Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela 9781503622272

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STRONG PARTIES AND LAME DUCKS

Strong Parties and Lame Ducks PRESIDENTIAL PARTYARCHY AND FACTIONALISM IN VENEZUELA

Michael Coppedge

Stanford University Press Stanford, California

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 1994 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University Printed in the United States of America CIP data appear at the end of the book Original printing 1994 Last figure below indicates year of this printing:

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

IN the decade that has passed since I first conceived of this study I have accumulated intellectual, personal, and financial debts that would be too numerous to acknowledge here even if I could remember them all, but some are impossible to forget. I owe my greatest intellectual debt to Juan Linz, who patiently critiqued and encouraged my first hesitant notions about Venezuelan democracy, taught me field research, introduced me to the comparative parties literature, helped me refine my arguments through many drafts, made me see the crucial role of presidentialism, and continued to be a mentor in the best and fullest sense even when he had no institutional obligation to do so. Debts this great can never be repaid, but are borne gratefully and handed down to the next generation. My other intellectual debts are to Robert Dahl, whose meticulous analyses of polyarchy have been an inspiration; to Mimi Keck, who steered me away from my intended study of the debt crisis; to AI Stepan, who laid out clearly what I had to do to succeed in this project; to Kathryn Sikkink, who helped me overcome my reluctance to criticize Venezuelan democracy; and to Scott Mainwaring, whose careful reading and detailed comments led me to tighten my arguments and support them with more comparisons. I am also grateful to Barry Ames, Jeff Anderson, David Cameron, Hernando De Soto, Larry Diamond, Barbara Geddes, the late Charlie Gillespie, Carol Graham, Stephan Haggard, Jonathan Hartlyn, Robert Kaufman, Barnett Rubin, James Scott, Matthew Shugart, and the late Konrad Stenzel for various useful contributions along the way. My thirteen months of field research were made possible by a generous Fulbright-Hays grant for doctoral dissertation research abroad, and preliminary research was funded by a Tinker grant for summer research. While in Venezuela I benefited from my affiliation with the Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (CENDES) of the

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Acknowledgments

Central University of Venezuela and especially from the guidance of researchers Luis Gomez Calcaiio, Margarita Lopez Maya, and Thais Maingon. The Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales (ILDIS), established by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, was a valuable repository of reference material. I am also grateful to the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University for employing me and giving me talented research assistants, and to Riordan Roett for being a friend and ideal senior colleague. The eighty Adecos who subjected themselves to my hour-long battery of questions deserve special thanks, even though promises of confidentiality prevent me from thanking them by name. However, I would like to give very special thanks to the Adecos (who did not necessarily participate in the survey) who went out of their way to help-Marco Tulio Bruni Celli, Josefina Bruni Celli, Luis Raul Matos Azocar, Teo Camargo, Henry Ramos Allup, Miguel Ocque, Paulina Gamus, Enrique Tejera Paris, and Carlos Andres Perez. Other Venezuelans-Margarita Lopez Maya, Luis Lander, Moises Nairn, Marfa Teresa Romero, Pedro Carrillo, Ramon Hernandez, and Andres Stambouli-helped me keep up with Venezuela during a long absence. The City University of New York kindly gave permission toreprint the section on AD penetration of organized labor in Chapter 2; along with Figure 2. r, it originally appeared in my "Parties and Society in Mexico and Venezuela: Why Competition Matters," Comparative Politics 25, no. 3 (Apr. 1993): 253-74. The Johns Hopkins University Press gave permission to reprint Table r.r, which will be published in my "Venezuela: Democratic Despite Presidentialism," in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Crisis of Presidential Democracy: The Latin American Evidence (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming 1994). Many passages from all chapters were first published in my Ph.D. dissertation, "Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: A Study of the Quality and Stability of Venezuelan Democracy," Yale University, 1988; University Microfilms graciously released the copyright for the dissertation to Stanford University Press. The small U.S. community of Venezuelanists deserves high praise for doggedly investing time in an understudied country. They are responsible for so much of what I know about Venezuela that they

Acknowledgments

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merit a blanket expression of thanks that transcends specific footnotes. So thank you, John Martz, Daniel Levine, David Myers, Terry Karl, Robert J. Alexander, David E. Blank, Jennifer McCoy, Steve Ellner, Daniel Hellinger, Charles Davis, Franklin Tugwell, Talton Ray, John Powell, Kenneth Coleman, and Mina Silberberg. Finally, I thank my family. My parents, John and Frances Coppedge, made it possible for me to finish graduate school, while Nathan, Brian, and Lynn have done their best to remind me, in a thousand irresistible ways, that there is more to life than political science.

M.C.

Contents

Abbreviations I.

xv

Presidential Partyarchy and Acci6n Democratica Views of Venezuelan Democracy 5 Characteristics of AD and Its Leadership

2.

Polyarchy and Partyarchy Partyarchy in Venezuela

I

9

I8 20

Control of Nominations 20 Choices Offered to Voters 22 Parties and the Congress 2 3 Penetration of Organizations AD Penetration of Organized Labor 3 I Parties and the Media 35

The Pros and Cons of Partyarchy

36

Partyarchy and Stability 3 7 Partyarchy and the Quality of Democracy 3 9 Internal Democracy and Factionalism 44

3· Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics

47

Three Parties in One 47 The Irrationality of Division in the Electoral Party

50

Factionalism and Voting for Acci6n Democratica 54 A Multivariate Estimate 57 Factionalism and the Quality of Representation at Elections 6I

4· The Policy Party 64 Executives and Their Parties 64 The Policy Party During the Lusinchi Government

70

2

7

x

Contents The Economic Crisis 71 AD's Policy Orientation 73 AD Was a Reformist Party 75 AD Was a Pragmatic Party 77

The Area of Consensus Orthodox Consensus 79

78 Heterodox Consensus 8r

Areas of Disagreement 84 Ideas vs. Actions-Labor Leaders 86 Ideas and Actions-Politicians 89 Lusinchi's Popularity 91 5. The Power Party 94 Opposition Unites, Governing Divides 97 Ins and Outs 103 The Five-Year Cycle 109 Fluid Factions n6 The Bandwagon Mentality 121 The Outs' Advantage 123 Why Ins and Outs Come into Conflict 128 Presidentialism I28 Collective Leadership 130 the Pattern-COPE/ and Electoral Reform IJI

Variations on

6. Policy and Power Struggles 136 Factions and Principle During the Lusinchi Government Factions and Self-Interest During the Lusinchi Government 145 Self-Interest and Principle in AD's History 147 The Destruction of Principled Factionalism 148 7· Strengths and Weaknesses of Venezuelan Democracy Strong Parties and Lame Ducks 154 How Partyarchy Helped Stability r 55 Partyarchy Hurts Stability 157

Reforming Presidential Partyarchy

How Presidential 163

Improving Accountability r6 3 The Advantages of a Parliamentary System 167 Modifying the Presidential System 169 Making Stalemate Less Likely 170

153

141

Contents

Venezuelan Presidential Partyarchy in Comparative Perspective 174 The Prevalence of Presidential Partyarchy 175 The Prevalence of Partyarchy 176 The Prevalence of Presidentialism 177

Appendix: Estimating the Electoral Costs of Factionalism r85 Notes

191

Bibliography Index

235

219

x1

Figures and Tables

FIGURES

2.1 Worker-Hours Lost to Strikes by Government, 1960-1985 34 3.1 Estimated Electoral Impact of Factionalism 63 4.1 Self-Placement of Adecos Along Left-Right Scale

76

5.1 Duration of Campaigns for Party Leadership, by Year of Presidential Term, 1959-1990 110 5.2 Age Distribution of Ins and Outs

119

TABLES 1.1

Percentages of Seats Won by Parties in Congress,

1959-1989 10 2.1 AD Leaders' Commitment to Cooperation with COPEI, 1985 41 3.1 Factionalism and AD's Electoral Performance, 1958-1988 56 3.2 A Model of the Dynamics of the AD Vote, 1958-1983 4· 1 Legislative Output in 14 Countries

6o

70

4.2 AD Leaders' Reactions to Lusinchi's Austerity Program

8o

4·3 Consensus Among AD Leaders on Orthodox Economic Policies 81 4·4 AD Leaders' Consensus Against Trade Liberalization

82

4·5 AD Leaders' Consensus in Favor of Stimulating Economic Growth 83

x1v

Figures and Tables

4.6 Strength of Support for the Party Line Among AD Leaders 92 4·7 AD Leaders' Feelings Toward Political Figures 5.1 Ins and Outs in Top Leadership Positions

93

107

5.2 Nomination Expectations of Ins and Outs and Preferred Nominating Procedures 108 5·3 Success of Faction Allies in 1985 Regional Internal Elections n6

5·4 Demographic Similarity of Ins and Outs II7 5·5 Personal Loyalties in the CEN, 1977-1985 120 6.1 Similarity of Policy Positions Across Factions 142 6.2 Economic Recovery Strategies Preferred by Ins and Outs 143 6.3 Reactions of Ins and Outs to Lusinchi's Austerity Program 144 6.4 Best Single Predictors of Factional Affiliation 146 6.5 Motives of Ins and Outs 147 7.1 Status of CO PRE Recommendations as of June 1992 165 7.2 Latin American Presidents with Single-Party Majorities in Both Chambers, 1900-1990 179

Figure 2.1 is from Coppedge, "Parties and Society in Mexico and Venezuela," and is used with the permission of Comparative Politics, published by the City University of New York. All other figures are used for the first time here since their first use in the author's dissertation. Table 1.1 is from Coppedge, "Venezuela: Democratic Despite Presidentialism," and is used with the permission of the Johns Hopkins University Press. Tables 4.1, 7.1, and 7.2 appear for the first time here. All other tables have appeared only in the author's dissertation.

ABBREVIATIONS

AD

Acci6n Democritica, the Democratic Action party

BS.

Bolivares, the Venezuelan currency

CDN

Comite Directivo Nacional, the governing body of AD meeting every 6-12 months

CEN

Comite Ejecutivo Nacional, the governing body of AD meeting weekly

CENDES

Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo, a research institute of the Central University of Venezuela

CES

Comite Ejecutivo Seccional, a governing body of AD at the state level

CODESA

Comite de Sindicatos Aut6nomos, a Christian Democratic trade union confederation

COPE!

Comite de Organizaci6n Politica Electoral Independiente, the Social Christian (Christian Democratic) party

CO PRE

Comisi6n Presidencial Para Ia Reforma del Estado, a blue-ribbon panel appointed by President Lusinchi to recommend institutional reforms, made a cabinet ministry under President Perez

CTV

Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Venezuela, the largest trade union confederation

CUTV

Confederaci6n Unificada de Trabajadores

xvt

Abbreviations Venezolanos, a trade union confederation affiliated with parties of the left

FCV

Federaci6n de Campesinos de Venezuela, the peak peasant confederation

FEDECAMARAS

Federaci6n de Cimaras de Comercio y Producci6n, the largest peak business association

FEDE-UNEP

Federaci6n-Uni6n Nacional de Empleados Publicos, the public employees union

MAS

Movimiento a! Socialismo, a democratic socialist party

MEP

Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo, a small center-left party created by a division of AD in 1967-68

MIR

Movimiento de Ia lzquierda Revolucionaria, a small leftist party, originally the political arm of guerrilla movements of the 196o's

STRONG PARTIES AND LAME DUCKS

CHAPTER ONE

Presidential Partyarchy and Acci6n Democratica

V

enezuelan democracy entered its deepest crisis during the 1989-93 presidency of Carlos Andres Perez. Coup attempts came very close to succeeding in February and November 1992. The plotters enjoyed the support of a significant segment of the population, and opinion polls revealed the presidency, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and most national politicians to be utterly lacking in popular support. 1 Constitutional guarantees were suspended after the coup attempts, just as they were during widespread rioting that broke out in February 1989. Prominent political leaders began calling for the president to resign two years before the end of his term, and when he refused to step down, the opposition parties in Congress impeached him for misuse of funds. The depth of this crisis is surprising to many, for two reasons. First, Venezuela has heretofore been considered a thoroughly consolidated democracy: it has held competitive elections every five years since 1958, and the two largest parties, Acci6n Democratica (AD) and the Social Christian Party (COPEI), alternated in the presidency for five consecutive governments. Second, it is difficult to blame the usual villains for the regime's troubles. Venezuela is not an economic basket case like the two democracies, Haiti and Peru, that failed in 1991 and 1992. On the contrary, it has the highest per capita GDP in Latin America, the fastest-growing economy in the region (10.4 percent in 1991), and a declining inflation rate that most of its neighbors would be thankful to have. The military had not meddled in politics since 1962; there is no guerrilla insurgency; the president is no dark-horse antipolitician; and drug trafficking has only begun to make an appearance. There is no obvious rea-

2

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democratica

son why this apparently stable democracy should be in danger of collapsing after 34 years. This book explains what went wrong. Steeped in the literature praising Venezuelan democracy, I made a research trip to Venezuela in 1983 and was taken aback to learn that some people there did not consider their country democratic. "We have no democracy here," one banker said. "What we have is a partidocracia," a "partyocracy." This was an intriguing paradox: why was this country praised for its longevity as a democracy and also denounced as undemocratic? I have since discovered that the stability and the shortcomings of Venezuelan democracy are two sides of the same coin. The institutions that make Venezuela a stable polity also tarnish the quality of its democracy. This book is a study of two institutions that produce this paradox. One is what the banker had in mind-partidocracia. In Venezuela, political parties monopolize the electoral process, dominate the legislative process, and penetrate politically relevant organizations to a degree that violates the spirit of democracy. The sad consequence is that many of the informal channels of representation that are taken for granted in other democracies, such as interest groups, the media, the courts, and independent opinion leaders, are blocked by extreme party domination. Without effective channels for the representation of their interests between elections, citizens become disenchanted with the parties and with the democratic regime. Parties play some of these roles to some extent in many other countries, but to my knowledge, there is no other pluralistic system in which parties control so many aspects of the democratic process so completely. Venezuela is probably the most extreme case of a pathological kind of political control that I call partyarchy. If democracy is government of the people, by the people, for the people, then partyarchy is government of the people, by the parties, for the parties. The other institution is the presidency. As Juan Linz and others have argued, most presidential systems are prone to the problem of stalemate: a standoff between the executive and the legislature that can lead to a constitutional crisis.2 Presidents who lack a working majority in the legislature either accomplish very little or attempt to govern by executive decree. If they respect the legislature's legitimate role in the political process, they cannot govern effectively. If they resort to decrees, they concentrate power in the presidency at

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democrdtica

3

the expense of the legislature, undermining the checks and balances built into presidential constitutions. Either way, the standoff lasts until the president's term of office expires. He cannot dissolve the legislature and hold new elections, and the legislature cannot dismiss him with a vote of no confidence, as would be possible in a parliamentary system. In the meantime, the opposition parties often adopt an obstructionist line to embarrass the president and improve their own chances in the next election. This book argues that Venezuela's current political problems are the result of partyarchy functioning in the context of a presidential system. A presidency alone is not bad, and rule by strong parties has its advantages. But both institutions together are what Venezuelans would call arroz con mango (rice with mango)-a revolting combination, and a recipe for trouble. The political process does not disappear when partyarchy blocks the informal channels of representation; it is simply shunted into the arena of party politics. And when one party controls the government, as is common in presidential systems, then much of the political process takes place within the governing party. In Venezuela, factional struggles within parties occupy a very prominent place in political life for this reason. These struggles follow a unique pattern that contributes to the poor quality of Venezuelan democracy. Every time a party governs, it divides into two antagonistic factions: a group of "Ins" who want to preserve the leadership of the incumbent president, and a group of "Outs" who are mainly interested in electing the next president. The bickering stirred up in these long, intense succession crises tends to sour voters on the parties, often so much that the governing party loses the next election. In the long run, these struggles tarnish the image of democracy itself. Yet there seems to be no particular connection between these factional struggles and the policy-making process: the factions no longer possess, much less promote, any policy agenda, and therefore they have little or no impact on government policy. From the standpoint of governability, this is an advantage, in that it helps to insulate technocratic policy-makers during economic crisis; but from the standpoint of democracy, the absence of issues in factional competition is tragic, for in a partyarchy there are no other effective channels for the representation of interests between elections.

4

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democratica

Lively competition within the governing party would seem to be a promising compensation for the lack of representation elsewhere. The promise goes unfulfilled because the factions are not recruited and organized in a way that would allow them to link citizens to their government between elections. Worse yet, historical evidence suggests that the kind of factionalism practiced in Venezuela systematically destroys principled factions and prevents new ones from taking root. Paradoxically, although presidential partyarchy undermines the quality of a democracy, it also enhances the stability of a democracy, at least in the short run. Party penetration of labor unions and other private organizations makes it possible for parties to keep protests and demands from reaching levels that could threaten the survival of the regime. By diverting internal party activity into an issueless power struggle and away from policy disagreements, factionalism insulates the government from disruptive pressure and therefore allows long-term implementation of difficult economic policies. And by increasing the chance of an opposition victory at the polls, factionalism in the governing party gives the opposition a stake in the system and keeps it from becoming disloyal. In the long term, however, the net effect of presidential partyarchy on stability is probably negative, because partyarchy fosters disillusionment with the parties and democracy, and presidentialism reduces the flexibility that could resolve the severe constitutional crises that are bound to develop sooner or later. Although presidential partyarchy cannot be blamed for every aspect of the crisis of democracy in Venezuela, it does explain several of the most important features of the crisis. People who turned to extraconstitutional solutions, as in the 1989 riots and the 1992 coup attempts, did so out of frustration with the functioning of democratic institutions and the blockage of formal channels of representation. Part of that frustration was, of course, left over from the poor economic performance of 1979-89; but a significant part of it was the by-product of intraparty bickering encouraged by the combination of presidentialism and Venezuela's brand of partyarchy. When frustration reached a crisis point and most of the population hoped that President Perez would resign, the presidential system made it difficult to find a solution. The president refused to resign and impeachment was unthinkable initially, yet few Venezuelans could imagine him

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democratica

5

finishing his term. A constitutional way out of this dilemma eluded the national political leadership for more than a year. Venezuela's presidential partyarchy can survive as a democracy only if it can make itself more democratic before it is too late.

Views of Venezuelan Democracy The urgent need for democratic reform has been a common theme in the Venezuelan scholarly literature since the mid-198o's, but most of the literature in English has remained wedded to an early interpretation that portrayed Venezuelan democracy in a positive light. Scholarly works published in the United States in the first decade of the democratic regime (1958-68) reflected the Cold War preoccupation with finding a capitalist and democratic alternative to the Cuban Revolution. Castro entered Havana between the December 1958 founding election in Venezuela and President Betancourt's inauguration in early 1959. Owing to this coincidence, the new Venezuelan democracy was quickly cast in the role of the alternative model by the U.S. government, and Betancourt welcomed the part.3 One of the new president's confidantes, Robert J. Alexander, published an influential book called The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution (1964) that loaded the new regime with praise and made explicit comparisons with Cuba. John Martz's encyclopedic Acci6n Democratica: Evolution of a Modern Political Party (1966) was similarly enthusiastic about Betancourt, his party, and the first governments of the regime. The first questions about Venezuelan democracy were raised by a U.S.-Venezuelan effort headed by J. A. Silva Michelena of the Central University's Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (CENDES) and Frank Bonilla of M.I.T.4 The CENDES-M.I.T. study (1970), combining the political culture approach then fashionable in the U.S. with the skepticism about "bourgeois democracy" common to Latin American scholars at the time, concluded that Venezuelan democracy was doomed to fail because of the lack of consensus in society. This conclusion caused a parting of ways between U.S. and Venezuelan interpretations: its pessimism became the norm among Venezuelan academics, while U.S. scholars became rebelliously optimistic. Daniel Levine in particular, reacting pointedly to the CENDES-

6

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democrdtica

M.l.T. study, argued that Venezuelan democracy had survived more than a decade in spite of a polarized society because of the skill of the political elite at isolating and containing conflict.5 He recognized one of the characteristics of the regime that is emphasized in this study-centralized control by party leaders-but he judged it a net advantage, not a disadvantage. In the late 196o's and early 197o's, that was the best conclusion to draw, for most of Venezuela's neighbors were succumbing one by one to brutal authoritarian rule: Brazil (1964), Bolivia (1964), Argentina (1966), Peru (1968), Ecuador (1970), and then Chile (1973) and Uruguay (1973). If strong parties and party leaders helped Venezuela avoid a similar fate, then they seemed to be good for democracy. This interpretation was also in line with the so-called "elite theory of democracy" associated with Schumpeter and others, in which democracy requires only a periodic competition among parties or candidates for the right to rule, decided by voters at elections.6 Meaningful mass participation in policy decisions between elections was deemphasized. This was a criterion for democracy that Venezuela could fulfill. Levine and other U.S. scholars were certainly aware of defects in Venezuela's democracy such as clientelism, corruption, and undemocratic practices inside parties, unions, and other organizations. David Blank's Politics in Venezuela was especially notable for its balanced interpretation. But in the context of Latin America in the 197o's, clientelism, corruption, and undemocratic practices were easily taken for granted, and therefore what stood out as significant about Venezuela was its democracy. Once Venezuela was labeled a democracy, analysts tended to ignore questions about the nature of the regime and instead focused on more specialized aspects of democratic politics, such as campaigns, elections, and public opinion? Venezuelan scholars remained more skeptical about their democracy, but it took them a while to find a critique that would stick.8 Studies of the conditions for revolution could not survive the defeat of the guerrillas and their integration into electoral politics by 1968, and as time passed, predictions of the collapse of the regime seemed increasingly unrealistic. Although criticism of the state's spending priorities and development plans was always possible, such criticism left the political regime itself unscathed. The only critique that attacked political arrangements was the one directed against

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democrdtica

7

corruption. Domingo Alberto Rangel, among others, argued that Venezuela was not a democracy because the major parties "bought" their votes with favors, patronage, and token populist programs; furthermore, the parties did not represent the people because, in order to finance these benefits, the parties had become dependent on, and controlled by, their patrons in the private sector.9 This line of argument, though greatly exaggerated, became especially appealing to the Left after 1973, when it needed an explanation for the dramatic AD-COPEI landslide in the elections of that year. 10 Left politicians and academics became increasingly critical of the ADCO PEl "establishment" (los partidos del "status"). Soon afterward, a few U.S. scholars began to criticize Venezuela, but mostly from a political economy perspective that echoed earlier Venezuelan objections, although with more sophisticated evidence. Some called attention to the waste and corruption growing out of the country's oil wealth.U Others accused the parties and private sector of conspiring to suppress the working class and its interests.U Yet on the whole, U.S. scholarship continued to make positive assessments of Venezuela's prospects during the 198o's and early 199o's.U In the early 198o's, voices on the Venezuelan Right began to join the criticism of AD and COPEI. This time, however,]. A. Gil Yepes and talk-show host Marcel Granier took the "establishment" to task for being insensitive to private sector, rather than popular, interests.14 Their criticisms also faulted the politicians for creating an inefficient state and corrupt vested interests determined to perpetuate it. In the midst of a growing consensus on the left and the right that party politicians were corrupt and unresponsive, some began to argue about the causes. Perhaps the first study to blame the poor quality of Venezuelan democracy was Luis J. Oropeza's Tutelary Pluralism (1983). Nairn and Piii.ango's massive El caso Venezuela (1984 ), which soon followed, had no chapter on parties but included a bold indictment of the parties' "obsession with control" in its conclusion. The criticism of Venezuelan democracy got its biggest push from the Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State (CO PRE), which President Lusinchi established in 1984 to fulfill a minor campaign promise. In 1986, going far beyond its mandate to find a cure for economic decline and deteriorating public services, CO PRE

8

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democratica

identified partidocracia as one of the central problems facing Venezuela _IS Because of the thoroughness of its research, the logic of its argument, and the prestige of its board, COPRE's conclusions carried tremendous weight, and thereafter, the critique of parties and democracy became standard in Venezuelan scholarship. 16 This review of the literature on Venezuelan democracy should make clear that much of what I have to say in this book has been said before, especially in Spanish, but I have sought to offer five general improvements on the existing literature. First, I provide new and better empirical evidence, some from a survey of elites and some from other original research, to support certain arguments about Venezuelan politics that heretofore have been only assertions or hearsay. In particular I demonstrate the lack of ideological commitment among party leaders and document the survival of undemocratic practices in intraparty elections and other arenas. Second, I provide explanations, backed by evidence, for pragmatism, party factionalism, and other phenomena that the literature has explained poorly or left unexplained. Third, I extrapolate from the intraparty level to the level of the democratic system, explaining how the undemocratic practices within parties tarnish the quality of democracy at the national level. Fourth, I place Venezuelan democracy in comparative perspective. One cannot appreciate the extent and consequences of Venezuelan partyarchy unless one compares it with the role of parties in other democracies. In discussions of executive-legislative relations, party organization, factionalism, and ties between parties and society, I provide systematic comparisons of institutions in Venezuela with institutions in other Latin American countries, the United States, Western Europe, and selected other countries. Finally, I argue that the quality of democracy affects the stability of a democratic regime. Like past scholars writing in the context of the Cuban Revolution or the rise of authoritarianism, I am influenced by the events around me. We are at the tail end of a wave of democratization that began in 1975 in Portugal, spread to all of South America, and then to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, with some resonance even in Africa and Asia. I believe that the wave has crested: many of the new democracies are fragile and will fail, as Haiti and Peru have already. Venezuela, one of the oldest regimes, is now a prime candidate for failure, and it is important

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democratica

9

to understand why. The breakdown of democratic regimes is frequently blamed on economic problems, but whether the regime falls depends as much on the strength of the regime as it does on the strength of the blow. Some democratic regimes are more resilient than others. The lesson of the Venezuelan case is that, although in the short term partyarchy can make a regime more resilient, in the long term it undermines the quality of democracy, which ultimately makes the regime less stable. For a democracy to survive, it must be democratic enough to respond to its people and adapt quickly to a changing world.

Characteristics of AD and Its Leadership Because Acci6n Democratica figures prominently in this study of Venezuelan party politics, I shall begin by giving the reader some familiarity with the party and its leadership. Acci6n Democratica has been the largest political party in Venezuela ever since its founding in 1941. Its founders, among whom the best known was R6mulo Betancourt, began their political careers as opponents of military rule in Venezuela, some of them active as early as 1928Y During the 193o's, they remained a small group, organized first as ORVE and then as PDN, and spent most of that decade in exile or in the underground opposition, working in a network of clandestine, highly disciplined cells based on the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. 18 Under the relatively liberal military government of General Medina Angarita (1941-45), these groups were legalized and took the party's present name. The party carried out a massive organizational effort among peasants, labor unions, and the middle class, and became a powerful force in the country. After joining with junior military officers in a 1945 coup, AD's leaders governed Venezuela for three years and oversaw the transition to a short-lived democracy, but in 1948 they were thrown out of power, and they spent the next ten years once more in exile or underground. After another coup ousted the dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez in 1958, AD became the largest party in the new democratic regime. Betancourt was elected president in 1958, and AD's candidates won four of the six presidential elections after that, losing only two to the principal opposition party, COPEI (see Table r.1). In the early 196o's, AD governments, nominally social democratic in orienta-

TABLE I. I

Percentages of Seats Won by Parties in Congress, 19 59-1989 (absolute numbers follow in parentheses) President & party

AD

Copei

URD

MAS

Others

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

Betancourt, AD

1959-64

57% (73)

15% (19)

26% (33)

-(-)

3% (4)

37 (65)

23 (40)

16 (29)

-(-)

24 (43)

31 (66)

28 (59)

8 (18)

-(-)

33 (71)

51 (102)

32 (64)

3 (5)

5 (9)

10 (20)

44 (88)

42 (84)

2 (3)

6 (11)

7 (13)

57 (113)

30 (60)

2 (3)

5 (10)

7 (14)

48 (97)

33 (67)

1 (2)

8 (18)a

9 (17)

Leoni, AD

1964-69 Caldera, COPE!

1969-74 Perez, AD

1974-79 Herrera, COPE!

1979-84 Lusinchi, AD

1984-89 Perez, AD

1989-93

SENATE

(excluding former presidents, who are Senators-for-life) Betancourt, AD

1959-64

63% (32)

12% (6)

21% (11)

-(-)

4% (2)

49 (22)

18 (8)

16 (7)

-(-)

18 (8)

37 (19)

31 (16)

6 (3)

-(-)

27 (14)

60 (28)

28 (13)

2 (1)

4 (2)

6 (3)

48 (21)

48 (21)

0 (0)

5 (2)

0 (0)

64 (28)

32 (14)

0 (0)

5 (2)

0 (0)

48 (22)

43 (20)

0 (0)

7 (3)a

2 (1)

Leoni, AD

1964-69 Caldera, COPE!

1969-74 Perez, AD

1974-79 Herrera, COPE!

1979-84 Lusinchi, AD

1984-89 Perez, AD

1989-93

souRcEs: Betancourt-Herrera governments: Consejo Supremo Electoral, La estadistica evolutiva de los partidos politicos; Lusinchi government: Consejo Supremo Electoral, Elecciones r983; second Perez government: E/ Nacional, Dec. 7, r988, p. D-r. NoTE : Figures reflect the initial distribution of seats among parties after the elections. Distributions in the Betancourt and Leoni governments changed greatly owing to AD splits. •MAS-MIR electoral coalition.

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democratica

n

tion, successfully defeated a communist insurgency; but after a long period of rapid economic expansion, the country was left with a massive, inefficient state and a huge foreign debt. The latest AD president, Carlos Andres Perez (elected to a second term in 1988), sought to reverse this legacy with a far-reaching program of structural adjustment before he was impeached in May 1993· Just who the leaders of AD are depends in part on what questions one has in mind, since different criteria apply. Whatever the criterion, the members of the National Executive Committee (CEN) would qualify as leaders of AD, for the CEN makes decisions for the party when neither the National Directive Committee (CON) nor the National Convention is in session. Since the CON meets only once or twice a year and the convention is held only once every four or five years, the CEN is in charge most of the time. In 1985 it had 31 members; in 1958 it had eleven members, and in 1989 it added four more. The delegates to the National Convention elect the CEN's atlarge "political secretaries" and officers (president, vice-president, general secretary, secretary of organization); the sectoral wings for labor, peasants, youth, women, and professionals and technicians) elect their own secretaries. 19 The CEN is a powerful, active body that meets at least once a week and customarily meets with the president of the republic weekly when AD is the governing party. Since this study deals with the formation of factions, a larger group of leaders should also be taken into consideration. The Parliamentary Fraction, composed of all of AD's national senators and deputies, includes not only most of the nationally prominent leaders but also the most important state leaders, since the general secretaries of the state party organizations are traditionally listed on the slate of AD candidates for Congress if they are willing to serve. This Parliamentary Fraction has ranged in size from 85 in 1969-74 to 141 in 1984-89. By definition it contains party leaders from all twenty states, two federal territories, and the Caracas federal district. It meets weekly when the Congress is in session; its only officers are a head and deputy head, although committee chairs and vice-chairs also possess some elevated status. Then there are the leaders of AD's important labor wing, which is not only the largest and best organized sector but also a symbol of AD's social democratic commitment to the working class. Even though AD is not a labor party, it relies on labor's continued

12

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democratica

support to maintain its legitimacy. The 27 leaders who are either members of the party's formal Labor Bureau (Bur6 Sindical) or are AD members of the Executive Committee of the Venezuelan Workers' Confederation (CTV) are the best representatives of the national labor leadership of the party. Many of the conclusions of this book are based on my survey of the members of these three groups, carried out between April 1985 and January 1986.20 Since it would have been impossible to interview all the AD members of Congress, I drew up a random sample of 66 from a pooled list of senators and deputies, and succeeded in interviewing 54 of them, among whom were Adecos from every state except Cojedes, Merida, and the Delta Amacuro territory. I was able to interview nearly all the CEN members and labor leaders: 23 of the 27 CEN members, and 21 of the 27 designated labor leaders. I increased the number of labor respondents to 23 by including a former National Labor Secretary and a member of Congress whose association with AD has been entirely through the labor movement. One respondent in the labor sample and four members of the Congress sample were substitutes for respondents who did not have time to participate in the survey. In all five cases, the substitutes held positions very similar to those of the respondents originally selected. Because of overlapping memberships among these three samples, the total number of respondents was 8o. In some respects the social backgrounds of the members of the CEN, labor, and congressional samples were very similar. Most of them (74 percent of the CEN, 64 percent of labor, and 66 percent of Congress) came from families in which the father was a shopkeeper, farmer, or manual laborer; a majority of each sample also married someone from that same background. 21 This statistic says little about them other than the fact that very few of AD's leaders came from wealthy families, and that Venezuela's occupational structure was very simple a generation or two ago. These leaders have since moved out of the lower middle class, however, to judge from answers to a question concerning the occupations of their three closest friends: very few mentioned businessmen, shopkeepers, farmers, or ranchers. Only four respondents in 8o had a close friend in the military. The leadership of AD was overwhelmingly male: only three of the 27 CEN members, two of the 27 labor leaders, and eight of AD's senators and deputies were women. Although the propor-

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democratica

13

tions are perhaps higher than in the United States, it appeared that in AD highly placed women tended to be more the product of a well-meaning tokenism than of any genuinely strong support for individual women "leaders." Beyond these similarities, the leaders showed some significant differences. The labor leaders, as in most social democratic and socialist parties, are a socially distinct group with respect to class and education. Only 30 percent of the labor leaders considered their families middle class or higher, compared with 69 percent of the congressional sample and 87 percent of the CEN. Whereas 68 percent of the labor leaders said that they grew up in a family with a "difficult" economic situation, only 33 percent of the congressional sample and 39 percent of the CEN made that claim. About onequarter of the CEN and the congressional sample claimed to have grown up in a "comfortable" or "prosperous" family; none of the labor leaders did. The class difference was magnified by an even greater difference in formal education. Sixty-nine and 72 percent of the CEN and congressional samples, respectively, finished college, whereas 64 percent of the labor leaders never finished secondary school. Perhaps because of the class differences, there were some marked differences in the social ties of the three groups. Eighty-one percent of the labor leaders had at least one close friend who was a labor leader, but most CEN members (87 percent) and members of Congress (70 percent) had no close (top three) friends who were labor leaders. The politicians in the CEN and Congress were much more likely to have friends who were politicians or professionals, probably because they were predominantly professionals themselves. Nearly 6o percent of those in the CEN had a law degree; although only 20 percent of the congressional sample had studied law, it was nonetheless a group of professionals, 71 percent of whom were qualified as lawyers, economists, teachers, doctors, engineers, or political scientists. In general, the members of Congress seemed just like the CEN members, except that they had had a greater variety of educational choices when they were in school. There were some important differences between the members of the CEN and the Congress, however. Members of the CEN were predominantly (74 percent) professional politicians: 6o percent had served at least four five-year terms in Congress. In contrast, nearly

14

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democratica

half (46 percent) of the congressional sample were first-termers, and only 39 percent considered themselves full-time politicians. Instead, they also worked as teachers (19 percent), labor leaders, journalists, businessmen, and engineers (5-10 percent each). About half (54 percent) of the congressional sample had business experience as a manager or board member, compared with only a quarter (26 percent) of the CEN. Members of Congress, then, tended to be amateurs in politics. Unless they held a committee chair or vice-chair or one of the two Fraction offices, they had no congressional office or staff. (Six of my interviews with them had to be conducted on the floor or in the gallery of the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate.) 22 There is also a difference in age: the members of Congress were in their forties and fifties. The CEN members, and also the labor leaders, were mostly in their fifties and sixties, and a few in their seventies, and the two groups shared a long association with AD83 percent of the CEN and 82 percent of the labor leaders joined Acci6n Democratica before the inauguration of democracy in 1958. This is strikingly higher than the 6o percent of the congressional sample who joined AD after 1958. Moreover, 65 percent of the CEN and 61 percent of the labor leaders spent time as political prisoners, in contrast to only 30 percent of the congressional sample. Even in persecution, however, the class difference divided the CEN members from the labor leaders: 61 percent of the CEN members were sent into exile, but 70 percent of the labor leaders remained in Venezuela under the dictatorship, often in prison. In 1985, therefore, the CEN and the labor leadership were still dominated by a generation of leaders who came of age in predemocratic Venezuela. The CEN members had a mostly middleclass background and were well educated, principally in law; labor leaders came from much poorer families, considered their families lower middle class, and had very little formal education. In terms of class, education, and friendships, the members of AD's Parliamentary Fraction were from essentially the same social stratum as the members of the CEN, but because they were younger and less advanced in their careers, they were more reliant on making a living through activities outside politics, overwhelmingly the professions. John Martz's study of AD in the early years of the democratic regime indicated that the principal conflicts within the party were generationalP One of the striking features of AD 30 years later

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democrdtica

15

is that, although there are still clear-cut generational (as well as educational and class) differences in the leadership, they no longer matter very much in the party's factional alignments. The reasons for this change, and its consequences for the quality of Venezuelan democracy, are explained in Chapters 5 and 6. Venezuela has one of the most extreme partyarchies in the democratic world, manifesting a high degree of party dominance in every relevant sphere-nominations, voting procedures, legislative behavior, penetration of civil society, and influence over the media. In the short term, partyarchy, the subject of Chapter 2, favors stability by strengthening political leaders who are trying to overcome a crisis, but in the long term it creates potentially destabilizing disillusionment with parties and democracy. Such disillusionment is especially likely in Venezuela, because the two largest parties differ very little in their electoral programs, and because factional competition within those parties involves only a small percentage of the voters and is unrelated to policy issues. Internal party politics is unusually important in a partyarchy because, where parties dominate so much of the political process, citizens tend to participate either within the parties or not at all. Chapter 3 opens a detailed examination of intraparty politics in Venezuela's largest party, Acci6n Democratica. The chapter first argues that the political process within the party varies tremendously with the arena in which the party is operating. There are, in effect, three parties in one in AD: a "policy party," which makes decisions about party doctrine, program, legislative behavior, and relations with the government; an "electoral party," which tries to win elections; and a "power party," which selects the party leadership. The chapter then describes AD's chronic factionalism, which makes no sense from the standpoint of the electoral and policy parties. As an analysis of election returns shows, AD's chronic factionalism is the chief hindrance to its electoral performance. The persistence of factionalism, an apparently irrational phenomenon, can only be explained by the politics of the power party. Chapter 4 discusses the policy party. In AD, the main actors in the policy party are the members of the National Executive Committee (CEN) and, when AD governs, the president. Although the CEN has greater ability than most governing parties to interfere with government policy, a case study of AD politics during the

r6

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democratica

first two years of the Lusinchi administration (r984-85) shows that there were almost no policy disagreements between the president and the policy party at that time. The depth of consensus is surprising because many of Lusinchi's policies were contrary to his party's image, and because the party was in the process of dividing into pro- and anti-Lusinchi factions. The party's eventual decision to nominate Lusinchi's rival, Carlos Andres Perez, to succeed him as president therefore was illogical from the perspective of the policy party. Chapters 3 and 4 together suggest that there is some essential key to understanding AD's internal politics that can be found only in the power party. Indeed, the factional conflicts that are baffling in the context of the electoral and policy parties make perfect sense in the context of the power party. Chapter 5 describes a pattern of factionalism that has afflicted AD since its founding: when AD is the governing party, two factions, most appropriately labeled the Ins and the Outs, form and dissolve in a regular five-year cycle that corresponds to the fiveyear presidential term. Each faction is built around a candidate for the presidential nomination and seeks to control the party machinery to ensure its candidate's nomination. The history of the party's internal politics since 1941 and accounts of factional behavior during the Lusinchi government show a pattern of factionalism that is clearly a rational power party response to the incentives generated by presidentialism and Venezuela's unique brand of partyarchy. Chapter 6 examines the relationship between the policy party and the power party. If the factions that routinely force turnovers in the party's leadership championed ideological or policy alternatives, then factionalism in the governing party would compensate to some degree for the lack of channels outside the parties for effective representation between elections. A comparison of the policy positions of the Ins and Outs during the Lusinchi government proves that the two factions were ideologically and programmatically indistinguishable. Today, as a consequence of the factional struggles the Ins and Outs are purely factions of interest rather than factions of principle. This was not always the case, but Chapter 6 argues that the factional struggle itself destroyed the early factions of principle and prevented new ones from emerging. Chapter 7 provides a broader perspective on the findings of Chapters 2 through 6. It outlines the consequences of intraparty

Partyarchy and Acci6n Democratica

17

politics for the larger Venezuelan political system, that have made presidential partyarchy a crisis-prone type of democracy, one that is resilient in the short run but ultimately vulnerable to breakdown unless it reforms itself to become less presidential and less partyarchie. Presidential partyarchy is a rare phenomenon: even the most partyarchic democracies tend to be parliamentary. Chile and Costa Rica-significantly, two of the most stable presidential democracies-are probably the only other presidential democracies that would qualify as partyarchies. But partyarchy by itself is probably more of a problem in Venezuela than in other countries because it is present to an extreme degree and is combined with a presidential system, a poorly differentiated nearly-two-party system, and pervasive clientelism. In Venezuela, because of frequent majority governments, economic prosperity, and exceptional leadership, political crises have seldom escalated into breakdowns of the regime. Nonetheless, many of the conclusions about presidentialism and partyarchy taken separately should be valid for many other countries.

CHAPTER TWO

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

D

efinitions of democracy rarely mention political parties. In the fifth century B.C., when democracy was born, there were no political parties; even in the loose sense of factions of notables in a legislature, parties did not exist until the eighteenth century. 1 Yet parties play essential roles in practically all democracies today.2 They recruit candidates, define issues, encourage participation, organize the work of legislatures, staff bureaucracies, and educate the public. No democracy of any size can function without parties. Nevertheless, in some countries parties seem to control so much of the political process that some observers have wondered whether these democracies can function with parties. This political syndrome is sufficiently well recognized to have a name: in Italian, it is called partitocrazia, in Spanish, partidocracia, in German, Parteienstaat, and in English, it has been called partyocracy.3 For my purposes, the term "partyarchy" is more suitable.4 A partyarchy is a democracy in which political parties monopolize the formal political process and politicize society along party lines. Since partyarchy is a variant of democracy, it is helpful to develop its definition more fully by contrasting it to a clear definition of democracy. I have chosen Robert Dahl's definition of polyarchy for this purpose.5 Dahl defines polyarchy as the set of institutional arrangements that permits public opposition and establishes the right to participate in politics. It is similar to the concept of democracy, but not exactly equivalent, which is analytically advantageous in an era in which democracy has become all things to all people. The most important distinction is that polyarchy deals with the political institutions common to actual "democracies" rather than with democracy as an ideal system. It is also exclusively concerntd with politi-

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

I9

cal, rather than economic or social, democracy, and with national, rather than regional or local, institutions. Polyarchy is therefore "the degree to which national political systems meet the minimum requirements for political democracy, where real-world 'democracies' rather than abstract ideals are the standard." 6 As formulated in Polyarchy, the minimum requirements for political democracy are: (I) freedom to form and join organizations, (2) freedom of expression, (3) right to vote, (4) eligibility for public office, (5) right of political leaders to compete for support, (6} alternative sources of information, (7) free and fair elections, and (8) institutions that make policy-makers accountable to voters through elections and other expressions of preference. Political systems that meet these requirements are "polyarchies." Partyarchy is the degree to which political parties interfere with the fulfillment of the requirements for polyarchy. All democracies that have active political parties possess some elements of partyarchy, but some systems are much more "partyarchic" than others. The extreme, limiting case of partyarchy would differ from polyarchy in the following respects: I. Parties control all nominations for public office, which limits eligibility to citizens who are considered reliable defenders of the parties' interests. 2. Electoral laws limit citizens' choices in an election to a vote for a party, rather than for a candidate. The voters therefore decide only how strong the parties are relative to each other; the parties decide who is actually elected. 3. Strong party discipline forces legislators to vote as a party bloc, and they take their cues from the leadership of the party outside the legislature. This deprives the legislature of an autonomous role in policy-making: it becomes a staging ground for party competition, a puppet theater with the parties outside pulling the strings. 4· Citizens are free to form and join organizations, but most existing organizations are deeply penetrated by political parties. Politically relevant organizations besides parties are either affiliated with a single party or are split into party factions that compete for control. New organizations that seek to be independent become targets for party takeover, by co-optation or infiltration, or by the creation of competing party-affiliated organizations. One way or another, political parties dominate organizational life. 5. The media, which could provide alternative sources of infor-

20

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

mation, are either owned and operated by the parties or report the views of party spokespersons. The information on which voters base their decisions is therefore highly politicized along party lines. 6. Even extreme partyarchies do not differ from polyarchies with respect to the remaining requirements for polyarchy: universal suffrage, freedom of expression, and the formal institutions, such as legislatures, "for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference." But because all the conditions are interconnected, the parties' interference with one condition distorts the meaning of the others. A partyarchy may qualify as a polyarchy in spite of these distortions, but only if the political parties do an exceptionally good job of mediating between government and society, for the parties do not allow other organizations to perform this role for them. This description of the extreme, limiting case is useful because it defines the ideal type that the dissimilar partidocracia, partitocrazia, and Parteienstaat all approximate. Although many political systems possess some of its characteristics to some degree, no actual system conforms to it in every respect. But Venezuela comes close.

Partyarchy in Venezuela Control of Nominations It would seem hard for Venezuelan parties to exercise exceptional control over nominations, since all parties control nominations; running candidates for office is the raison d'etre of a political party. But in Venezuela, party control of nominations is far more centralized than in most other democracies. The 20-30 members of the National Executive Committee (CEN) of AD have the right to choose, in effect, all the party's candidates for the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. According to party regulations, the sectional (state-level) executive committees (CES) send the CEN an unranked draft list of candidates for these positions? This list must contain three times as many names as there are posts to be filled in the electoral district, although the party actually nominates only twice the number of candidates as there are seats (enough for all the available seats plus an equal number of suplentes, or alternates). But the CES cannot rank the candidates; this is expressly the CEN's job. Since AD is likely to win only about half the available seats, the CEN can

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

21

eliminate five candidates for every one it picks. Furthermore, the regulations also permit the CEN to replace half of the names on the CES list with candidates of its own. In other words, the choice of candidates is the CEN's.8 This control over the nomination of national legislators by the national party leadership is not unique among well-disciplined parties such as AD. One survey of the selection of parliamentary candidates in roughly 8o parties in contemporary democracies found that the national party executive was the most important actor in about one-fifth of the cases, as it is in AD; 17 percent used a more centralized procedure (selection by interest groups, national faction leaders, or a single party leader), and 62 percent used a less centralized procedure (selection by constituency party members, activists in primaries, or party voters in general). 9 However, the size of the group that participates in the selection of candidates for one body is only one possible criterion for the degree of centralization of authority in a party. Another is the depth to which that group's authority penetrates in the organization. Authority is more centralized in a party in which the national leadership selects local candidates than in a party in which the national leadership selects only candidates for national office. By this critec rion, AD is probably much more extreme than other parties, for centralization is not limited to the selection of candidates to national office: the same procedure is followed for nominations to the state legislative assemblies: that is, the CES suggests three times as many candidates as the number of available seats, and the CEN ranks them, reserving the right to make its own substitutions for half of the list. The centralization of authority does not end there. Although candidates for city council seats are normally chosen by the state party leadership, the national leadership retains some control over nominations even at this level. The CEN reserves the right to make any changes it likes in the slates of city council candidates in districts with more than 40,000 inhabitants and in states "where confrontations exist among leaders whose origin, in the CEN's judgment, is the struggle over candidacies." The CEN's control at the municipal level also extends to the annual election of city council presidents. The CEN decides each year whom AD's council members should support for this position in each of the medium-to-large cities. 10 In

22

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

1985, the CEN designated roo of the 202 candidates for city council president.U This degree of centralization is probably unusual. In a comparison of sixteen countries, Peter Merkl observed that "the level of partisan domination of local governments is almost without exception low, or, at most, medium." 12 In Chile before Pinochet, for example, where parties were known to be tightly disciplined in many respects, party discipline in the election of mayors often was overridden by intense personal rivalries among municipal councillors (regidores) .13

Choices Offered to Voters

Voting for parties rather than candidates is common in electoral systems based on proportional representation, because where multimember districts are used, some type of party list voting is necessary. Many PR systems, however, allow voters to rank, delete, or choose among candidates on a single list drawn up by their party. Such preference voting has been used in Italy, Ireland, Peru, Chile (1958-73), Finland, the Australian Senate, and Tasmania. 14 In some party systems with well-institutionalized factions, such as Uruguay, voters have a choice of different factional lists within a given party list. And even where no choice among candidates running on the same list is allowed, ballots often list all or some of the candidates' names, as in Germany. 15 List voting is used in Venezuela, but until recently no candidates' names were ever listed on the ballot. Before 1989, Venezuelans cast two kinds of ballots-a small-card ballot for legislative elections at all levels, and a big-card ballot, for presidential elections only. The small-card ballots showed only the party's name, symbol, and colors. This ballot was used to allocate seats among parties in the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, the state legislative assemblies, and before 1978, the city councils. (Since 1978, separate municipal elections are held one year after the presidential election, but the ballots still show only parties.) The names of candidates appeared only once, in newspaper advertisements taken out by some of the parties about a month before the election. In legislative elections at all levels, therefore, the electorate had only a choice of parties. Even the presidential ballot was (and is still) actually a party ballot, because candidates are often represented on more than one

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

23

ballot, depending on how many parties are backing their candidacies. When voters mark their ballot for a candidate, they must choose a party along with the candidate, even though this choice has no bearing on the outcome of the presidential election. 16 Because of the glaring lack of knowledge about their representatives by local constituents, two reforms were passed after 1987 that made it possible for Venezuelans in some instances to vote for actual candidates. A 1988 electoral reform allowed the direct election of governors and mayors for the first time in 1989. (Formerly, governors had been appointed by the president, and the position of mayor did not exist; the closest equivalent was the president of the municipal council, elected yearly by the council members.) And in 1993, half of the national deputies will be elected in single-member districts. (The other half will continue to be elected by proportional representation using party slates.)

