It was a coalition with­ out precedent ( or sequel) in the history of Russia, a country where the opposition forces had always tended to break up into numerous warring factions, and where the liberal-conservative ele­ ments could never draw close enough to the radicals to be in a position to coordinate activities with them. On their own, the liberals and the liberal-conservatives who dominated the Union of Liberation could not h,ave gotten very far. The intellectuals and the affluent landlords in the Union's directorate could certainly have acutely embarrassed the Imperial regime with their provoca­ tive publications and banquet campaigns, but they could never have brought it to its knees. To accomplish this they required the "masses" to spread rebellion across the Empire; and access to these "masses" lay through the "democratic intelligentsia." The latter group was a loose agglomeration of Socialist Revolutionaries, So­ cial Democrats, and various nonparty "progressives" who, while espousing socialist ideals, were not prepared to join either the SRs or the SDs ( for example, salaried zemstvo employees, office clerks, skilled workers, and so on) . To be effective, the Union thus had to draw support from the organized and unorganized "left." It was widely acknowledged by Russian liberals, Struve among them, that it was the active support of the "democratic intelli­ gentsia" that had tipped the scales decisively in the liberals' favor in 1904-1905. 1 Given this experience, it is hardly surprising that even after the Union of Liberation had transformed itself into the Constitutional Democratic Party in October 1905, the liberals continued to at­ tach great value to the maintenance of close relations with the left. But it was not only past experience that spoke in favor of a left-wing orientation : such a course also could have been justified on strategic grounds. After October 1905 the Russian liberals faced two possibilities, neither of which would have been advan­ tageous to them should they have been cut off from their radical allies. One possibility was that the government would succeed in 1 That much was conceded even by the party's most implacable critic, V. A. Maklakov, who in 1956 in a letter to Boris Elkin agreed that until October 17, 1 905, "the struggle against the autocracy was by its very nature an illegal one, and could not have been waged otherwise than through contact with the more revolu­ tionary elements " : I owe this citation from the Elkin archive to Mr. Constantine Brancovan.

GREAT RUSSIA

6

pacifying the country, and then promptly revoke the political concessions which it had been forced to make to the liberals in the face of mass rebellion. In this event, the liberals, cut off from the "democratic intelligentsia" and unable to intimidate the authori­ ties with the threat of revolution, could find themselves isolated and crushed. The other possibility was that the government would fail to reestablish law and order, with the result that anarchy would become endemic to Russia. Under such conditions of "per­ manent revolution, " extreme radical groups could solidify their position among the "masses," and leading them through the breach in the ramparts of autocracy first made by the Union of Liberation, could assault the central redoubts of the liberal order: law, liberty, and property. This contingency too required that the opening to the left be maintained, if only to retain access to the large body of the "democratic intelligentsia" which was not at­ tracted to the idea of class war and a "proletarian" dictatorship. All these considerations spoke in favor of a leftward policy: or, as M iliukov was later to put it, of a strategy that combined "lib­ eral tactics with the threat of revolution."2 Of course, it could have been argued that the real challenge to liberal values ema­ nated not from the right but from the left, and that after October 17 a more sensible strategy would have been to leave the left in the lurch and join hands with the government in fighting anarchy from whatever quarter it came. The large majority of the liberals, however, were convinced that the Imperial regime remained ex­ tremely strong and durable, even after 1905, and that they could go on assailing it with impunity. Looking back at the events of these years from the perspective of emigration, Struve conceded that the proleft orientation of the liberals ( which he had shared for a while) derived psychologically from an exaggerated notion of the Imperial government's internal strength and stability. 3 The strategy which they had adopted inevitably brought the liberals on a collision course with the regime and virtually assured the failure of the constitutional order. All that one can say in its justification is that this strategy represented a calculated risk 2

P. N. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, ( 1859-1 91 7 ) , I ( New York, 1955 ) , 316. E.g. 29/7-20. The social composition of the Constitutional Democratic Party also influenced its left-wing orientation. Of its estimated 70,000-100,000 active members in 1907, 43.7 percent could be classified as members of the "intelli­ aa gentsia" : cf. E. D. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia i tsarizm v revoliutsii 1905-1907 t--t-· ( Moscow-Leningrad, 1939 ) , 305-306. 3

PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS, 190.:5 -1907

7

which seemed the more attractive to the party's leadership in that the victories of 1903-1 905 had given that leadership unwarranted self-confidence in its ability to control any situation that might arise from its revolutionary activities. The Kadet leadership felt convinced that by exercising unremitting pressure on the bureauc­ racy, with the radical elements at its beck and call, it would be able to compel the regime to yield one position after another un­ til genuine parliamentary democracy triumphed all along the line. Miliukov undoubtedly Jrnd behind him the large majority of the party rank and file when he steered the Constitutional Democrats along this militant course. He was inherently a cautious and mod­ erate man, who much of the time followed his constituency rather than led it. Defections of members who thought that the party leaned too far to the left were few, and they were more than matched by defections of those who felt that it did not lean far enoug!1 in that direction. Most right-wing defections occurred at the time of the party's formation, when the conservative elements of the Union of Liberation broke off to form the Union of 17 Oc­ tober. Struve ( like Maklakov ) joined the Kadet party and co­ operated with it, despite some misgivings about its strategy, for he saw no alternative, as neither the Octobrists nor the other splinter parties to the right of the Kadets appeared to him as viable options. The Constitutional Democratic Party ( or, as it later came to be known, the Party of Popular Freedom ) was formally founded at a congress held in Moscow on October 12-18, 1905. Attendance at this gathering was poor because the nationwide General Strike then in progress had halted the trains, stranding many of the dele­ gates from the provinces. In the statement with which he opened the meeting, Miliukov gave a decidedly radical twist to the new party's policy when he referred to groupings to the right of the Kadets as "opponents" ( protivniki) and to those to the left as "not opponents but allies" ( ne protivniki a soiu:::.n iki ) . He further asserted, with evident pride, that the Constitutional Democratic Party occupied "the same left wing of the Russian political move­ ment" as did the socialist parties, and characterized its program as the most "left" advanced by any liberal party in Europe. The principal differences between the KDs and the socialists, as Miliu­ kov defined them, cent ·, 1 Hr 1 ': t L r: ·. t r 1 ; � � 1 ': t fi ;; t l '/fJ.--; h ;;,J J d t I H i F:\;; ] ·. r:d , t h a t i c, , t rJ turn rr: ·/r;] 1 J t i r1r1 ;Jf "/. 'I L ,: r i '.!h t i r1 '.! 'JJ r1 ·, i rkrr: d t h r: r:x i "> t i ri '.' UJn '>t i t u t i rm f ;; r f rr1 rr1 ·_;;_t t.f tr;r:: :� r:t .,,_ r; r�;)_Lk 8.r1 rJ ·1:8.'> prr:parr:rJt,J :;rJ trJ um ­ ·.i rk r;; f 1 l r: k r i �t h ·, t r; ;; t t,8.ir, ;;_ mr1rhri 1/ iumdi v:i t h t h r: f(: �irne . .\f i l i 1 i ln1·: t r:r1rJ r:rJ t r; ·, r ;r:J,.- 8. rn i d d l r: ·.1:8.·-: ·;, i t h a c,] i f1h t L i ac, trJ\\'a.rd t L r: l d t : Lr: f ;;:;r;r,-rJ I J ") i r i :; t h r: t h r,: 8.t r�f ;;_ rr: ·:r; ] u t ;m ary 1 1ph (:8.Va.l ;;:, ;;_ ·1;r;;J fi r 1r1 i r1 t L r: \ t r 1 1 ��Jr:, f; 1 J t. at t h r: '> d_!fJ (; t i rn r: hr: wan t r:d thr: p ;Jrf / t ri L;. h: ;;_d ·:;;ri L J�r; r; f r;·, r:ry rJppr;rt 1 rn i ty a ffr;nJr:d by the umstitution t •.;;;_ i l r:d ;J. f t h r: rr1r:r:t i r1 �·, r; f t h r: (>: n t r al (>;rn rn i t t r:r: h r; ] d t r;ward t h r: r:r, d ri f ] 'j(J(j _ Th r: f;;;:, i r. prJ l i r.y ;;_dr;ptr:d i r1 1. r;l \-r: d , 8.'> L r: fon: , UJ TJ ­ f rr; n t ;tf i r; n , [; 1 J t r;f a ] r:ss ;J��rr:c,si •:r; k i ri d : "n rJt an ac,