Parties and the Congress In an extreme partyarchy, tight party discipline and the centralization of decision-making authority in the extraparliamentary party reduce the legislature to a staging ground for the parties. In Venezuela, the parliamentary party is clearly subordinated to the extraparliamentary leadership, and party discipline in legislative voting is virtually perfect. Whether one regards perfect legislative discipline as astonishing or only mildly exceptional depends on the conventional wisdom to which one subscribes. One school of conventional wisdom, which could be called the European parliamentary school, holds that tight discipline is the norm. In British parties, the index of legislative cohesion exceeds 99 percent in the postwar yearsP Cohesion exceeded 90 percent in Finland in the 195o's, ranged in the upper 8o's in the French Fourth Republic, and has always been very high in Sweden. 18 Such figures led one observer to conclude: "In practically every party, voting within parliament is highly disciplined .... [Outside of the U.S. Congress,] roll-call analysis is generally regarded as a pointless exercise." 19 Still, legislative cohesion is not perfect. Even in Britain, 6r to 8r percent of Conservative and Liberal backbenchers voted against their own government's bills at some point during the governments of 1970-74 and 1974-79.2°French parties tend to be far less cohesive,

24

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

and Italian parties are notoriously uncohesive by British standards. In all these countries, votes have to be counted and recorded. In Venezuela, party discipline in the Congress is so perfect that no counting or recording is necessary. One AD legislator said: We are figures who are absolutely dependent on a decision that is made by a body within the political organization to which we belong.... There is no congressman who belongs to a political party who is in a position to act, taking into consideration only his own opinions. In an exceptional case, it is possible for the congressman who is a specialist on a certain matter to impose his opinions, but really those opinions can be expressed only when they meet with the backing and blessing of the political organization to which he belongs_21

The normal procedure in the Congress is for the Speaker to have a bill read; debate is opened, at which time one designated spokesman for each party states his party's position on the bill; the Speaker then closes debate with the ritual statement, "Deputies who are in favor of approving [this bill], please indicate it with the customary sign"; and without counting votes, often without even looking up, he brings down his gavel and announces, "Approved." 22 There is no need to count votes, because everyone knows that the votes would reflect exactly the relative sizes of the party delegations presentP The rare roll-call votes that have been taken suggest that individual congressmen would not defect from the party line even if they had the chance. One instance was the culmination of the Sierra Nevada scandal. In 1981, COPEI succeeded in having a joint session of Congress vote on whether former President Perez (from AD) and six of his aides were politically, morally, and administratively responsible for an alleged overpricing-kickback deal on the purchase of a refrigerated transport ship, the Sierra Nevada. After a great deal of internal controversy, the National Executive Committee of AD decided that a "yes" vote would be too politically embarrassing for the party. When the voting took place, CO PEl congressmen uniformly voted "yes," and AD congressmen uniformly abstained (which counted as "no"). Moreover, the AD leader who had most forcefully insisted that Perez was guilty, Fraction Leader Arturo Hernandez Grisanti, abstained with the rest of his party, and passionately defended his abstention: When I, faithful to the duty and responsibility that I have, rise here to abstain as the Head of the Parliamentary Fraction of Acci6n Democratica, I

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

25

put to one side any personal opinion that I might have about the matter at hand .... I never doubted what my duty was. And I told the general secretary of the Social Christian Party COPEI and another leader of this political body that they should not declare or propose secret balloting, because no one, beginning with me, was going to hide behind a secret ballot to vote against what loyalty to party imposes and orders (applause) .... I was true to the dictates of my conscience within my party, and I have been true to my party in the Congress of the Republic. I am at peace with my conscience and also at peace with my party (prolonged applause).24

This kind of behavior is so alien to North American political culture that it may be hard to understand. But in Venezuelan political parties, where discipline is considered a virtue, it is the norm.25 If tight discipline really were the norm for parties everywhere, then Venezuela's perfect discipline would be only rather unusual. But if the range of comparisons is broadened beyond Western Europe, it is less clear that any such norm exists. In Latin America, only Venezuela, Mexico, and Chile have parties that usually enforce legislative discipline. In Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Peru, parties tend to be fairly cohesive in the legislative arena-more so than one might expect in a presidential system-but discipline is not enforced, and individual defections are common.26 In the Colombian Congress, factions within a party sometimes vote against other factions of the same party, and even faction leaders are only moderately successful at producing cohesionP And in the legislatures of Brazil and Ecuador, parties are almost completely without cohesion-reaching the extreme of frequent party-switching by legislators.28 A similar tendency prevailed in the Philippines before the Marcos regime. 29 Party cohesion does exist in the U.S. Congress. In the 198o's, the average member of Congress voted with his or her party 73-76 percent of the time when a majority of one party voted against a majority of the other.3° This is not the extreme degree of indiscipline that exists in Brazil and Ecuador-certainly party-switching is rare in the U.S.-but it represents less cohesion than in Argentina, Peru, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. In the legislative arena, therefore, Venezuelan parties are much more tightly disciplined than most parties in the Americas, and slightly more cohesive even than parties in Europe that are widely known for their tight discipline. For the extreme of partyarchy to be reached, however, tight discipline must be complemented by the subordination of the legislators

26

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

to extraparliamentary party leadership. The supremacy of the electoral party over the parliamentary party is rarer than party discipline, but it is a well-established fact in Venezuela. 31 In AD, the CEN seldom even consults its legislators before instructing them on the party line: "Really, instances of consultation in the forum of the Fraction are practically exceptional. I would go further: what the Fraction is going to say is normally processed in the inner circle [Ia cupula] of the political party ... before it is discussed by the Fraction itself. And then they bring us the issues already worked out." 32 There is, of course, more autonomy at the committee level, where most of the work of any legislature is accomplished, but this is only because it is impossible for the CEN to decide on every issue for every committee at its weekly meeting. The CEN still maintains its influence by stipulating that only CEN members may chair congressional committees.33 Committee chairs guide their committee's work in accordance with their understanding of the CEN's policies; and when the party line is unclear, they bring the question to the CEN for discussion. 34 When the subordination of the parliamentary party to the electoral party is taken into consideration, Venezuela becomes still more exceptional, because some parties that rank very high in legislative cohesion are dominated by their parliamentary leaders. This is the case, for example, in the British Labour and Conservative parties, although their extraparliamentary leadership has gained strength over the years. 35 The relative power of the electoral party and parliamentary party is a key issue in the distinction between polyarchy and partyarchy. Since all the leaders of a parliamentary party are elected officials, their decisions enjoy some democratic legitimacy. Many of the leaders of an electoral party are also elected representatives, but they are not necessarily members of parliament, and they do not owe their positions to popular election. In Venezuela, some of the most influential leaders in the electoral party are not elected. For example, Jaime Lusinchi remained a very influential member of the CEN of AD after his presidency, even though he left office in disrepute and was subsequently rated Venezuela's worst president in mass opinion polls.36 To the extent that such unelected leaders influence votes in the Congress, the political system deviates from polyarchy.

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

27

Penetration of Organizations

Except in totalitarian regimes, certain institutions or organizations are almost never politicized by parties-business associations, the Church, and the military. These organizations have always been powerful and do not need to affiliate with political parties in order to gain influence over the government. Indeed, many massbased political parties in Latin America were originally organized to counterbalance the power of wealth, religious authority, and military force with the power of organized numbers. In this respect, Venezuela is no different from any other nation in Latin America. But to a degree that is unusual in democratic societies, Venezuelan political parties have penetrated and gained control of most other private organizations. With the exception of business associations, the Church, and the military, all groups are battlefields for party struggles for control. In part, this penetration is a kind of symbolic competition among the parties: a victory for one party in the College of Engineers is interpreted as portending future victories in other organizations and in general elections. But the struggle for control also serves at least two other purposes. One is as a source of patronage. It is common for party leaders to reward loyal supporters with the party's nomination to be an officer of this or that organization. Not all these positions are salaried, but few government offices could match them for prestige and visibility. Apart from patronage, the struggle is essentially political-to increase a party's ability to control social groups for political purposes. During a campaign, control of organizations can be very useful: labor unions help the party they are identified with by canvassing, distributing leaflets, attending rallies, and transporting voters to the polls. Other organizations can help in other ways. It never hurts, for example, when the College of Economists puts its stamp of approval on a candidate's platform. Control of organizations can also be quite useful once a party is in power. In Venezuela, social organizations tend to follow party lines in their response to government actions: those affiliated with the opposition tend to criticize, demonstrate, or strike; those affiliated with the governing party tend to praise the government when possible, muffle their criticism otherwise, and in any case, refrain from active opposition. There are exceptions, but these are the general tendencies. It makes a

28

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

great deal of sense for a party to seek to control these organizations, especially when other parties are already seeking control. Daniel Levine has shown that this political penetration of civil society is so advanced in Venezuela because parties were founded in an "organizational vacuum." 37 Mass-based political parties began organizing in the late 1930's, following a series of repressive dictatorships that had not allowed any autonomous social organizations, especially popular ones. The new political parties created new organizations, including practically all the trade unions and peasant leagues. It follows that these organizations are subordinate to political parties today because they have never been autonomous and were never intended to be. Other organizations of the same era and on into the 194o's, though not created by the parties, were founded by people who were opposed to the dictatorship and joined with the parties in a common struggle. Some of the leaders of these social organizations, such as student unions, teachers unions, and many professional associations, became party leaders themselves, and thus started the tactical subordination of these organizations to the political parties. Since the early 196o's, these social organizations have chosen their officers in elections that are conducted along party lines: each party puts forward a slate of candidates and the organization's membership chooses among them. This procedure is followed in union elections, from the plant level to the national confederation; in peasant organizations, also at all levels; in the Bar Association, the Medical Association, societies of dentists, architects, accountants, economists, political scientists, public employees, teachers, professors, and other white-collar workers; and in student government, from the universities down to the junior high level (and sometimes below). There are rumors (unconfirmed but plausible) that even beauty contests are decided along party lines. It is rare for one party to dominate any national-level organization completely; perhaps the case that comes closest is the Venezuelan Peasant Federation, So percent of which is controlled by AD. If no party wins a majority of the seats on the governing board of an organization, the parties form alliances that determine what line the organization will follow. More often, one party wins a majority of the offices, usually the most significant ones, which give it effective control of the organization. Oddly, the minority parties seem

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

29

to defer to the majority party's leadership rather than destroy the illusion of class, sectoral, or occupational solidarity. Naturally enough, there have been attempts to establish social organizations that would be free of domination by the political parties. But the parties recognize that such autonomy poses a threat to their power and therefore actively subvert such attempts. Sometimes party loyalists are sent to infiltrate a new organization and eventually elect one of their own as its leader. More often, a party will co-opt an independent leader with an offer of a position in the government or a seat on a commission, in a party body, or in the Congress. Because there are so few channels for influence outside the parties, few leaders can resist these offers. Indeed, it often seems, especially during campaign season, that enterprising leaders create "independent" organizations just so they can invite co-optation. If co-optation fails, parties create parallel organizations that tend to attract more support than the independents because, having a party connection to the government, they achieve better results. This strategy was used often to recruit support in the squatter settlements in the early 196o's.38 This has also been the response of the parties to the neighborhood association movement beginning in the late 197o's. In urban areas, many asociaciones de vecinos sprang up to petition local councils for better police protection, road repairs, better sewer systems, and other improvements in public services. Acci6n Democritica's response was to set up a Municipal Affairs Department with a seat on the CEN, which actively encourages AD's municipal councilmen to create AD-affiliated neighborhood associations to preempt the creation of independent ones.39 COPEI, MAS, and Nueva Alternativa have also tried to penetrate these organizations.40 Parties in Venezuela have a preoccupation with controlling social organizations that borders on obsession. One indirect indicator of the extent of party penetration is the percentage of the population that belongs to AD or other political parties. As of 1985, Acci6n Democratica claimed 2,253,887 cardcarrying members in an estimated population of 8.65 million registered voters.41 If this claim is accepted, AD members amounted to 26 percent of the electorate in 1985. Survey evidence from 1973 suggests a smaller percentage, around 14 percent.42 The difference could well reflect an actual increase in membership.43 But both figures are still comparatively high: AD's membership is proportionately larger

30

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

than the membership of all parties combined in India, Japan, the Netherlands, or the U.S. About 28 percent of the Austrian electorate belongs to a political party, but that is still less than Venezuela's 31 percent. 44 With over two million members, AD is the largest Social Democratic party in the world in absolute terms. (The two next-largest parties, the Swedish Social Democrats and the West German SPD, had around one million members in the mid-197o's.) 45 With 26 percent of the electorate, it is also the largest Social Democratic party in relative terms. Most parties in this family claimed less than 5 percent of the electorate as members; the Swedish Social Democrats were the largest, with 18 percent, which is still less than AD's share even though the Swedish party benefited from indirect membership. Otherwise, the largest party was the Austrian Socialist Party, which claimed 17 percent in 1930 and 15.5 percent in 1957. Acci6n Demowitica also has a high level of penetration by Latin American standards. The Peronists claimed three million members in 1983, but that figure was probably an exaggeration, and even so amounts to only 17 percent of the electorate.46 The Colombian Conservatives claimed 17.6 percent, which suggests that the more successful Liberals would claim even more, but neither claim is very meaningful for a country that is known to lack effective grassroots party organizations. Peru's APRA and AP claimed around 10 percent each in the mid-198o's; Ecuador's lzquierda Democratica claimed only 7 percent in 1985. The only Latin American parties that claimed a larger percentage were Costa Rica's PLN, Bolivia's MNRH, and the Mexican PRI. The PRI claim (38 percent in 1982) is not comparable because it is based largely on indirect membership.47 The MNRH claim is probably inaccurate because it is based on a suspiciously round number (7oo,ooo members) that is 75 percent larger than the number of votes the party won in the nearest election.48 The PLN claim is probably more accurate. No data are available for Chilean parties. Because of the fragmentation of the Chilean party system, no single Chilean party (before Pinochet or after) would equal the degree of penetration achieved by AD or the PLN, yet Chilean parties taken together probably were and are overall just as penetrative.

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

31

AD Penetration of Organized Labor

Party membership figures deal only with the scope of penetration, leaving open the question of whether members are subordinated to party authority, but this is an important consideration. Some large parties do not exercise much control over their members; indeed, in some cases, such as the Peronists since 1955, it would be more accurate to say that the members (or blocks of members, like the labor unions) dictate to the party leadership. The relationship between AD and organized labor deserves extended treatment here because it is party-dominated to an unusual extent for a democratic country, and because this relationship is central to the events discussed in later chapters. Most of the Venezuelan labor movement is effectively subordinated to the general policy aims of Acci6n Democratica.49 The Venezuelan labor movement in general is highly politicized, since most unions were founded by party organizers starting in the late 193o's. Union leadership is chosen in union elections using party slates at all levels, including elections within the Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV), which is the peak association for over 8o percent of Venezuela's organized workers.50 Since its Second National Congress in 1944, AD has had the largest representation in the CTV.51 Since 1959, except for a brief period following a division of AD in 1967, 50 to 70 percent of the members of the National Congresses and Executive Committee of the CTV have been affiliated with AD.52 Although party loyalty is very strong among AD labor leaders, as it is among the labor leaders of all the other parties, it is useful to distinguish between the loyalty of labor leaders to their respective party labor wings and the loyalty of the labor wings to the national party leadership as a whole. The loyalty of AD's representatives on the Executive Committee of the CTV to their party's Labor Bureau (Bur6 Sindical) is absolute and unvarying. During research conducted during 1985, I asked sixteen of the seventeen AD members of the CTV Executive Committee the question, "Does the Executive Committee of the CTV sometimes make decisions about legislative bills, political demonstrations, strikes, or other important matters before they have been discussed by the labor bureaus of one or more of the political parties, or only afterward?" Eighty-one percent (thir-

32

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

teen) said that the parties must discuss the matters first, and the three who claimed otherwise, when asked to support their claim, were unable to come up with a counterexample. In other words, given AD's majority, AD's Labor Bureau enjoys at least veto power over the CTV's actions. To the question, "Does the Executive Committee of the CTV sometimes make decisions that the Labor Bureau of AD opposes?" all but one AD representative (94 percent) replied that it did not. Considering the overlap in the membership of the two bodies, the situation could hardly be otherwise: three-quarters of the Adecos in the CTV leadership were also members of the Labor Bureau. The relationship between the AD Labor Bureau and the party as a whole is more complicated, but it is strikingly similar to the relationship between the CTM and the PRI. Both are best described as a loose alliance that benefits both the labor wing and the party while reserving ultimate authority for the party.53 Top AD labor leaders, like other AD leaders, know that AD is not a labor party, and the great majority of them do not wish that it were. Manuel Peiialver, the general secretary and former labor secretary, has been adamant on this point: Might the workers of Accion Democratica have made a mistake when they joined the Party in that multiclass front? No, they made no mistake yesterday, they are not mistaken today, and they will not be mistaken tomorrow.... No, here a labor party has never been intended. If we believed that that was the solution for Venezuela we would have left Accion Democratica long ago and founded the party of the Venezuelan workers and wageearners. The reality that [party founder] Romulo Betancourt analyzed and taught us was different: that the economic conditions for a class party did not exist then, and less now. So we are also in Accion Democratica, and in spite of all this struggling they do let us participate-sometimes they don't and they block our way-but we open the way, and we participate in the party on equal footing with the other sectors of party multiclassism. 54

Adeco labor leaders believe that the interests of the Venezuelan working class are best served by having a close relationship with a powerful political party.55 There is ample reason to believe that they are right. For example, labor conflicts are referred automatically to tripartite commissions on which labor and government representatives loyal to AD can always outvote management.56 And many of the benefits enjoyed by organized workers are not the product

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

33

of collective bargaining but are decreed by Venezuelan presidents.5 7 Such was the case with the minimum wage, the Law against Unjustified Dismissals, general wage increases, various bonuses, and some extensions of social security coverage. One writer has declared that Venezuelan union leaders are not social actors but "institutional managers" of government largess.58 In these circumstances, labor leaders are wise to maintain close ties to the government, and one way to accomplish that is to be a powerful base of support for the governing party. Labor gets access because the politicians place a high value on labor support. No group is more useful than the labor unions for getting out the vote in general, as well as internal, elections. The human resources of the labor unions and federations of the state are at the disposal of the state labor secretary (frequently because he is a leader of the state labor federation), and this power allows him to act as a power broker in state politics. Labor leaders even became general secretaries at the state leveJ.5 9 The party loyalty of union leaders is further reinforced by numerous other practices. For example, all the labor confederations in Venezuela are heavily subsidized by the national government; labor leaders are rewarded with seats on official boards, party leadership positions, and seats in Congress by AD and other parties; many labor leaders (from all parties) benefit handsomely from large government subsidies and lax government regulation of union enterprises such as the Banco de los Trabajadores de Venezuela (BTV); 60 and unionists who embarrass an AD government, such as those who supported the "wrong" presidential precandidate within AD in 1967-68, are expelled from the party, voted out of union posts, harrassed, and intimidated.61 Undeniably, the genuine benefits of unionization are important in Venezuela: organized labor has privileged access to higher wages, social security and health care, food and transportation subsidies, and other benefits that are not available to nonunionized workers. 62 But control is also maintained by more coercive means. Venezuela has no closed shop, but union leaders find other ways to keep challengers to their leadership in line: 63 entitlements are distributed preferentially along party lines; and some unions are notorious for the lack of turnover in their leadership, which perpetuates itself in power by postponing assemblies or manipulating union elections.64

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

34 4

3

2

1960-63

1964-68

1969-73

1974-78

AD

AD

COPE!

AD

1979-83 1984-85 COPE!

AD

Year and Governing Party

Worker-hours lost to strikes by government, 1960-1985 (millions). Graph drawn from statistics in Carlos Eduardo Febres, "El movimiento sindical" (196o-8o), and the Year Book of Labour Statistics 1987 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1987), table 9A (1981-85).

FIG. 2.1.

The cooperation of the unions is also valuable to a government faced with a political or economic crisis. Betancourt's government gained legitimacy in the eyes of conservatives and the military in part because he and the AD labor leaders were able to persuade the unions to avoid strikes in those crucial first years of democracy, and even to accept wage cuts in the face of an economic crisis.65 Conversely, the CTV's cooperation is also useful to AD in the opposition, as a way of embarrassing COPEI governments with spectacular increases in strike activity. Figure 2. I leaves no doubt that the ties between the president's party and organized labor are the principal regulator of labor militancy in Venezuela: the two peaks in worker-hours lost to strikes both occurred during COPEI governments, while AD was leading the opposition.66 Ultimately, however, the Labor Bureau's right to act autonomously is limited, and the limitations are placed there by the national labor leaders themselves. Being unwilling to challenge party or government policy in ways that would bring their loyalty to the party

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

35

into question, they try to defend the interests of their class by exerting pressure privately through proper channels, asking, arguing, and persuading. In extreme instances they also take their case to the media. But they stop short of threatening or condoning strikes, demonstrations, or other forms of force. 67 Such actions would be considered embarrassing and damaging to the party or government and could endanger the chief benefits the labor wing receives from its alliance with the party-the trust and goodwill of the politicians. And since the politicians are the final judges of which actions are damaging and which are not, they exercise ultimate authority over the Labor Bureau. Labor leaders are allowed to think independently, to argue, to complain, and to posture; but they will not try to force the political leaders, including the president, to accede to demands that their political compaizeros consider economically irresponsible. One might expect AD labor leaders to be ashamed of their position, but on the contrary they defend it as "politically responsible." 68 Parties and the Media

In Italy, France, Germany, the United States in the nineteenth century, and in many other countries, it was and sometimes still is common for newspapers to be affiliated with political parties, either by direct party ownership or by open partisan sympathy. In Venezuela, none of the major newspapers or broadcasting stations has been affiliated with any political party since the AD-run daily, La Republica, folded in 1969. There is a wide range of editorial policy in the print media, from the business-oriented El Universal to the left-of-center journal Nueva Sociedad, to the Jesuits' SIC; but these are fundamentally ideological, not party differences. Nevertheless, the Venezuelan media are far from unpoliticized, although they express more than one point of view. Most of the staff writers for the major dailies are members of one or another of the small parties of the Left, and incorporate into their articles a constant undercurrent of disdain for the two "Establishment" parties, AD and COPEI. But almost all newspapers also have regular columnists or editorialists whose job it is to present the views of AD and COPEI on the issue of the moment. El Diario de Caracas has gone the furthest in this direction by printing an AD editorial page and a COPEI editorial page on a daily basis, each typically with

36

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

two or three articles and a cartoon. Furthermore, the very power of the parties has a tremendous indirectly politicizing effect, because everything they do is considered newsworthy. Reporters in both print and broadcast media (which have eclipsed the print media in importance since the 196o's) hang on the party leaders' every word. The parties probably would be happier with less attention from the media. The parties have gone to great lengths to ensure more favorable coverage. It is public knowledge that both AD and COPEI have promised seats in Congress to publishers in exchange for free publicity and favorable coverage of their presidential campaigns. In 1983, as a result of a deal with the Lusinchi campaign, four representatives of the Bloque DeArmas publishing group were elected to Congress on AD slates.69 In 1968, a similar deal was struck between the CO PEl campaign and Miguel Angel Capriles, a publisher of several magazines and a chain of newspapers. In exchange for favorable publicity for candidate Rafael Caldera, CO PEl promised Capriles a Senate seat, an ambassado~ship for his brother, and the right to designate eleven congressional candidates?0 Party leaders have even been known to bribe journalists or publishers not to print embarrassing revelations about the parties? 1 The Pros and Cons of Partyarchy It is not surprising that Venezuelans are intimately acquainted with the concept of partyarchy, or partidocracia. They use the term in a derogatory sense to imply that the regime is something inferior to a democracy. Elsewhere, the concept does not necessarily have a negative connotation: the Westminster system, for example, partakes of several aspects of partyarchy, yet few British would think of calling it anything but the eminently respectable "responsible party government," which Austin Ranney and others thirty years ago considered far superior to U.S. democracy as it was then organized.72 Whether a partyarchy is inferior to polyarchies or "democracies" in which parties do not play such an exaggerated role depends, first, on what the criterion for inferiority is: if the criterion is stability, then partyarchy seems to be superior, other things being equal. Since the wave of brutal authoritarianism in Latin America in the 196o's and 197o's, informed Argentinians, Chileans, Uruguayans,

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

37

Bolivians, and Brazilians have been inclined to admire Venezuela's stability. In this respect, Venezuela is a model for the rest of Latin America. But if the criterion is the quality of democracy, then the Venezuelan model leaves much to be desired.

Partyarchy and Stability Partyarchy does seem to promote regime stability, not only because penetrative parties are the best institutions possible for mobilizing active support for democracy or opposition to authoritarian rule but also because strong parties are valuable in restraining opposition when restraint is crucial to the preservation of democracy. Partyarchy alone may not be enough to save a democracy in a deep crisis, but in these two respects, partyarchy makes for a more resilient regime than democracies with less developed parties. During transitions and other critical times for a democratic regime, strict discipline strengthens the hand of party leaders in negotiations with other elites. A disciplined party's ability to mobilize its members for strikes or street actions gives its leaders a credible threat that they can use to impose their demands. And at the same time, a disciplined party's ability to restrain its members from making "excessive" demands enables its leaders to make credible promises, which encourages other elites to strike a deal with them. By itself, the enhanced bargaining power of party leaders does not necessarily favor stable democracy. In fact, some disciplined parties have so abused their strength during democratic rule that groups have gone into opposition to the regime. But if party leaders have a strong commitment to democracy, they can use their members and influence under authoritarian rule to press for liberalization, elections, and civilian rule. Once in power, restraint is especially important. If a governing party can take responsibility for maintaining public order, there is little need for the military to intervene. The party may have to institute unpopular actions, but as long as the military is out of the picture, discontent is expressed as opposition to the governing party, not to the regime. The goal of the opposition thus becomes that of replacing the governing party by elections, which reinforces democratic procedures. The history of Venezuela strongly confirms these hypotheses. In 1945, Acci6n Democratica was invited to participate in a coup

38

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

against the Medina dictatorship because the plotting officers believed they could not govern effectively without the support of a large and disciplined party. Acting on their leaders' instructions, AD militants risked their lives to support the coup even though, just two days earlier, AD had resolved at its national convention to support the election of a civilian government. The Revolutionary Junta that seized power at that time had an AD majority, and it held the country's first free and direct elections two years later. However, in the 1940's Acci6n Democratica's ability to mobilize was not balanced by any will to restrain its members. It won the elections of 1947 with over 70 percent of the vote but was overthrown eight months later by officers sympathetic to business leaders and the Catholic hierarchy, who thought AD had governed without respect for their interests.73 In 1958, when Venezuelan party leaders got a second chance to establish a democratic regime, restraint was their watchword, explicitly embodied in the Pact of Punto Fijo and other pacts? 4 One of the purposes of these pacts was to restrain conflict among political parties in order to create a united, prodemocratic front. The parties accomplished this purpose, minimizing antagonistic rhetoric, forming a National Unity government, and agreeing on a Common Minimum Program for the government. The dangerous polarization of the 194o's was avoided completely. Another purpose of the pacts was to moderate labor demands. Business elites conditioned their support for democracy on the parties' willingness to control strike activity? 5 The parties fulfilled their part of the bargain, for their "politically mature" labor leaders discouraged strikes/6 and the business elite also fulfilled its part by refusing to encourage or cooperate with the remaining military officers who still opposed the new democratic regime. The parties' ability to restrain opposition is not unlimited, as was clearly shown during February and March 1989, when protests about rising gasoline prices and bus fares escalated into five days of widespread rioting and looting that were only brought under control by brutal military force? 7 But these disturbances came after a decade of declining real wages, during which time opposition by organized labor and opposition parties had been remarkably restrained. When a democracy faces a crisis, partyarchy can buy leaders valuable time to find and implement a solution. Partyarchy

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

39

was central to the successful inauguration of democracy in Venezuela in 1958, and it helped maintain the regime in subsequent years. Partyarchy and the Quality of Democracy

Paradoxically, what is good for stability can be bad for democracy. Partyarchy may promote regime stability, but it does so by compromising the quality of democracy. Again, a partyarchy can in theory fulfill the requirements for polyarchy. However, a partyarchy can be considered fully polyarchic only if (I) the parties themselves are internally democratic and (2) the major parties are different in ways that offer voters a meaningful choice at elections.78 Neither of these conditions is met in Venezuela. In an extreme partyarchy, where political parties monopolize the formal political process, ordinary citizens have few channels for political participation. Non-party organizations are all too quickly penetrated by one or more parties; new independent organizations suffer a similar fate: leaders are co-opted by the parties, their membership is infiltrated by party militants, or the organization may be demoralized by competition with a parallel party-backed organization. Theoretically it is always possible to write a letter to a newspaper, speak from a soapbox, hand out leaflets on a street corner, or spray slogans on a wall, but it is not possible to do these things and be taken seriously when the potential to build an organization is cut off by parties that jealously guard their monopoly of political action. In a partyarchy, people tend to participate either through political parties or not at all. This fact by itself does not make the system undemocratic. There are two remaining avenues for participation-voting and party membership-that could serve as adequate channels for participation, but this assumes that citizens can express their own preferences freely. For voters to have a meaningful choice, the parties must differ from each other in ways that matter to the voters. Also, the system will not allow effective representation between elections unless informal channels of representation are unencumbered by party penetration, which means that the parties must be democratic within themselves. Groups of party members must be free to formulate positions different from those of the party leadership, and to impose these positions on the leadership when their supporters constitute a majority.

40

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

Neither condition can be satisfied fully, but the former condition is more easily satisfied than the latter. Internal democracy in political parties is subject to many constraints that are absent in the politics of autonomous organizations, constraints such as the gratitude and deference of followers toward leaders, the desire for unity, and the leaders' advantages in information, time, money, and other resources. These constraints make it hard for the rank and file to impose its will on the party when the leaders disagree? 9 It is sometimes said that internal party democracy is not necessary for democracy in the nation as a whole; all that is required is that voters have the right to choose among leaders (or parties) who are competing for support.80 But this argument implies that there are other avenues for participation besides parties. When partyarchy closes off those other avenues, a vote every few years is not enough. Certainly, when there is a vote, it is crucially important, if there is any democracy at all, that a partyarchy offer the voters a meaningful choice. This is not so simple as it may sound. No party system can represent all voters to an equal degree. With the multitude of issues, the variety of possible positions on them, and the differing importance of issues for different voters, perfect representation could only be achieved by a system that approached a ratio of one party per voter. Obviously, no one expects anything of that extreme, but it is certainly reasonable to expect a party system to offer the electorate a clear choice on a few issues that are important to many voters. If the party system in a partyarchy fails to offer such a choice, we can with good reason question its claim to be democratic. Venezuela's partyarchy hardly satisfies either condition. Although it has two major parties, the only ones that have a chance of winning an election, they are very similar. Nominally, Acci6n Democratica is a Social Democratic party and COPE! is a Christian Democratic party, and AD does receive greater support from the rural poor, the manual poor, workers, the Center Left, and residents of the East, while COPE! receives greater support from the middle class, the Right, and residents of the metropolitan area. But these are practically the only noticeable differences between the two constituencies. Both are catchall parties that appeal successfully to all groups in society.81 They receive about the same degree of support from the Radical Left, the Left, the Center, and the Center Right, from housewives, students, and business people, from the manual

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

41

TABLE 2.!

AD Leaders' Commitment to Cooperation with Copei, r98 5 Percentage answering yes CEN "Which of the [following] goals do you consider to be a good reason to have some kind of political pact with COPE!?" Ensuring some continuity in policies implemented by governments controlled by different parties. Establishing a reciprocal obligation between government and opposition to consult each other on important matters. Achieving a broad national consensus favorable to AD's programs. Avoiding open political conflict that could endanger the democratic system.

Congress

%

(n)

%

(n)

65

(15)

46

(25)

43

(10)

69

(37)

43

(10)

41

(22)

61

(14)

67

(36)

souRcE: Author's survey, described in Chapter r.

middle class, lower white-collar and upper white-collar workers, from rural, intermediate, and urban communities, and from residents of the Plains, Andes, the West, and the state of Zulia.82 If there are any differences, they are only in degree: both parties have important constituencies in all these groups and sectors, as well as in every region of the country. And like catchall parties everywhere, AD and COPEI tend to avoid taking clear positions on issues for fear of offending any of the diverse elements in their constituencies.83 A second important and very specific reason for the lack of issuebased competition between AD and COPEI is the Pact of Punto Fijo signed by the two parties in 1958 that committed them to a Common Minimum Program of land reform, eventual nationalization of the oil industry, respect for private property, and other general goals.84 Although the Pact of Punto Fijo was meant to last only through the first government, as a way of easing the transition to democracy, nearly all its terms have, endured as the programmatic framework for every Venezuelan government since that time. As Table 2. r shows, 27 years after the signing, the principle of maintaining an Establishment consensus on important issues was still important to the leaders of AD (and surely to the leaders of COPEI). For three decades, consensus was also reinforced by the wealth that flows from the oil industry. Venezuela has such an abundance of

42

Po/yarchy and Partyarchy

this valuable commodity that for many years there was no question about the best economic development strategy for the nation: stateled industrialization, financed by a state-run oil industry. Parties disagreed about the pace, terms, and scope of nationalization but not about the basic issue of the role of the state in the economy, and certainly no one could convincingly argue against a public enterprise that until recently earned over one thousand dollars a year for every man, woman, and child in the country. But oil, though bountiful and useful in lubricating the social frictions typical of all developing countries, reduced the need to make hard choices. Every Venezuelan government, whether headed by AD or by CO PEl, spent large sums to benefit every sector of society. The state provided generous subsidies for labor confederations and private businesses, for free education through the university level, for development corporations for each of the regions, and for many other benefits. It was far from being a welfare state (there was never any unemployment compensation, for example-only mandatory severance pay), but no organized group had to make do for long with much less than it asked for (while party penetration saw to it that no group asked for much more than it could receive).85 The shape of the party system indicated that this consensus was not confined to elites: over the years, So percent of the voters came to place their trust in the two parties that they perceived to be ideologically indistinguishable-A D and COPEI.86 Because of the programmatic convergence of AD and COPEI, voters are now left with little to choose between. They have no choice of ideologies or programs, except with respect to competition between the AD-COPEI Establishment and the miniscule extremes of Right and Left. In some ways, the choice resembles that between the Republicans and the Democrats-a choice of candidates more than of parties, of style more than substance. But in a partyarchy, the fuzziness and similarity of the two parties' platforms affect not just choices in an election but the entire political agenda. In other societies, some nonparty organizations have enough autonomy to focus their issues and place them on the agenda. In a partyarchy, in which parties are practically the only organizations that can define the terms of political debate, the agenda is set by political parties alone. The politically penetrated class, sectoral, and regional organizations can express only the interests that

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

43

have passed through the filter of party interest. Parties allow the expression of a constituency's interest only when the party leadership perceives a partisan advantage in adopting that interest as its own. Issues that are not adopted by the party leadership are suppressed and never make it to the daylight of political debate. 87 The broader the bases of support of the parties, the more partyarchy inhibits the autonomous expression of class, sectoral, and regional interests. In Venezuela, AD and COPEI rarely perceive a clear partisan advantage in advocating these interests, and therefore the dominant themes in Venezuelan politics are only those of party competition. So far as the public is concerned, politics has very little to do with Left vs. Right, labor vs. capital, East vs. West, or agriculture vs. industry. The parties discuss such issues, but they do so quietly, in a muffled way that avoids controversy. The kind of politics that the parties practice openly and pursue lustily is about Ins vs. Outs, government vs. opposition, and Us vs. Them. It is full of name-calling, mudslinging, and chest-beating. Both AD and COPEI engage in mutual indictments for sins of which both are guiltycorruption, absenteeism, disunity, and incompetence. They compete for credit for policies they both supported. And when they draw attention to substantive issues, there is usually a partisan angle hiding not far below the surface. Whether a choice between AD and COPEI is meaningful is open to question. As long as the economy was performing well, the answer seemed to be "Yes." For example, in a 1973 survey, 66 percent said, "It matters a lot which party is going to win this presidential election," and 92 percent said, "The result of this presidential election is important for the country." 88 It is possible that intense partisan competition led most voters to think that the choice of AD or COPEI was a meaningful one, even though "objectively," there was little substantive difference between the two parties. The fact that strong parties were working hard to show which choices were meaningful makes it very difficult to judge whether or not voters then really did have a meaningful choice, but there is no doubt that after a decade of economic stress and revelations of corruption, the choice has become much less meaningful. One indication of the growing disenchantment with parties is the rate of nonvoting in elections. Before 1978, abstention had never reached ro percent in any general election; since then, it has climbed to

44

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

12.4 percent in 1978,12.3 percent in 1983, and 18.1 percent in 1988. Along with this increasing electoral abstention there has also been a dramatic decline in party identification. In a 1988 survey asking respondents to state which party's positions were closest to their own, only 18 percent answered, "None of the above." But in September 1991, after three more years of economic hardship, periodic rioting, and seemingly endless revelations about corruption in the Lusinchi government, 45 percent answered the same question, "None of the above." 89 This increasing repudiation of the parties helps explain why rioters in 1989 chose not to express their frustrations within the system, and why there were no demonstrations in support of democracy after the failed coup attempts in February and November 1992. In these crises the only institutions with the power to propose immediate solutions were the parties, but because the parties were precisely the institutions whose leadership was unwelcome at that moment, the crises were much harder to solve. In the long run, therefore, partyarchy can tarnish the quality of democracy to the point where the regime's stability may be threatened.

Internal Democracy and Factionalism In spite of their obsession with control and their excellent discipline, Venezuelan parties are not monoliths. Discipline does not necessarily bring unity. Discipline is the ability to follow a leader; unity is the ability to follow the same leader. Venezuelan party members excel at the game of follow the leader, but they periodically disagree about which leader to follow. These factional conflicts are a salient feature in Venezuelan politics. They generate lots of noise and excitement, attract constant media attention, involve the expenditure of millions of dollars, and-most significantly-they result in the turnover of party leadership. In this last respect, they seem to provide a loophole in the Iron Law of Oligarchy. Factionalism does indicate a kind of internal democracy in Venezuelan parties, but it does not compensate for the missing participatory avenues closed by partyarchy. There are two reasons why this is so. One reason pertains to the nature of competition within the party. If internal party politics were organized around issues of government policy and performance that concerned party members,

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

45

that is, if there were ideological tendencies or factions of principle, then factional competition would connect decision-makers to the rank and file. The need to maintain the support of party members would encourage party leaders in the government to be responsive. This kind of factionalism existed briefly in AD at the beginning of the democratic regime, but it quickly degenerated into a succession of naked power struggles in which any connections between factions and relevant issues were coincidences or opportunistic afterthoughts. This characterization of factions and their evolution will be documented in later chapters. The issueless character of factions is one reason why internal party democracy cannot compensate for the lack of nonpartisan channels for political activity. The other reason has to do with the breadth of participation in internal party politics. It is not always desirable for a government to be dominated by one party, even if legislative discipline and the party system configuration make rule by a majority party possible. For example, Arend Lijphart has concluded that "majoritarian democracy" is unsuitable for plural societies such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland.90 Venezuela is not a plural society in the sense of being divided into "pillars" defined by religious, racial, or linguistic differences, and both AD and COPEI are cross sections of the entire population. But even if it is appropriate to exclude the opposition from most government decisions, granting the right to rule to party members excludes party voters who are not members, and who usually outnumber the members. Party membership is a narrow base on which to build a claim to legitimate rule. Narrower still is the core of party members who actually participate in internal party politics. In Venezuela, this base of active militants is probably as broad as it gets anywhere. If all 2,253,887 Adecos were active participants in internal party politics, they might constitute a justifiably large base of support for a democratic government. In most countries, turnout in internal party elections is very low. In AD, turnout is above average at around 43 percent, but even this high figure (which may be inflated by ballot-box stuffing) reduces the card-carrying constituency for an AD government to ro percent of the electorate at most. 91 This means that even in a very highly politicized and mobilized population like Venezuela's, only a small minority of the electorate is involved in internal party politics. This fact, combined with the

46

Polyarchy and Partyarchy

issueless character of factions in the Establishment parties, means that factionalism cannot compensate for the lack of channels for political activity outside the parties. The drawbacks of partyarchy should be kept in perspective. From the standpoint of political stability, its record is impressive. From the standpoint of democratic ideals, it is a disappointing system: ordinary citizens are deprived of the opportunity to organize effectively around certain issues; class, sectoral, and regional interests are subordinated to partisan concerns; and the political agenda all too regularly consists of trivial partisan bickering rather than important issues. Because partyarchy lies at the heart of both Venezuela's stability and its shortcomings, it is a disillusioning model. Yet if the system possesses the capacity to reform itself in the direction of greater democracy while fending off threats to stability, then partyarchy may be an attractive way station on the path to stable democracy.

CHAPTER THREE

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics

O

ne of the paradoxes of Venezuelan politics is that the two leading, very similar, parties, AD and COPEI, though they are large and powerful organizations that demand iron discipline, nonetheless suffer from a recurring problem of disunity. Both parties have factions that engage in raucous, bitter, sometimes violent, struggles for control of the party organization. Three times in its history, AD has split as a result of such factional strife; COPEI narrowly averted a split in 1988 and supplied two presidential candidates in 1993. How is it possible to reconcile these two images of Venezuelan parties? How can they be both tightly disciplined and chronically divided?

Three Parties in One In order to make sense of this paradox, it is necessary to think about parties in a more nuanced way than the layman habitually does. Political scientists who have thought about political parties as organizations-notably Robert Michels, Richard Katz, and Angelo Panebianco-offer considerable help in this task. 1 To these writers, political parties are anything but monoliths; they are, rather, political systems in themselves. Like political systems, political parties contain actors with conflicting interests who participate in a rulegoverned political process in order to influence collective decisions that are sometimes (though not always) binding on the membership. The actions of parties, like the actions of governments, are not spontaneous fiats but the outcome of the pushing and pulling of many actors.

48

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics

Just as the nature of the political process in political systems at large varies depending on the issue (giving rise to endless studies of The Politics of This and The Politics of That), the nature of the internal political process in parties varies depending on the arena in which the party is operating. Politics within a party in Congress is very different from politics within a party at the polls. Different arenas can involve: (a) different actors, not simply different individuals but a tremendous variance in their numbers; (b) participation in different kinds of activities; (c) conflicts over different issues or interests; (d) different rules and customs for dealing with these conflicts; and (e) different groupings of actors organized to exert their influence. The nature of the process can vary so widely that observers of the same party in different arenas could easily conclude that they were observing different parties. One observer might see a conflict-ridden party with widespread grass-roots participation, while another might see a tightly disciplined and highly consensual elite making decisions for an apathetic and uninvolved mass membership. If a party's internal political processes can be so different that they seem to belong to different parties, there may be some benefit in analyzing a party carrying out different tasks as though it actually were different parties. This is the analytic scheme I shall follow in the next few chapters while exploring the internal politics of Acci6n Democritica. I find it useful to speak of three "parties" in ADthe policy party, the power party, and the electoral party-which is merely a convenient way of referring to the internal politics of AD in the executive-legislative, internal electoral, and general electoral arenas, respectively.2 They are not, in reality, separate parties; however, as coming chapters will show, they might as well be. Of course, all three parties overlap, since the top leadership takes part in all party activities and each process may spill over into the others. Moreover, these overlaps raise some of the classic issues in theorizing about internal party politics-Hume's distinction between factions of principle and factions of interest and Michels's Iron Law of Oligarchy, among others.3 But before attempting to disentangle the interesting theoretical issues contained in the overlaps (in Chapter 6), it is helpful to understand each "party" on its own terms as much as possible. The policy party is the sum of all the processes by which AD sup-

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics

49

ports or opposes the government in the legislature. The number of actors is very limited, since only the members of the CEN, congressional committee chairs, a handful of labor leaders, and (if AD won the election) the president, his cabinet, and a few top bureaucrats have any significant influence over party policy (see Chapter 4). Even with a generous definition of influence, they would total fewer than roo party leaders. The relevant conflicts in this tiny party concern only policy issues and coalition options. If the policy party is divided into factions, the factions are defined by their members' common positions on these policy issues and coalition strategies. The rules that regulate conflict within the policy party are those governing executive-party relations and consultation and decisionmaking within the party, as well as unwritten conventions about legislative discipline, committee assignments, and so on. The power party is the sum of all the processes by which AD selects its leaders at all levels. These leaders include the members of the local, state, national, and sectoral executive committees, delegates to conventions, and anyone else elected to a post in the party hierarchy. They do not include the party's candidates for legislative positions, since these are public positions that do not necessarily carry any authority in internal party matters. It does, however, include the presidential candidate, because he is the effective leader of the party during the presidential campaign. Anyone who participates in these internal elections is an actor in the power party. If we include anyone who runs as a candidate, serves as a delegate, helps out in a campaign, shows up at a rally, or merely votes in internal elections, the power party would include ro to so percent of the card-carrying members of the party. In the 198o's, this would mean 2oo,ooo to 8oo,ooo activists-certainly a party very different in nature from the policy party. The conflict that is relevant in the power party would arise over competition for party posts and the benefits derived from them. To the extent that competition is among organized factions, those factions would be united by their support for certain candidates or slates of candidates for party posts. The "constitution" for this political subsystem basically amounts to the party's statutes, supplemented by any other rules, regulations, or conventional practices that govern internal elections or the process for amending those rules.

so

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics

The electoral party is the sum of all the processes by which AD competes in elections and defines the choices available to voters. The number of actors in this party is usually larger than the formal party membership, since it includes nonmember sympathizers who vote for the party or its presidential candidate. Thus, there are one to five million actors in this party. Participation ranges from plotting campaign strategy and drafting a platform to simply showing up to vote, that is, any activity that is intended to help the party win the election, including selecting candidates, campaigning, fund-raising, watching the polls, and turning out for rallies. All of the relevant conflict would pertain to the campaign-the platform, slogans, tactics, use of resources, alliances with other parties, how much effort to expend on the campaign, and so on. Some of the relevant rules are contained in the official laws of political parties and elections, and some are party rules on candidate selection, but the campaign process itself is poorly institutionalized. Each candidate organizes a campaign as he or she sees fit. 4 Aside from quarrels among a few elites over campaign strategy, there can be no organized groups in conflict unless the party splits, since federal election laws make it impossible for the same party to sponsor two official candidates in general elections. The Irrationality of Division in the Electoral Party In a parliamentary system, it could be in a party's interest to run more than one slate of candidates in an election. This need not happen by accident, as when a factional dispute over candidacies splits the party; sometimes it happens by design, under preferential voting rules, which allow each party to run multiple candidates for each seat. In theory, if a party offers more than its usual share of candidates, voters are more likely to find a candidate who represents their interests closely. MacKenzie argued that factions could play this positive role of increasing the number of choices if they existed in British parties, and Beller and Belloni claimed that factions actually perform this function in Italy.5 In practice, however, multiple slates would make sense only if ( r) more people voted for all the separate factions of a party than would have voted for that party if all its factions had backed the same slate of candidates, and (2) separate slates did not lessen the

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics

51

party's chances of winning executive power. Literature on this point suggests that these two conditions are rarely satisfied, and that the division of the electoral party is therefore usually irrational.6 "Factionalism" embraces a great variety of internal party competition, not all of which culminates in factions backing different candidates in general elections. When factions do compete in general elections, there is often a stigma attached to their division that outweighs the attraction of a more varied choice. In electoral systems without preferential voting, the only way a party can offer more than one choice is to split into two parties. Where this has happened, as in Israel, splintering is thought to weaken the party or family of parties, so there are perennial efforts to reunite the fragments of once-united parties? Factionalism also tends to discourage voters from supporting the party that is divided, especially if the factional imbroglios alienate both party activists and key segments of the voting population. Sullivan, Pressman, and Arterton have proposed that factional competition increases activists' and voters' psychological commitment to a particular candidate, which makes it hard for them to shift their support after that candidate's chances of winning evaporate.8 People tend to justify their choices by focusing on their candidate's merits and his rivals' defects. When a candidate withdraws from the race, his supporters have mixed feelings, at best, toward the remaining candidates. Howard L. Reiter provides survey data from the United States that support this explanation.9 For both Republicans and Democrats from 1976 to 1984, people who supported a candidate other than the nominee before the convention were 13 to 34 percent less likely than the nominee's early supporters to support the party nominee in the general election. Sullivan, Pressman, and Arterton further propose that the importance of this effect varies with the length of the internal campaign: the longer the campaign, the more intensely people become committed to a particular candidate, and the harder it is for them to support anyone else enthusiastically. The damage that can be done by factionalism is partly psychological, but it is also material in that it affects the willingness of local party leaders to campaign for the nominee. Leaders of party organizations at the state, district, or municipal level take a risk when they commit themselves to a candidate in the internal campaign. They

52

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics

must expect that if their candidate fails to win the nomination, they will be penalized. Even if the eventual nominee is not vindictive, he may well be inclined to reward his early supporters and ignore the others. Factionalism can also affect swing voters, a crucial segment of the electorate. Swing voters seem especially soured by factionalism, whether their vote is based on an educated comparison of parties or candidates or on simple considerations of self-interest. Many voters who are disgusted by the bickering, animosity, and mutual criticism of a divisive nomination process are likely to conclude that even if a party has an attractive program, it will be too divided to govern effectively. This reaction is magnified when the factions are merely clientelistic, because many of the swing voters who are looking for alternative ideologies or platforms will perceive that the infighting is only an issueless power struggle. These voters are also likely to wonder how a candidate can lead the nation when he cannot lead his own party. In systems where clientelism flourishes, more swing voters are likely to be of the second type: people who vote for the winner hoping to obtain access to the jobs and favors the governing party distributes. Factionalism dissuades these swing voters by creating the impression that the divided party has little chance of winning; these negative expectations then become self-fulfilling. Therefore, voters who are inclined to jump on a bandwagon jump to the party that is not weakened by factionalism. If all these discouraging considerations somehow did not apply, so that a party stood to win a larger combined total by running separate factional slates than by running a single slate, it would still be irrational for the party to do so in most presidential systems, where each faction would normally run a different presidential candidate. Since neither faction is likely to win more of the vote than the entire party might win if it remained united, the "mother" party's chances of winning executive power are decreased by division, negating the second condition. 10 Thus there are many reasons to believe that factionalism hurts the electoral party more than it helps. It may increase the number of choices, but it can taint the quality of those choices so much that fewer people support the separate factions of a divided party than would have supported a single united party. It would appear

Polyarchy and lntraparty Politics

53

that the probability that the drawbacks of factionalism outweigh its advantages is increased where (I) internal campaigns are long and involve many people; (2) candidates must rely on local or regional bosses and their machines to get out the vote, rather than appealing to the voters directly through the mass media; (3) factional activity is more of a struggle between ambitious personalities than a debate over ideas; (4) swing voters make up a significant portion of the electorate; and (5) the system is presidential. All these reasons suggest that the consequences of factionalism for electoral parties in Venezuela are overwhelmingly negative. In Venezuela campaigns are long and intense and involve large numbers of party activists. Internal campaigns in Venezuela's major parties last one to two years and encourage hundreds of thousands of party members to commit themselves to a precandidate as soon as possible. In such an environment, it is not at all surprising that voters would form strong candidate loyalties that would be hard to transfer. In Venezuela, 30 to 40 percent of the voting-age population are card-carrying party members.U Furthermore, a comparatively large proportion of the members of Venezuelan parties take active part in party politics. Turnout in internal party elections has ranged from I I percent to as high as 43 percent, which means that at least 3 percent, and perhaps 12 percent of the voting-age population participate in internal party politics before the real election campaign begins.U Venezuelan parties have campaigned intensely through the media since 1973, but judging from the massive mobilization of partisans for rallies during the campaigns, state and local party bosses still play an important role. Bosses who back the losing faction have little reason to work hard to get out the vote. In Venezuela, the nominee has only limited ability to remove anyone from party office, but he has great control over the more lucrative appointments-governorships (before 1989 ), bureaucratic positions, and seats in the Congress and state legislatures. The leaders on the losing side can always transfer their support to the winner after the nomination, but few of them can expect such last-minute conversions to yield much benefit. Therefore, the supporters of the runner-up in the internal campaign have little incentive to work hard for the nominee. They may try, but it is unlikely that they would try as hard as the leaders who can expect to be rewarded for their efforts.

54

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics

Finally, Venezuela possesses the unfortunate combination of significant swing voting and clientelistic factionalism. Survey evidence analyzed by Myers and O'Connor confirms that the number of swing voters in Venezuela is large enough to play a decisive role in contests between AD and COPEI.U There has been some disagreement as to the nature of factionalism in Venezuela, but Chapter 6 will show beyond doubt that factions in AD have lacked ideological motivations since the mid-196o's. Naturally, all factions claim to be motivated by principle rather than by self-interest, and a considerable number of voters believe them and therefore feel better represented. But these voters are likely to be committed partisans, not the swing voters who matter in the context of this argument.

Factionalism and Voting for Acci6n Democratica Acci6n Democratica began the democratic period in 1958 with 47. 5 percent of the national legislative vote. 14 The elected president, AD's R6mulo Betancourt, was plagued by disunity in his party throughout his five-year term. The first disturbances were the outgrowth of a factional grouping composed primarily of young leaders who had assumed leadership of the underground party after the Perez Jimenez dictatorship (1948-58) exiled or imprisoned the party founders. These "Muchachos," inspired by Fidel Castro's revolutionary successes in Cuba, became openly critical of the reformist Betancourt government and soon left the party to avoid certain expulsion. With the departure of the Muchachos, the ARS faction, born in the 194o's and led by Raul Ramos Gimenez, took on new life and made a premature attempt to wrest control of the party from Betancourt's Old Guard. Betancourt learned of their ambitions in time and was able to expel them before they could displace his faction. In the 1963 elections, in the aftermath of the Muchacho and ARS splits, AD won only 30.7 percent of the vote, a drop of nearly seventeen points in five years. Because AD began the democratic period with nearly twice as much support as any other party, Raul Leoni of AD was able to win the presidency for the 1964-69 period in spite of the party's dramatic decline. During the Leoni administration, however, AD suffered its third and most serious division. The conflict centered around a bitter struggle for the presidential nomination between

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics

55

Gonzalo Barrios and Luis Beltran Prieto Figueroa. After procedural disputes during the complicated nomination process, the Barrios and Prieto factions held separate conventions and expelled each other, and both candidates ran in the 1968 elections. The Barrios faction, judged the legitimate heir of Acci6n Democratica's name and property by the Supreme Court, received 6.6 percent less than AD had in 1963, declining to its lowest share, 24.0 percent. (The Prieto faction, running as the Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo, or MEP, won only 12.2 percent of the legislative vote.) As a result of the 1968 split, Acci6n Democratica was forced into the opposition during the 1969-74 presidency of Rafael Caldera, leader of AD's chief rival party, the Christian Democratic CO PEL The experience of being in the opposition and the desire to return to power united the party. Carlos Andres Perez became AD's presidential candidate after a highly consensual nomination campaign, and went on to win the 1973 presidential election by a landslide: AD won 42.8 percent of the legislative vote, which translated into majorities in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Thus party unity was rewarded by a dramatic gain of nearly nineteen points in the legislative vote. During the Perez administration, factionalism again appeared, and the party became polarized into two camps, one loyal to the president and led by presidential hopeful Jaime Lusinchi, the other quite critical of the Perez administration and led by Luis Piiierua Ordaz. Piiierua eventually won the nomination, but only after a bitter and prolonged contest. In this instance AD managed to avoid an outright split, but its share of the legislative vote still declined by more than four points and Piiierua narrowly lost the presidential race to CO PEl's Luis Herrera Campins. As before, the experience of being in the opposition from 1979 to 1984 united Acci6n Democratica. Since the party had not actually split, the followers of both Piiierua and Lusinchi remained in the party, and relations between the two groups remained tense for a couple of years. But when the nomination campaigns gathered steam, Jaime Lusinchi quickly emerged as the front-runner and won the nomination with only token opposition. In the wake of this renewed party unity, Lusinchi led AD to its greatest electoral victory in 25 years, in which AD's share of the legislative vote increased by more than eleven points, to 49·9 percent.

56

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics TABLE 3.1

Factionalism and AD's Electoral Performance, I958-r988 Percentage change in AD vote from Government

Factions and outcomes

AD (Betancourt)

Old Guard vs. ARS vs. Muchachos, MIR and ARS splits

-16.8

Barrios vs. Prieto, MEP split

-6.6

consensual nomination of Perez

+18.7

Lusinchi vs. Piiierua, split avoided

-4.3

consensual nomination of Lusinchi

+11.4

Perez vs. Lepage, split avoided

-6.6

1959-64

previous election

AD (Leoni)

1964-1969 COPEI (Caldera)

1969-74 AD (Perez)

1974-79 COPEI (Herrera)

1979-84 AD (Lusinchi)

1984-89

souRcEs: Factions and outcomes: see text of this chapter. Percentage changes in AD vote from previous election: calculated from Consejo Supremo Electoral, La estadistica evolutiva de los partidos politicos; Consejo Supremo Electoral, Elecciones 1983; and El Nacional, Dec. 7, 1988, p. D-r.

The party now had majorities in both houses of the Congress, and with this dominance, factionalism again arose between the Lusinchi administration and the followers of former President Carlos Andres Perez. Perez, now eligible to run again for the presidency, began campaigning for the nomination, running against Lusinchi's erstwhile Interior Minister, Octavio Lepage, who enjoyed the obvious backing of the president. The competition for the nomination polarized the party, but a long-rumored split was averted at the last moment and Perez took the nomination, and won the election. Although AD slipped back 6.6 percent, to 43.3 percent, it was successful against CO PEl, which had suffered an equally bitter nomination struggle between party founder Rafael Caldera and the eventual nominee, Eduardo Fernandez. Table 3.1 summarizes the association between factionalism and AD's electoral performance from 1958 to 1988. On average, AD's share of the vote declined by 8.6 percent following splits or conflictual nominations, and increased by IS percent following consensual nominations.

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics

57

A Multivariate Estimate

Although Table 3.1 suggests that the expected relationship between factionalism and the AD vote is correct, it does not prove the argument because it does not compare the actual vote for AD and its splinter parties with the vote that the party would have won if it had remained united. In order to make this comparison it is necessary to do a multivariate analysis that measures the costs of factionalism while controlling for other factors that also influence AD's electoral performance. This section shows that factionalism has had a strongly negative impact on support for AD that has outweighed the additional support won by the factions that splintered off from the party. The basic data for this analysis are the returns for national legislative elections, broken down for the 23 "federal entities" (20 states, two territories, and the Federal District) for the six elections held from 1958 to 1983 (Consejo Supremo Electoral, 1983 and 1984). Since it is not possible to perform a multiple regression analysis on a time series of only six years, either at the national level or in each of the states, I pooled the data. Pooling data for 23 states over six years gives a total of 138 observations, enough to estimate a multiple regression equation with AD's share of the valid votes cast in each state as the dependent variable. The use of pooled cross-sectional time-series data creates a danger of biased and inconsistent estimates of the coefficients. I corrected for this potential problem with a procedure known as Dummy Variable Least Squares (DVLS), in which dummy variables for the states are included in the model as explicit right-hand-side variables. The effect of this technique is to change the regression equation into a model of the variation of AD's vote around its mean in each state. (For a fuller methodological description of the analysis, see the Appendix.) In order to estimate the electoral impact of factionalism, one must first understand what other factors influence AD's electoral performance. My model takes into account several factors. r. The electoral performance of AD's principal rivals. AD competes with certain parties for the support of certain voters. The more votes these rival parties win, the fewer votes AD wins, and the fewer votes the rival parties win, the more votes AD wins. This rivalry

58

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics

would not be an appropriate explanation for many kinds of analysis. It does not, for example, provide any insight into why voters prefer one party to another in a given election, that is, insight into what the rivalry is all about. Furthermore, a rivalry explanation is useless for a predictive model, because it would require knowledge of election results to predict election results. For the purpose at hand, however, the performance of rival parties is a perfectly acceptable explanatory factor. The question posed does not require an understanding of the nature of rivalry between AD and COPEI; it only requires an estimate of how important that rivalry is, whatever its nature, relative to factionalism, which is the interesting point here. Also, although a predictive model would be more elegant and possibly more useful in the future, a good post-dictive explanatory model is all that is required. Since the dependent variable is the share of the vote won by AD in each state, the independent rivalry variables are the share of the vote won by AD's rivals in each state, but I include the vote shares of only some of the other parties-first, because not all the parties compete with AD for the same bloc of voters (they are not really rivals in practice), and second, because including the shares of all the parties would create an identity in the equation that explains all of the variance by definition and would make the estimate meaningless. Even including too many party shares would create a problem with multicollinearity, in which case the party-share coefficients and the R-squared would be artificially high and the coefficients of the factionalism variables too low. To find out how many and which party-share variables could be included without introducing this kind of bias, I tried all combinations of them (in models with the independent variables of interest) and chose the most robust. As it turned out, the shares of the other center-left and extremist parties were unrelated to AD's share, either alone or in combination with one or two other shares, and therefore they could be safely excluded. The share of the URD was related to AD's share only in combination with others, so its effects were judged to be largely due to multicollinearity. Excluding these three left the shares won by COPEI and the two parties that splintered off from AD in 1962 and 1968-AD-Oposicion and the MEP, respectively. Their coefficients were practically the same whether they were included separately or together.

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics

59

2. The rate of abstention. Preliminary research showed that AD benefits from high abstention rates. The reason for this relationship is not clear, but the most plausible explanation is that some group, such as extremists or young voters, is both most likely to abstain and least likely to vote for AD. The smaller the voting total, the greater AD's share is for a given number of votes. 15 3· Variation in AD's average vote, 1958-83, from state to state. This consideration is operationalized in the regression equation by the dummy variables for the states.16 As with the party share variables, I do not attempt to explain why some states are more pro-Adeco than others; but this is a factor that must be taken into account in order to generate an unbiased estimate of the impact of factionalism. 4· AD's early weakness in the Caracas metropolitan region. Other researchers have often noted that AD performed poorly in the central region throughout the 196o's. The reason for this was that AD's initial strength, in the 194o's, was among rural peasants, and in the 195o's, the period when tremendous urbanization occurred, AD was banned, so that when AD began the democratic period it was very poorly organized around Caracas. By 1970, after ten years of recruiting supporters among the marginal population, AD had greatly reduced the metropolitan-interior differenceP 5. The direct impact of factionalism. The obvious impact of factionalism is indirect: the loss of votes to a splinter party. This indirect impact is taken into account by the splinter party share, discussed above. But is there also a direct penalty for internal conflict, one that hurts the party across the board in addition to the votes lost to splinters, and independently of whether the party actually splits or not? To measure these effects, I included two dummy variables in the equation: one to capture the effect of an AD split preceding the election, and another for the effect of a divisive nomination process in AD that did not result in a split. Table 3.2 presents full descriptions of the variables, their coefficients, and relevant statistics; the Appendix gives a more detailed accounting of the methodological issues. This model says that the variation in AD's share of the vote can be explained by the following combination of factors: I. The average vote that AD won in the 1958-83 period varied only slightly from state to state. Sixteen of the 23 states had inter-

6o

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics TABLE 3.2

A Model of the Dynamics of the AD Vote, I958-r983 Dependent variable

Coefficients and IT-statistics! .66 ••

AD=

(26.5) -.49 .. (8.3) -.59 .. (6.6)

-.16 .. (7.5) + .003. (2.2) -.04' (2.4) -.13 .. (12.2) Coefficient

+.07 +.07 +.04 +.03 +.03 +.02 +.01 +.00 -.01 -.01 -.01

Independent variables Intercept (baseline AD share: 66 percent) COPE! (CO PEl's share of valid votes in each state) SPLINTERS (share of valid votes in each state won by parties that split from AD-MEP and AD-Oposici6n) a METROP (dummy for the central region entitiesthe Caracas Federal District and the states of Aragua, Carabobo, and Miranda-in 1958-68 only) ABSTENTION (percentage of eligible voters abstaining in each state) DIVNOM (dummy= 1 if AD experienced a divisive nomination process without splitting before the election; otherwise, dummy = 0) SPLIT (dummy = 1 if AD split before the election; otherwise, dummy = 0)

IT-statistic!

State intercepts

Coefficient

2T 2.4' 1.4

Monagas Apure Delta Amacuro Barinas Sucre Trujillo Portuguesa Cojedes Yaracuy Amazonas Tachira

-.02 -.03 -.03 -.03 -.05 -.06 -.06 -.07 -.09 -.12 -.15

1.1 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.5

IT-statistic!

0.6 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.4. 3.2. 4.1.

s.o·

State intercepts Merida Anzoategui Bolivar Falcon Lara Carabobo Miranda Zulia Aragua Nueva Esparta Caracas, D.F.

souRcE: Regression analysis described in Appendix. "Significant at the .oooi level. R-squared = .904 •significant at the .oslevel. 3 The MIR is not used as a splinter party because it included splinters from parties besides AD, it was banned in the first election after the split (1963 ), and it received insignificant support in subsequent elections.

cepts that were not significantly different from zero. Still, in a few states the average vote was different: AD was significantly weaker in the four central region entities and in the large western state of Zulia (location of the second city, Maracaibo) and the eastern state of Nueva Esparta (also known as Margarita Island); AD also was rather strong in two of the Plains states, Monagas and Apure. 2. AD's share was reduced by competition with CO PEl and also,

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics

61

to a slightly greater extent, by competition with its own splinter parties. For every percentage point that COPEI won, AD lost about half (0.49) of a point, and for every point that the splinter parties won, AD lost a little over half (o. 59) of a point. 18 3· The model confirms AD's early weakness around Caracas. In the central region from 1958 to 1968, AD won an average of sixteen points less than it did in the rest of the country (METROP). 4· AD benefits moderately but significantly from high abstention rates: for every one percent of eligible voters who do not come to the polls, AD gains three-tenths of a percent. Since voting is obligatory and moderately well enforced in Venezuela, this factor contributes only around 2 percent to AD's share. 5. The model implicitly says that the government's economic performance did not affect AD's electoral success in the 1958-83 period. Preliminary models included two indicators of economic performance-percent change in per capita GDP over the course of each government, and percent change in per capita GDP during the election year only-but these do not appear in the final model because the coefficients of both the election-year variable and the multiyear variable proved to be statistically and substantively insignificant.19 There was no "throw the bums out" reaction to economic performance. This result should not be surprising to anyone who has examined the raw data. In 1963 and 1968, AD's share of the vote declined even though, as the governing party, it had been responsible for a constant increase in per capita GDP; and in 1973 AD's vote increased, although, as the leading opposition party, it should not have profited from the prosperity of the Caldera years. 20 6. Finally, conflict within AD before the election has a large impact on the party's electoral success. If AD experiences a divisive nomination process, such as the 1977 conflict between Pinerua and Lusinchi, it is penalized four percentage points, on average. If the party splits outright, it is penalized thirteen points. These penalties are in addition to the half-plus point, already mentioned, that AD loses for every point won by splinter parties. Factionalism and the Quality of Representation at Elections If Acci6n Democratica were only an electoral party, its periodic internal conflict would make no sense. Factionalism hurts the

62

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics

party's ability to represent the people at elections. It is so damaging, in fact, that it has caused the party to lose the presidency twice. This is indisputable in the case of the 1968 election, which AD would have won if only r6,soo voters (equivalent to less than one-half of one percent of the valid votes, and less than one-fortieth of the vote for the AD splinter MEP) had voted for Gonzalo Barrios rather than Rafael Caldera. It is also very likely in the case of the only other presidential election AD lost. According to the model, AD would have won 43·3 percent of the legislative vote in 1978 if it had remained united, compared with the 38.6 percent actually won by COPE!. This would have given AD enough of a margin to win the presidential election also. This model can be used to estimate what AD's vote would have been if it had not suffered from internal conflict in 1963, 1968, and 1978. It can also be used to estimate how much of the vote AD would have lost if the ARS split, the MEP split, or the divisive nomination of 1978 had occurred in 1958, 1973, or 1983. Figure 3.1 compares the actual results to these simulated results, which are obtained by subtracting the penalties for a split or divisive nomination, where appropriate, and plugging in the actual 1963 state-level ARS vote or the 1968 MEP vote in the splinter variable for other yearsY The clear lesson of Figure 3. r is that if voting for a party is a sign that a person feels best represented by that party, then Venezuelans feel better represented by a united AD than by a divided AD. For every election year simulated, the united party won more votes than the party or parties under any sort of factionalism. Accion Democd.tica won significantly less of the vote if the nomination was divisive even if it did not split the party. If there was a minor splinter, of the magnitude of the ARS split, the combined vote for AD and its splinter was far lower, consistent with the pattern of a more severe bout of internal conflict that did not yield an attractive electoral alternative. If the split did yield a more attractive alternative, as in the simulated "major splinter" pattern and the actual case of the MEP, the combined vote was not quite so low, but the splinter party did not attract enough votes to overcome the voters' penalties for internal conflict. Overall, fewC"r voters felt well represented by AD and its splinter. It might seem that if voters became disgusted with the pettiness of infighting in AD, they would feel correspondingly better repre-

Polyarchy and Intraparty Politics 51.0

... _ ....,

Share of National Vote (percent)

-

63

~~

' ............. ___ . _ ___ ., ; ""',.,., Divisive ' ..... ; Nomination

40.0 ,.. , Minor Split 30.0

/

---

-------""

/

_______ ...,.,.,

/,.. Major Split /

22.9 - - - - Actual

AD

share

- - - - - - Predicted AD share at four levels of factionalism

•

Predicted AD share at actual level of factionalism

0

1958

1963

1968

1973

1978

1983

Year of Election

FIG. 3.1. Estimated electoral impact of factionalism. Regression model, described in Appendix.

sented by other parties, especially COPEI. If this were true, the overall quality of representation by the party system would be unchanged by factionalism. After careful consideration, however, it should be clear that there is a net loss in quality, because all the voters involved would be deprived of their most satisfying option. Those who vote for AD in spite of its internal conflict, whether they are swing voters or diehard partisans, would prefer to vote for a united AD; those who identify with AD but vote for CO PEl while AD is divided would also prefer to see AD united; and those who identify with CO PEl and vote for CO PEl may win, but their victory would be less satisfying, as though they had won a game by default. It is enough to win, but victory is always sweeter when one's opponent is strong.

If division is irrational for the electoral party, then why has AD done it three times and come close to division on at least two other occasions? The answer will be clear only after examining the politics of the power party in Chapter 5. First, however, Chapter 4 will introduce another paradox, this time in the policy party.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Policy Party

T

his chapter examines the policy party, that is, aspects of the internal politics of the governing party in Venezuela that affect government policy-who the important institutional actors are within the party, what the basis of their power is, the relationship between them, and the policy consequences of conflict between them. The two rnost important institutional actors in AD when it is the governing party are the president and the CEN, acting through the Congress. An analysis of their relationship and a case study of politics within AD during the first two years of the Lusinchi government show that the policy party was an eye of calm and consensus in the center of the storm raging in the power party during those years. This incongruity in AD's internal political affairs illustrates the importance of distinguishing between the policy party and the power party when examining a party's internal politics.

Executives and Their Parties Governing parties everywhere exhibit a pronounced and wellknown tendency to defer to the policies of their leaders in the executive.1 Leaders who remain outside the executive may occasionally clamor to get in, take potshots at the government from the safety of the legislative branch, or even withdraw their support, but such actions are not typical. On most issues, most of the time, governing parties support their government. Examples to the contrary loom large in the public's memory because they are the exception, not the rule. In countries where legislative parties are fairly cohesivein other words, in most of the democratic world-executives rarely lack the support of their own party.2

The Policy Party

65

Conflict between executives and their parties is exceptional in part because they have similar stands on the issues to begin with. It could also be rare because executives make concessions to their parties to obtain their support, but this is usually not the reason. It is much more common for parties to make concessions to their governments, because the executive usually has the upper hand. Executives have superior access to information and resources, so it is difficult to refute their claims that their policies are best. The leaders of most governing parties also understand that, in order to hold on to power, an executive must formulate policies that appeal to the entire nation, not just to the governing party. For all these reasons, "cabinet government," or even "prime ministerial government," has replaced the notion of party government in parliamentary systems. Parties have even less power over presidents, whose tenure in office is fixed. Within this tendency toward executive dominance, however, there is still quite a wide range of variation. In Mexico the president can expect the PRI to generate enthusiastic support for any initiative he dreams up, including reforms that undermine the institutions that kept the party in power for decades. In the Chilean Parliamentary Republic (r892-I920), the president was little more than an administrator who carried out the wishes of party leaders in the Congress.3 The relative strengths of executives and their parties depend on the specific combination of institutions in each country. In Venezuela, despite the unusual strength of political parties, the normal tendency toward executive dominance prevails: AD, for example, customarily releases its presidents from party discipline when they assume office.4 It has also granted its presidents farreaching decree powers every time it has been the majority party in Congress. Lusinchi received decree powers for six months in 1984. Betancourt received temporary decree powers in the third year of his term, five months after the democratic constitution went into effect, eliminating the decree powers he had enjoyed under Perez Jimenez's authoritarian 1953 constitution.5 Carlos Andres Perez in 1974 requested extraordinary powers to issue decrees for one year on a wide and vaguely worded set of issues. The congressional majority of AD granted him that authority on the condition that he give advance notice to multiparty commissions, but these commissions were largely ignored. Even the leaders of AD sometimes learned of

66

The Policy Party

decrees only after they had been published in the Gaceta Oficial, and the sheer volume of decrees went beyond any standard of responsible government-830 decrees and 51 new commissions in one year's time.6 Yet the president, though he is the dominant actor in the policy party, is not all-powerful, and he is not the sole actor. The CEN, too, has the potential to play an important policy role through its control of the Parliamentary Fraction of AD in the Congress. If the CEN is united behind a position, it dictates the party line to the chief of the Parliamentary Fraction, who tells the Fraction how the party will be voting each week-this even though individual members rarely if ever have an opportunity to register an actual vote in the Chamber. Committee chairs know what the CEN wants because only CEN members are allowed to chair congressional committees? Any Adecos who wished to vote against the party line in Congress would have a hard time finding an opportunity to do so, and if they succeeded, they would be expelled from the party in short order. Obviously, control of the Parliamentary Fraction gives the CEN some leverage with the president on legislative matters. If the president cannot count on the unquestioning support of his party, he may amend his legislative initiatives to please the other party leaders rather than risk the embarrassment of defeat in a legislative vote. If the party leaders are implacable, he may abandon some initiatives altogether. Control of the Congress is a potent bargaining chip in Venezuela because under Article 173 of the Constitution the president has no veto power. If he disapproves of a bill that has been passed by a simple majority in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, he may send it back to the Congress for a second consideration. If the bill is passed again, even if it is only by a simple majority, it becomes law, regardless of the president's position (unless the Supreme Court decides that the law is unconstitutional). And any bill approved by a two-thirds majority becomes law without further reconsideration. The fact that Congress has the last word provides a powerful incentive for the president to seek an understanding with the majority party bloc in the Congress. There are, therefore, two nodes of power in the policy party-the president and the CEN. The relationship between these two power

The Policy Party

67

nodes structures the politics of the policy party. Mutual dependence gives both an incentive to get along. The president needs not only the party's cooperation in legislative matters but also its defense of the government before the media, other parties, interest groups, and constituents. If the president were to lose the active support of his own party, he would lose much of his legitimacy as well. But the party is also dependent on the president, since it is identified in the public's eye with the president's policies and performance. His record becomes part of the party's image. It is in the interest of both party and president to consult often and to agree on policies that the party can support actively. Nevertheless, there are times when agreement is impossible, and in those situations, each actor has enough authority to act alone in certain spheres of policy-making. According to Article 190 of the Constitution, the president is entitled to change his cabinet, command the armed forces, write regulations to carry out laws, declare a brief state of emergency, and grant pardons without congressional action. The CEN, acting through the Congress, has the unilateral power to defeat public contracts, concessions, treaties, funding requests, and expropriations; censure and dismiss ministers (by twothirds vote); decide military promotions and the appointment of the attorney general; carry out investigations, with subpoena powers; prevent the president from leaving the country; impeach him; or pass any legislation it wishes.8 The CEN's support is not always sufficient for the passage of legislation, for AD has often lacked a single-party majority; but its support has always been necessary. Sometimes the CEN's decisions are sufficient for the passage of legislation, even when the president opposes passage. This happens either when AD controls a majority by itself or when it forms an ad hoc majority coalition in the Congress with opposition parties. Either kind of majority is constitutionally able to legislate over the president's head. Although it is difficult to document instances in which this has actually occurred, since presidents tend to claim that they supported any bill that their party backed in the Congress, there is no question that Congress has the ability to legislate over the president's head, and it has done so many times to presidents facing an opposition majority coalition. Opposition majority coalitions have been surprisingly common in Venezuela's democratic history. Presidents Leoni, Caldera, and

68

The Policy Party

Herrera never had majorities controlled by their parties, nor did Betancourt after 1962, nor did Perez in his second government. By the end of the 1989-94 term of office, presidents will have lacked working majorities (either single-party majorities or majority coalitions) during 56 percent of the democratic time elapsed between 1945 and 1994. Stalemates between the president and the Congress have also occurred frequently during these minority governments.9 Romulo Betancourt became a minority president in January 1962, when his last coalition fell apart. During the last year and a half of his administration, AD, COPEI, and URD united to defend the democratic regime in the face of four coup attempts and a guerrilla war, but budgetary conflicts still broke out and dramatically slowed the pace of his agrarian reform. Raul Leoni also became a minority president for the last fourteen months of his term when AD split in December 1967. He lost control over oil policy as a result, and the Congress was temporarily paralyzed over the election of congressional officers.10 No Venezuelan president, minority or not, has formed a coalition since early 1968Y Rafael Caldera (1969-74), whose party controlled only 28 percent of the seats in the Chamber, was stalemated for all but a year and a half of his five-year term, which was further tarnished by a constitutional conflict between the president and the Congress over the judicial appointment powerP The stalemate was alleviated by a pact between AD and CO PEl called the "Coincidencia," but even during this period only the most essential legislation was passed. 13 The next Copeyano president, Luis Herrera Campfns, also lacked a working majority in Congress (he had 43 percent), and also suffered from stalemate. During his first year in office (1979), AD boycotted the Congress for three weeks and delayed passage of practically all legislation until the end of the year. 14 Two-thirds of all the legislation approved between 1979 and 1982 was approved on the last day of each sessionY If AD controlled a majority by itself, or were willing to join a majority coalition in opposition to the president, it could at least threaten to stalemate the president or legislate without him; it has actually done so in the past. 16 According to Terry Karl, President Perez in his first term wanted congressional approval of a bill authorizing him to centralize control over an expanded state enterprise

The Policy Party

69

sector, but the AD leadership forced him to scale it back radicallyP This was a case of near-stalemate. The CEN probably also supported legislation that the president opposed in 1988, at the end of the Lusinchi administration, when the mantle of leadership had passed to the presidential nominee, Carlos Andres Perez. Perez supported a fundamental political reform that authorized the direct election of governors and mayors, which Lusinchi had opposed, but AD voted in favor of it in the Congress in August 1988.18 In a broader sense, however, Venezuelan presidents cannot be judged weak, for the frequent difficulties of the legislative process have contributed to the concentration of power in the presidency. Venezuelan presidents do not necessarily give up when the Congress becomes an obstacle to their programs; often they simply enact their programs by decree, circumventing the Congress altogether. For evidence of this tendency, one need look no further than the volume of legislation passed by the Congress. It is quite small: even under presidents who had working majorities in both houses, the Congress approved an average of only 27.9 laws per year from 1959 to 1982. (Minority governments averaged 23 .9.) 19 In comparative terms, the Venezuelan Congress is remarkably unproductive, as Table 4.1 shows: the average number of laws approved by the legislatures of other countries is much higher unless the legislature was a communist sham institution or is constitutionally relieved of most legislative responsibility, as the Canadian Senate is. The sphere of influence that comes under the CEN's exclusive control is therefore limited to the rather small volume of legislation that must go through the Congress, or does not depend on presidential implementation. Even the power of the purse is not so important as one might assume, for the bulk of public expenditures take place in the "decentralized" state enterprises, and are therefore offbudget, that is, not subject to congressional oversight. (Seventy-one percent of public expenditures were off-budget in 1975 .) 20 Privatization has somewhat reduced the proportion of expenditure that escapes congressional control, but much more reform will be necessary before Congress regains authority over most of government expenditures. Of course, the lack of a clearly defined boundary between the Congress' legislative competence and the president's normal decree powers leaves a large gray area in which disputes can arise, but for

70

The Policy Party TABLE 4.1

Legislative Output in 14 Countries

Legislature

Brazilian Federal Senate U.S. Congress Argentine Chamber of Deputies (1973-76) Nicaraguan National Assembly French Parlement British Parliament Spanish Cortes

Number of bills approved annually

Legislature

Number of bills approved annually

827 500-600

Colombian Congress Bulgarian Assembly

70 29

>300

Venezuelan Congress

28

Cuban People's Assembly Canadian Senate Hungarian National Assembly Mongolian Assembly

27 26

219 110 100 70

14 18

souRcEs: U.S., France, Britain, Spain, and Colombia: Gabaldon and Oberto, La reforma Parlamentaria, r: qn. Venezuela: Congreso de Ia Republica, 2 5 aiios de legislaci6n democrdtica. All others: Inter-Parliamentary Union, Parliaments of the World, pp. 909-20.

very obvious reasons the president usually wins these disputes. He is able to keep many of his actions secret from the Congress; he has superior access to and control over information, which gives him an advantage in interpreting for the public the timing, necessity, and appropriateness of actions that cannot remain secret; and, not the least, being an executive, he can present the Congress with a fait accompli that the Congress is powerless to reverse. All this makes the president the more powerful of the two institutional actors in the policy party. But even with these advantages for the president, if the CEN is unified in opposition, it can assert itself and, in effect, govern in certain narrowly defined spheres of policy. In this respect, it probably has greater influence over the policy process than most governing parties.

The Policy Party During the Lusinchi Government The tendency toward executive dominance and the importance of distinguishing between the policy party and the power party are nicely illustrated by a case study of politics in the AD policy party during the majority government of Jaime Lusinchi. Interpretation of this case is tricky, because even though Lusinchi's policies and

The Policy Party

71

policy-making style were closely aligned with the preferences of AD, he nevertheless had to contend with a growing, and ultimately successful, challenge to his leadership midway through his term. A superficial examination of this challenge tempts one to conclude that Lusinchi disregarded some fundamental principle of AD during his government, and this created sufficient resentment among many Adecos for them to rally around a candidate for the nomination who advocated a radically different economic program-and then righteously took control of the party from the wayward incumbent. Lusinchi came into office with the support of a nominally social democratic party, but he took a series of socially regressive measures in order to stabilize the economy and renegotiate Venezuela's foreign debt. Many observers expected these measures to provoke opposition within the governing party, and when Carlos Andres Perez emerged to seize control of the party from Lusinchi, many saw him as the champion of AD's populist holdouts. Indeed, he was a natural candidate for that role, after the statist tendencies and profligate spending of his first government. A closer look, however, reveals that this interpretation is a profound misunderstanding of what was really going on, for there was so much consensus among the leaders of AD on economic policy that there were few chances for any such issue to drive a wedge between the president and his party. The policy party was an eye of calm in the center of a storm. The contrast between the consensual politics of the policy party and the deepening divisions in the larger party is inexplicable as long as the analytical focus is confined to the policy party. The Economic Crisis

When Jaime Lusinchi took office in 1984, the country was experiencing a foreign-debt-related economic crisis. The crisis had first become serious in 1982-83, during the COPEI government of Luis Herrera Campfns. The official exchange rate of 4·3 bolfvares (Bs) to the U.S. dollar had not changed in twenty years, but recent inflation and a mounting foreign debt were creating increasing pressure for a devaluation. By late 1982 most Venezuelans who had any money knew that a devaluation was inevitable and prudently started buying dollars, yet the government did nothing. Worse still,

72

The Policy Party

while it was doing nothing, the Herrera government continued to make generous loans to businessmen who promptly invested the funds in dollars. Capital flight accelerated to a rate of Shoo million per day, a rate that even Venezuela's Sln billion in reserves could not sustain for long.21 Herrera took two actions that bought his government some time. In February 1983, he changed the single official exchange rate to a three-tier rate consisting of the old Bs4. 3I dollar for some purposes, Bs6/ dollar for others, and a floating rate for the rest. The cost of dollars for speculation quickly rose more than threefold, to Bsr3-r6/ dollar, and effectively reduced the outflow of capital. This de facto evaluation also dramatically increased the prices of many imported goods, so that imports fell52.8 percent in 1983, further reducing the outflow of currencyP The second action was to declare a unilateral moratorium on foreign debt payments. At that time, the structure of the country's foreign debt was such that its amortization obligations for the next fourteen months would have exhausted the entire national budget; 64 percent of the total debt was scheduled to fall due before 1985 P The moratorium, extended regularly upon expiration, kept the burden of debt service down to 17·4 percent of exports during that first year. Therefore, after a balance of payments deficit of $4.2 billion in 1982, the Herrera government managed to achieve a $4.4 billion balance of payments surplus in its last year (r983). This was only a temporary solution, however. The moratorium on debt payments could not be extended forever without triggering a default, which could cut off foreign investment for the foreseeable future. The foreign debt had to be rescheduled so that the country could afford to service it without severe disruption of its domestic economy. And until the debt was refinanced, there could be no new investment, confidence in the currency would continue to decline, and prices of essential imports would continue to rise. A large body of literature has grown up around the assumption that economic crises like the one Lusinchi inherited lead to political crises in democratic regimes.24 The core of the argument is that countries facing balance-of-payments problems due to a heavy foreign debt service burden are under pressure to adopt unpopular economic policies. The pressure comes when the government tries to refinance its foreign debt to ease the burden of debt service.

The Policy Party

73

The refinancing agreement must be negotiated with foreign creditor banks, which insist that the debtor governments adopt "orthodox" economic policies that they believe to be the best insurance that the country will be able to continue servicing its debt. These orthodox policies usually include wage restraint, the elimination of subsidies, the removal of price controls, tax increases, and other measures that are thought to be unwelcome to many of the debtor government's citizens. They are especially unwelcome when the reason for their adoption is to enrich foreign banks, which violates nationalist sensibilities. If the government adopts these policies, it supposedly faces at least a loss of support, probably an increase in strikes and demonstrations, and perhaps even a complete loss of public order, resulting in a military coup. But if the government does not adopt these policies, the creditors will not refinance the debt, which leads eventually to a declaration of default and the cutoff of all new lending to the country.

AD's Policy Orientation When Lusinchi led AD to majority control of the Congress for the third time in 1983, party leaders, remembering how Perez had abused his special decree powers, put up firmer resistance when Lusinchi asked for similar powers in 1984 to deal with the debt crisis. This time prior consultation between government and party delayed approval of the enabling legislation for four months, and the content of the decrees was strictly delineated in advance. 25 This delay brought a positive result in that intense consultation over the permissible content of the decrees forged a consensus on economic policy between AD and its government and prevented criticism later on. Lusinchi's use of his special powers was so circumspect that when they expired, the worst criticism COPEI could muster was that they had been unnecessary to begin with, as proved by the fact that Lusinchi had done so little with them.26 In view of the wide discussion that has surrounded the Latin American debt issue in the international arena, in academic circles, and in the countries of the region, including Venezuela, it may seem surprisingly tame to say that, a year after the enabling legislation was passed, a great many economic issues were uncontroversialthat is, the president shared the position of a large majority of his

74

The Policy Party

party on these issues-and that in fact the most striking feature of the debate about economic policy during the Lusinchi government was consensus. There was controversy over the debt issue among parties, but because Lusinchi headed a majority government in a partyarchy, he was not accountable to any party but his ownP In a single party, even a broad-based party, the scope of disagreement is relatively narrow. Disagreement between the Lusinchi government and AD on the debt issue was very limited. Those who are well acquainted with AD's ideological orientation in its latter years would probably not be surprised at the lack of controversy. The party itself often cultivated a leftist or populist image. It belonged to the Socialist International; it called itself a "revolutionary" party in its statutes; its unofficial name was El Partido del Pueblo ("The People's Party") and its speakers indulged in populist rhetoric; and in its early days, conservatives suspected that it was a front for communists. In fact, the most common term used to refer to a party member, Adeco, derived from "AD-COmunista," was coined by AD's opponents. 28 But AD had another image among some observers, who argued that even if AD started out as a revolutionary party, it compromised its principles when democratic rule began. During the transition to democracy in 1958-59, AD agreed to a political pact that committed it to restraint of labor demands and a coalition with more conservative parties.29 The party lost its left wing at this time, partly as a result of these compromises. Some go as far as to argue that Venezuela's phenomenally expensive political campaigns (by far the world's most expensive per capita, and among the most expensive in absolute terms) 30 made AD and CO PEl subservient to wealthy business groups in exchange for campaign financing. 31 Most knowledgeable students of Venezuelan politics would place AD's true position somewhere between these extreme stereotypes, but that leaves a broad middle ground that demands some clearer definition of AD's principles. Without digressing into a detailed discussion of all aspects of party doctrine, the essentials of what AD did and did not stand for can be summarized in two principles: AD was a reformist party, and it was a pragmatic party.Jl

The Policy Party

75

AD Was a Reformist Party In its Political Thesis Acci6n Demowitica claimed to be a "National Revolutionary" party.33 It set forth several goals that were indeed revolutionary: agrarian reform, national control of the oil industry, and redistribution of wealth and income. The first two goals have become largely irrelevant. The AD governments of Betancourt and Leoni (1959-69) carried out an agrarian reform that was "a major accomplishment in comparison with the performance of most agrarian reform programs in Latin America." 34 It was not a great success in terms of creating a class of self-sufficient smallholders, since only about one-third of peasant families received titles to land, and many of them, lacking technical and financial support, sold their land. But the program succeeded in greatly increasing agricultural production, and the need for land redistribution was overtaken by rapid urbanization. By 1985 only 10 percent of the work force was engaged in agriculture. Control of the oil industry was achieved beyond the party's wildest dreams. The Political Thesis did not even commit the party to eventual nationalization, but the industry was nationalized by an AD government in 1976. And the revenues from oil grew tremendously in the 197o's as an indirect result of another AD initiativethe formation of OPEC, which was initiated by Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo, the oil minister in Betancourt's government. 35 Needless to say, the party also played a major role in establishing a democratic regime in Venezuela. 36 Success left AD without much of a direction for the future. The Political Thesis had not been updated since 1964.37 There remained, of course, the redistribution of wealth and income, but since the Thesis commits the party to redistribution only by democratic means, without violence, this goal was not being achieved at a revolutionary pace; AD was no longer revolutionary, but reformist. The essence of reformism is making incremental changes, one at a time. Following this principle, AD governments made a revision of the tax code here, a revision of the penal code there, gave ongoing attention to infrastructure development projects, and occasionally passed a wage increase. Adecos in the mid-198o's were not interested in transforming the system; they only wanted to manage and

43%

21%

Left

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Self-placement by Congressmen (n =54)

Right

57%-

29%

r--

r--

14%

-, Left

30% 23%

8 9 10 7 4 5 6 3 1 2 Self-placement by labor leaders (n = 21)

i

~

1---.-~

Right

D

~-L--~~--~~~-L--L------L~

Left

7 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 Self-placement by CEN members (n = 18)

Right

FIG. 4· 1. Self-placement of Adecos along Left-Right scale. "Many people use the words Left and Right when they talk about politics. Here is a scale with a row of boxes running from left to right. Based on your political opinions, which box would you place yourself in to best reflect your political position?"

The Policy Party

77

improve it-quite understandable, since the system was fundamentally their creation. Those who wonder whether Acci6n Democratica's actions were accurate reflections of its members' true ideological leanings should examine Figure 4.1, which shows how Adecos placed themselves on a left-right scale. The largest proportion in each of the three samples was located at 5 on a I-to-IO left-right scale, which is as close to the center as one can sit and still be on the Left. Fewer than 30 percent of AD congressmen, labor leaders, or CEN members saw themselves as more definitely on the Left (3) or beyond. The average position was 4·4 for members of Congress, 4·3 for labor, and 4.8 for the CEN. Furthermore, the leaders of AD overwhelmingly saw their party as centrist. On a ten-point scale, the average leader of AD placed his party to the right of the MAS (3.1), MEP (2.8), MIR (1.7), and PCV (1.3), but also far to the left of COPEI, which he perceived to be on the far right at 8+ AD Was a Pragmatic Party In spite of what has been said above, some might consider the first AD government of Carlos Andres Perez (1974-79) more revolutionary than reformist because it attempted to make a great number of changes very quickly. Perez used his AD majority in the Congress to obtain emergency powers to rule by decree on economic matters for one year, and during that period he issued nearly one thousand decrees. Furthermore, some of the changes he promoted transformed the Venezuelan economy. For instance, gross per capita income increased by 6o percent in his first year in office. In five years Perez doubled the number of public employees and tripled government personnel expenditures. He created the Venezuelan Investment Fund, which was to receive half of all of the nation's oil export revenues. And he made it difficult for private employers to dismiss workers without giving generous severance pay.38 But it is easier to understand these intiatives as a response to Venezuela's huge oil bonanza during those years than as the expression of a revolutionary party or leader. This is especially true considering that the overall tendency of the measures was not redistributive. Many of the initial gains by the working class and the poor were lost to inflation after a few years. And besides, many of the decrees were very favorable to business-generous loans and public

78

The Policy Party

investment, protectionism, and producer subsidies. The orientation of the Perez government, as well as of other AD governments, was not to soak the rich but to treat all groups equally. The way that AD applied this formula depended on the economic circumstances: in a period of economic expansion, it tried to do something for everyone; in a period of economic contraction, it expected some sacrifice from everyone. A policy of treating all sectors equally, of sharing prosperity and hardship, cannot be classified in left-right terms, as liberal or conservative, progressive or reactionary. It was pragmatic, in the sense that the principal source of variation in policy was economic feasibility, not ideology or loyalty to any one class or sector. Another indication of AD's pragmatism was its tradition of freeing the president from party discipline. There was a strongly held notion among Adecos that the president was responsible to all Venezuelans, not just to the ones who voted for his party. If this understanding forced him to choose between policies that were favored by his party and policies that were best for the nation as a whole, Adecos felt, at least in principle, that the president should choose the latter. Withdrawing the whip from the president is a profoundly pragmatic practice, since it legitimates placing the possibilities of the moment above party doctrine.

The Area of Consensus The party's national leaders favored some, but not all, of the recommendations of the government's foreign creditors. More importantly, Lusinchi's economic policies closely reflected his party's preferences: his policies tended to follow the creditors' preferences where AD agreed, and to diverge from the creditors' preferences where AD disagreed. Since my survey of AD leaders was conducted after most of the policies had been adopted, the data presented here do not make it possible to determine whether AD's positions determined the president's policies, or the president's policies determined the party's positions. The data do, however, support the relevant argument: that there was substantial agreement between president and party on economic policy.

The Policy Party

79

Orthodox Consensus Party leaders' attitudes toward austerity typify their reactions to other policies. Despite all the predictions of social upheaval that would result from austerity in Latin America, it was not, in general, an unpopular policy among Adecos. It was common knowledge that the government budget contained a lot of waste. There were frequent stories in the press about great numbers of people who were on the payroll but never came to work, in addition to the people one could actually observe hanging around government offices with nothing to do.39 There were also stories about relatively low-level bureaucrats with high-level perks, such as rented cars, chauffeurs, bodyguards, expense accounts, and large budgets for travel and gifts. Insofar as austerity meant cutting back on this kind of waste, it was a very popular policy. President Lusinchi did not miss his chance to attack government waste. Among his first actions in office were a ro percent salary cut for the highest-paid officials and a ro percent budget cut for the state ministries.40 He also initiated the dismantling and sale of several unprofitable state enterprises that had been draining the national budget, including the Venezuelan Development Corporation, which had made some spectacularly bad investments in the mid-197o's. Most AD leaders approved of these policies. As Table 4.2 shows, all but two respondents believed that some kind of austerity program was necessary, and 57 to 87 percent of each sample either considered austerity a positive good or were unwilling to criticize the particular policies Lusinchi had adopted. It is interesting to note that the most supportive group was labor. One might suppose that AD leaders supported Lusinchi's austerity program because they recognized that it was necessary, even though they personally found it distasteful. Table 4.2 proves otherwise. Some of the AD leaders liked austerity, some opposed it, and some were undecided; but none of the 8o leaders interviewed thought of the austerity program as a necessary evil. AD's pragmatism is not simply an outcome imposed by economic circumstances on unfortunate politicians who really wish that they could try something more ambitious. Adecos practiced their pragmatism without regrets, consciously, deliberately, and wholeheartedly. AD attitudes on several other policy questions were also in line

8o

The Policy Party TABLE 4.2

AD Leaders' Reactions to Lusinchi's Austerity Program "Since he took office, the president has been implementing an austerity program to deal with the economic crisis that the country is now facing. Which of the statements [below] best expresses your feelings toward the austerity program?" In the long run, austerity is good for the country. I don't like austerity but really there is no alternative to the measures that have been adopted. Some kind of austerity program is necessary, but it is hard to say whether this program is what the country really needs or not. Some kind of austerity program is necessary, but the program that is now being implemented has many defects. Austerity is not the solution to the economic crisis that the country is e:>tperiencing. Other answer. TOTAL

Congress (n =54)

Labor (n = 23)

CEN (n = 23)

50%

61%

48%

0

0

0

17

26

9

31

13

39

2 0 100%

0 0 100%

0 4 100%

souRcE: Author's survey, described in Chapter I.

with the typical orthodox prescriptions. Large majorities of all three samples were in favor of the 1983 devaluation,41 sales tax increases, privatization of certain state enterprises, and revising trade regulations and licensing procedures to stimulate exports. There was also significant support for an income tax increase (Table 4.3). If the leaders who favored an increase in the income tax rate did not quite constitute a majority, it was only because the answers that were coded "it depends" were along the lines of "we need more tax revenue, but we should improve the collection of taxes before we raise the rates." Lusinchi's tax policies were very consistent with these party positions. He raised sales taxes on liquor and tobacco, and improved the collection of income tax by instituting tax withholding for professional honoraria, sales commissions, rent income, and contractual payments, and by requiring lump sum payments of personal income tax.

The Policy Party

81

TABLE 4·3

Consensus Among AD Leaders on Orthodox Economic Policies "Tell me which of these [policies] you approve of, and which you disapprove of."

a. The currency devaluation of 1983

Approve Disapprove It depends TOTAL

b. New or higher taxes on consumption, alcohol, and tobacco

Approve Disapprove It depends TOTAL

c. An income tax increase

Approve Disapprove It depends TOTAL

d. The sale of certain public enterprises

Approve Disapprove It depends TOTAL

e. Administrative stimulation of exports

Approve Disapprove It depends Not asked TOTAL

SOURCE:

Congress (n =54)

Labor (n = 23)

CEN (n = 23)

59% 37 4 100%

57% 39 4 100%

87% 13 0 100%

89% 6 6 100%

74% 4 100%

78% 17 4 100%

46% 28 26 100%

39% 22 39 100%

43% 39 17 100%

89% 9 2 100%

78% 13 9 100%

87% 9 4 100%

91% 6 2 2 100%

96% 4 0 0 100%

100% 0 0 0 100%

22

Author's survey, described in Chapter r.

Heterodox Consensus There were also areas in which party leaders disagreed with the orthodox approach, but most of these were areas in which the Lusinchi government itself pursued heterodox policies. A cornerstone of orthodox stabilization and adjustment policies is the liberalization of trade, which translates in practice into the phasing out of exchange controls, the reduction of import tariffs and restrictions, and the elimination of export subsidies. These policies are based on the belief that it is better to manage a balance-ofpayments problem by letting the market, through the exchange rate, balance international accounts, than to artificially restrict imports or subsidize exports. The Lusinchi government departed from orthodox prescriptions

82

The Policy Party TABLE

4·4

AD Leaders' Consensus Against Trade Liberalization "Tell me which of these [policies] you approve of, and which you disapprove of."

a. Imposition of exchange controls

Approve Disapprove It depends TOTAL

b. Subsidies for certain exporting industries

Approve Disapprove It depends Not asked TOTAL

c. Raising import tariffs

Approve Disapprove It depends TOTAL

d. Reducing import restrictions (that is, making importation easier)

Approve Disapprove It depends TOTAL

Congress (n =54)

Labor (n = 23)

CEN (n = 23)

87% 13 0 100%

91% 9 0 100%

91% 9 0 100%

67% 28 4 2 100%

70% 26 4 0 100%

87% 13 0 0 100%

46% 19 35 100%

57% 13 30 100%

52% 13 35 100%

35% 56 9 100%

35% 43 22 100%

30% 61 9 100%

souRcE: Author's survey, described in Chapter 1.

by maintaining exchange controls.42 The devaluation of 1983 was quite effective by itself in reducing the outflow of foreign currency, so the government did not have to rely heavily on new import restrictions.43 Lusinchi did, however, ban or restrict imports of certain agricultural products that were not native to Venezuela (wheat, apples, pears, and plums) or were produced in sufficient quantities domestically, such as corn and cotton. The government also maintained existing export subsidies, and simplified export regulations to draw nontraditional exporters into foreign trade. As Table 4·4 shows, on each of these issues, Lusinchi's deviations from orthodox prescriptions were mirrored in the attitudes of party leaders. Exchange controls (a) were one of the most popular measures to Adeco leaders; support for export subsidies (h) was also strong. Consensus appears to be less solid with respect to imports, but the weakness of the trend probably has more to do with the phrasing of the questions than with the degree of actual support. Pluralities leaned in favor of raising import tariffs and against

The Policy Party TABLE

83

4·5

AD Leaders' Consensus in Favor of Stimulating Economic Growth "Tell me which of these [policies[ you approve of, and which you disapprove of."

a. Lowering interest rates

Approve Disapprove It depends TOTAL

b. Restricting the money supply

Approve Disapprove It depends TOTAL

c. Tax incentives for private investment

Approve Disapprove It depends TOTAL

Congress (n =54)

Labor (n = 23)

CEN (n = 23)

74% 9 17 100%

70% 9 22 100%

61% 13 26 100%

26% 61 13 100%

22% 70 9 100%

13% 65 22 100%

76% 17 7 100%

70% 26 4 100%

74% 13 13 100%

souRcE: Author's survey, described in Chapter 1.

making importation easier, but neither tendency was marked (c and d). If a consensual position existed, it probably would have formed around imposing new import restrictions on certain items. Several respondents mentioned that they favored banning imports of luxury items. The government's handling of imports was at least inoffensive, given the party's indecision, and it may have been welcomed enthusiastically. A second area of united party-government rejection of orthodoxy was economic growth. Economists associated with the IMF and creditor banks have nothing against economic growth per se; in fact, they recognize that growth makes it easier for a country to service its debts. But in the overall orthodox scheme of things, growth is a secondary concern. It tends to be neglected in the emphasis on repayment on a fairly rapid schedule that precludes devoting resources to stimulating the economy. President Lusinchi, in contrast, considered growth an indispensable part of the solution to the debt crisis.44 Table 4· 5 shows that the leaders of Lusinchi's party also considered economic growth a high priority. They opposed restricting the money supply, which would contract the economy, and favored lowering interest rates and providing tax incentives for business, which would expand it. To these

84

The Policy Party

positions one could add the Adecos' support for export subsidies and administrative stimulation of exports (Tables 4.3,e and 4.4,b).

Areas of Disagreement Against this backdrop of policy consensus, there were several issues on which president and party disagreed. Two of these issues, however, concerned implementation of a policy rather than the principle of the policy itself, and on the other two only the labor leaders were clearly in disagreement with government policy. None of these issues was sufficiently important to cause the CEN to go into active opposition in the Congress.45 One of these issues was the unification of exchange rates. At the time of the 1983 devaluation, the Herrera government had created a complicated three-tier system of exchange rates, which was opposed by large majorities (76-96 percent) of the samples of the AD leadership. The Lusinchi government never achieved complete unification, but its official policy on exchange rates was that they should be unified-eventually. In the meantime, the government continued to devalue the average exchange rate very gradually by shifting transactions to the more expensive rates and eliminating cheaper rates. There is no evidence that party leaders were displeased with the government's gradual progress in this area. Indeed, in the light of subsequent revelations that some high party leaders were profiting handsomely from inside manipulation of the multiple exchange rate, there are good reasons to suspect that they secretly favored its prolongation. The only people who complained publicly about the slowness of unification were the creditors. Another issue on which there was some disagreement between party and government was whether or not to increase public investment. Although CEN members were evenly divided on this issue, a bare majority (56 percent) of the congressional sample and almost all (74 percent) of the labor leaders opposed postponing public investment projects, and large majorities of all three samples favored increasing in public investment as long as the enterprises were productive. Given the swollen debt service burden and falling oil prices, the Lusinchi government was unable to maintain existing levels of public investment, but Lusinchi found a compromise that probably was palatable to his party: he maintained his commitment to

The Policy Party

85

the largest and most visible existing projects, while prioritizing the newer and smaller projects, to be funded to the extent that the government ran a budget surplus.46 Lusinchi's handling of the issue was politically wise: AD labor leaders were drawn into calling for faster implementation of the Additional Investment Program, without questioning the amount that was to be spent. On the other two issues-exchange subsidies and wages and prices-the labor leadership was the only group in which a majority of the respondents took a position that was contrary to government policy. The first of these issues was one of the most controversial for AD: should the government sell dollars at the preferential Bs4.3/dollar rate to private firms for the repayment of their foreign debts? Responses to other survey questions revealed that, after the Herrera government, AD leaders held "currency speculators" and "the Venezuelan business community" responsible for the economic crisis. Labor leaders therefore felt strongly that their government should not give financial assistance to the very people who had caused the crisis, especially when the guilty persons probably had large dollar investments abroad that they could use to repay their debts. Lusinchi's policy was to set up an agency, RECADI, charged with registering all private foreign debt. Private firms had to secure RECADI's approval, signifying that a debt was legitimate, before they could apply for preferential dollars at the Central Bank.47 The intensity of some Adecos' opposition to this policy may have been due in part to their inside knowledge that RECADI was being used to finance corruption on a massive scale.48 The cost of living was one of the most pressing issues at the time: wages were already severely depressed in 1985, having declined steadily at a rate of 5.07 percent per year from 1978 to 1984.49 The government's response involved wage restraint and limited price liberalization. On the price side, Lusinchi followed a compromise policy that defused opposition from his party. He did remove most price controls, and prices rose by about 12.5 percent in 1984 and 1985. Price controls remained in force for 150 essential items (mostly food, clothing, and household supplies), but some difficult increases were impossible to avoid. Subsidy reductions, for example, increased domestic fuel prices by 20 percent and the prices of pasteurized and powdered milk by 120 and 85 percent, respectively.50

86

The Policy Party

Subsidy reduction and elimination of price controls were opposed by solid majorities of all three samples. However, as part of his Social Pact, Lusinchi established a Commission on Costs, Prices, and Salaries (Conacopresa) that gave representatives of the CTV, Fedecamaras (the largest business interest group), and government equal authority over price increases. Initially, all requests for permission to raise any prices had to go through Conacopresa, which had 90 days to reach a decision. In November 1984, Conacopresa's jurisdiction was restricted to the 150 essential goods and services, and all other prices could be raised after 6o days' notice. However, the Development Minister retained the right to add any item to the list of essential goods if it judged a proposed increase to be exorbitant. This change in the price-setting mechanism caused Fedecamaras to cancel its participation in Conacopresa. The resulting polemical uproar about the possible demise of the Social Pact obscured a more significant fact: labor and government representatives remained on the commission and continued to approve price increases. The CTV and the AD Labor Bureau were not, therefore, in a position to criticize Lusinchi's price policies. On the wage side, the periodic wage increases that Lusinchi decreed were not enough to keep salaries ahead of inflation, except perhaps for agricultural workers.51 Although practically no one would go on record in favor of real wage reductions, and 61-70 percent of the party leadership agreed that "so far not enough has been done to insure the well-being of the poor," most Adecos said that they were willing to accept some wage restraint provided there was a good reason, such as maintaining the stability of the democratic regime or avoiding widespread business failures, and a slim majority of the politicians was willing to accept wage restraint in order to fight inflation. Sixty-five percent of the labor leaders were not, however, and the same percentage expressed support for a general wage increase (which only 39 percent of the CEN and congressional samples supported). Here again, labor leaders took a policy position that was contrary to government policy.

Ideas vs. Actions-Labor Leaders It is clear that AD labor leaders disagreed with some aspects of government policy, but there is a difference between disagreeing

The Policy Party

87

with a policy and actually doing something about it. During 1984 and 1985, AD labor leaders put public pressure on the government on five occasions. In July 1984, AD labor secretary Antonio Rios called for the resignation of Manuel Azpurua, the finance minister, because he was recruited from one of the largest business groups and seemed to have skewed economic policy in a probusiness direction. In May 1985 the Adeco president of the CTV, Juan Jose Delpino, embarrassed Lusinchi by calling for "salary adjustments" at the CTV convention, when Lusinchi was present. In September 1985, Delpino made the CTV's wage demands explicit by calling for variable wage increases of up to 34 percent. Later that year, Delpino criticized the slowness with which the Additional Investment Program funds were being released, which was delaying expansion and the creation of new jobs. And just before the refinancing agreement was signed, Delpino remarked that Venezuela should not sign because oil earnings had fallen so much since the initial agreement had been reached that the country could no longer afford to meet even the rescheduled repayments. Obviously there was some friction between the government and the AD labor movement. But the seriousness of these conflicts must not be exaggerated, as it often was at the time. What passes for news in the competitive Caracas dailies is often a small comment taken out of context from a lengthy interview. If it is a controversial or quotable statement, whether the speaker meant to emphasize it or not, all the papers pick it up; then their reporters ask other politicians to comment, and these scandalized or smug reactions are printed too. Soon all the pundits are speculating about the implications of this latest burning issue, and it can be days or weeks before the matter is forgotten. This process sometimes gave the impression that labor leaders were mounting a concerted campaign to embarrass the government, or that government-labor relations were in some sort of crisis, when neither was really the case. In the first place, it is important to distinguish between the CTV and the Labor Bureau, because they played different roles. The CTV, through Delpino, was assigned the role of criticizing the government on behalf of the working class, while the Labor Bureau, under Rios's leadership, played the role of loyal bastion of the governing party. This was a useful division of labor that allowed both organs to appear faithful to their constituents and allies. Delpino did

88

The Policy Party

his best to maintain the fiction that the CTV was not dominated by AD, and Rios avoided offending the president.52 But since the CTV's every move is subject to an AD veto, this division of labor was wholly artificial and deceptive. The leaders of the majority fraction of the CTV had exactly the same attitudes as the leaders of the Labor Bureau; they had to, because they were mostly the same people. Delpino was a member of the Labor Bureau, and Rios was on the Executive Committee of the CTV. And yet, apart from Rios's intemperate criticism of the finance minister in the first months of the Lusinchi administration (which he never repeated), Rios and Delpino assumed different stances in public. In the midst of Delpino's declarations, for example, Rios was asked how the Labor Bureau could identify itself with the government and at the same time defend working class interests. His answer left no doubt where his sympathies lay: We'll do it by facing the workers honestly. We'll speak to them clearly about the nature of the grave crisis that we are suffering, not only because of the catastrophic COPEI government, but also because of the weakening of petroleum prices and production. The workers have to know that the resources that we can count on today are much smaller than those of other times. The easy life is over. The days when things were solved by throwing money at them are finished. We're coming into very difficult times in which you have to work very hard.53

He summed up the Labor Bureau's stance beautifully later in the same interview: Our criticism, our struggle, and our demand is not directed at the government that we ourselves elected and that is making a sincere effort to overcome the crisis. Our struggle is directed against the capitalists who, because of their insensitivity to the petitions of the workers, and because of their laziness and indolence, have been incapable, to put it kindly, of reactivating the economy in spite of all the stimulus that the National Government has given them.54

Knowing that the Labor Bureau would not allow the CTV to act on a militant position, Delpino had to choose his words carefully. For example, by calling for a "reajuste salarial," he was leaving open the possibility of increasing benefits rather than wages, and with time it became clear that the CTV would not insist on a general wage increase by decree, which opened the way for increases through

The Policy Party

89

normal collective bargaining, or for a one-time bonus. Since some CTV leaders affiliated with other parties had mentioned a general increase ("aumento general"), an interviewer asked Antonio Rfos what the Labor Bureau would do if the CTV were to insist on a general increase. Rfos's reply was simple: "Acci6n Democratica has a majority on the executive committee of the CTV, and we have adopted a categorical position of not supporting a general increase, but a wage adjustment [reajuste de sa/arias]." 55 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the CTV talked a great deal but took little action. It did nothing more than ask the government for action. Compared with other nations, Venezuelan labor has had a very low level of strike activity, and 1984-85 was no exception. A few weeks after Delpino called for a 20-40 percent wage increase, a reporter asked him what actions the CTV was prepared to take in order to achieve that goal. The CTV president replied: "A great quantity of measures can be used. First we will discuss things with the government and with Fedecamaras, in the Tripartite Commission. Without resorting to coercive measures like strikes and public demonstrations, because the situation of the country requires equilibrium among its principal forces, and the CTV wants to become an example of equilibrium." 56 He did not mention any other actions.57 There was disagreement between the AD labor movement and the government, and there was bargaining and pressure through proper channels, but there was no danger of lost loyalty and no political crisis within the party based on opposition to the government's economic policies. The Labor Bureau's behavior in 1984-85 dramatically illustrates its subordination to the CEN in the policy party. This case also illustrates the Labor Bureau's alliance with the progovernment "In" faction during the first years of the Lusinchi government.58

Ideas and Actions-Politicians AD politicians were no more interested in opposing the president than were the labor leaders. Some AD leaders did criticize their government publicly in 1984 and 1985, but their dissent was the exception; disciplined support by the silent majority was the rule. The AD politicians who publicized their disagreements with government policy were not speaking for any significant or organized

90

The Policy Party

group within the party. They were mavericks, speaking for themselves. Moreover, most leaders who criticized the government were promptly punished by official party organs. One of the first AD politicians to criticize the Lusinchi government was Cristobal Hernandez, a hardworking deputy and CEN member. Hernandez described himself as "a person who was uncomfortable with the way things were." 59 One of the things that made him most uncomfortable was the party's lack of a formal process for formulating policy, which resulted in party positions that he considered improvised and irresponsible. He dissented along these lines within channels-for example, telling Lusinchi that his campaign platform was an impossible wish list. He also opposed as economically unsound a coal mining project and a steel mill project that the party leadership allegedly favored for political reasons. These moves had won him enemies in high places even before Lusinchi's government began because, in his words, "a person who dedicates himself to checking up on them is a bothersome person." In Lusinchi's first year as president, Hernandez decided to make his proposals for party reform public. 60 Although his proposals were directed principally at the party, they were also indirectly critical of the government, since they implied that Lusinchi had assumed the presidency with an inadequate understanding of the country's needs and that his government was not sufficiently responsive to the party's wishes. The CEN immediately voted to suspend him from his position as political secretary on the CEN and to replace him as chairman of the Economics Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. When the year's suspension expired, the CEN refused to let him resume his CEN position. Hernandez ran for reelection to the CEN in 1985 and was defeated. Another apparent dissident, Luis Raul Matos Az6car, was the son of an AD labor leader and an articulate and intellectual adviser to the labor movement. He was, for example, the principal author of the 1980 Porlamar Manifesto, which was the CTV's most complete statement ever of its ideology and its role in the Venezuelan context. From there, Matos had been put in charge of drafting Lusinchi's Program of Government, and then became Planning Minister in the Lusinchi government. But at the beginning of his second year in that post, Matos resigned. He at first claimed that he had planned to resign all along after drawing up the government's Five Year Plan,

The Policy Party

91

which he had finished. But within a few months, he let it be known that he had resigned because his ideas, and those of the Program of Government, were not being implemented.61 In a public interview after his resignation, Matos spoke very critically about the excessive centralization of the political parties, their lack of internal democracy, and the government's tendency to listen more carefully to the powerful business groups than to organized labor. "The Revolution of the Best," he said, referring to Lusinchi's campaign theme, "has turned into the Revolution of the Flatterers." Matos had left a CEN position in order to become Planning Minister, and normally would have been allowed to resume his position upon handing over his portfolio. But after this accusation, the CEN refused to allow him to return to its ranks. And, like Cristobal Hernandez, he lost his bid for reelection to the CEN in 1985. There were a few other politicians who publicly criticized AD or its president in the first years of the Lusinchi government, but they did not have a large base of support, and ultimately they lost out. Pedro Conde, a vice-chairman of the Chamber of Deputies Economics Committee, on one or two occasions expressed extreme pessimism about the government's strategy for economic recovery in lengthy newspaper interviews. He ran for a CEN position and received 85 votes from the National Convention's 1,905 voting delegates. Other critics, like Marco Tulio Bruni Celli and Luis Piiienia Ordaz, were more concerned with internal party democracy and corruption, respectively, than with the government's economic policy, and both were outsiders to the informal party-government inner circle. Bruni Celli lost his race against Manuel Peiialver for general secretary by a wide margin, and Piiierua found very little support for his ambition to win the party's presidential nomination once again. No other politicians did anything noticeable to oppose the government's economic policies. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that all AD congressmen continued to vote in favor of all the government's bills with their usual perfect party discipline.

Lusinchi's Popularity A final indication of the issueless character of the conflict between Ins and Outs is the very strong support for Jaime Lusinchi and his performance in office. Even though the president did not achieve

92

The Policy Party 4.6 Strength of Support for the Party Line Among AD Leaders TABLE

"Party unity often requires all activists to obey the party line whether they agree with it or not. Could you estimate the percentage of the time that you obey the party's posi· tions enthusiastically, indifferently, and resignedly?" Mean percentage of the time Congress

Enthusiastically Indifferently Resignedly TOTAL

66 9

23 100

Labor

CEN

84 5 11 100

78 8 15 100

souRcE: Author's survey, described in Chapter r. NOTE:

Two respondents in each sample group refused to answer.

everything his party would have liked, on most issues his policies reflected party preferences very closely. His failures must be placed in the context of his successes. For example, actual economic growth may have been slight and limited to certain sectors by the end of 1985, but the leaders of AD approved of the efforts the government was making and were confident that economic recovery would soon be under way. Upwards of 70 percent of the leadership believed that recovery would begin by the end of 1986. And 92-96 percent of the leadership either approved completely of Lusinchi's performance as president or believed that his overall performance had been quite good. The leaders of AD claimed to obey the party line (which was to support the government) enthusiastically 66-84 percent of the time (Table 4.6). The Adecos surveyed also had very positive feelings toward Jaime Lusinchi. His average favorable/adverse rating was second only to that of R6mulo Betancourt, the founder of the party (Table 4· 7). Furthermore, on all three indicators, the group that was most supportive of Lusinchi was the Labor Bureau. In retrospect, with the knowledge that President Lusinchi lost control of his party less than two years later, and with the knowledge that by 1992 he was rated Venezuela's worst president in public opinion polls, it is hard to believe that he really could have been so popular and highly admired by his fellow party members in 1985.62

The Policy Party TABLE

93

4·7

AD Leaders' Feelings Toward Political Figures "I would like to know your feelings toward some political figures. Here is a scale that goes from 0 to 10. If you have a very favorable opinion about that person, you can give him the highest score, 10; if you have a very adverse opinion about that person you can give him a score of 0. Let's begin with ..." (followed by a list of nine Adecos and five leaders of other parties). Average score Political figure

Romulo Betancourt Jaime Lusinchi Carlos Andres Perez Manuel Penalver David Morales Bello Carlos Canache Mara Octavio Lepage Juan Jose Delpino Luis Pinerua Rafael Caldera Luis Beltran Prieto Eduardo Fernandez Teodoro Petko££ Luis Herrera Campfns

Congress

Labor

CEN

9.98 9.02 8.06 7.77 7.68 7.09 7.04 6.89 6.69 5.85 6.87 4.43 3.09 1.93

9.82 9.50 8.50 8.95 7.09 6.77 7.59 8.32 5.86 5.14 6.32 3.59 2.00 1.32

9.86 8.86 7.95 6.50 6.35 6.85 6.57 7.38 7.10 6.60 6.14 4.60 3.00 2.00

souRcE: Author's survey, described in Chapter I. NoTE:

The original order of the names in the question was: Caldera, Betan-

court, Petkoff, Perez, Herrera, Delpino, Fernandez, Lusinchi, Piilerlla, Prieto,

Penalver, Canache, and Morales Bello.

Yet the results of the survey reported here leave no doubt that this was the case. The divisions within the party made no sense in policy terms. Only an understanding of the politics of the power party can explain why a majority of the leaders of AD decided to transfer their allegiance from Lusinchi to Carlos Andres Perez. The next two chapters provide that understanding.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Power Party

W

hy do the leaders of AD persist in factional struggles that hurt them at elections and disappoint the voters? To answer this question we must shift our analytic focus from the electoral party to the power party, for the behavior that seems irrational in one arena is perfectly rational in the other. This chapter argues that the pattern of factionalism peculiar to AD arises naturally in response to certain institutions of the Venezuelan political system-presidentialism, centralized control of nominations, the noreelection rule, and the independence of political brokers below the national level of the party organization. This argument is illustrated by examples from the Lusinchi government and from Venezuelan history since 1941. First, however, it must be made clear that the explanation that follows is not an all-purpose, cross-nationally useful explanation of "factionalism." The existing literature on factionalism discourages anyone from even trying to offer such an explanation. There is hardly any debate in comparative politics about the causes of factionalism in general. The literature that does exist tends to be country-specific and devoted to the few systems where factions are well institutionalized and play an important role in politics. Thus there is a literature on Italian factions, a literature on Japanese factions, a literature on Israeli factions, and a literature on Indian factions. The studies of factions in other countries are few in number and written without much awareness of the nature of factions elsewhere and hardly constitute a true literature on the subject. There are a few comparative works on party factions, but they fall short of broad comparative theory in one way or another. Belloni and Beller's Faction Politics and Schmidt, Guasti, Lande, and Scott's Friends, Followers, and Factions are largely descriptive. Katz, in A

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Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems, and Panebianco, in Political Parties: Organisation and Power, spin elaborate theories derived from a few cases. Gallagher's conclusion to Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective, addresses only a small number of the hypotheses that have been offered. These are all impressive works of scholarship, but taken together they leave one with the conclusion that the state of the art is a state of confusion. By my count, these authors and others have suggested at least 34 causes of factionalism. 1 Various types of cleavages have been implicated-regional, ethnic, class, sectoral, generational, and educationaJ.2 Factionalism is sometimes blamed simply on cultural norms, a clientelistic society, envy or jealousy, personal loyalties, or personal ambition or greed.3 Panebianco notes that factionalism is also more likely in parties that lack a charismatic leader. Rapid social change and accompanying institutional breakdown have been cited as a cause.4 Other popular explanations are various aspects of a party's organizational history, such as the survival of its founding components, starting out as a governing party, gradual professionalization, the rise of bureaucratic rivalries, and losing touch with the rank and file. 5 Several authors have blamed decentralized party financing, and also frequent elections, preference voting, and proportional representation either within the party or in general elections.6 Lack of party cohesion is also sometimes attributed to constitutional arrangements such as federalism and presidentialism? The multiplicity of mutually compatible causes is daunting enough so far, but things really get confusing when one considers still other suggested causes that contradict each other. It is often said that being in government or being the dominant party in the system promotes internal divisions in parties.8 But at least one author has suggested that being in the opposition has a similar effect! 9 The literature on the relationship between ideology and factionalism is even more riddled with incongruities. Although there is little dispute that salient policy issues can divide parties, some believe that leftist parties are more prone to divisions, and some believe that parties of the right are more vulnerable (Duverger takes both sides). 10 Nor is there agreement on the effect of being ideological to begin with: some argue that strongly ideological parties are more likely to be factionalized, while others argue that lack of ideology encourages factionalism. 11 Richard Katz's conclusion, "The ;tumber of possible explana-

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tions far exceeds the number of cases," is not a gross exaggeration.U Most of the above hypotheses were developed to explain factionalism in just one country, employing what Katz dubs the "most peculiar feature approach." 13 Simply adding them up does not make them a cumulative literature. There is not as yet any conventional wisdom about the causes of factionalism because too few authors address the same hypotheses, and hardly anyone has tried to test many of these hypotheses systematically with a large sample of countries. The two best efforts, by Katz and Gallagher, successfully reject a few of the hypotheses, but one suspects that none of the above hypotheses could withstand a large-scale comparative test because the variety of factions in parties is simply too great. 14 A list of the number of ways in which factions can differ would be at least as long as the list of suggested causes. But if there is little profit in the comparative analysis of factions, one can draw some useful conclusions about the consequences of factionalism, which are fewer in number and lend themselves more easily to generalization. The consequences of factionalism in Venezuela's presidential partyarchy are the subject of Chapters 6 and 7, but the discussion there would render only a shallow understanding of Venezuelan party politics if it were not prefaced by an explanation of the causes of factionalism. In view of the futility of explaining factionalism in general, the first step in explaining a specific case of factionalism is to identify its characteristics. The characteristics are the phenomena in need of explanation, not the existence of any conflict at all, since conflict is found in every organization. This chapter describes the peculiar pattern of factionalism that exists in AD and explains how the factions are organized and why they are organized that way. The factions that have developed in Acci6n Democritica since its founding have differed in various ways. In addition to the rapid turnover in their leadership, some factions have reflected ideological cleavages, generational cleavages, or regional cleavages, while more recently they have cut across every cleavage imaginable. Some characteristics of AD's factions, particularly their ideology, have changed in the course of the last three decades. But there are six characteristics of AD's factions and factional conflict that have remained constant from one government to the next (with some minor variations after 1989):

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r. Factional conflict tends to afflict the governing party, while the party in opposition tends to unite. 2. There are two factions, one led by those close to the president ("Ins") and the other led by those excluded from his inner circle ("Outs"). 3· The factions are centered around candidates for the party's presidential nomination, which means that the factions flourish and perish in sync with the five-year presidential term. 4· Factional membership is extremely fluid: many activists switch from one faction to another within each administration, and even more do so from one administration to the next. 5. Activists who switch factions are driven by a bandwagon mentality. 6. The biggest bandwagon belongs to the Outs, whose candidate either wins the nomination or is expelled from the party so that he won't. These factions are not so well institutionalized as the betterknown factions in Italy and japan. Nevertheless, they follow a regular pattern and have important consequences and therefore merit a detailed analysis.

Opposition Unites, Governing Divides Acci6n Democratica suffers from factionalism only when it is the governing party. On the two occasions when CO PEl controlled the presidency, politics in AD was very different. Instead of looking for excuses to fight, Adecos looked for ways to get along. This section provides an overview of the patterns of conflict and consensus inside AD from its founding in 1941 to the present in order to document the association between the party's status as government or opposition and its internal unityY During its first four years (1941-45), AD was the only real party of opposition to the dictatorship of general Medina Angarita, and it was fervently united. The Medina government had a liberal policy on political rights, which gave the founders of AD their first chance to organize a mass-based political party. The party channeled all its energies into this organizational effort, growing from a handful of representatives in a few states united by a more numerous group in the capital to an organization with over 1oo,ooo members

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in twenty states and a dominant position in the labor and peasant union movement. 16 Factions started to develop only in 1945, when AD became the governing party under presidents R6mulo Betancourt (1945-48) and R6mulo Gallegos (1948). Within one year, a group of younger leaders nicknamed ARS and led by Raul Ramos Gimenez, Jesus Angel Paz Galarraga, and Jose Manzo Gonzalez began criticizing some of the junta's policies. As long as they expressed their discontent within party channels, they were tolerated; but when they made their dissent public, violating party discipline, the founders of the party took steps to purge them. In 1947, six Adecos who voted in the Constituent Assembly against the party line of making governors appointed rather than elected were expelled from the party. At the eighth national convention in May 1948, the ARS group was censured for "factionalism" and ordered to be tried by the National Disciplinary Tribunal. The Arsistas probably would have been expelled if the military uprising that toppled the Gallegos government had not interrupted their trialY As soon as AD found itself back in the opposition, however, the charges against the Arsistas were dropped, consistent with the pattern of "opposition unites, governing divides." 18 Persecution of AD during the dictatorship of Perez Jimenez (1948-58) created a different type of faction that would not have existed if the country had remained democratic and has not emerged again. By exiling the top leaders of AD and persecuting the activists who were allowed to remain in the country, the military junta divided AD into two groups. The exiles included almost all the leaders who had been prominent before the coup-Betancourt, Gonzalo Barrios, Raul Leoni, Luis Beltran Prieto, Ramos Gimenez. Leadership of the resident AD underground then fell to younger leaders, called Muchachos, among whom were Simon Saez Merida, Domingo Alberto Rangel, and Gumersindo Rodriguez. Once the two groups were divided physically, time and distance caused them to develop into factions with incompatible interests and perspectives.19 The Muchachos blamed the older leaders of AD for the coup, on the grounds that they had compromised too much and been too lenient with the military. 20 The Old Guard drew the opposite conclusion: that Gallegos had been overthrown because AD had been too partisan and had not compromised enough. 21

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When Perez Jimenez was deposed in January 1958, the Old Guard and the Muchachos finally had to face the challenge of coexisting in the same country and in the same party. In spite of the intense ideological and personal tensions between them, the same "opposition unites, governing divides" pattern governed their behavior as factions. During the yearlong provisional government between the fall of the dictator and the inauguration of Betancourt in February 1959, the Muchachos were the model of disciplined Adecos. At the national convention, they recognized the election of a CEN composed of six Old Guard leaders, three Arsistas, and only two Muchachos, neither of whom won an important post. The young incumbent general secretary, Saez Merida, was excluded completelyP Though the Muchachos had forged bonds with Communists during their underground activity and had come to sympathize with the Left, they remained silent when Betancourt pointedly excluded the PCV from the Pact of Punta Fijo and used his first major address after exile to deliver "an eloquent history of the party antagonism to international communism." 23 And though they would have preferred AD to run an independent "unity" candidate in the presidential election of 1958, they voted to nominate Betancourt when the unity negotiations broke down.24 Once Betancourt was in office, however, and AD was the governing party, the Muchachos unleashed their dissent in a string of public criticisms of the party organization, the Labor Bureau, Betancourt's foreign policy, and one of the president's close friends. The Old Guard and the Arsistas began expulsion proceedings, and rather than submit to a purge, the Muchachos left the party in 1960. Many of them joined or supported clandestine guerrilla groups that sought to overthrow the Betancourt government by force. 25 This was clearly a case of a principled faction, a one-time departure from the normal pattern, resulting from dictatorial persecution, but the expression of this factional conflict was still muted during the period in opposition and acute during the period in government. The validity of the claim that governing divides does not hinge solely on the Muchachos. It was also during the Betancourt government that the conflict between the ARS and the Old Guard came back to life. Having won the Old Guard's trust during the purge of the Muchachos, the Arsistas quietly attempted to take control of the party. In January 1961, they won a majority of 13 out of 22

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seats on the CEN without arousing suspicion, but when they tried to extend their control to the CDN and the national convention, the Old Guard realized what was going on and fought back. Desperate for support, the Arsistas used their control of the CEN to suspend internal party elections in five states and appoint pro-ARS delegates instead. This led to a series of mutual expulsions and refusals by each faction to recognize the authority of organs controlled by the other, ending in the second division of AD in two years. 26 The Old Guard remnant of AD managed to win the next election in spite of the ARS split, but it was still not free of factionalism. In fact, during the Leoni government AD suffered its worst conflict ever. Paz Galarraga, now general secretary, had parted company with the ARS before it was expelled in 1962 and had begun building his own faction of Pacistas. At first Paz hoped to win the presidential nomination for himself, but after a test of forces at the 1965 national convention, he realized that he would not be able to defeat Gonzalo Barrios, so the Pacistas organized a campaign to draft the charismatic but reluctant founder Luis Beltran Prieto as their candidate, and as unwitting stalking-horse for their faction.H Prieto's candidacy was so successful that the Pacistas were quickly absorbed into a larger movement of Prietistas. Betancourt, Barrios, and Leoni (who now aligned himself with Betancourt even though he had won the 1962 nomination against Betancourt's wishes, with Paz's help) joined forces to defeat the new faction led by their Old Guard compaiiero.28 Both sides resorted to extreme, unethical, and even violent tactics in the struggle, which in 1967 culminated in mutual expulsions and the third division of the party.29 This time the split was so serious that it cost AD the 1968 election, and the party entered the opposition once again. During the COPEI government of Rafael Caldera (1969-74), there were tensions in AD that certainly could have led to factional conflict, but they were handled in an amazingly harmonious fashion. Former president Leoni was rumored to favor Gonzalo Barrios as the next presidential candidate, and R6mulo Betancourt was rumored to favor Carlos Andres Perez. Any time two former presidents disagree about such an important matter, the situation is dangerously explosive. But Leoni did not actively promote Barrios, Barrios refused to campaign, and Betancourt refused to promote Perez's candidacy as long as Leoni lived. Instead, Betancourt pre-

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tended to be interested in becoming a candidate himself by returning to Venezuela in 1972 and refusing to rule out that possibility. This ruse further discouraged Barrios and Perez from campaigning.30 Then, less than a month before the nominating convention, Leoni died; twelve days later, Betancourt announced that he would not be a candidate; and Barrios and Perez were free to campaign. Four days before the convention, seeing that Perez would win, Barrios withdrew his candidacy, hoping to produce a unanimous acclamation of Perez going into the general election.31 It would be hard to imagine a more consensual process. After Carlos Andres Perez was elected president by a landslide in 1973, factionalism broke out again in AD. This time it did not end in a split, but only because President Perez, remembering how costly the last split had been, chose to surrender control of his party rather than provoke another one. 32 His loss of control was evident by July 1975, when the national convention elected Perez's most vehement critic, Luis Piiierua Ordaz, general secretary. In August 1976, Piiierua declared his presidential candidacy with the implicit backing of Betancourt, issuing veiled attacks on the corruption of the Perez government and its failure to consult with the party. He was soon opposed by a grouping dubbed "TOCOPI" (for "TOdos COntra Pliierua"), which eventually coalesced behind the candidacy of Jaime Lusinchi, a loyal defender of the Perez government.33 The two candidates agreed to settle the nomination in a direct primary, but this solution heightened the competition by broadening their campaigns and polarizing the entire party membership of r. 3 million people. At the worst point, partisans of one candidate were occupying local party headquarters to prevent the partisans of the other from holding rallies, and there were some violent incidents.34 Since the internal conflict of the Perez government was not resolved cleanly by a purge, 1979 found the two camps not only coexisting uneasily in one party but blaming each other for Piiierua's defeat at the hands of CO PEl's Luis Herrera Campins. A powerful indicator of the unifying effects of being in the opposition is the fact that, after a certain period of leftover hostility, the two factions set aside their recriminations and worked together to nominate a candidate for 1983 in virtual unanimity. The hostilities came to a head in 1980, when Piiierua and others were calling for an investigation of Perez's role in the Sierra Nevada scandal, and Jaime Lusinchi was

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launching an early campaign for general secretary with the backing of the old TOCOPI alliance. At that point, the CEN realized that AD's infighting was playing into CO PEl's hands, and suddenly cooperation and consensus broke out all over the party.35 Adeco congressmen unanimously abstained in the vote on Perez's responsibility for the scandal; Lusinchi distanced himself from Perez and became general secretary with So percent of the vote; and then Lusinchi sewed up the presidential nomination in August 1981 by agreeing to support labor secretary Manuel Penalver for general secretary in exchange for Labor Bureau support for his nomination campaign.36 After that, Pinerua ended his campaign, and Lusinchi coasted to the nomination with only token competition from his former TOCOPI ally David Morales Bello. Not even the death of R6mulo Betancourt in 1981 disturbed the spirit of unity that prevailed until Lusinchi was inaugurated President of the Republic in 1984. During the second year of Lusinchi's government (1984-89), the strong party support and internal unity that had carried him into office evaporated.37 Pinerua and others ignored CEN prohibitions against campaigning, and before long it was an open secret that Carlos Andres Perez would be seeking the presidential nomination for 1988. An "oficialista" faction surrounding President Lusinchi prevented Perez's supporters from winning control of the party machinery in the 1985 internal elections, which were marked by factional plotting, deception, some instances of fraud, and even a few cases of violence committed by state and sectoral bosses with the complicity of the oficialistas.38 Competition grew more intense in 1986, when Interior Minister Octavio Lepage resigned to campaign full-time for the nomination, and by early 1987, the party was thoroughly polarized between the pro-Lepage oficialistas and the Carlosandresistas. In early 1987, the tide turned toward Perez when the Labor Bureau and many state party bosses defected to the former president's camp, and Perez eventually won the nomination. Like Perez before him, President Lusinchi averted a split by accepting the defeat of his candidate, but not before flirting with another split. General Secretary Penalver was obviously philosophically reconciled to that possibility when he said, "AD is like a tree: when you prune it, it grows." 39 Perez won the 1988 election, preserving AD's status as the gov-

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erning party. But the party quickly became deeply divided once again, this time into a faction of "Ortodoxos" commanded by general secretary Luis Alfaro Ucero and aligned with former President Lusinchi, and a faction of "Renovadores" led by Hector Alonso Lopez and aligned with incumbent President Perez. The "orthodox" Outs defeated the Renovadores in the 1991 internal elections, but, saddled with the impeachment of Perez, his unpopular economic program, and the general antiparty atmosphere, they failed to recruit an attractive precandidate. Caracas mayor Claudio Fermin eventually won the nomination in AD's most direct primary ever. The primary allowed Fermin to depend less on regional brokers marshaled into factions than on direct appeals to the membership. He was a new breed of Out, but an Out nonetheless.40 The pattern of factionalism in AD may be evolving in response to the decentralizing reforms of 1989; if so, the new pattern confirms the explanation of AD factionalism that follows.

Ins and Outs Each time AD has been the governing party of Venezuela, it has divided itself into two factions. In the early stages of the nomination campaign, there have usually been more than two groups in the party, each clustered around a presidential "precandidate," but some candidates soon withdraw and throw their support to others, and these smaller groups merge, aligning themselves into two large camps supporting two precandidates. Why is it that there are always two factions, and only two factions, during AD governments? In a companion argument to his famous "rule" that plurality elections produce two-party systems, Duverger suggested that winner-take-all primaries within parties produce two factions. 41 Duverger's Rule has come in for considerable criticism from those who have noticed cases of two-party systems with proportional representation and multiparty systems with plurality elections. Shugart, however, has salvaged Duverger's Rule by showing that proportional representation tends to produce bipolar competition when legislative and presidential elections are held concurrently (and the presidential election has no second round). A concurrent presidential election lends a winner-take-all character to the contest even when the rules allow a more fraction-

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alized vote.42 If this logic is extended to intraparty politics, there is good reason to suspect that the need to nominate a presidential candidate is behind AD's two-faction structure. The presidential system also helps explain why the factions are organized around would-be nominees.43 Michael Gallagher, in a large-scale comparison of internal party politics, concluded that candidate selection is an issue in intra party politics only where there are single-member districts (and therefore a winner-take-all formula); almost everywhere else, "ticket balancing," or proportional representation of the various factions, renders candidate selection relatively uncontroversial.44 Presidentialism makes such a significant difference because it exaggerates the importance of winning control of the executive branch.45 In a parliamentary system, the second-largest party has a good chance of obtaining cabinet positions as part of a governing coalition, whereas in a presidential system that party is likely to be excluded from any direct control of administration. Executive positions are particularly important in Latin American republics, where constitutions and tradition have created relatively strong executives and relatively weak legislatures. Control of the executive is even more important for parties such as AD that make extensive use of patronage as a source of support. Since the party's access to power and to resources for building its base of support depends so heavily on winning the next presidential election, it is correspondingly important for the party to nominate a candidate who can lead it to victory. Hence presidentialism, especially Latin American presidentialism, creates powerful incentives for nomination campaigns to be the central concern of internal party politics. I call the two AD factions the Ins and the Outs because of the positions of their leaders: the Ins always include the incumbent president, and the Outs are always headed by someone who is excluded from the inner circle of government. A description of the leaders of the Ins and the Outs during the Lusinchi government will show how appropriate these labels are. Lusinchi began his presidency by choosing a team of advisers. The top four such leaders-Gonzalo Barrios, Manuel Peiialver, Octavio Lepage, and Luis Alfaro Ucero-were popularly known as the cogollito, or inner circle. They were the leaders whom Lusinchi consulted when he had to make politically difficult decisions that

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would require party support. The cogollito, together with other highly placed Adecos who enjoyed privileged access to the president for similar reasons, became the nucleus of one of the two factions. The Venezuelan press often referred to these people as the oficialistas or ortodoxos; I shall call them the Ins. Gonzalo Barrios, the party president, was in his eighties in 1985 and had been one of the top leaders of the party since the days of its precursor, the PDN. The party presidency gave him no direct control over funds or personnel, but his personal authority, derived from his statesmanship and skill at compromise, was so great that he was considered the most influential leader in the party. Manuel Peiialver rose from a manual laborer in the oil fields to national labor secretary of AD over the course of 40 years. He became general secretary of the party in 1981 in a deal masterminded by Betancourt, in which Lusinchi resigned as general secretary and supported Peiialver to fill the vacancy in exchange for labor's endorsement of his precandidacy.46 Peiialver's tenure as general secretary was not widely admired, but he was doggedly loyal to Lusinchi. Octavio Lepage was Lusinchi's interior minister until 1987, when he resigned to run for the presidential nomination with Lusinchi's emphatic blessing. He was known as a capable administrator with a stern, colorless personality that was bound to make his quest hard going. Luis Alfaro Ucero was a capable administrator of a different sort, a man whose unhealthy, rumpled look suggested that he had spent his entire life in the proverbial smoke-filled room. He put his talents to good use as organization secretary before and during 1985, working closely with Peiialver and the state general secretaries. When Lusinchi chose certain people to be insiders, he automatically excluded others. Of course, the vast majority of party members were simply not powerful enough to be insiders, and need not concern us here. However, others were excluded despite having considerable power. Three of these-Carlos Andres Perez, Luis Piiierua Ordaz, and David Morales Bello-together with their friends and admirers, became the nucleus of the second faction, the Outs. Carlos Andres Perez, popularly known as CAP, was R6mulo Betancourt's personal secretary during the Trienio, Betancourt's interior minister after 1959, leader of the Parliamentary Fraction under Leoni, and general secretary during the opposition to Cal-

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dera. His steady rise and his image as an energetic, effective, and virile man won him the 1973 presidential election by a wide margin.47 As president, Perez was energetic: he began his term with an endless stream of emergency decrees, nationalized the oil and steel industries, and tripled the size of the federal bureaucracy in five years.48 By the end of his term he had lost Betancourt's support and was increasingly criticized as fiscally irresponsible, corrupt, uncouth, and dangerously self-centered. But by 1985 he was far along on the comeback trail. Luis Pinerua Ordaz was a warrior against corruption, a bitter and vindictive perennial precandidate, and a columnist famous for his odd rhetorical style. During the Perez administration his anticorruption campaign made him Betancourt's favorite. After Betancourt's death in r98r, Barrios, Perez, and Pifierua all claimed to be his political heirs, and all were partly correct. Barrios inherited Betancourt's caution, Perez his shrewdness, and Pifierua his hatred of corruption and his creative abuse of the Spanish language. David Morales Bello was a successful lawyer, a quick-witted and articulate debater who looked good on television, and a presidential precandidate since the mid-197o's. Many people considered him only a stalking-horse for Perez, but he had considerable support of his own, as evidenced by the numbers supporting him for political secretary at the national conventions of 1981 and 1986. It is probably impossible to explain the differences in access to the president enjoyed by individual Ins and Outs by referring to any institutional or structural cause, especially in light of the surprising frequency with which proteges and mentors have turned against each other in AD's history. Whatever the reasons, variation in access was the key to the formation of the nuclei of the factions. All ten of the CEN Ins whom I interviewed indicated that they visited the president "frequently," whereas four of the six Outs claimed to visit him only "from time to time" or "rarely." This difference is especially significant considering the fact that the entire CEN was supposed to meet with the president nearly every week. The advantageous position of the Ins (and the appropriateness of the "Ins-Outs" labels) is starkly evident in Table s.r, which shows how Adecos rated the power of sixteen prominent party leaders. Six of the seven figures judged most powerful were Ins; only one Out, former president Perez, was in that group. The six Ins occupied

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TABLE 5.1

Ins and Outs in Top Leadership Positions "In every organization a few people inevitably acquire much more power than the rest. Which of the persons [listed below] would you say belong to this small group in AD?" (Respondents were allowed to choose any number of persons.) Person

Position

Gonzalo Barrios Carlos Andres Perez Jaime Lusinchi Manuel Peiialver Reinaldo Leandro Mora Octavia Lepage Luis Alfaro Ucero Luis Pifterua Ordaz Antonio Rios David Morales Bello Alejandro Izaguirre Carlos Canache Mata

AD president Former president Incumbent president AD general secretary President of Congress Interior minister AD organization secretary Former candidate AD labor secretary AD political secretary AD political secretary AD caucus leader

Named by

Faction

100%

In Out In In In In In Out In Out In Out

88 77 75 63 44 43 38 37 32 28 27

souRcE: Author's survey, described in Chapter r. NOTE: The original list also included the names of Arturo Hernandez Grisanti, Marco Tulia Bruni Celli, Armando Sanchez Bueno, and Luis Raul Matos Az6car. They are not listed above because fewer than ro percent of the respondents named them as members of the inner circle. Because there are probably other leaders not on the original list who would have been rated as more powerful, reproducing the entire original list would be misleading.

the key posts for controlling the resources of both government and party-President of the Republic, interior minister, party general secretary, party organization secretary, and party labor secretary. Perez was judged the second most powerful figure in the party even though he held no formal position that gave him direct control over public or party resources. His power, and that of the Outs generally, came instead from the other extreme of the organization-the party rank and file. Even at relatively high levels of the organization, Outs were approximately as numerous as Ins. The CEN contained rr Ins, ro Outs, and 7 who were uncommitted or whose affiliations were unknown. A random sample of AD's Parliamentary Fraction contained 20 Ins, 25 Outs, and 9 uncommitteds or unknowns. Popular wisdom in 1985 held that Outs, or at least Perez's supporters, constituted a clear majority of AD's grass-roots members and voters. It is difficult to prove this hypothesis conclusively without a reliable public opinion poll, but other evidence makes it hard to deny. There were rumors, for example, that confidential polls

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Nomination Expectations of Ins and Outs and Preferred Nominating Procedures Ins

Probable nominee Someone from own faction Someone from other faction Unwilling to make a prediction TOTAL

Of those unwilling to make a prediction: Favor nomination by primary or convention Favor nomination by electoral college TOTAL

Outs

%

(n)

%

(n)

19 6

72

75

( 6) ( 2) (24)

0 28

(23) ( 0) ( 9)

100

(32)

100

(31)

8

92

( 2) (22)

67 33

( 6) ( 3)

100

(24)

100

( 9)

souRcE: Author's survey, described in Chapter r. NoTE: "Probable nominee" is based on responses to the question, "Who probably will be AD's presidential candidate in 1988'" "Preferred nomination procedure" is based on responses to the question, "In the past, AD has used three methods to choose its presidential candidatea convention, a primary, and an electoral college. Which method do you prefer?" Those who were willing to make a prediction are excluded from the response to the second question because some of them, mostly Outs, were so confident of their candidate's chances that they believed the outcome would be the same regardless of the nominating procedure used. The responses of those who were not so sure, and therefore believed that the procedure mattered a great deal, are more revealing.

consistently showed Perez to be the most popular politician in the country.49 Certainly he was mobbed by adoring crowds whenever he went out in public, and he received the loudest and longest applause at any large party gathering.5 Furthermore, survey evidence indicates that AD leaders themselves believed Perez to be very popular at the grass-roots level. Most Outs expressed confidence that someone from their faction would win the party's presidential nomination in 1988, and few Ins were willing to predict that an In would be nominated (see Table 5.2). It is significant that the nominating methods preferred by the respondents who were unwilling to make a prediction reflected the assumption that Perez had broad-based grassroots support. Ninety-two percent of the Ins who would not predict a winner favored having an electoral college nominate the candidate, which would maximize the influence of the faction controlling the party machinery. The Outs who would not make a prediction tended to favor nomination by a primary, which would maximize the power of the rank and file. Thus, although AD leaders could not

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agree on who the candidate should be, they overwhelmingly agreed that Perez had great support at the base of the party, and would win a primary if one were held. Thus Acci6n Democratica began the Lusinchi administration with a small fissure at its top that divided the key leaders of government and party from Lusinchi's former rivals. The rest of the party was not divided at first; rather, it was unified strongly behind Lusinchi's victorious campaign. But as the nuclei of the two embryonic factions began to compete for control of the party, they rec;ruited partisans to their cause at deeper and deeper levels of the party hierarchy, until the small fissure had penetrated to the core of nearly every party organ in every sector and state. The Five- Year Cycle The third characteristic of factions in AD is that they are built around presidential precampaigns that begin early in each president's term. Nomination campaigns are unusually long in Venezuela. In recent years in the United States, even the most eager candidates do not announce their candidacies more than two years before the nominating convention. In Venezuela, some candidates start campaigning three years before the nomination, and any candidate who waited until one year before would be regarded as quixotic. As Figure 5. r shows, earnest campaigning, either for the nomination itself or for a CEN post such as general secretary, which is considered a stepping-stone to the presidency, always begins before the end of the second year of government, and lasts at least two and a half years during each five-year term. The institutional reason for these premature campaigns is that the outcome of the nomination process is decided by powerful brokers who control large blocs of votes at the nominating convention. These brokers are certain state party bosses and the secretaries of certain national party wings, and neither side gives support without strings attached. State party bosses back candidates who will return the favor by endorsing their own campaigns for state office. These alliances lengthen the nomination campaigns because the state leaders are elected one to three years before the nominating convention. Therefore, in order to receive the necessary support from state party bosses, presidential candidates have to start campaigning during the preceding internal elections.51

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GOVERNMENT

Betancourt Leoni Caldera Perez

Herrera Lusinchi first year - - - - - Campaign for General Secretary - - - - • Campaign for Nomination

0

Nominating Convention

FIG. 5.1. Duration of campaigns for party leadership, by year of presidential term, 1959-90. Original compilation based on many sources. A more detailed history of AD's internal politics can be found in the author's Ph.D. dissertation, Michael Coppedge, "Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: A Study of the Quality and Stability of Venezuelan Democracy," Yale University, 1988, chaps. 5 and 7·

Before 1968, these sectoral and state officials were supposed to be elected annually; their terms were lengthened to two years in 1970, and to three years in 1985. However, on several occasions the scheduled internal elections have been postponed for a year or more, so that candidates can never be sure that they will get another chance to win these brokers to their side before the nomination. Therefore, the wise candidate becomes heavily involved in recruiting and endorsing brokers the first chance he gets.52 During the Lusinchi government, this early campaigning was already clearly in evidence in 1985, more than three years before the next presidential election. The Outs began campaigning before the Ins because, lacking access to government resources, they could not

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count on manipulating the party machine in their favor. Their best bet was to mobilize overwhelming mass support for their local and regional candidates in the internal elections. This kind of mobilization required campaigning, so they campaigned as much and as early as they could. Luis Piiienia Ordaz and his protege, Marco Tulia Bruni Celli, were already touring the country in late 1984, traveling from state to state drumming up support for their side.53 Their campaigns, as well as several others, moved the Ins to declare a moratorium on all internal politicking until closer to the elections. It is odd, but extremely significant, that this prohibition was announced by Interior Minister Lepage, who no longer held any formal position in the party.54 Carlos Andres Perez had been keeping himself aloof from domestic and internal party politics since the end of his presidency in 1979, but in mid-August of 1985 he began his second run for the nomination. Because of the ban on internal campaigns, he disguised his activity as a movement to encourage participation and orderliness in the internal elections, but his endorsements of local candidates, his superhuman efforts to do clientelistic favors, and his refusal to deny his candidacy made his true purpose quite clear. By early 1987 he was campaigning openly, removing all doubt.55 David Morales Bello campaigned in a less energetic way, but took fewer pains to conceal his true purpose. By mid-July 1985 (more than three years before the election), he admitted publicly that he was seeking the nomination, with the tacit understanding that he would throw his support to Perez if Perez declared his candidacy.56 It was not so obvious how Piiierua would react to Perez's candidacy, since the two had been bitterly antagonistic toward the end of Perez's administration. But judging from the candidates whom the two leaders identified themselves with at the state level, being Outs gave Piiierua and Perez a common cause that overrode their old conflicts. Since the Ins stood to benefit by prohibiting campaigns, none of the potential In precandidates campaigned like the Outs. But Lepage did engage in an In-style variation. Whenever Lusinchi left the country for a state visit, Lepage became acting president, and he took full advantage of that position to inaugurate as many roads, dams, schools, and other public works as he could in the time that he had.

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The Power Party

Not all state and sectoral party secretaries are strong enough to deliver large blocs of votes at the nominating convention, but the ones who are play the deciding role in important party decisions. The labor secretary (or more correctly, the Labor Bureau, which makes collective decisions and acts as a bloc) is probably the most important broker in the party, because of its size and impressive ability to mobilize its membership. The Labor Bureau is not omnipotent; it has sometimes acted passively, endorsing the candidate who seems to have the nomination sewn up, and in 1967 it was divided by the nomination conflict. But it is fair to say that until the Labor Bureau decides, the outcome is in doubt; after it decides, the outcome is a foregone conclusion. Before the 1985 defeat of the incumbent agrarian secretary, the Agrarian Committee was considered a weaker but similarly structured broker. The Education Bureau also used to control a sizable bloc, but this sector has been weakened since the MEP split of 196768, which temporarily decimated AD's strength among educators. The other sectoral wings-Youth, Professionals and Technicians, and Women-have never been important vote brokers owing to their small size and lack of disciplined organization. After the Labor Bureau, the most important brokers are state party bosses. As long as the national leadership of the party is united, these bosses keep a low profile. But when the national leaders are divided over anything, state party leaders are called upon to arbitrate. When the cogollito is divided, the dispute is taken to the CEN, and when the CEN can't decide, it goes to the National Directive Committee (CDN), the majority of which is composed of delegations from the state party organizationsP An excellent example of the importance of the state bosses occurred in 1985, when the national leaders of the Ins and Outs were competing for their support. Both sides made major efforts to amend the party statutes in ways that would make it easier for them to gain control of the party in the internal elections of that year and eventually nominate the party's presidential candidate. If the two factions had been able to agree on a reform package to present to the CDN, it probably would have passed easily. But since the factions came tq the CDN with two proposals, the state leaders were in a position to play the national leaders of the two factions against each other for their own benefit.

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Several months before the internal elections, an Out-dominated commission recommended statutary reforms that would have gone a long way toward establishing greater internal democracy in AD, and therefore favored the Outs. These reforms included direct primaries, proportional representation in internal elections, an explicit rejection of democratic centralism, new rules to enforce the use of the secret ballot, and the creation of commissions to ensure fairness in internal elections. The Ins' organizational mastermind, Luis Alfaro Ucero, countered by drawing up his own set of proposals, which included indirect elections, winner-take-all formulas, endorsement of democratic centralism, and no new electoral fairness commissions until after the internal elections.58 Alfaro lobbied vigorously to obtain the support of the state general secretaries for this package that would have centralized power within the party. At the October 1985 meeting of the CDN, some CEN members tried to win rapid approval for the Out package, but by rising from their seats, shouting, and ignoring the speaker's calls for order, the state delegates made it very clear that they did not want to discuss the national leaders' package. The national leadership then had no choice but to negotiate a compromise with the state party leaders that would allow the CDN to proceed with its work. The state party leaders were not inclined to judge the merits of the reform proposals dispassionately, according to abstract notions of efficiency and fairness. This was not a legal or administrative dispute, but a political one, and as party bosses the state leaders had their own interests to protect. State party leaders like to have undisputed control of their organizations. Having to accommodate local minority factions means having less patronage at their disposal, greater vulnerability to criticism from within, less clout at the CDN and the National Convention, and ultimately less job security. Besides, in party circles a divided organization is frowned upon and its leader tends to be regarded as incompetent. Admiration is reserved for leaders who run a disciplined organization that can get out the vote with a minimum of infighting. All state leaders would like to be able to create such organizations by the sheer force of their personality, but only a few have what it takes to succeed. The rest are willing to settle for the appearance of unity created by exclusionary party rules and the repressive application of party discipline. Therefore, the In proposals that would have strengthened the

II4

The Power Party

party bosses' machines-preserving indirect elections, adhering to the winner-take-all formula, and upholding democratic centralism -had a natural appeal to the state party heads. But at the same time, the state leaders resisted interference in their organizations by the national leaders, who had been trying to influence the outcomes of regional internal elections, especially in the more divided states. State party leaders wanted full control of their own organizations, free from challenges from either below or above. Consequently, during private negotiations that followed the suspension of the opening session, leaders of the Ins, the Outs, and the state general secretaries drew up a fragile compromise package that combined most of Alfaro's proposals with a few sops to the Outs' commission. When the CDN reconvened, it approved all the proposals except proportional representation, one of the sops, which was easily defeated by the winner-take-all formula despite desperate speeches by Bruni Celli, Piiierua, Morales Bello, Perez himself (all Outs), and even Gonzalo Barrios. The state leaders also concocted another important setback for the national leadership. The Commission had proposed that the members of the new Internal Election Commissions that would oversee state elections be appointed by the CEN. If this proposal were approved, the CEN would be able to enforce the fairness of state elections (or not, where it saw fit to ignore abuses). For obvious reasons, the state leaders preferred to appoint these commissions themselves, and they forced a lengthy and disorderly debate on the issue when it came up. Various compromises were proposed and debated right there in front of the 200 delegates, and the national leadership, Ins as well as Outs, was defeated once again. 59 Following this defeat, the national leaders of the Ins began more strenuous efforts to win the internal elections. Interior Minister Lepage sought to win the allegiance of some state party bosses by granting them greater influence over state governmental policies and promising to make them governors after the elections.60 Where state party bosses could not be recruited, state governors helped the Ins in ways that ranged from the slightly unethical to the outrageously illegal. State government resources such as vehicles, printing presses, and manpower were pressed into service on the Ins' behalf, and supporters of In candidates were given preference in the distribution of jobs, food baskets, and other benefits.61 In order to gain more

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time to put an In in charge of the Venezuelan Peasant Confederation (FCV), the In-dominated CEN ordered AD peasant leaders to postpone some of the FCV elections while agents from the Interior and Agriculture ministries bribed peasant leaders.62 Antonio Rios made sly use of the classic aplanadora to win the election of a new Labor Bureau that systematically excluded the Outs.63 When the actual voting took place in December 1985, some Out supporters learned that they had been removed at the last minute from the membership rolls or assigned to faraway voting stations; others had trouble voting because the location of their voting stations was publicized only by word of mouth among the Ins; and in at least one state the CEN chose to ignore violent incidents that helped In-affiliated candidates to victory.64 These efforts produced a temporary victory for the Ins in the 1985 internal elections in fourteen of the 25 state contests for state general secretary. However, the fact that the Outs still won in eleven states in spite of the Ins' efforts testifies to the considerable autonomy enjoyed by some state party bosses. Their autonomy is even more evident when one controls for the quality of leadership of the candidates for state general secretary. Two factors correlate strongly with the results of the contests for state general secretary in 1985: the number of challengers the incumbent faced and the candidates' ties to the Ins. 65 I interpret the number of challengers as an indicator of the incumbent's success as a leader. The only incumbent who ran unopposed was Guillermo Call of Monagas, who was universally respected in the party for the serious, hardworking organization he ran.66 To have one opponent is normal, and not necessarily a sign of poor leadership. But when two, three, and four opponents spring up, it is probably a sign that the incumbent is not doing a good job and either can or should be defeated. In the 1985 internal elections, if the incumbent was unopposed or faced only one challenger, he won reelection. But if he faced two or more opponents, he succeeded only if he was identified with the In current. As Table 5. 3 shows, this generalization holds true for 23 of the 25 cases. The appropriate conclusion is that if a state general secretary ran the kind of organization that encouraged challengers, he had to choose his friends carefully. But if he was running his state organization smoothly and efficiently, he could stay in office regardless of

n6

The Power Party TABLE 5·3 Success of Faction Allies in 198 5 Regional Internal Elections

All incumbents facing one or zero opponents In incumbents with two or more opponents Out incumbents with two or more opponents

Won

Lost

10 6 0

1 1 7

souRcEs: An official list of the candidates in each state party contest was provided by the National Secretariat of Organization. Identification of the currents the candidates belonged to is based on press reports, which were very consistent with other information l gleaned from interviews and informal conversations. For internal election results, see "La corriente de CAP solo gan6 en tres estados," El Nacional, Nov. 26, 1985, p. D-17, and follow-up reports during the next two weeks.

his cooperation with Ins or Outs. Clearly, the brokers in the party, whether they are state bosses or labor leaders, are powers to contend with when the national leadership is divided. Winning their support is an indispensable part of any precandidate's strategy, and this is why internal campaigns begin so early.

Fluid Factions In comparative perspective, however, what is striking about factions in AD is not how long they last, but how transitory they are. They form and dissolve in a relatively brief period of time in part because they are not held together by any of the primordial congealing factors typical of the better-known factions of the world. They have no region in common, as the Bavarian Christian Democrats do in Germany and southern Democrats do in the U.S., nor any ethnicity, as factions do in Belgium and Quebec, nor an occupational identity like the coldiretti and various trade federations in the Italian DC, nor a generational cleavage such as the one that rippled through German parties in the 196o's and 197o's.67 In 1985 the Ins and Outs could hardly have been more demographically similar. There were no clear-cut differences between Ins and Outs along the lines of age, sex, education, wealth, career patterns, or any other common social cleavage.68 With two minor exceptions, the two groups were statistically indistinguishable (Table 5.4): national labor leaders tended disproportionately to be Ins, by a ratio of two to one, and there was a partial geographic disparity between the factions. Four out of five respondents who grew

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TABLE 5·4

Demographic Similarity of Ins and Outs Pet. who are

Age and experience Aged 59 or younger Freshman congressmen Joined party before 1948 Committee chairmen Class Middle-to-upper class identity Comfortable or prosperous early life Board members for private firms Occupation and Education Labor leaders Members of Congress Full-time politicians Holders of university degrees Career paths Participated in underground Jailed for political activity Exiled Raised in Caracas metropolitan area Lived elsewhere in Latin America Lived in United States Lived in Europe or Israel Friendships Has at least one good friend who is a labor leader Has at least one good friend who is a professional Has no more than one good friend who is a politician Has no good friends who are businessmen

Ins

Outs

N

p

49 54 47

so

51 46 53 50

43 24 38 10

.368 .171 .401 .594

46 58 50

54 42 50

46 19 32

.178 .245 .270

67 44 47 50

33 56 53 50

21 45 30 40

.041 .246 .489 .483

50 43 43 71 52 55 73

50 57 57 29 48 45 27

44 30 21 22 25 20 11

.471 .303 .359 .023 .426 .336 .076

58 40 52 44

42 60 48 56

24 40 48 39

.173 .081 .109 .242

souRcE: Author's survey, described in Appendix. NoTE: The symbol p is the probability that a 2 x

2 table in which the variables are at least as strongly related in the same direction could be produced by chance, using Fisher's Exact Test (one-tailed). Conventionally, a statistically significant association is indicated when p is less than .05. A few of the p's in this table are based on the more familiar Chi-square.

up in the Andean states were Outs (probably because Perez is from the Andean state of Tachira), and respondents raised in the Caracas metropolitan area tended to be Ins, by about two to one. But these differences do not greatly affect the overall similarity of the two factions. Most AD leaders were not labor leaders, and most respondents came from regions that were more equally divided between Ins and Outs.69 The similarity of Ins and Outs in age distribution is particularly

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The Power Party

significant because AD's past divisions have often been explained as conflicts among generational cohorts. John Martz, in his seminal volume on AD, identified three generational factions? 0 The first was the Old Guard, composed of the founders, who had begun their political careers in opposition to the Gomez and Lopez Contreras dictatorships before Accion Democnitica was created. The Arsistas were a younger generation that became active between 1941, when AD was legalized, and 1948, when a military coup ended the first AD government. The Muchachos joined the party in the late 194o's and during the underground resistance to the Perez Jimenez dictatorship ( 1948-58 ). Martz leaves no doubt that AD's first split, the 1961 MIR split, was a conflict between the Muchachos and the older two generations. The ARS split seems to have had an important generational component, although some AD leaders of that second generation were not Arsistas (including Lusinchi, Perez, and Canache) and not all of those who had been Arsistas were expelled-Paz Galarraga, for example. By the time of the 1967 MEP split, age seems to have been just one of several characteristics defining factions. By 1985, generational differences were nonexistent. The age distributions of the Ins and Outs, displayed in Figure 5.2, are nearly perfect mirror images. 71 There are two obvious reasons for this change. One is that the Old Guard had mostly died off in the 22 years since Martz did his research. Party president Gonzalo Barrios was the only figure from that generation who was still active, and one man in his eighties does not constitute a faction. Secondly, the more fractious leaders of the Muchachos and the ARS had all been expelled in the early 196o's. Their age cohorts who survived were not inclined to repeat their mistakes. A third possible reason is that Venezuela's 27 years of stable democracy had not produced as many discontinuities in recruitment as had the alternating periods of civilian and military rule in the previous 30 years. In terms of the most obvious characteristics of their members, then, the two factions were practically indistinguishable. Each was an alliance of strange bedfellows-old and young, rich and poor, learned and illiterate. But we must still explain why new factions united by common characteristics have not formed since the first ones were purged. One reason is simply that electoral rules do not allow new factions to survive. Some writers have argued that

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10 Number of Ins

8 6 4 2 0

27-39

40-49

50-59

60-69

70+

Age

2 4 Number of Outs

6

8 10

Age distributions of Ins and Outs. Author's survey, described in Chapter r.

FIG. 5.2.

factionalism is sometimes caused by electoral rules such as proportional representation in internal elections and various kinds of preferential voting that allow voters to cast votes for individual candidates within a party slate.72 Other writers have argued, more convincingly in my opinion, that such rules do not cause factions, but certainly do help preserve them if they already exist.7 3 In AD, winner-take-all rules still prevail, despite periodic efforts to install proportional representation in internal elections. This makes it hard for a new minority faction to gain a foothold in the party organization. Another reason is the extreme fluidity of factional loyalties. Someone who was an In in one government could well become an Out in the next, and vice versa. At the elite level, alliances among the leaders of factions or proto-factions have been strikingly unstable. The Arsista Ramos Gimenez allied with Betancourt to defeat the Muchachos, then Betancourt worked hard to expel the Ramos Gimenez faction the following year. Gonzalo Barrios and Luis Beltran Prieto worked together in the expulsion of the ARS, only to split the party in half as rivals for the nomination five years later. Betancourt opposed the nomination of Raul Leoni in 1963, but

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The Power Party TABLE 5·5 Personal Loyalties in the CEN, 1977-1985

1977-81

Loyalties Inconsistent Consistent Inconclusive TOTAL

1981-85

%

(n)

%

42 16 42 100

( 8)

24 32 44 100

( 3) ( 8)

(19)

'977-85

(n)

%

(n)

( 6) ( 8)

60 33

(11) (25)

100

( 9) ( 5) ( 1) (15)

7

souRcEs: For 1977, Maggi, "lnforme sobre las elecciones internas de Acci6n Democratica." For r98r, Pastor Heydra, "En AD los dirigentes estarian definidos," El Diario de Caracas, Oct. 8, r98r. For 1985, author's survey and observations. CODING:

Inconsistent

Consistent

Inconclusive

(1977-81 ): (1981-85): (1977-85): (1977-81): (r98r-85): (1977-85): (r977-8r): (1981-85): (1977-85):

Piiien\a-Lusinchi Lusinchi-Out Piiierua-ln, Lusinchi-Out Lusinchi-Lusinchi, neutral-neutral Lusinchi-ln, neutral-Out Piiierua-Out, Lusinchi-ln Piiierua/Lusinchi-neutral/Morales B. Morales B.-In/Out, neutral-In/Out Neutral-In

allied with him in opposition to the candidacy of Prieto in 1967. Carlos Andres Perez had been Betancourt's protege for almost 30 years before he became president, but before long a split between the two led Betancourt to encourage the anti-Perez candidacy of Pifierua. When Perez was president and Lusinchi was a candidate, they were allies; but when Lusinchi became president and it was Perez's turn to be the candidate, they became bitter adversaries. If the behavior of party elites is indicative, personal loyalties are short-lived in AD. Table 5. 5 shows a high turnover rate for personal loyalties among CEN members. The personal loyalties just before Lusinchi's nomination in 1982 were consistent with loyalties at the time of Pifierua's 1977 nomination for only r6 percent of the 1981 CEN members. From 1981 to 1985, that figure had risen to 32 percent, but over a span of eight years, 1977-85, some 6o percent of the party leaders who had been CEN members throughout that time had switched personal loyalties, either from Pifierua to Lusinchi's Ins or from Lusinchi to Pifierua and Perez's Outs. Evidence regarding the stability of personal loyalties among

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middle- and lower-level activists is much harder to come by. It is impossible to deny that leaders like Betancourt, Perez, and Pinerua have had some diehard supporters who would follow their mentor in good times and bad, and even out of the party altogether. But the scanty evidence that does exist, along with subjective impressions, leads me to believe that the bulk of the activists are not diehard followers of one leader. They seem to make alliances of convenience and change their loyalties as circumstances change. For example, in my survey of 8o top AD leaders, 90 percent claimed to have supported Lusinchi for the 1982 nomination. By 1985, these leaders were just as likely to be Outs as Ins: 44 percent were Ins, 41 percent were Outs, and r6 percent were uncommitted. Past support for Lusinchi's rivals was also completely irrelevant to factionalism. Among the 8o top leaders, and even among an elite sample of 23 CEN members, leaders who had supported Pinerua or Morales Bello were just as likely to be Ins as Outs.74

The Bandwagon Mentality The fifth characteristic of factionalism in AD is that the participants possess a bandwagon mentality. The sizes of the two factions are constantly changing. At the beginning of a government, they are only proto-factions consisting of a precandidate and his close friends and supporters. As the internal campaign proceeds, two of the factions grow prodigiously until they have adherents at alllev~ls of the party. During that process, activists switch loyalties from the weaker proto-factions to one of the two emerging factions. One of these two factions becomes larger than the other, and the larger it grows, the more activists defect to it. It becomes, in other words, a bandwagon. After the nomination, factions practically dissolve, only to re-form in the next government, with the alliances thoroughly reshuffled. Obviously, this bandwagon cycle could not proceed without fluid factional loyalties. But what drives the process is the presidential candidate's control of nominations. In Venezuela's closed-list system of proportional representation, people vote for parties, not for candidates. Voters decide only how many seats each party receives in the Congress. The parties themselves decide exactly which persons fill those seats. In AD, tradition reserves those crucial decisions to the presidential candidate.

122.

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The state organizations submit draft slates and formal approval comes from the CEN, but the CEN deferentially allows the nominee to decide which leaders appear on the lists, and in what order. No matter how magnanimous the Candidate feels toward his erstwhile adversaries after the nomination, he cannot resist favoring his supporters in the distribution of congressional seats (especially when many of those seats were already promised to early supporters). And no matter how generous he wishes to be, there is a limit to the number of seats he can distribute. Party leaders who wish to be elected to, or remain in, Congress (which is one of the few salaried positions for a politician-party officers are not paid) are under tremendous pressure to support the winning candidate, and the more support the better. Since there is stiff competition for each seat, mere endorsement provides little guarantee. Vocal support and enthusiastic campaigning and organizing for the candidate are much better. Naturally, supporting the losing candidate is akin to political suicide. Activists who hold other paid positions, such as state legislators, city councilmen, and public employees at all levels, are under similar pressure to support the winner. The only difference is that in their case, it is the candidate's supporters rather than the candidate himself who make the patronage decisions. Early in a nomination campaign when there is a crowded field of candidates and it is not clear who the winner will be, party leaders are free to support whomever they like, or to remain neutral. The clearer it becomes who the winner will be, however, the more pressure there is to commit oneself publicly. And the more people commit themselves to one candidate, the clearer it becomes who the winner will be. This spiraling dynamic creates the bandwagon effect. After the general election is over, the bandwagon breaks up as a new set of candidates, responding to the same institutional incentives, begins building a base of support for the next nomination. Activists maintain their allegiance to the old candidate for a while, but as one of the new candidates starts to pull ahead of the pack, increasing numbers of activists join the frontrunner's camp, and a new bandwagon takes shape. This becomes a five-year bandwagon cycle, the result of the Candidate's control of nominations and other patronage in a closed-list system of proportional representation

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combined with the important role of power broker played by state and sectoral party bosses.

The Outs' Advantage One final characteristic of factionalism in AD needs to be explained: when there is a conflict between Ins and Outs, the Outs become the larger faction. The serious threat that the Outs present to the incumbent president's leadership is unusual. The classic study of internal party politics, Robert Michels's Political Parties, shows why it is so difficult for lower-level leaders to challenge the dominant position of the incumbent party leadership. Is there something about Acci6n Democratica that violates the Iron Law of Oligarchy? Technically, the answer is no. The leaders of the Outs are members of the party oligarchy just as much as the leaders of the Ins, so factional conflict in AD is not a rebellion of the followers but rather a division within the ruling elite that has repercussions for the rank and file. It is, after all, an Iron Law of Oligarchy, not Autocracy. Still, incumbents everywhere are thought to enjoy certain advantages that make it difficult for them to lose elections, even to other elites who happen to be Outs. In Venezuela, the advantages of the president appear to be overwhelming. He has immense patronage at his disposal. Venezuela has around one million public employees, constituting about one-fifth of the active work force. Most of these jobs are not covered by civil service, so the president has a great deal of discretion in distributing them for party or factional purposes. He also has the ability to use other public resources to help his allies within the party. His control is enhanced by the fact that he appoints the state governors who oversee the distribution of jobs and other spoils. What advantages could the Outs possibly have to outweigh these advantages? It is not so much a matter of the Outs having advantages as the president and the Ins having disadvantages. One disadvantage is that the president, unlike a prime minister, is outside his party once he takes office. He holds no formal office in the CEN, and he has no direct control over the party organization, and he must therefore depend on allies within the party who do have that control. As long as his allies remain loyal, his leadership is intact.

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The Power Party

But the president suffers from another disadvantage that undermines the loyalty of many of his allies: the No Immediate Reelection clause of the Constitution. Venezuelan presidents cannot succeed themselves in office, although they may run for reelection ten years after the end of their term. This rule makes every incumbent an automatic lame duck. Amid all the uncertainty faced by party activists who are looking for the likely winner in the nomination campaign, one outcome is certain: the winner will not be the incumbent president. Faced with the certainty that sooner or later the mantle of leadership will rest on someone else's shoulders, the president tries two strategies. First he tries to postpone his loss of leadership by discouraging internal party campaigns. Usually this attempt fails, and the only result is to allow the Outs a head start. Then he tries the next-best strategy, which is to support the nomination of a friendly candidate who will not criticize him or challenge his leadership. This strategy transforms an ordinary nomination campaign into a struggle between Ins and Outs for control of the party. The outcome, as always, is in the hands of the regional and sectoral brokers. The independent power base of these brokers stands in the way of complete domination of the nomination process by the In-affiliated governors and the resources at their disposal. To be sure, the political culture of the party restrains the president and his governors from taking full advantage of public resources. One of the founding purposes of AD was to put an end to the rigged elections held by dictators and oligarchs prior to 1945, so modern-day abuses are protested vigorously by the Outs and would become counterproductive if carried to an extreme. But the independence of the state party bosses and the Labor and Agrarian secretaries is probably more important. As this chapter has shown, state leaders who have relatively united organizations do not need an alliance with the Ins to win reelection. Their security is more in keeping with the usual expectations regarding the advantages of incumbency. These leaders do not face the disadvantages that the president does: they are still inside the party, with their hands on the proper levers, and there are no party rules to make them automatic lame ducks? 5 Since the brokers have the freedom to choose the candidate who would best serve their own interests, they choose the candidate who has the best chance of winning the general election. Their fortunes

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are tied to those of the party as a whole. The only way to continue to have a sympathetic ally in the Labor Ministry, the Ministry of Agriculture, or the governor's office (indeed, the only way to be promoted to the governorship) is to elect a president from one's own party. If AD were a dominant party like the Mexican PRI, it would not make much difference who the candidate was. But because Venezuela has had a competitive party system throughout the current democratic regime, it is important to choose a dynamic, attractive candidate. In this context, the brokers are unlikely to throw their support behind the incumbent president's stand-in, who was chosen precisely because he posed no threat to the incumbent's leadership. One of the Outs is almost certain to possess more natural votegetting ability, and he is the one whom the brokers choose. As in the case of the 1985 internal elections, the state party bosses may make temporary alliances with the Ins at mid-term to extract concessions from the government, but eventually most of them decide that their future lies with the Outs. Their choice is even simpler when one of the Out candidates is a former president, who has already demonstrated some ability to win and has old debts to collect from his presidency. This situation is not so rare as it might seem, since the No Immediate Reelection Rule virtually guarantees that any party that has won the presidency in the previous ten years will have a former president in its ranks. This former president is the best figure imaginable to provide an alternative to the incumbent's leadership, either by becoming a candidate himself or by endorsing one of the younger Outs. They enjoy much more prestige than former U.S. presidents, who either lose their reelection bid or become ineligible after their second term. Venezuelan former presidents, by contrast, are still eligible and have not been defeated in a general election (until they run again). In Venezuela, the advantages enjoyed by the Outs do not guarantee that the Out candidate will win the nomination; in the 196o's, the Ins chose to split the party rather than lose the nomination. The Arsistas had gained control of the CEN and, if left to their own devices, would have nominated someone whom Betancourt opposed. The only way for Betancourt to stop them was to expel them, which he was barely able to do. Even after the split, Betancourt and his Ins were being displaced by Paz Galarraga's Outs.

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The Power Party

For example, toward the end of his government, Betancourt became concerned that the end of the coalition with COPEI would endanger the democratic regime, and he therefore proposed that AD choose a presidential candidate who was acceptable to COPEI, by having AD's national convention nominate five to seven possible candidates and authorizing the CEN to negotiate a final choice with the leadership of COPEF6 This idea did not sit well with the other party leaders, especially Paz, who doubted, with good reason, that COPEI would support an AD candidate for president.77 Betancourt took his proposal to the CEN, and it was voted down. He took it to the CON, and it was voted down there. He even proposed it a third time, at the eighth national convention in July 1963, but after a cold reception he prudently withdrew it before it could be voted down again. The influence of Betancourt, the leader of the Ins, was waning, while that of Paz, the leader of the Outs, was waxing. In the 1967 conflict between the Betancouristas and the Prietistas, it appears that Prieto was also the leader of the larger faction before the split. In the first place, the Prietistas were more confident of victory in the nomination struggle than the Betancouristas were. 78 The first results of the nominating convention election, as reported by El Universal, reflected the Prietistas' predictions closely. Prieto won eleven of the twelve states they had predicted, plus two they had written off to Barrios, and one was undecided. Barrios won only four of the eight they had allowed him, lost two of these to Prieto, and two were still undecided. In the remaining five states, where the outcomes had been impossible to predict, three went to Prieto, one to Barrios, and one was still undecided. At the time, the Betancouristas did not dispute the appearance of a clear victory for Prieto. If the states were weighted according to population, as their delegations to the national convention would have been, it would have been a landslide. Barrios questioned the accuracy of the returns presented but did not seem to pin his hopes on disputing them. When he was asked how he could possibly win the nomination, given the preliminary returns, his chief hope was that the uncommitted delegates would swing the results in his favor at the district conventions.7 9 But the results of the district conventions only strengthened Prieto's lead and made his victory at the national convention virtually inevitable. The only way the Ins could

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stop the Outs was to play dirty in the rest of the nomination process, and it was these tactics that provoked the split. The case for the strength of the Outs is easier to make for the 1977 and 1987 nominations, because both times the Ins chose to surrender rather than provoke another disastrous division. In 1977, President Perez himself never publicly endorsed Lusinchi's candidacy, but Lusinchi was clearly identified with the government. One indication was his choice of David Morales Bello as his campaign manager, a man who had put himself on the line by proposing a constitutional amendment that would have permitted Perez's reelection. Morales Bello was reportedly President Perez's first choice for the nomination. Also, some government officials who were close to the president apparently worked for Lusinchi.8° Furthermore, Lusinchi's attitude toward the Perez government was quite favorable. In the formal announcement of his precandidacy, for example, he wrote, "The work realized by compaiiero Carlos Andres Perez on the national scene as well as in the international sphere must be continued without frustrating amendments and therefore should be supported by a devastating electoral victory." 81 The eventual nominee, however, by a vote of 61 to 36 percent, was Luis Piiierua Ordaz, who had built his reputation on criticizing the Perez government. After resigning as Interior Minister, he talked loudly and incessantly about the need for administrative honesty. This moralistic campaign was universally interpreted as implicit criticism of corruption in the Perez government, and it was almost certainly intended as such. Cabinet members revealed privately that the president had a very low opinion of Pifierua.82 Events at the 1975 national convention illustrate how isolated Perez had become already in his second year in office. Knowing how weak his position was, Perez proposed a single slate of candidates for the CEN in order to prevent his supporters from being decimated. Betancourt and Barrios would do no more than guarantee the election of the two or three Perez supporters who were popular enough to be elected anyway, so this agreement fell through. 83 It is ironic that in 1987, Lusinchi and Perez were adversaries: Lusinchi, as the incumbent president, heading the Ins and Perez, as an aspiring candidate, heading the Outs. Once again, the Outs were the larger faction, for, despite Lusinchi's efforts on behalf of his

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favored candidate, Octavio Lepage, Perez won AD's presidential nomination by a three-to-one margin in October 1987. It is interesting to note that Perez's support grew fairly early in Lusinchi's term. A poll conducted in March 1986 showed Perez leading a field of eighteen possible candidates from all parties with 15 percent, compared with Lepage's one percent.84 His strong lead is perhaps not surprising at the popular level, but my own survey of AD members of Congress revealed that, even at that elite level, 55 percent of those willing to admit confidentially their support for a precandidate favored Carlos Andres Perez as early as 1985, and over So percent of the undecideds were considering him. The temporary defeat of the Outs in the internal elections of 1985 resulted not from any rejection of Perez but from the fact that he was not a candidate for any party post, and from the willingness of the state bosses to cooperate with the central government temporarily in exchange for increased local autonomy. 85 Most of them switched to Perez's camp before the nomination was decided.

Why Ins and Outs Come into Conflict In principle, the roles of supporting the government and winning the next election do not have to conflict. They might even be considered complementary. It is logical to assume that strong party support would improve a government's performance, since lack of party support would certainly handicap a government. And it also makes sense that a government with a record of good performance is an asset to a governing party facing an election. This is possible in theory, and perhaps it really works that way in some countries, but in Venezuela the two roles unfailingly and unfortunately conflict. The conflict can be made worse if the Outs give in to the temptation to criticize the president in order to legitimate their opposition, but the conflict would be present even if there were nothing to criticize in the government's performance. There are two reasons why this is so-presidentialism and collective party leadership.

Presidentialism Politicians undergo a change of perspective when they become heads of government. Before taking office they are party leaders,

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and they try to do what is best for their party. After taking office, they are leaders of an entire nation, and they must take the interests of all groups into account, or suffer the consequences. This broader perspective leads them sooner or later to take actions that are contrary to the interests of their party, and an executive-party crisis heats up as a result. The different perspectives of government and party are therefore said to cost an executive some support within his party. Executive-party crises do arise in Venezuela, but not, as writers usually imply, because of policy differences. However, the same tension is produced by the executive's tendency to consult his party insufficiently, which is another result of his distinct perspective. Many party leaders naturally feel that they should be included in the government's decision-making process, since the executive does, after all, owe his position to them. But the executive is besieged by pressures from other parties and interest groups as well, and he realizes that no one will share the blame with him if he makes a mistake. Furthermore, it is often considered inconsistent with democratic principles for the leadership of a party, which is an unelected group outside the formal institutions of government, to have too much influence over government decisions. Realizing this, Venezuelan parties follow the custom of releasing the president from party discipline. But the presidents do not return the favor and release their party from the obligation to support their program. Venezuelan presidents tend to do whatever they want in office and expect the party to follow. Some party leaders are willing to go along with this style, and others are not. This is how executive autonomy contributes to conflict within the party. The corrosive effects of executive autonomy on governmentparty relations have long been recognized in parliamentary systems. It is one of the reasons that Michels used to explain his "Iron Law of Oligarchy," and one of the reasons for the dominance of the parliamentary party over the electoral party observed by MacKenzie in Britain.86 Executive autonomy is even more pronounced in presidential systems. Presidents and their cabinets, unlike prime ministers, are not responsible to the legislature. They enjoy a fixed term of office that cannot be cut short by a vote of no confidence and practically never is shortened by impeachment (although military intervention remains a possibility in Latin America). Therefore,

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presidents tend to feel that they have a mandate that is independent of that of their party's congressional delegation. In countries with separated legislative and presidential elections, the president's confidence in his mandate is heightened by the fact that it is more recent than that of part of the legislatureP In Venezuela this added incentive for autonomy does not exist, because presidential and legislative elections are held simultaneously. But the president is still encouraged to act independently of his party by the fact that his name is on the ballot, and by the fact that his tenure in office is secure. Presidential hubris leads the incumbent into conflict with those who aspire to succeed him. Since the president expects the party to support his program, he discourages any party activities that could encourage party leaders to criticize it. Internal campaigns for the party's presidential nomination are just such activities. It is possible for a candidate to campaign for the nomination without criticizing the incumbent administration, but the less successful that administration is, and the tighter the competition is, the harder it is for a candidate to avoid criticisms that might improve his chances. Even positive promises to tackle a problem more energetically or to redirect attention to neglected issues can be (and usually are) interpreted as implied criticisms of the incumbent. In a developing country like Venezuela, there is always a long list of urgent, unsolved problems to choose from-corruption, poverty, malnutrition, malfunctioning public services, and inadequate infrastructure, to name a few. Even if all the candidates are determined not to criticize the incumbent, it is hard for the incumbent to believe that they will refrain from criticism indefinitely. From his perspective, it is better to discourage campaigning altogether, or at least delay it as long as possible.

Collective leadership The only time AD has "a Leader" is during the general election campaign, when the fortunes of the party and all its members are riding on the shoulders of the Candidate. Normally, the party is led not by one person but by a circle of national party leaders who share authority collectively. This tradition of collective leadership probably originated when AD was founded as a coalition of protoparties and interest groups. All the founders started out with an

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independent claim to authority based in other organizations, and since then the principle of collective leadership that was necessary to maintain the cooperation of the founders has become institutionalized. Before and after the general campaign, no leader can claim to be more than a first among equals. This is why all important party decisions are made by the CEN, or at least by the cogollito; and why the president meets with the CEN nearly every week while in office. Collective leadership contributes to tensions in party-government relations. When presidents succumb to the natural desire to monopolize authority and expect unconditional support (which is encouraged by the head-swelling experience of being the candidate), other party leaders assert their own authority. Moreover, the more party leaders think about the next election, the more the incumbent's leadership is threatened, for the new candidate inevitably eclipses the incumbent in authority. Collective leadership of a disciplined party does not mesh well with a presidential system. These two factors-presidential hubris and collective leadership of a disciplined party-make conflict between Ins and Outs practically inevitable when AD governs. When AD is in the opposition, such conflict does not develop because the two roles of winning the next election and leading the opposition are complementary. Opposition parties are supposed to challenge the president's leadership, criticize his performance, and ensure that the legislature checks his freedom of action. When AD is the opposition, it has only one hat to wear, so the nomination campaign produces one leader to wear it. When AD is the governing party, it has two hats to wear, so the campaign produces two heads. That is why opposition unites and governing divides AD.

Variations on the Pattern-COPE/ and Electoral Reform This explanation does not mean that every system with a lameduck presidency will show the same pattern of conflict in government and unity in opposition, with advantages for an Out faction, because there are so many other possible causes of factionalism to add to the confusion. Both preexisting cleavages-generational, regional, religious, educational, sectoral, ethnic, linguistic, and so

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on-and the rules that would allow factions to survive, such as internal proportional representation, need to be factored into the equation. The explanation I have just offered works for AD because all the preexisting cleavages were resolved, and because internal winner-take-all rules and the norms of party unity have not allowed new factions to survive. The absence of other possible causes of factionalism allows the effect of the lame-duck presidency to show up clearly. For example, many of the same causes of factionalism are also relevant for COPEI, because it operates in the same presidential system that AD does. True to expectations, some aspects of the same pattern of factionalism also show up in CO PEl. Ricardo Combellas, the leading scholar on COPEI, refers to internal groups in CO PEl as tendencies, which he defines as "stable sets of attitudes," borrowing Rose's definition. 88 However, the more Combellas describes COPEI's "tendencies," the clearer it becomes that they are indistinguishable from AD's factions. "In the case of COPEI," he states by way of qualification, "this stable set of attitudes is strongly penetrated by leadership: they are tendencies that are personalized in the conduct of their leaders and in the attitudinal patterns that they impose on their clienteles." 89 Furthermore, he lists the following defining characteristics of COPEI "tendencies": they are not ideological or programmatic; their membership is fluid, not closed; their existence is transitory and tied to the personal success of their leaders; they are vehicles for political mobility; and they are national in scope, though there are regional subfollowings that feed into them.90 Moreover, COPEI also experiences conflict between Ins and Outs during its governments: COPE! has not definitively solved the problem of governing partygovernment relations .... With the president go his most loyal attendents, and the natural erosion that the excessive "offerism" of the campaign produces is expressed in the frustration of a good part of the membership, normally channeled into leaderships and tendencies opposed to the presidential tendency. The electoral logic of the party progressively takes precedence over the governmental logic, generating subtle or explicit frictions and conflicts.91

Therefore, during the government of Rafael Caldera (1969-74), CO PEl experienced a "traumatic" nomination contest between Cal-

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dera's favorite, Lorenzo Fernandez, and Luis Herrera Campins, who was obviously the leader of an "Out" faction. Ten years later, the roles reversed during Luis Herrera's government, which "practically passed by in the midst of increasing distance between the 'herrerismo' tied to the government and the 'calderismo' controlling the party." 92 There are some interesting differences in factions between AD and COPEI, but they lend support to the proposed explanation of factionalism in AD. During the Caldera government, the conflict between Ins and Outs was won by the In candidate, Lorenzo Fernandez. And in opposition to the Lusinchi government, COPEI was not unified. Instead, it suffered a very divisive nomination struggle between former president Caldera and his former protege, Eduardo Fernandez. In both cases, I believe the deviations from the AD pattern were due to the absence of collective leadership. COPEI was founded by Rafael Caldera, not by a coalition of preexisting organizations, and as a result he was considered the unquestioned Leader of CO PEL He was, for example, the party's presidential candidate every time he was eligible to run (in 1947, 1958, 1963, and 1983) until 1988. Caldera's preeminence probably helped the In candidate win the nomination during the Caldera presidency. And the conflict in COPEI during the Lusinchi government was unrelated to the party's opposition role.lt was simply a coincidence that Caldera's advanced age finally eroded his following. If he had won the nomination and the 1988 election, he would have been in his eighties by the end of his presidency. Betancourt retired more gracefully, and while he lived, he was never the unquestioned Leader of his party, although since his death in 1981 there has been a tendency to glorify his leadership. As Caldera passes permanently from the scene, COPEI would be expected to approximate AD's pattern of factionalism more closely if other conditions remained equal. But as so often happens in politics, other conditions have changed in the interim in ways that have slightly modified the pattern of factionalism in AD and CO PEL The factional struggles culminating in the 1993 nomination of Claudio Fermin as AD's presidential candidate were very similar to the pattern of earlier periods. As before, factionalism afflicted the party in government, the factions were divided by the Ins vs. Outs cleavage, activists deserted the president

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to jump on a bandwagon, and the Ins failed to nominate a presidential candidate. But this time the two factions lost their cohesion early, precampaigns began late, and the nomination was decided by a process in which regional and sectoral brokers played a less decisive role than before. In this case, the Outs, or Ortodoxos, were led by many of the same figures who had opposed the nomination of Perez in 1987Jaime Lusinchi, Octavia Lepage, and especially the new general secretary, Luis Alfaro Ucero. The Ins, or Renovadores, coalesced around Hector Alonso Lopez, a defender of President Perez who launched a vigorous campaign to replace Alfaro as general secretary and probably would have made a bid for the presidential nomination if he had won. But in the October 1991 internal election, Alfaro retained this position and the Ortodoxos strengthened their control of the party machinery. Unlike their predecessors, the Renovadores seem to have disbanded at this point and never mounted a serious effort to win the nomination. Perez administration officials privately spoke favorably of the candidacy of former minister Carmela Lauria, but Lauria himself seemed to recognize that his ties to the administration were a handicap, and after February 1992 the president was probably too busy staving off coup attempts to promote the candidacy of an ally. Without an adversary, the Ortodoxos found it hard to unite behind a single candidate, and in the meantime a different sort of Out leader was blazing a new path to the nomination. In 1989 a new electoral law created the position of elected mayor and instituted the direct election of state governors. These officials were elected for the first time in December 1989 and again in 1992. The new electoral law made the old strategy for winning the presidential nomination obsolete, because state party bosses were no longer as willing or as able to deliver large blocs of votes for a factional candidate. They were less willing to do so because, being directly elected, they no longer had to back the winning faction in the presidential nomination struggle to ensure their continuance as governor in the next administration. And they were less able to do so because they had become more accountable to the new tier of leadership at the mayoral level. Claudio Fermin, the mayor of Caracas, gambled that in this reformed institutional environment the nomination would be won not by a national faction that forged deals with regional

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brokers but by someone who could bypass the brokers and attract support directly from activists with a good record of governing at the state and local level. This strategy worked well for Fermin in AD, just as it did for COPEI's nominee, Oswaldo Alvarez Paz, the governor of Zulia, who soundly defeated his party's general secretary, Eduardo Fernandez. To summarize, in a presidential system it makes sense for the presidential nomination to be the consuming passion of intraparty politics, especially when any factions based on other issues or identities have not been allowed to survive. The winner-take-all environment of a presidential system creates powerful incentives for bifactional competition within the party. It is rational for precandidates to start organizing early, when the support of powerful vote brokers in the organization is crucial to victory. It makes sense for activists to ally with the one that has the best chance of winning, since the nominee will distribute nominations and patronage. Given the premium on being on the right side, factional loyalties must remain fluid. And presidents who tend to alienate their parties and are required to step down on schedule have little chance of imposing a successor on a party anxious to win the next election. This is the logic of the power party, in which AD's pattern of factionalism makes good sense.

CHAPTER SIX

Policy and Power Struggles The English people believes itself to be free; it is gravely mistaken; it is free only during the election of Members of Parliament; as soon as the Members are elected, the people is enslaved; it is nothing. -Rousseau, The Social Contract

T

here have always been theorists who, like Rousseau, scoff at the notion of democracy between elections, but these theorists now form a distinct minority. Most of us believe that modern democracies do represent the people between elections. Systems of representation may be biased or crude or fallible or in other ways flawed, but we tend to assume that enough effective representation goes on in our "democracies" to justify calling them democratic. Representation takes place through both formal and informal channels. The formal channels are, of course, the legislative bodies at the local, state, and national levels, made up of popularly elected representatives. Informal representation is accomplished by the media, opinion polls, interest-group lobbying, public assemblies, hearings, letter writing, radio call-in shows, advertising, patterns of consumption, and all other activities that give governments information about what the people want. Formal representation is ultimately more important because it carries the force of law, and fairer because it is designed to give individual citizens approximately equal influence regardless of wealth or connections or education. Informal representation, despite its inequities and vagueness, also plays an undeniably important role in the democratic process. But both are usually full of flaws. It is sometimes argued that party factions compensate, or can

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compensate, for certain flaws in a system of formal representation. The usual assumption is that political parties do the job adequately without being subdivided into factions. Parties can, and usually do, offer a variety of ideologies, programs, strategies, and leaders that appeal to a variety of citizens. But in dominant-party systems, opposition parties may be too weak or too few in number to represent many people effectively; therefore, most of the work of representation is either done by factions within the dominant party, or it is not done at all. V. 0. Key, for example, argued that factions in one-party Louisiana, North Carolina, and North Dakota were sufficiently well organized and distinct in their platforms to perform effectively the functions of a two-party system. 1 Examining Italian correntocrazia, Belloni concluded, "The crucial element of the Italian party system is not the competition among the array of units in its nominally multi-party structure, but the competition among the faction units in the unofficially permanent governing party." 2 Similar arguments have been advanced about other factionalized dominant parties.3 If factionalism improves representation when the formal representative process is deeply flawed, it would also be desirable in a system with deeply flawed informal representation. A partyarchy is just such a system. Where few interest groups are free of party control and the media are saturated with highly partisan interpretations of the news, informal channels of representation are weak, and a correspondingly greater burden falls on the formal channelsparties. One would like to see greater variety in the positions espoused by the parties to compensate for the lack of diversity among the politically relevant groups of civil society. Factions could help provide that diversity. The burden of representation falling on the governing party is still greater when it controls a legislative majority, because the iron discipline of a partyarchy turns any majority party into a dominant party. Here again, factions within the majority party would improve the effective representation of a diverse society. The most obvious way in which factionalism would improve representation would be by simply increasing the number of leaders and positions available to advocate demands coming from below. The more internal groups there are, the more likely it is that one of them will adopt positions that closely match those of otherwise

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unrepresented groups in the rank and file, provided that the factions are well organized and hold positions that are indeed distinct.4 The interests represented by factions are not necessarily limited to those of party members: Belloni claims that factions of the Italian DC have at times relayed the concerns of interest groups and even other parties to the leadership of the dominant party.5 In a partyarchy, these concerns are probably represented more effectively within the party than they would be outside the party, since party leaders are more interested in placating faction leaders from their own party for the sake of maintaining party unity than they are in placating the leaders of other parties for the sake of some diffuse interparty consensus. If the factions are well organized and distinct, then factionalism also improves representation by allowing alternative leaders to become better prepared to lead. Their superior preparation is in part intellectual: factional competition can stimulate debate, which forces leaders to sharpen and refine their positions and improve the quality of their thinking and argument. Aronoff noted this benefit in Israeli factionalism, as did Mitchell among the parties and factions of the Bolivian Left.6 Factionalism also helps leaders to become better prepared by allowing them to become known and to publicize their positions to potential followers, which clarifies the options available and makes it easier for potential leaders to identify and mobilize a base of support. It is important to reiterate at this point that the benefits of factionalism for representation cannot be realized unless the factions in question are well organized and distinct. That is, each faction must be distinct in the sense that its members share a common coherent position that differs from the positions of other factions on matters of interest to the people being represented; and the members must be organized in a way that enables them to join together to express their demands, punish noncompliance with opposition, and reward compliance with support. There is considerable evidence that neither requirement is met when the factions in question are clientelist factions. Clientelist factions are structured like pyramids, with the head patron having several clients, those clients in turn being patrons to lower-level clients, and so on in a hierarchy of tiers of leaders. In order to keep the pyramid intact, a patron need not meet the needs of the clients

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at the very bottom; he need only satisfy the needs of his own client on the next tier down. Representation breaks down in this structure because the needs of the intermediate patron/ client, or broker, often differ from the needs of the clients at the base? The base wants benefits for itself, but the broker is too easily satisfied with patronage jobs for himself and a few relatives, or even with the prestige of having a powerful patron. In other words, brokers are easily coopted, and few benefits filter down to the base. If that happens, the faction serves more to keep party supporters in line than it does to represent their interests. Clientelist factions further hinder representation by skewing the terms of the relationship between the base and its representatives. In a society pervaded by clientelism, people approach their representatives as individuals rather than as groups; they ask for personal rather than community benefits; and when those requests are granted, the benefits are treated as favors rather than entitlements. As Lande observed for the Philippines, Valenzuela for Chile, and Zuckerman for Italy, these practices inhibit the formation of collective organizations that could demand satisfaction of community needs with greater autonomy. 8 In democratic theory, it is assumed that voters and representatives are in a relationship of exchange, and the terms of the exchange are that voters give the representatives political support in the form of a vote, and the representatives in return act on the voters' behalf. Clientelism shifts the terms of the exchange in the representative's favor by inserting several layers of intermediaries between voters and representatives. In effect, this creates transaction costs equal to the benefits necessary to reward the intermediaries, and some of these costs are borne by the voters. In this situation, mere voting is not enough to buy the good offices of the representative; the voters are also expected to contribute political supports for their immediate patron, which could include turning out for rallies, participating in community meetings, working in campaigns, or voting for him and his patrons in internal party elections. The total. cost to the voter amounts to the loss of political autonomy, which explains why clientelist factions tend to become instruments for control rather than vehicles for representation within the party. To summarize, the contribution of factionalism to representation depends on the nature of the factions. If the factions are well orga-

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nized and distinct in ways that matter to the voters, then the factions can in theory, and probably do in some actual cases, improve the quality of representation in the political system. But if the factions are clientelist factions, they are not organized in a way that enables them to make or enforce collective demands, and their members are not likely to share a common collective interest to begin with. This distinction between clientelist factions and programmatically distinct factions corresponds closely to David Hume's classic distinction between factions of principle and factions of interest.9 The usefulness of distinguishing between principle and self-interest has often been questioned on the grounds that real-life politicians are complex beings motivated by a combination of principle and self-interest, which are not, in any event, necessarily incompatible. 10 Although this questioning serves a useful purpose in warning us that it is not necessarily possible to distinguish between self-interested and principled motivations, it should not prevent us from making that distinction when it is possible to do so, because it can yield penetrating insights into the nature of the political process. In the interest of conceptual precision, it must be noted that clientelist factions are only a special case of factions of interest-that is, they are factions of interest that are pyramidally organized-and therefore conclusions about the representational potential of clientelist factions do not necessarily hold for other types of factions of interest. However, the conclusions stated above would hold as long as either of two conditions is met: ( r) the faction is internally organized in a way that prevents its leaders from being held accountable to the base, or (2) the members of the faction are not united by a shared collective interest. If either condition applied to a given faction of interest, then that faction would be incapable of making and enforcing collective demands. Chapter 5 revealed that in AD, national faction leaders are accountable to the brokers in the party when the national leadership is divided but that these brokers are not in turn accountable to their base and are therefore able to deliver blocs of votes in internal party elections. That is, factions are organized pyramidally in AD below the brokers, but not above them. What matters, then, is whether faction members at the level of the brokers and national faction leaders were united by collective interests. If they share collective interests, then the struggle between Ins and Outs has the potential to channel

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meaningful demands upward; if they do not, the struggle is essentially meaningless. This chapter argues that factional struggles in AD have not always been meaningless, but that the factional process progressively destroyed and discouraged factions of principle early in the party's existence, so that by the late 196o's, factionalism ceased to serve as a useful channel for representation. The questions of how factions in Venezuelan parties are organized, and whether they are programmatically distinct, are particularly important because Venezuela is a partyarchy. With a thoroughly politicized and penetrated civil society, most of the responsibility for representation falls to the party system; and with two leading parties that are barely distinguishable, and one party that sometimes wins unassailable majorities, factions are expected to assume some of that responsibility. If they do not, the quality of Venezuelan democracy leaves much to be desired.

Factions and Principle During the Lusinchi Government Chapter 4 made it clear that great consensus prevailed in AD on most issues that were salient during the Lusinchi government. Is it nevertheless possible that the Outs were united by a common opposition position? Since the Ins and Outs in my sample were roughly equal in number, the high level of overall agreement makes it unlikely that the members of one faction were united by one position and the members of the other faction were united by a different position. The Outs theoretically could have been a coalition of disgruntled minorities, a mixed group of people who dissented on more than one issue and joined forces to make a common front of opposition to the Ins. This hypothesis is decisively refuted by survey data, which show that the Ins vs. Outs cleavage cut across practically every economic issue cleavage imaginable. The Outs were organized in a way that would have made it possible for them to act in opposition to the government, but they had no common opposition positions to articulate. This conclusion is supported by a comparison of the distributions of Ins and Outs along the left-right continuum. The same mild polarization found in the pooled sample, with 5 being the most common position followed closely by 3, is reproduced within the two

J42

Policy and Power Struggles TABLE6.I

Similarity of Policy Positions Across Factions (in descending order of statistical significance) Percentage approving among Policy position

Ins

Outs

N

p

Reducing import restrictions Imposing exchange controls Subsidizing exports The 1983 currency devaluation Reducing subsidies for basic consumer goods Reducing industrial wages Reducing public employment Postponing public investment projects Unifying foreign exchange rates Providing dollars to private firms at preferential rates for repaying foreign debts Raising import duties Providing tax incentives for private investment Increasing real wages Lowering interest rates Increasing public investment Eliminating some barriers to foreign investment Raising income taxes Raising excise taxes Contracting the money supply Eliminating price controls Reducing job security Reducing public employees' wages Administrative stimulation of exports

24 97 81 73 23 6 60 21 88

45 86 65 58 40 0 32 94

60 68 65 66 51 67 62 59 64

.075 .113 .123 .151 .159 .224 .236 .262 .336

48 77 83 86 94

40 70 78 56 82 91

59 45 62 53 55 64

.353 .403 .423 .448 .476 .500

94 65 90 23 23 16 6 97

91 63 88 25 23 16 6 97

63 53 65 62 62 64 65 67

.515 .541 .553 .558 .619 .634 .682 .746

so

72

souRcE: Author's survey, described in Chapter I. NoTE: Percentages were calculated after excluding the respondents who answered "It de· pends." The symbol p is the probability that a 2 x 2 table in which the variables are at least as strongly related in the same direction could be produced by chance, using Fisher's Exact Test (one·tailed). Conventionally, a statistically significant association is indicated when p is less than .05.

factions. The Ins and the Outs are essentially indistinguishable in their self-placement along the Left-Right scale. Ideological differences, at least measured in this fashion, are not associated with the conflict between Ins and Outs. Turning to more specific measures, Table 6.1 compares the proportions of Ins and Outs approving 23 economic policies, which covered all the major options for dealing with Venezuela's debt

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TABLE 6.2

Economic Recovery Strategies Preferred by Ins and Outs "It has been said that there are two general strategies for promoting economic recovery. One proposes stimulating supply, that is, production; the other proposes stimulating demand, that is, the purchasing power of consumers. Which strategy seems better to you?" Number agreeing who are: Strategy

Stimulating supply (production) Stimulating supply and demand simultaneously (volunteered) Stimulating demand (consumers' purchasing power) TOTAL

Ins

Outs

Total

17

13

30

13

10

23

3 33

12

35

15 68

souRcE: Author's survey, described in Chapter r. NoTE: Association is statistically significant at p = .043 (Chi-square).

crisis. Not one of these 23 issues was significantly associated with factional loyalties in AD. There were dissenters among the Outs, but no more so than among the Ins; and there were economic policy supporters among the Ins, but not to a significantly greater degree than among the Outs. There are, however, two ideology or policy issues (out of two dozen such issues in my data set) that are significantly associated with factionalismY One significant association concerned the question of how to promote economic recovery. By 1985, Venezuela's economy had been stagnant or in a recession for four years. Economists generally subscribed to one of two strategies for promoting economic recovery. One was to stimulate the supply side by increasing investment and lowering interest rates to increase production; the other was the Keynesian one of stimulating demand by increasing wages and government spending. The preferences of AD leaders on this issue had a statistically significant association with factional affiliation (Table 6.2). Those who preferred to stimulate production or insisted on stimulating production and demand simultaneously had a slight tendency to be Ins. Those who preferred to stimulate demand were Outs, four to one.

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Policy and Power Struggles TABLE 6.3

Reactions of Ins and Outs to Lusinchi's Austerity Program "Since he took office, the President has been implementing an austerity program to deal with the economic crisis that the country is currently facing. Which of the statements [below] best expresses your feelings toward the austerity program?" Number agreeing who are:

Statement In the long run, austerity is good for the country. I don't like austerity but there really is no alternative to the measures that have been adopted. Some kind of austerity program is necessary, but it is hard to say whether this program is what the country really needs or not. Some kind of austerity program is necessary, but the program that is being implemented now has many problems. Austerity is not the solution to the economic crisis that the country is experiencing. TOTAL

Ins

Outs

Total

20

16

36

0

0

0

7

4

11

6

14

20

0

1 35

1 68

33

souRcE: Author's survey, described in Chapter z. NoTE : Chi-square not appropriate because of low cell counts. After combining the first three categories and the last two categories to make a 2 X 2 table, Fisher's Exact Test shows a statistically significant association (p ~ .025 ).

I also found a significant and very interesting association between factionalism and feelings about the president's austerity program; curiously, it is exactly what the hypothesis of issue-based factionalism would predict. The AD leaders who favored, or at least did not oppose, the package of austerity measures were more likely to be Ins than Outs; and those who expressed some opposition to the measures were two and a half times more likely to be Outs than Ins (Table 6.3). Recapitulating, to the extent that factionalism was associated with issues in 1985, the people who were most likely to be Outs were those who were critical of austerity or believed the best way to promote economic recovery was to stimulate demand rather than supply. These associations between issues and factions may be statisti-

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145

cally significant, but they are substantively meaningless. On both issues, the majority of the Ins agreed with the majority of the Outs. Ninety-one percent of the Ins favored stimulating supply or supply and demand simultaneously, and so did 66 percent of the Outs; 82 percent of the Ins were uncritical of austerity, as were 57 percent of the Outs. Furthermore, neither of these issues was one on which the party and the government disagreed. A majority of both factions agreed with the government's policies of austerity and demand restraint (see Chapter 4). The overlaps between issues and factions would have to be much more pronounced and much more clearly related to party-government tensions to create an issue-based opposition faction capable of coherently demanding greater responsiveness from the president. The marginal overlaps that did exist must be regarded as coincidence.

Factions and Self-Interest During the Lusinchi Government The evidence, then, leaves no doubt that factional loyalties had nothing to do with economic policy during the Lusinchi government, and the context of the economic crisis Venezuela was experiencing also strongly suggests that factions were not based on any policy issue, economic or not. Since the data collected in the survey concern economic policy issues only, I cannot state with absolute certainty that there was no relationship at all between factionalism and other kinds of issues, such as religion or foreign policy. But I am certain that there was no reason to expect other issues to have any relationship with factionalism: few politicians, inside AD or out, talked about any issues besides economic policy in my presence or before the media, and it is practically inconceivable for AD to come close to splitting over any issue that could be kept a secret. Therefore the only remaining conclusion is that these were factions of interest, nothing more, which solves the mystery raised in Chapter 4 of how it was possible for the leaders of AD to choose a presidential candidate whose policies were so different from those of the president with whom they were in great agreement. They chose Perez because he could win the election, regardless of his economic platform, which was, in any event, ambiguous until Inauguration Day.

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Policy and Power Struggles TABLE

6.4

Best Single Predictors of Factional Affiliation Predictor Candidate thought most likely to win nomination Adequacy of government consultation of CEN Preferred nomination method Feelings toward Perez Willingness to reveal candidate preference Frequency of enthusiastic support for parry line Perception of CO PEl's ideological position Feelings toward Pinerua Frequency of visits with President Lusinchi Frequency of reluctant support for parry line Attitude toward delayed reelection Feelings toward Morales Bello

p

lambda

Percent of cases explained

a a a a a

.594 .583 .531 .467 .406 .406 .400 .400 .375 .344 .308 .300

81 81 78 75 72 70 75 72 70 67 69 67

a

.001 a .001 .002 .006 .007

souRcE: Author's survey, described in Chapter r. NoTE: The symbol p is from Fisher's Exact Test, for which all variables were dichotomized. asignificant at a level of less than p = .OOI.

A look at some of the other survey data confirms this interpretation. In the data set from my survey of AD leaders, the twelve variables that are the best single predictors of factional loyalties are all related to discipline, candidacies, nomination procedures, government-party relations, and interparty competition (Table 6.4). Each of these variables alone accounts for at least two-thirds of the cases; a couple of them account for more than 8o percent. The data also lend themselves to a more sophisticated analysis. Using the variables from Table 6.4, one can construct many explanatory models that have strong predictive power (lambda greater than .650) or that account for over 8o percent of the cases. The best of these models is the one presented in Table 6.5P This model is perfectly consistent with the interpretation outlined so far in this chapter, keeping in mind that the data are from 1985 and therefore reflect factional loyalties at midterm, when the bandwagon shift from Ins to Outs was still incomplete. Table 6. 5 therefore shows how the leaders who were still Ins in the second year of the Lusinchi government differed from the leaders who were already Outs. It demonstrates that AD leaders were aligning themselves with one faction or the other according to two criteria-their willingness to refrain from criti-

Policy and Power Struggles

14 7

TABLE 605

Motives of Ins and Outs (N =59) the probability that he or she is an In/Out is: o

0

o

In

If an Adeco

0

o

(n)

%

(n)

6

( 1)

93

(14)

8

( 1)

92

(11)

38

( 3)

63

( 5)

100

( 3)

0

( 0)

100

(21)

0

( 0)

%

o

usually is NOT enthusiastic about supporting the party line usually IS enthusiastic about the party line but is a DIE-HARD supporter of Perez usually is enthusiastic, LEANS toward Perez, and rather LIKES David Morales Bello usually is enthusiastic, leans toward Perez, but has a POOR opinion of Morales Bello usually is enthusiastic and does NOT especially lean in favor of Perez 0

o

o

o

0

0

o

0

0

0

o

0

0

0

0

Out

souRcE: Author's survey, described in Chapter r.

cizing the party line, which was very progovernment at the time, and their favorable or adverse feelings toward the two leading Out candidates, Perez and Morales Bello.U In other words, factional polarization was the product of tension between a conscious duty to support the government and a strong desire to support an attractive candidate in the next election. The predictive association between these factors and faction loyalties is very strong. With a joint lambda of .828, it is equivalent to eleven-to-one odds, and accounts for 91.5 percent of the cases.

Self-Interest and Principle in AD's History It would be a mistake to leap from the evidence just presented to the conclusion that factions in AD have always been as devoid of principle as they were during the Lusinchi government. Some of the notable factions of the past clearly were principled to some degree. Certainly the Muchachos were, to an extreme degree. The Arsistas at various points of their existence called for the direct election of governors, greater state supervision of Catholic schools, and an end to the Guanabana coalition with CO PEL And though many of the

148

Policy and Power Struggles

Prietistas seem to have been drawn to their candidate by his charisma, others probably were inspired by his strong stands in favor of secular education. It would also be a mistake to conclude that conflict between factions of interest can have no policy consequences. The policies of Carlos Andres Perez in 1989 after his nomination by a faction of interest in 1987 clearly demonstrate that even unprincipled factions can cause dramatic policy shifts, if they support principled leaders for reasons that have nothing to do with those principles. Even though faction leaders and followers have had principled motives some of the time, conflicts over principle do not fully explain the outbreak of factionalism found in this party even in its early years. In AD, self-interested motives consistently have been both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the expression of factional conflict, and principled motives have been neither necessary nor sufficient. The party was beset by factionalism in the Lusinchi government even when principles were not at stake, just as it was in the Betancourt government when they were. It was united and free of division during the Provisional Government of 1958 even with the intensely ideological Muchachos still in the party, just as it was during the Caldera government after three factions had been recently purged. Principled disagreements do not cause factionalism in AD. If principled differences exist, they may influence which factions the principled individuals join, how the factions legitimate themselves, and what the consequences of the conflict may be; but the conflict would take place during AD governments even without the disagreements, and would be suppressed in the opposition in spite of disagreements. The cause of factionalism in AD is the selfinterest of party activists responding to the institutional incentives of the power party.

The Destruction of Principled Factionalism In the beginning of this chapter, I argued that factionalism in the governing party can perform the function of representation between elections if the factions are well organized and principled. Some of AD's early factions may have met these criteria, but during the Lusinchi government they certainly did not. If the factions of the Lusinchi administration were a one-time aberration, factional-

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149

ism could be a saving grace of partyarchy in Venezuela, a channel through which interests could be represented effectively despite the impermeability of the rest of the political system. Unfortunately, there are good reasons to suspect that AD's pattern of factionalism has a built-in tendency to destroy any existing principled factions and prevent new ones from taking root. As a result of this process, by the late 196o's, AD ceased to be an arena for representation between elections. The most obvious mechanism by which this destruction of principled factionalism operated was the expulsion of principled faction leaders. During the dictatorship of 1948-58, AD had a faction that developed an intense identification with leftist principles, but after the Muchachos were forced out in 196o-6r, AD was a more ideologically homogeneous party without a contingent on the left. Any of the Arsistas, Pacistas, or Prietistas who might have had strong ideological or programmatic positions were expelled in 1962 and 1967, leaving AD still more homogeneous. The factional process also progressively destroyed principled factions in more subtle ways. For example, the expulsion of the Muchachos sent a clear message to any leftists remaining in the party or contemplating joining the party that AD was no place for them. Those who were already Adecos therefore either withdrew or learned to downplay their principles; those who had considered joining gave their support to some other party. The same processes of socialization and self-selection deprived AD not only of activists on the left but of activists with strong ideological beliefs of any sort. Experiences with factionalism provided an environment in which a political culture of pragmatism evolved within the party. 14 Acci6n Democratica's strict party discipline allowed no room for public dissent from the party line. The Arsistas learned this in 1947-48, when six of their number were expelled for voting against the AD line in the Constituent Assembly and the rest were nearly expelled at the national convention. By 1960, the Arsistas were just as energetic as the Old Guard in punishing the Muchachos for their public criticisms of Betancourt. After the Muchachos were gone, there was no group left in the party to challenge the norm of absolute party discipline. Ideologues cannot remain in such an environment for long. A reformist, frequently governing party like AD makes compromises that irritate them. If they accept party disci-

150

Policy and Power Struggles

pline, they cease to be ideologues; if they refuse, they cease to be Adecos. Both Cristobal Hernandez and Luis Matos Az6car, the two mavericks described in the preceding chapter, were expelled from AD in 1992. 15 Acceptance of party discipline does not mean that one can never try to change the party line-the top leaders always have that prerogative-but it does mean that one must win control of the party first. Therefore, once the norm of absolute discipline was established, all attempts to change the party's direction automatically became power struggles. In the process, principle fell by the wayside, for there could be no campaigns built around differences of principle. The only "issues" permitted in these internal power struggles revolved around personality, character, electability, and self-serving calls for party reform. Thus, Piiienia emphasized his personal honesty, Perez emphasized his personal vigor and popularity, and Lusinchi and Perez called for grass-roots democracy, because that was where their support lay. The positions of Ins and Outs in factional competition became so predictably self-serving that they developed what could be called "Perennial Platforms." The Ins' positions all derive from their mission of supporting the incumbent president, while the Outs take positions designed to promote the interests of a candidate who can win the next general election. The Ins try to preserve their power by prohibiting factions from organizing and campaigning, while the Outs try to take power by defending their right to organize and campaign. The Outs want to hold the president accountable to the party and call for frequent consultation, while the Ins excuse the lack of consultation and lecture the Outs on not tying the president's hands. The Ins praise the government for bringing the principles of the party up to date, while the Outs call for a return to the founding principles of the party (although neither side goes into detail about this). The Ins seek to control internal elections to prevent embarrassment to the president, and therefore favor indirect election and conventions or electoral colleges; the Outs seek to capitalize on their strength at the grass roots and so favor direct election and primaries. 16 Familiarity with these perennial platforms helps interpret some of the otherwise puzzling rhetoric used by both factions in the internal campaigns in 1985. With the constant emphasis on unity and dis-

Policy and Power Struggles

151

ciplined support for the Lusinchi government, the Ins often implied that their adversaries were critical of the government. Humberto Celli, for example, remarked to reporters, "There are ... those who take advantage of the situation to attack some official or officials and the government, trying to capitalize on the discontent of the unsatisfied." 17 A few weeks later he reminded candidates for party office not to "give in to the temptation to practice oppositionist proselytism around the government's failings or omissions." 18 President Lusinchi, after explaining to the CDN delegates what severe policy constraints his government faced, called for harmony in the internal elections, saying, "I need a quiet [tranquilo] party for what lies ahead." 19 The Ins' accusation does not stand up to critical examination. The attitude of Carlos Andres Perez and most of the other Outs was to avoid confrontation and to praise the Lusinchi government. The most critical statement Perez made in 1985 was the following thought on public investment: "I would say that it is more than necessary for the necessary prudence to be combined with indispensable audacity if we really want to give the economy the push that it needs. So far the defect has been that investments have been made in installments, which haven't had the capacity or strength to provide the stimulus that economic recovery requires." 20 This statement was critical of implementation only, not of the policy itself. The criticism was made politely and respectfully. And in context, the statement was hardly critical at all, for the president himself had expressed his own frustration with delays in investment six months earlier and had pledged to dismiss ministers who did not cut through the red tape to use the investment funds allocated to them. Even so, the above statement stands out as unusually critical. The next statement was more typical of Perez's attitude: "The government of Jaime Lusinchi is the most difficult one in Venezuelan democratic history, one that has extremely difficult tasks. It is easy to exploit discontent and resentment and play into the adversaries' hands; what is hard is to defend the government's decisions, even when they are unpopular measures." Perez also said, "The obligation of all party members and leaders is to support the government because this is the government of AD and the acciondemocratista who doesn't back it is in the wrong party." 21 The Ins' emphasis on disciplined support for the government is

152

Policy and Power Struggles

understandable, given their close ties to the government. It was also probably a wise campaign strategy, since discipline and unity are appealling concepts in AD's political culture. But in fact the Outs were no more likely to criticize the government than the Ins were: the Outs in general did not disagree more with policy, their candidate did not campaign on a critical platform, and their decisions to become Outs had little or nothing to do with policy issues. It was conceivable, perhaps even probable, that Perez, once nominated, would become critical of the government, but I am not convinced that he was more prone to criticize than an In candidate. Both would tend to disassociate themselves from an unpopular government and identify themselves with a popular government. The Ins' rhetoric therefore created a misleading impression of what the internal elections were all about. The Outs were also guilty of misleading rhetoric. Whether their enthusiasm for participatory democracy, primary elections, and the will of the rank and file was genuinely felt or not, such positions were clearly in their interest as the faction of the more charismatic candidate. Roles, not the actors, defined the scripts. As Irving Janis put it, "Where you stand depends on where you sit." 22 The contrasts between the rhetoric of former Outs and present Ins, or former Ins and present Outs, are enlightening. As president, Perez was the champion of unity and discipline; under Lusinchi, he favored respect for the will of the base and for the ideals of democracy. Lusinchi has flip-flopped just as clearly. In ironic contrast to his involvement in the 1985 internal elections, he once criticized "the tampering with internal democracy and the free exchange of ideas and positions in order to solve circumstantial crises; [and] the marginalization, for diverse reasons, of important leaders." 23 The years of factional struggle transformed AD into a party incapable of preserving or encouraging internal competition between groups with either a different social base or a different ideological perspective. In their pursuit of power, Adecos struggled alongside their ideological adversaries to defeat their ideological allies. For them, power was not a means to a programmatic end; it was an end in itself. Struggles between such factions are essentially meaningless and do nothing to promote democracy in the larger political system.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Strengths and Weaknesses of Venezuelan Democracy

M

uch of this book has been devoted to an examination of party factionalism because in Venezuela, the nature and dynamics of politics within parties affect the quality of democracy and the stability of the regime. It is difficult to appreciate how important factionalism is without an understanding of the context in which it operates; it is also impossible to understand the causes of factionalism in Venezuela apart from the context that generates it. This chapter, therefore, resituates AD's unique brand of factionalism in the context of Venezuelan partyarchy and presidentialism. From this more general perspective, it becomes clear that presidential partyarchy is a crisis-prone type of democracy that has lost much of its early capacity to deal with crises and has developed an increasingly urgent need for reform. The second section of this chapter discusses and evaluates some recent actual reforms, as well as some that have not been tried, such as the adoption of a parliamentary system, the creation of the position of prime minister, and changes in party statutes. A third and final section of this chapter then shifts to the even broader cross-national comparative perspective to discuss what lessons Venezuela may hold for other countries. Presidential partyarchy is a rare combination because most partyarchies are parliamentary and many presidential democracies have weak parties; nevertheless, there are two comparable systems in Latin America. Moreover, partyarchy and presidentialism taken separately exist in other countries and show the same consequences, although the effects of partyarchy are less severe, and the effects of presidentialism more severe, outside of Venezuela.

154

Venezuelan Democracy

Strong Parties and Lame Ducks The Venezuelan democratic regime founded in 1958 faced four major challenges in its first decade. One was the fact that when Marcos Perez Jimenez was overthrown in 1957, AD, the largest political party in the system and the one most likely to elect the regime's first president, was still distrusted by the groups that had conspired to overthrow its Trienio government in 1948-the military, the Church, business leaders, and CO PEL A second major problem was the timing of the transition, which coincided with the Cuban Revolution: Castro took power between Betancourt's election in 1958 and his inauguration in 1959. The hopes and fears raised by the true social revolution taking place practically next door polarized politics in Venezuela, as it did everywhere in the hemisphere, making cooperation much more difficult to obtain. Third, support for the former dictator or for dictatorship remained strong for years among a minority of the population, particularly those living in the barrios of Caracas. These people lent support to some of the frequent coup attempts during the Betancourt government and in 1968 elected Perez Jimenez senator from the Federal District. Finally, there was also a deep division within AD between the Old Guard leadership whose first priority was political democracy and the younger activists who cared more about social transformation or short-term partisan gain. This division threatened the Old Guard's determination to share power with CO PEL All these challenges were, in part, mere historical accident. But two of them-the distrust of AD and the division within AD-were exacerbated by the presidential system, because the fundamental question in both was how to share power, and presidentialism made power sharing difficult. The prospect of a first-place finish for AD in the 1958 elections would not have been so threatening to its adversaries if victory had not entailed winner-take-all control of the presidency and all the decree and patronage powers that came with it. Power was so concentrated in the presidency that even a president who wanted to share power, as Betancourt did, had to go to extremes to make a coalition offer that even began to sound appealing to potential partners. However, any such offer was doomed to meet with resentment among AD activists, who were encouraged

Venezuelan Democracy

155

by the winner-take-all rules of a presidential election to believe that their party was entitled to govern alone. It is a little-known fact that the celebrated Pact of Pun to Fijo was a heroic effort to paste together some form of interparty unity in spite of the obstacles thrown up by the difficulty of sharing power in a presidential system. Most of the time between the opening of the campaign and the election of December 1958 was taken up by negotiations among AD, COPEI, and URD to select a "Unity Ca~­ didate" so that no one party would control the presidency. It was only when these negotiations failed, less than six weeks before the vote, that the three candidates signed the pact on power sharing, program, and campaign rhetoric, as a second-best alternative. 1 How Partyarchy Helped Stability Partyarchy helped Venezuela's political leaders overcome all these challenges. Daniel Levine was certainly correct in arguing that there was an irreducible element of wise leadership that made the crucial Pact of Punto Fijo possible? But none of the provisions of the pact would have helped if the leaders who signed it had not had the authority to commit their followers to those terms and to enforce them when it mattered. Partyarchy was necessary for making the Pact of Punto Fijo work. In order to overcome the distrust of the Church and COPEI, for example, it was necessary to remove the issue of state supervision of religious education from the political agenda for several years, since this was the issue that had pushed these institutions into disloyal opposition during the Trienio.3 The only way to keep the issue off the agenda was to prevent the many Adecos who still wanted to impose secular education from raising the issue in public. Tight party discipline made the implementation of that party line possible. It is significant that the issue finally emerged only in 1967, when Prieto's faction began to coalesce, fracturing party unity. In order to overcome the distrust of business leaders, Betancourt promised that strikes would be kept to a minimum in the first years of democracy.4 Why would business leaders believe that a party politician would be able to make good on a promise to restrain the militance of organized labor? Only because they knew that Betancourt's party had thoroughly penetrated labor unions. If Betancourt

r56

Venezuelan Democracy

had not been able to make this promise with some assurance, business leaders might not have been sufficiently confident about the viability of democracy to pressure the Provisional Government of 1958 to hold elections. The fact that party leaders were indeed able to deliver the paz /aboral, or labor peace, they had promised further reassured the private sector that business interests were not threatened by democracy. In order to meet the challenge of the Cuban Revolution, party leaders committed themselves and their parties to significant reform, including a far-reaching land reform, in the Common Minimum Program of the Pact of Punto Fijo. Caldera's ability to commit his traditionally conservative party to this wide-ranging turnover of property in the countryside was one way in which strong parties contributed to the defeat of the communist challenge in Venezuela. When that challenge manifested itself concretely as an armed guerrilla insurgency, the FALN, partyarchy helped in another way. The guerrillas were depending on the Venezuelan peasantry to join them in rising up against the capitalist regime; most of the peasants, however, had been staunchly loyal Adecos since the 194o's, and many intensified their support for the Betancourt government when they benefited from the land reform. Therefore, rather than joining the guerrillas, peasants served as government informers to speed the repression of the insurgency.5 The greatest threat to the young democracy was not in the countryside, but in the urban barrios, where the parties' local organizations were weakest and the population was consequently more susceptible to inroads by antidemocratic forces of the left and the right. Partyarchy abhors an organizational vacuum, however, so after ten to fifteen years of aggressive courtship (which included cooptation, infiltration, and intimidation along with some legitimate governmental responsiveness to urban needs), the prodemocratic parties strengthened their urban base considerably.6 The parties never completely overcame their relative weakness in these areas, but they were at least successful in preventing antidemocratic forces from organizing in any effective way. Finally, the tight discipline of Acci6n Democratica helped the Old Guard's strategy of sharing power with COPEI to succeed. This was a very controversial strategy: all during the Betancourt government, there were factions within AD that were opposed to

Venezuelan Democracy

157

cooperation with Caldera? The Muchachos believed that coalition with COPEI dampened AD's historic commitment to revolutionary change; the Arsistas wanted to end the Guanabana coalition, and the Pacistas after them pressured Leoni to form the Broad Base coalition with URD and the FND rather than with CO PEL True to the partyarchic principle of democratic centralism, however, all of these groups supported the coalition with CO PEl in their congressional votes, public statements, and other actions even while they worked secretly to win control of the party for themselves. Their discipline made it possible for the coalition parties to preserve their majorities in the Congress during the crucial first three years of the Betancourt government in spite of the MIR split and the withdrawal of the URD from the coalition. Tight discipline also carried AD through another difficult juncture-surrendering power to COPEI in 1969 after an extremely close election, which many observers consider the act that consolidated the democratic regime. 8

How Presidential Partyarchy Hurts Stability One of the lesser problems created by presidentialism that has not been ameliorated by partyarchy, and indeed in some ways has been exacerbated, is that of stalemate. In any presidential democracy, stalemate is a danger whenever the president lacks a working majority in either house of the Congress. In most of these countries, however, party discipline is not invariably enforced, and a president who lacks a permanent working majority often can put together an ad hoc majority one bill at a time by negotiating with individual legislators. In a partyarchy like Venezuela, that flexibility is lacking. It would be a waste of time for the president to negotiate with individual legislators because they are all bound to vote their party's line. Partyarchy therefore makes stalemates more intractable when they occur. The only immediate consequence of stalemate is a backlog in the legislative process, but as Juan Linz and others have argued, these stalemates can pose a threat to stability if a solution is not soon found. 9 Presidents who are frustrated by a hostile Congress are tempted to take drastic measures in order to carry out their policies. Sometimes these measures are marginally constitutional, such as broad interpretations of decree powers or administrative

158

Venezuelan Democracy

rule-making that shades over into the policy-making constitutionally reserved to the legislative branch. In Latin America, actions of this sort have usually gone uncorrected and over the years have concentrated power in the presidency to an extreme degree. Such concentration of power is not immediately destabilizing, but it probably does make elections more of a zero-sum game than they would be if power were shared more equally among several branches of government. Other times, these marginally constitutional circumventions have been challenged, with potentially destabilizing results. For example, President Febres Cordero of Ecuador once refused to publish an annoying act of Congress in the Gaceta Oficial, and was kidnapped and held hostage by junior military officers until he changed his mind. 10 Still other times, frustrated presidents take blatantly unconstitutional actions that are definitely destabilizing. President Alberto Fujimori's April 1992 autogolpe dissolving the Peruvian Congress and arresting its members is only the most recent example. It is important to keep in mind that frustration mounts on both sides of a stalemate: the people who frustrate the president are also frustrated by the president and would like to remove him from office, but they have no constitutional way to make that happen unless they have evidence of criminal activity by the president that would justify impeachment. In a relatively mild confrontation of this type, they may be content to censure or dismiss cabinet ministers, but in a more polarized situation, there can be a great temptation to ask the military to intervene. The coup attempts against Carlos Andres Perez in February and November 1992 are perfect illustrations of this extreme. Members of Congress did not favor military intervention, but their moderation cannot be confused with support for the president. Perez was so isolated by that year that the only thing keeping him in office was allegiance to a dangerously inflexible presidential constitution. In the long run, partyarchy has its own destabilizing effects that do not depend upon any interaction with presidentialism. Partyarchy destabilizes by blocking off most of the informal channels through which citizens voice their demands in healthy democracies. Citizens who feel that their voice is not heard within or outside the parties become disillusioned with democracy and are more likely to believe that an authoritarian alternative could not be much worse.

Venezuelan Democracy

159

The qualities that make a democracy democratic are much more than the formal mechanisms of voting, elections, and executive accountability to the legislature. There must also be a free society that allows citizens effective channels to make their voices heard between elections, for executives are normally more constrained by their own desire for popularity or legitimacy in the eyes of the public than they are by the formal checks and balances provided by the Congress. In a healthy democracy, political parties can, potentially, serve as one of these channels, but they are not the only possible channel. It is also desirable to have a free press, freedom to assemble and organize, and the resulting freedom of expression. This is why Dahl included these fundamental freedoms in his definition of polyarchy.U In Venezuela there is great freedom of expression in the media and on the street. But in order to have a truly effective voice, one must be able to organize; the freedoms must be complete. And in Venezuela, freedom of organization is constrained by the parties' obsession with control. As a result of the tactics described in Chapter 2, it is very difficult for ordinary citizens to make themselves heard outside the party structure. Partyarchy therefore handicaps the activities of the media, interest groups, and other institutions of civil society that normally would act as watchdogs and help to make the government responsive. It is also difficult for ordinary citizens to make themselves heard within the party structure. Every organization that has a tie to a party, from student governments to labor unions to professional associations, is required to subordinate the interests of its members to the priorities of the party whenever the two come into conflict. National, state, and even local politicians face expulsion if they disobey the party line handed down from the cogollo at the top. If the national party leadership happens to be divided, there is room for the next tier of officials to exert real influence, but these are state and sectoral bosses, not ordinary citizens. And when the national leadership is united, not even these bosses dare to resist the party line. The pervasive penetration of society by parties and the extreme centralization of authority within parties in Venezuela became, over a period of three decades, a net disadvantage for stability. Partidocracia was once an epithet that was rarely heard, much less taken

r6o

Venezuelan Democracy

seriously, in politically relevant circles, but by the mid-r98o's there was a widespread conviction that Venezuela was ruled by a political class of party politicians who were insufficiently sensitive to the needs of ordinary citizens. In response to this criticism, which had been articulated sporadically by television personality Marcel Granier, party mavericks like Luis Raul Matos Az6car, the Grupo Roraima think tank, and the emerging neighborhood association movement, President Lusinchi appointed a Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State (COPRE) to hear such criticisms and propose reforms. Even though COPRE was overwhelmingly composed of members or sympathizers of the political parties, its conclusions reflected the growing antiparty sentiment: In 1985, all the actors selected [for CO PRE] agreed in recognizing the deviation or distortion of the role that political parties ideally ought to play as mediators between society and the State. This distortion was manifested, according to the opinions expressed before COPRE, on three levels: the lack or absence of democracy within organizations; inequality in interparty relations; and blockage of the dynamism of civil society by the penetration, in civil organizations, of the guidelines dictated from the highest level of the parties. This self-criticism made by the parties and also shared by FEDECAMARAS corresponded to the intense debate that, as we have seen, had been building in Venezuela since the beginning of the decade. 12

These criticisms, accurately reflecting the downside of partyarchy, have a clear connection to the dramatic event that shook the world's confidence in Venezuela's stability-the riots of February 1989. The rioters were, naturally, responding to the economic shock program President Perez had announced at his inauguration days before; but why did they respond by burning buses, looting stores, and blockading streets? More to the point, why did they respond violently when Mexicans, Peruvians, and Argentinians accepted similar or worse measures more peacefully? Venezuelans responded with violence because all legitimate channels for expressing their grievances were closed to them. When they could no longer stand to keep quiet and do nothing, they took direct action. There are good reasons, then, why both presidentialism and partyarchy in the long run tend to undermine the stability of a democratic regime. There are other reasons to believe that the combination of presidentialism and partyarchy further weakens the regime in Venezuela, because, as Chapter 5 showed, the type of presidential

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partyarchy that exists in Venezuela afflicts the governing party with factionalism. Factionalism increases the risk of instability in four ways. First, when factionalism culminates in a division of the party, it can cost the president his working majority and lead to stalemate. This has happened twice: in 1962, as a result of the ARS split, and in 1967, as a result of the MEP split. Second, even if the inevitable factional struggle does not result in a split, the advantages enjoyed by the Outs erode the president's control of his party midway through his term, turning him into a lame duck prematurely. As Chapter 6 showed, being a lame duck does not necessarily mean that the president will be stalemated in the Congress by his own party (although stalemate would be the result if factions were principled); but a president who is known to be isolated from his own party appears weak and makes a more inviting target for the enemies of democracy than a president who still has a solid base of support. Carlos Andres Perez was known to be weak after the 1989 riots, but the most damning evidence of his isolation came in October 1991, when the "orthodox" Outs won control of AD at the national convention and removed many of Perez's remaining allies from leadership positions in the party.U Third, factionalism tarnishes the image of the party and its presidential candidate going into the general election. This is a very familiar phenomenon in the United States, where competition in the party primaries, especially in the Democratic party, tends to drive up the negative ratings of all the candidates. In Venezuela the negative consequences are also great, as Chapter 3 showed. The internal campaigns of the Ins and the Outs use the same techniques in their internal campaigns that the party uses in general campaigns-mass meetings, car caravans, posters and stenciled signs on walls, print ads, and radio and television spots. Internal campaigns can be more damaging to a candidate than general campaigns, because candidates from the same party are less likely to have clear ideological differences and therefore are more likely to base their appealsand attacks-on differences in personality and character. In recent years, every candidate has entered the general election campaign already tainted by scandalous rumors. 14 In the United States, no one would consider ritualized character assassination a threat to democracy, but U.S. democracy has been established for over 200 years. In a democracy that is not nearly so well institutionalized,

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any practice that erodes the legitimacy of parties and elections can become a threat to stability. Finally, the type of factionalism that afflicts AD helps justify the cynicism that Venezuelans are increasingly feeling because, as Chapter 6 proposed, it has become increasingly devoid of principle over the years. In 1958, party leaders were heroes to many Venezuelans because they stood for something. Now it is hard to tell what they stand for, and when they claim to stand for something it is hard to believe them because they have jumped on so many different bandwagons in the past. Power used to be a means to an end; now it appears to be an end in itself. All politicians are self-interested to some degree, but when they are perceived as being interested in themselves and nothing else, they lose the moral authority required for effective leadership. This failure of leadership helps explain Venezuelans' limited patience with economic reform. The social costs of structural adjustment in Mexico were as great or greater than they were in Venezuela, yet Mexico never experienced a collapse of public order like the Venezuelan riots or the coup attempts of 1992. There are undoubtedly many reasons for this, but one that should not be ignored is the difference in leadership. Mexicans knew that Carlos Salinas believed in his policies, and that he recognized the need to apply them fairly. His arrest of corrupt union leaders and businessmen in early 1989 symbolized his commitment and helped build his moral authority. Carlos Andres Perez is another story. Since the thrust of his policies has been to undo the economic policies of his first government, he is on shaky footing when he defends his program now. And when corruption has gone unpunished for so long, Venezuelans easily feel that the government has no right to expect them to make sacrifices. Summing up, partyarchy can be a short-run asset to political leaders dealing with a crisis, but both partyarchy and presidentialism, and especially the combination of the two, tend to generate more crises, escalate their severity, and, in the long run, undermine the usefulness of partyarchic control for crisis management. Over time, the disadvantages associated with presidential partyarchy grow. The disadvantages do not inevitably outweigh the advantages, however, because the possibility of reform remains.

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Reforming Presidential Partyarchy The two grievances that most powerfully motivated the leaders and supporters of the coup attempts of February 4 and November 27, 1992, were (r) corruption and (2) opposition to Carlos Andres Perez (because of his economic program, his penchant for foreign travel, and his alleged links to corrupt activities). Each grievance was a manifestation of one of the two central problems with presidential partyarchy-stalemate and a lack of accountability. The corruption was a symptom of the lack of accountability, and Perez's political isolation became a problem only because in a presidential system it was so difficult to remove him from office after his base of support had evaporated, leaving him stalemated.

Improving Accountability The relationship between partyarchy and the lack of accountability has been delineated clearly by one of Venezuela's preeminent legal scholars. Allan Randolph Brewer-Carias argues that the "Estado de partidos" or party-state overrode all the checks and balances built into the Venezuelan constitution. Separation of powers came to nought whenever the president's party controlled a majority in Congress; bicameralism made no sense when both senators and deputies took instructions from their party leadership; judicial review was nonexistent because judges were appointed according to party loyalties; 15 and federalism was a fiction because governors were appointed, mayors were nonexistent, and city council members were nominated by national party leaders. 16 Summarizing the consequences of this state of affairs, he writes: "When the same center of party power can control, simultaneously, the decisions of the Congress, the executive, and the Courts, there is no effective way to subject the State to real judicial control, and party dictatorship is total, because what is unconstitutional or illegal has no remedy and sometimes, as though by magic-the magic of the party-what is against the law is transformed into legality itself." 17 This diagnosis of the problem also points the way to remedies for the lack of accountability. What was needed was to strengthen federalism, the courts, and the Congress at the expense of the parties. To its great credit, CO PRE (the Presidential Commission for the

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Reform of the State}, created by President Lusinchi in 1984, recommended thorough and wide-ranging reforms designed to improve accountability. Its relevant recommendations, and the actions taken on them, are listed in Table 7.1. The surprising thing about this list is that so many of the reforms were actually adopted-direct and frequent election of governors and mayors, some transfer of resources and authority to the municipal and state levels, and the possibility of municipal referendums and recalls. Yet these reforms were not enough to restore Venezuelans' faith in their political system. Even though both Carlos Andres Perez and Eduardo Fernandez gave a prominent place to political reform in their presidential campaign platforms, voter abstention reached an unprecedented (for Venezuela) r8. r percent in the election of December 1988. The prospect of electing more accountable municipal and state officials in December 1989 did not prevent uncontrolled rioting in February and March of that year, and when those elections took place, 54 percent of the electorate did not vote. Further reforms were adopted after the rioting, yet when junior officers made a coup attempt against the democratic regime less than a year later, many Venezuelans cheered them on. Why didn't the reforms prevent the progressive delegitimation of Venezuelan democracy? The first answer is that they did not go far enough. With respect to decentralization, for example, the newly elected mayors and governors lacked authority and resources sufficient to make state and local government the vital political arena that reformers had dreamed of. Governors took office before there was any law defining the respective areas of competence of state and federal governments. When such a law was finally passed, it gave states only puny taxation powers and required states to coordinate half of their investment expenditures with the federal government. 18 Although the reform of the judiciary in October 1988 was one of the most urgently needed changes, "partisan meddling, inefficiency, and accusations of corruption continue. Although the new Law is still to be applied, it would be naive to pretend that it could, by itself, correct the evils that have been accumulating in this area." 19 The basic problem is that the only actors in a position to adopt reforms are the very actors that need reforming: success depends upon the parties' willingness to reform themselves. So far, the parties have done only the minimum necessary to create the impression of

TABLE 7.1

Status of CO PRE Recommendations as of June 1992 Adopted by February 1989: creation of the position of mayor direct election of governors direct election of mayors some transfer of resources and authority to municipios shortening of all election campaigns referendums at the municipal level municipal tax reform procedures to stimulate participation (partially) strengthening of municipal authority over the environment (formally) greater accountability for party financing and spending (partially) strengthening of regulation of campaign advertising new Organic Law of the Consejo de Ia Judicatura socioeconomic benefits for judges (partially) Adopted after February 1989 riots: elecci6n uninominal in municipal elections (combined with PR) elecci6n uninominal for half of Chamber of Deputies transfer of resources and authority to states (partially) midterm elections for municipal and state officials recall of city council members Not adopted by June 1992: frequent and direct internal elections } referendums within parties left up to the parties nomination by primaries supervision of internal elections by outside bodies strengthening of civil service at the municipal level greater state financing of party spending reduction of party spending registry and publication of party expenses limits on campaign contributions, with outside monitoring referendums at the state and national level souRcEs: Before February 1992: Gomez Calcaiio and Lopez Maya, El Teiido de Penelope, pp. u7-28. After February 1992: FBIS Latin America Report 92-035 (Feb. 21, 1992), p. 29; 92057 (Mar. 24, 1992), p. 25; 92-061 (Mar. 30, 1992), p. 40; 92-064 (Apr. 2, 1992), p. 37; 92-072 (Apr. 14, 1992), p. 57·

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change, and they have secretly undone some of that minimum by leaving themselves loopholes in which to reimpose party control. Therefore, the minimum has not been enough to convince the population that partidocracia has been dealt a mortal blow. As Gomez Calcaii.o and Lopez Maya eloquently put it: Like Penelope beseiged by her suitors, the Venezuelan elite promises to accede to the bold demands of opening and renewal that the newcomers make. By day, they weave the reforms that, they affirm, will be the burial shroud of clientelist and exclusionary democracy. But in the dark, they unravel the weaving, perhaps hoping for the caudillo who could rise to the task of expelling the intruders.20

It is possible, of course, that the reforms have already gone far enough and merely need more time to work. Certainly the Congress and the courts still lack autonomy, but there are scattered signs that state and local authorities are beginning to assert some independence from party control. Some of the governors elected in 1989, for example, have crossed party lines to support or oppose the president, or to join with other governors in demanding that the federal government devolve more power to the states.zt When half of the Congress is elected in single-member districts, as is slated for 1993, it is very likely that some of the new deputies will put the interests of their districts before the mandate of the party leadership on some issues. As such holes are opened in party discipline, it will become easier for citizens to hold party leaders accountable, and party leaders will finally have an incentive to relax their hold on the courts and the Congress. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the democratic regime will survive long enough for the existing reforms to bear fruit. By 1993 the country was in such a crisis atmosphere that only the impeachment of President Perez enabled the regime to stagger to the December 1993 elections, via the interim administrations of Octavio Lepage and Ramon J. Velasquez. Patience would probably be the best course in the near future because the long-term costs of drastic reforms that would further weaken the parties could be unacceptably high. As was argued earlier in this chapter, strong parties have been useful in helping the regime survive other crises; without that advantage, Venezuela could become as turbulent as the rest of Latin America.

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Improving accountability is an important task for Venezuela, and it has occupied most of the attention of the reformers working through CO PRE so far, but it is only one of two challenges the country faces. The other is to find a way to deal with the chronic stalemates between the president and the Congress. This was, after all, the most pressing issue in the aftermath of the February 1992 coup attempt: how to get rid of Carlos Andres Perez when he has lost all support but is not willing to resign? The eventual solution to this crisis, impeachment, is less than ideal because it requires the president to break the law. There are three better ways to approach the possibility of such crises in the future. The ideal would be to eliminate the possibility of stalemate by adopting a parliamentary system. In Venezuela, however, it is probably more realistic to take the second-best option of modifying the presidential system to help it overcome such crises when they do arise. A third option-the least desirable-would be to retain the existing presidential system but modify the party system in a way that makes stalemates less likely to occur.

The Advantages of a Parliamentary System The root of stalemate is the dilemma posed by having a president who is not eligible for immediate reelection. In a partyarchy, it is vitally important for the president to be the effective leader of his party. It takes decades for one person to earn the right to lead. It is therefore a tragic loss when the no-reelection rule forces a party to abandon its carefully cultivated relationship with its leader. It is especially tragic when this loss of leadership causes a president to be stalemated by his own party. These problems do not occur in parliamentary systemsP There is no artificial limit on a prime minister's tenure. As long as the prime minister is backed by a working majority in the Parliament and continues to win elections, he or she remains head of government and leader of the party. Occasionally a party leader is deposed in a parliamentary system, but only because the relationship between leader and party has soured for a legitimate reason, such as unacceptable policy, an election loss, or a scandalP There is no turnover for the sake of turnover, no lame-duck phenomenon, and no polarization between Ins and Outs.

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Stalemate is not a problem in parliamentary systems either. If there is no working majority in the parliament, whether it is because no party controls a majority or because the majority party lacks cohesion, either a new coalition will be formed, or new elections will be called. The united opposition majorities that are essential for stalemate are not allowed to exist. Presidents could, and sometimes do, build a legislative coalition with the support of smaller parties. But in a presidential partyarchy, the rules of the game discourage these parties from formal cooperation with the governing party. One reason is that the prize at stake in the next elections, the presidency, is indivisible. Potential coalition partners are reluctant to indulge in cooperation that would help the governing party wmagam. Another reason is that the potential coalition partners share a common interest with the other nongoverning parties in obstructing the legislative program of the government. They know they can get away with an obstructionist line until the next election. In a parliamentary system, there is no incentive for the opposition to unite in an obstructionist majority for long. If the government cannot govern, new elections will be called. There are often greater incentives for these parties to join a governing coalition. There seems little chance that Venezuela will adopt a parliamentary system. A government must be, first and foremost, legitimate, and the idea of a president is so strongly rooted in the political culture that any system that lacked a president probably would be considered alien. A parliamentary system might well make more sense, but legitimacy depends on tradition much more than on reason.24 To the extent that Venezuelans do not depend on tradition, they tend to borrow political ideas from another presidential system-the United States-owing to its geographical proximity, close economic and cultural ties, and political success (even though some of the conditions that allow presidentialism to work in the United States, such as weak parties, are absent in Venezuela). Perhaps if the current regime is overthrown and its failure is clearly connected with stalemate, the next democratic regime will consider parliamentarism in drawing up a new constitution. But in the absence of such a major upheaval, this particular reform is unlikely to be adopted.

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Modifying the Presidential System

If any major reform is to be adopted, it would most likely be a modification of the presidential system. The obvious alternative is the adoption of a mixed presidential-parliamentary system, one that has both an elected president who is head of state and a prime minister responsible to parliament who is head of government. Advocates of a mixed system argue that it combines the advantages of presidentialism and parliamentarism-the legitimacy and continuity of direct election and the flexibility of parliamentary responsibility. 25 It is also said to have worked well in the European countries where it has been tried, notably France and Finland.26 In France, however, the system works well because prime ministers are given real power, especially when they are not of the same party as the president. In Venezuela, with its strong presidential tradition, a president would not be likely to delegate much real authority to a prime minister. This has always been the case, for example, in Peru, which has a "prime minister" who is simply the ranking cabinet minister, subordinate to the president like the restP At this writing it seems probable that the Venezuelan constitution will be amended to create just such a "prime minister" -a figure who presides over the cabinet but remains accountable to the president rather than to the Congress. Dismissing such a prime minister would be of little help in solving a crisis, because he would be seen for what he is-a scapegoat. The truly responsible executive-the president-would remain untouchable. A mixed system could even make things worse, by tripling the number of relationships in which conflict could develop, from president vs. Congress to president vs. Congress or prime minister vs. Congress or president vs. prime minister.28 A handful of presidential constitutions have compromised on the separation of powers by granting the president the power to dissolve the Congress in an impasse.29 In Uruguay, although dissolution has never actually been carried out,30 President Sanguinetti has claimed that the threat of dissolution was useful to him in obtaining cooperation from the Congress.31 But dissolution and new elections would not necessarily resolve a serious impasse, and dissolution power probably tilts the scales too much in the president's favor. It might be preferable, as Lijphart has noted, to balance dissolution powers

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by giving the Congress the power to dismiss (and replace) the president.32 This arrangement has never been tried, but it would combine powerful incentives for president and Congress to cooperate and mechanisms for resolving any stalemates that nevertheless arose. If none of the above modifications is politically feasible, then it would be desirable at least to provide for the recall of the president. After meeting a challenging petition requirement, the citizens themselves could force the president to stand for reelection in the middle of his term against a candidate chosen by the organizers of the petition drive; the winner would then finish the term. It is rare for recalls to be permitted at the national level, much less successful, but it is easy to imagine one being successful against President Perez. Perhaps it would not be the best solution, but it would at least have the advantage of channeling discontent into a constitutional mechanism rather than into support for an extraconstitutional solution.

Making Stalemate Less Likely Unfortunately, the most popular alternative to the current system, absolute no-reelection, would not remedy, and could actually worsen the problems of stalemate and distorted accountability. Since the incumbent would still be an automatic lame duck, there would still be a succession crisis in the governing party, which would lead to the erosion of the president's leadership and increase the chances of stalemate. If anything, the succession crisis would be more severe. Ex-presidents derive much of their authority from their potential for reelection. If any ex-presidents were on the scene, they would be ineligible for reelection, and therefore less able than at present to provide leadership for the Outs. The nomination process would be less easily resolved, more confusing, and more costly to the party in the general election. If the goal is to make stalemates less likely, it would be wiser to go in the opposite direction. Allowing unlimited reelection would prevent the president from losing the leadership of his party, since aspirants to congressional seats, governorships, and party offices in the next administration would tend to support the incumbent for reelection. (They would, that is, as long as his performance in office was adequate; incumbents who performed poorly could be denied renomination by their party.) On the other hand, unlimited

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reelection would restore the incentive for presidents to abuse their powers in order to secure reelection. It would create a danger of continuismo, the very condition that the no immediate reelection rule was designed to prevent. The abuse of state power in internal elections suggests that this danger has not disappeared. A compromise would be to set a two-term limit, as in the United States. With this reform, succession struggles would erode presidential leadership at most half of the time, and probably far less often, since some presidents would not be elected to a second term. The less frequent the succession crises are, the lower the probability that a president will be stalemated by his own party or that his party will pay a "divisiveness" penalty in the next election. It would not prevent stalemate caused by interparty rivalry in a minority government; a parliamentary system or relaxation of party discipline would be needed for that. But the single reelection formula is one simple, politically conceivable reform that would do a great deal of good. 33 Even the single reelection proposal is relatively unpopular, however. When David Morales Bello proposed allowing presidential reelection during the first Perez government, he was opposed by all the top leaders of AD, including (eventually) President Perez himself.34 The principal reason was that the president would not be able to resist the temptation to abuse his powers in order to secure reelection. In response to Morales Bello's proposal, Gonzalo Barrios stated: The tendency for continuismo is a reality.... They say it's a shame to lose the services of an excellent president because of a legal provision that bars reelection, but I think that losing the services of the best statesman, which would be quite a rare occurrence, would be preferable to the very certain, and one could say permanent, occurrence of opening the door to, and whetting the appetite of a ruler who is tempted to perpetuate his mandate, eventually degenerating into dictatorship. 35

Barrios was expressing a view that was still very widely held in his party in the mid- 198o's. Although only 35 percent of the members of Congress whom I interviewed, and 17 percent of the CEN sample, believed that the "no immediate reelection" article was good ("conveniente"), the majority of the others preferred an even more restrictive provision-no reelection ever. 36 Altogether, 69 percent of

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the members of the CEN and Congress samples were opposed to any immediate reelection, and only 21 percent preferred allowing one immediate reelection, as in the United States.37 The secondmost-often cited reason for opposing immediate reelection was that the existing reelection ban "prevents the president from abusing his powers in order to get reelected." 38 These positions are not particularly surprising, considering the low awareness of the problems associated with the reelection ban. When asked about the truth of several propositions concerning the benefits and drawbacks of no-reelection, 38 percent of the Congress and CEN samples denied that ex-presidents cause problems for a successor from the same party, and 53 percent denied that the lame-duck phenomenon even exists. All AD leaders know that factionalism is a problem, and many of them are convinced that it hurts the party in elections, but few if any understand the source of the problem, much less how to solve it. Factionalism is typically blamed on the extreme ambition and arrogance of the other faction's candidate, or on nomination procedures. According to some AD leaders, "primaries," as the relatively direct internal elections of 1967 and 1977 are called, are associated with divisiveness and defeat, and conventions and electoral colleges are associated with unity and victory. Others, especially the defeated candidates, dispute this interpretation. My evidence has shown that divisiveness is indeed associated with defeat, and unity with victory, but that divisiveness and unity are not functions of the breadth of participation in the nominating process. Conventions did not prevent the MIR and ARS splits, and an electoral college did not prevent the conflict between Lusinchi and Perez in 198587. The correct association is between divisiveness and governing in a presidential partyarchy that prohibits reelection. Perhaps if these connections were better understood, there would be more support for the reforms suggested above. There are other possible reforms that could reduce the likelihood of factionalism, and therefore of stalemate, but none of the options is very appealing. The severity of factionalism in AD is due chiefly to the roughly even match in the relative power of the president, on the one hand, and the regional and sectoral brokers, on the other. Although Chapter 5 showed that the Outs have a structural advantage in a succession struggle, things are not so clear to the actual

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participants at the time. To many of them, it quite reasonably appears that the advantage lies with the Ins. The less clear it is which faction will win, the more evenly divided the party is, and the more severe the succession crisis becomes. One way to reduce the severity of factionalism, therefore, would be to make it very clear to all militants which side enjoys the advantage in an internal conflict. There are two different paths to this goal. One path would be to increase the party's (that is, the brokers') autonomy at the expense of the president. The most obvious steps in this direction read like the Perennial Platform of the Out Faction: establishing the direct election of state governors (to free them from the president's appointment power and the Interior Minister's supervision), placing internal party elections and nominations under the supervision of the Supreme Electoral Council (to control unfair electoral practices), and nominating the candidate in a national direct primary (to eliminate the brokerage function of the state bosses). A less obvious step would be to alter the timing of internal elections. If internal elections were held at the same time as the nomination primary (or, better yet, immediately after the nomination), then all candidates for party office would quickly converge on a single presidential candidacy and campaign on a platform of working harder than anyone else to ensure that candidate's victory in the general election. If adopted, these reforms would probably prevent any serious conflict between Ins and Outs. This improvement would be accomplished, however, by discouraging anyone from remaining an In, which would worsen the problem of stalemate. Presidents would find themselves even more isolated, for a longer period of time, than they currently are. One reform that might alleviate this problem would be to eliminate ex-presidential candidates' ex officio membership in the CEN. In order to have a vote in party affairs, expresidents would have to hold an administrative office that gave them direct control of the organization's resources, which would force the incumbent to include them in his inner circle, so they would not be Outs to begin with. Still, this is not a very promising path to take. The other path would be to strengthen the president at the expense of the party. This is the Mexican solution. Mexico offers an interesting contrast to Venezuela. It has a presidential system that

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does not allow reelection, yet until 1988 there was never a serious succession crisis in the governing party.39 Only rarely does anyone campaign for the nomination; more typically, everyone waits for the incumbent to handpick his successor. Furthermore, Mexican presidents suffer very little from their lame-duck status; on the contrary, they tend to be best remembered for the policies they adopted in the last days of their administration. The difference between Mexico and Venezuela lies in the balance of power between the governing party and the president. In Venezuela, the sectoral and regional vote brokers enjoy significant autonomy, whereas the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) is hard to distinguish from the state itself. The PRI is best thought of as a government agency that is responsible for mobilizing support for the government. There are two problems with the Mexican solution. First, it is probably impossible for Venezuela to copy at this late date. The close connection between the PRI and the Mexican regime dates back to the decade after the Revolution. The PRI was created by the Mexican state to solve the succession problem and to guarantee support for the government; AD, by contrast, was created in opposition to an established dictatorial regime, and came to power from the outside. The separation of party and state is well established in Venezuela and would be extremely difficult to erase. Second, even if the boundaries between party and state could be erased in Venezuela, the price would probably be the competitiveness of the party system. The integration of the Mexican state and the PRI that prevents succession crises also makes the PRI a dominant party that until recently has won (by fair means or foul) over 8o percent of the vote and never lost a presidential election or even a governorship until 1989.4°Few Venezuelans would be willing to pay that price.

Venezuelan Presidential Partyarchy in Comparative Perspective Venezuela holds lessons for some other countries. The lessons of presidential partyarchy are relevant for only a couple of other countries, since the combination of presidentialism and partyarchy is rare. Partyarchy alone, however, is much more common, so the advantages and disadvantages of Venezuelan partyarchy may be found in many other countries, though to a lesser degree because Vene-

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zuelan partyarchy is extreme and is made worse by clientelism and poor differentiation of the two major parties. Presidential democracies are also common, and they tend to have more of a problem with presidentialism than Venezuela does because Venezuela's oil wealth, frequent majority governments, and exceptional leadership have until very recently helped keep the problems associated with presidentialism from escalating to a regime crisis. The Prevalence of Presidential Partyarchy

Presidential partyarchy is an unusual combination. As Chapter 2 argued, most of the other regimes in which political parties are disciplined, penetrating, and controlling are European parliamentary systems, and even there partyarchy rarely approaches the extreme that has evolved in Venezuela. Presidential systems are more typically found in the Americas, where partyarchy is much less in evidence. Legislative discipline is too weak in Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, and the United States for these systems to be considered partyarchies. Discipline is tight enough in Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru, but the disorganization of parties at the grass roots in Argentina and Uruguay disqualifies them; Peru's APRA used to maintain a strong grass-roots organization, but it was the only party in the system to do so and it has been greatly weakened in recent years. Chile and Costa Rica, however, can be considered presidential partyarchies. The legislative discipline of Chilean parties meets European standards, and during both pre- and post-Pinochet democratic periods Chilean parties politicized and penetrated society just as thoroughly as parties did in Venezuela.41 In the Costa Rican Assembly, although individual defections are common, most legislators vote the party line most of time. The PUSC has only in the last decade coalesced as a single party, but the PLN has also been well organized and highly penetrative for decades, and the two parties together have politicized society quite thoroughly. 42 In these two cases, therefore, I would expect presidential partyarchy to cause one of the same problems that it has in Venezuela: making stalemate more likely and more intractable, owing to the rigidity of party blocs in the Congress. Venezuela's factionalism is also a consequence of its presidential partyarchy, but some of its characteristics depend on specific aspects of both presidentialism and partyarchy in Venezuela that are

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not present in other presidential partyarchies. I would expect additional research to show some sort of factionalism emerging even in presidential systems that are only mildly partyarchic, although the specific pattern of factionalism would vary depending on the timing of elections, the breadth of the parties' base of support, and other idiosyncracies. Having made that disclaimer, I nonetheless strongly suspect that the same Ins vs. Outs dynamic evident in Acci6n Democratica has been apparent in other Latin American countries, with the same attendant unprincipled bickering and infighting that tarnishes a party's image. In particular, I suspect that this kind of factionalism was largely responsible for the turnover of leadership in the Radical party in Argentina from 1916 to 1930, the 1956 split of the same party, the recurring nomination struggles in Costa Rica's PLN, and the erosion of Alan Garcia's leadership in Peru.43 The Prevalence of Partyarchy

As Chapter 2 showed, there are a number of systems-a few in Latin America, more in Europe-that approximate partyarchy to some degree. Among them would be Austria, Spain, Germany, Italy, Chile, Costa Rica, Argentina, and Peru. I think the advantages and disadvantages associated with partyarchy in Venezuela-stability in a crisis, but growing disillusionment with the parties-probably are also present in these other countries, though not to the same degree. First, partyarchy is more extreme in Venezuela than elsewhere. As Chapter 2 argued, there are many other countries in which parties have centralized control over nominations, or enforce tight legislative discipline, or deny voters a choice of candidates, or subordinate the legislative party to the electoral party, or penetrate and control other organizations, or dominate the media, but there is, so far as I know, no other polyarchy in which parties dominate so many aspects of the political process so completely. If any one of these channels is free of party control, it can act as an escape valve. For example, in Great Britain parties are extremely disciplined in Parliament, and the print media are highly politicized along party lines; but voters usually know who their MP is, and the Conservative and Labour parties do not even try to penetrate other organizations.44 Consequently, levels of party identification are high, and a vibrant

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civil society affords many opportunities for political participation outside the parties. It is only when parties have almost completely closed off all the escape valves that pressure builds to the point of threatening stability. Second, the similarity of AD and CO PEl makes the chief remaining avenue for participation-voting in elections-less satisfying. When AD and COPEI are both catch-all parties advocating stateled industrialization (before 1980) or economic liberalization (after 1987), it is relatively easy for voters to come to the conclusion that the most relevant cleavage is not the one that divides AD from COPEI but the one that divides the parties from the people. It is hard to imagine voters arriving at the same conclusion in Chile, where the ideological gulf between the major parties is too great to be dismissed as irrelevant. Third, the pervasive clientelism in Venezuelan society further undermines the legitimacy of the parties as mediators between citizens and government. If parties were concerned exclusively with matters of policy and strategy, it would be difficult to question their motives. But when leaders abuse public resources to reward their supporters and enrich themselves and sacrifice their own ideals (or avoid having ideals to begin with) to make sure they are on the winning side of a factional dispute, their motives become suspect. Some degree of clientelism exists wherever politicians do favors for their friends, but it is more prevalent in Latin America, and certainly in Venezuela, where oil-financed surpluses made the exchange of selective benefits for political support an irresistible temptation for many years. 45

The Prevalence of Presidentialism Presidential systems are common-indeed, the norm-in the Western Hemisphere, where all the democracies except those of the English-speaking Caribbean and Canada are presidential. A few countries outside the hemisphere, such as the Philippines, Nigeria, and South Korea, have also had presidential systems during their democratic or near-democratic years. There is now abundant literature to document the problems that presidential systems tend to encounter-stalemate, circumvention of the Congress, ministerial instability, constitutional crisis, and sometimes even the breakdown

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of democracy.46 Presidentialism has been implicated as a contributing factor in the breakdown of democracy in Argentina (1966), Brazil (1964), Chile (1973), Ecuador (1954, 1961, 1972), Peru (1968 and 1992), and Uruguay (1973).47 Presidentialism also played an obvious role in the early transfer of power from Alfonsfn to Menem in Argentina and the patent illegitimacy of the Sarney government in Brazil during its later years. If Venezuelan democracy has not broken down under presidentialism so far, it is not because presidentialism causes no problems but rather because Venezuela has enjoyed exceptional advantages over its neighbors that have helped it survive conflicts between the president and the Congress-economic prosperity, frequent majority governments, and exceptionalleadership.48 As Terry Karl has argued, Venezuela's oil wealth has been a curse as well as a blessing: it is distributed unequally, it puts the economy through boom-and-bust cycles, and it encourages governmental waste and corruption. 49 All these effects cause political problems. But they are problems that most other Latin American countries would love to have, if they could only have the blessing with the curse, for oil has transformed Venezuela from one of the poorest countries in Latin America to the wealthiest. Its per capita GDP has been by far the highest in Latin America since at least the 196o's.50 Oil wealth may not have been distributed equitably, but it was distributed wisely, from a political standpoint: there was always enough to satisfy the groups that were strong enough to jeopardize the democratic regime. Business got subsidies and protection; strategic unions got subsidized headquarters and generous contracts; the military got high-tech hardware, high salaries, and all the education it could absorb; and opposition politicians got seats in Congress and a share of the patronage to distribute. 51 Presidentialism leads to instability because it is rigid in the face of conflict. If there is no conflict, presidentialism is not a problem. Of course, Venezuela was never totally free of conflict, but its oil wealth made its conflicts less intense, less prolonged, and more easily resolved. There were therefore fewer opportunities than in less prosperous countries for presidentialism to contribute to a crisis. When major conflicts did arise, they were more often resolved quickly because majority governments were more common in Venezuela. As Table 7.2 shows, Venezuela has had majority governments

Venezuelan Democracy

179

TABLE 7.2

Latin American Presidents with Single-Party Majorities in Both Chambers, 1900-1990

Country

Presidents

Venezuela

Gallegos, Betancourt (1959-62), Perez (1974-79), Lusinchi Brum, Serrato, Amezaga, Martinez Trueba, and the colegiado years (1952-58)

Uruguay

Dominican Republic Peru Argentina Colombia

Costa Rica Bolivia Brazil Chile Ecuador

Blanco Prado (1939-45), Garcia Peron (1946-49), Frondizi, C:impora/Peron/Peron Santos (1939-42), Lopez Pumarejo, Lleras Camargo (1945-46) Figueres (1953-58), Monge (1982-86) none• noneb nonec noned

Majority years

Total years of democracy

Percent majority years

13

32

41

20

51

39

4 9

12 32

33 28

10

38

26

7

42

17

9 0 0 0 0

83 9 22 42 30

11 0 0

0 0

sou R c E : Author's original compilation from numerous sources. NoTE: "Years of democracy" were calculated using minimum standards for democracy: the executive gained office by a popular and fair election (which rules out Mexico, Paraguay, Haiti, Cuba, and most of Central America); suffrage was extended at least to adult, literate males (which allows inclusion of Ecuador and Peru before 1980); Congress was not dissolved indefinitely; and legislative elections were fair and contested by multiple parties (which rules out Colombia before 1939 and between 1949 and 1958, and Argentina 1949-55 ). For further information on individual countries, see note 52. "Bolivia's parties are too factionalized to guarantee a majority. bParty discipline in Brazil, with the exception of the PT, is too loose to guarantee a majority. c Chile's party system is usually too fragmented to guarantee a majority. dEcuador's party system is too fragmented and discipline is too loose to guarantee a majority.

during 41 percent of its democratic period, the highest percentage among the democracies in the region.52 Presidentialism becomes a problem when the president's party lacks a working majority in the Congress, opening the way for executive-legislative stalemate. Venezuelan presidents have lacked single-party working majorities more than half the time, but the fact that they have also enjoyed such majorities relatively often has helped shield the country from the perils of presidentialism.

180

Venezuelan Democracy

As Juan Linz has argued, when a democratic regime enters a crisis, small decisions made by individual leaders can make the difference between breakdown and reequilibration.53 Venezuelan democracy has experienced such crises more than once (usually during minority governments), and exceptional leadership has saved it more than once. R6mulo Betancourt and Rafael Caldera deserve much of the credit for the early stabilization of Venezuelan democracy, because they were repeatedly willing to value democracy above partisan gain when crises arose, most notably in the Pact of Punto Fijo and in the recognition of Caldera's victory in 1968.54 But in the crisis of 1992, Betancourt was long dead, and in his place Perez seemed paralyzed by the riots and the coup attempts. The aging Caldera threatened to run for president without the support of his own party and called for Perez to resign, echoing the complaints of the coup plotters. The lack of exceptional leadership was extremely wornsome. Impeachment eventually resolved this episode of stalemate. Impeachment was considered an unlikely resolution because it requires criminal charges against the president, and in the climate of impunity that prevailed in Venezuela's partyarchy it was rarely possible to gather enough evidence to make charges against any politician stick, and even if there was sufficient evidence, corrupt and politicized judges could be persuaded to dismiss the case or delay it indefinitely. But the February 1992 coup attempt, which was motivated in large part by frustration with this impunity, made President Perez anxious to demonstrate his administration's commitment to justice, at least symbolically. In this spirit he appointed the self-styled anticorruption Adeco Luis Piii.enia Ordaz Interior Minister and the nominally independent jurist, diplomat, and pundit Ramon Escovar Sal om Attorney General. A series of resignations and replacements also brought into being a Supreme Court with a relatively independent majority. The constant protests and disturbances of 1992 kept Piii.enia busy and prevented him from carrying out any plans he may have had to attack corruption vigorously. But Escovar Salom executed his new responsibilities with a vengeance, and in early 1993 produced a massive report charging the president and two of his ministers with misuse of funds. The report alleged that in the first few weeks of 1989, a secret Interior Ministry slush fund was used to purchase dol-

Venezuelan Democracy

181

lars at a heavily subsidized exchange rate left over from the Lusinchi administration. That rate was then abolished as part of Perez's first economic package, and the dollars were sold at a much higher exchange rate, producing a profit equivalent to several million dollars. The report alleged that this profit was transferred to the Office of the President, where it disappeared. The Supreme Court ruled that the report contained sufficient evidence to try Perez and the three ministers on corruption charges, and in May 1993 the Senate authorized a trial, forcing Perez to step down. He never voluntarily resigned, and none of AD's senators voted in favor of impeachment. In fact, when AD president Humberto Celli suggested, before the Supreme Court ruling, that things would be easier if Perez resigned, the CEN stripped him of his office. Celli was right, for impeachment turned out to be a constitutional minefield. New conflicting interpretations of the procedure emerged at every step of the way. Perez initially claimed that he could designate one of his ministers acting president because his absence would be temporary; he expected to be acquitted in a speedy trial and restored to office before his term expired. Eventually he accepted the congressional view that the president of the Senate would automatically become interim president as soon as the Senate authorized a trial. Ironically, the new acting president was Octavia Lepage, whom Perez had defeated for AD's presidential nomination in 1987. Once in office, Lepage argued that he was entitled to remain acting president for at least 90 days, and perhaps longer if there was no verdict in the impeachment trial. Some legal scholars argued that Lepage could govern no more than 90 days, and that without a verdict Venezuela could have a succession of brief acting presidencies until the next scheduled inauguration in February 1994. But the opinion that eventually prevailed was that of congress, which quickly voted to replace Lepage with an interim president, the elderly historian and statesman Ramon J. Velasquez. Even this appointment did not clear up all of the constitutional issues, because if Perez were acquitted with a few weeks remaining in his term, the constitution did not specify whether the congress's appointment of Velasquez would be annulled to allow Perez to finish out his term. It now seems like a gross understatement to say that the presidential system makes stalemates more likely and more in-

182

Venezuelan Democracy

tractable. In a parliamentary system there are much easier ways to replace a chief executive. It will take more than an impeachment to correct all the problems associated with Venezuela's presidential partyarchy. Fortunately, the most important reforms have already been passed-the electoral reforms of 1989 that created the position of mayor, authorized the direct election of governors, and provided for the election of half the congress in single-member districts by 1993. Although Perez was a master at using partyarchy for his own benefit, he did more to reform it, through his efforts on behalf of these electoral reforms, than most of the senators who voted to impeach him. Other necessary reforms have not yet been adopted, but these electoral changes make elected officials more accountable to their constituents and less accountable to the national party leadership-if the voters take advantage of them. The high abstention rates in the 1989 gubernatorial elections were a sign that most voters did not yet realize how much power had been placed in their hands. But the decisive defeat of many Adeco governors in 1992 and the youth and grassroots background of the AD and COPEI presidential candidates in 1993 suggest that the Venezuelan people are now using these tools to begin the renovation of their political parties.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Estimating the Electoral Costs of Factionalism

THE regression analysis was performed on a data set in which election returns for 23 states over six years were pooled. Such pooled cross-sectional time-series data make it possible to construct mathematical models of phenomena for which insufficient time-series data exist, but because pooled data have some special problems, one must take certain precautions in their analysis. One of the assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares is that errors are unassociated across observations. In pooled data, there are repeated observations from the same cross-sections (in this case, the same states). There is therefore a strong suspicion that the errors in a state in one year are correlated with the errors in that state in other years. If so, the estimates of the coefficients are biased and inefficient. 1 The ideal way to avoid this problem is to estimate a separate equation for each state; however, if there were enough data to estimate separate equations, it would not be necessary to pool data in the first place. But a comparison of a pooled-data model with a model based on separate equations is instructive. When there is a separate model for each state, each of the parameters in the equation is uniquely associated with that state. For example, in my application, there would be a Caracas intercept, an effect for AD-COPEI rivalry in Caracas, an effect for AD-splinter rivalry in Caracas, Caracas penalties for a split or a divisive nomination, and so on for each of the independent variables. In an OLS regression on pooled data, there is an implicit assumption that the unique state parameters are not significantly different from one another: that is, that all states have a common intercept and that each of the independent variables has the same (within the bounds of statistical significance) effect in all the states. To test this assumption, it would be necessary to add the unique state parameters to the right-hand side of the equation. But this would make the model equivalent to the separate equations model,

r86

APPENDIX

and would run into the same problem of insufficient data. Most researchers choose to assume either a common intercept or common coefficients for the independent variables. I chose the most common assumption: that the regressor variables have a common effect across states, but different intercepts. This assumption is operationalized by adding a dummy variable for each state to the righthand side of the equation, in effect estimating separate state intercepts. This is why the procedure is called Dummy Variable Least Squares (DVLS). The fact that there are not different independent variables for each state reflects the assumption that there is a common coefficient for each variable across states.

Autocorrelation I also checked the data for temporal autocorrelation. Using an iterative procedure, I checked for first- through fifth-order autocorrelation and found only a barely significant (T-ratio of 2.o6) fifth-order lag. Since there are only six elections in the time series, it signifies autocorrelation between 1958 and 1983 only. I have ignored this finding because it is completely contrary to reason to suppose that there is a 25-year lag in the model when no shorter lags are significant. Moreover, correcting for autocorrelation makes absolutely no substantive difference in the model: there are minute changes in the coefficients (on the order of .002) and the standard errors are generally lower, but all the parameters remain significant at the same general p-levels reported in the model, which for simplicity's sake does not correct for autocorrelation. I did find significant first-order autocorrelation in a similar model that included only seven state intercepts (the significant ones) of the 22 included in the reported model. I used the two-step full transform method, or PraisWinsten estimates in Generalized Least Squares to correct for first-order autocorrelation. 2 Again, the differences in the coefficients were minute and all parameters remained significant at the same general levels. Therefore, I doubt that significant autocorrelation is present; and even if it is, it makes no substantive difference in the model.

Simultaneity Whenever party-share variables are placed on both sides of an equation, there is a danger of bias due to simultaneity. In this case, there is strong a priori reason to suspect that AD's shares influence the rival parties' shares at the same time that the rival parties' shares are influencing AD's. If this problem is present, the coefficient of the independent variable is biased because it reflects the entire relationship between the two variables,

The Electoral Costs of Factionalism

r87

when in reality the independent variable is responsible for only part of the relationship.3 I tested for this simultaneity bias by creating two simultaneous equations models. In the first, AD's and COPEI's shares of the vote were the endogenous variables. The AD equation was specified exactly as the one reported above; the COPEI equation included exogenous variables for AD's share, the number of presidential elections COPEI has contested (NELS), a dummy variable for a divisive nomination process in COPEI (=I for 1973 and 1983, o otherwise), and 22 state dummies. The 2SLS estimates for the parameters of interest (and the corresponding absolute T-statistics) were as follows: .65 - .34 COPEI - .62 Splinters + .004 Abstention (20.4) (3.0) (6.3) (3.0) - .14 Metrop - .07 Divisive Nomination - .13 Split (5.8) (2.8) (11.5) [ + 22 state intercepts] Adjusted R-squared = .86 AD

=

.13 - .08 AD - .05 NELS - .08 Divisive Nomination (10.3) (4.2) (2.6) (1.1) in COPEI [ + 22 state intercepts] Adjusted R-squared = .65

COPEI

=

In the COPEI equation, the coefficient for the effect of competition with AD is decidedly insignificant (p = .27). This means that in this system of equations, COPEI shares are useful as predictors of AD shares, but AD shares are not useful as predictors of COPEI shares. There is no simultaneity bias, and therefore no need for a system of equations. COPEI shares can (indeed, should) be included in an AD equation without estimating a corresponding equation for CO PEl. The second simultaneous equations model included endogenous variables for AD's share and splinter party shares. A system of equations is worthless unless each equation in it is a good model. I quickly discovered that it is impossible to model the untransformed splinter party shares; they must be logged first. This is because splinter party shares range from less than one percent to nearly a third of the vote. Logging these values compresses their extreme variance. (A log transformation also unfortunately requires dropping all the observations from 1958, since there were no splinter parties in the first election and ln(o) is undefined.) The 2SLS estimates of the parameters of interest, with the corresponding absolute T-statistics, were as follows:

r88

APPENDIX

.49 - .32 COPEI - .04 ln(Splinters) + .002 (10.2) (2.5) (4.9) (1.9) Abstention - .09 Metropolitan - .06 Divisive Nomination (0.7) (3.2) - .14 Split [+ 22 state intercepts] (7.7) Adjusted R-squared = .87

AD

=

6.9 + 3.0 AD + 1.6 Split - .36 PAST (6.1) (1.8) (4.4) (2.9) + 1.7 MEP + .08 PRESENCE+ (22 state intercepts], (7.6) (3.0) Adjusted R-squared = .62

ln(Splinters)

=-

where PAST is the number of elections transpired since the splinter party was founded; MEP is a dummy that distinguishes between the two splinters, MEP and AD-Op; and PRESENCE is an indicator of the splinter party's local presence, as measured by the number of MEP city council members in each state in the period before the election. As was the case with CO PEl, the AD term in the splinter equation is not significant (p = .o8). This means that the splinter vote affects AD's vote, but AD's vote does not affect the splinter vote significantly. There is, therefore, no simultaneity problem: both the COPEI and splinter shares can be used as independent variables in the AD equation without estimating simultaneous equations for the CO PEl and splinter shares. 4

REFERENCE MATTER

Notes

For full titles, authors' full names, and publication information on works cited in short form in the Notes, see the Bibliography, p. 219. Chapter

I

Templeton, "The Evolution of Popular Opinion." Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism." 3. Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts." 4· Silva Michelena, The Illusion of Democracy in Dependent Nations, and Bonilla, The Failure of Elites. 5. Levine, Conflict and Political Change (1973 ), later condensed into his "Venezuela Since 1958" (1978). 6. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy; Dahl, Polyarchy. 7· See Myers, Democratic Campaigning in Venezuela; Martz and Baloyra, Electoral Mobilization; Martz and Myers, Venezuela: The Democratic Experience; and Penniman, ed., Venezuela at the Polls. 8. For a partial exception, see Rey, "El sistema de partidos," and his later E/ futuro de Ia democracia en Venezuela. 9· Rangel, Los mercaderes del voto. IO. See, for example, Alvarez, "Socialismo, para cuando?" II. Karl, "The Political Economy of Petrodollars"; Hellinger, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy. 12. See Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts," and Ellner, "Organized Labor's Political Influence." For a German perspective that is particularly good on the ossification of the supposedly social democratic AD, see Werz, Parteien, Staat und Entwicklung. 13. See especially Levine, "Venezuela: The Nature, Sources, and Prospects," but also Martz, "Party Elites in Colombia and Venezuela," and Martz and Myers, Venezuela: The Democratic Experience (rev. ed.). I.

2.

192

Notes to Pages 7-r4

14. Gil Yepes, The Future of Venezuelan Democracy; Granier, La generaci6n del relevo. 15. CO PRE, Propuestas para reformas politicas inmediatas. For a good analysis of the reform process, see Gomez Calcaiio and Lopez Maya, El tejido de Penelope. 16. See Arroyo Talavera, Elecciones y negociaciones, and BrewerCarias, Problemas del estado de partidos. 17. This paragraph and the one that follows rely heavily on the landmark study of the early years of the party, John Martz's Acci6n Democratica. 18. Lenin's original discussion of democratic centralism is in Lenin, What Is To Be Done?, pp. 165-76. For a more enlightening discussion that places the concept in its historical context, see Sabine and Thorson, A History of Political Theory, pp. 730-35 and 770-73. 19. Originally, only the labor and peasant wings elected their own secretaries (Martz, Acci6n Democratica, p. 157). Over the years, the other wings have been granted the same privilege (author's observations at the October 1985 meeting of the Comite Directivo Nacional). 20. I wrote most of the questions in close collaboration with Juan Linz and revised some of them on the advice of Mauricio Baez and Aristides Torres. Most of the questions were originally drafted in Spanish and were subsequently edited to conform to the Venezuelan idiom with help from Josefina Bruni Celli and Thais Maingon. I conducted all the interviews myself, reading questions and multiple-choice answers from a printed questionnaire. Surprisingly few respondents seemed to mind this formal procedure, in spite of their elevated status; many of them, in fact, were impressed that I had come so well prepared. The number of questions asked varied according to which samples the respondent belonged to. Answers were coded on the spot. Each interview lasted around an hour, although the length varied considerably, depending on how talkative the respondent was at the time. I felt that most respondents were amazingly candid; only four struck me as suspicious or uncooperative. Whenever possible, I also asked informal follow-up questions relating to the respondent's position, career, or unusual opinions. These follow-up interviews, along with interviews of leaders not included in the random sample, are annotated by brief descriptions of the sources' positions and by a numbering system that permits me to identify the sources exactly for my own purposes without breaking my promises of anonymity. 21. Labor leaders' marriages were unusually concentrated in this milieu, although a significant minority (21 percent) married children of politicians! 22. Many senators and deputies conduct business on the floor of Congress while it is in session, because their parties require them to be present even though most of them play no important role most of the time. Their

Notes to Pages 14-22

193

seats are equipped with telephones to help them use their time productively, making sessions of Congress noisy, confusing affairs. 23. Martz, Acci6n Democrdtica, pp. I74-92.

Chapter

2

Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p. 10. The only exceptions are tiny island nations-Kiribati, Tuvalu, and, until recently, Nauru. For a complete list of democracies as of I985, see Coppedge and Reinicke, "A Scale of Polyarchy." Information on the existence of parties is from the country summaries in Gastil, ed., Freedom in the World. 3. LaPalombara, Democracy Italian Style. 4- Partyarchy is no more correct etymologically than partyocracy, but it sounds better, and its pronunciation is more certain than that of the etymologically correct "particracy." Partyarchy also felicitously recalls "oligarchy," correctly suggesting rule by a few parties, and invites comparison with "polyarchy," which conveniently simplifies the task of defining the syndrome. 5· Dahl, Polyarchy, pp. I-4· 6. Coppedge and Reinicke, "A Scale of Polyarchy," p. 102. 7· These are the provisions in the "Reglamento para Ia selecci6n de candidatos a cargos de representaci6n popular," reproduced in full in "El CEN de AD se reserva el derecho a designar Ia mitad de los candidatos," El Nacional, July 16, I983. The fact that the editors of a daily newspaper considered this internal party regulation newsworthy is a telling indication of the importance of parties in the political system. 8. Also, it is well known that the CEN usually defers to the presidential nominee in its choice of candidates. 9· Gallagher, "Conclusion," in Gallagher and Marsh, eds., Candidate Selection, pp. 236-83. 10. Not all the council members obey the CEN directive, but those who do not are punished. One week after the April I985 elections of city council presidents, the CEN expelled nineteen council members from the party and brought sixteen others before the National Disciplinary Tribunal for possible sanction. El Nacional, May 2 and 7, I985. II. Interview with Lewis Perez Daboin, Director del Departamento de Asuntos Municipales, Comite Ejecutivo Nacional, July 25, 1985. 12. Merkl, "Mapping the Temporal Universe," p. 489. 13. A. Valenzuela, Political Brokers, chap. 5. I4. Mainwaring, "Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems," pp. 2833· I5. Edinger, Politics in West Germany. I.

2.

194

Notes to Pages 23-25

16. Sample ballots are reproduced as an appendix in Penniman, ed., Venezuela at the Polls. 17. Rose, "Still the Era of Party Government." 18. Von Beyme, "Governments." 19. Gallagher, "Conclusion," in Gallagher and Marsh, eds., Candidate Selection, p. 270. 20. Rose, "Still the Era of Party Government," pp. 288-92. 21. Interview with Jesus Eduardo Troconis Heredia, vice-chair of the Domestic Policy Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, June 20, 1985. 22. On procedural questions, the Speaker says, "If there are no observations, the motion is approved ... (one-second pause) .... Approved." 23. The roll is often called at the beginning of a session to determine exactly what those proportions are for the day and whether or not there is a quorum. After that point, no further roll calls are necessary. 24. Congreso de Ia Republica, Gaceta del Congreso, ro: 381-82. 25. In the extremely chaotic weeks following the coup attempt of February 4, 1992, there were two occasions when members of AD or COPEI did not vote their party's line. First, Rafael Caldera abstained on a vote ratifying President Perez's suspension of constitutional guarantees, while the rest of his party voted in favor; the abstention was so unprecedented that some wondered whether it was legal. A typical CO PEl congressman would have been expelled for such an act; Caldera got away with it only because he was a former president, the founder of his party, and the frontrunner in the 1993 presidential campaign. El Nacional, Feb. 5, 1992, p. D-1. Second, two AD deputies, Cristobal Hernandez and Luis Raul Matos Az6car, voted in favor of a March 26 MAS-MIR motion to censure three ministers in President Perez's cabinet, when the AD line was to oppose the motion. The CEN of AD initiated expulsion proceedings against both deputies four days later. "Perez Promises to Dismiss Central Bank Head," NOTIMEX report in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Latin America Report FBIS-LAT-92-063 (Apr. 1, 1992): 44· 26. Bolivia, too, probably fits this pattern. Characterization of Costa Rican legislative politics comes from personal correspondence with John Carey, a UC-San Diego doctoral candidate who interviewed many Costa Rican legislators in 1991. 27. According to James L. Payne, factions of the Liberals and Conservatives are fairly cohesive in the Colombian congress, but parties are not because factions within a party sometimes vote against each other. See Payne, Patterns, chaps. 10 and n. 28. Mainwaring, "Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems," and Conaghan, "Loose Parties." 29. Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties. 30. Calculated from annual scores in "Partisanship More Common in

Notes to Pages 26-29

195

House," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 45 (rorst Congress, rst Session-1989) (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1989): 34-B. These figures are not comparable to the indices of cohesion cited for European parties because votes in which a majority of one party voted with a majority of the other are not included. 31. Based on a study of the British Conservative and Labour parties, Robert MacKenzie developed an elaborate argument for the natural supremacy of the parliamentary party (MacKenzie, British Political Parties), but his work was done before the Labour Party Congress increased its influence over the Labour parliamentary group. 32. Troconis Heredia interview cited above. 33. There are occasional exceptions to this rule. In 1985, the only two exceptions were Henry Ramos Allup, who was allowed to chair the relatively unimportant Chamber of Deputies Committee on Science and Technology, and Wolfgang Larrazabal, a prestigious independent elected on an AD slate, who was awarded the chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Youth, Sports, Recreation, and Tourism. 34· Interview no. 57, Sept. 19, 1985, with an AD committee chair. 35. MacKenzie, British Political Parties, esp. chaps. I and ro. On Labour since 1973, see Kogan and Kogan, The Battle. 36. Gaither Poll from August and November 1991, cited in El Nacional, Jan. 26, 1992, p. D-2. Translated and reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Latin America Report92-037, Feb. 25,1992. 37· Levine, Conflict. 38. See Ray, The Politics of the Barrios. 39· Acci6n Democratica, Reglamento sabre el funcionamiento de las fracciones de concejales de Acci6n Demomitica, 1984; Reglamento del Departamento de Politica Municipal; and interview with the National Director of Municipal Policy, Lewis Perez Daboin, July 25, 1985. 40. For an optimistic assessment of the neighborhood association movement, see El Nacional, Oct. n, 1985. 41. The membership figure is that reported by Organization Secretary Luis Alfaro Ucero following the 1985 census of militants (El Nacional, Nov. 25, 1985). Although it is a very large figure (for example, it makes AD the largest nominally Social Democratic party in the world, in absolute terms), it probably is not inflated by much. Cross-checks verified that all 2.25 million names had valid cedula (national ID card) numbers, with no duplications. (Author's interview with the director of computer operations for the 1985 census of party membership.) The estimate of registered voters is my own projection, based on the smooth growth in the figures for 195883. Since 1968, the national figures for registered voters have differed from the estimated number of eligible voters by less than 8 percent. (Consejo Supremo Electoral, La estadistica evolutiva.)

196

Notes to Pages 29-32

42. According to Baloyra and Martz, Political Attitudes, p. rs6, 31 percent of the eligible voters sympathized with a party and have belonged to one at some time. I multiplied this figure by AD's share of the 1973legislative vote (44 percent) to obtain the 14 percent estimate. 43· An estimate for 1975 is close to the 1973 figure even though the 1973 and 1975 figures are based on different methods of calculation. Membership in AD was reported to be approximately one million in 1975 (Njaim, "El financiamiento," p. 40), which would have been around 18.5 percent of the registered voters. 44· Verba, Nie, and Kim, Participation and Political Equality, p. 96. 45· Figures on European Social Democratic parties are from Bartolini, "The Membership of Mass Parties," p. 188. 46. Party membership figures used to calculate percentages for this paragraph are from Day, Political Parties of the World. 47· Story, The Mexican Ruling Party, p. 82. 48. If all those who voted for the MNRH in 1985 had been members of the party, they would have amounted to only about 20 percent of the electorate. 49· For more information on party penetration of the labor movement in Venezuela, see Boeckh, "Organized Labor and Government"; Davis, Working-Class Mobilization; Davis and Coleman, "Political Control of Organized Labor"; Ellner, "Organized Labor's Political Influence"; Fagen, "Unions and Democracy"; Febres, "El movimiento sindical"; Godio, El movimiento obrero venezolano; Lopez Maya and Gomez Calcaflo, "Desarrollo y hegemonfa"; and McCoy, "Labor and the State." 50. Latin American Regional Report 85-05 (June 21, 1985). The figure is approximately correct for 1985. Some 13 to 20 percent of the organized work force are affiliated with the Christian Democratic CODESA or the leftist CUTV. 51. Boeckh, "Organized Labor and Government," pp. 173-78. 52. Davis and Coleman, "Political Control of Organized Labor," p. 259. 53· Ellner, "Organized Labor's Political Influence," describes the relationship between the political and labor leaders of AD in detail, but it exaggerates the Labor Bureau's autonomy and influence within the party during the 196o's. The labor wing did not prevail over the political leaders of AD in the mid-196o's so much as side with a majority faction against R6mulo Betancourt, who had lost his preeminence within his own party during those years. Many of Ellner's examples of labor's independence are actions by minority factions within the Labor Bureau that were overruled by the majority of its leadership or expelled. See chapter 7 of my dissertation, "Strong Parties and Lame Ducks," for an extended treatment of the Labor Bureau's role in intra party politics. 54· Peflalver, "Speech to the National Labor Plenum," pp. 17-18.

Notes to Pages 3 2-3 8

197

55. In my 1985 survey of AD leaders, 78 percent of the labor leaders and 63 percent of AD members of Congress agreed that the labor leaders should press their demands even if they lacked party support. 56. McCoy, "Labor and the State." According to a management source, the Labor Ministry sided with the unions more than So percent of the time on appeals of "unjustified" dismissals. U.S. Embassy Annual Labor Report of 1977, cited in Valente, The Political, Economic, and Labor Climate in Venezuela, p. 121. 57· McCoy, "Labor and the State," pp. 50-51. 58. Febres, "El movimiento sindical." 59· Confidential interview with an AD labor leader, Aug. 3, 1985. 6o. McCoy, "Labor and the State." 61. Ellner, "Organized Labor's Political Influence," pp. 91-99. 62. Davis and Coleman, "Political Control of Organized Labor," p. 262. 63. Ellner, "Organized Labor's Politicallnfluence," p. n6. 64. Davis, Working-Class Mobilization, p. 32, documents the case of a COPEI-led oil workers' union in which no opposition slate had ever been presented in a union election. Venezuela's large federation of public employees held no national congress for the first 26 years of its existence. (Confidential interview with a FEDE-UNEP leader, Caracas, june 6, 1985.) 65. Public employees' salaries were cut by 10 percent in 1960 and again in 1961. The second reduction provoked criticism by labor leaders affiliated with leftist parties, but the AD (and COPEI) leaders of the CTV supported the cuts and expelled the PCV and MIR from the CTV. Alexander, The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution, pp. 155-56 and 241-42. 66. McCoy, "Labor and the State," argues that labor militancy increased after 1969 owing to the CTV's increased financial independence and its new corporatist role. But as Figure 2. I demonstrates, if there was any such secular increase, it was dwarfed by the effects of party control. 67. Davis and Coleman, "Political Control of Organized Labor," pp. 253-54· 68. Pefi.alver, "Speech to the National Labor Plenum," and Pefi.alver, "Los trabajadores y Ia politica." 69. This detail emerged during my unsuccessful efforts to track down Deputy Armando DeArmas for an interview as part of my survey of AD congressmen. 70. Herman, Christian Democracy in Venezuela, p. 65. 71. Confidential interview with an aide to an AD member of Congress, Apr. 29, 1985. 72. Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government. 73. Kolb, Democracy and Dictatorship in Venezuela. 74· For a full discussion of the terms of the pacts, see Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts."

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Notes to Pages 3 8-44

75. Ibid., p. 210. 76. Levine, "Venezuela Since 1958," p. 97· 77· El dia que bajaron los cerros. 78. A third condition is that the regime not be presidential, since, as I argue in subsequent chapters, the combination of partyarchy and the presidency distorts the accountability of the government to the voters. 79· Michels, Political Parties. So. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 269. 81. Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party System." 82. Baloyra and Martz, Political Attitudes, pp. 175-82. These similarities and differences are based on a comparison of each party's combined members, sympathizers, and potential supporters as identified by analysis of survey data from 1973. Separate analyses of the various levels of partisanship reveal other differences. My criterion for "about the same degree of support" is a difference of less than four percentage points in the support for AD and COPEI from each of the groups mentioned. I do not include professionals because different operationalizations lead to different conclusions. 83. Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party System," and Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, chap. 4· 84. Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts." 85. Nafm and Pinango, "El caso Venezuela," pp. 538-79. 86. Baloyra and Martz, Political Attitudes, especially fig. 13, "Threedimensional Configuration of Venezuelan Political Space," p. 115. Unfortunately, these authors draw a misleading conclusion from their multidimensional scaling exercise. There is, as they argue, a fundamental ideological dimension to Venezuelan party identification in that ideology is the underlying criterion that distinguishes the extreme Left and the extreme Right from the centrist Establishment parties. But when the extremes are miniscule in size, and two ideologically indistinguishable parties win over So percent of the vote, ideology is practically irrelevant to Venezuelan politics. The nature of political competition is defined by the dimension that best differentiates between AD and COPEI, and that dimension, according to Baloyra and Martz's own analysis, is pure party competition-Ins vs. Outs. 87. Levine, Conflict and Political Change, shows how the parties kept certain issues off the agenda in the mid-196o's. The same practices continued through the 1970's and 198o's, although there are signs that weakening party discipline and growing media independence have progressively undermined the parties' control of the agenda since about 1989. 88. Baloyra and Martz, Political Attitudes, p. 219. 89. Alba Sanchez, "Poll Respondents Reject CAP, Support Caldera," translation of article in El Nacional, Jan. 26, 1992, p. D-2, in Foreign Broad-

Notes to Pages 4 s-s 3

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cast Information Service-Latin America Report 92-037 (Feb. 25, 1992): 25-27. 90. Lijphart, Democracies, pp. 3-4.

91. Forty-three percent was the official rate of participation claimed in the 1985 internal elections (El Nacional, Nov. 28, 1985). Rates reported for different states ranged from 28 to 70 percent, with 30 percent being the most common figure. CO PEl claimed a participation rate of only II percent in its last internal election before 1985 (ibid., Nov. 26, 1985). Chapter 3 I. Michels, Political Parties; Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems; Panebianco, Political Parties. See also MacKenzie, British Political Parties. 2. The concept of "policy party" comes from Rose, "Parties, Factions, and Tendencies in Britain." 3. Hume, "Of Parties in General," and Michels, Political Parties. 4· Myers, Democratic Campaigning in Venezuela; Myers, "The Acci6n Democratica Campaign"; and Herman, "The Christian Democratic Party." 5· MacKenzie, British Political Parties, chap. 10; Beller and Belloni, "The Study of Factions." 6. In a highly sophisticated analysis of the dynamics of the U.S. party system from 1840 to 1980, Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (Third Parties in America, pp. 193-214) conclude that factionalism in the two major parties has been by far the most important incentive for the creation of significant third parties. Pols by (Consequences of Party Reform, p. 86) also blames a "nominating process that encourages factionalism and discourages coalition-building" for the Democrats' poor showing in presidential races. Survey evidence from Spain shows that factional bickering was the most important reason why so many voters turned from the UCD in 1982. (Gunther, "El realineamiento del sistema de partidos de 1982," p. 64.) 7· Aronoff, "Fission and Fusion." 8. Sullivan, Pressman, and Arterton, Explorations in Convention Decision-Making, p. II9. 9· Reiter, Selecting the President, p. 130. 10. One notable exception is Uruguay, which permits factions to run separate slates without lessening the party's chance of electing one of its presidential candidates. Under the Ley de Lemas, the presidential candidate of the most-voted faction in the most-voted party wins the presidency. II. These figures have to remain approximate owing to the lack of reliable data. A 1973 survey by Baloyra and Martz, Political Attitudes in Venezuela, p. 156, found that 31 percent of the eligible voters sympathized with a party and had belonged to one at some time. Recent reports of party

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membership suggest that the figure would have been higher in the 198o's. For instance, AD's 1985 census of militants turned up a fairly reliable figure of 2.25 million members, which amounted to around 26 percent of the electorate in that year. The combined membership of all parties must have exceeded 40 percent. 12. El Nacional, Nov. 26 and 28, 1985. 13. Myers and O'Connor, "The Undecided Respondent." 14· From 1958 to 1988, Venezuelan voters cast a single ballot to elect legislative officials to the national Senate and Chamber of Deputies, the state legislative assemblies, and, until 1978, the city councils. Each vote was for a party, which designated its representatives by means of a closed-list system. Seats were distributed among the parties by a modified d'Hondt system of proportional representation. Starting in 1993, voters will be allowed to vote for individuals as well as parties. 15. Preliminary analysis showed that the abstention rate is also affected by internal party conflict. A divisive nomination increases the rate of abstention (presumably because some voters and organizers are disappointed that their candidate was not nominated), and a split lowers it (presumably because the split intensifies the factions' efforts to mobilize their followers). 16. Actually, as is standard procedure with dummy variables, one state must be omitted. I omitted Gmirico because its average vote for AD deviated least from the national average. 17. Baez, "Apuntes para el estudio de Ia sociologia electoral venezolana"; Baez, "From Praetorianism to Civic Order"; Blank, "The Regional Dimension of Venezuelan Politics"; Myers, "Urban Voting, Structural Cleavages, and Party System Evolution." 18. Whenever party-share variables are placed on both sides of an equation, there is a danger of bias due to simultaneity. That is, there is strong suspicion that AD's shares influence the rival parties' shares while the rival parties' shares are influencing AD's. If this is the case, the coefficients can be seriously biased, resulting in an erroneous model. My model does not suffer from this problem. I estimated two simultaneous equations models, one with AD and COPEI shares as endogenous variables, and one with AD and splinter shares as endogenous variables. In both cases, the coefficient of AD's share was not statistically significant in the rival party equation. This means that the rival parties affect AD, but AD does not affect the rival parties. A single-equation model is therefore the most appropriate one. For details, see the Appendix. 19. The probability that the coefficients of the election-year and fiveyear per capita GDP variables were not different from zero was 0.92 and 0.33, respectively. GDP per capita was not broken down by state in the data. 20. Changes in per capita GDP are not the only possible indicators of government performance. However, most other indicators that come

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to mind-inflation, employment, real wages-would give the same result, since they all vary together in two long periods: the boom from 1962 to 1979, and the bust thereafter. 21. Simulated splinter party shares at the national level vary from year to year because of changes in each state's contribution to the national vote.

Chapter 4 r. Michels, Political Parties; MacKenzie, British Political Parties; von Beyme, "Governments, Parliaments, and the Structure of Power." Although von Beyme's article is mainly concerned with showing the relative power of parliamentary parties as measured by their impact on cabinet changes, it provides abundant evidence that deference of parliamentary parties to their governments is the norm. 2. Brazil and Ecuador may be exceptions to this generalization, since their parties are even less cohesive than those in the United States. 3· Remmer, Party Competition in Argentina and Chile, pp. 62-63. 4· Martz, Acci6n Democratica, p. 106; Levine, Conflict and Political Change, pp. 236-43. But see Ellner, "Organized Labor's Political Influence," pp. 102-3, for one instance in which this norm was questioned. 5· Alexander, The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution, p. 182. 6. Karl, "The Political Economy of Petrodollars," p. 231. 7· Exceptions are occasionally made when there are more chairs to fill than the number of available CEN members in congress, but only minor committees are entrusted to non-CEN members. 8. Congreso de Ia Republica, Constituci6n, Title V, chaps. I, 2, 3, and 4· 9· For a much more detailed account of stalemate crises, see Coppedge, "Venezuela: Democratic Despite Presidentialism." 10. Tugwell, The Politics of Oil in Venezuela, p. 157; Velasquez, "Aspectos de Ia evoluci6n polftica de Venezuela," pp. 285-86. II. Perez, in his second term, tried to form a national coalition in order to inspire confidence in the democratic regime after he survived a coup attempt in February 1992. Two CO PEl leaders joined the cabinet, which was highly unusual, but they did so as individuals with their party's permission and not as representatives of COPE! in a coalition. Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Latin America Report 92-048 (Mar. II, 1992): 22. 12. Tugwell, The Politics of Oil in Venezuela, p. 103, and Velasquez, "Aspectos de Ia evoluci6n polftica de Venezuela," pp. 307-9. 13. Herman, Christian Democracy in Venezuela, pp. 145-46. 14. My account of this crisis is my interpretation of the events referred to in a partisan document: Acci6n Democratica, Documentos sabre Ia crisis Par/amentaria, esp. pp. 13-19.

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15. Calculated from information in Congreso de Ia Republica, 2 5 aiios de legislaci6n democratica. 16. Karl, "The Political Economy of Petrodollars," p. 496. I]. Ibid., pp. 517-50. 18. Gomez Calcafio and Lopez Maya, E/ tejido de Penelope, pp. 201-3. 19. These data were compiled from Congreso de Ia Republica, 25 aiios de legislaci6n democrdtica. The dates referred to are the dates of publication in the Gaceta oficial, but since the President must promulgate laws within ten days of legislative sanction unless he returns them for further consideration, the dates are approximately correct. 20. Karl, "The Political Economy of Petrodollars," table IV-5, p. 314. 21. New York Times, Dec. 10, 1983. 22. Unless otherwise noted, most macroeconomic figures cited in this chapter are from Banco Central de Venezuela, Informe econ6mico, 198185. 23. Interview with former debt negotiator Mauricio Garda Araujo, in El Diario de Caracas, Nov. 6, 1983. 24. The earliest and most influential of these works was Skidmore, "The Politics of Economic Stabilization." The most comprehensive version of this argument was advanced by Joan Nelson in "The Political Capacity of Stabilization." Another important attempt is Robert Kaufman's "Democratic and Authoritarian Responses to the Debt Issue." For a more complete bibliography and a critique of these arguments, see Remmer, "The Politics of Economic Stabilization." 25. Ley Habilitante; Lopez Maya, Gomez Calcafio, and Maingon, De Punto Fijo a/ Pacto Social, p. 97· 26. Interviews with Eduardo Fernandez and Leonardo Ferrer, E/ Nacional, June 23, 1985. 27. There was also controversy between the government and business, and between the government and its creditors, but these relations are irrelevant to the question at hand: whether a presidential partyarchy is more or less democratic than other kinds of democracies. I assume that the relations between the government, business, and foreign creditors would be the same in any kind of liberal democracy. 28. Party members originally preferred the term adeista, but now friends and enemies alike say Adeco except on the most formal occasions. 29. Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts," pp. 210-15. 30. Penniman, "Preface," in Penniman, ed., Venezuela at the Polls, p. xii. 31. The most elaborate version of this argument is Rangel, Los mercaderes del voto. 32. With the radical program of structural adjustment initiated by the second Perez government, some would say that the party has moved fur-

Notes to Pages 75-84

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ther to the right. It would be more accurate to say that, as has happened elsewhere, the extremes of adjustment have shaken the party out of its pragmatic stupor, leaving some Adecos in favor of the economic reforms and some opposed. 33· Acci6n Democr:itica, Tesis politica del partido. 34· Wynia, The Politics of Latin American Development, p. 199. 35. Tugwell, The Politics of Oil in Venezuela. 36. On the party's role in consolidating democracy, see Levine, Conflict and Political Change. 37· Young AD leaders from time to time call for a revision, and in 1979 the Political Committee formally decided to revise and update the Thesis, but as of this writing (1993) nothing has come of it. 38. Karl, "The Political Economy of Petrodollars," pp. 222-34. 39· These stories are by nature hard to document. However, a study of the administrative support for the Venezuelan Congress turned up some interesting findings. The occupations of 34 percent of the 810 white-collar employees had to be classified as "other" (not office workers, secretaries, typists, aides, receptionists, guards, public relations, accountants, or other professionals). And 75 percent of the 685 blue-collar workers were "messengers," "doormen," "guards," or "other" (not custodians, drivers, telephone operators, etc.). The authors comment, "Personnel who are not needed have been hired; personnel have been assigned to positions without meeting the minimum desirable requirements for preparation." Gabaldon and Oberto, La reforma parlamentaria 2: 252-54. 40. Latin American Weekly Report 84-12 (Mar. 23, 1984). 41. The devaluation of 1983 was very unpopular when it was decreed, as devaluations usually are. It was an especially hard blow for Venezuelans, who were proud of their sacred 4· 3 rate, which they associated with prosperity and international respect. Devaluation meant that thousands of middle-class Venezuelans could no longer go on yearly shopping sprees in Miami, where everything seemed cheap, or take a vacation in Europe. Black Friday, as the day of the devaluation is known, became the symbol of the end of an era. 42. In fact it would be hard not to have exchange controls in a country where over 90 percent of the foreign exchange is earned by the state. 43· Imports rose only modestly in 1984 and 1985, reaching only 55 percent of their 1982 level. 44· El Nacional, Oct. I, 1985, p. D-1. 45. Another issue of possible disagreement between the government and a significant portion of the party was whether or not to dismiss public employees as an austerity measure. Sixty-five percent of the congressmen and CEN members favored reducing public employment, while 57 percent of labor opposed such a reduction. The government was accused of

204

Notes to Pages Bs-86

firing thousands of Copeyanos from public jobs. Although this accusation was probably true (aside from possible exaggeration), it was not treated as an important matter by the government, most of the press, or even the top leaders of COPEI. I can only assume that these firings were part of the "normal" turnover of party loyalists after every change of government. Since many of the empty positions probably were quickly filled by Adecos, making it impossible to tell at the time whether there was a net gain or loss in public employment, it is highly unlikely that opposition to official policy could have crystallized around this issue. See El Nacional, Feb. 28, 1985. 46. Only Bs6.5 billion of the Bs18 billion in this Additional Investment Program was eventually funded, and red tape prevented most of the former amount from being released until 1986. Public investment therefore actually dropped 47 percent in 1984. Latin American Weekly Report 85-39 (Oct. 4, 1985 ). 47· A little less than half of the $14.7 billion in claims qualified toreceive dollars at the Bs4.3 rate; $4.1 billion was rejected, and the remainder was either netted out against foreign assets at the market rate or reclassified as imports or letters of credit, at the Bs7.5 rate. Business Latin America, Mar. 24, 1986. 48. This policy precipitated the resignation of Planning Minister Luis Raul Matos Azocar, who had strong ties to the AD Labor Bureau. Interview with Luis Raul Matos Azocar, July 17, 1985. When the dimensions of the RECADI scheme were revealed, it became a scandal that was as important in Venezuela as Watergate was in the U.S. 49· Analysis of Labor Ministry and Central Bank figures in Matos Az6car, "Los trabajadores en Ia sociedad de Ia escasez." 50. Latin American Weekly Report 85-03 (Jan. 18, 1985 ). 51. Lusinchi decreed three partial wage increases in his first two years in office: a 33 percent increase for agricultural workers in November 1984, a ro-20 percent increase for nonunionized blue-collar workers in January 1986, and a further 7·5-IO percent increase for agricultural workers that same month. Latin American Weekly Report 85-03 (Jan. 18, 1985) and Business Latin America, Jan. 13, 1986. All other wage increases were left up to collective bargaining and the goodwill of employers. Meanwhile, the President explicitly and repeatedly refused to decree an across-the-board wage increase, on the grounds that such an increase would be inflationary. Given an inflation rate of around 12 percent, the two increases decreed for agricultural workers increased their real income. This progress was only possible because agriculture was expanding rapidly in 1984-85. Workers in other sectors were less fortunate. The 10-20 percent increase for nonunionized obreros did not quite enable them to keep pace with inflation. The same can be said for unionized workers, since the average wage increase achieved through collective bargaining in 1984 was 20 percent, normally

Notes to Pages 88-95

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spread over a two-year contract. (Latin American Weekly Report 85-03, Jan. 18, 1985 .) None of these wage policies helped the unemployed, the marginal underemployed or self-employed, or the nonunionized white-collar workers. 52. The fact that the labor movement appeared to be restless was also useful to the government in its negotiations with foreign creditors, who needed to be convinced that some wage protection, economic expansion, and eventual revision of the terms of the refinancing agreement were politically necessary. 53· Alfredo Pefia interview with Antonio Rios, El Nacional, Oct. 21, 1985, p. D-2. 55. El Nacional, Oct. 16, 1985. 54· Ibid. 56. Ibid., Oct. 17, 1985. 57· There was only one major strike during this time, at the Hevensa electric oven plant in Ciudad Guayana, where the Causa R party happened to have more strength in the union than AD did. AD leaders in the CTV tended to ignore this strike or downplay its importance. It was a greater threat to them, in terms of party control of the union, than to the government. 58. The Labor Bureau adopted more of an opposition stance after it defected to the Outs in mid-1987. In the first half of 1987 there were three major strikes, and perhaps in response, President Lusinchi finally decreed a 20-30 percent general wage increase. See McCoy, "Venezuela: Austerity and the Working Class in a Democratic Regime." 59· This quote and most of the account that follows are from an interview with Cristobal Hernandez, June 27, 1985. 6o. Hernandez claimed that he reached this decision after someone tried to discredit him by accusing him of corruption. Believing that an important part of the party leadership was preparing to destroy his career, he resolved to go down fighting. 6r. Interview with Luis Raul Matos Az6car, July 17, 1985. 62. Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Latin America Report92037 (Feb. 25, 1992): 27.

Chapter 5 1. Following Katz, Theory of Parties p. 7, I consider factionalism an intermediate point in a dimension of organizational cohesion, ranging from monolithic unity to atomized individualism. The explanations cited were intended to explain degrees of factionalism ranging from bifactionalism to the kind of uncohesiveness found in Brazilian and Ecuadorian parties. 2. On class and sectoral cleavages, see Michels, Political Parties. On ethnic cleavages, see von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies,

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and Michels. On regional cleavages, see Duverger, Political Parties; Conaghan, "Loose Parties"; and Michels. On generational cleavages, see Martz, Acci6n Democratica; Hine, "Factionalism in Western European Parties"; Aronoff, "Fission and Fusion"; Michels; and Duverger. On school/university/kibbutz ties, see Duverger and Aronoff. 3· On cultural norms, see Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics"; Fukui, "Japan"; Conaghan, "Loose Parties"; and Gallagher's conclusion to Gallagher and Marsh, eds., Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective. On clientelistic society, see Chalmers, "Parties and Society in Latin America," and Zuckerman, The Politics of Faction. On personal loyalties, see Aronoff, "Fission and Fusion," and Zariski. On envy, jealousy, personal ambition, and greed, see Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia; Michels, Political Parties; and Aronoff. 4· Nicholson, "Factionalism and Public Policy in India." 5. On the survival of founding components, see Hine, "Factionalism in Western European Parties"; von Beyme, "Governments, Parliaments, and the Structure of Power"; and Panebianco, Political Parties. On starting out as a governing party, see Panebianco; on professionalization and bureaucratic rivalries, see Michels, Political Parties; on losing touch with the rank and file, see Mitchell, "Factionalism and Political Change in Bolivia." 6. On decentralized financing, see Michisada, "Glitter and Expense in LDP Factional Politics"; von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies; and Fukui, "Japan." On electoral rules, see Mainwaring, "Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems"; Duverger, Political Parties; Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics"; Fukui, "Japan"; and Zuckerman, The Politics of Faction. 7· On federalism, see Mainwaring, "Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems," and Nicholson, "Factionalism and Public Policy in India." On presidentialism, see Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies; von Beyme, "Governments, Parliaments, and the Structure of Power"; and Mainwaring. 8. On the effects of being in government, see Merkl, "Factionalism"; Zuckerman, The Politics of Faction; Panebianco, Political Parties; Aronoff, "Fission and Fusion"; and Michels, Political Parties. On factionalism in dominant parties, see Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, pp. 32022; von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies; Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics"; Fukui, "Japan"; and Panebianco. 9· Rose, "Parties, Factions, and Tendencies." 10. On the general impact of salient policy issues, see von Beyme, "Governments, Parliaments, and the Structure of Power"; Hine, "Factionalism in Western European Parties"; and von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies. On the vulnerability of the left, see Duverger, Political

Notes to Pages

95-IOZ

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Parties, and Hine. On the vulnerability of the right, see, schizophrenically, Duverger again. II. On strong ideology, see Aronoff, "Fission and Fusion." On lack of ideology, see Fukui, "Japan," or von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies. 12. Katz, Theory of Parties, p. 10. 13. Ibid. 14· Katz, Theory of Parties; Gallagher's conclusion to Gallagher and Marsh, eds., Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective. 15. This section is a condensation of a 120-page history of AD's internal political life in the author's dissertation: Coppedge, "Strong Parties and Lame Ducks," chaps. 5 and 7· 16. Martz, Acci6n Democratica, pp. 49-62. 17. Fuenmayor, Historia 7: 239-40,374-77. 18. Martz, Acci6n Democratica, pp. 183-85. 19. Coppedge, "Strong Parties and Lame Ducks," pp. 223-29. 20. Fuenmayor, Historia 9: 305-6. 21. Levine, "Venezuela since 1958." 22. Martz, Acci6n Democratica, pp. 174-83, 209. 23. Ibid., p. 99· 24. Mesa Espinosa, Por un caballo y una mujer, p. 294. 25. Martz, Acci6n Democratica, pp. 174-83. 26. Ibid., pp. 183-92. 27. Gonzalez Urdaneta, "El nacimiento del M.E.P.," p. 22; interview with Jesus Angel Paz Galarraga, Apr. 9, 1985. 28. Alexander, R6mulo Betancourt, pp. 601-6. 29. Rivas Rivas, Las tres divisiones de Acci6n Democratica; Belmonte Guzman, Briceno Reyes, and Urbano Taylor, "Las divisiones de Acci6n Democratica." 30. Martz and Baloyra, Electoral Mobilization, pp. 68-70. 31. The vote was not unanimous because a maverick CEN member, Cristobal Hernandez, directed his Youth Bureau delegates to vote for Reinaldo Leandro Mora, which earned Hernandez the ire of the rest of the convention. He was voted out of the CEN at that convention but reinstated afterward at Betancourt's insistence. Interview no. 26, with an AD deputy. 32. Coppedge, "Strong Parties and Lame Ducks," pp. 271-80; Maggi, "Informe sobre las elecciones internas." 33· Karl, "The Political Economy of Petrodollars," p. 590. 34· Maggi, "Informe sobre las elecciones internas," p. 7· 35. Coppedge, "Strong Parties and Lame Ducks," pp. 280-89. 36. Heydra, Elvia crucis del poder, pp. 201-74· 37· This paragraph is based on Coppedge, "Strong Parties and Lame

208

Notes to Pages ro2-9

Ducks," pp. 133-64, which documents Lusinchi's declining support in greater detail. 38. El Nacional, Sept. 26 and Nov. 12, q, and 21,1985. 39· El Diario de Caracas, Apr. 5, 1987. 40. Alberto Quiros Corradi, "Las elecciones de AD: las lealtades innecesarias," El Universal, Oct. q, 1991, sect. 2, p. 2; Diana Ramon Vilarasau, "Commentary Analyzes AD Internal Elections," El Diario de Caracas, Sept. II, 1991, p. 28, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Latin America Report91-202 (Oct. r8, 1991): 44-45. 41. Duverger, Political Parties, p. 220. 42. Shugart, "Duverger's Rule and Presidentialism." 43· This is not a full explanation, since one also must show why the factions are not organized by region, ethnicity, class, or some other commonality. Chapter 6 provides that explanation. 44· Gallagher's conclusion to Gallagher and Marsh, eds., Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective. 45. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism." 46. There are conflicting accounts of how this deal came to be proposed. Heydra, El via crucis del poder, pp. 265-70, says that it was Lusinchi's idea; an article in the newsmagazine Resumen (Aug. 9, 1981) says that the idea originated with the Labor Bureau, but reports rumors that Betancourt was behind it. I believe that it was Betancourt's idea, mainly because one of my survey respondents claimed to have been present at a meeting at which Betancourt told top labor leaders that, since Lusinchi seemed to have the nomination sewn up, they should think about who would succeed him as general secretary. In Betancourt's opinion, it was time for AD to have a general secretary from the labor movement. (Interview no. 70, with an AD labor leader.) 47· Perez's six-foot-four height helped the virile image stick in spite of a face that, with beady eyes, pointed nose, receding chin, and an overbite, was a caricaturist's delight. But his looks were deceptive. In an interview he repeated a saying about the people of the three Andean states: "The people of Trujillo look cunning, but are stupid; the people of Merida look stupid, and are stupid; and the people of Tachira look stupid, but are cunning." "I am from T:ichira," he added, to make sure I got his point. 48. An excellent account of Perez and his administration is Karl, "The Political Economy of Petrodollars." 49· See, for example, El Nacional, Mar. II, 1985, and El Diario de Caracas, May 4, 1986. 50. I myself observed these reactions at various party functions and during Perez's October 1985 campaign swing in Cumana. 51. Because the sectoral party secretaries are less dependent on outside

Notes to Pages no-r4

209

endorsements, their reelection needs do not accelerate the nomination race nearly so much as the state leaders' timetable. 52. Interview no. 85 (an aide to a candidate for state general secretary), Aug. 31,1985. 53. Piii.erua was rumored to be hoping for another shot at the presidency. Bruni Celli was planning to challenge Manuel Peii.alver for the position of general secretary, which he later did, without success. 54· El Universal, Jan. 6, 1985. 55. I accompanied Perez on his campaign swing to Cumana in October 1985. My comments about the purpose of these visits are based on my observations during this trip and press accounts of Perez's other stops. At each stop in a campaign swing, townspeople would pass envelopes or slips of paper through the crowd to Perez and his aides, asking for personal favors. According to Perez's national campaign organizer, the former president received 797 letters and over 300 scraps of paper during a three- or four-day stay in the state of Portuguesa. At this time, Perez was making campaign swings in one state after another, resting for just a few days in between, so the number of requests for favors must have been astronomical. His staff in Caracas forwarded each request to the proper authorities in the local, state, or national government with a cover letter from Perez asking the beleaguered officials to do everything they could to solve the petitioner's problem; then they would mail a copy of the cover letter back to the petitioner. According to the campaign organizer, only 10 percent of the requests could be granted, but the letters showed that Perez had done what he could to help. 56. El Nacional, July IJ, !985. See also "David Morales Bello: Mientras Carlos Andres Perez no de el si yo sigo mi trabajo porIa candidatura," ibid., Sept. r, 1985. 57· Disputes almost never go as far as the National Convention, which is the highest authority in the party. The CDN majority has expelled members who threaten to appeal to the National Convention. 58. The analysis that follows is based on official party documents that I obtained as an observer of the July-August and October 1985 CDN: Acci6n Democratica, Secretaria Nacional de Organizaci6n, Estatutos vigentes; Acci6n Democratica, Comite Ejecutivo Nacional, "Informe del CEN sobre Ia reforma estatutaria"; and Acci6n Democratica, Secretaria Nacional de Organizaci6n, Proyecto de reglamento para las elecciones internas. The CDN was closed to the press, and as far as I know, I was the only outsider allowed to observe the proceedings. 59· In spite of these demonstrations of independence, the state leaders were generally willing to follow the Ins' lead on issues that did not involve conflicts between national and sectional interests. For example, Alfaro's

2ro

Notes to Pages II4-18

"muzzle law" was approved the first time it was put to a vote. But when the Outs protested so loud and long that the session almost had to be suspended again, Alfaro was persuaded to retract the proposal, and (after some tricky parliamentary maneuvering) the "muzzle law" was voted on again and defeated unanimously on his recommendation. 6o. Interview no. 93, with an AD deputy in October 1985; El Nacional, Jan. 10, 1986. 61. For the case of Sucre, see El Nacional, Sept. 4, 1985. For the case of Merida, see ibid., Dec. 3-4, 1985. 62. Interview no. 24 with an AD peasant leader and various articles in El Nacional, Feb. 26-27 and May 3-5, 1985. I would be reluctant to cite unprovable accusations as evidence if there were some other plausible explanation for In-affiliated Eustasio Guevara's upset victory over the Outaffiliated Armando Gonzalez. Guevara was a very capable leader, intelligent and experienced, but there did not seem to be enough difference in merit between the two to overcome the advantages of Gonzalez's 24-year incumbency. 63. The only account of this event is the eyewitness description in my dissertation, "Strong Parties and Lame Ducks," pp. 156-58. 64. Ibid., pp. 158-62. 65. All incumbent general secretaries ran for reelection in 1985, although two winning candidates left their posts soon afterward to become members of the CEN. 66. This impression is based on reactions to Call's speech at the CON, and on comments by a former member of the Monagas organization (interview no. 85). 67. On Bavaria and the rest of Germany, see Merkl, "Factionalism." On the U.S. South, see Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. On Belgium and Quebec, see Lijphart, Democracies, pp. 26-27 and 132-36. On Italy, see Zuckerman, The Politics of Faction. 68. There were not enough women in my sample to test for statistical significance. However, there were several women in each faction. 69. Only about 20 percent of the Parliamentary Faction, for example, were labor leaders. This figure is rather high compared with other Venezuelan parties and legislatures in other countries, but that does not change the fact that labor leaders make up a small minority of the national party leadership. 70. Martz, Acci6n Democratica, pp. 99-102. A more recent work also explains factional conflict in AD and CO PEl as a transfer of power from the founders to the second generation. See Arroyo Talavera, Elecciones y negociaciones, pp. 156-63. 71. Comparison of Ins and Outs by the year in which they joined the party yields very similar results.

Notes to Pages n9-2 7

2u

72. Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics"; Fukui, "Japan"; and Mainwaring, "Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems." 73· Gonzalez, "Los partidos polfticos"; Hine, "Factionalism in Western European Parties"; and Gallagher's conclusion to Gallagher and Marsh, eds., Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective. 74· Past loyalties may be irrelevant because Lusinchi won the nomination in a relatively consensual process. If the precampaigns had been more divisive, as they have been during AD governments, past loyalties would probably have lingering importance. See Chapter 6 for a more detailed explanation. 75. The role of the party brokers is also consistent with observations made by Lipset, Trow, and Coleman in Union Democracy, their study of the International Typographical Union (ITU). The ITU was another apparent violator of the Iron Law of Oligarchy in that the incumbent national leadership of the union was often defeated in internal elections. Lipset and his colleagues found that the key to the incumbents' defeat was the existence of secondary organizations affiliated with the union but independent of the union leadership. In the ITU, these secondary organizations were two "chapels," or parties, built upon local printers' social clubs. In AD, the equivalent secondary organizations are the machines headed by state and sectoral brokers. 76. Alexander, R6mulo Betancourt, p. 568. 77· Ibid., pp. 569-71; interview with Jesus Angel Paz Galarraga, Apr. 9,

1985. 78. The Outs' predictions of the outcomes of the primaries were more

specific and more accurate. Anonymous sources inside the campaign commands of both precandidates agreed that the outcome of the primaries was fairly certain in 20 of the 25 state races, but they differed on how the 20 would be split. The Prietistas claimed that 12 of the states would go for Prieto and 8 for Barrios, and they named the 12 and the 8. Barrios's informer claimed just the reverse, 12 for Barrios and 8 for Prieto, but he refused to say which 12 Barrios would win. The Prietistas predicted that the outcome would be: for Prieto: Zulia, Miranda, Trujillo, Bolfvar, Merida, Falcon, Amazonas, Portuguesa, and Lara; for Barrios: Carabobo, Monagas, Tachira, Cumana, Delta Amacuro, Cojedes, Nueva Esparta, and Anzoategui; uncertain: Yaracuy, Guarico, Carupano, Aragua, and Vargas. The surprise victories for Prieto were Delta Amacuro and Nueva Esparta; the only uncertain contest won by Barrios was Yaracuy. El Universal, Sept. 22, 1967. This split cut across every geographical region of the country. 79· Ibid., Oct. 3, 1967. So. Alexander, R6mulo Betancourt, p. 636. 81. Maggi, "Informe sobre las elecciones internas," p. 9· 82. Karl, "The Political Economy of Petrodollars," p. 590.

212

Notes to Pages r27-40

83. El Nacional,July 21,1975. 84. El Diario de Caracas, May 4, 1986. The poll, conducted by Mer-

canalisis, asked who could do a better job as president in the next government. Around 37 percent of the sample was undecided. 85. For details on this exchange, see Coppedge, "Strong Parties and Lame Ducks," pp. 144-62. 86. Michels, Political Parties; MacKenzie, British Political Parties. 87. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism." 88. Combellas Lares, COPEI, p. 2n; and Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p. 74; or Rose, "Parties, Factions, and Tendencies," p. 37· 89. Combellas Lares, COPEI, p. 211. 90. Ibid., pp. 213-14. 91. Ibid., pp. 235-36. 92. Ibid., pp. 212-13. Chapter 6

Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, pp. 320-22. Belloni, "Factionalism, the Party System, and Italian Politics," p. 105. 3· Beller and Belloni, "The Study of Factions," pp. 3-18. 4· Rose, "Parties, Factions, and Tendencies," p. 42. 5. Belloni, "Factionalism, the Party System, and Italian Politics," pp. 1.

2.

100-105.

6. Aronoff, "Fission and Fusion," and Mitchell, "Factionalism and Political Change in Bolivia." 7· Chalmers, "Parties and Society in Latin America." 8. Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties; A. Valenzuela, Political Brokers in Chile; and Zuckerman, The Politics of Faction. The literature on Italian parties is divided on the nature of factions in the DC. Zuckerman examines the question most closely and concludes that they are factions of interest. Katz, Theory of Parties, agrees, saying that Italian factions use ideology as a weapon, not as an end in itself (p. 112). Belloni, "Factionalism, the Party System, and Italian Politics," is a good example of the argument that they are factions of principle. 9· Hume, "Of Parties in General." Hume mentioned a third type also, "factions of affection," but said little about it. 10. Ever since Hume, work on factions has been obsessed with the distinction between factions of interest and factions of principle (Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics"). Rose's "Parties, Factions, and Tendencies" assumed policy motivations for factions in Britain; Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia, attributed selfish motivations to factions in Colombia. In Political Parties, Michels sought to blur the distinction by declaring, "Differences of principle and of the intellectual order soon become personal [while] personal dislike and personal hostility pompously masquerade as differences of views and tactics" (pp. 175-76). Duverger's Politi-

Notes to Pages I43-49

213

cal Parties assumed that all factions had mixed motives; Panebianco, in Political Parties, postulated universal tension between the two (pp. 9-n); and Sartori, in Parties and Party Systems, drew distinctions between spoils factions of interest and power factions of interest, and ideological factions of principle and principled "idea groups" (pp. 76-79). 11. There is actually a third association, between factional affiliation and responses to the question, "Do you think that labor demands should be limited to maintain the competitiveness of the Venezuelan economy in the international market?" Those who thought labor demands should be limited tended to be Outs, and others tended to be Ins, both by a margin of a little less than two to one. It is not clear how to interpret this association because this response is not associated with an indicator of the priority of labor demands, and opinions about the state's role in the international economy are not associated with factionalism. Lacking a plausible interpretation, I have decided to treat it as a statistical fluke. 12. Because the data set is too small to calculate realistic estimates of the partial association of each variable while controlling for all the other variables, I tried all the two-factor models that could be generated from the twelve best predictors and selected the four best models for further analysis. These four did not include models that made use of indicators of the most likely nominee or the preferred nomination method, since they produce circular interpretations of factional conflict. Unfortunately, no models could make use of the indicator of the adequacy of government consultation of the CEN, since this question was asked only of CEN members. 13. The variable used as an indicator of enthusiasm in supporting the party line is based on the question, "Party unity often requires activists to obey the party line whether they agree with it or not. What percentages of the time would you say that you obey the party line enthusiastically (con animo), indifferently, and reluctantly (con resignaci6n)? (adding to 100 percent)." The measure of feelings toward David Morales Bello is based on a question that asked respondents to rate how favorably they felt toward him and thirteen other political figures, on a scale ranging from o (very adverse) to 10 (very favorable). Ratings of 8 to 10 are interpreted as "rather liking" Morales Bello, and ratings of 7 or less are interpreted as "having a poor opinion" of him. Support for Perez is measured by a Guttman scale that ranges from unconditional sympathy with Perez and lack of sympathy with Lusinchi at one extreme to strong sympathy with Lusinchi and strong opposition to Perez at the other extreme. It combines the feeling ratings just described with three other indicators of sympathy for Perez and Lusinchi on more specific matters, and has a coefficient of reproducibility of ·950. 14. In Sartori's conception, the characteristics of an ideological mentality are closed-mindedness and strong emotional intensity. Ideologues are therefore "adamant" people. The pragmatic mentality, by contrast, is

214

Notes to Pages rso-57

characterized by open-mindedness and weak emotional intensity. Pragmatists are therefore more flexible. See Sartori, "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems." I5. Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Latin America Report 92063 (Apr. I, I992): 44· I6. This last tendency has always been true in the past, but in I99I the Ortodoxo Outs for the first time had an interest in controlled elections while the pro-Perez Renovador Ins continued to call for respecting the will of the base. As the president's unpopularity grew, however, it must have become evident to the Outs that their position was self-defeating. See Alirio Bolivar, "La ortodoxia y Ia renovaci6n no son simples etiquetas," El Universal, Aug. 25, I99I, pp. I-I6. I?. El Nacional, Sept. II, I985. I8. Ibid., Oct. I, I985. I9. Author's observations at the October I985 CDN. 20. El Nacional, Dec. I3, I985. 21. Ibid., Sept. II, I985. 22. Allison, Essence of Decision, p. I76. Allison gives credit for this aphorism to Don K. Price. 23. Quoted in Briceno, jaime Lusinchi y Ia revoluci6n de los mejores, p.J42.

Chapter 7 I. For more details on these negotiations, see Coppedge, "Venezuela: Democratic Despite Presidentialism." 2. Levine, "Venezuela Since I958." 3· Levine, Conflict and Political Change. 4· Levine, "Venezuela Since I958," p. 97· 5· J. Powell, The Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant. 6. Ray, The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela. 7· Martz, Acci6n Democratica, p. I88. 8. Levine, "Venezuela Since I958"; Myers, Democratic Campaigning in Venezuela. Paradoxically, the transfer of power was an indirect result of factionalism in AD. If AD had not split in I967, Caldera would not have won in I968. Election simulations based on the model described in Chapter 3 indicate that if AD had never split or experienced a divisive nomination, there would never have been any president from CO PEL Moreover, since factionalism is mainly an affliction of governing parties in Venezuela, presidential partyarchy carries a built-in tendency toward alternation in power. Alternation is a form of power sharing that provides mutual guarantees to the main parties and therefore helps preserve Venezuelan democracy.

Notes to Pages 157-69

215

For an elaboration of this argument, see the author's dissertation, "Strong Parties and Lame Ducks," chap. 8. 9· Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," pp. 62-66. ro. Conaghan, "Loose Parties." n. Dahl, Polyarchy, pp. r-9. u. Gomez Calcaiio and Lopez Maya, El tejido de Penelope, pp. 98-99. 13. Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Latin America Report9r210 (Oct. 30, 1991): 42. 14· There are several good studies of campaigning in Venezuela. See Myers, Democratic Campaigning in Venezuela; Martz and Baloyra, Electoral Mobilization and Public Opinion; and Penniman, ed., Venezuela at the Polls. 15. Brewer-Carfas, Problemas del estado de partidos, claims that partisan appointment of judges began with the creation of the Consejo de Ia Judicatura in 1969 (p. 17). However, the Consejo was created by the AD-led Congress during the first COPE! government, to prevent President Caldera from appointing too many Copeyanos. This suggests that partisan appointments began well before 1969. See Vehisquez, "Aspectos de Ia evolucion politica de Venezuela," pp. 307-9. r6. Brewer-Carfas, Problemas del estado de partidos, pp. 14-21. I7. Ibid., p. 2I. r8. Gomez Calcaiio and Lopez Maya, El Tejido de Penelope, p. 210. 19. Ibid., p. 198. 20. Ibid., p. 207. 21. El Universal, Aug. 25, 1991, pp. r-r9; Lopez Maya, "Tensiones sociopoliticas," pp. 17-26. 22. The advantages of parliamentary systems over presidential systems have been most thoroughly discussed in Linz and Valenzuela, eds., The Crisis of Presidential Democracy. 23. For the classic account of leadership and turnover in Britain, see MacKenzie, British Political Parties. 24. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, pp. 215-17. 25. Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism Nor Parliamentarism." 26. Suleiman, "Presidential Government in France." 27. McClintock, "The Perils of Presidentialism?" 28. Linz, "Democracy: Presidential or Parliamentary." 29. Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies; Lijphart, Democracies, pp. 76-77. 30. Gillespie and Gonzalez, "Presidentialism and Democratic Stability in Uruguay." 31. Remarks by former Uruguayan president Julio Marfa Sanguinetti at the International Workshop on "Democratic Governability in Latin America," Georgetown University, Oct. 8-9, 1990.

216

Notes to Pages r70-7 4

32. Lijphart, Democracies, pp. 76-77; Lijphart notes that the suggestion was originally made by Lloyd Cutler. 33· It might be desirable, as part of this reform, to shorten the term of office from five years to four; ten years is a very long time for any one person to be president. 34· Karl, "The Political Economy of Petrodollars," pp. 486-87. 35. Quoted in Sanfn, Gracias a ti, p. 79· 36. In the constitutional drafting committee in 1959-60, absolute noreelection was proposed originally, but after private discussions among AD, COPEI, and the URD, the proposal was changed to reelection after two terms. Speaking in favor of this change, Gonzalo Barrios opposed absolute no-reelection because it would make a deserving man ineligible for life! His public defense of the two-term delay was that it would prevent incumbents and their successors from plotting to help each other back into office. (Congreso de La Republica, Comisi6n Bicameral de Reforma Constitucional, La Constituci6n de r96r y Ia evoluci6n constitucional de Venezuela, tomo I, vol. I, pp. 212-14 and tomo I, vol. 2, pp. I94-95 and p. 241.) This differs from the popular understanding, at least within AD, that the two-term delay was directed at R6mulo Betancourt personally; it was thought that he might be young enough to run for reelection in I963 or I968, but not in I973. This is why Morales Bello, in his proposal for an immediate reelection, said, "We cannot continue to burden ourselves with formulas that certain circumstances imposed at a given moment, which now have no logical explanation and are not useful." Sanfn, Gracias a ti, pp. 78-79. 37· Thirteen percent of the congressional sample mentioned some other system, usually an extended single term. 38. Among those satisfied with the existing provision, the reason most often cited was that the ban "obliges the parties to search for new leaders." This answer is not very meaningful, since the statement is a truism, and its meaning is ambiguous. The obligation to search for new leaders can be regarded as a good (because it brings fresh ideas to the top) as well as an evil (because it sidelines more experienced leaders). Those favoring absolute no-reelection most often agreed with the statement, "The article creates ex-presidents who have built their own power base and are able to make life difficult for their successors, even when they are from the same party." 39· The impressive candidacy of Cuauhtemoc Cirdenas indicates a fundamental change in the internal politics of the PRI, which had remained unchanged with regard to succession for nearly 6o years. A useful introduction to Mexican party politics is Story, The Mexican Ruling Party. 40. After the gubernatorial election in Baja California in I989, President Carlos Salinas for the first time forced the state PRI machine to recognize the victory of a PAN candidate for governor, Ernesto Ruffo Appel.

Notes to Pages I75-78

217

In 1991-92, four governors-elect from the PRI in Guanajuato, San Luis Potosi, Tabasco, and Michoacan were forced to resign, not because they lost the election but because opposition demonstrations were getting out of hand. Only one of the interim governors appointed in their place was from a party other than the PRI, however. See Cornelius, "Mexican Elections," and Tim Golden, "Protests Bring Ouster of Third Governor," New York Times, Jan. 30, 1992, p. A12. 41. See Fleet, The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy, and four works by A. Valenzuela: Political Brokers in Chile, "Parties, Politics, and the State in Chile," The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile, and "Party Politics and the Failure of Presidentialism in Chile." 42. Booth, "Costa Rica," pp. 395-417. 43· For the early Radical regime, see Rock, Politics in Argentina. For the 1956 split, see Gallo, Balbin, Frondizi, y Ia division del radicalismo. For factionalism in the PLN, see McDonald and Ruhl, Party Politics and Elections in Latin America, pp. 174-77. For the Garda government, see Graham, Peru's APRA. 44· Even the apparent exception-the close relationship between the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Labour party-is not an exception, because since the early 1970's it would be closer to the truth to say that the TUC penetrates Labour than the other way around. Kogan and Kogan, The Battle for the Labour Party. 45· Karl, "The Politics of Petrodollars." 46. The single best source on this point is Linz and Valenzuela, eds., The Crisis of Presidential Democracy. But see also Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multiparty Systems, and Democracy"; Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America"; Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies; and Riggs, "The Survival of Presidentialism in America." 47· On Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay, see the following articles in Linz and Valenzuela, eds., The Crisis of Presidential Democracy: A. Valenzuela, "Party Politics and the Failure of Presidentialism in Chile," Conaghan, "Loose Parties, Floating Politicians, and Institutional Stress," and Gillespie and Gonzalez, "Presidentialism and Democratic Stability in Uruguay." On Argentina, see De Riz, "Transitions to Democracy in Argentina." On Brazil, see Mainwaring, "Institutional Dilemmas of Multiparty Presidential Democracy." On Peru (1968), see Kuczynski, Peruvian Democracy Under Economic Stress. On Peru 1992, I am relying principally on a talk by Peruvian journalist Gustavo Gorriti at the Carnegie Endowment, Washington, D.C., May 20, 1992, in which he endorsed the parliamentary alternative. 48. I have developed this argument at length in "Venezuela: Democratic Despite Presidentialism." 49· Karl, "The Politics of Petrodollars," chaps. 1 and 6.

218

Notes to Pages r78-88

50. Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: L989 Report, p. 463. 51. Nafm and Piftango, "El caso Venezuela," pp. 547-51. On union benefits, see Valente, The Political, Economic, and Labor Climate in Venezuela. 52. Argentina: The UCR never gained control of the Senate in the 191630 period or during the Alfonsfn government. Menem had a Senate majority but in the Chamber had to rely on a coalition with the UCD. Chile: J. Alessandri's majority was a coalition; Frei lacked a majority in the Senate. Colombia: With the two-thirds majority requirement in force until 1968, the so-so split between Liberals and Conservatives gave neither party a working majority. Since 1974, both parties have been too factionalized to guarantee a working majority, despite nominal Liberal majorities in four governments. Costa Rica: Given the imperfect discipline of the PLN, the bare majorities of the Arias and second Figueres administrations (50.8 and 51 percent of seats, respectively) were insufficient for a working majority. Dominican Republic: Balaguer lacked strict PR/PRSC majorities in the Chamber of Deputies in 1978-82 and 1986-90. Peru: Sanchez-Cerro was not the head of an organized party; Bustamante headed a coalition, within which APRA had a single-party majority only in the Senate; Prado's majority in 1956 depended on APRA, which was not his party; Garda could not count on APRA support after 1987. Uruguay: I count only governments in which one party won a clear majority of seats and either all sublemas supported the same presidential candidate or one sublema was predominant within the governing party. Venezuela: Betancourt depended on a coalition with CO PEl after AD split in 1962. 53. "Editors' Preface and Acknowledgements," in Linz and Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America, pp. vii-x. 54· Levine, "Venezuela Since 1958," pp. 101-5.

Appendix 1. My discussion of pooled data problems and corrections is based on Maddala, Econometrics, pp. 320-26, and an application by Rosenstone in his Forecasting Presidential Elections, pp. 71-77 and 181-83. 2. SAS Institute, SASIETS (TM) User's Guide, p. 191. 3· Johnston, Econometric Methods, pp. 376-84. 4· The logged transformation of the splinter vote is not used in the final equation for AD because the unlogged variable is more strongly associated with AD's share. This is because AD's share is roughly ten times that of the splinter parties. Large (unlogged) fluctuations in a small variable (Splinters) are more useful for explaining small fluctuations in a large variable (AD).

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Index

In this index an "f" after a number indicates a separate reference on the next page, and an "ff" indicates separate references on the next two pages. A continuous discussion over two or more pages is indicated by a span of page numbers, e.g., "57-59." Passim is used for a cluster of references in close but not consecutive sequence. Abstention, 43-44, 59, 164, I82, 2oon Accion Democratica (AD), r, 40; and peasants, 9, II, 28, 75, II5, 124, I 56; and ideology or principles of, 9- II, 40-4I, 7I, 74-78, I49-50; history of, 9-14, 97-98, I47-49, I 54-57; and labor, 9-14 passim, 31-35,74, 77, 79, 84-9I passim, II2, 124, I55, 196n, 208n; and elections, Io, IS, 5463, 2I4n; and organizational structure of, II; and women, II, 12-13, I 12; and professionals and technical wing, II, IJ, 112; and working class, rr, 32, 40, 77, 87; and Parliamentary Fraction, II, 66, I07, 21on; and youth, II, I 12; and the military, I 2, 37-38, 154; and executive-legislative relations, I5-I6, 65-93; and municipal government, 29; membership in, 29-30, 45, 195n; and media 35-36; and private sector, 38,77-78,85,87, 91, I54ff; and the Church, 38, I54f; and relations with COPE!, 4I-43, 58, 68, 126, I47, I55ff, 20In; and economic policy, 7I-89; and teachers, 112; and party reform, Il3, 150. See also Campaigns; Clientelism; Congress; Factions; Nominations; Party discipline; Political parties; State party leaders Africa, 8 Agrarian reform, see Land reform

Alexander, Robert J., 5 Alvarez Paz, Oswaldo, 135 A pure state, 6o Argentina, 6, 25, 30f, 36, 70, r6o, 176, I78f, 2I8n Armed forces, see Military Aronoff, Myron]., 138 ARS, 54, 62, 98ff, u8f, 125, 147, 149, 157, r61, 172 Arterton, F. Christopher, 51 Asia, 8 Australia, 22 Azpurua, Manuel, 87 Ballots, see Electoral system Banco de los Trabajadores de Venezuela (BTV), 33· See also Labor unions Barrios, Gonzalo, 55, 62, 98, roof, 104 passim, rr4, u8f, 126f, I7I, 211n, 2r6n Belgium, 45 Beller, Dennis C., so, 94 Belloni, Frank P., 50, 94, 137f Betancourt, Romulo, ro, 93, uo, II9ff, 127, r96n, 2o8n; early career of, 5, 9; administration of, 9, 34, 54, 65, 67, 75, 92, 99, 125f, 148f, 154f, 179f; and Trienio, 98; late career of, roo-ror, ros, 133; death of, ro2 Blank, David Eugene, 6 Bolivia, 6, 30, 138, 175,179, 194n Bonilla, Frank, 5, 36

236

Index

Brazil, 6, 25, 36, 70, 175, r78f Brewer-Carias, Allan Randolph, I63 Britain, 23, 26, 50, 70, I29, 176 Bruni Celli, Marco Tulio, 91, ru, 114 Bulgaria, 70 Bur6 Sindical, see Labor Bureau Caldera, Rafael, ro, 36, 62, 93, no, I56f, I8o, I94n; administration of, 5sf, 67f, roo, 132-33, 148, 2I5n Call, Guillermo, II5 Campaigns, 6, 53; and AD, so, 74, I 30-3 r; and factionalism, 109- r6, 121-22, rso, 161 Canache Mara, Carlos, 93, Io7, u8 Canada,69,70, 178 Candidates, see Nominations Capriles, Miguel Angel, 36 Caracas, n, 59, 117, 154 Caribbean, 177 Castro, Fidel, 5, 54, 154 CON, see National Directive Committee Celli, Humberto, 151, r8r CEN, see National Executive Committee Centralization of authority: in political parties, 2rff, 91, 159-60; in the presidency, 69-70, 163-64 Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (CENDES), 5 CES, see Sectional Executive Committees Chile, 6, r7, 22, 25, 30, 36, 65, I39, 175, rnff Church, 27; and AD, 38, 154 City council, see Municipal government Civil Society, penetration of, see under Political parties Clientelism, 6f, 17, 27, 52, 123, I 54, 177; and factions, 52, 54, q8-4o; and AD, 104, III; in Philippines, 139; in Chile, 139; in Italy, 139; and democratic theory, 139 Coalitions, 7, 67-68, u6, 147, r56-57, 169, 201 n Cogollito or Cogollo, u2, 131, 159 Cold War, 5 Colombia, 25, 30, 70, I75, 179, 194n Combellas, Ricardo, I}2

Communists, u, 74, 99, I 56 Conde, Pedro, 91 Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV), u, 31-34,86-90, I97n. See also Labor unions; Labor Bureau Congress: public opinion of, I; in presidential systems, 2-3, 169-70; and elections, ro; and AD, II-14, 24, 26, 49; and committee chairs, II, I4, 26, 66; in partyarchy, 19; social background of, 12- I 3; and nominations, 20-2 r; and electoral system, 22; powers of, 66f, 69, r63; comparative legislative outputs of, 69-70. See also Coalitions; Executive-legislative relations; Presidents Consejo Nacional de Comercio, Precios y Salarios (Conacopresa), 86 Constitution: of I953, 65; of I961, 66f, 124, 158, 163 CO PRE, see Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State Corruption, 6, 43f, 84f, 91, r63, 178 Costa Rica, r7, 25, 30, 175f, I79, 194n, 2.18n Coups, see under Stability, political CTV, see Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Venezuela Cuban Revolution, 5, 8, 54, 154, 156 Dahl, Robert A., r8, 159 Debt crisis, rr, 7rff, 83ff, 142 Decree powers, 2-3, 65-66, 69, 77, ro6, I54, I 57· See also Executivelegislative relations; Economic policy; Presidents Delpino, Juan Jose, 87-88,93 Democracy, quality of, 2, 3-4, 8-9, 37,39-44, 141, 153, 182. See also Representation; Partyarchy Democratic theory, 5f, 9, 45; and polyarchy, r8-19, 26, 36, I 59; and factions, 48, 50-53, 94-96, 103-4, 136-41 Direct elections, see Electoral system Dominican Republic, I79, 2r8n Drug trafficking, I Duverger, Maurice, 103 Eastern Europe, 8

Index Economic crisis, 3, 38, 44, 71-73, 85,145 Economic policy, 3, 42, 61, 69,7189,I42-45,162, 202n,204n;by decree, 73 Ecuador,6,25,30,158,175,I78 Education, 42 Elections, 6, 7, 10; of I973, 55; analysis of legislative, 57-6I; of 1968, 62 Electoral System, I, I9; and proportional representation, 22-23; reform of, 23, 69, 134, r64-66, 182; and factions, 50-54, 103-4, rr8-19, 121-23 Escovar Salom, Ramon, r8o "Establishment," 7, 35, 4rf Executive-legislative relations, 2-5, 15-16,64-93, I6I, 167-74, I798o; in Peru, 169; in Uruguay, 169. See also Coalitions; Decree powers; Presidents; Stalemate Exile, 14, 98 Factions: in Uruguay, 22; and electoral system, 22, 50-54, 94; in Colombia, 25; and democratic theory, 48, 94-96, 103-4, I31-32, I36-4I; in Britain, so; in Italy, so, 94, 97, rr6, IJ7; in India, 94; in Japan, 94, 97; in Israel, 94, I38; in Belgium, rr6; in Germany, rr6; in Quebec, rr6; in the U.S., rr6, 137; in Bolivia, I38 -in Venezuela, 3-4, 44-46, 47; and Ins and Outs, 3, I6, 43, 91, 97, I02I6, 123-35, qo-47, I50-52, I6I, I70, 172-73; of principle, 4, 16, 44~45,54,99, I38-45, I47-5o;and governability, 4, r6I-62; in AD, n, IS-16, 45-50 passim, 54-135, I4052, 154, I72-73; of interest, 16, 54, 138-41, 145-52; in COPE!, 47, s6, I32-33· See also ARS; Muchachos; Old Guard FCV, see Federaci6n de Campesinos de Venezuela Federaci6n de Camaras de Comercio y Producci6n (Fedec:imaras), 86, 89, r6o: See also Private sector Federaci6n de Campesinos Venezuela (FCV), 28, rrs. See also Peasants Fermin, Claudio, 103, I33f

237

Fernandez,Eduardo,s6,93,I35,r64 Fernandez, Lorenzo, 133 Finland, 22, 23, r69 France, 23, 35, 70, I69 Frente Nacional Democratico, 157 Gallagher, Michael, 95, 104 Gallegos, R6mulo, 98, I79 Germany, 22, 35 Gil Yepes, Jose Antonio, 7 Gomez Calcano, Luis, uS, r66 Governability, 3, 4-5. See also Executive-legislative relations; Stability, political; Stalemate Governors, 53, rr4, 124; election of, 23, 69,I34,I63,I73,I82 Granier, Marcel, 7, r6o Grupo Roraima, I6o Guasti, Laura, 94 Guerrillas, r, 6, rr, 156 Haiti, r, 8 Hernandez, Cristobal, 9of, I so, r94n, 205n,207n Hernandez Grisanti, Arturo, 24 Herrera Campins, Luis, 10, 55, 67f, 71-72,74,93, IOI, no, 133 Hume, David, 48, I40 Hungary, 70 India, 94 Inequality, and redistribution, 75,77 Insurgency, see Guerrillas Interest groups, 2, 67, 137f, I 59· See also Civil society Ireland, 22 Israel, 94, I38 Italy, 22, 24, 35, 94, 97, I}7ff, 139 Izaguirre, Alejandro, 107 Janis, Irving, 152 Japan,94,97 Judicial reform, r64f Karl, Terry Lynn, 68, I78 Katz, RichardS., 47, 94,95 Key, V. 0., 137 Labor Bureau, I2, 31-35,86-89,92,99, 102, II2, ns, I96n. See also Acci6n Democratica, and labor

238

Index

Labor unions: 6, 27, 28, 42, I 59; and AD, 9-I5 passim, 3I-35, 49, 74, 77, 79, 84-9I passim, u6, 124; and state politics, 33; in Mexico, 32; and COPE!, 34; and stability, 38. See also Accion Democratica, and labor; Working class Land reform, 4', 75, I 56 Lande, Carl H., 94, 139 Lauria, Carmelo, 134 Leandro Mora, Reinaldo, 107 Left, the political, 7, 35, 40, 42, 74, 77, 99, '49. 156 Legislature, see Congress Leoni, Raul, 10, 54, 67f, 75, 98, wof, 105, IIO, II9, 157 Lepage, Octavio, 56, 93, 102, T04f, 107, III, 114, 128, 133, 166, 181 Levine, Daniel, 5, 6, 28, I 55 Lijphart, Arend, 45, 169 Linz, Juan J., 2, 157, I8o Local party leaders, 53 Lopez Contreras, I I 8 Lopez, Hector Alonso, 103, 134 Lopez Maya, Margarita, I66 Lusinchi, Jaime, 7, 26, 36, 44, 55f, 6r, IOI-3, u8, 12of, 134; administration of, IO, I6, 64f, 69, 70-74,78-94, 104-5, 107, 109ff, 128, 141-52 passim, 160, I64, 179,181, 204n MacKenzie, Robert T., so, 129 Manzo Gonzalez, jose, 98 Martz, John D., 5, 14, II8 MAS, see Movimiento al Socialismo Matos Azocar, Luis Ratti, 90-9I, r5o, 160, I94n, 204n Mayors, see Municipal government Media, I, 35-36, 53, 67, 87, 159; in partyarchy, 19-20, 137 Medina Angarita, General, 9, 38, 97 Merkl, Peter H., 22 Mexico, 25, 30, 32, 65, 125, 160, 162, 216n Michels, Robert, 4 7f, 12 3, 129 Middle class, 9, 40 Military: and political influence, I, 27, 37; governments, 9, 97f, II8; and the president, 67. See also under Accion Democritica MIR, see Movimiento de Ia lzquierda Revolucionaria

Mitchell, Christopher, q8 Mona gas state, 6o Mongolia, 70 Morales Bello, David, 93, 102, 1o5ff, III, II4, 121, 127, 147, 171

Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), ro, 29,77 Movimiento de Ia lzquierda Revolucio· naria (MIR), 77, u8, 157, I72 Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo (MEl'), 55' 62, 77, II 8, 161 Muchachos, 54,98-99, nSf, 147ff, '57 Multimember Districts, see Electoral system Municipal government, 2I-22; and elections, 22-23,69,134, 163ff, 181; and political parties, 29. See also Local party leaders Myers, David J., 54 Nairn, Moises, 7 National Convention, n, 209n National Directive Committee (CON), 11,

too,

112,126,151, 209n;

and

party reform, 113-15 National Executive Committee (CEN), 11,12-15,24,26, 49, 77, 99,109, 112, 173; and nominations, 20-22, 122, 125ff; and executive-legislative relations, 64, 66-70, 74; and party discipline, 90-91, ro2, q1, 193n, 194n; and Ins and Outs, 106-7, 120-21; and party reform, 113ff, I?I-72 Nationalization, see State, role of Neighborhood Association Movement, 29, 160 Netherlands, 4 5 Nicaragua, 70 Nigeria, 177 Nominations: in partyarchy, IS, 19, 2I22, 27; in AD, 20-22, 49, 100-IO), 108-16, 124-28; and factiooalIsm, 50-52,94,97, 103-4, 12I-23, 170, I73 Nueva Alternativa, 29 Nueva Esparta state (Margarita Island), 6o O'Connor, Robert E., 54 Oil, 7, 4I-42, 68, 75, 77, 84, 87, 106, I78

Index Old Guard, 98-roo, 149, I 54, I 56 Organizaci6n Venezolana (ORVE), 9 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 75 Oropeza, Luis J ., 7 ORVE, see Organizaci6n Venezolana Pact of Punta Fijo, 38, 4I, 99, 155f, 18o Panebianco, Angelo, 47,94 Parliamentarism, 65, 104, 129, 167-68; and presidentialism, 169-70 Parteienstaat, see Partyarchy Participation, and democratic theory, 6, 39, 45. See also Representation Partido Communista de Venezuela (PCV),77,99 Partido Democr:itico Nacional (PDN), 9,105 Partidocracia, 2, 8, 36. See also Partyarchy Partitocrazia, see Partyarchy Partyarchy: definition of, 2, r8, 1920; and quality of democracy, 3-4, 39-44, 46, 137f, I41, 149, 159-60; in Venezuela, 15, 36; and party discipline, 23, 25-26, 37; and polyarchy, 26, 36, 39; and stability, 37-39, 44, 46, I 55-62; in comparative perspective, 176 -presidential, 3-5, 17, 96, I 52, r6o8z; in Chile, 17, 175; in Costa Rica, I?, 175f; in Argentina, 176; in Peru, 176 Party discipline, 19; in comparative perspective, 22-25, 65; and factions, 44-45; and presidentialism, 128-30. See also under Partyarchy -in Venezuela, 23-26; and AD, 2425, 26,65-67, ?8, 89-91,98,149-52, I55, 194n; and COPE!, 24, I94n Party list voting, see Electoral systems Partyocracy, see Partyarchy Patronage, see Clientelism Paz Galarraga, Jesus Angel, 98, roo, n8, 125£, I 57 PDN, see Partido Democr:itico Nacional Peasants, 9, n, 28, 59, II5, 156 Penalver, Manuel, 32, 91, 93, roz, 104f, 107 Perez Alfonzo, Juan Pablo, 75 Perez, Carles Andres, IO, 24, s6, 71, 93,

239

107, IIO, II4-2I passim, 150ff, 208n; impeachment of, r, 4-5, II, I66-67, 170, r8o-8r; second administration of,r6,68,roz-3,I34,I45,I48,rs864 passim, 182, 194n, zorn, zozn; first administration of, 55, 65, 6869, 77-78, 100-IOI, 105-6, 127, 171, 179; popularity of, ro8, I47; campaigns of, III, 128, 209n Perez Jimenez, Marcos, 9, 54, 65, 98-99, n8, 154 Peronists, see Argentina Peru,r,6,8,zz,zs,3o,r58,r6o,r69, 175f, 178£, 218n Petko££, Teodoro, 93 Philippines, 25, I39, 177 Piftango, Ramon, 7 Pifterua Ordaz, Luis, 55, 6r, 91, 93, rorf, 105, 107, 110, II4, 120f, 127, rso, r8o Polarization, 6, 38 Political culture, 5, 152, I68 Political parties: in Venezuela, z; penetration of civil society by, 2, 15, 19-20, 27-36, 137, I4I, 159£; and partyarchy, 2, 19-20; social democratic, u, 13, 30, 40, 71, 74, 195n; and democratic theory, r8, 47-48, 137; in comparative perspective, 23, 25, 30; in U.S., 23, 30, sr, I99n; in Britain, 23, so, 129, 176; in Italy, 24, so; in Mexico, 25, 30, 65, 125, 216n; in Chile, 25, 30, I??; Christian democratic, 40; catchall, 40, 177; reform of, 90, II3, r6o. See also Coalitions; Executive-legislative relations; Party discipline; Partyarchy; Presidents Polyarchy, see under Democratic theory Populism, 7, 71,74 Portugal, 8 Preference voting, see Electoral system Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State (COPRE), 7-8, r6o, I63-65, I67 Presidentialism, 3-4, 94, ro4; and party discipline, 128-30; and factions, 135, 154; and parliamentarism, 16970; in comparative perspective, 175, 177£. See also under Partyarchy Presidents, I, 2; powers of, 66£, 69-70, 123-24 -and party relations, 64-65; in Vene-

240

Index

zuela, 64-93, 123-30; in Mexico, 65; in Chile, 65. See also Coalitions; Executive-legislative relations Pressman, Jeffrey L., 51 Prieto Figueroa, Luis Beltran, 55, 93, 98, roo, II9f, 126, 148f, 155, 211n Private sector, 7, 27, 42. See also under Accion Democratica Professionals, 28, I 59· See also under Accion Democr